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DEPARTMEN
LI8RAUY

PHILO JUDAEUS;

THE JEWISH-ALEXANDKIAN PHILOSOPHY

IN ITS

DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLETION.

JAMES DEUMMOND, LL.D.,

PRINCIPAL OF MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE, LONDON.

ovv, o)

//, Qeov OIKOQ

PHILO, DE SOMNIIS, I. 2,3.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. II.

WILLIAMS AND NOEGATE,

14, HENBIETTA STEEET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;
AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.

1888.

[All Sights reserved. ]

LONDON I

O. NORMAN AND SON, PRINTERS, HART STREET,
CO VENT GARDEN.

CONTENTS.

VOL. IL

BOOK III. (continued).

CHAPTER IV.
The existence and nature of God . 1 64

CHAPTER V.
The Divine Powers . . 65155

CHAPTER VI.
The Logos . ... . 156273

CHAPTER VII.

The higher Anthropology . . 274324

INDEX I. Subjects and Names . 325341

INDEX II. References to passages in Philo . . 342 353

INDEX III. References to passages in the Old

Testament cited by Philo . . 354 355

PHILO JUDAEUS.

BOOK III.

(CONTINUED.)

CHAPTER IV,

THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

HAVING now inquired into the nature of man, and contemplated
the scene amid which he is placed, we must proceed to the
profounder questions which are suggested by our survey. In
considering both the cosmos and man we came across traces of
dependence which seemed to involve the action of an external
cause ; and in the human soul the faculties of reason and prefer
ential choice, though not without the limitations of dependent
being, yet pointed to a suprarnundane source, and introduced
us to a world of ideas transcending the world of sense. We
must examine the validity of these intimations, and endeavour
to unfold their contents in the order of consecutive thought.

In inquiries about God, says Philo, there are two supreme
topics which exercise the intelligence of the genuine philoso
pher ; first, whether the Divine exists ; and secondly, what it is
in its essence.* This division of the subject affords a con
venient arrangement for our own exposition of his views. We
proceed, then, first to the evidence of the existence of God.

In constructing a philosophical system it was no more
possible for Philo than it is for ourselves to take the existence
of God for granted. He was met by atheistic theories more

* Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216).
VOL II. 1

THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD.

or less pronounced, and was obliged to justify his faith upon
rational grounds. Some,, whom he characterizes as atheists,
were content with an attitude of doubtj but others went
further, and boldly asserted that there was no God at all, and
that he was merely said to exist by men who had over
shadowed the truth with mythical inventions.* The latter
were under the necessity of offering a theory antagonistic to
theism, and accordingly maintained that nothing existed but
the perceptible and visible universe, which had never come
into being and would never perish, but was unbegotten and
incorruptible, without a guardian, a pilot, or a protector. f
Since there was thus no invisible and intelligible cause outside
of perceptible things, J it was assumed that everything in the
cosmos was borne along by spontaneous motion, and that arts
and studies, laws and customs, were due to the activity of the
human mind alone. Others, who are described as Chaldseans,
embraced a pantheistic theory. They too maintained that the
phenomenal world was the only existence ; but they declared
either that it was itself God, or that it included God within
itself as the soul of the universe. Apart from phenomena
there was no cause, but the periods of the sun and moon and
the other heavenly bodies determined the distribution of good
and ill, and thus everything was handed over to the dominion
of fate and necessity. || To these speculations Philo opposed
the doctrine of Moses, "the beholder of the invisible nature,
and seer of God/ ^T according to which the Divine exists, and
the supreme God** is neither the cosmos nor the soul of the
cosmos, nor are the heavenly bodies the prime causes ft of
human events. JJ

The arguments for the existence of God fall into two

* Mundi Op., 61 (I. 41) ; Praem. et Poen., 7 (II. 414).

f Somn., II. 43 (I. 696). j Dec. Orac., 13 (II. 190).

Leg. All., III. 9 (I. 93).

|| Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464) ; Cong. erud. gr. 9 (I. 526) ; Abr., 15 (II. 11).

H Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 579). ** TT^TOQ 0e: c . ft Td TrpeafivTctTa alna.

JJ Mund. Op., 61 (I. 41) ; Migrat. Abr., I.e.

NATURE POINTS TO GOD. 3

divisions, those drawn from nature and those furnished by
the intuitions of the soul.

The analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm lies at
the root of the evidence afforded by the contemplation of
nature. The invisible mind in man occupies the same position
in him as is filled by God in the universe ;* and having this
example in ourselves we may easily arrive at the knowledge
of God. For has not the mind in us been appointed a
sovereign, whom the whole community of the body obeys
and each of the senses follows ? And are we to suppose that
the cosmos,, the fairest and vastest and most perfect work,
of which all other things are only parts, is without a king
who holds it together and governs it justly ? And if he
is invisible, what wonder ? For our mind, too, is unseen.
If anyone will consider these things, he will know from
himself and his surroundings that the cosmos is not the
supreme God, but the work of the Supreme.f Appeal is
also made to the analogy of human art. Things fabricated are
always tokens by which the artificers are known. For who
can see statues or pictures without immediately thinking of
a sculptor or a painter ? Who, when he sees clothes or
ships or houses, does not form a conception of a weaver
and shipwright and builder ? And when one has entered
a well- governed city, in which political affairs are most
admirably arranged, what will he suppose but that this city
is under the presidency of good rulers ? When, therefore,
one has arrived at the real Megalopolis, the cosmos, and
has seen the firm-set earth, with its mountains and plains,
filled with trees and fruits and animals of every kind, and
flowing over it seas and lakes and rivers, both the perennial
and those derived from wintry floods, and the pleasant
temperature of winds and air, and the harmonious changes
of the seasons, and, over all, the sun and moon, the

* Mundi Op., 23 (I. 16).

f Abr., 16 (II. 12). See also Migrat. Abr., 33 (I. 465).

1 *

4 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

sovereigns of day and night, the planets and fixed stars, and
the entire heaven revolving in ranks with its own army, a
veritable cosmos within the cosmos, must he not be struck
with admiration, and reasonably, or rather necessarily con
ceive the notion of the Father and Creator, and conclude
that beauties so great and of such surpassing order have
not sprung spontaneously into being, but have been made by
a world-forming artificer, and are ruled by a providence ?
The cosmos is most completely a work of art, and must, there
fore, have been fabricated by some one who is excellent and
most perfect in knowledge. In this way we have received
our thought of the divine existence, proceeding from below
upwards, and endeavouring to reach the Creator by just reason
ing from his works as by a heavenly ladder.*

Intermediate between the two methods of approaching the
Divine is an argument founded on the axiom of causality.
In this argument we have to rely both on the observation of
nature and on a mental intuition. We have already seen
that the material universe fails in the marks of eternity and
of efficiency. f Hence we are compelled by an intellectual
law to seek, outside the visible world, for a first cause, J and for
an efficient cause. Philo unhesitatingly discovers this cause
in mind. || He does not martial his reasons for coming to this
conclusion ; but we can readily detect them in the views which
we have previously unfolded. In rejecting the possibility of
an eternal and efficient causality in matter, the only alternative
was to have recourse to mind, which was the only other known
entity, an entity moreover where the ideas of eternity and

* Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216-17) ; Praem. et Poen., 7 (II. 414-15).

t See Vol. I. p. 291 sq. and 297 sqq.

J Ilpwro v aiTiov, TO irptafivTaTov alnov or Tbtvairiiav. Conf . Ling. , 25 (I. 423) ;
Somn., I. 33 (I. 649) ; 41, p. 656 ; Fort., 7 (II. 381) ; TO aviararta alTior,
Fort., I.e. ; De Nobilitate 5 (II. 442).

To cpaffTr]piov aiTiov, Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2) ; TO cpwv UITIOV, not said, however,
of God, Prof., 24 (I. 565) ; TO TrnroiT]Kb O.ITIOV, Conf. Ling., 21 (1. 419) ; TO KIVOVV
aiTiov, Prof., 2 (I. 547).

|| Ttav o\(v vovg, Mundi Op., I.e.

INTUITION OF GOD. &gt;j

efficiency found a natural home. Again, the marks of causality
in the universe were all of an intellectual order. The operation
which produced the cosmos consisted of the impression of
intellectual forms upon shapeless matter, and therefore the
flow of cosmical change suggested the action, not of blind
force, but of providential reason. And, lastly, within human
experience mind alone possessed a self-determining power,
and therefore could alone furnish a key to the ultimate mystery
of being. Philo was thus led to the belief in a supreme Mind
as the original cause of the universe.

He did not, however, believe that this was the highest
mode of apprehending the Divine. It had been sanctioned,
indeed, by philosophers of the highest repute, who supposed
that our apprehension of the Cause must be derived from the
cosmos and its parts and their inherent powers. Those who
reasoned thus perceived God through a shadow, the artificer
through his works. But there was a more perfect and
purified mind, initiated into the great mysteries, which did
not know the Cause from what had been made, as one might
know the abiding substance from its shadow, but, having over
stepped the begotten, received a clear manifestation of the
Unbegotten, so as to apprehend him from himself. This might
be illustrated by a familiar comparison. The visible sun was
seen by the aid of nothing but the sun itself ; and in the
same way God, being his own light, was seen through himself
alone, and nothing in heaven or earth co-operated or was
able to co-operate in furnishing the pure apprehension of
his being. Those who strove to see God from the creation
were confined to conjecture ; but those pursued the truth
who perceived God by means of God, light by means of light.*
This faculty of spiritual discernment is the peculiar perogative
of pur race, and is due to the divine nature of the mind.
The thought of the Creator is the limit of blessedness ; and,
in order that man might not be without this, God breathed

* Leg. AIL, III. 32-3 (I. 107) ; Praern. et Pcen., 7 (II. 415).

6 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD.

from above of Ms own divinity, and it invisibly imprinted
its own forms on the invisible soul, which thus received no
longer mortal,, but immortal thoughts.* We have before
treated generally of the soul s power of intuition ; we have only
to add that this power culminates in the apprehension of God,
and as the eyes, which are compacted of corruptible matter, are
able to run up from the region of earth to the vast and
distant heaven, so the eyes of the soul pursue their sublime
course, and, winged with great desire of beholding real Being,
pass the limits of the entire cosmos, and press on to the
Unbegotten.t

This high faculty, however, though represented as inherent
in the very nature of the soul, is far from being invariable
in its action ; and if we would enjoy its revelations, we
must conform to its conditions. It was after Abraham
had left ff his land and his kindred and his father s house,"
that is the body, sensible perception, and speech, that God
appeared to him ; and this shows that God is clearly manifested
only to him who has put off mortal things and had recourse to
the incorporeal soul. For this reason, also, Moses took his
tent and pitched it outside the camp, and removed far from
the bodily encampment, hoping thus alone to become a perfect
suppliant and servant of God.J This detachment from bodily
things is naturally sought in that solitude which has always
been dear to the devout. Abraham was sent into the track
less wilderness, from which ordinary men would desire to flee,
as they would think it silly to choose, for the sake of obscure
benefits, acknowledged ills. Yet such is the ordinance of nature:
the sweetest life is that remote from the crowd, and those who
seek and desire to find God love the solitude which is dear
to him, striving in this first to resemble the happy and blessed
nature. Ketirement is favourable to that serenity which is
another condition of spiritual discernment. So long as men

* Quod det. pot. ins., 24 (I. 208). t Plantat. Noe., 5 (I. 333).

+ Quod det. pot. ins., 44 (I. 221). Abr., 18 (II. 14).

INTUITION OF GOD. 7

are immersed in distracting affairs, and, like ships in a wintry
storm, are tossed to and fro upon the waves of desire, they are
naturally far from Him who is ever still, and draw near to the
changeful flow of phenomenal existence. The unchangeable
soul alone has access to the unchangeable God, and truly takes
its stand near the divine power.* Since it is thus impossible
for one who is still moved by the senses rather than the
intellect to come to the investigation of real Being, and
it is necessary to close the eyes and stop the ears and
spend one s time in solitude and darkness, in order that the
eye of the soul, by which intelligible things are seen, may
not be overshadowed by anything perceptible, he who desires
to see God will turn to the consideration of himself and his
constitution ; and from that knowledge of himself which is
symbolized in Greek by Socrates, in Hebrew by Tharrha (the
father of Abraham), he will prepare a way to the knowledge
of the universal Father, who is so difficult to reach by our
guesses and conjectures. This knowledge is attained by our
perception of the mingled analogy and contrast between
ourselves and the cosmos, on which we have already touched.
But Philo just mentions a deeper thought which brings this
condition of self-knowledge under our present head. "When
Abraham most knew, he then most despaired of himself,
that he might come to an accurate knowledge of Him who
truly is. And the case is naturally so. For he who has
fully apprehended has fully despaired of himself, having clearly
learned the nothingness in everything created; and he who
has despaired of himself knows the Self-existent.f

From the conditional nature of the higher knowledge it
follows that it must appear in varying proportions in different
persons, and in the same person at different times. In
reference to this subject we may distinguish three stages in the
experience of the soul. First, it is profitable, if not for the

* Post. Cain., 7-9 (I. 230-1).

f Migrat. Abr., 34-5 (I. 466-7); Somn., I. 10 (I. 629-30) ; Abr., 16 (II. 12).

8 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

acquisition of perfect virtue,, at least with a view to civic life,
to be trained up in primeval opinions, and to pursue the
ancient report of noble deeds which historians and poets have
recorded. But this inherited belief is lower than our intuitive
perceptions. " When without our foresight or expectation a
sudden light of self-taught wisdom flashes upon us, which,
opening the closed eye of the soul, makes us seers instead of
hearers of knowledge, putting in the understanding the
swiftest of the senses, vision, instead of the slower hearing,
it is vain to exercise the ears with words." It is God who
causes these young shoots of intuition to spring up in the soul,
and then the things derived from mere instruction slip away
of themselves and are cancelled ; for the acquaintance or
disciple of God, or whatever name we are to call him, cannot
possibly put up with mortal guidance.* And yet this appre
hension is not necessarily the highest. The soul which
continues in what is good is competent to perceive self-taught
wisdom, but may not yet be able to see God, the sovereign of
wisdom. f And even if it has attained to this supreme vision,
it may still be subject to lower and higher moods. The under
standing which is engaged in self-discipline is liable to
irregular movements towards fruitfulness and the contrary, and
is continually, as it were, going up and down. When it is
fruitful and exalted, " it is illumined by the archetypal and
incorporeal beams of the rational fountain of God who brings
things to their completion ; but when it descends and is
barren, by the images of these, immortal words, which it is
customary to call angels/ In other words, when the rays of
God, through which are produced the clearest apprehensions
of things, leave the soul, the secondary and weaker light of
words, no longer of things, rises, just as in this lower world the
moon, which bears the second rank, sheds, after sunset, its
dimmer light upon the earth. J We shall have to recur to

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 22-3 (I. 178). f Quod det. pot. ins., 9 (I. 197).

J Somn., I. 19 (I. 638).

INTUITION OF GOD. &lt;)

these different grades of spiritual discernment ; at present ifc
is sufficient to mark their existence, in order to gain some in
sight into Philo s theological method.

The highest intuition is repeatedly described as seeing God ;
and the attainment of this vision is the ultimate goal of
philosophy. This has been symbolized in ancient story through
the change of name with which Jacob was honoured. Jacob is
the name of learning and progress, which are dependent upon
hearing ; but Israel is the name of perfection, for it signifies
the vision of God,* and what excellence could be more perfect
than seeing that which really is ?f Hearing is deceitful, for
it is open to falsehood as well as truth; but vision, by which
realities are perceived, cannot lie; and therefore Israel, the
seer of God, is higher than Ishmael, the hearer. J The
knowledge of God is the end of that royal way which those
who have been endowed with sight desire to tread ; to see
him is the most valuable of all possessions, and the firmest
support of virtue and goodness. || We must add, however,
that there is no guarantee that we shall ever gain this glorious
prize. Whether in seeking we shall find God is uncertain;
for to many he did not make himself known, but their toil was
ineffectual to the last. Yet the mere search for what is
beautiful is adequate of itself to give us a share of good
things, and to bring us joy ; and those will obtain pity whose
mental eye has been blinded, not by their voluntary choice,
but by the inexorable power of necessity.^

The above account is wanting in clearness and precision,

Oeov : elsewhere, vpwv 3fov. t Ebriet., 20 (I. 369).

\+ Prof., 38 (I. 577). Quod Deus immut., 30 (I. 294).

|| Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546). See also Leg. AIL, III. 66 (I. 124) ; Conf. Ling., 20
(I. 418) ; Quis rer. div. her., 15 (I. 483) ; Cong. erud. gr., 10 (I. 526) ; Mutat. Norn.,
12 (I. 590) ; Somn., II. 26 (I. 681) ; Abr., 12 (II. 9). See too the expressions,
o^iv Oeov and QavTaaiway TOV aykwriTov, Quod det. pot. ins., 43 (I. 221) ;
&lt;t&gt;i\o9tafjnov ^v x r), Quis rer. div. her., 15 (I. 484); r) opart) i/xi/x /, Prof., 25
(I. 566).

il Leg. AIL, III. 15 (I. 96) ; Post. Cain., 2 (I. 227) ; 6, p. 230.

10 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

and does not satisfy the requirements of a rigorous argument ;
but I have thought it better to retain Philo s own vagueness
of treatment than to ascribe to him a severity of reasoning
which he nowhere attempts. We may gather with sufficient
distinctness that he based his belief in the existence of God
upon the evidences of dependence and of rational order
presented by the cosmos ; upon our intellectual intuition of
cause, which he identified with mind; and upon moral and
spiritual intuitions, which depended upon variable conditions,
and consequently appeared in very different measures in
different persons, or in the same person at different times.
It is, then, from these sources that philosophy must derive her
further knowledge of God. She will see his nature reflected
in the order of creation, but will find him with much
greater clearness amid the relations of thought and in the
ideals which reveal themselves in the purified soul. The
laws of our intelligence bear the impress of ontological facts,
and things eternal and divine are not seen by the eye, but
apprehended by the reason alone.

In entering on an examination of the nature of God as
conceived by Philo it will be convenient first to notice the
limitations which we must observe in applying the human
analogy to the Divine Being. We have seen that the
argument for the existence of God is partly founded upon this
analogy : the presence of a mind in man guarantees the
reality of a universal mind. If we accept this analogy, it is
obvious that our knowledge of God must be drawn principally
from ourselves. We can know nothing of mind except what
is revealed in our self-consciousness, and even the philosopher
must be tempted simply to select, enlarge, and spiritualize the
human attributes, and fancy that in this way he can form an
adequate conception of God. Philo was quite aware that we
were thus confined within the limits of our own faculties, that
our idea of God was coloured by our mode of apprehension, and
that the difference between God and man was not only infinite

LIMITS OF HUMAN ANALOGY. 11

in scale, but profound in character. We must notice the
principal passages in which this view is enforced.

The fundamental failure of analogy between the microcosm
and the macrocosm is thus stated : (C Our mind has not
fabricated the body, but is the work of another; wherefore
also it is contained in the body as in a vessel. But the mind
of the universe has generated the whole ; and that which has
made is better than that which is produced, so that it would
not be carried in that which is inferior, to say nothing of the
fact that it is not suitable for the father to be contained in the
son, but for the son to grow up under the care of the father."*
This obvious distinction, that man is derived, and is placed
amid a scene which he has not created, while God is the
underived fountain of all being, will be found to have far-
reaching consequences. It secures, as is here intimated, the
transcendence of God ; and, as will be explained farther on,
it reverses the relation in which the finite and the infinite
minds stand to what in modern phraseology we may call their
common attributes. We must return to these points ; but at
present it is sufficient to notice the fundamental and infinite
difference between God and man.

So deeply was Philo impressed with the magnitude of this
difference that he recurs to it again and again. Nevertheless,
in speaking of God we are shut up within our own faculties,
and are obliged to use language respecting him which cannot
be philosophically justified. We are not able, says Philo, to
get out of ourselves, but receive our apprehension of the
Unbegotten from what happens to ourselves. t It is owing
to this limitation, which is inevitably narrower in the unin-
structed than in the cultured, that so many things are
said in Scripture which it is impossible for the educated
reason to accept. Philo s treatment of this subject throws
so much light, not only on his exegesis, but on his philosophy,

* Migrat. Abr., 35 (I. 466). f Conf. Ling., 21 (I. 419).

12 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

that we must produce the substance of two illustrative
passages.

When it is said that God swears (as in Ex. xiii. 11) we have to
consider whether this is declared as in reality attaching to him, since it
has seemed to very many to be inappropriate. For an oath suggests a
testimony about something that is disputable, but to God nothing is
obscure or disputable, and he requires no witness indeed he could have
none, for there is no other God equal to himself, to say nothing of the
fact that he who bears testimony is, to that extent, superior to him to
whom testimony is borne, a supposition inadmissible in the case of God.
Men, when they are disbelieved, have recourse to an oath in order to
obtain credit ; but God, when he speaks, is worthy of credit, so that
even his words, so far as security is concerned, differ in no respect from
oaths. And, indeed, while our judgment is accredited by an oath, the
oath itself is accredited by God ; for it is not on account of an oath
that God is to be believed, but on account of him that the oath is
sure. Why, then, did the Hierophant [Moses] think proper to
introduce him as swearing ? In order that he might at the same time
confute and console our weakness. For we cannot constantly store up
in our soul that verse, so worthy of the Cause, " God is not as man,"* so
as to escape all anthropomorphic expressions ; but generally participating
in the mortal, and unable to think of anything apart from ourselves, or
to escape from our own destinies, sunk in the mortal like snails, or wrapt
in a ball, like hedgehogs, round ourselves, we form our thoughts both
about the Blessed and Incorruptible and about ourselves, shrinking from
the absurdity of statement, that the Divine is in the human shape, but
setting up again the impiety in fact, that he is subject to human passions.
Therefore we attribute to him hands, feet, ingress, egress, enmities,
alienations, wrath parts and passions inappropriate to the Cause.
Among these is included the oath, an aid to our weakness. [A little
farther on Philo remarks that] Nature has given us innumerable things
attaching to mankind, in none of which does it itself participate ; for
instance birth, being itself unborn ; nourishment, though not requiring
nourishment ; growth, while it remains unaltered ; periods of life, though
receiving neither diminution nor addition ; an organic body which it is
unable to assume. Some one might say that these things are indifferent,
but that nature must be in possession of what is confessedly good. Well
then, among things that are really good let us examine those that are
most admired among us, which we pray to obtain and are considered
most happy when we have obtained. Who does not know that a happy
old age and a happy death are the greatest of human blessings, in neither

* Numb, xxiii. 19.

LIMITS OF HUMAN ANALOGY. 13

of which has nature any share, since it is exempt from age and death ?
We must remove, then, everything begotten, mortal, mutable, profane,
from our thought of God, the unbegotten, and incorruptible, and un
changeable, and holy, and only blessed.*

The second passage contains some important statements to
which we must attend in another connection ; meanwhile we
may select the portions which bear upon our present subject.
The narrative is under consideration where it is said that God
took it to heart or was angryf that he had made man.

Some persons [says Philo], when they have heard these words, suppose
that the self-existent EeingJ indulges in anger and wrath. But this Being
is not susceptible of any passion whatever ; for to be disquieted is peculiar
to human weakness, but to God neither the irrational passions of the soul
nor the parts and members of the body are at all appropriate. Never
theless such things are said by the Legislator for the sake of admonishing
those who cannot otherwise be brought to a sober frame of mind. For
the two highest statements of the Law concerning the Cause are, first,
that " God is not as man," second, that he is " as man." But the first
is guaranteed by the most certain truth ; the second is introduced for
the instruction of the mass of mankind, and not because God is such in
his real nature. For some men are friends of the soul, others of the
body. The former being able to associate with intelligible and incor
poreal natures, do not compare the self-existent Being to any kind of
created thing ; but the latter, being unable to divest themselves of their
fleshly covering, and to look upon simple and uncompounded nature,
have thoughts about the Cause of all which are similar to those that they
entertain about themselves, not reflecting that he who is made up of an
aggregation of many powers must require many parts for the service of
his several necessities. Now God, as being unbegotten and the producer
of all else, required none of the attributes of created things. Can we
suppose that he has feet wherewith to advance? Whither will he
go, since he has filled all things ? And to whom, when he has no
equal ? And for the sake of what, as he is not anxious about health
like us ? Has he hands for receiving and giving ? He receives nothing
from anyone; for besides having no necessities, he holds all things as
possessions. And he gives by using his Logos as the minister of his
gifts. He required no eyes ; for eyes have no perception without
sensible light, and sensible light is created ; but God saw before
creation, using himself as light. It is needless to speak of the organs
of nutrition, implying, as they do, successive satiety and want. These

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 28-30 (I. 181-3). t

J To tii/. Deut. i. 31.

14: THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

are the mythical creations of impious men, who introduce the Divine,
nominally in the form, in reality with the passions, of a man. Why,
then, does Moses ascribe feet, hands, ingress, egress, to the Un-
begotten? Why does he arm him against his enemies? Why, more
over, does he attribute to him jealousy, anger, wrath, and similar
affections? The answer is, that in framing the best legislation it is
necessary to keep one end in view, the benefit of all who read. Those,
then, who have received a happily constituted nature and an education
in all respects faultless, finding the subsequent path of life passable
and straight, take truth as their companion, and being initiated by her
into the true mysteries of the Self-existent, they attribute to him nothing
that characterizes creation. To them the most suitable of the oracles
is the verse that "God is not as man," but neither is he as the
heaven or the cosmos, for these, too, come under sensible perception.
But those of duller nature, who have been badly educated and are
unable to see sharply, require legislators to act as physicians, and devise
for the present malady its suitable cure. To ill-bred and foolish servants
a stern master is useful ; for dreading his threats they are admonished
against their will by their fear. Let all such, therefore, learn the false
hoods by which they will be benefited, if they cannot be brought to a
sober state of mind by means of truth. The most honest physicians
avoid telling the truth to their patients, knowing that they would thereby
dishearten them, and prevent the cure of the disease. Similarly the
Legislator, the best physician of the passions of the soul, proposed to
himself one end, to eradicate the diseases of the understanding ; and he
hoped that he would accomplish his purpose, if he represented the Cause
as using threats, and indignation, and inexorable wrath, and moreover
weapons for attacks upon evil doers for thus only is the fool ad
monished. Accordingly, with the two above-mentioned statements, that
God is as man, and is not as man, there appear to be woven two other
kindred things, fear and love ; for all the commandments tend towards
either the love or the fear of the Self-existerit. To those who do not in
thought ascribe to the self-existent Being either part or passion of man,
but, in a manner worthy of God, honour it on account of itself alone,
love is most appropriate ; but to all others fear.*

We arrive, then, at the following results. Our language
respecting God is inadequate, and our conceptions injuriously
coloured, because we cannot avoid viewing him through the
medium of our own nature. Nevertheless, we can to a large

* Quod Deus immut , 11-14 (I. 280-3). See also Conf. Ling., 27 (I 425)
Somn., I. 40 (I. 655-6); Post. Cain., 1,2 (1.226-7); Qu. et Sol. in Gen., I. 55
(Fragm., II. 669 sq.) ; II. 54, with the Greek in Harris, Fragm., p. 23.

HIS PEESONALITY. 15

extent escape from this defect by means of philosophical
reflection, and come to regard as useful figures of speech
many statements in Scripture which are accepted literally by
the uneducated. The fundamental rule is to refuse to ascribe
to God anything that can seem characteristic of created being.
Hence Philo rejects as impious both anthropomorphism and
anthropopathism ; that is, he denies to God the possession,
not only of a body, but of the irrational affections of the soul.
This rule, however, did not apply to the spiritual and invisible
man within, the reason and self-determining power which,
as we have seen, appeared to give man a unique position
in the world, and to be in their nature divine. Here, accord
ingly, we reach the conception of God which is implied in
the very inquiry after his existence. He is free, self-
determining Mind. That he is the Mind or Reason of the
universe is everywhere assumed."* That the power of free
volition properly belongs to him we have learned when con
sidering the question of free-will in man ; and so far is the
ascription of this power to him from lowering him in the
direction of anything created that it marks one of the cha
racteristic distinctions between him and creation. f Even his
beneficence is distinctly ascribed, not to any incapacity for
ill, but to his preference for the good.J It thus appears that
Philo accepted without reserve the Jewish doctrine of the
personality of God ; but instead of conceding that this imposed
restrictions upon the divine Being, or dragged him down towards
our finite nature, he believed that our personality lifted us
above creation, and drew us up towards the infinite perfection
of God. It was not that human thought blindly created a

* TtZv o\wv or TO~J TTCLVTUQ vovq, Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2) ; Leg. AIL, III. 9
(I. 93) ; Gigant., 10 (I. 268) ; Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 437) ; 33, p. 465 ; 35, p. 466 ;
o virkp jy/tae, Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 506).

f See Vol. I. p. 346 ; also TO avrtovaiov TO Qtov KparoQ, Plantat. Noe., 12
(I. 336) ; o fiiv OeoQ iicouffiov, avd-yKij Si ij ovvia, Somn., II. 38 (I. 692).

J Plantat. Noe., 20 (I. 342), a^0&lt;o dvvarai, Kai ev Kai KUKUJ^ TTOIIIV ....
QO.TIDOV fjiovov flovXeTat . . . . t/c TOV Trpoaipt TIKU&gt; tlvai &lt;pi\6Su&gt;pov.

16 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

god after its own image, but that the reason and will which
dwelt in men bore their own witness that they belonged
essentially to the infinite and eternal realm.

In proving the existence of God from the phenomena of
the cosmos we arrived at the same fundamental idea. We
there recognised God as rational cause; and this is only
another expression for self-determining mind. This concep
tion places God in distinct antithesis to creation ; for
" efficiency,* which it is not allowable to ascribe to what
is begotten, is the property of God,f while susceptibility^
is the property of the begotten." As burning is the pro
perty of fire, and chilling of snow, so also is efficiency of God,
and all the more because he is the source of activity to all
others. || It follows that he is not simply the First Cause,
the former Creator of a universe that now goes without him
on its appointed course, but he exercises a continual causality,
and is the ontological ground of every phenomenon, without
whom the cosmos would vanish. He never pauses in his
creative activity,^ but both fashioned the world long ago
without labour, and now and for ever ceases not to hold it
together.** Being by nature efficient he never refrains from
making the most beautiful things; and if he rests, his rest is
not inactivity, but the most unwearied energy, exerted with
perfect ease and without distress.tt Thus by our primary
conception of him he is placed in contrast with the universe,
and is recognised as unlike even the best of natural objects. JJ
If we remember what Philo has said about the essence
of the human mind, we shall not be surprised that he denies,
in the most unqualified way, the possibility of knowing the
divine essence. In deciding that the mind of man consisted
of divine Spirit he clearly marked its place among the finite
objects which are open to examination, but he only pushed

Cherub., 24 (I. 153). || Leg. AIL, I. 3 (I. 44) ^ Ib

* SS. Ab. et Caini, 8 (1. 169). |f Cherub., 26 (I. 155). J J Gigant., 10 (I. 268)

HIS ESSENCE UNKNOWN. 17

the inquiry into its essence back to a prior stage. There
we enter a region so exalted that we encounter impenetrable
mystery, and the second of the two supreme questions respect
ing God is pronounced to be a not only difficult, but perhaps
impossible " to solve.* This, however, is not owing to any
obscurity in God himself, but to the feebleness of our mental
vision a doctrine which is clearly set forth in the following
passage :

" The divine region is truly untrodden and unapproachable, not even
the purest understanding being able to ascend so great a height as only
to touch it. It is impossible for human nature to see the face of the Self-
existent." Face is a figurative expression to denote the purest idea of
the Self-existent, for a man is chiefly known by his face. Observe, God
does not say, " I am not visible by nature " for who can be more visible
than he who has rendered all other things visible? but, "Being
naturally such as to be seen, I am seen by none of mankind." The
reason is found in the infirmity of the created. To speak briefly, one
must first become God which is impossible in order to be able to
comprehend God. If one will die to the mortal life, and live the
immortal, he will perhaps see what he has never seen. But even the
sharpest vision will be unable to see the Uncreated, for it will first
be blinded by the piercing splendour and the rushing torrent of rays,
just as fire affords light to those who stand at a proper distance, but
burns up those who come near.f

Nor is it wonderful that we possess no faculty by which
we can form to ourselves a representation of the self-existent
Being, when the mind in each is unknown to us; and if
we cannot know the essence of our own soul, it is mere
simplicity to inquire into that of the universal soul.J In
one passage Philo emphasizes the uncertainty of this subject
with an absoluteness which goes beyond his accustomed
thought :

God [he declares] has shown his nature to none, and who can say
either that the Cause is body or that it is incorporeal, or that it is
of a certain kind, or that it is destitute of kind,f or in general express

* Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216). t Fragm., II. 654.

$ Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 579) ; Leg. AIL, I. 29 (I. 62). Airoiov.

18 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD.

himself with certainty about his essence, or quality, or habit, or
motion ?*

He is usually content with the position that we cannot know
what God is, though he is quite clear that there are certain
things which he is not.

The inscrutability of the divine essence is sometimes
brought into contrast with our assurance of the divine exist
ence. This is done, for instance, in commenting on a verse
in the song of Moses, where God is represented as saying,
Behold that I am "t :

To . speak of the self-existent Being as visible [says Philo] is not
a strict use, but a misapplication of language. Accordingly, in the
present passage he does not say, " Behold me," for it is impossible
for God in his essential being to be at all understood by what is created
but, "Behold that I am," that is, see my existence ; for it is sufficient
for human reason to attain the knowledge that there is and exists some
thing as the Cause of the universe ; but to press beyond this, and inquire
into essence or quality, is superlative folly.*

Men of spiritual mind, accordingly, not only refrain from
imposing a shape upon God, but are content to think of
him simply as being, and to apprehend his existence as free
from distinctive impress.

The doctrine which we are considering is frequently illus
trated by a reference to that remarkable passage in Exodus ||
where it is related that Moses prayed for a vision of the divine
glory, and the Lord promised to make all his goodness pass
before him, and yet could permit him to see only his back
parts, and not his face. The most elaborate and suggestive
comment upon this passage must be reserved till we come

* Leg. AIL, III. 73 (I. 128).

\ "leers, i cr, on lyw ti/a, Deut. xxxii. 39. + Post. Caini, 48 (I. 258).

To t//iX/}v avev ^apaicr^pog ri]V V7rapiv KaTaXafi/BdvecrQai . . . rt}v /card ro
tlvai fiovov tyctVTaaiav IvfSeZavTo, /u?) /zop^wffajTfc civro, Quod Deus immut., 11
(I. 281). The doctrine is completely summed up in the statement, 6 &lt;5 apa oiSt
~&lt;fi V(fi KaraXijTrTog, on fit} Kara TO tlvai povov VTrap^iQ yrip iari o KaraXctfi-
flavoniv airou, ro de %WQ( virdpfaus oiitikv. Ib., 13, p. 282.

j| xxxiii. 12, sqq.

HIS ESSENCE UNKNOWN. x 21

to the doctrine .of the divine powers ; meanwhile the following
may suffice :

Moses, the beholder of the invisible nature for the oracles say that
" he entered into the thick darkness,"* intimating thereby the unseen
essence having searched everything else, sought to see clearly Him who
is thrice-desirable and alone. But when he found nothing, not even
a form resembling what he hoped for, he fled in his despair to the
very Being whom he sought, and implored him, "show me thyself,
that with knowledge I may see thee." Nevertheless, he was disappointed
of his purpose, since a knowledge of the bodies and things which come
after the Self-existent was considered an amply sufficient gift for the
mortal race at its best ; for it is said, " Thou shalt see my back parts,
but my face shall not be seen by thee."f

God, then, is apprehensible, not by a front and direct gaze,
for this would explain what his nature is, but from the powers
which follow him, for these disclose, not his essence, but his
being, by means of their effects. J

The same doctrine is taught in the life of Abraham. The
oracles that were delivered to him fanned into a flame his
desire of knowing the self-existent Being, and nnder their
guidance he left the land of the Chaldasans, and entered
earnestly on his search for the one God; nor did he desist
before he received clearer representations, not of his essence,
for this is impossible, but of his being and providence. Hence
he is said to have been the first to believe God, since he was
the first to have a firm persuasion that there exists one
supreme Cause, who provides for the cosmos and it? contents.
But his failure to penetrate the divine essence is intimated
in the passage where it is said, " He came ii^to the place

* Ex. xx. 21.

y Mutat. Nona., 2 (I. 579). We may use this as a comment on the shorter
statement in the Vita Mosis, I. 28 (II. 106), in which Philo, wishing to exalt
Moses to the utmost, uses these words " he is said to have entered into the
darkness where God was, that is, into the unseen and invisible and incorporeal
essence that serves as the pattern of things, perceiving with the mind what
cannot be observed by mortal nature."

J Post. Cain., 48 (I. 258) ; see also 5, p. 229 ; Quod Deus immut., 24 (I.
289); Prof., 29 (I. 570) ; Monarch., I. (II. 218-19). Nobil., 5 (II. 442).

2 *

IP THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

of which God had told him and having lifted up his eyes
he saw the place afar off."*

It sounds like a contradiction to say that lie saw the place afar off
after he had come into it, and therefore the one word must signify
two different things, namely, the divine Logos, and God, who is before
the Logos. The Logos is called place [for reasons which will he
explained hereafter]. God is called place because he contains all
things, but is contained by none. I and all other objects are not
place, but in place, for the thing contained differs from that which
contains ; but the Divine, being contained by nothing, is necessarily
its own place. Our passage, then, means that he who has been con
ducted by wisdom as far as the divine Logos, has not yet reached
God in his essential being, but sees him afar off; or rather, he is
not competent even to behold him from a distance, but sees only
that God is at a distance from everything created, and that the appre
hension of him is very far removed from all human understanding.
Perhaps, however, place is not here an allegory for the Cause ; and
if not, we may understand the passage thus Abraham saw that the
place into which he had come was far from the nameless and unspeakable
and incomprehensible God.f

Thus everywhere we meet the same conclusion, that the
God-loving soul can attain only this as the supreme benefit
of its search, to comprehend that God in his essential being is
absolutely incomprehensible, and to see that he is not to
be seen.J

Immediately connected with this doctrine is that of the
namelessness of God. When Moses inquired what answer
he should give to those who questioned him about the name
of the Being who sent him, the divine answer was, " I am
He who is," which was equivalent to, "It is my nature
to be, not to be named." [| From this answer the Israelites
learned the difference between being and not being, and were
taught that no name in the strict sense could be applied to
him to whom alone being belongs. But since, owing to the
feebleness of our mortal race, some mode of addressing the

* Gen. xxii. 3, 4. f Somn., I. 11 (I. 630).

J Post. Cain., 4-6 (I. 228-9). Eyw tipi 6 Ctv, Ex. iii. 14.

Elvai TrtVKa ov

HIS NAMELESSNESS. 21

supremely Good is required, Moses was allowed to call God
the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, that is, the
God of the three natures or mental characters which seek
for wisdom and goodness from instruction, from nature, and
from self-discipline. This, however, is not properly speaking
a name ; and accordingly the Scripture adds, " this is a
temporal name,"* as being found in our time,t not in
that which is before time; and "a memorial," not that
which is placed beyond memory and reflection; and again
"to generations," not to unbegotten natures. So unspeak
able is the self -existent Being that not even the ministering
powers tell us their proper name. For after the wrestling
in which Jacob engaged for the acquisition of virtue, he
said to the invisible chief, " Tell me thy name ; " but he
said, " Why dost thou ask my name ? " and did not tell it
to him. For names are symbols of what is begotten, and
are not to be sought amongst incorruptible natures. J It
might seem to be a contradiction of this doctrine that Philo
himself applies a rich variety of names to the Supreme Being.
But the contradiction is only apparent. These names are
nothing more than modes of reference adapted to the imper
fection of our faculties, and do not really express the divine
nature. A name, in the full sense which Philo evidently
attributes to it, is that which describes and exhausts the
essence of the object to which it is applied. The term tri
angle, for instance, is a complete expression for the figure
which it represents. But 110 equivalent title can be applied
to the Divine Being, because his essence is unknown ; and
accordingly even such terms as God and Lord, so far as
they are significant of ideas, and not mere ciphers to denote

* "Ovofjia ai&viov. The unusual meaning of aiwviog is fixed by the context.

f A-iStvi.

% Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 580); Vita Mos., 1. 14 (II. 92-3); Somn., I. 39-40 (I. 655) ;
Abr., 10-11 (II. 8-9). In 24, p. 19 of the last-named treatise he says that God
is called in Scripture Kvpiy bvb\ia-i o "Qv, by which he probably means a name
devoted to him alone, but not one which is really exhaustive in its significance.

THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

the unknown Cause, express, not the fulness of the divine
essence, but only one of its aspects.* The same remark
will readily apply to other appellations. The sacred tetra-
grarnmafcon, however, presented a real exception, which Philo
was unable to explain away, and did not attempt to reconcile
with his philosophy. His reluctance to admit the consequences
which, as he must have perceived, flowed from this undeniable
violation of his rule, is apparent in his throwing upon others
the responsibility of making the four letters indicative of the
divine name, as though a doubt lingered in his own mind
whether this could really be the case.f At all events the
name was one which only those whose ears and tongue had
been purified by wisdom might hear and speak in holy places,
and no one else might utter anywhere. The theologian,
Moses, says that the name consisted of four letters, perhaps
regarding them as symbols of the first four numbers; for
the number four contains all things point, and line, and

surface, and solid, which are the measures of all things

and likewise the best musical harmonies. J Beyond this vague
surmise Philo does not attempt to determine the significance
of this mysterious name, and in accordance with his philo
sophical principles must have viewed it as incomprehensible ;
the word was revealed to the prophet, but its meaning was not
for us. It was agreeable to its awful character that he who
unseasonably uttered the name of the Lord of men and gods
should suffer the penalty of death. Respectful children keep
in reverent silence the proper names of their parents, though
they are only mortal, and use instead the terms which express
their natural relation, father and mother, intimating thereby
the surpassing benefits received from them, and their own
thankful disposition. Shall they, then, be deemed worthy of
forgiveness who indulge in unseasonable mockery, and make

* This statement will be fully illustrated farther on.

t E &v ovopa TOV ovrog &lt;f&gt;aci pqvvfaQai. Vita Mos. III. 14 (II 155)

j Ib. 11, p. 152.

GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 23

the most holy and divine name a mere expletive in their

talk ?*

The incomprehensibility of God is immediately connected
with the doctrine that he is without qualities.f We must
pay careful attention to this doctrine, because it is generally
supposed that Philo here becomes involved in insoluble con
tradictions, his speculative conclusions standing in opposition
to his religious necessities. A God without attributes, and
known only to exist, is not one whom we can worship or
love. Philo, accordingly, having, it is said, denied all attri
butes to God, nevertheless freely ascribes them to him, and
thus vacillates between a negative and a positive description
of the Divine in a manner which defies reconciliation. There
is undoubtedly a certain amount of verbal contradiction ; but
I venture to think that Philo was perfectly aware of this, and
that a considerable portion of his philosophy is devoted to
its solution.

The proposition that God is without qualities, though not
stated very frequently, is laid down with clearness and
emphasis. It is great absurdity, says Philo, to suppose
that God breathed through a mouth or nostrils; "for God is
not only without qualities, but not even in the human form." J
He who thinks that God has quality injures himself, and not
God ; for it is necessary to suppose him to be without quality,
and incorruptible and unchangeable. And again, in a pas
sage before referred to it is said, the companions of the soul,
who are able to associate with intelligible and incorporeal
natures, do not compare the self-existent Being to any form ||
of created things, but divest him of all quality, and apprehend
his existence as free from distinctive impress.^ These state
ments are sufficiently explicit, and are in perfect agreement
with all that we have hitherto said regarding the divine

* Vita Mos., III. 26, p. 166. t "ATTOIOC.

t Leg. All., L 13 (I. 50). Ib., 15, p. 53.

Or kind, Mia. H Q uod Deus immut " U (L 281)&gt;

21 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

essence. That essence is inscrutable and nameless, because
it is destitute of all the qualities which we recognize in things
around us, and is absolutely sui generis. Thus the same
negative predicate is applied to both God and matter. These
stand over against one another, possessing natures entirely
different, and each perfectly unique. They constitute the
two poles of the universe, the one being the unknown essence
which forms the substratum of all material things, the other
the equally unknown essence which impresses upon matter
its variety, and shapes it into a cosmos. Matter is without
qualities because it is beneath them, being intrinsically
motionless and dead, and waiting for something higher to
differentiate its dull mass ; God is without qualities because
he is above them, owing nothing to them, but being himself
the living source from which they emanate.

That we may clearly understand this doctrine, let us fix
in our minds the meaning of the expression " without
qualities." It denotes strictly that which does not belong
to a class, but is sui generis. Philo uses it in this, its
proper logical meaning. Quality " * is that the possession
of which makes you a member of a class ; and when any
quality is ascribed to you, you are to that extent placed on
a level with a number of other individuals. This is explained
by Philo in illustrating the categories. "I partake of sub
stance," he says, having borrowed from each of the four
elements what suffices for my composition ; " I partake also of
quality, by virtue of which I am a man."t It is evident from
this that " quality " must be denied to anything that lies
beyond the reach of classification. But it does not follow
that that which stands by itself is destitute of properties or
characteristic features ; for even in a class each single object
has its "property" J as well as the " qualities" which bring
it under a common name. It is a necessary consequence

* Iloiorijc. t Dec. Orac., 8 (II. 185).

I iSiortjc- Agr. Noe, 3 (I. 302).

GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 25

that everything belonging to a class * is compound, because
ifc has a share in a quality in which others, equally with
itself, participate. It is thus dependent on something more
comprehensive than itself, and, since compounds are liable
to dissolution, it is destined to come to an end. Accordingly
Philo says expressly that it is the nature of things belonging
to a class to admit genesis and corruption, although the ideas
by virtue of which they are enrolled in a class are incor
ruptible. For instance, c virginity " is always the same, but
a "virgin" is changeable and mortal. f Music, the habit "J
by sharing which a man is a musician, is better than the
musician, and the medical art is better than the medical man,
because the " habit " is eternal, efficient, perfect, but the
member of the class is mortal, susceptible, imperfect. The
belonging to a class, then, involves notions which are quite
inconsistent with any worthy conception of God, and nothing
remains but to regard him as " without qualities," or un
classified, a Being alone in his infinite perfection, and
dependent on nothing more comprehensive than himself.

This result, however, does not involve a denial of all pro
perties, or, in other words, of all but negative predicates to
God. It is only necessary that the attributes which are
ascribed to him should be regarded as properties," || and
not as " qualities." ^[ Thus matter, although it is " without
qualities," may be described as extended and impenetrable ;

Ilotoc. f Cherub., 15 (I. 148). J "Etc. Mutat. Norn., 21 (I. 597).
lotorTjrfg. For the meaning of iSwv see Aristotle s definition, ""Idiov
o /j,f] j]\ol fjitv TO TL rjv tlvai, ftovy 5 vTrdp^u KCII dvTiKaTijyoptlTai TOV
7T|Oay/iaro, olov IStov dvOpwTrov TO ypanfiaTiKfjg t Ivai deKTiKov fiydp a
iffTi, ypafijj,aTiKrJQ SEKTIKOQ tort, /cai ft ypajU/iartKr/g 1 StKTtKog iariv,
ianv. ovOeig yap Idiov Xlyft ro tv^t-^o^tvov aXXy v7rdp%tiv, olov TO
dvGwTry. Organon, Top. I. v. 4. I quote this familiar definition that the
reader may perceive clearly the force of Philo s language.

H This is illustrated by the phrase cnroiov vSwp, "pure water," which cannot
be intended to deny all properties to water, but denotes that which is simply
and absolutely water, and not water of a particular kind, such as salt or muddy.
This example shows that the phrase may be applied without regard to the

26 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

for these predicates do not place it in a class along with

other things which are not matter. They may indeed be

applied to an indefinite number of particular objects, which

are thus grouped into a class ; but when they are so applied,

they do not set these objects beside matter as members of the

same genus, so that you could affirm that matter and certain

other things are extended and impenetrable, but they only

class them under matter and declare them to be material.

The same reasoning will apply to the spiritual essence of

God. He is "without qualities/ and nevertheless we may

affirm that he is eternal, self -existent, omnipotent, omniscient,

perfect; for these predicates belong to himself alone, and

place him outside of every genus. If the first two might

be applied to matter, we must remember that Philo never

does so apply them. If he believed in the eternity of

matter, he regarded it as merely a negative reflection of the

eternity of God ; and so far was he from thinking of matter

as self-existent, that he regarded it rather as the non-existent.

The attributes which I have mentioned are by their very

nature incommunicable. They lie outside of our experience,

and are discovered only by an exercise of thought. But there

are other attributes which fall within our experience, which

distinguish man among the animal creation, which make him

a member of a class, and nevertheless are ascribed to

God. God is efficient, free, and self-determining. Does he,

higher genus under which the object may be included. Water in itself is a
species of matter, but the water in question is d-rroiov because it is not a species
of water. Much more is the expression applicable to God, who is not only not
a species of God, but is not a species of anything. Philo himself uses the word
in a similar way. Moses was desired to make a serpent. Why, then, did he
make a bronze serpent, when he received no command Trtpi 7roidrr;ro ? Perhaps
because the favours of God are immaterial, ideas, and aTroiot, but those of
mortals are seen conjoined with matter : Leg. All., II. 20 (I. 80-1). Of course, a
serpent can be classified as animal or reptile ; but a serpent in the abstract
cannot be classified as a particular kind of serpent. So also man in the abstract
is still a ykvoQ without species, and it is only the concrete human being that
becomes HIT IX&lt;*&gt;V Trotorjjrof. being man or woman : Mundi Op., 46 (I. 32).

GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 27

then, belong in this respect to the same genus as man ? Not
at all; for volitional power is, as we have seen, a property
of God.* If therefore we find volitional power in man, it only
proves that the human mind has a share of the divine essence ;
and we thus discover the connection between the latter doc
trine and Philo s theology. His belief in the divinity of the
human mind was necessary in order to reconcile with his
doctrine that God is without qualities his ascription to him
of those attributes which are demanded by the religious
affections. In assigning the same predicates to God and
man, he may seem at first sight to class them together, as
each participating in the same essence which is more compre
hensive than either; but he really means that man has a
finite share in an essence which God exhausts and trans
cends. We shall dwell farther on upon the predicates of God
in detail ; meanwhile we may observe that Philo does not
hesitate to admit such epithets as munificent, propitious,
merciful, good. But these do not draw God down from his
solitary perfection. They are different aspects of his infinite
fulness, archetypal ideas, which, borrowing all from him, lay
the impress of quality only on derived existences.

In order to understand the above reasoning it is necessary
to bear in mind that the notion of an attribute in the philo
sophy which we are considering was very different from that
with which we are familiar. We may illustrate the difference
by a change which has taken place more recently in physical
theory. It was formerly supposed that electricity and heat
were subtle fluids distributed among the particles of ordinary
bodies, and when an object was electrified, or hot, or cold,
it was thought that there was an excess or deficiency of these
fluids. Here, then, we have an instance in which the pre
dicate denoted, not, as it does to our present scientific appre
hension., a certain condition of the object itself, but the

* "Iciov Otov.

28 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

presence or absence of a substance completely different from
the object. Now, if we could imagine, in connection with this
hypothesis, that electricity and heat were ultimately the same
substance, and were differentiated only through the modes
of its manifestation, we could not properly class this substance
with hot or electrical bodies; and if we ever spoke of it as
hot or electrical, we should obviously use these words in a
sense different from that in which they are applicable to glass
and iron. The latter would have a share in heat and elec
tricity; the former would be heat and electricity, or rather
would be the unknown substance which comprised them. both.
This furnishes, I think, a strict analogy to Philo s conception
of attributes. These were not conditions affecting the minds
of which they might be predicated, but were essences in which
individual minds had their finite and transient share ; but
they were all included within God, and were summed up in
the unity of his infinite being. We noticed the former of
these doctrines in our remarks upon the human powers ; the
latter must await its full development till we treat of the
divine powers and the doctrine of ideas.

We must now direct our attention to those passages by
which, as I believe, the above exposition is established. First
of all, Philo expressly places God in a genus by himself. It
is not allowable, he says, to suppose that anything is better
than the Cause, since nothing is even equal, or even a little
inferior to him, (( but everything after God is found to have
descended by a whole genus. "* According to this statement
God is the highest genus, and may therefore be properly
described as the most generic. This is done in a passage
where Philo speaks of the supply of water and manna fur
nished to the Israelites in the wilderness. The rock cut away
at the top t is the wisdom of God, which he cut as topmost J

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 28 (I. 181).

f H ciKpfr-ofjiOQ Trirpa. I render it in this way, in order to preserve the play
upon the words. j "Xnpav t-tpsv.

GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 29

and first of all from his own powers,, and from which he gives
drink to God-loving souls. Now when they have received
drink they are filled also with manna, which is the most
generic thing, for manna is called "what," which is the
universal genus. The allusion here is to Exodus xvi. 15,
where it is related that, when the Israelites saw the manna,
they said to one another, What is this t" * Philo proceeds :
"the most generic thingt is God, and second is the WordJ
of God, but all other things exist in word only, and in reality
are equivalent to the non-existent/ || It seems clear that
these statements cannot be accepted in their ordinary logical
sense. According to this, God would be the term which
included the largest number of species and individuals, which
denoted more and connoted less than any other term ; and he
would be " without qualities " only by being turned into an
empty abstraction. That this is not Philo s meaning is
apparent from the fact that the word God is not, in its
highest sense, a generic term at all, but is always limited
to one single being. We must therefore understand the
above expressions in an ontological rather than in a logical
sense. God is the most generic, not on account of his logical
emptiness, but on account of his real fulness. He is the
Being who includes all else within his own solitary perfection,
and who alone imparts meaning and reality to all beneath.
As Philo strongly expresses it, " God is full of himself and
sufficient to himself, filling and containing all other things,
which are deficient and desert and empty, but himself being
contained by nothing else, as being himself one and the
whole." *[[ If, then, we pass from God to the good, the
beautiful, the true, it is not by an ascent of thought and by
introducing greater richness of meaning into a more abstract
notion, but by a descent and by a resolution of the perfect

* Ti ion TOVTO ; as it stands in the LXX. f To

I Aoyof. Aoyy fiovov. \\ Leg. All., II. 21 (I. 82).

II Elc Kai ro Trav, Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 52).

30 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

unity into lower and less significant conceptions. The latter
are unified and exhausted in God ; and it would therefore be
more correct to say that the good is divine than to say that
God is good."* It is for this reason that God is described as
u the good/ 3 or "the first good/ t and the source of all that
may be characterized by that epithet. He is, says Philo,
" alone blessed and happy, unparticipant of all evil,! and full
of perfect good, or rather, if one is to speak the truth, being
himself the good, who showered on heaven and earth the
individual things that are good." || Again, he is the most
self-sufficing, and in need of nothing created, " the first
good, the most perfect, the ever-flowing fountain of prudence
and righteousness and all excellence." 1T Similarly he is
called "the first and most perfect good, from whom, like a
fountain, the cosmos and its contents are watered with the
several things that are good"**

The description of God as the good "ft might seem to
determine his essence ; but this is far from Philo s intention.
God is indeed " the good/ but he is much more ; and we may
therefore legitimately speak of his goodness. JJ This, instead
of exhausting his being, is only " the oldest of the graces,"
the epithet oldest denoting, as often in Philo, that which is
prior or superior in thought. It is eternal, and its exercise
belongs to the divine nature. The transcendence of God
above goodness and every other property which we, in our
limited experience, can ascribe to him is expressed several
times in remarkable language. In the account of the embassy
to Caius, Philo speaks of the Uncreated and Divine as "the
first good and beautiful and blessed and happy, or, if one is to

* Compare the statement, ovdtv yap e&lt;m T&V KaXtiv o fir] 9eov n KO\ Otlov,
SS. Ab. et Cain., 17 (I. 174).

j- To ayaQov, or TO Trptirov ayaQov.

J So Tisch., Philon., p. 20, instead of " evils."

AjaOwi . || Ta Kara fjiepoQ dya6a. De Septenario 5 (II. 280).

IF Sacrificant., 4 (II. 254). ** TdtTri fi epovQ aya9d. Dec. Orac., 16 (II, 194).

|f To a-yaOov. %% Aya0or?je. Quod. Deus imrnut., 23 (I. 288-9).

GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 31

speak the truth, that which is better than the good, and more
beautiful than the beautiful, and happier than the happy, and
more blessed than blessedness itself, and whatever is more
perfect than these. For speech* is not able to ascend to the
intangible God, but sinks back, incapable of using proper
names as a ladder to the manifestation, I do not say of the
Self-existent for not even the whole heaven becoming
articulate voice would be rich in exact and well-aimed words
for this purpose, but of his attendant powers, creative, and
regal, and providential." f This might be taken as a mere
flight of rhetoric, to convey the most exalted idea of the
divine perfection ; but precisely similar language is used in
calm philosophical exposition. In pointing out the necessity
for both a susceptible and efficient cause in the creation of
the cosmos, Philo describes the latter as most pure and
unmixed mind, " better than virtue, and better than know
ledge, and better than the good itself and the beautiful
itself.^J And again, while insisting that though it is possible
for us to know God s existence, we cannot know his essence,
he says, " for that which is better than the good, and older
than the unit, and purer than one, cannot possibly be dis
cerned by any other, because it is right that he should be
apprehended by himself alone." The meaning of these
expressions is at once apparent, if our previous exposition
has been correct. God is superior to all our descriptive
epithets, because he includes within himself the archetypal
good and beautiful and blessed; and if we could know his
name, we should find it comprehensive of all these and more.
Our reason falters before this central unity. "We can, nay
must, believe in its existence ; but we can see it only through
the multiplying medium of our own imperfection, through
those powers or ideas in which we are allowed to participate,

* O Xoyof. t Le g- acl Cai -&gt; l ( IL 546 )&gt; sli 8 htl y abridged.

+ Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2). Praem. et Poen., 6 (II. 414).

32 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

and we can hold its essence neither in conception nor in
speech.

We are fortunately not left without particular examples
which serve to illustrate and confirm the above explanation.
First we may notice a passage relating, not to God himself,
but to his Logos, which shows that Philo does not hesitate to
use predicates which are the best available approximation to
the truth at the very moment when he contends that they fall
short of the truth. In speaking of the rational soul in man,
which had the divine Logos for its archetype, he says, " it is
necessary that the imitation of an all -beautiful pattern should
be all-beautiful. But the Logos of God is better even than
beauty itself, that which is beauty in nature,* since it is not
adorned with beauty, but is itself, to speak truly, beauty s
most becoming adornnient.^t Similar language is used of
God. " He is full of unmixed blessedness. His nature is
most perfect, or rather God is himself the summit and end
and boundary of blessedness, participating in nothing else for
his improvement, but having communicated his own to all
individuals from the fountain of the beautiful, himself.
For the beautiful things in the cosmos would never have
become such if they had not been made like the truly
beautiful, the Unbegotten and Blessed and Incorruptible, as
an archetype/ J Hence it is justly said, " There is nothing
beautiful which is not of God and divine." The statement
that God is older than the unit receives an explanation which

* Mangey, at the suggestion of Christophorson, reads iv rij
which is not very intelligible. Dahne, assuming that aiadrjry must be retained,.
places it after jcaXXa, thus emptying the passage of its real significance
[I. p. 262, Anm. 264]. Miiller points out that the word is a mere gloss, and is
not supported by any old authority [p. 370-1]. Nevertheless it must be confessed
that its omission does not remove every difficulty, for the clause oTrtp ICTIV iv ry
Qvaei KaXXog seems quite superfluous, unless it is intended to limit in some way
the previous avrou /cdXXouf, and this it cannot do if ipvaet is to be understood,
with Miiller, in quite a general sense, and not merely of perceptible nature.

f Mundi Op., 48 (I. 33). J Cherub., 25 (I. 154).

SS. Ab. et Cain., 17 (I. 174).

GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 33.

is verbally different, but involves a similar conception. Having
demonstrated the unity of God, Philo draws his conclusion
thus, " God, then, has been ranked according to the one and
the unit ; or rather even the unit has been ranked according
to the one God, for all number, like time, is younger than the
cosmos, while God is older than the cosmos and its creator."*
This shows that God is not one because he participates in
unity, but because the eternal simplicity of his own nature is
the archetype of unity. All these illustrations may be summed
up in what Philo says of the rationality of God j for the
rational is with him " the best genus,"f ar *d what is said of its
subordinate relation to the Divine must apply a fortiori to-
inferior genera. God, then, is before and above the Logos,,
and is superior to all rational nature. J His relation to the
rational is defined in a passage where the difference which I
have endeavoured to explain between the predicates of the
uncreated and of created beings is exhibited with unmistakable
clearness. Each of us, it is said, is two beings, animal and
man. To each of these has been assigned a kindred power,
to the one the vital, by virtue of which we live, to the other
the rational, by virtue of which we have become rational.
" In the vital, then, the irrational animals also participate ;
but the rational, God does not indeed participate in, but
rules, being the fountain of the most ancient Logos," and
the " archetype of rational nature." According to this
statement God is rational because, as I have before expressed
it, he exhausts and transcends rationality, and is the only
source from which it ultimately flows, whereas man is rational
because he has received a finite share of rationality, which.

* Leg. All., II. 1 (I. 67).

f To XoyiKov, oTrtp apiaTov TU&gt;V OVTWV y tvog lerrt, Quod Deus immut., 4 (I. 275).

{ Fragm., II. 625, answering to Qu. et Sol. in Gen. II. 62.

Quod det. pot. ins., 22, 23 (I. 207). We may compare the clear statement of
Origen: A\\ ovS ovaictQ juerlx" o Qtoq. Mtrtxtrai -yap paXXov f] /urlx" "
HeTi%tTai VTTO rtZv s%6vr&lt;i)V irvtv^ct Qtov. Kai o &lt;rwr?}p r/^twv ov /^re^ct \iiv
fiiKaioavvrjs SiKaioavvri dt &v jutrl^erai VTTO T(i&gt;v diicaiwv. Cont. Gels., VI. 64.

VOL. II. 3

34 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

transcends him, and can communicate itself with unexhausted

fulness to innumerable multitudes. Rationality is but one

expression of God s eternal and infinite essence ; and since it

reveals itself in our intelligence, it stands, as it were, between

God and man, deriving from the former all its store, and

imparting a tiny portion to each human soul, or rather

impressing each soul with its own form. We may sum up

the discussion in words which have been preserved in the

Armenian : "If you wish to speak properly, those things

which are justice and truth among men, are similitudes and

forms ; but those which are so with God are original principles

and prototypes or ideas."* We thus see that the doctrine of

intermediate powers or ideas, instead of being an artificial

resource to reconcile discordant thoughts, grows out of the

very roots of Philo s theology. But we must reserve this

subject for future treatment, and be content for the present

with having determined the force of the statement that God

is without qualities, and the general nature of what in modern

times we should call the divine attributes. The mode of

thought is far removed from our own ; but I hope I have

succeeded not only in making it clear, but in showing how ijb

was possible for rational men to adopt it. If the foregoing

interpretation be correct, the serious and unphilosophical

contradiction with which Philo is charged has been resolved ;

the strictest speculative thought ministers to religious

aspiration; God, instead of being an empty abstraction,

contains in his infinite fulness the eternal essence of all

perfect things; and, though he is too full and too perfect

for us to know him as he is, he gives us, in the ideals that

impress our souls, side-lights and broken gleams, which are

worthy of the implicit trust and devout homage so gladly

yielded by the religious heart of Philo.

Having thus determined the general character of the divine

* Qu. et Sol. in Gen. IV. 115.

HIS ETEENITY. 35

attributes, we must now endeavour, though at the risk of some
repetition, to bring under one view, and exhibit in detail, the
predicates which are actually applied to God by Philo. We
must remember that in the philosophy under consideration
God is primarily revealed as self-determining Mind, the
Cause of the universe. It follows that he must be eternal;*
for the belief in something eternal is a necessity of human
thought, and if God were not eternal he would depend on
something older and greater than himself ; in other words, he
would not be God, the first and supreme Cause. We find,
accordingly, that eternity is with Philo the most indispensable
mark of Deity, the want of which deprives all originated gods
of every just title to the name;f and eternity and causality
are naturally brought into combination in references to the
Supreme Being. He is " the unbegotten and eternal and the
Cause of all things," J the " oldest and generator and maker
of all things, . . . who is alone eternal, and Father of everything
else, intelligible and perceptible.^ He is " the Father of the
universe, the unbegotten God, and generator of all things." ||
His eternity is further emphasized by resolving it into the two
notions of without beginning and without end : he is " the
unbegotten and incorruptible and eternal. 3 ^" This reiteration
(and other passages might be cited) shows how fundamental
with Philo is the conception of God s eternity. The ascription
to him, however, of eternal causality, far from endowing him
with qualities and bringing him into a class, differentiates him
in the most absolute way from everything else. All other
things, however contrasted, have at least the fellowship of
origination ; but God is not like even the best of natural
objects, for the latter have come into being and are destined

* AlSlOQ.

j- Human., 2 (II. 386), ytvrjTOQ yap ovdetQ a\jj0ia Otog, . ... TO ai/ay/eato-
TO.TOV a&lt;pypr]p.vo(;, d idiorijTa.

I Dec. Orac., 14 (II. 191). Nobil., 5 (II. 442).

H Cherub., 13 (I. 147).

^ O dyWT]TO /cat atyQaproQ KOI aWioq, Dec. Orac., 10 (II. 187).

3 *

36 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

to be passive, but God is unbegotten and always active,* and
for this reason he requires none of the properties of created
things.f

From this primary attribute another distinctive mark
of the Divine was easily deduced. We have seen in another
connection that change was a characteristic of creation, and
betokened both an actual beginning and a natural liability to
dissolution. The Eternal, therefore, must be incapable of
change. He who supposes that God is not unbegotten and
incorruptible, or not immutable, injures himself and not God ;
for it is necessary to regard him as both incorruptible and
immutable, and he who does not think so fills his soul with
false and godless opinion. J Accordingly God and creation
(all at least beneath man) are separated from one another
by this irremovable difference. Everything generated is
necessarily mutable, for this is its property, as it is the
property of God to be immutable. || To this antithesis, how
ever, there are some exceptions. The cosmos, which as a
whole remains ever self-identical, reflects and guarantees
the stability of its maker.^[ Among minor objects not only
does the divine covenant share the unchangeableness of its
author, but the same privilege is extended to the perfect
man, who, by virtue of this exalted gift,, occupies an inter-
mediate position between man and God.** The reason for the
last two exceptions is found in the system of allegorical
interpretation. The immutability of God was taught in
Scripture by the words I stand here before thee/ ft standing
implying an immovable permanence. The same term is applied
to the covenant with Noah, " I will make my covenant to
stand ";;[;{ and we are told in Genesis that Abraham was

Gigant., 10 (I. 268). f Q uo d Deus immut., 12 (I. 281).

Leg. All., 1. 15 (I. 53). *is lov .

|| Leg. All., II. 9 (I. 72) ; 22, p. 82 ; Cherub., 6 (1. 142), rb plv Qii
rb SI ysvofievov $vau ^ra^rov. ^ Somn., II. 32 (I. 687).

** Ib. sqq.; Post. Cain., 9 (I. 231); Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 276); Mutat.
Norn., 13 (I. 591). ft Ex. xvii. 6. JJ Gen. ix. 11, S xviii. 22.

HIS INCOBKUPTIBILITY. UNITY. 37

standing before the Lord, and in Deuteronomy* that the
commandment came to Moses, " stand thou here with ine."
In the case of man we may find also a philosophical reason ;
for " only an immutable soul has access to the immutable
God/ f These exceptions do not violate the doctrine that
immutability is the property of God alone ; they only furnish
an extreme instance of what we have already learned, that
God can communicate to created beings some share of his
own most elevated attributes.

With the unchangeableness and incorruptibility of God are
closely connected his unity and simplicity. That Philo on
every suitable opportunity insists on the unity of God in oppo
sition to polytheism is only what we should expect, and it will
be sufficient to notice here two or three passages in which an
argument is advanced.

There is [he says], one Ruler and King, to whom alone it belongs to
preside over and administer all things ; for the Homeric saying, " the
government by many is not good, let there be one governor, one king,"J
is not more applicable to cities and men than to the cosmos and God ; for
of one cosmos there must of necessity be one Maker and Father and
Lord.

Not only is there but one God in contradistinction from
several, one with whom nothing existed prior to creation, and
who since the creation of the cosmos still remains in solitary
supremacy, but he is himself absolutely one and indivisible,
the archetypal unity.

He is "alone and one, not a compound, a simple nature." All other
things involve plurality. For instance, man consists of soul and body.
The soul has its irrational and rational parts, and the body includes the
hot, the cold, the heavy, the light, the dry, the moist. " But God is not
a compound, nor composed of many ingredients, but unmixed with all
else. For whatsoever might be united to God is either superior or
inferior or equal to him. But there is neither an equal nor a superior to

* v . 31. t Post. Cain., 9 (I. 231).

J Aristotle ends the eleventh book of his Metaphysics with the same quotation,
introduced for the same purpose, ra dt OVTO. ov fiovXtrai iroXiTtvecQai
OVK dyaObv TroXvKoipavlr) t\Q Koipavoc laroi. Conf. Ling., 33 (I. 431).

38 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

God, and nothing inferior is united to him ; otherwise he himself too will
become inferior, and in this case he will be also corruptible, which it is
not allowable to suppose. God therefore has been ranked in conformity
with one and the unit ; or rather even the unit is ranked in comf ormity
with the one God : for all number, like time, is younger than the cosmos,
while God is older than the cosmos, and its Creator."*

Elsewhere Philo insists that God is altogether without parts,
because our parts and members have been formed by nature
to serve our necessities ; but God is in need of nothing, and
therefore could derive no benefit from the possession of parts,
and cannot be supposed to have them. He is a " whole, not a
part," an expression which must denote that totality belongs
to his very essence, and it is impossible to think of him piece-
meal.f The stringency of this doctrine of the divine unity
must be borne in mind when we have to treat of the manifold-
ness of divine manifestations.

We have already learned that God is invisible. This may
be inferred from the attributes which we have just noticed.
There is indeed a sense in which the Lord of the universe may
be seen ; but it is not with the eyes of the body, for these see
only perceptible things, J and perceptible things are compound
and full of corruption, while the Divine is uncompounded and
incorruptible. He is seen, then, only with the eye of the soul.
Again, there is this difference: the eyes see only with the
co-operation of light, which is distinct both from the thing
seen and from the person seeing; but what the soul discerns, it
discerns without the assistance of anything else, for noiimena
are a light to themselves. This statement is in complete
accordance with the prevailing tone of Philo s philosophy.
God belongs absolutely to a realm cognizable only by reason,
and to imagine him visible to the bodily eye would be to
degrade him into the category of created, compound, and
corruptible things. Nevertheless there is one passage in

* Leg. All., II. 1 (I. 66-7).

t Si Vtos o\ov, ov /ilpof. Post. Cain., 1 (I. 226-7). J Ta alffdrjrd.

Mutat. Norn., 1 (I. 578-9).

INVISIBILITY. GOD IS LIGHT. 39

which another view is presented, and God is regarded as
invisible, not by his intrinsic nature, but by his own choice.
" He did not think proper/ says Philo, " to be apprehended,
by the eyes of the body, perhaps because it was not consistent
with holiness for the mortal to touch the Eternal, but perhaps
also on account of the weakness of our sight; for it would
not contain the beams poured from the Self- existent, since it is
not able to look even at the rays of the sun. 1 "* These words
certainly place God among objects which are by their nature
perceptible, though removed beyond the reach of our imper
fect vision. In doing so they contradict a fundamental distinc
tion in Philo s philosophy. I have no explanation to offer,
and can only suppose that the passage was written in careless
haste.

In this connection we may notice the statement that God is
light, which is carefully explained in such a way as to remove
him absolutely from the cognizance of the senses. " The eye
of the Self-existent," it is said, " requires no other light for
apprehension, but being itself an archetypal radiance shoots
forth innumerable beams, of which none is perceptible, but all
are intelligible."f It follows that, when we hear in Scripture
that God was seen by man, we must understand that this was
done without perceptible light, for the intelligible can be
apprehended only by intelligence; but God is a fountain of
the purest radiance, so that, whenever he manifests himself to
the soul, he causes the beams to arise that are without shadow
and shine on every side.J Philo even goes so far as to call
God the sun of the sun, the intelligible pattern of our percep
tible luminary, supplying visible splendours from his invisible
fountains. He makes it clear, however, in other passages
that he does not wish this to be understood too literally, as
though he was speculating on the unknowable essence of God.
Intellectual illumination finds its nearest analogy in the reveal-

* Abr., 16 (II. 12). t Cherub., 28 (1. 156)

J Mutat. Norn., 1 (I. 579). Sacrificant., 4 (II. 2o4).

40 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

ing power of light ; and Philo s language is founded upon this
analogy, and not on any real resemblance which he supposed
to exist between the divine nature and the light which shines
upon the world of sense. " For as, when the sun has risen,
the darkness disappears and all things are filled with light, in
the same manner whenever God, the intelligible sun, rises and
shines upon the soul, the darkness of the vices and passions is
dispersed, and the most pure and lovable species of the most
radiant virtue becomes manifest. w * It is only in conformity
with the rules of allegory that the sun is represented as like
the Father and Sovereign of the universe, for " nothing is
really like God/ The resemblance is found, first, in the fact
that God is light, as is said in the Psalms, " The Lord is my
light and my saviour " ;f and he is not only light but also the
archetype of all other light, or rather older and higher than
the archetype." The latter words show that the light-giving
power of God is simply one of his attributes, in the sense
already explained : behind it lies the unknown essence. Fur
ther to remove all ambiguity Philo reiterates, &lt;f he himself is
like nothing created/ Another point of resemblance is found
in the fact that " as the sun separates day and night, so Moses
says that God divided light and darkness." And lastly, "as
the sun, when it has risen, displays the hidden things of cor
poreal nature, so God, when he generated all things, not only
brought them into manifestation, but also made what before
was not, being himself not only an artificer, but also a
creator." J These concluding words prove yet again that God
was regarded as more than light, and as having a fulness of
power of which that intelligible light which illumined the soul
was only a partial expression. We are dealing only with
analogies needed by the human understanding, and are not
warranted in the conclusion that Philo conceived of God as a

* Human., 22 (II. 403).

t xxvi. 1, where Philo reads 0wc instead of the LXX

% Somn., I. 13 (I. 631-2).

HIS OMNIPBESENCE.

{ e light- nature/ * that is, I presume, as one whose essence was
light, even though the statement be guarded with the condition
that the light was not of a corporeal, but an intellectual kind, j-
We come now to certain views which seem necessarily
involved in the conception of God as cause. We have already
learned that, as the Creator of the universe, he must be trans
cendent above it, or, as Philo repeatedly puts it, he contains,
but is not contained. J Nevertheless, though he is outside the
universe, he is also within it ; for, as the cause of all things, he
must permeate all things. And lastly, since he is omnipresent,
it is impossible to apply to him any terms which depend on the
notion of place ; for this, by implying a here and a there,
involves limitation and a relation of parts to one another.
This line of thought is connectedly expressed in a passage
where Philo comments on the statement that IC The Lord
came down to see the city and the tower."

This statement [he says] is certainly to be understood in a figura
tive sense ; for it is the most surpassing impiety|j to suppose that the
Divine is present or absent, or comes down or the reverse, or is in
any way affected with the same habits and motions as individual
living beings. ^[ These things are said by the Legislator concerning
the non- anthropomorphic God in accordance with human analogy, with
a view to our instruction. For who does not know that he who
comes down must necessarily leave one place, and occupy another ?
But all things have been filled by God, who contains, but is not
contained, to whom alone it belongs to be both everywhere and no
where : nowhere, because he generated place along with the bodies which
occupy it, and we may not assert that that which has made is contained in
any of the things produced ; everywhere, because having stretched his
powers through earth and water, air and heaven, he has left no part
of the cosmos desert, but, having collected all things together, com
pressed them with invisible bonds, that they might never be dissolved.
To God in his essence, therefore, all terms of motion involving change of
place are inapplicable.**

The allusion to the divine powers extended through creation

* Lichtnatur.
ov

IF Tol Kara ^ P o S woi ff .

t Gfrorer, I. p. 120.
Gen. xi. 5.-
eimlv, iorlv datfltia.

** Conf . Ling., 27 (I. 425).

42 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD.

suggests questions as to the mode of God s omnipresence which
we are not yet prepared to answer; but we may notice a
few passages by which the other thoughts which are here com
bined are illustrated or confirmed. It would be impious and
silly, we are told, to imagine that God really planted a paradise,
as though he wanted luxurious resting-places, for not even
the entire cosmos would be a worthy dwelling for God, the
universal Ruler ; for he is his own place, and we cannot suppose
that the cause is contained in the effect.* It is for this, among
other reasons, to show that the efficient cause is not in the
thing produced, that Scripture compares the perceptible cosmos
to the footstool of God.f

The transcendent solitude of God, however, did not cut him
off from the world which he had made. " Though existing
outside of the creation, he has none the less filled the cosmos
with himself ." J " He has reached everywhere, he looks to
the ends, he has filled the universe, and of him not even
the smallest thing is desert." From him, therefore, who
has thus filled and permeated all things, and left nothing
empty of himself, it is impossible to escape or to hide ; for
what place can one occupy in which God is not ?|| But precisely
because he is thus everywhere, we cannot locate him ; for place
is that which contains, and therefore he who himself contains
the universe, and is contained by nothing, cannot, like created
things, be said to be in a place, but is his own place. This was
taught in Scripture when God said to Adam, "Thou art some-

* Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 52) ; Plantat. Noe., 8 (I. 334).

f Conf. Ling., 21 (I. 419). The unique expression, rov euriipa, rbv lv r$
K6(rn V Ofov, which is found in Mangey s text of Septen., 23 (II. 296), could only
mean that God, as the Saviour who supplies the bountiful provisions of nature,
for ever works within the Cosmos, besides existing in his infinite perfection
beyond it. In place of this reading, however, Tischendorf s improved text gives
rbv ytv kTijv KCII Trarkpa KCII (rwriypa TOV re Koapov Kai ruv iv KOVUM 6tov
(Philon., p. 64, 1. 1, sq.).

| Post. Cain., 5 (I. 229). Q uo d det. pot. ins., 42 (I. 220).

II Leg. All., III. 2 (I. 88) ; SS. Ab. et Cain., 18 (I. 175) ; Post. Cain., 2 (I. 227),
9, p. 231.

HIS OMNIPRESENCE. 43

where,"* implying that he himself was not some where, not walk
ing in Paradise, and contained by it, as Adam had supposed.f
We must therefore understand the language figuratively when
Noah prays that God will dwell in the houses of Shem. J God is
said to dwell in a house, not as in a place, but as exercising
a peculiar providence and care over that spot ; for every
owner has a necessary regard for his house. This illustration
may help to explain a passage where Philo expresses himself
more philosophically. God, he says, is both here and there
at the same time, not moving by transposition, so as to
occupy one place and leave another, but using an intensive
motion. || The meaning seems to be that, though God remains
immovable in his omnipresence, yet his power may be
manifested with varying intensity in different places, just as
he is said to dwell in the purified soul as in a house,
because his watchful providence is most conspicuous there.

In the foregoing exposition the influence of Stoical language
and conceptions is apparent, though Philo differed from the
Stoics in maintaining the transcendence and immateriality of
God. The question may be raised whether he succeeded in
borrowing only so much of the Stoical thought as suited the
organizing principle of his own system, and in emancipating
himself from materialism so completely as he supposed.
The argument that God cannot be in a place because he
contains, but is not contained, is not valid except on the
supposition that he is an extended substance., vaster than
all this visible universe. This notion is still more strongly
suggested when it is said that God contains all things
"in a circle,"^" and that he is the boundary of the heaven,

* Gen. iii. 9, TTOV tl, understanding TTOV not in its interrogative but declaratory
sense.

t Leg. All., III. 17 (I. 97) ; Somn., I. 11 (I. 630). J Gen. ix. 27.

Sobriet., 13 (I. 402).

|| SS. Ab. et Cain., 18 (I. 175-6). So, I think, we must understand rovuy
Xpwjutvoe ry KivijafL, assigning to roviKy the sense, not of extension, but of
strain ; for the former implies local movement, which is here expressly denied.

H Somn., I. 31(1.618).

44 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

which is indeed thus contained, but not by empty space, nor
by any material substance* either equal in magnitude to
itself or infinite. t This brings before the mind the idea
of an essence extended through space, and so participating
in one of the properties of matter; or, to borrow the simile
which Augustine applies to his own immature thought, it
likens God to an infinite sea, enclosing and permeating the
universe as though the latter were a huge sponge. J Yet I
believe that Philo was well aware that his language did not
correspond with the reality, but only reflected those forms of
the imagination which we so naturally employ when we think
of the incomprehensible Cause. In the latter of the two pas
sages just referred to, when he speaks of God as the boundary
of the heaven, he calls him in the same line its " charioteer
and pilot," words which are obviously figurative ; and as
he asserts that the heaven is infinitely great, he cannot have
conceived of it as literally contained or circumscribed. In
the former passage he proceeds to explain, in opposition to
those who assign a place to God either within or without
the cosmos, on the ground that everything in existence
occupies some place, that in the opinion of others (evidently
including himself) the Unbegotten is not like anything created,
but absolutely transcends it, and leaves even the swiftest
thought far behind ; but for this very reason it is impossible
to apprehend the intelligible cosmos except by transference
from the perceptible, or to think of the immaterial except
by starting from the material. If the " unchangeable beauty "
of the higher world can thus be discerned only by an ascent
from our lower perception into "some unspeakable and inex
plicable vision," I think we may be justified in referring
Philo s language respecting the all-containing nature of God,

* 2&lt;5//a. f Quis rer. div. her., 47 (I. 505). J Confess., VII. 5.

Cf . Quaest. et Sol. in Ex. II. 40, " Post autem mundum non est locus, sed
Deus," -which certainly suggests a meaning not strictly reducible to terms of
space.

HE IS ABOVE SPACE AND TIME. 45

not to his dimensions in space, but solely to his trans
cendence as cause. It is not that he literally contains the
cosmos as the circumambient air contains the earth, but that
as the sole Cause he necessarily comprises within his own
Being every visible effect, which remains as it were enfolded
in everlasting dependence on his creative will. This view
alone is in accordance with Philo s clearly defined doctrine of
the divine unity ; for the notion of possible division is in
separable from that of extended substance. We may, there
fore, conclude with some degree of confidence that, in Philo s
opinion, not only was God incapable of being confined within
the limits of any locality, but he was altogether exempt from
the conditions of space.

If God is above the conditions of place, he is equally
above time.* This subject is fully unfolded in connection
with the unchangeableness of God.

Our sentiments [it is said] are inevitably liable to change, because it is
impossible for us to foresee either the contingencies of the future or
the sentiments of other people. But to God everything is manifest,
for he penetrates even to the recesses of the soul, and sees clearly
what is invisible to all others, and, making use of his own peculiar
excellences, forethought and providence, he suffers nothing to escape
his apprehension, since not even the obscurity of the future affects him,
for nothing is either obscure or future to God. Future events are shaded
by coming time ; but God is the Creator even of time, for he is the
Father of its father, the cosmos being the father of time, having generated
it through its own movement ; so that time has to God the relation of a
grandson.f For the perceptible cosmos is the younger son of God, the

* Post. Cain., 5 (I. 228-9).

t It is, I think, interesting to compare the similar figure, applied to a different
subject, in Dante :

"Filosofia, mi disse, a chi 1 attende,
Nota non pure in una sola parte,
Come Natura lo suo corso prende
Dal divino Intelletto e da sua arte :
E se tu ben la tua Fisica note,
Tu troverai non dopo molte carte,
Che 1 arte vostra quella, quanto puote,
Segue, come il maestro fa il discente,
Si che vostr arte a Dio quasi 6 nipote."

Inferno, Canto xi., 97-105.

46 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

ideal world being the elder. Time, therefore, having sprung from the move
ments of this younger son, cannot affect the conditions of the divine
existence, and nothing is future with God; for his life is not time,*
but eternity ,f the archetype of time, and in eternity nothing is either
past or future, but only present. J

This statement helps to confirm our criticism in regard to
space ; for it is obvious that Philo elevates God absolutely
above the conditions of time. Eternity is not, in his view,
equivalent to infinite duration, of which time is a finite portion ;
for such duration necessarily involves past, present, and future.
The essence of time consists in succession ; for, according to
Philo, our idea of it is derived from moving bodies. But
phenomenal succession is precisely what is denied in eternity.
To God the totality of existence is immovably present, and the
coming and going of events, which pass in an ever-flowing
stream across the limited field of our consciousness, cannot ruffle
the stability of his infinite Being. Eternity is the archetype
of time, not by communicating to it its own unalterable now,
but because it bears to real being, that is to God, the same
relation that time bears to phenomenal existence. ||

God s independence of time and space establishes his
omniscience. As we have seen in the passage which we have
been just considering, no remoteness of time can conceal
anything from him to whom time exists not. The same con
sideration applies to space. No man can hide himself from
God, who has filled the universe, and of whom not even the
smallest thing is desert. And what wonder, when one cannot
emerge even from the material elements, but in flying from
one necessarily enters another ? Nor can one escape from the
cosmos, for there is nothing outside it, the whole of the four
elements having been expended in its composition. Since,
then, it is impracticable to flee from the work of God, how is

J Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 276-7). Somn., I. 32 (I. 649)

|| See Vol. I. pp. 294 sq.

HIS OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE. 47

it not rather impossible to run away from its Maker and
Governor ?* The doctrine of the divine omniscience is brought
forward chiefly in its relation to the secrets of the human
soul. The impure and impenitent man need not draw near to
worship; " for he shall never escape the observation of him
who sees the things in the recesses of the understanding, and
walks about in its inmost sanctuaries. "t Those who revile
the deaf or put a stumbling-block in the way of the blind
think not of him who holds his hand over and shields those
who are unable to help themselves ; but they cannot shun the
notice of God f( the overseer and administrator of all things/ J
even "of the invisible soul." What is a terror to the evil is
a joy to the good ; for he who honours parents., or pities the
poor, or benefits friends, or defends his country, or cares for
the common rights of all men, is well-pleasing before God,
who sees all things with sleepless eye, and calls what is
virtuous to himself. ||

That God is omnipotent follows immediately from the doc
trine that he is the sole efficient Cause, for any resistance to
him involves an adverse causality. This is constantly implied,
though not frequently asserted in Philo s discussions. We are
not, however, without explicit statements that "all things are
possible to God."^"

Having now noticed those attributes of God which bear no
moral impress, we turn to the consideration of those which
are expressive of his character. The treatment of these rests
upon the doctrine of the divine perfection, which is an imme
diate consequence of the views already explained. If God is
the sole absolute Cause, exhausting and transcending, as we
have said, every ideal that discloses itself in our minds, then he

* Quod det. pot. ins., 42 (I. 220-1). f Q uod ^ eus immut., 2 (I. 274).

} Justit., 10 (II. 368-9). Human., 2 (II. 384).

|| Mutat. Norn., 5 (I. 584).

^ Mundi Op., 14 (I. 10) ; Joseph., 40 (II. 75) ; Vita Mos., I. 31 (II. 108) ; Qu.
et Sol. in Gen. IV. 130.

48 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUBE OF GOD.

must be complete in himself, and contain within his own being
the sum of all conceivable good. His solitary independence
is asserted in the strongest manner by Philo. In commenting
on the words I am thy God "* he says :

They are employed with a misapplication, and not strictly ; for the
self-existent Being, regarded simply as self-existent, does not come under
the category of relation ;t for it is full of itself, and sufficient to itself,
equally hoth before and after the creation of the universe ; for it is
unchangeable, requiring nothing else at all, so that all things belong to
it, but it, strictly speaking, to nothing.^

In order to understand this passage we must carefully
observe the limitation &lt;c regarded simply as self-existent/ and
not hastily conclude that Philo places God beyond the reach of
every relation. His statement rests upon the logic of correla
tive terms, and is well illustrated by the examples in the
Organon. To take one of these man is not the correlative of
slave ; for though a man may possess a slave, yet he does so
not qua man, but qua master. So the conception of pure
being is complete in itself, and does not carry the thought to
anything beyond ; but the moment we speak of God as
Creator we are obliged to think also of things created, or
when we describe him as Cause we thereby put him in relation
to things that are caused. We must not suppose, however,
that Philo is drawing a merely logical distinction, for with
him logical distinctions are an evidence of reality. God, in the
totality of his being, is elevated above all relation ; he is
absolutely complete in himself, and nothing can add to his
fulness and perfection. Accordingly, when we ascribe to him
titles which are descriptive of relation, we refer only to certain
aspects of his being, certain "powers" which, because they
are directed towards objects, are "quasi relative." || The
limitation quasi is not used, I think, in order to evade a
difficulty. It seems to imply that the dependence of

* According to the LXX. rendering of Gen. xvii. 1.

j- To yap ov, y ov SOTIV, ow%t T&V irpoQ n. J Mutat. Nom., 4 (I. 582).

Arist., Org., Cat., vii. 6 sqq. || Qaavei

HIS PEBFECTION. 49

the correlative terms is not mutual, but is all on one side,
and that not the divine side. The powers of the Self-existent
are put forth into exercise without experiencing any alteration
in their intrinsic character through the reaction of the objects
to which they are applied ; so that, although their names in
volve a relation, it would be truer to say that their objects are
relative to them than that they are relative to their obiects.

The fulness of the divine perfection which gives rise to this
kind of one-sided relation, if I may so describe it, is clearly
set forth in a passage where Philo alludes to the offerings
that were presented in the festivals.

By the institution of festivals for himself G-od laid down a dogma
which is most necessary for the votaries of philosophy. " Now the
dogma is this : God alone truly feasts. For he alone rejoices, and alone
is glad, and alone has good cheer, and to him alone does it belong to keep
peace unmixed with. war. He is without pain, and without fear, and
unparticipant of evils, unyielding, unharmed, unwearied, full of pure
blessedness. His nature is most perfect, or rather God is himself the
summit and end and boundary of blessedness, sharing in nothing else
with a view to his improvement, but communicating what is peculiarly
his own* to all individual beingsf from the fountain of the beautiful,
himself. For the beautiful things in the cosmos would never have
become such if they had not been modelled after the really beautiful, the
unbegotten and happy and incorruptible, as an archetype. "J

The thought of the exhaustive completeness of God, which
we meet in the above passages, is repeated again and again
in various forms. " The full God " is in need of nothing, and
cannot be benefited by human service. || He is "full of
himself and sufficient to himself."^ Nothing "takes rank
with him ; for he needs nothing at all."** God cannot
literally swear, because there is none competent to be his
witness ; for " he is all the most precious things to himself,
kindred, relation, friend, virtue, blessedness, happiness,
knowledge, understanding, beginning, end, whole, all, judge,

* To I8iov. t

J Cherub., 25 (I. 154). Cf. Septen. 5 (II. 280).
|| Quod det. pot. ins., 16 (I. 202). IT Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 52).

** Leg. All., II. 1 (I. 66).
VOL. II. 4

50 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

opinion, counsel, law, action, sovereignty."* " God is not a
salesman, lowering the price of his own possessions, but the
bestower of all things, pouring forth the ever flowing fountains
of favours, not desiring a recompense ; for neither is he in
need himself, nor is any created thing competent to bestow a
gift in return/ t In fine God, " the most self-sufficing, is in
need of nothing else," being " the first and most perfect good/
" the ever flowing fountain of prudence and righteousness and
every virtue."!

It is a part of God s perfection that he has no participation
in evil ; and it follows from this that he cannot be the source
of evil. "It is/ says Philo, " a fault difficult or impossible
to cure to say that the Divine is the cause of evils." With
God are the treasures of good alone. || All his gifts are entire
and complete.^" He is " the cause only of good things, and of
no evil at all, since he was himself both the oldest of beings
and most perfect good."** This doctrine, on which we need
not dwell further at present, has important consequences in
connection with the problem of evil, which will be considered
in its proper place. ft

We must notice here a doctrine on which we have already

* Leg. AIL, III. 73 (I. 128). f Cherub., 34 (I. 161).

t Dec. Orac., 16 (II. 194) ; Sacrificant, 4 (II. 254). For the doctrine that
God is without wants see also Leg. All., III. 63 (I. 123) ; Cherub., 13 (I. 147) ;
Post. Cain., 1 (I. 227) ; Dec. Orac., 10 (II. 187) ; Fort., 3 (II. 377).

See the passages quoted on the last page from Cherub, and Septen.,
and also Mundi Op., 52 (I. 36).

I! Prof., 15 (I. 557-8.) H SS. Ab. et Cain., 14 (I. 173).

* Conf. Ling., 36 (I. 432). See also Qu. et Sol. in Gen. I., 100, with the
Greek in Harris, Fragments, p. 19, ws yap d^To^oQ Kaicias, ovru icai dvairioq.

ff One passage, however, expressly contradicts the above doctrine : Svo QIHTCIG
wpopev ysvofievag Kai TrXarTo^ivag Kai a/cpw TtToptvplvttG VTTO 6tov, rr)v
fitv s eavTtjc pXafispav icai eiriXriirTov Kai Kardparov, n]v &lt;Se ta$k\tfiov Kai
iiraiVTJ]v, Kai l^ovaav rfjv plv KifiSijXov, rr}v Sk doKipov xapaKTtjpa .... Eioi
yap tifftrep dyaQwv, ovrw Kai KOKWV Trapa r&lt; Bty Orjaavpoi: Leg. All., III. 34
(I. 108). If we attempt to reconcile this statement with Philo s habitual
teaching, we can only do so by saying that the evil nature is not so absolutely,
but only in relation to the moral life of man, in which the lower always becomes
evil in presence of a higher.

HIS FREEDOM FROM PASSION AND SIN. 51

touched, but which, belongs to the idea of the divine perfection.
The nature of God is free from pain and fear and every
passion.*" This follows directly from the fundamental con
ception of God as cause. As efficiency is his property, so
susceptibility is the property of that which is created; and,
therefore, as the passions express our susceptibility in relation
to certain objects, they cannot affect the supreme causal nature.
The same conclusion follows from moral considerations; for
whatever we do on account of wrath or fear or pain or
pleasure or any other passion is confessedly blameworthy, but
whatever we do with right reason and knowledge is laudable. t
Nevertheless Philo does not hesitate, in a very serious passage,
to speak of the " wrath of God J" as a thing to be carefully
shunned. But in doing so there can be no doubt that he
consciously used language which did not correspond with his
philosophical thought, and that he meant only to express that
passionless opposition to sin which we may reasonably ascribe
to the Divine ; for, as we have seen, he believed that the use
of this kind of inadequate or erroneous language was necessary,
and in regard to this very passion of anger, he says elsewhere
that it is properly predicated of men, but only figuratively of
the Self-existent. ||

From the reasonableness of God, thus wholly undisturbed
by passion, it follows that he is sinless. This is, of course,
everywhere implied, and in one passage it is distinctly asserted.
" Not to commit any sin at all is the property of God,^[ and
perhaps, also, of a divine man."** This statement derives
its chief interest from the added words, which show that
Philo did not regard the attribute of sinlessness as absolutely
incommunicable. A divine man was conceivable in whom this
element of the supreme perfection might dwell. We need not
suppose that this concession is inconsistent with the belief that

* Abr., 36 (II. 29). f Quod Deus immut., 15 (I. 283). J Opyij Otov.

Somn.,-11. 26 (I. 682). || Quod Deus immut., 1. c. IF "iSiov 9eov.

** De Poenitentia, 1 (II. 405).

4 *

52 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

sinlessness is in the strictest sense the property of God;
for it does not cease to be so by being lent out, as it were, for
the enjoyment of others, and the sinless man could become so
only by sharing in this high gift, and incorporating what was
really divine.

A parallel to this communication of the Divine occurs in
connection with the happiness of God. We have recently
cited a remarkable passage in which Philo insists on the
divine joyousness. The thought is one which is often repeated
in his writings. "The divine blessedness/ * "the blessed
and happy nature of God,"f are expressions which he uses
when nothing in the context particularly suggests them.
Elsewhere he says that " the nature of God alone participates
in perfect blessedness and happiness. "{ Here the word
"participates " is not philosophically accurate ; for it implies
that happiness is something external to God, of which he is
only a sharer. This cannot be intended, unless we have
already gone fatally astray in our interpretation; and we
may recognize in this example the ease with which language
is used in relation to God which is strictly applicable only in
the case of lower beings. A little farther on Philo adds, more
philosophically, that the genus of joy belongs to no other
than the Father of the universe. But notwithstanding this
exclusiveness of possession, joy is not wholly unknown to the
human race. Though he possesses it, God does not grudge
its use to the worthy. He bestows as much as the capacity of
the recipient will allow ; but joy mingled with pain is all that
human imperfection will receive, even as the pure light of
heaven is seen by us commingled with our dusky air.

It is a part of the divine happiness to enjoy perfect rest and
peace.

Hence [we are told] tlie Sabbath, which means rest, is repeatedly said
by Moses to be the Sabbath of God, not of men; for the one

* Cherub., 6 (I. 142). f Special, leg., IV. 8 (II. 343).

i Abr., 36 (II. 29). Mirk K ovaa.

HIS BEST AND PEACE. 53

entity that rests ia God. But by rest is meant " not inactivity
since the Cause of all is by nature efficient, never ceasing from
making the most beautiful things but the most unlaboured energy,
without distress, with, ample ease." On the other hand, even the
sublimest objects in nature, the sun and moon and entire heaven and
cosmos, are distressed by continual movements which are not at their
own disposal, and the changing seasons give the plainest evidence of their
weariness. But God changes not, and has no weakness, and is therefore
unwearied, and, though he makes all things, will never cease to rest.*

The same idea is brought out in an allegory of unusual
beauty.

The city of God is called by the Hebrews Jerusalem, a name which
signifies the vision of peace.f Wherefore we must not seek for the
city of the Self-existent in the regions of earth for it is not built of
wood and stone but in a soul unwarlike and keen- sighted, which has
preferred the contemplative and peaceful life. For what more venerable
and holy house could one find for God than an understanding devoted
to contemplation, eager to see all things, and not even in a dream
desiring sedition or confusion? For the " Spirit which is accustomed
to associate with me unseen " testifies that " God alone is the most
absolute and real peace, but begotten and corruptible matter is all
continual war ; for God is volition,;}; but matter is necessity. Whosoever,
then, is able to leave war, and necessity, and genesis, and corruption,
and to go over to the Unbegotten, to the incorruptible, to the volitional,
to peace, would justly be said to be a dwelling-place and city of God.
Let it, then, make no difference to thee to name the same subject either
vision of peace or vision of God ; for of the many -named powers of the
Self-existent peace is not only a member, but even a leader."||

In these passages the weariness and struggle of nature
are ascribed to the necessity under which it labours. The
connection of strife and fatigue with necessity is not imme
diately apparent ; but it is probably inferred from the analogy
of man, who, when he labours under compulsion, soon grows
tired, and inwardly wages war against the demands of his
situation. The human experience is easily transferred to the
heavenly bodies, which were also supposed to be intelligent
beings, and from them to the entire cosmos. We cannot help
remembering St. Paul s description of the whole creation as

* Cherub., 26 (I. 154-5). f Taking the word from HSH and

$ EKOVCIOV. AvayKrj. \\ Somn., if 38 (I. 691-2).

54: THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

groaning and travailing, waiting to be delivered from the
bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the
children of God.* In opposition to the toil and trouble of
material nature is the peace of God, which, as we can readily
understand, is the immediate result of unrestricted volitional
energy. Where the same high purpose flows on undisturbed
and unimpeded, the sense of effort and confusion must dis
appear, and leave behind an eternal rest and peace.

If, before the creation of the universe, God was so perfect,
so sufficient to himself, so blissful, why did he make things
which he could not need ? To this question Philo returns the
answer which Plato had given before him f : (C Because he was
good and munificent," J and did not grudge to matter, which
of itself had nothing beautiful, a share of his own best nature.
And as the goodness of the Self-existent was the reason for
creation, so he continued to bestow abundant blessings both
on the universe and on its parts, not because he judged any
thing to be worthy of favour, but having regard to his eternal
goodness, the oldest of his graces, and supposing that it
belonged to his happy and blessed nature to do good.|| Philo
insists upon this goodness so repeatedly and in such varied
terms that we must devote a little space to the survey of
its activity.

In the first place, then, God was, by virtue of his goodness,
the Cause, the Maker, the Generator of the universe.^! In
connection with creation several questions of the highest
importance will arise, but at present we must be content to fix

* Eomans viii. 19, sqq. f See Timaeus 29 E. J Mutat. Norn., 5 (I. 585).

Mundi Op., 5 (I. 5). J. G. Miiller well points out that Philo imports into
the meaning of TO ayaQov the Hebrew conception of God s loving-kindness
which does not belong to it in Plato [Des Juden Philo Buch von der Welt-
schopfung. Herausgegeben und erklart von J. G. Miiller, Berlin, 1841 ; p. 156].

|| Quod Deus immut., 23 (I. 288-9). For the reason of creation see also
Cherub., 35 (I. 162) ; Leg. All., III. 24 (I. 102).

f It is sufficient to refer to Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2); 61, p. 42; Cherub., 13
(I. 147) ; 35, p. 162 ; Animal, sacr. idon. 6 (II. 242) ; Nobil., 5 (II. 442).

HIS PEOVIDENCE. 55

firmly in our memory the fact that, whatever agents or
methods he may employ, God is regarded as the sole source
of creative causality, and as having acted, not under the
suggestion of any advocate, but from himself alone.*

In the second place, God must exercise providence over
the cosmos, caring both for the whole and for the parts. The
doctrine of providence is involved in the very conception of
a benevolent Creator, " for it is necessary by the laws and
ordinances of nature that that which has made should always
care for what has been generated, even as parents provide for
children.^f Hence God is the cc saviour and benefactor" of
the world. J "Arrayed in sovereignty, he holds the reins of
the cosmos by an autocratic law and right, providing not only
for those who are more worthy of preference, but also for
those who seem to be more obscure." He is the one leader
and sovereign and king, to whom alone it rightfully pertains
to preside over and administer all things, "|| "the Archon of
the great city, the general of the invincible host, the pilot who
always manages the universe with saving care."^[

In the exercise of his providence God s goodness is poured
forth with unrestricted prodigality. Being munificent, he
graciously bestows good things upon all, even upon the
imperfect, provoking them to the acquisition and zealous
pursuit of virtue, and showing at the same time that his
superabundant wealth is sufficient even for those who will
not be greatly benefited. He displays this very evidently
in the case of inanimate nature. For whenever he rains in

* Ovdevi fit TrapaKXrjTy T LQ yup ijv ere pOQ ; /tovy de kavrtp
Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5).

f Mundi Op., 61 (I. 41). See also 3, p. 2 ; Special, leg., III. 34 (II. 331) ;
Praem. et poen., 7 (II. 415).

+ Animal, sacr. idon., 6 (II. 242). Swr^p also Quod Deus immut., 34 (I. 296) ;
Migrat. Abr., 5 (I. 440) ; 22, p. 455 ; Quis rer. div. her., 12 (I. 481) ; Abr.,
27 (II. 21) ; Septen., 23 (II. 296) ; Praem. et Poen., 19 (II. 427) ; Exsecrat.,
8 (II. 435) ; Fragm., II. 677 (Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II., 2) ; Tisch., Philon., p. 43,
1. 3. Migrat. Abr., 33 (I. 465). || Conf. Ling., 33 (I. 431).

IF Dec. Orac., 12 (II. 189).

56 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

the sea,, and showers down fountains in the most desert places,
and waters the thin and rough and barren soil, making rivers
gush forth in floods, does he not display the excess of his
riches and goodness ?* In accordance with this rule he
tempers judgment with mercy, and exercises pity for the
benefit even of the unworthy ; and he not only pities after he
has judged, but he judges after he has pitied ; for with him
pity is older than judgment."t In varied figures Philo speaks
of " the abundant riches of the gracesj of God/ which
are awarded without stint to the worthy. They issue from
ever flowing fountains, themselves perennial, unceasing, and
without intermission. 1 1 Again, they are personified, and
become the virgin and immortal daughters of God, whom
an immovable law of nature binds in inseparable unison.^f
The kindness of God is described by many predicates. He is
munificent,"** giver of wealth, ft kind and lover of man,JJ
benevolent, propitious. |||| He manifests equity and kind
ness, TflT an ^ " his goodness and propitious power are the
harmony of all things.""***

In speaking of the unrestricted prodigality of the divine
beneficence, we refer only to its own intrinsic character, for
it is in fact restricted by the limited capacity of those who
experience it. The graces of God are uncircumscribed, but

* Leg. AIL, I. 13 (I. 50). f Q uod Deus immut., 16 (I. 284).

J Or favours, xupiriQ. Leg. AIL, III. 56 (I. 119).

i| Mundi Op., 60 (I. 41) ; Cherub., 34 (I. 161) ; Sacrificant, 5 (II. 254).

^ Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232) ; Migrat. Abr., 7 (I. 441) ; Vit. Mos., II. 1 (II. 135).

** i\6()wpo. See, besides the passages already cited, Cherub., 6 (I. 142) ;
9, p. 144 ; Post. Cain., 8 (I. 231) ; Quis rer. div. her., 7 (I. 477) ; Plantat. Noe,
20 (I. 342) ; 21 (I. 343) ; Migrat. Abr., 6 (I. 441) ; Prof., 13 (I. 556) ; Praem.
et Poen., 20 (II. 428).

ff nXourodorTje, Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232).

KOI 0iXdv0,ow7ro, Abr., 36 (II. 29).
fc, Vita Mos., II. 1 (II. 135) ; III. 31, p. 171.

, Vit. Mos., II. 1; Special, leg., II. 5 (II. 274); De Parentibus
colendis, 9, p. 28, of Mai s edition, this treatise not being in Mangey;
Fort., 7 (II. 382) ; and several other places.

IT IT Exsecrat., 9 (II. 436). *** Vit. Mos., III. 14 (II. 155).

HIS PEOVIDENCE. 57

not so the faculties of their recipients ; for it is not the nature
of that which is created to receive benefits, as it is the nature
of God to confer them, since his powers are infinite, but the
created, being too weak to receive their vastness, would faint
unless the lot of each were measured out in due proportion."^
If the stream of mercies carne with its own inexhaustible
flood, the plain would be like a lake and a marsh instead
of fruitful soiLf Or we may take an example from the
sun, whose flame we cannot look upon unmixed, for the sight
would be extinguished by the brilliance of its rays ; yet the
sun is only a single work of God, a mere aggregate of ether,
and how, then, can we view unmixed those unbegotten powers
which, round about him, flash forth the most splendid light ?
Thus no mortal, not even the whole heaven and cosmos, could
receive in their purity the knowledge and wisdom and pru
dence and righteousness, or any of the other virtues of God.
The Creator, therefore, in condescension to our natural weak
ness, is not willing either to benefit or punish as he can, but
only in proportion to the capacity which he sees in those who
are to be affected. J Similarly, he does not deliver oracles
conformably to the greatness of his own eloquence, for who
could contain the force of the divine words ? For this reason
the Israelites said to Moses, " Speak thou to us, and let not
God speak to us, lest we die." For if God wished to display
his riches, not even the whole world would hold them; but
wishing us to derive benefit from what he bestows, he
alternates his gifts, so that the continual enjoyment of the
same favours may not produce satiety and harm. If creation
were ever without the divine graces, it would utterly perish ;
but it cannot bear their excessive and unsparing rush, and
therefore its strength is the measure of their flow.||

* Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5).

t Quis rer. div. her., 7 (I. 477). J Quod Deus imnrat., 17 (I. 284-5).

Ex. xx. 19.

|| Post. Cain., 43 (I. 253-4). See also Ebriet., 9 (I. 362) ; Somn., I, 22
(I. 642) ; Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218).

58 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD.

While Philo thus retained an assured faith in providence, he
was quite aware of the objections which were brought against
it. These objections are discussed at great length in two
treatises " On Providence/ which have been preserved in an
Armenian version, and from the second of which Eusebius
quotes considerable portions in his Praeparatio Evangelii.
There is little that is original in the line of argument, and
what is most remarkable in these essays is their purely
philosophical and Hellenic character, which broadly dis
tinguishes them from the expository and Judaic colouring
of most of Philo s writings. The first is open to suspicion,
and cannot be safely appealed to in evidence of Philo s
opinions.* It would not greatly advance our knowledge of
the Alexandrian philosophy, and it would occupy a dispro
portionate space, to give an analysis of the contents even
of the second treatise, and it must suffice to notice a few
of the more salient points.

The constantly recurring arguments against providence
are mainly of two kinds. First, the existence of pain, which
is inflicted by various natural agents, appears iD consistent with
the supreme control of benevolent design. The violence of
winds and rain, hail and snow, lightning, earthquakes and
pestilence, wild beasts and noxious reptiles, inflict the most
terrible calamities on mankind. f In reply to this, several
considerations are urged. First, in regard to the whole ques
tion of providence, it must be remembered that the doctrine
does not imply that God is the cause of everything. Of what
is really evil, or what lies outside the course of nature, God is
no more the cause, than the beneficent law by which a virtuous
state is administered is the cause of the violence and rapine
which spring from the wickedness of the inhabitants.};
Secondly, of those natural agencies which are occasionally
attended by calamitous results, some., like wind and rain, were

* See Vol. I. p. 306, Note. f Prov. II. 87-97. J Prov. II. 82.

HIS PKOVIDENCE. 59

not intended for the rain of sailors and farmers, but for the
benefit of the whole human race, for they purify the earth
and air, and so contribute to the support of animals and
plants; and if a few suffer, it is no wonder, for they are
an insignificant portion of that entire class of men for whose
benefit providence is exercised.* Again, some infliction of
pain may be necessary to ensure the safety of the entire
system. The man who takes a just view will rejoice at what
ever is done without moral evil, even if it do not conduce
to pleasure, and will regard it as designed for the preservation
of the universe. A physician sometimes in dangerous diseases
amputates parts of the body in order to procure health for the
remainder, and a pilot, when storms assail him, casts over the
cargo in order to save the passengers, and no blame, but, on
the contrary, praise, attaches to these actions. In the same
way we must always admire the nature of the universe, and be
pleased with everything that is done apart from voluntary ill,
considering, not whether anything conduces to pleasure, but
whether the cosmos is directed safely, like a well-governed
city.f Another consideration is that some destructive agencies
are only accidental consequences of the primary design. We
can easily find illustrations of this in human affairs. Often
through the showy liberality of the master of a gymnasium
some of the vulgar wash in oil instead of water, and so make
the ground slippery ; but no one will ascribe the slipperiness
to the providence of the master. In cities you may observe
the porches generally inclining towards the south, so that
those who walk in them may be warm in winter, and enjoy the
breeze in summer. A consequence follows which was not
intended by the builders : the shadows thrown by the supports
indicate the hours. So again, fire is an essential work of
nature, but smoke is its consequence. Nevertheless, even
smoke is sometimes valuable, by betraying the advance of

* II. 99 ; Fragments, II. 642. f Praem. et poen., 5 (II. 413).

60 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD.

an enemy when fire is invisible owing to the brightness of the
sunshine. Thus, in the realm of nature, the rainbow and halo
and similar phenomena are merely accompaniments of her
primary works. Eclipses are consequences of the divine
natures of the sun and moon; bat they serve also as indi
cations either of the death of kings or the destruction of
cities. In the same manner earthquakes, pestilences, thunder
bolts, and similar things, though said to be sent by God, are
not really so ; for God is the cause of no evil whatever. The
changes in the elements produce these things, not as primary
works of nature, but as consequences which follow the neces
sary and primary works.* And lastly, just as states support
executioners, not through respect for their sentiments, but for
the utility of their services, so he who cares for that great
city the cosmos, appoints tyrants as public executioners over
those states in which he perceives violence, injustice, impiety,
and other evils ; and often, without employing such sub
ordinates, he inflicts the needed punishment through his own
agency, and sends famine, pestilence, or earthquake, by which
crowds are every day destroyed, and a great part of the
habitable world is desolated out of regard for virtue. f There
is some contradiction between these last two explanations,
so far as earthquakes and pestilence are concerned ; but in
regard to such causes of suffering they may be accepted as
alternative hypotheses.

The suggestion of a moral purpose in pain leads to the
second difficulty. If the world is righteously governed, why
is pain distributed with such a startling neglect of moral
considerations ? Why have the wicked an abundance of all
good things, riches, fame, honours, health, beauty, strength,
while those who pursue wisdom and virtue are almost all poor,
obscure, in a low position, without the means of support,
weak in their whole body, dull in their senses, languid,

* Prov. II. 99-102 ; Fragments, II. 643-4.
f Prov. II. 31-2 ; Fragments, II. 642.

HIS PROVIDENCE. 61

diseased, dyspeptic ? Why have a Polycrates and a Dionysius
everything that heart can wish, while a Socrates is done to
death by the plots of a worthless wretch ?* Why are the just
subject to the fear o death when a battle is imminent, and
the righteous and wicked overwhelmed with death at the same
time and place when a ship founders at sea ?t The first
answer is an attempt to limit the extent of the problem.
It does not follow that if certain persons are esteemed good
by us, they are really so, for the means of judgment possessed
by God are more accurate than those enjoyed by the human
mind. We have no tribunal which is competent to distinguish
between the righteous and the wicked, and secret sins may
have been committed by those who are apparently just.J
Then we must remember that providence takes a compre
hensive view, and that the righteous could not be exempt
from suffering without altering the whole constitution of
things, or suspending the laws of nature for individual benefit.
Having mortal bodies we are necessarily exposed to human
troubles. Bad men may plot against the good. If we are in
pestilential air, we must suffer from disease. If the wise man
is exposed to the rain he will be wet ; in the north wind he
will shiver; in summer he will be hot. Those who live in
places where crime abounds must submit to the penalty ; and
all who brave the wintry seas accept an equality of risk.
The good man readily acquiesces in this condition, for the
things which the wicked prize are not the highest objects
of human pursuit, or the sources of real blessedness. If
you have made your own divinity, your mind, the slave of
innumerable masters, desire, pleasure, fear, pain, folly, in
temperance, cowardice, injustice, it never can be blessed ; and
no one could ever suppose that it would be so who was once

* Prov. II. 3-14.

t (I. 59).

I Prov. (I. 60) ; II. 102 ; Frag., II. 644.

Prov. II., 24 and 102 ; Frag., II. 638 and 644.

62 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD.

smitten with admiration of the God-like good and beautiful.
The wise man desires not wealth and glory, but the acquisition
of virtue, and to penetrate to the audience-chamber of royal
reason.*

The foregoing sketch, in which, for the sake of clearness, I
have followed an order of my own, may suffice to show that
Philo was provided with reasons which appeared to justify the
ways of God, and how largely he followed Greek models in the
discussion of this difficult question.

We ought not to leave this subject without noticing the
fact that, in speaking of the providential arrangements of the
world, Philo sometimes substitutes nature for God. It will be
sufficient to illustrate this usage by a few examples. He says
that " all-provident nature "t assigned the face as the most
suitable locality for the senses. J " Nature" appointed man
the ruler of plants and animals. Though there are co-operating
causes in the production of plants and animals, yet nature is
the highest and elder and real cause ; and it is the fountain
and root and foundation of the arts and sciences, and, unless
nature be first laid down as a basis, everything is imperfect. ||
Of these passages the last is peculiarly important, because it is
the writer s object to show why first-fruits were dedicated to
God, and at the same time it is apparent that nature is not used
as synonymous with God, but to denote the divine constitution
of things, brought about by the divine agency within
them.f

After the foregoing exposition, we shall not think that Philo
has fallen into a feeble and unphilosophical contradiction when,
having denied that God has any name, he yet speaks of the

* Prov., II. 16 sqq. ; Frag., II. 635 sqq.

7 H Travra 7rpofj.t]0ovfitvr] (f&gt;vai. I Leg. AIL, I. 11 (I. 49).

Agr. Noe, 2 (I. 301). || Quis rer. div. her., 23 (I. 489).

IT See also Special. Leg., III. 36 (II. 332), tTf.KTrjvaro ?/ &lt;}&gt;vai
Human., 9 (II. 390); Exsecrat., 7 (II. 434), &v [av9pw7rwv~\ f.ua /uj/r/yp &gt;}

HIS MANY NAMES. 6a

" many-titled name of God,"* and himself applies to him,
besides the customary term ff God/ quite an extraordinary
number of appellations.t There was no name which could
express his essence, and be regarded as the spoken equivalent
of his incomprehensible being ; yet there were many names by
which he might be referred to for the purposes of intelligent
communication, though they denoted only some of his modes
of operation or some partial aspects of his full and inexhaustible
perfection. How the transition was conceived between unity

* Dec. Orac., 19 (II. 196), rip TOV Oeov

f The following list, though probably far from complete, will convey a fair
impression of Philo s usage. There are, no doubt, many passages which I have
failed to note, as I did not originally intend to make an exhaustive list ; but the
numbers attached to each epithet, representing the number of times that I have
actually made a note of the expression, will probably give a pretty correct notion
of the proportional use of the various terms. wv occurs perhaps 29 times ;
but 18 times the gender is doubtful owing to the case ; ro ov, 38 times;
ov, 3 ; TO TTOOQ a\i]9iiav ov, 3 ; and o OVTIOQ &v very frequently. Tow
(gender doubtful) occurs once ; TO \iovov once ; TOV d idiov (gender doubtful), once.
dytvvijTOQ is found 4 times; TO 0Iov, 12; TO OITIOV, 23; 6 mrtof, 1; TOV
TTcivTW aiTiov Kcti TraTpog, 1 ; TO T&V o\o)v a iriov, 2; 6 rwv o\iov VOVQ, 4 ;
6 VOVQ TWV o\h)v, 1 ; 6 TOV TravTOQ VOVQ, 1 ; r} TWV oXwr "^v^ij, 1 &gt; "&gt;! TOV TTUVTOQ
^w%?7, 1 ; 6 SijfuiovpyoQ, 6; 6 TrotrjrriQ, 4; 6 TTOUJTIJQ TU&gt;V oXwv, 4; 6 KooyiOTrotof,
1; 6 rjysp.&lt;tiv, 2; 6 7rar?/p, 15; 6 OeoQ o TraTrjp, 1 ; 6 irdvTwv vrarjyp, 1 ; o TOV
7rar?}p, 1 ; o Trar^p TOV Travrog, 2 ; 6 irarrjo TO!V 6Xwv, 11 ; 6 TOJV oXwv
, 6 aykvvr]TOQ Otoc;, Kai TCI 0vjj,7ravTa yevvtov, 2 ; 6 TOV Kofffiov TraTrjp, 1 ;
o ret oXa yevvrjaag TraTrjp, 1 ; 6 dyivrjTog KO.I TTCIVTIOV Trar^p, 1; o TrptfffBvTspog
dpxujv Kat 7/yfjUWj/, 1 ; 6 Trarijp, 6 (iXwv 6e 6f, 1 ; 6 ytwiivctQ avTOvg [rout,*
aTrXa^fTg] Trarr/p, 1; o TUJV OVTMV Trar^p, 1; 6 7rar/}p Kat ?/yf/iwj/ TWV

ffV/J.7TUVTtt)V, 2 .... TOV KO(T/iOU, 1 .... TOV TCaVTOQ, 1 ; 6 TOV TTUVTOQ ?}yjU(J^

Kai TraTrjp, 1 ; 6 KTiffTrjg /cai 7rarr}p TOV iravTOQ, 1 ; T&V oXtuv KT KJTIJQ KO.I
, 1; o TroirjTrjg Kai TraTrjp, 2; o 7rar?)p Kai TroujTr is, 1; 6 TroirjTrjg /cat
U&gt;V o\&lt;i)V, 3 .... TOV TTavTO(;, 1 ; 6 ?rar;}p Kat TTOII]TIIQ TWV oXav, 1 ; 7rar/}p

Kflt TTOlT)Tf/i; TOV KOfffJLOV, 2 ; 6 Ctykvi]TQ Kttl TTOirjTIJG, 1 ; O 7TaTj)p (Cat (3affl\VQ

TO&gt;V o\(DV, 1 ; yervr]Tr}Q raJV oXwv, 1 ; o r)yf/i&lt;ui TOV TTUVTOQ, 1 ; o TWV o\wv
iiytfjLwv, 5; 6 Travrjyfuwv, 1; 6 Travr]ytpuv Otog, 1; 6 TOV TTUVTOQ T/yf/twi/, 3;
6 Qtcjv Kai avOpwTTiiJV r/yfjuwv, 1 ; 6 TravTtov j/yf/iwv, 3 ; 6 TTOL^T^JQ Kai ryyfjuwv
Tovoe TOV TravTOQ, 1 ; 6 StaTroTtjg aTrdvTwv, 1 ; 6 irainrovTaviQ, 1 ; 6 trwr^p, 4 ;
6 rarr}p TOV TCUVTOQ, 1 ; 6 aiorfjp QSOQ, 4 ; 6 (rar?/jO Kat t XfW QtoQ , 1 ; 6 fiovog
GWTijp, 1 ; o fiuvoc; (T0(f&gt;6(;, 7 ; otTrtartup 0fof, 1.

The above list, to one who attempts to penetrate its religious and theological
significance, will not be without instruction.

$ THE EXISTENCE AND NATUBE OF GOD.

and manifoldness, between the absolute simplicity of the
supreme Mind and the endless variety of his tokens in the
cosmos, between the stillness and peace of an eternal and
immutable nature and the stir and rush of the phenomenal
world, must be the subject of our consideration in the following
chapter.

CHAPTER Y.

THE DIVINE POWERS.

IN referring to the questions with which philosophy concerns
itself, we saw that one of these related to the powers by which
the universe was held together.* The reason for this inquiry
is sufficiently obvious. Detached heaps of unrelated phenomena.
would not constitute a cosmos. But the human intellect
already clearly perceived that the universe was one vast
system, in which the remotest parts had certain definite
relations to the whole and to one another, and the incessant
changes which were observed proceeded according to some
fixed sequence or law. Thus was indicated the presence of
some mysterious and pervasive power which constrained the-
multiplicity of phenomena into a cosmical unity. An analogy
for this is found in that smaller system which lies so near to
our consciousness, the human organism, with its central soul
and its extended energy pervading every limb. Such thoughts
seem to have been in Philo s mind when, alluding to the
journeys of Abraham, he wrote, " Travel through the greatest
and most perfect man, this cosmos, and consider how the parts
are disjoined by places, but united by powers, and what is this
invisible bond of symmetry and unity for all things. "-f -A.
further reason for inquiry is found in the fact that force is
the characteristic mark of a cosmos as distinguished from

* Spec. Leg., III. 34 (II. 331) ; Swapus alg avvk^Tai /ecu norepov avrat
awuctra fj acrwjitarot.
f Migrat. Abr. 39 (I. 471).

VOL. II. 5

66 THE DIVINE POWERS.

amorphous matter. Whenever matter assumes a distinctive
form, the change must be due to a force impressing itself on
the susceptible material. So long as that form remains, the
presence of the force is still indicated ; for without it matter
would necessarily sink back into a condition destitute of
quality, and thus we see that form and force are, if not
identical, at least coincident. Now, the visible universe
presents an endless variety of forms, which stand to one
another in certain logical relations ; and accordingly, though
our notion of force is one, and is justly expressed by a singular
noun, we are compelled to speak of forces, such as the habitual
or conservative, the organic, the vital, the rational, and count
less others, arranged " according to species and genera."*

We see, then, that the contemplation of the world around us
opens an inquiry into the nature of cosmical forces. We must
now connect this result with positions which we have already
attained. Since God is the Creator of the cosmos, and
ultimately the sole efficient Cause, it is evident that he is the
one fountain of power, and the cosmical forces must be at the
same time divine forces. In treating of the nature of God we
met with divine powers, into the precise character and functions
of which we did not then pause to inquire. Some of these,
like the creative and providential, evidently bring God into
connection with the universe, and take their place among the
forces of the cosmos. Thus, whichever way our thought
travels, whether from the universe to God or from God to the
universe, we still meet with divine powers as the connecting
link. To determine the nature of these powers, and their
relation to the world and to God, is the task which must next
engage our attention.

Before entering on our exposition, we must observe that
there is no part of Philo s philosophy that presents greater
perplexities or has received more divergent interpretations.

* Leg. All., II. 7 (I. 71). The line of thought here sketched will be justified
and developed as we proceed.

DIFFICULTIES OF THE INQUIRY. 67

Our difficulties arise from various sources. The character of
ancient thought differs widely in some important respects from
our own, and what from our point of view appear to be contra
dictory doctrines, derived from opposing systems, and placed
in unreconciled juxtaposition, might wear a more harmonious
aspect if we could transport ourselves into the old-world circle
of ideas ; and this we can do only through an exercise of
philosophical imagination. Again, it is, as we have seen, fully
admitted by Philo himself that our language about God is
necessarily inadequate, and that statements may be used for
purposes of instruction which will not bear the scrutiny of
rigorous thought. Connected with this is Philo s rhetorical
style, and copious use of figurative language. To make the
due allowance for popular or poetical expression requires a
delicate employment of critical skill. Allegorical interpre
tation gives rise to further difficulties ; for Philo s terminology
is repeatedly influenced by the passage on which he is com
menting, and it is not always easy to decide whether some
particular word is to be understood strictly or as the passing
symbol of some higher spiritual truth. Lastly, there are
passages which are so far inconsistent with one another that,
if they stood alone, we should deduce from them incompatible
doctrines ; how are we to deal with these passages ? The
easiest and most obvious plan is to accept the inconsistency,
and say that Philo, according to the varying exigencies of his
system, adopted now this doctrine and now that, and never
perceived that they were in absolute contradiction to one
another. In regard to some subordinate points, we may readily
admit that the mind of so unsystematic a writer might be
exposed to this kind of oblivion ; but in regard to a vital and
central doctrine of his philosophy we can hardly help surmising
that the fault lies in the interpreters rather than the author,
and we cannot acquiesce in this easy riddance of difficulties
unless the fair laws of exegesis leave us no other alternative.
It seems a truer plan to select among these passages the

68 THE DIVINE POWEES.

statements wliicli are least ambiguous, and, taking them as
our clue, to seek the higher conception in which the incon
sistencies will disappear; then, if this cannot be found, to
consider whether opposing statements may not be explained
as figurative, or even as a temporary conformity to views
which had no serious and permanent hold upon PhnVs mind ;
and only in the last resort to admit that our author did not
know his own thoughts, or was incapable of comparing them.
For the execution of this plan we cannot lay down any rules :
everything depends on thoroughness of examination, and
candour and insight of philosophical judgment.

Throughout the following discussion we must bear in mind
what has been previously said respecting the analogy between
the divine and the human, and the differences by which they
are contrasted.* The human genus is, says Philo, "the
counterpart of the powers of God, a manifest image of the
invisible nature, a created image of the eternal." t These
words form a compendium of the view which we have fully
unfolded elsewhere. The powers of the human soul fall
under our experience, and thereby furnish us with the only
key by which we can unlock the mysteries that lie beyond our
experience ; but, in applying this key, we must always re
member the infinite distinction between the created and the
uncreated.

Addressing ourselves now to the question proposed at the
opening of this chapter, and starting from the point most
accessible to our experience, we observe that the world is full
of forces, which combine its multifarious parts into a cosmos.
" This universe/ we are told, " is held together by invisible
powers, which the Fabricator stretched from the extremities
of earth to the ends of heaven, making excellent provision that
the things bound should not be loosened ; for the powers are
bonds of the universe that cannot be broken ."J God has

* Vol. II. pp. 3 and 10 sqq. t Vita Mos., II. 12 (II. 144).

$ Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464).

PHYSICAL FOKCES.

extended his powers through, earth and water, air and heaven,
leaving no part of the cosmos desert; through them he has
collected and bound all things indissolubly, and thus his power
has embosomed and permeated the universe."* Hence the
powers are properly described as " unifying ";f f r j being
fastened around the universe, they prevent it from being
dissolved and corrupted into its component parts. ; Owing to
this function they are most frequently compared to bonds;
but they are also likened to pillars which sustain the whole
cosmos as a house.

These powers, so far as they affect the material world,
correspond with what we designate as physical forces, although
both the philosophical and the scientific conception of them in
Philo may be different from ours. Thus it is said that the
nature or organism which distinguishes plants is composed of
several powers, those of nutrition, change, and growth. || There
are " powers in bodies " which affect the senses according to
certain properties.^ We apprehend the Cause "from the
cosmos and its parts and the powers existing in these.""*"*
The language deviates more widely from our own when the
four elements are described as powers,ft and when it is stated
that God bestows some of his benefits " through earth, water,
air, sun, moon, heaven, other incorporeal powers. "{J This
inclusion of natural objects among the powers hardly receives
adequate explanation from Keferstein s suggestion that
" Philo regards them as the dwelling-place of the divine
powers." In accordance with our previous exposition, we must
rather suppose that the powers constitute the sole reality of
natural objects by differentiating them from otherwise indis
tinguishable matter. The sun, moon, and other bodies are

* Conf. Ling., 27 (I. 425).
% Conf. Ling., 32 (I. 430).
|j Quod Deus immut., 8 (I. 278).
** Leg. All., III. 32 (I. 107).

t EvoniKat, Plantat. Noe, 20 (I. 342).

Frag., II. 655.

11 Conf. Ling., 13 (I. 412).

ft Quis rer. div. her., 57 (I. 513).

P. 188.

70 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

not independent entities which, divine powers may inhabit or
may leave, but they are sun, moon, and so forth simply from
the presence and action of solar, lunar, and other forces, and
therefore it is at least as correct to say that they are powers as
to say that they are material. Withdraw from them all force
and they must lapse into the desert ground of unreality, as if
some noble statue, on which the sculptor had impressed his
skill, were to lose its informing idea, and sink back into the
shapeless block from which it was hewn.

It is a legitimate inference from what we have hitherto
learned of Philo s anthropology, that the mental faculties belong
to the same great category of divine powers ; for though they
are not expressly so described, we have seen that they are
eternal essences, and their divine character is further proved by
the derivation of the rational soul from the very substance of
God, " God having breathed in as much of his own power as
a mortal nature could receive."* Whether, then, we turn to
the world of matter or of mind, we are everywhere confronted
by a system of powers, which abide through all the changes of
phenomena, give form and reality to the objects of nature, and
carry the soul aloft to the primal fount of being.

Before entering on the more difficult questions connected
with the powers, we may notice their more obvious predicates,
negative and positive. In the first place, they are not
independent causes. This follows from the previously
established doctrine of the sole ultimate causality of God ;f
but it is also expressly asserted :

The sun, moon, and stars were said to have been created on the fourth
day, after the earth had produced its herbage, because God foresaw that
men would regard the revolutions of the heavenly bodies as the causes
of the earth s annual produce, and lie wished to teach them that the first
causesj were not to be ascribed to anything created, and that he himself

* Nobil., 3 (II. 440). f See Vol. II. pp. 4 sq. and 54 sq.

y airiac;.

DEPENDENT, BUT DIVINE. 71

did not require the aid of those luminaries, " to which indeed he has
given powers, but not autocratic " powers ; for, as a charioteer or a pilot,
" he leads everything as he will, according to law and right, requiring the
aid of nothing else, for all things are possible to God."*

So it is said elsewhere that

When our mind entertained the Chaldsean opinion, it used to ride round
the efficient powers as causes ;f but when it departed from this view, it
knew that the cosmos was governed by a Euler, of whose sovereignty it
received a mental representation. J

The last words will receive their full explanation hereafter ;
at present it is sufficient to observe that, according to the
passages just cited, the powers owe their efficiency to God,
and in no way interfere with Ms independent and absolute
sway.

But though the powers are thus subordinated to God, they
partake of his mystery and greatness. Our language is unable
to describe, not only the Self-existent, but even the powers
which act as his body-guard. The latter, belonging as they
do to the invisible and intelligible God, are themselves
absolutely invisible and intelligible. They are intelligible,
moreover, not in the sense of being actually apprehended by
the mind, but because, if they could be apprehended, it
would not be perception, but only the purest mind that could
apprehend them. They are, in fact, inapprehensible in essence,
and reveal only the effects of their energy. || So when Jacob
wrestled with an invisible antagonist, one of the (: ministering
powers," he asked in vain for his name ; for the powers, like
the Self-existent, are unspeakable, and names, those symbols
of the begotten, must not be sought with incorruptible
natures.^" It follows that the powers are immaterial,** and
they are accordingly so described. ft If tin 8 seems incon
sistent with the inclusion of the elements and other bodies
amonsj the powers, we must remember the explanation lately

* Mundi Op., 14 (I. 10). f T Spaorripiovt; Swa^ug UQ alriag.

I Mutat. Norn., 3 (I. 581). Leg. ad. Cai., 1 (II. 546).

[| Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218). 1T Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 580). *

tf Somn., I. 11 (I. 630) ; Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261).

72 THE DIVINE POWERS.

given. Every object, so far as it differs from primitive
matter, does so through the presence of an immaterial force ;
and when it is itself ranked among the powers, the reference
must be, not to its material side, which it possesses in common
with every object of perception, but to the intelligible force
which alone renders it capable of distinction and classification.

It is but one step further to say that the powers are uncir-
cumscribed and infinite as God himself,* independent of
time,f and unbegotten.J It follows that they are not
exhausted in the world of nature. God uses them unmixed
in relation to himself, but tempers them towards creation, for
it is impossible for a mortal nature to contain them in their
purity. We cannot look upon the flame of the sun unmixed,
for our sight would be quenched by the splendour of its beams,
though the sun is but a single work of God ; and are we to
suppose that we can fully understand, in their unblended
perfection, those unbegotten powers which, round about him,
flash most brilliant light ? The heat of the sun is subdued by
the frigid air, and so the divine powers are tempered to the
natural weakness of created things. We have only to add
that they are "most holy,"|| and incapable of error. ^f In the
application of the above predicates to powers which primarily
reveal themselves through their energy as cosrnical forces,
Philo does not explicitly state the reasons which guided his
judgment ; but they followed from his inevitable recognition
of the powers as divine ; and their subtle, invisible, and
immeasurable action in nature, if it would not immediately
suggest, would at least confirm an opinion reached by the
theological path.

We are now prepared to look more narrowly at what we
may call the rational function of the cosmical powers. They

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173), a.7Tfpiypa&lt;J&gt;o ydp o 9foQ, 7rffu yp0ot /ecu at
tWa/u IQ avTov : Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5), where the statement is made immediately
of God s x"P trf but the context shows that these are equivalent to the powers.

t "Axpovoi, SS. Ab. et Cain., 19 (I. 176). J Quod Deus immut., 17 (I. 284).

Ib. || Frag., II. 655. [ Conf. Ling., 23 (I. 422).

ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 73

introduce into matter and preserve the distinctions to which
the various kinds of objects are due. Withdraw all force, and
matter must immediately lose all distinctive marks, and sink
into the dead level of what,, so far as knowledge is concerned,
is tantamount to the non-existent. If this be so, we must
recognise the presence of power wherever we discover objects
that are capable of being distinguished and classified ; in
other words it is the powers that determine the characteristics
of the various orders of phenomenal existence. This is
clearly brought out in a passage in which Philo comments on
Abraham s sacrifice of the heifer, she-goat, ram, turtle-dove,
and pigeon.* Abraham divided the animals, except the birds,
and "laid each piece one against another." After sunset
lamps of firef passed through the midst of the pieces.

" The lamps of fire which were borne," says Philo, " are the decisions^
of the torch-bearer God, which are brilliant and translucent, whose
habit it is to continue in the midst of the pieces, I mean the antitheses,
out of which the whole cosmos is composed. For it is said, Lamps of
fire which passed through the midst of the pieces, that thou mayest know
that the divine powers, going through the midst both of affairs and of bodies,
corrupt nothing for the pieces remain unaffected [that is to say, we are
not told that the lamps consumed the parts of the victims] but very
beautifully separate and distinguish their several natures." [In conse-
sequence of this office they are described as] God s " cutters."

We see, therefore, that the process of differentiation which
we observed in noticing the phenomena of the cosmos is due
to the action of divine powers, which assign its distinctive
nature to each class of objects.

Since the function here ascribed to the powers is that which
belongs to the Platonic ideas, we cannot be surprised when
Philo explicitly identifies the former with the latter. The
principal passage in which he does so is one where he
represents God as returning a philosophical reply to the

* Gen. xv. t Aap.7ructs irvpos, LXX.

J Kpi&lt;m,=the separating judgments.

Quis rer. div. her. 61-2 (I. 518).

74 THE DIVINE POWERS.

entreaty of Moses that, as he could not reveal himself, he
would at least grant a vision of his glory * that is, of the
powers which acted as his body-guard. The reply, having
explained that the powers were, like God himself, inappre
hensible in essence, proceeds

" As, among you, seals, whenever wax or any similar material is applied
to them, make innumerable impressions, not suffering the loss of any
part, but remaining as they were, such you must suppose the powers
around me to be, applying qualities to things without quality, and forms
to the formless, while they experience no change or diminution in their
eternal nature. But some among you call them very appropriately
ideas,t since they give ideal forrnj to each thing, arranging the un-
arranged, and communicating determinate limits and definition and shape
to the indeterminate and indefinite and shapeless, and, in a word, altering
the worse into the better. "

Precisely the same function is elsewhere attributed to God
and his powers : it was God who called order out of disorder,
quality out of things without quality, and so forth ; for it is
the constant care of himself and his beneficent powers to
reform the discord of the worse substance, and bring it into
harmony with the better. 1 1 Again, we hear of "the seal of
the universe, the archetypal idea, by which all things, being
without ideal form^f and quality, were marked and impressed."**
It can only be in this, their ideal sense, that the powers are
spoken of as measures,tf that is, as the standard rules in con
formity with which specific objects were made.JJ The character
thus discovered in them brings them nearer to the realm of
thought, and proves them to be amenable to its laws; and so
we are introduced to a new and fruitful field of speculation.

We cannot find a better introduction to this subject than

1 ElSoiroiovtri, which we must prefer to the reading
Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218-19). jj J us tit., 7 (II. 367).

^ Or without species, avtiota.

** Mutat. Norn., 23 (I. 598). Cf. Somn., II. 6 (I. 665). ff mkrpa.

H SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173). Cf. Qu. et Sol in Gen., IV. 8. See also
Muncli Op., 9 (I. 7) ; 44, p. 31.

ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 75

the oft quoted passage in which Philo bases his whole theory
upon the analogy of human thought and action. Having
stated that the first day in the account of creation relates to
the intelligible cosmos, he proceeds to unfold his meaning
as follows :

"For God, as being God, anticipating that there could never be a
beautiful imitation without a beautiful pattern, or any perceptible thing
faultless which was not modelled in conformity with an archetypal and
intelligible idea, when he wished to fabricate this visible cosmos, first
shaped forth the intelligible, in order that, using an immaterial and most
God-like pattern, he might work out the material cosmos, a more recent
copy of an older one, destined to contain as many perceptible genera as
there were intelligible in the other. But it is not to be said or supposed
that the cosmos which consists of the ideas is in any place ; but in what
way it subsists we shall know by following up an example of what takes
place among ourselves. Whenever a city is founded to gratify the high
ambition of some king or emperor, claiming autocratic anthority, and at
the same time brilliant in thought, adding splendour to his good fortune,
sometimes a trained architect having offered his services, and inspected
the suitability of the place, describes first within himself almost all the
parts of the city that is to be erected, temples, gymnasia, town-halls,
market-places, harbours, docks, lanes, equipment of walls, foundations of
houses and other public edifices. Then, having received the forms of each
in his own soul, as in wax, he bears the figure of an intelligible city, and
having stirred up the images of this in his memory, and, still more, having
sealed there its characters, looking, like a good workman, to the pattern,
he begins to prepare the well proportioned mixture made of stones and
timber,* making the material substances like each of the immaterial
ideas. Similarly, then, we must think about God, who, when he purposed
foundingf the great city, first devised its forms, out of which, having
composed an intelligible cosmos, he completes the perceptible, using the
former as a pattern. As, then, the city which was first formed within
the architect had no exterior place, but had been sealed in the artist s
soul, in the same way not even the cosmos that consists of the ideas could
have any other place than the divine Logos which disposed these things
into a cosmos. For what other place could there be for his powers which
would be adequate to receive and contain, I do not say all, but any one
unmixed ?"

* I follow Miiller s text. f KriZeiv, as before of the literal city.

I Mundi Op., 4-5 (I. 4). Compare the account of the ideal tabernacle revealed
to the soul of Moses as the pattern of the material one : Vita Mos., III. 3
(II. 146).

7G THE DIVINE POWERS.

This passage affords a succinct view of Philo s theory ; but
its more important propositions are selected for separate treat
ment in different places, and it will be convenient to refer to
these in their order.

In the first place, the reality of the ideas and their influential
action upon matter are asserted in the strongest way in the
following passage :

It is only one of the forms of error maintained by impious and unholy
men to say that the immaterial ideas are an empty name without
participation in real fact. Those who affirm this, remove from things
the most necessary substance,* which is the archetypal pattern of all
the qualities of substance,f in accordance with which everything is
ideally formed and measured. Thus, the opinion which destroys ideas
confounds all things, and reduces them to that formlessness which was
prior to the elements. Now, what could be more absurd than this ? For
God generated everything out of matter, not touching it himself, for it
was not fitting for the Wise and Blessed to touch indefinite and confused
matter, but he made use of the immaterial powers, whose real name is
ideas, in order that the suitable form might engage each genus. But
the opinion in question introduces great disorder and confusion ; for by
destroying the things through which qualities arise, it destroys at the
same time qualities themselves. J

We must return to this passage when we come to consider
the relation between God and his powers ; at present we must
fix our attention upon the reality and energy of the ideas.
In making them not only realities, but the most necessary
substance in material things, we may seem to be departing
completely from the analogy between God and the architect;
but it is not so if we can adapt ourselves to the moulds of
ancient thought. The images in the architect s mind were
also realities, having their permanent seat within ; for though
they might pass from his consciousness, yet they could be
stirred up again by memory, and be viewed as the pattern by
which to regulate his work, and so they corresponded, within
the spiritual sphere, to the impressions of seals upon the soul,

* Ou&lt;ria=immaterial essence. -j- Ouo-i a=matter.

J Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261-2).

ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 77

and were abiding forms of thought which might be con
templated and utilised at pleasure. But, further, though their
seat was within, and as immaterial essences they could not be
located in space, yet they reappeared in the visible city, and
were that most necessary reality which alone made it a city
instead of a chaos of stones and wood. The architect s
thought was manifest, and became objective in the stateliness
of every temple, in the beauty of every portico, in the dignity
or grace of every statue, in the massive strength of the
fortifications, and the useful arrangements of the docks.
Everywhere was the impress of human genius, that mysterious
combination of ideas, that subtle power, which alone differ
entiated the materials of which the city was composed from,
the wildness of the forest and the mountain ; and we know
how these ideas remain through the vicissitudes of matter,
speaking to us still from many a crumbling ruin, or rehabili
tated in the young splendour of some fresh creation. It is
they, then, that are the realities, apparent wherever art has
bodied forth its imaginations ; and yet, when you ask for
their locality, you can find it only in some artist s soul. So
it is with the infinite Artist. His ideas are eternal forms of
thought ; and though they reside only in the absolute Reason,
yet their impress is upon the universe, and they reveal their
energy through all the orderly arrangements and ideal shapes
of the material world.

The honour of this doctrine is of course ascribed to Moses,
and the reality of the ideas confirmed by a Scriptural appeal.
It is said in Genesis* that man (( was formed in accordance
with the image of God/ f that is, as Philo understands it, he
was made, not like God, but like the image of God. Now if
the part (man) was the image of an image, much more must
the whole perceptible cosmos be so.J The same conclusion
follows from the fact that throughout the first chapter of

* i. 27. f KaT tiieova Otov. J Mundi Op. 6 (I. 5).

78 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

Genesis things are said to have been made according to genus,
not according to species.* This is most apparent in the case
of man ; for God first formed the generic man, including male
and female, but afterwards the species, Adam.t Lastly, this
view is established by the statement J that God made " every
green herb of the field before it was produced, and all grass
of the field before it sprang up." The verdure and the grass
which were invisibly there before they grew upon the earth
can be nothing but the intelligible ideas which are the seals
of perceptible effects. Taking this as a sample of everything
else, we must suppose that of all other things which fall
under the senses there pre-existed older forms and measures,
and that nature completes nothing perceptible without an
immaterial pattern. ||

As having their seat in pure reason the ideas are invariably
regarded as immaterial.^]" Nevertheless, we have seen that
they are the most necessary substance or essence in things ;
and we may therefore venture to define them as an immaterial
intelligible essence or force, belonging by its nature to the
realm of mind, yet capable of exhibiting through matter a
multiform energy, and of maintaining through all corporeal
changes the permanence of ideal types. If these conceptions
appear at all incompatible, we must remember, in justice to
Philo, that the difficulty recurs in every philosophy which is
not materialistic. Who can explain how spiritual volition
passes into bodily movement, and impresses its lasting effects
upon the shapes of matter ? Philosophy can only arrive at
ultimate facts, which are of necessity ultimate mysteries ; and
from this law not even materialism can escape. The relation
between consciousness and corporeal movements may be

* Kara ykvoq=lcka, and not KCIT tldog. f Leg. AIL, II. 4 (I. 69).

* Gen. ii. 5. T&tcij icai ptTpa.
|| Mundi Op., 44 (I. 30-31) ; Leg. All., I. 9-10 (I. 47-8).

11 AffwpctToi. See Ebriet., 25 (I. 372) ; 33, p. 378 ; Vita Mos., III. 3
(II. 146) ; cf. Dec. Orac., 21 (II. 108), otipavbc b aowpaTot;. See before, p. 71.

ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 79

differently conceived, but cannot be denied; and Philo is
therefore guilty of no contradiction in suggesting an analogous
relation between the forms of the divine Thought and the
lasting types of phenomenal existence. The mode in which he
endeavoured to make this relation clear to his own mind will
be described farther on.

We learned just now that the nature of the ideas is
eternal. This thought, which follows from their connection
with the eternal Mind, is elaborated in a passage which serves
to exhibit at the same time the identity of the ideas witli
logical genera.

" As, when some man of letters or grammarian has died, the literary and
grammatical faculty in the men has perished with them, but the ideas of
these remain, and in a manner live as enduring as the cosmos, in accord
ance with which [ideas] present and future men in everlasting succession
will become literary and grammatical; so also the prudent, or temperate,
or manly, or just, or, in a word, the wise in any individual might be
destroyed, nevertheless in the nature of the immortal whole, as on a
monument, prudence has been inscribed as immortal, and virtue uni
versally as incorruptible, in accordance with which both now there are
good men and hereafter there will be unless we are to say that the
death of any individual man has wrought destruction to humanity, in
regard to which whether we are to call it genus, or idea, or notion,* or
what, those who inquire into the strict use of terms will know." [The
passage goes on to say that] as one seal often survives unimpaired the
destruction of innumerable impressions, so the virtues, even if all the
characters with which they have marked the souls of those who came to
them were effaced by evil living or some other cause, would still retain
for ever their pure and incorruptible nature.f

These eternal entities, which reveal themselves as archetypal
patterns through the visible objects of creation, form collec
tively, through their orderly combination, an intelligible
cosmos, J which is the archetype of the perceptible. Hence,
the intelligible universe is said to be composed or compacted

* Evvorjfia.

f Quod det. pot. ins., 21 (I. 205-6). See also Mutat. Nom., 11 (I. 590) ; Cherub.,
2 (I. 139-40) ; Quis rer. div. her. 24 (I. 489), -nav ytvoc a

80 THE DIVINE POWERS.

out of the invisible and immaterial ideas.* In this connection
a passage occurs which seems to make a distinction between
the ideas and the powers. " Through these powers," it is
said, " the immaterial and intelligible cosmos was compacted,
the archetype of this phenomenal one, composed of invisible
ideas, as this one is of visible bodies. "f According to this
statement, it would seems as though the ideas were something
used by, and therefore distinct from, the powers, with which
we have previously identified them. We might perhaps escape
from this difficulty by the supposition that the ideas which
compose the intelligible cosmos do not exhaust the totality
of the divine powers, and were consequently used by the creative
and other powers which were not included in them. It is,
however, an objection to such an explanation that Philo nowhere
else draws this distinction, and that he expressly describes the
intelligible cosmos as "the idea of the ideas, the Logos of
God,"f which is with him always the supreme term next to the
Self-existent himself; and moreover, no power could enter
into the thought of man without being itself a part of the
world of ideas. We must, accordingly, suppose that there
is some confusion owing to the two aspects under which the
powers may be regarded, as efficient, and as forms of thought ;
and the meaning will then be that through the agency which
belonged to them as divine they formed themselves into an
orderly and ideal world. It is well to notice this seeming-
contradiction, because the passage, to which we shall have to
return, is not in other respects free from difficulty and
confusion.

* Somn., I. 32. (I. 648) ; Vita Mos., III. 13. (II. 154) ; cf. Gigant., 13 (I. 271).

f Conf. Ling., 34 (I. 431).

J Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5).

I refer here to the extant Greek works. In the Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II. 68
(Greek in Harris, Fragments, pp. 66 sqq.) the intelligible cosmos is represented
as distinct from and inferior to the principal divine powers. Either this may be
an earlier and less consistent view, or both here and in the Conf. Ling, the
intelligible world may be spoken of in a limited sense, and not include the
human race.

ANSWEK TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 81

Since the intelligible cosmos is immaterial, it is exempt from
the conditions of space, and has no locality except the divine
Logos, or Thought. The meaning of this statement, which
is laid down in the passage placed at the beginning of our
present discussion, must be more fully considered farther on ;
but we may observe here that Philo locates the ideas not only
in the Logos, but in God himself, just as we might ascribe the
design of a city indifferently to the architect or to the mind of
the architect. Not only does he say that before the origin of
individual perceptible things the generic perceptible belonged
to the forethought of the Creator,* but he describes God as
the "immaterial place of immaterial ideas."f From this the
transition is easy to the conception of God as himself the
supreme archetype, from whom the ideas flow into the per
ceptible cosmos. He is the archetypal beauty, from whose
fount the beautiful things of earth derive their share. J He is
the archetypal beam, who sends forth countless intelligible
rays. He is the archetypal pattern of laws, and of the
perceptible sun the sun that is intelligible, affording from the
invisible fountains visible lights to that which is seen.|| Since
he is incomprehensible, he caused, as it were, a certain splendour
to gleam from himself, which we justly call form, scattering
around the entire mind immaterial rays, and filling it with
supercelestial light ; guided by which the intellect is brought
through the mediation of form to the archetype. ^ These
passages exhibit to us in figures that which is not clearly
presentable in thought. The fountain diffusing its waters
through various channels, still more the light, which seems so
akin to the immaterial, with its silent velocity, its impalpable
pervasiveness, and its power of kindling new expression in
every object on which it falls, fitly symbolized the flow of the

* *Hv TO yeviKov aiffQijTov TrpofirjOsi^ rov TreTroirjuoroQ, Leg. AIL, I. 10. (I. 48).
t Cherub., 14 (I. 148). J Cherub., 25 (I. 154).

Ib., 28 (I. 156). || Sacrificant., 4 (II. 254).

t Qu. et Sol. in Gen., IV. 1.

VOL. II. 6

82 THE DIVINE POWEBS.

divine Thought, and the wakening of chaotic matter into
beauty and order under the transfiguring touch of the ideas.
But Philo did not forget that even the loftiest ideas could not
exhaust the essence of God. He was the archetype of light,
but he was more, and it was truer to say that he was older and
higher than the archetype, and was himself like nothing
created.* If we infer from this that the ideas were only
partial expressions of the infinite fulness of God, we shall bring
the doctrine of ideas into coincidence with that of the divine
attributes which we have previously established. As the
supremely beautiful and the only source whence beauty could
flow, he might be called the archetype of beauty ; but, in truth,
the archetypal idea was only one mode of the eternal Thought,
and included with other ideas in that supernal unity which
is inapprehensible by the human mind. This relation is
expressed as that of father and son. The idea, the intelligible
cosmos, as being the offspring of the divine intelligence, is
called the son of God,f and the epithet older is prefixed to
distinguish it from its counterpart, the perceptible cosmos,
which is named God s younger son.J The parallelism which
is thus drawn between the two worlds shows that the higher,
like the lower, although it has no outward existence, is not
regarded as identical with the divine Mind, but only as an
expression of its activity. God himself is higher than his
mental creations, and folds them within the embrace of his
mysterious essence.

Since the powers are identical with the ideas, we might
reasonably expect them to be arranged in a logical hierarchy,
approaching, as they ascended, nearer to the full reality of
God. This conception was certainly entertained by Philo,
though he does not attempt any elaborate classification. He
recognises a few powers, of universal or nearly universal sweep,
as standing closest to the Self-existent ; but the countless
multitude below these he leaves without arrangement, and with

* Somn., I. 13 (I. 632). f Ytog 6tov. J Quod Deus immut, 6 (I. 277).

CONSTITUTE A HIEKARCHY. 83

only the most casual description or allusion. The fullest
account of the descending scale is contained in a passage
which gives an allegorical explanation of the cities of refuge.

These are six in number, and correspond with six divine powers. The
oldest and best, acting as the metropolis, is the divine Logos. The other
five,powers of him who speaks (the word or Logos), are, as it were, colonies.
Foremost is the Creative,* by virture of which the Creator fabricated the
cosmos by a word.f Second is the Eegal.J by virtue of which he who has
made rules what has been made. Third is the Propitious, through which
the Artificer compassionates and pities his own work. The remaining
two are the two divisions of the Legislative, || namely, the Preceptive and
the Prohibitive.^ These are suited to the varying nature and strength of
those involved in involuntary faults. The swiftest runner must urge his
breathless course to the highest, divine Logos, the fountain of wisdom, that
he may draw thence, instead of death, eternal life. He who is not so
swift must fly to the Creative power, which Moses calls Deity, since
through it all things were deposited** and arranged into a cosmos for
he who has apprehended that the universe has come into being has
a valuable possession, the knowledge of him who created it, which imme
diately induces love towards him. He who is less ready must seek the
Regal power for even if the offspring is not admonished by love of
a father, the subject is so by fear of a ruler. But if the aforesaid
boundaries are too distant, we must have recourse to the other three.
For he who has anticipated that the Divinity is not inexorable, but kind
and gentle, even if he has sinned before, again repents, through hope of
an amnesty ; and he who reflects that God is a legislator will be blessed
in obeying all that he commands ; but the last shall find the last refuge,
the averting of evil, if not participation in good. Of five of these powers
there are imitations in the sanctuary ; of Precept and Prohibition, the
laws in the Ark ; of the Propitious power, the lid of the Ark, called the
mercy-seat ; of the Creative and Regal, the cherubim. But the divine
Logos above these did not enter into visible form, as resembling nothing
perceptible, but being the image of God, the oldest of all intelligible
things. One more distinction remains. The six powers are divided into
two classes. For of the cities of refuge three are beyond, that is, at a
distance from, the human race. These are the first three powers, to which
the heaven and the entire cosmos belong. But the other three enter into
closer relations with our perishable race ; for what need is there of
Prohibition for those who will do no wrong, and what need of Precept for

* H TroirjTiKr). "f Aoyy. J H

H tXewf. || H voftoQtTiKr].

*,[ The text is defective ; but the meaning is apparent from what follows.

** Qeog, . . . irkQr]. I have attempted to preserve the similarity of sound.

6 *

84: THE DIVINE POWERS.

those who are not naturally liable to fall, and what of the Propitious
power for those who will be absolutely without sin ? But mankind are in
need of these, because they are naturally prone both to voluntary and to
involuntary sins.*

We must observe that the last three powers, which we may
reduce to two, the propitious and the legislative, are only
subordinate varieties of the two immediately above them ; for
the legislative naturally belongs to the regal ; and it will be
apparent that the propitious comes under the creative when we
remember that the latter has for its fountain the truly good.f
The lower powers, therefore, in the above scale differ from the
higher, not in their essence, but in their range.

Since the highest powers next to the Logos (the considera
tion of which must be postponed) may thus he combined into
a pair, it is not surprising that Philo repeatedly dwells, not on
an extended list, but on two superlative powers, especially as
this classification (on which he evidently prides himself) was
suited to the language of the LXX and to the allegorical inter
pretation of more than one passage. He affirms that

Meditation on the cherubim who were stationed, with a flaming sword,
at the entrance of Paradise, revealed to his soul the important secret that
in the one+ really existing God the highest and first powers are two, Good
ness and Authority, and that by Goodness he generated the universe,
and by Authority he rules that which was generated, but that a third,
uniting the two, is Thought, or Logos, for by Logos God is both ruler and
good. The cherubim, then, are symbols of Sovereign ty|| and Goodness,
the two powers ; but the flaming sword, of Thought. These pure powers
meet and mingle, the dignity arising from Sovereignty being manifest in
the things wherein God is good, and Goodness being manifest in that
wherein he is sovereign.^"

* Prof., 18-19 (I. 560-1). In Qu. et Sol. in Ex., II. 68 (the Greek in Harris,
Fragments, pp. 66 sqq.), in an explanation of the Ark and its appurtenances, we
find a septenary arrangement. First is the supreme Being himself. Then
comes his Logos, the seminal essence of things. Next, from the Logos branch
off the two powers, creative and regal. From these come others : from the
creative, the propitious or beneficent ; from the regal, the legislative or
punitive. Under these is the Ark, which is a symbol of the intelligible cosmos.

f Mundi Op., 5 (I. 4-5). J Kara rov eva.

AyaQoniQ and E%ov&lt;ria.

1T Cherub., 9 (I. 143-4).

THE CEEATIVE AND THE KEGAL. 85

They are represented by the two names for God which are so
common in the LXX, "Lord" and "God."* Philo makes
frequent use of this interpretation, which, it will be seen,
results, in principle, from the doctrine of the namelessness of
God. Illustrations will occur as we proceed, and we may
confine ourselves at present to the passages which suit our
immediate purpose.

The appellations which have been mentioned [says Philo] indicate the
powers around the self-existent Being.f for that of " Lord " denotes the
power according to which he rules, and that of " God " the one according
to which he benefits. For which reason the name " God " is adopted
throughout the account of the creation by Moses ; for it was fitting that
the power according to which the Maker, in bringing things into genesis,
deposited^ and arranged them, should be so called. So far, then, as
he is sovereign, he has the power both to benefit and to injure ; but
so far as he is benefactor, he wills only the one, namely, benefit. The
phrase, " eternal God," is equivalent to " he who bestows favours, not at
odd times, but always and continuously, who benefits without inter
mission. ^

As the source of creation and the regulator of the divine
authority, the goodness of the Self-existent is "the oldest of
the graces"; || but inasmuch as the powers are really eternal,
and therefore " coeval," the epithet "oldest" refers to priority
in thought, and not in time.^f

The central thought connected with these two powers may
be expressed in other terms, and such are occasionally found.
Thus, it is said that

On one occasion Abraham addressed God as " dread Buler." ** This is

* Kwpioc and 9to. t T " t Er0ro.

Plantat. Noe, 20 (I. 342). For the thought of God s will directing his
power towards what is good see also Justit. 7 (II. 367).

|| TrptafiuTciTr] rHjv xaplTwv, Quod Deus immut., 23 (I. 288-9).

H Qu. et Sol. in Ex., II. 62 (the Greek in Harris, Fragm., p. 63). Compare
Aristotle s ri/uwrarov fj,kv yap TO irptaflvTaTov (Metaph., I. iii. 6), a sentiment
which will explain Philo s frequent use of " older," to denote higher and better.
Thus he himself says of the things of the soul, ov xpovy, a\Xd dvviifjiti ical
aiwjuart Trptaflvrepa /cat Trpaira ovrojg. Leg. All., III. 68 (I. 125); and of the
virtuous man, irpeafivrepoG p.ev ovv icai irpuTOQ laro* /cat Xtylcr^w 6

/cat t(T\aroQ TTCLQ dippwv, Abr., 46 (II. 39).
* A(T7r6r? Gen. xv. 2.

86 THE DIVINE POWEES.

said to be synonymous with " Lord " ; and it is so to this extent, that
the words refer to the same subject, but they differ in the ideas which
they suggest. " Lord " is suggestive of supreme authority,* which is
stable, in opposition to what is unstable and invalid ; but " dread Huler "
is connected with fear ; + so that it is equivalent, as it were, to " fearful
Lord," J not only having the supreme authority and might, but being
able to inspire fear and terror ; so that Abraham by using this form
of address showed that he approached God with fear and trembling,
conscious of the terror of his sovereignty .

From the conception of God s universal sway the idea of
punishment easily flows, for it is the part of a ruler to punish
the guilty. Accordingly, this power is sometimes described as
punitive. || "Around the self-existent Being/ it is said, " the
first and greatest of the powers are the beneficent and puni
tive -, and the beneficent is called God . . . . but the other
1 Lord/ " If This and similar statements leave no doubt of the
identity of the regal and the punitive powers. ** But as one
idea may comprise several, so one power may include a plurality.
We have seen that the legislative is embraced by the regal,
and is itself resolvable into the preceptive and prohibitive.
Similarly the punitive power may break itself up, and become
a set of punitive powers. Thus Philo speaks of the powers of
the Self-existent as " the world-creating, and regal, and provi
dential, and the rest, as many as are beneficent and punitive^-ft
We may infer from this language, what, indeed, is apparent
from the whole course of our exposition, that the two first
powers are the highest in the scale, not only of being, but of
logic, and that Philo regards goodness and authority as general
terms under which the multitude of the divine powers may be
classed. But he proceeds a step farther. Logically we may
conceive of an unrighteous authority, and hence the necessity
for distinguishing the two powers ; but in God, as we have
seen, goodness is the older and controls the exercise of the

* Kvpiog from tcvpoQ. f &i&lt;nr6rriQ from Stapes, whence diog .

J QofitpoQ KvpioQ. Quis rer. div. her., 6 (I. 476).

|| KoXaarripioG or /coAa&lt;rruc?;. f Sacrificant., 9 (II. 258).

* See also Quis rer. div. her., 34 (I. 496) ; Gigant., 11 (I. 269).
ff EvtpysnSee re Kai KoXaarrjpioi, Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546).

CONCENTRATED IN GOODNESS. 87

other, and therefore the question may be raised whether the
punitive powers ought not to be ranked among the beneficent,
not only because they are " parts of laws " (which are intended
for the reward of the good and the punishment of the bad),
but because even punishment often admonishes and sobers the
sinful, or, if not the sinful, at least their associates, through
fear of a similar chastisement.* With greater decision it is
said elsewhere that all the powers around God are helpful and
preservative of creation, and among these the punitive also are
included, for even punishment is not injurious, being a preven
tion and correction of sins.t Thus the powers, though capable
of a dual distribution, tend to concentrate themselves in the
divine goodness, which has driven away from itself envy, that
hater of virtue and beauty, and generates graces whereby it
has brought into genesis things that were not.J A power of
so large and benign a scope may well be described by many
epithets. Besides those which we have already met, the
following may be noticed. It is the bounteous, the generous, ||
the beneficent ; ^f and under it must be ranked propitious and
beneficent and munificent powers,** described also as gentle, ff
and favourable. fj We have only to add that we casually hear
also of God s saving powers; of thought and purpose, most
stable powers by which the Creator always surveys his works; || ||

* Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546).

f Conf. Ling., 34 (I. 431). For the expression KoXa&lt;m;pio cWa/mg, see also
Ebriet., 9 (I. 362) ; Post. Cain., 6 (I. 229).

% Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464). Xapiffrtnij.

II AwpjjriKjy, Quis rer. div. her., 34 (I. 496) ; xapttrriKT? also Somn., 1. 26 (I. 645).

II EvepyeTiKii, Mutat. Nom., 4 (I. 582). Here the creative power is distinguished
from it, and represented as akin to it and the regal. The distinction is logically
correct, beneficent goodness being wider than creative power, and being in truth
its fountain : Mundi Op., 5 (I. 4-5).

** "IXewf /cat ivepysTidag feat &lt;J&gt;i\oSwpovs, Conf. Ling., 36 (I. 432) : here punish
ments are viewed as alien to these powers an apparent inconsistency, which
will be better considered farther on.

ft HftspovQ, Plantat. Noe, 12 (I. 336). JJ xl l(rrr ?P* ou f &gt; Ebriet., 27 (1. 373).

Swrijpioi, Fortitud., 8 (II. 383).

|||| "Ewoia and SiavoiqGiQ, defined as- i] tvcnroKeijJievT] voqaig, and i i
dttZodos, Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277).

88 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

of his prescient power;* and of peace, which, " of the many-
named powers of the Self-existent, is not only a member but
also a leader .-"f

The terms which we have hitherto noticed, ideas and powers,
mark the main lines of Philo s speculation upon this subject.
But inasmuch as the powers denote certain excellent proper
ties, they are also denominated virtues ; J the word being used,
presumably, not in the sense of moral goodness, but as we
speak of the virtue of a plant or a drug a sense not unknown
to classical Greek. That the powers are intended is obvious
from the application of the term. Thus, we hear of the
divine virtues, the propitious and beneficent ; " and the
divine powers and virtues are coupled in such a way as to
show that they stand for the same thing regarded under dif
ferent aspects. ||

It is now time for us to enter upon the most difficult question
connected with the divine powers What was their precise
relation to God ? Were they attributes, or were they distinct
and subordinate persons, or were they neither, at least in
the modern sense of these terms ? Or had Philo no settled
doctrine, and can we escape from our perplexities only by
ascribing to him the most palpable contradictions ? Our
answer to these questions must be decided by a careful exam
ination of a large number of passages ; but our arrangement
of these passages, and the importance which we attach to
them singly, as affording the true key to Philo s thought, must
necessarily be governed, not only by such critical tact as we
may happen to possess, but by our conception of the philosophy
as a whole. Now, in treating of the doctrine of God, we
resolved, if we were not mistaken, what has been usually

* 7Tpoyvw(rrtKJ7, Vita Mos., III. 23 (II. 164) ; Qu. et Sol. in Gen. IV. 22.

t Somn., II. 38 (I. 692). J Aperai. Vita Mos., III. 23 (II. 163-4).

|| Twi/ Geidiv dvvaptwv KCII aperutv, Animal. Sacr. idon., 6 (II. 242). For the
use of the word see also Fragments, II. 656 and 660. Other passages confirming
what has been said about the classification of the powers will be referred to
as we proceed.

THE DOCTEINE TO BE KEPT SECEET. 89

regarded as a hopeless contradiction, and, in doing so, we saw
that the theory of the divine attributes, as intermediate between
the eternal essence and the created cosmos, grew out of the
very roots of Philo s theology, and was not a mere device to
introduce harmony into an unreconciled dualism. Since the
powers confessedly correspond in some sense to the divine
attributes, we may naturally take the position which we have
already gained as the starting-point for our further inquiry, in
the hope that we may thence penetrate in safety the obscurity
of a rather abstruse subject.

Philo himself was apparently well aware that the doctrine
which he represented was open to misconception, and ought to
be communicated only to those who were sufficiently advanced
in philosophical culture to understand its nice distinctions.
He displays his habitual ingenuity in finding a Scriptural justi
fication for the necessary concealment :

When Sarah was desired to " knead three measures of fine flour and
make hiding-cakes,"* the measures referred to God and his two highest
powers. It is good that these three measures should be, as it were,
kneaded in the soul, " in order that, being convinced of the existence of
the highest God, who has passed beyond his powers, being both seen
without them and manifested in them, it should receive impressions of
his authority and beneficence, and, becoming initiated into the perfect
rites, should not tell anyone rashly the divine mysteries, but, treasuring
them up, and holding its peace, should keep them in secret. For the
Scripture says, make hiding-cakes, because the sacred initiatory word
about the Unbegotten and his powers ought to be hidden, since it is not
for every one to keep a deposit of divine ceremonies. "f

The same warning is repeated farther on in the same
treatise, as a preliminary to the statement that, of all the best
powers around God, the legislative, though it is one, and of
equal honour with the rest, is naturally divided into two, the
one directed to the benefit of those who do right, the other to
the punishment of those who sin. This is to be kept as a

* Eyicpu^tac, sc. apTOQ, == bread baked under the ashes, and hence hidden,
Gen. xviii. 6.
f SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173-4).

90 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

secret,, to be deposited in the ears of older men when those of
the younger have been stopped. * Philo does not explain the
reasons for this secrecy ; but he was probably apprehensive
that the vulgar would misunderstand the division of the divine
nature into a series of powers, and construe it into something
inconsistent with the principles of monotheism. f This sup
position is confirmed by a Fragment^ in which it is said that
sacred words and things must not be communicated to all, and
the two leading qualifications for participating in such matters
are the complete rejection of idolatry, and purification in body
and soul through ancestral laws; and by another Fragment,
which declares that it is unlawful to utter sacred mysteries to the
uninitiated, on the ground that, " being unable to hear or see
incorporeal and intelligible nature/ they will blame what is not
worthy of blame. We learn from this advice not to be too
confident that our first impression of any particular passage is
the correct one; and especially if it is inconsistent with the
fundamental doctrine of Judaism or with Philo s unequivocal
statements elsewhere.

In selecting a passage with which to open our discussion,
and which must necessarily exercise a controlling influence on
our further progress, it seems not unreasonable to prefer one
in which Philo states his view with the most unmistakable
philosophical precision. Such a passage exists, though it has
not always received the attention which its importance
demands. It occurs in the treatise on Abraham, and relates
to the visit of the three men recorded in Genesis xviii. Philo
first deals with the narrative in its literal sense, and in doing
so makes use of some expressions to which we must return at
a later period of our inquiry, as they are thought to be
inconsistent with the purport of the following remarks. At

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 39 (I. 189).

f See the account of a similar caution in connection with the Midrash in
Siegfried, p. 212.
+ II. 658 sq. II. 658.

TEIPLE EEPEESENTATION OF GOD. 01

present we must be content to observe that the allegorical
interpretation ought to be regarded as the true expression of
philosophical belief, because the writer is less shackled by the
words of Scripture, and because the whole object of the
allegorical method is to exalt the literal sense into philosophy.
This, accordingly, Philo proceeds to do.

" The spoken words" [he says], "are symbols of things apprehended
in intelligence alone. Whenever, then, a soul, as it were in mid-day,* has
been illumined on all sides by God, and, being entirely filled with intelligible
light, becomes shadowless with the beams that are shed around it, it
apprehends a triple representation of one subject ; of one [of the three]
as actually existing, but of the other two as though they were shadows
cast from this. Something of a similar kind happens, too, in the case of
those who live in perceptible light ; for there often occur two shadows of
bodies at rest or in motion. Let no one suppose, however, that the word
shadows is used strictly in relation to G-od ; it is merely a misapplication
of the term for the clearer exhibition of the subject which we are
explaining, for the reality is not so. But, as one standing nearest to the
truth would say, the middle one is the Father of the universe, who in the
sacred Scriptures is called by a proper name the Self-existent,f and those
on each side are the oldest and nearest powers of the Self-existent, of
which one is called Creative, and the other Eegal. And the Creative is
Deity,J for by this he deposited and arranged everything into a cosmos,
and the Regal is Lord, for it is right for that which has made to rule and
hold sway over that which has been produced. The middle one, then,
being attended by each of the two powers as by a body-guard, presents
to the seeing intelligence a representation now of one, and now of three;
of one, whenever the soul, being perfectly purified, and having trans
cended not only the multitudes of numbers, but even the duad which
adjoins unity, presses on to the idea which is unmingled and uncomplicated
and in itself wanting nothing whatever in addition ; but of three, whenever,
not yet initiated into the great mysteries, it still celebrates its rites in the
lesser, and is unable to apprehend the self-existent Being|| from itself
alone without anything different [from, pure being], but apprehends it
through the effects as either creating or ruling. This, then, is, as the
proverb runs, a second voyage, but none the less partakes of opinion
dear to God. But the former method does not partake, but is itself the
opinion dear to God, or rather it is truth, which is older than opinion, and
more honourable than all opining." [The passage goes on to state that]
there are three orders of human character, distinguished severally by the

* Alluding to the time of the visit, Gen. sviii. 1.

t O "Qv. J Gfof. Or mental image, Qavraaiav. \\ To ov.

92 THE DIVINE POWEES.

possession of these three representations. The best has that of the truly
Self- existent, whom it serves by himself, without being drawn aside by
any other. The remaining two belong to those who are acquainted with
the Father through either the beneficent or the regal power. Now, when
men perceive that people want to associate with them for their own
advantage, they eye them askance and avoid them ; but God " gladly
calls to himself all who wish to honour him, in accordance with whatever
idea they prefer to do so."* The first reward is reserved for those who
serve him for his own sake, and that reward is friendship ; the second is
for those who on their own account hope to obtain advantages or expect
to be delivered from punishments, for even if their service is not
disinterested, it is nevertheless confined within divine enclosures, and
their reward is not indeed friendship, but acceptance as not aliens. For
God receives both him who wishes to share his beneficent power in order
to participate in good things, and him who through fear propitiates the
sovereign and lordly authority in order to avert punishment ; for they
will be improved through the continual exercise of sincere piety. The
manners from which these several characters start are different, but they
have one aim and one end, the service of God. Now that the triple
representation is virtually that of one subject is evident not only from
allegorical speculation, but from the written word ; for when the wise
Abraham supplicates those who seemed like three wayfarers, he con
verses with them, not as three, but as one, and addresses them in the
singular number, and again the promise is given by one as though he
alone were present.f

In this passage we have, not a hasty and casual remark, the
full bearing of which the writer might have failed to perceive,
but a long and careful statement, in which one leading thought
is insisted upon in a variety of ways. Let us bring the several
points together into a single view. In the first place, it is
asserted in the most explicit manner that God and his two
principal powers are in reality one subject, though presenting
to the understanding a threefold mental image ; in other
words, the distinction which is drawn is due, not to the nature
of God, but to the imperfection of our intelligence. Secondly,
for this one subject (whose essence, as we have learned else-

* "ATTClVTCtQ TOVQ KCt9 rjVTIVOVV ll tdV TrpOaipOVfltVOVQ Ttpdv avTOV

t Abr., 24-5 (II. 18-20). With this may be compared Qu. et Sol. in
Gen., IV. 2.

TKIPLE EEPEESENTATION OF GOD. 93

where, is unknown) we can find no more expressive name than
the " Self-existent," eternal and absolute Being. This is the
highest, because the simplest idea of him that we are capable
of forming ; it is completely one, representing no relation, and
neither admitting of analysis nor coming under any more com
prehensive term ; and in our holiest moods, when we can
detach ourselves from the plurality of what he does, and adore
him simply for what he is, we contemplate him as the one
reality. But there are lower moods in which we regard him
only through what he does, and then we see him as creating
or ruling. Observe, it is not said that we see powers which
are distinct from and beneath him, but that we see himself in
certain aspects. So it is said farther on that men honour, not
his powers, but God himself under certain ideas. We must
use this expression to interpret the words " propitiates the
sovereign and lordly authority/ for we can hardly suppose
that Philo has embedded a contradiction in the very heart of
a continuous comment ; and thus we learn that this very
natural and easy kind of personification is not inconsistent
with the doctrine which is set forth in the present passage.
Lastly, we must notice the way in which Philo appeals to the
written word, as though it might reasonably suggest a differ
ent view from that which he has reached by the method of
allegory, thus confirming our impression that his deliberate
philosophical belief is contained in his allegorical interpreta
tions rather than in his remarks upon the letter of Scripture.

A parallel passage, which compresses the same thought into
two or three lines, is more obscure ; but we may justly inter
pret it in the light of the foregoing exposition. " God/ it is
said, " being attended by two of the highest powers, Sover
eignty and Goodness, being one in the midst,* wrought in
the seeing soul triple representations.^

In a passage relating to another subject a similar view is
suggested. Philo is commenting on the words " The Lord

t SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173).

9 4 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

appeared to Abraham,"* and lias shown that the self-existent
Being is incomprehensible and without a name. He warns us
not to conclude from the words of Scripture that the Cause of
all shone upon and appeared to Abraham

" For what human mind would be competent to contain the greatness
of the representation ?" It was really one of the powers around the
Cause^namely, the Eegal, that appeared ; for " Lord " is an appellation of
sovereignty. But when our mind held the Chaldaean opinion, it took the
efficient powers for causes ; but when it removed from the Chaldean
dogma, it knew that the cosmos was guided and governed by a supreme
Ruler, of whose sovereignty it received a representation. Therefore the
Scripture says, not "the self-existent Being," but "the Lord" appeared,
meaning the King became manifest, being so from the beginning, but not
yet known to the soul, which, even if it learned late, did not continue
unlearned for ever, but received a representation of the sovereignty and
supreme rule in things. But the Euler having appeared confers a yet
greater benefit upon him who hears and sees, by saying, " I am thy
God/ Of what, then, in all creation is he not God? He speaks now,
not about the cosmos, of which the fabricator is certainly also God, but
about human souls, which he has not deemed worthy of the same care ;
for he thinks it right to be called Lord and Despot of the bad, God of the
improving, and of the best and most perfect both Lord and God.f

Nothing can be plainer than that the same being is re
ferred to throughout this passage as revealing himself under
different aspects. It is only in these aspects that the human
mind is competent to know him, for it could not contain the
full revelation of him as he is. Still, it may know that amid
a plurality of aspects there is real unity, and, instead of think
ing with the Chaldasans that the powers are so many independ
ent causes, may satisfy itself that they are only the mental
images of the sovereignty and beneficence of the Supreme
Euler. If this interpretation be correct, there could hardly be
a more emphatic rejection of the view which treats the powers
as a conclave of separate persons. There is one more fact
of great importance which we learn from this passage. When
Philo says " the Cause of the universe did not appear/* he
does not mean that there was no manifestation of God ; and
* Gen. xvii. 1. Mutat N

TEIPLE EEPEESENTATION OF GOD. 95

that some one else was revealed instead, but that God did not
appear in that particular character, that that was not the
form assumed by the mental representation. By parity of
reasoning we are bound, in all PhnVs statements respect
ing God, to consider the form of the subject, and not
hastily conclude that what is denied of God under one
term is therefore to be denied of him under another. He
may not do as absolute Being or universal Cause what never
theless he does as Benefactor or moral Governor. This is a
mode of language with which we are not familiar ; and yet, if
we knew a man under strongly contrasted characters, we
might say of him, without danger of being mistaken, that it
Was not the philosopher, but the general, that won the battle,
meaning that he succeeded in war, not by his philosophical,
but by his military abilities."*

One other passage may be quoted in this connection,
although the powers are not directly mentioned.

" To souls which, are incorporeal and wait upon him, it is likely that
God manifests himself as he is, conversing as a friend with friends, but
to those that are still in bodies likening himself to angels, not changing
his own nature for he is unalterable but placing in the souls which
receive the representation an opinion of a different shape,f so that they
suppose that the image J is not an imitation, but the archetypal form
itself." [It is added that] this was done for the benefit of men who were
unable to form any higher conception.

We learn once more from this passage that God, while
remaining unchangeable, reveals himself in various aspects
adapted to the weakness of our intelligence. These mental
images, since they fall far short of the great reality, or even
contain something quite erroneous, as when they clothe God

* To take an example from a standard writer : Gibbon says, " It is seldom that
the antiquarian and the philosopher are so happily blended," where he refers to
the abilities of the same man. [Ch. ix., note r.]

j" A6rtJ IvriQsvra [for Mangey s avrtQevra^ TOIQ Qavrao iovusvaic; irepofiop^ov.

J Eiicova, which, from the connection, must mean " the mental image."

Somn., I. 40 (I. 655). We may compare the expression in 12, p. 631 : " No
longer stretching the mental representations from himself, but from the powers
after him."

96 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

with the organs and passions of a man, are not the archetypal
form, the complete and adequate idea which we may conceive
to exist in more exalted minds, who see God as be is, but only
an imitation or imperfect copy of this lofty idea, serving indeed
to represent it to us, but not to be confounded with it. If
this be the meaning of the passage, it bears out the doctrine
that when we think of the regal or beneficent or other powers
of God, we are dealing with images or representative forms of
our own finite understanding, and not with real distinctions in
the eternal nature.

Now what are we to say to these passages ? Are we justified
in taking them as the key to our interpretation of Philo s doc
trine of the divine powers? In their favour we may plead
their length, their careful elaboration, their explicitness, their
manifestly philosophical character, and their agreement with
the doctrine of the divine attributes. Yet Gfrorer treats the
doctrine which they confessedly set forth as " a mere make
shift* occasioned by the necessity of rescuing the unity of the
divine essence. "f But as he does so, not on the ground of
anything in the passages themselves which renders their
meaning doubtful, or of anything in the context which might
explain their divergence from what is said elsewhere, but
solely on account of their alleged inconsistency with other
statements and with Philo s philosophy as a whole, we cannot
consider such summary dismissal to be anything but arbitrary
and unsatisfactory. Simply to pitch overboard whatever in
terferes with the main course of our exposition is a very easy
and comfortable mode of getting rid of a difficulty, but may
itself perhaps lie under the suspicion of being a " mere make
shift." We shall see as we proceed that the view which
receives so little courtesy is presented in a large number of
passages, and we shall not fail to notice carefully those which
appear to contradict it.

* Blosser Nothbehelf. f p - 155 -

ANALOGY OF THE WISE MAN. 97

Before attending to these passages we may allude to a most
instructive paragraph relating to the powers of man, which
supplies us with a valuable analogy to a subject lying more
remote from our apprehension.

Wisdom [it is there said] heing an art of arts, seems, indeed, to change
with different materials, but its true idea* appears unalterable to those
who have keen sight, and are not led astray by the material mass around
it, but perceive the character impressed by the art itself. It is told that
the celebrated sculptor Pheidias wrought brass, and ivory, and gold, and
other materials, and in all displayed one and the same art, so that not
only connoisseurs, but also those who were quite uninstructed, could
recognize the artist from his works. Perfect art, being an imitation of
nature, seals all materials with the same idea.f The same thing is shown
by the power in the wise man ; J for when it is engaged in things relating
to the Self- existent, it is called piety and holiness ; in things relating to
the sky and its objects, natural philosophy ; meteorological, in matters
relating to the air ; ethical, with its species, political and economical,
in matters pertaining to the rectification of human morals ; and, in other
aspects, convivial, regal, legislative. For the many -named wise man
has contained all these piety, holiness, natural philosophy, meteorology,
ethics, polity, economy, regal, legislative, and innumerable other powers ;
but in all he will be seen to have one and the same idea.[|

Now, this passage clearly informs us that wisdom, though
it is one and unalterable, is capable of a large variety of appli
cations, which may mislead the undiscerning into the belief that
it is changing and manifold ; and, further, that the wise man
has an endless variety of powers, which are all ultimately and
in reality the same, being expressions of wisdom, and owing
their diversity of name and function, not to the violation of
unity in wisdom itself, but to the multiplicity of objects
towards which it is directed. Here we have precisely the
same doctrine in regard to the wise man which is dismissed so
contumeliously when it is asserted in respect to God. We may
legitimately try, for the sake of rendering our thoughts more
lucid, whether we can easily and naturally extend the analogy
a little farther than Philo s immediate purpose required him to
do. We might say, without danger of being misunderstood,

* Eldof. f Ideav. { *H kv ry &lt;ro

*u(rtoXoyia. || Ebriet., 22 (I. 370-1).

VOL. II. 7

98 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

that the wise man used his powers, and that he did one thing
by one,, and something else by another. We might say that
he was known through his powers, meaning that his action as
a legislator and in other capacities partly revealed him. We
might say, further, that we knew him as a natural philosopher
or as a politician, but that we did not know himself, meaning
that we knew certain aspects of his mind, but that we had not
penetrated to that essential wisdom in which all his powers
found their unity, and the apprehension of which would include
all partial and inferior knowledge. From this point we might
go on to say that he was above or before his powers, because
he not only determined their application, but in the complete
ness and unity of his wisdom was larger and fuller than they
in the division and partiality of their nature. We shall do
well to bear this analogy in mind as we pursue our further
way through the doctrine of the divine powers.

We may begin with the remark that the powers are used
collectively as equivalent to the nature or essence of God.
Thus, it is said that mankind has obtained the sovereignty of
all earthly things, " being a copy of the powers of God, a
manifest image of the invisible nature, a created image of the
eternal."* Here the parallelism of the expressions shows that
the powers of God are identical with the invisible, eternal
nature. The same conclusion follows from the statement that
the powers communicate qualities to things without quality,
and shapes to things without shape, suffering no change or
diminution in the eternal nature ;f for, if they were distinct
from the eternal nature, the phrase would be without meaning.
The transition is easy to the use of power in the singular to
denote the divine essence, just as ff the power in the wise
man " signifies the essence by virtue of which he is wise.
This practice is illustrated by the saying that, " to possess an

9tov dvvantwv, SIKIJJV ri]Q aoparov
aiSiov ytvrjTij, Vita Mos., II. 12 (II. 144).

"j" MrjSev riJQ aifiiov ^t/crcwg ^ra\Xarro)Uva /ti^re n,f.iovp.kvaQ, Monarch., I. 6
(II. 219).

EQUIVALENT TO THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 99

unalterable intelligence approaches the power of God, since
the Divine is unalterable, but the created naturally change
able."* In a parallel passage it is said that "in reality an
unalterable soul alone has access to the unalterable God, and
the soul disposed in this way truly stands near divine power -"
and a little farther on it is added, " The self-existent Being which
moves and alters everything else is immovable and unalterable,
and communicates of its own nature, stillness, to the virtuous
man."f Here the context relieves the passage of any am
biguity that might be thought to attach to the previous state
ment. The same explanation of the phrase is the simplest
that can be given in two other instances. Moses, we are told,
wishes those who go to the service of the Self-existent first
to know themselves and their own essence ; for how could he
who is ignorant of himself apprehend the supreme and all-
surpassing power of God ?"J The antithesis seems to fix the
meaning of the power of God. As, however, the passage may
be thought to contradict what we have learned elsewhere re
specting our ignorance, not only of the divine essence, but of
our own, we must observe that the reference is to the mean
character of our bodily frame, which we must clearly under
stand in order to appreciate the infinite superiority of God, and
approach him with becoming humility. The implication, there
fore, is not a knowledge of God s essence in itself, but only in
its contrast to the composition of our bodies, and is not incon
sistent with Philo s ordinary doctrine. Again, it is asserted of
the first man that " God breathed in of his own power as much
as mortal nature could receive," for which reason God was his
Father, and he was an image of God. It might be maintained
here that the power of God is the Logos; but the passage
makes no allusion to the Logos, and we may be content to
assign to it for the present the meaning which it naturally
bears. It is hardly necessary to observe that the doctrine

* Cherub., 6 (I. 142). f Post. Cain., 9 (I. 231).

J Sacrificant., 2 (II. 252). Nobil., 3 (II. 440).

7 *

100 THE DIVINE POWEES.

which we have thus reached precisely coincides with that of
the attributes of God, which in their totality are combined in
the unknown unity of the divine essence.

It is a not unexpected result of the foregoing view that God
and his power or powers are used interchangeably. This
occurs in a long and rhetorical account of the preparation
which the soul ought to make for the indwelling of God.
That the supreme Deity is meant is evident from the language
in which he is described, " the Self-existent," " the intelligible
God/ " the King of kings and Sovereign God of all ; " and
yet, when all is ready for his reception, we hear only of ce the
descent of the powers of God/ which bring laws from heaven
according to the order of their Father, and become table-
companions of souls which love virtue.* Does, then, Philo
contradict at the close of the passage the statement with
which he starts, that God " invisibly enters the region of the
soul ? " Does God really hold aloof, and send powers which
are other than himself to take his place ? We need not resort
to so harsh a conclusion if we have travelled thus far upon the
right road. The doctrine implied seems to be this, that God
himself does indeed enter the soul, but does not reveal himself
there in the absolute unity of his essence ; he comes as the
beneficent, the gracious, the propitious, the legislative, and so
forth, and it is only through the medium of these powers that
our intellect is able to apprehend him. To call God their
Father may seem to imply a personal separation between
them ; but fatherhood is sometimes used to denote identity of
essence, and it is not a more violent figure to represent them
as children of God than to describe them as table-companions
of the soul. Similarly the wise man might be called the father
of his meteorological, ethical, and other activities. In another
passage a vision of God, a mental representation of the Un-
begotten, is promised to him who is freed from the chains of
the body. The proof is drawn from the instance of Abraham,
* Cherub., 28-31 (I. 156-8).

GOD AND THE POWEKS USED INTERCHANGEABLY. 101

who, when he had left his land and kindred and father s house,
began " to meet with the powers of the Self-existent " ; for
the law says that " God"* appeared to him/ intimating that
he manifests himself clearly to him who has put off mortal
things. f There is no hint that " God" is used here in the
limited sense of the creative power, and "the Unbegotten ":
must certainly denote the Supreme God. We may therefore
adopt the explanation which we have applied to the previous
passage. There is one more example. Prayer, it is said, is a
request for good things from God, but a great prayer is the
belief that God himself is the cause of good things from him
self, without the co-operation of any other of earth as fruit
ful, of rains as contributing to the growth of seeds and plants,
of air as able to nourish, and so forth; for all these things
receive changes by the power of God, so as often to produce
the opposite of their usual effects. || Here the power of God
cannot denote any being other than himself, or the argument
would be incoherent. The meaning evidently is, that as God
often reverses the customary effects of natural agents, he
cannot be dependent on their co-operation for the blessings
which he bestows.

The interchange of God and his powers leads us to notice a
number of passages in which the latter are regarded as pre
dicates of the former, and he is spoken of as being or doing
what is implied by their several names. The following is the
most general statement of this kind : " The soul which
honours the self-existent Being for the sake of the self-
existent Being itself, ought not to do so thoughtlessly^ or
ignorantly, but with knowledge and thought.*"* Now, our
thoughtft about him receives division and separation according
to each of the divine powers and virtues ; for God is good, and

* O QtoQ. f Q uod - det. P ot - ins -&gt; 43 4 ( L 221 ) t

Alluding to the vow in Num. vi. 2, where the LXX translate

Quod Deus immut., 19 (I. 285-6). f

Aoyy. tf

102 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

maker and producer of the universe, and provident of what he
begat, most happy Saviour and Benefactor, and full of all
blessedness, each of which is venerable and laudable, whether
considered separately by itself or along with those of the same
kind."* The predicative character of the powers is here too
apparent to require further remark. Similarly, in an allusion
to the legislative as one of the powers around God, the
parenthetical explanation is immediately subjoined, " for
[God] himself is a legislator and fountain of laws," implying
that the legislative power exists only because God is that which
it denotes. t The same relation is suggested when God is
spoken of as " the Benevolent and Propitious, who has filled
all things with his own beneficent power."{ Another mode of
expression represents the power as that by virtue of which
God acts. Thus, in exposing the folly of the man who
fancies that he can escape the notice of God, Philo says,
"Thou art ignorant of God s power, by virtue of which
he sees all things and hears all things at the same moment." ||
Clearly the power is not something which hears and sees
instead of God, but God s faculty of seeing and hearing.
Again, Jacob s words, "This is the house of God,"^[ mean,
" This perceptible cosmos is nothing else than the house of
God, one of the powers of him who is really God, by virtue of
which he was good."** Lastly, there are several passages in
which the two highest powers become simply predicates of the
Self- existent. We may cite these in the order in which they
occur. The saying, "lam the Lord "ft is not only equivalent
to " I am the perfect and incorruptible and truly good ; " but
stands for, "I am the Kuler and the King and Despot. "{J
Again, Scripture says "that Noah pleased the powers of the
Self-existent, Lord and God ; but Moses [pleased] him who

* Animal, sacr. idon., 6 (II. 242). f SS. Ab. et Cain., 39 (I. 189).

J Vita Mos., III. 31 (II. 171). Ka0 ijv.

II Sacrificant., 4 (II. 254). 1[ Gen. xxviii. 17.

** Somn., I. 32 (I. 648). ff Lev. xviii. 6.

i Gigant., 11 (I. 268-9). Gen. vi. 8.

PKEDICATES OF GOD. 103

is attended by tlie powers, and apart from them is understood
according to being only; for it is said, in the person of God,
Thou hast found favour with me/* indicating himself with
out any other. Thus, then, the Self-existent himself deems
the supreme wisdom in Moses worthy of favour through him
self alone, bat that which is modelled from this, being second
and more specific, through the subject powers, by virtue of
which he is both Lord and God, both Euler and Benefactor."f
This passage is most instructive, because the powers are so
strongly distinguished from the Self-existent. We must
return to it farther on, and endeavour to explain the force of
this distinction. Meanwhile we must be content with observ
ing that, whatever the distinction may be, it is asserted in
almost the same breath that it is the Self-existent himself who
is both Lord and God. A similar identification takes place in
another passage which it is needless to quote at length. The
appellations Lord and God signify the powers around the self-
existent Being, that by virtue of which he rules, and that by
virtue of which he benefits. So far as he is Ruler he is able to
do good or ill, but so far as he is Benefactor he wills only to
benefit. " Eternal God " means, Who gives continually, though
he is Lord and able to injure. Accordingly Jacob said, " the
Lord shall be my God,"J meaning, He will no longer show me
the despotic action of his rule, but the beneficent action of
his propitious and saving power. " What soul would suppose
this, that the Despot and Sovereign of the universe, making
no change in his own nature, but remaining alike, is continually
good and unceasingly munificent ?"|| It could hardly be made
more evident that Lord and God represent the same subject
regarded under different aspects. In the final question, " the
Despot and Sovereign of the universe " can denote only the
supreme God. It is he that is both despotic and beneficent,
and wonderfully harmonizes these antithetic characters in his

* Ex., xxxiii. 17. t Quod Deus immut., 24 (I. 289). J Gen. xxviii. 21.

To ivtpytTiKov, as before, TO deffiroTixov. \\ Plantat.Noe, 20, 21 (I. 342-3).

104 THE DIVINE POWEES.

own unchangeable Being. Again, in the interpretation of
Jacob s dream it is said that, "the Lord" who stood above
the ladder was the self-existent Being.* We thus learn that
the name which is strictly limited to one of the divine powers
may, as is so repeatedly the case with "God," be used to
denote the absolute Being himself, a practice which is not
easily understood if "Lord" and "God" denote separate
and subordinate persons. The passage, however, instructs us
more plainly. He who stood upon the ladder said to Jacob,
" I am the Lord God of Abraham thy father and the God of
Isaac." It is not without reason that this distinction is made
between Abraham and Isaac ; for the former, having lived
among the Chaldaaans, and acquired his wisdom by learning,
needed two powers to care for him, sovereignty and beneficence ;
but the other, being born under happier circumstances, and
having what was good by nature, did not require admonishing
rule, but only the gracious power. Moved by this, Jacob
offered a most admirable prayer, that to him te the Lord might
become God," for he wished no longer to fear him as a ruler,
but to honour him lovingly as a benefactor.f Comment is
unnecessary. In the last passage to be cited under this head,
Philo gives his opinion that by the cherubim on the lid of the
Ark were indicated the two oldest and highest powers of the
Self-existent, the creative and regal. "For," he adds, "being
alone truly self-existent, he is both maker in the strictest sense,
since he brought into being things that were not, and king by
nature, because no one would rule the things that were created
more justly than he who has made them."J Here, again,

* T6 5v.

t Somn., I. 25-26 (I. 644-5). Cf. the passage already fully cited, p. 94,
from Mutat. Norn., 3 (I. 581).

J Vita. Mos., III. 8 (II. 150). We may refer also to Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II. 66,
with the Greek in Harris, Fragments, p. 65, the force of which is quite lost in
the Latin. Having spoken of " the creative and regal powers," Philo says, in
explanation of the fact that the faces of the cherubim on the Ark inclined
towards one another, tTreidrj 6 fooc tig wv irai Troir/rr/g tort Kat (3a&lt;ri\tvg, eiicorwg ai
Sicicraaai Svvdfitig Ta\iv Hvwfftv tXa/Sov. The rest of the passage too is instructive.

PKEDICATES OF GOD. 1C5

comment is needless. From all these passages we learn that
it is the Self-existent himself who is what the various powers
denote, and who presents to the imperfect thought of man
these partial and broken glimpses of his own single and
unchangeable nature. Accordingly the powers are sometimes
spoken of precisely as we should speak of the attributes of
God. Thus we are told, that " God is the name of the good
ness of the Cause, that thou mayest know that he has made
even lifeless things, not by authority, but by goodness."
Immediately afterwards this goodness is referred to as a
power.* Again, God has given good things, not because he
thought anything worthy of favour ; but c looking to the
eternal goodness, and supposing that it belonged to his own
happy and blessed nature to benefit." Hence the goodness
of the Self-existent, the oldest of the graces " supplies the
reason for creation. t Once more, the four letters graven on
the golden plate on the high-priest s mitre signified, they say,
the name of the Self-existent, as it is not possible for anything
to subsist without summoning God;J "for his goodness and
propitious power are the harmony of all things. "

There is one other indication of PhnVs belief which is per
haps worth noticing before we quit the line of thought which
we have been following. In the passage where the intelligible
and the perceptible worlds are described as the elder and the
younger sons of God, time is spoken of as his grandson,
because the cosmos is the father of time, and God is the father
of the cosmos. || This seems to show that, whatever colour
Philo s language may occasionally afford to later Gnostic
speculations, he himself did not suppose that the material
world was separated from God by the intervention of the
intelligible; for had he thought that the perceptible cosmos
was not the immediate creation of God, but had emanated from

* Leg. All., III. 23 (I. 101). t Quod Deus immut., 23 (I. 288-9).

J "Avev /corojcX^ffewc Geov. Vita Mos., III. 14 (II. 155).

I! Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277).

106 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

the intelligible as from a separate group of powers, which
themselves were the immediate offspring of the First Cause,
he would have represented it, not as a younger son, but as a
grandson. By assigning to both the same relationship, he
makes them equally direct expressions of the divine causality ;
and since, nevertheless, the world of sense was created through
the powers, it follows that the latter were not regarded as
ontologically distinct from God.

The foregoing passages have been cited at such length in
order that a due impression may be formed of their number
and weight, and we may clearly see how Philo s writings are
pervaded by a conception which Gfrorer treats as "a mere
makeshift." Zeller frankly admits the frequent identification
of the powers with the divine nature, and perceives the import
ance of this identification in the philosophical system with
which it is connected j but he finds himself unable to reconcile
with this view the doctrine presented in other passages, and
maintains that Philo flatly contradicts himself, and was com
pelled to do so by the necessities of his theory. In the
doctrine of the powers, he observes, two representations cross
one another, the religious notion of personal, and the philo
sophical of impersonal, mediators. Philo combines the two
conceptions without noticing their contradiction ; indeed he
could not notice it, because, had he done so, he would thereby
have sacrificed the double nature which is essential to the
mediatorial character of the divine powers, by virtue of which
they must, on the one hand, be identical with God, in order
that through them the finite may be able to participate in the
Deity, and, on the other hand, be different from him, in order
that the Deity, in spite of this participation, may remain free
from all contact with the world. There is here, as elsewhere,
simply a contradiction, which the historian may indeed account
for, but cannot remove.* When a writer of such extensive
learning and such clear discernment makes so positive a state-
* III. ii. pp. 365 sq.

ALLEGED CONTRADICTION. 107

ment, we must proceed with caution. That the idea of person
ality was not very sharply defined by the ancient thinkers,, we
have already had occasion to observe ; but the charge against
Philo is not that he is vague and uncertain in the application
of this idea : it is that he predicates of the same object
identity with and difference from God in a sense that involves
absolute contradiction. We must carefully examine the
tendency of thought on which so serious an allegation is
based; but, in doing so, instead of considering first the
passages which seem most plainly to .contradict those that
have been hitherto adduced, we must rather follow, if it be
possible, the natural order of exposition, and develop the
ideas which we have already gained.

The simplest conception of the mediating office of the powers
is that which explains through their agency the omnipresence
of God. Gfrdrer, in rejecting the doctrine which we have
hitherto unfolded as not representing Philo s philosophical
opinion, but merely a concession to the popular faith, asks, as
though his question were conclusive, " To what end separate
the Eternal so anxiously from the world, if, through the
powers, which according to the latter exposition are nothing
else than his mode of operation, he enters again the circle of
the finite ?"* An attentive consideration of PhnVs language
will rather convince us that a primary function of the powers
was not to keep God out of the finite, but to bring him into it.
It was to remove the difficulty which must arise, not only in
Alexandrian Judaism, but in every system of theism. How is
it possible for the Eternal Mind, which transcends both space
and time, to act within them ? To say that he cannot, that
therefore he gets someone else to do it for him, is not a philo
sophical answer, and I do not believe that it is Philo s. The
latter may be satisfactory or not, but it is at least a serious
attempt to meet a speculative difficulty.

* P. 155.

108 THE DIVINE POWEES.

The first passage which demands our attention is one in
which he is commenting on the words, " The Lord came down
to see the city and the tower."*

These words must be figurative, because the Divine is not capable of
local motion, which involves leaving one place and occupying another.
" All things have been filled by God," who alone is everywhere and no
where. He is nowhere because he generated place and locality with bodies,
and we may not say that the Maker is contained in any of the things
made ; and he is " everywhere, because having stretched his own powers
through earth and water, air and heaven, he has left no part of the cosmos
desert, but collecting all things together he bound them throughout with
invisible bonds, that they should never be loosed, .... for the self-
existent Being which is above the powers is conceived to be superabund
ant, not according to essence only."f

It is perfectly clear from this statement that the powers are
not substitutes for God. It is he that is everywhere, and the
powers are introduced simply to explain the mode of his
omnipresence. He is present, not in the sense in which a
body is present, by having certain relations in space; but
while the thought of dimension cannot be applied to him, he
yet can make his energy operative in space, and is thus omni
present, not like a universally diffused matter, but through the
action of force, in other words, not essentially but dynamic
ally. A similar explanation, it will be remembered, was
given of the connection between the human mind and body :
the mind, though residing essentially in the head, was diffused
dynamically through the entire frame. J The analogy of the
sun and its beams which was then used is equally applicable to
the subject before us. We must interpret in conformity with
this unambiguous doctrine the succeeding words, " The self-
existent Being which is above the powers." This superiority
need not imply separation. Even the human mind, conceived
as a complex unity, is above the powers that compose it, and

* Gen. xi. 5.

f To fitv yap vTrepuvu) TWV dvvdpewv ov tTrivotlrai irepiTTSveiv, ov Kara TO
tivai HOVQV.

I Vol. I. p. 340 sq.

GOD OMNIPRESENT THROUGH THE POWERS. 109

so he who is better than the good, and more beautiful than
beauty, must be above the powers which partially represent
him to our thought. We must pay strict attention to Philo s
language : it is " the self -existent Being,"* God conceived as
absolute Being, God in his perfect and unrelated unity, who is
above the powers, the forms of his thought and modes of his
activity, which belong to the domain of the relative. Bearing
this contrast in mind, we can understand Philo s further state
ment : "Now, the power of this [Self-existent], which put
and ordered all things, has been strictly called God, and has
embosomed all things, and permeated the parts of the universe.
But the divine and invisible and inapprehensible self-existent
Being, which is everywhere, f is in truth visible and apprehen
sible nowhere Therefore, none of the terms of motion

which involves change of place is applicable to God in his
essential Being.^J

The same doctrine is laid down in another passage, where
Philo is remarking on the statement that Moses entered into
the darkness where God was :

The darkness means unseen thoughts about the S elf- existent ; "for the
Cause is not in l darkness, j| nor in place at all, but above both place and
time. For having yoked all created things beneath himself he is con
tained by nothing, but has stepped upon all. But having stepped upon,
and being outside creation, he has none the less filled the cosmos with
himself; for having through power stretched as far as the ends he wove
each to each according to the proportions of harmony." [[

Here the statement that he has filled the cosmos with himself
is perfectly explicit, and therefore the power whose presence
justifies this statement is not distinct from him. A little
farther on Philo adds :

God " being the same, is both very near and far off, touching indeed

* To ov. -j- To Qtiov . . . 7ravTa%ov ov.

| T&lt; Kara TO tlvai 9t&lt;. Conf. Ling., 27 (I. 425).
Ex. xx. 21.

|| So Tischendorf, in his Philonea, p. 87, retaining the MS. reading
for which Mangey reads, xpoVy.

^f Am -yap dvj&gt;a/iu&gt; dxpi irtparuv TtivaQ SKCHTTOV t/caVry . . . ovvv&lt;j&gt;T)Vv

110 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

with, the creative and punitive powers, as they are near to each, but
having driven the begotten very far from his nature in its essence."*

It is only as expressions of himself that the powers can be
thus said to make him [near ; it is only in his essence that is,
in the complete and absolute unity of his being that he is
said to be far off. This is a most instructive passage, for we
cannot suppose that Philo contradicts himself in the same
breath. He is quite aware of the seeming contradiction in
the statement that the same being is near and far off, and
resolves it to his own satisfaction by explaining that he is
near dynamically, remote essentially, near through partial
manifestations of his thought, remote in the incomprehensible
completeness of his nature.

There are one or two other passages which also support the
doctrine of God s presence through the powers, but can hardly
be said to throw further light upon Philo s meaning. The
question, " Will the Lord s hand not suffice ? " f signifies
&lt;f that the powers of the Self-existent reach everywhere J for
the benefit, not only of the illustrious, but also of those who
seem to be more obscure, on whom he graciously bestows what
is fitting, according to the standards and measures of the soul
of each, ruling and measuring the just proportion to each by the
equality in himself/ On these words we need only remark
that they do not represent God as withdrawn from all interest
in the lower world ; it is he that gives, it is he that assigns to
every man his due. So when we are told that God " has filled
all things throughout with his own beneficent power," || we
do not naturally think of a substitute for himself, especially as
it is he that is represented as acting. These passages, accord
ingly, if they do not advance our thought, are, at least,
consistent with what has been hitherto maintained.^"

That we may fully appreciate the force of the above argument

TO dvai (pv&lt;rtw. Post. Cain., 5-6 (I. 228-9).
f Num. xi. 23. J Uavrr] .... tyOdvtiv.

Mutat. Norn., 40 (I. 613-14). || Vita Mos., III. 31 (II. 171).

^[ See also Gigant., 11 (I. 269).

GOD STRETCHES THE POWERS. HI

we must refer back to what was said about the divine omni
presence in treating of the attributes of God. It is to him that
this high prerogative belongs. Yet we must think of him, not
as an extended and therefore material substance, but as one
who, though he transcends the conditions of space, can yet
make his energy felt wheresoever his sovereign will may
direct.

The term which Philo frequently employs to denote the local
action of the powers, is quite agreeable to the conception which
we have reached. He says that God stretches the powers
a word which would have an odd application to personal
mediators, but precisely suits the notion of exerting energy
either thoughout space or in particular parts of it. " Stretch"*
happily combines the ideas of extension and of strain, f and is
used characteristically of the direction of force upon certain
objects. We have seen it employed to describe the distribution
of the human powers to the various organs of the body, and we
are thus furnished with an analogy to the diffusion of the
divine powers throughout the universe. We may add two
further examples. " He who has stretched the energies of his
soul to God, and hopes for benefit from him alone," will
disclaim the receipt of his blessings from the objects of nature,
and accept all things " from the only Wise, since he stretches
his own propitious powers everywhere, and benefits through
these/ J Again, when one is listening quietly and atten
tively to an address, the mind is said to c c stretch itself to the
speaker. 1 " These examples are interesting, because they
represent the mind as extending its powers, or itself, beyond
the bodily circumference. They may satisfy us that we are not
to conceive the extension physically, but to regard it as a
figure of speech, representing in the least objectionable way,

f Cf. Philo s own Kara rf)v iff%vv KOI ivroviav (cat Svvauiv, in distinguishing
i iVfia from avpa, Leg. All., I. 13 (I. 51).
I Ebriet., 27 (I. 373). Quis rer. div. her., 3 (I. 474).

112 THE DIVINE POWEES.

a spiritual process whose reality is more obvious tlian its mode.
When we remember what Philo says of the inadequacy of
human language respecting God,, we must admit that this
remark will apply still more certainly to the extension of
the divine powers. The latter represents the fact that the
energy of the Supreme Cause is operative in space, and
supplies us with a physical analogy by which we can hold this
fact in our imagination, but is not designed to give a literal
description of the inscrutable mode in which God puts forth his
power.*

From the conception of stretching, that of touching easily
follows, for the power must be stretched to some object with
which it may be said to be in contact. The two ideas are
combined in a passage in which Philo speaks of the inspiration
of the human mind : God stretches the power from himself as
far as the mind, that we may receive a thought of him ; " for
how could the soul think of God, unless he inspired and
touched it dynamically,f for the human mind would not dare
to run up to such a height as to lay hold of the nature of
God, unless God himself drew it up to himself, so far as
was possible for a human mind to be drawn up, and stamped
it according to the powers that are accessible to thought.";];
Before commenting on this passage, we may quote another
which helps to illustrate it : " Nothing is higher than God ;
and if anyone has reached him by stretching the eye of
the soul, let him pray for permanence and stability. For
uphill roads are wearisome and slow, but the rush down,
tearing violently along rather than quietly descending, is swift
and very easy. Now the things that force us down are many ;
but they have no effect whenever God, having suspended the

* Nearly all the passages where reivta is used of the divine powers have been
already cited in other connections, and it is sufficient merely to refer to them :
Leg. All., I. 13 (I. 51) ; Post. Cain., 5 (I. 229) ; Conf. Ling., 27 (I. 425) ; Migrat.
Abr., 22 (I. 455), TrpoTtivag ; 32, p. 464, ctTrirtivt ; Mutat. Norn., 4 (I. 582).

t Kara ^vva^iv. \ Leg. AIL, I. 13 (I. 51).

GOD TOUCHES THINGS THROUGH THE POWERS. 113

soul from his powers, draws it to himself with a more powerful
pull." * It is evident that in these passages, physical imagery
is used to express facts which are hyperphysical. What, then,
are these facts ? First, there is a real connection between the
soul and God, which may be expressed under the twofold
aspect of a descent of the Divine upon the human, and an
ascent of the human to the Divine. Secondly, this connection
is effected through the mediation of the powers. If we ask
why there is any mediation, the answer is not supplied in the
text before us, but may be gathered from what we have
learned elsewhere. If it were said without qualification that
God himself touched the soul, it would be implied that he made
no partial revelation, but impressed upon the mind that one
all-containing thought, inaccessible to man, which would
convey a complete knowledge of the totality and unity of his
essence. Since this is impossible, if not for all finite natures,
at least for souls imprisoned in bodies, God can touch the soul
only by his power, that is, he makes- his energy present to the
human consciousness, where it resolves itself into a plurality of
powers or ideas representative of the Divine. In this way the
mind is taught to lift the spiritual eye to God, and is drawn up
to himself so far as mortal weakness will allow; for it can
apprehend as divine the powers or thoughts which are im
pressed upon it, and refer them to the unknown unity of
which they are the manifold expression.

We are now prepared to understand a passage which is
frequently quoted as proving decisively the separation of the
powers from God. Out of matter, it is said, " God generated
all things, not touching it himself, for it was not right for the
Wise and Blessed to come in contact with indeterminate and
mixed matter ; but he used the incorporeal powers, whose real
name is ideas, that the fitting form might take possession of
each genus." f If the powers were employed to do something
which it was not suitable for God to do himself, what can be

* Abr., 12 (II. 10). t Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261).

VOL. II. 8

114: THE DIVINE POWEKS.

plainer than that they and God are essentially distinct ? Dahne
relies upon the passages in which a contrast of this kind is drawn
as affording conclusive proof that the powers are persons essen
tially different from God, and declares that if Philo maintained
that it would be unworthy of God to interpenetrate the world,
but not unworthy of his attributes, though it is only through
their combination that God first became God, he talked perfect
nonsense, and we must cease to treat him as a philosopher.*
This is a summary way of settling a difficult question, and,
from our modern point of view, might appear to be unanswer
able. The notion, however, that God is made up by a com
bination of attributes is so exceedingly remote from the
thought of Philo, that we may suspect the critic s judgment of
being a little at fault. Instead of yielding to the first impulse
of common sense, let us look a little more deeply into the
matter, even at tbe risk of talking nonsense. If Philo had
said that God himself touched matter, not through his powers
but in his essence, what would he have meant ? Could he
have meant that he retained his transcendence, and made only
some feeble and partial revelation of himself through matter ?
I think not. According to all that we have yet learned, he
could only have meant that God impressed his whole being
upon matter, that from being transcendent he became imman
ent, and made through the cosmos a complete revelation of
his eternal essence. In that case the cosmos would be
obviously one, instead of letting its unity wait upon the
inferences of reason from its complex phenomena; the ideal
form impressed upon matter would exhibit to the mind a
single thought, and that thought would be tantamount to
God ; his name would be known, and in surveying the universe
we should gaze upon him face to face. But such was not
the aspect presented by the world. Matter was not adequate
to receive the transfiguring touch which would make it an
exhaustive expression of the Divine. Instead of one, there

* I. p. 239 sqq.

GOD TOUCHES THINGS THEOUGH THE POWERS. 115

were impressed on it a multitude of ideal forms, divine
thoughts which gave significance to its dull mass ; and no com
bination of these would produce God or adequately represent
him, but even when, through an effort of reason, we had bound
them together, and grasped the idea of the good, we should
still have to pass on to the unknown and transcendent unity,
which embraced in its infinite essence all, and more than
all, that a cosmos could reveal. It was necessary, therefore, to
say that God used the powers or ideas for his cosmic work, and
touched the universe only with these, while he kept the
begotten far from his essential Being.* In this their cosmical
aspect the powers become as it were objective to God, divine
thoughts permanently planted out in a material world, and they
might very easily be spoken of as independent essences, just as
we habitually refer to the physical forces as though they were
so many distinct agents, though we may regard them philo
sophically as modes of the divine activity. But that a real
separation from God is quite inadmissible is affirmed by Philo
in the most explicit language : " Nothing of the Divine is cut
so as to separate it, but is only extended." f This indeed
is said in immediate relation to the human soul, which is
invested with a distinct personality; but it is said in connection
with those " invisible powers " whereby it outstrips time, and
touches the universe and its parts. A focal aggregate of
powers may produce a person, but this, instead of suggesting,
is rather inconsistent with the ascription of personality to the
powers taken one by one. The great source which includes
and transcends them is a person, or, rather, he is the one arche-

* See the passage quoted on p. 110 from Post. Cain., 6 (I. 229). Perhaps what
1 conceive to be Philo s fundamental thought may be more clearly expressed as
follows : O *Qv could not impart Himself to matter ; for that would mean that
matter became partaker of eternal Being. Creation may become rational ; but
for the creation to become that which has not become, but always is, would be a
contradiction. Hence the absolute separation between pure Being and matter.

t Ts/ivtrai yap ovdiv TOV Qtiov fear airaprrjatv, a\\a povov licreivertu, Quod
det. pot. ins., 24 (I. 209).

8 *

116 THE DIVINE POWERS.

typal person by participation in whom all lower personality
subsists ; but the powers are modes of his energy, eternally
and inseparably dependent upon him, and destined to vanish if
he were not, as rays of light vanish when the central luminary
is quenched. They appear as ideal forms in matter, and
as thoughts in the human mind. By virtue of their origin they
are independent of time and space, and hence our thought can
transport itself instantaneously to the most distant regions, and
hold heaven and earth within its embrace. Thus they are the
connection between the universe and God, mediating between
them, not because they are different from both, but because
they are strictly separable from neither. Withdraw them from
the mind, and it becomes a non-entity ; withdraw them from
the material world, and it ceases to be a cosmos ; detach them,
if that be conceivable, from God, and they will sink into
nothingness. They are really divine, and, wherever it turns,
the seeing soul may discern some thought of God ; but they
are nowhere exhaustive of the divine, and it would be wholly
false to say that in their totality they were the equivalent
of God. Through them God has indeed left no part of
the cosmos empty of himself; but he has not made himself
and the cosmos conterminous, and therefore, as soon as we
endeavour to apprehend him in the unity of his being, he
remains to our thought essentially outside the universe, though
acting dynamically within it.* We may agree with this view
or not; but at all events it is something better than sheer
nonsense. It is a natural development of Philo s philosophy,
and seems to me a reasonable interpretation of his language.

* We may compare Philo s statement that the sovereign principle in man is
in its essence within the body, but in power is in Italy or Sicily when it thinks
about these places: Leg. AIL, I. 18 (I. 55). This is suggestive, though the
notion of locality which is here involved is of course inapplicable to God. Most
instructive also is Athanasius s remark about the Logos: axr-rrtp iv navy ry

KTiatl WV, IKTOC H W IffTl TOV TTCtVTOQ KCtT OVfflClV, tV TTUffl Si SffTl TOiQ tCtVTOV

Svvaptai, . . . Trepiexoiv ra o\a, fcai p) Trtpiexofisvoff, aXV Iv pavy T$
Ilarpi oXog wv Kara Travra. De Incarnat. c. xvii.

avrov

GOD GUAKDED BY THE POWEES. 117

On the other hand, to represent God as physically outside the
universe, and therefore requiring separate persons inferior to
himself to act upon matter for him, makes the whole subject
hopelessly incoherent; and if this was what Philo meant,
instead of rescuing his claim to be a philosopher, we may
rather pronounce it to be the clumsy device of one incapable
or impatient of metaphysical thought.

This view makes it an easy figure of speech to represent the
powers as standing round about God, and waiting upon him like
the retinue of a court. It will be remembered that the same
figure was used of the powers of the human mind, so that we
need have no scruple in recognizing here a simple personifica
tion. God is " the sovereign of all the powers."* With a view
to aid us, power sits as a ready helper beside God, and the
Sovereign himself draws nearer to benefit those who are
worthy. "f God is "attended by the powers as by a body
guard ."% They are his "followers and attendants," and by
their appearance in the cosmos reveal the existence, though
not the essence, of the Supreme Cause. || "The glory round
about" him^[ is none other than the powers which surround
him and act as his body-guard ** but these are invisible and
intelligible as himself, and are properly named ideas. tt The
figurative character of these passages is apparent, and no
comment is needed.JJ

It is hardly necessary to refer to a few passages where Philo
speaks of " God and his powers/ for such a distinction in
thought need not imply any separation infact. In only one

* Somn., I. 41 (I. 656). f Migrat. Abr., 10 (I. 444-5).

J Aopv^opovfitvy Trpog rSiv cwdfiitov, Quod Deus immut., 24 (I. 289).

ETTopivwv Kcd ccKoXovQtuv. IJ Post. Cain., 48 (I. 258).

IT T/)i/ TTtpi as d6av. * tag at dopv^opovaag (Hvva[j,tQ, . . . rdg irtpi ifie.

tt Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218-19).

JJ For the use of the phrase " around God" in connection with the powers
see also Quod Deus immut., 17 (I. 284) ; Plantat. Noe, 20 (I. 342) ; Mutat.
Norn., 3 (I. 581) ; Sacrificant., 9 (II. 258).

See QuodDeus immut., 1(1. 273), " The wise man sees God and his powers ;"
Migrat. Abr., 14 (I. 448), "Inquiries about God and his most sacred powers."

118 THE DIVINE POWEES.

of them is there any appearance of attributing personality to
the powers : fe It is always the care of himself and his bene
ficent powers to change the discord of the worse substance."*
The personification,, however,, belongs to the most familiar
figures of speech ; and the distinction only calls attention to
the benevolent nature of the divine purpose as a whole, and
the realisation of this benevolence in the various directions
prescribed to the different powers. Thus we might say of
some one, without danger of being misunderstood, that the
attainment of truth was the object of his mind and its several
faculties, and the addition of the latter words would impart
strength and comprehensiveness to the meaning of the
sentence.

Still less can we attach any importance to the statement
that God used his powers, for this is in complete agreement
with our ordinary modes of speech. One or two examples will
suffice. The Maker of the universe possessing thought and
purpose as most stable powers, and " always using these,
surveys his works. "f Again, it is said that " God uses the
powers unmixed towards himself, but mixed towards creation,
for it is impossible for a mortal nature to contain them
unmingled." This is illustrated by the tempering of the solar
beams, which reach us through the chill medium of the air.J
It is impossible in these passages to convert the powers into
personal agents, and the statement that God uses them no
more suggests real separation than is implied when we say of
ourselves that we use our intelligence or skill. That which
we use may be naturally spoken of as an instrument through
which we effect our purpose. Thus we may be said to do one
thing through our mechanical aptitude, another through our
scientific knowledge, a third through our political insight.

* Justit., 7 (II. 367). t Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277).

J Ib. 17, p. 284.

See also Gigant., 11 (I. 269) ; Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261) ; Qu. et Sol. in
Gen. I. 54 ; cf. Mundi Op., 4 (I. 4), where God is said to have used the intelligible
cosmos as a pattern.

GOD ABOVE THE POWEES. 119

Similarly God is said to confer benefits through his gracious
powers,* to have placed all things through the creative power, t
and to "confer by his own power unstinted abundance of good
things on all parts of the universe. V J Such language may, no
doubt, be used of personal agents, but there is not even
an apparent implication of personal agency in the above
quotations.

We come now to the passages most relied upon by
those who maintain the personality of the powers, some
of which undoubtedly present considerable difficulties to an
interpreter who takes a different view. We will treat them in
groups, beginning with those which most easily harmonize with
our previous exposition.

First, God is sometimes spoken of as above the powers.
This is no more than we should expect, when even the human
mind is described as a king attended by powers as its body
guards and messengers, and this though Philo looked upon
the powers as independent of the mind in whom they were
manifested. How much more is the Self-existent superior to
those powers which are forms of his thought and modes of his
energy, and are absolutely dependent on his will. This is
stated in a passage in which the leading object is to show the
equality and proportion which prevailed throughout the divisions
of the universe. The rule applies even to the highest realm.
1 The two first powers of the Self -existent, the gracious, by
virtue of which he formed the cosmos, whereby he has been
called God, and the punitive, by virtue of which he rules and
presides over creation, whereby he is named Lord, are
separated by him. standing above in the midst, for he says, I
will speak to thee from above the mercy-seat between the two
cherubim/ 1| in order to show that the highest powers of the

* Ebriet., 27 (I. 373).

-j- Mutat. Nom., 4 (I. 583) ; Abr., 24 (II. 19), with the dative instead of dm.
} Leg. ad Cai., 16 (II. 562), dative. See Vol. I. p. 342.

II Ex. xxv. 22.

120 THE DIVINE POWEES.

Self-existent, the donative and the punitive, are equal, using
him as a divider/ * The former part of this sentence precludes
the notion of any real separation between God and his powers,
for they are simply his predicates ; and, therefore, the descrip
tion in the latter part must be figurative, and refer to a
distinction in thought. The object is simply to point out the
even balancing of God s gracious and punitive agency; and
the figure, which is not a harsh one in itself, is obviously
governed by the quotation from Scripture on which the
doctrine is avowedly based. Again, the statement in Genesis,t
that "the Lord departed when he ceased speaking with
Abraham, and Abraham returned into his place," is explained
as meaning that God who is before all things^ no longer
stretches the representations from himself, but those from the
powers after him. The reference is clearly to higher and
lower spiritual moods. In the higher the mind seems to rise
above all phenomenal manifestation, and to commune with God
as one, the eternal and absolute Being ; but when it sinks back
to its ordinary condition, it can think of him only in his mani
fold activity, as Creator, Euler, Benefactor, and so forth. All
these modifications of his power are justly said to be { after "
him whose nature they partially express. Lastly, in a passage
previously quoted, || it is said that the highest God^]" " has
passed beyond his powers, being both seen without them and
manifested in them."** This might well appear at first sight
to be one of the most invincible evidences of the essential
distinction between God and his powers ; yet perhaps a little
reflection will show us that it is really a neat compendium of
the philosophy which has thus far spoken to us. The passage
tells us that it is good for the soul to have within itself the
three measures of the universe, the supreme Sovereign himself,

* Quis rer. div. her., 34 (I. 496). f xviii. 33. J O ?rp6 T&V o\uv QIOQ.

Tag [&lt;f&gt;a.VTa.aiaQ~\ cnrb rwv p,er avrbv dwd/Jisujv. Somn., I. 12 (I. 631).

|| P. 89. f Tuv avwTaru) . . 9eov.

TCLQ SwdflflS CtVTOV KCtl ^P Q O.VT&V Op^fieVOQ Kdl IV TCLUTCUQ

SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173).

GOD ABOVE THE POWERS. 121

who measures all things, and his goodness and authority, which
are the measures respectively of good and of subject things.
Each of these three measures is itself immeasurable and
incapable of being circumscribed.* Now if Philo was about to
represent the powers as separate persons, it is strange, to say
the least, that he should begin by calling them God s goodness
and authority, and making them infinite as God himself. So
understood the passage involves us in hopeless perplexity.
But all becomes clear if we remember that God was above the
powers as the unknown unity which comprehended them all,
and that he revealed himself in two different ways. The mind
may think of him simply as Being, the mysterious source of all
that is, and, refraining from all attempts at analysis, may
regard him as One, possessing an indivisible essence which it
is impossible to know. Thus he is seen without the powers.
But the mind is also led by the phenomena of creation and
providence to ascribe certain things to God, and to see through
broken and coloured gleams that light whose unviolated purity
it cannot behold. It is taught by the ideal forces which
pervade the universe to recognize God as Creator and Ruler ;
and thus the Self-existent is manifested in the powers, which
partly express his essence, but, owing to the inability of our
thought to combine them into a single idea, are unable wholly
to reveal it.f

We have already had occasion to notice the distinction
between God in his essential being and God conceived under
the partial aspect of the powers. We may refer here to two
more passages where this distinction is drawn. The statement
in the Law that "God is in heaven above and on earth
beneath," J does not mean that God is so in his essence, for
the self-existent Being contains, but is not contained. The

* EjCttim/ LKUSTQTJTCtl ILV OVCClU,fijQ aTTfpt yOOE^&gt;0 7 ( | ^ ( H &gt; CCTTfpl"Yp&lt;l&lt;f)Ol

KUl CLl fivVCtfJltlG CtVTOV.

f One other passage in which the self-existent Being is said to be above the
powers has been fully dealt with in treating of the omnipresence of God, pp. 108 sq.
t Josh. ii. 11. Kara TO flvai.

122 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

words point to his power by virtue of which* he ordered
all things. This is strictly goodness, the generator of graces
whereby it brought into existence things that were not. The
self-existent Being, as represented in the mind,f appears
in opinion everywhere, but in truth nowhere.J This passage
seems to assert most explicitly that that may be predicated
of one of the powers which it would be wrong to predicate of
the Self-existent ; what, then, it may be asked, can be plainer
than that Philo regarded one as essentially different from the
other ? We may reply by asking, what can be plainer than
that Philo is here dealing with a difference in our conception of
God himself ? Else why is he so careful to speak of God in his
essence, and to describe him by the most abstract term ? Why
not simply say that Scripture refers, not to the real and
supreme God, but to a subordinate agent who is frequently,
though improperly, called God ? This would have clearly and
adequately expressed the suggested meaning; and as it is quite
different from what Philo actually says, we may fairly conclude
that that is not his meaning. What, then, does he intend
to teach ? The verse in question declares that God is in
heaven, and therefore, at first sight, seems to imply that he is
immanent in the universe, subject to the conditions of space,
and with no reserve of causality above that which is manifested
in creation. This, as we know, would be opposed to a funda
mental doctrine of Philo s ; for, according to him, God is
transcendent above the universe, and is not amenable to the
limitations of place. Scripture, therefore, cannot have re
ferred to God in his essential being, but to his goodness,
which, though it is infinite when regarded simply as an
effluence of the divine nature, yet, when viewed as an exercise
of creative power, is necessarily co-extensive with creation.
Thus the passage naturally allies itself with the rest of our
exposition. Similar remarks will apply to a comment on the

* Ka0 rjv. -j- QavraaiaZoftevov. J Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464).

FONDNESS FOK PEKSONIFICATION. 123-

statement in Exodus xxiv. 16, that " the glory of God came
down upon Mount Sinai/** This, says Philo,puts to shame those
who, whether from impiety or simplicity, suppose that there are
local movements in the Divine. For it says plainly, not that
the essential God, who is thought of according to being only,-f
came down, but that his glory did so. Aofa,J being an
ambiguous word, admits of two explanations. It either
denotes the presence of the powers, as the military power of a
king is called his S6t;a, or implies merely an opinion about him,
so that the representation of the coming of God was wrought in
the minds of those present. Here again, the careful way in
which Philo guards his language shows that he is referring,
not to a distinction between God and some one else, but
between two aspects under which God may be regarded,
between God in his unknown and transcendent essence, and
God as manifested through the display of his power.

In the remaining passages the powers appear more or less
distinctly as persons, and the question will arise whether we are
to understand the language literally or figuratively. In order
to form a judgment upon this point, we must be acquainted
with the style of our author; and it will be convenient to
illustrate here by some examples his peculiar fondness for
personification. In passages already cited we may have
observed his tendency to describe things under, the terms of
human relationship, so that even time becomes with him a
grandson of God; and, what belongs more closely to our
present purpose, we have seen how the powers of the human
mind are turned into its body-guards and messengers. || Simi
larly, we hear of the " offspring of the understanding which act
as its body-guards and shieldbearers/ ^ and find the voice

* K.aTJ3r] r j 6a rov 9eov.

f Tbv ovaiuSr] dtov, TOV Kara TO tlvai povov irrivoov ^ivov.
I Meaning either " opinion " or " glory."

The Hebrew, n &lt; lTP"TO3 J might have removed the doubt. Fragm., II.
679 (Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II. 45).

1 Or angels. 1" Somn., II. 14 (I. 671).

124 THE DIVINE POWEES.

described as having " the rank of herald or interpreter to the
suggesting mind." * The impulses of the passions have
sown " superfluous natures in us, and folly is " the evil
husbandman of the soul."f In the self-examination which
befits the sabbath day, we should take account of our words and
deeds " in the council-chamber of the soul, the laws taking their
seats with us in the council and joining in the examination." J
As the laws are presumably the laws of Moses, and not
the powers of nature, there can be no question of their real
personality. Conscience is "a weighty accuser," || and re
garded as the power which convicts us of sin ^f it is finely
personified. " Dwelling and growing up along with each soul,
accustomed to accept nothing that is under accusation, using
always a nature that hates evil and loves virtue, being at once
accuser and judge, when stirred up as an accuser it charges,
accuses, puts to shame ; and again as a judge it teaches,
admonishes, advises to be converted; and if it succeeds in
persuading, it is joyfully reconciled, but if it fails it wages war
without a truce, not desisting either by day or by night, but
inflicting incurable pricks and wounds, until it snaps the
miserable and accursed life." ** The two principles which
contend for the mastery of the human soul are personified
throughout a passage which is far too long for complete quota
tion. " With each of us dwell two women who are hostile and
ill-disposed to one another, and fill the mental house with the
contentions of jealousy. Of these we love the one, supposing
her to be manageable and tame and most dear and appropriate
to ourselves; and she is called pleasure. But we hate the
other, thinking her untamable, savage, wild, most hostile;
and her name is virtue." The former comes to us tricked out
with every meretricious ornament, and attended by " craft,
rashness, flattery, quackery, fraud, false speech, false opinion,

* Somn., I. 5 (I. 625). f Sacrificant., 9 (II. 258).

J Dec. Orac., 20 (II. 197). To ffwuSog.

II Quod Deus immut., 27 (I. 291). f E\&yxc- ** Dec. Orac., 17 (II. 195).

FONDNESS FOR PERSONIFICATION. 125

impiety, injustice, intemperance ; " and standing in the midst
of these as the chorus which she leads, she addresses the mind,
setting forth the various charms of a voluptuous life, and
promising to bestow them without stint if the mind will live
with her. Virtue was in concealment hard by, and heard this
wheedling speech; and fearing that the mind might be un
wittingly captivated, she suddenly presents herself, with quiet
step and sober mien, attended by piety, holiness, truth, and
a long train of other virtues, which, standing on each side,
acted as her body-guard. She then addresses the mind, and
exposes the false pretensions of her rival.* After this we need
not be startled to hear that " all the virtues are virgins, but she
who is piety and righteousness, having received the leadership
as in a chorus, is the most beautiful." f But, perhaps, nothing
exhibits Philo s fondness for personification more strikingly
than its introduction into a plain historical narrative. In his
account of the troubles in Judaea he says that Petronius was
uncertain how to act, and, " having called together, as in a
council, all the thoughts of the soul, he examined the opinion of
each, and found them all unanimous in sentiment." J Passing
from the domain of the human mind, we find wealth described
as the (t the spear-bearer of the body." Noble birth is
endowed with speech that she may deliver her sentiments. "I
think," says Philo, "that noble birth, || if God stamped her in
the human form, would speak thus to rebellious descendants ; "
and then follows an address in which she contrasts her own
opinion with theirs.^" The Israelites who ultimately return
from the dispersion shall have three advocates** of reconcilia 7
tion with the Father:^ one, the equity and kindness of God&gt;

* De MercecTe Meretricis, 2-4 (II. 265-9). The same figure occurs, with les&
elaboration, in SS. Ab. et Caini, 5 (I. 167).

f Praem. et Poen., 9 (II. 416). J Leg. ad Cai., 31 (II. 577).

AopvQopog, which I have generally rendered "body-guard." Fortitud., 3
(II. 376).

11 E* r iva. 1 Nobil., 2 (II. 438-9).

** NapaK\r]roi.

126 THE DIVINE POWERS.

who always prefers forgiveness to punishment ; secondly, the
holiness of the founders of the nation, because, with souls freed
from bodies and rendering a genuine service to the Ruler, they
make effectual supplications for their sons and daughters ; and,
thirdly, that which especially moves the kindness of the afore
said, namely, the improvement * of those who are returning to
the way that ends with pleasing God.f Even if it be thought
that the equity and kindness of God are distinct persons,
we can hardly extend the same notion to the "holiness"
of the patriarchs and the " improvement" of the dispersed.
Again, we are told that mankind, in their various grades
of fortune, are nevertheless akin, since they have "one mother,
the common nature of all men." J Sciences and virtues are
&lt;( the daughters of right reason. " Lastly, we may notice a
few personifications in connection with God, which are so
similar to the foregoing that we can have no hesitation in
accepting them as figurative. God " rains down his virgin and
immortal graces/ || These graces are (&lt; his virgin daughters." If
God is " the husband of the virtue-loving intelligence," and
laughter is "his ideal son."** "Truth is an attendant of
God,"ft and "the overseer and guardian" of the "really
vivified and living polity. "JJ

These examples will suffice to show us how easily Philo falls
into the language of personification, and ought to make us
pause before we insist on throwing his whole philosophy into
confusion by too strict an interpretation of his words. At the
same time we must remember that we are bound to satisfy the
essential meaning of each passage, and not to fritter it away
into figures of speech. With this caution we proceed to the
personification of the powers.

We are told in Genesis [says Philo] that " Noah pleased the powers

* EE\Tiu&lt;ri. f Exsecrat., 9 (II. 436). + Dee. Orac., 10 (II. 187).

Gigant., 4 (I. 265). || Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232).

^1 Migrat. Abr., 7 (1. 441). ** O IvtitaBtTOQ VLOQ Otov, Mutat. Norn., 23 (I. 598),
tf Oiradog 9eov. Vita Mos., III. 21 (II. 162). $$ Nobil., 5 (II. 443

; vi. 8, Nw $ fyp %dpiv tvavTiov Kvpiov TOV Qeov.

PEKSONIFICATION OF THE POWERS. 127

of the Self-existent, both Lord and God, but Moses pleased him who
is attended by the powers as a body-guard, and apart from them is under-
stood according to being only ; for it is said, in the person of God, thou
hast found favour with me, * indicating himself apart from every
other.f Thus the Self-existent himself deemed the supreme wisdom
in Moses worthy of favour through himself alone, but that which was
copied from this, as being second and more specific, through the
subject powers, by virtue of which he is both Lord and God, Ruler and
Benefactor.^

Now we might reasonably maintain that whatever personality
is here ascribed to the powers must be figurative, because the
power named God has been immediately before represented as
" the goodness of the Self-existent/ and been obviously
identified with " his happy and blessed nature/ and in the
closing words of the quotation, if we regard the powers as
distinct agents, God is made dependent on his own subjects for
his primary and most essential attributes. To this mode of
argument, however, Zeller replies fairly enough that if Philo
treats the powers in the same connection sometimes as personal
beings, sometimes as ideas or divine powers and attributes, he
cannot have been aware how irreconcilable were these two
modes of presentation. The conception of personality is, no
doubt, frequently left vague and uncertain by ancient thinkers ;
but the examples to which Zeller appeals || do not appear to me
to illustrate the confusion of thought which is attributed to
Philo. The Platonic world with its soul, the deity of the Stoics,
the stars in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, are all distinct
beings of some sort, and the only uncertainty is whether they
are self-conscious or possessed only of an impersonal reason.
This was precisely the point which was not determined,
whether the enjoyment of reason involved the possession of
individual self-consciousness; and an unsteadiness of thought
upon this subject is quite intelligible. But the case is very
different with Philo s powers. If it was agreed that they were

* Ex. xxxiii. 17. f * Avev vavToc tripov. + Quod Deus inmrat., 24 (I. 289).
III. ii. p. 366, Anm. 3 of the previous page. || III. ii. p. 365, Anm. 2.

128 THE DIVINE POWERS.

distinct rational beings, and the only question was whether,
being so, they were self-conscious or not, we should have an
exact parallel. But the question is really the preliminary one,
whether they are distinct beings at all, and not simply the
partial expression of the divine nature as distributed and classi
fied for the apprehension of our finite intelligence. That Philo
was blind to this distinction is not easy to believe, and we
must test his language rigorously before we can admit it.

What, then, is the leading thought in the passage before us ?
Is it not that Noah had a less full and satisfying apprehension
of God than Moses ? The latter, having wisdom in the unity of
its genus, rose above the analytical understanding, and appre
hended God in his unity, as eternal Being: the former,
possessing wisdom only in the lower form of its different
species, naturally was obliged to distribute his ideas, and could
view the divine nature only under the double aspect of its
goodness and power. The personification corresponds with the
distinction which is thus drawn, and is suggested by the
language of Scripture. When it is said that Noah pleased the
powers, this is only an interpretation of the text, (C Noah found
favour with the Lord God," and the figure is certainly not so
violent as some of those we have met with above. But the figure
having been once introduced, what more natural than that it
should be carried through, and the powers be represented as
the body-guards and subjects of the Self-existent ? When we
have got so far, the latter may without violence be referred to
as " alone " and " apart from every other/ when we regard his
nature in its unity and without analysis; and Philo may
well have thought that he guarded against all misapprehension
when he wound up with the statement that, after all, it is the
Self-existent himself who is both Lord and God. This inter
pretation appears to me to give the genuine sense of the
passage, and, without constraint, to reconcile its seeming
contradictions.

The correctness of this explanation is confirmed by

PERSONIFICATION OF THE POWERS. 129

the unquestionably figurative character of the succeeding

passage :

In contrast with Noah and Moses, Joseph is introduced as the " body-
loving and passion-loving mind, sold to the chief cook, the pleasure of
our compound being." He finds favour with the chief keeper of the
prison. Now prisoners are strictly, not those who are condemned in courts
of justice, but those who are full of intemperance and cowardice and
injustice and impiety and innumerable other plagues ; and " the keeper
and steward of these, the governor of the prison, is a compound and
heap of crowded and various vices woven together into one species, to
please whom is the greatest penalty." Some, not seeing this, go to him
very joyfully, and act as his body-guard. Then the soul is exhorted to
strive with all its might not to be pleasing to the chief keepers of the
prison, but to the Cause, and, if it cannot please the Cause on account
of the greatness of the dignity, to go straight to his powers, and become
their suppliant, until they, having received continual and genuine service,
place it in the rank of those "who have pleased them.

Reduced to plain prose the passage is tantamount to this : do
not be subject to your passions and bodily pleasures, but serve
God; and if the highest conception of him be too pure and
abstract, then serve him under those lower conceptions which
appeal most readily to your understanding and your heart.
This is surely more reasonable than insisting on a literal
interpretation/ with the strange result of supposing that Philo
deliberately exhorts men to depart from their monotheistic
worship and transfer their homage to a crowd of inferior
beings, who are divine only by courtesy.

In another passage it is said that Moses prayed to " the
self-determination, the might of God himself, and the pro
pitious and gentle powers." The prayer on which this
statement is founded is immediately quoted,* and God is
throughout addressed in the singular number, and, in order to
mark, as Philo himself says, his supremacy and superiority to
all need, he is called the Eternal King.f In the commentary
which follows, the being to whom the prayer was offered is
treated as the supreme God, and there is no allusion to his

* Ex. xv. 17, 18. f BaaiXtvwv TWV aiuvaiv K.T.\.

VOL. II. 9

130 THE DIVINE POWERS.

powers except that the hands of God, which are mentioned,
but not invoked in the prayer, are explained as " his world-
making powers."*" It is apparent, then, that when Philo
spoke of praying to the propitious powers he had no thought
of personal beings other than God himself.

Lastly, under this head, we must notice a passage in which
judicial right, or AtV?;, is not only personified, but separated
from and, indeed, contrasted with God. It is true that At*;??
is not spoken of as one of the powers ; but that is clearly the
category to which she belongs, and we must not evade the
force of the argument under this plea.

It befitted the nature of God [we are told] to deliver the Ten Com
mandments, which were summaries of the specific laws, in his own
person, but the more detailed laws through the most perfect of the
prophets, whom he chose to be their interpreter. It is for this reason
that the Decalogue is a collection of simple commandments and pro
hibitions without the customary provision of penalties. The author
was God, the cause of good only, and of nothing evil. He conceived,
then, that it was most appropriate to his nature to issue his salutary
orders unmixed with punishment, in order that one might not choose the
best unwillingly, but with deliberate judgment. In doing so he did not
offer inviolability to those who do wrong, but knew that his assessor
AiKt), the overseer of human affairs, would not keep quiet, as being
naturally a hater of evil, and likely to accept as a congenial task the duty
of defence against the sinning. For it is becoming for the ministers and
lieutenants of God, as for generals in war, to use defensive weapons
against deserters, but for the great King to attend to the common safety
of the whole, maintaining peace, and continually supplying all the bless
ings of peace richly to all men everywhere. For in reality God is the
president of peace, but his under-servants are governors of wars.f

In the latter part of this passage, and especially the last
clause, there is no evidence that Philo is speaking of the
highest powers ; at least I am not aware of any other place in
which they are spoken of as God s under-servarits;J and it is
certainly possible that, having referred to A/^T;, he is led on to

* Plantat. Noe, 12 (I. 336-7). f Dec. Orac., 33 (II. 208-9).

PEESONIFICATION OF THE POWEES. 131

speak more generally of subordinate agents, whether human
or not, as in the beginning he had spoken of Moses as the
proper mediator for the communication of specific laws. In
regard to ALKTJ herself, however, the case is different. She
must be admitted to be one of the powers; and yet she is
personified, and has a function assigned to her which makes it
unnecessary for God to attach penalties to the violation of the
Ten Commandments. The mere~personification we may at once
dismiss, for no one can imagine that Philo literally placed an
assessor beside God. But how shall we explain the function
which seems to give her an objective existence apart from
God ? I believe we can easily do so in conformity with the
doctrine which we have laid down. According to that doctrine
AIKIJ can be nothing less than a permanent mode of divine
operation, established in the universe as one of its persistent
laws, and therefore representing in its manifold activity a
single divine thought and volition. In this aspect it is
exceedingly natural to speak of it as though it were a distinct
force, an objective thought embodied in the constitution of
the world, though we know all the time, as philosophers, that
it has no existence apart from the supreme will. ISTow, the
passage tells us that, when God graciously gave the Ten
Commandments in his own person, he wished to secure for
them a perfectly voluntary obedience, and therefore would not
introduce any deterrent ills which might be inconsistent with
the benignity of his nature. Instead of enacting separate
penalties, which would represent so many distinct volitions,
and make him appear harsh and stern, he preferred relying on
the universal law of retributive justice established in the
providential order of the world, a law which was of wider
scope, and, as we have seen, beneficent in design. It became
him, instead of continually forming fresh plans, and stepping
upon the scene with new punishments, to act through those
vast purposes which he had, as it were, projected upon matter,
and wrought as unchangeable laws into the constitution of

9 *

132 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

things. It seems to me that in this way Philo s language
may be adequately explained in entire consistency with the
views hitherto ascribed to him.

We may consider in this connection another passage in the
same treatise, in which reference is made to the divine voice
through which the Ten Commandments were proclaimed from
Sinai.*

Are we to suppose [it is asked] that God himself spoke in the manner
of a voice P Such a thought must not enter our mind ; for God is not as
a man, requiring a mouth and tongue, but, thinks Philo,f he wrought at
that time a very sacred and wonderful thing, "having ordered an
invisible noise to be fabricated in the air, fitted with perfect harmonies
more wonderfully than all instruments, not lifeless,^ but neither con
sisting of body and soul like an animal, but a rational soul full of
clearness and distinctness, which, having shaped and strained the air
and changed it to a naming fire, sounded forth, as breath through a trumpet,
so great an articulate voice that those who were farthest off seemed to
hear as well as those who were nearest." For the voices of men naturally
grow weak with distance. "But God s power breathing on the newly
created voice raised and kindled it, and shedding it everywhere rendered
the end clearer than the beginning, putting in the souls of each a
different sort of hearing [from the sensible], far superior to that which
comes through the ears. For the sensation, being slower, keeps quiet
until, struck by the air, it is aroused ; but the [hearing] of the inspired
understanding hastens with keenest swiftness to meet the words that
are spoken."||

The only argument for the personality of the powers which
can be derived from this passage is founded on the apparent
identity of the " soul" which produced the voice with " God s
power " to which the same office is ascribed. There are some
circumstances, however, which render this argument more
than precarious. In the first place, there is no good season
for asserting the supposed identity. The soul created for a
momentary purpose, and presumably dissipated again as soon
as the purpose was fulfilled, would of course be an expression
of, and inspired by, divine power, but cannot be synonymous

* Ex. xix. and xx. f E f*

i&gt;x*7", for which Mangey suggests fjxnv. || Dec. Orac., 9 (II. 185-6).

PERSONIFICATION OF THE POWERS. 133

with it. The latter is used here in its largest and vaguest
meaning, and no allusion is made to its mediatorial function;
on the other hand, the soul is fabricated for the special object
of acting in a single instance as the divine organ. Secondly,
it is by no means certain that a " rational soul " made and
employed in the way described would be regarded by Philo
as a person. Thirdly, Mangey would read TT^Z/, "sound,"
instead of f ^v^j]v ) " soul." In favour of this change we
might plead that the lines in which ^Jrv^v occurs require, in
any case, some emendation ; that the epithets applied to it are
more suitable to r]^rj ; and that it is strangely harsh to say that
an invisible noise was a rational soul. With this change of
reading the argument would fall. Fourthly, it is far from
clear that Philo is not mixing up a literal with an allegorical
interpretation. Literally a voice was fabricated in the air;
but at the end of the passage it turns out that this voice was
not really a noise in the air at all, but was apprehended only by
the inspired understanding. Hence it is said in Scripture"* that
ic all the people saw the voice }} ; for ce all the things that God
says are not words, but deeds, which eyes distinguish rather
than ears."f For these reasons I am unable to admit that
this passage affords the least support to the doctrine of the
personality of the powers.

We must now return to that long passage about the
visitors to Abraham from which we borrowed, as the key to
our interpretation, a considerable extract in which the triple
appearance of God is ascribed to the imperfection of the
human understanding. In the earlier part of this passage the
three visitors, who had seemed like men, are said, after they
communicated the divine promise, to have conveyed a more
sublime impression, that "of either prophets or angels,
changing from spiritual and mental substance into the human
form."J Philo himself regards them as angels, " sacred and
divine natures, under- servants and lieutenants of the first God,
* Ex. xx. 18. f 11, p. 188. J Abr., 22 (II. 17).

13i THE DIVINE POWEES.

through whom, as ambassadors, lie announces as many things
as he wishes to foretell to our race." In entering Abraham s
tent they presumed that he was " kindred and a fellow-slave
of the same master/ * Nothing can be plainer ; and Gfrorer
appeals to this passage as a decisive proof of the personality
of the powers. f We must observe, however, that Philo is
here giving the literal sense of the Scripture narrative ; and
lie makes no allusion to the powers till, in the next section, he
expressly enters on the symbolical interpretation ; and surely
it is most unwarrantable, when Philo says that literally the
three men are three angels in the form of men, figuratively
they are nothing of the kind, to force these two statements
together, as though they belonged to the same comment, and
cry, Behold ! a contradiction. If we act thus, let us at least
be consistent, and press the contradiction a little farther.
Almost within the limits of a single page we learn that all
three were angels, fellow- slaves with Abraham of the same
master, and that one of them was " the Father of the
universe/ " the Self-existent." Was the Self-existent, then,
an angel, and his own slave, and was Philo quite unconscious
of any incompatibility between these notions ? This may
convince us that we are not justified in mixing together two
systems of interpretation which the writer himself broadly
separates.

A later portion of the same passage occasions greater
difficulty, because Philo himself is no longer so careful, but
apparently blurs the two lines of exegesis. He devotes three
sections J to the destruction of Sodom and the surrounding
country, considered as an actual historical event, and then in
the succeeding section proceeds to the allegorical inter
pretation^ Contrary to what we should expect, he omits
the powers from the latter, and introduces them into the
former, where, according to his previous treatment of the

* Ib. 23. f P P- 155, sq. t 26 - 28 - 29-31.

THE APPEAKANCE TO ABEAHAM. 135

history, we ought to meet only with angels. This temporary
confusion occurs in an intermediate section* between the
history of the destruction of Sodom and the symbolical inter
pretation of the Pentapolis, and from its position may naturally
give a stronger appearance of personal separation between
God and his powers than was really in Philo s thoughts. The
general meaning, however, does not seem to me inconsistent
with the results of previous investigation. Let us observe in
the first place, that in the preceding sectionf Philo says, without
any qualification, that it was God who punished the Sodomites
by ordering the air to rain down fire upon them; and therefore
if he afterwards says that it was not the Self-existent who
punished, but only his powers, we properly fall back upon the
distinction so often drawn between God in his absolute being
and God as partially and analytically apprehended by men.
Let us see, however, what the passage says. Philo states that
his object in relating the dreadful calamities of Sodom has
been to show that of the three who appeared as men to
Abraham only two, according to the Scripture, came to
punish the inhabitants, while the third did not think it
right to come. The latter was, in Philo s opinion, the really
Self-existent, J and supposed it to be fitting to confer good
things in personal presence through himself, but to execute
the opposite of good by the ministration of the powers,
"that he may be antecedently thought to be the Cause of good
things only, and of nothing evil. Those kings also who imitate
the divine nature appear to me to act thus, extending favours
through themselves, but confirming punishments through
others. But since of the two powers one is beneficent, and
the other punitive, each, as we might expect, appears on the
land of the Sodomites, because of the five best cities in it
four were to be burnt, and one to be left unaffected and
secure from all evil. For the destruction ought to take

* 28. f 27. Kurd rrjv l^ffv tvvoiav ?]v o irpbs a\rj9tiav uv.

Ka0

136 THE DIVINE POWERS.

place through the punitive power, and salvation through the
beneficent. But since even the part that was saved had not
entire and perfect virtues, it was benefited by the power of
the S elf-existent , but was antecedently thought unworthy to
obtain the representation of the latter." Now, if this passage
stood alone, we should certainly believe that God and the
powers were quite distinct from one another ; and if we are
bound to take the words as a literal expression of Philo s
thought, we must admit that he contradicts himself, and that
at least in this one passage his doctrine of the powers becomes
a mere jumble of heterogeneous elements. But there are some
considerations, besides those already noticed, which must make
us pause before we conclude that the fault is not in the
expression rather than the thought. This is a continuation
of the passage in which Philo lays it down with so much
precision that God and his powers are in reality one subject,
and that the triple representation in our minds is due solely to
the imperfection of our spiritual vision. He thereby shows
that he is aware of the difference between the conceptions of
one God capable of manifesting himself in various modes, and
of one God presiding over a number of persons separate from
himself. It is not likely that within a few pages he entirely
confounds these two conceptions, and announces that what
was declared to be really one subject, though apparently three,
was, after all, three both apparently and really. But there is
within the passage itself a statement which compels us to
give it a very liberal interpretation. It is said that the Self-
existent " supposed it to be fitting to confer the good things
in personal presence* through himself." This refers of course
to the visit to Abraham s tent ; and therefore we learn that,
in Philo s opinion, the supreme and eternal Cause did really
come down, and enter the tent of a man, and talk and eat
with him. Is any interpreter of Philo prepared to admit this ?
One can almost see the scorn with which our philosopher would

THE APPEARANCE TO ABRAHAM. 137

desire such a one to " get away," and not to be so silly as to
impute to him this enormous impiety. We are, then, compelled
to allow that the language of the passage does not strictly
represent its thought, and that Philo was led through some
cause to confuse ideas which he knew would not really blend.
The cause, I believe, is that which has been already pointed
out, that he mixes the literal and the allegorical interpre
tations. Literally the three men or angels were three distinct
persons ; and in the progress of the story they separate from
one another, and only two of them repair to Sodom. Why
did the story assume this form ? " In order that [the Self-
existent] may be thought* to be the cause of good things only,
and of nothing evil." The intention, then, was not to draw a
real distinction between God and his powers, but to affect the
thoughts of men. Men are apt to look upon punishments
as evils, and therefore God, in order that they may not
misconceive his nature, often sends punishments through
subordinate agents, or even, as in the present narrative,
allows them to look upon the punitive force of nature as an
agent distinct from himself. Philo accepted the doctrine that
God was the cause only of good, but he had another way of
escaping the difficulty connected with providential punish
ments : these were not evils, but blessings in disguise, and the
punitive power, justly regarded, coalesced with the beneficent.f
Another evidence of the correctness of this interpretation is
afforded by the statement that the city which was saved was
deemed unworthy to retain the representation of the Self-
existent, for thus we are expressly thrown back into the
domain of mental images. In the allegory the city is vision,
the queen of the senses, which alone is able to transport itself
to incorruptible natures. If we venture to complete the
allegory which Philo has left unfinished, we must say that the
eye discerns throughout the cosmos the presence of the divine
beneficence, but is too imperfect to look upon God himself ;
* Nofitfiirai. - t See before, p. 87.

138 THE DIVINE POWEKS.

and then we shall have a distinction which introduces no new
or contradictory thought. But what are we to say to the
comparison with kings, who, imitating the divine nature, inflict
punishments through others ? The reply is perhaps to be
found in the more literal part of Philo s description. He says
that God ordered the air to rain down fire, and destroy the
country. The air, then, is the subordinate agent employed to
execute the divine purpose. Now, the air, we must remember,
is itself " a power, " but it is a power permanently impressed
upon matter; and regarded from the other side, as matter under
the constraint of divine force, it becomes objective to God, and
is properly viewed as a subordinate, though still impersonal,
agent. As the destroyer of Sodom it was charged for the time
with punitive power, and thus the latter, too, was temporarily
planted out, as it were, into distinct objective existence ; for
being impressed upon matter it fulfilled the one condition
which made an objective world possible. In this way, I think,
Philo s language may be explained. He cannot indeed be
acquitted of some confusion in his manner of presenting his
subject ; but this confusion may be accounted for, and is very
different from a radical contradiction in thought.

We come now to the explanation of a passage in Genesis
which evidently occasioned Philo some perplexity, and led
him into some confusion of thought and expression. In his
remarks upon it we meet with far the strongest evidence that
is produced to show that he ascribed distinct personality to
the powers. He treats of it in no fewer than four different
places, all of which we must consider if we wish to arrive at
his real meaning, or to discover whether he had any consistent
interpretation to offer; and in arranging them we may
advantageously reserve his longest and most elaborate
exposition for the last. The passage in question is that in
which a plural is used in connection with the creation of
the human race : " Let us make man."

One might reasonably doubt [says Philo] why Moses ascribed the

THE CKEATION OF MAN. 130

creation of man alone not to one fabricator, as lie did every thing else,
but, as it were, to several. For does the Father of the universe, to whom
all things are subject, require any one ? Or did he need no one to
co-operate with him when he made the heaven and the earth and the sea,
but prove unable to prepare of himself, without the assistance of others,
such a little animal as man ? The truest reason for this is necessarily
known to God only ; but we must not conceal the one that seems probable,
and has the merit of a plausible conjecture. It is this. Some things
have no participation in either virtue or vice, such as plants and irrational
animals, the former because they are without souls,* the latter because
they are not endowed with mind and thought, in which moral good and
evil reside. Other things participate only in virtue, being entirely free
from evil, as the stars. But other things are of mixed nature, as man,
who admits the opposites, prudence and folly, sobriety and intemper
ance, bravery and cowardice, justice and injustice, and, in a word, good
and evil, fair and base, virtue and vice. Accordingly it was most appro
priate for God, the Father of all, to make what was excellent through
himself alone, on account of its relationship to him ; and it was not alien
to him to make what was indifferent, since it, too, is without the vice that
is opposed to him ; but in regard to the things of mixed nature it was
partly appropriate and partly inappropriate : appropriate, on account of
the better idea mixed up in them ; inappropriate, on account of that which
is the contrary and inferior. Therefore it is only in connection with the
creation of man that God said " Let us make man," which signifies the
adoption of others as co-operators, in order that God, the sovereign of all,
may be ascribed [as author] to the blameless counsels and deeds of man
acting uprightly, but others, from among his subjects, to those of a
contrary kind ; for the father ought not to be the cause of evil to the
offspring, and vice and vicious activity are an evil.f

As this passage does not contain a single word about the
powers, it may be thought out of place to quote it ; but it is
interesting in several ways. The general conception is of
course borrowed from Plato s Timaeus ; J where the subordinate
divinities are called in to assist in the formation of mortal
creatures. Philo s difficulty, however, springs from a different
root from Plato s. He feels that the moral contrariety in
man s nature betokens a mixed origin, and cannot be traced
back to one divine thought. In the present passage he is
speaking of the intelligible man, the idea of humanity, as is

* Or sentient life f Mundi Op., 24 (I. 16 sq.). J 41 C. sqq.

140 THE DIVINE POWERS.

shown not only by the entire context, but by his concluding
remark that, although individual men had not yet taken form,
the species were properly distinguished through the statement
that " male and female were fabricated/ for the species exist
within the genus. What we immediately learn, then, from the
passage before us is this, that, since the very idea of humanity
involves the possibility of moral evil, it is not purely divine,
but must be in some way of mixed origin. The stars which
were above the reach of sin, the beasts which were below it,
might alike be true expressions of the thought of God ; but
man in departing from God thereby showed his participation in
an idea which was alien to the divine nature. Whether Philo
had formed any clear view of the origin of this lower idea, or
had attempted to reconcile it with his doctrine of the Logos as
containing the whole of the ideal world, it is impossible to say.
At all events he seems to have carried down the division thus
found in the ideal cosmos into the actual, and to have assigned
the creation of man in part to other agents than God. This
will become apparent as we proceed; but before leaving
the present passage we must make one or two further
remarks.

The very absence of reference to the powers is itself a
fact of some importance, because it helps to show that
Philo had no very decided and settled theory as to the
nature of the subjects who co-operated with God in the
creation of man. Again, Philo broaches his explanation only
as a plausible conjecture which may not be coincident with the
truth, and does not, like some of his interpreters, represent it
as belonging to the very kernel of his philosophy. And, what
is most important of all, the formation of man is represented as
an exception to the general order of creation, and as alone
requiring the presence of mediatorial agents. Has, then, Philo
forgotten all that he has previously said about the Logos
and the creative power ? We have no right to assume
this. He could not conceive of creation without their

THE CREATION OF MAN. 141

presence and activity ; and if the helpers who were other*
than God were not other than the most exalted divine
powers, then man was no exception to the universal rule.
Those, therefore, who insist on a strict interpretation of single
passages, apart from their bearing upon other passages, are
bound either to admit that God was the immediate creator
even of the beasts, and to abandon the whole doctrine of
mediatorial creation, and of a separation between God and
the universe, or to regard the subordinate agents in the
creation of man as different from the divine powers in the
highest sense.

This important result, however, is not left to mere inference.
Elsewhere Philo comments as follows on the words " I am
thy God : "f

The self-existent Being, as such, is not relative ; but some of the powers
are, as it were, relative ; for instance, the Regal and Beneficent. Akin to
these is the Creative, called God ; so that " I am thy God " is equivalent to
" I am maker and fabricator." " Now, it is the greatest gift to obtain the
architect himself, whom also the whole cosmos obtained. For he did not
form the soul of the bad, for vice is at enmity with God ; but the middle
soul lie formed not through himself alone, according to the most
sacred Moses, since, like wax, it was going to receive the difference of fair
and base, for which reason he says, Let us make man according to
our image, in order that, if it received a bad form, it might appear to be a
fabrication of others, but if a good one, of the artificer of things fair and
good alone. He, therefore, is altogether excellent to whom he says, I am
thy God, since he lias obtained the Maker alone without the assistance of
others. "J

In this passage, again, we are not told who assisted in the
creation of the bad man ; but it is perfectly clear that it
was not the high power known as the creative, for to have
been framed by this alone was the prerogative of the good
man, as of the universe at large. We must remember, then,
that the subordinate agents in the creation of man are
separated from the highest powers, which we have treated

* "Erepoi. f Gen. xvii. 1. J Mutat. Norn., 4 (I. 582-3).

142 THE DIVINE POWEBS.

as predicates of God, not only by inevitable inference from
man s exceptional position in the plan of creation, but by
Philo s express statement.

In the next passage the powers are introduced, and we
shall have to consider whether it contradicts those that
have been just referred to or can, without violence, be
harmonized with them. It will be better to quote it entire
in order that we may have the case fairly before us.

" It is not becoming for God to punish, as lie is the first and best
legislator, and lie punishes through the ministration of others, not
through himself ; for it is suitable for him to extend favours and gifts and
benefits, as being by nature good and munificent, but [to inflict] punish
ments, not indeed without his own order, since lie is king, but through the
agency of others who are adapted to suck services. Now the self-
disciplined [Jacob] bears witness to my statement by his words,
God who nourishes me from my youth, the angel who rescues me
out of all evils ;* for lie ascribed to God the older blessings, by which
the soul is nourished, but to a servant of God those that were more
recent, as many as result from the avoidance of sins. For this reason, too,
I suppose, when he gave a philosophical account of creation, while
he said that all other things were made by God, he signified that
man alone was formed as though with the co-operation of others ; for the
words occur, God said, Let us make man according to our image, a
multitude being implied by tke phrase let us make. The Father of the
universe, therefore, converses with his own powers.f to whom he gave the
mortal part of our soul to form, by imitating his art when lie shaped the
rational principle in us, judging it right that the sovereign principle
in the soul should be fabricated by the sovereign, but the subject
part by subjects. But he made use of the powers after liim,J not
only for the reason which has been mentioned, but because the soul
of man alone was to receive thoughts of evil and good, and to use
the one if it were not possible to use both. He considered it necessary,
therefore, to assign the genesis of evils to other fabricators, but that
of good things to himself alone. For this reason, too. though first
the phrase is used, Let us make man, as if referring to a multitude, it is
added, as if in reference to one, God made the man. For the one only
God is fabricator of the real man, \vho accordingly is purest mind, but the
multitude [is the maker] of man who is so called and mixed with.

* Gen. xlviii. 15, 16. f TaTc tavrov r __.

J Reading fj.e9 lavrov instead of jU0 tavrov. The latter, however, would
also suit the context, as we have above, fiera avvtpyuv.

THE CREATION OF MAN. 143

sensation. On this account man in the pre-eminent sense is mentioned
with the article for it is said God made the man, * that invisible and
unmixed thoughtf but the other, man, without this addition ; for the
phrase, Let us make man, signifies him who is woven together out
of irrational and rational nature."^

In dealing with this passage it is very easy to cry out
that the question is settled, for here the divine powers are
expressly mentioned, and are set over against God as personal
agents in the creation of man. This is quite contradictory
to the view which regards them as attributes, and therefore
it is proved that Philo vacillated illogically and blindly
between two irreconcilable tenets. Yet it is the duty of a good
critic to consider whether there may not be some view which
will harmonize, or at least may have appeared to Philo to
harmonize, these contrasts. I am fully aware indeed of the
danger which. Zeller points out, of imposing upon Philo
what are only our own inferences from difficulties of which
he himself was unconscious ; but we must be equally careful
not to ascribe to him contradictions out of which he provides us
with a clue. Now, we have one very strong reason for pausing
before we commit ourselves to a hasty interpretation of the
passage before us. If we insist upon adopting the sense which
most easily presents itself, and understanding by the powers
the creative and regal and the rest with which we have become
familiar as predicates of God, we not only involve Philo in
a confusion between the personal and the impersonal (into
which he may conceivably have fallen), but we attribute to him
a view which contradicts what the most celebrated critics
have regarded as the very root and essence of his philosophy.
In this passage, no less clearly than in the two previously
cited, man is broadly distinguished from the rest of creation,
and the distinction consists in this, that, whereas all other
parts of the cosmos were made by God himself, the intervention

* To v dvOpwTTov. f Aoyioyzoi/.

J Prof., 13-14 (I. 556). III. ii. p. 365, Anm. 3.

1M THE DIVINE POWERS.

of the powers was required only for the construction of
the irrational portion of the human soul. This simply sweeps
away the entire doctrine of powers which we have hitherto
learned; and if we can find no better interpretation, we can
only set the passage aside as lying beyond the limits of Philo s
philosophy, and containing views which were temporarily forced
upon him by the words of Scripture on which he was com
menting. We are not, however, shut up in this harsh alterna
tive ; for, notwithstanding Zeller s adverse opinion,* I think
Kefersteinf has pointed out the true solvent for our difficulties,
although his criticism may require some modification and
expansion.

It will be observed that the comment on the phrase, " Let us
make man/ is suggested by the words of Jacob, who speaks of
God as his nourisher, but of an angel as the being who rescued
him from evil. May we not, then, reasonably infer that when
Philo speaks of personal agents as acting under God in the
creation of man he alludes to angels ? But if we grant this, it
may be immediately urged that the divine powers are thereby
identified with angels, and their personality is fully established.
In order to form a sound opinion upon this subject we must
make a short digression, and notice the more important
statements respecting the angelic nature. We will only
premise that the relations between angels and the Logoi
will be reserved for future treatment.

A considerable part of Philo s doctrine of angels has been
already unfolded in treating of the human soul, and we
need now only recapitulate the most necessary parts of
what was there said. Those whom other philosophers
called demons, Moses was accustomed to call angels. Now,
they are souls flying in the air, some of whom descend into
bodies ; " but others did not think fit ever to be united
with any of the parts of the earth, whom, being consecrated and

* III. ii. p. 365, Anm. 3. f Pp. 1S5 sq.

DOCTKINE OF ANGELS.

taking- charge of the service of the Father, the Fabricator
is accustomed to use as assistants and ministers for the care of
mortals." Souls and demons and angels are, then, different
names for one and the same subject. Good angels are
ambassadors of men to God and of God to men, inviolable
and sacred on account of this blameless and honourable
service. Others, on the contrary, are profane and unworthy,
and only creep into the name of angels.* To this general
description we must add one or two very important statements.
The angels were created, and are spoken of as powers. " The
Maker," says Philo, "made two genera both in earth and
air; in the air the perceptible winged creatures, and other
powersf by no means apprehended anywhere by sense. This
band consists of incorporeal souls, not disposed in the same
ranks "; for some are said to enter mortal bodies, but others,
having obtained a more divine constitution, neglect the earth
and are next the ether itself. The latter are called by the
Greeks heroes, and by Moses angels, as they report good things
from the Sovereign to the subjects, and to the King the things
which the subjects need.J The fact that the angels belonged,
not to the eternal, but to the created realm is also casually
mentioned in another passage, which furnishes an instructive
example of the way in which Philo says what appears to him at
the moment appropriate to the words of Scripture on which he
is commenting, without taking pains to make a long interpreta
tion consistent in all its parts. He is remarking on the words,
" The angel of God said to me in a dream, Jacob ; and I said,
What is it ? And he said to me, Look up, ... I am the God who
appeared to thee in the place of God." His first observation
is, " You see that the divine word records as God-sent dreams
not only those that appear in connection with the oldest of
causes, but also those that come through his announcing

* Gigant., 2-4 (I. 263-5). See also the brief statement that "angels are an
army of God, incorporeal and blessed souls," SS. Ab. et Caini, 2 (I. 164).
f AIW//ICIC a\\a ff . { Plantat. Noe, 4 (I. 331-2). Gen. xxxi. 11-13.

VOL. n. 10

146 THE DIVINE POWERS.

and attendant angels, who have been deemed worthy of a
divine and blessed lot by the Father who begat them/ * It is
apparent from this that Philo at the beginning of his exposition
understood by the angel of God one of those subordinate
beings whom God made or begat, and who, as we have
seen, inhabited the air. Yet this angel says, " I am the
God who appeared to thee in the place of God." Only on the
previous page Philo has explained, in connection with the
"house of God/ that God denotes "one of the powers of the
real God, by virtue of which he was good." What an admirable
opportunity, then, for telling us that this power was an angel,
and removing in this way the startling difficulty presented by
the fact that the angel of God says, I am God." Yet he does
nothing of the kind ; and we may legitimately infer that
he refrains from using this obvious explanation because it
never occurred to him to identify the goodness of God
with an angel flying in the air. He adopts instead an
interpretation which is not very consistent with his opening
remark; but as it is given after an interval of a few pages, the
inconsistency may the more easily have escaped his notice. In
the words, " I am God," he understands God in the supreme
sense. He says nothing of the difficulty of putting such
language into the mouth of an angel ; but presumably he
has this difficulty in his mind when he says that to souls
which are still in bodies God appears in the likeness of
angels, not changing his own nature, but putting in the minds
of those who receive the representation the opinion of another
form. Thus our angel, who seemed so literal at the beginning,
is spirited away into an erroneous mental impression.f One
other passage deserves particular attention. In the great
cosmic temple, in which heaven is the sanctuary and the stars
the votive offerings, the priests are the angels who are under-

* Tow yevvfiffavToc. The object is not expressed, but is sufficiently evident
from the context.

t Somn., I. 33, 39, 40 (I. 649, 655).

NOT IDENTICAL WITH ANGELS. 147

servants of God s powers,* " incorporeal souls, not mixtures of
rational and irrational nature, as ours are, but having the
irrational element cut out, wholly intelligent throughout, pure
thoughts, t like a monad. "J

Such, then, is Philo s doctrine about the angels. Does it
follow that he identified them with those high powers which
we recognized as predicates of God ? If things are distin
guished by their attributes, it is not easy to imagine how Philo
could have distinguished these two classes more sharply from
one another. The powers are unbegotten, the angels are
begotten and made. The powers are uncircumscribed as God
himself, and stretched through earth and water, air and
heaven ; the angels are obviously finite and local, for they are
souls flying in the air. If, notwithstanding these broad
distinctions, we maintain that Philo identified the powers with
angels, we ascribe to him not only a want of clearness in his
notion of personality, but an absolute incapacity for coherent
thought. How little are we justified in doing so in the
present instance is apparent from the last passage which we
have quoted, where the angels are represented as under-
servants of the powers. Zeller must surely have overlooked
this passage when he affirmed that Philo nowhere indicates a
distinction between the powers and the angels. But if we
maintain the existence of this distinction, how can we consist
ently suppose that the powers with whom God conversed at
the creation of man were angels ? By the very simple reflec
tion that, though the powers were not necessarily angels, the
angels were most certainly powers. They are, as we have seen,
expressly so called; but then so are earth, water, air, fire,
nutrition, growth, improvement ; and, in a word, all classes and
functions in nature or in man come under this term. If it is
applicable to material things because they have been differen-

* Tovg vTroSiciKovovg O.VTOV rfi

f Ao-^/io^c. f Monarch., II. 1 (II. 222).

III. ii. p. 366, Anm. 3 of the previous page.

10 *

14:8 THE DIVINE POWEES.

tiated by the impress of some rational force, how much more is
it applicable to immaterial souls, which, in their uncompounded
being are nothing but divine power set apart and concentrated
into an individual life. We do not in this view distinguish
two classes of powers. The same conception of them is every
where present, and the various names and operations which
Philo attributes to them result from the logical unfolding of
the same primary thought, that God is the sole rational and
efficient Cause. The most that can be said is that we regard
them under two different aspects, now in the totality of their
essence, as genera which express the modes of the divine
activity, and again as partially and locally manifested in species
and individuals. Souls, or angels, were one form of divine
power, and each angel, being a pure expression of that form,
might itself be called a power. As this interpretation not only
reconciles apparently conflicting passages, but springs imme
diately from the roots of Philo s philosophy, it seems entitled
to our acceptance.

We have still to examine one long passage, and consider
how far it confirms or overthrows the results which we have
just obtained. It opens with a reference to the words ascribed
to God, " Come, and let us go down, and confound there their
tongue."*

Here God appears to be conversing with persons co-operating with
him. The same thing occurred before when he said, " Let us make
man according to our image," and again, " Adam has become as one of
us, to know good and evil."f This, then, must first of all be stated, that
nothing in existence is equal in honour to God, but there is one Ruler
and Sovereign and King, to whom alone it belongs to preside over and
administer all things. This being previously acknowledged we may
proceed. " God, being one, has innumerable powers around him, all
helping and preservative of what was created, among which the puni
tive also are included : but even punishment is not injurious, being a
prevention and correction of sins. Through these powers, again, the
incorporeal and intelligible cosmos was compacted, the archetype of this
apparent one, consisting of invisible ideas, as this does of visible bodies.

* Gen. xi. 7. t Gen. *" 22&lt;

THE CEEATION OF MAN. 149

Some people, then, being struck with astonishment at the nature of each
of the cosmi, not only deified them as wholes, but also the most beautiful
of the parts in them, sun and moon and the whole heaven, which, without
any shame, they called gods. And Moses, having observed their thought,
says, Lord, Lord, King of the gods, * to show his superiority as a ruler
to subjects. But there is also in the air a most sacred band of incorpo
real souls, attendant on the heavenly [beings] ; for the prophetic word is
accustomed to call these souls angels. The whole army, then, of each,
having been disposed in suitable ranks, ministers to and serves the
Sovereign who disposed it, whom in accordance with right and law it
follows as its commander ; for the divine army may never be convicted
of desertion. Now, it is becoming for a king to associate with his own
powers, and use them for services in such things as would not be suitably
fixed by God alone. For the Father of the universe is in need of
nothing, so as to require service from others if he wished to fabricate ;
but seeing what is becoming to himself and to the things that are entering
into being, he allowed the subject powers to mould some things, without
having given even to these an absolutely autocratic knowledge of com
pleting the work, in order that none of the things coming into genesis
should be out of harmony." These explanations having been necessarily
premised, we return to the creation o man. Beings above and below
man are alike free from sin ; but man almost alone, having a knowledge
of good and ill, often chooses what is worst, and avoids what is worthy of
pursuit. For this reason God attached the formation of man to his
lieutenants, saying, " Let us make man," in order that the right actions
of the mind might be ascribed to him alone, but the sins to others. For
it did not seem becoming to the all-ruling God to fabricate through him
self the way to evil in the rational soul, for which reason he committed
the formation of this part to those who are afterf him. For it was
necessary for the voluntary also, the antagonist to the involuntary, to be
prepared with a view to the completion of the universe. Further, we
ought to attend to this consideration, that God is the cause of good things
only, and of nothing evil at all, since he was himself both the oldest of
beings and the most perfect good. Now, it is most becoming for the best
of beings to fabricate the best things, as being appropriate to his own
nature, but for punishments inflicted on the wicked to be made secure
through the agency of those under him. This is attested by the words
of Jacob, " God who nourishes me from my youth, the angel who rescues
me out of all my evils." He hereby acknowledges " that genuine good
which nourishes virtue-loving souls is attributable to God only as its
Cause, whereas the domain of evil, on the contrary, has been committed to
angels, though even they have not an autocratic authority to punish, in

* The reference is apparently to Deut. x. 17. t Or beneath.

150 THE DIVINE POWERS.

order that his preservative nature may not begin any of the things
tending to corruption. Wherefore he says, Corne, let us go down, and
confound. For the impious were worthy to suffer such a penalty [as
this], that his propitious and beneficent and munificent powers should be
appropriated to punishments.* Knowing, however, that [punishments]
are profitable to mankind, he appointed them through the agency of
others, for it was necessary, on the one hand, that mankind should be
deemed worthy of correction, and, on the other, that the fountains of his
ever-flowing graces should be kept unmixed with evils, not only actual
but even supposed. "f

I have quoted this passage at such length in order that its
full bearing and the connection of its parts may be clearly
seen; for in it pre-eminently Philo is supposed to identify the
powers with angels. When referring to it in another con
nection we had occasion to observe that its phraseology was
deficient in precision; but a little attention will enable us to
trace its line of argument, and to perceive that Philo, so far
from confounding the highest powers with angels, draws a
very sharp distinction between them. At the opening of the
discussion he seems apprehensive that the use of the plural
may suggest a polytheistic conception, and he therefore begins
by strongly asserting the absolute unity of God. He then
passes on to the powers in their largest and most universal
sense, taking care to observe that the punitive, with which he
is more immediately concerned, were included among these,
and were, like the rest, of a beneficent character. He has, I
think, various reasons for referring to the powers. He wishes
to show that polytheists, though they revered what was intrin
sically divine, yet committed an error in breaking up the
divine unity and worshipping the partial and subordinate
manifestations of God. Again, he would point out that
punishment, though it is inflicted through the instrumentality
of inferior agents, nevertheless has its source in the depths of
the divine benevolence. And, lastly, he traces the descent of

Tvyxavf.iv, VXfw^ . . . dvva/me otKtiovaQai
f Ccnf. Ling., 33-36 (I. 430-3).

DESCENDING BANKS. 151

these agents, that they may not be regarded as a hostile force,
but recognised as obedient servants of God. The next step,
accordingly, is to describe the creation of the world, with
special reference to the parts which were deified by men.
This is done with the utmost brevity, so as not to interrupt
the main purpose of the exposition. We learn, however, what
is essential, the universal agency of the powers in the construc
tion of the intelligible cosmos ; and I venture to affirm that
throughout the entire passage this is the only agency which is
ascribed to these superlative powers. If Philo wanted no other
agents, why does he go further and introduce the perceptible
cosmos and angels, with no other result than confusing the
impression and misleading the thought ? It seems quite clear
that, having mentioned the powers, he has not yet reached the
ministers of God of whom he is in search. He proceeds,
accordingly, to the visible world, and to the sun, moon, and
whole heaven, which men were particularly fond of deifying.
Now we know that in Philo s philosophy the celestial bodies
were intelligent beings, marching their orderly round, and
fulfilling beneficent functions towards the earth beneath. Here,
then, it seems to me we have the first part of that army of
obedient powers to which Philo presently alludes. This con
clusion is perhaps confirmed by comparing with the present
passage the language which is used elsewhere about the sun
and moon. To these God gave powers, but not autocratic
ones, just as here it is said that he did not give the powers in
question autocratic knowledge;* and, again, he leads each
thing according to law and right, as here the army is said to
follow him according to right and statute law.f The heavenly
luminaries, then, were actually intermediate agents employed
by God for the benefit of mankind. But some freer activity

pv twutv, ov ^i]v rtiroKjOnrtlc, compared with ovde ravrau; t/c;
v avTGKpciTopa covg . . t7riarr]firjv.

Kara vcpov /coi Ziicijv, compared with Kara ZIKI]V /cat Qkopov, Mundi Op.,
14 (I. 10).

152 THE DIVINE POWEES.

was needed than was compatible with their stately movements
in settled orbits ; and hence Philo hastens to tell us that there
is also* in the air a band of angels, who form the second part
of the divine army. The little word "also" is of great import
ance, because it clearly distinguishes the angels from the beings
hitherto mentioned, and the same distinction is implied by the
word "each" in the phrase "the whole army of each." If
the allusion is to the powers originally referred to, then the
powers in their highest sense are distinguished from the
angels, and the fact that the latter are afterwards spoken of as
subject powers affords, as we have seen, no reason whatever
for their identification. I believe, however, that the reference
is to the sun, moon, and stars, which form an ethereal host
more remote from man, while the angels are an aerial army,
nearer to the earth and more interested in human affairs.
These two wings of the divine forces render an obedient service
to God, not because he needs them, but because he thinks it
becoming to entrust some things to their charge. The applica
tion to them of the term " powers " can no longer perplex us ;
and it is peculiarly suitable here, because an army constitutes
the power or forces of a king. That the powers in the supreme
sense are not alluded to is obvious from the limitation of their
agency, which is as carefully marked here as in the passages
previously considered. God permitted them to mould some
things. f Are these the all-pervasive powers through which
the intelligible cosmos was made ? Surely not, as they are
thus separated by an absolute difference of function. The
section relating to the creation of man throws no further light
upon the question. We are simply told that God employed
his " lieutenants " J and " those after him," but nothing is
said to indicate their precise nature. The succeeding section,
however, on the confusion of tongues seems to me conclusive.
Philo brings in his favourite text about the angel who rescued

* *Eor&lt; df Kcti. y "Eoriv a i7rXarreti/.

To7f /ifr avrov.

SUBOKDINATE AGENTS. 153

Jacob from evil, in order to prove that the duty of punishment
was delegated to angels. It was so delegated in order that
God s preservative nature* might not begin things tending
to corruption, that is, I presume, punishments which, though
intended to act beneficially, sometimes involve the destruction
of the offender. The succeeding words are of the utmost
importance, and have been fully quoted above. What do they
mean ? Surely this, that the men at Babel were so bad that
they deserved to be punished by the immediate action of divine
power, seeing even the propitious and beneficent powers of
God armed with the terrors of punitive justice. But instead
of exercising these powers God employed the agency of others,
presumably of angels; and he did so in order that the fountains
of his ever flowing graces, that is, the powers just mentioned,
the sources of all divine favour, might be kept free from the
very suspicion of evil. If this interpretation be correct, the
powers, in agreement with Philo s whole philosophy, take their
place within the divine nature, and are sacred and inviolable as
God himself, and it is only as partially enshrined within
some definite personality, which participates in but does not
coincide with them, that they act as subordinate agents in
the creation of man and the punishment of the wicked.

This exposition would hardly be complete if we did not
observe that Philo s admission of a plurality of creators is
occasioned solely by the difficulty of interpreting the passage
in Genesis, and not by the pressing requirements of his
philosophy ; for when he speaks of the creation of man apart
from this passage, he discards the plurality and is content
with the agency of God. This will become apparent when we
treat of the creation of the first man.t In such references
he is anxious to exalt the prerogatives of the founder of our
race, and circumstances which might seem to lower the dignity
of his origin are quietly omitted.

See Mundi Op., 47 (I. 33) ; 49, p. 33 ; Nobil., 3 (II. 440).

154: THE DIVINE POWEKS.

We have thus exhausted, if I am not mistaken, all the
passages that can be adduced in favour of the personality of
the powers, and have seen that, with no greater latitude of
interpretation than must be reasonably allowed to a rhetorical
and not always exact writer, they may be reconciled with the
philosophical views which were explained in the earlier part of
this chapter. These views are stated by Philo with a distinct
ness and precision which entitle them to a dominant place
in his doctrine of the powers, and flow as a logical consequence
from his theory of the Divine Nature. We are therefore bound
to accept them as representing his permanent belief. That he
unconsciously entertained at the same time a totally different
order of thought is not proved by any express assertion, but
only inferred from passages of which many appear to have
been misunderstood, and to be really confirmatory of the
opinions to which they are thought to be opposed ; others,
although if they stood alone they might leave on our minds
a contrary impression, are easily reconciled with Philo s
weightier utterances ; and others, again, exhibit the familiar
figure of poetic personification. We are, therefore, no longer
shut up in an interpretation which fills the whole theory of the
powers with incoherence and confusion, and reduces it to a
mere curiosity of incompetent speculation. With its truth or
falsehood we are not here concerned; nor can we yet tell
whether our researches into the doctrine of the Logos may not
compel us partially to reverse our judgment. But thus far we
have obtained a self-consistent philosophy, and we can trace
the divine powers by logical descent and sub-division from
their single home in the unknown essence of God through
the intelligible cosmos down to this visible image of the eternal
thought, with its vast tissue of genera and species, till we find
their impress upon individual forms, the chorus of stars, the
angelic host, man with his reason stretching beyond the
universe, the bird that wings its way through the air, the
flower that blooms in the field. We meet these powers every-

THE BEAUTY IN ALL PHENOMENA. 155

where, for they alone give reality and meaning to all that we
see and touch. They are the secret beauty in each humblest
thing j they are the mighty bonds which constrain earth and
ocean and sky into the harmony of a cosmos ; and since they
are but the varied expression of the divine energy, it is through
them that the universe lies enfolded in the all-pervading
immensity of God.

CHAPTEE VI.

THE LOGOS.

AMONG the powers we have met with the Logos, and it may
have seemed as though we ought to have treated it along with
the creative, regal, and other members of the dynamical
hierarchy; but on account of the magnitude and complexity
of the subject we have been obliged to reserve it for separate
discussion. We encounter here once more all the difficulties
that beset our way in the consideration of the powers : the
same florid and rhetorical style, the same fondness for personi
fication, the same mingling of the literal and the allegorical.
Moreover the uncertainty arising from Philo s eclectic method
now reaches its highest pitch, and it is increasingly difficult to
decide whether the heterogeneous elements of which his doctrine
is composed, Platonic, Stoical, and Jewish, lie side by side
without organic connection or have been fused together in the
moulds of a really philosophical mind. Besides these sources
of perplexity, which affect Phik/s philosophy in general, the
doctrine of the Logos has an ambiguity of its own, springing
from the variety of meanings which belong to its principal
term. These meanings have been elaborately, if not always
quite happily, classified by Grossmann.* No useful purpose
would be served here by going through his enormous list of
passages ; but we may point out very briefly the principal

* Quaest. Philon., II. p. 3 sqq.

MEANINGS OF LOGOS. 157

senses in which the word is used, apart from the metaphysical
doctrine which we are about to investigate. In its highest
signification it denotes the mind itself, the rational and
sovereign principle in the human soul.*" This meaning, how
ever, passes so easily into that of the rational faculty in the
mind that Philo is not careful to distinguish them, the exercise
of reason being in his view the one characteristic function of
mind. We are told accordingly that the sovereign principlef
is the place of the inward Logos, J and that the latter is " in
the understanding/^ and yet within a few lines it is identified
with the understanding. || From this the transition is made to
any kind of relation or condition which can be regarded as an
expression of reason. A very few examples will suffice to
illustrate this familiar use of the word. We are told that the
human mind has in man the logos which the great sovereign
has in the entire cosmos. ^[ The context proves that the
meaning here is " relation ";. and we thus see that the term
may be used in immediate connection with God and yet have
no trace of its metaphysical sense. Again, we meet with the
logoi, that is the relations or laws of harmony** and of music,tt
and " the unshaken and most stable and really divine logos in
numbers/ JJ that is, the rational principle or law which underlies
them. The term seems to aquire the meaning of character or
condition where 6 crax^pocrui^? Xoyo? or o Kara aco^poavvijv
^0709 is used as equivalent to the simple aw^poavvr]^ and
where Jacob, regarded as the representative of a particular
state of mind, is described as "the ascetic logos," |||| which
here corresponds with the more usual T/OOTTO?.^ Hence it

* See Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207), "the best species of soul, which has
been called VOVQ KCLI Xoyof. Abr., 18 (II. 13), where o ivSiaQtroQ, sc. Xoyof, is
identified with rbv i^t^iova vovv.

f To -hytpoviKov. J Aoyog wdtaOeroc, Vit. Mos., III. 13 (II. 154).

Ev Stavoiq. || Migrat. Abr., 13 (I. 447). If Mundi Op., 23 (I. 16).

** Post. Cain., 5 (I. 229). ft Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464).

II Vit. Mos., III. 12 (II. 154). Leg. All., II. 20 (I. 80-1).

|||| Quod Deus immut., 25 (I. 290).

HIT See other examples in Grossmann II. p. 24 sqq., under b.

158 THE LOGOS.

comes to denote the rational contents or meaning of a thing.
Thus we read, "the ethical logos [or meaning] is of the
following kind/ * and, " it is worth considering fully what
\6yov the saying has."t These and cognate significations all
rest upon the fundamental idea of reason ; and it deserves
notice that, under this division, the meaning passes from the
personal mind itself through an attribute or function of the
mind down to the most abstract and impersonal expression of
reason. The second leading sense of the term is speech,
language being the offspring of reason, and the thoughts of
the human mind naturally shaping themselves into the form
of words. As words may be written as well as spoken, logos
is applied to any kind of expression of thought through words,
such as argument, discourse, treatise, doctrine or system,
saying, rumour. This usuage does not require illustration,
and we need only refer to Philo s application of the term to
Scripture. A Scriptural passage is frequently referred to as
logos, and Scripture generally is described as " the sacred," or
divine/ 3 or " prophetic logos." I see no reason to suppose
that Philo intends by this phrase to represent the universal
Logos as speaking through the medium of Scripture. The
Old Testament or any part of it was a logos according to the
current use of the word, and its sacred character is indicated
simply by the qualifying epithets.

This rapid survey may be sufficient to convince us that we
must proceed with caution, and not hastily assume that logos
always denotes the same subject. Its shades of meaning are
so various that we must bear its ambiguity in mind if we
would do full justice to the passages which come under
investigation. Our difficulty is increased by the fact that we
have no corresponding term, of equal elasticity in our own
language. We are compelled to use several expressions to
translate this single Greek word, and we are not only thus in

* Leg. All., II. 6 (I. 69).

f Conf. Ling., 33 (I. 430). See also Migrat. Abr., 27 (I. 459).

ITS CONNECTION WITH THE POWERS. 159

danger of giving it greater precision in particular instances
than really belongs to it, but we are almost sure to lose some
of its finer shades of suggestiveness. Perhaps the nearest
parallel which English affords is the word " thought " for we
can apply it not only to the faculty of the mind and the
inward products of that faculty, but to their outward embodi
ment in language, as when we refer, for instance, to Young s
f( Night Thoughts/ or say of any book that it is full of
thought. Still the word is far from being co-extensive with
logos ; and though we may occasionally employ it as the most
appropriate translation, we shall be obliged to have recourse
to other terms as well. With these preliminary cautions we
may now enter on our difficult task.

In order to develop the subject from the point which we
have reached we must begin by viewing the Logos in its con
nection with the powers, regarded first in their ideal and then
in their dynamical aspects. We have seen that when we cast
our eye around the world every object of contemplation is dis
tinguished from inert matter by the presence of a rational
impress or idea. The ideas are only varied forms of the same
ultimate reason ; and therefore when we survey the cosmos as
a whole, and rise to the apprehension of its unity, we cannot
but view it as the pictured thought of God. If we perceived
nothing but the juxtaposition and succession of material
phenomena we could never rise to the discovery of unity and
law ; but the ideas range themselves by logical necessity under
one superlative term, and in the ideal cosmos, accordingly, we
detect the unity which our reason demands. This unity is
selected by Philo as characteristic of the intelligible world, for
he finds in it the explanation of the fact that the first day of
creation, which was devoted to the intelligible universe, is
called in Genesis not first, but one.* Wherein, then, does the
unity consist ? Since we are dealing with logical relations, it

* Qv%l TrpdJrrjv, a\\a "/u ai&gt;," . . ia TYJV row VOTJTOV
li.ova$iKt]v txovro^ (pvfftv, Mundi Op., 9 (I. 7).

160 THE LOGOS.

must be found in the highest genus, which may be predicated
of every lower term. Now all the ideas are rational, not
indeed in the sense of possessing a personal reason of their
own, but as forms and varieties of reason. At their head,
therefore, must stand supreme, abstract Reason ; or, in other
words, the multitudinous thoughts which speak to us from
every part of creation may be gathered together into one
Thought expressive of the Divine. Philo accordingly tells us
that the rational is the best genus of things.* He is not at
a loss for Scriptural warrant to confirm this assertion. The
miraculous food which was given to the Israelites in the desert
was a natural symbol of the divine nourishment which feeds
the soul. What this nourishment is Moses himself declares.
By an arbitrary apposition Philo obtains the clause : " This
bread which the Lord has given you to eat, this wordf which
the Lord enjoined. ^ The "word" is immediately identified
with the " Logos of God," which has many points of re
semblance to manna: its pervasiveness, like that of dew ; its
appearing only on what is desert as regards passions and vices;
its rarity, brilliance, and purity. Now manna means " some
thing,^ that is, the most generic of things ; and the Logos of
God also is above all the cosmos, and oldest and most generic
of the things that have come into being." || By the latter
words, which will demand our attention farther on, Philo
wishes to guard himself against the appearance of making the
Logos absolutely supreme. We have learned before that God
himself is at the head of the logical hierarchy ; and hence it is
stated in another passage that "God is the most generic thing,
and the Logos of God is second/^ that is, Reason or Thought
ranks logically beneath Being or the Divine.

* To Xoyi*cdj&gt;, oTTtp dpiffTOv ru&gt;v OVTWV y tvoQ sort, Quod Deus immut., 4 (I. 275).
f Prjua. J Ex. xvi. 15, 16.

I think Philo understood by T I tan TOVTO in the LXX. " this is something."
Others obtain the same sense from ".what," as I have rendered ri on p. 29.
j| Leg. All., III. 59-61 (I. 120-1). See also Quod det. pot. ins., 31 (I. 213-14).
^ Leg. AIL, II. 21(1. 82).

HIGHEST TERM NEXT TO GOD. 161

The logical superiority of the Logos is not worked out by
Philo with any fulness or precision ; but there are a few ex
amples from, which it receives casual illustration. In a passage
cited in another connection we learn that the Logos of God,
which is the all-beautif ul pattern of the human mind, is better
even than beauty itself, such beauty as is in nature, being not
adorned with beauty, but being itself beauty s most becoming
adornment;* in other words, it takes a higher place in the
scale of ideas, and communicates rather than participates in
beauty. So in the account of the cities of refuge, which
symbolize six divine powers, the Logos is " the oldest and
strongest and best mother-city, not merely a city," and to it
it is most profitable to fly first. It is " the highest/ and to
be reached only by the swiftest runners. "While the other five
powers had their visible resemblances in the sanctuary, the
divine Logos which was above the cherubim, the creative and
regal powers of God did not come into visible form, because
it was like nothing perceptible, but was the oldest of all intel
ligible things. This exalted position is indicated by the words,
" I will speak to thee from above the mercy-seat between the
two cherubim/ t which show " that the Logos is the driver of
the powers, but he who speaks is the rider, giving to the
driver the orders which tend to the correct driving of the
universe." J It is simply due to its logical force that the
Logos is thus placed between the powers : it is " the uniter of
both/ that is, it includes both ideas under itself, " for by
reason God is both ruler and good."

From what has been said, it is apparent that the Logos, or
divine Thought, sums up and comprehends the whole intelli
gible cosmos. This is taught in the most explicit way, and

* Mundi Op., 48 (I. 33). f Ex - xxv - 22 -

t Prof., 18-19 (I. 560-1). For the Eabbinical parallel to this figure see
Siegfried, p. 220.

Cherub., 9 (I. 144). These passages seem quite decisive against Baur s
view that the Logos stands beneath the two principal powers as their common
emanation. Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, I. p. 69.

VOL. II. 11

162 THE LOGOS.

presented in various lights. " The intelligible cosmos/ 5 it is
said, " is nothing else than the Thought of God when he is
already engaged in making a cosmos ; for neither is the intel
ligible city anything else than the reflection* of the architect
when he is already purposing to create the perceptible city
by the intelligible." f The precise shade of meaning to be
attached to the term in this passage will be more suitably con
sidered when we speak of the relation of the Logos to God ; at
present we simply mark the fact that by virtue of its being the
highest genus it includes the whole intelligible cosmos. Hence
it may be figuratively spoken of as the place of that cosmos.
The ideal world is not subject to the conditions of space ; you
cannot pick out any particular spot,, and say that it is there ;
it is located only in the divine Thought, just as the intelligible
city exists only in the soul of the architect. J That the Logos
not only contains but coincides with the intelligible universe
may be inferred from another passage, where the word " place "
in Scripture is represented as being sometimes an allegorical
expression for " the divine Logos which God himself has filled
entirely with immaterial powers/ [| This statement seems
to imply that the powers or ideas collectively exhaust the
Logos, and that therefore they and the Logos are convertible
terms, and the divine Thought is neither more nor less than
the sum total and logical equivalent of the divine thoughts.
Since God is more generic than the Logos, he of course
includes it and its contents, so that there is no inconsist
ency when, in a single passage, God, and not the Logos, is
described as the ee immaterial place of immaterial ideas. "^f

A place filled with ideas readily lends itself to the notion of
a book, and Philo has no difficulty in finding his whole ideal
theory in the words, " This is the book of the genesis of
heaven and earth, when they were made."** By " book " is

* Aoyr/iog, evidently used instead of Aoyog for the sake of variety.
f Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). J Ib., 4, 5 (I. 4), and 10, p. 7.

"OXov dt 6\uv. || Somn., I. 11 (I. 630).

H Cherub., 14 (I. 148). ** Gen. ii. 4.

THE UNIVEESAL IDEA. 1C3

denoted -the Logos of God, in which are inscribed and
engraved the constitutions* of all other things." The descrip
tion of the universe as -heaven and earth- leads him to
make a broad classification of the intelligible cosmos, heaven
indicating symbolically the idea of mind, and earth the idea
sensible perception. He applies this doctrine with much
ingenuity to the next verse in Genesis, but we need not dwell
upon subtleties of interpretation which give no further insist
into his philosophical system.f

If we have been thus far right in our interpretation, the
Logos must be itself an idea; and so accordingly it is expressly
called. -God,- it is said, -gives the soul a seal, an alt-
ful gift, teaching that he shaped the substance of all
things when it was unshaped, and stamped it when it was
unstamped, and gave it form when it was without quality, and,
having finished, he sealed the entire cosmos with an iinao-e
and idea, his own Logos J Here it is not only characterized
as an idea which, like other ideas, is impressed upon matter so
as to bring it into rational form, but it is clearly represented
as the universal idea, the one supreme and all-embracing
thought which brings the multiplicity of qualities into the
unity of a cosmos. Substantially the same doctrine is ex
pressed when it is affirmed that the - human mind is God-like,
being stamped in conformity to the highest Logos as an
archetypal idea." The highest Logos can be no other than the
crowning idea, which, as we learn from these two passages,
lays its impress alike on the macrocosm and the microcosm!
In this connection the term may even be dropped, and referred
to simply as the -rational idea/ as we learn by comparing
with the statement last cited the following : Murder is
sacrilege of the most heinous kind, for -nothing among
the possessions and treasures in the cosmos is either more
sacred or more God-like than man, an all-beautiful impression

* 2vffrd&lt;rei S . f Leg. All., I. 8-10 (I. 47-8).

t Somn., II. 6 (I. 665), s pec . Leg., IIL 37 (II. 333).

11 *

164: THE LOGOS.

of an all-beautiful image, stamped with the pattern of the
archetypal, rational idea.-"* Finally, as the head and sum
of the ideal world, it is called the " idea of the ideas."f

We have already learned from these passages that the
Logos, since it is an idea, is also an archetype or pattern, and
comes under the familiar figure of a seal, and further that
it is applicable in this respect to the two worlds of matter and
of mind. It may, however, be advantageous to produce a few
more illustrations of this doctrine. Having inferred from the
particular instance of man that the entire perceptible cosmos
was " an imitation of a divine image," Philo proceeds : " It is
evident that the archetypal seal also, which we affirm to be
the intelligible cosmos, would itself be the archetypal pattern,
the idea of the ideas, the Logos of God."J Elsewhere he
speaks of ,the seal of the universe, the archetypal idea, by which
all things, when without form and quality, were made significant
and stamped." The Logos is not mentioned here, but that
it is referred to is shown not only by the similarity of the
expressions to those used in the previous passage, but by the
parallelism of this statement to one recently quoted where
the Logos is named, both being founded on an allegorical
interpretation of the story of Thamar. || Again, we read that
" the Thought If of the Maker is itself the seal by which each
thing has been shaped, in accordance with which also the
species*"* that accompanies created things from the beginning
is perfect, as being an impression and image of a perfect
thought. For an animal, when produced, is incomplete in quan
tity, . . . but perfect in quality, for the same quality remains,
as having been impressed from a divine thought, that remains
and in no wise changes. "ft We learn very clearly from this
passage that the Logos is the genus under which the various

* Spec. Leg., III. 15 (II. 313).

f Idta ruv idtuv, Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5) ; Migrat. Abr., 18 (I. 452).

Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). Mutat. Norn., 23 (I. 598).

|| See Somn., II. 6 (I. 665). f Aoyog.

ft Pr f 2 (! 547-8),

AN AECHETYPE. 1G5

ideal types that are observed in the universe are classed, and

that the permanence of specific forms, which till modern

times was believed to be a fact of experience, is ascribed

to their participation in the unchangeableness of creative

thought. More particularly the Logos is spoken of as the

archetype of light/ and hence it is symbolically called the sun

in Scripture, being the pattern of the sun which revolves

in the sky.f This selection is no doubt made because of all

material things light, from its subtle and revealing energy,

bears the nearest analogy to intelligence, and reason is the

supreme source of intellectual illumination. J Among all the

objects of nature, however, man stands supreme, through the

possession of self-conscious rational power, and he, therefore,

in a pre-eminent degree exhibits the divine impress. " Every

man," it is said, "has been made in understanding akin

to divine Reason." || God used for the preparation of the

human soul no other pattern than his own Keason alone,!" to

which mankind is related, and from which, as an archetype,

the human mind has been formed ;** or, as it is elsewhere

expressed, the rational soul or spirit in us, being shaped

according to the archetypal idea of the divine image, is

itself an image of the divine and invisible, stamped with the

seal of God, the impression of which is eternal Reason.tt

That which determines the rational forms of the various
objects of creation, and maintains the permanence of ideal
types, may be regarded as a law which regulates the succession
of phenomena, and remains constant amid their changes. We
are thus transferred from the Platonic ideas to the Logos of
Heraclitus and the Stoics, and led to recognize everywhere the
presence of a cosmical power, the apparent counterpart of that

* Somn., I. 13 (I. 632) ; Mundi Op., 8 (I. 6-7). f Somn., I. 15 (I. 633).

J See Leg. All., III. 59 (I. 121).

QiicciWai, taken in connection with cvyf tvua. || Mundi Op., 51 (I. 35).
T Ib., 48, p. 33. ** Exsecrat., 8 (II. 435).

ft- Animal. Sacr. idon., 3 (II. 239) ; Plantat. Noe, 5 (I. 332). Cf. also Leg. All.,
III. 31 (I. 106-7).

166 THE LOGOS.

reason of which we are conscious in ourselves. To this power
we naturally attach the name by which we designate the regu
lative principle in ourselves ; and inasmuch as our individual
thought is liable to mistake and perversion, we frequently dis
tinguish the universal force as "right Keason/ * or "the
Keason of nature. f A few illustrative passages will give
us the necessary insight into this use of the term. f This
cosmos/ says Philo, " . . . uses one polity and one law. Now,
it is the Logos of nature enjoining what ought to be done, and
prohibitive of what ought not to be done."! This language
implies a plurality of commands, like several statutes included
under one code. We hear, accordingly, of " ordinances and
laws which God ordained to be immovable in the universe."
The immobility which characterizes the laws of nature is due
to the fact that they are expressions of Eeason, which is in its
essence unalterable. " That which is truly lawful is thereby
eternal, since right Reason, which is law, is not corruptible." ||
The eternity and pervasive power of law are well described in a
passage where, according to our present text, the Logos is not
mentioned. Eusebius, in quoting this passage, reads Logos "
instead of " Law " ;1f ^ ufc tae change is not important, for we
have now learned that the law of nature is identical with the
Logos. " The everlasting law of the eternal God/ says Philo,
" is the firmest and most secure support of the universe. This,
being stretched from the centre to the ends and from the
extremities to the centre, runs the long, unconquerable race of
nature, collecting and binding all the parts. For the Father
who begat it made it a bond of the universe that cannot be
broken."** The idea which was thus manifested as a natural
law in the physical world reappeared as a moral law in man.
f Since every city which is under lawft nas a civic constitution,

* OpOoQ Xoyo?. j A6yo Qvaewc. $ Joseph., 6 (II. 46).

Mundi Op., 19 (I. 13). || Ebriet., 35 (I. 379).

IT Praep. Ev., VII. 13. ** Plantat. Noe, 2 (I. 330-1).

, for which Miiller reads tvvopoz, " under good laws."

THE MOEAL LAW. 167

it was necessarily the case that the citizen of the cosmos used
the same civic constitution as the entire cosmos. Now, this is
the right Reason of nature, which by a stricter appellation is
named ordinance, being a divine law,* in accordance with
which the suitable and appropriate things were assigned to
each."f The transition is obvious from this doctrine to the
Stoical maxim, ""Live conformably to nature." Philo estab
lishes this maxim of " the best philosophers " by the statement
that "Abraham went as the Lord spoke to him."* This shows
that the mind, when it has entered the path of virtue, walks in
the steps of right Reason and follows God, and the works of
the wise man are not different from divine words. ]| Elsewhere
the Scripture says, "Abraham did all my law."*| "Now, law
is nothing but divine Reason** enjoining what is right and
forbidding what is wrong," so that in doing the law we do the
Logos, and our supreme end is to follow God.ft We must
observe how " God " takes the place of "nature" in Philo s
mind, and how the notion of something which is expressed
attaches itself to the word Logos throughout this passage. To
illustrate the definition which is here given of the law of nature,
we may compare the similar definition of law in general, such
as proceeds from a king or legislator, in the treatise " On
rewards and punishments." "Law," it is there said, "is
nothing else than a logos JJ enjoining what is right and for
bidding what is wrong/ The idea of law easily connects
itself with that of a covenant ; and so the covenant established
with Noah is represented as " law and Logos," and in this sense
is said to possess the attribute of stability in a degree second
only to that of the Self-existent himself. |||| The reason for
another comparison is less evident. The flaming sword which

QtloQ &v. t Mundi Op., 50 (I. 34). J Gen. xii. 4.

Here the idea of spoken reason is clearly present, for thus only can we
find a connection between tXaXjjcrev and \6yov.

|| Or uttered thoughts, Xoywr. If Gen. xxvi. 5. ** Aoyof.

ft Migrat. Abr., 23 (I. 456). Or rational statement.

Praem. et Poen., 9 (II. 417). |H| Somn., II. 33 and 36 (I. 688 and 690).

168 THE LOGOS.

guarded the entrance to Paradise symbolized the swift, hot,
and fiery Logos. This resemblance would naturally occur to
one who was deeply imbued with the Stoical philosophy; but
Philo had a further reason for this particular explanation. The
cherubim represented the two highest powers, the goodness
and sovereignty of God, and therefore the sword between them
must be the Logos which combined these powers into one.
When Philo adds that this Logos " never ceases to move with
all zeal, with a view to the choice of what is good and the
avoidance of the contrary," and thus attaches to it the idea of
law, he must be guided by a consideration of the office which
the sword is said to fulfil in the original story.*

As the pervasive law of the universe, the Logos exercises a
function at once logical and dynamical. " Looking to the
archetypal patterns " of God himself, " it gave shape to
species." f In other words, it is a rational force, which not
only determines the character and due subordination of species,
as we have already seen, but plants them out upon the field
of objective existence. In this capacity it receives a highly
characteristic name, "the Cutter.^J It is the province of
reason, both in ourselves and in the universe, though it is
itself indivisible, to discriminate and divide innumerable
other things. Our mind distributes into endless parts what
it receives by the intelligence ; and the divine Logos has
separated and apportioned all the things in nature. This con
ception is worked out in great detail in the treatise on "The
heir of divine things," and is founded upon the narrative of
Abraham s offering, || in which, while the other animals were
divided, the two birds, representing the archetypal Eeason
above us and its counterpart in us, were left without division.
We noticed this passage when we were considering the classifi-

* See Cherub., 9 (I. 144).

f E/x6p0ov tiSrj, Conf. Ling., 14 (I. 414). The Logos is not named in this
passage ; but that it is referred to is evident from expressions which will be
considered farther on.

J O TOfitvg. Quisrer. div. her. 26 sqq. (I. 491 sqq.). || Gen. xv.

THE BOND OF THE UNIVERSE. 169

cation of natural objects ; and we need not now dwell upon it
farther than to observe that the differentiation which we then
noticed is made the basis of a philosophical doctrine, and
carries our minds to the height of metaphysical thought. The
classification which is interpreted by our receptive reason must
be the product of an operative Reason, by which God has cut
all the natures of things in accordance with pre-established
ideas. * We are carried only one step farther back when it is
alleged that the divine Logos not only contained the ideal
creation, but disposed it into a cosmos. f

In considering the Logos under the aspect of natural law,
we have seen that it was regarded as the pervasive bond of the
universe. As this conception, which completes our descrip
tion of it as the sum -total of the powers, is of great import
ance, we must allude to some passages in which it is enforced
without the mediating notion of law. The Logos is in the
universe, J where it dwells as an "intelligent and rational
nature/ like the soul in man. We are not, however, to
suppose that the universe holds the Logos as the larger
contains the smaller, for tf as place is inclusive of bodies, and
is their refuge, so also the divine Logos includes and has filled
the universe. "|| This passage seems to teach the transcend
ence of the Logos ; and no doubt it is transcendent when
regarded as the ideal cosmos in the supreme Mind, though
when impressed upon matter as the potent Thought of God it
must become co-extensive with the visible scene. It is in this
latter capacity that it makes the cosmos a temple of God,
where it ministers as a high-priest.H In the fulfilment of its

* For the notion of the " cutting and division of things," see also SS. Ab. et
Cain., 24-26 (I. 179 sq.). If the Logos here is itself divided, we must explain
the seeming inconsistency by the modification of its meaning : as rational
force, everywhere one and the same, it is indivisible ; as the most generic idea,
it is resolvable into its species.

t Mundi Op., 5 (I. 4). J Ev r$ iravri, Vit. Mos., III. 13 (II. 154).

Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505). || Td o/\. Fragments, II. 655.

\ Somn., I. 37 (I. 653).

170 THE LOGOS.

function it is all-pervasive, for otherwise the permanence of
ideal types would disappear : remove the divine Thought from
any part of creation, and nothing but formless matter would
be left. The Logos, accordingly, is a cc nature which, being
stretched and poured and having reached everywhere, is
entirely full,* having harmoniously woven together all things
else.^f In figurative language we may say that it "puts on
the cosmos as a garment, for it arrays itself in earth and water
and air and fire and their products," as the individual soul puts
on the body; and it is ff the bond of all things, and holds
together and binds all the parts, and prevents them from being
dissolved and separated."! Thus, the order which the Creator
brought out of disorder is securely established by his strong
lieutenant, the Logos. All other things are in themselves
prone to dissolution, and wherever there is anything compact,
" it is bound by divine Reason, for this is a glue and bond,
having completely filled all the things that belong to matter ;||
and, having strung and woven things severally together, it is
strictly full of itself, not at all requiring anything different
[from itself] ."If Thus it is that the Logos holds together and
administers the universe.**

Thus far, then, we have obtained a clear and self-consistent
doctrine. The cosmos to the eye of reason is a tissue of
rational forms, ideas, or powers, which are permanently im
pressed upon formless matter. As these powers find their
highest unity in the unknown divine essence, which exhausts
and transcends them all, so at a lower stage they are summed
up in the Logos, with which in their totality they are co-exten
sive ; for they are all expressions of divine Thought, and of
that Thought there can be no expression which is not an ideal

f Td dXXa. Quis rer. div. her., 44 (I. 503). That the Logos, though not
named, is meant, is proved beyond question by the entire context.
J Prof., 20 (I. 562). Somn., I. 41 (I. 656).

|| Td Trdvra TTIQ ovaia^. ^ Quis rer. div. her., 38 (I. 499).

** Vit. Mos., III. 14 (II. 155).

TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 171

power. Hence, the Logos is the expressed Thought of God,
which takes up into itself all inferior ideas, and combines into
one force all the powers of nature. As in some magnificent
cathedral we may detach our minds from the multiplicity of
detail, and, viewing it as a whole, penetrate to the central
thought of the architect, so in the cosmic temple we may
group together its multifarious phenomena into one grand
impression, till we rise to the conception of a single universe
on which is imprinted the Creator s Thought ; and henceforth,
wherever we turn our gaze, to the lowliest flower by the river s
brink or to the majestic heavens with their marshalled host of
stars, we still discern the presence of that Thought which
alone, by its pervading energy, gives life and meaning to
the wondrous all.

We must now inquire into the precise extent of the analogy
between the divine and the human Logos; for it is evident that
the use of the term was founded on the experience of the
microcosm, and some notice of the resemblances and differences
in its application to the larger and the smaller world will give
us a clearer insight into Philo s meaning. We have seen that
Philo was familiar with the Stoical division of the human Logos,
into inward and uttered. Did he set the example to the later
theology of carrying up this distinction into the divine nature,
or did he recognize only a single aspect of the higher Logos,
and interpret it by the analogy of only one phase of the Logos
in man ? To this question opposing answers have been re
turned, and we must form our judgment by a careful examina
tion of the evidence.

Two facts are equally certain, that Philo acknowledges a
distinction of some sort in the universal Logos, and that, for
some reason or other, he never expresses this distinction by the
terms applied to the Logos in man.* The leading passage upon
this subject occurs in the " Life of Moses. "f An allegorical
interpretation is there given of the high-priest s vestments,

* EvdidQtTOQ and irpoQopiicoz. f Vit. Mos., III. 13 (II. 154).

172 THE LOGOS.

which collectively and severally represent the cosmos and its
various parts. Among these was the breast-plate, called by
the LXX " Logeion/ and described as twofold. t( Logeion,"
of course, suggests Logos, and we are informed that

" The Logos is double both in the universe and in the nature of man.
In the universe there are both that which relates to the immaterial and
pattern ideas, out of which the intelligible cosmos was established, and
that which relates to the visible objects (which are accordingly imitations
and copies of those ideas), out of which this perceptible cosmos was com
pleted. But in man the one is inward and the other uttered, and the one
is, as it were, a fountain, but the other sonorous,* flowing from the
former." (The passage goes on to interpret the square shape of the
breast-plate as an intimation that both the Logos of nature and that of
man ought to have gone everywhere, and in no respect to waver.) Two
virtues were appropriately assigned to it, declaration and truth ;f "for.
the Logos of nature is true and declarative of all things," and that of the
wise man ought to imitate it. But also to the two logoi in each of us,
the uttered and the inward, were assigned two suitable virtues to the
uttered, declaration, and to that in the intellect, truth ; for it is proper
for intellect to receive nothing false, and for interpretation J to offer no
impediment to the most exact declaration.

In this account we cannot but be equally struck with the
explicit recognition of an analogy between the human and the
divine Logos in the possession of a dual nature, and with the
failure to describe this common characteristic by the same or
similar terms. The words " inward " (or its equivalent " in
the understanding ") and " uttered " are applied no less than
three times to the logos in man, but not once to that in the
universe; and, further, the two virtues which are allotted
severally to the two forms or the human logos, are attributed
to the Logos of nature without reference to any such distinc
tion. This diversity of treatment can hardly be, as Gfrorer
supposes, accidental, and due to the fact that the distinction
in reference to the divine Logos was too well known to require
exposition. There is no evidence, except such as may be

f A^Xwcris and dXrjOtta, as the LXX render Urim and Thurnmim.
J Eppr]vsi&lt;. I. pp. 177-8.

TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 173

gathered from Philo, that this doctrine had yet been formu
lated; and the suggestion which ascribes to Alexandrian
speculation the familiar Stoical division of the human logos
into inner and outer, and traces so " unnatural " a conception
to a previously acknowledged distinction in the divine nature,
is of course quite untenable. Philo never shrinks from un
folding ideas which had become the common property of the
philosophical world ; and in the present passage, even if the
order of thought had been such as Gfrorer imagines, he would
surely have used the accepted terms in stating a well-known
doctrine, and would have given some intimation of the mode
in which the uttered Logos was derived from the inward
Logos in God. But as the words stand, we can only con
clude that he wished to carry up the human distinction into
the nature of God, but, owing to some perceived failure in the
analogy, did not choose to describe it by the same language.
We must, then, turn our attention to the exact character of
the dual Logos in the universe, and notice the points in which
the human analogy breaks down.

The Logos which alone can answer to the cc inward" is
" that which relates to the immaterial and pattern ideas, out of
which the intelligible cosmos was established." But Zeller
affirms that this does not answer to the " inward," because
the distinction which is drawn does not refer to the question
whether the Logos remains within the subject to whom it
belongs or issues forth from him, but to the question of the
objects with which it is engaged.* This is perfectly true in
regard to the mere form of expression, and it is evident that
Philo shrank from pressing the human analogy too closely.
But, as the objects referred to are "immaterial and pattern
ideas," and perceptible " imitations of those ideas/ the very
division of objects suggests a hidden and a manifested Logos.
The Logos, as the uniting thought under which all the ideas

* III. ii. p. 376.

THE LOGOS.

are subsumed, is never represented as objective to the divine-
Mind. God is himself, as we have seen, the place of imma
terial ideas ; * and the intelligible cosmos, as being older than
the perceptible, was deemed worthy of the privilege of re
maining with him, while the younger son alone was sent forth
to move through space and mark the intervals of time.f This
surely implies that the Logos, regarded as the sum of ideas,
^and not yet impressed upon matter, is hidden in the mind of
God, just as truly as an intelligible city is hidden in the mind
of an architect ; and I see no reason why Philo should nofc
have applied to it the epithet inward " except his reluctance
to use the correlative " uttered.-" That he did not consider it
unworthy of the divine nature is apparent from his applying
it to laughter as the son of God. {

The same conclusion is established by the passage quoted in
another connection, in which Philo himself, at considerable
length, compares the action of the Creator to that of an archi
tect, who plans a city in his mind before he proceeds to build
it of wood and stone. Before that comparison is introduced,
two divine processes are distinguished, which, though one is
prior to the other in thought, were in fact simultaneous. These
two processes are " ordering" and " purposing." I doubt
whether we give a sufficient account of these words by making
them, with Muller,|| equivalent to the uttered and the inward
Logos ; indeed I am not sure that this exegesis, without some
important qualifications, does not involve the whole subject in

* See before, p. 162. f Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 277).

J O ivd^eeroQ vlbs Qtov, Mutat. Norn. 23 (I. 598). Zeller also dwells upon the
fact that while &lt;^Awcrie and dXrjOtia are applied separately to the two \6yoi in
man, the \oyog of nature is said to be dXrjOrjg K ai drj\(OTiKos TTUVTUV, and
this can only be because he did not recognize the same distinction. We ought
to observe, however, that the Xoyog of the wise man is treated in the same way
as that of nature, and the distribution of the two virtues is made subsequently,
so that Philo may not have intended to mark in this way the difference between
the two cases.

Ov TrpoffrdTTovTa povov, d\\a Kai Siavoovpevov. Mundi Op. 3 (I 3)

II P. 139.

TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 175

confusion. According to it the "uttered Logos " could be
nothing else than the spoken word or command in obedience
to which the visible universe sprang into being, and the
" inward Logos " would be only the divine intention to issue
such a command. This is entirely different from any meaning
which we have hitherto found for the Logos. The words
rather express simply the initial and the final process in the
work of creation. It is in a divine purpose that every thing-
has its origin ; it is in instant response to a divine command
that everything springs into objective existence. Thus the
purpose extends itself to the complete result. It is, indeed,
as Philo himself says, not the thought which is laid up within,
but the issuing forth of thought,* and is therefore really more
applicable to an uttered than to an inward Logos. Hence we
find farther on in the passage that the purpose extends itself to
the visible cosmos as its ultimate object,t and is represented
as distinct from the inward conception, the formation of which
was the first step in the fulfilment of the purpose. J This
inward conception, which sprang immediately from the creative
purpose of God, was the intelligible cosmos, and this again, as
we are expressly told, was the Logos. Here, then, for the
first time, and not in the purpose, which is logically prior, we
meet with the inward Logos. Our passage does not speak of
any other Logos -, nevertheless, when illuminated by what we
have learned elsewhere, it easily betrays the place of the
" uttered." Two acts of creation are described :[ the first, that
which we have just considered ; the second, that of the percep
tible cosmos. The latter was formed by impressing the Logos
upon matter, in other words by making it objective, just as
the architect stamps his ideas upon marble or timber ; and this
Logos, planted out, as it were, from God, and everywhere
active, through air and earth and sea and sky, this divine

* "Evvoiav ical diavorjviv, n}v fj,ev IvaTTOKeifJttvijv ovaov VOIJGIV, TIJV
vorjawg SiftoSov, Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277).

j- Eov\rj9ftQ TQV bparbv TOVTOVI Kofffiov Srj/jnovpyrjtrai.

J Tryv peya\6iro\iv KT I&IV SiavorjOtiQ ivworjee Trportpov rove TVTTOVQ

176 THE LOGOS.

Thought, whose mighty presence can alone convert matter into
a cosmos, and which reveals itself in the beauty and harmonv
of nature, is clearly distinguishable from the same Thought
when hidden in the silent depths of God, and known only
to his omniscience. This objective Logos corresponds, in
a certain sense, with the uttered Logos in man.

In the course of the passage which we are noticing there
is some apparent confusion in the references to what, for
convenience, we must call the inward Logos. Where it
is first introduced it seems equivalent to the faculty
of reason. The words are as follows: "As, then, the
city which was first formed within the architect had no
exterior place, but had been sealed in the soul of the
artist, in the same way not even the cosmos consisting of
the ideas would have any other place than the divine Logos
which disposed these things into a cosmos/ If these
words stood alone we should conclude that the Logos, as
parallel to the human soul, was not identical with the ideal
world, but was rather the rational faculty which produced and
retained it ; yet within a page or two we are told that it is
the intelligible cosmos. How are we to explain this contradic
tion ? Probably Philo regarded any particular thought, so
long as it was unexpressed, as being in strictness only a mode
of the general faculty of thought. Thus, he says that, speak
ing without figurative language, * " one might affirm that the
intelligible cosmos is nothing else than the Logos of God when
he is already creating the cosmos ; for neither is the intelli
gible city anything else than the reflection of the architect
when he is already purposing to found the perceptible city by
the intelligible." This statement seems to imply that the
intelligible cosmos is not strictly a product of the divine
Reason, but is rather the mode which it assumes in the act of
creation. At this point a distinction becomes evident, which,
though not expressed, is, I think, implicitly acknowledged by

xprj&lt;ra&lt;r9ai T&lt;H ovopaaiv.

TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 177

Philo. An architect is capable of planning many cities ; and
therefore any particular city as conceived in his thought is
only one out of many modes which that thought might assume.
But there is only one cosmos, and its ideal is exhaustive of the
divine Thought. The ideal world, therefore, is not one of
many modes which the universal Reason may put on ; it is the
absolute and unchangeable mode of its existence, without
which it cannot be so much as conceived. Eemove all ideas,
and nothing but a mere potentiality of reason will remain.
Hence, in the Supreme Cause, reason and what might seem to
be its product become coincident. The ideas are summed up
in one superlative term, beyond which there is no further
faculty of reason ; and, as the idea of the ideas, the intelligible
cosmos and the Logos of God become indissolubly identified.
We must now turn to the other aspect of our subject.
That Philo recognized some kind of analogy between the
divine Logos and the uttered Logos in man is evident from
several passages besides the one which was quoted in the
earlier part of this discussion. In one of these he says that
the ( father s house " which was left by Abraham,"* denotes the
uttered Logos ; for the mind is our father, since to it belongs
the care of all our parts ; and speech is its house, where it
disposes and arranges itself and its various conceptions. Simi
larly God, the mind of the universe, has his own Logos for a
house, as may be inferred from Jacob s reference to the
" house of God/ t The comparison, however, is not worked
out, and throws no further light upon the point under con
sideration. We can only say that the disposal of the ideas
in that universal Thought which is stamped upon the visible
creation answers to man s disposal of his conceptions in speech,
for in each instance the process serves to make the inward
notions objective, and to locate them, as it were, in a habitation
different from the mind itself. Again, Logos is used as

* Gen. xii. 1. f Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 436-7). Gen. xxviii. 17.

VOL. II. 12

178 THE LOGOS.

synonymous with prj^a, a spoken word. We are told, for
instance, that the universe was fabricated by the speech
or word of the Cause."* It is by his own most brilliant
" speech, word," f that God makes both the idea of mind and
the idea of perception. J This notion of a creative word, prior
to the existence of the intelligible cosmos, is very different
from anything which we have hitherto met, and can hardly be
reconciled with the identification of the ideal world and the
Logos. The confusion, however, is a very natural one ; for the
creation of the ideas could only be regarded as the result of a
divine command, and this Philo expresses by the familiar term
Logos, adding, however, the explanation prj^a, without per
ceiving its inconsistency with his more usual doctrine. I cite
this passage, not as throwing light on a subject which it only
perplexes, but as proving that Philo connected with the divine
Logos the sense, not only of rational thought, but of rational
speech. Again, the nourishment which God gives the soul is
his own word and his own speech. This is stated in the
course of an allegorical interpretation of the manna in the
wilderness. || The lesson intended by this incident was that
man shall not live on bread alone, but on every word that issues
forth through the mouth of God; "^[ that is, the soul shall be
nourished by the whole Logos and by its part, " for the mouth
is a symbol of the Logos, and the word is a part of it. Now of
the more perfect the soul is nourished by the whole Logos, but
we might be content if we were nourished even by a part
of it." ** The precise way in which the Logos is regarded as
the nourisher of the human soul, must be considered farther
on ; meanwhile we may observe that in one passage the manna
is identified not only with the heavenly Logos of virtue," but
with " prophecy," tt and in another, prophecy is replaced by

* Aoyc/j, parallel with dia pfjuarog. SS. Ab. et Cain., 3 (I. 165).

f A6y&lt;&gt;, pfiitaTi. J Leg. All., I. 9 (I. 47). "Prj^a

U Ex. xvi. 14 sqq. II Deut. viii. 3.

** Leg^All., III. 60-1 (1. 121-2). Cf. Prof., 25 (I. 566).

tt SS. Ab. et Cain., 26 (I. ISO).

TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVEKSE. 179

philosophy. The words in the latter run thus : " This royal
way, which, as true and genuine, we affirm to be philosophy, the
Law calls the word and speech of God ; for it is written, thou
shalt not incline from the word which I command thee this
day. " * The connection of prophecy and philosophy with the
spoken word is obvious. As declared by human lips they
belong to the uttered logos of man ; but in their ideal aspect
they are identical with the law which is impressed upon the
face of nature j and this law, again, is, as we have seen, nothing
less than the divine Logos. Therefore we return to the
doctrine of the passage from which we started. The Logos in
the universe which answers to the uttered logos in man, and
may therefore be described as the Word of God, is the impress
of the supreme idea upon matter, the rational force which binds
the multitude of phenomena into the harmony and unity of a
cosmos.

It may seem strange that when Philo so freely speaks of the
Word of God he withholds from it the epithet "uttered."
The reason is found in the fact that, philosophically considered,
the Word of God and the word of man are totally different
in kind. The term " uttered " immediately suggested the
physical organs through which human speech issued; but
God had no such organs, and though his expressed Thought
might not inappropriately be compared to a Word, it could
hardly be associated with an adjective which at once recalled to
the mind a mouth and tongue. The distinction is carefully
pointed out by Philo himself. Having quoted the verse
" once the Lord spoke, these two things I heard," f he
remarks,

The word " once " is applicable to what is unmixed and a monad or unit,
while " twice " refers to what is mixed, and susceptible of composition
and dissolution. God, accordingly, speaks unmixed units ; for speech is
not for him a sonorous body of air, since it is mingled with, nothing else,

* Post. Cain., 30 (I. 244). f Psalm Ixi. 11 in the LXX. +

Beading ycywj/oe instead of the unmeaning yeyovwg.

12*

180 THE LOGOS.

but is incorporeal and naked, not differing from a unit. But we hear by
a duality, for the breath, when it is being sent forth from the sovereign
principle, is shaped in the mouth by the tongue, and then issuing forth
and getting mixed with its kindred air, and striking it, completes the
combination of a duality.*

In consequence of this peculiarity the divine voice was seen,
and not heard.

It is said in Scripture, " All the people saw the voice," f not heard it,
since what took place was not a beating of the air by the organs of mouth
and tongue, but a brilliant light of virtue, not differing from a rational
fountain. In another passage Scripture distinguishes the audible from
the visible by saying, " You heard a voice of words, and you saw, not a
resemblance, but a voice. "{ For the voice which is divided into noun and
verb and the parts of speech generally, is properly called audible, for it is
tested by hearing ; but that which does not consist of verbs or nouns,
but is the voice of God, is rightly introduced as visible, since it is seen by
the eye of the soul. Now observe with what novelty it is said that the
voice was visible, though the voice is almost the only thing connected with
us which is not visible, except the intellect. It is true, we do not see
tastes and smells regarded simply as such, but we see them when regarded
as bodies. The voice, however, is not visible, whether we regard it as
audible or as a body, supposing it to be a body ; but these two things in
us are invisible, mind and speech. But our faculty of sound has
not been made like the divine organ of voice ; for ours is mixed with
air, and flies to the kindred region of the ears ; but the divine consists
of pure and unmixed though t,|| which, on account of its rarity, out
strips hearing, and is seen by pure soul on account of its sharpness of
discernment.^]

I have referred to these passages at such length to show that
Philo was distinctly and fully aware of a failure in the analogy
between divine and human speech. So long as the Word was
regarded as simply an expression of thought it might, without
irreverence, be attributed to the divine Being ; but as soon as
it was defined by an epithet which was proper only to spoken
and audible language, it ceased to be applicable.

There are still one or two highly suggestive passages which

* Quod Deus immut., 18 (I. 285). t Exod. xx. 18.

} Deut. iv. 12. Ao yof. || A6yov.

t Migrat. Abr., 9 (I. 443-4).

TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVEESE. 1S1

will serve to complete our doctrine. Eeferring once more to
the statement that all the people saw the voice, Philo asks why
that of man was audible, but that of God visible. The answer
is, " Because as many things as God says are not words, but
works, which eyes rather than ears distinguish."* Again,
referring to the dream of Jacob, he speaks of the promises
made through words" as being confirmed by " works of
truth," and adds, "for it is the peculiar attribute of God to
speak certainly what will come to pass ; yet why do we say
this ? for his wordst differ not from works."* It might be
supposed that the intention here was only to emphasize the
certainty with which the divine promise or prediction must be
fulfilled. But I think more than this is implied. To say that
God foretells future events seems to separate the world s
movements from his sovereign will, and to place him, as it
were, in the position of a man who foretells an eclipse ; and
therefore Philo demurs to the expression which he has just
used. God s promises are not spoken words, relating to a
course of events which goes on independently of them, but
rather the potency by which the future is controlled, as the
seed is the promise of the harvest. Thus the word of God,
in any particular instance, is really a work ; it is the imprinting
of a divine idea which realizes itself through the ages. This
view is confirmed by the remaining passage. It is there said
that even time did not co-operate in the production of the
universe, "for God in speaking created simultaneously^
placing nothing between the two ; but if one ought to set
going a truer opinion, the word|| is his work."^[ In the first
statement the word and the deed are represented as different,
though contemporaneous. But Philo has a view which he
considers truer : the word and the deed are identical ; the
utterance is the stamping of the divine and cosmical Thought

* Dec. Orac., 11 (II. 188). f Aoyoi. + Somn., I. 31 (I. 648).

Alywv ufj,a TTO/. ||

t SS. Ab. et Cain., 18 (I. 175).

182 THE LOGOS.

upon matter ; and the Logos, the "Word, is the finished work,
the Thought of God made objective, for the sole creation and
the sole reality in this material universe is that Thought which
resolves itself into a permeating tissue of ideas, and speaks to
our reason as an expression of the Supreme Mind.

It is not wonderful, then, that Philo abstained from applying
to the Word of God an epithet which, however convenient it
became in the course of time, was too strongly associated in
his mind with spoken language to serve as a fitting medium
for his doctrine. If it be asked why he did not go farther,
and discard the use of "the Word" altogether, various
reasons may be given. Not only does it furnish a very natural
figure by which to represent the expression of divine Thought,
but it was already current in religious and philosophical
language. It had the sanction of the Old Testament, and the
term Logos with its convenient ambiguity provided an easy
transition from the Scriptural " Word of God " to the Stoical
"Keason," by which Philo s philosophy was so deeply
influenced. His belief in the transcendence of God led
inevitably to the distinction which was afterwards denoted by
the words inward " and f uttered "; but it was one thing to
adopt and interpret the language of the day, and quite
another to introduce for the first time a pair of correlative
terms which might suggest a much closer analogy between
God and man than he was willing to admit.

From what has been said the relations of the Logos to God
and to the cosmos have already become apparent. We must,
however, view these subjects separately, and consider how far
Philo s language in regard to them is consistent with the
doctrine which we have .just set forth.

" Neither before creation was anything with God* nor since
the creation of the cosmos is anything ranked with him/ ; t
In these words Philo asserts the absolute solitude of God. He

* -2vv T$ 0f. t Leg. All., II. 1 (1. 66).

RELATION TO GOD: HIS REASON. 183

presents them as a possible interpretation of the statement
that " it is not good for the man to be alone."* Why is it
not good for man ? Because it is good for the Alone to be
alone. This loneliness of God maybe interpreted as above;
and though Philo himself referred it rather to the simplicity
of the divine nature, there is no reason to doubt that he
accepted the doctrine contained in the former explanation.
Agreeably to this he says elsewhere that God, in determining
to create, " used no assistantf for who else was there ? but
himself alone."J We must, then, start by conceiving of God
as originally existing not only in the absolute simplicity of his
being, but in perfect solitude. There is no Logos distinguish
able from himself to share his counsels or to execute his plans.
But, as we have seen, the simplicity of his unknown essence
resolves itself to our thought into a variety of predicates
expressive of his manifestations in the cosmos. These may
be summed up in the two statements, he is good, and he is
powerful or sovereign, and these two, again, find their unity in
the proposition, he is rational. He is, accordingly, the Mind or
Reason of the universe. Have we, then, discovered his essence,
and when we have said that he is Reason, have we given an
exhaustive description of him ? No, for pure Being is a more
comprehensive conception than Eeason, and includes other
predicates. Being, for instance, is eternal and omnipresent,
and may have other attributes unknown to us, none of which
is necessarily involved in the rational. Reason, therefore, is a
mode of the divine essence, but not that essence itself ; and,
as in the case of all the powers, God exhausts and transcends
it. He may, accordingly, be spoken of as the fountain from
which it flows, as the Being who is before it. This view is
clearly exhibited in a passage previously quoted, " God, the
fountain of the oldest Reason, does not participate in, but
rules, the rational power." || This, of course, does not mean

Gen. ii. 18. f Or advocate, TrapaKXfjT^. J Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5).

Aoy . || Quod det. pot. ins., 22 (I. 207).

184: THE LOGOS.

that God has none of the rational power, but that he has
it all. We participate in it and are dependent upon it for the
possession of our reason; but it depends upon God for its
very existence. That it belongs to his essence is implied in
the comparison of a fountain ; and the same conclusion follows
from an argument which Philo uses, " Since God is the
fountain of Reason, it is a necessity that he who lives
irrationally has been separated from the life of God."*
This argument would not be valid unless reason were involved
essentially in the divine life. But that it is not exhaustive of
the divine essence is taught in many passages. God, who is
before and above the Logos, f is declared to be superior to all
rational nature. J He who has been conducted by wisdom into
the divine Reason does not reach God in his essence, but sees
him from a distance, or rather is not competent even to behold
him from afar off, but sees only that God is far from all
creation, and the comprehension .of him most widely removed
from all human understanding. || When, therefore, we say
that God is the Mind or Reason of the universe, we not only
express our own best conception, but assert a truth ; yet the
truth is inadequate, for above and beyond the immanent Reason
of the universe is the transcendent and eternal Being whose it
is, and into whose depth and fulness of perfection man, whose
highest experience is of reason, can never penetrate.

The view here sketched corresponds precisely with our
doctrine of the divine powers; but can we reconcile the
notion of a rational power or rational nature with the con
ception of the Logos as the ideal cosmos ? We can do so
only in the way already indicated, by supposing that in
God the faculty and the product are coincident. We, with

* TTJQ 6eov tufa. Post. Cain., 20 (I. 238).
f Hpb rov Xoyow, vKtp rbv Xoyov.

I Kpdffffwv tarlv rj Travel XoyiKij QVGIQ. Fragments, II. 625, answering to
Qu. et Sol. in Gen., II. 62.
Tov KUTO. TO dvai 6i6v. || Somn. I. 11 (I. 630).

EELATION TO GOD : HIS SON. 185

our imperfect gifts, fling off fugitive ideas which, cannot be
considered, either separately or collectively, as constituting the
essence of reason. But the divine Keason consists of perma
nent ideas and relations, which, though they might severally
be spoken of as its products, yet in their totality represent
its unchanging essence. Kationality in its highest sense
means the logical array of divine and eternal thoughts ;
and if we refer to the Logos now as a power and again as
the collective cosmical idea, we only adapt our language to
different aspects of the same thing.

As the idea of the ideas, the most generic thought, the
Logos is spoken of as the oldest of things, an expression
which probably describes its logical rather than its chrono
logical relations, since we have seen that the latter do not
enter into the creative activity of God.* Since it is depend
ent on the self-existing Cause, and, as a thought, must be
conceived by us as produced, it is represented under the figure
of a son, a kind of metaphor for which we have already
noticed Philo s predilection; and when this notion is com
bined with the preceding, it becomes the oldest, or first-born
son.j- It is, if I am not mistaken, always in its cosmical
relations, that is, as the Thought of God made objective in
the universe, and capable, therefore, of being conceived apart
from God, that it is described in this way ; and Philo s mean
ing is admirably illustrated by a passage where the figure is
carried still farther, and it is said that the Logos has for its
father God, who is the father of all things as well, and for
its mother Wisdom, through whom the universe came into
being,J and that this oldest Logos of the Self-existent puts
on the cosmos as a garment, for it is arrayed in earth and

* See, besides the passage quoted on p. 183 from Quod det. pot. ins. and others
to be mentioned presently, Prof. 19 (I. 561) ; Leg. AIL, III. 61 (I. 121).

f Agr. Noe, 12 (I. 308), TOV 6p9bv avrov Xoyov, irpwroyovov viov : Conf. Ling.,
14 (I. 414), TrpeaflvTctTov vibv . . . Trpwroyoi/or : 28, p. 427, TOV
O.VTOV \6yov: Somn., I. 37 (I. 653), 6 Trpwroyovoj UVTOV 6elo \6yo.

if E&lt; f

186 THE LOGOS.

water and air and fire and their products.* The relation
of the Logos to Wisdom must be reserved for separate dis
cussion ; at present we will only observe that the Logos
which is the son of God is here evidently represented, not
as the interior Reason or Thought of God, but as the supremo
idea impressed upon the visible universe.

In its filial or objective relation the Logos is the " image "
of God, and the archetype of the cosmos and of man.
" God," we are told, " gives the soul a seal, an all-beautiful
gift, teaching it that he shaped the substance of the universe
when it was unshaped, .... and sealed the whole cosmos
with an image and idea, his own Logos. "f Here it is obvious
that the Logos is the all-comprehending divine Thought which,
like a seal, is stamped upon matter, and gives rational form to-
its otherwise formless mass. Similarly, the mortal soul "was
stamped according to the image of the Self-existent; and
Thought,! through which the whole cosmos was fabricated,
is an image of God." This conception is frequently repeated
in regard to the human soul, or man in the highest sense. Of
the possessions in the cosmos nothing is more God-like than
man, " an all-beautiful impression of an all-beautiful image,
stamped with the pattern of an archetypal rational idea,"||
"the highest Thought/ or Reason.^ In somewhat varied
phrase, "the rational spirit in us has been shaped according to
an archetypal idea of the divine image. " ** In one passage the
figure of a seal or a pattern is abandoned in favour of that
of participation : man is related to God by virtue of partici
pation in Reason. ff It thus appears that man and the cosmos
bear the impress of the same supreme Thought, and the great
laws of reason of which we are conscious within are perceived
without. Philo has no direct Scriptural proof of this doctrine;

* Prof., 20 (I. 562). f Somn., II. 6 (I. 665).

+ Aoyoc. Monarch., II. 5 (II. 225).

!| Spec. Leg., III. 15 (II. 313). f Tbv avurdru Aoyor, ib., 37, p. 333.

** Animal. Sacr. idon., 3 (II. 239).

ft Kara n}v 7rpo \6yov Koivuviav, Spec. Leg., IV. 4 (II. 338).

EELATION TO GOD: HIS IMAGE. 187

but lie infers it from the statement that man was formed
according to the image of God.* If the part was an image of
an image, much more must the whole cosmos be so, and
macrocosm and microcosm bear the stamp of the same arche
typal seal.-f- This Scriptural foundation for the doctrine,
combined with the fact that reason in us is self-conscious,
and therefore lies closer to our knowledge than the rational
laws in the cosmos, naturally induces Philo to dwell most
frequently on the human mind as a copy of the Logos.
Confining our thoughts to this relation, we obtain a de
scending series of three terms God, the Logos, the human
reason. The undivided birds of Abraham s offering signify
the two winged and soaring Logoi, one an archetype above
us, the other an imitation existing in us. Now, Moses calls
the one above us an image of God, and the one in us an
impression of the image ; so that the mind in each of us,
which is properly and truly man, is a third impress^ from the
Creator, while the intervening one is a pattern of the one and
a copy of the other. In another, not very clearly expressed,
passage, an ideal man seems to be interposed between the
Logos and the actual man. " There are," it is said, " two
kinds of men, that which has been made according to the
image, and that which has been moulded out of earth, for it
desires the image. For the image of God is an archetype of
other things ; and every imitation desires that of which it is
an imitation, and is ranked with it."|| Perhaps we may
explain this by saying that the compound man, consisting
of mind and body, must, like everything else, have an idea,

* Kar tiKova Otov, Gen. i. 27. f Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5).

Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505). See also Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207),
" A divine power which Moses calls by a proper name, image, showing that
God is the archetype of rational nature, but man an imitation and copy, not the
two-natured animal, but the best species of the soul, which has been called
VOVQ Kal Adyof."

|| Leg. All., II. 2 (I. 67).

188 THE LOGOS.

in correspondence with which each individual man is framed;
and this idea must come below that of the real and inward
man, regarded simply as mind. It is this inward man that
is a copy of the Logos. What, then, is the philosophical
meaning of representing the human mind as third in the scale
of being, instead of making it the immediate image of God ?
Is it not this, that the individual mind may, and does, fall far
short of its ideal, and it is not the imperfect reason of Smith
and Jones, but perfect and ideal Keason, that is the image
of God. So far as our minds are rational, however feeble and
perverted, they must bear the impress of their ideal; but
beyond that ideal is the infinite Archetype of all. This state
ment has a sufficiently clear meaning even for our modern
conception ; but we must remember that the ideal of human
reason is not a mere abstraction, gathered by deducting the
imperfections of individual minds, but a permanent reality,
being the supreme divine Thought, that which, in the unknown
unity of the divine essence, reveals itself to us as reason, and,
in the universe, is apprehended as an all-pervading rational
force. As the ideal of the human mind, the Logos is even
spoken of as (( man." This is not done, however, without
Scriptural warrant. Zechariah* says, " Behold a man whose
name is rising."f What a strange appellation, says Philo,
if you think of man composed of body and soul. But the
name is most appropriate if you will acknowledge that
incorporeal man, not differing from a divine image; for the
Father of things caused this oldest son to rise,J whom else
where he named first-born. The same designation is justified
by the statement of Joseph s brethren, We all are sons of one
man/ || "If we have not yet become fit to be considered
children of God, at least we are children of his eternal image,

vi. 12. f AraroXr?, in the LXX.

ArlraXf. Conf. Ling., 14 (I. 414).

Gen. xlii. 11.

EELATION TO GOD : HIS IMAGE. 189

most sacred Thought; for the oldest Thought is an image
of God."*

We must now ascertain as nearly as we can what is meant
by calling the Logos an image of God. The most significant
passage is the one in which the cherubim on the Ark are said
to have symbolized the creative and regal powers.

The divine Logos above these had no visible representation, " as it
was like nothing perceptible, but was itself an image of God, the oldest
of all intelligible things, the nearest model of the only Being that
truly is, there being no bordering interval ;f for it is said, I will
speak to thee from above the mercy-seat between the two cherubim, J
so that the Logos is the driver of the powers, and he who speaks is
the rider."

From this statement we learn, first, that the Logos which is
the image of God is the spoken Word, that is, the objective
Thought of God stamped upon the universe ; secondly, that the
creative and providential activity of God is controlled by this
Thought, which is therefore represented as older ; and, thirdly,
that as the oldest of intelligibles, or the highest genus, it is the
one immediate expression of the divine nature, not, of course,
an adequate expression, but one which leaves no higher term
to mediate between it and God. All other things are an
expression of Thought, but Thought is an expression of God
alone. It is not unsuitable, then, to call it the image of
God ; for as a grand poem or a profound treatise is a reflec
tion of the mind of its author, so God can have no nearer
resemblance than the Thought which is the direct offspring
of his causality, and embraces the entire scheme of things.
If we may say so, the cosmical order is a divine poem, and
matter is the page whereon it has been inscribed, which,
from its blank, unmeaning look, has become replete with
rational form ; and he who can read the poem sees, not indeed

* Conf. Ling., 28 (I. 427).

f iyyvTciru), fujdivbg OVTOQ utOopiov iaori7/iaro, TOV povov o sanv

Ex. xxv. 22. Prof., 19 (I. 561).

190 THE LOGOS.

all the depths of eternal Being, but the purpose and the mind
of God.

The same idea is brought out by Philo under another figure,
that of a shadow. This is done in connection with Beseleel,
who was chosen to execute the necessary work in the preparation
of the Tabernacle.* Beseleel means, " God is in a shadow."t
Now, his Logos, with which as an organ he made the cosmos,
is the shadow of God ; and this shadow, and, as it were, copy,
is an archetype of other things. For as God is a pattern
of the image, here called shadow, so the image becomes
in its turn a pattern. That the shadow, in this passage, is
equivalent to the Thought projected upon matter, is evident
from what follows. One way of understanding the Divine, it is
said, is from the cosmos and its parts and the powers existing
in these. This is to apprehend God through a shadow,
to understand the artist through his works. Presently the
shadow is explained to mean " both the Logos and this
cosmos. "J The inclusion of the cosmos in a shadow which
was previously identified with the Logos, is intelligible if
our interpretation thus far has been correct. The cosmos
is certainly different from the Logos, because, it includes the
material condition which is absent from the latter ; and yet
qua cosmos, as a tissue of logical relations, it becomes identical
with it, and may be comprised under the same term. It
is as though the shadow of God, otherwise invisible, had
fallen upon matter, and so revealed a rational form, the
substance of which is hidden from our view.

From the foregoing discussion it has become apparent
that the Logos stands between God and the material world.
Though intimately united with the latter, as the pervasive
force which alone gives it reality, it is yet distinct from
it, because, being immaterial, it does not fall under the
senses, but is apprehended only by the intellect. On the

* Ex. ssxi. 1 sqq. f Ev GKI$ 6 0co= b b^ 2.

J Leg. All., III. 31-3 (I. 106-7).

RELATION TO GOD: MEDIATING. 191

other hand, it is no less closely united with God, because
it has flowed directly from his essence ; and yet it is dif
ferent from him, not only as a part from the whole, nor
only as our thoughts become different from ourselves when
we make them objects of contemplation, but as the force
which is rounded off and made permanently objective in
the order of the universe. To recur to the oft used analogy,
it is as though the artist s thought were not only visible
in the form of the statue, but were the enduring power
which held its particles together, and prevented it from
.sinking into undistinguishable dust. In that case the statue
would have 110 reality as a work of art if the constraining
thought of the artist were withdrawn ; nor would the thought
have any reality except as an inseparable expression of the
artist s sovereign and causal mind. Thus the thought would
mediate between the mind and the marble block, and seem to
border on both the ontological and the phenomenal realms.
This mediating position is distinctly assigned to the Logos
by Philo. To it, he says,

"The Father who generated the universe gave a special gift, that stand
ing on the borders it should separate the created from the Creator

.And it exults in the gift, and with dignity tells of it, saying, And I stood
between the Lord and you, * being neither unbegofcten as God nor
begotten as you, but in the middle between the extremes, serving as
a pledge to both ; on the side of him who planted, for a security that the
race will never wholly vanishf and depart, having chosen disorder instead
of order ; and on the side of that which has grown, for a good ground of
hope that the propitious God will never overlook his own work."J

The words which are here ascribed to the Logos, so far
as they are a quotation, are said in Scripture to have been
spoken by Moses ; but Moses is more than once represented as

* Deut. v. 5. This is elsewhere applied to " the understanding of the wise
man." Somn. II. 34 (I. 689).

t, apparently in an intransitive sense. Mangey suggests

{ Quis rer. div. her,, 42 (I. 501-2).

192 THE LOGOS.

a type of the Logos ; and in the passage here referred to a
reason for treating him as such may have been found in
the fact that he proceeds to report the words* of the Lord,
an office which naturally belonged to the interpreting Logos.
The general doctrine laid down by Philo in the above sentences
has already become sufficiently clear ; but we must notice for a
moment one or two of its particular expressions. The Logos
is not unbegotten as God ; for even if we regard the Thought of
God as eternal, still it is always logically dependent upon God,
and cannot be conceived as self-existent. A thought, even if
it be in fact coeval with the mind, must yet be looked upon
as the mind s offspring. On the other hand, it is not begotten
as man, because it has not been born in time or become a
part of the phenomenal universe. The distinction which is
here pointed out was afterwards expressed by the words
" begotten " and " made " ; but Philo, though evidently aware
of the distinction, has not introduced a terminology answering
to it, and we must not be surprised if, while words are still
fluid, and have not yet settled down into permanent moulds, the
use of language is occasionally a little inconsistent. The first
born son of God must have been begotten ; but as Philo
applies the latter term to everything created, it was neces
sary to deny its applicability to the Logos, at least in the
sense generally intended. Hence, instead of distinguishing
the Logos from the Father, as the begotten from the
unbegotten, he declares that it was neither, but occupied
a position between the two. The twofold pledge, also, which
the Logos offers is significant. As the mighty Thought of
God, ever linked with the divine Causality, it secures the
universe against a relapse into chaos. As a power essentially
divine ever active in the sphere of phenomena, it guarantees the
lasting continuity of Providence. The cosmos is God s " own
work."f The Logos, therefore, is not a demiurge who acts

* Td prjuara. -j- T6 idiov ipyov.

BELATION TO GOD : ETERNAL. 193

for or instead of God, but is God s own rational energy acting
upon matter; and as a material world cannot, like a human
work, be finished off and left to itself, this energy is always
there, and links the cosmos to the infinite source of power
and order.

These remarks may enable us to understand the contra
dictory predicates which are attributed to the Logos. On the
one hand it is eternal and incorruptible. The rational soul in
man, it is said, is stamped tf with the seal of God, whose
character is eternal Reason."" 5 Here the Logos is regarded
simply in its aspect of archetypal idea ; and although the
imprinting of that idea must have had a beginning, yet
the idea itself, as existing in the unchangeable God, must
have been eternal. In one other passage the same epithet is
applied to the Logos : &lt;( If we have not yet become fit to be
considered children of God, at least we are children of his
eternal image, the most sacred Logos."t Though we have
seen that the Logos is the image of God by virtue of its
being made objective in the universe, still it is intrinsically
the same whether it has become objective or is hidden away in
the mystery of the divine essence; and so the image may
be described as eternal, although the eternal and subjective
Logos would not in the first instance have been called an image
of God. That it is incorruptible follows as a matter of course.*
and hardly requires remark. " Being a Thought J of the Eternal,
it is of necessity itself also incorruptible/ This necessity
would not exist unless the Logos were a direct expression
of the divine essence ; and thus Philo s inference helps to
confirm our past exposition. Again, we read that " the
truly lawful is ipso facto eternal, || since right reason, which is
law, is not corruptible."^ Philo has just been speaking of
an immortal law inscribed on the nature of the universe " ;

* AiStos Xoyoc, Plantat. Noe, 5 (I. 332).

f Conf. Ling., 28 (I. 427). J Aoyoe.

Conf. Ling., 11 (I. 411). || AIWVJOJ/. IT Ebriet., 35 (I. 379).

VOL. II. 13

194: THE LOGOS.

and it is evident from the words which we have quoted
that right reason is the rational law which regulates the
cosmos, and this law, considered in its essence, and not in
its application, is eternal. But as soon as we withdraw our
attention from its essence, and think only of its application,
it takes its place among the objects of creation. The Logos,
as the Word or purely objective Thought of God, " is above
all the cosmos, and oldest and most generic of all the things
that have come into existence."* Its coming into existence
can describe only its assumption of the character of " Word/
its passing forth to take possession of matter and constrain it
to be a vehicle of divine ideas, which else must have dwelt for
ever within the solitude of God.

In conformity with the foregoing doctrine, we may dis
tinguish three grades in the knowledge of God. We may have
an immediate intuition of the transcendent Cause ; we may know
him inferential!/ from the Eeason displayed in his works;
or, lastly, we may stop short with that Eeason, and fail to
apprehend the Divinity beyond. The two former are set forth
in the passage about Beseleel, to which we lately referred.
We there learned that the supreme Artist may be known
through his works as through a shadow. " But there is a
more perfect and more purified mind, initiated in the great
mysteries, which knows the Cause, not from the effects, as
it would the permanent substance from a shadow, but, having
looked beyond the begotten, receives a clear appearance of the
Unbegotten, so as to apprehend from himself him and his
shadow, the latter meaning the Logos and this cosmos." This
higher mind is represented by Moses, whom God called up, and
to whom he spoke mouth to mouth; but a lower mode of appre
hension is symbolized by Beseleel, who received the appearance

* 1S&gt;v oaa ytyove. Leg. All., III. 61 (I. 121). Compare Migrat. Abr., 1
(I. 437), where, however, there is a comparative instead of a superlative,
6*7rp:&lt;r/Wreppc rZv ytvtaiv ilXrifdruv. Here also Philo is speaking of the
Word, and of its office in creation and providence.

THEEE GKADES IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 195

of God, not from the Cause himself, but from the things
that were made,, as from a shadow, perceiving the artist by a
process of inference. We saw just now that the shadow
denotes the Logos, and it is of course only as tenanted
by the divine Eeason that the cosmos is capable of revealing
God.* It follows, therefore, that those who under the guidance
of wisdom have reached the divine Logos have not necessarily
attained to God himself ; they only see him afar off, or, rather,
that he is far from all genesis. f In more modern phrase, they
discern an all-pervading energy and order in nature, which
points to a permanent ontological ground, but of this ground
itself they discern only that it is mysterious, impenetrable
Being. But the same mind may be differently affected at
different times. Now it may soar aloft, and be illumined
with the archetypal and immaterial rays of the rational
fountain of God; and, again, it may descend and meet only
images of these; and thus to meet the Logos is a most
sufficing gift for those who cannot behold God, who is before
the Logos, for they have the benefit of a mingled light
when the unmingled has set.J With some the latter state
of mind is permanent, and indeed, even among philosophers,
there is a yet lower stage than this. The companions of
knowledge ought to desire to behold the self-existent Being,
and if they cannot do this, to see at least his image, the
most sacred Logos, and next to this the most perfect of
perceptible works, this cosmos ; for the accurate discernment
of these is the object of philosophy. The Levites represent
minds of the highest order. The Sovereign of all is their
refuge, while others fly at most to the divine Logos ; and
while the former have as their law the God to whom they are
consecrated, the imperfect have the sacred Logos as theirs. ||
It follows that the Logos may be spoken of as a God in

* Leg. All, III. 31-3 (I. 106-8). f Somn., I. 11 (I. 630).

$ Ib., 19, p. 638 Conf. Ling., 20 (I. 419).

|| SS. Ab. et Cain., 38 (1, 188-9) ; Prof. 18 (I. 560).

13 *

196 THE LOGOS.

relation to our inferior perceptions. Philo, however, very
rarely avails himself of this privilege, and never without
Scriptural warrant. Commenting on the words addressed to
Jacob, I am the God who appeared to thee in the place of
God,"* he asks

Are there really two Gods ? For it is said, " I am the God who appeared
to thee," not in my place, but " in the place of God," as of another. The
solution is the following : The true God is one, but those improperly
so called are several. Wherefore the sacred Word has indicated the
true God in the present passage by the article, saying b Otog, but the one
improperly so named without the article, v TOTT^, not rov 0oi),but simply
Qtov. The latter is the eldest Logos. This usage is adopted in order to
benefit him who cannot yet see the true God ; for as those who are unable
to see the sun itself look upon the reflected ray as the sun, so they
mentally perceive the image of God, his Logos, as himself.f

In another passage Philo remarks on the words, " I swore
by myself, saith the Lord/ J

God alone affirms by himself, since he alone accurately knows his own
nature, and those must be considered impious who say that they swear
by God, for they cannot discern his nature. We must be content, then,
if we can swear by his name, according to the command in Deuteronomy,
" Thou shalt swear by his name," not by himself; that is, by the inter
preting Logos ; for this would be a God to us imperfect men, while of the
wise and perfect the first God would be so.||

Here there is no use of the word God in a subordinate sense
in the Scripture passages which are appealed to ; but the
application of the term to the Logos is readily suggested by
the context. The object of an oath is to confirm one s words
by the highest possible sanction ; and as men are precluded by
their ignorance from swearing by the supreme God, the Logos
must take for them the place of the Supreme. The name of
God is made to denote the Logos because, as a name expresses
the thing which it signifies, so the Logos is an expression of
the divine nature which it interprets to us. The phrase " the

* Gen. xxxi. 13, o Ofbg . . tv Tony Qsov.

f Somn., I. 39 and 41 (I. 655-6). J Gen. xxii. 16. vi. 13.

|| Leg. All., III. 73 (I. 128).

CALLED A GOD. 197

first God v * receives illustration from its use elsewhere in
opposition to those who thought that the cosmos was God :
those who consider it closely, says Philo, will know full well
that it is not the first God, but the work of the first God.f
This language seems to allow by implication a subordinate
divinity to the cosmos, and we might think it strange that a
monotheist did not disclaim any such meaning. JSTo doubt he
would have done so had he supposed that the world was a mere
fabric put together by God. But he viewed it as a tissue of
divine forces ; and therefore those who worshipped it as God
held not so much a false as an imperfect view. The Logos,
the cosmic principle in the material universe, was really divine,
being the rational energy, the formative Thought of God, and
consequently it was not by a mere figure of speech that it was
spoken of as God. Yet since it represented only the immanence
and not the transcendence of God, since it was an expression
of the eternal Cause and not that Cause itself, it was necessary
to distinguish it from the supreme and infinite Being; and
as the latter was called, in opposition to polytheistic and
pantheistic schemes, the First God, the Logos, the highest
term next to the Supreme, might be termed the second. This
appellation is actually used, but only once, and that in a
fragment preserved by Eusebius from the " Questions and
Answers/ Philo asks

" Why, as though speaking of another God, does he say, I made man
in the image of God, but not in his own image ? " The answer is
that nothing mortal could be made like tlie supreme Father of all,
but only like the second God,J the Logos. For the rational impress in
the soul of man must be stamped by divine Eeason, and cannot hare as
its archetype God, who is above Eeason.

Here the application of the term "God" to the Logos is
rendered necessary by Philo s interpretation of the passage on

* Trpoiroc 0o&lt;r. f Abr., 15-16 (II. 11-12).

Tov dtvrepov Qtbv.

Fragments, II. 625, answering to Qu. et Sol. in Gen., II. 62.

198 THE LOGOS.

which he is commenting. According to his own conception, as
expressed in the words before us, the Logos is simply the
archetype of the rational principle in man, and this archetype,
as we have seen, is the immanent Thought of the universe.
Whether in the doctrine that the Logos was a God to the
imperfect, whose conceptions could reach no higher, Philo had
the Stoics in his mind, I will not undertake to decide. But
at all events his language receives an interesting light from
the Stoical doctrine, which recognised no God above the all-
pervading Logos of the material system. When we remember
the philosophical atmosphere of the time and the requirements
of allegorical interpretation, we shall not be surprised that
Philo three times in his voluminous works speaks of the Logos
as a God, nor shall we be disposed to extract from such
language a doctrine inconsistent with all that we have hitherto
learned of the nature of the Logos and its relation to the
eternal Cause.

Little need be added to what has been already said respect
ing the relation which the Logos bears to the universe ; but
one or two forms of expression must be more distinctly
noticed. From the doctrine hitherto described we should
expect Philo to represent the Logos as the instrument of
creation and of providence. This indeed has become apparent
in some of the passages which we have quoted, and we need
only allude to one or two others which possess more than
usual interest. Having occasion to explain that God was a
cause, and not an instrument, Philo observes that

Four .things must concur in every act of creation namely, that by
which, that out of which, that by means of which, and that on account of
which ; or, in other words, the cause, the material, the instrument, and
the reason or purpose. Accordingly, the cosmos has for its cause God,
by whom it has been produced ; for its material the four elements, out of
which it was compounded ; for an instrument God s Logos,* through
which it was prepared ; and for its reason the goodness of the Creator.f

* "Qpyavov ft \6yov Qtov. f Cherub., 35 (I. 161-2).

INSTBUMENT OF CBEATION AND PBOVIDENCE. 199

In what way the Logos is the instrument of creation has
been so fully explained that it would be superflous to remark
further upon this and similar statements.* Creation and
providence naturally go together, and therefore these two
agencies of the Logos are sometimes spoken of at the same
time. Thus, we are told that the pilot of the universe, holding
the Logos as a tiller, steers all things, and when he moulded
the cosmos he used this as an instrument for the composition
of the things produced ;f and, again, he employs fl Reason as a
minister of his gifts, by which also he made the cosmos." J
The supremacy of a rational law over the seeming drift of
events is alluded to in a remarkable passage. The object of
the passage is to show the vanity of mortal affairs, which differ
nothing from false dreams.

This is illustrated by the changing fortunes of nations. Once Greece
flourished, hut the Macedonians took away its strength. Macedonia
again had its period of bloom, but was separated and weakened till it
was totally extinguished. Before the Macedonians the Persians prospered,
but one day destroyed their mighty kingdom. And now the Parthians
are more powerful than the Persians, who lately ruled them, and the
former subjects are the masters. The welfare of the once brilliant Egypt
passed away as a cloud. And so the whole habitable world is tossed up
and down like a ship at sea, which now has favourable, and again contrary
winds. For the divine Logos, which most men call fortune, moves in a
circle. In constant stream it acts upon cities and nations, assigning the
possessions of one to another, and those of all to all, merely exchanging
the property of each by periods, in order that as one city the whole
habitable world may have the best of governments, democracy. ||

This passage hints at rather than unfolds some very striking
thoughts. First of all, it distinctly recognizes a rational
direction in the fate of nations, and sets aside the common
belief in chance. Secondly, as reason implies an end in view,
it assumes that some end is being worked out by the rise and

* See also SS. Ab. et Cain., 3 (1. 165), di ov jcai 6
and Monarch., II. 5 (II. 225), where almost the same expression occurs.
f Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 437).

t Quod Deus immut., 12 (1.281), where we have $ instead of 81 ov.
Tv X t]. !1 Quod Deus immut., 36 (I. 298).

200 THE LOGOS.

fall of successive empires. This end, in the case of divine
Reason, must be good ; and Philo conjectures that the ultimate
aim must be the good of mankind, the universal distribution
of the blessings enjoyed by any, and the universal establish
ment of that form of government which rests on the equal
rights of all. So far as the Logos is concerned, it must, in
conformity with previous statements, be simply the instrument
through which the divine purpose is carried out. God directs
the affairs of men through the operation of that rational law
which is bound up in the very constitution of the world. In
this capacity the Logos is spoken of not only as the tiller "
held by God, but as itself the "steersman and pilot of the
universe."* Thus, the two worlds of nature and of man are
ruled by the same divine Reason, and the beneficent purposes
of God are being fulfilled, not only through the sublime law
which is interfused through every part of the material cosmos,
maintaining its majestic and harmonious movements, but
through a law no less sublime, though less easily discerned,
which underlies the seeming fortuity of our human lot, and
directs the vicissitudes of nations. These two laws are one :
both alike are the Logos, the supreme idea imprinted upon
the world, the rational energy of God acting within the realms
of time and space.

Such, then, in its broad outlines, is Philo s doctrine of the
Logos, a doctrine which, when taken in connection with the
previously established doctrines of the divine attributes and
the divine powers, is sufficiently clear and consistent; and
were we content to leave without discusion difficulties which
Philo himself has not discussed, we might consider the duty of
exposition as now discharged. There are, however, some
passages, hitherto unnoticed, which raise ioevitable questions
about the distinct essence and the personality of the Logos,
and, having been variously understood by different writers,

* Cherub., 11 (I. 145). Cf. SS. Ab. et Cain., 12 (I. 171).

RELATION TO WISDOM. 201

will require our serious attention. But before we enter
upon these perplexities, it will be better to examine some
peculiarities in Philo s phraseology, which will throw a
further light upon his opinions. He speaks not only
of the Logos, but [of the Wisdom,* of God, and though
the relation between these two terms is evidently intimate,
its precise character is rather obscure, and has been very
differently conceived. They are frequently supposed to be
identical in meaning, the former having been introduced under
the influence of Greek philosophy, strengthened by the desire
to obtain a masculine name for the mediating power, the latter
being a survival of the old Hebrew expression. From this
view Dahne and Baur diverge in opposite directions. Dahne
declares that the divine Wisdom is one of the powers of the
divine Logos,f and denotes that capacity for making wise
arrangements which must necessarily be postulated in the
mediating cause of the world s formation.;]; Baur, on the
other hand, places it on the highest stage, in the most intimate
union with the supreme Being, and along with it, though sub
ordinate, the two principal powers, goodness and sovereignty,
and assigns the Logos to the second stage, where it is the
same unity for the divine power operative in the universe as
Wisdom (or the supreme God himself, with whom it is one)
is upon the highest stage. To decide among these conflicting
opinions, it is necessary to review the passages on which our
judgment must rest.

We will notice first those places in which, notwithstanding
some apparent distinctions, Wisdom and the Logos seem on
the whole to be identified. In an allegorical interpretation of
Eden, Philo says that generic virtue receives its beginnings
from Eden, the Wisdom of God, which rejoices in its Father
alone, and the four specific virtues are derived from the
generic. Presently the former statement is repeated with an

* 2o0m. J Eine Theilkraft desselben. J I. p. 221.

Lehre von der Dreiein., I., p. 70.

202 THE LOGOS.

addition : generic goodness " goes forth out of Eden, the
Wisdom of God. Now this is the Logos of God; for in
accordance with this [Logos] generic virtue has been made."*
Here, I think, the identity is not, as Gfrorer seems to suppose, f
between the Logos and. "Wisdom, but between the Logos and
generic goodness. Eden is Wisdom, and the river is generic
goodness or the Logos, which divides itself into the four
specific virtues. Thus Wisdom and the Logos are distinguished
from one another, and if this passage stood alone, we should
not refer to it at present; but when we compare it with
corresponding passages, we receive a different impression.
We have observed before that Philo s allegorical interpre
tations follow a pretty regular system. We are accordingly
told elsewhere that Scripture " calls the Wisdom of the Self-
existent Eden" ;t and yet we are informed in another passage
that " Eden is, symbolically, right and divine Reason."
Farther on in the same treatise, Wisdom and the Logos seem
to be used as interchangeable terms. The soul is "watered
by the stream of Wisdom." || " The Logos of God gives drink
to the virtues ; for it is the beginning and fountain of beautiful
deeds." The virtues " have grown from the divine Logos, as
from one root."^ " Whence is it likely that the understand
ing thirsting for prudence should be filled except from the
Wisdom of God, the unfailing fountain ?" Presently we hear
again of " Wisdom, the divine fountain," and then of " the
stream of Wisdom";** and farther on, "the sacred Logos which
waters the sciences is itself the stream. "ff It would seem,
then, that the distinction drawn in the first passage, whatever
it may be, belongs to the thought rather than the terms ; for
Wisdom and the Logos appear alike under the figures of Eden,

* Leg. All., I. 19 (I. 56). t I- P- 225 -

t Somn., II. 37 (I. 690). Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232).

!! 36. II 37. ** 41.

tf 45. The whole passage extends from I. 249 to 255. The argument is
not affected by Tischendorf s reading ravrbv in the last quotation, instead of
M angey s UVTOQ.

EELATION TO WISDOM. 203

of a fountain, of a stream. The words are similarly inter
changed when it is said that " in those by whom the life of
the soul has been honoured the divine Logos dwells and
walks " , and a few lines farther on, f they have a secure and
unshaken power, being fattened by the Wisdom which
nourishes virtue-loving souls."*

The impression thus received, that the Logos and Wisdom
are, at .least to a certain extent, convertible terms is strengthened
when we find that some of the most striking characteristics
of the former are attributed to the latter. Thus, Wisdom is
represented as the highest of the divine powers. This is done
in a commentary on the passage in Deuteronomyt where Israel
is exhorted not to forget the Lord, "who brought forth for
thee out of a scarpedj rock a fountain of water, who fed thee
with manna in the desert." So, spiritually, we thirst " until
God sends upon us the stream of his own scarped Wisdom,
and gives drink to the soul, ... for the scarped rock is the
Wisdom of God, which he cut topmost and absolutely first
from his own powers, out of which [Wisdom] he gives drink to
God -loving souls." This language is evidently governed by
the figure under which the thought is presented, and we must
not insist on the word " cut," which, if taken strictly, would
contradict the doctrine that the powers are stretched, and not
severed ; but it seems sufficiently clear that Wisdom is regarded
as the highest divine power operative in the world. Yet this
is precisely the position we have already claimed for the
Logos. In the sequel of the passage, however, it might
seem as though the Logos were distinguished from Wisdom.
When souls have received drink tc they are filled also with
manna, the most generic thing ; . . . . now the most generic
thing is God, and the Logos of God is second." || This dis
tinction is rendered necessary by the allusion in Deuteronomy

* Ib., 35 (I. 249). t viii. 15, 16

J AKporo/iou, " top-cut." Aicpav Kai TTp(t)TiGTr]V

|| Leg. All., II. 21 (I. 81-2).

204: THE LOGOS.

to food as well as drink; but that it is only verbal is apparent
from another passage of very similar import. The nourish
ment of the soul, it is said, is described by the Legislator as
" honey from a rock and oil from a firm rock."* The rock is
ec the solid and unsevered Wisdom of God," the nurse of those
who desire incorruptible food. "The fountain of the divine
Wisdom " sometimes comes with gentler flow, and sweetens like
honey, sometimes more swiftly, and " becomes, as it were, the
oil of mental light. " Here there is nothing in the Scriptural
words to suggest a distinction between Wisdom and the Logos.
But neither is there anything to require their identification.
Nevertheless Philo proceeds to identify them in the most
express terms. " In another place/ he says, " making use of
a synonym, he calls this rock manna, the divine Logos which is
the oldest of things, and is named the most generic c some
thing, from which two cakes, the one of honey and the other
of oil, are made. "I We need not pursue the explanation
farther : it is clear that the rock, the fountain, the manna,
Wisdom, and the Logos are one, and differ to the ear rather
than to the understanding. Again, God, " the only wise," is
" the fountain of Wisdom," just as we have seen that he is the
fountain of rational power, and, as such, he delivers the
sciences to mankind. J He is also " the sovereign of Wisdom,"
and as we have learned that some may recognise the Logos
who cannot rise to the apprehension of the Self-existent, so
some may perceive Wisdom who are not yet able to behold its
sovereign. Wisdom is of course, like every divine power,
"older than the creation of the entire cosmos" ;|| but, more
than this, it is, like the Logos, instrumental in the production
of the cosmos. God being the Father of the universe, Wisdom
or Science^ is its mother. The details of this not very pleasing
metaphor must not, I think, be pressed into the service of Philo s

* Deut. xxxii. 13. t Quod det. pot. ins., 31 (I. 213-14).

I SS. Ab. et Cain., 17 (I. 175). Quod det. pot. ins., 9 (I. 197).

j| Human., 2 (II. 385).

EELATION TO WISDOM. 205

philosophy, but be treated as purely figurative. The figure is
due to the direction in Deuteronomy, that, if anyone has a dis
obedient son, the father and mother shall seize him and bring him
to the elders of the city.* Now, none could bear the punitive
powers of the parents of the universe ; but it is good to obey
their followers who preside over the soul namely, as a father,
the masculine and perfect and right Keason, and, as a mother,
encyclical education. f Here Wisdom first of all takes the
place which we have been accustomed to assign to the Logos,
being the divine instrument in creation, and then the Logos is
introduced as subordinate both to God and to Wisdom. We
must presently seek for some explanation of this kind of incon
sistency ; meanwhile we must not attach too much weight to
passages which are written for purposes of edification, and not
with a view to unfolding a philosophical doctrine, and especially
when the manner of treatment is under the control of an
allegory. Wisdom appears again as the medium of creation in
connection with the commandment "Honour thy father and
mother, that it may be well with thee/ J not, observes Philo,
with those who receive the honour, but with thee. This is the
case when we honour &lt;e as a father him who begat the cosmos,
and as a mother Wisdom, through which the universe was
completed; .... for neither the full God nor the highest
and perfect Science requires anything," so that in serving
them you benefit yourself. The same figure of a mother
recurs in yet another connection. " The high-priest is not
man, but divine Eeason, free from participation in all un
righteous deeds, not only voluntary, but even involuntary," for
he cannot defile himself either " for father," the mind, or " for
mother," sensation, || because "he had as his portion incor
ruptible and most pure parents, as a father God, who is also-
the Father of the universe, and as a mother Wisdom, through
which all things came into being." Philo goes on to say, in

* xxi. 18, 19. f Ebriet., 8-9 (I. 3G1-2). J Ex. xx. 12.

Quod det. pot. ins., 16 (I. 201-2). || Lev. xxi. 11.

206 THE LOGOS.

words already quoted, that the " oldest Logos of the Self-
existent puts on the cosmos as a garment/ and is the bond of
all things.* Here the creative function usually assigned to the
Logos is attributed to Wisdom, and yet the pervasive Logos
of the universe apparently owns it as a mother. This seeming
confusion will be noticed presently. In another passage the
cosmos is simply spoken of as "fabricated by divine Wisdom. "f
In one other place, although the creative action of Wisdom is
not mentioned, it is referred to as " the mother of all things."
Here, too, a Scriptural passage suggests the metaphor : " A
man shall leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife," J
that is, for the sake of sensation the mind leaves the Father,
the God of the universe, and the mother of all things, the Virtue
and Wisdom of God."|| The figure is somewhat modified
when God is spoken of as " the husband of Wisdom," for here
Wisdom is the generic virtue or wisdom of mankind, symbolized
by Sarah, which cannot become fruitful unless visited by divine
influence ;^[ but we may remark that it is not easy to dis
tinguish this wisdom ontologically from the Logos or rational
nature in which mankind participate. They are indeed used
interchangeably by Philo in a passage which serves in other
respects also to identify Wisdom aud the Logos. The state
ment in Genesis** that " God planted a paradise in Eden
towards the east" is under consideration. Divine and heavenly
Wisdom, we are told, is many-named, ff for Scripture "has
called it beginning and image and vision of God." This reminds
us at once of the many-named Logos of the Stoics ; and it is
noticeable that Philo himself elsewhere applies the same
epithet to the Logos, and the very first name which he
mentions is " Beginning." He also speaks of it as the image
of God, and as " Seeing Israel," which is equivalent to " the

* Prof.,^20 (I. 562). -j- Q u is rer. div. her., 41 (I. 501).

J Gen. ii. 24. Apertjv Kai aotyiav.

|| Leg. AIL, II. 14 (I. 75). j[ Cherub., 13, 14 (I. 147-8).

EELATION TO WISDOM. 207

vision o God " in tlie passage before us.* The resemblance
becomes still more apparent as we proceed. Earthly wisdom
is an imitation of the heavenly as an archetype, a fact which
is symbolized by the planting of Paradise; for God plants
in the mortal race earthly virtue, an imitation and copy of the
heavenly. Now virtue is called metaphorically " Paradise ; "
and the planting of Paradise is towards the east, " for right
Reason does not set and become extinguished, but always ac
cording to its nature rises, and as, I think, the sun, when it has
risen, fills the darkness of the air with light, so also virtue,
when it has risen in the soul, illumines its mist and disperses its
great darkness/ f It thus appears that Wisdom, Virtue, and
right Reason, are different names for the same thing, regarded,
it is true, now on the earthly, now on the heavenly, side, but
not distinguishable from one another in essence. Intellectual
perception is associated with light; and hence Wisdom, like
the Logos, is brought into connection with "the seeing Israel,"
and the Wisdom of God is declared to be " the archetypal light
of the sun, of which [light] the sun is an imitation and
image."J We have only to add that even the function of the
" Logos the cutter " is ascribed to Wisdom, though it is not
worked out so as to enable us to institute a detailed com
parison. The fountain of judgment " or separation, ||
mentioned in Genesis xiv. 7, is turned into the Wisdom of
God, " the judgment^ of all things, by which all opposites are
disunited."**

In some of the foregoing passages we have observed that,
though Wisdom and the Logos are identified either expressly or
"by the possession of. the same characteristics, yet they are also,
under the pressure of allegorical interpretation, distinguished
from one another. A few other places in which a distinction
is assumed require notice. Wisdom, "the best dwelling of

* See Conf. Ling., 28 (I. 427). f Leg. AIL, I. 14 (I. 51-2).

J Migrat. Abr., 8 (I. 442). A6yo S roficve.

j| Trjs Kpiaeuc. ^ Or separation. ** Prof., 35 (I. 575).

208 THE LOGOS.

virtue-loving souls/ is said to be the land of sacred Reason.
This statement is founded on the commandment given to
Jacob,* " Return to the land of thy father."t As the Logos
in man takes the place of father, Wisdom was required to
represent the land, and it would not be safe to infer from such
figures that Philo had in his mind any clear relation between
the two terms. If the language of Scripture had led him
to do so, I have no doubt that he would without scruple have
reversed the order, and represented the Logos as the land
of Wisdom. We have an actual instance of this kind of
inversion in the comparison of Wisdom and the Logos to a
fountain and a stream. Where Eden is made to represent
Wisdom, and its river the Logos, we learn that " the divine
Logos, like a river, descends from Wisdom, as from a foun
tain " { and yet, when the first of the cities of refuge does
duty for " the highest divine Logos," we are informed, quite
gratuitously, that the latter is the "fountain of Wisdom."
Agreeably to this order of thought, it is said that he who
is conducted by Wisdom arrives at the divine Logos, || and that
all the branches of education and wisdom^" flow perennially
from the " Word of God and divine Logos."** The latter
passage is peculiarly instructive, because the Logos, which
here stands for the heavenly bread or manna, presently
becomes " ethereal Wisdom," which God showers down upon
well-disposed minds.

Before we remark on this curious identity, difference, and
interchange of Logos and Wisdom, it will be advantageous
to notice those passages in which the latter is brought into
immediate connection with mankind, but without any expressed
relation to the Logos, for we shall thus gain a fuller insight into
its nature. " The divine spirit of Wisdom " may abide with
men, as it did with the wise Moses, tf This Wisdom is the

* Gen. xxxi. 3. f Migrat. Abr., 6 (I. 440).

J Somn.,II. 37 (I. 690). Prof., 18 (I. 560). || Somn., I. 11 (I. 630).

II UaiStlai Kai ffofiai. ** Prof., 25 (I. 566). ft Gigant., 11 (I. 269).

KELATION TO WISDOM. 209

perfect or royal way which leads to God,* and may be spoken
of as "the way of wisdom," or "the way of prudence."t
Human wisdom, however, is not the same as divine Wisdom,
but is related to it as species to genus, or as imitation to
archetype, J and whereas the universal prudence which inhabits
the Wisdom of God is imperishable, the individual prudence in
me perishes with me.|| Accordingly, the branches of human
knowledge are the principles or theorems^" of God s own
Wisdom.** Being itself equivalent, as we have seen, to science,tt
the divine Wisdom is the fountain from which the individual
sciences are watered. JJ It concerns not only the sciences, but
the arts ; and Wisdom, as it appears in the wise man, is described
as "the art of arts/ which, preserving its own true species
unaltered, exhibits itself in a variety of applications. |||| We
have only to add that Philo distinguishes wisdom and prudence
by saying that the former relates to the service of God, while
the latter is directed to the administration of human life.^f^f

It is apparent from the preceding account that Wisdom
does not receive from Philo the elaborate treatment which he
bestows upon the Logos and upon the divine powers generally,
and that if we were confined to this account the most striking
features of his philosophy would become obscure or disappear.
Nevertheless, it suggests a few questions to which we must
attempt an answer.

We must ask, first of all, how we are to understand the
relation between the Logos and Wisdom when they are dis
tinguished from one another. The most obvious reply is that
given by Heinze,*** that the Logos or Wisdom regarded as
a divine power working upon the world is different from the
same power when at rest in God, and that, therefore, either

* Quod Deus immut., 30 (I. 294) ; 34, p. 296. f Plantat. Noe, 22 (I. 343).

I Quis rer. div. her., 25 (I. 490).

II Leg. AIL, I. 25 (I. 59). H
** Quod Deus immut., 20 (I. 286). ff

Jt Prof., 35 (I. 575). Te X vr]

J| |1 Ebriet., 22 (I. 370). i [ Praern. et Poen., 14 (II. 421). *** P. 253.
VOL. II. 14

210 THE LOGOS.

may be represented as issuing forth from the other. I doubt,
however, whether this is the true solution of the difficulty.
There is only one passage which lends itself easily to this
interpretation. When Wisdom is represented, apparently, as
the mother of the universal cosmical Logos (symbolized by the
high-priest), we may fairly take the latter to be the uttered
Word, the former the eternal attribute of God. Yet even here
it would be hazardous to say that Philo was clearly conscious
of this distinction. In his allegory he wanted a mother for the
Logos, and none could be found but Wisdom ; and if we look
a little more closely at the details of the passage we shall find
room for a different explanation. The high-priest, though
standing for " divine Reason," represents in the main that por
tion of it which dwells in each man as a judge and rebuking con
science. " The oldest Logos of the Self -existent" is introduced
only to point out the universal laws of reason, which necessarily
reappear in its particular manifestations. When we are told
that this Logos put on the universe as a garment, it is imme
diately added that the individual soul puts on the body, and
the understanding of the wise man the virtues ; and when it is
said that the Logos of the Self-existent is the bond of all things,
it is only to show that the individual soul exercises a similar
faculty, and the purified mind of the wise man keeps the virtues
unbroken. The death of the high-priest is the departure of
"this most sacred Logos" from the soul, and the consequent
inroad of sin. I believe, therefore, that the distinction in
Philo s mind was not that between the inward and the uttered,
but between the universal and the particular, and that what he-
meant to teach was that the divine principle of righteous law
in each one of us was the offspring of that cosmical law which
" preserves the stars from wrong." This view is fully borne
out by other passages. Human or earthly wisdom or virtue
or right reason is related to the divine or heavenly as species
to genus, and is a copy or imitation of it. If, therefore,
Wisdom and the Logos be identical, you may say with equal

EELATION TO WISDOM. 211

propriety that human wisdom flows from the " highest divine
Logos " as a fountain, and that human reason flows from the
fountain of the divine Wisdom. It is as perennially flowing into
God-loving souls, in the form of " words and ordinances/ *
that the divine Logos is compared to a river ;f and such a
stream, distributing itself specifically to individual minds, may
be said, indifferently, to come from universal Wisdom or Reason*
So, again, the Logos which is the father of the man is that
portion of the Logos which belongs to him, and, as such, it
owns universal Wisdom as its land. Reversing the terms, he
who allows himself to be guided by the share of wisdom which
dwells in him reaches the cosmic Reason from which it comes.
In the passage where Wisdom is described as the mother of
the universe, and the Logos is ranked below it, the latter is
the right reason of men, which has received the care of souls,
and is classed with encyclical education ; in other words, it
is the species, and is justly made subordinate to the genus.
There is, however, one passage to which this explanation will
not apply. It is where Wisdom and the Logos are distinguished
as the drink and food of man, for here they stand together
in the same relation to man. The distinction is, as we have
seen, forced upon Philo by his allegory ; but we may also say
that Wisdom and the Logos, though identical in God, are
distinguishable in human apprehension. Wisdom, being
interchangeable with virtue and science, J carries with it the
notions of moral soundness and acquired knowledge, which
are not necessarily present in Logos, the rational principle by
which men are separated from the brutes. Thus the apparent
inconsistencies in Philo s language may be explained without
violating the ultimate identity of the Logos and Wisdom.

We must ask, in the next place, why Philo uses "Wisdom* 1
at all, and is not content with Logos. The explanation given
by Gfrorer and accepted by Heinze,|| that he adopts it

* Aoyoir Kai Soyparwv. t P st - Cain., 37 (I. 250).

rj and ImarfiM L P- 226 - II P&lt; 25(L

14 *

212 THE LOGOS.

principally when the mediating power is symbolized by some
feminine word in the Scriptural passage under consideration,
is certainly not sufficient. There are several passages in which
the rule is applicable, especially those in which Wisdom is the
mother of the universe, but there are also several (I have
counted seven) in which no reason of the kind exists, and there
are four others in which the rule is distinctly violated. Wisdom
is represented by Isaac, 1 * by Paradise,t and by bread, J which
are all masculine ; and, on the other hand, the Logos is signified
by a city, which is feminine, although it is described as the
fountain of Wisdom, and the relation might easily have been
reversed. || We must, therefore, seek for some further
explanation. One reason for its adoption is to be found, we
can hardly doubt, in its traditional use by Jewish writers, a
use sanctioned by the authority of the Old Testament. Philo
himself appeals to Proverbs to prove the antiquity of Wisdom,
( Grod acquired me absolutely first of his works, and founded
me before the age."^[ But I think the prevailing reason is to
be found in its greater suitability to express certain ideas.
Heinze has noticed the fact that it is never represented as the
all-penetrating bond of the universe.** But he might have
gone further. It is almost invariably used in relation to man
kind. It is the divine food and drink of the soul, the dwelling-
place of those that love virtue, the perfect way of human life,
the fountain from which the sciences are watered ; and even in
the few passages where it is spoken of as instrumental in the
act of creation, it is nearly always brought into connection
with men. It is a reasonable inference that it is often used on
account of its more distinct personal associations, and because
it expresses a source and form of character and attainment

* Quod det. pot. ins., 9 (1. 197). t Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 51-2).

J "Aproi, Prof., 25 (I. 566). UoXig.

|| Prof., 18 (I. 560).

IF So he renders viii. 22-3, deviating from the text of the LXX. Ebriet. 8
(I. 362).
** P. 255.

EELATION TO WISDOM. . 213

which are not so well indicated by the less definite terra
Logos.

We must ask, then, in conclusion, why Logos is so con
stantly preferred. One reason is probably to be found in its
gender, a point to which Philo undoubtedly attached some
importance. This is evident from a curious passage about
Wisdom which we have not yet noticed :

Bethuel, which, being interpreted, means the daughter of God, is a name
of Wisdom. Nevertheless, Bethuel is called the father of Rebecca. How
can the daughter of God be justly termed a father ? Because the name
of Wisdom is feminine, but its nature masculine. So all the virtues have
the titles of women, but the powers and actions of men ; for that which
is after God, even though it be older than all other things, is feminine in
comparison with that which makes the universe, the male always having
the prerogative. Hence Wisdom, the daughter of God, is masculine and
a father, generating in souls learning, instruction, science, prudence,
beautiful and laudable actions.*

If we may judge from this passage, Philo must have been
pleased to find a term of the desired gender which he could
conveniently substitute for the traditional "Wisdom," and
which, moreover, was not without the sanction of Scriptural
usage. It seems probable, however, that he was mainly
influenced by the philosophical qualifications of the word. It
was more flexible, and could be more easily used, in conformity
with human analogy, now for the inward conception, now for
the uttered or objective thought ; and its established position
in the Stoical philosophy must have forced it upon the attention
of one who was so strongly attracted as Philo by the moral
ideal of that austere system. He must have found it no small
advantage to have ready to his hand a theory of the universe
which only needed to be removed from its pantheistic basis,
and brought into harmony with the doctrine of the trans
cendence of God, to become a fitting vehicle for his own
speculations; and with the theory, however modified, he
naturally adopted its characteristic term.

* Prof., 9 (I. 553).

214: THE LOGOS.

There is another Old Testament term which is used by Philo
with less frequency, "the divine Spirit;" and though his
treatment of it does not greatly illumine our conceptions of
the Logos, we must briefly notice the leading thoughts which
he attaches to it. It is curious that, although Philo is unusually
careful to furnish us with definitions, this subject has been
thrown into confusion by more than one interpreter, from a
failure to distinguish two completely different meanings of the
Greek word Trvevpa,.* These two meanings are clearly pointed
out by our philosopher himself.

" The Spirit of God " [he says] signifies in one sense the air, tlie third
element, and it is used in this sense at the beginning of Genesis, where it
is said " the Spirit of God was borne above the water," for air, being light,
is borne up, and uses water as its basis. In the other sense, it is the pure
wisdom in which every wise man participate s.f

Gfrorer quotes this passage, and then adds that irvev^a
occurs only once more, so far as he is aware, in the physical
sense. J The place referred to is one in which fresh water is re
presented as one of the forces by which earth is held together,
the other being 7rvevfjLa. The parallelism of spirit with water
proves that it here denotes air. Gfrorer, however, might have
observed that this article of the Stoical physics occurs else
where. We have seen that spirit, in the sense of air, is the
source of " habit " in inorganic objects, and of higher qualities
in organized beings. || The term is also used in an enumeration
of the elements ;H and when the question is asked whether
the mind is " spirit or blood or body at all,"** we can hardly
doubt that the sense of air or breath is intended. We have
seen, in dealing with anthropology, that this is its meaning in a
fragment where it is represented as the essence of the irrational

* Heinze, generally so careful, is particularly unfortunate, p. 242-3. Dahne,
also, I. p. 294-5, and Keferstein, p. 162, confound the physical with the
metaphysical sense.

t Gigant., 5 (I. 265). J I. p. 230. Mundi Op., 45 (I. 31).

H See Vol. I. p. 281. U Ebriet., 27 (I. 373). ** Somn., I. 6 (I. 625).

EELATION TO THE SPIRIT. 215

soul ;"* and where, on the contrary, it appears as the essence of
the rational, Philo is careful to explain that he does not mean
tc air in motion."t It is- apparent, therefore, that the physical
sense was sufficiently familiar, so familiar indeed that, when
Philo departed from the Stoical view, he had to guard himself
against misapprehension.

Of the metaphysical sense two definitions are given which
are intended to be precise. In the passage last cited the term
is defined as a stamp and impress of a divine power which
Moses calls by a proper name, Image. " As the " image" has
been already identified with the Logos, it follows that the
Spirit which forms the essence of man s rational soul is the
impress of the Logos ; it is the communicated divine idea, the
imitation or the share which each man enjoys of the universal
Reason. According to this definition, it is the permanent
principle of rationality in man, breathed into him by the
Creator from his own essential life. According to the other
definition, it is the universal Wisdom which manifests itself
transiently and mutably in individual men. As we have
seen, it is "the pure knowledge of which every wise man
partakes."

This [Philo proceeds to say] is shown by the words of Scripture, that
" God called up Beseleel and filled him with divine Spirit, wisdom,
understanding, knowledge, " J " so that what divine Spirit is is denned
through these terms. " Of this kind is the Spirit of Moses also, which
came upon the seventy elders ; for, though they were elders, they could not
have been really superior to others unless they participated in that all- wise
Spirit. For it is said, " I will take from the Spirit that is upon thee, and
will put it upon the seventy elders.")] But this taking from the Spirit
did not involve cutting and separation, but resembled what occurs in the
case of fire, which, though it may kindle innumerable torches, remains in
no respect diminished. Such is the nature of knowledge, which, when it

* See Vol. I. pp. 320 sq. t Quod det. pot. ins. 23 (I. 207).

{ Ex. xxxi. 2-3. The LXX has irvwpct Qtiov ffofiae, K.r.X.; Philo reads
Otiov ao^iag, and evidently regards o-o^iaf, &c., as in apposition with

To T I sari 7rvti&gt;iJ,a Otlov opi/cwg did. TU&gt;V
\\ Num. xi. 17.

216 THE LOGOS.

has rendered all its votaries experienced, is not lessened, but often is even
improved. If, then, the spirit of Moses himself, or of any other created
being, were to be distributed to such a multitude, it would be divided
into so many little pieces, and diminished ; " but, as it is, the Spirit on
him is the wise, the divine, the indivisible, the inseparable, the excellent,*
that which is everywhere entirely filled up," which is not injured by
communication, nor lessened in understanding and knowledge and
wisdom. Divine Spirit, accordingly, can remain,f but not permanently
remain, J in the soul, because it is .hindered and oppressed by the flesh
and other things, as it is said, " My Spirit shall not continue to remain
in men for ever, because they are flesh."||

It is evident that the Spirit is here identified with. Wisdom
in its highest generic sense, and is therefore ontologically the
same as the Logos. The passage hardly requires comment;
but we must pause for a moment upon one expression on
account of the singular interpretation which is put upon
it by KefersteinT and Heinze.*"* The words which I have
rendered, "That which is everywhere entirely filled up/ ff
are interpreted by both these writers as " Die Alles erfiillende
Kraft/ the former translating them "Der Alles durch
Alles erfiillende/ and explaining that by " Alles" nature
and man are to be understood. Thus the Spirit is made
into a cosmical power, and then Heinze, ignoring its double
meaning, complains of Philo s inconsistency in making it
elsewhere the binding force of only one part of the earth.
Was ever "poor philosopher so badgered ? He is not the most
precise of writers ; but when he is precise his precision affords
him no shelter, and even his Greek is mistranslated to prove
that he is inconsequent. The meaning ascribed to the phrase
in question would be out of place even if it were legitimate to
turn a perfect passive participle into a present active one.
The notion to be established is that of a uniform, insepar
able essence, which does not consist of parts, and is therefore

* To aaTiiov. f Nevuv. J Atctfiivtiv.

|1 Gen. vi. 3. Gigant., 5-7 (I. 265-6). See also 11 and 12.
H Pp. 161 sq. ** P. 242.

ft To iravTt] St 1 o\uv t

THE SPIKIT. LOGOI. 217

not lessened by communication, and this is presented under
the figure of a substance which has been so completely filled
throughout that there are no interstices such as mark a
divisible object ; you may take from it, as from a flame, and
still it remains exactly as it was.

We need not dwell further on the relation of the Spirit to
man, or consider its bearing on prophecy, till we treat of the
higher anthropology. Sufficient has been said to show that it
is ontologically the same as the Logos, though in its higher
sense it is used of the Logos only in connection with mankind.
The latter term is generally preferred, and Gfrorer points out
that Trvevfjia is adopted only where it occurs in the text of
Scripture which is under discussion.* We may now pass on
to a term of more immediate interest.

Philo, still following the example of the Stoics, frequently
speaks, not only of the Logos, but of Logoi. A few instances
of the use of the latter term will make it apparent that these
Logoi are partial or limited expressions of the universal Logos.
The Logos, we are told, is compared to a river, on account of
the perennial flow of Logoi and ordinances, f by which God-
loving souls are nourished. J So the high -priest, who is a
recognized symbol of the Logos, is said to be " the father of
sacred Logoi." || These figures represent with sufficient clear
ness the logical dependence of the Logoi on the general prin
ciple of Reason. This dependence is further exemplified by the
occasional interchange of the singular and plural, the former
exhibiting in its unity what the latter resolves into its parts.
Thus the deeds of the wise man differ not from divine Logoi,
because he walks in the steps of the Logos. If, it is argued, the
Law is divine Reason, and the virtuous man keeps the Law, he
keeps Reason also ; so that the Logoi of God are the actions of
the wise man.T Here the Logos is used in its ethical relation.

* I. p. 242. f Or opinions, Soypdruv. J Post. Cain., 37 (I. 250).

See Migrat. Abr., 18 (I. 452) ; Prof. 20 (I. 562). || Somn., II. 28 (I. 683).
t Migrat. Abr., 23 (I. 456). Cf. 31, p. 463.

218 THE LOGOS.

The entire life of the good man is controlled by Reason, but his
particular acts correspond to special phases of that Reason, so
that the Logoi become,, as it were, the special precepts of the
one rational code which constitutes the law of nature. Hence
the soul is nourished with unearthly and incorruptible Logoi,
which God showers from that lofty and pure nature which he
has called heaven,* the Logos pregnant with divine lights. f
With this close relationship, they may well borrow a charac
teristic epithet of the Logos, and be described as " the right
words of wisdom."J They must share the same divine attri
bute, and therefore, when they ascend and descend through
the soul, they do not throw it down, but descend with it, out of
humanity and compassion towards our race, " for neither God
nor divine Reason is a cause of injury. " Like the Logos,
they are not heard, but seen with the eye of the soul.|| Like
it, too, they come to our knowledge before we rise to the
highest apprehension of God. Abraham, the wise man, always
desiring to understand the Sovereign of the universe, first
converses with divine Logoi.^j" So also Jacob, when he came
into Charran, sensible perception, met not God, but the divine
Logos ; for- God, not disdaining to come into sensible percep
tion,"^^ sends his own Logoi to assist the lovers of virtue ; and
they heal the infirmities of the soul, laying down sacred
admonitions as immovable laws. Accordingly, when he has
entered into sensible perception, he meets no longer God, but
the Logos of God. ft

The above statements, while proving the subordination of
the Logoi to universal Reason, direct our attention to another
point, which will become more striking as we proceed. The

* In allusion to Ex. xvi. 4, " I shower upon you loaves from heaven."

t Leg. AIL, III. 56 (I. 119), and 34, p. 108.

J Ol &lt;ro0iac fipOoi Xoyoi, Somn., I. 34 (I. 651). See also Prof., 33 (I. 573),
6pdol Kai rpo^ijuwraroi Xoyot.

Somn. 23 (I. 643). |] Migrat. Abr. 9 (I. 443). f Post. Cain., 6 (I. 229).

** Oy yap cnra^i&v 6 6tog tiQ alaOrjoiv tpxeaOat. The context, as well as
Philo s prevailing view, seems to require d%iu&gt;v instead of a

ff Somn. I. 12 (I. 631).

LOGOI. 219

subdivisions of the Logos have hitherto been described as
powers or ideas, and with these accordingly the Logoi must be
identified. Philo, however, uses the latter term especially to
denote the rational and ethical thoughts which present them
selves in the mind, and serve to direct the life of man, and we
can only appeal to a few passages in which the identity of the
Logoi and the powers is immediately apparent. One is that
which we last noticed, where converse with the sacred Logoi is
attributed to the fact that God imparts mental representations,
no longer of himself, but of the powers. A similar interchange
takes place in the previous passage about Abraham : the
divine Logoi, when referred to in their peculiar relation to
God, become "the creative and punitive powers." Again,
when the high-priest is described as the father of sacred Logoi,
it is added that some of these are overseers and guardians of
the affairs of nature, and others are ministers of God, desiring
to kindle the heavenly flame. The former of these two classes
must be the cosmical powers or ideas, the latter the ethical
laws which present themselves in human consciousness.* As
the overseers of nature they are equivalent to the " seminal
Logoi" of the Stoics; and yet, for some reason, Philo never
avails himself of this term. The only place where it occurs is
in a speech which is put into the mouth of the Emperor Caius.f
There is, however, at least one passage which proves that the
notion expressed by it was not foreign to Philo s thought. In
speaking of the creation of plants he says that

" The fruits were not only food for animals, but were also preparations
for the continual production of their like, containing the seminal sub
stances in which exist, obscure and unseen, the Logoi of the universe,
becoming, however, clear and manifest in the revolutions of seasons.
For God intended nature to run the long race, immortalizing genera, and
giving them a share of eternity. "J

* For the reason why Philo gives this interpretation to the children of the
high-priest, see Keferstein, p. 141 sqq. As it does not advance our philosophical
doctrine, we need not dwell upon it.

f Leg. ad Cai., 8 (II. 553). J Mundi Op., 13 (I. 9).

220 THE LOGOS.

The Logoi here must be the rational laws in accordance with
which everything is evolved,, and of which the most striking
exemplification is found in the seed ; or, in more logical phrase,
they are the permanent essences which constitute genera.
They are thus the precise equivalents of the powers or ideas.
The comparison of natural processes to the long race refers to
the way in which nature, as it were, doubles back upon its own
course, and returns to its original position. The seed is at
once the starting-point and the goal in the life of the plant, so
that the same conditions are continually reproduced, and the
permanence of .the type, idea, or Logos in each thing is
secured.

In one other passage the word Logoi seems to be used quite
in the Stoical sense, if not indeed in express reference to the
Stoics. Philo is speaking of different forms of error.

Some denied the reality of immaterial ideas, and thereby virtually
denied the existence of qualities. Others went farther, and along with
ideas rejected the existence of God, declaring that he was only said to
exist for the sake of benefiting men. A third class took exactly the
opposite course, and, although pursuing atheism, nevertheless, owing to
their reverence for that which seemed to be everywhere present and to
survey all things, introduced a multitude of male and female, older and
younger beings, filling the cosmos with a polyarchy of Logoi, in order
to cut away the belief in the one really existing God from the under
standing of men.*

The parallelism which is here expressed between the ideas
or their resulting qualities and the Logoi determines the
meaning of the latter : they are the rational principles which,
dwelling within material objects, make them what they are ;
and Philo s objection is not to the philosophical assertion
of their existence, but to their elevation into independent,
personal powers which superseded in men s worship the one
only God.

In other passages where the Logoi are brought into con
nection with the theory of ideas they describe, not cosmical,

* Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261-2).

LOGOI. 221

but human relations. " The wise man .... dwells as in a
native land, in intelligible virtues, which God speaks, not
differing from divine Logoi."* The Logoi here must be the
uttered thoughts, or divinely expressed ideals of virtue, in
which the good are able to participate. These, of course, are
species of the one supreme virtue or Reason, and hence the
number of specific virtues corresponds with that of the Logoi.
This notion is worked out in an allegorical interpretation of a
passage in Deuteronomy : t

" Ask thy father, and he will report to thee, thy elders, and they will
tell thee ; when the Most High divided the nations, when he distributed
the sons of Adam, he set boundaries of the nations according to the
number of the angels of God, J and his people Jacob became the portion
of the Lord, Israel the allotment of his inheritance." Father and elders
cannot be meant literally, for they know no more than ourselves about
the division of the nations. Therefore the reference must be to right
Reason, the father of our soul, and to the divine Logoi, our elders, which
were before everything earthly. It was these that first fixed the
boundaries of virtue, and to these we must go for the necessary infor
mation. When God apportioned and walled off the nations of the soul,
he made the boundaries of the offspring of virtue equal in number to the
angels ; " for as many as are the Logoi of God, so many are the nations
and species of virtue." The specific virtues belong to the servants, but
Israel, the chosen genus, to the sovereign.

The relation of the Logoi to angels will be considered farther
on; at present we only notice their identification with the
divine ethical ideas of which the several species of virtue
among men are the counterparts.

As the Logos is the rational law of the universe, so the
Logoi, considered as ethical ideas, are the laws, precepts, or
admonitions by which the soul ought to be governed. The
term is used in this sense very frequently ; but as the passages
throw no important light on Philo s philosophy, it will be
sufficient to cite a few by way of example, and content our
selves with a bare reference to the remainder. The divine
Logoi are the manna, the heavenly food, by which men may be

* Conf. Ling., 17 (I. 417). t xxxii. 7-9.

I According to the LXX reading. Post. Cain., 25-6 (I. 241-2).

222 THE LOGOS.

nourished,* "the immortal words of science and wisdom."-{-
"In regard to justice and every virtue there is an ancestral
law and ancient ordinance. But what else are laws and
ordinances than nature s sacred Logoi, possessing firmness and
fixity of themselves , so as not to differ from oaths ? "% Hence,
the promise made to Abraham assumed the character of an
oath, for (C the Logoi of God are oaths and laws of God and
most sacred ordinances/^ In this sense the term is strictly
applicable to the Ten Commandments. These were Logoi, not
only in the ordinary sense according to which all rational
statements are Logoi, but as the immediate expression of
divine ideas, " the ten generic laws,"|| or " generic summaries^
roots and principles, of the countless individual ]aws/^[ spoken
by God with that mysterious voice which, unlike the human,
pierces with subtle swiftness the ears of the inspired under
standing.**

The only remaining question affecting the Logoi is involved
in the one which we have reserved in regard to the supreme-
Logos, namely, whether Philo regarded the latter as a distinct
person. This question is not raised by the philosopher
himself, and it may be that his conception of personality was
not very strictly defined. Zeller s cautionff against judging of
this matter from the postulates of our modern thought is-

* Congr. erud. gr., 30 (I. 544). f Migrat, Abr. 14 (I. 448).

} Spec. Leg., II. 4 (II. 272).

Leg. All., III. 72 (I. 127-8). See also Leg. All., III. 4 (I. 90) ; SS. Ab. et
Cain., 38 (1. 189) ; Conf. Ling., 13 (I. 413-14) ; Somn., I. 34 (I. 650-1) ; Dec. Orac.,.
3 (II. 182); Praem. et Poen., 14 (II. 421) ; cf. Prof., 25 (I. 566), where the bread
from heaven, the prjpa, is equivalent to rj Qtia avvra^iQ.

|| Quis. rer. div. her., 35 (I. 496). IF Congr. erud. gr., 21 (I. 536).

** Dec. Orac., 9 (II. 185-6). See also 29, p. 205 ; 33, p. 208 ; De Circurri-
cisione, 1 (II. 210) ; Mutat. Norn., 3 (I. 582).

ff III. ii. p. 378 sq. Zeller himself, I cannot but think, falls to some extent
under his own rule. He says that people assume either that Philo s Logos is a
person outside of God, or that he is only God under a definite relation. His
own solution is that " according to Philo s view he is both, but for this very
reason neither exclusively." Zeller thus admits that there is no other alterna
tive, and so imposes upon Philo a contradiction of the most glaring kind.
According to the exposition which we have given* the modern alternative may

PERSONALITY. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 223

perfectly just; and if we find that Philo habitually united
notions which to our minds are totally incompatible, we must
only endeavour to escape from our own sharpness of definition
into his cloudy and vague speculation. Nevertheless we ought
not to thrust this inconsistency upon him unless we are
constrained to do so by a faithful exegesis. In this exegesis
we have only to estimate the value of single passages and
single expressions, and are not driven by the demands of
the philosophy itself now to volatilize the Logos into a divine
attribute and again to condense it into a person standing
between God and man. In this our position differs from
Zeller s. According to him the confused changes of meaning-
belong to the very essence of the philosophy, and he is
therefore less ready to admit the plea of poetical personifi
cation in particular instances. But according to our view the
separate personality of the Logos would be a purely disturbing
element, and introduce a quite needless perplexity into an
otherwise coherent system, and therefore we shall be inclined
to make a large allowance for Philo s bold and figurative
style.

"When the same question came before us in connection with
the divine powers, we noticed Philo s extreme fondness for
personification, and we must bear in mind the instances which
were then adduced. We may add here a few examples of the
personification of the Logos, or, if it be thought by any that
it is really regarded as a person, of the ascription to it of a
clearly figurative kind of personality. The fool, it is said,
casts off " the charioteer and umpire Reason," while a man of
the opposite character chooses ft divine Reason as his pilot."
That these expressions are metaphorical is evident, and that

be dismissed. The Thought of God permanently impressed upon the universe
cannot be properly described as God under a definite relation any more than the
shape of York Minster can be described as the architect who conceived it ; but
neither is it a person outside of God, or even possessed of any abiding reality
apart from God. This is neither a modern conception nor an illogical mixture
of two modern conceptions.

224 THE LOGOS.

no conception of real personality was attached to them by
Philo may be inferred from his presently substituting for
Logos the rational part of the soul " and " rational
nature. "* In another passage the Logos is symbolized by
the river which " makes glad the city of God/ f the soul of
the wise man, in which God is said to walk as in a city, for
Scripture says, " I will walk in you and will be God in you." J
" And for a blessed soul holding forth the most sacred goblet,
its own reflection, who is it that pours the sacred measuring-
cups of true good-cheer except Reason, the cupbearer and
toastmaster of God ? Though it differs not from the drink, but
is itself unmixed in brightness, .... the ambrosial potion
of good-cheer, that we ourselves, too, may make use of poetical
terms. " \\ The succession of metaphors here is alone sufficient
to show how remote is the idea of real personality, though it
of course does not exclude it. Again, "the moderator
Reason,"^]" arming itself with the virtues and their ordinances,
attacks and mightily vanquishes the nine arbitrary govern
ments of the four passions and the five senses.** Elsewhere
we learn that " the right Reason of nature has the power at
once of a father and of a husband ; " and this statement is
exemplified by its relations to the soul, in which, among other
things, it appears as a fe physician."tt By another figure " the
right Reason of nature" becomes "a military officer," JJ in
whose ranks the good man ought to be enrolled. Even the
logos or speech of man does not escape from Philo s tend
ency to personify : it is not only the defensive armour and
panoply of men, but their " spear-bearer " and " champion." ||||
This fondness for personification was strengthened by the

* Migrat. Abr., 12 (I. 446). f Ps. xlv. 4 ; LXX.

J Lev. xxvi. 12. Philo reads Iv vfjiiv Btos, instead of vfitiv QZOQ.

Aoyr/idff. || Somn., II. 37 (I. 691).

1F Tov auxppoviffrrjv Xoyov. ** Abr., 41 (II. 35).

ft Spec. Leg., II. 7 (II. 275). {
Human., 17 (II. 396).

7r t ooayam&lt;Tr//. Sonin., I. 17 (I. 636).

PERSONALITY : INFLUENCE OF ALLEGORY. 225

system of allegorical interpretation. The persons of Old
Testament history become the symbols of abstract qualities,
and consequently the allegory is frequently responsible for the
ascription of personal attributes to the general idea. The
Logos comes in for its share of this treatment. Abraham is
first the representative of " the wise man/ and then, by a
further abstraction, of the distinctive quality of the wise man,
" divine Keason/ the parent of laughter and joy, for this is the
signification of Isaac. A little farther on in the same passage
it is said that, (t The Lord begat Isaac." This is the explana
tion of the words " The Lord made laughter for me."* If we
require a rigid consistency, the Logos thus becomes identical
with the Lord, but it is very doubtful whether this is intended.
" The Lord," in a subordinate sense, stands everywhere else
for another power than the Logos, and therefore I believe it is
here used in its highest meaning. What proceeds from the
Logos proceeds from God, " the Father of the perfect nature. 1 "
But if we decide that the Logos is the "Lord," this identifica
tion results from the language of Scripture, and can no more
prove the personality of the Logos than its previous identi
fication with Abraham. f

Again, Melchizedek, the righteous king " of peace, or
Salem, gives injunctions by which men may have a good
voyage through life, " being steered by the good artificer and
pilot/ who is "right Eeason." Melchizedek also brings
forward wine, and gives drink to souls ; " for Eeason is a priest,
having the Self-existent as his portion, and entertaining high
and sublime and magnificent thoughts about him," for this is
the meaning of the statement that " he is a priest of the most
high God/ J To entertain thoughts is a characteristic of per
sonality ; but it is evident that the personality here is intro
duced to suit the statement about Melchizedek. Nevertheless,
the ascription of thoughts to the Logos must have some sort

* Gen. xxi. 6. t Leg. All., III. 77 (I. 130-1).

{ Gen. xiv. 18; Leg. All., III. 25-6 (I. 102-3).

VOL II. 15

226 THE LOGOS.

of justification in experience, and a consideration of this may
throw a clearer light upon our subject. The Logos is known
to consciousness as the very essence of our personality ; it is
by participation in reason that we are persons, and not merely
animals or things. Our sublime thoughts about God are
expressions of this reason ; and wherever right reason holds
sway among men, there elevated thoughts about God arise. It
is, I think, on this ground that Philo declares that " God has
given to his Logos the knowledge of himself as a native land
to dwell in/ * The Logos, in the connection where these
words occur, stands in opposition to him who has committed
involuntary manslaughter, and must therefore be viewed in
relation to its function in the human mind. The meaning
seems to be that whereas a man who has involuntarily com
mitted a crime, owing to the absence of reason,t can attain to
the knowledge of God only as an alien flies to a refuge, reason
apprehends God by virtue of its birthright, and lives in this
superior knowledge as in its native clime. Such are the facts
of experience on which Philo might justly rest many state
ments similar to that which we are considering. But though
the Logos assumed personality the moment it appeared in finite
individual minds, it does not at all follow that the abstract idea
was conceived of as a person. A pantheistic philosophy can
represent God as impersonal, and yet as evolved into personality
at the various centres of finite consciousness. This mode of
conception would suit all that we have hitherto learned of
Philo s doctrine of the Logos. Philo, however, avoided pan
theism by his belief that God was transcendent above the
Logos. From the depths of the divine personality flowed forth
the rational energy which pervaded creation, and in this its
universal form it had no personality distinct from that of God ;
but as it passed on and took possession of finite minds, per
sonality once more appeared. Thus we meet with consciousness
both at the upper and the lower ends, and the Logos is not a
* Prof., 14 (I. 557). t See 21, p. 563.

PEBSONALITY: INFLUENCE OP ALLEGOKY. 227

person, but rather an essence of personality derived from God
and communicated to man, and constituting the intermediate
link of energy by which the infinite person imparts himself to
his finite children. This explanation fully satisfies the passage
which we are considering ; and, if it is not disproved by other
passages, it will go far towards reconciling the apparent incon
sistencies of language by which interpreters of Philo are so
much perplexed.

Another representative of the Logos is Moses. He, like
Melchizedek, stands for the Logos, not in its cosmical aspects,
but as the common reason of mankind, that higher principle of
personality by which we are brought into contact with divine
thoughts and precepts. He is " the prophet Logos " which
bids us remember the way by which the Lord God has led us."*
In even less ambiguous phrase, he is " the purest mind,t the
truly excellent/ inspired at once with legislative and prophetic
functions, the genus of the Levitical tribe, the adherent of
truth. J By such language the general properties of human
reason are described, and it is evident that we are moving
in the region of abstract ideas. This is still more apparent
when we find that Aaron represents the uttered Logos, the
faculty of speech in man, which Moses, the mind or under
standing, uses as his interpreter. "Moses, the prophetic
Logos, says, When I go forth from the city/ the soul for this
is the city of the animal, giving laws and customs I will
spread out my hands *|| and spread forth and unfold all my
actions to God, calling him as witness and overseer of each. "
Now, all the disturbing voices of the senses cease " when the
understanding has gone forth from the city of the soul, and
attached its actions and purposes to God/ And the hands of
Moses are heavy, ^f because the actions of the wise man are
difficult to move or shake, for they are supported by Aaron, the

* Congr. erud.gr., 30 (I. 543). f O KaQa^raroQ rove.

Ib. 24, p. 538. Migrat. Abr., 14 (I. 448).

|| Ex. ix. 29. T Ex. xvii. 12.

15 *

228 THE LOGOS.

Logos, and Or,* which is light, that is, truth. Hence Aaron,
when he comes to an end, that is, is made perfect, goes up
into Or, which is light,fforthe end of Logos [speech] is truth. J
These instances sufficiently illustrate the strange blending
of historical persons with the abstract properties of human
reason and speech, which justly induces us to give a very wide
latitude to Philo s use of personification.

From individual men we come to a class. Ifc was the func
tion of the priests to act for men in their divine relations,
and therefore they naturally represented reason, the true priest
of mankind, while the high-priest, who presided over them all,
stood, not only for human reason, but for the universal, cos-
mical Logos. In reference to the procedure enjoined upon the
priest in matters of jealousy, || it is said that " the priest and
prophet Eeason has been commanded to set the soul before
God.-"^" That the high-priesthood signifies something higher
than a human office is proved by an injunction connected with
the cities of refuge. The involuntary slayer of a man was to
remain in his retreat till the death of the high-priest.** This,
says Philo, is a most unequal punishment, and therefore it
cannot be intended literally. The high-priest is not a man,
but divine Eeason, which arrays itself in the cosmos as a
garment, and lives in the soul as a judge. So long as this
most sacred Reason survives in the soul, no involuntary change
can enter it ; but if it dies, in the sense of being separated from
our soul, there is an immediate lapse into voluntary faults. -ft
In another connection we have seen that the dress of the
high-priest symbolized the several constituents of the universe.
The high-priest himself is the Logos, the bearer of the powers.

* "Qp in the LXX. f Num - xx - 25 - t Le S- A11 - IIL 14 &gt; 15 ( L 95 6 )

For Moses, Qta^oBkry Xdyy, see Migrat. Abr., 5 (I. 440) ; and for Aaron,
6 ycywvoc Xoyog TTpo(pijrev(t)v Siavoiy, one of al TOV f3ctat\eviv aiov vov
Sopvfopoi Swdpfig, ib., 31, p. 462 ; also Leg. AIL, I. 24 (I. 59), compared with
Leg. AIL, III. 33 (I. 108).

|| Num. v. 15 sqq. ^ Cherub., 5 (I. 141).

** Num. xxxv. 25. ft Prof., 20-1 (I. 561-3).

PEESONALITY : INFLUENCE OF ALLEGORY. 229

If, says Philo, you examine the high-priest Reason, you will
find his raiment variously wrought out of both intelligible and
perceptible powers. Two examples will suffice, taken from
the two extremes, the head and the feet. On the head is a
pure golden plate having the impression of a seal, " holiness
to the Lord;" and on the feet, on the extremity of the under
garment are bells and flowered work.* That seal is an idea of
ideas, according to which God stamped the cosmos, and is of
course incorporeal and intelligible; but the flowered work
and the bells are symbols of perceptible qualities, of which
seeing and hearing are the criteria.f We must notice here the
want of consistency in the figure. The idea of ideas is, as we
have learned, the Logos, and it is suitably represented by the
seal with which intelligible qualities were stamped. But at
the beginning of the comparison the high-priest himself is the
Logos, and thus becomes identical with the seal which was
impressed upon his golden plate. How evident it is that we
are dealing with logical, and not with personal relations. The
same universal thought or genus is at once the bearer and the
seal of all more partial ideas, bearing them as its species and
at the same time impressing them with its essence. We cannot
be too careful in distinguishing the serious doctrines of Philo
from the strange garb in which they are so often clothed.

We need notice in this connection only one other passage
where the cosmical and the human reason are distinguished.
" There are two temples of God : one this cosmos, in which
also is a high-priest, his first-begotten divine Reason ; and the
second, rational soul, of which the priest is the true man,
whose perceptible imitation is he who offers the ancestral
prayers and sacrifices."!

From this cloud-land of shifting and dissolving imagery,
where no one, I presume, will maintain that the limits of
poetical personification are trangressed, we pass to the more

* LXX; Ex. xxviii. 30, 32. f Migrat. Abr., 18 (I. 452).

} Somn., I. 37 (I. 653). See also Gig., 11 (I. 269).

230 THE LOGOS.

serious arguments for the personality of the Logos. Some of
these we have anticipated in our own exposition of Philo s
doctrine, where we have explained certain terms consistently
with the general scheme of thought ; and in regard to them I
need do little more than refer back to what has been already
said. This is the case with the titles " God/ " Son of God,"
" Image of God." Laughter also is the son of God, and we
can hardly suppose that Philo looked upon laughter as a
person. Moreover, the variety under which the connection is
conceived proves that we are dealing only with the figurative
relations of thought. God is the husband of Wisdom, and
yet Wisdom is the daughter of God, the mother of the Logos,
and the father of instruction.

More stress may be laid upon the fact that the Logos is
the image of God and the archetype of man ; for, if the two
extremes be persons, must not the connecting link also be a
person ? This question demands a fuller consideration, and
our reply to it will throw an instructive light upon our
previous conclusions. No one, I suppose, ever believed that
the number seven was a person, and yet that number is an
image of God. Not only does this statement bring it into
connection with the Logos, but our fullest information respect
ing the essence of the Logos is found in its conformity to
seven. It is, in fact, "the Logos of seven/ * "the holy
Logos according to seven/ t c the perfect Logos moving*
according to seven/ J Philo s treatment of the number
seven, therefore, may be expected to illustrate his meaning
when he speaks of the Logos. We must next observe
that by an image need be meant no more than an intellec
tual conception possessing a property similar to that which
distinguishes the object of which it is the image. Thus, the
number two is the image of matter, because, like matter, it
is divisible. Two is no doubt selected rather than any higher
number because it gives us the most elementary notion of

* Mundi Op., 40 (I. 28). f Leg. All. I. 6 (I. 46). J Ib. 8, p. 47.

PERSONALITY : IMAGE OF GOD. 231

division. Three is the image of solid body, because the solid
has three dimensions.* Seven is the image of God for the
following reason. Among the numbers up to ten it alone
neither produces nor is produced, that is to say, it is not
formed from any other number by multiplication, nor is any
other number formed by multiplication from it. It is, therefore,
the motherless virgin, who is said to have sprung from the
head of Zeus, and remains immovable, for all genesis consists
in movement. But the elder Kuler and Sovereign alone neither
moves nor is moved, and consequently seven would be properly
called his image. f Let us see, then, how this image is im
pressed upon creation. By the number seven "all things are
brought to perfection." It has numerous " ideas " or
relations connected with numbers, harmonies, and ratios, on
which we need not dwell. " But its nature extends also to
the whole visible substance, heaven and earth, the limits of
the universe ; for what part of the things in the cosmos is not
enamoured of seven, being subdued by the love and desire of
seven ? " J This number is " the idea of the planets," as unity
is of the fixed sphere. For the immaterial heaven, the pattern
of the visible, consists of unity and seven ; and so the actual
sky has been made out of indivisible and divisible nature.
Of the indivisible, u unity is the overseer }) ; " seven is