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PERSONAL MEMOIRS

U. S. GRANT.

VOL. II.

1 Jl

~^>

PERSONAL MEMOIRS

U. S. GRANT.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

• c

-y \ w * • " :

NEW YORK:
CHARLES L. WEBSTER & COMPANY.

1886

^> *'(r *

... * /

736621

CornuGHT, 1885,
By ULYSSES S. GRANT.

(All right* reserved.)

• »

• •• ••!

• •

• - •

V ►•

.• : -.-

Press of J. J. Little & Co.,
No«. 10 to so Astor Place, New York.

• • • » *

* • «

• » *

* •

CONTENTS.

VOLU M E I I.

CHAPTER XL.

PAGE

First Meeting with Secretary Stanton— General Rose-
crans— Commanding Military Division of Missis-
sippi— Andrew Johnson's Address — Arrival at
Chattanooga * 17-30

CHAPTER XLI.

Assuming the Command at Chattanooga — Opening a
Line of Supplies — Battle of Wauhatchie — On the
Picket Line 31-43

CHAPTER XLII.

Condition of the Army — Rebuilding the Railroad
— General Burnside's Situation— Orders for Bat-
tle—Plans for the Attack— Hooker's Position
—Sherman's Movements 44-60

CHAPTER XLIII.

Preparations for Battle— Thomas Carries the First
Line of the Enemy — Sherman Carries Missionary
Ridge — Battle of Lookout Mountain — General
Hooker's Fight 61-74

CHAPTER XLIV.

Battle of Chattanooga— A Gallant Charge— Complete
Rout of the Enemy— Pursuit of the Confederates
—General Bragg— Remarks on Chattanooga 75-88

IO CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

CHAPTER XLV.

PACK

The Relief of Knoxville— Headquarters moved to
Nashville— Visiting Knoxville— Cipher Dispatches
— Withholding Orders 89-106

CHAPTER XLVI.

Operations in Mississippi— Longstreet in East Tennes-
see—Commissioned Lieutenant-Genera l— Command-
ing the Armies of the United States— First In-
terview with President Lincoln 107-123

CHAPTER XLVII.

The Military Situation — Plans for the Campaign —
Sheridan assigned to Command of the Cavalry —
Flank Movements— Forrest at Fort Pillow— Gen-
eral Banks's Expedition — Colonel Mosby — An Inci-
dent of the Wilderness Campaign 124-145

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Commencement of the Grand Campaign— General But-
ler's Position— Sheridan's First Raid 146-1 57

CHAPTER XLIX.

Sherman's Campaign in Georgia — Siege of Atlanta —
Death of General McPherson — Attempt to Cap-
ture Andersonville— Capture of Atlanta 158-176

CHAPTER L.

Grand Movement of the Army of the Potomac — Cross-
ing the Rapidan— Entering the Wilderness — Bat-
tle of the Wilderness 177-203

CHAPTER LI.

After the Battle— Telegraph and Signal Service-
Movement by the Left Flank 204-216

CHAPTER LII.

Battle of Spottsylvania— Hancock's Position— Assault
of Warren's and Wright's Corps— Upton Promoted
on the Field— Good News from Butler and Sheri-
dan 21 7-227

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. II

CHAPTER LIII.

FAGS

Hancock's Assault— Losses of the Confederates — Pro-
motions Recommended — Discomfiture of the Enemy

— E well's Attack — Reducing the Artillery 228-242

•

CHAPTER LIV.

Movement by the Left Flank— Battle of North Anna
— An Incident of the March — Moving on Richmond
— South of the Pamunkey — Position of the Na-
tional Army ." 243-263

CHAPTER LV.

Advance on Cold Harbor — An Anecdote of the War —
Battle of Cold Harbor— Correspondence with Lee
— Retrospective 264-278

CHAPTER LVI.

Left Flank Movement across the Chickahominy and
James — General Lee — Visit to Butler—The Move-
ment on Petersburg — The Investment of Peters-
burg 279-299

CHAPTER LVII.

Raid on the Virginia Central Railroad — Raid on the
Weldon Railroad— Early's Movement upon Wash-
ington—Mining the Works before Petersburg— Ex-
plosion of the Mine before Petersburg — Campaign
in the Shenandoah Valley— Capture of the Wel-
don Railroad 300-325

CHAPTER LVIII.

Sheridan's Advance — Visit to Sheridan— Sheridan's
Victory in the Shenandoah— Sheridan's Ride to
Winchester— Close of the Campaign for the Win-
ter 326-343

CHAPTER LIX.

The Campaign in Georgia— Sherman's March to the
Sea — War Anecdotes— The March on Savannah —
Investment of Savannah— Capture of Savannah 344-376

12 CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

CHAPTER LX.

PACK

The Battle of Franklin— The Battle of Nashville. ... 377-386

. CHAPTER LXI.

Expedition against Fort Fisher— Attack on the Fort
— Failure of the Expedition — Second Expedition
against the Fort— Capture of Fort Fisher 387-399

CHAPTER LXII.

Sherman's March North— Sheridan Ordered to Lynch-
burg— Canby Ordered to Move against Mobile —
Movements of Schofield and Thomas— Capture of
Columbia, South Carolina— Sherman in the Caro-
linas 400-419

CHAPTER LXIII.

Arrival of the Peace Commissioners— Lincoln and the
Peace Commissioners — An Anecdote of Lincoln —
The Winter before Petersburg — Sheridan Destroys
the Railroad — Gordon Carries the Picket Line—
Parke Recaptures the Line— The Battle of White
Oak Road 420-43 5

CHAPTER LXIV.

Interview with Sheridan — Grand Movement of the
Army of the Potomac — Sheridan's Advance on Five
Forks — Battle of Five Forks — Parke and Wright
Storm the Enemy's Line — Battles before Peters-
burg 43^-453

CHAPTER LXV.

The Capture of Petersburg— Meeting President Lin-
coln in Petersburg — The Capture of Richmond —
Pursuing the Enemy — Visit to Sheridan and Meade 454-469

CHAPTER LXVI.

Battle of Sailor's Creek— Engagement at Farmville—
Correspondence with General Lee— Sheridan in-
tercepts the Enemy 470-482

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II 1 3

CHAPTER LXVII.

PAGE

Negotiations at Appomattox — Interview with Lee at
McLean's House— The Terms of Surrender— Lee's
Surrender — Interview with Lee after the Surren-
der 483-498

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Morale of the two Armies — Relative Conditions of
the North and South — President Lincoln visits
Richmond — Arrival at Washington — President
Lincoln's Assassination— President Johnson's Pol-
icy 499-512

CHAPTER LXIX.

Sherman and Johnston— Johnston's Surrender to
Sherman— Capture of Mobile— Wilson's Expedition
—Capture of Jefferson Davis— General Thomas's
Qualities— Estimate of General Canby 513-526

CHAPTER LXX.

The End of the War — The March to Washington-
One of Lincoln's Anecdotes— Grand Review at
Washington — Characteristics of Lincoln and
Stanton— Estimate of the different Corps Com-
manders 527-541

CONCLUSION 542-554

APPENDIX 555-632

INDEX 633-647

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

VOLU ME II.

PACK

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Engraved on Steel, by

Wm. E. Marshall Frontispiece

Map of Knoxville, Nashville and Chattanooga 23

Map of Chattanooga and Vicinity $3

Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga 65

Map of the Meridian Campaign 1 1 1

Map of Bermuda Hundred 149

Map of Sherman's Campaign, Chattanooga to Atlanta 161

Map Illustrating Siege of Atlanta 173

Map of Wilderness Campaign 179

Map of the Battle of the Wilderness 189

Map of the Country between the Wilderness and Spott-

sylvania Court House 209

Map of the Battle of Spottsylvania 219

Map of the Battle of North Anna 247

Map of the Operations between the Pamunkey and the

James Rivers 257

Map of Central Virginia 261

Map of the Battle of Cold Harbor 267

Map of Richmond * 309

Map of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign 330

Map of Sherman's March to the Sea 360

Map of the Nashville Campaign South 381

Map of Fort Fisher 389

Map of Sherm an's March North 407

Map of Petersburg and Five Forks 441

Map of the Appomattox Campaign 457

Map of Jetersville and Sailor's Creek 471

Map of High Bridge and Farmville 475

Map of Appomattox Court House 487

Etching of McLean's House at Appomattox where General

Lee's Surrender took Place 488

Fac-simile of the Original Terms of Lee's Surrender as

Written by General Grant 496

Map of the Defences of the City of Mobile 520

Map of the Seat of War— 1861 to 1865 632

PERSONAL MEMOIRS

U. S. GRANT.

VOLUME II.

CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON — GENERAL
ROSECRANS — COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF
MISSISSIPPI — ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS — AR-
RIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

THE reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863,
from Cairo, announcing my arrival at that
point) came on the morning of the 1 7th, directing
me to proceed immediately to the Gait House, Louis-
ville, where I would meet an officer of the War De-
partment with my instructions. I left Cairo within
an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch,
going by rail via Indianapolis. Just as the train I
was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis
a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the

Vol. il— 2

1 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE 0\ S. GRANT.

Secretary of War was coming into the station and
wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time,
though we had held frequent conversations over the
wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.
Occasionally at night he would order the wires be-
tween the War Department and my headquarters to
be connected, and we would hold a conversation for
an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary was
accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I
had never met, though he and my father had been
old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the spe-
cial train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and
accompanied me to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of
what was wanted after I left Vicksburg, except the
suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches that I had
better go to Nashville and superintend the operation
of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we
started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying
that I might take my choice of them. The two were
identical in all but one particular. Both created the
" Military Division of the Mississippi," (giving me
the command) composed of the Departments of the
Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all
the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi
River north of Banks's command in the south-west.
One order left the department commanders as they

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON, I 9

were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and as-
signed Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter.
We reached Louisville after night and, if I remem-
ber rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The Secretary
of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on
that occasion from which he never expected to re-
cover. He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giv-
ing me the military news at the capital and talking
about the disappointment at the results of some
of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after
our arrival all matters of discussion seemed ex-
hausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening
away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and my-
self having relatives living in Louisville. In the
course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dis-
patch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga,
informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans
would retreat, and advising peremptory orders
against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I
urged strongly upon the government the propriety
of a movement against Mobile. General Rosecrans
had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large
and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863,
with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal
to his own at first, considering it was on the defen-
sive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's

20 PER SOX A I. MEMOIRS OF C. S. GRAXT.

army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston,
in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the
siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck suggest-
ing that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By
so doing he would either detain the latter s troops
where they were or lay Chattanooga open to capt-
ure. General Halleck strongly approved the sug-
gestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly
ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter
had constantly failed to comply with the order, and
at last, after having held a council of war, had re-
plied in effect that it was a military maxim " not to
fight two decisive battles at the same time." If true,
the maxim was not applicable in this case. It would
be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought
the same day, but it would not be bad to win them.
I, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of
Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans' front so many
of the enemy that his chances of victory were much
greater than they would be if he waited until the
siege was over, when these troops could be returned.
Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army
that was detaching troops to raise the siege. Fi-
nally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days
afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops
sent from Bragg were free to return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the
* ^eneral-in-chief the movement against Mobile. I

GENERAL ROSECRANS. 21

knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in,
being depleted continually, not only by ordinary
casualties, but also by having to detach troops to
hold its constantly extending line over which to
draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as con-
stantly being strengthened. Mobile was important
to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening
force was guarded by little else than artillery. If
threatened by land and from the water at the same
time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have
to be sent to its defence. Those troops would neces-
sarily come from Bragg. My judgment was over-
ruled, and the troops under my command were dissi-
pated over other parts of the country where it was
thought they could render the most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rose-
crans was in trouble and required assistance. The
emergency was now too immediate to allow us to
give this assistance by making an attack in rear of
Bragg upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary to
reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every
available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg
south of the Tennessee River, and through and be-
yond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and in-
trenched, and made himself strong there, all would
have been right and the mistake of not moving ear-
lier partially compensated. But he pushed on, with

22 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. & GRANT.

his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops
from Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg
took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in
turn, and was able to get his army together at Chicka-
mauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before
the main battle was brought on. The battle was
fought on the 19th and 20th of September, and
Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in
artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed,
wounded and captured. The corps under Major-
General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while
Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned
to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but later,
and with his troops in good order. Bragg followed
and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlook-
ing Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Moun-
tain, west of the town, which Rosecrans had aban-
doned, and with it his control of the river and the
river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National
troops were now strongly intrenched in Chattanooga
Valley, with the Tennessee River behind them and
the enemy occupying commanding heights to the
east and west, with a strong line across the valley
from mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga
Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their
line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above
results, and directed all the forces that could be

24 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. 5. GRANT.

spared from my department to be sent to Rosecrans.
Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was
on his way, and McPherson was moving east with
most of the garrison of Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible
disaster. It would not only have been the loss of a
most important strategic position to us, but it would
have been attended with the loss of all the artillery
still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the
annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or
demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from
Nashville. The railroad between this base and the
army was in possession of the government up to
Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to
the south side of the Tennessee River ; but Bragg,
holding Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of
Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river
and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south
and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga
and Bridgeport. The distance between these two
places is but twenty-six miles by rail ; but owing
to the position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans
had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of
the river and over a mountainous country, increas-
ing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his ani-
mals, nearly ten thousand of which had already

COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI. 25

starved, and not enough were left to draw a single
piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey
the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard
bread for a considerable time, with but few other
supplies except beef driven from Nashville across
the country. The region along the road became so
exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time
they reached Chattanooga they were much in the
condition of the few animals left alive there — "on
the lift" Indeed, the beef was so poor that the sol-
diers were in the habit of saying, with a faint face-
tiousness, that they were living on "half rations of
hard bread and beef dried on the hoof."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the
troops were without sufficient shoes or other cloth-
ing suitable for the advancing season. What they
had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines
was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There
were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank,
where it was abundant. The only way of supplying
fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut
trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable
distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it
down with the current, effecting a landing on the
south side within our lines by the use of paddles or
poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of
the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not prob-

26 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

able that any of the army would have reached the
railroad as an organized body, if followed by the
enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stan-
ton sent for me. Finding that I was out he became
nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he
met, including guests of the house, whether they
knew where I was, and bidding them find me and
send me to him at once. About eleven o'clock I re-
turned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the
house, every person met was a messenger from the
Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to
see me. I hastened to the room of the Secretary and
found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-
gown. Saying that the retreat must be prevented,
he showed me the dispatch. I immediately wrote an
order assuming command of the Military Division of
the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rose-
crans. I then telegraphed to him the order from
Washington assigning Thomas to the command of
the Army of the Cumberland ; and to Thomas that
he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, informing
him at the same time that I would be at the front as
soon as possible. A prompt reply was received
from Thomas, saying, " We will hold the town
till we starve." I appreciated the force of this
dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of
affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if

ANDRE IV JOHNSON S ADDRESS. 2 J

but two courses were open : one to starve, the other
to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started,
with my staff, and proceeded as far as Nashville. At
that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that
point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the
next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew
Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. He de-
livered a speech of welcome. His composure showed
that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was
long, and I was in torture while he was delivering it,
fearing something would be expected from me in
response. I was relieved, however, the people as-
sembled having apparently heard enough. At all
events they commenced a general hand-shaking,
which, although trying where there is so much of
it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who
was then at Knoxville, that important points in his
department ought to be fortified, so that they could
be held with the least number of men ; to Admiral
Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed
Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on
their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his
army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to con-
voy them; and to Thomas, suggesting that large
parties should be put at work on the wagon-road
then in use back to Bridgeport.

28 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for
the front, reaching Stevenson, Alabama, after dark.
Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came
into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he
described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga,
and made some excellent suggestions as to what
should be done. My only wonder was that he had
not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridge-
port, where we stopped for the night. From here
we took horses and made our way by Jasper and
over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga, There had
been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable
from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs
on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since
the time of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be
carried over places where it was not safe to cross
on horseback. The roads were strewn with the
debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thou-
sands of starved mules and horses. At Jasper,
some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there
was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his head-
quarters there. From this point I telegraphed Burn-
side to make every effort to secure five hundred
rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-
arms. We stopped for the night at a little hamlet
some ten or twelve miles farther on. The next day
we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I
went directly to General Thomas's headquarters, and

ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA, 29

remaining there a few days, until I could establish
my own.

During the evening most of the general officers
called in to pay their respects and to talk about the
condition of affairs. They pointed out on the map
the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which
Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If
any of them had approved the move they did not
say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occu-
pying the position of chief engineer of the Army
of the Cumberland. I had known Smith as a
cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of
having met him after my graduation, in 1843, UP
to this time. He explained the situation of the
two armies and the topography of the country so
plainly that I could see it without an inspection.
I found that he had established a saw-mill on the
banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine
found in the neighborhood ; and, by rafting logs
from the north side of the river above, had got
out the lumber and completed pontoons and road-
way plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge
being there already. He was also rapidly getting
out the materials and constructing the boats for
a third bridge. In addition to this he had far
under way a steamer for plying between Chat-
tanooga and Bridgeport whenever we might get
possession of the river. This boat consisted of a

30 rJih'SOXAL MEMOIRS OF L\ S. GKAXT.

scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill,
housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was
propelled .by a second engine taken from some shop
or factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying
General Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have
General Sherman assigned to the command of the
Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field.
The request was at once complied with.

CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA — OPENING
A LINE OF SUPPLIES — BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE —
ON THE PICKET LINE.

THE next day, the 24th, I started out to make
a personal inspection, taking Thomas and
Smith with me, besides most of the members of
my personal staff. We crossed to the north side
of the river, and, moving to the north of detached
spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at Brown's
Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain,
unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses
back from the river and approached the water on
foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on
the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full
view, and we were within easy range. They did
not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our
presence. They must have seen that we were all -
commissioned officers. But, I suppose, they looked
upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of
war, feeding or starving ttj^mselves, and thought it
would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-
defence.

X2 PER SO. Y.I/ MEMOIRS OF C. S. GRAXT.

That night I issued orders for opening the route
to Bridgeport — a cracker Iim\ as the soldiers appro-
priately termed it. They had been so long on short
rations that my first thought was the establishment
of a line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Ten-
nessee, where that river runs nearly due west. It
is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles
in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs.
To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising
from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and
terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more
before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of
the valley is Lookout Mountain, twenty-two hun-
dred feet above-tide water. Just below the town the
Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to
the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level
ground between the mountain and river. The
Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point,
where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular.
East of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chick-
amauga River ; west of Lookout Mountain is Look-
out Creek ; and west of that, Raccoon Mountains.
Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost
perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in
a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the sum-
mit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet
in height. On the gently sloping ground, between

OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES. 37

Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched.
At five o'clock Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, sur-
prised the picket guard, and captured most of it.
By seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was fer-
ried over and in possession of a height commanding
the ferry. This was speedily fortified, while a detail
was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock the
bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Look-
out valley, was fortified and connected with the rest
of the army. The two bridges over the Tennessee
River — a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one
at Brown's Ferry — with the road north of the river,
covered from both the fire and the view of the
enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker
found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the af-
ternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at
Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry,
while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th
corps, stopped three miles south. The pickets of
the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and
soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout
valley to Bridgeport. Between Brown's Ferry and
Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a narrow
gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream
so much as to increase the current beyond the
capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. To get
up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled ; that is,

34 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farm-
house, which is reached by a wagon-road from the
valley east

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on
the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended
along the crest for some distance south, thence across
Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Look-
out Mountain was also fortified and held by the
enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout valley west,
and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending
down the river so as to command the road on the
north bank and render it useless to us. In ad-
dition to this there was an intrenched line in Chat-
tanooga valley extending from the river east of the
town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment
complete. Besides the fortifications on Mission
Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with
occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front
The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley
towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two
armies could converse. At one point they were
separated only by the narrow creek which gives its
name to the valley and town, and from which both
sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter
than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was
strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and
commanded the river below. Practically, the Army

OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES. 35

of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had
stopped with his cavalry north of the river the pass-
ing of a train loaded with ammunition and njedical
supplies. The Union army was short of both, not
having ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into
this new field, ordered parts of the nth and 12th
corps, commanded respectively by Generals How-
ard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole,
from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rose-
crans. It would have been folly to send them
to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left
there. They were consequently left on the railroad,
where supplies could be brought to them. Before
my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at
Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental
in preparing for the move which I was now about
to make, and so clear in his judgment about the
manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to
him that he should have command of the troops
detailed to execute the design, although he was then
acting as a staff officer and was not in command of
troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chat-
tanooga, the following details were made : General
Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to
cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march

36 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF O. S. GRANT.

up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry.
General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps,
Army pf the Cumberland, was ordered to move down
the river on the north side, by a back road, until op-
posite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in
Hooker's rear after he had passed. Four thousand
men were at the same time detailed to act under
General Smith directly from Chattanooga, Eigh-
teen hundred of them, under General Hazen. were
to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of
night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north
base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, then land
on the south side and capture or drive away the
pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the
remainder of the detail, also under cover of night,
by the north bank of the river to Brown's Ferry,
taking with him all the material for laying the
bridge "as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridge-
port and commenced his eastward march. At three
o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen moved
into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eigh-
teen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith
started enough in advance to be near the river
when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of
detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chatta-
nooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the
stream, sheltered from the view from the top of

OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES. 3 7

Lookout It was over this road Smith marched.
At five o'clock Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, sur-
prised the picket guard, and captured most of it.
By seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was fer-
ried over and in possession of a height commanding
the ferry. This was speedily fortified, while a detail
was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock the
bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Look-
out valley, was fortified and connected with the rest
of the army. The two bridges over the Tennessee
River — a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one
at Brown's Ferry — with the road north of the river,
covered from both the fire and the view of the
enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker
found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the af-
ternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at
Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry,
while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th
corps, stopped three miles south. The pickets of
the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and
soon came in and surrendered.

38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

pulled up by ropes from the. shore. But there is
no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridge-
port to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only
eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with
it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low
pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side of
the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side
to the river opposite Chattanooga. There were
several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of
forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed
back to Nashville for a good supply of vegetables
and small rations, which the troops had been so long
deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from
the east a full supply of land transportation. His
animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad
roads without forage, but were in good condition.
In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way
was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steam-
ers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were
receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an
eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. The
men were soon reclothed and also well fed ; an abun-
dance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerful-
ness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks.
Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any
longer as doomed. The weak and languid appear-
ance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at

OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES. 39

once. I do not know what the effect was on the
other side, but assume it must have been correspond-
ingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but
a short time before, and must have perceived our
condition to be about as Bragg described it in his
subsequent report. " These dispositions," he said,
"faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy
evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and
forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his
depot, and the one by which reinforcements must
reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his de-
struction was only a question of time." But the dis-
positions were not " faithfully sustained," and I doubt
not but thousands of men engaged in trying to " sus-
tain " them now rejoice that they were not. There
was no time during the rebellion when I did «ot
think, and often say, that the South was more to be
benefited by its defeat than the North. The lat-
ter had the people, the institutions, and the territory
to make a great and prosperous nation. The former
was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all
civilized people not brought up under it, and one
which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and
enervated th« governing class. With the outside
world at war with this institution, they could not
have extended their territory. The labor of the
country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so.
The whites could not toil without becoming de-

40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

graded, and those who did were denominated " poor
white trash." The system of labor would have
soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor.
The non-slaveholders would have left the country,
and the small slaveholder must have sold out to
his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the slaves
would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being
in sympathy with them, would have risen in their
might and exterminated them. The war was expen-
sive to the South as well as to the North, both in
blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements
which secured to us a line of supplies. He appreci-
ated its importance, and hastened to try to recover
the line from us. His strength on Lookout Moun-
tain was not equal to Hooker's command in the val-
ley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to
march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga,
in order to reach Lookout Valley ; but on the night
of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary
at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the
battle commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from
Brown's Ferry. He had three miles to march to
reach Geary. On his way he was fi«ed upon by
rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road
and from which the road was commanded. Howard
turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured
it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking

BA TTLE OF WA UHA TCHIE. 4 1

many prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold
this height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary. Be-
fore he got up, Geary had been engaged for about
three hours against a vastly superior force. The
night was so dark that the men could not distinguish
one from another except by the light of the
flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and up-
roar, Hookers teamsters became frightened and de-
serted their teams. The mules also became fright-
ened, and breaking loose from their fastenings
stampeded directly towards the enemy. The latter,
no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in
turn. By four o'clock in the morning the battle
had entirely ceased, and our " cracker line " was
never afterward disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith
lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The
enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, cap-
tured. In the night engagement of the 28th-gth
Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never
knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried
over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured
more than a hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over
which to bring our supplies to the army, I made a
personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets
of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga
Creek comes down the centre of the valley to within

42 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. GRAXT.

a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga,
then bears off westerly, then north westerly, and en-
ters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout
Mountain. This creek, from its mouth up to where
it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets,
and the guards of both armies drew their water from
the same stream. As I would be under short-range
fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me,
except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance
to the rear. I rode from our right around to our
left When I came to the camp of the picket guard
of our side, I heard the call, " Turn out the guard
for the commanding general." I replied, "Never
mind the guard." and they were dismissed and went
back to their tents. Just back of these, and about
equally distant from the creek, were the guards of
the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post
called out in like manner, " Turn out the guard
for the commanding general/' and, I believe, added,
" General Grant." Their line in a moment front-
faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute,
which I returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist be-
tween the pickets of the two armies. At one place
there was a tree which had fallen across the stream,
and which was used by the soldiers of both armies
in drawing water for their camps. General Long-
treet's corps was stationed there at the time, and

ON THE PICKET LINE. 43

wore blue of a little different shade from our
uniform. Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I
rode up to him, commenced conversing with him,
and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was
very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he
belonged to General Longstreet's corps. I asked
him a few questions — but not with a view of gaining
any particular information — all of which he answered,
and I rode off.

CHAPTER XLII.

condition of the army rebuilding the rail-
road — general burnside's situation orders

for battle — plans for the attack hook-

er's position — Sherman's movements.

HAVING got the Army of the Cumberland in a
comfortable position, I now began to look after
the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in
about as desperate a condition as the Army of the
Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged.
He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible
base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and
much farther from any railroad we had possession of.
The roads back were over mountains, and all sup-
plies along the line had long since been exhausted.
His animals, too, had been starved, and their car-
casses lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far
back towards Lexington, Ky. East Tennessee still
furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did
not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies,
or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.
Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth
on the nth of October. His instructions required

REBUILDING THE RAILROAD. 45

him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring
up supplies. The distance was about three hundred
and thirty miles through a hostile country. His
entire command could not have maintained the road
if it had been completed. The bridges had all been
destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage
done. A hostile community lived along the road;
guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less
of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West.
Often Sherman's work was destroyed as soon as
completed, and he only a short distance away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the
Tennessee River at Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing
the difficulty Sherman would have to supply himself
from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies
sent from St. Louis on small steamers, to be con-
voyed by the navy, to meet him at Eastport. These
he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work
of repairing roads and to move on with his whole
force to Stevenson, Alabama, without delay. This
order was borne to Sherman by a messenger, who
paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated
over Muscle Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the
27th. In this Sherman was notified that the rebels
were moving a force towards Cleveland, East Tennes-
see, and might be going to Nashville, in which event
his troops were in the best position to beat them there.
Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, aban-

46 PERSOXAL MEMO/US OF If. S. GRANT.

doned the work he was engaged upon and pushed
on at once. On the ist of November he crossed the
Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence,
Alabama, with the head of column, while his troops
were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up
the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with
cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the
single track road from Nashville. All indications
pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying
Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five
thousand more, by the same route. A single track
could not do this. I gave, therefore, an order to
Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command,
of about eight thousand men, at Athens, and subse-
quently directed the latter to arrange his troops
along the railroad from Decatur north towards
Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from
Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country,
cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of
considerable width, and with valleys far below the
road-bed. All the bridges over these had been de-
stroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the
enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off
had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how
to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had
been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur,
and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and

REBUILDING THE RAILROAD. 47

Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads
unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us
two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply
the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther
east, the river supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable
soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He
had no tools to work with except those of the pio-
neers— axes, picks, and spades. With these he was
able to intrench his men and protect them against
surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had
no base of supplies until the road could be completed
back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after
protecting his men was the getting in of food and
forage from the surrounding country. He had his
men and teams bring in all the grain they could
find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef,
and such other food as could be found. Millers
were detailed from the ranks to run the mills alonij
the line of the army. When these were not near
enough to the troops for protection they were taken
down and moved up to the line of the road. Black-
smith shops, with all the iron and steel found in
them, were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths
were detailed and set to work making the tools
necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen
were put to work getting out timber for bridges and
cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should

48 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

be completed. Car-builders were set to work repair-
ing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch
of railroad building, making tools to work with, and
supplying the workmen with food, was all going on
at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or
laborer except what the command itself furnished.
But rails and cars the men could not make without
material, and there was not enough rolling stock to
keep the road we already had worked to its full
capacity. There were no rails except those in use.
To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the
ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to
be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except
ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee
to points on the river and on the Memphis and
Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives
and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis
and Charleston to Nashville. The military manager
of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling
stocl? and, as far as he could, bridge material.
General Dodge had the work assigned him finished
within forty days after receiving his orders. The
number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and
eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide
chasms ; the length of road repaired was one hun-
dred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were
either moving against Burnside or were going to

GENERAL BURN SIDE'S SITUATION. 49

Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland. Their
presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at
Washington, and, on account of our helpless con-
dition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness.
Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do
something for Burnside's relief ; calling attention to
the importance of holding East Tennessee; saying
the President was much concerned for the protec-
tion of the loyal people in that section, etc We
had not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single
piece of artillery, much less a supply train. Rein-
forcements could not help Burnside, because he had
neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them ;
hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had.
There was no relief possible for him except by ex-
pelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about
Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our
front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides
Wheelers cavalry, five thousand more, to go against
Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was
more aggravating because nothing could be done
until Sherman should get up. The authorities at
Washington were now more than ever anxious for
the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with
dispatches faster than ever, urging that something
should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before
Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I

Vol. 11.— 4

50 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the energy's
right, so as to force the return of the troops that
had gone up the valley. I directed him to take
mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could
get them: to move the necessary artillery. But he
persisted in the declaration that he could not move a
single piece of artillery, and could not see how he
could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was
left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches
as best I could ; urge Sherman forward, although
he was making every effort to get forward, and en-
courage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a
short time he should be relieved. All of Burnsides
dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his
ability to hold his position as long as his ammuni-
tion held out. He even suggested the propriety of
abandoning the territory he held south and west of
Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his
base and make it more difficult for him to get
back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin.

Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon ; but
from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon
trains. Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good
one, and it was adopted. On the 14th I tele-
graphed him :

" Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force
will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you
can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing

ORDERS FOR BA TTLE. 5 1

and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time,
I will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a
force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make
the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to
get to his supplies. Sherman would have been here before this
but for high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up
that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans
for his relief, as follows :

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you
can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.
With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last
moment and save the most productive part of your possessions.
Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across
the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as
soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same
time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and
from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can,
carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking
for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further con-
firm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from
Whiteside to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over
a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus be-
ing concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the
whole force is going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has
only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on
the 1 6th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for
making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you
think you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly con-
ceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing

52 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be
left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to
the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and
inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you
ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how
would they be fed after they got even one day east from here ? "

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at
Loudon until the 13th. That being the terminus
of his railroad communications, it is probable he was
directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was
in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the
same time where he could be brought back speedily
to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left
Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and
proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and
reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance
of Sherman's arrival,* except the dates, which could

* Chattanooga, November 18, 1863.
Major-General W. T. Sherman :

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-
General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person,
and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions
will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a
force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with
the South ; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly
located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the
result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to

PLANS FOR THE ATTACK. 53

not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far
away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of
no special advantage to us now. Hooker was in-
structed to send Howards corps to the north side
of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the
north side, and to go into camp opposite Chatta-
nooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker

Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,
if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above
Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or
thereabouts. U. S. GRANT,

Maj.-Genl.

Chattanooga, November 18, 1863.
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas,

Chattanooga :
All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not be-
ing provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the
mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot
be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you
understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him
strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a
crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chicka-
mauga ; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights
on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of
artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to
about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate
against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in
Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left
flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on
the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in

54 *£i3:-x*z je£jfci£s «?/- r. s. cmaxt.

Sw at a tiroe to be afterwards appointed, to ascend
the western slope between die upper and lower pali-
sades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack
the enemy's right nank. form a line across it, extend
our left over South Chkkamauga River so as to

10 rajre wbesever ordered. This division should show
irfrrf as xhrczxahu$T as possible on the most practicable line for
rtarrng an attack cp tae TaUer. Yoor effort then will be to form
a jmctaon wiih ShenzLxn. w*»fcr»g toot adTance well towards the
northern end of MisxeniiT Ridge, and moving as near simul-
taneously with him as possible. The junction once formed' and
the ridge carried, communications will be at once established
between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river.
Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.
Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division
and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old
Army of the Cumberland Howard's corps can then be held in
readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman.
It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north
side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge,
and there held in readiness for such orders as may become neces-
sary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked
rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on
the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be
taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or un-
necessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department
for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying
your infantry and artillery over the creek.

U. S. GRANT,

Major- General.

PLANS FOR THE ATTACK. 55

threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and
thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere
or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga
Station. Hooker was to perform like service on
our right His problem was to get from Lookout
Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expedi-
tious way possible ; cross the latter valley rapidly
to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary
Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north,
with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley
east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear
on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this
also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland,
occupied the centre, and was to assault while the
enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his
two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the
Tennessee at Brown's Ferry and move east of
Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of
Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of
the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the
ridge. There are two streams called Chickamauga
emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chatta-
nooga— North Chickamauga, taking its rise in Ten-
nessee, flowjng south, and emptying into the river
some seven or eight miles east ; while the South
Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows
northward, and empties into the Tennessee some

56 P&RSOXAL MEMOIRS OP V. & GRANT.

three or four miles above the town. There were
now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North
Chickamauga River, their presence there being un-
known to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that
point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down
with the current, thirty men in each boat A few
were to land east of the mouth of the South Chicka-
mauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a
bridge connecting the two banks of the river. The
rest were to land on the south side of the Tennes-
see, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if pro-
longed, and a sufficient number of men to man the
boats were to push to the north side to ferry
over the main body of Sherman's command while
those left on the south side intrenched themselves.
Thomas was to move out from his lines facing the
ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard
against an attack down the valley. Lookout Valley
being of no present value to us, and being untenable
by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,
Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders
brought him to Chattanooga by the established
route north of the Tennessee. He was then to
move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was abso-
lutely essential to us so long as Chattanooga was
besieged. It was the key to our line for supplying

ttooxEx's position. 57

the army. But it was not essential after the enemy
was dispersed from our front, or even after the bat-
tle for this purpose was begun. Hooker's orders,
therefore, were designed to get his force past Look-
out Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to
Missionary Ridge. By crossing the north face of
Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga
Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across
the valley, and would necessarily force its evacua-
tion. Orders were accordingly given to march by
this route. But days before the battle began the
advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan
of action were all considered. The passage over
the mountain was a difficult one to make in the
face of an enemy. It might consume so much time
as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it
at other points where they were more wanted.
After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the
same name, quite a formidable stream to get an
army over, had to be crossed. I was perfectly
willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Moun-
tain until we got through with the troops on Mis-
sionary Ridge. By marching Hooker to the north
side of the river, thence up the stream, and re-
crossing at the town, he could be got in position
at any named time ; when in this new position, he
would have Chattanooga Creek behind him, and
the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestion-

58 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. $. GRANT.

ably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line
across the valley and on Lookout Mountain.
Hookers order was changed accordingly. As ex-
plained elsewhere, the original order had to be re-
verted to, because of a flood in the river rendering
the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the passage
of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted
to bring all the troops together against Missionary
Ridge,

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him,
with Generals Thomas and Smith and other officers,
to the north side of the river, and showed them the
ground over which Sherman had to march, and
pointed out generally what he was expected to do.
I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still
in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.
Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who
did not share in this anxiety. Nothing could be
done for him, however, until Sherman's troops were
up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over,
Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters,
rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelly's Ferry.
Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th,
reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made
the above-described inspection on the morning of
the 1 6th, and started back the same evening to
hurry up his command, fully appreciating the impor-
tance of time.

SttEXMAWS MOVEMENTS. 59

His march was conducted with as much expedi-
tion as the roads and season would admit of. By
the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the
head of column, but many of his troops were far
behind, and one division (Ewings) was at Trenton,
sent that way to create the impression that Lookout
was to be taken from the south. Sherman received
his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could
not be ready for the assault the following morning.
News had been received that the battle had been
commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut
off from telegraphic communications. The Presi-
dent, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck,
were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was
also great, but more endurable, because I was where
I could soon do something to relieve the situation.
It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for
the next day. I then asked him if they could not
be got up to make the assault on the morning of
the 2 2d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date.
But the elements were against us. It rained all
the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that
it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander
under Burnside, was at this time occupying a posi-
tion farther up the valley than Knoxville — about
Maynardville — and was still in telegraphic communi-
cation with the North. A dispatch was received

50 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's
right, so as to force the return of the troops that
had gone up the valley. I directed him to take
mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could
get themr to move the necessary artillery. But he
persisted in the declaration that he could not move a
single piece of artillery, and could not see how he
could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was
left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches
as best I could ; urge Sherman forward, although
he was making every effort to get forward, and en-
courage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a
short time he should be relieved. All of Burnside's
dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his
ability to hold his position as long as his ammuni-
tion held out He even suggested the propriety of
abandoning the territory he held south and west of
Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his
base and make it more difficult for him to get
back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin.

" Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport His whole force
will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you
can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing

ORDERS FOR BA TTLE. 5 1

And again later in the day, indicating my plans
for his relief, as follows :

42 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga,
then bears off westerly, then north westerly, and en-
ters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout
Mountain. This creek, from its mouth up to where
it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets,
and the guards of both armies drew their water from
the same stream. As I would be under short-range
fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me,
except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance
to the rear. I rode from our right around to our
left. When I came to the camp of the picket guard
of our side, I heard the call, " Turn out the guard
for the commanding general." I replied, "Never
mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went
back to their tents. Just back of these, and about
equally distant from the creek, were the guards of
the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post
called out in like manner, " Turn out the guard
for the commanding general," and, I believe, added,
"General Grant." Their line in a moment front-
faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute,
which I returned.

ON THE PICKET LINE. 43

64 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce
their advance guards. But it was not without loss
on both sides. This movement secured to us a
line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied
in the morning, and the one which the enemy had
occupied up to this time. The fortifications were
rapidly turned to face the other way. During the
following night they were made strong. We lost in
this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed
and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite
as heavily, including the prisoners that were capt-
ured. With the exception of the firing of artillery,
kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until
night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first
day

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and
if I could only have been assured that Burnside
could hold out ten days longer I should have rested
more easily. But we were doing the best we could
for him and the cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was
in a position to move, though one division (Oster-
haus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's
Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had
rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that
point in condition for troops to cross ; but I was
determined to move that night even without this
division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accord-

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66 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (7. S. GRANT.

ingly to report to Hooker, if he could not cross by
eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Because
of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were
again changed, but this time only back to those first
given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty
as Chief Engineer of the Military Division. To him
were given the general direction of moving troops
by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the
bridge after they reached their position, and gen-
erally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief
engineer. During the night General Morgan L.
Smith's division was marched to the point where the
pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith
was selected for the delicate duty of manning the
boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south
bank of the river. During this night also General
J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces
of artillery, belonging to the Army of the Cumber-
land, and placed them on the north side of the river
so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in
protecting the approach to the point where the south
end of the bridge was to rest He had to use Sher-
man's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas hav-
ing none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th,
Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chicka-
mauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each

SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE. 6 J

loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The
boats with their precious freight dropped down
quietly with the current to avoid attracting the at-
tention of any one who could convey information to
the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South
Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the
troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the
picket guard known to be at that point. The guard
were surprised, and twenty of their number captured.
The remainder of the troops effected a landing at
the point where the bridge was to start, with equally
good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's
command from the north side of the Tennessee was
at once commenced, using the pontoons for the pur-
pose. A steamer was also brought up from the town
to assist. The rest of M. L. Smith s division came
first, then the division of John E. Smith. The
troops as they landed were put to work intrenching
their position. By daylight the two entire divisions
were over, and well covered by the works they had
built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross
the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. The
ferrying over the infantry was continued with the
steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, how-
ever, as fast as they were wanted to put in their
place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge
was completed, as well as one over the South Chick-

68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (/. S. GRANT.

amauga connecting the troops left on that side with
their comrades below, and all the infantry and artil-
lery were on the south bank of the Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on
Missionary Ridge. By one o'clock he started with
M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course
of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the
right and a little to the rear ; and Ewing still farther
to the right and also a little to the rear of J. E.
Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the
right if an enemy should come from that direction.
A good skirmish line preceded each of these col-
umns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached ; the
skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by
their supports. By half-past three Sherman was in
possession of the height without having sustained
much loss. A brigade from each division was now
brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of
the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be
aware of this movement until the top of the hill was
gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the
day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Moun-
tain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured
from the view of persons in the valley. But now
the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and
made several attempts with their skirmishers to
drive them away, but without avail. Later in the
day a more determined attack was made, but this,

SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE. 69

too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he
had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon
after the bridge was completed, and by half-past
three the whole of it was over both bridges and on
its way to strike the enemy's communications at
Chickamauga Station. All of Sherman's command
was now south of the Tennessee. During the after-
noon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded
and carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was ex-
pected of him on the 24th, there was nothing
for him to do this day except to strengthen his
position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of
Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and was
directed to report to him. With two or three regi-
ments of his command he moved in the morning
along the banks of the Tennessee, and reached the
point where the bridge was being laid. He went out
on the bridge as far as it was completed from the
south end, and saw Sherman superintending the
work from the north side and moving himself south
as fast as an additional boat was put in and the
roadway put upon it. Howard reported to his new
chief across the chasm between them, which was
now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east
of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west.

70 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF L\ .9. GRANT.

He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the 15th
corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps,
Army of the Potomac ; and Cruft's, 14th corps,
Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on the right
at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus
near Brown's Ferry. These troops were all west
of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank
of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and
three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce
them if attacked. These brigades occupied the
summit of the mountain. General Carter L. Ste-
venson was in command of the whole. Why any
troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard,
were kept on the mountain-top, I do not see. A
hundred men could have held the summit — which is
a palisade for more than thirty feet down — against
the assault of any number of men from the position
Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting
Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered,
and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance
with troops, even in the absence of an opposing
force. Farther up, the ground becomes more even
and level, and was in cultivation. On the east side
the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon
road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of Chat-
tanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved

BATTLE OF LOOKOUT AfOUNTAIN. Jl

Gearys division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's,
up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The re-
mainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge
over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad.
Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross
it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade after
a slight skirmish with thfe pickets guarding it. This
attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement
farther up was not observed. A heavy mist ob-
scured him from the view of the troops on the top
of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost un-
observed, and captured the picket of over forty men
on guard near by. He then commenced ascending
the mountain directly in his front. By this time the
enemy was seen coming down from their camps on
the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits
to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven
o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was
up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was
driven away with considerable loss in killed and
captured.

While the operations at the bridge were pro-
gressing, Geary was pushing up the hill over great
obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his
front, and in face of the guns on top of the moun-
tain. The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear
menaced, gave way, and were followed by Cruft
and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of

72 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.

Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill,
driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary had
gained the open ground on the north slope of the
mountain, with his right close up to the base of the
upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications
in his front. The rest of the command coming up,
a line was formed from the base of the upper pali-
sade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob.
Hooker's advance now made our line a continu-
ous one. It was in full view, extending from the
Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up
Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge,
over the top of the north end of the ridge to
Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge
a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth
of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of
Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper pali-
sade. The day was hazy, so that Hooker's oper-
ations were not visible to us except at moments
when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his
artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The
enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was
soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon
the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Look-
out all day as to hide whatever was going on from
the view of those below, settled down and made it
so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for

GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT. 73

the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported 'his
position as impregnable. By a little after five direct
communication was established, and a brigade of
troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him.
These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek and
met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and
by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to
Hooker and was assigned to his left I now tele-
graphed to Washington : " The fight to-day pro-
gressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Mis-
sionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel,
and his left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from
Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain,
and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up.
Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, be-
sides which a small number have fallen into our
hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the
President replied : " Your dispatches as to fighting
on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done.
Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And
Halleck also telegraphed : " I congratulate you on
the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burn-
side is hard pushed, and that any further delay may
prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power
to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the
Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chicka-
mauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited

74 PER SOX A L MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRAN7

in fhe river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of
citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, hav-
ing crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left
from the upper bridge over the plain to the north
base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a
late hour in the night, but it was not connected with
an assault at any point.

CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA A GALLANT CHARGE

COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY PURSUIT OF

THE CONFEDERATES — GENERAL BRAGG — REMARKS
ON CHATTANOOGA.

AT twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet,
I began to give orders for the next day,
and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burn-
side. Sherman was directed to attack at daylight.
Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour,
and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he
still remained ; if he had gone, then to move di-
rectly to Rossville and operate against the left and
rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas
was not to move until Hooker had reached Mission-
ary Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob,
he would not move without further orders from me.
The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright,
and the whole field was in full view from the top of
Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's
headquarters were in full view, and officers — pre-
sumably staff officers — could be seen coming and
going constantly.

76 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried
on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main
ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over
which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and
near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes
between the two hills. The problem now was to get
to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on
the point ; and back farther, where the ground was
still higher, was a second fortification commanding
the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light
enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in
motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained.
Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Mis-
sionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, sup-
ported by two brigades of John E. Smith's division ;
and Corse with his brigade was between the two,
moving directly towards the hill to be captured.
The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east
side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing,
but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the
west side. The troops advanced rapidly and car-
ried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan
L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy
off from the railroad bridge and the means of
bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga
Station, where the main depot was located. The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive
our troops from the position we had gained, but

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. fj

• without success. The contest lasted for two hours.
Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly
wounded in this assault. Sherman now threat-
ened both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made
it necessary for him to weaken other points of
his line to strengthen his right. From the posi-
tion I occupied I could see column after column
of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every
Confederate gun that could be brought to bear
upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him.
J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the west
side of the ridge to the support of Corse's com-
mand, over open ground and in the face of a heavy
fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the
very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time,
but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his
right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed
by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's
troops into a wood, where they were speedily re-
formed, when they charged and drove the attacking
party back to his intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance
of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I di-
rected Thomas to send a division to reinforce him.
Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right
of Orchard Knob. It had to march a considerable
distance directly under the eyes of the enemy to
reach its position. Bragg at once commenced mass-

78 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ing in the same direction. This was what I wanted. •
But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I
had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the
ridge in the .neighborhood of Rossville and compel-
ling Bragg to mass in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain dur-
ing the night, as I expected he would. In crossing
the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga
Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads
behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with
no obstructions in his front but distance and the de-
struction above named. He was detained four hours
crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the
immediate advantage I expected from his forces.
His reaching Braggs flank and extending across it
was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the
ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so criti-
cal that the assault for his relief could not be de-
layed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying
under arms from early morning, ready to move the
instant the signal was given. I now directed
Thomas to order the charge at once.* I watched
eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at
last that there was no indication of any charge
being made. The centre of the line which was

* In this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the
first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge.

A GALLANT CHARGE. 79

to make the charge was near where Thomas and
I stood, but concealed from view by an interven-
ing forest Turning to Thomas to inquire what
caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J.
Wood, one of the division commanders who was to
make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke
to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge
as ordered an hour before. He replied very
promptly that this was the first he had heard of it,
but that he had been ready all day to move at a
moments notice. I told him to make the charge
at once He was off in a moment, and in an incred-
ibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and
Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before
them towards Missionary Ridge. The Confederates
were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in
front of us, and had a second line half-way down
and another at the base. Our men drove the
troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so
rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel
and Union troops went over the first line of works
almost at the same time. Many rebels were capt-
ured and sent to the rear under the fire of their
own friends higher up the hill. Those that were
not captured retreated, and were pursued. The
retreating hordes being between friends and pur-
suers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid kill-
ing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the

80 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest
position. Without awaiting further orders or stop-
ping to reform, on our troops went to the second
line of works ; over that and on for the crest — thus
effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for
the battle and of the 24th * for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest.
The fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon
and musket balls filled the air : but the damage
done was in small proportion to the ammunition ex-
pended. The pursuit continued until the crest was
reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over
the Confederate barriers at different points in front

* Chattanooga. November 24, 1863.
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas,

Chattanooga :
General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel
with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel
and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have
instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be
in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits
and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the
presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's position on the
mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is
found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would
be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he
can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY. 8 1

of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The re-
treat of the enemy along most of his line was pre-
cipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and his
officers lost all control over their men. Many were
captured, and thousands threw away their arms in
their flight

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the
Chickamauga River at a point above where the
enemy crossed. He met some resistance from
troops occupying a second hill in rear of Mis-
sionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the
main body and of the artillery and trains. It was
now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on
that account pushed his men forward up this second
hill slowly and without attracting the attention of
the men placed to defend it, while he detached to
the right and left to surround the position. The
enemy discovered the movement before these dis-
positions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,
leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners
in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement
the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are
indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners,
artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his
prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have
been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going
forward, General Thomas with staff, General Gordon

Vol. il— 6

82 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Granger, commander of the corps making the as-
sault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob,
from which the entire field could be observed. The
moment the troops were seen going over the last
line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his
command, and mounting my horse I rode to the
front General Thomas left about the same time.
Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pur-
suit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who
commanded the division to the left of Sheridan,
accompanied his men on horseback in the charge,
but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit To the
left, in Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed
against Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn
and the contest lasted longer. I ordered Granger
to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he
was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of
musketry in the direction the enemy had taken,
that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy
had got well out of the way. The enemy con-
fronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their
left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was
not aware of the extent of our success until after
nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at day-
light in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy
had left his front he directed his reserves, Davis's
division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push

PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 83

over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chicka-
mauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Sta-
tion. He ordered Howard to move up the stream
some two miles to where there was an old bridge,
repair it during the night, and follow Davis at four
o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was or-
dered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was
still held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies
of men of both armies. The rest of Sherman's com-
mand was directed to follow Howard at daylight in
the morning to get on to the railroad towards Grays-

ville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga
Creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point
He got his troops over, with the exception of the
artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three
o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the
bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with
the remainder of his command. At Rossville he
came upon the flank of a division of the enemy,
which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge.
This threw them on Palmer. They could make but
little resistance in the position they were caught in,
and as many of them as could do so escaped.
Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position
during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, ex-
tending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his left,
on the road to Graysville.

84 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that
Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief
would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out ; to
Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and
informed him that forces would be sent up the valley
to relieve Burnside,

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had
taken measures for the relief of Burnside the mo-
ment the way should be clear. Thomas was directed
to have the little steamer that had been built at
Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and
ammunition. Granger's corps was to move by the
south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of
the Holston, and up that to Knoxville, accompanied
by the boat. In addition to the supplies transported
by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of am-
munition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days'
rations in haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the
Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Ten-
nessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland par-
ticipated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the
heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee
River so mingled the troops that the organizations
were not kept together, under their respective com-
manders, during the battle. Hooker, on the right,
had Geary's division of the 12th corps, Army of
the Potomac ; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,

PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 85

Army of the Tennessee ; and Cruft's division of the
Army of the Cumberland Sherman had three divis-
ions of his own army, Howard's corps from the
Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's divi-
sion of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no
jealousy — hardly rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether
officers or men took any note at the time of the fact
of this intermingling of commands. All saw a de-
fiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted
that every move was intended to dislodge him, and
it made no difference where the troops came from
so that the end was accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great
odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of \\
position, and was accomplished more easily than was j \
expected by reason of Braggs making several grave * \
mistakes : first, in sending away his ablest corps • i
commander with over twenty thousand troops ; sec- •
ond, in sending away a division of troops on the eve
of battle ; third, in placing so much of a force on the
plain in front of his impregnable position.

"It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited
Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my
reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and believed
that he had come out to reconcile a serious differ-
ence between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding
this difficult to do, planned the campaign against
Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general.

86 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the
war, the latter very well. We had been three years
at West Point together, and, after my graduation,
for a time in the same regiment Then we served
together in the Mexican War. I had known Bragg
in Mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently.
I could well understand how there might be an
irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-in-
formed man, professionally and otherwise. He was
also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of
an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious.
A man of the highest moral character and the most
correct habits, yet in the old army he was in fre-
quent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on
the lookout to catch his commanding officer infring-
ing his prerogatives ; as a post commander he was
equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even
of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very
characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when
stationed at a post of several companies commanded
by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of
the companies and at the same time acting as post
quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieu-
tenant at the time, but his captain was detached on
other duty. As commander of the company he
made a requisition upon the quartermaster — himself

GENERAL BRAGG. 87

— for something he wanted. As quartermaster he
declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the
back of it his reasons for so doing. As company
commander he responded to this, urging that his
requisition called for nothing but what he was en-
titled to, and that it was the duty of the quarter-
master to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted
that he was right In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the command-
ing officer of the post. The latter, when he saw
the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed : " My
God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every
officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling
with yourself ! "

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He
was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier,
subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his
subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which
he had the courage to maintain. He was never on
the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon
as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knox-
ville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis
had an exalted opinion of his own military genius,
and thought he saw a chance of ' killing two birds
with one stone." On several occasions during the
war he came to the relief of the Union army by
means of his superior military genius.

88 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

I speak advisedly when I say Mr. Davis prided
himself on his military capacity. He says so him-
self, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his
nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of
his generals have said so in their writings since the
downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the
battle of Chattanooga were as fought Sherman was
to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did ; Hooker
to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as
he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get
across the south end of the ridge near Rossville.
When Hooker had secured that position the Army
of the Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Be-
fore Sherman arrived, however, the order was so
changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee
River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy
rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's Ferry
could not be maintained in a condition to be used in
crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's
orders were changed by telegraph back to what they
were originally.

Note. — From this point on this volume was written (with the exception
of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written)
by General Grant after his great illness in April, and the present arrange-
ment of the subject-matter was made by him between the ioth and 18th of
July, 1885.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE — HEADQUARTERS MOVED
TO NASHVILLE — VISITING KNOXVILLE — CIPHER
DISPATCHES — WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

CHATTANOOGA now being secure to the Na-
tional troops beyond any doubt, I immediately
turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the
situation of which the President, in particular, was
very anxious. Prior to the battles, I had made prep-
arations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside
at the very earliest moment after securing Chatta-
nooga. We had there two little steamers which
had been built and fitted up from the remains of
old boats and put in condition to run. General
Thomas was directed to have one of these boats
loaded with rations and ammunition and move up
the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston,
keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.
General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to
make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment
Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no cir-
cumstances were the troops to return to their old

90 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

camps. With the provisions carried, and the little
that could be got in the country, it was supposed
he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away,
after which event East Tennessee would furnish
abundance of food for Burnside's army and his own
also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again
on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the
road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to
start Granger until he received further orders from
me ; advising him that I was going to the front to
more fully see the situation. I was not right sure
but that Bragg*s troops might be over their stam-
pede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case
Bragg might think it well to take the road back
to Cleveland, move thence towards Knoxville, and,
uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon
Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the
2 7th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest. The
enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and
small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether,
seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with
the exception of Cleburne's division, which was act-
ing as rear-guard to cover the retreat

When Hooker moved from Rossyille toward
Ringgold Palmer's division took the road to Grays-
ville, and Sherman moved by the w&y of Chicka-

THE RELIEF OF KN0XV1LLE. 9 1

mauga Station toward the same point. As soon as
I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff offi-
cer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the
condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to
start Granger at once. Feeling now that the troops
were already on the march for the relief of Burn-
side I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at
Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return
of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated
between East Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's
Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from Chat-
tanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker
had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His
men were attacking Cleburne's division, which had
taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as
to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through
a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point.
Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the
creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great
many times in the course of the first mile. This
attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men un-
necessarily. Hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of
artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were
left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour
and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of
the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all

92 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

other property that could be of use to the enemy,
but not to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached
Graysville with his troops, where he found Palmer
had preceded him. Palmer had picked up many pris-
oners and much abandoned property on the route.
I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sher-
man, remained there over night and did not return
to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th.
I then found that Thomas had not yet started
Granger, thus having lost a full day which I deemed
of so much importance in determining the fate of
Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that
on the 23d of the month Burnside had telegraphed
that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days
and during that time he could hold out against
Longstreet, but if not relieved within the time in-
dicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt
to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an
impossibility. He was already very low in ammu-
nition, and with an army pursuing he would not
have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started
but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for
himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent
word to General Sherman of the situation and di-
rected him to march to the relief of Knoxville. I
also gave him the problem that we had to solv<

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 93

that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies
left, and that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his re-
turn from Graysville, having sent out detachments
on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleve-
land and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road,
and these troops had not yet returned to camp. I
was very loath to send Sherman, because his men
needed rest after their long march from Memphis
and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had be-
come satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if
his relief depended upon General Granger's move-
ments.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of
the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, on the night
of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked ra-
tions in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in
their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle
while out, they took with them neither overcoats
nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and
at night they must have suffered more or less. The
two days' rations had already lasted them five days ;
and they were now to go through a country which
had been run over so much by Confederate troops
that there was but little probability of finding much
food. They did, however, succeed in capturing some
flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some
of the mills, which the men made up into bread ;

94 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

and in this and other ways they eked out an exist-
ence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get
news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus
induce him to hold out a little longer if it became
necessary, that I determined to send a message to
him. I therefore sent a member of my staff, Col-
onel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could,
report to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all
the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana
was at Chattanooga during the battle, and had been
there even before I assumed command. Mr. Dana
volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did
accompany him. I put the information of what was
being done for the relief of Knoxville into writing,
and directed that in some way or other it must be
secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall
into the hands of General Longstreet. They made
the trip safely ; General Longstreet did learn of
Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there,
and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a
longer time if it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Hol-
ston River to catch scows and flats as they floated
down. On these, by previous arrangements with the
loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour
and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and
were thus secured for the use of the Union troops.

THE RELIEF OF KNOX VILLE. 95

They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east
side, which was not covered by the enemy ; so that
when relief arrived Burnside had more provisions
on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all
these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529
wounded and 330 missing. We captured 6,142
prisoners — about 50 per cent more than the enemy
reported for their total loss — 40 pieces of artil-
lery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over
7,000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in
arms was probably much greater than here reported,
because we picked up a great many that were found
abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about
60,000 men. Bragg had about half this number, but
his position was supposed to be impregnable. It
was his own fault that he did not have more men
present. He had sent Longstreet away with his
corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty
thousand men, thus reducing his own force more
than one-third and depriving himself of the presence
of the ablest general of his command. He did this,
too, after our troops had opened a line of communi-
cation by way of Brown s and Kelly's ferries with
Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies
of every kind ; and also when he knew reinforce-
ments were coming to me. Knoxville was of no

96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.

earthly use to him while Chattanooga was in our
hands. If he should capture Chattanooga, Knox-
ville with its garrison would have fallen into his
hands without a struggle. - 1 have never been able
to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when
Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the
Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to re-
inforce Longstreet. He also started another di-
vision a day later, but our attack having commenced
before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back.
It had got so far, however, that it could not return
to Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It
is possible this latter blunder may have been made
by Bragg having become confused as to what was
going on on our side. Sherman had, as already
stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee
River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of Braggs
troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before
the attack. They then disappeared behind foot
hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on
Missionary Ridge until they met their assault Bragg
knew it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and,
they being so long out of view, may have supposed
that they had gone up the north bank of the Ten-
nessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that
Longstreet was therefore in danger. But the first
great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be ac-

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 97

counted for in any way I know of. If he had capt-
ured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have
fallen without a struggle. It would have been a
victory for us to have got our army away from
Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater
victory to drive away the besieging army ; a still
greater one to defeat that army in his chosen
ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was
the heavier, as we were the attacking party. The
enemy reported his loss in killed at 361 : but as he
reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over
6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have
been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but
little reliance can be placed on this report. There
was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the
part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them,
and a disposition to get away if they could. Then,
too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year
with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the
West, there was much the same feeling in the South
at this time that there had been in the North the
fall and winter before. If the same license had
been allowed the people and press in the South that
was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would prob-
ably have been the last battle fought for the pres-
ervation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these bat-

Vol. 11. — 7

98 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ties had been such that I thought him eminently
entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had
previously been named by the President for promo-
tion to the grade of major-general, but that the
Senate had rejected the nomination. I was not
aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore
strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy.
My recommendation was heeded and the appoint-
ment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of
course, informed the authorities at Washington —
the President and Secretary of War — of the fact,
which caused great rejoicing there. The President
especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been re-
lieved * without further bloodshed. The safety of
Burnside s army and the loyal people of East Ten-
nessee had been the subject of much anxiety to
the President for several months, during which time

* Washington, D. C,
December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

Maj.-General U. S. Grant:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chatta-
nooga is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your
command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the
skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so
great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless
you all.

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE, 99

he was doing all he could to relieve the situation ;
sending a new commander * with a few thousand
troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and tele-
graphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember
Burnside," " do something for Burnside," and other
appeals of like tenor. He saw no escape for East
Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga,
Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out
of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpow-
ered : and his anxiety was still intense until he heard
that Longstreet had been driven from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry
Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then
stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the
State. The latter did not do so, however, but
stopped only a short distance farther on and sub-
sisted his army for the entire winter off East Ten-
nessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman
made disposition of his troops along the Tennes-
see River in accordance with instructions. I left
Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about
the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to
Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which
to communicate with my entire military division,
and also with the authorities at Washington. While
remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my

* General John G. Foster.

IOO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me
out of communication with both my command and
Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention
during the winter,* so I set myself to the task of hav-
ing troops in positions from which they could move
to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies
so as to be ready to claim a due share of the ene-
my's attention upon the appearance of the first good
weather in the spring. I expected to retain the
command I then had, and prepared myself for the
campaign against Atlanta. I also had great hopes
of having a campaign made against Mobile from the
Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy that
place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from
the West by way of the road running through Au-
gusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. I was pre-
paring to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it
was my expectation to push through to Mobile if

* During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, 111., sub-
scribed for and had a diamond-hilted sword made for General
Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The
scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running
nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names
of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at
Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and
Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the
government at Washington.

VISITING KftpXVJLLE. IOI

that city was in our possession : if not, to Savan-
nah ; and in this manner to get possession of the
only east and west railroad that would then be -.left
to the enemy. But the spring campaign ag^hjst
Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies
over Cumberland Gap until their animals had nearly
all starved. I now determined to go myself to see
if there was any possible chance of using that route
in the spring, and if not to abandon it. Accordingly
I left Nashville in the latter part of December by
rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took
one of the little steamers previously spoken of as
having been built there, and, putting my horses
aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch with
the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had
been repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Straw-
berry Plains. I went by rail therefore to Knoxville,
where I remained for several days. General John G.
Foster was then commanding the Department of the
Ohio. It was an intensely cold winter, the thermom-
eter being down as low as zero every morning for
more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on
my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Ken-
tucky, the first point where I could reach rail to
carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it,
was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead

102 PERSONAL AfJ&jfOtftS OF U. S. GRANT.

, • • • *

animals, much'-ps J had found it on my first trip to
Chattaftooga\cxver Waldron's Ridge. The road had

been:^uJL'-up to as great a depth as clay could be

* * *#

; Ky;'Tfiules and wagons, and in that condition frozen ;
V#v :Vo that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains
to Lexington over these holps and knobs in the
road was a very cheerless one, and very disagree-
able.

I found a great many people at home along that
route, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost
universally, intensely loyal. They would collect in
little places where we would stop of evenings, to see
me, generally hearing of my approach before we
arrived. The people naturally expected to see the
commanding general the oldest person in the party.
I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical
director was gray-haired and probably twelve or
more years my senior. The crowds would generally
swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity
of quietly dismounting and getting into the house.
It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing
remarks from one spectator to another about their
general. Those remarks were apt to be more com-
plimentary to the cause than to the appearance of
the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up,
and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were
all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nash-
ville by the 13th of January, 1864.

CIPHER DISPATCHES. IO3

When I started on this trip it was necessary for
me to have some person along who could turn dis-
patches into cipher, and who could also read the
cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive
daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the
War Department **■£. that time, Mr. Stanton had
taken entire control of the matter of regulating the
telegraph and determining how it should be used,
and of saying who, and who alone, should have the
ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as
well as the ciphers used, were practically independent
of the commanders whom they were serving imme-
diately under, and had to report to the War Depart-
ment through General Stager all the dispatches
which they received or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator
back at Nashville, because that was the point at
which all dispatches to me would come, to be for-
warded from there. As I have said, it was necessary
for me also to have an operator during this inspec-
tion who had possession of this cipher to enable me
to telegraph to my division and to the War De-
partment without my dispatches being read by all
the operators along the line of wires over which they
were transmitted. Accordingly I ordered the cipher
operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.
Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had
selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly

104 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.

could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at
my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the
key to Captain Comstock as directed by me, stating
that his orders from the War Department were not
to give it to anybody — the commanding general or
any one else. I told him I would see whether he
would or not. He said that if he did he would
be punished. I told him if he did not he most cer-
tainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that pun-
ishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my
order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was
not protected altogether from the consequences of
his disobedience to his orders) from the War Depart-
ment, he yielded. When I returned from Knoxville
I found quite a commotion. The operator had been
reprimanded very severely and ordered to be re-
lieved. I informed the Secretary of War, or his
assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager,
that the man could not be relieved, for he had only
obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for
me to have the cipher, and the man would most cer-
tainly have been punished if he had not delivered it ;
that they would have to punish me if they punished
anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a dis-
agreeable difference between the Secretary of War
and myself that occurred until the war was over,

WITHHOLDING ORDERS. IO5

when we had another little spat. Owing to his nat-
ural disposition to assume all power and control in
all matters that he had anything whatever to do
with, he boldly took command of the armies, and,
while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited
any order from me going out of the adjutant-gen-
eral's office until he had approved it. This was
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any
orders that came from me to be issued from the
adjutant-general's office until he had examined
them and given his approval. He never disturbed
himself, either, in examining my orders until it was
entirely convenient for him ; so that orders which I
had prepared would often lie there three or four
days before he would sanction them. I remon-
strated against this in writing, and the Secretary
apologetically restored me to my rightful position
of General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon
lapsed again and took control much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had pro-
posed to Burnside that he should go with him to
drive Longstreet out of Tennessee ; but Burnside
assured him that with the troops which had been
brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he
would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet
without availing himself of this offer. As before
stated Sherman's command had left their camps
north of the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two

■■%*■?'

1 06

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or
blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to
return to their camps by the end of that time. The
weather was now cold and they were suffering, but
still they were ready to make the further sacrifice,.
• had it been required, for the good of the cause
which had brought them into service. Sherman,
having accomplished the object for which he was
sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the
Tennessee River.

CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI LONGSTREET IN EAST TEN-
NESSEE COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT - GENERAL —

COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

SOON after his return from Knoxville I ordered
Sherman to distribute his forces from Stevenson
* to Decatur and thence north to Nashville ; Sherman
suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mis-
sissippi, to the limits of his own department and
where most of his army still remained, for the pur-
pose of clearing out what Confederates might still
be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River
to impede its navigation by our boats. He expected
also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the
same thing on the west shore. Of course I ap-
proved heartily.

About the ioth of January Sherman was back in
Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got to-
gether his Memphis men, or ordered them collected
and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg
and out to where McPherson was in command, and

108 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

had him organize his surplus troops so as to give
him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was
occupying Meridian with his headquarters, and had
two divisions of infantry with a considerable force
of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined,
therefore, to move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General
Sooy Smith to Sherman's department, and they had
mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.
Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered
him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a
force of about 7,000 with which to go against
Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from
Memphis. Smith was ordered to move about the
1 st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the
arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out
scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the
enemy and to bring back all the information they
could gather. When these scouts returned it was
through them that he got the information of Gen-
eral Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength
and disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, com-
posed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under
so able a leader were very effective. Smith's com-
mand was nearly double that of Forrest, but not

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI. IO9

equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful ex-
perience such as Forrest's men had had. The fact
is, troops who have fought a few battles and won,
and followed up their victories, improve upon what
they were before to an extent that can hardly be
counted by percentage. The difference in result is
often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat.
This same difference, too, is often due to the way
troops are officered, and for the particular kind of
warfare which Forrest had carried on neither army
could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and
moved out on his expedition, meeting with no
opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black,
and with no great deal of opposition after that until
he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place
he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th,
and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved
in two columns to enable him to get a good supply
of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here, how-
ever, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep
his army close together. He had no serious en-
gagement; but he met some of the enemy who de-
stroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Missis-
sippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near
being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month,

HO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (7. S. GRANT.

the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, Ala-
bama. He spent several days in Meridian in thor-
oughly destroying the railroad to the north and
south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy
Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest before this
time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory be-
cause of a superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing
of him, however, he started on his return trip to
Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while
waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound
in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the ist as
expected, had not left until the nth. Smith did
meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in For-
rest's favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing
a co-operative movement with him against Shreve-
port, subject to my approval. I disapproved of
Sherman's going himself, because I had other im-
portant work for him to do, but consented that he
might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though
their time to remain absent must be limited. We
must have them for the spring campaign. The trans-
Mississippi movement proved abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the
Vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there con-
tracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown
so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I
obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he

112 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting
to find him alive on my arrival. While I was per-
mitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my
command to any one else, but was directed to keep
the headquarters with me and to communicate reg-
ularly with all parts of my division and with Wash-
ington, just as though I had remained at Nash-
ville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga,
having gone there again to make preparations to
have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of
Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in
Mississippi. I directed Thomas, and Logan who
was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threaten-
ing movement to the south against J. E. Johnston,
who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of
making him keep as many troops as possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that John-
ston had already sent two divisions in the direction of
Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, and
two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee.
Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I di-
rected Thomas to send at least ten thousand men,
besides Stanley's division which was already to the
east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who
was now in command in East Tennessee, of this move-
ment of troops into his department and also of the
reinforcements Longstreet had received. My object

LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE. 1 13

was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a
part of the preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in
command of the Department of the Ohio after Burn-
side until Schofield relieved him,* advised me that he
thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet
just where he was ; that he was perfectly quiet in
East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there,
his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to
any place where it could effect the most for their
cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopt-
ing that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit
of Longstreet.

On the 1 2th of February I ordered Thomas to
take Dalton and hold it, if possible ; and I directed
him to move without delay. Finding that he had
not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start,
telling him how important it was, that the object of
the movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who
was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then

* Washington, D. C,

December 29, 1863.

Ma j. -General U. S. Grant :

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be
granted, who would you like as his successor ? It is possible that
Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK,
[Official) General-in-Chief.

Vol. ti. — 8

114 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

again on the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked
him if he could not start the next day. He finally
got off on the 2 2d or 23d. The enemy fell back
from his front without a battle, but took a new
position quite as strong and farther to the rear.
Thomas reported that he could not go any farther,
because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly
starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were
repaired. He soon fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason.
He could not carry supplies with him, and Long-
street was between him and the supplies still left
in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would
be moving towards his supplies, while our forces,
following, would be receding from theirs. On the
2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's suc-
cess, which eased my mind very much. The next
day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general
of the army had passed through Congress and be-
came a law on the 26th of February. My nomi-
nation had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of
March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was
ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive my
commission, and started the day following that.
The commission was handed to me on the 9th. It
was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by
President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my

COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, I 15

eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and
a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read
from a paper — stating, however, as a preliminary, and
prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that
up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in
public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I
might prepare a few lines of reply. The President
said :

" General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what
you have done, and its reliance upon you for what
remains to be done in the existing great struggle,
are now presented, with this commission constituting
you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United
States. With this high honor, devolves upon you,
also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country
herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you.
I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak
for the nation, goes my own hearty personal con-
currence."

To this I replied : (<Mr, President, I accept the
commission, with gratitude for the high honor con-
ferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have
fought in so many fields for our common country, it
will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your
expectations. I feel the full weight of the respon-
sibilities now devolving on me ; and I know that if
they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above

I 1 6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both
nations and men."

On the ioth I visited the headquarters of the
Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station ; then re-
turned to Washington, and pushed west at once to
make my arrangements for turning over the com-
mands there and giving general directions for the
preparations to be made for the spring campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in
the West, even if I was made lieutenant-general ;
but when I got to Washington and saw the situ-
ation it was plain that here was the point for the
commanding general to be. No one else could,
probably, resist the pressure that would be brought
to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and
pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I
started back to have Sherman advanced to my late
position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of
the department, and Logan to the command of
McPherson s corps. These changes were all made
on my recommendation and without hesitation.
My commission as lieutenant-general was given
to me on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following
day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,
commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his head-
quarters at Brandy Station, north of the Rapidan. I
had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican

•

war, but had not met him since until this visit

V->

COMMANDING ARMIES OF THE UNITED STA TES. I I 7

I was a stranger to most of the Army of the
Potomac, I might say to all except the officers of
the regular army who had served in the Mexican
war. There had been some changes ordered in the
organization of that army before my promotion.
One was the consolidation of five corps into three,
thus throwing some officers of rank out of important
commands. Meade evidently thought that I might
want to make still one more change not yet ordered.
He said to me that I might want an officer who had
served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman
specially, to take his place. If so, he begged me not
to hesitate about making the change. He urged
that the work before us was of such vast impor-
tance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes
of no one person should stand in the way of select-
ing the right men for all positions. For himself,
he would serve to the best of his ability wherever
placed. I assured him that I had no thought of
substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he
could not be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable V
opinion of Meade than did his great victory at
Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to
be selected, and not those who seek, from whom
we may always expect the most efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing
to me if not to him. He was commanding an army

Il8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

and, for nearly a year previous to my taking com-
mand of all the armies, was in supreme command
of the Army of the Potomac — except from the
authorities at Washington. All other general offi-
cers occupying similar positions were independent in
their commands so far as any one present with them
was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's
position as nearly as possible what it would have
been if I had been in Washington or any other place
away from his command. I therefore gave all orders
for the movements of the Army of the Potomac to
Meade to have them executed. To avoid the neces-
sity of having to give orders direct, I established my
headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for
locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened,
and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the
troops affected. On the nth I returned to Wash-
ington and, on the day after, orders were published
by the War Department placing me in command of
all the armies. I had left Washington the night be-
fore to return to my old command in the West and
to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join
me in Nashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military di-
vision of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and
we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had
Sherman accompany me that far on my way back
to Washington so that we could talk over the

COMMANDING ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES. 119

matters about which I wanted to see him, without los-
ing any more time from my new command than was
necessary. The first point which I wished to discuss
was particularly about the co-operation of his com-
mand with mine when the spring campaign should
commence. There were also other and minor points,
minor as compared with the great importance of the
question to be decided by sanguinary war — the res-
toration to duty of officers who had been relieved
from important commands, namely McClellan, Burn-
side and Fremont in the East, and Buell, McCook,
Negley and Crittenden in the West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been
invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of
the campaign I thought advisable for the command
under me — now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston
was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia
with an army, the largest part of which was stationed
at Dalton, about 38 miles south of Chattanooga.
Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleve-
land with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as
to the first duty of the armies of the military division
of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first
objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta,
the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck
giving my views of the approaching campaign, and
at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected

120 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

that General Banks would be through with the cam-
paign which he had been ordered upon before my
appointment to the command of all the armies, and
would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of
the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to
move upon Mobile by land while the navy would
close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability.*
The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack John-
ston and destroy his army if possible, to capture At-
lanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of
Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to
hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east
and west, and the troops from one or other of the
armies to hold important points on the southern road,
the only east and west road that would be left in the
possession of the enemy. This would cut the Con-
federacy in two again, as our gaining possession of
the Mississippi River had done before. Banks was
not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and
circumstances that could not be foreseen determined
the campaign which was afterwards made, the success
and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all
lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been re-
lieved from important commands to duty again, I left
Sherman to look after those who had been removed
in the West while I looked out for the rest. I

* See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.

FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 121

directed, however, that he should make no assign-
ment until I could speak to the Secretary of War
about the matter. I shortly after recommended to
the Secretary the assignment of General Buell to
duty. I received the assurance that duty would be
offered to him ; and afterwards the Secretary told me
that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the
latter had declined it, saying that it would be degra-
dation to accept the assignment offered. I under-
stood afterwards that he refused to serve under either
Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.
Both graduated before him and ranked him in the Qld
army. Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general.
All of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman
and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse a
soldier can make for declining service is that he once
ranked the commander he is ordered to report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington,
and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Cul-
peper Court-House, a few miles south of the head-
quarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of
the President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called
to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-
general. I knew him, however, very well and favor-
ably from the accounts given by officers under me
at the West who had known him all their lives. I
had also read the remarkable series of debates be-

122 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

tween Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when
they were rival candidates for the United States Sen-
ate. I was then a resident of Missouri, and by no
means a " Lincoln man " in that contest ; but I
recognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he
stated to me that he had never professed to be a
military man or to know how campaigns should be
conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them :
but that procrastination on the part of commanders,
and the pressure from the people at the North and
Cpngress, which was always with him, forced him
into issuing his series of " Military Orders " — one,
two, three, etc. He did not know but they were
all wrong, and did know that some of them were.
All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one
who would take the responsibility and act, and call
on him for all the assistance needed, pledging him-
self to use all the power of the government in ren-
dering such assistance. Assuring him that I would
do the best I could with the means at hand, and
avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War
Department, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before
only, but felt that I knew him better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had
occasionally held conversations over the wires, at
night, when they were not being otherwise used.

FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN, 1 23

He and General Halleck both cautioned me against
giving the President my plans of campaign, saying
that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing
anything asked of him, that some friend would be
sure to get from him all he knew. I should have
said that in our interview the President told me he
did not want to know what I proposed to do. But
he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which
he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased
about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which
he had evidently marked every position occupied by
the Federal and Confederate armies up to that ,
time. He pointed out on the map two streams/
which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that"
the army might be moved on boats and landed be-
tween the mouths of these streams. We would
then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and
the tributaries would protect our flanks while we
moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not sug-
gest that the same streams would protect Lee's
flanks while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the Presi-
dent, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to Gen-
eral Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated,
at Culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early
campaign commenced.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION — PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN
SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAV-
ALRY FLANK MOVEMENTS — FORREST AT FORT PIL-
LOW— GENERAL BANKS' S EXPEDITION — COLONEL
MOSBY — AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAM-
PAIGN.

WHEN I assumed command of all the armies
the situation was about this: the Mississippi
River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth ; the

line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the
North-west north of that river. A few points in
Louisiana not remote from the river were held by
the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the
Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held sub-
stantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the
line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in
nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia
was in our hands ; and that part of old Virginia
north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge
we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress
Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia ; Plymouth, Wash-

THE MILITARY SITUATION.

'25

ington and New Berne in North Carolina ; Beaufort,
Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal
and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia ;
Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola
in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory,
an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the
enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command
of the military division of the Mississippi, commanded
all the troops in the territory west of the Alleghanies
and north of Natchez, with a large movable force
about Chattanooga. His command was subdivided
into four departments, but the commanders all re-
ported to Sherman and were subject to his orders.
This arrangement, however, insured the better pro-
tection of all lines of communication through the
acquired territory, for the reason that these different
department commanders could act promptly in case
of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respec-
tive jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the
division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substan-
tially the same relations towards each other as three
years before, or when the war began ; they were
both between the Federal and Confederate capitals.
It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the
sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond
that, no substantial advantage had been gained by

126 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

either side. Battles had been fought of as great
severity as had ever been known in war, over
ground from the James River and Chickahominy,
near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg,
in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes
favorable to the National army, sometimes to the
Confederate army ; but in every instance, I believe,
claimed as victories for the South by the Southern
press if not by the Southern generals. The North-
ern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims ;
a portion of it always magnified rebel success and
belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely
earnest in their desire for the preservation of the
Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal
armies, would nevertheless generally express dissat-
isfaction with whatever victories were gained be-
cause they were not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not
engaged in guarding lines of communication was on
the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of
Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank
of the same river, was strongly intrenched and com-
manded by the acknowledged ablest general in the
Confederate army. The country back to the James
River is cut up with many streams, generally narrow,
deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged.
The region is heavily timbered, and the roads nar-
row, and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy

THE MILITARY SITUATION. \2J

was not, of course, unprepared with adequate forti-
fications at convenient intervals all the way back to
Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified
position they would always have another farther to
the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so
formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons
alone seemed almost impossible. System and dis-
cipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen
departments, though four of them in the West had
been concentrated into a single military division. The
Army of the Potomac was a separate command and
had no territorial limits. There were thus seventeen
distinct commanders. Before this time these various
armies had acted separately and independently of
each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often
of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce
another more actively engaged. I determined to
stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the
Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis
along the line described as our position at the time,
and north of it, the right wing ; the Army of the
James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and
all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy.
Some of these latter were occupying positions from
which they could not render service proportionate to
their numerical strength. All such were depleted to

128 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a
guard against blockade runners ; where they could not
do this their positions were abandoned altogether. In
this way ten thousand men were added to the Army
of the James from South Carolina alone, with Gen-
eral Gillmore in command. It was not contemplated
that General Gillmore should leave his department ;
but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for
active service, he asked to accompany them and was
permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough,
of whom there were many thousands, were ordered
to their proper commands ; concentration was the
order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time
to advance at the earliest moment the roads would
permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac,
or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over
twenty thousand strong, under General Burnside,
had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland.
This was an admirable position for such a reinforce-
ment. The corps could be brought at the last
moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the
Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast,
south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina,
to operate against Richmond from that direction.
In fact Burnside and the War Department both
thought the 9th corps was intended for such an
expedition up to the last moment.

PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 1 29

My general plan now was to concentrate all the
force possible against the Confederate armies in the
field. There were but two such, as we have seen,
east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The
Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee
commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan,
confronting the Army of the Potomac ; the second,
under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton,
Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was still at Chat-
tanooga. Beside these main armies the Confeder-
ates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great
storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line
of communications from Richmond to Tennessee.
Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was
in the West with a large force ; making a larger
command necessary to hold what we had gained in
Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon
any territory north of the line held by the enemy
because it would lay the Northern States open to
invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the
principal garrison for the protection of Washington
even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces
to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded
their special trusts when advancing from them as
well as when remaining at them. Better indeed, for
they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and
resources at a greater distance from ours, and with
a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well

Vol. 11. — 9

I30 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few
miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict
other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged
for a simultaneous movement all along the line.
Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, John-
ston's army and Atlanta being his objective points.*

* [Private and Confidential.]

Headquarters Armies of the United States,

Washington, D. C, Aptil 4, 1864.

Major-General W. T. Sherman,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

General : — It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow
me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts
of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre.
For your information I now write you my programme, as at pres-
ent determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up
his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch ; to
turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the
navy, and to return your troops to you and his own to New Or-
leans ; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to
hold that with not to exceed four thousand men ; to reduce the
number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number neces-
sary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than
twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand
men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence opera-
tions against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for
him to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two
operate against Richmond from the south side of the James
River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to oper-

ri.AXS FO/i THE CAMPAIGX. 13 I

Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move
from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry
force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennes-
see Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy
would have to keep a large force to protect their
communications, or see them destroyed and a large
amount of forage and provision, which they so much
needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command
in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up
the valley, covering the North from an invasion

ate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces
and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the
Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-
five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's
army, wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under
Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other,
under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move
against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will
be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand
men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up
and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you
can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but
simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave
you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,
as early as you can, your plan of operations.

I32 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

through that channel as well while advancing as by
remaining near Harpers Ferry. Every mile he ad-
vanced also gave us possession of stores on which
Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James
River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his
objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler
at Fort Monroe. This was the first time I had ever
met him. Before giving him any order as to the
part he was to play in the approaching campaign I

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th
inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating
now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct,
except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25 th inst., if
possible. But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as
possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting
through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I
believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I
do not calculate on very great results ; but it is the only way I can
take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has
to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his
front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on
the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a
large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin him-
self he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF CAVALRY, 1 33

invited his views. They were very much such as I
intended to direct, and as I did direct,* in writing,
before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to
the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of
Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet
been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against
his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I
insisted that his services had been such that he
should be rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly
complied with, and I assigned him to the command
of one of the corps under General Butler. I was not
long in finding out that the objections to Smith's
promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President
I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that
had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the
war, and the belief that it was capable of accom-
plishing much more than it had done if under a
thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best man
in the army for that command. Halleck was present
and spoke up, saying: " How would Sheridan do?"
I replied : " The very man I want." The President
said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was
telegraphed for that clay, and on his arrival was
assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with
the Army of the Potomac. This relieved General

* Sec instructions to Butler, in Generals Grant's report, Appendix.

134 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on
that officer, however, for I did not know but that
he had been as efficient as any other cavalry com-
mander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered
to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in
time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his
objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to
whether I should move the Army of the Potomac
by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.
Each plan presented advantages.* If by his right —

* In Field, Culpeper C. H.. Vam

April 9. 1864.
Maj. -General Geo. G. Meade,

Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations
for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confi-
dentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and
towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn
over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the
navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande,
and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men,
to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other
movements. From the scattered condition of his command, how-
ever, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans
before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same
time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's
army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his

FLANK MOVEMENTS. 1 35

my left — the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tribu-
taries would furnish us an easy line over which to
bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance

ultimate aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chatta-
nooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of
the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his
front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making prep-
arations for it. Two columns of his command will make south
at the same time with the general move ; one from Beverly, from
ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord ; the other
from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under Brig. -General
Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Ten-
nessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington, and
if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return
to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you. The
other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord.
The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage
southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting
Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South
Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000
men into the field directly to his front. The force will be com-
manded by Maj. -General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,
Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from
the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous
with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,
there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in
doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or
below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other

I36 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF I/. S. GRANT.

of every position the army could occupy from the
Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if he
chose, detach or move his whole army north on a

with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off
from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid.
But if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations
we start with hold out. We separate from Butler so that he
cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route Brandy
Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured
on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more
fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce
you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after
the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from Bull
Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to
collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and trans-
ports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall back
into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and yours
will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. What I
would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing bag-
gage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a
regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should
be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and
ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division head-
quarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make
arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to
White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contin-
gency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every
probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.

FORREST AT FORT PILLOW. 1 37

line rather interior to the one I would have to take
in following. A movement by his left — our right —
would obviate this ; but all that was done would have
to be done with the supplies and ammunition we
started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan
was abandoned when the limited quantity of sup-
plies possible to take with us was considered. The
country over which we would have to pass was so
exhausted of all food or forage that we would be
obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy
was not entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a
raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border,
capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men
at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on
Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.
While he was able to enter the city he failed to capt-
ure the forts or any part of the garrison. On the
first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sher-
man to send all his cavalry against him, and not to
let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.
Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops
against him before he got my order.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for

ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred

rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the

amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieu tenant-General.

I38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked
the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection
of the navigation of the Mississippi River. The gar-
rison consisted of a regiment of colored troops,
infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry.
These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered.
I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he
did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, " with the blood of
the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The ap-
proximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but
few of the officers escaping. My loss was about
twenty killed. It is hoped that these facts will de-
monstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers
cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently For-
rest made a report in which he left out the part
which shocks humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had
said to Halleck that Plymouth and Washington,
North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It would
be better to have the garrisons engaged there added
to Butler's command. If success attended our arms
both places, and others too, would fall into our
hands naturally. These places had been occupied
by Federal troops before I took command of the
armies, and I knew that the Executive would be
reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained
my views ; but before my views were carried out

GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION.

*39

the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth. I
then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but
directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards.
This was essential because New Berne was a port
into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the
Red River long before my promotion to general
command. I had opposed the movement strenuously,
but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior
at the time. By direction of Halleck I had reinforced
Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from
Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted
back badly before the forward movement commenced.
But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he
should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn
over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded
in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Ar-
kansas. Orders were given accordingly, and with
the expectation that the campaign would be ended in
time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to
where it belonged and get back to New Orleans him-
self in time to execute his part in the general plan.
But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get
back in time to take pc*rt in the programme as laid
down. Nor was Smith returned until long after the
movements of May, 1864, had been begun. The ser-
vices of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above
the number required to hold all that was necessary

I40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed.
It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his ex-
pedition was ordered from Washington and he was
in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I
make no criticism on this point. He opposed the
expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced
as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move.
On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy
Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappa-
hannock. Meade was notified and directed to bring
his troops forward to his advance. On the following
day Butler was notified of my intended advance on
the 4th of May, and he was directed to move the
night of the same day and get as far up the James
River as possible by daylight, and push on from there
to accomplish the task given him. He was also
notified that reinforcements were being collected in
Washington City, which would be forwarded to him
should the enemy fall back into the trenches at Rich-
mond. The same day Sherman was directed to get
his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. Sigel
was in Winchester and was notified to move in con-
junction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the
campaign from the Rapidan to the James River that
all the loss of life could have been obviated by mov-
ing the army there on transports. Richmond was

COLONEL MOSBY 141

fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man
inside to defend was more than equal to five out-
side besieging or assaulting. To get possession of
Lee's army was the first great object. With the
capture of his army Richmond would necessarily
follow. It was better to fight him outside of his
stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac
had been moved bodily to the James River by water
Lee could have moved a part of his forces back to
Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to re-
inforce it, and with the balance moved on to Wash-
ington. Then, too, I ordered a move, simultaneous
with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James
River by a formidable army already collected at the
mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from
the 26th of March to the 4th of May, I generally
visited Washington once a week to confer with the
Secretary of War and President. On the last occa-
sion, a few days before moving, a circumstance
occurred which came near postponing my part in
the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby
had for a long time been commanding a partisan
corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the
Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field
on this occasion, as the train approached Warren-
ton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the
east of the road a > if made by a body of cavalry on

142 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRAKT.

a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was
stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the
dust. There was but one man at the station, and
he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few min-
utes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal
cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no doubt
he would have let his prisoners escape to capture
the train. I was on a special train, if I remember
correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know
Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat intimately.
He is a different man entirely from what I had sup-
posed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as
if he could endure any amount of physical exercise.
He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful.
There were probably but few men in the South who
could have commanded successfully a separate de-
tachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so
near the border of hostilities, as long as he did with-
out losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last
interview with the President before reaching the
James River. He had of course become acquainted
with the fact that a general movement had been or-
dered all along the line, and seemed to think it a
new feature in war. I explained to him that it was
necessary to have a great number of troops to guard
and hold the territory we had captured, and to

AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN, 1 43

prevent incursions into the Northern States. These
troops could perform this service just as well by ad-
vancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they
would compel the enemy to keep detachments to
hold them back, or else lay his own territory open
to invasion. His answer was : " Oh, yes ! I see that.
As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must
hold a leg while somebody else does/'

There was a certain incident connected with the
Wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of
place to speak ; and to avoid a digression further on
I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper
the Honorable E. B. Washburne visited me there,
and remained with my headquarters for some dis-
tance south, through the battle in the Wilderness
and, I think, to Spottsylvania. He was accom-
panied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as a
literary gentleman who wished to accompany the
army with a view of writing a history of the war
when it was over. He assured me — and I have no
doubt Swinton gave him the assurance — that he was
not present as a correspondent of the press. I ex-
pressed an entire willingness to have him (Swinton)
accompany the army, and would have allowed him
to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in
the character of the information he could give. We
received Richmond papers with about as much regu-

144 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

larity as if there had been no war, and knew that our
papers were received with equal regularity by the
Confederates. It was desirable, therefore, that cor-
respondents should not be privileged spies of the
enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited
guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that
he was not asked to become so. At all events he
was not invited, and soon I found that he was cor-
responding with some paper (I have now forgotten
which one), thus violating his word either expressed
or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne
had given as to the character of his mission. I never
saw the man from the day of our introduction to the
present that I recollect. He accompanied us, how-
ever, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing, the Rapidan (the
night of the 5th of May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of
my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquar-
ters. A short time before midnight I gave him ver-
bal instructions for the night. Three days later I
read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these
instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and pos-
sibly after the second, day's fighting in the Wilder-
ness) General Meade came to my tent for consul-
tation, bringing with him some of his staff officers.
Both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire

AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 1 45

some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conver-
sation should be private. There was a stump a little
to one side, and between the front of the tent and
camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers,
saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground
and leaning against the stump, listening to the con-
versation between Meade and myself. He called
the attention of Colonel Rowley to it The latter
immediately took the man by the shoulder and
asked him, in language more forcible than polite,
what he was doing there. The man proved to be
Swinton, the " historian," and his replies to the ques-
tion were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was
warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold
Harbor. General Meade came to my headquarters
saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,
who at some previous time had given great offence,
and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. I
promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but
that he must be expelled from the lines of the army
not to return again on pain of punishment

Vol. 11.— xo

CHAPTER XLVIII.

commencement of the grand campaign general

butler's position — Sheridan's first raid.

THE armies were now all ready to move for the
accomplishment of a single object. They were
acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible
over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the
Confederacy, was the main end to which all were
working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important
obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result
aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent
objective. It was of less importance only because the
capture of Johnston and his army would not pro-
duce so immediate and decisive a result in closing
the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond,
Lee and his army. All other troops were employed
exclusively in support of these two movements.
This was the plan ; and I will now endeavor to give,
as concisely as I can, the method of its execution,
outlining first the operations of minor detached but
co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what
he had been sent to do on the Red River, and elimi-

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN. 1 47

nated the use of forty thousand veterans whose co-
operation in the grand campaign had been expected
— ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand
against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved
out, it is true, according to programme ; but just
when I was hoping to hear of good work being done
in the valley I received instead the following an-
nouncement from Halleck: "Sigel is in full retreat
on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run ; never
did anything else." The enemy had intercepted him
about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving
him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out
of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's
forces in two columns. Though the one under his
immediate command failed ingloriously the other
proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell
his western column advanced from the Gauley in
West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more
happy results. They reached the Virginia and Ten-
nessee Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of
supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and
burning the bridge over New River. Having ac-
complished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to
Meadow Bluffs and there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his com-
mand, except the cavalry and some artillery which

I48 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF 17. S. GRANT.

moved up the south bank of the James River. His
steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York
River as if threatening the rear of Lee's army. At
midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight
was far up the James River. He seized City Point
and Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without
loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the
enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step con-
templated in my instructions to Butler. He was to
act from here, looking to Richmond as his objective
point. I had given him to uoderstand that I should
aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Rich-
mond if he would stand ; but should Lee fall back
into Richmond I would follow up and make a junc-
tion of the armies of the Potomac and the James on
the James River. He was directed to secure a foot-
ing as far up the south side of the river as he could
at as early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had
begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his
cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon Railroad.
He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad
between Petersburg and Richmond, but no great
success attended these latter efforts. He made no
great effort to establish himself on that road and neg-
lected to attack Petersburg, which was almost de-
fenceless. About the nth he advanced slowly until

150 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

he reached the works at Dairy's Bluff, about half way
between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the
mean time Beauregard had been gathering reinforce-
ments. On the 1 6th" he attacked Butler with great
vigor, and with such success as to limit very mate-
rially the further usefulness of the Army of the
James as a distinct factor in the campaign. I after-
ward ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the
Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to
man his works, hold securely the footing he had al-
ready gained and maintain a threatening front to-
ward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen
between the two rivers, the James and Appomat-
tox, was one of great natural strength, one where
a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed
by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very
short one in comparison with the extent of territory
which it thoroughly protected. His right was pro-
tected by the James River, his left by the Appo-
mattox, and his rear by their junction — the two
streams uniting near by. The bends of the two
streams shortened the line that had been chosen
for intrenchments, while it increased the area which
the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I
sent my chief engineer, General Barnard, from the
Army of the Potomac to that of the James to inspect

GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION. 151

Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again
safely make an order (or General Butler's movement
in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting
so near Richmond ; or, if I could not, wnether his
position was strong enough to justify me in with-
drawing some of his troops and having them brought
round by water to White House to join me and re-
inforce the Army of the Potomac General Barnard
reported the position very strong for defensive pur-
poses, and that I could do the latter with great
security; but that General Butler could not move
from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any
effect. He said that the general occupied a place be-
tween the James and Appomattox rivers which was
of great strength, and where with an inferior force he
could hold it for an indefinite length of time against
a superior ; but that he could do nothing offensively.
I then asked him why Butler could not move out
from his lines and push across the Richmond and
Petersburg Railroad to the rear and on the south side
of Richmond. \fk replied that it was impracticable,
because the enemy had substantially the sameline
across the neck of land that General Butler had
He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of
the locality, remarking that the position was like a
bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across
the neck represented the cork ; that the enemy had
built an equally strong line immediately in front of

<f ^ ,v

^P . ' I52 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

fry

y him across the neck ; and it was therefore as if Butler

was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an
attack ; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had
corked the bottle and with a small force could hold
the cork in its place. This struck me as being very
expressive of his position, particularly when I saw
the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn ;
and in making my subsequent report I. used that
expression without adding quotation marks, never
thinking that anything had been said that would at-
tract attention — as this did, very much to the annoy-
ance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I know, very
much to my own. I found afterwards that this was
mentioned in the notes of General Badeau's book,
which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have
stricken out ; yet it was retained there, though
against my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I
have often made it before, it has never been in my
power until now to place it where it will correct his-
tory ; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may
have done to individuals, particularly to officers who
were gallantly serving their country during the try-
ing period of the war for the preservation of the
Union. General Butler certainly gave his very ear-
nest support to the war ; and he gave his own best
efforts personally to the suppression of the re-
bellion.

SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. 1 53

The further operations of the Army of the James
can best be treated of in connection with those of
the Army of the Potomac, the two being so inti-
mately associated and connected as to be substan-
tially one body in which the individuality of the
supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's
great Atlanta campaign, which must conclude my
description of the various co-operative movements
preparatory to proceeding with that of the opera-
tions of the centre, I will briefly mention Sheridan's
first raid upon Lee's communications which, though
an incident of the operations on the main line and
not specifically marked out in the original plan,
attained in its brilliant execution and results all
the proportions of an independent campaign. By
thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to
more perfectly observe the continuity of events
occurring in my immediate front when I shall have
undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapi-
dan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the
Wilderness and when we were moving on Spottsyl-
vania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from
the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of
Lee's army and attack his cavalry : to cut the two
roads — one running west through Gordonsville, Char-
lottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond,

154 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and
rations, to move on to the James River and draw
these from Butler's supplies. This move took him
past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders
were also given in writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold. First, if
successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy
the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and tele-
graphic communications, and destroy or get for his
own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up.
Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after
him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and
trains than by remaining with the army. Third,
his absence would save the trains drawing his forage
and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had
now become our base. He started at daylight the
next morning, and accomplished more than was ex-
pected. It was sixteen days before he got back to
the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Rich-
mond. Before night Stuart, commanding the Con-
federate cavalry, came on to the rear of his com-
mand. But the advance kept on, crossed the North
Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Vir-
ginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred
_^^dttMpn prisoners on their way to Richmond, de-
^^^ ^Tfcd ^ie road and used and destroyed a large
Milt of subsistence and medical stores.

SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. 1 55

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing to-
wards Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the
morning of the ioth and, by a detour and an ex-
hausting march, interposed between Sheridan and
Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles
north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad
and more supplies at Ashland, and on the nth ar-
rived in Stuart's front A severe engagement en-
sued in which the losses were heavy on both sides,
but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally
wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were
captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of
Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through
the inner ones. But having no supports near he
could not have remained. After caring for his
wounded he struck for the James River below the
city, to communicate with Butler and to rest his
men and horses as well as to get food and forage
for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and
the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was
stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He then
turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy
by Meadow Bridge. He found this barred, and the
defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying
the opposite side. The panic created by his first
entrance within the outer works of Richmond hav-

I56 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ing subsided troops were sent out to attack his
rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which
but few generals could have extricated themselves.
The defences of Richmond, manned, were to the
right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no
bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to
the rear was a force from Richmond. This force
was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's
divisions, while Sheridan turned to the left with the
remaining division and hastily built a bridge over
the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy,
forced a crossing and soon dispersed the Confeder-
ates he found there. The enemy was held back
from the stream by the fire of the troops not
engaged in bridge building.

On the 1 3th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over
the Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this
stream and on that day went into camp on the James
River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself
into communication with General Butler, who directed
all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at
Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or
Lee's army was now. Great caution therefore had
to be exercised in getting back. On the 1 7th, after
resting his command for three days, he started on
his return. He moved by the way of White House.

SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. 1 5 J

The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned
by the enemy, but a new one was speedily impro-
vised and the cavalry crossed over it On the 2 2d
he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he learned
the position of the two armies. On the 24th he
joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold
Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely
around Lee's army : encountered his cavalry in four
engagements, and defeated them in all ; recaptured
four hundred Union prisoners and killed and cap-
tured many of the enemy ; destroyed and used many
supplies and munitions of war ; destroyed miles of
railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance
by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two
weeks.

CHAPTER XLIX.

Sherman's campaign in Georgia — seige of Atlanta

death of general mcpherson — attempt to

capture andersonville — capture of atlanta.

AFTER separating from Sherman in Cincinnati
I went on to Washington, as already stated,
while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties
of his new command. His military division was
now composed of four departments and embraced
all the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains
and east of the Mississippi River, together with
the State of Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The
most easterly of these was the Department of the
Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next
was the Department of the Cumberland, General
Thomas commanding; the third the Department
of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding ;
and General Steele still commanded the trans-
Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last-
named department was so far away that Sherman
could not communicate with it very readily after
starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore
soon transferred from his military division to that of

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 1 59

the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved
General Banks, was in command.

The movements of the armies, as \ have stated
in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fix-
ing the day to start when the season should be far
enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be
in a condition for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work pre-
paring for the task which was assigned him to ac-
complish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay
at Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men,
guarding those points of Tennessee which were re-
garded as most worth holding ; Thomas, with over
sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumber-
land, was at Chattanooga ; and Schofield, with about
fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With
these three armies, numbering about one hundred
thousand men in all, Sherman was to move on the
day fixed for the general advance, with a view of
destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta.
He visited each of these commands to inform him-
self as to their condition, and it was found to be,
speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to
was that of getting, before the time arrived for start-
ing, an accumulation of supplies forward to Chat-
tanooga sufficiently large to warrant a movement.
He found, when he got to that place, that the trains

l6o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

over the single-track railroad, which was frequently
interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only
sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops
without bringing forward any surplus of any kind
He found, however, that trains were being used to
transport all the beef cattle,, horses for the cavalry,
and even teams that were being brought to the
front He at once changed all this, and required
beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything
that could travel, even the troops, to be marched,
and used the road exclusively for transporting sup-
plies. In this way he was able to accumulate an
abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the
move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton,
which was nearly one-fourth of the way between
Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is moun-
tainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in moun-
tain streams, some of them of considerable volume.
Dalton is on ground where water drains towards
Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising
north-east from there and flowing south-west —
this being the general direction which all the main
streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries
entering into them. Johnston had been preparing
himself for this campaign during the entire winter.
The best positions for defence had been selected
all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very

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1 62 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

strongly intrenched ; so that, as he might be forced
to fall back from one position, he would have
another to fall into in his rear. His position at
Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no
doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sher-
man there and prevent him from getting any fur-
ther. With a less skilful general, and one disposed
to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would
have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was
farthest back, a few days in advance from Knoxville,
having him move on the direct road to Dalton.
Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been
Shermans intention to cross McPherson over the
Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and
move him south from there so as to have him come
into the road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta
a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston
was occupying ; but when that was contemplated it
was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops
enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter should
move against him while unsupported by the balance
of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of
McPherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the
express provision that they were to have a furlough.
This furlough had not yet expired, and they were
not back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two di-

SHERMAN" S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 1 63

visions under A. J. Smith, the winter before, to
co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this
with the express pledge that they should be back by
a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very
campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were
not returned That department continued to ab-
sorb troops to no purpose to the end of the wan
This left McPherson so weak that the part of the
plan above indicated had to be changed. He
was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and
moved from there on a road to the right of
Thomas — the two coming together about Dalton.
The three armies were abreast, all ready to start
promptly on time-
Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly
fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to
carry it by assault ; and even to carry it by regular
approaches was impracticable. There was a nar-
rowing up in the mountain, between the National
and Confederate armies, through* which a stream, a
wagon road and a railroad ran Besides, the stream
had been dammed so that the valley was a lake.
Through this gorge the troops would have to pass.
McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,
to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into
the rear of the enemy. This was a surprise to John-
ston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his
position at Dalton.

164 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about
Resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around
to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear.
Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The
pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was
reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except
that Newton's division overtook the rear of John-
ston's army and engaged it Sherman was now
obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his
railroad trains. He was depending upon the rail-
road for all of his supplies, and as of course the rail-
road was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it
had to be rebuilt This work was pushed forward
night and day, and caused much less delay than
most persons would naturally expect in a moun-
tainous country where there were so many bridges
to be rebuilt

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the
most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out
of one position after another all the way there. It
is true this was not accomplished without a good
deal of fighting — some of it very hard fighting, rising
to the dignity of very important battles — neither
were single positions gained in a day. On the con-
trary, weeks were spent at some ; and about Atlanta
more than a month was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was fin-
ished up to the rear of Sherman's army and the pur-

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 1 65

suit renewed This pursuit brought him up to the
vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly
intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position.
An assault upon it was not thought of, but prepara-
tions were made to flank the enemy out of it This
was done by sending a large force around our right,
by the way of Dallas, to reach the rear of the
enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found
the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted
hard fighting for about a week at a place called New
Hope Church. On the left our troops also were for-
tified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.
They kept working still farther around to the left
toward the railroad. This was the case more par-
ticularly with the cavalry. By the 4th of June John-
ston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly
that he drew off and Allatoona was left in our pos-
session.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly
intrenched for occupation by our troops before ad-
vancing farther, and made a secondary base of sup-
plies. The railroad was finished up to that point,
the intrenchments completed, store-houses provided
for food, and the army got in readiness for a further
advance. The rains, however, were falling in such
torrents that it was impossible to move the army by
the side roads which they would have to move upon
in order to turn Johnston out of his new position.

1 66 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P.
Blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divi-
sions of veterans who had been on furlough,

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kene-
saw Mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited
him. At this latter place our troops made an assault
upon the enemy's lines after having got their own
lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining consider-
able loss. But during the progress of the battle
Schofield was gaining ground to the left ; and the
cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the
enerfly's rear. These operations were completed by
the 3d of July, when it was found that Johnston had
evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sher-
man had made every preparation to abandon the
railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments.
He had intended, moving out with twenty days'
rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the
railroad again at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston
frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above
stated. This time he fell back to the Chattahoo-
chee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again,
Sherman getting easy possession of the Chattahoo-
chee River both above and below him. The enemy
was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened
by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th
he fell back across the river.

THE SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 1 67

Here Johnston made a stand until the 1 7th, when
Sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final
movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston was now
relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem
to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of
the administration at Richmond, or of the people of
that section of the South in which he was command-
ing. The very fact of a change of commanders being
ordered under such circumstances was an indication of
a change of policy, and that now they would become
the aggressors — the very thing our troops wanted

For my own paat, I think that Johnston's tactics
were right Anything that could have prolonged the
war a year beyond the time that it did finally close,
would probably have exhausted the North to such an
extent that they might then have abandoned the
contest and agreed to a separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way
around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of
the city. In addition to this, there were advanced
intrenchments which had to be taken before a close
siege could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of com-
manders, the enemy was about to assume the offen-
sive. On the 20th he came out and attacked the
Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hookers
corps, and Newton's and Johnson's divisions were

1 68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT-

the principal ones engaged in this contest, which
lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates
were then forced to fall back inside their main lines.
The losses were quite heavy on both sides. On
this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-
General, was very badly wounded. During the
night Hood abandoned his outer lines, and our
troops were advanced. The investment had not
been relinquished for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out
again, passing by our left flank, which was then in
motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and
a desperate battle ensued, which* lasted most of the
day of the 2 2d. At first the battle went very much
in favor of the Confederates, our troops being some-
what surprised. While our troops were advancing
they were struck in flank, and their flank was envel-
oped. But they had become too thorough veterans
to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an un-
expected attack when off their guard, and soon they
were in order and engaging the enemy, with the ad-
vantage now of knowing where their antagonist was.
The field of battle continued to expand until it em-
braced about seven miles of ground. Finally, how-
ever, and before night, the enemy was driven back
into the city.*

* General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of the Army
of %the Tennessee daring this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed.

DEATH OF GENERAL McPHERSON. \ 69

It was during this battle that McPherson, while
passing from one column to another, was instantly
killed In his death the army lost one of its ablest,
purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get
upon the railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in
the direction of Augusta. He was successful in this,
and returned about the time of the battle. Rous-
seau had also come up from Tennessee with a small
division of cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee
River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama.
Finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking
the railroad in rear of Sherman, and reported to him
about this time.

The battle of the 2 2d is usually known as the
Battle of Atlanta, although the city did not fall into
our hands until the 2d of September. Preparations
went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his
position. The work was tedious, and the lines that
had to be maintained were very long. Our troops
were gradually worked around to the east until they
struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta.

wounded and missing at 3,521 ; and estimated that of the enemy to be not le&«
than 10,000 : and General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sher-
man the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken
by his depleted command, remarks : " The disparity of forces can be seen from
the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under Fuller and Mersy
they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight bri-
gades and three divisions ; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy."

170 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

These lines were strongly fortified, as were those to
the north and west of the city — all as close up to the
enemy's lines as practicable — in order to hold them
with the smallest possible number of men, the design
being to detach an army to move by our right and
try to get upon the railroad down south of Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank
commenced. On the 28th the enemy struck our
right flank, General Logan commanding, with great
vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by
that means was enabled to resist all assaults and
inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy.
These assaults were continued to the middle of
the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later
in the day. The enemy's losses in these unsuc-
cessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front
withdrew into the town. This now left Sherman's
army close up to the Confederate lines, extending
from a point directly east of the city around by the
north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles ;
the whole of this line being intrenched, and made
stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman
to destroy the railroads to the south, about Macon.
He was then to go east and, if possible, release our
risoners about Andersonville. There were painful
ories current at the time about the great hardships

ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE. 171

these prisoners had to endure in the way of general
bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed,
and in the way in which they were fed. Great sym-
pathy was felt for them ; and it was thought that
even if they could be turned loose upon the country
it would be a great relief to them. But the attempt
proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small
brigade, was first reported to have been captured ;
but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of
damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some
prisoners ; but encountering afterwards a largely
superior force of the enemy he was obliged to
drop his prisoners and get back as best he could
with what men he had left. He had lost several
hundred men out of his small command. On the
4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little
brigade of about a thousand men, returned report-
ing Stoneman and all but himself as lost I myself
had heard around Richmond of the capture of
Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he
received. The rumor was confirmed there, also,
from other sources. A few days after Colonel
Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a
small detachment and confirmed the report of the
capture of Stoneman with something less than a
thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all
his force was impossible, had made arrangements for

172 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the escape of two divisions. He covered the move-
ment of these divisions to the rear with a force of
about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered
himself and this detachment to the commanding
Confederate. In this raid, however, much damage
was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of
cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of
military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get
upon the railroad to our right, where Schofield was
in command, but these attempts failed utterly.
General Palmer was charged with being the cause of
this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sher-
man and General Schofield ; but I am not prepared
to say this, although a question seems to have arisen
with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right
to command him. If he did raise this question while
an action was going on, that act alone was exceed-
ingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our rail-
road north of Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to
Dalton. This cut Sherman off from communica-
tion with the North for several days. Sherman re-
sponded to this attack on his lines of communica-
tion by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of
August to reach the Macon road about Jonesboro.
He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around

174 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF I/. S. GRANT.

the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back
again in his former position on our left by the 2 2d.
These little affairs, however, contributed but very
little to the grand result They annoyed, it is true,
but any damage thus done to a railroad by any
cavalry expedition is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his
tactics ; that is, for a flank movement with as large a
force as could be got together to some point in the
enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last move-
ment on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of Sep-
tember was well up towards the railroad twenty miles
south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee intrenched,
ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was
unable to drive Hardee away before night set in.
Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of
his own accord. That night Hood blew up his
military works, such as he thought would be valua-
ble in our hands, and decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W.
Slocum, who was commanding north of the city,
moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and noti-
fied Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately
back, taking three days to reach the city, and
occupied a line extending from Decatur on the
left to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops ex-
tending out of the city for some distance to the
right

CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 175

The campaign had lasted about four months, and
was one of the most memorable in history. There
was but little if anything in the whole campaign,
now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to
criticise severely. It was creditable alike to the gen-
eral who commanded and the army which had exe-
cuted it Sherman had on this campaign some
bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders
whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his
command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves
comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their
arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was turned
into a military base. The citizens were all compelled
to leave. Sherman also very wisely prohibited the
assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who
always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if
permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens
and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of
but little use to them, and for which they are made
to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the num-
ber of these traders to one for each of his three
armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North
instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. This
was the first great political campaign for the Repub-
licans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later
by Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley ;

176 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

and these two campaigns probably had more effect
in settling the election of the following November
than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the
parading with banners and bands of music in the
North.

CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

CROSSING THE RAPIDAN — ENTERING THE WILDER-
NESS—BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

SOON after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of
the Potomac moved out from its position north
of the Rapidan, to start upon that memorable cam-
paign, destined to result in the capture of the Con-
federate capital and the army defending it. This
was not to be accomplished, however, without as
desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed ;
not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month,
or a single season. The losses inflicted, and endured,
were destined to be severe ; but the armies now con-
fronting each other had already been in deadly con-
flict for a period of three years, with immense losses
in killed, by death from sickness, captured and
wounded ; and neither had made any real progress
toward accomplishing the final end. It is true the
Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they
claimed this to be their sole object. But previously
they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capt-
ure Philadelphia, New York, and the National

Vol. ii. — 12

178 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Capital, and had made several attempts to do so,
and once or twice had come fearfully near making
their boast good — too near for complacent contem-
plation by the loyal North. They had also come
near losing their own capital on at least one oc-
casion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign
now begun was destined to result in heavier losses,
to both armies, in a given time, than any previously
suffered ; but the carnage was to be limited to a sin-
gle year, and to accomplish all that had been antici-
pated or desired at the beginning in that time. We
had to have hard fighting to achieve this. The two
armies had been confronting each other so long,
without any decisive result, that they hardly knew
which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and
ammunition were taken in wagons. Beef cattle
were driven with the trains, and butchered as
wanted. Three days' rations in addition, in haver-
sacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on
the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate,
from the Rapidan to the crossing of the James River,
is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which
make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The cross-
ings of these streams by the army were generally
made not far above tide-water, and where they
formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance

i8o

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

of troops even when the enemy did not appear in
opposition. The country roads were narrow and
poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense
forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the
Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infan-
try except along the roads. All bridges were
naturally destroyed before the National troops came
to them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three
infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respec-
tively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren,

UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1 864.

[compiled.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.
Major-General George G. Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

First Brigade, Col. Nel-
son A. Miles.

Second Brigade, Col.
Thomas A. Smyth.

Third Brigade, Col.
Paul Frank.

Fourth Brigade, Col.
John R. Brooke.

Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock,

commanding

Second Army Corps.

First Division,
Brig. -Gen. Francis <
C. Barlow.

Second Division,

Brig. -Gen. John

Gibbon.

Third Division,

Maj.-Gen. David

B. Birney.

Fourth Division,

First Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Alex. S. Webb.

Second Brigade. Brig.
Gen. Joshua T. Ow-
en.

Third Brigade, Col.
Samuel S. Carroll.

First Brigade, Brig.
Gen. J. H. H. Ward.

Second Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Alexander Hays.
r First Brigade, Col. Rob-
ert McAllister.

Brig.-Gen.Gershom i Second BrigadCt CoL
Mott- [ Wm. R. Brewster.

Artillery Brigade, Col.
John C. Tidball.

CROSSING THE RAPIDAN

181

John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery
was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This
arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could
not be used to advantage in such a country as we
were destined to pass through. The surplus was
much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the
narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the
forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was
in advance on the right, and marched directly for
Germania Ford, preceded by one division of cavalry,
under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick
followed Warren with the 6th corps. Germania
Ford was nine or ten miles below the right of Lee's

Ma j. Gen. G. K. Warren,

commanding

Fifth Army Corps.

First Division,

Brig. -Gen. Charles

Griffin.

Second Division,

Brig. -Gen. John C.

Robinson.

Third Division,

Brig.-Gen. Samuel

W. Crawford.

Fourth Division,

S. Wadsworth.

First Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Romeyn B.
Ayres.

Second Brigade, Col.
Jacob B. Sweitzer.

Third Brigade, Brig.
Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

First Brigade, Col. Sam-
uel H. Leonard.

Second Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Henry Baxter.

Third Brigade, Col.
Andrew W. Denison.

First Brigade, Col.

Wm. McCandless.
Third Brigade, Col.

Joseph W. Fisher.

First Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Lysander Cut-
ler.

Brig.-Gen. James \ Second Brigade, Brig.-

Gen. James C. Rice.
Third Brigade, Col.
Roy Stone.

Artillery Brigade, Col.
C S. Wainwright.

182

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,

line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another
road, farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles
below Germania, preceded by Gregg's division of
cavalry, and followed by the artillery. Torbert's di-
vision of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for
the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy
from crossing and getting into our rear. The cav-

M a j. -Gen. John Sedgwick,

commanding

Sixth Army Corps.

Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan,

commanding

Cavalry Corps.

First Division,
Brig. -Gen. H. G. «
Wright

Third Division,

Brig.-Gen. James

B. Ricketts.

Second Division,
Brig. -Gen. George ■>
W. Getty.

First Division,
Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. <
Torbcrt.

Second Division,
Brig.-Gen. D.
McM. Gregg.

Third Division,

Brig.-Gen. J. H.

Wilson.

' First Brigade, Col.
Henry \V. Brown.

Second Brigade, Col.
Emory Upton.

Third Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. D. A. Russell.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Alexander Sha-
ler.

" First Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Frank Wheaton.

Second Brigade, Col.
Lewis A. Grant.

Third Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Thos. H. Neill.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Henry L. Eus-
tis.

First Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Wm. H. Morris.

Second Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. T. Seymour.

Artillery Brigade, Col.
C H. Tompkins.

r First Brigade. Brig.-
Gen. G. A. Custer.

Second Brigade, Col.
Thos. C Devin.

Reserve Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Wesley Merritt.

First Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Henry E. Da-
vies, Jr.

Second Brigade. Col. J.
Irvin Gregg.

f First Brigade, Col. T.
I M. Bryan, Jr.
*] Second Brigade, Col.
I Geo. H. Chapman.

CROSSING THE RAPIDAN.

183

airy seized the two crossings before daylight, drove
the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six
o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the
crossing of the infantry and artillery. This was un-
doubtedly a surprise to Lee. The fact that the move*
ment was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at War-
ren ton, guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward
to preserve control of it in case our crossing the

Maj.-Gen. A E. Burnside,
commanding
Ninth Army Corps.

First Division,

Brig. "Gen. T. G.

Stevenson.

Second Division,

Brig.-Gen. Robert

B. Potter.

Third Division,
Brig.-Gen. Orlando
B. Willcox.

Fourth Division,

Brig.-Gen. Edward

Ferrero.

Brig. -Gen. Henry J. Hunt, ^
commanding Artillery.

Reserve,
Col. H. S. Burton.

General Headquarters -

f First Brigade, CoL
Sumner Carruth.
Second Brigade, CoUv^
Daniel Leasure. T^F*

First Brigade, CoL

Zenas R. Bliss.
Second Brigade. CoL

Simon G. Griffin.

First Brigade, CoL John

F. Hartranft.
Second Brigade, CoL

Benj. C Christ.

First Brigade, Col.

Joshua K. Sigfried.
Second Brigade, Col.

Henry G. Thomas.

Provisional Brigade, Col.
Elisha G. Marshall.

First Brigade, Col. J.

H. Kitching. .
Second Brigade, Maj.

J. A. Tompkins
First Brig. Horse Art,

Capt J. M. Robert-
son.
Second Brigade Horse

Art, Capt D. R.

Ransom.
Third Brigade, Maj. R.

H. Fitzhugh.

f Provost Guard, Brig.-
Gen. M. R. Patrick.
Volunteer Engineers,
Brig.-Gen. ft. W.
Benham.

184 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.

Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed,
however, to advance at once on receiving notice that
the army had crossed ; and a dispatch was sent to
him a little after one p.m. giving the information that
our crossing had been successful.

CONFEDERATE ARxMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by General

Robert E. Lee, August 31st, 1864.

First Army Corps : Lieut. -Gen. R. H. Anderson, Commanding.

f Brig. -Gen. Seth NL Barton's Brigade, (a)

Maj.-Gen. Geo. E. Pickett's J " M. D. Corse's

Eppa Hunton'
Wm. R. Terry's

Division. "| " EppaHunton's

Maj.-Gen. C. W. Field's Divi- j **&'?**• £. T. Anderson's Brigade.
e;™» /m 1 *»• M. Law s (c) "

Sl°n'W ( " John Bratton's

Maj.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw's
Division, (d)

Brig. -Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade.
B. G. Humphreys'
Goode Bryan's
Kershaw's (Old)

Second Army Corps : Major-General Jubal A. Early, Commanding.

f Brig. -Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade, (e)
Maj.-Gen. John B. Gordon's I " John Pegram's " (/)

Division. | Gordon's " (^)

L Brig. -Gen. R. F. Hoke's

f Stonewall Brig. (Brig. -Gen. J. A. Walker).

Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson's I uJU.ru.. t \* t » u • a il\
Hividnn 1 Brig. -Gen. J. M. Jones Brigade. (A)

ulylslon- » Geo. H. Stewart's " (A)

{ " L. A. Stafford's '« (*)

" Brig. -Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (1)
Geo. Dole's " (*)
S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
C. A. Battle's
R. D. Johnston's " (/)

NOTB.

(a) Col. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 20th, and probably at above date.

(4) Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Benning's and Gregg's

Brigades.
(c) Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles.

{d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty ; names not indicated.
(*) Constituting York's Brigade.
(/*) In Ramseurs Division.
(/) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding,

and containing tath Georgia Battalion. Organization of the Army

[A) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, ' of the Valley District.

Gordon's Division.
(/) Grimes' Brigade.
<k) Cook's

Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes' Di
vision.

< i

ENTERING THE WILDERNESS. 1 85

The country was heavily wooded at all the points
of crossing, particularly on the south side of the
river. The battle-field from the crossing of the Rap-
idan until the final movement from the Wilderness
toward Spottsylvania was of the same character.
There were some clearings and small farms within
what might be termed the battle-field ; but generally
the country was covered with a dense forest The
roads were narrow and bad. All the conditions
were favorable for defensive operations.

Third Army Corps : Lieut. -Gen. A. P. Hill, Commanding.

' Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.
Mahone's
Brig. -Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m)

A. R. Wright's
Joseph Finegan's

Maj.-Gen. Wm. Mahone's Di- h
vision. (!)

A. R. Wright's

Maj.-Gen. C. M. Wilcox's
Division.

' Brig.-Gen. £. L. Thomas's Brigade (*)
James H. Lane's R
Sam'l McGowan's "
Alfred M. Scale's "

" Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.

Maj.-Gen. H. Heth's Division. <
W

.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigs
John R. Cooke's "
D. McRae's
J. J. Archer's
H. H.

H. H. Walker's "
Unattached : 5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps : Lieuten ant-General Wade Hampton, Commanding. (/)

Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's Di- j Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade,
vision. \ " L. L. Lomax's "

Maj.-Gen. M. C. Butlers Di- j B"6;Gen. John Dunovaitfs Brigade,
vision ) oung s

f " Thomas L. Rosser's "

Maj.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee's Di- j Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade,
vision. \ " J. R. Chambliss's

<«

Note.
(/> Returns report but one general officer present for duty ; name not indicated.

Km) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
(«) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding.
(0> Four brigadier-generals reported present I<

(/) On face
Lee" '

brigadier-generals reported present lor duty ; names not indicated.

ice of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's, Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F.

's Division, ana Dealing's Brigade.

1 86

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

There are two roads, good for that part of Vir-
ginia, running from Orange Court House to the
battle-field. The most southerly of these roads is
known as the Orange Court House Plank Road,
the northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There

Artillery Reserve : Brig. -Gen. W. N.

Pendleton, Commanding.

Cabell's Battalion.

' Manly*s Battery.

1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.

Carleton's Battery.
w Calloway's Battery.

Haskell's Battalion. <t

' Branch's Battery.

Nelson's

Garden's
L Rowan "

Brig. -Gen.
E. P.
Alexander's
Division.*

Hugo's Battalion.

' Smith's Battery.
Moody
Woolfolk "
Parker's "
Taylor's "
Fickling's "

h Martin's "

Gibb's Battalion.

Davidson's Batter}'.
Dickenson's "
[ Otey's

( I

Braxton's Battalion. 4

" Lee Battery.

1st Md. Artillery.

Stafford
b Alleghany "

Cutshaw's Battalion.

[ Charlotteville Artillery.

Staunton
[ Courtney

Brig. -Gen.

A. L.
Long's Divi-
sion.

Carter's Battalion. \
Nelson's Battalion.

Morris Artillery.
Orange "
King William Artillery.
h Jeff Davis

[ Amherst Artillery.

] Milledge

( Fluvauna "

Brown's Battalion. -

Powhatan Artillery.
2d Richmond Howitzers.
3d

Rockbridge Artillery.
fc Salem Flying Artillery.

* But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and Alexander'*
name not on the original.

ENTERING THE WILDERNESS

«87

are also roads from east of the battle-field running
to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancel-
lorsville, branching at Aldrich's ; the western branch
going by Piney Branch Church, Alsops, thence by
the Brock Road to Spottsylvania ; the east branch
goes by Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania. The
Brock Road runs from Germania Ford through
the battle-field and on to the Court House. As
Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up
with numerous roads, some going to the town di-
rect, and others crossing so as to connect the farms
with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House.
From there to Fredericksburg he had the use of
the two roads above described running nearly paral-
lel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facili-

Col. R. L.
Walker's
Division.

Cutt's Battalion.

Richardson's Battalion.

Mcintosh's Battalion.

Pegram's Battalion.

Poague's Battalion.

Ross's Battery.
Patterson's Battery.
Irwin Artillery.

Lewis Artillery.
Donaldsonville Artillery.
Norfolk Light
Huger

Johnson's Battery.

Hardaway Artillery.

Danville

2d Rockbridge Artillery.

Peedee Artillery.
Fredericksburg Artillery.
Letcher "

Purcell Battery.
Crenshaw's Battery.

Madison Artillery.
Albemarle "
Brooke
Charlotte

1 88 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ties, for that country, for concentrating his forces to
his right. These roads strike the road from Ger-
mania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was
assured, the cavalry pushed forward, Wilson's divi-
sion by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, on
the Orange Plank Road ; Gregg to the left towards
Chancellors ville. Warren followed Wilson and
reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took
position there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed
Warren. He was across the river and in camp on
the south bank, on the right of Warren, by sun-
down. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel
with Warren and camped about six miles east of
him. Before night all the troops, and by the even-
ing of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand
wagons, were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than
was the quartermaster's corps with the Army of the
Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that would
have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond,
stretched along in single file and separated as
the teams necessarily would be. when moving, we
could still carry only three days' forage and about
ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of
ammunition. To overcome all difficulties, the chief
quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked
on each wagon the corps badge with the divi-

THE WILDERNESS.

F.oi

rt Brig. Gen. N. Mi

Mij

BrC

B\£%%i

CtiirfofEnsincav

lS6j

I9O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

sion color and the number of the brigade. At a
glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon
belonged could be told. The wagons were also
marked to note the contents : if ammunition,
whether for artillery or infantry ; if forage, whether
grain or hay ; if rations, whether bread, pork,
beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be.
Empty wagons were never allowed to follow the
army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was
empty it would return to the base of supply for a
load of precisely the same article that had been
taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave
the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the
army they would be parked in fields nearest to the
brigades they belonged to. Issues, except of am-
munition, were made at night in all cases. By this
system the hauling of forage for the supply train
was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed
theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops
had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the
front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedgwick's
corps ; and established headquarters for the after-
noon and night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this move-
ment began, to cut down the baggage of officers and
men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding
this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 191

to Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and
overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their
knapsacks ; an improvidence I had never witnessed
before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have
discovered at a very early hour on the morning of
the 4th of May,' that the Army of the Potomac was
moving, evidently did not learn until about one
o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would
confront his army. This I judge from the fact that
at 1. 1 5 p.m., an hour and a quarter after Warren
had reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers
took off rebel signals which, when translated, were
seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their in-
trenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announc-
ing that Sherman, Butler and Crook had moved
according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the
Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet,
each commanding corps, to move to the right to
attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Long-
street to follow on the same road. Longstreet was
at this time — middle of the afternoon — at Gordons-
ville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered
by the Orange Pike. He was near by and arrived
some four miles east of Mine Run before bivouack-
ing for the night.

I92 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

My orders were given through General Meade
for an early advance on the morning of the 5th.
Warren was to move to Parker's store, and
Wilson's cavalry — then at Parkers store — to move
on to Craig's meeting-house. Sedgwick followed
Warren, closing in on his right The Army of the
Potomac was facing to the west, though our
advance was made to the south, except when facing
the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westward
to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to
Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store,
Warren discovered the enemy. He sent word back
to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare
to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division
of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he
could find, to join on to Warren's right, and
Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps,
was ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear
and get on his left. This was the speediest way
to reinforce Warren who was confronting the
enemy on both the Orange plank and turnpike
roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on re-
ceiving word that the Army of the Potomac had
safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night
march, although some of his troops had to march
forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 93

the head of his column early on the morning of
the 5 th.

Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilder-
ness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as
it was light enough to see the road. I remained
to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in
position. Burnside at this time was not under
Meade's command, and was his senior in rank.
Getting information of the proximity of the enemy,
I informed Meade, and without waiting to see
Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters
to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other
occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy
could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were
not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet
reached the point where he was to halt, when he
discovered the enemy near by. Neither party had
any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore,
ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it.
At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered to come up to
the support of Getty. He himself arrived at Getty's
front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the
rear. Getty was directed to hold his position at all
hazards until relieved. About this hour Warren
was ready, and attacked with favorable though not
decisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from
Warren and was in a precarious condition for a time.

Vol. 11. — 13

194 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther
south, and was cut off from the rest of the army.
At two o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive,
and immediately he was ordered to join Getty
and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and
narrow roads prevented him from getting into posi-
tion for attack as promptly as he generally did when
receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again
received his orders to attack, and General Getty
received orders from Meade a few minutes later to
attack whether Hancock was ready or not. He met
the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, com-
manded by Birney and Mott, and later two brigades,
Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.
This was timely and saved Getty. During the
battle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but re-
mained on the field. One of Birney's most gallant
brigade commanders — Alexander Hays — was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three
years, and had served with him through the Mex-
ican war, a portion of the time in the same regi-
ment. He was a most gallant officer, ready to
lead his command wherever ordered. With him it
was " Come, boys," not " Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the
2d division were sent to reinforce Hancock and
Getty ; but the density of the intervening forest was

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 95

such that, there being no road to march upon, they
did not get up with the head of column until night,
and bivouacked where they were without getting
into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's divi-
sion of cavalry to Todd's Tavern in search of Wil-
son. This was fortunate. He found Wilson en-
gaged with a superior force under General Rosser,
supported by infantry, and falling back before it.
Together they were strong enough to turn the
tables upon the enemy and themselves become ag-
gressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back
beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued
until night put a close to it. Neither side made
any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my
orders were given for the following morning. We
knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to
join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might
arrive during the night. I was anxious that the
rebels should not take the initiative in the morning,
and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault
at 4.30 o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour
changed to six. Deferring to his wishes as far as I
was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed
as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the

I96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Potomac. Wadsworth with his division, which had
arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular
to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock.
He was directed to move at the same time, and to
attack Hill's left

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions,
was directed to get in between Warren and Wads-
worth, and attack as soon as he could get in position
to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make
attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy
as they could and to take advantage of any attempt
to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside was
ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's
centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the
right of Lee's army. Hancock was informed of all
the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them — a
colored division — was sent to guard the wagon train,
and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should
be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up.
This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding
the early hour at which I had ordered the assault,
both for the purpose of being the attacking party
and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was
ahead in his assault on our right. His purpose was
evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named,

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 97

but learning in time that Longstreet was moving a
part of his corps by the Catharpin Road, thus threat-
ening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, com-
manded by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to
cover the approaches by which Longstreet was ex-
pected. This disposition was made in time to attack
as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the
Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the right of
it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour,
when the enemy began to break up in great con-
fusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that
opinion now, that if the country had been such that
Hancock and his command could have seen the con-
fusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would
have been taken advantage of so effectually that Lee
would not have made another stand outside of his
Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was or-
dered to attack, but was not able to accomplish
much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to
connect with Hancock's left and attack the enemy's
cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear.
He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and
Brock roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated
them at both places. Later he was attacked, and
again the enemy was repulsed.

I96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (/. S. GRANT.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them — a
colored division — was sent to guard the wagon train,
and he did not see it again until July.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named,

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 97

fusion.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was or-
dered to attack, but was not able to accomplish
much.

I98 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and
Stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road,
still further reinforced his position guarding the
entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident hap-
pened during the day to further induce Hancock to
weaken his attacking column. Word reached him
that troops were seen moving towards him from the
direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade
was detached to meet this new enemy ; but the
troops approaching proved to be several hundred
convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the
road Hancock had advanced upon, to join their re-
spective commands. At 6.50 o'clock a.m., Burnside,
who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock,
was ordered to send a division to the support of
Hancock, but to continue with the remainder of
his command in the execution of his previous order.
The difficulty of making a way through the dense
forests prevented Burnside from getting up in
time to be of any service on the forenoon of the
sixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the
morning, a mile or more. He maintained this po-
sition until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came
upon him. The retreating column of Hill meeting
reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, be-
came encouraged and returned with them. They
were enabled, from the density of the forest, to ap-

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 99

proach within a few hundred yards of our advance
before being discovered Falling upon a brigade of
Hancocks corps thrown to the advance, they swept
it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up
his advantage and soon came upon Mott's division,
which fell back in great confusion. Hancock made
dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after
holding it for a time, fell back into the position that
he had held in the morning, which was strongly in-
trenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wads-
worth while trying to rally his men was mortally
wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The
enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and
Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement.
Longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume com-
mand for many weeks. His loss was a severe one
to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the
mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our
lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee
took command of his right in person. He was not
able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock's
position, and withdrew from our front for the pur-
pose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear
his front of all remnants that might be left of Long-
street's or Hill's commands. This brigade having
been formed at right angles to the intrenchments

200 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

held by Hancock's command, swept down the whole
length of them from left to right. A brigade of the
enemy was encountered in this move ; but it broke
and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fur)-.
Burnside had not yet been able to get up to render
any assistance. But it was now only about nine in
the morning, and he was getting into position on
Hancocks right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left.
His line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours
and opened a heavy fire. This status was main-
tained for about half an hour. Then a part of
Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's di-
vision gave way and retired in disorder. The enemy
under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and
pushed through our line, planting their flags on a
part of the intrenchments not on fire. But owing to
the efforts of Hancock, their success was but tem-
porary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a
double quick with his brigade and drove back the
enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting had continued
from five in the morning sometimes along the whole
line, at other times only in places. The ground
fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-
quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of the
severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this
belt where it was impossible to reach them. The

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 201

woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the
conflagration raged. The wounded who had not
strength to move themselves were either suffocated
or burned to death. Finally the fire communicated
with our breastworks, in places. Being constructed
of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle
still raged, our men firing through the flames until it
became too hot to remain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in con-
fusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore or-
der. These facts, however, were learned subse-
quently, or we would have taken advantage of his
condition and no doubt gained a decisive success.
His troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the
order, which I had given previously to this assault,
for Hancock to attack, because his troops had ex-
hausted their ammunition and did not have time to
replenish from the train, which was at some distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up
an assault during all this time ; but their efforts had
no other effect than to prevent the enemy from
reinforcing his right from the troops in their
front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the
Rapidan to be taken up except one at Germania
Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to
reinforce our left. This left our right in danger of

202 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

being turned, and us of being cut off from all pres-
ent base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his
right and intrenched it for protection against at-
tack. But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early
came out from his lines in considerable force and got
in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the pre-
cautions taken, and created considerable confusion.
Early captured several hundred prisoners, among
them two general officers. The defence, however,
was vigorous ; and night coming on, the enemy was
thrown into as much confusion as our troops, en-
gaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs that if we
had discovered the confusion in his lines we might
have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort
Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early,
continued coming to my headquarters even after
Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to
the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed
with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and
would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew
within their intrenchments. On the morning of the
7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from
Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and
skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find
the position of the enemy. Some went as far as a
mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed
no disposition to come out of his works. There was

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 203

no battle during the day, and but little firing except
in Warren's front ; he being directed about noon to
make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some
sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of
Lee to drive him back. This ended the Battle of
the Wilderness.

CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE — TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SER-
VICE— MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK.

MORE desperate fighting has not been witnessed
on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th

of May. Our victory consisted in having successfully

•

crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an
enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit
We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th,
which, if it had been followed up, must have proven
very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an
advantage ; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood
at the close, the two armies were relatively in about
the same condition to meet each other as when the
river divided them. But the fact of having safely
crossed was a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe.
Those of the Confederates must have been even
more so ; but I have no means of speaking with
accuracy upon this point. The German ia Ford
bridge was transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the
transportation of the wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two

TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE. 205

things connected with all movements of the Army of
the Potomac : first, in every change of position or
halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy
or not, the moment arms were stacked the men in-
trenched themselves. For this purpose they would
build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found
in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt for-
ward on the timber. Thus the digging they did
counted in making a depression to stand in, and in-
creased the elevation in front of them. It was won-
derful how quickly they could in this way construct
defences of considerable strength. When a halt was
made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in
his presence, these would be strengthened or their
positions changed under the direction of engineer
officers. The second was, the use made of the tele-
graph and signal corps. Nothing could be more com-
plete than the organization and discipline of this body
of brave and intelligent men. Insulated wires — insu-
lated so that they would transmit messages in a
storm, on the ground or under water — were wound
upon reels, making about two hundred pounds
weight of wire to each reel. Two men and one mule
were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle on
which this was carried was provided with a rack like
a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised
above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve
freely. There was a wagon, supplied with a tele-

206 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

graph operator, battery and telegraph instruments
for each division, each corps, each army, and one for
my headquarters. There were wagons also loaded
with light poles, about the size and length of a wall
tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end,
used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons
and artillery would not run over them. The mules
thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always
kept with the command they were assigned to. The
operators were also assigned to particular headquar-
ters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to
go into camp all the men connected with this
branch of service would proceed to put up their
wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would
be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the bri-
gade he belonged to, and would be led in a line
parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end
of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off.
When he had walked the length of the wire the
whole of it would be on the ground. This would
be done in rear of every brigade at the same time.
The ends of all the wires would then be joined,
making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole
army. The men, attached to brigades or divisions,
would all commence at once raising the wires with
their telegraph poles. This was done by making a
loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and

TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE. 207

raising the pole to a perpendicular position. At in-
tervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some
other permanent object, so that one pole was suffi-
cient at a place. In the absence of such a support
two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed
at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place.
While this was being done the telegraph wagons
would take their positions near where the headquar-
ters they belonged to were to be established, and
would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes
longer time than it took a mule to walk the length
of its coil, telegraphic communication would be
effected between all the headquarters of the army.
No orders ever had to be given to establish the
telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march. The
men composing this corps were assigned to speci-
fied commands. When movements were made, they
would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize
upon high points of ground giving a commanding
view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall
trees on the highest points if not cleared, and
would denote, by signals, the positions of different
parts of our own army, and often the movements of
the enemy. They would also take off the signals
of the enemy and transmit them. It would some-
times take too long a time to make translations of
intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit

208 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

from them. But sometimes they gave useful infor-
mation.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from
Washington announcing that Sherman had probably
attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler had
reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise
on the 5th. I had given orders for a movement
by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move rap-
idly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get
there.

My order for this movement was as follows :

Headquarters Armies of the U. S.,

May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.
Major-General Meade,

Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take
position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's
Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney
Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to Old
Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown
forward early in the morning to the Ny River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave
Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then
follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move
to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to
Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move
on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and
Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of
destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before
the troops move, and then move off quietly.

210 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy
attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be
prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain,
with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify
these instructions.
All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel
cavalry at Todd's Tavern, but routed them, thus
opening the way for the troops that were to go by
that route at night. Soon after dark Warren with-
drew from the front of the enemy, and was soon fol-
lowed by Sedgwick. Warren's march carried him
immediately behind the works where Hancock's com-
mand lay on the Brock Road. With my staff and
a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops.
Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest
enthusiasm was manifested by Hancocks men as
we passed by. No doubt it was inspired by the
fact that the movement was south. It indicated to
them that they had passed through the "beginning
of the end " in the battle just fought. The cheer-
ing was so lusty that the enemy must have taken
it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him
a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly
heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but
a little way beyond our left when the road forked.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK. 211

We looked to see, if we could, which road Sheridan
had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed
to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it.
We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B.
Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the
engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that
would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too,
should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and
all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported
that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on
would bring us into his lines in a short distance. We
returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indi-
cate the right road to the head of Warren's column
when it should come up, and continued our journey
to Todd's Tavern, where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-
fold : first, I did not want Lee to get back to Rich-
mond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could
get there ; second, I wanted to get between his army
and Richmond if possible ; and, if not, to draw him
into the open field. But Lee, by accident, beat us
to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had been
ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to
march upon before the movement commenced.
Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army
of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed
his government. Accordingly he ordered Long-
street's corps — now commanded by Anderson — to

v;. <*

i*'

*■ >

' *2 1 2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania.
But the woods being still on fire, Anderson could
not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his
destination that night. By this accident Lee got
possession of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say
now what would have been the result if Lees
orders had been obeyed as given; but it is cer-
tain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and
between him and his capital. My belief is that
there would have been a race between the two
armies to see which could reach Richmond first,
and the Army of the Potomac would have had the
shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapi-
I dan we came near closing the campaign, so far as
battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the
James River or Richmond. The first failure was
caused by our not following up the success gained
over Hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as be-
fore described : the second, when fires caused by
that battle drove Anderson to make a march during
the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to
commence on the morning of the 8th. But accident
often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting
during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd's
Tavern until after night, with the field his at the
close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing
Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po

AfOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK. 213

River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get
to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's
orders to Merritt — who was holding the bridge — on

his arrival at Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the
road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson,
who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his
division of cavalry ; but he could not hold it against
the Confederate corps which had not been detained
at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been
but for the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders.
Had he been permitted to execute the orders Sher-
idan gave him, he would have been guarding with
two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po
River which Anderson had to cross, and must have
detained him long enough to enable Warren to
reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself — if indeed the
intrenchments were not already made — immediately
across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of
his presence, but probably supposed it was the cav-
alry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day.
He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He soon
organized his men, as they were not pursued by the
enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his
whole corps. This time he succeeded in gaining a
position immediately in the enemy's front, where
he intrenched. His right and left divisions — the
former Crawford's, the latter Wadsworth's, now com-

214 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

manded by Cutler — drove the enemy back some dis-
tance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced
to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious to crush
Anderson before Lee could get a force to his sup-
port To this end Sedgwick, who was at Piney
Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's support
Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was notified of
Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in
readiness to come up. Burnside, who was with the
wagon trains at Aldrich's on our extreme left, re-
ceived the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in
getting up for some reason — probably unavoidable,
because he was never at fault when serious work was
to be done — so that it was near night before the
combined forces were ready to attack. Even then
all of Sedgwick's command did not get into the en-
gagement. Warren led the last assault, one division
at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold : when he received
an order to do anything, it would at once occur to
his mind how all the balance of the army should be
engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His
ideas were generally good, but he would forget that
the person giving him orders had thought of others
at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he
did get ready to execute an order, after giving most
intelligent instructions to division commanders, he

At 0 VEMENT B Y THE LEFT FLANK. 2 I 5

would go in with one division, holding the others in
reserve until he could superintend their movements
in person also, forgetting that division commanders
could execute an order without his presence. His
difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control.
He was an officer of superior ability, quick percep-
tions, and personal courage to accomplish anything
that could be done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps — now commanded
by Early — to move by the very road we had
marched upon. This shows that even early in the
morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become ac-
quainted with my move, but still thought that the
Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.
Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond
that he had possession of Spottsylvania and was
thus on my flank. Anderson was in possession of
Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, how- ■'.
ever. Early only found that he had been following
us when he rap against Hancock at Todd's Tavern.
His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field
of Spottsylvania for that day ; but he, in like manner,
kept Early back and forced him to move by another
route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the
7th by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in
the lead. It would also have given us an hour or
more earlier start. It took all that time for Warren

2l6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock
after he had got his troops out of their line con-
fronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancocks ca-
pacity to use his whole force when necessary, would,
no doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson be-
fore he could be reinforced. But the movement
made was tactical. It kept the troops in mass
against a possible assault by the enemy. Our left
occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to
the right passed. If an attack had been made by
the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in posi-
tion, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps
in position as reserves, until his entire front was
passed. By a left flank movement the army would
have been scattered while still passing the front of
the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by
it would have been very much exposed. Then, too,
I had not yet learned the special qualifications of
the different corps commanders. At that time my
judgment was that Warren was the^ man I would
suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen
to that gallant soldier to take him from the field.
As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier,
an able man ; and he was beside thoroughly imbued
with the solemnity and importance of the duty he
had to perform.

CHAPTER LIL

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA — HANCOCK^ POSITION —

ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND WRIGHT^ CORPS

UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD GOOD NEWS

FROM BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

THE Mattapony River is formed by the junction
of the Mat, the Ta, the Po and the Ny rivers, the
last being the northernmost of the four. It takes
its rise about a mile south and a little east of the
Wilderness Tavern. The Po rises south-west of the
same place, but farther away. Spottsylvania is on
the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they
are but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches
Spottsylvania without crossing either of these
streams. Lee's army coming up by the Catharpin
Road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. War-
ren and Hancock came by the Brock Road. Sedg-
wick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burn-
side coming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had
to cross the Ny near the enemy. He found pickets
at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a
brigade of Willcoxs division, and the stream was
crossed. This brigade was furiously attacked ; but

2l8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the remainder of the division coming up, they
were enabled to hold their position, and soon
fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack,
word came from Hancock that Early had left his
front. He had been forced over to the Catharpin
Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at
Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan
had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the
8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania.
These movements of the enemy gave me the idea
that Lee was about to make the attempt to get to,
or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies.
I made arrangements to attack his right and get be-
tween him and Richmond if he should try to execute
this design. If he had any such intention it was
abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south
of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but
deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily
wooded and marshy bottoms — at the time we wrere
there — and difficult to cross except where bridged.
The country about was generally heavily timbered,
but with occasional clearings. It was a much better
country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an
offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies
was as follows : Lee occupied a semicircle facing

220 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town.
Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell
came next, then Early. Warren occupied our right,
covering the Brock and other roads converging at
Spottsylvania ; Sedgwick was to his left and Burn-
side on our extreme left Hancock was yet back at
Todd's Tavern, but as soon as it was known that
Early had left Hancock's front the latter was ordered
up to Warren's right He formed a line with three
divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the
afternoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get
on the enemy's flank. The fourth division of Han-
cock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's
when the corps first came up ; but in the after-
noon it was brought up and placed to the left
of Sedgwick's — now Wright's — 6th corps. In the
morning General Sedgwick had been killed near
the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharp-
shooters. His loss was a severe one to the Army
of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H.
G. Wright succeeded him in the command of his
corps.

Hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of May,
across the left flank of Lee's army, but separated
from it, and also from the remainder of Meade's
army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the
hour and the darkness of the night he would have
attempted to cross the river again at Wooden

HANCOCK'S POSITION. 2 2 1

Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with
both friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps
crossed runs nearly due east. Just below his lower
crossing — the troops crossed at three points — it
turns due south, and after passing under Wooden
Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction.
During the night this corps built three bridges over
the Po ; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced
Lee to reinforce his left during the night. Accord-
ingly on the morning of the ioth, when Hancock
renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front,
he found himself confronted by some of Early's
command, which had been brought from the ex-
treme right of the enemy during the night. He
succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade,
however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his
front, no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning
of the ioth, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it
was found that an advantage could be gained. The
enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high
ground overlooking the river, and commanding the
Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson's left
rested on the Po, where it turns south ; therefore,
for Hancock to cross over — although it would bring
him to the same side of the stream with the rest of

222 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the army — would still farther isolate him from it
The stream would have to be crossed twice in the
face of the enemy to unite with the main body.
The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to
meet this movement of Hancock's, and I deter-
mined to take advantage of it Accordingly in the
morning, orders were issued for an attack in the
afternoon on the centre by Warren's and Wright's
corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force.
Two of his divisions were brought to the north side
of the Po. Gibbon was placed to the right of War-
ren, and Birney in his rear as a reserve. Barlow's
division was left south of the stream, and Mott of the
same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps.
Burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in
force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack
with vigor. The enemy seeing Barlow's division
isolated from the rest of the army, came out and
attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the assault with
great slaughter, and with considerable loss to him-
self. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the
assault Birney was now moved to the high ground
overlooking the river crossings built by our troops,
and covered the crossings. The second assault was
repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and
Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation.
General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this move.

ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS 22;$

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to
take place, there was a ravine grown up with large
trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable
by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered
with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon,
reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one
and the second with two divisions. He was repulsed
on both occasions, but gained such information of the
ground as to induce him to report recommending
the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained
a considerably advanced position from the one he
started from. He then organized a storming party,
consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel
Emory Upton, of the 121st New York Volunteers,
to the command of it. About four o'clock in the
afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and
Wright's corps, with Mott's division of Hancocks
corps, to move simultaneously. The movement was
prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of strug-
gles began. The battle-field was so densely covered
with forest that but little could be seen, by any one
person, as to the progress made. Meade and I
occupied the best position we could get, in rear of
Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C.
Rice being among the killed. He was not followed,
however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to

224 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

reorganize his command as soon as covered from the
guns of the enemy. To the left our success was de-
cided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action
of Mott. Upton with his assaulting party pushed for-
ward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. Turn-
ing to the right and left he captured several guns and
some hundreds of prisoners. Mott was ordered to
his assistance but failed utterly. So much time was
lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the
right position to reinforce, that I ordered Upton to
withdraw ; but the officers and men of his command
were so averse to giving up the advantage they had
gained that I withdrew the order. To relieve them,
I ordered a renewal of the assault. By this time Han-
cock, who had gone with Birney's division to relieve
Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him.
His corps was now joined with Warren's and Wright's
in this last assault It was gallantly made, many
men getting up to, and over, the works of the
enemy ; but they were not able to hold them. At
night they were withdrawn. Upton brought his pris-
oners with him, but the guns he had captured he was
obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important
advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and
dash possessed by him lost it to us. Before leaving
Washington I had been authorized to promote offi-
cers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By
this authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-gen-

UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD. 22 5

eral upon Upton on the spot, and this act was con-
firmed by the President. Upton had been badly
wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few
hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, com-
pletely turning Lee's right He was not aware of
the importance of the advantage he had gained,
and I, being with the troops where the heavy fight-
ing was, did not know of it at the time. He had
gained his position with but little fighting, and
almost without loss. Burnside's position now sepa-
rated him widely from Wright's corps, the corps
nearest to him. At night he was ordered to join on
to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost
to us an important advantage. I attach no blame to
Burnside for this, but I do to myself for not having
had a staff officer with him to report to me his posi-
tion.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line
at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the
single instance of his attack on Barlow. Then he
was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an
entire corps against two brigades. Barlow took up
his bridges in the presence of this force.

On the nth there was no battle and but little
firing; none except by Mott who made a reconnois-
sance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the
enemy's line.

Vol. ii. — 15

226 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck :

Near Spottsylvania C. H.,

May ii, 1864— 8.30 a. M.

Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army,

Washington, D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The re-
sult up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been
heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time
eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably
twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be
greater — we having taken over foui thousand prisoners in battle,
whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. I am
now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply
of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this
line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to
the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in
as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain
was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more
convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad
to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up
to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers,
and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's
army being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

And also, I received information, through the War
Department, from General Butler that his cavalry
under Kautz had cut the railroad south of Peters-

GOOD NEWS frROM BUTLER AND SHERIDAN 227

burg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and
had whipped Hill, killing, wounding and capturing
many. Also that he was intrenched, and could
maintain himself. On this same day came news from
Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten
miles of the railroad and telegraph between Lee and
Richmond, one and a half million rations, and most
of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to
cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and pass
around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry
and communications, which was successfully exe-
cuted in the manner I have already described.

CHAPTER LIII.

Hancock's assault — losses of the confederates

■PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED DISCOMFITURE OF

THE ENEMY EWELL's ATTACK REDUCING THE

ARTILLERY.

IN the reconnoissance made by Mott on the nth,
a salient was discovered at the right centre. I
determined that an assault should be made at that
point.* Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was
ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren
and Wright, under cover of night, to Wright's left,
and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the
next morning. The night was dark, it rained heav-
ily, and the road was difficult, so that it was mid-
night when he reached the point where he was to

* Headquarters Armies U. S.,

May II, 1864.— 3 P.M.
Major-General Meade,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5 th and
6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a
vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. I
will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burn-
side, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT. 229

halt. It took most of the night to get the men in
position for their advance in the morning. The men
got but little rest. Burnside was ordered to attack *
on the left of the salient at the same hour. I sent
two of my staff officers to impress upon him the
importance of pushing forward vigorously. Han-
cock was notified of this. Warren and Wright were
ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in
the assault if circumstances made it advisable. I
occupied a central position most convenient for re-
ceiving information from all points. Hancock put

vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as
close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion
caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents
itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last
evening would have proved entirely successful if it had com-
menced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by

Mott's division and the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

* Headquarters, Armies U. S.,
May ii, 1864. — 4 p.m.
Major-General A. E. Burnside,

Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps
under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the
enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. You will move against the
enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor
at precisely 4 o'clock a. m. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let your
preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy
and veiled entirely from the enemy.

23O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT,

Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to
his right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was
held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying
the start more than half an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass
to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily
wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the
enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there
was also a marsh to cross. But, notwithstanding all
these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time
without firing a gun, and when within four or five
hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud
cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the
breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost
simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand
conflict took place. The men of the two sides were
too close together to fire, but used their guns as
clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock's

I send two of my staff officers ; Colonels Comstock and Bab-
cock, in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted
with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain
with you and General Hancock with instructions to render you
every assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright
will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take ad-
vantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and
will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT.

23I

corps captured some four thousand prisoners —
among them a division and a brigade commander —
twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons,
and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms,
and many colors. Hancock, as soon as the hand-
to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the
enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel
lines. About six o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to
the support of Hancock's. Burnside, on the left,
had advanced up east of the salient to the very
parapet of the enemy. Potter, commanding one of
his divisions, got over but was not able to remain
there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the
enemy ; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee
could not afford to leave us in full possession of.
He made the most strenuous efforts to regain the
position he had lost. Troops were brought up from
his left and attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock
was forced to fall back : but he did so slowly, with
his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,
until behind the breastworks he had captured.
These he turned, facing them the other way, and
continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to rein-
force Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was
wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish
the command of his corps, although the fighting
lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At eight

232 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. S GRANT.

o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so
slow in making his dispositions that his orders were
frequently repeated, and with emphasis. At eleven
o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve
Warren from his command if he failed to move
promptly. Hancock placed batteries on high ground
in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing
over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a
positive nature, but negatively a great deal. He
kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from that
quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had
been as prompt as Wright was with the 6th corps,
better results might have been obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the
broken point of his line. Five times during the
day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging
our troops from their new position. His losses
must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents
would be separated by but a few feet. In one place
a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely
down by musket balls. All the trees between the
lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and
musketry. It was three o'clock next morning before
the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then
been twenty hours under fire. In this engagement
we did not lose a single organization, not even a
company. The enemy lost one division with its

LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES. 233

commander, one v brigade and one regiment, with
heavy losses elsewhere.* Our losses were heavy,
but, as stated, no whole company was captured. At
night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,
and by the following morning he was strongly in-
trenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up,
Cutler's division sent to Wright, and Griffin's to
Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, General
Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the re-
maining division, and authorized him to give it
orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line
from wing to wing continuously. About the centre
stood a house which proved to be occupied by an
old lady and her daughter. She showed such un-
mistakable signs of being strongly Union that I

* Headquarters Armies U. S.,

May 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m.
Major-General Halleck,

Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and
four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, includ-
ing two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. The
enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. We
have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we
have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade
(Doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

234 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. & GRANT.

stopped. She said she had not seen a Union flag
for so long a time that it did her heart good to
look upon it again. She said her husband and son,
being Union men, had had to leave early in the war,
and were now somewhere in the Union army, if alive.
She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered
rations issued to her, and promised to find out if I
could where the husband and son were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a
little skirmishing between Mott's division and the
enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be moving out,
and I did not want him to go without my knowing
it. The indications were that he was moving, but
it was found that he was only taking his new posi-
tion back from the salient that had been captured.
Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was
reduced to a brigade, and assigned to Birney's divi-
sion.

During this day I wrote to Washington recom-
mending Sherman and Meade * for promotion to the

* Spottsylvania C. H., May 13, 1864.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War,

Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made
for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles,
to wit : Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General
John Gibbon to be Major-Generals ; Colonel S. S. Carroll, 8th
Ohio Volunteers ; Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York Volunteers;

PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED. 235

grade of Major-General in the regular army ; Han-
cock for Brigadier-General ; Wright, Gibbon and
Humphreys to be Major-Generals of Volunteers ;
and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers. Upton
had already been named as such, but the appoint-
ment had to be confirmed by the Senate on the nomi-
nation of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were
moved by the rear to the left of Burnside. The
night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads
were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and

Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, to be
Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.
S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His
services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recogni-
tion. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims
of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend
his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also ask to have
General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth Army
Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Hum-
phreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expecta-
tions. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands
I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded
by promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army
the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally
gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this
time without seeing both.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

236 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through.
It was midnight before they got to the point where
they were to halt, and daylight before the troops
could be organized to advance to their position in
line. They gained their position in line, however,
without any fighting, except a little in Wrights front
Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which
we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed
to yield. Upton first drove the enemy, and was then
repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support with
his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the
position was secured and fortified. There was no
more battle during the 14th. This brought our line
east of the Court House and running north and south
and facing west.

During the night of the I4th-i5th Lee moved to
cover this new front. This left Hancock without an
enemy confronting him. He was brought to the
rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any
direction he might be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill.
The former reported the capture of the outer works
at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and that his
cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of
Richmond on the Danville road : and the latter, the
destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West
Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day

DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY. 237

news came from Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman
had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and was
following him south. The report from Sheridan
embraced his operations up to his passing the outer
defences of Richmond. The prospect must now have
been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph
were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and
wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital.
Temporarily that city was cut off from all communica-
tion with the outside except by courier. This con-
dition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.
I wrote Halleck :

Near Spottsylvania C. H.,
May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

Washington, D. C. :

We have had five days almost constant rain without any pros-
pect yet of it clearing up. The roads have now become so im-
passable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run
between here and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations neces-
sarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather.
The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence

of ultimate success.

******

You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the
elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no
manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing

238 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

was done on the 1 7th. But that night Hancock and
Wright were to make a night march back to their
old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock
in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to
protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful.
On this day (18th) the news was almost as dis-
couraging to us as it had been two days before in
the rebel capital. As stated above, Hancock's and
Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault.
News came that Sigel had been defeated at New
Market, badly, and was retreating down the valley.
Not two hours before, I had sent the inquiry to
Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton
to stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I
asked at once that Sigel might be relieved, and
some one else put in his place. Hunter's name
was suggested, and I heartily approved. Further
news from Butler reported him driven from Drury's
Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg
road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, re-
lieved, and Canby put in his place. This change
of commander was not on my suggestion. All this
news was very discouraging. All of it must have
been known by the enemy before it was by me. In
fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been
known to him at the moment I thought he was in
despair, and his anguish had been already relieved
when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture.

E WELL* S ATTACK. 239

But this was no time for repining. I immediately
gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on
towards Richmond, to commence on the night of
the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the co-
operation of the navy in changing our base of sup-
plies from Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the
Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements,
except six thousand raw troops under Brigadier-
General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived They had not
yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were
on our right This corps had been brought to the
rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction.
Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and
seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved E well's
corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's
as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. Tyler
had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been
halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitch-
ing's brigade of Warren's corps. Tyler received
the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained
their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy
of veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily,
and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make
dispositions. Birney was thrown to Tyler's right and
Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve ; and
Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

ZJO P£Jt3QXAL MEJtcrss ZJ C- S. G* 4 vr

Warren had been ordered to gee oa Ew^ITs ttank
and in his rear, to cut hrn oE from, his intrench-
ments. Bat his efforts were so feeble that under
the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss
of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and
wounded. The army being engaged until after dark.
I rescinded the order for the march bv our left flank
that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were
coming out to attack. I naturally supposed they
would detach a force to destroy our trains. The
withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered
one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over
which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded
by a division of colored troops, commanded by Gen-
eral Ferrero, belonging to Burnside s corps* Ferrero
was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to
throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be
prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if
he had to retreat to do so towards Fredericksburg.
The enemy did detach as expected, and captured
twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were
soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen
us in the past few days, Lee could be reinforced
largely, and I had no doubt he would be. Beaure-
gard had come up from the south with troops to
guard the Confederate capital when it was in dan-

REDUCING THE ARTILLERY. 24 1

ger. Butler being driven back, most of the troops
could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed
in North Carolina ; and Sigels troops having gone
back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could
be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles con-
vinced me that we had more artillery than could ever
be brought into action at any one time. It occu-
pied much of the road in marching, and taxed the
trains in bringing up forage. Artillery is very use-
ful when it can be brought into action, but it is a
very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used.
Before%leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back
to the defences of Washington over one hundred
pieces of artillery, with the .horses and caissons.
This relieved the roads over which we were to
march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and
still left us more artillery than could be advantage-
ously used. In fact, before reaching the James
River I again reduced the artillery with the army
largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was ex-
posed on the road to Richmond, and at a distance
from the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack
the exposed corps before reinforcements could come
up ; in which case the main army could follow Lee
up and attack him before he had time to intrench.
So I issued the following orders :

Vol. 11.—16

242 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

.VANIA C. H., VA.f )

1 8, 1864. )

Near Spottsylvania
May

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock
and Burnside from the position they now hold, and put Burnside
to the left of Wright. Wright and Burnside should then force
their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a gen-
eral engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will
come out of their works to fight, and intrench. Hancock should
march and take up a position as if in support of the two left
corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be
moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can
be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the
Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in
whatever force he can find him. If the enemy make a general
move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps
of the army, and attacked^ if possible, before time is given to
intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and sur-
plus artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out
of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank
movement, to commence after night.

CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK — BATTLE OF NORTH
ANNA — AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH — MOVING ON
RICHMOND — SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY — POSITION
OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

WE were now to operate in a different country
from any we had before seen in Virginia. The
roads were wide and good, and the country well cul-
tivated. No men were seen except those bearing
arms, even the black man having been sent away.
The country, however, was new to us, and we had
neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads
were, or where they led to. Engineer and staff offi-
cers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the
place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring
they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity
of each army corps. Our course was south, and we
took all roads leading in that direction which would
not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly
to Guiney's Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad,
thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford.
He was at Milford by the night of the 21st Here

244 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

he met a detachment of Pickett's division coming
from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speed-
ily driven away, and several hundred captured.
Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and
reached Guiney's Station that night without moles-
tation. Burnside and Wright were retained at
Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an in-
tended assault, and to hold Lee, if possible, while
Hancock and Warren should get start enough to in-
terpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the
initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside
alone, or by following by the Telegraph Road and
striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even
Hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come
up. But he did not avail himself of either oppor-
tunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my
designs ; but moved by his interior line — the Tele-
graph Road — to qjake sure of keeping between his
capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never
again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy
blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved
out followed by Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was
to take the Telegraph Road ; but finding Stanard's
Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned
east to the road taken by Hancock and Warren with-
out an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night

BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA. 245

of the 2 1 st I had my headquarters near the 6th
corps, at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry
was between us and Hancock. There was a slight
attack on Burnside's and Wrights corps as they
moved out of their lines ; but it was easily repulsed.
The object probably was only to make sure that we
were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of
the Confederates.

By the morning of the 2 2d Burnside and Wright
were at Guiney's Station. Hancock's corps had now
been marching and fighting continuously for several
days, not having had rest even at night much of the
time. They- were, therefore, permitted to rest dur-
ing the 2 2d. But Warren was pushed to Harris's
Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with
it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New
Bethel Church. Wright's corps was still back at
Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of
the troops the next day :

New Bethel, Va., May 22, 1864.
Major-General Meade,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to
march at fixe a.m. to-morrow. At that hour each command will
send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading
south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond
the South Anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of
the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the

246 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna,
as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps
will be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The
map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but,
no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides,
others can be found, to give one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties.
The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to
Jericho Ford, Wright's following. Warren arrived at
the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock
effected a crossing under the protection of sharp-
shooters. The men had to wade in water up to
their waists. As soon as enough troops were over
to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artil-
lery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line
formed was almost perpendicular to the course of
the river — Crawford on the left, next to the river,
Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee
was found intrenched along the front of their line.
The whole of Hill's corps was sent against Warren's
right before it had got in position. A brigade of
Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy follow-
ing, but assistance coming up the enemy was in
turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss

248 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRAXT.

in killed and wounded, with about five hundred pris-
oners left in our hands. By night Wright's corps
was up ready to reinforce Warren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the
wooden bridge which spans the North Anna River
just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad
crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived.
They found the bridge guarded, with troops in-
trenched, on the north side. Hancock sent two
brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left,
and when properly disposed they charged simultane-
ously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy
retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved
into the river, and some of them were drowned. Sev-
eral hundred prisoners were captured. The hour
was so late that Hancock did not cross until next
morning.

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road
running between those described above, and which
strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway be-
tween Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour
of its arrival was too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south
side of the river without opposition, and formed line
facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was taken
possession of and destroyed as far as possible.
Wright's corps crossed at Jericho early the same day,
and took position to the right of Warren's corps,

BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA. 249

extending south of the Virginia Central Railroad.
This road was torn up for a considerable distance to
the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent
and twisted by heating them over the burning ties.
It was found, however, that Burnside's corps could
not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with
his centre on the river at this point, with the two
wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle
where it overlooked the river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's
line was accurately known, I directed Hancock and
Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford by the
south side of the river. They found the enemy too
strong to justify a serious attack. A third ford was
found between Ox Ford and Jericho. Burnside was
directed to cross a division over this ford, and to
send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was
crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed
up the river to connect with Crawford's left. Potter
joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge.
Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of
Hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heav-
ily. When joined to Warren's corps he was no
further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford
from the north side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North
Anna. Our lines covered his front, with the six
miles separating the two wings guarded by but a

25O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

single division. To get from one wing to the other
the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could
reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in
a very short march ; or could concentrate the whole
of it wherever he might choose to assault We
were, for the time, practically two armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being rein-
forced, largely. About this time the very troops
whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or were
coming in. Pickett with a full division from Rich-
mond was up ; Hoke from North Carolina had come
with a brigade ; and Breckinridge was there : in all
probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But
he did not attempt to drive us from the field.

On the 2 2d or 23d I received dispatches from
Washington saying that Sherman had taken Kings-
ton, crossed the Etowah River and was advancing
into Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine
plantation house waiting for Burnside's corps to pass.
Meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were
with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and
an elderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing us,
came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber
rattling as he walked. He touched his hat politely
to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they
had never seen so many " live Yankees " before in
their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly

AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH. 25 1

saying, " Oh yes, I have; many more." "Where?"
said Burnside. " In Richmond." Prisoners, of course,
was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received.
This threw the younger lady into tears. I found
the information she had received (and I suppose
it was the information generally in circulation
through the South) was that Lee was driving us
from the State in the most demoralized condition,
and that in the South-west our troops were but little
better than prisoners of war. Seeing our troops
moving south was ocular proof that a part of her
information was incorrect, and she asked me if my
news from Sherman was true. I assured her that
there was no doubt about it I left a guard to
protect the house from intrusion until the troops
should have all passed, and assured her that if her
husband was in hiding she could bring him in and
he should be protected also. But I presume he was
in the Confederate army.

On the 25 th I gave orders, through Halleck, to
Hunter, who had relieved Sigel, to move up the
Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to
Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if pos-
sible, living upon the country and cutting the rail-
roads and canal as he went. After doing this .he
could find his way back to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was

252 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

falling back on Richmond This proved not to be
true. But we could do nothing where we were un-
less Lee would assume the offensive. I determined,
therefore, to draw out of our present position and
make one more effort to get between him and Rich-
mond. I had no expectation now, however, of suc-
ceeding in this ; but I did expect to hold him far
enough west to enable me to reach the James River
high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army
of the Potomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Wash-
ington of the position of the two armies ; of the re-
inforcements the enemy had received ; of the move
I proposed to make ; * and directed that our base of

* Quarles' Mills, Va., May 26, 1864.
Major-General Halleck,

Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows : Lee's
right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg
road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox
Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little River
guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps and one
division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford and covers
the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th corps is on
the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and
below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that
it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility.
The 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from
the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford
to Little River, and parallel with and near to the enemy.

MOVING ON RICHMOND. 253

supplies should be shifted to White House, on the
Pamunkey. The wagon train and guards moved
directly from Port Royal to White House. Sup-
plies moved around by water, guarded by the navy.
Orders had previously been sent, through Halleck,

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaugh-
ter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the
enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible on
account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him
by the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna
River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the
movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined there-
fore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover
Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still
where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, be-
longing to the right wing of our army, and one division of that
wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and
moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this di-
vision with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for
Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The balance of
the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rap-
idly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south
bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing.

Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take
show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A
battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our
men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and
attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that
our success over Lee's army is already assured. The promptness
and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has

254 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House.
This order was repeated on the 25th, with directions
that they should be landed on the north side of the
Pamunkey, and marched until they joined the Army
of the Potomac

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the
Army of the Potomac from its position south of the
North Anna in the presence of the enemy. To ac-
complish it I issued the following order :

Quarles' Mills, Va., May 25, 1864.
Major General Meade,

Commanding A. P.
Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams
and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-mor-
row. Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the
road to Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention

contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our
men, and to break down that of the enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fred-
ericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north of
Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to
import rail from elsewhere.

Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover Town it will prob-
ably be necessary for us to move on down the Pamunkey until a
crossing is effected. I think it advisable therefore to change our
base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House. I wish you
would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the
railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery

and leave men to hold it

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY. 255

to the fact. Send with it Wright's best division or division under
his ablest commander. Have their places filled up in the line so
if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the
cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem
necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and
Taylor's Ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at
these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. As soon as it
is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first
from Wright's corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town,
taking with them no teams to impede their march. At the same
time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and
6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the
same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with
Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where
they will be handy to support Hancock if. necessary, or will be
that much on their road to follow the 5 th and 6th corps. Han-
cock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as
the way is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave nothing for him
to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare
artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon
as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get possession of
all the crossings they can in that neighborhood, t think it would
be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's
left, to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from
the left and moved by our right south to Little
River. Here he manoeuvred to give the impression
that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's
army.

256 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Under cover of night our right wing was with-
drawn to the north side of the river, Lee being com-
pletely deceived by Wilson's feint *On the after-
noon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's
and Torbert's cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's
fords towards Hanover. As soon as it was dark
both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry,
leaving small guards behind to keep up the impres-
sion that crossings were to be attempted in the
morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of
infantry under General Russell. On the morning
of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little
loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken pris-
oners. Thus a position was secured south of the
Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavairy
pushed on to Hanover Town. Here Barringer's,
formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was en-
countered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the
rear of Burnside's and Hancock's corps. When out
of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets
confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed
last, watching all the fords until everything had re-
crossed ; then taking up the pontoons and destroy-
ing other bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this
move. The one nearest to and north of the North

Field of Operations

Pamunkey and the James Rivers.

258 PEZSOS'AL MEMOIRS OF l\ SL GRAXT.

Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed
by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved
by a road farther north, and longer. The trains
moved by a road still farther north, and had to
travel a still greater distance. All the troops that
had crossed the Pamunkey on the morning of the
27th remained quiet during the rest of the day.
while the troops north of that stream marched to
reach the crossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our move-
ment from North Anna ; for on the morning of the
27th he telegraphed to Richmond : •' Enemy crossed
to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at
Hanover Town." The troops that had then crossed
left his front the night of the 25th.

The country' we were now in was a difficult one to
move troops over. The streams were numerous,
deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into
swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of
trees and underbrush. The banks were generally
low and marshy, making the streams difficult to
approach except where there were roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Rich-
mond. There are two roads leading there ; the
most direct and shortest one crossing the Chicka-
hominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Cen-
tral Railroad, the second going by New and Old
Cold Harbor. A few miles out from Hanover

SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY. 259

Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville
to Richmond. New Cold Harbor was important to
us because while there we both covered the roads
back to White House (where our supplies came
from), and the roads south-east over which we would
have to pass to get to the James River below the
Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an
early start, and by noon all had crossed except
Burnsides corps. This was left on the north side
temporarily to guard the large wagon train. A line
was at once formed extending south from the river,
Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's in the centre,
and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy
if he should come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to re-
connoitre towards Mechanicsville to find Lee's
position. At Hawes' Shop, just where the middle
road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he en-
countered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and
partially intrenched. Gregg attacked with his di-
vision, but was unable to move the enemy. In the
evening Custer came up with a brigade. The attack
was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and
charging as infantry. This time the assault was suc-
cessful, both sides losing a considerable number of
men. But our troops had to bury the dead, and
found that more Confederate than Union soldiers

260 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. CRAXT.

had been killed. The position was easily held, be-
cause our infantry was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force,
to find the position of Lee. Wrights corps pushed
to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corps pushed
toward Totopotomoy Creek ; Warren's corps to the
left on the Shady Grove Church Road, while Burn-
side was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed
forward three miles on the left with but little fight-
ing. There was now an appearance of a movement
past our left flank, and Sheridan was sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopot-
omoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified.
Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps,
and Burnside was brought forward and crossed,
taking position to the left of Hancock. Warren
moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady
Grove Church Road. There was some skirmishing
along the centre, and in the evening Early attacked
Warren with some vigor, driving him back at first,
and threatening to turn our left flank. As the
best means of reinforcing the left, Hancock was
ordered to attack in his front He carried and
held the rifle-pits. While this was going on War-
ren got his men up, repulsed Early, and drove
him more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the
pontoons in Washington to be sent to City Point.

^^£59%2jJ

: i SHOWING

AfBdnimptwain,

21 I804--5.

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262 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of
Smith with his corps at White House. I notified
Meade, in writing, as follows :

Near H awes' Shop, Va.,

6.40 p.m.. May 30, 1864.

Major-General Meade,

Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House to-
night and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early
hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. It is not improbable
that the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling
to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a
dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. Sher-
idan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well
out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the Mechanicsville road.
Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's right, so that, if it
becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily
whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if neces-
sary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a bri-
gade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communi-
cate with Smith and to return with him. I will send orders for
Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. GRANT.

I also notified Smith of his danger, and the pre-
cautions that would be taken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substan-
tially from Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central
Railroad south and east to the vicinity of Cold Har-
bor. Ours was : The left of Warren's corps was
on the Shady Grove Road, extending to the Me-

POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. 263

chanicsville Road and about three miles south of
the Totopotomoy. Burnside to his right, then
Hancock, and Wright on the extreme right, ex-
tending towards Hanover Court House, six miles
south-east of it. Sheridan with two divisions of
cavalry was watching our left front towards Cold
Harbor. Wilson with his division on our right was
sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad and
destroy it as far back as possible. He got possession
of Hanover Court House the next day after a skir-
mish with Young's cavalry brigade. The enemy at-
tacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were
sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the
enemy followed some distance towards Cold Harbor.

CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR — AN ANECDOTE OF THE
WAR — BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR — CORRESPONDENCE
WITH LEE — RETROSPECTIVE.

ON the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold
Harbor. He found it intrenched and occupied
by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued but
the place was carried. The enemy well knew the
importance of Cold Harbor to us, and seemed de-
termined that we should not hold it. He returned
with such a large force that Sheridan was about
withdrawing without making any effort to hold it
against such odds ; but about the time he com-
menced the evacuation he received orders to hold
the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could
be sent to him. He speedily turned the rebel works
to face against them and placed his men in position
for defence. Night came on before the enemy was
ready for assault.

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening
to march directly to Cold Harbor passing by the rear
of the army. It was expected to arrive by daylight
or before ; but the night was dark and the distance

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR. 265

great, so that it was nine o'clock the ist of June
before it reached its destination. Before the arrival
of Wright the enemy had made two assaults on
Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy
loss to the enemy. Wright's corps coming up, there
was no further assault on Cold Harbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House,
was also directed to march directly to Cold Harbor,
and was expected early on the morning of the ist of
June ; but by some blunder the order which reached
Smith directed him to Newcastle instead of Cold
Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did not reach
his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon,
and then with tired and worn-out men from their
long and dusty march. He landed twelve thousand
five hundred men from Butler's command, but a divi-
sion was left at White House temporarily and many
men had fallen out of ranks in their long march.

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our
right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal
and Confederate, were so close together at that
point that either side could detect directly any move-
ment made by the other. Finding at daylight that
Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that
he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after
light on the ist of June Anderson, who commanded
the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along War-
ren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigor-

266 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF L\ S. GRANT.

ously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out
and get on his front Warren fired his artillery at the
enemy ; but lost so much time in making ready that
the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported
the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and
besides his lines were so long that he had no mass
of troops to move with. He seemed to have for-
gotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves
while their defenders are fighting in their front
Wright reconnoitred some distance to his front:
but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor already
taken had halted and fortified some distance west

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith
were ready to make an assault In front of both the
ground was clear for several hundred yards, and
then became wooded. Both charged across this
open space and into the wood, capturing and holding
the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also captur-
ing seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged War-
ren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed
each time with loss. There was no officer more
capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than War-
ren when the enemy forced him to it. There was
also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps
at the same time ; but it was feeble and probably
only intended to relieve Anderson who was being
pressed by Wright and Smith.

268 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

During the night the enemy made frequent at-
tacks with the view of dispossessing us of the im-
portant position we had gained, but without effect-
ing their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during
the night and ordered to the left of Wright I ex-
pected to take the offensive on the morning of the
2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so
excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep,
that the head of column only reached Old Cold
Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30
a.m. Preparations were made for an attack in the
afternoon, but did not take place until the next
morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left to
connect with Smith : Hancock's corps was got into
position to the left of Wright's, and Burnside was
moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While
Warren and Burnside were making these changes
the enemy came out several times and attacked them,
capturing several hundred prisoners. The attacks
were repulsed, but not followed up as they should
have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed
Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they
should seize all such opportunities when they oc-
curred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres
being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy
out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon

A HrAR ANECDOTE. 269

the Virginia Central Railroad, having damaged it
considerably. But, like ourselves, the rebels had
become experts in repairing such damage. Sher-
man, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his cam-
paign to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The
rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and
obstruct his communications had become so dis-
gusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few
hours after a bridge had been burned, that they pro-
posed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. One
of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries
duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as
fast as you can blow them up ; better save your
powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks
of the Chickahominy, to find crossings and the con-
dition of the roads. He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make
his line correspond to ours. His lines extended
now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor.
Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor
to the Chickahominy, with a division of cavalry
guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the
3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock,
Wright and Smith ; but Warren and Burnside were
to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack
with great earnestness if he should either rein-
force more threatened points by drawing from that

27O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present

itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points
in their respective fronts where they would make
their assaults. The move was to commence at half-
past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow
and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with
Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with
great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and
musketry, through thickets and swamps. Notwith-
standing all the resistance of the enemy and the
natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a posi-
tion occupied by the enemy outside their main line
where the road makes a deep cut through a bank
affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had
been made for that purpose. Three pieces of ar-
tillery had been captured here, and several hun-
dred prisoners. The guns were immediately turned
against the men who had just been using them. No

Near Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.
Major-General Meade,

Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,
suspend the offensive ; but when one does succeed, push it vigor-
ously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from
wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the
course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR. 2JI

assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched
under fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon
was not so fortunate in his front. He found the
ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep
ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his
men struggled on until some of them got up to the
very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained
ground much nearer the enemy than that which he
left, and here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the
outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished
nothing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer
rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this
corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed
of any over which charges were made. An open
plain intervened between the contending forces at
this point, which was exposed both to a direct and
a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine run-
ning towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect
men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a di-
rect fire, put Martindale's division in it, and with
Brooks supporting him on the left and Devens on
the right succeeded in gaining the outer — probably
picket — rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also ad-
vanced and gained ground — which brought the
whole army on one line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without
benefit to compensate : but the enemy was not

272 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him
to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the
battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposi-
tion to leave his defences far behind him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven
in the morning. At eleven o'clock I started to visit
all the corps commanders to see for myself the dif-
ferent positions gained and to get their opinion of
the practicability of doing anything more in their
respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the
enemy was too strong to make any further assault
promise success. Wright thought he could gain the
lines of the enemy, but it would require the co-
operation of Hancock's and Smith's corps. Srhith
thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine :
Burnside thought something could be done in his
front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore,
to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve
directed in the following letter that all offensive
action should cease.

Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864. — 12.30 p. m.
Major-General Meade,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of
success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspen-
sion of farther advance for the present. Hold our most ad-
vanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive
our line may be contracted from the right if practicable.

BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR. 273

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and
advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches.
To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary
that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the
former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effect-
ually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrench-
ments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the
enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all

should be ready to resist an assault.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

The remainder of the day was spent in strength-
ening the line we now held. By night we were as
strong against Lee as he was against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right
front, abandoning some of their wounded, and with-
out burying their dead. These we were able to care
for. But there were many dead and wounded men
between the lines of the contending forces, which
were now close together, who could not be cared
for without a cessation of hostilities.

So I wrote the following :

Cold Harbor, Va., June 5, 1864.
General R. E. Lee,

Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of
both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines
occupied respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dic-
tate that some provision should be made to provide against such
Vol. 11. — 18

274 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no
battle is raging; either party be authorized to send to any point
between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters
to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the
other party. Any other method, equally fair to both parties, you
may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut-General.

Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement
would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that
in future, when either party wished to remove their
dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent I an-
swered this immediately by saying :

Cold Harbor, Va.,/***6, 1864.
General R. £. Lee,

Commanding Army of N. Va.

"Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will

send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded

between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you

be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this

be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. I will direct

all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go

beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on

ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

Lee's response was that he could not consent to
the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded
in the way I proposed, but when either party desired
such permission it should be asked for by flag of

CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE. 2/5

truce ; and he had directed that any parties I may
have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be
turned back. I answered :

Cold Harbor. Va t June 6, 1864.
General R. E. Lee,

Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want
of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a sus-
pension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two
hours. Permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for
this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be ex-
tended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same
duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting
the correspondence brought it to the 7th of June —
forty-eight hours after it commenced — before parties
were got out to collect the men left upon the field.
In the meantime all but two of the wounded had
died. And I wrote to Lee :

Cold Harbor, Vk^June 7, 1864.

10.30 A.M.
Gen. R. E. Lee,

Commanding Army of N. Va.
I regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been
received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was de-
livered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of
the dead and wounded had expired ; 10.45 PM- was tne nour at
which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven
and twelve it reached my headquarters. As a consequence, it

**** :, ^

V.6

/^~' ^-*-^^*

276 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. ■

was not understood by the troops of this army that there was, a
cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and
wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six men
of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in
search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were
captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of under-
standing. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned
the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners,
but must be returned to their commands. These officers and
men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear,
I have not determined whether they will be sent back the way
they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of
wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nuga-
tory, I remain, &c,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant- General.

I have always regretted that the last assault at
Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same
thing of the assault of the 2 2d of May, 1863, at Vicks-
burg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was
gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained.
Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative
losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that,
the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have
acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endur-
ance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army
of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight
them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed,
they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining

RE TROSPECTIVE.

277

any advantage of their antagonist in the open field.
They had come to much prefer breastworks in their
front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge
seemed to revive their hopes temporarily ; but it
was of short duration. The effect upon the Army
of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached
the James River, however, all effects of the battle
of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at
Vicksburg. We were in a Southern climate, at
the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the
Tennessee had won five successive victories over the
garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks.
They had driven a portion of that army from Port
Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked
them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They
had attacked another portion of the same army at
Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the
interior of the State, and driven them back into
Jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured
and missing, besides loss of large and small arms :
they had captured the capital of the State of Mis-
sissippi, with a large amount of materials of war and
manufactures. Only a few days before, they had
beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first
at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge,
inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more
men (including those cut off from returning) besides

278 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of
the Tennessee had come to believe that they could
beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There
was no telling how long a regular siege might last
As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot
season in a Southern climate* There was no telling
what the casualties might be among Northern troops
working and living in trenches, drinking surface
water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropi-
cal sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in
May, it would not only have saved the army the risk
it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of
the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid
army, well equipped and officered, to operate else-
where with. These are reasons justifying the assault
The only benefit we gained — and it was a slight one
for so great a sacrifice — was that the men worked
cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied
with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not
been made, I have no doubt that the majority of
those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have
believed that had we assaulted it would have proven
successful, and would have saved life, health and
comfort

CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY

AND JAMES GENERAL LEE VISIT TO BUTLER —

THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG THE INVEST-
MENT OF PETERSBURG.

LEE'S position was now so near Richmond, and
the intervening swamps of the Chickahominy
so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in
the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my
next left flank move carry the Army of the Potomac
south of the James River.* Preparations for this
were promptly commenced. The move was a haz-
ardous one to make : the Chickahominy River, with
its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to
be crossed ; all the bridges over it east of Lee were
destroyed ; the enemy had a shorter line and better
roads to travel on to confront me in crossing ; more

*Cold Harbor, June 5, 1864.
Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army,

Washington, D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would

be impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that

would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use

that road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a

28o

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

than fifty miles intervened between me and Butler,
by the roads I should have to travel, with both the
James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross;
and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be got
out of a position but a few hundred yards from the
enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not
choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance
to travel and his bridges over the Chickahominy
and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush
him before the army with me could come to his

long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our
strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his
lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea
from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible north of
Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on
the north side of the James River to transfer the army to the
south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south
if he should retreat

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of
the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have.
They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on
the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of
repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater
sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be
accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have
therefore resolved upon the following plan :

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied
by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable
circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent
west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver

MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES. 28 1

relief. Then too he might spare troops enough to
send against Hunter who was approaching Lynch-
burg, living upon the country he passed through,
and without ammunition further than what he car-
ried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon
Lee's not seeing my danger as I saw it. Besides
we had armies on both sides of the James River and
not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that
its safety would be a matter of the first consideration

Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this is
effected I will move the army to the south side of the James
River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to
City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on
north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most
possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought
to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James Riyer, I can cut off all
sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the
canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be
lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make
the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south
side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels
can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our
army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrench-
ments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and
whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieu tenant-General.

282 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of the so-called Confederate government, if it was
not with the military commanders. But I took all the
precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communi-
cate with Hunter and to break up the Virginia Cen-
tral Railroad and the James River Canal, on the 7th
of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back
with him.* Hunter was also informed by way of
Washington and the Valley that Sheridan was on the
way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, and
the regions penetrated by them, were of vast impor-

* Cold Harbor, Va., June 6, 1864.
Major-General D. Hunter,

Commanding Dept. W. Va.
General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instruc-
tions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there
the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way as
much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of
the canal on James River is of great importance to us. Accord-
ing to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guid-
ance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there.
It would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg
for a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the
enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as
to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see, in
looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of your
instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be
from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have so understood it,
you will be doing just what I want. The direction I would now
give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between Staun-

MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES. 283

tance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large
per cent, of all the supplies for the Army of North-
ern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before
Sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from
Hunter reporting his advance to Staunton and suc-
cessful engagement with the enemy near that place
on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander,
W. S. Jones, was killed. On the 4th of June the
enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside on
our right was moved up between Warren and Smith.
On the 5th Birney returned to Hancock, which ex-
tended his left now to the Chickahominy, and Warren
was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed

ton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most prac-
ticable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch of the Va.
Central road. From thence move eastward along the line of the
road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join Gen-
eral Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan and
yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Po-
tomac by the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions.

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed
back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and
deem it practicable to reach that point, you will exercise your
judgment about going there.

If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and
Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to
destroy the canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut -General.

284 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

to send two divisions to the left to extend down the
banks of that stream to Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry
extended still farther east to Jones's Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie — who was in command
at White House, and who had been in command at
our base of supplies in all the changes made from
the start — was ordered to take up the iron from
the York River Railroad and put it on boats, and to
be in readiness to move by water to City Point

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line
'down the bank overlooking the Chickahominy, under
cover of which the army could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all
organized troops arriving at White House, without
debarking from their transports, to report to Butler.
Hal leek was at this time instructed to send all rein-
forcements to City Point

On the nth I wrote :

Cold Harbor, Va.,/***ii, 1864.

Major-Gen. B. F. Butler,

Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the
James River will commence after dark to-morrow night Col.
Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was
necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which
the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to
ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a cross-
ing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river
at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not yet returned,

MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES. 285

so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I would wish, but
the time between this and Sunday night being so short in which
to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes to
make arrangements for gunboats and transportation to send up
the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will
leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, to-morrow,
as possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or
Ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning.
This corps numbers now 15,300 men. They take with them
neither wagons nor artillery ; these latter marching with the bal-
ance of the army to the James River. The remainder of the
army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at Jones's,
and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below City
Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army
should be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may
have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand.
General Smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, go-
ing by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day be-
hind, unless detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case
you will be strong enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-
engineer and your chief- quartermaster, to commence at once the
collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on
its arrival. If there is a point below City Point where a pontoon
bridge can be thrown, have it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you
deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold
Petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops
to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, how-
ever, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a
reasonable degree of confidence of success. If you should go

286 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

■

there, I think troops should take nothing with them except whit
they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place
is secured. If Colonel Dent should not succeed in securing the
requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before
reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut-General.

P. S. — On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White
House. The distance which they will have to march will be
enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time,
and the uncertainty of navigation on the Chickahominy will be
avoided. U. S. GRANT.

Cold Harbor, Va.,/*** ii, 1864.
Major-General G. G. Meadb,

Commanding Army of the Potomac

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose
of ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which
to march the army has not yet returned. It is now getting so
late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move
to-morrow night without waiting longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that
is, the 1 8th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone,
their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the
army to Cole's Landing or Ferry, and there embark for City
Point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the
Long Bridge Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until
stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may
direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's
Bridge. After the crossing is effected, the most practicable
roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhattan. Of course,

MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES. 287

this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance.
The 5 th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the
army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the
same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should be kept
well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made
lower down than Jones's they should take it

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-GeneraL

P. S. — In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and

the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men

there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White

House. They should be directed to load up transports, and start

them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even

whole divisions to go together.

U. S. GRANT.

About this time word was received (through the
Richmond papers of the nth) that Crook and
Averell had united and were moving east. This,
with the news of Hunters successful engagement
near Staunton, was no doubt known to Lee before
it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two
divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both
to Lees communications and supplies. Much of
his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and Early with
Ewells entire corps was sent to the Valley. Sup-
plies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the
sources from which to draw them were in our hands.
People from outside began to pour into Richmond
to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation
reigned there.

288 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

On the 1 2th Smith was ordered to move at night
to White House, not to stop until he reached there,
and to take boats at once for City Point, leaving his
trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long
Bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering
through the water and mud, leaving their horses be-
hind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pon-
toon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which
the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed
out for a mile or two to watch and detain any ad-
vance that might be made from the other side. War-
ren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the
1 3th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed
Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge,
followed by Wright. Ferrero's division, with the
wagon train, moved farther east, by Window
Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by
cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats
at Richmond. These might run down at night and
inflict great damage upon us before they could be
sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had,
in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to
be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emer-
gency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk
as high up the river as we could guard them, and
prevent their removal by the enemy.

MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKA HOMINY AND JAMES. 289

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chicka-
hominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in
holding the roads from Richmond while the army
passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to
impede our march, however, but Warren and Wilson
reported the enemy strongly fortified in their
front By the evening of the 13th Hancock's
corps was at Charles City Court House on the
James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were
on the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night,
Warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the
army. The material for a pontoon bridge was
already at hand and the work of laying it was com-
menced immediately, under the superintendence of
Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the engineer
brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing
commenced, Hancock in advance, using both the
bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the
Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's corps —
which was a separate command until the 24th of
May when it was incorporated with the main army
— numbered about 116,000 men. During the pro-
gress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements
were received. At the crossing of the James River
June I4th-i5th the army numbered about 115,000.
Besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of
six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing,

Vol. n. — 19

290

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

about one -half of the artillery was sent back to
Washington, and many men were discharged by rea-
son of the expiration of their term of service.* In
estimating our strength every enlisted man and every
commissioned officer present is included, no matter
how employed ; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hos-
pital attendants, company cooks and all. Operating
in an enemy's country, and being supplied always
from a distant base, large detachments had at all times
to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base
of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads lead-
ing to our flanks and rear. We were also operating
in a country unknown to us, and without competent
guides or maps showing the roads accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two
armies differs materially. In the Confederate army
often only bayonets are taken into account, never, I
believe, do they estimate more than are handling
the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets

*FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE ADJUTAWT-

GENERAL's OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE.

KILLED.

WOUNDED.

MISSING.

AGGREGATE.

Wilderness. Mav ^th to 7th

2,26l

2,271
186

99
1,769

8,785
9,300

792

358

6.752

2,902

I.970

I65

1,537

I3>948

Cold Harbor, May 31st to June 12th.

I3.60I

1,143

509
10,058

Total

6.586

26,047

6626

39,259

■$►*■

GENERAL LEE. 29 1

or carbines. Generally the latter are far enough
away to be excluded from the count in any one field.
Officers and details of enlisted men are not included.
In the Northern armies the estimate is most liberal,
taking in all connected with the army and drawing

Pay-
Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had

not less than 80,000 men at the start His rein-
forcements were about equal to ours during the
campaign, deducting the discharged men and those
sent back. He was on the defensive, and in a
country in which every stream, every road, every
obstacle to the movement of troops and every na-
tural defence was familiar to him and his army. The
citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and
could and did furnish him with accurate reports of
our every move. Rear guards were not necessary
for him, and having always a railroad at his back,
large wagon trains were not required. All circum-
stances considered we did not have any advantage
in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern
Virginia in all these contests, was a very highly esti-
mated man in the Confederate army and States, and
filled also a very high place in the estimation of the
people and press of the Northern States. His praise
was sounded throughout the entire North after every
action he was engaged in : the number of his forces

292 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

was always lowered and that of the National forces
exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I
judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. To
be extolled by the entire press of the South after
every engagement, and by a portion of the press
North with equal vehemence, was calculated to give
him the entire confidence of his troops and to make
him feared by his antagonists. It was not an un-
common thing for my staff-officers to hear from
Eastern officers, " Well, Grant has never met Bobby
Lee yet." There were good and true officers who
believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia
was superior to the Army of the Potomac man to
man. I do not believe? so, fexcept as the advantages
spoken of above made them so. Before the end I
believe the difference was the other way. The Army
of Northern Virginia became despondent and saw
the end. It did not please them. The National army
saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached
the James on the 14th of June. Preparations were
at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges
and crossing the river. As already stated, I had
previously ordered General Butler to have two ves-
sels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a
point above that occupied by our gunboats, where
the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to
obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate gun-

VISIT TO BUTLER. 293

boats from coming down the river. Butler had had
these boats filled and put in position, but had not
had them sunk before my arrival. I ordered this
done, ^nd also directed that he should turn over all
material and boats not then in use in the river to
be used in ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to
Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler for the pur-
pose of directing a movement against Petersburg,
while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were
crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold
Harbor by the way of White House, thence on
steamers to City Point tor the purpose of giving
General Butler more troops with which to accomplish
this result. General Butler was ordered to send
Smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could
be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army
of the James. He gave Smith about six thousand
reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred
cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five hundred
colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach
the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the Con-
federate advance line of works was but two miles
outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move under
cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and
assault as soon as he could after daylight. I believed

294 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

then, and still believe, that Petersburg could have
been easily captured at that time. It only had about
2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular
troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the
city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith
started as proposed, but his advance encountered a
rebel force intrenched between City Point and their
lines outside of Petersburg. This position he carried,
with some loss to the enemy ; but there was so much
delay that it was daylight before his troops really
got off from there. While there I informed General
Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river and
move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the
latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there
more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from his posi-
tion.

I returned down the river to wrhere the troops of
the Army of the Potomac now were, communicated
to General Meade, in writing, the directions I had
given to General Butler and directed him (Meade)
to cross Hancock's corps over under cover of night,
and push them forward in the morning to Peters-
burg ; halting them, however, at a designated point
until they could hear from Smith. I also informed
General Meade that I had ordered rations from
Bermuda Hundred for Hancocks corps, and desired
him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more
time than was absolutely necessary. The rations

THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG. 295

did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while he
got all his corps over during the night, remained
until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them.
He then moved without them, and on the road re-
ceived a note from General W. F. Smith, asking
him to come on. This seems to be the first informa-
tion that General Hancock had received of the fact
that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything
particular was expected of him. Otherwise he would
have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon.

Srfiith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early
in the forenoon of the 15 th, and spent the day until
after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering
what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's
line consisted of redans occupying commanding
positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. To the
east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox back,
there were thirteen of these redans extending a dis-
tance of several miles, probably three. If they had
been properly manned they could have held out
against any force that could have attacked them, at
least until reinforcements could have got up from the
north of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with
success. By nine o'clock at night he was in posses-
sion of five of these redans and, of course, of the
connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained
artillery, which fell into our hands.. Hancock came

296 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

up and proposed to take any part assigned to him ;
and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were
in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in
command, and captured another redan. Meade
came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock,
who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the com-
mand of his corps on account of the breaking out
afresh of the wound he had received at Gettysburg.
During the day Meade assaulted and carried one
more redan to his right and two to his left: In
all this we lost very heavily. The works were not
strongly manned, but they all had guns in them
which fell into our hands, together with the men
who were handling them in the effort to repel these
assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded
south of Richmond, had received no reinforcements,
except Hoke's division from Drury's Bluff,* which

* City Point, Va.,/«w 17, 1864 — 11 a.m.

Major-Gen. Halleck,

Washington, D. C.
****** *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned

their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt

expected troops from north of the James River to take their place

before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage of this and

moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between

Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain possession of.

THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG. 297

had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though
he had urged the authorities very strongly to send
them, believing, as he did, that Petersburg would
be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 1 7th the fighting was very severe and
the losses heavy ; and at night our troops occupied
about the same position they had occupied in the
morning, except that they held a redan which
had been captured by Potter during the day. Dur-
ing the night, however, Beauregard fell back to the
line which had been already selected, and com-
menced fortifying it. Our troops advanced on the
1 8th to the line which he had abandoned, and found
that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many
of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches
and in front of them.

Colonel J. L Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine,
was wounded on the 18th. He was gallantly leading
his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit
of doing in all the engagements in which he had
previously been engaged. He had several times
been recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their com-
manders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five
days. Day and night has been all the same, no delays being
allowed on any account.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut-General.

298 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

gallant and meritorious conduct. On this occasion,
however, I . promoted him on the spot, and forwarded
a copy of my order to the War Department, asking
that my act might be confirmed and Chamberlain's
name sent to the Senate for confirmation without
any delay. This was done, and at last a gallant
and meritorious officer received partial justice at the
hands of his government, which he had served so
faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been
communicated to him, that officer, with his usual
promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the
ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock
in the afternoon of the 15th. The days were long
and it would have given him considerable time
before night. I do not think there is any doubt that
Petersburg itself could have been carried without
much loss ; or, at least, if protected by inner de-
tached works, that a line could have been established
very much in rear of the one then occupied by the
enemy. This would have given us control of both
the Weldon and South Side railroads. This would
also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting
which had to be done from the 15th to .whe i8th,
and would have given us greatly the advantage in
the long siege which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover
and allowed some of the rest which they had so long

THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG. 299

needed. They remained quiet, except that there
was more or less firing every day, until the 22d,
when General Meade ordered an advance towards the
Weldon Railroad. We were very anxious to get to
that road, and even round to the South Side Railroad
if possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded
by Birney, to the left, with a view to at least force
the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line.
General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by
a road farther south, to march directly for the Wel-
don road. The enemy passed in between these two
corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious
results to the National troops, who were then with-
drawn from their advanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the invest-
ment of Petersburg, while the Army of the James
held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we pos-
sessed north of the James River. The 9th corps,
Burnside's, was placed upon the right at Petersburg ;
the 5th, Warren's, next ; the 2d, Birney's, next ; then
the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left and south.
Thus began the siege of Petersburg.

CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD— RAID ON

THE WELDON RAILROAD EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON

WASHINGTON MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERS-
BURG EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERS-
BURG CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY —

CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

ON the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had
as already indicated sent Sheridan with two
divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could
of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Hunter
had been operating up the Shenandoah Valley with
some success, having fought a battle near Staun-
ton where he captured a great many prisoners,
besides killing and wounding a good many men.
After the battle he formed a junction at Staun-
ton with Averell and Crook, who had come up
from the Kanawha, or Gauley River. It was sup-
posed, therefore, that General Hunter would be
about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan
could get there, doing on the way the damage that
he was sent to do.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD. 301

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter,
in case he should meet him about Charlottesville,
join and return with him to the Army of the Poto-
mac Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley,
started ' Breckinridge out for its defence at once.
Learning later of Sheridan's going with two divi-
sions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of
cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North
Anna to get out west, and learned of the move-
ment of these troops to the south side of the
same stream almost as soon as they had started.
He pushed on to get to Trevilian Station to com-
mence his destruction at that point. On the night
of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles
east of Trevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same
night at Trevilian Station and Hampton but a few
miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance
on Sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very
badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a counter
move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between
the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear.
This he did successfully, so that at daylight, when
the assault was made, the enemy found himself at
the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear,
and broke in some confusion. The losses were
probably very light on both sides in killed and

302 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five
hundred prisoners and sent them to City Point

During that day, the nth, Sheridan moved into
Trevilian Station, and the following day proceeded
to tear up the road east and west There was con-
siderable fighting during the whole of the day, but
the work of destruction went on. In the meantime,
at night, the enemy had taken possession of the
crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go
north when he left Trevilian. Sheridan learned,
however, from sonjg, of the prisoners he had cap-
tured here, that C&jpwral Hunter was about Lynch-
burg, and therefore that there was no use of his
going on to Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the
1 2th, and made his way north and farther east,
coming around by the north side of White House,
and arriving there on the 21st Here he found an
abundance of forage for his animals, food for his
men, and security while resting. He had been
obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the
field-hospital which he had established near Trevil-
ian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the
enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot ;
but now that our troops were all on the James River,
it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies.
Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up;

RAID 0Ar THE WELDON RAILROAD. 303

which he did on the 2 2d of June, bringing the gar-
rison and an immense wagon train with him. All
these were over the James River by the 26th of the
month, and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's divi-
sion on a raid to destroy the Weldon and South Side
roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton
free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wil-
son's position became precarious. Meade therefore,
on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the river to make
a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got
back, though not without severe loss, having struck
both roads, but the damage done was soon re-
paired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about
Petersburg until late in July. The time, however,
was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and
making our position generally more secure against a
sudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after
other portions of my command, where things had not
been going on so favorably, always, as I could have
wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to suc-
ceed Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley immediately
took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the
5th of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On
the 8th he formed a junction with Crook and Averell
at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on

304 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Lynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and
invested on the 16th. Up to this time he was very
successful ; and but for the difficulty of taking with
him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march,
through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have
captured Lynchburg. The destruction of the en-
emy's supplies and manufactories had been very
great To meet this movement under General
Hunter, General Lee sent Early with his corps, a
part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.
After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, Gen-
eral Hunter, owingSfS%a want of ammunition to give
battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately,
this want of ammunition left him no choice of route
for his return but by the way of the Gauley and
Xanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio River, re-
turning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad. A long time was consumed in
making this movement Meantime the valley was
left open to Early's troops, and others in that
quarter ; and Washington also was uncovered.
Early took advantage of this condition of affairs and
moved on Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace,
with headquarters at Baltimore, commanded the
department in which the Shenandoah lay. His sur-
plus of troops with which to move against the
enemy was small in number. Most of these were

EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON. 305

raw and, consequently, very much inferior to our
veterans and to the veterans which Early had with
him ; but the situation of Washington was precari-
ous, and Wallace moved with commendable prompti-
tude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He could
hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he
hoped to cripple and delay him until Washington
could be put into a state of preparation for his re-
ception. I had previously ordered General Meade
to send a division to Baltimore for the purpose of
adding to the defences of Washington, and he had
sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps (Wright's),
which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Find-
ing that Wallace had gone to the front with his com-
mand, Ricketts immediately took the cars and followed
him to the Monocacy with his entire division. They
met the enemy and, as might have been expected,
were defeated ; but they succeeded in stopping him
for the day on which the battle took place. The
next morning Early started on his march to the
capital of the Nation, arriving before it on the nth.
Learning of the gravity of the situation I had
directed General Meade to also order Wright with
the rest of his corps directly to Washington for the
relief of that place, and the latter reached there the
very day that Early arrived before it. The 19th
corps, which had been stationed in Louisiana,
having been ordered up to reinforce the armies

Vol. 11. — 20

306 PERSONAL MEAWIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

about Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fort-
ress Monroe, on their way to join us. I diverted
them from that point to Washington, which place
they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright,
on the nth. The 19th corps was commanded by
Major-General Emory. > v *

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of
attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but
the next morning he found our intrenchments, which
were very strong, fully manned. He at once com-
menced to retr^sU^ Wright following. There is no
telling how much'tms result was contributed to by
General Lew Wallace's leading what might well be
considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been
but one day earlier he might have entered the capital
before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent.
Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted
to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this
occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a
greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the
lot of a commander of an equal force to render by
means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening.
Some time before, Forrest had met Sturgis in com-
mand of some of our cavalry in Mississippi and
handled him very roughly, gaining a very great vic-
tory over him. This left Forrest free to go almost
where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of

*yl

MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG. 307

Sherman who was then advancing. Shtrman was
abundantly able to look after the arrriy that he was
immediately with, and all of his military division
so long as he could communicate with it ; but it was
my place to see that he had the means with which
to hold his rear^j^|wo divisions under A. J. Smith
had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some months
before. Sherman ordered these back, with direc-
tions to attack Forrest. Smith met and defeated
him very badly. I then directed that Smith should
hang to Forrest and not let him go ; and to prevent
by all means his getting upon the Memphis and
Nashville Railroad. Sherman had anticipated me
in this matter, and given the same orders in sub-
stance ; but receiving my directions for this order to
Smith, he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had com-
menced running a mine from about the centre of his
front under the Confederate works confronting him.
He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants,
of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was
mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a
practical miner. Burnside had submitted the scheme
to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it,
as a means of keeping the men occupied. His posi-
tion was very favorable for carrying on this work,
but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion. The position of the two lines at that

308 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

point were only about a hundred yards apart with a
comparatively deep ravine intervening. In the bot-
tom of this ravine the work commenced. The posi-
tion was unfavorable in this particular : that the
enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its
front was commanded by their ow« lines both to the
right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping
upward back of the Confederate line for a consider-
able distance, and it was presumable that the enemy
had, at least, a detached work on this highest point
The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the
mine was finished ready for charging ; but I had
this work of charging deferred until we were ready
for it. 1

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and
said that there was great consternation in Richmond,
and that Lee was coming out to make an attack upon
us — the object being to put us on the defensive so
that he might detach troops to go to Georgia where
the army Sherman was operating against was said
to be in great trouble. I put the army commanders,
Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack
was not made.

1 concluded, then, a few days later, to do some-
thing in the way of offensive movement myself, hav-
ing in view something of the same object that Lee
had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in
Washington, and with this reduction of my force Lee

310 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.

might very readily have spared some troops from the
defences to send West. I had other objects in view,
however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The
mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and
I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg
if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as
many of Lee's troops away from the south side of
the James River as possible. Accordingly, on the
26th, we commenced a movement with Hancocks
corps and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the
way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon
bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to let the
cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry
of the Army of the James, get by Lee's lines and de-
stroy as much as they could of the Virginia Central
Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was
to move out so as to protect their rear and cover
their retreat back when they should have got through
with their work. We were successful in drawing the
enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I
expected. The mine was ordered to be charged,
and the morning of the 30th of July was the time
fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute
orders * on the 24th directing how I wanted the as-

*City Point, Va., July 24, 1864.
Major-General Meade,

Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Ber-
muda Hundred report against the probability of success from an

MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG. 3 I I

sault conducted, which orders he amplified into gen-
eral instructions for the guidance of the troops that
were to be engaged.

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved
most heartily, were all that I can see now was neces-
sary. The only further precaution which he could
have taken, and which he could not foresee, would
have been to have different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred
feet long from where it entered the ground to the
point where it was under the enemy's works, and with
a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running
under their lines. Eight chambers had been left, re-
attack there. The chances they think will be better on Burnside's
front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all
the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to
penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed with the abso-
lute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line,
if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to
their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking
through.

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery pos-
sible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during
the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the support of the
artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of
their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in
if successful. The field artillery and infantry held in the lines
during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a mo-
ment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as
they should receive orders. One thing, however, should be im-

312 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

quiring a ton of powder each to charge them. All
was ready by the time I had prescribed ; and on the
29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back«near
the James River with their troops. Under cover of
night they started to recross the bridge at Deep
Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our
lines in front of the mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with
a sufficient number of men and concentrate the bal-
ance on the right next to Burnside's corps, while
Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily
under Meade, was to form in the rear of Burnside to
support him when he went in. All were to clear off

pressed on corps commanders. If they see the enemy giving
away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily
assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such
knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army
commanders. General Ord can co-operate with his corps in this
movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hun-
dred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an
assault between the Appomattox and James rivers, as may be
deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If
not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy

the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if possible.
*******

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at Peters-
burg, Burnside's mine will be blown up. . . .

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG. 313

the parapets and the abatis in their front so as to
leave the space as open as possible, and be able to
charge the moment the mine had been sprung and
Burnside had taken possession. Burnside's corps
was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to
the top of the hill, supported on the right and left
by Ord's and Warren's corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions per-
fectly so far as making ready was concerned. Burn-
side seemed to have paid no attention whatever to
the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his
own front for his troops to get over in the best way
they could. The four divisions of his corps were
commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and
Ferrero. The last was a colored division ; and Burn-
side selected it to make the assault. Meade inter-
fered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie s division
— a worse selection than the first could have been.
In fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division
commanders Burnside had who were equal to the
occasion. Ledlie besides being otherwise inefficient,
proved also to possess disqualification less common
among soldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the
mine so that it did not go off until about five o clock
in the morning. When it did explode it was very
successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and
something like a hundred feet in length. Instantly

314 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which

•

had been placed in the most commanding positions
covering the ground to the right and left of where
the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, com-
menced playing. Ledlie's division marched into the
crater immediately on the explosion, but most of
the men stopped there in the absence of any one to
give directions ; their commander having found some
safe retreat to get into before they started. There
was some delay on the left and right in advancing,
but some of the troops did get in and turn to the
right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as I expected
they would do.

There had been great consternation in Peters-
burg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine
that we were going to explode. They knew we were
mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by
countermining, though Beauregard had taken the pre-
caution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear
of that part of their line fronting where they could
see that our men were at work. We had learned
through deserters who had come in that the people
had very wild rumors about what was going on on
our side. They said that we had undermined the
whole of Petersburg ; that they were resting upon a
slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment
they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based
my calculations upon this state of feeling, and ex-

EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG. 315

pected that when the mine was exploded the troops
to the right and left would flee in all directions,
and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could
get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy
had come to a realization of the true situation. It
was just as I expected it would be. We could see
the men running without any apparent object except
to get away. It was half an hour before musketry
firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our
men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy
got artillery up to play upon them ; and it was nine
o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his
right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us I
about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured ; «
and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps
commander and the incompetency of the division
commander who was sent to lead the assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine,
and finding that most of that part of Lee's army
which had been drawn north of the James River
were still there, I gave Meade directions to send
a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, be-
fore Lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen
or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad. But mis-
fortunes never come singly. I learned during that
same afternoon that Wright's pursuit of Early was
feeble because of the constant and contrary orders

316 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

he had been receiving from Washington, while I was
cut off from immediate communication by reason
of our cable across Chesapeake Bay being broken.
Early, however, was not aware of the fact that
Wright was not pursuing until he had reached
Strasburg. Finding that he was not pursued he
turned back to Winchester, where Crook was
stationed with a small force, and drove him out. He
then pushed north until he had reached the Poto-
mac, then he sent McCausland across to Cham-
bersburg, Pa., to destroy that town. Chambers-
burg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison
whatever, and no fortifications ; yet McCausland,
under Early's orders, burned the place and left about
three hundred families houseless. This occurred on
the 30th of July. I rescinded my orders for the
troops to go out to destroy the Weldon Railroad,
and directed them to embark for Washington City.
After burning Chambersburg McCausland retreated,
pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland. They
were met and defeated by General Kelley and
driven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the
Confederates, because it was the principal store-
house they now had for feeding their armies about
Richmond. It was well known that they would
make a desperate struggle to maintain it. It had
been the source of a great deal of trouble to us here-

CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 317

tofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly be-
cause of the incompetency of some of the com-
manders, but chiefly because of interference from
Washington. It seemed to be the policy of General
Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force
sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving
right and left so as to keep between the enemy and
our capital ; and, generally speaking, they pursued
this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts
of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore,
free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle,
and such provisions as they could carry away from
Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined
to put a stop tp this. I started Sheridan at once for
that field of operation, and on the following day sent
another division of his cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned
to that command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the
ground that he was too young for so important a
command. On the ist of August when I sent rein-
forcements for the protection of Washington, I sent
the following orders :

City Point, Va.,
August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.
Major-General Halleck,

Washington, D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the
enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter
is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all

318 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of
the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy
goes let our troops go also. Once started up the valley they ought
to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central
Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct
command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. All the cavalry,
I presume, will reach Washington in the course of to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

The President in some way or other got to see
this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions
to be given to the commanders in the field, oper-
ating against Early, and sent me the following very
characteristic dispatch :

Office U. S. Military Telegraph,

War Department,

Washington, D. C, August 3, 1864.
Cypher. 6 P.M.,

Lt.-General Grant,

City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, " I want Sheridan
put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to
put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death.
Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think,
is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please
look over the despatches you may have received from here, even
since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is
any idea in the head of any one here, of " putting our army south
of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direc-
tion. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless
you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.

CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 3 19

I replied to this that " I would start in two hours
for Washington," and soon got off, going directly
to the Monocacy without stopping at Washington on
my way. I found General Hunters army encamped
there, scattered over the fields along the banks of
the Monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and
locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, which he had taken the precaution to
bring back and collect at that point. I asked the
general where the enemy was. He replied that
he did not know. He said the fact was, that he was
so embarrassed with orders from Washington moving
him first to the right and then to the left that he
had lost all trace of the enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out
where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got
up and trains made up, giving directions to push
for Halltown, some four miles above Harpers Ferry,
in the Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the
wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that
could be transported by the cars were to go in that
way. I knew that the valley was of such importance
to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scat-
tered at that time, he would in a very short time be
found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions.*
I told him that Sheridan was in Washington, and still

*See letter, August 5th, Appendix.

320 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

another division-was on itf£ way ; and suggested that
he establish lv. iSadquarters of the department at
any point that would suit him best, Cumberland,
Baltimore, or elsewhere, and give Sheridan command
of the troops in the field. The general replied to
this, that he thought he had better be relieved en-
tirely. He said that General Halleck seemed so
much to distrust his fitness for the position he was
in that he thought somebody else ought to be
there. He did not want, in any way, to embarrass
the cause ; thus showing a patriotism that was none
too common in the army. There were not many
major-generals who would voluntarily have asked
to have the command of a department taken from
them on the supposition that for some particular
reason, or for any reason, the service would be bet-
ter performed. I told him, " very well then." and
telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come to the
Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and
meet him there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but
reached there after the troops were all off. I
went to the station and remained there until he
arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were
about all the Union people, except General Hunter
and his staff, who were left at the Monocacy when
Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what
had been done and what I wanted him to do, giv-

CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 32 1

ing him, at the same time, the ;yvjitten instructions
which had been prepared for Gk, Hunter and

directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with,
8,000 of them being cavalry. Early had about the
same number, but the superior ability of the National
commander over the Confederate commander was so
great that all the latter's advantage of being on the
defensive was more than counterbalanced by this
circumstance. As I had predicted, Early was soon
found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Penn-
sylvania and Maryland were speedily freed from
the invaders. The importance of the valley was so
great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early,
but not to the extent that we thought and feared he
would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforce-
ments from being sent out from Richmond, I had
to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces
about his capital. I therefore gave orders for
another move to the north side of the James River,
to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps, part of the
10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of
cavalry were crossed to the north side of the James
during the night of the 13th- 14th of August. A
threatening position was maintained for a number of
days, with more or less skirmishing, and some toler-
ably hard fighting; although it was my object and my

Vol. 11. — 21

322 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

instructions that anything like a battle should be
avoided, unless opportunities should present them-
selves which would insure great success. General
Meade was left in command of the few troops around
Petersburg, strongly intrenched ; and was instructed
to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quar-
ter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening
that might occur through an effort on the part of
the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was
no particular victory gained on either side ; but
during that time no more reinforcements were sent
to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to
prevent reinforcements being sent from Richmond
against him, and also that the efforts we had made
had proven that one of the divisions which we sup-
posed had gone to the valley was still at Richmond,
because we had captured six or seven hundred pris-
oners from that division, each of its four brigades
having contributed to our list of captures. I also
informed him that but one division had gone, and it
was possible that I should be able to prevent the
going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sher-
man, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforce-
ments. He was perfectly willing to take the raw
troops then being raised in the North-west, saying
that he could teach them more soldiering in one day

CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD. 323

among his troops than they would learn in a week
in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all
troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be
sent to him. Sherman also wanted to be assured
that no Eastern troops were moving out against him.
I informed him of what I had done and assured him
that I would hold all the troops there that it was
possible for me to hold, and that up to that time
none had gone. I also informed him that his real
danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the
trans-Mississippi Department. If Smith should
escape Steele, and get across the Mississippi River,
he might move against him. I had, therefore, asked
to have an expedition ready to move from New
Orleans against Mobile in case Kirby Smith should
get across. This would have a tendency to draw
him to the defence of that place, instead of going
against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments
Halleck informed me that there was an organized
scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft, and
suggested that it might become necessary to draw
troops from the field to put it down. He also
advised taking in sail, and not going too fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of
the James River on the night of the 20th. Before
they were withdrawn, however, and while most of
Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren

324 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture
the Weldon Railroad. He took up his line of march
well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the
troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to
cover that part of the line which he had vacated
by moving out. From our left, near the old line, it
was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A
division was ordered from the right of the Peters-
burg line to reinforce Warren, while a division was
brought back from the north side of the James
River to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy. The
limits from which his supplies had been drawn were
already very much contracted, and I knew that he
must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried
the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. He
fortified his new position, and our trenches were
then extended from the left of our main line to
connect with his new one. Lee made repeated at-
tempts to dislodge Warren's corps, but without
success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforce-
ments reached him, troops were sent south to destroy
the bridges on the Weldon Railroad ; and with such
success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a
distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies they
got thereafter from that source. It was on the 21st
that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon Rail-

CAPTURE OF THE WELDOX RAILROAD. 325

road as having been lost to him; but along about
the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recap-
ture it ; again he failed and with very heavy losses
to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north
side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock
and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon
Railroad They were attacked on the 25th at
Reams's Station, and after desperate fighting a part
of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery.
But the Weldon Railroad never wrent out of our
possession from the 18th of August to the close of
the war.

CHAPTER LVIII.

sheridan's advance — visit to sheridan — Sheri-
dan's VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH SHERIDAN'S

RIDE TO WINCHESTER CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN

FOR THE WINTER,

WE had our troops on the Weldon Railroad
contending against a large force that re-
garded this road of so much importance that they
could afford to expend many lives in retaking it;
Sherman just getting through to Atlanta with great
losses of men from casualties, discharges and detach-
ments left along as guards to occupy and hold the
road in rear of him ; Washington threatened but a
short time before, and now Early being strengthened
in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt.
It kept me pretty active in looking after all these
points.

On the ioth of August Sheridan had advanced
on Early up the Shenandoah Valley, Early falling
back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee
had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of in-
fantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen

VISIT TO SHERIDAN. 327

Early. It was important that Sheridan should be in-
formed of this, so I sent the information to Wash-
ington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be
sent from there to get the message to Sheridan at
all hazards, giving him the information. The mes-
senger, an officer of the army, pushed through with
great energy and reached Sheridan just in time.
The officer went through by way of Snicker's Gap,
escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just
making his preparations to attack Early in his chosen
position. Now, however, he was thrown back on the
defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit
General Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. My
purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive him
out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies
for Lee's army. I knew it was impossible for me to
get orders through Washington to Sheridan to make
a move, because they would be stopped there and
such orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the
Secretary of War) would suggest would be given
instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory
to mine. I therefore, without stopping at Washing-
ton, went directly through to Charlestown, some ten
miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited there to see
General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance
to inform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a

328 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF I/. 5. GRANT.

map showing the positions of his army and that of
the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side
pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the
camps of the two armies. He said that if he had
permission he would move so and so (pointing out
how) against the Confederates, and that he could
" whip them." Before starting I had drawn up a plan
of campaign for Sheridan, which I had brought with
me ; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive
in his views and so confident of success, I said
nothing about this and did not take it out of my
pocket

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's
Ferry, where all of his stores were. By keeping the
teams at that place, their forage did not have to be
hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, pro-
visions and rations for the men were wanted, trains
would be made up to deliver the stores to the com-
missaries and quartermasters encamped at Win-
chester. Knowing that he, in making preparations
to move at a given day, would have to bring up
wagon trains from Harpers Ferry, I asked him if
he could be ready to get off by the following Tues-
day. This was on Friday. " O yes," he said, he
14 could be off before daylight on Monday." I told
him then to make the attack at that time and ac-
cording to his own plan ; and I immediately started
to return to the army about Richmond. After visit-

SHERIDAN* S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH. 329

ing Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived
at City Point on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr.
Robert Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when
workmen might be put upon the road again so as to
make repairs and put it in shape for running. It
was a large piece of property to have standing idle.
I told him I could not answer then positively but
would try and inform him before a great while. On
my return Mr. Garrett met me again with the same
question and I told him I thought that by the
following Wednesday he might send his work-
men out on his road. I gave him no further infor-
mation however, and he had no suspicion of how
I expected to have the road cleared for his work-
men.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon.
He met Early at the crossing of Opequon Creek,
and won a most decisive victory — one which
electrified the country. Early had invited this at-
tack himself by his bad generalship and made the
victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division
east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's
Ferry ; and about the time I arrived there he started
with two other divisions (leaving but two in their
camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose
of destroying the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at

SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH. 33 I

that point. Early here learned that I had been with
Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement
on foot, started back as soon as he got the informa-
tion. But his forces were separated and, as I have
said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back to
Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early
made another stand there, behind works which ex-
tended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanks
and again sent him speeding up the valley, follow-
ing in hot pursuit. The pursuit was continued up

•

the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.
Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners
and sixteen guns. The houses which he passed all
along the route were found to be filled with Early's
wounded, and the country swarmed with his de-
serters. Finally, on the 25th, Early turned from
the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at Harrison-
burg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition
began to be accomplished. Sheridan went to work
with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle,
and everything in the upper part of the valley re-
quired by our troops ; and especially taking what
might be of use to the enemy. What he could not
take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would
not be invited to come back there. I congratulated
Sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a

332 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the
guns being aimed at the enemy around Petersburg.
I also notified the other commanders throughout the
country, who also fired salutes in honor of his vic-
tory.

I had reason to believe that the administration
was a little afraid to have a decisive battle fought at
that time, for fear it might go against us and have a
bad effect on the November elections. The conven-
tion which had met and made its nomination of the
Democratic candidate for the presidency had de-
clared the war a failure. Treason was talked as
boldly in Chicago at that convention as ever it had
been in Charleston. It was a question whether the
government would then have had the power to
make arrests and punish those who thus talked
treason. But this decisive victory was the most
effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they
could hear from him in Washington, and the Presi-
dent became very much frightened about him. He
was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like
that of General Cass was said to have been, in one
of our Indian wars, when he was an officer of the
army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that
the first thing he knew he found himself in their
front, and the Indians pursuing him. The President
was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side

SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH. 333

of Early and that Early was in behind him. He was
afraid that Sheridan was getting so far away that
reinforcements would be sent out from Richmond
to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the Presi-
dent that I had taken steps to prevent Lee from
sending reinforcements to Early, by attacking the
former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his
position, I sent Ord with the 18th corps and Birney
with the 10th corps to make an advance on Richmond,
to threaten it Ord moved with the left wing up to
Chaffins Bluff; Birney with the ioth corps took a
road farther north ; while Kautz with the cavalry
took the Darby road, still farther to the north.
They got across the river by the next morning, and
made an effort to surprise the enemy. In that, how-
ever, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy's lines were very strong and very in-
tricate. Stannard's division of the 18th corps with
General Burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault
against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen
guns and a good many prisoners. Burnham was
killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens who suc-
ceeded him was badly wounded ; and his successor
also fell in the same way. Some works to the right
and left were also carried with the guns in them —
six in number — and a few more prisoners. Birney's
troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched

334 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts
upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing
Fort Harrison into the new line and extending it to
the river. This brought us pretty close to the
enemy on the north side of the James, and the two
opposing lines maintained their relative positions to
the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to
advance, but it failed. Ord fell badly wounded, and
had to be relieved ; the command devolved upon
General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was as-
signed to the command of the 18th corps. During
the night Lee reinforced his troops about Fort Gil-
mer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by
transferring eight additional brigades from Peters-
burg, and attempted to retake the works which we
had captured by concentrating ten brigades against
them. All their efforts failed, their attacks being all
repulsed with very heavy loss. In one of these as-
saults upon us General Stannard, a gallant officer,
who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our
casualties during these operations amounted to 394
killed, 1,554 wounded and 324 missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was in-
structed to keep up an appearance of moving troops
to our extreme left. Parke and Warren were kept
with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move,

SHERIDAN* S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH. 335

leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scat-
tering line on the other intrenchments. The object
of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to
the north side of the river. Meade was instructed
to watch the enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his
lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under War-
ren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at
Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main
line. Our troops followed and made an attack in
the hope of carrying the enemy's main line ; but
in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large
number of men, mostly captured. The number
of killed and wounded was not large. The next
day our troops advanced again and established them-
selves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front
of the enemy. This advanced Warren's position on
the Weldon Railroad very considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the
valley, and taken the productions of the valley
so that instead of going there for supplies the
enemy would have to bring his provisions with
him if he again entered it, recommended a reduc-
tion of his own force, the surplus to be sent where
it could be of more use. I approved of his sug-
gestion, and ordered him to send Wright's corps back
to the James River. I further directed him to
repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards

336 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the advanced position which we would hold with a
small force. The troops were to be sent to Wash-
ington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch
the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the
enemy from getting into the rear of Sheridan
while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to
the Confederate army that, contrary to our expec-
tations, they determined to make one more strike,
and save it if possible before the supplies should be
all destroyed. Reinforcements were sent therefore
to Early, and this before any of our troops had been
withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at
Harrisonburg ; but the latter had not remained
there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced
retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the
food and forage and driving the cattle before him,
Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his
cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead
of Rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most
completely, capturing eleven guns and a large num-
ber of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty
men. His cavalry pursued the enemy back some
twenty-five miles. On the 10th of October the
march down the valley was again resumed, Early
again following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the

SHERIDAN* S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH. 337

opportunity if afforded by the enemy's having been
sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut
the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad.
But this order had to go through Washington where
it was intercepted ; and when Sheridan received what
purported to be a statement of what I wanted him
to do it was something entirely different. Halleck
informed Sheridan that it was my wish for him to
hold a forward position as a base from which to act
against Charlottesville and Gordonsville ; that he
should fortify this position and provision it

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly ; and I
was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as fol-
lows :

City Point, Va.,

October 14, 1864.— 12.30 P.M.
Major-General Sheridan,

Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Rail-
road and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best,
holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their
forces. If you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own
for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly
as much as their destruction. If you cannot do this, then the next
best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a
good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defen-
sive operations. You need not therefore send here more than one

division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

Sheridan having been summoned to Washington

Vol. 11. — 22

338 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

City, started on the 15th leaving Wright in com-
mand. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some
twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morn-
ing while at Front Royal, Sheridan received a
dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch from
Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It di-
rected the latter to be ready to move and to crush
Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On
the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cav-
alry up the valley to join Wright.

On the 1 8th of October Early was ready to move,
and during the night succeeded in getting his troops
in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately
and in great confusion down the valley, losing
eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more
prisoners. The right under General Getty main-
tained a firm and steady front, falling back to Mid-
dletown where it took a position and made a stand.
The cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads lead-
ing to Winchester and held them for the use of
our troops in falling back, General Wright having
ordered a retreat back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th,
reached Winchester that night. The following
morning he started to join his command. He had
scarcely got out of town, when he met his men
returning in panic from the front and also heard
heavy firing to the south. He immediately ordered

SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER. 339

the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across
the valley to stop the stragglers. Leaving mem-
bers of his staff to take care of Winchester and
the public property there, he set out with a small
escort directly for the scene of battle. As he met
the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, remind-
ing them that they were going the wrong way. His
presence soon restored confidence. Finding them-
selves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt
and turn back. Many of those who had run ten
miles got back in time to redeem their reputation
as gallant soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty
and Custer still holding their ground firmly between
the Confederates and our retreating troops. Every-
thing in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at
once proceeded to intrench his position ; and he
awaited an assault from the enemy. This was made
with vigor, and was directed principally against
Emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss
in the first attack. By one o'clock the attack was
repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that he
seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went
to work to intrench himself with a view to holding
the position he had already gained. He thought,
no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to
leave him unmolested ; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan

340 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

advanced. He sent his cavalry by both flanks, and
they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The contest
was close for a time, but at length the left of the
enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole
line soon followed. Early tried to rally his men, but
they were followed so closely that they had to give
way very quickly every time they attempted to
make a stand. Our cavalry, having pushed on and
got in the rear of the Confederates, captured twenty-
four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had
been lost in the morning. This victory pretty much
closed the campaigning in the Valley of Virginia.
All the Confederate troops were sent back to
Richmond with the exception of one division of
infantry and a little cavalry. Wright's corps was
ordered back to the Army of the Potomac, and two
other divisions were withdrawn from the valley.
Early had lost more men in killed, wounded and
captured in the valley than Sheridan had com-
manded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements
General R. B. Hayes, who succeeded me as Presi-
dent of the United States, bore a very honorable
part. His conduct on the field was marked by con-
spicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities
of a higher order than that of mere personal daring.
This might well have been expected of one who
could write at the time he is said to have done so :

CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE WINTER. 34 1

" Any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would
abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in Con-
gress, ought to be scalped." Having entered the
army as a Major of Volunteers at the beginning of
the war, General Hayes attained by meritorious ser-
vice the rank of Brevet Major-General before its
close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy
attacked Kautz's cavalry on the 7th of October, and
drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded
and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. This
was followed up by an attack on our intrenched in-
fantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter.
On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by Gen-
eral Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from
some new works he was constructing, which resulted
in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt
to get possession of the South Side Railroad, and
for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The
attempt proved a failure, however, the most ad-
vanced of our troops not getting nearer than within
six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing the impos-
sibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops
to withdraw, and they were all back in their former
positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstra-
tion on the north side of the James River in order

34* PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF C. S. GRAXT.

to support this move, by detaining there the Con-
federate troops who were on that side. He suc-
ceeded in this, but failed of further results by not
marching past the enemy's left before turning in
on the Darby road and by reason of simply com-
ing up against their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond
for the winter. Of course there was frequent skir-
mishing between pickets, but no serious battle was
fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It
would prolong this work to give a detailed ac-
count of all that took place from day to day around
Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and
it would not interest the general reader if given.
All these details can be found by the military student
in a series of books published by the Scribners,
Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the
publications of the War Department, including both
the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock
was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by
the Secretary of War and ordered to Washington,
to organize and command a corps of veteran troops
to be designated the 1st corps. It was expected
that this would give him a large command to co-
operate with in the spring. It was my expecta-
tion, at the time, that in the final operations Han-
cock should move either up the valley, or else east

CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE WINTER. 343

of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg ; the idea being to
make the spring campaign the close of the war. I
expected, with Sherman coming up from the South,
Meade south of Petersburg and around Richmond,
and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots
of supplies established in the eastern part of that
State, to move from the direction of Washington or
the valley towards Lynchburg. We would then
have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be
cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to sup-
port his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army
of the Potomac, was assigned to the command of
the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA — SHERMAN'S MARCH TO
THE SEA — WAR ANECDOTES — THE MARCH ON SAVAN-
NAH— INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH CAPTURE OF

SAVANNAH.

LET us now return to the operations in the
military division of the Mississippi, and accom-
pany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the
territory of the enemy very materially and cut off
one of his two remaining lines of roads from east
to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis
visited Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at
each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th of
September, and at Macon on the 2 2d. Inasmuch
as he had relieved Johnston and appointed Hood,
and Hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is
natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed
with General Johnston's policy. My own judgment
is that Johnston acted very wisely : he husbanded
his men and saved as much of his territory as he
could, without fighting decisive battles in which all

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 345

might be lost As Sherman advanced, as I have
shown, his army became spread out, until, if this
had been continued, it would have been easy to
destroy it in detail. I know that both Sherman
and I were rejoiced when we heard of the change.
Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier
and not destitute of ability ; but unfortunately his
policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw
him, without thinking much of the consequences of
defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor
Brown, of Georgia, and General Johnston in un-
measured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty
to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as Gen-
eral Johnston is concerned, I think Davis did him a
great injustice in this particular. I had known the
general before the war and strongly believed it would
be impossible for him to accept a high commission
for the purpose of betraying the cause he had es-
poused. Then, as I have said, I think that his
policy was the best one that could have been pur-
sued by the whole South — protract the war, which
was all that was necessary to enable them to
gain recognition in the end. The North was
already growing weary, as the South evidently
was also, but with this difference. In the North the
people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever
they chose to stop supplies. The South was a

346 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

military camp, controlled absolutely by the gov-
ernment with soldiers to back it, and the war
could have been protracted, no matter to what ex-
tent the discontent reached, up to the point of open
mutiny of the soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's
speeches were frank appeals to the people of Geor-
gia and that portion of the South to come to their
relief. He tried to assure his frightened hearers
that the Yankees were rapidly digging their own
graves ; that measures were already being taken to
cut them off from supplies from the North ; and
that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear,
they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile peo-
ple. Papers containing reports of these speeches
immediately reached the Northern States, and they
were republished. Of course, that caused no alarm
so long as telegraphic communication was kept up
with Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta
he moved to the south-west and was followed by
a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared
upon the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with
his whole army began destroying the road. At
the same time also the work was begun in Tennes-
see and Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his
hearers at Palmetto and Macon would take place.
He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry gen-
eral in the South) north for this purpose ; and For-

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 347

rest and Wheeler carried out their orders with more
or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison.
Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat
of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a num-
ber of transports, something the accomplishment of
which is very hard to account for. Hood's army
had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdraw-
ing the Georgia State troops for the purpose of
gathering in the season's crops for the use of the
people and for the use of the army. This not only
depleted Hood's forces but it served a most excel-
lent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and
forage for the use of our army in its subsequent
march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his
force and go himself with portions of it hither and
thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that
with the army he then had it would be impossible
to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him
any force whatever with which to take the offensive.
Had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforce-
ments would have been necessary ; and Mr. Davis's
prediction of the destruction of the army would have
been realized, or else Sherman would have been
obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. Davis
said in his speeches would prove more disastrous
than Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in
reaching Sherman. He took advantage of the in-

548 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. £ GRAXT.

formation they gave, and made all the preparation
possible for him to make to meet what now became
expected, attempts to break his communications.
Something else had to be done : and to Sherman's
sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in
dawning upon him, not only that something else had
to be done, but what that something else should be.
On September ioth I telegraphed Sherman as
follows :

City Point, Va. , Sept iof 1864.
Major-General Sherman.

Atlanta. Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations

can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be

commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to

the end of the war. If we give him no peace whilst the war

lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now that we have all of Mobile

Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it will be the best move

to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, whilst you move

on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in this

matter.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieu tenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly :

" If I could be sure of finding provisions and
ammunition at Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I can
march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up
Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other.
* * * If you can manage to take the Savannah
River as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 349

as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State
of Georgia,"

On the 1 2th I sent a special messenger, one of my
own staff, with a letter inviting Sherman's views
about the next campaign.

City Point, Vam Sept 12, 1864.
Major-General W. T. Sherman,

Commanding Mil. Division of the Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel
Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better
than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself
strong enough for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to
get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming for-
ward very rapidly. My lines are necessarily very long, extending
from Deep Bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed
by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Appomattox
to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly fortified, and can
be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes
many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend
my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or
Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the
Danville Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want
to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wil-
mington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort
Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet
will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries
as they did at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the
harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile.
What you are to do with the forces at your command, I do not
see. The difficulties of supplying your army, except when you
are constantly moving, beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it

350 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.

had not been for Price's movements Canby would have sent
twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command on
the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With
these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one
half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then
move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and
Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you
could take and open up a new base of supplies. My object now
in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for
you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time every- .
thing can be got ready. It will probably be the 5th of October
before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names
forward and I will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-GeneraL

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to
Washington that Hood's troops were in his rear.
He had provided against this by sending a division
to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia,
which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that
Hood would fall back in the direction from which he
had come to reach the railroad. At the same time
Sherman and Hood kept up a correspondence
relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment
of citizens, and other matters suitable to be ar-
ranged between hostile commanders in the field.
On the 27th of September I telegraphed Sherman
as follows :

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA.

35*

City Point, Va.,
September 27, 1864. — 10.30 A.M.
Major-General Sherman :

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western
States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from
you. * * *

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chat-
tanooga, and afterwards to Nashville, with another
division (Morgan's) of the advanced army. Sher-
man then suggested that, when he was prepared, his
movements should take place against Milledgeville
and then to Savannah. His expectation at that
time was, to make this movement as soon as he
could get up his supplies. Hood was moving in his
own country, and was moving light so that he could
make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended
upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was
not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of
affairs happened, Mobile had been looked upon as
the objective point of Sherman's army. It had been
a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first
suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the
troops in Louisiana, instead of frittering away their
time in the trans-Mississippi, should move against
Mobile. I recommended this from time to time
until I came into command of the army, the last of

352 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

March 1864. Having the power in my own hands,
I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores
and troops, in the department of the Gulf about
New Orleans, with a view to a move against Mobile,
in support of, and in conjunction with, the other
armies operating in the field. Before I came into
command, these troops had been scattered over the
trans-Mississippi department in such a way that they
could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to
take any part in the original movement ; hence
the consideration, which had caused Mobile to be
selected as the objective point for Sherman's army
to find his next base of supplies after having cut
loose from Atlanta, no longer existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient
officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave
the army about the first of October. He was in
command of two divisions of the 16th corps, con-
solidated into one. Sherman then divided his
army into the right and left wings — the right
commanded by General O. O. Howard and the
left by General Slocum. General Dodge's two
divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.
Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th
corps, and Slocum's the 14th and 20th corps, com-
manded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Wil-
liams. Generals Logan and Blair commanded the
two corps composing the right wing. About this

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 353

time they left to take part in the presidential elec-
tion, which took place that year, leaving their corps
to Osterhaus and Ransom. I have no doubt that their
leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the War
Department. General Blair got back in time to re-
sume his command and to proceed with it through-
out the march to the sea and back to the grand
review at Washington. General Logan did not
return to his command until after it reached Sa-
vannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer
of General Howard from that portion of the Army
of the Potomac which was then with the Western
Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennes-
see, with which army General Logan had served
from the battle of Belmont to the fall of Atlanta —
having passed successively through all grades from
colonel commanding a regiment to general com-
manding a brigade, division and army corps, until
upon the death of McPherson the command of the
entire Army of the Tennessee devolved upon him
in the midst of a hotly contested battle. He con-
ceived that he had done his full duty as commander
in that engagement ; and I can bear testimony,
from personal observation, that he had proved him-
self fully equal to all the lower positions which he
had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to
question the motive which actuated Sherman in

Vol. 11. — 23

354 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

taking an officer from another army to supersede
General Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he
did this for what he considered would be to the
good of the service, which was more important
than that the personal feelings of any individual
should not be aggrieved ; though I doubt whether he
had an officer with him who could have filled the
place as Logan would have done. Differences of
opinion must exist between the best of friends as to
policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness.
The officer who has the command, however, should
be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers
under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered
about sixty thousand effective men. All weak men had
been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were
not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he
had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the
earth ; better than any European soldiers, because
they not only worked like a machine but the machine
thought. European armies know very little what
they are fighting for, and care less. Included in
these sixty thousand troops, there were two small di-
visions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four
thousand men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty
thousand men, independent of Forrest, whose forces
were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.
Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 355

Davis's military plan was admirable, and promised
the best results of anything he could have done, ac-
cording to my judgment. I say this because I have
criticised his military judgment in the removal of
Johnston, and also in the appointment of Hood. I
am aware, however, that there was high feeling exist-
ing at that time between Davis and his subordinate,
whom I regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from At-
lanta was again very badly broken, Hood having
got on the track with his army. Sherman saw after
night, from a high point, the road burning for miles.
The defence of the railroad by our troops was very
gallant, but they could not hold points between
their intrenched positions against Hood's whole
army ; in fact they made no attempt to do so ;
but generally the intrenched positions were held,
as well as important bridges, and stores located
at them. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by
a small force of men under the command of Gen-
eral Corse, one of the very able and efficient
volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with
a small force, was cut off from the remainder of
the National army and was attacked with great
vigor by many times his own number. Sherman
from his high position could see the battle raging,
with the Confederate troops between him and his
subordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the

356 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

temporary siege, but the time that would be neces-
sarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be so
great that all occupying the intrenchments might
be dead. Corse was a man who would never sur-
render. From a high position some of Sherman's
signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a
hole in the block house at Allatoona. It was from
Corse. He had been shot through the face, but
he signalled to his chief a message which left no
doubt of his determination to hold his post at all
hazards. It was at this point probably, that Sher-
man first realized that with the forces at his dis-
posal, the keeping open of his line of communica-
tions with the North would be impossible if he
expected to retain any force with which to operate
offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, there-
fore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga,
when all ready to move, and leave the latter place
garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it
was necessary that he should repair damages already
done, and hold the road until he could get forward
such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as
he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march,
and to return to the north his surplus artillery ; his
object being to move light and to have no more artil-
lery than could be used to advantage on the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though
he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 357

latter moving the other way while he was moving
south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold
Tennessee and Kentucky. I, myself, was thoroughly
satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On
the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman author-
izing him definitely to move according to the plan he
had proposed : that is, cutting loose from his base,
giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chat-
tanooga. To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley
(4th corps) back, and also ordered Schofield, com-
manding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand
strong, to report to him. In addition to this, A. J.
Smith, who, with two divisions of Sherman's army,
was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the
enemy from that State, was under orders to return to
Thomas and, under the most unfavorable circum-
stances, might be expected to arrive there long be-
fore Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that
were being raised in the North-west went to Thomas
as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. Thomas,
without any of these additions spoken of, had a
garrison at Chattanooga — which had been strength-
ened by one division — and garrisons at Bridgeport,
Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence.
There were already with him in Nashville ten
thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many
thousands of employees in the quartermasters and

358

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

other departments who could be put in the in
trenchments in front of Nashville, for its defence
Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dis
mounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped foi
the field. Thomas had at this time about forty-fiv<
thousand men without any of the reinforcement!
here above enumerated. These reinforcements gav<
him altogether about seventy thousand men, withou
counting what might be added by the new leviei
already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon th<
field, not to supersede Hood in command, but t(
take general charge over the entire district in whicl
Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating
He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens foi
assistance to be rendered in every way : by sending
reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line o
march of the invaders, by destroying the bridge!
over which they would have to cross, and by, ir
every way, obstructing the roads to their front. Bui
it was hard to convince the people of the propriety
of destroying supplies which were so much needec
by themselves, and each one hoped that his owr
possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camj
near Decatur, Alabama, where he remained until the
29th of October, but without making an attack or
the garrison of that place.

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 359

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats,
from Muscle Shoals east ; and, also, below the
second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with
the troops that might be concentrated from the
garrisons along the river at any point where Hood
might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible
for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where
it was navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navi-
gable, and below them again is another shoal which
also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved
down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama,
crossed over and remained there for some time, col-
lecting supplies of food, forage and ammunition.
All of these had to come from a considerable dis-
tance south, because the region in which he was
then situated was mountainous, with small valleys
which produced but little, and what they had pro-
duced had long since been exhausted. On the ist
of November I suggested to Sherman, and also
asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying
Hood before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved
definitely his making his proposed campaign through
Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender mercy
of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman
fixed the ioth of November as the day of starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to
Atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 36 1

commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and
the cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then
the capital of Georgia, being Sherman's objective or
stopping place on the way to Savannah. The left
wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much
farther east than those taken by the right wing.
Slocum was in command, and threatened Augusta
as the point to which he was moving, but he was
to turn off and meet the right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it
worthless for military purposes before starting, Sher-
man himself remaining over a day to superintend
the work, and see that it was well done. Shermans
orders for this campaign were perfect. Before start-
ing, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak
men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured
soldiers to accompany him on his long march in
prospect. His artillery was reduced to sixty-five
guns. The ammunition carried with them was two
hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations
were taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded
to its capacity for rapid movement. The army was
expected to live on the country, and to always keep
the wagons full of forage and provisions against
a possible delay of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made
most of their advance along the line of railroads,
which they destroyed. The method adopted to per-

362 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

form this work, was to burn and destroy all the
bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at
places, to tear up the track and bend the rails.
Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along
one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place
these under the rails and, hoisting all at once,
turn over many rods of road at one time. The
ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as
they were loosened, would be carried and put across
these log heaps. When a sufficient number of rails
were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on
fire. This would heat the rails very much more in
the middle, that being over the main part of the
fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally
bend of their own weight ; but the soldiers, to in-
crease the damage, would take tongs and, one or
two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force
against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus
leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest
trees of Georgia. All this work was going on at
the same time, there being a sufficient number of
men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs
and built the fire ; some put the rails upon the fire ;
while others would bend those that were sufficiently
heated : so that, by the time the last bit of road
was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a
certain place, the rails previously taken up were
already destroyed.

WAR ANECDOTES. 363

The organization for supplying the army was very
complete. Each brigade furnished a company to
gather supplies of forage and provisions for the
command to which they belonged. Strict injunc-
tions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise
unnecessarily annoying the people ; but everything
in shape of food for man and forage for beast
was taken. The supplies were turned over to the
brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were
issued by them to their respective commands pre-
cisely the same as if they had been purchased. The
captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry,
some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasion-
ally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and
the army " bummers," in collecting their loads and
getting back to their respective commands, was mar-
vellous. When they started out in the morning,
they were always on foot ; but scarcely one of them
returned in the evening without being mounted on
a horse or mule. These would be turned in for
the general use of the army, and the next day these
men would start out afoot and return again in the
evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall
under the head of romance ; indeed, I am afraid
that in telling some of their experiences, the romance
got the better of the truth upon which the story was

364

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes
are told, very little of the foundation is left I suspect
that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added
to make the stories better. In one instance it was
reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed
a house where they discovered some chickens under
the dwelling. They immediately proceeded to cap-
ture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady
of the house, who happened to be at home, made
piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they
were a few she had put away to save by permission
of other parties who had preceded and who had
taken all the others that she had The soldiers
seemed moved at her appeal ; but looking at the
chickens again they were tempted and one of them
replied : " The rebellion must be suppressed if it
takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and pro-
ceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has
been told. The South, prior to the rebellion, kept
bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took
refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt
convicts. Orders were issued to kill all these animals
as they were met with. On one occasion a soldier
picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress,
and was carrying it off to execution when the lady
made a strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier
replied, " Madam, our orders are to kill every blood-

WAR ANECDOTES. 365

hound." " But this is not a bloodhound," said the
lady. " Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will
grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as
he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the neces-
sary hardship they would seem to imply, I do not
believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging con-
sidering that we were in the enemy's territory and
without any supplies except such as the country
afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached
Milledgeville. The right wing was not far off : but
proceeded on its way towards Savannah destroying
the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville
remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings
used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its
march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr.
Davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the
legislature of the State and all the State officers.
The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry
away even his garden vegetables, while he left the
archives of the State to fall into our hands. The
only military force that was opposed to Sherman's
forward march was the Georgia militia, a division
under the command of General G. W. Smith,
and a battalion under Harry Wayne. Neither the
quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufifi-

366 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF L\ S. GRANT.

cient to even retard the progress of Sherman's
army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this
time at the successful invasion of Georgia that they
took the cadets from the military college and
added them to the ranks of the militia. They even
liberated the State convicts under promise from
them that they would serve in the army. I have
but little doubt that the worst acts that were at-
tributed to Sherman's army were committed by
these convicts, and by other Southern people who
ought to have been under sentence — such people
as could be found in every community. North and
South — who took advantage of their country being
invaded to commit crime. They were in but little
danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sher-
man's movements pictured him as in the most de-
plorable condition : stating that his men were starv-
ing, that they were demoralized and wandering
about almost without object, aiming only to reach
the sea coast and get under the protection of our
navy. These papers got to the North and had
more or less effect upon the minds of the people,
causing much distress to all loyal persons — particu-
larly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers
with Sherman. Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts,
had a letter written asking me if I could give him

THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH 367

anything that he could say to the loyal people that
would comfort them. I told him there was not
the slightest occasion for alarm ; that with 60,000
such men as Sherman had with him, such a com-
manding officer as he was could not be cut off in
the open country. He might possibly be prevented
from reaching the point he had started out to reach,
but he would get through somewhere and would
finally get to his chosen destination : and even if
worst came to worst he could return North. I
heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those
who would inquire of him as to what he thought about
the safety of Sherman's army, that Sherman was all
right : " Grant says they are safe with such a general,
and that if they cannot get out where they want
to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the
State House, organized a legislature, and proceeded
to business precisely as if they were the legislative
body belonging to the State of Georgia. The de-
bates were exciting, and were upon the subject of
the situation the South was in at that time, par-
ticularly the State of Georgia. They went so far
as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate,
the ordinance of secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march,
going by the way of Waynesboro and Louisville,
Millen being the next objective and where the two

368 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF I/. S. GRANT.

columns (the right and left wings) were to meet
The left wing moved to the left of the direct road,
and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it
look as though Augusta was the point they were
aiming for. They moved on all the roads they
could find leading in that direction. The cavalry
was sent to make a rapid march in hope of sur-
prising Millen before the Union prisoners could be
carried away ; but they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was
about one hundred miles. At this point Wheeler,
who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and
swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops
confronting Sherman. Hardee, a native of Georgia,
also came, but brought no troops with him. It was
intended that he should raise as large an army as
possible with which to intercept Shermans march.
He did succeed in raising some troops, and with
these and those under the command of Wheeler and
Wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoy-
ance but no great detention. Our cavalry and
Wheelers had a pretty severe engagement, in which
Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving
the idea that Sherman was probably making for that

point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and
the march was resumed the following day for Savan-
nah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sent

THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH. 369

to Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was
there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to de-
stroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised a force
it was too late to do the work expected of it
Hardee's whole force probably numbered less than
ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy
and poor, and affords but very little forage other
than rice straw, which was then growing. This
answered a very good purpose as forage, and the
rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations.
No further resistance worthy of note was met with,
until within a few miles of Savannah. This place
was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. Sher-
man proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the
place, and found that the enemy had placed tor-
pedoes in the ground, which were to explode when
stepped on by man or beast. One of these exploded
under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to
pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so
badly that it had to be amputated. Sherman at once
ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in
a compact body in advance, to either explode the
torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosion
took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savan-
nah commenced. Sherman then, before proceed-
ing any further with operations for the capture of

Vol. 11.— 24

37° PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

the place, started with some troops to open com-
munication with our fleet, which he expected to find
in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the
enemy would permit In marching to the coast he
encountered Fort McAllister, which it was necessary
to reduce before the supplies he might find on ship*
board could be made available. Fort McAllister
was soon captured by an assault made by General
Hazen's division. Communication was then estab-
lished with the fleet The capture of Savannah
then only occupied a few days, and involved no
great loss of life. The garrison, however, as we
shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the
river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with
the fleet he found there a steamer, which I had
forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails
for his army, also supplies which I supposed he
would be in need of. General J. G. Foster, who
commanded all the troops south of North Carolina
on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman
before he had opened communication with the fleet,
with the view of ascertaining what assistance he
could be to him. Foster returned immediately to
his own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the pur-
pose of sending Sherman siege guns, and also if he
should find he had them to spare, supplies of cloth-
ing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles

INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH. 37 1

might not be found outside. The mail on the
steamer which I sent down, had been collected by
Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Depart-
ment, who went in charge of it. On this same vessel
I sent an officer of my staff (Lieutenant Dunn) with
the following letter to General Sherman :

City Point, Va., Dec. 3, 1864.

Major-General W. T. Sherman,

Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicat-
ing no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails
(which had been previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel
Markland, Special Agent of the Post Office Department) to be
sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be for-
warded to you as soon as heard from on the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain
from congratulating you and those under your command, until
bottom has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for
the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made
here. The enemy has been closely watched though, and pre-
vented from detaching against you. I think not one man has
gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dis- •
mounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying
to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place.
Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler
are making to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the
best, I do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting
this expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th,
and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions

372 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will
your views after you have established yourself on the sea-co;
With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only t
through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy be)
the fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by hold
Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the e
of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force fr
there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with He
close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have
the roads except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part
this falling back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may h;
been. It did not look so, however, to me. In my opini
Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry. Hood 1
the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood i
be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news you ?
learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here tl
there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done
will run down the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ;
Mrs. Sherman to go with me.

Your* truly,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieu tenant-General.

I quote this letter because it gives the reader
full knowledge of the events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah
complete its investment and insure the surrender
the garrison. The country about Savannah is lc
and marshy, and the city was well intrenched fro
the river above to the river below, and assaul

CAPTURE QF SAVANNAH. 373

could not be made except along a comparatively nar-
row causeway. For this reason assaults must have
resulted in serious destruction of life to the Union
troops, with the chance of failing altogether. Sher-
man therefore decided upon a 'complete investment
of the place. When he believed this investment
completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender.
General Hardee, who was in command, replied in
substance that the condition of affairs was not such
as Sherman had described. He said he was in full
communication with his department and was receiv-
ing supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all
communication with the west side of the river, and
by the river itself to the north and south. On the
South Carolina side the country was all rice fields,
through which it would have been impossible to bring
supplies — so that Hardee had no possible communi-
cation with the outside world except by a dilapidated
plank road starting from the west bank of the river.
Sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person
to a point on the coast, where General Foster had
troops stationed under General Hatch, for the pur-
pose of making arrangements with the latter officer
to go through by one of the numerous channels run-
ning inland along that part of the coast of South
Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardee
still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last

374 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF C. S. GRANT.

means he had of getting supplies, if not of com-
munication.

While arranging for this movement, and before die
attempt to execute the plan had been commenced
Sherman received information through one of his
staff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah
the night before. This was the night of the 21st of
December. Before evacuating the place Hardee had
blown up the navy yard. Some iron-clads had been
destroyed, as well as other property that might have
been valuable to us ; but he left an immense amount
of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad
cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and
several thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of
Savannah, which Sherman relates in his Memoirs,
and which is worthy of repetition. Savannah was
one of the points where blockade runners entered.
Shortly after the city fell into our possession, a
blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubt-
ing but the Confederates were still in possession.
It was not molested, and the captain did not find out
his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the
Custom House, where he found a new occupant of
the building, and made a less profitable disposition
of his vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship
of Sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book

v.-

CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH. 375

when it appeared before the public, I want to state
here that no question upon that subject was ever
raised between General Sherman and myself. Cir-
cumstances made the plan on which Sherman ex-
pected to act impracticable, and as commander of
the forces he necessarily had to devise a new one
which would give more promise of success : conse-
quently he recommended the destruction of the rail-
road back to Chattanooga, and that he should be
authorized then to move, as he did, from Atlanta
forward. His suggestions were finally approved,
although they did not immediately find favor in
Washington. Even when it came to the time of
starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propri-
ety of the campaign he was about to commence,
filled the mind of the President, induced no doubt
by his advisers. This went so far as to move the
President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for
a day or two until I could think the matter over.
My recollection is, though I find no record to show
it, that out of deference to the President's wish I did
send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a
day or two, or else the connections between us were
already cut so that I could not do so. However this
may be, the question of who devised the plan of '
march from Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered :
it was clearly Sherman, and to him also belongs the
credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardly possi-

1
■ \

„ 1

376 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S.

ble that any one else than those on the spot could
have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede
one that did not promise success.*

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time
it was first submitted to me. My chief of staff,
however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as I
learned subsequently, finding that he could not move
me, he appealed to the authorities at Washington to
stop it

* See Appendix, letters of Oct nth.

CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN THE BATTLE OF NASH-
VILLE.

AS we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing
the Tennessee River between Muscle Shoals
and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864.
Thomas sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps,
together with three brigades of Wilson's cavalry to
Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November
Hood started and moved in such a manner as to
avoid Schofield, thereby turning his position. Hood
had with him three infantry corps, commanded respec-
tively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham.
These, with Jiis cavalry, numbered about forty-five
thousand men. Schofield had, of all arms, about
thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore,
for Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy,
but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it ; but to
fall back in case of an advance on Nashville, and to
fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the
enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by
Thomas himself. As soon as Schofield saw this move-
ment of Hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did

378 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to
Columbia. At Columbia there was a slight skir-
mish but no battle. From this place Schofield then
retreated to Franklin. He had sent his wagons in
advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two
divisions to protect them. Cheatham's corps of
Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went
into camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th,
passed Spring Hill, where Cheatham was bivou-
acked, during the night without molestation, though
within half a mile of where the Confederates were
encamped. On the morning of the 30th he had
arrived at Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in
time to make an attack the same day. The fight
was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confeder-
ate generals led their men in the repeated charges,
and the loss among them was of unusuaj proportions.
This fighting continued with great severity until
long after the night closed in, when the Confederates
drew off. General Stanley, who commanded two
divisions of the Union troops, and whose troops bore
the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but
maintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to
Thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by
our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. 379

besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was
189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and
missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield
at Franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he
should have done, and fight out the battle there.
He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat
to Nashville, which the latter did during that night
and the next day. .

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his prepara-
tions to receive Hood. The road to Chattanooga
was still well guarded with strong garrisons at Mur-
freesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga.
Thomas had previously given up Decatur and had
been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two divisions just
returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's
division and R. S. Grangers, which he had drawn
from the front. His quartermasters men, about ten
thousand in number, had been organized and armed
under the command of the chief quartermaster, Gen-
eral J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the fortifica-
tions under the general supervision of General Z. B.
Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and
to invest that place almost without interference.
Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that
he would have been safe against the attack of
Hood. He had troops enough even to annihilate

380 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

him in the open field. To me his delay was unac-
countable— sitting there and permitting himself to
be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he
would have to fight the enemy strongly posted be-
hind fortifications. It is true the weather was very
bad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so
that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that
made it very difficult to move. But I was afraid that
the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas
and manage to get north of the Cumberland River.
If he did this, I apprehended most serious results
from the campaign in the North, and was afraid we
might even have to send troops from the East to
head him off if he got there, General Thomas's move-
ments being always so deliberate and so slow, though
effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dis-
patches sent from City Point* to make the attack at
once. The country was alarmed, the administration
was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing
would take place which I have just described — that
is, Hood would get north. It was all without avail
further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas saying

♦City Point, Va., December*, 1864.
Major-General Thomas,

Nashville, Tenn.
If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will
lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to aban-
don the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is all

382 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

that he was getting ready to move as soon as he
could, that he was making preparations, etc. At last
I had to say to General Thomas that I should be
obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly.
He replied that he was very sorry, but he would
move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point
about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gal-
lant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to pro-
ceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed

well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies.
Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citi-
zens, etc.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant- General.

City Point, Va., December 2, 1864. — 1.30 p.m.
Major-General Thomas,

Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nash-
ville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at
Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville
we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he
was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method
of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer incalculable in-
jury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put
forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. Should
you get him to retreating give him no peace.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-GeneraL

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. 383

him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it
until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved,
then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with
me by telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking
over the situation, I became restless, and concluded
to go myself. I went as far as Washington City,
when a dispatch was received from General Thomas
announcing his readiness at last to move, and des-
ignating the time of his movement I concluded
to wait until that time. He did move, and was suc-
cessful from the start This was on the 15th of De-
cember. General Logan was at Louisville at the

City Point, Va., December 5, 1864.
Major-General Thomas,

Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland
to where he can cross it ? It seems to me whilst you should be
getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after For-
rest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens
him in all possibility as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT,
; Lieutenant-GeneraL

City Point, Va., December 6, 1864. — 4 p.m.
Major-General Thomas,

Nashville, Tenn.
Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your
cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign
back to the Ohio River.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

384 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. & GRANT.

time this movement was made, and telegraphed the
fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther him-
self.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favor-
able to the Union troops, and continued until night
closed in upon the combat The next day the battle
was renewed After a successful assault upon Hood's
men in their intrenchments the enemy fled in dis-
order, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their

Cmr Fonrr, Va., December Zt 1864. — 8.30 P.M.
Majok-Genkral Thomas,

Nashville, Tcnn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident
the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are scat-
tered. Why not attack at once ? By all means avoid the contin-
gency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat to the
Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of States to
send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross
the river. You clearly never should cross except in rear of the
enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of
destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed he
never can replace it. Use the means at your command, and you
can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end

of the land to the other.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-GeneraL

City Point, Va., December 11, 1864.— 4 p.m.
Majob-Genxral Thomas,

Nashville, Tcnn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be wit-
nessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you will

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. 385

artillery and small arms in great numbers on the
field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our
cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not
their horses with them ; so that they were not ready
to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy re-
treated. They sent back, however, for their horses,
and endeavored to get to Franklin ahead of Hood's
broken army by the Granny White Road, but
too much time was consumed in getting started.

be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there
be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so
far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you
follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. I am in
hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that
you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieu tenant-General.

Washington, D. C, December 15, 1864.
Major-General Thomas,

Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch

from Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall

go no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until

he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many

privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for

future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take

them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now

expected.

U. S. GRANT.

Lieu tenant-General.
Vol. n. — 25

386 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. GRANT.

They had got but a few miles beyond the scene of
the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dis-
mounted and behind intrcnchments covering the
road on which they were advancing. Here, another
battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on
foot, in which the Confederates were again routed
and driven in great disorder. Our cavalry then went
into bivouac, and renewed the pursuit on the follow-
ing morning. They were too late. The enemy al-
ready had possession of Franklin, and was beyond
them. It now became a chase in which the Confed-
erates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few
miles of Columbia, where they found the rebels had
destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other
bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few
days before had swelled the stream into a mad tor-
rent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortunately,
cither through a mistake in the wording of the
order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was
to have been sent by rail out to Franklin, to be
taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone
toward Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a
delay of some four days in building bridges out of
the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of course
Hood got such a start in this time that farther
pursuit was useless, although it was continued for
some distance, but without coming upon him again.

CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER — ATTACK ON THE
FORT — FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION — SECOND EX-
PEDITION AGAINST THE FORT— CAPTURE OF FORT
FISHER.

UP to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort
Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River and
below the City of Wilmington. This port was of
immense importance to the Confederates, because
it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners
by means of which they brought in from abroad
such supplies and munitions of war as they could
not produce at home. It was equally important to
us to get possession of it, not only because it was
desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a
speedy termination of the war, but also because for-
eign governments, particularly the British Govern-
ment, were constantly threatening that unless ours
could maintain the blockade of that coast they
should cease to recognize any blockade. For these
reasons I determined, with the concurrence of the
Navy Department, in December, to send an expe-

5^5 fZMSOXAZ Jf£JfCI£S OF C. i GMAXT.

ditfon agalssc Fori Fisher for the purpose of cap-
turing iw

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining
the blockade. I will mention a circumstance that took
place a: Fort Fisher after its falL Two English block-
ade runners came in at night. Their commanders,
not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way
through all our rleet and got into the river unob-
served- They then signalled the fort, announcing
their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort
who had been there before and who understood these
signals. He informed General Tern- what reply he
should make to have them come in. and Terry did as
he advised. The vessels came in. their officers entirely
unconscious that they were falling into the hands of
the Union forces. Even after they were brought in
to the fort thev were entertained in conversation for
some little time before suspecting that the Union
troops were occupying the fort. They were finally
informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel. of the Army of the
James, to go with the expedition, but gave instruc-
tions through General Butler. He commanded the
department within whose geographical limits Fort
Fisher was situated, as well as Beaufort and other
points on that coast held by our troops; he was,
therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the ex-
jiedition against Fort Fisher.

39°

PEMSCXAL MEMOIRS OF V. £ GRAXT.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer
loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near
the shore under the fort and exploded, it would
create great havoc and make the capture an easy
matter. Admiral Porter, who was to command the
naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and
it was not disapproved of in Washington ; the navy
was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer
for this purpose. I had no confidence in the success
of the scheme, and so expressed myself ; but as no
serious harm could come of the experiment, and the
authorities at Washington seemed desirous to have
it tried, I permitted it. The steamer was sent to
Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with
powder and prepared for the part she was to play
in the reduction of Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the
expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the
9th of December (1864). Very heavy storms pre-
vailed, however, at that time along that part of the
sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until
the 13th or 14th. His advance arrived off Fort
Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been
already assembled, or was assembling, but they were
obliged to run into Beaufort for munitions, coal, etc. ;
then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully pre-
pared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th ;
but Butler, who had remained outside from the 15th

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER.

39*

up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh
water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to replen-
ish. Another storm overtook him, and several days
more were lost before the army and navy were both
ready at the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was
towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was
safe to run. 'She was then propelled by her own
machinery to within about five hundred yards of the
shore. There the clockwork, which was to explode
her within a certain length of time, was set and she
was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels
put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion
upon them. At two o'clock in the morning the ex-
plosion took place — and produced no more effect on
the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting
of a boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would
have done. Indeed when the troops in Fort Fisher
heard the explosion they supposed it was the
bursting of *a boiler in one of the Yankee gun-
boats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat penin-
sula north of Cape Fear River. The soil is sandy.
Back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded,
and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran
across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in
width, and extended along, the sea coast about thir-
teen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of

392 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (7. S. GRANT.

21 guns and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns
on the sea front. At that time it was only gam-
soned by four companies of infantry, one light bat-
tery and the gunners at the heavy guns — less than
seven hundred men — with a reserve of less than a
thousand men five miles up the peninsula. General
Whiting of the Confederate army was in command,
and General Bragg was in command of the force at
Wilmington. Both commenced calling for reinforce-
ments the moment they saw our troops landing.
The Governor of North Carolina called for every-
body who could stand behind a parapet and shoot
a gun, to join them. In this way they got two or
three hundred additional men into Fort Fisher;
and Hokes division, five or six thousand strong, was
sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops
arrived the very day that Butler was ready to ad-
vance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs
of concentric circles, their heavy iron-clads going in
very close range, being nearest the shore, and leav-
ing intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels
could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled
to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute.
The damage done to the fort by these shells was
very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled
in the fort. But the firing silenced all the guns by
making it too hot for the men to maintain their

ATTACK ON THE FORT.

393

positions about them and compelling them to seek
shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butlers troops under
General Adelbert Ames effected a landing out of
range of the fort without difficulty. This was ac-
complished under the protection of gunboats sent for
the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack
upon the fort by the fleet. They formed a line
across the peninsula and advanced, part going north
and part toward the fort, covering themselves as
they did so. Curtis pushed forward and came
near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at
what was called the Flag Pond Battery. Weitzel
accompanied him to within a half a mile of the
works. Here he saw that the fort had not been
injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against
an assault. Ames, who had gone north in his ad-
vance, captured 228 of the reserves. These pris-
oners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of
Hoke's division of six thousand from Richmond had
already arrived and the rest would soon be in his
rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to with-
draw his troops from the peninsula and return to the
fleet. At that time there had not been a man on
our side injured except by one of the shells from the
fleet. Curtis had got within a few yards of the
works. Some of his men had snatched a flag from

394 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.

the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse
from the inside of the stockade. At night Butler in-
formed Porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons
above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as
his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.
Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beau-
fort for more ammunition. He could fire much
faster than he had been doing, and would keep the
enemy from showing himself until our men were
within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that
Butler would leave some brave fellows like those
who had snatched the flag from the parapet and
taken the horse from the fort

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops
aboard, except Curtis's brigade, and started back. In
doing this, Butler made a fearful mistake. My in-
structions to him, or to the officer who went in com-
mand of the expedition, were explicit in the statement
that to effect a landing would be of itself a great vic-
tory, and if one should be effected, the foothold
must not be relinquished ; on the contrary, a regu-
lar siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard
against interference by reason of storms, supplies of
provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be
got on shore. But General Butler seems to have lost
sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at
Fort Monroe on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows :

FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION. 395

City Point, Va.,

Dec. 28, 1864.— 8.30 p.m.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable
failure. Many of the troops arc back here. Delays and free talk
of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops
to Wilmington to defeat it. After the expedition sailed from
Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during
which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. Who is
to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in
which he complained bitterly of having been aban-
doned by the army just when the fort was nearly in
our possession, and begged that our troops might be
sent back again to co-operate, but with a different
commander. As soon as I heard this I sent a mes-
senger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.
I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in
his disappointment, and that I wduld send the same
troops back with a different commander, with some
reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had
received. I told him it would take some little time
to get transportation for the additional troops ; but
as soon as it could be had the men should be on their
way to him, and there would be no delay on my part
I selected A. H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports
could be got ready and the troops aboard. They

396 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. & GRANT.

sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day. The ob-
ject and destination of the second expedition were at
the time kept a secret to all except a few in the Navy
Department and in the army to whom it was neces-
sary to impart the information. General Terry had
not the slightest idea of where he was going or what
he was to do. He simply knew that he was going to
sea and that he had his orders with him, which were
to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Por-
ter and have entire harmony between army and navy,
because the work before them would require the best
efforts of both arms of the service. They arrived off
Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, pre-
vented a landing at Fort Fisher until the 13th. The
navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and
at the same time assisted the army in landing, this
time five miles away. Only iron-clads fired at first ;
the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns
so as to ascertain their positions. This object being
accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and
fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the
fort showed evident signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as
had been done before, and at two o'clock on the fol-
lowing morning was up within two miles of the fort
with a respectable abatis in front of his line. His ar-
tillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. Again

SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT. 397

Curtiss brigade of Ames's divison had the lead. By
noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a
half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face
the other way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault
on the following day. The two commanders ar-
ranged their signals so that they could communicate
with each other from time to time as they might
have occasion. At daylight the fleet commenced its
firing. The time agreed upon for the assault was
the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who com-
manded the assaulting column moved at 3.30.
Porter landed a force of sailors and marines to
move against the sea-front in co-operation with
Ames's assault They were under Commander
Breese of the navy. These sailors and marines
had worked their way up to within a couple of
hundred yards of the fort before the assault. The
signal was given and the assault was made ; but the
poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very
badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and
wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met
by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade
through the swamp up to their waists to reach the
fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some
killed ; but they soon reached the palisades. These
they cut away, and pushed on through. The other

398 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

troops then came up, Penny packers following Cur-
tis, and Bell, who commanded the 3d brigade of
Ames's division, following Penny packer But the
fort was not yet captured though the parapet was
gained.

The works were very extensive. The large para-
pet around the work would have been but very little
protection to those inside except when they were
close up under it. Traverses had, therefore, been
run until really the work was a succession of small
forts enclosed by a large one. The rebels made a
desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven
from these traverses one by one. The fight con-
tinued till long after night. Our troops gained first
one traverse and then another, and by 10 o'clock at
night the place was carried. During this engage-
ment the sailors, who had been repulsed in their as-
sault on the bastion, rendered the best service they
could by reinforcing Terry's northern line — thus en-
abling him to send a detachment to the assistance of
Ames. The fleet kept up a continuous fire upon
that part of the fort which was still occupied by the
enemy. By means of signals they could be informed
where to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up
Fort Caswell on the opposite side of Cape Fear
River, and abandoned two extensive works on
Smith's Island in the river.

CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

399

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides
small-arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and
2,083 prisoners. In addition to these, there were
about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had
lost no killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the
brigade commanders, wa» killed, and two, Curtis and
Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from
Savannah, arrived off Fort Fisher soon after it fell.
When he heard the good news he promoted all the
officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous
gallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-
general, but had not been confirmed. This con-
firmed him ; and soon after I recommended him for
a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it
was given to him for this victory.

CHAPTER LXII.

Sherman's march north — sheridan ordered to

lynchburg canby ordered to move against

mobile — movements of schofield and thomas
capture of columbia, south carolina sher-
man in the carolinas.

WHEN news of Sherman being in possession
of Savannah reached the North, distinguished
statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him.
Among others who went was the Secretary of War,
who seemed much pleased at the result of his cam-
paign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of
New York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party,
was put in charge of the public property that had
been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then
turned over to General Fosters command to hold,
so that Sherman might have his own entire army
free to operate as might be decided upon in the
future, I sent the chief engineer of the Army of
the Potomac (General Barnard) with letters to Gen-
eral Sherman. He remained some time with the gen-
eral, and when he returned brought back letters, one
of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to

SHERMAN* S MARCH NORTH 40I

what ought to be done in co-operation with him,
when he should have started upon his march north-
ward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I
had no idea originally of having Sherman march
from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North Car-
olina. The season was bad, the roads impassable
for anything except such an army as he had, and I
should not have thought of ordering such a move.
I had, therefore, made preparations to collect trans-
ports to carry Sherman and his army around to the
James River by water, and so informed him. On
receiving this letter he went to work immediately to
prepare for the move, but seeing that it would re-
quire a long time to collect the transports, he sug-
gested the idea then of marching up north through
the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve
this ; for if successful, it promised every advantage.
His march through Georgia had thoroughly de-
stroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and
had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of
supply to the west of it. If North and South Caro-
lina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for
feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate
garrison at Richmond would be reduced in territory,
from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits
in the State of Virginia ; and, although that section
of the country was fertile, it was already well ex-

Vol. 11. — 26

402 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT.

hausted of both forage and food. I approved Sher-
man's suggestion therefore at once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because
supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to
be brought from a long distance. Sherman would
now have to march through a country furnishing
fewer provisions than that he had previously been
operating in during his march to the sea. Besides,
he was confronting, or marching toward, a force
of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had
encountered on their previous march ; and the
territory through which he had to pass had now
become of such vast importance to the very ex-
istence of the Confederate army, that the most
desperate efforts were to be expected in order to
save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary
supplies to start with, made arrangements with Ad-
miral Dahlgren, who commanded that part of the
navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and
General Foster, commanding the troops, to take
positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast,
which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood
of Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall
back upon the sea coast, in case he should encoun-
ter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress.
He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH. 403

what he would like to have done in support of his
movement farther north. This letter was brought
to City Point by General Barnard at a time when
I happened to be going to Washington City, where
I arrived on the 21st of January. I cannot tell the
provision I had already made to co-operate with
Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement,
better than by giving my reply to this letter.

Headquarters Armies of the United States,

Washington, D. C.t/an. 21, 1865.

Major-General W. T. Sherman,

Commanding Mil. Div. of the Mississippi.

General : — Your letters brought by General Barnard were re-
ceived at City Point, and read with interest. Not having them
with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to
satisfy you on all points of recommendation. As I arrived here
at one p.m., and must leave at six p.m., having in the meantime
spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I
must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a
campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to
Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand)
will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as
rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincin-
nati. The corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was
induced to do this because I did not believe Thomas could pos-
sibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated
a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct
one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the
pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far be-
hind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pur-
suit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed

404 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U* S. GRANT.

the State, from whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer
for Eastport He is possessed of excellent judgment, great cool-
ness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit He also re-
ported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up.
This report and a determination to give the enemy no rest de-
termined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to
Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to,
to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several
routes he would select No reply is yet received. Canby has
been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior,
towards Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move
from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent
to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will have a
moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a
force there of eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half
the number. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington
also has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on
the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about
Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he
will be sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus
forces at the two points will move to the interior toward Golds-
boro' in co-operation with your movements. From either point,
railroad communications can be run out, there being here abun-
dance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's
army south. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against
you, if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort
Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in
communication with them. They will be so instructed. From

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH 405

about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches
much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the mean-
time, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two
corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the
troops about Richmond.

To resume : Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from
the Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it
doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-
operate with you from New Bern or Wilmington, or both. You
can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who
will return with any message you may have for me. If there is
anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on snip-
board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut-General.

I had written on the 18th of January to General
Sherman, giving him the news of the battle of
Nashville. He was much pleased at the result, al-
though, like myself, he had been very much dis-
appointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross
the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of
Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked
there. He, however, as I had done, sent Thomas a
warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of
thanks to Sherman and his army passed by Congress
were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the dibris

406 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

in Savannah cleared up, commencing the work by
removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,
and taking up all other obstructions. He had then
intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a
small garrison. By the middle of January all his
work was done, except the accumulation of supplies
to commence his movements with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from
Savannah, going along by the river of the same name,
and the other by roads farther east, threatening
Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving
his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to
Pocotaligo by water. This column, in moving north,
threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not deter-
mined at first that they would not have a force visit
Charleston. South Carolina had done so much to
prepare the public mind of the South for secession,
and had been so active in precipitating the decision
of the question before the South was fully prepared
to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling
throughout the North and also largely entertained
by people of the South, that the State of South Car-
olina, and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in
particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon
them. In fact, nothing but the decisive results that
followed, deterred the radical portion of the people
from condemning the movement, because Charleston
had been left out. To pass into the interior would,

408 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and
its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is
so situated between two formidable rivers that a
small garrison could have held it against all odds as
long as their supplies would hold out Sherman
therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were
completed for the final march, Columbia, South Car-
olina, being the first objective ; Fayetteville, North
Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or neighbor-
hood, the final one, unless something further should
be determined upon. The right wing went from
Pocotaligo, and the left from about Hardee ville on
the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty
direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, however,
were to threaten Charleston on the right, and Au-
gusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen,
news of which Sherman had received before starting
out on his march. We already had New Bern and
had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of
Fort Fisher ; as did other points on the sea coast,
where the National troops were now in readiness to
co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had
passed Fayetteville.

On the 1 8th of January I ordered Can by, in
command at New Orleans, to move against Mobile,
Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose

SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG. 409

of destroying roads, machine shops, etc On the
8th of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in
the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as
the weather would permit and strike the canal west
of Richmond at or about Lynchburg ; and on the
20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon
as the roads would permit, saying : " As soon as it
is possible to travel, I think you will have no diffi-
culty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry
force alone. From there you could destroy the
railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be
of no further use to the rebellion. * * * This
additional raid, with one starting from East Ten-
nessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or
five thousand cavalry ; one from East port, Missis-
sippi, ten thousand cavalry ; Canby, from Mobile
Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops
— these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma
and Montgomery ; and Sherman with a large army
eating out the vitals of South Carolina — is all that
will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to
stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great
obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evac-
uated on Tuesday last."

On the 27th of February, more than a month
after Canby had received his orders, I again wrote
to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to hear
of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that

4IO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. & GRANT.

I had sent Grierson to take command of his cavalry*
he being a very efficient officer. I further sug-
gested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi,
and if he was there, he would find him an officer of
great courage and capacity whom it would be diffi-
cult to get by. I still further informed him that
Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force
into Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon
as possible thereafter. This force did not get off
however.

All these movements were designed to be in
support of Sherman's march, the object being to
keep the Confederate troops in the West from
leaving there. But neither Canby nor Thomas
could be got off in time. I had some time before
depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the
reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedi-
tion which he had been ordered to send out, and
to have the troops where they might do something.
Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of
his movements. I ordered him to go in person ;
but he prepared to send a detachment under an-
other officer. General Granger had got down to
New Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote
Canby that he must not put him in command of
troops. In spite of this he asked the War Depart-
ment to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service

CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE. 411

rendered to the cause in that quarter, I said to
Canby : " I am in receipt of a dispatch * * * in-
forming me that you have made requisitions for a
construction corps and material to build seventy
miles of railroad. I have directed that none be sent
Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to
you that they might be where they could act in win-
ter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in
the West. If there had been any idea of repairing
railroads, it could have been done much better from
the North, where we already had the troops. I ex-
pected your movements to be co-operative with
Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I
wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly
and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads,
machine shops, etc., not to build them. Take Mo-
bile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior
— to Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads,
rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on
war, and, when you have done this, take such posi-
tions as can be supplied by water. By this means
alone you can occupy positions from which the ene-
my's roads in the interior can be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too
late to render any service in the direction for which
they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, con-
sisted of Hardee's troops and Wheeler's cavalry,

412 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all ; but
frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as
I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman's
movements. Everything possible was being done
to raise troops in the South. Lee dispatched against
Sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve
Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other
defences of the harbor and its neighborhood,
amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed,
wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men.
After Thomas's victory at Nashville what remained,
of Hood's army were gathered together and for-
warded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-
operate with these forces; and, finally, General
Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders
of the South though not in favor with the admin-
istration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in
command of all the troops in North and South
Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part
of January, but before sending his troops to North
Carolina I went with him down the coast to see the
situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions
after being on the ground than I could very well
have given without We soon returned, and the
troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both
New Bern and Wilmington are connected with
Raleigh by railroads which unite at Goldsboro.

MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS, 413

Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the
mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and
move up to secure the Wilmington and Charlotte-
ville Railroad. This column took their pontoon
bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to
the island south of the city of Wilmington. A large
body was sent by the north side to co-operate with
them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 2 2d
of February. I took the precaution to provide for
Sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn
in toward the sea coast before reaching North
Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place
where he was liable to have to make such a de-
flection from his projected march. I also sent
railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great
abundance, now that we were not operating the
roads in Virginia. The gauge of the North Caro-
lina railroads being the same as the Virginia rail-
roads had been altered too ; these cars and locomo-
tives were ready for use there without any change.
On the 31st of January I countermanded the
orders given to Thomas to move south to Alabama
and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his force
by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed in
lieu of this movement, that he should send Stone-
man through East Tennessee, and push him well
down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support
of Sherman. Thomas did not get Stoneman off in

414 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed he
was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of
his being in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately
changed the order, and directed Thomas to send
him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on the
1 2th of March, he did push down through the north-
western end of South Carolina, creating some con-
sternation. I also ordered Thomas to send the 4th
corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more
roads east of that. I also directed him to concen-
trate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a probable
movement of his army through that way toward
Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles
from Savannah. Shermans march was without
much incident until he entered Columbia, on the
17th of February. He was detained in his progress
by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and re-
build the bridges. There was constant skirmishing
and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies,
but this did not retard the advance of the infantry.
Four days, also, were lost in making complete the
destruction of the most important railroads south of
Columbia ; there was also some delay caused by the
high water, and the destruction of the bridges on
the line of the road. A formidable river had to be
crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a
small garrison under General Wade Hampton.

CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH COLUMBIA. 415

There was but little delay, however, further than
that caused by high water in the stream. Hampton
left as Sherman approached, and the city was found
to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony
displayed in discussions of the question as to who
set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the
part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the
part of the Confederates. One thing is certain : as
soon as our troops took possession, they at once
proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of
their ability with the limited means at hand. In
any case, the example set by the Confederates
in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pa., a
town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make
a defence of the act of firing the seat of government
of the State most responsible for the conflict then
raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the
mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the
commander of the National forces for the purpose
of surrendering the town, making terms for the pro-
tection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention
at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took
the town without making any conditions whatever
with its citizens. He then, however, co-operated
with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and
providing for the people who were rendered desti-

41 6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

tute by this destruction of their homes. When he
left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head
of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to
tide them over until some arrangement could be
made for their future supplies. He remained in
Columbia until the roads, public buildings, work-
shops and everything that could be useful to the
enemy were destroyed While at Columbia, Sher-
man learned for the first time that what remained
of Hood's army was confronting him, under the
command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of Feb-
ruary, and Foster garrisoned the place. Wilming-
ton was captured on the 2 2d. Columbia and Che-
raw farther north, were regarded as so secure from
invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and
Augusta had sent much of their valuable property
to these two points to be stored. Among the
goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old
Madeira, silverware, and furniture. I am afraid
much of these goods fell into the hands of our
troops. There was found at Columbia a large
amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and
fixed ammunition. These, of course, were among
the articles destroyed. While here, Sherman also
learned of Johnston's restoration to command.
The latter was given, as already stated, all troops
in North and South Carolina. After the comple-

SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINA S. 417

tion of the destruction of public property about
Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his march and
reached Cheraw without any special opposition
and without incident to relate. The railroads, of
course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way.
Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw ; and,
finally, on the 6th of March crossed his troops over
the Pedee and advanced straight for Fayetteville.
Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped.
Sherman reached Fayetteville on the nth of March.
He had dispatched scouts from Cheraw with letters
to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to send
a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and
other articles which he enumerated. The scouts got
through successfully, and a boat was sent with the
mail and such articles for which Sherman had asked
as were in store at Wilmington ; unfortunately, how-
ever, those stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fay-
etteville for Goldsboro. The march, now, had to be
made with great caution, for he was approaching
Lees army and nearing the country that still re-
mained open to the enemy. Besides, he was con-
fronting all that he had had to confront in his
previous march up to that point, reinforced by the
garrisons along the road and by what remained of
Hood's army. Frantic appeals were made to the
people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of

Vol. 11. — 27

41 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 4 GRANT.

our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did not
have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men. The people
had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the
Confederate army were much more numerous than
the voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the
1 6th between Johnston's troops and Sherman's, with
some loss ; and at Benton ville on the 19th and 2 1st of
March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest be-
fore the morning of the 2 2d. Sherman's loss in
these last engagements in killed, wounded, and miss-
ing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops
at last reached Goldsboro on the "123d of the month
and went into bivouac ; end there his men were des-
tined to have a long rest. Schofield was there to
meet him with the troops which had been sent to
Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had John-
ston confronting him ; but with an army much in-
ferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. He
had Lee to the north of him with a force largely
superior ; but I was holding Lee with a still greater
force, and had he made his escape and gotten down
to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforce-
ments he now had from Schofield and Terry, would
have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for
an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore
with his back to it, and our navy occupied the har-

SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINA & 419

bors. He had a railroad to both Wilmington and
New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected
by streams, which intersect that part of the country
and deepen as they approach the sea. Then, too,
Sherman knew that if Lee should escape me I would
be on his heels, and he and Johnston together would
be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a
stand. With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful
whether Lee's army would have amounted to much
as an army when it reached North Carolina. John-
ston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and
would hardly have made an offensive movement,
even if they could have been induced to remain on
duty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies
were, like their brethren of the North, as brave as
men can be ; but no man is so brave that he may
not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage
him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter
how just he deems it.

CHAPTER LXIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS — LINCOLN AND
THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS — AN ANECDOTE OF LIN-
COLN— THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG SHERI-
DAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD— GORDON CARRIES
THE PICKET LINE — PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE
THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

ON the last of January, 1865, peace commission-
ers from the so-called Confederate States pre-
sented themselves on our lines around Petersburg,
and were immediately conducted to my headquarters
at City Point. They proved to be Alexander H.
Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge
Campbell, Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M.
T. Hunter, formerly United States Senator and then
a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my head-
quarters, and I at once conducted them to the
steamer Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which
was very comfortably fitted up for the use of pas-
sengers. I at once communicated by telegraph with
Washington and informed the Secretary of War and

e President of the arrival of these commissioners

LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS. 42 1

and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace
between the United States and, as they termed
it, the Confederate Government I was instructed
to retain them at City Point, until the President, or
some one whom he would designate, should come to
meet them. They remained several days as guests
on board the boat I saw them quite frequently,
though I have no recollection of having had any
conversation whatever with them on the subject of
their mission. It was something I had nothing to
do with, and I therefore did not wish to express any
views on the subject For my own part I never had
admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they
were the representatives of a government. There
had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to
concede anything of the kind. As long as they re-
mained there, however, our relations were pleasant
and I found them all very agreeable gentlemen. I
directed the captain to furnish them with the best the
boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort
in every way possible. No guard was placed over
them and no restriction was put upon their move-
ments ; nor was there any pledge asked that they
would not abuse the privileges extended to them.
They were permitted to leave the boat -when they
felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and
visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met either of these gentlemen before

422 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

the war, but knew them well by reputation and
through their public services, and I had been a par-
ticular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had always sup-
posed that he was a very small man, but when I saw
him in the dusk of the evening I was very much sur-
prised to find so large a man as he seemed to be.
When he got down on to the boat I found that he
was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manu-
facture that had been introduced into the South dur-
ing the rebellion. The cloth was thicker than any-
thing of the kind I had ever seen, even in Canada.
The overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so
large that it gave him the appearance of being an
average-sized man. He took this off when he reached
the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the ap-
parent change in size, in the coat and out of it

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I re-
ceived a dispatch from Washington, directing me to
send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to meet
the President and a member of the cabinet. Mr.
Lincoln met them there and had an interview of
short duration. It was not a great while after they
met that the President visited me at City Point. He
spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said
he had told them that there would be no use in
entering into any negotiations unless they would
recognize, first : that the Union as a whole must be
forever preserved, and second : that slavery must be

AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN. 423

abolished. If they were willing to concede these two
points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations
and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet
of paper with his signature attached for them to fill
in the terms upon which they were willing to live
with us in the Union and be one people. He always
showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the
Southern people, and I never heard him abuse an
enemy. Some of the cruel things said about Presi-
dent Lincoln, particularly in the North, iised to
pierce him to the heart ; but never in my presence
did he evince a revengeful disposition — and I saw a
great deal of him at City Point, for he seemed glad to
get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital.
Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr.
Lincoln. It was on the occasion of his visit to me
just after he had talked with the peace commis-
sioners at Hampton Roads. After a little conver-
sation, he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of
Stephens's. I replied that I had. " Well," said he,
11 did you see him take it off ? " I said yes. " Well,"
said he, " didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and
the littlest ear that ever you did see ? " Long after-
wards I told this story to the Confederate General
J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.
He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard after-
wards, Stephens laughed immoderately at the simile
of Mr. Lincoln.

424 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. & GRANT.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the
peace commissioners, passed off quietly and unevent-
fully, except for two or three little incidents. On
one occasion during this period, while I was visiting
Washington City for the purpose of conferring with
the administration, the enemy's cavalry under Gen-
eral Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and
then going to the south, got in east of us. Before
their presence was known, they had driven off a large
number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section.
It was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed
by the Confederates. It was only retaliating for
what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at
a time, when out of supplies — taking what the Con-
federate army otherwise would have gotten. As
appears in this book, on one single occasion we cap-
tured five thousand head of cattle which were cross-
ing the Mississippi River near Port Hudson on their
way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in
the East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience
during the rebellion was the last few weeks before
Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the Confed-
erate army was such that they would try to make an
escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was
afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my
sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing
was left but a picket line. He had his railroad by

THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG. 425

the way of Danville south, and I was afraid that he
was running off his men and all stores and ordnance
except such as it would be necessary to carry with
him for his immediate defence. I knew he could
move much more lightly and more rapidly than I, and
that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so
that we would have the same army to fight again
farther south — and the war might be prolonged an-
other year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not
see how it was possible for the Confederates to hold
out much longer where they were. There is no doubt
that Richmond would have been evacuated much
sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the
capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of
evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a
very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army.
When it was evacuated (as we shall see further on),
the Confederacy at once began to crumble and fade
away. Then, too, desertions were taking place, not
only among those who were with General Lee in the
neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the
whole Confederacy. I remember that in a conver-
sation with me on one occasion long prior to this,
General Butler remarked that the Confederates
would find great difficulty in getting more men for
their army ; possibly adding, though I am not certain
as to this, " unless they should arm the slave."

426 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting
every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen
and forty-five ; and now they had passed a law for
the further conscription of boys from fourteen to
eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men
from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior re-
serves. The latter were to hold the necessary points
not in immediate danger, and especially those in the
rear. General Butler, in alluding to this conscrip-
tion, remarked that they were thus " robbing both
the cradle and the grave," an expression which I
afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Wash-
burn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get
no more recruits they were losing at least a regi-
ment a day, taking it throughout the entire army,
by desertions alone. Then by casualties of war,
sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were
much heavier. It was a mere question of arithmetic
to calculate how long they could hold out while that
rate of depletion was going on. Of course long be-
fore their army would be thus reduced to nothing the
army which we had in the field would have been
able to capture theirs. Then too I knew from the
great number of desertions, that the men who had
fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the
cause which they believed in — and as earnestly, I take
it, as our men believed in the cause for which they

THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG. 427

were fighting — had lost hope and become despon-
dent. Many of them were making application to be
sent North where they might get employment until
the war was over, when they could return to their
Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very
impatient for the time to come when I could com-
mence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly be-
lieved would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe,
however, and which detained me. One was the fact
that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the
roads were impassable for artillery and teams. It
was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficient-
ly to enable us to move the wagon trains and artil-
lery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating
in the enemy's country. The other consideration
was that General Sheridan with the cavalry of the
Army of the Potomac was operating on the north
side of the James River, having come down from
the Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should
have his cavalry with me, and I was therefore
obliged to wait until he could join me south of the
James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan.
He had met Early between Staunton and Char-
lottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his

428 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. £ GRANT.

entire command. Early and some of his officers
escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses
or in the woods.

On the 1 2th I heard from him again. He had
turned east, to come to White House. He could
not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains
had been so very heavy and the streams were so very
much swollen. He had a pontoon train with him,
but it would not reach half way across some of the
streams, at their then stage of water, which he would
have to get over in going south as first ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for
him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived.
We had intended to abandon it because the James
River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him,
divided into two divisions commanded respectively
by Custer and Devin. General Merritt was acting
as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very light,
carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a
larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations,
and a very little else besides ammunition. They
stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing
up the railroad back toward Lynchburg. He also
sent a division along the James River Canal to de-
stroy locks, culverts, etc. All mills and factories
along the lines of march of his troops were de-
stroyed also.

SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD. 429

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time
that his making a march to White House was now
somewhat hazardous. He determined therefore to
fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was
as near to Richmond as it was possible to get, or
until attacked. He did this, destroying the canal as
far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point as near
Richmond as he could get. On the ioth he was at
Columbia. Negroes had joined his column to the
number of two thousand or more, and they assisted
considerably in the work of destroying the railroads
and the canal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition
as when he started, because he had been able to find
plenty of forage. He had captured most of Early's
horses and picked up a good many others on the
road. When he reached Ashland he was assailed
by the enemy in force. He resisted their assault
with part of his command, moved quickly across the
South and North Anna, going north, and reached
White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed
with reference to the time he could get away from
Goldsboro where he then was. Supplies had to be
got up to him which would last him through a long
march, as there would probably not be much to be
obtained in the country through which he would
pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should
start from where he was, in the neighborhood of

430 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Goldsboro, on the 18th of April, the earliest day at
which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I
was until he could come up, and make a sure thing
of it ; but I had determined to move as soon as the
roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I
had been tied down somewhat in the matter of
fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until
Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenan-
doah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his
presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to
the execution of the plans which I had in mind.
However, having arrived at White House on the
19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away
some night before I was aware of it, and having the
lead of me, push into North Carolina to join with
Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had,
as early as the 1st of the month of March, given
instructions to the troops around Petersburg to
keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement
should not escape their notice, and to be ready to
strike at once if it was undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March
Mr. Davis and General Lee had a consultation
about the situation of affairs in and about Richmond
and Petersburg, and they both agreed that these
places were no longer tenable for them, and that

GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE. 43 1

they must get away as soon as possible. They,
too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of
the roads which would make it possible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and
to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach
the Danville Road with greater security than he
would have in the way the two armies were situated,
determined upon an assault upon the right of our
lines around Petersburg. The night of the 24th of
March was fixed upon for this assault, and General
Gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan.
The point between Fort Stedman and Battery
No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was
selected as the point of his attack. The attack was
to be made at night, and the troops were to get pos-
session of the higher ground in the rear where they
supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the
right and left, create a panic in the lines of our
army, and force me to contract my lines. Lee hoped
this would detain me a few days longer and give
him an opportunity of escape. The plan was well
conceived and the execution of it very well done in-
deed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our
line.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of
night, at the point at which they were to make their
charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely
without the knowledge of the troops inside of our

432 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

main line of intrenchments ; this reduced the dis-
tance he would have to charge over to not much
more than fifty yards. For some time before the
deserters had been coming in with great frequency,
often bringing their arms with them, and this the
Confederate general knew. Taking advantage of
this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms,
creeping through to ours as if to desert. When
they got to our lines they at once took possession
and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In
the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as
if in great security. This plan was to have been
executed and much damage done before daylight;
but the troops that were to reinforce Gordon had
to be brought from the north side of the James
River and, by some accident on the railroad on their
way over, they were detained for a considerable
time ; so that it got to be nearly daylight before
they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost
without loss, the enemy passing through our lines
between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Then
turning to the right and left they captured the fort
and the battery, with all the arms and troops in
them. Continuing the charge, they also carried
batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which
they turned toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night

PARKE RECAPTURES THE UNE. 433

and this break in his line cut him off from all com-
munication with his headquarters. Parke, however,
commanding the 9th corps when this breach took
place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters,
and learning that the general was away, assumed com-
mand himself and with commendable promptitude
made all preparations to drive the enemy back. Gen-
eral Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of ar-
tillery and planted them in rear of the captured works
so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between
the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out
with his division, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to
the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that
direction and rapidly drove them back into Fort
Stedman. On the other side they were driven
back into the intrenchments which they had cap-
tured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken
by Willcox early in the morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the
captured fort and batteries, and communication was
once more established. The artillery fire was kept
up so continuously that it was impossible for the
Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for
reinforcements to join them. They all, therefore,
fell captives into our hands. This effort of Lee's
cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in
their killing, wounding and capturing about two

thousand of ours.
Vol. 11.— 28

434 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the
Confederates, our troops made a charge and car-
ried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they
strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but
a short distance to charge over when our attack
came to be made a few days later.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for
this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for
the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with
three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry,
was to move in advance on the night of the 27th,
from the north side of the James River and take
his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.
He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the
James to hold Bermuda Hundred and the north of
the James River. The engineer brigade was to be
left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines
about Petersburg.*

Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and
Warren were then on our extreme left with the
2d and 5th corps. They were directed on the ar-
rival of Ord, and on his getting into position in
their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out
west toward Five Forks, the object being to get into
a position from which we could strike the South
Side Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad.

* See orders to Major-Generals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan, March 24th,
Appendix.

THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD. 435

There was considerable fighting in taking up these
new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the
Army of the James had also to participate some-
what, and the losses were quite severe.

This was what was known as the battle of White
Oak Road.

CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN GRAND MOVEMENT OF

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC — SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE

ON FIVE FORKS BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS — PARKE

AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE BATTLES

BEFORE PETERSBURG.

SHERIDAN reached City Point on the 26th day
of March. His horses, of course, were jaded
and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days
of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals
and also to have them shod and put in condition
for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan's
arrival at City Point I prepared his instructions
for the move which I had decided upon. The
movement was to commence on the 29th of the
month.

After reading the instructions I had given him,
Sheridan walked out of my tent, and I followed to
have some conversation with him by himself — not in
the presence of anybody else, even of a member
of my staff. In preparing his instructions I contem-
plated just what took place ; that is to say, capturing
Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN. 437

Richmond and terminating the contest before sepa-
rating from the enemy. But the Nation had already
become restless and discouraged at the prolongation
of the war, and many believed that it would never
terminate except by compromise. Knowing that un-
less my plan proved an entire success it would be in-
terpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided in these
instructions that in a certain event he was to cut
loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base
of supplies, and living upon the country proceed
south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it,
across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who
was guarding that road, and co-operate with Sher-
man in destroying Johnston ; then with these com-
bined forces to help carry out the instructions which
Sherman already had received, to act in co-opera-
tion with the armies around Petersburg and Rich-
mond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions
he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, pos-
sibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army of
the Potomac, and place himself between the two
main armies of the enemy. I said to him : "Gen-
eral, this portion of your instructions I have put in
merely as a blind ; " and gave him the reason for
doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a
matter of fact, I intended to close the war right here,
with this movement, and that he should go no

438 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

farther. His face at once brightened up, and slap-
ping his hand on his leg he said : " I am glad to hear
it, and we can do it."

Sheridan was not however to make his movement
against Five Forks until he got further instructions
from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to de-
scribe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on
our extreme left and far to the rear, south, Sheridan
rode up to where my headquarters were then estab-
lished, at Dabney's Mills. He met some of my staff
officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the pros-
pects of success, giving reasons why he believed this
would prove the final and successful effort. Al-
though my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that
we return to our position about City Point and in
the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan to
come in to see me and say to me what he had been
saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about
giving his advice where it had not been asked ; so
one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan
had what they considered important news, and sug-
gested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad
to see the spirit of confidence with which he was im-
bued. Knowing as I did from experience, of what
great value that feeling of confidence by a commander
was, I determined to make a movement at once,
although on account of the rains which had fallen

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 439

after I had started out the roads were still very heavy.
Orders were given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately
there having been a few days free from rain, the sur-
face of the ground was dry, giving indications that
the time had come when we could move. On that
date I moved out with all the army available after
leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Peters-
burg. It soon set in raining again however, and in
a very short time the roads became practically im-
passable for teams, and almost so for cavalry.
Sometimes a horse or mule would be standing
apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot
would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to
catch himself all his feet would sink and he would
have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so
common in that part of Virginia and other southern
States. It became necessary therefore to build cor-
duroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to
move our artillery upon. The army had become so
accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well
prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. The
next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress
to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan
with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions
to then come up by the road leading north-west to
Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line.

This movement was made for the purpose of ex-

44° PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

tending our lines to the west as far as practicable
towards the enemy's extreme right, or Five Forks.
The column moving detached from the army still in
the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small
The forces in the trenches were themselves extend-
ing to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme
left when the extension began, but Humphreys was
marched around later and thrown into line between
him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry
Five Forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear,
and force them to weaken their centre to protect their
right so that an assault in the centre might be suc-
cessfully made. General Wright's corps had been
designated to make this assault, which I intended to
order as soon as information reached me of Sheri-
dan's success. He was to move under cover as close
to the enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would under-
stand my design to be to get up to the South Side
and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as soon as he
had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th.
These roads were so important to his very existence
while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg,
and of such vital importance to him even in case of
retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous
efforts to defend them. He did on the 30th send
Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks.

442 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

He also sent around to the right of his army some
two or three other divisions, besides directing that
other troops be held in readiness on the north side
of the James River to come over on call. He came
over himself to superintend in person the defence of
his right flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House
on the night of the 30th, and then took a road lead-
ing north-west to Five Forks. He had only his cav-
alry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry
he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually
drove them back however until in the neighborhood
of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other
troops besides those he had been contending with,
and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what
had taken place and stated that he was falling back
toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked
me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I re-
plied to him that it was impossible to send Wright's
corps because that corps was already in line close up
to the enemy, where we should want to assault when
the proper time came, and was besides a long dis-
tance from him ; but the 2d (Humphreys's) and 5th
(Warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a
little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the
left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I
would send Warren.

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE PORKS. 443

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move
at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court
House and put himself in communication with Sheri-
dan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was
very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting
until after 5 o'clock next morning. When he did
move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at
Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the
recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable.
Sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being
impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible,
sent orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened
or at least ordered to move up rapidly by General
Meade. He now felt that he could not cross that
creek without bridges, and his orders were changed
to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank
or get in their rear ; but he was so late in getting
up that Sheridan determined to move forward with-
out him. However, Ayres's division of Warren's
corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day,
most of the time separated from the remainder of
the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock
on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up
so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon.
Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of
a severe cross fire of the enemy was found march-
ing away from the fighting. This did not continue

444 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

long, however ; the division was brought back and
with Ayres's division did most excellent service dur-
ing the day. Crawford's division of the same corps
had backed still farther off, and although orders
were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late be-
fore it finally got to where it could be of material
assistance. Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the after-
noon or a little later, in advancing up to the point
from which to make his designed assault upon Five
Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the
assault and have it all over before night, because the
ground he occupied would be untenable for him in
bivouac during the night Unless the assault was
made and was successful, he would be obliged to re-
turn to Dinwiddie Court- House, or even further than
that for the night

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan
wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, and he
also wanted Warren. He sent staff officer after
staff officer in search of Warren, directing that
general to report to him, but they were unable to
find him. At all events Sheridan was unable to get
that officer to him. Finally he went himself. He
issued an order relieving Warren and assigning
Griffin to the command of the 5th corps. The troops
were then brought up and the assault successfully
made.

BA TTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 445

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory
movements in the battle of White Oak Road and
in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was
very much afraid that at the last moment he would
fail Sheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence,
great earnestness, quick perception, and could make
his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under dif-
ficulties where he was forced to act. But I had be-
fore discovered a defect which was beyond his con-
trol, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in
emergencies like the one just before us. He could
see every danger at a glance before he had en-
countered it He would not only make prepara-
tions to meet the danger which might occur, but he
would inform his commanding officer what others
should do while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to
call his attention to these defects, and to say that as
much as I liked General Warren, now was not a time
when we could let our personal feelings for any one
stand in the way of success ; and if his removal was
necessary to success, not to hesitate. It was upon
that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren.
I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted
still more that I had not long before taken occasion
to assign him to another field of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went
over the parapets of the enemy. The two armies

446 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

were mingled together there for a time in such man-
ner that it was almost a question which one was
going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon,
however, the enemy broke and ran in every direc-
tion ; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery
and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our
hands. The flying troops were pursued in different
directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under Sheridan
pursuing the larger body which moved north-west

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at
night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing
the importance to him of the part of the enemy's
line which had been captured, returned, sending the
5th corps across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of
Petersburg, and facing them toward it. Merritt,
with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of
Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on
the night of the 1st of April. I then issued orders
for an assault by Wright and Parke at four o'clock
on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the 2d
corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with
the Army of the James, on the left, to hold them-
selves in readiness to take any advantage that could
be taken from weakening in their front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success
of the day ; in fact I had reported to him during the
day and evening as I got news, because he was so

Parke and bright storm the enemy's line. 447

much interested in the movements taking place that
I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I could. I
notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River,
directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy,
and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from
there to promptly enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession
of Five Forks as of so much importance that he
would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risk-
ing everything upon the cast of a single die. It was
for this reason that I had ordered the assault to
take place at once, as soon as I had received the
news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps com-
manders, however, reported that it was so dark that
the men could not see to move, and it would be im-
possible to make the assault then. But we kept up
a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around
the whole line including that north of the James
River, until it was light enough to move, which was
about a quarter to five in the morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved
out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as
they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and ar-
tillery, and went without flinching directly on till they
mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside
of the enemy's line. Parke, who was on the right,
swept down to the right and captured a very con-
siderable length of line in that direction, but at that

448 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

point the outer was so near the inner line which
closely enveloped the city of Petersburg that he
could make no advance forward and, in fact, had
a very serious task to turn the lines which he had
captured to the defence of his own troops and to
hold them ; but he succeeded in this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to
Hatcher's Run, sweeping £very thing before him.
The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured
line, under cover of which he made something of a
stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on ;
but the latter met no serious obstacle. As you pro-
ceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually
much farther from the inner one, and along about
Hatchers Run they must be nearly two miles apart.
Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable
amount of artillery and some prisoners — Wright
about three thousand of them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedi-
ence to the instructions they had received, had suc-
ceeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in
capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front ;
and before Wright got up to that point, Ord had
also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's in-
trenchments. The second corps soon followed; and
the outer works of Petersburg yrere in the hands of
the National troops, never to be wrenched from them
again. When Wright reached Hatchers Run, he

BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG, 449

sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad
just outside of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills.
As soon as I received the news of Wright's success,
I sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points
around the line, including the troops at Bermuda
Hundred and those on the north side of the James,
and to the President at City Point. Further dis-
patches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the
additional news to these points. Finding at length
that they were all in, I mounted my horse to join
the troops who were inside the works. When I ar-
rived there I rode my horse over the parapet just
as Wright's three thousand prisoners were coming
out. I was soon joined inside by General Meade
and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part
of the lost ground. Parke on our right was repeat-
edly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. Before
noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side
of the James River thus bringing the bulk of Lee's
army around to the support of his extreme right As
soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed
him to keep up close to the enemy and to have
Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda Hundred front,
to do the same thing, and if they found any break
to go in ; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this
would separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Vol. 11 — 29

450 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks,
swept down to Petersburg, coming in on our left
This gave us a continuous line from the Appomattox
River below .the city to the same river above. At
eleven o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I
reinforced Parke with two brigades from City Point
With this additional force he completed his captured
works for better defence, and built back from his
right, so as to protect his flank. He also carried in
and made an abatis between himself and the enemy.
Lee brought additional troops and artillery against
Parke even after this was done, and made several
assaults with very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched
line close up to Petersburg, two enclosed works
outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth. We
thought it had now become necessary to carry them
by assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort
Gregg was assaulted by Foster's division of the
24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by two brigades
from Ord's command. The battle was desperate
and the National troops were repulsed several
times ; but it was finally carried, and immediately
the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place.
The guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the
retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with
some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surren-
dered.

BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG. 45 1

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report
to Sheridan. In moving to execute this order he
came upon the enemy at the intersection of the
White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The en-
emy fell back to Sutherland Station on the South
Side, Road and were followed by Miles. This posi-
tion, naturally a strong and defensible one, was
also strongly intrenched. Sheridan now came up and
Miles asked permission from him to make the assault,
which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys
had got through the outer works in his front, and
came up also and assumed command over Miles, who
commanded a division in his corps. I had sent an
order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move
towards Petersburg. This order he now got, and
started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The latter
made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had
to fall back a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I
directed Humphreys to send a division back to his
relief. He went himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Peters-
burg had sent Merritt with his cavalry to the west to
attack some Confederate cavalry that had assembled
there. Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox
River. Sheridan then took the enemy at Suther-
land Station on the reverse side from where Miles
was, and the two together captured the place, with a

452 PER SOX AL MEMOIRS OF C. SL CRAXT.

large number of prisoners and some pieces of artil-
lery, and put the remainder, portions of three Confed-
erate corps, to flight. Sheridan followed, and drove
them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.
Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which
he with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by as-
sault. I cannot explain the situation here better
than by giving my dispatch to City Point that even-
ing:

Botdtox Road, xea& PnnsmG,

April 2, 1865. — 4.40 p.m.

COL05XL T. S. Bo wns.

Citv

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a
few hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Peters-
burg to the river above. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such
part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either
designedly on their part or because they could not help it.
Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. Miles s
division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to Suther-
land Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met them, and
at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whether
Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with
another division from here. The whole captures since the
army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve
thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not
know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * *
I think the President might come out and pay us a visit to-
morrow.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-Genend.

BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG. 453

During the night of April 2d our line was in-
trenched from the river above to the river below. I
ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next
morning at five a.m., to be followed by an assault
at six o'clock ; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg
early in the morning

CHAPTER LXV.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG MEETING PRESIDENT

LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG THE CAPTURE OF RICH-
MOND PURSUING THE ENEMY VISIT TO SHERI-
DAN AND MEADE.

GENERAL MEADE and I entered Peters-
burg on the morning of the 3d and took a
position under cover of a house which protected
us from the enemies musketry which was flying
thick and fast th.ere. As we would occasionally look
around the corner we could see the streets and the
Appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge,
packed with the Confederate army. I did not have
artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was try-
ing to make his escape, and I wanted to push imme-
diately in pursuit. At all events I had not the heart
to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated
and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.
Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated
Petersburg, a man came in who represented himsielf
to be an engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia.
He said that Lee had for some time been at work

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG. 455

preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into
which he would throw himself when forced out of
Petersburg, and fight his final battle there ; that he
was actually at that time drawing his troops from
Richmond, and falling back into this prepared
work. This statement was made to General Meade
and myself when we were together. I had already
given orders for the movement up the south side of
the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee ;
but Meade was so much impressed by this man's
story that he thought we ought to cross the Appo-
mattox there at once and move against Lee in his
new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as he
would have been to have put himself and his army
between two formidable streams like the James and
Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as
those of the Potomac and the James. Then these
streams coming together as they did to the east of
him, it would be only necessary to close up in the
west to have him thoroughly cut off from all sup-
plies or possibility of reinforcement. It would only
have been a question of days, and not many of them,
if he had taken the position assigned to him by the
so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged
to surrender his army. Such is one of the ruses re-
sorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. My
judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to
evacuate Richmond, and that the only course for

456 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. £ GRANT.

him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road
Accordingly my object was to secure a point on thai
road south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He sug-
gested that if Lee was going that way we would
follow him. My reply was that we did not want to
follow him ; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut
him off, and if he would only stay in the position he
(Meade) believed him to be in at that time, I wanted
nothing better ; that when we got in possession of
the Danville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appo-
mattox River, if we still found him between the two
rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward
and close him up. That we would then have all the
advantage we could possibly have by moving directly
against him from Petersburg, even if he remained in
the position assigned him by the engineer officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the in-
trenchments, so as to start them out on the Danville
Road early in the morning, supposing that Lee would
be gone during the night During the night I strength-
ened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities
at Richmond, during the day, of the condition of
affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him
to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out
that long. Davis was at church when he received
Lee's dispatch. The congregation was dismissed
with the notice that there would be no evening

458 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. & GRANT.

service. The rebel government left Richmond about
two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d.

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at
Amelia Court House, his object being to get away,
join Johnston if possible, and to try to crush Sherman
before I could get there. As soon as I was sure of
this I notified Sheridan and directed him to move out
on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the Ap-
pomattox River as speedily as possible. He replied
that he already had some of his command nine
miles out I then ordered the rest of the Army of
the Potomac under Meade to follow the same road
in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the
same road, and the Army of the James was directed
to follow the road which ran alongside of the South
Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair the
railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That
road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock
was all of the 4 feet %]/2 inches gauge ; consequently
the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up
throughout the whole length and relaid so as to con-
form to the gauge of our cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and
had been for some days. I would have let him know
what I contemplated doing, only while I felt a strong
conviction that the move was going to be successful,
yet it might not prove so ; and then I would have
only added another to the many disappointments he

MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG. 459

had been suffering for the past three years. But
when we started out he saw that we were moving-
for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed, remained
there to hear the result

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg,
I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out
there and see me, while I would await his arrival. I
had started all the troops out early in the morning,
so that after the National army left Petersburg
there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal
in the streets. There was absolutely no one there,
except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort
of cavalry. We had selected the piazza of a deserted
house, and occupied it until the President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me,
after warm congratulations for the victory, and
thanks both to myself and to the army which had ac-
complished it, was : " Do you know, general, that I
have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days
that you intended to do something like this." Our
movements having been successful up to this point, I
no longer had any object in concealing from the
President all my movements, and the objects I had
in view. He remained for some days near City
Point, and I communicated with him frequently and
fully by telegraph.

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for
Sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in

460 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the destruction of Lee's army. I told him that I
had been verv anxious to have the Eastern armies
vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted
all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue
them or drive them from their capital The Western
armies had been in the main successful until they
had conquered all the territory from the Mississippi
River to the State of North Carolina, and were
now almost ready to knock at the back door of Rich-
mond, asking admittance. I said to him that if the
Western armies should be even upon the field, opera-
ting against Richmond and Lee, the credit would be
given to them for the capture, by politicians and
non-combatants from the section of country which
those troops hailed from. It might lead to disagree-
able bickerings between members of Congress of
the East and those of the West in some of their de-
bates. Western members might be throwing it up
to the members of the East that in the suppression
of the rebellion they were not able to capture an
army, or to accomplish much in the way of contribu-
ting toward that end, but had to wait until the
Western armies had conquered all the territory south
and west of them, and then come on to help them
capture the only army they had been engaged

with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never
thought of it before, because his anxiety was so

THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND. 46 1

great that he did not care where the aid came from
so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be
proud of its four years' record in the suppression of
the rebellion. The army it had to fight was the
protection to the capital of a people which was at-
tempting to found a nation upon the territory of the
United States. Its loss would be the loss of the
cause. Every energy, therefore, was put forth by
the Confederacy to protect and maintain their capi-
tal. Everything else would go if it went. Lee's
army had to be strengthened to enable it to main-
tain its position, no matter what territory was
wrested from the South in another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have in-
dicated, between the soldiers of the two sections;
and, fortunately, there has been none between the
politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought
of the liability of such a state of things in advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln
mounted his horse and started on his return to City
Point, while I and my staff started to join the army,
now a good many miles in advance. Up to this
time I had not received the report of the capture of
Richmond.

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a
dispatch from Generel Weitzel which notified me
that he had taken possession of Richmond at about

462 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. £ GRANT.

8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and
that he had found the city on fire in two places.
The city was in the most utter confusion. The
authorities had taken the precaution to empty all
the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the pro-
visions which the Confederate government had left,
for the people to gather up The city had been
deserted by the authorities, civil and military, with-
out any notice whatever that they were about to
leave. In fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation
the people had been led to believe that Lee had
gained an important victory somewhere around
Petersburg.

Weitzel's command found evidence of great de-
moralization in Lee's army, there being still a great
many men and even officers in the town. The city
was on fire. Our troops were directed to extinguish
the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing.
The fire had been started by some one connected
with the retreating army. All authorities deny that
it was authorized, and I presume it was the work of
excited men who were leaving what they regarded as
their capital and may have felt that it was better to
destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their
enemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found
the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish

them.

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great

PURSUING THE ENEMY. 463

many of them, were cut off from getting back into
Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly
and closely that they threw away caissons, ammuni-
tion, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their
loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River
until finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already
said, to join the command, which halted at Suther-
land Station, about nine miles out. We had still
time to march as much farther, and time was an ob-
ject ; but the roads were bad and the trains belong-
ing to the advance corps had blocked up the road so
that it was impossible to get on. Then, again, our
cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pur-
suing them ; and the orders were that the roads
should be given up to the cavalry whenever they
appeared. This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of
the corps which were left back, thought to gain time
by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to
get up some rations for them, and clearing out the
road, so that when they did start they would be un-
interrupted. Humphreys, who was far ahead, was
also out of rations. They did not succeed in getting
them up through the night ; but the Army of the
Potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the
reflection that at last they were following up a
victory to its end, that they preferred marching

464 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. & GRANT.

without rations to running a possible risk of letting
the enemy elude them. So the march was resumed
at three o'clock in the morning.

Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep
Creek, and driven them north to the Appomattox,
where, I presume, most of them were forced to
cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had
ordered rations up from Danville for his famishing
army, and that they were to meet him at Farmville.
This showed that Lee had already abandoned the
idea of following the railroad down to Danville, but
had determined to go farther west, by the way of
Farmville. I notified Sheridan of this and directed
him to get possession of the road before the supplies
could reach Lee. He responded that he had already
sent Crook's division to get upon the road between
Burkes ville and Jetersville, then to face north and
march along the road upon the latter place ; and he
thought Crook must be there now. The bulk of
the army moved directly for Jetersville by two
roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan
saying that Crook was on the Danville Road, I im-
mediately ordered Meade to make a forced march
with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's
corps across from the road they were on to the
South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army

PURSUING THE ENEMY. 465

of the James and to protect the railroad which that
army was repairing as it went along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in
the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from Lee,
ordering two hundred thousand rations from Dan-
ville. The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheri-
dan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville
and had ifr forwarded from there. In the meantime,
however, dispatches from other sources had reached
Danville, and they knew there that our army was on
the line of the road ; so that they sent no further
supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the
cavalry, were off between the road which the Army
of the Potomac was marching on and the Appo-
mattox River, and were attacking the enemy in
flank. They picked up a great many prisoners and
forced the abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House,
and also his advance north of 'Jetersville, and sent
his troops out to collect forage. The country was
very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers
scattered a great deal ; many of them were picked
up by our men, and many others never returned
to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad
south of Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of
the situation. I again ordered Meade up with all

Vol. 11 — 30

466 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

•

dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of
infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee s entire
army. Meade, always prompt in obeying orders,
now pushed forward with great energy, although
he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of
bed. Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at
three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I
have said, the wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the
South Side Railroad. On the morning of the 5th
I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade
was making, and suggested that he might now
attack Lee. We had now no other objective
than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious
to close the thing up at once.

On the 5th I marched again with Ord's com-
mand until within about ten miles of Burkesville,
where I stopped to let his army pass. I then received
from Sheridan the following dispatch :

" The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House,
and on this side of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to
Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of
artillery and some wagons. We can capture the Army of North-
ern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then
advance upon it. My cavalry was at Burkesville yesterday, and
six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last night. General Lee
is at Amelia Court House in person. They are out of rations, or
nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad towards Burkes-
ville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point."

PURSUING THE ENEMY. 467

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee
to get south to his provisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off im-
mediately towards Farmville, moved Davies's bri-
gade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies found
the movement had already commenced. He at-
tacked and drove away their cavalry which was
escorting wagons to the west, capturing and
burning 180 wagons. He also captured five
pieces of artillery. The Confederate infantry then
moved against him and probably would have
handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent
two more brigades of cavalry to follow Davies, and
they came to his relief in time. A sharp engage-
ment took place between these three brigades of
cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter
was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two
o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his
troops. The head of Humphreys's corps followed in
about an hour afterwards. Sheridan stationed the
troops as they came up, at Meade's request, the latter
still being very sick. He extended two divisions of
this corps off to the west of the road to the left
of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right.
The cavalry by this time had also come up, andi
they were put still farther off to the left, Sheridan
feeling certain that there lay the route by which«

468 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT.

the enemy intended to escape. He wanted to at-
tack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would
get away ; but Meade prevented this, preferring to
wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which
had been handed to him by a colored man, with a
note from himself saying that he wished I was there
myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court House,
April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to
his mother, and showed the demoralization of the
Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me the
information as here related of the movements of that
day. I received a second message from Sheridan
on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically
the importance of my presence. This was brought
to me by a scout in gray uniform. It was written
on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as
chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a precau-
tion taken so that if the scout should be captured he
could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting
it into his mouth, chew it It would cause no
surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing
tobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was
received. I gave Ord directions to continue his
march to Burkesville and there intrench himself for
the night, and in the morning to move west to cut
off all the roads between there and Farmville.

I then started with a few of my staff and a very

VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE. 469

small escort of cavalry, going directly through the
woods, to join Meade's army. The distance was
about sixteen miles ; but the night being dark our
progress was slow through the woods in the absence
of dirett roads. However, we got to the outposts
about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some
little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity
and were conducted in to where Sheridan was bivou-
acked. We talked over the situation for some
little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he
thought Lee was trying to do, and that Meade's
orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank,
would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping
us and putting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his
headquarters about midnight. I explained to Meade
that we did not want to follow the enemy ; we
wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders
would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that,
I had no doubt that Lee was moving right then.
Meade changed his orders at once. They were now
given for an advance on Amelia Court House, at
an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay ;
that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most
of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung
out still farther to the left

CHAPTER LXVI.

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK ENGAGEMENT AT FARM-

VILLE — CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE

SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

THE Appomattox, going westward, takes a long
sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood
of the Richmond and Danville Railroad bridge, and
then trends north-westerly. Sailor's Creek, an insig-
nificant stream, running northward, empties into the
Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jeters-
ville. Near the High Bridge the stage road from
Petersburg to Lynchburg crosses the Appomattox
River, also on a bridge. The railroad runs on the
north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west,
and from there, recrossing, continues on the south
side of it. The roads coming up from the south-east
to Farmville cross the Appomattox River there on
a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the
Lynchburg and Petersburg Railroad well to the
left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House,
availed himself of all the roads between the Danville

472 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. GRANT.

Road and Appomattox River to move upon, and
never permitted the head of his columns to stop be-
cause of any fighting that might be going on in his
rear. In this way he came very near succeeding in
getting to his provision trains and eluding us with
at least part of his army.

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the
night before, and our army in moving upon Amelia
Court House soon encountered them. There was
a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was
reached. Our cavalry charged in upon a body of
theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to
get it past our left A severe engagement ensued, in
which we captured many prisoners, and many men
also were killed and wounded. There was as much
gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in
these little engagements as was displayed at any time
during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of
the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a
heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, ar-
tillery and cavalry were all brought into action. Our
men on the right, as they were brought in against
the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his
flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from
the lay of the country. Our firing was also very
much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his
retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK. 473

turn around every time he fired. The enemy's loss
was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as
in captures. Some six general officers fell into our
hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men
were made prisoners. This engagement was com-
menced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th,
and the retreat and pursuit were continued until
nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the
ground where the night had overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had
commenced that morning, I ordered Wright's corps,
which was on the extreme right, to be moved to
the left past the whole army, to take the place of
Griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time
to move by and place itself . on the right The
object of this movement was to get the 6th corps,
Wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had
formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently
in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and
under Sheridan's direct command until after the sur-
render.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all
the roads southward between Burkesville and the
High Bridge. On the morning of the 6th he sent
Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with
instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return
rapidly to Burkesville Station ; and he prepared him-

474

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

self to resist the enemy there. Soon after Washburn
had started Ord became a little alarmed as to his
safety and sent Colonel Read, of his staff, with about
eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him
back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head
of Lee's column had got up to the road between him
and where Washburn now was, and attempted to
send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could
not get through. Read, however, had got through
ahead of the enemy. He rode on to Farmville and
was on his way back again when he found his return
cut off, and Washburn confronting apparently the
advance of Lee's army. Read drew his men up into
line of battle, his force now consisting of less than
six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along
their front, making a speech to his men to inspire
them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt
He then gave the order to charge. This little
band made several charges, of course unsuccessful
ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than
equal to their own entire number. Colonel Read fell
mortally wounded, and then Washburn ; and at the
close of the conflict nearly every officer of the com-
mand and most of the rank and file had been either
killed or wounded. The remainder then surrendered.
The Confederates took this to be only the advance
of a larger column which had headed them off, and
so stopped to intrench ; so that this gallant band

476 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong
detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved
to us the trains following. Lee himself pushed on
and crossed the wagon road bridge near the High
Bridge, and attempted to destroy it He did set
fire to it, but the flames had made but little head-
way when Humphreys came up with his corps and
drove away the rear-guard which had been left
to protect it while it was being burned up. Hum-
phreys forced his way across with some loss, and
followed Lee to the intersection of the road cross-
ing at Farmville with the one from Petersburg
Here Lee held a position which was very strong,
naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys
was alone, confronting him all through the day,
and in a very hazardous position. He put on a
bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss,
but was not assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of
Prince Edward's Court House, along with the 5th
corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in between Griffin
and the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry
and Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville.
When the cavalry reached Farmville they found
that some of the Confederates were in ahead of
them, and had already got their trains of provi-
sions back to that point ; but our troops were in

ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE. 477

time to prevent them from securing anything to
eat, although they succeeded in again running the
trains off, so that we did not get them for some time.
These troops retreated to the north side of the
Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroy-
ing the bridge after them. Considerable fighting
ensued there, between Wright's corps and a portion
of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the
cavalry forded the stream and drove them away.
Wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over
on and then marched out to the junction of the roads
to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night I
had stopped the night before at Burkesville Junc-
tion. Our troops were then pretty much all out of
the place, but we had a field hospital there, and
Ord's command was extended from that point
towards Farmville.

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer
of the regular army, who told me that in a conversa-
tion with General Ewell, one of the prisoners and a
relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had got
across the James River he knew their cause was lost,
and it was the duty of their authorities to make the
best terms they could while they still had a right to
claim concessions. The authorities thought differ-
ently, however. Now the cause was lost and they
had no right to claim anything. He said further,
that for every man that was killed after this in the

478 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. £ GRANT.

war somebody is responsible, and it would be but
very little better than murder. He was not sure
that Lee would consent to surrender his army with-
out being able to consult with the President, but he
hoped he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there
early in the day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing
through, away to the south. Meade was back
towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys confront-
ing Lee as before stated. After having gone into
bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan
learned that seven trains of provisions and forage
were at Appomattox, and determined to start
at once and capture them ; and a forced march was
necessary in order to get there before Lee's army
could secure them. He wrote me a note telling me
this. This fact, together with the incident related
the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the idea of
opening correspondence with General Lee on the
subject of the surrender of his army. I therefore
wrote to him on this day, as follows :

Headquarters Armies of the U. S.,

5 p.m., Apiil 7, 1S65.
General R. E. Lee,

Commanding C. S. A.

The results of the last week must convince you of the hope-
lessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern
Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as
my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE. 479

effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion
of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern
Virginia.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

Lee replied on the evening of the same day as
follows :

Aprils 1865.

General : — I have received your note of this day. Though
not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and
therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you
will offer on condition of its surrender.

R E. LEE,

General.

Lieut. -General U. S. Grant,

Commanding Armies of the U. S.

This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as
deserving another letter and wrote him as follows :

Aptil%, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,

Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking
the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply I would say
that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I
would insist upon, namely : that the men and officers surrendered
shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Govern-
ment of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet

480 PMMSMfAL muans 0* U. &. GZAMT.

you, or will designate oftccts to meet any ofliceis you
for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the pur-
pose of arranging definitely the terms upon which die
of the Ann j of Northern Virginia win be received.

u. s. grant,

Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his
soldiers had enlisted from that part of the State
where they now were, and were continually dropping
out of the ranks and going to their homes. I know
that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of furni-
ture at Farmville, which had probably been used
as a Confederate hospital. The next morning when
I came out I found a Confederate colonel there,
who reported to me and said that he was the pro-
prietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a
regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood
He said that when he came along past home, he
found that he was the only, man of the regiment
remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out,
and now wanted to surrender himself. I told him to
stay there and he would not be molested. That was
one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee's
force by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day,
his troops moved with alacrity and without any
straggling. They began to see the end of what
they had been fighting four years for. Nothing

SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY. 48 1

seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move
without rations and travel without rest until the end.
Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was
now a rival for the front The infantry marched
about as rapidly as the cavalry could.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move
south of Appomattox Station, which is about five
miles south-west of the Court House, to get west of
the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. They
got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded par-
tially ; but some of the train men had just discovered
the movement of our troops and succeeded in run-
ning off three of the trains. The other four were
held by Custer.

The head of Lee's column came marching up there
on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, I suppose,
that there were any Union soldiers near. The Con-
federates were surprised to find our cavalry had pos-
session of the trains. However, they were desperate
and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. In
the me\6e that ensued they succeeded in burning
one of the trains, but not in getting anything from
it. Custer then ordered the other trains run back
on the road towards Farmville, and the fight con-
tinued.

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's
army were engaged. Soon, however, Lee's men
were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting

Vol. n — 31

482 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. But our
infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the
time the enemy got up they found Griffin's corps
and the Army of the James confronting them. A
sharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up
a white flag.

CHAPTER LXVIL

negotiations at appomattox — interview with lee
at Mclean's house — the terms of surrender —

lee's surrender interview with lee after

the surrender,

ON the 8th I had followed the Army of the Poto-
mac in rear of Lee. I was suffering very
severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farm-
house on the road some distance in rear of the main
body of the army. I spent the night in bathing my
feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard
plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck,
hoping to be cured by morning. During the night I
received Lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting
an interview between the lines on the following
morning.* But it was for a different purpose from
that of surrendering his army, and I answered him
as follows :

Headquarters Armies of the U. S.,

Apilt), 1865.
General R. E. Lee,

Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to
treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten a.m.

* See Appendix.

484

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, the
I am eq'-Lally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole Xort
entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can b
had are well understood. By the South laying down their arm
they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands c
human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet dc
stroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settlet
without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc,

U. S- GRANT,

Lieutenant-General

I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, stil
suffering with the headache, to get to the head o
the column. I was not more than two or thre<
miles from Appomattox Court House at the time

but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee'
army, or a portion of it. I had therefore to movi
south in order to get upon a road coming up fron
another direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, a
already described, I was in this way moving toward
Appomattox Court House, and consequently coul<
not be communicated with immediately, and be in
formed of what Lee had done. Lee, therefore, sen
a flae to the rear to advise Meade and one to th<
front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message
to me for the purpose of having a meeting to con
suit about the surrender of his army, and asked foi
a suspension of hostilities until I could be communi
cated with. As they had heard nothing of this until

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX. 485

the fighting had got to be severe and all going against
Lee, both of these commanders hesitated very con-
siderably about suspending hostilities at all. They
were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the
Army of Northern Virginia where it could not escape
except by some deception. They, however, finally
consented to a suspension of hostilities for two
hours to give an opportunity of communicating
with me in that time, if possible. It was found that,
from the route I had taken, they would probably
not be able to communicate with me and get an
answer back within the time fixed unless the mes-
senger should pass through the rebel lines,

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer
bearing this message through his lines to me.

Afttt/g, 1865.

General : — I received your note of this morning on the picket-
line whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely
what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with
reference to the surrender of this army. I now request an inter-
view in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yes-
terday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant,

Commanding U. S. Armies.

When the officer reached me I was still suffering
with the sick headache ; but the instant I saw the
contents of the note I was cured. I wrote the fol-
lowing note in reply and hastened on :

486 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. & GRANT.

A+i/g, 1865.
General R. £. Lee,

Commanding C S. Annies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received,
in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and
Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at
this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church and will
push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice
sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place
will meet me.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-GeneraL

I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was
located with his troops drawn up in line of battle
facing the Confederate army near by. They were
very much excited, and expressed their view that this
was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to
get away. They said they believed that Johnston
was marching up from North Carolina now, and Lee
was moving to join him ; and they would whip the
rebels where they now were in five minutes if I
would only let them go in. But I had no doubt about
the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted
to where he was. I found him at the house of a Mr.
McLean, at Appomattox Court House, with Colonel
Marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my arrival.
The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a
portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a
little valley which separated it from that on the

APPOMATOX COIM HOUSE.

under ihc direction of Bvt. Brig. Gm. N. Mici

BvL M*J. Genl A. A HumPHSBvi.
Brig. Gcn'l & Chief of Engi

^■■■,w- ■""-

J *

k^-mm^

488 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in
line of battle to the south.

Before stating what took place between General
Lee and myself, I will give all there is of the story
of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of
which are told until they are believed to be true. The
war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule,
and the story of the apple tree is one of those fic-
tions based on a slight foundation of fact. As I
have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of
the hill occupied by the Confederate forces. Run-
ning diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which,
at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that
the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the
roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment
General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that
when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon
this embankment with his feet in the road below
and his back resting against the tree. The story
had no other foundation than that. Like many
other stories, it would be very good if it was only
true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and
had served with him in the Mexican War ; but did
not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and
rank, that he would remember me ; while I would
more naturally remember him distinctly, because he

■ ■ . ■• I 1

» v..

1 ■ ■>.'•.

• • ' I . " I "I

; ■ r

ii ;

i ■ • » .

. ■ »'.

INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT McLEAN'S HOUSE. 489

was the chief of staff of General Scott in the Mexi-
can Wan

When I had left camp that morning I had not ex-
pected so soon the result that was then taking place,
and consequently was in rough garb. I was with-
out a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on
the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with
the shoulder straps of mjrrank to indicate to the
army who I was. When I went into the house I
found General Lee, We greeted each other, and
after shaking hands took our seats. I had my staff
with me, a good portion of whom were in the room
during the whole of the interview.

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know.
As he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible
face, it was impossible to say whether he felt in-
wardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad
over the result, and was too manly to show it.
Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed
from my observation ; but my own feelings, which
had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his let-
ter, were sad and depressed. I felt like anything
rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who
had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered
so much for a cause, though that cause was, I
believe, one of the worst for which a people ever
fought, and one for which there was the least
excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity

490 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

of the great mass of those who were opposed to
us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which
was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of con-
siderable value, very likely the sword which had
been presented by the State of Virginia ; at all
events, it was an entirely different sword from the
one that would ordinarily be worn in the field In
my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private
with the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have
contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely
dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. But
this was not a matter that I thought of until after-
wards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army
times. He remarked that he remembered me very
well in the old army ; and I told him that as a
matter of course I remembered him perfectly, but
from the difference in our rank and years (there
being about sixteen years' difference in our ages), I
had thought it very likely that I had not attracted
his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him
after such a long interval. Our conversation grew
so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our
meeting. After the conversation had run on in this
style for some time, General Lee called my attention
to the object of our meeting, and said that he • had
asked for this interview for the purpose of getting

THE TERMS OF SURRENDER. 49 1

from me the terms I proposed to give his army. I
said that I meant merely that his army should lay
down their arms, not to take them up again during
the continuance of the war unless duly and properly
exchanged. He said that he had so understood my
letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation
about matters foreign to the subject which had
brought us together. This continued for some little
time, when General Lee again interrupted the course
of the conversation by suggesting that the terms I
proposed to give his army ought to be written out
I called to General Parker, secretary on my staff,
for writing materials, and commenced writing out the
following terms :

Appomattox C. H., Va.,

Apl 9th, 1865.
Gen. R. E. Lee,

Comd'g C. S. A.
Gen : In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of
the 8th inst, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of
N. Va. on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of all the officers and
men to be made in duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer
designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or
officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual
paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United
States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental
commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands.
The arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked,
and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them.
This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their

492 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will
be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United
States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws
in force where they may reside.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,

Lit. Gen.

When I put my pen to the paper I did not know
the first word that I should make use of in writing
the terms. I only knew what was in my mind, and I
wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no
mistaking it As I wrote on, the thought occurred to
me that the officers had their own private horses and
effects, which were important to them, but of no value
to us ; also that it would be an unnecessary humili-
ation to call upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between
General Lee and myself, either about private prop-
erty, side arms, or kindred subjects. He appeared
to have no objections to the terms first proposed ; or
if he had a point to make against them he wished to
wait until they were in writing to make it When
he read over that part of the terms about side arms,
horses and private property of the officers, he re-
marked, with some feeling, I thought, that this would
have a happy effect upon his army.

Then, after a little further conversation, General
Lee remarked to me again that their army was

LEE'S SURRENDER. 493

organized a little differently from the army of the
United States (still maintaining by implication that
we were two countries) ; that in their army the
cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses ;
and he asked if he was to understand that the men
who so owned their horses were to be permitted
to retain them. I told him that as the terms were
written they would not ; that only the officers were
permitted to take their private property. He then,
after reading over the terms a second time, re-
marked that that was clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be
about the last battle of the war — I sincerely hoped
so ; and I said further I took it that most of the
men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole
country had been so raided by the two armies
that it was doubtful whether they would be able
to put in a crop to carry themselves and their
families through the next winter without the aid
of the horses they were then riding. The United
States did not want them and I would, therefore,
instruct the officers I left behind to receive the
paroles of his troops to let every man of the Con-
federate army who claimed to own a horse or mule
take the animal to his home. Lee remarked again
that this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following
letter :

494 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,

Aptil 9, 1865.

General : — I received your letter of this date containing the
terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as pro-
posed by you. As they are substantially the same as those ex-
pressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will
proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations
into effect.

R. E. LEE, General

Lieut. -General U. S. Grant.

While duplicates of the two letters were being
made, the Union generals present were severally
presented to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword
and my handing it back, this and much more that
has been said about it is the purest romance. The
word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either
of us until I wrote it in the terms. There was no
premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the
moment I wrote it down. If I had happened to omit
it, and General Lee had called my attention to it, I
should have put it in the terms precisely as I acceded
to the provision about the soldiers retaining their
horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before
taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a
very bad condition for want of food, and that they
were without forage ; that his men had been living
for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that

LEES SURRENDER. 495

he would have to ask me for rations and forage. I
told him " certainly," and asked for how many men
he wanted rations. His answer was " about twenty-
five thousand : " and I authorized him to send his
own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox
Station, two or three miles away, where he could have,
out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions
wanted. As for forage, we had ourselves depended
almost entirely upon the country for that

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were desig-
nated by me to carry into effect the paroling of Lee's
troops before they should start for their homes —
General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon
and Pendleton for them to confer with in order to
facilitate this work. Lee and I then separated as
cordially as we had met, he returning to his own
lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at
Appomattox.

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Wash-
ington as follows :

Headquarters Appomattox C. H., Va.,

April 9M, 1865, 4.30 p.m.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War,

Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this
afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The accompanying ad-
ditional correspondence will show the conditions fully.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut. -General.

496 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

When news of the surrender first reached our
lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hun-
dred guns in honor of the victory. I at once sent
word, however, to have it stopped. The Confeder-
ates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to
exult over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once,
with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of sup-
plies, and what I now deemed other useless outlay
of money. Before leaving, however, I thought I

Note. — The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender inserted
at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the
publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S. Parker, Military
Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time of the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's mani-
fold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlinea-
tions and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion
of General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General
Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to General
Grant. The original was then transcribed by General Parker
upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General Lee.

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the
original document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and
Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the
form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor
of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and
General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and
handed it to General Grant. This letter is copied on page 494*

Publishers.

If
i'

INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER. 497

would like to see General Lee again ; so next morn-
ing I rode out beyond our lines towards his head-
quarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer
carrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it
was, and met me. We had there between the
lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversa-
tion of over half an hour, in the course of which Lee
said to me that the South was a big country and
that we might have to march over it three or four
times before the war entirely ended, but that we
would now be able to do it as they could no longer
resist us. He expressed it as his earnest hope, how-
ever, that we would not be called upon to cause more
loss and sacrifice of life ; but he could not foretell the
result. I then suggested to General Lee that there was
not a man in the Confederacy whose influence with
the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his,
and that if he would now advise the surrender of all
the armies I had no doubt his advice would be fol-
lowed with alacrity. But Lee said, that he could not
do that without consulting the President first. I
knew there was no use to urge him to do anything
against his ideas of what was right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other offi-
cers, some of whom seemed to have a great
desire to go inside the Confederate lines. They
finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the

.Vol. 11 —32

498 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

purpose of seeing some of their old army friends,
and the permission was granted. They went over,
had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and
brought some of them back with them when they
returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his
lines and I returned to the house of Mr. McLean.
Here the officers of both armies came in great num-
bers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as
though they had been friends separated for a long
time while fighting battles under the same flag. For
the time being it looked very much as if all thought
of the war had escaped their minds. After an hour
pleasantly passed in this way I set out on horseback,
accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for
Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad
had by this time been repaired.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

morale of the two armies relative conditions

of the north and south — president lincoln

visits richmond arrival at washington

president Lincoln's assassination — president
Johnson's policy,

AFTER the fall of Petersburg, and when the
armies of the Potomac ajid the J ames were in
motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the
National troops had greatly improved. There was
no more straggling, no more rear guards. The men
who in former times had been falling back, were now,
as I have already stated, striving to get to the front
For the first time in four weary years they felt that
they were now nearing the time when they could
return to their homes with their country saved. On
the other hand, the Confederates were more than
correspondingly depressed. Their despondency in-
creased with each returning day, and especially after
the battle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their
arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out
of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods
in the hope of reaching their homes. I have already

500 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a
regiment whose colonel I met at Farmville. As a
result of these and other influences, when Lee finally
surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356
officers and men left to be paroled, and many of
these were without arms. It was probably this latter
fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes
made, North and South, that Lee surrendered a
smaller number of men than what the official figures
show. As a matter of official record, and in addition
to the number paroled as given above, we captured
between March 29th and the date of surrender 19,132
Confederates, to say nothing of Lee's other losses,
killed, wounded and missing, during the series of
desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and
determined flight. The same record shows the
number of cannon, including those at Appomattox,
to have been 689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion
as to the number of troops engaged in every battle,
or all important battles, fought between the sections,
the South magnifying the number of Union troops
engaged and belittling their own. Northern writers
have fallen, in many instances, into the same error.
I have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly
loyal to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight
the South had made and successfully continued for
four years before yielding, with their twelve million

RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH. 50I

of people against our twenty, and of the twelve
four being colored slaves, non-combatants. I will
add to their argument. We had many regiments of
brave and loyal men who volunteered under great
difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the
South.

But the South had rebelled against the National
government It was not bound by any constitutional
restrictions. The whole South was a military camp.
The occupation of the colored people was to furnish
supplies for the army. Conscription was resorted to
early, and embraced every male from the age of
eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically
unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number
of civil officers of State and intended National gov-
ernment. The old and physically disabled furnished
a good portion of these. The slaves, the non-com-
batants, one-third of the whole, were required to
work in the field without regard to sex, and almost
without regard to age. Children from the age of
eight years could and did handle the hoe ; they were
not much older when they began to hold the plough.
The four million of colored non-combatants were
equal to more than three times their number in the
North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food
from the soil to support armies. Women did not
work in the fields in the North, and children attended
school.

502 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

The arts of peace were carried on in the North.
Towns and cities grew during* the war. Inventions
were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the
products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the
field. In the South no opposition was allowed to
the government which had been set up and which
would have become real and respected if the rebellion
had been successful. No rear had to be protected.
All the troops in service could be brought to the
front to contest every inch of ground threatened
with invasion. The press of the South, like the
people who remained at home, were loyal to the
Southern cause.

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities
presented about the same appearance they do in
time of peace. The furnace was in blast, the shops
were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated,
not only to supply the population of the North and
the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to
pay a part of the expense of the war. In the North
the press was free up to the point of open treason.
The citizen could entertain his views and express
them. Troops were necessary in the Northern
States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army
being released by outside force, armed and set at
large to destroy by fire our Northern cities. Plans
were formed by Northern and Southern citizens to
burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them,

RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH 503

to spread infection by importing clothing from in-
fected regions, to blow up our river and lake steam-
ers— regardless of the destruction of innocent lives.
The copperhead disreputable portion of the press
magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the
Union army. It was, with a large following, an aux-
iliary to the Confederate army. The North would
have been much stronger with a hundred thousand
of these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest
of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union senti-
ment was in the South, than we were as the battle
was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military
camp. The colored people, four million in number,
were submissive, and worked in the field and took
care of the families while the able-bodied white
men were at the front fighting for a cause destined
to defeat. The cause was popular, and was enthu-
siastically supported by the young men. The con-
scription took all of them. Before the war was
over, further conscriptions took those between four-
teen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves,
and those between forty-five and sixty as senior re-
serves. It would have been an offence, directly
after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask
any able-bodied man in the South, who was between
the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during
the war, whether he had been in the Confederate

504 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

army. He would assert that he had, or account for
his absence from the ranks. Under such circum-
stances it is hard to conceive how the North showed
such a superiority of force in every battle fought. I
know they did not.

During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan
officer, of no military education, but possessed of
courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the
Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee,
He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at
home wherever he went The army operating
against the South, on the contrary, had to protect
its lines of communication with the North, from
which all supplies had to come to the front.
Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops
stationed at convenient distances apart. These
guards could not render assistance beyond the
points where stationed. Morgan was foot-loose and
could operate where his information — always correct
— led him to believe he could do the greatest dam-
age. During the time he was operating in this way
he killed, wounded and captured several times the
number he ever had under his command at any
one time. He destroyed many millions of prop-
erty in addition. Places he did not attack had to
be guarded as if threatened by him. Forrest, an
abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from
the National front quite as many men as could be

PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND. 505

spared for offensive operations. It is safe to say
that more than half the National army was engaged
in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick
in hospital or on detail which prevented their bear-
ing arms. Then, again, large forces were employed
where no Confederate army confronted them. I
deem it safe to say that there were no large en-
gagements where the National numbers compen-
sated for the advantage of position and intrench-
ment occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the Presi-
dent went to Richmond in company with Admiral
Porter, and on board his flagship. He found the
people of that city in great consternation. The
leading citizens among the people who had re-
mained at home surrounded him, anxious that some-
thing should be done to relieve them from suspense.
General Weitzel was not then in the city, having
taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after
his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagra-
tion which they had found in progress on entering
the Confederate capital. The President sent for
him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had
on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading
citizen of Virginia being also present. After this
interview the President wrote an order in about
these words, which I quote from memory : " General
Weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling

506 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

itself the Legislature of Virginia to meet for the
purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the
Confederate armies."

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing
that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it
published in their papers. This call, however, went
very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contem-
plated, as he did not say the " Legislature of Vir-
ginia" but "the body which called itself the Legisla-
ture of Virginia." Mjr. Stanton saw the call as pub-
lished in the Northern papers the very next issue and
took the liberty of countermanding the order author-
izing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other
body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the
President was nearer the spot than he was.

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was
( a man who never questioned his own authority, and
who always did in war time what he wanted to do.
He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist;
but the Constitution was not an impediment to him
while the war lasted. In this latter particular I en-
tirely agree with the view he evidently held. The
Constitution was not framed with a view to any
such rebellion as that of 186 1-5. While it did not
authorize rebellion it made no provision against it.
Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as in-
herent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as
the right of an individual to preserve his life when

ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON. 507

in jeopardy. The Constitution was therefore in
abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way
affected the progress and termination of the war.

Those in rebellion against the government of the
United States were not restricted by constitutional
provisions, or any other, except the acts of their
Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause
for which the South was then fighting. It would
be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united
in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely
untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their
efforts to maintain the Union intact, should be re-
strained by a Constitution prepared by our ancestors
for the express, purpose of insuring the permanency
of the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station,
I went with my staff and a few others directly to
Burkesville Station on my way to Washington.
The road from Burkesville back having been newly
repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off
the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after
midnight of the second day when I reached City
Point. As soon as possible I took a dispatch-boat
thence to Washington City.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time
in preparing the necessary orders for the new
state of affairs ; communicating with my different
commanders of separate departments, bodies of

508 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

troops, etc. But by the 14th I was pretty well
through with this work, so as to be able to visit
my children, who were then in Burlington, New
Jersey, attending school. Mrs. Grant was with me
in Washington at the time, and we were invited
by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them
to the theatre on the evening of that day. I replied
to the President's verbal invitation to the effect,
that if we were in the city we would take great
pleasure in accompanying them ; but that I was
very anxious to get away and visit my children,
and if I could get through my work during the
day I should do so. I did get through and started
by the evening train on the 14th, sending Mr.
Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at
the theatre.

At that time the railroad to New York entered
Philadelphia on Broad Street ; passengers were con-
veyed in ambulances to the Delaware River, and
then ferried to Camden, at which point they took
the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on the
east side of the City of Philadelphia, I found
people awaiting my arrival there ; and also dis-
patches informing me of the assassination of the
President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable
assassination of the Vice-President, Mr. Johnson,
and requesting my immediate return.

It would be impossible for me to describe the

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S A SSA SSINA TION. 509

feeling that overcame me at the news of these assas-
sinations, more especially the assassination of the
President. I knew his goodness of heart, his
generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to
have everybody happy, and above all his desire to
see all the people of the United States enter again
upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality
among all I knew also the feeling that Mr. John-
son had expressed in speeches and conversation
against the Southern people, and I feared that his
course towards them would be such as to repel, and
make them unwilling citizens ; and if they became
such they would remain so for a long while. I felt
that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how
far.

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take
me back to Washington City ; but Mrs. Grant was
with me ; it was after midnight and Burlington was
but an hour away. Finding that I could accompany
her to our house and return about as soon as they
would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia
station, I went up with her and returned imme-
diately by the same special train. The joy that I
had witnessed among the people in the street and
in public places in Washington when I left there,
had been turned to grief ; the city was in reality
a city of mourning. I have stated what I believed
then the effect of this would be, and my judgment

5IO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

now is that I was right. I believe the South would
have been saved from very much of the hardness of
feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's course
towards them during the first few months of his
administration. Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's
assassination was particularly unfortunate for the
entire nation.

Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did en-
gender bitterness of feeling. His denunciations of
treason and his ever-ready remark, " Treason is a
crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all
those men of the South who came to him to get some
assurances of safety so that they might go to work
at something with the feeling that what they ob-
tained would be secure to them. He uttered his
denunciations with great vehemence, and as they
were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many
Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond
endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large
degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feel-
ing, wishes and judgment of those over whom he
presides ; and the Southerners who read the denun-
ciations of themselves and their people must have
come to the conclusion that he uttered the senti-
ments of the Northern people ; whereas, as a
matter of fact, but for the assassination of Mr.
Ljncoln, I believe the great majority of the North-

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY. 5 1 1

ern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would
have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on
terms that would be the least humiliating to the
people who had rebelled against their government.
They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, that be-
sides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

The people who had been in rebellion must neces-
sarily come back into the Union, and be incorpo-
rated as an integral part of the nation. Naturally
the nearer they were placed to an equality
with the people who had not rebelled, the more
reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists,
and the better citizens they would be from the begin-
ning. They surely would not make good citizens if
they felt that they had a yoke around their necks.

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern
people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage.
They supposed that it would naturally follow the
freedom of the negro, but that there would be a
time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could pre-
pare themselves for the privileges of citizenship be-
fore the full right would be conferred ; but Mr. John-
son, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed
to regard the South not only as an oppressed people,
but as the people best entitled to consideration of any
of our citizens. This was more than the people who
had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union
were prepared for, and they became more radical in

512 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

their views. The Southerners had the most power
in the executive branch, Mr. Johnson having gone
to their side ; and with a compact South, and such
sympathy and support as they could get from the
North, they felt that they would be able to control
the nation at once, and already many of them acted
^s if they thought they were entitled to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one
hand, and receiving the support of the South on the
other, drove Congress, which was overwhelmingly
republican, to the passing of first one measure and
then another to restrict his power. There being a
solid South on one side that was in accord with the
political party in the North which had sympathized
with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Con-
gress and of the majority of the legislatures of the
States, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in
all his ignorance. In this work, I shall not discuss the
question of how far the policy of Congress in this
particular proved a wise one. It became an absolute
necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of
the President and the blindness of the Southern people
to their own interest. As to myself, while strongly
favoring the course that would be the least humili-
ating to the people who had been in rebellion, I
had gradually worked up to the point where, with
the majority of the people, I favored immediate
enfranchisement.

CHAPTER LXIX.

sherman and johnston — johnston^ surrender to
sherman capture of mobile — wilson's expe-
dition capture of jefferson davis general

thomas's qualities — estimate of general

CANBY.

WHEN I left Appomattox I ordered General
Meade to proceed leisurely back to Burkes-
ville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the
Army of the James, and to go into camp there until
further orders from me. General Johnston, as has
been stated before, was in North Carolina confront-
ing General Sherman. It could not be known posi-
tively, of course, whether Johnston would surrender
on the news of Lee's surrender, though I supposed
he would ; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was
the natural point from which to move to attack him.
The army which I could have sent against him was
superior to his, and that with which Sherman con-
fronted him was also superior ; and between the two
he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven
away. With the loss of their capital and the Army
of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether John-

Vol. II —33

514 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ston's men would have had the spirit to stand. My
belief was that he would make no such attempt ; but
I adopted this course as a precaution against what
might happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point,
I sent a messenger to North Carolina by boat with
dispatches to General Sherman, informing him of
the surrender of Lee and his army ; also of the
terms which I had given him ; and I authorized
Sherman to give the same terjns to Johnston if the
latter chose to accept them. The country is familiar
with the terms that Sherman agreed to conditionally,
because they embraced a political question as well
as a military one and he would therefore have to
confer with the government before agreeing to them
definitely.

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City
Point while visiting there to confer with me about
our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincoln
had said to the peace commissioners when he met
them at Hampton Roads, viz. : that before he could
enter into negotiations with them they would have
to agree to two points: one being that the Union
should be preserved, and the other that slavery
should be abolished ; and if they were ready to con-
cede these two points he was almost ready to sign his
name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to
fill out the balance of the terms upon which we

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON. 5 1 5

would live together. He had also seen notices in
the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond,
and had read in the same papers that while there he
had authorized the convening of the Legislature of
Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the
terms that I had made with General Lee, that he was
but carrying out the wishes of the President of the
United States. But seeing that he was going beyond
his authority, he made it a point that the terms were
only conditional. They signed them with this under-
standing, and agreed to a truce until the terms could
be sent to Washington for approval ; if approved by
the proper authorities there, they would then be
final; if not approved, then he would give due notice,
before resuming hostilities. As the world knows,
Sherman, from being one of the most popular gen-
erals of the land (Congress having even gone so far
as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-
general for the purpose of advancing him to that
grade), was denounced by the President and Secre-
tary of War in very bitter terms. Some people
went so far as to denounce him as a traitor — a most
preposterous term to apply to a man who had ren-
dered so much service as he had, even supposing
he had macle a mistake in granting such terms as
he did to Johnston and his army. If Sherman had
taken authority to send Johnston with his army

516 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of
their own States, without submitting the question
to the authorities at Washington, the suspicions
against him might have some foundation. But the
feeling against Sherman died out very rapidly, and
it was not many weeks before he was restored to
the fullest confidence of the American people.

When, some days after my return to Washington,
President Johnson and the Secretary of War received
the terms which General Sherman had forwarded for
approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called
and I was sent for. There seemed to be the greatest
consternation, lest Sherman would commit the gov-
ernment to terms which they were not willing to
accede to and which he had no right to grant. A
message went out directing the troops in the South
not to obey General Sherman. I was ordered to
proceed at once to North Carolina and take charge
of matters there myself. Of course I started with-
out delay, and reached there as soon as possible. I
repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly
as possible, hoping to see him without even his
army learning of my presence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters,
and we were at once closeted together. I showed
him the instructions and orders under which I visited
him. I told him that I wanted him to notify General
Johnston that the terms which they had conditionally

JOHNSTON SURRENDERS TO SHERMAN. 517

agreed upon had not been approved in Washington,
and that he was authorized to offer the same terms
I had given General Lee. I sent Sherman to do
this himself. I did not wish the knowledge of my
presence to be known to the army generally ; so I
left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the sur-
render solely by himself, and without the . enemy
knowing that I was anywhere near the field. As
soon as possible I started to get away, to leave Sher-
man quite free and untrammelled.

At Goldsboro\ on my way back, I met a mail, con-
taining the last newspapers, and I found in them
indications of great excitement in the North over
the terms Sherman had given Johnston ; and harsh
orders that had been promulgated by the President
and Secretary of War. I knew that Sherman must
see these papers, and I fully realized what great
indignation they would cause him, though I do not
think his feelings could have been more excited than
were my own. But like the true and loyal soldier
that he was, he carried out the instructions I had
given him, obtained the surrender of Johnston's
army, and settled down in his camp about Raleigh,
to await final orders.

There were still a few expeditions out in the South
that could not be communicated with, and had to be
left to act according to the judgment of their respec-
tive commanders. With these it was impossible to

518 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF L\ S. GRAXT.

tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and John-
ston, of which they must have heard, might affect
their judgment as to what was best to do.

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to
get off f rfcm the commands of Thomas and Canby did
finally get off : one under Canby himself, against Mo-
bile, late in March ; that under Stoneman from East
Tennessee on the 20th ; and the one under Wilson,
starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 2 2d of
March. They were all eminently successful, but
without any good result Indeed much valuable
property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time
when we would have liked to spare them. The war
was practically over before their victories were
gained. They were so late in commencing operations,
that they did not hold any troops away that other-
wise would have been operating against the armies
which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies
to a surrender. The only possible good that we may
have experienced from these raids was by Stonemans
getting near Lynchburg about the time the armies
of the Potomac and the James were closing in on
Lee at Appomattox.

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed
north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Rail-
road. He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges
at different places and rendered the road useless to
the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg.

CAPTURE OF MOBILE. 519

His approach caused the evacuation of that city
about the time we were at Appomattox, and was
the cause of a commotion we heard of there. He
then pushed south, and was operating in the rear
of Johnston's army about the time the negotia-
tions were going on between Sherman and John-
ston for the latter's surrender. In this raid Stone-
man captured and destroyed a large amount of
stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand
prisoners were the trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of
March. The city of Mobile was protected by two
forts, besides other intrenchments — Spanish Fort,
on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely,
north of the city. These forts were invested. On
the night of the 8th of April, the National troops
having carried the enemy's works at one point,
Spanish Fort was evacuated ; and on the 9th, the
very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried
by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the
nth the city was evacuated.

I had tried for more than two years to have an
expedition sent against Mobile when its possession
by us would have been of great advantage. It
finally cost lives to take it when its possession
was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it
would within a few days have fallen into our hands
without any bloodshed whatever

WILSON'S EXPEDITION. 5 2 1

Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well
equipped and well armed. He was an energetic
officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest
was in his front, but with neither his old-time army
nor his old-time prestige. He now had princi-
pally conscripts. His conscripts were generally old
men and boys. He had a few thousand regular
cavalry left, but not enough to even retard mate-
rially the progress of Wilsons cavalry. Selma fell
on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners
and a large quantity of war material, machine shops,
etc., to be disposed of by the victors. Tuscaloosa,
Montgomery and West Point fell in quick succession.
These were all important points to the enemy by
reason of their railroad connections, as depots of
supplies, and because of their manufactories of war
material. They were fortified or intrenched, and
there was considerable fighting before they were
captured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of April.
Here news was received of the negotiations for the
surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged
to the military division commanded by Sher-
man, and of course was bound by his terms.
This stopped all fighting.

General Richard Taylor had now become the
senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of
the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he
surrendered everything within the limits of this

522 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith sur-
rendered the trans-Mississippi department on the
26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at
liberty to continue the war.

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugi-
tive president of the defunct confederacy before he
got out of the country. This occurred at Irwinsville,
Georgia, on the nth of May. For myself, and I
believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have
been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in
escaping, but for one reason : I feared that if not
captured, he might get into the trans- Mississippi
region and there set up a more contracted confeder-
acy. The young men now out of homes and out of
employment might have rallied under his standard
and protracted the war yet another year. The
Northern people were tired of the war, they were
tired of piling up a debt which would be a further
mortgage upon their homes.

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to
escape, because he did not wish to deal with the
matter of his punishment. He knew there would
be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-
Confederate president, for high treason. He thought
blood enough had already been spilled to atone for
our wickedness as a nation. At all events he did
not wish to be the judge to decide whether more
should be shed or not. But his own life was sacri-

CAR TURE OF JEFFERSON DA VIS. 523

ficed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-
president of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the
hands of the government which he had lent all his
talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the
best interest of all concerned. This reflection does
not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of be-
reavement in the untimely loss of so good and great
a man as Abraham Lincoln.

He would have proven the best friend the South
could have had, and saved much of the wrangling
and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruc-
tion under a President who at first wished to revenge
himself upon Southern men of better social stand-
ing than himself, but who still sought their recog-
nition, and in a short time conceived the idea and
advanced the proposition to become their Moses to
lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties.

The story of the legislation enacted during the
reconstruction period to stay the hands of the
President is too fresh in the minds of the people to
be told now, Much of it, no doubt, was unconsti-
tutional ; but it was hoped that the laws enacted
would serve their purpose before the question of
constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary
and a decision obtained. These laws did serve their
purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the
statute books of the United States, no one taking

524 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.

interest enough in them to give them a passing
thought

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr.
Davis was wearing when he was captured I cannot
settle this question from, personal knowledge of the
facts ; but I have been under the belief, from infor-
mation given to me by General Wilson shortly after
the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was
surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed
in a gentleman's dressing gown. Naturally enough,
Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect
much how this should be accomplished provided it
might be done successfully. If captured, he would
be no ordinary prisoner. He represented all there
was of that hostility to the government which had
caused four years of the bloodiest war — and the
most costly in other respects of which history makes
any record. Every one supposed he would be tried
for treason if captured, and that he would be exe-
cuted. Had he succeeded in making his escape in
any disguise it would have been adjudged a good
thing afterwards by his admirers.

As my official letters on file in the War Depart-
ment, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect
upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhat upon
his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to
him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier.
The same remark will apply also in the case of

GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES. 525

General Canby. I had been at West Point with
Thomas one year, and had known him later in the
old army. He was a man of commanding appear-
ance, slow and deliberate in speech and action ; sen-
sible, honest and brave. He possessed valuable
soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. He gained
the confidence of all who served under him, and
almost their love. This implies a very valuable
quality. It is a quality which calls out the most
efficient services of the troops serving under the
commander possessing it.

Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and
always good. He could not be driven from a point he
was given to hold. He was not as good, however, in
pursuit as he was in action. I do not believe that
he could ever have conducted Sherman's army from
Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defences and
the commander guarding that line in 1864. On the
other hand, if it had been given him to hold the
line which Johnston tried to hold, neither that gene-
ral nor Sherman, nor any other officer could have
done it better.

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly de-
served, as he has received, the plaudits of his coun-
trymen for the part he played in the great tragedy
of 1861-5.

General Canby was an officer of great merit. He
was naturally studious, and inclined to the law.

526 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

There have been in the army but very few, if any,
officers who took as much interest in reading and
digesting every act of Congress and every regula-
tion for the government of the army as he. His
knowledge gained in this way made him a most
valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all
his army services were rendered up to the time of
his being assigned to the Military Division of the
Gulf. He was an exceedingly modest officer,
though of great talent and learning. I presume
his feelings when first called upon to command
a large army against a fortified city, were some-
what like my own when marching a regiment
against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861.
Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepi-
dation in going into battle with some one else com-
manding. Had Canby been in other engagements
afterwards, he would, I have no doubt, have ad-
vanced without any fear arising from a sense of the
responsibility. He was afterwards killed in the lava
beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hos-
tile Modoc Indians. His character was as pure as his
talent and learning were great His services were
valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau
officer. I have no idea that it was from choice that
his services were rendered in an office, but because
of his superior efficiency there.

CHAPTER LXX.

the end of the war the march to washington

one of Lincoln's anecdotes — grand review at
washington— characteristics of lincoln and

stanton estimate of the different corps

commanders.

THINGS began to quiet down, and as the cer-
tainty that there would be no more armed re-
sistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina
and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to
the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out
Suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places
throughout the South to insure obedience to the
laws that might be enacted for the government of
the several States, and to insure security to the lives
and property of all classes. I do not know how far
this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at
that time, that such a course should be pursued. I
think now that these garrisons were continued after
they ceased to be absolutely required ; but it is not
to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought
between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could termi-

528 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

nate without leaving many serious apprehensions
in the mind of the people as to what should be
done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up
to Manchester, on the south side of the James
River, opposite Richmond, and there put them in
camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what
the situation was there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was
committed upon him. Halleck had been sent to
Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued
orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from
obeying his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the
papers on his return, containing this order of Hal-
leck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.
On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from
Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from
Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest.
This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck,
furthermore, that he had seen his order. He also
stated that he was coming up to take command of
his troops, and as he marched through it would
probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself,
because he (Sherman) would not be responsible for
what some rash person might do through indig-
nation for the treatment he had received. Very
soon after that, Sherman received orders from me to
proceed to Washington City, and to go into camp on

THE END OF THE WAR. 529

the south side of the city pending the mustering-out
of the troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march
northward from Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that
from Richmond to Washington City. The army,
however, commanded by Sherman, which had been
engaged in all the battles of the West and had
marched from the Mississippi through the Southern
States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and
thence to Washington City, had passed over many
of the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, thus
having seen, to a greater extent than any other body
of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war
for the preservation of the Union.

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to
the sea and north to Goldsboro, while it was
not accompanied with the danger that was antici-
pated, yet was magnificent in its results, and
equally magnificent in the way it was conducted.
It had an important bearing, in various ways,
upon the great object we had in view, that of
closing the war. All the States east of the Missis-
sippi River up to the State of Georgia, had felt the
hardships of the war. Georgia, and South Carolina,
and almost all of North Carolina, up to this time,
had been exempt from invasion by the Northern
armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.
Their newspapers had given such an account of

Vol. 11 — 34

530 PER SO A A L MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Confederate success, that the people who remained
at home had been convinced that the Yankees had
been whipped from first to last, and driven from
pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be
holding out for any other purpose than to find a
way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the news-
papers in his front were proclaiming daily that his
army was nothing better than a mob of men who
were frightened out of their wits and hastening,
panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our
navy for protection against the Southern people. As
the army was seen marching on triumphantly, how-
ever the minds of the people became disabused and
they saw the true state of affairs. In turn they
became disheartened, and would have been glad to
submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this
march, and which was calculated to hasten the end,
was the fact that the great storehouse of Georgia
was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies.
As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the
destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and
the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off
their resources and left the armies still in Virginia
and North Carolina dependent for supplies upon a
very small area of country, already very much ex-
hausted of food and forage.

THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON. 53 1

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville
Junction and the other from the neighborhood of
Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into
camp near the Capital, as directed. The troops
were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they ap-
peared in their respective camps as ready and fit
for duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt
whether an equal body of men of any nation, take
them man for man, officer for officer, was ever
gotten together that would have proved their equal
in a great battle.

The armies of Europe are machines : the men
are brave and the officers capable ; but the majority
of the soldiers in most of the nations of Europe are
taken from a class of people who are not very intel-
ligent and who have very little interest in the contest
in which they are called upon to take part. Our
armies were composed of men who were able to
read, men who knew what they were fighting for,
and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, ex-
cept in an emergency when the safety of the nation
was involved, and so necessarily must have been
more than equal to men who fought merely because
they were brave and because they were thoroughly
drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance oc-
curred during the time these troops were in camp
before starting North.

532 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

I remember one little incident which I will relate
as an anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It oc-
curred a day after I reached Washington, and about
the time General Meade reached Burkesville with
the army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left Rich-
mond with the Confederate States government, and
had gone to Danville. Supposing I was necessarily
with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter
to me there informing me that, as governor of the
Commonwealth of the State of Virginia, he had
temporarily removed the State capital from Rich-
mond to Danville, and asking if he would be per-
mitted to perform the functions of his office there
without molestation by the Federal authorities. I
give this letter only in substance. He also in-
quired of me whether in case he was not allowed
to perform the duties of his office, he with a few
others might not be permitted to leave the country
and go abroad without interference. General Meade
being informed that a flag of truce was outside his
pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and
had the letter brought in without informing the
officer who brought it that I was not present. He
read the letter and telegraphed me its contents.
Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this dis-
patch, I repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln,
supposing I was asking for instructions, said, in re-
ply to that part of Governor Smith's letter which

ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES. 533

inquired whether he with a few friends would be
permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his
position was like that of a certain Irishman (giving
the name) he knew in Springfield who was very pop-
ular with the people, a man of considerable promise,
and very much liked. Unfortunately he had acquired
the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that
the habit was growing on him. These friends deter-
mined to make an effort to save him, and to do this
they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic
drinks. They asked Pat to join them in signing the
pledge, and he consented. He had been so long out
of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that
he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. After a
few days this began to grow distasteful to him. So
holding the glass behind him, he said : " Doctor,
couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbe-
knownst to myself."

I do not remember what the instructions were the
President gave me, but I know that Governor Smith
was not permitted to perform the duties of his
office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been
spared, there would have been no efforts made to
prevent any one from leaving the country who
desired to do so. He would have been equally will-
ing to permit the return of the same expatriated
citizens after they had time to repent of their
choice.

534 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U S GRANT.

On the 1 8th of May orders were issued by the
adjutant-general for a grand review by the Presi-
dent and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's
armies. The review commenced on the 23d and
lasted two days. Meade's army occupied over six
hours of the first day in passing the grand stand
which had been erected in front of the President's
house. Sherman witnessed this review from the
grand stand which was occupied by the President
and his cabinet. Here he showed his resentment for
the cruel and harsh treatment that had unneces-
sarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of
War, by refusing to take his extended hand

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south
side of the Potomac. During the night of the 23d
he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the
Capitol. Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of
the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review.
Sherman's army made a different appearance from
that of the Army of the Potomac. The latter had
been operating where they received directly from the
North full supplies of food and clothing regularly:
the review of this army therefore was the review of
a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and
orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any
duty, but without the experience of gathering their
own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and
of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was

GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON. 535

not so well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac,
but their marching could not be excelled ; they
gave the appearance of men who had been thor-
oughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long
and continuous marches or through exposure to any
climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.
They exhibited also some of the order of march
through Georgia where the " sweet potatoes sprung
up from the ground" as Shermans army went
marching through. In the rear of a company there
would be a captured horse or mule loaded with
small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other
food picked up for the use of the men. Negro
families who had followed the army would sometimes
come along in the rear of a company, with three or
four children packed upon a single mule, and the
mother leading it.

The sight was varied and grand : nearly all day
for two successive days, from the Capitol to the
Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of orderly
soldiers marching in columns of companies. The
National flag was flying from almost every house and
store ; the windows were filled with spectators ; the
door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored
people and poor whites who did not succeed in
securing better quarters from which to get a view
of the grand armies. The city was about as full
of strangers who had come to see the sights as it

536 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

usually is on inauguration day when a new President
takes his seat

It may not be out of place to again allude to Presi-
dent Lincoln and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton,
who were the great conspicuous figures in the exec-
utive branch of the government There is no great
difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to
the characteristics of the President With Mr. Stan-
ton the case is different They were the very oppo-
site of each other in almost every particular, except
that each possessed great ability. Mr. Lincoln
gained influence over men by making them feel that
it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferred
yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than
to insist upon having his own way. It distressed
him to disappoint others. In matters of public
duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the
least offensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned
his own authority to command, unless resisted. He
cared nothing for the feeling of others. In fact it
seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than
to gratify. He felt no hesitation in assuming the
functions of the executive, or in acting without
advising with him. If his act was not sustained, he
would change it — if he saw the matter would be fol-
lowed up until he did so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials
formed the complement of each other. The Secre-

CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON. 537

tary was required to prevent the Presidents being
imposed upon. The President was required in the
more responsible place of seeing that injustice was
not done to others. I do not know that this view
of these two men is still entertained by the majority
of the people. It is not a correct view, however, in
my estimation. Mr. Lincoln did not require a guar-
dian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to
trust his generals in making and executing their
plans. The Secretary was very timid, and it was
impossible for him to avoid interfering with the
armies covering the capital when it was sought to
defend it by an offensive movement against the army
guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our
weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was
in danger. The enemy would not have been in
danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. These
characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown
shortly after Early came so near getting into the
capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served
with me during the war between the States, and
who attracted much public attention, but of whose
ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate,
are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and
Hooker. There were others of great merit, such
as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of

538 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

those first named, Burnside at one time had com*
mand of the Army of the Potomac, and later of
the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded
the Army of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit,
with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond
his control. He had been an officer of the engineer
corps before the war, and consequently had never
served with troops until he was over forty-six years
of age. He never had, I believe, a command of
less than a brigade. He saw clearly and distinctly
the position of the enemy, and the topography of
the country in front of his own position. His first
idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground,
sometimes without reference to the direction we
wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate
to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could
execute an order which changed his own plans
with the same zeal he would have displayed if the
plan had been his own. He was brave and con-
scientious, and commanded the respect of all who
knew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that
would get beyond his control, at times, and make
him speak to officers of high rank in the most offen-
sive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly
than he himself, and no one regretted it more.
This made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for
those around him to approach him even with infor-

ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS. 539

mation. In spite of this defect he was a most valua-
ble officer and deserves a high place in the annals
of his country.

General Burnside was an officer who was gen-
erally liked and respected. He was not, however,
fitted to command an army. No one knew this bet-
ter than himself. He always admitted his blunders,
and extenuated those of officers under him beyond
what they were entitled to. It was hardly his fault
that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had
known him very well before, however. Where I did
see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement in bring-
ing his command around the point of Lookout
Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was bril-
liant. I nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous
man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He
was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the
rights of others. His disposition was, when engaged
in battle, to get detached from the main body of the
army and exercise a separate command, gathering to
his standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all
the general officers who did not exercise a separate
command. He commanded a corps longer than any
other one, and his name was never mentioned as hav-
ing committed in battle a blunder for which he was
responsible. He was a man of very conspicuous

540 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

personal appearance. Tall, well-formed and, at the
time of which I now write, young and fresh-looking;
he presented an appearance that would attract the
attention of an army as he passed His genial dis-'
position made him friends, and his personal courage
and his presence with his command in the thickest
of the fight won for him the confidence of troops
serving under him. No matter how hard the fight,
the 2d corps always felt that their commander was
looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had
an opportunity of forming an estimate of his quali-
fications as a soldier from personal observation. I
had known him in Mexico when both of us were
lieutenants, and when our service gave no indica-
tion that either of us would ever be equal to the
command of a brigade. He stood very high in the
army, however, as an officer and a man. He was
brave and conscientious. His ambition was not
great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. He
was willing to do any amount of battling, but always
wanted some one else to direct. He declined the
command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not
oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a
volunteer without a military education. His way was
won without political influence up to an important
separate command — the expedition against Fort

ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS. 541

Fisher, in January, 1865. His success there was
most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brig-
adier-general in the regular army and of major-
general of volunteers. He is a man who makes
friends of those under him by his consideration of
their wants and their dues. As a commander, he
won their confidence by his coolness in action and
by his clearness of perception in taking in the situa-
tion under which he was placed at any given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good
corps commanders, but came into that position so
near to the close of the war as not to attract
public attention. All three served as such, in the
last campaign of the armies of the Potomac and
the James, which culminated at Appomattox Court
House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden
collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to
the exclusion of almost everything else. I regarded
Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in
the army. Graduating at West Point, as he did,
during the second year of the war, he had won his
way up to the command of a corps before its close.
This he did upon his own merit and without
influence.

CONCLUSION.

THE cause of the great War. of the Rebellion
against the United States will have to be at-
tributed to slavery. For some years before the war
began it was a trite saying among some politicians
that " A state half slave and half free cannot exist."
All must become slave or all free, or the state will
go down. I took no part myself in any such view of
the case at the time, but since the war is over, re-
viewing the whole question, I have come to the con-
clusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual
guarantees for its security wherever it existed ; and
in a country like ours where the larger portion of it
was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and
well-to-do population, the people would naturally
have but little sympathy with demands upon them
for its protection. Hence the people of the South
were dependent upon keeping control of the
general government to secure the perpetuation of
their favorite institution. They were enabled to
maintain this control long after the States where
slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling

conclusion. 543

power, through the assistance they received from odd
men here and there throughout the Northern States.
They saw their power waning, and this led them to
encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of
the Northern States by enacting such laws as the
Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every Northern
man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn
out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a
Southern man. Northern marshals became slave-
catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to
the support and protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would
not permit any longer than until they could get the
power to expunge such laws from the statute books.
Prior to the time of these encroachments the great
majority of the people of the North had no particu-
lar quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not
forced to have it themselves. But they were not
willing to play the rol£ of police for the South in the
protection of this particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had
railroads, telegraphs and steamboats — in a word,
rapid transit of any sort — the States were each al-
most a separate nationality. At that time the sub-
ject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to
the public mind. But the country grew, rapid tran-
sit was established, and trade and commerce between
the States got to be so much greater than before, that

544 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

the power of the National government became more
felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted
in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we
did. We are better off now than we would have
been without it, and have made more rapid progress
than we otherwise should have made. The civilized
nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual
activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough
acquaintance among people of different nationalities,
has become common ; whereas, before, it was but the
few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond
the limits of their own country or who knew anything
about other people. Then, too, our republican insti-
tutions were regarded as experiments up to the break-
ing out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe
generally believed that our republic was a rope of
sand that would part the moment the slightest strain
was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself cap-
able of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was
ever made, and our people have proven themselves
to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach
us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states dur-
ing our troubles shows the lack of conscience of com-
munities where the responsibility does not come upon
a single individual. Seeing a nation that extended

conclusion. 545

from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of
a continent, growing as we were growing in popula-
tion, wealth and intelligence, the European nations
thought it would be well to give us a check. We
might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace,
or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions.
Hence, England was constantly finding fault with
the administration at Washington because we were
not able '.o keep up an effective blockade. She
also joined, at first, with France and Spain in set-
ting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mex-
ico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that
Mexico had of being treated as an independent
power. It is true they trumped up grievances as
a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can
always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been un-
able to give that protection to the subjects of
foreign nations which she would have liked to give,
and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced
loans from them. Under pretence of protecting
their citizens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a
foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon
our continent, thus threatening our peace at home.
I, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against
the United States by the powers engaged, and sup-
posed as a matter of course that the United States
would treat it as such when their hands were free to

Vol. ii — 35

546 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln
and the Secretary of War, but never heard any special
views from them to enable me to judge what they
thought or felt about it I inferred that they felt a
good deal as I did, but were unwilling to commit them-
selves while we had our own troubles upon our hands.

All of the powers except France very soon with-
drew from the armed intervention for the establish-
ment of an Austrian prince upon the throne of Mex-
ico ; but the governing people of these countries
continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles
in our way. After the surrender of Lee, therefore,
entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheri-
dan with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him
where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French
from Mexico. These troops got off before they
could be stopped ; and went to the Rio Grande, where
Sheridan distributed them up and down the river,
much to the consternation of the troops in the
quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This
soon led to a request from France that we should
withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to nego-
tiations for the withdrawal of theirs. Finally Bazaine
was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French
Government. From that day the empire began to
totter. Mexico was then able to maintain her inde-
pendence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the

conclusion, 547

United States. I did not blame France for her
part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the
ruins of the Mexican Republic. That was the
scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or
merit.' He had succeeded in stealing the govern-
ment of his country, and made a change in its
form against the wishes and instincts of his people.
He tried to play the part of the first Napoleon,
without the ability to sustain that rol£. He sought
by new conquests to add to his empire and his
glory ; but the signal failure of his scheme of con-
quest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-
Prussian war was an expensive one; but it was
worth to* France all it cost her people. It was the
completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The
beginning was when he landed troops on this con-
tinent. Failing here, the prestige of his name — all
the prestige he ever had — was gone. He must
achieve a success or fall. He tried to strike down
his neighbor, Prussia — and fell.

I never admired the character of the first Na-
poleon ; but I recognize his great genius. His
work, too, has left its impress for good on the
face of Europe. The third Napoleon could have
no claim to having done a good or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary
to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a

548 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one,
occurring among our own people again ; but, grow-
ing as we are, in population, wealth and military
power, we may become the envy of nations which
led us in all these particulars only a few years
ago ; and unless we are prepared for it we may
be in danger of a combined movement being some
day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty
years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the
lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the
greatest security, without the power to resist an in-
vasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers
for a time until we could prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast
defences should be put in the finest possible condi-
tion. Neither of these cost much when it is con-
sidered where the money goes, and what we get in
return. Money expended in a fine navy, not only
adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the
future, but is very material aid to our commerce with
foreign nations in the meantime. Money spent upon
sea-coast defences is spent among our own people,
and all goes back again among the people. The work
accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a
feeling of security.

England's course towards the United States during
the rebellion exasperated the people of this country
very much against the mother country. I regretted

conclusion. 549

it England and the United States are natural
allies, and should be the best of friends. They speak
one language, and are related by blood and other ties.
We together, or even either separately, are better
qualified than any other people to establish com-
merce between all the nationalities of the world,

England governs her own colonies, and particu-
larly those embracing the people of different races
from her own, better than any other nation. She is
just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes them
self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the
laborer. She does not seem to look upon the col-
onies as outside possessions which she is at liberty
to work for the support and aggrandizement of the
home government.

The hostility of England to the United States
during our rebellion was not so much real as it was
apparent. It was the hostility of the leaders of one
political party. I am told that there was no time
during the civil war when they were able to get up
in England a demonstration in favor of secession,
while these were constantly being gotten up in favor
of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the
North. Even in Manchester, which suffered so fear-
fully by having the cotton cut off from her mills,
they had a monster demonstration in favor of the
North at the very time when their workmen were
almost famishing.

55O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

It is possible that the question of a conflict
between races may come up in the future, as did
that between freedom and slavery before. The con-
dition of the colored man within our borders may
become a source of anxiety, to say the least But
he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he
now should be considered as having as good a right
to remain here as any other class of our citizens. It
was looking to a settlement of this question that
led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo
during the time I was President of the United
States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only
by the administration, but by all the people, almost
without price. The island is upon our shores, is
very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen mil-
lions of people. The products of the soil are so
valuable that labor in her fields would be so compen-
sated as to enable those who wished to go there to
quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took it
that the colored people would go there in great num-
bers, so as to have independent states governed by
their own race. They would still be States of the
Union, and under the protection of the General
Government ; but the citizens would be almost
wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we
have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that

CONCLUSION.

551

we already possessed. It was seen that the volun-
teers of the Mexican war largely composed the
pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast country.
Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to
be a nucleus for the population of the important points
of the territory acquired by that war. After our
rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty
to return to their homes, they found they were not
satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop
of the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines
of the mountains first attracted them ; but after-
wards they found that rich valleys and productive
grazing and farming lands were there. This territory,
the geography of which was not known to us at
the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as
any portion of our country. Railroads traverse it
in every direction, north, south, east, and west.
The mines are worked. The high lands are used
for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are
found in many of the valleys. This is the work of
the volunteer. It is probable that the Indians would
have had control of these lands for a century yet but
for the war. We must conclude, therefore, that wars
are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people
were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their
birth. In fact an immense majority of the whole
people did not feel secure against coming to want

552 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

should they move among entire strangers. So much
was the country divided into small communities that
localized idioms had grown up, so that you could
almost tell what section a person was from by hear-
ing him speak. Before, new territories were settled
by a " class " ; people who shunned contact with
others ; people who, when the country began to
settle up around them, would push out farther
from civilization. Their guns furnished meat, and
the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil,
their bread and vegetables. All the streams
abounded with fish. Trapping would furnish pelts to
be brought into the States once a year, to pay for
necessary articles which they could not raise — powder,
lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. Oc-
casionally some little articles of luxury would enter
into these purchases — a quarter of a pound of tea,
two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some
playing cards, and if anything was left over of the
proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the
country beyond the settlements of these frontiers-
men. This is all changed now. The war begot a
spirit of independence and enterprise. The feeling
now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old sur-
roundings to enable him to get up in the world.
There is now such a commingling of the people
that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer

conclusion. 553

localized to any great extent ; the country has filled
up " from the centre all around to the sea " ; rail-
roads connect the two oceans and all parts of the
interior ; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the
country are now furnished the student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power
and intelligence. We have but little to do to pre-
serve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and
the respect of other nations. Our experience ought
to teach us the necessity of the first ; our power se-
cures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when
there is to be great harmony between the Federal
and Confederate. I cannot stay to be a living wit-
ness to the correctness of this prophecy ; but I feel
it within me that it is to be so. The universally
kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it
was supposed that each day would prove my last,
seemed to me the beginning of the answer to " Let
us have peace."

The expressions of these kindly feelings were not
restricted to a section of the country, nor to a divi-
sion of the people. They came from individual citi-
zens of all nationalities ; from all denominations —
the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew ; and from
the various societies of the land — scientific, educa-
tional, religious, or otherwise. Politics did not en-
ter into the matter at all.

-j

554 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this sig-
nificance should be given because I was the object
of it. But the war between the States was a very
bloody and a very costly war. One side or . the
other had to yield principles they deemed dearer
than life before it could be brought to an end. I
commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged
on the victorious side. I was, no matter whether
deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of
the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying
fact that Confederates should have joined heartily
in this spontaneous move. I hope the good feeling
inaugurated may continue to the end.

APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,

OF THE

UNITED STATES ARMIES— i864-'65.

Headquarters Armies of the United States,
Washington, D. C, July 22, 1865.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Sir : — I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of my
appointment to command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with
the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops
that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and
weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The
resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far infe-
rior to ours : but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with
a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines
of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to
supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and with-
out concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, ena-
bling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of com-
munication for transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing

556 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. £ GRANT.

the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers,
during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and
do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. It was
a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not
more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's su-
perior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could
be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the
people, both North and South, until the military power of the re-
bellion was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops
practicable against the armed force of the enemy ; preventing him
from using the same force at different seasons against first one and
then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refit-
ting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance.
Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the
enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other
way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission
with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution
and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders
given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they
might have been better in conception and execution is for the
people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay
the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done
has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in
what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contend-
ing forces was about as follows : The Mississippi River was strong-
ly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its
mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us
armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream.
A few points in Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river,
were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the
mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undisputed pos-
session of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than
eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into

APPENDIX. 557

the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them
out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that
probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in
garrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men,
with the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas,
and along the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much
of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops
to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal peo-
ple to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held sub-
stantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers,
running eastward to include nearly all of the State of Tennessee.
South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in
Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from
the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was sub-
stantially within our lines. Virginia, with the exception of the
northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about the mouth
of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Mon-
roe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying
along the Rap i dan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the
sea-coast footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington,
and New Bern, in North Carolina ; Beaufort, Folly and Morris
Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South
Carolina ; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West
and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important
ports were blockaded by the navy. The accompanying map, a
copy of which was sent to General Sherman and other commanders
in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at
the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign
of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to
occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and
a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary
to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies.
In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made
every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier ; and those
who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collect-
ing deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to
bring almost his entire strength into the field.

558 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee
and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army com-
manded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extend-
ing from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and
defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the
Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly in-
trenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending At-
lanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre,
against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. la
addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under For-
rest, in North-east Mississippi ; a considerable force, of all arms,
in the Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and
extreme eastern part of Tennessee ; and also confronting our sea-
coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no
foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them,
were the main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the com-
mand of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the
armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies
and the Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the
immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command
of the Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general
supervision of the movements of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's
army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's
country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon
their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of
joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while
I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in
the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so. More specific
written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had
talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied
that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest
extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red

APPENDIX. 559

River against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized
previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on
the 15th of March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should
be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the
taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than
General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their com-
mand, he would send them back at the time specified by General
Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of
the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary to move-
ments east of the Mississippi ; that should his expedition prove
successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River with such
force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his
troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move
for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that
then held by him more easily held ; that it might be a part of the
spring campaign to move against Mobile ; that it certainly would
be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without em-
barrassing other movements ; that New Orleans would be the
point of departure for such an expedition ; also, that I had di-
rected General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as sug-
gested by him (General Banks), instead of a demonstration, as
Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification
and directions, he was instructed as follows :

" 1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over
the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

" 2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold
upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will
turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-
half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored
troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it
from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not
to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the terri-
tory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the
river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty
thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect
to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here
stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession
of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present

560 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. £ GRANT.

command for operations against Mobile. With these and such — Ht!wnt as I
can give yon from elsewhere, lose no time in ■—*»«£ * Apm^.*^.^^ to be
followed by an attack npoo Mobile. Two or more iroo-dads will be ordered
to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which
to co-operate. Yon can make yonr own arrangements with the admiral for ms
co-operation, and select yonr own tine of approach. My own idea of the mat-
ter is that Pascagoula should be yonr base ; but, from your long service in the
Gulf Department, yon will know best about the matter. It is intended that
yonr movements shall be co-operathre with movements elsewhere, and yon
not now start too soon. AH I would now add is, that you commence the
Generation of your forces at once. Preset ve a profound secrecy of what you
intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

" U. S. GRANT, fim tenant-General.

" Major-General N. P. Banks."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be
his objective point ; that wherever Lee went he would go also.
For his movement two plans presented themselves : One to cross
the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank ; the other
above, moving by his left Each presented advantages over the
other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee
would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going
north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we did would have
to be done whilst the rations we started with held out ; besides, it
separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to
co-operate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be
used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York
or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the
lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-
General B. F. Butler :

" Fort Monroe, Virginia, April 2, 1864.

" General : — In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at
as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have co-operative action of all
the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

" It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to
act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the terri-
tory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration
can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's
country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement, they inter*
po.se themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby re-

APPENDIX. 561

ducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the
attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's
army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention
must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we
can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of
the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it im-
possible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, there-
fore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable : The Army
of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective
point. You will collect all the forces from your command that car. be spared
from garrison duty — I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men —
to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being your objective
point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men
from South Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them
in person. Major-General W*. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to com-
mand the troops sent into the field from your own department.

" General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,
with all the troops on transports, by the 1 8th instant, or as soon thereafter as
practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will
make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best cal-
culated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

" When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as pos-
sible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for
the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be
given at this time for your further movements.

" The fact that has already been stated — that is, that Richmond is to be your
objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and
the Army of the Potomac — must be your guide. This indicates the necessity
of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance.
Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the
Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies
would become a unit.

" All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction.
If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to
cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it
would be of immense advantage.

1 ' You will please forward for my information, at the .earliest practicable day,
all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this
order.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" Major-General B. F. Butler."

On the 1 6th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On

the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army
Vol. 11 — 36

562 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S.

and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him
to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade
moved from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him
as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the
27th of April ; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Cul-
peper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however,
fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction
with his (General Butler's) army on the James River ; that, could
I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south
side, so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I
would form the junction there ; that circumstances might make
this course advisable anyhow ; that he should use every exertion
to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could,
and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move ; that
if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a
force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and
Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept
in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations,
and also those kept in the background for the protection of our
extended lines between the loyal States and the armies operating
against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General
Sigel, was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the
frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops
could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the
North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy,
they could act directly to their front, and give better protection
than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement they would
either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of
his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.
General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available
force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston,
under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East
Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord
having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was in-
structed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Bev-
erly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the

APPENDIX. 563

Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the
Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one
on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the
Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar
Creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the mo-
ment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, and ad-
vance as far as possible ; while General Crook would take pos-
session of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the
Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroy-
ing the New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, opera-
tions were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being
in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a gen-
eral movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebel-
lion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me de-
sirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against
Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it
were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result
in the East. If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fight-
ing, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he
could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough
for the defence of Richmond. It was well understood, by both
Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that
it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James
River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at
Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent im-
portance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying rail-
road communication as far south as possible. Believing, however,
in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was re-
inforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As
the Army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him,
Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy
did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city
in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I
tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent

564 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. £ GRANT.

command of the Army of the Potomac My instructions far that
army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leav-
ing all the details and the execution to him. The campaigns that
followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His
commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him
in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that
his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise
have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early
on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction
and .orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions.
Before night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (the fifth
and sixth corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second
corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheri-
dan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, num-
bering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight oppo-
sition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was
about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it
removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had
entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active,
large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so
large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and pro-
tected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, Major-
General G. K. Warren commanding,) met and engaged the enemy
outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furi-
ously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast
as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the
density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with
commendable promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the
Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the
crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad,
holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move
until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured,
but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This
crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six
o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into
action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his troops having

APPENDIX. 565

marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappa-
hannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion,
probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,
unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a
soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock
on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until
darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position
that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy
made a feeble attempt to tum our right flank, capturing several
hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the
promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and
commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored
order. On the morning of the 7 th, reconnoissances showed that
the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to
the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was
evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him
of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,
notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait
an attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on
and put my whole force between him and Richmond ; and orders
were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the
night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards Spottsylvania
Court House, the fifth corps mcJving on the most direct road.
But the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and
having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. On the
8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been
sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify
the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven
back on the main force, within the recently constructed works,
after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides.
On the morning of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a raid
against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The
9th, 10th, and nth were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, with-
out decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able
and distinguished soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, com-
manding the sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wright
succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12 th

566 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The second
corps,. Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of
his line, capturing most of Johnson's division of E well's corps
and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate
that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. The 13th,
14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring
and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Washington.
Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the
enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the
iSth with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence
at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the afternoon
of the 19th, E well's corps came out of its works on our extreme
right flank ; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy
loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the
night of the 21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again,
having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads,
was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took
position behind it. The fifth corps reached the North Anna on
the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps.
The second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the
second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between
that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition.
Soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but re-
pulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the 25th, General
Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on
which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots
at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large
supplies of rations, and many miles of' railroad-track ; recaptured
about four hundred of our men on their way to Richmond as pris-
oners of war ; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow
Tavern ; carried the first line of works around Richmond 'but
finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault', re-
crossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge
under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing,
on the James River, where he communicated with General Butler.
This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's
cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains.

APPENDIX. 567

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in
pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore
having joined him with the tenth corps. At the same time he sent
a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of West
Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foot-
hold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General Kautz,
from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of Petersburg and
Richmond. On the 5 th, he occupied, without opposition, both
City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a com-
plete surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army,
and commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnois-
sance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying
a portion of it after some fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as
follows :

" Headquarters, near Bermuda Landing,

May 9, 1864.
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

" Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand
seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chicka-
hominy, and have safely brought them to their present position. These were
colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same
day with our movement up James River, forced the black Water, burned the
railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard's
force at that point.

" We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of rail-
road, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against
the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

44 Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting
of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill
I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many pris-
oners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

" General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to
Lee from Beauregard's force.

" BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried
a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or
Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the
6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond
and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose

568 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defence
of those places. On the 16th, the enemy attacked General Butler
in his position in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or
drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the James
and Appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his
front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valu-
able to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of great
security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly
against Richmond rs if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It
required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it
there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a
raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield,
Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track,
two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quan-
tities of commissary and other stores ; thence, crossing to the
South Side Road, struck it at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and
'White's Stations, destroying the road and station-houses ; thence
he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General
Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an
iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C, commanded by General
H. W. Wessells, and our gunboats there ; and, after severe fighting,
the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and arma-
ment captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami
disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically
sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to
bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the
south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In ad-
dition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably
not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the
scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of
Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was
difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, there-
fore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to
secure what had been gained ; and accordingly, on the 2 2d, I

APPENDIX 569

directed that they be sent forward, under command of Major-Gen-
eral W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by
Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the
Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of
Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than
either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th
to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover
Town to turn the enemy's position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under
Sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance ; crossed the Pamun-
key River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on
the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful
engagement with the enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and
30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court
House and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the enemy's posi-
tion north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the last
day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed
with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered
by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving
the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the
railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the
enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached
Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and
General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White
House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1 st day of June an attack was made at five p.m. by the
6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps
being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This
resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of
works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of
General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated
assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but
was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he
made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but
failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an

57C PSJtICXAL JfEJfllMS OF C £ CEAXT.

rji cc. "fist yL C+l ±e yL oc Jttic wie again assanked the
«i*=.y i ▼ irk*. =i cze icce cc drrratr aim from his position. In
zzjk vziirr.zt -»ir j:» wis hearr. wrrile tsar oc the cnemr. I hare
rasr-n v- leiier*. wis cocpaniiTeiy tgii. It was the only general
sr^&ik =a*it free r:.* Raciias. tj tbe Tames which did not indict
. zc*l zzxt ?z&=LT a'j&a lo cccizKasaie Cor oar own losses, I would

* * *

ac: :*t urji*T5t»£ 25 saying siar ill prevkxis attacks resulted in
v ;t vri-a ts :,«^r ansa, or accomplished as much as I had hoped
zz',rz th-tta : L^t they ir.^icaed upon the enemy severe losses,
which :.fmit<L ui the end, to the complete overthrow of the re-

Frcm the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Rich-
mond, i: was impossible, by any dank movement, to interpose be-
tween him and the citv. I was still in a condition to either move bv
his left flack, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue
my move by his right flank to the south side of the James.
While the former might have been better as a covering for Wash-
ington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would
be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that
would protect :he Fredericksburg Railroad, a long, vulnerable
line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that
would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave
open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south
hide of the James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's
army north of Richmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his
lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the
army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow
hirn south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness,
it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to
run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the
defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive imme-
diately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could
easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I
was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had de-
signed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to
hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of
any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until
the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville to

APPENDIX. 5 7 1

effectually break up the railroad connection between Richmond
and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg ; and when the cavalry
got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James
River, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all
his sources of supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan,
got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad,
with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near
Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the
work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of
the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry,
under General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to
capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and com-
mon bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the
works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town,
but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the works
which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault im-
practicable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting
one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I
sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's
command by water, via the White House, to reach there in ad-
vance of the Army of the Potomac. This was for the express
purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware
of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on
the evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General
Wilson, and the 5 th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long
Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings
of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, at
Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of
the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and North-
ern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they
had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before
fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing
the vantage ground of either. The Southern press and people,

572 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding
that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New
York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only
defended their Capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam,
Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were
by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them.
Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only
be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The
battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold
Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even
more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him
wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were
probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in
the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party ; and when
he did attack, it was in the open field. The details of these bat-
tles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery,
have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major-Gen-
eral Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to
the James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-
shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely
wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base* from
which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit can-
not, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary
departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them.
Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Briga-
dier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the
available roads between the army and our water-base, and but
little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under
General Sigel, commenced on the ist of May. General Crook,
who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, di-
vided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry,
to General Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes.
Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near Wythe-
ville, on the ioth, and proceeding to New River and Christians-
burg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots,
including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at

APPENDIX. 5 73

Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Val-
ley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15 th, and, after a severe
engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar
Creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satis-
factory, I asked his removal from command, and Major-General
Hunter was appointed to supersede him. His instructions were
embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General H. W.
Halleck, chief of staff of the army :

" Near Spottsylvania Court House, Va.,

May 20, 1864.

«<

The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are
brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole,
therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direc-
tion ; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet
too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will
be doing good service. • • *

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-Geaeral.

" Major-General H. W. Halleck."

Jericho Ford, Va., May 25, 1864.

" If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do
so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond
possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back
to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" Major-General H. W. Halleck."

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving
up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June
at Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and de-
feated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five
hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand
of small arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junc-
tion with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he
moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached
and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very
successful ; and but for the difficulty of taking with him suffi-
cient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile

574 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy
important, point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and
manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under
General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a
corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time before
Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General
Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from
before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him
no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This
lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence
of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead
of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have
been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against
the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it
If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the
James River Canal, on the main line of communication between
Lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken
exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now
disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted
within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and
the interests of the service. The promptitude of his movements
and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his
country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac : The 2d corps com-
menced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by
ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing. The laying of the pontoon-
bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing
of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both
bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to
Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate
capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler vere verbal, and were for
him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the
troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then
held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the
Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg

APPENDIX. 5 75

by divisions as rapidly as it could be done ; that we could re-
inforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring
troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and con-
fronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next
morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to sat-
isfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines
until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he
made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg
from the Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half
miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred pris-
oners. This was about seven p.m. Between the line thus cap-
tured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was
no evidence that the enemy had reinforced Petersburg with a
single brigade from any source. The night was clear — the moon
shining brightly — and favorable to further operations. General
Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General
Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as
he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander,
who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and
what to do with the troops. But instead of taking these troops and
pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock
to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done
before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force.
An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by
the troops under Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required
until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position.
The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued
with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and
resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works
of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured
by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hun-
dred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and
persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and i8th. but only resulted
in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could
not be dislodged. The advantages of position gained by us were
very great. The army chen proceeded to envelop Petersburg

576 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

towards the South Side Railroad, as far as possible without attack-
ing fortifications.

On the 1 6th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from
a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expect-
ing, no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the
place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General
Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the
railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was
apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two
divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that
were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point,
to report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which Gen-
eral Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position
in advance of his present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced
back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning.
General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on
the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong
picket-line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divi-
sions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them
to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Be-
tween four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked
and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment
was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on
the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by
pontoon-bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedi-
tion against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White
House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and
compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was, that Gen-
eral Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevilian Station, on
the morning of the nth of June, whom he attacked, and after an
obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He left
his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four
hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12th he
destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa Court
House. This occupied until three o'clock p. m., when he advanced

APPENDIX. 577

in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced
by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles
from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. On
the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the ene-
my's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry.
Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition to
continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage
(the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing
from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side
of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching
White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the
depot at that place, he moved to the James River, which he
reached safely after heavy fighting. He commenced crossing
on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation,
and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 2 2d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of
the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry
of the Army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads
south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's
Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and
the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near
Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the ene-
my's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station on the afternoon of
the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville Railroad to
Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found
the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not
dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on
the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad
crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive
engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left with a view
of reaching Reams's Station (supposing it to be in our possession).
At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by in-
fantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains.
In this last encounter, General Kautz, with a part of his command,
became separated, and made his way into our lines. General
Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing
the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our left and rear.
The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compen-
Vol. 11 —37

578 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

sated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by
railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Rich-
mond to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation
of his army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in
this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from
Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of
the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the
night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the
cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north
bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler had
there. On the 27 th the enemy was driven from his intrenched
position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th
our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road,
but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy
force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in consid-
erable loss to both sides. The first object of this move having
failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the
enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by
assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there.
One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the
28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the iSth
corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose
in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d
corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of
the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of
the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung,
blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of
the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately
took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line
for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line
in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to
the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason to
believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were
immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting
them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had
been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. The
captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to

APPENDIX. 5 79

us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus
terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful
assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hun-
ter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River,
thus laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raids into Maryland
and Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that
valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained,
General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was di-
rected to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to
Harper's Ferry ; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by
reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was
experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to
find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For
this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating
against Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then
fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf
Department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertain-
ment of the, result of the Red River expedition. The garrisons of
Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy-
artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from
the invalid corps. One division under command of General
Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remain-
ing two divisions of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were
subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy
approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command of
our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdstown ;
and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the
river and occupied Maryland Heights. On the 6th the enemy
occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick
City. General Wallace, with Ricketts's division and his own com-
mand, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out
from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force
on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His
force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy
nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet
it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable General
Wright to reach Washington with two divisions of the 6th corps,

580 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. From Mono-
cacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance
reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a
reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascer-
tain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued,
in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and
wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He com-
menced retreating during the night. Learning the exact condition
of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraph, at forty- five
minutes past eleven p.m., on the 12th, the assignment of Major-
General H. G. Wright to the command of all the troops that could
be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and
directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the
force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General
Wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th ; on the 18th the
enemy was overtaken at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah,
when a sharp skirmish occurred ; and on the 20th, General
Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at
Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred
prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or
Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to
the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be used
in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by
him into the valley ; and that Hunter should remain in the She-
nandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and
Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt
that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be
developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave Washington.
Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted from the order to re-
turn to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again ad-
vancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then
at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry.
The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party
into Pennsylvania which on the 30th burned Chambersburg, and
then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland.
They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and with dimin-

APPENDIX. 581

ished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From
the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down
between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to trans-
mit messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four
to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers
back ; so that often orders would be given, and then information
would be received showing a different state of facts from those on
which they were based, causing a confusion and apparent contra-
diction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those
who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the
enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. To
remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person
should have the supreme command of all the forces in the Depart-
ments of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle
Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in
person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington,
with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces
against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the
neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General Hun-
ter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy Western
Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I hesi-
tated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at
Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. There-
fore, on the 4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and
determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there,
and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the
following instructions :

" Monocacy Bridge, Maryland,

August 5, 1864—8 P.M.

11 General : — Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vi-
cinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for
public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroad,
if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the
enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following
him and attacking him wherever found ; follow him, if driven south of the Po-
tomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has

582 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,
detaching under a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the
raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade
of cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville may be taken into ac-
count.

" There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best
cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be in-
structed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the
Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the
Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is
desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all
provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command ; such as
cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be
destroyed — they should rather be protected ; but the people should be informed
that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids
must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

" Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south ; and to do this, you
want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he
takes.

" Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular

vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through

which you march.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General D. Hunter."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance
reached Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a will-
ingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have Gen-
eral Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the
morning train, with orders to take general command of "all the
troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy,
who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained
at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of
the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military
affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of Wash-
ington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Depart-
ments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were con-
stituted into the " Middle Military Division," and Major-General
Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and

APPENDIX. 583

Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac.
The first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the nth of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of
September were both of an offensive and defensive character, re-
sulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in
which we were generally successful, but no general engagement
took place. The two armies lay in such a position — the enemy on
the west bank of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our
forces in front of Berryville — that either could bring on a battle
at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States
of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another
army could be interposed to check him. Under these circum-
stances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Final-
ly, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesa-
peake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy,
became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of
relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened
invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken.
But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing
more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what would
be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15 th of September
to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with
him, what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he
pointed out so distinctly how each army lay ; what he could do
the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of
success, that I saw there were but two words of instructions neces-
sary— Go in ! For the conveniences of forage, the teams for sup-
plying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he
could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on
the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could be-
fore daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I
may here add, that the result was such that I have never since
deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him
orders.

Early on the morning of the i9«:h, General Sheridan attacked
General Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a
most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until ^v\t o'clock in the
evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position

584 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

from Opequon Creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand
prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy rallied, and
made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was
attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [2 2d].
Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonburg,
Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the
upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel
army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north
side of Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early
again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his
cavalry encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were
defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three
hundred and fifty prisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy
crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the
Shenandoah, forded the North Fork, and early on the morning of
the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and
turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed
our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much
confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and New-
town. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester
when the battle commenced, arrived on the field, arranged his
lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and im-
mediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great
vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss
of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had cap-
tured in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped during the
night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg.
Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the
enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah
Valley. I was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army
of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's army to
the Army of the Jam*s, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold
Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him
to move without detaching from his force for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy
had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early
in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and

APPENDIX. 585

Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a
force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of August,
to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent
him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those
sent. In this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several
hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching
orders, and ascertained that but one division (Kershaw's), of the
three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist
this movement, the 5 th corps, General Warren commanding, was
moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon Rail-
road. During the day he had considerable fighting. To regain
possession of the road, the enc?my made repeated and desperate
assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. On the night
of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the James were with-
drawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at Peters-
burg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry,
while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked,
and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five
pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from
the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad,
enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army
in front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad com-
pelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have
but few troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond.
On the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney,
and the 18th corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General
Butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and
advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong
fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin's Farm, known as
Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the New
Market Road and intrenchments. This success was followed up
by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the
Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy
loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the
right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner

586 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF I/. S. GRANT.

line, but was unable to get further. The position captured from
the enemy was so threatening to Richmond, that I determined to
hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge
us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly.
On the morning of the 30th, General Meade sent out a reconnois-
sance, with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found
sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side.
In this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works
near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon, troops moving to
get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in
heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the
forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was
also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the e::emy attacked Kautz's cavalry
north of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery — eight or
nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our intrenched
infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the
13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view
to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing,
which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient
men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank.
The 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with
the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a pas-
sage of Hatcher's Run, and moved up the south side of it towards
the South Side Railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry
reached the Boydton Plank Road where it crosses Hatcher's Run.
At this point we were six miles distant from the South Side Rail-
road, which I had hoped by this movement to reach and hold.
But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's forti-
fications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by
which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to with-
draw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly.
Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had
connected with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters.
Soon after I left the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in
the gap between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not

APPENDIX. 587

closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General
Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock immediately faced
his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy
within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demon-
stration on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy
on the Williamsburg Road, and also on the York River Railroad.
In the former he was unsuccessful ; in the latter he succeeded in
carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces
withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg
and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined
to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive move-
ments for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to
prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. By
the 7th of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run,
and the Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May,
with the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, com-
manded, respectively, by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and
Schofield, upon Johnston's army at Dalton ; but finding the
enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering Dalton, too strong
to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap
to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in
front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston,
finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified
position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May
15 th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy re-
treated south. Late on the 17th, his rear- guard was overtaken
near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next
morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vigorously
pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but during
the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these
operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division of
Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts and
artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman,
having given his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in
motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult

588 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance,
under General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving
him back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. Several sharp en-
counters occurred at this point. The most important was on the
28th, when the enemy assaulted General McPherson at Dallas, but
received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched
position at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong posi-
tions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to
yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on
Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson
made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the
2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right
flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in con-
sequence of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated
across the Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his
men rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed
his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large por-
tion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to
Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General John-
ston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-
defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the
vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which
was on the 22d of July. About one p.m. of this day the brave,
accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General
Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennes-
see through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by
.Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and
ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or
division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss.
Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sher-
man, after securing his line of communications across the Chatta-
hoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank
upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy
from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and after defeating
the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and Lovejoy's,

APPENDIX. 589

forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September occu-
pied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler,
attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed
at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded
west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro', and Franklin, and was finally
driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid
was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau
joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur,
having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery
Railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also
made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the
remaining railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two
were successful — the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was
prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank move-
ments and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be
read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, ac-
companying it, give the details of that most successful cam-
paign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-
track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating.
This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and
every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force
of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently
waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of
Georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and de-
stroy it beyond the possibility of further use. To guard against
this danger, Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient
force to operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed
General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-
General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On
the morning of the ioth of June, General Sturgis met the enemy
near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in
utter rout and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one
hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however,

590 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of
communications. The persistency with which he followed up
this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs
necessary. In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith, with
the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by
General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their
return from Red River, where they had done most excellent ser-
vice. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take
the offensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness
and effect which has characterized his whole military career. On
the 14th of July, he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and
whipped him badly. The fighting continued through three days.
Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. Having
accomplished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned
to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under
Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it cap-
tured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th
attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th
Illinois Volunteers. Colonel H., having but a small force, with-
drew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the
enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General
Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to sur-
render, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New
Jersey Volunteers, that being placed there by his Government
with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it,
surrender was out of the question.

On the morning of the same dav Forrest attacked Fort Pillow.
Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and
the 1st Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major
Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in
the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault ; and,
after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman
and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, ap-
peared before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's

APPENDIX. 591

operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted
of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thou-
sand cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter
part of May. On the nth of June they attacked and captured
Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was overtaken
by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss,
and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerilla
was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee,
and his command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the
Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of
the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I
am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under Gen-
eral Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detach-
ment of the 17th array corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of
March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day
earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces
at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the
14th to give him battle in the open field ; but, while occupying
the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed
forward to Fort de Russy, which had been left with a weak gar-
rison, and captured it with its garrison — about three hundred and
fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. Our
loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed forward to Alexan-
dria, which place he reached on the 18th. On the 21st he had
an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, in which he
defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four
pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under
the rebel General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General
Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed
forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6th he moved
from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced
and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the
field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight
miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat.
On the 8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy
attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of

592 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores.
During the night, General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where
another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed
with great loss. During the night, General Banks continued his
retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria,
which he reached on the 27 th of April. Here a serious difficult]!
arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the ex-
pedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since
they passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of
Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under, his superin-
tendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was
contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after con-
siderable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Mor-
ganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month. The dis-
astrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the sea-
son, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a
movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with
the 7 th army corps, to co-operate with General Banks's expedition
on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the
1 6th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined,
near Elkin's Ferry, in Washita County, by General Thayer, who
had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes,
in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden,
which he occupied about the middle of ApnI.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks
on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's
Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back to
the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and
reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April, the
enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry,
but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was about six
hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command
of the " Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore
directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating
against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to

APPENDIX. 593

such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and
lines of communications he then occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman,
General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy
that was collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met
and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our
loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General
Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-oper-
ate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay.
On the 8th of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined
naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bom-
bardment, surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted
to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one
hundred and four pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel Gen-
eral Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached
Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's
command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, was or-
dered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time,
sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This
made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no
doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive
him back ; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,
would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price
attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence
moved north to the Missouri River, and continued up that river
towards Kansas. General Curtis, commanding Department of
Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel
the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans's cavalry was
operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated,
with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large num-
ber of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Ar-
kansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over
the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief
done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be
Vol. 11 —38

594 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have
concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the
latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the
garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitu-
lated on the 24th. Soon after the surrender two regiments of re-
inforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to
surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the
garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at
Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the
morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under Bu-
ford, appeared lx fore Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of
the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained
in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again sum-
moned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night
before. He withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had
been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of
October, but without success. On the morning of the 2d he re-
newed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on
the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the
morning of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant. While
these operations were going on, every exertion was made by
General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he
could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his es-
cape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was
sent to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the
enemy on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from
Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position
around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge
him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned
to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put
his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all prep-
arations for refuting and supplying them for future service.

APPENDIX.

595

The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland
River, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops
but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon,
Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and
soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans
of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them.
He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had
been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the
defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the
army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon re-
ported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's
right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Kig Shanty, and
moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the re-
mainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Ala-
bama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the
roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sher-
man proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with
all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows :

" Centreville, Georgia,

October I o— noon.
•' Dispatch al>out Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River,
twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and Ohio
road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Forter, and
leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the State ?
He will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach Nash-

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

" LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch,
I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter : " I will therefore
give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be rein-
forced to the maximum ; that after you get Wilmington, you
strike for Savannah and the river ; that Canby be instructed to
hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus,
Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appaiachicola,

596 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order
for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as
soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce, and the city of Sa-
vannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine
of date September 1 2th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing
substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him
of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation

in Virginia, etc.

" City Point, Virginia,

October 11, 1864 — 11 A.M.

" Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood was
going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio
and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River,
about Florence or Decatur ? If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented
from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not
believe you would meet Hood's army, but would *be bushwhacked by all the
old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home.
Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he
could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going
south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but
I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force
from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be
ndependent of mine ; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am
afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent
Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you
will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" Major-General Wr. T. Sherman."

" Kingston, Georgia,

October 11 — 11 A.M.

" Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedar-
town, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one corps on
ny road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th
corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active
force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive.
With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can con-
stantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road,
and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city — send
back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through
Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and
Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being
on the defensive, I would be on the offensive ; instead of guessing at what he

APPENDIX. 597

means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is
full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of
the Chattahoochee.

" Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T.SHERMAN, Major-General.

"Lieutenant-General Grant."

" City Point, Virginia,

October n. 1864 — 11.30 P.M.

" Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-
coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may
make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you
think Vst.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General W. T. Sherman."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting
through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads,
leading east and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the
east from the west. In other words, cut the would-be Confed-
eracy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining posses-
sion of the Mississippi River. General Sherman's plan virtually
effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his
proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the mean-
time to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved
westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman
sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the
23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chat-
tanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom
he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division,
save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move
with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal,
there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of
the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would be
able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore
readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-
coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of
November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta

598 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

and Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed
Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the
country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own
might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, in-
stead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy,
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the
only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the
Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the
whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was
met with, the condition of the country through which the armies
passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River,
and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all
clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from At-
lanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one
from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut
the enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops
in that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the
South, also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the
railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from
Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. I).
Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on
the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central
Railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Can-
ton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large
amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was with-
out favorable results. The expedition from the Department of
the South, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General
John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms,
including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and
debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it
moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill,
about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and
attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after
severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and
forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night
General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General

APPENDIX. 599

Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah
Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move north-
ward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At
all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should
not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting.
On the 26th of October, the advance of Hood's army attacked the
garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, with-
drew towards Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry,
in effecting a lgdgment on the north side of the Tennessee River,
near Florence. On the 28th, Porrest reached the Tennessee, at
Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. On
the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below John-
sonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats
and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries
upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the gar-
rison. The gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also
were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the
enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and
property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire.
On the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side
of the Tennessee River, above Johnson ville, moving towards
Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th,
General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski,
and put in command of all the troops there, with instructions to
watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to
risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's
command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his
cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General
Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards
Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gain-
ing time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy coming
up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at
Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the
afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed.
His loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty

6oO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight
hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general officers
killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two
thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the
enemy met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his
expectations. During the night, General Schofield fell back to-
wards Nashville. This left the field to the enemy — not lost by
battle, but voluntarily abandoned — so that General Thomas's
whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up
arid commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville
on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood wras crossing the Ten-
nessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General
Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of
General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could
spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on
the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15 th December, General Thomas at-
tacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated
and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in
our hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, in-
cluding four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was in-
creased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry
across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would
cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After
urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assum-
ing the offensive, I started West to superintend matters there in
person. Reaching Washington City, I received General Thomas's
dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as
far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and
apprehensions were dispelled. 1 am not yet satisfied but that
General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood be-
fore Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have
moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of
waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclem-
ency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than

APPENDIX. 60 1

he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will
be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judg-
ment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued
by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee- River, being forced to
abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation.
On the 28th of December our advanced forces ascertained that he
had made good his escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee
and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army transporta-
tion and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his
main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of cavalry,
under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania Volunteers, con-
tinued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable
transportation and the enemy's pontoon-bridge. The details of
these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas's
report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson,
started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he
surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona,
Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the rail-
road, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's
army, four thousand new English carbines, and large amounts of
public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and cap-
tured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of
fourteen cars ; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the
Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories
and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops
and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

Duiing these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with
a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee.
On the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near
Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners.
Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville.
Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville,
but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under
the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated
the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's

602 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Station, to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him
into Virginia — destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad
into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his com-
mand. On the 1 2th of December he commenced his movement,
capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them.
On the 1 6th he struck the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, com-
pletely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing all his
artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners ; and
destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the exten-
sive lead -works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force
under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison
of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made
arrangements to attack it the next morning ; but morning found
Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and
destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount
of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus suc-
cessfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge
to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast
port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad,
and send cotton and ether products out by blockade-runners, be-
sides Ivein^; a i»Li» e of i^reat strategic value. The navv had been
making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but
with only partial efiei :. The nature of the outlet of Caj>e Fear
River was such, that it required watching for so great a distance
that, without possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort
Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor
against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation
A a land force, which I agreed to furni>h. Immediately com-
menced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral I). IV
IViur. if the most formidable armada ever collected for concen-
tration uivn cne eh en point. This necessarilv attracted the at-
ter.tion o: the enemy, as well a> that of the loyal North : and
through the imprudence of the jublic press, and very likely of
officers o: both branches of service, the exact object of the ex-
pedition became a subject of common discussion in the news-
paivrs both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared

APPENDIX. 603

to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until
the later part of November, when, being again called upon by
Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to fur-
nish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with
Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a con-
ference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time
of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was re-
garded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely
arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of
December, if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November,
that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces
about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the
expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg,
and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the de-
parture of Major-General Weitzel, who had been designated to
command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained
one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given :

"City Point, Virginia, December b, 1864.

" General : — The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to
close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second
will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope
for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the
enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you
have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, ex-
cept in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of in-
trenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by
effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic,
north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected
while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance
to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating
with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our
hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be
sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into
the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the at-
tempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is con-
sumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a
matter of after consideration.

44 The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately
in command of the troops.

604 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

" Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near
Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond
without delay.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General B. F. Butler."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops
were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they
were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and
instructions should go through him. They were so sent ; but
General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never re-
ceived the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their ex-
istence, until he read General Butler's published official report of
the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accom-
panying it. I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying the
expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda
Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had
received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather
formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to
witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The ex-
pedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting
the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off with-
out any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged
upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and ar-
rived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher,
on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening
of the 1 8th, having put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the
monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land
troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted,
the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to replenish ; this, with the
state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous
until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded on the morning
of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from Beaufort ;
but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern
newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the
object of the explosion until they were informed by the Northern
press.

APPENDIX. 605

On the 25 th a landing was effected without opposition, and a
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up
towards the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result
of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the
instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and
the return of the expedition. The re-embarkation was accom-
plished by the morning of the 27th.

On the return of the expedition, officers and men — among them
Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M.
Curtis, First- Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York
Volunteers, First- Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieu-
tenant George Simpson, 14 2d New York Volunteers — voluntarily
reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort,
and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch
from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter,
informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing
the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be
taken. The natural supposition with me was, that when the troops
abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. Finding it
had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December, advising
Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and
make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected
Brevet Major-General (now Major-Gcneral) A. H. Terry to com-
mand the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the
same that composed the former, with the addition of a small
brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small
siege train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I
communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the fol-
lowing instructions :

" City Point, Virginia, January 3, 1865.

" General : — The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out
to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C. , and Wilmington ultimately,
if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the
naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself and
command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading
Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should
exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that

606 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF C/. S. GRANT.

you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be per-
formed b each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of
action. 1 would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing.
I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment
and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him
as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be
attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Furt Fisher is
built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the
practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against
superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy.
If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be
abandoned until its reduction L accomplished, or another plan of campaign is
ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views arc. that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a
portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it operates on
the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies
or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.

11 A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readi-
ness to be sent to you if required All other supplies can be drawn from Beau-
fort as you need them.

" Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When
you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare,
to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

" In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beau-
fort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not
debark at Beaufort until so directed.

44 General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore
and place them on sea-going vc^ ds. These troops will be brought to Fort
Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you
reqiirc them, they will be sent to you.

44 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" Brevet Major-General A. II. Terry."

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet
brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was
assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will b'j seen that these instructions did not differ materially
from those given for the first expedition ; and that in neither in-
stance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a
matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Tort Monroe on the morning of the
6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where,
owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of

^ APPENDIX. bo1/

the 1 2th, when it got under way and reached its destination that
evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the
troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock
p.m. was completed without loss. On the 14th a reconnois-
sance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and
a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a de-
fensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort.
This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work
had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of
the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting
was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was
secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the
most important successes of the war. Our loss was : killed, one
hundred and ten ; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On
the 1 6th and 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Cas-
well and the works on Smith's Island, which were immediately
occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the
Cape Fear River.

At my request, Major-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and
Major-General E. (). C. Ord assigned to the Department of Vir-
ginia and North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring
the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army
now threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation
for General Thomas's surplus troops — fields from which they
would co-operate with other movements. General Thomas was
therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his
communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the 7th
of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the
departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield
with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This direction
was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached
Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to
Fort Fisher and New Bern. On the 26th he was directed to send
General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to re-
port to General Canby. By the 7th of February the whole force
was en raute for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military de«

608 PERSONAL MEMOIRS. OF V. S. GRANT.

partment, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed
under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following in-
structions were given him :

" Cl 1 Y Point, V a. , January 3i,i S65.

" General : — * * * Your movements are intended as co-operative with
Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to
be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsbnro' will then be your objective
point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern, or both, as you deem
best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro*, you will advance on the
line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast — as near to it
as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two
objects : the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his
march north ; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of
inarch. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points,
Wilmington or New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the
interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage
for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as
many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may
be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions
direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army.
You will learn what steps he has taken, and l-e governed in your requisitions
accordingly. A supply of ordnance store* will al>o be necessary.

*' Make all requisitions uj>on the chiefs of their respective departments in
the field wiih me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity,
and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress
Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those re-
quired for your own command.

" The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your impera-
tive duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid Sher-
man. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for in-
structions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details
for carrying out the>e instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge,
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance
of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of
Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 2Sth of February ; this limits your
time very materially.

** If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be
supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been
sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two.
On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

" U.S.GRANT, Lieutcnant-Ccneral.

" Major General J. M. Schofield."

APPENDIX. 6(X)

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,
accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for
myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with
General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be
done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah — his
army entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Ten-
nessee, the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take
several months to re-establish a through line from west to east,
and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important
operation towards closing the rebellion — I sent orders to General
Sherman on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base on
the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery
and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the balance of
his command.

On the 1 8th of December, having received information of the
defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and
that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transporta-
tion, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army,
and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards
the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him
to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best
to do. A few days after this I received a communication from
General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging the re-
ceipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations
to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also
that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march
to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report
to me ; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after
the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me
by the middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this
letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and,
without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him,
on the 28th of December, to make preparations to start, as he
proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and
South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as
soon as he could.

On the 2 1 st of January I informed General Sherman that I had
Vol. 11 — 39

6lO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ordered the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding,
east ; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men ; that we
had at Fort Fisher, about eight thousand men ; at New Bern,
about four thousand ; that if Wilmington was captured, General
Schofield would go there ; if not, he would be sent to New Bern ;
that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would
move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his
movement ; that from either point railroad communication could
be run out ; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders
as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to
reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy
under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the
Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence on
the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the
19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance be-
fore it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington

on the morning of the 2 2d, the enemy having retreated towards
Goldsboro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for
a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns — one from Wilming-
ton, and the other from New Hern — and to repair the railroad
leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sher-
man by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became
necessary. The column from New Bern was attacked on the
8th of March, at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of
several hundred prisoners. On the nth the enemy renewed his
attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe
loss, and fell back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse
River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Golds-
boro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's
Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the

22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in
motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina,
on the 17th ; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via
Fayettevilh*, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, open-
ing up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape

APPENDIX. 6 1 I

Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'.
He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe
fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this engage-
ment was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater.
On the 1 8th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe
Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three
guns and driving it back upon the main body. General Siocum,
who was in the advance, ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's
army was m the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, in-
trenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed
forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smithfiejd,
leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there Sherman
continued to Goldsboro', which place had been occupied by Gen-
eral Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten miles
above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got pos-
session and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 2 2d), thus forming a
junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of
Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on
the night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on
the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was
directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman,
from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down
towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources
of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee by
way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if
possible. Of the feasibility of this latter, however, General Stone-
man was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would
attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and
facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so late in
making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed
out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I
directed General Thomas to change his course, and order him
to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards
Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between
our- garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it
not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from

6l2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid
north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February the fol-
lowing communication was sent to General Thomas :

'•City Point, Va., February 14, 1865.

' ' General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile
and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twentv thousand
men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby
will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that
section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood's army has been
terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by deser-
tion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them
to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so with-
drawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel
Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been
brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman ) This being true, or even if it
is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and
leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore,
that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readi-
ness to go south. The object would be threefold : first, to attract as much of
the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to Canby ; second, to destroy
the enemy's line of communications and military resources ; third, to destroy
or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would
probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would
not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Dis-
cretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where,
according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects
named above.

11 Now that your force lias been so much depleted, I do not know what num-
ber of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men,
however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you
should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or
four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will in-
form you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other
sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.

" To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as pos-
sible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number
of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to
the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight
horses.

" Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you
will be able to send under these directions.

41 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-Geperal.

"Major-General G. H. Thomas."

APPENDIX. 6 I 3

On the 15 th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon
after the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general move-
ment of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communi-
cations with the city, north of James River, should be cut off.
The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the
Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent
from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable,
whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the
enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which,
if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly
the latter of these objects. I therefore telegraphed General
Sheridan as follows :

"City Point, Va., Fehrttary 20, 1865 — 1 p.m.

*' General: — As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no

difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there

you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no

further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look

after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there

would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the

westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional

raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman,

numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering

seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand

cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed

troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery,

and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all

that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would

advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was

evacuated on Tuesday last.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutcnant-Gcneral.

" Major-General P. H. Sheridan."

On the 25 th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, in-
quiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him
definite information as to the points he might be expected to move
on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer, the follow-
ing telegram was sent him :

"City Point, Va., February 25, 1865.

" General: — Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposi-
ton he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly

6 14 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C. , and fit out for a new start. I think,
however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I be-
lieve he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to Golds-
boro\ If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after
movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach
Sherman, I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh,
or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places,
with railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or New

Bern.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General.

" Major-General P. H. Sheridan."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of Feb-
ruary, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thou-
sand each. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which
the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the
Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d,
the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed
on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an in-
trenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to
make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the posi-
tion was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of
artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons
and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle- flags, weie
captured. The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men,
were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched on Charlottes-
ville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went,
which place he reached on the 3d. Here he remained two days,
destroying the railroad towards Richmond and Lynchburg, includ-
ing the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the
Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. This neces-
sary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.
On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he
sent one to Scottsville, whence it inarched up the James River
Canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places
the bank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from
this column to Duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge
across the James River at that place, but failed. The enemy
burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge
across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved

APPENDIX. 6 1 5

down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Am-
herst Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg ; thence across
the country, uniting with the column at New Market. The river
being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it ; and the
enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to
cross the river and get on the South Side Railroad about Farm-
ville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing
left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the
White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New-
Market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards
Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks
wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland,
concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the ioth. Here he
rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his
whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him
at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An
infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White
House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in
a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he
crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and
many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the
Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to Gen-
eral Thomas :

" City Point, Virginia,

March 7, 1S65 — 9.30 A.M.

" General : — I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad
in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and fortify there.
Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required. With Bull's
Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be
prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign to-
wards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should
break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-
stock that may be caught west of that.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" Major General G. H. Thomas/1

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was
moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending
it under General Dick Taylor ; Thomas was pushing out two large

616 personal memoirs; of u. s. grant.

and well-appointed cavalry expeditions — one from Middle Tennes-
see under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy's vital
points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under Major-
General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg— and assembling the re-
mainder of his available forces, preparat jry to commence offensive
operations from East Tennessee ; General Sheridan's cavalry was
at White House ; the armies of the Potomac and James were con-
fronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and
Petersburg ; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by
that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro' ; General Pope was
making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy
under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi ; and
General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of
Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate of-
fensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over
winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House.
At this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the
fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Peters-
burg and Richmond for the puqx>se of uniting with Johnston,
before he was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared
to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March, General
Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at
Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Poto-
mac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, Gen-
eral Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general
movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued :

•' City Point, Virginia,

Manh 24. 1S65.

"C.kmrw — On the 2oth instant the armies operating against Richmond
will Iv mo\ed b\ our left, for the double purj>ose of turning the enemy out of
hNpie^nt jMMiion around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cav-
alry urdii Ceneral Sherid.in. which will start at the same time in its efforts
to reach a:%d d»-<!rov :1k- South Side and Danville railroads. Two corps of
the Aism ot the Potomac will be moved at tir>t in two columns, taking the
two nu In cro>.N| •£ H.itchcr*> Run. nearest where the present line held by
us strikes that >:rv.nn. I »th moving towards Uinwiddie Court House.

" The vavaltv under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under

APPENDIX. 6 1 7

General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the
Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the Not-
toway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony . Creek.
General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions
which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army
of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military Divi-
sion not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will
report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defences of City
Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for
holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders
from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The 9th army corps will be
left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now oc-
cupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are
withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the
position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops
to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest no-
tice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so
much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present
left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until
further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the
Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the
movement Major-General Wcitzel will be left in command of all the forces re-
maining behind from the Army of the James.

'* The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on
the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum
number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army.
A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be started from
Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner,
for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished,
will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be
sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be
spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses
the Blackwatcr. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel
Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be instructed to do all
the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and
Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of car-
nages, it might be -practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the
enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with
four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much
hauling as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of
days' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his com-
missary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus
of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be
taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carty,

6l8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRAXT.

after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded
country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery im-
practicable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight
guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders.

" All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may
be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as
much as possible. While I would not now order an unconditional attack on
the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if
the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case
they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join
or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps
will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General
Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable
to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the James
should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible
unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be
regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves princi-
pally for the defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning
all the line north of the James, except inclosed works — only to be abandoned,
however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

4 'By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Rich-
mond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip
their line* to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of
it. while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. It
cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the
trencher net to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very
fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as
almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have
it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack
from the enemy, those no: attacked are not to wait for orders from the
commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, arid notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the
same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their
corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of fol-
lowing up a repulse of the enemy.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" M vi^r-Gfnf.rvls Mkai>k. Ori\ and Sheridan."

Earlv on the morning of the 2^th the enemv assaulted our
lines in front of the 9th coq^s (which held from the Appomat-
tox River towards our left , and carried Fort Stedman, and a
part or the line to the right and left of it, established themselves
and turned the guns of the fort against us ; but our troops on
either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought

APPENDIX. 6 1 9

up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed
and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. Our
loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven
wounded, and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at
once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in
their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held
the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d
and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The
enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without
success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hun-
dred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven miss-
ing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp
about Goldsboro\ and his preparations for furnishing supplies to
them perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March,
and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously
written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for
twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command
to bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front
of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this
movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to
the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence he
could move on to the Richmond and Danville Railroad, striking it
in the vicinity of Burkesvilie, or join the armies operating against
Richmond, as might be deemed best Tnis plan he was directed
to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the
meantime. 1 explained to him the movement I had ordered to
commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as
entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to
destroy the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive
the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid con-
centration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the
report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly
convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the
signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a
long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the
summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put

620 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by
the destruction of the Danville Road, retard the concentration of
the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to
abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore
determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27 th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions
of the 24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one
division of the 25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding,
and Mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance
of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned
him near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th
the following instructions were given to General Sheridan :

"City Point, Va., March 28, 1865.

41 General : — The 5th array corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three
A.M. to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but
about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the
right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House. Move
your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any
particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the
5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through I>inwiddie, reach the
right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to
attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible.
Should he come out and attack us. or get himself where he can be attacked,
move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that
the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on
the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not
do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you
may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find it practicable, I
would like you to cross the South Side Road, between Petersburg and Burkes-
ville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, how-
ever, until you reach the Danville Road, which I would like you to strike as
near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as
complete as possible. You can then pass on to the South Side Road, west of
Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner.

44 After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are
now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army,
selecting your road further south, or you may goon into North Carolina and join
General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to
me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant -General.

*4 Major-Generaj. P. II. Sheridan."

APPENDIX. 62 1

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At
night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of
our infantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its inter-
section with the Boydton Plank Road. The position of the troops
from left to right was as follows : Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys,
Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the

capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was

made. I therefore addressed the following communication to

General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to

cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received

notice from me to do so :

" Gravelly Creek, March 29, 1865.

" General : — Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.
We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road to
Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting
into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position.
General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker Road intersects the Boydton
Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. Humphreys
reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

*' I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going
back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's
roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get
on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course,
modify your action. We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen
what can be done with the enemy. The signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported,
at half-past eleven A.M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from
Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

" U. S. GRANT, Licutenant-Gencral.

" Major-General P. H . Sheridan."

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain
fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled
vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them.
During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House
towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force. Gen-
eral Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton
Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting
across the latter ; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and
extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was,
and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front

622 PER SOX A L MEMOIRS OF V S GRAXT.

into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals
Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to de-
termine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The
two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us as he
did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left. I conceived
his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my
estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to
extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General Sheridan with
a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the
enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's
lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week
before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored
this. The enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that
time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together
at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the
other. Preparations were at once made to relieve General Hum-
phreys's corps, to report to General Sheridan ; but the condition of
the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of
the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possesions
of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To accom-
plish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,
which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven
back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn,
forced back uj>on the 3d division, when the enemy was checked.
A division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support,
the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the
White ( )ak Road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion
of his cavalry got possession of the Five Forks ; but the enemy,
after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry,
defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards
Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed great
generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on
the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he
deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to
take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy
over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his
progress slow. At this juncture he dispatched to me what had
taken place, and that he wTas dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie

APPENDIX. 623

Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one division of
the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon
after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys
could hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other
two divisions of the 5 th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so
ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the
sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of Hum-
phreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements.
On the morning of the 1st of April, General Sheridan, reinforced
by General Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where,
late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified
position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six
thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles
Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th
corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some
apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert
his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan
before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and
open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General Miles's
division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a
bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in
the morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's
lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps,
sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's
Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He
was closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command,
until he met the other division of General Ord's that had suc-
ceeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run. Generals
Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all
of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while General
Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General
Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the
enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable
to carry his inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the
condition of affairs, returned General Miles to his proper com-
mand. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding
Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most gallant

624 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

charge, captured two strong inclosed works — the most salient and
commanding south of Petersburg — thus materially shortening the
line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy
south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Sta-
tion, where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe en-
gagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks
were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was
moving from Ford's Station towards Petersburg, and a division
sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he
broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and
many prisoners. This force retreated by the main road along the
Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy evacu-
ated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville.
On the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General
Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appo-
mattox, followed by General Meade with the 2d and 6th corps,
while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along the South Side
Road ; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. On
the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville Road near Jeters-
ville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court House. He
immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of Gen-
eral Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord
reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman
the following communication :

"Wilson's Station, Aptil 5. 1865.

" General : — All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Dan-
ville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night,
reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much de-
moralized. We hope to reduce this number one-half. I shall push on to
Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go
there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us
see if we cannot tini>h the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether
it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville,
you will bj better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now
are the only strategic points to strike at.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" Major-General W. T. Sherman."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was

APPENDIX. 625

moving west of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan
moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to
General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, fol-
lowed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5 th corps pressed hard
after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several
pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Burkesville to-
wards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squad-
ron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier- General Theodore Read, to
reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the head of
Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and de-
tained until General Read was killed and his small force over-
powered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and
enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his
force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched him-
self. In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemy south
of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about
four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got
up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which
resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among
whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d
corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's
success.

On the morning of the 7 th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry,
except one division, and the 5 th corps moving by Prince Edward's
Court House ; the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one
division of cavalry, on Farmville ; and the 2d corps by the High
Bridge Road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to
the north side of the Appomattox ; but so close was the pursuit,
that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High
Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed
over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at Farm-
ville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly
hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from
Farmville :

"April 7, 1865.

" General : — The result of the last week must convince you of the hopeless-
ness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this

Vol. 11 —40

626 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF Cf. S. GRANT.

struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the
responsibility of any farther effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender
of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern
Virginia.

44 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General
t€ General R. E. Lee."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at
Farmville the following :

" April 7, 1S65.

" General : — I have received your note of this date. Though not enter-
taining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the
part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid use-
less effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask
the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.

'* Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant."

To this I immediately replied :

" April 8, 1S65.

44 General : — Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, ask-
ing the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that fxace being my great de-
sire, there is but one condition I would insist upon — namely, That the men
and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against
the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet
you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same
purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely
the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be

received.

44 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

44 General R. E. Lee."

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed.
General Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General
Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox
Station, followed by General Ord's command and the 5th corps.
During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fight-
ing with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a
general engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan
struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from
there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery', a hospital-train,
and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. Dur-

APPENDIX. 627

ing this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about
midnight received the following communication from General
Lee :

" April 8, 1865.

" General :— I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of
yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not
think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army ; but as
the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know
whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you
with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia ; but as far as your
proposal may affect the Confederates States forces under my command, and
tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-
morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the

two armies.

" R. E. LEE, General.

* Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as
follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the
Appomattox :

"Aprils T865.

" General : — Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to

treat on the subject of peace ; the meeting proposed for ten A. M. to-day could

lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for

peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The

terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying

down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of

human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously

hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life,

I subscribe myself, etc.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" General R. E. Lee."

On the morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th
corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making
a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was
at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, request-
ing a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a sur-
render.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the
following from General Lee:

628 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

44 April 9, 1865.

" General : — I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither
I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in
your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I
now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of
yesterday, for that purpose.

«' R. E LEE, General.

" Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant.*'

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result
of which is set forth in the following correspondence :

Appomattox Court-House, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

" General : — In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of all the officers and men to be
made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me,
the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The
officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Govern-
ment of the United States until properly exchanged ; and each company or
regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The
arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over
to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the
side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each
officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed
by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws
in force where they may reside.

44 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant. General.

"General R. E. Lee."

" Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, Apifg, 1865.

44 General :— I have received your letter of this date containing the terms of
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are
substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they
are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the
stipulations into effect.

" R. E. LEE, General.

•' Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps
under Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain
at Appomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered
army was completed, and to take charge of the public property.

APPENDIX. 629

The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity
of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South
caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that
the armies lately under his leadership are at their Jiomes, desiring
peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance
officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5 th, General Sherman moved
directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and
through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the
morning of the 1 3th. The day preceding, news of the surrender
of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General
Sherman and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an
agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or
basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President. This
agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which
disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated
to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th,
at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice
was at once given by him to General Johnston for the termination
of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th another
meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the
25th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of
Johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given
to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee
got off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North
Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg,
and Big Lick. The force striking .it at Big Lick pushed on to
within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges,
while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New
River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro', on the
North Carolina Railroad ; struck that road and destroyed the
bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between Greens-
boro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along
it, and captured four hundred prisoners. . At Salisbury he attacked
and defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, captur-

63O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.

ing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred
and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army
stores. At this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and
the bridges towards Charlotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make
preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and
the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th
of March. The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith com-
manding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River ; the
13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from
Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both mov-
ing thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th ; while
Major-General Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the
railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction
with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe
bombardment of Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on
the 8th of April. During the night the enemy evacuated the fort
Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prison-
ers captured ; our loss was considerable. These successes practi-
cally opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to approach
Mobile from the north. On the night of the nth the city was
evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the
morning of the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wil-
oon, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men,
was delayed by rains until March 2 2d, when it moved from Chick-
asaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered
the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove
him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three
guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River.
On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma,
defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,
destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops,
vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners.
On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th
he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending information
of his operations to General Canby, marched on Montgomery,
which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having aban-

APPENDIX. 63 1

doned it. At this place many stores and five steamboats fell into
our hands. Thence a force marched direct on Columbus, and
another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and
captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand
five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gun-
boats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much
other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred
prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three
hundred cars. On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia,
with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five
generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. General Wilson,
hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces
in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of
May nth.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to
General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Missis-
sippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy un-
der Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in
motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its
immediate command ; but on the 26th day of May, and before
they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered
his entire command to Major-General Canby. This surrender did
not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel Presi-
dent and Vice-President ; and the bad faith was exhibited of first
disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate
plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against
the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carry-
ing with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States,
which had been surrendered to us by agreement — among them
some of the leaders who had surrendered in person — and the dis-
turbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for
troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and move-
ments to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of
them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed
greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of

632 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.

these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith sub-
mitted ; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing
them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially
reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respect-
fully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in
which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and
the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is
no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible
for men to do in battle they have done. The Western armies
commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and received
the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed
to them in North Carolina. The armies of the East commenced
their battles on the river from which the Army of the Potomac
derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old
antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendid
achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all
sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced
too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that
might have followed had either section failed in its duty. All have
a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves
and each other for having done their full share in restoring the
supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the
United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony
with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause,
drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

THE END

INDEX.

Abercrombis, General, II, 284.
Adams, Colonel, II, 171.
Albertis, Major, death of, I, 126.
Ames, Adelbert, General, II, 393 ; at

capture of Fort Fisher, 397, 398.
Anderson, G T., General, II, 329.
Anderson, R. H., General, at battle

of Wilderness, II, 200; 211 ; 212 ;

213 ; 214 ; 215 ; 216 : at battle of

Spottsylvania, 220, 221 ; 265; 266.
Anderson, Richard, Lieutenant, I,

180 ; 184.
Arkansas Post, capture of, I, 439-440.
Army of Invasion, organization of, I,

99-

Army of Northern Virginia, composi-
tion of. II, 184-187.

Army of Occupation, character of, I,

67.
Army of the Potomac, composition of,

II, 180-183 ; quartermaster's corps

of, 188, 190 ; intrenchments of, 204-

205 ; telegraph system of, 205-207 ;

signal service of, 207-208 ; losses

of, 290.
Atlanta, Ga , Sherman's campaign

against, II, 163-174 ; battle of,

108 ; capture of, 174.
Augur, Lieutenant, I, 75; 77.
Averell, General, II, 131 ; 147 ; 236 ;

287 ; 300 ; 303.
Ayres, General, II, 236 ; 443 ; 444.

Babcock. Colonel, II, 230 ; Gen-
eral, 488.

Badeau. General, applies to War De-
partment for copy of letter from
Grant offering his services to Gov-
ernment, I, 240 ; unearths facts in
relation to Halleck's removal of
Grant from command, 328 ; state-
ments made by, 340, 354, 370, 543,
II, 152, 342.

Bailey, Doctor, I, 32 ; 33.

Bailey, Major, I, 36.

Baird, General, II, 63 ; at battle of
Chattanooga, 77, 82.

Banks, Major-General, I, 491 ; 500 ;
524 ; 544 ; receives surrender of
Port Hudson, 568 ; 574 ; 575 ;
579 ; 58o ; 581 ; II, 18 ; 107 ; no;
120 ; 130 ; 132 ; 134 ; 135 ; his
Red River expedition, 139, 140,
146; 159 J i°2 ; 238 ; 307.

Barlow, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 197 ; at battle of Spottsyl-
vania, 222, 224, 225 ; 230 ; at bat-
tle of Cold Harbor, 270, 271.

Barnard, General, II, 150; 151 ; 152;
400 ; 403.

Barrett, Major, attempts to capture
Grant, I, 268.

Barringer, General, II, 256.

Baxter, Captain, I, 336 ; 337.

Baxter, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 194.

Bazaine, Genera], II, 546.

Beauregard, P. G. T. , Lieutenant, at
battle of Cerro Gordo, I, 131 ; dif-
fers with A. S. Johnston in views,
361 „ 362 ; succeeds Johnston in com-
mand at Shiloh, 362 ; his reports of
losses, 366, 367 ; makes efforts to
obtain reinforcements, 374 ; is rein-
forced, 376 ; orders the evacuation
of Corinth, 380 ; is superseded by
Bragg, 401 ; II, 141 ; 150 ; 227 ;
240 ; 296 ; 297 ; 314 ; 358 ; 416.

Belknap, Colonel, I, 173.

Bell, General, at capture of Fort
Fisher, II, 398 ; is killed, 399.

Belmont, battle of, I, 270-280.

Benham, Brigadier-General, II, 289 ;
is killed, 333.

Benjamin, Lieutenant, I, 74 ; 76 ; 77 ;
78.

634

INDEX.

Benton, Thomas H., Senator, I, 122 ;
172.

Big Black River Bridge, battle of, I,
522-527.

Birney, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 194, 200; at battle of
Spottsylvania, 222, 224 ; 230 ; 234 ;
239 ; at battle of Cold Harbor, 270 ;
283; 299; 321; 333.

Blair, Frank P., leads Free- soil De-
mocracy of St. Louis, I, 212 ; pre-
vents St. Louis from going into
rebel hands, 234 ; raises a regiment
and takes command of it, 235 ; at
occupation of Grand Gulf, 494 ;
503; 506; 509; 510; 512; 515;
at battle of Champion Hill, 517,
520 ; at battle of Big Black River
Bridge, 523, 527 ; at siege of Vicks-
burg, 533, 543, 544 ; General, his
bravery and obedience, 573, 574 ;
II, 46 ; 166 ; 352 ; 353.

Blair, Governor, I, 403.

Bliss, Captain, I, 83 ; Colonel, 206.

Boggs, Harry, I, 211 ; 212.

Bowen, General, I, 482 ; 483 ; at sur-
render of Vicksburg, 556, 557, 558,

559-
Bowers, T. S., Colonel, II, 145 ; 452.

Bragg, General, I, 3S4 ; 396 : 397 ;

401 ; 405 ; 407 ; 535 ; 579 ; H. x9 ;

20; 21 ; 22; 24 ; 39; 51 ; 55 ; 60;
61 ; 75 ; at battle of Chattanooga,
77, 78, 81, 82 ; 84 ; 85 ; his charac-
ter and disposition, 86, 87 ; 90 ; 95 ;
96; 97; 112 ; 368 ; 371 ; 392.

Brannan, J. M., General, II, 66.

Breckinridge, Mr., I, 216 ; General,
II, 250 ; 301.

Breese, Commander, at capture of Fort
Fisher, II, 397.

Brooke, Colonel, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 198.

Brooks, Captain Horace, I, 157.

Brooks, General, at battle of Cold
Harbor, II, 271.

Brough, Governor, II, 18.

Brown, B. Gratz, Colonel, I, 256 ; 257.

Brown, George, Lieutenant-Command-
er, I, 464.

Brown, Governor, II. 345 ; 347 ; 365.

Brown, Jacob, Major. I, 91 ; 99.

Brown, John, character of. I, 20.

Buchanan, James, I. 215 ; President,
helplessness of administration of,
226 ; 309 ; 462.

Buckland, Colonel, I, 333; 334.

Buckner, S. B., 1, 181 ; 184 ; General,
285 ; surenders Fort Donelson, 310,
311, 312, 313, 314 ; II. 61 ; 96.

Buell, Don Carlos, Brigadier-General,
commands Department of the Ohio,
I, 285 ; 318 ; 319 ; 320 ; 321 ; 323 ;

331 ; 332 ; 334 ; 335 ; 336 ; at

battle of Shiloh, 344, 345, 347,
348, 349. 350, 354. 355 ; charac-
ter of, 358, 359 ; 361 ; 366 ; 370 ;

371 ; 372 ; 382 ; 383 ; 394 ; 397 ;

398 ; 401 ; 403 ; 405 ; 414 ; is suc-
ceeded by Rosecrans, 420 ; II, 119 ;
121.

Bull-fighting, I, 175-178.

Bureau, Freedman's, origin of, I, 424-
426.

Burn ham, General, is killed, II, 333.

Buraside, General, I, 384 ; 545 ; II, 27 ;

28 ; 44 ; 46 ; 48 ; 49 ; 50 ; 53 ; 59 ;
60 ; 62 ; 64 ; 73 ; 75 ; 84 ; 89 ; 90 ;

91 ; 92 ; 93 ; 94 ; 95 ; 9* ; 99 ; 1C5 ;

113 ; 119 ; 128 ; 131 ; 136 ; 140 ;

* 145 ; 183 ; 192 ; 193 ; at battle of
Wilderness, 196, 198, 200,201 ; 208;
214 ; 217 , at battle of Spottsylvania,
218, 220, 222, 225 ; 228 ; 229 ;
231 ; 232 ; 235 ; 240 ; 242 ; 244 ;
245 ; at battle of North Anna, 248,
249 ; 250 ; 251 ; 256 ; 258 ; 259 ;
260 ; 263 ; 266 ; 268 ; 269 ; at
battle of Cold Harbor, 271, 272
283 ; 288 ; 289 ; 297 ; 299 ; 307
311 ; 312 ; 313 ; 314 ; 537
his ability, 539.

Butler, B. F., General, II, 127

132 ; 133 ; 135 ; 136 ; 138 ; ^40 ;

147 ; operates on James River, 148,
150, 151, 152; his earnestness, 152 ;
154 J 155 ; I5(i ; 191 *» captures City

538

Point, 208 ; 211

; 226 ; 227 ;

236 ;

238 ; 241 ; 254 ;

265 ; 280 ;

284;

288 ; 292 ; 293 ;

294 ; 296 ;

30S ;

310 ; 341 ; 371 ;

3S8 ; 390 ;

392 ;

393 ; 394 ; 425 ;

426.

Butler, William O.,

General, I,

109 ;

173.

Campbell, Judge, II, 420.
Camp Salubrity. I, 52-53 ; 56-60.
Canby, General, II, 121 ; 159 ; 238 ;

348 ; 350 ; 404 ; 405 ; 408 ; 409 ;

410 ; 411 ; 5:8 ; 519 ; his charac-
ter and ability, 525, 526.

Capron, Colonel. II, 171.

Carlin, General, II. 73.

Carr, General, I, 483 ; 510 ; 512 ; at

INDEX.

635

battle of Champion's Hill, 518, 520 ;

523 ; 524.

Carroll, Colonel, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 194, 200 ; 234 ; 235.

Casey, Captain, at battle of Chapul-
tepec, I, 154.

Cass, General, II, 332.

Caves of Mexico, visit to, I, 184- 1 90.

Cerro Gordo, battle of, I, 132-133.

Chamberlain, J. L., Colonel, II, 297 ;
promoted to brigadier-generalcy on
the field, 298.

Champion's Hill, battle of, I, 516-521.

Chandlfr, Zachariah, elected mayor of
Detroit, I, 193.

Chapultepec, battle of, I, 154.

Charleston, S. C, evacuation of, II,
416.

Chattanooga, Tenn., II, 32.

Chattanooga, battle of, II, 76-82.

Cheatham, General, II, 377 ; 378.

Childs, Lieutenant- Colonel, at battle
of Palo Alto, I, 94.

Church, Professor, I, 51.

Churubusco, battle of, I, 145.

Clarke, General, at capture of San
Antonio, I, 144.

Clay. Mr., Grant's admiration for, I,
212.

Cleburne, General, II, 90 ; 91.

Cold Harbor, battle of, II, 270-272 ;
reflections upon, 276.

Columbia, S. C, burning of, II, 415.

Comstock, Captain, at siege of Vicks-
burg, I. 537 ; II, 103 ; 104 ; Colo-
nel, 211 ; 230 ; 284 ; 286.

Contreras, battle of, I, 143.

Corinth, Miss., occupation of, I, 380 ;
battle of, 416-420.

Corpus Christi, Texas, I, 64.

Corse, General, at battle of Chatta-
nooga, II, 76 ; his efficiency, 77,
355; 356.

Courage, I, 59 ; 92-93 ; 248-250.

Crawford, General, II, 213 ; 239 ;
246 ; at battle of North Anna, 249 ;
at battle of Five Forks, 444.

Crittenden, George, Captain, I, 181.

Crittenden, General, at battle of Shiloh,
I» 348, 350 ; II, 22 ; 119 ; at battle
of North Anna, 249.

Crocker, M. M.. Brigadier-General, I,
421 ; 481 ; 486 ; at battle of Ray-
mond, 497 ; his ability, 497, 498 ; at
capture of Jackson, 504, 506; 510 ;
at battle of Champion's Hill, 516,
5*7» 5i8 ; 573-

Crook, Brigadier-General, II, 131 ;

*35 ; 147 J 191 J 287 ; 300 ; 303 ;

316 ; 464 ; 476.
Cross, Major, I, 90.
Cruft, General, II, 70; at battle of

Lookout Mountain, 71 ; 85.
Cullum, General, I, 317.
Curtis, General, I, 429.
Curtis, N. M., General, II, 393 ; 394 ;

at capture of Fort Fisher, 397, 398 ;

seriously wounded, 399.
Cushing, Brigadier-General, I, 173.
Custer, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 202 ; 259 ; 301 ; 339 ;

428; 481.
Cutler, General, II, 214 ; 233 ; 246.

Dahlgren, Admiral. II, 402.
Dana, C. A., I, 486; 583; II, 19;

26 ; 51 ; 94.
Da vies, General, I, 404 ; II, 466 ;

467.
Davis, Jefferson, I, 223 ; is elected

president of Confederacy, 227 ; 361 ;

II, 39 ; 85 ; his military capacity,

87. 88 ; 344 ; 345 ; 340 ; 347 J 354 ;

355 ; 365 ; 412 ; 430 ; 456 ; 478 ;

497 ; is captured, 522 ; 524.
Davis, Jefferson C, Colonel, I, 260 ;

II, 73 ; 82 ; 83 ; 85 ; 352.
De Loche, Mr., I, 388 ; 389.
Dennis, Colonel, I, 400.
Dent, F. T., I, 46 ; Colonel, II, 285 ;

286.
Dent, Julia, becomes acquainted with

Grant, I, 46 ; is engaged to Grant,

50 ; corresponds with Grant, 51 ;

marries Grant, 193.
Devens, General, at battle of Cold

Harbor, II, 271.
Devin, Colonel, II, 428.
Dix, Major, I, 74 ; 75.
Dodge, G. M., General, II, 46 ; 47 ;

48 ; 169 ; 235 ; his efficiency, 352.
Dole, General, II, 233.
Donaldson, J. L., General, II, ^79.
Donelson, Fort, capture of, I, 294-

315.
Douglas. Stephen A., I, 216 ; Senator,

238 ; II, 122.
Draper, Mr., II, 400.
Dueling, Grant's opinion of, I, 59.
Duncan, Colonel, opposes Scott, I,

172, 173
Dunn, William M. , Captain, I, 567 ;

Lieutenant, II, 371.
Duty, Grant's ideas of, I, 459.

6*6

INDEX.

Early, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 202 ; 215 ; at battle of
Spottsylvania, 218 ; 220 ; 221 ; 239
260 ; 287 ; 304 ; 305 ; 306 ; 315
316 ; 318 ; 321 ; 326 ; 327 ; 329

331 ; 333 ; 336 ; 338 ; 339 ; 340

427 ; 428 ; 429 ; 537.
Eaton, Chaplain, organizes labor of

freedmen, I, 425.
Egan, General, at battle of North

Anna, II, 248.
Ellet, Colonel, I, 464.
Emory, Major-General, II, 306 ; 308 ;

339.
England, attitude of, II, 548-549.

Ewell, Lieutenant, I, 49 ; General, II,
191 ; at battle of Spottsylvania, 220;
239 ; 240 ; 287 ; 477.

Ewing, General, II, 59 ; at battle of
Missionary Ridge, 68.

Farragut. Admiral, runs batteries
at Port Hudson, I, 464.

Ferrero, General, II, 240 ; 288 ; 313.

Five Forks, battle of, II, 444-446.

Floyd, Secretary, scatters army and
sends arms South, I, 226 ; General,
his inefficiency as a soldier, 294,
308 ; his unfaithfulness as a civil
officer, 309 ; escapes from Fort Don-
elson, 310, 313, 314; 324.

Foote, Flag-officer, I, 2S7 ; at capture
of Fort Henry, 283 ; at capture of
Fort Donelson, 298, 301, 302, 303,

304 : 317-

Forrest, General, escapes from Fort
Donelson, I, 310, 313, 314 ; 432 ;
II, 108; 109; no; his bravery,
129 ; 137 ; captures Fort Pillow,
138 ; 306 ; 307 ; his ability, 346 ;
347 ; 354 ; 383 I bis courage and
capacity, 410; 504 ; 521.

Fort Fisher, capture of, II, 396-399.

Fort Henry, capture of, I, 288-2g2.

Fort Pillow, Forrest's capture of, II,
138.

Foster, John G., Lieutenant, I, 132 ;
General, II, 99; 101 ; 113; 370;
373 ; 400 ; 402 ; 408 ; 412 ; 416 ;
450.

Foulk, Philip, I, 23S ; 239.

France, attitude of, II, 546-547.

Franklin, battle of, II, 378.

Fremont, General. I. 264; 268 ; takes
command in field, 269 ; is super-
seded by Halleck, 284; 459; II,
119.

Fuller, General, II, 169.
Fyfle, Colonel, I, 3J0.

Gaines, General, I, 120.

Galena, III., Grant's residence at, I,
210-231.

Gardner, Frank, I, 78 ; General, sur-
renders Port Hudson, 568.

Garland, Lieutenant-Colonel, I, 104 ;
at battle of Monterey, 112; 141;
142 ; 143 ; 144 ; is seriously wound-
ed, 162.

Garrard, General, II, 169.

Garrett, Robert, II, 329.

Geary, General, II, 37 ; at battle of
Wauhatchie, 40, 41 ; 54 ; 70 ; at
battle of Lookout Mountain, 71, 72 ;
84.

Georgetown, O. , Grant's boyhood at,
I, 24-31 ; notable facts in regard to,

35-36.

Getty, General, II, 192 ; 193 ; at bat-
tle of Wilderness, 194 ; 338 ; 339.

Gibbon, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 197, 200 ; at battle of
Spottsylvania. 222 ; 230 ; 234 ; 235 ;
239 ; at battle of Cold Harbor, 270,
271 ; 450; 495.

Gillmore, General, II, 128; 130 5131;

132 ; 135-

Gore, Captain, I, 155.

Gordon, J. B., General, II, 256 ; 423 ;
431 ; 432 ; 434 ; 495.

Grand Gulf, occupation of. I, 490.

Granger, Gordon, General, I. 401 ;
402 ; 403 ; II, 63 ; at battle of
Chattanooga, 82 ; 84 ; 89 ; 90 ; 91 ;
92 ; 93 ; 105 ; 41a

Granger, R. S , General, II, 379,

Grant, Frederick D.. assists in prepar-
ing Memoirs, I. 9; 247; 248 ; is with
Grant in campaign and siege of
Vicksburg. 486, 487 ; II, no; 115.

Grant, Jesse R., lives with Judge Tod,
I, 19, 20 ; his education, 21 ; estab-
lishes himself in business at Raven-
na, O., 21 ; moves to Point Pleasant,
O., 21 ; contributes to newspapers,
22 ; his interest in politics. 22 ;
marries Hannah Simpson, 24 ; his
interest in education of his children,
25 ; cultivates land, 26 ; moves to
Bethel, O., 40 ; 212 ; 215 ; 216.

Grant, Lawson, I, 22.

Grant, Matthew, I, 17.

Grant, Noah, I, 18.

Grant, Noah, Captain, I, 18 ; 19.

INDEX.

&37

Grant, Peter, I, 19 ; 20.

Grant, Samuel, I, 17.

Grant, Solomon, I, 18 ; 19.

Grant, U. S., is injured by a fall, I,
7 ; loses financial resources, 7 ;
writes for Century Magazine ^ 7 ; is
seriously ill, 8 ; his ancestry, 17-19 ;
his birth, at Point Pleasant, O., 24 ;
moves to Georgetown, O. , 24 ; his
early educational opportunities, 24-
25 ; his progress at school, 25 ; his
early tastes and occupations, 26-31 ;
is appointed to West Point, 32 ;
goes to West Point, 37-38 ; is ad-
mitted to West Point, 38 ; is dis-
contented, 38 ; his class rank, 39-
41 ; enjoys his first furlough, 40 ;
has a presentiment of future great-
ness, 40 ; chooses between arms of
service, 42 ; leaves West Point, 42 ;
serves at Jefferson Barracks, 45- 50 ;
becomes acquainted with Julia Dent,
46 ; is engaged to Julia Dent, 50 ;
corresponds with Julia Dent, 51 ;
applies for assistant professorship at
West Point, 51 ; serves at Camp
Salubrity, 52-60 ; goes to Corpus
Christ i with his regiment, 61-64 »
visits Austin, 74-76 ; marches to
the Rio Grande, 84-89 ; is promoted
to second-lieutenancy, 78 ; at bat-
tle of Palo Alto, 93-96 ; commands
a company, 97-98 ; at battle of
Resaca de la Pal ma, 97-9S ; his re-
flections on his destiny, 103 ; acts
as quartermaster and commissary,
105 ; at battle of Monterey, no-
117 ; at siege of Vera Cruz, 127-
128 ; at battle of Cerro Gordo, 132-
133 ; at battle of Contreras, 143 ;
at battle of Churubusco, 145 ; at
battle of Molino del Rey, 1 51-153 ;
at battle of Chapultepec, 154 ; at
San Cosme, 155-159 ; is promoted
to first-lieutenancy, 162 ; visits Po-
pocatepetl, 180-184 \ visits Caves*
of Mexico, 184-190 ; marries Julia
Dent, 193 ; serves at Detroit, 193 ;
goes to Pacific coast with his regi-
ment, 194-199 ; is stationed in Cali-
fornia, 200-202 ; in Oregon Terri-
tory, 202-206 ; is promoted to
captaincy, 206 ; resigns his position
in army and joins his family, 210 ;
builds a house, 211 ; engages in
real estate business in St Louis,
211 ; is candidate for office of

county engineer, 211 ; enters his
father's store at Galena, 111., as
clerk; 212 ; casts his first vote,
215 ; presides at a Union meeting,
230 ; declines a captaincy of volun-
teers, 23 1 ; assists the adjutant-gen-
eral of Illinois, 233-238 ; offers his
services to the Government, 239-
240 ; is appointed colonel of 21st
Illinois regiment, 242 ; moves in
various directions with his regiment,
246-250 ; takes command of a sub-
district, 25 x ; is stationed at Mexi-
co, Mo., 251-253; is appointed
brigadier-general, 254 ; at Ironton,
Mo , 256-257 ; at Jefferson City,
Mo., 258-260; is assigned to com-
mand of District of South-east Mis-
souri, 261 ; seizes Paducah, 264-
266 ; at battle of Belmont, 270-
280 ; narrowly escapes death, 279 ;
captures Fort • Henry, 28S-292 ;
captures Fort Donelson, 294-315 ;
is promoted to major-generalship of
volunteers, 316 ; is relieved of com-
mand, 325-326 ; is restored to com-
mand, 327 ; is injured by fall of a
horse, 333-334 ; at battle of Shiloh,
338-352 ; is struck by a bullet, 353 ;
narrowly escapes being made a pris-
oner, 388-390 ; at battle of Iuka,
410-413 ; at battle of Corinth, 416-
420 ; is put in command of Depart-
ment of the Tennessee, 421 ; begins
campaign against Vicksburg, 422 ;
employs freedmen, 424-426 ; is
criticised by newspapers, 458-459 ;
at attack on Grand Gulf, 474-476 ;
captures Port Gibson, 485 ; occu-
pies Grand Gulf, 490 ; at battle of
Raymond, 497 ; captures Jackson,
Miss., 499-506 ; at tattle of Cham-
pion's Hill, 516-521 ; at battle of
Black River Bridge, 526 ; relieves
McClernand of command, 546 ;
receives surrender of Vicksburg,
532-563 ; is injured by fall of a
horse, 581-582 ; is ordered to Cairo,
583-584 ; is appointed to command
of Military Division of the Missis-
sippi, II, 18 ; at battle of Wau-
hatchie, 40-41 ; at battle of Mis-
sionary Ridge, 68 ; at battle of
Lookout Mountain, 71-73 ; at battle
of Chattanooga, 76-82 ; is thanked
by President Lincoln, 98 ; receives
thanks of Congress, 100 ; antago-

niies Stanton, 103-105 ; is comtnis.
stoned lieutenant-general, 114-]
narrowly escapes capture, 141-I43
at battle of Wilderness, 193-203
at battle of Spottsylvsnia, 317-93;
at battle of North Anna, 348-249
at battle of Cold Harbor, 370 » ...
receives surrender of Lee 488-4 .
Grant, U. &, Mrs.. I, 194 ; 347 ; Ir

°W,'

it battle of Wilderness,
356; aw; 381 ; 335.

Gresham, General, II, 168.

Gtierton, Colonel, I, 488; 489; 11,

410,
Griffin, General, II, 333 ; 336 ; 346 J

443 ; at battle of Five Forks, 444 ;

465 ; 467 ; 473 ; 476 ; 483 ; 49s; 537;
541.

Grose, Colonel, at battle of Lookout

Mountain, II, 7*
Gwin, Commander, I, 347.

Haouxman, Gbmkml, I, 410.

Hains, Lieutenant, I, 468 ; 536 ; 537.

Halleck. H. W., Major-General, su-
persedes Fremont, I, 384 ; 285 ;
387; 396; 317; 334; removes
Grant from command of an expedi-
tion, 325, 336 ; 337 J 338 ; 370 ; as-
sumes command in field, 371 ; 373 ;
377 1 380; occupies Corinth, j;si ;
365 ; is appointed to command of all
the Union armies, 393,393; 394; 396;
403 ; 4<>3;4I7 1430 1437; 430; 43' ;
457 ; supports Grant against news-
paper criticism, 460 ; 49a : 5°o ; 5^3:
524;S3S; S<6: 573:578: his dis].-
tion, 579 ; 583 ; 5B3 ; II, :fi ; 20 ;

aa ; 30 ; 35 : 59; 73; 84; "a; "91

123; r33: '38; 139; M71 "o;
333: 337; 238; 239; ast; 252;
253 ; 260; 379; 383; 384; 396; 317;

320 ; 323 ; 337 ; 337 ; 403 ; 528.

Hamer, Thomas I_, secures Grmi's
appointment to West Point, I, 33,
34 ; his ability, 103.

Hamilton, C. S., Major-General, I,
421 ; 433.

Hampton, Wade, General, II, 301 ;

303 ; 309 ; 414 ; 415 -.417; 434-

Hancock, W. S., General, II, 1S0 :
183 ; 188 ; 193 ; 193 ; at battte of
Wilderness, 194, 195, 196, 197, igB,
199, 300, 301 ; 308; 310; 314 : 215 ;
316 ; 317 ; at battle of Spottsylvania,

3l8, 330. 231, 333, 333, 934; 218;

aag; 230 ; 231 ; 333 ; 333 ; 335 ; 330;

338 ; 339 ; 340 ; 343 ; 343; 344 i 345!

at battle of North Anna, 348, 349 ;

859 ; 35s ; 3$° ; 958 ; 359; 360; a6a;

263 ; 306 ; 368 ; 269 ; at battle of

Cold Harbor, 270, 372 ; 373 ; 383 ;

288 ; 889; 394; 295; 396; 398;

399 ; 31° : 319 ; 331 ; 325 ; 34a ;

343 ! 537 ; bis ability and courage,

539-5*-
Hardee.C

II. 17

417.
Harney, General, I, 138.
Harris, Thomas, Colonel, I, 849;

350; General, II, 536.
Hartranft. General. II. 433.
HartsufT, General, II, 449.
Haslett, Lieutenant. I, 53.
Hatch, Colonel. I. 488 : 489.
Hatch, General, II, 373-
Hawkins, Major, I, 353.
Hayes, K. I)., General, his gallantry

and efficiency, II, 540, 341.
Hays, Alexander. General, at battle of

Wilderness, his gallantry, II, 194.
Haien. General, ft, 36 ; 37 ; captures

Fort McAllister, 370.
Hebert, Colonel, I, 192.
Heck man, General, II, 334.
Herron, General, at siege of Vicks-

bnnj. I, 545. 548.
Heth, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 194 ;45a.
Hill, General, II, 191 ; at battle of

Wilderness, 195, 196, 198, 199 ;

312 ; 315 ; 337 ; 346 ; at battle of

North Anna, 349.
Hillyer, Captain. I, 255 ; 305 ; 459.
Hinks, General, II, 293.
Hoffman, Colonel, at capture of San

Antonio, I, 144.
Hoke, General, II, 341 ; 350 ; 396 ;

392 ; 393-
Holly Springs, Miss., occupation of,

I, 427 ; loss of, 432.

Holmes, Captain, I, 78 ; toa ; Gen-
eral, 565 ; 566.
Hood, General, supersedes Johnston,

II, 167; 16S ; 174; 344; his methods,
345: 34&; 347; 348; 3S<>; 35':
354 ; 355 ; 356 ; 357 : 358 ; 359 :
373 ; 377 ; at battle of Franklin,
378 ; 379 ; 380 ; 382 ; 383 ; at battle
of Nashville, 3S4, 3B5, 386; 403;
405 ; 413 ; 416 ; 417.

INDEX.

639

Hooker, General, II, 35 ; 36 : 37 ;
38 ; at battle of Wauhatchie, 40, 41;

5i; 53; 55*. 56; 57; 58; 66; 69;
70 ; at battle of Lookout Mountain,
72 \ 73 I 75 J at battle of Chattanoo-
ga, 78, 80 ; 83 ; 84 ; 88 ; 90 ; 91 ;
167 ; 537 ; 538 ; his character, 539.

Horses, Grant's experience with, I,
27-30 ; 50 ; 86 ; 333-334 ; 581-582.

Hoskins, Lieutenant, at battle of Mon-
terey, I, in.

Hovey, General, I, 428 ; 483 ; 509 ;
510; 512; 513; 515; at battle of
Champion's Hill, 516, 517, 518, 519,
520.

Howard, B. B., I, 230.

Howard, O. O., General, II, 28 ; 35 ;
37 ; at battle of Wauhatchie, 40 ;
53 ; 54 ; 60 ; 63 ; 69 ; 83 ; 85 ; 352 ;

353 ; 361.

Hudson, Captain, II, 405.

Humphreys. General. II, 233 ; 235 ;
343 ; at battle of White Oak Road,
434; 440; 442; 446; 448; 451; 452;

456 ; 463 ; 466 ; 467 ; 476 ; 477 ;

478 ; 537 ; 541.

Hunt, Henry J., General, II, 181.
Hunter, General, I, 296 ; 316 ; 459 ;

II, 238 ; 251 ; 273 ; 281 ; 282 ; 283 ;
' 287; 300 ; 301 ; 302 ; 303 ; 304 ; 317;

318 ; 319 ; 320 ; 321.
Hunter, R. M. T., II, 420.
Hurlbut, General, I, 332 ; at battle of

Shiloh, 338, 345, 35<>> 366; 386;

at battle of Corinth, 416, 417, 418,

419 ; 441 ; 494 ; 508 ; 535 ; 544 ;

545 ; 582 ; II, 107 ; 108.

Indians, their treatment by Hudson's
Bay Company, their manner of
trading, I, 204 ; their remedy for
disease, 205-206.

Ingalls, Rufus, General, II, 188.

Iuka, battle of, I, 410-413.

Intrigue, political, I, 1 19-122.

Jackson, Claiborn, Governor, I,

225 ; 234.
Jackson, General, attempts to capture

Grant, I, 388, 389, 390.

Jackson, Miss., capture of, I, 499-506.
efferson Barracks, St. Louis, I, 45.
Jenkins, General, at battle of Wilder*

ness, II, 199.
Johnson, Andrew, Governor. II, 27 ;
Vice-President, 508 ; President, 509 ;

his course toward the South, 510,
511, 512 ; 515 ; 516 ; 517 ; 523 ; 534.

Johnson, R. D., General, II, 233.
ohnson, Richard W., General, II, 63;
167.

Johnston, A. S., General, I, 192 ;
309 ; 310 ; 322 ; 323 ; 324 ; 33* i
333 ; 345 ; his ability, 359, 360, 361,
362 ; 363 ; 376.

Johnston, Joseph £., General, I, 192,
500 ; 504; 505 ; 506 ; 507 ; 508 ; 509 ;
511 ; 522 ; 530; 535; 540; 545J 548;
549; 5535 5555 556; 559J 565 , 566 ;
567; 576; 580; II, 20; 112; 119;
120; 129; 131; 134; 146; 159; 160;
162; 163 ; 164 ; 165; 166; is relieved
from command, his tactics, 167 ;
208 ; 237 ; 344 ; his policy, 345 ;
355 ; his ability, is put in command
of troops in North and South Caro-
lina, 412; 416; 418; 419; 430; 437;
458;486; 513; 5M; 5i5» 516; sur-
renders to Sherman, 517; 518; 519;

521; 525.
Johnston, William Preston, Colonel, I,

314; 363.
Jones, W. S., General, II, 283.

Juarez, President, II, 546.

Judah, Lieutenant, at battle of San

Cosme, I, 155.

Kautz, A. V., General, I, 36; II,

226; 293; 310; 333; 341.
Kearney, Philip, Captain. I, 146; 192.
Kearney, Steven, Colonel, I, 45.
Kelley, General, II, 316.
Kelly, Miss, I, 19.
Kilpatrick, General, II. 172.
Kimball, General, I, 544.
King, Major, I, 36.
Kitching, Colonel, II, 239.

Lagow, C.B., Lieutenant, 1, 254; 255.
Lake Providence, I, 448-449.
Lauman, General, I, 494; at siege of

Vicksburg, 534. 545*

Lawler, General, I, 524; at battle of
Black River Bridge, 526.

Ledlie, General, II, 313; 314.

Lee, Fitz-Hugh, General, II, 301.

Lee, Robert E., Captain, I, 131; 192;
General, 579; 580; II,- 100; 123;
129; 131; 132; 135; 136; 137; Mi;
146; 148; 153; 154; 156; 157; 181:
183; 187; 191; at battle of Wilder-
ness, 196, 197, 199. 200, 201, 202,
203; 208; 211; 212; 213; 2x4; 215;

640

INDEX.

217; at battle of Spottsylvania, 2x8,
220, 22T, 222, 225; 226; 227; 231;
232; 233; 234 ; 236; 237; 238; 230;
240 ; 241 ; 242; 244 ; 246; at battle
of North Anna, 249; 250; 251; 252;
253; 255; 256; 258; 259; 260; 262;
265; 269; at battle of Cold Harbor,
272; 273 ; 274; 275; 279; 280; 281;
285; 287; his advantages n a com-
mander, 291, 292; 294; 301; 504;
9o8; 309; 310; 315; 321; 323; 324;
325; 326; 327; 333; 334; 335; 343;
401; 404; 405; 412; 417; 4i8; 419;

424; 425 ; 430; 431 ; 433; 439; 440;
442; 447; 449; 450; 454; 455; 456;
458; 460; 461; 462; 464; 465; 466;

467; 469; 470; 472; 474; 476; 477;

478; 479> 48o ; 481 ; 482; 483 ; 484;
485 ; 486 ; surrenders Army of North-
ern Virginia, .488, 489, 490, 491,

492, 493. 494. 495; 496; 497; 498;

499; 500; 505; 507; 513 ; 514 ; 515;
517; 5*8; 519; 546.

Lee, Stephen D.. General, II, 377.

Leggett, M. D., Colonel, I, 400;
Brigadier-General, 421 ; 549.

Lincoln, Abraham, I, 216; goes to
Washington as President elect, 227,
228 ; takes oath to maintain Union,
229; 254; his hopefulness of
Union cause, 406 ; sends congratula-
tory letter to Grant, 419:430; 446
459; supports Grant against news
paper criticism, 460; 567; 578; II
49; 59 * 73* 89; thanks Grant, 98
99; 115; 121; 122; 123; 133; 141
142; 143; 235; 237; 318; 332; 333
366; 367; 375J 394; 42o; 421; 422
his generosity and kindness, 423

446; 4495 452; 458; 4595 46o; 46i
463; 505; 506; is assassinated, 508
509; 510; 514; 5'5'» 522; reflections
in regard to, 523 ; anecdote about,
532; 533; contrasted with Stanton,

536, 537; 546.

Lincoln, Mrs., II, 508.

Logan, John A., is elected to Congress,
I, 244; his political attitude, 245;
General, his influence in his Congres-
sional district, 246; 379; 472; 481;
484; 485; 489; at occupation of
Grand Gulf, 49°: his ability, 497;
504; 510; at battle of Champion's
Hill, 516, 517, 520 ; at siege of
Vicksburg, 552, 558; 564; 573; II,
112; 116; 16S ; 170; 352; 353; 354;
382 ; 383.

Longstreet, General, at battle of Warn-
hatchie, II, 40 ; 42 ; 43 ; 49 ; 50 ;
51 ; 52; 60 ; 61 ; 85 ; 86 ; his
character, 87 ; 90 ; 92 ; 94 ; 95 ;
9°: 99; 105; 112; 113; 114:191;
at battle of Wilderness, 195, 196,
197, 198 ; is seriously wounded, 199;

211 ; 338 ; 449 ; 495-

Lookout Mountain, battle of, II, 71-
72.

Loomis, General, at battle of Chat-
tanooga, II, 76.

Loomis, Mr., I, 233.

Loring, General, I, 482 ; 520.

London, Colonel, I, 36.

Lovell, Mansfield, I, 181; General,
416.

Lather, Lieutenant, I, 96.

Lyon, N., Captain, I, 234 ; 235,

Mackenzie, Genual, II, 434 ; 465 ;
537 ; his abffity, 541.

Macon, Ga., capture of, II, $21.

Mansfield, Major, I, 109 ; 192.

Markland, A. H., Colonel, II, 371.

Marshall, Colonel, I. 36.

Marshall, Colonel, II, 486.

Marsh, C. C, Colonel, I, 262 ; Brig-
adier-General, 421.

Mason, Rodney, Colonel, surrenders
Clarksville, I, 398, 390.

Matamoras, Mex., skirmish at, I, 9a

Martindale, General, at battle of Cold
Harbor, II, 271.

McArthur, General, I, 404 ; 517 ; at
siege of Vicksburg, 534.

McCall, Captain, I, 79 ; 85 ; at battle
of Resaca de la Palma, 97 ; 192.

McCandless, William, Colonel, II, 235.

McCausland, General, II, 316.

McClellan, George B., Lieutenant, at
battle of Cerro Gordo, I, 132 ; Gen-
eral, 241 ; 285 ; 325 ; orders Grant
relieved from duty, 327 ; 459 ; II,
119.

McClernand, John A., I, 244 ; 246 ;
General, 286 ; at capture of Fort
Henry, 288 ; at capture of Fort
Donelson, 298, 299, 300, 305, 306,
314 ; 332 ; at battle of Shiloh, 338,

343. 345, 350, 357, 366, 367 ; 371 ;
421 ; 426 ; 430 ; 432 ; 437 ; at cap-
ture of Arkansas Post, 439; his
fitness to command, 440 ; 441 ; 442 ;
446 ; 459 ; 465 ; 466 ; 468 ; 470 ;
474 : 476 ; 477 ; 480 ; 481 ; 482 ;
483 ; 484 ; at occupation of Grand

INDEX.

641

508 ; 509; 510; 512; 513 ; 515;

517 ; 519 ; 523 ; 528 ; 529 ; at siege
of Vicksburg, 531, 534, 545. 54°.

McCook, A. McD., General, at battle
of Shiloh, I, 348, 350, 354, 355 \ II.
22 ; 119; 171.

McGroierty. General, I, 36.

McKinzie, Captain, at battle of Cha-
pultepec, I, 154.

McLean, Mr., II, 486 ; 496 ; 498.

McPherson, Colonel, I, 332 ; 335 ;
337 ; at battle of Shiloh, 353 ; Gene-
ral, at battle of Corinth, 416, 417 ;
is promoted to major-gen eralcy, 421 ;
423 ; 428 ; 444 ; 447 ; 449; 469 ; 470 ;
471 ; 474 ; 480 ; 481 ; 483 ; 484;
486 ; 4S9 ; at occupation of Grand
Gulf, 490 ; 493 ; 494 ; 495 ; 496 ;
at battle of Raymond, 497 ; at cap-
ture of Jackson, 499, 500, 501, 503,
504, 505, 506 ; 508 ; 509 ; 510 ; 512 ;
5X3 I 515 ; at battle of Champion's
Hill, 516, 517, 518, 520 ; 523 ; 524 ;
at battle of Black River Bridge,
526 ; 527 ; 528 ; 529 ; 531 ; at
siege of Vicksburg* 533, 534, 546,

557, 558 ; 582 ; 583 ; II, 24 ; 48
107; 116; 158; 159; 162; 163
is killed, his character and ability
169; 353-

Meade, George G., Lieutenant, I, no
General, II, 116; 117 ; 118 ; 134
140 ; 144 ; 145 ; 154 ; 192 ; 193
at battle of Wilderness, 194, 195
208 ; 210 ; 213 ; 216 ; at battle of
Spottsylvania, 220, 223; 228 ; 232
233 : 234 ; 235 ; 242 ; 245 ; 250
254 ; 262 ; 268 ; 270 ; 272 ; 284
286 ; 294 ; 296 ; 299 ; 303 ; 305
307 I 308 ; 310; 3" ; 312 ; 313
315 J 322 ; 334 ; 335 \ 341 ; 343
432 ; 433 ; 434 ; 443 ; 449 ; at cap
ture of Petersburg, 454 ; 455 ; 456
458 ; 464 ; 465 ; 466 ; 467 ; 468
469 ; 478 ; 484 ; 513 ; 532 ; 534
537 ; his character and ability, 538

Merritt, General, II, 213 ; 428 ; 446

451 ; 464 ; 465 ; 495-

Mersy, Colonel, II, 169.

Mexicans, their bravery and patriotism,

I, 168-169 ; their amusments, 175-

179 ; 188.
Mexico under Spanish rule, I, 65-67.
Mexico, City of, capture of, I, 162.
Miles, General, II, 451 ; 452.

Vol. 11. — 41

Missionary Ridge, battle of, II, 68.
Mitchell, General, I, 319.
Mobile. Ala., capture of, II, 519.
Molino del Rey, battle of, I, 1 51-153.
Monterey, Mex. , movement of forces to,

I, 104-107 ; preparation for attack'
ing, 109-110; battle of, I10-117.

Montgomery, Ala., capture of, II, 521.
Montgomery, Colonel, I, 556.
Morales, General, surrenders Vera

Cruz, I, 127.
Morgan, General, II, 351.
Morgan, John H., General, II, 504.
Morrison, William R., Colonel, I, 300.
Morris, Thomas, I, 32 ; 34.
Mosby, John S., Colonel, II, 141 ; his

character and ability, 142.
Mott, General, at battle of Wilderness,

II, 194, 199, 200 ; at battle of Spott-
sylvania, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225 ;
228 ; 229 ; 230 ; 234.

Mower, J. A., Brigadier-General, I,

421; 545.
Mules, branding and breaking, I, 79-

83.
Mulligan, Colonel, I, 258

Murphy, Colonel, I, 406 ; 407 ; 432 ;

433 ; his character, 434.

Napoleon I. II, 547.
Napoleon III, II, 547.
Nashville, battle of, II, 384-386.
Navy under Admiral Porter, efficiency

of, 1, 574-
Negley, General, II, 119.
Nelson, General, I, 296; 318; 319 y

320; 321 ; 335 ; 347 ; at battle of

Shiloh, 350 ; 365.
Newton, General, II, 164 ; 167.
North Anna, battle of, II, 248-249.

O'Fallon, John, Colonel, I, 46.
Oglesby, Richard J., Colonel, I, 264 ;.
270 ; 271 ; 281 ; at battle of Corinth r

419.
Oliver, W. S-, Colonel, I, 472.
Ord, General, I, 404 ; 407 ; 408 ; at

battle of Iuka, 410, 41 1, 4x2, 413 ;

at battle of Corinth, 417, 418; at

capture of Vicksburg, 558 ; 566?

576 ; 581 ; II. 131 ; 135 ; 3" ; 313 ;

333 ; is seriously wounded, 334 ; at
battle of White Oak Road, 434 ; 446 ;.
448 ; 450 ; 466 ; 468 ; 473 ; 474 ; 476 ;

477 ; 478.
Osterhaus, General, 1, 483 ',.484 ; 509 ;
510 ; 512 ; 5x3 ; at battle of Cham-

642

INDEX.

pion's Hill, 518, 520; 523; 524;
546 ; II, 64 ; 70 ; at battle of Look-
out Mountain, 71 ; 84 ; 353.
Owen, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 194.

Paducah, Ky., capture of, I, 264-266.

Page, Captain, at battle of Palo Alto,
I, 96.

Palmer, John M., Colonel, I, 248; Gen-
eral, II, 36 ; 56 ; 63 ; 83 ; 90 ; 92 ;
172.

Palo Alto, battle of, I, 93-96.

Parke, General, I, 545 ; II, 334 ; 433 ;

434 ; 446; 447 ;443 ;44Q ; 450 J 458 ;
464.

Parker, General, II, 491 ; 496.

Parties, secret political, Grant's opin-
ion of, I, 213.

Patterson, General, I, 130.

Payne, Mr., I, 27 ; 28.

Pemberton, Lieutenant, I, 159; Gen-
eral, 420 ; 423 ; 42S ;43i ; 433 ; 434 ;

435 i 437 ; 478 ; 495 ; 496 ; 499 ; 5«> ;
503; 507; 509; 5io; 511; 513; at
battle of Champion's Hill, 516, 520 ;
522 ; 530 ; 545 ; 548 ; 549 ; 553 I 555 ;
556: 557; 558; 559; 56i; surren-
ders Vicksburg, 563 ; 564 ; 565 ; 568 ;

569; 576; 580; 581.

Pendleton, General, II, 495.

Pennybacker, Colonel, at capture of
Fort Fisher, II, 398 ; is seriously
wounded, 399.

Perote, Mex , capture of, I, 135.

Petersburg, Va. , investment of, II, 299;
explosion of mine before, 313; cap-
ture of, 454.

Pleasonton, Alfred, General. II, 134.

Pleasants, Colonel. II, 307.

Pickett, General, II, 244 ; 250 ; 440.

Pierce, Colonel, at battle of North
Anna, II, 248.

Pierce, General Franklin, I, 146 ; 147.

Pillow, General, r.t battle of Cerro
Gordo, I, 133 ; 137 ; at battle of
Chapultepec, 154 ; opposes Scott,
172 ; 173 ; 294 ; 309 ; escapes from
Fort Donelson, 310 ; 313 ; 314 ; 324.

Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., I, 330-338.

Prime, Captain, at siege of Vicksburg,

I, 536.
Point Pleasant, O., Grant's birth at,

I. 24.
Politics before War of Rebellion, I,

212-228 ; Grant's participation in,

■212^217.

Polk, Bishop, General, I, 281 ; II, 108.
Polk President, I, 121 ; 122 ; 172.
Pope, John, General, I, 238 ; 251 ; 371;

372 ; 374 ; 377 ; 378 ; 379 ; 382 ; 405.
Porter, Admiral, I, 429 ; at capture
of Arkansas Post, 439, 440 ; 453 ;
454 ; 461 ; 462 ; runs Vicksburg
batteries, 463, 464 ; attacks Grand

Gulf, 475,476 ; 477 ; 478; 490; 500;

at siege of Vicksburg, 537, 544, 554,
559, 574; II. 27; 37i; 39o; 392;

394 ; 395 ; 396 ; at capture of Fort
Fisher, 397 ; 505.

Porter, Andrew, Captain, I, 181; 185.

Porter, Lieutenant-Colonel, II, 349.

Porter, Theodric, Lieutenant, I, 90.

Porter, William, Captain, I, 290.

Port Gibson, Miss., capture of, I, 485.

Port Hudson, La., surrender of, I, 568.

Potter, General, II, 231; at battle of
North Anna, 249; 297; 313.

Prentiss, B. M., General, supersedes
Grant, I, 257; is disaffected, 262,
263; his bravery and devotion, 264;
332 ; at battle of Shiloh, 338 ; is
captured, 340; 342; 346; 366; 370;
defends Helena, 535 ; 565 ; 566.

Price, Sterling, General, I, 25S; 270;

395 I 397 ; 405 ; captures Iuka, 406,
407 ; 40S ; 410; 416; 434; 580;

II, 350.

Quin'by, General, I, 452 ; 531.
Quitman, General, I, 137 ; 143 ; 155 :
161.

Ralston, Mr., I, 29.

Ransom, General, I, 517 ; his ability,

527: 533 ; 573 ; 5So ; II, 353-
Rawlins, John A., I, 230 ; 255 ; 256 ;

Colonel, 543.
Raymond, battle of, I, 497.
Read, Colonel, II, 474.
Resaca de la Palma, battle of, I, 96-

9S.
Revolution, right of, I, 219.
Reynolds, Lieutenant-Governor, I,

225.
Rice, J. C, General, at battle of

Spottsylvania, killed, II, 223.
Richmond, Va., capture of, II, 461-

462.
Ricketts, General, II, 305.
Riley, General, at capture of San

Antonio, I, 144.
Ringgold, Major, at battle of Palo

Alto, I, 96.

IJVDEX.

^43

Rockwell, Mrs., I, 1 8.

Rosecrans, General, I, 404 ; 406 ; 407;

408 ; at battle of Iuka, 410 ; 411 ;

412 ; 413 ; at battle of Corinth,

416, 417. 418, 419, 420 ; 434 ; 535 ;

582 ; 583; II, 18 ; 19 ; 20; 21 ;

22 ; 24 ; is superseded by Thomas,

26 ; 28 ; 29 : 35 ; 357.
Ross, Colonel, I, 396 ; General, 450 ;

451 ; 452.

Rosser, General, at battle of Wilder-
ness, II, 195 ; 336.
Rousseau, General, II, 169.
Rowley, Captain, I, 337 ; II, 144 ;

145.
Russell, General, II, 256.

Rust. General, at battle of Corinth, I,

416.

Sailor's Creek, battle of, II, 472-

473.
San Antonio, Mex., capture of, I, 144.

San Cosme, battle of, I, 155-159.

Sanders, Captain, I, log.

San Francisco, Cal., early days of, I,

200-202 ; 207-209.
Santa Anna, President, I, 54; 55; 132;

133; J34J 147; 149; evacuates City

of Mexico, 159; 171.
Santo Domingo, II. 550.
Savannah. Ga., siege of, II, 369-374;

capture of, 374.
Schenck, Captain, I, 194.
Schofield, General, I, 58c; II, 112;

113; 114; 158; 159; 162; 166; 172;

357; 377; 378; 379*. 403; 404; 412;
413; 418.
Scott, VVinfield S., General, his personal
appearance, I, 41; his aspirations,
119; political opposition to, 119, 120,
121, 122; assumes command of army
of invasion, 122; 126; 129; 131; 132;
135; contrasted withNTaylor, 138,
139; 143; his tactics, 145; 147; 148;
149; 150; 151; 154; 161; his wisdom
and discretion, 163; 164; his general-
ship, 165, 166, 167; 170; 171; 172;
is relieved of command in field,

173; 174; 179; H. 489-
Sedgwick, John. General, II. 181;

188; 190; 192; at battle of Wilder-
ness. 196, 201, 202; 208; 210; 214;
217; at battle of Spottsylvania, is
killed, 220; 537; his bravery and
conscientiousness, 540.

Slavery, II, 542 543.

Selma, Ala., capture of, II, 521.

Semmes, Lieutenant, at battle of San
Cosme, I, 155.

Seward, Mr., I, 222; is assassinated,
II, 508.

Shendan, P. H., Colonel, I, 396; Gen-
eral, 402; 403; II, 63; at battle of
Chattanooga, 78, 79, 81, 82; 133;
makes first raid against Lee, 153,
154. *55, 156, I57;175;i8i; at bat-
tle of Wilderness, 195, 197, 198,
210; 211; 212; 213; 218; 227; 237;
252; 256; 259; 260; 262; 263; 264;
265; 269; 282; 283; 287; 300; 301;
302; 303; 310; 312; 317; 318; 319;
320; 321; 322; 326; 327; 328; 329;
is congratulated by Grant, 331; 332;

333; 335J 336; 337; 338; his ride to
Winchester, 339; 340; 409; 427; 428;
429; 430; 434; 436; 437; 438; 440;
442; 443; at battle of Five Forks,
444, 445, 446; 450; 451; 452; 456;
458; 464; 465; 466; 467; 468; 469;
473; 478; 480; 481; 484; 486; 488;
546.
Sherman, General, offers assistance
to Grant, I, 315; 331; 332; 333;
334; 3371 338; 339; his ability, is
wounded, 343; at battle of Shiloh,
345. 346, 348, 350, 355. 357, 366,

367, 37o? 379; 385; 39^; 404; 423;
427; 428; 429; 430; 431; attempts
to capture Vicksburg, 437, 438;
captures Arkansas Post, 439, 440;

441; 453: 454; 468; 47i;478; 48i;
486; 492; 493; 494; 495; 496; at
capture of Jackson, 499, 500, 501,
503, 504, 505, 506; 507; 503; 510;
5ii; 512; 515; 522; 523; 527; 528;
529; 531; at siege of Vicksburg, 534,
541, 542, 543, 546, 548, 556; 566;
567; 576; 5771 582; 583; II, 24; 27;
is assigned to command of Army of
the Tennessee, 30; 44; 45; 46; 49;

50; 51; 52; 53; 541 55; 56; 58; 59; 60;
64; 66; 67; at battle of Missionary
Ridge, 68; 69; 72; 73; 74; 75; at
battle of Chattanooga, 76, 77, 78, 80,
82; 83; 85; 88; 90; 92; 93; 94; 96;
99; 105; 106; 107: 108; 109; no;
112; 113; 114; 116; 117; succeeds
Grant in command of Division of the
Mississippi, 118; 119; 120; 121; 125;
129; 130; 134; 137; 139; 140; 147;
I53'» 158; 159; 160; 162; conducts
campaign against Atlanta, 163, 164,
166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174;
captures Atlanta, 174; 175; 191; 208;

644

INDEX.

234; 235; 237; 250; 251; 26 ; 307;
308; 322; 323; 326; 343; his march
to the sea, 344-37&; 4°°; 4<>i; 402;
403; receives resolutions of thanks
from Congress, 405; 406; 408; 409;
410; 411; 4121413; 414; 415; 416;
417; 418; 419; 429; 430; 437; 458;
459; 513; 5*4; 515; 5J6; receives sur-
render of Johnston, his loyalty, 517;
519; 521; 525; 52S; 529, 53o; 534;

535-
Sherman, Mrs., II, 372.
Shields, General, at battle of Churu-

busco, I, 145.
Shiloh, battle of, I, 338-370.
Shirk, Commander, at battle of Shiloh,

I, 347-
Sibley, Captain, I, 1S1; 1S5.

Sigel, General, II, 131; 132; 135; 140;

147; 238; 241; 251; 303.
Simpson, Hannah, ancestry of, I, 22,

23; marries Jesse R. Grant, 24.
Simpson, John, I, 23.
Slaughter, Lieutenant, I, 198; 199.
Slocum, H. W., General, II, 35; 174;

352; 3^1.
Smith, A. J., General, I, 483; 487;
509; 510; 512; at battle of Champion's
Hill, 517, 51S; at siege of Vicksburg,

54s. 557. 553, 559; n. J39; l63;
307; 357; 379; 405.

Smith, C. F., Captain, I, 42; 97; Gen-
eral, 266; 270; 2S5; 2S6; his ability,
2S7; 2SS; 291; 292; 29S; 301; 305;
at capture of Fort Donelson, 306,
30S, 310; 316; 317; 3".S; 320; 321;
Halleck's estimate of, 328; 332; 338.

Smith, Dr., I, 3S8.

Smith, Dr., II, 477; 47S.

Smith. Giles A., General, II, 66; 69.

Smith, Governor, II. 532; 533.

Smith, G. \.., Lieutenant, I, 131;
General, II. 365.

Smith. John E.. Brigadier-General, I,
421; 4S4; II, 67; at battle of Mission-
ary Ridge, 6S; at battle of Chatta-
nooga. 70, 77.

Smith, Kirby. General, II, 323; sur-
renders, 522.

Smith, Morgan L., General. II. 66;
67; at capture of Missionary Ridge,
(>>: at battle of Chattanooga, 76; S3.

Smith, Sidney. Lieutenant, I. 125; 162.

Smith, Si:oy. General, L 545; II, 10S;
no.

Smith, Watson. Lieutenant-Com-
mander, I. 451.

Smith, \V. F., Brigadier-General, II,
29; 3i; 35; 36; 37; at battle of
Wauhatchie, 41; 58; 66; Major-
General, 97; 98; 131; 133; 135;
254; 262; 205; 266; 268; 269; at
battle of Cold Harbor, 271, 272;
273; 283; 285; 288.

South, attitude of, before War, I, 219-
228; advantages of, at beginning of
War, 282-283; boldness of. during
War, 444; benefit of War to, II, 39-
40; bravery and gallantry of, 426.

Spottsylvania, battle of , II, 217-225.

Stager, General, II, 103; 104.

Stanley, General, II, 112; 357; at
battle of Franklin, 378 ; 4x4.

Stannard, General, II, 333 ; 334.

Stanton, Secretary, II, 18; 19; 26;
59 ; 98 ; 103 ; 104 ; his disposition,
105 ; 121 ; 122 ; 123 ; 141 ; 234 ;

237; 317; 327; 342; 399; 400;
403 ; 420 ; 495 ; 506 ; 515 ; 516 ;

5J7 I 534 ; contrasted with Lincoln,
536, 537 ; 54b.
States, European, conduct of, II, 544-

549-
Steedman, General, II, 379.

Steele, General, I. 471; 512; 566;

576 ; 577 ; II, 130 ; 134 ; 139 ; Js8 ;
323.

Stephens, Alexander H., II, 420 : 422 ;

423.
Stevens, Colonel, II, 333.

Stevens, Isaac I., Lieutenant. I, 131.
Stevenson, Carter L., General, II, 70.
Stevenson, J. D., Brigadier-General. I,

421 ; 506.
Stevenson. T- G . General, at battle of

Spottsylvania. is killed. II, 222.
Stewart. General, II, 377.
Stone. C. P., Lieutenant. I, 181 ; 184.
Stoneman, General, II. 170; 171;

172 ; 409 ; 413 ; 51S ; 519
Stuart, General, at battle of Shiloh, I.

33$ ; 453-
Stuart, J. E B. . General, II, 154 ; 155;

at battle of Wilderness, 19S.
Sturgi*. General, II, 306.
Sullivan, J. C, Brigadier-General, I.

470; 49:.
Swinton, Mr., II, 143; 144; 145.

Taylor, Colonel, II, 468.

Taylor, Riehard, General, I, 544; 554 ;

surrenders, II, 521.
Tavlor, Zacharv. General, commands

army of occupation, L 67 ; 71 ; pre-

INDEX.

645

vents plundering. 85 ; 92 ; 93 ; 94 ;
95 » 97 J 99 » n*s bravery and mod-
esty, 100 ; 101 ; 102 ; 107 ; no ; 120 ;
121 ; 122 ; 123 ; 134 ; contrasted
with Scott, 138, 139 ; 164 ; his gen-
eralship, 167; 168; is elected Presi-
dent, 174.

Territt, Lieutenant, at battle of Monte-
rey, I, 116.

Terry, Alfred H., General. II. 388;
395 ; at capture of Fort Fisher, 396,
397. 398 ; promoted to brigadier-
generalcy in regular army, 399 ; 404 ;
413 ; 417 ; 418 ; 537 ; his character,

540, 541.

Texas, condition of. before Mexican
War, I, 54 ; occupation of, by
United States troops, 67 ; transpor-
tation in, 69 ; game in, 75-76 ; wild
horses in, 87.

Thayer, Colonel, at capture of Fort
Donelson. I, 298 ; 299 ; 301 ; 302 ;
306; 307.

Thomas, George H., Major-General, I,
286 ; 323 ; 366 ; 371 ; 379 ; 414 ; II,
19; 22; supersedes Rosecrans, 26;
27 ; 28 ; 31 ; 35 ; 50 ; 51 ; 52 ; 53 ;
55 ; 56 ; 58 ; 59 I °3 ; 66 ; 69 ; at
battle of Lookout Mountain, 72 ; 75 ;
at battle of Chattanooga, 77, 7$, 79,
80, 81, S2 ; 84 ; 89 ; 90 ; 91 ; 92 ;
99; 112; 113; 114; 158; 159;
162 ; 163 ; 343 ; 351 ; 357 ; 358 ;
359 ; 372 ; 377 ; 378 ; 379 ; 380 ;

382 ; 383 ; 384 ; 403 ; 404 ; 405 ;

410 ; 411 ; 412 ; 413 ; 414 ; 5*8 ; his

ability, 524, 525.
Thompson, Jacob. I, 462.
Thompson, Jeff., Colonel, I, 261 ; 263 ;

264.
Thornton, Captain. I. 89.
Tidball, General, II, 433.
Tilghman, Lloyd, General, I, 267 ; is

captured, 292.
Tod, Governor, I, 19.
Tod, Judge, I, 19; 20.
Tod, Mrs., I, 20.
Torbert, A. T. A., Brigadier-General,

II, 182 ; 256.
Tower, Z. B., Lieutenant, I, 131 ;

181 ; General, II. 379.
Townsend, General. I, 240.
Towson, Brevet Brigadier-General, I,

173-
Trist. Nicholas P., negotiates treaty

with Mexico, I, 147 ; 148 ; 171; 172.
Tuscaloosa, Ala., capture of, II, 521.

Tattle, General, I, 505.

Twiggs, Colonel, I, 100 ; 109 ; Gen-
eral, 130 ; 137 ; 138.

Tyler. Mr?., II. 250.

Tyler, President, approves bill for an-
nexation of Texas. I. 58.

Tyler, Robert O. , Brigadier-General,
II, 239.

Upton, Emory, Colonel, at battle
of Spottsylvania, II, 223, 224 ; is
promoted to brigadier-generalcy and
seriously wounded, 225 ; 234 ; 235 ;
236.

Van Buren, Martin, President, I,

41.
Van Dom, General, I, 376 ; 395 ; 405 ;

408; at battle of Iuka, 410, 411;

415 ; at battle of Corinth, 416. 417,

418, 419 ; captures Holly Springs,

432 ; 433 ; 435 ; 438.

Van Duzer, II, 385.

Vera Cruz, seige of, I, 127-128.

Vicksburg, Miss., movements against,

I, 422-531 ; siege of, 532-562 ; sur-
render of, 563.

Villepigue, General, at battle of Cor-
inth, I, 416.
Vose, Colonel, I, 6a

Wadsworth, General, at battle of
Wilderness, II, 194, 196 ; 197 ;
is mortally wounded and captured,
199 ; 213.

Walke, Captain, I, 293 ; 300 ; 301.

Wallace, Lew., General, at capture of
Fort Donelson, I, 298, 299, 301,
305, 306, 312 ; 332 ; 334 ; 336 ; 337 ;
at battle of Shiloh, 346, 347, 348,

350, 35i. 352, 3°6; 371 ; II, 304;

305 ; 306.
Wallace, W. H. L., Colonel, I, 270 ;

Brigadier-General, 332 ; 335 ; his

ability, 339; 346 ; 351.
Wallace, W. H. L., Mrs., I, 351.
Wallen, Lieutenant, I, 96.
Ward, General, at battle of Wilderness,

II, 200.

War, Mexican, injustice of, I, 53-56 ;
assemblage of troops for, 67 ; acts
of troops to provoke, 68 ; forces at
beginning of, 84 ; first movement of
troops in, 84-89 ; skirmish at Mata-
moras, 90 ; battle of Palo Alto, 93-
96 ; armaments of contending forces,
95 ; battle of Resaca de la Palma,

646

INDEX,

96-98 ; movement of forces to Mon-
terey, 104-107 ; preparation for at-
tacking Monterey, 1 09-1 10; battle
of Monterey, 1 10-117 ; movement
of army to Vera Cruz, 1 21-126 ;
siege of Vera Cruz, 127-128 ; battle
of Cerro Gordo, 132-133 ; capture
of Perote, 135 ; raising of additional
troops, 137 ; battle of Contreras,
143 ; capture of San Antonio, 144 ;
battle of Churubusco, 145 ; negotia-
tions for peace, 147 ; battle of
Molino del Rey, 151-153 ; battle of
Chapultepec, 154; battle of San
Cosme, 155-159 ; capture of City of
Mexico, 162 ; treaty of peace signed,
172 ; treaty of peace ratified, 192.
War of Rebellion, Reflections on, I,
170 ; secession of States, 229 ; loss
of Fort Sumter, 229 ; first call for
troops, 229 ; second call for troops,
242 ; battle of Belmont, 270-280 ;
capture of Fort Henry, 288-292 ;
capture of Fort Donelson, 294-315 ;
battle of Shiloh, 338-370 ; occupa-
tion of Corinth, 380 ; discouraging
indications, 406 ; battle of Iuka,
410-413 ; battle of Corinth, 416-
420 ; loss of Holly Springs, 432 ;
capture of Arkansa: Post. 439-440 ;
capture of Port Gibson, 4S5 ; occu-
pation of Grand Gulf, 490 ; battle
of Raymond. 497 ; capture of Jack-
son, 499-506 ; battle of Champion's
Hill, 516-521 ; battle of Black River
Bridge, 526 ; capture of Vicksburg,
532-503 '- battle of Gettysburg, 567 ;
capture of Port Hudson, 56S ; battle
of Wauhatchie, II, 40-41 ; battle of
Missionary Ridge. 68 ; battle of
Lookout Mountain, 71-73 ; battle of
Chattanooga, 76-82 ; loss of Fort
Pillow, 138 ; battle of Atlanta, 168 ;
occupation of Atlanta, 174 ; battle
of Wilderness, 193-203 ; battle of
Spottsylvania, 217-225 ; battle of
North Anna, 248-249 ; battle of
Cold Harbor, 270-272 ; Sherman's
march to the sea, 344-376 ; capture
of Savannah, 374 ; battle of Franklin,
378 ; battle of Nashville, 384-386 ;
capture of Fort Fisher, 396-399 ; at-
tempt to negotiate peace, 420-423 ;
battle of White Oak Road, 434-435 ;
battle of Five Forks, 444-446 ; cap-
ture of Richmond. 461-462 ; battle
of Sailor's Creek, 472-473 ; surren-

der of Lee, 488-495 ; surrender of
Johnston, 517 ; capture of Mobile,
519 ; capture of Selma, Tuscaloosa,
Montgomery, West Point, and
Macon, 521 ; surrender of Taylor,

521 ; surrender of E. Kirby Smith,

522 ; capture of Jefferscn Davis,
C22 ; review of Sherman's and
Meade's armies, 534-535 ; cause of,
542-543 ; reflections on, 544-554-

Warren, G. K., Geneial. II, 180:181;
188; 191; 192; at battle of Wilder-
ness, 193, J 96, 201, 203; 208; 210;
2ii;2i3; his methods, 214, 215; 216;
217; at battle of Spottsylvania, 220,
222, 223, 224; 228; 229; 230; 231;
232; 233; 235; 236; 230; 240; 244;
245; 246; at battle of North Anna,
248, 249; 254; 256; 258; 259; 260;
262; 265; 266; 26S; 269; at battle
of Cold Harbor, 271, 272; 283; 288;
289; 299; 312; 313; 323; 324; 334;
335; at battle of Wrhite Oak Road,
434; 440; 442; 443; is relieved of
command, 444; his defects, 445.

Washburn, C. C., General, I, 428;

545-
Washburn, Colonel, II, 473; 474.

Washburne, E. B., I, 230; 231; 238;

II, 143; 144; 426.
Watts, Major, I, 572.
Wauhatchie, battle of, II, 4C--IJ.
Wayne, Hairv. General, II. 36*;; 36S.
Webster. J. D. , Colonel, at capture of

Fort Donelson, I, 307, 30S; at battle

of Shiloh, 345. 347-
Weitzel. General. II. 334: 3$S; 393;

434; 447; 449; captures Richmond.

461. 462; 505.
West Point, Ala., capture of. II, 521.
West Point, N. Y., Grant's stay at, I.

38-44.
Wheeler, General, II, 49'. i~2; 347".

368; 411.
White. Chilton, I, 29, Colonel, 36.
White. John IX, I, 29; 31.
Whiting*. General, II. 392-
White Oak Road, battle of, II, 434-

435-
Wilcox, Cadmus M., General, II. 452

Wilderness, battle of, 11,193-203; com-
ments on, 204.

Willcox, Orlando B., General. II, 59;
61; 75; S4; at battle of Spottsylvania,

217: 313: 433-
Williams, A. S., General, II, 352.

Williams, Captain, I, 116.

INDEX.

647

Williams, Thomas, General, I, 446.

Wilmington, N. C.*, capture of, II,
416.

Wilson, J. H., Lieutenant-Colonel, I,
449; 45o; 485; II, 94; General, 156;
181; 188; 192; at battle of Wilder-
ness, 194, 195; 213; 255; 256; 263;
268; 289; 303; 358; 3771 518; 521;
522; 524.

Wolves, I, 77-78.

Wood. T. J.. General, I, 366; II, 63;
at battle of Chattanooga, 78, 79, 81,
82,

Worth, William J., General, I, 100;
101; 109; at battle of Monterey, 113;
his temperament, 123, 124; 130; 135;
136; 137; 141. 143; : 49; his relations
with Scott, 151; at battle of Molino
del Rey, 152; at battle of San

Cosme. 155, 157, 158, 159; 161; op-
poses Scott, 172; 173.
Wright, H. G., General, II, 192; at
battle of Spottsylvania, 220, 222,
223, 224, 225; 228; 229; 230; 231;
232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 238; 242;
244; 245; 246; at battle of North
Anna, 248; 254; 255; 256; 258; 259;
260; 262; 263; 264; 265; 266; 268;
269; at battle of Cold Harbor, 271,
272; 273; 283; 288; 289; 299; 305;
306; 308; 315; 316; 335; 338; 340;
440; 442; 446; 447; 448; 449; 463;
466; 473; 476; 477; 537.

Yates, Richard, Governor, I, 232;

233; 242.
Yazoo Pass, operations at, I, 450-455.
Young, P. M. B., General, II, 263.

ERRATA, VOLUME 1.

P*gfe &7. tin* 2^( page 89, line 9, read Little Colorado for Colorado.

ne 25,

ne 2,
ne 2d,

Page 93, 1
Page 108, 1
Page 173, 1
Page 17S, I
Page 1S8, line 15,
Page 258, line 5,
Page 293, line 10,
Page 299, line 4,
Page 494. line 27,

ne 5, read May

1S46

paymaster

Tlacos

Tlaco

Sterling

Phelps

Cumberland

9th

for March.

" 1847.

14 surgeon.

" Clackos.

" Clacko.

" Stirling.

" Walke.

' ' Tennessee.

" 8th.

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1 !-..

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