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PERSONAL MEMOIRS
U. S. GRANT.
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PERSONAL MEMOIRS
U. S. GRANT.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
NEW YORK:
CHARLES L. WEBSTER & COMPANY.
CopYitiGirr, 1885,
By ULYSSES S. GRANT.
(AU right* rtserved.)
Press of J. J. Liulc & Co.,
Nos. lb to 90 Astor Place, New York.
/^Cxc^oPl^ ^ ^ ^^^^^'
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PREFACE.
'* Ali AN proposes and God disposes." There are
i Y 1 but few important events in the affairs of men
brought about by their own choice.
Although frequently urged by friends to write my
memoirs I had determined never to do so, nor to
write anything for publication. At the age of nearly
sixty-two I received an injury from a fall, which con-
fined me closely to the house while it did not ap-
parently affect my general health. This made study
a pleasant pastime. Shortly after, the rascality of a
business partner developed itself by the announce-
ment of a failure. This was followed soon after by
universal depression of all securities, which seemed
to threaten the extinction of a good part of the in-
come still retained, and for which I am indebted to
the kindly act of friends. At this juncture the editor
of the Century Magazine asked me to write a few
articles for him. I consented for the money it gave
me; for at that moment I was living upon borrowed
money. The work I found congenial, and I deter-
8 PREFACE.
mined to continue it The event is an important
one for me, for good or evil ; I hope for the former.
In preparing these volumes for the public, I have
entered upon the task with the sincere desire to
avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the
National or Confederate side, other than the un-
avoidable injustice of not making mention often
where special mention is due. There must be many
errors of omission in this work, because the subject
is too large to be treated of in two volumes in such
way as to do justice to all the officers and men en-
gaged. There were thousands of instances, during
the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and
brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special men-
tion and are not here alluded to. The troops en-
gaged in them will have to look to the detailed
reports of their individual commanders for the full
history of those deeds.
The first volume, as well as a portion of the
second, was written before I had reason to suppose
I was in a critical condition of health. Later I was
reduced almost to the point of death, and it became
impossible for me to attend to anything for weeks.
I have, however, somewhat regained my strength,
and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as
a person should devote to such work. I would have
more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public
if I could have allowed myself more time. I have
used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son,
F. D. Grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify fn»i
the records every statement of fact given. The com-
ments are my own, and show how I saw the matters
treated of whether others saw them in the same li|^t
ornot.
With these remarks I present these volumes to
the public, asking no favor but hoping they will meet
the approval of the reader.
U. S. GRANT.
MOOMT HacGuook, Niw Yoke, Jttfy i, 1885.
CONTENTS.
VOLUME I.
Preface • 7
CHAPTER I.
Ancestry— Birth— Boyhood *. 17-31
CHAPTER II.
West Point— Graduation 52-^44
CHAPTER ni.
Army Life— Causes of the Mexican War— Camp Salu-
brity 45-60
CHAPTER IV.
Corpus Christi— Mexican Smuggling — Spanish Rule in
Mexico— Supplying Transportation 61-73
CHAPTER V.
Trip to Austin — Promotion to full Second-Lieuten-
ant—Army OF Occupation 74-33
CHAPTER VI.
Advance of the Army— Crossing the Colorado— The
Rio Grande 84-91
CHAPTER VII.
The Mexican War— The Battle of Palo Alto— The
Battle of Resaca de la Palma — Army of Invasion
—General Taylor— Movement on Camargo 92-106
CHAPTER VIII.
Advance on Monterey— The Black Fort— The Battle
of Monterey— Surrender of the City 107-1 18
12 CONTENTS OF VOLUME /.
CHAPTER IX.
rxci
Political Intrigue— Buena Vista— Movement against
Vera Cruz— Siege and Capture of Vera Cruz 1 19-128
CHAPTER X.
March to Jalapa— Battle of Cerro Gordo — Perote—
PUEBLA — Scott and Taylor 129-139
CHAPTER XL
Advance on the City of Mexico— Battle of Contreras
—Assault at Churubusco— Negotiations for Peace
—Battle of Moling del Rey— Storming of Chapul-
tepec— San Cosme— Evacuation of the City— Halls
OF the Montezumas 140-161
CHAPTER XII.
Promotion to First Lieutenant — Capture of the City
OF Mexico— The Army — Mexican Soldiers— Peace
Negotiations 162-174
CHAPTER XIIL
Treaty of Peace— Mexican Bull Fights— Regimental
Quartermaster— Trip to Popocatapetl— Trip to
THE Caves of Mexico 175-190
CHAPTER XIV.
Return of the Army — Marriage— Ordered to the Pa-
cific Coast— Crossing the Isthmus — Arrival at San
Francisco 191-199
CHAPTER XV.
San Francisco— Early California Experiences — Life on
THE Pacific Coast— Promoted Captain— Flush Times
IN California 200-209
CHAPTER XVL
Resignation— Private Life— Life at Galena— The Com-
ing Crisis 310-228
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. 1 3
CHAPTER XVII.
Outbreak of the Rebeluon-^Presiding at a Union
Meetinc— Mustering Ofhcer of State Troops—
Lyon at Camp Jackson— Services tendered to the
Government 229-241
CHAPTER XVIII.
Appointed Colonel of the 2ist Illinois— Personnel of
THE Regiment— General Logan— March to Mis-
souri—Movement against Harris at Florida,
Mo.— General Pope in Command— Stationed at
Mexico, Mo 242-253
CHAPTER XIX.
Commissioned Brigadier-General— Command at Iron-
ton, Mo.— Jefferson City— Cape Girardeau— Gen-
eral Prentiss— Seizure of Paducah— Headquar-
ters AT Cairo 254-268
CHAPTER XX.
General Fremont in Command — Movement against Bel-
mont — Battle of Belmont— A narrow Escape-
After the Battle 269-281
CHAPTER XXI.
General Halleck in Command— Commanding the Dis-
trict of Cairo — Movement on Fort Henry —
Capture of Fort Henry 282-293
CHAPTER XXII.
Investment of Fort Donelson— The naval Operations
—Attack of the Enemy — Assaulting the Works
— Surrender of the Fort 294-315
CHAPTER XXIII.
Promoted Major-General of Volunteers — Unoccupied
Territory — Advance upon Nashville— Situation
OF THE Troops— Confederate Retreat— Relieved
OF THE Command— Restored to the Command-
General Smith 316-329
14 CONTENTS OF VOLUME L
CHAPTER XXIV.
PACI
The Army at Pittsburg Landing— Injured by a Fall
— ^The Confederate Attack at Shiloh — The First
Day's Fight at Shiloh— General Sherman— Condi-
tion OF the Army — Close of the First Day's
Fight— The Second Day's Fight— Retreat and
Defeat of the Confederates 330-352
CHAPTER XXV.
Struck by a Bullet — Precipitate Retreat of the Con-
federates — Intrenchments at Shiloh — General
BuELL — General Johnston — Remarks on Shiloh 353-370
CHAPTER XXVI.
Halleck Assumes Command in the Field — The Ad-
vance UPON Corinth— Occupation of Corinth —
The Army Separated 371-384
CHAPTER XXVII.
Headquarters Moved to Memphis — On the Road to
Memphis — Escaping Jackson — Complaints and Re-
quests — Halleck Appointed Commander-in-Chief —
Return to Corinth— Movements of Bragg— Sur-
render of Clarksville— The Advance upon
Chattanooga— Sheridan Colonel of a Michigan
Regiment 385-403
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Advance of Van Dorn and Price — Price Enters Iuka
— Baitle of Iuka 404-413
CHAPTER XXIX.
Van Dorn's Movements— Battle of Corinth— Command
OF the Department of the Tennessee 414-421
CHAPTER XXX.
The Campaign against Vicksburg — Employing the
Freedmen— Occupation of Holly Springs — Sherman
Ordered to Memphis — Sherman's Movements down
the Mississippi — Van Dorn Captures Holly Springs
— Collecting Forage and Food 422-436
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. 1 5
CHAPTER XXXI.
Headquarters Moved to Holly Springs— General Mc-
Clernand in Command— Assuming Command at
Young's Point — Operations above Vicksburg —
Fortifications about Vicksburg—The Canai^— Lake
Providence— Operations at Yazoo Pass 437--455
CHAPTER XXXII.
The Bayous West of the Mississippi— Criticisms of the
Northern Press— Running the Batteries— Loss of
THE INDIANOLA— Disposition of the Troops 456-472
CHAPTER XXXIII.
Attack on Grand Gulf— Operations below Vicksburg. 473-484
CHAPTER XXXIV.
Capture of Port Gibson— Grierson's Raid — Occupation
OF Grand Gulf— Movement up the Big Black-
Battle OF Raymond 485-498
CHAPTER XXXV.
Movement against Jackson— Fall of Jackson— Inter-
cepting the Enemy— Baitle of Champion's Hill... 499-521
CHAPTER XXXVI.
Battle of Black River Bridge— Crossing the Big
Black — Investment of Vicksburg— Assaulting the
Works 522-531
CHAPTER XXXVIL
Siege of Vicksburg 532-547
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
Johnston's Movements — Fortifications at Haines*
Bluff — Explosion of the Mine— Expulsion of the
Second Mine— Preparing for the Assault — The
Flag of Truce— Meeting with Pemberton —
Negotiations for Surrender— Accepting the Terms
-Surrender of Vicksburg 548-570
CHAPTER XXXIX.
Retrospect of the Campaign — Sherman's Movements-
Proposed Movement upon Mobile— A painful Ac-
cident—Ordered to Report at Cairo 571-584
MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.
VOLU M E I
PAGB
Brevet Second Lieutenant U. S. Grant at the Age of 21
Years, from an old Daguerreotype taken at Bethel,
Clermont County, Ohio, in 1843. Engraved on Steel
BY A. H. Ritchie, N.A Frontispiece
Fac-simile of Handwriting Dedication
Birthplace at Point Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio.
Etched by Wm. E. Marshall •. 24
Map of Monterey and its Approaches 114
Map of the Valley of Mexico 160
Map of the Battle-field near Belmont 275
Map showing the relative Positions of Fort Henry Ai»n)
Fort Donelson 289
Map of Fort Donelson 297
Fac-simile of General Buckner's Dispatch relating to
Terms of Capitulation, General Grant's reply, " I pro-
pose TO move immediately upon your Works," and Gen-
eral Buckner's answer accepting the Terms for the
Surrender of Fort Donelson, all from the Original
Documents 312
Map of the Field of Shiloh 341
Map of the Country about Corinth, Mississippi 375
Map of the Battles of Iuka and Corinth 409
Map of the Vicksburg Campaign 467
Map— Bruinsburg, Port Gibson and Grand Gulf 479
Map of the Country about Jackson, Mississippi 502
Map of the Battle of Champion's Hill 514
Map of Battle-field of Big Black River Bridge ► 525
Map of the Siege of Vicksburg 539
Map— Line of Defences Vicksburg to Haines* Bluff and
Black River Bridge 550
Note. — The Daguerreotype from which the frontispiece was engraved was
famished the publishers through the courtesy of Mr. George W. Childs.
The fac-similes of General Buckner's dispatches at Fort Donelson are copied
from the originals furnished the publishers through the courtesy of Mr.
Ferdinand J. Dreer. General Grant's dispatch, ** I propose to move imme-
diately upon your works," was copied from the original document in the pos-
session of the publishers.
PERSONAL MEMOIRS
OF
U. S. GRANT
CHAPTER I.
ANCESTRY — BIRTH — BOYHOOD.
MY family is American, and has been for gen-
erations, in all its branches, direct and col-
lateral.
Mathew Grant, the founder of the branch in
America, of which I am a descendant, reached Dor-
chester, Massachusetts, in May, 1630. In 1635 he
moved to what is now Windsor, Connecticut, and
was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty
years. He was also, for many years of the time,
town clerk. He was a married man when he arrived
at Dorchester, but his children were all born in this
country. His eldest son, Samuel, took lands on the
east side of the Connecticut River, opposite Windsor,
which have been held and occupied by descendants
of his to this day.
Vol. I.— a
1 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
I am of the eighth generation from Mathew Grant,
and seventh from Samuel. Mathew Grant's first wife
died a few years after their settlement in Windsor,
and he soon after married the widow Rockwell, who,
with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers
with him and his first wife, on the ship Mary and
John, from Dorchester, England, in 1630. Mrs.
Rockwell had several children by her first marriage,
and others by her second. By intermarriage, two or
three generations later, I am descended from both
the wives of Mathew Grant.
In the fifth descending generation my great grand-
father, Noah Grant, and his younger brother, Solo-
mon, held commissions in the English army, in 1756,
in the war against the French and Indians. Both
were killed that year.
My grandfather, also named Noah, was then but
nine years old. At the breaking out of the war of
the Revolution, after the battles of Concord and Lex-
ington, he went with a Connecticut company to join
the Continental army, and was present at the battle
of Bunker Hill. He served until the fall of York-
town, or through the entire Revolutionary war. He
must, however, have been on furlough part of the
time — as I believe most of the soldiers of that period
were — for he married in Connecticut during the war,
had two children, and was a widower at the close.
Soon after this he emigrated to Westmoreland
AJfCSSTSY. 19
County. Pennsylvania, and settled near the town of
Greensburg in that county. He took with him the
younger of bis two children, Peter Grant The
elder, Solomon, remained with his relatives in Con-
necticut until old enough to do for himself, when he
emigrated to the British West Indies,
Not loi^r after his settlement in Pennsylvania, my
grandfather, Captain Noah Grant, married a Miss
Kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this time to
Ohio, and settled where the town of DeeHield now
stands. He had now five children, including Peter,
a son by his first marriage. My father, Jesse R.
Giant, was the second child— oldest son, by the
second marriage.
Peter Grant went early to Maysville, Kentucky,
where he was very prosperous, married, had a family
of nine children, and was drowned at the mouth of
the Kanawha River, Virginia, in 1825, being at the
time one of the wealthy men of the West.
My grandmother Grant died in 1805, leaving
seven children. This broke up the family. Cap-
tain Noah Grant was not thrifty in the way of "lay-
ing up stores on earth," and, after the death of his
second wife, he went, with the two youngest children.
to live with his son Peter, in Maysville. The rest
of the family found homes in the neighborhood of
Deerfield, my father in the family of Judge Tod, the
father of the late Governor Tod, of Ohio. His in-
20 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
dustry and independence of character were such, that
I imagine his labor compensated fully for the ex-
pense of his maintenance.
There must have been a cordiality in his welcome
into the Tod family, for to the day of his death he
looked upon Judge Tod and his wife, with all the
reverence he could have felt if they had been par-
ents instead of benefactors. I have often heard him
speak of Mrs. Tod as the most admirable woman
he had ever known. He remained with the Tod
family only a few years, until old enough to learn a
trade. He went first, I believe, with his half-
brother, Peter Grant, who, though not a tanner him-
self, owned a tannery in Maysville, Kentucky. Here
he learned his trade, and in a few years returned to
Deerfield and worked for, and lived in the family
of a Mr. Brown, the father of John Brown — ** whose
body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul
goes marching on." I have often heard my father
speak of John Brown, particularly since the events at
Harper's Ferry. Brown was a boy when they lived
in the same house, but he knew him afterwards, and
regarded him as a man of great purity of character,
of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic
and extremist in whatever he advocated. It was
certainly the act of an insane man to attempt the
invasion of the South, and the overthrow of slavery,
with less than twenty men.
ANCESTR Y. 2 I
My father set up for himself in business, estab-
lishing a tannery at Ravenna, the county seat of
Portage County. In a few years he removed from
Ravenna, and set up the same business at Point
Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio.
During the minority of my father, the West af-
forded but poor facilities for the most opulent of the
youth to acquire an education, and the majority were
dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exer-
tions for whatever learning they obtained. I have
often heard him say that his time at school was lim-
ited to six months, when he was very young, too
young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the
advantages of an education, and to a ** quarter's
schooling" afterwards, probably while living with
Judge Tod. But his thirst for education was in-
tense. He learned rapidly, and was a constant
reader up to the day of his death — in his eightieth
year. Books were scarce in the Western Reserve
during his youth, but he read every book he could
borrow in the neighborhood where he lived. This
scarcity gave him the early habit of studying every-
thing he read, so that when he got through with a
book, he knew everythinu^ in it. The habit contin-
ued through life. Even after reading the daily pa-
pers — which he never neglected — he could give all
the important information they contained. He made
himself an excellent English scholar, and before he
22 PERSONAL AfEMOJRS OF U. S. GRAXT,
was twenty years of age was a constant contributor
to Western newspapers, and was also, from that
time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in
the societies for this purpose, which were common in
the West at that time. He always took an active
part in politics, but was never a candidate for office,
except, I believe, that he was the first Mayor of
Georgetown. He supported Jackson for the Presi-
dency ; but he was a Whig, a great admirer of
Henr)' Clay, and never voted for any other demo-
crat for high office after Jackson.
My mother's family lived in Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania, for several generations. I have little
information about her ancestors. Her family took no
interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who
died when I was sixteen years old, knew only back
to his grandfather. On the other side, my father
took a great interest in the subject, and in his
researches, he found that there was an entailed estate
in Windsor, Connecticut, belonging to the family,
to which his nephew, Lawson Grant — still living —
was the heir. He was so much interested in the
subject that he got his nephew to empower him to
act in the matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when I was a
boy ten or eleven years old, he went to Windsor,
proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the
claim of the owners for a consideration — three thou-
!;and dollars, I think. I remember the circumstance
AJfCESTXY. 23
well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his
letum that he f oimd some widows living on the pro{>-
ertyt who had little or nothing beyond their homa.
From these he refused to receive any recompense.
My mother^s father, John Simpson, moved from
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, to Clermont
County, Ohio, about the year 1819, taking with him
his four children, three daughters and one son. My
mother, Hannah Simpson, was the third of these
children, and was then over twenty years of age.
Her oldest sister was at that time married, and had
several children. She still lives in Clermont County
at this writing, October 5th, 1884, and is over ninety
years of age. Until her memory failed her, a few
years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond
recovery when the Democratic party lost control in
1 86a Her family, which was large, inherited her
views, with the exception of one son who settled in
Kentucky before the war. He was the only one of
the children who entered the volunteer service to
suppress the rebellion.
Her brother, next of age and now past eighty-
eight, is also still living in Clermont County, within
a few miles of the old homestead, and is as active in
mind as ever. He was a supporter of the Govern-
ment during the war, and remains a firm believer,
that national success by the Democratic party means
irretrievable ruin.
■ t
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IV
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24 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
In June, 182 1, my father, Jesse R. Grant, married
Hannah Simpson. I was born on the 27th of April,
1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio.
In the fall of 1823 we moved to Georgetown, the
county seat of Brown, the adjoining county cast.
This place remained my home, until at the age of
seventeen, in 1839, ' went to West Point
The schools, at the time of which I write, were
very indifferent. There were no free schools, and
none in which the scholars were classified. They
were all supported by subscription, and a single
teacher — who was often a man or a woman incapable
of teaching much, even if they imparted all they
knew — would have thirty or forty scholars, male and
female, from the infant learning the A B C's up to
the young lady of eighteen and the boy of twenty,
studying the highest branches taught — the three R's,
'* Reading, 'Riting, 'Rithmetic." I never saw an
algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the
arithmetic, in Georgetown, until after I was ap-
pointed to West Point. I then bought a work on
algebra in Cincinnati ; but having no teacher it was
Greek to me.
My life in Georgetown was uneventful. From
the age of five or six until seventeen, I attended the
subscription schools of the village, except during the
winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. The former period
was spent in Maysville, Kentucky, attending the
,1V I' »
f -.■
. ■ 1
BOYHOOD. 25
school of Richardson and Rand ; the latter in Ripley,
Ohio, at a private school. I was not studious in
habit, and probably did not make progress enough
to compensate for the outlay for board and tuition.
At all events both wintem were w^vx in going over
the same old arithmetic which I knew every word of
before, and r^>eating : ''A noun is the name of a
thing," which I had also heard my Georgetown
teachers repeat, until I had come to believe it — ^but
I cast no reflections upon my old teacher, Richard-
son. He tum^ out bright scholars from his school,
many of whom have filled conspicuous places in the
service of their States. Two of my cotemporaries
there — ^who, I believe, never attended any other in-
stitution of learning — have held seats in Congress,
and one, if not both, other high offices ; these are
Wadsworth and Brewster.
My father was, from my earliest recollection, in
comfortable circumstances, considering the times, his
place of residence, and the community in which he
lived. Mindful of his own lack of facilities for
acquiring an education, his greatest desire in
maturer years was for the education of his children.
Consequently, as stated before, I never missed a
quarter from school from the time I was old enough
to attend till the time of leaving home. This did
not exempt me from labor. In my early days, every
one labored more or less, in the region where my
26 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
youth was spent, and more in proportion to their
private means. It was only the very poor who were
exempt. While my father carried on the manu-
facture of leather and worked at the trade himself,
he owned and tilled considerable land. I detested
the trade, preferring almost any other labor ; but I
was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in
which horses were used. We had, among other
lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the vil-
lage. In the fall of the year choppers were
employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-
month. When I was seven or eight years of age, I
began hauling all the wood used in the house and
shops. I could not load it on the wagons, of course,
at that time, but I could drive, and the choppers
would load, and some one at the house unload.
When about eleven years old, I was strong enough
to hold a plough. From that age until seventeen I
did all the work done with horses, such as breaking
up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes,
bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the
wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow
or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still
attending school. For this I was compensated by the
fact that there was never any scolding or punishing
by my parents ; no objection to rational enjoyments,
such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to
swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my
BO YHOOD.
27
jjrandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles
off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse
and sleigh when there was snow on the ground.
While still quite young I had visited Cincinnati,
forty-five miles away, several times, alone ; also Mays-
ville, Kentucky, often, and once Louisville. The jour-
ney to Louisville was a big one for a boy of that day.
I had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to
Chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's
family, who were removing to Toledo, Ohio, and re-
turned alone ; and had gone once, in like manner,
to Flat Rock, Kentucky, about seventy miles
away. On this latter occasion I was fifteen years of
age. While at Flat Rock, at the house of a Mr.
Payne, whom I was visiting with his brother, a
neighbor of ours in Georgetown, I saw a very fine
saddle horse, which I rather coveted, and proposed
to Mr. Payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the
two I was driving. Payne hesitated to trade with a
boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told
him that it would be all right, that I was allowed to
do as I pleased with the horses. I was seventy
miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and
Mr. Payne said he did not know that his horse
had ever had a collar on. I asked to have him
hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see
whether he would work. It was soon evident that
the horse had never worn harness before; but he
26 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
youth was spent, and more in proportion to their
private means. It was only the very poor who were
exempt. While my father carried on the manu-
facture of leather and worked at the trade himself,
he owned and tilled considerable land. I detested
the trade, preferring almost any other labor ; but I
was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in
which horses were used. We had, among other
lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the vil-
lage. In the fall of the year choppers were
employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-
month. When I was seven or eight years of age, I
began hauling all the wood used in the house and
shops. I could not load it on the wagons, of course,
at that time, but I could drive, and the choppers
would load, and some one at the house unload.
When about eleven years old, I was strong enough
to hold a plough. From that age until seventeen I
did all the work done with horses, such as breaking
up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes,
bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the
wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow
or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc, while still
attending school. For this I was compensated by the
fact that there was never any scolding or punishing
by my parents ; no objection to rational enjoyments,
such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to
swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my
BO YHOOD. 2 7
grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles
off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse
and sleigh when there was snow on the ground.
While still quite young I had visited Cincinnati,
forty-five miles away, several times, alone ; also Mays-
ville, Kentucky, often, and once Louisville. The jour-
ney to Louisville was a big one for a boy of that day.
I had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to
Chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's
family, who were removing to Toledo, Ohio, and re-
turned alone ; and had gone once, in like manner,
to Flat Rock, Kentucky, about seventy miles
away. On this latter occasion I was fifteen years of
age. While at Flat Rock, at the house of a Mr.
Payne, whom I was visiting with his brother, a
neighbor of ours in Georgetown, I saw a very fine
saddle horse, which I rather coveted, and proposed
to Mr. Payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the
two I was driving. Payne hesitated to trade with a
boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told
him that it would be all right, that I was allowed to
do as I pleased with the horses. I was seventy
miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and
Mr. Payne said he did not know that his horse
had ever had a collar on. I asked to have him
hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see
whether he would work. It was soon evident that
the horse had never worn harness before; but he
30 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
offer that price ; if it was not accepted I was to offer
twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him,
to give the twenty-five. I at once mounted a horse
and went for the colt. When I got to Mr. Ralston's
house, I said to him : '* Papa says I may offer you
twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that.
I am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't
take that, to give you twenty-five." It would not
require a Connecticut man to guess the price finally
agreed upon. This story is nearly true. I certainly
showed very plainly that I had come for the colt and
meant to have him. I could not have been over
eight years old at the time. This transaction caused
me great heart-burning. The story got out among
the boys of the village, and it was a long time before
I heard the last of it. Boys enjoy the misery of
their companions, at least village boys in that day
did, and in later life I have found that all adults
are not free from the peculiarity. I kept the horse
until he was four years old, when he went blind, and
I sold him for twenty dollars. When I went to Mays-
ville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, I
recognized my colt as one of the blind horses work-
ing on the tread- wheel of the ferry-boat.
I have described enough of my early life to give
an impression of the whole. I did not like to work ;
but I did as much of it, while young, as grown men
can be hired to do in these days, and attended
BOYHOOD. 31
school at the same time. I had as many privileges
as any boy in the village, and probably more than
most of them. I have no recollection of ever having
been punished at home, either by scolding or by the
rod. But at school the case was different The rod
was freely used there, and I was not exempt from
its influence. I can see John D. White — the school
teacher— now, with his long beech switch always in
his hand. It was not always the same one, either.
Switches were brought in bundles, from a beech
wood near the school house, by the boys for whose
benefit they were intended. Often a whole bundle
would be used up in a single day. I never had
any hard feelings against my teacher, either while
attending the school, or in later years when reflect-
ing upon my experience. Mr. White was a kind-
hearted man, and was much respected by the com-
munity in which he lived. He only followed the
universal custom of the period, and that under which
he had received his own education.
CHAPTER II.
WEST POINT — GRADUATION.
IN the winter of 1838-9 I was attending school at
Ripley, only ten miles distant from Georgetown,
but spent the Christmas holidays at home. During
this vacation my father received a letter from the
Honorable Thomas Morris, then United States Sen-
ator from Ohio. When he read it he said to me,
•' Ulysses, I believe you are going to receive the ap-
pointment*' "What appointment?" I inquired.
*' To West Point; I have applied for it." ''But I
won't go," I said. He said he thought I would, and
I thought so too, if he did. I really had no objection
to going to West Point, except that I had a very
exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get
through. I did not believe I possessed them, and could
not bear the idea of failing. There had been four
boys from our village, or its immediate neighborhood,
who had been graduated from West Point, and never
a failure of any one appointed from Georgetown, ex-
cept in the case of the one whose place I was to take.
He was the son of Dr. Bailey, our nearest and most
intimate neighbor. Young Bailey had been appointed
WEST POINT. ^3
in 1837. Finding before the January examination fol-
lowing, that he could not pass, he resigned and went
to a private school, and remained there until the fol-
lowing year, when he was reappointed. Before
the next examination he was dismissed. Dr. Bailey
was a proud and sensitive man. and felt the failure
(rf his Km so keenly that he forbade his return home^
There were no tel^^raphs in those days to dissemt-f
nate news rapidly, no railroads west of the Allegha-
nies, and but few east ; and above all, there were no
iiqx>rters prying into other people's private affairs.
Ccmsequently it did not become generally known that
there was a vacancy at West Point from our district
until I was appointed. I presume Mrs. Bailey con-
fided to my mother the fact that Bartlett had been
dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his
son's return home.
The Honorable Thomas L. Hamer. one of the
ablest men Ohio ever produced, was our member of
Congress at the time, and had the right of nomi-
nation. He and my father had been members of
the same debating society (where they were gener-
ally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal
friends from their early manhood up to a few years
before. In politics they differed. Hamer was a
life-long Democrat, while my father was a Whig.
They had a warm discussion, which finally became
angry — over some act of President Jackson, the re-
34 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
moval of the deposit of public moneys, I think — after
which they never spoke until after my appointment.
I know both of them felt badly over this estrange-
ment, and would have been glad at any time to
come to a reconciliation ; but neither would make
the advance. Under these circumstances my father
would not write to Hamer for the appointment, but
he wrote to Thomas Morris, United States Senator
from Ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy
at West Point from our district, and that he would
be glad if I could be appointed to fill it. This let-
ter, I presume, was turned over to Mr. Hamer, and,
as there was no other applicant, he cheerfully ap-
pointed me. Thi3 healed the breach between the
two, never after reopened.
Besides the argument used by my father in favor
of my going to West Point — that '*he thought I
would go " — there was another very strong induce-
ment. I had always a great desire to travel. I was
already the best travelled boy in Georgetown, except
the sons of one man, John Walker, who had emi-
grated to Texas with his family, and immigrated back
as soon as he could get the means to do so. In his
short stay in Texas he acquired a very different
opinion of the country from what one would form
going there now.
I had been east to Wheeling, Virginia, and north
to the Western Reserve, in Ohio, west to Louis-
WEST POINT. 35
ville, and south to Bourbon County, Kentucky, be-
sides having driven or ridden pretty much over the
whole country within fifty miles of home. Going
to West Point would give me the opportunity of
visiting the two great cities of the continent, Phila-
delphia and New York. This was enough. When
these places were visited I would have been glad to
have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any
other accident happen, by which I might have re-
ceived a temporary injury sufficient to make me
ineligible, for a time, to enter the Academy. Nothing
of the kind occurred, and I had to face the music.
Georgetown has a remarkable record for a west-
ern village. It is, and has been from its earliest ex-
istence, a democratic town. There was probably
no time during the rebellion when, if the opportu-
nity could have been afforded, it would not have
voted for Jefferson Davis for President of the United
States, over Mr. Lincoln, or any other representa-
tive of his party ; unless it was immediately after
some of John Morgan's men, in his celebrated raid
through Ohio, spent a few hours in the village.
The rebels helped themselves to whatever they
could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses,
and many ordered meals to be prepared for them by
the families. This was no doubt a far pleasanter duty
for some families than it would have been to render
a like service for Union soldiers. The line between
36 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
the Rebel and Union element in Georgetown was so
marked that it led to divisions even in the churches.
There were churches in that part of Ohio where
treason was preached regularly, and where, to secure
membership, hostility to the government, to the war
and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more es-
sential than a belief in the authenticity or credibil-
ity of the Bible. There were men in Georgetown
who filled all the requirements for membership in
these churches.
Yet this far-off western village, with a population,
including old and young, male and female, of about
one thousand — about enough for the organization of a
single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing
arms — furnished the Union army four general officers
and one colonel. West Point graduates, and nine
generals and field officers of Volunteers, that I can
think of. Of the graduates from West Point, all
had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the
rebellion, except possibly General A. V. Kautz, who
had remained in the army from his graduation.
Two of the colonels also entered the service from
other localities. The other seven. General Mc-
Groierty, Colonels White, Fyffe. Loudon and Mar-
shall, Majors King and Bailey, were all residents of
Georgetown when the war broke out, and all of
them, who were alive at the close, returned there.
Major Bailey was the cadet who had preceded mc
IVEST POINT, 37
at West Point, He was killed in West Virginia, in
his first engagement. As far as I know, every boy
who has entered West Point from that village since
my time has been graduated.
I took passage on a steamer at Ripley, Ohio, for
Pittsburg, about the middle of May, 1839. Western
boats at that day did not make regular trips at
stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any
length of time, for passengers or freight. I have
myself been detained two or three days at a place
after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one,
drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting
had expired. On this occasion we had no vexa-
tious delays, and in about three days Pittsburg was
reached. From Pittsburg I chose passage by the
canal to Harrisburg, rather than by the more expe-
ditious stage. This gave a better opportunity of
enjoying the fine scenery of Western Pennsylvania,
and I had rather a dread of reaching my destination
at all. At that time the canal was much patronized
by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the
period, no mode of conveyance could be more pleas-
ant, when time was not an object. F'rom Harrisburg to
Philadelphia there was a railroad, the first I had ever
seen, except the one on which I had just crossed
the summit of the Alleghany Mountains, and over
which canal boats were transported. In travelling by
the road from Harrisburg, I thought the perfection of
38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF L\ S. GRANT,
rapid transit had been reached. We travelled at
least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and
made the whole distance averaging probably as
much as twelve miles an hour. This seemed like
annihilating space. I stopped five days in Philadel-
phia, saw about every street in the city, attended the
theatre, visited Girard College (which was then in
course of construction), and got reprimanded from
home afterwards, fo^ dallying by the way so long.
My sojourn in New York was shorter, but long
enough to enable me to see the city very well. I
reported at West Point on the 30th or 31st of May,
and about two weeks later passed my examination
for admission, without difficulty, verj' much to my
surprise.
A military life had no charms for me, and I had
not the faintest idea of staying in the army even if I
should be graduated, which 1 did not expect. The
encampment which preceded the commencement of
academic studies was very wearisome and uninterest-
ing. When the 28th of August came — the date for
breaking up camp and going into barracks — I felt as
though I had been at West Point always, and that if
I staid to graduation, I would have to remain always.
I did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in
fact I rarely ever read over a lesson the second time
during my entire cadetship. I could not sit in
my room doing nothing. There is a fine library
IVES 7' roixT.
39
connected with the Academy from which cadets can
get books to read in their quarters. I devoted
more time to these, than to books relating to the
course of studies. Much of the time, I am sorry to
say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy
sort. I read all of Bulwer s then published, Coop-
ers, Marryat's, Scott's, Washington Irving s works,
Lever s, and many others that I do not now remem-
ber. Mathematics was very easy to me, so that
when January came, I passed the examination, tak-
ing a good standing in that branch. In French,
the only other study at that time in the first year s
course, my standing was very low. In fact, if the
class had been turned the other end foremost I
should have been near head. I never succeeded
in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any
one study, during the four years. I came near it in
French, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and
conduct.
Early in the session of the Congress which met
in December, 1839, a bill was discussed abolishinij
the Military Academy. I saw in this an honorable
way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with
much interest, but with impatience at the delay in
taking action, for I was selfish enough to favor the
bill. It never passed, and a year later, although the
time hung drearily with me, I would have been sorry
to have seen it succeed. My idea then was to get
40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
through the course, secure a detail for a few years
as assistant professor of mathematics at the Acad-
emy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as
professor in some respectable college ; but circum-
stances always did shape my course different from
my plans.
At the end of two years the class received the
usual furlough, extending from the close of the June
examination to the 28th of August This I enjoyed
beyond any other period of my life. My father had
sold out his business in Georgetown — where my
youth had been spent, and to which my day-dreams
carried me back as my future home, if I should ever
be able to retire on a competency. He had moved
to Bethel, only twelve miles away, in the adjoining
county of Clermont, and had bought a young horse
that had never been in harness, for my special use
under the saddle during my furlough. Most of my
time was spent among my old school-mates —
these ten weeks were shorter than one week at West
Point.
Persons acquainted with the Academy know that
the corps of cadets is divided into four companies
for the purpose of military exercises. These com-
panies are officered from the cadets, the superin-
tendent and commandant selecting the officers for
their military bearing and qualifications. The adju-
tant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieu-
WEST POINT. 41
tenants are taken from the first, or Senior class ; the
sergeants from the second, or Junior class; and the
corporals from the third, or Sophomore class. I had
not been " called out " as a corporal, but when I re-
turned from furlough I found myself the last but
one — about my standing in all the tactics — of eigh-
teen sergeants. The promotion was too much
for me. That year my standing in the class — as
shown by the number of demerits of the year — ^was
about the same as it was among the sergeants, and I
was dropped, and served the fourth year as a pri-
vate.
During my first years encampment General Scott
visited West Point, and reviewed the cadets. With
his commanding figure, his quite colossal size and
showy uniform, I thought him the finest specimen of
manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to
be envied. I could never resemble him in appear-
ance, but I believe I did have a presentiment for a
moment that some day I should occupy his place on
review — although I had no intention then of remain-
ing in the army. My experience in a horse-trade
ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me,
were too fresh in my mind for me to communicate
this presentiment to even my most intimate chum.
The next summer Martin Van Buren, then President
of the United States, visited West Point and re-
viewed the cadets ; he did not impress me with
42 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
the awe which Scott had inspired. In fact I regard-
ed General Scott and Captain C. F. Smith, the
Commandant of Cadets, as the two men most to be
envied in the nation. I retained a high regard for
both up to the day of their death.
The last two years wore away more rapidly than
the first two, but they still seemed about five times as
long as Ohio years, to me. At last all the examina-
tions were passed, and the members of the class
were called upon to record their choice of arms of
service and regiments. I was anxious to enter the
cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but
there was only one regiment of dragoons in the
Army at that time, and attached to that, besides the
full complement of officers, there were at least four
brevet second lieutenants. I recorded therefore my
first choice, dragoons ; second, 4th infantry ; and got
the latter. Again there was a furlough — or, more
properly speaking, leave of absence for the class
were now commissioned officers — this time to the
end of September. Again I went to Ohio to spend
my vacation among my old school-mates ; and again
I found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special
use, besides a horse and buggy that I could drive —
but I was not in a physical condition to enjoy my-
self quite as well as on the former occasion. For
six months before graduation I had had a desperate
cough (*' Tyler's grip" it was called), and I was very
GRADUATION. 43
much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seven-
teen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though I
had grown six inches in stature in the mean time.
There was consumption in my father s family, two of
his brothers having died of that disease, which made
my symptoms more alarming. The brother and
sister next younger than myself died, during the re-
bellion, of the same disease, and I seemed the most
promising subject for it of the three in 1843.
Having made alternate choice of two different
arms of service with different uniforms, I could not
get a uniform suit until notified of my assignment
I left my measurement with a tailor, with directions
not to make the uniform until I notified him whether
it was to be for infantry or dragoons. Notice did
not reach me for several weeks, and then it took at
least a week to get the letter of instructions to the
tailor and two more to make the clothes and have
them sent to me. This was a time of great sus-
pense. I was impatient to get on my uniform and
see how it looked, and probably wanted my old
school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it.
The conceit was knocked out of me by two little
circumstances that happened soon after the arrival
of the clothes, which gave me a distaste for military
uniform that I never recovered from. Soon after
the arrival of the suit I donned it, and put off for
Cincinnati on horseback. While I was riding along
44 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
a Street of that city, imagining that every one was
looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when I
first saw General Scott, a little urchin, bareheaded,
barefooted, with dirty and ragged pants held up by
a single gallows — that's what suspenders were called
then — and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for
weeks, turned to me and cried : ** Soldier ! will you
work? No, sir — ee; I'll sell my shirt first! !" The
horse trade and its dire consequences were recalled
to mind.
The other circumstance occurred at home. Op-
posite our house in Bethel stood the old stage tavern
where "man and beast" found accommodation.
The stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed
of some humor. On my return I found him parading
the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted,
but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons — ^just
the color of my uniform trousers — with a strip
of white cotton sheeting sewed down the outside
seams in imitation of mine. The joke was a huge
one in the mind of many of the people, and was
much enjoyed by them ; but I did not appreciate it
so highly.
During the remainder of my leave of absence, my
time was spent in visiting friends in Georgetown
and Cincinnati, and occasionally other towns in that
part of the State.
CHAPTER III.
ARMY LIFE — CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR — CAMl'
SALUBRITY.
ON the 30th of September I reported for duty
at Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, with the
4th United States infantry. It was the largest
military post in the country at that time, being
garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight
of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th.
Colonel Steven Kearney, one of the ablest officers
of the day, commanded the post, and under him
discipline was kept at a high standard, but without
vexatious rules or regulations. Every drill and roll-
call had to be attended, but in the intervals officers
were permitted to enjoy themselves, leaving the gar-
rison, and going where they pleased, without making
written application to state where they were going
for how long, etc., so that they were back for their
next duty. It did seem to me, in my early army
days, that too many of the older officers, when they
came to command posts, made it a study to think
what orders they could publish to annoy their sub-
ordinates and render them uncomfortable. I no-
46 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ticed, however, a few years later, when the Mexican
war broke out, that most of this class of officers dis-
covered they were possessed of disabilities which
entirely incapacitated them for active field service.
They had the moral courage to proclaim it, too.
They were right ; but they did not always give their
disease the right name.
At West Point I had a class-mate — in the last
year of our studies he was room-mate also^F. T.
Dent, whose family resided some five miles west of
Jefferson Barracks. Two of his unmarried brothers
were living at home at that time, and as I had taken
with me from Ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, I
soon found my way out to White Haven, the name
of the Dent estate. As I found the family congenial
my visits became frequent. There were at home,
besides the young men, two daughters, one a school
miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine.
There was still an older daughter of seventeen, who
had been spending several years at boarding-school
in St. Louis, but who, though through school, had
not yet returned home. She was spending the
winter in the city with connections, the family of
Colonel John OTallon, well known in St. Louis. In
February she returned to her country home. After
that I do not know but my visits became more
frequent ; they certainly did become more enjoyable.
We would often take walks, or go on horseback to
A/^MY LIFE, 47
visit the neighbors, until I became quite well ac-
quainted in that vicinity. Sometimes one of the
brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the
younger sisters. If the 4th infantry had remained
at Jefferson Barracks it is possible, even probable,
that this life might have continued for some years
without my finding out that there was anything
serious the matter with me ; but in the following
May a circumstance occurred which developed my
sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it.
The annexation of Texas was at this time the sub-
ject of violent discussion in Congress, in the press,
and by individuals. The administration of Presi-
dent Tyler, then in power, was making the most
strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was.
indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day.
During these discussions the greater part of the sin-
gle rifle regiment in the army — the 2d dragoons,
which had been dismounted a year or two before,
and designated ** Dismounted Rifles" — was stationed
at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, some twenty-five miles
east of the Texas line, to observe the frontier.
About the ist of May the 3d infantry was ordered
from Jefferson Barracks to Louisiana, to go into
camp in the neighborhood of Fort Jessup, and there
await further orders. The troops were embarked
on steamers and were on their way down the Missis-
sippi within a few days after the receipt of this
48 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (7. S, GRANT,
order. About the time they started I obtained a
leave of absence for twenty days to go to Ohio to
visit my parents. I was obliged to go to St Louis
to take a steamer for Louisville or Cincinnati, or
the first steamer going up the Ohio River to any
point. Before I left St. Louis orders were received
at Jefferson Barracks for the 4th infantry to follow
the 3d, A messenger was sent after me to stop my
leaving ; but before he could reach me I was off,
totally ignorant of these events. A day or two after
my arrival at Bethel I received a letter from a class-
mate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me
of the circumstances related above, and advising me
not to open any letter post marked St. Louis or Jef-
ferson Barracks, until the expiration of my leave,
and saying that he would pack up my things and
take them along for me. His advice was not neces-
sary, for no other letter was sent to me. I now
discovered that I was exceedingly anxious to get
back to Jefferson Barracks, and I understood the
reason without explanation from any one. My leave
of absence required me to report for duty, at Jeffer-
son Barracks, at the end of twenty days. I knew
my regiment had gone up the Red River, but
I was not disposed to break the letter of my leave ;
besides, if I had proceeded to Louisiana direct, 1
could not have reached there until after the expira-
tion of my leave. Accordintrly, at the end of the
ARMY LIFE,
49
twenty days, I reported for duty to Lieutenant Ewell,
commanding at Jefferson Barracks, handing him at
the same time my leave of absence. After noticing
the phraseology of the order — leaves of absence
were generally worded, *'at the end of which time
he will report for duty with his proper command "
— he said he would give me an order to join my
regiment in Louisiana. I then asked for a few days'
leave before starting, which he readily granted.
This was the same Ewell who acquired considerable
reputation as a Confederate general during the
rebellion. He was a man much esteemed, and de-
servedly so, in the old army, and proved himself a
gallant and efficient officer in two wars — both in my
estimation unholy.
1 immediately procured a horse and started for
the country, taking no baggage with me, of course.
There is an insignificant creek — the Gravois — be-
tween Jefferson Barracks and the place to which I
was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over
it from its source to its mouth. There is not water
enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee
mill, and at low water there is none running whatever.
On this occasion it had been raining heavily, and,
when the creek was reached, I found the banks full to
overflowing, and the current rapid. I looked at it a
moment to consider what to do. One of my super-
stitions had always been when I started to go any
Vol. I. — 4
50 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
where, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until
the thing intended was accomplished. I have fre-
quently started to go to places where I had never
been and to which I did not know the way, depend-
ing upon making inquiries on the road, and if I got
past the place without knowing it, instead of turning
back, I would go on until a road was found turning
in the right direction, take that, and come in by the
other side. So I struck into the stream, and in an
instant the horse was swimming and I being carried
down by the current I headed the horse towards
the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and
without other clothes on that side of the stream. I
went on, however, to my destination and borrowed
a dry suit from my — future — brother-in-law. We
were not of the same size, but the clothes answered
every purpose until I got more of my own.
Before I returned I mustered up courage to make
known, in the most awkward manner imaginable, the
discovery I had made on learning that the 4th in-
fantry had been ordered away from Jefferson Bar-
racks. The young lady afterwards admitted that she
too, although until then she had never looked upon
me other than as a visitor whose company was agree-
able to her, had experienced a depression of spirits
she could not account for when the recriment left. Be-
fore separating it was definitely understood that at a
convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not
ARMY LIFE,
51
let the removal of a regiment trouble us. This was
in May, 1844. ^^ was the 226 of August, 1848, before
the fulfilment of this agreement. My duties kept me
on the frontier of Louisiana with the Army of Obser-
vation during the pendency of Annexation ; and
afterwards I was absent through the war with Mex-
ico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the
annexation itself During that time there was a con-
stant correspondence between Miss Dent and my-
self, but we only met once in the period of four years
and three months. In May, 1845, I procured a
leave for twenty days, visited St. Louis, and ob-
tained the consent of the parents for the union, which
had not been asked for before.
As already stated, it was never my intention to
remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for
a professorship in some college. Accordingly, soon
after I was settled at Jefferson Barracks, I wrote a
letter to Professor Church — Professor of Mathemat-
ics at West Point — requesting him to ask my desig-
nation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be
made. Assistant professors at West Point are all
officers of the army, supposed to be selected for
their special fitness for the particular branch of study
they are assigned to teach. The answer from Profes-
sor Church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt I
should have been detailed a year or two later but for
the Mexican War coming on. Accordingly I laid
52 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in
garrison, with regularity, if not persistency. I re-
viewed my West Point course of mathematics during
the seven months at Jefferson Barracks, and read
many valuable historical works, besides an occasional
novel. To help my memory I kept a book in which
I would write up, from time to time, my recollections
of all I had read since last posting it. When the
regiment was ordered away, I being absent at the
time, my effects were packed up by Lieutenant Has-
lett, of the 4th infantry, and taken along. I never
saw my journal after, nor did I ever keep another,
except for a portion of the time while travelling
abroad. Often since a fear has crossed my mind lest
that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands
of some malicious person who would publish it I
know its appearance would cause me as much heart-
burning as my youthful horse-trade, or the later re-
buke for wearing uniform clothes.
The 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on
the reservation at Fort Jessup, about midway be-
tween the Red River and the Sabine. Our orders
required us to go into camp in the same neighbor-
hood, and await further instructions. Those author-
ized to do so selected a place in the pine woods,
between the old town of Natchitoches and Grand
Ecore, about three miles from each, and on high
ground back from the river. The place was given
ARMY LIFE. 53
the name of Camp Salubrity, and proved entitled to
it. The camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with
spring branches in the valley, in front and rear.
The springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure
water, and the ridge was above the flight of mos-
quitoes, which abound in that region in great mul-
titudes and of great voracity. In the valley they
swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit
of the ridge. The regiment occupied this camp six
months before the first death occurred, and that was
caused by an accident.
There was no intimation given that the removal
of the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry to the west-
ern border of Louisiana was occasioned in any way
by the prospective annexation of Texas, but it was
generally understood that such was the case. Osten-
sibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into
Texas, but really as a menace to Mexico in case she
appeared to contemplate war. Generally the officers
of the army were indifferent whether the annexation
was consummated or not ; but not so all of them.
For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the measure,
and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one
of the most unjust ever waged by a stronorer against
a weaker nation. It was an instance of a republic
following the bad example of European monarchies,
in not considering justice in their desire to acquire
additional territory.
54 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
Texas was originally a state belonging to the re-
public of Mexico. It extended from the Sabine
River on the east to the Rio Grande on the west, and
from the Gulf of Mexico on the south and east to the
territory of the United States and New Mexico—
another Mexican state at that time — on the north
and west. An empire in territory, it had but a
very sparse population, until settled by Americans
who had received authority from Mexico to colonize.
These colonists paid very little attention to the
supreme government, and introduced slavery into
the state almost from the start, though the constitu-
tion of Mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction
that institution. Soon they set up an independent
government of their own, and war existed, between
Texas and Mexico, in name from that time until
1836, when active hostilities very nearly ceased
upon the capture of Santa Anna, the Mexican Presi-
dent. Before long, however, the same people — who
with permission of Mexico had colonized Texas,
and afterwards set up slavery there, and then se-
ceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so —
offered themselves and the State to the United
States, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. The
occupation, separation and annexation were, from
the inception of the movement to its final consum-
mation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which
slave states might be formed for the American Union.
CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR, 55
Even if the annexation itself could be justified, the
manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon
Mexico cannot. The fact is, annexationists wanted
more territory than they could possibly lay any claim
to, as part of the new acquisition. Texas, as an inde-
pendent State, never had exercised jurisdiction over
the territory between the Nueces River and the Rio
Grande. Mexico had never recognized the independ-
ence of Texas, and maintained that, even if independ-
ent, the State had no claim south of the Nueces. I
am aware that a treaty, made by the Texans with
Santa Anna while he was under duress, ceded all
the territory between the Nueces and the Rio
Grande ; but he was a prisoner of war when the
treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. He
knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of
the Texans, if they should ever capture him. The
Texans, if they had taken his life, would have only
followed the example set by Santa Anna himself a
few years before, when he executed the entire gar-
rison of the Alamo and the villagers of Goliad.
In taking military possession of Texas after annex-
ation, the army of occupation, under General Taylor,
was directed to occupy the disputed territory. The
army did not stop at the Nueces and offer to nego-
tiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but
went beyond, apparently in order to force Mexico to
initiate war. It is to the credit of the American na-
56 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
tion, however, that after conquering Mexico, and
while practically holding the country in our posses-
sion, so that we could have retained the whole of it,
or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum
for the additional territory taken ; more than it was
worth, or was likely to be, to Mexico. To us it was
an empire and of incalculable value ; but it might have
been obtained by other means. The Southern rebel-
lion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican war.
Nations, like individuals, are punished for their trans-
gressions. We got our punishment in the most san-
guinary and expensive war of modern times.
The 4th infantry went into camp at Salubrity in
the month of May, 1844, with instructions, as I
have said, to await further orders. At first, officers
and men occupied ordinary tents. As the summer
heat increased these were covered by sheds to break
the rays of the sun. The summer was whiled away
in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting
those stationed at, and near, Fort Jessup, twenty-five
miles away, visiting the planters on the Red River,
and the citizens of Natchitoches and Grand Ecore.
There was much pleasant intercourse between the
inhabitants and the officers of the army. I retain
very agreeable recollections of my stay at Camp Salu-
brity, and of the acquaintances made there, and no
doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living
who were there at the time. I can call to mind
CAMP SALUBRITY, 57
only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself,
who were at Camp Salubrity with the regiment, who
are now alive.
With a war in prospect, and belonging to a regi-
ment that had an unusual number of officers detailed
on special duty away from the regiment, my hopes
of being ordered to West Point as instructor van-
ished. At the time of which I now write, officers in
the quartermaster's, commissary's and adjutant-gen-
eral's departments were appointed from the line of
the army, and did not vacate their regimental com-
missions until their regimental and staff commissions
were for the same grades. Generally lieutenants
were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the
staff corps. If they should reach a captaincy in the
line before they arrived at a majority in the staff,
they would elect which commission they would retain.
In the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers
were on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently
detached from the regiment. Under these circum-
stances I gave up everything like a special course of
reading, and only read thereafter for my own amuse-
ment, and not very much for that, until the war was
over. I kept a horse and rode, and staid out of
doors most of the time by day, and entirely recovered
from the cough which I had carried from West Point,
and from all indications of consumption. I have
often thought that my life was saved, and my health
58 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an
administrative act, and a war, both of which I dis-
approved.
As summer wore away, and cool days and colder
nights came upon us, the tents we were occupying
ceased to afford comfortable quarters ; and * * further
orders " not reaching us, we began to look about to
remedy the hardship. Men were put to work getting
out timber to build huts, and in a very short time all
were comfortably housed — privates as well as offi-
cers. The outlay by the government in accomplish-
ing this was nothing, or nearly nothing. The winter
was spent more agreeably than the summer had
been. There were occasional parties given by the
planters along the ** coast " — as the bottom lands on
the Red River were called. The climate was de-
lightful.
Near the close of the short session of Congress of
1844-5, ^h^ ^^^^ for the annexation of Texas to the
United States was passed. It reached President
Tyler on the ist of March, 1845, ^^^ promptly re-
ceived his approval. When the news reached us we
began to look again for ** further orders." They did
not arrive promptly, and on the ist of May fol-
lowing I asked and obtained a leave of absence for
twenty days, for the purpose of visiting St. Louis.
The object of this visit has been before stated.
Early in July the long expected orders were re-
CAMP SALUBRITY. 59
ceived, but they only took the regiment to New
Orleans Barracks. We reached there before the
middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still
further orders. The yellow fever was raging in New
Orleans during the time we remained there, and the
streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous
well-observed Sunday. I recollect but one occasion
when this observance seemed to be broken by the
inhabitants. One morning about daylight I hap-
pened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a
rifle not far off, I looked out to ascertain where the
sound came from. I observed a couple of clusters of
men near by, and learned afterwards that ** it was noth-
ing ; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference
of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces." I do not
remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but
no doubt the question of difference was settled
satisfactorily, and ** honorably," in the estimation of
the parties engaged. I do not believe I ever would
have the courage to fight a duel. If any man should
wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill
him, I would not be willing to give him the choice of
weapons with which it should be done, and of the time,
place and distance separating us, when I executed
him. If I should do another such a wrong as to
justify him in killing me, I would make any reasona-
ble atonement within my [)ower, if convinced of the
wrong done. I place my opposition to duelling
6o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT,
on higher grounds than any here stated. No doubt
a majority of the duels fought have been for want
of moral courage on the part of those engaged to
decline.
At Camp Salubrity, and when we went to New
Orleans Barracks, the 4th infantry was commanded
by Colonel Vose, then an old gentleman who had
not commanded on drill for a number of years.
He was not a man to discover infirmity in the pres-
ence of danger. It now appeared that war was
imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush
up his tactics. Accordingly, when we got settled
down at our new post, he took command of the regi-
ment at a battalion drill. Only two or three evolu-
tions had been gone through when he dismissed the
battalion, and, turning to go to his own quarters,
dropped dead. He had not been complaining of ill
health, but no doubt died of heart disease. He
was a most estimable man, of exemplary habits, and
by no means the author of his own disease.
CHAPTER IV.
CORPUS CHRISTI MEXICAN SMUGGLING SPANISH RULE
IN MEXICO — SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION.
EARLY in September the regiment left New Or-
leans for Corpus Christi, now in Texas. Ocean
steamers were not then common, and the passage was
made in sailing vessels. At that time there was not
more than three feet of water in the channel at the out-
let of Corpus Christi Bay ; the debarkation, therefore,
had to take place by small steamers, and at an island
in the channel called Shell Island, the ships anchor-
ing some miles out from shore. This made the work
slow, and as the army was only supplied with one or
two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the
landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp
and garrison equipage, etc. There happened to be
pleasant weather while this was going on, but the
land-swell was so great that when the ship and
steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave
they would be at considerable distance apart. The
men and baggage were let down to a point higher
than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship
and steamer got into the trough between the waves.
62 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
and were close together, the load would be drawn
over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested
on the deck.
After I had gone ashore, and had been on guard
several days at Shell Island, quite six miles from the
ship, I had occasion for some reason or other to
return on board. While on the Suviah — I think that
was the name of our vessel — I heard a tremendous
racket at the other end of the ship, and much and
excited sailor language, such as **damn your eyes,"
etc. In a moment or two the captain, who was an
excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not
weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running
out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as
he was, and crying that his men had mutinied. It
was necessary to sustain the captain without ques-
tion, and in a few minutes all the sailors charged with
mutiny were in irons. I rather felt for a time a wish
that I had not gone aboard just then. As the
men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed
in irons without resistance, I always doubted if they
knew that they had mutinied until they were told.
By the time I was ready to leave the ship again I
thought I had learned enough of the working of the
double and single pulley, by which passengers were
let down from the upper deck of the ship to the
steamer below, and determined to let myself down
without assistance. Without saying anything of my
CORPUS CHRtSTL 63
intentions to any one, I mounted the railing, and tak-
ing hold of the centre rbpe, just below the upper
block, I put one foot on the hook below the lower
block, and stepped off. Just as I did so some one
called out '* hold on." It was too late. I tried to
" hold on " with all my might, but my heels went up,
and my head went down so rapidly that my hold
broke, and I plunged head foremost into the water,
some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that
it seemed to me I never would stop. When I
came to the surface again, being a fair swim-
mer, and not having lost my presence of mind, I
swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and
I was drawn up without a scratch or injury. I do not
believe there was a man on board who sympathized
with me in the least when they found me uninjured.
I rather enjoyed the joke myself. The captain of
the Suviah died of his disease a few months later,
and I believe before the mutineers were tried. I
hope they got clear, because, as before stated, I al-
ways thought the mutiny was all in the brain of a
very weak and sick man.
After reaching shore, or Shell Island, the labor of
fjetting to Corpus Christi was slow and tedious.
There was, if my memory serves me, but one small
steamer to transport troops and baggage when the
4th infantry arrived. Others were procured later.
The distance from Shell Island to Corpus Christi was
64 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
some sixteen or eighteen miles. The channel to the
bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was,
had to be dragged over the bottom when loaded.
Not more than one trip a day could be effected.
Later this was remedied, by deepening the channel
and increasinor the number of vessels suitable to its
navigation.
Corpus Christi is near the head of the bay of the
same name, formed by the entrance of the Nueces
River into tide-water, and is on the west bank of that
bay. At the time of its first occupancy by United
States troops there was a small Mexican hamlet
there, containing probably less than one hundred
souls. There was, in addition, a small American
trading post, at which goods were sold to Mexican
smugglers. All goods were put up in compact pack-
ages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for
loading on pack mules. Two of these packages
made a load for an ordinary Mexican mule, and three
for the larger ones. The bulk of the trade was in
leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes.
The Mexicans had, before the arrival of the army,
but little to offer in exchange except silver. The
trade in tobacco was enormous, considering the popu-
lation to be supplied. Almost every Mexican above
the age of ten years, and many much younger,
smoked the cigarette. Nearly every Mexican carried
a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the
MEXICAN SMVGGUNC, 65
hands» and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers.
The cigarettes were made by the smokers as they
used them.
Up to the time of which I write, and for years
afterwards — I think until the administration of Presi-
dent Juarez — the cultivation, manufacture and sale
of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and
paid the bulk of the revenue collected from internal
sources. The price was enormously high, and made
successful smuggling very profitable. The difficulty
of obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why
everybody, male and female, used it at that time. I
know from my own experience that when I was at
West Point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was
prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed se-
verely punished, made the majority of the cadets,
myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it.
I failed utterly at the time and for many years after-
ward ; but the majority accomplished the object of
their youthful ambition.
Under Spanish rule Mexico was prohibited from
producing anything that the mother-country could
supply. This rule excluded the cultivation of the
grape, olive and many other articles to which the
soil and climate were well adapted. The country
was governed for " revenue only;'* and tobacco, which
cannot be raised in Spain, but is indigenous to Mex-
ico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this
Vol. I. 5
66 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
prime object of government The native population
had been in the habit of using "the weed" from a
period, back of any recorded history of this continent.
Bad habits — if not restrained by law or public opin-
ion — spread more rapidly and universally than good
ones, and the Spanish colonists adopted the use of
tobacco almost as generally as the natives. Spain,
therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from
this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in spec-
ified localities — and in these places farmed out the
privilege at a very high price. The tobacco when
raised could only be sold to the government, and the
price to the consumer was limited only by the avarice
of the authorities, and the capacity of the people to
pay.
All laws for the government of the country were
enacted in Spain, and the officers for their execution
were appointed by the Crown, and sent out to the New
El Dorado. The Mexicans had been brought up igno-
rant of how to legislate or how to nile. When they
gained their independence, after many years of war,
it was the most natural thing in the world that they
should adopt as their own the laws then in existence.
The only change was, that Mexico became her own
executor of the laws and the recipient of the reve-
nues. The tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue
under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not
the very last, of the obnoxious imposts to be re-
SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO. 67
pealed. Now, the citizens are allowed to cultivate
any crops the soil will yield. Tobacco is cheap, and
every quality can be produced Its use is by no
means so general as when I first visited the country.
Gradually the ''Army of Occupation" assembled
at Corpus Christi. When it was all together it con-
sisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of dra-
goons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments
of infantry — the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th — and one
regiment of artillery acting as infantry — not more
than three thousand men in all. General Zachary
Taylor commanded the whole. There were troops
enough in one body to establish a drill and discipline
sufficient to fit men and officers for all they were ca-
pable of in case of battle. The rank and file were
composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace,
to serve for seven dollars a month, and were neces-
sarily inferior as material to the average volunteers
enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also
to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of
the Union. The men engaged in the Mexican war
were brave, and the officers of the regular army, from
highest to lowest, were educated in their profession.
A more efficient army for its number and armament, I
do not believe ever fought a battle than the one com-
manded by General Taylor in his first two engage-
ments on Mexican — or Texan soil.
The presence of United States troops on the edge
68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
of the disputed territory furthest from the Mexican
settlements, was not sufficient to provoke hostilities.
We were sent to provoke a fight, but it was essen-
tial that Mexico should commence it. It was very
doubtful whether Congress would declare war ; but
if Mexico should attack our troops, the Executive
could announce, ** Whereas, war exists by the
acts of, etc.," and prosecute the contest with
vigor. Once initiated there were but few public
men who would have the courage to oppose it. Ex-
perience proves that the man who obstructs a war in
which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right
or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or his-
tory. Better for him, individually, to advocate "war,
pestilence, and famine," than to act as obstructionist
to a war already begun. The history of the defeat-
ed rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with
that of the Northern man who aided him by conspir-
ing against his government while protected by it.
The most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-
home traitor can hope for is — oblivion.
Mexico showing no willingness to come to the
Nueces to drive the invaders from her soil, it be-
came necessary for the '* invaders" to approach to
within a convenient distance to be struck. Accord-
ingly, preparations were begun for moving the army
to the Rio Grande, to a point near Matamoras. It
was desirable to occupy a position near the largest
SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION. 69
centre of population possible to reach, without abso-
lutely invading territory to which we set up no claim
whatever.
The distance from Corpus Christi to Matamoras
is about one hundred and fifty miles. The country
does not abound in fresh water, and the length of the
marches had to be regulated by the distance between
water supplies. Besides the streams, there were oc-
casional pools, filled during the rainy season, some
probably made by the traders, who travelled con-
stantly between Corpus Christi and the Rio Grande,
and some by the buffalo. There was not at that
time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd
of domestic animals, between Corpus Christi and
Matamoras. It was necessary, therefore, to have a
wagon train sufficiently large to transport the camp
and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for
the army, and part rations of grain for the artillery
horses and all the animals taken from the north,
where they had been accustomed to having their
forage furnished them. The army was but in-
differently supplied with transportation. Wagons
and harness could easily be supplied from the north ;
but mules and horses could not so readily be brought.
The American traders and Mexican smugglers
came to the relief. Contracts were made for mules
at from eight to eleven dollars each. The smugglers
furnished the animals, and took their pay in goods of
70
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
the description before mentioned. I doubt whether
the Mexicans received in value from the traders five
dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and
still more, whether they paid anything but their own
time in procuring them. Such is trade ; such is war.
The government paid in hard cash to the contractor
the stipulated price.
Between the Rio Grande and the Nueces there
was at that time a large band of wild horses feeding;
as numerous, probably, as the band of buffalo roam-
ing further north was before its rapid extermination
commenced. The Mexicans used to capture these
in large numbers and bring them into the American
settlements and sell them. A picked animal could
be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but
taken at wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-
six dollars a dozen. Some of these were purchased
for the army, and answered a most useful purpose.
The horses were generally very strong, formed much
like the Norman horse, and with very heavy manes
and tails. A number of officers supplied themselves
with these, and they generally rendered as useful
service as the northern animal ; in fact they were
much better when grazing was the only means of
supplying forage.
There was no need for haste, and some months
were consumed in the necessary preparations for a
move. In the meantime the army was engaged in
SUPPLYING TRAKSPORTATtON. J I
all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier.
Twice, that I remember, small trains were sent from
Corpus Christi, with cavalry escorts, to San Antonio
and Austin, with paymasters and funds to pay off
small detachments of troops stationed at those
places. General Taylor encouraged officers to ac«
company these expeditions. I accompanied one
of them in December, 1845. ^^^ distance from
Corpus Christi to San Antonio was then computed
at one hundred and fifty miles. Now that roads
exist it is probably less. From San Antonio to
Austin we computed the distance at one hundred
and ten miles, and from the latter place back to
Corpus Christi at over two hundred miles. I know
the distance now from San Antonio to Austin is but
little over eighty miles, so that our computation was
probably too high.
There was not at the time an individual living
between Corpus Christi and San Antonio until
within about thirty miles of the latter point,
where there were a few scattering Mexican settle-
ments along the San Antonio River. The people
in at least one of these hamlets lived underground
for protection against the Indians. The country
abounded in game, such as deer and antelope, with
abundance of wild turkeys along the streams
and where there were nut-bearing woods. On the
Nueces, s^bout twenty-five mile? up from Corpus
72 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town
called San Patricio, but the inhabitants had all been
massacred by the Indians, or driven away.
San Antonio was about equally divided in popu-
lation between Americans and Mexicans. From
there to Austin there was not a single residence
except at New Braunfels, on the Guadalupe
River. At that point was a settlement of Ger-
mans who had only that year come into the State.
At all events they were living in small huts, about
such as soldiers would hastily construct for temporary
occupation. From Austin to Corpus Christi there
was only a small settlement at Bastrop, with a few
farms along the Colorado River ; but after leaving
that, there were no settlements except the home of
one man, with one female slave, at the old town of
Goliad. Some of the houses were still standing.
Goliad had been quite a village for the period and
region, but some years before there had been a Mexi-
can massacre, in which every inhabitant had been
killed or driven away. This, with the massacre of
the prisoners in the Alamo, San Antonio, about
the same time, more than three hundred men in all,
furnished the strongest justification the Texans had
for carrying on the war with so much cruelty. In
fact, from that time until the Mexican war, the
hostilities between Texans and Mexicans was so
great that neither was safe in the neighborhood
SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATiOH. 73
of the Other who might be in superior numbers or
possessed of superior arms. The man we found
living there seemed like an old friend ; he had come
from near Fort Jessup, Louisiana, where the officers
of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had
known him and his family. He had emigrated in
advance of his family to build up a home for them.
CHAPTER V.
TRIP TO AUSTIN — PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND LIEU-
TENANT ARMY OF OCCUPATION.
WHEN our party left Corpus Christi it was
quite large, including the cavalry escort,
Paymaster, Major Dix, his clerk and the
officers who, like myself, were simply on
leave ; but all the officers on leave, except
Lieutenant Benjamin — afterwards killed in the
valley of Mexico — Lieutenant, now General, Augur,
and myself, concluded to spend their allotted
time at San Antonio and return from there. We
were all to be back at Corpus Christi by the end of
the month. The paymaster was detained in Austin
so long that, if we had waited for him, we would
have exceeded our leave. We concluded, there-
fore, to start back at once with the animals we
had, and having to rely principally on grass for their
food, it was a good six days' journey. We had to
sleep on the prairie every night, except at Goliad,
and possibly one night on the Colorado, without
shelter and with only such food as we carried with
us, and prepared ourselves. The journey was haz-
TRIP TO AUSTIN. 75
ardous on account of Indians, and there were
white men in Texas whom I would not have
cared to meet in a secluded place. Lieutenant
Augur was taken seriously sick before we reached
Goliad and at a distance from any habitation. To
add to the complication, his horse — ^a mustang that
had probably been captured from the band of wild
horses before alluded to, and of undoubted lon-
gevity at his capture — ^gave out It was absolutely
necessary to get forward to Goliad to find a shelter
for our sick companion. By dint of patience and
exceedingly slow movements, Goliad was at last
reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our pa-
tient We remained over a day, hoping that Augur
might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. He
did not, however, and knowing that Major Dix would
be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now
empty, and escort, we arranged with our Louisiana
friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant
until thus relieved, and went on.
I had never been a sportsman in my life ; had
scarcely ever gone in search of game, and rarely seen
any when looking for it. On this trip there was
no minute of time while travelling between San
Patricio and the settlements on the San Antonio
River, from San Antonio to Austin, and again from
the Colorado River back to San Patricio, when deer
or antelope could not be seen in great numbers.
76 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening,
after going into camp, some would go out and soon
return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the
entire camp. I, however, never went out, and had
no occasion to fire my gun ; except, being detained
over a day at Goliad, Benjamin and I concluded to
go down to the creek — ^which was fringed with tim-
ber, much of it the pecan — and bring back a few
turkeys. We had scarcely reached the edge of the
timber when I heard the flutter of wings over-
head, and in an instant I saw two or three tur-
keys flying away. These were soon followed by
more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty
or thirty had left from just over my head. All this
time I stood watching the turkeys to see where they
flew — with my gun on my shoulder, and never once
thought of levelling it at the birds. When I had
time to reflect upon the matter, I came to the con-
clusion that as a sportsman I was a failure, and went
back to the house. Benjamin remained out, and
got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back.
After the second night at Goliad, Benjamin and
I started to make the remainder of the journey
alone. We reached Corpus Christi just in time to
avoid ** absence without leave." We met no one —
not even an Indian — during the remainder of our
journey, except at San Patricio. A new settlement
had been started there in our absence of three
TRIP TO AUSTIN. 77
weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there were
houses already built, while the proximity of troops
gave protection against the Indians. On the
evening of the first day out from Goliad we heard
the most unearthly howling of wolves, directly in
our front. The prairie grass was tall and we could
not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that
they were near. To my ear it appeared that there
must have been enough of them to devour our
party, horses and all, at a single meal. The part
of Ohio that I hailed from was not thickly settled,
but wolves had been driven out long before I left
Benjamin was from Indiana, still less populated,
where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. He
understood the nature of the animal and the
capacity of a few to make believe there was an
unlimited number of them. He kept on towards
the noise, unmoved. I followed in his trail, lack-
ing moral courage to turn back and join our
sick companion. I have no doubt that if Benjamin
had proposed returning to Goliad, I would not only
have "seconded the motion" but have suggested
that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave Augur
sick there in the first place ; but Benjamin did not
propose turning back. When he did speak it was
to ask : " Grant, how many wolves do you think
there are in that pack?" Knowing where he was
from, and suspecting that he thought I would over-
78 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
estimate the number, I determined to show my
acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate
below what possibly could be correct, and answered :
**Oh, about twenty," very indifferently. He smiled
and rode on. In a minute we were close upon
them, and before they saw us. There were just two
of them. Seated upon their haunches, with their
mouths close together, they had made all the noise
we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. I
have often thought of this incident since when I
have heard the noise of a few disappointed poli-
ticians who had deserted their associates. There
are always more of them before they are counted.
A week or two before leaving Corpus Christi on
this trip, I had been promoted from brevet second-
lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full second-lieutenant,
7th infantry. Frank Gardner,* of the 7th, was
promoted to the 4th in the same orders. We
immediately made application to be transferred, so
as to get back to our old regiments. On my return,
I found that our application had been approved
at Washington. While in the 7th infantry I was
in the company of Captain Holmes, afterwards a
Lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. I
never came in contact with him in the war of the
Rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous
service in his high rank. My transfer carried me
♦ Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.
PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND-UEUTENANT Jg
to the company of Captain McCall, who resigned
from the army after the Mexican war and settled in
Philadelphia. He was prompt, however, to volun-
teer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose
to the rank of major-general in the Union army. I
was not fortunate enough to meet him after he
resigned. In the old army he was esteemed very
highly as a soldier and gentleman. Our relations
were always most pleasant.
The preparations at Corpus Christi for an advance
progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty
or more lieutenants as if we had been there. The
principal business consisted in securing mules, and
getting them broken to harness. The process was
slow but amusing. The animals sold to the govern-
ment were all young and unbroken, even to the
saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of
the prairie. Usually a number would be brought in
by a company of Mexicans, partners in the delivery.
The mules were first driven into a stockade, called
a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. The
Mexicans, — who were all experienced in throwing
the lasso, — would go into the corral on horseback,
with their lassos attached to the pommels of their
saddles. Soldiers detailed as teamsters and black-
smiths would also enter the corral^ the former with
ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding
irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. A lasso
8o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
was then thrown over the neck of a mule, when he
would immediately go to the length of his tether,
first one end, then the other in the ain While
he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso
would be thrown by another Mexican, catching the
animal by a fore-foot. This would bring the mule to
the ground, when he was seized and held by the
teamsters while the blacksmith put upon him, with
hot irons, the initials " U. S." Ropes were then put
about the neck, with a slip-noose which would
tighten around the throat if pulled. With a man
on each side holding these ropes, the mule was
released from his other bindings and allowed to rise.
With more or less difficulty he would be conducted
to a picket rope outside and fastened there. The
delivery of that mule was then complete. This
process was gone through with every mule and wild
horse with the army of occupation.
The method of breaking them was less cruel and
much more amusing. It is a well-known fact that
where domestic animals are used for specific pur-
poses from generation to generation, the descendants
are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same uses. At
that time in Northern Mexico the mule, or his an-
cestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except
for the saddle or pack. At all events the Corpus
Christi mule resisted the new use to which he was
being put. The treatment he was subjected to in
^
ARMY OF OCCUPATION, 8 1
order to overcome his prejudices was summary and
effective.
The soldiers were principally foreigners who had
enlisted in our large cities, and, with the exception of
a chance drayman among them, it is not probable
that any of the men who reported themselves as
competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in
their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous
experience in driving any animal whatever to har-
ness. Numbers together can accomplish what twice
their number acting individually could not perform.
Five mules were allotted to each wagon. A team-
ster would select at the picket rope five animals of
nearly the same color and general appearance for
his team. With a full corps of assistants, other
teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules
together. In twos the men would approach each
animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its
heels. Two ropes would be put about the neck
of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could
be choked if too unruly. They were then led
out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon
in the position they had to keep ever after.
Two men remained on either side of the leader,
with the lassos about its neck, and one man re-
tained the same restraining influence over each of
the others. All being ready, the hold would be
slackened and the team started. The first motion
Vol. I.— 6
82 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs
bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. After re-
peating this movement a few times the leaders would
start to run. This would bring the breeching tight
against the mules at the wheels, which these last
seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt
at coercion and would resist by taking a seat, some-
times going so far as to lie down. In time all were
broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheer-
fully, but there never was a time during the war when
it was safe to let a Mexican mule get entirely loose.
Their drivers were all teamsters by the time they
got through.
I recollect one case of a mule that had worked
in a team under the saddle, not only for some
time at Corpus Christi, where he was broken,
but all the way to the point opposite Matamoras,
then to Camargo, where he got loose from his fasten-
ings during the night. He did not run away at first,
but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two,
coming up sometimes to the feed trough even ;
but on the approach of the teamster he always got
out of the way. At last, growing tired of the con-
stant effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether.
Nothing short of a Mexican with his lasso could
have caught him. Regulations would not have
warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a
man with a lasso to catch that mule ; but they did
ARMY OF OCCUPATION. 83
allow the expenditure " of the mule," on a certifi-
cate that he had run away without any fault of the
quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and
also the purchase of another to take his place. I
am a competent witness, for I was regimental
quartermaster at the time.
While at Corpus Christi all the officers who had
a fancy for riding kept horses. The animals cost
but little in the first instance, and when picketed
they would get their living without any cost. I had
three not long before the army moved, but a sad
accident bereft me of them all at one time. A
colored boy who gave them all the attention they
got — besides looking after my tent and that of a
class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking for
us, all for about eight dollars per month, was
riding one to water and leading the other two.
The led horses pulled him from his scat and all
three ran away. They never were heard of after-
wards. Shortly after that some one told Captain
Bliss, General Taylor's Adjutant-General, of my
misfortune. "Yes; I heard Grant lost five or six
dollars' worth of horses the other day/' he replied.
That was a slander ; they were broken to the
saddle when I got them and cost nearly twenty
dollars. I never suspected the colored boy of ma-
licious intent in letting them get away, because, if
they had not escaped, he could have had one of them
to ride on the lonij march then in prospect.
CHAPTER VI.
ADVANCE OF THE ARMY — CROSSING THE COLORADO
THE RIO GRANDE.
AT last the preparations were complete and or-
ders were issued for the advance to begin on
the 8th of March. General Taylor had an army
of not more than three thousand men. One
battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent
troops were sent on by water to Brazos Santiago,
at the mouth of the Rio Grande. A guard was
left back at Corpus Christi to look after public
property and to take care of those who were too
sick to be removed. The remainder of the army,
probably not more than twenty five hundred men,
was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry
independent. Colonel Twiggs, with seven compa-
nies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery,
moved on the 8th. He was followed by the three
infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the
commands. Thus the rear brigade did not move
from Corpus Christi until the nth of March. In
view of the immense bodies of men moved on the
same day over narrow roads, through dense forests
ADVANCE OF THE ARMY. 85
and across large streams, in our late war, it seems
strange now that a body of less than three thousand
men should have been broken into four columns,
separated by a day's march.
General Taylor was opposed to anything like
plundering by the troops, and in this instance, I
doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the ag-
grieved party and was not willing to injure them
further than his instructions from Washington de-
manded His orders to the troops enjoined scrupu-
lous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons
and the payment of the highest price for all supplies
taken for the use of the army.
All officers of foot regiments who had horses
were permitted to ride them on the march when it
did not interfere with their military duties. As
already related, having lost my ** five or six dollars*
worth of horses *' but a short time before I deter-
mined not to get another, but to make the journey
on foot. My company commander, Captain Mc-
Call, had two good American horses, of consider-
ably more value in that country, where native horses
were cheap, than they were in the States. He used
one himself and wanted the other for his servant.
He was quite anxious to know whether I did not
intend to get me another horse before the march
began. I told him No ; I belonged to a foot regi-
ment I did not understand the object of his
86 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to
start, he said : " There, Grant, is a horse for
you." I found that he could not bear the idea of his
servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant
went a-foot. He had found a mustang, a three-year-
old colt only recently captured, which had been pur-
chased by one of the colored servants with the
regiment for the sum of three dollars. It was
probably the only horse at Corpus Christi that could
have been purchased just then for any reasonable
price. Five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per
cent, advance, induced the owner to part with the
mustang. I was sorry to take him, because I really
felt that, belonging to a foot regiment, it was my
duty to march with the men. But I saw the Cap-
tain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the
horse for the trip. The day we started was the first
time the horse had ever been under saddle. I
had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him,
though for the first day there were frequent dis-
agreements between us as to which way we should
go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. At
no time during the day could I choose exactly the
part of the column I would march with ; but after
that, I had as tractable a horse as any with the army,
and there was none that stood the trip better. He
never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the
grass he could pick within the length of his picket rope.
ADVANCE OF THE ARMY. 87
A few days out from Corpus Christi, the immense
herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between
the Nueces and the Rio Grande was seen directly in
advance of the head of the column and but a few
miles ofif. It was the very band from which the horse
I was riding had been captured but a few weeks be-
fore. The column was halted for a rest, and a num-
ber of officers, myself among them, rode out two or
three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd.
The country was a rolling prairie, and, from the
higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the
earth's curvature. As far as the eye could reach to
our right, the herd extended. To the left, it ex-
tended equally. There was no estimating the number
of animals in it ; I have no idea that they could all
have been corralled in the State of Rhode Island, or
Delaware, at one time. If they had been, they would
have been so thick that the pasturage would have
given out the first day. People who saw the South-
ern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can
appreciate the size of the Texas band of wild horses
in 1846.
At the point where the army struck the Colorado
River, the stream was quite wide and of sufficient
depth for navigation. The water was brackish and
the banks were fringed with timber. Here the whole
army concentrated before attempting to cross. The
army was not accompanied by a pontoon train,
88 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
and at that time the troops were not instructed
in bridge building. To add to the embarrass-
ment of the situation, the army was here^ for
the first time, threatened with opposition. Buglers,
concealed from our view by the brush on the
opposite side, sounded the "assembly," and other
military calls. Like the wolves before spoken of,
they gave the impression that there was a large
number of them and that, if the troops were in pro-
portion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour
General Taylor and his army. There were prob-
ably but few troops, and those engaged principally
in watching the movements of the " invader." A
few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam
the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed.
I do not remember that a single shot was fired.
The troops waded the stream, which was up to
their necks in the deepest part. Teams were crossed
by attaching a long rope to the end of the wagon
tongue, passing it between the two swing mules and
by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well
as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying
the end to men on the opposite shore. The bank
down to the water was steep on both sides. A rope
long enough to cross the river, therefore, was at-
tached to the back axle of the wagon, and men be-
hind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon
** beating " the mules into the water. This latter
CROSSING THE COLORADO. 89
rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of
the forward one back, to be used over again. The
water was deep enough for a short distance to swim
the little Mexican mules which the army was then
using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through
so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead,
that no time was left them to show their obstinacy.
In this manner the artillery and transportation of
the " army of occupation " crossed the Colorado
River.
About the middle of the month of March the ad-
vance of the army reached the Rio Grande and
went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite
the city of Matamoras and almost under the guns
of a small fort at the lower end of the town. There
was not at that time a single habitation from Corpus
Christi until the Rio Grande was reached.
The work of fortifying was commenced at once.
The fort was laid out by the engineers, but the work
was done by the soldiers under the supervision of
their officers, the chief engineer retaining general
directions. The Mexicans now became so incensed
at our near approach that some of their troops
crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe for
small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of
camp. They captured two companies of dragoons,
commanded by Captains Thornton and Hardee. The
latter figured as a general in the late war, on the
90 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
Confederate side, and was author of the tactics first
used by both armies. Lieutenant Theodric Porter,
of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with a small
detachment ; and Major Cross, the assistant quarter-
master-general, had also been killed not far from
camp.
There was no base of supplies nearer than Point
Isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the Rio
Grande and twenty-five miles away. The enemy,
if the Mexicans could be called such at this time
when no war had been declared, hovered about in
such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon
train after supplies with any escort that could be
spared. I have already said that General Taylor s
whole command on the Rio Grande numbered less
than three thousand men. He had, however, a few
more troops at Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago.
The supplies brought from Corpus Christi in wagons
were running short. Work was therefore pushed
with great vigor on the defences, to enable the mini-
mum number of troops to hold the fort. All the
men who could be employed, were kept at work
from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of
the day. With all this the fort was not completed
until the supplies grew so short that further delay
in obtaining more could not be thought of. By
the latter part of April the work was in a partially
defensible condition, and the 7th infantry. Major
THE RIO GRANDE. 9 1
Jacob Brown commanding, was marched in to garri-
son it, with some few pieces of artillery. All the
supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to
carry the rest of the army to Point Isabel, were
left with the garrison, and the march was com-
menced with the remainder of the command, every
wagon being taken with the army. Early on the
second day after starting the force reached its desti-
nation, without opposition from the Mexicans. There
was some delay in getting supplies ashore from ves-
sels at anchor in the open roadstead.
CHAPTER VII.
THE MEXICAN WAR THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO THE
BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA ARMY OF INVA-
SION — GENERAL TAYLOR MOVEMENT ON CAMARGO.
WHILE General Taylor was away with the
bulk of hfs army, the little garrison up the
river was besieged. As we lay in our tents upon the
sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the Rio Grande
could be distinctly heard.
The war had begun.
There were no possible means of obtaining news
from the garrison, and information from outside
could not be otherwise than unfavorable. What
General Taylor's feelings were during this suspense
I do not know ; but for myself, a young second-
lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun be-
fore, I felt sorry that I had enlisted. A great many
men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get
into the fray. When they say so themselves they
generally fail to convince their hearers that they
are as anxious as they would like to make believe,
and as they approach danger they become more
subdued. This rule is not universal, for I have
THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO. 93
known a few men who were always aching for a
fight when there was no enemy near, who were as
good as their word when the battle did come. But
the number of such men is small.
On the 7th of March the wagons were all loaded
and General Taylor started on his return, with his
army reinforced at Point Isabel, but still less than
three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on
the Rio Grande. The road from Point Isabel to
Matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie,
until the timber that borders the bank of the Rio
Grande is reached. This river, like the Mississippi,
flows through a rich alluvial valley in the most
meandering manner, running towards all points of
the compass at times within a few miles. Formerly
the river ran by Resaca de la Palma, some four or
five miles east of the present channel. The old bed
of the river at Resaca had become filled at places,
leaving a succession of little lakes. The timber that
had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a con-
siderable distance out, was still standing. This tim-
ber was struck six or eight miles out from the
besieged garrison, at a point known as Palo Alto —
"Tall trees" or ''woods."
Early in the forenoon of the 8th of May as
Palo Alto was approached, an army, certainly out-
numbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in
line of battle just in front of the timber. Their
94 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT,
bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight
formidably. The force was composed largely of
cavalry armed with lances. Where we were the
grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of
the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at
the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-
needle. General Taylor halted his army before
the head of column came in range of the artillery
of the Mexicans. He then formed a line of battle,
facing the enemy. His artillery, two batteries and
two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen,
were placed in position at intervals along the line.
A battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, of the artillery, as re-
serves. These preparations completed, orders were
given for a platoon of each company to stack arms
and go to a stream off to the right of the command,
to fill their canteens and also those of the rest
of their respective companies. When the men
were all back in their places in line, the command
to advance was given. As I looked down that long
line of about three thousand armed men, advancing
towards a larger force also armed, I thought what
a fearful responsibility General Taylor must feel,
commanding such a host and so far away from
friends. The Mexicans immediately opened fire
upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry.
At first their shots did not reach us, and the advance
THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO. 95
was continued. As we got nearer, the cannon balls
commenced going through the ranks. They hurt
no one, however, during this advance, because they
would strike the ground long before they reached our
line, and ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly
that the men would see them and open ranks and let
them pass. When we got to a point where the artil-
lery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and
the battle opened on both sides.
The infantry under General Taylor was armed
with flint-lock muskets, and paper cartridges charged
with powder, buck-shot and ball. At the distance
of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you
all day without your finding it out. The artillery
was generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only
solid shot ; but General Taylor had with him three
or four twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, be-
sides his eighteen-pounders before spoken of, that
had a long range. This made a powerful armament.
The Mexicans were armed about as we were so far
as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery
only fired solid shot. We had greatly the advantage
in this arm.
The artillery was advanced a rod or two in front
of the line, and opened fire. The infantry stood at
order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our
shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as
to step out of their way. It could be seen that the
96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
eighteenpounders and the howitzers did a great deal
of execution. On our side there was little or no loss
while we occupied this position. During the battle
Major Ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery
officer, was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Luther,
also of the artillery, was struck. During the day
several advances were made, and just at dusk it be-
came evident that the Mexicans were falling back.
We again advanced, and occupied at the close of the
battle substantially the ground held by the enemy
at the beginning. In this last move there was a brisk
fire upon our troops, and some execution was done.
One cannon-ball passed through our ranks, not far
from me. It took off the head of an enlisted man^
and the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment,
while the splinters from the musket of the killed
soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two
or three others, including one officer. Lieutenant
Wallen, — hurting them more or less. Our casualties
for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded.
At the break of day on the 9th, the army under
Taylor was ready to renew the battle ; but an advance
showed that the enemy had entirely left our front
during the night. The chaparral before us was im-
penetrable except where there were roads or trails,
with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimen-
sions. A body of men penetrating it might easily be
ambushed. It was better to have a few men caught
BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA. 97
in this way than the whole army, yet it was neces-
sary that the garrison at the river should be relieved.
To get to them the chaparral had to be passed.
Thus I assume General Taylor reasoned. He halted
the army not far in advance of the ground occupied
by the Mexicans the day before, and selected Cap-
tain C. F. Smith, of the artillery, and Captain McCall,
of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked
men each and find where the enemy had gone.
This left me in command of the company, an honor
and responsibility I thought very great
Smith and McCall found no obstruction in the way
of their advance until they came up to the succession
of ponds, before described, at Resaca. The Mexicans
had passed them and formed their lines on the op-
posite bank. This position they had strengthened a
little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their
front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches
and open places. Smith and McCall deployed on each
side of the road as well as they could, and engaged
the enemy at long range. Word was sent back, and
the advance of the whole army was at once com-
menced. As we came up we were deployed in
like manner. I was with the right wing, and led my
company through the thicket wherever a penetrable
place could be found, taking advantage of any clear
spot that would carry me towards the enemy. At
last I got pretty close up without knowing it. The
Vol. I. — 7
98 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead,
cutting the limbs of the chaparral right and left. We
could not see the enemy, so I ordered my men to lie
down, an order that did not have to be enforced. We
kept our position until it became evident that the
enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew to
find better ground to advance upon.
By this time some progress had been made on our
left. A section of artillery had been captured by the
cavalry, and some prisoners had been taken. The
Mexicans were giving way all along the line, and
many of them had, no doubt, left early. I at last
found a clear space separating two ponds. There
seemed to be a few men in front and I charged upon
them with my company. There was no resistance,
and we captured a Mexican colonel, who had been
wounded, and a few men. Just as I was sending
them to the rear with a guard of two or three men, a
private came from the front bringing back one of
our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance
of where I was. The ground had been charged over
before. My exploit was equal to that of the soldier
who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the
enemy. When asked why he did not cut off his
head, he replied : '* Some one had done that before."
This left no doubt in my mind but that the battle
of Resaca de la Palma would have been won, just as
it was, if I had not been there.
ARMY OF INVASION. 99
There was no further resistance. The evening of
the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground
near the Fort, and the garrison was relieved. The
siege had lasted a number of days, but the casualties
were few in number. Major Jacob Brown, of the
7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed,
and in his honor the fort was named. Since then a
town of considerable importance has sprung up on
the gfround occupied by the fort and troops, which
has also taken his name.
The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma
seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs ;
but we had only a faint conception of their magni-
tude until they were fought over in the North by the
Press and the reports came back to us. At the same
time, or about the same time, we learned that war
existed between the United States and Mexico, by
the acts of the latter country. On learning this fact
General Taylor transferred our camps to the south
or west bank of the river, and Matamoras was occu-
pied. We then became the " Army of Invasion."
Up to this time Taylor had none but regular troops
in his command ; but now that invasion had already
taken place, volunteers for one year commenced ar-
riving. The army remained at Matamoras until
sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into
the interior. General Taylor was not an officer to
trouble the administration much with his demands,
lOO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
but was inclined to do the best he could with the
means given him. He felt his responsibility as going
no further. If he had thought that he was sent to
perform an impossibility with the means given him,
he would probably have informed the authorities of
his opinion and left them to determine what should
be done. If the judgment was against him he would
have gone on and done the best he could with the
means at hand without parading his grievance before
the public. No soldier could face either danger or
responsibility more calmly than he. These are quali-
ties more rarely found than genius or physical courage.
General Taylor never made any great show or
parade, either of uniform or retinue. In dress he
was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in
the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an
officer ; but he was known to every soldier in his
army, and was respected by all. I can call to mind
only one instance when I saw him in uniform, and
one other when I heard of his wearing it. On both
occasions he was unfortunate. The first was at
Corpus Christi. He had concluded to review his
army before starting on the march and gave orders
accordingly. Colonel Twiggs was then second in
rank with the army, and to him was given the com-
mand of the review. Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-
General Worth, a far different soldier from Taylor
in the use of the uniform, was next to Twiggs in
GENERAL TAYLOR, lOI
rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet
rank when the accidents of service threw them where
one or the other had to command. Worth declined
to attend the review as subordinate to Twiggs until
the question was settled by the highest authority.
This broke up the review, and the question was re-
ferred to Washington for final decision.
General Taylor was himself only a colonel, in real
rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by
brevet He was assigned to duty, however, by the
President, with the rank which his brevet gave him.
Worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of com-
manding a division he must, under the army regula-
tions of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet
rank. The question was submitted to Washington,
and no response was received until after the army
had reached the Rio Grande. It was decided against
General Worth, who at once tendered his resigna-
tion and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the
same vessel that carried it. This kept him out of
the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.
Either the resignation was not accepted, or General
Worth withdrew it before action had been taken.
At all events he returned to the army in time to
command his division in the battle of Monterey, and
served with it to the end of the war.
The second occasion on which General Taylor
was said to have donned his uniform, was in order to
I02 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
receive a visit from the Flag Officer of the naval
squadron off the mouth of the Rio Grande. While
the army was on that river the Flag Officer sent
word that he would call on the General to pay his
respects on a certain day. General Taylor, knowing
that naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the
" law allowed " on all occasions of ceremony, thought
it would be only civil to receive his guest in the
same style. His uniform was therefore got out,
brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit.
The Flag Officer, knowing General Taylor's aversion
to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it
would be regarded as a compliment should he meet
him in civilian s dress, left off his uniform for this
occasion. The meeting was said to have been em-
barrassing to both, and the conversation was princi-
pally apologetic.
The time was whiled away pleasantly enough at
Matamoras, while we were waiting for volunteers.
It is probable that all the most important people of
the territory occupied by our army left their homes
before we got there, but with those remaining the
best of relations apparently existed. It was the
policy of the Commanding General to allow no pil-
laging, no taking of private property for public or
individual use without satisfactory compensation, so
that a better market was afforded than the people
had ever known before.
MOVEMENT ON CAM A EGO. I03
Among the troops that joined us at Matamoras
was an Ohio regiment, of which Thomas L. Hamer,
the Member of Congress who had given me my
appointment to West Point, was major. He told me
then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that
as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-gen-
eral, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. I
have said before that Hamer was one of the ablest
men Ohio ever produced. At that time he was in
the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age,
and possessed an admirable physique, promising long
life. But he was taken sick before Monterey, and
died within a few days. I have always believed that
had his life been spared, he would have been Presi-
dent of the United States during the term filled by
President Pierce. Had Hamer filled that office his
partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt I
should have been appointed to one of the staff corps
of the army — the Pay Department probably — and
would therefore now be preparing to retire. Neither
of these speculations is unreasonable, and they are
mentioned to show how little men control their own
destiny.
Reinforcements having arrived, in the month of
August the movement commenced from Matamoras
to Camargo, the head of navigation on the Rio
Grande. The line of the Rio Grande was all that
was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to in-
I04 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
vade Mexico from the North. In that case the
most natural route to take was the one which Gen-
eral Taylor selected. It entered a pass in the Sierra
Madre Mountains, at Monterey, through which the
main road runs to the City of Mexico. Monterey
itself was a good point to hold, even if the line of
the Rio Grande covered all the territory we desired
to occupy at that time. It is built on a plain two
thousand feet above tide water, where the air is
bracing and the situation healthy.
On the 19th of August the army started for
Monterey, leaving a small garrison at Matamoras.
The troops, with the exception of the artillery, cav-
alry, and the brigade to which I belonged, were
moved up the river to Camargo on steamers. As
there were but two or three of these, the boats
had to make a number of trips before the last of the
troops were up. Those who marched did so by
the south side of the river. Lieutenant-Colonel
Garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade com-
mander, and on this occasion commanded the entire
marching force. One day out convinced him that
marching by day in that latitude, in the month of
August, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, par-
ticularly for Northern men. The order of marching
was changed and night marches were substituted
with the best results.
When Camargo v/as reached, we found a city of
MOVEMENT ON CAMARGO. 105
tents outside the Mexican hamlet. I was detailed
to act as quartermaster and commissary to the
regiment. The teams that had proven abundantly
sufficient to ' transport all supplies from Corpus
Christi to the Rio Grande over the level prairies of
Texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the
reinforced army in a mountainous country. To ob-
viate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with
Mexicans to pack and drive them. I had charge of
the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of
the pack train to supplement them. There were not
men enough in the army to manage that train with-
out the help of Mexicans who had learned how. As
it was the difficulty was great enough. The troops
would take up their march at an early hour each
day. After they had started, the tents and cooking
utensils had to be made into packages, so that they
could be lashed to the backs of the mules. Sheet-
iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were incon-
venient articles to transport in that way. It took
several hours to get ready to start each morning,
and by the time we were ready some of the mules
first loaded would be tired of standing so long with
their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would
start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he
scattered his load ; others would lie down and try to
disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the
top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-
I06 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
poles for part of their loads would manage to run a
tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they would
take the other. I am not aware of ever having
used a profane expletive in my life ; but I would
have the charity to excuse those who may have done
so, if they were in charge of a train of Mexican pack
mules at the time.
CHAPTER VIII.
ADVANCE ON MONTEREY — THE BLACK FORT THE
BATTLE OF MONTEREY — SURRENDER OF THE CITY.
THE advance from Camargo was commenced on
the 5lh of September, The army was divided
into four columns, separated from each other by one
day's march. The advance reached Cerralvo in four
days and halted for the remainder of the troops to
come up. By the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and
the same day the advance resumed its march, followed
as before, a day separating the divisions. The for-
ward division halted again at Marin, twenty-four miles
from Monterey. Both this place and Cerralvo were
nearly deserted, and men, women and children were
seen running and scattered over the hills as we ap-
proached; but when the people returned they found
all their abandoned property safe, which must have
given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos — " the
Yankees." From Marin the movement was in mass.
On the 19th General Taylor, with his army, was en-
camped at Walnut Springs, within three miles of
Monterey.
The town is on a small stream coming out of
I08 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT,
the mountain-pass, and is backed by a range of
hills of moderate elevation. To the north, between
the city and Walnut Springs, stretches an exten-
sive plain. On this plain, and entirely outside of
the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, en-
closed on all sides, to which our army gave the name
of "Black Fort" Its guns commanded the ap-
proaches to the city to the full extent of their range.
There were two detached spurs of hills or mountains
to the north and north-west of the city, which were
also fortified. On one of these stood the Bishop's
Palace. The road to Saltillo leaves the upper or
western end of the city under the fire of the guns
from these heights. The lower or eastern end was
defended by two or three small detached works,
armed with artillery and infantry. To the south
was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back
of that the range of foot-hills. The plaza in the
centre of the city was the citadel, properly speaking.
All the streets leading from it were swept by artillery,
cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets.
The house-tops near the plaza were converted into
infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for
parapets. Such were the defences of Monterey in
September, 1847. General Ampudia, with a force of
certainly ten thousand men, was in command.
General Taylor s force was about six thousand five
hundred strong, in three divisions, under Generals
*
ADVANCE ON MONTEREY. lOQ
Butler, Twiggs and Worth. The troops went into
camp at Walnut Springs, while the engfineer officers,
under Major Mansfield — a General in the late war —
commenced their reconnoissance. Major Mansfield
found that it would be practicable to get troops
around, out of range of the Black Fort and the
works on the detached hills to the north-west of the
city, to the Saltillo road. With this road in our pos-
session, the enemy would be cut off from receiving
further supplies, if not from all communication with
the interior. General Worth, with his division some-
what reinforced, was given the task of gaining pos-
session of the Saltillo road, and of carrying the de-
tached works outside the city, in that quarter. He
started on his march early in the afternoon of the
20th. The divisions under Generals Butler and
Twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and
north sides of the city and the works on those fronts,
in support of the movement under General Worth.
Worth's was regarded as the main attack on Mon-
terey, and all other operations were in support of it.
His march this day was uninterrupted ; but the enemy
was seen to reinforce heavily about the Bishop's
Palace and the other outside fortifications on their
left. General Worth reached a defensible position
just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights
north-west of the city, and bivouacked for the night.
The engineer officers with him — Captain Sanders and
I I O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
Lieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards the com-
mander of the victorious National army at the battle
of Gettysburg — made a reconnoissance to the Saltillo
road under cover of night
During the night of the 20th General Taylor had
established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-
pounder howitzers and a ten-inch mortar, at a point
from which they could play upon Black Fort. A
natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to
protect men standing in it from the fire from the
fort, was selected and the battery established on the
crest nearest the enemy. The 4th infantry, then
consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered
to support the artillerists while they were intrenching
themselves and their guns. I was regimental quar-
termaster at the time and was ordered to remain in
charge of camp and the public property at Walnut
Springs. It was supposed that the regiment would
return to its camp in the morning.
The point for establishing the siege battery was
reached and the work performed without attract-
ing the attention of the enemy. At daylight the
next morning fire was opened on both sides and
continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great
fury. My curiosity got the better of my judgment,
and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see
what was going on. I had been there but a short
time when an order to charge was given, and lacking
THE BLACK FORT. 1 1 1
the moral courage to return to camp — ^where I had
been oixlered to stay — I charged with the regiment.
As soon as the troops were out of the depression
they came under the fire of Black Fort As they
advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding
the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry.
About one-third of the men engaged in the charge
were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes.
We retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but
eastward and perpendicular to the direct road run,
ning into the city from Walnut Springs. I was, I
believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the
charge who was on horseback. When we got to a
place of safety the regiment halted and drew itself
together — what was left of it. The adjutant of the
regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in
robust health, found himself very much fatigued
from running on foot in the charge and retreat, and,
seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that he
could be mounted also. I offered him my horse and
he accepted the offer. A few minutes later I saw
a soldier, a quartermasters man, mounted, not far
away. I ran to him, took his horse and was back
with the regiment in a few minutes. In a short time
we were off again ; and the next place of safety from
the shots of the enemy that I recollect of being in,
was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the
lower batteries. The adjutant to whom I had loaned
I 1 2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
my horse was killed, and I was designated to act in
his place.
This charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed.
We belonged to the brigade commanded by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Garland, and he had received orders
to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry
them if he could without too much loss, for the pur-
pose of creating a diversion in favor of Worth, who
was conducting the movement which it was intended
should be decisive. By a movement by the left flank
Garland could have led his men beyond the range of
the fire from Black Fort and advanced towards the
north-east angle of the city, as well covered from fire
as could be expected. There was no undue loss of
life in reaching the lower end of Monterey, except
that sustained by Garland's command.
Meanwhile Quitman's brigade, conducted by an
officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of
the city, and was placed under cover of the houses
without much loss. Colonel Garland's brigade also
arrived at the suburbs, and, by the assistance of some
of our troops that had reached house-tops from
which they could fire into a little battery covering the
approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery
was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon
another work of the enemy. An entrance into the
east end of the city was now secured, and the houses
protected our troops so long as they were inactive.
THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY I13
On the west General Worth had reached the Sal-
tillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss.
He turned from his new position and captured the
forts on both heights in that quarter. This gave him
possession of the upper or west end of Monterey.
Troops from both Twiggs's and Butler s divisions
were in possession of the east end of the town, but the
Black Fort to the north of the town and the plaza in
the centre were still in the possession of the enemy.
Our camps at Walnut Springs, three miles away,
were guarded by a company from each regiment. A
regiment of Kentucky volunteers guarded the mor-
tars and howitzers engaged against Black |^ort. Prac-
tically Monterey was invested.
There was nothing done on the 2 2d by the United
States troops; but the enemy kept up a harmless
fire upon us from Black Fort and the batteries still
in their possession at the east end of the city.
During the night they evacuated these ; so that on
the morning of the 23d we held undisputed posses-
sion of the east end of Monterey.
Twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city,
and well covered from the fire of the enemy. But
the streets leading to the plaza — all Spanish or
Spanish-American towns have near their centres a
square called a plaza — were commanded from all
directions by artillery. The houses were flat-roofed
and but one or two stories high, and about the plaza
Vol. I.— 8
THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY. II5
the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops
being protected from our fire by parapets made of
sand-bags. All advances into the city were thus
attended with much danger. While moving along
streets which did not lead to the plaza, our men were
protected from the fire, and from the view, of the
enemy except at the crossings ; but at these a vol-
ley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were
invariably encountered. The 3d and 4th regiments
of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in
this way and with heavy loss. The loss of the 3d
infantry in commissioned officers was especially
severe. There were only five companies of the regi-
ment and not over twelve officers present, and five
of these officers were killed. When within a square
of the plaza this small command, ten companies
in all, was brought to a halt. Placing themselves
under cover from the shots of the enemy, the men
would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags
on the neighboring houses. The exposure of a
single head would bring a volley from our soldiers.
We had not occupied this position long when it
was discovered that our ammunition was growing
low. I volunteered to go back* to the point we had
* General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to General
Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to the effect that he was
nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be
reinforced. Deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to
carry it. so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered his services,
which were accepted. — Publishers.
Il6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
Started from, report our position to General Twiggs,
and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. We
were at this time occupying ground off from the
street, in rear of the houses. My ride back was an
exposed one. Before starting I adjusted myself on
the side of my horse furthest from the enemy, and
with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle,
and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, I
started at full run. It was only at street crossings
that my horse was under fire, but these I crossed at
such a flying rate that generally I was past and under
cover of the next block of houses before the enemy
fired. I got out safely without a scratch.
At one place on my ride, I saw a sentry walking
in front of a house, and stopped to inquire what he
was doing there. Finding that the house was full
of wounded American officers and soldiers, I dis-
mounted and went in. I found there Captain Will-
iams, of the Engineer Corps, wounded in the head,
probably fatally, and Lieutenant Territt, also badly
wounded, his bowels protruding from his wound.
There were quite a number of soldiers also. Prom-
ising them to report their situation, I left, readjusted
myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was
soon with the troops at the east end. Before am-
munition could be collected, the two regiments I
had been with were seen returning, running the same
gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going
SURRENDER OF THE CITY. H7
in, but with comparatively little loss. The move-
ment was countermanded and the troops were with-
drawn. The poor wounded officers and men I had
found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the
night, and died.
While this was going on at the east, General
Worth, with a small division of troops, was advanc-
ing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the
city. He resorted to a better expedient for getting
to the plaza — the citadel — than we did on the
east. Instead of moving by the open streets, he
advanced through the houses, cutting passage-
ways from one to another. Without much loss
of life, he got so near the plaza during the night
that before morning, Ampudia, the Mexican com-
mander, made overtures for the surrender of the
city and garrison. This stopped all further hostil-
ities. The terms of surrender were soon agreed
upon. The prisoners were paroled and permitted
to take their horses and personal property with
them.
My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican
garrison of Monterey marching out of town as pris-
oners, and no doubt the same feeling was experi-
enced by most of our army who witnessed it. Many
of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances,
and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses
that did not look as if they could carry their riders
1 1 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
out of town. The men looked in but little better
condition. I thought how little interest the men be-
fore me had in the results of the war, and how little
knowledge they had of ** what it was all about."
After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey
a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. As had
been the case on the Rio Grande, the people who
remained at their homes fraternized with the
" Yankees " in the pleasantest manner. In fact, un-
der the humane policy of our commander, I question
whether the great majority of the Mexican people
did not regret our departure as much as they had
regretted our coming. Property and person were
thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for
all the products of the country such as the people
had never enjoyed before. The educated and
wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere,
abandoned their homes and remained away from
them as long as they were in the possession of the
invaders ; but this class formed a very small percent-
age of the whole population.
CHAPTER IX.
POLITICAL INTRIGUE BUENA VISTA — MOVEMENf:
AGAINST VERA CRUZ — SIEGE AND CAPTURE 0^1
VERA CRUZ,
THE Mexican war was a political war, and the ad-
ministration conducting it desired to make party j
capital out of it. General Scott was at the head of
the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledg
fessional capacity, his claim to the command
forces in the field was almost indisputable and does
not seem to have been denied by President Polk, or
Marcy, his Secretary of War. Scott was a Whig
and the administration was democratic. General
Scott was also known to have political aspirations,
and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil
positions as military victories. It would not do
therefore to give him command of the ' ' army of con-
quest." The plans submitted by Scott for a cam-
paign in Mexico were disapproved by the adminis-
tration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little
disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans
were not to be supported by the administration, suc-
cess could not be expected. This was on the 27th
I20 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
of May, 1846. Four days later General Scott was
notified that he need not go to Mexico. General
Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and fee-
ble to take the field. Colonel Zachary Taylor — a
brigadier-general by brevet — was therefore left in
command. He, too, was a Whig, but was not sup-
posed to entertain any political ambitions ; nor did
he ; but after the fall of Monterey, his third battle
and third complete victory, the Whig papers at home
began to speak of him as the candidate of their party
for the Presidency. Something had to be done to
neutralize his growing popularity. He could not be
relieved from duty in the field where all his battles
had been victories : the design would have been too
transparent. It was finally decided to send General
Scott to Mexico in chief command, and to authorize
him to carry out his own original plan : that is, cap-
ture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the
country. It was no doubt supposed that Scott's am-
bition would lead him to slaughter Taylor or destroy
his chances for the Presidency, and yet it was hoped
that he would not make sufficient capital himself to
secure the prize.
The administration had indeed a most embarrassing
problem to solve. It was engaged in a war of con-
quest which must be carried to a successful issue, or
the political object would be unattained. Yet all the
capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the
»
POLITICAL tUTRIGUB. \
Opposition, and the man selected for his lack of polit- ,
ical ambition had himself become a prominent can- j
didate for the Presidency. It was necessary to de-
stroy his chances promptly. The problem was to do
this without the loss of conquest and without per-
mitting another general of the same political party
to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the adminis-
tration of Mr. Polk made every preparation to dis-
grace Scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him
to such desperation that he would disgrace him-
self.
General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of
the Rio Grande, Matamoras and Saltillo from the
first. Now that he was in command of all the forces
in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his reg-
ular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as
he thought, to hold the line then in possession of
the invading army. Indeed Scott did not deem it
important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande,
and authorized Taylor to fall back to that line if he
chose. General Taylor protested against the deple-
tion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon
Buena Vista would indicate that he did not share the
views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of
conquest beyond the Rio Grande.
Scott had estimated the men and material that
would be required to capture Vera Cruz and to march
on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty
122 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
miles in the interior. He was promised all he asked
and seemed to have not only the confidence of the
President, but his sincere good wishes. The prom-
ises were all broken. Only about half the troops
were furnished that had been pledged, other war
material was withheld and Scott had scarcely started
for Mexico before the President undertook to super-
sede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H.
Benton as lieutenant-general. This being refused
by Congress, the President asked legislative authority
to place a junior over a senior of the same grade,
with the view of appointing Benton to the rank of
major-general and then placing him in command of
the army, but Congress failed to accede to this prop-
osition as well, and Scott remained in command :
but every general appointed to serve under him was
politically opposed to the chief, and several were
personally hostile.
General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point
Isabel, at the mouth of the Rio Grande, late in De-
cember, 1 846, and proceeded at once up the river to
Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to
meet him. Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards
Tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there.
He had started on this march before he was aware of
General Scott being in the country. Under these
circumstances Scott had to issue his orders designat-
ing the troops to be withdrawn from Taylor, without
»
fU'ENA rrsTA. 123
the persona! consultation he had expected to hold
with his subordinate.
General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, February
22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed
almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in
battle before, and over a vastly superior force nu-
merically, made his nomination for the Presidency
by the Whigs a foregone conclusion. He was nom-
inated and elected in 1848. I believe that he sin-
cerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring
the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to
the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of
any people, the Presidency of the United States.
When General Scott assumed command of the
army of invasion, I was in the division of General
David Twiggs, in Taylor's command ; but under the
new orders my regiment was transferred to the divi-
sion of General William Worth, in which I served
to the close of the war. The troops withdrawn
from Taylor to form part of the forces to operate
against Vera Cruz, were assembled at the mouth
of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation
for their destination. I found General Worth a
different man from any I had before served directly
under. He was nervous, impatient and restless on
the march, or when important or responsible duty
confronted him. There was not the least reason for
haste on the march, for it was known that it would
124 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point
of our embarkation to carry the army, but Gen-
eral Worth moved his division with a rapidity that
would have been commendable had he been going
to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. The length
of the marches was regulated by the distances be-
tween places affording a supply of water for the
troops, and these distances were sometimes long
and sometimes short General Worth on one occa-
sion at least, after having made the full distance
intended for the day, and after the troops were in
camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck
and made the march that night which had been
intended for the next day. Some commanders can
move troops so as to get the maximum distance out
of them without fatigue, while others can wear them
out in a few days without accomplishing so much.
General Worth belonged to this latter class. He
enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting
qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to
him.
The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the
neighborhood of the mouth of the Rio Grande for
several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to
carry it to its new field of operations. The trans-
ports were all sailing vessels. The passage was a
tedious one, and many of the troops were on ship-
board over thirty days from the embarkation at the
MOVEMBNT ACAIfTSr VERA CRUZ. 125 ,
mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarka-
tion south of Vera Cruz. The trip was a comfort-
less one for officers and men. The transports used
were built for carrying freight and possessed but
limited accommodations for passengers, and the cli-
mate added to the discomfort of all. i
The transports with troops were assembled in the i
harbor of Anton Lizardo, some sixteen miles south ,
of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the I
remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammuni-
tion and supplies of all kinds from the North. With
the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-
boat — the first vessel of the kind I had ever seen, '
and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any
one then with the army. At that day ocean steam-
ers were rare, and what there were were side-wheel-
ers. This little vessel, going through the fleet so
fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water
out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. I
recollect that Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th
infantrj', by whom I happened to be standing on the
deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, ex-
claimed, " Why, the thing looks as if it was propelled
by the force of circumstances."
Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, *^c little army
of ten or twelve thousand men, given Scott to invade
a country with a population of seven or eight mill-
ions, a mountainous country affording the greatest
126 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
possible natural advantages for defence, was all as-
sembled and ready to commence the perilous task
of landing from vessels lying in the open sea.
The debarkation took place inside of the little
island of Sacrificios, some three miles south of Vera
Cruz. The vessels could not get anywhere near
shore, so that everything had to be landed in light-
ers or surf-boats ; General Scott had provided these
before leaving the North. The breakers were some-
times high, so that the landing was tedious. The
men were got ashore rapidly, because they could
wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp
and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and
all stores had to be protected from the salt water,
and therefore their landing took several days. The
Mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw
no obstacles in the way of our landing except an
occasional shot from their nearest fort. During
the debarkation one shot took off the head of
Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reached any-
where near the same distance. On the 9th of March
the troops were landed and the investment of Vera
Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south of the city to
the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily
effected. The landing of stores was continued until
everything was got ashore.
Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to
1880, was a walled city. The wall extended from
SfECE Ah'D CAPTURE OF VESA CRUZ. \1f
the water's edge south of the town to the water aga
on the north. There were fortifications at intervals
along the line and at the angles. In front of the
city, and on an island half a mile out in the Gulf,
stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed fortification
of large dimensions and great strength for that
period. Against artillery of the present day the land
forts and walls would prove elements of weakness
rather than strength. After the invading army had
established their camps out of range of the fire from
the city, batteries were established, under cover of
night, far to the front of the line where the troops
lay. These batteries were intrenched and the ap-
proaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been
made at any time by the Mexicans, the men serving
the batteries could have been quickly reinforced
without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's
main line. No serious attempt was made to capture
the batteries or to drive our troops away.
The siege continued with brisk firing on our side
till the 27th of March, by which time a considerable
breach had been made in the wall surrounding the
city. Upon this General Morales, who was Govern-
or of both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, com-
menced a correspondence with General Scott look-
ing to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison.
On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were
occupied by Scott's army. About five thousand pris-
128 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
oners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides
large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell
into the hands of the victorious force. The casual-
ties on our side during the siege amounted to
sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded.
I
CHAPTER X.
MARCH TO JALAPA — BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO
PEROT E^PUEBLA — SCOTT AND TAVLOR.
GENERAL SCOTT had less than twelve thou-
sand men at Vera Cruz. He had been promised
by the administration a very much larger force, or
claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity.
Twelve thousand was a very small army with which
to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an
enemy's country, and to besiege the capital ; a city, at
that time, of largely over one hundred thousand in-
habitants. Then, too, any line of march that could be
selected led through mountain passes easily defended.
In fact, there were at that time but two roads from
Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico that could be taken
by an army; one by Jalapa and Perote, the other by
Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on
the great plain which extends to the City of Mexico
after the range of mountains is passed.
It was very important to get the army away from
Vera Cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the
yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city
early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not
130 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
acclimated ; but transportation, which was expected
from the North, was arriving very slowly. It was
absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the
army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and
above the fevers of the coast. At that point the
country is fertile, and an army of the size of General
Scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period.
Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons
for the captured city and fort, the moving column
was now less than ten thousand strong. This force
was composed of three divisions, under Generals
Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of
escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as
transportation enough could be got together to move
a division the advance was commenced. On the
8th of April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He
was followed very soon by Patterson, with his division.
General Worth was to bring up the rear with his
command as soon as transportation enough was as-
sembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with
the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison
equipage. It was the 13th of April before this di-
vision left Vera Cruz.
The leading division ran against the enemy at
Cerro Gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to
Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio, about
three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson
reached Plan del Rio with his division soon after
MARCH -JO /AI-AFA. I3I
Twiggs arrived. The two were then secure against
an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the
Mexican forces. At all events they confronted the
enemy without reinforcements and without molesta-
tion, until the 18th of April. General Scott had re-
mained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the
field; but on the i2lh, learning the situation at the
front, he hastened on to take personal supervision.
He at once commenced his preparations for the capt-
ure of the position held by Santa Anna and of the
troops holding it.
Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the
mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of Jalapa,
and Santa Anna had selected this point as the easiest
to defend against an invading army. The road, said
to have been built by Cortez, zigzags around the
mountain-side and was defended at everj' turn by
artillery. On either side were deep chasms or
mountain walls. A direct attack along the road
was an impossibility. A flank movement seemed
equally impossible. After the arrival of the
commanding-general upon the scene, reconnols-
sances were sent out to find, or to make, a road
by which the rear of the enemy's works might be
reached without a front attack. These reconnois-
sances were made under the supervision of Captain
Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G. T.
Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G, W.
132 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
Smith, George B. McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of
the corps of engineers, all officers who attained
rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great
conflict for the preservation of the unity of the
nation. The reconnoissance was completed, and the
labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank
of the enemy was effected by the 1 7th of the month.
This was accomplished without the knowledge of
Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where he
supposed it impossible. On the same day General
Scott issued his order for the attack on the i8th.
The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps
there was not a battle of the Mexican war, or of any
other, where orders issued before an engagement
were nearer being a correct report of what after-
wards took place. Under the supervision of the
engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to
the right where the walls were so steep that men
could barely climb them. Animals could not. These
had been opened under cover of night, without
attracting the notice of the enemy. The engineers,
who had directed the opening, led the way and the
troops followed. Artillery was let down the steep
slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong
rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a
piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept
their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a
few at the front directed the course of the piece. In
»
BATTLE OF CERSO GO J? DO. 1 33
like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the
opposite slopes. In this way Scott's troops reached
their assigned position in rear of most of the intrench-
ments of the enemy, unobserved. The attack was
made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a
hasty retreat, and those occupying them surrendered.
On the left General Pillow's command made a formid-
able demonstration, which doubtless held a part of
the enemy in his front and contributed to the vic-
tory. I am not pretending to give full details of all
the battles fought, but of the portion that I saw.
There were troops engaged on both sides at other
points in which both sustained losses; but the battle
was won as Iierc narrated.
The surprise of the enemy was complete, the vic-
tory overwhelming ; some three thousand prisoners
fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount of ord-
nance and ordnance stores. The prisoners were
paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and
ammunition destroyed. The battle of Buena Vista
was probably very important to the success of Gen-
eral Scott at Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign
from Vera Cruz to the great plains reaching to the
City of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna had to
protect his capital and the mountain passes west of
Vera Cruz, was the one he had with him confronting
General Taylor, It is not likely that he would have
gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United
134 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT
States troops when he knew his country was threat-
ened with invasion further south. When Taylor
moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena
Vista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the
invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get
back in time to meet General Scott in the mountain
passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor
was disastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwith-
standing this, he marched his army to Cerro Gordo,
a distance not much short of one thousand miles by
the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself
well before Scott got there. If he had been success-
ful at Buena Vista his troops would no doubt have
made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo.
Had the battle of Buena Vista not been fought
Santa Anna would have had time to move leisurely
to meet the invader further south and with an army
not demoralized nor depleted by defeat.
After the battle the victorious army moved on to
Jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and
healthy countr}% far above the fevers of the coast
Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and be-
tween there and the great plain the whole line of the
road is easy of defence. It was important, therefore,
to get possession of the great highway between the
sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it
leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have
time to re-organize and fortify in our front. Worth's
division was selected to go forward to secure this
result The division marched to Perote on the
great plain, not far from where the road debouches
from the mountains. There is a low, strong fort
on the plain in front of the town, known as the
Castle of Perote. This, however, offered no resist-
ance and fell into our hands, with its armament.
General Scott having now only nine or ten thou-
sand men west of Vera Cruz, and the time of some
four thousand of them being about to expire, a long
delay was the consequence. The troops were in
a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for
an indefinite period even if their line back to Vera
Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that
the men whose time would expire before the City of
Mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the
American army, would not remain beyond the term
for which they had volunteered, the commanding-
general determined to discharge them at once, for a
delay until the expiration of their time would have
compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during
the season of the vomito. This reduced Scott's
force in the 6eld to about five thousand men.
Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote
and marched on to Puebla. The roads were wide
and the country open except through one pass in a
spur of mountains coming up from the south, through
which the road runs. Notwithstanding this the small
136 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
column was divided into two bodies, moving a day
apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special
note, except that while lying at the town of Amo-
zoque — an easy day's march east of Puebla — a body
of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong,
was seen to our right, not more than a mile away.
A battery or two, with two or three infantry regi-
ments, was sent against them and they soon disap-
peared. On the 15th of May we entered the city of
Puebla.
General Worth was in command at Puebla until
the latter end of May, when General Scott arrived.
Here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, par-
ticularly under responsibilities, showed itself. During
his brief command he had the enemy hovering around
near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own.
The brigade to which I was attached changed quar-
ters three different times in about a week, occupying
at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the
city ; then at the western entrance ; then at the ex-
treme east. On one occasion General Worth had
the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three
days' cooked rations in their haversacks. He gal-
loped from one command to another proclaiming
the near proximity of Santa Anna with an army
vastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived
upon the scene the latter part of the month, and
nothing more was heard of Santa Anna and his myr-
PUEBLA. l^y
lads. There were, of coiir^^e, bodies of mounted
Mexicans hovering around to watch our movements
and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops,
if they ventured too far out. These always with-
drew on the approach of any considerable num-
ber of our soldiers. After the arrival of General
Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train
of wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure
forage. We had less than a thousand men as escort,
and never thought of danger. We procured fuU
loads for our entire train at two plantations, which
could easily have furnished as much more.
There had been great delay in obtaining the
authority of Congress for the raising of the troops
asked for by the administration. A bill was before
the National Legislature from early in the session of
1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional
regiments for the war to be attached to the regular
army, but it was the middle of February before it
became a law. Appointments of commissioned offi-
cers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted,
the regiments equipped and the whole transported
to Mexico. It was August before General Scott re-
ceived reinforcement sufficient to warrant an ad-
vance. His moving column, not even now more
than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions,
commanded by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and
Quitman. There was also a cavalry corps under
138 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
General Harney, composed of detachments of the ist,
2d, and 3d dragoons. The advance commenced on
the 7th of August with Twiggs's division in front
The remaining three divisions followed, with an in-
terval of a day between. The marches were short,
to make concentration easier in case of attack,
I had now been in battle with the two leading com-
manders conducting armies in a foreign land. The
contrast between the two was very marked. General
Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself en-
tirely for comfort. He moved about the field in
which he was operating to see through his own eyes
the situation. Often he would be without staff
ofificers, and when he was accompanied by them there
was no prescribed order in which they followed. He
was very much given to sit his horse side-ways —
with both feet on one side — particularly on the battle-
field. General Scott was the reverse in all these par-
ticulars. He always wore all the uniform prescribed
or allowed by law when he inspected his lines ; word
would be sent to all division and brigade commanders
in advance, notifying them of the hour when the com-
manding general might be expected. This was done
so that all the army might be under arms to salute their
chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his
dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs.
His staff proper, besides all officers constructively on
his staff — engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc,
SCOTT AND TAYLOR i3q
that could be spared — followed, also in uniform and
in prescribed order. Orders were prepared with great
care and evidently with the view that they should
be a history of what followed.
In their modes of expressing thought, these two
generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other
characteristics. General Scott was precise in lan-
guage, cultivated a style peculiarly his own ; was proud
of his rhetoric ; not aver::e to speaki ng of himself, often
in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon
the person he was talking about without the least
embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist,
but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly
that there could be no mistaking it. He knew how
to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-
chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the
construction of high-sounding sentences. But with
their opposite characteristics both were great and suc-
cessful soldiers ; both were true, patriotic and upright
in all their dealings. Both were pleasant to serve
under — Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw
more through the eyes of his stafT officers than
through his own. His plans were deliberately pre-
pared, and fully expressed In orders. Taylor saw
for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency
without reference to how they would read in his-
tory.
CHAPTER XI.
ADVANXE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO BATTLE OF CON-
TRERAS — ASSAULT AT CHURUBUSCO NEGOTIATIONS
FOR PEACE — BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY — STORM-
ING OF CHAPULTEPEC — SAN COSME — EVACUATION
OF THE CITY HALLS OF THE MONTEZUMAS.
TH E route followed by the army from Puebla to
the City of Mexico was over Rio Frio mountain,
the road leading over which, at the highest point, is
about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The
pass through this mountain might have been easily
defended, but it was not ; and the advanced division
reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla.
The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain,
on a plain backed by another mountain six miles far-
ther west, with others still nearer on the north and
south. Between the western base of Rio Frio
and the City of Mexico there are three lakes,
Chalco and Xochimilco on the left and Texcoco on
the right, extending to the east end of the City
of Mexico. Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a
narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the
city runs. Xochimilco is also to the left of the
ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO.
road, but at a considerable distance south of it,
and is connected with Lake ChaJco by a narrow
channel. There is a high rocky mound, called El
Penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the
low flat ground dividing the lakes. This mound was
strengthened by intrenchments at its base and sum-
mit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable.
Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotia
and other points near the eastern end of Lake Chalco.
Reconnoissances were made up to within gun-shot of
El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by
the south side of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and
come upon it from the south and south-west. A way
was fuuiid aruund the lake, and by ihc iSlIi u( August
troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about
eleven miles due south from the plaza of the cap-
ital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpam and the city
lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of
Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras.
All these points, except St. Augustin Tlalpam,
were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. Contreras
is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base,
where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion,
reaching nearly to San Antonio. This made the
approach to the city from the south very difficult.
The brigade to which I was attached — Gar-
land's, of Worth's division — was sent to con-
front San Antonio, two or three miles from
142 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
St. Augustin Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco
and the City of Mexico. The ground on which
San Antonio stands is completely in the valley,
and the surface of the land is only a little above
the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-
west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water.
To the south-west is the Pedregal — the volcanic rock
before spoken of — over which cavalry or artillery
could not be passed, and infantry would make but
poor progress if confronted by an enemy. From the
position occupied by Garland's brigade, therefore, no
movement could be made against the defences of San
Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow cause-
way, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which
was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry.
If Contreras, some three miles west and south, should
fall into our hands, troops from there could move to
the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy
between us and the city. Under these circumstances
General Scott directed the holding of the front of
the enemy without making an attack until further
orders.
On the 1 8th of August, the day of reach-
ing San Augustin Tlalpam, Garland's brigade
secured a position within easy range of the
advanced intrenchments of San Antonio, but
where his troops were protected by an arti-
ficial embankment that had been thrown up for
some other purpose than defence. General Scott at
once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about
Contreras, and on the igth movements were com-
menced to get troops into positions from which an
assault could be made upon the force occupying that
place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east,
and the mountain on the south, made the passage by
either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their
work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks ;
but a road was completed during the day and night
of the 1 gth, and troops were got to the north and west
of the enemy.
This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an
engagement in which the officers of ihe engineer
corps won special distinction. In fact, in both
cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were
made easier for the troops that had to execute them
than they would have been on an ordinary field. The
very strength of each of these positions was, by the
skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for
the assaulting parties while securing their positions
for final attack. All the troops with General Scott
in the valley of Mexico, except a part of the division
of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the
brigade of Garland (Worth's division) at San An-
tonio, were engaged at the battle of Contreras, or
were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their
chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. The
144 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in
less than half an hour from the sound of the advance
the position was in our hands, with many prisoners
and large quantities of ordnance and other stores.
The brigade commanded by General Riley was from
its position the most conspicuous in the final assault,
but all did well, volunteers and regulars.
From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we
could see the progress made at Contreras and the
movement of troops toward the flank and rear of the
enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the way back
to the city could see the same thing, and their con-
duct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight
We moved out at once, and found them gone from
our immediate front. Clarke's brigade of Worth's
division now moved west over the point of the Ped-
regal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently
to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the
causeway leading to Churubusco and the City of
Mexico. When he approached Churubusco his
left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a t6te-de-
pont at that place and brought on an engagement.
About an hour after, Garland was ordered to advance
directly along the causeway, and got up in time to
take part in the engagement. San Antonio was
found evacuated, the evacuation having probably
taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the
stars and stripes waving over Contreras.
ASSAULT AT CHURUBUSCO, 145
The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and
even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved
by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way
of San Antonio and Churubusco. It was expected
by the commanding general that these troops would
move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of
his position at Churubusco, before turning east to
reach the San Antonio road, but they did not suc-
ceed in this, and Churubusco proved to be about the
severest battle fought in the valley of Mexico.
General Scott coming upon the battle-field about
this juncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to
move north and turn the right of the enemy. This
Shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy
loss. The enemy finally gave way, 'leaving in our
hands prisoners, artillery and small arms. The bal-
ance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the
very gates of the city, fell in like manner. I recollect
at this place that some of the gunners who had stood
their ground, were deserters from General Taylor's
army on the Rio Grande.
Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General
Scott in these various engagements of the 20th of
August, 1847, were faultless as I look upon them now,
after the lapse of so many years. As before stated, the
work of the engineer ofificers who made the reconnois-
sances and led the different commands to their destina-
tions, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his
Vol. I. — 10
146 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
orders to his various subordinates with all the pre-
cision he could use on an ordinary march. I mean,
up to the points from which the attack was to com-
mence. After that point is reached the enemy often
induces a change of orders not before contemplated.
The enemy outside the city outnumbered our sol-
diery quite three to one, but they had become so de-
moralized by the succession of defeats this day, that
the City of Mexico could have been entered without
much further bloodshed. In fact, Captain Philip
Kearney — afterwards a general in the war of the re-
bellion — rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very
gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered
with his little force, only at that point he was badly
wounded, as wVe several of his officers. He had
not heard the call for a halt.
General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in
Mexico, at Puebla, a short time before the advance
upon the capital commenced. He had consequently
not been in any of the engagements of the war up to
the battle of Contreras. By an unfortunate fall of
his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was pain-
fully injured. The next day, when his brigade, with
the other troops engaged on the same field, was
ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guard-
ing the diflferent points of the road from San Augus-
tin Tlalpam to the city. General Pierce attempted to
accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered
NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. 1 47
to do SO, and fainted This circumstance gave rise to
exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when
he became a candidate for the Presidency. Whatever
General Pierce's qualifications may have been for
the Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of
courage. I was not a supporter of him politically,
but I knew him more intimately than I did any other
of the volunteer generals.
General Scott abstained from entering the city at
this time, because Mr. Nicholas P. Trist,the commis-
sioner on the part of the United States to negotiate a
treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and
either he or General Scott thought — probably both of
them — that a treaty would be more possible while the
Mexican government was in possession of the capital
than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands
of an invader. Be this as it may, we did not enter
at that time. The army took up positions along
the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as
far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were at once
entered into with Santa Anna, who was then practi-
cally the Government and the immediate commander
of all the troops engaged in defence of the country.
A truce was signed which denied to either party the
right to strengthen its position, or to receive re-
inforcements during the continuance of the armis-
tices, but authorized General Scott to draw sup-
plies for his army from the city in the meantime.
148 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
Negotiations were commenced at once and were
kept up vigorously, between Mr. Trist and the com-
missioners appointed on the part of Mexico, until the
2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed in
his ultimatum. Texas was to be given up absolutely
by Mexico, and New Mexico and California ceded
to the United States for a stipulated sum to be after-
wards determined. I do not suppose Mr. Trist had
any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries.
The war was one of conquest, in the interest of an in-
stitution, and the probabilities are that private in-
structions were for the acquisition of territory out of
which new States might be carved. At all events the
Mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that
they commenced preparations for defence, without
giving notice of the termination of the armistice. The
terms of the truce had been violated before, when
teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies
for the army. The first train entering the city was
very severely threatened by a mob. This, however,
was apologized for by the authorities and all responsi-
bility for it denied ; and thereafter, to avoid exciting
the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their
escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in
barracks and the citizens in bed. The circumstance
was overlooked and negotiations continued. As
soon as the news reached General Scott of the second
violation of the armistice, about the 4th of September,
BATTLE OF MO UNO DEL REV. 1 49
he wrote a vigorous note to President Santa Anna,
calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatis-
factory reply, declared the armistice at an end.
General Scott, with Worth's division, was now
occupying Tacubaya, a village some four miles south-
west of the City of Mexico, and extending from the
base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a
mile. More than a mile west, and also a little above
the plain, stands Molino del Rey. The mill is a long
stone structure, one story high and several hundred
feet in length. At the period of which I speak Gen-
eral Scott supposed a portion of the mill to be used
as a foundry for the casting of guns. This, however,
proved to be a mistake. It was valuable to the
Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained.
The building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags
over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formida-
ble defence for infantry. Chapultepec is a mound
springing up from the plain to the height of probably
three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line be-
tween Molino del Rey and the western part of the
city. It was fortified both on the top and on the
rocky and precipitous sides.
The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two
aqueducts, resting on strong stone arches. One of
these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a
mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino
del Rey, and runs north close to the west base of
150 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Chapultepec ; thence along the centre of a wide road,
until it reaches the road running east into the city
by the Garita San Cosme ; from which point the
aqueduct and road both run east to the city.
The second aqueduct starts from the east base of
Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs
north-east to the city. This aqueduct, like the other,
runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving
a space on each side. The arches supporting the
aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops
as well as to those engaged defensively. At points
on the San Cosme road parapets were thrown across,
with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery
in each. At the point where both road and aque-
duct turn at right angles from north to east, there
was not only one of these parapets supplied by one
gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the
north of the San Cosme road, facing south and
commanding a view of the road back to Chapulte-
pec, were covered with infantry, protected by para-
pets made of sand-bags. The roads leading to garitas
(the gates) San Cosme and Belen, by which these
aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched.
Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides
of both roads. Such were the defences of the City
of Mexico in September, 1847, on the routes over
which General Scott entered.
Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been
BATTLE OF MOUNO DEL REY. 151
very partial to General Worth — indeed he continued
so up to the close of hostilities — but, for some
reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief.
Scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart.
He did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary
showed every disposition to appease his subordinate.
It was understood at the time that he gave Worth
authority to plan and execute the battle of Molino
del Rey without dictation or interference from any
one, for the very purpose of restoring their former
relations. The effort failed, and the two generals
remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each
other, if not actually hostile.
The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the
8th of September. The night of the 7th, Worth
sent for his brigade and regimental commanders,
with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive
instructions for the morrow. These orders contem-
plated a movement up to within striking distance of
the Mills before daylight The engineers had re-
connoitred the ground as well as possible, and had
acquired all the information necessary to base proper
orders both for approach and attack.
By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops
to be engaged at Molino were all at the places des-
ignated. The ground in front of the Mills, to the
south, was commanded by the artillery from the sum-
mit of Chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries
152 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
at hand ; but a charge was made, and soon all was oven
Worth's troops entered the Mills by every door, and
the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultei>ec
Had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt
Americans and Mexicans would have gone over the
defences of Chapultepec so near together that the
place would have fallen into our hands without further
loss. The defenders of the works could not have
fired upon us without endangering their own men.
This was not done, and five days later more val-
uable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had
been so nearly in our possession on the 8th. I do
not criticise the failure to capture Chapultepec at
this time. The result that followed the first assault
could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit
by the unexpected advantage, the commanding gen-
eral must have been on the spot and given the
necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops
must have kept on without orders. It is always, how-
ever, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped
or otherwise directed. The loss on our side at Molino
del Rey was severe for the numbers engaged. It
was especially so among commissioned officers.
I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the
Mills. In passing through to the north side, looking
towards Chapultepec, I happened to notice that there
were armed Mexicans still on top of the building,
only a few feet from many of our men. Not seeing
STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC. 1 53
any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the build-
ing, I took a few soldiers, and had a cart that hap-
pened to be standing near brought up, and, placing
the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels
so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a
sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet
of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the
building, followed by a few men, but found a private
soldier had preceded me by some other way. There
were still quite a number of Mexicans on the roof,
among them a major and five or six officers of lower
grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before
our troops occupied the building. They still had
their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was
walking as sentry', guarding the prisoners he had sur-
rounded, all by himself. I halted the sentinel, re-
ceived the swords from the commissioned officers, and
proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now with
me, to disable the muskets by striking them against
the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground
below.
Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops
engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard
over the captured position and property, were marched
back to their quarters in Tacubaya. The engage-
ment did not last many minutes, but the killed and
wounded were numerous for the number of troops
engaged.
154 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
During the night of the nth batteries were estab-
lished which could play upon the fortifications of
Chapultepec. The bombardment commenced early
on the morning of the 1 2th, but there was no further
engagement during this day than that of the artillery.
General Scott assigned the capture of Chapultepec
to General Pillow, but did not leave the details to
his judgment. Two assaulting columns, two hundred
and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the
occasion, were formed. They were commanded by
Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively. The as-
sault was successful, but bloody.
In later years, if not at the time, the battles of
Molino del Rey and Chapultepec have seemed to me
to have been wholly unnecessary. When the assaults
upon the garitas of San Cosme and Belen were de-
termined upon, the road running east to the former
gate could have been reached easily, without an en-
gagement, by moving along south of the Mills until
west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence
north to the road above mentioned ; or, if desirable
to keep the two attacking columns nearer together,
the troops could have been turned east so as to come
on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from
Chapultepec. In like manner, the troops designated
to act against Belen could have kept east of Chapul-
tepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct,
also out of range of Chapultepec. Molino del Rey
SAN COSME. 155
and Chapukepec would both have been necessarily
evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they
would ha\'e been turned.
General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of
Mississippi, who stood well with the army both as a
soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting
against Belen. General Worth commanded the col-
umn against San Cosme. When Chapukepec fell the
advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads.
I was on the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most
that took place on that route. When opposition
was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by
keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct,
advancing an arch at a time. We encountered no
serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point
where the road we were on intersects that running
east to the city, the point where the aqueduct turns
at a right angle. I have described the defences
of this position before. There were but three com-
missioned officers besides myself, that I can now call
to mind, with the advance when the above position
was reached. One of these officers was a Lieutenant
Semmes, of the Marine Corps. I think Captain Gore,
and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th infantry, were the
others. Our progress was stopped for the time by
the single piece of artillery at the angle of the
roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back
from it
156 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT,
West of the road from where we were, stood a
house occupying the south-west angle made by the
San Cosme road and the road we were moving
upon. A stone wall ran from the house along each
of these roads for a considerable distance and thence
back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about
the house. I watched my opportunity and skipped
across the road and behind the south wall. Proceed-
ing cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, I
peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still
cautiously, until the road running east and west was
reached. I then returned to the troops, and called
for volunteers. All that were close to me, or that
heard me, about a dozen, offered their services.
Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I
watched our opportunity and got them across the
road and under cover of the wall beyond, before
the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under
cover of the arches kept a close watch on the in-
trenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops
beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above
the parapets they would fire at it Our crossing was
thus made practicable without loss.
When we reached a safe position I instructed my
little command again to carry their arms at a trail,
not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and
to move very cautiously following me until the San
Cosme road was reached ; we would then be on the
SAN COSME. 157
flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and
with no obstruction between us and them. When
we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure
before described, I saw some United States troops
pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who
had come up since my reconnaissance. This was the
company of Captain Horace Brooks, of the artillery,
acting as infantry. I explained to Brooks briefly
what I had discovered and what I was about to do.
He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I
inight go on and he would follow. As soon as we got
on the road leading to the city the troops serving
the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the
house-tops near by followed; our men went after
them in such close pursuit — the troops we had left
under the arches joining — that a second line across
the road, about half-way between the first and the
garita, was carried. No reinforcements had yet
come up except Brooks's company, and the position
we had taken was too advanced to be held by so
small a force. It was given up, but retaken later in
the day, with some loss.
Worth's command gradually advanced to the front
now open to it. Later in the day in reconnoi-
tring I found a church off to the south of the
road, which looked to me as if the belfry would
command the ground back of the garita San
Cosme. I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a
158 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, 5. GRANT.
mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with
me. The road being in possession of the enemy,
we had to take the field to the south to reach the
church. This took us over several ditches breast
deep in water and grown up with water plants.
These ditches, however, were not over eight or ten
feet in width. The howitzer was taken to pieces
and carried by the men to its destination. When I
knocked for admission a priest came to the door,
who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us.
With the little Spanish then at my command, I ex-
plained to him that he might save property by open-
ing the door, and he certainly would save himself
from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least ; and
besides, I intended to go in whether he consented
or not He beg^n to see his duty in the same light
that I did, and opened the door, though he did not
look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so.
The gun was carried to the belfry and put together.
We were not more than two or three hundred
yards from San Cosme. The shots from our
little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created
great confusion. Why they did not send out a
small party and capture us, I do not know. We
had no infantry or other defences besides our one
gun.
The effect of this g^n upon the troops about the
gate of the city was so marked that General Worth
EVACUATION OF THE CITY. 1 59
saw it from his position.* He was so pleased that
he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Pemberton — later
Lieutenant-General commanding the defences of
Vicksburg — to bring me to him. He expressed his
gratification at the services the howitzer in the
church steeple was doing» saying that every shot
was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs
to report to me with another howitzer to be placed
along with the one already rendering so much ser-
vice. I could not tell the General that there was not
room enough in the steeple for another gun, because
he probably would have looked upon such a state-
ment as a contradiction from a second lieutenant I
took the captain with me, but did not use his gun.
The night of the 13th of September was spent by
the troops under General Worth in the houses near
San Cosme, and in line confronting the general line
of the enemy across to Belen. The troops that I
was with were in the houses north of the road lead-
ing into the city, and were engaged during the night
in cutting passage-ways from one house to another
towards the town. During the night Santa Anna,
with his army — except the deserters — left the city.
He liberated all the convicts confined in the town,
hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some
injury before daylight ; but several hours after Santa
* Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and General
Worth.— PUBUSHERS.
vAucrwHEnco
ArumoFTHEMEncAnn
HALLS OF THE MONTEZUMAS. l6l
Anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a
delegation to General Scott to ask — if not demand —
an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of
citizens and the supremacy of the city government
in the management of municipal affairs. General
Scott declined to trammel himself with conditions,
but gave assurances that those who chose to remain
within our lines would be protected so long as they
behaved themselves properly.
General Quitman had advanced along his line
very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his
command occupied nearly the same position at
Belen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme.
After the interview above related between General
Scott and the city council, orders were issued for
the cautious entry of both columns in the morning.
The troops under Worth were to stop at the Ala-
meda, a park near the west end of the city. Quit-
man was to go directly to the Plaza, and take
possession of the Palace — a mass of buildings on the
east side in which Congress has its sessions, the
national courts are held, the public ofifices are all
located, the President resides, and much room is left
for museums, receptions, etc. This is the building
generally designated as the ** Halls of the Monte-
zumas."
Vol. I.- II
CHAPTER XII.
PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT — CAPTURE OF THE
CITY OF MEXICO — THE ARMY — MEXICAN SOLDIERS
— PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.
ON entering the city the troops were fired upon by
the released convicts, and possibly by deserters
and hostile citizens. The streets were deserted, and
the place presented the appearance of a '* city of the
dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from
house-tops, windows, and around corners. In this
firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment. Gar-
land, was badly wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith,
of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. He
died a few days after, and by his death I was pro-
moted to the grade of first lieutenant. I had gone
Note. — It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a greait many years
before the Mexican war to have established in the United States a soldiers'
home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly. I believe, in
France. He recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual
reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any hearing. Now, as he had
conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and
cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and ap-
pointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum thus realized he
• had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo, sales of captured government
tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220,000. Por-
PROMOTION TO FIRST UEUTENANT. 1 63
into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second
lieutenant, and I entered the city of Mexico sixteen
months later with the same rank, after having been
in all the engagements possible for any one man
and in a regiment that lost more officers during
the war than it ever had present at any one engage-
ment My regiment lost four commissioned officers,
all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during
the Mexican war. The Mexicans were not so dis-
criminating. They sometimes picked off my
juniors.
General Scott soon followed the troops into the
city, in state. I wonder that he was not fired upon,
but I believe he was not ; at all events he was not
hurt. He took quarters at first in the ** Halls of the
Montezumas," and from there issued his wise and
discreet orders for the government of a conquered
city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated
convicts already spoken of — orders which chal-
lenge the respect of all who study them. Lawless-
tions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the
wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $i i8 ,000
remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the war was over and the
troops all home. General Scott applied to have this money, which had never
been turned into the Treasury of the United States, expended in establishing
such homes as he had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation
of the Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,
Kentucky.
The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never had many sol-
diers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.
164 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ness was soon suppressed, and the City of Mexico
settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. The
people began to make their appearance upon the
streets without fear of the invaders. Shortly after-
wards the bulk of the troops were sent from the
city to the villages at the foot of the mountains,
four or five miles to the south and south-west
Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican
war and the manner in which it was brought about,
I have no means of knowing. His orders to troops
indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little
regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. On
the other hand, General Taylor's, I think, indicate
that he considered the administration accountable
for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on
himself further than for the faithful performance of
his duties. Both generals deserve the commenda-
tions of their countrymen and to live in the grateful
memory of this people to the latest generation.
Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the
plain, reached after passing the mountains east of
Perote, extends to the cities of Puebla and Mexico.
The route travelled by the army before reaching
Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain com-
ing up from the south. This pass is very susceptible
of defence by a smaller against a larger force.
Again, the highest point of the road-bed between
Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico is over Rio Frio
CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. 1 65
mountain, which also might have been successfully
defended by an inferior against a superior force.
But by moving north of the mountains, and about
thirty miles north of Puebla, both of these passes
would have been avoided. The road from Perote to
the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as
the prairies in our West. Arriving due north from
Puebla, troops could have been detached to take
possession of that place, and then proceeding west
with the rest of the army no mountain would have
been encountered before reaching the City of Mexico.
It is true this road would have brought troops in
by Guadalupe — ^a town, church and detached spur
of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all
bearing the same general name— and at this point
Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which
was fortified both at the base and on the sides : but
troops could have passed north of the mountain and
come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so
flanked the position, as they actually did on the
south.
It has always seemed to me that this northern
route to the City of Mexico, would have been the
better one to have taken. But my later experience
has taught me two lessons: first, that things are
seen plainer after the events have occurred ; second,
that the most confident critics are generally those
who know the least about the matter criticised. I
1 66 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
know just enough about the Mexican war to approve
heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ
with a little of it. It is natural that an important
city like Puebla should not have been passed with
contempt ; it may be natural that the direct road to
it should have been taken ; but it could have been
passed, its evacuation insured and possession ac-
quired without danger of encountering the enemy
in intricate mountain defiles. In this same way
the City of Mexico could have been approached
without any danger of opposition, except in the open
field.
But General Scott's successes are an answer to all
criticism. He invaded a populous country, pene-
trating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior,
with a force at no time equal to one-half of that
opposed to him ; he was without a base ; the enemy
was always intrenched, always on the defensive ; yet
he won every battle, he captured the capital, and
conquered the government. Credit is due to the
troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the
strategy were the general's.
I had now made marches and been in battle under
both General Scott and General Taylor. The
former divided his force of 10,500 men into four col-
umns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla
to the capital of the nation, when it was known that
an army more than twice as large as his own stood
THE ARMY, 1 67
ready to resist his coming. The road was broad
and the country open except in crossing the Rio
Frio mountain. General Taylor pursued the same
course in marching toward an enemy. He moved
even in smaller bodies. I never thought at the time
to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all
matters pertaining to their profession. I supposed
they moved in small bodies because more men could
not be passed over a single road on the same day
with their artillery and necessary trains. Later
I found the fallacy of this belief. The rebellion,
which followed as a sequence to the Mexican
war, never could have been suppressed if larger
bodies of men could not have been moved at the
same time than was the custom under Scott and
Taylor.
The victories in Mexico were, in every instance,
over vastly superior numbers. There were two
reasons for this. Both General Scott and General
Taylor had such armies as are not often got to-
gether. At the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-
la-Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it
was composed exclusively of regular troops, under
the best of drill and discipline. Every officer, from
the highest to the lowest, was educated in his pro-
fession, not at West Point necessarily, but in the
camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars.
The rank and file were probably inferior, as material
1 68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that
participated in all the later battles of the war ; but
they were brave men, and then drill and discipline
brought out all there was in them. A better army,
man for man, probably never faced an enemy than
the one commanded by General Taylor in the earli-
est two engagements of the Mexican war. The volun-
teers who followed were of better material, but
without drill or discipline at the start They
were associated with so many disciplined men
and professionally educated officers, that when
they went into engagements it was with a confi-
dence they would not have felt otherwise. They
became soldiers themselves almost at once. All
these conditions we would enjoy again in case of
war.
The Mexican army of that day was hardly an
organization. The private soldier was picked up
from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted ;
his consent was not asked ; he was poorly clothed,
worse fed, and seldom paid. He was turned
adrift when no longer wanted. The officers of
the lower grades were but little superior to the
men. With all this I have seen as brave stands
made by some of these men as I have ever seen
made by soldiers. Now Mexico has a standing army
larger than that of the United States. They have
a military school modelled after West Point. Their
MEXICAN SOLDIERS. ' 1 69
officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave.
The Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibil-
ity in this generation.
The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it
would be well if we would imitate in part, but with
more regard to truth. They celebrate the anniver-
saries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very
great victories. The anniversaries are recognized as
national holidays. At these two battles, while the
United States troops were victorious, it was at very
great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexi-
cans suffered. The Mexicans, as on many other oc-
casions, stood up as well as any troops ever did
The trouble seemed to be the lack of experience
among the officers, which led them after a certain
time to simply quit, without being particularly
whipped, but because they had fought enough.
Their authorities of the present day grow enthu-
siastic over their theme when telling of these vic-
tories, and speak with pride of the large sum of
money they forced us to pay in the end. With us,
now twenty years after the close of the most stupend-
ous war ever known, we have writers — who profess
devotion to the nation — engaged in trying to prove
that the Union forces were not victorious ; prac-
tically, they say, we were slashed around from Donel-
son to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga ; and in the
East from Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the
170 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion.
There is no difference in the amount of romance in
the two stories.
I would not have the anniversaries of our victories
celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days
and spent in humiliation and prayer; but I would
like to see truthful history written. Such history
will do full credit to the courage, endurance and sol-
dierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what
section of the country he hailed from, or in what
ranks he fought. The justice of the cause which
in the end prevailed, will, I doubt not, come to be
acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time.
For the present, and so long as there are living wit-
nesses of the great war of sections, there will be
people who will not be consoled for the loss of a
cause which they believed to be holy. As time
passes, people, even of the South, will begin to
wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever
fought for or justified institutions which acknowl-
edged the right of property in man.
After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of
the government of Mexico, it looked very much as
if military occupation of the country for a long
time might be necessary. General Scott at once
began the preparation of orders, regulations and
laws in view of this contingency. He contemplated
making the country pay all the expenses of the oc-
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. I7I
cupation, without the army becoming a perceptible
burden upon the people. His plan was to levy a
direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the
ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports.
From the beginning of the war private property had
not been taken, either for the use of the army or of
individuals, without full compensation. This policy
was to be pursued. There were not troops enough
in the valley of Mexico to occupy many points, but
now that there was no organized army of the enemy
of any size, reinforcements could be got from the
Rio Grande, and there were also new volunteers ar-
riving from time to time, all by way of Vera Cruz.
Military possession was taken of Cuernavaca, fifty
miles south of the City of Mexico ; of Toluca, nearly
as far west, and of Pachuca, a mining town of great
importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. Vera
Cruz, Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already in
our possession.
Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed
in the person of Santa Anna, and it looked doubtful
for a time whether the United States commissioner,
Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate with.
A temporary government, however, was soon es-
tablished at Queretaro, and Trist began negotiations
for a conclusion of the war. Before terms were final-
ly agreed upon he was ordered back to Washing-
ton, but General Scott prevailed upon him to remain,
172 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and
the administration must approve his acts if he suc-
ceeded in making such a treaty as had been contem-
plated in his instructions. The treaty was finally
signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted by the
government at Washington. It is that known as the
" Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo," and secured to
the United States the Rio Grande as the boundary
of Texas, and the whole territory then included in
New Mexico and Upper California, for the sum of
$15,000,000.
Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the oppo-
sition of Generals Pillow, Worth and Colonel Dun-
can to General Scott became very marked. Scott
claimed that they had demanded of the President his
removal. I do not know whether this is so or not,
but I do know of their unconcealed hostility to
their chief. At last he placed them in arrest, and
preferred charges against them of insubordination
and disrespect. This act brought on a crisis in the
career of the general commanding. He had asserted
from the beginning that the administration was hos-
tile to him ; that it had failed in its promises of men
and war material ; that the President himself had
shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to
procure the appointment of Benton : and the ad-
ministration now gave open evidence of its enmity.
About the middle of February orders came conven-
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, I 73
ing a court of inquiry, composed of Brevet Brig^a-
dier-General Towson, the surgeon-general of the
army, Brigadier-General Gushing and Colonel Bel-
knap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and
the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were re-
ceived from Washington, relieving Scott of the com-
mand of the army in the field and assigning Major-
General William O. Butler of Kentucky to the
place. This order also released Pillow, Worth and
Duncan from arrest
If a change was to be made the selection of Gen-
eral Butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so
far as I remember to have heard expressions on
the subject. There were many who regarded the
treatment of General Scott as harsh and unjust. It
is quite possible that the vanity of the General had
led him to say and do things that afforded a plaus-
ible pretext to the administration for doing just
what it did and what it had wanted to do from the
start. The court tried the accuser quite as much as
the accused. It was adjourned before completing
its labors, to meet in Frederick, Maryland. General
Scott left the country, and never after had more
than the nominal command of the army until early
in 1 861. He certainly was not sustained in his ef-
forts to maintain discipline in high places.
The efforts to kill off politically the two success-
ful generals, made them both candidates for the
174 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Presidency. General Taylor was nominated in
1848, and was elected. Four years later General
Scott received the nomination but was badly
beaten, and the party nominating him died with his
defeat*
* The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott, Taylor and
Pierce — and any number of aspirants for that high office. It made also gov-
ernors of States, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of
high rank both in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war
in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican war in two
years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the Union
side. On the other side, the side of the South, nearly every man who holds
office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a Confed-
erate soldier ; but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the South was
a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the
army who were not in it.
CHAPTER XIIL
TREATY OF PEACE MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS — REGIMEN-
TAL QUARTERMASTER — TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL —
TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.
THE treaty of peace between the two countries
was signed by the commissioners of each side
early in February, 1848. It took a considerable time
for it to reach Washington, receive the approval of the
administration, and be finally ratified by the Senate.
It was naturally supposed by the army that there
would be no more fighting, and officers and men
were of course anxious to get home, but knowing
there must be delay they contented themselves as
best they could. Every Sunday there was a bull fight
for the amusement of those who would pay their
fifty cents. I attended one of them — just one — not
wishing to leave the country without having wit-
nessed the national sport. The sight to me was
sickening. I could not see how human beings could
enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as
they seemed to do on these occasions.
At these sports there are usually from four to six
bulls sacrificed. The audience occupies seats around
176 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
the ring in which the exhibition is given, each seat
but the foremost rising higher than the one in front,
so that every one can get a full view of the sport
When all is ready a bull is turned into the ring.
Three or four men come in, mounted on the merest
skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so
weak that they could not make a sudden turn with
their riders without danger of falling down. The
men are armed with spears having a point as sharp
as a needle. Other men enter the arena on foot,
armed with red flags and explosives about the size of
a musket cartridge. To each of these explosives is
fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose
of attaching them to the bull by running the needle
into the skin. Before the animal is turned loose a
lot of these explosives are attached to him. The
pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is
exasperating ; but when the explosions of the car-
tridges commence the animal becomes frantic As
he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another
runs a spear into him. He turns towards his last
tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag ;
the bull rushes for this and is allowed to take it
on his horns. The flag drops and covers the eyes of
the animal so that he is at a loss what to do ; it is
jerked from him and the torment is renewed. When
the animal is worked into an uncontrollable frenzy,
the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores — literally
MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS, 177
murderers — enter, armed with knives having blades
twelve or eighteen inches long, and sharp. The
trick is to dodge an attack from the animal and
stab him to the heart as he passes. If these efforts
fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by
driving a knife blade into the spinal column just
back of the horns. He is then dragged out by
horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the
same performance is renewed.
On the occasion when I was present one of the
bulls was not turned aside by the attacks in the rear,
the presentations of the red flag, etc., etc., but kept
right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of
a horse threw him and his rider to the ground with
great force. The horse was killed and the rider lay
prostrate as if dead. The bull was then lassoed and
killed in the manner above described. Men came in
and carried the dead man off in a litter. When the
slaughtered bull and horse were dragged out, a fresh
bull was turned into the ring. Conspicuous amonij the
spectators was the man who had been carried out on
a litter but a few minutes before. He was only
dead so far as that performance went ; but the corpse
was so lively that it could not forego the chance of
witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren
who might not be so fortunate. There was a feeling
of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he
had come to life again. I confess that I felt sorry
Vol. I. 13
178 PERSONAL MEMOIRS CF U. S. GRANT.
to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. I did
not stay for the conclusion of the performance ; but
while I did stay, there was not a bull killed in the
prescribed way.
Bull fights are now prohibited in the Federal Dis-
trict — embracing a territory around the City of
Mexico, somewhat larger than the District of Colum-
bia — and they are not an institution in any part of
the country. During one of my recent visits to
Mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at
Puebla and at Pachuca. I was not notified in ad-
vance so as be able to decline and thus prevent
the performance ; but in both cases I civilly de-
clined to attend.
Another amusement of the people of Mexico of
that day, and one which nearly all indulged in, male
and female, old and young, priest and layman, was
Monte playing. Regular feast weeks were held
every year at what was then known as St Augustin
Tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. There were dealers
to suit every class and condition of people. In many
of the booths clackos — the copper coin of the coun-
try, four of them making six and a quarter cents
of our money — were piled up in great quantities,
with some silver, to accommodate the people who
could not bet more than a few pennies at a time.
In other booths silver formed the bulk of the capi-
tal of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed
REGIMENTAL QUARTERMASTER. 1 79
if there should be a run of luck against the bank.
In some there was no coin except gold. Here the
rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a
single day. All this is stopped now.
For myself, I was kept somewhat busy during the
winter of 1847-8. My regiment was stationed in
Tacubaya. I was regimental quartermaster and
commissary. General Scott had been unable to get
clothing for the troops from the North. The men
were becoming — well, they needed clothing. Mate-
rial had to be purchased, such as could be obtained,
and people employed to make it up into ** Yankee
uniforms." A quartermaster in the city was designated
to attend to this special duty ; but clothing was so
much needed that it was seized as fast as made up.
A regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time.
I had to look after this matter for the 4th infantry.
Then our regimental fund had run down and some
of the musicians in the band had been without their
extra pay for a number of months.
The regimental bands at that day were kept up
partly by pay from the government, and partly by
pay from the regimental fund. There was authority
of law for enlisting a certain number of men as mu-
sicians. So many could receive the pay of non-
commissioned officers of the various grades, and the
remainder the pay of privates. This would not se-
cure a band leader, nor good players on certain in-
l8o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
struments. In garrison there are various ways of
keeping up a regimental fund sufRcient to gfive extra
pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin al-
leys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra
comforts to the men. The best device for supplying
the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers instead of
flour. The ration used to be eighteen ounces per day
of either flour or bread ; and one hundred pounds
of flour will make one hundred and forty pounds of
bread. This saving was purchased by the commis-
sary for the benefit of -the fund. In the emergency
the 4th infantry was laboring under, I rented a bak-
ery in the city, hired bakers — Mexicans — bought fuel
and whatever was necessary, and I also got a con-
tract from the chief commissary of the army for bak-
ing a large amount of hard bread. In two months
I made more money for the fund than my pay
amounted to during the entire war. While stationed
at Monterey I had relieved the post fund in the
same way. There, however, was no profit except
in the saving of flour by converting it into bread.
In the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained
leave to visit Popocatapetl, the highest volcano in
America, and to take an escort. I went with the
party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicu-
ous positions before the country. Of those who
"went south," and attained high rank, there was
Lieutenant Richard Anderson, who commanded a
TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL. l8l
corps at Spottsylvania ; Captain Sibley, a major-
general, and, after the war, for a number of years
in the employ of the Khedive of Egypt ; Captain
George Crittenden, a rebel general ; S. B. Buckner,
who surrendered Fort Donelson ; and Mansfield
Lovell, who commanded at New Orleans before that
city fell into the hands of the National troops. Of
those who remained on our side there were Captain
Andrew Porter, Lieutenant C. P. Stone and Lieu-
tenant Z. B. Tower. There were quite a number
of other officers, whose names I cannot recollect.
At a little village (Ozumba) near the base of Po-
pocatapetl, wheit we purposed to commence the
ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules with
forage for our horses. High up on the mountain
there was a deserted house of one room, called the
Vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by
men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain.
The pasturage up there was very fine when we saw
it, and there were still some cattle, descendants of the
former domestic herd, which had now become wild.
It was possible to go on horseback as far as the
Vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous
in places. Sometimes it was very narrow with a
yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet
down to a roaring mountain torrent below, and al-
most perpendicular walls on the other side. At one
of these places one of our mules loaded with two
1 82 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as
big as he was, struck his load against the moun-
tain-side and was precipitated to the bottom. The
descent was steep but not perpendicular. The mule
rolled over and over until the bottom was reached,
and we supposed of course the poor animal was
dashed to pieces. What was our surprise, not
long after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost
mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent The
load had protected the animal from serious injury ;
and his owner had gone after him and found a way
back to the path leading up to the hut where we
were to stay.
The night at the Vaqueria was one of the most
unpleasant I ever knew. It was very cold and the
rain fell in torrents. A little higher up the rain
ceased and snow began. The wind blew with great
velocity. The log-cabin we were in had lost the roof
entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly
better than a sieve. There was little or no sleep
that night. As soon as it was light the next morn-
ing, we started to make the ascent to the summit.
The wind continued to blow with violence and the
weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain
nor snow. The clouds, however, concealed from our
view the country below us, except at times a momen-
tary glimpse could be got through a clear space
between them. The wind carried the loose snow
TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL, 1 83
around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make
it almost impossible to stand up against it. We la-
bored on and on, until it became evident that the top
could not be reached before night, if at all in such
a storm, and we concluded to return. The descent
was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got
below the snow line. At the cabin we mounted
our horses, ^nd by night were at Ozumba.
The fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the
night before drove us to bed early. Our beds consist-
ed of a place on the dirt-floor with a blanket under us.
Soon all were asleep ; but long before morning first
one and then another of our party began to cry out
with excruciating pain in the eyes. Not one escaped it.
By morning the eyes of half the party were so swollen
that they were entirely closed. The others suffered
pain equally. The feeling was about what might be
expected from the prick of a sharp needle at a white
heat. We remained in quarters until the afternoon
bathing our eyes in cold water. This relieved us
very much, and before night the pain had entirely
left. The swelling, however, continued, and about
half the party still had their eyes entirely closed ;
but we concluded to make a start back, those who
could see a little leading the horses of those who
could not see at all. We moved back to the village
of Ameca Ameca, some six miles, and stopped again
for the night. The next morning all were entirely
184 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
well and free from pain. The weather was clear and
Popocatapetl stood out in all its beauty, the top look-
ing as if not a mile away, and inviting us to return.
About half the party were anxious to try the ascent
again, and concluded to do so. The remainder —
I was with the remainder — concluded that we had
got all the pleasure there was to be had out of moun-
tain climbing, and that we would visit the great
caves of Mexico, some ninety miles from where we
then were, on the road to Acapulco.
The party that ascended the mountain the second
time succeeded in reaching the crater at the top,
with but little of the labor they encountered in their
first attempt. Three of them — Anderson, Stone and
Buckner — wrote accounts of their journey, which
were published at the time. I made no notes of this
excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but
it seems to me that I can see the whole of it as
vividly as if it were but yesterday. I have been back
at Ameca Ameca, and the village beyond, twice in the
last five years. The scene had not changed mate-
rially from my recollection of it
The party which I was with moved south down
the valley to the town of Cuantla, some forty miles
from Ameca Ameca. The latter stands on the plain
at the foot of Popocatapetl, at an elevation of about
eight thousand feet above tide water. The slope
down is gradual as the traveller moves south, but
TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO, 1 85
one would not judge that, in going to Cuantla. de-
scent enough had been made to occasion a material
change in the climate and productions of the soil ;
but such is the case. In the morning we left a tem-
perate climate where the cereals and fruits are those
common to the United States ; we halted in the
evening in a tropical climate where the orange and
banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were flourish-
ing. We had been travelling, apparently, on a plain
all day, but in the direction of the flow of water.
Soon after the capture of the City of Mexico an
armistice had been agreed to, designating the limits
beyond which troops of the respective armies were not
to go during its continuance. Our party knew noth-
ing about these limits. As we approached Cuantla
bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed
from the guard-house in the edge of the town towards
us. Our party halted, and I tied a white pocket
handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of
truce, proceeded on to the town. Captains Sibley
and Porter followed a few hundred yards behind. I
was detained at the guard-house until a messenger
could be dispatched to the quarters of the command-
ing general, who authorized that I should be con-
ducted to him. I had been with the general but
a few minutes when the two officers following
announced themselves. The Mexican general re-
minded us that it was a violation of the truce for us
1 86 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
to be there. However, as we had no special authority
from our own commanding general, and as we knew
nothing about the terms of the truce, we were per-
mitted to occupy a vacant house outside the g^ard
for the night, with the promise of a guide to put us
on the road to Cuernavaca the next morning.
Cuernavaca is a town west of Cuantla. The
country through which we passed, between these two
towns, is tropical in climate and productions and
rich in scenery. At one point, about half-way be-
tween the two places, the road goes over a low pass
in the mountains in which there is a very quaint old
town, the inhabitants of which at that day were
nearly all full-blooded Indians. Very few of them
even spoke Spanish. The houses were built of
stone and generally only one story high. The streets
were narrow, and had probably been paved before
Cortez visited the country. They had not been
graded, but the paving had been done on the natural
surface. We had with us one vehicle, a cart, which
was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever
passed through that town.
On a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb
of an ancient king ; and it was understood that the
inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well
as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to
be buried in it. We ascended the mountain and
surveyed the tomb ; but it showed no particular
TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO. 1 87
marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or ad-
vanced civilization. The next day we went into
Cuernavaca.
After a day's rest at Cuernavaca our party set out
again on the journey to the great caves of Mexico.
We had proceeded but a few miles when we were
stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the
terms of the existing armistice did not permit us to
go further in that direction. Upon convincing the
guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers
desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of
the country which we expected soon to leave, we were
conducted to a large hacienda near by, and directed
to remain thereuntil the commanding general of that
department could be communicated with and his
decision obtained as to whether we should be per-
mitted to pursue our journey. The guard promised
to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply
by night. At night there was no response from the
commanding general, but the captain of the guard
was sure he would have a reply by morning. Again
in the morning there was no reply. The second
evening the same thing happened, and finally we
learned that the guard had sent no message or mes-
senger to the department commander. We deter-
mined therefore to go on unless stopped by a force
sufficient to compel obedience.
After a few hours' travel we came to a town where
1 88 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT,
a scene similar to the one at Cuantla occurred.
The commanding officer sent a guide to conduct our
party around the village and to put us upon our road
again. This was the last interruption : that night
we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight
miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. It
must have been a Saturday night ; the peons had
been paid off, and spent part of the night in gam-
bling away their scanty week's earnings. Their coin
was principally copper, and I do not believe there
was a man among them who had received as much
as twenty-five cents in money. They were as much
excited, however, as if they had been staking thou-
sands. I recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his
last clacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most ex-
cited manner, put that up on the turn of a card.
Monte was the game played, the place out of doors,
near the window of the room occupied by the officers
of our party.
The next morning we were at the mouth qf the
cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles
and rockets. We explored to a distance of about
three miles from the entrance, and found a succes-
sion of chambers of great dimensions and of great
beauty when lit up with our rockets. Stalactites
and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. Some
of the former were many feet in diameter and ex-
tended from ceiling to floor ; some of the latter
TRIP TO THE CA VES OF MEXICO, \ 89
were but a few feet high from the floor; but the
formation is going on constantly, and many centu-
ries hence these stalagmites will extend to the ceil-
ing and become complete columns. The stalagmites
were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled
with water. The water percolates through the roof,
a drop at a time — often the drops several min-
utes apart — and more or less charged with mineral
matter. Evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the
mineral behind. This in time makes the immense
columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight,
which serve to support the roofs over the vast cham-
bers. I recollect that at one point in the cave one
of these columns is of such huge proportions that
there is only a narrow passage left on either side of
it. Some of our party became satisfied with their
explorations before we had reached the point to
which the guides were accustomed to take explor-
ers, and started back without guides. Coming to
the large column spoken of, they followed it entirely
around, and commenced retracing their steps into
the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of
the fact. When the rest of us had completed our
explorations, we started out with our guides, but had
not gone far before we saw the torches of an ap-
proaching party. We could not conceive who these
could be, for all of us had come in together, and
there were none but ourselves at the entrance when
I go PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
we Started in. Very soon we found it was our
friends. It took them some time to conceive how
they had got where they were. They were sure
they had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave,
and had gone about far enough to have reached it
CHAPTER XIV.
RETURN OF THE ARMY — MARRIAGE — ORDERED TO THE
PACIFIC COAST -CROSSING THE ISTHMUS — ARRIVAL
AT SAN FRANCISCO.
MY experience in the Mexican war was of great
advantage to me afterwards. Besides the
many practical lessons it taught, the war brought
nearly all the officers of the regular army together
so as to make them personally acquainted. It also
brought them in contact with volunteers, many of
whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards.
Then, in my particular case, I had been at West Point
at about the right time to meet most of the graduates
who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of
the rebellion to be trusted with large commands.
Graduating in 1843, I was at the military academy
from one to four years with all cadets who graduated
between 1840 and 1846 — seven classes. These classes
embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards be-
came generals on one side or the other in the re-
bellion, many of them holding high commands. All
the older officers, who became conspicuous in the
rebellion, I had also served with and known in Mex-
192 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
ICO : Lee, J. E. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, Holmes,
Heb6rt and a number of others on the Confederate
side ; McCall, Mansfield, Phil. Kearney and others
on the National side. The acquaintance thus formed
was of immense service to me in the war of the re-
bellion — I mean what I learned of the characters of
those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I do not
pretend to say that all movements, or even many of
them, were made with special reference to the char-
acteristics of the commander against whom they
were directed. But my appreciation of my enemies
was certainly affected by this knowledge. The
natural disposition of most people is to clothe a
commander of a large army whom they do not
know, with almost superhuman abilities. A large
part of the National army, for instance, and most
of the press of the country, clothed General Lee
with just such qualities, but I had known him per-
sonally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was
just as well that I felt this.
The treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the
evacuation of Mexico by United States troops was
ordered. Early in June the troops in the City of
Mexico began to move out. Many of them, includ-
ing the brigade to which I belonged, were assembled
at Jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival
of transports at Vera Cruz : but with all this pre-
caution my regiment and others were in camp on
AfARRfAGE.
193
the sand beach in a July sun, for about a week be-
fore embarking, while the fever raged with great
virulence in Vera Cruz, not two miles away. I can
call to mind only one person, an officer, who died of
the disease. My regiment was sent to Pascagoula,
Mississippi, to spend the summer. As soon as it
was settled in camp I obtained a leave of absence
for four months and proceeded to St. Louis. On
the 2 2d of August, 1848. 1 was married to Miss Julia
Dent, the lady of whom I have before spoken. We
visited my parents and relations in Ohio, and, at the
end of my leave, proceeded to my post at Sackett's
Harbor, New York. In April following I was or-
dered to Detroit, Michigan, where two years were
spent with but few important incidents.
The present constitution of the State of Michigan
was ratified during this time. By the terms of one
of its provisions, all citizens of the United States
residing within the State at the time of the ratification
became citizens of Michigan also. During my stay
in Detroit there was an election for city officers.
Mr. Zachariah Chandler was the candidate of the
Whigs for the office of Mayor, and was elected, al-
though the city was then reckoned democratic. All
the officers stationed there at the time who offered
their votes were permitted to cast them. I did not
offer mine, however, as I did not wish to consider
myself a citizen of Michigan. This was Mr. Chand-
Vol. I. — 13
194 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
ler's first entry into politics, a career he followed
ever after with great success, and in which he died
enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of his coun-
trymen.
In the spring of 1851 the garrison at Detroit was
transferred to Sackett's Harbor, and in the following
spring the entire 4th infantry was ordered to the
Pacific Coast. It was decided that Mrs. Grant should
visit my parents at first for a few months, and then
remain with her own family at their St. Louis home
until an opportunity offered of sending for her. In
the month of April the regiment was assembled at
Governor's Island, New York Harbor, and on the
5th of July eight companies sailed for Aspinwall.
We numbered a little over seven hundred persons,
including the families of officers and soldiers. Pas-
sage was secured for us on the old steamer Ohio,
commanded at the time by Captain Schenck, of the
navy. It had not been determined, until a day or two
before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by
the Ohio ; consequently, a complement of passengers
had already been secured. The addition of over
seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most
uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in July.
In eight days Aspinwall was reached. At that
time the streets of the town were eight or ten inches
under water, and foot passengers passed from place
to place on raised foot-walks. July is at the height
ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST, 1 95
of the wet season, on the Isthmus. At intervals the
rain would pour down in streams, followed in not
many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's sun.
These alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were
continuous in the afternoons. I wondered how any
person could live many months in Aspinwall, and
wondered still more why any one tried.
In the summer of 1852 the Panama railroad was
completed only to the point where it now crosses
the Chagres River. From there passengers were
carried by boats to Gorgona, at which place they
took mules for Panama, some twenty-five miles fur-
ther. Those who travelled over the Isthmus in those
days will remember that boats on the Chagres River
were propelled by natives not inconveniently bur-
dened with clothing. These boats carried thirty to
forty passengers each. The crews consisted of six
men to a boat, armed with long poles. There were
planks wide enough for a man to walk on conven-
iently, running along the sides of each boat from end
to end. The men would start from the bow, place
one end of their poles against the river bottom, brace
their shoulders against the other end, and then walk
to the stern as rapidly as they could. In this way
from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be
made, against the current of the river.
I, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of
the public property and had also to look after the
196
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
transportation. A contract had been entered into
with the steamship company in New York for the
transportation of the regiment to California, includ-
ing the Isthmus transit. A certain amount of bag-
gage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were
to be furnished to commissioned officers and to all
disabled persons. The regiment, with the exception
of one company left as guards to the public prop-
erty — camp and garrison equipage principally — and
the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as
above described, for Gorgona. From this place they
marched to Panama, and were soon comfortably on
the steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four
miles from the town. I, with one company of troops
and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess
chests and camp kettles, was sent to Cruces, a town
a few miles higher up the Chagres River than Gor-
gona. There I found an impecunious American who
had taken the contract to furnish transportation for
the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds
for the freight and so much for each saddle animal.
But when we reached Cruces there was not a mule,
either for pack or saddle, in the place. The con-
tractor promised that the animals should be on hand
in the morning. In the morning he said that they
were on the way from some imaginary place, and
would arrive in the course of the day. This went
on until I saw that he could not procure the animals
CROSSING THE ISTHMUS,
197
at all at the price he had promised to furnish them
for. The unusual number of passengers that had
come over on the steamer, and the large amount of
freight to pack, had created an unprecedented de-
mand for mules. Some of the passengers paid as
high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride
twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold
for ten dollars in that market at other times. Mean-
while the cholera had broken out, and men were dying
every hour. To diminish the food for the disease,
I permitted the company detailed with me to pro-
ceed to Panama. The captain and the doctors ac-
companied the men, and I was left alone with the
sick and the soldiers who had families. The regi-
ment at Panama was also affected with the disease ;
but there were better accommodations for the well
on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with
the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off.
There were also hospital tents on shore on the island
of Flamingo, which stands in the bay.
I was about a week at Cruces before transportation
began to come in. About one-third of the people
with me died, either at Cruces or on the way to
Panama. There was no agent of the transportation
company at Cruces to consult, or to take the respon-
sibility of procuring transportation at a price which
would secure it. I therefore myself dismissed the
contractor and made a new contract with a native,
198 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
at more than double the original price. Thus we
finally reached Panama. The steamer, however,
could not proceed •until the cholera abated, and the
regiment was detained still longer. Altogether, on
the Isthmus and on the Pacific side, we were delayed
six weeks. About one-seventh of those who left New
York harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of July,
now lie buried on the Isthmus of Panama or on
Flamingo island in Panama Bay.
One amusing circumstance occurred while we were
lying at anchor in Panama Bay. In the regiment
there was a Lieutenant Slaughter who was very liable
to sea-sickness. It almost made him sick to see the
wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading
it. Soon after his graduation. Slaughter was ordered
to California and took passage by a sailing vessel
going around Cape Horn. The vessel was seven
months making the voyage, and Slaughter was sick
every moment of the time, never more so than while
lying at anchor after reaching his place of desti-
nation. On landing in California he found orders
which had come by the Isthmus, notifying him of
a mistake in his assignment ; he should have been
ordered to the northern lakes. He started back
by the Isthmus route and was sick all the way.
But when he arrived at the East he was again ordered
to California, this time definitely, and at this date was
making his third trip. He was as sick as ever, and had
ARRIVAL A T SAN FRANCISCO.
199
been so for more than a month while lying at anchor in
the bay. I remember him well, seated with his elbows
on the table in front of him, his chin between his
hands, and looking the picture of despair. At last he
broke out, '' I wish I had taken my fathers advice ;
he wanted me to go into the navy ; if I had done so,
I should not have had to go to sea so much. " Poor
Slaughter ! it was his last sea voyage. He was kill-
ed by Indians in Oregon
By the last of August the cholera had so abated
that it was deemed safe to start The disease did not
break out again on the way to California, and we
reached San Francisco early in September.
CHAPTER XV.
SAN FRANCISCO — EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES —
LIFE ON THE PACIFIC COAST PROMOTED CAPTAIN
— FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA.
SAN FRANCISCO at that day was a lively place.
Gold, or placer digging as it was called, was at
its height. Steamers plied daily between San Fran-
cisco and both Stockton and Sacramento. Passengers
and gold from the southern mines came by the Stock-
ton boat; from the northern mines by Sacramento. In
the evening when these boats arrived, Long Wharf —
•
there was but one wharf in San Francisco in 1852 — was
alive with people crowding to meet the miners as they
came down to sell their '* dust" and to " have a time."
Of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses
or restaurants ; others belonged to a class of impecu-
nious adventurers, of good manners and good presence,
who were ever on the alert to make the acquaint-
ance of people with some ready means, in the hope of
being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. Many
were young men of good family, good education and
gentlemanly instincts. Their parents had been able
to support them during their minority, and to give
EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES. 201
them good educations, but not to maintain them
afterwards. From 1849 ^^ '853 there was a rush of
people to the Pacific coast, of the class described All
thought that fortunes were to be picked up, with-
out effort, in the gold fields on the Pacific. Some
realized more than their most sanguine expectations ;
but for one such there were hundreds disappointed,
many of whom now fill unknown graves ; others died
wrecks of their former selves, and many, without
a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts.
Many of the real scenes in early California life exceed
in strangeness and interest any of the mere products
of the brain of the novelist.
Those early days in California brought out char-
acter. It was a long way off then, and the journey
was expensive. The fortunate could go by Cape
Horn or by the Isthmus of Panama ; but the mass of
pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. This
took an entire summer. They were very lucky when
they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle
All other means were exhausted in procuring the
outfit on the Missouri River. The immigrant, on ar-
riving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land,
far from friends. Time pressed, for the little means
that could be realized from the sale of what was left
of the outfit would not support a man long at Cali-
fornia prices. Many became discouraged. Others
would take off their coats and look for a job, no
202 PERSONAL AfEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
matter what it might be. These succeeded as a
rule. There were many young men who had studied
professions before they went to California, and who
had never done a day s manual labor in their lives,
who took in the situation at once and went to work
to make a start at anything they could get to do.
Some supplied carpenters and masons with mate-
rial — carrying plank, brick, or mortar, as the case
might be ; others drove stages, drays, or baggage
wagons, until they could do better. More became
discouraged early and spent their time looking up
people who would "treat," or lounging about res-
taurants and gambling houses where free lunches
were furnished daily. They were welcomed at these
places because they often brought in miners who
proved good customers.
My regiment spent a few weeks at Benicia bar-
racks, and then was ordered to Fort Vancouver, on
the Columbia River, then in Oregon Territory. Dur-
ing the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided,
all north of the Columbia River being taken from
Oregon to make Washington Territory.
Prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the
Pacific coast from 1849 until at least 1853 — that it
would have been impossible for officers of the army
to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that author-
ity was given them to purchase from the commissary
such supplies as he kept, at New Orleans wholesale
LIFE ON THE PACIFIC COAST, 2O3
prices. A cook could not be hired for the pay of
a captain. The cook could do better. At Benicia, in
1852, flour was 25 cents per pound ; potatoes were 16
cents ; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents : onions,
37/4 cents ; meat and other articles in proportion. In
1853 at Vancouver vegetables were a little lower. I
with three other officers concluded that we would
raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus
realize something handsome. I bought a pair of
horses that had crossed the plains that summer and
were very poor. They recuperated rapidly, however,
and proved a good team to break up the ground
with. I performed all the labor of breaking up the
ground while the other officers planted the potatoes.
Our crop was enormous. Luckily for us the Colum-
bia River rose to a great height from the melting of
the snow in the mountains in June, and overflowed
and killed most of our crop. This saved digging it
up, for everybody on the Pacific coast seemed to
have come to the conclusion at the same time that
agriculture would be profitable. In 1853 more
than three-quarters of the potatoes raised were per-
mitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown
away. The only potatoes we sold were to our own
mess.
While I was stationed on the Pacific coast we were
free from Indian wars. There were quite a number
of remnants of tribes in the vicinity of Portland in
204 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Oregon, and of Fort Vancouver in Washington Ter-
ritory. They had generally acquired some of the
vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except
in individual cases. The Hudson's Bay Company
had held the North-west with their trading posts for
many years before the United States was represented
on the Pacific coast. They still retained posts along
the Columbia River and one at Fort Vancouver,
when I was there. Their treatment of the Indians
had brought out the better qualities of the savages.
Farming had been undertaken by the company to
supply the I ndians with bread and vegetables ; they
raised some cattle and horses ; and they had now
taught the Indians to do the labor of the farm and
herd. They always compensated them for their labor,
and always gave them goods of uniform quality and
at uniform price.
Before the advent of the American, the medium of
exchange between the Indian and the white man
was pelts. Afterward it was silver coin. If an
Indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar
gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first
thing he did was to exchange it for American half
dollars. These he could count. He would then
commence his purchases, paying for each article
separately, as he got it. He would not trust any
one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. At
that day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the
LIFE ON THE PACIFIC COAST, 205
government, were common on the Pacific coast.
They were called slugs.
The Indians, along the lower Columbia as far as
the Cascades and on the lower Willamette, died
off very fast during the year I spent in that section ;
for besides acquiring the vices of the white people
they had acquired also their diseases. The measles
and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. In
their wild state, before the appearance of the white
man among them, the principal complaints they
were subject to were those produced by long in-
voluntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of
game, and over-eating. Instinct more than reason
had taught them a remedy for these ills. It was
the steam bath. Something like a bake-oven was
built, large enough to admit a man lying down.
Bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about
six feet long and some two or three feet apart ;
other bushes connected the rows at one end. The
tops of the bushes were drawn together to interlace,
and confined in that position ; the whole was then
plastered over with wet clay until every opening
was filled. Just inside the open end of the oven
the floor was scooped out so as to make a hole that
would hold a bucket or two of water. These ovens
were always built on the banks of a stream, a big
spring, or pool of water. When a patient required
a bath, a fire was built near the oven and a pile
206 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT,
of Stones put upon it. The cavity at the front
was then filled with water. When the stones were
sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself
into the oven ; a blanket would be thrown over
the open end, and hot stones put into the water
until the patient could stand it no longer. He
was then withdrawn from his steam bath and
doused into the cold stream near by. This treat-
ment may have answered with the early ailments of
the Indians. With the measles or small-pox it
would kill every time.
During my year on the Columbia River, the small-
pox exterminated one small remnant of a band of
Indians entirely, and reduced others materially. I
do not think there was a case of recovery among
them, until the doctor with the Hudson Bay Com-
pany took the matter in hand and established a
hospital. Nearly every case he treated recovered.
I never, myself, saw the treatment described in the
preceding paragraph, but have heard it described
by persons who have witnessed it The decimation
among the Indians I knew of personally, and the
hospital, established for their benefit, was a Hudson's
Bay building not a stone's throw from my own
quarters.
The death of Colonel Bliss, of the Adjutant
General's department, which occurred July 5th,
1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company
PROMOTED CAPTAIN. 20J
then stationed at Humboldt Bay, California. The
notice reached me in September of the same year,
and I very soon started to join my new command.
There was no way of reaching Humboldt at that
time except to take passage on a San Francisco
sailing vessel going after lumber. Red wood, a
species of cedar, which on the Pacific coast takes
the place filled by white pine in the East, then
abounded on the banks of Humboldt Bay. There
were extensive saw- mills engaged in preparing
this lumber for the San Francisco market, and
sailing vessels, used in getting it to market, fur-
nished the only means of communication between
Humboldt and the balance of the world.^
I was obliged to remain in San Francisco for sev-
eral days before I found a vessel. This gave me a
good opportunity of comparing the San Francisco of
1852 with that of 1853. As before stated, there had
been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852 —
Long Wharf. In 1853 the town had grown out into
the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf when
I first saw it Streets and houses had been built
out on piles where the year before the largest ves-
sels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the
wharf. There was no filling under the streets or
houses. San Francisco presented the same gen-
eral appearance as the year before ; that is, eating,
drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous
208 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
for their number and publicity. They were on the
first floor, with doors wide open. At all hours of
the day and night in walking the streets, the eye was
regaled, on every block near the water front, by the
sight of players at faro. Often broken places were
found in the street, large enough to let a man down
into the water below. I have but little doubt that
many of the people who went to the Pacific coast in
the early days of the gold excitement, and have
never been heard from since, or who were heard
from for a time and then ceased to write, found
watery graves beneath the houses or streets built
over San Francisco Bay.
Besides the gambling in cards there was gambling
on a larger scale in city lots. These were sold ** On
Change," much as stocks are now sold on Wall
Street. Cash, at time of purchase, was always paid
by the broker ; but the purchaser had only to put up
his margin. He was charged at the rate of two or
three per cent, a month on the difference, besides
commissions. The sand hills, some of them almost
inaccessible to foot-passengers, were surveyed off and
mapped into fifty vara lots — a vara being a Spanish
yard. These were sold at first at very low prices,
but were sold and resold for higher prices until they
went up to many thousands of dollars. The brokers
did a fine business, and so did many such purchasers
as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the
FLUSH TIMES IN CAUFORNIA. 2O9
final crash came. As the city grew, the sand hills
back of the town furnished material for filling up the
bay under the houses and streets, and still further
out. The temporary houses, first built over the
water in the harbor, soon gave way to more solid
structures. The main business part of the city now
is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest
class lay at anchor in the early days. I was in San
Francisco again in 1854. Gambling houses had dis-
appeared from public view. The city had become
staid and orderly.
Vol. I.— 14
CHAPTER XVI.
RESIGNATION — PRIVATE LIFE — LIFE AT GALENA — THE
COMING CRISIS,
MY family, all this while, was at the East It con-
sisted now of a wife and two children. I saw
no chance of supporting them on the Pacific coast out
of my pay as an army officer. I concluded, there-
fore, to resign, and in March applied for a leave of
absence until the end of the July following, tender-
ing my resignation to take effect at the end of that
time. I left the Pacific coast very much attached to
it, and with the full expectation of making it my
future home. That expectation and that hope re-
mained uppermost in my mind until the Lieutenant-
Generalcy bill was introduced into Congress in the
winter of 1863-4. The passage of that bill, and my
promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a
citizen of the further West.
In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family,
to find in it a son whom I had never seen, born
while I was on the Isthmus of Panama. I was now
to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle
for our support. My wife had a farm near St.
PRIVATE UFE. 211
Louis, to which we went, but I had no means to
stock it A house had to be built also. I worked
very hard, never losing a day because of bad
weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate
way. If nothing else could be done I would load a
cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for
sale. I managed to keep along very well until 1858,
when I was attacked by fever and ague. I had suf-
fered very severely and for a long time from this
disease, while a boy in Ohio. It lasted now over a
year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it
did interfere greatly with the amount of work I was
able to perform. In the fall of 1858 I sold out my
stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and
gave up farming.
In the winter I established a partnership with
Harry Boggs, a cousin of Mrs. Grant, in the real
estate agency business. I spent that winter at St
Louis myself, but did not take my family into town
until the spring. Our business might have become
prosperous if I had been able to wait for it to grow.
As it was, there was no more than one person could
attend to, and not enough to support two families.
While a citizen of St Louis and engaged in the real
estate agency business, I was a candidate for the
office of county engineer, an office of respectability
and emolument which would have been very accept-
able to me at that time. The incumbent was ap-
212 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
pointed by the county court, which consisted of
five members. My opponent had the advantage of
birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and
carried off the prize. I now withdrew from the co-
partnership with Boggs, and, in May, i860, removed
to Galena, Illinois, and took a clerkship in my
father s store.
While a citizen of Missouri, my first opportunity
for casting a vote at a Presidential election occurred.
I had been in the army from before attaining my
majority and had thought but little about politics,
although I was a Whig by education and a great
admirer of Mr. Clay. But the Whig party had
ceased to exist before I had an opportunity of exer-
cising the privilege of casting a ballot ; the Know-
Nothing party had taken its place, but was on the
wane; and the Republican party was in a chaotic
state and had not yet received a name. It had no
existence in the Slave States except at points on the
borders next to Free States. In St Louis City and
County, what afterwards became the Republican
party was known as the Free-Soil Democracy, led
by the Honorable Frank P. Blair. Most of my
neighbors had known me as an officer of the army
with Whig proclivities. They had been on the same
side, and, on the death of their party, many had be-
come Know-Nothings, or members of the American
party. There was a lodge near my new home, and
PRIVATE LIFE, 2I3
I was invited to join it. I accepted the invitation ;
was initiated ; attended a meeting just one week
later, and never went to another afterwards.
I have no apologies to make for having been one
week a member of the American party ; for I still
think native-born citizens of the United States
should have as much protection, as many privileges
in their native country, as those who voluntarily
select it for a home. But all secret, oath-bound po-
litical parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter
how pure or how patriotic the motives and prin-
ciples which first bring them together. No political
party can or ought to exist when one of its corner-
stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to
the right to worship God ** according to the dictate
of one's own conscience," or according to the creed
of any religious denomination whatever. Neverthe-
less, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the
State laws, wherever the two come in conflict this
claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever
cost.
Up to the Mexican war there were a few out and
out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to
slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of
the peace up to the Presidency of the United States.
They were noisy but not numerous. But the great
majority of people at the North, where slavery did
not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked
-314 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
upon its existence in any part of the country as
unfortunate. They did not hold the States where
slavery existed responsible for it ; and believed that
protection should be given to the right of property
in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached
to be rid of the institution. Opposition to slavery
was not a creed of either political party. In some
sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the Dem-
ocratic party, and in others to the Whigs. But with
the inauguration of the Mexican war, in fact with
the annexation of Texas, "the inevitable conflict"
commenced.
As the time for the Presidential election of 1856
— the first at which I had the opportunity of voting —
approached, party feeling began to run high. The
Republican party was regarded in the South and the
border States not only as opposed to the extension
of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition
of the institution without compensation to the own-
ers. The most horrible visions seemed to present
themselves to the minds of people who, one would
suppose, ought to have known better. Many edu-
cated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to
believe that emancipation meant social equality.
Treason to the Government was openly advocated
and was not rebuked. It was evident to my mind
that the election of a Republican President in 1856
meant the secession of all the Slave States, and re-
UFE AT GALENA. 215
bellion. Under these circumstances I preferred the
success of a candidate whose election would preveAt
or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged
into a war the end of which no man could foretell.
With a Democrat elected by the unanimous vote of
the Slave States, there could be no pretext for seces-
sion for four years. I very much hoped that the
passions of the people would subside in that time,
and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it
was not, I believed the country would be better
prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. I
therefore voted for James Buchanan for President
Four years later the Republican party was suc-
cessful in electing its candidate to the Presidency.
The civilized world has learned the consequence.
Four millions of human beings held as chattels
have been liberated ; the ballot has been given
to them ; the free schools of the country have
been opened to their children. The nation still lives,
and the people are just as free to avoid social inti-
macy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they
are with white people.
While living in Galena I was nominally only a
clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated
salary. In reality my position was different. My
father had never lived in Galena himself, but
had established my two brothers there, the one next
younger than myself in charge of the business,
2l6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
assisted by the youngest. When I went there it
was my father's intention to give up all connection
with the business himself, and to establish his three
sons in it : but the brother who had really built up
the business was sinking with consumption, and it
was not thought best to make any change while he
was in this condition. He lived until September,
1 86 1, when he succumbed to that insidious disease
which always flatters its victims into the belief that
they are growing better up to the close of life. A
more honorable man never transacted business. In
September, 1861, I was engaged in an employment
which required all my attention elsewhere.
During the eleven months that I lived in Galena
prior to the first call for volunteers, I had been
strictly attentive to my business, and had made but
few acquaintances other than customers and people
engaged in the same line with myself. When the
election took place in November, i860, I had not
been a resident of Illinois long enough to gain citi-
zenship and could not, therefore, vote. I was really
glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have
compelled me to vote for Stephen A. Douglas, who
had no possible chance of election. The contest
was really between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Lin-
coln ; between minority rule and rule by the majority.
I wanted, as between these candidates, to see Mr.
Lincoln elected. Excitement ran high during the
UFE AT GALENA. 21 J
canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened the
scene in the generally quiet streets of Galena many
nights during the campaign. I did not parade with
either party, but occasionally met with the ''wide
awakes " — Republicans — in their rooms, and super-
intended their drill. It was evident, from the
time of the Chicago nomination to the close of
the canvass, that the election of the Republican can-
didate would be the signal for some of the Southern
States to secede. I still had hopes that the four
years which had elapsed since the first nomination of
a Presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed
to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme
pro-slavery sentiment to cool down ; for the South-
erners to think well before they took the awful leap
which they had so vehemently threatened. But I was
mistaken.
The Republican candidate was elected, and solid
substantial people of the North-west, and I presume
the same order of people throughout the entire North,
felt very serious, but determined, after this event.
It was very much discussed whether the South would
carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate
government, the corner-stone of which should be, pro-
tection to the ** Divine " institution of slavery. For
there were people who believed in the *' divinity" of
human slavery, as there are now people who believe
Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by the
2l8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
Most High. We forgive them for entertaining such
notions, but forbid their practice. It was generally
believed that there would be a flurry ; that some of
the extreme Southern States would go so far as to
pass ordinances of secession. But the common im-
pression was that this step was so plainly suicidal
for the South, that the movement would not spread
over much of the territory and would not last long.
Doubtless the founders of our government, the
majority of them at least, regarded the confederation
of the colonies as an experiment Each colony con-
sidered itself a separate government; that the confed-
eration was for mutual protection against a foreign
foe, and the prevention of strife and war among them-
selves. If there had been a desire on the part of any
single State to withdraw from the compact at any time
while the number of States was limited to the original
thirteen, I do not suppose there would have been any
to contest the right, no matter how much the deter-
mination might have been regretted. The problem
changed on the ratification of the Constitution by all
the colonies ; it changed still more when amendments
were added ; and if the right of any one State to with-
draw continued to exist at all after the ratification of
the Constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation
of new States, at least so far as the new States them-
selves were concerned. It was never possessed at all
by Florida or the States west of the Mississippi, all
THE COMING CRISIS, 2I9
of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire
nation. Texas and the territory brought into the
Union in consequence of annexation, were purchased
with both blood and treasure ; and Texas, with a do-
main greater than that of any European state except
Russia, was permitted to retain as state property all
the public lands within its borders. It would have been
ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for
this State to withdraw from the Union after all that
had been spent and done to introduce her ; yet, if sep-
aration had actually occurred, Texas must necessarily
have gone with the South, both on account of her
institutions and her geographical position. Secession
was illogical as well as impracticable ; it was revolution.
Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one.
When people are oppressed by their government, it
is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of
the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by
withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and sub-
stituting a government more acceptable. But any
people or part of a people who resort to this rem-
edy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim
for protection given by citizenship — on the issue.
Victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror
— must be the result.
In the case of the war between the States it
would have been the exact truth if the South had
said, — ** We do not want to live with you Northern
220 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, 5. GRANT.
people any longer ; we know our institution of
slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are grow-
ing numerically stronger than we, it may at some
time in the future be endangered. So long as you
permitted us to control the government, and with
the aid of a few friends at the North to enact laws
constituting your section a g^ard against the escape
of our property, we were willing to live with
you. You have been submissive to our rule
heretofore ; but it looks now as if you did not
intend to continue so, and we will remain in the
Union no longer." Instead of this the seceding
States cried lustily, — '* Let us alone ; you have no
constitutional power to interfere with us." News-
papers and people at the North reiterated the cry.
Individuals might ignore the constitution; but the
Nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce
the strictest construction of that instrument; the
construction put upon it by the Southerners them-
selves. The fact is the constitution did not apply
to any such contingency as the one existing from
1 86 1 to 1865. Its framers never dreamed of such
a contingency occurring. If they had foreseen it,
the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the
right of a State or States to withdraw rather than
that there should be war between brothers.
The framers were wise in their generation and
wanted to do the very best possible to secure their
THE COMING CRISIS. 221
own liberty and independence, and that also of
their descendants to the latest days. It is pre-
posterous to suppose that the people of one genera-
tion can lay down the best and only rules of
government for all who are to come after them,
and under unforeseen contingencies. At the time
of the framing of our constitution the only physi-
cal forces that had been subdued and made to
serve man and do his labor, were the currents in
the streams and in the air we breathe. Rude
machinery, propelled by water power, had been
invented ; sails to propel ships upon the waters
had been set to catch the passing breeze — but the
application of steam to propel vessels against both
wind and current, and machinery to do all manner
of work had not been thought of. The instanta-
neous transmission of messages around the world
by means of electricity would probably at that day
have been attributed to witchcraft or a league
with the Devil. Immaterial circumstances had
changed as greatly as material ones. We could
not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules
laid down under circumstances so different for emer-
gencies so utterly unanticipated. The fathers them-
selves would have been the first to declare that their
prerogatives were not irrevocable. They would
surely have resisted secession could they have lived
to see the shape it assumed.
222 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
I travelled through the Northwest considerably
during the winter of 1 860-1. We had customers in
all the little towns in south-west Wisconsin, south-
east Minnesota and north-east Iowa. These gener-
ally knew I had been a captain in the regular army
and had served through the Mexican war. Conse-
quently wherever I stopped at night, some of the
people would come to the public-house where I was,
and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of
the future. My own views at that time were like
those officially expressed by Mr. Seward at a later
day, that " the war would be over in ninety days." I
continued to entertain these views until after the
battle of Shiloh. I believe now that there would
have been no more battles at the West after the
capture of Fort Donelson if all the troops in that
region had been under a single commander who
would have followed up that victory.
There is little doubt in my mind now that the pre-
vailing sentiment of the South would have been op-
posed to secession in i860 and 1861, if there had
been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased
by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had
counted for as much as that of any other. But there
was no calm discussion of the question. Demagogues
who were too old to enter the army if there should
be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion
of their own ability that they did not believe they
THE COMING CRISIS. 223
could be spared from the direction of the affairs of
state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and
unceasingly against the North ; against its aggressions
upon the South ; its interference with Southern rights,
etc., etc They denounced the Northerners as cow-
ards, poltroons, negro-worshippers ; claimed that one
Southern man was equal to five Northern men in
battle ; that if the South would stand up for its rights
the North would back down. Mr. Jefferson Davis
said in a speech, delivered at La Grange, Mississippi,
before the secession of that State, that he would
agree to drink all the blood spilled south of Mason
and Dixon's line if there should be a war. The
young men who would have the fighting to do in
case of war, believed all these statements, both in re-
gard to the aggressiveness of the North and its cow-
ardice. They, too, cried out for a separation from
such people. The great bulk of the legal voters of
the South were men who owned no slaves ; their
homes were generally in the hills and poor country ;
their facilities for educating their children, even up to
the point of reading and writing, were very limited ;
their interest in the contest was very meagre — what
there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was
with the North ; they too needed emancipation.
Under the old regime they were looked down upon
by those who controlled all the affairs in the inter-
est of slave owners, as poor white trash who were
224 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according
to direction.
I am aware that this last statement may be disput-
ed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show
that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammel-
led in the South as in any section of the country ; but
in the face of any such contradiction I reassert the
statement. The shot-g^n was not resorted to. Mask-
ed men did not ride over the country at night intim-
idating voters ; but there was a firm feeling that a
class existed in every State with a sort of divine right
to control public afifairs. If they could not get this
control by one means they must by another. The
end justified the means. The coercion, if mild, was
complete.
There were two political parties, it is true, in all
the States, both strong in numbers and respect-
ability, but both equally loyal to the institution
which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all other
institutions in state or nation. The slave-owners
were the minority, but governed both parties. Had
politics ever divided the slave-holders and the non-
slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged
to yield, or internecine war would have been the
consequence. I do not know that the Southern
people were to blame for this condition of affairs.
There was a time when slavery was not profitable,
and the discussion of the merits of the institution
THE COMING CRISIS, 225
was confined almost exclusively to the territory
where it existed. The States of Virginia and Ken-
tucky came near abolishing slavery by their own
acts, one State defeating the measure by a tie vote
and the other only lacking one. But when the insti-
tution became profitable, all talk of its abolition
ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human
nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its
support The cotton-gin probably had much to do
with the justification of slavery.
The winter of 1 860-1 will be remembered by
middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excite-
ment South Carolina promptly seceded after the
result of the Presidential election was known.
Other Southern States proposed to follow. In some
of them the Union sentiment was so strong that it
had to be suppressed by force. Maryland, Dela-
ware, Kentucky and Missouri, all Slave States,
failed to pass ordinances of secession ; but they
were all represented in the so-called congress of the
so-called Confederate States. The Governor and
Lieutenant-Governor of Missouri, in 1861, Jack-
son and Reynolds, were both supporters of the
rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. The
governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor
assumed his office ; issued proclamations as gov-
ernor of the State ; was recognized as such by the
Confederate Government, and continued his preten-
VOL. I.- 15
226 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
sions until the collapse of the rebellion. The South
claimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed
the right to coerce into their confederation such
States as they wanted, that is, all the States where
slavery existed. They did not seem to think this
course inconsistent. The fact is, the Southern slave-
owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of
slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility — a right
to govern independent of the interest or wishes of
those who did not hold such property. They con-
vinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the
institution and, next, that that particular institution
was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators
but themselves.
Meanwhile the Administration of President Bu-
chanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that
the general government had no power to interfere ;
that the Nation had no power to save its own life.
Mr. Buchanan had in his cabinet two members at
least, who were as earnest — to use a mild term — in
the cause of secession as Mr. Davis or any South-
ern statesman. One of them, Floyd, the Secretary
of War, scattered the army so that much of it could
be captured when hostilities should commence, and
distributed the cannon and small arms from Northern
arsenals throughout the South so as to be on hand
when treason wanted them. The navy was scat-
tered in like manner. The President did not pre-
THE COMING CRISIS. 22*J
vent his cabinet preparing for war upon their gov-
ernment, either by destroying its resources or stor-
ing them in the South until a de facto government
was established with Jefferson Davis as its President,
and Montgomery, Alabama, as the Capital. The
secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. In their
own estimation they were aliens in the country which
had given them birth. Loyal men were put into
their places. Treason in the executive branch of the
government was estopped. But the harm had al-
ready been done. The stable door was locked after
the horse had been stolen.
During all of the trying winter of 1 860-1, when
the Southerners were so defiant that they would not
allow within their borders the expression of a sen-
timent hostile to their views, it was a brave man
indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty
to the Union. On the other hand men at the North
— prominent men — proclaimed that the government
had no power to coerce the South into submission
to the laws of the land; that if the North under-
took to raise armies to go south, these armies would
have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers. A
portion of the press of the North was constantly pro-
claiming similar views. When the time arrived for
the President-elect to go to the capital of the Nation
to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him
to travel, not only as a President-elect, but as any
228 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
private citizen should be allowed to do. Instead of
going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of
his constituents at all the stations along tlie road, he
was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled
into the capital. He disappeared from public view
on his journey, and the next the country knew, his
arrival was announced at the capital. There is little
doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had
attempted to travel openly throughout his journey.
CHAPTER XVIL
OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION — PRESIDING AT A UNION
MEETING MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS —
LYON AT CAMP JACKSON — SERVICES TENDERED TO
THE GOVERNMENT.
THE 4th of March, 1861, came, and Abraham Lin-
coin was sworn to maintain the Union against
all its enemies. The secession of one State after
another followed, until eleven had gone out. On the
nth of April Fort Sumter, a National fort in the har-
bor of Charleston, South Carolina, was fired upon
by the Southerners and a few days after was captured.
The Confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and
thereby debarred themselves of all right to claim pro-
tection under the Constitution of the United States.
We did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but
all the same, they debarred themselves of the right
to expect better treatment than people of any other
foreign state who make war upon an independent
nation. Upon the firing on Sumter President Lin-
coln issued his first call for troops and soon after a
proclamation convening Congress in extra session.
The call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days'
230 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
service. If the shot fired at Fort Sumter "was
heard around the world," the call of the President for
75,000 men was heard throughout the Northern States.
There was not a state in the North of a million of
inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire
number faster than arms could have been supplied
to them, if it had been necessary.
As soon as the news of the call for volunteers
reached Galena, posters were stuck up calling for a
meeting of the citizens at the court-house in the even-
ing. Business ceased entirely; all was excitement;
for a time there were no party distinctions ; all were
Union men, determined to avenge the insult to the
national flag. In the evening the court-house was
packed. Although a comparative stranger I was call-
ed upon to preside ; the sole reason, possibly, was that
I had been in the army and had seen service. With
much embarrassment and some prompting I made out
to announce the object of the meeting. Speeches
were in order, but it is doubtful whether it would have
been safe just then to make other than patriotic ones.
There was probably no one in the house, however,
who felt like making any other. The two principal
speeches were by B. B. Howard, the post-master and
a Breckinridge Democrat at the November election
the fall before, and John A. Rawlins, an elector on
the Douglas ticket. E. B. Washburne, with whom I
was not acquainted at that time, came in after the
PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING. 23 1
meeting had been organized, and expressed, I under-
stood afterwards, a little surprise that Galena could
not furnish a presiding ofBcer for such an occasion
without taking a stranger. He came forward and
was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the
patriotism of the meeting.
After the speaking was over volunteers were called
for to form a company. The quota of Illinois had
been fixed at six regiments ; and it was supposed that
one company would be as much as would be accepted
from Galena. The company was raised and the
officers and non-commissioned officers elected before
the meeting adjourned. I declined the captaincy
before the balloting, but announced that I would aid
the company in every way I could and would be
found in the service in some position if there should
be a war. I never went into our leather store after
that meeting, to put up a package or do other business.
The ladies of Galena were quite as patriotic as the
men. They could not enlist, but they conceived the
idea of sending their first company to the field uni-
formed. They came to me to get a description of the
United States uniform for infantry ; subscribed and
bought the material ; procured tailors to cut out the
garments, and the ladies made them up. In a few
days the company was in uniform and ready to report
at the State capital for assignment The men all turn-
ed out the morning after their enlistment, and I took
232 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
charge, divided them into squads and superintended
their drill. When they were ready to go to Spring-
field I went with them and remained there until they
were assigned to a regiment
There were so many more volunteers than had been
called for that the question whom to accept was quite
embarrassing to the governor, Richard Yates. The
legislature was in session at the time, however, and
came to his relief. A law was enacted authorizing
the governor to accept the services of ten additional
regiments, one from each congressional district, for
one month, to be paid by the State, but pledged to go
into the service of the United States if there should
be a further call during their term. Even with this
relief the governor was still very much embarrassed.
Before the war was over he was like the President
when he was taken with the varioloid : '* at last he had
something he could give to all who wanted it."
In time the Galena company was mustered into the
United States service, forming a part of the nth
Illinois volunteer infantry. My duties, I thought,
had ended at Springfield, and I was prepared to start
home by the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock.
Up to that time I do not think I had been introduced
to Governor Yates, or had ever spoken to him. I
knew him by sight, however, because he was living
at the same hotel and I often saw him at table.
The evening I was to quit the capital I left the
MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS. 233
supper room before the governor and was standing
at the front door when he came out He spoke to
me, calling me by my old army title " Captain/' and
said he understood that I was about leaving the
city. I answered that I was. He said he would
be glad if I would remain over-night and call at
the Executive office the next morning. I complied
with his request, and was asked to go into the Ad-
jutant-General's office and render such assistance
as I could, the governor saying that my army ex-
perience would be of great service there. I accept-
ed the proposition.
My old army experience I found indeed of very
great service. I was no clerk, nor had I any capac-
ity to become one. The only place I ever found in
my life to put a paper so as to find it again was
either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or
secretary more careful than myself. But I had been
quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the
field. The army forms were familiar to me and I
could direct how they should be made out. There
was a clerk in the office of the Adjutant-General
who supplied my deficiencies. The ease with which
the State of Illinois settled its accounts with the
government at the close of the war is evidence of
the efficiency of Mr. Loomis as an accountant on a
large scale. He remained in the office until that
time.
234 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
As I have stated, the legislature authorized the
governor to accept the services of ten additional regi-
ments. I had charge of mustering these regiments
into the State service. They were assembled at
the most convenient railroad centres in their re-
spective congressional districts. I detailed officers
to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three
in the southern part of the State myself. One of
these was to assemble at Belleville, some eighteen
miles south-east of St. Louis. When I got there I
found that only one or two companies had arrived.
There was no probability of the regiment coming to-
gether under five days. This gave me a few idle
days which I concluded to spend in St. Louis.
There was a considerable force of State militia at
Camp Jackson, on the outskirts of St. Louis, at the
time. There is but little doubt that it was the de-
sign of Governor Claiborn Jackson to have these
troops ready to seize the United States arsenal and
the city of St. Louis. Why they did not do so I do
not know. There was but a small garrison, two
companies I think, under Captain N. Lyon at the
arsenal, and but for the timely services of the Hon.
F. P. Blair, I have little doubt that St Louis would
have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal
with all its arms and ammunition.
Blair was a leader among the Union men of St.
Louis in 1861. There was no State government in
LYON AT CAMP JACKSON, 235
Missouri at the time that would sanction the raising
of troops or commissioned officers to protect United
States property, but Blair had probably procured
some form of authority from the President to raise
troops in Missouri and to muster them into the ser-
vice of the United States. At all events, he did
raise a regiment and took command himself as Col-
onel With this force he reported to Captain Lyon
and placed himself and regiment under his orders.
It was whispered that Lyon thus reinforced intended
to break up Camp Jackson and capture the militia.
I went down to the arsenal in the morning to see
the troops start out I had known Lyon for two
years at West Point and in the old army afterwards.
Blair I knew very well by sight. I had heard him
speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times,
but I had never spoken to him. As the troops
marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal,
Blair was on his horse outside forming them into
line preparatory to their march. I introduced my-
self to him and had a few moments* conversation
and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. This
was my first personal acquaintance with the Honor-
able — afterwards Major-General F. P. Blair. Camp
Jackson surrendered without a fight and the gar-
rison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners
of war.
Up to this time the enemies of the government in
236 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
St. Louis had been bold and defiant, while Union
men were quiet but determined. The enemies had
their head-quarters in a central and public position
on Pine Street, near Fifth — from which the rebel flag
was flaunted boldly. The Union men had a place of
meeting somewhere in the city, I did not know
where, and I doubt whether they dared to enrage
the enemies of the government by placing the na-
tional flag outside their head-quarters. As soon
as the news of the capture of Camp Jackson reached
the city the condition of affairs was changed.
Union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if you
will, intolerant They proclaimed their sentiments
boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect
for the Union. The secessionists became quiet but
were filled with suppressed rage. They had been
playing the bully. The Union men ordered the
rebel flag taken down from the building on Pine
Street. The command was given in tones of author-
ity and it was taken down, never to be raised again
in St. Louis.
I witnessed the scene. I had heard of the sur-
render of the camp and that the garrison was on its
way to the arsenal. I had seen the troops start out
in the morning and had wished them success. I
now determined to go to the arsenal and await their
arrival and congratulate them. I stepped on a car
standing at the corner of 4th and Pine streets, and
LYOI^ AT CAMP JACKSON. 2$7
saw a crowd of people standing quietly in front of
the head-quarters, who were there for the purpose of
hauling down the flag. There were squads of other
people at intervals down the street They too were
quiet but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered
their resentment at the insult to, what they called,
"their" flag. Before the car I was in had started, a
dapper little fellow — he would be called a dude at
this day — stepped in. He was in a great state of
excitement and used adjectives freely to express his
contempt for the Union and for those who had just
perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a
free people. There was only one other passenger
in the car besides myself when this young man en-
tered. He evidently expected to find nothing but
sympathy when he got away from the ** mud sills "
engaged in compelling a *' free people " to pull down
a flag they adored. He turned to me saying:
" Things have come to a pretty pass when a free
people can't choose their own flag. Where I came
from if a man dares to say a word in favor of
the Union we hang him to a limb of the first tree
we come to." I replied that "after all we were
not so intolerant in St Louis as we might be ; I
had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard
of one ; there were plenty of them who ought to
be, however." The j^oung man subsided. He was
so crestfallen that I believe if I had ordered him
238 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
to leave the car he would have gone quietly out,
saying to himself : " More Yankee oppression."
By nightfall the late defenders of Camp Jackson
were all within the walls of the St. Louis arsenal,
prisoners of war. The next day I left St. Louis for
Mattoon, Illinois, where I was to muster in the regi-
ment from that congressional district This was the
2 1st Illinois infantry, the regiment of which I sub-
sequently became colonel. I mustered one regi-
ment afterwards, when my services for the State
were about closed.
Brigadier-General John Pope was stationed at
Springfield, as United States mustering officer, all
the time I was in the State service. He was a
native of Illinois and well acquainted with most of
the prominent men in the State. I was a carpet-
bagger and knew but few of them. While I was on
duty at Springfield the senators, representatives in
Congress, ex-governors and the State legislators
were nearly all at the State capital. The only ac-
quaintance I made among them was with the gov-
ernor, whom I was serving, and, by chance, with
Senator S. A. Douglas. The only members of
Congress I knew were Washburne and Philip Foulk.
With the former, though he represented my district
and we were citizens of the same town, I only be-
came acquainted at the meeting when the first com-
pany of Galena volunteers was raised. Foulk I had
SERVICES TENDERED TV THE GOVERNMENT. 239
known in St. Louis when I was a citizen of that
city. I had been three years at West Point with
Pope and had served with him a short time during
the Mexican war» under General Taylor. I saw a
good deal of him during my service with the State.
On one occasion he said to me that I ought to go
into the United States service. I told him I in-
tended to do so if there was a war. He spoke of
his acquaintance with the public men of the State,
and said he could get them to recommend me for a
position and that he would do all he could for me.
I declined to receive endorsement for permission
to fight for my country.
Going home for a day or two soon after this con-
versation with General Pope, I wrote from Galena
the following letter to the Adjutant-General of the
Army.
Galkna, Ilunois,
May 24, 1861.
Cou L. Thomas,
Adjt. Gen. U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.
Sir : — Having served for fifteen years in the regular army,
including four years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of
every one who has been educated at the Government expense to
oflFer their services for the support of that Government, I have
the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close
of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. I would say, in
view of my present age and length of service, I feel myself com-
petent to command a regiment, if the President, in his judgment,
should see fit to intnist one to me
240 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Since the first call of the President I have been serving on the
staff of the Governor of this State, rendering such aid as I could
in the organization of our State militia, and am still engaged in
that capacity. A letter addressed to me at Springfield, Illinois,
will reach me.
I am very respectfully,
Your obt svt.,
U. S. GRANT.
This letter failed to elicit an answer from the
Adjutant-General of the Army. I presume it was
hardly read by him, and certainly it could not have
been submitted to higher authority. Subsequent to
the war General Badeau having heard of this letter
applied to the War Department for a copy of it.
The letter could not be found and no one recol-
lected ever having seen it I took no copy when
it was written. Long after the application of Gen-
eral Badeau, General Townsend, who had become
Adjutant-General of the Army, while packing up
papers preparatory to the removal of his office,
found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. It
had not been destroyed, but it had not been regu-
larly filed away.
I felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high
as the colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat
doubtful whether I would be equal to the position.
But I had seen nearly every colonel who had been
mustered in from the State of Illinois, and some
from Indiana, and felt that if they could com-
SERVICES TENDERED TO THE GOVERNMENT. 24 1
mand a regiment properly, and with credit, I could
also.
Having but little to do after the muster of the
last of the regiments authorized by the State legis-
lature, I asked and obtained of the governor leave
of absence for a week to visit my parents in Cov-
ington, Kentucky, immediately opposite Cincinnati.
General McClellan had been made a major-general
and had his headquarters at Cincinnati In reality
I wanted to see him. I had known him slightly at
West Point, where we served one year together,
and in the Mexican war. I was in hopes that when
he saw me he would offer me a position on his
staff. I called on two successive days at his office
but failed to see him on either occasion, and re-
turned to Springfield.
Vol. I. — 16
CHAPTER XVIII.
APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 2 1 ST ILLINOIS PERSON-
NEL OF THE REGIMENT GENERAL LOGAN MARCH
TO MISSOURI MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT
FLORIDA, MO.^-GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND STA-
TIONED AT MEXICO, MO.
WHILE I was absent from the State capital on
this occasion the President's second call for
troops was issued. This time it was for 300,000 men,
for three years or the war. This brought into the
United States service all the regim'ents then in the
State service. These had elected their officers from
highest to lowest and were accepted with their organi-
zations as they were, except in two instances. A Chi-
cago regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very
young man to the colonelcy. When it came to taking
the field the regiment asked to have another appointed
colonel and the one they had previously chosen
made lieutenant colonel. The 21st regiment of in-
fantr)^ mustered in by me at Mattoon, refused to
go into the service with the colonel of their selection
in any position. While I was still absent Governor
Yates appointed me colonel of this latter regiment.
PERSONNEL OF THE REGIMENT. 243
A few days after I was in charge of it and in camp
on the fair grounds near Springfield.
My regiment was composed in large part of young
men of as good social position as any in their sec-
tion of the State. It embraced the sons of farmers,
lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers
and ministers, and some men of maturer years who
had filled such positions themselves. There were
also men in it who could be led astray; and the
colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had
proved to be fully capable of developing all there
was in his men of recklessness. It was said that he
even went so far at times as to take the guard from
their posts and go with them to the village near by
and make a night of it. When there came a pros-
pect of battle the regiment wanted to have some
one else to lead them. I found it very hard work
for a few days to bring all the men into anything
like subordination ; but the great majority favored
discipline, and by the application of a little regular
army punishment qll were reduced to as good dis-
cipline as one could ask.
The ten regiments which had volunteered in the
State service for thirty days, it will be remembered,
had done so with a pledge to go into the National
service if called upon within that time. When
they volunteered the government had only called
for ninety days' enlistments. Men were called now
244 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
for three years or the war. They felt that this
change of period released them from the obligation
of re-volunteering. When I was appointed colonel,
the 2 1 St regiment was still in the State service.
About the time they were to be mustered into the
United States service, such of them as would go,
two members of Congress from the State, Mc-
Clernand and Logan, appeared at the capital and
I was introduced to them. I had never seen either
of them before, but I had read a great deal about
them, and particularly about Logan, in the news-
papers. Both were democratic members of Con-
gress, and Logan had been elected from the south-
ern district of the State, where he had a majority of
eighteen thousand over his Republican competitor.
His district had been settled originally by people
from the Southern States, and at the breaking out of
secession they sympathized with the South. At
the first outbreak of war some of them joined the
Southern army ; many others were preparing to do
so ; others rode over the country at night denounc-
ing the Union, and made it as necessary to guard
railroad bridges over which National troops had to
pass in southern Illinois, as it was in Kentucky or
any of the border slave states. Logan's popularity
in this district was unbounded. He knew almost
enough of the people in it by their Christian names,
to form an ordinary congressional district. As he
GENERAL LOGAN, 245
went in politics, so his district was sure to go. The
Republican papers had been demanding that he
should announce where he stood on the questions
which at that time engrossed the whole of public
thought. Some were very bitter in their denun-
ciations of his silence. Logan was not a man to be
coerced into an utterance by threats. He did, how-
ever, come out in a speech before the adjournment
of the special session of Congress which was
convened by the President soon after his inaugura-
tion, and announced his undying loyalty and devo-
tion to the Union. But I had not happened to see
that speech, so that when I first met Logan my im-
pressions were those formed from reading denun-
ciations of him. McClernand, on the other hand, had
early taken strong grounds for the maintenance of
the Union and had been praised accordingly by the
Republican papers. The gentlemen who presented
these two members of Congress asked me if I would
have any objections to their addressing my regiment.
I hesitated a little before answering. It was but a
few days before the time set for mustering into the
United States service such of the men as were will-
ing to volunteer for three years or the war. I had
some doubt as to the effect a speech from Logan
might have ; but as he was with McClernand, whose
sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the
day were well known, I gave my consent. Mc-
246 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
demand spoke first ; and Logan followed in a
speech which he has hardly equalled since for force
and eloquence. It breathed a loyalty and devotion
to the Union which inspired my men to such a point
that they would have volunteered to remain in the
army as long as an enemy of the country continued
to bear arms against it They entered the United
States service almost to a man.
General Logan went to his part of the State and
gave his attention to raising troops. The very men
who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in
southern Illinois became the defenders of the Union.
Logan entered the service himself as colonel of a
regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of major-gen-
eral. His district, which had promised at first to
give much trouble to the government, filled every
call made upon it for troops, without resorting to
the draft. There was no call made when there were
not more volunteers than were asked for. That
congressional district stands credited at the War
Department to-day with furnishing more men for
the army than it was called on to supply.
I remained in Springfield with my regiment until
the 3d of July, when I was ordered to Quincy, Illinois.
By that time the regiment was in a good state of dis-
cipline and the officers and men were well up in the
company drill. There was direct railroad commu-
nication between Springfield and Quincy, but I
MARCH TO MISSOURI, 247
thought it would be good preparation for the troops
to march there. We had no transportation for our
camp and garrison equipage, so wagons were hired
for the occasion and on the 3d of July we started.
There was no hurry, but fair marches were made
every day until the Illinois River was crossed.
There I was overtaken by a dispatch saying that
the destination of the regiment had been changed to
Ironton, Missouri, and ordering me to halt where I
was and await the arrival of a steamer which had
been dispatched up the Illinois River to take the
regiment to St. Louis. The boat, when it did come,
grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we
were in camp. We remained there several days
waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before
this occurred news came that an Illinois regiment was
surrounded by rebels at a point on the Hannibal
and St. Joe Railroad some miles west of Palmyra,
in Missouri, and I was ordered to proceed with all
dispatch to their relief. We took the cars and
reached Quincy in a few hours.
When I left Galena for the last time to take com-
mand of the 2 1 St regiment I took with me my oldest
son, Frederick D. Grant, then a lad of eleven years
of age. On receiving the order to take rail for
Quincy I wrote to Mrs. Grant, to relieve what I sup-
posed would be her great anxiety for one so young
going into danger, that I would send Fred home
248 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
from Quincy by river. I received a prompt letter
in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition, and
urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany
me. It came too late. Fred was already on his
way up the Mississippi bound for Dubuque, Iowa,
from which place there was a railroad to Galena.
My sensations as we approached what I supposed
might be **a field of battle" were anything but
agreeable. I had been in all the engagements in
Mexico that it was possible for one person to be in ;
but not in command. If some one else had been
colonel and I had been lieutenant-colonel I do not
think I would have felt any trepidation. Before
we were prepared to cross the Mississippi River at
Quincy my anxiety was relieved ; for the men of the
besieged regiment came straggling into town. I
am inclined to think both sides got frightened and
ran away.
I took my regiment to Palmyra and remained
there for a few days, until relieved by the 19th Illinois
infantr>\ From Palmyra I proceeded to Salt River,
the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed
by the enemy. Colonel John M. Palmer at that
time commanded the 13th Illinois, which was acting
as a guard to workmen who were engaged in re-
building this bridge. Palmer was my senior and
commanded the two regiments as long as we re-
mained together. The bridge was finished in about
MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT FLORIDA, MO. 249
two weeks, and I received orders to move against
Colonel Thomas Harris, who was said to be en-
camped at the little town of Florida, some twenty-
five miles south of where we then were.
At the time of which I now write we had no
transportation and the country about Salt River
was sparsely settled, so that it took some days to
collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp
and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thou-
sand strong, together with a week's supply of pro-
vision and some ammunition. While preparations
for the move were going on I felt quite comfortable ;
but when we got on the road and found every house
deserted I was anything but easy. In the twenty-
five miles we had to march we did not see a per-
son, old or young, male or female, except two horse-
men who were on a road that crossed ours. As
soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their
horses could carry them. I kept my men in the
ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted
houses or taking anything from them. We halted
at night on the road and proceeded the next morn-
ing at an early hour. Harris had been encamped in
a creek bottom for the sake of being near water.
The hills on either side of the creek extend to a
considerable height, possibly more than a hundred
feet. As we approached the brow of the hill from
which it was expected we could see Harris' camp.
250 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us,
my heart kept getting higher and higher until it
felt to me as though it was in my throat I would
have given anything then to have been back in Illi-
nois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and
consider what to do ; I kept right on. When we
reached a point from which the valley below was in
full view I halted The place where Harris had
been encamped a few days before was still there
and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly
visible, but the troops were gone. My heart re-
sumed its place. It occurred to me at once that
Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had
been of him. This was a view of the question I
had never taken before ; but it was one I never
forgot afterwards. From that event to the close
of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon
confronting an enemy, though I always felt more
or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as
much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The
lesson was valuable.
Inquiries at the village of Florida divulged the
fact that Colonel Harris, learning of my intended
movement, while my transportation was being col-
lected took time by the forelock and left Florida
before I had started from Salt River. He had in-
creased the distance between us by forty miles. The
next day I started back to my old camp at Salt River
GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND, 25 1
bridge. The citizens living on the line of our march
had returned to their houses after we passed, and
finding everything in good order, nothing carried
away, they were at their front doors ready to greet
us now. They had evidently been led to believe
that the National troops carried death and devasta-
tion with them wherever they went.
In a short time after our return to Salt River
bridge I was ordered with my regiment to the town
of Mexico. General Pope was then commanding the
district embracing all of the State of Missouri between
the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, with his head-
quarters in the village of Mexico. I was assigned
to the command of a sub-district embracing the
troops in the immediate neighborhood, some three
regiments of infantry and a section of artillery.
There was one regiment encamped by the side of
mine. I assumed command of the whole and the
first night sent the commander of the other regiment
the parole and countersign. Not wishing to be out-
done in courtesy, he immediately sent me the counter-
sign for his regiment for the night. When he was
informed that the countersign sent to him was for
use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult
to make him understand that this was not an unwar-
ranted interference of one colonel over another.
No doubt he attributed it for the time to the pre-
sumption of a graduate of West Point over a volun-
252 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
teer pure and simple. But the question was soon
settled and we had no further trouble.
My arrival in Mexico had been preceded by that
of two or three regiments in which proper discipline
had not been maintained, and the men had been in
the habit of visiting houses without invitation and
helping themselves to food and drink, or demanding
them from the occupants. They carried their mus-
kets while out of camp and made every man they
found take the oath of allegiance to the government
I at once published orders prohibiting the soldiers
from going into private houses unless invited by the
inhabitants, and from appropriating private property
to their own or to government uses. The people
were no longer molested or made afraid. I received
the most marked courtesy from the citizens of Mex-
ico as long as I remained there.
Up to this time my regiment had not been carried
in the school of the soldier beyond the company
drill, except that it had received some training on
the march from Springfield to the Illinois River.
There was now a good opportunity of exercising it
in the battalion drill. While I was at West Point
the tactics used in the army had been Scott's and
the musket the flint lock. I had never looked at a
copy of tactics from the time of my graduation.
My standing in that branch of studies had been near
the foot of the class. In the Mexican war in the
summer of 1846, I had been appointed regimental
STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO. 253
quartermaster and commissary and had not been at
a battalion drill since. The arms had been changed
since then and Hardee's tactics had been adopted.
I got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson,
intending to confine the exercise of the first day to
the commands I had thus learned. By pursuing this
course from day to day I thought I would soon get
through the volume.
We were encamped just outside of town on the
common, among scattering suburban houses with
enclosed gardens, and when I got my regiment
in line and rode to the front I soon saw that if I
attempted to follow the lesson I had studied I would
have to clear away some of the houses and garden
fences to make room. I perceived at once, however,
that Hardee's tactics — a mere translation from the
French with Hardee's name attached — was nothing
more than common sense and the progress of the
age applied to Scott's system. The commands
were abbreviated and the movement expedited.
Under the old tactics almost every change in the
order of march was preceded by a "halt," then
came the change, and then the " forward march."
With the new tactics all these changes could be made
while in motion. I found no trouble in giving com-
mands that would take my regiment where I wanted
it to go and carry it around all obstacles. I do not
believe that the officers of the regiment ever discov-
ered that I had never studied the tactics that I used.
CHAPTER XIX.
COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER - GENERAL — COMMAND AT
IRONTON, MO. —JEFFERSON CITY — CAPE GIRARDEAU
GENERAL PRENTISS — SEIZURE OF PADUCAH —
HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO.
I HAD not been in Mexico many weeks when,
reading a St. Louis paper, I found the President
had asked the Illinois delegation in Congress to
recommend some citizens of the State for the position
of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously
recommended me as first on a list of seven. I was
very much surprised because, as I have said, my
acquaintance with the Congressmen was very limited
and I did not know of anything I had done to inspire
such confidence. The papers of the next day an-
nounced that my name, with three others, had been
sent to the Senate, and a few days after our confir-
mation was announced.
When appointed brigadier - general I at once
thought it proper that one of my aides should
come from the regiment I had been commanding,
and so selected Lieutenant C. B. Lagow. While liv-
ing in St. Louis, I had had a desk in the law office
COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERALi 255
of McCIellan, Moody and Hillyen Difference in
views between the members of the firm on the ques-
tions of the day, and general hard times in the bor-
der cities, had broken up this firm. Hillyer was
quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very
brilliant I asked him to accept a place on my
sta£f. I also wanted to take one man from my new
home. Galena. The canvass in the Presidential
campaign the fall before had brought out a young
lawyer by the name of John A. Rawlins, who
proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the
State. He was also a candidate for elector on
the Douglas ticket When Sumter was fired upon
and the integrity of the Union threatened, there
was no man more ready to serve his country
than he. I wrote at once asking him to accept
the position of assistant adjutant-general with
the rank of captain, on my staff. He was about
entering the service as major of a new regiment
then organizing in the north-western part of
the State ; but he threw this up and accepted my
offer.
Neither Hillyer nor Lagow proved to have any
particular taste or special qualifications for the duties
of the soldier, and the former resigned during the
Vicksburg campaign ; the latter I relieved after the
battle of Chattanooga. Rawlins remained with me
as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier-
256 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
general and chief-of-staff to the General of the
Army — an office created for him — before the war
closed. He was an able man, possessed of great
firmness, and could say '* no " so emphatically to a
request which he thought should not be granted
that the person he was addressing would understand
at once that there was no use of pressing the matter.
General Rawlins was a very useful officer in other
ways than this. I became very much attached to
him.
Shortly after my promotion I was ordered to
Ironton, Missouri, to command a district in that
part of the State, and took the 21st Illinois, my old
regiment, with me. Several other regiments were
ordered to the same destination about the same time.
Ironton is on the Iron Mountain railroad, about
seventy miles south of St. Louis, and situated among
hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. When
I reached there, about the 8th of August, Colonel B.
Gratz Brown — afterwards Governor of Missouri and
in 1872 Vice-Presidential candidate — was in command.
Some of his troops were ninety days' men and their
time had expired some time before. The men had
no clothing but what they had volunteered in, and
much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay
on. General Hardee — the author of the tactics I did
not study — was at Greenville, some twenty-five miles
further south, it was said, with five thousand Con-
COMMAND AT IRON TON, MO. 257
federate troops. Under these circumstances Colonel
Brown's command was very much demoralized. A
squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the val-
ley and captured the entire force. Brown himself
was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever
has been since. I relieved him and sent all his men
home, within a day or two, to be mustered out of
service.
Within ten days after reaching I ronton I was
prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at
Greenville. I sent a column east out of the valley
we were in, with orders to swing around to the south
and west and come into the Greenville road ten
miles south of I ronton. Another column marched
on the direct road and went into camp at the point
designated for the two columns to meet. I was to
ride out the next morning and take personal com-
mand of the movement. My experience against
Harris, in northern Missouri, had inspired me with
confidence. But when the evening train came in, it
brought General B. M. Prentiss with orders to take
command of the district His orders did not relieve
me, but I knew that by law I was senior, and at that
time even the President did not have the authority
to assign a junior to command a senior of the same
grade. I therefore gave General Prentiss the situa-
tion of the troops and the general condition of
affairs, and started for St. Louis the same day. The
Vol. I.- 17
258 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
movement against the rebels at Greenville went no
further.
From St. Louis I was ordered to Jefferson City,
the capital of the State, to take command. General
Stirling Price, of the Confederate army, was thought
to be threatening the capital, Lexington, Chillicothe
and other comparatively large towns in the central
part of Missouri. I found a good many troops in
Jefferson City, but in the greatest confusion, and no
one person knew where they all were. Colonel Mul-
ligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had
not been educated as yet to his new profession and
did not know how to maintain discipline. I found
that volunteers had obtained permission from the
department commander, or claimed they had, to
raise, some of them, regiments ; some battalions ;
some companies — the officers to be commissioned
according to the number of men they brought into
the service. There were recruiting stations all over
town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over
the doors, announcing the arm of service and length
of time for which recruits at that station would be
received. The law required all volunteers to serve
for three years or the war. But in Jefferson City
in August, 1 86 1, they were recruited for different
periods and on different conditions ; some were en-
listed for six months, some for a year, some without
any condition as to where they were to serve, others
JEFFERSON CITY. 259
were not to be sent out of the State. The recruits
were principally men from regiments stationed there
and already in the service, bound for three years if
the war lasted that long.
The city was filled with Union fugitives who had
been driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with
the National troops. They were in a deplorable
condition and must have starved but for the support
the government gave them. They had generally
made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a
yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. A
little bedding besides their clothing and some food
had been thrown into the wagon. All else of their
worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by
their former neighbors; for the Union man in Mis-
souri who staid at home during the rebellion, if he
was not immediately under the protection of the
National troops, was at perpetual war with his neigh-
bors. I stopped the recruiting service, and disposed
the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to
guard all approaches. Order was soon restored.
I had been at Jefferson City but a few days when
I was directed from department headquarters to fit
out an expedition to Lexington, Booneville and
Chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those
cities all the funds they had and send them to St.
Louis. The western army had not yet been sup-
plied with transportation. It became necessary
26o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
therefore to press into the service teams belonging
to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those
of Union men. This afforded an opportunity of giv-
ing employment to such of the refugees within our
lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. They
accepted the service with alacrity. As fast as troops
could be got off they were moved west some twenty
miles or more. In seven or eight days from my as-
suming command at Jefferson City, I had all the
troops, except a small garrison, at an advanced posi-
tion and expected to join them myself the next day.
But my campaigns had not yet begun, for while
seated at my office door, with nothing further to do
until it was time to start for the front, I saw an offi-
cer of rank approaching, who proved to be Colonel
Jefferson C. Davis. I had never met him before,
but he introduced himself by handing me an order
for him to proceed to Jefferson City and relieve me
of the command. The orders directed that I should
report at department headquarters at St Louis with-
out delay, to receive important special instructions.
It was about an hour before the only regular train
of the day would start. I therefore turned over to
Colonel Davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to
him the progress that had been made to carry out the
department instructions already described. I had at
that time but one staff officer,* doing myself all the
* C. B. Lagbw, the others not yet having joined me.
CAPE GIRARDEAU. 26 1
detail work usually performed by an adjutant-general.
In an hour after being relieved from the command
I was on my way to St. Louis, leaving my single staff
officer to follow the next day with our horses and
baggage.
The ** important special instructions " which I re-
ceived the next day, assigned me to the command
of the district of south-east Missouri, embracing all
the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well
as all southern Illinois. At first I was to take personal
command of a combined expedition that had been
ordered for the capture of Colonel Jeff. Thompson,
a sort of independent or partisan commander who
was disputing with us the possession of south-east
Missouri. Troops had been ordered to move from
Ironton to Cape Girardeau, sixty or seventy miles
to the south-east, on the Mississippi River; while the
forces at Cape Girardeau had been ordered to move
to Jacksonville, ten miles out towards Ironton ; and
troops at Cairo and Bird's Point, at the junction of
the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, were to hold them-
selves in readiness to go down the Mississippi to Bel-
mont, eighteen miles below, to be moved west from
there when an officer should come to command them.
I was the officer who had been selected for this pur-
pose. Cairo was to become my headquarters when
the expedition terminated.
In pursuance of my orders I established my tem-
262 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
porary headquarters at Cape Girardeau and sent
instructions to the commanding officer at Jackson,
to inform me of the approach of General Prentiss
from I ronton. Hired wagons were kept moving
night and day to take additional rations to Jackson,
to supply the troops when they started from there.
Neither General Prentiss nor Colonel Marsh, who
commanded at Jackson, knew their destination. I
drew up all the instructions for the contemplated
move, and kept them in my pocket until I should
hear of the junction of our troops at Jackson. Two
or three days after my arrival at Cape Girardeau,
word came that General Prentiss was approaching
that place (Jackson). I started at once to meet him
there and to give him his orders. As I turned the
first corner of a street after starting, I saw a column
of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. I
turned and rode around the block the other way, so
as to meet the head of the column. I found there
General Prentiss himself, with a large escort. He
had halted his troops at Jackson for the night, and
had come on himself to Cape Girardeau, leaving
orders for his command to follow him in the morn-
ing. I gave the general his orders — which stopped
him at Jackson — but he was very much aggrieved
at being placed under another brigadier-general,
particularly as he believed himself to be the senior.
He had been a brigadier, in command at Cairo,
GENERAL PRENTISS. 263
while I was mustering officer at Springfield without
any rank. But we were nominated at the same
time for the United States service, and both our
commissions bore date May 17th, 1861. By virtue
of my former army rank I was, by law, the senior.
General Prentiss failed to get orders to his troops
to remain at Jackson, and the next morning early
they were reported as approaching Cape Girardeau.
I then ordered the general very peremptorily to
countermarch his command and take it back to
Jackson. He obeyed the order, but bade his com-
mand adieu when he got them to Jackson, and went
to St Louis and reported himself. This broke up
the expedition. But little harm was done, as Jeff.
Thompson moved light and had no fixed place for
even nominal headquarters. He was as much at
home in Arkansas as he was in Missouri and would
keep out of the way of a superior force. Prentiss
was sent to another part of the State.
General Prentiss made a great mistake on the
above occasion, one that he would not have com-
mitted later in the war. When I came to know
him better, I regretted it much. In consequence
of this occurrence he was off duty in the field when
the principal campaign at the West was going on,
and his juniors received promotion while he was
where none could be obtained. He would have
been next to myself in rank in the district of south-
264 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
east Missouri, by virtue of his services in the Mexi-
can war. He was a brave and very earnest soldier.
No man in the service was more sincere in his devo-
tion to the cause for which we were battling ; none
more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it.
On the 4th of September I removed my head-
quarters to Cairo and found Colonel Richard
Oglesby in command of the post We had never
met, at least not to my knowledge. After my pro-
motion I had ordered my brigadier-general's uniform
from New York, but it had not yet arrived, so that
I was in citizen's dress. The Colonel had his office
full of people, mostly from the neighboring States
of Missouri and Kentucky, making complaints or
asking favors. He evidently did not catch my name
when I was presented, for on my taking a piece of
paper from the table where he was seated and writ-
ing the order assuming command of the district of
south-east Missouri, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby to
command the post at Bird's Point, and handing it
to him, he put on an expression of surprise that
looked a little as if he would like to have some one
identify me. But he surrendered the office without
question.
The day after I assumed command at Cairo a man
came to me who said he was a scout of General
Fremont. He reported that he had just come from
Columbus, a point on the Mississippi twenty miles
SEIZURE OF PADUCAH. 265
below on the Kentucky side, and that troops had
started from there, or were about to start, to seize
Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee. There
was no time for delay ; I reported by telegraph to
the department commander the information I had
received, and added that I was taking steps to get
off that night to be in advance of the enemy in se-
curing that important point. There was a large
number of steamers lying at Cairo and a good many
boatmen were staying in the town. It was the work
of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with
coal aboard and steam up. Troops were also des-
ignated to go aboard. The distance from Cairo to
Paducah is about forty-five miles. I did not wish to
get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed
therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in
the stream until the time to start. Not having re-
ceived an answer to my first dispatch, I again tele-
graphed to department headquarters that I should
start for Paducah that night unless I received further
orders. Hearing nothing, we started before midnight
and arrived early the following morning, anticipating
the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours.
It proved very fortunate that the expedition against
Jeff. Thompson had been broken up. Had it not
been, the enemy would have seized Paducah and
fortified it, to our very great annoyance.
When the National troops entered the town the
266 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
citizens were taken by surprise. I never after saw
such consternation depicted on the faces of the people.
Men, women and children came out of their doors
looking pale and frightened at the presence of the
invader. They were expecting rebel troops that day.
In fact, nearly four thousand men from Columbus
were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of Pa-
ducah on their way to occupy the place. I had but
two regiments and one battery with me ; but the
enemy did not know this and returned to Columbus.
I stationed my troops at the best points to guard
the roads leading into the city, left gunboats to
guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to
start on my return to Cairo. Before leaving, how-
• ever, I addressed a short printed proclamation to the
citizens of Paducah assuring them of our peaceful
intentions, that we had come among them to pro-
tect them against the enemies of our country, and
that all who chose could continue their usual avoca-
tions with assurance of the protection of the gov-
ernment. This was evidently a relief to them ; but
the majority would have much preferred the presence
of the other army. I reinforced Paducah rapidly
from the troops at Cape Girardeau ; and a day or
two later General C. F. Smith, a most accomplished
soldier, reported at Cairo and was assigned to the
command of the post at the mouth of the Tennessee.
In a short time it was well fortified and a detach-
HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO. 267
ment was sent to occupy Smithland, at the mouth of
the Cumberland.
The State government of Kentucky at that time
was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an
armed neutrality between the North and the South,
and the governor really seemed to think the State had
a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. The
rebels already occupied two towns in the State, Co-
lumbus and Hickman, on the Mississippi ; and at the
very moment the National troops were entering Pa-
ducah from the Ohio front, General Lloyd Tilghman
— z, Confederate — ^with his staff and a small detach-
ment of men, were getting out in the other direction,
while, as I have already said, nearly four thousand
Confederate troops were on Kentucky soil on their
way to take possession of the town. But, in the
estimation of the governor and of those who thought
with him, this did not justify the National authorities
in invading the soil of Kentucky. I informed the
legislature of the State of what I was doing, and my
action was approved by the majority of that body.
On my return to Cairo I found authority from de-
partment headquarters for me to take Paducah " if I
felt strong enough," but very soon after I was repri-
manded from the same quarters for my correspondence
with the legislature and warned against a repetition
of the offence.
Soon after I took command at Cairo, General
268 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange
of the prisoners captured at Camp Jackson in the
month of May. I received orders to pass them
through my lines to Columbus as they presented
themselves with proper credentials. Quite a number
of these prisoners I had been personally acquainted
with before the war. Such of them as I had so
known were received at my headquarters as old
acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not
disturbed by their presence. On one occasion when
several were present in my office my intention to
visit Cape Girardeau the next day, to inspect the
troops at that point, was mentioned. Something
transpired which postponed my trip ; but a steamer
employed by the government was passing a point
some twenty or more miles above Cairo, the next
day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper
escort brought her to. A major, one of those who
had been at my headquarters the day before, came
at once aboard and after some search made a direct
demand for my delivery. It was hard to persuade
him that I was not there. This officer was Major
Barrett, of St. Louis. I had been acquainted with
his family before the war.
CHAPTER XX.
GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND — MOVEMENT AGAINST
BELMONT — BATTLE OF BELMONT — A NARROW ES-
CAPE — AFTER THE BATTLE.
FROM the occupation of Paducah up to the early
part of November nothing important occurred
with the troops under my command. I was rein-
forced from time to time and the men were drilled
and disciplined preparatory for the service which was
sure to come. By the ist of November I had not
fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill
and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like
themselves, had not yet been in an engagement.
They were growing impatient at lying idle so long,
almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they
had volunteered to fight against. I asked on one
or two occasions to be allowed to move against Co-
lumbus. It could have been taken soon after the
occupation of Paducah ; but before November it
was so strongly fortified that it would have required
a large force and a long siege to capture it.
In the latter part of October General Fremont
took the field in person and moved from Jefferson
270 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
City against General Sterling Price, who was then
in the State of Missouri with a considerable com-
mand. About the first of November I was directed
from department headquarters to make a demonstra-
tion on both sides of the Mississippi River with the
view of detaining the rebels at Columbus within
their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I
was notified from the same quarter that there were
some 3,ocx) of the enemy on the St Francis River
about fifty miles west, or south-west, from Cairo, and
was ordered to send another force against them. I
dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops suf-
ficient to compete with the reported number of the
enemy. On the 5th word came from the same
source that the rebels were about to detach a large
force from Columbus to be moved by boats down
the Mississippi and up the White River, in Arkansas,
in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to
prevent this movement if possible. I accordingly
sent a regiment from Bird's Point under Colonel W.
H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforce Oglesby,
with orders to march to New Madrid, a point some
distance below Columbus, on the Missouri side. At
the same time I directed General C. F. Smith to
move all the troops he could spare from Paducah
directly against Columbus, halting them, however, a
few miles from the town to await further orders from
me. Then I gathered up all the troops at Cairo and
MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT. 271
Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and moved them
down the river on steamers convoyed by two gun-
boats, accompanying them myself. My force con-
sisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five
regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies
of cavalry. We dropped down the river on the 6th to
within about six miles of Columbus, debarked a few
men on the Kentucky side and established pickets to
connect with the troops from Paducah.
I had no orders which contemplated an attack by
the National troops, nor did I intend anything of
the kind when I started out from Cairo ; but after
we started I saw that the officers and men were
elated at the prospect of at last having the oppor-
tunity of doing what they had volunteered to do —
fight the enemies of their country. I did not see
how I could maintain discipline, or retain the confi-
dence of my command, if we should return to Cairo
without an effort to do something. Columbus,
besides being strongly fortified, contained a gar-
rison much more numerous than the force I had
with me. It would not do, therefore, to attack
that point About two o clock on the morning
of the 7th, I learned that the enemy was crossing
troops from Columbus to the west bank to be
dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby. I knew
there was a small camp of Confederates at Belmont,
immediately opposite Columbus, and I speedily
272 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
resolved to push down the river, land on the Mis-
souri side, capture Belmont, break up the camp and
return. Accordingly, the pickets above Columbus
were drawn in at once, and about daylight the boats
moved out from shore. In an hour we were debark-
ing on the west bank of the Mississippi, just out of
range of the batteries at Columbus.
The ground on the west shore of the river, oppo-
site Columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut
up with sloughs. The soil is rich and the timber
large and heavy. There were some small clearings
between Belmont and the point where we landed,
but most of the country was covered with the native
forests. We landed in front of a cornfield. When
the debarkation commenced, I took a regiment down
the river to post it as a guard against surprise. At
that time I had no staff officer who could be trusted
with that duty. In the woods, at a short distance
below the clearing, I found a depression, dry at the
time, but which at high water became a slough or
bayou. I placed the men in the hollow, gave
them their instructions and ordered them to remain
there until they were properly relieved. These
troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our trans-
ports.
Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to
divine our intentions. From Columbus they could,
of course, see our gunboats and transports loaded
MO VEMENT A GAINST BELMONT. 273
with troops. But the force from Paducah was
threatening them from the land side, and it was
hardly to be expected that if Columbus was our
object we would separate our troops by a wide riven
They doubtless thought we meant to draw a large
force from the east bank, then embark ourselves,
land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on
Columbus before their divided command could be
united.
About eight o'clock we started from the point of
debarkation, marching by the flank. After moving
in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, I halted
where there was marshy ground covered with a
heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed
a large part of my force as skirmishers. By this
time the enemy discovered that we were moving
upon Belmont and sent out troops to meet us.
Soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers
were encountered and fighting commenced. This
continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four
hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until
he was driven into his camp. Early in this engage-
ment my horse was shot under me, but I got
another from one of my staff and kept well up with
the advance until the river was reached.
The officers and men engaged at Belmont were
then under fire for the first time. Veterans could
not have behaved better than they did up to the
Vol. I.— x8.
274 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
m
moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point
they became demoralized from their victory and
failed to reap its full reward. The enemy had been
followed so closely that when he reached the clear
ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a
hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected
him from our shots and from view. This precipitate
retreat at the last moment enabled the National forces
to pick their way without hinderance through the
abatis — the only artificial defence the enemy had.
The moment the camp was reached our men laid
down their arms and commenced rummaging the
tents to pick up trophies. Some of the higher officers
were little better than the privates. They galloped
about from one cluster of men to another and at
every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union
cause and the achievements of the command.
All this time the troops we had been engaged with
for four hours, lay crouched under cover of the river
bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned
to do so ; but finding that they were not pursued,
they worked their way up the river and came up on
the bank between us and our transports. I saw at the
same time two steamers coming from the Columbus
side towards the west shore, above us, black — or gray
— with soldiers from boiler deck to roof. Some of
my men were engaged in firing from captured guns
at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheer-
276 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ing at every shot, I tried to get them to turn their
guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far
away. My efforts were in vain. At last I directed
my staff officers to set fire to the camps. This drew
the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of
Columbus. They had abstained from firing before,
probably because they were afraid of hitting their
own men ; or they may have supposed, until the camp
was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their
friends. About this time, too, the men we had
driven over the bank were seen in line up the river
between us and our transports. The alarm ''sur-
rounded" was given. The guns of the enemy and
the report of being surrounded, brought officers and
men completely under control. At first some of the
officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was
to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was
nothing to do but surrender. But when I announced
that we had cut our way in and could cut our way
out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers
and soldiers. They formed line rapidly and we
started back to our boats, with the men deployed as
skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. The
enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this
time was feeble. Again the Confederates sought
shelter under the river banks. We could not stop,
however, to pick them up, because the troops we had
seen crossing the river had debarked by this time
BATTLE OF BELMONT. IJJ
and were nearer our transports than we were. It
would be prudent to get them behind us ; but we
were not again molested on our way to the boats.
From the beginning of the fighting our wounded
had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the
place of debarkation. I now set the troops to bring-
ing their wounded to the boats. After this had
gone on for some little time I rode down the road,
without even a staff officer, to visit the guard I
had stationed over the approach to our transports.
I knew the enemy had crossed over from Columbus
in considerable numbers and might be expected to
attack us as we were embarking. This guard would
be encountered first and, as they were in a natural
intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for
a considerable time. My surprise was great to find
there was not a single man in the trench. Riding
back to the boat I found the officer who had com-
manded the guard and learned that he had with-
drawn his force when the main body fell back. At
first I ordered the guard to return, but finding that
it would take some time to get the men together
and march them back to their position, I counter-
manded the order. Then fearing that the enemy
we had seen crossing the river below might be com-
ing upon us unawares, I rode out in the field to
our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether
the enemy was passing. The field was grown up
278 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.
with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of
even a person on horseback, except directly along
the rows. Even in that direction, owing to the
overhanging blades of com, the view was not ex-
tensive. I had not gone more than a few hundred
yards when I saw a body of troops marching past
me not fifty yards away. I looked at them for a
moment and then turned my horse towards the
river and started back, first in a walk, and when I
thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy,
as fast as my horse could carry me. When at the
river bank I still had to ride a few hundred yards to
the point where the nearest transport lay.
The cornfield in front of our transports terminated
at the edge of a dense forest Before I got back the
enemy had entered this forest and had opened a
brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, with the ex-
ception of details that had gone to the front after
the wounded, were now either aboard the transports
or very near them. Those who were not aboard
soon got there, and the boats pushed off. I was the
only man of the National army between the rebels
and our transports. The captain of a boat that had
just pushed out but had not started, recognized me
and ordered the engineer not to start the engine ; he
then had a plank run out for me. My horse seemed
to take in the situation. There was no path down
the bank and every one acquainted with the Missis-
A NARROW ESCAPE. 279
sippi River knows that its banks, in a natural state, do
not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular.
My horse put his fore feet over the bank without
hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well
under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard
the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single
gang plank. I dismounted and went at once to the
upper deck.
The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of No-
vember, 1 86 1, so that the banks were higher than
the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the
steamers. The rebels were some distance back from
the river, so that their fire was high and did us but
little harm. Our smoke-stack was riddled with bul-
lets, but there were only three men wounded on
the boats, two of whom were soldiers. When I
first went on deck I entered the captain's room ad-
joining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa.
I did not keep that position a moment, but rose to
go out on the deck to observe what was going on. I
had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the
room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it
and lodged in the foot.
When the enemy opened fire on the transports
our gunboats returned it with vigor. They were
well out in the stream and some distance down, so
that they had to give but very little elevation to their
guns to clear the banks of the river. Their position
28o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he
was marching through the cornfield. The execution
was very great, as we could see at the time and as
I afterwards learned more positively. We were very
soon out of range and went peacefully on our way
to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great
victory and that he had contributed his share to it.
Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded
and missing. About 125 of our wounded fell into
the hands of the enemy. We returned with 175
prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces.
The loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642
men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged
about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with
the transports. The enemy had about 7,000 ; but this
includes the troops brought over from Columbus
who were not engaged in the first defence of Bel-
mont.
The two objects for which the battle of Belmont
was fought were fully accomplished The enemy
gave up all idea of detaching troops from Columbus.
His losses were very heavy for that period of the
war. Columbus was beset by people looking for their
wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical
treatment or burial. I learned later, when I had
moved further south, that Belmont had caused more
mourning than almost any other battle up to that
time. The National troops acquired a confidence in
AFTER THE BATTLE. 28 X
themselves at Belmont that did not desert them
through the war.
The day after the battle I met some officers from
General Polk's command, arranged for permission
to bury our dead at Belmont and also commenced
negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. When
our men went to bury their dead, before they were
allowed to land they were conducted below the point
where the enemy had engaged our transports. Some
of the officers expressed a desire to see the field ; but
the request was refused with the statement that we
had no dead there.
While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer,
whom I had known both at West Point and in the
Mexican war, that I was in the cornfield near their
troops when they passed ; that I had been on horse-
back and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time.
This officer was on General Polk's staff. He said
both he and the general had seen me and that Polk
had said to his men, " There is a Yankee ; you may
try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but no-
body fired at me.
Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a
wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the
possibility of them from the beginning. If it had not
been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have
been captured or destroyed with his three thousand
men. Then I should have been culpable indeed.
CHAPTER XXI.
GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND — COMMANDING THE
DISTRICT OF CAIRO — MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY
— CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.
WHILE at Cairo I had frequent opportunities
of meeting the rebel officers of the Columbus
garrison. They seemed to be very fond of coming
up on steamers under flags of truce. On two or three
occasions I went down in like manner. When one of
their boats was seen coming up carrying a white flag,
a gun would be fired from the lower battery at Fort
Holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to
come no farther. I would then take a steamer and,
with my staff and occasionally a few other officers,
go down to receive the party. There were several
officers among them whom I had known before, both
at West Point and in Mexico. Seeing these officers
who had been educated for the profession of arms,
both at school and in actual war, which is a far more
efficient training, impressed me with the great ad-
vantage the South possessed over the North at the
beginning of the rebellion. They had from thirty to
forty per cent, of the educated soldiers of the Nation.
GEXERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND, 283
They had no standing army and, consequently, these
trained soldiers had to find employment with the
troops from their own States. In this way what
there was of military education and training was dis-
tributed throughout their whole army. The whole
loaf was leavened.
The North had a greater number of educated and
trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in
the army and were retained, generally with their old
commands and rank, until the war had lasted many
months. In the Army of the Potomac there was
what was known as the "regular brigade," in which,
from the commanding officer down to the youngest
second lieutenant, every one was educated to his
profession. So, too, with many of the batteries ; all
the officers, generally four in number to each, were
men educated for their profession. Some of these
went into battle at the beginning under division com-
manders who were entirely without military training.
This state of affairs gave me an idea which I ex-
pressed while at Cairo ; that the government ought
to disband the regular army, with the exception of
the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that
they would receive no compensation while the war
lasted except as volunteers. The register should be
kept up, but the names of all officers who were not
in the volunteer service at the close, should be
stricken from it.
284 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
On the 9th of November, two days after the battle
of Belmont, Major-General H. W. Halleck super-
seded General Fremont in command of the Depart-
ment of the Missouri. The limits of his command
took in Arkansas and west Kentucky east to the
Cumberland River. From the battle of Belmont
until early in February, 1862, the troops under my
command did little except prepare for the long
struggle which proved to be before them.
The enemy at this time occupied a line running
from the Mississippi River at Columbus to Bowling
Green and Mill Springs, Kentucky. Each of these
positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on
the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers near the Ten-
nessee state line. The works on the Tennessee were
called Fort Heiman and Fort Henry, and that on
the Cumberland was Fort Donelson. At these points
the two rivers approached within eleven miles of each
other. The lines of rifle pits at each place extended
back from the water at least two miles, so that the
garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart.
These positions were of immense importance to the
enemy ; and of course correspondingly important for
us to possess ourselves of. With Fort Henry in our
hands we had a navigable stream open to us up to
Muscle Shoals, in Alabama. The Memphis and
Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee at East-
port, Mississippi, and follows close to the banks of
COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF CAIRO. 285
the river up to the shoals. This road, of vast im-
portance to the enemy, would cease to be of use to
them for through traffic the moment Fort Henry
became ours. Fort Donelson was the gate to Nash-
ville — a place of g^eat military and political impor-
tance — ^and to a rich country extending far east in
Kentucky. These two points in our possession the
enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the
Memphis and Charleston road, or to the boundary
of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road
would be lost to them for through communication.
The designation of my command had been changed
after Halleck's arrival, from the District of South-
east Missouri to the District of Cairo, and the
small district commanded by General C. F. Smith,
embracing the mouths of the Tennessee and Cum-
berland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction.
Early in January, 1862, I was directed by General
McClellan, through my department commander, to
make a reconnoissance in favor of Brigadier-General
Don Carlos Buell, who commanded the Depart-
ment of the Ohio, with headquarters at Louisville,
and who was confronting General S. B. Buckner
with a larger Confederate force at Bowling Green.
It was supposed that Buell was about to make some
move against the enemy, and my demonstration was
intended to prevent the sending of troops from Co-
lumbus, Fort Henry or Donelson to Buckner. I at
286 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
once ordered General Smith to send a force up the
west bank of the Tennessee to threaten forts Hei-
man and Henry ; McClemand at the same time
with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west
Kentucky, threatening Columbus with one column
and the Tennessee River with another. I went with
McClernand's command. The weather was very bad ;
snow and rain fell ; the roads, never good in that
section, were intolerable. We were out more than a
week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the
men suffering very much. The object of the expe-
dition was accomplished. The enemy did not send
reinforcements to Bowling Green, and General
George H. Thomas fought and won the battle of
Mill Springs before we returned.
As a result of this expedition General Smith re-
ported that he thought it practicable to capture Fort
Heiman. This fort stood on high ground, com-
pletely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite
side of the river, and its possession by us, with the
aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of
Fort Henry. This report of Smith's confirmed
views I had previously held, that the true line of
operations for us was up the Tennessee and Cum-
berland rivers. With us there, the enemy would be
compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely
out of the State of Kentucky. On the 6th of Jan-
uary, before receiving orders for this expedition, I
MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY. 287
had asked permission of the general commanding the
department to go to see him at St Louis. My ob-
ject was to lay this plan of campaign before him.
Now that my views had been confirmed by so able a
general as Smith, I renewed my request to go to St
Louis on what I deemed important military business.
The leave was granted, but not graciously. I had
known General Halleck but very slightly in the old
army, not having met him either at West Point or
during the Mexican war. I was received with so
little cordiality that I perhaps stated the object of
my visit with less clearness than I might have done,
and I had not uttered many sentences before I was
cut short as if my plan was preposterous. I returned
to Cairo very much crestfallen.
Flag-officer Foote commanded the little fleet of
gunboats then in the neighborhood of Cairo and,
though in another branch of the service, was subject
to the command of General Halleck. He and I
consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed
with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the cam-
paign up the Tennessee. Notwithstanding the re-
buff I had received from my immediate chief, I there-
fore, on the 28th of January, renewed the suggestion
by telegraph that "if permitted, I could take and
hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee." This time I was
backed by Flag-officer Foote, who sent a similar dis-
patch. On the 29th I wrote fully in support of the
288 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
proposition. On the ist of February I received full
instructions from department headquarters to move
upon Fort Henry. On the 2d the expedition started.
In February, 1862, there were quite a good many
steamers laid up at Cairo for want of employment,
the Mississippi River being closed against navigation
below that point. There were also many men in the
town whose occupation had been following the
river in various capacities, from captain down to
deck hand. But there were not enough of either
boats or men to move at one time the 1 7,coo men
I proposed to take with me up the Tennessee. I
loaded the boats with more than half the force, how-
ever, and sent General McClernand in command. I
followed with one of the later boats and found Mc-
Clernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles
below Fort Henry. Seven gunboats under Flag-
officer Foote had accompanied the advance. The
transports we had with us had to return to Paducah
to bring up a division from there, with General C. F.
Smith in command.
Before sending the boats back I wanted to get the
troops as near to the enemy as I could without com-
ing within range of their guns. There was a stream
empting into the Tennessee on the east side, ap-
parently at about long range distance below the fort
On account of the narrow water-shed separating the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at that point, the
290 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
Stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but
when we were there, in February, it was a torrent.
It would facilitate the investment of Fort Henrj-
materially if the troops could be landed south of that
stream. To test whether this could be done I
boarded the gunboat Essex and requested Captain
Wm. Porter commanding it, to approach the fort
to draw its fire. After we had gone some dis-
tance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire
of the fort, which fell much short of us. In conse-
quence I had made up my mind to return and bring
the troops to the upper side of the creek, when the
enemy opened upon us with a rifled gfun that sent
shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. One
shot passed very near where Captain Porter and I
were standing, struck the deck near the stern, pene-
trated and passed through the cabin and so out into
the river. We immediately turned back, and the
troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek.
When the landing was completed I returned with
the transports to Paducah to hasten up the balance
of the troops. I got back on the 5th with the ad-
vance, the remainder following as rapidly as the
steamers could carry them. At ten o'clock at night,
on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up.
Being anxious to commence operations as soon as
possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, I
issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the
CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY, 29 1
6th. I felt sure that all the troops would be up by
that time.
Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which
gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down
the stream. The camp outside the fort was in-
trenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back
on the road to Donelson and Dover. The garrison
of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong
reinforcements from Donelson halted some miles out
There were seventeen heavy guns in the fort The
river was very high, the banks being overflowed ex-
cept where the bluffs come to the water's edge. A
portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood
was two feet deep in water. Below, the water ex-
tended into the woods several hundred yards back
from the bank on the east side. On the west bank
Fort Heiman stood on high ground, completely com-
manding Fort Henry. The distance from Fort
Henry to Donelson is but eleven miles. The two
positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw
his interest, that it was natural to suppose that rein-
forcements would come from every quarter from
which they could be got Prompt action on our part
was imperative.
The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start
at the same moment The troops were to invest
the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at
close quarters. General Smith was to land a brigade
292 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
of his division on the west bank during the night of
the 5th and get it in rear of Heiman.
At the hour designated the troops and gunboats
started. General Smith found Fort Heiman had
been evacuated before his men arrived. The gun-
boats soon engaged the water batteries at very close
quarters, but the troops which were to invest Fort
Henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as
by the dense forest and the high water in what
would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of
streams. This delay made no difference in the
result. On our first appearance Tilghman had sent
his entire command, with the exception of about one
hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the
outworks on the road to Dover and Donelson, so
as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy ;
and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered
them to retreat on Donelson. He stated in his sub-
sequent report that the defence was intended solely
to give his troops time to make their escape.
Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety
men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammu-
nition and whatever stores were there. Our cavalry
pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and
picked up two guns and a few stragglers ; but the
enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force
did not get in sight of any except the stragglers.
All the gunboats engaged were hit many times.
CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. 293
The damage, however, beyond what could be repair-
ed by a small expenditure of money, was slight, ex-
cept to the Essex. A shell penetrated the boiler of
that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding
forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who
had been detailed to act with the navy. On several
occasions during the war such details were made
when the complement of men with the navy was
insufficient for the duty before them. After the fall
of Fort Henry Captain Walke, commanding the
iron-clad Carondelet^ at my request ascended the
Tennessee River and thoroughly destroyed the
bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad.
CHAPTER XXIL
INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON — THE NAVAL OPERA-
TIONS — ATTACK OF THE ENEMY — ASSAULTING THE
WORKS — SURRENDER OF THE FORT.
{INFORMED the department commander of our
success at Fort Henry and that on the 8th I would
take Fort Donelson. But the rain continued to fall
SO heavily that the roads became impassable for artil-
lery and wagon trains. Then, too, it would not have
been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. At
least it would have been leaving behind a valuable
part of our available force.
On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry,
I took my staff and the cavalry — a part of one regi-
ment — and made a reconnoissance to within about a
mile of the outer line of works at Donelson. I had
known General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that
with any force, no matter how small, I could march
up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was
given to hold. I said this to the officers of my staff
at the time. I knew that Floyd was in command,
but he was no soldier, and I judged that he would
yield to Pillow's pretensions. I met, as I expected,
INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON. 295
no Opposition in making the reconnoissance and, be-
sides learning the topography of the country on the
way and around Fort Donelson, found that there
were two roads available for marching ; one leading
to the village of Dover, the other to Donelson.
Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the
river, from Dover. The fort, as it stood in 1861,
embraced about one hundred acres of land. On the
east it fronted the Cumberland; to the north it
faceid Hickman's creek, a small stream which at that
time was deep and wide because of the back-water
from the river; on the south was another small
stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the Cumber-
land. This also was filled with back-water from the
river. The fort stood on high ground, some of it as
much as a hundred feet above the Cumberland.
Strong protection to the heavy guns in the water
batteries had been obtained by cutting away places
for them in the bluff. To the west there was a line
of .rifle-pits some two miles back from the river at
the farthest point This line ran generally along
the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a
ravine which opens into the river between the village
and the fort. The ground inside and outside of this
intrenched line was very broken and generally wood-
ed. The trees outside of the rifle-pits had been cut
down for a considerable way out, and had been felled
so that their tops lay outwards from the intrench-
296 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
ments. The limbs had been trimmed and pointed,
and thus formed an abatis in front of the greater
part of the line. Outside of this intrenched line, and
extending about half the entire length of it, is a
ravine running north and south and opening into
Hickman creek at a point north of the fort The
entire side of this ravine next to the works was one
long abatis.
General Halleck commenced his efforts in all
quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me im-
mediately on my departure from Cairo. General
Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large
division under General Nelson, from Buell's army,
was also dispatched. Orders went out from the War
Department to consolidate fragments of companies
that were being recruited in the Western States so
as to make full companies, and to consolidate com-
panies into regiments. General Halleck did not
approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donel-
son. He said nothing whatever to me on the subject.
He informed Buell on the 7th that I would march
against Fort Donelson the next day ; but on the
loth he directed me to fortify Fort Henry strongly,
particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded
me intrenching tools for that purpose. I received
this dispatch in front of Fort Donelson.
I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson be-
cause I knew the importance of the place to the
298 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly.
I felt that I5,cxx) men on the 8th would be more
effective than 50,cxx) a month later. I asked Flag-
officer Foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still
about Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River
and not to wait for those gone to Eastport and
Florence ; but the others got back in time and we
started on the 1 2th. I had moved McClernand out
a few miles the night before so as to leave the road
as free as possible.
Just as we were about to start the first reinforce-
ment reached me on transports. It was a brigade
composed of six full regiments commanded by
Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska. As the gunboats
were going around to Donelson by the Tennessee,
Ohio and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayer to
turn about and go under their convoy.
I started from Fort Henry with I5,cxx) men, in-
cluding eight batteries and part of a regiment of
cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to detain
us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by
noon. That afternoon and the next day were spent
in taking up ground to make the investment as com-
plete as possible. General Smith had been directed
to leave a portion of his division behind to guard
forts Henry and Heiman. He left General Lew.
Wallace with 2,500 men. With the remainder of
his division he occupied our left, extending to Hjck-
INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON 299
man creek. McCIemand was on the right and cov-
ered the roads running south and south-west from
Dover. His right extended to the back-water up the
ravine opening into the Tennessee south of the vil-
lage. The troops were not intrenched, but the
nature of the ground was such that they were just
as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if
rifle-pits had been thrown up. Our line was gener-
ally along the crest of ridges. The artillery was
protected by being sunk in the ground. The men
who were not serving the g^ns were perfectly covered
from fire on taking position a little back from the crest.
The greatest suffering was from want of shelter. It
was midwinter and during the siege we had rain
and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. It
would not do to allow camp-fires except far down
the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not
do to allow many of the troops to remain there iat
the same time. In the march over from Fort Henry
numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets
and overcoats. There was therefore much discom-
fort and absolute suffering.
During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of
Wallace and Thayer on the 14th, the National forces,
composed of but 15,000 men, without intrenchments,
confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without
conflict further than what was brought on by our-
selves. Only one gunboat had arrived. There* was
3(X) PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the
movement of our troops in securing commanding
positions ; but there was no actual fighting during
this time except once, on the 13th, in front of Mc-
Clernand's command. That general had undertaken
to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoy-
ing his men. Without orders or authority he sent
three regiments to make the assault The battery
was in the main line of the enemy, which was de-
fended by his whole army present Of course the
assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our
side was great for the number of men engaged. In
this assault Colonel William Morrison fell badly
wounded. Up to this time the surgeons with the
army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses
near our line for all the sick and wounded ; but now
hospitals were overcrowded. Owing, however, to the
energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering was
not so great as it might have been. The hospital
arrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as
it was possible to make them, considering the in-
clemency of the weather and the lack of tents, in a
sparsely settled country where the houses were gen-
erally of but one or two rooms.
On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry
on the loth, I had requested him to take the vessels
that had accompanied him on his expedition up the
Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS, 30I
far up towards Donelson as possible. He started
without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat,
the CarandeUt, towed by the steamer Alps. Captain
Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the
1 2th, a little after noon. About the time the ad-
vance of troops reached a point within gunshot of
the fort on the land side, he engaged the water bat-
teries at long range. On the 13th I informed him
of my arrival the day before and of the establish-
ment of most of our batteries, requesting him at the
same time to attack again that day so that I might
take advantage of any diversion. The attack was
made and many shots fell within the fort, creating
some consternation, as we now know. The invest-
ment on the land side was made as complete as the
number of troops engaged would admit of.
During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote
arrived with the iron-clads Si. Louis, Louisville and
Pittsburg and the wooden gunboats Tyler and
Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade. On the
morning of the 14th Thayer was landed. Wallace,
whom I had ordered over from Fort Henry, also
arrived about the same time. Up to this time he
had been commanding a brigade belonging to the
division of General C. F. Smith. These troops were
now restored to the division they belonged to, and
General Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command
of a division composed of the brigade of Colonel
302 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
Thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the
same day. This new division was assigned to the
centre, giving the two flanking divisions an oppor-
tunity to close up and form a stronger line.
The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy
within his lines, while the gunboats should attack
the water batteries at close quarters and silence his
guns if possible. Some of the gunboats were to run
the batteries, get above the fort and above the
village of Dover. I had ordered a reconnoissance
made with the view of getting troops to the river
above Dover in case they should be needed there.
That position attained by the gunboats it would have
been but a question of time — and a very short time,
too — when the garrison would have been compelled
to surrender.
By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer
Foote was ready, and advanced upon the water
batteries with his entire fleet. After coming in range
of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow,
but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that
could be brought to bear upon the fort. I occupied
a position on shore from which I could see the ad-
vancing navy. The leading boat got within a very
short distance of the water batter)', not further off I
think than two hundred yards, and I soon saw one
and then another of them dropping down the river,
visibly disabled. Then the whole fleet followed and
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS. 303
the engagement closed for the day. The gunboat
which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides having
been hit about sixty times, several of the shots pass-
ing through near the water-line, had a shot enter the
pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the
wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. The
tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and
she, too, dropped helplessly back. Two others had
their pilot-houses so injured that they scarcely formed
a protection to the men at the wheel
The enemy had evidently been much demoralized
by the assault, but they were jubilant when they saw
the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely
out of the control of the men on board. Of course
I only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats
and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse.
Subsequent reports, now published, show that the
enemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond.
The sun went down on the night of the 14th of
February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort
Donelson anything but comforted over the prospects.
The weather had turned intensely cold ; the men
were without tents and could not keep up fires where
most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated,
many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets.
Two of the strongest of our gunboats had been dis-
abled, presumably beyond the possibility of rendering
any present assistance. I retired this night not
304 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
knowing but that I would have to intrench my posi-
tion, and bring up tents for the men or build huts
under the cover of the hills.
On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet
broad day, a messenger from Flag-officer Foote
handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me on
the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the
day before so much that he could not come himself to
me. I at once made my preparations for starting.
I directed my adjutant-general to notify each of the
division commanders of my absence and instruct them
to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they
received further orders, but to hold their positions.
From the heavy rains that had fallen for days and
weeks preceding and from the constant use of the
roads between the troops and the landing four to
seven miles below, these roads had become cut up so
as to be hardly passable. The intense cold of the
night of the I4th-i5th had frozen the ground solid.
This made travel on horseback even slower than
through the mud ; but I went as fast as the roads
would allow.
When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship
was anchored out in the stream. A small boat, how-
ever, awaited my arrival and I was soon on board
with the flag-officer. He explained to me in short
the condition in which he was left by the engagement
of the evening before, and suggested that I should
ATTACK OF THE ENEMY. 305
intrench while he returned to Mound City with his
disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that
he could have the necessary repairs made and be
back in ten days. I saw the absolute necessity of
his gunboats going into hospital and did not know
but I should be forced to the alternative of going
through a siege. But the enemy relieved me from
this necessity.
When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer
Foote I had no idea that there would be any engage-
ment on land unless I brought it on myself. The
conditions for battle were much more favorable to us
than they had been for the first two days of the in-
vestment. From the 12th to the 14th we had but
15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now
we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels,
a large division of troops under General L. Wallace
and 2,500 men brought over from Fort Henry
belonging to the division of C. F. Smith. The en-
emy, however, had taken the initiative. Just as I
landed I met Captain Hillyer of my staff^, white with
fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of
the National troops. He said the enemy had come
out of his lines in full force and attacked and scat-
tered McClernand s division, which was in full re-
treat. The roads, as I have said, were unfit for mak-
ing fast time, but I got to my command as soon as
possible. The attack had been made on the National
Vol. I. — 20
306 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
right. I was some four or five miles north of our
left. The line was about three miles long. In reach-
ing the point where the disaster had occurred I had
to pass the divisions of Smith and Wallace. I saw
no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held
by Smith ; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict
and had taken part in it. He had, at an opportune
time, sent Thayer's brigade to the support of Mc-
Clernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy
within his lines.
I saw everything favorable for us along the line of
our left and centre. When I came to the right ap-
pearances were different. The enemy had come out
in full force to cut his way out and make his escape.
McClernand's division had to bear the brunt of the
attack from this combined force. His men had stood
up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-
boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammuni-
tion near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at
that stage of the war it was not all of our command-
ers of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had
been educated up to the point of seeing that their
men were constantly supplied with ammunition during
an engagement. When the men found themselves
without ammunition they could not stand up against
troops who seemed to have plenty of it. The divi-
sion broke and a portion fled, but most of the men,
as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range
ASSAULTING THE WORKS. 307
of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about
this time that Thayer pushed his brigade in between
the enemy and those of our troops that were without
ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back
within his intrenchments and was there when I got
on the field.
I saw the men standing in knots talking in the
most excited manner. No officer seemed to be giv-
ing any directions. The soldiers had their muskets,
but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close
at hand. I heard some of the men say that the ene-
my had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks
filled with rations. They seemed to think this indi-
cated a determination on his part to stay out and
fight just as long as the provisions held out. I
turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, who
was with me, and said : " Some of our men are pretty
badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so,
for he has attempted to force his way out, but has
fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be
victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry
if he gets ahead of me." I determined to make the
assault at once on our left. It was clear to my mind
that the enemy had started to march out with his
entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack
could be made on the left before the enemy could re-
distribute his forces along the line, we would find but
little opposition except from the intervening abatis.
308 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.
I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call
out to the men as we passed : ** Fill your cartridge-
boxes, quick, and get into line ; the enemy is trying
to escape and he must not be permitted to do so."
This acted like a charm. The men only wanted some
one to give them a command. We rode rapidly to
Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to
him and directed him to charge the enemy's works
in his front with his whole division, saying at the
same time that he would find nothing but a very
thin line to contend with. The general was off in an
incredibly short time, going in advance himself to
keep his men from firing while they were working
their way through the abatis intervening between
them and the enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was
passed, and the night of the 15th General Smith,
with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines
of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that
the Confederates must surrender or be captured the
next day.
There seems from subsequent accounts to have
been much consternation, particularly among the offi-
cers of high rank, in Dover during the night of the
15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who
was a man of talent enough for any civil position,
was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the ele-
ments of one. He was further unfitted for command,
for the reason that his conscience must have troubled
ASSAULTING THE WORKS. 309
him and made him afraid. As Secretary of War he
had taken a solemn oath to maintain the Constitution
of the United States and to uphold the same against
all its enemies. He had betrayed that trust As
Secretary of War he was reported through the north-
em press to have scattered the little army the coun-
try had so that the most of it could be picked up in
detail when secession occurred. About a year before
leaving the Cabinet he had removed arms from north-
ern to southern arsenals. He continued in the Cab-
inet of President Buchanan until about the ist of
January, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for
the establishment of a confederacy made out of
United States territory. Well may he have been
afraid to fall into the hands of National troops. He
would no doubt have been tried for misappropri-
ating public property, if not for treason, had he been
captured. General Pillow, next in command, was
conceited, and prided himself much on his services in
the Mexican war. He telegraphed to General John-
ston, at Nashville, after our men were within the
rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making
his escape, that the Southern troops had had great
success all day. Johnston forwarded the dispatch
to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital
were reading it Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.
A council of war was held by the enemy at which
all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out
3IO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT
longer. General Buckner, who was third in rank in
the garrison but much the most capable soldier,
seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort
until the general commanding the department,
A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquar-
ters at Nashville. Buckner's report shows, however,
that he considered Donelson lost and that any
attempt to hold the place longer would be at the
sacrifice of the command. Being assured that
Johnston was already in Nashville, Buckner too
agreed that surrender was the proper thing. Floyd
turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it
It then devolved upon Buckner, who accepted the
responsibility of the position. Floyd and Pillow
took possession of all the river transports at Dover
and before morning both were on their way to
Nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded
by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000.
Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland ;
others went on the steamers. During the night For-
rest also, with his cavalry and some other troops,
about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing
between our right and the river. They had to ford
or swim over the back-water in the little creek just
south of Dover.
Before daylight General Smith brought to me the
following letter from General Buckner :
SURRENDER OF THE FORT. 31 1
Headquarters, Fort Donelson,
Pehruary 16, 1862.
Sir : — In consideration of all the circumstances governing the
present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the Com-
manding Officer of the Federal forces the appointment of Com-
missioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and
fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice
until 12 o'clock to-day.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your ob't seVt,
S. B. BUCKNER,
Brig. Gen. C. S. A.
To Brigidier-General U. & Grant,
Com'ding U. S. Forces,
Near Fort Donelson.
To this I responded as follows :
Headquarters Army in the Field,
Camp near Donelson,
February 16, 1862.
General S. B. Buckner,
Confederate Anny.
Sir : — Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment
of Commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received.
No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can
be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your ob't seV't,
U. S. GRANT,
Brig. Gen.
To this I received the following reply :
312 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Headquarters, Dover, Tennessee.
February i6, 1862.
To Brig. Geni U. S. Grant,
U. S. Army.
Sir : — The distribution of the forces under my command, in-
cident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the over-
whelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding
the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept
the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.
I am, sir,
Your very ob't se'v't,
S. B. BUCKNER,
Brig. Gen. C S. A.
General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the
first of the above letters, sent word to his different
commanders on the line of rifle-pits, notifying them
that he had made a proposition looking to the sur-
render of the garrison, and directing them to notify
National troops in their front so that all fighting
might be prevented. White flags were stuck at inter-
vals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the
fort. As soon as the last letter from Buckner was
received I mounted my horse and rode to Dover.
General Wallace, I found, had preceded me an hour
or more. I presume that, seeing white flags exposed
in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and.
not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he
found himself at the headquarters of General Buck-
ner.
I had been at West Point three years with Buck-
SURRENDER OF THE FORT. 313
ner and afterwards served with him in the army, so
that we were quite well acquainted. In the course
of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said
to me that if he had been in command I would not
have got up to Donelson as easily as I did. I told
him that if he had been in command I should not
have tried in the way I did: I had invested their
lines with a smaller force than they had to defend
them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full
5,000 strong, around by water; I had relied very
much upon their commander to allow me to come
safely up to the outside of their works. I asked
General Buckner about what force he had to sur*
render. He replied that he could not tell with any
degree of accuracy ; that all the sick and weak had
been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort
Henry ; that Floyd and Pillow had left during the
night, taking many men with them ; and that Forrest,
and probably others, had also escaped during the
preceding night : the number of casualties he could
not tell ; but he said I would not find fewer than
12,000, nor more than 15,000.
He asked permission to send parties outside of the
lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th
when they tried to get out. I gave directions that
his permit to pass our limits should be recognized.
I have no reason to believe that this privilege was
abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with
314 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
the sight of Confederates passing to and fro that I
have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unob-
served and went on. The most of the men who
went in that way no doubt thought they had had
war enough, and left with the intention of remain-
ing out of the army. Some came to me and asked
permission to go, saying that they were tired of
the war and would not be caught in the ranks again^
and I bade them go.
The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donel-
son can never be given with entire accuracy. The
largest number admitted by any writer on the South-
ern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston. He gives
the number at 1 7,000. But this must be an under-
estimate. The commissary general of prisoners re-
ported having issued rations to 14,623 Fort Donelson
prisoners at Cairo, as they passed that point. Gen-
eral Pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000 ;
but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual
numbers than the officers of McClernand's division,
for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their
works, in front of that division, and were buried or
cared for by Buckner after the surrender and when
Pillow was a fugitive. It is known that Floyd and
Pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking
with them not less than 3,000 men. Forrest escaped
with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and
in squads all night. It is probable that the Con-
SUXXENDER OF THE FORT. 315
federate force at Donelson, on the 1 5th of February,
1862, was 21,000 in round numbers.
On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27,000 men to
confront the Confederate lines and guard the road
four or five miles to the left, over which all our
supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the
1 6th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements
arrived.
During the siege General Sherman had been sent
to Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland River,
to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. At
that time he was my senior in rank and there was
no authority of law to assign a junior to command a
senior of the same grade. But every boat that came
up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of
encouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon
him for any assistance he could render and saying
that if he could be of service at the front I might
send for him and he would waive rank.
CHAPTER XXIII.
PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS — UNOCCU-
PIED TERRITORY — ADVANCE UPON NASHVILLE
SITUATION OF THE TROOPS CONFEDERATE RETREAT
— RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND RESTORED TO THE
COMMAND — GENERAL SMITH.
TH E news of the fall of Fort Donelson caused great
delight all over the North. At the South, par-
ticularly in Richmond, the effect was correspondingly
depressing. I was promptly promoted to the grade
of Major-General of Volunteers, and confirmed by
the Senate. All three of my division commanders
were promoted to the same grade and the colonels
who commanded brigades were made brigadier-
generals in the volunteer service. My chief, who was
in St. Louis, telegraphed his congratulations to Gen-
eral Hunter in Kansas for the services he had ren-
dered in securing the fall of Fort Donelson by send-
ing reinforcements so rapidly. To Washington he
telegraphed that the victory was due to General C.
F. Smith ; " promote him," he said, ** and the whole
country will applaud." On the 19th there was pub-
lished at St. Louis a formal order thanking Flag-
UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY, 317
officer Foote and myself, and the forces under our
command, for the victories on the Tennessee and
the Cumberland. I received no other recognition
whatever from General Halleck. But General Cul-
lum, his chief of staff, who was at Cairo, wrote me a
warm congratulatory letter on his own behalf. I
approved of General Smith's promotion highly, as
I did all the promotions that were made.
My opinion was and still is that immediately after
the fall of Fort Donelson the way was opened to the
National forces all over the South-west without much
resistance. If one general who would have taken
the responsibility had been in command of all the
troops west of the AUeghanies, he could have marched
to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg
with the troops we then had, and as volunteering
was going on rapidly over the North there would
soon have been force enough at all these centres to
operate offensively against any body of the enemy
that might be found near them. Rapid movements
and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have
promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could
have been had as fast as transportation could have
been obtained to carry them to their destination.
On the other hand there were tens of thousands of
strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in
the south-western States, who had not gone into the
Confederate army in February, 1862, and who had
3l8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
no particular desire to go. If our lines had been
extended to protect their homes, many of them never
would have gone. Providence ruled differently.
Time was given the enemy to collect armies and
fortify his new positions ; and twice afterwards he
came near forcing his north-western front up to the
Ohio River.
I promptly informed the department commander
of our success at Fort Donelson and that the way
was open now to Clarksville and Nashville ; and that
unless I received orders to the contrary I should take
Clarksville on the 21st and Nashville about the ist
of March. Both these places are on the Cumber-
land River above Fort Donelson. As I heard noth-
ing from headquarters on the subject, General C.
F. Smith was sent to Clarksville at the time desig-
nated and found the place evacuated. The capture
of forts Henry and Donelson had broken the line
the enemy had taken from Columbus to Bowling
Green, and it was known that he was falling back
from the eastern point of this line and that Buell
was following, or at least advancing. I should have
sent troops to Nashville at the time I sent to Clarks-
ville, but my transportation was limited and there
were many prisoners to be forwarded north.
None of the reinforcements from Buell's army ar-
rived until the 24th of February. Then General
Nelson came up, with orders to report to me with
AD VANCE UPON NA SH VILLE. 3 1 9
two brigades, he having sent one brigade to Cairo.
I knew General Buell was advancing on Nashville
from the north, and I was advised by scouts that the
rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all
the supplies they could. Nashville was, at that time,
one of the best provisioned posts in the South. I
had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking
Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered
Nelson to proceed to Nashville without debarking at
Fort Donelson. I sent a gunboat also as a convoy.
The Cumberland River was very high at the time ;
the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned,
and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be
before the enemv left. Nashville is on the west bank
of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching from
the east. I thought the steamers carrying Nelson's
division would be useful in ferrying the balance of
Buell's forces across. I ordered Nelson to put
himself in communication with Buell as soon as
possible, and if he found him more than two days off
from Nashville to return below the city and await
orders. Buell, however, had already arrived in person
at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitcheirs divi-
sion of his command reached there the same day.
Nelson immediately took possession of the city.
After Nelson had gone and before I had learned
of Buell's arrival, I sent word to department head-
quarters that I should go to Nashville myself on the
320 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
28th if I received no orders to the contrary. Hear-
ing nothing, I went as I had informed my superior
officer I would do. On arriving at Clarksville I saw
a fleet of steamers at the shore — the same that had
taken Nelson's division — and troops going aboard.
I landed and called on the commanding officer,
General C. F. Smith. As soon as he saw me he
showed an order he had just received from Buell in
these words :
Nashville, February 25, 1862.
General C. F. Smith,
Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville.
General: — The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to
my intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to
hold this side at every hazard. If the enemy should assume the
offensive, and I am assured by reliable persons that in view of my
position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inad-
equate, consisting of only 15,000 men. I have to request you,
therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your
command. So important do I consider the occasion that I think
it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and
I send four boats, the Diana^ Woodford^ John Rain^ and Autocrat^
to bring you up. In five or six days my force will probably be
sufficient to relieve you.
Very respectfully, your ob't srv't,
D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General Comd'g.
P. S. — The steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night.
General Smith said this order was nonsense. But
I told him it was better to obey it. The General
replied, **of course I must obey," and said his men
SITCATIOX OF THE TlOriS^ XZ\
,. _'— -^
were embarking as fast as trey co.. i. • v^
to Nashville and i'ST>£Ctei lie ::c4i:i!:c 15-*:^:: in-
Nelson's troops. I did dm see Bjel f— -I'r ii«:
day, and wrote him a note sijrlri^ ihii I z:uxL i^e-^rr -Li
Nashville since earlv occn-.z:^ 2irjf haf b:cef ii
meet him. On r:v rerzin: is ibe !#:«::: "^e i:Kfi
His troops were sciZ e^si cc lie r:v*r c.ji ij>e
steamers that had carried Nei=»:c r dr-iSj'.c ni if ere
mostlv at ClarksvCje ti irjiri? y^T.'T £ ij-ibj^ri^ I
said to General 3-eII zrr nfinLirjur
enemy was reireaifn^ ^r fas: 2:^ pifenTi'j
Buell said there wls f:girri:g rriijr*^ ic ii^s: -c. -^ lei
or twelve mH-es iW2fr. I aSiid : * ' iice zfryj^'j:
nition and 'z^rr.'i ^::'jzj'z. '^i^i zzst ^.t^rr"^ .-, '," s-^','-
tr\'ine to ':::iLrr: s.t l'« ^ iit -i-i. T '-* • • - ,- r
doubtless w.ih ibt reir-r-i-'- v :.-, i.--. " - -
protect the irLrir ibrj i.'t r^^-'r Wt v .'
Bueii spoke reri' ^>:,_i.-' ti.j :r -:rt t-srr :'*r c.- >-
was in of ar. c.*jlsc:c fnr: v.-'t ^rer ' -i. ■ - :-*•
absence of pi*=rirr* n£":rTr;ic.i'T. ' -^ -*- ^r: " r vr-
niation w^^ r-icrenn H* •eirv-T.vn '.^c" '- 'h-- ■
••\Vel!7 I =«id. • I oi -r.r ^.tivv -^ - , >„-' - -
Clarksv:.'^ Ge:iier^ ^icrir.: . "-'vv': . . -rt ^' ->.rf r:
to join Yo:i-"
Smfth's tr>x« ▼*re reiinx-ri :-/- ^—f* -> ' ;*
enemv were ir"tuii^ •! r»^ uvi!- —jr. - - • -•-r'
not to rei^im: ic^ IL
322 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston
commanded all the Confederate troops west of the
Alleghany Mountains, with the exception of those in
the extreme south. On the National side the forces
confronting him were divided into, at first three, then
four separate departments. Johnston had greatly
the advantage in having supreme command over all
troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon
one point, while the forces similarly situated on the
National side, divided into independent commands,
could not be brought into harmonious action except
by orders from Washington.
At the beginning of 1862 Johnston's troops east
of the Mississippi occupied a line extending from
Columbus, on his left, to Mill Springs, on his right.
As we have seen, Columbus, both banks of the
Tennessee River, the west bank of the Cumberland
and Bowling Green, all were strongly fortified. Mill
Springs was intrenched. The National troops occu-
pied no territory south of the Ohio, except three
small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown
out from Louisville to confront that at Bowling
Green. Johnston's strength was no doubt numer-
ically inferior to that of the National troops ; but
this was compensated for by the advantage of being
sole commander of all the Confederate forces at the
West, and of operating in a country where his friends
would take care of his rear without any detail of
CONFEDERATE RETREAT, 323
soldiers. But when General George H. Thomas
moved upon the enemy at Mill Springs and totally
routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed
and wounded, and forts Henry and Heiman fell
into the hands of the National forces, with their
armaments and about 100 prisoners, those losses
seemed to dishearten the Confederate commander
so much that he immediately commenced a re-
treat from Bowling Green on Nashville. He
reached this latter place on the 14th of February,
while Donelson was still besieged. Buell followed
with a portion of the Army of the Ohio, but he had
to march and did not reach the east bank of the
Cumberland opposite Nashville until the 24th of
the month, and then with only one division of his
army.
The bridge at Nashville had been destroyed and
all boats removed or disabled, so that a small gar-
rison could have held the place against any National
troops that could have been brought against it within
ten days after the arrival of the force from Bowling
Green. Johnston seemed to lie quietly at Nash-
ville to await the result at Fort Donelson, on which
he had staked the possession of most of the territory
embraced in the States of Kentucky and Tennessee.
It is true, the two generals senior in rank at Fort
Donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches,
even claiming great Confederate victories up to the
324 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
night of the i6th when they must have been pre-
paring for their individual escape. Johnston made
a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command
to Floyd, who he must have known was no soldier
jeven if he possessed the elements of one. Pillow's
presence as second was also a mistake. If these
officers had been forced upon him and designated
for that particular command, then he should have
left Nashville with a small garrison under a trusty
officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to
Donelson himself. If he had been captured the
result could not have been worse than it was.
Johnston's heart failed him upon the first ad-
vance of National troops. He wrote to Richmond
on the 8th of February, ** I think the gunboats of the
enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the
necessity of employing their land force in co-opera-
tion." After the fall of that place he abandoned
Nashville and Chattanooga without an effort to save
either, and fell back into northern Mississippi, where,
six weeks later, he was destined to end his career.
From the time of leaving Cairo I was singularly
unfortunate in not receiving dispatches from General
Halleck. The order of the loth of February direct-
ing me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to
the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had
been sent for that purpose, reached me after Donel-
son was invested. I received nothing direct which
RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND. 325
indicated that the department commander knew we
were in possession of Donelsoil. I was reporting
regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent to
Cairo, soon after the troops left- there, to receive all
reports from the front and to telegraph the substance
to the St Louis headquarters. Cairo was at the
southern end of the telegraph wire. Another line was
started at once from Cairo to Paducah and Smithland,
at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland
respectively. My dispatches were all sent to Cairo
by boat, but many of those addressed to me were
sent to the operator at the end of the advancing
wire and he failed to forward them. This operator
afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post
after a short time and went south taking his dis-
patches with him. A telegram from General Mc-
Clellan to me of February i6th, the day of the sur-
render, directing me to report in full the situation,
was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of
March.
On the 2d of March I received orders dated March
1st to move my command back to Fort Henry, leav-
ing only a small garrison at Donelson. From Fort
Henry expeditions were to be sent against Eastport,
Mississippi, and Paris, Tennessee. We started from
Donelson on the 4th, and the same day I was back on
the Tennessee River. On March 4th I also received
the following dispatch from General Halleck:
326 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant,
Fort Henry :
You will place Maj.-Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedi-
tion, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey
my orders to report strength and positions of your command ?
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.
I was surprised. This was the first intimation I
had received that General Halleck had called for in-
formation as to the strength of my command. On
the 6th he wrote to me again. ** Your going to Nash-
ville without authority, and when your presence with
your troops was of the utmost importance, was a
matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so
much so that I was advised to arrest you on your
return." This was the first I knew of his objecting
to my going to Nashville. . That place was not be-
yond the limits of my command, which, it had been
expressly declared in orders^ were " not defined."
Nashville is west of the Cumberland River, and I
had sent troops that had reported to me for duty
to occupy the place. I turned over the command
as directed and then replied to General Halleck
courteously, but asked to be relieved from further
duty under him.
Later I learned that General Halleck had been
calling lustily for more troops, promising that he
would do something important if he could only be
RESTORED TO THE COMMAND. 327
sufficiently reinforced. McClellan asked him what
force he then had. Halleck telegraphed me to
supply the information so far as my command was
concerned, but I received none of his dispatches.
At last Halleck reported to Washington that he had
repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my
force, but could get nothing out of me ; that I had
gone to Nashville, beyond the limits of my command,
without his authority, and that my army was more
demoralized by victory than the army at Bull Run
had been by defeat. General McClellan, on this in-
formation, ordered that I should be relieved from
duty and that an investigation should be made into
any charges against me. He even authorized my
arrest. Thus in less than two weeks after the vic-
tory at Donelson, the two leading generals in the
army were in correspondence as to what disposition
should be made of me, and in less than three weeks
I was virtually in arrest and without a command.
On the 13th of March I was restored to command,
and on the 17th Halleck sent me a copy of an order
from the War Department which stated that accounts
of my misbehavior had reached Washington and
directed him to investigate and report the facts. He
forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from
himself to Washington entirely exonerating me ; but
he did not inform me that it was his own reports that
had created all the trouble. On the contrary, he
328 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
wrote to me, " Instead of relieving you, I wish you,
as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume
immediate command, and lead it to new victories."
In consequence I felt very grateful to him, and sup-
posed it was his interposition that had set me right
with the government. I never knew the truth until
General Badeau unearthed the facts in his researches
for his history of my campaigns.
General Halleck unquestionably deemed General
C. F. Smith a much fitter officer for the command of
all the forces in the military district than I was, and,
to render him available for such command, desired
his promotion to antedate mine and those of the
other division commanders. It is probable that the
general opinion was that Smith's long services in the
army and distinguished deeds rendered him the
more proper person for such command. Indeed I
was rather inclined to this opinion myself at that
time, and would have served as faithfully under Smith
as he had done under me. But this did not justify
the dispatches which General Halleck sent to Wash-
ington, or his subsequent concealment of them from
me when pretending to explain the action of my
superiors.
On receipt of the order restoring me to command
I proceeded to Savannah on the Tennessee, to which
point my troops had advanced. General Smith was
delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his de-
GENERAL SMITH, 329
nunciation of the treatment I had received. He was
on a sick bed at the time, from which he never came
away alive. His death was a severe loss to our
western army. His personal courage was unques-
tioned, his judgment and professional acquirements
were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence of those
he commanded as well as of those over him.
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING INJURED BY A FALL
— THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH — THE
FIRST day's fight AT SHILOH GENERAL SHERMAN
— CONDITION OF THE ARMY — CLOSE OF THE FIRST
day's fight — THE SECOND DAY's FIGHT — RETREAT
AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.
WHEN I reassumed command on the 17th of
March I found the army divided, about half
being on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah,
while one division was at Crump's landing on the
west bank about four miles higher up, and the re-
mainder at Pittsburg landing, five miles above
Crump's. The enemy was in. force at Corinth, the
junction of the two most important railroads in the
Mississippi valley — one connecting Memphis and the
Mississippi River with the East, and the other lead-
ing south to all the cotton states. Still another rail-
road connects Corinth with Jackson, in west Tennes-
see. If we obtained possession of Corinth the ene-
my would have no railroad for the transportation of
armies or supplies until that running east from Vicks-
burg was reached. It was the great strategic posi-
THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING, 33 1
tion at the West between the Tennessee and the Mis-
sissippi rivers and between Nashville and Vicksburg.
I at once put all the troops at Savannah in motion
for Pittsburg landing, knowing that the enemy was
fortifying at Corinth and collecting an army there
under Johnston. It was my expectation to march
against that army as soon as Buell, who had been
ordered to reinforce me with the Army of the Ohio,
should arrive ; and the west bank of the river was
the place to start from. Pittsburg is only about
twenty miles from Corinth, and Hamburg landing,
four miles further up the river, is a mile or two
nearer. I had not been in command long before I
selected Hamburg as the place to put the Army of
the Ohio when it arrived. The roads from Pittsburg
and Hamburg to Corinth converge some eight miles
out. This disposition of the troops would have given
additional roads to march over when the advance
commenced, within supporting distance of each other.
Before I arrived at Savannah, Sherman, who had
joined the Army of the Tennessee and been placed
in command of a division, had made an expedition
on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighbor-
hood of Eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose
of destroying the railroad east of Corinth. The rains
had been so heavy for some time before that the low-
lands had become impassable swamps. Sherman de-
barked his troops and started out to accomplish the
332 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
object of the expedition ; but the river was rising
so rapidly that the back-water up the small tribu-
taries threatened to cut off the possibility of getting
back to the boats, and the expedition had to return
without reaching the railroad. The guns had to be
hauled by hand through the water to get back to the
boats.
On the 1 7th of March the army on the Tennessee
River consisted of five divisions, commanded respect-
ively by Generals C. F. Smith, McClernand, L.
Wallace, Hurlbut and Sherman. General W. H. L.
Wallace was temporarily in command of Smith's divi-
sion, General Smith, as I have said, being confined to
his bed. Reinforcements were arriving daily and as
they came up they were organized, first into brigades,
then into a division, and the command given to
General Prentiss, who had been ordered to report
to me. General Buell was on his way from Nash-
ville with 40,000 veterans. On the 19th of March
he was at Columbia, Tennessee, eighty-five miles
from Pittsburg. When all reinforcements should
have arrived I expected to take the initiative
by marching on Corinth, and had no expectation
of needing fortifications, though this subject was
taken into consideration. McPherson, my only
military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to
intrench. He did so, but reported that it would
have to be made in rear of the line of encamp-
THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING, 333
ment as it then ran. The new line, while it would
be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the
Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily
supplied with water, and in case of attack these
creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. The
fact is, I regarded the campaign we were engaged in
as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy
would leave strong intrenchments to take the in-
itiative when he knew he would be attacked where
he was if he remained. This view, however, did
not prevent every precaution being taken and every
effort made to keep advised of all movements of the
enemy.
Johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out
towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred
between it and our outposts. On the ist of April
this cavalry became bold and approached our lines,
showing that an advance of some kind was contem-
plated. On the 2d Johnston left Corinth in force to
attack my army. On the 4th his cavalry dashed
down and captured a small picket guard of six or
seven men, stationed some five miles out from Pitts-
burg on the Corinth road. Colonel Buckland sent
relief to the guard at once and soon followed in per-
son with an entire regiment, and General Sherman
followed Buckland taking the remainder of a brigade.
The pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond
the point where the picket guard had been captured.
334 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
and after nightfall Sherman returned to camp and
reported to me by letter what had occurred.
At this time a large body of the enemy was hover-
ing to the west of us, along the line of the Mobile
and Ohio railroad. My apprehension was much
greater for the safety of Crump's landing than it was
for Pittsburg. I had no apprehension that the enemy
could really capture either place. But I feared it
was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon
Crump's and destroy our transports and stores,
most of which were kept at that point, and then
retreat before Wallace could be reinforced. Lew.
Wallace's position I regarded as so well chosen that
he was not removed.
At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg
and returned to Savannah in the evening. I was
intending to remove my headquarters to Pittsburg,
but Buell was expected daily and would come in at
Savannah. I remained at this point, therefore, a few
days longer than I otherwise should have done, in
order to meet him on his arrival. The skirmishing
in our front, however, had been so continuous from
about the 3d of April that I did not leave Pittsburg
each night until an hour when I felt there would be
no further danger before the morning.
On Friday the 4th, the day of Buckland's ad-
vance, I was very much injured by my horse falling
with me, and on me, while I was trying to get to the
INJURED BY A FALL, 335
front where firing had been heard. The night was
one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down
in torrents ; nothing was visible to the eye except as
revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. Under
these circumstances I had to trust to the horse, with-
out guidance, to keep the road. I had not gone far,
however, when I met General W. H. L.Wallace and
Colonel (afterwards General) McPherson coming
from the direction of the front. They said all was
quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. On the way
back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under
him, and he fell with my leg under his body. The ex-
treme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains
of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a
severe injury and protracted lameness. As it was,
my ankle was very much injured, so much so that
my boot had to be cut off. For two or three days
after I was unable to walk except with crutches.
On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of
Buell's army, arrived at Savannah and I ordered him
to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a
position where he could be ferried over to Crump's
landing or Pittsburg as occasion required. I had
learned that General Buell himself would be at Sa-
vannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his
arrival. Affairs at Pittsburg landing had been such
for several days that I did not want to be away dur-
ing the day. I determined, therefore, to take a very
336 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT,
early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus
save time. He had arrived on the evening of the 5th,
but had not advised me of the fact and I was not
aware of it until some time after. While I was at
breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the
direction of Pittsburg landing, and I hastened there,
sending a hurried note to Buell informing him of
the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah.
On the way up the river I directed the dispatch-boat
to run in close to Crump's landing, so that I could
communicate with General Lew. Wallace. I found
him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see
me, and I directed him to get his troops in line ready
to execute any orders he might receive. He replied
that his troops were already under arms and prepared
to move.
Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that
Crump's landing might not be the point of attack.
On reaching the front, however, about eight a.m.,
I found that the attack on Pittsburg was unmistak-
able, and that nothing more than a small guard, to
protect our transports and stores, was needed at
Crump's. Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on my
staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order
General Wallace to march immediately to Pittsburg
by the road nearest the river. Captain Baxter made
a memorandum of this order. About one p.m., not
hearing from Wallace and being much in need of
THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH. 337
reinforcements, I sent two more of my staff, Colonel
McPherson and Captain Rowley, to bring him up
with his division. They reported finding him march-
ing towards Purdy, Bethel, or some point west from
the river, and farther from Pittsburg by several
miles than when he started. The road from his first
position to Pittsburg landing was direct and near
the river. Between the two points a bridge had
been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at
which Wallace's command had assisted, expressly to
enable the troops at the two places to support each
other in case of need. Wallace did not arrive in
time to take part in the first day's fight. General
Wallace has since claimed that the order delivered
to him by Captain Baxter was simply to join the
right of the army, and that the road over which he
marched would have taken him to the road from
Pittsburg to Purdy where it crosses Owl Creek on
the right of Sherman ; but this is not where I had
ordered him nor where I wanted him to go.
I never could see and do not now see why any
order was necessary further than to direct him to
come to Pittsburg landing, without specifying by
what route. His was one of three veteran divisions
that had been in battle, and its absence was severely
felt. Later in the war General Wallace would
not have made the mistake that he committed on
the 6th of April, 1862. I presume his idea was that
Vol I.— 22.
338 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
by taking the route he dkd he would be able to
come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and
thus perform an act of heroism that would redound
to the credit of his command, as well as to the bene-
fit of his country.
Some two or three miles from Pittsburg landing
was a log meeting-house called Shiloh. It stood on
the ridge which divides the waters of Snake and
Lick creeks, the former emptying into the Tennes-
see just north of Pittsburg landing, and the latter
south. This point was the key to our position and
was held by Sherman. His division was at that
time wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in
an engagement ; but I thought this deficiency was
more than made up by the superiority of the com-
mander. McClernand was on Sherman's left, with
troops that had been engaged at forts Henry and
Donelson and were therefore veterans so far as
western troops had become such at that stage of
the war. Next to McClernand came Prentiss with
a raw division, and on the extreme left, Stuart with
one brigade of Sherman's division. Hurlbut was in
rear of Prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time
of the onset. The division of General C. F. Smith
was on the right, also in reserve. General Smith
was still sick in bed at Savannah, but within hear-
ing of our guns. His services would no doubt have
been of inestimable value had his health permitted
THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH 339
his presence. The command of his division de-
volved upon Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace,
a most estimable and able officer ; a veteran too, for
he had served a year in the Mexican war and had
been with his command at Henry and Donelson.
Wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's en-
gagement, and with the change of commanders thus
necessarily effected in the heat of battle the effi-
ciency of his division was much weakened.
The position of our troops made a continuous line
from Lick Creek on the left to Owl Creek, a branch
of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearly south
and possibly a little west. The water in all these
streams was very high at the time and contributed
to protect our flanks. The enemy was compelled,
therefore, to attack directly in front. This he did
with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the Na-
tional side, but suffering much heavier on his own.
The Confederate assaults were made with such a
disregard of losses on their own side that our line
of tents soon fell into their hands. The ground on
which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily
timbered with scattered clearings, the woods giving
some protection to the troops on both sides. There
was also considerable underbrush. A number of at-
tempts were made by the enemy to turn our right
flank, where Sherman was posted, but every effort
was repulsed with heavy loss. But the front attack
340 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the suc-
cess of these attempts to get on our flanks, the Na-
tional troops were compelled, several times, to take
positions to the rear nearer Pittsburg landing.
When the firing ceased at night the National line
was all of a mile in rear of the position it had oc-
cupied in the morning.
In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the
division commanded by General Prentiss did not
fall back with the others. This left his flanks
exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him
with about 2,200 of his officers and men. General
Badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as about the
time this capture took place. He may be right as
to the time, but my recollection is that the hour
was later. General Prentiss himself gave the hour
as half-past five. I was with him, as I was with each
of the division commanders that day, several times,
and my recollection is that the last time I was with
him was about half-past four, when his division was
standing up firmly and the General was as cool as
if expecting victory. But no matter whether it
was four or later, the story that he and his command
were surprised and captured in their camps is with-
out any foundation whatever. If it had been true,
as currently reported at the time and yet be-
lieved by thousands of people, that Prentiss and
his division had been captured in their beds, there
342 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
would not have been an all-day struggle, with the
loss of thousands killed and wounded on the Con-
federate side.
With the single exception of a few minutes
after the capture of Prentiss, a continuous and
unbroken line was maintained all day from Snake
Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek
or the Tennessee on the left above Pittsburg.
There was no hour during the day when there was
not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some
point on the line, but seldom at all points at the
same time. It was a case of Southern dash against
Northern pluck and endurance. Three of the five
divisions engaged on Sunday were entirely raw, and
many of the men had only received their arms on
the way from their States to the field. Many of
them had arrived but a day or two before and
were hardly able to load their muskets according
to the manual. Their officers were equally igno-
rant of their duties. Under these circumstances it
is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke
at the first fire. In two cases, as I now remember,
colonels led their regiments from the field on
first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. In
these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards,
unfit for any military position ; but not so the
officers and men led out of danger by them.
Better troops never went upon a battle-field than
GENERAL SHERMAN. 343
many of these, officers and men, afterwards proved
themselves to be, who fled panic-stricken at the
first whistle of bullets and shell at Shiloh.
During the whole of Sunday I was continuously
engaged in passing from one part of the field to
another, giving directions to division commanders.
In thus moving along the line, however, I never
deemed it important to stay long with Sherman.
Although his troops were then under fire for the
first time, their commander, by his constant presence
with them, inspired a confidence in officers and
men that enabled them to render services on that
bloody battle-field worthy of the best of veterans.
McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest
fighting was in front of these two divisions.
McClernand told me on that day, the 6th, that
he profited much by having so able a commander
supporting him. A casualty to Sherman that
would have taken him from the field that day
would have been a sad one for the troops en-
gaged at Shiloh. And how near we came to this !
On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in the
hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his
coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball
passed through his hat. In addition to this he
had several horses shot during the day.
The nature of this battle was such that cavalry
could not be used in front ; I therefore formed ours
344 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
into line in rear, to stop stragglers — of whom there
were many. When there would be enough of them
to make a show, and after they had recovered from
their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part
of the line which needed support, without regard to
their companies, regiments or brigades.
On one occasion during the day I rode back as
far as the river and met General Buell, who had just
arrived ; I do not remember the hour, but at that
time there probably were as many as four or five
thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river
bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been
shot where they lay, without resistance, before they
would have taken muskets and marched to the front
to protect themselves. This meeting between Gen-
eral Buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used
to run between the landing and Savannah. It was
brief, and related specially to his getting his troops
over the river. As we left the boat together, Buell's
attention was attracted by the men lying under cover
of the river bank. I saw him berating them and
trying to shame them into joining their regiments.
He even threatened them with shells from the gun-
boats near by. But it was all to no effect. Most of
these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as
any of those who saved the battle from which they
had deserted. I have no doubt that this sight im-
pressed General Buell with the idea that a line of
CONDITION OF THE ARMY. 345
retreat would be a good thing just then. If he had
come in by the front instead of through the stragglers
in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently.
Could he have come through the Confederate rear,
he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that
at our own. The distant rear of an army engaged in
battle is not the best place from which to judge
correctly what is going on in front. Later in the
war, while occupying the country between the Ten-
nessee and the Mississippi, I learned that the panic
in the Confederate lines had not differed much from
that within our own. Some of the country people
estimated the stragglers from Johnston s army as high
as 20,000. Of course this was an exaggeration.
The situation at the close of Sunday was as fol-
lows: along the top of the bluff just south of
the log-house which stood at Pittsburg landing,
Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged
twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up
the river. This line of artillery was on the crest of
a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the
Tennessee. Hurlbut with his division intact was on
the right of this artillery, extending west and pos-
sibly a little north. McClernand came next in the
general line, looking more to the west. His division
was complete in its organization and ready for any
duty. Sherman came next, his right extending to
Snake Creek. His command, like the other two.
346 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
was complete in its organization and ready, like its
chief, for any service it might be called upon to
render. All three divisions were, as a matter of
course, more or less shattered and depleted in num-
bers from the terrible battle of the day. The division
of W. H. L, Wallace, as much from the disorder
arising from changes of division and brigade com-
manders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause,
had lost its organization and did not occupy a place
in the line as a division. Prentiss' command was
gone as a division, many of its members having been
killed, wounded or captured ; but it had rendered
valiant services before its final dispersal, and had con-
tributed a good share to the defence of Shiloh.
The right of my line rested near the bank of Snake
Creek, a short distance above the bridge which
had been built by the troops for the purpose of con-
necting Crump's landing and Pittsburg landing.
Sherman had posted some troops in a log-house and
out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge over
which Wallace was expected and the creek above
that point. In this last position Sherman was fre-
quently attacked before night, but held the point
until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance in
order to make room for Lew. Wallace, who came up
after dark.
There was, as I have said, a deep ravine in front
of our left The Tennessee River was very high
CLOSE OF THE FIRST DA TS FIGHT 347
and there was water to a considerable depth in
the ravine. Here the enemy made a last desper-
ate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. The
gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Gwin and Shirk com-
manding, with the artillery under Webster, aided
the army and effectually checked their further prog-
ress. Before any of Buell's troops had reached the
west bank of the Tennessee, firing had almost entirely
ceased ; anything like an attempt on the part of the
enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. There
was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy,
some of his shells passing beyond us ; but I do not
remember that there was the whistle of a single mus-
ket-ball heard. As his troops arrived in the dusk
General Buell marched several of his regiments part
way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly
for some minutes, but I do not think a single man
engaged in this firing received an injury. The at-
tack had spent its force.
General Lew. Wallace, with 5,000 effective men,
arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was
placed on the right. Thus night came, Wallace came,
and the advance of Nelson's division came ; but
none — unless night — in time to be of material service
to the gallant men who saved Shiloh on that first
day against large odds. Buell's loss on the 6th of
April was two men killed and one wounded, all mem-
bers of the 36th Indiana infantry. The Army of
348 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
the Tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men.
The presence of two or three regiments of Buells
army on the west bank before firing ceased had not
the slightest effect in preventing the capture of Pitts-
burg landing.
So confident was I before firing had ceased on the
6th that the next day would bring victory to our
arms if we could only take the initiative, that I vis-
ited each division commander in person before any
reinforcements had reached the field. I directed
them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the
morning as soon as they could see, and push them
forward until they found the enemy, following with
their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to
engage the enemy as soon as found. To Sherman I
told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson, and
said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh.
Victory was assured when Wallace arrived, even if
there had been no other support. I was glad, how-
ever, to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit
them with doing all there was for them to do. Dur-
ing the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson s
division, Buell's army, crossed the river and were
ready to advance in the morning, forming the left
wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and Mc-
Cook's, came up the river from Savannah in the
transports and were on the west bank early on the
7th. Buell commanded them in person. My com-
THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT. 349
mand was thus nearly doubled in numbers and effi-
ciency.
During the night rain fell in torrents and our
troops were exposed to the storm without shelter.
I made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred
yards back from the river bank. My ankle was so
much swollen from the fall of my horse the Friday
night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that
I could get no rest. The drenching rain would have
precluded the possibility of sleep without this addi-
tional cause. Some time after midnight, growing
restive under the storm and the continuous pain, I
moved back to the log-house under the bank. This
had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded
men were being brought in, their wounds* dressed,
a leg or an arm amputated as the case might require,
and everything being done to save life or alleviate
suffering. The sight was more unendurable than
encountering the enemy's fire, and I returned to my
tree in the rain.
The advance on the morning of the 7th developed
the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops be-
fore the battle began, more than a mile back from
the most advanced position of the Confederates on
the day before. It is known now that they had not
yet learned of the arrival of Buell's command. Possi-
bly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our
tents during the rain, and also to get away from the
350 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
shells that were dropped upon them by the gunboats
every fifteen minutes during the night.
The position of the Union troops on the morning
of the 7th was as follows : General Lew. Wallace on
the right ; Sherman on his left ; then McClemand
and then Hurlbut Nelson, of Buell's army, was on
our extreme left, next to the river. Crittenden was
next in line after Nelson and on his right ; McCook
followed and formed the extreme right of Buell's
command. My old command thus formed the right
wing, while the troops directly under Buell consti-
tuted the left wing of the army. These relative
positions were retained during the entire day, or
until the enemy was driven from the field.
In a very short time the battle became general all
along the line. This day everything was favorable to
the Union side. We had now become the attacking
party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we
had been the day before, until finally he beat a pre-
cipitate retreat. The last point held by him was near
the road leading from the landing to Corinth, on the
left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About
three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that
the enemy was giving way everywhere else, I
gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regi-
ments, from troops near by, formed them in line of
battle and marched them forward, going in front
myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. At
RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES, 35 1
this point there was a clearing between us and the
enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. I
knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted
a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join
their friends who had started earlier. After march-
ing to within musket-range I stopped and let the
troops pass. The command, Charge, was given, and
was executed with loud cheers and with a run ; when
the last of the enemy broke.
Note. — Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs. W. H. L. Wal-
lace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the
field of Shil6h, a letter from General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning
of the 5th. At the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates
had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's landing and
Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near Shiloh. This letter shows
that at that time General Lew. Wallace was making preparations for the
emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh
and his position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends it
over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg landing and Purdy
road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the
latter over Owl Creek, where our right rested. In this letter General Lew.
Wallace advises General W. IL L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow"
(and his letter also says ** April 5th." which is the same day the letter was dated
and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to re-
port to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of General W. H.
L. Wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the
cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they
could " act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different
camps."
This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has been said by
others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at the battle of Shiloh. It
shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in
the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in
the absence of orders to move by a different road.
352 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatorioess,
was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which
would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen
back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. This
falling back had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up
to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest
the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it
to General Wallace, so that I am not competent to say just what order the
General actually received.
General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at Crump's
landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and a half miles out.
Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace eariy ordered his First and
Third brigades to concentrate on the Second. If the position of our front had
not changed, the road which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter
to our right than the River road.
U. S. GRANT.
Mount MacGregor, New York, June 21, 1S85.
CHAPTER XXV.
STRUCK BY A BULLET — PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE
CONFEDERATES — INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH GEN-
ERAL BUELL — GENERAL JOHNSTON — REMARKS ON
SHILOH.
DURING this second day of the battle I had
been moving from right to left and back, to
see for myself the progress made. In the early
part of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel
McPherson and Major Hawkins, then my chief
commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops.
We were moving along the northern edge of a
clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the
landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to
our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry
opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the
other side of the clearing. The shells and balls
whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute.
I do not think it took us longer than that to get out
of range and out of sight. In the sudden start we
made. Major Hawkins lost his hat. He did not stop
to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe
position we halted to take an account of damages.
McPherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop.
Vol. i.~23
354 PERSONAL MEAfOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
On examination it was found that a ball had struck
him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and
had gone entirely through. In a few minutes the
poor beast dropped dead ; he had given no sign of
injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck
the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt,
and broken it nearly off ; before the battle was over
it had broken off entirely. There were three of us :
one had lost a horse, killed ; one a hat and one a
sword-scabbard. All were thankful that it was no
worse.
After the rain of the night before and the frequent
and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads
were almost impassable. The enemy carrying his
artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat,
made them still worse for troops following. I wanted
to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men
who had fought desperately for two days, lying in
the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did
Note : In an article on the batUe of Shiloh which I wrote for the Century Mag-
azine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook, who commanded a division of
Buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday.
April 7th, because of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his his-
tory, also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice to Gen-
eral McCook and his command, I must say that they left a point twenty-two
miles east of Savannah on the morning of the 6th. From the heavy rains of a
few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were nec-
essarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only
marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night
without rest It was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good
PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 355
not feel disposed to positively order Buell, or any
part of his command, to pursue. Although the senior
in rank at the time I had been so only a few
weeks. Buell was, and had been for some time
past, a department commander, while I commanded
only a district. I did not meet Buell in person
until too late to get troops ready and pursue with
effect ; but had I seen him at the moment of the
last charge I should have at least requested him to
follow.
I rode forward several miles the day after the
battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much,
if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and
the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their
loads to enable them to get off their guns. About
five miles out we found their field hospital aban-
doned. An immediate pursuit must have resulted
in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners
and probably some guns.
Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West
service as its position allowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to per-
form a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation
from division commanders in the Army of the Tennessee. General Sherman
both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. General McCook
himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. I
refer to these circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook
injustice in my article in the Century^ though not to the extent one would
suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do any one an injustice,
and if convinced that I have done one, I am always willing to make the fuUest
admission.
356 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
during the war, and but few in the East equalled it
for hard, determined fighting. I saw an open field,
in our possession on the second day, over which the
Confederates had made repeated charges the day
before, so covered with dead that it would have been
possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction,
stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the
ground. On our side National and Confederate
troops were mingled together in about equal pro-
portions; but on the remainder of the field nearly
all were Confederates. On one part, which had evi-
dently not been ploughed for several years, probably
because the land was poor, bushes had grown up,
some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was
not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets.
The smaller ones were all cut down.
Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and
to the experience of the army I was then command-
ing, we were on the defensive. We were without
intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort,
and more than half the army engaged the first day
was without experience or even drill as soldiers. The
officers with them, except the division commanders
and possibly two or three of the brigade command-
ers, were equally inexperienced in war. The result
was a Union victory that gave the men who achieved
it great confidence in themselves ever after.
The enemy fought bravely, but they had started
INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH. 357
out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a
position. They failed in both, with very heavy loss
in killed and wounded, and must have gone back
discouraged and convinced that the *' Yankee " was
not an enemy to be despised.
After the battle I gave verbal instructions to di-
vision commanders to let the regiments send out
parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties,
under commissioned ofificers from each division, to
bury the Confederate dead in their respective fronts
and to report the numbers so buried. The latter
part of these instructions was not carried out by all;
but they were by those sent from Sherman's division,
and by some of the parties sent out by McClernand.
The heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in
front of these two divisions.
The criticism has often been made that the Union
troops should have been intrenched at Shiloh. Up
to that time the pick and spade had been but little
resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this
subject under consideration soon after re-assuming
command in the field, and, as already stated, my only
military engineer reported unfavorably. Besides this,
the troops with me, officers and men, needed disci-
pline and drill more than they did experience with
the pick, shovel and axe. Reinforcements were
arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had
been hastily thrown together into companies and
358 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
regiments — fragments of incomplete organizations,
the men and officers strangers to each other. Under
all these circumstances I concluded that drill and
discipline were worth more to our men than fortifi-
cations.
General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with
as much professional pride and ambition of a com-
mendable sort as I ever knew. I had been two
years at West Point with him, and had served with
him afterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war,
several years more. He was not given in early life
or in mature years to forming intimate acquaint-
ances. He was studious by habit, and commanded
the confidence and respect of all who knew him.
He was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not
distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who
" enlisted for the war " and the soldier who serves
in time of peace. One system embraced men who
risked life for a principle, and often men of social
standing, competence, or wealth and independence
of character. The other includes, as a rule, only
men who could not do as well in any other occupa-
tion. General Buell became an object of harsh
criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his
loyalty. No one who knew him ever believed him
capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be
more dishonorable than to accept high rank and
command in war and then betray the trust. When
GENERAL BUELL, 359
I came into command of the army in 1864, I re-
quested the Secretary of War to restore General
Buell to duty.
After the war, during the summer of 1865, I trav-
elled considerably through the North, and was
everywhere met by large numbers of people. Every
one had his opinion about the manner in which the
war had been conducted : who among the generals
had failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the
press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped,
and were not always disposed to report correctly
what did not confirm their preconceived notions,
either about the conduct of the war or the individ-
uals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently
occurred for me to defend General Buell against
what I believed to be most unjust charges. O.i one
occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very
charge I had so often refuted— of disloyalty. This
brought from General Buell a very severe retort,
which I saw in the New York World some time
before I received the letter itself. I could very well
understand his grievance at seeing untrue and dis-
graceful charges apparently sustained by an officer
who, at the time, was at the head of the army. I
replied to him, but not through the press. I kept
no copy of my letter, nor did I ever see it in print ;
neither did I receive an answer.
General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded
360 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
the Confederate forces at the beginning of the bat-
tle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the
first day. This wound, as I understood afterwards,
was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. But
he was a man who would not abandon what he
deemed an important trust in the face of danger and
consequently continued in the saddle, commanding,
until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had
to be taken from his horse, and soon after died
The news was not long in reaching our side and I
suppose was quite an encouragement to the National
soldiers.
I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican
war and later as an officer in the regular army.
He was a man of high character and ability. His
contemporaries at West Point, and officers generally
who came to know him personally later and who re-
mained on our side, expected him to prove the most
formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would
produce.
I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief
command of an army to prove or disprove the high
estimate that had been placed upon his military
ability ; but after studying the orders and dispatches
of Johnston I am compelled to materially modify
my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier.
My judgment now is that he was vacillating and un-
decided in his actions.
GENERA L JOHNSTON. 36 1
All the disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee were
so discouraging to the authorities in Richmond that
Jefferson Davis wrote an unofficial letter to Johnston
expressing his own anxiety and that of the public,
and saying that he had made such defence as was
dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence
of a report he needed facts. The letter was not a
reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as
much felt as though it had been one. General John-
ston raised another army as rapidly as he could, and
fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth. He
knew the National troops were preparing to attack
him in his chosen position. But he had evidently
become so disturbed at the results of his operations
that he resolved to strike out in an offensive cam-
paign which would restore all that was lost, and if
successful accomplish still more. We have the
authority of his son and biographer for saying that
his plan was to attack the forces at Shiloh and crush
them ; then to cross the Tennessee and destroy the
army of Buell, and push the war across the Ohio
River. The design was a bold one ; but we have the
same authority for saying that in the execution John-
ston showed vacillation and indecision. He left
Corinth on the 2d of April and was not ready to
attack until the 6th. The distance his army had to
march was less than twenty miles. Beauregard, his
second in command, was opposed to the attack for
362 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
two reasons : first, he thought, if let alone the Na-
tional troops would attack the Confederates in
their intrenchments ; second, we were in ground of
our own choosing and would necessarily be in-
trenched. Johnston not only listened to the objection
of Beauregard to an attack, but held a council of
war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. On
the evening of the same day he was in consultation
with some of his generals on the same subject, and
still again on the morning of the 6th. During this
last consultation, and before a decision had been
reached, the battle began by the National troops
opening fire on the enemy. This seemed to settle
the question as to whether there was to be any battle
of Shiloh. It also seems to me to settle the question
as to whether there was a surprise.
I do not question the personal courage of General
Johnston, or his ability. But he did not win the
distinction predicted for him by many of his
friends. He did prove that as a general he was
over-estimated.
General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston
and succeeded to the command, which he retained to
the close of the battle and during the subsequent
retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place.
His tactics have been severely criticised by Confede-
rate writers, but I do not believe his fallen chief
could have done any better under the circumstances.
REMARKS ON SHILOH. 363
Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won when
Johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army
under me would have been annihilated or captured.
Ifs defeated the Confederates at Shiloh. There is
little doubt that we would have been disgracefully
beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had
passed harmlessly over the enemy and if all of theirs
had taken effect. Commanding generals are liable
to be killed during engagements ; and the fact that
when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to
induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly
ordered, is evidence that there was neither the uni-
versal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded
confidence on theirs which has been claimed. There
was, in fact, no hour during the day when I doubted
the eventual defeat of the enemy, although I was
disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did
not arrive at an earlier hour.
The description of the battle of Shiloh given by
Colonel Wm. Preston Johnston is very graphic and
well told. The reader will imagine that he can see
each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob
of Union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy
more demoralized than ever towards the Tennessee
River, which was a little more than two miles away
at the beginning of the onset. If the reader does
not stop to inquire why, with such Confederate suc-
cess for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the
364 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
National troops were not all killed, captured or
driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture
as perfect But I witnessed the fight from the Na-
tional side from eight o'clock in the morning until
night closed the contest I see but little in the de-
scription that I can recognize. The Confederate
troops fought well and deserve commendation enough
for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of April,
without detracting from their antagonists or claim-
ing anything more than their just dues.
The reports of the enemy show that their condition
at the end of the first day was deplorable ; their losses
in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and
their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on
the National side, with the difference that those of
the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought
back to their respective commands for many days.
On the Union side but few of the stragglers fell
back further than the landing on the river, and many
of these were in line for duty on the second day.
The admissions of the highest Confederate officers
engaged at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for
them absurd. The victory was not to either party
until the battle was over. It was then a Union vic-
tory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the
Ohio both participated. But the Army of the Ten-
nessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and
held it at bay until near night ; and night alone closed
REMARKS ON SHILOH. 365
the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson's
division.
The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh,
but the particular skill claimed I could not and still
cannot see ; though there is nothing to criticise ex-
cept the claims put forward for it since. But the
Confederate claimants for superiority in strategy,
superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and
prowess are not so unjust to the Union troops en-
gaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The
troops on both sides were American, and united they
need not fear any foreign foe. It is possible that
the Southern man started in with a little more dash
than his Northern brother ; but he was correspond-
ingly less enduring.
The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was
simply to hurl their men against ours — first at one
point, then at another, sometimes at several points
at once. This they did with daring and energy, un-
til at night the rebel troops were worn out. Our
effort during the same time was to be prepared to
resist assaults wherever made. The object of the
Confederates on the second day was to get away
with as much of their army and material as possible.
Ours then was to drive them from our front, and to
capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their
men and material. We were successful in driving
them back, but not so successful in captures as if
366 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
farther pursuit could have been made. As it
was, we captured or recaptured on the second day
about as much artillery as we lost on the first ; and,
leaving out the one great capture of Prentiss, we
took more prisoners on Monday than the enemy
gained from us on Sunday. On the 6th Sherman
lost seven pieces of artillery, McClernand six, Pren-
tiss eight, and Hurlbut two batteries. On the 7th
Sherman captured seven guns, McClernand three
and the Army of the Ohio twenty.
At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union forces
on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. Lew.
Wallace brought 5,000 more after nightfall. Beau-
regard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955.
According to the custom of enumeration in the
South, this number probably excluded every man
enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse,
and all commissioned officers — everybody who did
not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With us
everybody in the field receivijig pay from the gov-
ernment is counted Excluding the troops who fled,
panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was
not a time during the 6th when we had more than
25,000 men in line. On the 7th Buell brought 20,-
000 more. Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's
did not reach the field during the engagement; Wood's
arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to
be of much service.
REMARKS ON SHILOIL 367
Our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed,
8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing. Of these, 2,103
were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported
a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed,
8,01 2 wounded and 957 missing. This estimate must
be incorrect We buried, by actual count, more of
the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of Mc-
Clemand and Sherman alone than here reported, and
4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties for the
whole field. Beauregard reports the Confederate
force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss
during the two days at 10,699 ; and at the same time
declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle
on the morning of the 7th.
The navy gave a hearty support to the army at
Shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and sub-
sequently when I was in command. The nature of
the ground was such, however, that on this occasion
it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sun-
down on the first day. The country was broken
and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the
battle from the river, so that friends would be as
much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the
foe. But about sundown, when the National troops
were back in their last position, the right of the
enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of
the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor
and effect. After nightfall, when firing had en-
368 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
tirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet in-
formed himself, approximately, of the position of our
troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell
within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes
during the night. This was done with effect, as is
proved by the Confederate reports.
Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thou-
sands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion
against the Government would collapse suddenly
and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over
any of its armies. Donelson and Henry were
such victories. An army of more than 21,000 men
was captured or destroyed. Bowling Green, Colum-
bus and Hickman, Kentucky, fell in consequence,
and Clarksville and Nashville, Tennessee, the last
two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into
our hands. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers,
from their mouths to the head of navigation, were se-
cured. But when Confederate armies were collected
which not only attempted to hold a line farther
south, from Memphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville
and on to the Atlantic, but assumed the offensive
and made such a gallant effort to regain what had
been lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving
the Union except by complete conquest. Up to that
time it had been the policy of our army, certainly
of that portion commanded by me, to protect the
property of the citizens whose territory was invaded,
REMARKS ON SHILOH. 369
without regard to their sentiments, whether Union
or Secession. After this, however, I regarded it as
humane to both sides to protect the persons of those
found at their homes, but to consume everything
that could be used to support or supply armies.
Protection was still continued over such supplies as
were within lines held by us and which we expected
to continue to hold ; but such supplies within the
reach of Confederate armies I regarded as much
contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their de-
struction was accomplished without bloodshed and
tended to the same result as the destruction of
armies. I continued this policy to the close of the
war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discour-
aged and punished. Instructions were always given
to take provisions and forage under the direction of
commissioned officers who should give receipts to
owners, if at home, and turn the property over to
officers of the quartermaster or commissary depart-
ments to be issued as if furnished from our North-
ern depots. But much was destroyed without re-
ceipts to owners, when it could not be brought with-
in our lines and would otherwise have gone to the
support of secession and rebellion.
This policy I believe exercised a material influ-
ence in hastening the end.
The battle of Shiloh. or Pittsburg landing, has
been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case
Vol, I. — 24
370 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
more accurately, more persistently misunderstood,
than any other engagement between National and
Confederate troops during the entire rebellion.
Correct reports of the battle have been published,
notably by Sherman, Badeau and, in a speech before
a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss ; but all
of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the
rebellion and after public opinion had been most
erroneously formed.
I myself made no report to General Halleck,
further than was contained in a letter, written im-
mediately after the battle informing him that an en-
gagement had been fought and announcing the
result A few days afterwards General Halleck
moved his headquarters to Pittsburg landing and
assumed command of the troops in the field.
Although next to him in rank, and nominally in com-
mand of my old district and army, I was ignored as
much as if I had been at the most distant point of
territory within my jurisdiction ; and although I was
in command of all the troops engaged at Shiloh I
was not permitted to see one of the reports of Gen-
eral Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they
were published by the War Department long after
the event. For this reason I never made a full of-
ficial report of this engagement
CHAPTER XXVI.
HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD — THE
ADVANCE UPON CORINTH OCCUPATION OF COR-
INTH — THE ARMY SEPARATED.
GENERAL HALLECK arrived at Pittsburg
landing on the nth of April and immediately
assumed command in the field. On the 21st Gen-
eral Pope arrived with an army 30.000 strong, fresh
from the capture of Island Number Ten in the
Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburg
landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had
now three armies : the Army of the Ohio, Buell
commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope
commanding ; and the Army of the Tennessee. His
orders divided the combined force into the right
wing, reserve, centre and left wing. Major-General
George H. Thomas, who had been in Buells army,
was transferred with his division to the Army of the
Tennessee and given command of the right wing,
composed of all of that army except McClernand's
and Lew. Wallace's divisions. McClernand was
assigned to the command of the reserve, composed
of his own and Lew. Wallace's divisions. Buell
372 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio ; and
Pope the left wing, the Army of the Mississippi. I
was named second in command of the whole, and
was also supposed to be in command of the right
wing and reserve.
Orders were given to all the commanders engaged
at Shiloh to send in their reports without delay to
department headquarters. Those from officers of
the Army of the Tennessee were sent through me ;
but from the Army of the Ohio they were sent by
General Buell without passing through my hands.
General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my
report, but I positively declined on the ground that
he had received the reports of a part of the army en-
gaged at Shiloh without their coming through me.
He admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the
circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to
get the reports off before moving the command, and
as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded
it to Washington.
Preparations were at once made upon the arrival
of the new commander for an advance on Corinth.
Owl Creek, on our right, was bridged, and expedi-
tions were sent to the north-west and west to ascer-
tain if our position was being threatened from those
quarters ; the roads towards Corinth were cordu-
royed and new ones made ; lateral roads were also
constructed, so that in case of necessity troops march-
THE ADVANCE UPON CORINTH, 373
ing by different routes could reinforce each other.
All commanders were cautioned against bringing on
an engagement and informed in so many words that
it would be better to retreat than to fight. By the
30th of April all preparations were complete; the
country west to the Mobile and Ohio railroad had
been reconnoitred, as well as the road to Corinth
as far as Monterey twelve miles from Pittsburg.
Everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been
encountered, but they were observers and not in
force to fight battles.
Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direc-
tion from Pittsburg landing and about nineteen
miles away as the bird would fly, but probably
twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It is about
four miles south of the line dividing the States
of Tennessee and Mississippi, and at the junction
of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with the
Mobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus
to Mobile. From Pittsburg to Corinth the land is
rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that
makes high hills to pass over. In 1862 the greater
part of the country was covered with forest with
intervening clearings and houses. Underbrush was
dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ra-
vines, but generally not so thick on the high land as
to prevent men passing through with ease. There
are two small creeks running from north of the
374 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
town and connecting some four miles south, where
they form Bridge Creek which empties into the Tus-
cumbia River. Corinth is on the ridge between these
streams and is a naturally strong defensive position.
The creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but
the stream to the east widens out in front of the
town into a swamp, impassable in the presence of
an enemy. On the crest of the west bank of this
stream the enemy was strongly intrenched.
Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the
enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for
us to possess ourselves of. We ought to have
seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and
Nashville, when it could have been taken without a
battle, but failing then it should have been taken,
without delay, on the concentration of troops at
Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In fact
the arrival of Pope should not have been awaited.
There was no time from the battle of Shiloh up to
the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would
not have left if pushed. The demoralization among
the Confederates from their defeats at Henry and
Donelson ; their long marches from Bowling Green,
Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh ;
in fact from having been driven out of Kentucky
and Tennessee, was so great that a stand for the
time would have been impossible. Beauregard
made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and par-
MAP
CORINTH, ,
MISS. /^^^
376 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT,
tially succeeded. He appealed to the people of the
South-west for new regiments, and received a few.
A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the
same quarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a
different way. He had negroes sent out to him to
take the place of teamsters, company cooks and
laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white
men into the ranks. The people, while willing
to send their sons to the field, were not willing to
part with their negroes. It is only fair to state that
they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies
for the army and for the families left at home.
Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dom
immediately after Shiloh with 17,000 men. Interior
points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to
the strength at Corinth. With these reinforcements
and the new regiments, Beauregard had, during the
month of May, 1862, a large force on paper, but
probably not much over 50,000 effective men. We
estimated his strength at 70,000. Our own was, in
round numbers, 120,000. The defensible nature of
the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made
50,000 then enough to maintain their position against
double that number for an indefinite time but for
the demoralization spoken of.
On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its
advance from Shiloh upon Corinth. The movement
was a siege from the start to the close. The National
ADVANCE UPON CORINTH. 2^77
troops were always behind intrenchments, except of
course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the
front to clear the way for an advance. Even the
commanders of these parties were cautioned, ** not
to bring on an engagement" ** It is better to retreat
than to fight." The enemy were constantly watching
our advance, but as they were simply observers there
were but few engagements that even threatened to
become battles. All the engagements fought ought
to have served to encourage the enemy. Roads were
again made in our front, and again corduroyed ; a
line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced
to the new position. Cross roads were constructed
to these new positions to enable the troops to con-
centrate in case of attack. The National armies
were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the
Tennessee River to Corinth.
For myself I was little more than an observer.
Orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve,
ignoring me, and advances were made from one line
of intrenchments to another without notifying me.
My position was so embarrassing in fact that I made
several applications during the siege to be relieved.
General Halleck kept his headquarters generally,
if not all the time, with the right wing. Pope being
on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief,
and consequently got loose as it were at times.
On the 3d of May he was at Seven Mile Creek
378 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, 5. GRANT.
with the main body of his command, but threw for-
ward a division to Farmington, within four miles of
Corinth. His troops had quite a little engagement
at Farmington on that day, but carried the place with
considerable loss to the enemy. There would then
have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and
right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy,
but Pope was ordered back to conform with the gen-
eral line. On the 8th of May he moved again, tak-
ing his whole force to Farmington, and pushed out
two divisions close to the rebel line. Again he was
ordered back. By the 4th of May the centre and
right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out Their
advance was slow from there, for they intrenched
with every forward movement The left wing move J
up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself
close to the enemy. The creek, with the marsh
before described, separated the two lines. Skir-
mishers thirty feet apart could have maintained
either line at this point.
Our centre and right were, at this time, extended
so that the right of the right wing was probably five
miles from Corinth and four from the works in their
front The creek, which was a formidable obstacle
for either side to pass on our left, became a very
slight obstacle on our right Here the enemy
occupied two positions. One of them, as much as
two miles out from his main line, was on a command-
ADVANCE UPON CORINTH. 379
ing elevation and defended by an intrenched bat-
tery with infantry supports. A heavy wood inter-
vened between this work and the National forces.
In rear to the south there was a clearing extending a
mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house
which had been loop-holed and was occupied by in-
fantry. Sherman s division carried these two posi-
tions with some loss to himself, but with probably
greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May, and on
that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or
as complete as it was ever made. Thomas' right now
rested west of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. Pope's
left commanded the Memphis and Charleston rail-
road east of Corinth.
Some days before I had suggested to the com-
manding general that I thought if he would move
the Army of the Mississippi at night, by the rear of
the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight.
Pope would find no natural obstacle in his front
and, I believed, no serious artificial one. The
ground, or works, occupied by our left could be
held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream
and swamp in front. To the right the troops would
have a dry ridge to march over. I was silenced so
quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested an
unmilitary movement.
Later, probably on the 28th of May, General
Logan, whose command was then on the Mobile and
380 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been
evacuating for several days and that if allowed he
could go into Corinth with his brigade. Trains of
cars were heard coming in and going out of Corinth
constantly. Some of the men who had been en-
gaged in various capacities on railroads before the
war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears
to the rail, not only which way the trains were mov-
ing but which trains were loaded and which were
empty. They said loaded trains had been going out
for several days and empty ones coming in. Subse-
quent events proved the correctness of their judg-
ment Beauregard published his orders for the
evacuation of Corinth on the 26th of May and fixed
the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on
the 30th of May General Halleck had his whole
army drawn up prepared for battle and announced
in orders that there was every indication that our
left was to be attacked that morning. Corinth
had already been evacuated and the National troops
marched on and took possession without opposi-
tion. Everything had been destroyed or carried
away. The Confederate commander had instructed
his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train to
create the impression among the Yankees that re-
inforcements were arriving. There was not a sick
or wounded man left by the Confederates, nor
stores of any kind. Some ammunition had been
OCCUPATION^ OF CORINTH. 38 1
blown up — not removed — but the trophies of war
were a few Quaker guns, logs of about the diameter
of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons
and pointed in the most threatening manner towards
us.
The possession of Corinth by the National troops
was of strategic importance, but the victory was
barren in every other particular. It was nearly
bloodless. It is a question whether the morale of
the Confederate troops engaged at Corinth was not
improved by the immunity with which they were
permitted to remove all public property and then
withdraw themselves. On our side I know officers
and men of the Army of the Tennessee — and I pre-
sume the same is true of those of the other com-
mands — were disappointed at the result. They
could not see how the mere occupation of places
was to close the war while large and effective rebel
armies existed. They believed that a well-directed
attack would at least have partially destroyed the
army defending Corinth. For myself I am satisfied
that Corinth could have been captured in a two days
campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of re-
inforcements after the battle of Shiloh.
General Halleck at once commenced erecting forti-
fications around Corinth on a scale to indicate that
this one point must be held if it took the whole
National army to do it. All commanding points two
382 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west
were strongly fortified. It was expected in case of
necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. They
were laid out on a scale that would have required
100,000 men to fully man them. It was probably
thought that a final battle of the war would be fought
at that point These fortifications were never used.
Tmmediately after the occupation of Corinth by the
National troops, General Pope was sent in pursuit
of the retreating garrison and General Buell soon
followed. Buell was the senior of the two generals
and commanded the entire column. The pursuit was
kept up for some thirty miles, but did not result in
the capture of any material of war or prisoners,
unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and
were willing captives. On the loth of June the pur-
suing column was all back at Corinth. The Army
of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of these
movements.
The Confederates were now driven out of West
Tennessee, and on the 6th of June, after a well-con-
tested naval battle, the National forces took posses-
sion of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from
its source to that point. The railroad from Columbus
to Corinth was at once put in good condition and
held by us. We had garrisons at Donelson, Clarks-
ville and Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and
held the Tennessee River from its mouth to East-
THE ARMY SEPARATED. 383
port. New Orleans and Baton Rouge had fallen into
the possession of the National forces, so that now
the Confederates at the west were narrowed down for
all communication with Richmond to the single line
of road running east from Vicksburg. To dispossess
them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first
importance. The possession of the Mississippi by
us from Memphis to Baton Rouge was also a most
important object It would be equal to the ampu-
tation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the
enemy.
After the capture of Corinth a movable force of
80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory
acquired, could have been set in motion for the
accomplishment of any great campaign for the sup-
pression of the rebellion. In addition to this fresh
troops were being raised to swell the effective force.
But the work of depletion commenced. Buell with
the Army of the Ohio was sent cast, following the
line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad. This
he was ordered to repair as he advanced — only to have
it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops
as soon as he was out of the way. If he had been
sent directly to Chattanooga as rapidly as he could
march, leaving two or three divisions along the line
of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have
arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved
much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred
384 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
in gaining Chattanooga. Bragg would then not have
had time to raise an army to contest the possession
of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky ; the
battles of Stone River and Chickamauga would not
necessarily have been fought; Bumside would not
have been besieged in Knoxville without the power
of helping himself or escaping ; the battle of Chatta-
nooga would not have been fought These are the
negative advantages, if the term negative is appli-
cable, which would probably have resulted from
prompt movements after Corinth fell into the posses-
sion of the National forces. The positive results
might have been : a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to
Vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of
Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.
CHAPTER XXVII.
HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS — ON THE ROAD TO
MEMPHIS ESCAPING JACKSON COMPLAINTS AND
REQUESTS — HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF — RETURN TO CORINTH — MOVEMENTS OF
BRAGG SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE — THE AD-
VANCE UPON CHATTANOOGA — SHERIDAN COLONEL
OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT.
MY position at Corinth, with a nominal command
and yet no command, became so unbearable
that I asked permission of Halleck to remove my
headquarters to Memphis. I had repeatedly asked,
between the fall of Donelson and the evacuation of
Corinth, to be relieved from duty under Halleck ; but
all my applications were refused until the occupation
of the town. I then obtained permission to leave the
department, but General Sherman happened to call
on me as I was about starting and urged me so
strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to
remain. My application to be permitted to remove
my headquarters to Memphis was, however, approved,
and on the 21st of June I started for that point with
my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one
Vol. I. 25
386 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
company. There was a detachment of two or three
companies going some twenty-five miles west to be
stationed as a guard to the railroad. I went under
cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the
next morning proceeded to La Grange with no con-
voy but the few cavalry men I had with me.
From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-
seven miles. There were no troops stationed be-
tween these two points, except a small force guard-
ing a working party which was engaged in repairing
the railroad. Not knowing where this party would
be found I halted at La Grange. General Hurlbut
was in command there at the time and had his
headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very
commodious country house. The proprietor was at
home and, learning of my arrival, he invited Gen-
eral Hurlbut and me to dine with him. I accepted
the invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon
with my host, who was a thorough Southern gen-
tleman fully convinced of the justice of secession.
After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he
entertained me with a recital of the services he
was rendering the cause. He was too old to be in
the ranks himself — he must have been quite seventy
then — but his means enabled him to be useful in
other ways. In ordinary times the homestead where
he was now living produced the bread and meat to
supply the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-
ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS. 387
lands of Mississippi. Now he raised food and forage
on both places, and thought he would have that year
a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of
poor men who had gone into the war and left their
families dependent upon the " patriotism '* of those
better off. The crops around me looked fine, and I had
at the moment an idea that about the time they were
ready to be gathered the " Yankee " troops would be
in the neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit
of those engaged in the suppression of the rebellion
instead of its support. I felt, however, the greatest
respect for the candor of my host and for his zeal in
a cause he thoroughly believed in, though our views
were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive.
The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La
Grange to Memphis was very warm, even for that
latitude and season. With my staff and small escort
I started at an early hour, and before noon we ar-
rived within twenty miles of Memphis. At this point
I saw a very comfortable-looking white-haired gentle-
man seated at the front of his house, a little distance
from the road. I let my staff and escort ride ahead
while I halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass
of water. I was invited at once to dismount and
come in. I found my host very genial and com-
municative, and staid longer than I had intended,
until the lady of the house announced dinner and
asked me to join them. The host, however, was not
388 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
pressing, so that I declined the invitation and, mount-
ing my horse, rode on.
About a mile west from where I had been stop-
ping a road comes up from the south-east, joining
that from La Grange to Memphis. A mile west of
this junction I found my staff and escort halted and
enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a
house located several hundred feet back from the road,
their horses hitched to the fence along the line of
the road. I, too, stopped and we remained there
until the cool of the afternoon, and then rode into
Memphis.
The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty
miles from Memphis was a Mr. De Loche, a man
loyal to the Union. He had not pressed me to tarry
longer with him because in the early part of my
visit a neighbor, a Dr. Smith, had called and, on be-
ing presented to me, backed off the porch as if some-
thing had hit him. Mr. De Loche knew that the
rebel General Jackson was in that neighborhood
with a detachment of cavalry. His neighbor was as
earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche
in that of the Union. The exact location of Jack-
son was entirely unknown to Mr. De Loche ; but he
was sure that his neighbor would know it and would
give information of my presence, and this made my
stay unpleasant to him after the call of Dr. Smith.
I have stated that a detachment of troops was en
ESCAPING J A CKSON. 389
gaged in guarding workmen who were repairing the
railroad east of Memphis. On the day I entered
Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle
which had been sent east for the troops so engaged.
The drovers were not enlisted men and he released
them. A day or two after one of these drovers came
to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of
his capture, said Jackson was very much disappointed
that he had not captured me ; that he was six or seven
miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad
when he learned that I was stopping at the house of
Mr. De Loche, and had ridden with his command to
the junction of the road he was on with that from
La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I
had passed three-quarters of an hour before. He
thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded
horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start.
Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he
would have found me with my party quietly resting
under the shade of trees and without even arms in
our hands with which to defend ourselves.
General Jackson of course did not communicate
his disappointment at not capturing me to a pris-
oner, a young drover ; but from the talk among the
soldiers the facts related were learned. A day or
two later Mr. De Loche called on me in Memphis
to apologize for his apparent incivility in not insist-
ing on my staying for dinner. He said that his wife
390 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after
the call of his neighbor, he had felt restless until I
got away. I never met General Jackson before the
war, nor during it, but have met him since at his
very comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs,
Colorado. I reminded him of the above incident,
and this drew from him the response that he was
thankful now he had not captured me. I certainly
was very thankful too.
My occupation of Memphis as district head-
quarters did not last long. The period, however,
was marked by a few incidents which were novel to
me. Up to that time I had not occupied any place
in the South where the citizens were at home in any
great numbers. Dover was within the fortifications
at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, every
citizen was gone. There were no people living at
Pittsburg landing, and but very few at Corinth.
Memphis, however, was a populous city, and there
were many of the citizens remaining there who were
not only thoroughly impressed with the justice of
their cause, but who thought that even the " Yankee
soldiery " must entertain the same views if they
could only be induced to make an honest confession.
It took hours of my time every day to listen to com-
plaints and requests. The latter were generally
reasonable, and if so they were granted ; but the
complaints were not always, or even often, well
COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS. 39 1
founded. Two instances will mark the general char-
acter. First : the officer who commanded at Mem-
phis immediately after the city fell into the hands of
the National troops had ordered one of the churches
of the city to be opened to the soldiers. Army
chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit.
Second : at the beginning of the war the Confederate
Congress had passed a law confiscating all property
of ** alien enemies " at the South, including the
debts of Southerners to Northern men. In conse-
quence of this law, when Memphis was occupied
the provost- marshal had forcibly collected all the
evidences he could obtain of such debts.
Almost the first complaints made to me were these
two outrages. The gentleman who made the com-
plaints informed me first of his own high standing as a
lawyer, a citizen and a Christian. He was a deacon
in the church which had been defiled by the occu-
pation of Union troops, and by a Union chaplain
filling the pulpit. He did not use the word ** de-
file,'* but he expressed the idea very clearly. He
asked that the church be restored to the former
congregation. I told him that no order had been
issued prohibiting the congregation attending the
church. He said of course the congregation could
not hear a Northern clergyman who differed so
radically with them on questions of government.
I told him the troops would continue to occupy
392 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
that church for the present, and that they would
not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments pro-
claimed from the pulpit This closed the argu-
ment on the first point.
Then came the second. The complainant said that
he wanted the papers restored to him which had been
surrendered to the provost-marshal under protest;
he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the
" Confederate States Government " had been the at-
torney for a number of large business houses at the
North ; that '* his government " had confiscated all
debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commis-
sioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them
over to the ''government" : but in his case, owing to
his high standing, he had been permitted to hold these
claims for collection, the responsible officials know-
ing that he would account to the ** government" for
every dollar received. He said that his '* govern-
ment," when it came in possession of all its territory,
would hold him personally responsible for the claims
he had surrendered to the provost-marshal. His
impudence was so sublime that I was rather amused
than indignant. I told him, however, that if he
would remain in Memphis I did not believe the
Confederate government would ever molest him.
He left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance
as I was at the brazenness of his request.
On the I ith of July General Halleck received tde-
HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 393
graphic orders appointing him to the command of all
the armies, with headquarters in Washington. His
instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field
of duty with as little delay as was consistent with
the safety and interests of his previous command.
I was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same
day to report at department headquarters at Corinth.
I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief
had been ordered to a different field and did not
know whether to move my headquarters or not. I
telegraphed asking if I was to take my staff with me,
and received word in reply : " This place will be
your headquarters. You can judge for yourself."
I left Memphis for my new field without delay, and
reached Corinth on the 15th of the month. General
Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he
was very uncommunicative, and gave me no informa-
tion as to what I had been called to Corinth for.
When General Halleck left to assume the duties
of general-in-chief I remained in ' command of the
district of West Tennessee. Practically I became a
department commander, because no one was assigned
to that position over me and I made my reports
direct to the general-in-chief ; but I was not assigned
to the position of department commander until the
25th of October. General Halleck while command-
ing the Department of the Mississippi had had con-
trol as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooga
394
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
north. My district only embraced West Tennessee
and Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. Buell,
with the Army of the Ohio, had, as previously stated,
been ordered east towards Chattanooga, with instruc-
tions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad
as he advanced. Troops had been sent north by
Halleck along the line of the Mobile and Ohio rail-
road to put it in repair as far as Columbus. Other
troops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson,
Tennessee, to Grand Junction, and still others on the
road west to Memphis.
The remainder of the magnificent army of 1 20,000
men which entered Corinth on the 30th of May
had now become so scattered that I was put
entirely on the defensive in a territory whose
population was hostile to the Union. One of the
first things I had to do was to construct fortifications
at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could
be spared to man them. The structures that had
been built during the months of May and June were
left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and
others were constructed in a few days, plainer in
design but suited to the command available to de-
fend them.
I disposed the troops belonging to the district in
conformity with the situation as rapidly as possible.
The forces at Donelson, Clarksville and Nashville,
with those at Corinth and along the railroad east-
RETURN TO CORINTH. 395
ward, I regarded as sufficient for protection against
any attack from the west. The Mobile and Ohio
railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth,
to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad
from Jackson, Tennessee, to Bolivar. Grand Junc-
tion and La Grange on the Memphis railroad were
abandoned.
South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confront-
ing it, was Van Dorn, with a sufficient force to organ-
ize a movable army of thirty-five to forty thousand
men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri.
This movable force could be thrown against either
Corinth, Bolivar or Memphis; and the best that
could be done in such event would be to weaken the
points not threatened in order to reinforce the one
that was. Nothing could be gained on the National
side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory
already occupied was as much as the force present
could guard. The most anxious period of the war,
to me, was during the time the Army of the Ten-
nessee was guarding the territory acquired by the
fall of Corinth and Memphis and before I was
sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. The
enemy also had cavalry operating in our rear, mak-
ing it necessary to guard every point of the rail-
road back to Columbus, on the security of which we
were dependent for all our supplies. Headquarters
were connected by telegraph with all points of the
396 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
command except Memphis and the Mississippi below
Columbus. With these points communication was had
by the railroad to Columbus, then down the river by
boat. To reinforce Memphis would take three or
four days, and to get an order there for troops to
move elsewhere would have taken at least two days.
Memphis therefore was practically isolated from the
balance of the command. But it was in Sherman's
hands. Then too the troops were well intrenched
and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary.
During the two months after the departure of
General Halleck there was much fighting between
small bodies of the contending armies, but these en-
counters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main
battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by
those engaged in them. Some of them, however,
estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and
wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the
battles of the Mexican war which attracted so much
of the attention of the public when they occurred.
About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding
at Bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the
enemy so that he had to be reinforced from Jackson
and Corinth. On the 27th there was skirmishing on
the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On
the 30th I learned from Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who
had been far to the south, that Bragg in person was
at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail
MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG. 397
(by way of Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon
train marching overland to join him at Rome. Price
was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, with
a large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an out-
post. I proposed to the general-in-chief to be per-
mitted to drive him away, but was informed that,
while I had to judge for myself, the best use^to make
of my troops was not to scatter theniy but hold them
ready to reinforce Buell.
The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon
trains to Chattanooga across country, while his troops
were transported over a long round-about road to
the same destination, without need of guards except
when in my immediate front, demonstrates the ad-
vantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country
where the people are friendly. Buell was marching
through a hostile region and had to have his com-
munications thoroughly guarded back to a base of
supplies. More men were required the farther the
National troops penetrated into the enemy's country.
I, with an army sufficiently powerful to have de-
stroyed Bragg, was purely on the defensive and ac-
complishing no more than to hold a force far inferior
to my own.
On the 2d of August I was ordered from Wash-
ington to live upon the country, on the resources of
citizens hostile to the government, so far as practicable.
I was also directed to " handle rebels within our lines
398 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them
from their homes and from our lines. I do not
recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not
a soldier) during the entire rebellion. I am aware
that a great many were sent to northern prisons,
particularly to Joliet, Illinois, by some of my sub-
ordinates with the statement that it was my order.
I had all such released the moment I learned of their
arrest ; and finally sent a staff officer north to release
every prisoner who was said to be confined by my
order. There were many citizens at home who de-
served punishment because they were soldiers when
an opportunity was afforded to inflict an injury to
the National cause. This class was not of the kind
that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better
that a few guilty men should escape than that a great
many innocent ones should suffer.
On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two
more divisions to Buell. They were sent the same
day by way of Decatur. On the 2 2d Colonel
Rodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six
companies of his regiment
Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led
their regiments off the field at almost the first fire of
the rebels at Shiloh. He was by nature and educa-
tion a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his
action when the battle was over. He came to me
with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to
^
SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE. 399
have another trial. I felt great sympathy for him
and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarks-
ville and Donelson. He selected Clarksville for his
headquarters, no doubt because he regarded it as
the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. But
when he was summoned to surrender by a band of
guerillas, his constitutional weakness overcame him.
He inquired the number of men the enemy had, and
receiving a response indicating a force greater than
his own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact
he would surrender. Arrangements were made for
him to count the guerillas, and having satisfied him-
self that the enemy had the greater force he surren-
dered and informed his subordinate at Donelson of
the fact, advising him to do the same. The guerillas
paroled their prisoners and moved upon Donelson,
but the officer in command at that point marched out
to meet them and drove them away.
Among other embarrassments, at the time of
which I now write, was the fact that the government
wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the
South and directed me to give every facility toward
that end. Pay in gold was authorized, and stations on
the Mississippi River and on the railroad in our pos-
session had to be designated where cotton would be
received. This opened to the enemy not only the
means of converting cotton into money, which had a
value all over the world and which they so much
400 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining ac-
curate and intelligent information in regard to our
position and strength. It was also demoralizing to the
troops. Citizens obtaining permits from the treasury
department had to be protected within our lines and
given facilities to get out cotton by which they real-
ized enormous profits. Men who had enlisted to
fight the battles of their country did not like to be
engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the sup-
port of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of
which went to men who shared none of their dangers.
On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett,
near Bolivar, with the 20th and 29th Ohio volunteer
infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be
about 4,000 strong. The enemy was driven away
with a loss of more than one hundred men. On the
1st of September the bridge guard at Medon was
attacked by guerillas. The guard held the position
until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leav-
ing about fifty of their number on the field dead or
wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen
wounded. On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a
force of less than 500 infantry and two pieces of
artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in strong
force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them
away with great loss. Our troops buried 1 79 of the
enemy's dead, left upon the field. Afterwards it was
found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battle-
THE ADVANCE UPON CHATTANOOGA, 40I
field were turned into hospitals for the wounded.
Our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five
killed and wounded. On the 2d of September I
was ordered to send more reinforcements to BuelL
Jackson and Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent
the reinforcements. On the 4th I received direct
orders to send Granger's division also to Louisville,
Kentucky.
General Buell had left Corinth about the loth of
June to march upon Chattanooga ; Bragg, who had
superseded Beauregard in command, sent one divi-
sion from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same
place. This gave Buell about seventeen days start
If he had not been required to repair the railroad as
he advanced, the march could have been made in
eighteen days at the outside, and Chattanooga must
have been reached by the National forces before the
rebels could have possibly got there. The road be-
tween Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have
been put in repair by other troops, so that commu-
nication with the North would have been opened in
a short time after the occupation of the place by the
National troops. If Buell had been permitted to
move in the first instance, with the whole of the
Army of the Ohio and that portion of the Army of
the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have
thrown four divisions from his own command along
the line of road to repair and guard it
Vol. I. — 26
402 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, 5. GRANT.
Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th
of September. I was at the station at Corinth when
the troops reached that point, and found General P.
H. Sheridan with them. I expressed surprise at see-
ing him and said that I had not expected him to go.
He showed decided disappointment at the prospect
of being detained. I felt a little nettled at his desire
to get away and did not detain him.
Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in
which I had served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and
stationed on the Pacific coast when the war broke
out. He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861,
and before the close of the year managed in some
way, I do not know how, to get East. He went to
Missouri. Halleck had known him as a very success-
ful young officer in managing campaigns against the
Indians on the Pacific coast, and appointed him act-
ing-quartermaster in south-west Missouri. There
was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while
Sheridan served in that capacity ; but he got into
difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his
stringent rules for preventing the use of public trans-
portation for private purposes. He asked to be re-
lieved from further duty in the capacity in which he
was engaged and his request was granted. When
General Halleck took the field in April, 1862, Sheri-
dan was assigned to duty on his staff. During the
advance on Corinth a vacancy occurred in the col-
SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT, 403
onelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry. Governor Blair,
of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking
him to suggest the name of a professional soldier
for the vacancy, saying he would appoint a good
man without reference to his State. Sheridan was
named ; and was so conspicuously efficient that when
Corinth was reached he was assigned to command a
cavalry brigade in the Army of the Mississippi. He
was in command at Booneville on the ist of July
with two small regiments, when he was attacked by
a force full three times as numerous as his own. By
very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of attack he
completely routed the enemy. For this he was made
a brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure
in the army about Corinth. On this account I was
sorry to see him leaving me. His departure was
probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished
services in his new field.
Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before
Buell got there, and on the night of their arrival
Sheridan with his command threw up works around
the railroad station for the defence of troops as they
came from the front.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE PRICE ENTERS
lUKA BATTLE OF lUKA.
AT this time, September 4th, I had two divisions
of the Army of the Mississippi stationed at
Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville. There were at
Corinth also Davies' division and two brig^ades of
McArthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. This force
constituted my left wing, of which Rosecrans was in
command. General Ord commanded the centre,
from Bethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio
railroad and from Jackson to Bolivar where the
Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River.
General Sherman commanded on the right at Mem-
phis with two of his brigades back at Brownsville, at
the crossing of the Hatchie River by the Memphis
and Ohio railroad. This made the most convenient
arrangement I could devise for concentrating all my
spare forces upon any threatened point. All the
troops of the command were within telegraphic com-
munication of each other, except those under Sher-
man. By bringing a portion of his command to
Brownsville, from which point there was a railroad
ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE. 405
and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could
be had with that part of my command within a few
hours by the use of couriers. In case it became
necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangement
all the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard,
could be sent by rail by the way of Jackson in less
than twenty-four hours ; while the troops from
Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their
place.
On the 7th of September I learned of the advance
of Van Dom and Price, apparently upon Corinth.
One division was brought from Memphis to Bolivar
to meet any emergency that might arise from this
move of the enemy. I was much concerned because
my first duty, after holding the territory acquired
within my command, was to prevent further re-
inforcing of Bragg in Middle Tennessee. Already
the Army of Northern Virginia had defeated the
army under General Pope and was invading Mary-
land. In the Centre General Buell was on his way
to Louisville and Bragg marching parallel to him
with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River.
I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell
until at this time my entire force numbered less than
50,000 men, of all arms. This included everything
from Cairo south within my jurisdiction. If I too
should be driven back, the Ohio River would become
the line dividing the belligerents west of the AUe-
406 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ghanies, while at the East the line was already
farther north than when hostilities commenced at
the opening of the war. It is true Nashville was
never given up after its first capture, but it would
have been isolated and the garrison there would
have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the
troops in West Tennessee had been compelled to
fall back. To say at the end of the second year of
the war the line dividing the contestants at the
East was pushed north of Maryland, a State that
had not seceded, and at the West beyond Kentucky,
another State which had been always loyal, would
have been discouraging indeed. As it was, many
loyal people despaired in the fall of 1862 of ever
saving the Union. The administration at Washing-
ton was much concerned for the safety of the cause
it held so dear. But I believe there was never a day
when the President did not think that, in some way
or other, a cause so just as ours would come out
triumphant
Up to the nth of September Rosecrans still had
troops on the railroad east of Corinth, but they had
all been ordered in. By the 1 2th all were in except
a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th
Wisconsin. He had been detained to guard the
remainder of the stores which had not yet been
brought in to Corinth.
On the 13th of September General Sterling Price
PRICE ENTERS JUKA, 407
entered luka, a town about twenty miles east of
Corinth op the Memphis and Charleston railroad.
Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the
place. He made no resistance, but evacuated the
town on the approach of the enemy, I was appre-
hensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get
troops into Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was
afterwards ascertained to be. The authorities at
Washington, including the general-in-chief of the
army, were very anxious, as I have said, about
affairs both in East and Middle Tennessee; and my
anxiety was quite as great on their account as for
any danger threatening my command. I had not
force enough at Corinth to attack Price even by
stripping everything ; and there was danger that
before troops could be got from other points he
might be far on his way across the Tennessee, To
prevent this all spare forces at Bolivar and Jackson
were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentrated
at Jackson for their transportation. Within twenty-
four hours from the transmission of the order the
troops were at their destination, although there
had been a delay of four hours resulting from the
forward train getting off the track and stopping all
the others. This gave a reinforcement of near 8,000
men. General Ord in command. General Rosecrans
commanded the district of Corinth with a movable
force of about 9,000, independent of the garrison
408 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
deemed necessary to be left behind. It was known
that General Van Dorn was about a four days'
march south of us, with a large force It might
have been part of his plan to attack at Corinth,
Price coming from the east while he came up
from the south. My desire was to attack Price be-
fore Van Dorn could reach Corinth or go to his
relief.
General Rosecrans had previously had his head-
quarters at luka, where his command was spread out
along the Memphis and Charleston railroad east-
ward. While there he had a most excellent map
prepared showing all the roads and streams in the
surrounding country. He was also personally famil-
iar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to
him in my plans for the approach. We had cars
enough to transport all of General Ord s command,
which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on the
road about seven miles west of luka. From there
his troops were to march by the north side of the
railroad and attack Price from the north-west, while
Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position
south of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road. A
small force was to hold the Jacinto road where it
turns to the north-east, while the main force moved
on. the Fulton road which comes into luka further
east. This plan was suggested by Rosecrans.
Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton
4IO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.
road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of
troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in Sep-
tember, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity.
The Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles
away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army
followed by a pursuing force. Ord was on the north-
west, and even if a rebel movement had been pos-
sible in that direction it could have brought only
temporary relief, for it would have carried Price's
army to the rear of the National forces and isolated
it from all support. It looked to me that, if Price
would remain in luka until we could get there, his
annihilation was inevitable.
On the morning of the i8th of September General
Ord moved by rail to Burnsville, and there left the
cars and moved out to perform his part of the pro-
gramme. He was to get as near the enemy as pos-
sible during the day and intrench himself so as to
hold his position until the next morning. Rosecrans
was to be up by the morning of the igth on the two
roads before described, and the attack was to be from
all three quarters simultaneously. Troops enough
were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detain any cavalry
that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden
dash into Corinth until I could be notified. There
was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there
v/ould be no delay in communication. I detained
cars and locomotives enough at Burnsville to trans-
BATTLE OF J UK A, 4II
r
port the whole of Ord's command at once, and if Van
Dom had moved against Corinth instead of luka I
could have thrown in reinforcements to the number
of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived. I
remained at Burnsville with a detachment of about
900 men from Ord's command and communicated
with my two wings by courier. Ord met the advance
of the enemy soon after leaving Burnsville. Quite
a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels
back with considerable loss, including one general
officer killed. He maintained his position and was
ready to attack by daylight the next morning. I
was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch
from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-
two miles from luka, saying that some of his com-
mand had been delayed, and that the rear of his
column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said,
however, that he would still beat luka by two o'clock
the next day. I did not believe this possible because
of the distance and the condition of the roads, which
was bad ; besides, troops after a forced march of
twenty miles are not in a good condition for fight-
ing the moment they get through. It might do in
marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not
to make an assault. I immediately sent Ord a copy
of Rosecrans' dispatch and ordered him to be in
readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound
of guns to the south or south-east. He was instructed
412 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indi-
cations of battle. During the 19th the wind blew
in the wrong direction to transmit sound either
towards the point where Ord was, or to Bumsville
where I had remained
A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rose-
crans arrived with the head of his column at Bamets,
the point where the Jacinto road to luka leaves the
road going east He here turned north without
sending any troops to the Fulton road. While still
moving in column up the Jacinto road he met a
force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten
and driven back upon the main road. In this short
engagement his loss was considerable for the number
engaged, and one battery was taken from him. The
wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direc-
tion to transmit sound towards either Ord or me.
Neither he nor I nor any one in either command
heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field.
After the engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch
announcing the result This was brought by a cou-
rier. There was no road between Burnsville and the
position then occupied by Rosecrans and the coun-
try was impassable for a man on horseback. The
courier bearing the message was compelled to move
west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road lead-
ing to Burnsville. This made it a late hour of the
night before I learned of the battle that had taken
BATTLE OF J UK A. 413
place during the afternoon, I at once notified
Ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early
in the morning. The next morning Rosecrans him-
self renewed the attack and went into luka with but
little resistance, Ord also went in according to or-
ders, without hearing a gun from the south of town
but supposing the troops coming from the south-west
must be up by that time, Rosecrans, however, had
put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy
had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by
that road during the night Word was soon brought
to me that our troops were in luka, I immediately
rode into town and found that the enemy was not be-
ing pursued even by the cavalry. I ordered pursuit
by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on
with him a few miles in person. He followed only
a few miles after I left him and then went into camp,
and the pursuit was continued no further. I was dis-
appointed at the result of the battle of luka — but I
had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that
I found no fault at the time.
CHAPTER XXIX.
VAN DORN's movements — BATTLE OF CORINTH COM-
MAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
ON the 19th of September General Geo. H.
Thomas was ordered east to reinforce Buell.
This threw the army at my command still more on
the defensive. The Memphis and Charleston rail-
road was abandoned, except at Corinth, and small
forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction.
Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was
given up and Bolivar became our most advanced
position on the Mississippi Central railroad. Our
cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent ex-
peditions were sent out to watch the movements of
the enemy. We were in a country where nearly all
the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us
and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress.
It was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early
information of our every move. We, on the con-
trary, had to go after our information in force, and
then often returned without it.
On the 2 2d Bolivar was threatened by a large
force from south of Grand Junction, supposed to be
VAN DORirS MO YEMEN TS, 4 1 5
twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artil-
lery. I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in
person to superintend the movement of troops to
whatever point the attack might be made upon. The
troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel
the threatened movement without a battle. Our
cavalry followed the enemy south of Davis' mills in
Mississippi.
On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently
endeavoring to strike the Mississippi River above
Memphis. At the same time other points within my
command were so threatened that it was impossible
to concentrate a foroe to drive him away. There
was at this juncture a large Union force at Helena,
Arkansas, which, had it been within my command, I
could have ordered across the river to attack and
break up tKe Mississippi Central railroad far to the
south. This would not only have called Van Dorn
back, but would have compelled the retention of a
large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repe-
tition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies.
Geographical lines between the commands during
the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they
were too rigidly adhered to.
Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the
line above Memphis, as had apparently been his in-
tention. He was simply covering a deeper design ;
one much more important to his cause. By the ist
41 6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT
of October it was fully apparent that Corinth was to
be attacked with great force and determination, and
that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepig^e and Rust
had joined their strength for this purpose. There
was some skirmishing outside of Corinth with the
advance of the enemy on the 3d. The rebels massed
in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charles-
ton and the Mobile and Ohio railroads, and were
thus between the troops at Corinth and all possible
reinforcements. Any fresh troops for us must come
by a circuitous route.
On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered Gen-
eral McPherson, who was at Jackson, to join Rose-
crans at Corinth with reinforcements picked up along
the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. Hurlbut
had been ordered from Bolivar to march for the same
destination ; and as Van Dorn was coming upon
Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell
in with the advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmish-
ing ensued on the evening of the 3d. On the 4th
Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt,
to capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could
come up. In that case the enemy himself could have
occupied the defences of Corinth and held at bay
all the Union troops that arrived. In fact he could
have taken the offensive against the reinforcements
with three or four times their number and still left a
sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth to hold
BATTLE OF CORINTH, 417
them. He came near success, some of his troops
penetrating the National lines at least once, but the
works that were built after Halleck's departure en-
abled Rosecrans to hold his position until the troops
of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards
the rebel front and rear. The enemy was finally
driven back with great slaughter : all their charges,
made with great gallantry, were repulsed. The loss
on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with
Van Dorn's. McPherson came up with the train of
cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as
was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got
in to the support of Rosecrans just after the repulse.
His approach, as well as that of Hurlbut, was known
to the enemy and had a moral effect. General
Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory,
although I had given specific orders in advance of
the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy
was repelled. He did not do so. and I repeated the
order after the battle. In the first order he was
notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going
to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy
was not pursued.
General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and
being senior took command of his troops. This
force encountered the head of Van Dorn*s retreating
column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge
some ten miles out from Corinth. The bottom land
Vol. I. - 27
41 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
here was swampy and bad for the operations of
troops, making a good place to get an enemy into.
Ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge
and drove them back in a panic. Many were killed,
and others were drowned by being pushed off the
bridge in their hurried retreat. Ord followed and
met the main force. He was too weak in numbers
to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the
enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher
up the stream. Ord was wounded in this engage-
ment and the command devolved on Hurlbut
Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning
of the 5th and then took the wrong road. Moving in
the enemy's country he travelled with a wagon train
to carry his provisions and munitions of war. His
march was therefore slower than that of the enemy,
who was moving towards his supplies. Two or three
hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without any-
thing except what the men carried on their persons,
would have been worth more than any pursuit com-
menced the next day could have possibly been. Even
when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the
route taken by the enemy, he would have come
upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a stream in front
and Ord holding the only bridge ; but he took the
road leading north and towards Chewalla instead of
west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy
had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from
BATTLE OF CORINTH. 419
battle as when he started. Hurlbut had not the
numbers to meet any such force as Van Dorn's if they
had been in any mood for fighting, and he might
have been in great peril.
I now regarded the time to accomplish anything
by pursuit as past and, after Rosecrans reached
Jonesboro, I ordered him to return. He kept on
to Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to
go farther. I thereupon ordered him to halt and
submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who
allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter,
but inquired *' why not pursue ? " Upon this I ordered
Rosecrans back. Had he gone much farther he
would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had
at Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen
ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost
his army.
The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being
315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. The
enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported 1,423
dead and 2,225 prisoners. We fought behind breast-
works, which accounts in some degree for the dis-
parity. Among the killed on our side was General
Hackelman. General Oglesby was badly, it was for
some time supposed mortally, wounded. I received
a congratulatory letter from the President, which ex-
pressed also his sorrow for the losses.
This battle was recognized by me as being a
420 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
decided victory, though not so complete as I had
hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now think
was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer
at Corinth. Since the war it is known that the
result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy,
and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at
the North. The battle relieved me from any further
anxiety for the safety of the territory within my ju-
risdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements I
suggested to the general-in-chief a forward move-
ment against Vicksburg.
On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton s
being in command at Holly Springs and much rein-
forced by conscripts and troops from Alabama and
Texas. The same day General Rosecrans was re-
lieved from duty with my command, and shortly after
he succeeded Buell in the command of the army in
Middle Tennessee. I was delighted at the promotion
of General Rosecrans to a separate command, because
I still believed that when independent of an immediate
superior the qualities which I, at that time, credited
him with possessing, would show themselves. As a
subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I
wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty
that very day.
At the close of the operations just described my
force, in round numbers, was 48,500. Of these 4,800
were in Kentucky and Illinois, 7,000 in Memphis,
COMMAND OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE. 42 1
19,200 from Mound City south, and 17,500 at Cor-
inth. General McClernand had been authorized
from Washington to go north and organize troops
to be used in opening the Mississippi. These new
levies with other reinforcements now began to come
in.
On the 25th of October I was placed in command
of the Department of the Tennessee. Reinforce-
ments continued to come from the north and by the
2d of November I was prepared to take the initiative.
This was a great relief after the two and a half
months of continued defence over a large district of
country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy
ready to give information of our every move. I have
described very imperfectly a few of the battles and
skirmishes that took place during this time. To
describe all would take more space than I can allot
to the purpose ; to make special mention of all the
officers and troops who distinguished themselves,
would take a volume.
Note. — For gallantry in the various enj^agements, from the time I was
left in command down to 26th of October and on my recommendation, Gen-
erals Mcpherson and C. S. Hamilton were promoted to be Major-Generals, and
Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa, J. A. Mower,
nth Missouri, M. D. Lcggett. 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and
John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.
CHAPTER XXX.
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG — EMPLOYING TH!
FREEDMEN OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS — SHER
MAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS — SHERMAN's MOVEMENT:
DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI — VAN DORN CAPTURE!
HOLLY SPRINGS COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD.
VICKSBURG was important to the enem)
because it occupied the first high grount
coming close to the river below Memphis. Fron
there a railroad runs east, connecting with othei
roads leading to all points of the Southern States
A railroad also starts from the opposite side of the
river, extending west as far as Shreveport, Louis
iana. Vicksburg was the only channel, at the i tk
of the events of which this chapter treats, connect
ing the parts of the Confederacy divided by the
Mississippi. So long as it was held by the enemy
the free navigation of the river was prevented
Hence its importance. Points on the river betweei
Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as depend
encies ; but their fall was sure to follow the captun
of the former place.
The campaign against Vicksburg commenced O!
the 2d of November as indicated in a dispatch tt
the gencral-in-chief in the following words : " 1 hav<
THR CAMPAIGX AGAINST VICKSBURG, 423
commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with
three divisions from Corinth and two from BoUvan
Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee] to-morrow,
and take command in person. If found practicable,
I will go to Holly Springs, and, may be. Grenada,
completing railroad and telegraph as I go."
At this time my command was holding the Mobile
and Ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles
south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky ; the
Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junc-
tion with the Mobile and Ohio ; the Memphis and
Charleston from Corinth east to Bear Creek, and the
Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis. My en-
tire command was no more than was necessary to
hold • these lines, and hardly that if kept on the de-
fensive. By moving against the enemy and into
his ur'^ubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving
their army before us, these lines would nearly hold
themselves ; thus affording a large force for field
operations. My moving force at that time was about
30,000 men, and I estimated the enemy confronting
me, under Pemberton, at about the same number.
General McPhcrson commanded my left wing and
General C. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman
was at Memphis with the right wing. Pemberton
was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied Holly
Springs and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Cen-
tral railroad. On the 8th we occupied Grand June-
424 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.
tion and La Grange, throwing a considerable force
seven or eight miles south, along the line of the rail-
road. The road from Bolivar forward was repaired
and put in running order as the troops advanced*
Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom
in war that large bodies of troops must operate from
a base of supplies which they always covered and
gfuarded in all forward movements. There was
delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in
gathering and forwarding supplies to the front.
By my orders, and in accordance with previous in-
structions from Washington, all the forage within
reach was collected under the supervision of the
chief quartermaster and the provisions under the
chief commissary, receipts being given when there
was anyone to take them ; the supplies in any event
to be accounted for as government stores. The
stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of
the possibility of supplying a moving column in an
enemy's country from the country itself.
It was at this point, probably, where the first idea
of a ** Freedman's Bureau " took its origin. Orders
of the government prohibited the expulsion of the
negroes from the protection of the army, when they
came in voluntarily. Humanity forbade allowing
them to starve. With such an army of them, of
all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about
Grand Junction, amounting to many thousands, it
EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN. 425
was impossible to advance. There was no special
authority for feeding them unless they were em-
ployed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the
army ; but only able-bodied young men were suit-
able for such work. This labor would support but a
very limited percentage of them. The plantations
were all deserted ; the cotton and corn were ripe :
men, women and children above ten years of age
could be employed in saving these crops. To do
this work with contrabands, or to have it done, or-
ganization under a competent chief was necessary.
On inquiring for such a man Chaplain Eaton, now
and for many years the very able United States
Commissioner of Education, was suggested. He
proved as efficient in that field as he has since done
in his present one. I gave him all the assistants and
guards he called for. We together fixed the prices
to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to
the government or to individuals. The cotton was
to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers
to receive the stipulated price (my recollection is
twelve and a half cents per pound for picking and
ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the
cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the
government. Citizens remaining on their plantations
were allowed the privilege of having their crops saved
by freedmen on the same terms.
At once the freedmen became self-sustaining.
426 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
The money was not paid to them directly, but was
expended judiciously and for their benefit. They
gave me no trouble afterwards.
Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood
along the Mississippi River to supply the large num-
ber of steamers on that stream. A good price
was paid for chopping wood used for the supply
of government steamers (steamers chartered and
which the government had to supply with fuel).
Those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher
price. In this way a fund was created not only suf-
ficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male
and female, but to build them comfortable cabins,
hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many
comforts they had never known before.
At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I
was very much disturbed by newspaper rumors that
General McClernand was to have a separate and in-
dependent command within mine, to operate against
Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi River. Two
commanders on the same field are always one too
many, and in this case I did not think the general
selected had either the experience or the qualifica-
tions to fit him for so important a position. I feared
for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially
as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute
so important a trust. But on the 12th I received a
dispatch from General Halleck saying that I had
OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS. 427
command of all the troops sent to my department and
authorizing me to fight the enemy where I pleased.
The next day my cavalry was in Holly Springs,
and the enemy fell back south of the Tallahatchie.
Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies
and munitions of war, all of which at that time came
by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, except the few
stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junc-
tion. This was a long line (increasing in length
as we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's coun-
try. On the 15th of November, while I was still
at Holly Springs, I sent word to Sherman to
meet me at Columbus. We were but forty-seven
miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to
meet was for me to take the rail to Columbus and
Sherman a steamer for the same place. At that
meeting, besides talking over my general plans I
gave him his orders to join me with two divisions
and to march them down the Mississippi Central
railroad if he could. Sherman, who was always
prompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles
north of Oxford. He brouofht three divisions with
him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of in-
fantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small
detachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he
knew were on their way from the north to Memphis.
About this time General Halleck ordered troops from
Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi
428 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
was not under my command then) to cut the road in
Pemberton s rear. The expedition was under Gen-
erals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and was successful
so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the
damage done was very slight and was soon repaired.
The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very
high, the railroad bridge destroyed and Pember-
ton strongly fortified on the south side. A cross-
ing would have been impossible in the presence of an
enemy. I sent the cavalry higher up the stream and
they secured a crossing. This caused the enemy to
evacuate their position, which was possibly accelerated
by the expedition of Hovey and Washburn. The
enemy was followed as far south as Oxford by the
main body of troops, and some seventeen miles farther
by McPherson's command. Here the pursuit was
halted to repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie
northward, in order to bring up supplies. The piles
on which the railroad bridge rested had been left
standing. The work of constructing a roadway for
the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails
were laid for cars.
During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads
I learned that an expedition down the Mississippi now
was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent com-
mander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th of
December back to Memphis to take charge. The
following were his orders :
SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS, 429
Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee.
Oxford, Mississippi, December 8. 1862.
Major-General W. T. Sherman,
Commanding Right Wing :
You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis,
Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command.
On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the
troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present
east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and
divisions in your own army. As soon as possible move with them
down the river to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-oper-
ation of the gunboat fleet under command of Flag-officer Porter
proceed to the reduction of that place in such manner as circum-
stances, and your own judgment « may dictate.
The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., nec-
essary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The Quarter-
master at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation
for 30,000 men ; should you still find yourself deficient, your
quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from
such transports as may come into the port of Memphis.
On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with
Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.
Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when
you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will
hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such
manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.
Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient
officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege
guns, and whatever cavalry may be there.
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier,
430 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
for on the 3d of December I asked Halleck if it would
not be well to hold the enemy south of the Yalla-
busha and move a force from Helena and Memphis
on Vicksburg. On the 5th again I suggested, from
Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helena troops were at
my command I thought it would be possible to take
them and the Memphis forces south of the mouth of
the Yazoo River, and thus secure Vicksburg and the
State of Mississippi. Halleck on the same day, the
5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold
the country south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect
25,000 troops at Memphis by the 20th for the Vicks-
burg expedition. I sent Sherman with two divisions
at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and
asked whether I should command the expedition
down the river myself or send Sherman. I was
authorized to do as I thought best for the accom-
plishment of the great object in view. I sent Sher-
man and so informed General Halleck.
As stated, my action in sending Sherman back
was expedited by a desire to get him in command of
the forces separated from my direct supervision. I
feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was
his senior and who had authority from the President
and Secretary of War to exercise that particular
command, — and independently. I doubted McCIer-
nand*s fitness ; and I had good reason to believe that
in forestalling him I was by no means giving offence
SHERMAN* S MOVEMENTS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI. 43 1
to those whose authority to command was above both
him and me.
Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the
correspondence between us or between General
Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my
going further south than the Yallabusha. Pember-
ton's force in my front was the main part of the gar-
rison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the
defence of the territory held by us in West Tennes-
see and Kentucky. I hoped to hold Pemberton in
my front while Sherman should get in his rear and
into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could
be held the better.
It was understood, however, between General Sher-
man and myself that our movements were to be co-
operative ; if Pemberton could not be held away from
Vicksburg I was to follow him ; but at that time it was
not expected to abandon the railroad north of the
Yallabusha. With that point as a secondary base of
supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoo
until communications could be opened with the Mis-
sissippi was contemplated.
It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman
and his command, that if the enemy should fall back
I would follow him even to the gates of Vicks-
burg. I intended in such an event to hold the road
to Grenada on the Yallabusha and cut loose from
there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies
432 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF L\ 5. GRANT.
on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada
to fall back upon in case of failure. It should be
remembered that at the time I speak of it had not
been demonstrated that an army could operate in an
enemy's territory' depending upon the country for
supplies. A halt was called at Oxford with the ad-
vance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the
road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food,
forage and munitions to the front
On the 1 8th of December I received orders from
Washington to divide my command into four army
corps, with General McClemand to command one of
them and to be assigned to that part of the army
which was to operate down the Mississippi. This
interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in
my ultimately taking the command in person. Mc-
Clernand was at that time in Springfield, Illinois.
The order was obeyed without any delay. Dis-
patches were sent to him the same day in con-
formity.
On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly
Springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the
garrison of 1,500 men commanded by Colonel Mur-
phy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and destroyed
all our munitions of war, food and forage. The capt-
ure was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding
but not to the troops under him. At the same time
Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson,
VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS. 433
Tennessee, and Columbus, Kentucky, doing much
damage to it This cut me off from all communi-
cation with the north for more than a week, and it
was more than two weeks before rations or forage
could be issued from stores obtained in the regular
way. This demonstrated the impossibility of main-
taining so long a line of road over which to draw
supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country.
I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign
into the interior with Columbus as a base, and re-
turned to La Grange and Grand Junction destroying
the road to my front and repairing the road to Mem-
phis, making the Mississippi River the line over
which to draw supplies. Pemberton was falling back
at the same time.
The moment I received the news of Van Dorn s
success I sent the cavalry at the front back to drive
him from the country. He had start enough to move
north destroying the railroad in many places, and to
attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to
the railroad. All these he found warned of his
coming and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn did
not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the
one at Holly Springs, which was larger than all the
others attacked by him put together. Murphy
was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made
no preparations to meet him. He did not even
notify his command.
Vol I.— 28,
434 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months
before, had evacuated luka on the approach of the
enemy. General Rosecrans denounced him for the
act and desired to have him tried and punished. I
sustained the colonel at the time because his com-
mand was a small one compared with that of the
enemy — not one-tenth as large — and I thought he
had done well to. get away without falling into their
hands. His leaving large stores to fall into Prices
possession I looked upon as an oversight and excused
it on the ground of inexperience in military mat-
ters. He should, however, have destroyed them.
This last surrender demonstrated to my mind that
Rosecrans* judgment of Murphy's conduct at luka
was correct. The surrender of Holly Springs was
most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty
of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed
to serve, or gross cowardice.
After the war was over I read from the diary of
a lady who accompanied General Pemberton in his
retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreat was
almost a panic. The roads were bad and it was
difficult to move the artillery and trains. Why there
should have been a panic I do not see. No ex-
pedition had yet started down the Mississippi River.
Had I known the demoralized condition of the
enemy, or the fact that central Mississippi abounded
so in all army supplies, I would have been in pursuit
COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD, 435
of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the
roads in my rear.
After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my
next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had,
under proper escort, to collect and bring in all
supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen
miles east and west of the road from our front
back to Grand Junction, leaving two months' supplies
for the families of those whose stores were taken. I
was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country
afforded. It showed that we could have subsisted
off the country for two months instead of two weeks
without going beyond the limits designated. This
taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of
later in the campaign when our army lived twenty
days with the issue of only five days' rations by the
commissary. Our loss of supplies was great at
Holly Springs, but it was more than compensated
for by those taken from the country and by the
lesson taught.
The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the
destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing
among the people remaining in Oxford. They came
with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense
joy, to ask what I was going to do now without any-
thing for my soldiers to eat. I told them that I was
not disturbed ; that I had already sent troops and wag-
ons to collect all the food and forage they could find
436 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
for fifteen miles on each side of the road. Countenan-
ces soon changed, and so did the inquiry. The next
was, ** What are we to do?" My response was that
we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own
northern resources while visiting them; but their
friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy
what we had brought along, and it could not be ex-
pected that men, with arms in their hands, would
starve in the midst of plenty. I advised them to
emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in
eating up what we left.
CHAPTER XXXI.
HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS — GENERAL
m'cLERNAND in command — ASSUMING COMMAND
AT young's point OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG
FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG — THE CANAL
LAKE PROVIDENCE — OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS.
THIS interruption in my communications north — I
was really cut off from communication with a
great part of my own command during this time —
resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before
McClernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the i8th
did not reach McClernand. Pem.berton got back to
Vicksburg before Sherman got there. The rebel
positions were on a bluff on the Yazoo River,
some miles above its mouth. The waters were high
so that the bottoms were generally overflowed,
leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between
points of debarkation and the high bluffs. These
were fortified and defended at all points. The
rebel position was impregnable against any force that
could be brought against its front. Sherman could
not use one- fourth of his force. His efforts to capt-
ure the city, or the high ground north of it, were
necessarily unavailing.
438 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF i\ S. GRANT,
Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had
no opportunity of communicating with him after the
destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on
the 20th. He did not know but what I was in the
rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a
new base of supplies for the troops with me. I had,
before he started from Memphis, directed him to take
with him a few small steamers suitable for the navi-
gation of the Yazoo, not knowing but that I might
want them to supply me after cutting loose from my
base at Grenada,
On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to
Holly Springs. The troops were drawn back grad-
ually, but without haste or confusion, finding supplies
abundant and no enemy following. The road was
not damaged south of Holly Springs by Van Dorn,
at least not to an extent to cause any delay. As I
had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and
to repair the road to that point, I remained at Holly
Springs until this work was completed.
On the loth of January, the work on the road from
Holly Springs to Grand Junction and thence to
Memphis being completed, I moved my headquarters
to the latter place. During the campaign here de-
scribed, the losses (mostly captures) were about
equal, crediting the rebels with their Holly Springs
capture, which they could not hold.
When Sherman started on his expedition down the
GENERAL M'CLERNAND IX COMMAND, 439
river he had 20,000 men. taken from Memphis, and
was reinforced by 12,000 more at Helena, Arkansas.
The troops on the west bank of the river had previ-
ously been assigned to my command. McClernand
having received the orders for his assignment reached
the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, and
immediately assumed command of all the troops with
Sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th,
and all of Sherman's, the 1 5th. Sherman, and Admi-
ral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the
Yazoo. After consultation they decided that neither
the army nor navy could render service to the cause
where they were, and learning that I had withdrawn
from the interior of Mississippi, they determined to
return to the Arkansas River and to attack Arkansas
Post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned by
about five or six thousand men. Sherman had learned
of the existence of this force through a man who had
been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded
with ammunition and other supplies intended for his
command. The man had made his escape. McCler-
nand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says.
No obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and
transports were within range of the fort. After three
days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made
by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of
the place, and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 1 7 guns. I
was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an
440 PEffSOXAL AfEMOI/^S OF t\ ^ GHAXT.
unnecessary side movement having no especial bear-
ing upon the work before us; but when the result
was understood I regarded it as very important
Five thousand Confederate troops left in the rear
might have caused us much trouble and loss of prop-
erty while navigating the Mississippi.
Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post
and the capture of the garrison, McClernand returned
with his entire force to Napoleon, at the mouth of the
Arkansas River. From here I received messages from
both Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come
and take command in person, and expressing their
distrust of McClernand's ability and fitness for so im-
portant and intricate an expedition.
On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command
at Napoleon. It was here made evident to me that
both the army and navy were so distrustful of McCler-
nand's fitness to command that, while they would do
all they could to insure success, this distrust was an
element of weakness. It would have been criminal
to send troops under these circumstances into such
danger. By this time I had received authority to re-
lieve McClernand, or to assign any person else to the
command of the river expedition, or to assume com-
mand in person. I felt great embarrassment about
McClernand. He was the senior major-general
after myself within the department. It would not do,
with his rank and ambition, to assign a junior over him.
ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUy(?S POINT. 44 1
Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the com-
mand myself. I would have been glad to put
Sherman in command, to give him an opportunity
to accomplish what he had failed in the December
before; but there seemed no other way out of the
difficulty, for he was junior to McClernand. Sher-
man's failure needs no apology.
On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with
the entire command, to Young's Point and Milliken s
Bend, while I returned to Memphis to make all the
necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind
me secure. General Hurlbut with the i6th corps
was left in command. The Memphis and Charleston
railroad w^s held, while the Mississippi Central was
given up. Columbus was the only point between
Cairo and Memphis, on the river, left with a garri-
son. All the troops and guns from the posts on the
abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front.
On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point
and assumed command the following day. General
McClernand took exception in a most characteristic
way — for him. His correspondence with me on the
subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a
protest. It was highly insubordinate, but I over-
looked it, as I believed, for the good of the service.
General McClernand was a politician of very consid-
erable prominence in his State ; he was a member of
Congress when the secession war broke out; he be-
442 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
longed to that political party which furnished all the
opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the
war for saving the Union ; there was no delay in his
declaring himself for the Union at all hazards, and
there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of
where he stood in the contest before the country. He
also gave up his seat in Congress to take the field in
defence of the principles he had proclaimed.
The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicks-
burg now began. The problem was to secure a foot-
ing upon dry ground on the east side of the river
from which the troops could operate against Vicks-
burg. The Mississippi River, from Cairo south, runs
through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width,
bound on the east by land running from eighty up to
two or more hundred feet above the river. On the
west side the highest land, except in a few places, is
but little above the highest water. Through this
valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way.
varying in direction to all points of the compass. At
places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. After
leaving Memphis, there are no such highlands coming
to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicks-
burg is reached.
The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled
from the river in high water — many of them navigable
for steamers. All of them would be, except for over-
han«:ine trees, narrowness and tortuous course, mak-
OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG, 443
ing it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of
any considerable length. Marching across this coun-
try in the face of an enemy was impossible ; navigat-
ing it proved equally impracticable. The strategical
way according to the rule, therefore, would have been
to go back to Memphis ; establish that as a base of
supplies ; fortify it so that the storehouses could be
held by a small garrison, and move from there
along the line of railroad, repairing as we ad-
vanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson, Mississippi.
At this time the North had become very much dis-
couraged. Many strong Union men believed that
the war must prove a failure. The elections of 1862
had gone against the party which was for the pros-
ecution of the war to save the Union if it took the
last man and the last dollar. Voluntary enlistments
had ceased throughout the greater part of the North,
and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks.
It was my judgment at the time that to make a back-
ward movement as long as that from Vicksburg to
Memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet
full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a
defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions
ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters
lost. There was nothing left to be done but to go
forward to a decisive victory. This was in my mind
from the moment I took command in person at Young's
Point
444 PERSOSAL yfEMOIRS OF V. ^ GRAXT.
The winter of 1862— 3 was a noted one for continuous
high water in the Mississippi and for heavy rains
along the lower river. To get dry land, or rather
land above the water, to encamp the troops upon,
took many miles of river front We had to occupy
the levees and the ground immediately behind. This
was so limited that one corps, the 1 7th, under Gen-
eral McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy
miles above Vicksburg.
It w*as in January the troops took their position
opposite Vicksburg. The water was very high and
the rains were incessant There seemed no possi-
bility of a land movement before the end of March
or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time.
The effect would be demoralizing to the troops and
injurious to their health. Friends in the North would
have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies
in the same section more and more insolent in their
gibes and denunciation of the cause and those en-
gaged in it
I always admired the South, as bad as I thought
their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced
all opposition and all croaking, by press or by individ-
uals, within their control. War at all times, whether
a civil war between sections of a common country or
between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with
honor. But, once entered into, it is too much for
human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks
FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG, 445
to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing
section or nation.
Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land
coming to the rivers edge, below that on which
Memphis stands. The bluff, or high land, follows
the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and
continues in a southerly direction to the Mississippi
River, thence it runs along the Mississippi to War-
renton, six miles below. The Yazoo River leaves the
high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and
empties into the Mississippi nine miles above Vicks-
burg. Vicksburg is built on this high land where
the Mississippi washes the base of the hill. Haines'
Bluff, eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo
River, was strongly fortified The whole distance
from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton
was also intrenched, with batteries at suitable dis-
tances and rifle-pits connecting them.
From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a
north-easterly direction to a point just above the city,
when it again turns and runs south-westerly, leaving
vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade,
exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the
city before they were in range of the upper batteries.
Since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what
was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. North
of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut
up with bayous, and much overflowed. A front at-
446 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT,
tack was therefore impossible, and was never contem-
plated ; certainly not by me. The problem then be-
came, how to secure a landing on high ground east of
the Mississippi without an apparent retreat Then com-
menced a series of experiments to consume time, and to
divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of
the public generally. I, myself, never felt great confi-
dence that any of the experiments resorted to would
prove successful. Nevertheless I was always pre-
pared to take advantage of them in case they did.
In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up
from New Orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve
feet wide and about as deep, straight across from
Young's Point to the river below. The distance
across was a little over a mile. It was Williams'
expectation that when the river rose it would cut a
navigable channel through ; but the canal started in
an eddy from both ends, and, of course, it only filled
up with water on the rise without doing any execu-
tion in the way of cutting. Mr. Lincoln had navi-
gated the Mississippi in his younger days and under-
stood well its tendency to change its channel, in
places, from time to time. He set much store ac-
cordingly by this canal. General McClernand had
been, therefore, directed before I went to Youngs
Point to push the work of widening and deepening
this canal. After my arrival the work was diligently
pushed with about 4,000 men — as many as could be
THE CANAL, 447
used to advantage — until interrupted by a sudden
rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end,
which had been put there to keep the water out until
the excavation was completed. This was on the 8th
of March.
Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as
to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of
much advantage to us. It runs in a direction almost
perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite
side, or east bank, of the river. As soon as the
enemy discovered what we were doing he estab-
lished a battery commanding the canal throughout
its length. This battery soon drove out our dredges,
two in number, which were doing the work of thou-
sands of men. Had the canal been completed it
might have proven of some use in running trans-
ports through, under the cover of night, to use below ;
but they would yet have to run batteries, though
for a much shorter distance.
While this work was progressing we were busy in
other directions, trying to find an avail?ble landing
on high ground on the east bank of the river, or to
make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the
batteries.
On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at
the front, I ordered General McPherson, stationed
with his corps at Lake Providence, to cut the levee
at that point. If successful in opening a channel for
448 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
navigation by this route, it would carry us to the
Mississippi Riverthrough the mouth of the Red River,
just above Port Hudson and four hundred miles below
Vicksburg by the river.
Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the
Mississippi, about a mile from the present channel.
It is six miles long and has its outlet through Bayou
Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and
•
Red Rivers. The last three are navigable streams at all
seasons. Bayous Baxter and Macon are narrow and
tortuous, and the banks are covered with dense forests
overhanging the channel. They were also filled
with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. The
land along the Mississippi River, from Memphis
down, is in all instances highest next to the river,
except where the river washes the bluffs which form
the boundary of the valley through which it winds.
Bayou Baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to
spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress
swamp before it reaches the Macon. There was
about two feet of water in this swamp at the time.
To get through it, even with vessels of the lightest
draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy
timber wide enough to make a passage way. As
the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom —
under water — it was an undertaking of great magni-
tude.
On the 4th of February I visited General Mc-
LAKE PROVIDENQE. 449
Pherson, and remained with him several days. The
work had not progressed so far as to admit the water
from the river into the lake, but the troops had
succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably
not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into
the lake. With this we were able to explore the
lake and bayou as far as cleared. I saw then that
there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming
a practicable route for moving troops through an
enemy's country. The distance from Lake Provi-
dence to the point where vessels going by that
route would enter the Mississippi again, is about four
hundred and seventy miles by the main river. The
distance would probably be greater by the tortuous
bayous through which this new route would carry
us. The enemy held Port Hudson, below where the
Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above
to Vicksburg. The Red River, Washita and Tensas
were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on
which the enemy could throw small bodies of men
to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops
with their sharpshooters. I let the work go on,
believing employment was better than idleness for
the men. Then, too, it served as a cover for other
efforts which gave a better prospect of success.
This work was abandoned after the canal proved a
failure.
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent
Vol. I. — 29
450 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
to Helena, Arkansas, to examine and open a way
through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible.
Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet
from the Mississippi River into Moon Lake, a mile
east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Pass
to Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie,
which joins the Yallabusha about two hundred and
fifty miles below Moon Lake and forms the Yazoo
River. These were formerly navigated by steamers
trading with the rich plantations along their banks;
but the State of Mississippi had built a strong levee
across the inlet some years before, leaving the only
entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by
way of the mouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of
miles below.
On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was
cut. The river being high the rush of water
through the cut was so great that in a very short
time the entire obstruction was washed away. The
bayous were soon filled and much of the country
was overflowed. This pass leaves the Mississippi
River but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th
General Ross, with his brigade of about 4,500 men
on transports, moved into this new water-way. The
rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass
and the Coldwater by felling trees into them. Much
of the timber in this region being of greater specific
gravity than water, and being of great size, their
OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS, 45 1
removal was a matter of great labor; but it was
finally accomplished, and on the nth of March Ross
found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under
the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson
Smith, confronting a fortification at Greenwood, where
the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha unite and the
Yazoo begins. The bends of the rivers are such at
this point as to almost form an island, scarcely above
water at that stage of the river. This island was
fortified and manned. It was named Fort Pemberton
after the commander at Vicksburg. No land ap-
proach was accessible. The troops, therefore, could
render no assistance towards an assault further than
to establish a battery on a little piece of ground
which was discovered above water. The gunboats,
however, attacked on the nth and again on the
13th of March. Both efforts were failures and
were not renewed. One gunboat was disabled
and we lost six men killed and twenty-five wounded.
The loss of the enemy was less.
Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that
it was thought that a rise of two feet would drive
the enemy out. In hope of enlisting the elements
on our side, which had been so much against us
up to this time, a second cut was made in the
Mississippi levee, this time directly opposite Helena,
or six miles above the former cut. It did not
accomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his
452 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
fleet, started back. On the 2 2d he met Quinby
with a brigade at Yazoo Pass. Quinby was the
senior of Ross, and assumed command. He was not
satisfied with returning to his former position without
seeing for himself whether anything could be accom-
plished. Accordingly Fort Pemberton was revisited
by our troops ; but an inspection was sufficient this
time without an attack. Quinby, with his command,
returned with but little delay. In the meantime I was
much exercised for the safety of Ross, not knowing
that Quinby had been able to join him. Reinforce-
ments were of no use in a country covered with water,
as they would have to remain on board of their trans-
ports. Relief had to come from another quarter. So
I determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pem-
berton.
Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River be-
tween Haines' Bluff and its mouth. It is narrow,
very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy growth
of timber, but it is deep. It approaches to within one
mile of the Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles
above Young's Point. Steel's Bayou connects with
Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek, Deer
Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big
Sunflower River, and the Big Sunflower with the
Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines' Bluff in
a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles
by the winding of the river. All these waterways
OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS. 453
are of about the same nature so far as navigation is
concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; this af-
fords free navigation.
Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as
Deer Creek on the 14th of March, and reported it
navigable. On the next day he started with five
gunboats and four mortar-boats. I went with him
for some distance. The heavy, overhanging timber
retarded progress very much, as did also the
short turns in so narrow a stream. The gunboats,
however, ploughed their way through without other
damage than to their appearance. The transports
did not fare so well although they followed behind.
The road was somewhat cleared for them by the
gunboats. In the evening I returned to headquarters
to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went in per-
son on the 1 6th, taking with him Stuart's division of
the 15th corps. They took large river transports to
Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, where they debarked
and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where they re-
embarked on the transports. The river steamers, with
their tall smoke-stacks and light guards extending
out, were so much impeded that the gunboats got far
ahead. Porter, with his fleet, got within a few hun-
dred yards of where the sailing would have been
clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling
trees into the water, when he encountered rebel
sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by
454 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
obstructions in his front. He could do noth-
ing with gunboats against sharp-shooters. The
rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000
men — many more than there were sailors in the
fleet
Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral,
to clear out Black Bayou and to hurry up reinforce-
ments, which were far behind. On the night of the
19th he received notice from the admiral that he had
been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in immi-
nent peril. Sherman at once returned through Black
Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a
steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had,
coming up. They tried to force their way through
Black Bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow
and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on
foot It was night when they landed, and intensely
dark. There was but a narrow strip of land above
water, and that was grown up with underbrush or
cane. The troops lighted their way through this
with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a
half, when they came to an open plantation. Here
the troops rested until morning. They made twenty-
one miles from this resting-place by noon the next
day, and were in time to rescue the fleet Porter
had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats
rather than have them fall into the hands of the
enemy. More welcome visitors he probably never
OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS. 455
met than the **boys in blue ** on this occasion. The
vessels were backed out and returned to their ren-
dezvous on the Mississippi; and thus ended in
failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of Vicks-
burg.
CHAPTER XXXII.
THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI CRITICISMS OF
THE NORTHERN PRESS — RUNNING THE BATTERIES-
LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA — DISPOSITION OF THE
TROOPS.
THE original canal scheme was also abandoned
on the 27th of March. The effort to make a
waterway through Lake Providence and the connect-
ing bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable
about the same time.
At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point,
bayous or channels start, which connecting with
other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enter the
Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles
above Grand Gulf. The Mississippi levee cuts the
supply of water off from these bayous or channels,
but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these points,
is carried through these same channels to the river
below. In case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the
water escaping would find its^ outlet through the
same channels. The dredges and laborers from the
canal having been driven out by overflow and the
enemy's batteries, I determined to open these other
THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 457
channels, if possible. If successful the effort would
afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for
our transports. There was a good road back of the
levees, along these bayous, to carry the troops, artil-
lery and wagon trains over whenever the water re-
ceded a little, and after a few days of dry weather.
Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other
plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this
new one was undertaken.
As early as the 4th of February I had written to
Halleck about this route, stating that I thought it
much more practicable than the other undertaking
(the Lake Providence route), and that it would have
been accomplished with much less labor if commenced
before the water had got all over the country.
The upper end of these bayous being cut off from
a water supply, further than the rainfall back of the
levees, was grown up with dense timber for a dis-
tance of several miles from their source. It was
necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in
the water from the river. This work was continued
until the waters of the river began to recede and the
road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the
water. One small steamer and some barges were
got through this channel, but no further use could be
made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond
this it was no more successful than the other experi-
ments with which the winter was whiled away. AH
458 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
these failures would have been very discouraging if I
had expected much from the efforts ; but I had not
From the first the most I hoped to accomplish was
the passage of transports, to be used below Vicks-
burg, without exposure to the long line of batteries
defending that city.
This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous
rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one
of great hardship to all engaged about Vicksburg.
The river was higher than its natural banks from
December, 1862, to the following April. The war
had suspended peaceful pursuits in the South, further
than the production of army supplies, and in conse-
quence the levees were neglected and broken in
many places and the whole country was covered with
water. Troops could scarcely find dry ground on
which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out
among the men. Measles and small-pox also at-
tacked them. The hospital arrangements and medi-
cal attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss
of life was much less than might have been expected.
Visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories
to relate ; Northern papers came back to the soldiers
with these stories exaggerated. Because I would not
divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced
me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in
an emergency, and clamored for my removal. They
were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my sim-
CRITICISMS OF THE NORTHERN PRESS 459
pie removal, but named who my successor should be.
McClernand, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were
all mentioned in this connection. I took no steps to
answer these complaints, but continued to do my
duty, as I understood it, to the best of my ability.
Every one has his superstitions. One of mine is that
in positions of great responsibility every one should
do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned
by competent authority, without application or the use
of influence to change his position. While at Cairo
I had watched with very great interest the opera-
tions of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that
as the main field of the war. I had no idea, myself,
of ever having any large command, nor did I suppose
that I was equal to one ; but I had the vanity to think
that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well in
the command of a brigade. On one occasion, in
talking about this to my staff officers, all of whom
were civilians without any military education what-
ever, I said that I would give anything if I were com-
manding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the
Potomac and I believed I could do some good. Cap-
tain Hillyer spoke up and suggested that I make
application to be transferred there to command the
cavalry. I then told him that I would cut my right
arm off first, and mentioned this superstition.
In time of war the President, being by the Consti-
tution Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy,
460 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
IS responsible for the selection of commanders. He
should not be embarrassed in making his selections.
I having been selected, my responsibility ended with
my doing the best I knew how. If I had sought the
place, or obtained it through personal or political in-
fluence, my belief is that I would have feared to
undertake any plan of my own conception, and would
probably have awaited direct orders from my distant
superiors. Persons obtaining important commands
by application or political influence are apt to keep a
written record of complaints and predictions of defeat,
which are shown in case of disaster. Somebody
must be responsible for their failures.
With all the pressure brought to bear upon them,
both President Lincoln and General Halleck stood by
me to the end of the campaign. I had never met Mr.
Lincoln, but his support was constant
At last the waters began to recede ; the roads cross-
ing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous,
were emerging from the waters ; the troops were all
concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bend
preparatory to a final move which was to crown the
long, tedious and discouraging labors with success.
I had had in contemplation the whole winter the
movement by land to a point below Vicksburg from
which to operate, subject only to the possible but not
expected success of some one of the expedients re-
sorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base.
RUNNING THE BATTERIES, 46 1
This could not be undertaken until the waters receded.
I did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an
officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make
preparations for the start. My recollection is that
Admiral Porter was the first one to whom I mentioned
it The co-operation of the navy was absolutely es-
sential to the success (even to the contemplation) of
such an enterprise. I had no more authority to com-
mand Porter than he had to command me. It was
necessary to have part of his fleet below Vicksburg if
the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries
were also essential. The navy was the only escort
and protection for these steamers, all of which in get-
ting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries.
Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that
he had better superintend the preparation of the
steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would
probably understand the work better than soldiers.
I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because
I admitted his argument, but because it would enable
me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs.
Porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above
the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the
enemy by the dense forests that intervened. Even
spies could not get near him, on account of the under-
growth and overflowed lands. Suspicions of some
mysterious movements were aroused. Our river
guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly
462 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
and mysteriously up the river near the east shore,
from the direction of Vicksburg, towards the fleet On
overhauling the boat they found a small white flag,
not much larger than a handkerchief, set up in the
stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of
discovery. The boat, crew and passengers were
brought ashore to me. The chief personage aboard
proved to be Jacob Thompson, Secretary of the In-
terior under the administration of President Buchanan.
After a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more
I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to
return to Vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that
there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of
Mr. Thompson and his flag.
Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of
the steamers for their hazardous passage of the ene-
my's batteries. The great essential was to protect
the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the
fires under the boilers from view. This he accom-
plished by loading the steamers, between the guards
and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above,
with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of
the boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain.
The hay and grain would be wanted below, and could
not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy
roads over which we expected to march.
Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis
and Chicago, yawls and barges to be used as ferries
RUNNING THE BATTERIES. 463
when we got below. By the i6th of April Porter
was ready to start on his perilous trip. The advance,
flagship Benton, Porter commanding, started at ten
o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes
by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, the Price^
lashed to her side, the Louisville, Motmd City^ Pitts-
burgh and Carondelet — all of these being naval ves-
sels. Next came the transports — Forest Queen, Sil-
ver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loaded
with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and trans-
port steamers when below the batteries. The gun-
boat Tuscumbia brought up the rear. Soon after the
start a battery between Vicksburg and Warren ton
opened fire across the intervening peninsula, followed
by the upper batteries, and then by batteries all along
the line. The gunboats ran up close under the bluffs,
delivering their fire in return at short distances,
probably without much effect. They were under fire
for more than two hours and every vessel was struck
many times, but with little damage to the gunboats.
The transports did not fare so well. The Henry Clay
was disabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after
a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers,
set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's
edge. The burning mass, however, floated down to
Carthage before grounding, as did also one of the
barges in tow.
The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for
464 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
they were ready to light up the river by means of
bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the
point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side.
The sight was magnificent, but terrible. I witnessed
it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the
middle of the river and as low down as it was pru-
dent to go. My mind was much relieved when I
learned that no one on the transports had been
killed and but few, if any, wounded. During the
running of the batteries men were stationed in the
holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton
shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. All
damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direc-
tion of Admiral Porter.
The experiment of passing batteries had been tried
before this, however, during the war. Admiral Far-
ragut had run the batteries at Port Hudson with
the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited
me from below Vicksburg. The 13th of February
Admiral Porter had sent the gunboat Indianola,
Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding,
below. She met Colonel Ellet of the Marine brigade
below Natchez on a captured steamer. Two of the
ColoneFs fleet had previously run the batteries, produc-
ing the greatest consternation among the people along
the Mississippi from Vicksburg* to the Red River.
* Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate battery on the Red
River two days before with one of his boats, the De Soto, Running aground.
loss df" THE JNDIANOLA, 465
The Indianola remained about the mouth of the
Red River some days, and then started up the Mis-
sissippi. The Confederates soon raised the Queen of
the West* and repaired her. With this vessel and
the ram Webby which they had had for some time in
the Red River, and two other steamers, they followed
the Indiafwla. The latter was encumbered with
barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make
but little speed against the rapid current of the Mis-
sissippi. The Confederate fleet overtook her just
above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on
the 24th of February. The Indianola was superior
to all the others in armament, and probably would
have destroyed them or driven them away, but for
her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for
an hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven
or eight times by the ram and other vessels, and was
finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition.
The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel
run ashore. Officers and crew then surrendered.
I had started McClernand with his corps of four
divisions on the 29th of March, by way of Richmond,
he was obliged to abandon his vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to
her and blew her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.
With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the New Era, and
succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf and reaching the vicinity of
Vicksburg.
* One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on February
the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.
Vol. X. — 30
466 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that he might
capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the
troops could get there ; but the roads were very bad,
scarcely above water yet Some miles from New
Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in
several places, overflowing the roads for the distance
of two miles. Boats were collected from the sur-
rounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport
the troops across the overflowed interval. By the
6th of April McClernand had reached New Carthage
with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried
through the woods by these boats. On the 1 7th I
visited New Carthage in person, and saw that the
process of getting troops through in the way we
were doing was so tedious that a better method must
be devised. The water was falling, and in a few
days there would not be depth enough to use boats ;
nor would the land be dry enough to march over.
McClernand had already found a new route from
Smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred, to
Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below New
Carthage. This increased the march from Milliken's
Bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. Four
bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them
each over six hundred feet long, making about two
thousand feet of bridging in all. The river falling
made the current in these bayous very rapid, increas-
468 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
ing the difficulty of building and permanently fasten-
ing these bridges; but the ingenuity of the " Yankee
soldier " was equal to any emergency. The bridges
were soon built of such material as could be found
near by, and so substantial were they that not a
single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with
artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss
of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). This, if
my memory serves me correctly, broke through the
only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across
the peninsula. These bridges were all built by
McClernand's command, under the supervision of
Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps.
I returned to Milliken's Bend on the i8th or 19th,
and on the 20th issued the following final order for
the movement of troops :
Headquarters Department of the Tennessee,
MiLLiKEN*s Bend, Lx>uisiana,
April 20, 1863.
Special Orders, No. no.
*******
VIII. The following orders are published for the information
and guidance of the " Array in the Field," in its present move-
ment to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi
River, from which Vicksburg can be approached by practicable
roads.
First. — The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A.
McClemand commanding, will constitute the right wing.
Second. — The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sher-
man commanding, will constitute the left wing.
DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS. 469
Third. — The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B.
McPherson commanding, will constitute the centre.
Fourth, — The order of march to New Carthage will be from
right to left.
Fifth, — Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army
corps ; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as neces-
sity may require. When the reserve is formed by divisions, each
division will remain under the immediate command of its respect-
ive corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a
particular emergency.
Sixth. — Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facili-
ties can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage.
Seventh. — In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to
each company for the protection of rations from rain ; one wall
tent for each regimental headquarters ; one wall tent for each
brigade headquarters ; and one wall tent for each division head-
quarters ; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their
respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such
tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number
allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O., series of 1862.
Eighth. — All the teams of the three army corps, under the im-
mediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns,
will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the
authorized camp equipage of the army.
Ninth, — As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the
Seventeenth army corps will take its place ; and it, in turn, will
be followed in like manner by the Fifteenth army coq^s.
Tenth, — Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed
by corps commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New
Carthage.
Eleventh, — General hospitals will be established by the medical
director, between Duckport and Milliken's Bend. All sick and
disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in charge
470 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for
duty. Each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good
drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents
of their respective corps ; officers so detailed will organize the
men under their charge into squads and companies, without re-
gard to the regiments they belong to ; and in the absence of con-
valescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint
non-commissioned officers or privates. The force so organized
will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to Milliken's
Bend. They will furnish all the guards and details required for
general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the
camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats.
Twelfth. — The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to
New Carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation
of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ord-
nance, required by previous orders.
Thirteenth. — Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect
all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line
of march ; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles
useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and
searching houses without proper orders from division command-
ers, are positively prohibited. All such irregularities must be
summarily punished.
Fourteenth. — Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to
the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the
line from here to New Carthage. His particular attention is called
to General Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Wash-
ington, of date March 20, 1863.
By order of
Major-General U. S. GRANT.
McClernand was already below on the Mississippi.
Two of McPherson s divisions were put upon the
DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS. 47 1
march immediately. The third had not yet arrived
from Lake Providence ; it was on its way to Milliken's
Bend and was to follow on arrival.
Sherman was to follow McPherson. Two of his
divisions were at Duckport and Young's Point, and
the third under Steele was under orders to return
from Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent
to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our
transports.
It had now become evident that the army could
not be rationed by a wagon train over the single
narrow and almost impassable road between Milli-
ken's Bend and Perkins* plantation. Accordingly
six more steamers were pro'tected as before, to run
the batteries, and were loaded with supplies. They
took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations.
On the night of the 22d of April they ran the bat-
teries, five getting through more or less disabled
while one was sunk. About half the barges got
through with their needed freight.
When it was first proposed to run the blockade at
Vicksburg with river steamers there were but two
captains or masters who were willing to accompany
their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were
called for from the army, men who had had expe-
rience in any capacity in navigating the western
rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and
deck-hands enough presented themselves to take fivQ
472 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
times the number of vessels we were moving through
this dangerous ordeal. Most of them were from
Logan's division, composed generally of men from
the southern part of Illinois and from Missouri.
All but two of the steamers were commanded by
volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned.
In this instance, as in all others during the war, I
found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and
among the commissioned officers to meet every call
for aid whether mechanical or professional. Colonel
W. S. Oliver was master of transportation on this
occasion by special detail.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
ATTACK ON GRAND GULF — OPERATIONS BELOW
VICKSBURG.
ON the 24th my headquarters were with the ad-
vance at Perkins* plantation. Reconnoissances
were made in boats to ascertain whether there was
high land on the east shore of the river where we
might land above Grand Gulf. There was none prac-
ticable. Accordingly the troops were set in motion for
Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down the river
and nearly opposite Grand Gulf. The loss of two
steamers and six barges reduced our transportation
so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water.
Some of the steamers that had got below were in-
jured in their machinery, so that they were only use-
ful as barges towed by those less severely injured.
All the troops, therefore, except what could be trans-
ported in one trip, had to march. The road lay west
of Lake St. Joseph. Three large bayous had to be
crossed. They were rapidly bridged in the same
manner as those previously encountered.
Note. — On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of Illinois, happened to
be on a visit to the army, and accompanied me to Carthiige. I furnished an
ambulance for his use and that of some of the State officers who accompanied
him.
474 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard
Times, and McPherson's was following closely. I
had determined to make the attempt to effect a
landing on the east side of the river as soon as pos-
sible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th,
McClemand was directed to embark all the troops
from his corps that our transports and barges could
carry. About 1 0,000 men were so embarked. The
plan was to have the navy silence the guns at Grand
Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to
debark in the shortest possible time under cover of
the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm.
The following order was issued :
(
Perkins' Plantation, La.,
Apfil 27, 1863.
Major-General J. A. McClernand,
Commanding 13th A. C.
Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so
much of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard the
artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage,
except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places ^-
signed, to be moved at a moment's warning.
All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain
behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you
see, by special orders of this date, General McPherson is ordered
to send one division.
The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence
all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps \*'ill be on the
river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land be-
low the promontory first brought to view passing down the river.
ATTACK ON GRAND GULF, 475
Once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to
form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take posses-
sion of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your
command so that it cannot support itself. The first object is to
get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until
such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a
forward movement.
Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position
indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such
troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are
silenced.
It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the
city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to
run past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney. In case this should
prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed,
when the transports are to start with this view. Or, it may be
expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. In this
case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where
the men could land and move by forced marches to below Grand
Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There
will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the
transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf ;
one, that the transports can run by without the troops ; and the
last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board.
Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be
left to run the blockade.
If not already directed, require your men to keep three days*
rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement
commences. U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
At 8 o'clock A.M., 29th, Porter made the attack
with his entire strength present, eight gunboats.
476 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
For nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept
up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. All
this time McClemand's io,cxx) men were huddled
together on the transports in the stream ready to
attempt a landing if signalled I occupied a tug
from which I could see the eflfect of the battle on
both sides, within range of the enemy's guns ; but a
small tug, without armament, was not calculated to
attract the fire of batteries while they were being
assailed themselves. About half-past one the fleet
withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavail-
ing. The enemy ceased firing as soon as we with-
drew. I immediately signalled the Admiral and went
aboard his ship. The navy lost in this engagement
eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. A large pro-
portion of these were of the crew of the flagship,
and most of those from a single shell which pene-
trated the ship's side and exploded between decks
where the men were working their guns. The sight
of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as
I boarded the ship was sickening.
Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs
at the very foot of it. It is as defensible upon its
front as Vicksburg and, at that time, would have
been just as impossible to capture by a front attack.
I therefore requested Porter to run the batteries with
his fleet that night, and to take charge of the trans-
ports, all of which would be wanted below.
ATTACK ON GRAND Gl/LF. 477
There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana
side extending towards Grand Gulf, made by the river
running nearly east from about three miles above
and nearly in the opposite direction from that point
for about the same distance below. The land was
so low and wet that it would not have been practica-
ble to march an army across but for a levee. I had
had this explored before, as well as the east bank
below to ascertain if there was a possible point of
debarkation north of Rodney. It was found that
the top of the levee afforded a good road to march
upon.
Porter, as was always the case with him, not only
acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his
entire fleet as transports. I had intended to make
this request, but he anticipated me. At dusk, when
concealed from the view of the enemy at Grand
Gulf, McClernand landed his command on the
west bank. The navy and transports ran the bat-
teries successfully. The troops marched across the
point of land under cover of night, unobserved. By
the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet,
iron-clads, gunboats, river steamers and barges,
quietly moving down the river three miles below
them, black, or rather blue, with National troops.
When the troops debarked, the evening of the
29th, it was expected that we would have to go to
Rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing ;
478 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
but that night a colored man came in who informed
me that a good landing would be found at Bruins-
burg, a few miles above Rodney, from which point
there was a good road leading to Port Gibson some
twelve miles in the interior. The information was
found correct, and our landing was effected without
opposition.
Sherman had not left his position above Vicks-
burg yet. On the morning of the 27th I ordered
him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the
Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff.
My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as
much force about Vicksburg as I could, until I could
secure a good footing on high land east of the river.
The move was eminently successful and, as we
afterwards learned, created great confusion about
Vicksburg and doubts about our real design. Sher-
man moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf,
the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and
eight gunboats which Porter had left above Vicks-
burg.
He debarked his troops and apparently made
every preparation to attack the enemy while the
navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff.
This move was made without a single casualty in
either branch of the service. On the first of May
Sherman received orders from me (sent from Hard
Times the evening of the 29th of April) to with-
480 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (J, S. CRANT,
draw from the front of Haines' Bluff and follow Mc-
Pherson with two divisions as fast as he could.
I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins
plantation. Now that all our gunboats were below
Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit
out boats in the Big Black with improvised arma-
ment and attempt to destroy these supplies. Mc-
Pherson was at Hard Times with a portion of his
corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his
command. The night of the 29th I directed him to
arm one of the transports with artillery and send it
up to Perkins' plantation as a guard ; and also to
have the siege guns we had brought along moved
there and put in position.
The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at
De Shroon's, Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg.
Mississippi. Early on the morning of 30th of April
McClernands corps and one division of McPherson's
corps were speedily landed.
When this was effected I felt a degree of relief
scarcely ever equalled since. Vicksburg was not yet
taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized bv
any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy's
country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicks-
burg between me and my base of supplies. But I was
on dry ground on the same side of the river with the
enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships and
exposures from the month of December previous to
OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG, 48 1
this time that had been made and endured, were for
the accomplishment of this one object.
I had with me the 1 3th corps, General McClernand
commanding, and two brigades of Logan s division
of the 17th corps, General McPherson commanding —
in all not more than twenty thousand men to com-
mence the campaign with. These were soon re-
inforced by the remaining brigade of Logan's divis-
ion and Crocker's division of the 17th corps. On
the 7th of May I was further reinforced by Sherman
with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. My total
force was then about thirty-three thousand men.
The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff
and Jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand
men. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg and is
connected with it by a railroad. My first problem
was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base.
Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The
bottom at that point is higher than most of the low
land in the valley of the Mississippi, and a good
road leads to the bluff. It was natural to expect
the garrison from Grand Gulf to come out to meet
us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this
solid base. Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just
above Bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream
and was high at the time, in order to intercept us
they had to go by Port Gibson, the nearest point
where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more
Vol. I.— 31
482 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
than doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the
high land back of Bruinsburg. No time was to be
lost in securing this foothold. Our transportation
was not sufficient to move all the army across the
river at one trip, or even two ; but the landing of
the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was
eflfected during the day, April 30th, and early even-
ing. McClemand was advanced as soon as ammu-
nition and two days' rations (to last five) could be
issued to his men. The bluffs were reached an hour
before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hop-
ing to reach Port Gibson and save the bridge span-
ning the Bayou Pierre before the enemy could get
there ; for crossing a stream in the presence of an
enemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the
starting point of roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburgand
Jackson.
McClernand's advance met the enemy about five
miles west of Port Gibson at Thompsons planta-
tion. There was some firing during the night, but
nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until day-
light. The enemy had taken a strong natural posi-
tion with most of the Grand Gulf garrison, number-
ing about seven or eight thousand men, under
General Bowen. His hope was to hold me in check
until reinforcements under Loring could reach him
from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to
render much assistance south of Port Gibson. Two
OPERATIONS BELOW VtCKSBURG. 483
brigades of McPherson's corps followed McClernand
as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued,
and were ready to take position upon the battle-
field whenever the 13th corps could be got out of
the way.
The country in this part of Mississippi stands on
edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges
except when they occasionally pass from one ridge
to another. Where there are no clearings the sides
of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of
timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are
filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetra-
ble. This makes it easy for an inferior force to de-
lay, if not defeat, a far superior one.
Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the
road to Port Gibson divides, taking two ridges which
do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest
point. These roads unite just outside the town.
This made it necessary for McClernand to divide his
force. It was not only divided, but it was separated
by a deep ravine of the character above described.
One flank could not reinforce the other except
by marching back to the junction of the roads.
McClernand put the divisions of Hovey, Carr and
A. J. Smith upon the light-hand branch and Oster-
haus on the left. I was on the field by ten a.m., and
inspected both flanks in person. On the right the
enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not
484 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
repulsing our advance. On the left, however, Oster-
haus was not faring so well. He had been repulsed
with some loss. As soon as the road could be
cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPher-
son, who was close upon the rear of the 1 3th corps,
with two brigades of Logan's division. This was
about noon. I ordered him to send one brigade
(General John E. Smith s was selected) to support
Osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the
enemy out of his position. This movement carried
the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and,
when Smith's troops were seen well through the
ravine, Osterhaus was directed to renew his front
attack. It was successful and unattended by heavy
loss. The enemy was sent in full retreat on their
right, and their left followed before sunset While
the movement to our left was going on, McClernand,
who was with his right flank, sent me frequent re-
quests for reinforcements, although the force with
him was not being pressed. I had been upon the
ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging
all the men he had. We followed up our victory
until night overtook us about two miles from Port
Gibson ; then the troops went into bivouac for the
night.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON — GRIERSON's RAID — OCCU-
PATION OF GRAND GULF — MOVEMENT UP THE
BIG BLACK BATTLE OF RAYMOND.
WE Started next morning for Port Gibson as
soon as it was light enough to see the road.
We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to
find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our
crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned.
The troops were set to work at once to construct a
bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre.
At this time the water was high and the current
rapid. What might be called a raft-bridge was soon
constructed from material obtained from wooden
buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for
carrying the whole army over safely. Colonel J. H.
Wilson, a member of my staff, planned and super-
intended the construction of this bridge, going into
the water and working as hard as any one engaged.
Officers and men generally joined in this work.
When it was finished the army crossed and marched
eight miles beyond to the North Fork that day.
One brigade of Logan's division was sent down the
stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery,
486 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
which had been left behind with infantry supports
to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge.
Two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find
a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair the
bridge there. The enemy soon left when he found
we were building a bridge elsewhere. Before leav-
ing Port Gibson we were reinforced by Crocker's
division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the
Mississippi at Bruinsburg and come up without
stopping except to get two days' rations. McPher-
son still had one division west of the Mississippi
River, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to
the river below until Sherman's command should
relieve it.
On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son
Frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before,
on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to
get away without him until after Grand Gulf should
fall into our hands ; but on waking up he learned
that I had gone, and being guided by the sound of
the battle raging at Thompson's Hill — called the
Battle of Port Gibson — found his way to where I
was. He had no horse to ride at the time, and I had
no facilities for even preparing a meal. He, there-
fore, foraged around the best he could until we
reached Grand Gulf. Mr. C. A. Dana, then an of-
ficer of the War Department, accompanied me on
the Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of
CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON. 487
the siege. He was in the same situation as Fred so
far as transportation and mess arrangements were
concerned. The first time I call to mind seeing
either of them, after the battle, they were mounted
on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each
equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles.
Our trains arrived a few days later, after which
we were all perfectly equipped.
My son accompanied me throughout the campaign
and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to
his mother, who was at home. He looked out for
himself and was in every battle of the campaign.
His age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take
in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that
would not be possible in more mature years.
When the movement from Bruinsburg com-
menced we were without a wagon train. The train
still west of the Mississippi was carried around with
proper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's
Bend to Hard Times seventy or more miles below,
and did not get up for some days after the battle of
Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' trans-
portation, servants, mess chest, and everything ex-
cept what I had on, was with this train. General A.
J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruins-
burg which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without
upholstering further than stirrups. I had no other
for nearly a week.
488 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
It was necessary to have transportation for ammu-
nition. Provisions could be taken from the country ;
but all the ammunition that can be carried on the
person is soon exhausted when there is much fight-
ing. I directed, therefore, immediately on landing
that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether
horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be col-
lected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition.
Quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a
motley train it was. In it could be found fine car-
riages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of car-
tridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn
by mules with plough-harness, straw collars, rope-lines,
etc. ; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carr^'ing
cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that
could be found in the way of transportation on a
plantation, either for use or pleasure. The making
out of provision returns was stopped for the time.
No formalities were to retard our progress until a
position was secured when the time could be spared
to observe them.
It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a
Southern paper of the complete success of Colonel
Grierson, who was making a raid through central
Mississippi. He had started from La Grange April
17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. On
the 2ist he had detached Colonel Hatch with one
regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus
GRIERSON'S RAID, 489
and Macon and then return to La Grange. Hatch
had a sharp fight with the enemy at Columbus and
retreated along the railroad, destroying it at Okalona
and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26.
Grierson continued his movement with about 1,000
men, breaking the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad
and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving
at Baton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great im-
portance, for Grierson had attracted the attention of
the enemy from the main movement against Vicks-
burg.
During the night of the 2d of May the bridge
over the North Fork was repaired, and the troops
commenced crossing at five the next morning. Before
the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by
the enemy from a commanding position ; but they
were soon driven ofT. It was evident that the enemy
was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg.
Every commanding position from this (Grindstone)
crossing to Hankinson's ferry over the Big Black
was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our prog-
ress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's
ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a
detachment of his command across and several miles
north on the road to Vicksburg. When the junction
of the road going to Vicksburg with the road from
Grand Gulf to Raymond and Jackson was reached,
Logan with his division was turned to the left to-
490 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
wards Grand Gulf. I went with him a short distance
from this junction. McPherson had encountered the
largest force yet met since the battle of Port Gib-
son and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle ;
but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come
up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave
way. McPherson was ordered to hold Hankinson's
ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with
one division ; McClernand, who was now in the rear,
was to join in this as well as to guard the line
back down the bayou. I did not want to take
the chances of having an enemy lurking in our
rear.
On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf,
where the road comes into the one from Vicksburg
to the same place six or seven miles out, I learned
that the last of the enemy had retreated past that
place on their way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to
make the proper disposition of his troops for the
night, while I rode into the town with an escort of
about twenty cavalry. Admiral Porter had already
arrived with his fleet. The enemy had abandoned
his heavy guns and evacuated the place.
When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not
been with my baggage since the 27th of April and
consequently had had no change of underclothing,
no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at
other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The
OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF. 491
first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh
underclothing from one of the naval officers and get
a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters
to the general-in-chief informing him of our present
position, dispatches to be telegraphed from Cairo,
orders to General Sullivan commanding above Vicks-
burg. and gave orders to all my corps commanders.
About twelve o'clock at night I was through my work
and started for Hankinson's ferry, arriving there
before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard from
Banks, who was on the Red River, and who said
that he could not be at Port Hudson before the loth
of May and then with only 15,000 men. Up to this
time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf,
as a base of supplies, detach McClernand's corps to
Banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of
Port Hudson.
The news from Banks forced upon me a different
plan of campaign from the one intended. To wait
for his co-operation would have detained me at
least a month. The reinforcements would not have
reached ten thousand men after deducting casual-
ties and necessary river guards at all high points
close to the river for over three hundred miles. The
enemy would have strengthened his position and
been reinforced by more men than Banks could have
brought. I therefore determined to move independ-
ently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the
492 PERSOI^AL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
rebel force in rear of Vicksburg and invest or capt-
ture the city.
Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base
and the authorities at Washington were notified. I
knew well that Halleck's caution would lead him to
disapprove of this course ; but it was the only one
that gave any chance of success. The time it would
take to communicate with Washington and get a
reply would be so great that I could not be inter-
fered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan
was practicable. Even Sherman, who afterwards
ignored bases of supplies other than what were
afforded by the country while marching through four
States of the Confederacy with an army more than
twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from
Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility
of supplying our army over a single road. He urged
me to **stop all troops till your army is partially
supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as pos-
sible ; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life."
To this I replied : *' I do not calculate upon the pos-
sibility of supplying the army with full rations from
Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without
constructing additional roads. What I do expect is
to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt
we can, and make the country furnish the balance."
We started from Bruinsburg with an average of
about two days rations, and received no more from
OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF. 493
our own supplies for some days ; abundance was
found in the mean time. A delay would give the
enemy time to reinforce and fortify.
McClernand's and McPherson's commands were
kept substantially as they were on the night of the
2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three
days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry
and forage were found in abundance. Quite a quan-
tity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the
country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained
in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plan-
tation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by
mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their
slaves. All these were kept nmning while we were
stopping, day and night, and when we were march-
ing, during the night, at all plantations covered by
the troops. But the product was taken by the troops
nearest by, so that the majority of the command was
destined to go without bread until a new base was
established on the Yazoo above Vicksburg.
While the troops were awaiting the arrival of ra-
tions I ordered reconnoissances made by McClernand
and McPherson, with the view of leading the enemy
to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black
and attack the city at once.
On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and
crossed his command that night and the next day.
Three days' rations had been brought up from Grand
494 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. Or-
ders were given for a forward movement the next
day. Sherman was directed to order up Blair, who
had been left behind to guard the road from Milli-
ken's Bend to Hard Times with two brigades.
The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered
to send two hundred wagons with Blair, and the
commissary was to load them with hard bread, cof-
fee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of
salt meat.
On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Mem-
phis, was ordered to send four regiments from his
command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's divis-
ion, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's
division in addition, the latter to join the army in
the field. The four regiments were to be taken
from troops near the river so that there would be
no delay.
During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in
his troops north of the Big Black and was off at
an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky
Springs, Utica and Raymond. That night he
and McClernand were both at Rocky Springs ten
miles from Hankinson's ferry. McPherson remained
there during the 8th, while McClernand moved
to Big Sandy and Sherman marched from Grand
Gulf to Hankinson's ferry. The 8th. McPherson
moved to a point within a few miles west of Utica;
MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK. 495
McClernand and Sherman remained where they were.
On the loth McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman
to Big Sandy ; McClernand was still at Big Sandy.
The I ith, McClernand was at Five Mile Creek ; Sher-
man at Auburn ; McPherson five miles advanced
from Utica. May T2th, McClernand was at Fourteen
Mile Creek ; Sherman at Fourteen Mile Creek ; Mc-
Pherson at Raymond after a battle.
After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Han-
kinson's ferry Vicksburg could have been approach-
ed and besieged by the south side. It is not prob-
able, however, that Pemberton would have permit-
ted a close besiegement. The broken nature of the
ground would have enabled him to hold a strong de-
fensible line from the river south of the city to the
Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back
to that point. It was my plan, therefore, to get to the
railroad east of Vicksburg, and approach from that
direction. Accordingly, McPherson's troops that
had crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the
movement east to Jackson commenced.
As has been stated before, the country is very
much broken and the roads generally confined to
the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one
(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach desig-
nated points out parallel to the railroad and only
from six to ten miles from it. McClernand's corps
was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guard-
496 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
ing all the crossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a
stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was
reached and crossings effected by McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the
right of Sherman, extending to Raymond The
cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to
find the roads : to cover our advances and to find
the most practicable routes from one command to
another so they could support each other in case of
an attack. In making this move I estimated Pem-
berton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eigh-
teen thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines
Bluff and Jackson. It would not be possible for
Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one
place, and I determined to throw my army between
his and fight him in detail. This was done with
success, but I found afterwards that I had entirely
under-estimated Pemberton's strength.
Up to this point our movements had been made
without serious opposition. My line was now near
ly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad
and about seven miles south of it. The right was
at Raymond eighteen miles from Jackson, Mc-
Pherson commanding ; Sherman in the centre on
Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across ;
McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen Mile
Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two
miles of Edward's station, where the enemy had con-
BA TTLE OF RA YMOND. 497
centrated a considerable force and where they un-
doubtedly expected us to attack. McClernand's left
was on the Big Black. In all our moves, up to
this time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely,
and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the
enemy throwing a force on our rear.
McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand
strong with two batteries under General Gregg,
about two miles out of Raymond. This was about
two P.M. Logan was in advance with one of his
brigades. He deployed and moved up to engage
the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to
be cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's
division, and Crocker's, which was still farther in
rear, to come forward with all dispatch. The order
was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in
position for assault before Crocker could get up,
and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's posi-
tion easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not
to appear against our front again until we met at
Jackson.
In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339
wounded, and 37 missing — nearly or quite all from
Logan's division. The enemy's loss was 100 killed,
305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.
I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as com-
petent division commanders as could be found in or
out of the army and both equal to a much higher
Vol. I.— 32.
498 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT.
command. Crocker, however, was dying of con-
sumption when he volunteered. His weak condition
never put him on the sick report when there was a
battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his
feet. He died not long after the close of the rebel-
lion.
CHAPTER. XXXV.
MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON — FALL OF JACKSON — IN-
TERCEPTING THE ENEMY — BATTLE OF CHAMPION's
HILL.
WHEN the news reached me of McPherson's
victory at Raymond about sundown my po-
sition was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn
the whole column towards Jackson and capture that
place without delay.
Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I sup-
posed, about 18,000 men ; in fact, as I learned after-
wards, with nearly 50,000. A force was also collect-
ing on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the
railroads communicating with Vicksburg connect.
All the enemy's supplies of men and stores would
•
come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiege
Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid.
I therefore determined to move swiftly towards Jack-
son, destroy or drive any force in that direction and
then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving against
Jackson, I uncovered my own communication. So
I finally decided to have none — to cut loose alto-
gether from my base and move my whole force
5CX) PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
eastward. I then had no fears for my communica-
tions, and if I moved quickly enough could turn upon
Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear.
Accordingly, all previous orders g^ven during the
day for movements on the 13th were annulled by
new ones. McPherson was ordered at daylight to
move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson ; Sherman
was notified of my determination to capture Jackson
and work from there westward. He was ordered to
start at four in the morning and march to Raymond.
McClernand was ordered to march with three divis-
ions by Dillon's to Raymond. One was left to
guard the crossing of the Big Black.
On the loth I had received a letter from Banks,
on the Red River, asking reinforcements. Porter
had gpne to his assistance with a part of his fleet on
the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position
and declining to send any troops. I looked upon side
movements as long as the enemy held Port Hudson
and Vicksburg as a waste of time and material.
General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson
in the night of the 13th from Tennessee, and im-
mediately assumed command of all the Confeder-
ate troops in Mississippi. I knew he was expect-
ing reinforcements from the south and east. On
the 6th I had written to General Halleck: ''Infor-
mation from the other side leaves me to believe the
enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma."
MO VEMENT A GAINST J A CKSON, 50 1
Up to this time my troops had been kept in sup-
porting distances of each other, as far as the nature
of the country would admit Reconnoissances were
constantly made from each corps to enable them to
acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes
from one to another in case a union became neces-
sary.
McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early
on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying
the railroad. Sherman's advance reached Raymond
before the last of McPherson's command had got
out of the town. McClernand withdrew from the
front of the enemy, at Edward's station, with much
skill and without loss, and reached his position for
the night in good order. On the night of the 13th,
McPherson was ordered to march at early dawn
upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away. Sherman was
given the same order ; but he was to move by the
direct road from Raymond to Jackson, which is south
of the road McPherson was on and does not ap-
proach within two miles of it at the point where it
crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that
time, defended the city. McClernand was ordered
to move one division of his command to Clinton, one
division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs
following Sherman's line, and a third to Raymond.
He was also directed to send his siege guns, four in
number, with the troops going by Mississippi Springs.
MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON. 503
McClemand's position was an advantageous one in
any event. With one division at Clinton he was in
position to reinforce McPherson, at Jackson, rapidly
if it became necessary ; the division beyond Missis-
sippi Springs was equally available to reinforce
Sherman ; the one at Raymond could take either
road. He still had two other divisions farther back,
now that Blair had come up, available within a
day at Jackson. If this last command should not be
wanted at Jackson, they were already one day's
march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on
three different roads leading to the latter city. But
the most important consideration in my mind was
to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should
come out to attack my rear. This I expected him
to do ; as shown further on, he was directed by
Johnston to make this very move.
I notified General Halleck that I should attack
the State capital on the 14th. A courier carried
the dispatch to Grand Gulf through an unprotected
country.
Sherman and McPherson communicated with each
other during the night and arranged to reach Jack-
son at about the same hour. It rained in torrents
during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the
day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable, and
in some places on Sherman's line, where the land was
low, they were covered more than a foot deep with
504 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
water. But the troops never murmured. By nine
o'clock Crocker, of McPherson's corps, who was now
in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and
speedily drove them in upon the main body. They
were outside of the intrenchments in a strong posi-
tion, and proved to be the troops that had been
driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been rein-
forced during the night by Georgia and South
Carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to
eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still
more.
Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some
distance out from the town, but speedily drove them
in. He was now on the south and south-west of
Jackson confronting the Confederates behind their
breastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly
two miles north, occupying a line running north and
south across the Vicksburg railroad. Artillery was
brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to
an assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division
while he deployed Crocker s for the assault. Sherman
made similar dispositions on the right. By eleven
A.M. both were ready to attack. Crocker moved his
division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line.
These troops at once encountered the enemy's ad-
vance and drove it back on the main body, when
they returned to their proper regiment and the whole
division charged, routing the enemy completely and
PALL OF JACKSON. 505
driving him into this main line. This stand by the
enemy was made more than two miles outside of his
main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his
command until within range of the guns of the enemy
from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring
his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine
the next move. It was now about noon.
While this was going on Sherman was confronting
a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he
was marching — the Mississippi Springs road — and
commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which
he had to pass. By detaching right and left the
stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speed-
ily driven within the main line. This brought our
whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which
was continuous on the north, west and south sides
from the Pearl River north of the city to the same
river south. I was with Sherman. He was con-
fronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. Appear-
ances did not justify an assault where we were. I
had directed Sherman to send a force to the right,
and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River. This
force, Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the
right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy
had left that part of the line. Tuttle's movement or
McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to
order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to
retard us while he was getting away. Tuttle had
506 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
seen this and, passing through the lines without re-
sistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists con-
fronting Sherman and captured them with ten pieces
of artillery. I rode immediately to the State House,
where I was soon followed by Sherman. About the
same time McPherson discovered that the enemy
was leaving his front, and advanced Crocker, who
was so close upon the enemy that they could not
move their guns or destroy them. He captured
seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the National
flag over the rebel capital of Mississippi. Stevenson's
brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was
too late or not expeditious enough.
Our loss in this engagement was : McPherson,
37 killed, 228 wounded; Sherman, 4 killed and 21
wounded and missing. The enemy lost 845 killed,
wounded and captured. Seventeen guns fell into
our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their
store-houses, containing a large amount of com-
missary stores.
On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined
McClernand's 4th division. He had with him two
hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only com-
missary supplies received during the entire cam-
paign.
I slept that night in the room that Johnston was
said to have occupied the night before.
About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps
PALL OF JACKSON. 507
commanders and directed the dispositions to be made
of their troops. Sherman was to remain in Jackson
until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre,
and manufacturing city of military supplies. He did
the work most effectually. Sherman and I went
together into a manufactory which had not ceased
work on account of the battle nor for the entrance
of Yankee troops. Our presence did not seem to
attract the attention of either the manager or the
operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked on
for a while to see the tent cloth which they were
making roll out of the looms, with '* C. S. A." woven
in each bolt There was an immense amount of
cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told
Sherman I thought they had done work enough.
The operatives were told they could leave and take
^ with them what cloth they could carry. In a few
minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. The
proprietor visited Washington while I was President
to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was
private. He asked me to give him a statement of
the fact that his property had been destroyed by
National troops, so that he might use it with Congress
where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his
claim. I declined.
On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the fol-
lowing dispatch to Pemberton at Edward's station :
'' I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-Gen-
508 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
eral Sherman is between us with four divisions at
Clinton. It is important to establish communication,
that you may be reinforced. If practicable, come
up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment
would be of immense value. All the troops you can
quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-
important." This dispatch was sent in triplicate, by
different messengers. One of the messengers hap-
pened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from
Memphis some months before by Hurlbut for utter-
ing disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was
a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensi-
bly as a warning to those who entertained the senti-
ments he expressed ; but Hurlbut and the expelled
man understood each other. He delivered his copy
of Johnston's dispatch to McPherson who forwarded
it to me.
Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered
McPherson to move promptly in the morning back
to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could
reach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west
of Jackson. I also informed McClernand of the
capture of Jackson and sent him the following order :
** It is evidently the design of the enemy to get
north of us and cross the Big Black, and beat us
into Vicksburg. We must not allow them to do this.
Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and
make all dispatch in getting there. Move troops by
INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY. 509
the most direct road from wherever they may be on
the receipt of this order."
And to Blair I wrote : " Their design is evidently
to cross the Big Black and pass down the peninsula
between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. We must
beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton ;
take all the trains with you. Smith's division, and
any other troops now with you, will go to the same
place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as to
divide your troops and train."
Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six
miles north of Jackson, the night of the 14th. He
sent from there to Pemberton dispatches announcing
the loss of Jackson, and the following order :
" As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they
must be united to the rest of the army. I am anx-
ious to see a force assembled that may be able to in-
flict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant sup-
ply himself from the Mississippi ? Can you not cut
him off from it, and above all, should he be com-
pelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him."
The concentration of my troops was easy, consid-
ering the character of the country. McPherson
moved along the road parallel with and near the
railroad. McClernand's command was, one division
(Hovey's) on the road McPherson had to take, but
with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus) was at
Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the
5IO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
Other near Champion s Hill ; one (Carr's) had to pass
over the same road with Osterhaus, but being back
at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained by it ;
the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near
Auburn with a different road to pass over. McCler-
nand faced about and moved promptly. His cavalry
from Raymond sieized Bolton by half-past nine in
the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and
capturing several men.
The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton;
Carr and Osterhaus were about three miles south,
but abreast, facing west ; Smith was north of Ray-
mond with Blair in his rear.
McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had
marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached Hovey
and went into camp ; Crocker bivouacked just in
Hovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman with
two divisions, was in Jackson, completing the de-
struction of roads, bridges and military factories. I
rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I or-
dered McClernand to move early in the morning on
Edward's station, cautioning him to watch for the
enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he
felt very certain of success.
I naturally expected that Pemberton would en-
deavor to obey the orders of his superior, which I
have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This, in-
deed, I knew he could not do ; but I felt sure he
INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY. 511
would make the attempt to reach that point. It
turned out, however, that he had decided his supe-
rior's plans were impracticable, and consequently de-
termined to move south from Edward s station and
get between me and my base. I, however, had no
base, having abandoned it more than a week before.
On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south
from Edward's station, but the rains had swollen
Baker s Creek, which he had to cross, so much that
he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed
away. This brought him back to the Jackson road,
on which there was a good bridge over Baker's
Creek. Some of his troops were marching until
midnight to get there. Receiving here early on the
1 6th a repetition of his order to join Johnston at Clin-
ton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his
chief, informing him of the route by which he might
be expected.
About five o'clock in the morning (i6th) two men,
who had been employed on the Jackson and Vicks-
burg railroad, were brought to me. They reported
that they had passed through Pemberton's army in
the night, and that it was still marching east. They
reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry
and ten batteries ; in all, about twenty-five thousand
men.
I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson an-
other day in order to complete his work ; but getting
512 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
the above information I sent him orders to move with
all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an
ammunition train on the road at once, with directions
to its commander to march with all possible speed
until he came up to our rear. Within an hour after
receiving this order Steele's division was on the
road. At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who
was near Auburn, to move with all speed to Ed-
ward's station. McClemand was directed to embrace
Blair in his command for the present Blair's divis-
ion was a part of the 15th army corps (Sherman's);
but as it was on its way to join its corps, it natu-
rally struck our left first, now that we had faced
about and were moving west. The 15th corps, when
it got up, would be on our extreme right. McPher-
son was directed to get his trains out of the way of
the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely
as possible. McClernand had two roads about
three miles apart, converging at Edward's station,
over which to march his troops. Hovey's division
of his corps had the advance on a third road (the
Clinton) still farther north. McClernand was di-
rected to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by
the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and
Carr by the middle road. Orders were to move
cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for
the enemy.
Smith's division on the most southern road was
BATTLE OF CHAMPIOITS HILL, 513
the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who
were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the middle
road, hearing the*firing, pushed his skirmishers for-
ward, found the enemy's pickets and forced them
back to the main line. About the same time Hovey
encountered the enemy on the northern or direct
wagon road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPher-
son was hastening up to join Hovey, but was embar-
rassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I
was still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word
of the situation, and expressed the wish that I was
up. By half-past seven I was on the road and pro-
ceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that
were in front of troops off the road. When I ar-
rived Hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a
battle.
McClemand was in person on the middle road
and had a shorter distance to march to reach the
enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him word
by a staff officer to push forward and attack. These
orders were repeated several times without appar-
ently expediting McClernand's advance.
Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen
his position to receive us, whether taken by accident
or design, was well selected. It is one of the high-
est points in that section, and commanded all the
ground in range. On the east side of the ridge,
which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first
Vol. I.— 33
BA TTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 5 1 5
north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek.
It was grown up thickly with large trees and under-
growth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops,
even when not defended. The ridge occupied by
the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine
turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the
north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edward's
station wagon-road turns almost due south at this
point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about
a mile ; then turning west, descends by a gentle de-
clivity to Baker's Creek, nearly a mile away. On the
west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is
cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There
was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber
near the summit west of the road.
From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's
station, some three miles west of Champion's Hill.
There is one also to Bolton. From this latter road
there is still another, leaving it about three and a half
miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the
same station. It was along these two roads that
three divisions of McClernand's corps, and Blair
of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were
moving. Hovey of McClernand's command was with
McPherson, farther north on the road from Bolton
direct to Edward's station. The middle road comes
into the northern road at the point where the latter
turns to the west and descends to Baker's Creek ;
5l6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
the southern road is still several miles south and
does not intersect the others until it reaches Ed-
ward's station. Pemberton's lines covered all these
roads, and faced east Hovey's line, when it first
drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to
that of the enemy and confronted his left
By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into
a hard-contested battle. Hovey alone, before other
troops could be got to assist him, had captured a
battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold
his position and had to abandon the artillery. Mc-
Pherson brought up his troops as fast as possible,
Logan in front, and posted them on the right of
Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan
reinforced Hovey with one brigade from his divis-
ion ; with his other two he moved farther west to
make room for Crocker, who was coming up as
rapidly as the roads would admit Hovey was still
being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for
more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was
now coming up, to send one brigade from his divis-
ion. McPherson ordered two batteries to be sta-
tioned where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line,
and they did good execution.
From Logan's position now a direct forward
movement carried him over open fields, in rear of
the enemy and in a line parallel with them. He did
make exactly this move, attacking, however, the ene-
BA TTLE OF CHAMPION* S HILL, 5 1 7
my through the belt of woods covering the west
slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this
time I had kept my position near Hovey where we
were the most heavily pressed ; but about noon I
moved with a part of my staff by our right around,
until I came up with Logan himself. I found him
near the road leading down to Bakers Creek. He
was actually in command of the only road over which
the enemy could retreat ; Hovey, reinforced by two
brigades from McPherson's command, confronted
the enemy's left ; Crocker, with two brigades, cover-
ed their left flank ; McClernand two hours before,
had been within two miles and a half of their centre
with two divisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and
A. J. Smith's, were confronting the rebel right; Ran-
som, with a brigade of Mc Arthurs division of the
17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at
Grand Gulf a few days before, and was coming up
on their right flank. Neither Logan nor I knew
that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just
at this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, ask-
ing for more reinforcements. There were none to
spare. I then gave an order to move McPherson's
command by the left flank around to Hovey. This
uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon
taken advantage of by the enemy.
During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was
by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker,
5l8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
and by Crocker gallantly coming up with two other
brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the
last one about the time the road was opened to the
rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was be-
tween three and four o'clock. I rode forward, or
rather back, to where the middle road intersects the
north road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's divis-
ion just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south
and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced
in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's
two divisions with him, had marched and fought from
early dawn, and were not in the best condition to
follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to Osterhaus
to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw per-
sonally, I explained the situation and directed him
to pursue vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to
cross it if he could ; Osterhaus to follow him. The
pursuit was continued until after dark.
The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four
hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three
hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to
the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's divis-
ion and of McPherson s two divisions was engaged
during the battle. No other part of my command
was engaged at all, except that as described before.
Osterhaus s and A. J. Smith s divisions had encoun-
tered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-
past seven. Their positions were admirable for ad-
BA TTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 5 1 9
vancing upon the enemy's line. McClernand, with
two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-
field long before noon, and in easy hearing. I sent
him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent
to explain to him the situation. These traversed the
wood separating us, without escort, and directed
him to push forward ; but he did not come. It is
true, in front of McClernand there was a small force
of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a
ravine obstructing his advance ; but if he had moved
to the right by the road my staff officers had follow-
ed the enemy must either have fallen back or been
cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey,
who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right
flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle
at the time. To obey the order he would have had
to pull out from the front of the enemy and march
back as far as McClernand had to advance to get
into battle, and substantially over the same ground.
Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the or-
der of his intermediate superior.
We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely
engaged. This excludes those that did not get up,
all of McClernand's command except Hovey. Our
loss was 410 killed. 1,844 wounded ^ind 187 missing.
Hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing
— more than one-third of his division.
Had McClernand come up with reasonable prompt-
520 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S, GRANT,
ness, or had I known the ground as I did afterwards,
I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped
with any organized force. As it was he lost over
three thousand killed and wounded and about three
thousand captured in battle and in pursuit Loring's
division, which was the right of Pemberton's line,
was cut off from the retreating army and never got
back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back
that night to the Big Black River. His troops did
not stop before midnight and many of them left be-
fore the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a
good part of them returned to their homes. Logan
alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns.
Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all,
exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled,
thus making 1,200.
McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his
men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one bri-
gade to guard our wounded. The pursuit was con-
tinued as long as it was light enough to see the road.
The night of the i6th of May found McPherson s
command bivouacked from two to six miles west
of the battle-field, along the line of the road to
Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward^s
station, and Blair was about three miles south-east ;
Hovey remained on the field where his troops had
fought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war
material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on
BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL, 52 I
the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery,
I pushed through the advancing column with my
staff and kept in advance until after night. Find-
ing ourselves alone we stopped and took possession
of a vacant house. As no troops came up we moved
back a mile or more until we met the head of the
column just going into bivouac on the road. We
had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house
which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which
was filled with wounded and dying who had been
brought from the battle-field we had just left
While a battle is raging one can see his enemy
mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand,
with great composure; but after the battle these
scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed
to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy
as a friend.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE — CROSSING THE BIG
BLACK — INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG ASSAULTING
THE WORKS.
WE were now assured of our position between
Johnston and Pemberton, without a possibility
of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might have
made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the
bridge there and, by moving north on the west side,
have eluded us and finally returned to Johnston.
But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would
have been his proper move, however, and the one
Johnston would have made had he been in Pember-
ton's place. In fact it would have been in conform-
ity with Johnston s orders to Pemberton.
Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops
about noon on the i6th and reached Bolton, twenty
miles west, before halting. His rear guard did not get
in until two a.m. the 17th, but renewed their march
by daylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson,
and was forced to leave his own wounded in care
of surgeons and attendants. At Bolton he was in-
formed of our victory. He was directed to com-
mence the march early next day, and to diverge from
BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE, 523
the road he was on to Bridgeport on the Big Black
River, some eleven miles above the point where we
expected to find the enemy. Blair was ordered to
join him there with the pontoon train as early as
possible.
This movement brought Sherman's corps together,
and at a point where I hoped a crossing of the Big
Black might be effected and Sherman's corps used
to flank the enemy out of his position in our front,
thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the
army. I informed him that I would endeavor to hold
the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.
The advance division, Carr s (McClernand's corps),
resumed the pursuit at half-past three a.m. on the
17th, followed closely by Osterhaus, McPherson
bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected,
the enemy was found in position on the Big Black.
The point was only six miles from that where my ad-
vance had rested for the night, and was reached at
an early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the
west, and has washed close up to the high land ;
the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed
at very high water, but was cleared and in cultiva-
tion. A bayou runs irregularly across this low land,
the bottom of which, however, is above the surface
of the Big Black at ordinary stages. When the
river is full water runs through it, converting the
point of land into an island. The bayou was grown
524 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the
ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of
water in it The rebels had constructed a parapet
along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton
bales from the plantation close by and throwing
dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly com-
manded from the height west of the river. At the
upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared
land which afforded a cover for a portion of our
men. Carr s division was deployed on our right,
Lawlers brigade forming his extreme right and
reaching through these woods to the river above.
Osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of Carr
and covered the enemy's entire front McPherson
was in column on the road, the head close by, ready
to come in wherever he could be of assistance.
While the troops were standing as here described
an officer from Banks' staff came up and presented
me with a letter from General Halleck, dated the
1 1 th of May. It had been sent by the way of New
Orleans to Banks to be forwarded to me. It ordered
me to return to Grand Gulf and to co-operate from
there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to
return with our combined forces to besiege Vicks-
burg. I told the officer that the order came too
late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he
knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch in-
sisted that I ought to obey the order, and was giv-
526 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ing arguments to support his position when I heard
great cheering to the right of our line and, looking
in that direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves
leading a charge upon the enemy. I immediately
mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the
charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered
the dispatch ; I think not even to this day.
The assault was successful. But little resistance
was made. The enemy fled from the west bank of
the river, burning the bridge behind him and leav-
ing the men and guns on the east side to fall into
our hands. Many tried to escape by swimming the
river. Some succeeded and some were drowned in
the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and
1,751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237
wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probably lost
but few men except those captured and drowned.
% But for the successful and complete destruction of
the bridge, I have but little doubt that we should
have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his
occupying his defences around Vicksburg.
As the bridge was destroyed and the river was
high, new bridges had to be built. It was but little
after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place.
As soon as work could be commenced, orders were
given for the construction of three bridges. One
was taken charge of by Lieutenant Hains, of the
Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson him-
CROSSING THE BIG BLACK, 527
self and one by General Ransom, a most gallant
and intelligent volunteer officer. My recollection is
that Hains built a raft bridge; McPherson a pon-
toon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pon-
toons; and that Ransom felled trees on opposite
banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the
tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlac-
ing in the river, without the trees being entirely
severed from their stumps. A bridge was then made
with these trees to support the roadway. Lumber
was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever
found, for this purpose. By eight o'clock in the
morning of the i8th all three bridges were complete
and the troops were crossing.
Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the
1 7th and found Blair with the pontoon train already
there. A few of the enemy were intrenched on the
west bank, but they made little resistance and soon ^
surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night
and the third the following morning.
On the 1 8th I moved along the Vicksburg road in
advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined
Sherman. My first anxiety was to secure a base
of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg.
Sherman's line of march led him to the very point
on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy the Decem-
ber before when he was repulsed. Sherman was
equally anxious with myself. Our impatience led
528 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
US to move in advance of the column and well up
with the advanced skirmishers. There were some
detached works along the crest of the hill. These
were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison
from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way
to Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of the enemy
whistled by thick and fast for a short time. In a
few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of looking
down from the spot coveted so much by him the
December before on the ground where his command
had lain so helpless for offensive action. He turned
to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no
positive assurance of success. This, however, he
said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in
history and I ought to make a report of it at once.
Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no
telling what might happen before it was taken ; but
whether captured or not, this was a complete and
successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sher-
man's language ; but the substance only. My rea-
son for mentioning this incident will appear further
on.
McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came
into the Jackson and Vicksburg road which Sherman
was on, but to his rear. He arrived at night near the
lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McCler-
nand moved by the direct road near the railroad to
Mount Albans, and then turned to the left and put
INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 529
his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry to
Vicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson.
I now had my three corps up to the works built for
the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads — one to
the north, one to the east and one to the south-
east of the city. By the morning of the 19th the
investment was as complete as my limited number
of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right,
and covered the high ground from where it over-
looked the Yazoo as far south-east as his troops
would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and
occupied ground on both sides of the Jackson road.
McClernand took up the ground to his left and ex-
tended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keep-
ing a continuous line.
On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with
the enemy while we were getting into better posi-
tion. The enemy had been much demoralized by
his defeats at Champions Hill and the Big Black,
and I believed he would not make much effort to
hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two o'clock I
ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more
advanced positions for all our troops where they
were fully covered from the fire of the enemy.
The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening
our position and in making roads in rear of the
army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most
of the army had now been for three weeks with
Vol. I.— 34
530 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT.
only five days' rations issued by the commissary.
They had an abundance of food, however, but began
to feel the want of bread. I remember that in pass-
ing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a
soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice,
but yet so that I heard him, " Hard tack." In a
moment the cry was taken up all along the line,
'• Hard tack ! Hard tack !" I told the men nearest
to me that we had been engaged ever since the
arrival of the troops in building a road over which
to supply them with everything they needed. The
cry was instantly changed to cheers. By the night
of the 2 1 st all the troops had full rations issued to
them. The bread and coffee were highly appre-
ciated.
I now determined on a second assault Johnston
was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army
not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with
me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There
was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pem-
berton, and after all he might defeat my anticipa-
tions of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not
prevent the capture of the city. The immediate
capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the
reinforcements which were so much wanted else-
where, and would set free the army under me to
drive Johnston from the State. But the first consid-
eration of all was — the troops believed they could
Assaulting the tvORxs, 531
carry the works in their front, and would not have
worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not
been allowed to try.
The attack was ordered to commence on all parts
of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the 2 2d with a
furious cannonade from every battery in position.
All the corps commanders set their time by mine so
that all might open the engagement at the same
minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of
each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to
the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their
battle flags upon them ; but at no place were we
able to enter. General McClernand reported that
he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several
points, and wanted reinforcements. I occupied a
position from which I believed I could see as well as
he what took place in his front, and I did not see
the success he reported. But his request for rein-
forcements being repeated I could not ignore it, and
sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps. Sher-
man and McPherson were both ordered to renew
their assaults as a diversion in favor of McClernand.
This last attack only served to increase our casual-
ties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon
as it was dark our troops that had reached the
enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for
security all day, were withdrawn ; and thus ended
the last assault upon Vicksburg.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.
I NOW determined upon a regular siege — to "out-
camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more
losses. The experience of the 2 2d convinced officers
and men that this was best, and they went to work
on the defences and approaches with a will With
the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicks-
burg was complete. As long as we could hold our
position the enemy was limited in supplies of food,
men and munitions of war to what they had on
hand. These could not last always.
The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced
April 30th. On the i8th of May the army was in rear
of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty days after
the crossing, the city was completely invested and an
assault had been made : five distinct battles (besides
continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won
by the Union forces ; the capital of the State had
fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and
everything useful for military purposes had been de-
stroyed ; an average of about one hundred and eighty
miles had been marched by the troops engaged;
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG, 533
but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage ;
over six thousand prisoners had been captured, and
as many more of the enemy had been killed or
wounded ; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one
field-pieces had fallen into our hands ; and four hun-
dred miles of the river, from Vicksburg to Port
Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that
had crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was
less than forty-three thousand men. One division of
these, Blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the
battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged
there ; and one brigade. Ransom's of McPherson's
corps, reached the field after the battle. The enemy
had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the
roads between these places, over sixty thousand
men. They were in their own country, where no
rear guards were necessary. The country is admi-
rable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an
offensive campaign. All their troops had to be met.
We were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them
in detail : at Port Gibson seven or eight thousand ;
at Raymond, five thousand ; at Jackson, from eight
to eleven thousand ; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five
thousand ; at the Big Black, four thousand. A part
of those met at Jackson were all that was left of
those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten
in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon
their own ground. Our loss up to this time was :
534
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
h:t
Port Gibson
South Fork Bayou Pierre
Skirmishes, May 3
Fourteen Mile Creek . . .
Raymond
Jackson
Champion's Hill
Big Black
Bridgeport
Total
KILLKD.
I
6
42
410
39
695
WOUNDED.
719
I
9
24
339
1,844
237
I
3,425
MISSING.
25
37
7
187
3
259
Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and
continued on duty. Not half of them were dis-
abled for any length of time.
After the unsuccessful assault of the 2 2d the work
of the regular siege began. Shermfan occupied the
right starting from the river above Vicksburg,
McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now
with him) and McClernand the left, holding the
road south to Warrenton. Lauman's division ar-
rived at this time and was placed on the extreme
left of the line.
In the interval between the assaults of the 19th
and 2 2d, roads had been completed from the Yazoo
River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of the
army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and
ammunition ; ground had been selected and cleared on
SJEGE OF VJCKSBURG. 535
which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and
cooking utensils were brought up. The troops had
been without these from the time of crossing the
Mississippi up to this time. All was now ready for
the pick and spade. Prentiss and Hurlbut were
ordered to send forward every man that could be
spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the
fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston.
I knew that Johnston was receiving reinforcements
from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in
Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the
enemy that I believed he would make the most
strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk
of losing ground elsewhere.
My line was more than fifteen miles long, extend-
ing from Haines' Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to War-
renton. The line of the enemy was about seven.
In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and
Jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly rein-
forced, we required a second line of defence facing
the other way. I had not troops enough under my
command to man these. General Halleck appre-
ciated the situation and, without being asked, for-
warded reinforcements with all possible dispatch.
The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for
defence. On the north it is about two hundred feet
above the Mississippi River at the highest point and
very much cut up by the washing rains; the ra-
536 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
vines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while
the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest
Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and
was in cultivation. But here, too, it was cut up by
ravines and small streams. The enemy's line of de-
fence followed the crest of a ridge from the river
north of the city eastward, then southerly around to
the Jackson road, full three miles back of the city ;
thence in a southwesterly direction to the river.
Deep ravines of the description given lay in front of
these defences. As there is a succession of gillies,
cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line
was necessarily very irregular. To follow each of
these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the
slopes on either side, would have lengthened their
line very much. Generally therefore, or in many
places, their line would run from near the head of
one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and
an outer work triangular in shape, generally open in
the rear, was thrown up on the point ; with a few men
in this outer work they commanded the approaches
to the main line completely.
The work to be done, to make our position as
strong against the enemy as his was against us, was
very great. The problem was also complicated by
our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as
possible. We had but four engineer officers with us.
Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief,
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG, 537
and the work at the beginning was mainly directed
by him. His health soon gave out, when he was
succeeded by Captain Comstock, also of the Engi-
neer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long
line I directed that all officers who had graduated
at West Point, where they had necessarily to study
military engineering, should in addition to their
other duties assist in the work.
The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary
were graduates. The chief commissary, now the
Commissary-General of the Army, begged off, how-
ever, saying that there was nothing in engineering
that he was good for unless he would do for a sap-
roller. As soldiers require rations while working in
the ditches as well as when marching and fighting,
and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used
as a sap-roller, I let him off. The general is a large
man ; weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and
is not tall.
We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pound-
ers, and there were none at the West to draw from.
Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery
of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the
field artillery used in the campaign, the siege began.
The first thing to do was to get the artillery in bat-
teries where they would occupy commanding posi-
tions ; then establish the camps, under cover from
the fire of the enemy but as near up as possible ; and
538 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect
the entire command by the shortest route. The ene-
my did not harass us much while we were construct-
ing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammuni-
tion was short ; and their infantry was kept down by
our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and
ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself
above the rebel works.
In no place were our lines more than six hundred
yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore,
to cover our men by something more than the ordi-
nary parapet. To give additional protection sand
bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the
parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for
musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these
means the men were enabled to walk about erect
when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharp-
shooters. The enemy used in their defence explo-
sive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting
over our men in the trenches, they would do some
execution ; but I do not remember a single case
where a man was injured by a piece of one of these
shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded,
the wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball
would have hit as well. Their use is barbarous,
because they produce increased suffering with-
out any corresponding^ advantage to those using
them,
'■■'•■■* jp^"^^
f-*-'
MAP
Siege of Vicksburg, Miss.
From the 18th of May to the 4th of July, 1863.
\
540 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (/, S. GRANT.
The enemy could not resort to our method to
protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible
supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it
freely. Splinters from the timber would have made
havoc among the men behind.
There were no mortars with the besiegers, ex-
cept what the navy had in front of the city; but
wooden ones were made by taking logs of the
toughest wood that could be found, boring them out
for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with
r
Strong iron bands. These answered as coehorns,
and shells were successfully thrown from them into
the trenches of the enemy.
The labor of building the batteries and intrench-
ing was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by
negroes who came within our lines and who were
paid for their work ; but details from the troops had
often to be made. The work was pushed forward as
rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position
was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy
the batteries were advanced. By the 30th of June
there were two hundred and twenty guns in position,
mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy
guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the
navy. We were now as strong for defence against
the garrison of Vicksburg as they were against us ;
but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was
receiving constant reinforcements from the east
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 54 1
He had at this time a larger force than I had had
at any time prior to the battle of Champion's
Hill
As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union
army behind Vicksburg reached the North, floods of
visitors began to pour in. Some came to gratify
curiosity ; some to see sons or brothers who had
passed through the terrible ordeal ; members of the
Christian and Sanitary Associations came to minister
to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often
those coming to see a son or brother would bring a
dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little
the gift would be appreciated. Many of the soldiers
had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys
without bread during the march, that the sight of
poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away
their appetite. But the intention was good.
Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of
Illinois, with most of the State officers. I naturally
wanted to show them what there was of most in-
terest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most
broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen
without exposure. I therefore took them to Sher-
man's headquarters and presented them. Before
starting out to look at the lines — possibly while
Sherman's horse was being saddled — there were
many questions asked about the late campaign, about
which the North had been so imperfectly informed.
54^ Pergonal MkMdiks dP t/. i 6kANT.
There was a little knot around Sherman and another
around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in the
most animated manner, what he had said to me when
we first looked down from Walnut Hills upon the
land below on the i8th of May, adding: "Grant is
entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign ;
I opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it" But
for this speech it is not likely that Sherman's opposi-
tion would have ever been heard of. His untiring
energy and great efficiency during the campaign en-
title him to a full share of all the credit due for its
success. He could not have done more if the plan
had been his own.
Note. — When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to
make, he called to see me about It. I recollect that I had transferred my head-
quarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the
levee. I «vas seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when
Sherman came up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he would
like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut the door
after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying
that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be
glad to manoeuvre a year — or a long time — to get me in. I was going into the
enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points
strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an axiom in war that
when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so
from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of
the eye, etc. He pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in
the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign
to make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be
reached on the east bank of the river ; fortify there and establish a depot of
supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in
case of disaster. I said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then
On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the
Yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to
be between the Big Black and the Yazoo. The
country was rich and full of supplies of both food and
forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The
cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army,
and the food and forage to be consumed by our
troops or destroyed by fire ; all bridges were to be
destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impas-
said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from
Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To this I replied, the
country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies;
the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary en-
listments had ceased throughout most of the North and conscription was already
resorted to, and if we went back so far as Memphis it would discourage the
people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use : neither men to hold
them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us was
to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. No progress was
being made in any other field, and we had to go on.
Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins, embodying
his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to
at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins
showed me the letter, but I did not see any reason for changing my plans. The
letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned be-
tween Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I remember of. I did
not regard the letter as official, and consequently did net preserve it. General
Sherman furnished a copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his
history of my campaigns. I did nut regard either the conversation between us
or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice
which the relations between us fully justified. Sherman gave the same energy
to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had
been ordered by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression
which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's prejudice, and for
which there was no fair foundation
544 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
sable as possible. Blair went forty-five miles and
was gone almost a week. His work was effectually
done. I requested Porter at this time to send the
marine brigade, a floating nondescript force which
had been assigned to his command and which proved
very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until rein-
forcements could be sent.
On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks,
asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at
Port Hudson. Of course I could not comply with
his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was
in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front,
and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise
the siege.
On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's zovcv-v
mand arrived, General Kimball commanding. It
was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of
Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big
Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division
and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on Blair s
return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place
with instructions to watch the crossings of the Big
Black River, to destroy the roads in his (Blair's) front,
and to gather or destroy all supplies.
On the 7th of June our little force of colored and
white troops across the Mississippi, at Milliken's
Bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men from Richard
Taylors trans-Mississippi command. With the aid
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 545
of the gunboats they were speedily repelled. I sent
Mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the
enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou ; and we had no
further trouble in that quarter during the siege.
This was the first important engagement of the war
in which colored troops were under fire. These
men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the
beginning of the siege, but they behaved well.
On the 8th of June a full division arrived from
Hurlbut's command, under General Sooy Smith. It
was sent immediately to Haines Bluff, and General
C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general com-
mand at that point
On the nth a strong division arrived from the
Department of the Missouri under General Herron,
which was placed on our left This cut off the last
possible chance of communication between Pember-
ton and Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up
on McClernand s left while Herron intrenched from
Lauman to the water's edge. At this point the
water recedes a few hundred yards from the high
land. Through this opening no doubt the Con-
federate commanders had been able to get messen-
gers under cover of night.
On the 14th General Parke arrived with two
divisions of Burnside's corps, and was immediately
dispatched to Haines' Bluff. These latter troops+-
Herron's and Parke's — were the reinforcemcals
Vol. I.— 35
546 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
already spoken of sent by Halleck in anticipation
of their being needed. They arrived none too
soon.
I now had about seventy-one thousand men.
More than half were disposed across the penin-
sula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the
Big Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching
the crossings of the latter river farther south and
west from the crossing of the Jackson road to Bald-
win's ferry and below.
There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg,
along which and their immediate sides, our work
was specially pushed and batteries advanced ; but
no commanding point within range of the enemy
was neglected.
On the 1 7th I received a letter from General Sher-
man and one on the i8th from General McPherson,
saying that their respective commands had com-
plained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order
published by General McCIernand to the 13th corps,
which did great injustice to the other troops engaged
in the campaign. This order had been sent North
and published, and now papers containing it had
reached our camps. The order had not been heard
of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of
McClernand's command until brought in this way
I at once wrote to McCIernand, directing him to
send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I at
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 547
once relieved him from the command of the 13th
army corps and ordered him back to Springfield,
Illinois. The publication of his order in the press
was in violation of War Department orders and also
of mine.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
Johnston's movements — fortifications at haines'
BLUFF — explosion OF THE MINE — EXPLOSION OF
THE SECOND MINE PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT
— THE FLAG OF TRUCE MEETING WITH PEMBER-
TON — NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER — ACCEPTING
THE TERMS — SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.
ON the 2 2d of June positive information was re-
ceived that Johnston had crossed the Big Black
River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise
the siege and release Pemberton. The correspond-
ence between Johnston and Pemberton shows that all
expectation of holding Vicksburg had by this time
passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately ordered
Sherman to the command of all the forces from
Haines' Bluff to the Big Black River. This amount-
ed now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.
Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions
were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to re-
inforce Sherman. Haines' Bluff had been strongly
fortified on the land side, and on all commanding
points from there to the Big Black at the railroad
crossing batteries had been constructed. The work
FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES BLUFF. 549
of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not al-
ready done, was an easy task for the troops that
were to defend them.
We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton,
while we were also looking east to defend ourselves
against an expected siege by Johnston. But as
against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as sub-
stantially protected as they were against us. Where
we were looking east and north we were strongly
fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidently
took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained
from making an assault on us because it would
simply have inflicted loss on both sides without ac-
complishing any result. We were strong enough to
have taken the offensive against him ; but I did
not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold
upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced
at the opportunity of defending ourselves against
an attack by Johnston.
From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and
pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy
had been steadily progressing. At three points on
the Jackson road, in front of Ransom's brigade, a
sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the
25th of June we had it undermined and the mine
charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not
succeed in reaching our mine. At this particular
point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises
EXPLOSION OF THE MINE. 55 I
abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of
the enemy's parapet. In fact this parapet was also
our protection. The soldiers of the two sides occa-
sionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier;
sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the
Union soldiers for the tobacco of the Confederates ;
at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades,
and often our men, catching them in their hands,
returned them.
Our mine had been started some distance back
down the hill ; consequently when it had extended as
far as the parapet it was many feet below it. This
caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find
and destroy it. On the 25th of June at three
o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A
heavy artillery fire all along the line had been
ordered to open with the explosion. The effect was
to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater
where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to
enable us to pass a column of attack through. In
fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had
thrown up a line farther back, where most of the
men guarding that point were placed. There were
a few men, however, left at the advance line, and
others working in the countermine, which was still
being pushed to find ours. All that were there were
thrown into the air, some of them coming down on
our side, still alive. I remember one colored man.
552 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
who had been under ground at work when the ex-
plosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He
was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some
one asked him how high he had gone up. " Dun
no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply.
General Logan commanded at this point and took
this colored man to his quarters, where he did ser-
vice to the end of the siege.
As soon as the explosion took place the crater
was seized by two regiments of our troops who were
near by, under cover, where they had been placed
for the express purpose. The enemy made a des-
perate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon
retired behind the new line. From here, however,
they threw hand-grenades, which did some execu-
tion. The compliment was returned by our men,
but not with so much effect. The enemy could lay
their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided
the contestants, and roll them down upon us ; while
from our side they had to be thrown over the para-
pet, which was at considerable elevation. During
the night we made efforts to secure our position in
the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to
run trenches along the outer base of their parapet,
right and left ; but the enemy continued throwing
their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammuni-
tion (shells), the fuses of which they would light
with port-fires, and throw them by hand into our
EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE. 553
ranks. We found it impossible to continue this
work. Another mine was consequently started
which was exploded on the ist of July, destroying an
entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a consider-
able number of its occupants and leaving an immense
chasm where it stood. No attempt to charge was
made this time, the experience of the 25th admon-
ishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about
thirty killed and wounded. The enemy must have
lost more in the two explosions than we did in the
first We lost none in the second.
From this time forward the work of mining and
pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prose-
cuted with vigor, and I determined to explode no
more mines until we were ready to explode a num-
ber at different points and assault immediately
after. We were up now at three different points,
one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet
of the enemy divided us.
At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston
to Pemberton informed me that Johnston intended to
make a determined attack upon us in order to re-
lieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew the garrison
would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. The
picket lines were so close to each other — ^where there
was space enough between the lines to post pickets
— that the men could converse. On the 21st of
June I was informed, through this means, that Pem-
554 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT.
berton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the
Louisiana side under cover of night ; that he had
employed workmen in making boats for that pur-
pose ; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain
if they would make an assault on the ** Yankees " to
cut their way out ; that they had refused, and almost
mutinied, because their commander would not surren-
der and relieve their sufferings, and had only been
pacified by the assurance that boats enough would
be finished in a week to carry them all over. The
rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had
been pulled down to get material to build these
boats with. Afterwards this story was verified : on
entering the city we found a large number of very
rudely constructed boats.
All necessary steps were at once taken to ren-
der such an attempt abortive. Our pickets were
doubled ; Admiral Porter was notified, so that the
river might be more closely watched ; material was
collected on the west bank of the river to be set on
fire and light up the river if the attempt was made ;
and batteries were established along the levee cross-
ing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the
attempt been made the garrison of Vicksburg would
have been drowned, or made prisoners on the Louisi-
ana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on
the west bank to co-operate in this movement, I
believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done
PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT. 555
SO with a force sufficient to be of service. The Mis-
sissippi was now in our possession from its source to
its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicks-
burg and of Port Hudson. We had nearly ex-
hausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake
Providence to opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west
were not of a character to draw supplies over for any
considerable force.
By the ist of July our approaches had reached the
enemy's ditch at a number of places. At ten points
we could move under cover to within from five to
one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were
given to make all preparations for assault on the
6th of July. The debouches were ordered widened
to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also
to be widened to admit the troops to pass through
four abreast. Plank, and bags filled with cotton
packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable
the troops to cross the ditches.
On the night of the ist of July Johnston was be-
tween Brownsville and the Big Black, and wrote
Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the
month an attempt would be made to create a diver-
sion to enable him to cut his way out. Pemberton
was a prisoner before this message reached him.
On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside
relief, addressed the following letter to each of his
four division commanders :
556 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
" Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown
in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I
see no prospect of the former, and there are maYiy great, if not
insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore,
requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the
condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches
and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful
evacuation."
Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the
other two practically did the same. They expressed
the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail.
Pemberton had previously got a message to John-
ston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with
me for a release of the garrison with their arms.
Johnston replied that it would be a confession of
weakness for him to do so ; but he authorized Pem-
berton to use his name in making such an arrange-
ment.
On the 3d about ten o'clock a.m. white flags ap-
peared on a portion of the rebel works. Hostilities
along that part of the line ceased at once. Soon
two persons were seen coming towards our lines
bearing a white flag. They proved to be General
Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Mont-
gomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the fol-
lowing letter to me :
" I have the honor to propose an armistice for hours, with
the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To
this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners.
THE FLAG OF TRUCE, 557
to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and
hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to
save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to
a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position
for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed
you under a flag of truce, by Major-General John S. Bo wen."
It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on
the line where these white flags were visible, and the
news soon spread to all parts of the command. The
troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard
fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a
hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to dis-
eases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many Northern
papers that came to them saying all their suffering
was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken,
were at last at an end and the Union sure to be
saved.
Bo wen was received by General A. J. Smith, and
asked to see me. I had been a neighbor of Bowen s
in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably before
the war ; but his request was refused. He then sug-
gested that I should meet Pemberton. To this I
sent a verbal message saying that, if Pemberton de-
sired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's
corps at three o'clock that afternoon. I also sent
the following written reply to Pemberton's letter :
" Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice
for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitula-
558 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
tion through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless
effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended
at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of
the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance
and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the
respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with
all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the propo-
sition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitu-
lation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above."
At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point
suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the
same officers who had borne his letter of the morning.
Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith,
and several officers of my staff, accompanied me.
Our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few
hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near by stood a
stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the
event. It was but a short time before the last ves-
tige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the
fragments taken as trophies. Since then the same
tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the
shape of trophies, as " The True Cross."
Pemberton and I had served in the same division
during part of the Mexican War. I knew him very
well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaint-
ance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to
give his army if it surrendered. My answer was the
same as proposed in my reply to his letter. Pember-
ton then said, rather snappishly, ** The conference
MEETING WITH PEMBERTON. 559
might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave.
I said, "Very well." General Bo wen, I saw, was
very anxious that the surrender should be consum*
mated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton
and I were talking, showed this. He now proposed
that he and one of our generals should have a con-
ference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could
be made binding upon me that they might propose.
Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference, dur-
ing which Pemberton and I, moving a short dis-
tance away towards the enemy's lines were in con-
versation. After a while Bowen suggested that the
Confederate army should be allowed to march out
with the honors of war, carrying their small arms
and field artillery. This was promptly and uncere-
moniously rejected. The interview here ended, I
agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms
by ten o'clock that night.
Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the
correspondence with Pemberton commenced, so that
hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army
and navy. It was agreed on my parting with Pem-
berton that they should not be renewed until our
correspondence ceased.-
When I returned to my headquarters I sent for
all the corps and division commanders with the army
immediately confronting Vicksburg. Half the army
was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for John-
56o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ston. I informed them of the contents of Pember-
ton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the
interview, and that I was ready to hear any suggest
tion ; but would hold the power of deciding entirely
in my own hands. This was the nearest approach to
a -'council of war" I ever held. Against the gen-
eral, and almost unanimous judgment of the council
I sent the following letter :
" In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit
the following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicks-
burg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I
will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight
A.M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles
be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out
of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and
clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each.
The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other
property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of ra-
tions you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you
now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing
them. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams
as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be
carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and
wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.
The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst offi-
cers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners."
By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners
captured by either army were required to be for-
warded as soon as possible to either Aiken's land-
ing below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to
NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER, 56 1
Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until
they could be exchanged. There was a Confederate
commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the
exchange. I did not propose to take him a prisoner,
but to leave him free to perform the functions of his
office. Had I insisted upon an unconditional sur-
render there would have been over thirty thousand
men to transport to Cairo, very much to the incon-
venience of the army on the Mississippi. Thence
the prisoners would have had to be transported by
rail to Washington or Baltimore ; thence again by
steamer to Aiken's — all at very great expense. At
Aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because
the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to
give in exchange. Then again Pemberton's army
was largely composed of men whose homes were in
the South-west ; I knew many of them were tired of
the war and would get home just as soon as they
could. A large number of them had voluntarily
come into our lines during the siege, and requested
to be sent north where they could get employment
until the war was over and they could go to their
homes.
Late at night I received the foUov/ing reply to my
last letter :
" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your commu-
nication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this
garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted ; but, in
Vol. I.— 36
562 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in
the defence of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amend-
mentSy which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement
between us. At ten o'clock a.m. to-morrow, I propose to evacuate
the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and
garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and
arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. After which
you will take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and
personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be
respected."
This was received after midnight. My reply was
as follows :
" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your com-
munication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you
cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish
every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with
the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some
time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treat-
ment of citizens and their private property. While I do not pro-
pose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent
to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property
which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated
in my proposition of last evening ; that is, officers will be allowed
their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one
horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to
march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms
at ten o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain
as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it
Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my
terms by nine o'clock a.m. I shall regard them as having been
rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be ac-
ACCEPTING THE TERMS. 563
cepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent
such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon
your men."
Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.
During the siege there had been a good deal of
friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two
armies, on picket and where the lines were close to-
gether. All rebels were known as "Johnnies," all
Union troops as "Yanks." Often "Johnny" would
call : "Well, Yank, when are you coming into town?"
The reply was sometimes : " We propose to celebrate
the 4th of July there." Sometimes it would be :
" We always treat our prisoners with kindness and
do not want to hurt them ; " or, " We are holding
you as prisoners of war while you are feeding your-
selves." The garrison, from the commanding gen-
eral down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the
fourth. They knew from the temper of their men
it would be successful when made ; and that would be
a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it
would be attended with severe loss to them.
The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly
through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior
to the fourth, in speaking of the " Yankee " boast
that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day,
that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was " First
ketch your rabbit." The paper at this time and for
some time previous was printed on the plain side of
564 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
wall paper. The last number was issued on the
fourth and announced that we had "caught our
rabbit"
I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his
correspondence on the third with a two-fold pur-
pose : first, to avoid an assault, which he knew
would be successful, and second, to prevent the
capture taking place on the great national holiday,
the anniversary of the Declaration of American In-
dependence. Holding out for better terms as he did
he defeated his aim in the latter particular.
At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg
marched out of their works and formed line in front,
stacked arms and marched back in good order. Our
whole army present witnessed this scene without
cheering. Logan s division, which had approached
nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in ; and
the flag of one of the regiments of his division was
soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers
were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies
began to fraternize. Our men had had full rations
from the time the siege commenced, to the close.
The enemy had been suffering, particularly towards
the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from
their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had
so recently been engaged in starving out. It was
accepted with avidity and with thanks.
Pemberton says in his report :
SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 565
" If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the
day for surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon
that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity
of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the en-
trance on the 4th of July into the stronghold of the great river,
and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then
what could not be extorted from them at any other time."
This does not support my view of his reasons for
selecting the day he did for surrendering. But it
must be recollected that his first letter asking terms
was received about lo o'clock a.m., July 3d. It then
could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-
four hours to effect a surrender. He knew that
Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising
the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as
long as he could. He knew his men would not re-
sist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth.
In our interview he told me he had rations enough
to hold out for some time — my recollection is two
weeks. It was this statement that induced me to
insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for
his men from his own supplies.
On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army
of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the
trans-Mississippi department, made an attack upon
Helena, Arkansas. He was totally defeated by Gen-
eral Prentiss, who was holding Helena with less than
forty-two hundred soldiers. Holmes reported his
566 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed ; but as Pren-
tiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his
losses. The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded,
and between 30 and 40 missing. This was the last
effort on the part of the Confederacy to raise the
siege of Vicksburg.
On the third, as soon as negotiations were com
menced, I notified Sherman and directed him to be
ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive
him out of the State and destroy his army if he
could. Steele and Ord were directed at the same
time to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon
as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was
notified.
I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to
the river to exchange congratulations with the navy
upon our joint victory. At that time I found that
many of the citizens had been living under ground.
The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those
back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow
clay of great tenacity. Where roads and streets are
cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand
as well as if composed of stone. The magazines of
the enemy were made by running passage-ways into
this clay at places where there were deep cuts. Many
citizens secured places of safety for their families by
carving out rooms in these embankments. A door-
way in these cases would be cut in a high bank.
SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG, 567
Starting from the level of the road or street, and after
running in a few feet a room of the size required was
carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the
door-way. In some instances I saw where two rooms
were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in
the clay wall separating them. Some of these were
carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration.
In these the occupants were fully secure from the
shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city
night and day without intermission.
1 returned to my old headquarters outside in the
afternoon, and did not move into the town until the
sixth. On the afternoon of the fourth I sent Cap-
tain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest
point where the telegraph could be reached, with a
dispatch to the general-in-chief. It was as follows :
" The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed
is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great ad-
vantage to us at this moment. It saves, probably, several days in
the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate
service. Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on John-
ston, to drive him from the State. I will send troops to the relief
of Banks, and return the 9th army corps to Bumside."
This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won
the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from
the minds of the President, his Cabinet and the
loyal people all over the North. The fate of the
Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell. Much
568 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
hard fighting was to be done afterwards and
many precious lives were to be sacrificed ; but the
morale was with the supporters of the Union ever
after.
I at the same time wrote to General Banks in
forming him of the fall and sending him a copy
of the terms ; also saying I would send him all
the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the
only foothold the enemy now had on the Mississippi
River. General Banks had a number of copies of
this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and
very soon a copy fell into the hands of General
Gardner, who was then in command of Port Hudson.
Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of
the National forces saying that he had been informed
of the surrender of Vicksburg and telling how the
information reached him. He added that if this was
true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. Gen-
eral Banks gave him assurances that Vicksburg had
been surrendered, and General Gardner surrendered
unconditionally on the 9th of July. Port Hudson
with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms
and other stores fell into the hands of the Union
forces : from that day to the close of the rebellion
the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth,
remained in the control of the National troops,
Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg
until the whole could be paroled. The paroles
SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 569
were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for
each, Federals and Confederates), and signed by
the commanding officers of the companies or regi-
ments. Duplicates were also made for each soldier
and signed by each individually, one to be retained
by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us.
Several hundred refused to sign their paroles, pre-
ferring to be sent to the North as prisoners to being
sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of
the way, hoping to escape either alternative.
Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel
these men to sign their paroles, but I declined. It
also leaked out that many of the men who had
signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to
their homes as soon as they got out of our lines.
Pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to
assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion, to act
as guards in keeping his men together while being
marched to a camp of instruction, where he ex-
pected to keep them until exchanged. This request
was also declined. It was precisely what I expected
and hoped that they would do. I told him, how-
ever, that I would see that they marched beyond
our lines in good order. By the eleventh, just one
week after the surrender, the paroles were completed
and the Confederate garrison marched out. Many
deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to
the ranks to fight again than would have been the
570 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
case had the surrender been unconditional and the
prisoners sent to the James River to be paroled.
As soon as our troops took possession of the city
guards were established along the whole line of
parapet, from the river above to the river below.
The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old
camps behind the intrenchments. No restraint was
put upon them, except by their own commanders.
They were rationed about as our own men, and
from our supplies. The men of the two armies
fraternized as if they had been fighting for the
same cause. When they passed out of the works
they had so long and so gallantly defended, be-
tween lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer
went up, not a remark was made that would give
pain. Really, I believe there was a feeling of sad-
ness just then in the breasts of most of the Union
soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antago-
nists.
The day before the departure the following order
was issued :
" Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They
will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from
there to Edward's Ferry,* and on by way of Raymond. Instruct
the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to
make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of
ranks after they have passed."
* Meant Edward's Station.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN — SHERMAN's MOVE-
MENTS — PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPON MOBILE A
PAINFUL ACCIDENT — ORDERED TO REPORT AT
CAIRO.
THE capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ord-
nance and ordnance stores, and the successful
battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to
the loyal people of the North. New hopes for the
final success of the cause of the Union were in-
spired. The victory gained at Gettysburg, upon the
same day, added to their hopes. Now the Mississippi
River was entirely in the possession of the National
troops ; for the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port
Hudson at once. The army of northern Virginia
was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back to
about the same ground it occupied in 1861. The
Army of the Tennessee united with the Army of the
Gulf, dividing the Confederate States completely.
The first dispatch I received from the govern-
ment after the fall of Vicksburg was in these words :
" I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without ac-
tual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh arti-
cle of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and
572 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT,
that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the
enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners
have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further
orders."
Halleck did not know that they had already been
delivered into the hands of Major Watts, Confeder-
ate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners.
At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered,
together with 1 72 cannon, about 60,000 muskets and
a large amount of ammunition. The small-arms
of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of
ours. Up to this time our troops at the West had
been limited to the old United States flint-lock
muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian
musket imported early in the war — almost as dan-
gerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed
at — and a few new and improved arms. These
were of many different calibers, a fact that caused
much trouble in distributing ammunition during an
engagement. The enemy had generally new arms
which had run the blockade and were of uniform
caliber. After the surrender I authorized all colonels
whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets,
to place them in the stack of captured arms and re-
place them with the latter. A large number of arms
turned in to the Ordnance Department as captured,
were thus arms that had really been used by the
Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.
RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN, 573
In this narrative I have not made the mention I
should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services
entitle them to special mention. Neither have I
made that mention of the navy which its services
deserve. Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of
Vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in
proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers
and men. A military education was acquired which
no other school could have given. Men who thought
a company was quite enough for them to command
properly at the beginning, would have made good
regimental or brigade commanders ; most of the
brigade commanders were equal to the command of
a division, and one. Ransom, would have been equal
to the command of a corps at least. Logan and
Crocker ended the campaign fitted to command in-
dependent armies.
General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend
a full-fledged general, without having served in a
lower grade. He commanded a division in the cam-
paign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had
voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress.
I knew him as a frank, positive and generous man,
true to his friends even to a fault, but always a
leader. I dreaded his coming ; I knew from ex-
perience that it was more difficult to command two
generals desiring to be leaders than it was to com-
mand one army officered intelligently and with sub-
574 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ordination. It affords me the greatest pleasure to
record now my agreeable disappointment in respect
to his character. There was no man braver than he,
nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his su-
perior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. He
was one man as a soldier, another as a politician.
The navy under Porter was all it could be, dur-
ing the entire campaign. Without its assistance the
campaign could not have been successfully made with
twice the number of men engaged. It could not
have been made at all, in the way it was, with any
number of men without such assistance. The most
perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of
the service. There never was a request made, that
I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of
his subordinates, that was not promptly complied
with.
The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and
developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862
had gone against the prosecution of the war. Volun-
tary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft
had been resorted to ; this was resisted, and a defeat
or backward movement would have made its execu-
tion impossible. A forward movement to a decisive
victory was necessary. Accordingly I resolved to
get below Vicksburg, unite with Banks against Port
Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that
base and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our
RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN. 575
combined forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching
Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and fighting
a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing
me that he could not be at Port Hudson under ten
days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The
time was worth more than the reinforcements ; I
therefore determined to push into the interior of the
enemy's country.
With a large river behind us, held above and be-
low by the enemy, rapid movements were essential
to success. Jackson was captured the day after a new
commander had arrived, and only a few days before
large reinforcements were expected. A rapid move-
ment west was made ; the garrison of Vicksburg
was met in two engagements and badly defeated,
and driven back into its stronghold and there success-
fully besieged. It looks now as though Providence
had directed the course of the campaign while the
Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.
Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg
there were three things that required immediate
attention. The first was to send a force to drive the
enemy from our rear, and out of the State. The
second was to send reinforcements to Banks near
Port Hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph
of opening the Mississippi from its source to its
mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing
the Stars and Stripes. The third was to inform
576 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT.
the authorities at Washington and the North of
the good news, to relieve their long suspense and
strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success
of the cause they had so much at heart
Soon after negotiations were opened with General
Pemberton for the surrender of the city, I notified
Sherman, whose troops extended from Haines* Bluff
on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and
Jackson road over the Big Black on the right, and
directed him to hold his command in readiness to
advance and drive the enemy from the State as soon
as Vicksburg surrendered. Steele and Ord were
directed to be in readiness to join Sherman in his
move against General Johnston, and Sherman was
advised of this also. Sherman moved promptly,
crossing the Big Black at three different points with
as many columns, all concentrating at Bolton, twenty
miles west of Jackson.
Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg
almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell
back on Jackson. On the 8th of July Sherman was
within ten miles of Jackson and on the nth was
close up to the defences of the city and shelling the
town. The siege was kept up until the morning of
the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had
evacuated during the night. The weather was very
hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. Johnston
destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much
SHERMAN* S MOVEMENTS. K^yj
the start that pursuit was useless ; but Sherman sent
one division, Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east
of Jackson.
The National loss in the second capture of Jack-
son was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded
and missing. The Confederate loss was probably
less, except in captured. More than this number
fell into our hands as prisoners.
Medicines and food were left for the Confederate
wounded and sick who had to be left behind. A
large amount of rations was issued to the families
that remained in Jackson. Medicine and food were
also sent to Raymond for the destitute families as
well as the sick and wounded, as I thought it only
fair that we should return to these people some of
the articles we had taken while marching through
the country. I wrote to Sherman : " Impress upon
the men the importance of going through the State
in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking any-
thing not absolutely necessary for their subsistence
while travelling. They should try to create as favor-
able an impression as possible upon the people."
Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were
issued to all the people, from Bruinsburg to Jackson
and back to Vicksburg, whose resources had been
taken for the supply of our army. Very large quan-
tities of groceries and provisions were so issued.
Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his
Vol. I.— 37
578 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
troops took much the same position they had occu-
pied before — from the Big Black to Haines Bluff.
Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured
or routed all regular Confederate forces for more
than a hundred miles in all directions, I felt that the
troops that had done so much should be allowed to
do more before the enemy could recover from the
blow he had received, and while important points
might be captured without bloodshed I suggest-
ed to the General-in-chief the idea of a campaign
against Mobile, starting from Lake Pontchartrain.
Halleck preferred another course. The possession
of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed
to possess more importance in his mind than almost
any campaign east of the Mississippi. I am
well aware that the President was very anxious to
have a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some
of the foreign governments which seemed to be
seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so
far as to recognize belligerent rights to the Confed-
erate States. This, however, could have been easily
done without wasting troops in western Louisiana
and eastern Texas, by sending a garrison at once to
Brownsville on the Rio Grande.
Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go
against Mobile, so that I was obliged to settle down
and see myself put again on the defensive as I had
been a year before in west Tennessee. It would have
PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPON MOBILE. 579
been an easy thing to capture Mobile at the time I
proposed to go there. Having that as a base of
operations, troops could have been thrown into the
interior to operate against General Bragg's army.
This would necessarily have compelled Bragg to
detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. If he
had not done this the troops from Mobile could have
inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the coun-
try from which his army and Lee's were yet receiving
their supplies. I was so much impressed with this
idea that I renewed my request later in July and
again about the ist of August, and proposed sending
all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance
of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at
or near Mobile. I also asked for a leave of absence
to visit New Orleans, particularly if my suggestion
to move against Mobile should be approved. Both
requests were refused. So far as my experience with
General Halleck went it was very much easier for
him to refuse a favor than to grant one. But I did
not regard this as a favor. It was simply in line of
duty, though out of my department.
The General-in-chief having decided against me,
the depletion of an army, which had won a suc-
cession of great victories, commenced, as had
been the case the year before after the fall of
Corinth when the army was sent where it would
do the least good By orders, I sent to Banks a
580 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRAXT.
force of 4,000 men ; returned the 9th corps to Ken-
tucky and, when transportation had been collected,
started a division of 5,000 men to Schofield in
Missouri where Price was raiding the State. I also
detached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to
garrison that place permanently. This latter move
was quite fortunate as to the time when Ransom
arrived there. The enemy happened to have a large
number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the
way from Texas to feed the Eastern armies, and also
a large amount of munitions of war which had prob-
ably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and
which were on the way to Lee's and other armies in
the East
The troops that were left with me around Vicks-
burg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in
making expeditions against guerilla bands and small
detachments of cavalry which infested the interior,
and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on
the railroads. The guerillas and cavalry were not
there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disap-
peared on the first approach of our troops.
The country back of Vicksburg was filled with
deserters from Pemberton's army and, it was re-
ported, many from Johnston's also. The men deter-
mined not to fight again while the war lasted. Those
who lived beyond the reach of the Confederate
army wanted to get to their homes. Those who
A PAINFUL ACCIDENT. 58 1
did not, wanted to get North where they could work
for their support till the war was over. Besides all
this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time
being, among the citizens of that part of Missis-
sippi, but this feeling soon subsided. It is not prob-
able that Pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his
army to the camp where he proposed taking them,
and these were in a demoralized condition.
On the 7th of August I further depleted my army
by sending the J 3th corps, General Ord command-
ing, to Banks. Besides this I received orders to
co-operate with the latter general in movements west
of the Mississippi. Having received this order I
went to New Orleans to confer with Banks about the
proposed movement. All these movements came
to naught.
During this visit I reviewed Banks' army a short
distance above Carrollton. The horse I rode was
vicious and but little used, and on my return to New
Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in
the street, fell, probably on me. I was rendered
insensible, and when I regained consciousness I
found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors
attending me. My leg was swollen from the knee
to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of
bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit.
The pain was almost beyond endurance. I lay at
the hotel something over a week without being able
582 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, 5. GRANT.
to turn myself in bed. I had a steamer stop at the
nearest point possible, and was carried to it on a
litter. I was then taken to Vicksburg, where I
remained unable to move for some time after-
wards.
While I was absent General Sherman declined to
assume command because, he said, it would confuse
the records ; but he let all the orders be made in my
name, and was glad to render any assistance he could.
No orders were issued by my staff, certainly no im-
portant orders, except upon consultation with and
approval of Sherman.
On the 13th of September, while I was still in
New Orleans, Halleck telegraphed to me to send all
available forces to Memphis and thence to Tuscum-
bia. to co-operate with Rosecrans for the relief of
Chattanooga. On the 15th he telegraphed again
for all available forces to go to Rosecrans. This
was received on the 27th. I was still contined to
mv bed. unable to rise from it without assistance ;
but I at once ordered Sherman to send one division
to Memphis as fast as transports could be provided.
The division of McPherson s corps, which had got
off and was on the way to join Steele in Arkansas,
was recalled and sent, likewse, to report to Hurlbut
at Memphis^ Hurlbut was directed to forward these
two divisions with two others from his own corps at
once, and also to send any other troops that might be
ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO. 583
returning there. Halleck suggested that some good
man, like Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to
Memphis to take charge of the troops going east.
On this I sent Sherman, as being, I thought, the
most suitable person for an independent command,
and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given
to any one. He was directed to take with him
another division of his corps. This left one back,
but having one of McPherson's divisions he had
still the equivalent.
Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle
of Chickamauga had been fought and Rosecrans
forced back into Chattanooga. The administra-
tion as well as the General-in-chief was nearly fran-
tic at the situation of affairs there. Mr. Charles A.
Dana, an officer of the War Department, was sent
to Rosecrans headquarters I do not know what
his instructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga
when I arrived there at a later period.
It seems that Halleck suggested that I should
go to Nashville as soon as able to move and take
general direction of the troops moving from the
west. I received the following dispatch dated
October 3d : *' It is the wish of the Secretary of War
that as soon as General Grant is able he will
come to Cairo and report by telegraph." I was
still very lame, but started without delay. Arriv-
ing at Columbus on the i6th I reported by tele-
584 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. 5. GRANT.
graph: "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d
directing me to report from Cairo was received
at 11.30 on the loth. Left the same day with
staff and headquarters and am here en route for
Cairo. "
END OF VOL. I.
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