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COMMISSION, 1900-1913 



Volume I n O ^ 




Copyright, 1914, 

Set up and electrotyped. Published February, 1914. 

Norbioat ilrees 

J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co, 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



I. View Point and Subject-Matter .... 1 

II. Was Independence Promised ? 18 

III. Insurgent " Cooperation " 67 

IV. The Premeditated Insurgent Attack . . . 127 
V. Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report 152 

VI. Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley . . 170 

VII. Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere . 206 

Vni. Did We Destroy a Republic? 242 

IX. The Conduct of the War 270 

X. Mr. Bryan and Independence 295 

XI. The First Philippine Commission .... 301 

XII. The Establishment of Civil Government . . 325 

XIII. The Philippine Civil Service 360 

XIV. The Constabulary and Public Order . . . 378 
XV. The Administration of Justice 400 

XVI. Health Conditions 408 

XVII. Baguio and the Benguet Road 449 

XVIII. The Coordination of Scientific Work . . . 488 


Peace and Prosperity Frontispiece 


Fort San Antonio Abad, showing the Effect of the Fire from 

Dewey's Fleet 6 

Felipe Buencamino 14 

The San Juan Bridge 20 

Insurgent Prisoners 28 

Typical Insurgent Trenches 36 

Inside View of Insurgent Trenches at the Bagbag River ... 42 

General Henry W. Lawton 50 

Feeding Filipino Refugees 58 

The First Philippine Commission 61 

The Second Philippine Commission 72 

The Return of Mr. Taft 80 

Governor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot Escort . 88 

Governor-general Forbes in the Wild Man's Country ... 96 

The Philippine Supreme Court 104 

An Unsanitary Well . . 112 

A Flowing Artesian Well 112 

An Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila . . 120 

An Improved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila . . . 128 

Disinfecting by the Acre 136 

An Old-style Provincial Jail 144 

Retreat at Bilibid Prison, Manila 154 

Bilibid Prison Hospital 160 

Modern Contagious Disease Ward, San Lazaro Hospital . . . 168 

Filipina Trained Nurses 176 

Staff of the Bontoc Hospital 184 

A Victim of Yaws before and after Treatment with Salvarsan . 192 

The Culion Leper Colony 200 

Building the Benguet Road 208 

Freight Autos on the Benguet Road 216 

The Famous Zig-zag on the Benguet Road 224 

A Typical Baguio Road 232 




One of the First Benguet Government Cottages .... 240 

Typical Cottages at Baguio 248 

A Baguio Home 256 

The Baguio Hospital 264 

Government Centre at Baguio 272 

A Scene in the Baguio Teachers' Camp 280 

The Baguio Country Club 288 

The Bureau of Science Building, Manila 306 

The Philippine General Hospital 314 

The College of Medicine and Surgery, Manila 322 

An Old-style Schoolhouse, with Teachers and Pupils . . . 330 

A Modern Primary School Building 338 

Old-style Central School Building 346 

Modern Central School Building 346 

Typical Scene in a Trade School 354 

An Embroidery Class 362 

Philippine Embroidery 370 

Filipino Trained Nurses 380 

A School Athletic Team 386 

Filipina Girls playing Basket-ball 394 

University Hall, Manila 402 

Bakidau 410 

In Hostile Country 418 

Travel under Difficulties 426 

Dangerous Navigation 434 

A Negrito Family and their " House " 442 

A Typical Negrito 446 

Typical Kalingas 452 

Settling a Head-hunting Feud 458 

Entertaining the Kalingas 464 

An Tfugao Family 470 

Ifugao Dancers 478 

An Ifugao Dancer 484 

Ifugao Rice Terraces ...»»••••• 492 




View Point and Subject-Matter 

It is customary in Latin countries for a would-be 
author or orator to endeavour, at the beginning of his book 
or his speech, to estabhsh his status. Possibly I have be- 
come partially Latinized as the result of some eighteen 
years of residence in the Philippines. At all events it is 
my purpose to state at the outset facts which will tend to 
make clear my view point and at the same time briefly to 
outhne the subject-matter which I hereinafter discuss. 

As a boy I went through several of the successive 
stages of collector's fever from which the young commonly 
suffer. First it was postage stamps; then birds' nests, 
obtained during the winter season when no longer of use 
to their builders. Later 1 was allowed to collect eggs, 
and finally the birds themselves. At one time my great 
ambition was to become a taxidermist. My family did 
not actively oppose this desire but suggested that a few 
prehminary years in school and college might prove useful. 

I eventually lost my ambition to be a taxidermist but 
did not lose my interest in zoology and botany. While a 
student at the University of Michigan I speciaUzed in 
these subjects. I was fortunate in having as one of my 
instructors Professor Joseph B. Steere, then at the head 
of the Department of Zoology. Professor Steere, who 
had been a great traveller, at times entertained his classes 



with wonderfully interesting tales of adventure on the 
Amazon and in the Andes, Peru, Formosa, the Philippines 
and the Dutch Moluccas. My ambition was fired by 
his stories and when in the spring of 1886 he announced 
his intention of returning to the Philippines the following 
year to take up and prosecute anew zoological work which 
he had begun there in 1874, offering to take with him a 
limited number of his students who were to have the 
benefit of his knowledge of Spanish and of his wide ex- 
perience as a traveller and collector, and were in turn to 
allow him to work up their collections after their return 
to the United States, I made up my mind to go. 

I was then endeavouring to get through the University 
on an allowance of $375 per year and was in consequence 
not overburdened with surplus funds. I however managed 
to get my life insured for $1500 and to borrow $1200 on 
the policy, and with this rather limited sum upon which 
to draw purchased an outfit for a year's collecting and 
sailed with Doctor Steere for Manila. Two other young 
Americans accompanied him. One of these. Doctor 
Frank S. Bourns, was like myself afterwards destined to 
play a part in Philippine affairs which was not then 
dreamed of by either of us. 

We spent approximately a year in the islands. Unfor- 
tunately we had neglected to provide ourselves with 
proper official credentials and as a result we had some 
embarrassing experiences. We were arrested by sus- 
picious Spanish officials shortly after our arrival and were 
tried on trumped-up charges. On several subsequent 
occasions we narrowly escaped arrest and imprisonment. 

The unfriendly attitude of certain of our Spanish ac- 
quaintances was hardly to be wondered at. They could 
not believe that sensible, civilized human beings would 
shoot tiny birds, pay for eggs the size of the tip of one's 
little finger more than hens' eggs were worth, undergo 
not a few hardships and run many risks while living in 
the simplest of native houses on very inadequate food, 


unless actuated by some hidden purpose. At different 
times they suspected us of looking for gold deposits, of 
designing to stir up trouble among the natives, or of being 
political spies. 

When Doctor Bourns came back with the American 
troops in 1908 and I returned as a member of the first 
Philippine Commission in 1909, this last supposition be- 
came a fixed belief with many of our former Spanish ac- 
quaintances who still remained in the islands, and they 
frankly expressed their regret that they had not shot us 
while they had the chance. 

Over against certain unpleasant experiences with those 
who could not understand us or our work I must set 
much kind and invaluable assistance rendered by others 
who could, and did. 

All in all we spent a most interesting year, visiting 
eighteen of the more important islands.^ 

Throughout this trip we lived in very close contact 
with the Filipinos, either occupying the tribunales, the 
municipal buildings of their towns, where they felt at 
Hberty to call and observe us at all hours of the day and 
night, or actually living in their houses, which in some 
instances were not vacated by the owners during our 

Incidentally we saw something of several of the wild 
tribes, including the Tagbanuas of Palawan, the Moros of 
Jolo, Basilan and Mindanao, and the Mangyans of 

We experienced many very real hardships, ran not a 
few serious risks and ended our sojourn with six weeks of 
fever and starvation in the interior of Mindoro. While 
we would not have cut short our appointed stay by a 
day, we were nevertheless delighted when we could turn 
our faces homeward, and Doctor Bourns and I agreed 

^ Cuyo, Palawan, Balabac, Cagayan de Jol6, Jol6 proper, Basilan, 
Mindanao, Panay, Guimaras, Negros, Siquijor, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, 
Leyte, Masbate, Marinduque and Mindoro, 


that we had had quite enough of Hfe in the Phihp- 

Upon my arrival at my home in Vermont a competent 
physician told my family that I might not live a week. 
I however recuperated so rapidly that I was able to re- 
turn to the University of Michigan that fall and to com- 
plete the work of my senior year. I became a member of 
the teaching staff of the institution before my graduation. 

Little as I suspected it at the time, the tropics had fixed 
their strangely firm grip on me during that fateful first 
trip to the Far East which was destined to modify my 
whole subsequent life. I had firmly believed that if 
fortunate enough to get home I should have sense 
enough to stay there, but before six months had elapsed 
I was finding life at Ann Arbor, Michigan, decidedly 
prosaic, and longing to return to the Philippines and 
finish a piece of zoological work which I knew was as yet 
only begun. 

Doctor Bourns, like myself, was eager to go back, and 
we set out to raise $10,000 to pay the expenses of a two- 
years collecting tour, in the course of which we hoped to 
visit regions not hitherto penetrated by any zoologist. 

Times were then getting hard, and good Doctor Angell, 
the president of the university, thought it a great joke 
that two young fellovs^s like ourselves should attempt to 
raise so considerable a sum to be spent largel}^ for our own 
benefit. Whenever he met me on the street he used to 
ask whether we had obtained that $10,000 yet, and then 
shake with laughter. One of the great satisfactions of 
my life came when, on a beautiful May morning in 1890, 
I was able to answer his inquiry in the aflftrmative. 

He fairly staggered with amazement, but promptly re- 
covering himself warmly congratulated me, and with 
that kindly interest which he has always shown in the 
affairs of young men, asked how he could help us. Through 
his kindl}^ offices and the intervention of the State De- 
partment we were able to obtain a royal order from the 


Spanish government which assured us a very different 
reception on our return to the PhiHppines in August from 
that which had been accorded us on the occasion of our 
first visit to the islands. 

There was now revealed to us a pleasing side of Spanish 
character which we had largely missed during our first 
visit. Satisfied as to our identity and as to the motives 
which actuated us, the Spanish officials, practically with- 
out exception, did everything in their power to assist us 
and to render our sojourn pleasant and profitable. Our 
mail was delivered to us at points fifty miles distant 
from provincial capitals. When our remittances failed 
to reach us on time, as they not infrequently did, money 
was loaned to us freely without security. Troops were 
urged upon us for our protection when we desired to pene- 
trate regions considered to be dangerous. Our Spanish 
friends constantly offered us the hospitality of their homes 
and with many of them the offer was more than pro forma. 
Indeed, in several instances it was insisted upon so 
strongly that we accepted it, to our great pleasure and 

OflScials were quite frank in discussing before us the 
affairs of their several provinces, and we gained a very 
clear insight into existing political methods and conditions. 

During this trip we lived in even closer contact with 
the Filipino ^ population than on the occasion of our first 
\'isit. Our rapidly growing knowledge of Spanish, and 
of Visayan, one of the more important native dialects, 
rendered it increasingly easy for us to comnmnicate with 
them, gain their confidence and learn to look at things 

1 I employ the noun Filipinos to designate collectively the eight 
civilized, Christianized peoples, called respectively the Cagayans, 
Ilocanos, Pangasinans, Zambalans, Pampangans, Tagalogs, Bicols 
and Visayans, or any of them; the adjective Filipino to designate 
anjiihing pertaining to these peoples, or any of them ; the noun Phil- 
ippines to designate the country, and the adjective Phihppine to desig- 
nate anything pertaining to the country as distinguished from its 


from their view point. They talked with us most frankly 
and fully about their political troubles. 

During this our second sojourn in the Philippines, 
which lengthened to two years and six months, we re- 
visited the islands with which we had become more or 
less familiar on our first trip and added six others to the 
list.^ We lived for a time among the wild Bukidnons 
and Negritos of the Negros mountains. 

After my companion had gone to Borneo I had the mis- 
fortune to contract typhoid fever when alone in Busuanga, 
and being ignorant of the nature of the malady from 
which I was suffering, kept on my feet until I could no 
longer stand, with the natural result that I came uncom- 
monly near paying for my foolishness with my life, and 
have ever since suffered from resulting physical disabili- 
ties. When able to travel, I left the islands upon the 
urgent recommendation of my physician, feeling that the 
task which had led me to return there was almost accom- 
plished and sure that my wanderings in the Far East 
were over. 

Shortly after my return to the United States I was 
offered a position as a member of the zoological staff of 
the University of Michigan, accepted it, received speedy 
promotion, and hoped and expected to end my days as a 
college professor. 

In 1898 the prospect of war with Spain awakened old 
memories. I fancy that the knowledge then possessed 
by the average American citizen relative to the Philip- 
pines was fairly well typified by that of a good old lady 
at my Vermont birthplace who had spanked me when I 
was a small boy, and who, after my first return from the 
Philippine Islands, said to me, ''Deanie, are them Philip- 
pians you have been a visitin' the people that Paul wrote 
the Epistle to?" 

I endeavoured to do my part toward dispelling this 
ignorance. My knowledge of Philippine affairs led me 

1 Busuanga, Culion, Tawi Tawi, Tablas, Romblon and Sibuyan. 

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strongly to favour armed intervention in Cuba, where 
similar political conditions seemed to prevail to a con- 
siderable extent, and I fear that I was considered by many 
of my university colleagues something of a ''jingo." 
Indeed, a member of the University Board of Regents 
said that I ought to be compelled to enlist. As a matter 
of fact, compulsion would have been quite unnecessary 
had it not been for physical disability. 

My life-long friend and former travelling companion. 
Doctor Bourns, was not similarly hampered. He 
promptly joined the army as a medical officer with the 
rank of major, and sailed for the islands on the second 
steamer which carried United States troops there. As a 
natural result of his familiarity with Spanish and his 
wide acquaintanceship among the Filipinos, he was 
ordered from the outset to devote his time more largely 
to political matters than to the practice of his profession. 
He did all that he could to prevent misunderstandings 
between Filipinos and Americans. He assisted as an 
interpreter at the negotiations for the surrender of Manila 
on August 13, 1898, after taking part in the attack on 
the city. Later he was given the rather difficult task of 
suppressing a bad outbreak of smallpox among the 
Spanish prisoners of war, which he performed with great 
success. He was finally made chief health officer of 
Manila, although he continued to devote himself largely 
to political matters, got numberless deserving Filipinos 
out of trouble, and rapidly increased his already wide 
circle of Filipino friends. Through his letters I was kept 
quite closely in touch with the situation. 

Meanwhile I decided that the Philippines were not for 
me, asked for and obtained leave for study in Europe, 
and in December 1898 set out for New York to engage 
passage for myself and my family. I went by way of 
Washington in order to communicate to President Mc- 
Kinley certain facts relative to the Philippine situation 
which it seemed to me ought to be brought to his attention. 


I believed that there was serious danger of an outbreak 
of hostiUties between Fihpinos and Americans, and that 
such a catastrophe, resulting from mutual misunder- 
standing, might be avoided if seasonable action were 
taken. I have since learned how wrong was this latter 
belief. My previous experience had been almost exclu- 
sively with the Visayans and the wild tribes, and the 
revolution against the United States was at the outset a 
strictly Tagalog affair, and hence beyond my ken. 

President McKinley very kindly gave me all the time 
I wanted, displayed a most earnest desire to learn the 
truth, and showed the deepest and most friendly interest 
in the Filipinos. Let no man believe that then or later 
he had the slightest idea of bringing about the exploita- 
tion of their country. On the contrary, he evinced a 
most earnest desire to learn what was best for them and 
then to do it if it lay within his power. 

To my amazement, at the end of our interview he asked 
me whether I would be willing to go to the islands as his 
personal representative. 

I could not immediately decide to make such a radical 
change in my plans as this would involve, and asked for 
a week's time to think the matter over, which was granted. 
I decided to go. 

Meanwhile, the President had evolved the idea of 
sending out a commission and asked me if I would serve 
on it. I told him that I would and left for my home to 
make preparations for an early departure. A few days 
later he announced the names of the commissioners. 
They were Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell 
University; Major-General Elwell S. Otis, then the rank- 
ing army officer in the Philippines ; Rear- Admiral George 
Dewey, then in command of the United States fleet in 
Philippine waters ; Colonel Charles Denby, who had for 
fourteen years served as United States Minister to China, 
and myself. 

Colonel Denby was delayed in Washington by pubhc 


business. Mr. Schurman and I reached Yokohama on 
the morning of February 13, and on arrival there 
learned, to our deep regret, that hostilities had broken 
out on the fourth instant. We reached Manila on the 
evening of March 4, but Colonel Denby was unable to 
join us until x\pril 2, Meanwhile, as we could not begin 
our work in his absence, I had an exceptional opportunity 
to observe conditions in the field, of which I availed 

I served with the first Philippine Commission until it 
had completed its work, and was then appointed to the 
second Philippine Commission without a day's break in 
my period of service. 

The members of this latter body were William H. Taft 
of Ohio ; Luke E. Wright of Tennessee ; Henry C. Ide 
of Vermont ; Bernard Moses of California, and myself. 
Briefly stated, the task before us was to establish civil 
government in the Philippine Islands. After a period of 
ninety days, to be spent in observation, the commission 
was to become the legislative body, while executive 
power continued to be vested for a time in the military. 

This condition endured until the 4th of July, 1901, on 
which day Mr. Taft was appointed civil governor. On 
September 1, 1901, each of the remaining original members 
of the commission became an executive officer as well. 
Mr. Wright was appointed secretary of commerce and 
police ; Mr. Ide, secretary of finance and justice ; Mr. 
Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I mj^self, 
Secretary of the Interior. On the same daj'- three Fili- 
pino members were added to the commission : Dr. T. H. 
Pardo de Tavera, Sr. Benito Legarda and Sr. Jose R. de 

Until the 16th of October, 1907, the Commission con- 
tinued to serve as the sole legislative body. It is at 
the present time the upper house of the Philippine Leg- 
islature, the Philippine x'Vssembly, composed of eighty- 
one elective members, constituting the lower house. 


I have therefore had a hand in the enactment of all 
legislation put in force in the Philippine Islands since the 
American occupation, with the exception of certain laws 
passed during my few and brief absences. 

As secretary of the interior it fell to my lot to organize 
and direct the operations of a Bureau of Health, a Bureau 
of Government Laboratories, a Bureau of Forestry, a 
Bureau of Pubhc Lands, a Bureau of Agriculture, a 
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, a Mining Bureau and a 
Weather Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau of Non- 
Christian Tribes and the Mining Bureau were incorporated 
with the Bureau of Government Laboratories to form the 
Bureau of Science, which continued under my executive 
control. The Bureau of Agriculture was transferred to 
the Department of Pubhc Instruction in 1909. 

I was at the outset given administrative contl-ol of all 
matters pertaining to the non-Christian tribes, which 
constitute, roughly speaking, an eighth of the population 
of the Philippines, and until my resignation retained such 
control throughout the islands, except in the Moro 
Province, which at an early day was put directly under 
the governor-general. 

I participated in the organization of civil government 
in the several provinces of the archipelago, and myself 
drafted the Municipal Code for the government of the 
towns inhabited by Filipinos, as well as the Special Pro- 
vincial Government Act and the Township Government 
Act for that of the provinces and settlements inhabited 
chiefly by the non-Christian tribes. 

At the outset we did not so much as know with cer- 
tainty the names of the several wild and savage tribes 
inhabiting the more remote and inaccessible portions of 
the archipelago. As I was unable to obtain reliable in- 
formation concerning them on which to base legislation 
for their control and uplifting, I proceeded to get such 
inform^ation for myself by visiting their territory, much 
of which was then quite unexplored. 


After this territory was organized into five so-called 
''Special Government Provinces," some of my Filipino 
friends, I fear not moved solely by anxiety for the public 
good, favoured and secured a legislative enactment which 
made it my official duty to visit and inspect these pro- 
vinces at least once during each fiscal year. I shall 
always feel indebted to them for giving me this oppor- 
tunity to become intimately acquainted with some of 
the most interesting, most progressive, and potentially 
most important peoples of the Philippines. 

When in 1901 I received the news that a central gov- 
ernment was soon to be established, I was in the Sub- 
province of Lepanto on my first trip through the wilder 
and less-known portions of northern Luzon. During 
each succeeding year I have spent from two to four 
months in travel through the archipelago, familiarizing 
myself at first hand with local conditions. 

I have frequently taken with me on these inspection 
trips representatives of the Bureaus of Forestry, Agricul- 
ture, Science and Health to carry on practical investiga- 
tions, and have made it my business to visit and explore 
little known and unknown regions. There are very few 
islands worthy of the name which it has not been my 
privilege to visit. 

The organization of an effective campaign against 
diseases Hke bubonic plague, smallpox, Asiatic cholera 
and leprosy in a country where no similar work had ever 
previously been undertaken, inliabited by people pro- 
foundly ignorant of the benefits to be derived from 
modem methods of sanitation, and superstitious to a 
degree, promptly brought me into \dolent conflict with 
the beliefs and prejudices of a large portion of the Filipino 

A similar result followed the inauguration of an active 
campaign for the suppression of surra, foot and mouth 
disease, and rinderpest, which were rapidly destroying 
the horses and cattle. 


From the outset I was held responsible for the enforce- 
ment of marine and land quarantine regulations, which 
were at first very obnoxious to the general public. 

When the Pure Food and Drugs Act adopted by Con- 
gress for the United States was made applicable to the 
Philippines without any provision for its enforcement, 
this not altogether pleasant duty was assigned to me. 

I did not seek appointment to the Philippine service 
in the first instance. The political influence at my com- 
mand has never extended beyond my own vote. During 
a period of twelve years my removal was loudly and fre- 
quently demanded, yet I saw President Schurman, Colonel 
Denby, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Commissioner 
Moses, Governor Taft, Governor Wright, Governor Ide, 
Governor Smith, Secretary Shuster, Commissioner Tavera, 
Commissioner Legarda and Governor Forbes, all my col- 
leagues on one or the other of the Philippine commissions, 
leave the service, before my own voluntary retirement 
on September 15, 1913. 

I had long expected a request for my resignation at 
any time, and had often wished that it might come. 
Indeed I once before tendered it voluntarily, only to have 
President Taft saj^ that he thought I should withdraw it, 
which I did. I am absolutely without political ambition 
save an earnest desire to earn the political epitaph, "He 
did what he could." 

During my brief and infrequent visits to the United 
States I have discovered there widespread and radical 
misapprehension as to conditions in the Philippines, but 
have failed to find that lack of interest in them which is 
commonly said to exist. On the contrary, I have found 
the American public keenly desirous of getting at the real 
facts whenever there was an opportunity to do so. 

The extraordinary extent to which untrue statements 
have been accepted at their face value has surprised and 
deeply disturbed me. I have conversed with three col- 
lege presidents, each of whom beUeved that the current 


expenses of the Philippine government were paid from 
the United States Treasury. 

The preponderance of false and misleading statements 
about the Philippines is due, it seems to me, primarily to 
the fact that it is those persons with whom the climate 
disagrees and who in consequence are invalided home, 
and those who are separated from the service in the in- 
terest of the public good, who return to the United States 
and get an audience there ; while those who successfully 
adapt themselves to local conditions, display interest in 
their work and become proficient in it, remain in the 
islands for long periods during which they are too busy, 
and too far from home, to make themselves heard. 

Incidentally it must be remembered that if such per- 
sons do attempt to set forth facts which years of practical 
experience have taught them, they are promptly accused 
of endeavouring to save their own bread and butter by 
seeking to perpetuate conditions which insure them fat 

When I think of the splendid men who have uncom- 
plainingly laid dowai their lives in the military and in the 
civil service of their country in these islands, and of the 
larger number who have given freely of their best years 
to unselfish, efficient work for others, this charge fills me 
with indignation. 

The only thing that kept me in the PhiUppine service 
for so long a time ^vas my interest in the work for the 
non-Christian tribes and my fear that while my successor 
was gaining knowledge concerning it which can be had 
only through experience, matters might temporarily go 
to the bad. It has been my ambition to bring this w^ork 
to such a point that it would move on, for a time at least, 
by its own momentum. 

I am now setting forth my views relative to the past 
and present situation in the islands because I believe 
that their inhabitants are confronted by a danger graver 
than any which they have before faced since the time 


when their fate wavered in the balance, while the ques- 
tion whether the United States should acquire sover- 
eignty over them or should allow Spain to continue to 
rule them was under consideration. 

It is my purpose to tell the plain, hard truth regard- 
less of the effect of such conduct upon my future career. 
It has been alleged that my views on Philippine prob- 
lems were coloured by a desire to retain my official position. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, no 
man who has not served for long and sometimes very 
weary years as a public official, and has not been a target 
for numerous more or less irresponsible individuals whose 
hands were filled wdth mud and who were actuated by a 
fixed desire to throw it at something, can appreciate as 
keenly as I do the manifold blessings which attend the 
life of a private citizen. 

I trust that I have said enough to make clear my view 
point, and now a word as to subject-matter. It is my in- 
tention to correct some of the very numerous misstate- 
ments which have been made concerning past and present 
conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote, from time 
to time, such statements, both verbal and written, and 
more especially some of those which have recently ap- 
peared in a book entitled ''The American Occupation of 
the Philippines, 1898-1912," by James H. Blount, who 
signs himself ''Officer of the United States Volunteers in 
the Philippines, 1899-1901 ; United States District Judge 
in the Philippines, 1901-1905." 

Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyper- 
bole, and has made so very evident the bitter personal 
animosities which inspire many of his statements, that it 
has been a genuine surprise to his former associates and 
acquaintances that his book has been taken seriously. 

It should be sufficiently evident to any unprejudiced 
reader that in writing it he has played the part of the 
special pleader rather than that of the historian. He 
has used government records freely, and as is usually the 

Felipe Buencamino. 

Perhaps the most prolific writer on political subjects whom the Philippines 
have produced. He was at one time a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet and 
accompanied Agiiinaldo's mother and son when they surrendered in order 
to obtain American protection. 


case when a special pleader quotes from such records, the 
nature of the matter which he has omitted is worthy of 
more than passing attention. I shall hope to be able to 
fill some of the gaps that he has left in the documentary 
history of the events which he discusses and by so do- 
ing, very materially to change its purport. 

As pubhc documents have been so misused, and as a 
new administration is bestowing on Filipinos poUtical 
offices, and giving them opportunities, for which they are 
as yet utterly unprepared, thus endangering the results of 
years of hard, patient, self-sacrificing work performed by 
experienced and competent men, it becomes necessary to 
strike home by revealing unpleasant facts which are of 
record but have not heretofore been disclosed because of 
the injury to reputations and the wounding of feelings 
which would result from their publication. In doing 
this I feel that I am only discharging a duty to the people 
of the United States, who are entitled to know the truth 
if the present possibility of Philippine independence is to 
be seriously considered, and to the several FiUpino peoples 
who are to-day in danger of rushing headlong to their 
own utter and final destruction. 

At the outset I shall discuss the oft-asserted claim that 
the Fihpino leaders were deceived and betrayed by Ameri- 
can officials whom they assisted, and that this unpar- 
donable conduct led to the outbreak of active hostihties 
which occurred just prior to the arrival at Manila of the 
first PhiHppine Commission. 

I shall then show that these leaders never estabhshed a 
government which adequately protected life and property, 
or gave to their people peace, happiness or justice, but 
on the contrary inaugurated a veritable reign of terror 
under which murder became a governmental institution, 
while rape, inhuman torture, burying alive and other 
ghastly crimes were of common occurrence, and usually 
went unpunished. The data which I use in establishing 
these contentions are for the most part taken directly 


from the Insurgent records, in referring to which I employ 
the war department abbreviation "P. I. R." followed 
by a number. 

I next take up some of the more important subsequent 
historical events, describing the work of the first Philip- 
pine Commission, and showing in what manner the 
government established by the second Philippine Com- 
mission has discharged its stewardship, subsequently dis- 
cussing certain as yet unsolved problems which confront 
the present government, such as that presented by the 
existence of slavery and peonage, and that of the non- 
Christian tribes. For the benefit of those who, like Judge 
Blount, consider the Philippines "a vast straggly archi- 
pelago of jungle-covered islands in the south seas which 
have been a nuisance to eveiy government that ever 
owned them," I give some facts as to the islands, their 
climate, their natural resources and their commercial 
possibilities, and close by setting forth my views as to 
the present ability of the civilized Cagayans, Ilocanos, 
Pampangans, Zambals, Pangasinans, Tagalogs, Bicols 
and Visayans, commonly and correctly called Filipinos, 
to establish, or to maintain when established, a stable 
government throughout Filipino territory, to say nothing 
of bringing under just and effective control, and of pro- 
tecting and civilizing, the people of some twenty-seven 
non-Christian tribes which constitute an eighth of the 
population, and occupy approximately half of the terri- 
tory, of the Philippine Islands. 

I wish here to acknowledge my very great indebtedness 
to Major J. R. M. Taylor, who has translated and com- 
piled the Insurgent ^ records, thereby making available a 
very large mass of reliable and most valuable information 
without which a number of chapters of this book would 
have remained unwritten. Surely no man who bases his 

1 I use the word " Insurgents " as a proper noun, to designate the 
Filipinos who took up arms against the United States, hence capitalize 
it, and the adjective derived from it. 



statements concerning Filipino rule on the facts set forth 
in these records can be accused of deriving his informa- 
tion from hostile or prejudiced sources. 
Of them, Major Taylor says : — 

"No one reading the Insurgent records can fail to be im- 
pressed with the difference between the Spanish and the Tagd- 
log documents. Many of the former are doubtless written 
with a view to their coming into the hands of the Americans, or 
with deliberate purpose to have them do so, and are framed 
accordingly. All Tagdiog documents, intended only for Fili- 
pinos, say much that is not said in the Spanish documents. 
The orders of the Dictator ^ to his subjects were conveyed in 
the latter series of documents." 

^ General Aguinaldo. 

VOL. I — C 


Was Independence Promised? 

It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to 
allege, or to insinuate, that American consuls and naval 
officers promised the Insurgent leaders that the inde- 
pendence of the Philippines would be recognized by the 
United States. It has been claimed by some that the 
cooperation of the Insurgents in the military operations 
against Manila was sought for and secured. Others say 
that they were at least de facto allies of the United States, 
and that they were in the end shamelessly betrayed and 
wantonly attacked. 

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly 
by the Insurgent records, that each of them is false. I 
ask the forbearance of my readers if, in the three chapters 
which I devote to these matters, I quote documentary 
evidence at length. When original documents or extracts 
from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story, I 
sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other 
cases I give my own version of the facts which they set 
forth, but give the full text in foot-notes. In nearly all 
instances references are given to sources of documentary 
information. I greatly regret that Taylor's narrative, 
with its very numerous supporting documents, is not 
readily accessible to the student of history. It ought to 
have been published, but never got beyond the galley- 
proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore obhged to 
use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures 
designating the page of this galley proof on which the 
passage referred to is found. Whenever possible I give 



the War Department numbers ^ of Insurgent documents, 
but in a few cases can give only the exhibit numbers 
assigned by Taylor in printing the documents. 

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find 
any one of them. Copies of his work may be found in the 
War Department and in the office of the Chief of the 
Philippine Constabulary. 

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were 
deceived, even had deceit been practised as claimed, 
Aguinaldo would have had no just ground for com- 
plaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its 
use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the 
Americans, as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited.- 
However, most Americans hold to a standard very dif- 
ferent from his. Was it departed from in this instance ? 

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that 
Pratt and Dewey promised him the recognition of the 
independence of the Phihppines by the United States.^ 

Judge Blount has referred to the ''c?e facto alliance 
between the Americans and Aguinaldo," and has dwelt 
at length on ''promises, both expressed and implied," 
which were subsequently repudiated by Consul Pratt, 
Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt, 
constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically 
charge, bad faith on the part of these officers of the 
United States.* 

On analyzing his statements we find that he is dis- 
creetly non-committal as to exactly what were the ex- 
pressed promises, nor does he make it so plain as might 
be desired what legitimate inferences were deducible 
from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes 

1 Beginning with the letters "P. I. R." 

2 See pp. 53, 55, 68. 

' See pp. 27, 47, 49, 63 of this book for repetitions and variations 
of this charge of Aguinaldo. 

^ See p. 31 of his book, "The American Occupation of the Philip- 
pines," in referring to which I will hereafter use the word Blount, fol- 
lowed by a page number. 


an alleged statement of General Anderson to the effect 
that : — 

"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman,^ 
and Williams ^ did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that 
a Philippino government would be recognized, the Phillippinos 
certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than from 
their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammuni- 
tion, as I did subsequently at his request."^ 

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review 
certain historical facts, knowledge of which will be useful 
in considering them. 

In August, 1896, an insurrection Spain had 
broken out in the Philippines under the leadership of 
Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of Cavite Viejo, who had 
been a school teacher, and was, at that time, goberna- 
dorcillo * of his town. 

It had been terminated by the so-called "Treaty of 
Biacnabato," signed in Manila on December 15, 1897. 

This document provided for the surrender of "Don 
Emilio Aguinaldo, Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in 
arms," and Don Marciano Llanera and Don Baldomero 
Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with their soldiers 
and arms. 

"The Excellent Seiior General in Chief" of the Spanish 
forces was to "provide the necessary means for support- 
ing the lives" of those who surrendered before a certain 
fixed date. 

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay 
them $800,000 5 in three instalments, the first of $400,000, 
the second and third of $200,000 each. 

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up 

1 U. S. Consul General Rounseville Wildman of Hongkong. 

2 U. S. Consul O. F. Williams of Manila. 

3 Blount, p. 43. 

^ A term, more or less corresponding to maj'or, then applied to the 
ranking municipal officer of a pueblo or town. 

5 Eight hundred thousand Mexican dollars, the actual value of 
which constantly fluctuated. 



























their residence outside the islands. Their deportation 
was duly provided for, and Aguinaldo and twenty-six of 
his companions were taken to Hongkong, on the Spanish 
steamer Uranus; arriving there on December 31, 1897. 

On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the 
Hongkong Bank, to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co. 

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabato had a 
meeting under the presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an 
Ilocano ^ who was the ranking officer in the absence of 
Aguinaldo, and requested that the second instalment, of 
$200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor- 
general, Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and 
they divided the money, although Aguinaldo denied their 
right to do so, claiming that it should have been sent to 

The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never 
made. Primo de Rivera, says that he turned over a 
check for $200,000 to his successor, General Augustin, 
in April, 1898 ; giving as his reason for refusing to pay 
it ,to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no 
prospect of its being equitably divided among those who 
were entitled to receive it under the agreement. 

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain re- 
forms were promised by the Spanish government at the 
time the treaty of Biacnabato was negotiated, and as 
these measures were not put into effect, they organized a 
junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It in- 
cluded in its membership a number of Filipijio political 
exiles, then residing at that place. 

The men who composed this organization soon fell to 
quarrelling and it became necessary to come to a definite 
understanding as to its aims. Under the arrangement 
finally reached, the junta, as a whole, was charged with 
the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago ; with 

* The Ilocanos are one of the eight civilized peoples who collectively 
make up the Filipinos. They number 803,942, and inhabit certain 
provinces in northern Luzon. 


all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; 
and with the preparation and shipment of such articles 
as were needed to carry on the revolution in the Philip- 
pines. It was to be allowed voice by Aguinaldo's govern- 
ment in any serious question which might arise abroad, 
and would aid that government in bringing the civil ad- 
ministration of the Philippines to the level of that of the 
most advanced nations. 

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders 
over the division of the funds deposited at Hongkong. 

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the 
events of this period, and as it is of historic interest, and 
makes clear just how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, 
meet Pratt, and enter into negotiations with him, I quote 
extensive extracts from it.^ 

"From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the 
banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had de- 
posited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his 
companions in Hongkong. These expenses were kept at a 
minimum; the money was drawn and spent by him. If one 
of the men with him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo 
paid for them ; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought 
it. Minute accounts were kept, which are on file among his 
papers, and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceed- 
ing his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while 
he was living at the rate of 22,000, ^vith constant demands 
being made upon him by men who came from the Philippines. 
Life was not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo's com- 
panions were entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial 
expenses had to be approved by him, and he held them' down 
with a strong hand. They were men living in a strange land, 
among a people whose language they did not speak, having 
nothing to do but quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting for 
a chance to return to their own country, which they watched 
with weary eyes while they guarded the embers by which they 
hoped to light the fires of a new insurrection. 

1 1 have not felt at liberty to correct spelling, capitalization, punctu- 
ation or grammar in quotations, except in the ease of perfectly evident 
printer's errors. It should be remembered that the results of Taylor's 
work were left in the form of galley proof. 


''The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong 
were not the only Filipinos domiciled there ; a number of men 
had taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872, 
and some of them at least had prospered. Some of them, hke 
the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost 
no relations wth the followers of Aguinaldo ; some, like J. M. 
Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of the 
governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their 
full confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following 
wanted and were working for independence and independence 
alone, while the Filipinos who had long lived in Hongkong 
wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no con- 
fidence in the ability of the country to stand alone or in the 
fitness of Aguinaldo and ^his following to direct the councils 
of a state. The character of the new refugees did not inspire 
confidence in these older men, who hoped for a protectorate by 
or annexation to the United States. 

" On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there 
informed the State Department that D. Cortes, M. Cortes, 
A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and Jose Maria Basa (50), all 
very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and la-wyers of Manila, 
desired to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of their 
powerful families in Manila to the United States, and that they 
had instructed all their connections to render every aid to the 
United States forces in Manila. On May 14 he forwarded state- 
ments of other Filipinos dom.iciled in Hongkong, not members 
of the junta, that they desired to submit their allegiance and 
the allegiance of their families in the Philippine Islands to the 
United States. One of Aguinaldo's followers, writing somewhat 
later, spoke with bitterness of the rich old men who went about 
calling their companions 'beggarly rebels,' but these men 
were rich, and their names and their apparent adhesion to the 
cause represented by Aguinaldo would inspire confidence in 
him among men of property in the Philippines. They were, 
accordingly, not to be lightly alienated ; therefore, at first, at 
least, no open break took place \\ath them, but their attitude 
toward the leaders of the insurrection is shown by the fact that 
after the early summer of 1898 they took no, or very little, 
part in the insurgent movement, although they were living in 
Hongkong, the seat of the junta, which conducted the propa- 
ganda for the insurgent government of the Philippines. 

" But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the con- 
ditions and of the opportunities which were about to open be- 


fore the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spain and 
the United States was imminent and a United States squadron 
was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly 
concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which had 
been received from the Spanish government as the price of his 
surrender. The importance of his presence near the Philippines 
in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did occur to him any- 
thing which he could obtain there from the aid of the United 
States probably seemed for the moment of little consequence 
compared with escaping from his wrangling companions with 
enough money to live on in Paris. 

" Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the 
second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded 
200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the 
agreement that he should establish a company in Hongkong 
for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of those 
who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in Hong- 
kong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He 
then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong, calling 
upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds deposited 
in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others, and asked 
for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo or any member of the 
junta from handling or disposing of any part of said funds. He 
filed as evidence copies of the Biacnabato agreement and of 
the agreement made by the leaders on December 19. This 
suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho, but in 
that of all the exiles who were described as living in exile in 
Hongkong in accordance mth an agreement made with the 
Spanish Government. Artacho probably had adherents among 
these men, some at least of whom were utterly weary of waiting 
in Hongkong and of living upon what was doled out to them. 
Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than indefinite 
exile spent in dependence upon the inner group for even the 
means of existence. 

" The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the 
trust funds which the complainant recognized were legally in 
the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great 
difficulty without his presence and without his account books. 
Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced as attempting 
to extort blackmail, but he refused to yield, and Aguinaldo, 
rather than explain the inner workings of the Hongkong junta 
before a British court, prepared for flight. A summons was 
issued for his appearance before the supreme court of Hongkong 
on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its jurisdiction. 


" He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, 
which had become due according to the terms of the deposit, 
and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check, 
engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del 
Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed 
V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks 
signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to 
provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason for 
departure that he was going to remain under cover until Artacho 
could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for this 
purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United 

" Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hong- 
kong on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after 
stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain 
had been rendered inevitable by the resolution of Congress 
demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba, 
and was declared on April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his fol- 
lowers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on the 
other side of the world might have upon the future of the PhiHp- 
pines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there was an 
Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of 
the civil service in India, and had lived for some years in the 
Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged 
in writing letters to the Singapore Free Press upon the Philip- 
pines, and in retailing such information as was in his possession 
concerning them to the United States consul-general in Singa- 
pore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to Commodore 
Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and realized 
what could be done \\dth him, and that if the matter were well 
handled it might be to his own advantage. He went at once to 
see Aguinaldo and informed him that the United States consul- 
general was anxious to see him. He went to the consul-general 
and informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo, and that he 
was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded to agree to 
a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it, and it took 
place, according to Aguinaldo, on the night of April 22 (accord- 
ing to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The statement made 
by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According to his account 
book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a telegram to the Hong- 
kong junta concerning the negotiations 'with America.' 

"Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, 
so in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter 
who is interested in the subject of the discussion may be a 


dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told Agui- 
naldo. Certainly Pratt did not know ; but whatever was said 
during these conversations it is within the limits of possibility 
that Pratt may have been made to say by the interpreter more 
than he intended, and that his statements of what would prob- 
ably be granted by the United States Government and his ex- 
pression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence 
may have been translated as assurances and as promises. Bray, 
who, according to his Filipino former friends, was apt to talk 
too much, may have talked too much on this occasion, and so 
the myth of the formal agreement between Aguinaldo on be- 
half of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on behalf of the United 
States grew up, a fiction which Bray himself, with a natural 
desire to add to his own importance, did his best to circulate. 
"Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably 
reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an adviser, so 
that later he could make his own terms. For a time he wTote 
letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had some in- 
fluence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and later 
was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to various 
newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His 
cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between 
the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque 
than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective, 
as Aguinaldo ordered that he should be given $5000. He 
wanted more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and 
he ceased to be in their employment." ^ 

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting 
at Singapore, and we shall be able to determine with some 
accuracy what actually transpired there. 

We can now consider understandingly the charges made 
against Pratt and Dewey. 

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt 
promised Aguinaldo recognition of the independence of 
the Philippines if he and his people would cooperate with 
the United States forces against Spain. 

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his ''Resefia 
Veridica" ^ in the following words : — 

1 Taylor, 42 F Z-43 F Z. 

^ For the history of this document, see p. 51. 


"In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the 
Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bat6, 
the Filipinos had a right to renew their interrupted revolution 
and advised me to take up arms anew against Spain, assuring 
me that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advan- 
tages (mayores ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what 
advantages the United States would concede to the Philippines, 
suggesting, when I had the proper opening, the propriety of 
making an agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered 
that he would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey, 
who was the chief of the expedition against the Philippines, 
and who had ample powers from President McKinley. 

" On the followdng day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we 
again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral 
had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States would 
at least recognize the independence of the Pliilippine govern- 
ment under a naval protectorate, but that there was no neces- 
sity to put it in WTiting, as the words of the admiral and the 
American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled, not being 
like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that the Government 
of North America was a very honourable Government, a very 
just and very powerful one." ^ 

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of 
State as follows : — • 

"General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange 
with Dewey cooperation insurgents Manila. 


On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how 
he had come to meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he 
had done. He said : — 

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo 
the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present in- 
surrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philip- 
pines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst ex- 
plaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, 
to point out the danger of continuing independent action at 
this stage ; and, having convinced him of the expediency of 
cooperating wdth our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the 
assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with 

1 P. I. R., 1300. 2. 


Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I 
telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through 
our consul-general at Hongkong : — 

"' Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong 
arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents 
Manila if desired. Telegraph. 


The Commodore's reply read thus : — 

'"Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. 

Pratt adds : — 

" I received it late at night, and at once communicated to 
General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private 
secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off 
by the British Steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday 
the 26th. 

"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last inter- 
view with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall 
give you by next mail. 

"The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, 
and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed 
in him. 

" I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the 
commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict 
of action and facilitated the work of occupying and adminis- 
tering the Philippines. 

" If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, 
as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied ; to Mr. Bray, however, 
I consider there is due some special recognition for most valu- 
able services rendered. 

" How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to 

"I have, etc."i 

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that 
he had no authority to speak for the government ; that 
there was no mention in the cablegrams between Pratt and 
Dewey of independence or indeed of any conditions on which 
Aguinaldo was to cooperate, these details being left for 

1 Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session, 
P. P. 341 et seq. 

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future arrangement with Dewey ; and that Pratt thought 
that he had prevented possible conflict of action and 
facilitated the work of occupying and administering the 

The particulars as to the second and last interview 
between Aguinaldo and Pratt were embodied in the fol- 
lowing letter : — 

"No. 213. Consulate-General of the United States. 

" Singapore, April 30, 1898. 

"Sir: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, 
I have the honor to report that in the second and last interview 
I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure 
for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commo- 
dore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute control over his 
forces in the Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be 
tolerated by the American Government, the President having 
declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be car- 
ried on in strict accord with modern principles of civiHzed war- 

" To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that 
he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold 
his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our com- 
mander should direct. 

" The general stated that he hoped the United States would 
assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to 
allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their o\vn, 
in the organization of which he would desire American advice 
and assistance. 

" These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss. 

" I have, etc., 

"E. Spencer Pratt, 

" United States Consul-General.'^ 

In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 
1898, Pratt made the following statement : — 

"I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the ques- 
tion of the future policy of the United States with regard to the 
Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, com- 
mitted the government in no way whatever, and, in the course 
of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the 
Government would cooperate with him — General Aguinaldo — 


for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that, in accept- 
ing his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to 
recognize any political claims which he might put forward." ^ 

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this 
allegation ? 

I will give in full Blount's statement as to what occurred 
at a meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early suc- 
cesses of Dewey and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his 
nearest approach to a direct claim, that any one at any 
time promised independence : — 

"First there was music by the band. Then followed the 
formal reading and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, 
representing the Filipino community of Singapore, The ad- 
dress pledged the 'eternal gratitude' of the Filipino people to 
Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee ; alluded to the 
glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been enabled ; 
by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey 
by Consul Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take 
up arms 'in defence of those principles of justice and liberty 
of which your country is the foremost champion ' and trusted 
'that the United States . . . -will efficaciously second the 
programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo 
in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence 
under the protection of the United States.' 

"Mr. Pratt arose and 'proceeded, speaking in French,' says 
the newspaper — it does not say Alabama French, but that is 
doubtless what it was — 'to state his belief that the Filipinos 
would prove and were now proving themselves fit for self- 
government.' The gentleman from Alabama then went on to 
review the mighty events and developments of the preceding 
six weeks, Dewey's victory of May 1st, ' the brilliant achieve- 
ments of your own distinguished leader. General Emiho Agui- 
naldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at sea,' etc. ' You 
have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being ac- 
complished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen 
under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that 
General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I imme- 
diately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me 
that he was the man for the occasion ; and, having communi- 
cated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to 
join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know. ' " '^ 

1 Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session; 
also P. I. R., 496. ^ Blount, pp. 11-12. 


Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his 
speech, and his version of Pratt's reply thereto, in a letter 
to Aguinaldo, dated Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he 
served as interpreter, he, if any one, should know what 
Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of the 
Singapore Free Press, with which strained relations had 
formerly existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the 
editor of this paper and that of the Straits Times, he says 
that on the previous afternoon he went with the other 
Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues : — 

" This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours 
having been victorious and immediately after the cry of our 
worthy chief which found an echo in this colony. For this pur- 
pose 30 or more Filipinos — 9 of the higher class, 15 musicians 
and the remainder of the middle class — went to greet Consul A., 
here, and on the invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He 
received us in his private office, and it was imposing to see that 
the only decoration was the American flag which covered the 
desk, and in its centre, a carved wooden frame holding the por- 
trait of our worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I 
introduced them all. We found there also, and were introduced 
to, the Editor of the Straits Times and the Free Press of here, 
and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection, I read 
the following speech in French : — 

" ' His Excellency, the Consul General of the United 
States of America in Singapore : 
" ' Your Excellency : The Filipinos of all social classes 
residing in this port, have come to greet Your Excellency as 
the genuine representative of the great and powerful American 
Republic in order to express to you our eternal gratitude for 
the moral and material support given by Admiral Dewey to 
our General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of eight 
million Filipinos. The latter and we ourselves hope that the 
United States, your nation, persevering in its humanitarian pol- 
icy, will without cessation and (with) decided energy continue to 
support the programme agreed upon in Singapore between Your 
Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the Indepen- 
dence of the Phihppine Islands, under an American protector- 
ate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and congratula- 
tions on being the first one in accepting and supporting this idea 
which time and events have well developed to the great satis- 


faction of our nation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent 
Sir, to express to your worthy President and the American 
Republic, our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent wishes 
for their prosperity. I have concluded.' 

" The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the 
following terms : — 

"'You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only 
faithfully followed the instructions received from my Govern- 
ment ; the fact of the sudden departure of your General will 
permit you to infer that I have done so. I shall in any case 
inform my Government of your good wishes and I thank you 
in its name. You know that your wishes are mine also, and 
for this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo, 
I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest humanity 
possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers, our 
nation and all the other nations may see that you are humane 
and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.' 

" After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul ; 
he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and lemonade 
for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were offered 
with the sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon, Enri- 
quez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the Free Press, 
Straits Tirnes and Mr. Bray. We drank to America and her 
humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines with 
America ; we gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an 
important defender ; we drank to the Free Press for taking such 
an interest in our affairs, and to the Straits Times (sarcastically) ; 
but I was very careful not to propose a toast to our general, 
which was done at the proper time by ' Flaco ' ^ when we gave 
three cheers ; for the sake of courtesy we cheered for England, 
which had been so hospitable to us, and when everybody had 
become quiet, the Editor of the Straits Times took his glass in 
his hand and cried in a loud voice, 'The Philippine Republic,' 
to which we all responded. 'Flaco' disappeared a moment, 
and when he returned he brought with him the American flag, 
and formally presented it to us in French, which I interpreted 
to all in Spanish, as follows : ' Gentlemen : The American Consul, 
with his deep affection for us, presents us this flag as the great- 
est and most expressive remembrance which he can give us. 
The red stripes stand for the generous blood of her sons, shed 
to obtain her liberty ; the white stripes stand for her virginity 
and purity as our country ; the blue background indicates the 

1 Pratt. 


sky and each star represents a free and independent State ; 
this is America, and the Consul is desirous that we also should 
have so glorious a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant 
as could be wished, securing peace Avith respect, and may God 
be our help and guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it 
our most sincere thanks for so signal a courtesy.' Hereupon, 
to the surprise of everybody as no one expected it, the Consul 
requested that some Filipino airs be played which seemed to 
please him very much. Finally, about 6.15, we left, very well 
satisfied ^vith the reception accorded us and the kindness of the 
Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech, which 
I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French text, 
which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything 
further for the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion 
as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the future, 
I am, 

" Yours, etc. 
(Signed) " Isidoro de los Santos." 

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following 
note : — 

" (Note hy Compiler. — In a letter written in Tagalog to 
Aguinaldo on June 6 by Santos he describes the American consul 
general as having cried out 'Hurrah for General Aguinaldo, 
hurrah for the Republic of the PhiUppines' and then, having 
apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the 
room waving the American flag before giving it to the assembled 
Filipinos (P. I. R., 406. 7).)" ^ 

This final statement does not present the representative 
of the United States government at Singapore in a very 
favourable light, but I take the facts as I find them. If 
now we compare the speech actually made by Dr. Santos 
with Blount's version of it, we shall find that with the 
exception of the words ''eternal gratitude" the passages 
which he encloses in quotation marks are not in the original 
at all. The glories of independence are not alluded to, 
nor is there so much as a suggestion that Aguinaldo had 
been enabled to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take 
up arms, which he certainly had not done. 

1 P. I. R., 516. 4. 

VOL. I — D 


Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped 
FiHpino procedure so very commonly employed that 
those of us who have dealt much with his people have 
learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists in 
referring to one's having said just exactly what one did 
not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid 
it, in claiming that because one did not deny the alle- 
gation one has admitted its truth. 

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this pro- 
cedure in his dealings with Dewey and others. 

In the present instance Santos employed it rather 
cleverly when he expressed the hope that the United 
States would ' ' continue to support the programme agreed 
upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and General 
Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philip- 
pine Islands under an American protectorate." 

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly 
violated his part of the agreement, for we shall see that 
he stated over and over again, in correspondence with 
members of the junta and others, that a protectorate 
would be considered only if absolute independence finally 
proved unattainable, but there is no reason to beUeve that 
any such agreement was made. 

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. 
Blount implies, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, 
that Pratt's knowledge of French was poor. At all events 
Pratt in his reply made not the slightest reference to the 
hope expressed by Santos that the United States would 
continue to support the programme which Santos said had 
been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and 
claim of a promise of independence based on these speeches 
must obviously be abandoned. There is no doubt that 
Pratt personally sympathized with the ambitions of the 
Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his sympathy on 
this and other occasions, but to do this was one thing and 
to have attempted to compromise his government would 
have been another and very different one. The shrewd 


Filipinos with whom he was deahng understood this 
difference perfectly well. 

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason 
to believe that his sympathy was not purely disinterested. 
Aguinaldo claims that Pratt wished to be appointed 
''representative of the Philippines in the United States 
to promptly secure the official recognition of our inde- 
pendence" and that he promised him "a, high post in 
the customs service." ^ 

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in 
Blount's statement are enclosed in quotation marks. 
From what were they quoted? The next paragraph in 
his book tells us : — 

"Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt 
oration : At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, refreshments 
were served, and as the FiUpinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, 
there was no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments." ^ 

The use of this clipping from the Singapore Free 
Press illustrates admirably Blount's methods. The Free 
Press had at first displayed a marked coldness toward the 
insurgent cause, but its editor, Mr. St. Clair, was oppor- 
tunely "seen" by Bray, who reported that as a result of 
his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter 
be friendly, and they were. In other words, the Free 

i"The Consul — after telling me that, before arri^dng in Hong- 
kong harbor, a launch would be sent bj' the Admiral to secretly take 
us to the North American squadron, a secrecy which pleased me also, 
as it would avoid giving publicity to my acts — then advised me that 
I should appoint him the representative of the Philippines in the United 
States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence. 
I answered that whenever the Philippine government should be formed, 
I would nominate him for the office he desired, although I considered 
that but small recompense for his aid, and that in case of our having 
the good fortune to seciire our independence I would bestow upon him 
a high post in the customs service besides granting the commercial 
advantages and the participation in the expenses of the war which 
the Consul asked for his Government in Washington, since the Filipinos 
agreed in advance to what is here stated, considering it a proper testi- 
monial of gratitude." — P. I. R., 1300. 2. 

2 Blount, p. 12. 


Press became the Singapore organ of the insurrection, and 
its editor, .according to Bray,'' a true and loyal friend" of 

Blount claims to have made "an exhaustive examina- 
tion of the records of that period." ^ Why then did he use 
as evidence a newspaper clipping from an Insurgent organ, 
instead of Santos's letter ? 

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that 
Pratt forwarded to the State Department a proclamation 
which he says was gotten up by the Insurgent leaders at 
Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in advance of 
Aguinaldo's coming. He says that it was headed "Amer- 
ica's Allies" and quotes from it as follows : — 

" Compatriots : Divine Providence is about to place in- 
dependence within our reach. . . . The Americans, not from 
mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the 
lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered 
it opportune, etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the 
present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for 
the Philippines. . . . The Americans will attack by sea and 
prevent any reenf orcements coming from Spain ; . . . . we in- 
surgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more 
than sufficient arms, because the Americans have arms and 
will find means to assist us. There where you see the American 
flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!'^ ^ 

The translation that he used is that given in Senate 
Document No. 62, L. 60, and is none too accurate. He 
allows it to be inferred that this proclamation was actu- 
ally issued. It was not. Its history is as follows : — 

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had Hved 
in Hongkong since 1872, on account of his connection 
with the troubles of that year, wrote letters ^ to a number 

1 Blount, pp. 8-9. 2 i})i^^^ p. 9. 

^ The following is one of them : — 

"H. Kong, May 16, 1898. 
"Senor Don Jose Enrique Basa: 

" My dear Enrique : As an aid to the American policy in the Phil- 
ippines, — America being the most liberal and humanitarian nation in 















0) ro 


to ^' 










of friends recommending the widest possible circulation 
of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as an aid to the 
American policy in the Philippines "in the war against the 
tyrannical friars and the Spaniards." 

With these letters there were sent two different proclama- 
tions, each beginning with the words ''Fellow Country- 
men." The first, which is the one referred to by Blount, 
continues : — 

"Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our 
independence, and this under the freest form to which all in- 
dividuals, all people, all countries, may aspire. 

"The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest, 
attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos, 
find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective 
mantle, now that they find themselves obliged to break their 
friendship wth the Spanish people, because of the tyranny 
they have exercised in Cuba, causing all Americans, with whom 
they have great commercial relations, enormous damages. 

"At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the 

" We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of 
your arms to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers ; do not 
make such a mistake ; rather (shoot) kill yourselves than treat 
our liberators as enemies. 

" Do not pay attention to the decree of Prime de Rivera, 
calHng on you to enUst for the war, for that will cost you your 
lives : rather die than act as ingrates toward our redeemers, 
the Americans. 

" Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the 
same time avoicUng reenforcements which may come from 
Spain ; therefore the insurrection must attack by land. Per- 

the world, — I earnestly recommend the widest possible circulation 
of the proclamation which I send herewith in order that the Americans 
may be supported in the war against the tjTannical friars and the 
Spaniards who have connived with them, and that public order, so 
necessary under the present conditions, be preserved. 
" Thy relative, twenty-six years an emigrant. 

(Signed) "J. M. Basa." 

— P. I. R., 1204-10. 


haps you will have more than sufficient arms, as the Americans 
have arms, and will find the means to aid you. 

"Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that 
they are our redeemers." ^ 

On the margin is written : '^ Viva, for America with the 
Philippines ! " 

Apparently what Basa here means by independence is 
independence from Spain, for it is known that he was 
in favour of annexation to the United States, and in the 
second proclamation we find the following : — - 

"This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for 
contriving that our country (all the Philippine Archipelago) 
may be counted as another Star in the Great Republic of the 
United States, great because of its wisdom, its wealth, and its 
constitutional laws. 

"Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. 
With America we shall have development in the broadest 
sense (of advancement) in civilization. 

" With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy. 

" Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have 
already been given. Explain to all our fellow countrymen 
the benefits of this change, which will be blessed by Heaven, 
by men and by our children. 

" Viva America with the Philippines ! ! !" ^ 

The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for 
delivery on his arrival. They were never delivered, and it 
is reasonable to suppose, especially as Basa, who was a 
man of importance and means, was a member of the group 
who desired annexation to the United States, that Agui- 
naldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture 
with him and then quietly suppressed them. Obviously, 
however, he sent or gave a copy of the first one to Pratt, 
presumably without the written words : ''Viva, for Amer- 
ica with the Philippines !" 

And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred 
at Singapore which I consider incontrovertible. 

Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on 

1 P. I. R., 1204-10. 2 Ibid., 1204-10. 


May 4, 1898, a meeting of the junta was held. The 
minutes of this meeting/ signed by each of the several 
Fihpinos present, form a part of the Insurgent records 
which have come into the possession of the United States 
Government. They state among other things that : — 

"The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preced- 
ing meeting, which were approved. The temporary President 
reported that D. Emilio Aguinaldo had just arrived from 
Singapore and it became necessary for him to take possession 
of the office to which he has been elected." 

After the transaction of some further business Agui- 
naldo was summoned, appeared at the meeting, and was 
duly installed as President. Then : — 

"The President described the negotiations which took 
place during his absence in Singapore ■with the American Consul 
of that English colony. Both agreed that the President should 
confer with the Admiral commanding the American squadron 
in Mirs Bay, and if the latter should accept his propositions, 
advantageous, in his judgment, to the Philippines, he would 
go to said country in one of the cruisers which form the fleet 
for the purpose of taking part in the present events. And as 
he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to have an 
interview with the American Consul of this colony on the day 
of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview. 

" Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at 
present, he begged the committee to discuss the advisability 
of his going to said islands with all the leaders of prominence in 
the last rebellion residing in this colony, in case the Admiral 
gave them an opportunity to do so." 

Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any 
promise of independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or 
any one else. Is it conceivable that Aguinaldo in de- 
scribing ''the negotiations which took place during his 
absence in Singapore with the American Consul of the 
English Colony" would, by any chance, have failed to 
inform his associates in Hongkong of such an extraor- 
dinary and fortunate occurrence as the promising by 

1 P. I. R., 53-2. 


Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that the United States 
would recognize PhiUppine independence ? 

Sandico ^ thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for — 

"From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the 
American fleet and with the American Consul in this colony, 
he believed that under present conditions it was absolutely 
necessary for the President to go to the Philippines, since, 
according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by 
said fleet, and a provisional government was now being formed 
in that capital. The intervention of the President in the for- 
mation of that government is undoubtedly essential, since his 
prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently prevent 
dissensions among the sons of the country, and it would be 
possible thereby to obtain a perfect organization both for the 
military and civil evolution of that country. 

" Srs. Garchitorena ^ and Apacible ^ expressed themselves in 
similar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks, the 
President insisted that he considered it reckless for him to go 
to the Philippines without first making a written agreement 
with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed himself at 
his orders, that he might make him subscribe to or sign a docu- 
ment containing proposals highly prejudicial to the interests 
of the country, from which might arise the following two very 
grave contingencies : 

" 1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit 
an unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally 
cursed by the Filipinos. 

"2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two 
would be evident. 

"And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the com- 
mittee that the four parties (?) of the insurgents now here, 
under charge of the competent chiefs authorized in writing by 
him, should go to the Philippines to intervene, after a con- 
ference with the Admiral, in these important questions; such 
means, in his opinion, should be first employed to ascertain in 

^ Teodoro Sandico, an influential Tagalog leader, who spoke English 
well and afterward served as a spy while employed by the Americans 
as an interpreter. 

2 Senor Garchitorena was a wealthy Tagalog of Manila, and, at 
this time, a prominent member of the Hongkong junta. 

' Dr. Galicano Apacible, a very intelligent and rather conservative 
Tagalog physician. After Aguinaldo left Hongkong, he was the 
leading member of the junta. 


an authentic manner what the intentions of the United States 
in regard to that country are; and if his intervention is ab- 
solutely necessary, he would not object to go at once to the 
Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in his power to 
remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he had 
offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice his life." 

Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the 
intentions of the United States were in regard to the 
Philippines if both he and Pratt had already promised 
recognition of independence ? 

"Srs. Sandico, Garchitorcna, Gonzaga ^ and Apacible re- 
plied that they were fully convinced the Admiral of the Ameri- 
can squadron would furnish the President all the arms which 
he might desire, since the former was convinced that the fleet 
could do nothing in the Philippines unless it were used in con- 
junction ^\^th the insurgents in the development of their plans 
of war against the Spanish government. . . . The authority 
to treat which the President desired to give to the other chiefs, 
"without reflecting at all upon their personal qualifications, 
they did not believe would be as efficacious as his personal 
intervention which is necessary in grave affairs, such as those 
the subject of discussion ; there would be no better occasion 
than that afforded them to insure the landing of the expedition- 
ary forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense 
of the Americans and to assure the situation of the Philippines 
in regard to our legitimate aspirations against those very 
people. The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, would 
be the victims of the demands and exactions of the United 
States ; but, provided with arms, would be able to oppose them- 
selves to them, struggling for independence, in which consists 
the true happiness of the Philippines. And they finished by 
saying that it made no difference if the Spanish government 
did demand the return of the P400,000, and if the demand 
were allowed in an action, since the object of the sum would be 
obtained by the Admiral furnishing the Filipinos the arms which 
they required for the struggle for their legitimate aspirations." 

Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the 
Americans to be used if necessary "against those very 
people" later. 

* Sr. Graco Gonzaga, a prominent Filipino lawyer of the province 
of Cagayan. 


"The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would 
be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the 
United States, if they colonized that country, and would drive 
them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic 
struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb 
in shaking off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington 
proposed to carry out the fundamental principles of its con- 
stitution, there was no doubt that it would not attempt to 
colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them. It was prob- 
able then that it would give them independence and guarantee 
it; in such case the presence of the President was necessary, 
as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the country 
who sought office, who might cause the intervention of Euro- 
pean powers, an intervention which there was no reason to doubt 
would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the country. . . . 
What injury could come to the Philippines, even if we ad- 
mitted that the Admiral would not give arms to the President 
on account of his refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the 
country, after he had taken all means to provide for her de- 
fence? None. Such an act of the President could not be 
censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious, 
because it would be one proof more of his undoubted patriotism." 

Not one word of any promise of independence do we 
find in this remarkable document. On the contrary it 
furnishes conclusive proof that no such promise had 
been made and that the future relations between Filipinos 
and Americans were still completely uncertain. 

And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and 
St. Clair, the latter the editor of the Insurgent organ 
in Singapore, were present on the occasion when inde- 
pendence was said to have been promised by Pratt. 
Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms 
that it was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking 
him roundly to task for this claim, in the following very 
interesting terms : — 

" I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt knov/ that you still hold 
that you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his, 
(and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he (is) 
quite aware of what took place in Spanish, and as to turning of 
his conversation into a pretense of agreement he knows nothing. 












I— t 





He says very truly : ' My own party, the Democrats, will say 
if they read this book — If this man takes it upon himself to 
be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we had better not 
employ him any more — I frankly cannot understand your 
action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all. 

"Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the 
President on Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly 
what did take place and what did not, and I should know if he 
had any ground to think that the slightest promise was made by 
Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it unauthorized and de- 
cline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reported what he sup- 
posed took place accurately; he had no surety on what you 
might have said, naturally. 

"And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of the 
agreement as having taken place then, nor in the paper you 
communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor did 
Pratt know of any. It is only more recently that the fiction 
took shape. 'The wish father to the thought,' or the statement 
repeated till it has become believed by the — ,^ this is common. 

"Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point of 
view, to drop any such foolishness. The vital thing, and 
nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he at 
last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing, all else is 
empty wind. 

"Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of 
paper with ' Clauses ' and put on a ton of sealing wax as consular 
seals, what, pray, to anj^ common sense mind would all that 
have been w^orth ? Nothing ! ! Nothing ! ! And yet, where 
is the agreement, where is the seal? Where are there any 
signatures ? And if you had them — waste paper — believe 
me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is energy 
misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the public 
in America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo 
together as participants in common action ; you surely com- 
prehend this means! Think and think again; it means 
success as far as it is possible. The other work is not only lost, 
but does not gain much sympathy, especially this criticism of 
the conduct of American troops ; things may be true that are 
not expedient to say. Sink everything into Dewey-Aguinaldo 
cooperation, that was on both sides honest even if it did not 
imply any actual arrangement, which, of course, Dewey him- 
self could not make. That here you have the facts, — undenied 
— incontrovertible." ^ 

^ There is an illegible word in the original. ^ P. I. R., 406-5. 


The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated Janu- 
ary 12, 1899, seems to me to throw much light on the 
question of how these claims relative to the promised 
recognition of Filipino independence sometimes originated 
and were bolstered up : — 

"With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump 
card to be played. Did you not say that the basis of any 
negotiation in Singapore was the Independence of the Philip- 
pines under an American protectorate? This is what Consul 
Pratt telegraphed and to which Dewey and Washington agreed ; 
as I figured up the 'price' of the telegram, I know very well 
what occurred, and I am ready to state it and to swear to it 
when the proper time comes. There are five of us against one 
in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny it. 
Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am 
certain that he also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough 
draft as an historical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal 
friend of yours, as is your humble servant." ^ 

The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his 
claim that St. Clair would confirm his false statements, 
made as it was after receiving St. Clair's letter above 

But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump 
card. He tried to play it himself by cabling Senator 
Hoar, on the same day, that as the man who introduced 
General Aguinaldo to the American government through 
the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that the 
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate 
with Dewey were independence under a protectorate.^ 

1 P. I. R., 398. 9. 

2 " Hongkong, 12 Jan. 1899, — 2 p.m. 
" Senator Hoar, Washington. 

"As the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American 
government through the consul at Singapore, I frankly state that the 
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey 
were independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear to 
this. The military party suborned correspondents are deceiving the 
American nation by means of malevolent lying statements. If your 
powerful influence does not change this insensate poUey there will be 
a hopeless conflict with the inevitable results disastrous for the Ameri- 
cans. " Bray." 

—P. I. R., 853^. 


Let us now trace Aguinaldo's subsequent movements, 
and see what promises, if any, were made to him by Wild- 
man and Dewey. He had returned to Hongkong with 
two companions, all travelling under assumed names. 
Only his most trusted friends among the members of the 
junta were at first allowed to know where he was living. 

His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for 
him to come to some sort of a temporary arrangement 
with Artacho, if he was to avoid legal difficulties, and to 
reestablish himself with some of his companions, who had 
accused him of deserting with the intention of going to 
Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When 
harmony had been temporarily restored through the good 
offices of Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Con- 
sul General Wildman. He has since claimed that Wild- 
man, too, promised him independence, but the truth 
seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to be- 
come an American citizen. This being impossible, he 
wanted to return to the Philippines and place himself 
under Dewey's orders. He wanted to help throw off the 
yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by the decision 
of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines.^ 

1 " Then Aguinaldo had an interview with the United States consul 
in Hongkong, in which he told him that he was anxious to become an 
American citizen, but this being impossible, he desired,^ to be allowed 
to return to the Philippines and place himself under the orders of 
Commodore Dewey. According to the brother of that Consul, who 
certainly must have had opportunities for kno'wing the facts in the 
case, he made no demands for independence, but said that he hoped 
that the Americans would not leave the Filipinos to their fate, but 
would annex the Philippines and protect them against the Spaniards. 
He promised the Consul that he would fight with the Americans and 
not attempt to foment a revolution against the United States. His 
highest expressed aim was to throw off the Spanish yoke, and, that 
once accomplished, he would abide by the decision of the United States 
as to the ultimate disposition of the Philippines. If Aguinaldo had 
expressed his real intentions of obtaining arms and using them only 
for his own purposes, and, if he found it expedient, against the United 
States, it is not to be thought that he would have been returned to the 
Philippines on a United States vessel."* 

* Taylor, 44 F Z. 


Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised inde- 
pendence by Wildman, or, indeed, that the latter had been 
allowed to know that the Filipinos desired it, seems to me 
to be negatived, not only by Wildman's own statements, 
but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written on 
August 5, 1908, in which he says : — 

*'The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o'clock, 
as I had requested an interview with him before his departure, 
and I was unable to go to the Consulate on account of the 
swelling of my feet. From our conversation I infer that in- 
dependence will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose 
to him our true desires. . . . Said consul approved my tele- 
gram to McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, 
a copy of which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our rep- 
resentative in the commission, we may arrive at a friendly 
understanding, and it will enable us to prepare for the fight in 
case they refuse to listen to our request. On the other hand, 
if at the very beginning they refuse to admit our representative, 
we will at once be in a position to know what should be clone, 
i.e. to prepare for war." ^ 

On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that 
Aguinaldo ought to go to the Philippines, and go he did. 
It would seem that he at first gave up the idea of joining 
Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter, giving 
minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist 
his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan 
Bay on the east coast of Luzon ; directing the capture of 
the town of San Antonio, just back of Capones Islands, 
in Zambales, and ending with the words: ''We will 
surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned, so 
you must be prepared." 

Something led him again to change his mind, and he 
finally sailed on the McCulloch. 

In his "Resena Veridica" written later for political 
purposes, Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey 
promised him that the United States would recognize 
the independence of the Filipino people. I will let 

ip. I. R., 471. 7. 


him tell his own story, confronting his statements with 
those of the admiral. 

"May 19, 1898. 
" The McCulloch started at eleven o'clock on the morning of 
the 17th of May for the Philippines ; we anchored, between 
twelve and one o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in the 
waters of Cavite, and immediately the launch of the Admiral 
— with his aid and private secretary — came to convey me 
to the Olympia, where I was received, with my aid, Sr. Leyva, 
with the honors of a general, by a section of marine guards." ^ 

Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified : ^ 

"The Chairman. You, of course, never saluted the flag? 

"Admiral Dewey. Certainly not ; and I do not think I ever 
called Aguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don't think I 
ever called him 'General.' 

" The Chairman. And when he came on board ship was he 
received with any special honors at the side? 

" Admiral Dewey. Never." 

The ''Resena Veridica" continues: — 

"The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings 
of courtesy I asked him 'if all the telegrams relative to myself 
which he had addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, 
were true.' He replied in the affirmative, and added, ' that the 
United States had come to the Philippines to protect its natives 
and free them from the yoke of Spain.' 

"He said, moreover, that 'America was rich in territory 
and money, and needed no colonies,' concluding by assuring 
me, 'to have no doubt whatever about the recognition of 
Philippine independence by the United States.' Thereupon 
he asked me if I could get the people to arise against the Span- 
iards and carry on a rapid campaign." ^ 

As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to 
Pratt about Aguinaldo. It merely directed that the latter 
be sent. 

ip. I. R., 1300. 2. 

^ Admiral Dewey's testimony, from whieh I quote extracts, will be 
found in Senate Documents, Vol. 25, 57 Congress, 1st session, pp. 2928, 

» P. I. R., 1300. 2. 


a ' 

I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgement 
for the generous help which the United States was giving the 
Fihpino people, as well as my admiration for the magnificence 
and goodness of the American people. I also stated to him that 
'before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a 
meeting, at which was discussed and considered the possibility 
that — after defeating the Spaniards — the Filipinos might have 
a war with the Americans, if they should refuse to recognize 
our independence, who were sure to defeat us because they 
should find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in 
the war against the Spaniards,' requesting that he pardon my 

''The Admiral replied that he 'was delighted at my sincerity, 
and believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat 
each other as allies and friends, clearly explaining all doubts 
for the better understanding between both parties,' and added 
that, 'so he had been informed, the United States would recog- 
nize the independence of the Filipino people, guaranteed by 
the word of honor of the Americans, — more binding than 
documents which may remain unfulfilled when it is desired to 
fail in them as happened with the compacts signed by the 
Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino national 
flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protect it before 
the other nations, which were represented by the various 
squadrons then in the Bay ; although he said we should con- 
quer the power from the Spaniards before floating said flag, 
so that the act should be more honourable in the sight of the 
whole world, and, above all, before the United States, in order 
that when the Filipino ships mth their national flag would 
pass before the foreign squadrons they should inspire respect 
and esteem.' 

"Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and 
generous offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my life 
was necessary to honor the Admiral before the United States, 
I was then ready to sacrifice it. * 

"I added that under such conditions I could assure him 
that all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution to 
shake off the yoke of Spain ; that it was not strange that some 
few were not yet on his side on accomit of lack of arms or be- 
cause of personal expediency. 

"Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to 
whom I announced that I would take up my residence at the 
Naval Headquarters in the Cavite Arsenal." ^ 

ip. I. R., 1300. 2. 


Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances 
the claim that on the occasion of the visit of General 
Anderson and Admiral Dewey the latter again promised 
him independence. 

He says : — 

" In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by 
General Anderson, presented himself, and after greetings of 
courtesy said to me : ' You have seen confirmed all of what 
I promised and said to you. How pretty your flag is. It 
has a triangle, and it looks like Cuba's. Will you give me one 
as a reminder when I return to America ? ' 

"I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of honour 
and that there was no necessity whatever to draw up in docu- 
mentary form his agreements, and as for the flag, that he could 
count on it, even at that very moment. 

"Dewey continued: 'Documents are not complied with 
when there is no honour, as has happened with your agreement 
with the Spaniards, who have failed in what was written and 
signed. Trust in my word for I hold myself responsible that 
the United States will recognize the independence of the country. 
But I recommend to you [plural. — Tr.] to keep everything 
which we have talked about and agreed upon with a great deal 
of secrecy for the present. And, moreover, I entreat you 
[plural. — Tr.] to be patient if our soldiers should insult some 
Filipino, because, as volunteers, they are yet lacking in dis- 
cipline.' " ^ 

Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the 
recognition of Philippine independence by him : — 

"The Chairman. You remember the question of your 
recognizing his republic was a good deal discussed and you 
wrote me a letter, which I read in the senate. Of course, I 
am only asking now about what you said in the letter. There 
was no recognition of the republic ? 

"Admiral Devjey. Never. I did not think I had any 
authority to do it and it never occurred to me to do it. There 
was a sort of a reign of terror ; there was no government. 
These people had got power for the first time in their lives and 
they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of 
cruelty which were brought to my notice were hardly credible. 

1 Taylor, 4 MG., E. 

VOL. I — E 


I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners 
kindly, and he said he would." 

He has further testified that he never as much as heard 
of independence until the appearance of Aguinaldo's 
proclamation of June 15, 1898 : — 

^^ Admiral Dewey. . . . Then when I heard that our troops 
were coming I asked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite 
and make room for our men. He demurred at this, but finally 
withdrew and established headquarters across the bay at a 
place called Bacoor, from which place on the 15th of June he 
sent me a proclamation declaring the independence of the 

'The Chairman. Was that the first? 

'' Admiral Dewey. That was the first intimation; the first 
I had ever heard of independence of the Philippines. 

" The Chairman. He had said something to you — 

'^ Admiral Dewey. Not a word. He had done what I told 
him. He was most obedient ; whatever I told him to do he 
did. I attached so little importance to this proclamation that 
I did not even cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded 
it through the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted 

Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being in- 
terrogated as to the statements of the ''Reseiia Verldica," 
it will be seen that he has, nevertheless, covered them 

It was my good fortune to be long and intimately as- 
sociated with Admiral Dewey while serving on the first 
Philippine commission. He always grew indignant when 
the subject of any promises relative to independence said 
to have been made by him was so much as mentioned, 
and gave to the commission in writing the following : — • 

" The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23, 
published in the Springfield Republican, so far as it relates to 
reported conversations with me, or actions of mine, is a tissue 
of falsehood. I never, directly or indirectly, promised the 
Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo with 
military honors, or recognized or saluted the so-called Filipino 
flag. I never considered him as an ally, although I did make 









use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against 
the Spaniards." ^ 

As Dewey's allegations flatly contradict those of 
Aguinaldo, we must choose between the two. While I 
have no doubt as to where the choice will fall, I will now 
submit some additional matter of interest. Let us first 
consider the history of the ''Resena Veridica" in which 
Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On Sep- 
tember 12, 1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apacible 
in Hongkong, saying : — 

"This work is entitled 'Resena Verfdica de la Revolucion 
Filipina' in which Don Emilio relates in detail his acts with 
Admiral Dewey. It has been distributed to the Consuls and 
you are ordered to reprint it there translated into English and 
send some copies to the United States, even though only a 
thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copies also to Europe, 
Senor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If the Agent 
you may have selected for the United States should still be 
there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy of the pam- 
phlet with him for its publication. 

"This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure 
in transmitting to you for due execution." ^ 

But there was a change of heart about giving the 
pamphlet to the consuls, for under date of September 30 
Buencamino wrote : — 

"We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may 
not counteract the effects that we desire to produce with this 
publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we be- 
lieve it advisable to make this pamphlet public in those colonies 
before your arrival in the United States." ^ 

To this letter he added in cipher the following post- 
script to Pablo Ocampo, in charge of Aguinaldo's corre- 
spondence in Manila : — 

"At last moment — Nota bene : 

"Don't deliver any copy of the 'Resena Verfdica' to the 

1 Report of the Philippine commission to the President. January 
31, 1900. Vol. I, p. 121. 

2 P. I. R., 396. 3. ' Ibid., 396. 3. 


Consuls, even though it was so directed in the beginning of the 
letter. All except one, which is for you, will be sent to Hong- 
kong, Don Pedro de la Vina being bearer of the same, as also 
of the other documents. The copy intended for you is neither 
to be divulged nor published, for strict reserve is required until 
those which are being sent arrive at their destination." ^ 

The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this 
document until it could reach its destination and work its 
harm is of course obvious. Its statements were so out- 
rageously false that they would have been instantly and 
authoritatively contradicted had it been issued seasonably 
at Manila. 

The truth is that Aguinaldo's claim that he had been 
promised independence was a gradual growth. Let us 
trace it. 

On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to ''My dear 
brother," inviting the recipients and their companions 
to meet him at once, and arrange the best way to entrap 
all the enemy in their homes. 

In this he says that he has promised the American 
admiral that they will ''carry on modern war" and adds : 
"Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned 
and treated well, and then you will see that our reputa- 
tion will be very good in all Europe, which will declare for 
our independence ; but if we do not conduct ourselves 
thus, the Americans will decide to sell us or else divide 
up our territory. As they will hold us incapable of gov- 
erning our land, we shall not secure our liberty, rather the 
contrary ; our own soil will be delivered over to other 
hands." ^ 

1 P. I. R., 461. 4. 

2 " My Dear Brother : I inform you that we arrived here in Cavite 
at eleven o'clock and disembarked at fom* o'clock in the afternoon after 
our conference with the American Admiral. Everything appears to 
be favourable for obtaining our independence. I cannot say more on 
that subject as it would take too long. 

" I have no other object in writing this except to ask you and your 
companions to meet at once and arrange the best way to entrap all 
the enemy in your town, emplojang deceit, for instance, make a 


In this letter, written on the very day of the interview 
at which he subsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey 
had promised independence, does he make any claim that 
this had occurred? No, he very distinctly implies the 
contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly have said 
"The United States, through its representatives Dewey 
and Pratt, has promised to recognize our independence" 
he would have failed to do so when this would instantly 
have secured him the vigorous support which he was 
then uncertain of obtaining ? I think not. 

In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit 
be employed and that Spanish officers be treacherously 
attacked. The practising of deceit was a carefully con- 
sidered part of the insurgent policy. In a letter from 
Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as 
follows to Mabini : ^ — 

"the time will come when disguises must be set aside and we 
will see who is deceiving whom. The statements made by some 

present of whatever you think best to the chiefs successively and then 
at once enter the houses and attack them, or if not this, do what you 
think best. Show valor and resolution, brothers, the hour has arrived 
for the Philippines to belong to her sons and not to them, only one 
step and we shall reach Independence ; be constant, brothers, and be 
united in feelings, do not imitate those who show two faces, whatever 
such people do sooner or later they wall be slaves. Respect foreigners 
and their property, also enemies who surrender. 

" I want you to know that in respect to our conduct I have promised 
the American Admiral and other nations, that we shall carry on modern 
war. Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated 
well and then you will see that our reputation will be very good in 
all Europe which will declare for our Independence ; but if we do not 
conduct ourselves thus the Americans will decide to sell us or else 
diAdde up our territory as they will hold us incapable of governing 
our land, we shall not secure our liberty; rather the contrary; our 
own soil will be deUvered over to other hands. 

" Therefore, my brethren, I urge that we strive to unite our efforts, 
and let us fire our hearts wath the idea of vindicating our country. 
Many nations are on our side." — P. I. R., 12. 1. 

1 Mabini was a Tagalog paralytic of exceptional ability. In my 
opinion he was the strongest man whom the revolution produced. 


of the commanders of the fleet here to Don Emilio and myself 
were to the effect that the exclusive purpose of the Government 
at Washington with regard to the Filipinos, is to grant this 
country independence, without any conditions, although I said 
to myself that such a purpose was too philanthropical. Don 
Emilio knew what I thought then, and I still think the same ; 
that is to say that we are the ones who must secure the indepen- 
dence of our country by means of unheard of sacrifices and thus 
work out its happiness." ^ 

Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of de- 
ceit. He practised what he preached. Simeon Villa, 
one of his companions on his subsequent flight through 
Northern Luzon, before he finally took refuge at Palanan, 
kept a diary, which constitutes an official record of this 
long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history 
of other days, of which none is more interesting than his 
account of the beginning of hostilities against the Span- 
iards, in August, 1896. From it we learn that Aguinaldo, 
who was known to the friar of his town to be both a mason 
and a chief of the Katipunan, was in danger during August, 
and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meet- 
ing of all the compromised persons of the place, who 
agreed that on the following day he should ''make repre- 
sentations to the governor of the province." Villa says 
that he was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife. 
Early on the following morning, he ''presented himself to 
the governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite 
Viejo, offered him their respects and their loyalty to 
Spain," at the same time asking a garrison of a hundred 
men for his town, which the governor promised to send 
at once if the captain-general approved. 

That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts 
to his fellow-conspirators, "and told them that then was 
the opportune moment for rising against the Spaniards." 
He initiated the uprising himself the next morning.^ 

ip. I. R., 451. 1. 

- Extract from the Journal of Simeon Villa. 
" The memorable month of August, 1896, arrived. Aguinaldo was 


Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery 
more frankly employed ? 

•master' of the Cavite Lodge. Moreover, he was a member of 
the 'Katipunan' Society and the chief of the many members who 
were in the pueblo of Cavite Viejo. What was to be done ? Agui- 
naldo, not knowing what to do, and mindful of the fact that the cu- 
rate there knew positively that he was not only a mason, but also the 
chief of the Katipiinans of his pueblo, considered it expedient on the 
night of August 29 to at once call a meeting of all the compromised 
persons in his town. Aguinaldo made clear to them their grave sit- 

" They all agreed that on the following day Aguinaldo, their chief, 
should make representations to the Governor of Cavite ; so he went 
away very early the folloA\'ing morning, presented himself to the gov- 
ernor, and in the name of the people of Ca\'ite Viejo offered him their 
respects and their loyalty to Spain, at the same time requesting him 
to condescend to send to his town a garrison of 100 men for its security. 
The governor replied that he would first consult the captain-general, 
and if the proposition was approved he would send the garrison at 

"As Aguinaldo was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife, 
they offered him wine and sweetmeats. As soon as this was over he 
took his leave and returned happy to his town. On arrival in the town 
he assembled all the compromised persons and informed them of the 
brilliant result of his efforts. Continuing, he told them that then was 
the opportune moment for rising in arms against the Spaniards. To 
this they unanimously replied by saying it was terrible, because no 
arms were available, and that for this reason it would certainly prove 
to be a disaster for them. 

"But Aguinaldo, in company with his godfather, the lamented 
Candido Tirona, insisted on con\dncing them with their strong argu- 
ments. They made them understand that Spanish cruelty would 
annihilate them without fail, and for no other reason than that they 
were members of the Katipunan. 

"As it happened, at that very time there were two 'Guardia Civil' 
soldiers in the court-house. So at about 2 o'clock in the morning, 
Aguinaldo and Tirona went directly to the court-house. Arriving 
there, these two determined insurgent chiefs intimated to the guards 
that they should surrender their equipments. These replied that it 
was impossible, and said they would die first. Instantly a struggle 
ensued between the four men, which lasted nearly an hour. But it 
resulted in favor of the insurgent chiefs who succeeded in taking the 
guns and cartridges. Once in possession of these armaments, the two 
chiefs, accompanied by a number of the town people, directed them- 
selves to the convent in order to capture the curate. Very unfortu- 
nately for them, the curate was no longer there when they arrived ; 
he had made his escape. While the struggle was going on with the 


I have indulged in this digression to show that Agui- 
naldo could hardly have complained had the methods 
which he used against others been employed against him. 
He was never deceived by the Americans, but his claims 
relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soon 
deceiving his own people. 

On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclama- 
tions. One of these, doubtless intended to be seen by 
Americans, made no mention of Independence, but 
said : ^ — 

guards in the court-house, he received the news and fled at once by 
embarking in a native boat. 

" The insurgent chiefs then returned to the court-house and immedi- 
ately prepared a communication to all the municipal captains in the 
provinces of Cavite, Batangas and Laguna, inviting them to at once 
rise against Spain, and stating that their own town of Cavite Viejo 
was already freed from slavery. 

" Each one of these communications was sent out by a mounted 
courier, so that before the expiration of many hours all the towns in 
Cavite Province were informed of what had taken place in Cavite Viejo. 

" On the following day some of the towns took up arms. At the same 
time Aguinaldo, in company with many people from his town, marched 
on Imus in order to attack the Spanish troops who were there. When 
he arrived in Imus the people of this town at once joined him and they 
all went to the convent, in which were the iriars and the soldiers of 
the 'Guardia Civil.' Just as he arrived at the atrium of the Church 
his companions did not wish to follow him, for fear that the soldiers 
were occupying the church tower. So Aguinaldo advanced alone until 
he reached the door of the convent. Once here, he called his compan- 
ions to aid him. But these were not so determined as he was, and only 
about five responded. When these got to where Aguinaldo was, he 
commenced breaking in the door which was soon open. They went 
upstairs, but they found nobody, since the friars and soldiers had 
crossed over to the treasury building. 

" Aguinaldo's companions were now numerous, because the others 
followed him when they saw that nothing happened to those who went 
up into the convent ; and all of these went immediately to the treasm-y 
building, in which were the friars and soldiers whom they were hunting. 
When they reached it they found the doors closed, so they could not 
pass. Aguinaldo ordered the house burned. Those in hiding inside 
the house were without any other remedy and had to surrender ; but 
meanwhile some of them had been burned to death, among these a 
lieutenant of the 'Guardia Civil.' By this victory Aguinaldo suc- 
ceeded in taking 17 rifles and two 2| pounder guns." — -P. I. R., 869. 

^ "My Beloved Countrymen: I accepted the agreement of peace 


''The great powerful North American nation has offered 
its disinterested protection to secure the Hberty of this 

In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a 
different use, he made the statement that the great 
North American nation had come to give decisive and 
disinterested protection, ''considering us as sufficiently 
civihzed and capable of governing ourselves." ^ 

proposed by Don Pedro A. Paterno after his consultation with the 
Captain-General of the islands (Philippines), agreeing in consequence 
thereof to surrender our arms and disband the troops under my immedi- 
ate command under certain conditions, as I believed it more advan- 
tageous for the country than to continue the insurrection, for which 
I had but limited resources, but as some of the said conditions were 
not complied with, some of the bands are discontented and have not 
surrendered their arms. Five months have elapsed without the in- 
auguration of any of the reforms which I asked in order to place our 
country on a level with civihzed people — for instance, our neighbor, 
Japan, which in the short space of twenty years has reached a point 
where she has no reason to envy any one, her strength and ascendency 
being shown in the last war with China. I see the impotence of the 
Spanish Government to contend with certain elements which oppose 
constant obstacles to the progress of the country itself and whose 
destructive influence has been one of the causes of the uprising of the 
masses, and as the great and powerful North American nation has 
offered its disinterested protection to secure the hberty of this 
country, I again assume command of all the troops in the struggle for 
the attainment of our lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial 
government to be administered by decrees promulgated under my sole 
responsibihty and with the advice of distinguished persons until the 
time when these islands, being under our complete control, may form 
a constitutional republican assembly and appoint a president and 
cabinet, into whose hands I shall then resign the command of the 

"Emilio Aguinaldo. 

" Given at Cavite, May 24, 1898." —P. I. R. 206. 6. 

1 "The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty 
and therefore the friend of our people oppressed and enslaved by the 
tjTanny and despotism of its ruler, has come to us manifesting a pro- 
tection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested toward our in- 
habitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of govern- 
ing ourselves and our unfortunate country. In order to maintain this 
high estimate granted us by the generous North American nation we 
should abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion, 
which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes relating to persons or 


On June 5, having practically gained control of 
Cavite Province, he felt strong enough to announce 
that independence would be proclaimed on June 12, 
and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree. 

The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the com- 
manders and officers of his command, was invited to the 
ceremonies, but none of them went. As it was important 
for Aguinaldo to have some one there to pose as a repre- 
sentative of the United States, he utilized for this purpose 
a certain '^ Colonel'' Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of 
Shanghai, who was running a cinematograph show. He 
appeared as Aguinaldo 's chief of artillery and the 
representative of the North American nation.^ 

Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memo- 
randum addressed to President McKinley did not claim 
that independence had been promised, but said : — 

"As soon as the Spanish- American war began, the American 
representatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and 
Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist the 
American arms, which they did gladly and loyally, as allies, 
with the conviction that their personality would be recognized, 
as well as their political, autonomous and sovereign rights." ^ 

property, with the purpose of avoiding international conflict during 
the period of our campaign." — P. I. R., 43. 3. 

1 Of this extraordinary oeemTence Taylor saj's : — 
"Invitations to the ceremony of the declaration of independence 

were sent to Admiral Dewey ; but neither he nor any of his officers 
were present. It was, however, important to Aguinaldo that some 
American should be there whom the assembled people would consider 
a representative of the United States. 'Colonel' Johnson, ex-hotel 
keeper of Shanghai, who was in the Philippines exhibiting a cinemato- 
graph, kindly consented to appear on this occasion as Aguinaldo's 
Chief of Artillery and the representative of the North American nation. 
His name does not appear subsequently among the papers of Aguinaldo. 
It is possible that his position as colonel and chief of artillery was a 
merely temporary one which enabled him to appear in a uniform which 
would befit the character of the representative of a great people upon 
so solemn an occasion ! " * 

2 P. I. R., 451. 4. 
* Taylor, 2G A J. 





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In it he does, however, claim that the organization of 
a government independent of America and Spain was 
accomplished with the tacit consent of the admiral com- 
manding the fleet and with that of the general and military 
and political commanders of the United States of North 
America in the Philippines. 

"Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but 
accepted them as a consummated legal act, and maintained 
official relations with the new organization, making use thereof 
in its subsequent actions and for the subsequent development 
of the campaign, which was consequently brought to such a 
happy end." ^ 

This is a second illustration of the stereotj^jed insurgent 
procedure of announcing a policy and then claiming that 
failure to attack it meant acquiescence in it. Admiral 
Dewey says that he did not even read this proclamation. 
There was no reason why he should have done so, as it 
did not deal with matters which he was authorized to 
settle. He had no instructions relative to the recogni- 
tion of new governments, and he sent this document to 
Washington without comment, as he should have done.- 

Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly rec- 
ognized the Insurgent government, certain passages from 
an unsigned document in the handwriting of Mabini, pre- 
pared about July 15, 1898, are of interest. Mabini, speak- 
ing of the attitude of the Americans, says, "Notwith- 
standing all this and in spite of their protestations of 
friendship, they have always refused to recognize that 
government." Also, ''If they persist in refusing to rec- 
ognize our government, we shall see ourselves compelled 
to come to an agreement with any other government 
that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms." ^ 

1 P. I. R., 451. 4. 2 See p. 50. 

* " They are aware that a Government has been established here 
from the beginning : first the Dictatorial, and afterwards, when several 
provinces had been freed from Spanish domination, there was implanted 
in the same a proper organization, and thus a new Government was 
established in the form best adapted to the principles of liberty ; but 


This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to 
whether Americans had recognized the Insurgent govern- 
ment on or before the date when it was written. 

Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo 
and General Anderson. 

Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by 
the latter, in which, after describing the Filipinos, he 
adds, ' ' The people expect independence. ' ' Blount says : — 

"That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the 
commanding general of our forces in the Philippines advises the 
Washington Government, 'The people expect independence' 
is the hardest thing in the public archives of our government 
covering that momentous period for those who love the memory 
of Mr. McKinley to get around. After the war with the 
Filipinos broke out, McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches, 
'I never dreamed they would turn against us. ' " ^ 

If there is nothing harder than this to get around the 
memory of President McKinley will not suffer, as the 

notwithstanding all this and in spite of their protestations of friendship, 
they have always refused to recognize that government. 

" The things they request involve the recognition of a right which 
we cannot and ought not to grant, unless they recognize our Govern- 
ment and unless the limits of the powers of both sides be defined. 
If they wish us to recognize them in Cavite, let them recognize our 
rights in Paranaque. 

" The United States are our creditors more than any other nation ; 
not only are they due the gratitude of the Filipino people, but also 
they should be allowed to profit by the advantages this people can 
grant them without loss of our legitimate right to a free and independent 
life. Therefore we are disposed to make a treaty or convention with 
them. They will be no longer able to allege the lack of national char- 
acter, for in the near future there is to be assembled the Revolutionary 
Congress composed of the Representatives of the provinces. 

" They should understand that they have come to make war on the 
Spaniards ; that the Filipinos have risen in arms against the same 
enemy to achieve their liberty and independence ; and that in conse- 
quence they cannot exercise dominion over us without violation of 
international law. If they persist in refusing to recognize our Govern- 
ment, we shall see ourselves obliged to come to an agreement with any 
other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms." 

— P. I. R., 58. 
1 Blount, p. 24. 


important thing is not what Aguinaldo had led his people 
to expect, but what the American officials had promised 
him. The President was certainly not bound to believe 
that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they 
did then expect independence. Blount has seen fit to 
leave unmentioned certain other facts which are very 
pertinent in this connection. 

Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico 
made the following statement in a letter to Aguinaldo : — 

"I also have to inform you that Senores Basa, Cortes and 
Co. have congratulated the Government of the United States 
upon the capture of Manila, stating at the same time that now 
that Filipino soil had been soaked with American blood, the 
Islands must remain American. I believe that a telegram 
should be sent immediately, to counteract that sent by them." ^ 

Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 
1898, Agoncillo had transmitted another telegram to 
President McKinley through Consul-General Wildman, 
reading as follows : — 

"Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador- Extraor- 
dinary, representing the provisional government of the 
Philippine Islands, in its name and the name of its President, 
Emilio Aguinaldo, congratulates you on the successful termina- 
tion of the war, and commends the occupancy of Manila. I 
assure the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning 
support of our people, and petition that we be granted one or 
more representatives on the commission that is to decide the 
future of our Islands." ^ 

It would appear, therefore, that the President had more 
information on this subject than was transmitted by 
General Anderson ! 

Not only did the latter passively refrain from recogniz- 
ing Aguinaldo's pretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he 
wrote to him as follows : — 

"I observe that your Excellency has announced j^ourself 
Dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply 

1 P. I. R., 416. 1. ^ Ibid., 102. 5. 


in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such 
an assumption. I have no orders from my government on the 
subject." '• 

The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true 
state of affairs was kept up until further deception was 
useless. Consul Williams, for instance, wrote on June 
16, 1898 : — 

"For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations 
with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to 
our forces when treating for their return here. Last Sunday, 
12th, they held a council to form provisional government, I 
was urged to attend, but thought best to dechne. A form of 
government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me to- 
day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be 
held as a colony of the United States of America." ^ 

Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality 
proclaimed the independence of the Philippines. Few 
Americans at this time knew any Spanish and none un- 
derstood Tagalog, so that it was comparatively easy to 
deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what 
Aguinaldo considered it expedient to have him believe. 

The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, 
supposed to have been sent at this time, is of especial 
interest in this connection : — 

"My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where 
the addressee is] until after the visit of the American Consul, 
because I do not wish the negotiations to end in an ultimatum, 
and in order that you may tell him all that is favourable for 
the cause of our Nation. I charge you with the task of giving 
him a reply, and if he should ask about me tell him that since 
the time of his last visit there I have not recovered from my 
illness. If anything important should happen we can com- 
municate with each other by telegraph, using a code in matters 
that require secrecy." ^ 

In a letter supposed to have been written during 
November, 1898, prepared for Aguinaldo's signature and 

1 Senate Document 208, 1900, p. 9. 

2 Taylor, 26 A J. ^ p. j. r.^ 5, iq. 


addressed to Senor McKinley, President of the Republic 
of the United States of North America, but apparently 
never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge ^ previously 
made in his " Resena Veridica," that Pratt and Dewey 
promised independence. It need not be further dis- 

The climax was finally reached in an official protest 
against the Paris Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris 
on the 12th of December, 1898, in which occurs the 
following : — 

"The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege 
a better right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to the 
future of the Philippines. 

"On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith 
impose on them the explicit recognition of the political status 
of the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted 
ally of their forces in the moments of danger and strife. The 
noble general Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipino chiefs 
were solicited to place themselves at the head of the suffering 
and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and to 
second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey. 

" At the time of employing their armed cooperation, both the 
Commander of the Petrel and Captain Wood in Hongkong, 
before the declaration of war, the American Consuls-General 
Mr. Pratt in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hongkong, and 
Mr. Williams in Cavite, acting as international agents of the 
great American nation, at a moment of great anxiety offered to 

1 " Going to Singapore, I had several interviews with the Consul of 
the United States, Mr. Spencer Pratt, who informed me that the war 
was directed against Spain only and that in addition your action in 
the Philippines had as an object the independence of my beloved 

" The Commander of the MacCulloch telegraphed me also from 
Hongkong, offering in the name of Commodore Dewey, to take me 
to Cavite, in order to raise the Filipinos against Spain. 

" Without any written treaty, counting only upon the sacred word 
of American citizens, I went to Hongkong, embarked on the Mac- 
Culloch and a few days later had the honor to make the acquaintance 
of the -victorious Commodore Dewey, who likewise informed me that 
he had come to make war against Spain, that he had annihilated the 
fleet of Admiral ]SIontojo and that the United States desired to give 
the Philippines their independence." — P. I. R., 441. 2. 


recognize the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon as 
triumph was obtained. 

"Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war, 
the McCulhch was placed at the disposal of the said leaders 
and which took them to their native shores; and Admiral 
Dewey himself, by sending the man-of-war ; by not denying 
to General Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of his 
promises, when they were presented to him on board his flag- 
ship in the Bay of Manila ; by receiving the said General Agui- 
naldo before and after his victories and notable deeds of arms, 
with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an allied 
army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the 
efficacious cooperation of that Army and of those Generals; 
by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted 
on sea and land, consenting that their ships should sail with the 
said flag within the places which were blockaded ; by receiv- 
ing a solemn notification of the formal proclamation of the 
Philippine nation, without protesting against it, nor opposing 
in any way its existence ; by entering into relations with those 
Generals and mth the national Filipino authorities recently 
established, recognized without question the corporated body 
and autonomous sovereignty of the people who had just suc- 
ceeded in breaking their fetters and freeing themselves by the 
impulse of their own force." ^ 

It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The 
commander of the Petrel Captain Wood, Consul 
Wildman and Consul Williams are now included among 
those alleged to have promised independence, and it is 
claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours 
due the chief of an independent state when he visited 
Admiral Dewey, whereas his own original claim was that 
he was received with the honours due a general, which is 
quite a different matter. 

As a matter of fact, American oflBcers usually addressed 
and treated Aguinaldo as a general. The extent to which 
they were able to use his organization to further the ends 
of their government will be set forth later. 

In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo 
admits that there is no agreement, but says that he cannot 

iP. I. R., 102. 1. 

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tell the peoples that it does not exist, ''fearing that I 
may not be able to restrain the popular excitement." ^ 
He begs Wildman to use his influence on his government 
so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the 
fate of the people "without considering their will duly 
represented by my government." Is it conceivable that, 
if there had been any ground for claiming a promise of 
independence, Aguinaldo would have failed to mention 
it at this time ? 

We may summarize the well-established facts as fol- 
lows : — 

Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty 
sympathy with the ambition of the Filipino leaders to ob- 
tain independence, and would personally have profited 
from such a result, but he refrained from compromising 
his government and made no promises in its behalf. 

Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo 
the possibility of independence. 

There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of 
the Admiral ever discussed independence with any Fili- 
pino, much less made any promise concerning it. 

Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised 
it, and both were kept in ignorance of the fact that it 
was desired up to the last possible moment. 

It is not claimed that either General Anderson or 
General Merritt made any promise concerning it. 

The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by 
any of these men is fully justified by well-established facts. 

Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset 
from sajdng, in any document v/hich Americans could 
read, that independence had been promised, and advanced 
this claim only when the growing strength of his land 
force had given him confidence. He repeated it, with 
increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ulti- 
mately openly threatening war if his pretensions were 
not recognized. In doing this, he was merely carrying 

ip. I. R., Books C-i. 

VOL. I — F 


out a carefully prearranged plan, agreed upon by the 
Hongkong junta. 

And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents 
were our ''faithful allies" and ''cooperated" with us in 
the taking of Manila. We shall find that this subject 
richly repays investigation. 


Insurgent ' ' Cooperation ' ' 

I HAVE previously ^ called attention to the minutes of 
a session of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, 
from which it indirectly appears that the Filipino leaders 
at that time hoped to secure arms at the expense of the 
Americans and purposed to attack them later if it seemed 

The treacherous policy then outlined v^^as never departed 
from by Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for 
Manila with their eyes wide open, knowing full well that 
they had been promised nothing; prepared to match 
their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, and intent on 
deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used 
first against the Spaniards and later against the Ameri- 
cans, after they had been employed to help bring about 
the downfall of Spain. 

There exists a significant circular signed ''J.M.B." ^ 
believed to have been an outright forgery, both from its 
tenor and from the fact that the signature ''J.M.B." 
is not in the handwriting of Basa's letter hereinbefore 

It contains the following statements : — 

"The true patriots have organized a committee to which I 
belong, nammg Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as Vice- 
President. The latter and three others have commenced diplo- 
matic negotiations with the Admiral and American Consul, 
and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us, although 
they said they would give us independence. The Committee 
deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same time equip- 
ping ourselves with arms. 

1 P. 39. 2 For J. M. Basa. 



"We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will 
be disembarked in the Philippines by the squadron. 

"A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with 
them in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will be 
held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony, 
we shall reject such offer and rise in arms. 

" A separate expedition will disembark at v/hatever point 
may be considered suitable. 

"Jose Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron 
in order to give secret instructions to the Chiefs. 

"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point; 
you will communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who 
will recognize the gravity of the subject." ^ 

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials 
were forged in order to gain the prestige of his name for 
this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the 
purpose of the Filipinos to deceive the Americans by 
allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with them, 
and then to attack them. 

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice 
to Aguinaldo, given under date of August 26, 1898, to 
the effect that friendly relations should be maintained 
with the Americans until the diplomatic negotiations at 
Paris should end ; that an effort should be made to find 
out the future status of the islands ''by deceitful means," 
and that confidence should never be put in the Americans. 

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a post- 
script to this letter, saying : — 

"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs 
should employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans 
until our status is defined ; but said order should be confiden- 
tially given. Try to mislead them." ^ 

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of 
the Paris conference.^ 

1 P. I. R., 507-7. 2 P. I. R., 477. 1. 

' " Until the Philippine question is finally decided, you would do 
well in not having any controversy with the Americans. After hav- 
ing secured the extinction of Spanish control for good, you may then 
liquidate accounts with the United States in the event that they wish 


Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty 
of Paris would leave their country to them as it left Cuba 
to the Cubans,^ and adds that having helped us take the 
city of Manila, they ''felt that they had been 'given the 
double cross,'" "believed that the Americans had been 
guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian, and that was 
the cause of the war." ^ 

The quotations already given from Insurgent records 
show plainly that the principal thing for which the 
Filipinos were waiting was the ousting of Spain from the 
Philippines by the United States ; those which follow show 
that war was by no means inevitable as a result of a 
a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the 
question of whether a United States protectorate, or even 
annexation to the United States, might be considered, 
was left open to a very late date.^ 

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents 
whipped the Spaniards without our assistance, but 
whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish sovereignty 
had practically disappeared from the islands at the time 
Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that 
"decrepit" Spain "could not possibly have sent any 
reenforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos 
would have 'eaten them up.'" ■* 

to control in the interior; but in the meantime, let what will occm", 
do not allow yourself to have any controversy with them. Matters 
are in a very delicate state at the present time." — P. I. R., 398. 3. 

In a postscript to the same letter Bray saj^s : — 

"America is a great nation and does not wish that conditions be 
dictated to her. I am more than ever convinced that you must be 
patient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishes 
and insanities, before the questions before the Paris Congress are 
definitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain ; then there would 
still be time to show your teeth if they try to govern the country. 
I would not object at present to them taking up their residence 
there and acting in the capacity of guard for good government, plac- 
ing our trust for the future in r*rovidence which will never abandon 
the Philippines." —P. I. R., 398. 3. 

» Blount, p. 283. 2 Ibid., p. 283. ' See p. 74. 

" " Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but one 
left to protect her own coast cities. The death kneU of her once proud 


But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were 
by no means sanguine. Their more intelHgent and 
reasonable men clearly foresaw that they could not win 
unaided. Senor Antonio Regidor was at the time residing 
in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence 
and exceptionally good education. He took a keen 
interest in the situation, and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed 
Agonciilo as follows : — 

"In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send 
a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to 
abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a 
common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, espe- 
cially of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever 
form, would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos 
en masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. 
London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept 
American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to 
remain." ^ 

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, 
but Agonciilo did not share them. He replied on July 
29: — 

"Provisional government's aspiration is independence. 
Make this campaign." ^ 

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he 
replied as follows, addressing his communication to Basa : 

"America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later 
with natives international question other difficulties necessary 
to encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally rais- 
ing American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence 
outside opinion show islands resolved united America high 
circles advise in view present circumstances only feasible pro- 
gramme is protectorate." ^ 

colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not 
possibly have sent any reenforcements to the Philippines. Besides, 
the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'" — Blount, p. 127. 
1 P. I. R., 471. 4. 2 ij,id^^ 471, 4. s j^^^^^ 450. 2. 


Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this 
cablegram, for on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he 
made the following statements and inquiries : — 

"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions 
which will arise are these : Have we sufficient arms to maintain 
the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? 
If the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish 
that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty, have we 
sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory over Spain 
and over them in the future ? If you think that we have not 
sufficient strength to fight against them, should we accept 
independence under the American protectorate? And if so, 
what conditions or advantages should we give to the United 
States ? You should carefully consider the preceding questions, 
and I suggest that you should, in a confidential manner, consult 
them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private 
secretary and military chiefs of rank; and your decision be 
notified to our representatives abroad in order that they may 
know what they must do in their negotiations. You will see 
from the telegram addressed to me by Regidor that he suggests 
to me to send a message to MacKinley requesting him not to 
abandon us, and to submit to them [the U. S.] unconditionally. 
As I do not agree with him and as I cannot take any action 
which is against the instructions of the government, I replied 
to him that the only desire of our government is independence. 
This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of 
this reply, he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards 
sent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter, 
upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots, 
and they adopted a resolution to send a message to MacKinley 
requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was 
present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested against such measure. 
In view of this protest, they again agreed that I should be pres- 
ent in the meeting, since I am the representative of our govern- 
ment. At the meeting where I was present, I pointed out the 
inadvisability of their resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, 
that we should await your instructions in regard to the matter 
before sending any message of that character. So the message 
was not sent ; but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, 
sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure 
our cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion 
and went so far as to say to Basa the following : ' Many of us, 
especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being so ; 


politicians for what we hear from others ; we claim to be pa- 
triots, but we are only so in words ; we wish to be chiefs, but 
none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.' To this he did not 
reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act of treach- 
ery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your letter. What 
union can you expect from this people? " ^ 

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose in- 
itials were forged on the letter quoted on page 67. 

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo 
came back once more to the question of independence 
under a protectorate and made it very clear that at this 
late day he did not know whether this was or was not 
what the Filipinos desired. ^ 

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that 
it would be an easy matter to escape from Spanish domina- 
tion, much less that the islands were already rid of it, 
for he wrote to Mabini that the United States were likely 
again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of Spain. 
He said that "ii events will be what their telegrams in- 
dicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To 
be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and 
bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be 
favourable to us. . . . Spain free from Cuba and her 
other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will 
send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." ^ Apacible 

1 P. I. R., 471. 4. 

2 "You should not forget what I have stated at the beginning of 
this letter; because I am of the opinion that those questions should 
be well considered by all of you. If our people desire independence 
under the American protectorate, it is necessary that our representa- 
tives to the United States be given instructions as to the conditions 
which we should grant to the United States. The peace negotiations 
are in full blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in send- 
ing our representatives. Therefore, if you agree to independence 
under a protectorate, you should recommend it at once. I leave it, 
however, to your care, as you are better qualified than myself concern- 
ing the conditions of our country." — P. I. R., 471. 4. 

^ "My Dear Friend : . . . The last telegrams from Europe which 
Felipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our future. The 
preliminaries of peace are announced. The demand of America is, 
annexation of Porto Rico and the Ladrone Islands, independence of 





2 =j 








1 -a 

i c3 







thought that the best thing was independence under an 
American protectorate. 

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that 
in the United States he should "not accept any contracts 
or give any promises respecting protection oi- annexation, 
because we will see first if we can obtain independence." ^ 

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded 
by Aguinaldo from the possible accepted solutions, for 
in outlining the policy of the Phihppine government to 
Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote : — 

Cuba under an American protectorate and an American coaling sta- 
tion in the Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the 
hands of Spain. On the other hand, all the powers will unite to pre- 
vent the annexation of the Philippines, according to the telegrams of 
Regidor; the American cabinet hesitates about including us in the 
negotiations for peace from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos 
in Europe adiise us to send a message to America giving our uncondi- 
tional adhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we 
have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands 
of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether 
the end will be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by 
the other powers wdll assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from 
Cuba and her other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us 
and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think 
that the Filipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will be 
a long and bloody war. And on account of the treaty the other 
powers will aid Spain to completely dominate us and place all possible 
obstacles in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of 
revolutionary labours. In view of all this and bearing in mind the 
present urgency of the matter, it is necessary for that government to 
establish and publish its policy. We believe that the best for us and 
the only feasible one, if we want to establish negotiations with America, 
is independence under an American protectorate." — P. I, R., 453. 3. 
1 " The policy which you wiU pursue in the United States is the 
following one : — 

"Make them understand that whatever may be their intention 
towards us, it is not possible for them to overrule the sentiments of 
the people represented by the government, and they must first recog- 
nize it if we are to come to an agreement. Still do not accept any con- 
tracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, be- 
cause we will see first if we can obtain independence. This is what 
we shall endeavour to secure ; meanwhile, if it should be possible to do 
so, still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bind 
yourself but that once we are independent, we will be able to make 
arrangements with them." — P. I. R., Books C-I. 


"The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To 
struggle for the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our 
strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexa- 
tion will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that 
the recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or 
diplomacy, is impossible." ^ 

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to con- 
sider annexation if necessary.- He was apparently not 
sanguine at this time as to the result of a continued 
struggle with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help 
of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and 
desired to know on what terms it could be had.^ 

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured 
annexation made themselves heard. 

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote 
from that place : — 

"I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders 
and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite 
of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting 
for annexation to the United States first, and for independence 
secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty 
of the Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders 

1 P. I. R., 5. 7. 

2 In a letter written on that date to Agoneillo he says : — 

" Notwithstanding, I enclose you the credentials as requested ; 
thereby you will see that in addition to your representing us at Wash- 
ington, you may assist the commission they have formed for the pur- 
pose of determining the future condition of the Philippines. 

" But you must act in such manner that they may not be able to say 
that we have accepted the said commission, because it is my wish to 
protect [protest ? D. C. W.] at all times against their being charged with 
determining our destiny. You must bear in mind that the policy of the 
government is to obtain absolute independence, and if perchance we 
should know by the course of events that such cannot be the ease, we 
wiU then think of protection or annexation." —P. I. R., Books C-1. 

^ On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agoneillo : — 

" It is said that General Merritt is going away to take part in the 
work of the Commission. On this account it is important that you 
proceed as quickly as possible to America, in order to know what takes 
place. If perchance v;^e should go back to Spanish control, ask them 
to help us as the French helped them during their own revolution and 
ask also the terms." — P. I. R., Books C-1. 


call on me and say they would not raise one finger unless I could 
assure them that the United States intended to give them United 
States citizenship if they wished it." ^ 

We have already noted the action of Basa and the 
Cortez family who insisted that the Islands must remain 
American,^ and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President 
McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his own, congratulat- 
ing him on the outcome of the war, commending the oc- 
cupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United 
States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of 
the Filipinos,^ but it is to be feared that the sending of 
this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent 
game of deceit. 

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in 
Hongkong.-* Indeed we know that some of the strongest 
and best of the Fihpinos there were in favour of it. 

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said : — 

"In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano^ addressed to Don 
Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a 
letter written from the town of Pagsanjdn, province of Laguna, 
in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In 
this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the 
United States and said : 'Avoid all doing and undoing, and when 
America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be 
time enough to make laws.' Mabini, w^hose influence at that 
time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's government, paid no 
heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the PhiHp- 
pine government was established in Malolos, and before congress 

1 Taylor, 18 A.J. « See p. 61. 3 j}.i^_ 

* Some time during August, 1898, Sandico wrote a letter to Agui- 
naldo of which the postscript reads as foUows : — 

"P.S. — If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila, 
please send me mv credentials. There are also annexationists here 
[i.e., in Manila. — D. C. W.]." — P. I. R., 416. 3. 

* Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. 
He is a man of excellent character, high attainments and great ability. 
He held important legal positions under the Spanish government. 
In October, 1898, he was appointed Secretary of Foreign Relations of 
the "Philippine Republic," but never served as such officer. He was 
given the degree of Doctor of Law by Yale University in 1904. 


had promulgated a Philippine constitution, Messrs. Arellano 
and Pardo^ still more earnestly advocated union with America, 
the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief 
diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States to 
acknowledge the independence of the country under a protector- 
ate through the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was 
accepted at a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But 
on the following day Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he 
had had a conference with the Japanese consul and had been 
told by him : ' that if Aguinaldo would support absolute inde- 
pendence the Japanese Government would help.' Aguinaldo 
believed Sandico's story (which turned out to be absolutely 
false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by the cabi- 
net. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated 
themselves from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me 
afterwards that he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated 
Washington, assuring him that a majority of the American 
people were inclined to acknowledge the independence of the 
Philippines and of Cuba." ^ 

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, 
to the vicinity of Manila. 

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported 
that a delegation from four thousand Visayan soldiers, 
a delegation which also represented southern business 
interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to an- 

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as 
follows : All were agreed that the assistance of the United 
States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty. 

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly 
relations were to be maintained with the United States, 
if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine 
territory, and then they were to "show their teeth," 
and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force 
of arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would 
be accepted only when it could be clearly seen that the 

1 Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the most brilliant living 
Filipinos. He had spent many years in Paris, was a talented physician, 
and under American rule served for more than seven years as a member 
of the Philippine Commission. ^ Taylor, 55 AJ. * Taylor, 26 AJ. 


recognition of independence, won either by force of arms 
or by diplomacy, was impossible. 

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored 
annexation to the United States or a United States pro- 
tectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by 
Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter had the 
guns their ideas prevailed. 

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sover- 
eignty in the Phihppines, was signed on December 10, 
1898. It is important to bear this date in mind later, 
when considering the Insurgent records relative to the 
preparations which were so carefully made for attacking 
the American troops. 

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the co- 
operation alleged to have been asked by Americans and 
given by Filipinos. The following points are not in dis- 
pute : — 

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to cooperate with Dewey. 

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding 
that he would do so. 

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main 
Spanish fleet ; by bringing him and his associates back 
to the Philippines ; by furnishing them arms and ammuni- 
tion ; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe 
distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have 
made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms 
subsequently imported by the Insurgents. 

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons 
in the provinces and used the arms and ammunition cap- 
tured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which 
surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large numbers of 
people into the walled city, thus rendering the position 
of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a 
possible bombardment, and prevented this garrison from 
betaking itself to the pro\dnces, as it might otherwise 
have done, lea\'ing Manila to shift for itself. 

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault. 


It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have 
been possible for the Admiral to take it at any time, but 
he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States 
forces, and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent 
forces for this purpose. 

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? 
Let us consider his testimony on the subject : — 

"Senator Carmack. You did want a man there who could 
organize and rouse the people ? 

"Admiral Dewey. I didn't want anybody. I would like 
to say now that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by 
Consul Pratt and Consul Wildman ; I didn't do anything — 

"Senator Carmack. Did they have any power to force him 
upon you ? 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; they had in a way. They had 
not the official power, but one will yield after a while to con- 
stant pressure. I did not expect anything of them ; I did not 
think they would do anything. I would not have taken them ; 
I did not want them ; I did not believe in them ; because, when 
I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the country was in 
a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun, as Mr. Williams 
put it, there would be a general uprising, and I thought these 
half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong would play a very 
small part in it." ^ 

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet 
ready for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one 
hand and by irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pa- 
thetic ; but it had its humorous features, which were not 
lost on the Admiral himself. I quote the following : — 

"Senator Patterson. Was there any communication between 
you and Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or agree- 
ment with Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the 
PhiUppine Islands? 

"Admiral Dewey. No. 

"Senator Patterson. What became of the correspondence, 
Admiral, if you know? 

" Admiral Dewey. It is all in the Navy Department. When 
I turned over my command my official correspondence was all 
sent to the Navy Department. 

' Senate Documents, Vol. 25, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, 
p. 2969. 


"Senator Patterson. You retained all of your letters from 
any United States officials ? 

" Admiral Dewey . No; they went to the Department. 

"Senator Patterson. I mean you did not destroy them. 

"Admiral Dewey. No ; I did not destroy them. 

"Senator Patterson. And you turned them over to the 
Navy Department ? 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes ; our regulations require that. I 
may say that for my own information I kept copies of certain 
telegrams and cablegrams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr. 
Pratt's letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He 
seemed to be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other 
people's business and I don't think his letters impressed me. 

"Senator Patterson. He was the consul-general? 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the 
attack on Manila, j^ou know. 

"Senator Patterson. I understand that. 

"Admiral Dewey. I received lots of advice, you understand, 
from many irresponsible people. 

"Senator Patterson. But Pratt was the consul-general of 
the Government there? 

" Admiral Deivey . Yes; he was consul-general. 

"Senator Patterson. And he communicated with you, 
giving you such information as he thought you might be inter- 
ested in, and among other information he gave you was this 
concerning Aguinaldo? 

"Admiral Deivey. I don't remember; no, I really don't 
remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than 
that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you 
see how much importance I attached to him ; I did not wait 
for him. 

"Senator Patterson. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo 
to come as soon as possible.' 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for 

"Senator Patterson. Yes; but there was a reason for that. 

"Admiral Dewey. I think more to get rid of him than any- 
thing else. 

" Senator Carmack. Rid of whom? 

"Admiral Dewey. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They 
were bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron 
ready for battle, and these little men were coming on board 
my ship at Hongkong and taking a good deal of my time, and 
I did not attach the sUghtest importance to anything they 


could do, and they did nothing; that is, none of them went 
with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal 
of talk, but when the time came they did not go. One of them 
didn't go because he didn't have any toothbrush. 

"Senator Burrows. Did he give that as a reason? 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush.'" ^ 

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure 
exercised on him by Pratt and Wildman, and allowed 
Aguinaldo and some of his associates to be brought to 
Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance 
from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking 
a common enemy, in its own way. 

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation 
between Aguinaldo and the naval forces of the United 
States : — 

"Senator Patterson. Then, Admiral, until you knew that 
they were going to send land forces to your assistance you 
thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into 
land forces, did you ? 

"Admiral Dewey. No; not a necessity. 

"Senator Patterson. You thought it might prove of value 
to you? 

"Admiral Dewey. I testified here, I think, in a way that an- 
swers that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy; now, 
you go your way and I will go mine ; we had better act inde- 
pendently.' That was the wisest thing I ever said. 

"Senator Patterson. But you stated that you were using 
these people and they were permitted to organize, that you 
might use them. 

"Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us. 

"Senator Patterson. Very well, they were to assist you. 
Did you not either permit them or encourage them — I do not 
care which term you use — to organize into an army, such 
as it was, that they might render you such assistance as you 
needed ? 

"Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us, but incidentally 
they were fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy 
which had been their enemy for three hundred years. 

1 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2931-2932. 





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"Senator Patterson. I understand that, Admiral. 

"Admiral Dewey. While assisting us they were fighting 
their own battles, too. 

" The Chairman. You were encouraging insurrection against 
a common enemy with which you were at war ? 

"Admiral Dewey. I think so. I had in my mind an illustra- 
tion furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil 
war, and the only friends we had in the South were the negroes, 
and we made use of them ; they assisted us on many occasions. 
I had that in mind ; I said these people were our friends, and 
'we have come here and they will help us just exactly as the 
negroes helped us in the civil war.' 

"Senator Patterson. The negroes were expecting their 
freedom — 

"Admiral Dewey. The Filipinos were slaves, too. 

"Senator Patterson. What were the Filipinos expecting? 

"Admiral Dewey. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards ; 
I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall 
but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds 
was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and that 
would have occurred — I have thought that many times — if 
we had had troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May 
before the insurrection got started; these people would have 
accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our loyal 
friends — I don't know for how long, but they would have been 
our friends then. 

"Senator Patterson. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman, 
or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos wanted 
their own country and to rule their own country ; that that is 
what they were expecting ? 

"Admiral Dewey. I heard from Williams that there was an 
insurrection there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were 
very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond 
getting rid of them. There was one. Dr. Rizal, who had the 
idea of independence, but I don't think that Aguinaldo had 
much idea of it. 

"Senator Carmack. Then what useful purpose did the 
Filipino army serve; why did you want the Filipino army at 
all ? 

"Admiral Dewey. I did not want them. 

"Senator Carmack. Did you not want the Filipino forces? 

"Admiral Dewey. No, not really. It was their owti idea 
coming over there. We could have taken the city at any 
moment we had the troops to occupy it." 
VOL. I — a 


Admiral Dewey has made the following statements 
relative to the importance of Aguinaldo's military opera- 
tions : — 

" Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonder- 
fully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, 
and finally put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, 
and he wanted to take this up — wanted me to tow it up so he 
could attack the city with it. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do 
nothing until our troops come.' I knew he could not take the 
city without the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, 
and I knew that what he was doing — driving the Spaniards in 
— was saving our own troops, because our own men perhaps 
would have had to do that same thing. He and I were always 
on the most friendly terms ; we had never had any differences. 
He considered me as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had 
the highest admiration for us because we had whipped the 
Spaniards who had been riding them down for three hundred 


« m * * • * * 

"Senator Patterson (continuing). You sent this short dis- 
patch to the Secretary of the Navy : — 

" ' Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia 
yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. 
Doubt his abihty to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.' 

" Do you recall that visit ? 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes. 

"Senator Patterson. He came to tell you, did he, that he 
was going to make a general attack, and you — 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes. 

"Senator Patterson. And you doubted his ability to suc- 

"Admiral Dewey. And he wanted me to assist him. He 
wanted me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew he 
could not take the city ; of course he could not. 

"Senator Patterson. Did you urge that he should not make 
the attack? 

"Admiral Dewey. I do not remember that; very likely I 

"Senator Patterson. And was he not persuaded or restrained 
by you from doing so ? 

"Admiral Dewey. I do not remember; but it is very 
likely. I did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily, 
because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had 


no artillery, and they could not take it, I knew very well, and I 
wanted the situation to remain as it was until our troops came 
to occupy it. 

"Senator Patterson. But you found that whenever you ex- 
pressed a strong objection to anything being done at that time 
that Aguinaldo yielded to your request ? 

" Admiral Dewey. Up to the time the army came he did 
everything I requested. I had not much to do with him after 
the army came." ^ 

But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not suffi- 
cient to prevent his looting, as the following extracts from 
his testimony show : — 

"Senator Patterson. Is that what you mean when you say 
he looted — that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions 
and whatever was necessary ? That is what you meant ? 

"Admiral Dewey. That is one part of it. 

" Senator Car mack. This was taking provisions for the use 
of the army ? 

" Admiral Dewey. That is one thing he did. 

" Senator Carmack. You said you did not object to that 
at the time ? 

"Admiral Dewey. No. It would have been useless ; he got 
beyond me very soon — he got out of my hands very soon.^ 

"Senator Carmack. You said yesterday you suspected that 
Aguinaldo took the lion's share of the provisions that were 
gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you 
made that accusation ? 

"Admiral Dewey. Because he was living in Malolos like a 
prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about 
by his taking the lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting, 
I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight 
hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything 
he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because 
I saw the loot brought in ; and I know that every dollar that 
was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at 
the threat of death.^ 


"Senator Patterson. Do you believe in this proclamation he 
was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people ? 

1 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2956. 2 ji^^cl., p. 2966. 

3 Ibid., p. 2965, 


"Admiral Dewey. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was 
there for gain — for money — that independence had never up 
to that time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. 
That is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe 
that implicitly.^ 

"Senator Patterson. And you found nothing to cause any 
doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila sur- 
rendered ? 

"Admiral Dewey. His loyalty to whom? 

"Senator Patterson. To you and to the cause for which he 
was fighting ? 

"Admiral Dewey. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us 
about the time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving 
out of Cavite to make room for our troops. 

"Senator Patterson. Do you mean by that that you feared 
that he was commencing to think more of independence than 
the success of the American cause ? 

"Admiral Dewey. Yes." ^ 

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo cooperated 
with the marine forces of the United States. Now let us 
examine the claim that he cooperated with the land 
forces after their arrival. 

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have 
accomplished was the maintenance of an effective land 
blockade which prevented the entrance of provisions, 
and produced a very serious food shortage. Both Otis 
and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn 
from the Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclu- 

* Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2955. 

2 Ihid., p. 2952. 

' The following passage is an extract from an unsigned order dated 
July 22, 1898: — 

"For the preservation of peace and good order in the community 
and to put an end to the acts of those who within and without the city 
of Manila and in the neighboring provinces not under the control of 
the Spanish Government, are evading the orders issued by these 
Headquarters, and in \-iew of the large number of those who are storing 
and monopolizing food and other most necessary articles, under the 
pretence of desiring to sell them to the Americans, but whose real 
intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where they receive higher 


The landing of the American troops for the attack on 
Manila was not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but 
it was narrowly and distrustfully watched. 

Necessary transportation requested by General Ander- 
son was ultimately furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudg- 
ingly after a three weeks' delay, and as a result of threats 
that it would be seized if not voluntarily supplied. 

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila 
from which to make the attack on that city were, in part 
at least, jaelded to the Americans by the Filipinos 
upon the request of the former. 

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in ad- 
vance of projected American attacks. 

They carried out their own attack on the city without 
regard to the plans, or the requests, of the Americans. 
They secretly treated with the Spaniards in the endeavour 
to secure the surrender of the city to themselves. 

prices for their merchandise, without regard for the injury they are 
doing the cause of our independence, I have seen fit to decree the fol- 
lowing: ..." P. I. R., 45. 5 and 125. 3. 

Relative to this matter, Taylor says : — 

"The defection of Buencamino and Pilar had opened the road to 
Aguinaldo, but at first the blockade was not effective. There were 
too many natives there with friends and relations in Aguinaldo's camp 
to make him desire to subject the city to the hardships of an effective 
siege. And, furthermore, he did not have the force, nor did his men 
have the necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. It 
was not until the first part of July that the price of pro\-isions increased. 
It was at no time found necessary by the authorities to take over all 
the stores of provisions in the city. Indeed, there seems to have been 
a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and the country to 
the north. It was a traffic in which it has been charged that certain 
Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldo permitted it, 
and on July 26, 1898, signed an order directing that food should be 
sent into Manila from the north to prevent starvation in the city, and 
ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity not to interfere with 
this traffic (P. I. R., 1087-4). The entrance of food supplies was 
confined to the northern line, for then it would not be known to the 
Americans who, after July 30, occupied the entrenchments in front 
of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to see too much 
of Aguinaldo's methods." * 

* Taylor, 14 AJ. 


After the capitulation to the Americans had been 
agreed upon, and on the very morning of the day of the 
surrender, they endeavoured to push home an attack. 
Disregarding the request that they keep out of the final 
assault, they crowded into the city with, and after, the 
American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the 
city wall while a flag of truce w^as flying, provoking a 
return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers. 

They demanded for themselves Malacaiian palace and 
other buildings and a share in ''the war booty." They 
promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied, 
and ultimately retired from their positions within the 
city limits on the evening of their last day of grace after 
being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so 
they would be driven out. 

I will now quote from the records in support of these 

The following is the programme of ''cooperation" out- 
lined to Aguinaldo by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 
1898: — 

"I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation 
of Manila and I hope that General Augustin wall be obliged to 
turn over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. 
You are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from 
a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should 
declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival 
of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor 
with full powers to establish a provisional government. 

He 4: :): :<' ^ :)c 4= 

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the 
interior towns with their troops or any other act which might 
be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance. 

He H: 4( 4: 4: 4^ 4: 

"After having written these lines, I had another conference 
with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regard- 
ing the question of independence. He has had a consultation 
v/ith the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that 
you should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding 
what Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and 


this should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Gov- 
ernment having been thus constituted in due form, the Ameri- 
cans would have no right to invade the Philippines without com- 
mitting a violation of international law. They are no longer 
fighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. 
The advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic 
play to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because 
he is well aware of the false position said General would find 
himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands ; 
do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans 
have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet 
on the high seas ; they have not conquered any land, but in the 
meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by conquest 
from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have no 
right to enter further. Under certain conditions and guarantees, 
permit the landing of American troops ; but be very careful, 
they must not be permitted to land until they execute an agree- 
ment with the duly constituted government of the Philippines, 
respecting all its institutions, and they must under no pretext 
whatever be permitted to garrison any place except the munic- 
ipal limits of Manila, Cebii, and Iloilo, and even therein care 
should be observed. . . . You must not permit a single soldier 
to land without having these guarantees." ^ 

When General Anderson, with the first United States 
troops of occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo 
did not call on him, as an " ally " might have been ex- 
pected to do. Later, however, Admiral Dewey and 
General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without 
any of the ceremony of an official military call, the 
Admiral saying to General Anderson : — 

"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just 
put on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." ^ 

And they went in that way. 

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo defi- 
nitely requesting his cooperation in the following words : — 

"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable re- 
lations with you, and to have you and your force cooperate with 
us in the military operations against the Spanish forces." ^ 

1 P. I. R., 398. 2. = Senate Document 331, p. 2976, 1902. 

' P. I. R., 102-10. 


On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General 
Anderson for the 

"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands 
inspire in the Great North American nation," ^ 

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with 
the Filipinos and treat them with justice, courtesy and 
kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to 
cooperation in his reply, and Anderson apparently never 
renewed his request for cooperation in military operations. 
On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying : — 

"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by 
Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th 
instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding, which 
I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect 
large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you as 
a military officer that we will require much more room to camp 
our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For this I 
would like to have Your Excellency's advice and cooperation, 
as you are best acquainted with the resources of the country." ^ 

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter 
dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United 
States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo : — 

"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not 
at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding 
with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to 
cooperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and Presi- 
dent, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. 
This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, 
I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish 
a provisional government." ^ 

Evidently, however, cooperation, even in the matter 
of getting necessary transportation, did not materialize, 
for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote 
Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transporta- 
tion, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this 

iP. I. R., Books C-1. ■ P. I. R., 102-10. 'Ibid. 














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we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so 
far that the native population are not willing to give us this 
assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and 
if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties 
to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do 
this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has 
spent millions in money to send forces here to expel the Span- 
iards and to give good government to the whole people, and the 
return we are asking is comparatively slight. 

"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that 
we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with 
labor and material at the current market prices. We are pre- 
pared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot 
undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner." 

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General 
Anderson inquiring whether it was sent by authority of 
the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement that 
it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones reported on July 
20 that it was impossible to secure transportation ex- 
cept upon Aguinaldo 's order and that the natives had 
removed their cart wheels and hidden them, from which 
it is to be inferred that the transportation requested 
had not been furnished. 

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Agui- 
naldo had given orders against furnishing the transporta- 
tion desired, for on July 21 he wrote the Adjutant- 
General of the Army as follows : — 

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an 
elaborate system of military government, under his assumed 
authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being 
given us, except by his order. As to this last, I have written 
to him that our requisitions on the countrj^ for horses, ox carts, 
fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and 
that he must aid in having them filled." 

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as 
follows : — 


■ General : When I came here three weeks ago I requested 
Your Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure 


means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to 
fight the cause of your people. So far we have received no 

"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to 
make requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen 
and ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass 
you and make requisition directly on the people. 

" I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience. 

"I remain with great respect, etc." ^ 

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows : — 

"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to 
manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond 
measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non- 
receipt of any response relative to the assistance that you have 
asked of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because 
I did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue proper 
orders vv^henever you advised me of the number of these, giving 
me notice in advance. 

"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that 
within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, 
but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the num- 
ber of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses 
in this vicinity, omng to deaths from epizootic diseases in 
January, February, and March last. 

"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleas- 
ure to advise Your Excellency. 

"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts 
that I shall place at your disposition when you need them, 
provided you give me previous notice four days in advance." ^ 

General Anderson replied : — 

"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions 
for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that there should 
have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom 
we applied even for the hiring of carromatas, etc., told our peo- 
ple that they had orders to supply nothing except by your 
orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension 
on their part." ^ 

From this series of communications it appears that it 
took three weeks, and a very direct threat to seize trans- 

1 P. I. R., 102. 10. . 2 Ibid., Books C-1. ' Ibid.: 102-10. 


portation, to bring about Aguinaldo's promise of assistance 
in securing it. What help had he given, meanwhile, in 
other matters ? 

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to 
assist American officers in making reconnaissance of the 
approaches to Manila, and to favor them with his advice.^ 

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him 
to allow Major J. F. Bell,^ who was gathering information 
for General Merritt, to see maps, and further requesting 
him to place at Bell's disposal any available information 
about the force of the enemy and the topography of the 

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a 
Lieutenant E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a 

Such records as I have been able to find do not show 
what response, if any, Aguinaldo made to these several 
requests, but General Anderson's original views as to the 
willingness of the Insurgents to cooperate with him 
underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898, in a 
letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army 
he makes the following statement : — 

''The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself 
Dictator and self-appointed President. He has declared 
martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and ad- 
ministration under it. 

"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he 
and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the 
great American republic of the north, yet in many ways they 
obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila 
without us. 

"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with 
the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in Manila." ^ 

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later. 
On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Ander- 
son in effect warning him not to disembark American 

1 P. I. R., 102-10. 2 Now a major-general. 

3 P. I. R., 102-10. " lUd. <* Ibid. 


troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the 
Spaniards without first communicating in writing the 
places to be occupied and the object of the occupation.^ 
Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15, 
1899, did not pass unnoticed. On July 21 General 
Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General of the army con- 
cerning it : — 

"Hi.s assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let 
him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, 
while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem 
strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclama- 
tion as Dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication 
and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote 
such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's 
request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of 
Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every 
other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. These 
people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all 
deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives. 
They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization 
of their own ; and although insignificant in appearance, are 
fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. 
A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than 
a regiment of volunteers." 


1 "Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the 
favors we have received through Admiral Dewey and (being) more de- 
sirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would 
have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely pre- 
judicial, not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Excellency, 
I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembark- 
ing North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos 
from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because 
as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philip- 
pine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North 
American troops as a violation of its rights. 

" I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron 
the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidily. Be- 
cause of this I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the 
necessity that before disembarking, you should communicate in writ- 
ing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the 
object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form 
and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgression against friend- 
ship."— P. I. R., Books C-1. 


Because he was invited as general rather than as 
president, Aguinaldo refused to attend a parade and 
review on the 4th of July. This fact is, in itself, an answer 
to his claim that the Americans were tacitly recognizing 
his pretensions. 

After referring to this incident, Blount says : — 

"On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines 
it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our declara- 
tion before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved dis- 
cussion." ^ 

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the 
following year when the declaration was read on the 
Luneta to a considerable gathering of Filipinos among 
whom were many school children, and it has often been 
read since. 

The landing of American troops at Paraiiaque and their 
going into camp near that town on July 15 caused much 
excitement, and a lively interchange of telegrams between 
Insurgent officers folio wed. ^ 

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans,^ 
and trouble soon began. 

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as 
follows : — 

1 Blount, p. 59. 

2 On July 15 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : — 
"Urgent. Received a telegram from the captain adjutant, who is 

in Paranaque, of the following tenor : ' I inform your excellency that 
two cascos of armed Americans have arrived at this point. I await 
orders from Your Excellency.' Which I hasten to communicate to 
Your Excellency for the proper action." — P. I. R., 849. 

Later on the same day Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : — 
"Lieutenant-Colonel Duboee with three hundred men waiting for 
more troops from Cavite, and also orders, but not to attack." — P. I. R., 

' Captain Torres telegraphed Aguinaldo on Julj^ 15 as follows : — 
"I have read all yoiu* telegrams and carried out the same, and I 
incidentally questioned them about their purposes, [they] replying 
that they will aid ; let time demonstrate it. They also intend to en- 
camp over here at Paranaque. I will report to you any occurrence." 

— P.'l. R., 69. 6. 


"An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel 
of the Army whom we should obey ; and that it is your desire. 
We did not listen to him, awaiting your order." 

On the back of the telegram is written the following : — 

"Reply. — You should not obey. What this American 
Colonel says is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. 
You should require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but 
upright, also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and 
not timid." ^ 

Obviously there was no real cooperation between Ameri- 
can and Filipino troops at this time. General Anderson 
ignored General Aguinaldo's request for information as 
to places where American troops were to land in Filipino 
territory and the objects of disembarking them. 

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack 
upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some 
of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Arevalo tele- 
graphed Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"In conference with General Greene I asked for an official 
letter, a copy of which I send you : * Headquarters 2nd Brigade, 
U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 
29th, 1898. El Seizor Noriel, General de Brigade. Sir : 
In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message 
which Captain Arevalo brought to me during the night, I beg 
to inform you that my troops will occupy the intrenchments 
between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp for that 
purpose at 8.00 o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you 
will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. 
Thanking you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, 
your obedient servant, F. V. Greene, Brigadier General, 
commanding.' " ^ 

This clear direct declaration of intention by General 
Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as 
'^ Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches." He 
bases his statements concerning the matter on a news- 
paper report. 

1 P. I. R., 69. 5. 2 /bid., 849. 


The attitude of the army officers in the matter of 
obtaining permission to occupy the trenches needed in 
preparing for the assault on the city could not have been 
more correct. 

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following 
emphatic instructions relative to the matter : — 

"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can 
ask Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy 
their trenches, but if refused not to use force." 

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, 
asking permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse 
No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The 
permission was granted on the following day. 

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to 
have avoided conferences with American officers. On 
the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had 
put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement that 
he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts.^ 

The landing of American troops at Parafiaque for the 
assault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent 
troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor.^ 

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo ^ wrote to General Pio 

^"Admiral Dewey's Aide was here to-day. I told him I was 
ignorant of your whereabouts and, if he had no objection, he might 
talk with me as I am your representative ; but he said that he could 
not do so, as he had orders to speak with you personally, about some- 
thing very important. He then departed." — P. I. R., 1179. 5. 

2 The following telegram was addressed to the President or the 
Secretary of War by Sulpieio at Baeoor, on August 8, 1898 : — 

"Last night I received a telegram from General Noriel, asking for 
100 eavanes of rice which he needs immediately, since he has ordered 
to send him all the troops here on account of the landing of Americans 
in Paranaque. General Mascardo will send him the troops which 
are here. There are 56 bundles [of rice. — Tr.] deposited in this 
storehouse." — P. I. R., 1179. 5. 

' This man's record is not known to me. Apparently he was an 
ofiBcer in the Spanish army, for he is later reported as surrendering 
to the Insurgents at Santa Ana on August 13, 1898. See footnote 
4, p. 104. 


del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next 
day and that, — 

"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place 
to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, 
sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again 
without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio ; and con- 
vince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this ; and 
when it is done the whole world will wonder and say that we 
have done well, and will not be able to give out that the people 
here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers." ^ 

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of 
the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, as is 
shown by the following letter : — 

"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2, Expeditionary. 
Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.) 

" Senor Don Artemio Ricarte : ^ 

" My Dear Sir : I have received to-day your kind letter 
giving warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for 
your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. 
I assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely, 

" Luis Martinez Alcobendas. 
" SiNGALON, August 10, 1898." 3 

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence 
of this sort. He says : — 

"The officers of the United States Army who believed that 
the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American 
movements were right. Sastron has printed a letter from Pio 
del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding 
at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him 
that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 
and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold 
their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards 
should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to 
himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's 
information was correct, and on August 2 eight American sol- 
diers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." ^ 

^ Taylor, 33 AJ. 2 Artemio Ricarte was one of the ranking In- 

surgent generals directing operations against Manila. 
3 P. I. R., 1087. 5. ' Taylor, 30 AJ. 


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Taylor continues : — 

"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. 
It is not probable that these were the only two such letters 
written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although 
he could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could 
not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He 
did not want the Americans in the Philippines, They were in 
his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did 
not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. 
He saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he 
should obtain from them what he wanted ; accordingly all 
losses both among Spaniards and Americans would, from 
Aguinaldo's point of view, inure to his benefit. The best 
possible thing for him would be to hold his own force intact 
while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses, small as 
they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front 
of the Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing 
that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Span- 
iards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved 
his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo ; but 
it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." ^ 

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is 
further shown by a telegram from General Pio del Pilar, 
sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898 : — 

"Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about 
to surrender because they want to turn over the place ; the 
Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that 
they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears that 
they want to deceive us ; they do not want to give us arms, and 
if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them and drive them 
out. I await your reply." ^ 

This is perhaps not quite the kind of cooperation that 
Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt had 

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to 
capture Manila for themselves, not only because of the 
''war booty," for which they were hungry, but because 
of the status which they felt that the taking of the capital 

1 Taylor, 30 A J. 2 P. I. R., 849. 

VOL. I — H 


of the Philippines would assure them. The great im- 
portance which they attached to this plan is shown in 
communications written by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and 

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says : — 

''On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and 
Pantaleon Garcia to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the 
Spaniards to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleon Garcfa 
was planning to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa 
Cruz (P. I. P., 243. 7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice 
should be gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the 
use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he 
intended making in a few days (P. I. R., 1087. 5). 

"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for 
himself was growing steadily less, now determined to force 
himself into the city with the Americans and demand a con- 
sideration for the assistance he had rendered them during the 
siege. It is true he had assisted them, but his assistance had 
not been intentional. It was the result of the operations he 
was carrying on for his o^vn ends. The operations of the 
Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common 
enemy of both ; but the operations were not joint operations, 
and although their purpose was a common purpose, it was not 
a mutual one. On August 8 Aguinaldo appointed General 

^ On August 2, 1899, Agoncillo wrote Mabini : — 

" I send Don Emilio the information I have been able to obtain 
here, in order that in view thereof you [plural] may consider the best 
solution of our present poUtical problem, which is an exceptional case 
in history. In my opinion, the most critical moment, which I call 
agonizing, whether correctly or not I know not, is the capture of Manila, 
where General Merritt mil constitute a provisional government, in 
compliance with the instructions from his Government. It is un- 
necessary to recommend that you observe great tact, great prudence, 
when this event occurs. Ascertain the real wishes of the people in 
this conflict and the war resources at our disposal and those which 
you may count on during the struggle until its termination." 

— P. I. R., 451. 3. 

In his document entitled "Means for Attaining Filipino Independ- 
ence" Aguinaldo had written: — 

"VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists 
must occupy aU Manila including the Walled City with the object 
and purpose that the nation possessing the Philippines accor4ing to 
the decision of the Powers will be forced to come to an understanding 
with the Filipinos to avoid the shedding of blood." — P. I. R., 457. 5, 


Ricarte commander in the operations about Manila, ordered 
him to respect the property of all foreigners, and told him that 
in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they were to 
carry their flag and plant it there (P. I. R., 703. 2). Judging 
from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the 
foreign consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under 
the protection of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had 
not taken refuge on the vessels in the bay, so that when his 
troops entered the city no foreign lives would be taken, and no 
foreign property would be injured. The earnestness with 
which he urged that all foreigners not Spaniards should take 
steps to identifj^ themselves and their property shows that he 
considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians as 
fair booty of war." ^ 

There was certainly no need of Insurgent assistance in 
the assault on Manila. 

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender 
of Manila had been agreed upon in advance were correct, 
as is shown by the following testimony of Admiral Dewey : 

"Senator Patterson. When did you reach an understanding 
with the Spanish commander upon the subject,^ — how long 
before the 12th or 13th of August? 

"Admiral Dewey. Several days before. 

"Senator Patterson. To whom did you communicate the 
arrangement that you had ? 

"Admiral Dewey. General Merritt and, of course, all of 
my own captains — General Merritt, and I think a council of 
officers on board of one of the steamers. I think there were 
several army officers present when I told the General that ; 
and I may say here that I do not think General Merritt took 
much stock in it. 

"Senator Patterson. What statement did you make to 
them. Admiral, in substance? 

"Admiral Dewey. That the Spaniards were ready to sur- 
render, but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying 
forts. I selected one at Malate, away from the city.^ They 
said I must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to 
make a signal by the international code, 'Do you surrender?' 
Then they were to hoist a white flag at a certain bastion ; and 

1 Taylor, 29 AJ. = That is, the surrender of Manila. 

2 Fort San Antonio A'bad. 


I may say now that I was the first one to discover the white 
flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I 
happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while, 
and then made the signal according to the programme. We 
could not see the white flag — it was rather a thick day — but 
finally I discovered it on the south bastion; I don't know 
how long it had been flying there when I first saw it." ^ 

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, 
Buencamino telegraphed Aguinaldo, urging him in the 
strongest terms to attack that night so that Americans 
might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the result that 
the Insurgents would be included in the official negotia- 
tions. He further advised Aguinaldo that he must not 
suspend his attack because the Americans suspended 

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 
12, he received an order from General Merritt to notify 
Aguinaldo to forbid the Insurgents under his command 
from entering Manila. This notification was delivered 
to Aguinaldo that night, and was received by him with 

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made 
an independent attack of their own, as planned."* It 

1 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2943. 

2 "I must tell you that I feel as you should feel in regard to our 
government not having officially participated in the capitulation of 
Alanila. Accordingly the war must be continued with Spain, because, 
if we attack to-night, the Americans, acting upon the request of the 
Spaniards and foreigners in addition to those who took part in the 
capitulation, will have to ask us to suspend operations ; hence we shall 
be included in the negotiations and this will work to our advantage. 

"To-night at 2 a.m. you will attack Avithout fail in order that we 
may be included in the capitulation which the Americans made to-day. 
You must not stop the attacks because they do, and this is also the 
opinion of our partisans among the foreigners." 

— P. I. R., 1179. 5 & 427. 5. 

' "Our Rule in the Philippines," The North American Review, 1900, 
No. 170. 

* General Ricarte to Aguinaldo, August 12, 1898, 11.1.5 p.m. : 

"Have received the telegram from your honourable person regard- 
ing attack at four o'clock in the morning, although we will make the 


promptly led to trouble with the Americans, and at 8 a.m. 
Aguinaldo received a telegram from General Anderson 
sternly warning him not to let his troops enter Manila 
without the consent of the American commander on the 
south side of the Pasig River. ^ 

Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to 
this request, except to direct General Riego de Dios, who 
was at Cavite, to go with Buencamino without losing a 
moment and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible.^ 

At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying 
that his troops were being forced, by threats of violence, 
to retire from positions which they had taken, and asking 
Anderson to order his troops to avoid difficulty with the 
Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he had directed 
his men to aid the American forces if the latter are attacked 
by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the sub- 
ject of their entering Manila.^ 

attack anyway. I have directed Gen. Pio Del Pilar begin firing 
cannon at the hour set. At the present time we are making prepara- 
tions and will also give orders to the chiefs of the columns." 

— P. I. R., 849. 

1 "August 13, 1898. 
" Dated. Camp Dewey 13. To General Aguinaldo. Commanding 
Philippine Forces, Baeoor : Do not let your troops enter Manila with- 
out the permission of the American commander on this side of Pasig 
river. You will be under our fire. 

" Anderson, Brig. General." 
— P. I. R., 102-10. 

'^ "Copy : Gen. Riego, Ca\ate : Have just received a note from Gen. 
Anderson saying to me he does not permit my troops to enter Manila 
without permission from the American commander on this side of the 
Pasig River. They will be under his fire. Go with Senor Buencamino 
and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible, as to the motive for 
said note, without losing a moment. August 13, '98. E. A." 

— P.I. R., 849. 

^ "I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In conse- 
quence of this I have not answered until now. My troops are forced 
by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. 
It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should lament, that you order 
your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they 
have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given 


Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to 
his telegram to General Riego de Dios, in which that 
officer communicated the views of Araneta ^ and Buenca- 
mino, who had been unable to find General Anderson. 
This important communication follows : — 

"Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been 
consulted in regard to your telegram of to-day, they confirm 
capitulation, and in regard to the telegraphic note of General 
Anderson they are of the opinion, first that we should con- 
tinue hostilities while we ask for an explanation ; second, that 
explanation should be in the following terms : Inquire reason 
for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila with- 
out permission of the American commander ; third, in case the 
(terms of ?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that 
we do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitula- 
tion is not favourable to our independence. General Anderson 
is not here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only 
Admiral Dewey is in the Bay. We ask authorization to ex- 
press our explanation in the proposed terms and to have a 
conference with Admiral Dewey in order to have our claims 
reach General Merritt." ^ 

An indorsement written by Mabini and signed by 
Aguinaldo on the above paper reads : — 

"I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we 
believe that we have the right to enter Manila without per- 
mission as we have a part in the surrender of the Spaniards. 
They would not have surrendered if our troops had not cut 
off their retreat to the interior. Besides but for us the landing 
of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtain an answer 
as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before the consuls 
in case it is necessary." ^ 

strict orders to my eliiefs tliat tliey preserve strict respect to American 
forces and to aid them in ease they are attacked by a common 

1 Gregorio Araneta, later a member of the Philippine Commission 
and Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was Secretary of Justice 
under the Malolos government, and was also secretary of the Insur- 
gent Congress. He was at this time a bright young lawyer of good 
ability and character. 

2 P. I. R., 849. 3 Ibid. 


Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 p.m. General 
Ricarte telegraphed to Aguinaldo : — 

"Americans wish to put us out. Give directions." ^ 

Apparently about the same hour he wired more at 
length, as follows : — 

"Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. 
Mabolo and San Jose warn us that they will fire on us when the 
time comes. Impossible to remain there without disagreeing 
with them. Since 5 o'clock this morning we have been furiously 
attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spaniards silent. 
No losses yet." ^ 

At 3.52 he wired again : — 

"General Pio del Pilar informs me of the following : 'Come 
here, if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Concepcion 
are not allowed to go out and we are prohibited to move on any 
farther. We it was who succeeded in capturing that place. 
Come here or there will be trouble, since they are driving me 
away, and refusing to listen to what I say.' I am at this very 
moment going to aforesaid place." ^ 

At 5 P.M. another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as 
follows : — 

"Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional 
Exposition, Agricultural College and other buildings are ours. 
Our flag flies already at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzon 
with his troops is in the Perez building, Paco. Colonels Julian 
Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentino are in the convent of Ermita. 
All houses without flag are guarded by our soldiers." * 

At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows : — 

"I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to 
me that our flag at Singalong church (visita) was removed by 
the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing us 
to approach thereto. General Pio del Pilar is at present at the 
barrio of Concepcion. Americans prohibited him to move on 
any farther. How can he enter Manila?"^ 

1 P. I. R., 849. 2 jfjid^^ 849, 3 /^^^^.^ 1179. 5. 

* Ibid. 6 ff^fi^ 


No attention was paid to General Anderson's request 
that the Insurgent troops should not enter Manila with- 
out permission. They crowded forward with and after 
the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive, 
they found American and Spanish troops confronting 
each other but not firing, the former on the drive, the 
latter on the neighbouring city wall. A flag of truce was 
waving from the south bastion, nevertheless the Insur- 
gents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire 
which killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this 
incident General Greene has said : — 

"At this point the California regiment a short time before 
had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on 
the walls, and the latter, in returning the fire, had caused a 
loss in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded." ^ 

Some of these matters must have come to the atten- 
tion of General Anderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a tele- 
gram, received by the latter at 6.35 p.m., as follows : — 

''Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to Gen. Agui- 
naldo. Commanding Fihpino Forces. — Manila, taken. Serious 
trouble threatened between our forces. Try and prevent it. 
Your troops should not force themselves in the city until we 
have received the full surrender then we will negotiate with 

"Anderson, commanding." ^ 

It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb 
of Santa Ana, and captured Spanish and Filipino officers 
and men.^ 

1 Report of War Dept., 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 69. 

2 Taylor, Exhibit 739. 

' The following two telegrams were sent by General Pio del Pilar 
to Aguinaldo at 9.30 p.m. : — 

"I inform you that the Bayambang troops who have presented 
themselves before me when we entered Santa Ana this afternoon, are : 
4 lieutenants, 171 soldiers with their respective rifles and ammunitions, 
Major Fernando Acevedo, Captain Lieerio Geronimo, 1 Spanish lieu- 
tenant, and 1 prisoner by the name of Enrique Flores. All of them 
I put under your orders." — P. I. R., 1179. 5. 

















-) -J' 03 

■/j >-5 



In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the 
following contention of Aguinaldo, advanced in his 
''Reseiia Veridica" : — 

"Our own forces could see the American forces land on the 
beach of the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucfa. The Span- 
ish soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the atten- 
tion of every one because they did not fire on the former, a mys- 
tery which was explained at nightfall of that day, by the news 
of the capitulation of the place by General Senor Jdudenes ^ 
to the American General, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation which 
the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction 
of what had been agreed upon wath Admiral Dewey, in regard 
to the formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila 
by the two armies, American and Filipino, together and in 

"This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the Ameri- 
can officers was made clearer by the telegrams, which General 
Anderson addressed to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th 
day, requesting that I should order our troops not to enter 
Manila, which request was refused, inasmuch as it was con- 
trary to what was agreed upon, and to the high ends of the 
Revolutionary Government, which, on taking upon itself the 
immense work of besieging Manila, during the two months and 
a half, sacrificing thousands of lives and millions in material 
interests, could not surely have done so with any object other 
than that of capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which 
^ith firmness and tenacity defended that place." ^ 

On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Ander- 
son as follows : — 

"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, 
have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you 
know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on account of 
the many sacrifices made of money, and lives, I do not consider 
it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be dis- 
obeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will 
allow the troops to enter because we have given proofs many 

"Very urgent. I inform you of the capture made by my soldiers : 
2 lieutenants of the Marine Corps, 2 lieutenants of the Spanish In- 
fantry, 52 soldiers. Rifles about 400. I put them under your orders 
and await your instructions." — P. I. R., 1179. 5. 

1 The Spanish Governor-General. ^ P. I. R., 1300. 2. 


times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Paranaque, 
Pasay, Singdlon and Maytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best 
to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly under- 
standing and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of 
the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe Buencamino and 
others, who will to-day go out from our lines and hold a confer- 
ence with you, and that they will be safe during the conference." ^ 

Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for 
joint occupation. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and 
General Merritt informed the government that since 
the occupation of Manila and its suburbs the Insurgents 
outside had been insisting on this, and asked how far 
they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the 

They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 
that the President of the United States had directed : — 

''That there must be no joint occupation with the Insur- 
gents. The United States in the possession of Manila city, 
Manila bay and harbor must preserve the peace and protect 
persons and property within the territory occupied by their 
military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others 
must recognize the military occupation and authority of the 
United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by 
the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are 
necessary to this end." ^ 

This left the military and naval commanders no option 
in the premises, and in any event dual occupation was out 
of the question because of the lawlessness of the Insurgent 

At this very time they were looting the portions of the 
city which they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by 
their own records were not confining their attacks to 
Spaniards, but were assaulting their own people and raid- 
ing the property of foreigners as well.^ The continuation 
of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible. 

The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the 

1 Taylor, 58 HJ. " m^,^ 59. 3 gge footnote 2, p. 108. 


"war booty," and asked certain other extraordinary con- 
cessions as follows : — 

" (4) Our sacrifices in cooperating in the siege and taking of 
Manila being well known, it is just that we should share in the 
war booty. 

" (5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacanang and 
the Convents of Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de 

" (6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled 
by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General 
Merritt should require some Filipinos we should be pleased if 
he will grant our President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour of 
recommending select and skilled Filipinos. The jurisdiction 
of the authorities of Manila shall not be recognized beyond the 
municipal radius. 

•' (7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate 
our military positions without permission of the respective 
commanders thereof and shall evacuate all the positions which 
they occupy at the present time beyond the municipal radius ; 
Spaniards who pass our lines without permission of the com- 
mander will be considered as spies. 

****** if 

"(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and 
petitions do not signify on our part that we recognize the 
sovereignty of North America in these islands, as they are made 
necessary by the present war." ^ 

Under the instructions of the President these demands 
could not be acceded to. Nor could they have been 
acceded to had there been no such instructions. In this 
connection the following extract from General Jaudenes's 
cablegram for June 8th to his home government is highly 
significant : — 

"Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from 
fear of outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of bom- 
bardment, which has not yet begun." ^ 

It would seem that the population of the suburbs did 
not have a high idea of Insurgent discipline. 

1 P. I. R., Books C-l. 2 Taylor, 15 A.J. 


That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown 
by a passage in a letter sent the following day to Governor- 
General Augustin by Buencamino : — 

''Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope 
of assistance from anywhere, and Senor Aguinaldo being dis- 
posed to make use of the fleet in order to bombard, if Your 
Excellency should prolong the struggle with tenacity, I do not 
know, frankly, what else to do other than to succumb dying, 
but Your Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 
Indians,^ inflamed with battle, drunk with triumph and with 
blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there vnW not be 
allowed to escape either women, children, or Peninsular friars, 
— especially the friars ; and, I believe that the rights of hu- 
manity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well con- 
sidered by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and military 
duty may be, although worth as much or more than existence 
itself there is no right by which they should be won at the cost 
of the rights of humanity, and the latter outweigh every con- 
sideration and all duty." ^ 

Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none 
better, what they had in mind at this time. 

As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such 
opportunity as they had, and their own records show it. 

In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed 
outrages, threatening people with their arms, and this 
was still going on a week after the fall of Manila.^ 

General Pio del Pilar was believed to be responsible 
for much of this misconduct, and Mabini proposed that 
as it was necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, 
and they could not remove him by force, he be promoted.^ 

1 The word Indies, here translated "Indians," means Malayan 
Filipinos of pure blood as distinguished from mestizos or people of 
mixed blood. 2 p. j. r.^ 913. 2. 

3 The following telegram was sent by Colonel Jose to Aguinaldo : — 

"Urgent. August 20, 1898 : Colonel Lopez reports that our troops 

are still sacking and committing outrages in Malate, Paco and 

Ermita, even menacing people with their arms. Urge you to take 

proper measures to stop these abuses." — P. I. R., 1167. 3. 

* Extract from a letter of August 20, 1899, from Mabini to Aguinaldo : 
"Senor L<5pez, your adjutant, arrived and told me of many com- 
plaints regarding the behaviour of the soldiers. He says that our oflfi- 


Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo 
as follows : — 

"The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases of 
kidnapping (dukut) occurring in Tondo, San Sebastidn and 
San Miguel. Last night some of ours were surprised in the 
act of kidnapping a person. I have also heard that many- 
persons are asking for contributions of war. I tell them ^ 
that you know nothing of all this and that if some persons are 
kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the Spanish 
spies and secret police, which is great." ^ 

Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the 
matter of preventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898, 
he wrote Aguinaldo from Manila as follows : — 

"By authority of General Don Pio del Pilar and accompanied 
by the AVar Auditor, Senor Urbano, we entered a prison where 
the individuals Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisostomo 
were kept. They were almost prostrated. They had lately been 
released from Bilibid where they had been confined for political 
crimes. On being asked the reason for their imprisonment 
they began by showing us their bodies from which blood still 
issued as the result of the barbarous treatment received from 
Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same person of whom 
I spoke to you in one of my previous letters ; I declared to 
you then that he had assaulted, revolver in hand, a man in 
the middle of one of the most frequented streets of the suburb 
of Paco on pure suspicion. 

"The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the 
accusations made against them it was for fear of greater punish- 
ments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard took 

eers carrj^ off many horses, some of them belonging to foreigners. If 
the foreigners should enter a protest against such doings, I do not 
know what will be thought of our government. 

" It is also absolutely necessary that a stop should be put to the 
passes, and that the tax on merchandise entering Manila, should no 
longer be exacted. It is absolutely necessary, if you think well of it, 
for us to promote General Pio, and make him your second in command. 
It is necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, as we cannot 
remove him by force ; and do not reprimand him. 

" If you approve, I will write a Decree, but I reflect that nothing will 
succeed, if our commanders are not obliged to comply." 

— P. I. R., 472. 13. 

1 I.e. the Americans. * p_ j, r.^ 453. 8. 


the liberty of striking with his fist the one who dared to express 
himself so. 

"Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced 
to tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation 
for a country that wished to be free and that they, the Ameri- 
cans, do not arrest any one without just cause.^ 

"I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter 
in question and other abuses in order that the measures you 
may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are 
making a target of ourselves in the sight of all nations, especially 
so in that of the Americans who note any act of ours and judge 
us secretly now in order to do so later in public. To make light 
of this is to plant a seed of future injury to us, because many 
will desire to place themselves under the protection of the 
American flag, seeing that ours refuses to defend the citizens' 
individual rights. 

"I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested to- 
gether with his accomplices in the matter so that it may serve 
as a lesson not only for him but also for those who think like 
him." 2 

Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not 
produce the desired result, for on September 28 he wrote 
Aguinaldo a long letter complaining that in Manila per- 
sonal security did not exist, people were being tortured 
and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very frequent, 
and these abuses were being committed by Filipino 
officers and men. Some of the things which had come to 
his knowledge were of such a nature that he preferred to 
speak to Aguinaldo privately about them.^ 

1 Major J. F. Bell accompanied Sandico on this trip. 

2 P. I. R., 1166. 12. 

' " I regret very much to have to inform you that as long as per- 
sonal property is not respected here in Manila especially, by some of 
our men, as long as personal security does not exist and as long as 
prisoners are tortured, we cannot hope to deserve the confidence 
of the other governments. Murders, thefts of carriages and horses, 
are very frequent here, as is kidnapping, . . . 

" Sergeant Barcena, of the Fifth Company of the Second Zone, that 
is the zone of General Pio del Pilar, informed me that the cruel oflaeers 
of that Zone, were Major Carmona and a lieutenant who was formerly 
a barber. 

"I know that the Government has ordered that private persons 
and property be respected and has withdrawn from the military the 


Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, 
theft — these are not pleasant things, but they continued 
to occur, and Aguinaldo, who apparently desired to pre- 
vent them, was powerless to do so. He did not dare 
discipline General Pio del Pilar, nor remove him from the 
vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer con- 
tinued to work their will on their own unfortunate and 
helpless people. 

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly 
Insurgent forces to leave Manila. The American com- 
mander showed great forbearance and negotiations con- 

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission 
(Buencamino and Gregorio Araneta) telegraphed Agui- 

power of trying civilians ; but in view of the fact that notwithstanding 
this restriction some of them continue to discharge powers of which 
they have been divested, I find it necessary to call your attention 
thereto, in order that more energetic measures may be adopted so 
that other nations may not be led to believe that our government is 
very weak. 

" In the jurisdiction of the Americans, I have surprised small groups 
of officers, who devote themselves to summoning persons before them 
and arresting them. These groups can be found in Binondo, Tondo 
and Trozo. I have used all friendly measures to secure their dissolu- 
tion, but if they continue their conduct, I shall be obliged to turn them 
over to the American authorities, although I inform you that I shall 
not make use of such measures, until diplomatic means are exhausted. 

" I understand very well that in endeavouring to stop the abuses com- 
mitted by our officers and by the Filipinos who claim to belong to us, 
in Manila, I expose myself to becoming a victim of their vengeance ; 
nevertheless, this does not terrify me, because my duty to the country 
reqiiires it. 

"I beg of you that if you take any steps against Major Carmona 
and the barber lieutenant, to be very careful and call General Pio del 
Pilar and come to an understanding \vith him as to the mode of pun- 
ishment of these officers. . . . 

" I have discovered grave cases which are occiuring in the Presidio 
of Manila, which I propose to relate to you when I shall have the 
honor to see you personally. The Americans are already aware of 
these cases, and are working in their own interest untiringly. 

" I could tell you a good many other things, but I do not do so on 
account of lack of time, and because I wish to reserve them until I can 
speak to you privately. In the meantime, order me as you will, etc." 
— P. I. R., 416. 7. 


naldo that a clause in a proposed agreement requiring 
prior permission of Insurgent officers before American 
troops could pass or approach their lines had greatly dis- 
pleased General Anderson who declined to treat until 
after the withdrawal of Noriel's troops from Manila.^ 

Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that 
he had already made up his mind to fight the Americans, 
for it contains the following significant words: ''The 
conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing 
by asking as favours of them what are really our rights." ^ 

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent 
Major J. F. Bell to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with 
a memorandum in which were the words : — 

"In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his 
arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as fol- 
lows: ..." 

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of 
special importance. It reads as follows : — 

"(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally 
the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to 

1" General Anderson received us very well, but in the proposed 
agreement the clauses requiring the prior permission of our commanders 
before American troops could pass or approach our lines displeased 
him very much. Gen. Anderson refuses to treat until after the with- 
drawal of Noriel's troops. I think it prudent to yield. This telegram 
is in amplification of another which, at the request of Gen. Anderson, 
we sent through his telegraph station to your excellency." — P. I. R., 

* "It is impossible to order General Noriel to fall back because if 
we order it they will ask the same thing from General Pio and we 
shall get nothing ourselves. And the worst is that after we have 
evacuated Manila and its environs they will follow us up to our new 
positions to take them too without our being able to obtain from them 
any formal statement of the concession signed in due form. The con- 
flict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as 
favours of them what are really our rights. We shall maintain them 
as long as we are able, confiding in Providence and in Justice. I con- 
firm my last telegram. Tell General Anderson that we shall hold a 
meeting of the council of Government in order to decide. Please 
return here soon with your companions. I inclose the map which I 
hope you will return." — P. I. R., 427. 1. 

An Unsanitary Well. 

This is a typical old-style well, with the family washing going on beside it. 
Under such circumstances infection of the well water invariably resulted. 

A Flowing Artesian Well. 

There ia no way in which the water from such a well can become infected. 
More than eight hundred fifty have been sunk, and the death rate in some 
towns fortunate enough to possess them has fallen off fifty per cent, as a 


deal fairly with him and his people ; but not knowing what the 
policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make 
any promises, except that in the event of the United States 
withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him 
in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Govern- 
ment." ^ 

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement 
Major Bell says : — 

"I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General 
M. meant to convey by the underscored portion of this remark, 
but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. 
had used to me, and I preferred they should seek any further 
explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error 
if 1 undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of 
definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the lan- 
guage seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. 
They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some 
definite promise on this subject." ^ 

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water 
works be started up at once, a thing which was very 
necessary as Manila was suffering from lack of water. 
I should be glad if I could leave this matter here, but 
I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further 
statement : — 

"Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made 
kno^vn to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event 
of the United States withdrawing from these islands, care would 
be taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was 
found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the 
General made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the 
expression ' forces of the Government ' to mean the naval forces, 
should future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation." ^ 

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General 
Merritt's intention. If this is not the case, I must say 
in all frankness that in my opinion it was General Merritt's 
intention to indulge in sharp practice. 

1 Senate Document No. 208, p. 22. « Ibid., p. 23. ' Ibid., p. 26. 

VOL. I — 1 


Obviously, the American naval forces did not find 
Aguinaldo in any ''condition/' in the sense in which 
General Merritt uses the term. On the contrary, they 
brought him from Hongkong and assisted him in starting 
a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative 
to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the 
negotiations took place, and General Merritt's promise 
could not legitimately be interpreted to refer to anything 

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing 
situation would have resulted. General Merritt was 
obviously not authorized to make such a proposition in 
the first instance, and the only honourable course left 
open to him would have been to advise Washington of 
his improper action and beg the Government to support 
him in it and thus save the honour of the country. 

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise 
nor accept the offer. On the contrary, he promptly and 
indignantly denied that he was committed to anything, 
and sought to impose new conditions which were not 
acceded to. 

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General 
Merritt and called his attention to the fact that in making 
this offer he had grossly exceeded his authority, for in 
his reply to Aguiiialdo's protest General Merritt says : — 

"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the 
event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States 
and Spain are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the 
military representative only of the United States to make any 
promises such as you request. As you have already been in- 
formed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans 
out here and the Government, of which you already know the 
beneficence, to determine these matters in the future." ^ 

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in 
the memorandum hereinbefore referred to, it must have 
aroused the suspicions of Aguinaldo and his associates, 

1 Senate Document No. 208, p. 24. 


and in my opinion Merritt's conduct in making such a 
proposal in the first instance was inexcusable. 

Before he could terminate the negotiations which fol- 
lowed he was called away, and turned this matter, together 
with other unfinished business, over to his successor. 
General E. S. Otis. 

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Agui- 
naldo as follows : — 

"General Aguinaldo, Bacoor: 

"Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply 
to your letter of August 27 \Wthin four days, I desire to state 
that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity 
to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take 
time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at the 
earliest opportunity. " Otis." 

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long 
letter fully discussing the whole situation in the light of 
the complete information which he had meanwhile ob- 
tained. Since so much has been made of this incident 
by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following 
extracts from General Otis's letter, which embody a fair 
and judicial statement of the conditions which existed : — 

"You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city 
of Manila, to which you promise to retire your troops, and name 
as conditions precedent : First, protection to your shipping by 
the United States Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels 
wdthin the waters in United States occupation ; second, restitu- 
tion to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by 
your troops, in the event that treaty stipulations between the 
United States and Spain surrender to the last-named govern- 
ment the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that 
United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines 
you name shall retire within the same. 

"A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the 
United States Government, the city of Manila, involves con- 
sideration of some of the other concessions you desire to be 
made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the 
matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from 
remarks contained in former correspondence, I am of the 


opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition 
is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent 
parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. 
In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full 
possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named 
belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation 
gave the United States Government full occupancy of the city 
and defences of Manila, and that Government obligated itself 
to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants 
of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and 
all international precedents the United States authority over 
Manila and its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot es- 
cape the obligations which it has assumed. 


"But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my 
Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of 
Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions con- 
tained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of 
your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition — a 
joint occupation — upon supposed equitable grounds, referring 
to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they 
have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. 
It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured 
great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten 
that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the 
seas of both hemispheres ; sent back to Spain the Spanish army 
and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and 
the secure holding of the Philippine possessions ; that since 
May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, 
but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it, 
preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby 
preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants ? Is it for- 
gotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the re- 
tention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has 
opened up to you the ports of the Island of Luzon and held 
Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects? 


"Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and 
those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of jus- 
tice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracti- 
cability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its 
suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of 
your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to 
prevent friction between our respective forces, which might 


result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for con- 
tinued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, 
irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or 
impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave dis- 
turbances ; and in this connection I call to your attention the 
recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires investiga- 
tion. There might also arise conflict of authority between our 
subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire 
actual possession of our troops, I find that permits are given 
to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, 
to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, 
and that several cases of kidnapping have taken place. In 
pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, 
domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected 
parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I 
know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have 
declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the 
contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with 
those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such 
interference with our administration of civil affairs must even- 
tually result in conflict. 

"... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the sub- 
ject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupa- 
tion of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, 
should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest 
of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance 
rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion 
granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are bind- 
ing on my Government, does not follow, for it has never recog- 
nized the existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty,' as 
have many European governments. No enemy's property of 
any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded 
to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to ap- 
propriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be 
very severely punished through military tribunals, on which 
have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The 
enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be 
expended in administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) 
must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and 
between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. 
My troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by 
reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this 
comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect 
to individual advantages which occupation bestows. 


"I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the con- 
cessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the re- 
tirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 
27th ultimo. 

"The first is : Protection to your shipping and free naviga- 
tion to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the 
limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly 
you could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports 
not in the rightful i3ossession of the United States. That, as 
you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guaran- 
tee, following international recognition of the belligerent rights 
of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing 
armistice continues, the United States are in rightful possession, 
in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are 
concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tribu- 
taries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce 
and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely 
as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed 
nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, what- 
ever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade 
restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will 
be extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard is 
neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises 
supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way re- 
lated to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it 
avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, 
for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not 
do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government 
could now, under the prevailing truce ^vith Spain, invest him 
with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time pre- 
serve its international obligations. 

"The second concession named by you is restitution of 
positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty 
of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the 
late capitulatory articles ; and the third and last is a promise 
to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the 
lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. 
These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered 
together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. 
From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions 
made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature 
of the obligations resting on the United States with regard to 
the territory to which they have the legal right of possession 
under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither 


in law or morals can the concessions be made. I would be 
powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing 
more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive 
head of my Government and not being vested ^vith discretionary 
power to determine matters of such moment. In the present 
instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but 
have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of 
its international promises and national honour, which it has 
never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of 
the city and suburbs of Manila and am directed specially to 
preserve the peace and protect persons and property within 
the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitu- 
lation. These mandates must be obeyed. 

''Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity, 
holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation 
as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I 
represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy the 
United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate hold- 
ings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information 
on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscien- 
tiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It 
remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course 
of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to 
the world the principles which actuate your proceedings. 

"It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am 
compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces 
evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and 
defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that 
end in view within a very short space of time should you decline 
to comply wdth my Government's demands; and I hereby 
serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn 
beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday, the 15th 
instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that 
my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate 
consequences which may ensue. 


"In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred 
freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communi- 
cation and am delegated by him to state that he fully approves 
of the same in all respects ; that the commands of our Govern- 
ment compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our 
respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert 
of action." 


This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, 
coupled with the firm statement of intention with which 
it closed, produced a decided effect on Aguinaldo. Con- 
cerning the events to which it led, General Otis has made 
this statement : — 

*'0n September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and 
consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer 
and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, 
called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of 
the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in 
writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated 
by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless 
they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to 
force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue 
a request unaccompanied bj^ any threat to use force, as Agui- 
naldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops 
upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th 
instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of 
that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents v/ouid with- 
draw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing 
a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which 
I designated — something which he could show to the troops 
and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a 
request from these headquarters — he would probably be able 
to retire his men without much difficulty ; that, of course, they 
themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would 
be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note 
of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following : — 

" ' Office U. S. Military Governor in the 
" 'Philippine Islands, 

" 'Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898. 

"'The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces: 

" ' Sir : Referring to my communication of September 8, I 
have the honour to inform you that I have had a most agreeable 
conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of 
your revolutionary government upon the matters therein 
contained. We have discussed at length the complications 
now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase, while 
our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the 
city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the 
withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations 

















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which have always been maintained by and between them and 
the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated. 
I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments 
and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to pa- 
tiently listen to their report of our conversation ? 

" ' It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and miutual 
amicable relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized 
if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, 
is the desire of yourself and associates. 

" ' May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from 
Manila ? 

" ' Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence 
in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to 
this request. 

" * I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant, 

(Signed) " ' E. S. Otis, 

"'Major-General, U. S. V., 
"'United States Military Governor in the Philippines.' 

" In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was re- 
ceived : — 

" ' Malolos, Bulacan, September 16, 1898. 

" ' The Commanding General of the American Forces : 

" ' My dear Sir : Referring to your esteemed communication, 
dated the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I 
have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon 
their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and 
that they should retire to points where contact with yours 
would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict. 

" ' I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced 
of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the 
American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the 
confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people. 

" ' A consideration of my many occupations will serve to ex- 
cuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired. 

" ' Your very respectful servant, 

(Signed) " ' Emilio Aguinaldo.' 

" On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations 
withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged 
by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. 
This certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to 
be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the 


general officer in command ^ would not obey instructions, and 
they proposed to remove his men gradually by organizations 
and thereafter to punish him for his disobedience. The with- 
drawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched out 
in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops." ^ 

I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that 
this is the one instance I have found in which a promise 
was made, fortunately in the form of an offer which was 
not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has seemed to me 
that the reasons why General Merritt should never have 
made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have 
renewed it, should be fully set forth. 

On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Wash- 
ington that Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions 
critical, and that the number of armed Insurgents in the 
city was large and rapidly increasing. He stated that 
on the 8th he would send a notification to Aguinaldo that 
unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyond the line 
of the suburbs of the city before September 15 he would 
be obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United 
States would hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfor- 
tunate consequences which might ensue. 

Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his gov- 
ernment by the United States, but did not consider such 
recognition probable, and pushed preparations to attack 
if a favorable opportunity should offer. 

Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, 
let us briefly review the results of our investigations as to 
Insurgent cooperation with the American forces up to this 

Taylor has made the following excellent summary of 
the case : — 

"Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory war- 
fare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his 

1 Pio del Pilar. 

2 Report of the War Department, 1899, Vol. I, part IV, pp. 5-10. 


attacks were very serious is shown from the Spanish reports of 
casualties ; but although he had failed to secure the surrender 
of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison occupied and 
within their works. The American force on land was now 
strong enough to begin offensive operations. So far the rela- 
tions between the Americans and Aguinaldo had not been really 
friendly. They were in his way, and yet he could not break 
with them, for he hoped to use them for the attainment of the 
designs which he had by this time frankly declared. The 
Americans had listened to these declarations, and had not an- 
swered them, nor was it possible to answer them. The American 
forces were there under the instructions of the President to 
make war on Spain and to establish a military government in 
the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared himself a dictator 
and the Philippines independent. To have recognized him in 
his civil capacity, to have dealt with him in his civil capacity, 
would have meant a recognition of his government by the 
military commander in the field — a thing impossible and un- 
lawful. Officers of the United States forces are not empowered 
to recognize governments ; that function is reserved to the 
President of the United States ; and in this case he, in his 
orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19, copies of which 
were forwarded to General Merritt for his guidance, informed 
him that the army of occupation was sent to the Philippines 
'for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the 
Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security 
to the islands while in the possession of the United States.' 
These instructions contemplated the establishment of a mili- 
tary government in the archipelago by military officials of the 
United States. 

4: if: !|: 4: 4c :(: 4c 

"It is true that in spite of the date of these instructions 
General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of them 
on August 28, three days after the departure of General Ander- 
son, and what that officer knew of them could only have been 
what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an un- 
signed copy of them shown him at the White House, but they 
were in accordance with the practice of the United States 
Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice 
General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo 
were guided by it. 

4: 4: 4: 4: * 4i 4i 

"It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers 
received the impression at this time from their conversation 


with American officers that the United States would un- 
doubtedly recognize the independence of the Philippines, and 
that the cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impres- 
sion. There was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain 
to secure the surrender of Manila to himself was not coopera- 
tion. That he refrained from attacking the Americans and 
occasionally permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which 
they paid, was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their 
plans and his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation. 
Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the 
necessity of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the 
necessities of his operations against the Spaniards, to make 
Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did was 
with the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported 
in all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not 
obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the 
attainment of his ends ; and this he was forced to purchase 
by compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. 
But his compliance with them, as all American officers serving 
there well knew, was never willing, was never complete, and 
was never given except under pressure. It is true that writers 
upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is born 
of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their readers 
that any government but that of the United States, any colonial 
administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtain 
the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by judi- 
cious concessions to them at this time. The only concession 
which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have 
been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines 
under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with 
the plenitude of the powers of the Katipunan as dictator, and 
a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This prom- 
ise the Government of the United States could not make. 
Until the ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insur- 
gents of the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, 
and with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had. 
* Ht * * * * * 

"No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered 
by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American com- 
mander, and no American commander ever rendered such re- 
turns to him. At the time of General Merritt's arrival, and 
until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents 
and United States troops were united solely by the fact that 
they had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were 


such that the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had 
to avoid doing anything which might cause the insurgents to 
attack them and perhaps make terms witli Spain ; while 
Aguinaldo and his followers, in order to accomplish the sur- 
render of Manila to themselves, had to maintain such relations 
with the Americans as would induce the Spaniards to believe 
that their fleet was at his disposal,^ and also such apparent 
harmony and cooperation with them in the execution of their 
plans that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos would be forced 
to believe that the Americans would in all ways use their forces 
to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires. 

"General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately 
taking such steps as would lead to his occupation of Manila. 
With the arrival of the third expedition he was able to pass 
through the insurgent lines between Camp Dewey and Manila, 
for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal from Aguinaldo. 

"In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained posi- 
tions of investment opposite the Spanish lines along their full 
extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran within 800 
yards of San Antonio Abad. The approaches to the beach and 
village of Pasay were in their possession. 

"'This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of 
quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish 
position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult 
to deal with owing to the peculiar conditions of our relations 
with the insurgents. ... As General Aguinaldo did not visit 
me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military 
leader, and as my instructions from the President fully con- 
templated the occupation of the islands by the American land 
forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are 
absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the polit- 
ical condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to 
hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until 
I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I 
would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation 
and enforce my authority in the event that "his pretensions 
should clash with my designs. For these reasons the prepara- 
tions for the attack on the city were pressed and the military 
operations conducted without reference to the situation of the 
insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently 
fully established by the fact that when the troops at my com- 
mand carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the 
sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were 

1 See Buencamino's letter to Jaudines, p. 108. 


under no obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack, 
to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the insur- 
gents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the 
city and the suburbs.'" ^ 

All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in 
common was an enemy. They each fought that enemy 
in their own way. There was no cooperation. On the 
part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I will submit 
further evidence of this fact. 

1 Taylor 36 AJ. et seq. 


The Premeditated Insurgent Attack 

It will be remembered that the minutes of the session 
of the Hong Kong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the 
result of his negotiations with Pratt and received his in- 
structions relative to the trip to Manila, recorded the 
fact that there would be no better occasion for the expedi- 
tionary forces ''to arm themselves at the expense of the 
Americans," and that provided with arms the Filipino 
people would be able to oppose themselves to the United 
States and combat their demands if they attempted to 
colonize the country.^ 

The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attack- 
ing the United States troops was, it is evident, clearly 
foreseen from the beginning. Active preparations for 
doing this now soon began. 

Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely 
visited Manila at all times, Aguinaldo wrote on October 1 
to his commander in Laguna Province that he must not 
permit Americans there without passes. He was to get 
rid of them civilly, but he was to keep them out and in- 
form all authorities there of his instructions. 

On August 24 an American soldier was killed and 
others were wounded in Cavite by Insurgent troops who 
fired from behind. An Insurgent officer in Cavite at the 
time reported on his record of services that he — 

"took part in the movement against the Americans on 
the afternoon of the 24th of August, under the orders of the 
commander of the troops and the adjutant of the post." 

» See p. 41. 


This shows that the movement was ordered, but the 
Insurgents promptly reahzed that it was ill advised. 

On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be pre- 
paring for operations against the Americans. He was 
ordered to suspend his preparations. The same day- 
General P. Mercado Rizal, commanding in Laguna 
Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they were to 
consider the Americans as their allies or their enemies. 
He wanted to know whether the war was to stop or con- 
tinue becoming more furious. This not because he 
desired to ask questions about the secrets of the govern- 
ment, but because he wished to prepare the minds of the 
people for the future. Mabini's answer has not been 

We have already noted that on August 8 Fernando 
Acevedo wrote General Pio del Pilar recommending that 
he attack and annihilate the American troops ; that on 
August 10 Pilar wrote Aguinaldo suggesting that the 
Americans be attacked, and that on August 17 Aguinaldo 
stated : "The conflict is coming sooner or later." ^ 

At this time Sandico entered the service of the Ameri- 
cans as an interpreter and acted as a spy, endeavouring 
to keep his people fully informed relative to the plans and 
acts of his employers. Incidentally he endeavoured to 
convince the latter that the barbarities really committed 
by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpe- 
trated by enemies of the Insurgent cause who wished to 
discredit it. 

In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible says 
that the conflict will come sooner or later and asks Agui- 
naldo if it would not be better for them to provoke it 
before the Americans concentrate their troops.^ 

1 P. I. R., 427. 1. 

- "The insolent commentary of the American Consul here, if it is 
true, clearly shows the intention of America to impose her will upon 
us by force. In this case, the conflict will come sooner or later. Would 
it not be better for us to provoke the conflict while the Americans 















- -a 











M o 
JS c 


On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo 
that on the previous night the Americans had attempted 
to push back his line at San Lazaro, and that morning 
had concentrated and penetrated the Insurgent territory, 
making a reconnaissance through the fields about Sam- 
paloc. Aguinaldo put an indorsement on this communi- 
cation saying that he had long since ordered that the In- 
surgent line should not be passed. He instructed Garcia 
to throw troops in front of the Americans at Sampaloc, 
and order them to leave, and to warn the bolo men. 
Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent 

An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo's hand- 
writing dated Malolos, September 13 (?), 1898,^ shows 
how tense was the situation while the question of with- 
drawal of the Insurgent forces from the city of Manila 
was under consideration. It contains instructions for 
General Pio del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General 
Noriel or Colonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open 
to doubt. 

General Pio del Pilar was directed : — 

"To have a detachment posted in the interval from the 
branch of the river of Pace in a northerly direction to the 
bridge and so on up to the Pasig river in the direction of Panda- 
can, the river serving as a line until the suburb of Panque is 
reached which will be under our jurisdiction. Proceed to exe- 

have not as yet concentrated their troops there ? Or would it be better 
to wait for the results of the Congress of Paris ? This question should 
be answered immediately by the committee on foreign relations of 
the Congress of representatives and the decision should be sent at 
once to us so that we can proceed according to your instructions." 

— P. I. R., 453. 11. 

1 "I gave an order long ago not to permit our line to be passed, and 
to say frankly that it was by mj^ order. To be prepared to defend our 
rights you are ordered to place troops in front of American position at 
Sampaloc and to tell them plainly to leave, to warn the Sandatahan 
[bolo men. — D. C. W.] and get everything ready ; you must warn 
the commanders of the zones about Manila. Do not forget, whenever 
in doubt." — P. I. R., 849. 

2 P. I. R., 88. 9. 

VOL. I — K 


cute this order on its receipt, posting detachments where they 
are necessary and trenches will be made without loss of time 
working day and night. Do not rest for by doing so we may lose 
the opportunity; beg of the troops to assist in the formation 
of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect, we especially 
expect something Wednesday and Thursday, the 15th and 16th 
of this month. The danger is imminent on the mentioned days, 
also in the time that follows. 

" Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive 
orders to leave that place, do not do so on any account without 
my orders, happen what may. . . . 

" Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day 

" Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Span- 
iards did, if possible have them calculate the number of their 
antagonists and how much ammunition there is in comparison 
with the number of the attacking force, in fact, there are occa- 
sions when each shot fired kills as many as four men. 

" I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions 
and that you will maintain the honour of the Philippines by your 
courage and in noway permit your rights to be trampled under- 
foot." 1 

General Garcia was instructed as follows : — 

"On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post de- 
tachments in the points indicated by lines on the enclosed plan. 
On receipt of this and as soon as you learn its contents, proceed 
secretly to determine the most suitable places to post detach- 
ments and immediately post our troops and have intrenchments 
made employing day and night in this work. Beg this of our 
soldiers." ^ 

The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows : — • 

"At eight o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th, 
withdraw your command from the town of Malate as indicated 
on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a 
straight line from there to the branch of the river in Paco will 
be the line of our jurisdiction even though we may not be of 
one mind in the matter. On receipt of this proceed to determine 
the most suitable places to post our troops even if they are not 
supplied with batteries; on posting the detachments give in- 
structions to have intrenchments made immediately without 

1 P. I. R., 88. 9. 2 Ibid. 


resting, especially on the days of the 15th and 16th. Since 
affairs have a serious aspect, do not lose vigilance and be on the 
alert at all times. . . . 

" Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite 
so that all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night. 

" In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave 
your posts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be 
prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them 
that you have no instructions given you with regard to what 
they ask." ^ 

Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung 
by a very slender thread. On September 14 the governor 
of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the 
ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for ac- 
tion to-morrow. I await a reply." ^ 

But war was not to begin at this time. On September 
23 Bray wrote to Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a 
defensive attitude until the result of the negotiations at 
Paris should become known, giving way to the Americans 
and not showing his teeth. He could take the offensive 
later if advisable and should have little difficulty in settling 
accounts with the American soldiers.^ 

Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between 
the American and the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should 
arise before the departure of the latter.^ 

1 P. I. R., 88. 9. 2 Ibid., 849. 

' "Until the decision of the Paris Congress is known, all of us here 
are of the opinion that you should maintain a defensive attitude re- 
garding the Americans, giving way to them with regard to Manila 
and its suburbs or in anything they may wish, although apparently 
only, and not show them your teeth. After the decision of the Congress 
is known, you may take the offensive if advisable, and according to the 
information we may have of the American soldiers it should not be 
difficult for you and your army to settle accounts with them." 

— P. I. R., 398. 6. 

*"If you and the Americans should happen to come in conflict 
before the departure of the Spanish soldiers, it might happen that 
the Yankees would enter into an alliance with them to combat the 
Fihpinos. Think weU over this." — P. I. R., 398. 6. 


Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. 
During September, Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting 
the urgent necessity of reorganizing the ''masons" and 
the Katipunan/ and that all be furnished with knives, 
to be kept hidden so that they might be "ready for any 

In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in 
hand, feeling among them ran high, and they wanted to 
fight. ^ On November 30, 1898, General Mascardo tele- 
graphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo asking if he 
might begin firing in order to prevent the American troops 
from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in 
the affirmative.^ 

On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that 
according to a despatch from Batangas, American divers 
were working unceasingly and that a subordinate had 
ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to land. 
Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at 
sea, but that they must not be allowed to land under any 

i"It is also of urgent necessity, Senor President, to reestablish 
committees in all the suburbs and that the masons and the Katipunan 
be reorganized, and it is adv-isable that all be provided with knives 
ready for any event, but it is proper that these arms be hidden." 

— P. I. R., 466. 9. 

2 "Our soldiers are always desirous of fighting in order to bring 
affairs to an end, as they are very resentful with regard to the evacua- 
tion of the suburbs mentioned." — P. I. R., Books C-1. 

^ "Most urgent. Have received telegraphic order from War 
Dept., which says: 'Prevent American troops from disembarking.* 
In case they insist what am I to do ? May I begin firing ?" 

This telegram was indorsed by Aguinaldo : — 

"Answered afBrmatively December 1, 1898." — P. I. R., 849. 

* "Most urgent. According to despatch from Captain detached at 
Batangas, American divers are working unceasingly. He says that he 
ordered them to be fired on in case they try to land. Await your 

Aguinaldo's reply ran as follows : — 

"I do not mind their working at sea, but you must under no condi- 
tions allow them to land troops ; be brave for the sake of your Tagalog 
heart. Approve your action." — P. I. R., 1179. 2. 


On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as 
follows : — 

"The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with 
the American troops has been adjusted without prejudice. 
Our preparations ought to continue. Awaiting orders." ^ 

San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 
4, 1899. 

On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of 
our position at Singalong. I do not know what they wish ; if 
they enter Pineda I open fire." ^ 

By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds 
that the Americans, who had been bearing their insults 
in silence, were cowards. Aguinaldo's indorsement on 
this telegram reads : — 

"Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are 
few against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you 
have more than that number. E. A., Dec. 12, 1898." ^ 

Relative to the insults which were at this time showered 
upon Americans, Taylor has made the following state- 
ment : ■* — 

"Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates 
in the eight months during which the United States had pre- 
vented Spain from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the 
Philippines, and she might still be kind. The men about 
Aguinaldo who had risen farthest and fastest could not endure 
the thought of having to accept subordinate positions in a gov- 
ernment not directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the 
door of the palace of the president saluted them as the halber- 
diers at the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in 
Manila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the 
coming of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the 
streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them, and they 
knew that if they won, the Philippines would be divided into 
fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises, would hold in feudal 
tenure from a Malay potentate. They were confident. They 

1 P. I. R., 849. « Ibid. ' Ibid. * 56 AJ, 


held Luzon. They held the people. They had no intention 
of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws and himted 
men. The United States force in Manila was small and 
America was far. It was true that they might have to fight for 
the prize which they had seized, but the military leaders about 
Aguinaldo were confident of winning in case they fought. They 
believed the Americans were afraid of them and would be easily 
beaten. American soldiers had been seized and had been in- 
sulted by the followers of Aguinaldo and no resort had been 
made to force. The Americans had been ordered to avoid 
bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also probable 
that many of the insults to which they had been subjected were 
not appreciated by them. A tall soldier from western America 
paid no attention to the insults hurled at him in a language 
which he did not understand. And yet the small excited Fih- 
pinos might retire feeling that the American had tamely sub- 
mitted to insult worse than a blow." 

By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in 
position in the vicinity of Manila all of the field guns in 
his possession. 

The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It 
provided for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in 
the Philippines. This was what the Insurgents had been 
waiting for, and thereafter things moved rapidly. It is 
obvious that an attack was definitely planned for at this 
time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey tele- 
graphed Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second 
zone of Manila had directed him to assist by entering 
that city as soon as they opened fire against the American 

On the following day Cailles reported that he had 
occupied blockhouse No. 12, which was within the 
American lines, and added the following significant 
statement : — 

^ "We are constantly alarmed here by American troops who wish 
to come within the military line. To-day received word from second 
chief, second zone, Manila, that as soon as they opened fire against 
the American troops I assist by entering Manila. I have no orders 
in this matter; I await your directions." — P. I. R., 849. 


"The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots from 
Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on the Ameri- 
can line of trenches, and to follow the living to Manila. The 
dead can lie with the dead. Yesterday we were content waiting 
for the arming of the San Quintin." ^ 

San Quintin's Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian 
vespers, the massacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. 
Obviously the Insurgents were planning something similar 
for Manila. 

For some reason the attack was not made as planned, 
but there was no intention of abandoning it. Within 
fifteen days of January 1 some 40,000 Filipinos left Manila. 
Why ? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to Senor Benito 
Legarda at Manila, saying : — 

"I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here 
to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you — I merely 
wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the 
day or the week." ^ 

Many details of the plan of attack have come into our 
possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Agui- 
naldo during January relative to a plan for an uprising of 
the prisoners in Bilibid Prison, saying that it should by 
all means come ''before the movement is begun any- 
where else," and calling attention to the necessity of 
stationing men to prevent the American soldiers near 
by in the Zorilla theatre from coming to the rescue. On 
the back of this letter there is a sketch plan showing 
where bolo men were to be stationed, ready to attack 
these soldiers.^ 

1 P. I. R., 849. 

2 Taylor, 70 AJ. 

3 "It is absolutely necessary that an order be received here permit- 
ting the uprising of those in prison before the movement is begun any- 
where else ; in the prison the word shall be given at the moment the 
bugle sounds retreat ; it is indispensable that some of our party be 
prepared in the vicinity of the Iris bridge, San Pedro street and Dulum- 
brayan bridge, in order to prevent the Americans quartered in the 
Pennsylvania barracks (Zorilla theatre) from aiding those in the 
prison." — P. I. R., 73. 3. 


In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, 
Aguinaldo said : — 

"I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the pro- 
posed amendments, every one knows that our newborn Repubhc 
now has to fight for its existence against giants in ambition and 
in power." ^ 

An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 
1899, contains the following statement : — 

"It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent 
and inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands of 
soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on 
December 20th last to take that port together with the whole 
of Visayas and Mindanao." ^ 

On January 4 the following significant telegram was 
sent out : — 

"Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to Pro- 
vincial Presidents, wherever there may be Telegraphic 
Service, to be communicated to the Local Chiefs of each 

" Malolos, January 4, 1899, 9.35 a.m. 
"To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinan : 
" Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose 
the American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare 
their bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barrio 
national militia is organized, each six of whom should be com- 
manded by a corporal, each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty- 
six by a second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant, 
and each one hundred and four by a captain, directing that the 
soldiers of the national militia elect their own officers, informing 
all that upon our attitude depends our salvation. 

" LiNGAYEN, January 4, 1899." 

There is a note thereon which reads : — 

" Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the com- 
manding general." 

(Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those 
of the Provincial President.) ^ 

1 P. I. R., 40. 8. 2 ii)id_^ Books C-1. » Ibid., 1141. 3. 



















On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation 
which contains the following statement : — 

"The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace 
and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is, that 
with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 
26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of 
conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied 
by my government. 

"My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such 
a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by 
a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, 'champion of 
oppressed nations.' Thus it is that my government is ready 
to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forci- 
ble possession of the Visayan Islands. I announce these rights 
before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may 
pronounce its infallible verdict as to who arc the true oppres- 
sors of nations and the tormentors of human kind. 

"Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed." ^ 

Three days later this proclamation, which was rather 
dangerously like a declaration of war, was reissued with 
a significant change in the last one of the passages quoted, 
the w^ords ''attempt to take forcible possession of any 
part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction" being 
substituted for the words ''attempt to take forcible posses- 
sion of the Visayan Islands." 

On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 p.m., Sandico telegraphed 
Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"Note. — In consequence of the orders of General Rios 
to his officers, as soon as the Filipino attack begins the Ameri- 
cans should be driven into the Intramuros district and the 
Walled city should be set on fire." ^ 

Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside 
the city of Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclu- 
sion. I quote Taylor's excellent summary of them : — 

"After Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 5 the number 
of organizations charged with an attack within the city in- 

' P. I. R., 1186. 10. ^ Ibid., 8^9. 


creased rapidly and it is possible that those which had been 
formed during Spanish rule had never been disbanded. San- 
dico's clubs for athletic exercises and mutual improvement 
formed a nucleus for these bodies and the directing boards of 
the popular committees took up the work of recruiting, while 
some of the members became officers of the militia or san- 
datahan. On January 6 the commander of militia in Trozo, 
Manila, reported that 1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the 
popular committee. On January 7 Bonifacio Arevalo for- 
warded to the head of the central committee a list of the 
officers of the battalion which had just been organized in Sam- 
paloc for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the 
same time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for 
arming the prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of the 
American soldiers quartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across the 
street. He said : — 

"'Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of 
the volunteers of the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the 
creation of a disciplinary battalion and the provisional appoint- 
ments of officers for 600 sandatahan, or militia, ready to provide 
themselves by force with the American rifles in the Zorrilla 

"He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It 
was not difficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob, to 
burn, to rape and to murder. These were the crimes for which 
they were serving sentences. The political prisoners had been 
released. . . . 

"On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first 
battalion organized by the committees of Sampaloc ; on January 
27 he approved those of the second battalion. By January 22 
two battalions had been organized in Quiapo. At least one 
regiment of eight companies was raised in Binondo, for on Jan- 
uary 23 its commander forwarded a roll of the officers to Agui- 
naldo for his approval. . . . On January 25 T. Sandico, at 
Malolos, submitted for approval the names of a number of offi- 
cers of the territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January 
30, 1899, a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was 
forwarded approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the 
committee of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permis- 
sion to recruit a body for the defence of the country. The regi- 
ment of ' Armas Blancas ' had already been raised in Tondo and 
Binondo. It was in existence there in December, 1898, and 
may have been originally organized to act against Spain. On 
February 2 all officers of the territorial militia in Manila reported 


at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico, for the pur- 
pose of receiving their commissions and taking the oath to the 
flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote that a multi- 
tude of men were present in uniform, and that the oath was ad- 
ministered by Gen. Pantaleon Garcia. There is no reason for 
beheving that this is a complete statement of sandatahan or- 
ganized in Manila by the end of January, and yet this statement 
gives a force of at least 6330 men. General Otis said that this 
force had been reported to him as being 10,000 men. It is prob- 
ably true that only a small number of them had rifles ; but 
armed with long knives and daggers they could have inflicted 
much damage in a sudden night attack in the narrow and 
badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9, 1899, Agui- 
naldo wrote his instructions for the sandatahan of Manila. 
Members of this body were to enter the houses of the American 
officers on the pretext of bringing them presents. Once in they 
were to kill. The sentinels at the gates of the barracks were to 
be approached by men dressed as women and killed. The gates 
of the barracks held and as many officers as possible treacher- 
ously murdered, the sandatahan were to rise throughout the 
city, and by attacking in the rear the United States troops on 
the outer line were to aid in opening a way for Aguinaldo's 
force. To further increase the confusion and perhaps to punish 
the natives who had not joined them, the sandatahan were to 
fire the city. 

" It is a fair deduction from Luna's orders for an uprising in 
Manila, from Aguinaldo's instructions for the sandatahan, 
from other documents among the papers of the insurgents and 
from what was done in Manila on February 22 that Aguinaldo 
and his advisers about the middle of January, 1899, drew up a 
plan of attack upon Manila which would, if carried out, have 
inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was not carried 
out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna. 

"It is true that the instructions were general ; but that par- 
ticular instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for the 
murder of General Otis is shown by his note on the back of a 
document presented to him.^ 

"... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo 
and the men about him in beginning a war by the murder of 
the commanding general on the other side. 

****** 4s 

1 See p. 733. 


"... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on 
February 4 the Americans attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos 
who were using their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet 
here in Aguinaldo's own handwriting is the record of the fact 
that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the Amer- 
ican commander. 

"The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon 
and in Manila was not to be a mere raid such as the bandits 
of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenceless 
towns. The plan was a piece of calculated savagery in which 
murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a 
purpose. The servants were to kill their employers ; organized 
bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the city of 
Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases 
employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the 
barracks of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates; 
all Americans in the streets were to be killed, the city was to be 
fired and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo. 
If this plan had been carried out no white man and no white 
woman would have escaped. The reenforcements from the 
United States would have arrived to fiiid only the smoking 
ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General Augustfn 
what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians 
drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately plamied 
for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital not as 
it had been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take 
it as Count Tilly took Magdeburg. 

"The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini, San- 
dico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in European schools, were 
men of trained and subtle minds. With them cruelty and assassi- 
nation was not a matter of savage impulse but of deUberate 
calculation ; with them assassination was employed as an effec- 
tive addition to political propaganda, and murder as an ulti- 
mate resource in political manoeuvres." ^ 

Some portions of Aguinaldo's instructions to the san- 
datahan are particularly worthy of perpetuation, as they 
illustrate his ideas as to the conduct which should be ob- 
served by cultured, patriotic, honourable and very humane 
men, who were not cruel : — 

"Art. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks 
should send in first four men with a good present for the Ameri- 

1 Taylor, 68-69 AJ. 


can commander. Immediately after will follow four others 
who will make a pretence of looking for the same officer for some 
reason and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or 
houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This 
wherever it is possible at the moment of attack. 

''Art. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the 
Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the 
attack on the barracks by the sandatahan should be a complete 
surprise and with decision and courage. One should go alone 
in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive 
the sentinel one of them should dress as a woman and must 
take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his 
piece, thus caUing the attention of those in the barracks. This 
will enable his companions who are approaching to assist in the 
general attack. 

"Art. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan 
should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, 
but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the 
Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who 
can injure them, they may take the rifles in one hand and the 
ammunition in the other. 

"Art. 6. The ofl&cers shall take care that on the tops of 
the houses along the streets where the American forces shall 
pass there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared 
with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as 
boiling water, oil and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready 
to be Ughted and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy 
objects that they can throw on the passing American troops. 
At the same time in the lower parts of the houses will be con- 
cealed the sandatahan, who will attack immediately. Great 
care should be taken not to throw glass in the streets, as the 
greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. On these houses 
there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the objects to 
be thrown down, a number of the sandatahan, in order to cover 
a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that 
we may be sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces. 

"Art. 7. All FiUpinos, real defenders of their country, 
should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside at- 
tack at the very moment that they note the first movement 
in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the 
troops that surround Manila wall proceed without delay to force 
the enemy's line and unite themselves with their brothers in 
the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided 
against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and 


I charge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners 
shall be respected and that the American prisoners shall be 
treated well. 

:i: ***** * 

"Art. 9. In addition to the instructions given in para- 
graph 6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling 
water, tallow, molasses and other liquids, which shall be thrown 
as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their houses, 
or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these 
houses shall be the sandatahan who shall hurl the hquids that 
shall be passed to them by the women and children. 

"Art. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not pos- 
sess the same, the sandatahan can provide themselves with 
lances and arrows with long sharp heads, and these should be 
shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well 
into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that 
in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh. 

"Art. 12. . . . Neither will you forget your sacred oath and 
immaculate banner; nor will you forget the promises made 
by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that we 
Filipinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins, nor are we 
cruel, but on the contrary, that we are men of culture and pa- 
triotism, honourable and very humane." ^ 

Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates.^ 

The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive, 
but desired, if possible, to provoke the Americans into 
firing the first shot. They made no secret of their desire 
for conflict, but increased their hostile demonstrations 
and pushed their lines forward into forbidden territory. 
Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract 
from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on 
January 10, 1899 : — 

"Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell 
me to withdraw our forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall 

1 P. I. R., 206-207. 

2 ' Above all I expect that you will respect the persons and goods 
of private persons of all nationalities, including the Chinese ; that you 
will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of the enemy who 
surrender. And that you be on the sharp lookout for those traitors 
and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to mar our victory." 


not draw back a step, and in place of withdrawing, I shall ad- 
vance a little farther. He brings a letter from his general, in 
which he speaks to me as a friend. I said that from the day I 
knew that Maquinley (McKinlcy) opposed our independence 
I did not want any dealings with any American. War, war, is 
what we want. The Americans after this speech went ofif 
pale." ' 

Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for 
there is a reply in his handwriting which reads : — 

"I approve and applaud what you have done with the 
Americans, and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers 
and soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until 
the arrival of their reenforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum 
and remain always on the alert. — E. A. Jan. 10, 1899." ^ 

On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned FeHciano 
Cruz and Severino Quitiongco to assassinate General 

On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Agui- 
naldo as follows : — 

"We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention 
in your telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our 
Government is arranging for the forces that will be able first to 
enter Manila." 

This telegram is indorsed in Aguinaldo's handwriting : 

"As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the 
heroes will have as their rewards a large quantity of money, 
extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bato, 
Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the 
congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their 
being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with 
their generals, and, if possible, the chief of them all who repre- 
sents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot ?) falls to you, or, 
better said, to General Noriel and Colonel Cailles. 

"The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a 
few days. 

(Signed) "E. A. 
"Malolos, Jan. 14, 1899." " 

» P. I. R., 849. 2 Ibid. 

' For the document on wMch this statement is based see p. 733. 

* P. I. R., 849. 


On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted : 
''Death to the Americans," and held a review to celebrate 
the rupture of friendly relations with the United States.^ 

At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious 
attack upon Manila and telegraphed it to some of his 
officers. General Garcia replied from Caloocan on 
January 17 that the dream would come true as soon as 
the conflict with the Americans began.^ 

In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite 
ready, and ordered that the Filipino soldiers in the walled 
city keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to 
deceive them, ''since the hoped-for moment has not yet 
arrived." ^ 

The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans 
were cowards,"* and openly boasted that when the attack 
began they would drive them into the sea. 

1 Taylor, 81 AJ. 

2 " In reply to your telegram concerning your dream of entering 
Manila after four hours of combat. I have the honour to inform you 
for myself and the officers and soldiers under my command that your 
dream will come true as soon as the conflict with the Americans be- 
gins, since we shall advance at any cost." — P. I. R., 849. 

3 On January 21, 1899, the commander of the fourth zone, Caloo- 
can, wired Aguinaldo that : 

"Julian Santo, commander of the territorial militia of Trozo, in- 
forms me that 400 native soldiers of the Spanish army to-day incor- 
porated in his militia. He lives in the walled city, and he wants to 
know your opinion upon the present situation, since the Americans 
want to hold them as prisoners or confine them in Bilibid prison." 

(Indorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "Tell the Filipino soldiers 
in the walled city affiliated to oiu' cause that they must keep on good 
terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, and prevent 
their confining them, since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived." 

— P. I. R., 849. 

^ On January 20, 1899, a correspondent wrote to one of the In- 
surgents abroad : 

" In some places (in Manila) there have been fights with bolos be- 
tween Filipinos and Americans who wanted to tear down the proclama- 
tion of our president while the people defended it with their bolos. 
They say that it amuses them to see the Americans run when they 
draw their knives. It is said that some 10,000 servants have gone on 
strike. Some Americans have already disappeared by the method 
of 'dukut' but it will not be proper to publish this in my opinion." 

— P. I. R., 980. 82. 























On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey" 
that : — 

"The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines 
and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that 
very shortly they will give us battle. My best information 
is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and 
within the city before our additional troops arrive, and the 
least spark may start a conflagration." ^ 

As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work 
of strengthening the Insurgent positions around Manila 
was pushed with all possible speed.^ 

About the middle of January General Otis stationed 
the First Nebraska Regiment upon the high ground at 
Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of conditions at this 
time, and of the circumstances leading to the actual out- 
break of hostilities Taylor says : — 

"During the latter part of January General Otis was in- 
formed on good insurgent authority that the insurgents medi- 
tated an attack upon those troops, and he was advised to re- 
move them, as in their exposed position they would kill them all. 
General MacArthur, under whose command the regiment was, 

1 Taylor, AJ. 73. 

^ (Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo :) 

"To the President of the Republic, Malolos, from the Provincial 
Governor of Manila, San Juan del Monte, Jan. 29, 1899, 10.25 a.m. : 
I yesterday visited the military road in process of construction, Santa 
Ana to Pineda. To-morrow it will be sufficiently completed to permit 
passage, and in two days after it will be finished. Considering opening 
another military road direct from Caloocan to San Juan. Desire 

(Indorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo :) " Telegram received. I am 
very much satisfied, and in the name of the government I congratulate 
you and the presidents of Santa Ana and Pineda with their inhabitants 
for their efforts for the public good. You are authorized to open 
another military road from Caloocan to San Juan del Monte, and I 
want you to endeavor to finish it this week, as I am certain you will." 
— P. I. R., 849. 

(Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo :) 

"To the Secretary of the Interior, Malolos, from San Juan del 
Monte — Received Feb. 3, 1899 from the Provincial Governor Manila: 
Road marked out ; work began Wednesday. I shall put forth every 
effort to finish by middle of the coming week." — P. I. R., 849. 

VOL. I — L 


placed two guns in position there, as it was fully expected that 
the insurgents would direct their attack upon that point, as in 
fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents of the regiment 
covered the ridge, and its outposts extended along the San Juan 
River, a small stream which formed part of the line of delimita- 
tion between the Americans and the insurgents. 

"For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pres- 
sure of the insurgents was constant along this position, so con- 
stant indeed that in the light of subsequent events it indicated 
a premeditated purpose on the part of some one in the insurgent 
army to force a collision at that point. On February 2 General 
MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth 
Army Corps, wrote to the commanding general of the Filipino 
troops in the third zone in front of him that — 

'"An armed party from your command now occupies the 
village in front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably 
more than a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very 
active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be 
withdrawn to your side of the line at once. From this date if 
the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they 
must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem neces- 

"Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del 
Monte, replied upon the receipt of this communication that the 
action of his troops was foreign to his wishes and that he would 
give immediate orders for them to retire. At about half past 
8 on the night of February 4 a small insurgent patrol entered 
the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7 
and advanced to the little village of Santol in front of an out- 
post of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from 
which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February 2. 
An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent 
patrol continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the 
insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire 
was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread 
rapidly down the American and insurgent lines and both forces 
at once sprang to arms." ^ 

General Otis's account of the opening of active hostili- 
ties follows : — 

"On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detach- 
ment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position 

» Taylor, 73 AJ. 


immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The 
outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently 
bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was re- 
ported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to com- 
municate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops 
concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, 
and the reply received was all that could be desired. However, 
the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening 
of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our 
small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 
yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, 
an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or 
answer when challenged. The result was that our picket dis- 
charged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa 
opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed. 

"The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a 
small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their 
ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their 
premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insur- 
gent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were 
not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They de- 
sired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but 
the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated 
their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long, 
however, for it was their object to force an issue before American 
troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila." ^ 

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so care- 
fully planned for. We learn from the Insurgent records 
that the shot of the American sentry missed its mark. 
There was no reason why it should have provoked a hot 
return fire, but it did. 

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what 
the Insurgents had anticipated. The Americans did not 
drive very well. It was but a short time before they 
themselves were routed and driven from their positions. 

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that 
his troops had been wantonly attacked. The plain fact 
is that the Insurgent patrol in question deliberately drew 
the fire of the American sentry, and this was just as much 

1 Taylor, 73 AJ. 


an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whether 
the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher 
authority is not definitely known. 

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain 
Zialcita from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 p.m., 
to Major Gray, San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting : 

"I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General 
Ricarte is not here. I believe (that if the) Americans open fire 
we shall attack. Will ask instructions (of) Malolos." ^ 

This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something 
was to be done to draw the American fire. 

Aguinaldo's first statement relative to the opening of 
hostilities is embodied in a general order dated Malolos, 
February 4, 1899, and reads in part as follows : — 

"Nine o'clock p.m., this date, I received from Caloocan sta- 
tion a message communicated to me that the American forces, 
without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our 
camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the 
blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses 
among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and 
of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend 
themselves until the firing became general all along the line. 

"No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. 
I have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it 
at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the 
army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations 
and many sacrificed rights. 


"... I order and command : — 

"1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine 
forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and 
the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed 
by the laws of war. 

"2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philip- 
pine forces will be treated as prisoners of war. 

"3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accred- 
ited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may 
accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the 
resulting declaration of war." ^ 

1 P. I. R., 2018. 2 ji^id., 1090. 5. 


Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid 
hostilities are absurd, in view of his own instructions con- 
cerning the attack to be made simultaneously within and 
without the city of Manila. 

There is other correspondence which throws light on the 
situation which existed immediately prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities. On January 25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled 
from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong: "Recom- 
mend you await beginning American aggression, justifying 
our conduct nations." ^ 

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, 
for on January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate 
in Washington would take final vote upon the treaty of 
peace between the United States and Spain on February 
6, and said : — 

"It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immedi- 
ately before the ratification of the treaty. A conflict after the 
ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public 
opinion." ^ 

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recom- 
mendation that hostilities begin before February 6 if 
America did not answer meanwhile. It was evidently 
well understood in Hongkong that Aguinaldo's receipt 
of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin, for on Feb- 
ruary 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hos- 
tilities of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Wash- 
ington as follows : — 

" Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here denied 
Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote Senate 
to-day any case insignificant skirmish due intentional provo- 

" Bray." » 

The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted 
leave no escape from the conclusion that the outbreak 
of hostilities which occurred on February 4, 1899, had been 

1 P. I. R., 453. 4. 2 P. I. R., 453. 2. ' P. I. R., 493. 12. 


carefully prepared for and was deliberately precipitated 
by the Filipinos themselves. 
Blount says : — 

"It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever 
expected to succeed in a war with us." ^ 

It may have been wooden-headed for the Fihpinos to 
expect this, but expect it they certainly did. We have 
seen how they held their soldiers in check until after 
Spain had been ousted from the Philippines by the Treaty 
of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now only 
remained to carry out the balance of their original plan 
to get rid of the Americans in one way or another. 

General Otis states that'' when Aguinaldo had completed 
his preparations for attack he prepared the outlines of his 
declaration of war, the full text of which was published at 
Malolos on the evening, and very shortly after, hostilities 
began. This declaration was circulated in Manila on the 
morning of February 5." ^ 

The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the 
punishment which they received on February 4 and 5. 

Blount has stated ^ that if the resolutions of Senator 
Bacon introduced on January 11, 1899, had passed, we 
never should have had any war with the Filipinos. The 
resolutions in question concluded thus : — 

"That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or 
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over 
said islands except for the pacification thereof, and assert their 
determination when an independent government shall have 
been duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to 
transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reason- 
able and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, 
and to thereupon leave the government and control of the 
islands to their people." 

I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which 
these resolutions might have had if passed. The Insur- 

1 Blount, p. 190. 2 Taylor, 86 AJ. ^ Blount, p. 175. 


gents felt themselves to be fully competent to bring about 
such pacification of the islands as they deemed necessary. 
At the time the resolutions were presented in the Senate 
their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attack 
their .Ajnerican opponents upon the most slender excuse. 
Aguinaldo himself could not have held them much longer, 
and it is not impossible that they got away from him as 
it was. They would have interpreted the passage of the 
Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness, and 
hastened their attack. As we have seen, "war, war, 
war" was what they wanted. 

Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for 
the outbreak of hostilities to the United States by claim- 
ing that certain words italicized by him in what he calls 
the "Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation" were nec- 
essarily, to the Insurgents, "fighting words." The ex- 
pressions referred to have to do with the establishment 
of United States sovereignty and the exercise of govern- 
mental control in the Philippine Islands. 

These words were not "fighting words," the Insurgent 
policy being, as I have shown by the records, to consider 
the acceptance of a protectorate or of annexation in the 
event that it did not prove possible to negotiate absolute 
independence, or probable that the American troops 
could be driven from the islands. 

The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their abil- 
ity to whip the cowardly Americans, rather than any 
fixed determination on their part to push a struggle for 
independence to the bitter end, led to their attack. 


Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report 

The Good Book says, "By their fruits ye shall know 
them, whether they be good or evil," and it seems proper 
to apply this test to the Insurgents and their government. 

The extraordinary claim has been advanced that the 
United States destroyed a republic in the Philippines 
and erected an oligarchy on its ruins. Various writers 
and speakers who have not gone so far as this have yet 
maintained that Aguinaldo and his associates established 
a real, effective government throughout the archipelago 
during the interim between his return and the outbreak 
of hostilities with the United States. 

In summarizing conditions on September 15, 1898, 
Judge Blount says : ^ — 

"Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, 
with complete machinery of government in each province for 
all matters of justice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000 
men at his beck, and his whole people a unit at his back, Agui- 
naldo formally inaugurated his permanent government — per- 
manent as opposed to the previous provisional government — 
with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned after 
our own,^ just as the South American republics had done before 
him when they were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the new 

He refers to our utter failure to understand ''what a 
wonderfully complete 'going concern' Aguinaldo 's gov- 
ernment had become throughout the Philippine Archi- 
pelago before the Treaty of Paris was signed." ^ 

1 Blount, p. 98. 

2 The constitution used was most certainly not patterned after 
our own. See p. 265. 

3 Blount, p. 111. 



He bases his claim as to the excellent state of pubHc 
order in the Insurgent territory at this time on a report of 
Paymaster W. E. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent 
of the United States Navy, who between October 8 and 
November 20, 1898, made a long, rapid trip through 
northern Luzon, traversing the provinces of Bulacan, 
Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Nueva 
Vizcaya, Isabela, Cagayan, South Ilocos and Union, in 
the order named, thence proceeding to Dagupan and down 
the railroad through Pangasinan, Tarlac, Pampanga and 
Bulacan to Manila. 

He says that these gentlemen found the authority 
of Aguinaldo's government universally acknowledged, 
the country in a state of perfect tranquilhty and public 
order, ^ with profound peace and freedom from brigandage 
and the like.^ 

Now if it be true that Aguinaldo established complete 
machinery of government throughout all of Luzon out- 
side of Manila for all matters of justice, taxes and police, 
so that life and property were safe and peace, tran- 
quilhty and justice assured, we may well dispense with 
quibbling as to whether the proper name was appUed to 
such government. But did he ? 

Let us examine with some care the history of the 
Wilcox-Sargent trip, and see if we can gain further light 
from other sources relative to the condition of public 
order in the territory which they traversed. 

I propose, for the most part, to let the captured In- 
surgent records speak for themselves, as it is fair to as- 
sume that Insurgent officers were at no pains to repre- 

1 "The light Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox throw on the then uni- 
versal acknowledgment of the authority of the Aguinaldo government 
and the perfect tranquilhty and public order maintained under it, in 
the Cagayan valley." — Blount, pp. 114-115. 

2 "The country in fact, as Aguinaldo alwaj^s claimed in his proc- 
lamations of that period seeking recognition of his government by 
the Powers, in a state of profound peace and tranquillity — free from 
brigandage and the like." — Blount, p. 115. 


sent conditions as worse than they really were. In view 
of the fragmentary character of these records, we may also 
assume that the complete story would be still more 
interesting and instructive than the one which I have 
been able to reconstruct. 

Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox were almost everywhere 
hospitably received, and were entertained with dinners 
and dances after the inimitable fashion of the hospitable 
Filipino everywhere. They gained a very favourable 
impression of the state of public order in the provinces 
through which they passed for the reason that from the 
very start their trip was strictly personally conducted. 
They saw exactly what it was intended that they should 
see and very little more. Their progress was several times 
interrupted for longer or shorter periods without adequate 
explanation. We now know that on these occasions the 
scenery so carefully prepared in advance for them had be- 
come a little disarranged and needed to be straightened 
up. Facts which I will cite show that most shocking and 
horrible events, of which they learned nothing, were oc- 
curring in the territory through which they passed. 

For a considerable time before their departure American 
visitors had been carefully excluded from the Insurgent 
territory, but the Filipino leaders decided to let these two 
men go through it to the end that they might make as 
favourable a report as possible. How carefully the way 
was prepared for American visitors is shown by the fol- 
lowing telegram : — 

"San Pedro, Macati, 

" July 30, 1898. 
"To the Local Presidente of Pasig : 

"You are hereby informed that the Americans are going 
to your to-piTi and they will ask your opinion [of what the people 
desire. — Tr.] You should answer them that we want a repub- 
lican government. The same answer must be given through- 
out your jurisdiction. 

(Signed) " Pio del Pilar, 
" General of the Second Zone." ^ 
» P. I. R., 958. 11 




Now General Pilar had an uncomfortable way of kill- 
ing people who did not obey his orders, and under the 
rules of the Insurgent government he was abundantly 
justified in so doing. His suggestions as to what visiting 
Americans should be told or shown would be likely to be 
acceded to. Certainly this seems to have been the case 
in the present instance, for on the same day General 
Noriel reported as follows : ^ — 

"President R. G., Bacoor, from Gen. Noriel, Pineda, July 
30, 12. 10 P.M. : I inform your excellency that some commissioners 
of the American admiral are making investigations in the region 
around Pasay as to the wishes and opinion of the people as to 
the government. To-day I received a statement from some, 
giving the answer : ' Free government rnider American protec- 
torate [copy mutilated, two or three words missing here] the 

Blount quotes with approval Admiral Dewey's state- 
ment made shortly after the return of Wilcox and Sargent 
that in his opinion their report ''contains the most com- 
plete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the 
present state of the northern part of Luzon Island." ^ 
This was true. 

The admiral might have gone further and said that it 
contained practically the only information then obtainable 
in regard to conditions in the territory in question, but as 
I shall conclusively show it was neither complete nor 

Judge Blount in describing the experiences of Messrs. 
Wilcox and Sargent naively makes the statement that : 

"The tourists were provided at Resales by order of Agui- 
naldo with a mihtary escort, ' which was continued by relays all 
the way to Aparri.'" ^ 

It certainly was ! 

Very little Spanish w^as then spoken in Nueva Vizcaya, 
Isabela or Cagayan. What opportunity had these two 

1 P. I. R., 849. 2 Blount, p. 108. ' Ibid., p. 109. 


men, ignorant as they were of the native dialects, to learn 
the sinister facts as to what had been and was occurring 
in the territory which they visited? 

No one can fail to be delighted with Filipino hospitality, 
which was lavishly bestowed upon them everywhere, and 
it is only natural that they should have reported favour- 
ably upon what they saw. It was about this time that 
an order was issued ^ that fronts of buildings should be 
whitewashed, streets cleaned and fences repaired with 
a view to showing every one, and especially travellers 
through the territory of the Insurgents, that they were 
"not opposed to a good such as a refined and civilized 
people should have." Doubtless the report of the two 
men from Dewey's fleet was made in the best of faith. 
I will now endeavour to show what were some of the 
actual conditions in the territory through which they 


They first visited Bulacan. They do not mention hear- 
ing of the activities of a Chinaman named Ignacio Paua, 
who had been given the rank of colonel by Aguinaldo and 
assigned the task of extorting contributions for the revolu- 
tion from his countrymen. In a letter to Aguinaldo 
written on July 6, 1898, Paua states that he has collected 
more than $1,000 from the Chinese of these small towns, 
but asks for an order ''prohibiting the outrages that are 
being committed against such merchants as are not our 
enemies." He further says, ''When the contributions 
from the Chinamen of all the pueblos shall have been 
completed I v/ish to publish a proclamation forbidding 
any injury to the Chinamen and any interference with 
their small business enterprises," and adds that "the 

1 "With a view to showing every one and especially foreigners 
travelling through the territory of the Republic, that we are not op- 
posed to a good such as a refined and civilized people should have, the 
fronts of buildings should be whitewashed, streets should be cleaned 
and fences repaired." — P. I. R., 292. 3. 


natives hereabouts themselves are the people who are 
committing said abuses." ' 

Apparently Paua had no objection to the committing 
of outrages against merchants that were the enemies of 
the cause, nor does he seem to have objected to injury to 
Chinamen before contributions were completed. His own 
methods were none too mild. On August 27, 1898, General 
Pio del Pilar telegraphed Aguinaldo that five Insurgent 
soldiers, under a leader supposed to be Paua, had entered 
the store of a Chinaman, and tried to kidnap his wife, but 
had left on the payment of $10 and a promise to pay $50 
later, saying that they would return and hang their fellow 
countryman if the latter amount was not forthcoming.^ 

Paua was later made a general in consideration of his 
valuable services ! 

1 "It would be a great satisfaction to me to aid you with all my 
strength ; and the only thing that I see to object to is that the Com- 
manders and Generals in this province are getting pretty abusive 
toward our brethren and allow themselves to be bribed by the Tagalog 
merchants so as to allow them to enter Manila with their goods, which 
is of gi'eat assistance to our enemies. 

" Concerning the contributions which I have collected from the China- 
men, it amounts to more than P 2,000 here in Tambobong, Meycauayan 
and Polo alone ; and those from the other pueblos have not yet come 
to see me. Furthermore, I would like an order from you prohibiting 
the outrages that are being committed against such merchants as are 
not our enemies ; and when the contributions from the Chinamen of 
all the pueblos shall have been completed, I wish to publish a proclama- 
tion forbidding any injury to the Chinamen and any interference with 
their small business enterprises ; since this is a disgrace to our govern- 
ment and to your name ; for the natives of hereabouts themselves 
are the people who are committing said abuses, and in hopes of putting 
a stop to them, I await your decision at the earliest possible moment 
concerning the proclamation referred to." — P. I. R., 355. 11. 

^ "Last night in the place known as Santo Cristo (Manila?) the 
store of J. Ricafort, a Chinaman, was entered by five soldiers of our 
army under an unknown commander supposed to be Colonel Paua. 
They tried to kidnap the wife of Ricafort. At the request of P. Garcia 
they desisted upon payment of 20 pesos and the agreement that 100 
pesos would be paid later. If this was not done they would return 
and hang them. To quiet these people I gave them a pass to assure 
their personal safetj% and exacted at the same time a promise that 
they should not report the matter to the Americans. PauUno Garcia 
is now at Pedro Macati." — P. I. R., 1187. 4, 



Our travellers next visited Pampanga. Here they ap- 
parently overlooked the fact that Aguinaldo did not have 
''his whole people a unit at his back." The citizens of 
Macabebe seem not to have approved of the Aguinaldo 
regime, for the Insurgent records show that : — 

''Representatives of the towns of Pampanga assembled in 
San Fernando on June 26, 1898, and under the presidency of 
General Maximino. Hizon agreed to yield him complete 'obe- 
dience as military governor of the province and representative 
of the illustrious dictator of these Philippine Islands.' The 
town of Macabebe refused to send any delegates to this 
gathering." ^ 

It may be incidentally mentioned that Blount has 
passed somewhat lightly over the fact that he himself 
during his army days commanded an aggregation of 
sturdy citizens from this town, known as Macabebe 
scouts, who diligently shot the Insurgents full of holes 
whenever they got a chance. He incorrectly refers to 
them as a "tribe or clan." ^ It is absurd to call them a 
tribe. They are merely the inhabitants of a town which 
has long been at odds with the neighbouring towns of the 

Things had come to a bad pass in Pampanga when its 
head wrote that the punishment of beating people in the 
plaza and tying them up so that they would be exposed 
to the full rays of the sun should be stopped. He argued 
that such methods would not lead the people of other 

1 P. I. R., 223. 

2 "Early in the war we had availed om'selves of a certain tribe, or 
clan, known as the Maeeabebes, who look nowise different from all other 
Filipinos, but who had, under the Spanish government, by reason of 
long-standing feuds with their more rebellious neighbom-s, come to be 
absolutely loyal to the Spanish authorities. When we came they had 
transferred that loyalty to us, and had now become a recognized and 
valuable part of our military force." — Blount, pp. 333-334. 


nations to believe that the reign of liberty, equahty and 
fraternity had begun in the Phihppines.^ 

When it is remembered that persons tied up and ex- 
posed to the full rays of the sun in the Philippine lowlands 
soon die, in a most uncomfortable manner, we shall 
agree with the head of this province that this custom has 
its objectionable features ! 


Wliile the failure of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent to 
learn of the relations between the Tagalogs of Macabebe 
and their neighbours, or of the fact that people were being 
pubhcly tortured in Pampanga, is perhaps not to be won- 
dered at under the circumstances, it is hard to see how they 
could have failed to hear something of the seriously dis- 
turbed conditions in Tarlac if they so much as got off the 
train there. 

On August 24 the commissioner in charge of elections 
in that province asked for troops to protect him, in holding 
them in the town of Urdaneta, against a party of two thou- 
sand men of the place, who were going to prevent them. 

On September 22 the secretary of the interior ordered 
that the requirements of the decree of June 18, establish- 
ing municipal governments, should be strictly complied 
with, as in many of the towns ''the inhabitants continue 
to follow the ancient methods by which the friars exploited 
us at their pleasure and which showed their great contempt 
for the law." - 

1 "On July 28, 1898, the head of the province of Pampanga wrote 
that the punishment of beating people in the plaza and tying them 
up so that they would be exposed to the full rays of the sun should be 
stopped. He complained that these methods had been carried so 
far that even people of good social position had been so punished. 
It was especially undesirable to employ such punishments, as the 
people of other nations seeing them would not believe that the reign 
of liberty, equality, and fraternity had begun in the Philippines." 

— P. I. R., 196. 3. 

2 Taylor, 47 AJ. 


The following letter to Aguinaldo, from Juan Nepomu- 
ceno, Representative from Tarlac, speaks for itself as to 
conditions in that province on December 27, 1898, shortly 
after the American travellers passed through it on their 
return : — 

"I regret exceedingly being compelled to report to you that 
since Sunday the 25th instant scandalous acts have been going 
on in the Province of Tarlac, which I represent. On the night 
of the Sunday mentioned the entire family of the Local Chief 
of Bamban was murdered, and his house and warehouse were 
burned. Also the Tax Commissioner and the Secretary, 
Fabian Ignacio, have been murdered. Last night Senor Jacinto 
Vega was kidnapped at the town of Gerona ; and seven travel- 
lers were murdered at O'Donnel, which town was pillaged, as 
well as the barrio of Matayumtayum of the town of La Paz. 
On that day various suspicious parties were seen in the town of 
Panique and in the same barrio, according to reliable reports 
which I have just received. 

"All this general demoralization of the province, according 
to the information which I have obtained, is due to the fact that 
the province is dissatisfied with the Provincial Chief, Senor 
Alfonso Ramos, and with Major Manuel de Leon ; for this is 
substantiated by the fact that all the events described 
occurred since last Sunday, when Senor Alfonso Ramos 
returned, to take charge of the Office of Provincial President, 
after having been detained for several days in this town. 
Wherefore, I believe that in order to restore tranquillity in the 
province, consideration be given to various documents that 
have been presented to the Government and to the standing 
Committee of Justice; and that there be removed from office 
Senor Alfonso Ramos, as well as said Seiior Manuel de Leon, 
who has no prestige whatever in this province. Moreover 
on the day when fifty-four soldiers of the command deserted, 
he himself left for San Fernando, Pampanga." ^ 

On November 30, 1898, General Macabulos sent 
Aguinaldo a telegram ^ from which it evidently appears 

1 ?. I. R., 944. 

2 "I have the honour to inform you that I have been in this town 
since yesterday afternoon issuing, in a proclamation, conciliatory 
orders to the populace that the people comprised in the uprising must 
present themselves and express aversion and repudiation of it, promis- 
ing them consideration and pardon as long as they lay aside arms. In 






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that there was an armed uprising in Tarlac which he was 
endeavouring to quell and that he hoped for early success. 
Apparently, however, his efforts to secure tranquiUity 
were not entirely successful, for on December 18 he 
telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"In a telegram dated to-day Lieut. Paraso, commanding 
a detachment at Camilin, informs me that last night his detach- 
ment was attacked by Tulisanes (robbers). The fire lasted 
four hours without any casualties among our men. This after- 
noon received another from the captain commanding said 
detachment, informing me of the same, and that nothing new 
has occurred. The people of the town await with anxiety the 
result of the charges they have made, especially against the 
local president and the justice of the peace, the original of which 
I sent to your high authority." ^ 

Obviously the police machinery was not working quite 
smoothly when a detachment of Insurgent troops could 
be kept under fire for four hours by a robber band, and 
perhaps the attacking party were not all ''robbers." 
Soldiers do not ordinarily carry much to steal. 

We obtain some further information from the following 
telegram of December 27, 1898, sent by the secretary 
of the interior to the President of the Revolutionary 
Government : — 

''Most urgent. According to reports no excitement except 
in Bangbang, Tarlac, which at 12 a.m., 25th, was attacked by 
TuHsanes [bandits or robbers, — D. C. W.]. The local presi- 
dente with his patrols arrested six of them. On continuing 
the pursuit he met in Talacon a party too large to attack. At 
7 A.M. of the 26th the town was again attacked by criminals, 
who killed the tax collector, and others who burnt some houses, 
among them that of the local presidente, and his stables, in 
which he lost two horses. I report this for your information." ^ 

compliance with and following the earlier published proclamation, 
thej^ presented two guns and innumerable bolos. I hope soon for 
tranquilUty among the people there tlirough these efforts. I ask dis- 
pense with assembly of the Junta. Camilin, November 30, 1898." 
— P. I. R., 849. 

1 P. I. R., 849. 2 Ibid. 

VOL. I — M 


Evidently tax collectors were not popular in Tarlac. 

Still further light is shed on the situation by a telegram 
from the secretary of the interior to Aguinaldo, dated 
December 28, 1898 : — 

"According to my information the excitement in Tarlac 
increases. I do not think that the people of the province would 
have committed such barbarities by themselves. For this 
reason the silence of General Macabulos is suspicious ; to speak 
frankly, it encourages the rebels. Some seven hundred of them, 
with one hundred and fifty rifles, entered Panique, seized the 
arms of the police, the town funds, and attacked the houses of 
the people. I report this for your information. All necessary 
measures will be taken." ^ 

Note also the following from the secretary of the in- 
terior, under date of December 27, 1898, to Aguinaldo : — 

"I have just learned that not only in Bangbang, but also in 
Gerona, Onell, and other places in Tarlac, men have been as- 
saulted by numerous Tulisanes, armed with rifles and bolos, 
who are killing and capturing the inhabitants and attacking 
travellers, robbing them of everything they have. The President 
should declare at once that that province is in state of siege, 
applying martial law to the criminals. That — (remainder 
missing)." ^ 

The secretary of agriculture took a more cheerful 
view of the situation. Under date of December 28 
he telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"The events in Bangbang, Tarlac Province, according to a 
witness here worthy of credit, have arisen from an attempt to 
procure vengeance on the local presidente, and robbery of 
Chinese shops. Hence they are without political importance. 
The tax collector killed, and a countryman servant of the local 
presidente wounded. They burnt two houses of the local 
presidente, a stable, and a warehouse for sugar-cane," ^ 

Obviously the robbery of Chinese shops and the killing of 
a few individuals was at first considered by the secretary of 
agriculture to be without political importance. Evi- 

1 P. I. R., 849. 2 Ibid. ' Ibid. 


dently he changed his mind, however, for on the same day, 
December 28, 1898, he telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : — 

"I think it necessary to send Aghpay ^ to quiet Tarlac. 
Send for him. If you desire, I will go to Tarlac to investigate 
the causes of the disorders, in order to find a remedy for them." ^ 

At this stage of events Aguinaldo was summoned to 
Malolos by a telegram from Mabini under date of Decem- 
ber 29, which reads as follows : — 

"Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trfas 
is sick. We can come to no decision in regard to the Tarlac 
matter. Cannot constitute a government without you." ^ 

The measures which were actually taken are set forth in 
another telegram of the same date from the secretaries of 
w^ar and interior to Aguinaldo, which reads as follows : — 

"We have sent civil and military commissioners to Tarlac; 
among them the Director of War and persons of much moral 
influence, in order to stifle the disturbances. The necessary 
instructions have been given them and full powers for the pur- 
pose, and as far as possible to satisfy the people. Have also 
sent there six companies of soldiers with explicit instructions 
to their commander to guard only the towns, and make the 
people return to a peaceful life, using a policy of attraction for 
the purpose." ^ 

Let us hope that the commander was able to attract 
the people with his six companies of soldiers, and make 
them return to a peaceful life. 

Still further light is thrown on the situation in Tarlac 
by the following extract from ''Episodios de la Revolucion 
Filipina" by Padre Joaquin D. Duran, an Augustinian 
priest, Manila, 1901, page 71 : — 

"At that period the Filipinos, loving order, having been de- 
ceived of the emancipation promise, changed by the Katipunan 
into crimes and attacks on the municipality of the pueblos, dis- 

^ Gregorio Aglipay, an Iloeano Catholic priest who became an active 
Insurgent leader. Later he abandoned the Catholic faith and set 
up a new church which gained many adherents in the Philippines. 

2 P. I. R., 849. 3 jf^i^^ 4 ji,id. 


content broke out in all parts, and, although latent in some 
provinces, in that of Tarlac was materialized in an ex-sergeant 
of the late Spanish civil guard. A valorous and determined 
man, he lifted up his flag against that of Aguinaldo. One 
hundred rifles were sufficient to terrorize the inhabitants of said 
province, crushing the enthusiastic members of the revolution- 
ary party. . . . Having taken possession of four to^\Tis, Pe- 
cheche would have been everywhere successful if ambition 
and pride had not directed his footsteps. In January, 1899, 
the Aguinaldista commander of Tarlac province, afraid that 
his whole province would espouse the cause of the sergeant, 
attempted by every means in his power to interrupt his career, 
not hesitating to avail himself of crime to destroy the influence 
of Pecheche with the many people who had been incensed by the 
Katipiinan and had in turn become firm partisans of the Guards 
of Honour. 

"The Ilocano Tranquilino Pagarigan, local presidente at 
that time of Camiling, served as an admirable instrument for 
this purpose. . . . Pecheche was invited to a solemn festivity 
organized by Tranquilino, who pretended to recognize him as 
his chief, and rendering himself a vassal by taking an oath to his 
flag. He accepted the invitation, and after the mass which 
was celebrated went to a meal at the convent, where, after 
the meal was over, the members of the K. K. K. surrounded 
Pecheche and 10 of his officers and killed them with bolos or 
tied them and threw them out of the windows and down the 
staircase. Some priests were held captive in the building where 
this took place and were informed of what had taken place 
immediately afterwards." 

This extract shows how easy it then was for any man 
of determination to acquire a following, especially if 
he could dispose of a few rifles. It also gives an excellent 
idea of the methods employed by the Insurgents in dealing 
with those who opposed their rule. 

General Fred D. Grant once told me, with much amuse- 
ment, of an interesting experience during a fight on 
Mt. Arayat in Pampanga. His men took a trench and 
captured some of its occupants. Several of these were 
impressed as guides and required to show the attacking 
forces the locations of other trenches. At first they 
served unwillingly, but presently became enthusiastic 


and rushed the works of their quondam fellow-soldiers in 
the van of the American attack. Finally they begged 
for guns. Grant added that he could start from Bacolor 
for San Fernando any morning with a supply of rifles 
and pick up volunteers enough to capture the place, and 
that on the return trip he could get enough more to 
attack Bacolor ! 


And now we come to Pangasinan, the most populous 
province of Luzon, and the third in the Philippines in 
number of inhabitants. 

"In July, 1898, the officer in Dagupan wrote to the com- 
manding general of Tarlac Province that he would like to know 
whom he was required to obey, as there were so many officials 
of all ranks who gave him orders that it was impossible for him 
to know where he stood." ^ 

In a letter dated August 17, 1898, to Aguinaldo, Benito 
Legarda complained that a bad impression had been 
produced by the news from Dagupan that when the In- 
surgents entered there, after many outrages committed 
upon the inmates of a girls' school, every officer had 
carried off those who suited him.^ 

What should we say if United States troops entered the 
town of Wellesley and raped numerous students at the 
college, the officers subsequently taking away with them 
the young ladies who happened to suit them ? Yet things 
of this sort hardly caused a ripple in the country then 
under the Insurgent flag, and I learned of this particular 
incident by accident, although I have known Legarda 
for years. 

I quote the following general description of conditions 
in Pangasinan from a letter addressed by Cecilio Apostol 
to General Aguinaldo on July 6, 1898 : — 

"You probably know that in the Province of Pangasindn, 
of one of the towns in which your humble servant is a resident, 

> P. I. R., 1231. 2. 2 Taylor, 62 AJ. 


the Spanish flag through our good fortune has not flown here 
for the past few months, since the few Spaniards who hved here 
have concentrated in Dagupan, a place not diSicult of attack, 
as is said. 

"But this is what is going on in this Province : There exist 
here two Departmental Governments, one calling itself that of 
Northern Luzon and of which Don Vicente del Prado is the 
President, and the other which calls itself that of Northern and 
Central Luzon, presided over by Don Juliano Paraiso. Be- 
sides these two gentlemen, there are two governors in the prov- 
ince ( !) one Civil Political Military, living in Lingayen, named 
Don Felipe J. Bartolome, and another living in Real Guerrero, 
a town of Tayug, named Don Vicente Estrella. And in addi- 
tion there are a large number of Administrators, Inspectors, 
Military Judges, Generals, . . . they cannot be counted. It 
is a pandemonium of which even Christ, who permits it, cannot 
make anything. Indeed, the situation is insupportable. It 
reminds me of the schism in the middle ages when there were 
two Popes, both legitimate, neither true. Things are as clear 
as thick chocolate, as the Spaniards say. In my poor opinion, 
good administration is the mother-in-law of disorder, since dis- 
order is chaos and chaos produces nothing but confusion, that 
is to say, death. 

" I have had an opportunity, through the kindness of a friend, 
to read the decree of that Government, dated June 18th, of 
the present year, and the accompanying 'Instructions for the 
government of towns and provinces.' Article 9 of the said 
decree says that the Superior Government will name a com- 
missioner for each province with the special duty of establish- 
ing there the organization set forth in the decree. Very well 
so far: which of the so-called Presidents of Northern or of 
Northern and Central Luzon is the commissioner appointed by 
that government to establish the new organization in that prov- 
ince? Are military commanders named by you for Pangasi- 
nan? I would be very much surprised if either of them could 
show his credentials. Aside from these, the fact remains that 
in those instructions no mention is made of Presidents of Depart- 
ments, there is a manifest contradiction in their jurisdictions, 
since while one calls himself president of a Departmental Gov- 
ernment, of Northern Luzon, the other governs the Northern 
and Central portion of the Island, according to the seals which 
they use. 

"And, nevertheless, a person calling himself the General 
Administrator of the Treasury and the said Governor of the 


Province, both of whom live in Tayug, came to this town when 
the Spaniards voluntarily abandoned it and gathered all the 
people of means, and drew up an act of election, a copy of which 
is attached. From it you will see how this organization violates 
the provisions of the decree of the 18th of June. 

"Another item : They got up a contract with the people of 
means of this to^\^l, and did the same thing in the other to\^^ls, 
in which contract they exact from us $1250 which they call 
contributions of war (see document No. 2 attached). Among 
the doubtful powers of these gentlemen is the one to exact 
these sums included? Have they express orders from that 
Government ? 

"Perhaps these blessed gentlemen — they are high flyers 
there is no doubt about that, — have struck the clever idea of 
calling themselves generals, governors, etc., in order to enjoy a 
certain prestige and to give a certain color of legality to their 
acts — this, although they don't know an iota of what they are 
doing. But what I am sure of, and many other men also, is 
that there is no order, that here there is not a single person in 
authority whom to obey. This superfluity of rulers will finally 
lead to strained relations between them and the towns of this 
province will end by paying the piper. 

"But we poor ignorant creatures in so far as the republican 
form of government is concerned, in order to avoid worse evils 
took them at their word, obeyed them like automatons, hyp- 
notized by the title of ' Insurgents ' which they applied to them- 
selves. But when I had an opportunity to read the said decree, 
doubts were forced upon me, I began to suspect — may God 
and they pardon me — that they were trying to impose upon us 
nicely, that, shielded by the motto, 'have faith in and submit 
to the will of the country' they came to these towns 'for busi- 

"In order to dissipate this doubt, in order to do away with 
abuses, if there are abuses, I made up my mind to send you 
this account of the condition of things here. I flatter myself 
that when you learn of the lamentable situation of this province, 
you will soon deign to take steps to establish order, because 
thereon depends the tranquillity of Pangasinan and in the end a 
strict compliance with your superior orders. 

"There will be no limit to the thanks of the people of this 
province if their petitions secure favourable consideration and 
an immediate response from the high patriotism and honourable 
standpoint of the Supreme Dictator of the Philippines." * 

1 P. I. R., 77. 


It will be noted that the picture thus dra\\Ti by Senor 
Apostol differs in certain unportant particulars from that 
painted in such engaging colours by Judge Blount. 

In September, 1898, the civil governor of Pangasinan 
had to have an escort of troops in passing through his 

On November 20, 1898, the head of the town of San 
JManuel wrote the provincial governor that his people 
could no longer support the troops quartered on them, 
as the adherents of the Katipuan had burned or stolen 
all of their property.- 

The sum total of Blount's description of affairs in 
this, the most populous province of Luzon, is derived 
from the narrative of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and 
reads as follows : — 

"In Pangasinan 'the people were all very respectful and 
polite and offered the hospitality of their homes.' " ^ 

Doubtless true, but as a summary of conditions per- 
haps a trifle sketchy. 

Nueva Ecija 

Nueva Ecija was the next pro^dnce visited by Wilcox 
and Sargent. They have failed to inform us that : — 

"In December, 1899, certain men charged with being mem- 
bers of this society [Guards of Honour] were interrogated in 
Nueva Ecija as to their purposes. One of those questioned 
said : — 

'"That their purpose was one day, the date being unkno^Mi 
to the deponent, when the Ilocanos of Batac came, to rise up in 
arms and kill the Tagdlos, both private mdividuals and public 
employees, excepting those who agreed to the former, for the 
reason that honours were granted only to the Tagdlos, and but 
few to the Ilocanos.'" * 

Blount has assured us that the Filipinos were a unit at 
Agmnaldo's back and were and are an united people, and 

1 P. I. R.. 47. 7. 2 jbid^^ 951. 3. 

3 Blount, p. 109. ^ P. I. R., 1006. 


















here are the Ilocanos of Nueva Ecija spoiHng his theory 
by remembering that they are Ilocanos and proposing to 
kill whom ? Not certain individual Filipinos, who might 
have offended them, but the Tagdlogs ! 

That there were other troubles in Nueva Ecija is 
shown by the following statement : — 

"On January 7, 1899, the commissioner of Aguinaldo's 
treasury sent to collect contributions of war in Nueva Ecija 
Province reported that the company stationed in San Isidro 
had become guerillas under command of its officers and op- 
posed his collections, stating that they were acting in compliance 
with orders from higher authority." ^ 

And now, in following the route taken by our tourist 
friends, we reach Nueva Vizcaj^a and the Cagayan valley. 

» P. I. R., 870. 4. 


Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley 

NuEVA VizcAYA is drained by the Magat River, a branch 
of the Cagayan. While the provinces of Isabela and 
Cagayan constitute the Cagayan valley proper, Blount 
includes Nueva Vizcaya in the territory covered by this 
designation, and for the purpose of this discussion I 
will follow his example. 

Especial interest attaches to the history of Insurgent 
rule, in the Cagayan valley, as above defined, for the 
reason that Blount himself served there as a judge of the 
court of first instance. He says : ^ — 

"The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history of that 
Cagayan valley as almost any other American." 

He was. For his action in concealing the horrible 
conditions which arose there under Insurgent rule, 
with which he was perfectly familiar, and in foisting on 
the public the account of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent, 
as portraying the conditions which actually existed 
there, I propose to arraign him before the bar of public 
opinion. In so doing I shall consider these conditions 
at some length. We have much documentary evidence 
concerning them in addition to that furnished by the 
Insurgent records, although the latter quite sufficiently 
demonstrate many of the more essential facts. 

In describing the adventures of Messrs. Wilcox and 
Sargent in this region, Judge Blount says : ^ — 

"There ^ they were met by Simeon Villa, military commander 
of Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to Aguinaldo 

* Blount, p. 113. 2 jbid., p. 111. 3 At Carig, Isabela. 



afterwards, and was captured by General Funston along with 
Aguinaldo in the spring of 1901." 

The facts as to Villa's career in the Cagayan valley 
are especially worthy of note as they seem to have entitled 
him, in the opinion of his superiors, to the promotion 
which was afterward accorded him. He was an intimate 
friend of Aguinaldo and later accompanied him on his 
long flight through northern Luzon. 

On August 10, 1898, Colonel Daniel Tirona, a native 
of Cavite Province and one of the intimates of Aguinaldo, 
was ordered to proceed to Aparri in the Insurgent steamer 
Filipinas and establish the revolutionary government 
in northern Luzon. In doing this he was to hold elec- 
tions for office-holders under Aguinaldo's government 
and was authorized to approve or disapprove the results, 
his action being subject to subsequent revision by 
Aguinaldo. His forces were composed of four companies 
armed with rifles. 

Tirona reached Aparri on August 25 and promptly 
secured the surrender of the Spaniards there. 

He w^as accompanied by Simeon Villa, the man under 
discussion, and by Colonel Leyba, who was also very 
close to Aguinaldo. 

Abuse of the Spanish prisoners began at once. It is 
claimed that the governor of North Ilocos, who was 
among those captured, was grossly mistreated. 

Taylor briefly summarizes subsequent events as 
follows : ^ — 

"Whatever the treatment of the Spanish governor of Ilocos 
may really have been, there is testimony to show that some of 
the other prisoners, especially the priests, were abused and out- 
raged under the direction of S. Villa and Colonel Leyba, both 
of whom were very close to Aguinaldo. Some of the Spanish 
civil officials were put in stocks and beaten, and one of the 
officers who had surrendered at Aparri was tortured to death. 
This was done with the purpose of extorting money from them, 

1 Taylor, 42 AJ. 


for it was believed that they had hidden funds in place of turn- 
ing them over. All the Spaniards were immediately stripped 
of everything they had. The priests were subjected to a system- 
atic series of insults and abuse under the direction of Villa 
in order to destroy their influence over the people by degrad- 
ing them in their eyes. It was for this that they were beaten 
and exposed naked in the sun ; and other torture, such as 
pouring the wax of burning candles into their eyes, was used 
to make them disclose where they had hidden church vessels 
and church funds. The testimony of a friar who suffered 
these outrages is that the great mass of the people saw such 
treatment of their parish priests with horror, and were present 
at it only through fear of the organized force of the Katipunan." 

Taylor's statement is mildness itself in view of the well- 
established facts. 

The question of killing the Spanish prisoners, including 
the friars, had previously been seriously considered,^ but 
it was deemed wiser to keep most of the friars alive, 
extort money from them by torture, and offer to liberate 
them in return for a large cash indemnity, or for political 
concessions. Day after day and week after week Villa 
presided at, or himself conducted, the torture of ill-fated 
priests and other Spaniards who fell into his hands. 
Even Filipinos whom he suspected of knowing the where- 
abouts of hidden friar money did not escape. 

The following information relative to the conduct of 
the Insurgents in the Cagayan valley is chiefly taken from 
a manuscript copy of "Historia de la Conquista de 
Cagayan por los Tagalos Revolucionarios,^' in which the 
narratives of certain captured friars are transcribed 
and compiled by Father Julian Malumbres of the 
Dominican Order. 

The formal surrender of Aparri occurred on August 
26. Tirona, his officers and his soldiers, promptly 
pillaged the convento.^ The officers left the Bishop of 
Vigan ten pesos, but the soldiers subsequently took them 
away from him. Wardrobes and trunks were broken 

* See p. 731. ^ The parsonage, or residence of the priest. 


open ; clocks, shoes, money, everything was carried off. 
Even personal papers and prayer-books were taken from 
some of the priests, many of whom were left with ab- 
solutely nothing save the few remaining clothes in which 
they stood. 

On the same day Villa, accompanied by Victa and 
Rafael Perea,^ went to the convento and told the priests 
who were imprisoned there that their last hour had come. 
He shut all of them except the bishop and five priests in 
a room near the church, then separated the Augustinians, 
Juan Zallo, Gabino Olaso, Fidel Franco, Mariano Rod- 
riguez, and Clemente Hidalgo, from the others and took 
them into the lower part of the convento where he told 
them that he intended to kill them if they did not give 
him more money. The priests told him that they had 
given all they had, whereupon he had their arms tied 
behind their backs, kicked them, struck them and 
whipped them with rattans. 

Father Zallo was thrown on his face and savagely 
beaten. Meanwhile two shots were fired over the heads of 
the others and a soldier called out ''One has fallen," 
badly frightening the priests who had remained shut in 
the room. Villa then returned with soldiers to this room, 
ordered his men to load, and directed that one priest step 
forward to be shot. Father Mariano Ortiz complied 
■wdth this request, asking that he be the first victim. 
Villa, however, contented himself with threatening him 
with a revolver and kicking and striking him until he fell 
to the floor. He was then beaten with the butts of guns. 

Fa^-her Jose Vazquez, an old man of sixty years, who 
had thrown some money into a privy to keep it from faUing 
into the hands of the Insurgents, was stripped and com- 
pelled to recover it with his bare hands, after which he 
was kicked, and beaten with rattans. 

Father Aquilino Garcia was unmercifully kicked and 
beaten to make him give up money, and this sort of 

1 Insurgent officers. 


thing continued until Villa, tired out with the physical 
exertion involved in assaulting these defenceless men, 
departed, leaving his uncompleted task to others, who 
continued it for some time. 

The net result to the Insurgents of the sacking of the 
convento and of the tortures thus inflicted was approxi- 
mately $20,000 gold in addition to the silver, bank notes, 
letters of credit, jewels, etc., which they obtained. 

On September 5 Villa had Fathers Juan Recio and 
Buenaventura Macia given fifty blows each, although 
Father Juan was ill. 

Villa then went to Lalloc, where other priests were im- 
prisoned. On September 6 he demanded money of them, 
causing them to be kicked and beaten. Father Angel 
was beaten in an especially cruel manner for the appar- 
ent purpose of killing him, after which he was thrust 
into a privy. Father Isidro Fernandez was also fearfully 
abused. Stripped of his habit, and stretched face down on 
the floor, he was horribly beaten, and was then kicked, 
and struck with the butt of a revolver on the forehead. 

A little later the priests were offered their liberty for 
a million dollars, which they were of course unable to 
furnish. Meanwhile the torture continued from time 
to time. 

On August 30 Tuguegarao was taken by the Insurgents 
without resistance. Colonel Leyba promptly proceeded 
to the convento and demanded the money of the friars 
as spoil of war. He found only eight hundred pesos in 
the safe. Father Corujedo was threatened with death 
if he did not give more. Other priests were threatened 
but not tortured at this time. The prisoners in the jail 
were liberated, but many of them had promptly to be put 
back again because of the disorder which resulted, and 
that same evening Leyba was obliged to publish a notice 
threatening robbers with death. 

At midnight on September 3 Father Corujedo was 
taken from the convento by Captain Diego and was again 


asked for money. Replying that he had no more to give, 
he was beaten with the hilt of a sabre and stripped of 
his habit, preparatory to being executed. A mock sen- 
tence of death was pronounced on him and he was placed 
facing to the west to be shot in the back. Diego ordered 
his soldiers to load, adding, "When I count three all fire," 
but the fatal count was not completed. Three priests 
from Alcala were given similar treatment. 

The troubles of the priests imprisoned at Tuguegarao 
were sufficiently great, but they were augmented a 
thousand fold when Villa arrived on September 11. 
He came to the building where they were imprisoned, 
bearing a revolver, a sabre and a great quantity of rattans. 
He ordered the priests into the corner of the room in which 
they were confined, and beat those who did not move 
quickly enough to suit him. He threatened them with a 
very rigorous examination, at the same time assuring them 
that at Aparri he had hung up the bishop until blood flowed 
from his mouth and his ears, and that he would do the same 
with them if they did not tell him where they had their 
money hidden. There followed the usual rain of kicks and 
blows, a number of the priests being obliged to take off 
their habits in order that they might be punished more 

Fathers Calixto Prieto and Daniel Gonzales, professors 
in educational institutions, he ordered beaten because they 
were friars. 

Fathers Corujedo and Caddedila were beaten, kicked 
and insulted. Both were gray-haired old men and the 
latter was at the time very weak, and suffering from a 
severe attack of asthma. Father Pedro Vincente was 
also brutally beaten. 

The following is the description given by an eye-witness 
of conditions at Tuguegarao : — 

"Even the Indies of Cagayan complained and were the 
victims of looting and robbery on the part of the soldiery. So 
lacking in discipline and so demoralized was that army that 


according to the confession of a prominent Filipino it was of 
imperative necessity to disarm them.^ On the other hand we 
saw with real astonishment that instead of warlike soldiers 
accustomed to battle they were nearly all raw recruits and 
apprentices. From an army lacking in discipline, and lawless, 
only outrages, looting and all sorts of savagery and injustice 
were to be expected. Witnesses to their demoralization are, 
aside from the natives themselves who were the first to acknowl- 
edge it, the Chinese merchants whose losses were incalculable ; 
not a single store or commercial establishment remained that 
was not looted repeatedly. As to the Spaniards it goes with- 
out saying because it is publicly known, that between soldiers 
and officers they despoiled them to their heart's content, with- 
out any right except that of brute force, of everything that 
struck their fancy, and it was of no avail to complain to the 
officers and ask for justice, as they turned a deaf ear to such 
complaints. At Tuguegarao they looted in a manner never 
seen before, like Vandals, and it was not without reason that 
a prominent Filipino said, in speaking to a priest: 'Vandalism 
has taken possession of the place.' These acts of robbery were 
generally accompanied by the most savage insults ; it was 
anarchy, as we heard an eye-witness affirm, who also stated 
that no law was recognized except that of danger, and the 
vanquished were granted nothing but the inevitable duty of 
bowing with resignation to the iniquitous demands of that 
soulless rabble, skilled in crime." 

Villa now set forth for Isabela. Meanwhile the jailer 
of the priests proceeded to steal their clothes, including 
shirts, shoes and even handkerchiefs. Isabela was taken 
without resistance on September 12. Dimas Guzman ^ 
swore to the priests on his life that he would work without 
rest to the end that all friars and all Spaniards might 
be respected, but he perjured himself. 

On September 12 Villa and others entered the town of 
Cabagan Viejo, where Villa promptly assaulted Father 
Segundo Rodriguez, threatening him with a revolver, 
beating him unmercifully, insulting him in every possible 
way and robbing him of his last cent. After the bloody 

1 Their own commander so reported. See p. 202. 
- Shortly afterward "elected" governor. 

FiLiPiXA Trained Nurses. 

This photograph shows the menib -rs of the first class to graduate from the 

government traiiiinn school. 


scene was over he sacked the convento, even taking away 
the priests' clothes. 

Villa also cruelly beat a Filipino, Quintin Agansi, who 
was taking care of money for masses which the priests 
wished to save from the Insurgents. 

After Father Segundo had suffered torture and abuse 
for two hours he was obliged to start at once on a journey 
to Auitan. The suffering priest, after being compelled 
to march through the street shouting ''Vivas!" for the 
Republic and Aguinaldo, spent the night without a 
mouthful of food or a drink of water. 

Father Deogracias Garcia, a priest of Cabagan Nuevo, 
was subjected to torture because he had sent to Hongkong 
during May a letter of credit for $5000 which belonged to 
the Church. Villa and Leyba entered his convento and 
after beating him ordered his hands and feet to be tied 
together, then passed a pole between them and had him 
lifted from the ground, after which two great jars of 
water were poured down his nose and throat without 
interruption.^ In order to make the water flow through 
his nose better, they thrust a piece of wood into the nasal 
passages until it came out in his throat. From time to 
time the torture was suspended while they asked him 
whether he would tell the truth as to where he had con- 
cealed his money. This unfortunate priest was so sure 
he was going to die that while the torture was in progress 
he received absolution from a fellow priest. After the 
torture with water there followed a long and cruel beating, 
and the unhappy victim was finally thrust into a filthy 

' Meanwhile Father Calzada was assaulted by a group of 
soldiers and badly beaten, after which he was let down 
into the filth of a privy, first by the feet and afterwards 
by the head. 

On the 14th a lieutenant with soldiers entered the 

1 This form of torture is commonly referred to in the Philippines 
as the "water cure." 

VOL. I — N 


convento of Tumauini and as usual demanded money 
of the occupants, who gave him $80, all they had at the 
time. This quantity not being satisfactory, a rope was 
sent for and the hands of the two priests were tied while 
they were whipped, kicked and beaten. They were, 
however, released when Father Bonet promised to get 
additional money. They had a short respite until the 
arrival of Villa, who still demanded more money of 
Father Blanco, and failing to get it for the reason that the 
father had no more, leaped upon him and gave him a 
dreadful beating, his companions joining in with whips, 
rattans and the butts of guns. They at last left their 
victim stretched on the ground almost dead. This 
priest showed the marks of his ill treatment six months 
afterward. Not satisfied with this, Villa gave him the 
so-called ''water cure." 

Meanwhile his followers had also beaten Father Bonet. 
Villa started to do likewise but was too tired, having 
exhausted his energies on Father Blanco. While the 
tortures were going on, the convento was completely 
sacked. Father Blanco's library was thrown out of the 

Villa entered Ilagan on the 15th of September at 8 
o'clock at night. Hastening to the convento, with a com- 
pany of well-armed soldiers, he had his men surround 
the three priests who awaited him there, then summoned 
the local priest to a separate room and demanded money. 
The priest gave him all he had. Not satisfied, Villa 
leaped upon him, kicking him, beating him and pounding 
him with the butt of a gun. Many of his associates 
joined in the disgraceful attack. The unfortunate victim 
was then stripped of his habit, obliged to he down and 
received more than a hundred lashes. When he was 
nearly senseless he was subjected to torture by water, 
being repeatedly lifted up when filled with water, and 
allowed to fall on the floor. Wliile some were pouring 
water down his nose and throat, others spilled hot wax 


on his face and head. The torment repeatedly rendered 
the priest senseless, but he was allowed to recover 
from time to time so that he might suffer when it was 

The torturing of this unhappy man lasted for three 
hours, and the horrible scene was immediately succeeded 
by another quite as bad. Villa called Father Domingo 
Campo and, after taking from him the little money that 
he had, ordered him stripped. He was then given 
numberless kicks and blows from the butts of rifles and 
150 lashes, after which he was unable to rise. There 
followed the torture with water, on the pretext that he 
had money hidden away. 

Meanwhile the houses of Spaniards and the shops of 
the Chinese were completely sacked, and the men who 
objected were knocked down or cut down with bolos. 
Numerous girls and women were raped. 

On September 15 Leyba received notice of the surrender 
of Nueva Vizcaya. I quote the following from the 
narrative above referred to : — 

"Dolfin's soldiers 1 were the most depraved ever seen: their 
thieving instincts had no bounds ; so they had hardly entered 
Nueva Vizcaya when they started to give themselves up furi- 
ously to robbery, looking upon all things as loot ; in the very 
shadow of these soldiers the province was invaded by a mob of 
adventurous and ragged persons from Nueva Ecija; between 
the two they picked Nueva Vizcaya clean. When they had 
grown tired of completely shearing the unfortunate Vizcayan 
people, leaving them poverty-stricken, they flew in small bands 
to the pueblos of Isabela, going as far as Angadanan, giving 
themselves up to unbridled pillage of the most unjust and dis- 
orderly kind. Some of these highwaymen demanded money 
and arms from the priest of Angadanan, but Father Marciano 
informed them 'that it could not be, as Leyba already knew 
what he had and would be angry.' 

"To this very day the people of Nueva Vizcaya have been 
unable to recover from the stupendous losses suffered by them 

1 Major Delfin commanded the expedition which took Nueva 


as regards their wealth and industries. How many curses did 
they pour forth and still continue to level against the Katipiinan 
that brought them naught but tribulations !" 

Confirmation of these statements is found in the fol- 
lowing brief but significant passage from the Insurgent 
records : — 

"At the end of December, 1898, when the military com- 
mander of Nueva Vizcaya called upon the Governor of that 
province to order the police of the towns to report to him as 
volunteers to be incorporated in the army which was being 
prepared for the defence of the country, the Governor protested 
against it and informed the government that his attempt to 
obtain volunteers was in fact only a means of disarming the 
towns and leaving them without protection against the soldiers 
who did what they wanted and took what they wished and 
committed every outrage mthout being pmiished for it by their 
ofiicers." ^ 

The effect of the surrender of Nueva Vizcaya on Leyba 
and Villa is thus described by Father Malumbres : — 

"Mad with joy and swollen with pride Leyba and company 
were like men who travelled flower-strewn paths, crowned with 
laurels, and were acclaimed as victors in all the towns on their 
road, their intoxication of joy taking a sudden rise when they 
came to believe themselves kings of the valley. It was then 
that their delirium reached its brimful measure and their 
treatment of those whom they had vanquished began to be 
daily more cruel and inhuman. In Cagayan their fear of the 
forces in Nueva Vizcaya kept them from showing such unquali- 
fiable excesses of cruelty and nameless barbarities, but the tri- 
umph of the Katipiinan arms in Nueva Vizcaya completely 
broke down the wall of restraint which somewhat repressed 
those sanguinary executioners thirsting to fatten untrammelled 
on the innocent blood of unarmed and defenceless men. From 
that melancholy time there began an era of unheard of out- 
rages and barbarous scenes, unbelievable were they not proved 
by evidence of every description. The savage acts committed 
in Isabela by the inhuman Leyba and Villa cannot possibly 
be painted true to life and in all their tragic details. The 
blackest hues, the most heartrending accents, the most vigor- 
ous language and the most fulminating anathemas would be 

1 P. I. R., 246. 3. 


a pale image of the truth, and our pen cannot express with true 
ardour the terrifying scenes and cruel torments brought about 
by such fierce chieftains on such indefensive religious. It 
seems impossible that a fleshly heart could hold so much wicked- 
ness, for these petty chiefs were veritable monsters of cruelty 
who surpassed a Nero ; men who were entire strangers to noble 
and humane sentiments and who in appearance having the 
figure of a man were in reality tigers roaring in desperation, or 
mad dogs who gnashed their teeth in fury." 

On September 18 Leyba continued his march, while 
Villa remained behind at Ilagan to torture the prisoners 
who might be brought in from Isabela. 

On arrival at Gamut, Leyba at once entered the con- 
vento and as usual immediately demanded money from 
the priests. Father Venancio gave him all he had. He 
was nevertheless given a frightful whipping, six persons 
holding him while others rained blows upon him. A de- 
termined effort was made to force the priest to recant, 
and when this failed Leyba leaped upon him, kicking 
and beating him. He then ordered him thrown down 
face uppermost, and asked for a knife v\^ith the apparent 
intention of mutilating him. He did not use the knife, 
however, but instead, assisted by his followers, gave the 
unhappy priest another terrific beating, even standing 
upon him and leaping up and down. The priest was left 
unable to speak, and did not recover for months. 

Later Leyba had torture by water applied to Father 
Gregorio Cabrero and lay brother Venancio Aguinaco, 
while Father Sabanda was savagely beaten. 

On the 19th of September Father Miguel Garcia of 
Reina Mercedes was horribly beaten in his convento 
by a captain sent there to get what money he had. 

In Cauayan, on September 20, Fathers Perez and 
Aguirrezabal were beaten and compelled to give up 
money by five emissaries of Leyba, and the latter priest 
was cut in the face with a sabre. The convento was 
sacked. On the 25th Leyba arrived and after kicking 
and beating Father Garcia compelled him to give up 


$1700. He then informed the priests that if it were not 
for Aguinaldo's orders he would kill all the Spaniards. 

On the afternoon of the 24th three priests and a Spaniard 
named Soto arrived at Ilagan. The following is the state- 
ment of an eye-witness as to what happened : — 

"They led the priests to the headquarters of the command- 
ing officer where the tyrant Villa, always eager to inflict suffer- 
ing on humanity, awaited them. The scene witnessed by the 
priests obeisant to the cruel judge was horrifying in the ex- 
treme. Four lions whose thirst for vengeance was extreme in 
all, threw themselves, blind with fury, without a word and with 
the look of a basilisk, upon poor Senor Soto giving him such 
innumerable and furious blows on head and face that weary 
as he was from his past journey, the ill-treatment received at 
Angadanan and weighted down by years, he was soon thrown 
down by his executioners under the lintel of the door getting 
a terrible blow on the head as he fell ; even this did not satisfy 
nor tame down those fierce-hearted men, who on the contrary 
continued with their infamous work more furious than before, 
and their cruelty did not flag on seeing their victim at their 
feet. They could have done no v/orse had they been Silipan 
savages dancing in triumph around the palpitating head cut 
from the body of some enemy. 

"The priests who witnessed this blood-curdling scene trem- 
bled like the weak reed before the gale, waiting their turn to 
be tortured, but God willed that cruel Villa should be content 
with the butchery perpetrated upon unhappy Sr. Soto. Villa 
dismissed the priests after despoiling them of their bags and 
clothes telling them, to torment them : ' Go to the convento 
until the missing ones turn up so that I may shoot you all 


Leyba entered Echague on September 22, promptly 
going to the convento as usual and demanding money of 
the priest, Father Mata. When the latter had given him 
all he had, he received three terrific beatings at the hands 
of some twelve men armed with whips and sticks, after 
which Leyba himself struck him with his fist and his 
sabre. He was finally knocked down by a blow with 
the sabre and left disabled. It took six months for him 
to recover. 


Shortly after Leyba's arrival in Nueva Vizcaya on the 
afternoon of the 25th, five priests were summoned to 
Solano and there abused in the usual fashion in an effort 
to extort money from them. Only one escaped ill 
treatment and one was nearly killed. 

Leyba now went to Bayombong to carry out the es- 
tablished programme with the priests. There he found 
Governor Perez of Isabela, who had taken with him cer- 
tain government moneys and employed them to pay sal- 
aries of soldiers and other employees. He insisted on the 
return of the total amount and threatened to shoot Perez 
if it was not forthcoming. The Spaniards of the vicinity 
subscribed $700 which they themselves badlj^ needed and 
saved him from being shot. The priests of the place were 
then summoned to Leyba's quarters and were beaten 
and tortured. One of them was thrown on the floor and 
beaten nearly to death, Leyba standing meanwhile with 
his foot on the unfortunate man's neck. Another was 
given six hundred lashes and countless blows and kicks. 
Leyba stood on this man's neck also. When the victim's 
back ceased to have any feeling, his legs were beaten. 
Leyba terminated this period of diversion by kicking 
Father Diez in the solar plexus and then mocking him 
as he lay gasping on the floor. That afternoon one of 
the priests, so badly injured that he could not rise un- 
aided, was put on a horse and compelled to ride in the 
hot sun to Solano. 

Villa and Leyba had their able imitators, as is shown 
by the following description of the torturing of Father 
Ceferino by Major Delfin at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, on 
September 27 : — 

"They wished to give brave evidence of their hate for the 
friar before Leyba left, and show him that they were as brave 
as he when it came to oppressing and torturing the friar. This 
tragedy began by Jimenez again asking Father Ceferino for 
the money. The priest answered as he had done before. 
Then Jimenez started to talk in Tagalog to the commanding 


officer and surely it was nothing good that he told him, for 
suddenly Delfin left the bench and darting fire from his eyes, 
fell in blind fury upon the defenceless priest ; what harsh words 
he uttered in Tagalog while he vented his fury on his victim, 
striking him with his clenched fist, slapping him and kicking 
him, I do not know, but the religious man fell at the feet of his 
furious executioner who, being now the prey of the most stu- 
pendous rage, could scarcely get his tongue to stutter and 
continued to kick the priest, without seeing where he kicked 
him. Getting deeper and deeper in the abyss and perhaps not 
knowing what he was about, this petty chief made straight for 
a sabre lying on a table to continue his bloody work. In the 
meantime the priest had risen to his feet and awaited with resig- 
nation new torments which certainly were even worse than the 
first, for he gave him so many and such hard blows with the 
sabre that the blade was broken close to the hilt. This acci- 
dent so infuriated Delfin that he again threw himself upon the 
priest, kicking him furiously and striking him repeatedly until 
he again threw him to the ground, and not yet satisfied, his 
vengefulness led him to throw himself upon his victim with 
the fury of a tiger after his prey, beating him on the head with 
the hilt of the saber until the blood ran in streams and formed 
pools upon the pavement. The priest, more dead than alive, 
shuddered from head to foot, and appeared to be struggling in 
a tremendous fight between life and death ; he had hardly 
enough strength to get his tongue to ask for God's mercy. At 
this most critical juncture, and when it seemed as if death were 
inevitable, the martyr received absolution from Father Diez, 
who witnessed the blood-curdling picture with his heart pierced 
with grief at the sight of the sufferings of his innocent brother, 
feeling as must the condemned man preparing for death who 
sees the hours fly by with vertiginous rapidity. The blood 
flowing from the wounds on the priest's head appeared to in- 
furiate and blind the heart of Delfin who, rising from his vic- 
tim's body, sped away to the armory in the court house, seized 
a rifle, and came back furious to brain him with the butt and 
finish killing the priest ; but God willed to free his servant from 
death at the hands of those cannibals, so that generous Lieu- 
tenant Navarro interfered, took the rifle away from him and 
caught Delfin by the arm, threatening him with some words 
spoken in Tagalog. Then Navarro, to appease Delfin's anger, 
turned the priest over with his face to the ground and gave him 
a few strokes with the bamboo, and feigning anger and indigna- 
tion, ordered him away. 


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"Those who witnessed the horrible tragedy, the brutality 
of the tjTant and the prostration of the friar were persuaded 
that the latter would never survive his martyrdom. The reli- 
gious man himself holds it as a veritable portent that he out- 
lived such a terrible trial ; but even this did not satisfy them as 
subsequently the Secretary again called Father Ceferino to 
subject him to a further scrutiny, as ridiculous as it was mali- 
cious, though it did not go beyond words or insults." 

Senor Perez, the governor of Isabela, and Father 
Diez were compelled to go to Ilagan. After they had 
arrived there on October 2d, Villa proceeded to torture 
them. At the outset ten soldiers, undoubtedly instructed 
beforehand, beat the governor down to the earth, with 
the butts of their guns. Villa himself struck him three 
times in the chest with the butt of a gun and Father Diez 
gave him absolution, thinking he was dying. Father 
Diez w^as then knocked down repeatedly with the butts 
of guns, being made to stand up promptly each time in 
order that he might be knocked down again. Not 
satisfied with this. Villa compelled the suffering priest to 
kneel before him and kicked him in the nose, repeating 
the operation until he left him stretched on the floor 
half-senseless with his nose broken. He next had both 
victims put in stocks with their weight supported by 
their feet alone. While in this position soldiers beat 
them and jumped onto them and one set the governor's 
beard on fire with matches. Father Diez was kept in 
the stocks four days. He was then sent to Tuguegarao 
in order that personal enemies there might take vengeance 
on him, Villa bidding him good-by with the following 
words: ''Go now to Tuguegarao and see if they will 
finish killing you there." Sefior Perez was kept in the 
stocks eight days and it is a wonder that he did not die. 

Upon the 25th of September Villa w^ent to the convento 
in Ilagan prepared to torture the priests, but he succeeded 
in compelling a number of them to sign indorsements 
in his favour on various letters of credit payable by the 
Tabacalera Company and departed again in fairly good 


humour, having done nothing worse than strike one of 

Later, however, on the pretext that Fathers Aguado 
and Labanda had money hidden away, he determined 
to torture them with water. The first to be tortured was 
Father Labanda. Villa had him taken to the prison 
where the priest found his two faithful Filipino servants 
who had been beaten cruelly and were then hanging from 
a beam, this having been done in order to make them tell 
where his money was. 

He was tied after the usual fashion and water poured 
down his nose and throat. During the brief respites 
necessary in order to prevent his dying outright he was 
cruelly beaten. They finally dragged him out of the 
prison by the feet, his head leaving a bloody trail on the 
stones. After he had been taken back to his companions, 
one of the men who had tortured him came to beg his 
pardon, saying that he had been compelled to do it by 

Father Aguado was next tortured in one of the rooms 
of the convento. Villa finished the day's work by an- 
nouncing to the band of priests that he would have them 
all shot the next day on the plaza, and ordering them to 
get ready. 

On the 29th the barbarities practised by this inhuman 
fiend reached their climax in the torturing to death of 
Lieutenant Piera. The following description gives some 
faint idea of one of the most diabolical crimes ever com- 
mitted in the Philippines : — 

"Villa's cruelty and sanguinary jeering grew without let 
or hindrance from day to day ; it seemed that this hyena con- 
tinually cudgelled his brains to invent new kinds of torture and 
to jeer at the friars. On the night of the 29th of September 
the diabolical idea occurred to him of giving the coup de grace 
to the prestige of the friars by making them pass through the 
streets of Ilagan conducting and playing a band of music. 
He carried out his nonsensical purpose by calling upon Father 
Diogracias to play the big drum, and when this priest had 


started playing Villa learned that Father Primo was a musician 
and could therefore play the drum and lead the band with all 
skill, so he called upon Father Primo to come forward, and with 
one thing and another this ridiculous function was carried on 
until the late hours of the night. 

"While these two priests were serenading Villa and his 
gang, the most dreadful shrieks were heard from the jail, 
accompanied by pitiful cries that would melt the coldest heart. 
The priests hearing these echoes of sorrow and pain, and who did 
not know for what purpose Fathers Deogracias and Primo had 
been separated from them, seemed to recognize the voices of 
these two priests among the groans, believing them to be cruelly 
tortured ; for this reason they began to say the rosary in order 
that the Most Holy Virgin might imbue them with patience 
and fortitude in their martyrdom. Great was their surprise 
when these priests returned saving that they had contented 
themselves with merely making fun of them by obliging them 
to play the big drum and lead the band. 

"Although this somewhat tempered their sorrow, a thorn 
remained in their hearts, fearing that the moving lamentations 
and the mortal groans came from the lips of some hapless 
Spaniard. This fatidical presentiment turned out unfortu- 
nately to be a fact. The victim sacrificed that melancholy 
night, still remembered with a shudder by the priests, was 
Lieutenant Salvador Piera. This brave soldier, who had made 
up his mind to die in the breach rather than surrender the town 
of Aparri, was persuaded to capitulate only by the prayers 
and tears of certain Spanish laclies who had been instructed 
to do so by a man who should have been the first one to shoulder 
a rifle. After having been harassed in Aparri he was taken 
to Tuguegarao at the request of Esteban Quinta or Isidoro 
Maquigat, two artful filibusters thirsting to revenge themselves 
on the Lieutenant, who during the time of the Spanish govern- 
ment had justly laid his heavy hand upon them. In the latter 
part of September they conducted him on foot and without 
any consideration whatever to the capital of Isabela. In this 
town he was at once placed in solitary confinement in one of 
the rooms of the convento and allowed no intercourse with 
any one. The sin for v/hich they recriminated Piera was 
his having charged Dimas^ with being a filibuster, and their 
revengefulness reached an incredible limit. The heartrend- 

1 Dimas Guzman. 


ing moans of this martyr to his duty still resound in that con- 
venlo converted into the scene of an orgy of blood. The un- 
fortunate man was heard to shout : 'For God's sake, for God's 
sake, have pity,' and trustworthy persons tell that under the 
strain of torture he would challenge them to fight in a fair field 
by saying : ' I will fight alone against twenty of you ; ' but the 
cowardly torturers, a reproach to the Filipino race, looked upon 
it as an amusement to glut their spite on a defenceless man 
whose hands were tied. They had him strung up all night with 
but insignificant refreshment and rest, sometimes being sus- 
pended by his arms which finally became disjointed and use- 
less, and at others he was hung up by his feet, the blood rush- 
ing to his head and placing him in imminent danger of sudden 
death. It was the intention of these brutes to torture him as 
much as possible before killing him, just as a member of the 
feline race plays with, tosses in the air and pirouettes around 
the victim which falls into his claws. If to the torture of the 
rope are added the blows with cudgels and the butts of rifles 
which were frequently rained upon the victim it will be no sur- 
prise that early on the morning of the 30th he was in the throes 
of death in the midst of which the sufferer had just enough 
strength to say that he was hungry and thirsty; then those 
cannibals (the heart is filled with fury in setting forth such 
cruelty) cut a piece of flesh from the calf of the dying man's 
leg and conveyed it to his mouth and instead of water they 
gave him to drink some of his own urine. What savagery ! 

"The blood from the wound finished the killing of the faint- 
ing Piera. The blood shed served to infuriate more the bar- 
barous executioners who in order to give the finishing stroke to 
the martyr, as an unrivalled expression of their savage ferocity, 
thrust a red-hot iron into his mouth and eyes. That same 
night these treacherous and ferocious tyrants whose sin made 
them hate the light, buried the body in the darkness of the 
night in a patch of cogon grass adjoining the convento." 

Piera's torture was by no means confined to this last 
night of his life, as the following account of it shows : — 

"In the first days of this accursed month, while the padres 
were bemoaning their fate in jail, a dark drama was being 
enacted in the convento, whose hair-raising scenes would have 
inspired terror to Montepiu himself. 

"Lieutenant Salvador Piera of the Guardia Civil, command- 
ing officer at Aparri, who, realizing that all resistance was use- 


less, gave way to the persistent solicitations of Spaniards and 
natives and surrendered that town on honourable terms, which 
the Katipdnan forces did not respect after the capitulation had 
been signed, was sent for by Villa, the military authority of 
Isabela. Something terrible was going to happen as Piera 
himself felt confident, for it is said that before leaving Aparri 
he went to confession where he settled the important business 
of his conscience in a Christian manner with a representative 
of God. 

"And so it turned out, for as soon as he arrived in Ilagan he 
was taken to the convento and placed incomunicado in one of 
its apartments. Soon after, three or four vile fiends, — for 
they do not deserve the name of men, — bound him with 
strong cords and hanged him to a beam. Then they began to 
charge him ^vith having prosecuted a certain Mason, and in- 
flicted upon him the most frightful tortures. The pen refuses 
to set forth so many atrocities. For three days they had him 
in that position while his vile assassins made a martyr of him. 
Our hair stands on end to think of such crimes. The heart- 
rending cries of this unfortunate man while prey to such bar- 
barous torments could be heard in every part of the town and 
carried panic to the homes of all the inhabitants. 

"The late hours of the night were always chosen by those 
treacherous fiends to give Piera the trato de cuerda (this form of 
torture consists in tying the hands of the victim behind his back 
and hanging him by them by a rope passed through a pulley 
attached to a beam ; his body is lifted as high as it will go and 
then allowed to fall by its own weight without reaching the 
ground) ; but this torture was administered to him in a form so 
terrible that all the pictures of this kind of torment found in 
the dreadful narratives of the calumniators of the Holy Office, 
pale into insignificance in comparison with the atrocious de- 
tails of the tortures here recited ; at each violent jerk the 
unhappy victim feeling that his limbs were being torn asunder 
would cry out ' My God ! My God ! ' This terrifying cry rever- 
berating through the jail would freeze the very blood of the poor 
priests therein incarcerated. 

"On the third day, when those infuriated hyenas appeared 
to have spent their diabolical rage ; after they had thrust a 
red-hot iron into his eyes and left him with sightless sockets ; 
the poor martyr, the prey of delirium, cried out that he was 
hungry, and one of those sicarii cut a piece of flesh from Piera's 
thigh and was infamous enough to carry it to his mouth. On 
the night of the seventh of the month very late a number 


of wretches buried in the convento garden a body still dripping 
warm blood from the lips of which there escaped the feeble 
plaints of anguish of a dying man." 

The feeling of the Spaniards relative to this matter 
is well shown by the following statement of Father 
Malumbres : — 

"This horrible crime cannot be pardoned by God or man, 
and is still uninvestigated, crjdng to Heaven for vengeance 
with greater reason than the blood of the innocent Abel. So 
long as the criminals remain unpunished it will be a black and 
indelible stigma and an ugly stain on the race harljouring in its 
midst the perpetrators of this unheard-of sin. Words of repro- 
bation are not enough, justice demands exemplary and complete 
reparation, and if the powers of earth do not take justice into 
their own hands, God will send fire from Heaven and will cause 
to disappear from the face of the earth the criminals and even 
their descendants. A murder so cruel and premeditated can 
be punished in no other way. 

"If the courts here should wish to punish the guilty persons 
it would not be a difficult task ; the public points its finger at 
those who dyed their hands in the blood of the heroic soldier, 
and we shall set them forth here echoing the voice of the people. 
The soulless instigator was Dimas Guzman. The executioners 
were a certain Jose Guzman (alias Pepin, a nephew of Dimas) 
and Cayetano Perez." 

The matter was duly taken up in the courts, and Judge 
Blount himself tried the cases. 

The judge takes a very mild and liberal view of the 
occurrence. He says of it : ^ — 

"Villa was accompanied by his aide. Lieutenant Ventura 
Guzman, The latter is an old acquaintance of the author of 
the present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for 
playing a minor part in the murder of an officer of the Spanish 
army committed under Villa's orders just prior to, or about the 
time of, the Wilcox-Sargent visit. He was found guilty, and 
sentenced, but later liberated under President Roosevelt's 
amnesty of 1902. He was guilty, but the deceased, so the people 
in the Cagayan Valley used to say, in being tortured to death, 

1 Blount, p. 112. 


got only the same sort of medicine he had often administered 
thereabouts. At any rate, that was the broad theory of the 
amnesty in wiping out all these old cases." 

He adds : — 

"I sentenced both Dimas and Ventura to life imprisonment 
for being accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer above 
named, Lieutenant Piera. Villa officiated as arch-fiend on 
the grewsome occasion. I am quite sure I would have hung 
Villa without any compunction at that time, if I could have 
gotten hold of him. I tried to get hold of him, but Governor 
Taft's attorney-general, Mr. Wilfley, UTote me that Villa was 
somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on British territory, 
and extradition would involve application to the London 
Foreign Office. The intimation was that we had trouble enough 
of our own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed 
under our predecessors in sovereignty. I have understood that 
Villa is now practising medicine in Manila. More than one 
officer of the American army that I know afterwards did things 
to the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did to that unhappy 
Spanish officer, Lieutenant Piera. On the whole, I think 
President Roosevelt acted wisely and humanely in wiping the 
slate. We had new problems to deal with, and were not bound 
to handicap ourselves with the old ones left over from the Span- 
ish regime." ^ 


But it happens that this was the Filipino regime. 
Piera's torture occurred at the very time when, according 
to Blount, Aguinaldo had "a wonderfully complete 
'going concern' throughout the Philippine archipelago." 

Furthermore, it occurred in the Cagayan valley where 
Blount says "perfect tranquilhty and public order" were 
then being maintained by "the authority of the Aguinaldo 
government" in a country which Messrs. Wilcox and 
Sargent, who arrived on the scene of this barbarous 
murder by torture four weeks later, found so " quiet and 

Not only was Blount perfectly familiar with every 
detail of this damnable crime, but he must of necessity 

1 Blount, p. 114. 


have known of the torturing of friars to extort money, 
which preceded and followed it. 

The following statement seems to sum up his view of 
the whole matter : — 

"It is true there were cruelties practised by the Filipinos 
on the Spaniards. But they were ebullitions of revenge for 
three centuries of tyranny. They do not prove unfitness for 
self-government. I, for one, prefer to follow the example set 
by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil over all 
those matters." ^ 

The judge drew the veil not only over this, but, as we 
have seen, over numerous other pertinent matters which 
occurred in this land of "profound peace and tran- 
quilhty " just at the time Wilcox and Sargent were making 
their trip. My apologies to him for withdrawing the 
veil and for maintaining that such occurrences as those 
in question demonstrate complete and utter unfitness for 
self-government on the part of those who brought them 
about ! 

If it be true that Blount knew more than one officer 
of the American army who did things to the Filipinos 
almost as cruel as Villa did to Lieutenant Piera, why did 
he not report them and have the criminals brought to 
justice ? 

Such an attack on the army, in the course of which 
there is not given a name or a fact which could serve as 
a basis for an investigation, is cowardly and despicable. 

I do not for a moment believe that Blount speaks the 
truth, but if he does, then his failure to attempt to bring 
to justice the human fiends concerned brands him ! 

It has been the fashion in certain quarters to make vile 
allegations of this sort against officers of the United States 
army, couching them in discreetly general terms. This is 
a contemptible procedure, for it frees those who make reck- 
less charges from danger of the criminal proceedings which 
would otherwise doubtless be brought against them. 

1 Blount, p. 113. 





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On arrival at Ilagan, the town where Piera was tor- 
tured to death, Blount says ^ that Messrs. Wilcox and 
Sargent were 

"given a grand haile [ball] and fiesta [feast], a kind of dinner- 
dance, we would call it. . , . From Ilagan they proceeded to 
Aparri, cordially received everywhere, and finding the country 
in fact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of 
that period, seeking recognition of his government by the 
Powers, in a state of profound peace and tranquillity — free 
from brigandage and the like." 

Within sight of the banquet hall, within hearing of 
the music, lay a lighter on which were huddled eighty-four 
priests of the Catholic Church, many of them gray-haired 
old men, innocent of any evil conduct, who for weeks had 
suffered, mentally and physically, the tortures of the 

Of the events of this evening and the following day 
Father Malumbres says : — 

"From the river the convento could be seen profusely illu- 
minated and the strains of music could be heard, an evident 
sign that they were engaged in revelry. This gave us a bad 
start, as we came to fear that Villa had returned from the 
expedition undertaken to come up with two Americans who 
had crossed the Caraballo range and were thinking of coming 
down as far as Aparri. It was late to announce to Villa our 
arrival at Ilagan, so that we were obliged to pass the night on 
the lighter. In the morning our boat was anchored in front of 
the pueblo of Ilagan, where we were credibly informed that 
Villa had returned. This accursed news made us begin to 
fear some disagreeable incident. 

"Our Matias went ashore and delivered the official communi- 
cation regarding our transfer to Villa, while we waited impa- 
tiently for his decision. Sergeant Matias at length returned 
with orders for our disembarkation ; we put on the best clothes 
we had and the rowers placed a broad plank between the lighter 
and the arsenal and we left our floating prison two abreast. 
Matias called the roll and the order to march, we were eighty- 
four friars in a long column climbing the steep ascent to Ilagan. 

1 Blount, p. 114. 

VOL. I — O 


"When we had arrived in front of the building used for head- 
quarters, we faced about in front thereof, and the first thing 
we saw in one of the windows were the sinister features of Fal- 
aris, who with a thundering brow and black look was delighting 
himself in the contemplation of so many priests surrounded by 
bayonets and filled with misery. Any other person but Villa 
would have melted on seeing such a spectacle, which could but 
incite compassion. The two American tourists were also 
looking on at this horrible scene as if stupefied, but they soon 
withdrew in order, perhaps, not to look upon such a painful 
picture. It was, indeed, heartrending to contemplate therein 
old gray-haired men who had passed their lives in apostolic 
work side by side with young men who had just arrived in this 
ungrateful land, and many sick who rather than men seemed 
to be marble statues, who had no recourse but to stand in line, 
without one word of consolation ; therein figured some who 
wore religious garb, others in secular dress limited to a pair of 
rumpled trousers and a cast-off coat, the lack of this luxurious 
garment being replaced in some instances by a native shirt. 

"For two long hours we were detained in the middle of the 
street under the rays of a burning sun and to the scandal of the 
immense crowd which had been gathered together to witness 
the denouement of the tragedy. The priests had hardly come 
into the presence of Villa when Fathers Isidro and Florentino 
were called out for the purpose of having heaped upon them a 
flood of insults and affronts. Father Isidro was ordered by 
Villa to interview Sr. Sabas Orros, who, Villa supposed, would 
wreak his revenge blindly upon him, but he was greatly mis- 
taken, as said gentleman treated the priest with great respect ; 
the tyrant remained talking to Father Florentino in the recep- 
tion room of the headquarters building, and when it appeared 
that such talk would come to blows, the elder of the Americans 
left one of the rooms toward the reception room, and the 
scene suddenly changing. Villa arose and addressing the priest 
said : ' I am pleased to introduce to you an American Brigadier- 
General, Mr. N.' The latter returned a cordial greeting in 
Spanish to the priest who made a courteous acknowledgment; 
after this exchange of courtesies. Villa resumed his defamatory 
work, pouring out a string of absurdities and infamous insults 
upon the friars, going so far as to say in so many words : ' from 
the bishop down you are all thieves and depraved' he added 
another word which it would be shameful to write down, and 
so he went on from one abyss to another without regard to 
reputations or the respect due to venerated persons. 


" The American let his disgust be seen while Villa was talking, 
and the latter understood these protests and ordered the priest 
to withdraw, the comedy coming to an end by the American 
shaking hands with the priest and offering him assistance. 
Villa would not shake hands with him, as was natural, but the 
priest was able to see that he was confused when he saw the 
distinction and courtesy with which an American general had 
treated a helpless friar. What a narrow idea did the Americans 
form of the government of Aguinaldo, represented by men as 
savage and inhuman as Villa ! 

"The natives averred that the Americans referred to were 
spies who had come to explore those provinces and w^ere making 
maps of the strategic points and principal roads, so that a very 
careful watch was kept upon them and Villa took measures 
to have them go down the river without landing at any place 
between Echague and Ilagan. At Ilagan they were given an 
entertainment and dance, Villa being a skilled hand in this sort 
of thing, and a few days later he accompanied them to Aparri ^ 
without allowing them to set foot on land. The government 
of Aguinaldo no longer had everything its own way, and secret 
orders had been given to have every step of the explorers 
followed. The commanding and other leading officers of the 
Valley, supporting the orders of the government, circulated an 
order throughout the towns which read as follows : — 
'"To ALL Local Officers: 

"'You Avill not permit any maps to be made or notes to be 
taken of strategic points by Americans or foreigners ; nor will 
you allow them to become acquainted with the points of de- 
fence ; you \^^ll endeavour to report immediately to this Govern- 
ment any suspicious persons ; you will make your investiga- 
tions secretly, accompanying suspected persons and feigning 
that their investigations are approved, and finally when it shall 
seem to you that such suspected persons have finished their 
work, you will advise without loss of time, in order that their 
notes may be seized.' 

"Despite this order the Americans were able to inform them- 
selves very thoroughly of the forces in the Valley and its state 
of defence, and Filipinos were not lacking who for a few pesos 
would put them abreast of all information regarding the plans 
and projects of Aguinaldo's government." 

Relative to this Wilcox-Sargent trip Taylor says : — 
^ A distance of 120 miles. 


"In October and November, 1898, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox, 
U.S.N., and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, U.S.N., travelled 
through Northern Luzon from which they returned with a 
favourable impression of the government which had been set 
up by Aguinaldo's agents. 

'' It was realized by the subtle men whom they met that it 
was highly expedient that they should make a favourable report 
and accordingly they were well received, and although constant 
obstacles were thrown in the way of their seeing what it was 
not considered well for them to see yet the real reasons for the 
delays in their journey were carefully kept from them. At 
least some of their letters to the fleet were taken, translated, 
and sent to Aguinaldo, who kept them, and constant reports 
upon them and their movements were made." 

Blount refers to the fact that Mr. Sargent tells a char- 
acteristic story of Villa,^ whose vengeful feeling toward 
the Spaniards showed on all occasions. 

It would doubtless have interested the travellers to 
know that the "robbery" consisted in taking the funds 
out of the province to save them from falling into Villa's 
hands, and in paying them to soldiers in Nueva Vizcaya to 
whom money was due. It would further have interested 
them to know that this unfortunate Spaniard had been 
twice tortured within an inch of his life by Villa. 

But let us continue our interrupted narrative : — 

"The presence of the Americans in Ilagan soon freed us 
from certain forms of savagery and barbarous intentions on 
the part of Villa. There can be no doubt that the tyrant was 
constantly cudgelling his brains to invent new methods of 
showing his contempt for the friars; at the unlucky time we 
write of he conceived the infamous plan of ordering a circular 
enclosure of cane to be made, put a pig into it — we trust the 
reader will pardon the details — with a bell hung to his neck, 
blindfolded the priests and compelled them to enter the enclo- 
sure with sticks in their hands, and in this ridiculous attitude, 

1 "The former Spanish Governor of the Province was of course a 
prisoner in Villa's custody. Villa had the ex-Governor brought in, 
for the travellers to see him, and remarked, in his presence to them, 
'This is the man who robbed this province of twenty-five thousand 
dollars during the last year of his office.'" — Blount, p. 115. 


obliged them to strike about when the sound of the bell appraised 
them of the animal's proximity ; it is obvious that the princi- 
pal purpose of the fiendish Villa was to have the priests lay 
about them in such a way as to deal each other the blows 
instead of the pig. The tyrant also had the idea of making us 
and the other priests in Ilagan parade the streets of that town 
dancing and playing the band. The wish to consummate his 
plan was not lacking but he was deterred by the presence of 
the Americans and the arguments of Sr. Sabas Orros to whom 
we also owed the signal favour that Villa did not take us to our 
prisons at Tumauini and Gamut on foot and with our clothing 
in a bundle at our backs." 

On October 2 a banquet was given in Villa's honour at 
Ilagan and the pleasant idea occurred to him to have four 
of the friars dance at it for his amusement. The people 
of the town put their handkerchiefs before their faces 
to shut out the sight, and some wept. Father Campo, 
one of the priests who was obliged to dance, had great 
ulcers on his legs from the wounds caused by the cords 
with which he had been bound when he was tortured with 
water, and was at first unable to raise his feet from the 
floor ; but Villa threatened him with a rattan until he 
finally did so. This caused the sores on his legs to burst 
open so that the bones showed. 

On the 3d of October a number of the friars were com- 
pelled to get up a band and go out and meet Leyba 
with music on his arrival. The people of the towns 
closed their windows in disgust at the sight. A great 
crowd had gathered to receive Leyba, and the priests 
were compelled to dance in the middle of the street, but 
this again only caused disgust. A couple of priests were 
then beaten in the usual fashion in a private house. 
This caused murmuring even among those of the soldiers 
who were natives of the Cagayan valley. At the same 
time two other priests were horribly whipped in the 

This has been a long story, but the half has not been 
told. Those who escaped torture had their feelings 


harrowed by the sight of the sufferings of their fellows. 
They were constantly and grossly insulted; were often 
confined in the most unsanitary quarters ; given poor 
and insufficient food and bad water, or none at all; 
robbed of their clothing ; compelled to march long dis- 
tances under a tropical sun when sick, wounded and 
suffering; obliged to do servants' work publicly; forced 
to make a ridiculous spectacle of themselves in the public 
streets; ordered to recant, and heaven knows what 
not ! "^ 

The torments practised on them had two principal 
objects: to compel them to give up money, and to dis- 
credit them with the common people. They failed to 
accomplish this latter result. There is abundant evidence 
that the natives of the Cagayan valley clothed and fed 
them when they could, and wept over the painful humil- 
iations and the dreadful sufferings which they were 
powerless to prevent or relieve. 

The tormentors were men from distant provinces, with 
no possible personal grievances against the priests whom 
they martyrized. Their action was the result, not of an 
''ebullition of revenge for three centuries of tyranny" 
as stated by Blount, but of insensate greed of gold and 
damnable viciousness. I believe the American people 
will hold that such cruelities brand those who practise 
them as unfit to govern their fellows, or themselves. 

Lest I be accused of basing my conclusions on ex parte 
statements I will now return to the Insurgent record of 
events in the Cagayan valley. 

At the outset the Spanish officers of the Tabacalera 
Company ^ fared comparatively well. In a letter dated 
September 27, 1898, and addressed to the secretary of 
war of the revolutionary government, Leyba says of 
the taking of Tuguegarao that the only terms of the sur- 
render were to respect life. He therefore felt at liberty 

* La Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a very strong com- 
mercial organization. 


to seize all the money that the friars had hidden, "which 
was accomplished by applying the stick." He adds that 
they did nothing to the agents of the great Tabacalera 
Company, then the most powerful commercial organiza- 
tion in the Islands, for the significant reason that they 
had found that its stock was largely held by Frenchmen 
and feared trouble.^ 

On December 4, 1898, Leyba, concerning whose ideas 
as to public order we are already informed, wrote a most 
illuminating letter setting forth the conditions which 
had existed there. He does not claim that there had been 
Octavian peace ! 

It should be borne in mind that this letter covers the 
very time during which Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent 
passed through the Cagayan valley. It paints a vivid 
picture of conditions, and as the painter was the ranking 
Insurgent officer in the valley during this entire period, 
he cannot be accused of hostile prejudice. I therefore 
give the letter in full : — 

"Aparri, December 4, 1898. 
"Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, 
" The Secretary of War : 

"Dear Sir and of my Greatest Esteem: I take the 
liberty of addressing this to you in order to state that owing 
to the lack of discipline in the soldiers whom we have brought, 
since they are all volunteers and whom I am not able to reduce 

* "I call your attention to the fact that the only terms to the sur- 
render were to respect life, and it was for this reason that I seized all 
the money they [i.e. the friars, — D. C. W.] had hidden away, which 
was accomplished bj-- applying the stick. In this capital I found 
thirty-four thousand dollars in silver and a draft on the Compania 
General de Tabacos for twenty thousand dollars which can be collected 
here. . . . 

" The bearer can give you more details concerning the abuses com- 
mitted in this province of Vizcaya by the forces of Major Delfin Esquizel. 
Also, I wish to Inform joxi that we have done nothing to the Compania 
General de Tabacos, for we have learned from their records that much 
of their stock is held by Frenchmen, and consequently we fear a con- 
flict. For this reason we await your orders on this matter. We took 
all the arms we found in their possession, however." — P. I. R., 271. 2. 


to rigorous subordination, for the revolution would find itself 
without soldiers with whom to win triumph, they committed 
many abuses and misdeed which, for the lack of evidence, I 
was not able to punish, although I knew of these abuses but 
had no proof, and as a lover of my country and of the prestige 
of the Revolutionary Army, I took care not to disclose the secret 
to any one, in this way avoiding the formation of an atmosphere 
against the cause of our Independence to the grave injury of 
us all. But it happened that, in spite of the good advice which 
I have given them and the punishments which I have given to 
some of the 3d Company of Cauit, they did not improve their 
conduct but have gone to the extreme of committing a scanda- 
lous robbery of 20,800 pesos which sum the German, Otto 
Weber, was taking to the capital, which deed has caused me to 
work without ceasing, without sleeping entire nights, for I 
understood what a serious matter it was to take money from a 
foreigner. After making many inquiries, it was discovered 
that a very large part of the money which reached the sum of 
$10,000, a little more or less, was buried under the quarters 
which the said company occupied, this with the sanction of all 
the officers, it appears to me, because it is impossible that such 
a sum could be brought into a house where so many soldiers are 
living without the knowledge of the officers. 

''Indignant at such shameful behaviour, I reprimanded the 
officers and preferred charges against the ones I deemed to 
blame in the matter. 

"Afterwards I found out that they had attempted to murder 
me for trying to find out the originators of the crime. On 
account of this, and in order to prevent a civil war which would 
have broken out against the said soldiers if precautions had not 
been taken, I decided to disarm them, to the great displeasure 
of the Colonel who was not aware of my motives. 

"This bad conduct has been copied by the soldiers of the 
4th Company stationed in Ilagan, and I believe the Colonel, 
guided by my warning, will take the same measures in regard 
to them. 

"As the officers are the first ones to commit abuses and mis- 
deeds, it is easily seen that the soldiers under their orders, 
guided by them, will commit worse ones than the chiefs, and 
as these seem to lack the moral strength to control and repri- 
mand them, I propose to you, if it meets your approval, that 
all these soldiers and some of the officers be returned to their 
homes by the steamer Luzon, if there should be sufficient coal, 
or in another if you order it, since they tell me themselves that 









— a 
s a 

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because they are far away from their homes they do not wish 
to continue in the service in this province. This is easily 
arranged as there are now men stationed in this province for 
instructing the native volunteers, many of whom have been 
students, and will therefore make good officers and non-com- 
missioned officers, and in this way a battalion could be formed, 
well disciplined from the beginning and disgraceful things would 
be avoided not only towards the natives of this province but 
also towards foreigners, which is the most important. Having 
stated my case, I place myself always at your disposal, request- 
ing you will attend to this affair. 

"With reference to the 4th Company stationed in the Prov- 
ince of Isabela, whose captain is Don Antonio Monzon of 
Panamitan, there are many complaints of thefts and assaults 
committed by the soldiers, and in answer to my questions, Don 
Sime6n Adriano y Villa, Major and Sanitary Inspector and 
doctor of this battalion, whom I have stationed there for lack 
of a competent person, tells me that he has always punished 
and offered advice to officers and soldiers in order to prevent the 
recurrence of thefts and assaults, but he has never been able to 
suppress them completely, because the soldiers are abandoned 
by their officers, and because of lack of example on the part of 
the latter ; they do not understand that it is a great blot when 
they commit these abuses, since when they discover the goods 
or house of a Spaniard they believe they have a right to appro- 
priate everything which they encounter. 

"I have learned lately, that some foreigners, residents in 
that province, among them some employees of the Tobacco 
Factory, 'El Oriente' and of the firm of Baer Senior & Co., 
who have Spanish employees in various pueblos of that province, 
have some very serious complaints to make of assaults com- 
mitted against them prejudicial to their interests; however, 
I hope that now with the arrival of General Tirona he will 
regulate matters, although I believe that this gentleman is not 
sufficiently energetic in proceeding against the officers and 
soldiers, as I have seen when I reprimanded and punished 
them for faults committed he has pardoned them, and it ap- 
pears that he censures energetic acts which we must use in 
order to subject them to rigorous discipline. The same thing 
happened when Major Sr. Victa wished to discipline them ; 
it appears that the Colonel reprimanded him when he punished 
some soldiers for gambling in their quarters, since, as you know, 
that gentleman believes that he who is right is the one who 
comes to him first, and who is best able to flatter him. 


*'The Colonel has agreed with me that his first act on 
arrival at the province of Isabela should be to disarm and take 
all the money he finds among the soldiers of the 4th Company 
(Panamitan) in order to serve as indemnity for the property 
of the foreigners in case they should make any claim. 

"I request that you send some leader or officer in order to 
superintend our actions, and to lift the doubt which hangs 
over the person who has worked faithfully and honourably in 
the sacred cause of our Independence. 

"I am filling the position of First Chief in the Port of Aparri 
temporarily on account of the absence of the Colonel who has 
conferred on me all his duties and power. After the military 
operations which were carried on as far as the last town in 
Isabela, being tired and somewhat sick, I was put in charge 
of these military headquarters, which I found to be very much 
mixed up, the town, moreover, being desperate on accomit of 
the assaults committed by my predecessor, Rafael Perca, who 
was appointed by the Colonel, and who was formerly 2d Cap- 
tain of the steamer Filipinas. After arriving and taking 
charge, having received numerous complaints against him, I 
had him arrested and I found that he had been guilty of rob- 
bery, unla^vful use of insignia, illegal marriage, rape and at- 
tempted rape. I hold him in custody only awaiting the arrival 
of the Colonel in order to convene a court-martial for his trial, in 
which the Colonel will act as President and I as Judge Advocate. 

"With nothing more to communicate, I hope you will 
attend to my just claim and send a special delegate to investi- 
gate our acts and see the truth, for perhaps if a statement comes 
direct from me you will not believe it. 

"I am your affectionate and faithful subordinate, who kisses 
your hand, 

(Signed) " J. N. Leyba." ^ 

Blount states that conditions existed ''just like this, 
all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands." ^ Unfortunately 
this was only too true ! 

The troops complained of by Leyba were made up of 
Aguinaldo's fellow townsmen. They never obeyed any 

1 P. I. R. 192. 4. 

2 "I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor Taft 
in 1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly would not have 
occurred had the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then 
existing, just like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands." — Blount, 
p. 116. 


one else, and left a trail of murder and rapine behind them. 
Aguinaldo never punished them, and from the time when 
one of them tried to murder their commander until a 
guard composed of them murdered General Antonio 
Luna in June, 1899, they are mentioned only with fear 
and execration. 

Blount describes with enthusiasm the establishment 
of civil government in Cagayan. 

Perhaps Americans will be interested in knowing who 
was its head and how it worked. The "elections" were 
held on December 9, 1898, and Dimas Guzman was 
chosen head of the province. He was the man subse- 
quently sentenced to life-imprisonment by Blount, for 
complicity in the murder of Lieutenant Piera. In describ- 
ing his method of conducting his government he says 
that the people doubted the legality of attempts to collect 
taxes ; that the abuses of heads of towns caused rioting 
in the towns, in which only Ilocanos took part ; and that 
he not only did not report these things but contrived to 
conceal them from foreigners in the province.^ 

His failure to report these troubles and disorders to his 
government is of interest, as Blount alleges ^ that dif- 

1 "On account of this the vulgar people doubted the legality of our 
actions in the collection of taxes, and accordingly it became difficult ; 
and this, coupled with the inveterate abuses of the heads of the towns, 
which the head of the province was not able to perceive in time to 
check, caused a tumult in Echague, which, owing to wise councils 
and efforts at pacification, was appeased -^athout it being followed by 
serious consequences ; but I have no doubt that this tumult was due 
only to the suggestions of ungovernable and passionate persons ani- 
mated by the spirit of faction, since those who took part in it were 
all Ilocanos, no native of Echague having any hand in it. The same 
thing occurred in Naguilian, where the disorders were also quieted. 
Not only did I make no report of all this to the government of the 
republic on account of the abnormality of the present conditions, but 
I also succeeded in concealing them from the foreigners here so that 
they should not succeed in discovering the truth, which would be to 
the prejudice of our cause." — Taylor, 42 A.T. 

* "I may add that as judge of that district in 1901-2 there came 
before me a number of cases in the trial of which the fact would be 
brought out of this or that difference among the local authorities hav- 


ferences between the local authorities were in a number 
of cases referred to the Malolos government for settle- 

Blount says^ that General Otis's reports were full of 
inexcusable blunders about the Tagalogs taking posses- 
sion of provinces and making the people do things, and 
cites the relations between Villa and Dimas Guzman to 
illustrate the error of these allegations. 

He has elsewhere ^ referred to Villa as the '' arch-fiend" 
in the matter of torturing the unhappy Spaniards as well 
as the Filipinos who incurred his ill-will. We have seen 
that Guzman proved an apt pupil and did credit to his 
instructor in connection with the torturing of Lieutenant 
Piera, but it nevertheless appears from Guzman's own 
statements that his relations with the Insurgent officers 
and their subordinates involved some rather grave 
difficulties. Of Major Canoy, for instance, he says : — 

"I must add that the said Major Canoy is such a remarkable 
character that he saw fit to give my cook a beating for not tak- 
ing off his hat when he met him. He insulted the delegate of 
rents of Cabagan Vie jo for the same reason. He struck the 
head man of the town of Bagabag in the face. He put some of 
the members of the town council of Echague in the stocks, and 
he had others whipped." ' 

It was really incautious for Governor Guzman to com- 
plain of these conditions because Major Canoy and his 
party won, and the Governor had to resign. 

But the day of reckoning came. It was in consequence 

ing been referred to the Malolos Government for settlement. And 
they always waited until they heard from it." — Blount, p. 115. 

1 "General Otis's reports are full of the most inexcusable blunders 
about how 'the Tagals' took possession of the various provinces and 
made the people do this or that. Villa's relations with Guzman were 
just about those of a New Yorker or a Bostonian sent up to Vermont 
in the aays of the American Revolution to help organize the resistance 
there, in conjunction with one of the local leaders of the patriot cause 
in the Green Mountain State." — Blount, p. 112. 

2 Blount, p. 114. 

3 Taylor, 42 AJ. 


of the atrocities committed by the Tagalog soldiers in the 
Cagayan valley that Captain Batchelder was able a little 
later to march practically unopposed through the prov- 
inces of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan with 
one battalion of American negro troops, for whom he had 
neither food nor extra ammunition, and that Tirona 
surrendered the Insurgent forces in the valley without 
attempting resistance ! 


Insuegent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere 

Referring to the conditions alleged to have been found 
by Sargent and Wilcox in the Cagayan valley, Blount 

says : — 

"Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar 
trip through the provinces of southern Luzon about this same 
time, under similar friendly auspices, before we turned friend- 
ship to hate and fear and misery, in the name of Benevolent 
Assimilation, they would, we now know, have found similar 
conditions." ^ 

So far as concerns the provinces of Mindoro and Pala- 
wan, and the great island of Mindanao, he dodges the 
issue, alleging the unimportance of Mindoro and Pala- 
wan, and claiming that ''Mohammedan Mindanao" 
presents a problem by itself. Under such generalities 
he hides the truth as to what happened in these regions. 

I agree with him that there was essential identity be- 
tween actual conditions in the Cagayan valley and those 
which prevailed under Insurgent rule elsewhere in Luzon 
and in the Visayas. I will go further and say that con- 
ditions in the Cagayan valley did not differ essentially 
from those which prevailed throughout all portions of 
the archipelago which fell under Insurgent control, ex- 
cept that in several provinces captured friars and other 
Spaniards were quickly murdered whereas in the Cagayan 
valley no friar was quite killed outright by torture. 
Those who ultimately died of their injuries lived for some 

Let us now consider some of the actual occurrences in 

1 Blount, p. 111. 


these other provinces, continuing to follow the route of 
our tourists until it brings us back to Manila. 

South Ilocos 

The first province visited by Messrs. Wilcox and Sar- 
gent after leaving Aparri was South Ilocos. The con- 
ditions which had prevailed at Vigan, the capital of the 
province, shortly before their arrival, are described in a 
letter signed "Mariano" and addressed under date of 
September 25, 1898, to Senor Don Mena Crisologo, from 
which I quote extracts : — 

"Dear Mena: I read with a happy heart your letter of 
the 3rd instant, and in answer I have to say: — 

" On the 22nd of August a mass meeting was held for the 
election of the local presidente of this towTi, and I was elected 
to the office; and on the 1st instant the Colonel appointed 
me Provisional Provincial President of this province, so that 
you can imagine the position I am in and the responsibilities 
which weigh on me. 

" Your house is occupied by the Colonel, in view of the fact 
that it is not rented. 

" I have here eleven friar prisoners and the damned priests 
who escaped from here have not as yet been returned, but it 
is knowTi that they are prisoners in Cagaj'-an, and as soon as 
they arrive here I will treat them as they deserve. 

" It is with great regret that I have to relate the events and 
misfortunes which we have been suffering here since the arrival 
of the troops, as all the detachments are supported by the 
towns, and here in the capital where the commissary is estab- 
lished, our resources are exhausted, owing to the unreasonable 
demands of the commissary, because he never asks what is only 
just and necessary, but if he needs provisions for 200 men, he 
always asks enough for 1000. And notwithstanding this, 
the most lamentable and sad occurrences are taking place 
almost daily in the different barrios, and often in the towTi 
itself; the soldiers are guilty of many abuses and disorderly 
acts, such as rapes and murders, which usually remain un- 
punished by reason of the real authors thereof not being found, 
and when they are found and reported to their commanders, 
the latter do nothing. One night the house and estate of 
Sario Tinon in Anannam was sacked by six armed men, who 


threatened him and took his money, his wife's jewels and the 
best horses he had. Thank God that his family was at the 
time in the capital, and it appears that now the authors of 
this act are being discovered. 

" I am at the present time working with Father Aglipay to 
have the forces stationed here replaced by our volunteers 
which I am recruiting, in order to prevent in so far as possible 
the frequent acts of barbarity which the former are committing 
in the province. 

" When the friars from Lepanto arrived here, they were made 
to publish the following proclamation : — 

" ' Proclamation. — We, the friars, declare that all the acts 
committed by us against the honest Filipinos when we dis- 
charged our respective offices, were false and in contravention 
of the rights of the Holy Church, because we only wished to 
deceive and prejudice the honest inhabitants of the Philippines ; 
for which reason we now suffer what we are suffering, as you 
see, according to the old adage that " he who owes must pay." 
And now we inform all you honest Filipinos that we repent 
for the acts above referred to, which are in contravention of 
the laws and good customs, and ask your pardon. — Vigan, 
September 13, 1898.' 

" All of which I communicate to you in order that you may 
form an idea of what is taking place here, and take such steps 
as may be proper for the common good, and especially for the 
good of this town, hoping that with the aid of your valuable 
protection the abuses and disorders suffered by the residents 
will be stopped." ^ 

The province of Abra, now a subprovince of South 
Ilocos, was evidently no exception to the general rule, 
for there is on file a letter to Aguinaldo with twenty-six 
signatures, protesting bitterly against the oppression of 
the poor, in the effort to compel them to contribute war 
taxes, complaining against the misuse of supplies gathered 
ostensibly for the soldiers, and stating that the petitioners 
will be obliged to take refuge with the Igorots and 
Negritos, if not granted relief.^ 

ip. I. R., 974. 3. 

2 "December 20, 1898. 
" To THE Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government. 

" The undersigned residents of the harangay of D. Francisco Queru- 
btQ and D. Melchor Balueg, of Bucay, of the province of Abra, appeal 

Building the Benc;uet Road. 
In this, as in many other places, it proved necessary to blast the road out of 

the solid rock. 


Apparently the trouble grew, for on December 27, 1898, 
the "Director of Diplomacy" telegraphed to Aguinaldo 
concerning it, saying : — 

"Most urgent. The discontent in the provinces of Pan- 
gasinan, Tarlac and Yloco (Ilocos) is increasing. The town 
of Bangbang rose in revolt the 25th and 26th of this month, 
and killed all of the civil officials. It is impossible to describe 
the abuses committed by the military and civil authorities of 
the 'said provinces. I urge you to send a force of 100 men and a 
diplomatic officer to reestablish order. The matter is urgent." ^ 

I find nothing important in the Insurgent records con- 
cerning conditions in La Union at this time. Pangasinan, 

to you with the utmost subjection from their place of residence and 
state : That their heads or representatives, D. Francisco Querubin 
and Melehor Balueg, respectively, force them to pay two pesos each 
as a war tax, your humble vassals above cited being hardly able to 
earn their own livelihood and support their families, and, notwithstand- 
ing their labor, some of them cannot get anything to eat without ap- 
pealing to the charity of their richer neighbours ; but notwithstanding 
this sad situation, they offer a peseta each as a mark of gratitude to 
the mother country, Filipinas, but said gentlemen, the representatives 
mentioned, have not the slightest pity and worry us to the extent 
of having kept us in our houses a day and a night without anything to 
eat, not even permitting us to go out to get a drink. 

"We must inform you that the head of the barangay, D. Melehor 
Balueg, when he gathers the supplies for the troops stationed in his 
town, said supplies consisting of rice, pigs, chickens and eggs, uses 
one-half of what is gathered, and then again orders his assistants to 

"In fact, the undersigned request you to direct that the peseta 
which they offer be accepted and that the said Don Francisco Querubin 
and Don Melehor Balueg be relieved of their duties, in order to put a 
stop to the abuses constantly committed by them ; and if this be not 
done, the petitioners will be obliged to leave their homes and property 
in the town and take up their residences in the mountains with the 
Negritos and Igorots, in order that the others may remain in the 
town and live tranquilly. 

" This is a grace which we do not doubt we will receive from you, 
whose life may God preserve for many years. 

"BucAY, November 12, 1898." (26 signatures) 

(In blue pencil in the handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "It will be 

" Dec. 20, 1898. "E. A." 

— P. I. R., 991. 4. 

» P. I. R., 849. 

VOL. I — P 


Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan, which were now revisited 
by our tourists, have already been discussed. 

The Province of Manila 

Conditions in Manila Province, as distinguished from 
Manila City, left much to be desired. 

Admiral Dewey made a statement applicable to the 
territory adjacent to the city and bay of Manila in a 
cablegram to Washington dated October 14, 1898, which 
reads as follows : — 

"It is important that the disposition of the Philippine 
Islands should be decided as soon as possible. . . . General 
anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of 
Manila. Natives appear unable to govern." ^ 

Of it Blount says : — 

"In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately re- 
peated as true some wild rumours then currently accepted by 
the Europeans and Americans at Manila which, of course, were 
impossible of verification. I say 'unfortunately' with some 
earnestness, because it does not appear on the face of his 
message that they were mere rumours. And, that they were 
wholly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared 
up in previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order, 
and tranquillity which prevailed throughout Luz6n at that 
time has been, it is believed, put beyond all doubt." ^ 

Blount seems here to have overlooked the fact that the 
admiral himself was in Manila Bay and in Manila City 
at the time he sent this cablegram. The statements in 
question were not rumours, they were deliberate expres- 
sions of opinion on the part of a man who had first-hand 
information and knew what he was saying. 

They were not the Admiral's only allegations on this 
subject. When testifying before the Senate committee 
he said : — 

" Admiral Dewey. I knew that there was no government in 
the whole of the Philippines. Our fleet had destroyed the 

1 Blount, p. 130. 2 Ibid., pp. 130-131. 


only government there was, and there was no other government ; 
there was a reign of terror throughout the Philippines, looting, 
robbing, murdering ; a reign of terror throughout the islands." 

La Laguna 

Having brought our tourist friends safely back to 
Manila, we must now leave them there and strike out by 
ourselves if we are to see other provinces. 

La Laguna lies just east of Manila. Of it we learn that : 

"Laguna Province was so overrun by bands of robbers 
that the head of the pueblo of San Pablo ordered the people 
to concentrate in the town to avoid their attacks." ^ 


The province of Bataan lies just across the bay from 

"On January 10, 1899, the secretary of the interior directed 
the governor of Bataan Province to ascertain the whereabouts 
of a number of men who had just deserted with their rifles 
from the commands there. He was to appeal to their patriot- 
ism and tell them that if they would but return to their com- 
panies their complaints would be attended to and they would 
be pardoned." ^ 


Zambales joins Bataan on the west and north. On 
November 13, 1898, Wenceslao Vinvegra wrote to Agui- 
naldo describing the state of affairs in this province. From 
his letter we learn that two brothers named Teodoro and 
Doroteo Pansacula, claiming to be governor and brig- 
adier general respectively, who are charged with aban- 
donment of their posts in the field, disobedience and at- 
tempts against the union of the Insurgents, had been 
committing all manner of abuses. They had organized 
a band of cut-throats, armed with rifles and bolos, and 

1 P. I. R., 1142. 4. s lUd., 2002. 3. 


were terrorizing the towns, committing robberies and 
murders and ordering that money be furnished for them- 
selves and food for their men. 

They were also encouraging the people to disobey the 
local authorities and refuse to pay taxes, and were pro- 
mulgating a theory, popular with the masses, that the 
time had come for the rich to be poor and the poor rich. 

They had furthermore induced regular Insurgent troops 
to rise up in arms.^ 

From this communication it would appear that the 
Insurgent government had not been entirely effective in 
Zambales up to November 13th, 1898. 

From other communications we learn that the soldiers 
at Alaminos were about to desert on November 30th, 
1898 ; ^ that it was deemed necessary to restrict travel 
between Tarlac, Pampanga, Bataan and Zambales in 
order to prevent robberies ;^ and that on January 9, 1899, 
the governor of the province found it impossible to con- 
tinue the inspection of a number of towns, as many of 
their officials had fled to escape the abuses of the military.'* 
Conditions were obviously very serious in Zambales at 
this time. 

1 P. I. R., 964. 3. 

^ " On November 30, 1898, the commander in Alaminos, Zambales 
Province, telegraphed that his soldiers were all about to desert as the 
head of the town would not furnish rations or pay without orders from 
the governor." — P. I. R., 2002. 3. 

' "On December 22, Aguinaldo, in accordance with a request from 
the governor of Zambales Province, ordered the heads of the provinces 
of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bataan, and Pampanga to prohibit the people 
of their provinces from going to Zambales without passports signed by 
them, stating the route they were to take in going and returning and 
the length of time to be spent in the journey. The governor of Zam- 
bales had asked for this regulation in order to prevent the commission 
of robberies in Zambales and to distinguish persons justly subject to 
suspicion from those of good conduct." — P. I. R., 266. 3. 

*"0n January 9, the governor of Zambales found it impossible 
to continue the inspection of certain towns of his province and to 
continue holding elections, as many of the officials had fled to escape 
the exactions and abuses of the military commanders." 

— P. I. R., 988. 2. 



Cavite province lies immediately south of Manila 
province as the latter was then constituted. On August 
24, 1898, the secretary of war wired Aguinaldo that two 
drunken Americans had been killed by Insurgent sol- 
diers.^ On the same day General Anderson advised the 
governor of Cavite that one American soldier had been 
killed and three wounded by his people, and demanded 
his immediate withdrawal, with his guard, from the town.^ 
The governor asked Aguinaldo for instructions. Agui- 
naldo replied instructing the governor to deny that the 
American had been killed by Insurgent soldiers and to 
claim that he had met death at the hands of his own 
companions. The governor was further directed to give 
up his life before leaving the place. ^ 

In view of the definite statement from one of his own 
officers that the soldier in question was killed by Filipino 
soldiers, Aguinaldo's instructions to say that he was 
killed by Ainericans are interesting as showing his 

Not only were the Insurgents obviously unable to con- 
trol their own soldiers in Cavite town sufficiently to pre- 
vent them from committing murder, but conditions in 
the province of the same name left much to be desired. 

i"The Governor of Cavite reports two drunken Americans have 
been killed by our soldiers. I tell him to have an investigation immedi- 
ately and report the fact to the American commander." — P. I. R., 849. 

2 "Most urgent. Gen. Anderson informs me in a letter that, 'in 
order to avoid the very serious misfortune of an encounter between 
our troops, I demand your immediate withdrawal with yoiu- guard 
from Cavite. One of my men has been killed and three wounded by 
your people.' This is positive and does not admit of explanation or 
delay. I ask you to inform me of your decision." — P. I. R., 849. 

' "Gen. Riego de Digs, Cavite : Telegram received. Do not leave 
the post, and say that you cannot abandon the city without my orders, 
and say that he was not killed by our soldiers, but by them themselves 
[the Americans. — D. C. W.], since they were drunk, according to 
your telegram. Give up your life before abandoning that place, and 
investigate matters." — P. I. R., 849. 


On December 29, 1898, the governor wired Aguinaldo 
that the town of Marigondong had risen in arms.^ 

It is a well-known fact that land records were destroyed 
in Cavite. Of this matter Taylor says : — 

"In Cavite, in Cavite Province, and probably in most of 
the other provinces, one of the first acts of the insurgents who 
gathered about Aguinaldo was to destroy all the land titles 
which had been recorded and filed in the Spanish administra- 
tive bureaus. In case the independence of the Philippines 
was won, the land of the friars, the land of the Spaniards and 
of those who still stood by Spain, would be in the gift of Agui- 
naldo or of any strong man who could impose his will upon the 
people. And the men who joined this leader would be rich 
in the chief riches of the country, and those who refused to do 
so would be ruined men." ^ 


"The native civil officials who took charge of the govern- 
ment of Sorsogon Province when the Spaniards abandoned 
it did not think it worth while to hoist the insurgent flag until 
a force of four companies arrived there to take station early 
in November, 1898. The officer in command promptly or- 
dered the Chinamen hi the town of Sorsogon, who are prosperous 
people, to contribute to the support of his troops. They 
at once gave him cloth for uniforms, provisions, and 10,000 
pesos. This was not sufficient, for on November 8 Gen. 
Ignacio Paua, who seems to have been the insurgent agent 
in dealing with the Chinese, complained that the troops in 
Sorsogon were pillaging the Chinamen there. They had killed 
13, wounded 19, and ruined a number of others." ^ 

In January, 1899, a correspondent wrote Aguinaldo that 
it was very difficult to collect taxes as every one was taking 
what he could lay his hands on.^ 

^ "Urgent. Gen. Alvarez telegraphed that Riego de Dios informed 
him that the town of Maragondong had risen in arms on account of 
abuses committed by the local President against Salvador Riego. 
This is the reason the town took up arms. Will go there to-morrow." 

— P. I. R., 849. 
2 Taylor, 19 AJ. => P. I. R., 1057. 4. " Taylor, 95 HS. 


Amhos Camarines 

On September 18, 1898, Elias Angeles, a corporal of the 
guardia civil, headed an uprising against the Spaniards. 
The Spanish officer in command, and all of his family, 
were killed by shooting up through the floor of the room 
which they occupied. Angeles then assumed the title 
of Politico-Military-Governor. 

When the Tagalog Vicente Lucban arrived on his way 
to Samar, he ordered Angeles to meet him at Magarao, 
with all his troops and arms, disarmed the troops, giving 
their rifles to his own followers, marched into Nueva 
Caceres and took possession of the entire government. 
Aguinaldo subsequently made Lucban a general, and sent 
him on his way to Samar. 

Lucban was succeeded by another Tagalog, ''General" 
Guevara, a very ignorant man, who displayed special 
ability in making collections, and is reported to have kept 
a large part of the funds which came into his possession. 

Colonel Peiia, who called himself ''General/' was one 
of the worst of the Tagalog invaders, for they were prac- 
tically that. He threatened all who opposed him with 
death, and summarily shot at least one man in Tigaon. 
That town subsequently rose against him, and he was 
badly cut up by the Bicols.^ On getting out of the hos- 
pital he was sent away. 

The daughters of prominent families suffered at the 
hands of these villains. Peiia abducted one, a son of 
Guevara another. Her brother followed young Guevara 
and killed him. If girls of the best families w^re so 
treated, how must those of the common people have 
fared ? 

Braganza ordered the killing of all Spaniards and 
Chinese at Muialabag. Some forty-eight Spaniards were 

^ The name applied to the Filipinos of Ambos Camarines, Albay 
and Sorsogdn. 


Many Chinese were killed at Pasacao ; about thirty 
at Libmanan by order of Vicente Ursua a Tagalog ; more 
than twenty at Calabanga. 

Conditions became so unbearable that Faustino Santa 
Ana gathered around him all Bicols who were willing to 
fight the Tagalogs, but the troubles were finally patched up. 

American troops had little difficulty in occupying Ambos 
Camarines and other Bicol provinces, owing to the hatred 
in which the Tagalogs were held. 


Conditions in the important island of Mindoro may be 
inferred from the fact that it became necessary for its 
governor to issue a decree on November 10, 1898, which 
contained the following provisions among others : — 

*'2nd. The local presidentes of the pueblos will not permit 
anyone belonging to their jurisdiction to pass from one pueblo 
to another nor to another province without the corresponding 
pass, with a certificate upon its back that the taxes of its holder 
have been paid. 

" 3rd. That from this date no one will be allowed to absent 
himself from his pueblo without previously informing its 
head who will give him an authorization on which will be 
noted the approval of the presidente of the pueblo. . . . 

" 5th. Persons arriving from a neighboring town or prov- 
ince in any pueblo of this province will immediately present 
themselves before the presidente of said pueblo with their 
passes. He will without charge, stamp them with his official seal." '■ 

These are peculiar regulations for a province which is 
at peace, and as Major Taylor has truly remarked : — 

"The form of liberty contemplated by the founders of the 
Philippine Republic was not considered incompatible with a 
very considerable absence of personal freedom." ^ 

Later, when travelling through Mindoro, I was told how 
an unfortunate legless Spaniard, who had been running 
a small shop in one of the towns and who was on good 
terms with his Filipino neighbors, was carried out into 

1 P. I. R., 262. 3. 2 Taylor, 48 AJ. 











































t— ( 

























the plaza, seated in a chair, and then cut to pieces with 
bolos in the presence of his wife and children who were 
compelled to witness the horrible spectacle ! 

On this same trip Captain R. G. Offley, then the Ameri- 
can Governor of Mindoro, told me while I was at Pina- 
malayan that the people there were greatly alarmed be- 
cause a murderer, liberated under the amnesty, had re- 
turned and was prow^ling about in that vicinity. This 
man had a rather unique record. He had captured one 
of his enemies, and after stripping him completely had 
caused the top of an immense ant-hill to be dug off. The 
unfortunate victim was then tied, laid on it, and the earth 
and ants which had been removed were shovelled back 
over his body until only his head projected. The ants 
did the rest ! Another rather unusual achievement of 
this interesting individual was to tie the feet of one of 
his enemies to a tree, fasten a rope around his neck, hitch 
a carabao to the rope, and start up the carabao, thus 
pulUng off the head of his victim. Yet this man and 
others like him were set at hberty under the amnesty 
proclamation, in spite of the vigorous protests of the 
Philippine Commission, who thought that murderers of 
this type ought to be hanged. 

And now I wish to discuss briefly an interesting and 
highly characteristic statement of Judge Blount. In 
referring to conditions in the Visayan Islands, he says : — 

"Of course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But 
as Luzon goes, so go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is 
but the tail to the Luzon kite. Luzon contains 4,000,000 of 
the 8,000,000 people out there, and Manila is to the Filipino 
people what Paris is to the French and to France. Luzon is 
about the size of Ohio, and the other six islands that really 
matter, are in size mere little Connecticuts and Rhode Islands, 
and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos."^ 

This paragraph is no exception to the general rule that 
the statements of this author will not bear analysis. One 

1 Blount, p. 116. 



of the other six islands that he says really matters is 
Samar. Its area is 5031 square miles. The area of 
Rhode Island is 1250 square miles. The smallest of the 
six islands named is Bohol, with an area of 1411 square 
miles. It cannot be called a little Rhode Island. 

As regards population, Arizona has 122,931. It is 
hardly proper to call either Panay with a population of 
743,646, Cebu with 592,247, Negros with 460,776, Leyte 
with 357,641, Bohol with 243,148 or even Samar with 
only 222,690, a mere Arizona, and New Mexico with 
195,310 is also a bit behind. 

Luzon really has an area of 40,969 square miles and a 
population of 3,798,507.^ What Blount is pleased to call 
'Hhe tail to the Luzon kite," is made up as follows : — 


Area (Square Miles) 


Samar . 
Negros . 
Panay . 
Cebu . 
Bohol . 







Even so, the tail is a trifle long and heavy for the kite, 
but if we are going to compare Luzon with ''the Southern 
Islands," by which Blount can presumably only mean the 
rest of the archipelago, why not really do it ? The pro- 
cess involves nothing more complicated than the subtrac- 
tion of its area and population from those of the archipel- 
ago as a whole. 

Area (Square Miles) 


Philippines . . . 



Difference . . 



^ Accepting the 1903 census figures. 


Performing this operation, we discover that the tail 
would fly away with the kite, as Luzon has less than half 
of the total population and only a little more than a third 
of the total area. 

To compare the area or the population of one large 
island with those of individual small ones, in determining 
the relative importance of the former in the country of 
which it makes up a part, is like comparing the area and 
population of a great state with those of the individual 
counties going to make up other states. 

Blount resorts to a similar questionable procedure in 
trying to show the insignificance of Mindoro and Palawan. 
There are an island of Mindoro and a province of Mindoro ; 
an island of Palawan and a province of Palawan. In 
each case the province, which includes numerous small 
islands, as well as the large one from which it takes its 
name, is much larger and more populous than is the main 
island, and obviously it is the province with which we 
are concerned. 

Even if Blount wished to limit discussion to the Chris- 
tian natives commonly called Filipinos, his procedure is 
still wholly unfair. Of these there are 3,575,001 in Luzon 
and 3,412,685 in the other islands. In other words, the 
Filipino population is almost equally divided between the 
two regions. 

As he would not have found it convenient to discuss 
the conditions which arose in Mindanao under Insurgent 
rule, he attempts to show that no political impor- 
tance attaches to them. In the passage above quoted 
he does not so much as mention either Mindoro or Pala- 
wan (Paragua). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to 
justify his action by making the following statements: — 

"The political or governmental problem being now re- 
duced from 3141 islands to eleven, the last three ^ of the nine 

^ Aguinaldo considered Mindanao important enough to form one 
of the three federal states into which he proposed to divide the Philip- 


contained in the above table may also be eliminated as fol- 
lows : ^ — 

"Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk 
of Luzon, pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of 
Greenwich, is thick with densely wooded mountains and 
jungle over a large part of its area, has a reputation of being 
very unhealthy (malarious), is also very sparsely settled, and 
does not now, nor has it ever, cut any figure politically as a 
disturbing factor." ^ 

Apart from the fact that the political problem involved 
in the government of the important islands which Blount 
would thus leave out of consideration, is not solved by- 
ignoring it, certain of his further statements cannot be 
allowed to go uncorrected. 

The allegation that the island has never "cut any figure 
politically as a disturbing factor" is absurd. In the 
Spanish days its forests furnished a safe refuge for evil- 
doers who were from time to time driven out of Cavite 
and Batangas. A large proportion of its Filipino inhabit- 
ants were criminals who not infrequently organized 
regular piratical expeditions and raided towns in Masbate, 
Romblon and Palawan. The people of the Cuyos and 
Calamianes groups lived in constant terror of the Mindoro 
pirates, and tulisanes,^ who paid them frequent visits. 
I myself have been at Calapan, the capital of the prov- 
ince, when the Spanish officials did not dare to go without 
armed escort as far as the outskirts of the town for fear 
of being captured and held for ransom. During con- 
siderable periods they did not really pretend to exercise 
control over the criminal Filipinos inhabiting the west 
coast of the island. Conditions as to public order were 
worse in Mindoro than anywhere else in the archipelago 
north of Mindanao and Jolo. 

No less absurd are Blount's suggestions as to the gen- 
eral worthlessness of the island. There are high moun- 
tains in its interior, and there are great stretches of the 

* Blount, p. 228. '' Ibid., p. 229. ^ Bandits, or organized robbers. 


most fertile land in the world along its coast. Its north- 
ern and eastern portions have a very heavy and evenly 
distributed rainfall, and are admirably suited to the grow- 
ing of cocoanuts, hemp, cacao, rubber and similar tropi- 
cal products. In this region rice flourishes wonderfully 
without irrigation. There was a time in the past when 
Mindoro was known as ''the granary of the Philippines." 
Later its population was decimated by constant Moro 
attacks, and cattle disease destroyed its draft animals, 
with the result that the cultivated lands were abandoned 
to a considerable extent and again grew up to jungle, 
from which, however, it is easy to redeem them. The 
west coast has strongly marked wet and dry seasons sim- 
ilar to those at Manila. There is abundant water avail- 
able for irrigation, furnished by streams which never run 
dry. Much of the soil is rich, and will grow the best of 
sugar in large quantity. The forests, which now cover 
extensive areas, abound in fine woods, and produce rubber 
and other valuable gums. There are outcroppings of 
lignite at numerous points on the island, and in the vi- 
cinity of Mt. Halcon is found the finest marble yet dis- 
covered in this part of the world. Gold is also present 
in some quantity at various places. In short, Mindoro 
is naturally one of the richest islands in the Archipelago. 
If its tillable lands were under high cultivation, it would 
support half the population of the Philippines. 


In endeavouring to show that Palawan is without po- 
litical importance Blount has followed precisely the pro- 
cedure which he adopted in the case of Mindoro. First, 
he gives the area and the population of the island, when 
he should concern himself with the province. The area 
of the island is 4027 square miles ; that of the province, 
5238 square miles. According to the 1903 census, the 
population of the island was 10,918, while that of the 


province, which contains such thickly settled and fertile 
islands as Cuyo and Agutaya, was 39,582. Of course, if 
one wishes to emphasize the unimportance of Palawan, 
it is more convenient to take the figures for the island. 
Blount says : — 

'' Paragua,^ the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower 
left of any map of the archipelago, extending northeast-south- 
west at an angle of about 45°, is practically worthless, being 
fit for nothing much except a penal colony, for which purpose 
it is in fact now used." ^ 

I must deny the truthfulness of his statements, even 
if we limit our consideration to the island of Palawan. 
Only 159 of its 4027 square miles are utilized for a penal 
colony. Its natural wealth is simply enormous. It is 
covered throughout the greater part of its extent with 
virgin forest containing magnificent stands of the best 
timber. Damar, a very valuable varnish gum, is abun- 
dant in its mountains. Much of the so-called ''Singapore 
cane," so highly prized by makers of rattan and wicker 
furniture, comes from its west coast. It is a well-watered 
island, and its level plains, which receive the wash from 
its heavily forested mountains, have a soil of unsurpassed 
fertility in which cocoanuts come to bearing in five years 
or even less. Incidentally, the greater part of the island 
lies south of the typhoon belt. Malampaya Sound, situ- 
ated near its northwestern extremity, is one of the world's 
great harbors. But should we wish to rid ourselves of 
this wonderful island, I may say, without violating any 
ofiicial confidences, that there was a time when Germany 
would have been more than pleased to take it off our 
hands ; and indeed our British friends, who were suffi- 
ciently interested in it to survey it some decades ago, 
might possibly be prevailed upon to accept it ! 

There are good reasons why Blount thought it conven- 
ient to make it appear that Palawan was politically un- 

1 The old Spanish name for Palawan. * Blount, p. 228. 


important. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities with 
Spain the Filipino garrison at Puerto Princesa mutinied, 
and the things which they did were not nice. Among 
others, they liberated the convicts, Puerto Princesa being 
at the time a penal colony, and the latter, together with 
some of the soldiers, started up the east coast of the 
island, leaving a trail of devastation in their wake. The 
prosperous town of Tinitian was abandoned as they 
approached it, and was so thoroughly cleaned out by them 
that it has never since been reoccupied except by a few 
stragglers. Other towns, including Tay-Tay, were raided. 

On November 27, 1899, Aguinaldo's representative in 
this province wrote him that the inhabitants were pre- 
paring to kill all the Tagalogs and revolt against Insur- 
gent rule.^ Later when some of the latter were anxious to 
get the people of one of the northern settlements to 
take them on a short boat journey, these Visayans con- 
sented to give them a lift only on condition that they 
first allow themselves to be bound, and then took them 
out to sea and threw them overboard. 

Another thing which Blount would have found it in- 
convenient to discuss is the conduct of the people of 
Cuyo, at one time the capital of the province. On this 
island, which contains but twenty-one square miles, there 
were in 1903 no less than 7545 inhabitants. They hated 
and feared the people of Mindoro and sent messengers 
to Iloilo, after the Americans had occupied that place, to 
beg for a garrison of American troops, and to say that if 
furnished with an American flag they themselves would 
defend it. For some reason they were not given the flag, 
and the sending of a garrison was long delayed. Having 
grown weary of waiting, they made an American flag of 
their own, hoisted it, and when the Insurgents from Min- 
doro came intrenched themselves and defended it. They 
were actually being besieged w^hen the American garrison 
finally arrived. Here is one more fact inconsistent with 

» P. I. R., 944. 10. 


the theory that the FiHpino people were a unit at 
Aguinaldo's back, and of course the easiest way to get 
around such an occurrence is to forget to mention it ! 


And now we come to the great island of Mindanao, 
which all but equals Luzon in size, having an area of 36,292 
square miles as against the 40,969 of Luzon. Blount's 
first mention of it is peculiar. 

In connection with the words " the other six islands 
that really matter," in the passage above cited on page 
116 of his book, he has inserted a foot-note reading as 
follows : — 

"The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao 
is always dealt with in this book as a separate and distinct 
problem." ^ 

But it was hardly possible for him to dismiss this 
great island, which is a little continent by itself, quite so 
cavalierly and I will quote the more important of his 
further and later statements regarding it : — 

"While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near 
Borneo, with its 36,000 square miles of area, requires that the 
Philippine archipelago be described as stretching over more 
than one thousand miles from north to south, still, inasmuch 
as Mindanao only contains about 500,000 people all told, 
half of them semi-civilized, the governmental problem it 
presents has no more to do with the main problem of whether, 
if ever, we are to grant independence to the 7,000,000 Chris- 
tians of the other islands, than the questions that have to be 
passed on by our Commissioner of Indian Affairs have to do 
with the tariff. Mindanao's 36,000 square miles constitute 
nearly a third of the total area of the Philippine archipelago, 
and more than that fraction of the 97,500 square miles of 
territory to a consideration of which our attention is reduced 
by the process of elimination above indicated. Turning over 
Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan semi-civilized 
Moros would indeed be 'like granting self-government to an 

* Blount, p. 116. 












Apache reservation under some local chief/ as Mr. Roose- 
velt, in the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would 
be to grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo. Fur- 
thermore, the Moros, so far as they can think, would prefer 
to owe allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition as subjects 
of, some great nation. Again, because the Filipinos have no 
moral right to control the Moros, and could not if they would, 
the latter being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the 
thought of possible ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the 
most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed 
principles has not a leg to stand on with regard to Mohammedan 
Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as to it, we have a distinct 
separate problem, which cannot be solved in the lifetime of 
anybody now living. But it is a problem which need not in 
the least delay the advent of independence for the other four- 
teen fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago — all 
Christians living on islands north of Mindanao. It is true 
that there are some Christian Filipinos on Mindanao, but in 
policing the Moros, our government would of course protect 
them from the Moros. If they did not like our government, 
they could move to such parts of the islands as we might per- 
mit to be incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. 
Inasmuch as the 300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan 
island of Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo (the 
*Sulu archipelago,' so called, 'reigned over' by the sultan of 
comic opera fame) originally presented, as they will always 
present, a distinct and separate problem, and never did have 
anything more to do with the Philippine insurrection against 
us than their cousins and co-religionists over in near-by Bor- 
neo, the task which confronted Mr. Root in the fall of 1899, 
to wit, the suppression of the Philippine insurrection, meant 
practically the subjugation of one big island, Luzon, contain- 
ing half the population and one third of the total area of the 
archipelago, and six neighbouring small ones, the Visayan 
Islands." ^ 

Now as a matter of fact Mindanao is by no means 
Mohammedan. The Mohammedan Malays, called Moros, 
are found here and there along the western coast of the 
Zamboanga peninsula and along the southern coast of the 
island as far as Davao. They also extend far up the Cota- 
bato River and occupy the Lake Lanao region, but that 

» Blount, p. 229. 

VOL. I — Q 


is all. The interior of the island is for the most part 
occupied by the members of a number of non-Christian, 
non-Mohammedan tribes, while its northern and eastern 
coasts are inhabited by Visayan Filipinos, of whom there 
are many in Zamboanga itself. 

While, as Blount says, the Moros took no part in the 
insurrection against the United States, the Visayans of 
Mindanao did, and we had some lively tussles with them 
in Misaixds and in Surigao. 

It is indeed unthinkable that we should turn Mindanao 
over to the Moros. Abandonment of it by us would in 
the end result in this, as they would take possession of 
the entire island in the course of time. Neither the other 
wild tribes nor the Filipinos could stand against them. I 
heartily agree with the conclusion that we must retain 
this island for many years before we can settle the prob- 
lems which it presents. It is further true that we might 
retain it and still grant independence to the remainder 
of the Philippine Archipelago, but if we are to eliminate 
Mindanao from consideration because the Filipinos have 
no right to control the Moros, of whom there are in reality 
only about a hundred and fifty-four thousand^ on the 
island, and could not if they would, what about Luzon, 
where there are in reality no less than four hundred 
and sixty thousand non-Christians,^ many of whom, like 
the Ifugaos, Bontoc Igorots, Kalingas and wild Tingians, 
are fierce fighters and practically all of whom are bitterly 
opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination 
by Filipinos, while most of them welcome American rule ? 

Have the Filipinos any more moral right to control 
them than they have to control the Moros ? Could they 
control them if they would ? And has the most uncom- 
promising advocate of the consent of the governed prin- 
ciple "a leg to stand on" in the one case if he lacks it in 
the other ? 

The Filipino politicians are not ready to admit that 

1 According to the census of 1903, 154,706. ^ See table on p. 651. 


Filipinos could not satisfactorily govern Moros and have 
even alleged that they did so govern them during the 
period now under discussion. Let us examine the facts. 

Aguinaldo attempted to enter into negotiations with 
the Sultan of Jolo, addressing him as his "great and 
powerful brother," ^ but this brother does not seem to 
have received his advances with enthusiasm, and the other 
brothers proceeded to do things to the Filipinos at the 
first opportunity. 

Jose Roa in writing Aguinaldo on January 26, 1899, of 
conditions in the province of Misamis says : - — 

"Hardly had said evacuation of Iligan taken place on the 
28th of last month, when the Moros or Mohammedans of the 
interior, our mortal enemies since times immemorial on account 
of their religious fanaticism which they carry to extremes, as 
do their co-religionists in Europe and Asia, and on account of 
their objection to leading a civilized life, began to harry the 
town of Iligan which is the nearest town to the lake around 
which is the densest Moro population. Due to the prestige 
of the local president of that town, Senor Carloto Sariol, and 
the energy that he showed, after some days of constant firing 
against groups who descended upon the suburbs of the town, 
he was successful in having them abandon their hostile atti- 
tude and promise to live in peace and harmony with said 

1 (Contemporary copy in Spanish. — P. I. R., Books C-L :) 

"January 19, 1899. 

" The President of the Philippine Republic very cordially greets his 
great and powerful brother, the Sultan of Jolo, and makes known : — 

" That the Filipinos, after having thrown off the yoke of foreign 
domination cannot forget their brothers of Jolo to whom they are bound 
hj the ties of race, interests, security and defense in this region of the 
Far East. 

" The Philippine Republic has resolved to respect absolutely the 
beliefs and traditions of each island in order to establish on solid bases 
the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests. 

" I therefore in the name of all the Filipinos very gladly offer to the 
powerful Sultan of Jolo and to all brothers who acknowledge his great 
authority, the highest assurance of friendship, consideration and es- 

"Malolos, January 18, 1899." 

(No signature.) 

2 P. I. R., 76. 1. 


towns, this verbal agreement being participated in by the 
Dattos of some settlements who did not wish to treat with the 
Spanish Government. 

''Being acquainted nevertheless with these people, we know 
by experience that the more friendly they appear, the more 
we must watch against them, because as soon as they find a 
good opportunity they do not fail to take advantage of it to 
enter the towns for the purpose of sacking them and kidnapping 
as many of their inhabitants as possible in order to reduce 
them to slavery." 

Immediately after the abandomnent of Cotabato by the 
Spaniards the Filipino residents set up a government 
there. A few days later the Moro datos, Piang, Ali and 
Djimbangan, dropped in with their followers, cut off the 
head of the Filipino presidente, served a few other leading 
officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded 
to set up a government of their own which was the only 
government that the place had prior to the arrival of the 
American troops. 

Dato Djimbangan promptly caused the Filipina women 
of the place to be stripped and compelled to march before 
him on the public plaza in a state of nudity. 

At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town 
at any time after the Spaniards left had they desired to 
do so. On the arrival of the Americans Dato Mandi 
offered to take it and turn it over to them, but his propo- 
sition was declined. 

He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to condi- 
tions under Insurgent rule. It reads as follows : — 


'We always had peace in Zamboanga District, except 
during the revolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899, when 
for seven or eight months there was in existence the so-called 
FiUpino Repubhc. During that time there was much robbing 
and kilhng ; the Ufe of a man was worth no more than that of 
a chicken ; men killed one another for personal gain ; enemies 
fought one another with the bolo instead of settling their dif- 
ferences before the law. It was a time of bloodshed and terror. 
There was no justice. Because of this the Moros were opposed 
to the Filipinos. There was conflict between the better class 


of Filipinos and the revolutionists, who had gained control 
of the local government." ^ 

Elsewhere throughout the Moro territoiy those Fili- 
pinos who did not promptly make their escape were mur- 
dered or enslaved. In short, the lion and the lamb lay 
down together, with the lamb inside as usual. 

Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of 
Filipinos to govern Moros did not result in complete 

Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to 
open communication with the Sultan of Jolo, authorizing 
him to establish in all the rancherias of Mindanao and 
Jolo a government in accordance with a decree duly trans- 
mitted. The Sultan was requested to report the result 
of his efforts and to give the number of his forces with 
their arms, and was advised that, "if in this war, which 
I consider to be the last, we secure our independence 
and with the opposition of our brothers in that region, 
with yourself at their head, we are successful in preventing 
the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country 
will always render a tribute of homage and gratitude to 
your memory." ^ Curiously, the Sultan seems to have 
remained unmoved by the appeal. 

^ From an official document on file at Manila. 

2 " Being brothers, the descendants of the same race and of one soul, 
the same sun shines upon us and we breathe the same air, so that our 
sentiments are also one, and we aspire to the independence and liberty 
of our countrj' in order to secure its progress and place it on a level with 
other civilized nations ; and with this assurance I have taken the liberty 
to address you this letter, begging of you to accept the commission 
which in the name of our government I have the honour to confer upon 
you. You are authorized thereunder to establish in all the 'Ran- 
cherias' of Mindanao and Jolo, a civil and military economic-adminis- 
trative organization, in accordance with the decrees which I enclose 
herewith, and after having established the same, I request that you 
make a report to our Honourable President of the Philippine Republic, 
Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo, of the result thereof and of the number of the 
force with their arms and ammunition, in order to ascertain whether 
they would be sufficient to prevent the invasion of the enemy and 
whether there is any necessity of sending reenforcements of arms to 
said Islands for this purpose. If in this war, which I consider to be 



This tight little island of 1236 square miles had in 1903 
a Visayan population of 29,451. Its people are all Fili- 
pinos, and are on the whole rather an unusually orderly 
and worthy set. There is no reason why it should have 
been excluded in considering "the human problem in its 
broader governmental aspect," whatever that may be, nor 
can I understand why Blount should have desired to ex- 
clude it except that he seems to have been endeavouring 
to exclude everything possible outside of Luzon, in order 
to increase the apparent importance of the Christian 
provinces of that island. Masbate should of course be 
taken into account in connection with the Visayan Is- 
lands, of which it is one. 

The islands ordinarily included in the group known as 
''The Visayas" from the ancient tribal name of the civiUzed 
Filipino people who inhabit them, who are called Visayans, 
are Samar, Panay, Negros, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Masbate, 
Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijor and numerous 
smaller islands adjacent to those named. Although 
their inhabitants are all rated as one people, they speak 
a number of more or less distinct dialects. Only Panay, 
Negros, Samar, Tablas and Sibuyan have non-Christian 
inhabitants, and in the three islands last named their 
number is so small as to be negligible. In the moun- 
tains of Panay and Negros, however, Negritos are to be 
found in considerable numbers, as are the representatives 
of a tribe sometimes called Monteses ^ and sometimes 

the last, we secure our independence, and with the opposition of our 
brothers in that region, with yourself at their head, we are successful 
in preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country 
will always render a tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory. 

" God preserve you many years. 

"May 31, 1899. " Baldomero Aguinaldo, 

" Lieut. Gen. Superior P. M. Commander of Southern Region. 
"To THE Honourable Sultan Raha Halon." 

— P. I. R., 810-4. 

1 Spanish for "mountain people." 


Bukidnon. The latter tribal designation I have thought 
it best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Min- 

In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government 
of Aguinaldo was established at various places and dif- 
ferent times, without consulting or considering the will 
of the people. The men who went as his delegates were 
supported by armed forces, hence their authority was not 
at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurings 
which might easily have grown into a war cry. 

The attitude of the Visayan Filipinos is clearly fore- 
shadowed in the following extract from a letter dated 
January 14, 1899, in which Mabini discussed the ad- 
visability of putting the constitution in force : — 

"And even if this change is made, I fear that Negros and 
Iloilo will form a federal Republic and not one in conformity 
vnth the centralized Republic pro\dded for by the Constitu- 
tion." 1 

The action later taken by Negros shows that there was 
abundant reason for this fear. 

As late as February 26, 1899, the Insurgent govern- 
ment was still ignorant as to the real conditions in Negros 
and Mindanao.^ 

From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible 
at Hongkong, we learn that Aguinaldo and his followers 
were even then still uninformed as to events in the Vi- 

1 P. I. R., 512. A 5. 

2 Extract from a letter to Apacible of the Hongkong junta dated 
February 26, 1899 : — 

"It is also said that the Cantonal Government of Negros has wished 
to make a treaty with the Americans, some members of that govern- 
ment having come in American transports to confer with General Otis. 
We are not aware of the conditions of the arrangement, because the 
Negros people have thus far not wished to put themselves in com- 
munication "nath us ; we only know by news more or less reliable that 
the capital of that island has been occupied by the American forces 
without opposition. 

"Of Mindanao we know absolutely nothing; we also are ignorant 
of what has been the lot of oiu* agents in America." 


sayan Islands.^ In view of these facts, how ridiculous 
become the contentions of those who claim that the 
Malolos government represented the archipelago as a 
whole. And what shall we say of the following statement, 
remembering that the Treaty of Paris was signed De- 
cember 10, 1899? 

"When the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in 
possession of Cavite and Manila, with less than twenty thou- 
sand men under his command, and Aguinaldo was in posses- 
sion of practically all of the rest of the archipelago with between 
35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns, 
and the whole Filipino population were in sympathy with the 
army of their country." ^ 

Ultimately, by one means or another, and chiefly by 
the use of armed emissaries, the Visayan Islands, with the 
exception of Negros, were brought into the Insurgent 

Mabini's fear that Negros and Iloilo would form a 
federal republic was not realized, but Negros set up its 
own government, applied to the local commander of the 
United States forces for help, endeavoured with almost 
complete success to keep out Tagalog invaders, and pres- 
ently settled down contentedly under American rule, 
facts of which Blount makes no mention. On the con- 
trary, without just cause, he includes this great island, 
with its 4881 square miles of territory and its 560,776 
inhabitants, in the area over which he claims that Agui- 
naldo exercised complete control. 

At Iloilo the American troops encountered opposition 
when they planned to land. Negotiations had been en- 

^ "Of the Visayas and Mindanao we know nothing positive as yet, 
it is whispered that the Americans have succeeded in occupying Negros 
and Cebu against the will of the inhabitants. Iloilo continues the 
strugglo energetically. It does not matter that they occupy tempo- 
rarily those beautiful islands, because Luzon will know how to fight 
for herself and the rest of the islands, and will not lay down arms with- 
out the independence of the Philippine Archipelago." 

2 Blount, p. 140. 









g 03 

c — 

o s 












tered into with the local FiUpino officers, but the latter, 
under the influence of representatives whom Aguinaldo 
had sent from Luzon, announced themselves as adher- 
ents of his government, and when the American troops 
finally disembarked fired the town ahead of them. It 
has been claimed that in doing this they were inspired 
by pure patriotism, but the facts shown by their own 
records present a very different picture. 

In writing to Aguinaldo on April 8, 1899, Mabini says : 

"We have received a communication forwarded from 
Iloilo, from General Martin Delgado and Francisco Soriano, 
your commissioner. Soriano states that the troops of Diocno 
have done nothing except commit excesses and steal money 
during the attack by the Americans upon the to^vn of Iloilo, 
even going so far as to break their guns by using them as poles 
to carry the stolen money which they took to Cdpiz. It is 
said that these forces, besides being unwilling to fight the 
Americans, refuse to give their guns to those who do wish to 
fight and do not want Capiz to aid the people of Iloilo, who are 
the ones who support the entire forces, including the troops of 
Diocno who went there." ^ 

This same letter contains the following brief reference 
to conditions in Cebu and Leyte : — 

"Also a native priest, Sefior Pascual Reyes, has arrived 
here from Cebii, and says that in Le>i;e General Lucban is 
committing many abuses and that Colonel Mojica is only a 
mere figurehead. In Cebii, he says, things are also in a chaotic 
condition, because the military chief, Magsilum [Maxilom, 
— Tr.], and the people are not in harmony." 

Further details as to conditions in Cebu are given in a 
letter to Aguinaldo from the commissioner whom he 
put in charge of elections in that island, who on Febru- 
ary 19, 1899, writes : ^ — 

"Having arrived in this province the 8th of last month, I 
left on the Uth for the northern pueblos of this Island to hold 
the elections for the ofiices ordered by the Superior Decree of 
June 18, last. 


1 P. I. R., 62. 2. 2 Ibid., 144. 1. 


"The news spread like an electric spark, as in all the pueblos 
I visited later I found that almost all of the residents were in 
their homes, so that when the elections were held in the town 
hall, all the principal residents attended, requesting me to 
inform you that they were disposed to sacrifice even their 
dearest affections whenever necessary for our sacred cause ; 
they only asked me to inform those who hold the reins of 
government at the present time in this province, that some 
steps be taken to put a stop to the arbitrary acts which had 
been and still are being committed by the so-called Captains, 
Majors, Colonels, Generals and Captains General, who abusing 
in the most barefaced manner the positions they claimed to 
hold, were depriving them of their horses and their carabaos, 
or cattle. I promised them that I would do this, as I do now, 
by sending a communication at once to Sres. Flores and Max- 
ilom, who are at the head of the provincial government, im- 
pressing upon them the fact that if they continue to grant 
ranks and titles to persons of this character, as they have done, 
it would end in the utter ruin of this wealthy province." 

He adds that these men did not remedy the evils com- 
plained of. It would be possible to cover in detail all of 
this and the remaining Insurgent territory, and to show 
that Judge Blount was quite right in stating that condi- 
tions similar to those encountered in Luzon arose there, 
but the limitations of time and space forbid, and I must 
ask my readers to accept on faith the statements of Blount 
and myself that such was the case ! 

Taylor thus summarizes the conditions which ultimately 
arose : — 

"The Insurgent soldiers lived in their own land as they 
would have lived in a conquered country. They were quar- 
tered on the towns and the towns had to feed them whether 
they would or not. 

"Peace there was where Aguinaldo's soldiers had not pen- 
etrated, but there does not seem to have been progress. Life 
went very well in a long siesta in the shady villages under the 
palm trees, but not only the structure of the State, its very 
foundations were falling apart. When Aguinaldo's soldiers 
came they brought cruelty and license with them. Proud of 
their victories and confident in themselves they felt that the 
labourers in the fields, the merchants in the towns, were for the 


purpose of administering to their necessities and their desires. 
Aguinaldo, having seen this force gather about him, was forced 
to entreat it, to appeal to it ; he was never strong enough to 
enforce discipline, even if he cared to do it." 

Aguinaldo himself finally became disheartened over 
his inability to maintain a decent state of public order in 
the territory which he claimed to govern, and in Decem- 
ber, 1898, tendered his resignation, giving among other 
reasons odious favouritism on the part of some of the 
military chiefs, together with a desire to enrich them- 
selves by improper means, such as accepting bribes, 
making prisoners a source of gain, and decreasing the 
allowance of the soldiers. He said that many soldiers 
had received sums of money as their share of booty, and 
intimated that officers must have done the same. He 
made charges against civil as well as military officers and 
ended by saying that he retained the evidence for presen- 
tation when called on.^ 

1 "The second reason for my resignation is the pain caused me by 
having still to read among the reports of our miUtary associates that 
in some of the chiefs, besides odious favouritism, is clearly seen a desire 
to enrich themselves, accepting bribes, making even prisoners a means 
of gain, and others there are, above all the commissaries, who dare 
to decrease the allowance of the soldier, little enough already ; — I 
throw the blame of all this upon those who taught us such a custom ; 
consequently I have reason to hope that they will change their 

"The same cause of complaint I have concerning some companions 
who are discharging civil offices, especially those who are far from the 
oversight of the government, who put theii* own welfare before tlie 
common good, and de\-ise a thousand means to further their own ends, 
even to the extent of gambling. Where are the police ? Are they, 
perchance, also bribed ? Pity money is so ill spent ! However, every 
one is obliged to know that falsehood will never prevail against truth, 
and as evidence hereof many soldiers have confessed to the govern- 
ment as to having received certain sums in the share of the booty, and 
if we consider that the latter who receive their share have told the 
truth, why should those who are present during the partition of the 
money and receive nothing, not do so ? In this way the eyes of some 
that were blinded are gradually opened ; I confess, moreover, that 
the latter are to be blamed less than those in authority who are so 


Aguinaldo was later persuaded to withdraw his resig- 
nation. No wonder that he wished to tender it ! 

In referring to the report of Wilcox and Sargent, Blount 
has said : — 

"Tliis report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey 
under date of November 23, 1898, and by him forwarded to 
the Navy Department for its information, with the comment 
that it 'in my opinion contains the most complete and reliable 
information obtainable in regard to the present state of the 
northern part of Luzon Island.' The Admiral's indorsement 
was not sent to the Senate along with the report." ^ 

He thus gives it to be understood that the admiral 
believed that the report truthfully set forth the condi- 
tions which actually existed in these provinces, and that 
his indorsement was suppressed. Not only was it true 
that this report when rendered contained the most com- 
plete and reliable information then available in regard 
to the existing state of the northern part of Luzon Island, 
but it contained the only first-hand information avail- 
able. The facts ultimately leaked out and led the ad- 
miral radically to change his opinion as to the conditions 
which arose under Insurgent rule. Of them he later 
said : — 

"There was a sort of a reign of terror ; there was no govern- 
ment. These people had got power for the first time in their 
lives and they were riding roughshod over the community. 
The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice were 
hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat 
his prisoners kindly, and he said he would." 

I believe that I have fully demonstrated the truth of 
these statements. Blount was thoroughly familiar with 

attached to the methods of the past administration, who, we may hope, 
will change their mode of conduct and exhibit true patriotism. 

"I certify to the truth of all the above-mentioned evils, which must 
be eradicated. I retain the evidence for presentation when called on, 
so that if any of the readers hereof should consider themselves referred 
to and should resent it, I am ready to beg their pardon." — P. I. R., 8. 2. 

1 Blount, p. 108. 


Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee, in 
which they occur, but he did not mention them. 

I cannot close this discussion of Insurgent rule without 
quoting extracts from a remarkable document written by 
Isabelo Artacho in October,^ 1899. It was entitled 
''Declaration Letter and Proclamation" and was ad- 
dressed to the Filipino people. While it is probable 
that Artacho was impelled to tell the truth by his hatred 
for Aguinaldo, t'ell the truth he did, and his rank and 
standing entitle his statements to consideration : — 

"Study the work of the insurrection; see if it is, as is said, 
the faithful interpretation of your wishes and desires. 

" Go through your towns, fields, and mountains. Wherever 
you see an insurgent gun or bolo you will find girls and faithful 
wives violated, parents and brothers crjdng for the murder of 
a son or of a brother ; honest families robbed and in misery ; 
villages burned and plundered for the benefit of a chief or a 
General ; you will see fresh and living signs yet of those hor- 
rible crimes perpetrated with the greatest cynicism by those 
who call themselves your liberators ! Liberators because 
they wear red pants, or a red shirt, or carry on their hats a 
piece of red cloth or a triangular figure ! 

"Here, a president stabs a man, perhaps the most honest of 
the village, simply for having implored mercy for a creature 
arbitrarily inflicted with the cepo [an oblong square piece of 
heavy wood divided into two parts, with a lock at each end 
and six or more holes in the middle to confine the feet of pris- 
oners] ; there, a djdng man, suspended by the feet in a cepo, 
raised from the level of the ground, by another president who 
has charged him with an unproved crime ; there a poor woman 
falsely charged and driven by petty officers \\dth their bayonets 
for having objected to their invasion into her house, or shop, 
they being supposed to be, each. Justice itself, 'Justicia,' and to 
be obeyed as images of the Gods ; there, generals who murder 
without fear, for an insignificant motive, creatures whose 
members are being mutilated, or their flesh cut in slices and 
afterwards roasted and given them to eat ; there, ofiicers 
braining a girl who has refused to accede to their sensual 
wishes, the lifeless body of the victim, pierced with shots, 
after having been made use of, is thrown into the river. It is 

1 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2928-2941. 


not unusual to witness officers burying people alive in a tomb 
prepared by the victim, by order of the murderer; it is not 
unusual to see a Pidsne-Jndge pointing a revolver at a man who 
is about to give evidence, and threatening to brain him for 
ha\dng dared to ask: 'Why and to whom am I to declare?' 
And finally, on his tottering throne, you -w-ill see the Magistrate 
of the Philippines, so called by his worshippers, with his me- 
phistophelian smile, disposing and directing the execution of 
a murder, of a plunder, of a robbery, or the execution of some 
other crimes against those who are indifferent or do not care 
to worship him, such indifference being considered a crime. 

''Putting aside the many other murders, I may mention 
that one recently committed on the person of the renowTied 
and by many called the worthy General, Antonio Luna, which 
took place just at the entrance of the palace of the Republic 
Presidency, and also the assassination at Kavite of the ever 
remembered martyr, Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the 
' Katipiinan ' Society, and the one who initiated the Revolution 
of 1896 ; against the memory of whom it has been committed, 
in the proclamation of that falsely called Republic, the crim- 
inal and unjust omission to render the smallest manifestation 
of Filipinos' feehngs towards him, to prevent that same 
might dislike his murderers ! 

"Study the ordinances and constitution of this so-called 
democratic Government of the Republic, that grand work of 
the wise Fihpinos; admire wdth me that beautiful monu- 
ment erected on a sheet of paper and consecrated to the con- 
quest of reason and labour, especially in connection with human 
rights and property, the basis for the well-being of social life; 
but, lament and deplore with me its palpable nullity when 
brought to practice and you will again see that the laws were 
made for the people and not the people for the laws ! 

"Under this republic called democratic it is a crime to think, 
to wish, to say, anything which does not agree with what the 
said Gods think, wish and say. Nobody and nothing is at- 
tended to, whilst those who have your fives in their hands must 
be respected. 

"Under this Goverment there cannot be the slightest notice 
taken of family, property, morafity and justice, but confusion 
and disorder appear everywhere fike a dreadful shadow, pro- 
duced by the ignorance of the subordinate officers, and of the 
powers that be in the villages and provinces, who are sup- 
ported by a special committee, or special commissioners em- 
powered to impoverish and to ruin all and with the right of 


disposing, at their own accord, life, family and individual 
property without responsibility whatsoever on their part. 

*^ ^F ^^ ^F '^ •^ *|* 

" Let the peaceful annexation of the whole of the Southern 
Islands of Jolo, Mindanao, Iloilo, Negros, Cebu and others 
where now the American flag is hoisted and under whose 
shadow tranquillity and well-being are experienced, speak for 

" Let it speak for itself, the proceeding observed by the whole 
people of Imus, who were asking protection when the American 
troops took possession of the town of Bacoor, whilst the insur- 
gent troops there located were hostile. 

" Let them speak for themselves, the protests against the 
war made by the numerous persons of S. Francisco de Malabon, 
Sta. Cruz de Malabon, Perez Dasmarinas and other towns, 
before the Worthy Chief Mariano Trias, who ultimately 
refused, with dignity, the high position of Secretary of War, 
for which rank he was promoted for reasons which are not 
worth publishing here. In fine, let it speak for itself, the 
non-resistance shown by the people of Old Kavite [Kawit], 
Noveleta, and Rozario of the heroic province of Kavite, not- 
withstanding the many intrenchments and troops there lo- 
cated, as well as the identical behaviour observed by other 
towns of Luzon provinces who are ready to follow when the 
American troops are in them. 

* * * rn if ^ ^i 

" In fact no one would believe it, and the Philippine people 
are tired of waiting for the day when Haring Gavino will shake 
a napkin to produce suddenly horses vomiting fire and light- 
ning and troops of dangerous insects; that day in which 
they will witness the realization of that famous telegraphed 
dream to the effect that two hours after the commencement of 
the war the insurgents -will take their breakfast in the Palace 
of * Malacanang,' their tiffin in the Senate House, and their dinner 
on board the Olyynpia or in Kavite ; that day in which the 
celebrated Pequenines army, with their invisible Chief-leader, 
will exterminate the American troops by means of handfuls of 
dust and sand thrown at them, which process, it is said, has 
caused the smallpox to the Americans; that day in which 
the Colorum army will capture the American fleet ^vith the 
cords their troops are proxaded with, in combination with a 
grand intrenchment of Tayabas made of husks of paddy, 
by a Nazarene, who will then, by merely touching, convert each 


husk into a Bee with a deadly sting; that day in which the 
insurgents, like their leaders, provided with hosts of flour, 
or of paper, pieces of candles of the holy- week matins, holy 
water, pieces of consecrated stones; of vestments belonging 
to a miraculous Saint or with some other Anting-Anting or 
talisman or amuletos, will make themselves invulnerable to 
bullets ; also have power to convert into any of the four ele- 
ments, Uke those personages of the PhiUppine legends and 
comedies, — Ygmidio, Tenoso, Florante, Barnardo, Carpio, 

" Yes, the people of the Philippines are quite tired of waiting 
for the predicted European conflict, which it is said would 
give them their independence ; if not, perhaps, divide the 
Islands as they are now amongst cousins, brothers, nephews, 
uncles and godfathers. 

" In the near future, when we have acquired the necessary 
political and social education and the habit of behaving justly 
towards ourselves and towards our fellow-brothers ; when free 
from all superstition, healthy, strong and vigorous, we find 
ourselves capable of governing ourselves, without there being 
the possibility of the preponderance of our passions in the 
consideration, direction, and administration of the interests 
of our country, then, and only then, we wiU be free ! we will 
be independent ! ^ 

" Hongkong, 1st October, 1899." 

Most of the men who perpetrated the outrages I have 
detailed are alive to-day, and are powers in their respective 
communities. Simeon Villa was recently elected a mem- 
ber of the municipal board from the south district of 
Manila, but fortunately an American governor-general 
prevented him from taking his seat. Just prior to my 
departure from Manila he was appointed, by Speaker 
Osmena, a member of a committee on reception for 
Governor-General Harrison. 

The kind of independent ''government" these men es- 
tablished is the kind that they would again establish if 
they had the chance, ^ but among the persons to be tortured 

1 P. I. R., 838-2. 

2 In this connection note Blount's statement : — 

"But we are considering how much of a government the Filipinos 
had in 1898, because the answer is pertinent to what sort of a govern- 














and murdered would now be those Americans who failed to 
escape season ably. I do not mean to say that such a 
state of affairs would come about immediately, but it would 
certainly arise within a comparatively short time. Sooner 
yet ''the united Filipino people" would split up on old 
tribal Hnes, and fly at each other's throats. 

ment they could run if permitted now or at any time in the future." 
— Blount, p. 73. 



Did We Destroy a Republic? 

The claim has frequently been made that the United 
States government destroyed a republic in the Phihppine 
Islands,^ but some of the critics seem to entertain peculiar 
ideas as to what a republic is. Blount states ^ that 
Aguinaldo declined to hear our declaration of indepen- 
dence read ''because we would not recognize his right to 
assert the same truths," and then apparently forgetting 
the Insurgent chief's alleged adherence to the principles 
of this document, he lets the cat out of the bag by saying 
that "the war satisfied us all that Aguinaldo would have 
been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz," and would him- 
self have been " The Republic." ^ 

He would doubtless have set up Just this sort of a 
government, if not assassinated too soon, but it would 

^ Blount refers to 

"The death-warrant of the Philippine republic signed by Mr. 
McKinley on September 16th." — Blount, p. 99. 

Speaking of Mr. Roosevelt's opinion of the practicability of granting 
independence to the Filipinos, he says : — 

"Yet it represented then one of the many current misapprehensions 
about the Filipinos which moved this great nation to destroy a young 
republic set up in a spirit of intelligent and generous emulation of our 
own." — Blount, p. 230. 

2 "Here was a man claiming to be President of a newly established 
republic based on the principles set forth in our Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, which republic had just issued a like Declaration, and he 
was invited to come and hear our declaration read, and declined be- 
cause we would not recognize his right to assert the same truths." 
— Blount, p. 59. 

^ "The war satisfied us all that Aguinaldo would have been a small 
edition of Porfirio Diaz, and that the Filipino republic-that-might-have- 
been would have been, very decidedly, 'a going concern,' although 
Aguinaldo probably would have been able to say with a degree of 
accuracy, as Diaz might have said in Mexico for so many years, 'The 
Republic ? I am the Republic' " — Blount, p. 292. 



hardly have accorded with the principles of the declaration 
of independence, nor would it have been exactly " a gov- 
ernment of the people, by the people, for the people." 

Blount truly says^ that the educated Fihpinos, ad- 
mittedly very few in number, absolutely control the masses. 
He adds 2 that presidentes of pueblos are as absolute 
bosses as is Murphy in Tammany Hall, and that the towns 
taken collectively constitute the provinces. The first 
statement is true, and the second, which is tantamount 
to a declaration that the presidentes control every square 
foot of the provinces and every man in them, is not so far 
from the truth as it might be. I have been old-fashioned 
enough to retain the idea that a republic is "a state in 
which the sovereign power resides in the whole body of 
the people, and is exercised by representatives elected 
by them." 

Blount labored under no delusion as to the fitness of 
the common people to govern.^ 

1 "The war demonstrated to the army, to a Q. E. D., that the Fili- 
pinos are 'capable of self-government,' unless the kind which happens 
to suit the genius of the American people is the only kind of govern- 
ment on earth that is respectable, and the one panacea for all the ills of 
government among men without regard to their temperament or his- 
torical antecedents. The educated patriotic Filipinos can control the 
masses of the people in their several districts as completely as a cap- 
tain ever controlled a company." — Blount, p. 292. 

2 "Even to-daj^ the presidente of a pueblo is as absolute boss of his 
town as Charles F. Murphy is in Tammany Hall. And a town or 
pueblo in the Philippines is more than an area covered by more or less 
contiguous buildings and grounds. It is more like a township in Massa- 
chusetts, so that when you account governmentally for the pueblos of a 
given province, you account for every square foot of that province 
and for every man in it." 

^ "In there reviewing the Samar and other insurrections of 1905 in 
the Philippines, you find him {i.e. Roosevelt) dealing with the real root 
of the evil with perfect honesty, though adopting the view that the 
Filipino people were to blame therefor, because we had placed too much 
power in the hands of an ignorant electorate, which had elected rascally 
officials." — Blount, p. 297. 

Also: — 

"But we proceeded to ram down their throats a preconceived theory 
that the only road to self-government was for an alien people to step 
in and make the ignorant masses the sine qua non." — Blount, p. 546. 


Not only did the Filipinos themselves understand 
perfectly well that they had no republic, but there were 
many of them who were fully aware of the fact that they 
could establish none. Fernando Acevedo, in writing to 
General Plo del Pilar on August 8, 1898, said : ^ — 

" There could be no republic here, even though the Americans 
should consent, because, according to the treaties, the Fili- 
pinos are not in condition for a republic. Besides this, all 
Europe will oppose it, and if it should be that they divide our 
country as though it were a round cake, what would become 
of us and what would belong to us?" 

I will now trace the evolution of the government 
which Aguinaldo did set up. In doing so I follow Taylor's 
argument very closely, drawing on his unpublished Ms., 
not only for ideas, but in some instances for the words in 
which they are clothed. I change his words in many cases, 
and do not mean to unload on him any responsibility 
for my statements, but do wish to acknowledge my in- 
debtedness to him and at the same time to avoid the neces- 
sity for the continual use of quotation marks. 

Aguinaldo's methods in establishing his republic are 
shown by his order ^ that ''any person who fights for his 
country has absolute power to kill any one not friendly 
to our cause" and the further order ^ prescribing that 
twelve lashes should be given to a soldier who lost even 
a single cartridge, while if he continued to waste ammu- 
nition he should be severely punished. In March, 1899, 
workmen who had abandoned their work in the arsenal 
at Malolos were arrested, returned, given twenty-five 
lashes each and then ordered to work.* 

Also : — 

"Of course the ignorant electorate we perpetrated on Samar as an 
'expression of our theoretical views' proved that we had 'gone too 
fast ' in conferring self-government, or to quote Mr. Roosevelt, had been 
'reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power of a people,' 
if to begin with the rankest material for constructing a government that 
there was at hand was to offer a fair test of capacity for self-govern- 
ment." — Blount, p. 546. i P. I. R., 499. 1 Ex. 134. 

» Ibid., 206. 1. 3 Ibid., 1124. 2. " Ibid., 204. 6. 


The news that an American expedition was about to 
sail for the PhiHppines made him realize that he had not 
much more than a month in which to place himself in 
a position in which he would have to be consulted and 
assisted, and this he tried to do. The arms he received 
from Hongkong on May 23 enabled him to begin an in- 
surrection, not as an ally of the United States, but on his 
own account. From May 21 to May 24 he issued orders 
for the uprising against Spain. On May 24 he declared 
himself Dictator of the Philippines in a proclamation 
in which he promised to resign his power into the hands 
of a president and cabinet, to be appointed when a consti- 
tutional assembly was convened, which would be as soon 
as the islands had passed into his control. He further 
announced that the North American nation had given 
its disinterested protection in order that the liberty of the 
Philippines should be gained.^ On May 25, 1898, the 
first American troops sailed from San Francisco for the 

Aguinaldo still had a month in which to seize enough 
Spanish territory to erect thereon what would appear to 
the Americans on their arrival to be a government of 
Luzon, of which he was the head. The Hongkong 
junta and Aguinaldo himself intended to ask for the recog- 
nition of their government, but they had first to create it. 
To obtain recognition it was necessary that the American 
commander on land should be able to report that wherever 
he or his troops had gone the country was ruled by 
Aguinaldo according to laws which showed that the people 
were capable of governing themselves. 

As the United States is a repubUc it was natural that 
the directing group of insurgent leaders should decide upon 
a republican form of government. That form would 
appeal to the people of the United States; the first 
"Christian Asiatic Republic" was a description which 
would inevitably awaken sympathy in that mother of 

1 P. I. R., 206. 6. 


republics. The idea was a wise and subtle one; but 
Aguinaldo's republic was merely an elaborate stage-setting, 
arranged for the contemplation of the people of the 
United States. 

By June 5, 1898, the success of the insurgent arms had 
been such that Aguinaldo felt that he could throw down 
the mask. He would still be glad of American assistance, 
but he felt himself strong enough to do without it. He 
saw that "there can now be proclaimed before the Filipino 
people and the civilized nations its only aspiration, namely, 
the independence of this country, which proclamation 
should not be delayed for any ulterior object of this govern- 
ment" ^ and ordered that the independence of the Philip- 
pines should be proclaimed at his birthplace, Cavite 
Viejo, on June 12, 1898. On that date he formally 
proclaimed it. The provinces of Cavite, Bataan, Pam- 
panga, Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Morong were 
about to fall into his hands, the Spanish troops in them 
being besieged, and about to surrender. 

From the same place on June 18, 1898, Aguinaldo 
promulgated his decree for the creation and adminis- 
tration of municipalities.- In brief, this provided that 
as soon as the territory of the archipelago, or any 
portion thereof, had passed from the possession of 
Spanish forces, the people in the towns who were most 
conspicuous for their intelligence, social position and 
upright conduct were to meet and elect a town govern- 
ment. The heads of the towns in every province were to 
elect a head for the province and his three counsellors. 
The provincial council, composed of these four officials, 
with the presidente of the capital of the province, were to 
see to the execution in that province of the decrees of the 
central government and to advise and suggest. 

This provincial council was to elect representatives 
for the revolutionary congress, which was to be charged 
with submitting suggestions to the central government 

1 P. I. R., 674. 1. 2 /ftid.^ 206. 3. 


upon interior and exterior affairs, and was to be heard 
by the government upon serious matters which admitted 
of delay and discussion. 

Before any person elected to office was permitted to 
discharge his functions, his election was to be approved 
by the central government. The military commanders, 
except in time of war, were to have no jurisdiction over the 
civil authorities. They could, however, demand such 
supplies as they might need, and these could not be re- 
fused. The government was to appoint commissioners 
to carry these regulations into effect. 

On June 20 Aguinaldo issued his regulations for the 
government of provinces and municipalities ^ as supple- 
mental to the decree of two days before. It went 
into the details of goverimient, under the following 
heads : police, justice, taxation and registration of 

On June 23 he proclaimed the establishment of a revolu- 
tionary government, with himself as ''president." In 
this capacity he had all the powers of the Spanish gov- 
ernor-general, unhampered by any orders from Spain. 
It is true that the scheme provided for the eventual for- 
mation of a republic, but it is doubtful if the people who 
drew it up really knew what that word meant. What 
was provided for in practice was a strong and highly 
centralized military dictatorship, in which, under the 
form of election, provision was made for the filling of all 
offices by men devoted to the group which had seized 

According to this decree the dictatorial government was 
in future to be entitled the revolutionary government. 
Its duty was to struggle for the independence of the 
Philippines in order to estabish a true republic. The dic- 
tator was to be known as the president of the revolu- 
tionary government. There were to be four secretaries — 
one of foreign affairs, commerce and marine ; one of 

1 P. I. R., 206. 3. 


war and public works ; one of police and interior order, 
justice, education and hygiene ; one of the treasury, 
agriculture and manufactures. The government could 
increase the number of secretaries if necessary. They 
were to assist the president in the despatch of business 
coming under their departments. 

In addition to the president and his secretaries, there 
was to be a revolutionary congress composed of repre- 
sentatives from the provinces of the Philippine Archi- 
pelago, elected as provided by the decree of June 18. 
In case a province was not able to elect representatives, 
the government would appoint them for such province. 
The congress was to discuss and advise, to approve 
treaties and loans, and to examine and approve the ac- 
counts of the secretary of the treasury. If important 
matters admitted of delay, the congress would be heard 
concerning them ; but if they did not admit of delay, 
the president of the government was to act at once. 
Projects of law could be presented by any representative, 
and by the secretaries of the government. 

A permanent committee of congress presided over by 
the vice-president was to be chosen by that body. This 
was to serve as a court of appeal in criminal cases and as 
a court of final jurisdiction in cases arising between the 
secretaries of the government and provincial officials. 
The acts of congress were not to go into effect until the 
president of the government ordered their execution. 
He was also to have the right of veto. 

This was a well-devised plan to secure control for the cen- 
tral group about Aguinaldo. His commissioners, under a 
form of election in which the electors were carefully selected 
men, established municipal governments devoted to the 
cause of the revolution. These were to choose provincial 
officials and members of the congress. All elections were 
subject to Aguinaldo's approval, and every province was 
under the command of a military representative of his, 
who could and did call upon the civil authorities for 












such supplies as he deemed fit. All real power was vested 
in the central group, and the central group was composed 
of Emilio Aguinaldo and his public and private advisers. 
By this time he had gathered about him men who were 
trained in the law, some of whom had served the Spanish 
government in various capacities. They were accustomed 
to the methods that had previously prevailed under the 
Spanish regime, and were now ready to draw up con- 
stitutions and regulations for the new government. 
Mabini wrote the three organic decrees. Copies of them 
were sent to the foreign consuls in Manila, and on July 
15, 1898 to Admiral Dewey. 

Although the title of ''president" was assumed by 
Aguinaldo, as more likely to be favourably considered 
in the United States than ''dictator," the tendency of 
his followers who had not been educated in Europe was 
to speak of and to regard him not as a president, but as an 
overlord holding all power in his hands. The people 
did not feel themselves citizens of a republic, copartners 
in an estate ; they considered themselves subject to a 
ruler who sometimes called himself president, and some- 
times dictator. Indeed, there is much to show that if 
Aguinaldo and his followers had succeeded in their plans, 
even the name "republic" would not have been long 
continued as the title of his goverimient.^ 

» On July 7, 1898, the secretary of the revolutionary junta in Min- 
danao, in \\Titing to Aguinaldo, closed his letter with the following 
formula : " Command this, your vassal, at all hours at the orders of 
his respected chief, on whom he will never turn his back, and whom 
he will never forswear. God preserve you. Captain General, many 
years." P. I. R., 1080. 1. Every now and then we find a queer use 
of the term " royal family." This seems to have been common among 
the mass of the people. Heads of towns and men of position often 
used the expression " royal orders " in speaking of the orders and 
decrees issued by Aguinaldo. For example, the officials of Tayug, a 
town of 19,000 people in Pangasinan P'rov'ince, certified, on October 9, 
1898, that they had carried out the instructions for " the establishment 
of the popular government in accordance with the royal decree of 
June 18, 1898." — P. I. R., 1188. 1. 

In October certain of Aguinaldo's adherents in Tondo wrote to him 


Aguinaldo's claim as to the effectiveness of his govern- 
ment on August 6, 1898, was as follows : ^ "The govern- 
ment of the revolution actually rules in the provinces of 
Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, 
Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Infanta and besieges the 
capital, Manila. The most perfect order and tranquillity 
reign in these provinces, governed by authorities elected 
by the inhabitants in conformity with the organic decrees 
dated June 18 and 23 last. Moreover, the revolution 
has about nine thousand prisoners of war who are treated 
humanely and according to the rules of civilized warfare. 
We can muster more than thirty thousand men organized 
as a regular army." 

It may have been that in the majority of these provinces 
municipal governments, formed in accordance with the 
provisions of the decree of June 18, had been established ; 
but provincial governments had not been established in 
all of them, and tranquillity did not reign in any of them, 

and protested against the acts of the local presidente, who, they held, 
had not been duly elected in accordance with the provisions of the 
"royal order" of June 18, 1898. They closed their respectful protest 
by requesting that said royal order should be obeyed. — Taylor, AJ., 63. 

In 1899 an officer of the army in Union Province wrote : " In ac- 
cordance with the orders of the secretary of war of our republican 
government of these islands, issued in compliance with royal decree, 
article 5, published on March 8." On September 1, 1898, the local 
presidente of the town of Mangatarem, writing to the head of the 
province, said that he had not furnished the estimates required because 
the elections provided for in " article 7 of the royal decree of the 
superior government, dated June 18 last," had not been approved. 
A young son of a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet, writing to his father 
in September, 1899, spoke of the "royal decree of June 18, 1898." 
— P. I. R., 1188. 3. In Romblon, in August, 1898, elections were held in 
compliance with the prescription of the " royal decree of June 18, 1898," 
and Aguinaldo approved them, apparently without considering that 
this was an anomalous way of describing a decree of the dictator of 
the so-called republic. On March 7, 1899, a general in the revolutionary 
service stated that an officer had been released from arrest by a "royal 
order. ' The attitude of mind which made men speak of Aguinaldo's 
"royal orders" in 1898 did not change when he fled before the ad- 
vance of the United States army. His orders remained royal orders. 
They were again and again referred to in this way. 

I P. I. R., Books C-1. 


as they were the scene of operations against the Spaniards. 
There could not well have been nine thousand prisoners in 
his hands at this time, as that was claimed later when a 
large additional number of Spaniards had surrendered. As 
for the thirty thousand men organized as a regular army, 
there may be a certain difference of opinion as to what con- 
stitutes a regular army ; the men who saw Aguinaldo's force 
then, and who have read the papers of its leaders, must be of 
the opinion that that force was not a regular army. Prob- 
ably only Manila Province had a provincial government 
on August 6. Its local presidentes met at Cavite Viejo on 
August 3 and elected three members of congress from 
the province, and also the members of the provincial 
government. The election took place under the super- 
vision of Colonel Teodoro Gonzales, whom Aguinaldo 
had appointed governor of Manila Province on August 1. 
He remained governor after the election was held. Not 
until August 17 did the local presidentes of Bulacan 
assemble \mder the presidency of the secretary of the 
interior and proceed to elect two members to congress 
and the members of the provincial government. Not 
until August 20 was there an election for the members 
of the provincial government of Cavite Province. This 
was held in the town of Cavite. Isaac Fernando Rios, 
who was afterwards a member of the Filipino junta in 
Madrid, was chosen a representative of the pro\dnce ; 
but as he wrote that he was in favour of coming to 
some agreement with Spain which would permit the 
development of the Phihppines, without abandoning the 
sovereignty of that country, Aguinaldo promptly dis- 
approved his election ^ and ordered a new one held for the 
office thus left vacant. On October 2, 1899, Aguinaldo 
approved the result of a new election held there because 
four of the five high officials of the province had absented 
themselves, while one of them had died. Of the men 
who had so absented themselves one had gone abroad, 

1 P. I. R., 1216. 1. 


while the other three had remained in Manila or Cavite 
under the government of the United States.^ 

The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had 
arms in their hands. It is not probable that many of 
them had any conviction concerning the form of govern- 
ment which would be best for the Philippines. There 
were no signs of a spontaneous desire for a republic. 
Orders came from the group about Aguinaldo, and the 
people accepted a dictator and a republic as they accepted 
a president and a republic, without knowing, and prob- 
ably without caring very much, what it all meant, except 
that they hoped that taxes would cease with the departure 
of the friars. A determined and well-organized minority 
had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, 
heterogeneous, and leaderless majority. 

As soon as a province was occupied by the Insurgents 
it was divided into territorial zones within which com- 
mand was exerted by military officers. On July 20, 1898, 
Cavite had been divided into four zones, and next day 
Brigadier-General Artemio Ricarte was placed in command 
of the province and the first zone. 

By July 7 Bulacan Province had been divided into six 
zones, and Nueva Ecija into four zones, with a separate 
commander for each zone. These men established the 
government prescribed by Aguinaldo 's decrees of the 
middle of June. Probably by the end of July Aguinaldo's 
municipal governments had been established in the greater 
part of the towns of Luzon. These governments were 
not established by the mass of the people. The mass of 
the people were not consulted, but they were not in the 
habit of being consulted in such matters and probably 
saw no necessity for it in this case. As an evidence of 
this we have the fact that from the beginning the acts of 
election were almost always drawn up in Spanish, al- 
though by far the greater portion of the people of the 
archipelago spoke only the native dialects. 

» P. I. R., 1216. 1. 


The method of establishing these municipal govern- 
ments employed in Cavite in June, 1898, was continued 
to the end of Aguinaldo's rule. It was the same in dif- 
ferent places and at different times. Data obtained 
from reports and documents written in towns far removed 
from each other follow. They must be considered to- 
gether in order to obtain an idea of what this method 
really was. 

When the Insurgent movement had progressed suffi- 
ciently far, the leaders collected their adherents and ob- 
tained recognition as the heads of their provinces or dis- 
tricts. For example, representatives of the towns of 
Pampanga assembled at San Fernando on June 26, 1898, 
and under the presidency of General Maximo . Hizon 
agreed to yield him "complete obedience as military 
governor of the province and representative of the illus- 
trious dictator of these Philippine Islands." ^ The town 
of Macabebe refused to send any delegates to this gather- 
ing. Commissioners, in almost every case officers of 
Aguinaldo's army, were empowered by him to estabhsh 
the so-called republican government. They appointed 
delegates who proceeded to the smaller towns and held 
elections ; but whenever possible the commissioner of 
Aguinaldo presided. In many cases these delegates 
were lieutenants of the army. The commissioners selected 
the electors, for they had all to be '^ marked out by their 
good conduct, their wealth, and their social position," 
and they had all to be in favour of independence. They 
then presided at the elections, which were viva voce. 
They apparently selected the people to be elected, and 
forwarded a record of the proceedings to the central 
government. The election had to be approved by the 
dictator or president before the successful candidates 
could assume the duties of their offices. Later on, the 
military commanders remote from the seat of government 
were authorized to approve elections and install the 

1 P. I. R., 223. 


successful candidates, but the records of election had 
even then to be forwarded to the capital for approval, 
the action of the commissioner not being final. 

The commissioners do not seem to have been able to 
find many men who had the necessary requisites for 
electors. In the town of Lipa, Batangas Province, with a 
population of forty thousand seven hundred forty-three, 
at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente was chosen 
for whom twenty-five votes were cast. On November 
23, 1898, an election was held at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, for 
a presidente to succeed one who had been elected repre- 
sentative in congress. One hundred and sixteen votes 
were cast. The population of Vigan is nineteen thousand. 
On October 5, 1898, at Echague, Isabela Province, a 
presidente was elected for whom fifty-four votes were 
cast. The population of Echague is fifty-four thousand. 
On October 2, 1898, at Cabagan Nuevo, Isabela, one 
hundred and eleven men voted out of a population of 
sixty-two hundred and forty. On January 29, 1899, 
the town of Hernani, in Samar, elected its municipal 
officials under the supervision of V. Lukban. Fifty- 
four men voted. The town has a population of twenty- 
five hundred and fifty-five. 

The elections, so-called, were not always held without 
protest. For example, the town of San Jos6, Batangas, 
protested unavaihngly to Aguinaldo against the result 
of an election held at 10 p.m., in a storm of rain. Men 
who had been on friendly terms with the Spaniards 
were usually excluded from all participation. If in spite 
of the precautions taken men were elected who were 
disliked by the commissioner or his supporters, the 
election could be set aside on the ground that the person 
elected was not an adherent of the revolution. 

The elections were often held in a singular manner, 
as in the following case : ^ — 

" On August 20, 1898, four men of Tondo appeared before 

1 P. I. R. 1133. 1. 


Aguinaldo on Bacoor and announced that they were represen- 
tatives of the people of the district, who loved liberty. Then 
in accordance with the directions of the president of the republic 
under the supervision of the secretary of the interior, they drew 
lots from a hat to decide how the offices of the head of the dis- 
trict, delegate of police, delegate of the treasury and delegate 
of justice were to be distributed. The decision having been 
made in this simple fashion, Aguinaldo gravely approved the 
election as expressing the will of the people. Perhaps it did, 
for they seem to have continued, at least for a time, to obey 
them. On November 14, 1898, Aguinaldo again approved an 
election for local officials in Tondo which since August 13 had 
been wthin the American lines." 

On August 23 San Carlos, in Pangasindn Province, a 
town of twenty-three thousand people, elected its officials 
under the new form of government. The presidente chosen 
was a well-known member of the Katipunan, and before 
the election was held announced his intention of killing 
any one who was chosen for the position for which he was 
a candidate.^ He was accordingly elected. In spite 
of this grave informality, an informality which formed 
one ground for a protest on the part of some of the people 
of the town, Aguinaldo approved the election. 

On October 21, 1898, an election was held under the 
supervision of the military commander in Camarines for 
the municipal officials of the town of Yriga.^ The voting 
was oral, and a secretary wrote down the votes for the 
two candidates under direction of the commissioner, 
who finally announced that the candidate whose friend 
he was had been elected, but without stating how many 
votes he had received. This newly elected head of the 
town had the town crier on the following night publish 
through the streets an address to the people, in which he 
thanked those who had voted for him and warned those who 
had not that it would be well for them to beware. The 
Spanish law known as the Maura Law, which regulated the 
elections in the municipalities under the Spanish govern- 
ment, provided for a limited electoral body, composed 
1 P. I. R., 1137. 4. 2 ji^d^^ R^ 1165. 2. 


largely of ex-officials of the municipalities. The choosing 
of an electoral body by the military commander of a dis- 
trict probably did not seem strange to the people. The 
provincial and municipal officials were established in office 
by armed men, and they were obeyed because they had 
been installed by armed men ; but it was a form of elec- 
tion to which people, as a rule, saw no reason to object. 
There were, however, in many cases bitter complaints of 
the abuses committed by the officers thus ''elected." 

This form of government spread with the advance 
of Aguinaldo's arms. Municipal elections were held 
in Tarlac in July, in Ilocos Norte and Tayabas in August, 
in Benguet and the Batanes Islands in September, 1898, 
in Panay in December, 1898, and in Leyte and Samar in 
January, 1899. 

On December 27 Antonio Luna wrote that all the 
provinces of Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, 
and Ticao, Romblon, part of Panay, the Batanes, and 
Babuyanes Islands were under the jurisdiction of the 
insurgent government.^ 

By October 7, 1898, 14 of the 36 provinces and dis- 
tricts into which Luzon had been divided by the Spanish 
government had civil governors.^ These 14 were Taga- 
log provinces or provinces which the Tagalogs con- 
trolled. The other provinces were still under military 
rule, and, indeed, even the provinces under civilians were 
dominated by their military commanders. With the 
manner of holding elections which prevailed, the governors 
must have been men who were in favour of the military 
party in force, for otherwise they would not have been 

It is not probable that the number of provinces under 
civil governors much increased. If in Pangasinan Prov- 
ince, where there are many Tagalogs, organizations 
opposed to the rule of Aguinaldo could cause serious 
disorders, as was the case, it must have been considered 

1 P. I. R., 319. 1. 2 Ihid., 3. 33. ^ jud., 1022. 3. 





























expedient for the success of the attempt of the Tagdlogs, 
who form only a fifth of the population, to dominate 
the archipelago, that all provinces in which an effective 
majority of the people were not of that tribe, should be 
kept under military rule. The municipal governments 
which had been established in Luzon were in the hands of 
Aguinaldo's adherents, or of men who it was hoped would 
prove loyal to him. They were men of the Spanish- 
speaking group, which has always dominated the people 
of the islands. They were probably not as a rule men 
of means. Many of them, perhaps most of them, had 
been clerks and employees under the Spanish govern- 
ment, and they saw no reason for changing the methods 
of town administration which had then been followed. 
The municipal taxes, the estimates for expenditures, and 
the regulations for town government, w^ere but little modi- 
fied from those they found in force. In many ways such 
changes as were made were for the worse. 

Once installed in power, Aguinaldo's officials were 
required to exercise over the mass of the people about the 
same control that had always been exercised over them. 
The governing group considered that they were perfectly 
capable of providing for the welfare of the islands, and 
that it was the duty of the people to obey them without 

When the insurgent force was increased in preparation 
for war with the Americans a large number of municipal 
officials resigned, or attempted to do so. It was not 
easy for a municipal official under Aguinaldo's govern- 
ment to resign. A resignation, to be accepted, had to 
be accompanied by the certificate of a physician that the 
person concerned was unfit to perform the duties of 
his office. Judging by the record,^ an epidemic seems to 
have attacked the municipal officials in January, 1899. 
It is probable that they saw that war was inevitable and 
that they did not wish to remain in charge of the towns 

1 P. T. R., 1200. 

VOL. I — S 


and be responsible for providing for the necessities of 
'Hhe liberating army." In Pangasinan in that month 
men could not leave their barrios without obtaining the 
permission of the headman, and in one town men Vv^ho had 
attempted to sell their property for the purpose of going 
to Manila were, on January 17, ordered to be arrested 
and their conduct investigated.^ 

Aguinaldo, having established himself at Malolos, or- 
dered the congress provided for in his decree of June 23, 
1898, to assemble at the capital on September 15, 1898, and 
appointed a number of provisional representatives for 
provinces and islands not under his control.^ It has often 
been claimed that Aguinaldo's government controlled 
at this time the whole archipelago, except the bay and 
city of Manila and the town of Cavite.^ 

Blount quotes the following statement from the report 
of the First Philippine Commission : — 

"While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, 
the Filipino forces made themselves masters of the entire 
island except that city." * 

I signed that statement, and signed it in good faith ; 
nevertheless, it is untrue. The Filipino forces never con- 

1 P. I. R., 907. 6. 2 p. I. R., 39. 7. 

3 The following memorandum to accompany a letter from Senor 
Don Sixto Lopez, Secretary of Senor Don Felipe Agoneillo, to the 
Honorable the Secretary of State, written January 5, 1899, clearly 
sets forth this claim : — ■ 

"Pursuant to the action of said congress a detailed system of govern- 
ment has been provided for and is actually maintained in aU the por- 
tions of the Philippine Islands, except so much of the provinces of 
Manila and Cavite as is now in the actual possession of the American 
Army, such excepted part containing only about 3 per cent, of the popu- 
lation of the entire islands and an infinitely smaller proportion of their 

" From the foregoing it will appear that the Philippine government 
is now, as it has been practically ever since the 16th of June, 1898, 
in substantially full possession of the territory of the people it repre- 
sents." — Taylor Ex. 530 57 KU., Congressional Record, June 3,1902, 
Vol. 35, part 6, p. 6217. 

* Blount, p. 70. 


trolled the territory now known as Ifugao, Bontoc, Ka- 
linga or Apayao, much less that occupied by the Negritos 
on the east coast of Luzon, but this is not all. There 
exists among the Insurgent records a very important 
document, prepared by Mabini, showing that when the 
call for the first session of the Fihpino congress was 
issued, there were no less than sixty-one provinces and 
commandancias, which the Insurgents, when talking 
among themselves, did not even claim to control, and 
twenty-one of these were in or immediately adjacent to 

1" September, 1898. 

"Although article 11, Chapter 2, of the Organic Decree of June 23 
(1898) last, prescribes that the appointment of provisional represen- 
tatives of Congress be given to persons who have been bom or have 
resided in the provinces which they are to represent ; taking into con- 
sideration the urgent necessity that said body enter upon its functions 
, immediately, I hereby decree the following : — 

"1. The following are appointed provisional Representatives . . . 

"2. A meeting of Congress is called for the 15th instant, to be held 
in the town of Malolos, province of Bulacan. 

"3. The Secretary of the Interior shall take steps to notify the 
persons appointed and those elected by the popular commanders in the 
provinces ah'eady occupied by the Revolution, of the call as soon as 

"Giv. ..." 

(Attached hereto is the following, with the names written in Mabini's 
handwriting :) 

"September, 1898. 

"Provinces not subject to the Revolutionary Government of the 




Highest class 


Salvador V. del 
Rosario and Felipe 

Ilocos Norte 



Jose, Antonio Lima 

Tlocos Sur 



Ignacio Villamor, 
Jose Aleji 

Isabela de Luz6n 

Third class 


Ariston Bautista 




Jose Albert 




Pablo Tecson 



The men who composed this congress were among 
the ablest natives of the archipelago ; but representative 




Pol.-Mil. Govt. 


Isidro Paredes 

Nueva Viscaya 



Enrique Mendiola 







Masbate and Tieao 

Pol.-Mil. Comandancia 

X • 

Alberto Barreto 








Joaquin Luna 






Fernando Canon 










Ledn Apacible 




Mariano Ocampo 







Island of CebU 

Pol.-Mil. Govt, of high- 


Cayetano Arellano 

est class 

and Pardo de Ta 

Iloilo, Panay 



Gregorio Araneta 
and Melecio Figu- 

Island of Leyte 



Ledn Guerrero 

Negros Occidental 



Jose Maria de la 

Island of Samar 


Pablo Ocampo 

Antique, Island of 



Hipolito Magsaliu 



Lowest class 


Miguel Zaragoza 

Negros Oriental 



Aguedo Velarde 

Island of Bohol 



Juan Manday Ga- 


Pol.-Mil. Comandancia 


Vicente Gonzalez 




Mariano V. del 


1st Dist. Pol.- Mil. Govt. 


Pedro A. Paterno 


2d Dist. do 


Maximino Paterno 


3d Dist. do 


Benito Valdes 


4th Dist. do 


Telesforo Chuidian 


5th Dist. do 


Enrique Mercaida 


6th Dist. do 


Juan Tuason 



institutions mean nothing unless they represent the 
people; if they do not, they are a conscious lie devised 
either to deceive the people of the country or foreign 
nations, and it is not possible for any system founded 
upon a lie to endure. A real republic must be founded not 
upon a few brilliant men to compose the governing group 
but upon a people trained in self-restraint and accus- 
tomed to govern by compromise and concession, not 




7th Dist. do 

1. Gonzalo Tuason 


Pol.-Mil. Comandancia 

1. Gonzalo Tuason 



Baras is under Pol.- 

Mil. Govt, of Baliia 


Levae is under Pol.- 

Mil. Comandancia 

of Cottabatto 


Pol.-Mil. Comandancia 

"Malabang. This 

Comandancia is 

under the Military 

Comandancia of 

Bahia Illana. 

Reina Regente. This 

Comandancia is 

under the Pol.- 

Mil. Govt, of Cot- 


Bay of Sarangani and 

Pol.-Mil. Comandancia 

adjacent islands 


Pol.-Mil. Govt. 

Island of Jold 


1. Benito Legarda 


Pol.-Mil. Com. 





Island of Paragua 

Pol.-Mil. Govt. 

1. Felipe Calderdn. 



1. Manuel Jerez 



1. Manuel Genato 

Marianas Islands 


Oriental Carolines 


Camarines, North 

Don Tomas del 

and South 

Rosario and Don 
Cecilio Hilario 

Exhibit 226, 76 MG, E, Extract from original in Spanish, A. L. S., 

P. I. R., 416. 1." 


by force. To endure it must be based upon a solid founda- 
tion of self-control, of self-respect and of respect for the 
rights of others upon the part of the great majority of 
the common people. If it is not, the government which 
follows a period of tumult, confusion and civil war will 
be a government of the sword. The record the Philippine 
republic has left behind it contains nothing to confirm 
the belief that it would have endured, even in name, if 
the destinies of the islands had been left in the hands of 
the men who set it up. 

The national assembly met on the appointed day in 
the parish church of Barasoain, Malolos, which had 
been set aside for the meetings of congress. This body 
probably had then more elected members than at its 
subsequent meetings, but even so it contained a large 
number of men who were appointed by Aguinaldo after 
consultation with his council to represent provinces which 
they had never even seen. 

From a ''list of representatives of the provinces and 
districts, selected by election and appointment by the 
government up to July 7, 1899, with incomplete list of 
October 6, 1899" ^ I find that there were 193 members, 
of w^hom forty-two were elected and one hundred fifty-one 
were appointed. This congress was therefore not an elec- 
tive body. Was it in any sense representative ? The fol- 
lowing table, showing the distribution of delegates between 
the several peoples, will enable us to answer this question. 

In considering this table it must be remembered that the 
relationship given between the number of delegates as- 
signed to a given people and the number of individuals com- 
posing it is only approximate, as no one of these peoples is 
strictly limited to the provinces where it predominates. 

I have classified the provinces as Tagalog, Visayan, 
etc., according to census returns showing the people who 
form a majority of their inhabitants in each case. ^ 

1 P. I. R., 38. 3. 

2 The 1903 census returns are here used for each of the several peoples. 




Visayans . . 
Tagalogs . . 
Ilocanos . . 
Bicols . . 
Pangasindns . 
Zambalans . 

















It will be noted that the Tagalog provinces had 
eighteen out of a total of forty-two elected delegates. 
The Visayans, by far the most numerous people in the 
islands, did not have one. The non-Christian prov- 
inces had a very disproportionately large total of del- 
egates, of whom four are put down as elected, but on 
examination we find that one of these is from Lepanto, 
the capital of which was an Ilocano town ; one is from 
Nueva Vizcaya, where there is a considerable Cagayan- 
Ilocano population ; one is from Benguet, the capital of 
which was an Ilocano town, and one from Tiagan, 
which was an Ilocano settlement. These delegates 
should therefore really be credited to the Ilocanos. 

If the individual relationships of the several members 
are considered, the result is even more striking. Of the 
thirty-eight delegates assigned to the non-Christian prov- 
inces, one only, good old Lino Abaya of Tiagan, was a 
non-Christian. Many of the non-Christian comandancias 
were given a number of delegates wholly disproportionate 
to their population, and in this way the congress was 
stuffed full of Tagalogs. 

Think of Filipe Buencamino, of Aguinaldo's cabinet, 
representing the Moros of Zamboanga; of the mild, 
scholarly botanist Leon Guerrero representing the Moros, 


Bagobos, Mandayas and Manobos of Davao ; of Jos6 M. 
Lerma, the unscrupulous politician of the province of 
Bataan, just across the bay from Manila, representing the 
wild Moros of Cotabato ; of Juan Tuason, a timid Chinese 
mestizo Manila business man, representing the Yacan 
and Samal Moros of Basilan ; of my good friend Benito 
Legarda, since a member of the Philippine Commission, 
and a resident delegate from the Philippines to the congress 
of the United States, representing the bloody Moros of 
Jolo ! Yet they appear as representatives of these several 

Few, indeed, of the delegates from non-Christian territory 
had ever set foot in the provinces or comandancias from 
which they were appointed, or would have been able to 
so much as name the wild tribe or tribes inhabiting them. 

I have been furnished a list, made up with all pos- 
sible care by competent persons, from which it appears 
that there were eighty-five delegates actually present 
at the opening of congress, of whom fifty-nine were 
Tagalogs,five Bicols, three Pampangans,twoVisayans, and 
one a Zambalan. For the others there are no data available. 
Yet it has been claimed that this was a representative 
body ! It was a Tagalog body, without enough represen- 
tatives of any other one of the numerous Philippine peoples 
to be worth mentioning. 

With a congress thus organized, Aguinaldo should have 
had no difficulty in obtaining any legislation he desired. 

The coimnittee of congress appointed to draw up a 
constitution set to work promptly, and by October 16, 1898, 
had proceeded so far with their work that Buencamino was 
able to write to Aguinaldo that while he had been of the 
opinion that it would have been best for him to continue 
as a dictator aided by a committee of able men, yet it 
would now be a blow to the prestige of congress to suspend 
its sessions. Aguinaldo noted upon this letter the fact 
that he did not approve of a constitution.^ 

1 P. I. R., 485. 1. 




O 0) 

W 5 


























f ) 
































































Apparently early in December the committee submitted 
their project. In presenting it to congress they said^ 
that — 

"The work whose results the commission has the honour 
to present for the consideration of congress has been largely 
a matter of selection ; in executing it not only has the French 
constitution been used, but also those of Belgium, Mexico, 
Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, as we have 
considered those nations as most resembling the Filipino people." 

The most important difference between this project and 
the actual constitution adopted was that, although the 
project provided that the Dominican, Recollect, Fran- 
ciscan and Augustinian friars should be expelled from the 
country and that their estates should become the property 
of the state, yet it recognized the Catholic religion as that 
of the state and forbade state contribution to the sup- 
port of any other, although it permitted the practice in 
'private of any religion not opposed to morality, which 
did not threaten the safety of the country. The govern- 
ment was authorized to negotiate a concordat with the 
Pope for the regulation of the relations between church 
and state. A strong party was in favour of this recognition, 
but it finally failed of adoption, and the constitution as 
promulgated provided for the freedom and equality of 
religion and for free and compulsory education which 
had not been provided for in the original project. The 
constitution as approved forbade the granting of titles 
of nobility, decorations or honorary titles by the state 
to any Filipino. This paragraph did not exist in the 
original project, which merely forbade any Filipino to 
accept them without the consent of the government. 

Mabini, the ablest of all Aguinaldo's advisers, did not 
approve of the constitution. He himself had drawn up 
a project for a constitution during June, 1898, but it 
was not accepted by the committee, the greater part of 
whom were Catholics and for that reason opposed to 

1 P. I. R., 40. 1. 


Mabini, who was a bitter antagonist of that church. 
And yet when separation of church and state was finally 
provided for it did not please Mabini, who, although he 
was opposed to church control, wrote to Aguinaldo ^ that 
the constitution as passed by congress was not acceptable 
and should not be promulgated because the constitutional 
guarantees of individual liberty could not be maintained, 
as the army had to be in control for the time being, and 
furthermore it was not expedient to separate church and 
state, as this separation would alienate many of their 
adherents. Indeed, there was not much in the constitu- 
tion which he thought ought to take immediate effect,^ 
and he wrote that congress was ill-disposed toward hun 
because he had refused to agree to its promulgation. 
Existing conditions were such that he believed that all 
powers should be vested in one person. He warned Agui- 
naldo that if the constitution were put in force, he would 
be at the mercy of his secretaries. On January 1, 1899, 
Aguinaldo, probably at the suggestion of Mabini, proposed 
certain changes in it.^ 

Evidently the provisions of the constitution did not 
worry Aguinaldo much, as is shown by his reply to the 
request by some of his officers for information as to what 
reward those who were first in the attack on Manila 
should receive. He promised them such titles as marquis, 
duke, etc.^ 

On January 2, 1899, Aguinaldo announced the forma- 
tion of a new cabinet made up as follows : Apolinario 
Mabini president and secretary of foreign affairs ; Teodoro 
Sandico, secretary of the interior ; Mariano Trias, secretary 
of the treasury ; Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary of war 
and navy, and Gracio Gonzaga, secretary oifomento} On 
January 4 Mabini took the oath of office as the presi- 

1 P. I. R., 377. 13. "" Ibid., 472. 9. 

3 Ibid., 40. 8. * Ibid., 849. See p. 143. 

^ A general term covering education, public works, agriculture and 


dent of the council of government. This body met 
twice a week at Malolos on set days, and at the close 
of its deliberations forwarded to Aguinaldo a statement 
of the subjects discussed and the conclusions reached for 
his decision. The president of the republic did not pre- 
side at, or take part in, its deliberations. 

On January 4, 1899, General Otis issued a proclamation 
in which he announced that the United States had ob- 
tained possession of the Philippines and that its govern- 
ment would be extended over the islands of the archipelago. 
Aguinaldo replied next day with one which, if not intended 
to be a declaration of war, was at least a warning that 
hostilities were imminent. This proclamation was carried 
into Manila by his emissaries and posted up over the one 
issued by the American commander. It was a challenge 
to a trial of strength, and Aguinaldo and his advisers 
. hastened their preparations for the coming combat. 

The secretary of the interior on the same day sent an 
order to the heads of all provinces directing the organiza- 
tion of territorial militia to resist the American invasion, 
and ordering the heads of the towns to hold meetings of the 
people to protest against the aggression of the United 
States. They were held in accordance with these orders, 
and records of the proceedings were sent to Malolos and 
published in the official organ of the government as 
evidence of the feeling of the people. It was, however, 
not considered necessary in publishing them to mention 
the fact that they had been held in compliance with orders. 

On January 14, 1899, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo^ rec- 
ommending changes in the proposed constitution, which 
he still liked as little as ever. He was afraid that Negros 
and Panay would refuse to accept the form of govern- 
ment it prescribed. The worst thing about it was that the 
Americans would be less disposed to recognize Aguinaldo's 
government; for when they saw the constitution they 
would know, as it made no mention of them, that the 

1 P. I. R., 512. A 5. 


Filipinos wanted independence. Mabini thought that 
it was possible that the wording of the constitution might 
have been deliberately planned by members of the congress 
in favour of annexation to the United States, so that that 
country would be warned, would become more mistrustful, 
and would refuse to recognize Aguinaldo's government. 
Whatever the president of the council may have thought 
about the theoretical advisability of a congress to rep- 
resent the people, he found one much in the way when 
he had obtained it. 

Buencamino advised that the constitution should be 
approved and promulgated; one argument was that the 
congress had been consulted in the matter of a national 
loan, and if it was dissolved, there could be no loan. 
This was apparently the only matter upon which it had 
been consulted.^ 

The constitution of the Philippine Republic was ratified 
at a session of the congress on January 20, 1899. 

On January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo sanctioned it and 
ordered that it should be ''kept, complied with and exe- 
cuted in all its parts because it is the sovereign will of 
the Philippine people." - The constitution provided 
for a government of three coordinate pov/ers, executive, 
legislative and judicial. Whether it provided for a form 
of government which would have succeeded in the Philip- 
pines was not determined by actual experience. It was 
never really put in force for war with the United States 
began in two weeks and the constitution must stand as 
the expression of the ideas of a certain group of educated 
natives rather than as the working formula for the actual 
conduct of the political life of a nation. One proof of 
this is the fact that not until June 8, 1899, were Aguinaldo's 
decrees upon the registration of marriages and upon civil 
marriage, dated June 20, 1898, revoked, and the provisions 
of the constitution concerning marriage put in effect.^ 

1 P. I. R., 485. 5. 

2 Senate Document 138, Fifty-sixth Congress, First Session. 
» P. I. R., Books B-6. 


Aguinaldo had approved the constitution ; he had in- 
formed the foreign consuls and General Otis that it had 
been promulgated and become the law of the land. It 
was not promulgated. It had not become the law of 
the land. It served one important purpose. It passed 
into the hands of the Americans and showed them the 
ability and the aspirations of certain individuals of the 
archipelago, but Mabini and his followers did not believe 
in its form or in its provisions, and Mabini at least was 
emphatic in his declarations that the time had not yet come 
for it to be put into effect. On January 24, 1899, he wrote 
to Aguinaldo that if it should be promulgated it would be 
absolutely necessary to give the president the veto power, 
and replace the elected representatives by others appointed 
by the government. If this were not done the president 
would be at the mercy of congress, and the people, seeing 
that disagreement between the executive government and 
.the congress was the cause of its misfortunes, would start an- 
other revolutionary movement to destroy both of them.^ 

As long as Mabini remained in power the constitution 
was mere paper. Its adoption was not indicative of the 
capacity of the people to maintain self-government. It 
expressed only the academic aspirations of the men who 
drafted it. There is not the slightest evidence from any 
previous or subsequent experience of the people that it 
would have worked in practice. It was enacted for the 
misleading of Americans rather than for the benefit of 
the Filipinos. 

While the government of Aguinaldo was called a 
republic, it was in fact a Tagalog military oligarchy in 
which the great mass of the people had no share. Their 
duty was only to give soldiers for the army and labourers 
for the fields, and to obey without question* the orders 
they received from the military heads of their provinces. 

There is no cause for vain regrets. We did not destroy 
a republic in the Philippines. There never was anything 
there to destroy which even remotely resembled a republic. 

1 P. I. R., 472. 8. 


The Conduct of the War 

It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of 
the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss 
any one of its several campaigns. I propose to limit 
myself to a statement of the conditions under which it 
was conducted, and a description of the two periods into 
which it may be divided. 

From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated 
with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, 
Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain 
towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammuni- 
tion should be punished with twelve lashes for a first 
offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled 
and ''severely punished" for a third. ^ 

1 "To the Military Chiefs of the towns mentioned in the margin 
[there is nothing in the margin. — Tr.] : — 

" As there are still many soldiers paying no notice to the order for- 
bidding the waste of cartridges, you are required to give a certain 
amount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day if there is 
any cartridge missing, and if so, inquire into the reason. In order that 
this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed it proper to pre- 
scribe the punishment for such offence, of which you will inform the sol- 
diers under your command, and post this circular in a prominent place. 
Said punishments are as follows : — 

"Art. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished 
with 12 lashes ; in ease he commits the same offence again he shall be 
punished with 24 lashes ; and on a further offence of like character by 
the same soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished. 

" Art. 2. A soldier who has been found short of even one cartridge 
out of the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes, 
provided that he has not previously been in any engagement. 

"Art. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reason 
of throwing them away dm'ing an engagement, shall be court-martialled, 
and Feverely punished. 

" I most earnestly recommend you to carefully look after your soldiers 
and see that every one is complying with the foregoing order. 

" This order should be transmitted from one town to another men- 
tioned in the margin, and the last one should return it to this office 



On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that 
any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when 
not before the enemy should be liable to capital punish- 
ment,^ which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers 
for very minor offences. 

Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then 
excused from service on the pajmient of cash. 

Tiie soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed end- 
less abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the 
outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters 
dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse 
thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed. 

" The documents of this period show that the insurgent 
troops driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people 
of the neighbouring to^vns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. 
Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they 
directed these outrages. It was not for some days that con- 
.trol was regained." ^ 

with the information that the same has been received and complied 
with by all. 

" May God guard you many years. 

" E. Aguinaldo, Dictator. 

"Cavite, June 17th, 1898." —P. I. R., 1124. 2. 

1 "November 16, 1900. 
(Stamp) " Lacuna Brigade. Headquarters. 

" Major Thomas Tagunton : Advise all officers of this brigade that 
he who allows his soldiers to load their rifles without being before the 
enemy, shall be liable to capital punishment. If the soldiers intention- 
ally or otherwise fii'e their pieces, whether in the air or at any deter- 
mined or undetermined person, said soldiers and the officers to whose 
command they belong shall also be liable to the same punishment as 
above, without further proceedings, for the reason that we are almost 
in front of the enemj^ and all the more if the shots take effect upon any 
of the soldiers or chiefs. 

" Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings, 
as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoning 
their squads allow them to commit certain outrages. 

" You will report receipt of and compliance with this order. 

" God preserve you many years. 

" General Headquarters, November 16, 1900. 

(Signed) " Lacuna, General, PoUtical-Military Governor and Chief 
of Operations. " — P. I. R., 643. 1. 

* Taylor, AJ. 85. 


Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other 
high Insurgent officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and 
robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately 
they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impos- 
sible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who 
removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure 
and simple.^ 

Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at 
another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands some- 
times cooperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns 
which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands 
of Insurgent cominanders,^ and armed bandits appeared 
and plundered them. 

1 " Kabat' an, Oct. 14th, 1899. 


" Marti'n F. Delgado, General and Politico-Military Gov- 
ernor OF THE Province of Iloilo. 

" As a consequence of the frequent assaults and robberies committed 
by persons wearing military uniforms, and with the determination to 
correct, with a firm hand, such scandalous conduct, which, besides 
causing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, also makes it 
easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have, at the suggestion 
of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following : — 

"1. From this date forward all private citizens are absolutely pro- 
hibited from wearing military uniforms. 

" 2. All authorities, both civil and military, under this Government, 
are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict. 

" 3. All persons who, not being in the military service, are, after 
the publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms, and who 
cannot show that they are in the military service, will be suspected as 
evil-doers and will be sent to this Government to be subjected to the 
corresponding corrective measures. 


(Signed) " Marti'n Delgado, 
" Governor-General-President." 
— P. I. R., 881.4. 

2 "On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity having 
failed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections and that if 
the people did not pay — 

" ' I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of with- 
drawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [the pueblos] 
to the fate which God will decide upon,' which of course meant that he 










There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who 
suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand,^ but many of 
them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the 
evil doers. 

The Visayas 

Feeling between Tagalog soldiers and Visayan people 
grew constantly more bitter, and before many months 
had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest 
officers of the "Regional Revolutionary Government 
of the Visayas" protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,^ 

would leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stood ready to 
descend upon them." — P. I. R., B., 4. 

" This threat was not an idle one." — Taylor, 67 HS. E-L. 

1" Santa Cruz, Laguna, July, 1899. 
" Hon. Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo. . . . 

" There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of the province 
with his gang ; I had him an-ested and shot and the robberies ceased. 
Murders were being committed ; I had the murderers caught, shot one 
of them, and there were no more murders ; officers of the reserve would 
consider themselves kings in their towns, they would shoot the local 
presidentes and commit other unlawful acts ; I disarmed them, and tried 
the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo, alias Baneucane, who 
attempted to escape and was killed. With the death of these persons 
order has been completely reestablished in this province. Several 
had rifles that were used ordy for robbery and after two or three trials 
all turned over their rifles, and the arming of the battalion was com- 

«fC «^ 3|C #fC *fC i^C *(• 

(Signed) "Juan Cailles." 
— P. I. R., 7 «& 8. 

2 "Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas. 

"Office of the President. 
" Kabatuan, March 16, 1899. 
" To THE Honourable President of the Philippine Republic, 
" Sexor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, 
"Most Distinguished President: 


" In order to avoid the distress which the knowledge of the abuses 
which are already unbearable, daily committed by the troops of Senor 
Diocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to communicate 
them to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feels that 
it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The death of 
private individuals and assaults committed in the towns are daily 

VOL. I — T 


but without result. The situation was entirely beyond 
his control. 

On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order 
which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his 
own weakness in dealing with them.^ 

reported as having been committed by the troops of General Diocno. 
Of the numerous companies of Senor Diocno, only two under the orders 
of General Araneta fight against the enemy, the remainder are the 
terror of the town and it is a week since Sr. Diocno went to Capiz with- 
out telling any one what he was going to do. 

" In vieTv^ of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this General consti- 
tuting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you to order 
General Diocno to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americans with and 
to enable the towns to recover their former tranquillity ; this govern- 
ment asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justice with which 
you act and it wishes for you many years of life for our liberty and our 

" Kabatuan, March 16, 1899. 

(Signed) " Jovito Yttsay, 
" Temporary President. 
(Signed) " Francisco Soriano, 
" General Secretary.'^ 
— P. I. R., 52. 5. 

1 "Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general in 
chief of the republican army of the Visayan Islands. 

" General Headquarters of Santa Barbara, 

" April 20, 1899. 

" The existence of a state of war, and the trying circumstances through 
which the country is now passing have brought about a complete 
change in the order of nearly all the pueblos ; and I have noticed with 
profound regret that sacking, robbery, sequestrations, and other 
crimes highly dishonourable to our noble cause, are of daily occurrence. 
With a view to preventing such conduct in the future, and in order to 
guarantee to the inhabitants of the military district under my command 
the most complete tranquillity, I hereby decree : 

"1. That any person or persons who commit acts of brigandage, 
sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbances of a public 
nature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individual or 
property rights, shall be severely punished in accordance with military 

"2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or Mili- 
tary Authorities within the 30 days immediately following this date, 
and who turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight other 
outlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for the crimes they 
have committed. 

" 3. That when the period of 30 days above mentioned has passed, 


In Luzon General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers 
and citizens of his province of committing ''robberies, 
assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed 
only by barbarous and savage tribes." ^ 

That very serious conditions promptly became general 
is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo's govern- 
ment for February 24, 1899, when it decided — 

"that the president of the council shall study such measures 
as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between 
the civil and military authorities of every provmce, in order 
that fatal consequences may be avoided." 

any person taken in the act of committing robbery, or who attempts 
to rob with an organized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or per- 
forms acts of incendiarism, or any other criminal act, will be summarily 
condemned to death by a military tribunal. 

" The Local Juntas of the various towns in conjunction with citizens 
of standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilance service 
to maintain public order and the authority of the law. 

"M. Delgado." 
— P. I. R., Books B 4. 

1" February 13, 1899. 

(In the margin : A stamp which says :) " Philippine Republic — 
Headquarters of operations of the provinces of Southern Luzon. 

"Itis with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults, 
kidnapping, and other crimes which are committed only by barbarous 
and savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without taking into 
consideration that the purpose of the insm-rection which has given origin 
to our social regeneration is true justice, for the reestablishment of 
which the lives and property are being sacrificed of all who are proud 
of being called Filipinos. These acts are being committed without 
restriction by civilians as well as soldiers perhaps ^ith the cooperation 
of their respective chiefs, to the shame of the authority vested in them 
and to the prejudice of the society to which they unworthily belong, 
and even to the integrity itself of the Republic. And in order that 
these barbarous and savage acts may disappear and that rigorous and 
exemplary punishment be meted out, I have deemed it proper to 
forward to you for general information the proclamation of these 
Headquarters of February 12th last, which is as follows : 

(Signed) " Mariano Trias. 

" Liculenant-General. 

To THE PouTico-MiLiTARY Chief OF Infanta." — P. I. R., 896-9. 


With such conditions prevaihng among the Filipinos 
themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civil- 
ized warfare would be violated and that American sol- 
diers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with 
barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated.^ 
American soldiers were trapped, poisoned ^ and murdered 
in other ways.^ 

It was promptly charged in the United States that 
American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount 
has revived these old tales. 

I know personally that during the early days of the 
war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with 
the greatest humanity and kindness. 

A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the 
circulation of the most shocking statements concerning 
the abuses committed by American soldiers. I have 

1 "There does not seem to have been the faintest conception that 
there was any reason for not using the white fiag to deceive people who 
were foolish enough to believe that Aguinaldo was going to adhere 
to the rules prescribed for its use. The writer in the early spring of 
1899 once watched an insurgent party advance under a white flag 
upon an American line of trenches. When an officer and a bugler 
went forward to receive them they threw down the flag and imme- 
diately opened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be 
dragging behind them." — Taylor, 48 HS. 

2 "Such ammunition was not effective unless fired from very close 
quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas stronger than the 
people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do with securing 
their cooperation, not only as bolomen but also in the digging of the 
pits which were placed in the trails and also set about the towns. 
These were required to be constructed by the local authorities. In the 
bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimes poisoned ; and the 
pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragile framework ; so that 
if a man stood upon it he would fall through upon the spike. Bows 
were set in the jungle with a string set across the trail so that any one 
stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo shaft with a poisoned 
head. On September 18, 1900, Lukban congratulated the people of 
the town of Katubig upon the efficient use they had made of arrows 
with the heads dipped in 'dita,' a native poison. (P. I. R., 502. 8.)" 

— Taylor, 83 HS. 
2 See also the chapter entitled "Murder as a Governmental Insti- 


elsewhere described^ the fate that overtook Colonel 
Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the 
humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and 

Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their 
lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and 
proclamations issued by civil officers informed the 
people that the American soldiers stole, burned, 
robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid 
on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly 
to turn the powerful influence of the women as a 
whole against them, and partly to show that they were 
no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently 
committed rape.^ 

» See p. 313. 

2 The following newspaper supplement printed in Tagalog for the 
benefit of the common people, is typical of this class of literature, with 
which the country was kept flooded : 

(Circular printed in Tagalog. P. I. R., 17-6. Supplement to 
Heraldo Filipino. 

" Friday, 24th February, 1899. 
" Countrymen : 

" We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions of 
North America were found out early. If we had not found them out 
by this time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank 
God that they commenced the war. 

" You ought to know by this time that these people can teach us 
nothing good. What we can learn from them is all evil. You must 
admit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers in 
Manila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them are out or 
busy. Their ev-il inclinations prevail over them to such an extent that 
the houses most worthy of consideration are not safe. They are worse 
than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not the slightest 
idea of looking at things from the point of view of a man of honour nor 
have they the slightest respect for reason, for this does not control their 
actions in the least. Without the slightest attention to civility they 
rush into houses and if they find the people eating, without saying 
a word, they take what they want from the table, put it into their 
mouths and go as they came. 

" If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the siesta, it makes 
no difference to them ; they go into the most private parts of the house 
as though they were walking in the street. 

" In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wants 
payment they threaten him with their rifles. 


These horrible tales were at first believed even by some 
of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions/ 
but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known 
to most of them from the start. 

In official correspondence between them, not intended 
for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers 
of despatches for> the reason that Americans did not 
search them.^ More significant yet, v/hen conditions 

" One can hardly believe and my pen refuses to write all of the 
perversity, and evil and bad habits of these people. 

" Their habits and manners are a disgrace to the country where they 
were born. In no history have such customs and manners been de- 
scribed even in that of the most ignorant people. 

" They search women who pass, feeling all over their bodies, tak- 
ing from them money and whatever else they carry and if they come 
on them in a lonely place they strip them naked after violating them 
and do not leave a rag on them. 

" Are these those honest men of whom we have heard ? Are these 
the people who were going to teach us good habits ? Are these the 
people who were going to guide us ? The race which does these things 
is the most hated one in the world, it is the race which commits most 
cruelties, it is the race which does not treat its mother with respect ; 
in this race there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is a 
race which does not know what honour is, which does not possess the 
slightest vestige of regard for good manners. Are these the people 
who are going to protect us ? It is better for us to die at once than fall 
into the power of these unequalled malefactors. 

" i Down with the bad men ! 

" i Kill the Americans ! ! 

" I Let the people of the United States be exterminated ! 1 1 

" i Notice. — This sheet is distributed gratis." 

1 "A light upon the treatment of women by these people is given 
by the fact that after an American detachment had captured Lukban's 
papers and family on August 18, and came so close to taking him that 
he was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wrote 
to him that to their surprise the women, who had fully expected to be 
abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to live in. 
(P. I. R., 1143. 4.)" — Taylor, 84 HS. 

2 In a letter to General Ambrosio Moxica from dated 

March 2, 1900, occurs the following : — 

"The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutual 
assistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to where 
the enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certain 
points, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands should 
have regular couriers, with you or with general headquarters, giving 
advice daily of any occurrence and carrying correspondence. They 


became bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their 
women and children to seek American protection in 
Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them 
came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. 
Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this 
procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from 
Villa's famous diary : ^ — 

" December 22. — It was 7 a.m. when we arrived in Ambay- 
iian. Here we found the women worn out from the painful 
journey they had suffered. They were seated on the groimd. 
In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of 
hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would 
prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the domin- 
ion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties 
of every patriot who loves his country. 

" We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them 
immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites 
were satisfied. 

' " The honorable president had already decided some days 
before to send ail the Vv^omen to Manila, including his family, 
and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with 

3p ^^ ^^ *|* ^p ^p ^p 

" December 24. — We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 
8 o'clock this morning a report came saying the Americans 
had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest 
town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. 
An immediate decision was made. The honourable president 
told his family and the other women that they should remain 
in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the 
Americans, and he named Senors Sytiar and Paez to remain 
also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. 
As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable presi- 
dent prepared himself for the march. The parting was a 
very sad one for himself and for his family. 

must select trustworthy women to carry correspondence, charging 
them to hide the letters underneath their skirts, bearing in mind that 
the Americans do not search them ; and in sending to the towns for 
arms or food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities, 
so as not to attract attention." — P. I. R., 2035. 3. 

1 Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinaldo on his long flight, kept 
a somewhat detailed account of events in the form of a diary. 


"The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o'clock in the 
morning, his family and the other women remaining behind 
with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila."^ 

In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were 
kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. 
Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the mem- 
bers of his own family, as is shown by a later entry : — 

" February 6. — We have been informed that the mother 
and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in 
the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that 
capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable presi- 
dent. We have also learned that Seiior Buencamino, and 
Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American author- 
ities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the 
honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that 
they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila." ^ 

The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, 
had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. 
What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, 
wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safe- 
keeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as 
murderers, and violaters of women ? Aguinaldo did just 
this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully 
aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown 
by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica 
of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to 
what should be done with wounded men : — 

" If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or else- 
where, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammu- 
nition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that 
they may not be captured by the enemy ; and if the wounded 
cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the 
place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the 
arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the 
ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle ; 
and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take 
good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed ; therefore, 

ip. I. R., 869. Uhid. 
















































































I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the 
men." ^ 

There were some rare individual instances in which un- 
injured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with 
cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the 
most part late in the war when the ''water cure" in 
mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel 
persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts 
of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the 
perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, 
and the assassination of those who had sought American 
protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually 
the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had 
only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men 
who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment 
was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some 
instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts 
to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts 
cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted 
in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, 
and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general 
rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were 
concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprec- 
edented under similar conditions. The Insurgents vio- 
lated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, 
spies and men fighting in citizens' clothes not only were 
not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly 
have been, but were often turned loose with a mere w^arn- 
ing not to offend again. 

The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause 
was by no means lunited to such matters. Every time 
their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated 
and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered 
up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, 
victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that many 

» P. I. R., 2035. 3. 


times more Americans had fallen in some insignificant 
skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, 
while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the 
thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting 
north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. 
In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all 
northern Luzon during the entire month. 

On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the 
following remarkable news items among others : — 

" Pavia, April 6th, 1899. 

"The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local 
Presidents of the towns shown on the margin : 

^^Toions: Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zdrraga, Duman- 
gas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate. 

4c 4c 4c :)e 4c :jc He 

" Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops 
advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley 
account death General and officers and many soldiers. 

sk * * * 4: 4c * 

"At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American 
prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos. 

"At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more 
Americans dead and 600 prisoners. 

" Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, 
he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they 
replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley 
accomplished nothing. 

" To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought. 

"Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. To- 
morrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little 
leaving for Manila. 

" General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas. 

" According to reports by telegraph hostilities have com- 
menced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also 
Pasay and Maytubig. 

"American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many pris- 
oners taken. 

" General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas : Battle 
stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who 
provoked war. 


" Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs 
and officers dead." * 

Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and 
Escolta are the main business streets of the city. 

Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that 
colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for 
they reported two thousand of them killed on February 
6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.^ 

We learn from the Filipino Herald for February 23, 
1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and 
occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops 
were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, 
and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan.^ 

1 P. I. R., 886. 13. 

2 Exhibit 1233 

(Original in Spanish. Contemporaiy copy. P. I. R., Books B. 4.) 

"General Headquarters, Santa Barbara, Feb. 28th, 1899." 
(Literal copy of telegram.) 

1* JjC 5p ^ 7|C 5j» S|( 

" Casualties, Americans, on 6th, 2000 Colonels dead, one General ; 
all churches converted into hospitals full American wounded ; total 
Amei'iean casualties 7000 confii-med by General FuUon just arrived 
from Malolos ; says also Iloilo quiet and not taken. 

4c 4: 4: 4s * 4= 4: 

"A true copy 

" By order of Chief of Staff. " Juan Beloso." 

' (Supplement to the Filipino Herald.) 

" Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899. — 4 p.m. 
" The Filipino Army occupies the suburbs of Manila. 

4: H: :): :f: 4: :<: :<: 

" The three columns commanded by Generals Pio del Pilar and 
Licerio and Col. Hizon now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San 
Miguel, San Sebastian, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo. 

" The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meisic and 
our flag is now flying there. 


" The American troops now in Caloocan and La Loma to the num- 
ber of over six thousand are besieged by the colunms commanded by 
Generals Luna, Llanera and Garcia. 


But why continue. No tale concerning American 
losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by 
the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. 
The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to 
fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order 
properly to punish them. 

General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured 
before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General 
Moxica of Leyte on that date.^ 

And what of conditions in the United States during 
this troubled period ? We learn from the Insurgent records 
that prior to January 15, 1900, ''the Union Army" had 
met with a new disaster, as a result of which President 
McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by 
Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be pro- 
claimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, "General 
Otis's successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party," 
arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative 
to proclaiming the Philippine Republic. ^ Things now 


" This very moment the special train carrying the Honourable 
President has left for Calooean. 

" Viva the independent Philippines ! ! ! 

" Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army ! ! ! 

" Notice. This sheet is distributed gratis." — P. I. R., 70-6. 

1 " (News.) The American General, MacArthur, with his entire 
staff, was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern Luzon. Another 
American general died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was 
seriously wounded in an ambush or fight. When shot he was a colonel, 
but on account of said fight he was promoted to the rank of a general, 
so that later when he died, he had the benefit of that rank." 

— P. I. R., 2035. 3. 

2 (Telegrams) 

"Washington, January 15, 1900, 10 a.m. 
"(Received, Cebti, January 16, 1900, 11 a.m.) 
" Owing to a new disaster of the Union Army, MacKinley has ten- 
dered his resignation as President, Mr. Bryan succeeding him. 

" Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate 
is being discussed. 

" Philippine independence will be proclaimed February the 4th. 


went from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats 
and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before 
August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about 
strained relations between Germany and the United 
States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German 
Emperor.^ Before September 15, 1901, he had been 
killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the 
Filipinos could acclaim their independence.^ 

The first period of the war, which we may term the 
period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its 
close, and there followed the second period, characterized 
by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents. 

On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice 
of General Plo del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever 
ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, 
whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to 
begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics 
were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, 
Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November. 

Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said : — 

"If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to 
barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to sav- 
agery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility 
before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is 
the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, 
the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought 
which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Rob- 
bery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake. 

" Remark. — The basis of a protectorate has been published in 

" Manila, January 20, 1900, 10 a.m. 
" (Received at Cebu on the same day, at 11 a.m.) 

" Otis' successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party, has just 
arrived. He brings with him papers and instructions in regard to 
proclamation of the Philippine Republic. 

" It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebu, will be transferred 
to the Archbishopric of Manila, and Rev. Nozaleda to Spain." — 
P. I. R., Books B-10. 

1 P. I. R., 1193. 2. 2 Ibid., 2025. 


Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of 
terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury 
caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war 
in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination 
favorable to the people who have chosen it." ' 

The case under discussion furnished no exception to the 
general rule. 

Such semblance of discipline as had previously existed 
among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Con- 
ditions had been very bad under the ' ' Republic " and worse 
during the first period of the war. During the second 
period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, 
and the common people were driven into the arms of 
the Amiericans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously 
carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in 
thousands of cases. I have described at some length the 
conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as 
a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is re- 
ferred for details.- 

In the effort to protect the towns which showed them- 
selves friendly, the American forces were divided, sub- 
divided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they 
were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. 
By December of the same year the number had increased 
to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than 
sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus 
afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the 
people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers. 

It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrec- 
tion, while continuing to seek to protect those who put 
their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in 
order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field 
operations were actively pushed. One after another the 
Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. 
Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements 
to the people shortly after giving up active field operations, 

1 Taylor, 47 HS. ^ Beginning on page 730. 


whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken 
prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 
23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east 
coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place 
in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely 
isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from 
his followers, many of whom beheved him to be dead. 
On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino 
people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they 
wanted peace. He said : — 

"Manila, April 19, 190L 
" To the Filipino People : — 

" I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the un- 
happy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a 
surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the 
progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning 
of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to 
me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hos- 
tilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely 
essential to the welfare of the PhiUppines. 

" The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, 
nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by 
their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, 
in which they find their advance along the path impeded by 
an irresistible force — a force which, while it restrains them, 
yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting 
to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully 
embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have 
already united aromid the glorious and sovereign banner of 
the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in 
the belief that under its protection our people will attain all 
the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to 

" The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace ; 
so be it. Enough of blood ; enough of tears and desolation. 
This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they 
are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people 
which has thus clearly manifested its will. 

" So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, 
and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world 
that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for 
peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning 


to see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised 
by the generosity of the great American nation. 

" By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the 
United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now 
do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am 
serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs. 

" Emilio Aguinaldo.^ 
"Manila, April 19, 1901." 

This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, 
Tagalog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of 
the war, but it did not lead to immediate general sur- 
render, for as Taylor has very truly said : — 

"A force like Aguinaldo's could not be surrendered. It had 
been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline 
had always been very lax. It had originally been held together 
by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from 
the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the 
leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his 
OAvn province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but 
which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces 
over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control 
when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing 
through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of 
highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars 
who at opportmie moments resort to petty larceny." ^ 

Aguinaldo's forces now passed through these several 
stages. Some of his more important subordinates had 
previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, 
still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more 
or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, 
but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the 
field only a very limited number of real military leaders, 
like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban 
in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit 
chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces 
of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented 
by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers and 

1 Taylor, 36 GV, Exhibit 1017. 2 Taylor, 28 HS. 


while serving in this capacity had become so enamoured 
of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle 
down and work for their daily bread, preferring to con- 
tinue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, 
whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than 

The war was practically over. The insurrection^ had 
failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the 
end for independence compared in intellectual power with 
Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy 
of special attention. At the time of his death, he left 
behind a memoir from which I quote the following : — 

"The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because 
its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by repre- 
hensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most 
useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was 
jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the 
people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandize- 
ment, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, 
character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and 
relationship which boimd them to him ; and wishing to have 
his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, 
he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus 
secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people 
having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by 
the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so 
terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings." ^ 

These are by no means the only reasons why the rev- 
olution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure. 

The surrender or capture of the more respectable 
military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the 
hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of 
whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irre- 
sponsible and unscrupulous. 

Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare 
against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to. 

» P. I. R., 1021. 6. 

VOL. I. — D 


The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. 
General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found 
a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficul- 
ties in reconcentration — not the kind of reconcentration 
which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure 
of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results 
have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows : — 

"General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be 
to avoid making war against those who really wanted the 
termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them 
against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these 
considerations in importance, however, was the absolute 
necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food 
by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those 
who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hard- 
ship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for them- 
selves and their families, it was determined to establish zones 
of protection with limits sufficiently near all to^vns to enable 
the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within 
these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by 
insurgents. He accordingly, 'in order to put an end to en- 
forced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhab- 
itants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts 
by means of intimidation and assassination,' ordered the 
commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas 
and Laguna to 'immediately specify and establish plainly 
marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within 
which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, 
to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection 
to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depreda- 
tion of armed msurgents. The limits may include the bar- 
rios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection 
and supervision by the garrison, and should include some 
ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it 
can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will 
be garrisoned as soon as troops become available. 

" 'Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once 
given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the juris- 
diction of towns over which they exercise supervision, inform- 
ing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, 
and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying bar- 
rios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includ- 


ing rice, palay,^ chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits 
of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their 
property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become 
liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be per- 
mitted to move houses from outlying districts should they 
desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for them- 
selves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, 
and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege 
of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices 
of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest 
of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful condi- 
tions have been reestablished in the brigade these persons 
will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assist- 
ance be rendered them as may be found practicable.' 

" It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these 
zones ; but they were warned that unless they accepted that 
protection their property, which consisted almost entirely 
of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruc- 
tion, because it might be impossible to determine whether it 
belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to 
vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of 
the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued 
by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was pub- 
lished amiouncing an mtention to retaliate by the execution 
of prisoners of war m case any more were assassinated by 
insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary 
to do this. Assassinations stopped at once. 

" As the campaign progressed it became more and more 
apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed 
through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came 
to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. 
The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the 
determinmg factor m forming the decision and attitude of 
many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, 
and from time to time many additional families entered the 
zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and 
natives volunteered assistance to x\mericans at every hand 
and in every tovvoi. When these volunteers were trustworthy 
they were armed and sent out into the momitains from which 
they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half- 
famished men, women, and children who, released from the 
intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones 
of protection. 

' Unhusked rice. 


"The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within 
these areas was caused to the mestizo ruHng group, whose 
members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being 
treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to 
have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a 
man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the 
lord of his barrio,^ the possibility of having to cultivate a field 
with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. 
These men suffered and suffered acutely ; but it was not their 
bodies which suffered — it was their pride. 

''Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people 
had turned against their once highly respected chief, and 
toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined 
the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. 
Realization of the fact that the people were against him mate- 
rially aided in forcing his surrender. 

" General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 
8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or 
another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly 
released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the 
first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. 
They had returned to their homes. 

" The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones 
and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance 
of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents 
even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on 
August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding 
the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, 
Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of 
three counties of that State to remove from their residences 
within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations 
which he had established. All grain and hay in that district 
was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was 
not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebel- 
lion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The 
American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new 
method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, 
however, effectively employed an old one. 

" The insurrection had originated among the Tagalogs and 
had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied 
by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. Gen- 
eral Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagdlog 

1 Village. 


" On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insur- 
rection against the sovereign authority of the United States 
in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil 
governments having been established throughout the entire 
territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the 
office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. 
On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a 
proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reserva- 
tions, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons 
in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the 

General Bell's motives and methods in reconcentrating 
the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly 
misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. 
He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he 
adopted resulted in the reestablishment of law and order 
at a minimum cost of human suffering. 

Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps 
received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many 
of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to 
their homes when normal conditions again prevailed. 

The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas 
campaign was very small. ^ Blount has sought to make 
it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war 
there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof 
the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published 
as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, 
gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the 
census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.^ 

The report of the United States Philippine Commission 
for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while 
in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there 
had been a holocaust in Manila ? Not at all. It means 

^ 153, according to Blount himself. 

- "Nor can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history for 
the awful fact that, according to the United States Coast and Geodetic 
Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of Batangas 
pro\'ince was 312,192, and according to the American Census of the 
Philippines of 1903, it was 257,715, rest entirely on military shoulders." 
— Blount, pp. 383-384. 


only that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the 
protection of the American forces there during the period 
when they feared their own soldiers in the pro\dnces had 
mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed 
period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge 
in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them 
returned later ; others did not. 

Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report 
of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that : 

"The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by dis- 
ease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 
200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former 
years the province had." ^ 

Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a 
mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are 
hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing 
a decrease in population during a longer period of only 
fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not 
apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths 
due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort 
to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been 
made, and the very thing which then prevented the 
adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put 
forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people 
themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there 
was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at 
this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in 
this province, and even cholera, which swept it during 
the period in question and is far more readily commu- 
nicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three 
hundred and ninety-nine known deaths. 

In the end peace was established and prosperity fol- 
lowed in its wake. 

This result was brought about in part by the efficient 
activity of the armed forces of the United States and in 
part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine 

1 Blount, p. 597. ^ See Chapters XI and XII. 


Mr. Bryan and Independence 

In order to bring home to some of my Democratic and 
Anti-Imperialist friends the unrehable character of the 
testimony of even the very high officers of the so-called 
Philippine Republic, I here quote certain extracts from 
the Insurgent records, showing the important part played, 
doubtless unwittingly, by Mr. William Jennings Bryan in 
Philippine politics during the war. The first of these might 
properly have been considered in the chapter entitled 
''Was Independence Promised?" Others are instruc- 
tive in that they show the use made of false news in bol- 
stering up the Insurgent cause, and might with propriety 
have been included in the chapter on " The Conduct of the 
War." I have thought it best to keep them by themselves. 
Further comment on them would seem to be superfluous. 

" On May 1, 1900 (P. I. R., 516. 6), I. de los Santos wrote a 
long letter in Tagdiog and cipher to Aguinaldo, in which he 
reported upon the progress of what he would have probably 
called the diplomatic campaign. If this letter is to be believed, 
the agents in the United States of the junta had been able 
to form relations which might be of great value to them. Santos 
said in part : — 

'"Commissioners . . . Senores Kant (G. Apacible) and 
Raff (Sixto Lopez) duly carried out your last instructions given 
at Tarlac. Senor Del Pan, sailing by way of Japan, about the 
middle of October, and Sefior Caney (G. Apacible), sailing by 
way of Europe about the 1st of November, met in Toronto 
about the middle of February following. But before the 
arrival of Kant, Raff had already come from Hayti (United 
States) and was able to pry in upon our political friends and 
enemies. When they met each other they continued the voy- 
age incognito, as Raff had done previously, making themselves 



known to a very few people; but later on, and according to 
the instructions carried by Caney, they made themselves 
known to a greater number of people, and have succeeded in 
interviewing Bryan who happened to be in New York. Senor 
Raff said that Bryan feared being present at a conference, lest 
he might be called a traitor by members of his own party, and 
also by those of the opposite or "imperialist" party, who are 
quite proud over the victories they have gained against our 
people over there. Nevertheless, Raff was able to be present 
and talk at some of the anti-imperialist meetings, our political 
friends introducing him as a friend from the committee (at Hong- 
kong) and as an advocate of the cessation of the war over there 
in order that our sacred rights may be given consideration by 
them. And as Bryan could not personally take part in the 
conference, he sent a most trusted person, his right-hand man, 
Dr. Gardner. The results of the conference between Seiior 
Raff and Dr. Gardner, the latter acting in the name of Mr. 
Bryan, are as follows : — 

"' 1st. That we may fight on, and Bryan will never cease 
to defend our sacred rights. 2nd. That we must never 
mention Bryan's name in our manifestos and proclamations, 
lest the opposite party might say he is a traitor. 3rd. That 
we are in the right ; and hence he promised in the name of 
Bryan that if this Senor Bryan is victorious in the presidential 
campaign, he will recognize our independence without delay. 
Your honored self can easily conclude from all the foregoing 
that Senor Del Pan, after the receipt of these promises, concurred 
with him ; and he returned to inform Senor Apacible about 
the results of the conference. So these two studied over the 
plan of the policy to be adopted and carried out. I write you 
what their opinions are, viz. : 1st, that they will reside there, 
pending the outcome of the presidential contest, aiding the 
propaganda and enlivening it until November, the date set 
for the desired thing. Owing to what Dr. Gardner said and 
promised in the name of Bryan, some one ought to stay there 
in order that Bryan may be approached, if he is elected, so he 
can sign the recognition of our independence ; and this should 
be done at once, lest in his excitement over the victory he 
should forget his promise. 3rd. For carrying out the two 
propositions just mentioned, they request 2000 pounds sterl- 
ing, that is $20,000 in silver, to be used for the propaganda, for 
paying newspapers and for bribing senators — this last clause 
is somewhat dangerous and impossible. And 4th, that the 
money must be sent immediately, and that you should be 


informed not to mention the name of Bryan in the manifestos 
and proclamations. 

"'In order to answer quickly and decisively that proposi- 
tion, and as I did not have the desired money here, I answered 
as follows: "Plan approved; for the sake of economy we have 
decided that one of the two retire, but before doing so make 
arrangements, establish communications with leaders of 
Bryan's party, and he who remains should thus cultivate the 
relations ; he who is to retire will locate himself in Paris near 
Seiior Katipalad (Agoncillo) with whom he will secretly discuss 
political problems that may arise. So he will watch for the 
opportune moment of Bryan's election, in order to go imme- 
diately to Hayti and formally arrange the contract with 
Bryan." ^ 


"'By the end of 1899, by the time guerrilla warfare was well 
under way, by the time that any Filipino government, unless 
an expression of the unfettered will of the nearest bandit who 
can muster a dozen rifles may be called a government, had 
ceased to exist, a strong opposition to the policy of the admin- 
istration had arisen in the tJnited States and a demand for the 
recognition of the independence of the Philippines. The 
junta in Hongkong were assured that the Democratic party 
would come into power in the next elections and that this would 
mean the success of the patriotic efforts of Aguinaldo and his 
followers. The news was good and was forthwith spread abroad 
in "Extracts from our correspondence with America," "News 
from our foreign agents," "News from America," and "Trans- 
lations from the foreign press" — circulars and handbills printed 
on thin paper which were smuggled into the Philippines and 
passed into the hands of the guerrilla leaders who could read 
Spanish. They gathered their followers about them and told 
them that a powerful party had arisen in America which was 
going to give them all they had ever asked for. They had only 
to fight on, for success was certain. In America the "Anti- 
imperialists" were hanging the "Imperialists," and they should 
continue to harry the American adherents among the natives 
of the Philippines. 

" ' There are a number of j^hese publications among the papers 
captured from the insurgents, and the adoption of this method 
of propaganda seems to have been nearly coincident with 
Aguinaldo's orders declaring guerrilla warfare. It does not 

1 Taylor, 13 KK, E. 


seem likely that the matter contained in them was supplied by 
a Filipino, for if it was he assumed a general acquaintance 
among the people with American politics and American methods 
which they were far from possessing. 

"'In these pubhcations the Filipinos were assured that 
the Imperialists were kept in power only by the lavish con- 
tributions of the " truts," whatever they may have been ; but 
the people of the United States were growing weary of their 
domination and were about to return to the true principles of 
Washington and Jefferson. The illustrious Americans " Crosvy 
Sticcney, and Vartridge" were all laboring for the cause of 
Philippine independence. Long lists of American cities were 
given in which the illustrious orators Mr. Croshy and Mr. 
Schurts had addressed applauding crowds upon the necessity 
of throttling the "truts" because they opposed recognition 
of the rights of the Filipinos. In August, 1900, " News from our 
agents in America" informed its readers that — 

*" " W. J. Bryan has stated in a speech that his first act upon 
being elected President will be to declare the independence of 
the Philippines." 

" ' On June 16, 1900, Gen. Riego de Dios, acting head of the 
Hongkong junta, wrote to Gen. I. Torres (P. I. R., 530), the 
guerrilla commander in Bulacan Province, and assured him that 
a little more endurance, a little more constancy, was all that 
was needed to secure the attainment of their ends. According 
to their advices the Democratic party would win in the ap- 
proaching elections in the United States, and — " it is certain 
that Bryan is the incarnation of our independence." 

" ' The number of men opposed to the policy of the adminis- 
tration was said to be continually increasing. 

" ' The attitude of those who protect us cannot be more 
manly and resolute : " Continue the struggle until you conquer 
or die." Mr. Beecher of the League in Cincinnati writes us : 
"I shall always be the champion of the cause of justice and of 
truth," says Mr. Winslow of the Boston League. "Not even 
threats of imprisonment will make me cease in my undertak- 
ing," Doctor Denziger assures us. "I shall accept every risk 
and responsibility," says Doctor Leverson. " If it is necessary, 
I shall go so far as to provoke a revolution in my own country," 
repeats Mr. Udell. "It is necessary to save the Republic and 
democracy from the abyss of imperialism and save the worthy 
Filipinos from oppression and extermination " is cried by all, 
and the sound of this cry is ever rising louder and louder.' " ^ 

1 Taylor, 15 and 16 KK, E. 


Extract from a letter of Papa Isio^ dated March 4, 
1901 :— 

"I have received from Luzon an order to proceed more 
rapidly with my operations this month, as Bryan ordered 
Emiho to keep the war going vigorously until April, and he 
also said that if independence was not given the Philippines by 
that time, he, Bryan, and his followers would rise in arms 
against the oppressors." ^ 

"Tarlac, Oct. 26, 1899. 
" To the Military Governor of This City, and 
To the Secretary of the Interior. 
"As a meeting shall be held on the morning of Sunday next 
in the Presidential Palace of this Republic in return for that 
held in the United States by Mr. Bryan, who drank to the name 
of our Honourable President as one of the heroes of the world, 
and for the purpose of celebrating it with more pomp and con- 
tributing to it the greater splendor with your personnel, I will 
be obliged to you if you will please call at this office to confer 
with me on the matter. 
"God preserve you, etc. 

(Signed) " F, Buencamino." ' 

In a letter written by A. Flores, acting secretary of 
war, to the military governor of Tarlac on October 27, 
1899, there occurs the following : — 

"In the United States meetings and banquets have been 
held in honor of our Honourable President, Don Emilio Agui- 
naldo, who was pronounced one of the heroes of the world by 
Mr. Bryan, future president of the United States. The Ma- 
sonic Society, therefore, interpreting the unanimous desires of 
the people, and with the approval of the government, will on 
Sunday the 29th instant, organize a meeting or popular assem- 
bly in the interest of national independence and in honor of 
Mr. Bryan of the anti-imperiahst party, the defenders of our 
cause in the United States. The meeting will consist of two 
functions ; first — at nine a.m. of the 29th the assembly will 
convene in a suitable place, a national hymn will inaugurate 

1 "Pope" Isio was the last of a series of bandit leaders, claiming for 
themselves miraculous powers, who long infested the mountains of 

2 P. I. R., 970. 7. 3 P. I. R., 1134-1. 


the exercises, after which appropriate addresses will be de- 
livered ; and second — at four p.m. a popular demonstration 
will take place throughout the town, with bands of music 
parading the streets; residents will decorate and illuminate 
their houses. 

"Which I have the pleasure of transmitting to you for j-our 
information and guidance and for that of the troops under your 
command." ^ 

1 P. I. R., 17. 9. 



The First Philippine Commission 

I HAVE elsewhere mentioned the appointment of the 
First PhiUppine Commission. 

On January 18, 1899, its civiUan members met at 
Washington and received the President's instructions. 

We were to aid in 'Hhe most humane, pacific and 
effective extension of authority throughout these islands, 
and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits 
of a wise and generous protection of life and property to 
the inhabitants." 

We were directed to meet at the earliest possible day 
in the city of Manila and to announce by a public procla- 
mation our presence and the mission intrusted to us, 
carefully setting forth that while the established military 
government would be continued as long as necessity might 
require, efforts v/ould be made to alleviate the burden of 
taxation, to establish industrial and commercial pros- 
perity and to provide for the safety of persons and property 
by such means as might be found conducive to those ends. 

We were to endeavour, without interfering with the 
military authorities, to ascertain what amelioration in 
the condition of the inhabitants and what improvements 
in public order were practicable, and for this purpose were 
to study attentively the existing social and political state 
of the several populations, particularly as regarded the 
forms of local government, the administration of justice, 
the collection of customs and other taxes, the means of 
transportation and the need of public improvements, re- 
porting through the Department of State the results of 
our observations and reflections, and recommending such 
executive action as might, from time to time, seem to us 
wise and useful. 



We were authorized to recommend suitable persons for 
appointment to offices, made necessary by personal 
changes in the existing civil administration, from among 
the inhabitants who had previously acknowledged their 
allegiance to the American government. 

We were to ''ever use due respect for all the ideals, 
customs and institutions of the tribes which compose the 
population, emphasizing upon all occasions the just and 
beneficent intentions of the United States," and were 
commissioned on account of our "knowledge, skill, and 
integrity as bearers of the good-will, the protection and 
the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquer- 
ing nation." ^ 

Nothing could be more false than Blount's insinua- 
tion that we were sent out to help Otis run the war.^ 
There was no war when we started, and we were expressly 
enjoined from interfering with the military government 
or its officers. We were sent to deliver a message of 
good-will, to investigate, and to recommend, and there 
our powers ended. 

Mr. Schurnian and I, v.dth a small clerical force, sailed 
from Vancouver, January 31, 1899. On our arrival at 
Yokohama v\^e learned with keen regret of the outbreak 
of hostilities at Manila. 

Blount has incorrectly stated that President McKinley 
had sent the commission out when the dogs of war were 
already let loose.'^ The dogs of war had not been loosed 

1 For the full text of these instructions, see appendix, p. 975. 

2 "Mr. McKinley sent Mr. Taft out, in the spring preceding the elec- 
tion of 1900, to help General Mac Arthur run the war." — Blount, p. 281. 

"The Taft Commission was sent out, to 'aid' General Mae Arthur, as 
the Schurman Commissionhad 'aided' General Otis." — Blount, p. 289. 

^ "In February, 1899, the dogs of war being already let loose, 
President McKinley had resumed his now wlioUy impossible Benevolent 
Assimilation programme, by sending out the Schurman Commission, 
which was the prototype of the Taft Commission, to yearningly explain 
our intentions to the insurgents, and to make clear to them how unquali- 
fiedly benevolent those intentions were. The scheme was like trying to 
put salt on a bird's tail after you have flushed him." — Blount, p. 217. 


when we started, and one of the main purposes in sending 
us was to keep them in their kennels if possible. 

Aguinaldo has made the following statements in his 
' ' Resena Veridica " : — 

"... We, the Filipinos, would have received said com- 
mission, as honourable agents of the great America, with demon- 
strations of true kindness and entire adhesion. The commis- 
sioners would have toured over all our provinces, seeing and 
observing at close range order and tranquillity, in the whole of 
our territory. They would have seen the fields tilled and 
planted. They would have examined our Constitution and 
public administration, in perfect peace, and they would have 
experienced and enjoyed that ineffable charm of our Oriental 
manner, a mixture of aljandon and solicitude, of warmth and 
of frigidity, of confidence and of suspiciousness, which makes 
our relations with foreigners change into a thousand colours, 
agreeable to the utmost. 

"Ah ! but this landscape suited neither General Otis nor the 
Imperialists ! For their criminal intention it was better that 
the American commissioners should find war and desolation 
in the Philippines, perceiving from the day of their arrival the 
fetid stench emitted by the mingled corpses of Americans and 
Filipinos. For their purposes it was better that that gentle- 
man, Mr. Schurman, President of the Commission, could not 
leave Manila, limiting himself to listen to the few Filipinos, 
who, having yielded to the reasonings of gold, were partisans 
of the Imperialists. It was better that the commission should 
contemplate the Philippine problem through conflagrations, 
to the whiz of bullets, on the transverse light of all the unchained 
passions, in order that it might not form any exact or complete 
opinion of the natural and proper limits of said problem. Ah ! 
it was better, in short, that the commission should leave de- 
feated in not having secured peace, and would blame me and 
the other Filipinos, when I and the whole Filipino people 
anxiously desired that peace should have been secured before 
rather than now, but an honourable and worthy peace for the 
United States and for the Philippine Republic." ^ 

These statements, made to deceive the public, make 
interesting reading in the light of our present knowledge as 
to the purposes and plans of Aguinaldo and his associates. 

1 P. I. R., 1300. 2. 


On our arrival at Yokohama we were promptly informed 
by a secretary from the United States Legation that no 
less a personage than Marquis Ito had been in frequent 
communication with the Filipinos since 1894, that they 
had been looking to him for advice and support, and 
that he had interested himself in the present situation 
sufficiently to come to the American minister and offer 
to go to the Philippines, not in any sense as an agent of 
the United States, but as a private individual, and to use 
his influence in our behalf. His contention was that the 
then existing conditions resulted from misunderstandings. 

He said that Americans did not understand Asiatics, 
but he was an Asiatic himself and did understand the 
Filipinos, and thought that he could settle the whole 
affair. The minister had cabled to Washington for in- 
structions. Naturally the offer was not accepted. 

I was reminded, by this extraordinary incident, of a 
previous occurrence. I spent the month of March, 1893, 
in Tokio when returning from my second visit to 
the Philippines, and was kindly invited to inspect the 
zoological work at the Imperial University. When I 
visited the institution for that purpose, I was questioned 
very closely on the islands, their people and their re- 
sources. The gentlemen who interrogated me may have 
been connected with the university, but I doubt it. 

We reached Hongkong on February 22. Here I had 
an interview with Dr. Apacible of the. junta, while Mr. 
Schurman visited Canton. Apacible told me that the 
Filipinos wanted an independent republic under an Ameri- 
can protectorate. Pressed for the details of their desires, 
he said that "the function of a protector is to pro- 
tect." Further than that he could not go. I tried to 
convince him of the hopelessness of the course the Fili- 
pinos were then pursuing and of the kindly intentions of 
my government, but felt that I made no impression 
on him. 

We arrived at Manila on March 4, 1899, too late to 


land. Firebugs were abroad. We watched a number 
of houses burn, and heard the occasional crackle of rifle 
fire along the line of the defences around the city. The 
next morning there was artillery fire for a time at San 
Pedro Macati. Everywhere were abundant evidences 
that the war was on. 

This left little for us to do at the moment except to 
inform ourselves as to conditions, especially as Colonel 
Denby had not yet arrived, and General Otis was over- 
whelmed with work and anxiety. 

I renewed my acquaintance with many old Filipino 
and Spanish friends and improved the opportunity, not 
likely to recur in my experience, to see as much as possible 
of the fighting in the field. 

One day when I was at San Pedro Macati, Captain 
Dyer, who commanded a battery of 3.2-inch guns there, 
suggested that if I wished to investigate the effect of 
shrapnel fire I could do so by visiting a place on a neigh- 
bouring hillside which he indicated. Acting upon his sug- 
gestion, I set out, accompanied by my private secretary, 
who, like myself, was clad in white duck. The Insurgent 
sharpshooters on the other side of the river devoted some 
attention to us, but we knew that so long as they aimed 
at us we were quite safe. Few of their bullets came within 
hearing distance. 

We were hunting about on the hillside for the place indi- 
cated by Captain Dyer, when suddenly we heard ourselves 
cursed loudly and fluently in extremely plain American, 
and there emerged from a neighbouring thicket a very 
angry infantry officer. On venturing to inquire the cause 
of his most uncomplimentary remarks, I found that he was 
in command of skirmishers who were going through the 
brush to see whether there was anything left there which 
needed shooting up. As many of the Insurgent soldiers 
dressed in white, and as American civilians were not com- 
monly to be met in Insurgent territory, these men had 
been just about to fire on us when they discovered their 

VOL. I — X 


mistake. We went back to Manila and bought some 
khald clothes. 

At first my interest in military matters was not appre- 
ciated by my army friends, who could not see what 
business I had to be wandering around without a gun in 
places where guns were in use. I had, however, long 
since discovered that reliable first-hand information on 
any subject is likely to be useful sooner or later, and so it 
proved in this case. 

For several weeks after we reached Manila there was 
no active military movement ; then came the inaugura- 
tion of the short, sharp campaign which ended for the 
moment with the taking of Malolos. For long, tedious 
weeks our soldiers had sweltered in muddy trenches, 
shot at by an always invisible foe whom they were not 
allow^ed to attack. It was anticipated that when the 
forward movement began, it would be active. Close 
secrecy was maintained with regard to it. Captain Hed- 
worth Lambton, of the British cruiser Powerful, then lying 
in Manila Bay, exacted a promise from me that I would 
tell him if I found out when the advance was to begin, so 
that we might go to Caloocan together and watch the 
fighting from the church tower, which commanded a mag- 
nificent view of the field of operations. 

I finally heard a fairly definite statement that our 
troops would move the following morning. I rushed to 
General Otis's office and after some parleying had it con- 
firmed by him. It was then too late to advise Lambton, 
and in fact I could not properly have done so, as the 
information had been given me under pledge of secrecy. 
Accompanied by my private secretary, Dr. P. L. Sherman, 
I hastened to Caloocan, where we arrived just at dusk, 
having had to run the gantlet of numerous inquisitive 
sentries en route. 

We spent the night in the church, where General 
Wheaton and his staff had their headquarters, and long 
before daylight were perched in a convenient opening in 


- -3 



■J >) 











its galvanized iron roof, made on a former occasion by a 
shell from Dewey's fleet. 

From this vantage point we could see the entire length 
of the line of battle. The attack began shortly after day- 
light. Near Caloocan the Insurgent works were close in, 
but further off toward La Loma they were in some places 
distant a mile or more from the trenches of the Americans. 

The general plan of attack was that the whole Ameri- 
can line should rotate to the north and west on Caloocan 
as a pivot, driving the Insurgents in toward Malabon if 
possible. The latter began to fire as soon as the Ameri- 
can troops showed themselves, regardless of the fact that 
their enemies were quite out of range. As most of them 
were using black-powder cartridges, their four or five 
miles of trenches were instantl}^ outlined. The ground 
was very dry so that the bullets threw up puffs of dust 
where they struck, and it was possible to judge the 
accuracy of the fire of each of the opposing forces. 

Rather heavy resistance was encountered on the extreme 
right, and the turning movement did not materialize as 
rapidly as had been hoped. General Wheaton, who was 
in command of the forces about the church, finally moved 
to the front, and as we were directly in the rear of his line 
and the Insurgents, as usual, overshot badly, we found 
ourselves in an uncomfortably hot corner. Bullets 
rattled on the church roof like hail, and presently one 
passed through the opening through which Major Bourns, 
Colonel Potter, of the engineer corps, and I were sticking 
our heads. Immediately thereafter we were observed 
by Dr. Sherman making record time on all fours along 
one of the framing timbers of the church toward its 
tower. There we took up our station, and thereafter 
observed the fighting by peeping through windows 
partially closed with blocks of volcanic tuff. We had a 
beautiful opportunity to see the artillery fire. The guns 
were directly in front of and below us and we could 
watch the laying of the several pieces and then turn our 


field-glasses on the particular portions of the Insurgent 
trenches where the projectiles were likely to strike. 
Again and again we caught bursting shells in the fields 
of our glasses and could thus see their effect as accurately 
as if we had been standing close by, without any danger 
of being perforated by shrapnel. 

After the Insurgent position had been carried we 
walked forward to their line of trenches and followed it 
east to a point beyond the La Loma Church, counting 
the dead and wounded, as I had heard wild stories of 
tremendous slaughter and wanted to see just how much 
damage the fire of our troops had really done. On our 
way we passed the Caloocan railroad station which had 
been converted into a temporary field hospital. Here I 
saw good Father McKinnon, the chaplain of the First 
California Volunteers, assisting a surgeon and soaked 
with the blood of wounded men. He was one chaplain 
in a thousand. It was always easy to find him. One 
had only to look where trouble threatened and help was 
needed. He was sure to be there. 

On my way from the railway station to the trenches I 
met a very much excited officer returning from the front. 
He had evidently had a long and recent interview with 
Cyrus Noble, ^ and was determined to tell me all about 
the fighting. I escaped from him after some delay, and 
with much difficulty. Later he remembered having met 
me, but made a grievous mistake as to the scene of our 
encounter, insisting that we had been together in ''Whea- 
ton's Hole," an uncommonly hot position where numerous 
people got hurt. He persisted in giving a graphic account 
of our experiences, and in paying high tribute to my 
coolness and courage under heavy fire. My efforts to 
persuade him that I had not been with him there proved 
futile, and I finally gave up the attempt. I wonder 
how many other military reputations rest upon so slender 

1 A brand of whiskey then much in use. 


a foundation ! This experience was unique. I never 
saw another officer under the influence of Hquor when 
in the field. 

At the time that we visited the Insurgent trenches, 
not all of our own killed and wounded had been removed, 
yet every wounded Insurgent whom we found had a 
United States army canteen of water at his side, obviously 
left by some kindly American soldier. Not a few of the 
injured had been furnished hardtack as well. All were 
ultimately taken to Manila and there given the best of 
care by army surgeons. 

Sometime later a most extraordinary account of this 
fight, written by a soldier, was published in the Springfield 
Republican. It was charged that our men had murdered 
prisoners in cold blood, and had committed all manner 
of barbarities, the writer saying among other things : — 

"We first bombarded a town called Malabon and then 
entered it and killed every man, woman and child in the place." 

The facts were briefly as follows : There was an Insur- 
gent regiment in and near a mangrove swamp to the right 
of this town. When it became obstreperous it was 
shelled for a short time until it quieted down again. 
None of the shells entered the town. Indeed, most of 
them struck in the water. Our troops did not enter 
Malabon that day, but passed to the northward, leaving 
behind a small guard to keep the Insurgents from coming 
out of Malabon in their rear. Had they then entered 
the town, they would not have found any women, chil- 
dren or non-combatant men to kill for the reason that all 
such persons had been sent away some time before. 
The town was burned, in part, but by the Insurgents 
themselves. They fired the church and a great orphan 
asylum, and did much other wanton damage. 

Being able to speak from personal observation as to 
the occurrences of that day, I sent a long cablegram direct 
to the Chicago Times-Herald stating the facts. 


After my return to the United States, President McKin- 
ley was kind enough to say to me that if there had been 
no other result from the visit of the first Philippine Com- 
mission to the islands than the sending of that cablegram, 
he should have considered the expense involved more 
than justified. He added that the country was being 
flooded at the time with false and slanderous rumours, 
and people at home did not know what to believe. The 
statements of army officers were discounted in advance, 
and other testimony from some unprejudiced source was 
badly needed. 

On April 2, 1899, Colonel Denby arrived, and our serious 
work began. The fighting continued and there was little 
that we could do save earnestly to strive to promote 
friendly relations with the conservative element among 
the Filipinos, and to gather the information we had been 
instructed to obtain. 

On April 4, 1899, we issued a proclamation setting 
forth in clear and simple language the purposes of the 
American government.^ It was translated into Tagalog 
and other dialects and widely circulated. The Insurgent 
leaders were alert to keep the common people and the 
soldiers from learning of the kindly purposes of the 
United States. They were forbidden to read the docu- 
ment and we were reliably informed that the imposition 
of the death penalty was threatened if this order was 
violated. In Manila crowds of Filipinos gathered about 
copies of the proclamation which were posted in public 
places. Many of them were soon effaced by Insurgent 
agents or sympathizers. 

This document unquestionably served a very useful 
purpose.^ For one thing, it promptly brought us into 
much closer touch with the more conservative Filipinos. 

1 For the text of this document see the Appendix, p. 977. 

2 In view of the alleged attitude of General Otis toward the work 
of the Commission, the following statement by him as to the effect 
of this proclamation is of interest : — 

General Otis said: "It was unanimously decided to print, publish. 


We soon established relations of friendliness and confi- 
dence with men like Ai-ellano, Torres, Legarda and Tavera, 
who had left the Malolos government when it demon- 
strated its futility, and were ready to turn to the United 
States for help. Insurgent sympathizers also conferred 
freely with us. We were invited to a beautiful function 
given in our honour at the home of a wealthy family, 
and were impressed, as no one can fail to be, with the 
dignified bearing of our Filipino hosts, a thing which is 
always in evidence on such occasions. We gave a return 
function which was largely attended and greatly aided 
in the establishment of relations of confidence and friend- 
ship with leading FiHpino residents of Manila. 

The Filipinos were much impressed with Colonel Denby. 
He was a handsome man, of imposing presence, with one 
of the kindest hearts that ever beat. They felt instinc- 
tively that they could have confidence in him, and showed 
it on all occasions. 

Meanwhile we lost no opportunity to inform ourselves 
as to conditions and events, conferring with Filipinos from 
various parts of the archipelago and with Chinese, Ger- 
mans, Frenchmen, Belgians, Austrians, Englishmen, 
Spaniards and Americans. Among the witnesses who 

post, and disseminate as much as possible among the inhabitants 
under insurgent domination this address, printing the same in the 
English, Spanish, and Tagalog languages. This was done, but 
scarcely had it been posted in Manila twenty-four hours before 
it was so torn and mutilated as to be unrecognizable. It suffered 
the same fate as the proclamation of January 4, set out in 
pages 113 and 114 of this report, but it produced a marked 
beneficial influence on the people, especially those outside our 
lines, as it carried with it a conviction of the United States' intentions, 
on account of the source from which it emanated, it being an 
expression from a committee of gentlemen especially appointed to 
proclaim the poUcy which the United States would pursue." 

— Taylor, 90 AJ. 
Taylor adds : "The commander of one of the regiments of sandatahan 
in Manila reported that he had forced the people of the city to destroy 
the proclamations issued by the commission (P. I. R., 73. 9). As he 
found this necessary, the action of the people could hardly have reflected 
their real feelings in the matter." 


came before us were farmers, bankers, brokers, merchants, 
lawyers, physicians, railroad men, shipowners, educators 
and public officials. Certainly all classes of opinion were 
represented, and when we were called upon by the Presi- 
dent, a little later, for a statement of the situation we felt 
fully prepared to make it. 

Blount has charged that the commission attempted to 
interfere with the conduct of the war, and cites a cable- 
gram from General Otis stating that conferences v/ith 
Insurgents cost soldiers' lives in support of this conten- 
tion. No conference with Insurgent leaders was ever 
held without the previous knowledge and approval of 
the general, who was himself a member of the commission. 

Late in April General Luna sent Colonel Arguelles of 
his staff to ask for a fifteen days' suspension of hostilities 
under the pretext of enabling the Insurgent congress to 
meet at San Fernando, Pampanga, on May 1, to discuss 
the situation and decide what it wanted to do. He called 
on the commission and urged us to ask Otis to grant this 
request, but we declined to intervene, and General Otis 
refused to grant it. 

Mabini continued Luna's effort, sending Arguelles 
back with letters to Otis and to the commission. In the 
latter he asked for ''an armistice and a suspension of 
hostilities as an indispensable means of arriving at peace," 
stating explicitly that the Philippine government ''does 
not solicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which 
to reenforce itself." 

The commission again referred Arguelles to General 
Otis on the matter of armistice and suspension of hostili- 
ties. We suspected that the statement that these things 
were not asked for in order to gain time was false, 
and this has since been definitely established. 

Taylor says : — 

"On April 11 Mabini wrote to General Luna (Exhibit 719) 
that Aguinaldo's council was of the opinion that no negotia- 
tions for the release of the Spanish prisoners should be consid- 


ered unless the American Commission agreed to a suspension 
of hostilities for the purpose of treating, not only in regard to 
the prisoners, but for the purpose of opening negotiations be- 
tween Aguinaldo's government and the American authorities. 
'"In arriving at this decision we have been actuated by the 
desire to gain time for our arsenals to produce sufficient car- 
tridges, if, as would seem to be probable, they persist in not 
even recognizing our belligerency, as means for furthering the 
recognition of our independence.'"^ 

Arguelles, on his return, was instructed to ask Otis 
for a — 

"general armistice and suspension of hostilities in all the archi- 
pelago for the short space of three months, in order to enable 
it to consult the opinion of the people concerning the govern- 
ment which would be the most advantageous, and the inter- 
vention in it which should be given to the North American 
Government, and to appoint an extraordinary commission with 
full powers, to act in the name of the Philippine people." ^ 

General Otis naturally again declined to grant the re- 
quest for a suspension of hostilities. 

Little came of the conference between Arguelles and 
the commission, except that we really succeeded in con- 
vincing him of the good intentions of our government, 
and this promptly got him into very serious trouble, as 
we shall soon see. I took him to a tent hospital on the 
First Reserve Hospital grounds where wounded Insur- 
gents were receiving the best of treatment at the hands 
of American surgeons, and he was amazed. He had been 
taught to believe that the Americans murdered prisoners, 
raped women, and committed similar barbarities when- 
ever they got a chance. As we have seen, stories of this 
sort were industriously spread by many of the Insurgent 
leaders among their soldiers, and among the common 
people as well. They served to arouse the passions of the 
former, and stirred them up to acts of devilish brutality 
which they might perhaps not otherwise have perpetrated. 

1 Taylor, 96 AJ. ^ Ibid. 


Arguelles told the truth upon his return, and this, together 
with his suggestion that it might be well to consider the 
acceptance of the form of government offered by the 
United States, nearly cost him his life. Relative to this 
matter Taylor says : — 

"When Arguelles returned to the insurgent lines, it must 
have been considered that he had said too much in Manila. 
While he had been sent there to persuade the Americans to 
agree to a suspension of hostilities to be consumed in endless 
discussion under cover of which Luna's army could be reorgan- 
ized, he had not only failed to secure the desired armistice, but 
had come back with the opinion that it might after all be 
advisable to accept the government proposed by the United 
States. On May 22 General Luna ordered his arrest and 
trial for being in favour of the autonomy of the United States 
in the Philippine Islands. He was tried promptly, the prose- 
cuting witness being another officer of Luna's staff who had 
accompanied him to Manila and acted as a spy upon his move- 
ments (P. I. R., 285. 2). The court sentenced him to dismissal 
and confinement at hard labor for twelve years. This did not 
satisfy Luna's thirst for vengeance, and he was imprisoned in 
Bautista on the first floor of a building whose second story 
was occupied by that officer. One night Luna came alone 
into the room where he was confined and told him that although 
he was a traitor, yet he had done good service to the cause; 
and it was not proper that a man who had been a colonel in the 
army should be seen working on the roads under a guard. He 
told him that the proper thing for him to do was to blow his 
brains out, and that if he did not do it within a reasonable time 
the sentinel at his door would shoot him. He gave him a 
pistol and left the room. Arguelles decided not to kill him- 
self, but fully expected that the guard would kill him. Shortly 
afterwards Luna was summoned to meet Aguinaldo, and never 
returned. On September 29, 1899, his sentence was declared 
null and void and he was reinstated in his former rank (P. I. R., 
285. 3, and 2030. 2)." ^ 

Colonel Arguelles has told me exactly the same story. 
For a time it seemed as if the views expressed by him 
might prevail. 

1 Taylor, 97 AJ. 

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"According to Felipe Buencamino and some others, the 
majority of the members of congress had been in favour of abso- 
hite independence until they saw the demoralization of the 
officers and soldiers which resulted in the American occupation 
of Malolos. In the middle of April, 1899, they remembered 
Arellano's advice, and all of the intelligent men in Aguinaldo's 
government, except Antonio Luna and the officers who had 
no desire to lay down their miUtary rank, decided to accept 
the sovereignty of the United States. At about the same time 
copies of the proclamation issued by the American Commis- 
sion in Manila reached them and still further influenced them 
toward the adoption of this purpose. By the time congress 
met in San Isidro on May 1, 1899, all of the members had 
accepted it except a few partisans of Mabini, then president 
of the council of government. At its first meeting the congress 
resolved to change the poUcy of war %vith the United States 
to one of peace, and this change of policy in congress led to 
the fall of Mabini and his succession by Paterno. The first 
act of the new council was the appointment of a commission 
headed by Felipe Buencamino which was to go to Manila and 
there negotiate with the American authorities for an honourable 
surrender." ^ 

"Although Mabini had fallen from power, Luna and his 
powerful faction had still to be reckoned with. He was less 
moderate than Mabini, and had armed adherents, which Mabini 
did not, and when Paterno declared his policy of moderation 
and diplomacy he answered it on the day the new council of 
government was proclaimed by an order that all foreigners 
U\'ing in the Philippines except Chinese and Spaniards, should 
leave for Manila within forty-eight hours." ^ 

Unfortunately Luna intercepted the Buencamino com- 
mission. Its head he kicked, cuffed and threatened v^ith 
a revolver. One of its members v^^as General Gregorio del 
Pilar. He was allowed to proceed, as he commanded a 
brigade of troops which might have deserted had he been 
badly treated, but Luna named three other men to go 
with him in place of those who had been originally ap- 
pointed.^ They were Gracio Gonzaga, Captain Zialcita, 
and Alberto Baretto. They reached Manila on May 19, 

1 Taylor, 97 A.J. 2 Ihid. 

* Nominally they were named by Aguinaldo. 


1899, and during their stay there had two long inter- 
views with the commission. 

They said that they had come, with larger powers than 
had been conferred on Arguelles, to discuss the possibility 
of peace, the form of ultimate government which might 
be proposed in future, and the attitude of the United 
States government toward needed reforms. 

Meanwhile, on May 4, we had laid before the President 
a plan of government informally discussed with Arguelles, 
and had received the following reply, authorizing, in sub- 
stance, what we had suggested : — 

''WAsmNGTON, May 5, 1899, 10.20 p.m. 

" ScHURMAN, Manila : 

"Yours 4th received. You are authorized to propose that 
under the military power of the President, pending action of 
Congress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist 
of a governor-general, appointed by the President ; cabinet, 
appointed by the governor-general ; a general advisory council 
elected by the people ; the qualifications of electors to be care- 
fully considered and determined ; the governor-general to have 
absolute veto. Judiciary strong and independent ; principal 
judges appointed by the President. The cabinet and judges 
to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both, having regard 
to fitness. The President earnestly desires the cessation of 
bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippine Islands at an 
early date shall have the largest measure of local self-govern- 
ment consistent with peace and good order. 

"Hay." 1 

Our proclamation of April 4, 1899, was also taken up 
at their request and was gone over minutely, sentence by 
sentence. We were asked to explain certain expressions 
which they did not fully understand. 

They told us that it would be hard for their army to 
lay down its arms when it had accomplished nothing, and 
asked if it could be taken into the service of the United 
States. We answered that some of the regiments might 

1 Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, VoL I, 

1900, p. 9. 


be taken over and employment on public works be found 
for the soldiers of others. 

We endeavoured to arrange for an interview with 
Aguinaldo, either going to meet him or assuring him safe 
conduct should he desire to confer with us at Manila. 

They left, promising to return in three weeks when 
they had had time to consider the matters under discus- 
sion, but they never came back. 

Shortly thereafter there was an odd occurrence. Soon 
after our arrival we had learned that Mr. Schurman 
was a man of very variable opinions. He was rather 
readily convinced by plausible arguments, but sometimes 
very suddenly reversed his views on an important 

At the outset Archbishop Nozaleda made a great im- 
pression upon him. The Archbishop was a thorough- 
going Spaniard of the old school, and entertained some- 
what radical opinions as to what should be done to end the 
distressing situation which existed. After talking with 
him Mr. Schurman seemed to be convinced that we 
ought to adopt a stern and bloody policy, a conclusion 
to which Colonel Denby and I decidedly objected. 

A little later he made a trip up the Pasig River with 
Admiral Dewey and others and had a chance to see some- 
thing of the aftermath of war. It was not at all pretty. 
It never is. I was waiting for him with a carriage at the 
river landing on his return and had hard work to keep 
him away from the cable office. His feelings had under- 
gone a complete revulsion. He insisted that if the Ameri- 
can people knew what we were doing they would demand 
that the war be terminated immediately at any cost and 
by whatsoever means, and he wanted to tell them all 
about it at once. By the next morning, however, things 
fortunately looked rather differently to him. 

Mr. Schurman acquired a working knowledge of the 
Spanish language with extraordinary promptness. Shortly 
thereafter Colonel Denby and I discovered that when 


Filipinos came to see the commission in order to impart 
information or to seek it, he was conferring with them 
privately and sending them away without our seeing them 
at all. 

Soon after we had made our formal statement of 
the situation to the President, Mr. Schurman had an 
interview with an Englishman who had been living in 
Insurgent territory north of Manila, from which he had 
just been ejected, in accordance with Luna's order. This 
man told him all about the mistakes of the Americans and 
evidently greatly impressed him, for shortly thereafter he 
read to us at a commission meeting a draft of a proposed 
cablegram which he said he hoped we would approve. 
It would have stultified us, had we signed it, as it involved 
in effect the abandonment of the position we had so 
recently taken and a radical change in the policy we had 
recommended. Mr. Schurman told us that if we did 
not care to sign it, he would send it as an expression of 
his personal opinion. Colonel Denby asked him if his 
personal opinion differed from his official opinion, and 
received an affirmative reply. We declined to approve 
the proposed cablegram, whereupon he informed us that 
if his poUcy were adopted, he and General Aguinaldo would 
settle things without assistance from us, and that other- 
wise he would resign. He inquired whether we, too, 
would send a cable, and we told him certainly not, unless 
further information from us was requested. He sent his 
proposed message, in somewhat modified form, and re- 
ceived a prompt reply instructing him to submit it to the 
full commission and cable their views. 

He did submit it to Colonel Denby and myself at a 
regularly called commission meeting, argued that in doing 
this he had obeyed the President's instructions, and 
vowed that he would not show it to General Otis. I 
showed it to the General myself, allowing him to believe 
that I did so with Mr. Schurman's approval, and thus 
avoided serious trouble, as he had been personally advised 


from Washington of the instructions to Mr. Schurman. 
The General then joined with Colonel Denby and myself 
in a cablegram setting forth our views, and so this incident 

Mr. Schurman did not resign, but thereafter we saw 
very little of him. He made a hasty trip to the Visayas 
and the Southern Islands and sailed for the United States 
shortly after his return to Manila, being anxious to get 
back in time for the opening of the college year at Cornell. 

Colonel Denby and I were instructed to remain at 
Manila, where we rendered such assistance as we could 
give, and continued to gather information relative to the 
situation, the country and the people. In this latter 
work we were given invaluable help by Jesuit priests, who 
prepared for us a comprehensive monograph embodying 
a very large amount of valuable information, and furnished 
us a series of new maps as well. The latter were subse- 
quently published by the United States Coast and Geo- 
detic Survey in the form of an Atlas of the Philippines. 

Early in September we had a most interesting interview 
with Sr. Jose de Luzuriaga, a distinguished and patriotic 
Filipino from western Negros, where American sover- 
eignty had been accepted without resistance. Up to 
that time it had been possible for the people of Negros 
to keep out Tagalog invaders. Sr. Luzuriaga assured 
us that so long as this condition continued, there would 
be no trouble, and he was quite right. 

Aguinaldo's agents eventually gained a foothold there 
for a short time, and did some mischief, but it did not 
result very seriously. 

We felt an especial interest in this island, as General 
Otis had asked us carefullj'- to study and to criticise a 
scheme for its government which had been drafted by 
General James F. Smith, who afterward became justice 
of the Supreme Court of the Phihppines, secretary of 
public instruction and governor-general of the islands, 
and was then in command of the troops in Negros. 


General Lawton arrived in the Philippines during our 
stay. His coming had been eagerly looked forward to 
by the army. He had sailed with the understanding 
that he was to be put in charge of field operations. While 
he was at sea, influences were brought to bear which 
changed this plan. 

It is my firm conviction that if Lawton had been put 
in command, the war would have ended promptly. He 
was a wonderful man in the field. He possessed the faculty 
of instilling his own tremendous energy into his officers 
and men, whose privations and dangers he shared, thereby 
arousing an unfaltering loyalty which stood him in good 
stead in time of need. If there was fighting to be done, 
he promptly and thoroughly whipped everything in sight. 
He punished looting and disorder with a heavy hand, 
treated prisoners and noncombatants with the utmost 
kindness, and won the good-will of all Filipinos with whom 
he came in contact. 

General MacArthur was always declaring that the 
Filipinos were a unit against us and that he could never 
get information from them. General Lawton never 
lacked for such information as he needed, and constantly 
and successfully used the Filipinos themselves as messen- 
gers and for other purposes. I came to know him inti- 
mately, and learned to admire and love him as did all 
those who had that great privilege. 

For some time I had charge of his spies. Never have 
men taken longer chances than did the faithful few who 
at this time furnished us with information as to events 
in Insurgent territory. Discovery meant prompt and 
cruel death. For a long time Major F. S. Bourns had 
performed the uncongenial task of directing the spies. 
He was then the chief health officer of Manila, and as 
all sorts of people were compelled to consult him on sani- 
tary matters, visits to his office aroused no suspicion. 
He spoke Spanish, and this was imperatively necessary. 
Our spies simply would not communicate results through 


interpreters. The facts revealed by the Insurgent records 
show how right they were in refusing to do so. 

Major Bourns eventually returned to the United States. 
His work was taken over by an army officer, with the 
result that two of our best men died very suddenly in that 
gentleman's back yard. As I spoke Spanish, and as all 
sorts of people came to see the commission, I was the logi- 
cal candidate for this job, which I thereupon inherited. 

Each morning, if there was news, I myself laboriously 
thumped out my notes on the typewriter, making an orig- 
inal and one copy. The copy I took at once to General 
Lawton. The original I took, later, to General Otis. 

General Lawton was firmly convinced that most army 
officers were unfitted by their training to perform civil 
functions. He organized municipal governments with 
all possible promptness in the towns occupied by his 
troops, and in this work he requested my assistance, 
which I was of course glad to give. Sr. Felipe Calderon 
drafted a simple provisional scheme of municipal govern- 
ment which I submitted for criticism to that most dis- 
tinguished and able of Filipinos, Sr. Cayetano Arellano.^ 
When the final changes in it had been made, I accompanied 
General Lawton on a trip to try putting it into effect. 
We held elections and established mmiicipal governments 
in a number of the towns just south of Manila, and in 
some of those along the Pasig River. 

General Otis watched our operations and their results 
narrowly, and was sufficiently well pleased with the latter 
to order General Kobbe to follow a similar course in 
various towns on or near the railroad north of Manila. 
Kobbe did not profess to know much about .municipal 
government, and asked me to go with him and help until 
he got the hang of the thing, which I did. 

Thus it happened that the first Philippine Conunission 
had a sort of left-handed interest in the first municipal gov- 
ernments established in the islands under American rule. 
1 Now chief justice of the Philippine Supreme Court. 

VOL, I — Y 


In his endeavour to show that the Commission inter- 
fered with mihtary operations, Blount has ascribed cer- 
tain statements to Major Starr. He says : '' ... at San 
Isidro on or about November 8, Major Starr said : 'We 
took this town last spring/ stating how much our loss 
had been in so doing, ' but partly as a result of the Schur- 
man commission parleying with the Insurgents, General 
Otis had us fall back. We have just had to take it 
again.'" ^ 

If Major Starr ever made such a statement he was 
sadly misinformed. General Lawton was the best friend 
I ever had in the United States Army. I saw him almost 
daily when he was in Manila, and he showed me the 
whole telegraphic correspondence which passed between 
him and General Otis on the subject of the withdrawal 
from San Isidro and Nueva Ecija, whichwas certainly one of 
the most ill advised moves that any military commander 
was ever compelled to make. General Lawton's unremit- 
ting attacks had absolutely demoralized the Insurgent force, 
and my information is that when he finally turned back, 
Aguinaldo and several members of his cabinet were wait- 
ing, ten miles away, to surrender to him when he next 
advanced, believing that they could never escape from 
him. I have not the telegraphic correspondence before 
me, but I remember its salient features. Otis ordered 
Lawton to withdraw, and Lawton, convinced of the in- 
advisability of the measure, objected. Otis replied that, 
with the rainy season coming on, he could neither provi- 
sion him nor furnish him aromunition. Lawton an- 
swered that he had provisions enough to last three weeks 
and ammunition enough to finish the war, whereupon Otis 
peremptorily ordered him to withdraw. The Philippine 
Commission had no more to do with this matter than they 
had to do with the similar order against advancing which 
Otis sent Lawton on the day the latter won the Zapote 
River fight, when the Insurgents were running all over the 

1 Blount, p. 235. 










Province of Cavite. Lawton wanted to push forward 
and clean the whole place up. The reply to his request 
to be allowed to do so ran, if memory serves me well, as 
follows : — 

"Do nothing. You have accomplished all that was ex- 
pected of you." 

Later on, Lawton and his devoted officers and men had 
to duplicate the fierce campaign which had resulted in 
the taking of San Isidro. This made possible the move- 
ment that Lawton had had in mind in the first instance, 
which was made with the result that organized armed 
resistance to the authority of the United States promptly 
ceased in northern Luzon. 

While on this subject I wish to record the fact that 
shortly after his return from the San Isidro campaign 
General Lawton asked me to accompany him on a visit 
to General Otis and act as a witness. I did so. In my 
presence Lawton said to Otis that if the latter would 
give him two regiments, would allow him to arm, equip and 
provision them to suit himself, and would turn him loose, 
he would stake his reputation as a soldier, and his position 
in the United States Army, on the claim that within sixty 
days he would end the insurrection and would deliver to 
General Otis one Emilio Aguinaldo, dead or alive. The 
general laughed at his offer. General Lawton asked me 
some day to make these facts public. As life is an un- 
certain thing, I deem it proper to do so now. Personally 
I am convinced that if his offer had been accepted he 
would have kept his promise. 

On September 15, 1899, Colonel Denby and I sailed 
for the United States, having been recalled to Washing- 
ton. Shortly after our arrival there the commission 
issued a brief preliminary report. The winter was spent 
in the preparation of our final report, which constituted 
a full and authoritative treatise on the islands, the 
people and their resources. Father Jose Algue, the dis- 


tinguished head of the Philippine Weather Bureau, was 
called to Washington to help us, and gave us invaluable 

Our preliminary report, dated November 2, 1899, and 
the first volume of our final report, published on January- 
Si, 1900, contained our observations and recommenda- 
tions relative to political matters. 

Mr. Schurman has been credited with saying in an 
address made on January 11, 1902 : ''Any decent kind of 
government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the 
best possible government of Filipinos by Americans." ^ 

On November 2, 1900, he signed the following state- 
ment : 2 — 

"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the com- 
mission believe that the government of the Philippines would 
speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not 
necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual 
division of the islands among them. Only through American 
occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and 
united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the 
indispensable need from the Filipino point of view of main- 
taining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recog- 
nized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents 
who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, 
would take the revenues and leave us the responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the 
Filipinos cannot stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Fili- 
pinos coincides with the dictates of national honour in forbidding 
om* abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any 
point of view escape the responsibilities of government which 
our sovereignty entails ; and the commission is strongly per- 
suaded that the performance of our national duty will prove 
the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands." ; 

More than fourteen years' experience in governmental 
work in the Philippines has profoundly impressed me 
with the fundamental soundness of these conclusions of 
the first Philippine Commission. Every statement then 
made still holds true. 

1 Blount, p. 105. 2 Report Philippine Commission, Vol. I, p. 183. 


The Establishment of Civil Government 

The first Philippine Commission did not complete 
its work until March, 1900. By this time conditions 
had so far improved in the archipelago that President 
McKinley was prepared to initiate a movement looking 
toward the establishment of civil government there. With 
this end in view he appointed the following commission 
of five civilians ; William H. Taft of Ohio, Dean C. 
Worcester of Michigan, Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, 
Henry C. Ide of Vermont and Bernard Moses of Cali- 
fornia. Our appointments were dated March 16, 1900. 
Our instructions which were full, are given in the appendix.^ 
I was the only member of the first commission to be 
reappointed. Neither General Otis nor Admiral Dewey 
cared to serve, and indeed the professional duties of each 
of them rendered his appointment to the new com- 
mission difficult, if not impossible. Mr. Schurman had 
at one time expressed himself as vigorously opposed to 
the idea of a new commission, maintaining that the best 
results could be obtained by the appointment of a civil 
governor with wide powers. It was therefore taken 
for granted that he would not desire reappointment. 
Colonel Denby was keenly interested in the work and 
would have been glad to continue it, but he was past 
seventy and with his good wife had then spent some fifteen 
years in the Far East. He doubted whether his strength 
would be adequate to bear the strain of the arduous task 
which obviously lay before the new commission, and Mrs. 
Denby desired to remain in the United States where she 

1 P. 981. 


could be near her children from whom she had been long 
separated, so her husband felt constrained to say that he 
did not wish to return to the Philippines. 

I separated from him with the keenest regret. He was 
an amiable, tactful man of commanding ability and unim- 
peachable integrity, actuated by the best of motives and 
loyal to the highest ideals. He constantly sought to 
avoid not only evil but the appearance of evil I count 
it one of the great privileges of my life to have been as- 
sociated with him. The one thing in the book written 
by James H. Blount which aroused my ire was his char- 
acterization of Colonel Denby as a hypocrite. No 
falser, meaner, more utterly contemptible statement was 
ever made, and when I read it the temptation rose hot 
within me to make public Blount's personal Philippine 
record, but after the first heat of anger had passed I 
remembered what the good old Colonel would have 
wished me to do in such a case, and forbore. 

The second Philippine commission, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as ''the commission," received its instructions 
on April 7, 1900. 

They covered a most delicate and complicated subject, 
namely, the gradual transfer of control from military to 
civil authority in a country extensive regions of which 
were still in open rebellion. 

In the opinion of President McKinley there was no 
reason why steps should not be taken, from time to time, 
to inaugurate governments essentially popular in their 
form as fast as territory came under the permanent con- 
trol of our troops, and indeed, as we have seen, this had 
already been done by the army. It was provided that 
we should continue and perfect the work of organizing 
and establishing civil governments already commenced 
by the military authorities. In doing this we were to 
act as a board of which Mr. Taft was designated president. 
It was contemplated that the transfer of authority from 
military commanders to civil officers would be gradual, 


and full and complete cooperation between these au- 
thorities was enjoined. Having familiarized ourselves 
with the conditions then prevailing in the islands, we were 
to devote our attention first to the establishment of munic- 
ipal governments, in which the natives should be given 
the opportunity to manage their local affairs to the fullest 
extent and with the least supervision and control found 
to be practicable. We were then to consider the organi- 
zation of larger administrative divisions, and when of 
the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands 
was such that the central administration could safely 
be transferred from military to civil control were to report 
this conclusion to the secretary of war with our recom- 
mendations as to the form of central government which 
should be established. 

Beginning with. September 1, 1900, we were authorized 
to exercise, subject to the approval of the President and 
the secretary of war, the legislative power, which was 
then to be transferred from the military governor to us 
until the establishment of civil central government, or 
until Congress should otherwise provide. We were 
authorized during a like period to appoint to office such 
officers under the judicial, educational, and civil service 
systems, and in the municipal and departmental govern- 
ments, as were duly provided for. Until the complete 
transfer of control the military governor was to remain 
the chief executive head of the government and to exercise 
the executive authority previously possessed by him and 
not expressly assigned to the commission by the president 
in his instructions. In establishing municipal governments 
we were to take as the basis of our work those established 
by the military governor, under the order of August 8, 
1899, which I had helped to set up, as well as those estab- 
lished under the report of a board constituted by the 
military governor by his order of January 29, 1900, of 
which Sefior Cayetano Arellano was the president. 

In the establishment of departmental or provincial 


governments we were to give special attention to the then- 
existing government of the island of Negros, established 
with the approval of the people of that island under the 
order of the military governor of July 22, 1899. 

We were instructed to investigate troubles growing 
out of large land holdings, including those of the religious 
orders, and to promote, extend and improve the system of 
education already inaugurated by the military authorities, 
giving first importance to the extension of a system of 
primary education free to all, which would tend to fit the 
people for the duties of citizenship and the ordinary 
avocations of a civilized community. Instruction was 
to be given at first in the native dialects, but full oppor- 
tunity for all of the people to acquire English was to be 
provided as soon as possible. If necessity demanded, we 
were authorized to make changes in the existing system 
of taxation and in the body of the laws under which the 
people were governed, although such changes were to be 
relegated to the civil government which we were to 
establish later, so far as might be. Our instructions con- 
tained the following important passages : — 

" In all the forms of government and administrative provi- 
sions which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission 
should bear in mind that the government which they are 
establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the 
expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, 
peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, 
and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their 
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest 
extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable 
requisites of just and effective government. 

"At the same time the commission should bear in mind, 
and the people of the islands should be made plainly to under- 
stand, that there are certain great principles of government 
which have been made the basis of our governmental system 
which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance 
of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, 
been denied the experience possessed by us ; that there are also 
certain practical rules of government which we have found to 


be essential to the preservation of these great principles of 
liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of 
government must be established and maintained in their 
islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however 
much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure 
with which they are familiar. 

"It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the 
Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these 
principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short 
time command universal assent. Upon every division and 
branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must 
be imposed these inviolable rules : — 

"That no person shall be deprived of life, hberty, or property 
without due process of law ; that private property shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation; that in all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence ; 
that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted ; that 
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence, 
or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated ; that neither slavery 
nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment 
for crime ; that no bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall 
be passed ; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press, or the rights of the people to peaceably 
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of griev- 
ances ; that no law shall be made respecting the establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that 
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 
worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be 

It has been the fashion in some quarters to sneer at 
the last of these paragraphs, and to insinuate, if not to 
charge, that President McKinley in his policy toward 
the Philippine Islands was actuated by unworthy motives. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. From the 
beginning to the end the real good of the several peoples 


of the archipelago came first with him, and no one who 
had the privilege of knowing him well doubts it. Thor- 
oughly imbued with the lofty sentiments expressed by him 
in our instructions, we set forth on our long pilgrimage 
to a country where we were to undertake a heavy task 
essentially different from that which had ever before 
fallen to the lot of any five citizens of the United States. 

On April 17, 1900, we sailed from San Francisco on the 
United States army transport Hancock. We were forty- 
five strong. Of this goodly company only four remain 
in the Philippines to-day,^ — Mr. and Mrs. Branagan, 
Mrs. Worcester and myself. Singularly enough, with 
two exceptions, all of the others are still alive and at work. 
Arthur W. Ferguson, prince of interpreters, who was 
later appointed Executive Secretary, died in the service 
after more than six years of extraordinarily faithful and 
efficient work. James A. LeRoy, my faithful, able and 
efficient private secretary, contracted tuberculosis, and 
fell a victim to it after a long and gallant fight. 

At Honolulu we met with a severe disappointment. It 
was of course our duty to call on Governor Dole. We were 
advised that silk hats and frock coats must be donned for 
this visit, and it was perishing hot. We reached the palace 
in a reeking perspiration and had a long wait in a suffocat- 
ing room. When Mr. Dole appeared, he was closely 
followed by an attendant bearing a large and most at- 
tractive-looking bottle carefully wrapped in a napkin, 
and our spirits rose. But, alas ! It contained Poland 
water. . 

At Tokio we had an audience with the Emperor and 
were received by the Empress as well. In the high 
official who had charge of the palace where these events 
took place, I discovered an old University of Michigan 
graduate who made the occasion especially pleasant for me. 

We finally reached Manila on the morning of June 3. 
Although the thermometer was in the nineties, a certain 

1 September 15, 1913. 

















frigidity pervaded the atmosphere on our arrival, which 
General MacArthur, the military governor, seemed to 
regard in the light of an intrusion. 

He had been directed to provide suitable office quarters 
for us. To our amazement and amusement we found desks 
for five commissioners and five private secretaries placed in 
one little room in the Ayuntamiento .^ While it was possible 
to get through the room without scrambling over them, 
it would have been equally possible to circle it, walking 
on them, without stepping on the floor. In the course 
of our first long official interview with the General, he in- 
formed us that we were "an injection into an otherwise 
normal situation." 

He added that we had already mediatized the volume 
of work that flowed over his desk. At the moment none 
of us were quite sure what he meant, but we found the 
word in the dictionary. How often in the weary years 
that were to follow I wished that some one would materially 
mediatize the task which fell to my lot ! It was General 
MacArthur 's honestly held and frankly expressed opinion 
that what the Filipinos needed was "military govern- 
ment pinned to their backs for ten years with bayonets." 
He later changed that view very radically, and when 
civil provincial governments were finally established it was 
with his approval, and, in many instances, upon his specific 

At the outset some effort was made to keep the public 
away from us. Word was passed that we had no au- 
thority, which was true enough, as our legislative activities 
were not to begin until September 1. The ninety days 
which intervened were very advantageously spent in 
gaining familiarity with the situation, which we had no 
difficulty in doing. Plenty of people were already weary 
of mihtary rule and flocked to us. None of my com- 
panions had ever before set foot in the Philippines, and 

1 The building where the executive offices of the insular government 
have been located since the American occupation. 


although I had spent more than four years there, I still 
had plenty to learn. 

In this connection I am reminded of an event which 
occurred somewhat later. While the commission was 
en route from Iloilo to Catbalogan when we were establish- 
ing civil provincial governments, General Hughes and 
Mr. Taft became involved in a somewhat animated dis- 
cussion. The General displayed an accurate knowledge 
of facts which were of such a nature that one would 
hardly have expected an army officer to be familiar with 
them. Mr. Taft said : " General,. how do you do it ? You 
have always been a busy man, devoted to your profession. 
How have you managed to accumulate such a remarkable 
fund of information?" The General smiled his rare 
smile and replied: '^ Governor, I will tell you. I always 
try to go to bed at night knowing a little more than I did 
when I got up in the morning." It is a wise plan to 

On September 1 we assumed the legislative power, 
our first official act being to appropriate $2,000,000 
Mexican for the construction and repair of highways 
and bridges. 

We were impressed with the fundamental necessity of 
promptly opening up lines of land communication in 
a country which almost completely lacked them, and there 
were many poor people in dire need of employment who 
would be relieved by the opportunity to earn an honest 
living which the inauguration of road construction would 
afford them. 

Our second act appropriated $5000 Mexican for the 
purpose of making a survey to ascertain the most ad- 
vantageous route for a railroad into the mountains of 
Benguet, where we wished to establish a much-needed 
health resort for the people of the archipelago. 

Seven days later we passed an act for the establish- 
ment and maintenance of an efficient and honest civil 
service in the Philippine Islands. This measure was of 


basic importance. We had stipulated before leaving 
Washington that no political appointees should be forced 
upon us under any circumstances. The members of the 
second commission, like their predecessors of the first, 
were firm in the belief that national politics should, if 
possible, be kept out of the administration of Phihppine 
affairs, and we endeavoured to insure this result. 

Our tenth act appropriated SI 500 Mexican to be paid 
to the widow of Salvador Reyes, vice-president of Santa 
Cruz in Laguna Province, assassinated because of his 
loyalty to the established government. 

Our fifteenth act increased the monthly salaries of 
Filipino public school teachers in Manila. 

Our sixteenth and seventeenth acts reorganized the 
Forestry Bureau and the Mining Bureau. 

On October 15 we appropriated $1,000,000 United 
States currencj^ for improving the port of Manila, where 
there was urgent need of protection for shipping during 
the typhoon season. 

On December 12 we passed an act authorizing the 
establishment of local police in cities and towns in the 
Phihppine Islands and appropriating $150,000 United 
States currency for their maintenance. 

Two days later we passed a much-needed act regulating 
the sale of intoxicating liquors within the city of Manila 
and its attached barrios. 

On December 21, we appropriated $75,000 United 
States currency for the construction of the Benguet Road, 
little dreaming how much time would elapse and how 
many more dollars would be appropriated, before a ve- 
hicle passed over it. 

It will be sufficiently evident that I cannot here give an 
account of the several acts which we passed when I say 
that they number four hundred forty-nine during the first 
year. We created the administrative bureaus of a well- 
organized government, established civil rule in numerous 
municipahties and provinces, provided for the necessary 


expenses of government, organized courts and reformed 
the judiciary. So important were the results following the 
establishment of the Civil Service Act and the act pro- 
viding for the organization of courts for the Philippine 
Islands that I have devoted a chapter to each. 

Although there were no limits on our power to enact 
legislation other than those imposed by our instructions 
hereinbefore referred to, nothing was further from our 
desire than to exercise too arbitrarily the authority con- 
ferred upon us. 

Taylor has correctly described our method of procedure 
in the following words : — 

"On September 1, 1900, the Commission began its legisla- 
tive and executive duties. In performing them it adopted the 
policy of passing no laws, except in cases of emergency, without 
pubhshing them in the daily press, nor until after they had 
passed a second reading and the public had been given an 
opportunity to come before the Commission and suggest objec- 
tions or amendments to the bills. Before enacting them they 
were submitted to the military governor for his consideration 
and comment." ^ 

The other especially important events of our first legisla- 
tive year were the establishment of civil rule in the 
municipalities as well as in thirty-eight provinces and the 
substitution of the military central government by the grad- 
ual creation of bureaus and the ultimate appointment of a 
civil governor and of five heads of executive departments. 

On November 23, 1900, we passed an act providing 
for the estabhshment of a civil government in the province 
of Benguet,and thus it happened that a province practically 
all of whose inhabitants were members of a non-Christian 
tribe was the first to enjoy the benefits of civil rule. This 
action grew out of investigations by General Wright and 
myself made when visiting Baguio during the latter part 
of July, which led us to the conclusion that civil govern- 
ment could be established in Benguet at any time and 

1 Taylor, 18 HS. 


should be established as soon as possible. In view of the 
rather primitive state of civilization of the people for 
whom we were legislating, a special act adapted to local 
conditions was passed providing for a provincial govern- 
ment and fixing a form of government for the several 

On January 31, 1901, we passed an act for the organiza- 
tion of municipal governments in the Philippine Islands 
which, with various amendments, is still in effect and has 
been made applicable to all municipal corporations of 
the Philippines inhabited chiefly by Fihpinos, except the 
city of Manila, the city of Baguio and a few small settle- 
ments in the so-called special government provmces.^ 

On February 6, 1901, we passed a general act for the 
organization of provincial governments in the Philippine 
Islands. A special act was required to make it applicable 
to any given province. 

Having thus prepared for the serious work of establish- 
ing civil government throughout the archipelago so fast 
and so far as conditions might seem to justify, we deter- 
mined to visit the several provinces and to familiarize 
ourselves with conditions on the ground in each case 
before taking action. We invariably sought the opinion 
of the military authorities as to the fitness of the prov- 
inces under consideration for ci\dl rule, and never 
established it except with their approval. Indeed, in 
several cases we yielded to their judgment and organized 
provinces which we ourselves thought might better wait 
for a time. 

Our first trip was to the northward along the line of 
the Manila-Dagupan railway, and in the course of it 
we organized the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac 
and Pangasinan. 

On the 2d of March we crossed Manila Bay to Bataan 
and established a civil provincial government there. 

1 This name is applied to certain pro\ances organized under special 
acts because the majority of their inhabitants are non-Christians. 


The first provincial officers were necessarily appointed, 
not elected. I well remember the consternation which 
Mr. Taft created on this trip, when in announcing the 
appointment of a man of strong character who was much 
disliked by some of the people present, he said that if 
the appointee did not behave well his official head would 
be promptly removed. Surprise showed on almost 
every face in the audience. They had become suffi- 
ciently accustomed to the idea of being beheaded or 
otherwise sent out of the world by their own people, 
but had been led to believe that the Americans were a 
humane nation, and it took Mr. Taft at least five minutes 
to explain his joke. 

During the second week in March the commission 
transferred its officers bodily to the United States Army 
Transport Sumner and started on a long journey in the 
course of which it visited and established provincial 
governments in eighteen provinces,^ returning to Manila 
on the 3d of May. 

This trip was most interesting but dreadfully wearing. 
Everywhere we were overwhelmed by the hospitality of 
our Filipino friends. We arrived at some new place 
nearly every morning, and the programme in each was 
much the same. After an early breakfast we hurried 
ashore, drove or walked about for a short time to see 
what the town was like, and then attended a popular 
meeting in its largest building, where we held long and 
frank converse with the people on local conditions, 
giving them every opportunity to air their views, with 
the result that the local orators, of whom there were 
usually more than a sufficiency, had an opportunity to 
bring their heavy guns into action. Then followed a recess 
in the course of which we partook of a very elaborate 
lunch, and when possible conferred privately with in- 

' Tayabas, Romblon, Masbate, Iloilo, Antique, Capiz, Cebli, Bohol, 
Occidental Negros, Oriental Negros, Leyte, Albay, Ambos, Cama- 
rines, Sorsogon, Marinduque, Batangas, Surigao, and Misamis. 


fluential men, often learning things which they did not 
care to tell us in pubhc. Then came another open meet- 
ing at which the actual organization of the province was 
effected and the officials were appointed and sworn in. 
After this there was a long formal dinner, with the endless 
courses which characterize such functions in the Philip- 
pines, and then came a ball which lasted till the wee small 
hours. When at last we got on board, tired out, our 
steamer sailed, and often brought us to some new place 
by sunrise. 

In several instances we did not pass the act organizing 
a given province at the time of our visit, but for one 
reason or another postponed action until a later date. 
We visited a number of places like Jolo, Basilan, Zam- 
boanga, Cotabato, Davao and Samar, where we had no 
intention of establishing civil government, in order to 
observe local conditions. 

We touched at Marinduque on our trip south, and found 
that nothing could then be done there, but the better 
element were anxious for a change, and we promised them 
that if they would bring about certain specified results 
before our return we would give them a provincial govern- 
ment. They undertook to do so, and kept their word. 
Needless to say we also kept ours. 

We had grave doubts as to the advisability of estab- 
lishing civil governments in Cebu, Bohol and Batangas. 
In the first of these places the people were sullen and ugly. 
In the second there was a marked disinclination on the 
part of leading citizens to accept public office. There 
had been a little scattering rifle fire on the outskirts of 
the capital of the third very shortly before our arrival 
there, but the organization of all these provinces was rec- 
ommended by the military authorities, and we decided 
to try an experiment which could do little harm, as we 
could return any one of them to military control in short 
order should such a course seem necessary. 

An effort has been made to make it appear that in 

VOL. I — Z 


organizing Cebu, Bohol and Batangas, we acted pre- 
maturely and upon our own initiative, thus complicating 
the situation for the military authorities. I will let 
Blount voice this complaint. He says in part : — 

"In his report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four 
principal provinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble 
shortly after the civil government was set up in that year, 
and had to be returned to military control, were organized 
under civil rule 'on the recommendation' of the then com- 
manding general (Mac Arthur). It certainly seems unlikely 
that the haste to change from military rule to civil rule came 
on the motion of the military. If the Commission ever got, 
in writing, from General MacArthur, a 'recommendation' 
that any provinces be placed under civil rule while still in 
insurrection, the text of the writing wdll show a mere soldierly 
acquiescence in the will of Mr. McKinley, the commander- 
in-chief. Parol ^ contemporaneous evidence will show that 
General MacArthur told them, substantially, that they were 
'riding for a fall.' In fact, whenever an insurrection would 
break out in a province after Governor Taft's inauguration as 
governor, the whole attitude of the army in the Philippines, 
from the commanding general down was 'I told you so.' 
They did not say this where Governor Taft could hear it, 
but it was common knowledge that they were much addicted 
to damning 'politics' as the cause of all the trouble." ^ 

Prophecy is always dangerous and when unnecessary 
seems rather inexcusable. I submit the essential portions 
of the record to show exactly what we did get from General 
MacArthur, and add the suggestion that it was really 
hardly essential that he should make his recommendations 
in writing, as he did, for the reason that he was a gentle- 
man and would not have repudiated a verbal reconmienda- 
tion once made. 

On February 5, 1901, Governor Taft wrote General 
MacArthur a letter closing with the following paragraph : — 

"As already communicated to you the purpose of the Com- 
mission is to make a Southern trip on the 23rd of February, 
or as soon thereafter as practicable, with the idea of arranging 

* Obviously a misprint, perhaps, for " perusal of." ^ Blount, p. 380. 














































for provincial governments there, and I am directed by the 
Commission to request your opinion as to the provinces in 
which provincial governments may be safely established. 
It is understood that Panay, Romblon, Tayabas, and possibly 
one or two of the Camarines are ready for this. What has been 
said with reference to the Northern provinces applies to these, 
but we shall communicate with you further as to the Southern 
provinces when we have been advised as to the possibility of 
securing a steamer," 

On February 9, General MacArthur gave the following 
instructions to the Commanding General, Department 
of the Visayas : — 

"The Military Governor desires that you report to this 
office at the earliest date practicable the provinces in your 
department that may be considered ready for the establish- 
ment of civil governmcints therein and in this connection directs 
me to say that it should not be considered as necessary that 
complete pacification has been brought about in a province 
before reporting it as ready for such government; that the 
provincial civil governments to be established will doubtless 
prove useful agents in the further work of pacification." 

On February 27, that officer reported that in his opinion 
Iloilo, Capiz, Oriental Negros and Occidental Negros 
were ready ; that Antique might be in a few days, and 
that Cebu, Bohol and Leyte were not. These facts were 
reported to Governor Taft by General MacArthur on 
March 4, and on the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder 
wrote to the commanding general of the Visayas : — 

"The Military Governor directs me to say that he regards 
the initiation of provincial civil government as an aid in the 
work of pacification, in which view it is not necessary that a 
province should be completely pacified as a condition to the 
initiation of such government. He has expressed to the Com- 
mission the opinion that you may be able, upon their arrival 
at Iloilo, to submit a supplementary list of provinces in which 
it would be advisable to establish at once these governments," 

Meanwhile General MacArthur wrote on February 13, 
to Governor Taft : — 


"In partial reply to your letter of the 5th instant I have 
the honor to inform you that the Commanding General, De- 
partment of Southern Luzon, reports but one province, Taya- 
bas, as ready at the present time for civil government. I add 
the provinces of Laguna, Batangas and Cavite, believing that 
the institution of civil government in all these provinces will 
be in assistance of the military authorities in the work of 

General MacArthur's communications seem to me to 
show something more than "a mere soldierly acquiescence 
in the will of Mr. McKinley," especially as the President 
had no knowledge of these provinces, and never made any 
reconomendation whatsoever relative to the establishment 
of civil government there. 

Similarly, in establishing civil government in Cebu 
and Bohol, the commission acted on the specific recom- 
mendation of the military, and rather against its own 
judgment. There seemed no very good reason for refus- 
ing to try civil government, if the commanding general 
wanted it tried, and when it failed, as it promptly did, 
in Cebu, Bohol and Batangas, these provinces were 
immediately returned to the full control of the military, 
and left there until conditions became satisfactory. 

Hvaving escaped the perils of the deep, and the much 
graver perils of the dinner table, during our southern 
trip, we returned to Manila, wearier, wiser and sadder 
men than when we started, for we had learned much of 
the superstitions, the ignorance and the obsessions which 
prevailed among the Filipinos, and we knew that many 
of the men who from love of country had accepted office 
under us had done so at the peril of their lives. We had 
all had an excellent opportunity to come to know the 
Filipinos. Their dignity of bearing, their courtesy, 
their friendly hospitality, their love of imposing functions, 
and of fiestas and display, their childishness and irre- 
sponsibility in many matters, their passion for gambling, 
for litigation and for political intrigue, even the loves and 
the hatreds of some of them, had been spread before us like 


an open book. It is a fact that except for the inhabitants 
of Cebu, Bohol and Batangas, the people wanted what 
we had to give them and were grateful for it. Never 
before had they had their day in court, and they ap- 
preciated it. 

The establishment of civil government throughout so 
large a proportion of the provinces in the islands would 
have been impossible at this time had it not been for 
the helpful activities of the Federal Party organized on 
December 23, 1900, by many of the best and most in- 
jfluential Filipinos in the archipelago for the purpose of 
aiding in the establishment of peace and order. Its 
members were tireless in their activities. They suc- 
ceeded in persuading many Insurgent leaders to lay down 
their arms, so that a normal condition could be restored in 
territory which the latter had previously harried. They 
convinced many of the common people of the true pur- 
poses of the American government, and in numerous 
other ways rendered invaluable services. 

The officers and many of the members and agents of 
this party were promptly sentenced to death by Agui- 
naldo, and many of them were assassinated ;^ but the party 
persisted in its efforts until success was attained. 

During June of 1901 Professor Moses and I made 
a horseback trip through Pangasinan, La Union, Benguet, 
Lepanto and Ilocos Sur, accompanied by our private 
secretaries. Professor Moses was in wretched health 
as the result of overwork and confinement, and needed 
out-of-door exercise. 

I had been intrusted with the drafting of legislation 
for the government of the non-Christian tribes, and wanted 
to learn as much about them as possible, so that I could 
act intelligently. 

We started from Dagupan mounted on horses kindly 
furnished us by the army, and escorted by four mounted 
infantrymen. None of us had ridden for years, and 

^ For further details see pp. 746 ; 753. 


army officers were offering wagers that we would not get 
as far as Baguio. At Mangaldan a cavalry outfit re- 
placed our mounted infantrymen, and while the members 
of our new escort were resting under the shade of a tree 
in the cemetery, I heard them voicing joyful anticipations 
of the easy time they were to have travelling with tender- 
feet. I made up my mind to give them some healthful 
exercise on the trip. 

Having first visited the work at the lower end of the 
Benguet Road and then travelled across country in a 
driving storm over wretched trails, we reached Bauang, 
our point of departure for the interior. Here I called 
the sergeant in charge and asked him where were the extra 
shoes for our horses. In some confusion he confessed 
that he had brought none, whereupon I read him a homily 
on the duties of a cavalryman, and sent the whole outfit 
to San Fernando to get the horses reshod and provided 
with extra shoes for the trip. 

We arrived at Baguio in a howling typhoon. When we 
emerged from the hills into the open, and our horses got 
the full sweep of the storm, they at first refused to face it. 
We forced them into it, however, and a few moments later 
had found refuge in the house of Mr. Otto Scheerer, a hos- 
pitable German. The cavalrymen and the horses got in 
under the building. It gave me great joy to hear through 
the floor the voice of the sergeant remarking, with much 
emphasis of the sort best represented in print by dashes, 
that if he had known the sort of a trip he was starting 
on he would have been on sick report the morning of 
his departure. 

We waited in vain three days for the storm to end and 
then rode on. Mr. Scheerer, who accompanied us, had 
sent ahead to arrange for lunch at the house of a rich 
Igorot named Acop, but when we arrived at this man's 
place, soaked, cold, and hungry, we found it shut up. 
He had not received the message and was away from home. 
Investigation showed that our only resource in the com- 


missary line were some wads of sticky, unsalted, boiled 
rice which our Igorot carriers had inside their hats, in 
contact with their frowsy hair. We bolted as much of 
this as the Igorots could spare, killing its rather high 
flavour with cayenne peppers picked beside the trail, 
and continued our journey. In descending a steep hill 
my horse stumbled and while attempting to recover 
himself drove a sharp stone into his hoof and turned a 
complete somersault, throwing me over his head on to 
the rocks. When I got him up he was dead lame, and 
I walked the rest of the way to Ambuklao, where we 
arrived just at sunset. 

This once prosperous Httle Igorot hamlet had been 
burned by the Spaniards, for no apparent reason, during 
their flight from the province in 1906, and we found only 
two houses standing. They were naturally crowded. 
I was so dead with fatigue that I threw my saddle on the 
ground, and using it as a pillow, lay down in a couple of 
inches of water and fell sound asleep. Later the Igorots 
vacated one of the houses, and placed it at our disposal. 
I spent the greater part of the night in a contest with an 
old Igorot woman, who for the commendable purpose of 
keeping us warm tended a smoky pitch-pine fire, and shut 
the door, which afforded our only means of ventilation, 
every time I dropped asleep. Awakened by the stifling 
smoke I would open it again, but as soon as I dozed she 
would shut it. I finally solved the problem by lying 
down with my head sticking out of the door. 

The next day was bright and clear. We rested until 
noon, drying out our belongings meanwhile, and then 
continued our journey, visiting the Igorot settlements on 
the Agno River and those in southern Lepanto and finally 
reaching Cervantes, the capital of that sub-province. 
The Igorots of Benguet and Lepanto received us with the 
utmost friendliness, and when not in danger of breaking 
our necks by falling over the edges of the wretched trails, 
we greatly enjoyed our trip. 


At Cervantes we were met by a delegation of Bontoc 
Igorots, who begged us to visit their country, and we 
were just preparing to do so when we received a telegram 
recalling us to Manila to be present at the inauguration 
of Mr. Taft as civil governor. During our absence 
the commission had established provincial governments 
in Rizal, Cavite and Nueva Ecija. Mr. Taft was in- 
augurated on July 4, 1901. Thenceforth he exercised 
control over the provinces where civil government had 
been established, while the military governor continued 
in charge of each of the remaining provinces until it 
was duly organized and transferred to civil control. 

In August, 1901, the commission sailed on a tour of 
the remaining northern provinces, visiting La Union, 
Ilocos Sur, Abra, Ilocos Norte, Cagayan, Isabela and 
Zambales in the order named, and establishing a govern- 
ment in each. On the trip to Abra those members of the 
commission not previously accustomed to roughing it 
in the islands were given a novel experience, for we went 
up the Abra River on bamboo rafts. However, a ver- 
itable ship of state had been prepared for Governor Taft, 
and no one suffered any great discomfort. 

At Vigan, the capital of Ilocos, we narrowly escaped 
drowning in the surf when returning to our steamer. For 
a time our good viray ^ with some twenty oarsmen was 
unable to make headway through the rolling waves. It 
broached to, nearly filled with water, and struck the 
bottom heavily several times. Some of the men quit 
rowing and began to pray, whereupon General J. F. Bell, 
who was sitting in the stern, rose to his feet, and shouted 
at them until they became more afraid of him than of 
the sea, and pulled for dear life until we were out of danger. 
Upon arrival at the ship we watched with interest the 
progress of other boats through the surf, and were alarmed 
to see the men in one madly divesting themselves of their 
clothing. When it finally came alongside its occupants 

1 A native surf boat. 


made flying leaps for the gangway, and we discovered 
that a great hole had been knocked in its bottom, and that 
raincoats, ordinary coats, and trousers had been jammed 
into this opening in order to keep the rapidly sinking 
craft afloat for a few moments. 

In the Cagayan valley we had a taste of real tropical 
heat. Never have I seen a man suffer more than did 
Mr. Taft at Ilagan on the day when we established a pro- 
vincial government for Isabela, and the night that fol- 
lowed still hngers in my memory. The air was suffocating. 
My bed was in a corner. I dragged it out between a 
window and a door and threw both wide open. Still I 
could not sleep. Shpping off my pajamas, I seated myself 
on the broad window sill. The heat was intolerable. I 
poured water over myself and resumed my seat in the 
window. The water would not evaporate. I sat there 
until morning, as I could not endure the heat lying down. 

Such conditions are unknown throughout the greater 
part of the archipelago, where cool sea breezes temper the 
heat at all times. In the Cagayan valley an immense 
plain is bordered by ranges of high mountains to the east 
and the west. They seem to shut off both monsoons to 
a considerable extent, and there veiy trying heat is by 
no means unusual. 

On September 1, 1901, the first day of the second year 
of actual service of the commission, a complete central 
civil government was established. Commissioner Wright 
was appointed secretary of commerce and police ; Com- 
missioner Ide, secretary of finance and justice; Com- 
missioner Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I 
myself secretary of the interior. The commission was 
strengthened by the addition of three Filipino members : 
Senor Benito Legarda, Sefior Jose R. de Luzuriaga, and 
Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, all of whom were men of 
exceptional ability and had rendered distinguished service 
in the establishment of peace and order. 

Except for the addition of one more Filipino on July 


6, 1908, the organization of the commission has remained 
unchanged up to the present time, although there have 
been numerous changes in its personnel. The task which 
lay before it was to enact a code of laws adapted to the 
peculiar conditions existing in the Philippines, and this 
was indeed a herculean undertaking. Its members 
laboured unremittingly. Governor Taft and General 
Wright were towers of strength in the early days. The 
rest of us did what we could, and I, for one, am very proud 
of the result. Certainly no one can ever claim that the 
commission was not industrious. Before it finally ceased 
to be the legislative body of the islands it had passed some 
eighteen hundred acts. Obviously, as it is not my pur- 
pose to write an encyclopedia of law, I cannot discuss 
them in detail, and must content myself with here barely 
mentioning a few of the more important results obtained, 
leaving the more detailed discussion of some of them for 
later chapters. 

In general, it may be said that the additional bureaus 
necessary for the work of the Insular government were 
created, and given proper powers. Civil government 
was gradually extended to the entire archipelago.^ The 
criminal code was amended and supplemented by the 
passage of new laws. The administration of justice was 
reorganized and reformed. ^ An efficient native insular 
police force was organized, and an admirable state of 
public order brought about.^ The health service was 
extended to the provinces, and health conditions were 
greatly improved throughout the islands.^ Baguio was 
made accessible and became both the summer capital 
and a health resort for the people of the islands.^ The 
scientific work of the government was coordinated, and 
efficiency and economy in its performance were insured.^ 

Primary and secondary schools were estabhshed through- 
out the islands, supplemented by trade schools, and 

1 See Chapters XXI-XXIV. ^ Chap. XV. ' Chap. XIV. 

* Chap. XVI. ' Chap. XVII. <* Chap. XVIII. 

Old-style Central School Building. 

This structure is typical of the better-class school-houses constructed by the 


■M WW »■■ 


Modern Central School Building. 

This structure is typical of the better-class school-houses constructed under 

American rule. 


a normal school at Manila.^ Legislation was enacted, 
and submitted to the President and to Congress, covering 
the disposition of public lands. ^ The purchase of ex- 
tensive estates belonging to certain religious orders, and 
the sale of their holdings therein to tenants, was pro- 
vided for.^ Fairly adequate legislation for the protection 
and development of the forest resources of the islands 
was enacted.* Means of communication by land and 
sea were greatly improved, and the development of com- 
merce was thus stimulated.^ 

It is a noteworthy fact that all of these things were 
done with a per capita taxation of about $ 2.24 ! 

Another fundamentally important aid to the commercial 
development of the islands was afforded by a radical ref- 
ormation of the currency. 

The islands under the sovereignty of Spain had their 
own distinct silver coinage in peso, media peso, peseta 
and media peseta pieces. 

In 1878 the Spanish government, hoping to check the 
heavy exportation of gold currency from the Philippines, 
passed a law prohibiting the importation of Mexican 
dollars, but allowed the Mexican dollars then in the islands 
to continue to circulate as legal tender. 

When the American troops arrived, there were in cir- 
culation the Spanish-Philippine peso and subsidiary 
silver coins ; Spanish pesos of different mintings ; Mexican 
pesos of different mintings ; Hongkong dollars, fractional 
silver coins from different Chinese countries, and copper 
coins from nearly every country in the Orient. Although 
a law had been passed prohibiting the introduction 
of Mexican dollars into the islands, they were being 
constantly smuggled in. Fluctuations in the price of 
silver affected the value of the silver coins, and the money 
in common use was in reality a commodity, worth on any 
given day what one could get for it. These conditions 

1 See Chapter XIX. 2 Chap. XXX. => Chap. XXX. 

* Chap. XXXI. 6 Chap. XXXII. 


affected most disastrously the business interests of the 
islands. Merchants were forced to allow very wide 
margins in commercial transactions, because they did 
not know what their goods would actually cost them in 
local currency upon arrival. The most important busi- 
ness of the local banks was in reality that of exchange 
brokers and note shavers. They hammered the exchange 
rate down and bought silver, then boosted the rate 
skyward and sold. 

The American army brought in a large amount of gold, 
but this did not remain in circulation long, as it was ex- 
ported by the different business concerns, or hoarded. 

United States silver money had a limited circulation 
during the early days of American occupation, but it 
passed at less than its true value. An effort was made 
under the military administration to keep the ratio of 
exchange at two to one by the purchase from the public 
of all United States currency offered at that rate to the 

For a long time the banks refused to carry private 
accounts in United States currency, but when it was 
offered for deposit it was changed into Mexicans with 
a heavy charge for the transaction, and an account opened 
in Mexican currency to the credit of the depositor. If 
the depositor afterward desired to get United States 
currency, he gave a check for it at the then existing rate 
of exchange. Such conditions were intolerable, and the 
commission passed an act making it an offence to refuse 
to accept for deposit the currency of the sovereign power, 
but this did not remedy the fundamental difficulty. 
There came a heavy slump in the price of silver. The 
Insular government lost a very large sum because of the 
decrease in value of its silver coin. 

Mr. Charles A. Conant had been brought from the 
United States to make a report on the feasibility of pro- 
viding an American coinage for the islands. He rec- 
ommended that the unit of value should be a peso, 


equivalent to fifty cents United States currency. Con- 
gress, by an act passed July 1, 1902, vested general au- 
thority over the coinage in the Philippine government, 
but the commission decided not to take action until more 
specific authority could be obtained from Congress, as 
the proposed reform was radical, and it was very important 
that the new currency should at the outset conunand the 
confidence so essential to its success. 

After long discussion, Congress authorized, by an act 
passed March 2, 1903, a new currency system based on 
a theoretical peso of 12.9 grains of gold 900 fine, equivalent 
to one-half of a United States gold dollar. The cir- 
culating medium was to be the Philippine silver peso, 
which was to be legal tender for all debts, public and pri- 
vate, and its value was to be maintained on a parity with 
the theoretical gold peso. For this purpose the creation 
of a gold standard, or gold reserve fund, was provided for, 
and this fund was to be maintained and could be used 
for no other purpose. 

Considerable difficulty was experienced in introducing 
the new currency into the islands. The banks at first 
failed to give any assistance to the government. The 
business men of Manila, and especially the Chinese, dis- 
counted the new Philippine peso, because it did not 
contain as much silver as did the Mexican dollar. They 
were quickly brought to time, and given to understand 
where they stood if they discredited the currency of the 

The Spanish Philippine coins and the Mexican coins 
in circulation were collected by the treasury and ex- 
ported to the San Francisco mint, where they were re- 
minted into new coins of the weight and fineness prescribed 
by law. 

The establishment of a gold standard fund to main- 
tain the parity between the gold and silver dollar was 
quickly effected by the sale of exchange on the United 
States in accordance with the established law, at a cost 


estimated to be the same as the transportation of the gold 
coin itself. 

The army, by direction of the secretary of war, ceased 
to pay in United States money, and its paymasters were 
given credit at the Insular Treasury, where they obtained 
the necessary funds in Philippine currency. 

The government also authorized, in addition to the 
coinage of silver, the issuance of paper money in two, 
five, and ten peso notes. All of the coins and bills were 
readily interchangeable with the United States coins in 
common use, the dollar being worth two pesos, the half 
dollar one peso, the twenty-five cent piece a half peso, 
the ten-cent piece a peseta, the five-cent piece a media 
peseta and the cent two centavos. 

Unfortunately the silver value of the new peso was such 
that when the price of silver again rose, its bullion value 
was greater than its money value, and in consequence 
coins of this denomination were hoarded and exported. 
It proved necessary to prohibit their exportation, and to 
issue new coins of less bullion value, but this was the only 
really serious difficulty attending a fundamental reform 
which put the currency on a sound basis. The original 
pesos were recoined and a handsome profit made on the 

No one who has not lived in a country where the 
circulating medium is constantly fluctuating in value can 
fully appreciate the enormous benefit conferred on the 
Philippine Islands by this important reform. 

Another reform of far-reaching importance was the 
readjustment of the burden of taxation so that it should 
bear lightly on the necessities of life, and heavily on its 
luxuries. This was a complete reversal of the scheme 
which we found in force, under which wheat flour and 
kerosene oil paid very heavy import duties while cigars 
and champagne were lightly taxed. 

We imposed export taxes on certain products of the 
country. Such taxes are objected to by many political 


economists, but were approved of by the Filipinos, who 
strongly opposed the imposition of a logical and very 
necessary personal tax to provide funds for the con- 
struction and maintenance of highways and bridges. It 
is usually wise, when practicable, to obtain funds for 
necessary governmental purposes by the imposition of 
taxes which are willingly paid, 

Mr. Taft resigned the governorship of the Philippines 
to become secretary of war, his resignation taking effect 
January 31, 1904. He had performed a monumental 
work for the Filipinos, and for humanity at large, during 
his years of service in the islands, and carried with him 
the good will of most of the people whom he had so 
faithfully, efficiently and seif-sacrificingly served. He had 
at one time very gravely impaired his health by hard work, 
and when the opportunity came to satisfy a lifelong 
ambition by accepting appointment as a Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, he had passed it by, 
in order to perform his duty to the people of the Philippine 
Islands. As secretary of war, and as President of the 
United States, he availed himself of every opportunity 
which these high offices afforded to help the Filipinos, and 
to increase the prosperity of their country. They have had 
no better friend, and no other friend whom they have 
ever had has been so useful to them. One more proof 
of his real greatness is afforded by the fact that to-day, 
after being reviled by many Filipino politicians whom he 
befriended, who have succeeded to a large degree in 
making the common people of the Philippines consider 
him their enemy, his interest in the people of the Islands 
is as keen, and his eagerness to help them is as great, 
as in the early days when they acclaimed him their 

General Luke E. Wright, a democrat of Memphis, 
Tennessee, was appointed by President Roosevelt civil gov- 
ernor in Mr. Taft's place. He rendered his country and 
the Filipinos most distinguished service. It is one thing 


to build up a great government, with numerous political 
appointments at one's disposal, and another to stand by 
and keep it running smoothly and efficiently, when a lot 
of disappointed politicians, who have seen their last hope 
of political preferment go a-glinamering, are throwing 
sand into the bearings of the machine. This latter class 
had begun to plot against Governor Taft before his 
resignation took efTect, but their machinations were 
rendered fruitless by the wave of regret raised by his 
coming departure. 

They now devoted themselves, with a good deal of 
success, to injuring Governor Wright, who declined to be 
dictated to, in the matter of appointments, by the Federal 
Party, and aroused the ire of many politicians by occa- 
sionally telling the Filipinos unpalatable but wholesome 
and necessary truths relative to their fitness for immedi- 
ate independence. 

General Wright, whose title had been changed from 
governor to governor-general on February 6, 1905, went 
on leave during the latter part of that year, fully expect- 
ing to return and resume his work in the Philippines, but 
the islands were not to see him again. He resigned, 
effective April 1, 1906, to become United States Ambas- 
sador to Japan. In my opinion, the acceptance of his 
resignation at this time was one of the gravest mistakes 
ever made in the Philippine policy of the United States. 
The islands were deprived of the services of a very able 
and distinguished man, thoroughly conversant with their 
needs, who had the courage of his convictions, and whose 
convictions were thoroughly sound. 

Certain Filipino politicians openly boasted that they 
had secured his removal, and they and their ilk were en- 
couraged to put forth new and pernicious efforts. Had 
General Wright returned to the islands much of the po- 
litical unrest from which they have since suffered would 
have been avoided. He was beloved by his associates, 
who felt a sense of personal loss when they learned that 


the places which had known him in The PhiHppines would 
know him no more. 

He was succeeded for the brief period of five and a half 
months by Judge Henry C. Ide, vice-governor and secre- 
tary of finance and justice, who had performed his 
duties while he was on leave. Judge Ide was a republi- 
can, from Vermont. He resigned on September 19, 1906. 

He was succeeded by General James F. Smith, a demo- 
crat from California, who had come to the islands as a 
colonel of volunteers, and had won promotion because of 
his valuable services in the Visayas, and more especially 
in the island of Negros, where he had earned the good will 
of the Filipinos by his tact and kindness. Later he had 
served, unwillingly, as head of the Manila custom house. 

He was subsequently made a justice of the supreme 
court of the Philippines. A lawyer by profession, he 
had resigned this position with regret to accept appoint- 
ment, on January 1, 1903, as secretary of public instruc- 
tion. He did not desire the governor-generalship and 
made a strong but unsuccessful effort to avoid accepting 
the position, which he finally took from a sense of duty. 
He was a good lawyer, with a big heart, and a keen insight 
into human nature. He thoroughly understood the 
Fihpinos, and he made an excellent governor-general. 
It was during his term of office that the Philippine Legis- 
lature, composed of an upper appointive house, the 
Philippine Commission, and a lower elective house, the 
Philippine Assembly, met for the first time on October 16, 

I devote a separate chapter^ to the Phihppine Legis- 
lature and its work, so need not discuss it here. Suffice 
it to say that such success as attended the work of this 
body during its inaugural, first and special sessions, was 
very largely due to the tactful influence of Governor- 
General Smith, who gave the speaker of the assembly 
much valuable, friendly counsel, and kept the two houses 

1 Chapter XXVII. 
VOL. I — 2a 


working in comparative harmony. Having struggled 
through one session of the legislature, Governor-General 
Smith felt at liberty to resign. He greatly desired to 
leave the Philippine government service and return to 
the practice of his profession. His resignation was re- 
luctantly accepted, about a year after he had tendered it, 
and he left the service on November 10, 1909. 

He was succeeded by Vice-Governor W. Cameron 
Forbes, a republican from Massachusetts, who had 
accepted appointment as secretary of commerce and 
police on June 15, 1904. A man of independent 
means, Mr. Forbes entered the public service only be- 
cause of the opportunity for greater usefulness which 
was thus afforded him. He brought to bear on the 
problems which confronted him as secretary of com- 
merce and police intelligence and ability of a very high 
order. Wide practical experience in the management 
of large business interests had admirably fitted him to 
improve the organization and increase the efficiency of the 
insular police force, and to mature and carry out plans 
for bettering means of communication and otherwise 
facilitating and stimulating the normal, healthful com- 
mercial development of the islands. I have devoted 
several chapters to the discussion of the results accom- 
phshed along these Hnes,^ and will not attempt here to 
enumerate them. 

Like all of his predecessors, he brought to the office 
of governor-general mature experience gained on the 
ground, having been in the service more than five years 
at the time of his promotion. 

As governor-general, he not only retained his keen 
interest in the large problems which had previously 
engaged his attention, and laboured unceasingly and most 
successfully in the performance of the duties of his new 
office, but took an especial interest in the development 
of the summer capital, and in the work for the non- 

1 Chapters XIV, XXII, XXIII and XXIV. 


















Christian peoples of the islands, devoting a much greater 
amount of time and attention to familiarizing himself 
with the needs of this portion of the population than had 
ever previously been given to it by any governor-general. 
He visited the Moros and the Bukidnons in the south, 
and the Negritos, the Benguet Igorots, the Lepanto 
Igorots, the Bontoc Igorots, the Ilongots, the Ifugaos, 
the Kalingas, and both the wild and the civihzed Tingians, 
in the north, repeatedly inspecting the several sub- 
provinces of the Mountain Province. 

Through his generosity in making proper grounds 
available, public interest in outdoor sports was greatly 
stimulated at Manila and at Baguio, while his own 
participation in polo, baseball and golf was a good example 
to Americans and Filipinos alike, in a country where 
vigorous outdoor exercise is very necessary to the physical 
development of the young and the preservation of the 
health of the mature. He was a true friend of the Filipinos, 
whom he genuinely liked and was always ready to assist. 
His personal influence was a powerful factor in the success of 
the very important work carried on at the Philippine Normal 
School and the Philippine Training School for Nurses. 

During his term of office the prosperity of the islands 
increased by leaps and bounds, public order became better 
than ever before in their history, and the efficiency 
of the civil service reached its maximum. No other 
governor-general ever drew so heavily on his private 
means in promoting the public good, and it was the 
irony of fate that he should have been accused, by 
certain irresponsible anti-imperiahsts, of using his public 
office to promote his private interests. Near the end of 
his administration grossly and absurdly false charges 
were made against him on the floor of the House by 
Representative WilHam A. Jones. As their falsity has 
been conclusively and finally shown, ^ I will not here lend 
importance to them by repeating them. No official 

1 Reply to Jones, Pamphlet, Manila, 1913. 


has ever given any country a cleaner administration than 
Governor-General Forbes gave the Philippines. 

It was his fortune to be in office at the time of the change 
in the national administration of the United States. 
x4.fter continuing to serve for months with no sign from 
Washington as to whether his resignation was desired, he 
was advised by the Chief of the bureau of insular affairs 
that the appointment of Mr. Francis Burton Harrison, 
who is a Tammany Hall democrat, as his successor had 
been sent to the Senate,^ and three days after its confirma- 
tion received a curt request for his resignation to be 
effected in a week and a day. He was also requested to 
employ servants for Mr. Harrison. Spaniards who read 
on the public streets newspapers which printed this 
message were seen to tear them up and stamp on the 
pieces ! Our Spanish friends are accustomed to expect 
courtesy in connection with the removal of faithful and 
efficient public servants. 

All other governors-general had taken the oath of 
office at Manila. Mr. Harrison took it at Washington 
on September 2, 1913. He is the first American governor 
of the islands who has entered upon his high duties with- 
out previous experience in the country which he is to 
govern, and he has as yet displayed little inchnation to 
profit by the experience of either Filipino or American 
administrative insular officials of high rank. It is too 
soon to discuss any feature of his administration other 
than his attitude toward the civil service, which I take up 
elsewhere,^ and I can only express the hope that when he 
has gained that knowledge which can come only through 
personal observation on the ground, he will grow to be a 
wise, strong, conservative official. 

The establishment of civil government in the Philippine 
Islands under American rule was a gradual evolution up 
to the time of the assumption of control by Governor- 
General Harrison. 

1 See pp. 375-77. 


I will not attempt to follow in detail all of its successive 
stages, but in closing this chapter will endeavour briefly 
to summarize the results obtained up to that time. 

The Philippines now have two delegates to the Congress 
of the United States appointed by the legislature in 
accordance with the provision of Section 8 of the Act of 
Congress of July 1, 1902. Both are Filipinos. 

The ranking executive officials of the insular govern- 
ment are a governor-general, a secretary of the interior, 
a secretary of finance and justice, a secretary of com- 
merce and police and a secretary of public instruction. 
All of these officers are appointed by the President, subject 
to confirmation by the Senate. The secretary of finance 
and justice is a Filipino ; the other secretaries of de- 
partments are Americans. 

There is a legislature composed of two houses known 
respectively as the Philippine Commission and the 
Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Commission is 
composed of nine members ; five are the governor- 
general and the four secretaries of department ex officio, 
and four are appointed by the President subject to con- 
firmation by the Senate. Four of the members are 
Filipinos and five are Americans.^ 

The Philippine Assembly is composed of eight-one 
elected members, all of whom are Filipinos. They 
represent thirty-four of the thirty-nine provinces into 
which the archipelago is divided. The two houses of 
the legislature have equal powers. Neither has any 
special privilege in the matter of initiating legislation, 
and affirmative action by both is required in order to 
pass it. The Moro Province, the Mountain Province 
and the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Agusan 
are not represented in the assembly, nor are they 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Philippine Legislature. 
The Philippine Commission alone has legislative juris- 
diction over them, their population being largely com- 

1 Under the new regime these figures have been reversed. 


posed of Moros, or members of other non-Christian 

The provinces may be divided into regularly organized 
provinces governed under the provincial government act, 
and specially organized provinces, which include the Moro 
Province, the Mountain Province and the provinces of 
Mindoro, Palawan, Agusan and Nueva Vizcaya, of which 
the first is governed under a special law and the remaining 
four are governed under a different one known as ''The 
Special Provincial Government Act." 

Regularly organized provinces have a governor and 
a treasurer. The governor is elected, and the treasurer 
is appointed by the governor-general with the approval 
of the commission. These two officials, with another 
known as the third member, constitute a provincial 
board. The third member is elected. As the Filipinos 
usually elect to office men from among their own people, 
practically all of the elective provincial officers are 
Filipinos, as are ten of the appointive officers, it 
having been the policy to appoint Filipinos whenever 

Regularly organized provinces are divided into munici- 
palities which elect their own officers and control their 
own affairs for the most part. Provincial treasurers 
have intervention in municipal expenditures, which are 
approved in advance for each fiscal year, and municipal 
officers may be removed for misconduct by the governor- 

All officers of the six special government provinces are 
appointed by the governor-general with the approval 
of the commission. 

There are four regularly organized municipalities in 
these provinces, but the remainder of their territory is 
divided into townships, which elect their own officers, 
except their secretary-treasurers, who are appointed by 
the provincial governor ; and into rancherias or settle- 
ments, with all of their officials appointed by the pro- 


vincial governor. This latter form of local government 
is confined to the more primitive wild people. 

The judiciary is independent. The details of its or- 
ganization will be found in Chapter XV. 

Three of the seven justices of the supreme court, in- 
cluding the chief justice, are Filipinos, as are approx- 
imately half of the judges of the courts of first instance 
and practically all justices of the peace. 

At the close of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913, 
71 per cent of the employees in the classified civil service 
of the islands were Filipinos painstakingly trained for 
the positions to which they had been appointed. 

Prior to the American occupation, the Filipinos had 
practically no intervention in the government of their 

The changes introduced in the twelve years since the 
establishment of civil government began are of a sweeping 
and radical nature. For reasons hereinafter fully set forth, 
I believe they have been somewhat too sweeping, and too 
radical. At all events, it is now certainly the part of 
wisdom carefully to analyze their results before going 

I deem the subject of the establishment of civil govern- 
mental control over the non-Christian tribes of the 
Philippines worthy of special consideration.^ 

1 See Chapters XX-XXIV. 


The Philippine Civil Service 

Before the Philippine Commission left Washington, a 
clear understanding was reached with the President and 
secretary of war to the effect that no political appointee 
whatsoever should under any circumstances be forced 
upon us. After arrival at Manila early attention was 
given to the drafting of a civil service act by Mr. Taft, 
who was fortunate in having the assistance of Mr. Frank 
M. Kiggins, chief of the examining division of the United 
States Civil Service Commission. The passage of this 
act and its strict enforcement led to very favourable com- 
ment in the United States. In his first annual message 
President Roosevelt said : — 

''It is important to have this system obtain at home, but it 
is even more important to have it rigidly applied in our insular 
possessions. . . . 

"The merit system is simply one method of securing honest 
and efficient administration of the government, and in the long 
run the sole justification of any type of government lies in its 
proving itself both honest and efficient." 

Secretary Root also gave us his fullest support, calling 
attention to the fact that the law which we had passed 
was of a very advanced type, and that under such cir- 
cumstances as confronted us, the securing of the best men 
available should outweigh, and indeed practically exclude, 
all other considerations. 

Our action met with the unqualified approval of or- 
ganizations which especially interest themselves in the 
maintenance of clean and efficient public service, such 
as the Cambridge (Massachusetts) Civil Service Reform 



Association ^ and the National Civil Service Reform 
League, whose committee on civil service in depen- 
dencies spoke in very high terms of existing conditions 
in the Philippines.^ 

In its first annual report the Civil Service Board called 
attention to some of the more important provisions of 
the Act in the following words : — 

"Competitive examinations must, whenever practicable, 
be held for original entrance to the service, and promotions of 
employees must also be based upon competitive examinations, 
in which the previous experience and efficiency of employees 
shall be given due consideration. The examinations for en- 
trance to the service must be held in the United States and in 
the Philippine Islands, and applicants are required to be tested 
in both English and Spanish. 

"Disloyalty to the United States of America as the supreme 
authority in the Islands is made a complete disqualification for 
holding office, and every applicant for admission to the service 
must, before being admitted to examination, take the oath of 
loyalty. By an amendment to the Civil Service Act on Jan- 
uary 26, 1901, it is further declared that all persons in arms 
against the authority of the United States in the Philippine 
Islands, and all persons aiding or abetting them, on the first 
day of April, 1901, shall be ineligible to hold office. 

"A minimum age limit of eighteen years and a maximum 
age limit of forty years are fixed for those who enter the lowest 
grades in the service. This avoids the difficulty and embarrass- 

^ "The merit system has received renewed support from President 
Roosevelt in his administration, and by the extension of civil service 
throughout the nation, as well as in our new possessions. The Philip- 
pine service is reported to be very satisfactory, and efforts are being 
made for the extension and larger development of regulations in Porto 

2 "From the President down, every official charged with a duty 
touching the government of our dependencies is imbued with a pro- 
found sense of duty, and adequate realization of the situation and the 
imperative necessity of an unselfish, patriotic execution of the laws and 
regulations in the interest of the highest welfare of the inhabitants of the 
dependencies. With this state of affairs, the establishment of the 
merit system in them on an enduring basis should follow as a matter 
of course. It will be the aim of this Committee to aid in every possible 
way in extending and improving the system, and to that end to give 
to the whole subject careful and detailed study." 


ment that would result from the admission of men advanced in 
years to positions where the duties can be better performed 
by younger and more energetic persons. 

"The Board is given authority to investigate matters rela- 
tive to the enforcement of the act and the rules, and is em- 
powered to administer oaths, to summon witnesses, and to 
require the production of office books and records in making 
such investigations. Without such a provision it would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to conduct satisfactory inves- 
tigations, but -^ith the authority conferred by the act, the Board 
can make a rigid inquiry into the facts of every case arising 
under the act and the rules. 

"The act provides for the ultimate classification of all posi- 
tions in the service, from laborers to heads of bureaus and 
offices, and the Board may, in its discretion, determine the 
efficiency of those now in the ser\'ice as well as those who may 
enter hereafter through its examinations. This authority 
will enable the Board to ascertain the fitness of all employees 
so that only the most competent will be retained in the service. 

"As a check upon the illegal payment of salaries the act 
provides that whenever the Board ffiids that a person has been 
appointed in violation of its provisions or of the rules of the 
Board, and so certifies to the disbursing and auditing officers, 
such payments shall be illegal, and if payment is continued 
the disbursing officer shall not receive credit for the same and 
the auditing officer who authorizes the pajTnent shall be liable 
on his official bond for the loss to the government." 

In its third annual report the Civil Ser\dce Board 
mentioned the following among its distinctive duties : — 

"All appointments to classified positions are required to be 
made on a form prescribed by the Board, and the Board's 
attestation is required in each case before the Civil Governor 
or Secretary of Department ■will approve the appointment and 
before the disbursing officer "\nll pay any salary. 

"The papers in all cases of reduction, removal and enforced 
resignation are required to be submitted to the Board for recom- 
mendation before transmission to the Civil Governor or Secre- 
tary of Department for final action. 

"The Board is required to keep a record of all unclassified 
as well as classified employees in the Philippine ci\-il service, 
showing among other things date of appointment, original 
position and salary, place of emplojTiient, all changes in status 
and grade, and all accrued and sick leave granted. 







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"From its service records the Board is required to compile 
annually, for publication on January 1, a roster of the officers 
and employees under the Philippine Government. 

"Applications from employees, classified and unclassified, 
for accrued and sick leave for more than two days must be made 
on a form prescribed by the Board and forwarded to it for veri- 
fication of service record and previous leave granted and for 
recommendation before final action is taken by the Civil Gov- 
ernor or Secretary of Department." 

These extracts from official reports clearly show that 
the act was indeed of a very advanced type, and if hon- 
estly enforced would of necessity lead to the establish- 
ment and maintenance of "an efficient and honest civil 
service," for which purpose it was enacted. 

In 1905 the insular government dispensed with boards 
as administrative agencies, and in accordance with this 
general policy, a bureau of civil service with a director 
at its head was substituted for the Civil Service Board, 
thus securing greater administrative efficiency and in- 
creased economy. 

At first the Civil Service Act applied to comparatively 
few positions, as only a few bureaus and offices had been 
created, but as the government was organized and grew, 
the different bureaus and offices were placed in the classi- 
fied service, the acts organizing them leaving in the un- 
classified service positions to which in the judgment of 
the commission the examination requirements of the 
act should not apply. Ultimately these requirements 
were made applicable to the treasurers of all munici- 
palities and to all positions, including teachers, in the 
executive and judicial branches of the central govern- 
ment, the provincial governments, and the governments of 
the cities of Manila and Baguio, except a few specifically 
excepted by law, which for the most part are unclassified 
or exempt in almost all governments, national, state and 
municipal, having civil service laws. None of the states 
of the Union has such a widely extended classification of 
its civil service. 


With the exception of the positions specifically placed 
in the unclassified service by law and of appointments 
made by the Philippine Commission, all positions in the 
Philippine civil service are classified and must be filled by 
appointees who have passed civil service examinations. 
Neither the governor-general nor the Bureau of Civil 
Service can, by the promulgation of civil service rules, 
or in any other manner whatever, transfer any position 
from the classified to the unclassified service or except 
from examination any position in the classified service. 
Under most of the civil service laws of the United States 
the President or the governor of the state has authority 
to transfer positions from the non-classified or exempted 
class to the competitive classified civil service or vice 
versa, these powers sometimes leading to manipulation 
of the civil service rules for political purposes. 

In the Philippines, where emergencies, such as cholera 
epidemics, sometimes lead to the employment of large 
bodies of temporary employees without examination, 
when the emergency has passed the temporary employees 
have always been discharged ; and no employee has ever 
received classification without examination on account 
of temporary service. This is in marked contrast to 
the practice in the United States, where large bodies of 
employees taken on for temporary service due to emer- 
gencies, such as the war with Spain, are not infrequently 
blanketed into the classified service without examination. 

In its last annual report the board recommended that 
a number of official positions in the unclassified service 
be placed in the classified service, and gave as a reason 
therefor that such action would ''add to the attractive- 
ness of the classified service by increasing the oppor 
tunities therein for promotion to responsible positions. 
This recommendation was adopted by providing that all 
vacancies in the positions of heads and assistant heads of 
bureaus or offices and of superintendents shall be filled by 
promotion, with or without examination, in the discre- 



tion of the civil governor or proper head of a department, 
of persons in the classified civil service, if competent 
persons are found therein. 

This provision is an important and distinguishing 
feature of the Philippine Civil Service Act. The federal 
civil service has none comparable with it. It is of special 
value in that it induces young men of exceptional ability 
and training to enter the lower grades, for they have the 
certainty that faithful and efficient work will in the end 
earn for them the highest positions. 

On February 25, 1909, the director of civil service 
made the following statement with respect to the ob- 
servance of the law : — 

"A careful study of Act 5 and all acts amendatory thereof 
will show that there has been no change in the policy adopted 
by the Commission at the outset to extend the classified ser- 
vice as widely as possible and to fill by promotion all the higher 
positions so far as practicable. The provision requiring the 
higher positions to be filled by promotion so far as practicable 
has always been regarded by the Philippine Commission, by 
this Bureau, and by others interested in obtaining the best 
possible government service in the Philippines as one of the 
most important provisions of the Civil Service Act. It has 
been faithfully observed by all Governors-General. . . . With 
the exception of the positions of Governor-General and Secre- 
taries of Departments, the Philippine Civil Service Act requires 
the highest positions in the executive civil service, namely, 
chiefs and assistant chiefs of Bureaus and Offices, to be filled 
by promotion from the entire service in all cases except when 
in the opinion of the appointing power there is no person com- 
petent and available who possesses the qualifications required, 
and this provision has been faithfully observed heretofore." 

The enforcement of the law by the commission has 
received the following commendation from the executive 
committee of the National Civil Service Reform League : — 

"We have further to note with satisfaction the course of the 
Phihppine Commission, by which, if it be persevered in, the 
merit system will be established in the Islands of that archi- 
pelago at least as thoroughly and consistently as in any depart- 


merit of government, Federal, State, or Municipal, in the 
Union. This must be, in any case, regarded as a gratifying 
recognition of sound principles of administration on the part 
of the Commission, and justifies the hope that, within the limits 
of their jurisdiction at least, no repetition of the scandals of 
post-bellum days will be tolerated." 

Up to the time of the appointment of Governor-General 
Harrison the provisions of the Civil Service Act and rules 
were firmly supported by all of the governors-general 
and secretaries of departments, and the annual reports 
of the governor-general uniformly expressed satisfac- 
tion with their practical operation. Mr. Taft was always 
an enthusiastic supporter of the merit system. 

Governor-General Forbes in his inaugural address made 
the following statements : — 

''It is necessary that the civil service should be rigidly main- 
tained and its rules carefully observed. One very distinguished 
Filipino has recently been appointed to administrative control 
of one of the most important departments of the Government, 
equal in rank to any executive position in the Islands with the 
exception of the Executive head. In the executive branch of 
the Government, the Filipinization of the service must steadily 
continue. As vacancies occur Filipinos will be gradually sub- 
stituted for Americans as rapidly as can be done without posi- 
tive detriment to the service. At the same time, care will be 
taken to provide a suitable career for honest and capable 
Americans who have come out here in good faith. They should 
know that during good behavior and efficient performance of 
their duty they are secure in their positions, and that when 
they desire to return to the United States an effort will be made 
to place them in the civil service at home. 

"I want no better men than the present officers and em- 
ployees of the Government, Americans and Filipinos. They 
compare favorably with any set of men I have ever seen both as 
regards ability and fidelity to duty." 

Tender the operation of the Civil Service Act the pro- 
portion of Filipinos employed has increased from 49 per 
cent, in 1903, to 71 per cent in 1913, as is shown by the 
following table : — 



Comparison of Percentages of Americans and 
Filipinos in the Service 

' Year 

Number op Employees 


























For the first few years after the estabhshment of the 
government large numbers of Americans were appointed, 
as there were comparatively few Filipino candidates with 
the necessary educational quahfications. During the 
last two years, 89 per cent of the persons appointed in 
the islands have been Filipinos. 

There has been a great increase in the number of Fili- 
pinos entering the civil service examinations in English. 
Ten years ago 97 per cent of those examined took their 
examinations in Spanish, while during last year 89 per 
cent of those examined took examinations in Enghsh, 
the total number so examined being 7755. Almost all 
appointees for ordinary clerical work are now Filipinos, 
but the supply of bookkeepers, stenographers, civil en- 
gineers, physicians, veterinarians, sui-veyors, chemists, 
bacteriologists, agriculturists, horticulturists, constabu- 
lary officers, nurses, electricians, mechanical engineers, 
and other scientific employees is still insufficient to meet 
the demands of the service. Only one Filipino has passed 

» No data for 1906 available. 


the stenographer examination in EngHsh since the organ- 
ization of the government, and it is necessary each year 
to bring many American stenographers from the United 
States. A few Fihpinos pass each year the junior steno- 
grapher examination ^ and are able to fill some of the 
positions which would formerly have required the ap- 
pointment of Americans. 

The salaries paid to executive officials, chiefs of bureaus 
and offices, chief clerks, and chiefs of divisions equal in 
many instances those paid to officials occupying similar 
positions in the service of the United States government. 

In the legislative branch the speaker receives $8000 
per annum. Members of the Philippine Commission 
without portfolios receive $7500 per annum. Members of 
the Philippine Assembly receive $15 a day for each day 
in which the assembly is in session. 

In the executive branch secretaries of departments 
receive $15,500 per annum each, including $5000 received 
by them as members of the Philippine Commission. The 
executive secretary receives $9000 per annum. The 
salaries of other bureau chiefs range from $2500 per 
annum to $7500. 

The justices of the Philippine Supreme Court receive 
$10,000 per annum. Judges of courts of first instance 
receive from $4500 to $5500. 

The following extracts from an article by the chairman 
of the Philippine Civil Service Board give information 
with respect to salaries in the Philippine Islands, as com- 
pared with salaries paid in surrounding British and Dutch 
colonies : — 

''The salaries paid officials in all branches of the service of 
the Straits Settlements are generally lower than those paid in 
the Philippine civil service. In this connection, however, it 
is only just to state that the population and extent of the 
territory under British control, and the expenses of living, are 
less than in the Philippines, while the difficulty of the prob- 

^ Eight passed last year. 


lems to be solved is not so great. The salaries paid to natives 
who fill the lower grade positions in the civil service of the Phil- 
ippine Islands are three and four times as great as the salaries 
paid to natives in similar classes of work in the civil service of 
the British Malay colonies. 

"A study of the colonial civil service of the Dutch in the 
islands of Java and Madura gives us somewhat different 
results. . . . 

"The matter of salaries is peculiarly interesting. The 
comparison made above of the compensations received by the 
high officials in the civil service of the English colonies and by 
those in the Philippines does not hold good when applied to the 
Dutch in Java. In fact, the salary of the Governor-General of 
Java is somewhat remarkable in contrast with that of the Civil 
Governor of the Philippines. As is well known, the latter 
receives $20,000, while the salary of the Governor-General of 
Java amounts to 132,000 gulden or something over $53,000. 
The American official is given, in addition, free transportation 
on all official investigations and free use of the governor's 
palace, but not the cost of maintenance. On the other hand, 
the Dutch governor is granted 51,000 gulden (about $21,500) 
as personal and household expenses and travel pay. 

"The general secretary of the government receives 24,000 
gulden ($9648), as compared with the executive secretary of 
the Philippine government, whose salary is $7500.^ The 
seven heads of departments in the Javanese service each re- 
ceive a like compensation of 24000 gulden. The Raad, or 
Council, of the Dutch colonial government is composed of a 
vice-president and four members — the former receiving about 
$14,500, the latter slightly over $11,500 each. In the Phil- 
ippine government the executive functions of heads of depart- 
ments are exercised by four members of the legislative body, 
each of whom receives $10,500 for his executive services and 
$5000 for his legislative duties. Without going further into 
detail, the conclusion is evident that all officials of high rank 
are much better paid in the Dutch service. When a compari- 
son is made between the chief clerks and other office employees 
of middle grades — not natives — the salaries are seen to be 
about the same in the two countries. 

"All natives in positions of lower grades, however, in the 
Philippine Islands fare better than their Malay brethren, either 
in the Straits Settlements or in the East Indies." — (Second 
Annual Report of the Philippine Civil Service Board, pp. 60, 61.) 

1 He now receives $9000. 
VOL. I — 2 b 



"Difference in salaries for subordinate positions in the 
British and Dutch colonial services and the Philippine service 
are distinctly in favour of subordinate employees in the Philip- 
pine service ; only the higher officials, after long experience, 
in the British colonial service receive larger salaries than corre- 
sponding officials in the Philippine service ; the leave of absence 
and other privileges for the Philippine service are not less 
liberal than for other colonial services." — (Report of the 
Philippine Commission for 1905, p. 74.) 

The entrance salaries of Americans brought to the 
islands are considerably in excess of the entrance salaries 
received on appointment to the civil service in the United 

The following table shows the minimum entrance 
salaries given to Americans appointed in the United 
States to the United States civil service, as shown by 
the manual of examinations of the United States Civil 
Service Commission for the fall of 1913, and to Ameri- 
cans appointed in the United States to the Philippine 
Civil Service : — 

Aid (Surveyor) . . 
Civil Engineer . . . 
Forester, assistant 
Scientific Assistant, 
(Agricultural Inspector) 
Physician .... 


Stenographer . . . 
Trained Nurse . . . 

Teacher . . 





600 Board, 
quarters and laundry 

United States 

$ 900 


.50 per hour 
600 and laundry 


The following cases taken from the official rosters 
show some promotions to the higher positions in the 
service of employees who entered the lower ranks of the 
classified service : — 

Philippine Embroidery. 
This work was done by a pupil in one of the Manila city schools. 


A clerk who entered the service in 1899 at $1800 per 
annum was appointed in 1903 an assistant chief of bureau 
at $3000 per annum and in 1908 executive secretary at 
$9000 per annum. A teacher appointed in 1899 at $720 
per annum was appointed a chief of an office at $4000 
per annum and in 1912 a judge at $4500 per annum. 
A teacher who entered the service in 1901 at $1200 per 
annum was in 1909 appointed a chief of a bureau at $6000 
per annum. A teacher who entered the service in 1904 at 
$1000 per annum was appointed in 1911 an assistant chief 
of a bureau at $6000 per annum. A clerk who entered 
the service in 1901 at $1200 per annum was appointed in 
1909 an assistant chief of the executive bureau at $3750 per 
annum and in 1912 a chief of a bureau at $6000 per annum. 
A stenographer who entered the service in 1902 at $1400 
per annum was in 1908 appointed an assistant chief of a 
bureau at $5000 per annum. A transitman who entered 
the service in 1905 at $1400 per annum was in 1913 ap- 
pointed an assistant chief of a bureau at $4500 per an- 
num. An accountant who entered the service in 1901 
at $1800 per annum was in 1907 appointed an assistant 
cliief of a bureau at $3750 per annum and in 1909 a chief 
of a bureau at $6000 per annum. A law clerk who en- 
tered the service in 1904 at $1800 per annum was in 1913 
appointed judge at $4500 per annum. In no service any- 
where has promotion depended more directly on demon- 
strated ability, and in many instances it has been rapid. 

Young men living two in a room may obtain room and 
board in boarding houses in Manila at a rate as low as 
$35 per month each. In the Young Men's Christian 
Association building, a large reenforced concrete structure 
with reading room, gymnasium, and a good restaurant, 
the charge for two in a room is $10.25 each. Board costs 
$27.50, a total of $37.75. The expenses for clothing in 
Manila are less than in the United States, as white 
clothing is worn the whole year and white duck suits 
may be obtained for about $3 each. The expenses for 


laundry amount to about $5 a month. The necessity 
of employing a muchacho ^ is nil, in the case of an un- 
married employee who boards. Servants are far cheaper 
and better in the Philippines than in the United States. 

In a discussion of the salaries paid in the Philippine civil 
service the question of the leave allowed should be con- 
sidered. Classified employees who receive an annual 
salary of $1000 or more per annum may be granted 
twenty-eight days' leave per annum to cover absences 
from duty due to illness or other causes. If not taken dur- 
ing the calendar year in which it is earned or in January 
or February of the succeeding year, it is forfeited. Em- 
ployees taking vacation leave during the months of 
December, January, February and March may take 
fifty-six days, corresponding to two years of service, at 
one time, and may thus get time to visit Australia, 
Japan, China, and neighbouring countries. 

In addition to vacation leave an employee whose salary 
is $1000 or more but less than $1800 per annum is entitled 
to thirty days' accrued leave per annum, and an employee 
whose salary is $1800 per annum or more is entitled to 
thirty-five days' accrued leave per annum. Accrued leave 
may accumulate for not more than five years of service. 

All classified employees are entitled to visit the United 
States or foreign countries once in every three years, 
receiving in addition to their accrued leave, one year's 
vacation leave, allowance of actual travel time at half 
pay not to exceed sixty days, and return travel expenses 
from place of residence in the United States, or from port 
of embarkation in a foreign country to Manila, on the 
completion of two years of service after date of return. 
An employee entitled to thirty-five days' accrued leave per 
annum who visits the United States after having rendered 
three years of service receives a total of two hundred 
thirteen days' accrued leave, vacation leave, and half-pay 
travel time. If he postpones his visit till he has com- 

^ Male servant. 


pleted five years of service, he receives a total of two 
hundred ninety-one days' accrued leave, vacation leave 
and travel time. An employee entitled to thirty days' 
accrued leave per annum who visits the United States 
after three years of service receives a total of one hun- 
dred ninety-four days' leave and half-pay travel time, and 
if he postpones his visit until he has rendered five years 
of service, he receives a total of two hundred fifty-nine 
days' leave and travel time. 

It will be seen that these are very liberal allowances. 
An employee receiving $1200 at the end of two years of 
service may spend eight weeks of vacation leave visiting 
Japan or other surrounding countries, and at the end of 
an additional year's service he may visit his home in the 
United States with six and a third months' absence on 
full and half pay and with his expenses from his home to 
Manila payable two years after his return, and during every 
three years of his service he may have the same privileges. 

The law also provides that if an employee is wounded or 
injured in the performance of duty, he may have a total 
of six months' leave on full pay in addition to any ac- 
crued leave to his credit. 

Employees who have rendered satisfactory service and 
resign after three or more years receive in a lump sum all 
accrued leave due and thirty days' half salary. For ex- 
ample, an employee who has received $1800 per annum 
and has served five years without taking any leave in ex- 
cess of the four weeks' vacation leave allowable annually 
would draw $1025 were he to resign. 

The school sessions amount to forty weeks per annum 
and the school vacations to twelve weeks per annum.^ 
Teachers receive an annual salary and draw full pay 
during vacations as well as during school sessions. Every 
third year they are allowed to visit the United States or 
foreign countries with an allowance of sixty days' half-pay 
travel time in addition to the ten weeks' long vacation, 

* Two weeks at Christmas and ten weeks in April, May and June. 


and on completing two years of service after return to the 
islands they are entitled to their travelling expenses from 
place of residence in the United States to Manila or from 
port of embarkation in a foreign country to Manila. 

It is interesting to compare these provisions with the 
regulations governing leave of absence in the British 
colonial service : — • 

(1) There is no distinction between sick leave and ordinary 
leave, the leave of absence on account of sickness being charged 
against the ordinary leave allowable. 

(2) There are two classes of leave : vacation leave on full 
pay and half-pay leave. 

(3) The vacation leave amounts to three months every 
two years, and must be taken during the two years, as it does 
not accumulate. 

(4) The half-pay leave amounts to two months for each 
year of service, but cannot be taken until after a period of six 
years' resident service in the Colony, except in cases of serious 
indisposition supported by medical certificate, or of "urgent 
private affairs," the nature of which must be stated to the 
governor. In either case, the governor and council must be 
satisfied that the indulgence is indispensable. 

Half pay in African and Asiatic colonies may accumulate for 
twelve years' service — i.e. twenty-four months' half-pay leave. 

(5) After the exhaustion of all vacation leave and half-pay 
leave, an advance of six months' half-pay leave may be made 
on special grounds ("urgent private affairs" or illness supported 
by a medical certificate), the advance being charged against 
leave accruing subsequently. 

(6) For the purpose of visiting home, an officer may be 
granted the vacation leave due him (which is never more than 
three months) on full pay, and his accumulated half-pay leave, 
to commence at the expiration of his vacation leave. 

(7) Judicial and education officers do not receive the vacation 
leave described in paragraph 3 above, the vacation of courts 
and schools being considered equal to this, but they do receive 
the half-pay leave described in paragraph 4, and may, when 
visiting home on half-pay leave, receive full pay during any 
ordinary vacation of the court or school. 

It will be noted that although officers in the British 
colonial service are allowed much longer periods of ab- 


sence, the greater part of their absence is on half pay and 
the total money value of the leave -allowable in the British 
colonial service and in the Philippine civil service is about 
the same. As officers naturally prefer to be on full pay 
instead of half pay while on leave, the provision of the 
Philippine law is in their interest ; it is also in the interest 
of the service, as the periods of the absence from duty 
are not so prolonged. 

The Phihppine Civil Service Law is now about to be 
put to its first really severe test as a result of the change 
in the national administration. Heretofore those whose 
duty and privilege it has been to enforce it have been in 
the most full and hearty sympathy with its purposes. 
President McKinley was from the outset definitely com- 
mitted to the widest application of the merit system to 
appointments in the Philippines. Mr. Roosevelt and 
Mr. Taft firmly supported that system, as has each suc- 
ceeding governor-general up to, but not including, Mr. 
Harrison, who is as yet an unknown quantity. 

It is interesting, however, to note that on the day fol- 
lowing his arrival there was a demand for the instant 
resignation of Mr. Thomas Gary Welch, a faithful and 
efficient employee of the government, who had been for 
nearly ten years in the service, whose position was desired 
for, and immediately given to, Mr. Stephen Bonsai. That 
gentleman had been appointed at Washington a member 
of the Municipal Board of Manila immediately after 
Mr. Harrison's confirmation as governor-general. It 
is not recorded that Mr. Bonsai rendered any valuable 
service to the city on the voyage, or during the twenty- 
four hours of his occupancy of his municipal post sub- 
sequent to his arrival ! Nor does it appear that he 
passed any examination before his early promotion. 

Following closely upon the removal of Mr. Welch came 
a demand for the resignation of Captain Charles H. 
Sleeper, Director of Lands, who was unquestionably one 
of the ablest and most efficient of the bureau chiefs. 


He had earned the ill-will of the politicos by insisting 
that persons authorized to make public land surveys, or 
other surveys on which claims of title as against the 
government were to be based, should know enough about 
surveying to make one correct survey when given an 
opportunity practically to demonstrate their abilities 
under very favourable conditions. He had also incurred 
the dislike of influential caciques by defending the occu- 
pants of small holdings on friar estates from the rapacity 
of their rich neighbours, and by protecting free-patent 
applicants and homesteaders when large landowners 
opposed their applications in order to prevent their 
securing land, so that they might the more easily be 
held as peon labourers. 

He had started in his bureau a practical school for 
Filipino surveyors which was training really well-quali- 
fied candidates for positions desired by the politicians 
for themselves or their incompetent friends. 

Last, but not least, he had helped to upset the plans of 
the men primarily responsible for the so-called "friar 
lands investigation" conducted by the House Committee 
on Insular Affairs, wliich cost the United States govern- 
ment a very large sum, and resulted in demonstrating 
his uprightness and the efficiency of his administration. 

Mr. John R. Wilson, the assistant director of lands, 
was absent at the moment, but his resignation was de- 
manded on the day of his return. He too was an active, 
efficient, upright man. 

Both of these removals were political acts, pure and 
simple. Sr. Manuel Tinio was appointed Director of 
Lands. He is a bright young Ilocano of good character, 
who had become a ''general" in the Insurgent army at 
twenty-one years of age. He is unfit to hold the place, 
because, as he has himself frankly said, he knows nothing 
about the work. He is charged with the duty of admin- 
istering $7,000,000 worth of friar lands, and the whole pub- 
lic domain of the Philippine Islands, and with such minor 


duties as the checkmating of the machinations of numer- 
ous wealthy Fihpinos who seek fraudulently to acquire 
great tracts through fraudulent claims to unperfected 
titles and by other improper means. 

While in Honolulu, en route to Manila, Mr. Harrison 
gave out an interview, which I am credibly informed he 
has since confirmed in substance. It contained the fol- 
lowing statement : — 

"For years I have been of the minority in Congress and 
have seen the Democrats kicked about, trampled upon, and 
otherwise manhandled by Republicans, so that I must confess 
it now gives me a saturnine pleasure to see the Democrats in 
a position to do the same thing to the Republicans." 

His early official acts after arrival at Manila confirmed 
the belief that this was indeed the spirit in which he was 
facing the grave responsibilities which there confronted 

It is beyond doubt or cavil that high ideals heretofore 
have prevailed in the Philippine Civil Service. Are they 
now to be substituted by the methods of the ward politi- 
cian ? 

In its report for 1901 the Philippine Commission said : — 

"The civil service law has been in operation since our last 
report, and we see no reason to change our conclusion as to the 
absolute necessity for its existence, and strict enforcement. 
Without this law American government in these Islands is, 
in our opinion, foredoomed to humiliating failure." 

I signed that report. I have not since seen any reason 
to change my mind. 


The Philippine Constabulary and Public Order 

During the last thirty years of Spanish rule in the 
Philippines evil-doers were pursued and apprehended 
and public order was maintained chiefly by the guardia 
civil. At the time of its organization in 1868 this body 
had a single division. By 1880 the number had been 
increased to three, two for Luzon and one for the Visayan 

The guardia civil was organized upon a military basis, 
its officers and soldiers being drawn from the regular army 
of Spain by selection or upon recommendation. De- 
tachments were distributed throughout the provinces and 
were commanded according to their size by commissioned 
or non-commissioned officers. Central offices were located 
in district capitals ; company headquarters were stationed 
in provincial capitals, and detachments were sent to 
places where they were deemed to be necessary. 

Under ordinary conditions they rendered service as 
patrols of two men each, but for the purpose of attacking 
large bands of outlaws one or several companies were 
employed as occasion required. 

The guardia civil had jurisdiction over all sorts of 
violations of laws and municipal ordinances. They 
made reports upon which were based the appointments 
of municipal officers, the granting of licenses to carry 
firearms, and the determination of the loyalty or the 
disloyalty of individuals. 

They were vested with extraordinary powers. Offences 
against them were tried by courts-martial, and were 
construed as offences against sentinels on duty. Penalties 
were therefore extremely severe. 



Officers of the guardia civil on leave could by their 
own initiative assume a status of duty with the full powers 
and responsibilities that go with command. This is 
contrary to American practice, under which only dire 
emergency justifies an officer in assuming an official 
status unless he is duly assigned thereto by competent 

The guardia civil could arrest on suspicion, and while 
the Spanish Government did not directly authorize or 
sanction the use of force to extort confessions, it was not 
scrupulous in the matter of accepting confessions so 
obtained as evidence of crime, nor was it quick to punish 
members of the guardia civil charged with mistreatment 
of prisoners. 

Reports made by the guardia civil were not questioned, 
but were accepted without support even in cases of the 
killing of prisoners alleged to have attempted to escape, 
or of men evading arrest. 

This method of eliminating without trial citizens 
deemed to be undesirable was applied with especial fre- 
quency in the suppression of active brigandage, and 
latterly during the revolution against Spain. Prisoners 
in charge of the guardia civil were always tied elbow to 
elbow. They knew full well that resistance or flight was 
an invitation to their guards to kill them, and that this 
invitation was likely to be promptly accepted. 

In the investigation of crime the members of this or- 
ganization arrested persons on suspicion and compelled 
them to make revelations, true or false. Eye-witnesses 
to the commission of crime were not needed in the Spanish 
courts of that day. The confession of an accused person 
secured his conviction, even though not made in the 
presence of a judge. Indirect and hearsay evidence were 
accepted, and such things as writs of habeas corpus and 
the plea of double jeopardy were unknown in Spanish 

The guardia civil could rearrest individuals and again 


charge them with crimes of which they had already 
been acquitted. I have been assured by reliable Fihpino 
witnesses that it was common during the latter days of 
Spanish sovereignty for persons who had made themselves 
obnoxious to the government to be invited by non- 
commissioned officers to take a walk, which was followed 
either by their complete disappearance or by the subse- 
quent discovery of their dead bodies. 

It naturally resulted that the members of the guardia 
civil were regarded with detestation and terror by the 
people, but their power was so absolute that protest 
rarely became public. The one notable exception was 
furnished by Dr. Rizal's book entitled ''Noh Me 
Tangere," which voiced the complaints of the Filipinos 
against them. There is not a vestige of doubt that 
hatred of them was one of the principal causes of the 
insurrection against Spain. 

In 1901 the American government organized a rural 
police force in the Philippines. It was called the Philip- 
pine constabulary. The insurrection was then drawing 
to a close, but there were left in the field many guerilla 
bands armed and uniformed. Their members sought 
to excuse their lawless acts under the plea of patriotism 
and opposition to the forces of the United States. In 
many provinces they combined with professional bandits 
or with rehgious fanatics. Various "popes" arose, like 
Papa Isio in Negros. The Filipinos had become accus- 
tomed to a state of war which had continued for nearly 
six years. Habits of peace had been abandoned. The 
once prosperous haciendas were in ruins. War and pesti- 
lence had destroyed many of the work animals, and those 
which remained continued to perish from disease. Asiatic 
cholera was sweeping through the archipelago, and con- 
sternation and disorder followed in its wake. 

Under such circumstances the organization of a rural 
police force was imperatively necessary. Unfortunately 
the most critical situation which it was to be called upon 









to meet had to be faced at the very outset, when both 
officers and men were inexperienced and before adequate 
discipHne could be estabhshed. 

The law providing for its establishment was drawn by 
the Honourable Luke E. Wright, at that time secretary 
of commerce and police and later destined to become 
governor-general of the Philippines and secretary of 
war of the United States. 

It was intended that the constabulary should accom- 
plish its ends by force when necessary but by sympathetic 
supervision when possible, suppressing brigandage and 
turning the people towards habits of peace. The fact 
was clearly borne in mind that the abuses of the guardia 
civil had not been forgotten and the new force was de- 
signed to meet existing conditions, to allay as rapidly 
as possible the existing just rancour against the similar 
organization established under the Spanish regime, and 
to avoid the evils which had contributed so much toward 
causing the downfall of Spanish sovereignty. The law 
was admirably framed to achieve these ends. 

The officers of the constabulary were selected chiefly 
from American volunteers recently mustered out and 
from honourably discharged soldiers of the United States 
army. Some few Fihpinos, whose loyalty was above 
suspicion, were appointed to the lower grades. This 
number has since been materially augumented, and 
some of the original Filipino appointees have risen to the 
rank of captain. 

It was inevitable that at the outset there should 
be abuses. The organization was necessarily born at 
work ; there was no time to instruct, to formulate regu- 
lations, to wait until a satisfactory state of discipline had 
been brought about. There were not barracks for 
housing the soldiers ; there were neither uniforms, nor 
arms, nor ammunition. There was no system for ra- 
tioning the men. All of these things had to be provided, 
and they were provided through a natural evolution of 


practical processes, crystallizing into form, tested by the 
duties of the day. The organization which grew up was a 
true survival of the fittest, both in personnel and in 
methods. The wonder is not that some abuses occurred, 
but that they were so few ; not that there were occasional 
evidences of lack of efficiency, but that efficiency was on 
the whole so high from the beginning. 

The several provinces were made administrative units, 
the commanding officer in each being designated as 
'^senior inspector." The men who were to serve in a 
given province were by preference recruited there, and a 
departure was thus made from the usual foreign colonial 

In 1905 the total force was fixed at one hundred com- 
panies with a nominal strength of two officers and fifty 
men each. Under special conditions this rule may be 
departed from, and the size of the companies or the number 
of officers increased. 

Each province is divided by the senior inspector into 
sections, and the responsibility for patrol work and general 
policing rests on the senior company officer in each station. 
The provinces are grouped into five districts, each com- 
manded by an assistant chief who exercises therein the 
authority, and performs the duties appropriate to the 
chief for the entire Philippines. The higher adminis- 
trative positions have always been filled by detailing 
regular officers of the United States army. 

The constabulary soldiers are now neatly uniformed, 
armed with Krag carbines and well disciplined. They 
show the effect of good and regular food and of systematic 
exercise, their physical condition being vastly superior 
to that of the average Filipino. They are given regular 
instruction in their military duties. It is conducted in 

The Philippine constabulary may be defined as a body 
of armed men with a military organization, recruited 
from among the people of the islands, officered in part 


by Americans and in part by Filipinos, and employed 
primarily for police duty in connection with the establish- 
ment and maintenance of public order. 

Blount's chapters on the administrations of Taft, Wright 
and Smith embody one prolonged plaint to the effect 
that the organization of the constabulary was premature, 
and that after the war proper ended, the last smouldering 
embers of armed and organized insurrection should 
have been stamped out, and the brigandage which had 
existed in the Philippines for centuries should have been 
dealt with, by the United States army rather than by 
the constabulary. 

Even if it were true that the army could have rendered 
more effective service to this end than could have been 
expected at the outset from a newly organized body of 
Filipino soldiers, the argument against the organization 
and use of the constabulary would in my opinion have 
been by no means conclusive. It is our declared policy 
to prepare the Fihpinos to establish and maintain a 
stable government of their own. The proper exercise of 
police powers is obviously necessary to such an end. 

From the outset we have sacrificed efficiency in order 
that our wards might gain practical experience, and 
might demonstrate their ability, or lack of ability, to 
perform necessary governmental functions. Does any 
one cognizant of the situation doubt for a moment that 
provincial and municipal affairs in the Philippine Islands 
would to-day be more efficiently administered if pro- 
vincial and municipal officers were appointed instead of 
being elected ? Is any one so foolish as to imagine that 
the sanitary regeneration of the islands would not have 
progressed much more rapidly had highly trained American 
health officers been used in place of many of the badly 
educated and comparatively inexperienced Filipino 
physicians whose services have been utilized ? 

Nevertheless, in the concrete case under discussion I 
dissent from the claim that more satisfactory results 


could have been obtained by the use of American 

The army had long been supreme in the Philippines. 
Every function of government had been performed 
by its officers and men, if performed at all. Our 
troops had been combating an elusive and cruel enemy. 
If they were human it is to be presumed that they still 
harbored animosities, born of these conditions, toward 
the people with whom they had so recently been fighting. 
Had the work of pacification been then turned over to them 
it would have meant that often in the locaUties in which 
they had been fighting, and in deaHng with the men 
to whom they had very recently been actively opposed 
in armed conflict, they would have been called upon to 
perform tasks and to entertain feehngs radically different 
from those of the preceding two or three years. 

A detachment, marching through Leyte, found an 
American who had disappeared a short time before 
crucified, head down. His abdominal wall had been 
carefully opened so that his intestines might hang down 
in his face. 

Another American prisoner, found on the same trip, had 
been buried in the ground with only his head projecting. 
His mouth had been propped open with a stick, a trail 
of sugar laid to it through the forest, and a handful thrown 
into it. 

MilHons of ants had done the rest. 

Officers and men who saw such things were thereby 
fitted for war, rather than for ordinary pohce duty. 

The truth is that they had seen so many of them 
that they continued to see them in imagination when 
they no longer existed. I well remember when a general 
officer, directed by his superior to attend a banquet at 
Manila in which Americans and Fihpinos joined, came 
to it wearing a big revolver ! 

Long after Manila was quiet I was obhged to get out 
of my carriage in the rain and darkness half a dozen 


times while driving the length of Calle Real, and ''ap- 
proach to be recognized" by raw "rookies," each of whom 
pointed a loaded rifle at me while I did it. I know that 
this did not tend to make me feel peaceable or happy. 
In my opinion it was wholly unnecessary, and yet I did not 
blame the army for thinking otherwise. 

After the war was over, when my private secretary, 
Mr. James H. LeRoy, was one day approaching Malolos, 
he was sternly commanded by a sentry to halt, the com- 
mand being emphasized as usual by presenting to his 
attention a most unattractive view down the muzzle of 
a Krag. He was next ordered to "salute the flag," which 
he finally discovered with difficulty in the distance, after 
being told where to look. The army way is right and neces- 
sary in war, but it makes a lot of bother in time of peace ! 

This was not the only reason for failing to make more 
extensive use of American soldiers in police duty. A 
veteran colonel of United States cavalry who had just 
read Judge Blount's book was asked what he thought of 
the claim therein made that the army should have done 
the poUce and pacification work of the Philippines. His 
reply was : — 

"How long would it take a regiment of Filipinos to catch 
an American outlaw in the United States? Impossible !" 

Another army officer said : — 

"Catching Filipino outlaws with the Army is like catching 
a flea in a twenty-acre field with a traction engine." 

There is perhaps nothing so demoralizing to regular 
troops as employment on police duty which requires them 
to work singly or in small squads. Discipline speedily 
goes to the dogs and instruction becomes impossible. 

Successful prosecution of the work of chasing ladrones in 
the Philippines requires a thorough knowledge of local 
topography and of local native dialects. Spanish is of 
use, but only in dealing mth educated Filipinos. A 

VOL. I — 2 c 


knowledge of the Filipino himself; of his habits of 
thought ; of his attitude toward the white man ; and 
toward the illustrado, or educated man, of his own race ; 
ability to enter a town and speedily to determine the 
relative importance of its leading citizens, finally centring 
on the one man, always to be found, who runs it, whether 
he holds political office or not, and also to enlist the 
sympathy and cooperation of its people ; all of these 
things are essential to the successful handling of brigand- 
age in the Philippines, whether such brigandage has, or 
lacks, political significance. 

The following parallel will make clear some of the 
reasons why it was determined to use constabulary 
instead of American soldiers in policing the Philippines 
from the time the insurrection officially ended : — 

United States Army Philippine Constabulary 

Soldier costs per annum Soldier costs per annum 
$1400. (Authority: Adju- $363.50. 
tant General Heistand in 

American soldiers come from Constabulary soldiers are en- 
America, listed in the province where 

they are to serve. 

Few American soldiers speak All constabulary soldiers speak 
the local dialects. local dialects. 

Few American soldiers speak All educated constabulary sol- 
any Spanish. diers speak Spanish. 

American soldiers usually have Constabulary soldiers, native 
but a slight knowledge of to the country, know the 
local geography and topog- geography and topography 
raphy. of their respective prov- 


Few American soldiers have The Filipino soldier certainly 

had enough contact with knows his own kind better 

Filipinos to understand than the American does, 


































The American soldier uses a 
ration of certain fixed com- 
ponents imported over sea. 
(A ration is the day's al- 
lowance of food for one 

The American ration costs 
24.3 cents United States 
currency (exclusive of cost 
of transportation and han- 
dling). Fresh meat requir- 
ing ice to keep it is a 
principal part of the Ameri- 
can ration. To supply it 
requires a regular system of 
transport from the United 
States to Manila and from 
thence to local ports, and 
wagon transportation from 
ports to inland stations. 

The American soldier is at no 
pains to enlist the sympathy 
and cooperation of the peo- 
ple ; and his methods of 
discipline, habits of life, etc., 
make it practically impos- 
sible for him to gain them. 

The constabulary soldier is 
rationed in cash and buys 
the food of the country 
where he happens to be. 

The constabulary cash ration 
is 10.5 cents United States 
currency. (No freight or 
handling charges.) The con- 
stabulary soldier knows not 
ice. His food grows in the 
islands. He buys it on 
the ground and needs no 
transportation to bring it to 

The idea of enlisting the sym- 
pathy and cooperation of 
the local population is the 
strongest tenet in the con- 
stabulary creed. 

Before preparing the foregoing statement relative to 
the reasons for using Philippine constabulary soldiers 
instead of soldiers of the United States army for police 
work during the period in question, I asked Colonel J. G. 
Harbord, assistant director of the constabulary, who 
has served with that body nine years, has been its acting 
director and is an officer of the United States army, to give 
me a memorandum on the subject. It is only fair to him 
to say that I have not only followed very closely the line 
of argument embodied in the memorandum which he was 
good enough to prepare for me, but have in many instances 
used his very words. The parallel columns are his. 


The constabulary soldier, thoroughly familiar with 
the topography of the country in which he operates ; 
speaking the local dialect and acquainted with the 
persons most likely to be able and willing to furnish 
accurate information ; familiar with the characteristics 
of his own people ; able to live off the country and keep 
well, is under all ordinary circumstances a more efficient 
and vastly less expensive police officer than the American 
soldier, no matter how brave and energetic the latter 
may be. Furthermore, his activities are much less likely 
to arouse animosity. 

Incidentally, the army is pretty consistently unwilling 
to take the field unless the constitutional guarantees are 
temporarily suspended, and it particularly objects to 
writs of habeas corpus. The suspension of such guaran- 
tees is obviously undesirable unless really very necessary. 

Let us now consider some of the specific instances 
of alleged inefficiency of the constabulary in suppressing 
public disorder, cited by Blount. 

On page 403 of his book he says, speaking of Governor 
Taft and disorder in the province of Albay which arose in 
1902-1903: — 

"He did not want to order out the military again if he could 
help it, and this relegated him to his native municipal police 
and constabulary, experimental outfits of doubtful lo3^alty, 
and, at best, wholly inadequate, as it afterwards turned out, 
for the maintenance of public order and for affording to the 
peaceably inclined people that sort of security for life and 
property, and that protection against semi-political as well as 
unmitigated brigandage, which would comport with the dig- 
nity of this nation." 

The facts as to these disorders are briefly as follows : — 
In 1902 an outlaw in Tayabas Province who 
made his living by organizing political conspiracies and 
collecting contributions in the name of patriotism, who 
was known as Jose Roldan when operating in adjoining 
provinces, but had an alias in Tayabas, found his life made 


SO uncomfortable by the constabulary of that province 
that he transferred his operations to Albay. There he 
affiliated himself with a few ex-Insurgent officers who 
had turned outlaws instead of surrendering, and with 
oath violators, and began the same kind of political 
operations which he had carried out in Tayabas, the 
principal feature of his work being the collection of 

The troubles in Albay were encouraged by wealthy 
Filipinos who saw in them a probable opportunity to 
acquire valuable hemp lands at bottom prices, for people 
dependent on their hemp fields, if prevented from working 
them, might in the end be forced to sell them. Roldan 
soon lost standing with his new organization because it 
was found that he was using for his personal benefit the 
money which he collected. 

About this time one Simeon Ola joined his organization. 
Ola was a native of Albay, where he had been an Insurgent 
major under the command of the Tagalog general, Belar- 
mino. His temporary rank had gone to his head, and he 
is reported to have shown considerable severity and 
hauteur in his treatment of his former neighbours in Guino- 
batan, to which place he had returned at the close of the 
insurrection. Meanwhile, a wealthy Chinese mestizo 
named Don Circilio Jaucian, on whom Ola, during his 
brief career as an Insurgent officer, had laid a heav}^ hand, 
had become presidente of the town. 

Smarting under the indignities which he had suffered, 
Jaucian made it very uncomfortable for the former major, 
and in ways well understood in Malay countries brought 
it home to the latter that their positions had been reversed. 
Ola's house was mysteriously burned, and his life in 
Guinobatan was made so unbearable that he took to 
the hills. 

Ola had held higher military rank than had any of 
his outlaw associates, and he became their dominating 
spirit. He had no grievance against the Americans, but 


took every opportunity to avenge himself on the caciques 
of Guinobatan, his native town. 

Three assistant chiefs of constabulary, Garwood, 
Baker and Bandholtz, were successively sent to Albay 
to deal with this situation. Baker and Bandholtz were 
regular army officers. The latter ended the disturbances, 
employing first and last some twelve companies of Philip- 
pine scouts, armed, officered, paid, equipped and disci- 
plined as are the regular soldiers of the United States army, 
and a similar number of constabulary soldiers. Eleven 
stations in the restricted field of operations of this outlaw 
were occupied by scouts. There were few armed conflicts 
in force between Ola's men and these troops. In fact, 
it was only with the greatest difficulty that this band, 
which from time to time dissolved into the population 
only to reappear again, could be located even by the native 
soldiers. It would have been impracticable successfully 
to use American troops for such work. 

Referring to the statement made by Blount ^ that Vice- 
Governor Wright made a visit to Albay in 1903 in the 
interest ''of the peace-at-any-price policy that the Manila 
Government was bent on," and the implication that he 
went there to conduct peace negotiations, General Band- 
holtz, who suppressed outlawry in Albay, has said that 
Vice-Governor Wright and Commissioner Pardo de 
Tavera came there at his request to look into conditions 
with reference to certain allegations which had been 

Colonel Bandholtz and the then chief of constabulary, 
General Allen, were supported by the civil governor and 
the commission in their recommendations that no terms 
should be made with the outlaws. The following state- 
ment occurs in a letter from General Bandholtz dated 
September 21, 1903 : — 

"No one is more anxious to terminate this business than 
I am, nevertheless I think it would be a mistake to offer any 

1 Blount, p. 425. 


such inducements, and that more lasting benefits would result 
by hammering away as we have been doing." 

And General Allen said in an indorsement to the 
Philippine Commission : — 

". . . in my opinion the judgment of Colonel Bandholtz 
in matters connected with the pacification of Albay should 
receive favourable consideration. Halfway measures are always 
misinterpreted and used to the detriment of the Government 
among the ignorant followers of the outlaws." 

These views prevailed. 

Blount has claimed that the death rate in the Albay 
jail at this time was very excessive, and cites it as an in- 
stance of the result of American maladministration. 

Assuming that his tabulation^ of the dead who died in the 
Albay jail between May 30 and September, 1903, amount- 
ing to 120, is correct, the following statements should be 
made : — 

Only recently has it been demonstrated that beri-beri is 
due to the use of polished rice, which was up to the time 
of this discovery regarded as far superior to unpolished 
rice as an article of food, and is still much better liked 
by the Filipinos than is the unpolished article. Many 
of these deaths were from beri-beri, and were due to a 
misguided effort to give the prisoners the best possible 

Cholera was raging in the province of Albay throughout 
the period in question, and the people outside of the jail 
suffered no less than did those within it. The same is 
true of malarial infection. In other words, conditions 
inside the jail were quite similar to those then prevailing 
outside, except that the prisoners got polished rice which 
was given them with the best intentions in the world, and 
was by them considered a superior article of food. 

With the present knowledge of the methods of dis- 
semination of Asiatic cholera gained as a result of the 

I Blount, p. 430. 


American occupation of the Philippines, we should 
probably be able to exclude it from a jail under such 
circumstances, as the part played by ''germ carriers" 
who show no outward manifestations of infection is now 
understood, but it was not then dreamed of. One of the 
greatest reforms effected by Americans in the Philippines 
is the sanitation of the jails and penitentiaries, and we 
cannot be fairly blamed for not knowing in 1903 what 
nobody then knew. 

The troubles in Albay ended with the surrender of Ola 
on September 25, 1903. Blount gives the impression 
that he had a knowledge of them which was gained by 
personal observation. He arrived in the province in 
the middle of November, seven weeks after normal 
conditions had been reestablished. 

On October 5, 1903, General Bandholtz telegraphed with 
reference to the final surrender of Ola's band : — 

"The towns are splitting themselves wide open celebrating 
pacification and Ramon Santos (later elected governor) is 
going to give a record-breaking fiesta at Ligao. Everybody 
invited. Scouts and Constabulary have done superb work." 

Blount makes much of disorders in Samar and Leyte. 
Let us consider the facts. 

In all countries feuds between highlanders and low- 
landers have been common. Although the inhabitants 
of the hills and those of the lowlands in the two islands 
under discussion are probably of identical blood and origin, 
they long since became separated in thought and feeling, 
and grew to be mutually antagonistic. The ignorant peo- 
ple of the interior have always been oppressed by their 
supposedly more highly civihzed brethren living on or 
near the coast. 

The kilhng of Otoy by the constabulary in 1911 marked 
the passing of the last of a series of mountain chiefs who 
had exercised a very powerful influence over the hill people 
and had claimed for themselves supernatural powers. 


Manila hemp is the principal product upon which these 
mountaineers depend in bartering for cloth and other 
supplies. The cleaning of hemp involves very severe 
exertion, and when it is cleaned it must usually, in 
Samar, be carried to the seashore on the backs of the men 
who raise it. Under the most favourable circumstances, 
it may be transported thither in small hancas ^ down the 

The lowland people of Samar and Leyte had long been 
holding up the hill people when they brought in their 
hemp for sale in precisely the way that Filipinos in other 
islands are accustomed to hold up members of the non- 
Christian tribes. They played the part of middlemen, 
purchasing the hemp of the ignorant hill people at low 
prices and often reselling it, without giving it even a day's 
storage, at a very much higher figure. This system was 
carried so far that conditions became unbearable and 
finally resulted in so-called puldjanism which began in the 
year 1904. 

The term puldjan is derived from a native word 
meaning ''red" and was given to the mountain people 
because in their attacks upon the lowlanders they wore, 
as a distinguishing mark, red trousers or a dash of red 
colour elsewhere about their sparse clothing. They raided 
coast towns and did immense damage before they were 
finally brought under control. It should be remembered 
that these conditions were allowed to arise by a Filipino 
provincial governor, and by Filipino municipal officials. 
It is altogether probable that a good American governor 
would have prevented them, but as it was, neither their 
cause nor their importance were understood at the outset. 
The puldjan movement was directed primarily against 

The first outbreak occurred on July 10, 1904, in the 
Gandara River valley where a settlement of the lowlanders 
was burned and some of its inhabitants were killed. 

1 Native dugouts. 


Eventually disorder spread to many places on the coast, 
and one scout garrison of a single company was surprised 
and overwhelmed by superior numbers. Officers and men 
were massacred and their rifles taken. 

In point of area Samar is the third island in the Philip- 
pines. In its interior are many rugged peaks and heavily 
forested mountains. It was here that a detachment of 
United States marines under the command of Major 
Waller, while attempting to cross the island, were lost 
for nearly two weeks, going without food for days and 
enduring terrible hardships. 

At the time in question there were not five miles of 
road on the island passable for a vehicle, nor were there 
trails through the mountains over which horses could be 
ridden. The only interior lines of communication were a 
few footpaths over which the natives were accustomed to 
make their way from the mountains to the coast. 

Troops have perhaps never attempted a campaign in a 
country more difficult than the interior of Samar. The 
traditional needle in the haystack would be easy to find 
compared with an outlaw, or band of outlaws, in such a 
rugged wilderness. 

Upon the outbreak of trouble troops were hurried to 
Samar, and by December, 1904, according to Blount 
himself, there were some 1800 native soldiers on the island 
who were left free for active operations in the field by the 
garrisoning of various coast towns with sixteen com- 
panies of United States infantry. 

If the nature of the feuds between the Samar lowlanders 
and highlanders had then been better understood, the 
ensuing troubles, which were more or less continuous for 
nearly two years, might perhaps have been avoided. As 
soon as it became evident that the situation was such as 
to demand the use of the army it was employed to supple- 
ment the operations of the constabulary. 

About the time that trouble ended in Samar it began 
in Leyte. There was no real connection between the 















disorders in the two islands. No leader on either island 
is known to have communicated with any leader on the 
other ; no fanatical follower ever left Samar for Leyte or 
Leyte for Samar so far as we are informed. 

For convenience of administration the two islands were 
grouped in a single connnand after the army was requested 
to take over the handling of the disturbances there, in 
cooperation with the constabulary. The trouble ended 
in 1907 and both islands have remained quiet ever since. 
The same causes would again produce the same results 
now or at any time in the future, and they would be then, 
as in the past, the outcome of the oppression of the weak 
by the strong and without other pohtical significance. 
Under a good government they should never recur. 

Many circumstances which did not exist in 1902 and 

1904 made it feasible to use the army in Samar and 
Leyte during 1905 and 1906. The high officers who had 
exercised such sweeping powers during the insurrection 
had meanwhile given way to other commanders. Indeed, 
a practically new Philippine army had come into existence. 
The policy of the insular government as to the treatment 
of individual Filipinos had been recognized and indorsed 
by Americans generally, but many of the objections to the 
use of the troops, including the heavy expense involved, 
still existed and I affirm without fear of successful contra- 
diction that had it been possible to place in Samar and 
Leyte a number of constabulary soldiers equal to that 
of the scouts and American troops actually employed, 
disorder would have been terminated much more quickly 
and at very greatly less cost. 

With the final breaking up of organized brigandage in 

1905 law and order may be said to have been established 
throughout the islands. It has since been the business 
of the constabulary to maintain it. The value of the 
cooperation of the law-abiding portion of the population 
has been fully recognized. The newly appointed constab- 
ulary officer has impressed upon him the necessity of 


manifesting an interest in the people with whom he comes 
in contact ; of cultivating the acquaintance of Filipinos 
of all social grades, and of assisting to settle their disagree- 
ments and harmonize their differences whenever possible. 
He is taught a native dialect. 

The constabulary have to a high degree merited and 
secured the confidence and good-will of the people, whose 
rights they respect. There is a complete absence of the 
old arbitrary procedure followed by the guardia civil and 
as a result there are frequent requests from Filipino 
officials for additional detachments, while the removal of a 
company from a given community is almost invariably 
followed by vigorous protests. The power of human 
sympathy is very great, and as the attitude of constabulary 
officers and men is usually one of sympathy, conciliation 
and affection, that body has earned and deserved popu- 

The success of the constabulary in apprehending 
criminals has been both praiseworthy and noteworthy. 
The courage and efficiency which have often been dis- 
played by its officers and men in hard-fought engage- 
ments with Moro outlaws or with organized bands of 
thieves and brigands have been beyond praise. Many of 
its officers have rendered invaluable service in bringing 
the people of the more unruly non-Christian tribes under 
governmental control, not only bravely and efficiently 
performing their duty as police officers, but assisting in 
trail construction or discharging, in effect, the duties of 
lieutenant-governors in very remote places which could 
be visited by the actual lieutenant-governors only in- 
frequently. I later take occasion to mention the valuable 
work done by Lieutenant Case in the early days of If ugao, 
and to dwell at length on the splendid service rendered 
there by Lieutenant Jeff D. Gallman, who was for many 
years Heutenant-governor of the subprovince while con- 
tinuing to serve as a constabulary officer. Lieutenant 
Maimban at Quiangan, and Lieutenant Dosser at Mayo- 


yao, have been and are most useful, though they do not 
hold official positions under the Mountain Province or re- 
ceive any additional compensation for the special services 
which they render. Captain Guy O. Fort served most 
acceptably as governor of the province of Agusan during 
the interim between the resignation of Governor Lewis 
and the appointment of Governor Bryant and Lieutenants 
Atkins and Zapanta have also rendered valuable service 
as assistants to the provincial governor. Lieutenant 
Turnbull is now assistant to the governor of Nueva 
Vizcaya for work among the Ilongots on the Pacific coast 
of northern Luzon. Other constabulary officers, who 
have not been called upon for special service of this kind, 
have performed their ordinary duties in such a way as 
to demonstrate that they were actuated by the spirit of 
cooperation and have been of great help. 

But the work of the constabulary has not been con- 
fined to police duty. They have been of the greatest 
assistance to the Director of Health in effectively main- 
taining quarantine, and making possible the isolation 
of victims of dangerous communicable diseases like 
cholera and smallpox, when inefficient municipal policemen 
have utterly failed to do their duty. They have given 
similar assistance to the Director of Agriculture in the 
maintenance of quarantine in connection with efforts 
to combat diseases of domestic animals. In great emer- 
gencies such as those presented by the recent eruption 
of Taal volcano, and the devastation caused by great 
typhoons, they have been quick to respond to the call 
of duty and have rendered efficient and heroic service. 
They assist internal revenue officers. Except in a few 
of the largest cities they are the firemen of the islands 
and by their effective work have repeatedly checked con- 
flagrations, which are of frequent occurrence and tend 
to be very destnictive in this country, where most of the 
houses are built of bamboo and nipa palm, and where 
roofs become dry as tinder during the long period 


when there is httle or no rain. They have aided in com- 
bating pests of locusts, and, in short, have been ready 
to meet ahnost any kind of an emergency which has 

The importance of having such a body of alert, indus- 
trious, disciplined, efficient men inspired by a high sense 
of duty, and physically so well developed that they can 
continue to perform that duty in the face of long-continued 
privations and hardships, is beyond dispute. The results 
which have been obtained by the Philippine constabulary 
have abundantly justified the policy which led to its 

Its task has been no sinecure. Eleven officers and one 
hundred ninety-seven enlisted men have been killed in 
action. Forty-eight officers and nine hundred ninety- 
one men have died of disease. Forty-six officers have 
been wounded in action. Seven hundred sixty-eight 
men have been discharged for disability. Seven thou- 
sand four hundred twenty-four firearms and 45,018 rounds 
of ammunition have been captured by, or surrendered 
to, the constabulary. Four thousand eight hundred 
sixty-two outlaws have been killed and 11,977 taken 
prisoners. Twelve thousand two hundred sixty-two stolen 
animals have been recovered. 

There are many things which are not brought home 
to the reader by such statistics. The weary days and 
nights on tropical trails ; the weakness and pain of dysen- 
tery ; the freezing and the burning of pernicious malaria ; 
the heavy weight of responsibility when one must act, in 
matters of life and death, with no superior to consult ; 
the disappointment when carefully laid plans go wrong; 
the discouragement caused by indifference ; the danger 
of infection with loathsome diseases ; ingratitude ; deadly 
peril ; aching wounds ; sudden death, and, worse yet, 
death after suffering long drawn out, when one meets 
one's end knowing that it is coming and that one's family 
will be left without means or resources, — these are some 


of the things that the officers and men of this gallant 
corps have faced unflinchingly. 

The work of the constabulary and of the Philippine 
scouts has conclusively demonstrated the courage and 
efficiency of the Filipino as a soldier when well disciplined 
and well led. 

The establishment and maintenance of order in the 
Philippines have afforded opportunity for some of the 
bravest deeds in the annals of any race, and the opportu- 
nity has been nobly met. The head-hunters of the Moun- 
tain Province, the Mohammedan Moros of Mindanao, 
Jolo and Palawan, the bloody puld janes of Samar and 
Leyte, the wily tulisanes of Luzon, all unrestrained by 
any regard for the rules of civilized warfare, have for 
twelve years matched their fanatical bravery against the 
gallantry of the khaki-clad Filipino soldiers. Time and 
again a single officer and a handful of men have taken 
chances that in almost any other land would have won 
them the Victoria cross, the legion of honor, or some 
similar decoration. Here their only reward has been 
the sense of duty well done. 

The force known as the Philippine constabulary was 
organized for the purpose of establishing and maintaining 
order. It has established and is maintaining a condition 
of order never before equalled or approached in the 
history of the islands. The policy which led to its organi- 
zation has been a thousand times justified. 


The Administration of Justice 

In no branch of the pubhc administration have there 
been more numerous or more beneficial reforms than in 
the administration of justice. They have resulted in 
simplifying organization, in decreasing the possibility of 
corruption and partiality, and in diminishing the cost of 
litigation and the time which it requires. 

For the benefit of those especially interested I give in 
the appendix the past and present organization of the 
courts.^ The subject is too technical to interest the 
average layman. 

The slender salaries paid to judges, the fact that in 
the majority of cases their appointment and promotion 
were due to influence and suggestion, their liability to be 
transferred from one court to another or from the Phil- 
ippines to the Antilles, as frequently happened, and the 
further fact that the subordinate personnel of the courts 
was not a salaried one, caused the administration of jus- 
tice in the Philippine Islands to be looked upon askance. 
There was a general belief, well founded in many instances, 
that lawsuits were won through influence or bribery. 
Clerks and the subordinate personnel of the courts were 
readily bribed. Indeed, they frequently demanded bribes 
from litigants, or from defendants in criminal cases, under 
promise to expedite the trials if paid to do so, or under 
threat to commit some injustice if payment was not 
forthcoming. For many years after the American occupa- 
tion justices of the peace received no salaries and had to 

1 See p. 998. 


look to fees for their compensation. This system worked 
wretchedly. The positions were only too often filled by 
very incompetent and unworthy men, who stimulated 
litigation in order to make more money. Now all justices 
of the peace receive reasonable salaries. 

The paying of regular salaries and the furnishing of 
necessary offices and supplies have done much to improve 
the work of justice of the peace courts, which are now 
presided over by men who average far better than even 
their immediate predecessors. 

Until they were put on a salary basis the work of the 
Filipino justices of the peace left much more to be 
desired than is lacking at present. In many instances they 
allowed gross brutalities, perpetrated by the rich on the 
poor, or by the strong on the weak, to go unpunished. 
The following case furnished me by an American teacher 
is typical of what has occurred only too often : — - 

"On another occasion, I met the brother of my house 
muchacha,^ a boy about eight. He had a sort of protuberance 
on one side caused by broken ribs which had not been set. I 
questioned my muchacha. She said her step-father had kicked 
the child across the room some weeks before and broken his 
ribs. The next day, I took the child together with Senora 
Bayot, the \viie of the Governor's secretary, before the local 
Justice of the Peace. Senora Bayot translated and the child 
told the same story as had his sister. The Justice of the Peace 
issued an order for the step-father to report to him on the next 
day. That night my muchacha told me that her step-father 
had threatened to kill the child if he did not tell the Justice 
that he got the hurt by falling out of an orange tree. The 
child did as ordered, and the step-father was dismissed. When 
I questioned the Justice of the Peace as to why he credited the 
second tale, he said the child was under oath then, and was not 
under oath in the first statements." 

It was not deemed wise at the outset to appoint a 
Filipino judge for the city of Manila, as it was feared that 
there would be a lack of confidence in a Filipino who had 
occasion to decide cases involving large sums of money 

' Female servant. 
VOL. I — 2d 


in which Americans or foreigners on the one hand and 
Filipinos on the other were interested ; but a few years after 
the estabhshment of the new judicial system Filipino 
judges had won such a reputation for justice and fairness 
as to gain the confidence of Americans and foreigners 
and the appointment of a Filipino judge for the court of 
the city of Manila did not arouse any opposition. 

Filipino judges of courts of first instance seem usually 
to have been actuated by a desire to do full justice. 
The instances in which complaints have been made 
against them because of partiality to party or to race are 
few. Some of them have been justly criticised for tardi- 
ness in cleaning up their dockets, and it is undoubtedly 
true that their capacity for turning out work is on the 
average below that of their Americans associates. 

The fact must not be forgotten that Americans are in 
the majority in the Supreme Court, which reviews the 
decisions of courts of first instance, and this undoubtedly 
exercises a restraining influence. It is not possible ac- 
curately to judge what would be the actions of a body of 
men now subject to such control if it did not exist. It is 
furthermore true that the Filipinos are more inclined to 
be suspicious of their own countrymen than of Americans, 
and there have been from time to time specific requests 
from them that judges in certain provinces be Americans. 

Under the Spanish regime the fees paid by litigants were 
excessive and the use of stamped paper was compulsory. 
Its value ranged from twenty-five centavos to two pesos 
for a folio of two sheets according to the amount involved 
in the suit. Now there are fixed fees of $8 in civil suits, 
except in probate matters, where the fee is $12. 

It was in the power of an unscrupulous litigant to make 
a lawsuit almost eternal. In matters involving an amount 
exceeding $250 it was lawful to institute proceedings in 
the action whereby the decision of the main issue was sus- 
pended pending decision of the proceedings, and as a deci- 
sion was appealable to the audiencia, this was often done 



by attorneys who had an interest in delaying the suit. 
By instituting one proceeding after another a suit could 
be indefinitely prolonged. 

Another method of securing delay was to object to the 
judge. In case the judge denied the ground of the ob- 
jection, a proceeding was instituted against him and the 
trial of the main issue was turned over to another judge ; 
although the proceeding arising out of the objection did 
not suspend the trial of the main issue, when the time 
came to decide the latter the decision was wdthheld until 
the proceeding arising out of the objection was settled, 
and as this latter was one in connection with which other 
proceedings could be instituted which might delay the 
decision and consequently the decision of the main issue, 
there was no end to the matter. 

To-day all this has been stopped by the procedure in 
court. The challenging of judges is not allowed, although 
they must refrain from the trial of any matter when they 
are disqualified in any way as regards it. Proceedings 
which suspend the trial of the main issue cannot be in- 
stituted. The procedure itself is more expeditious, the 
time allowances and formalities have been reduced, and 
all the long Spanish civil procedure regarding the presen- 
tation of evidence has been shortened. Suits are settled 
with a speediness previously unknown. In order to avoid 
delay on the part of judges in rendering decisions, an act 
has been passed prohibiting the payment of their salaries 
without a certificate that they have no matter which has 
been awaiting decision for more than three months. 

Owing to the inquisitorial procedure which obtained 
under Spanish rule, the disposition of criminal cases was 
even slower than that of civil cases. The cause would 
be commenced, either de officio, by the judge who had a 
knowledge of the crime, or by the prosecuting attorney, 
or by virtue of private accusation on the part of the person 
aggrieved. The case once started, the investigations made 
during the period known as the sumario were conducted in 


the absence of the accused. The latter had no hand in 
the case, as it was thought that the reserve and secrecy 
of the procedure ought not to be violated to the end that 
the accused might not frustrate the evidence of the pros- 
ecution by preparing his defence. Owing many times 
to the inactivity of the judge or of the prosecuting at- 
torney, to the great amount of work which weighed down 
the courts — for actions were begun when there was 
knowledge of the commission of the crime, although the 
perpetrators were not known — and by the manipulations 
at other times of the private accuser to whose interest 
it was to harm the accused by delaying the sumario, this 
period was often made to extend over years and years. 
Meanwhile the defendant was confined in prison, as no 
bail was allowed in any case in which the penalty was that 
of presidio correccional (from six months and one day to 
six years' imprisonment) or greater. In addition to this 
the circumstance that all criminal causes in the islands 
had to be sent for review to the proper audiencia, caused 
a large accumulation of old cases in these higher courts, 
and this alone made their disposition a matter of some 

To-day the procedure is rapid. Information having 
been brought against the defendant, the trial is had in 
the same term or at most during the next term of court. 
Sometimes the trial is suspended owing to the non-appear- 
ance of witnesses, but it can be said that cases are rare 
where causes are pending in the docket of the court for 
a longer period than two terms. Causes appealed to the 
Supreme Court are disposed of promptly, and as a general 
rule it does not take over six months to get a decision. 

Defendants in criminal cases have now been granted 
by the Philippine Bill certain fundamentally important 
rights which they did not formerly enjoy ; namely, to 
appear and defend in person or by counsel at every stage 
of the proceedings ; to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation ; to testify as witnesses in their 


own behalf ; to be exempt from testifying against them- 
selves ; to be confronted at the trial by, and to cross- 
examine, the witnesses against them ; to have compul- 
sory process issue for obtaining witnesses in their own 
favour ; to have speedy and public trials ; to be admitted 
to bail with sufficient sureties in all cases, except for capi- 
tal offences. None of these rights were enjoyed under 
the procedure in effect during the Spanish regime. A 
man was prosecuted without being notified of the charges 
against him, and he was only made aware of the case 
against him after the sumario. When all of the evidence 
of the prosecution had been taken the accused was heard 
in his own defence. He was compelled to testify, and was 
subjected to a very inquisitorial examination, including 
questions which incriminated him. Although he had the 
right to compel witnesses for the prosecution to ratify 
over their signatures the evidence against him given during 
the sumario, as the defence of the majority of the accused 
was in the hands of attorneys de officio they nearly always 
renounced this privilege of the defendant, and, as has 
already been said, bail was not admitted in any grave 
offence during the trial. 

No sentence of acquittal in a criminal case can now 
be appealed from by the government. Under the Spanish 
system sentences of acquittal of courts of first instance 
had to be referred for review to the proper audiencia and 
the fiscal of the latter could appeal from a sentence of 
acquittal by it. 

The Philippine Bill grants to the inhabitants of the 
islands other important individual rights which they 
did not formerly possess. 

The Spanish constitution was not in force here, and al- 
though the Penal Code contained provisions for punishing, 
in a way, officials who violated certain rights granted by the 
Spanish constitution, citizens had no expeditious method of 
securing their punishment. Now the Code of Civil Pro- 
cedure grants them certain special remedies by which their 


rights can be made good. To illustrate : Under the Spanish 
regime the only remedy for a man illegally detained was to 
bring a criminal action against the person illegally detain- 
ing him. He did not have the remedy of the writ of habeas 
corpus nor the writ of prohibition against an official who 
attempted to make him the victim of some unlawful act. 
His only remedy was to bring a criminal action against 
such official, or to sue him for damages. He could not 
compel public officials to perform their ministerial duties 
by mandamus proceedings. 

The individual rights conferred by the Philippine Bill, 
and the special remedies granted by the Code of Civil 
Procedure, assure to the inhabitants of the islands lib- 
erties and privileges entirely unknown to them during 
the days of Spanish sovereignty, and these liberties and 
privileges are adequately safeguarded. 

Two things still greatly comphcate the administration 
of justice in the Philippines. 

The first is the dense ignorance of the people of the 
working class who for the most part have failed to learn 
of their new rights, and even if they know them are afraid 
to attempt to assert them in opposition to the will of the 
caciques, whose power for evil they know only too well. 

The other is the unreliability of many witnesses and 
their shocking readiness to perjure themselves. It is al- 
ways possible to manufacture testimony at small expense. 
While the criminal libel suit brought against certain 
members of the staff of the newspaper El Renacimiento, 
which libelled me, was in progress the judge showed 
me the opinion of the two Filipino assessors ^ in one of 
the cases and told me that it was written by an attorney 
for the defence. I could not believe this, but a few 
days later an assessor in another of the cases called at 
my house, bringing a draft of the opinion of himself 
and his associate which he sought to submit to me for 

* Men appointed to assist the judge in deciding questions of fact. 
Their decision is not binding on him. 


criticism or modification, saying that I knew much more 
about the case than they did ! He was nonplussed at 
my refusal to read the document, and left saying "acqui 
tiene V. nuevo servidor.^' ^ Had I redrafted the opinion, 
as I might have done, my "new servant" would have 
called later for a quid pro quo. 

Some of the Filipino judges of first instance have 
proved weak in matters affecting the integrity of 
public domain and the protection of the public forests, 
but on the whole these officers have done rather surpris- 
ingly well. It must be remembered that the best men in 
the islands have now been appointed, and that another 
generation must come on before there will be available 
any considerable number of new candidates who are up 
to the standard of the present appointees. 

^ Here [i.e. in me] you have a new servant. 


Health Conditions 

I HAD abundant opportunity to observe health condi- 
tions in the Philippines during the Spanish regime and 
they were shocking in the extreme. There were no pro- 
visions for the sanitary disposal of human waste even in 
Manila. If one had occasion to be out on foot at night, 
it was wise to keep in the middle of the street and still 
wiser to carry a raised umbrella. 

Immediately after the American occupation some five 
hundred barrels of caked excrement were taken from a 
single tower in one of the old Manila monasteries. The 
moat around the city wall, and the esteros, or tidal creeks, 
reeked with filth, and the smells which assailed one's 
nostrils, especially at night, were disgusting. 

Distilled water was not to be had for drinking purposes. 
The city water supply came from the Mariquina River, 
and some fifteen thousand Filipinos lived on or near the 
banks of that stream above the intake. The water was 
often so thick with sediment that one could not see through 
a glass of it, and it was out of the question to attempt to 
get it boiled unless one had facilities of one's own. 

Conditions in the provinces were proportionately 
worse. As a rule, there was no evidence of any effort to 
put provincial towns into decent sanitary conditions. I 
must, however, note one striking exception. Brigadier 
General Juan Arolas, long the governor of Jol6, had a 
thorough knowledge of modern sanitary methods and a 
keen appreciation of the benefits derivable from their 
application. When he was sent to Jol6, practically in 
banishment, the town was a plague spot to which were 
assigned Spaniards whose early demise would have been 



looked upon with favour by those in power. He con- 
verted it into a healthy place the death rate of which 
compared favourably with that of European cities, thereby 
demonstrating conclusively what could be done even 
under very unfavourable conditions. No troops in the 
islands were kept in anything like such physical condition 
as were the regiments assigned to him, and he bore a 
lasting grudge against any one inconsiderate enough to 
die in Jol6. 

Everywhere I saw people dying of curable ailments. 
Malaria was prevalent in many regions in which it was 
impossible to secure good quinine. The stuff on sale 
usually consisted largely of cornstarch, or plaster of Paris. 
Fortunately we had brought with us from the United 
States a great quantity of quinine and we made friends 
with the Filipinos in many a town by giving this drug 
gratis to their sick. 

Smallpox was generally regarded as a necessary ailment 
of childhood. It was a common thing to see children 
covered with the eruption of this disease watching, or 
joining in, the play of groups of healthy little ones. 

The clothing of people who had died of smallpox was 
handed on to other members of the family, sometimes 
without even being washed. The victims of the disease 
often immersed themselves in cold water when their fever 
was high, and paid the penalty for their ignorance with 
their lives. 

The average Spaniard was a firm believer in the noxious- 
ness of night air, which he said produced paludismo.^ 
Most Filipinos were afraid of an imaginary spirit, devil 
or mythical creature known as asudng, and closed their 
windows and doors after dark as a protection against it. 
Thus it came about that in a coimtry where fresh air is 
especially necessary at night no one got it. 

Tuberculosis was dreadfully common, and its victim? 
were conveying it to others without let or hindrance. 

1 Malaria. 


A distressingly large percentage of native-born infants 
died before reaching one year of age on account of infec- 
tion at birth, insufficient clothing, or improper food. I 
have many times seen a native mother thrust boiled rice 
into the mouth of a child only a few days old, and I have 
seen babies taught to smoke tobacco before they could 

Before our party left the islands in 1888, cholera had 
broken out at a remote and isolated place. A little later 
it spead over a considerable part of the archipelago. On 
my return in 1890 I heard the most shocking stories of 
what had occurred. Victims of this disease were regarded 
with such fear and horror by their friends that they were 
not infrequently carried out while in a state of coma, and 
buried alive. It became necessary to issue orders to have 
shelters prepared in cemeteries under which bodies were 
required to be deposited and left for a certain number of 
hours before burial, in order to prevent this result. 

In Siquijor an unfortunate, carried to the cemetery 
after he had lost consciousness, came to himself, crawled 
out from under a mass of corpses which had been piled on 
top of him, got up and walked home. When he entered 
his house, his assembled friends and relatives vacated it 
through the windows, believing him to be his own ghost. 
They did not return until morning, when they found him 
dead on the floor. 

I heard a well-authenticated story of a case in which 
all the members of a family died except a creeping infant 
who subsisted for some time by sucking a breeding sow 
which was being kept in the kitchen. 

During the great cholera epidemic in 1882 it is said 
that the approaches to the Manila cemeteries were 
blocked with vehicles of every description loaded with 
corpses, and that the stench from unburied bodies in the 
San Lazaro district was so dreadful that one could 
hardly go through it. 

Beri-beri was common among the occupants of jails, 


This Kalinga chief saved the lives of Colonel Bias Villanior, Mr. Sanuu-1 E. 
Kane, and the author during the first trip ever made through the Kalinga 
countrj- by outsiders. 


lighthouses and other government institutions, as well as 
in certain garrisoned towns like Balabac. ** 

In 1892 I found the wife of a very dear Spanish friend 
dying from an ailment which in the United States could 
have been promptly and certainly remedied by a surgical 
operation. I begged him to take her to Manila, telling 
him of the ease with which any fairly good surgeon would 
relieve her, and promising to interest myself in her case 
on my arrival there. To my utter amazement I found 
that there was not a surgeon in the Philippine Islands 
who would venture to open the human abdomen. The 
one man who had sometimes done this in Spain stated 
that it would be impossible for him to undertake it in 
Manila, on account of the lack of a suitable operating 
room, of instruments and of the necessary anaesthetist and 
other professional assistants. In fact, at the time of the 
American occupation there was not a modern operating 
room, much less a modern hospital, in the Philippines. 
Thousands upon thousands of people were perishing need- 
lessly every year for the lack of surgical intervention. A 
common procedure in dealing with wounds was to cover 
them with poultices of chewed tobacco, ashes, and leaves. 

In many provinces the people were without medical 
assistance of any sort, and fell into the hands of native 
quacks who were little, if at all, better than witch doctors. 

The most fantastic views were entertained relative to 
the causation of disease. In some towns it was vigorously 
asserted that after a peculiar looking black dog ran down 
the street cholera appeared. In other places cholera was 
generally ascribed to the poisoning of wells by Spaniards or 

Cemeteries were not infrequently situated in the very 
midst of towns, or near the local supplies of drinking water. 
Conditions within their walls were often shocking from 
an aesthetic view point. As the area available for burials 
was limited, and the graves were usually unmarked, parts 
of decomposed bodies were constantly being dug up. It 


was the custom to throw such remains about the foot of 
the cross at the centre of the cemetery. 

Mihtary sanitation was also very bad. I was at 
Zamboanga when the wreck of General Weyler's ex- 
pedition to Lake Lanoa began to return. There had 
been no adequate provision for the medical care of the 
force in the field, and the condition of many of the sol- 
diers was pitiable in the extreme. Disabled men were 
brought in by the shipload, and the hospitals at Zam- 
boanga, Isabela de Basilan and Jolo were soon filled to 

The lack of adequate sanitary measures was equally 
in evidence in dealing with cattle disease. Rinderpest, a 
highly contagious and very destructive disease of horned 
cattle, was introduced in 1888 and spread like fire in 
prairie grass. No real effort was made to check it prior 
to the American occupation, and it caused enormous 
losses, both directly by killing large numbers of beef 
cattle and indirectly by depriving farmers of draft animals. 

When I first visited the islands every member of our 
party fell ill within a few weeks. All of us suffered in- 
tensely from tropical ulcers. Two had malaria ; one had 
dysentery ; one, acute inflammation of the liver, possibly 
of amoebic origin ; and so on to the end of the chapter. 
I myself got so loaded up with malaria in Mindoro that 
it took me fifteen years to get rid of it. 

Fortunately the American army of occupation brought 
with it numerous competent physicians and surgeons, and 
abundant hospital equipment and supplies, for the sol- 
diers promptly contracted about all the different ailments 
to be acquired in the islands. 

When I arrived in Manila on the 5th of March, 1899, 1 
found that a great army hospital, called the "First Re- 
serve," had been established in the old rice market. There 
was another sizable one on the Bagumbayan drive. A 
third occupied a large building belonging to French sisters 
of charity which was ordinarily used for school purposes. 


In immediate connection with the First Reserve Hos- 
pital was a tent hospital where sick and wounded Insur- 
gents were being given the best of care. 

Field hospitals were promptly established as the troops 
moved out from Manila, and in connection with many of 
these Filipinos were given much needed medical and 
surgical help. The recipients of such kindly treatment 
were, however, prohibited by Insurgent officers from tell- 
ing others of their experiences lest the hatred of Americans 
diminish as a result. 

Smallpox had broken out among the Spanish soldiers 
in the walled city and was spreading badly when my 
friend. Major Frank S. Bourns of the army medical corps, 
was given the task of eradicating it, which he promptly 
accomplished. A little later the use of the Santa Ana 
church as a smallpox hospital was authorized, and sick 
Filipinos were carefully tended there. 

The army promptly set about cleaning up Manila and 
waging war upon the more serious ailments which 
threatened the health of the soldiers and that of the 
public. The work was at the outset put under the direc- 
tion of Major Edie, a very capable and efficient medi- 
cal officer. Subsequently it was turned over to Major 
Bourns, who, on account of his intimate knowledge of 
Spanish, and his wide acquaintance with the Filipinos, 
was able to carry out many much-needed reforms, and 
in doing so aroused a iTiinimum of public antagonism. 

Upon the establishment of civil government Governor 
Taft was very desirous of retaining Major Bourns's ser- 
vices, but this did not prove practicable, as he desired 
to give up government work and engage in private business. 

There was promptly created an efficient board of 
health made up of men of recognized ability and large 
practical experience. Its chairman was Major Louis M. 
Maus, commissioner of public health. The other mem- 
bers were Mr. H. D. Osgood, sanitary engineer ; Dr. 
Franklin H. Meacham, chief sanitary inspector ; Dr. 


Paul C. Freer, superintendent of government labora- 
tories ; and Dr. Manuel Gomez, secretary. 

This board was promptly put upon its mettle. It had 
inherited from the army an incipient epidemic of bubonic 
plague in Manila, and the disease soon spread to Cavite 
and also to Cebu, then the second port of the Philippines 
in commercial importance. It also appeared in several 
provincial towns near Cavite. An effective campaign 
against it, inaugurated at this time, was never abandoned 
until it was completely eradicated in 1906, — a noteworthy 
result to achieve in a country like the Philippines. 

On March 21, 1902, I was advised that two patients 
at San Juan de Dios hospital were developing symptoms 
of Asiatic cholera, and on the following day a positive 
laboratory diagnosis was made. Other cases followed in 
quick succession, and we soon found ourselves facing a 
virulent epidemic of this highly dangerous disease. At 
the outset the mortality was practically 100 per cent. 
Unfortunately, there was no one connected with the 
medical service of the islands who had had practical 
experience in dealing with cholera, and we had to get this 
as we went along. 

At the time of the outbreak. Governor Taft was in the 
United States, Acting Governor Wright was in Leyte, 
the secretary of finance and justice was in Japan, and 
there were present in Manila only the secretary of public 
instruction and the secretary of the interior. As the 
executive head of the government was absent, and there 
was no quorum of the legislative body, I of necessity 
arrogated to myself powers which I did not lawfully possess, 
appointing employees and incurring expenses without the 
usual formalities. 

On the morning of March 22 I informed General 
Chaffee that four cases of cholera had occurred in Manila, 
and requested that an adequate military force be de- 
spatched to the valley of the Mariquina River to protect 
the city water supply from possible contamination. 


This request was promptly acceded to, and the guard 
thereafter maintained proved adequate to prevent infec- 
tion of the city water, although there are three towns on 
the river above the intake, and it was the custom of their 
people to bathe and wash their clothing in this stream. 
Many of the filthy surface wells of the city were filled as 
rapidly as possible, and those that could not be filled were 

The people, entirely unaccustomed as they were to 
any sanitary restrictions, believing that the disease was 
not cholera, and firm in their conviction that they had a 
right to do whatever they liked so long as they kept on 
their own premises, bitterly resented the burning or dis- 
infection of their houses and effects, and the restriction 
of their liberty to go and come as they pleased, and in 
spite of the fact that the number of cases was kept down 
in a manner never before dreamed of at Manila, there 
arose an increasingly bitter feeling of hostility toward the 
work of the board of health. In fact, the very success 
of the campaign proved an obstacle, and we were assured 
that the disease could not be cholera, as, if it were, there 
would be a thousand deaths a day ! 

An educational campaign was immediately begun, and 
simple directions for avoiding infection were published 
and scattered broadcast. Distilled water was furnished 
gratis to all who would drink it, stations for its distribu- 
tion being established through the city and supplemented 
by large water wagons driven through the streets. The 
sale of foods likely to convey the disease was prohibited. 
Large numbers of emergency sanitary inspectors were 
immediately appointed, and every effort was made to 
detect all cases as soon as possible. A land quarantine 
was established around the city, to protect the provinces. 

In anticipation of a possible extensive outbreak of con- 
tagious disease a detention camp capable of accommo- 
dating some twenty-five hundred people had been 
established previously on the San Lazaro grounds, and to 


this place were taken the cholera ''contacts." A cholera 
hospital was opened near this camp, and the stricken were 
removed to it from their homes as speedily as possible, 
the buildings which they had occupied being thoroughly 
disinfected, or burned if disinfection was impracticable. 

The bodies of the dead were at the outset either buried 
in hermetically sealed coffins or cremated. When the 
detention camp and hospital at San Lazaro threatened 
to become crowded, a second camp and hospital were 
established at Santa Mesa. At this latter place both 
"contacts" and the sick were obliged to live in tents. 

The Spanish residents were allowed to establish a 
private cholera hospital in a large and well-ventilated 
convento on Calle Herran. As the number of sick Span- 
iards was nothing like sufficient to fill this building, they 
were asked to turn over the unoccupied space in it to the 
board of health, which they most generously did. 

In response to popular clamour a hospital under strictly 
Filipino management was opened in a nipa building in 
Tondo. Interest in it soon flagged, and the government 
found itself with this institution on its hands. 

The epidemic came soon after the close of a long-con- 
tinued war, and there were at that time in Manila not a 
few evil-intentioned persons, both foreign and native, 
who welcomed every opportunity to make trouble. The 
difficulties arising from the claim advanced by a number 
of reputable but ignorant medical men that the disease 
was not cholera at all were sufficiently great. They were 
enormously increased by false and malicious stories to 
the effect that "contacts" were killed at the detention 
camp ; that patients on arrival at the cholera hospital 
were given a drink of poisoned vino ^ and instantly dropped 
dead ; that the distilled water distributed free of charge 
was poisoned, and that the Americans were poisoning the 

1 A strong alcoholic drink commonly made by diluting low-grade 
alcohol with water and flavouring it. 


The necessary use of strychnine as a heart stimulant 
at the cholera hospital was made the basis for a story 
that the sick were being poisoned with this drug. 

These silly tales were widely circulated and quite 
generally believed, and as a result of the fear thus en- 
gendered, and of the desire on the part of relatives and 
neighbours of stricken persons to escape disinfection and 
quarantine, strong efforts were often made to conceal the 
sick and the dead, and when this was not possible the 
''contacts" usually ran away. There were not wanting 
instances of the driving of cholera victims into the streets. 

In spite of the generally hostile attitude of the public 
and some grave mistakes in poUcy, the measures adopted 
sufficed at the outset to hold the disease in check to an 
extent which surprised even the health officers themselves. 

On May 15 there began a rapid and quite steady de- 
cline in the number of cases. 

In June, however, it increased. During July it grew 
steadily larger, and on the 25th of that month there were 
ninety-one cases, the largest number which has ever oc- 
curred in Manila on any day since the American occu- 

Throughout the early months of the epidemic Major 
Maus had laboured unceasingly to check it, displaying 
an energy and an indifference to fatigue and personal 
discomfort which were highly commendable. The long- 
continued strain ultimately began to tell on him severely. 
On May 17 orders were received from the Adjutant- 
General's Office providing for his relief on or about July 30, 
and stating that Major E. C. Carter, of the United States 
Army Medical Corps, would be available for detail as 
commissioner of public health on that date, if his services 
were desired.' Arrangements were accordingly made to 
have Major Carter proceed to the Philippines. Major 
Maus's resignation was accepted, effective July 31. Dr. 
Frank S. Bourns was urged to take temporary charge of 
the situation, and consented to do so. 

VOL. I — 2e 


On the 8th of August Major Carter arrived and an- 
nounced his readiness to assume his duties, but it was 
suggested to him that he ought first to have some time 
to famiharize himself with them, and Dr. Bourns was left 
free to carry out the special work for which he had been 

This he did with promptness and despatch, the number 
of cases for August being but seven hundred twenty as 
against thirteen hundred sixty-eight for the previous 
month. On the 8th of September, having brought the 
disease under control at Manila, he insisted on resigning 
in order to attend to his private affairs, which were 
suffering from neglect, and his resignation was reluctantly 

Dr. Bourns's remarkable success in dealing with a very 
difficult situation was largely due to his ability to devise 
measures which, while thoroughly effective, were less 
irritating to the public than were those which had been 
previously employed. 

The policy which he had inaugurated was followed by 
his successor with the result that the cases fell to two 
hundred seventy-five in September and eighty-eight in 
October. In November there was a slight recrudescence, 
but the disease did not again threaten to escape control 
and in February practically disappeared, there being but 
two cases during the entire month. 

The return of hot, damp weather again produced a 
slight recrudescence, and scattering cases continued to 
occur until March, when the epidemic of 1902-1904 
ended in Manila. 

In view of the conditions which then prevailed and of 
the extreme risk of a general infection of the city water 
supply, which, had it occurred, would doubtless have re- 
sulted in the death of a third of the population, this is a j 
record of which the Bureau of Health may well be proud. 

The effort to prevent the spread of infection by main- 
taining a land quarantine around Manila proved entirely 







. to 

k: ;> i* 

Ch -i I 

P o g 

M o 

• -» .^ 


















ineffective. The disease promptly appeared in the prov- 
inces where the campaign against it was from the outset 
in charge of newly appointed Filipino presidents of pro- 
vincial boards of health, aided, when practicable, by 
medical inspectors from Manila. 

Before it was finally checked in Manila there were 
5581 cases with 4386 deaths ; while in the provinces, in 
many of which it necessarily long ran its course prac- 
tically unhindered, there were 160,671 cases, with 105,075 

On the 27th of April, 1904, the Board of Health passed 
the follomng resolutions : — 

" Whereas cases of Asiatic cholera have occurred in but three 
provincial to^ms of the Philippine Islands since February 8, 
1904; and 

" Whereas only one case of Asiatic cholera has been reported 
as occurring any place in the Philippine Islands since March 8, 
1904; and 

"Whereas the city of Manila was declared on March 23 to 
be free from the infection of Asiatic cholera ; On motion 

" Resolved, That the islands composing the Philippine Archi- 
pelago are, and are hereby declared to be, free from the infection 
of Asiatic cholera ; and 

'^ Beit further resolved, That the Commissioner of Public Health 
be directed to send a copy of these resolutions to the honourable 
the Secretary of the Interior, the Municipal Board, the United 
States Marine-Hospital Service, and the Collector of Customs." 

As a matter of fact, however, it later proved that cholera 
was endemic in certain swampy regions near Manila, 
and in 1905 we found ourselves with a new epidemic on 
our hands. 

At the end of the second week, beginning August 23, 
there had been one hundred thirty-seven cases, as com- 
pared with one hundred twenty-five for the same period 
during the epidemic of 1902-1904. 

However, the conditions for combating cholera were 
now far more favourable than in 1902. Major E. C. 
Carter had at his own request been relieved from duty as 


commissioner of public health, and Dr. Victor G. Heiser, 
passed assistant surgeon of the United States public 
health and marine hospital service, had been appointed 
to succeed him on April 5, 1905. Dr. Heiser was a highly 
trained officer of one of the most efficient services which 
has ever been organized for the combating of contagious 
and infectious diseases. 

He had under him in the city of Manila a small but 
thoroughly trained body of twenty-four medical inspec- 
tors, of whom nineteen were Americans and five Filipi- 
nos. Profiting by his previous experience and that of 
his predecessors in the Philippine service, he inaugurated 
a campaign which practically terminated the epidemic 
in Manila on February 21, 1906,^ with a total of two 
hundred eighty-three cases and two hundred forty-three 

This brief and decisive campaign reflects the greatest 
credit on all concerned with it. 

The board of health had one great advantage in the 
fact that the San Lazaro contagious disease hospital had 
been completed. This building, with its cool wards and 
attractive surroundings, made it possible to give cholera 
victims the best of care. 

There was at the outset little or no fear of this hospital, 
but apparently this condition of things was not satis- 
factory to that small but dangerous element of the 
Manila public which from the time of the American occu- 
pation has never let pass any opportunity to make trouble. 
As usual, the medium of attack was the local press. 
Soberania Nacional published a most extraordinary 
article painting in vivid colours the alleged horrors of the 
San Lazaro Hospital, and stating among other things that 
the naked bodies of the dead, tagged and with their feet 
tied together, lay about the entrance of that institution. 
A more false statement was never published. 

Within twenty-four hours after its appearance terror 

^ There was one stray case in March. 


reigned among the lower classes, and living and dead 
cholera victims were being smuggled out of the city to 
neighbouring towns. 

Feeling that the vicious attitude of a certain section of 
the press had cost lives enough, I sent the editor of this 
paper a courteous invitation to call at my office. He 
made no response. I then wrote him, demanding a re- 
traction, and sending him a correct statement to publish.^ 

He was at first disposed to argue the matter, but 
finding that I meant business published the article which 
I sent to him and made the following retraction : — 

* "To THE Editor of El Soberania Nacional, Manila, P.I. 

" Sir : In your issue of the 7th of July there appeared a paragraph 
embodying a shameful libel of the administration of the San Lazaro 
Hospital, which reads as follows : 

'"{/n cuadro verdaderamenle aterrador es el que presenta el patio del 
Hospital de San Lazaro. Los fallecidos por la enfermedad del colera, 
son expuestos desnudos en el atrio de dicho Hospital con un cartel atado 
en los pies con la inscripcion de sus respectivos nombres.' 

"This statement was so grossly and ridiculously false and at the 
same time so extremely harmful in its effect as to bring you fairly and 
squarely within the reach of the law. 

"Yesterday morning I sent you a courteous letter requesting you 
to come to my office, purposing to discuss the affair with you in a 
friendly manner, and hoping to find that the statement referred to 
had been prepared by some irresponsible subordinate and published 
through oversight. 

"As, however, you have neither acceded to my request for a con- 
ference nor had the courtesy to reply to my letter, I now have the 
honour to forward you herewith a communication which embodies a 
reply to the false statement above referred to and at the same time 
conveys information as to what is actually being done at the San 
Lazaro Hospital. I request that you give this letter immediate pub- 
licity tlu-ough your paper, and in the editorial columns or elsewhere in 
some conspicuous place retract immediately and fully the libellous 
statement relative to the exposure of the dead, above referred to. 

"Kindly advise me of your intention in the matter. The bearer 
of this communication has instructions to wait for j^our reply. I shall 
interpret failure to hear from j'ou by return messenger as refusal to re- 
tract this slander and to publish the enclosed communication, and 
shall act accordingly. 

"Very respectfully, 

"Dean C. Worcester, 
"Secretary of the Interior." 


" We are exceedingly glad to affirm in the honour of truth and 
justice, that the news given by us on the seventh instant under 
the title 'Painful Scenes,' and 'Naked Dead,' is absolutely 
absurd, false and unreasonable. 

" We have investigated the truth of the said notice, and can 
affirm to our readers that it is entirely inaccurate, as in the court- 
yard of the said hospital the naked dead that we have spoken 
of are not now exposed, nor have they ever been so exposed. 

" The truth is above all things, and to rectify a baseless piece 
of news should not be a doubtful action on the part of the person 
who gave the news, but rather something in his favour that the 
public should appreciate it at its full value. 

" To conclude, we must record our gratitude to the Secretary 
of the Interior, the Hon. Dean C. Worcester, for the inves- 
tigations made in the premises with the purpose of ascertaining 
the truth of the alleged facts, and for the courteous way in 
which he received us this morning when interviewed by one of 
our reporters." 

In the provinces the results of the campaign against 
cholera were far less satisfactory than in Manila as was 
to be anticipated, owing to lack of adequate personnel, 
but the cases, which numbered 34,238 and deaths which 
numbered 22,938, were far fewer than during the previous 

I shall not attempt here to trace the course of the sub- 
sequent epidemics which have occurred from time to 
time, but shall content myself with giving the deaths 
by years. In 1908, they numbered 18,811; in 1909, 
7306; in 1910, 6940; in 1911, 203. In 1912, there were 
none, and thus far in 1913 there have been none.^ 

The superstitious practices which were formerly em- 
ployed by the Filipinos to combat this scourge have given 
way to simple and inexpensive hygienic measures, and we 
can safely count on sufficient cooperation from the people 
to make an effective campaign possible when it next ap- 

Never shall I forget the strain of the early days of the 
first epidemic. Two of my best men, Dr. Meacham and 

1 Just before I left Manila in October, 1913, cholera reappeared there. 


Mr. Mudge, literally worked themselves to death, remain- 
ing on duty when they knew that they were in imminent 
danger, and in the end laying down their lives willingly 
for an alien and hostile people. Such things make one 
proud of being an American. 

At times the situation was not devoid of amusing 
features. I had occasion to visit one of the northern 
provinces, where the epidemic was especially severe, in 
an effort to calm the panic-stricken populace. I stayed 
with the governor, a very intelligent Filipino. For 
obvious reasons I investigated his domestic arrangements, 
finding that he was boiling drinking water, thoroughly 
cooking all food, and taking all usual and necessary pre- 
cautions to prevent infection. 

On returning to his house the first evening, after a short 
absence, I found the grounds decorated with lighted 
Japanese lanterns. Supposing that the proverbial Filipino 
hospitality had risen above even such untoward circum- 
stances as those which then existed, I asked the governor 
what the entertainment was to be. In evident perplexity 
he replied that he had not planned to have any enter- 
tainment, and on my inquiring what the lanterns were 
for, said he had heard that they were good to keep away 
cholera germs ! 

I have referred to the fact that the civil government 
inherited a fairly well developed epidemic of bubonic 
plague. In 1901 this disease caused four hundred twenty- 
seven deaths, in 1902 it caused ten only, but the demands 
made on the sanitary force by the cholera epidemic which 
began in that year rendered it impossible to give to plague 
the attention which it otherwise would have had, with the 
result that in 1903 we had one hundred seventy-four 
deaths. In 1904 there were seventy-eight ; in 1905, forty- 
three ; in 1906, seven ; in 1907, none ; and from 1907 until 
1912, none. In the latter year the disease was reintroduced. 

Rats become infected with it, and fleas transmit it 
from them to human beings. It was probably brought 


in by pestiferous rodents hidden inside packages of 
vegetables, as it appeared in a district where crates 
of vegetables are opened in large numbers, and did 
not appear in the vicinity of the piers, although shore 
rats are abundant there, and if diseased rodents had 
landed from shipping, would promptly have become in- 
fected, — a thing which did not occur. 

At about the same time plague also appeared at Iloilo, 
where it was eradicated with a total of nine deaths. At 
Manila there have been up to the present time ^ fifty-nine 
deaths, and scattering cases continue to occur at con- 
siderable intervals. 

Had plague not been promptly and effectively com- 
bated, it would unquestionably have spread rapidly, 
causing untold misery and heavy property losses. 

As I have previously stated, at the time of the Ameri- 
can occupation smallpox was by many people regarded 
as an almost inevitable ailment of childhood. It proved 
necessary to secure the passage of legislation forbidding 
the inoculation of human beings with it to prevent mis- 
guided Filipinos from deliberately communicating it to 
their children, not because they did not dearly love them, 
but because they regarded infection with it as a calamity 
sure to come sooner or later, and desired to have it over 
with once for all. 

We have performed more than ten million vaccinations, 
with the result that the annual deaths from this disease 
have decreased from forty thousand at the outset to seven 
himdred for the year just ended. There is now less small- 
pox in Manila than in Washington. 

In the six provinces nearest Manila it was killing, on 
the average, six thousand persons annually. For a year 
after we finished vaccinating the inhabitants of these 
provinces it did not cause a death among them ; nor has 
it since caused such a death except among new-born 
children or newly arrived unvaccinated persons. 

1 Sept. 15, 1913. 


These extraordinary results have been achieved with- 
out the loss of a life or a limb so far as we know. The 
vaccine used was prepared by our own Bureau of Science 
with extraordinary care, and has proved to be remarkably 
pure and active. 

We at first endeavoured to have vaccinations performed 
by local Filipino health officers, but, after spending large 
sums without obtaining satisfactory results, gave up this 
plan and substituted therefor a method of procedure by 
which the work was carried on under the very immediate 
supervision of the director of health. We then made sub- 
stantial progress. However, under the law as it at present 
stands, succeeding annual vaccination, intended to insure 
the immunization of children soon after they are born and 
of unvaccinated persons who may come into a given terri- 
tory, are intrusted to the local Filipino authorities, with 
the result that in very many cases they are not attended to. 
We get elaborate returns showing the number of persons 
vaccinated. Then comes an outbreak of smallpox, and 
on investigation we learn that the vaccinations so fully 
reported were made on paper only ! In other words, the 
continuance of this work, of such vital importance to the 
Filipino people, is still directly dependent upon continued 
control by American health officers. 

Another great problem now in a fair way to final solu- 
tion is the eradication of leprosy. At the outset we were 
told by the church authorities that there were thirty thou- 
sand lepers in the islands. In 1905 we began to isolate and 
care for all supposed victims of this disease, only to find 
that many outcasts believed to be suffering from it were 
really afflicted with curable ailments. We were able to 
restore a very large number of them to society, to their 
great joy and that of their friends. 

A few hundreds of true lepers were being humanely 
cared for in Manila and elsewhere. Many others had 
been driven out of the towTis into forests or waste places 
on the larger islands, where they were perishing miser- 


ably from fever and other diseases. Still others had been 
isolated on sand quays, where they were in danger of dying 
from thirst during the dry season. Not a few wandered 
through the towns at will, spreading the disease broad- 

All known lepers are now cared for at Culion, a healthful, 
sanitary town with good streets, excellent water and sewer 
systems, many modern concrete buildings and a first- 
class hospital. 

They are not confined to the limits of the town, but 
wander at will, except that they are excluded from the 
immediate vicinity of the houses of the officers and em- 
ployees of the colony. 

They may have their little farms, and raise pigs, 
chickens, vegetables, etc., if they wish. They may, and 
do, float about over the waters of the neighbouring bay 
in boats or on rafts, and fish to their hearts' content. 
They are well fed and well cared for, and their physical 
condition improves to a marked degree promptly after 
their arrival at the colony. The only hardship which 
they suffer is that necessarily involved in separation from 
their relatives and friends, and this is mitigated by occa- 
sional visits which the latter may make them. 

Since we began to isolate lepers, their number has de- 
creased to approximately three thousand, and with a con- 
tinuance of the present policy the disease should soon 
disappear from the Philippines. 

During the period immediately subsequent to the 
American occupation, amoebic dysentery wrought sad 
havoc both among our soldiers and among civil govern- 
ment officers and employees. Four of my own family 
of five had it, and one had it twice, in spite of the fact 
that we took all known precautions ; and the experience 
of my family was by no means exceptional. This dis- 
ease then annually cost the lives of a large number of 
American men and women, and a considerable additional 
number went home invalids for life as a result of infection 















with it. We seemed to hear almost daily of some new 

Careful scientific investigation carried on at the bureau 
of science taught us the best methods of combating this 
type of dysentery, and the proper disposal of human feces, 
the regulation of methods used in fertilizing vegetables, 
improvement in supplies of drinking water, and other 
simple, hygienic measures have reduced the deaths from 
it among Americans to an almost negligible minimum. 
Such cases as occur are almost without exception detected 
early, and readily yield to treatment. 

The belief that Filipinos do not suffer from this disease 
has proved to be without foundation. It kills thou- 
sands of them every year. Those w^ho are willing to 
adopt the simple precautions which experience has shown 
to be necessary may enjoy the large degree of immunity 
from it which Americans now have. 

The chief cause of amoebic dysentery in the Philippines 
has undoubtedly been infected drinldng w^ater. From 
time immemorial the people have been obtaining their 
water for drinking purposes from flowing streams, open 
springs or shallow surface wells. 

The wells were especially dangerous, as it was the 
common custom to w^ash clothing around them so that 
water containing disease germs frequently seeped into 
wells used by whole villages. The results of such con- 
ditions during a cholera epidemic can readily be imagined. 

The drinking supplies of many provincial towns have 
now been radically improved by the sinking of 853 suc- 
cessful artesian wells. 

In many places there has been a resulting reduction of 
more than fifty per cent in the annual death rate. Large 
sums are spent yearly by the government in drilling 
additional wells, — a policy which is warmly approved by 
the common people. The recent appropriations for this 
purpose have been $255,000 for the fiscal year 1912, 
$60,000 for 1913 and $200,000 for 1914. 


When we came to the islands, malaria was killing as 
many persons as was smallpox. The mortality caused by 
it is now being greatly reduced by giving away annually 
millions of doses of quinine, and by draining or spraying 
with petroleum places where mosquitoes breed, as well as 
by teaching the people the importance of sleeping under 
mosquito nets and the necessity of keeping patients 
suffering from active attacks of malaria where mosquitoes 
cannot get at them. Only quinine of established quality 
is allowed in the market. 

The results obtained in combating malaria are often 
very striking. Calapan, the capital of Mindoro, was in 
Spanish days known as ''the white man's grave" on 
account of the prevalence of ''pernicious fever" there. 
To-day it is an exceptionally healthy provincial town. 

At Iwahig, in Palawan, the Spaniards attempted to 
conduct a penal colony. They were compelled to abandon 
it on account of pernicious malaria, which caused con- 
tinued serious mortality when the American government 
attempted to establish a similar institution there. Appli- 
cation of the usual sanitary measures has made it a 
healthful place. 

Old jails throughout the islands have been rendered 
sanitary, or replaced by new ones. The loathsome skin 
diseases from which prisoners formerly suffered have in 
consequence disappeared. The practical results obtained 
in Bilibid, the insular penitentiary, are worthy of special 
note. The annual death rate at this institution was 
78.25 per thousand for the calendar year 1904. It in- 
creased steadily each month from January, 1904, to Sep- 
tember, 1905, when it reached its maximum, deaths 
occurring at the rate of 241.15 per thousand per year. 
At this time the director of health was given charge of 
the sanitation of this prison. 

By remedying overcrowding, improving drainage, in- 
stalling sewers and regulating diet along scientific lines, 
the rate was reduced in six months to 70 per 1000, and there 
it stuck. 


A systematic examination of the stools of prisoners was 
then made. Eighty-four per cent were found to be afflicted 
with at least one intestinal parasite. Fifty per cent had two 
or more, and twenty per cent had three or more. Fifty-two 
per cent of the total had hookworm. Active treatment for 
the elimination of these parasites was begun in one barrack, 
and after the work was completed it was noted that there 
was much less disease there than in the remainder. All of 
the thirty-five hundred prisoners were ultimately examined, 
and intestinal parasites eradicated if present. The death 
rate then dropped to thirteen to the thousand, and has 
remained at or near this figure up to the present time. 

I have already referred to the discovery of the cause of 
beri-beri, and to the effect of the governor-general's order 
forbidding the use of polished rice in government institu- 
tions or by government organizations. 

I subsequently made a strong effort to secure legislation 
imposing a heavy internal revenue tax on polished rice, 
thus penalizing its use. I failed, but such effort will be 
renewed by some one, let us hope with ultimate success. 

In Spanish days cholera, leprosy, smallpox and other 
dangerous communicable diseases were constantly rein- 
troduced from without. This is no longer the case. The 
United States public health and marine hospital ser- 
vice has stretched an effective defensive line around the 
archipelago and has sent its outposts to Hongkong, 
Shanghai and Amoj'', to prevent, so far as possible, the 
embarkation for Manila of persons suffering from such 
ailments. We now have the most effective quarantine 
system in the tropics, and one of the best in the world. 
At Mariveles there is a very large and complete disin- 
fecting plant, and vessels may also be satisfactorily dis- 
infected at Cebu and Iloilo. 

This quarantine service kept the Philippines free from 
bubonic plague for seven years, and has repeatedly pre- 
vented the entry of pneumonic plague, that most deadly 
of all known diseases. 


A peculiar and shockingly disfiguring disease known as 
yaws occurs somewhat infrequently in the Philippine low- 
lands and is very prevalent in a number of places in the 
highlands. In many ways it resembles syphilis, and in- 
deed at one time was considered to be syphilitic in its 
origin. Doctor Richard P. Strong, of the Bureau of 
Science, made the very important discovery that sal- 
varsan is an absolute specific for it. The effect of an 
injection of this remedy closely approaches a miracle in 
medicine. In five or six days the condition of the patient 
begins to improve rapidly. By the end of the second 
week his horrible sores have healed. 

It was with this remedy that we began our health work 
among some of the wilder head-hunters of northern 
Luzon. Think of the advantage of being absolutely cer- 
tain of curing such an ailment in every case, and think 
of the gratitude of poor wretches, undergoing untold 
suffering, when they were almost immediately relieved ! 

Soon after this use for salvarsan was discovered, I 
caused a liberal supply of it to be sent to the Bontoc 
Hospital. For some time we were unable to persuade 
any victims of yaws to undergo treatment, but finally we 
found one at Barlig who was guilty of a minor criminal 
offence, arrested him, and took him to Bontoc. Instead 
of putting him in jail there, we sent him to the hospital 
for treatment. 

At first he complained bitterly that we were putting 
no medicine on his sores. Then the remedy began to 
work and he decided it was "strong medicine." By the 
tenth day he was running around town joyfully exhibit- 
ing his rapidly healing body to every one who would look 
at it. On the fourteenth day he suddenly disappeared, 
to the deep regret of the medical men, who had hoped 
that they might keep him as an example of what could 
be done, and thus persuade others to undergo treatment. 
A few days later, however, he reappeared with thirteen 
victims of yaws from his home town, having meanwhile 


twice covered on foot the great distance which separates 
BarHg from Bontoc, and assembled and brought in his 

As we have seen, the people of Manila were formerly 
supplied with impure drinking water from the Mariquina 
River, and were therefore in constant danger of infection 
with cholera and other deadly diseases. At a cost of some 
$1,500,000 we have given the city a modern water 
system, the intake of which is far up in the hills above 
the last village. The annual deaths from ordinary water- 
borne diseases exclusive of cholera have fallen from 3558 
— the average number at the time the new system was 
introduced — to 1195. Recently a leak in the dam, which 
necessitated temporary resumption of the use of the Mari- 
quina River water, was immediately followed by a marked 
increase in the number of deaths from such diseases, 
thus conclusively demonstrating the fact that we were 
right in ascribing the previous reduction in deaths to a 
better water supply. 

This annual saving of lives is an important result, but 
more important yet is the fact that when Asiatic cholera 
reappears in the Mariquina valley, as it inevitably will 
sooner or later, we shall not live in constant fear of a 
general infection of the Manila water supply, which, judg- 
ing from the experience of other cities where modern 
sanitary methods have been introduced, might result in 
the death of a third of the population. In every country 
a very considerable part of the population always fails to 
boil its drinking water, no matter how great the resulting 
danger may be. 

Manila lacked any facilities for the proper disposal of 
human waste, and the conditions which resulted were un- 
speakable, especially in the little bmrios, or groups of 
houses, placed close together, helter-skelter, on wet, 
swampy ground and reached by means of runways not 
worthy even of the name of alleys, as one often had to 
crouch to pass along them. 


A modern sewer system costing S2, 000,000, sup- 
plemented by a pail system, has very effectively solved 
this problem, while thousands of homes closely crowded 
on disease-infected, mosquito-breeding ground have been 
removed to high, dry, sanitary sites. The regions thus 
vacated have in many instances been drained, filled, pro- 
vided with city water and good streets, and made fit for 
human occupancy. 

The old moat around the city walls w^as a veritable 
incubator of disease. It has been converted into an 
athletic field where crowds of people take healthful exer- 
cise. The esteros, or tidal creeks, reeked wdth filth. 
More than twenty miles of such creeks have been cleaned 
out, although much still remains to be done to put them 
in really satisfactoiy condition. 

There were no regulations covering the construction 
of buildings, and it was not unusual to find six or eight 
persons sleeping in a closed and unventilated room 
10 X 8 X 8 feet. Manila now has an excellent sanitary 
code, and such conditions have been made unlawful. 

The previous woeful lack of hospital facilities has been 
effectively remedied. At a cost of approximately a mil- 
lion and quarter pesos we have built and equipped the 
great Philippine General Hospital, one of the most modern 
institutions of its kind in the world, and by far the best 
in the Far East. In it we have very satisfactorily solved 
the question of getting sufficient light and air in the 
tropics without getting excessive heat. Its buildings are 
certainly among the very coolest in the city of Manila, 
and ''the hospital smell" is everyw^here conspicuously 

It is called a three-hundred-bed institution, but as a 
matter of fact the ventilation is so admirable that nearly 
two hundred additional beds can safely be put in as an 
emergency measure. 

Two hundred and twenty of its beds are free. In 
them a very large number of persons are annually given 


the best of medical and surgical care. At its free 
clinic some eighty thousand patients find relief in the 
course of a year. 

The increase in private hospital facilities has also been 
noteworthy. Among the new institutions doing admir- 
able work should be mentioned the University Hospital, 
an Episcopal institution ; the Mary J. Johnston Hospital, 
a Methodist institution ; and St. Paul's Hospital, a 
Catholic institution. Patients are admitted to all of 
them without regard to their rehgious belief, a policy the 
liberality of which must commend itself to all broad- 
minded persons. 

In enumerating the hospitals of Manila, the old Spanish 
institution, San Juan de Dios, should not be forgotten, for 
it has been improved and modernized until it offers 
good facilities for the treatment of the sick and the 

All of the above mentioned institutions are in effect 
acute-case hospitals designed for the treatment of curable 
ailments. Cases of dangerous communicable disease are 
excluded from them, but are adequately provided for at 
San Lazaro where the insular government has established 
modern and adequate hospitals for plague, smallpox, 
cholera, diphtheria, scarlet fever, measles, etc., as well as 
a detention hospital for lepers, pending their departure 
for Culion. 

An insane hospital capable of comfortably accommo- 
dating 300 inmates has also been provided. A few years 
since the insane were commonly chained to floors, or tied 
to stakes under houses or in yards, and were not infre- 
quently burned alive during conflagrations. Such condi- 
tions no longer exist, but the government is not yet able 
to provide for nearly all of the insane who need institu- 
tional care. 

The several institutions above mentioned have a very 
important function apart from the relief of human suffer- 
ing, in that they afford unexcelled opportunities for giving 

VOL. I — 2 P 


practical instruction in nursing and in the practice of 
medicine and surgery. 

A few years ago there was not such a thing as a Fih- 
pina trained nurse in the islands. I was firmly convinced 
that the Filipinas of this country could learn to be good 
nurses, and made earnest efforts to have included among 
the first students sent at government expense to the 
United States several young women of good family who 
should attend nurses' training schools and then return 
to assist in our hospital work. 

I failed to secure the adoption of this plan, but later the 
training of nurses was inaugurated in connection with 
hospital work at the old Civil Hospital, St. Paul's, the 
University Hospital, the Mary J. Johnston Hospital and 
the Philippine General Hospital. At the latter institu- 
tion there is now conducted an admirable school where 
more than two hundred young men and women are being 
trained. Three classes have already graduated from it, 
and Filipina nurses have long since proved themselves to 
be exceptionally efficient, capable and faithful. It will 
be some time before we can educate as many as are 
needed in the government hospitals, and after that has 
been accomplished a vast field opens before others in the 
provincial towns, where the need of trained assistants in 
caring for the sick is very great. 

We found exceedingly few competent Fihpino physicians 
or surgeons in the islands. This condition was due not 
to natural incompetence on the part of the Filipinos but 
to the previous lack of adequate educational facilities. 
The government has estabhshed a thoroughly modern 
college of medicine and surgery, well housed, and pro- 
vided with all necessary laboratory facilities. It furnishes 
the best of theoretical instruction, while its students have 
every opportunity for practical work at the bedsides of 
patients in the government hospitals, all patients in free 
beds being admitted subject to the condition that they 
will allow their cases to be studied. 




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While there is still an evident tendency on the part of 
graduates of this school to feel that they know enough, 
and to desire to get to making money without delay, we 
are nevertheless managing to attract an increasingly large 
number of the more competent to the intern service of 
the Philippine General Hospital, where as the result of 
additional years of practical experience they become ex- 
ceptionally proficient. 

This institution, with its great free clinic, offers very 
exceptional facilities for practical instruction, and we 
have already trained some extremely competent Filipino 
physicians and surgeons. 

As funds permit, hospital work is being extended to 
the provinces. At Cebii a thoroughly up-to-date sixty- 
bed institution is now open. A smaller one was estab- 
lished years ago at Baguio, where surgical work may be 
performed with great advantage on account of the rapidity 
with which convalescence occurs in the cool, pure moun- 
tain air, which also expedites the recovery of persons re- 
cuperating from wasting diseases. 

A little more than a year ago a hospital was opened at 
Bontoc, the demand for accommodations being so great 
from the start that we did not even await the arrival of 
beds. Sick Igorots were only too glad to lie on the floor 
if their needs could be ministered to. 

It had previously been the custom of the wild men to 
kill chickens, pigs or carabaos in case of illness, in order 
to propitiate evil spirits, the kind and number of animals 
killed being of course determined by the wealth of the 
patients. They have now satisfied themselves that 
quinine for malaria, salvarsan for yaws, and other effective 
remedies for common ailments are more useful and more 
readily obtained than was the helpful intervention of the 
anitos, or spirits of the dead, while the methods and re- 
sults of modern surgery are a source of unending amaze- 
ment and satisfaction to them. 

The first surgeon to anaesthetize a Kalinga became 


promptly and widely known as ''the man who kills people 
and brings them to life again," and the individual on 
whom he operated successfully, who chanced to be the 
most influential chief of the tribe, became his friend for 
life. Indeed, the results of medical and surgical work 
for the wild men have been an important factor in bring- 
ing about and maintaining friendly relations with them. 

Their gratitude is at times very touching. At Atok, 
in Benguet, there lives an Igorot chief named Palasi. 
When he was already old a son was born to him. This 
boy, who was the delight of his declining years, became 
deathly ill with confluent smallpox, and the Igorots con- 
sidered him as good as dead. At this time Sanitary 
Inspector Baron appeared on the scene. He promptly 
turned every one else out of the house and himself nursed 
the boy, saving his life. Palasi wished to pay him for 
his services, but was informed by Mr. Baron that the 
government paid him, and he could not accept additional 
compensation. Palasi promptly made the long journey 
to Baguio to ascertain whether Baron had told him the 
truth, and was informed by Governor Pack that this was 
the case. The old man retired to Atok, quite disgusted 
with the strange ways of Americans. 

Six months later he again appeared at Baguio to ask 
the governor about a fiesta which he had just heard it 
was customary to celebrate on the 25th of December. 
He had been told that Americans were in the habit of 
giving presents to each other at this time, and asked if 
this was the case. Governor Pack said yes. Palasi then 
inquired if the feast was a good feast, and the custom a 
good custom, and was assured that both of these things 
were true. He next asked if it would be a good feast for 
Igorots as well as for Americans, and receiving an affirma- 
tive reply from the unsuspecting governor, triumphantly 
declared that he was going to give Baron his best horse. 
Under the circumstances the governor allowed him to 
do so. 


In connection with the Bontoc Hospital we use two 
men, one of whom travels from settlement to settlement, 
relieving minor ailments on the spot and sending to the 
hospital only those patients who need to go there, while 
the other stays at home and receives them. From time 
to time these two doctors "change works." Pages from 
their daily journals, \vritten in the field, often read like 

Were I a young man, and possessed of adequate knowl- 
edge of medicine and surgery, I would ask nothing better 
than to minister to the wants of these people. One might 
not, and indeed would not, acquire great wealth, but he 
would be rich in friends. Here lies a great field for 
practical missionary work. 

In connection with the health work there have been 
many occurrences which were both amusing and sad. At 
one time there was great excitement over a sacred spring 
which had appeared in Manila Bay off the district of 
Tondo. It was duly blessed by Aglipay, the head of the 
so-called Aglipayano church. Coincidently with its dis- 
covery there was a sharp little outbreak of Asiatic cholera. 
Investigation revealed the fact that the "spring" had its 
origin in a broken sewer pipe. We were obUged to pre- 
vent the faithful from further partaking of its waters, 
and thus insuring themselves a speedy trip to the better 

At one time cases of cholera appeared scattered gen- 
erally throughout the Mariquina valley and without ap- 
parent connection. For some days we were unable to 
make a guess as to their origin. Then we heard that a 
"Queen" had arisen at the town of Taytay near the 
Laguna de Bay. An investigation of the Queen and her 
activities resulted in rather astonishing revelations. She 
was a very ordinary looking Tagdlog girl who had secured 
the body of an old bull-cart, stopped the cracks with clay, 
partially filled it with water and decaying vegetable 
matter, and at rather frequent intervals had bathed in 


the fermenting mass thus concocted. In due time she 
announced herself a healer of all the ills to which flesh is 
heir, and the sick flocked to her. Cholera was then preva- 
lent in some of the towns near Taytay, and there were 
persons suffering from it among those seeking reUef. 
Some of them were directed to wash their hands in the 
extemporized tank, while others bathed their bodies in 
it. As a result it soon contained a cholera culture of un- 
precedented richness. This was given to patients apply- 
ing for treatment, and was bottled and sent to those who 
were too ill to come in person. Hence numerous scatter- 
ing cases of cholera which did not bear any relationship 
to other known cases. 

It proved quite an undertaking to put the Queen of 
Taytay out of business. We first asked the local authori- 
ties to have her sent to Manila, but the presidente and the 
poUce declined to act. We then applied for a warrant 
to the Filipino judge of the court of first instance having 
jurisdiction over Taytay, but that worthy official found 
it convenient to be suddenly called out of the province. 
At last we prevailed upon soldiers of the Phihppine con- 
stabulary to arrest the queen and bring her to Manila. 

We had anticipated that she might prove insane, but 
she showed herself to be a very keen-witted young woman. 
We employed her at the San Lazaro Hospital to look after 
cholera patients. The people of Taytay were not satis- 
fied, and a few days later a large delegation of them came 
to Manila and demanded the Queen. I was at my wits' 
end to know what to do, but old Spanish law can usually 
be relied upon in emergencies, and the attorney-general 
discovered a provision couched in very general terms, 
which provided against disobedience to the authorities. 
It was only necessary for an ''authority" to have read 
to an ordinary person a statement setting forth what that 
person must not do ; then if the order was violated, such 
person could be made to suffer pains and penalties. 

I accordingly prepared a most impressive order pro- 


hibiting the Queen of Taytay from further engaging in the 
practice of medicine, had her followers drawn up in bat- 
tahon formation, placed myself at the front and centre, 
caused the Queen to be brought before me, and read her 
my communication, at the same time charging the good 
people of Taytay not to tempt her again to try her hand 
at heaUng, for the reason that if they did she would surely 
get into serious trouble. They marched away with the 
Queen and I have not heard of her since. 

Hardly a year goes by that some similar miraculous 
healer does not set up in business, and the supply of 
dupes seems to be unending. 

While it is comparatively easy to combat disease in a 
place hke Manila, what of the provinces, where in many 
cases there is not one physician to two hundred thousand 
inhabitants ? 

To meet this difficulty we have an organization of dis- 
trict and municipal health officers. A district may in- 
clude a single province or several provinces. A district 
health officer is invariably a physician who has had reason- 
ably thorough practical training in the work of pubUc 
sanitation, usually at Manila. 

He is supposed to spend his time in sanitary work 
rather than in treating sick individuals, but it is, of course, 
impossible for him always to refuse to treat such persons, 
and we encourage gratuitous work for the poor when it can 
be carried on without interfering too seriously with more 
important duties. 

Presidents of municipal boards of health may exercise 
jurisdiction over a single municipahty or over several. 
They are supposed to maintain good sanitary conditions 
in their respective towns, under the general supervision 
of district health officers, and to instruct their people in 
sanitary methods and their results, as well as to devote a 
certain amount of their time to the refief of the suffering 

On the whole it must be admitted that while this 


system has accomplished much, it has fallen far short of 
accomplishing what it should. 

Men like Dr. Arlington Pond of Cebii have wrought 
marvels, and have conclusively demonstrated the fact 
that it is not the system that is at fault. Of our thirteen 
district health officers, ten are Filipinos. They are, with 
few exceptions, letter-perfect. They know what they 
ought to do, but as a rule lack the initiative and the 
courage to do it. 

Recently after discovering exceptionally bad sanitary 
conditions in several towns of the province of Misamis, I 
demanded an explanation of the district health officer, an 
exceptionally well-educated and intelligent Filipino phy- 
sician. I found, as I had anticipated, that the sanitary 
regulations of his towns left little to be desired, but that 
they were absolutely ignored. 

I asked him what sense there was in paying his salary 
if he failed to remedy such conditions as I had discovered. 
He replied that if he were really going to compel people 
to clean up, it would be necessary to begin with the pro- 
vincial governor, whose premises were in a bad state. 
When I suggested that in my opinion the provincial 
governor would be the best possible man to begin with, 
the doctor evidently thought me crazy ! 

It is as yet impossible for the average intelligent Fili- 
pino to understand that the rich and the poor, the power- 
ful and the weak, should be treated alike. 

It often happens that a province asks for an American 
health officer, or a Fihpino demands the services of an 
American physician. My invariable procedure in such 
cases has been to request that the application be made in 
writing. For some mysterious reason the petitioners are 
seldom wilUng to go on record. 

A short time since we had a strong demand from 
Iloilo for an American district health officer. I made 
the usual suggestion and got a written request that there 
be sent to Iloilo a district health officer '' after the style 


of the district health officer of Cebu." If Dr. Pond's 
nationality may be considered a part of his style, then 
this was a request for an American, otherwise not ! 

With rather shocldng frequency, FiUpinos who must be 
examined for leprosy or some other dangerous communi- 
cable disease strongly insist that the examination be made 
by an American bacteriologist rather than by one of their 
own countrymen. 

In connection with recent election troubles two men 
were ^^Tongfully denounced as lepers. In several in- 
stances perfectly sound people have been thrust among 
lepers who were being taken on board steamer for transfer 
to Culion. This grievous wrong was committed by their 
enemies under cover of darkness, and in the confusion 
which attends the embarking of a number of people in a 
heavy sea. The reason why the services of Americans 
are often specially requested for diagnostic work is not 
far to seek ! 

It is a significant fact that our greatest success in estab- 
Hshing satisfactory provincial sanitary conditions has 
been achieved in certain of the "special government 
provinces," where the people are under the very direct 
control of American officials. 

There is not a regularly organized province in the 
Phihppines in which the towns are as clean as are those 
of Mindoro, where, until recently, we have never had a 
resident district health officer. 

I beheve that nowhere in the tropics can there be found 
native towns which are cleaner or more healthful than are 
those of Bukidnon, inhabited in some instances by people 
who have hterally been brought down out of the tree-tops 
wdthin the last two or three years. We have never had a 
resident health officer in this subprovince. 

I mention these facts not as an argument against 
health officers, but as a proof of what can be done without 
them by intelligent Americans vested with proper 


It has given me especial pleasure to see the fundamental 
change which has come about in public sentiment relative 
to medical, surgical and sanitary work. At the outset 
sanitary inspectors and vaccinators carried on their work 
at serious risk of personal violence. Indeed, several of 
them were killed. Incredible tales were believed by the 
populace, with the result that cholera victims sometimes 
had to be taken to the hospital by force. In later years 
it has been by no means unusual for them to come in 
voluntarily and request treatment. 

General hospitals were in the old days regarded as 
places where people so unfortunate as to have no homes 
to die in might go to end their days. It was almost im- 
possible to get any other class of persons into them. 

Now we constantly turn away deserving patients from 
the Philippine General Hospital because of lack of room. 
The common people are flocking to it in rapidly increas- 
ing numbers. We even have ''repeaters," and persons 
who drop in just to get a comfortable bed and a bath 
while waiting for an examination which will inevitably 
show that there is nothing wrong with them. 

Our difficulties were increased at the outset by the fact 
that many foreign medical men worldng in the Far East 
good-naturedly ridiculed our efforts to better conditions, 
claiming that in tropical colonies it was customary to 
take only such steps as would safeguard the health of 
European residents, and that it was really best to let the 
masses live as they would, since orientals were incapable 
of sanitary reform, and the attempt to bring it about in- 
volved a waste of effort that might be more profitably 
directed elsewhere. Furthermore these men were, in their 
several countries, practising what they preached. 

It has been very interesting to note the reaction of 
American methods upon those previously in vogue in 
neighbouring colonies. At first our efforts to make 
Asiatics clean up, and to eliminate diseases like leprosy, 
cholera and plague, were viewed with mild amusement, 










not unmixed with contempt ; but the results which we 
obtained soon aroused lively interest. 

Foreign governments began to send representatives to 
the annual meetings of the " Philippine Island Medical 
Association," ^ in order to learn more of our methods. 
From these small beginnings sprang "The Far Eastern 
Association of Tropical Medicine/' the biennial meetings 
of which bring together the most experienced, skilful and 
widely known physicians and sanitarians in the East for 
an interchange of views and experiences which is invalu- 
able, and greatly facilitates concerted action between the 
various governments concerned in dealing with what may 
be termed ''international health problems." 

The first meeting of this Association was held at Manila, 
the second at Hongkong. The third will take place at 

The results of a rigid enforcement of the ''Pure Food 
and Drugs Act" are worthy of more than passing notice. 
Such enforcement has been comparatively easy as the 
officials concerned are not hampered by politics. The 
Philippines were at one time a dumping-ground for prod- 
ucts that could not be sold elsewhere, but it is now possi- 
ble for FiHpinos to obtain wholesome preserved foods and 
unadulterated drugs, except in very remote places where 
none of any sort are available. 

The cost of our medical and sanitary work has been 
comparatively small. The per capita rate of taxation 
here is lower than in any other civilized country. What 
we have done has been accomphshed without spending 
vast sums of money or resorting to military measures. 

The results obtained are very largely due to the 
faithfulness and efficiency of Dr. Victor G. Heiser, who 
was chief quarantine officer of the Philippines when he 
succeeded Major E. C. Carter as cormnissioner of pubhc 

' The first organization of American physicians in the Philippines 
was the Manila Medical Association, from which the Philippine Island 
Medical Association ultimately developed. 


health on April 5, 1905, and was later made director of 
health when the original board of health was abolished as 
an administrative entity. He has continued to hold the 
office of chief quarantine officer, and thus has been in 
complete executive control of the health situation for 
eight years. 

Through good report and ill, mostly ill, he has given 
unsparingly of his time, his skill and his wisdom, always 
treating the government money as if it were his own. 

His tenure of office has been long enough to enable 
him to inaugurate and carry out policies, and thus get 

Seldom, if ever, have health officials been more viciously 
and persistently attacked than have Dr. Heiser and myself. 
The assaults on us have been the direct result of a firm 
stand for a new sanitary order of things, established in 
the interest of the whole body of inhabitants of these 
islands, civilized and uncivilized. We both welcome 
the profound change in public sentiment, which has slowly 
but surely come about as a result of practical accom- 

Many very grave health problems still confront the 
insular administration. Of these the most serious are 
the eradication of tuberculosis and the reduction of the 
very high infant mortality rate. 

It is believed that about one Filipino in five suffers 
from tuberculosis in some form during his life and the 
work we have thus far accomplished in many fields must 
be considered as in a way a clearing of the decks for 
action against this, the greatest enemy of all. However, 
the Philippines do not differ essentially from other civilized 
countries, in all of which tuberculosis is a very serious 
factor in the death rate. 

As regards infant mortality the situation is different. 
More than fifty per cent of the babes die before completing 
their first year of life. The causes which lead to this 
appalling result have been made the subject of careful 


investigation which still continues. Popular interest has 
been aroused, but it is undoubtedly true that many years 
of patient work will be necessary before anything ap- 
proaching satisfactory results can be brought about. 

The physical condition of the average Filipino is un- 
doubtedly bad. Of one hundred seventy-eight university 
students recently examined sixty-nine were found to be 
suffering from serious organic troubles. Unquestionably 
the great mass of the people are underfed. This is largely 
due to the poor quality of the rice which they consume, and 
to the fact that rice forms too large a part of their diet. 
I am firmly convinced that much of the so-called laziness 
of the Filipinos is the direct result of physical weakness 
due to improper and insufficient food. 

Since the American occupation a large amount of time 
has been successfully devoted to the working out of a 
good all-around diet made up of local products the cost 
of which comes within the means of the poor. The next 
thing will be to get them to adopt it, and there comes the 
rub. Incalculable good would result, if we could only 
persuade the people of these islands to sleep with their 
windows open. Thousands upon thousands of infant 
lives would be saved annuall}^ if mothers could be per- 
suaded not to give sohd food to their Uttle ones during 
the early months of their existence. 

In the educational campaign which we have thus far 
conducted with some considerable degree of success, two 
agencies have proved invaluable, namely the Catholic 
Church and the public schools. Again and again I 
have begged Apostolic Delegate Monsignor Agius and 
Archbishop Harty to bring to bear the influence of the 
Church in favour of simple sanitary regulations, the 
general adoption of which was imperatively necessary in 
combating some epidemic of disease. They have in- 
variably given me invaluable assistance. 

Through the public schools we reach more than half a 
million children, and they take the information which we 


convey to them home to their parents. Simple rules for 
the prevention of cholera have been universally taught 
in the schools. When the use of English has become 
generalized the difficulty now encountered in reaching the 
common people will largely disappear. The truth is that 
they are singularly tractable and docile when their reason 
can be effectively appealed to. The readiness with which 
they have submitted to the rigorous measures necessary 
for the elimination of leprosy is a lasting honour to 

Would the sanitary campaign so vitally important to 
the people of the Philippines be effectively continued if 
American authority were withdrawn at this time ? With 
regret I must answer this question emphatically in the 
negative. We have succeeded in training a few good 
physicians and surgeons. We have thus far failed to 
train really efficient sanitary officers. What is lacking is 
not so much knowledge as to what should be done as 
initiative and courage to do it. Until this condition 
changes radically for the better, Filipinos cannot safely 
be intrusted with the sanitary regeneration of their coun- 
try. Under American control the population of the 
islands is steadily and rapidly increasing. It is my firm 
conviction that if Filipinos were at this time placed in 
control of the health work, the population would steadily 
and rapidly decrease. 

The present attitude of the Filipino press toward sani- 
tary work is both interesting and important. I quote 
the following editorial from the March 27, 1913, issue of 
El Ideal, a paper generally believed to be controlled by 
Speaker Osmeiia : — 

"Some persons, who, because of being ignorant of many 
things, do not sympathize with the Filipino people, who are in 
the habit of frequently throwing up to them the violent opposi- 
tion of our masses to strict sanitary measures in cases of epi- 
demics, and the lively protests which are provoked here on some 
occasions by other provisions tending to end some public calam- 

A Typical Negrito. 

The people of this tribe of woolly-headed blacks are believed to be the 
aboriprincs of the Philippines. Only about twenty-five thousand of them 


ity, thinking they see in this disposition of mind an indication 
of our incapacity to govern ourselves. . . . 

"To be more expressive, we shall say that the sanitary agents 
and veterinarians of the government, swollen with power and 
overly zealous of their prestige, quickly become, when an oc- 
casion like those cited by us presents itself, cunning czars, 
whose sphere of influence is in direct ratio to the peaceful 
character and ignorance of the people intrusted to their care, 
and whose excesses and abuses recognize no limits but the 
natural ones established by the greater or lesser honour of those 
public servants, their greater or lesser cynicism, and their 
greater or lesser degree of temerity. 

"This, and nothing else, is the logical and natural explanation 
of the hostility of our people toward those measures of good 
government which are sincerely esteemed for what they are 
worth, but for which they have veritable terror because of the 
nameless abuses to which they give rise. 

"These comments are of palpitating current interest at this 
moment, when reports are made almost daily to the press and 
the proper authorities of misbehaviour and excesses befitting 
soulless people who live without the law committed by persons 
who should be examples of prudence, honesty and good man- 
ners, for it is in this concept that the people are compelled to fur- 
nish them their daily bread." 

It is deeply to be regretted that the public press of the 
islands has not yet become sufficiently enhghtened to 
join in the great sanitary campaign which has already 
reheved an enormous amount of human suffering and has 
greatly increased the expectancy of life of the people of 
the Philippines. 

The Phihppine Assembly has repeatedly passed acts 
providing for the creation of a sort of sanitary council 
of numerous members authorized to pass on pubhc health 
measures proposed by the director of health and in- 
structed to disapprove them if not in accordance with the 
behefs and customs of the Fihpinos. 

In protecting the public health in the Phihppine 
Islands emergencies constantly arise which must be in- 
stantly and effectively met. It would be as logical to 
place a commanding general directing a battle under the 


control of an advisory board as it would thus to tie the 
hands of the director of health, and it is difficult to see 
how any competent and self-respecting sanitarian could 
be willing to continue to hold this position if so hampered. 
The Philippine Commission has heretofore invariably 
tabled the acts designed to accomplish this end, but that 
body has now been " Filipinized " and its future attitude 
on this very important question is therefore in doubt. 
Hardly had the legislative session opened in October, 1913, 
when the assembly again passed the same old bill. 
Should it become a law, there will be occasion to watch, 
with especial interest, the death rate of Manila and that 
of the archipelago as a whole. 


Baguio and the Benguet Road 

In June, 1892, when sitting in a native house on a hill 
overlooking Naujan Lake in Mindoro, and anxiously 
awaiting the boats which were to make it possible for my 
party to return to the coast, I saw a small flotilla approach- 

To my surprise and regret I found that it was not 
coming for us, but brought a number of Spanish officers 
who had heard that we had some mysterious procedure 
for killing the tamarau, an extraordinarily wild and vicious 
little buffalo peculiar to this island. They had come to 
get us to tell them how we did it, if possible, and if not 
to watch us and find out for themselves. 

We described to them our method, which was easily 
understood. It consisted in picking up a likely trail 
along some water course, following it until the tamarau 
was overtaken, and then shooting him. This looked 
suspiciously simple to our Spanish friends before they had 
tried it, and they shook their heads. After trying it 
they became convinced that more than a few days of 
experience would be necessary before satisfactory results 
could be obtained. They profited httle by the best infor- 
mation we could give them, and by the services of the 
expert tracker whom we loaned to them. Meanwhile 
I obtained from one of them, Senor Domingo Sanchez, 
information destined to become of great importance in 
the development of the Philippines. 

Seiior Sanchez, who was an employee of the Spanish 
forestry bureau, told me that in the highlands of Northern 
Luzon at an elevation of about five thousand feet, there was 

VOL. I — 2 G 449 


a region of pines and oaks blessed with a perpetually tem- 
perate climate and even with occasional frosts. I confess 
that I did not believe all of his statements. I was 
then experienced in climbing Philippine mountains, and at 
five thousand feet had invariably found a hopeless tangle 
of the rankest tropical vegetation, with humidity so high 
that trees were draped with ferns, orchids, and thick moss, 
and dripping with moisture. However, I knew that 
the mere presence of pine and oak trees would mean the 
occurrence of special bird species feeding upon their seeds, 
and so determined to investigate. 

A severe attack of typhoid fever necessitated my leaving 
the islands before I could carry out this plan, but upon 
my return with the first Philippine Commission in 1899 
I remembered Senor Sanchez's story. In view of the 
probability that American occupation would continue for 
a long period, the existence or non-existence near Manila 
of an extensive highland region with a temperate climate 
became a question of great practical importance. I there- 
fore caused search to be made in the Spanish archives to 
see what, if any, reliable information was available, and to 
my great satisfaction unearthed a detailed report made by 
a committee of three distinguished and competent Span- 
ish officers who had spent some weeks at Baguio in the 
comandancia of Benguet, during which period they had 
made six temperature observations daily, had tramped 
over the neighbouring country very thoroughly, had 
located a number of springs of potable water and deter- 
mined their approximate flow, and in short had gathered 
a large series of very valuable data which more than bore 
out the statements of Seiior Sanchez. 

I found, furthermore, that Spanish engineers had made 
a survey for a carriage road into this country, and had 
prepared a profile of it with estimates of the amount and 
cost of the necessary excavation and other work. 

While in Washington during the winter of 1899-1900, 
I brought this matter to the attention of Secretary Root. 


Just as the second Philippine Commission was fihng out of 
his office, after receiving its instructions, he called out to 
us directing that we look into that Benguet matter, and 
if the facts proved to be as stated open up the country. 

Mindful of these instructions the commission delegated 
General Luke E. Wright and myself to visit Benguet and 
familiarize ourselves with conditions by investigation on 
the ground. General Mac Arthur was dubious when we 
expressed a desire to carry out the instructions of the 
secretary of war. He told us that the country was very 
dangerous, doubtless confusing it with Bangued, the capi- 
tal of Abra, near which there was at that time a strong and 
active Insurgent force. 

We insisted on going, so he said that he would send a 
troop of cavalry with us, and he kept his word. During 
the last week of July we finally sailed from Manila on a 
naval vessel for San Fernando in the province of Union. 
From this place we expected to go by road as far as Nagui- 
lian, in the same province, and thence on horseback to 
Trinidad and Baguio, in Benguet. 

In order to expedite investigations as much as possible 
we took with us Mr. Horace L. Higgins, president of 
the Manila and Dagupan Railway Company, who was 
an engineer of experience, to report on the practicabihty 
of constructing a railway to Baguio. We also took 
Major L. M. Maus, of the army medical corps, and Dr. 
Frank S. Bourns, who then held the volunteer rank of 
major in the same corps, to report on the possibilities of 
the place as a health resort. Two young naval officers 
went along just for the trip. 

Major Maus accompanied us only because requested 
to do so. Taking the latitude and altitude as a basis for 
his calculations, he had already determined with a lead 
pencil and piece of paper just what the climate of Baguio 
must be, and had demonstrated to his own complete satis- 
faction that the statements of the members of the Spanish 
conmiittee above referred to were necessarily false. 


His first rude shock came when we were met at San 
Fernando by a young aide to Colonel ^ Duval, who was in 
command of the local garrison at that place. This Heu- 
tenant told us that some negro soldiers were stationed at 
Trinidad and were being kept supplied by an army pack 
train. I asked him how they were getting on. He said 
very well, except that they could not keep warm. They 
had called for all the spare blankets available, but still 
complained of the cold ! 

The trail proved to be in execrable condition. No 
repair work had been done on it since 1896, and its constant 
use during the then-existing rainy season by a pack train 
had completed its destruction. Much of the way it was 
a mere V in the earth, with deep mud at the bottom. 

We left Naguilian early in the morning and stopped for 
lunch at a little place properly called Sablan, but unoffi- 
cially known as "The Bells." Aguinaldo had thought 
at one time of establishing his headquarters in Benguet 
and had planned to have a gun foundry at Sablan. His 
troops accordingly stole most of the church bells in the 
neighbouring lowland towns, meaning to use them for gun 
metal, and compelled the unfortunate Benguet Igorots 
to carry them up the steep trail. Boiler pipes, which had 
been used in lieu of carrying poles, had in several instances 
been badly bent out of shape. There was even an old 
vertical boiler which had been lugged up entire for some 
unknown reason. 

The labour involved must have been enormous, and we 
were assured that when the Igorot bearers, prostrated with 
fatigue, had refused to continue their titanic task without 
rest, they had been driven to it at the muzzles of Insurgent 
rifles, and that some of them had been shot as a lesson to 
the others. At all events, the boiler and the bells were 
there, and there the boiler and the larger bells have 
remained ever since ! 

It was still steaming hot at Sablan, and the whole 

1 Now a major-general. 

Typical Kalingas. 

The people of this tribe, until recently fierce head-hunters, have been brought 
under effecti%'e control largely through the individual efforts of Lieutenant- 
Governor Walter F. Hale. 


countryside was buried in the densest tropical vegetation. 
Major Maus was triumphant. Things were working out 
just as he had predicted. However, as we were already 
halfway up, we thought that we might as well continue 
the journey. I had expected to find pines and oaks, but 
had anticipated that they would grow amidst a dense 
tangle of damp tropical vegetation. 

We were all literally dumfounded when within the 
space of a hundred yards we suddenly left the tropics 
behind us and came out into a wonderful region of pine 
parks. Trees stood on the rounded knolls at compara- 
tively wide intervals, and there were scores of places where, 
in order to have a beautiful house lot, one needed only to 
construct driveways and go to work with a lawn-mower. 
At the same moment, a delightful cold breeze swept down 
from the heights above us. 

Just at sunset we experienced a second surprise, coming 
out on the knife-sharp crest of a ridge, and seeing spread 
before us the Trinidad Valley, which is shaped hke a huge 
wash-basin. Its floor was vividly green with growing 
rice, Igorot houses were dotted here and there over its 
surface, and the whole peaceful, beautiful scene was 
illuminated by the rays of the setting sun. The air had 
been washed clean by the heavy rain which had poured 
down on us throughout the afternoon, and the sight was 
one never to be forgotten. 

Just at dusk we reached the Httle settlement of Trinidad, 
which had been the capital of the Spanish comandancia 
of Benguet, finding that its inhabitants were in part 
Ilocanos and in part Igorots. 

Here we were hospitably entertained by the officers of 
the military post. It was so cold that one's breath showed. 
Major Maus improved the opportunity to indulge in a 
severe chill. Finding him buried under blankets, we asked 
his views as to the Benguet climate. They were radical ! 
It is only fair to the Major to say that the report which he 
ultimately made set forth the facts fully and fairly. 


It did not suit General Mac Arthur. Years afterward, 
when discussing the cHmate of Benguet with Surgeon- 
General Sternberg, I referred to this report and found to 
my amazement that he had never seen it. He caused an 
investigation to be made, and it was at last resurrected 
from a dusty pigeonhole. 

On our arrival at Trinidad we received a letter from 
Mr. Otto Scheerer, the one white resident of Benguet, 
inviting us to make our headquarters at his house when 
we visited Baguio. Bright and early the next morning 
Mr. Scheerer himself appeared on the scene and guided us 
to his home, where he entertained us most hospitably 
during our entire stay. The trip from Trinidad, a 
distance of four miles, was made over a wretched pony 

We found conditions exactly as described in the Spanish 
report. The country was gently rolling, its elevation 
ranging from forty-five hundred to fifty-two hundred feet. 
The hills were covered with short, thick grass, and with 
magnificent pine trees, which for the most part grew at 
considerable distance from each other, while along the 
streams there were wonderful tree ferns and luxuriant 
tangles of beautiful tropical vegetation. It took us but a 
short time to decide that here was an ideal site for a future 
city, if water could be found in sufficient quantity. 

We revisited each of the several springs discovered and 
described by the Spanish committee, but decided that they 
would be inadequate to supply a town of any great size. 
Mr. Scheerer now came to the front and guided us to the 
very thing that we were looking for, but had hardly dared 
hope to find ; namely, a magnificent spring of crystal-clear 
water. At that time it was flowing nearly a million 
gallons per day. It burst forth from a hillside in such a 
manner as to make its protection from surface drainage 
easy, and we decided that there was nothing lacking to 
make Baguio an admirable site for the future summer 
capital and health resort of the Philippines. 


It was obvious that the construction of a highway from 
San Fernando, in Union, to Baguio would involve con- 
siderable expense, and we asked Mr. Scheerer about other 
possible lines of communication. A study of the Spanish 
maps had led us to consider two : one up the valley of the 
Agno River, and the other up that of the Bued River. 
The latter route had the great advantage of affording 
direct communication with the end of the railway line at 

Mr. Scheerer took us to a point which commanded a 
view for some distance do^vn the Bued River valley, and 
conditions looked rather favourable. Mr. Higgins under- 
took to make a trip down this valley to the plains of Pan- 
gasinan, reporting to us on his arrival at Manila, so we 
returned to that place and awaited advices from him. 
He was furnished with a guard of soldiers from Trinidad, 
and attempted to go down the river bed, but encountered 
unexpected difficulties, and his progi'ess was finally checked 
by a box carion from which he escaped with difficulty, 
spending a night without food or water on a chilly mountain 
top known as ''Thumb Peak." The following morning 
he managed to cross to a high mountain called Santo 
Tomas, whence he returned to Baguio, He was, how- 
ever, of the opinion that the trip down the carion could be 
made without special difficulty by a party suitably 
provided with food and tentage. 

Convinced by our report that active measures should 
be taken to estabfish communication with this wonderful 
region, the commission, on September 12, 1900, appro- 
priated $5000 Mexican, ''for the purpose of making a 
survey to ascertain the most advantageous route for a 
railway into the mountains of Benguet, Island of Luzon, 
and the probable cost thereof." 

Captain Charles W. Meade, then serving as city en- 
gineer of Manila, was selected to make the survey. There 
was every theoretical reason to believe him competent, 
and we did not question either his integrity or his abihty. 


After being absent from Manila for some time, he reported 
in favour of the Bued River valley route, saying that it 
was entirely feasible to build a railway along it. 

He suggested that, as the construction of a wagon road 
would be necessary in building the railroad, we might as 
well undertake that first, and so be able to go to Baguio 
in wheeled vehicles before the railroad was completed. 
He asked for $75,000 United States currency, with which 
to build this road, stating that he expected to be able to 
do it for 165,000, but would like $10,000 as a margin of 

On December 21, 1901, the commission passed an act 
authorizing the construction of a highway from Pozorubio, 
in Pangasinan, to Baguio, ''the same to be built under 
the general supervision of the military governor and the 
immediate direction of Captain Charles W. Meade, 
Thirty-sixth Infantry, United States Volunteers, who has 
been detailed by the military governor for that purpose, 
along the general line of survey recently made by Captain 
Meade for a railway between said towns." The $75,000 
asked for were appropriated by this act. 

Work began promptly at both ends of the line. In June, 
1901, I set out on my first trip through the wild man's 
territory in northern Luzon. Incidentally, and for my per- 
sonal satisfaction only, I inspected the work on the road. 
We had been rather disappointed by Captain Meade's 
failure to make more rapid progress. At the lower end 
I found that delay was being caused by a huge cliff neces- 
sitating a very heavy rock cut. I was assured by Captain 
Meade that from this point on the line ran through dirt 
most of the way, so that the road could be completed very 
rapidly. This statement proved to be grossly in error. 
It took years of hard work to open up the road. 

Its cost when finally ready for traffic was $1,961,847.05. 
Its length was forty-five kilometers eight hundred ninety- 
one meters/ of which thirty-four kilometers were in non- 

1 About 28.7 miles. 


Christian territory. Some ten kilometers of the remainder 
have since been incorporated in the first-class road system of 
the province of Pangasinan,asthispartis chiefly used by the 
people of that province in shipping their agricultural prod- 
ucts to Benguet, and in maintaining communication 
between their towns. 

The additional cost of the road to date ^ since it was 
first opened is $792,434, making its total cost to date 
$2,754,281.05. This includes not only the actual cost of 
maintenance, but very extensive improvements, such as 
the metalling of the road from the so-called zigzag to 
Baguio, the construction of five steel bridges, and the 
replacing of all the original bridges on the road and of 
all the original culverts except those made of concrete or 

On my arrival in Benguet in 1901, I found that good 
progress had been made on the upper end of the road, 
which had penetrated for a short distance into the caiion 
proper without encountering any considerable obstacles. 

On October 15, 1901, the commission stated in its 
annual report to the secretary of war, ''He- has been 
much delayed by the difficulty of procuring the labour 
necessary for its early completion, and several months 
will yet elapse before it is finished !" They did ! 

On August 20, 1901, Captain Meade was reheved, and 
Mr. N. M. Holmes was made engineer of the road. 

On February 3, 1902, a Uttle sanitarium was opened 
in a small native house at Baguio. During the following 
July I was sent to it as a patient, and while in Ben- 
guet again inspected the road which had been continued 
high up on the canon wall to a point where, on a very 
steep mountain side, a peculiar rock formation had been 
encountered at the very grass roots. This rock disin- 
tegrated rapidly under the action of the sun when exposed 
to it. Comparatively solid in the morning, it would 
crack to pieces and slide down the mountain side before 

1 May 1, 1913. - Captain Meade. 


night. A sixty-foot cut had already been made into the 
precipitous mountain side, and the result was an unstable 
road-bed, hardly four feet in width, which threatened to 
go out at any moment. 

My trip to Baguio promptly relieved a severe attack 
of acute intestinal trouble from which I had been suffering, 
and when Governor Taft fell ill the following year with a 
similar ailment, and his physicians recommended his re- 
turn to the United States, I did my best to persuade him 
to try Baguio instead. He decided to do so. 

Five rough cottages had meanwhile been constructed 
for the use of the commissioners, the lumber for them 
being sawed by hand on the ground. Boards had been 
nailed to frames as rapidly as they fell from the logs, and 
had shrunk to such an extent that a reasonably expert 
marksman might almost have thrown a cat by the tail 
through any one of the houses. At night they looked 
like the old-fashioned perforated tin lanterns, leaking 
light in a thousand places. These were the luxurious 
homes provided for the high officials of the government 
of which so much has been said ! 

We paid for them an annual rental amounting to ten 
per cent of their cost, which had of course been excessively 
high on account of the necessity of packing everything 
used in them, except the lumber, up the Naguilian trail. 

However, we were in no frame of mind to be critical. 
We had put in three years of killing hard work, labouring 
seven days in the week, and keeping hours such as to 
arouse a feeling little short of horror among old British 
and other foreign residents. We were all completely 
exhausted, and Mr. Taft was ill. For my part, I would 
gladly have paid almost any sum for a tent under the 
pine trees and the privilege of occupying it for a few weeks. 

On the trip up Mr. Taft had ridden a magnificent saddle 
horse which had been given to him by General Chaffee. 
At the time he left, Manila had been burning hot. When 
he was at last seated on the porch of the little house which 







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was to be his home for weeks, with a cool breeze sighing 
through the needles of a spreading pine tree close at hand, 
his satisfaction knew no bounds. Already his magnifi- 
cent constitution had begun to respond to the stimula- 
tion of the wonderful mountain air, and filled with en- 
thusiasm he summoned a stenographer and dictated the 
following cablegram to the secretary of war : — 

"April 15, 1903. 


"Stood trip well, rode horseback 25 miles to 5000 feet alti- 
tude. Hope amoebic dysentery cured. Great province this, 
only 150 miles from Manila with air as bracing as Adirondacks 
or Murray Bay. Only pines and grass lands. Temperature 
this hottest month in the Philippines in my cottage porch at 
three in the afternoon 68. Fires are necessary night and morn- 


As quick as the wires could bring it, he received the 
following reply : 

"WAsmNGTON, D.C., April 16, 1903. 


"Referring to telegram from your office of 15