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Full text of "Philo Judaeus; or, The Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy in its development and completion"

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DEPARTMEN 
LI8RAUY 



PHILO JUDAEUS; 



THE JEWISH-ALEXANDKIAN PHILOSOPHY 



IN ITS 



DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLETION. 



JAMES DEUMMOND, LL.D., 

PRINCIPAL OF MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE, LONDON. 



ovv, o) 



//, Qeov OIKOQ 

PHILO, DE SOMNIIS, I. 2,3. 



IN TWO VOLUMES. 
VOL. II. 




WILLIAMS AND NOEGATE, 

14, HENBIETTA STEEET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON; 
AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH. 

1888. 



[All Sights reserved. ] 










LONDON I 

O. NORMAN AND SON, PRINTERS, HART STREET, 
CO VENT GARDEN. 



CONTENTS. 



VOL. IL 

BOOK III. (continued). 

CHAPTER IV. 
The existence and nature of God . 1 64 

CHAPTER V. 
The Divine Powers . . 65155 

CHAPTER VI. 
The Logos . ... . 156273 

CHAPTER VII. 

The higher Anthropology . . 274324 

INDEX I. Subjects and Names . 325341 

INDEX II. References to passages in Philo . . 342 353 

INDEX III. References to passages in the Old 

Testament cited by Philo . . 354 355 



PHILO JUDAEUS. 



BOOK III. 

(CONTINUED.) 

CHAPTER IV, 

THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

HAVING now inquired into the nature of man, and contemplated 
the scene amid which he is placed, we must proceed to the 
profounder questions which are suggested by our survey. In 
considering both the cosmos and man we came across traces of 
dependence which seemed to involve the action of an external 
cause ; and in the human soul the faculties of reason and prefer 
ential choice, though not without the limitations of dependent 
being, yet pointed to a suprarnundane source, and introduced 
us to a world of ideas transcending the world of sense. We 
must examine the validity of these intimations, and endeavour 
to unfold their contents in the order of consecutive thought. 

In inquiries about God, says Philo, there are two supreme 
topics which exercise the intelligence of the genuine philoso 
pher ; first, whether the Divine exists ; and secondly, what it is 
in its essence.* This division of the subject affords a con 
venient arrangement for our own exposition of his views. We 
proceed, then, first to the evidence of the existence of God. 

In constructing a philosophical system it was no more 
possible for Philo than it is for ourselves to take the existence 
of God for granted. He was met by atheistic theories more 

* Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216). 
VOL II. 1 



THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD. 

or less pronounced, and was obliged to justify his faith upon 
rational grounds. Some,, whom he characterizes as atheists, 
were content with an attitude of doubtj but others went 
further, and boldly asserted that there was no God at all, and 
that he was merely said to exist by men who had over 
shadowed the truth with mythical inventions.* The latter 
were under the necessity of offering a theory antagonistic to 
theism, and accordingly maintained that nothing existed but 
the perceptible and visible universe, which had never come 
into being and would never perish, but was unbegotten and 
incorruptible, without a guardian, a pilot, or a protector. f 
Since there was thus no invisible and intelligible cause outside 
of perceptible things, J it was assumed that everything in the 
cosmos was borne along by spontaneous motion, and that arts 
and studies, laws and customs, were due to the activity of the 
human mind alone. Others, who are described as Chaldseans, 
embraced a pantheistic theory. They too maintained that the 
phenomenal world was the only existence ; but they declared 
either that it was itself God, or that it included God within 
itself as the soul of the universe. Apart from phenomena 
there was no cause, but the periods of the sun and moon and 
the other heavenly bodies determined the distribution of good 
and ill, and thus everything was handed over to the dominion 
of fate and necessity. || To these speculations Philo opposed 
the doctrine of Moses, "the beholder of the invisible nature, 
and seer of God/ ^T according to which the Divine exists, and 
the supreme God** is neither the cosmos nor the soul of the 
cosmos, nor are the heavenly bodies the prime causes ft of 
human events. JJ 

The arguments for the existence of God fall into two 

* Mundi Op., 61 (I. 41) ; Praem. et Poen., 7 (II. 414). 

f Somn., II. 43 (I. 696). j Dec. Orac., 13 (II. 190). 

Leg. All., III. 9 (I. 93). 

|| Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464) ; Cong. erud. gr. 9 (I. 526) ; Abr., 15 (II. 11). 

H Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 579). ** TT^TOQ 0e: c . ft Td TrpeafivTctTa alna. 

JJ Mund. Op., 61 (I. 41) ; Migrat. Abr., I.e. 



NATURE POINTS TO GOD. 3 

divisions, those drawn from nature and those furnished by 
the intuitions of the soul. 

The analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm lies at 
the root of the evidence afforded by the contemplation of 
nature. The invisible mind in man occupies the same position 
in him as is filled by God in the universe ;* and having this 
example in ourselves we may easily arrive at the knowledge 
of God. For has not the mind in us been appointed a 
sovereign, whom the whole community of the body obeys 
and each of the senses follows ? And are we to suppose that 
the cosmos,, the fairest and vastest and most perfect work, 
of which all other things are only parts, is without a king 
who holds it together and governs it justly ? And if he 
is invisible, what wonder ? For our mind, too, is unseen. 
If anyone will consider these things, he will know from 
himself and his surroundings that the cosmos is not the 
supreme God, but the work of the Supreme.f Appeal is 
also made to the analogy of human art. Things fabricated are 
always tokens by which the artificers are known. For who 
can see statues or pictures without immediately thinking of 
a sculptor or a painter ? Who, when he sees clothes or 
ships or houses, does not form a conception of a weaver 
and shipwright and builder ? And when one has entered 
a well- governed city, in which political affairs are most 
admirably arranged, what will he suppose but that this city 
is under the presidency of good rulers ? When, therefore, 
one has arrived at the real Megalopolis, the cosmos, and 
has seen the firm-set earth, with its mountains and plains, 
filled with trees and fruits and animals of every kind, and 
flowing over it seas and lakes and rivers, both the perennial 
and those derived from wintry floods, and the pleasant 
temperature of winds and air, and the harmonious changes 
of the seasons, and, over all, the sun and moon, the 

* Mundi Op., 23 (I. 16). 

f Abr., 16 (II. 12). See also Migrat. Abr., 33 (I. 465). 

1 * 



4 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

sovereigns of day and night, the planets and fixed stars, and 
the entire heaven revolving in ranks with its own army, a 
veritable cosmos within the cosmos, must he not be struck 
with admiration, and reasonably, or rather necessarily con 
ceive the notion of the Father and Creator, and conclude 
that beauties so great and of such surpassing order have 
not sprung spontaneously into being, but have been made by 
a world-forming artificer, and are ruled by a providence ? 
The cosmos is most completely a work of art, and must, there 
fore, have been fabricated by some one who is excellent and 
most perfect in knowledge. In this way we have received 
our thought of the divine existence, proceeding from below 
upwards, and endeavouring to reach the Creator by just reason 
ing from his works as by a heavenly ladder.* 

Intermediate between the two methods of approaching the 
Divine is an argument founded on the axiom of causality. 
In this argument we have to rely both on the observation of 
nature and on a mental intuition. We have already seen 
that the material universe fails in the marks of eternity and 
of efficiency. f Hence we are compelled by an intellectual 
law to seek, outside the visible world, for a first cause, J and for 
an efficient cause. Philo unhesitatingly discovers this cause 
in mind. || He does not martial his reasons for coming to this 
conclusion ; but we can readily detect them in the views which 
we have previously unfolded. In rejecting the possibility of 
an eternal and efficient causality in matter, the only alternative 
was to have recourse to mind, which was the only other known 
entity, an entity moreover where the ideas of eternity and 

* Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216-17) ; Praem. et Poen., 7 (II. 414-15). 

t See Vol. I. p. 291 sq. and 297 sqq. 

J Ilpwro v aiTiov, TO irptafivTaTov alnov or Tbtvairiiav. Conf . Ling. , 25 (I. 423) ; 
Somn., I. 33 (I. 649) ; 41, p. 656 ; Fort., 7 (II. 381) ; TO aviararta alTior, 
Fort., I.e. ; De Nobilitate 5 (II. 442). 

To cpaffTr]piov aiTiov, Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2) ; TO cpwv UITIOV, not said, however, 
of God, Prof., 24 (I. 565) ; TO TrnroiT]Kb O.ITIOV, Conf. Ling., 21 (1. 419) ; TO KIVOVV 
aiTiov, Prof., 2 (I. 547). 

|| Ttav o\(v vovg, Mundi Op., I.e. 



INTUITION OF GOD. >j 

efficiency found a natural home. Again, the marks of causality 
in the universe were all of an intellectual order. The operation 
which produced the cosmos consisted of the impression of 
intellectual forms upon shapeless matter, and therefore the 
flow of cosmical change suggested the action, not of blind 
force, but of providential reason. And, lastly, within human 
experience mind alone possessed a self-determining power, 
and therefore could alone furnish a key to the ultimate mystery 
of being. Philo was thus led to the belief in a supreme Mind 
as the original cause of the universe. 

He did not, however, believe that this was the highest 
mode of apprehending the Divine. It had been sanctioned, 
indeed, by philosophers of the highest repute, who supposed 
that our apprehension of the Cause must be derived from the 
cosmos and its parts and their inherent powers. Those who 
reasoned thus perceived God through a shadow, the artificer 
through his works. But there was a more perfect and 
purified mind, initiated into the great mysteries, which did 
not know the Cause from what had been made, as one might 
know the abiding substance from its shadow, but, having over 
stepped the begotten, received a clear manifestation of the 
Unbegotten, so as to apprehend him from himself. This might 
be illustrated by a familiar comparison. The visible sun was 
seen by the aid of nothing but the sun itself ; and in the 
same way God, being his own light, was seen through himself 
alone, and nothing in heaven or earth co-operated or was 
able to co-operate in furnishing the pure apprehension of 
his being. Those who strove to see God from the creation 
were confined to conjecture ; but those pursued the truth 
who perceived God by means of God, light by means of light.* 
This faculty of spiritual discernment is the peculiar perogative 
of pur race, and is due to the divine nature of the mind. 
The thought of the Creator is the limit of blessedness ; and, 
in order that man might not be without this, God breathed 

* Leg. AIL, III. 32-3 (I. 107) ; Praern. et Pcen., 7 (II. 415). 



6 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD. 

from above of Ms own divinity, and it invisibly imprinted 
its own forms on the invisible soul, which thus received no 
longer mortal,, but immortal thoughts.* We have before 
treated generally of the soul s power of intuition ; we have only 
to add that this power culminates in the apprehension of God, 
and as the eyes, which are compacted of corruptible matter, are 
able to run up from the region of earth to the vast and 
distant heaven, so the eyes of the soul pursue their sublime 
course, and, winged with great desire of beholding real Being, 
pass the limits of the entire cosmos, and press on to the 
Unbegotten.t 

This high faculty, however, though represented as inherent 
in the very nature of the soul, is far from being invariable 
in its action ; and if we would enjoy its revelations, we 
must conform to its conditions. It was after Abraham 
had left ff his land and his kindred and his father s house," 
that is the body, sensible perception, and speech, that God 
appeared to him ; and this shows that God is clearly manifested 
only to him who has put off mortal things and had recourse to 
the incorporeal soul. For this reason, also, Moses took his 
tent and pitched it outside the camp, and removed far from 
the bodily encampment, hoping thus alone to become a perfect 
suppliant and servant of God.J This detachment from bodily 
things is naturally sought in that solitude which has always 
been dear to the devout. Abraham was sent into the track 
less wilderness, from which ordinary men would desire to flee, 
as they would think it silly to choose, for the sake of obscure 
benefits, acknowledged ills. Yet such is the ordinance of nature: 
the sweetest life is that remote from the crowd, and those who 
seek and desire to find God love the solitude which is dear 
to him, striving in this first to resemble the happy and blessed 
nature. Ketirement is favourable to that serenity which is 
another condition of spiritual discernment. So long as men 

* Quod det. pot. ins., 24 (I. 208). t Plantat. Noe., 5 (I. 333). 

+ Quod det. pot. ins., 44 (I. 221). Abr., 18 (II. 14). 



INTUITION OF GOD. 7 

are immersed in distracting affairs, and, like ships in a wintry 
storm, are tossed to and fro upon the waves of desire, they are 
naturally far from Him who is ever still, and draw near to the 
changeful flow of phenomenal existence. The unchangeable 
soul alone has access to the unchangeable God, and truly takes 
its stand near the divine power.* Since it is thus impossible 
for one who is still moved by the senses rather than the 
intellect to come to the investigation of real Being, and 
it is necessary to close the eyes and stop the ears and 
spend one s time in solitude and darkness, in order that the 
eye of the soul, by which intelligible things are seen, may 
not be overshadowed by anything perceptible, he who desires 
to see God will turn to the consideration of himself and his 
constitution ; and from that knowledge of himself which is 
symbolized in Greek by Socrates, in Hebrew by Tharrha (the 
father of Abraham), he will prepare a way to the knowledge 
of the universal Father, who is so difficult to reach by our 
guesses and conjectures. This knowledge is attained by our 
perception of the mingled analogy and contrast between 
ourselves and the cosmos, on which we have already touched. 
But Philo just mentions a deeper thought which brings this 
condition of self-knowledge under our present head. "When 
Abraham most knew, he then most despaired of himself, 
that he might come to an accurate knowledge of Him who 
truly is. And the case is naturally so. For he who has 
fully apprehended has fully despaired of himself, having clearly 
learned the nothingness in everything created; and he who 
has despaired of himself knows the Self-existent.f 

From the conditional nature of the higher knowledge it 
follows that it must appear in varying proportions in different 
persons, and in the same person at different times. In 
reference to this subject we may distinguish three stages in the 
experience of the soul. First, it is profitable, if not for the 

* Post. Cain., 7-9 (I. 230-1). 

f Migrat. Abr., 34-5 (I. 466-7); Somn., I. 10 (I. 629-30) ; Abr., 16 (II. 12). 



8 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

acquisition of perfect virtue,, at least with a view to civic life, 
to be trained up in primeval opinions, and to pursue the 
ancient report of noble deeds which historians and poets have 
recorded. But this inherited belief is lower than our intuitive 
perceptions. " When without our foresight or expectation a 
sudden light of self-taught wisdom flashes upon us, which, 
opening the closed eye of the soul, makes us seers instead of 
hearers of knowledge, putting in the understanding the 
swiftest of the senses, vision, instead of the slower hearing, 
it is vain to exercise the ears with words." It is God who 
causes these young shoots of intuition to spring up in the soul, 
and then the things derived from mere instruction slip away 
of themselves and are cancelled ; for the acquaintance or 
disciple of God, or whatever name we are to call him, cannot 
possibly put up with mortal guidance.* And yet this appre 
hension is not necessarily the highest. The soul which 
continues in what is good is competent to perceive self-taught 
wisdom, but may not yet be able to see God, the sovereign of 
wisdom. f And even if it has attained to this supreme vision, 
it may still be subject to lower and higher moods. The under 
standing which is engaged in self-discipline is liable to 
irregular movements towards fruitfulness and the contrary, and 
is continually, as it were, going up and down. When it is 
fruitful and exalted, " it is illumined by the archetypal and 
incorporeal beams of the rational fountain of God who brings 
things to their completion ; but when it descends and is 
barren, by the images of these, immortal words, which it is 
customary to call angels/ In other words, when the rays of 
God, through which are produced the clearest apprehensions 
of things, leave the soul, the secondary and weaker light of 
words, no longer of things, rises, just as in this lower world the 
moon, which bears the second rank, sheds, after sunset, its 
dimmer light upon the earth. J We shall have to recur to 

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 22-3 (I. 178). f Quod det. pot. ins., 9 (I. 197). 

J Somn., I. 19 (I. 638). 



INTUITION OF GOD. <) 

these different grades of spiritual discernment ; at present ifc 
is sufficient to mark their existence, in order to gain some in 
sight into Philo s theological method. 

The highest intuition is repeatedly described as seeing God ; 
and the attainment of this vision is the ultimate goal of 
philosophy. This has been symbolized in ancient story through 
the change of name with which Jacob was honoured. Jacob is 
the name of learning and progress, which are dependent upon 
hearing ; but Israel is the name of perfection, for it signifies 
the vision of God,* and what excellence could be more perfect 
than seeing that which really is ?f Hearing is deceitful, for 
it is open to falsehood as well as truth; but vision, by which 
realities are perceived, cannot lie; and therefore Israel, the 
seer of God, is higher than Ishmael, the hearer. J The 
knowledge of God is the end of that royal way which those 
who have been endowed with sight desire to tread ; to see 
him is the most valuable of all possessions, and the firmest 
support of virtue and goodness. || We must add, however, 
that there is no guarantee that we shall ever gain this glorious 
prize. Whether in seeking we shall find God is uncertain; 
for to many he did not make himself known, but their toil was 
ineffectual to the last. Yet the mere search for what is 
beautiful is adequate of itself to give us a share of good 
things, and to bring us joy ; and those will obtain pity whose 
mental eye has been blinded, not by their voluntary choice, 
but by the inexorable power of necessity.^ 

The above account is wanting in clearness and precision, 



Oeov : elsewhere, vpwv 3fov. t Ebriet., 20 (I. 369). 

\+ Prof., 38 (I. 577). Quod Deus immut., 30 (I. 294). 

|| Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546). See also Leg. AIL, III. 66 (I. 124) ; Conf. Ling., 20 
(I. 418) ; Quis rer. div. her., 15 (I. 483) ; Cong. erud. gr., 10 (I. 526) ; Mutat. Norn., 
12 (I. 590) ; Somn., II. 26 (I. 681) ; Abr., 12 (II. 9). See too the expressions, 
o^iv Oeov and QavTaaiway TOV aykwriTov, Quod det. pot. ins., 43 (I. 221) ; 
<t>i\o9tafjnov ^v x r), Quis rer. div. her., 15 (I. 484); r) opart) i/xi/x /, Prof., 25 
(I. 566). 

il Leg. AIL, III. 15 (I. 96) ; Post. Cain., 2 (I. 227) ; 6, p. 230. 



10 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

and does not satisfy the requirements of a rigorous argument ; 
but I have thought it better to retain Philo s own vagueness 
of treatment than to ascribe to him a severity of reasoning 
which he nowhere attempts. We may gather with sufficient 
distinctness that he based his belief in the existence of God 
upon the evidences of dependence and of rational order 
presented by the cosmos ; upon our intellectual intuition of 
cause, which he identified with mind; and upon moral and 
spiritual intuitions, which depended upon variable conditions, 
and consequently appeared in very different measures in 
different persons, or in the same person at different times. 
It is, then, from these sources that philosophy must derive her 
further knowledge of God. She will see his nature reflected 
in the order of creation, but will find him with much 
greater clearness amid the relations of thought and in the 
ideals which reveal themselves in the purified soul. The 
laws of our intelligence bear the impress of ontological facts, 
and things eternal and divine are not seen by the eye, but 
apprehended by the reason alone. 

In entering on an examination of the nature of God as 
conceived by Philo it will be convenient first to notice the 
limitations which we must observe in applying the human 
analogy to the Divine Being. We have seen that the 
argument for the existence of God is partly founded upon this 
analogy : the presence of a mind in man guarantees the 
reality of a universal mind. If we accept this analogy, it is 
obvious that our knowledge of God must be drawn principally 
from ourselves. We can know nothing of mind except what 
is revealed in our self-consciousness, and even the philosopher 
must be tempted simply to select, enlarge, and spiritualize the 
human attributes, and fancy that in this way he can form an 
adequate conception of God. Philo was quite aware that we 
were thus confined within the limits of our own faculties, that 
our idea of God was coloured by our mode of apprehension, and 
that the difference between God and man was not only infinite 



LIMITS OF HUMAN ANALOGY. 11 

in scale, but profound in character. We must notice the 
principal passages in which this view is enforced. 

The fundamental failure of analogy between the microcosm 
and the macrocosm is thus stated : (C Our mind has not 
fabricated the body, but is the work of another; wherefore 
also it is contained in the body as in a vessel. But the mind 
of the universe has generated the whole ; and that which has 
made is better than that which is produced, so that it would 
not be carried in that which is inferior, to say nothing of the 
fact that it is not suitable for the father to be contained in the 
son, but for the son to grow up under the care of the father."* 
This obvious distinction, that man is derived, and is placed 
amid a scene which he has not created, while God is the 
underived fountain of all being, will be found to have far- 
reaching consequences. It secures, as is here intimated, the 
transcendence of God ; and, as will be explained farther on, 
it reverses the relation in which the finite and the infinite 
minds stand to what in modern phraseology we may call their 
common attributes. We must return to these points ; but at 
present it is sufficient to notice the fundamental and infinite 
difference between God and man. 

So deeply was Philo impressed with the magnitude of this 
difference that he recurs to it again and again. Nevertheless, 
in speaking of God we are shut up within our own faculties, 
and are obliged to use language respecting him which cannot 
be philosophically justified. We are not able, says Philo, to 
get out of ourselves, but receive our apprehension of the 
Unbegotten from what happens to ourselves. t It is owing 
to this limitation, which is inevitably narrower in the unin- 
structed than in the cultured, that so many things are 
said in Scripture which it is impossible for the educated 
reason to accept. Philo s treatment of this subject throws 
so much light, not only on his exegesis, but on his philosophy, 

* Migrat. Abr., 35 (I. 466). f Conf. Ling., 21 (I. 419). 



12 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

that we must produce the substance of two illustrative 
passages. 

When it is said that God swears (as in Ex. xiii. 11) we have to 
consider whether this is declared as in reality attaching to him, since it 
has seemed to very many to be inappropriate. For an oath suggests a 
testimony about something that is disputable, but to God nothing is 
obscure or disputable, and he requires no witness indeed he could have 
none, for there is no other God equal to himself, to say nothing of the 
fact that he who bears testimony is, to that extent, superior to him to 
whom testimony is borne, a supposition inadmissible in the case of God. 
Men, when they are disbelieved, have recourse to an oath in order to 
obtain credit ; but God, when he speaks, is worthy of credit, so that 
even his words, so far as security is concerned, differ in no respect from 
oaths. And, indeed, while our judgment is accredited by an oath, the 
oath itself is accredited by God ; for it is not on account of an oath 
that God is to be believed, but on account of him that the oath is 
sure. Why, then, did the Hierophant [Moses] think proper to 
introduce him as swearing ? In order that he might at the same time 
confute and console our weakness. For we cannot constantly store up 
in our soul that verse, so worthy of the Cause, " God is not as man,"* so 
as to escape all anthropomorphic expressions ; but generally participating 
in the mortal, and unable to think of anything apart from ourselves, or 
to escape from our own destinies, sunk in the mortal like snails, or wrapt 
in a ball, like hedgehogs, round ourselves, we form our thoughts both 
about the Blessed and Incorruptible and about ourselves, shrinking from 
the absurdity of statement, that the Divine is in the human shape, but 
setting up again the impiety in fact, that he is subject to human passions. 
Therefore we attribute to him hands, feet, ingress, egress, enmities, 
alienations, wrath parts and passions inappropriate to the Cause. 
Among these is included the oath, an aid to our weakness. [A little 
farther on Philo remarks that] Nature has given us innumerable things 
attaching to mankind, in none of which does it itself participate ; for 
instance birth, being itself unborn ; nourishment, though not requiring 
nourishment ; growth, while it remains unaltered ; periods of life, though 
receiving neither diminution nor addition ; an organic body which it is 
unable to assume. Some one might say that these things are indifferent, 
but that nature must be in possession of what is confessedly good. Well 
then, among things that are really good let us examine those that are 
most admired among us, which we pray to obtain and are considered 
most happy when we have obtained. Who does not know that a happy 
old age and a happy death are the greatest of human blessings, in neither 

* Numb, xxiii. 19. 



LIMITS OF HUMAN ANALOGY. 13 

of which has nature any share, since it is exempt from age and death ? 
We must remove, then, everything begotten, mortal, mutable, profane, 
from our thought of God, the unbegotten, and incorruptible, and un 
changeable, and holy, and only blessed.* 

The second passage contains some important statements to 
which we must attend in another connection ; meanwhile we 
may select the portions which bear upon our present subject. 
The narrative is under consideration where it is said that God 
took it to heart or was angryf that he had made man. 

Some persons [says Philo], when they have heard these words, suppose 
that the self-existent EeingJ indulges in anger and wrath. But this Being 
is not susceptible of any passion whatever ; for to be disquieted is peculiar 
to human weakness, but to God neither the irrational passions of the soul 
nor the parts and members of the body are at all appropriate. Never 
theless such things are said by the Legislator for the sake of admonishing 
those who cannot otherwise be brought to a sober frame of mind. For 
the two highest statements of the Law concerning the Cause are, first, 
that " God is not as man," second, that he is " as man." But the first 
is guaranteed by the most certain truth ; the second is introduced for 
the instruction of the mass of mankind, and not because God is such in 
his real nature. For some men are friends of the soul, others of the 
body. The former being able to associate with intelligible and incor 
poreal natures, do not compare the self-existent Being to any kind of 
created thing ; but the latter, being unable to divest themselves of their 
fleshly covering, and to look upon simple and uncompounded nature, 
have thoughts about the Cause of all which are similar to those that they 
entertain about themselves, not reflecting that he who is made up of an 
aggregation of many powers must require many parts for the service of 
his several necessities. Now God, as being unbegotten and the producer 
of all else, required none of the attributes of created things. Can we 
suppose that he has feet wherewith to advance? Whither will he 
go, since he has filled all things ? And to whom, when he has no 
equal ? And for the sake of what, as he is not anxious about health 
like us ? Has he hands for receiving and giving ? He receives nothing 
from anyone; for besides having no necessities, he holds all things as 
possessions. And he gives by using his Logos as the minister of his 
gifts. He required no eyes ; for eyes have no perception without 
sensible light, and sensible light is created ; but God saw before 
creation, using himself as light. It is needless to speak of the organs 
of nutrition, implying, as they do, successive satiety and want. These 



* SS. Ab. et Cain., 28-30 (I. 181-3). t 

J To tii/. Deut. i. 31. 



14: THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

are the mythical creations of impious men, who introduce the Divine, 
nominally in the form, in reality with the passions, of a man. Why, 
then, does Moses ascribe feet, hands, ingress, egress, to the Un- 
begotten? Why does he arm him against his enemies? Why, more 
over, does he attribute to him jealousy, anger, wrath, and similar 
affections? The answer is, that in framing the best legislation it is 
necessary to keep one end in view, the benefit of all who read. Those, 
then, who have received a happily constituted nature and an education 
in all respects faultless, finding the subsequent path of life passable 
and straight, take truth as their companion, and being initiated by her 
into the true mysteries of the Self-existent, they attribute to him nothing 
that characterizes creation. To them the most suitable of the oracles 
is the verse that "God is not as man," but neither is he as the 
heaven or the cosmos, for these, too, come under sensible perception. 
But those of duller nature, who have been badly educated and are 
unable to see sharply, require legislators to act as physicians, and devise 
for the present malady its suitable cure. To ill-bred and foolish servants 
a stern master is useful ; for dreading his threats they are admonished 
against their will by their fear. Let all such, therefore, learn the false 
hoods by which they will be benefited, if they cannot be brought to a 
sober state of mind by means of truth. The most honest physicians 
avoid telling the truth to their patients, knowing that they would thereby 
dishearten them, and prevent the cure of the disease. Similarly the 
Legislator, the best physician of the passions of the soul, proposed to 
himself one end, to eradicate the diseases of the understanding ; and he 
hoped that he would accomplish his purpose, if he represented the Cause 
as using threats, and indignation, and inexorable wrath, and moreover 
weapons for attacks upon evil doers for thus only is the fool ad 
monished. Accordingly, with the two above-mentioned statements, that 
God is as man, and is not as man, there appear to be woven two other 
kindred things, fear and love ; for all the commandments tend towards 
either the love or the fear of the Self-existerit. To those who do not in 
thought ascribe to the self-existent Being either part or passion of man, 
but, in a manner worthy of God, honour it on account of itself alone, 
love is most appropriate ; but to all others fear.* 

We arrive, then, at the following results. Our language 
respecting God is inadequate, and our conceptions injuriously 
coloured, because we cannot avoid viewing him through the 
medium of our own nature. Nevertheless, we can to a large 

* Quod Deus immut , 11-14 (I. 280-3). See also Conf. Ling., 27 (I 425) 
Somn., I. 40 (I. 655-6); Post. Cain., 1,2 (1.226-7); Qu. et Sol. in Gen., I. 55 
(Fragm., II. 669 sq.) ; II. 54, with the Greek in Harris, Fragm., p. 23. 



HIS PEESONALITY. 15 

extent escape from this defect by means of philosophical 
reflection, and come to regard as useful figures of speech 
many statements in Scripture which are accepted literally by 
the uneducated. The fundamental rule is to refuse to ascribe 
to God anything that can seem characteristic of created being. 
Hence Philo rejects as impious both anthropomorphism and 
anthropopathism ; that is, he denies to God the possession, 
not only of a body, but of the irrational affections of the soul. 
This rule, however, did not apply to the spiritual and invisible 
man within, the reason and self-determining power which, 
as we have seen, appeared to give man a unique position 
in the world, and to be in their nature divine. Here, accord 
ingly, we reach the conception of God which is implied in 
the very inquiry after his existence. He is free, self- 
determining Mind. That he is the Mind or Reason of the 
universe is everywhere assumed."* That the power of free 
volition properly belongs to him we have learned when con 
sidering the question of free-will in man ; and so far is the 
ascription of this power to him from lowering him in the 
direction of anything created that it marks one of the cha 
racteristic distinctions between him and creation. f Even his 
beneficence is distinctly ascribed, not to any incapacity for 
ill, but to his preference for the good.J It thus appears that 
Philo accepted without reserve the Jewish doctrine of the 
personality of God ; but instead of conceding that this imposed 
restrictions upon the divine Being, or dragged him down towards 
our finite nature, he believed that our personality lifted us 
above creation, and drew us up towards the infinite perfection 
of God. It was not that human thought blindly created a 



* TtZv o\wv or TO~J TTCLVTUQ vovq, Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2) ; Leg. AIL, III. 9 
(I. 93) ; Gigant., 10 (I. 268) ; Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 437) ; 33, p. 465 ; 35, p. 466 ; 
o virkp jy/tae, Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 506). 

f See Vol. I. p. 346 ; also TO avrtovaiov TO Qtov KparoQ, Plantat. Noe., 12 
(I. 336) ; o fiiv OeoQ iicouffiov, avd-yKij Si ij ovvia, Somn., II. 38 (I. 692). 

J Plantat. Noe., 20 (I. 342), a^0<o dvvarai, Kai ev Kai KUKUJ^ TTOIIIV .... 
QO.TIDOV fjiovov flovXeTat . . . . t/c TOV Trpoaipt TIKU> tlvai <pi\6Su>pov. 



16 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

god after its own image, but that the reason and will which 
dwelt in men bore their own witness that they belonged 
essentially to the infinite and eternal realm. 

In proving the existence of God from the phenomena of 
the cosmos we arrived at the same fundamental idea. We 
there recognised God as rational cause; and this is only 
another expression for self-determining mind. This concep 
tion places God in distinct antithesis to creation ; for 
" efficiency,* which it is not allowable to ascribe to what 
is begotten, is the property of God,f while susceptibility^ 
is the property of the begotten." As burning is the pro 
perty of fire, and chilling of snow, so also is efficiency of God, 
and all the more because he is the source of activity to all 
others. || It follows that he is not simply the First Cause, 
the former Creator of a universe that now goes without him 
on its appointed course, but he exercises a continual causality, 
and is the ontological ground of every phenomenon, without 
whom the cosmos would vanish. He never pauses in his 
creative activity,^ but both fashioned the world long ago 
without labour, and now and for ever ceases not to hold it 
together.** Being by nature efficient he never refrains from 
making the most beautiful things; and if he rests, his rest is 
not inactivity, but the most unwearied energy, exerted with 
perfect ease and without distress.tt Thus by our primary 
conception of him he is placed in contrast with the universe, 
and is recognised as unlike even the best of natural objects. JJ 
If we remember what Philo has said about the essence 
of the human mind, we shall not be surprised that he denies, 
in the most unqualified way, the possibility of knowing the 
divine essence. In deciding that the mind of man consisted 
of divine Spirit he clearly marked its place among the finite 
objects which are open to examination, but he only pushed 



t 

Cherub., 24 (I. 153). || Leg. AIL, I. 3 (I. 44) ^ Ib 

* SS. Ab. et Caini, 8 (1. 169). |f Cherub., 26 (I. 155). J J Gigant., 10 (I. 268) 



HIS ESSENCE UNKNOWN. 17 

the inquiry into its essence back to a prior stage. There 
we enter a region so exalted that we encounter impenetrable 
mystery, and the second of the two supreme questions respect 
ing God is pronounced to be a not only difficult, but perhaps 
impossible " to solve.* This, however, is not owing to any 
obscurity in God himself, but to the feebleness of our mental 
vision a doctrine which is clearly set forth in the following 
passage : 

" The divine region is truly untrodden and unapproachable, not even 
the purest understanding being able to ascend so great a height as only 
to touch it. It is impossible for human nature to see the face of the Self- 
existent." Face is a figurative expression to denote the purest idea of 
the Self-existent, for a man is chiefly known by his face. Observe, God 
does not say, " I am not visible by nature " for who can be more visible 
than he who has rendered all other things visible? but, "Being 
naturally such as to be seen, I am seen by none of mankind." The 
reason is found in the infirmity of the created. To speak briefly, one 
must first become God which is impossible in order to be able to 
comprehend God. If one will die to the mortal life, and live the 
immortal, he will perhaps see what he has never seen. But even the 
sharpest vision will be unable to see the Uncreated, for it will first 
be blinded by the piercing splendour and the rushing torrent of rays, 
just as fire affords light to those who stand at a proper distance, but 
burns up those who come near.f 

Nor is it wonderful that we possess no faculty by which 
we can form to ourselves a representation of the self-existent 
Being, when the mind in each is unknown to us; and if 
we cannot know the essence of our own soul, it is mere 
simplicity to inquire into that of the universal soul.J In 
one passage Philo emphasizes the uncertainty of this subject 
with an absoluteness which goes beyond his accustomed 
thought : 

God [he declares] has shown his nature to none, and who can say 
either that the Cause is body or that it is incorporeal, or that it is 
of a certain kind, or that it is destitute of kind,f or in general express 

* Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216). t Fragm., II. 654. 

$ Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 579) ; Leg. AIL, I. 29 (I. 62). Airoiov. 

2 



18 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD. 

himself with certainty about his essence, or quality, or habit, or 
motion ?* 

He is usually content with the position that we cannot know 
what God is, though he is quite clear that there are certain 
things which he is not. 

The inscrutability of the divine essence is sometimes 
brought into contrast with our assurance of the divine exist 
ence. This is done, for instance, in commenting on a verse 
in the song of Moses, where God is represented as saying, 
Behold that I am "t : 

To . speak of the self-existent Being as visible [says Philo] is not 
a strict use, but a misapplication of language. Accordingly, in the 
present passage he does not say, " Behold me," for it is impossible 
for God in his essential being to be at all understood by what is created 
but, "Behold that I am," that is, see my existence ; for it is sufficient 
for human reason to attain the knowledge that there is and exists some 
thing as the Cause of the universe ; but to press beyond this, and inquire 
into essence or quality, is superlative folly.* 

Men of spiritual mind, accordingly, not only refrain from 
imposing a shape upon God, but are content to think of 
him simply as being, and to apprehend his existence as free 
from distinctive impress. 

The doctrine which we are considering is frequently illus 
trated by a reference to that remarkable passage in Exodus || 
where it is related that Moses prayed for a vision of the divine 
glory, and the Lord promised to make all his goodness pass 
before him, and yet could permit him to see only his back 
parts, and not his face. The most elaborate and suggestive 
comment upon this passage must be reserved till we come 

* Leg. AIL, III. 73 (I. 128). 

\ "leers, i cr, on lyw ti/a, Deut. xxxii. 39. + Post. Caini, 48 (I. 258). 

To t//iX/}v avev ^apaicr^pog ri]V V7rapiv KaTaXafi/BdvecrQai . . . rt}v /card ro 
tlvai fiovov tyctVTaaiav IvfSeZavTo, /u?) /zop^wffajTfc civro, Quod Deus immut., 11 
(I. 281). The doctrine is completely summed up in the statement, 6 <5 apa oiSt 
~<fi V(fi KaraXijTrTog, on fit} Kara TO tlvai povov VTrap^iQ yrip iari o KaraXctfi- 
flavoniv airou, ro de %WQ( virdpfaus oiitikv. Ib., 13, p. 282. 

j| xxxiii. 12, sqq. 



HIS ESSENCE UNKNOWN. x 21 

to the doctrine .of the divine powers ; meanwhile the following 
may suffice : 

Moses, the beholder of the invisible nature for the oracles say that 
" he entered into the thick darkness,"* intimating thereby the unseen 
essence having searched everything else, sought to see clearly Him who 
is thrice-desirable and alone. But when he found nothing, not even 
a form resembling what he hoped for, he fled in his despair to the 
very Being whom he sought, and implored him, "show me thyself, 
that with knowledge I may see thee." Nevertheless, he was disappointed 
of his purpose, since a knowledge of the bodies and things which come 
after the Self-existent was considered an amply sufficient gift for the 
mortal race at its best ; for it is said, " Thou shalt see my back parts, 
but my face shall not be seen by thee."f 

God, then, is apprehensible, not by a front and direct gaze, 
for this would explain what his nature is, but from the powers 
which follow him, for these disclose, not his essence, but his 
being, by means of their effects. J 

The same doctrine is taught in the life of Abraham. The 
oracles that were delivered to him fanned into a flame his 
desire of knowing the self-existent Being, and nnder their 
guidance he left the land of the Chaldasans, and entered 
earnestly on his search for the one God; nor did he desist 
before he received clearer representations, not of his essence, 
for this is impossible, but of his being and providence. Hence 
he is said to have been the first to believe God, since he was 
the first to have a firm persuasion that there exists one 
supreme Cause, who provides for the cosmos and it? contents. 
But his failure to penetrate the divine essence is intimated 
in the passage where it is said, " He came ii^to the place 

* Ex. xx. 21. 

y Mutat. Nona., 2 (I. 579). We may use this as a comment on the shorter 
statement in the Vita Mosis, I. 28 (II. 106), in which Philo, wishing to exalt 
Moses to the utmost, uses these words " he is said to have entered into the 
darkness where God was, that is, into the unseen and invisible and incorporeal 
essence that serves as the pattern of things, perceiving with the mind what 
cannot be observed by mortal nature." 

J Post. Cain., 48 (I. 258) ; see also 5, p. 229 ; Quod Deus immut., 24 (I. 
289); Prof., 29 (I. 570) ; Monarch., I. (II. 218-19). Nobil., 5 (II. 442). 

2 * 



IP THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

of which God had told him and having lifted up his eyes 
he saw the place afar off."* 

It sounds like a contradiction to say that lie saw the place afar off 
after he had come into it, and therefore the one word must signify 
two different things, namely, the divine Logos, and God, who is before 
the Logos. The Logos is called place [for reasons which will he 
explained hereafter]. God is called place because he contains all 
things, but is contained by none. I and all other objects are not 
place, but in place, for the thing contained differs from that which 
contains ; but the Divine, being contained by nothing, is necessarily 
its own place. Our passage, then, means that he who has been con 
ducted by wisdom as far as the divine Logos, has not yet reached 
God in his essential being, but sees him afar off; or rather, he is 
not competent even to behold him from a distance, but sees only 
that God is at a distance from everything created, and that the appre 
hension of him is very far removed from all human understanding. 
Perhaps, however, place is not here an allegory for the Cause ; and 
if not, we may understand the passage thus Abraham saw that the 
place into which he had come was far from the nameless and unspeakable 
and incomprehensible God.f 

Thus everywhere we meet the same conclusion, that the 
God-loving soul can attain only this as the supreme benefit 
of its search, to comprehend that God in his essential being is 
absolutely incomprehensible, and to see that he is not to 
be seen.J 

Immediately connected with this doctrine is that of the 
namelessness of God. When Moses inquired what answer 
he should give to those who questioned him about the name 
of the Being who sent him, the divine answer was, " I am 
He who is," which was equivalent to, "It is my nature 
to be, not to be named." [| From this answer the Israelites 
learned the difference between being and not being, and were 
taught that no name in the strict sense could be applied to 
him to whom alone being belongs. But since, owing to the 
feebleness of our mortal race, some mode of addressing the 

* Gen. xxii. 3, 4. f Somn., I. 11 (I. 630). 

J Post. Cain., 4-6 (I. 228-9). Eyw tipi 6 Ctv, Ex. iii. 14. 

Elvai TrtVKa ov 



HIS NAMELESSNESS. 21 

supremely Good is required, Moses was allowed to call God 
the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, that is, the 
God of the three natures or mental characters which seek 
for wisdom and goodness from instruction, from nature, and 
from self-discipline. This, however, is not properly speaking 
a name ; and accordingly the Scripture adds, " this is a 
temporal name,"* as being found in our time,t not in 
that which is before time; and "a memorial," not that 
which is placed beyond memory and reflection; and again 
"to generations," not to unbegotten natures. So unspeak 
able is the self -existent Being that not even the ministering 
powers tell us their proper name. For after the wrestling 
in which Jacob engaged for the acquisition of virtue, he 
said to the invisible chief, " Tell me thy name ; " but he 
said, " Why dost thou ask my name ? " and did not tell it 
to him. For names are symbols of what is begotten, and 
are not to be sought amongst incorruptible natures. J It 
might seem to be a contradiction of this doctrine that Philo 
himself applies a rich variety of names to the Supreme Being. 
But the contradiction is only apparent. These names are 
nothing more than modes of reference adapted to the imper 
fection of our faculties, and do not really express the divine 
nature. A name, in the full sense which Philo evidently 
attributes to it, is that which describes and exhausts the 
essence of the object to which it is applied. The term tri 
angle, for instance, is a complete expression for the figure 
which it represents. But 110 equivalent title can be applied 
to the Divine Being, because his essence is unknown ; and 
accordingly even such terms as God and Lord, so far as 
they are significant of ideas, and not mere ciphers to denote 

* "Ovofjia ai&viov. The unusual meaning of aiwviog is fixed by the context. 

f A-iStvi. 

% Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 580); Vita Mos., 1. 14 (II. 92-3); Somn., I. 39-40 (I. 655) ; 
Abr., 10-11 (II. 8-9). In 24, p. 19 of the last-named treatise he says that God 
is called in Scripture Kvpiy bvb\ia-i o "Qv, by which he probably means a name 
devoted to him alone, but not one which is really exhaustive in its significance. 



THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

the unknown Cause, express, not the fulness of the divine 
essence, but only one of its aspects.* The same remark 
will readily apply to other appellations. The sacred tetra- 
grarnmafcon, however, presented a real exception, which Philo 
was unable to explain away, and did not attempt to reconcile 
with his philosophy. His reluctance to admit the consequences 
which, as he must have perceived, flowed from this undeniable 
violation of his rule, is apparent in his throwing upon others 
the responsibility of making the four letters indicative of the 
divine name, as though a doubt lingered in his own mind 
whether this could really be the case.f At all events the 
name was one which only those whose ears and tongue had 
been purified by wisdom might hear and speak in holy places, 
and no one else might utter anywhere. The theologian, 
Moses, says that the name consisted of four letters, perhaps 
regarding them as symbols of the first four numbers; for 
the number four contains all things point, and line, and 

surface, and solid, which are the measures of all things 

and likewise the best musical harmonies. J Beyond this vague 
surmise Philo does not attempt to determine the significance 
of this mysterious name, and in accordance with his philo 
sophical principles must have viewed it as incomprehensible ; 
the word was revealed to the prophet, but its meaning was not 
for us. It was agreeable to its awful character that he who 
unseasonably uttered the name of the Lord of men and gods 
should suffer the penalty of death. Respectful children keep 
in reverent silence the proper names of their parents, though 
they are only mortal, and use instead the terms which express 
their natural relation, father and mother, intimating thereby 
the surpassing benefits received from them, and their own 
thankful disposition. Shall they, then, be deemed worthy of 
forgiveness who indulge in unseasonable mockery, and make 

* This statement will be fully illustrated farther on. 

t E &v ovopa TOV ovrog <f>aci pqvvfaQai. Vita Mos. III. 14 (II 155) 

j Ib. 11, p. 152. 



GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 23 

the most holy and divine name a mere expletive in their 

talk ?* 

The incomprehensibility of God is immediately connected 
with the doctrine that he is without qualities.f We must 
pay careful attention to this doctrine, because it is generally 
supposed that Philo here becomes involved in insoluble con 
tradictions, his speculative conclusions standing in opposition 
to his religious necessities. A God without attributes, and 
known only to exist, is not one whom we can worship or 
love. Philo, accordingly, having, it is said, denied all attri 
butes to God, nevertheless freely ascribes them to him, and 
thus vacillates between a negative and a positive description 
of the Divine in a manner which defies reconciliation. There 
is undoubtedly a certain amount of verbal contradiction ; but 
I venture to think that Philo was perfectly aware of this, and 
that a considerable portion of his philosophy is devoted to 
its solution. 

The proposition that God is without qualities, though not 
stated very frequently, is laid down with clearness and 
emphasis. It is great absurdity, says Philo, to suppose 
that God breathed through a mouth or nostrils; "for God is 
not only without qualities, but not even in the human form." J 
He who thinks that God has quality injures himself, and not 
God ; for it is necessary to suppose him to be without quality, 
and incorruptible and unchangeable. And again, in a pas 
sage before referred to it is said, the companions of the soul, 
who are able to associate with intelligible and incorporeal 
natures, do not compare the self-existent Being to any form || 
of created things, but divest him of all quality, and apprehend 
his existence as free from distinctive impress.^ These state 
ments are sufficiently explicit, and are in perfect agreement 
with all that we have hitherto said regarding the divine 

* Vita Mos., III. 26, p. 166. t "ATTOIOC. 

t Leg. All., L 13 (I. 50). Ib., 15, p. 53. 

Or kind, Mia. H Q uod Deus immut " U (L 281)> 



21 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

essence. That essence is inscrutable and nameless, because 
it is destitute of all the qualities which we recognize in things 
around us, and is absolutely sui generis. Thus the same 
negative predicate is applied to both God and matter. These 
stand over against one another, possessing natures entirely 
different, and each perfectly unique. They constitute the 
two poles of the universe, the one being the unknown essence 
which forms the substratum of all material things, the other 
the equally unknown essence which impresses upon matter 
its variety, and shapes it into a cosmos. Matter is without 
qualities because it is beneath them, being intrinsically 
motionless and dead, and waiting for something higher to 
differentiate its dull mass ; God is without qualities because 
he is above them, owing nothing to them, but being himself 
the living source from which they emanate. 

That we may clearly understand this doctrine, let us fix 
in our minds the meaning of the expression " without 
qualities." It denotes strictly that which does not belong 
to a class, but is sui generis. Philo uses it in this, its 
proper logical meaning. Quality " * is that the possession 
of which makes you a member of a class ; and when any 
quality is ascribed to you, you are to that extent placed on 
a level with a number of other individuals. This is explained 
by Philo in illustrating the categories. "I partake of sub 
stance," he says, having borrowed from each of the four 
elements what suffices for my composition ; " I partake also of 
quality, by virtue of which I am a man."t It is evident from 
this that " quality " must be denied to anything that lies 
beyond the reach of classification. But it does not follow 
that that which stands by itself is destitute of properties or 
characteristic features ; for even in a class each single object 
has its "property" J as well as the " qualities" which bring 
it under a common name. It is a necessary consequence 

* Iloiorijc. t Dec. Orac., 8 (II. 185). 

I iSiortjc- Agr. Noe, 3 (I. 302). 



GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 25 

that everything belonging to a class * is compound, because 
ifc has a share in a quality in which others, equally with 
itself, participate. It is thus dependent on something more 
comprehensive than itself, and, since compounds are liable 
to dissolution, it is destined to come to an end. Accordingly 
Philo says expressly that it is the nature of things belonging 
to a class to admit genesis and corruption, although the ideas 
by virtue of which they are enrolled in a class are incor 
ruptible. For instance, c virginity " is always the same, but 
a "virgin" is changeable and mortal. f Music, the habit "J 
by sharing which a man is a musician, is better than the 
musician, and the medical art is better than the medical man, 
because the " habit " is eternal, efficient, perfect, but the 
member of the class is mortal, susceptible, imperfect. The 
belonging to a class, then, involves notions which are quite 
inconsistent with any worthy conception of God, and nothing 
remains but to regard him as " without qualities," or un 
classified, a Being alone in his infinite perfection, and 
dependent on nothing more comprehensive than himself. 

This result, however, does not involve a denial of all pro 
perties, or, in other words, of all but negative predicates to 
God. It is only necessary that the attributes which are 
ascribed to him should be regarded as properties," || and 
not as " qualities." ^[ Thus matter, although it is " without 
qualities," may be described as extended and impenetrable ; 



Ilotoc. f Cherub., 15 (I. 148). J "Etc. Mutat. Norn., 21 (I. 597). 
lotorTjrfg. For the meaning of iSwv see Aristotle s definition, ""Idiov 
o /j,f] j]\ol fjitv TO TL rjv tlvai, ftovy 5 vTrdp^u KCII dvTiKaTijyoptlTai TOV 
7T|Oay/iaro, olov IStov dvOpwTrov TO ypanfiaTiKfjg t Ivai deKTiKov fiydp a 
iffTi, ypafijj,aTiKrJQ SEKTIKOQ tort, /cai ft ypajU/iartKr/g 1 StKTtKog iariv, 
ianv. ovOeig yap Idiov Xlyft ro tv^t-^o^tvov aXXy v7rdp%tiv, olov TO 
dvGwTry. Organon, Top. I. v. 4. I quote this familiar definition that the 
reader may perceive clearly the force of Philo s language. 

H This is illustrated by the phrase cnroiov vSwp, "pure water," which cannot 
be intended to deny all properties to water, but denotes that which is simply 
and absolutely water, and not water of a particular kind, such as salt or muddy. 
This example shows that the phrase may be applied without regard to the 



26 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

for these predicates do not place it in a class along with 

other things which are not matter. They may indeed be 

applied to an indefinite number of particular objects, which 

are thus grouped into a class ; but when they are so applied, 

they do not set these objects beside matter as members of the 

same genus, so that you could affirm that matter and certain 

other things are extended and impenetrable, but they only 

class them under matter and declare them to be material. 

The same reasoning will apply to the spiritual essence of 

God. He is "without qualities/ and nevertheless we may 

affirm that he is eternal, self -existent, omnipotent, omniscient, 

perfect; for these predicates belong to himself alone, and 

place him outside of every genus. If the first two might 

be applied to matter, we must remember that Philo never 

does so apply them. If he believed in the eternity of 

matter, he regarded it as merely a negative reflection of the 

eternity of God ; and so far was he from thinking of matter 

as self-existent, that he regarded it rather as the non-existent. 

The attributes which I have mentioned are by their very 

nature incommunicable. They lie outside of our experience, 

and are discovered only by an exercise of thought. But there 

are other attributes which fall within our experience, which 

distinguish man among the animal creation, which make him 

a member of a class, and nevertheless are ascribed to 

God. God is efficient, free, and self-determining. Does he, 

higher genus under which the object may be included. Water in itself is a 
species of matter, but the water in question is d-rroiov because it is not a species 
of water. Much more is the expression applicable to God, who is not only not 
a species of God, but is not a species of anything. Philo himself uses the word 
in a similar way. Moses was desired to make a serpent. Why, then, did he 
make a bronze serpent, when he received no command Trtpi 7roidrr;ro ? Perhaps 
because the favours of God are immaterial, ideas, and aTroiot, but those of 
mortals are seen conjoined with matter : Leg. All., II. 20 (I. 80-1). Of course, a 
serpent can be classified as animal or reptile ; but a serpent in the abstract 
cannot be classified as a particular kind of serpent. So also man in the abstract 
is still a ykvoQ without species, and it is only the concrete human being that 
becomes HIT IX<*>V Trotorjjrof. being man or woman : Mundi Op., 46 (I. 32). 



GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 27 

then, belong in this respect to the same genus as man ? Not 
at all; for volitional power is, as we have seen, a property 
of God.* If therefore we find volitional power in man, it only 
proves that the human mind has a share of the divine essence ; 
and we thus discover the connection between the latter doc 
trine and Philo s theology. His belief in the divinity of the 
human mind was necessary in order to reconcile with his 
doctrine that God is without qualities his ascription to him 
of those attributes which are demanded by the religious 
affections. In assigning the same predicates to God and 
man, he may seem at first sight to class them together, as 
each participating in the same essence which is more compre 
hensive than either; but he really means that man has a 
finite share in an essence which God exhausts and trans 
cends. We shall dwell farther on upon the predicates of God 
in detail ; meanwhile we may observe that Philo does not 
hesitate to admit such epithets as munificent, propitious, 
merciful, good. But these do not draw God down from his 
solitary perfection. They are different aspects of his infinite 
fulness, archetypal ideas, which, borrowing all from him, lay 
the impress of quality only on derived existences. 

In order to understand the above reasoning it is necessary 
to bear in mind that the notion of an attribute in the philo 
sophy which we are considering was very different from that 
with which we are familiar. We may illustrate the difference 
by a change which has taken place more recently in physical 
theory. It was formerly supposed that electricity and heat 
were subtle fluids distributed among the particles of ordinary 
bodies, and when an object was electrified, or hot, or cold, 
it was thought that there was an excess or deficiency of these 
fluids. Here, then, we have an instance in which the pre 
dicate denoted, not, as it does to our present scientific appre 
hension., a certain condition of the object itself, but the 

* "Iciov Otov. 



28 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

presence or absence of a substance completely different from 
the object. Now, if we could imagine, in connection with this 
hypothesis, that electricity and heat were ultimately the same 
substance, and were differentiated only through the modes 
of its manifestation, we could not properly class this substance 
with hot or electrical bodies; and if we ever spoke of it as 
hot or electrical, we should obviously use these words in a 
sense different from that in which they are applicable to glass 
and iron. The latter would have a share in heat and elec 
tricity; the former would be heat and electricity, or rather 
would be the unknown substance which comprised them. both. 
This furnishes, I think, a strict analogy to Philo s conception 
of attributes. These were not conditions affecting the minds 
of which they might be predicated, but were essences in which 
individual minds had their finite and transient share ; but 
they were all included within God, and were summed up in 
the unity of his infinite being. We noticed the former of 
these doctrines in our remarks upon the human powers ; the 
latter must await its full development till we treat of the 
divine powers and the doctrine of ideas. 

We must now direct our attention to those passages by 
which, as I believe, the above exposition is established. First 
of all, Philo expressly places God in a genus by himself. It 
is not allowable, he says, to suppose that anything is better 
than the Cause, since nothing is even equal, or even a little 
inferior to him, (( but everything after God is found to have 
descended by a whole genus. "* According to this statement 
God is the highest genus, and may therefore be properly 
described as the most generic. This is done in a passage 
where Philo speaks of the supply of water and manna fur 
nished to the Israelites in the wilderness. The rock cut away 
at the top t is the wisdom of God, which he cut as topmost J 

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 28 (I. 181). 

f H ciKpfr-ofjiOQ Trirpa. I render it in this way, in order to preserve the play 
upon the words. j "Xnpav t-tpsv. 



GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 29 

and first of all from his own powers,, and from which he gives 
drink to God-loving souls. Now when they have received 
drink they are filled also with manna, which is the most 
generic thing, for manna is called "what," which is the 
universal genus. The allusion here is to Exodus xvi. 15, 
where it is related that, when the Israelites saw the manna, 
they said to one another, What is this t" * Philo proceeds : 
"the most generic thingt is God, and second is the WordJ 
of God, but all other things exist in word only, and in reality 
are equivalent to the non-existent/ || It seems clear that 
these statements cannot be accepted in their ordinary logical 
sense. According to this, God would be the term which 
included the largest number of species and individuals, which 
denoted more and connoted less than any other term ; and he 
would be " without qualities " only by being turned into an 
empty abstraction. That this is not Philo s meaning is 
apparent from the fact that the word God is not, in its 
highest sense, a generic term at all, but is always limited 
to one single being. We must therefore understand the 
above expressions in an ontological rather than in a logical 
sense. God is the most generic, not on account of his logical 
emptiness, but on account of his real fulness. He is the 
Being who includes all else within his own solitary perfection, 
and who alone imparts meaning and reality to all beneath. 
As Philo strongly expresses it, " God is full of himself and 
sufficient to himself, filling and containing all other things, 
which are deficient and desert and empty, but himself being 
contained by nothing else, as being himself one and the 
whole." *[[ If, then, we pass from God to the good, the 
beautiful, the true, it is not by an ascent of thought and by 
introducing greater richness of meaning into a more abstract 
notion, but by a descent and by a resolution of the perfect 



* Ti ion TOVTO ; as it stands in the LXX. f To 

I Aoyof. Aoyy fiovov. \\ Leg. All., II. 21 (I. 82). 

II Elc Kai ro Trav, Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 52). 



30 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

unity into lower and less significant conceptions. The latter 
are unified and exhausted in God ; and it would therefore be 
more correct to say that the good is divine than to say that 
God is good."* It is for this reason that God is described as 
u the good/ 3 or "the first good/ t and the source of all that 
may be characterized by that epithet. He is, says Philo, 
" alone blessed and happy, unparticipant of all evil,! and full 
of perfect good, or rather, if one is to speak the truth, being 
himself the good, who showered on heaven and earth the 
individual things that are good." || Again, he is the most 
self-sufficing, and in need of nothing created, " the first 
good, the most perfect, the ever-flowing fountain of prudence 
and righteousness and all excellence." 1T Similarly he is 
called "the first and most perfect good, from whom, like a 
fountain, the cosmos and its contents are watered with the 
several things that are good"** 

The description of God as the good "ft might seem to 
determine his essence ; but this is far from Philo s intention. 
God is indeed " the good/ but he is much more ; and we may 
therefore legitimately speak of his goodness. JJ This, instead 
of exhausting his being, is only " the oldest of the graces," 
the epithet oldest denoting, as often in Philo, that which is 
prior or superior in thought. It is eternal, and its exercise 
belongs to the divine nature. The transcendence of God 
above goodness and every other property which we, in our 
limited experience, can ascribe to him is expressed several 
times in remarkable language. In the account of the embassy 
to Caius, Philo speaks of the Uncreated and Divine as "the 
first good and beautiful and blessed and happy, or, if one is to 

* Compare the statement, ovdtv yap e<m T&V KaXtiv o fir] 9eov n KO\ Otlov, 
SS. Ab. et Cain., 17 (I. 174). 

j- To ayaQov, or TO Trptirov ayaQov. 

J So Tisch., Philon., p. 20, instead of " evils." 

AjaOwi . || Ta Kara fjiepoQ dya6a. De Septenario 5 (II. 280). 

IF Sacrificant., 4 (II. 254). ** TdtTri fi epovQ aya9d. Dec. Orac., 16 (II, 194). 

|f To a-yaOov. %% Aya0or?je. Quod. Deus imrnut., 23 (I. 288-9). 



GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 31 

speak the truth, that which is better than the good, and more 
beautiful than the beautiful, and happier than the happy, and 
more blessed than blessedness itself, and whatever is more 
perfect than these. For speech* is not able to ascend to the 
intangible God, but sinks back, incapable of using proper 
names as a ladder to the manifestation, I do not say of the 
Self-existent for not even the whole heaven becoming 
articulate voice would be rich in exact and well-aimed words 
for this purpose, but of his attendant powers, creative, and 
regal, and providential." f This might be taken as a mere 
flight of rhetoric, to convey the most exalted idea of the 
divine perfection ; but precisely similar language is used in 
calm philosophical exposition. In pointing out the necessity 
for both a susceptible and efficient cause in the creation of 
the cosmos, Philo describes the latter as most pure and 
unmixed mind, " better than virtue, and better than know 
ledge, and better than the good itself and the beautiful 
itself.^J And again, while insisting that though it is possible 
for us to know God s existence, we cannot know his essence, 
he says, " for that which is better than the good, and older 
than the unit, and purer than one, cannot possibly be dis 
cerned by any other, because it is right that he should be 
apprehended by himself alone." The meaning of these 
expressions is at once apparent, if our previous exposition 
has been correct. God is superior to all our descriptive 
epithets, because he includes within himself the archetypal 
good and beautiful and blessed; and if we could know his 
name, we should find it comprehensive of all these and more. 
Our reason falters before this central unity. "We can, nay 
must, believe in its existence ; but we can see it only through 
the multiplying medium of our own imperfection, through 
those powers or ideas in which we are allowed to participate, 

* O Xoyof. t Le g- acl Cai -> l ( IL 546 )> sli 8 htl y abridged. 

+ Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2). Praem. et Poen., 6 (II. 414). 



32 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

and we can hold its essence neither in conception nor in 
speech. 

We are fortunately not left without particular examples 
which serve to illustrate and confirm the above explanation. 
First we may notice a passage relating, not to God himself, 
but to his Logos, which shows that Philo does not hesitate to 
use predicates which are the best available approximation to 
the truth at the very moment when he contends that they fall 
short of the truth. In speaking of the rational soul in man, 
which had the divine Logos for its archetype, he says, " it is 
necessary that the imitation of an all -beautiful pattern should 
be all-beautiful. But the Logos of God is better even than 
beauty itself, that which is beauty in nature,* since it is not 
adorned with beauty, but is itself, to speak truly, beauty s 
most becoming adornnient.^t Similar language is used of 
God. " He is full of unmixed blessedness. His nature is 
most perfect, or rather God is himself the summit and end 
and boundary of blessedness, participating in nothing else for 
his improvement, but having communicated his own to all 
individuals from the fountain of the beautiful, himself. 
For the beautiful things in the cosmos would never have 
become such if they had not been made like the truly 
beautiful, the Unbegotten and Blessed and Incorruptible, as 
an archetype/ J Hence it is justly said, " There is nothing 
beautiful which is not of God and divine." The statement 
that God is older than the unit receives an explanation which 



* Mangey, at the suggestion of Christophorson, reads iv rij 
which is not very intelligible. Dahne, assuming that aiadrjry must be retained,. 
places it after jcaXXa, thus emptying the passage of its real significance 
[I. p. 262, Anm. 264]. Miiller points out that the word is a mere gloss, and is 
not supported by any old authority [p. 370-1]. Nevertheless it must be confessed 
that its omission does not remove every difficulty, for the clause oTrtp ICTIV iv ry 
Qvaei KaXXog seems quite superfluous, unless it is intended to limit in some way 
the previous avrou /cdXXouf, and this it cannot do if ipvaet is to be understood, 
with Miiller, in quite a general sense, and not merely of perceptible nature. 

f Mundi Op., 48 (I. 33). J Cherub., 25 (I. 154). 

SS. Ab. et Cain., 17 (I. 174). 



GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 33. 

is verbally different, but involves a similar conception. Having 
demonstrated the unity of God, Philo draws his conclusion 
thus, " God, then, has been ranked according to the one and 
the unit ; or rather even the unit has been ranked according 
to the one God, for all number, like time, is younger than the 
cosmos, while God is older than the cosmos and its creator."* 
This shows that God is not one because he participates in 
unity, but because the eternal simplicity of his own nature is 
the archetype of unity. All these illustrations may be summed 
up in what Philo says of the rationality of God j for the 
rational is with him " the best genus,"f ar *d what is said of its 
subordinate relation to the Divine must apply a fortiori to- 
inferior genera. God, then, is before and above the Logos,, 
and is superior to all rational nature. J His relation to the 
rational is defined in a passage where the difference which I 
have endeavoured to explain between the predicates of the 
uncreated and of created beings is exhibited with unmistakable 
clearness. Each of us, it is said, is two beings, animal and 
man. To each of these has been assigned a kindred power, 
to the one the vital, by virtue of which we live, to the other 
the rational, by virtue of which we have become rational. 
" In the vital, then, the irrational animals also participate ; 
but the rational, God does not indeed participate in, but 
rules, being the fountain of the most ancient Logos," and 
the " archetype of rational nature." According to this 
statement God is rational because, as I have before expressed 
it, he exhausts and transcends rationality, and is the only 
source from which it ultimately flows, whereas man is rational 
because he has received a finite share of rationality, which. 

* Leg. All., II. 1 (I. 67). 

f To XoyiKov, oTrtp apiaTov TU>V OVTWV y tvog lerrt, Quod Deus immut., 4 (I. 275). 

{ Fragm., II. 625, answering to Qu. et Sol. in Gen. II. 62. 

Quod det. pot. ins., 22, 23 (I. 207). We may compare the clear statement of 
Origen: A\\ ovS ovaictQ juerlx" o Qtoq. Mtrtxtrai -yap paXXov f] /urlx" " 
HeTi%tTai VTTO rtZv s%6vr<i)V irvtv^ct Qtov. Kai o <rwr?}p r/^twv ov /^re^ct \iiv 
fiiKaioavvrjs SiKaioavvri dt &v jutrl^erai VTTO T(i>v diicaiwv. Cont. Gels., VI. 64. 

VOL. II. 3 



34 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

transcends him, and can communicate itself with unexhausted 

fulness to innumerable multitudes. Rationality is but one 

expression of God s eternal and infinite essence ; and since it 

reveals itself in our intelligence, it stands, as it were, between 

God and man, deriving from the former all its store, and 

imparting a tiny portion to each human soul, or rather 

impressing each soul with its own form. We may sum up 

the discussion in words which have been preserved in the 

Armenian : "If you wish to speak properly, those things 

which are justice and truth among men, are similitudes and 

forms ; but those which are so with God are original principles 

and prototypes or ideas."* We thus see that the doctrine of 

intermediate powers or ideas, instead of being an artificial 

resource to reconcile discordant thoughts, grows out of the 

very roots of Philo s theology. But we must reserve this 

subject for future treatment, and be content for the present 

with having determined the force of the statement that God 

is without qualities, and the general nature of what in modern 

times we should call the divine attributes. The mode of 

thought is far removed from our own ; but I hope I have 

succeeded not only in making it clear, but in showing how ijb 

was possible for rational men to adopt it. If the foregoing 

interpretation be correct, the serious and unphilosophical 

contradiction with which Philo is charged has been resolved ; 

the strictest speculative thought ministers to religious 

aspiration; God, instead of being an empty abstraction, 

contains in his infinite fulness the eternal essence of all 

perfect things; and, though he is too full and too perfect 

for us to know him as he is, he gives us, in the ideals that 

impress our souls, side-lights and broken gleams, which are 

worthy of the implicit trust and devout homage so gladly 

yielded by the religious heart of Philo. 

Having thus determined the general character of the divine 

* Qu. et Sol. in Gen. IV. 115. 



HIS ETEENITY. 35 

attributes, we must now endeavour, though at the risk of some 
repetition, to bring under one view, and exhibit in detail, the 
predicates which are actually applied to God by Philo. We 
must remember that in the philosophy under consideration 
God is primarily revealed as self-determining Mind, the 
Cause of the universe. It follows that he must be eternal;* 
for the belief in something eternal is a necessity of human 
thought, and if God were not eternal he would depend on 
something older and greater than himself ; in other words, he 
would not be God, the first and supreme Cause. We find, 
accordingly, that eternity is with Philo the most indispensable 
mark of Deity, the want of which deprives all originated gods 
of every just title to the name;f and eternity and causality 
are naturally brought into combination in references to the 
Supreme Being. He is " the unbegotten and eternal and the 
Cause of all things," J the " oldest and generator and maker 
of all things, . . . who is alone eternal, and Father of everything 
else, intelligible and perceptible.^ He is " the Father of the 
universe, the unbegotten God, and generator of all things." || 
His eternity is further emphasized by resolving it into the two 
notions of without beginning and without end : he is " the 
unbegotten and incorruptible and eternal. 3 ^" This reiteration 
(and other passages might be cited) shows how fundamental 
with Philo is the conception of God s eternity. The ascription 
to him, however, of eternal causality, far from endowing him 
with qualities and bringing him into a class, differentiates him 
in the most absolute way from everything else. All other 
things, however contrasted, have at least the fellowship of 
origination ; but God is not like even the best of natural 
objects, for the latter have come into being and are destined 

* AlSlOQ. 

j- Human., 2 (II. 386), ytvrjTOQ yap ovdetQ a\jj0ia Otog, . ... TO ai/ay/eato- 
TO.TOV a<pypr]p.vo(;, d idiorijTa. 

I Dec. Orac., 14 (II. 191). Nobil., 5 (II. 442). 

H Cherub., 13 (I. 147). 

^ O dyWT]TO /cat atyQaproQ KOI aWioq, Dec. Orac., 10 (II. 187). 

3 * 



36 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

to be passive, but God is unbegotten and always active,* and 
for this reason he requires none of the properties of created 
things.f 

From this primary attribute another distinctive mark 
of the Divine was easily deduced. We have seen in another 
connection that change was a characteristic of creation, and 
betokened both an actual beginning and a natural liability to 
dissolution. The Eternal, therefore, must be incapable of 
change. He who supposes that God is not unbegotten and 
incorruptible, or not immutable, injures himself and not God ; 
for it is necessary to regard him as both incorruptible and 
immutable, and he who does not think so fills his soul with 
false and godless opinion. J Accordingly God and creation 
(all at least beneath man) are separated from one another 
by this irremovable difference. Everything generated is 
necessarily mutable, for this is its property, as it is the 
property of God to be immutable. || To this antithesis, how 
ever, there are some exceptions. The cosmos, which as a 
whole remains ever self-identical, reflects and guarantees 
the stability of its maker.^[ Among minor objects not only 
does the divine covenant share the unchangeableness of its 
author, but the same privilege is extended to the perfect 
man, who, by virtue of this exalted gift,, occupies an inter- 
mediate position between man and God.** The reason for the 
last two exceptions is found in the system of allegorical 
interpretation. The immutability of God was taught in 
Scripture by the words I stand here before thee/ ft standing 
implying an immovable permanence. The same term is applied 
to the covenant with Noah, " I will make my covenant to 
stand ";;[;{ and we are told in Genesis that Abraham was 



* 



Gigant., 10 (I. 268). f Q uo d Deus immut., 12 (I. 281). 

Leg. All., 1. 15 (I. 53). *is lov . 



|| Leg. All., II. 9 (I. 72) ; 22, p. 82 ; Cherub., 6 (1. 142), rb plv Qii 
rb SI ysvofievov $vau ^ra^rov. ^ Somn., II. 32 (I. 687). 

** Ib. sqq.; Post. Cain., 9 (I. 231); Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 276); Mutat. 
Norn., 13 (I. 591). ft Ex. xvii. 6. JJ Gen. ix. 11, S xviii. 22. 






HIS INCOBKUPTIBILITY. UNITY. 37 

standing before the Lord, and in Deuteronomy* that the 
commandment came to Moses, " stand thou here with ine." 
In the case of man we may find also a philosophical reason ; 
for " only an immutable soul has access to the immutable 
God/ f These exceptions do not violate the doctrine that 
immutability is the property of God alone ; they only furnish 
an extreme instance of what we have already learned, that 
God can communicate to created beings some share of his 
own most elevated attributes. 

With the unchangeableness and incorruptibility of God are 
closely connected his unity and simplicity. That Philo on 
every suitable opportunity insists on the unity of God in oppo 
sition to polytheism is only what we should expect, and it will 
be sufficient to notice here two or three passages in which an 
argument is advanced. 

There is [he says], one Ruler and King, to whom alone it belongs to 
preside over and administer all things ; for the Homeric saying, " the 
government by many is not good, let there be one governor, one king,"J 
is not more applicable to cities and men than to the cosmos and God ; for 
of one cosmos there must of necessity be one Maker and Father and 
Lord. 

Not only is there but one God in contradistinction from 
several, one with whom nothing existed prior to creation, and 
who since the creation of the cosmos still remains in solitary 
supremacy, but he is himself absolutely one and indivisible, 
the archetypal unity. 

He is "alone and one, not a compound, a simple nature." All other 
things involve plurality. For instance, man consists of soul and body. 
The soul has its irrational and rational parts, and the body includes the 
hot, the cold, the heavy, the light, the dry, the moist. " But God is not 
a compound, nor composed of many ingredients, but unmixed with all 
else. For whatsoever might be united to God is either superior or 
inferior or equal to him. But there is neither an equal nor a superior to 

* v . 31. t Post. Cain., 9 (I. 231). 

J Aristotle ends the eleventh book of his Metaphysics with the same quotation, 
introduced for the same purpose, ra dt OVTO. ov fiovXtrai iroXiTtvecQai 
OVK dyaObv TroXvKoipavlr) t\Q Koipavoc laroi. Conf. Ling., 33 (I. 431). 



38 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

God, and nothing inferior is united to him ; otherwise he himself too will 
become inferior, and in this case he will be also corruptible, which it is 
not allowable to suppose. God therefore has been ranked in conformity 
with one and the unit ; or rather even the unit is ranked in comf ormity 
with the one God : for all number, like time, is younger than the cosmos, 
while God is older than the cosmos, and its Creator."* 

Elsewhere Philo insists that God is altogether without parts, 
because our parts and members have been formed by nature 
to serve our necessities ; but God is in need of nothing, and 
therefore could derive no benefit from the possession of parts, 
and cannot be supposed to have them. He is a " whole, not a 
part," an expression which must denote that totality belongs 
to his very essence, and it is impossible to think of him piece- 
meal.f The stringency of this doctrine of the divine unity 
must be borne in mind when we have to treat of the manifold- 
ness of divine manifestations. 

We have already learned that God is invisible. This may 
be inferred from the attributes which we have just noticed. 
There is indeed a sense in which the Lord of the universe may 
be seen ; but it is not with the eyes of the body, for these see 
only perceptible things, J and perceptible things are compound 
and full of corruption, while the Divine is uncompounded and 
incorruptible. He is seen, then, only with the eye of the soul. 
Again, there is this difference: the eyes see only with the 
co-operation of light, which is distinct both from the thing 
seen and from the person seeing; but what the soul discerns, it 
discerns without the assistance of anything else, for noiimena 
are a light to themselves. This statement is in complete 
accordance with the prevailing tone of Philo s philosophy. 
God belongs absolutely to a realm cognizable only by reason, 
and to imagine him visible to the bodily eye would be to 
degrade him into the category of created, compound, and 
corruptible things. Nevertheless there is one passage in 

* Leg. All., II. 1 (I. 66-7). 

t Si Vtos o\ov, ov /ilpof. Post. Cain., 1 (I. 226-7). J Ta alffdrjrd. 

Mutat. Norn., 1 (I. 578-9). 



INVISIBILITY. GOD IS LIGHT. 39 

which another view is presented, and God is regarded as 
invisible, not by his intrinsic nature, but by his own choice. 
" He did not think proper/ says Philo, " to be apprehended, 
by the eyes of the body, perhaps because it was not consistent 
with holiness for the mortal to touch the Eternal, but perhaps 
also on account of the weakness of our sight; for it would 
not contain the beams poured from the Self- existent, since it is 
not able to look even at the rays of the sun. 1 "* These words 
certainly place God among objects which are by their nature 
perceptible, though removed beyond the reach of our imper 
fect vision. In doing so they contradict a fundamental distinc 
tion in Philo s philosophy. I have no explanation to offer, 
and can only suppose that the passage was written in careless 
haste. 

In this connection we may notice the statement that God is 
light, which is carefully explained in such a way as to remove 
him absolutely from the cognizance of the senses. " The eye 
of the Self-existent," it is said, " requires no other light for 
apprehension, but being itself an archetypal radiance shoots 
forth innumerable beams, of which none is perceptible, but all 
are intelligible."f It follows that, when we hear in Scripture 
that God was seen by man, we must understand that this was 
done without perceptible light, for the intelligible can be 
apprehended only by intelligence; but God is a fountain of 
the purest radiance, so that, whenever he manifests himself to 
the soul, he causes the beams to arise that are without shadow 
and shine on every side.J Philo even goes so far as to call 
God the sun of the sun, the intelligible pattern of our percep 
tible luminary, supplying visible splendours from his invisible 
fountains. He makes it clear, however, in other passages 
that he does not wish this to be understood too literally, as 
though he was speculating on the unknowable essence of God. 
Intellectual illumination finds its nearest analogy in the reveal- 

* Abr., 16 (II. 12). t Cherub., 28 (1. 156) 

J Mutat. Norn., 1 (I. 579). Sacrificant., 4 (II. 2o4). 



40 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

ing power of light ; and Philo s language is founded upon this 
analogy, and not on any real resemblance which he supposed 
to exist between the divine nature and the light which shines 
upon the world of sense. " For as, when the sun has risen, 
the darkness disappears and all things are filled with light, in 
the same manner whenever God, the intelligible sun, rises and 
shines upon the soul, the darkness of the vices and passions is 
dispersed, and the most pure and lovable species of the most 
radiant virtue becomes manifest. w * It is only in conformity 
with the rules of allegory that the sun is represented as like 
the Father and Sovereign of the universe, for " nothing is 
really like God/ The resemblance is found, first, in the fact 
that God is light, as is said in the Psalms, " The Lord is my 
light and my saviour " ;f and he is not only light but also the 
archetype of all other light, or rather older and higher than 
the archetype." The latter words show that the light-giving 
power of God is simply one of his attributes, in the sense 
already explained : behind it lies the unknown essence. Fur 
ther to remove all ambiguity Philo reiterates, <f he himself is 
like nothing created/ Another point of resemblance is found 
in the fact that " as the sun separates day and night, so Moses 
says that God divided light and darkness." And lastly, "as 
the sun, when it has risen, displays the hidden things of cor 
poreal nature, so God, when he generated all things, not only 
brought them into manifestation, but also made what before 
was not, being himself not only an artificer, but also a 
creator." J These concluding words prove yet again that God 
was regarded as more than light, and as having a fulness of 
power of which that intelligible light which illumined the soul 
was only a partial expression. We are dealing only with 
analogies needed by the human understanding, and are not 
warranted in the conclusion that Philo conceived of God as a 

* Human., 22 (II. 403). 

t xxvi. 1, where Philo reads 0wc instead of the LXX 

% Somn., I. 13 (I. 631-2). 



HIS OMNIPBESENCE. 



41 



{ e light- nature/ * that is, I presume, as one whose essence was 
light, even though the statement be guarded with the condition 
that the light was not of a corporeal, but an intellectual kind, j- 
We come now to certain views which seem necessarily 
involved in the conception of God as cause. We have already 
learned that, as the Creator of the universe, he must be trans 
cendent above it, or, as Philo repeatedly puts it, he contains, 
but is not contained. J Nevertheless, though he is outside the 
universe, he is also within it ; for, as the cause of all things, he 
must permeate all things. And lastly, since he is omnipresent, 
it is impossible to apply to him any terms which depend on the 
notion of place ; for this, by implying a here and a there, 
involves limitation and a relation of parts to one another. 
This line of thought is connectedly expressed in a passage 
where Philo comments on the statement that IC The Lord 
came down to see the city and the tower." 

This statement [he says] is certainly to be understood in a figura 
tive sense ; for it is the most surpassing impiety|j to suppose that the 
Divine is present or absent, or comes down or the reverse, or is in 
any way affected with the same habits and motions as individual 
living beings. ^[ These things are said by the Legislator concerning 
the non- anthropomorphic God in accordance with human analogy, with 
a view to our instruction. For who does not know that he who 
comes down must necessarily leave one place, and occupy another ? 
But all things have been filled by God, who contains, but is not 
contained, to whom alone it belongs to be both everywhere and no 
where : nowhere, because he generated place along with the bodies which 
occupy it, and we may not assert that that which has made is contained in 
any of the things produced ; everywhere, because having stretched his 
powers through earth and water, air and heaven, he has left no part 
of the cosmos desert, but, having collected all things together, com 
pressed them with invisible bonds, that they might never be dissolved. 
To God in his essence, therefore, all terms of motion involving change of 
place are inapplicable.** 

The allusion to the divine powers extended through creation 



* Lichtnatur. 
ov 



IF Tol Kara ^ P o S woi ff . 



t Gfrorer, I. p. 120. 
Gen. xi. 5.- 
eimlv, iorlv datfltia. 

** Conf . Ling., 27 (I. 425). 



42 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD. 

suggests questions as to the mode of God s omnipresence which 
we are not yet prepared to answer; but we may notice a 
few passages by which the other thoughts which are here com 
bined are illustrated or confirmed. It would be impious and 
silly, we are told, to imagine that God really planted a paradise, 
as though he wanted luxurious resting-places, for not even 
the entire cosmos would be a worthy dwelling for God, the 
universal Ruler ; for he is his own place, and we cannot suppose 
that the cause is contained in the effect.* It is for this, among 
other reasons, to show that the efficient cause is not in the 
thing produced, that Scripture compares the perceptible cosmos 
to the footstool of God.f 

The transcendent solitude of God, however, did not cut him 
off from the world which he had made. " Though existing 
outside of the creation, he has none the less filled the cosmos 
with himself ." J " He has reached everywhere, he looks to 
the ends, he has filled the universe, and of him not even 
the smallest thing is desert." From him, therefore, who 
has thus filled and permeated all things, and left nothing 
empty of himself, it is impossible to escape or to hide ; for 
what place can one occupy in which God is not ?|| But precisely 
because he is thus everywhere, we cannot locate him ; for place 
is that which contains, and therefore he who himself contains 
the universe, and is contained by nothing, cannot, like created 
things, be said to be in a place, but is his own place. This was 
taught in Scripture when God said to Adam, "Thou art some- 

* Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 52) ; Plantat. Noe., 8 (I. 334). 

f Conf. Ling., 21 (I. 419). The unique expression, rov euriipa, rbv lv r$ 
K6(rn V Ofov, which is found in Mangey s text of Septen., 23 (II. 296), could only 
mean that God, as the Saviour who supplies the bountiful provisions of nature, 
for ever works within the Cosmos, besides existing in his infinite perfection 
beyond it. In place of this reading, however, Tischendorf s improved text gives 
rbv ytv kTijv KCII Trarkpa KCII (rwriypa TOV re Koapov Kai ruv iv KOVUM 6tov 
(Philon., p. 64, 1. 1, sq.). 

| Post. Cain., 5 (I. 229). Q uo d det. pot. ins., 42 (I. 220). 

II Leg. All., III. 2 (I. 88) ; SS. Ab. et Cain., 18 (I. 175) ; Post. Cain., 2 (I. 227), 
9, p. 231. 



HIS OMNIPRESENCE. 43 

where,"* implying that he himself was not some where, not walk 
ing in Paradise, and contained by it, as Adam had supposed.f 
We must therefore understand the language figuratively when 
Noah prays that God will dwell in the houses of Shem. J God is 
said to dwell in a house, not as in a place, but as exercising 
a peculiar providence and care over that spot ; for every 
owner has a necessary regard for his house. This illustration 
may help to explain a passage where Philo expresses himself 
more philosophically. God, he says, is both here and there 
at the same time, not moving by transposition, so as to 
occupy one place and leave another, but using an intensive 
motion. || The meaning seems to be that, though God remains 
immovable in his omnipresence, yet his power may be 
manifested with varying intensity in different places, just as 
he is said to dwell in the purified soul as in a house, 
because his watchful providence is most conspicuous there. 

In the foregoing exposition the influence of Stoical language 
and conceptions is apparent, though Philo differed from the 
Stoics in maintaining the transcendence and immateriality of 
God. The question may be raised whether he succeeded in 
borrowing only so much of the Stoical thought as suited the 
organizing principle of his own system, and in emancipating 
himself from materialism so completely as he supposed. 
The argument that God cannot be in a place because he 
contains, but is not contained, is not valid except on the 
supposition that he is an extended substance., vaster than 
all this visible universe. This notion is still more strongly 
suggested when it is said that God contains all things 
"in a circle,"^" and that he is the boundary of the heaven, 

* Gen. iii. 9, TTOV tl, understanding TTOV not in its interrogative but declaratory 
sense. 

t Leg. All., III. 17 (I. 97) ; Somn., I. 11 (I. 630). J Gen. ix. 27. 

Sobriet., 13 (I. 402). 

|| SS. Ab. et Cain., 18 (I. 175-6). So, I think, we must understand rovuy 
Xpwjutvoe ry KivijafL, assigning to roviKy the sense, not of extension, but of 
strain ; for the former implies local movement, which is here expressly denied. 

H Somn., I. 31(1.618). 



44 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

which is indeed thus contained, but not by empty space, nor 
by any material substance* either equal in magnitude to 
itself or infinite. t This brings before the mind the idea 
of an essence extended through space, and so participating 
in one of the properties of matter; or, to borrow the simile 
which Augustine applies to his own immature thought, it 
likens God to an infinite sea, enclosing and permeating the 
universe as though the latter were a huge sponge. J Yet I 
believe that Philo was well aware that his language did not 
correspond with the reality, but only reflected those forms of 
the imagination which we so naturally employ when we think 
of the incomprehensible Cause. In the latter of the two pas 
sages just referred to, when he speaks of God as the boundary 
of the heaven, he calls him in the same line its " charioteer 
and pilot," words which are obviously figurative ; and as 
he asserts that the heaven is infinitely great, he cannot have 
conceived of it as literally contained or circumscribed. In 
the former passage he proceeds to explain, in opposition to 
those who assign a place to God either within or without 
the cosmos, on the ground that everything in existence 
occupies some place, that in the opinion of others (evidently 
including himself) the Unbegotten is not like anything created, 
but absolutely transcends it, and leaves even the swiftest 
thought far behind ; but for this very reason it is impossible 
to apprehend the intelligible cosmos except by transference 
from the perceptible, or to think of the immaterial except 
by starting from the material. If the " unchangeable beauty " 
of the higher world can thus be discerned only by an ascent 
from our lower perception into "some unspeakable and inex 
plicable vision," I think we may be justified in referring 
Philo s language respecting the all-containing nature of God, 

* 2<5//a. f Quis rer. div. her., 47 (I. 505). J Confess., VII. 5. 

Cf . Quaest. et Sol. in Ex. II. 40, " Post autem mundum non est locus, sed 
Deus," -which certainly suggests a meaning not strictly reducible to terms of 
space. 



HE IS ABOVE SPACE AND TIME. 45 

not to his dimensions in space, but solely to his trans 
cendence as cause. It is not that he literally contains the 
cosmos as the circumambient air contains the earth, but that 
as the sole Cause he necessarily comprises within his own 
Being every visible effect, which remains as it were enfolded 
in everlasting dependence on his creative will. This view 
alone is in accordance with Philo s clearly defined doctrine of 
the divine unity ; for the notion of possible division is in 
separable from that of extended substance. We may, there 
fore, conclude with some degree of confidence that, in Philo s 
opinion, not only was God incapable of being confined within 
the limits of any locality, but he was altogether exempt from 
the conditions of space. 

If God is above the conditions of place, he is equally 
above time.* This subject is fully unfolded in connection 
with the unchangeableness of God. 

Our sentiments [it is said] are inevitably liable to change, because it is 
impossible for us to foresee either the contingencies of the future or 
the sentiments of other people. But to God everything is manifest, 
for he penetrates even to the recesses of the soul, and sees clearly 
what is invisible to all others, and, making use of his own peculiar 
excellences, forethought and providence, he suffers nothing to escape 
his apprehension, since not even the obscurity of the future affects him, 
for nothing is either obscure or future to God. Future events are shaded 
by coming time ; but God is the Creator even of time, for he is the 
Father of its father, the cosmos being the father of time, having generated 
it through its own movement ; so that time has to God the relation of a 
grandson.f For the perceptible cosmos is the younger son of God, the 

* Post. Cain., 5 (I. 228-9). 

t It is, I think, interesting to compare the similar figure, applied to a different 
subject, in Dante : 

"Filosofia, mi disse, a chi 1 attende, 
Nota non pure in una sola parte, 
Come Natura lo suo corso prende 
Dal divino Intelletto e da sua arte : 
E se tu ben la tua Fisica note, 
Tu troverai non dopo molte carte, 
Che 1 arte vostra quella, quanto puote, 
Segue, come il maestro fa il discente, 
Si che vostr arte a Dio quasi 6 nipote." 

Inferno, Canto xi., 97-105. 



46 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

ideal world being the elder. Time, therefore, having sprung from the move 
ments of this younger son, cannot affect the conditions of the divine 
existence, and nothing is future with God; for his life is not time,* 
but eternity ,f the archetype of time, and in eternity nothing is either 
past or future, but only present. J 

This statement helps to confirm our criticism in regard to 
space ; for it is obvious that Philo elevates God absolutely 
above the conditions of time. Eternity is not, in his view, 
equivalent to infinite duration, of which time is a finite portion ; 
for such duration necessarily involves past, present, and future. 
The essence of time consists in succession ; for, according to 
Philo, our idea of it is derived from moving bodies. But 
phenomenal succession is precisely what is denied in eternity. 
To God the totality of existence is immovably present, and the 
coming and going of events, which pass in an ever-flowing 
stream across the limited field of our consciousness, cannot ruffle 
the stability of his infinite Being. Eternity is the archetype 
of time, not by communicating to it its own unalterable now, 
but because it bears to real being, that is to God, the same 
relation that time bears to phenomenal existence. || 

God s independence of time and space establishes his 
omniscience. As we have seen in the passage which we have 
been just considering, no remoteness of time can conceal 
anything from him to whom time exists not. The same con 
sideration applies to space. No man can hide himself from 
God, who has filled the universe, and of whom not even the 
smallest thing is desert. And what wonder, when one cannot 
emerge even from the material elements, but in flying from 
one necessarily enters another ? Nor can one escape from the 
cosmos, for there is nothing outside it, the whole of the four 
elements having been expended in its composition. Since, 
then, it is impracticable to flee from the work of God, how is 



f 

J Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 276-7). Somn., I. 32 (I. 649) 

|| See Vol. I. pp. 294 sq. 



HIS OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE. 47 

it not rather impossible to run away from its Maker and 
Governor ?* The doctrine of the divine omniscience is brought 
forward chiefly in its relation to the secrets of the human 
soul. The impure and impenitent man need not draw near to 
worship; " for he shall never escape the observation of him 
who sees the things in the recesses of the understanding, and 
walks about in its inmost sanctuaries. "t Those who revile 
the deaf or put a stumbling-block in the way of the blind 
think not of him who holds his hand over and shields those 
who are unable to help themselves ; but they cannot shun the 
notice of God f( the overseer and administrator of all things/ J 
even "of the invisible soul." What is a terror to the evil is 
a joy to the good ; for he who honours parents., or pities the 
poor, or benefits friends, or defends his country, or cares for 
the common rights of all men, is well-pleasing before God, 
who sees all things with sleepless eye, and calls what is 
virtuous to himself. || 

That God is omnipotent follows immediately from the doc 
trine that he is the sole efficient Cause, for any resistance to 
him involves an adverse causality. This is constantly implied, 
though not frequently asserted in Philo s discussions. We are 
not, however, without explicit statements that "all things are 
possible to God."^" 

Having now noticed those attributes of God which bear no 
moral impress, we turn to the consideration of those which 
are expressive of his character. The treatment of these rests 
upon the doctrine of the divine perfection, which is an imme 
diate consequence of the views already explained. If God is 
the sole absolute Cause, exhausting and transcending, as we 
have said, every ideal that discloses itself in our minds, then he 



* Quod det. pot. ins., 42 (I. 220-1). f Q uod ^ eus immut., 2 (I. 274). 

} Justit., 10 (II. 368-9). Human., 2 (II. 384). 

|| Mutat. Norn., 5 (I. 584). 

^ Mundi Op., 14 (I. 10) ; Joseph., 40 (II. 75) ; Vita Mos., I. 31 (II. 108) ; Qu. 
et Sol. in Gen. IV. 130. 



48 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUBE OF GOD. 

must be complete in himself, and contain within his own being 
the sum of all conceivable good. His solitary independence 
is asserted in the strongest manner by Philo. In commenting 
on the words I am thy God "* he says : 

They are employed with a misapplication, and not strictly ; for the 
self-existent Being, regarded simply as self-existent, does not come under 
the category of relation ;t for it is full of itself, and sufficient to itself, 
equally hoth before and after the creation of the universe ; for it is 
unchangeable, requiring nothing else at all, so that all things belong to 
it, but it, strictly speaking, to nothing.^ 

In order to understand this passage we must carefully 
observe the limitation <c regarded simply as self-existent/ and 
not hastily conclude that Philo places God beyond the reach of 
every relation. His statement rests upon the logic of correla 
tive terms, and is well illustrated by the examples in the 
Organon. To take one of these man is not the correlative of 
slave ; for though a man may possess a slave, yet he does so 
not qua man, but qua master. So the conception of pure 
being is complete in itself, and does not carry the thought to 
anything beyond ; but the moment we speak of God as 
Creator we are obliged to think also of things created, or 
when we describe him as Cause we thereby put him in relation 
to things that are caused. We must not suppose, however, 
that Philo is drawing a merely logical distinction, for with 
him logical distinctions are an evidence of reality. God, in the 
totality of his being, is elevated above all relation ; he is 
absolutely complete in himself, and nothing can add to his 
fulness and perfection. Accordingly, when we ascribe to him 
titles which are descriptive of relation, we refer only to certain 
aspects of his being, certain "powers" which, because they 
are directed towards objects, are "quasi relative." || The 
limitation quasi is not used, I think, in order to evade a 
difficulty. It seems to imply that the dependence of 

* According to the LXX. rendering of Gen. xvii. 1. 

j- To yap ov, y ov SOTIV, ow%t T&V irpoQ n. J Mutat. Nom., 4 (I. 582). 

Arist., Org., Cat., vii. 6 sqq. || Qaavei 









HIS PEBFECTION. 49 

the correlative terms is not mutual, but is all on one side, 
and that not the divine side. The powers of the Self-existent 
are put forth into exercise without experiencing any alteration 
in their intrinsic character through the reaction of the objects 
to which they are applied ; so that, although their names in 
volve a relation, it would be truer to say that their objects are 
relative to them than that they are relative to their obiects. 

The fulness of the divine perfection which gives rise to this 
kind of one-sided relation, if I may so describe it, is clearly 
set forth in a passage where Philo alludes to the offerings 
that were presented in the festivals. 

By the institution of festivals for himself G-od laid down a dogma 
which is most necessary for the votaries of philosophy. " Now the 
dogma is this : God alone truly feasts. For he alone rejoices, and alone 
is glad, and alone has good cheer, and to him alone does it belong to keep 
peace unmixed with. war. He is without pain, and without fear, and 
unparticipant of evils, unyielding, unharmed, unwearied, full of pure 
blessedness. His nature is most perfect, or rather God is himself the 
summit and end and boundary of blessedness, sharing in nothing else 
with a view to his improvement, but communicating what is peculiarly 
his own* to all individual beingsf from the fountain of the beautiful, 
himself. For the beautiful things in the cosmos would never have 
become such if they had not been modelled after the really beautiful, the 
unbegotten and happy and incorruptible, as an archetype. "J 

The thought of the exhaustive completeness of God, which 
we meet in the above passages, is repeated again and again 
in various forms. " The full God " is in need of nothing, and 
cannot be benefited by human service. || He is "full of 
himself and sufficient to himself."^ Nothing "takes rank 
with him ; for he needs nothing at all."** God cannot 
literally swear, because there is none competent to be his 
witness ; for " he is all the most precious things to himself, 
kindred, relation, friend, virtue, blessedness, happiness, 
knowledge, understanding, beginning, end, whole, all, judge, 



* To I8iov. t 

J Cherub., 25 (I. 154). Cf. Septen. 5 (II. 280). 
|| Quod det. pot. ins., 16 (I. 202). IT Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 52). 

** Leg. All., II. 1 (I. 66). 
VOL. II. 4 



50 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

opinion, counsel, law, action, sovereignty."* " God is not a 
salesman, lowering the price of his own possessions, but the 
bestower of all things, pouring forth the ever flowing fountains 
of favours, not desiring a recompense ; for neither is he in 
need himself, nor is any created thing competent to bestow a 
gift in return/ t In fine God, " the most self-sufficing, is in 
need of nothing else," being " the first and most perfect good/ 
" the ever flowing fountain of prudence and righteousness and 
every virtue."! 

It is a part of God s perfection that he has no participation 
in evil ; and it follows from this that he cannot be the source 
of evil. "It is/ says Philo, " a fault difficult or impossible 
to cure to say that the Divine is the cause of evils." With 
God are the treasures of good alone. || All his gifts are entire 
and complete.^" He is " the cause only of good things, and of 
no evil at all, since he was himself both the oldest of beings 
and most perfect good."** This doctrine, on which we need 
not dwell further at present, has important consequences in 
connection with the problem of evil, which will be considered 
in its proper place. ft 

We must notice here a doctrine on which we have already 

* Leg. AIL, III. 73 (I. 128). f Cherub., 34 (I. 161). 

t Dec. Orac., 16 (II. 194) ; Sacrificant, 4 (II. 254). For the doctrine that 
God is without wants see also Leg. All., III. 63 (I. 123) ; Cherub., 13 (I. 147) ; 
Post. Cain., 1 (I. 227) ; Dec. Orac., 10 (II. 187) ; Fort., 3 (II. 377). 

See the passages quoted on the last page from Cherub, and Septen., 
and also Mundi Op., 52 (I. 36). 

I! Prof., 15 (I. 557-8.) H SS. Ab. et Cain., 14 (I. 173). 

* Conf. Ling., 36 (I. 432). See also Qu. et Sol. in Gen. I., 100, with the 
Greek in Harris, Fragments, p. 19, ws yap d^To^oQ Kaicias, ovru icai dvairioq. 

ff One passage, however, expressly contradicts the above doctrine : Svo QIHTCIG 
wpopev ysvofievag Kai TrXarTo^ivag Kai a/cpw TtToptvplvttG VTTO 6tov, rr)v 
fitv s eavTtjc pXafispav icai eiriXriirTov Kai Kardparov, n]v <Se ta$k\tfiov Kai 
iiraiVTJ]v, Kai l^ovaav rfjv plv KifiSijXov, rr}v Sk doKipov xapaKTtjpa .... Eioi 
yap tifftrep dyaQwv, ovrw Kai KOKWV Trapa r< Bty Orjaavpoi: Leg. All., III. 34 
(I. 108). If we attempt to reconcile this statement with Philo s habitual 
teaching, we can only do so by saying that the evil nature is not so absolutely, 
but only in relation to the moral life of man, in which the lower always becomes 
evil in presence of a higher. 



HIS FREEDOM FROM PASSION AND SIN. 51 

touched, but which, belongs to the idea of the divine perfection. 
The nature of God is free from pain and fear and every 
passion.*" This follows directly from the fundamental con 
ception of God as cause. As efficiency is his property, so 
susceptibility is the property of that which is created; and, 
therefore, as the passions express our susceptibility in relation 
to certain objects, they cannot affect the supreme causal nature. 
The same conclusion follows from moral considerations; for 
whatever we do on account of wrath or fear or pain or 
pleasure or any other passion is confessedly blameworthy, but 
whatever we do with right reason and knowledge is laudable. t 
Nevertheless Philo does not hesitate, in a very serious passage, 
to speak of the " wrath of God J" as a thing to be carefully 
shunned. But in doing so there can be no doubt that he 
consciously used language which did not correspond with his 
philosophical thought, and that he meant only to express that 
passionless opposition to sin which we may reasonably ascribe 
to the Divine ; for, as we have seen, he believed that the use 
of this kind of inadequate or erroneous language was necessary, 
and in regard to this very passion of anger, he says elsewhere 
that it is properly predicated of men, but only figuratively of 
the Self-existent. || 

From the reasonableness of God, thus wholly undisturbed 
by passion, it follows that he is sinless. This is, of course, 
everywhere implied, and in one passage it is distinctly asserted. 
" Not to commit any sin at all is the property of God,^[ and 
perhaps, also, of a divine man."** This statement derives 
its chief interest from the added words, which show that 
Philo did not regard the attribute of sinlessness as absolutely 
incommunicable. A divine man was conceivable in whom this 
element of the supreme perfection might dwell. We need not 
suppose that this concession is inconsistent with the belief that 

* Abr., 36 (II. 29). f Quod Deus immut., 15 (I. 283). J Opyij Otov. 

Somn.,-11. 26 (I. 682). || Quod Deus immut., 1. c. IF "iSiov 9eov. 

** De Poenitentia, 1 (II. 405). 

4 * 



52 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 

sinlessness is in the strictest sense the property of God; 
for it does not cease to be so by being lent out, as it were, for 
the enjoyment of others, and the sinless man could become so 
only by sharing in this high gift, and incorporating what was 
really divine. 

A parallel to this communication of the Divine occurs in 
connection with the happiness of God. We have recently 
cited a remarkable passage in which Philo insists on the 
divine joyousness. The thought is one which is often repeated 
in his writings. "The divine blessedness/ * "the blessed 
and happy nature of God,"f are expressions which he uses 
when nothing in the context particularly suggests them. 
Elsewhere he says that " the nature of God alone participates 
in perfect blessedness and happiness. "{ Here the word 
"participates " is not philosophically accurate ; for it implies 
that happiness is something external to God, of which he is 
only a sharer. This cannot be intended, unless we have 
already gone fatally astray in our interpretation; and we 
may recognize in this example the ease with which language 
is used in relation to God which is strictly applicable only in 
the case of lower beings. A little farther on Philo adds, more 
philosophically, that the genus of joy belongs to no other 
than the Father of the universe. But notwithstanding this 
exclusiveness of possession, joy is not wholly unknown to the 
human race. Though he possesses it, God does not grudge 
its use to the worthy. He bestows as much as the capacity of 
the recipient will allow ; but joy mingled with pain is all that 
human imperfection will receive, even as the pure light of 
heaven is seen by us commingled with our dusky air. 

It is a part of the divine happiness to enjoy perfect rest and 
peace. 

Hence [we are told] tlie Sabbath, which means rest, is repeatedly said 
by Moses to be the Sabbath of God, not of men; for the one 

* Cherub., 6 (I. 142). f Special, leg., IV. 8 (II. 343). 

i Abr., 36 (II. 29). Mirk K ovaa. 



HIS BEST AND PEACE. 53 

entity that rests ia God. But by rest is meant " not inactivity 
since the Cause of all is by nature efficient, never ceasing from 
making the most beautiful things but the most unlaboured energy, 
without distress, with, ample ease." On the other hand, even the 
sublimest objects in nature, the sun and moon and entire heaven and 
cosmos, are distressed by continual movements which are not at their 
own disposal, and the changing seasons give the plainest evidence of their 
weariness. But God changes not, and has no weakness, and is therefore 
unwearied, and, though he makes all things, will never cease to rest.* 

The same idea is brought out in an allegory of unusual 
beauty. 

The city of God is called by the Hebrews Jerusalem, a name which 
signifies the vision of peace.f Wherefore we must not seek for the 
city of the Self-existent in the regions of earth for it is not built of 
wood and stone but in a soul unwarlike and keen- sighted, which has 
preferred the contemplative and peaceful life. For what more venerable 
and holy house could one find for God than an understanding devoted 
to contemplation, eager to see all things, and not even in a dream 
desiring sedition or confusion? For the " Spirit which is accustomed 
to associate with me unseen " testifies that " God alone is the most 
absolute and real peace, but begotten and corruptible matter is all 
continual war ; for God is volition,;}; but matter is necessity. Whosoever, 
then, is able to leave war, and necessity, and genesis, and corruption, 
and to go over to the Unbegotten, to the incorruptible, to the volitional, 
to peace, would justly be said to be a dwelling-place and city of God. 
Let it, then, make no difference to thee to name the same subject either 
vision of peace or vision of God ; for of the many -named powers of the 
Self-existent peace is not only a member, but even a leader."|| 

In these passages the weariness and struggle of nature 
are ascribed to the necessity under which it labours. The 
connection of strife and fatigue with necessity is not imme 
diately apparent ; but it is probably inferred from the analogy 
of man, who, when he labours under compulsion, soon grows 
tired, and inwardly wages war against the demands of his 
situation. The human experience is easily transferred to the 
heavenly bodies, which were also supposed to be intelligent 
beings, and from them to the entire cosmos. We cannot help 
remembering St. Paul s description of the whole creation as 



* Cherub., 26 (I. 154-5). f Taking the word from HSH and 

$ EKOVCIOV. AvayKrj. \\ Somn., if 38 (I. 691-2). 



54: THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

groaning and travailing, waiting to be delivered from the 
bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the 
children of God.* In opposition to the toil and trouble of 
material nature is the peace of God, which, as we can readily 
understand, is the immediate result of unrestricted volitional 
energy. Where the same high purpose flows on undisturbed 
and unimpeded, the sense of effort and confusion must dis 
appear, and leave behind an eternal rest and peace. 

If, before the creation of the universe, God was so perfect, 
so sufficient to himself, so blissful, why did he make things 
which he could not need ? To this question Philo returns the 
answer which Plato had given before him f : (C Because he was 
good and munificent," J and did not grudge to matter, which 
of itself had nothing beautiful, a share of his own best nature. 
And as the goodness of the Self-existent was the reason for 
creation, so he continued to bestow abundant blessings both 
on the universe and on its parts, not because he judged any 
thing to be worthy of favour, but having regard to his eternal 
goodness, the oldest of his graces, and supposing that it 
belonged to his happy and blessed nature to do good.|| Philo 
insists upon this goodness so repeatedly and in such varied 
terms that we must devote a little space to the survey of 
its activity. 

In the first place, then, God was, by virtue of his goodness, 
the Cause, the Maker, the Generator of the universe.^! In 
connection with creation several questions of the highest 
importance will arise, but at present we must be content to fix 



* Eomans viii. 19, sqq. f See Timaeus 29 E. J Mutat. Norn., 5 (I. 585). 

Mundi Op., 5 (I. 5). J. G. Miiller well points out that Philo imports into 
the meaning of TO ayaQov the Hebrew conception of God s loving-kindness 
which does not belong to it in Plato [Des Juden Philo Buch von der Welt- 
schopfung. Herausgegeben und erklart von J. G. Miiller, Berlin, 1841 ; p. 156]. 

|| Quod Deus immut., 23 (I. 288-9). For the reason of creation see also 
Cherub., 35 (I. 162) ; Leg. All., III. 24 (I. 102). 

f It is sufficient to refer to Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2); 61, p. 42; Cherub., 13 
(I. 147) ; 35, p. 162 ; Animal, sacr. idon. 6 (II. 242) ; Nobil., 5 (II. 442). 



HIS PEOVIDENCE. 55 

firmly in our memory the fact that, whatever agents or 
methods he may employ, God is regarded as the sole source 
of creative causality, and as having acted, not under the 
suggestion of any advocate, but from himself alone.* 

In the second place, God must exercise providence over 
the cosmos, caring both for the whole and for the parts. The 
doctrine of providence is involved in the very conception of 
a benevolent Creator, " for it is necessary by the laws and 
ordinances of nature that that which has made should always 
care for what has been generated, even as parents provide for 
children.^f Hence God is the cc saviour and benefactor" of 
the world. J "Arrayed in sovereignty, he holds the reins of 
the cosmos by an autocratic law and right, providing not only 
for those who are more worthy of preference, but also for 
those who seem to be more obscure." He is the one leader 
and sovereign and king, to whom alone it rightfully pertains 
to preside over and administer all things, "|| "the Archon of 
the great city, the general of the invincible host, the pilot who 
always manages the universe with saving care."^[ 

In the exercise of his providence God s goodness is poured 
forth with unrestricted prodigality. Being munificent, he 
graciously bestows good things upon all, even upon the 
imperfect, provoking them to the acquisition and zealous 
pursuit of virtue, and showing at the same time that his 
superabundant wealth is sufficient even for those who will 
not be greatly benefited. He displays this very evidently 
in the case of inanimate nature. For whenever he rains in 



* Ovdevi fit TrapaKXrjTy T LQ yup ijv ere pOQ ; /tovy de kavrtp 
Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). 

f Mundi Op., 61 (I. 41). See also 3, p. 2 ; Special, leg., III. 34 (II. 331) ; 
Praem. et poen., 7 (II. 415). 

+ Animal, sacr. idon., 6 (II. 242). Swr^p also Quod Deus immut., 34 (I. 296) ; 
Migrat. Abr., 5 (I. 440) ; 22, p. 455 ; Quis rer. div. her., 12 (I. 481) ; Abr., 
27 (II. 21) ; Septen., 23 (II. 296) ; Praem. et Poen., 19 (II. 427) ; Exsecrat., 
8 (II. 435) ; Fragm., II. 677 (Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II., 2) ; Tisch., Philon., p. 43, 
1. 3. Migrat. Abr., 33 (I. 465). || Conf. Ling., 33 (I. 431). 

IF Dec. Orac., 12 (II. 189). 



56 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

the sea,, and showers down fountains in the most desert places, 
and waters the thin and rough and barren soil, making rivers 
gush forth in floods, does he not display the excess of his 
riches and goodness ?* In accordance with this rule he 
tempers judgment with mercy, and exercises pity for the 
benefit even of the unworthy ; and he not only pities after he 
has judged, but he judges after he has pitied ; for with him 
pity is older than judgment."t In varied figures Philo speaks 
of " the abundant riches of the gracesj of God/ which 
are awarded without stint to the worthy. They issue from 
ever flowing fountains, themselves perennial, unceasing, and 
without intermission. 1 1 Again, they are personified, and 
become the virgin and immortal daughters of God, whom 
an immovable law of nature binds in inseparable unison.^f 
The kindness of God is described by many predicates. He is 
munificent,"** giver of wealth, ft kind and lover of man,JJ 
benevolent, propitious. |||| He manifests equity and kind 
ness, TflT an ^ " his goodness and propitious power are the 
harmony of all things.""*** 

In speaking of the unrestricted prodigality of the divine 
beneficence, we refer only to its own intrinsic character, for 
it is in fact restricted by the limited capacity of those who 
experience it. The graces of God are uncircumscribed, but 

* Leg. AIL, I. 13 (I. 50). f Q uod Deus immut., 16 (I. 284). 

J Or favours, xupiriQ. Leg. AIL, III. 56 (I. 119). 

i| Mundi Op., 60 (I. 41) ; Cherub., 34 (I. 161) ; Sacrificant, 5 (II. 254). 

^ Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232) ; Migrat. Abr., 7 (I. 441) ; Vit. Mos., II. 1 (II. 135). 

** i\6()wpo. See, besides the passages already cited, Cherub., 6 (I. 142) ; 
9, p. 144 ; Post. Cain., 8 (I. 231) ; Quis rer. div. her., 7 (I. 477) ; Plantat. Noe, 
20 (I. 342) ; 21 (I. 343) ; Migrat. Abr., 6 (I. 441) ; Prof., 13 (I. 556) ; Praem. 
et Poen., 20 (II. 428). 

ff nXourodorTje, Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232). 

KOI 0iXdv0,ow7ro, Abr., 36 (II. 29). 
fc, Vita Mos., II. 1 (II. 135) ; III. 31, p. 171. 

, Vit. Mos., II. 1; Special, leg., II. 5 (II. 274); De Parentibus 
colendis, 9, p. 28, of Mai s edition, this treatise not being in Mangey; 
Fort., 7 (II. 382) ; and several other places. 

IT IT Exsecrat., 9 (II. 436). *** Vit. Mos., III. 14 (II. 155). 



HIS PEOVIDENCE. 57 

not so the faculties of their recipients ; for it is not the nature 
of that which is created to receive benefits, as it is the nature 
of God to confer them, since his powers are infinite, but the 
created, being too weak to receive their vastness, would faint 
unless the lot of each were measured out in due proportion."^ 
If the stream of mercies carne with its own inexhaustible 
flood, the plain would be like a lake and a marsh instead 
of fruitful soiLf Or we may take an example from the 
sun, whose flame we cannot look upon unmixed, for the sight 
would be extinguished by the brilliance of its rays ; yet the 
sun is only a single work of God, a mere aggregate of ether, 
and how, then, can we view unmixed those unbegotten powers 
which, round about him, flash forth the most splendid light ? 
Thus no mortal, not even the whole heaven and cosmos, could 
receive in their purity the knowledge and wisdom and pru 
dence and righteousness, or any of the other virtues of God. 
The Creator, therefore, in condescension to our natural weak 
ness, is not willing either to benefit or punish as he can, but 
only in proportion to the capacity which he sees in those who 
are to be affected. J Similarly, he does not deliver oracles 
conformably to the greatness of his own eloquence, for who 
could contain the force of the divine words ? For this reason 
the Israelites said to Moses, " Speak thou to us, and let not 
God speak to us, lest we die." For if God wished to display 
his riches, not even the whole world would hold them; but 
wishing us to derive benefit from what he bestows, he 
alternates his gifts, so that the continual enjoyment of the 
same favours may not produce satiety and harm. If creation 
were ever without the divine graces, it would utterly perish ; 
but it cannot bear their excessive and unsparing rush, and 
therefore its strength is the measure of their flow.|| 

* Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). 

t Quis rer. div. her., 7 (I. 477). J Quod Deus imnrat., 17 (I. 284-5). 

Ex. xx. 19. 

|| Post. Cain., 43 (I. 253-4). See also Ebriet., 9 (I. 362) ; Somn., I, 22 
(I. 642) ; Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218). 



58 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD. 

While Philo thus retained an assured faith in providence, he 
was quite aware of the objections which were brought against 
it. These objections are discussed at great length in two 
treatises " On Providence/ which have been preserved in an 
Armenian version, and from the second of which Eusebius 
quotes considerable portions in his Praeparatio Evangelii. 
There is little that is original in the line of argument, and 
what is most remarkable in these essays is their purely 
philosophical and Hellenic character, which broadly dis 
tinguishes them from the expository and Judaic colouring 
of most of Philo s writings. The first is open to suspicion, 
and cannot be safely appealed to in evidence of Philo s 
opinions.* It would not greatly advance our knowledge of 
the Alexandrian philosophy, and it would occupy a dispro 
portionate space, to give an analysis of the contents even 
of the second treatise, and it must suffice to notice a few 
of the more salient points. 

The constantly recurring arguments against providence 
are mainly of two kinds. First, the existence of pain, which 
is inflicted by various natural agents, appears iD consistent with 
the supreme control of benevolent design. The violence of 
winds and rain, hail and snow, lightning, earthquakes and 
pestilence, wild beasts and noxious reptiles, inflict the most 
terrible calamities on mankind. f In reply to this, several 
considerations are urged. First, in regard to the whole ques 
tion of providence, it must be remembered that the doctrine 
does not imply that God is the cause of everything. Of what 
is really evil, or what lies outside the course of nature, God is 
no more the cause, than the beneficent law by which a virtuous 
state is administered is the cause of the violence and rapine 
which spring from the wickedness of the inhabitants.}; 
Secondly, of those natural agencies which are occasionally 
attended by calamitous results, some., like wind and rain, were 

* See Vol. I. p. 306, Note. f Prov. II. 87-97. J Prov. II. 82. 



HIS PKOVIDENCE. 59 

not intended for the rain of sailors and farmers, but for the 
benefit of the whole human race, for they purify the earth 
and air, and so contribute to the support of animals and 
plants; and if a few suffer, it is no wonder, for they are 
an insignificant portion of that entire class of men for whose 
benefit providence is exercised.* Again, some infliction of 
pain may be necessary to ensure the safety of the entire 
system. The man who takes a just view will rejoice at what 
ever is done without moral evil, even if it do not conduce 
to pleasure, and will regard it as designed for the preservation 
of the universe. A physician sometimes in dangerous diseases 
amputates parts of the body in order to procure health for the 
remainder, and a pilot, when storms assail him, casts over the 
cargo in order to save the passengers, and no blame, but, on 
the contrary, praise, attaches to these actions. In the same 
way we must always admire the nature of the universe, and be 
pleased with everything that is done apart from voluntary ill, 
considering, not whether anything conduces to pleasure, but 
whether the cosmos is directed safely, like a well-governed 
city.f Another consideration is that some destructive agencies 
are only accidental consequences of the primary design. We 
can easily find illustrations of this in human affairs. Often 
through the showy liberality of the master of a gymnasium 
some of the vulgar wash in oil instead of water, and so make 
the ground slippery ; but no one will ascribe the slipperiness 
to the providence of the master. In cities you may observe 
the porches generally inclining towards the south, so that 
those who walk in them may be warm in winter, and enjoy the 
breeze in summer. A consequence follows which was not 
intended by the builders : the shadows thrown by the supports 
indicate the hours. So again, fire is an essential work of 
nature, but smoke is its consequence. Nevertheless, even 
smoke is sometimes valuable, by betraying the advance of 

* II. 99 ; Fragments, II. 642. f Praem. et poen., 5 (II. 413). 



60 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. 

an enemy when fire is invisible owing to the brightness of the 
sunshine. Thus, in the realm of nature, the rainbow and halo 
and similar phenomena are merely accompaniments of her 
primary works. Eclipses are consequences of the divine 
natures of the sun and moon; bat they serve also as indi 
cations either of the death of kings or the destruction of 
cities. In the same manner earthquakes, pestilences, thunder 
bolts, and similar things, though said to be sent by God, are 
not really so ; for God is the cause of no evil whatever. The 
changes in the elements produce these things, not as primary 
works of nature, but as consequences which follow the neces 
sary and primary works.* And lastly, just as states support 
executioners, not through respect for their sentiments, but for 
the utility of their services, so he who cares for that great 
city the cosmos, appoints tyrants as public executioners over 
those states in which he perceives violence, injustice, impiety, 
and other evils ; and often, without employing such sub 
ordinates, he inflicts the needed punishment through his own 
agency, and sends famine, pestilence, or earthquake, by which 
crowds are every day destroyed, and a great part of the 
habitable world is desolated out of regard for virtue. f There 
is some contradiction between these last two explanations, 
so far as earthquakes and pestilence are concerned ; but in 
regard to such causes of suffering they may be accepted as 
alternative hypotheses. 

The suggestion of a moral purpose in pain leads to the 
second difficulty. If the world is righteously governed, why 
is pain distributed with such a startling neglect of moral 
considerations ? Why have the wicked an abundance of all 
good things, riches, fame, honours, health, beauty, strength, 
while those who pursue wisdom and virtue are almost all poor, 
obscure, in a low position, without the means of support, 
weak in their whole body, dull in their senses, languid, 

* Prov. II. 99-102 ; Fragments, II. 643-4. 
f Prov. II. 31-2 ; Fragments, II. 642. 



HIS PROVIDENCE. 61 

diseased, dyspeptic ? Why have a Polycrates and a Dionysius 
everything that heart can wish, while a Socrates is done to 
death by the plots of a worthless wretch ?* Why are the just 
subject to the fear o death when a battle is imminent, and 
the righteous and wicked overwhelmed with death at the same 
time and place when a ship founders at sea ?t The first 
answer is an attempt to limit the extent of the problem. 
It does not follow that if certain persons are esteemed good 
by us, they are really so, for the means of judgment possessed 
by God are more accurate than those enjoyed by the human 
mind. We have no tribunal which is competent to distinguish 
between the righteous and the wicked, and secret sins may 
have been committed by those who are apparently just.J 
Then we must remember that providence takes a compre 
hensive view, and that the righteous could not be exempt 
from suffering without altering the whole constitution of 
things, or suspending the laws of nature for individual benefit. 
Having mortal bodies we are necessarily exposed to human 
troubles. Bad men may plot against the good. If we are in 
pestilential air, we must suffer from disease. If the wise man 
is exposed to the rain he will be wet ; in the north wind he 
will shiver; in summer he will be hot. Those who live in 
places where crime abounds must submit to the penalty ; and 
all who brave the wintry seas accept an equality of risk. 
The good man readily acquiesces in this condition, for the 
things which the wicked prize are not the highest objects 
of human pursuit, or the sources of real blessedness. If 
you have made your own divinity, your mind, the slave of 
innumerable masters, desire, pleasure, fear, pain, folly, in 
temperance, cowardice, injustice, it never can be blessed ; and 
no one could ever suppose that it would be so who was once 

* Prov. II. 3-14. 

t (I. 59). 

I Prov. (I. 60) ; II. 102 ; Frag., II. 644. 

Prov. II., 24 and 102 ; Frag., II. 638 and 644. 



62 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF GOD. 

smitten with admiration of the God-like good and beautiful. 
The wise man desires not wealth and glory, but the acquisition 
of virtue, and to penetrate to the audience-chamber of royal 
reason.* 

The foregoing sketch, in which, for the sake of clearness, I 
have followed an order of my own, may suffice to show that 
Philo was provided with reasons which appeared to justify the 
ways of God, and how largely he followed Greek models in the 
discussion of this difficult question. 

We ought not to leave this subject without noticing the 
fact that, in speaking of the providential arrangements of the 
world, Philo sometimes substitutes nature for God. It will be 
sufficient to illustrate this usage by a few examples. He says 
that " all-provident nature "t assigned the face as the most 
suitable locality for the senses. J " Nature" appointed man 
the ruler of plants and animals. Though there are co-operating 
causes in the production of plants and animals, yet nature is 
the highest and elder and real cause ; and it is the fountain 
and root and foundation of the arts and sciences, and, unless 
nature be first laid down as a basis, everything is imperfect. || 
Of these passages the last is peculiarly important, because it is 
the writer s object to show why first-fruits were dedicated to 
God, and at the same time it is apparent that nature is not used 
as synonymous with God, but to denote the divine constitution 
of things, brought about by the divine agency within 
them.f 

After the foregoing exposition, we shall not think that Philo 
has fallen into a feeble and unphilosophical contradiction when, 
having denied that God has any name, he yet speaks of the 



* Prov., II. 16 sqq. ; Frag., II. 635 sqq. 

7 H Travra 7rpofj.t]0ovfitvr] (f>vai. I Leg. AIL, I. 11 (I. 49). 

Agr. Noe, 2 (I. 301). || Quis rer. div. her., 23 (I. 489). 

IT See also Special. Leg., III. 36 (II. 332), tTf.KTrjvaro ?/ <}>vai 
Human., 9 (II. 390); Exsecrat., 7 (II. 434), &v [av9pw7rwv~\ f.ua /uj/r/yp >} 



HIS MANY NAMES. 6a 

" many-titled name of God,"* and himself applies to him, 
besides the customary term ff God/ quite an extraordinary 
number of appellations.t There was no name which could 
express his essence, and be regarded as the spoken equivalent 
of his incomprehensible being ; yet there were many names by 
which he might be referred to for the purposes of intelligent 
communication, though they denoted only some of his modes 
of operation or some partial aspects of his full and inexhaustible 
perfection. How the transition was conceived between unity 



* Dec. Orac., 19 (II. 196), rip TOV Oeov 

f The following list, though probably far from complete, will convey a fair 
impression of Philo s usage. There are, no doubt, many passages which I have 
failed to note, as I did not originally intend to make an exhaustive list ; but the 
numbers attached to each epithet, representing the number of times that I have 
actually made a note of the expression, will probably give a pretty correct notion 
of the proportional use of the various terms. wv occurs perhaps 29 times ; 
but 18 times the gender is doubtful owing to the case ; ro ov, 38 times; 
ov, 3 ; TO TTOOQ a\i]9iiav ov, 3 ; and o OVTIOQ &v very frequently. Tow 
(gender doubtful) occurs once ; TO \iovov once ; TOV d idiov (gender doubtful), once. 
dytvvijTOQ is found 4 times; TO 0Iov, 12; TO OITIOV, 23; 6 mrtof, 1; TOV 
TTcivTW aiTiov Kcti TraTpog, 1 ; TO T&V o\o)v a iriov, 2; 6 rwv o\iov VOVQ, 4 ; 
6 VOVQ TWV o\h)v, 1 ; 6 TOV TravTOQ VOVQ, 1 ; r} TWV oXwr "^v^ij, 1 > ">! TOV TTUVTOQ 
^w%?7, 1 ; 6 SijfuiovpyoQ, 6; 6 TrotrjrriQ, 4; 6 TTOUJTIJQ TU>V oXwv, 4; 6 KooyiOTrotof, 
1; 6 rjysp.<tiv, 2; 6 7rar?/p, 15; 6 OeoQ o TraTrjp, 1 ; 6 irdvTwv vrarjyp, 1 ; o TOV 
7rar?}p, 1 ; o Trar^p TOV Travrog, 2 ; 6 irarrjo TO!V 6Xwv, 11 ; 6 TOJV oXwv 
, 6 aykvvr]TOQ Otoc;, Kai TCI 0vjj,7ravTa yevvtov, 2 ; 6 TOV Kofffiov TraTrjp, 1 ; 
o ret oXa yevvrjaag TraTrjp, 1 ; 6 dyivrjTog KO.I TTCIVTIOV Trar^p, 1; o TrptfffBvTspog 
dpxujv Kat 7/yfjUWj/, 1 ; 6 Trarijp, 6 (iXwv 6e 6f, 1 ; 6 ytwiivctQ avTOvg [rout,* 
aTrXa^fTg] Trarr/p, 1; o TUJV OVTMV Trar^p, 1; 6 7rar/}p Kat ?/yf/iwj/ TWV 

ffV/J.7TUVTtt)V, 2 .... TOV KO(T/iOU, 1 .... TOV TCaVTOQ, 1 ; 6 TOV TTUVTOQ ?}yjU(J^ 

Kai TraTrjp, 1 ; 6 KTiffTrjg /cai 7rarr}p TOV iravTOQ, 1 ; T&V oXtuv KT KJTIJQ KO.I 
, 1; o TroirjTrjg Kai TraTrjp, 2; o 7rar?)p Kai TroujTr is, 1; 6 TroirjTrjg /cat 
U>V o\<i)V, 3 .... TOV TTavTO(;, 1 ; 6 ?rar;}p Kat TTOII]TIIQ TWV oXav, 1 ; 7rar/}p 

Kflt TTOlT)Tf/i; TOV KOfffJLOV, 2 ; 6 Ctykvi]TQ Kttl TTOirjTIJG, 1 ; O 7TaTj)p (Cat (3affl\VQ 

TO>V o\(DV, 1 ; yervr]Tr}Q raJV oXwv, 1 ; o r)yf/i<ui TOV TTUVTOQ, 1 ; o TWV o\wv 
iiytfjLwv, 5; 6 Travrjyfuwv, 1; 6 Travr]ytpuv Otog, 1; 6 TOV TTUVTOQ T/yf/twi/, 3; 
6 Qtcjv Kai avOpwTTiiJV r/yfjuwv, 1 ; 6 TravTtov j/yf/iwv, 3 ; 6 TTOL^T^JQ Kai ryyfjuwv 
Tovoe TOV TravTOQ, 1 ; 6 StaTroTtjg aTrdvTwv, 1 ; 6 irainrovTaviQ, 1 ; 6 trwr^p, 4 ; 
6 rarr}p TOV TCUVTOQ, 1 ; 6 aiorfjp QSOQ, 4 ; 6 (rar?/jO Kat t XfW QtoQ , 1 ; 6 fiovog 
GWTijp, 1 ; o fiuvoc; (T0(f>6(;, 7 ; otTrtartup 0fof, 1. 

The above list, to one who attempts to penetrate its religious and theological 
significance, will not be without instruction. 



$ THE EXISTENCE AND NATUBE OF GOD. 

and manifoldness, between the absolute simplicity of the 
supreme Mind and the endless variety of his tokens in the 
cosmos, between the stillness and peace of an eternal and 
immutable nature and the stir and rush of the phenomenal 
world, must be the subject of our consideration in the following 
chapter. 



CHAPTER Y. 

THE DIVINE POWERS. 

IN referring to the questions with which philosophy concerns 
itself, we saw that one of these related to the powers by which 
the universe was held together.* The reason for this inquiry 
is sufficiently obvious. Detached heaps of unrelated phenomena. 
would not constitute a cosmos. But the human intellect 
already clearly perceived that the universe was one vast 
system, in which the remotest parts had certain definite 
relations to the whole and to one another, and the incessant 
changes which were observed proceeded according to some 
fixed sequence or law. Thus was indicated the presence of 
some mysterious and pervasive power which constrained the- 
multiplicity of phenomena into a cosmical unity. An analogy 
for this is found in that smaller system which lies so near to 
our consciousness, the human organism, with its central soul 
and its extended energy pervading every limb. Such thoughts 
seem to have been in Philo s mind when, alluding to the 
journeys of Abraham, he wrote, " Travel through the greatest 
and most perfect man, this cosmos, and consider how the parts 
are disjoined by places, but united by powers, and what is this 
invisible bond of symmetry and unity for all things. "-f -A. 
further reason for inquiry is found in the fact that force is 
the characteristic mark of a cosmos as distinguished from 



* Spec. Leg., III. 34 (II. 331) ; Swapus alg avvk^Tai /ecu norepov avrat 
awuctra fj acrwjitarot. 
f Migrat. Abr. 39 (I. 471). 

VOL. II. 5 



66 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

amorphous matter. Whenever matter assumes a distinctive 
form, the change must be due to a force impressing itself on 
the susceptible material. So long as that form remains, the 
presence of the force is still indicated ; for without it matter 
would necessarily sink back into a condition destitute of 
quality, and thus we see that form and force are, if not 
identical, at least coincident. Now, the visible universe 
presents an endless variety of forms, which stand to one 
another in certain logical relations ; and accordingly, though 
our notion of force is one, and is justly expressed by a singular 
noun, we are compelled to speak of forces, such as the habitual 
or conservative, the organic, the vital, the rational, and count 
less others, arranged " according to species and genera."* 

We see, then, that the contemplation of the world around us 
opens an inquiry into the nature of cosmical forces. We must 
now connect this result with positions which we have already 
attained. Since God is the Creator of the cosmos, and 
ultimately the sole efficient Cause, it is evident that he is the 
one fountain of power, and the cosmical forces must be at the 
same time divine forces. In treating of the nature of God we 
met with divine powers, into the precise character and functions 
of which we did not then pause to inquire. Some of these, 
like the creative and providential, evidently bring God into 
connection with the universe, and take their place among the 
forces of the cosmos. Thus, whichever way our thought 
travels, whether from the universe to God or from God to the 
universe, we still meet with divine powers as the connecting 
link. To determine the nature of these powers, and their 
relation to the world and to God, is the task which must next 
engage our attention. 

Before entering on our exposition, we must observe that 
there is no part of Philo s philosophy that presents greater 
perplexities or has received more divergent interpretations. 

* Leg. All., II. 7 (I. 71). The line of thought here sketched will be justified 
and developed as we proceed. 



DIFFICULTIES OF THE INQUIRY. 67 

Our difficulties arise from various sources. The character of 
ancient thought differs widely in some important respects from 
our own, and what from our point of view appear to be contra 
dictory doctrines, derived from opposing systems, and placed 
in unreconciled juxtaposition, might wear a more harmonious 
aspect if we could transport ourselves into the old-world circle 
of ideas ; and this we can do only through an exercise of 
philosophical imagination. Again, it is, as we have seen, fully 
admitted by Philo himself that our language about God is 
necessarily inadequate, and that statements may be used for 
purposes of instruction which will not bear the scrutiny of 
rigorous thought. Connected with this is Philo s rhetorical 
style, and copious use of figurative language. To make the 
due allowance for popular or poetical expression requires a 
delicate employment of critical skill. Allegorical interpre 
tation gives rise to further difficulties ; for Philo s terminology 
is repeatedly influenced by the passage on which he is com 
menting, and it is not always easy to decide whether some 
particular word is to be understood strictly or as the passing 
symbol of some higher spiritual truth. Lastly, there are 
passages which are so far inconsistent with one another that, 
if they stood alone, we should deduce from them incompatible 
doctrines ; how are we to deal with these passages ? The 
easiest and most obvious plan is to accept the inconsistency, 
and say that Philo, according to the varying exigencies of his 
system, adopted now this doctrine and now that, and never 
perceived that they were in absolute contradiction to one 
another. In regard to some subordinate points, we may readily 
admit that the mind of so unsystematic a writer might be 
exposed to this kind of oblivion ; but in regard to a vital and 
central doctrine of his philosophy we can hardly help surmising 
that the fault lies in the interpreters rather than the author, 
and we cannot acquiesce in this easy riddance of difficulties 
unless the fair laws of exegesis leave us no other alternative. 
It seems a truer plan to select among these passages the 



68 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

statements wliicli are least ambiguous, and, taking them as 
our clue, to seek the higher conception in which the incon 
sistencies will disappear; then, if this cannot be found, to 
consider whether opposing statements may not be explained 
as figurative, or even as a temporary conformity to views 
which had no serious and permanent hold upon PhnVs mind ; 
and only in the last resort to admit that our author did not 
know his own thoughts, or was incapable of comparing them. 
For the execution of this plan we cannot lay down any rules : 
everything depends on thoroughness of examination, and 
candour and insight of philosophical judgment. 

Throughout the following discussion we must bear in mind 
what has been previously said respecting the analogy between 
the divine and the human, and the differences by which they 
are contrasted.* The human genus is, says Philo, "the 
counterpart of the powers of God, a manifest image of the 
invisible nature, a created image of the eternal." t These 
words form a compendium of the view which we have fully 
unfolded elsewhere. The powers of the human soul fall 
under our experience, and thereby furnish us with the only 
key by which we can unlock the mysteries that lie beyond our 
experience ; but, in applying this key, we must always re 
member the infinite distinction between the created and the 
uncreated. 

Addressing ourselves now to the question proposed at the 
opening of this chapter, and starting from the point most 
accessible to our experience, we observe that the world is full 
of forces, which combine its multifarious parts into a cosmos. 
" This universe/ we are told, " is held together by invisible 
powers, which the Fabricator stretched from the extremities 
of earth to the ends of heaven, making excellent provision that 
the things bound should not be loosened ; for the powers are 
bonds of the universe that cannot be broken ."J God has 

* Vol. II. pp. 3 and 10 sqq. t Vita Mos., II. 12 (II. 144). 

$ Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464). 



PHYSICAL FOKCES. 



69 



extended his powers through, earth and water, air and heaven, 
leaving no part of the cosmos desert; through them he has 
collected and bound all things indissolubly, and thus his power 
has embosomed and permeated the universe."* Hence the 
powers are properly described as " unifying ";f f r j being 
fastened around the universe, they prevent it from being 
dissolved and corrupted into its component parts. ; Owing to 
this function they are most frequently compared to bonds; 
but they are also likened to pillars which sustain the whole 
cosmos as a house. 

These powers, so far as they affect the material world, 
correspond with what we designate as physical forces, although 
both the philosophical and the scientific conception of them in 
Philo may be different from ours. Thus it is said that the 
nature or organism which distinguishes plants is composed of 
several powers, those of nutrition, change, and growth. || There 
are " powers in bodies " which affect the senses according to 
certain properties.^ We apprehend the Cause "from the 
cosmos and its parts and the powers existing in these.""*"* 
The language deviates more widely from our own when the 
four elements are described as powers,ft and when it is stated 
that God bestows some of his benefits " through earth, water, 
air, sun, moon, heaven, other incorporeal powers. "{J This 
inclusion of natural objects among the powers hardly receives 
adequate explanation from Keferstein s suggestion that 
" Philo regards them as the dwelling-place of the divine 
powers." In accordance with our previous exposition, we must 
rather suppose that the powers constitute the sole reality of 
natural objects by differentiating them from otherwise indis 
tinguishable matter. The sun, moon, and other bodies are 



* Conf. Ling., 27 (I. 425). 
% Conf. Ling., 32 (I. 430). 
|j Quod Deus immut., 8 (I. 278). 
** Leg. All., III. 32 (I. 107). 



t EvoniKat, Plantat. Noe, 20 (I. 342). 

Frag., II. 655. 

11 Conf. Ling., 13 (I. 412). 

ft Quis rer. div. her., 57 (I. 513). 

P. 188. 






70 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

not independent entities which, divine powers may inhabit or 
may leave, but they are sun, moon, and so forth simply from 
the presence and action of solar, lunar, and other forces, and 
therefore it is at least as correct to say that they are powers as 
to say that they are material. Withdraw from them all force 
and they must lapse into the desert ground of unreality, as if 
some noble statue, on which the sculptor had impressed his 
skill, were to lose its informing idea, and sink back into the 
shapeless block from which it was hewn. 

It is a legitimate inference from what we have hitherto 
learned of Philo s anthropology, that the mental faculties belong 
to the same great category of divine powers ; for though they 
are not expressly so described, we have seen that they are 
eternal essences, and their divine character is further proved by 
the derivation of the rational soul from the very substance of 
God, " God having breathed in as much of his own power as 
a mortal nature could receive."* Whether, then, we turn to 
the world of matter or of mind, we are everywhere confronted 
by a system of powers, which abide through all the changes of 
phenomena, give form and reality to the objects of nature, and 
carry the soul aloft to the primal fount of being. 

Before entering on the more difficult questions connected 
with the powers, we may notice their more obvious predicates, 
negative and positive. In the first place, they are not 
independent causes. This follows from the previously 
established doctrine of the sole ultimate causality of God ;f 
but it is also expressly asserted : 

The sun, moon, and stars were said to have been created on the fourth 
day, after the earth had produced its herbage, because God foresaw that 
men would regard the revolutions of the heavenly bodies as the causes 
of the earth s annual produce, and lie wished to teach them that the first 
causesj were not to be ascribed to anything created, and that he himself 

* Nobil., 3 (II. 440). f See Vol. II. pp. 4 sq. and 54 sq. 

y airiac;. 



DEPENDENT, BUT DIVINE. 71 

did not require the aid of those luminaries, " to which indeed he has 
given powers, but not autocratic " powers ; for, as a charioteer or a pilot, 
" he leads everything as he will, according to law and right, requiring the 
aid of nothing else, for all things are possible to God."* 

So it is said elsewhere that 

When our mind entertained the Chaldsean opinion, it used to ride round 
the efficient powers as causes ;f but when it departed from this view, it 
knew that the cosmos was governed by a Euler, of whose sovereignty it 
received a mental representation. J 

The last words will receive their full explanation hereafter ; 
at present it is sufficient to observe that, according to the 
passages just cited, the powers owe their efficiency to God, 
and in no way interfere with Ms independent and absolute 
sway. 

But though the powers are thus subordinated to God, they 
partake of his mystery and greatness. Our language is unable 
to describe, not only the Self-existent, but even the powers 
which act as his body-guard. The latter, belonging as they 
do to the invisible and intelligible God, are themselves 
absolutely invisible and intelligible. They are intelligible, 
moreover, not in the sense of being actually apprehended by 
the mind, but because, if they could be apprehended, it 
would not be perception, but only the purest mind that could 
apprehend them. They are, in fact, inapprehensible in essence, 
and reveal only the effects of their energy. || So when Jacob 
wrestled with an invisible antagonist, one of the (: ministering 
powers," he asked in vain for his name ; for the powers, like 
the Self-existent, are unspeakable, and names, those symbols 
of the begotten, must not be sought with incorruptible 
natures.^" It follows that the powers are immaterial,** and 
they are accordingly so described. ft If tin 8 seems incon 
sistent with the inclusion of the elements and other bodies 
amonsj the powers, we must remember the explanation lately 

* Mundi Op., 14 (I. 10). f T Spaorripiovt; Swa^ug UQ alriag. 

I Mutat. Norn., 3 (I. 581). Leg. ad. Cai., 1 (II. 546). 

[| Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218). 1T Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 580). * 

tf Somn., I. 11 (I. 630) ; Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261). 



72 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

given. Every object, so far as it differs from primitive 
matter, does so through the presence of an immaterial force ; 
and when it is itself ranked among the powers, the reference 
must be, not to its material side, which it possesses in common 
with every object of perception, but to the intelligible force 
which alone renders it capable of distinction and classification. 

It is but one step further to say that the powers are uncir- 
cumscribed and infinite as God himself,* independent of 
time,f and unbegotten.J It follows that they are not 
exhausted in the world of nature. God uses them unmixed 
in relation to himself, but tempers them towards creation, for 
it is impossible for a mortal nature to contain them in their 
purity. We cannot look upon the flame of the sun unmixed, 
for our sight would be quenched by the splendour of its beams, 
though the sun is but a single work of God ; and are we to 
suppose that we can fully understand, in their unblended 
perfection, those unbegotten powers which, round about him, 
flash most brilliant light ? The heat of the sun is subdued by 
the frigid air, and so the divine powers are tempered to the 
natural weakness of created things. We have only to add 
that they are "most holy,"|| and incapable of error. ^f In the 
application of the above predicates to powers which primarily 
reveal themselves through their energy as cosrnical forces, 
Philo does not explicitly state the reasons which guided his 
judgment ; but they followed from his inevitable recognition 
of the powers as divine ; and their subtle, invisible, and 
immeasurable action in nature, if it would not immediately 
suggest, would at least confirm an opinion reached by the 
theological path. 

We are now prepared to look more narrowly at what we 
may call the rational function of the cosmical powers. They 

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173), a.7Tfpiypa<J>o ydp o 9foQ, 7rffu yp0ot /ecu at 
tWa/u IQ avTov : Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5), where the statement is made immediately 
of God s x"P trf but the context shows that these are equivalent to the powers. 

t "Axpovoi, SS. Ab. et Cain., 19 (I. 176). J Quod Deus immut., 17 (I. 284). 

Ib. || Frag., II. 655. [ Conf. Ling., 23 (I. 422). 






ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 73 

introduce into matter and preserve the distinctions to which 
the various kinds of objects are due. Withdraw all force, and 
matter must immediately lose all distinctive marks, and sink 
into the dead level of what,, so far as knowledge is concerned, 
is tantamount to the non-existent. If this be so, we must 
recognise the presence of power wherever we discover objects 
that are capable of being distinguished and classified ; in 
other words it is the powers that determine the characteristics 
of the various orders of phenomenal existence. This is 
clearly brought out in a passage in which Philo comments on 
Abraham s sacrifice of the heifer, she-goat, ram, turtle-dove, 
and pigeon.* Abraham divided the animals, except the birds, 
and "laid each piece one against another." After sunset 
lamps of firef passed through the midst of the pieces. 

" The lamps of fire which were borne," says Philo, " are the decisions^ 
of the torch-bearer God, which are brilliant and translucent, whose 
habit it is to continue in the midst of the pieces, I mean the antitheses, 
out of which the whole cosmos is composed. For it is said, Lamps of 
fire which passed through the midst of the pieces, that thou mayest know 
that the divine powers, going through the midst both of affairs and of bodies, 
corrupt nothing for the pieces remain unaffected [that is to say, we are 
not told that the lamps consumed the parts of the victims] but very 
beautifully separate and distinguish their several natures." [In conse- 
sequence of this office they are described as] God s " cutters." 

We see, therefore, that the process of differentiation which 
we observed in noticing the phenomena of the cosmos is due 
to the action of divine powers, which assign its distinctive 
nature to each class of objects. 

Since the function here ascribed to the powers is that which 
belongs to the Platonic ideas, we cannot be surprised when 
Philo explicitly identifies the former with the latter. The 
principal passage in which he does so is one where he 
represents God as returning a philosophical reply to the 

* Gen. xv. t Aap.7ructs irvpos, LXX. 

J Kpi<m,=the separating judgments. 

Quis rer. div. her. 61-2 (I. 518). 



74 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

entreaty of Moses that, as he could not reveal himself, he 
would at least grant a vision of his glory * that is, of the 
powers which acted as his body-guard. The reply, having 
explained that the powers were, like God himself, inappre 
hensible in essence, proceeds 

" As, among you, seals, whenever wax or any similar material is applied 
to them, make innumerable impressions, not suffering the loss of any 
part, but remaining as they were, such you must suppose the powers 
around me to be, applying qualities to things without quality, and forms 
to the formless, while they experience no change or diminution in their 
eternal nature. But some among you call them very appropriately 
ideas,t since they give ideal forrnj to each thing, arranging the un- 
arranged, and communicating determinate limits and definition and shape 
to the indeterminate and indefinite and shapeless, and, in a word, altering 
the worse into the better. " 

Precisely the same function is elsewhere attributed to God 
and his powers : it was God who called order out of disorder, 
quality out of things without quality, and so forth ; for it is 
the constant care of himself and his beneficent powers to 
reform the discord of the worse substance, and bring it into 
harmony with the better. 1 1 Again, we hear of "the seal of 
the universe, the archetypal idea, by which all things, being 
without ideal form^f and quality, were marked and impressed."** 
It can only be in this, their ideal sense, that the powers are 
spoken of as measures,tf that is, as the standard rules in con 
formity with which specific objects were made.JJ The character 
thus discovered in them brings them nearer to the realm of 
thought, and proves them to be amenable to its laws; and so 
we are introduced to a new and fruitful field of speculation. 

We cannot find a better introduction to this subject than 



f 

1 ElSoiroiovtri, which we must prefer to the reading 
Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218-19). jj J us tit., 7 (II. 367). 

^ Or without species, avtiota. 

** Mutat. Norn., 23 (I. 598). Cf. Somn., II. 6 (I. 665). ff mkrpa. 

H SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173). Cf. Qu. et Sol in Gen., IV. 8. See also 
Muncli Op., 9 (I. 7) ; 44, p. 31. 



ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 75 

the oft quoted passage in which Philo bases his whole theory 
upon the analogy of human thought and action. Having 
stated that the first day in the account of creation relates to 
the intelligible cosmos, he proceeds to unfold his meaning 
as follows : 

"For God, as being God, anticipating that there could never be a 
beautiful imitation without a beautiful pattern, or any perceptible thing 
faultless which was not modelled in conformity with an archetypal and 
intelligible idea, when he wished to fabricate this visible cosmos, first 
shaped forth the intelligible, in order that, using an immaterial and most 
God-like pattern, he might work out the material cosmos, a more recent 
copy of an older one, destined to contain as many perceptible genera as 
there were intelligible in the other. But it is not to be said or supposed 
that the cosmos which consists of the ideas is in any place ; but in what 
way it subsists we shall know by following up an example of what takes 
place among ourselves. Whenever a city is founded to gratify the high 
ambition of some king or emperor, claiming autocratic anthority, and at 
the same time brilliant in thought, adding splendour to his good fortune, 
sometimes a trained architect having offered his services, and inspected 
the suitability of the place, describes first within himself almost all the 
parts of the city that is to be erected, temples, gymnasia, town-halls, 
market-places, harbours, docks, lanes, equipment of walls, foundations of 
houses and other public edifices. Then, having received the forms of each 
in his own soul, as in wax, he bears the figure of an intelligible city, and 
having stirred up the images of this in his memory, and, still more, having 
sealed there its characters, looking, like a good workman, to the pattern, 
he begins to prepare the well proportioned mixture made of stones and 
timber,* making the material substances like each of the immaterial 
ideas. Similarly, then, we must think about God, who, when he purposed 
foundingf the great city, first devised its forms, out of which, having 
composed an intelligible cosmos, he completes the perceptible, using the 
former as a pattern. As, then, the city which was first formed within 
the architect had no exterior place, but had been sealed in the artist s 
soul, in the same way not even the cosmos that consists of the ideas could 
have any other place than the divine Logos which disposed these things 
into a cosmos. For what other place could there be for his powers which 
would be adequate to receive and contain, I do not say all, but any one 
unmixed ?" 

* I follow Miiller s text. f KriZeiv, as before of the literal city. 

I Mundi Op., 4-5 (I. 4). Compare the account of the ideal tabernacle revealed 
to the soul of Moses as the pattern of the material one : Vita Mos., III. 3 
(II. 146). 



7G THE DIVINE POWERS. 

This passage affords a succinct view of Philo s theory ; but 
its more important propositions are selected for separate treat 
ment in different places, and it will be convenient to refer to 
these in their order. 

In the first place, the reality of the ideas and their influential 
action upon matter are asserted in the strongest way in the 
following passage : 

It is only one of the forms of error maintained by impious and unholy 
men to say that the immaterial ideas are an empty name without 
participation in real fact. Those who affirm this, remove from things 
the most necessary substance,* which is the archetypal pattern of all 
the qualities of substance,f in accordance with which everything is 
ideally formed and measured. Thus, the opinion which destroys ideas 
confounds all things, and reduces them to that formlessness which was 
prior to the elements. Now, what could be more absurd than this ? For 
God generated everything out of matter, not touching it himself, for it 
was not fitting for the Wise and Blessed to touch indefinite and confused 
matter, but he made use of the immaterial powers, whose real name is 
ideas, in order that the suitable form might engage each genus. But 
the opinion in question introduces great disorder and confusion ; for by 
destroying the things through which qualities arise, it destroys at the 
same time qualities themselves. J 

We must return to this passage when we come to consider 
the relation between God and his powers ; at present we must 
fix our attention upon the reality and energy of the ideas. 
In making them not only realities, but the most necessary 
substance in material things, we may seem to be departing 
completely from the analogy between God and the architect; 
but it is not so if we can adapt ourselves to the moulds of 
ancient thought. The images in the architect s mind were 
also realities, having their permanent seat within ; for though 
they might pass from his consciousness, yet they could be 
stirred up again by memory, and be viewed as the pattern by 
which to regulate his work, and so they corresponded, within 
the spiritual sphere, to the impressions of seals upon the soul, 

* Ou<ria=immaterial essence. -j- Ouo-i a=matter. 

J Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261-2). 



ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 77 

and were abiding forms of thought which might be con 
templated and utilised at pleasure. But, further, though their 
seat was within, and as immaterial essences they could not be 
located in space, yet they reappeared in the visible city, and 
were that most necessary reality which alone made it a city 
instead of a chaos of stones and wood. The architect s 
thought was manifest, and became objective in the stateliness 
of every temple, in the beauty of every portico, in the dignity 
or grace of every statue, in the massive strength of the 
fortifications, and the useful arrangements of the docks. 
Everywhere was the impress of human genius, that mysterious 
combination of ideas, that subtle power, which alone differ 
entiated the materials of which the city was composed from, 
the wildness of the forest and the mountain ; and we know 
how these ideas remain through the vicissitudes of matter, 
speaking to us still from many a crumbling ruin, or rehabili 
tated in the young splendour of some fresh creation. It is 
they, then, that are the realities, apparent wherever art has 
bodied forth its imaginations ; and yet, when you ask for 
their locality, you can find it only in some artist s soul. So 
it is with the infinite Artist. His ideas are eternal forms of 
thought ; and though they reside only in the absolute Reason, 
yet their impress is upon the universe, and they reveal their 
energy through all the orderly arrangements and ideal shapes 
of the material world. 

The honour of this doctrine is of course ascribed to Moses, 
and the reality of the ideas confirmed by a Scriptural appeal. 
It is said in Genesis* that man (( was formed in accordance 
with the image of God/ f that is, as Philo understands it, he 
was made, not like God, but like the image of God. Now if 
the part (man) was the image of an image, much more must 
the whole perceptible cosmos be so.J The same conclusion 
follows from the fact that throughout the first chapter of 

* i. 27. f KaT tiieova Otov. J Mundi Op. 6 (I. 5). 



78 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

Genesis things are said to have been made according to genus, 
not according to species.* This is most apparent in the case 
of man ; for God first formed the generic man, including male 
and female, but afterwards the species, Adam.t Lastly, this 
view is established by the statement J that God made " every 
green herb of the field before it was produced, and all grass 
of the field before it sprang up." The verdure and the grass 
which were invisibly there before they grew upon the earth 
can be nothing but the intelligible ideas which are the seals 
of perceptible effects. Taking this as a sample of everything 
else, we must suppose that of all other things which fall 
under the senses there pre-existed older forms and measures, 
and that nature completes nothing perceptible without an 
immaterial pattern. || 

As having their seat in pure reason the ideas are invariably 
regarded as immaterial.^]" Nevertheless, we have seen that 
they are the most necessary substance or essence in things ; 
and we may therefore venture to define them as an immaterial 
intelligible essence or force, belonging by its nature to the 
realm of mind, yet capable of exhibiting through matter a 
multiform energy, and of maintaining through all corporeal 
changes the permanence of ideal types. If these conceptions 
appear at all incompatible, we must remember, in justice to 
Philo, that the difficulty recurs in every philosophy which is 
not materialistic. Who can explain how spiritual volition 
passes into bodily movement, and impresses its lasting effects 
upon the shapes of matter ? Philosophy can only arrive at 
ultimate facts, which are of necessity ultimate mysteries ; and 
from this law not even materialism can escape. The relation 
between consciousness and corporeal movements may be 



* Kara ykvoq=lcka, and not KCIT tldog. f Leg. AIL, II. 4 (I. 69). 

* Gen. ii. 5. T&tcij icai ptTpa. 
|| Mundi Op., 44 (I. 30-31) ; Leg. All., I. 9-10 (I. 47-8). 

11 AffwpctToi. See Ebriet., 25 (I. 372) ; 33, p. 378 ; Vita Mos., III. 3 
(II. 146) ; cf. Dec. Orac., 21 (II. 108), otipavbc b aowpaTot;. See before, p. 71. 



ANSWER TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 79 

differently conceived, but cannot be denied; and Philo is 
therefore guilty of no contradiction in suggesting an analogous 
relation between the forms of the divine Thought and the 
lasting types of phenomenal existence. The mode in which he 
endeavoured to make this relation clear to his own mind will 
be described farther on. 

We learned just now that the nature of the ideas is 
eternal. This thought, which follows from their connection 
with the eternal Mind, is elaborated in a passage which serves 
to exhibit at the same time the identity of the ideas witli 
logical genera. 

" As, when some man of letters or grammarian has died, the literary and 
grammatical faculty in the men has perished with them, but the ideas of 
these remain, and in a manner live as enduring as the cosmos, in accord 
ance with which [ideas] present and future men in everlasting succession 
will become literary and grammatical; so also the prudent, or temperate, 
or manly, or just, or, in a word, the wise in any individual might be 
destroyed, nevertheless in the nature of the immortal whole, as on a 
monument, prudence has been inscribed as immortal, and virtue uni 
versally as incorruptible, in accordance with which both now there are 
good men and hereafter there will be unless we are to say that the 
death of any individual man has wrought destruction to humanity, in 
regard to which whether we are to call it genus, or idea, or notion,* or 
what, those who inquire into the strict use of terms will know." [The 
passage goes on to say that] as one seal often survives unimpaired the 
destruction of innumerable impressions, so the virtues, even if all the 
characters with which they have marked the souls of those who came to 
them were effaced by evil living or some other cause, would still retain 
for ever their pure and incorruptible nature.f 

These eternal entities, which reveal themselves as archetypal 
patterns through the visible objects of creation, form collec 
tively, through their orderly combination, an intelligible 
cosmos, J which is the archetype of the perceptible. Hence, 
the intelligible universe is said to be composed or compacted 

* Evvorjfia. 

f Quod det. pot. ins., 21 (I. 205-6). See also Mutat. Nom., 11 (I. 590) ; Cherub., 
2 (I. 139-40) ; Quis rer. div. her. 24 (I. 489), -nav ytvoc a 





80 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

out of the invisible and immaterial ideas.* In this connection 
a passage occurs which seems to make a distinction between 
the ideas and the powers. " Through these powers," it is 
said, " the immaterial and intelligible cosmos was compacted, 
the archetype of this phenomenal one, composed of invisible 
ideas, as this one is of visible bodies. "f According to this 
statement, it would seems as though the ideas were something 
used by, and therefore distinct from, the powers, with which 
we have previously identified them. We might perhaps escape 
from this difficulty by the supposition that the ideas which 
compose the intelligible cosmos do not exhaust the totality 
of the divine powers, and were consequently used by the creative 
and other powers which were not included in them. It is, 
however, an objection to such an explanation that Philo nowhere 
else draws this distinction, and that he expressly describes the 
intelligible cosmos as "the idea of the ideas, the Logos of 
God,"f which is with him always the supreme term next to the 
Self-existent himself; and moreover, no power could enter 
into the thought of man without being itself a part of the 
world of ideas. We must, accordingly, suppose that there 
is some confusion owing to the two aspects under which the 
powers may be regarded, as efficient, and as forms of thought ; 
and the meaning will then be that through the agency which 
belonged to them as divine they formed themselves into an 
orderly and ideal world. It is well to notice this seeming- 
contradiction, because the passage, to which we shall have to 
return, is not in other respects free from difficulty and 
confusion. 

* Somn., I. 32. (I. 648) ; Vita Mos., III. 13. (II. 154) ; cf. Gigant., 13 (I. 271). 

f Conf. Ling., 34 (I. 431). 

J Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). 

I refer here to the extant Greek works. In the Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II. 68 
(Greek in Harris, Fragments, pp. 66 sqq.) the intelligible cosmos is represented 
as distinct from and inferior to the principal divine powers. Either this may be 
an earlier and less consistent view, or both here and in the Conf. Ling, the 
intelligible world may be spoken of in a limited sense, and not include the 
human race. 



ANSWEK TO THE PLATONIC IDEAS. 81 

Since the intelligible cosmos is immaterial, it is exempt from 
the conditions of space, and has no locality except the divine 
Logos, or Thought. The meaning of this statement, which 
is laid down in the passage placed at the beginning of our 
present discussion, must be more fully considered farther on ; 
but we may observe here that Philo locates the ideas not only 
in the Logos, but in God himself, just as we might ascribe the 
design of a city indifferently to the architect or to the mind of 
the architect. Not only does he say that before the origin of 
individual perceptible things the generic perceptible belonged 
to the forethought of the Creator,* but he describes God as 
the "immaterial place of immaterial ideas."f From this the 
transition is easy to the conception of God as himself the 
supreme archetype, from whom the ideas flow into the per 
ceptible cosmos. He is the archetypal beauty, from whose 
fount the beautiful things of earth derive their share. J He is 
the archetypal beam, who sends forth countless intelligible 
rays. He is the archetypal pattern of laws, and of the 
perceptible sun the sun that is intelligible, affording from the 
invisible fountains visible lights to that which is seen.|| Since 
he is incomprehensible, he caused, as it were, a certain splendour 
to gleam from himself, which we justly call form, scattering 
around the entire mind immaterial rays, and filling it with 
supercelestial light ; guided by which the intellect is brought 
through the mediation of form to the archetype. ^ These 
passages exhibit to us in figures that which is not clearly 
presentable in thought. The fountain diffusing its waters 
through various channels, still more the light, which seems so 
akin to the immaterial, with its silent velocity, its impalpable 
pervasiveness, and its power of kindling new expression in 
every object on which it falls, fitly symbolized the flow of the 



* *Hv TO yeviKov aiffQijTov TrpofirjOsi^ rov TreTroirjuoroQ, Leg. AIL, I. 10. (I. 48). 
t Cherub., 14 (I. 148). J Cherub., 25 (I. 154). 

Ib., 28 (I. 156). || Sacrificant., 4 (II. 254). 

t Qu. et Sol. in Gen., IV. 1. 

VOL. II. 6 



82 THE DIVINE POWEBS. 

divine Thought, and the wakening of chaotic matter into 
beauty and order under the transfiguring touch of the ideas. 
But Philo did not forget that even the loftiest ideas could not 
exhaust the essence of God. He was the archetype of light, 
but he was more, and it was truer to say that he was older and 
higher than the archetype, and was himself like nothing 
created.* If we infer from this that the ideas were only 
partial expressions of the infinite fulness of God, we shall bring 
the doctrine of ideas into coincidence with that of the divine 
attributes which we have previously established. As the 
supremely beautiful and the only source whence beauty could 
flow, he might be called the archetype of beauty ; but, in truth, 
the archetypal idea was only one mode of the eternal Thought, 
and included with other ideas in that supernal unity which 
is inapprehensible by the human mind. This relation is 
expressed as that of father and son. The idea, the intelligible 
cosmos, as being the offspring of the divine intelligence, is 
called the son of God,f and the epithet older is prefixed to 
distinguish it from its counterpart, the perceptible cosmos, 
which is named God s younger son.J The parallelism which 
is thus drawn between the two worlds shows that the higher, 
like the lower, although it has no outward existence, is not 
regarded as identical with the divine Mind, but only as an 
expression of its activity. God himself is higher than his 
mental creations, and folds them within the embrace of his 
mysterious essence. 

Since the powers are identical with the ideas, we might 
reasonably expect them to be arranged in a logical hierarchy, 
approaching, as they ascended, nearer to the full reality of 
God. This conception was certainly entertained by Philo, 
though he does not attempt any elaborate classification. He 
recognises a few powers, of universal or nearly universal sweep, 
as standing closest to the Self-existent ; but the countless 
multitude below these he leaves without arrangement, and with 

* Somn., I. 13 (I. 632). f Ytog 6tov. J Quod Deus immut, 6 (I. 277). 



CONSTITUTE A HIEKARCHY. 83 

only the most casual description or allusion. The fullest 
account of the descending scale is contained in a passage 
which gives an allegorical explanation of the cities of refuge. 

These are six in number, and correspond with six divine powers. The 
oldest and best, acting as the metropolis, is the divine Logos. The other 
five,powers of him who speaks (the word or Logos), are, as it were, colonies. 
Foremost is the Creative,* by virture of which the Creator fabricated the 
cosmos by a word.f Second is the Eegal.J by virtue of which he who has 
made rules what has been made. Third is the Propitious, through which 
the Artificer compassionates and pities his own work. The remaining 
two are the two divisions of the Legislative, || namely, the Preceptive and 
the Prohibitive.^ These are suited to the varying nature and strength of 
those involved in involuntary faults. The swiftest runner must urge his 
breathless course to the highest, divine Logos, the fountain of wisdom, that 
he may draw thence, instead of death, eternal life. He who is not so 
swift must fly to the Creative power, which Moses calls Deity, since 
through it all things were deposited** and arranged into a cosmos for 
he who has apprehended that the universe has come into being has 
a valuable possession, the knowledge of him who created it, which imme 
diately induces love towards him. He who is less ready must seek the 
Regal power for even if the offspring is not admonished by love of 
a father, the subject is so by fear of a ruler. But if the aforesaid 
boundaries are too distant, we must have recourse to the other three. 
For he who has anticipated that the Divinity is not inexorable, but kind 
and gentle, even if he has sinned before, again repents, through hope of 
an amnesty ; and he who reflects that God is a legislator will be blessed 
in obeying all that he commands ; but the last shall find the last refuge, 
the averting of evil, if not participation in good. Of five of these powers 
there are imitations in the sanctuary ; of Precept and Prohibition, the 
laws in the Ark ; of the Propitious power, the lid of the Ark, called the 
mercy-seat ; of the Creative and Regal, the cherubim. But the divine 
Logos above these did not enter into visible form, as resembling nothing 
perceptible, but being the image of God, the oldest of all intelligible 
things. One more distinction remains. The six powers are divided into 
two classes. For of the cities of refuge three are beyond, that is, at a 
distance from, the human race. These are the first three powers, to which 
the heaven and the entire cosmos belong. But the other three enter into 
closer relations with our perishable race ; for what need is there of 
Prohibition for those who will do no wrong, and what need of Precept for 



* H TroirjTiKr). "f Aoyy. J H 

H tXewf. || H voftoQtTiKr]. 

*,[ The text is defective ; but the meaning is apparent from what follows. 

** Qeog, . . . irkQr]. I have attempted to preserve the similarity of sound. 

6 * 



84: THE DIVINE POWERS. 

those who are not naturally liable to fall, and what of the Propitious 
power for those who will be absolutely without sin ? But mankind are in 
need of these, because they are naturally prone both to voluntary and to 
involuntary sins.* 

We must observe that the last three powers, which we may 
reduce to two, the propitious and the legislative, are only 
subordinate varieties of the two immediately above them ; for 
the legislative naturally belongs to the regal ; and it will be 
apparent that the propitious comes under the creative when we 
remember that the latter has for its fountain the truly good.f 
The lower powers, therefore, in the above scale differ from the 
higher, not in their essence, but in their range. 

Since the highest powers next to the Logos (the considera 
tion of which must be postponed) may thus he combined into 
a pair, it is not surprising that Philo repeatedly dwells, not on 
an extended list, but on two superlative powers, especially as 
this classification (on which he evidently prides himself) was 
suited to the language of the LXX and to the allegorical inter 
pretation of more than one passage. He affirms that 

Meditation on the cherubim who were stationed, with a flaming sword, 
at the entrance of Paradise, revealed to his soul the important secret that 
in the one+ really existing God the highest and first powers are two, Good 
ness and Authority, and that by Goodness he generated the universe, 
and by Authority he rules that which was generated, but that a third, 
uniting the two, is Thought, or Logos, for by Logos God is both ruler and 
good. The cherubim, then, are symbols of Sovereign ty|| and Goodness, 
the two powers ; but the flaming sword, of Thought. These pure powers 
meet and mingle, the dignity arising from Sovereignty being manifest in 
the things wherein God is good, and Goodness being manifest in that 
wherein he is sovereign.^" 

* Prof., 18-19 (I. 560-1). In Qu. et Sol. in Ex., II. 68 (the Greek in Harris, 
Fragments, pp. 66 sqq.), in an explanation of the Ark and its appurtenances, we 
find a septenary arrangement. First is the supreme Being himself. Then 
comes his Logos, the seminal essence of things. Next, from the Logos branch 
off the two powers, creative and regal. From these come others : from the 
creative, the propitious or beneficent ; from the regal, the legislative or 
punitive. Under these is the Ark, which is a symbol of the intelligible cosmos. 

f Mundi Op., 5 (I. 4-5). J Kara rov eva. 

AyaQoniQ and E%ov<ria. 

1T Cherub., 9 (I. 143-4). 



THE CEEATIVE AND THE KEGAL. 85 

They are represented by the two names for God which are so 
common in the LXX, "Lord" and "God."* Philo makes 
frequent use of this interpretation, which, it will be seen, 
results, in principle, from the doctrine of the namelessness of 
God. Illustrations will occur as we proceed, and we may 
confine ourselves at present to the passages which suit our 
immediate purpose. 

The appellations which have been mentioned [says Philo] indicate the 
powers around the self-existent Being.f for that of " Lord " denotes the 
power according to which he rules, and that of " God " the one according 
to which he benefits. For which reason the name " God " is adopted 
throughout the account of the creation by Moses ; for it was fitting that 
the power according to which the Maker, in bringing things into genesis, 
deposited^ and arranged them, should be so called. So far, then, as 
he is sovereign, he has the power both to benefit and to injure ; but 
so far as he is benefactor, he wills only the one, namely, benefit. The 
phrase, " eternal God," is equivalent to " he who bestows favours, not at 
odd times, but always and continuously, who benefits without inter 
mission. ^ 

As the source of creation and the regulator of the divine 
authority, the goodness of the Self-existent is "the oldest of 
the graces"; || but inasmuch as the powers are really eternal, 
and therefore " coeval," the epithet "oldest" refers to priority 
in thought, and not in time.^f 

The central thought connected with these two powers may 
be expressed in other terms, and such are occasionally found. 
Thus, it is said that 

On one occasion Abraham addressed God as " dread Buler." ** This is 



* Kwpioc and 9to. t T " t Er0ro. 

Plantat. Noe, 20 (I. 342). For the thought of God s will directing his 
power towards what is good see also Justit. 7 (II. 367). 

|| TrptafiuTciTr] rHjv xaplTwv, Quod Deus immut., 23 (I. 288-9). 

H Qu. et Sol. in Ex., II. 62 (the Greek in Harris, Fragm., p. 63). Compare 
Aristotle s ri/uwrarov fj,kv yap TO irptaflvTaTov (Metaph., I. iii. 6), a sentiment 
which will explain Philo s frequent use of " older," to denote higher and better. 
Thus he himself says of the things of the soul, ov xpovy, a\Xd dvviifjiti ical 
aiwjuart Trptaflvrepa /cat Trpaira ovrojg. Leg. All., III. 68 (I. 125); and of the 
virtuous man, irpeafivrepoG p.ev ovv icai irpuTOQ laro* /cat Xtylcr^w 6 

/cat t(T\aroQ TTCLQ dippwv, Abr., 46 (II. 39). 
* A(T7r6r? Gen. xv. 2. 



86 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

said to be synonymous with " Lord " ; and it is so to this extent, that 
the words refer to the same subject, but they differ in the ideas which 
they suggest. " Lord " is suggestive of supreme authority,* which is 
stable, in opposition to what is unstable and invalid ; but " dread Huler " 
is connected with fear ; + so that it is equivalent, as it were, to " fearful 
Lord," J not only having the supreme authority and might, but being 
able to inspire fear and terror ; so that Abraham by using this form 
of address showed that he approached God with fear and trembling, 
conscious of the terror of his sovereignty . 

From the conception of God s universal sway the idea of 
punishment easily flows, for it is the part of a ruler to punish 
the guilty. Accordingly, this power is sometimes described as 
punitive. || "Around the self-existent Being/ it is said, " the 
first and greatest of the powers are the beneficent and puni 
tive -, and the beneficent is called God . . . . but the other 
1 Lord/ " If This and similar statements leave no doubt of the 
identity of the regal and the punitive powers. ** But as one 
idea may comprise several, so one power may include a plurality. 
We have seen that the legislative is embraced by the regal, 
and is itself resolvable into the preceptive and prohibitive. 
Similarly the punitive power may break itself up, and become 
a set of punitive powers. Thus Philo speaks of the powers of 
the Self-existent as " the world-creating, and regal, and provi 
dential, and the rest, as many as are beneficent and punitive^-ft 
We may infer from this language, what, indeed, is apparent 
from the whole course of our exposition, that the two first 
powers are the highest in the scale, not only of being, but of 
logic, and that Philo regards goodness and authority as general 
terms under which the multitude of the divine powers may be 
classed. But he proceeds a step farther. Logically we may 
conceive of an unrighteous authority, and hence the necessity 
for distinguishing the two powers ; but in God, as we have 
seen, goodness is the older and controls the exercise of the 

* Kvpiog from tcvpoQ. f &i<nr6rriQ from Stapes, whence diog . 

J QofitpoQ KvpioQ. Quis rer. div. her., 6 (I. 476). 

|| KoXaarripioG or /coAa<rruc?;. f Sacrificant., 9 (II. 258). 

* See also Quis rer. div. her., 34 (I. 496) ; Gigant., 11 (I. 269). 
ff EvtpysnSee re Kai KoXaarrjpioi, Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546). 



CONCENTRATED IN GOODNESS. 87 

other, and therefore the question may be raised whether the 
punitive powers ought not to be ranked among the beneficent, 
not only because they are " parts of laws " (which are intended 
for the reward of the good and the punishment of the bad), 
but because even punishment often admonishes and sobers the 
sinful, or, if not the sinful, at least their associates, through 
fear of a similar chastisement.* With greater decision it is 
said elsewhere that all the powers around God are helpful and 
preservative of creation, and among these the punitive also are 
included, for even punishment is not injurious, being a preven 
tion and correction of sins.t Thus the powers, though capable 
of a dual distribution, tend to concentrate themselves in the 
divine goodness, which has driven away from itself envy, that 
hater of virtue and beauty, and generates graces whereby it 
has brought into genesis things that were not.J A power of 
so large and benign a scope may well be described by many 
epithets. Besides those which we have already met, the 
following may be noticed. It is the bounteous, the generous, || 
the beneficent ; ^f and under it must be ranked propitious and 
beneficent and munificent powers,** described also as gentle, ff 
and favourable. fj We have only to add that we casually hear 
also of God s saving powers; of thought and purpose, most 
stable powers by which the Creator always surveys his works; || || 

* Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546). 

f Conf. Ling., 34 (I. 431). For the expression KoXa<m;pio cWa/mg, see also 
Ebriet., 9 (I. 362) ; Post. Cain., 6 (I. 229). 

% Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464). Xapiffrtnij. 

II AwpjjriKjy, Quis rer. div. her., 34 (I. 496) ; xapttrriKT? also Somn., 1. 26 (I. 645). 

II EvepyeTiKii, Mutat. Nom., 4 (I. 582). Here the creative power is distinguished 
from it, and represented as akin to it and the regal. The distinction is logically 
correct, beneficent goodness being wider than creative power, and being in truth 
its fountain : Mundi Op., 5 (I. 4-5). 

** "IXewf /cat ivepysTidag feat <J>i\oSwpovs, Conf. Ling., 36 (I. 432) : here punish 
ments are viewed as alien to these powers an apparent inconsistency, which 
will be better considered farther on. 

ft HftspovQ, Plantat. Noe, 12 (I. 336). JJ xl l(rrr ?P* ou f > Ebriet., 27 (1. 373). 

Swrijpioi, Fortitud., 8 (II. 383). 

|||| "Ewoia and SiavoiqGiQ, defined as- i] tvcnroKeijJievT] voqaig, and i i 
dttZodos, Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277). 



88 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

of his prescient power;* and of peace, which, " of the many- 
named powers of the Self-existent, is not only a member but 
also a leader .-"f 

The terms which we have hitherto noticed, ideas and powers, 
mark the main lines of Philo s speculation upon this subject. 
But inasmuch as the powers denote certain excellent proper 
ties, they are also denominated virtues ; J the word being used, 
presumably, not in the sense of moral goodness, but as we 
speak of the virtue of a plant or a drug a sense not unknown 
to classical Greek. That the powers are intended is obvious 
from the application of the term. Thus, we hear of the 
divine virtues, the propitious and beneficent ; " and the 
divine powers and virtues are coupled in such a way as to 
show that they stand for the same thing regarded under dif 
ferent aspects. || 

It is now time for us to enter upon the most difficult question 
connected with the divine powers What was their precise 
relation to God ? Were they attributes, or were they distinct 
and subordinate persons, or were they neither, at least in 
the modern sense of these terms ? Or had Philo no settled 
doctrine, and can we escape from our perplexities only by 
ascribing to him the most palpable contradictions ? Our 
answer to these questions must be decided by a careful exam 
ination of a large number of passages ; but our arrangement 
of these passages, and the importance which we attach to 
them singly, as affording the true key to Philo s thought, must 
necessarily be governed, not only by such critical tact as we 
may happen to possess, but by our conception of the philosophy 
as a whole. Now, in treating of the doctrine of God, we 
resolved, if we were not mistaken, what has been usually 

* 7Tpoyvw(rrtKJ7, Vita Mos., III. 23 (II. 164) ; Qu. et Sol. in Gen. IV. 22. 

t Somn., II. 38 (I. 692). J Aperai. Vita Mos., III. 23 (II. 163-4). 

|| Twi/ Geidiv dvvaptwv KCII aperutv, Animal. Sacr. idon., 6 (II. 242). For the 
use of the word see also Fragments, II. 656 and 660. Other passages confirming 
what has been said about the classification of the powers will be referred to 
as we proceed. 



THE DOCTEINE TO BE KEPT SECEET. 89 

regarded as a hopeless contradiction, and, in doing so, we saw 
that the theory of the divine attributes, as intermediate between 
the eternal essence and the created cosmos, grew out of the 
very roots of Philo s theology, and was not a mere device to 
introduce harmony into an unreconciled dualism. Since the 
powers confessedly correspond in some sense to the divine 
attributes, we may naturally take the position which we have 
already gained as the starting-point for our further inquiry, in 
the hope that we may thence penetrate in safety the obscurity 
of a rather abstruse subject. 

Philo himself was apparently well aware that the doctrine 
which he represented was open to misconception, and ought to 
be communicated only to those who were sufficiently advanced 
in philosophical culture to understand its nice distinctions. 
He displays his habitual ingenuity in finding a Scriptural justi 
fication for the necessary concealment : 

When Sarah was desired to " knead three measures of fine flour and 
make hiding-cakes,"* the measures referred to God and his two highest 
powers. It is good that these three measures should be, as it were, 
kneaded in the soul, " in order that, being convinced of the existence of 
the highest God, who has passed beyond his powers, being both seen 
without them and manifested in them, it should receive impressions of 
his authority and beneficence, and, becoming initiated into the perfect 
rites, should not tell anyone rashly the divine mysteries, but, treasuring 
them up, and holding its peace, should keep them in secret. For the 
Scripture says, make hiding-cakes, because the sacred initiatory word 
about the Unbegotten and his powers ought to be hidden, since it is not 
for every one to keep a deposit of divine ceremonies. "f 

The same warning is repeated farther on in the same 
treatise, as a preliminary to the statement that, of all the best 
powers around God, the legislative, though it is one, and of 
equal honour with the rest, is naturally divided into two, the 
one directed to the benefit of those who do right, the other to 
the punishment of those who sin. This is to be kept as a 

* Eyicpu^tac, sc. apTOQ, == bread baked under the ashes, and hence hidden, 
Gen. xviii. 6. 
f SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173-4). 



90 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

secret,, to be deposited in the ears of older men when those of 
the younger have been stopped. * Philo does not explain the 
reasons for this secrecy ; but he was probably apprehensive 
that the vulgar would misunderstand the division of the divine 
nature into a series of powers, and construe it into something 
inconsistent with the principles of monotheism. f This sup 
position is confirmed by a Fragment^ in which it is said that 
sacred words and things must not be communicated to all, and 
the two leading qualifications for participating in such matters 
are the complete rejection of idolatry, and purification in body 
and soul through ancestral laws; and by another Fragment, 
which declares that it is unlawful to utter sacred mysteries to the 
uninitiated, on the ground that, " being unable to hear or see 
incorporeal and intelligible nature/ they will blame what is not 
worthy of blame. We learn from this advice not to be too 
confident that our first impression of any particular passage is 
the correct one; and especially if it is inconsistent with the 
fundamental doctrine of Judaism or with Philo s unequivocal 
statements elsewhere. 

In selecting a passage with which to open our discussion, 
and which must necessarily exercise a controlling influence on 
our further progress, it seems not unreasonable to prefer one 
in which Philo states his view with the most unmistakable 
philosophical precision. Such a passage exists, though it has 
not always received the attention which its importance 
demands. It occurs in the treatise on Abraham, and relates 
to the visit of the three men recorded in Genesis xviii. Philo 
first deals with the narrative in its literal sense, and in doing 
so makes use of some expressions to which we must return at 
a later period of our inquiry, as they are thought to be 
inconsistent with the purport of the following remarks. At 

* SS. Ab. et Cain., 39 (I. 189). 

f See the account of a similar caution in connection with the Midrash in 
Siegfried, p. 212. 
+ II. 658 sq. II. 658. 



TEIPLE EEPEESENTATION OF GOD. 01 

present we must be content to observe that the allegorical 
interpretation ought to be regarded as the true expression of 
philosophical belief, because the writer is less shackled by the 
words of Scripture, and because the whole object of the 
allegorical method is to exalt the literal sense into philosophy. 
This, accordingly, Philo proceeds to do. 

" The spoken words" [he says], "are symbols of things apprehended 
in intelligence alone. Whenever, then, a soul, as it were in mid-day,* has 
been illumined on all sides by God, and, being entirely filled with intelligible 
light, becomes shadowless with the beams that are shed around it, it 
apprehends a triple representation of one subject ; of one [of the three] 
as actually existing, but of the other two as though they were shadows 
cast from this. Something of a similar kind happens, too, in the case of 
those who live in perceptible light ; for there often occur two shadows of 
bodies at rest or in motion. Let no one suppose, however, that the word 
shadows is used strictly in relation to G-od ; it is merely a misapplication 
of the term for the clearer exhibition of the subject which we are 
explaining, for the reality is not so. But, as one standing nearest to the 
truth would say, the middle one is the Father of the universe, who in the 
sacred Scriptures is called by a proper name the Self-existent,f and those 
on each side are the oldest and nearest powers of the Self-existent, of 
which one is called Creative, and the other Eegal. And the Creative is 
Deity,J for by this he deposited and arranged everything into a cosmos, 
and the Regal is Lord, for it is right for that which has made to rule and 
hold sway over that which has been produced. The middle one, then, 
being attended by each of the two powers as by a body-guard, presents 
to the seeing intelligence a representation now of one, and now of three; 
of one, whenever the soul, being perfectly purified, and having trans 
cended not only the multitudes of numbers, but even the duad which 
adjoins unity, presses on to the idea which is unmingled and uncomplicated 
and in itself wanting nothing whatever in addition ; but of three, whenever, 
not yet initiated into the great mysteries, it still celebrates its rites in the 
lesser, and is unable to apprehend the self-existent Being|| from itself 
alone without anything different [from, pure being], but apprehends it 
through the effects as either creating or ruling. This, then, is, as the 
proverb runs, a second voyage, but none the less partakes of opinion 
dear to God. But the former method does not partake, but is itself the 
opinion dear to God, or rather it is truth, which is older than opinion, and 
more honourable than all opining." [The passage goes on to state that] 
there are three orders of human character, distinguished severally by the 

* Alluding to the time of the visit, Gen. sviii. 1. 

t O "Qv. J Gfof. Or mental image, Qavraaiav. \\ To ov. 



92 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

possession of these three representations. The best has that of the truly 
Self- existent, whom it serves by himself, without being drawn aside by 
any other. The remaining two belong to those who are acquainted with 
the Father through either the beneficent or the regal power. Now, when 
men perceive that people want to associate with them for their own 
advantage, they eye them askance and avoid them ; but God " gladly 
calls to himself all who wish to honour him, in accordance with whatever 
idea they prefer to do so."* The first reward is reserved for those who 
serve him for his own sake, and that reward is friendship ; the second is 
for those who on their own account hope to obtain advantages or expect 
to be delivered from punishments, for even if their service is not 
disinterested, it is nevertheless confined within divine enclosures, and 
their reward is not indeed friendship, but acceptance as not aliens. For 
God receives both him who wishes to share his beneficent power in order 
to participate in good things, and him who through fear propitiates the 
sovereign and lordly authority in order to avert punishment ; for they 
will be improved through the continual exercise of sincere piety. The 
manners from which these several characters start are different, but they 
have one aim and one end, the service of God. Now that the triple 
representation is virtually that of one subject is evident not only from 
allegorical speculation, but from the written word ; for when the wise 
Abraham supplicates those who seemed like three wayfarers, he con 
verses with them, not as three, but as one, and addresses them in the 
singular number, and again the promise is given by one as though he 
alone were present.f 

In this passage we have, not a hasty and casual remark, the 
full bearing of which the writer might have failed to perceive, 
but a long and careful statement, in which one leading thought 
is insisted upon in a variety of ways. Let us bring the several 
points together into a single view. In the first place, it is 
asserted in the most explicit manner that God and his two 
principal powers are in reality one subject, though presenting 
to the understanding a threefold mental image ; in other 
words, the distinction which is drawn is due, not to the nature 
of God, but to the imperfection of our intelligence. Secondly, 
for this one subject (whose essence, as we have learned else- 



* "ATTClVTCtQ TOVQ KCt9 rjVTIVOVV ll tdV TrpOaipOVfltVOVQ Ttpdv avTOV 



t Abr., 24-5 (II. 18-20). With this may be compared Qu. et Sol. in 
Gen., IV. 2. 



TKIPLE EEPEESENTATION OF GOD. 93 

where, is unknown) we can find no more expressive name than 
the " Self-existent," eternal and absolute Being. This is the 
highest, because the simplest idea of him that we are capable 
of forming ; it is completely one, representing no relation, and 
neither admitting of analysis nor coming under any more com 
prehensive term ; and in our holiest moods, when we can 
detach ourselves from the plurality of what he does, and adore 
him simply for what he is, we contemplate him as the one 
reality. But there are lower moods in which we regard him 
only through what he does, and then we see him as creating 
or ruling. Observe, it is not said that we see powers which 
are distinct from and beneath him, but that we see himself in 
certain aspects. So it is said farther on that men honour, not 
his powers, but God himself under certain ideas. We must 
use this expression to interpret the words " propitiates the 
sovereign and lordly authority/ for we can hardly suppose 
that Philo has embedded a contradiction in the very heart of 
a continuous comment ; and thus we learn that this very 
natural and easy kind of personification is not inconsistent 
with the doctrine which is set forth in the present passage. 
Lastly, we must notice the way in which Philo appeals to the 
written word, as though it might reasonably suggest a differ 
ent view from that which he has reached by the method of 
allegory, thus confirming our impression that his deliberate 
philosophical belief is contained in his allegorical interpreta 
tions rather than in his remarks upon the letter of Scripture. 

A parallel passage, which compresses the same thought into 
two or three lines, is more obscure ; but we may justly inter 
pret it in the light of the foregoing exposition. " God/ it is 
said, " being attended by two of the highest powers, Sover 
eignty and Goodness, being one in the midst,* wrought in 
the seeing soul triple representations.^ 

In a passage relating to another subject a similar view is 
suggested. Philo is commenting on the words " The Lord 

t SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173). 



9 4 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

appeared to Abraham,"* and lias shown that the self-existent 
Being is incomprehensible and without a name. He warns us 
not to conclude from the words of Scripture that the Cause of 
all shone upon and appeared to Abraham 

" For what human mind would be competent to contain the greatness 
of the representation ?" It was really one of the powers around the 
Cause^namely, the Eegal, that appeared ; for " Lord " is an appellation of 
sovereignty. But when our mind held the Chaldaean opinion, it took the 
efficient powers for causes ; but when it removed from the Chaldean 
dogma, it knew that the cosmos was guided and governed by a supreme 
Ruler, of whose sovereignty it received a representation. Therefore the 
Scripture says, not "the self-existent Being," but "the Lord" appeared, 
meaning the King became manifest, being so from the beginning, but not 
yet known to the soul, which, even if it learned late, did not continue 
unlearned for ever, but received a representation of the sovereignty and 
supreme rule in things. But the Euler having appeared confers a yet 
greater benefit upon him who hears and sees, by saying, " I am thy 
God/ Of what, then, in all creation is he not God? He speaks now, 
not about the cosmos, of which the fabricator is certainly also God, but 
about human souls, which he has not deemed worthy of the same care ; 
for he thinks it right to be called Lord and Despot of the bad, God of the 
improving, and of the best and most perfect both Lord and God.f 

Nothing can be plainer than that the same being is re 
ferred to throughout this passage as revealing himself under 
different aspects. It is only in these aspects that the human 
mind is competent to know him, for it could not contain the 
full revelation of him as he is. Still, it may know that amid 
a plurality of aspects there is real unity, and, instead of think 
ing with the Chaldasans that the powers are so many independ 
ent causes, may satisfy itself that they are only the mental 
images of the sovereignty and beneficence of the Supreme 
Euler. If this interpretation be correct, there could hardly be 
a more emphatic rejection of the view which treats the powers 
as a conclave of separate persons. There is one more fact 
of great importance which we learn from this passage. When 
Philo says " the Cause of the universe did not appear/* he 
does not mean that there was no manifestation of God ; and 
* Gen. xvii. 1. Mutat N 



TEIPLE EEPEESENTATION OF GOD. 95 

that some one else was revealed instead, but that God did not 
appear in that particular character, that that was not the 
form assumed by the mental representation. By parity of 
reasoning we are bound, in all PhnVs statements respect 
ing God, to consider the form of the subject, and not 
hastily conclude that what is denied of God under one 
term is therefore to be denied of him under another. He 
may not do as absolute Being or universal Cause what never 
theless he does as Benefactor or moral Governor. This is a 
mode of language with which we are not familiar ; and yet, if 
we knew a man under strongly contrasted characters, we 
might say of him, without danger of being mistaken, that it 
Was not the philosopher, but the general, that won the battle, 
meaning that he succeeded in war, not by his philosophical, 
but by his military abilities."* 

One other passage may be quoted in this connection, 
although the powers are not directly mentioned. 

" To souls which, are incorporeal and wait upon him, it is likely that 
God manifests himself as he is, conversing as a friend with friends, but 
to those that are still in bodies likening himself to angels, not changing 
his own nature for he is unalterable but placing in the souls which 
receive the representation an opinion of a different shape,f so that they 
suppose that the image J is not an imitation, but the archetypal form 
itself." [It is added that] this was done for the benefit of men who were 
unable to form any higher conception. 

We learn once more from this passage that God, while 
remaining unchangeable, reveals himself in various aspects 
adapted to the weakness of our intelligence. These mental 
images, since they fall far short of the great reality, or even 
contain something quite erroneous, as when they clothe God 

* To take an example from a standard writer : Gibbon says, " It is seldom that 
the antiquarian and the philosopher are so happily blended," where he refers to 
the abilities of the same man. [Ch. ix., note r.] 

j" A6rtJ IvriQsvra [for Mangey s avrtQevra^ TOIQ Qavrao iovusvaic; irepofiop^ov. 

J Eiicova, which, from the connection, must mean " the mental image." 

Somn., I. 40 (I. 655). We may compare the expression in 12, p. 631 : " No 
longer stretching the mental representations from himself, but from the powers 
after him." 



96 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

with the organs and passions of a man, are not the archetypal 
form, the complete and adequate idea which we may conceive 
to exist in more exalted minds, who see God as be is, but only 
an imitation or imperfect copy of this lofty idea, serving indeed 
to represent it to us, but not to be confounded with it. If 
this be the meaning of the passage, it bears out the doctrine 
that when we think of the regal or beneficent or other powers 
of God, we are dealing with images or representative forms of 
our own finite understanding, and not with real distinctions in 
the eternal nature. 

Now what are we to say to these passages ? Are we justified 
in taking them as the key to our interpretation of Philo s doc 
trine of the divine powers? In their favour we may plead 
their length, their careful elaboration, their explicitness, their 
manifestly philosophical character, and their agreement with 
the doctrine of the divine attributes. Yet Gfrorer treats the 
doctrine which they confessedly set forth as " a mere make 
shift* occasioned by the necessity of rescuing the unity of the 
divine essence. "f But as he does so, not on the ground of 
anything in the passages themselves which renders their 
meaning doubtful, or of anything in the context which might 
explain their divergence from what is said elsewhere, but 
solely on account of their alleged inconsistency with other 
statements and with Philo s philosophy as a whole, we cannot 
consider such summary dismissal to be anything but arbitrary 
and unsatisfactory. Simply to pitch overboard whatever in 
terferes with the main course of our exposition is a very easy 
and comfortable mode of getting rid of a difficulty, but may 
itself perhaps lie under the suspicion of being a " mere make 
shift." We shall see as we proceed that the view which 
receives so little courtesy is presented in a large number of 
passages, and we shall not fail to notice carefully those which 
appear to contradict it. 

* Blosser Nothbehelf. f p - 155 - 



ANALOGY OF THE WISE MAN. 97 

Before attending to these passages we may allude to a most 
instructive paragraph relating to the powers of man, which 
supplies us with a valuable analogy to a subject lying more 
remote from our apprehension. 

Wisdom [it is there said] heing an art of arts, seems, indeed, to change 
with different materials, but its true idea* appears unalterable to those 
who have keen sight, and are not led astray by the material mass around 
it, but perceive the character impressed by the art itself. It is told that 
the celebrated sculptor Pheidias wrought brass, and ivory, and gold, and 
other materials, and in all displayed one and the same art, so that not 
only connoisseurs, but also those who were quite uninstructed, could 
recognize the artist from his works. Perfect art, being an imitation of 
nature, seals all materials with the same idea.f The same thing is shown 
by the power in the wise man ; J for when it is engaged in things relating 
to the Self- existent, it is called piety and holiness ; in things relating to 
the sky and its objects, natural philosophy ; meteorological, in matters 
relating to the air ; ethical, with its species, political and economical, 
in matters pertaining to the rectification of human morals ; and, in other 
aspects, convivial, regal, legislative. For the many -named wise man 
has contained all these piety, holiness, natural philosophy, meteorology, 
ethics, polity, economy, regal, legislative, and innumerable other powers ; 
but in all he will be seen to have one and the same idea.[| 

Now, this passage clearly informs us that wisdom, though 
it is one and unalterable, is capable of a large variety of appli 
cations, which may mislead the undiscerning into the belief that 
it is changing and manifold ; and, further, that the wise man 
has an endless variety of powers, which are all ultimately and 
in reality the same, being expressions of wisdom, and owing 
their diversity of name and function, not to the violation of 
unity in wisdom itself, but to the multiplicity of objects 
towards which it is directed. Here we have precisely the 
same doctrine in regard to the wise man which is dismissed so 
contumeliously when it is asserted in respect to God. We may 
legitimately try, for the sake of rendering our thoughts more 
lucid, whether we can easily and naturally extend the analogy 
a little farther than Philo s immediate purpose required him to 
do. We might say, without danger of being misunderstood, 

* Eldof. f Ideav. { *H kv ry <ro 

*u(rtoXoyia. || Ebriet., 22 (I. 370-1). 

VOL. II. 7 



98 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

that the wise man used his powers, and that he did one thing 
by one,, and something else by another. We might say that 
he was known through his powers, meaning that his action as 
a legislator and in other capacities partly revealed him. We 
might say, further, that we knew him as a natural philosopher 
or as a politician, but that we did not know himself, meaning 
that we knew certain aspects of his mind, but that we had not 
penetrated to that essential wisdom in which all his powers 
found their unity, and the apprehension of which would include 
all partial and inferior knowledge. From this point we might 
go on to say that he was above or before his powers, because 
he not only determined their application, but in the complete 
ness and unity of his wisdom was larger and fuller than they 
in the division and partiality of their nature. We shall do 
well to bear this analogy in mind as we pursue our further 
way through the doctrine of the divine powers. 

We may begin with the remark that the powers are used 
collectively as equivalent to the nature or essence of God. 
Thus, it is said that mankind has obtained the sovereignty of 
all earthly things, " being a copy of the powers of God, a 
manifest image of the invisible nature, a created image of the 
eternal."* Here the parallelism of the expressions shows that 
the powers of God are identical with the invisible, eternal 
nature. The same conclusion follows from the statement that 
the powers communicate qualities to things without quality, 
and shapes to things without shape, suffering no change or 
diminution in the eternal nature ;f for, if they were distinct 
from the eternal nature, the phrase would be without meaning. 
The transition is easy to the use of power in the singular to 
denote the divine essence, just as ff the power in the wise 
man " signifies the essence by virtue of which he is wise. 
This practice is illustrated by the saying that, " to possess an 



9tov dvvantwv, SIKIJJV ri]Q aoparov 
aiSiov ytvrjTij, Vita Mos., II. 12 (II. 144). 

"j" MrjSev riJQ aifiiov ^t/crcwg ^ra\Xarro)Uva /ti^re n,f.iovp.kvaQ, Monarch., I. 6 
(II. 219). 



EQUIVALENT TO THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 99 

unalterable intelligence approaches the power of God, since 
the Divine is unalterable, but the created naturally change 
able."* In a parallel passage it is said that "in reality an 
unalterable soul alone has access to the unalterable God, and 
the soul disposed in this way truly stands near divine power -" 
and a little farther on it is added, " The self-existent Being which 
moves and alters everything else is immovable and unalterable, 
and communicates of its own nature, stillness, to the virtuous 
man."f Here the context relieves the passage of any am 
biguity that might be thought to attach to the previous state 
ment. The same explanation of the phrase is the simplest 
that can be given in two other instances. Moses, we are told, 
wishes those who go to the service of the Self-existent first 
to know themselves and their own essence ; for how could he 
who is ignorant of himself apprehend the supreme and all- 
surpassing power of God ?"J The antithesis seems to fix the 
meaning of the power of God. As, however, the passage may 
be thought to contradict what we have learned elsewhere re 
specting our ignorance, not only of the divine essence, but of 
our own, we must observe that the reference is to the mean 
character of our bodily frame, which we must clearly under 
stand in order to appreciate the infinite superiority of God, and 
approach him with becoming humility. The implication, there 
fore, is not a knowledge of God s essence in itself, but only in 
its contrast to the composition of our bodies, and is not incon 
sistent with Philo s ordinary doctrine. Again, it is asserted of 
the first man that " God breathed in of his own power as much 
as mortal nature could receive," for which reason God was his 
Father, and he was an image of God. It might be maintained 
here that the power of God is the Logos; but the passage 
makes no allusion to the Logos, and we may be content to 
assign to it for the present the meaning which it naturally 
bears. It is hardly necessary to observe that the doctrine 

* Cherub., 6 (I. 142). f Post. Cain., 9 (I. 231). 

J Sacrificant., 2 (II. 252). Nobil., 3 (II. 440). 

7 * 



100 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

which we have thus reached precisely coincides with that of 
the attributes of God, which in their totality are combined in 
the unknown unity of the divine essence. 

It is a not unexpected result of the foregoing view that God 
and his power or powers are used interchangeably. This 
occurs in a long and rhetorical account of the preparation 
which the soul ought to make for the indwelling of God. 
That the supreme Deity is meant is evident from the language 
in which he is described, " the Self-existent," " the intelligible 
God/ " the King of kings and Sovereign God of all ; " and 
yet, when all is ready for his reception, we hear only of ce the 
descent of the powers of God/ which bring laws from heaven 
according to the order of their Father, and become table- 
companions of souls which love virtue.* Does, then, Philo 
contradict at the close of the passage the statement with 
which he starts, that God " invisibly enters the region of the 
soul ? " Does God really hold aloof, and send powers which 
are other than himself to take his place ? We need not resort 
to so harsh a conclusion if we have travelled thus far upon the 
right road. The doctrine implied seems to be this, that God 
himself does indeed enter the soul, but does not reveal himself 
there in the absolute unity of his essence ; he comes as the 
beneficent, the gracious, the propitious, the legislative, and so 
forth, and it is only through the medium of these powers that 
our intellect is able to apprehend him. To call God their 
Father may seem to imply a personal separation between 
them ; but fatherhood is sometimes used to denote identity of 
essence, and it is not a more violent figure to represent them 
as children of God than to describe them as table-companions 
of the soul. Similarly the wise man might be called the father 
of his meteorological, ethical, and other activities. In another 
passage a vision of God, a mental representation of the Un- 
begotten, is promised to him who is freed from the chains of 
the body. The proof is drawn from the instance of Abraham, 
* Cherub., 28-31 (I. 156-8). 



GOD AND THE POWEKS USED INTERCHANGEABLY. 101 

who, when he had left his land and kindred and father s house, 
began " to meet with the powers of the Self-existent " ; for 
the law says that " God"* appeared to him/ intimating that 
he manifests himself clearly to him who has put off mortal 
things. f There is no hint that " God" is used here in the 
limited sense of the creative power, and "the Unbegotten ": 
must certainly denote the Supreme God. We may therefore 
adopt the explanation which we have applied to the previous 
passage. There is one more example. Prayer, it is said, is a 
request for good things from God, but a great prayer is the 
belief that God himself is the cause of good things from him 
self, without the co-operation of any other of earth as fruit 
ful, of rains as contributing to the growth of seeds and plants, 
of air as able to nourish, and so forth; for all these things 
receive changes by the power of God, so as often to produce 
the opposite of their usual effects. || Here the power of God 
cannot denote any being other than himself, or the argument 
would be incoherent. The meaning evidently is, that as God 
often reverses the customary effects of natural agents, he 
cannot be dependent on their co-operation for the blessings 
which he bestows. 

The interchange of God and his powers leads us to notice a 
number of passages in which the latter are regarded as pre 
dicates of the former, and he is spoken of as being or doing 
what is implied by their several names. The following is the 
most general statement of this kind : " The soul which 
honours the self-existent Being for the sake of the self- 
existent Being itself, ought not to do so thoughtlessly^ or 
ignorantly, but with knowledge and thought.*"* Now, our 
thoughtft about him receives division and separation according 
to each of the divine powers and virtues ; for God is good, and 

* O QtoQ. f Q uod - det. P ot - ins -> 43 4 ( L 221 ) t 

Alluding to the vow in Num. vi. 2, where the LXX translate 



** 



Quod Deus immut., 19 (I. 285-6). f 

Aoyy. tf 



102 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

maker and producer of the universe, and provident of what he 
begat, most happy Saviour and Benefactor, and full of all 
blessedness, each of which is venerable and laudable, whether 
considered separately by itself or along with those of the same 
kind."* The predicative character of the powers is here too 
apparent to require further remark. Similarly, in an allusion 
to the legislative as one of the powers around God, the 
parenthetical explanation is immediately subjoined, " for 
[God] himself is a legislator and fountain of laws," implying 
that the legislative power exists only because God is that which 
it denotes. t The same relation is suggested when God is 
spoken of as " the Benevolent and Propitious, who has filled 
all things with his own beneficent power."{ Another mode of 
expression represents the power as that by virtue of which 
God acts. Thus, in exposing the folly of the man who 
fancies that he can escape the notice of God, Philo says, 
"Thou art ignorant of God s power, by virtue of which 
he sees all things and hears all things at the same moment." || 
Clearly the power is not something which hears and sees 
instead of God, but God s faculty of seeing and hearing. 
Again, Jacob s words, "This is the house of God,"^[ mean, 
" This perceptible cosmos is nothing else than the house of 
God, one of the powers of him who is really God, by virtue of 
which he was good."** Lastly, there are several passages in 
which the two highest powers become simply predicates of the 
Self- existent. We may cite these in the order in which they 
occur. The saying, "lam the Lord "ft is not only equivalent 
to " I am the perfect and incorruptible and truly good ; " but 
stands for, "I am the Kuler and the King and Despot. "{J 
Again, Scripture says "that Noah pleased the powers of the 
Self-existent, Lord and God ; but Moses [pleased] him who 

* Animal, sacr. idon., 6 (II. 242). f SS. Ab. et Cain., 39 (I. 189). 

J Vita Mos., III. 31 (II. 171). Ka0 ijv. 

II Sacrificant., 4 (II. 254). 1[ Gen. xxviii. 17. 

** Somn., I. 32 (I. 648). ff Lev. xviii. 6. 

i Gigant., 11 (I. 268-9). Gen. vi. 8. 



PKEDICATES OF GOD. 103 

is attended by tlie powers, and apart from them is understood 
according to being only; for it is said, in the person of God, 
Thou hast found favour with me/* indicating himself with 
out any other. Thus, then, the Self-existent himself deems 
the supreme wisdom in Moses worthy of favour through him 
self alone, bat that which is modelled from this, being second 
and more specific, through the subject powers, by virtue of 
which he is both Lord and God, both Euler and Benefactor."f 
This passage is most instructive, because the powers are so 
strongly distinguished from the Self-existent. We must 
return to it farther on, and endeavour to explain the force of 
this distinction. Meanwhile we must be content with observ 
ing that, whatever the distinction may be, it is asserted in 
almost the same breath that it is the Self-existent himself who 
is both Lord and God. A similar identification takes place in 
another passage which it is needless to quote at length. The 
appellations Lord and God signify the powers around the self- 
existent Being, that by virtue of which he rules, and that by 
virtue of which he benefits. So far as he is Ruler he is able to 
do good or ill, but so far as he is Benefactor he wills only to 
benefit. " Eternal God " means, Who gives continually, though 
he is Lord and able to injure. Accordingly Jacob said, " the 
Lord shall be my God,"J meaning, He will no longer show me 
the despotic action of his rule, but the beneficent action of 
his propitious and saving power. " What soul would suppose 
this, that the Despot and Sovereign of the universe, making 
no change in his own nature, but remaining alike, is continually 
good and unceasingly munificent ?"|| It could hardly be made 
more evident that Lord and God represent the same subject 
regarded under different aspects. In the final question, " the 
Despot and Sovereign of the universe " can denote only the 
supreme God. It is he that is both despotic and beneficent, 
and wonderfully harmonizes these antithetic characters in his 

* Ex., xxxiii. 17. t Quod Deus immut., 24 (I. 289). J Gen. xxviii. 21. 

To ivtpytTiKov, as before, TO deffiroTixov. \\ Plantat.Noe, 20, 21 (I. 342-3). 



104 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

own unchangeable Being. Again, in the interpretation of 
Jacob s dream it is said that, "the Lord" who stood above 
the ladder was the self-existent Being.* We thus learn that 
the name which is strictly limited to one of the divine powers 
may, as is so repeatedly the case with "God," be used to 
denote the absolute Being himself, a practice which is not 
easily understood if "Lord" and "God" denote separate 
and subordinate persons. The passage, however, instructs us 
more plainly. He who stood upon the ladder said to Jacob, 
" I am the Lord God of Abraham thy father and the God of 
Isaac." It is not without reason that this distinction is made 
between Abraham and Isaac ; for the former, having lived 
among the Chaldaaans, and acquired his wisdom by learning, 
needed two powers to care for him, sovereignty and beneficence ; 
but the other, being born under happier circumstances, and 
having what was good by nature, did not require admonishing 
rule, but only the gracious power. Moved by this, Jacob 
offered a most admirable prayer, that to him te the Lord might 
become God," for he wished no longer to fear him as a ruler, 
but to honour him lovingly as a benefactor.f Comment is 
unnecessary. In the last passage to be cited under this head, 
Philo gives his opinion that by the cherubim on the lid of the 
Ark were indicated the two oldest and highest powers of the 
Self-existent, the creative and regal. "For," he adds, "being 
alone truly self-existent, he is both maker in the strictest sense, 
since he brought into being things that were not, and king by 
nature, because no one would rule the things that were created 
more justly than he who has made them."J Here, again, 

* T6 5v. 

t Somn., I. 25-26 (I. 644-5). Cf. the passage already fully cited, p. 94, 
from Mutat. Norn., 3 (I. 581). 

J Vita. Mos., III. 8 (II. 150). We may refer also to Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II. 66, 
with the Greek in Harris, Fragments, p. 65, the force of which is quite lost in 
the Latin. Having spoken of " the creative and regal powers," Philo says, in 
explanation of the fact that the faces of the cherubim on the Ark inclined 
towards one another, tTreidrj 6 fooc tig wv irai Troir/rr/g tort Kat (3a<ri\tvg, eiicorwg ai 
Sicicraaai Svvdfitig Ta\iv Hvwfftv tXa/Sov. The rest of the passage too is instructive. 



PKEDICATES OF GOD. 1C5 

comment is needless. From all these passages we learn that 
it is the Self-existent himself who is what the various powers 
denote, and who presents to the imperfect thought of man 
these partial and broken glimpses of his own single and 
unchangeable nature. Accordingly the powers are sometimes 
spoken of precisely as we should speak of the attributes of 
God. Thus we are told, that " God is the name of the good 
ness of the Cause, that thou mayest know that he has made 
even lifeless things, not by authority, but by goodness." 
Immediately afterwards this goodness is referred to as a 
power.* Again, God has given good things, not because he 
thought anything worthy of favour ; but c looking to the 
eternal goodness, and supposing that it belonged to his own 
happy and blessed nature to benefit." Hence the goodness 
of the Self-existent, the oldest of the graces " supplies the 
reason for creation. t Once more, the four letters graven on 
the golden plate on the high-priest s mitre signified, they say, 
the name of the Self-existent, as it is not possible for anything 
to subsist without summoning God;J "for his goodness and 
propitious power are the harmony of all things. " 

There is one other indication of PhnVs belief which is per 
haps worth noticing before we quit the line of thought which 
we have been following. In the passage where the intelligible 
and the perceptible worlds are described as the elder and the 
younger sons of God, time is spoken of as his grandson, 
because the cosmos is the father of time, and God is the father 
of the cosmos. || This seems to show that, whatever colour 
Philo s language may occasionally afford to later Gnostic 
speculations, he himself did not suppose that the material 
world was separated from God by the intervention of the 
intelligible; for had he thought that the perceptible cosmos 
was not the immediate creation of God, but had emanated from 

* Leg. All., III. 23 (I. 101). t Quod Deus immut., 23 (I. 288-9). 

J "Avev /corojcX^ffewc Geov. Vita Mos., III. 14 (II. 155). 

I! Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277). 



106 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

the intelligible as from a separate group of powers, which 
themselves were the immediate offspring of the First Cause, 
he would have represented it, not as a younger son, but as a 
grandson. By assigning to both the same relationship, he 
makes them equally direct expressions of the divine causality ; 
and since, nevertheless, the world of sense was created through 
the powers, it follows that the latter were not regarded as 
ontologically distinct from God. 

The foregoing passages have been cited at such length in 
order that a due impression may be formed of their number 
and weight, and we may clearly see how Philo s writings are 
pervaded by a conception which Gfrorer treats as "a mere 
makeshift." Zeller frankly admits the frequent identification 
of the powers with the divine nature, and perceives the import 
ance of this identification in the philosophical system with 
which it is connected j but he finds himself unable to reconcile 
with this view the doctrine presented in other passages, and 
maintains that Philo flatly contradicts himself, and was com 
pelled to do so by the necessities of his theory. In the 
doctrine of the powers, he observes, two representations cross 
one another, the religious notion of personal, and the philo 
sophical of impersonal, mediators. Philo combines the two 
conceptions without noticing their contradiction ; indeed he 
could not notice it, because, had he done so, he would thereby 
have sacrificed the double nature which is essential to the 
mediatorial character of the divine powers, by virtue of which 
they must, on the one hand, be identical with God, in order 
that through them the finite may be able to participate in the 
Deity, and, on the other hand, be different from him, in order 
that the Deity, in spite of this participation, may remain free 
from all contact with the world. There is here, as elsewhere, 
simply a contradiction, which the historian may indeed account 
for, but cannot remove.* When a writer of such extensive 
learning and such clear discernment makes so positive a state- 
* III. ii. pp. 365 sq. 



ALLEGED CONTRADICTION. 107 

ment, we must proceed with caution. That the idea of person 
ality was not very sharply defined by the ancient thinkers,, we 
have already had occasion to observe ; but the charge against 
Philo is not that he is vague and uncertain in the application 
of this idea : it is that he predicates of the same object 
identity with and difference from God in a sense that involves 
absolute contradiction. We must carefully examine the 
tendency of thought on which so serious an allegation is 
based; but, in doing so, instead of considering first the 
passages which seem most plainly to .contradict those that 
have been hitherto adduced, we must rather follow, if it be 
possible, the natural order of exposition, and develop the 
ideas which we have already gained. 

The simplest conception of the mediating office of the powers 
is that which explains through their agency the omnipresence 
of God. Gfrdrer, in rejecting the doctrine which we have 
hitherto unfolded as not representing Philo s philosophical 
opinion, but merely a concession to the popular faith, asks, as 
though his question were conclusive, " To what end separate 
the Eternal so anxiously from the world, if, through the 
powers, which according to the latter exposition are nothing 
else than his mode of operation, he enters again the circle of 
the finite ?"* An attentive consideration of PhnVs language 
will rather convince us that a primary function of the powers 
was not to keep God out of the finite, but to bring him into it. 
It was to remove the difficulty which must arise, not only in 
Alexandrian Judaism, but in every system of theism. How is 
it possible for the Eternal Mind, which transcends both space 
and time, to act within them ? To say that he cannot, that 
therefore he gets someone else to do it for him, is not a philo 
sophical answer, and I do not believe that it is Philo s. The 
latter may be satisfactory or not, but it is at least a serious 
attempt to meet a speculative difficulty. 

* P. 155. 



108 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

The first passage which demands our attention is one in 
which he is commenting on the words, " The Lord came down 
to see the city and the tower."* 

These words must be figurative, because the Divine is not capable of 
local motion, which involves leaving one place and occupying another. 
" All things have been filled by God," who alone is everywhere and no 
where. He is nowhere because he generated place and locality with bodies, 
and we may not say that the Maker is contained in any of the things 
made ; and he is " everywhere, because having stretched his own powers 
through earth and water, air and heaven, he has left no part of the cosmos 
desert, but collecting all things together he bound them throughout with 
invisible bonds, that they should never be loosed, .... for the self- 
existent Being which is above the powers is conceived to be superabund 
ant, not according to essence only."f 

It is perfectly clear from this statement that the powers are 
not substitutes for God. It is he that is everywhere, and the 
powers are introduced simply to explain the mode of his 
omnipresence. He is present, not in the sense in which a 
body is present, by having certain relations in space; but 
while the thought of dimension cannot be applied to him, he 
yet can make his energy operative in space, and is thus omni 
present, not like a universally diffused matter, but through the 
action of force, in other words, not essentially but dynamic 
ally. A similar explanation, it will be remembered, was 
given of the connection between the human mind and body : 
the mind, though residing essentially in the head, was diffused 
dynamically through the entire frame. J The analogy of the 
sun and its beams which was then used is equally applicable to 
the subject before us. We must interpret in conformity with 
this unambiguous doctrine the succeeding words, " The self- 
existent Being which is above the powers." This superiority 
need not imply separation. Even the human mind, conceived 
as a complex unity, is above the powers that compose it, and 

* Gen. xi. 5. 

f To fitv yap vTrepuvu) TWV dvvdpewv ov tTrivotlrai irepiTTSveiv, ov Kara TO 
tivai HOVQV. 

I Vol. I. p. 340 sq. 



GOD OMNIPRESENT THROUGH THE POWERS. 109 

so he who is better than the good, and more beautiful than 
beauty, must be above the powers which partially represent 
him to our thought. We must pay strict attention to Philo s 
language : it is " the self -existent Being,"* God conceived as 
absolute Being, God in his perfect and unrelated unity, who is 
above the powers, the forms of his thought and modes of his 
activity, which belong to the domain of the relative. Bearing 
this contrast in mind, we can understand Philo s further state 
ment : "Now, the power of this [Self-existent], which put 
and ordered all things, has been strictly called God, and has 
embosomed all things, and permeated the parts of the universe. 
But the divine and invisible and inapprehensible self-existent 
Being, which is everywhere, f is in truth visible and apprehen 
sible nowhere Therefore, none of the terms of motion 

which involves change of place is applicable to God in his 
essential Being.^J 

The same doctrine is laid down in another passage, where 
Philo is remarking on the statement that Moses entered into 
the darkness where God was : 

The darkness means unseen thoughts about the S elf- existent ; "for the 
Cause is not in l darkness, j| nor in place at all, but above both place and 
time. For having yoked all created things beneath himself he is con 
tained by nothing, but has stepped upon all. But having stepped upon, 
and being outside creation, he has none the less filled the cosmos with 
himself; for having through power stretched as far as the ends he wove 
each to each according to the proportions of harmony." [[ 

Here the statement that he has filled the cosmos with himself 
is perfectly explicit, and therefore the power whose presence 
justifies this statement is not distinct from him. A little 
farther on Philo adds : 

God " being the same, is both very near and far off, touching indeed 

* To ov. -j- To Qtiov . . . 7ravTa%ov ov. 

| T< Kara TO tlvai 9t<. Conf. Ling., 27 (I. 425). 
Ex. xx. 21. 

|| So Tischendorf, in his Philonea, p. 87, retaining the MS. reading 
for which Mangey reads, xpoVy. 

^f Am -yap dvj>a/iu> dxpi irtparuv TtivaQ SKCHTTOV t/caVry . . . ovvv<j>T)Vv 



110 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

with, the creative and punitive powers, as they are near to each, but 
having driven the begotten very far from his nature in its essence."* 

It is only as expressions of himself that the powers can be 
thus said to make him [near ; it is only in his essence that is, 
in the complete and absolute unity of his being that he is 
said to be far off. This is a most instructive passage, for we 
cannot suppose that Philo contradicts himself in the same 
breath. He is quite aware of the seeming contradiction in 
the statement that the same being is near and far off, and 
resolves it to his own satisfaction by explaining that he is 
near dynamically, remote essentially, near through partial 
manifestations of his thought, remote in the incomprehensible 
completeness of his nature. 

There are one or two other passages which also support the 
doctrine of God s presence through the powers, but can hardly 
be said to throw further light upon Philo s meaning. The 
question, " Will the Lord s hand not suffice ? " f signifies 
<f that the powers of the Self-existent reach everywhere J for 
the benefit, not only of the illustrious, but also of those who 
seem to be more obscure, on whom he graciously bestows what 
is fitting, according to the standards and measures of the soul 
of each, ruling and measuring the just proportion to each by the 
equality in himself/ On these words we need only remark 
that they do not represent God as withdrawn from all interest 
in the lower world ; it is he that gives, it is he that assigns to 
every man his due. So when we are told that God " has filled 
all things throughout with his own beneficent power," || we 
do not naturally think of a substitute for himself, especially as 
it is he that is represented as acting. These passages, accord 
ingly, if they do not advance our thought, are, at least, 
consistent with what has been hitherto maintained.^" 

That we may fully appreciate the force of the above argument 



TO dvai (pv<rtw. Post. Cain., 5-6 (I. 228-9). 
f Num. xi. 23. J Uavrr] .... tyOdvtiv. 

Mutat. Norn., 40 (I. 613-14). || Vita Mos., III. 31 (II. 171). 

^[ See also Gigant., 11 (I. 269). 



GOD STRETCHES THE POWERS. HI 

we must refer back to what was said about the divine omni 
presence in treating of the attributes of God. It is to him that 
this high prerogative belongs. Yet we must think of him, not 
as an extended and therefore material substance, but as one 
who, though he transcends the conditions of space, can yet 
make his energy felt wheresoever his sovereign will may 
direct. 

The term which Philo frequently employs to denote the local 
action of the powers, is quite agreeable to the conception which 
we have reached. He says that God stretches the powers 
a word which would have an odd application to personal 
mediators, but precisely suits the notion of exerting energy 
either thoughout space or in particular parts of it. " Stretch"* 
happily combines the ideas of extension and of strain, f and is 
used characteristically of the direction of force upon certain 
objects. We have seen it employed to describe the distribution 
of the human powers to the various organs of the body, and we 
are thus furnished with an analogy to the diffusion of the 
divine powers throughout the universe. We may add two 
further examples. " He who has stretched the energies of his 
soul to God, and hopes for benefit from him alone," will 
disclaim the receipt of his blessings from the objects of nature, 
and accept all things " from the only Wise, since he stretches 
his own propitious powers everywhere, and benefits through 
these/ J Again, when one is listening quietly and atten 
tively to an address, the mind is said to c c stretch itself to the 
speaker. 1 " These examples are interesting, because they 
represent the mind as extending its powers, or itself, beyond 
the bodily circumference. They may satisfy us that we are not 
to conceive the extension physically, but to regard it as a 
figure of speech, representing in the least objectionable way, 



f Cf. Philo s own Kara rf)v iff%vv KOI ivroviav (cat Svvauiv, in distinguishing 
i iVfia from avpa, Leg. All., I. 13 (I. 51). 
I Ebriet., 27 (I. 373). Quis rer. div. her., 3 (I. 474). 



112 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

a spiritual process whose reality is more obvious tlian its mode. 
When we remember what Philo says of the inadequacy of 
human language respecting God,, we must admit that this 
remark will apply still more certainly to the extension of 
the divine powers. The latter represents the fact that the 
energy of the Supreme Cause is operative in space, and 
supplies us with a physical analogy by which we can hold this 
fact in our imagination, but is not designed to give a literal 
description of the inscrutable mode in which God puts forth his 
power.* 

From the conception of stretching, that of touching easily 
follows, for the power must be stretched to some object with 
which it may be said to be in contact. The two ideas are 
combined in a passage in which Philo speaks of the inspiration 
of the human mind : God stretches the power from himself as 
far as the mind, that we may receive a thought of him ; " for 
how could the soul think of God, unless he inspired and 
touched it dynamically,f for the human mind would not dare 
to run up to such a height as to lay hold of the nature of 
God, unless God himself drew it up to himself, so far as 
was possible for a human mind to be drawn up, and stamped 
it according to the powers that are accessible to thought.";]; 
Before commenting on this passage, we may quote another 
which helps to illustrate it : " Nothing is higher than God ; 
and if anyone has reached him by stretching the eye of 
the soul, let him pray for permanence and stability. For 
uphill roads are wearisome and slow, but the rush down, 
tearing violently along rather than quietly descending, is swift 
and very easy. Now the things that force us down are many ; 
but they have no effect whenever God, having suspended the 

* Nearly all the passages where reivta is used of the divine powers have been 
already cited in other connections, and it is sufficient merely to refer to them : 
Leg. All., I. 13 (I. 51) ; Post. Cain., 5 (I. 229) ; Conf. Ling., 27 (I. 425) ; Migrat. 
Abr., 22 (I. 455), TrpoTtivag ; 32, p. 464, ctTrirtivt ; Mutat. Norn., 4 (I. 582). 

t Kara ^vva^iv. \ Leg. AIL, I. 13 (I. 51). 



GOD TOUCHES THINGS THROUGH THE POWERS. 113 

soul from his powers, draws it to himself with a more powerful 
pull." * It is evident that in these passages, physical imagery 
is used to express facts which are hyperphysical. What, then, 
are these facts ? First, there is a real connection between the 
soul and God, which may be expressed under the twofold 
aspect of a descent of the Divine upon the human, and an 
ascent of the human to the Divine. Secondly, this connection 
is effected through the mediation of the powers. If we ask 
why there is any mediation, the answer is not supplied in the 
text before us, but may be gathered from what we have 
learned elsewhere. If it were said without qualification that 
God himself touched the soul, it would be implied that he made 
no partial revelation, but impressed upon the mind that one 
all-containing thought, inaccessible to man, which would 
convey a complete knowledge of the totality and unity of his 
essence. Since this is impossible, if not for all finite natures, 
at least for souls imprisoned in bodies, God can touch the soul 
only by his power, that is, he makes- his energy present to the 
human consciousness, where it resolves itself into a plurality of 
powers or ideas representative of the Divine. In this way the 
mind is taught to lift the spiritual eye to God, and is drawn up 
to himself so far as mortal weakness will allow; for it can 
apprehend as divine the powers or thoughts which are im 
pressed upon it, and refer them to the unknown unity of 
which they are the manifold expression. 

We are now prepared to understand a passage which is 
frequently quoted as proving decisively the separation of the 
powers from God. Out of matter, it is said, " God generated 
all things, not touching it himself, for it was not right for the 
Wise and Blessed to come in contact with indeterminate and 
mixed matter ; but he used the incorporeal powers, whose real 
name is ideas, that the fitting form might take possession of 
each genus." f If the powers were employed to do something 
which it was not suitable for God to do himself, what can be 

* Abr., 12 (II. 10). t Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261). 

VOL. II. 8 



114: THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

plainer than that they and God are essentially distinct ? Dahne 
relies upon the passages in which a contrast of this kind is drawn 
as affording conclusive proof that the powers are persons essen 
tially different from God, and declares that if Philo maintained 
that it would be unworthy of God to interpenetrate the world, 
but not unworthy of his attributes, though it is only through 
their combination that God first became God, he talked perfect 
nonsense, and we must cease to treat him as a philosopher.* 
This is a summary way of settling a difficult question, and, 
from our modern point of view, might appear to be unanswer 
able. The notion, however, that God is made up by a com 
bination of attributes is so exceedingly remote from the 
thought of Philo, that we may suspect the critic s judgment of 
being a little at fault. Instead of yielding to the first impulse 
of common sense, let us look a little more deeply into the 
matter, even at tbe risk of talking nonsense. If Philo had 
said that God himself touched matter, not through his powers 
but in his essence, what would he have meant ? Could he 
have meant that he retained his transcendence, and made only 
some feeble and partial revelation of himself through matter ? 
I think not. According to all that we have yet learned, he 
could only have meant that God impressed his whole being 
upon matter, that from being transcendent he became imman 
ent, and made through the cosmos a complete revelation of 
his eternal essence. In that case the cosmos would be 
obviously one, instead of letting its unity wait upon the 
inferences of reason from its complex phenomena; the ideal 
form impressed upon matter would exhibit to the mind a 
single thought, and that thought would be tantamount to 
God ; his name would be known, and in surveying the universe 
we should gaze upon him face to face. But such was not 
the aspect presented by the world. Matter was not adequate 
to receive the transfiguring touch which would make it an 
exhaustive expression of the Divine. Instead of one, there 

* I. p. 239 sqq. 



GOD TOUCHES THINGS THEOUGH THE POWERS. 115 

were impressed on it a multitude of ideal forms, divine 
thoughts which gave significance to its dull mass ; and no com 
bination of these would produce God or adequately represent 
him, but even when, through an effort of reason, we had bound 
them together, and grasped the idea of the good, we should 
still have to pass on to the unknown and transcendent unity, 
which embraced in its infinite essence all, and more than 
all, that a cosmos could reveal. It was necessary, therefore, to 
say that God used the powers or ideas for his cosmic work, and 
touched the universe only with these, while he kept the 
begotten far from his essential Being.* In this their cosmical 
aspect the powers become as it were objective to God, divine 
thoughts permanently planted out in a material world, and they 
might very easily be spoken of as independent essences, just as 
we habitually refer to the physical forces as though they were 
so many distinct agents, though we may regard them philo 
sophically as modes of the divine activity. But that a real 
separation from God is quite inadmissible is affirmed by Philo 
in the most explicit language : " Nothing of the Divine is cut 
so as to separate it, but is only extended." f This indeed 
is said in immediate relation to the human soul, which is 
invested with a distinct personality; but it is said in connection 
with those " invisible powers " whereby it outstrips time, and 
touches the universe and its parts. A focal aggregate of 
powers may produce a person, but this, instead of suggesting, 
is rather inconsistent with the ascription of personality to the 
powers taken one by one. The great source which includes 
and transcends them is a person, or, rather, he is the one arche- 



* See the passage quoted on p. 110 from Post. Cain., 6 (I. 229). Perhaps what 
1 conceive to be Philo s fundamental thought may be more clearly expressed as 
follows : O *Qv could not impart Himself to matter ; for that would mean that 
matter became partaker of eternal Being. Creation may become rational ; but 
for the creation to become that which has not become, but always is, would be a 
contradiction. Hence the absolute separation between pure Being and matter. 

t Ts/ivtrai yap ovdiv TOV Qtiov fear airaprrjatv, a\\a povov licreivertu, Quod 
det. pot. ins., 24 (I. 209). 

8 * 



116 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

typal person by participation in whom all lower personality 
subsists ; but the powers are modes of his energy, eternally 
and inseparably dependent upon him, and destined to vanish if 
he were not, as rays of light vanish when the central luminary 
is quenched. They appear as ideal forms in matter, and 
as thoughts in the human mind. By virtue of their origin they 
are independent of time and space, and hence our thought can 
transport itself instantaneously to the most distant regions, and 
hold heaven and earth within its embrace. Thus they are the 
connection between the universe and God, mediating between 
them, not because they are different from both, but because 
they are strictly separable from neither. Withdraw them from 
the mind, and it becomes a non-entity ; withdraw them from 
the material world, and it ceases to be a cosmos ; detach them, 
if that be conceivable, from God, and they will sink into 
nothingness. They are really divine, and, wherever it turns, 
the seeing soul may discern some thought of God ; but they 
are nowhere exhaustive of the divine, and it would be wholly 
false to say that in their totality they were the equivalent 
of God. Through them God has indeed left no part of 
the cosmos empty of himself; but he has not made himself 
and the cosmos conterminous, and therefore, as soon as we 
endeavour to apprehend him in the unity of his being, he 
remains to our thought essentially outside the universe, though 
acting dynamically within it.* We may agree with this view 
or not; but at all events it is something better than sheer 
nonsense. It is a natural development of Philo s philosophy, 
and seems to me a reasonable interpretation of his language. 

* We may compare Philo s statement that the sovereign principle in man is 
in its essence within the body, but in power is in Italy or Sicily when it thinks 
about these places: Leg. AIL, I. 18 (I. 55). This is suggestive, though the 
notion of locality which is here involved is of course inapplicable to God. Most 
instructive also is Athanasius s remark about the Logos: axr-rrtp iv navy ry 

KTiatl WV, IKTOC H W IffTl TOV TTCtVTOQ KCtT OVfflClV, tV TTUffl Si SffTl TOiQ tCtVTOV 

Svvaptai, . . . Trepiexoiv ra o\a, fcai p) Trtpiexofisvoff, aXV Iv pavy T$ 
Ilarpi oXog wv Kara Travra. De Incarnat. c. xvii. 



avrov 



GOD GUAKDED BY THE POWEES. 117 

On the other hand, to represent God as physically outside the 
universe, and therefore requiring separate persons inferior to 
himself to act upon matter for him, makes the whole subject 
hopelessly incoherent; and if this was what Philo meant, 
instead of rescuing his claim to be a philosopher, we may 
rather pronounce it to be the clumsy device of one incapable 
or impatient of metaphysical thought. 

This view makes it an easy figure of speech to represent the 
powers as standing round about God, and waiting upon him like 
the retinue of a court. It will be remembered that the same 
figure was used of the powers of the human mind, so that we 
need have no scruple in recognizing here a simple personifica 
tion. God is " the sovereign of all the powers."* With a view 
to aid us, power sits as a ready helper beside God, and the 
Sovereign himself draws nearer to benefit those who are 
worthy. "f God is "attended by the powers as by a body 
guard ."% They are his "followers and attendants," and by 
their appearance in the cosmos reveal the existence, though 
not the essence, of the Supreme Cause. || "The glory round 
about" him^[ is none other than the powers which surround 
him and act as his body-guard ** but these are invisible and 
intelligible as himself, and are properly named ideas. tt The 
figurative character of these passages is apparent, and no 
comment is needed.JJ 

It is hardly necessary to refer to a few passages where Philo 
speaks of " God and his powers/ for such a distinction in 
thought need not imply any separation infact. In only one 

* Somn., I. 41 (I. 656). f Migrat. Abr., 10 (I. 444-5). 

J Aopv^opovfitvy Trpog rSiv cwdfiitov, Quod Deus immut., 24 (I. 289). 

ETTopivwv Kcd ccKoXovQtuv. IJ Post. Cain., 48 (I. 258). 

IT T/)i/ TTtpi as d6av. * tag at dopv^opovaag (Hvva[j,tQ, . . . rdg irtpi ifie. 

tt Monarch., I. 6 (II. 218-19). 

JJ For the use of the phrase " around God" in connection with the powers 
see also Quod Deus immut., 17 (I. 284) ; Plantat. Noe, 20 (I. 342) ; Mutat. 
Norn., 3 (I. 581) ; Sacrificant., 9 (II. 258). 

See QuodDeus immut., 1(1. 273), " The wise man sees God and his powers ;" 
Migrat. Abr., 14 (I. 448), "Inquiries about God and his most sacred powers." 



118 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

of them is there any appearance of attributing personality to 
the powers : fe It is always the care of himself and his bene 
ficent powers to change the discord of the worse substance."* 
The personification,, however,, belongs to the most familiar 
figures of speech ; and the distinction only calls attention to 
the benevolent nature of the divine purpose as a whole, and 
the realisation of this benevolence in the various directions 
prescribed to the different powers. Thus we might say of 
some one, without danger of being misunderstood, that the 
attainment of truth was the object of his mind and its several 
faculties, and the addition of the latter words would impart 
strength and comprehensiveness to the meaning of the 
sentence. 

Still less can we attach any importance to the statement 
that God used his powers, for this is in complete agreement 
with our ordinary modes of speech. One or two examples will 
suffice. The Maker of the universe possessing thought and 
purpose as most stable powers, and " always using these, 
surveys his works. "f Again, it is said that " God uses the 
powers unmixed towards himself, but mixed towards creation, 
for it is impossible for a mortal nature to contain them 
unmingled." This is illustrated by the tempering of the solar 
beams, which reach us through the chill medium of the air.J 
It is impossible in these passages to convert the powers into 
personal agents, and the statement that God uses them no 
more suggests real separation than is implied when we say of 
ourselves that we use our intelligence or skill. That which 
we use may be naturally spoken of as an instrument through 
which we effect our purpose. Thus we may be said to do one 
thing through our mechanical aptitude, another through our 
scientific knowledge, a third through our political insight. 

* Justit., 7 (II. 367). t Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277). 

J Ib. 17, p. 284. 

See also Gigant., 11 (I. 269) ; Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261) ; Qu. et Sol. in 
Gen. I. 54 ; cf. Mundi Op., 4 (I. 4), where God is said to have used the intelligible 
cosmos as a pattern. 



GOD ABOVE THE POWEES. 119 

Similarly God is said to confer benefits through his gracious 
powers,* to have placed all things through the creative power, t 
and to "confer by his own power unstinted abundance of good 
things on all parts of the universe. V J Such language may, no 
doubt, be used of personal agents, but there is not even 
an apparent implication of personal agency in the above 
quotations. 

We come now to the passages most relied upon by 
those who maintain the personality of the powers, some 
of which undoubtedly present considerable difficulties to an 
interpreter who takes a different view. We will treat them in 
groups, beginning with those which most easily harmonize with 
our previous exposition. 

First, God is sometimes spoken of as above the powers. 
This is no more than we should expect, when even the human 
mind is described as a king attended by powers as its body 
guards and messengers, and this though Philo looked upon 
the powers as independent of the mind in whom they were 
manifested. How much more is the Self-existent superior to 
those powers which are forms of his thought and modes of his 
energy, and are absolutely dependent on his will. This is 
stated in a passage in which the leading object is to show the 
equality and proportion which prevailed throughout the divisions 
of the universe. The rule applies even to the highest realm. 
1 The two first powers of the Self -existent, the gracious, by 
virtue of which he formed the cosmos, whereby he has been 
called God, and the punitive, by virtue of which he rules and 
presides over creation, whereby he is named Lord, are 
separated by him. standing above in the midst, for he says, I 
will speak to thee from above the mercy-seat between the two 
cherubim/ 1| in order to show that the highest powers of the 

* Ebriet., 27 (I. 373). 

-j- Mutat. Nom., 4 (I. 583) ; Abr., 24 (II. 19), with the dative instead of dm. 
} Leg. ad Cai., 16 (II. 562), dative. See Vol. I. p. 342. 

II Ex. xxv. 22. 



120 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

Self-existent, the donative and the punitive, are equal, using 
him as a divider/ * The former part of this sentence precludes 
the notion of any real separation between God and his powers, 
for they are simply his predicates ; and, therefore, the descrip 
tion in the latter part must be figurative, and refer to a 
distinction in thought. The object is simply to point out the 
even balancing of God s gracious and punitive agency; and 
the figure, which is not a harsh one in itself, is obviously 
governed by the quotation from Scripture on which the 
doctrine is avowedly based. Again, the statement in Genesis,t 
that "the Lord departed when he ceased speaking with 
Abraham, and Abraham returned into his place," is explained 
as meaning that God who is before all things^ no longer 
stretches the representations from himself, but those from the 
powers after him. The reference is clearly to higher and 
lower spiritual moods. In the higher the mind seems to rise 
above all phenomenal manifestation, and to commune with God 
as one, the eternal and absolute Being ; but when it sinks back 
to its ordinary condition, it can think of him only in his mani 
fold activity, as Creator, Euler, Benefactor, and so forth. All 
these modifications of his power are justly said to be { after " 
him whose nature they partially express. Lastly, in a passage 
previously quoted, || it is said that the highest God^]" " has 
passed beyond his powers, being both seen without them and 
manifested in them."** This might well appear at first sight 
to be one of the most invincible evidences of the essential 
distinction between God and his powers ; yet perhaps a little 
reflection will show us that it is really a neat compendium of 
the philosophy which has thus far spoken to us. The passage 
tells us that it is good for the soul to have within itself the 
three measures of the universe, the supreme Sovereign himself, 

* Quis rer. div. her., 34 (I. 496). f xviii. 33. J O ?rp6 T&V o\uv QIOQ. 

Tag [<f>a.VTa.aiaQ~\ cnrb rwv p,er avrbv dwd/Jisujv. Somn., I. 12 (I. 631). 

|| P. 89. f Tuv avwTaru) . . 9eov. 

TCLQ SwdflflS CtVTOV KCtl ^P Q O.VT&V Op^fieVOQ Kdl IV TCLUTCUQ 

SS. Ab. et Cain., 15 (I. 173). 



GOD ABOVE THE POWERS. 121 

who measures all things, and his goodness and authority, which 
are the measures respectively of good and of subject things. 
Each of these three measures is itself immeasurable and 
incapable of being circumscribed.* Now if Philo was about to 
represent the powers as separate persons, it is strange, to say 
the least, that he should begin by calling them God s goodness 
and authority, and making them infinite as God himself. So 
understood the passage involves us in hopeless perplexity. 
But all becomes clear if we remember that God was above the 
powers as the unknown unity which comprehended them all, 
and that he revealed himself in two different ways. The mind 
may think of him simply as Being, the mysterious source of all 
that is, and, refraining from all attempts at analysis, may 
regard him as One, possessing an indivisible essence which it 
is impossible to know. Thus he is seen without the powers. 
But the mind is also led by the phenomena of creation and 
providence to ascribe certain things to God, and to see through 
broken and coloured gleams that light whose unviolated purity 
it cannot behold. It is taught by the ideal forces which 
pervade the universe to recognize God as Creator and Ruler ; 
and thus the Self-existent is manifested in the powers, which 
partly express his essence, but, owing to the inability of our 
thought to combine them into a single idea, are unable wholly 
to reveal it.f 

We have already had occasion to notice the distinction 
between God in his essential being and God conceived under 
the partial aspect of the powers. We may refer here to two 
more passages where this distinction is drawn. The statement 
in the Law that "God is in heaven above and on earth 
beneath," J does not mean that God is so in his essence, for 
the self-existent Being contains, but is not contained. The 

* EjCttim/ LKUSTQTJTCtl ILV OVCClU,fijQ aTTfpt yOOE^>0 7 ( | ^ ( H > CCTTfpl"Yp<l<f)Ol 

KUl CLl fivVCtfJltlG CtVTOV. 

f One other passage in which the self-existent Being is said to be above the 
powers has been fully dealt with in treating of the omnipresence of God, pp. 108 sq. 
t Josh. ii. 11. Kara TO flvai. 



122 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

words point to his power by virtue of which* he ordered 
all things. This is strictly goodness, the generator of graces 
whereby it brought into existence things that were not. The 
self-existent Being, as represented in the mind,f appears 
in opinion everywhere, but in truth nowhere.J This passage 
seems to assert most explicitly that that may be predicated 
of one of the powers which it would be wrong to predicate of 
the Self-existent ; what, then, it may be asked, can be plainer 
than that Philo regarded one as essentially different from the 
other ? We may reply by asking, what can be plainer than 
that Philo is here dealing with a difference in our conception of 
God himself ? Else why is he so careful to speak of God in his 
essence, and to describe him by the most abstract term ? Why 
not simply say that Scripture refers, not to the real and 
supreme God, but to a subordinate agent who is frequently, 
though improperly, called God ? This would have clearly and 
adequately expressed the suggested meaning; and as it is quite 
different from what Philo actually says, we may fairly conclude 
that that is not his meaning. What, then, does he intend 
to teach ? The verse in question declares that God is in 
heaven, and therefore, at first sight, seems to imply that he is 
immanent in the universe, subject to the conditions of space, 
and with no reserve of causality above that which is manifested 
in creation. This, as we know, would be opposed to a funda 
mental doctrine of Philo s ; for, according to him, God is 
transcendent above the universe, and is not amenable to the 
limitations of place. Scripture, therefore, cannot have re 
ferred to God in his essential being, but to his goodness, 
which, though it is infinite when regarded simply as an 
effluence of the divine nature, yet, when viewed as an exercise 
of creative power, is necessarily co-extensive with creation. 
Thus the passage naturally allies itself with the rest of our 
exposition. Similar remarks will apply to a comment on the 

* Ka0 rjv. -j- QavraaiaZoftevov. J Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464). 



FONDNESS FOK PEKSONIFICATION. 123- 

statement in Exodus xxiv. 16, that " the glory of God came 
down upon Mount Sinai/** This, says Philo,puts to shame those 
who, whether from impiety or simplicity, suppose that there are 
local movements in the Divine. For it says plainly, not that 
the essential God, who is thought of according to being only,-f 
came down, but that his glory did so. Aofa,J being an 
ambiguous word, admits of two explanations. It either 
denotes the presence of the powers, as the military power of a 
king is called his S6t;a, or implies merely an opinion about him, 
so that the representation of the coming of God was wrought in 
the minds of those present. Here again, the careful way in 
which Philo guards his language shows that he is referring, 
not to a distinction between God and some one else, but 
between two aspects under which God may be regarded, 
between God in his unknown and transcendent essence, and 
God as manifested through the display of his power. 

In the remaining passages the powers appear more or less 
distinctly as persons, and the question will arise whether we are 
to understand the language literally or figuratively. In order 
to form a judgment upon this point, we must be acquainted 
with the style of our author; and it will be convenient to 
illustrate here by some examples his peculiar fondness for 
personification. In passages already cited we may have 
observed his tendency to describe things under, the terms of 
human relationship, so that even time becomes with him a 
grandson of God; and, what belongs more closely to our 
present purpose, we have seen how the powers of the human 
mind are turned into its body-guards and messengers. || Simi 
larly, we hear of the " offspring of the understanding which act 
as its body-guards and shieldbearers/ ^ and find the voice 

* K.aTJ3r] r j 6a rov 9eov. 

f Tbv ovaiuSr] dtov, TOV Kara TO tlvai povov irrivoov ^ivov. 
I Meaning either " opinion " or " glory." 

The Hebrew, n < lTP"TO3 J might have removed the doubt. Fragm., II. 
679 (Qu. et Sol. in Ex. II. 45). 

1 Or angels. 1" Somn., II. 14 (I. 671). 



124 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

described as having " the rank of herald or interpreter to the 
suggesting mind." * The impulses of the passions have 
sown " superfluous natures in us, and folly is " the evil 
husbandman of the soul."f In the self-examination which 
befits the sabbath day, we should take account of our words and 
deeds " in the council-chamber of the soul, the laws taking their 
seats with us in the council and joining in the examination." J 
As the laws are presumably the laws of Moses, and not 
the powers of nature, there can be no question of their real 
personality. Conscience is "a weighty accuser," || and re 
garded as the power which convicts us of sin ^f it is finely 
personified. " Dwelling and growing up along with each soul, 
accustomed to accept nothing that is under accusation, using 
always a nature that hates evil and loves virtue, being at once 
accuser and judge, when stirred up as an accuser it charges, 
accuses, puts to shame ; and again as a judge it teaches, 
admonishes, advises to be converted; and if it succeeds in 
persuading, it is joyfully reconciled, but if it fails it wages war 
without a truce, not desisting either by day or by night, but 
inflicting incurable pricks and wounds, until it snaps the 
miserable and accursed life." ** The two principles which 
contend for the mastery of the human soul are personified 
throughout a passage which is far too long for complete quota 
tion. " With each of us dwell two women who are hostile and 
ill-disposed to one another, and fill the mental house with the 
contentions of jealousy. Of these we love the one, supposing 
her to be manageable and tame and most dear and appropriate 
to ourselves; and she is called pleasure. But we hate the 
other, thinking her untamable, savage, wild, most hostile; 
and her name is virtue." The former comes to us tricked out 
with every meretricious ornament, and attended by " craft, 
rashness, flattery, quackery, fraud, false speech, false opinion, 

* Somn., I. 5 (I. 625). f Sacrificant., 9 (II. 258). 

J Dec. Orac., 20 (II. 197). To ffwuSog. 

II Quod Deus immut., 27 (I. 291). f E\&yxc- ** Dec. Orac., 17 (II. 195). 



FONDNESS FOR PERSONIFICATION. 125 

impiety, injustice, intemperance ; " and standing in the midst 
of these as the chorus which she leads, she addresses the mind, 
setting forth the various charms of a voluptuous life, and 
promising to bestow them without stint if the mind will live 
with her. Virtue was in concealment hard by, and heard this 
wheedling speech; and fearing that the mind might be un 
wittingly captivated, she suddenly presents herself, with quiet 
step and sober mien, attended by piety, holiness, truth, and 
a long train of other virtues, which, standing on each side, 
acted as her body-guard. She then addresses the mind, and 
exposes the false pretensions of her rival.* After this we need 
not be startled to hear that " all the virtues are virgins, but she 
who is piety and righteousness, having received the leadership 
as in a chorus, is the most beautiful." f But, perhaps, nothing 
exhibits Philo s fondness for personification more strikingly 
than its introduction into a plain historical narrative. In his 
account of the troubles in Judaea he says that Petronius was 
uncertain how to act, and, " having called together, as in a 
council, all the thoughts of the soul, he examined the opinion of 
each, and found them all unanimous in sentiment." J Passing 
from the domain of the human mind, we find wealth described 
as the (t the spear-bearer of the body." Noble birth is 
endowed with speech that she may deliver her sentiments. "I 
think," says Philo, "that noble birth, || if God stamped her in 
the human form, would speak thus to rebellious descendants ; " 
and then follows an address in which she contrasts her own 
opinion with theirs.^" The Israelites who ultimately return 
from the dispersion shall have three advocates** of reconcilia 7 
tion with the Father:^ one, the equity and kindness of God> 

* De MercecTe Meretricis, 2-4 (II. 265-9). The same figure occurs, with les& 
elaboration, in SS. Ab. et Caini, 5 (I. 167). 

f Praem. et Poen., 9 (II. 416). J Leg. ad Cai., 31 (II. 577). 

AopvQopog, which I have generally rendered "body-guard." Fortitud., 3 
(II. 376). 

11 E* r iva. 1 Nobil., 2 (II. 438-9). 

** NapaK\r]roi. 



126 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

who always prefers forgiveness to punishment ; secondly, the 
holiness of the founders of the nation, because, with souls freed 
from bodies and rendering a genuine service to the Ruler, they 
make effectual supplications for their sons and daughters ; and, 
thirdly, that which especially moves the kindness of the afore 
said, namely, the improvement * of those who are returning to 
the way that ends with pleasing God.f Even if it be thought 
that the equity and kindness of God are distinct persons, 
we can hardly extend the same notion to the "holiness" 
of the patriarchs and the " improvement" of the dispersed. 
Again, we are told that mankind, in their various grades 
of fortune, are nevertheless akin, since they have "one mother, 
the common nature of all men." J Sciences and virtues are 
<( the daughters of right reason. " Lastly, we may notice a 
few personifications in connection with God, which are so 
similar to the foregoing that we can have no hesitation in 
accepting them as figurative. God " rains down his virgin and 
immortal graces/ || These graces are (< his virgin daughters." If 
God is " the husband of the virtue-loving intelligence," and 
laughter is "his ideal son."** "Truth is an attendant of 
God,"ft and "the overseer and guardian" of the "really 
vivified and living polity. "JJ 

These examples will suffice to show us how easily Philo falls 
into the language of personification, and ought to make us 
pause before we insist on throwing his whole philosophy into 
confusion by too strict an interpretation of his words. At the 
same time we must remember that we are bound to satisfy the 
essential meaning of each passage, and not to fritter it away 
into figures of speech. With this caution we proceed to the 
personification of the powers. 

We are told in Genesis [says Philo] that " Noah pleased the powers 

* EE\Tiu<ri. f Exsecrat., 9 (II. 436). + Dee. Orac., 10 (II. 187). 

Gigant., 4 (I. 265). || Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232). 

^1 Migrat. Abr., 7 (1. 441). ** O IvtitaBtTOQ VLOQ Otov, Mutat. Norn., 23 (I. 598), 
tf Oiradog 9eov. Vita Mos., III. 21 (II. 162). $$ Nobil., 5 (II. 443 

; vi. 8, Nw $ fyp %dpiv tvavTiov Kvpiov TOV Qeov. 



PEKSONIFICATION OF THE POWERS. 127 

of the Self-existent, both Lord and God, but Moses pleased him who 
is attended by the powers as a body-guard, and apart from them is under- 
stood according to being only ; for it is said, in the person of God, thou 
hast found favour with me, * indicating himself apart from every 
other.f Thus the Self-existent himself deemed the supreme wisdom 
in Moses worthy of favour through himself alone, but that which was 
copied from this, as being second and more specific, through the 
subject powers, by virtue of which he is both Lord and God, Ruler and 
Benefactor.^ 

Now we might reasonably maintain that whatever personality 
is here ascribed to the powers must be figurative, because the 
power named God has been immediately before represented as 
" the goodness of the Self-existent/ and been obviously 
identified with " his happy and blessed nature/ and in the 
closing words of the quotation, if we regard the powers as 
distinct agents, God is made dependent on his own subjects for 
his primary and most essential attributes. To this mode of 
argument, however, Zeller replies fairly enough that if Philo 
treats the powers in the same connection sometimes as personal 
beings, sometimes as ideas or divine powers and attributes, he 
cannot have been aware how irreconcilable were these two 
modes of presentation. The conception of personality is, no 
doubt, frequently left vague and uncertain by ancient thinkers ; 
but the examples to which Zeller appeals || do not appear to me 
to illustrate the confusion of thought which is attributed to 
Philo. The Platonic world with its soul, the deity of the Stoics, 
the stars in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, are all distinct 
beings of some sort, and the only uncertainty is whether they 
are self-conscious or possessed only of an impersonal reason. 
This was precisely the point which was not determined, 
whether the enjoyment of reason involved the possession of 
individual self-consciousness; and an unsteadiness of thought 
upon this subject is quite intelligible. But the case is very 
different with Philo s powers. If it was agreed that they were 



* Ex. xxxiii. 17. f * Avev vavToc tripov. + Quod Deus inmrat., 24 (I. 289). 
III. ii. p. 366, Anm. 3 of the previous page. || III. ii. p. 365, Anm. 2. 



128 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

distinct rational beings, and the only question was whether, 
being so, they were self-conscious or not, we should have an 
exact parallel. But the question is really the preliminary one, 
whether they are distinct beings at all, and not simply the 
partial expression of the divine nature as distributed and classi 
fied for the apprehension of our finite intelligence. That Philo 
was blind to this distinction is not easy to believe, and we 
must test his language rigorously before we can admit it. 

What, then, is the leading thought in the passage before us ? 
Is it not that Noah had a less full and satisfying apprehension 
of God than Moses ? The latter, having wisdom in the unity of 
its genus, rose above the analytical understanding, and appre 
hended God in his unity, as eternal Being: the former, 
possessing wisdom only in the lower form of its different 
species, naturally was obliged to distribute his ideas, and could 
view the divine nature only under the double aspect of its 
goodness and power. The personification corresponds with the 
distinction which is thus drawn, and is suggested by the 
language of Scripture. When it is said that Noah pleased the 
powers, this is only an interpretation of the text, (C Noah found 
favour with the Lord God," and the figure is certainly not so 
violent as some of those we have met with above. But the figure 
having been once introduced, what more natural than that it 
should be carried through, and the powers be represented as 
the body-guards and subjects of the Self-existent ? When we 
have got so far, the latter may without violence be referred to 
as " alone " and " apart from every other/ when we regard his 
nature in its unity and without analysis; and Philo may 
well have thought that he guarded against all misapprehension 
when he wound up with the statement that, after all, it is the 
Self-existent himself who is both Lord and God. This inter 
pretation appears to me to give the genuine sense of the 
passage, and, without constraint, to reconcile its seeming 
contradictions. 

The correctness of this explanation is confirmed by 



PERSONIFICATION OF THE POWERS. 129 

the unquestionably figurative character of the succeeding 

passage : 

In contrast with Noah and Moses, Joseph is introduced as the " body- 
loving and passion-loving mind, sold to the chief cook, the pleasure of 
our compound being." He finds favour with the chief keeper of the 
prison. Now prisoners are strictly, not those who are condemned in courts 
of justice, but those who are full of intemperance and cowardice and 
injustice and impiety and innumerable other plagues ; and " the keeper 
and steward of these, the governor of the prison, is a compound and 
heap of crowded and various vices woven together into one species, to 
please whom is the greatest penalty." Some, not seeing this, go to him 
very joyfully, and act as his body-guard. Then the soul is exhorted to 
strive with all its might not to be pleasing to the chief keepers of the 
prison, but to the Cause, and, if it cannot please the Cause on account 
of the greatness of the dignity, to go straight to his powers, and become 
their suppliant, until they, having received continual and genuine service, 
place it in the rank of those "who have pleased them. 

Reduced to plain prose the passage is tantamount to this : do 
not be subject to your passions and bodily pleasures, but serve 
God; and if the highest conception of him be too pure and 
abstract, then serve him under those lower conceptions which 
appeal most readily to your understanding and your heart. 
This is surely more reasonable than insisting on a literal 
interpretation/ with the strange result of supposing that Philo 
deliberately exhorts men to depart from their monotheistic 
worship and transfer their homage to a crowd of inferior 
beings, who are divine only by courtesy. 

In another passage it is said that Moses prayed to " the 
self-determination, the might of God himself, and the pro 
pitious and gentle powers." The prayer on which this 
statement is founded is immediately quoted,* and God is 
throughout addressed in the singular number, and, in order to 
mark, as Philo himself says, his supremacy and superiority to 
all need, he is called the Eternal King.f In the commentary 
which follows, the being to whom the prayer was offered is 
treated as the supreme God, and there is no allusion to his 

* Ex. xv. 17, 18. f BaaiXtvwv TWV aiuvaiv K.T.\. 

VOL. II. 9 



130 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

powers except that the hands of God, which are mentioned, 
but not invoked in the prayer, are explained as " his world- 
making powers."*" It is apparent, then, that when Philo 
spoke of praying to the propitious powers he had no thought 
of personal beings other than God himself. 

Lastly, under this head, we must notice a passage in which 
judicial right, or AtV?;, is not only personified, but separated 
from and, indeed, contrasted with God. It is true that At*;?? 
is not spoken of as one of the powers ; but that is clearly the 
category to which she belongs, and we must not evade the 
force of the argument under this plea. 

It befitted the nature of God [we are told] to deliver the Ten Com 
mandments, which were summaries of the specific laws, in his own 
person, but the more detailed laws through the most perfect of the 
prophets, whom he chose to be their interpreter. It is for this reason 
that the Decalogue is a collection of simple commandments and pro 
hibitions without the customary provision of penalties. The author 
was God, the cause of good only, and of nothing evil. He conceived, 
then, that it was most appropriate to his nature to issue his salutary 
orders unmixed with punishment, in order that one might not choose the 
best unwillingly, but with deliberate judgment. In doing so he did not 
offer inviolability to those who do wrong, but knew that his assessor 
AiKt), the overseer of human affairs, would not keep quiet, as being 
naturally a hater of evil, and likely to accept as a congenial task the duty 
of defence against the sinning. For it is becoming for the ministers and 
lieutenants of God, as for generals in war, to use defensive weapons 
against deserters, but for the great King to attend to the common safety 
of the whole, maintaining peace, and continually supplying all the bless 
ings of peace richly to all men everywhere. For in reality God is the 
president of peace, but his under-servants are governors of wars.f 

In the latter part of this passage, and especially the last 
clause, there is no evidence that Philo is speaking of the 
highest powers ; at least I am not aware of any other place in 
which they are spoken of as God s under-servarits;J and it is 
certainly possible that, having referred to A/^T;, he is led on to 

* Plantat. Noe, 12 (I. 336-7). f Dec. Orac., 33 (II. 208-9). 



PEESONIFICATION OF THE POWEES. 131 

speak more generally of subordinate agents, whether human 
or not, as in the beginning he had spoken of Moses as the 
proper mediator for the communication of specific laws. In 
regard to ALKTJ herself, however, the case is different. She 
must be admitted to be one of the powers; and yet she is 
personified, and has a function assigned to her which makes it 
unnecessary for God to attach penalties to the violation of the 
Ten Commandments. The mere~personification we may at once 
dismiss, for no one can imagine that Philo literally placed an 
assessor beside God. But how shall we explain the function 
which seems to give her an objective existence apart from 
God ? I believe we can easily do so in conformity with the 
doctrine which we have laid down. According to that doctrine 
AIKIJ can be nothing less than a permanent mode of divine 
operation, established in the universe as one of its persistent 
laws, and therefore representing in its manifold activity a 
single divine thought and volition. In this aspect it is 
exceedingly natural to speak of it as though it were a distinct 
force, an objective thought embodied in the constitution of 
the world, though we know all the time, as philosophers, that 
it has no existence apart from the supreme will. ISTow, the 
passage tells us that, when God graciously gave the Ten 
Commandments in his own person, he wished to secure for 
them a perfectly voluntary obedience, and therefore would not 
introduce any deterrent ills which might be inconsistent with 
the benignity of his nature. Instead of enacting separate 
penalties, which would represent so many distinct volitions, 
and make him appear harsh and stern, he preferred relying on 
the universal law of retributive justice established in the 
providential order of the world, a law which was of wider 
scope, and, as we have seen, beneficent in design. It became 
him, instead of continually forming fresh plans, and stepping 
upon the scene with new punishments, to act through those 
vast purposes which he had, as it were, projected upon matter, 
and wrought as unchangeable laws into the constitution of 

9 * 



132 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

things. It seems to me that in this way Philo s language 
may be adequately explained in entire consistency with the 
views hitherto ascribed to him. 

We may consider in this connection another passage in the 
same treatise, in which reference is made to the divine voice 
through which the Ten Commandments were proclaimed from 
Sinai.* 

Are we to suppose [it is asked] that God himself spoke in the manner 
of a voice P Such a thought must not enter our mind ; for God is not as 
a man, requiring a mouth and tongue, but, thinks Philo,f he wrought at 
that time a very sacred and wonderful thing, "having ordered an 
invisible noise to be fabricated in the air, fitted with perfect harmonies 
more wonderfully than all instruments, not lifeless,^ but neither con 
sisting of body and soul like an animal, but a rational soul full of 
clearness and distinctness, which, having shaped and strained the air 
and changed it to a naming fire, sounded forth, as breath through a trumpet, 
so great an articulate voice that those who were farthest off seemed to 
hear as well as those who were nearest." For the voices of men naturally 
grow weak with distance. "But God s power breathing on the newly 
created voice raised and kindled it, and shedding it everywhere rendered 
the end clearer than the beginning, putting in the souls of each a 
different sort of hearing [from the sensible], far superior to that which 
comes through the ears. For the sensation, being slower, keeps quiet 
until, struck by the air, it is aroused ; but the [hearing] of the inspired 
understanding hastens with keenest swiftness to meet the words that 
are spoken."|| 

The only argument for the personality of the powers which 
can be derived from this passage is founded on the apparent 
identity of the " soul" which produced the voice with " God s 
power " to which the same office is ascribed. There are some 
circumstances, however, which render this argument more 
than precarious. In the first place, there is no good season 
for asserting the supposed identity. The soul created for a 
momentary purpose, and presumably dissipated again as soon 
as the purpose was fulfilled, would of course be an expression 
of, and inspired by, divine power, but cannot be synonymous 



* Ex. xix. and xx. f E f* 

i>x*7", for which Mangey suggests fjxnv. || Dec. Orac., 9 (II. 185-6). 



PERSONIFICATION OF THE POWERS. 133 

with it. The latter is used here in its largest and vaguest 
meaning, and no allusion is made to its mediatorial function; 
on the other hand, the soul is fabricated for the special object 
of acting in a single instance as the divine organ. Secondly, 
it is by no means certain that a " rational soul " made and 
employed in the way described would be regarded by Philo 
as a person. Thirdly, Mangey would read TT^Z/, "sound," 
instead of f ^v^j]v ) " soul." In favour of this change we 
might plead that the lines in which ^Jrv^v occurs require, in 
any case, some emendation ; that the epithets applied to it are 
more suitable to r]^rj ; and that it is strangely harsh to say that 
an invisible noise was a rational soul. With this change of 
reading the argument would fall. Fourthly, it is far from 
clear that Philo is not mixing up a literal with an allegorical 
interpretation. Literally a voice was fabricated in the air; 
but at the end of the passage it turns out that this voice was 
not really a noise in the air at all, but was apprehended only by 
the inspired understanding. Hence it is said in Scripture"* that 
ic all the people saw the voice }} ; for ce all the things that God 
says are not words, but deeds, which eyes distinguish rather 
than ears."f For these reasons I am unable to admit that 
this passage affords the least support to the doctrine of the 
personality of the powers. 

We must now return to that long passage about the 
visitors to Abraham from which we borrowed, as the key to 
our interpretation, a considerable extract in which the triple 
appearance of God is ascribed to the imperfection of the 
human understanding. In the earlier part of this passage the 
three visitors, who had seemed like men, are said, after they 
communicated the divine promise, to have conveyed a more 
sublime impression, that "of either prophets or angels, 
changing from spiritual and mental substance into the human 
form."J Philo himself regards them as angels, " sacred and 
divine natures, under- servants and lieutenants of the first God, 
* Ex. xx. 18. f 11, p. 188. J Abr., 22 (II. 17). 



13i THE DIVINE POWEES. 

through whom, as ambassadors, lie announces as many things 
as he wishes to foretell to our race." In entering Abraham s 
tent they presumed that he was " kindred and a fellow-slave 
of the same master/ * Nothing can be plainer ; and Gfrorer 
appeals to this passage as a decisive proof of the personality 
of the powers. f We must observe, however, that Philo is 
here giving the literal sense of the Scripture narrative ; and 
lie makes no allusion to the powers till, in the next section, he 
expressly enters on the symbolical interpretation ; and surely 
it is most unwarrantable, when Philo says that literally the 
three men are three angels in the form of men, figuratively 
they are nothing of the kind, to force these two statements 
together, as though they belonged to the same comment, and 
cry, Behold ! a contradiction. If we act thus, let us at least 
be consistent, and press the contradiction a little farther. 
Almost within the limits of a single page we learn that all 
three were angels, fellow- slaves with Abraham of the same 
master, and that one of them was " the Father of the 
universe/ " the Self-existent." Was the Self-existent, then, 
an angel, and his own slave, and was Philo quite unconscious 
of any incompatibility between these notions ? This may 
convince us that we are not justified in mixing together two 
systems of interpretation which the writer himself broadly 
separates. 

A later portion of the same passage occasions greater 
difficulty, because Philo himself is no longer so careful, but 
apparently blurs the two lines of exegesis. He devotes three 
sections J to the destruction of Sodom and the surrounding 
country, considered as an actual historical event, and then in 
the succeeding section proceeds to the allegorical inter 
pretation^ Contrary to what we should expect, he omits 
the powers from the latter, and introduces them into the 
former, where, according to his previous treatment of the 

* Ib. 23. f P P- 155, sq. t 26 - 28 - 29-31. 



THE APPEAKANCE TO ABEAHAM. 135 

history, we ought to meet only with angels. This temporary 
confusion occurs in an intermediate section* between the 
history of the destruction of Sodom and the symbolical inter 
pretation of the Pentapolis, and from its position may naturally 
give a stronger appearance of personal separation between 
God and his powers than was really in Philo s thoughts. The 
general meaning, however, does not seem to me inconsistent 
with the results of previous investigation. Let us observe in 
the first place, that in the preceding sectionf Philo says, without 
any qualification, that it was God who punished the Sodomites 
by ordering the air to rain down fire upon them; and therefore 
if he afterwards says that it was not the Self-existent who 
punished, but only his powers, we properly fall back upon the 
distinction so often drawn between God in his absolute being 
and God as partially and analytically apprehended by men. 
Let us see, however, what the passage says. Philo states that 
his object in relating the dreadful calamities of Sodom has 
been to show that of the three who appeared as men to 
Abraham only two, according to the Scripture, came to 
punish the inhabitants, while the third did not think it 
right to come. The latter was, in Philo s opinion, the really 
Self-existent, J and supposed it to be fitting to confer good 
things in personal presence through himself, but to execute 
the opposite of good by the ministration of the powers, 
"that he may be antecedently thought to be the Cause of good 
things only, and of nothing evil. Those kings also who imitate 
the divine nature appear to me to act thus, extending favours 
through themselves, but confirming punishments through 
others. But since of the two powers one is beneficent, and 
the other punitive, each, as we might expect, appears on the 
land of the Sodomites, because of the five best cities in it 
four were to be burnt, and one to be left unaffected and 
secure from all evil. For the destruction ought to take 

* 28. f 27. Kurd rrjv l^ffv tvvoiav ?]v o irpbs a\rj9tiav uv. 

Ka0 



136 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

place through the punitive power, and salvation through the 
beneficent. But since even the part that was saved had not 
entire and perfect virtues, it was benefited by the power of 
the S elf-existent , but was antecedently thought unworthy to 
obtain the representation of the latter." Now, if this passage 
stood alone, we should certainly believe that God and the 
powers were quite distinct from one another ; and if we are 
bound to take the words as a literal expression of Philo s 
thought, we must admit that he contradicts himself, and that 
at least in this one passage his doctrine of the powers becomes 
a mere jumble of heterogeneous elements. But there are some 
considerations, besides those already noticed, which must make 
us pause before we conclude that the fault is not in the 
expression rather than the thought. This is a continuation 
of the passage in which Philo lays it down with so much 
precision that God and his powers are in reality one subject, 
and that the triple representation in our minds is due solely to 
the imperfection of our spiritual vision. He thereby shows 
that he is aware of the difference between the conceptions of 
one God capable of manifesting himself in various modes, and 
of one God presiding over a number of persons separate from 
himself. It is not likely that within a few pages he entirely 
confounds these two conceptions, and announces that what 
was declared to be really one subject, though apparently three, 
was, after all, three both apparently and really. But there is 
within the passage itself a statement which compels us to 
give it a very liberal interpretation. It is said that the Self- 
existent " supposed it to be fitting to confer the good things 
in personal presence* through himself." This refers of course 
to the visit to Abraham s tent ; and therefore we learn that, 
in Philo s opinion, the supreme and eternal Cause did really 
come down, and enter the tent of a man, and talk and eat 
with him. Is any interpreter of Philo prepared to admit this ? 
One can almost see the scorn with which our philosopher would 



THE APPEARANCE TO ABRAHAM. 137 

desire such a one to " get away," and not to be so silly as to 
impute to him this enormous impiety. We are, then, compelled 
to allow that the language of the passage does not strictly 
represent its thought, and that Philo was led through some 
cause to confuse ideas which he knew would not really blend. 
The cause, I believe, is that which has been already pointed 
out, that he mixes the literal and the allegorical interpre 
tations. Literally the three men or angels were three distinct 
persons ; and in the progress of the story they separate from 
one another, and only two of them repair to Sodom. Why 
did the story assume this form ? " In order that [the Self- 
existent] may be thought* to be the cause of good things only, 
and of nothing evil." The intention, then, was not to draw a 
real distinction between God and his powers, but to affect the 
thoughts of men. Men are apt to look upon punishments 
as evils, and therefore God, in order that they may not 
misconceive his nature, often sends punishments through 
subordinate agents, or even, as in the present narrative, 
allows them to look upon the punitive force of nature as an 
agent distinct from himself. Philo accepted the doctrine that 
God was the cause only of good, but he had another way of 
escaping the difficulty connected with providential punish 
ments : these were not evils, but blessings in disguise, and the 
punitive power, justly regarded, coalesced with the beneficent.f 
Another evidence of the correctness of this interpretation is 
afforded by the statement that the city which was saved was 
deemed unworthy to retain the representation of the Self- 
existent, for thus we are expressly thrown back into the 
domain of mental images. In the allegory the city is vision, 
the queen of the senses, which alone is able to transport itself 
to incorruptible natures. If we venture to complete the 
allegory which Philo has left unfinished, we must say that the 
eye discerns throughout the cosmos the presence of the divine 
beneficence, but is too imperfect to look upon God himself ; 
* Nofitfiirai. - t See before, p. 87. 



138 THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

and then we shall have a distinction which introduces no new 
or contradictory thought. But what are we to say to the 
comparison with kings, who, imitating the divine nature, inflict 
punishments through others ? The reply is perhaps to be 
found in the more literal part of Philo s description. He says 
that God ordered the air to rain down fire, and destroy the 
country. The air, then, is the subordinate agent employed to 
execute the divine purpose. Now, the air, we must remember, 
is itself " a power, " but it is a power permanently impressed 
upon matter; and regarded from the other side, as matter under 
the constraint of divine force, it becomes objective to God, and 
is properly viewed as a subordinate, though still impersonal, 
agent. As the destroyer of Sodom it was charged for the time 
with punitive power, and thus the latter, too, was temporarily 
planted out, as it were, into distinct objective existence ; for 
being impressed upon matter it fulfilled the one condition 
which made an objective world possible. In this way, I think, 
Philo s language may be explained. He cannot indeed be 
acquitted of some confusion in his manner of presenting his 
subject ; but this confusion may be accounted for, and is very 
different from a radical contradiction in thought. 

We come now to the explanation of a passage in Genesis 
which evidently occasioned Philo some perplexity, and led 
him into some confusion of thought and expression. In his 
remarks upon it we meet with far the strongest evidence that 
is produced to show that he ascribed distinct personality to 
the powers. He treats of it in no fewer than four different 
places, all of which we must consider if we wish to arrive at 
his real meaning, or to discover whether he had any consistent 
interpretation to offer; and in arranging them we may 
advantageously reserve his longest and most elaborate 
exposition for the last. The passage in question is that in 
which a plural is used in connection with the creation of 
the human race : " Let us make man." 

One might reasonably doubt [says Philo] why Moses ascribed the 



THE CKEATION OF MAN. 130 

creation of man alone not to one fabricator, as lie did every thing else, 
but, as it were, to several. For does the Father of the universe, to whom 
all things are subject, require any one ? Or did he need no one to 
co-operate with him when he made the heaven and the earth and the sea, 
but prove unable to prepare of himself, without the assistance of others, 
such a little animal as man ? The truest reason for this is necessarily 
known to God only ; but we must not conceal the one that seems probable, 
and has the merit of a plausible conjecture. It is this. Some things 
have no participation in either virtue or vice, such as plants and irrational 
animals, the former because they are without souls,* the latter because 
they are not endowed with mind and thought, in which moral good and 
evil reside. Other things participate only in virtue, being entirely free 
from evil, as the stars. But other things are of mixed nature, as man, 
who admits the opposites, prudence and folly, sobriety and intemper 
ance, bravery and cowardice, justice and injustice, and, in a word, good 
and evil, fair and base, virtue and vice. Accordingly it was most appro 
priate for God, the Father of all, to make what was excellent through 
himself alone, on account of its relationship to him ; and it was not alien 
to him to make what was indifferent, since it, too, is without the vice that 
is opposed to him ; but in regard to the things of mixed nature it was 
partly appropriate and partly inappropriate : appropriate, on account of 
the better idea mixed up in them ; inappropriate, on account of that which 
is the contrary and inferior. Therefore it is only in connection with the 
creation of man that God said " Let us make man," which signifies the 
adoption of others as co-operators, in order that God, the sovereign of all, 
may be ascribed [as author] to the blameless counsels and deeds of man 
acting uprightly, but others, from among his subjects, to those of a 
contrary kind ; for the father ought not to be the cause of evil to the 
offspring, and vice and vicious activity are an evil.f 

As this passage does not contain a single word about the 
powers, it may be thought out of place to quote it ; but it is 
interesting in several ways. The general conception is of 
course borrowed from Plato s Timaeus ; J where the subordinate 
divinities are called in to assist in the formation of mortal 
creatures. Philo s difficulty, however, springs from a different 
root from Plato s. He feels that the moral contrariety in 
man s nature betokens a mixed origin, and cannot be traced 
back to one divine thought. In the present passage he is 
speaking of the intelligible man, the idea of humanity, as is 

* Or sentient life f Mundi Op., 24 (I. 16 sq.). J 41 C. sqq. 



140 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

shown not only by the entire context, but by his concluding 
remark that, although individual men had not yet taken form, 
the species were properly distinguished through the statement 
that " male and female were fabricated/ for the species exist 
within the genus. What we immediately learn, then, from the 
passage before us is this, that, since the very idea of humanity 
involves the possibility of moral evil, it is not purely divine, 
but must be in some way of mixed origin. The stars which 
were above the reach of sin, the beasts which were below it, 
might alike be true expressions of the thought of God ; but 
man in departing from God thereby showed his participation in 
an idea which was alien to the divine nature. Whether Philo 
had formed any clear view of the origin of this lower idea, or 
had attempted to reconcile it with his doctrine of the Logos as 
containing the whole of the ideal world, it is impossible to say. 
At all events he seems to have carried down the division thus 
found in the ideal cosmos into the actual, and to have assigned 
the creation of man in part to other agents than God. This 
will become apparent as we proceed; but before leaving 
the present passage we must make one or two further 
remarks. 

The very absence of reference to the powers is itself a 
fact of some importance, because it helps to show that 
Philo had no very decided and settled theory as to the 
nature of the subjects who co-operated with God in the 
creation of man. Again, Philo broaches his explanation only 
as a plausible conjecture which may not be coincident with the 
truth, and does not, like some of his interpreters, represent it 
as belonging to the very kernel of his philosophy. And, what 
is most important of all, the formation of man is represented as 
an exception to the general order of creation, and as alone 
requiring the presence of mediatorial agents. Has, then, Philo 
forgotten all that he has previously said about the Logos 
and the creative power ? We have no right to assume 
this. He could not conceive of creation without their 



THE CREATION OF MAN. 141 

presence and activity ; and if the helpers who were other* 
than God were not other than the most exalted divine 
powers, then man was no exception to the universal rule. 
Those, therefore, who insist on a strict interpretation of single 
passages, apart from their bearing upon other passages, are 
bound either to admit that God was the immediate creator 
even of the beasts, and to abandon the whole doctrine of 
mediatorial creation, and of a separation between God and 
the universe, or to regard the subordinate agents in the 
creation of man as different from the divine powers in the 
highest sense. 

This important result, however, is not left to mere inference. 
Elsewhere Philo comments as follows on the words " I am 
thy God : "f 

The self-existent Being, as such, is not relative ; but some of the powers 
are, as it were, relative ; for instance, the Regal and Beneficent. Akin to 
these is the Creative, called God ; so that " I am thy God " is equivalent to 
" I am maker and fabricator." " Now, it is the greatest gift to obtain the 
architect himself, whom also the whole cosmos obtained. For he did not 
form the soul of the bad, for vice is at enmity with God ; but the middle 
soul lie formed not through himself alone, according to the most 
sacred Moses, since, like wax, it was going to receive the difference of fair 
and base, for which reason he says, Let us make man according to 
our image, in order that, if it received a bad form, it might appear to be a 
fabrication of others, but if a good one, of the artificer of things fair and 
good alone. He, therefore, is altogether excellent to whom he says, I am 
thy God, since he lias obtained the Maker alone without the assistance of 
others. "J 

In this passage, again, we are not told who assisted in the 
creation of the bad man ; but it is perfectly clear that it 
was not the high power known as the creative, for to have 
been framed by this alone was the prerogative of the good 
man, as of the universe at large. We must remember, then, 
that the subordinate agents in the creation of man are 
separated from the highest powers, which we have treated 

* "Erepoi. f Gen. xvii. 1. J Mutat. Norn., 4 (I. 582-3). 



142 THE DIVINE POWEBS. 

as predicates of God, not only by inevitable inference from 
man s exceptional position in the plan of creation, but by 
Philo s express statement. 

In the next passage the powers are introduced, and we 
shall have to consider whether it contradicts those that 
have been just referred to or can, without violence, be 
harmonized with them. It will be better to quote it entire 
in order that we may have the case fairly before us. 

" It is not becoming for God to punish, as lie is the first and best 
legislator, and lie punishes through the ministration of others, not 
through himself ; for it is suitable for him to extend favours and gifts and 
benefits, as being by nature good and munificent, but [to inflict] punish 
ments, not indeed without his own order, since lie is king, but through the 
agency of others who are adapted to suck services. Now the self- 
disciplined [Jacob] bears witness to my statement by his words, 
God who nourishes me from my youth, the angel who rescues me 
out of all evils ;* for lie ascribed to God the older blessings, by which 
the soul is nourished, but to a servant of God those that were more 
recent, as many as result from the avoidance of sins. For this reason, too, 
I suppose, when he gave a philosophical account of creation, while 
he said that all other things were made by God, he signified that 
man alone was formed as though with the co-operation of others ; for the 
words occur, God said, Let us make man according to our image, a 
multitude being implied by tke phrase let us make. The Father of the 
universe, therefore, converses with his own powers.f to whom he gave the 
mortal part of our soul to form, by imitating his art when lie shaped the 
rational principle in us, judging it right that the sovereign principle 
in the soul should be fabricated by the sovereign, but the subject 
part by subjects. But he made use of the powers after liim,J not 
only for the reason which has been mentioned, but because the soul 
of man alone was to receive thoughts of evil and good, and to use 
the one if it were not possible to use both. He considered it necessary, 
therefore, to assign the genesis of evils to other fabricators, but that 
of good things to himself alone. For this reason, too. though first 
the phrase is used, Let us make man, as if referring to a multitude, it is 
added, as if in reference to one, God made the man. For the one only 
God is fabricator of the real man, \vho accordingly is purest mind, but the 
multitude [is the maker] of man who is so called and mixed with. 



* Gen. xlviii. 15, 16. f TaTc tavrov r __. 

J Reading fj.e9 lavrov instead of jU0 tavrov. The latter, however, would 
also suit the context, as we have above, fiera avvtpyuv. 



THE CREATION OF MAN. 143 

sensation. On this account man in the pre-eminent sense is mentioned 
with the article for it is said God made the man, * that invisible and 
unmixed thoughtf but the other, man, without this addition ; for the 
phrase, Let us make man, signifies him who is woven together out 
of irrational and rational nature."^ 

In dealing with this passage it is very easy to cry out 
that the question is settled, for here the divine powers are 
expressly mentioned, and are set over against God as personal 
agents in the creation of man. This is quite contradictory 
to the view which regards them as attributes, and therefore 
it is proved that Philo vacillated illogically and blindly 
between two irreconcilable tenets. Yet it is the duty of a good 
critic to consider whether there may not be some view which 
will harmonize, or at least may have appeared to Philo to 
harmonize, these contrasts. I am fully aware indeed of the 
danger which. Zeller points out, of imposing upon Philo 
what are only our own inferences from difficulties of which 
he himself was unconscious ; but we must be equally careful 
not to ascribe to him contradictions out of which he provides us 
with a clue. Now, we have one very strong reason for pausing 
before we commit ourselves to a hasty interpretation of the 
passage before us. If we insist upon adopting the sense which 
most easily presents itself, and understanding by the powers 
the creative and regal and the rest with which we have become 
familiar as predicates of God, we not only involve Philo in 
a confusion between the personal and the impersonal (into 
which he may conceivably have fallen), but we attribute to him 
a view which contradicts what the most celebrated critics 
have regarded as the very root and essence of his philosophy. 
In this passage, no less clearly than in the two previously 
cited, man is broadly distinguished from the rest of creation, 
and the distinction consists in this, that, whereas all other 
parts of the cosmos were made by God himself, the intervention 

* To v dvOpwTTov. f Aoyioyzoi/. 

J Prof., 13-14 (I. 556). III. ii. p. 365, Anm. 3. 



1M THE DIVINE POWERS. 

of the powers was required only for the construction of 
the irrational portion of the human soul. This simply sweeps 
away the entire doctrine of powers which we have hitherto 
learned; and if we can find no better interpretation, we can 
only set the passage aside as lying beyond the limits of Philo s 
philosophy, and containing views which were temporarily forced 
upon him by the words of Scripture on which he was com 
menting. We are not, however, shut up in this harsh alterna 
tive ; for, notwithstanding Zeller s adverse opinion,* I think 
Kefersteinf has pointed out the true solvent for our difficulties, 
although his criticism may require some modification and 
expansion. 

It will be observed that the comment on the phrase, " Let us 
make man/ is suggested by the words of Jacob, who speaks of 
God as his nourisher, but of an angel as the being who rescued 
him from evil. May we not, then, reasonably infer that when 
Philo speaks of personal agents as acting under God in the 
creation of man he alludes to angels ? But if we grant this, it 
may be immediately urged that the divine powers are thereby 
identified with angels, and their personality is fully established. 
In order to form a sound opinion upon this subject we must 
make a short digression, and notice the more important 
statements respecting the angelic nature. We will only 
premise that the relations between angels and the Logoi 
will be reserved for future treatment. 

A considerable part of Philo s doctrine of angels has been 
already unfolded in treating of the human soul, and we 
need now only recapitulate the most necessary parts of 
what was there said. Those whom other philosophers 
called demons, Moses was accustomed to call angels. Now, 
they are souls flying in the air, some of whom descend into 
bodies ; " but others did not think fit ever to be united 
with any of the parts of the earth, whom, being consecrated and 

* III. ii. p. 365, Anm. 3. f Pp. 1S5 sq. 



DOCTKINE OF ANGELS. 

taking- charge of the service of the Father, the Fabricator 
is accustomed to use as assistants and ministers for the care of 
mortals." Souls and demons and angels are, then, different 
names for one and the same subject. Good angels are 
ambassadors of men to God and of God to men, inviolable 
and sacred on account of this blameless and honourable 
service. Others, on the contrary, are profane and unworthy, 
and only creep into the name of angels.* To this general 
description we must add one or two very important statements. 
The angels were created, and are spoken of as powers. " The 
Maker," says Philo, "made two genera both in earth and 
air; in the air the perceptible winged creatures, and other 
powersf by no means apprehended anywhere by sense. This 
band consists of incorporeal souls, not disposed in the same 
ranks "; for some are said to enter mortal bodies, but others, 
having obtained a more divine constitution, neglect the earth 
and are next the ether itself. The latter are called by the 
Greeks heroes, and by Moses angels, as they report good things 
from the Sovereign to the subjects, and to the King the things 
which the subjects need.J The fact that the angels belonged, 
not to the eternal, but to the created realm is also casually 
mentioned in another passage, which furnishes an instructive 
example of the way in which Philo says what appears to him at 
the moment appropriate to the words of Scripture on which he 
is commenting, without taking pains to make a long interpreta 
tion consistent in all its parts. He is remarking on the words, 
" The angel of God said to me in a dream, Jacob ; and I said, 
What is it ? And he said to me, Look up, ... I am the God who 
appeared to thee in the place of God." His first observation 
is, " You see that the divine word records as God-sent dreams 
not only those that appear in connection with the oldest of 
causes, but also those that come through his announcing 

* Gigant., 2-4 (I. 263-5). See also the brief statement that "angels are an 
army of God, incorporeal and blessed souls," SS. Ab. et Caini, 2 (I. 164). 
f AIW//ICIC a\\a ff . { Plantat. Noe, 4 (I. 331-2). Gen. xxxi. 11-13. 

VOL. n. 10 



146 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

and attendant angels, who have been deemed worthy of a 
divine and blessed lot by the Father who begat them/ * It is 
apparent from this that Philo at the beginning of his exposition 
understood by the angel of God one of those subordinate 
beings whom God made or begat, and who, as we have 
seen, inhabited the air. Yet this angel says, " I am the 
God who appeared to thee in the place of God." Only on the 
previous page Philo has explained, in connection with the 
"house of God/ that God denotes "one of the powers of the 
real God, by virtue of which he was good." What an admirable 
opportunity, then, for telling us that this power was an angel, 
and removing in this way the startling difficulty presented by 
the fact that the angel of God says, I am God." Yet he does 
nothing of the kind ; and we may legitimately infer that 
he refrains from using this obvious explanation because it 
never occurred to him to identify the goodness of God 
with an angel flying in the air. He adopts instead an 
interpretation which is not very consistent with his opening 
remark; but as it is given after an interval of a few pages, the 
inconsistency may the more easily have escaped his notice. In 
the words, " I am God," he understands God in the supreme 
sense. He says nothing of the difficulty of putting such 
language into the mouth of an angel ; but presumably he 
has this difficulty in his mind when he says that to souls 
which are still in bodies God appears in the likeness of 
angels, not changing his own nature, but putting in the minds 
of those who receive the representation the opinion of another 
form. Thus our angel, who seemed so literal at the beginning, 
is spirited away into an erroneous mental impression.f One 
other passage deserves particular attention. In the great 
cosmic temple, in which heaven is the sanctuary and the stars 
the votive offerings, the priests are the angels who are under- 

* Tow yevvfiffavToc. The object is not expressed, but is sufficiently evident 
from the context. 

t Somn., I. 33, 39, 40 (I. 649, 655). 



NOT IDENTICAL WITH ANGELS. 147 

servants of God s powers,* " incorporeal souls, not mixtures of 
rational and irrational nature, as ours are, but having the 
irrational element cut out, wholly intelligent throughout, pure 
thoughts, t like a monad. "J 

Such, then, is Philo s doctrine about the angels. Does it 
follow that he identified them with those high powers which 
we recognized as predicates of God ? If things are distin 
guished by their attributes, it is not easy to imagine how Philo 
could have distinguished these two classes more sharply from 
one another. The powers are unbegotten, the angels are 
begotten and made. The powers are uncircumscribed as God 
himself, and stretched through earth and water, air and 
heaven ; the angels are obviously finite and local, for they are 
souls flying in the air. If, notwithstanding these broad 
distinctions, we maintain that Philo identified the powers with 
angels, we ascribe to him not only a want of clearness in his 
notion of personality, but an absolute incapacity for coherent 
thought. How little are we justified in doing so in the 
present instance is apparent from the last passage which we 
have quoted, where the angels are represented as under- 
servants of the powers. Zeller must surely have overlooked 
this passage when he affirmed that Philo nowhere indicates a 
distinction between the powers and the angels. But if we 
maintain the existence of this distinction, how can we consist 
ently suppose that the powers with whom God conversed at 
the creation of man were angels ? By the very simple reflec 
tion that, though the powers were not necessarily angels, the 
angels were most certainly powers. They are, as we have seen, 
expressly so called; but then so are earth, water, air, fire, 
nutrition, growth, improvement ; and, in a word, all classes and 
functions in nature or in man come under this term. If it is 
applicable to material things because they have been differen- 



* Tovg vTroSiciKovovg O.VTOV rfi 

f Ao-^/io^c. f Monarch., II. 1 (II. 222). 

III. ii. p. 366, Anm. 3 of the previous page. 

10 * 



14:8 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

tiated by the impress of some rational force, how much more is 
it applicable to immaterial souls, which, in their uncompounded 
being are nothing but divine power set apart and concentrated 
into an individual life. We do not in this view distinguish 
two classes of powers. The same conception of them is every 
where present, and the various names and operations which 
Philo attributes to them result from the logical unfolding of 
the same primary thought, that God is the sole rational and 
efficient Cause. The most that can be said is that we regard 
them under two different aspects, now in the totality of their 
essence, as genera which express the modes of the divine 
activity, and again as partially and locally manifested in species 
and individuals. Souls, or angels, were one form of divine 
power, and each angel, being a pure expression of that form, 
might itself be called a power. As this interpretation not only 
reconciles apparently conflicting passages, but springs imme 
diately from the roots of Philo s philosophy, it seems entitled 
to our acceptance. 

We have still to examine one long passage, and consider 
how far it confirms or overthrows the results which we have 
just obtained. It opens with a reference to the words ascribed 
to God, " Come, and let us go down, and confound there their 
tongue."* 

Here God appears to be conversing with persons co-operating with 
him. The same thing occurred before when he said, " Let us make 
man according to our image," and again, " Adam has become as one of 
us, to know good and evil."f This, then, must first of all be stated, that 
nothing in existence is equal in honour to God, but there is one Ruler 
and Sovereign and King, to whom alone it belongs to preside over and 
administer all things. This being previously acknowledged we may 
proceed. " God, being one, has innumerable powers around him, all 
helping and preservative of what was created, among which the puni 
tive also are included : but even punishment is not injurious, being a 
prevention and correction of sins. Through these powers, again, the 
incorporeal and intelligible cosmos was compacted, the archetype of this 
apparent one, consisting of invisible ideas, as this does of visible bodies. 

* Gen. xi. 7. t Gen. *" 22< 



THE CEEATION OF MAN. 149 

Some people, then, being struck with astonishment at the nature of each 
of the cosmi, not only deified them as wholes, but also the most beautiful 
of the parts in them, sun and moon and the whole heaven, which, without 
any shame, they called gods. And Moses, having observed their thought, 
says, Lord, Lord, King of the gods, * to show his superiority as a ruler 
to subjects. But there is also in the air a most sacred band of incorpo 
real souls, attendant on the heavenly [beings] ; for the prophetic word is 
accustomed to call these souls angels. The whole army, then, of each, 
having been disposed in suitable ranks, ministers to and serves the 
Sovereign who disposed it, whom in accordance with right and law it 
follows as its commander ; for the divine army may never be convicted 
of desertion. Now, it is becoming for a king to associate with his own 
powers, and use them for services in such things as would not be suitably 
fixed by God alone. For the Father of the universe is in need of 
nothing, so as to require service from others if he wished to fabricate ; 
but seeing what is becoming to himself and to the things that are entering 
into being, he allowed the subject powers to mould some things, without 
having given even to these an absolutely autocratic knowledge of com 
pleting the work, in order that none of the things coming into genesis 
should be out of harmony." These explanations having been necessarily 
premised, we return to the creation o man. Beings above and below 
man are alike free from sin ; but man almost alone, having a knowledge 
of good and ill, often chooses what is worst, and avoids what is worthy of 
pursuit. For this reason God attached the formation of man to his 
lieutenants, saying, " Let us make man," in order that the right actions 
of the mind might be ascribed to him alone, but the sins to others. For 
it did not seem becoming to the all-ruling God to fabricate through him 
self the way to evil in the rational soul, for which reason he committed 
the formation of this part to those who are afterf him. For it was 
necessary for the voluntary also, the antagonist to the involuntary, to be 
prepared with a view to the completion of the universe. Further, we 
ought to attend to this consideration, that God is the cause of good things 
only, and of nothing evil at all, since he was himself both the oldest of 
beings and the most perfect good. Now, it is most becoming for the best 
of beings to fabricate the best things, as being appropriate to his own 
nature, but for punishments inflicted on the wicked to be made secure 
through the agency of those under him. This is attested by the words 
of Jacob, " God who nourishes me from my youth, the angel who rescues 
me out of all my evils." He hereby acknowledges " that genuine good 
which nourishes virtue-loving souls is attributable to God only as its 
Cause, whereas the domain of evil, on the contrary, has been committed to 
angels, though even they have not an autocratic authority to punish, in 

* The reference is apparently to Deut. x. 17. t Or beneath. 



150 THE DIVINE POWERS. 

order that his preservative nature may not begin any of the things 
tending to corruption. Wherefore he says, Corne, let us go down, and 
confound. For the impious were worthy to suffer such a penalty [as 
this], that his propitious and beneficent and munificent powers should be 
appropriated to punishments.* Knowing, however, that [punishments] 
are profitable to mankind, he appointed them through the agency of 
others, for it was necessary, on the one hand, that mankind should be 
deemed worthy of correction, and, on the other, that the fountains of his 
ever-flowing graces should be kept unmixed with evils, not only actual 
but even supposed. "f 

I have quoted this passage at such length in order that its 
full bearing and the connection of its parts may be clearly 
seen; for in it pre-eminently Philo is supposed to identify the 
powers with angels. When referring to it in another con 
nection we had occasion to observe that its phraseology was 
deficient in precision; but a little attention will enable us to 
trace its line of argument, and to perceive that Philo, so far 
from confounding the highest powers with angels, draws a 
very sharp distinction between them. At the opening of the 
discussion he seems apprehensive that the use of the plural 
may suggest a polytheistic conception, and he therefore begins 
by strongly asserting the absolute unity of God. He then 
passes on to the powers in their largest and most universal 
sense, taking care to observe that the punitive, with which he 
is more immediately concerned, were included among these, 
and were, like the rest, of a beneficent character. He has, I 
think, various reasons for referring to the powers. He wishes 
to show that polytheists, though they revered what was intrin 
sically divine, yet committed an error in breaking up the 
divine unity and worshipping the partial and subordinate 
manifestations of God. Again, he would point out that 
punishment, though it is inflicted through the instrumentality 
of inferior agents, nevertheless has its source in the depths of 
the divine benevolence. And, lastly, he traces the descent of 



Tvyxavf.iv, VXfw^ . . . dvva/me otKtiovaQai 
f Ccnf. Ling., 33-36 (I. 430-3). 



DESCENDING BANKS. 151 

these agents, that they may not be regarded as a hostile force, 
but recognised as obedient servants of God. The next step, 
accordingly, is to describe the creation of the world, with 
special reference to the parts which were deified by men. 
This is done with the utmost brevity, so as not to interrupt 
the main purpose of the exposition. We learn, however, what 
is essential, the universal agency of the powers in the construc 
tion of the intelligible cosmos ; and I venture to affirm that 
throughout the entire passage this is the only agency which is 
ascribed to these superlative powers. If Philo wanted no other 
agents, why does he go further and introduce the perceptible 
cosmos and angels, with no other result than confusing the 
impression and misleading the thought ? It seems quite clear 
that, having mentioned the powers, he has not yet reached the 
ministers of God of whom he is in search. He proceeds, 
accordingly, to the visible world, and to the sun, moon, and 
whole heaven, which men were particularly fond of deifying. 
Now we know that in Philo s philosophy the celestial bodies 
were intelligent beings, marching their orderly round, and 
fulfilling beneficent functions towards the earth beneath. Here, 
then, it seems to me we have the first part of that army of 
obedient powers to which Philo presently alludes. This con 
clusion is perhaps confirmed by comparing with the present 
passage the language which is used elsewhere about the sun 
and moon. To these God gave powers, but not autocratic 
ones, just as here it is said that he did not give the powers in 
question autocratic knowledge;* and, again, he leads each 
thing according to law and right, as here the army is said to 
follow him according to right and statute law.f The heavenly 
luminaries, then, were actually intermediate agents employed 
by God for the benefit of mankind. But some freer activity 



pv twutv, ov ^i]v rtiroKjOnrtlc, compared with ovde ravrau; t/c; 
v avTGKpciTopa covg . . t7riarr]firjv. 

Kara vcpov /coi Ziicijv, compared with Kara ZIKI]V /cat Qkopov, Mundi Op., 
14 (I. 10). 



152 THE DIVINE POWEES. 

was needed than was compatible with their stately movements 
in settled orbits ; and hence Philo hastens to tell us that there 
is also* in the air a band of angels, who form the second part 
of the divine army. The little word "also" is of great import 
ance, because it clearly distinguishes the angels from the beings 
hitherto mentioned, and the same distinction is implied by the 
word "each" in the phrase "the whole army of each." If 
the allusion is to the powers originally referred to, then the 
powers in their highest sense are distinguished from the 
angels, and the fact that the latter are afterwards spoken of as 
subject powers affords, as we have seen, no reason whatever 
for their identification. I believe, however, that the reference 
is to the sun, moon, and stars, which form an ethereal host 
more remote from man, while the angels are an aerial army, 
nearer to the earth and more interested in human affairs. 
These two wings of the divine forces render an obedient service 
to God, not because he needs them, but because he thinks it 
becoming to entrust some things to their charge. The applica 
tion to them of the term " powers " can no longer perplex us ; 
and it is peculiarly suitable here, because an army constitutes 
the power or forces of a king. That the powers in the supreme 
sense are not alluded to is obvious from the limitation of their 
agency, which is as carefully marked here as in the passages 
previously considered. God permitted them to mould some 
things. f Are these the all-pervasive powers through which 
the intelligible cosmos was made ? Surely not, as they are 
thus separated by an absolute difference of function. The 
section relating to the creation of man throws no further light 
upon the question. We are simply told that God employed 
his " lieutenants " J and " those after him," but nothing is 
said to indicate their precise nature. The succeeding section, 
however, on the confusion of tongues seems to me conclusive. 
Philo brings in his favourite text about the angel who rescued 

* *Eor< df Kcti. y "Eoriv a i7rXarreti/. 

To7f /ifr avrov. 



SUBOKDINATE AGENTS. 153 

Jacob from evil, in order to prove that the duty of punishment 
was delegated to angels. It was so delegated in order that 
God s preservative nature* might not begin things tending 
to corruption, that is, I presume, punishments which, though 
intended to act beneficially, sometimes involve the destruction 
of the offender. The succeeding words are of the utmost 
importance, and have been fully quoted above. What do they 
mean ? Surely this, that the men at Babel were so bad that 
they deserved to be punished by the immediate action of divine 
power, seeing even the propitious and beneficent powers of 
God armed with the terrors of punitive justice. But instead 
of exercising these powers God employed the agency of others, 
presumably of angels; and he did so in order that the fountains 
of his ever flowing graces, that is, the powers just mentioned, 
the sources of all divine favour, might be kept free from the 
very suspicion of evil. If this interpretation be correct, the 
powers, in agreement with Philo s whole philosophy, take their 
place within the divine nature, and are sacred and inviolable as 
God himself, and it is only as partially enshrined within 
some definite personality, which participates in but does not 
coincide with them, that they act as subordinate agents in 
the creation of man and the punishment of the wicked. 

This exposition would hardly be complete if we did not 
observe that Philo s admission of a plurality of creators is 
occasioned solely by the difficulty of interpreting the passage 
in Genesis, and not by the pressing requirements of his 
philosophy ; for when he speaks of the creation of man apart 
from this passage, he discards the plurality and is content 
with the agency of God. This will become apparent when we 
treat of the creation of the first man.t In such references 
he is anxious to exalt the prerogatives of the founder of our 
race, and circumstances which might seem to lower the dignity 
of his origin are quietly omitted. 



H 

See Mundi Op., 47 (I. 33) ; 49, p. 33 ; Nobil., 3 (II. 440). 



154: THE DIVINE POWEKS. 

We have thus exhausted, if I am not mistaken, all the 
passages that can be adduced in favour of the personality of 
the powers, and have seen that, with no greater latitude of 
interpretation than must be reasonably allowed to a rhetorical 
and not always exact writer, they may be reconciled with the 
philosophical views which were explained in the earlier part of 
this chapter. These views are stated by Philo with a distinct 
ness and precision which entitle them to a dominant place 
in his doctrine of the powers, and flow as a logical consequence 
from his theory of the Divine Nature. We are therefore bound 
to accept them as representing his permanent belief. That he 
unconsciously entertained at the same time a totally different 
order of thought is not proved by any express assertion, but 
only inferred from passages of which many appear to have 
been misunderstood, and to be really confirmatory of the 
opinions to which they are thought to be opposed ; others, 
although if they stood alone they might leave on our minds 
a contrary impression, are easily reconciled with Philo s 
weightier utterances ; and others, again, exhibit the familiar 
figure of poetic personification. We are, therefore, no longer 
shut up in an interpretation which fills the whole theory of the 
powers with incoherence and confusion, and reduces it to a 
mere curiosity of incompetent speculation. With its truth or 
falsehood we are not here concerned; nor can we yet tell 
whether our researches into the doctrine of the Logos may not 
compel us partially to reverse our judgment. But thus far we 
have obtained a self-consistent philosophy, and we can trace 
the divine powers by logical descent and sub-division from 
their single home in the unknown essence of God through 
the intelligible cosmos down to this visible image of the eternal 
thought, with its vast tissue of genera and species, till we find 
their impress upon individual forms, the chorus of stars, the 
angelic host, man with his reason stretching beyond the 
universe, the bird that wings its way through the air, the 
flower that blooms in the field. We meet these powers every- 



THE BEAUTY IN ALL PHENOMENA. 155 

where, for they alone give reality and meaning to all that we 
see and touch. They are the secret beauty in each humblest 
thing j they are the mighty bonds which constrain earth and 
ocean and sky into the harmony of a cosmos ; and since they 
are but the varied expression of the divine energy, it is through 
them that the universe lies enfolded in the all-pervading 
immensity of God. 



CHAPTEE VI. 

THE LOGOS. 

AMONG the powers we have met with the Logos, and it may 
have seemed as though we ought to have treated it along with 
the creative, regal, and other members of the dynamical 
hierarchy; but on account of the magnitude and complexity 
of the subject we have been obliged to reserve it for separate 
discussion. We encounter here once more all the difficulties 
that beset our way in the consideration of the powers : the 
same florid and rhetorical style, the same fondness for personi 
fication, the same mingling of the literal and the allegorical. 
Moreover the uncertainty arising from Philo s eclectic method 
now reaches its highest pitch, and it is increasingly difficult to 
decide whether the heterogeneous elements of which his doctrine 
is composed, Platonic, Stoical, and Jewish, lie side by side 
without organic connection or have been fused together in the 
moulds of a really philosophical mind. Besides these sources 
of perplexity, which affect Phik/s philosophy in general, the 
doctrine of the Logos has an ambiguity of its own, springing 
from the variety of meanings which belong to its principal 
term. These meanings have been elaborately, if not always 
quite happily, classified by Grossmann.* No useful purpose 
would be served here by going through his enormous list of 
passages ; but we may point out very briefly the principal 

* Quaest. Philon., II. p. 3 sqq. 



MEANINGS OF LOGOS. 157 

senses in which the word is used, apart from the metaphysical 
doctrine which we are about to investigate. In its highest 
signification it denotes the mind itself, the rational and 
sovereign principle in the human soul.*" This meaning, how 
ever, passes so easily into that of the rational faculty in the 
mind that Philo is not careful to distinguish them, the exercise 
of reason being in his view the one characteristic function of 
mind. We are told accordingly that the sovereign principlef 
is the place of the inward Logos, J and that the latter is " in 
the understanding/^ and yet within a few lines it is identified 
with the understanding. || From this the transition is made to 
any kind of relation or condition which can be regarded as an 
expression of reason. A very few examples will suffice to 
illustrate this familiar use of the word. We are told that the 
human mind has in man the logos which the great sovereign 
has in the entire cosmos. ^[ The context proves that the 
meaning here is " relation ";. and we thus see that the term 
may be used in immediate connection with God and yet have 
no trace of its metaphysical sense. Again, we meet with the 
logoi, that is the relations or laws of harmony** and of music,tt 
and " the unshaken and most stable and really divine logos in 
numbers/ JJ that is, the rational principle or law which underlies 
them. The term seems to aquire the meaning of character or 
condition where 6 crax^pocrui^? Xoyo? or o Kara aco^poavvijv 
^0709 is used as equivalent to the simple aw^poavvr]^ and 
where Jacob, regarded as the representative of a particular 
state of mind, is described as "the ascetic logos," |||| which 
here corresponds with the more usual T/OOTTO?.^ Hence it 

* See Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207), "the best species of soul, which has 
been called VOVQ KCLI Xoyof. Abr., 18 (II. 13), where o ivSiaQtroQ, sc. Xoyof, is 
identified with rbv i^t^iova vovv. 

f To -hytpoviKov. J Aoyog wdtaOeroc, Vit. Mos., III. 13 (II. 154). 

Ev Stavoiq. || Migrat. Abr., 13 (I. 447). If Mundi Op., 23 (I. 16). 

** Post. Cain., 5 (I. 229). ft Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464). 

II Vit. Mos., III. 12 (II. 154). Leg. All., II. 20 (I. 80-1). 

|||| Quod Deus immut., 25 (I. 290). 

HIT See other examples in Grossmann II. p. 24 sqq., under b. 



158 THE LOGOS. 

comes to denote the rational contents or meaning of a thing. 
Thus we read, "the ethical logos [or meaning] is of the 
following kind/ * and, " it is worth considering fully what 
\6yov the saying has."t These and cognate significations all 
rest upon the fundamental idea of reason ; and it deserves 
notice that, under this division, the meaning passes from the 
personal mind itself through an attribute or function of the 
mind down to the most abstract and impersonal expression of 
reason. The second leading sense of the term is speech, 
language being the offspring of reason, and the thoughts of 
the human mind naturally shaping themselves into the form 
of words. As words may be written as well as spoken, logos 
is applied to any kind of expression of thought through words, 
such as argument, discourse, treatise, doctrine or system, 
saying, rumour. This usuage does not require illustration, 
and we need only refer to Philo s application of the term to 
Scripture. A Scriptural passage is frequently referred to as 
logos, and Scripture generally is described as " the sacred," or 
divine/ 3 or " prophetic logos." I see no reason to suppose 
that Philo intends by this phrase to represent the universal 
Logos as speaking through the medium of Scripture. The 
Old Testament or any part of it was a logos according to the 
current use of the word, and its sacred character is indicated 
simply by the qualifying epithets. 

This rapid survey may be sufficient to convince us that we 
must proceed with caution, and not hastily assume that logos 
always denotes the same subject. Its shades of meaning are 
so various that we must bear its ambiguity in mind if we 
would do full justice to the passages which come under 
investigation. Our difficulty is increased by the fact that we 
have no corresponding term, of equal elasticity in our own 
language. We are compelled to use several expressions to 
translate this single Greek word, and we are not only thus in 

* Leg. All., II. 6 (I. 69). 

f Conf. Ling., 33 (I. 430). See also Migrat. Abr., 27 (I. 459). 



ITS CONNECTION WITH THE POWERS. 159 

danger of giving it greater precision in particular instances 
than really belongs to it, but we are almost sure to lose some 
of its finer shades of suggestiveness. Perhaps the nearest 
parallel which English affords is the word " thought " for we 
can apply it not only to the faculty of the mind and the 
inward products of that faculty, but to their outward embodi 
ment in language, as when we refer, for instance, to Young s 
f( Night Thoughts/ or say of any book that it is full of 
thought. Still the word is far from being co-extensive with 
logos ; and though we may occasionally employ it as the most 
appropriate translation, we shall be obliged to have recourse 
to other terms as well. With these preliminary cautions we 
may now enter on our difficult task. 

In order to develop the subject from the point which we 
have reached we must begin by viewing the Logos in its con 
nection with the powers, regarded first in their ideal and then 
in their dynamical aspects. We have seen that when we cast 
our eye around the world every object of contemplation is dis 
tinguished from inert matter by the presence of a rational 
impress or idea. The ideas are only varied forms of the same 
ultimate reason ; and therefore when we survey the cosmos as 
a whole, and rise to the apprehension of its unity, we cannot 
but view it as the pictured thought of God. If we perceived 
nothing but the juxtaposition and succession of material 
phenomena we could never rise to the discovery of unity and 
law ; but the ideas range themselves by logical necessity under 
one superlative term, and in the ideal cosmos, accordingly, we 
detect the unity which our reason demands. This unity is 
selected by Philo as characteristic of the intelligible world, for 
he finds in it the explanation of the fact that the first day of 
creation, which was devoted to the intelligible universe, is 
called in Genesis not first, but one.* Wherein, then, does the 
unity consist ? Since we are dealing with logical relations, it 



* Qv%l TrpdJrrjv, a\\a "/u ai>," . . ia TYJV row VOTJTOV 
li.ova$iKt]v txovro^ (pvfftv, Mundi Op., 9 (I. 7). 



160 THE LOGOS. 

must be found in the highest genus, which may be predicated 
of every lower term. Now all the ideas are rational, not 
indeed in the sense of possessing a personal reason of their 
own, but as forms and varieties of reason. At their head, 
therefore, must stand supreme, abstract Reason ; or, in other 
words, the multitudinous thoughts which speak to us from 
every part of creation may be gathered together into one 
Thought expressive of the Divine. Philo accordingly tells us 
that the rational is the best genus of things.* He is not at 
a loss for Scriptural warrant to confirm this assertion. The 
miraculous food which was given to the Israelites in the desert 
was a natural symbol of the divine nourishment which feeds 
the soul. What this nourishment is Moses himself declares. 
By an arbitrary apposition Philo obtains the clause : " This 
bread which the Lord has given you to eat, this wordf which 
the Lord enjoined. ^ The "word" is immediately identified 
with the " Logos of God," which has many points of re 
semblance to manna: its pervasiveness, like that of dew ; its 
appearing only on what is desert as regards passions and vices; 
its rarity, brilliance, and purity. Now manna means " some 
thing,^ that is, the most generic of things ; and the Logos of 
God also is above all the cosmos, and oldest and most generic 
of the things that have come into being." || By the latter 
words, which will demand our attention farther on, Philo 
wishes to guard himself against the appearance of making the 
Logos absolutely supreme. We have learned before that God 
himself is at the head of the logical hierarchy ; and hence it is 
stated in another passage that "God is the most generic thing, 
and the Logos of God is second/^ that is, Reason or Thought 
ranks logically beneath Being or the Divine. 

* To Xoyi*cdj>, oTTtp dpiffTOv ru>v OVTWV y tvoQ sort, Quod Deus immut., 4 (I. 275). 
f Prjua. J Ex. xvi. 15, 16. 

I think Philo understood by T I tan TOVTO in the LXX. " this is something." 
Others obtain the same sense from ".what," as I have rendered ri on p. 29. 
j| Leg. All., III. 59-61 (I. 120-1). See also Quod det. pot. ins., 31 (I. 213-14). 
^ Leg. AIL, II. 21(1. 82). 



HIGHEST TERM NEXT TO GOD. 161 

The logical superiority of the Logos is not worked out by 
Philo with any fulness or precision ; but there are a few ex 
amples from, which it receives casual illustration. In a passage 
cited in another connection we learn that the Logos of God, 
which is the all-beautif ul pattern of the human mind, is better 
even than beauty itself, such beauty as is in nature, being not 
adorned with beauty, but being itself beauty s most becoming 
adornment;* in other words, it takes a higher place in the 
scale of ideas, and communicates rather than participates in 
beauty. So in the account of the cities of refuge, which 
symbolize six divine powers, the Logos is " the oldest and 
strongest and best mother-city, not merely a city," and to it 
it is most profitable to fly first. It is " the highest/ and to 
be reached only by the swiftest runners. "While the other five 
powers had their visible resemblances in the sanctuary, the 
divine Logos which was above the cherubim, the creative and 
regal powers of God did not come into visible form, because 
it was like nothing perceptible, but was the oldest of all intel 
ligible things. This exalted position is indicated by the words, 
" I will speak to thee from above the mercy-seat between the 
two cherubim/ t which show " that the Logos is the driver of 
the powers, but he who speaks is the rider, giving to the 
driver the orders which tend to the correct driving of the 
universe." J It is simply due to its logical force that the 
Logos is thus placed between the powers : it is " the uniter of 
both/ that is, it includes both ideas under itself, " for by 
reason God is both ruler and good." 

From what has been said, it is apparent that the Logos, or 
divine Thought, sums up and comprehends the whole intelli 
gible cosmos. This is taught in the most explicit way, and 

* Mundi Op., 48 (I. 33). f Ex - xxv - 22 - 

t Prof., 18-19 (I. 560-1). For the Eabbinical parallel to this figure see 
Siegfried, p. 220. 

Cherub., 9 (I. 144). These passages seem quite decisive against Baur s 
view that the Logos stands beneath the two principal powers as their common 
emanation. Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, I. p. 69. 

VOL. II. 11 



162 THE LOGOS. 

presented in various lights. " The intelligible cosmos/ 5 it is 
said, " is nothing else than the Thought of God when he is 
already engaged in making a cosmos ; for neither is the intel 
ligible city anything else than the reflection* of the architect 
when he is already purposing to create the perceptible city 
by the intelligible." f The precise shade of meaning to be 
attached to the term in this passage will be more suitably con 
sidered when we speak of the relation of the Logos to God ; at 
present we simply mark the fact that by virtue of its being the 
highest genus it includes the whole intelligible cosmos. Hence 
it may be figuratively spoken of as the place of that cosmos. 
The ideal world is not subject to the conditions of space ; you 
cannot pick out any particular spot,, and say that it is there ; 
it is located only in the divine Thought, just as the intelligible 
city exists only in the soul of the architect. J That the Logos 
not only contains but coincides with the intelligible universe 
may be inferred from another passage, where the word " place " 
in Scripture is represented as being sometimes an allegorical 
expression for " the divine Logos which God himself has filled 
entirely with immaterial powers/ [| This statement seems 
to imply that the powers or ideas collectively exhaust the 
Logos, and that therefore they and the Logos are convertible 
terms, and the divine Thought is neither more nor less than 
the sum total and logical equivalent of the divine thoughts. 
Since God is more generic than the Logos, he of course 
includes it and its contents, so that there is no inconsist 
ency when, in a single passage, God, and not the Logos, is 
described as the ee immaterial place of immaterial ideas. "^f 

A place filled with ideas readily lends itself to the notion of 
a book, and Philo has no difficulty in finding his whole ideal 
theory in the words, " This is the book of the genesis of 
heaven and earth, when they were made."** By " book " is 

* Aoyr/iog, evidently used instead of Aoyog for the sake of variety. 
f Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). J Ib., 4, 5 (I. 4), and 10, p. 7. 

"OXov dt 6\uv. || Somn., I. 11 (I. 630). 

H Cherub., 14 (I. 148). ** Gen. ii. 4. 



THE UNIVEESAL IDEA. 1C3 

denoted -the Logos of God, in which are inscribed and 
engraved the constitutions* of all other things." The descrip 
tion of the universe as -heaven and earth- leads him to 
make a broad classification of the intelligible cosmos, heaven 
indicating symbolically the idea of mind, and earth the idea 
sensible perception. He applies this doctrine with much 
ingenuity to the next verse in Genesis, but we need not dwell 
upon subtleties of interpretation which give no further insist 
into his philosophical system.f 

If we have been thus far right in our interpretation, the 
Logos must be itself an idea; and so accordingly it is expressly 
called. -God,- it is said, -gives the soul a seal, an alt- 
ful gift, teaching that he shaped the substance of all 
things when it was unshaped, and stamped it when it was 
unstamped, and gave it form when it was without quality, and, 
having finished, he sealed the entire cosmos with an iinao-e 
and idea, his own Logos J Here it is not only characterized 
as an idea which, like other ideas, is impressed upon matter so 
as to bring it into rational form, but it is clearly represented 
as the universal idea, the one supreme and all-embracing 
thought which brings the multiplicity of qualities into the 
unity of a cosmos. Substantially the same doctrine is ex 
pressed when it is affirmed that the - human mind is God-like, 
being stamped in conformity to the highest Logos as an 
archetypal idea." The highest Logos can be no other than the 
crowning idea, which, as we learn from these two passages, 
lays its impress alike on the macrocosm and the microcosm! 
In this connection the term may even be dropped, and referred 
to simply as the -rational idea/ as we learn by comparing 
with the statement last cited the following : Murder is 
sacrilege of the most heinous kind, for -nothing among 
the possessions and treasures in the cosmos is either more 
sacred or more God-like than man, an all-beautiful impression 

* 2vffrd<rei S . f Leg. All., I. 8-10 (I. 47-8). 

t Somn., II. 6 (I. 665), s pec . Leg., IIL 37 (II. 333). 

11 * 



164: THE LOGOS. 

of an all-beautiful image, stamped with the pattern of the 
archetypal, rational idea.-"* Finally, as the head and sum 
of the ideal world, it is called the " idea of the ideas."f 

We have already learned from these passages that the 
Logos, since it is an idea, is also an archetype or pattern, and 
comes under the familiar figure of a seal, and further that 
it is applicable in this respect to the two worlds of matter and 
of mind. It may, however, be advantageous to produce a few 
more illustrations of this doctrine. Having inferred from the 
particular instance of man that the entire perceptible cosmos 
was " an imitation of a divine image," Philo proceeds : " It is 
evident that the archetypal seal also, which we affirm to be 
the intelligible cosmos, would itself be the archetypal pattern, 
the idea of the ideas, the Logos of God."J Elsewhere he 
speaks of ,the seal of the universe, the archetypal idea, by which 
all things, when without form and quality, were made significant 
and stamped." The Logos is not mentioned here, but that 
it is referred to is shown not only by the similarity of the 
expressions to those used in the previous passage, but by the 
parallelism of this statement to one recently quoted where 
the Logos is named, both being founded on an allegorical 
interpretation of the story of Thamar. || Again, we read that 
" the Thought If of the Maker is itself the seal by which each 
thing has been shaped, in accordance with which also the 
species*"* that accompanies created things from the beginning 
is perfect, as being an impression and image of a perfect 
thought. For an animal, when produced, is incomplete in quan 
tity, . . . but perfect in quality, for the same quality remains, 
as having been impressed from a divine thought, that remains 
and in no wise changes. "ft We learn very clearly from this 
passage that the Logos is the genus under which the various 

* Spec. Leg., III. 15 (II. 313). 

f Idta ruv idtuv, Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5) ; Migrat. Abr., 18 (I. 452). 

Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). Mutat. Norn., 23 (I. 598). 

|| See Somn., II. 6 (I. 665). f Aoyog. 

ft Pr f 2 (! 547-8), 



AN AECHETYPE. 1G5 

ideal types that are observed in the universe are classed, and 

that the permanence of specific forms, which till modern 

times was believed to be a fact of experience, is ascribed 

to their participation in the unchangeableness of creative 

thought. More particularly the Logos is spoken of as the 

archetype of light/ and hence it is symbolically called the sun 

in Scripture, being the pattern of the sun which revolves 

in the sky.f This selection is no doubt made because of all 

material things light, from its subtle and revealing energy, 

bears the nearest analogy to intelligence, and reason is the 

supreme source of intellectual illumination. J Among all the 

objects of nature, however, man stands supreme, through the 

possession of self-conscious rational power, and he, therefore, 

in a pre-eminent degree exhibits the divine impress. " Every 

man," it is said, "has been made in understanding akin 

to divine Reason." || God used for the preparation of the 

human soul no other pattern than his own Keason alone,!" to 

which mankind is related, and from which, as an archetype, 

the human mind has been formed ;** or, as it is elsewhere 

expressed, the rational soul or spirit in us, being shaped 

according to the archetypal idea of the divine image, is 

itself an image of the divine and invisible, stamped with the 

seal of God, the impression of which is eternal Reason.tt 

That which determines the rational forms of the various 
objects of creation, and maintains the permanence of ideal 
types, may be regarded as a law which regulates the succession 
of phenomena, and remains constant amid their changes. We 
are thus transferred from the Platonic ideas to the Logos of 
Heraclitus and the Stoics, and led to recognize everywhere the 
presence of a cosmical power, the apparent counterpart of that 

* Somn., I. 13 (I. 632) ; Mundi Op., 8 (I. 6-7). f Somn., I. 15 (I. 633). 

J See Leg. All., III. 59 (I. 121). 

QiicciWai, taken in connection with cvyf tvua. || Mundi Op., 51 (I. 35). 
T Ib., 48, p. 33. ** Exsecrat., 8 (II. 435). 

ft- Animal. Sacr. idon., 3 (II. 239) ; Plantat. Noe, 5 (I. 332). Cf. also Leg. All., 
III. 31 (I. 106-7). 



166 THE LOGOS. 

reason of which we are conscious in ourselves. To this power 
we naturally attach the name by which we designate the regu 
lative principle in ourselves ; and inasmuch as our individual 
thought is liable to mistake and perversion, we frequently dis 
tinguish the universal force as "right Keason/ * or "the 
Keason of nature. f A few illustrative passages will give 
us the necessary insight into this use of the term. f This 
cosmos/ says Philo, " . . . uses one polity and one law. Now, 
it is the Logos of nature enjoining what ought to be done, and 
prohibitive of what ought not to be done."! This language 
implies a plurality of commands, like several statutes included 
under one code. We hear, accordingly, of " ordinances and 
laws which God ordained to be immovable in the universe." 
The immobility which characterizes the laws of nature is due 
to the fact that they are expressions of Eeason, which is in its 
essence unalterable. " That which is truly lawful is thereby 
eternal, since right Reason, which is law, is not corruptible." || 
The eternity and pervasive power of law are well described in a 
passage where, according to our present text, the Logos is not 
mentioned. Eusebius, in quoting this passage, reads Logos " 
instead of " Law " ;1f ^ ufc tae change is not important, for we 
have now learned that the law of nature is identical with the 
Logos. " The everlasting law of the eternal God/ says Philo, 
" is the firmest and most secure support of the universe. This, 
being stretched from the centre to the ends and from the 
extremities to the centre, runs the long, unconquerable race of 
nature, collecting and binding all the parts. For the Father 
who begat it made it a bond of the universe that cannot be 
broken."** The idea which was thus manifested as a natural 
law in the physical world reappeared as a moral law in man. 
f Since every city which is under lawft nas a civic constitution, 

* OpOoQ Xoyo?. j A6yo Qvaewc. $ Joseph., 6 (II. 46). 

Mundi Op., 19 (I. 13). || Ebriet., 35 (I. 379). 

IT Praep. Ev., VII. 13. ** Plantat. Noe, 2 (I. 330-1). 

, for which Miiller reads tvvopoz, " under good laws." 



THE MOEAL LAW. 167 

it was necessarily the case that the citizen of the cosmos used 
the same civic constitution as the entire cosmos. Now, this is 
the right Reason of nature, which by a stricter appellation is 
named ordinance, being a divine law,* in accordance with 
which the suitable and appropriate things were assigned to 
each."f The transition is obvious from this doctrine to the 
Stoical maxim, ""Live conformably to nature." Philo estab 
lishes this maxim of " the best philosophers " by the statement 
that "Abraham went as the Lord spoke to him."* This shows 
that the mind, when it has entered the path of virtue, walks in 
the steps of right Reason and follows God, and the works of 
the wise man are not different from divine words. ]| Elsewhere 
the Scripture says, "Abraham did all my law."*| "Now, law 
is nothing but divine Reason** enjoining what is right and 
forbidding what is wrong," so that in doing the law we do the 
Logos, and our supreme end is to follow God.ft We must 
observe how " God " takes the place of "nature" in Philo s 
mind, and how the notion of something which is expressed 
attaches itself to the word Logos throughout this passage. To 
illustrate the definition which is here given of the law of nature, 
we may compare the similar definition of law in general, such 
as proceeds from a king or legislator, in the treatise " On 
rewards and punishments." "Law," it is there said, "is 
nothing else than a logos JJ enjoining what is right and for 
bidding what is wrong/ The idea of law easily connects 
itself with that of a covenant ; and so the covenant established 
with Noah is represented as " law and Logos," and in this sense 
is said to possess the attribute of stability in a degree second 
only to that of the Self-existent himself. |||| The reason for 
another comparison is less evident. The flaming sword which 



QtloQ &v. t Mundi Op., 50 (I. 34). J Gen. xii. 4. 

Here the idea of spoken reason is clearly present, for thus only can we 
find a connection between tXaXjjcrev and \6yov. 

|| Or uttered thoughts, Xoywr. If Gen. xxvi. 5. ** Aoyof. 

ft Migrat. Abr., 23 (I. 456). Or rational statement. 

Praem. et Poen., 9 (II. 417). |H| Somn., II. 33 and 36 (I. 688 and 690). 



168 THE LOGOS. 

guarded the entrance to Paradise symbolized the swift, hot, 
and fiery Logos. This resemblance would naturally occur to 
one who was deeply imbued with the Stoical philosophy; but 
Philo had a further reason for this particular explanation. The 
cherubim represented the two highest powers, the goodness 
and sovereignty of God, and therefore the sword between them 
must be the Logos which combined these powers into one. 
When Philo adds that this Logos " never ceases to move with 
all zeal, with a view to the choice of what is good and the 
avoidance of the contrary," and thus attaches to it the idea of 
law, he must be guided by a consideration of the office which 
the sword is said to fulfil in the original story.* 

As the pervasive law of the universe, the Logos exercises a 
function at once logical and dynamical. " Looking to the 
archetypal patterns " of God himself, " it gave shape to 
species." f In other words, it is a rational force, which not 
only determines the character and due subordination of species, 
as we have already seen, but plants them out upon the field 
of objective existence. In this capacity it receives a highly 
characteristic name, "the Cutter.^J It is the province of 
reason, both in ourselves and in the universe, though it is 
itself indivisible, to discriminate and divide innumerable 
other things. Our mind distributes into endless parts what 
it receives by the intelligence ; and the divine Logos has 
separated and apportioned all the things in nature. This con 
ception is worked out in great detail in the treatise on "The 
heir of divine things," and is founded upon the narrative of 
Abraham s offering, || in which, while the other animals were 
divided, the two birds, representing the archetypal Eeason 
above us and its counterpart in us, were left without division. 
We noticed this passage when we were considering the classifi- 

* See Cherub., 9 (I. 144). 

f E/x6p0ov tiSrj, Conf. Ling., 14 (I. 414). The Logos is not named in this 
passage ; but that it is referred to is evident from expressions which will be 
considered farther on. 

J O TOfitvg. Quisrer. div. her. 26 sqq. (I. 491 sqq.). || Gen. xv. 



THE BOND OF THE UNIVERSE. 169 

cation of natural objects ; and we need not now dwell upon it 
farther than to observe that the differentiation which we then 
noticed is made the basis of a philosophical doctrine, and 
carries our minds to the height of metaphysical thought. The 
classification which is interpreted by our receptive reason must 
be the product of an operative Reason, by which God has cut 
all the natures of things in accordance with pre-established 
ideas. * We are carried only one step farther back when it is 
alleged that the divine Logos not only contained the ideal 
creation, but disposed it into a cosmos. f 

In considering the Logos under the aspect of natural law, 
we have seen that it was regarded as the pervasive bond of the 
universe. As this conception, which completes our descrip 
tion of it as the sum -total of the powers, is of great import 
ance, we must allude to some passages in which it is enforced 
without the mediating notion of law. The Logos is in the 
universe, J where it dwells as an "intelligent and rational 
nature/ like the soul in man. We are not, however, to 
suppose that the universe holds the Logos as the larger 
contains the smaller, for tf as place is inclusive of bodies, and 
is their refuge, so also the divine Logos includes and has filled 
the universe. "|| This passage seems to teach the transcend 
ence of the Logos ; and no doubt it is transcendent when 
regarded as the ideal cosmos in the supreme Mind, though 
when impressed upon matter as the potent Thought of God it 
must become co-extensive with the visible scene. It is in this 
latter capacity that it makes the cosmos a temple of God, 
where it ministers as a high-priest.H In the fulfilment of its 



* For the notion of the " cutting and division of things," see also SS. Ab. et 
Cain., 24-26 (I. 179 sq.). If the Logos here is itself divided, we must explain 
the seeming inconsistency by the modification of its meaning : as rational 
force, everywhere one and the same, it is indivisible ; as the most generic idea, 
it is resolvable into its species. 

t Mundi Op., 5 (I. 4). J Ev r$ iravri, Vit. Mos., III. 13 (II. 154). 

Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505). || Td o/\. Fragments, II. 655. 

\ Somn., I. 37 (I. 653). 



170 THE LOGOS. 

function it is all-pervasive, for otherwise the permanence of 
ideal types would disappear : remove the divine Thought from 
any part of creation, and nothing but formless matter would 
be left. The Logos, accordingly, is a cc nature which, being 
stretched and poured and having reached everywhere, is 
entirely full,* having harmoniously woven together all things 
else.^f In figurative language we may say that it "puts on 
the cosmos as a garment, for it arrays itself in earth and water 
and air and fire and their products," as the individual soul puts 
on the body; and it is ff the bond of all things, and holds 
together and binds all the parts, and prevents them from being 
dissolved and separated."! Thus, the order which the Creator 
brought out of disorder is securely established by his strong 
lieutenant, the Logos. All other things are in themselves 
prone to dissolution, and wherever there is anything compact, 
" it is bound by divine Reason, for this is a glue and bond, 
having completely filled all the things that belong to matter ;|| 
and, having strung and woven things severally together, it is 
strictly full of itself, not at all requiring anything different 
[from itself] ."If Thus it is that the Logos holds together and 
administers the universe.** 

Thus far, then, we have obtained a clear and self-consistent 
doctrine. The cosmos to the eye of reason is a tissue of 
rational forms, ideas, or powers, which are permanently im 
pressed upon formless matter. As these powers find their 
highest unity in the unknown divine essence, which exhausts 
and transcends them all, so at a lower stage they are summed 
up in the Logos, with which in their totality they are co-exten 
sive ; for they are all expressions of divine Thought, and of 
that Thought there can be no expression which is not an ideal 



f Td dXXa. Quis rer. div. her., 44 (I. 503). That the Logos, though not 
named, is meant, is proved beyond question by the entire context. 
J Prof., 20 (I. 562). Somn., I. 41 (I. 656). 

|| Td Trdvra TTIQ ovaia^. ^ Quis rer. div. her., 38 (I. 499). 

** Vit. Mos., III. 14 (II. 155). 



TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 171 

power. Hence, the Logos is the expressed Thought of God, 
which takes up into itself all inferior ideas, and combines into 
one force all the powers of nature. As in some magnificent 
cathedral we may detach our minds from the multiplicity of 
detail, and, viewing it as a whole, penetrate to the central 
thought of the architect, so in the cosmic temple we may 
group together its multifarious phenomena into one grand 
impression, till we rise to the conception of a single universe 
on which is imprinted the Creator s Thought ; and henceforth, 
wherever we turn our gaze, to the lowliest flower by the river s 
brink or to the majestic heavens with their marshalled host of 
stars, we still discern the presence of that Thought which 
alone, by its pervading energy, gives life and meaning to 
the wondrous all. 

We must now inquire into the precise extent of the analogy 
between the divine and the human Logos; for it is evident that 
the use of the term was founded on the experience of the 
microcosm, and some notice of the resemblances and differences 
in its application to the larger and the smaller world will give 
us a clearer insight into Philo s meaning. We have seen that 
Philo was familiar with the Stoical division of the human Logos, 
into inward and uttered. Did he set the example to the later 
theology of carrying up this distinction into the divine nature, 
or did he recognize only a single aspect of the higher Logos, 
and interpret it by the analogy of only one phase of the Logos 
in man ? To this question opposing answers have been re 
turned, and we must form our judgment by a careful examina 
tion of the evidence. 

Two facts are equally certain, that Philo acknowledges a 
distinction of some sort in the universal Logos, and that, for 
some reason or other, he never expresses this distinction by the 
terms applied to the Logos in man.* The leading passage upon 
this subject occurs in the " Life of Moses. "f An allegorical 
interpretation is there given of the high-priest s vestments, 

* EvdidQtTOQ and irpoQopiicoz. f Vit. Mos., III. 13 (II. 154). 



172 THE LOGOS. 

which collectively and severally represent the cosmos and its 
various parts. Among these was the breast-plate, called by 
the LXX " Logeion/ and described as twofold. t( Logeion," 
of course, suggests Logos, and we are informed that 

" The Logos is double both in the universe and in the nature of man. 
In the universe there are both that which relates to the immaterial and 
pattern ideas, out of which the intelligible cosmos was established, and 
that which relates to the visible objects (which are accordingly imitations 
and copies of those ideas), out of which this perceptible cosmos was com 
pleted. But in man the one is inward and the other uttered, and the one 
is, as it were, a fountain, but the other sonorous,* flowing from the 
former." (The passage goes on to interpret the square shape of the 
breast-plate as an intimation that both the Logos of nature and that of 
man ought to have gone everywhere, and in no respect to waver.) Two 
virtues were appropriately assigned to it, declaration and truth ;f "for. 
the Logos of nature is true and declarative of all things," and that of the 
wise man ought to imitate it. But also to the two logoi in each of us, 
the uttered and the inward, were assigned two suitable virtues to the 
uttered, declaration, and to that in the intellect, truth ; for it is proper 
for intellect to receive nothing false, and for interpretation J to offer no 
impediment to the most exact declaration. 

In this account we cannot but be equally struck with the 
explicit recognition of an analogy between the human and the 
divine Logos in the possession of a dual nature, and with the 
failure to describe this common characteristic by the same or 
similar terms. The words " inward " (or its equivalent " in 
the understanding ") and " uttered " are applied no less than 
three times to the logos in man, but not once to that in the 
universe; and, further, the two virtues which are allotted 
severally to the two forms or the human logos, are attributed 
to the Logos of nature without reference to any such distinc 
tion. This diversity of treatment can hardly be, as Gfrorer 
supposes, accidental, and due to the fact that the distinction 
in reference to the divine Logos was too well known to require 
exposition. There is no evidence, except such as may be 



f A^Xwcris and dXrjOtta, as the LXX render Urim and Thurnmim. 
J Eppr]vsi<. I. pp. 177-8. 



TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 173 

gathered from Philo, that this doctrine had yet been formu 
lated; and the suggestion which ascribes to Alexandrian 
speculation the familiar Stoical division of the human logos 
into inner and outer, and traces so " unnatural " a conception 
to a previously acknowledged distinction in the divine nature, 
is of course quite untenable. Philo never shrinks from un 
folding ideas which had become the common property of the 
philosophical world ; and in the present passage, even if the 
order of thought had been such as Gfrorer imagines, he would 
surely have used the accepted terms in stating a well-known 
doctrine, and would have given some intimation of the mode 
in which the uttered Logos was derived from the inward 
Logos in God. But as the words stand, we can only con 
clude that he wished to carry up the human distinction into 
the nature of God, but, owing to some perceived failure in the 
analogy, did not choose to describe it by the same language. 
We must, then, turn our attention to the exact character of 
the dual Logos in the universe, and notice the points in which 
the human analogy breaks down. 

The Logos which alone can answer to the cc inward" is 
" that which relates to the immaterial and pattern ideas, out of 
which the intelligible cosmos was established." But Zeller 
affirms that this does not answer to the " inward," because 
the distinction which is drawn does not refer to the question 
whether the Logos remains within the subject to whom it 
belongs or issues forth from him, but to the question of the 
objects with which it is engaged.* This is perfectly true in 
regard to the mere form of expression, and it is evident that 
Philo shrank from pressing the human analogy too closely. 
But, as the objects referred to are "immaterial and pattern 
ideas," and perceptible " imitations of those ideas/ the very 
division of objects suggests a hidden and a manifested Logos. 
The Logos, as the uniting thought under which all the ideas 

* III. ii. p. 376. 



THE LOGOS. 



are subsumed, is never represented as objective to the divine- 
Mind. God is himself, as we have seen, the place of imma 
terial ideas ; * and the intelligible cosmos, as being older than 
the perceptible, was deemed worthy of the privilege of re 
maining with him, while the younger son alone was sent forth 
to move through space and mark the intervals of time.f This 
surely implies that the Logos, regarded as the sum of ideas, 
^and not yet impressed upon matter, is hidden in the mind of 
God, just as truly as an intelligible city is hidden in the mind 
of an architect ; and I see no reason why Philo should nofc 
have applied to it the epithet inward " except his reluctance 
to use the correlative " uttered.-" That he did not consider it 
unworthy of the divine nature is apparent from his applying 
it to laughter as the son of God. { 

The same conclusion is established by the passage quoted in 
another connection, in which Philo himself, at considerable 
length, compares the action of the Creator to that of an archi 
tect, who plans a city in his mind before he proceeds to build 
it of wood and stone. Before that comparison is introduced, 
two divine processes are distinguished, which, though one is 
prior to the other in thought, were in fact simultaneous. These 
two processes are " ordering" and " purposing." I doubt 
whether we give a sufficient account of these words by making 
them, with Muller,|| equivalent to the uttered and the inward 
Logos ; indeed I am not sure that this exegesis, without some 
important qualifications, does not involve the whole subject in 

* See before, p. 162. f Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 277). 

J O ivd^eeroQ vlbs Qtov, Mutat. Norn. 23 (I. 598). Zeller also dwells upon the 
fact that while <^Awcrie and dXrjOtia are applied separately to the two \6yoi in 
man, the \oyog of nature is said to be dXrjOrjg K ai drj\(OTiKos TTUVTUV, and 
this can only be because he did not recognize the same distinction. We ought 
to observe, however, that the Xoyog of the wise man is treated in the same way 
as that of nature, and the distribution of the two virtues is made subsequently, 
so that Philo may not have intended to mark in this way the difference between 
the two cases. 

Ov TrpoffrdTTovTa povov, d\\a Kai Siavoovpevov. Mundi Op. 3 (I 3) 

II P. 139. 



TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 175 

confusion. According to it the "uttered Logos " could be 
nothing else than the spoken word or command in obedience 
to which the visible universe sprang into being, and the 
" inward Logos " would be only the divine intention to issue 
such a command. This is entirely different from any meaning 
which we have hitherto found for the Logos. The words 
rather express simply the initial and the final process in the 
work of creation. It is in a divine purpose that every thing- 
has its origin ; it is in instant response to a divine command 
that everything springs into objective existence. Thus the 
purpose extends itself to the complete result. It is, indeed, 
as Philo himself says, not the thought which is laid up within, 
but the issuing forth of thought,* and is therefore really more 
applicable to an uttered than to an inward Logos. Hence we 
find farther on in the passage that the purpose extends itself to 
the visible cosmos as its ultimate object,t and is represented 
as distinct from the inward conception, the formation of which 
was the first step in the fulfilment of the purpose. J This 
inward conception, which sprang immediately from the creative 
purpose of God, was the intelligible cosmos, and this again, as 
we are expressly told, was the Logos. Here, then, for the 
first time, and not in the purpose, which is logically prior, we 
meet with the inward Logos. Our passage does not speak of 
any other Logos -, nevertheless, when illuminated by what we 
have learned elsewhere, it easily betrays the place of the 
" uttered." Two acts of creation are described :[ the first, that 
which we have just considered ; the second, that of the percep 
tible cosmos. The latter was formed by impressing the Logos 
upon matter, in other words by making it objective, just as 
the architect stamps his ideas upon marble or timber ; and this 
Logos, planted out, as it were, from God, and everywhere 
active, through air and earth and sea and sky, this divine 



* "Evvoiav ical diavorjviv, n}v fj,ev IvaTTOKeifJttvijv ovaov VOIJGIV, TIJV 
vorjawg SiftoSov, Quod Deus immut., 7 (I. 277). 

j- Eov\rj9ftQ TQV bparbv TOVTOVI Kofffiov Srj/jnovpyrjtrai. 

J Tryv peya\6iro\iv KT I&IV SiavorjOtiQ ivworjee Trportpov rove TVTTOVQ 



176 THE LOGOS. 

Thought, whose mighty presence can alone convert matter into 
a cosmos, and which reveals itself in the beauty and harmonv 
of nature, is clearly distinguishable from the same Thought 
when hidden in the silent depths of God, and known only 
to his omniscience. This objective Logos corresponds, in 
a certain sense, with the uttered Logos in man. 

In the course of the passage which we are noticing there 
is some apparent confusion in the references to what, for 
convenience, we must call the inward Logos. Where it 
is first introduced it seems equivalent to the faculty 
of reason. The words are as follows: "As, then, the 
city which was first formed within the architect had no 
exterior place, but had been sealed in the soul of the 
artist, in the same way not even the cosmos consisting of 
the ideas would have any other place than the divine Logos 
which disposed these things into a cosmos/ If these 
words stood alone we should conclude that the Logos, as 
parallel to the human soul, was not identical with the ideal 
world, but was rather the rational faculty which produced and 
retained it ; yet within a page or two we are told that it is 
the intelligible cosmos. How are we to explain this contradic 
tion ? Probably Philo regarded any particular thought, so 
long as it was unexpressed, as being in strictness only a mode 
of the general faculty of thought. Thus, he says that, speak 
ing without figurative language, * " one might affirm that the 
intelligible cosmos is nothing else than the Logos of God when 
he is already creating the cosmos ; for neither is the intelli 
gible city anything else than the reflection of the architect 
when he is already purposing to found the perceptible city by 
the intelligible." This statement seems to imply that the 
intelligible cosmos is not strictly a product of the divine 
Reason, but is rather the mode which it assumes in the act of 
creation. At this point a distinction becomes evident, which, 
though not expressed, is, I think, implicitly acknowledged by 

xprj<ra<r9ai T<H ovopaaiv. 



TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVERSE. 177 

Philo. An architect is capable of planning many cities ; and 
therefore any particular city as conceived in his thought is 
only one out of many modes which that thought might assume. 
But there is only one cosmos, and its ideal is exhaustive of the 
divine Thought. The ideal world, therefore, is not one of 
many modes which the universal Reason may put on ; it is the 
absolute and unchangeable mode of its existence, without 
which it cannot be so much as conceived. Eemove all ideas, 
and nothing but a mere potentiality of reason will remain. 
Hence, in the Supreme Cause, reason and what might seem to 
be its product become coincident. The ideas are summed up 
in one superlative term, beyond which there is no further 
faculty of reason ; and, as the idea of the ideas, the intelligible 
cosmos and the Logos of God become indissolubly identified. 
We must now turn to the other aspect of our subject. 
That Philo recognized some kind of analogy between the 
divine Logos and the uttered Logos in man is evident from 
several passages besides the one which was quoted in the 
earlier part of this discussion. In one of these he says that 
the ( father s house " which was left by Abraham,"* denotes the 
uttered Logos ; for the mind is our father, since to it belongs 
the care of all our parts ; and speech is its house, where it 
disposes and arranges itself and its various conceptions. Simi 
larly God, the mind of the universe, has his own Logos for a 
house, as may be inferred from Jacob s reference to the 
" house of God/ t The comparison, however, is not worked 
out, and throws no further light upon the point under con 
sideration. We can only say that the disposal of the ideas 
in that universal Thought which is stamped upon the visible 
creation answers to man s disposal of his conceptions in speech, 
for in each instance the process serves to make the inward 
notions objective, and to locate them, as it were, in a habitation 
different from the mind itself. Again, Logos is used as 

* Gen. xii. 1. f Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 436-7). Gen. xxviii. 17. 

VOL. II. 12 



178 THE LOGOS. 

synonymous with prj^a, a spoken word. We are told, for 
instance, that the universe was fabricated by the speech 
or word of the Cause."* It is by his own most brilliant 
" speech, word," f that God makes both the idea of mind and 
the idea of perception. J This notion of a creative word, prior 
to the existence of the intelligible cosmos, is very different 
from anything which we have hitherto met, and can hardly be 
reconciled with the identification of the ideal world and the 
Logos. The confusion, however, is a very natural one ; for the 
creation of the ideas could only be regarded as the result of a 
divine command, and this Philo expresses by the familiar term 
Logos, adding, however, the explanation prj^a, without per 
ceiving its inconsistency with his more usual doctrine. I cite 
this passage, not as throwing light on a subject which it only 
perplexes, but as proving that Philo connected with the divine 
Logos the sense, not only of rational thought, but of rational 
speech. Again, the nourishment which God gives the soul is 
his own word and his own speech. This is stated in the 
course of an allegorical interpretation of the manna in the 
wilderness. || The lesson intended by this incident was that 
man shall not live on bread alone, but on every word that issues 
forth through the mouth of God; "^[ that is, the soul shall be 
nourished by the whole Logos and by its part, " for the mouth 
is a symbol of the Logos, and the word is a part of it. Now of 
the more perfect the soul is nourished by the whole Logos, but 
we might be content if we were nourished even by a part 
of it." ** The precise way in which the Logos is regarded as 
the nourisher of the human soul, must be considered farther 
on ; meanwhile we may observe that in one passage the manna 
is identified not only with the heavenly Logos of virtue," but 
with " prophecy," tt and in another, prophecy is replaced by 

* Aoyc/j, parallel with dia pfjuarog. SS. Ab. et Cain., 3 (I. 165). 

f A6y<>, pfiitaTi. J Leg. All., I. 9 (I. 47). "Prj^a 

U Ex. xvi. 14 sqq. II Deut. viii. 3. 

** Leg^All., III. 60-1 (1. 121-2). Cf. Prof., 25 (I. 566). 

tt SS. Ab. et Cain., 26 (I. ISO). 



TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVEKSE. 179 

philosophy. The words in the latter run thus : " This royal 
way, which, as true and genuine, we affirm to be philosophy, the 
Law calls the word and speech of God ; for it is written, thou 
shalt not incline from the word which I command thee this 
day. " * The connection of prophecy and philosophy with the 
spoken word is obvious. As declared by human lips they 
belong to the uttered logos of man ; but in their ideal aspect 
they are identical with the law which is impressed upon the 
face of nature j and this law, again, is, as we have seen, nothing 
less than the divine Logos. Therefore we return to the 
doctrine of the passage from which we started. The Logos in 
the universe which answers to the uttered logos in man, and 
may therefore be described as the Word of God, is the impress 
of the supreme idea upon matter, the rational force which binds 
the multitude of phenomena into the harmony and unity of a 
cosmos. 

It may seem strange that when Philo so freely speaks of the 
Word of God he withholds from it the epithet "uttered." 
The reason is found in the fact that, philosophically considered, 
the Word of God and the word of man are totally different 
in kind. The term " uttered " immediately suggested the 
physical organs through which human speech issued; but 
God had no such organs, and though his expressed Thought 
might not inappropriately be compared to a Word, it could 
hardly be associated with an adjective which at once recalled to 
the mind a mouth and tongue. The distinction is carefully 
pointed out by Philo himself. Having quoted the verse 
" once the Lord spoke, these two things I heard," f he 
remarks, 

The word " once " is applicable to what is unmixed and a monad or unit, 
while " twice " refers to what is mixed, and susceptible of composition 
and dissolution. God, accordingly, speaks unmixed units ; for speech is 
not for him a sonorous body of air, since it is mingled with, nothing else, 

* Post. Cain., 30 (I. 244). f Psalm Ixi. 11 in the LXX. + 

Beading ycywj/oe instead of the unmeaning yeyovwg. 

12* 



180 THE LOGOS. 

but is incorporeal and naked, not differing from a unit. But we hear by 
a duality, for the breath, when it is being sent forth from the sovereign 
principle, is shaped in the mouth by the tongue, and then issuing forth 
and getting mixed with its kindred air, and striking it, completes the 
combination of a duality.* 

In consequence of this peculiarity the divine voice was seen, 
and not heard. 

It is said in Scripture, " All the people saw the voice," f not heard it, 
since what took place was not a beating of the air by the organs of mouth 
and tongue, but a brilliant light of virtue, not differing from a rational 
fountain. In another passage Scripture distinguishes the audible from 
the visible by saying, " You heard a voice of words, and you saw, not a 
resemblance, but a voice. "{ For the voice which is divided into noun and 
verb and the parts of speech generally, is properly called audible, for it is 
tested by hearing ; but that which does not consist of verbs or nouns, 
but is the voice of God, is rightly introduced as visible, since it is seen by 
the eye of the soul. Now observe with what novelty it is said that the 
voice was visible, though the voice is almost the only thing connected with 
us which is not visible, except the intellect. It is true, we do not see 
tastes and smells regarded simply as such, but we see them when regarded 
as bodies. The voice, however, is not visible, whether we regard it as 
audible or as a body, supposing it to be a body ; but these two things in 
us are invisible, mind and speech. But our faculty of sound has 
not been made like the divine organ of voice ; for ours is mixed with 
air, and flies to the kindred region of the ears ; but the divine consists 
of pure and unmixed though t,|| which, on account of its rarity, out 
strips hearing, and is seen by pure soul on account of its sharpness of 
discernment.^] 

I have referred to these passages at such length to show that 
Philo was distinctly and fully aware of a failure in the analogy 
between divine and human speech. So long as the Word was 
regarded as simply an expression of thought it might, without 
irreverence, be attributed to the divine Being ; but as soon as 
it was defined by an epithet which was proper only to spoken 
and audible language, it ceased to be applicable. 

There are still one or two highly suggestive passages which 



* Quod Deus immut., 18 (I. 285). t Exod. xx. 18. 

} Deut. iv. 12. Ao yof. || A6yov. 

t Migrat. Abr., 9 (I. 443-4). 



TWOFOLD IN THE UNIVEESE. 1S1 

will serve to complete our doctrine. Eeferring once more to 
the statement that all the people saw the voice, Philo asks why 
that of man was audible, but that of God visible. The answer 
is, " Because as many things as God says are not words, but 
works, which eyes rather than ears distinguish."* Again, 
referring to the dream of Jacob, he speaks of the promises 
made through words" as being confirmed by " works of 
truth," and adds, "for it is the peculiar attribute of God to 
speak certainly what will come to pass ; yet why do we say 
this ? for his wordst differ not from works."* It might be 
supposed that the intention here was only to emphasize the 
certainty with which the divine promise or prediction must be 
fulfilled. But I think more than this is implied. To say that 
God foretells future events seems to separate the world s 
movements from his sovereign will, and to place him, as it 
were, in the position of a man who foretells an eclipse ; and 
therefore Philo demurs to the expression which he has just 
used. God s promises are not spoken words, relating to a 
course of events which goes on independently of them, but 
rather the potency by which the future is controlled, as the 
seed is the promise of the harvest. Thus the word of God, 
in any particular instance, is really a work ; it is the imprinting 
of a divine idea which realizes itself through the ages. This 
view is confirmed by the remaining passage. It is there said 
that even time did not co-operate in the production of the 
universe, "for God in speaking created simultaneously^ 
placing nothing between the two ; but if one ought to set 
going a truer opinion, the word|| is his work."^[ In the first 
statement the word and the deed are represented as different, 
though contemporaneous. But Philo has a view which he 
considers truer : the word and the deed are identical ; the 
utterance is the stamping of the divine and cosmical Thought 

* Dec. Orac., 11 (II. 188). f Aoyoi. + Somn., I. 31 (I. 648). 

Alywv ufj,a TTO/. || 

t SS. Ab. et Cain., 18 (I. 175). 



182 THE LOGOS. 

upon matter ; and the Logos, the "Word, is the finished work, 
the Thought of God made objective, for the sole creation and 
the sole reality in this material universe is that Thought which 
resolves itself into a permeating tissue of ideas, and speaks to 
our reason as an expression of the Supreme Mind. 

It is not wonderful, then, that Philo abstained from applying 
to the Word of God an epithet which, however convenient it 
became in the course of time, was too strongly associated in 
his mind with spoken language to serve as a fitting medium 
for his doctrine. If it be asked why he did not go farther, 
and discard the use of "the Word" altogether, various 
reasons may be given. Not only does it furnish a very natural 
figure by which to represent the expression of divine Thought, 
but it was already current in religious and philosophical 
language. It had the sanction of the Old Testament, and the 
term Logos with its convenient ambiguity provided an easy 
transition from the Scriptural " Word of God " to the Stoical 
"Keason," by which Philo s philosophy was so deeply 
influenced. His belief in the transcendence of God led 
inevitably to the distinction which was afterwards denoted by 
the words inward " and f uttered "; but it was one thing to 
adopt and interpret the language of the day, and quite 
another to introduce for the first time a pair of correlative 
terms which might suggest a much closer analogy between 
God and man than he was willing to admit. 

From what has been said the relations of the Logos to God 
and to the cosmos have already become apparent. We must, 
however, view these subjects separately, and consider how far 
Philo s language in regard to them is consistent with the 
doctrine which we have .just set forth. 

" Neither before creation was anything with God* nor since 
the creation of the cosmos is anything ranked with him/ ; t 
In these words Philo asserts the absolute solitude of God. He 

* -2vv T$ 0f. t Leg. All., II. 1 (1. 66). 



RELATION TO GOD: HIS REASON. 183 

presents them as a possible interpretation of the statement 
that " it is not good for the man to be alone."* Why is it 
not good for man ? Because it is good for the Alone to be 
alone. This loneliness of God maybe interpreted as above; 
and though Philo himself referred it rather to the simplicity 
of the divine nature, there is no reason to doubt that he 
accepted the doctrine contained in the former explanation. 
Agreeably to this he says elsewhere that God, in determining 
to create, " used no assistantf for who else was there ? but 
himself alone."J We must, then, start by conceiving of God 
as originally existing not only in the absolute simplicity of his 
being, but in perfect solitude. There is no Logos distinguish 
able from himself to share his counsels or to execute his plans. 
But, as we have seen, the simplicity of his unknown essence 
resolves itself to our thought into a variety of predicates 
expressive of his manifestations in the cosmos. These may 
be summed up in the two statements, he is good, and he is 
powerful or sovereign, and these two, again, find their unity in 
the proposition, he is rational. He is, accordingly, the Mind or 
Reason of the universe. Have we, then, discovered his essence, 
and when we have said that he is Reason, have we given an 
exhaustive description of him ? No, for pure Being is a more 
comprehensive conception than Eeason, and includes other 
predicates. Being, for instance, is eternal and omnipresent, 
and may have other attributes unknown to us, none of which 
is necessarily involved in the rational. Reason, therefore, is a 
mode of the divine essence, but not that essence itself ; and, 
as in the case of all the powers, God exhausts and transcends 
it. He may, accordingly, be spoken of as the fountain from 
which it flows, as the Being who is before it. This view is 
clearly exhibited in a passage previously quoted, " God, the 
fountain of the oldest Reason, does not participate in, but 
rules, the rational power." || This, of course, does not mean 



Gen. ii. 18. f Or advocate, TrapaKXfjT^. J Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). 

Aoy . || Quod det. pot. ins., 22 (I. 207). 



184: THE LOGOS. 

that God has none of the rational power, but that he has 
it all. We participate in it and are dependent upon it for the 
possession of our reason; but it depends upon God for its 
very existence. That it belongs to his essence is implied in 
the comparison of a fountain ; and the same conclusion follows 
from an argument which Philo uses, " Since God is the 
fountain of Reason, it is a necessity that he who lives 
irrationally has been separated from the life of God."* 
This argument would not be valid unless reason were involved 
essentially in the divine life. But that it is not exhaustive of 
the divine essence is taught in many passages. God, who is 
before and above the Logos, f is declared to be superior to all 
rational nature. J He who has been conducted by wisdom into 
the divine Reason does not reach God in his essence, but sees 
him from a distance, or rather is not competent even to behold 
him from afar off, but sees only that God is far from all 
creation, and the comprehension .of him most widely removed 
from all human understanding. || When, therefore, we say 
that God is the Mind or Reason of the universe, we not only 
express our own best conception, but assert a truth ; yet the 
truth is inadequate, for above and beyond the immanent Reason 
of the universe is the transcendent and eternal Being whose it 
is, and into whose depth and fulness of perfection man, whose 
highest experience is of reason, can never penetrate. 

The view here sketched corresponds precisely with our 
doctrine of the divine powers; but can we reconcile the 
notion of a rational power or rational nature with the con 
ception of the Logos as the ideal cosmos ? We can do so 
only in the way already indicated, by supposing that in 
God the faculty and the product are coincident. We, with 



* TTJQ 6eov tufa. Post. Cain., 20 (I. 238). 
f Hpb rov Xoyow, vKtp rbv Xoyov. 

I Kpdffffwv tarlv rj Travel XoyiKij QVGIQ. Fragments, II. 625, answering to 
Qu. et Sol. in Gen., II. 62. 
Tov KUTO. TO dvai 6i6v. || Somn. I. 11 (I. 630). 



EELATION TO GOD : HIS SON. 185 

our imperfect gifts, fling off fugitive ideas which, cannot be 
considered, either separately or collectively, as constituting the 
essence of reason. But the divine Keason consists of perma 
nent ideas and relations, which, though they might severally 
be spoken of as its products, yet in their totality represent 
its unchanging essence. Kationality in its highest sense 
means the logical array of divine and eternal thoughts ; 
and if we refer to the Logos now as a power and again as 
the collective cosmical idea, we only adapt our language to 
different aspects of the same thing. 

As the idea of the ideas, the most generic thought, the 
Logos is spoken of as the oldest of things, an expression 
which probably describes its logical rather than its chrono 
logical relations, since we have seen that the latter do not 
enter into the creative activity of God.* Since it is depend 
ent on the self-existing Cause, and, as a thought, must be 
conceived by us as produced, it is represented under the figure 
of a son, a kind of metaphor for which we have already 
noticed Philo s predilection; and when this notion is com 
bined with the preceding, it becomes the oldest, or first-born 
son.j- It is, if I am not mistaken, always in its cosmical 
relations, that is, as the Thought of God made objective in 
the universe, and capable, therefore, of being conceived apart 
from God, that it is described in this way ; and Philo s mean 
ing is admirably illustrated by a passage where the figure is 
carried still farther, and it is said that the Logos has for its 
father God, who is the father of all things as well, and for 
its mother Wisdom, through whom the universe came into 
being,J and that this oldest Logos of the Self-existent puts 
on the cosmos as a garment, for it is arrayed in earth and 

* See, besides the passage quoted on p. 183 from Quod det. pot. ins. and others 
to be mentioned presently, Prof. 19 (I. 561) ; Leg. AIL, III. 61 (I. 121). 

f Agr. Noe, 12 (I. 308), TOV 6p9bv avrov Xoyov, irpwroyovov viov : Conf. Ling., 
14 (I. 414), TrpeaflvTctTov vibv . . . Trpwroyoi/or : 28, p. 427, TOV 
O.VTOV \6yov: Somn., I. 37 (I. 653), 6 Trpwroyovoj UVTOV 6elo \6yo. 

if E< f 



186 THE LOGOS. 

water and air and fire and their products.* The relation 
of the Logos to Wisdom must be reserved for separate dis 
cussion ; at present we will only observe that the Logos 
which is the son of God is here evidently represented, not 
as the interior Reason or Thought of God, but as the supremo 
idea impressed upon the visible universe. 

In its filial or objective relation the Logos is the " image " 
of God, and the archetype of the cosmos and of man. 
" God," we are told, " gives the soul a seal, an all-beautiful 
gift, teaching it that he shaped the substance of the universe 
when it was unshaped, .... and sealed the whole cosmos 
with an image and idea, his own Logos. "f Here it is obvious 
that the Logos is the all-comprehending divine Thought which, 
like a seal, is stamped upon matter, and gives rational form to- 
its otherwise formless mass. Similarly, the mortal soul "was 
stamped according to the image of the Self-existent; and 
Thought,! through which the whole cosmos was fabricated, 
is an image of God." This conception is frequently repeated 
in regard to the human soul, or man in the highest sense. Of 
the possessions in the cosmos nothing is more God-like than 
man, " an all-beautiful impression of an all-beautiful image, 
stamped with the pattern of an archetypal rational idea,"|| 
"the highest Thought/ or Reason.^ In somewhat varied 
phrase, "the rational spirit in us has been shaped according to 
an archetypal idea of the divine image. " ** In one passage the 
figure of a seal or a pattern is abandoned in favour of that 
of participation : man is related to God by virtue of partici 
pation in Reason. ff It thus appears that man and the cosmos 
bear the impress of the same supreme Thought, and the great 
laws of reason of which we are conscious within are perceived 
without. Philo has no direct Scriptural proof of this doctrine; 

* Prof., 20 (I. 562). f Somn., II. 6 (I. 665). 

+ Aoyoc. Monarch., II. 5 (II. 225). 

!| Spec. Leg., III. 15 (II. 313). f Tbv avurdru Aoyor, ib., 37, p. 333. 

** Animal. Sacr. idon., 3 (II. 239). 

ft Kara n}v 7rpo \6yov Koivuviav, Spec. Leg., IV. 4 (II. 338). 



EELATION TO GOD: HIS IMAGE. 187 

but lie infers it from the statement that man was formed 
according to the image of God.* If the part was an image of 
an image, much more must the whole cosmos be so, and 
macrocosm and microcosm bear the stamp of the same arche 
typal seal.-f- This Scriptural foundation for the doctrine, 
combined with the fact that reason in us is self-conscious, 
and therefore lies closer to our knowledge than the rational 
laws in the cosmos, naturally induces Philo to dwell most 
frequently on the human mind as a copy of the Logos. 
Confining our thoughts to this relation, we obtain a de 
scending series of three terms God, the Logos, the human 
reason. The undivided birds of Abraham s offering signify 
the two winged and soaring Logoi, one an archetype above 
us, the other an imitation existing in us. Now, Moses calls 
the one above us an image of God, and the one in us an 
impression of the image ; so that the mind in each of us, 
which is properly and truly man, is a third impress^ from the 
Creator, while the intervening one is a pattern of the one and 
a copy of the other. In another, not very clearly expressed, 
passage, an ideal man seems to be interposed between the 
Logos and the actual man. " There are," it is said, " two 
kinds of men, that which has been made according to the 
image, and that which has been moulded out of earth, for it 
desires the image. For the image of God is an archetype of 
other things ; and every imitation desires that of which it is 
an imitation, and is ranked with it."|| Perhaps we may 
explain this by saying that the compound man, consisting 
of mind and body, must, like everything else, have an idea, 



* Kar tiKova Otov, Gen. i. 27. f Mundi Op., 6 (I. 5). 

Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505). See also Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207), 
" A divine power which Moses calls by a proper name, image, showing that 
God is the archetype of rational nature, but man an imitation and copy, not the 
two-natured animal, but the best species of the soul, which has been called 
VOVQ Kal Adyof." 

|| Leg. All., II. 2 (I. 67). 



188 THE LOGOS. 

in correspondence with which each individual man is framed; 
and this idea must come below that of the real and inward 
man, regarded simply as mind. It is this inward man that 
is a copy of the Logos. What, then, is the philosophical 
meaning of representing the human mind as third in the scale 
of being, instead of making it the immediate image of God ? 
Is it not this, that the individual mind may, and does, fall far 
short of its ideal, and it is not the imperfect reason of Smith 
and Jones, but perfect and ideal Keason, that is the image 
of God. So far as our minds are rational, however feeble and 
perverted, they must bear the impress of their ideal; but 
beyond that ideal is the infinite Archetype of all. This state 
ment has a sufficiently clear meaning even for our modern 
conception ; but we must remember that the ideal of human 
reason is not a mere abstraction, gathered by deducting the 
imperfections of individual minds, but a permanent reality, 
being the supreme divine Thought, that which, in the unknown 
unity of the divine essence, reveals itself to us as reason, and, 
in the universe, is apprehended as an all-pervading rational 
force. As the ideal of the human mind, the Logos is even 
spoken of as (( man." This is not done, however, without 
Scriptural warrant. Zechariah* says, " Behold a man whose 
name is rising."f What a strange appellation, says Philo, 
if you think of man composed of body and soul. But the 
name is most appropriate if you will acknowledge that 
incorporeal man, not differing from a divine image; for the 
Father of things caused this oldest son to rise,J whom else 
where he named first-born. The same designation is justified 
by the statement of Joseph s brethren, We all are sons of one 
man/ || "If we have not yet become fit to be considered 
children of God, at least we are children of his eternal image, 



vi. 12. f AraroXr?, in the LXX. 

ArlraXf. Conf. Ling., 14 (I. 414). 

Gen. xlii. 11. 



EELATION TO GOD : HIS IMAGE. 189 

most sacred Thought; for the oldest Thought is an image 
of God."* 

We must now ascertain as nearly as we can what is meant 
by calling the Logos an image of God. The most significant 
passage is the one in which the cherubim on the Ark are said 
to have symbolized the creative and regal powers. 

The divine Logos above these had no visible representation, " as it 
was like nothing perceptible, but was itself an image of God, the oldest 
of all intelligible things, the nearest model of the only Being that 
truly is, there being no bordering interval ;f for it is said, I will 
speak to thee from above the mercy-seat between the two cherubim, J 
so that the Logos is the driver of the powers, and he who speaks is 
the rider." 

From this statement we learn, first, that the Logos which is 
the image of God is the spoken Word, that is, the objective 
Thought of God stamped upon the universe ; secondly, that the 
creative and providential activity of God is controlled by this 
Thought, which is therefore represented as older ; and, thirdly, 
that as the oldest of intelligibles, or the highest genus, it is the 
one immediate expression of the divine nature, not, of course, 
an adequate expression, but one which leaves no higher term 
to mediate between it and God. All other things are an 
expression of Thought, but Thought is an expression of God 
alone. It is not unsuitable, then, to call it the image of 
God ; for as a grand poem or a profound treatise is a reflec 
tion of the mind of its author, so God can have no nearer 
resemblance than the Thought which is the direct offspring 
of his causality, and embraces the entire scheme of things. 
If we may say so, the cosmical order is a divine poem, and 
matter is the page whereon it has been inscribed, which, 
from its blank, unmeaning look, has become replete with 
rational form ; and he who can read the poem sees, not indeed 

* Conf. Ling., 28 (I. 427). 

f iyyvTciru), fujdivbg OVTOQ utOopiov iaori7/iaro, TOV povov o sanv 



Ex. xxv. 22. Prof., 19 (I. 561). 



190 THE LOGOS. 

all the depths of eternal Being, but the purpose and the mind 
of God. 

The same idea is brought out by Philo under another figure, 
that of a shadow. This is done in connection with Beseleel, 
who was chosen to execute the necessary work in the preparation 
of the Tabernacle.* Beseleel means, " God is in a shadow."t 
Now, his Logos, with which as an organ he made the cosmos, 
is the shadow of God ; and this shadow, and, as it were, copy, 
is an archetype of other things. For as God is a pattern 
of the image, here called shadow, so the image becomes 
in its turn a pattern. That the shadow, in this passage, is 
equivalent to the Thought projected upon matter, is evident 
from what follows. One way of understanding the Divine, it is 
said, is from the cosmos and its parts and the powers existing 
in these. This is to apprehend God through a shadow, 
to understand the artist through his works. Presently the 
shadow is explained to mean " both the Logos and this 
cosmos. "J The inclusion of the cosmos in a shadow which 
was previously identified with the Logos, is intelligible if 
our interpretation thus far has been correct. The cosmos 
is certainly different from the Logos, because, it includes the 
material condition which is absent from the latter ; and yet 
qua cosmos, as a tissue of logical relations, it becomes identical 
with it, and may be comprised under the same term. It 
is as though the shadow of God, otherwise invisible, had 
fallen upon matter, and so revealed a rational form, the 
substance of which is hidden from our view. 

From the foregoing discussion it has become apparent 
that the Logos stands between God and the material world. 
Though intimately united with the latter, as the pervasive 
force which alone gives it reality, it is yet distinct from 
it, because, being immaterial, it does not fall under the 
senses, but is apprehended only by the intellect. On the 

* Ex. ssxi. 1 sqq. f Ev GKI$ 6 0co= b b^ 2. 

J Leg. All., III. 31-3 (I. 106-7). 



RELATION TO GOD: MEDIATING. 191 

other hand, it is no less closely united with God, because 
it has flowed directly from his essence ; and yet it is dif 
ferent from him, not only as a part from the whole, nor 
only as our thoughts become different from ourselves when 
we make them objects of contemplation, but as the force 
which is rounded off and made permanently objective in 
the order of the universe. To recur to the oft used analogy, 
it is as though the artist s thought were not only visible 
in the form of the statue, but were the enduring power 
which held its particles together, and prevented it from 
.sinking into undistinguishable dust. In that case the statue 
would have 110 reality as a work of art if the constraining 
thought of the artist were withdrawn ; nor would the thought 
have any reality except as an inseparable expression of the 
artist s sovereign and causal mind. Thus the thought would 
mediate between the mind and the marble block, and seem to 
border on both the ontological and the phenomenal realms. 
This mediating position is distinctly assigned to the Logos 
by Philo. To it, he says, 

"The Father who generated the universe gave a special gift, that stand 
ing on the borders it should separate the created from the Creator 

.And it exults in the gift, and with dignity tells of it, saying, And I stood 
between the Lord and you, * being neither unbegofcten as God nor 
begotten as you, but in the middle between the extremes, serving as 
a pledge to both ; on the side of him who planted, for a security that the 
race will never wholly vanishf and depart, having chosen disorder instead 
of order ; and on the side of that which has grown, for a good ground of 
hope that the propitious God will never overlook his own work."J 

The words which are here ascribed to the Logos, so far 
as they are a quotation, are said in Scripture to have been 
spoken by Moses ; but Moses is more than once represented as 

* Deut. v. 5. This is elsewhere applied to " the understanding of the wise 
man." Somn. II. 34 (I. 689). 

t, apparently in an intransitive sense. Mangey suggests 



{ Quis rer. div. her,, 42 (I. 501-2). 



192 THE LOGOS. 

a type of the Logos ; and in the passage here referred to a 
reason for treating him as such may have been found in 
the fact that he proceeds to report the words* of the Lord, 
an office which naturally belonged to the interpreting Logos. 
The general doctrine laid down by Philo in the above sentences 
has already become sufficiently clear ; but we must notice for a 
moment one or two of its particular expressions. The Logos 
is not unbegotten as God ; for even if we regard the Thought of 
God as eternal, still it is always logically dependent upon God, 
and cannot be conceived as self-existent. A thought, even if 
it be in fact coeval with the mind, must yet be looked upon 
as the mind s offspring. On the other hand, it is not begotten 
as man, because it has not been born in time or become a 
part of the phenomenal universe. The distinction which is 
here pointed out was afterwards expressed by the words 
" begotten " and " made " ; but Philo, though evidently aware 
of the distinction, has not introduced a terminology answering 
to it, and we must not be surprised if, while words are still 
fluid, and have not yet settled down into permanent moulds, the 
use of language is occasionally a little inconsistent. The first 
born son of God must have been begotten ; but as Philo 
applies the latter term to everything created, it was neces 
sary to deny its applicability to the Logos, at least in the 
sense generally intended. Hence, instead of distinguishing 
the Logos from the Father, as the begotten from the 
unbegotten, he declares that it was neither, but occupied 
a position between the two. The twofold pledge, also, which 
the Logos offers is significant. As the mighty Thought of 
God, ever linked with the divine Causality, it secures the 
universe against a relapse into chaos. As a power essentially 
divine ever active in the sphere of phenomena, it guarantees the 
lasting continuity of Providence. The cosmos is God s " own 
work."f The Logos, therefore, is not a demiurge who acts 

* Td prjuara. -j- T6 idiov ipyov. 



BELATION TO GOD : ETERNAL. 193 

for or instead of God, but is God s own rational energy acting 
upon matter; and as a material world cannot, like a human 
work, be finished off and left to itself, this energy is always 
there, and links the cosmos to the infinite source of power 
and order. 

These remarks may enable us to understand the contra 
dictory predicates which are attributed to the Logos. On the 
one hand it is eternal and incorruptible. The rational soul in 
man, it is said, is stamped tf with the seal of God, whose 
character is eternal Reason."" 5 Here the Logos is regarded 
simply in its aspect of archetypal idea ; and although the 
imprinting of that idea must have had a beginning, yet 
the idea itself, as existing in the unchangeable God, must 
have been eternal. In one other passage the same epithet is 
applied to the Logos : <( If we have not yet become fit to be 
considered children of God, at least we are children of his 
eternal image, the most sacred Logos."t Though we have 
seen that the Logos is the image of God by virtue of its 
being made objective in the universe, still it is intrinsically 
the same whether it has become objective or is hidden away in 
the mystery of the divine essence; and so the image may 
be described as eternal, although the eternal and subjective 
Logos would not in the first instance have been called an image 
of God. That it is incorruptible follows as a matter of course.* 
and hardly requires remark. " Being a Thought J of the Eternal, 
it is of necessity itself also incorruptible/ This necessity 
would not exist unless the Logos were a direct expression 
of the divine essence ; and thus Philo s inference helps to 
confirm our past exposition. Again, we read that " the 
truly lawful is ipso facto eternal, || since right reason, which is 
law, is not corruptible."^ Philo has just been speaking of 
an immortal law inscribed on the nature of the universe " ; 

* AiStos Xoyoc, Plantat. Noe, 5 (I. 332). 

f Conf. Ling., 28 (I. 427). J Aoyoe. 

Conf. Ling., 11 (I. 411). || AIWVJOJ/. IT Ebriet., 35 (I. 379). 

VOL. II. 13 



194: THE LOGOS. 

and it is evident from the words which we have quoted 
that right reason is the rational law which regulates the 
cosmos, and this law, considered in its essence, and not in 
its application, is eternal. But as soon as we withdraw our 
attention from its essence, and think only of its application, 
it takes its place among the objects of creation. The Logos, 
as the Word or purely objective Thought of God, " is above 
all the cosmos, and oldest and most generic of all the things 
that have come into existence."* Its coming into existence 
can describe only its assumption of the character of " Word/ 
its passing forth to take possession of matter and constrain it 
to be a vehicle of divine ideas, which else must have dwelt for 
ever within the solitude of God. 

In conformity with the foregoing doctrine, we may dis 
tinguish three grades in the knowledge of God. We may have 
an immediate intuition of the transcendent Cause ; we may know 
him inferential!/ from the Eeason displayed in his works; 
or, lastly, we may stop short with that Eeason, and fail to 
apprehend the Divinity beyond. The two former are set forth 
in the passage about Beseleel, to which we lately referred. 
We there learned that the supreme Artist may be known 
through his works as through a shadow. " But there is a 
more perfect and more purified mind, initiated in the great 
mysteries, which knows the Cause, not from the effects, as 
it would the permanent substance from a shadow, but, having 
looked beyond the begotten, receives a clear appearance of the 
Unbegotten, so as to apprehend from himself him and his 
shadow, the latter meaning the Logos and this cosmos." This 
higher mind is represented by Moses, whom God called up, and 
to whom he spoke mouth to mouth; but a lower mode of appre 
hension is symbolized by Beseleel, who received the appearance 

* 1S>v oaa ytyove. Leg. All., III. 61 (I. 121). Compare Migrat. Abr., 1 
(I. 437), where, however, there is a comparative instead of a superlative, 
6*7rp:<r/Wreppc rZv ytvtaiv ilXrifdruv. Here also Philo is speaking of the 
Word, and of its office in creation and providence. 






THEEE GKADES IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 195 

of God, not from the Cause himself, but from the things 
that were made,, as from a shadow, perceiving the artist by a 
process of inference. We saw just now that the shadow 
denotes the Logos, and it is of course only as tenanted 
by the divine Eeason that the cosmos is capable of revealing 
God.* It follows, therefore, that those who under the guidance 
of wisdom have reached the divine Logos have not necessarily 
attained to God himself ; they only see him afar off, or, rather, 
that he is far from all genesis. f In more modern phrase, they 
discern an all-pervading energy and order in nature, which 
points to a permanent ontological ground, but of this ground 
itself they discern only that it is mysterious, impenetrable 
Being. But the same mind may be differently affected at 
different times. Now it may soar aloft, and be illumined 
with the archetypal and immaterial rays of the rational 
fountain of God; and, again, it may descend and meet only 
images of these; and thus to meet the Logos is a most 
sufficing gift for those who cannot behold God, who is before 
the Logos, for they have the benefit of a mingled light 
when the unmingled has set.J With some the latter state 
of mind is permanent, and indeed, even among philosophers, 
there is a yet lower stage than this. The companions of 
knowledge ought to desire to behold the self-existent Being, 
and if they cannot do this, to see at least his image, the 
most sacred Logos, and next to this the most perfect of 
perceptible works, this cosmos ; for the accurate discernment 
of these is the object of philosophy. The Levites represent 
minds of the highest order. The Sovereign of all is their 
refuge, while others fly at most to the divine Logos ; and 
while the former have as their law the God to whom they are 
consecrated, the imperfect have the sacred Logos as theirs. || 
It follows that the Logos may be spoken of as a God in 

* Leg. All, III. 31-3 (I. 106-8). f Somn., I. 11 (I. 630). 

$ Ib., 19, p. 638 Conf. Ling., 20 (I. 419). 

|| SS. Ab. et Cain., 38 (1, 188-9) ; Prof. 18 (I. 560). 

13 * 



196 THE LOGOS. 

relation to our inferior perceptions. Philo, however, very 
rarely avails himself of this privilege, and never without 
Scriptural warrant. Commenting on the words addressed to 
Jacob, I am the God who appeared to thee in the place of 
God,"* he asks 

Are there really two Gods ? For it is said, " I am the God who appeared 
to thee," not in my place, but " in the place of God," as of another. The 
solution is the following : The true God is one, but those improperly 
so called are several. Wherefore the sacred Word has indicated the 
true God in the present passage by the article, saying b Otog, but the one 
improperly so named without the article, v TOTT^, not rov 0oi),but simply 
Qtov. The latter is the eldest Logos. This usage is adopted in order to 
benefit him who cannot yet see the true God ; for as those who are unable 
to see the sun itself look upon the reflected ray as the sun, so they 
mentally perceive the image of God, his Logos, as himself.f 

In another passage Philo remarks on the words, " I swore 
by myself, saith the Lord/ J 

God alone affirms by himself, since he alone accurately knows his own 
nature, and those must be considered impious who say that they swear 
by God, for they cannot discern his nature. We must be content, then, 
if we can swear by his name, according to the command in Deuteronomy, 
" Thou shalt swear by his name," not by himself; that is, by the inter 
preting Logos ; for this would be a God to us imperfect men, while of the 
wise and perfect the first God would be so.|| 

Here there is no use of the word God in a subordinate sense 
in the Scripture passages which are appealed to ; but the 
application of the term to the Logos is readily suggested by 
the context. The object of an oath is to confirm one s words 
by the highest possible sanction ; and as men are precluded by 
their ignorance from swearing by the supreme God, the Logos 
must take for them the place of the Supreme. The name of 
God is made to denote the Logos because, as a name expresses 
the thing which it signifies, so the Logos is an expression of 
the divine nature which it interprets to us. The phrase " the 

* Gen. xxxi. 13, o Ofbg . . tv Tony Qsov. 

f Somn., I. 39 and 41 (I. 655-6). J Gen. xxii. 16. vi. 13. 

|| Leg. All., III. 73 (I. 128). 



CALLED A GOD. 197 

first God v * receives illustration from its use elsewhere in 
opposition to those who thought that the cosmos was God : 
those who consider it closely, says Philo, will know full well 
that it is not the first God, but the work of the first God.f 
This language seems to allow by implication a subordinate 
divinity to the cosmos, and we might think it strange that a 
monotheist did not disclaim any such meaning. JSTo doubt he 
would have done so had he supposed that the world was a mere 
fabric put together by God. But he viewed it as a tissue of 
divine forces ; and therefore those who worshipped it as God 
held not so much a false as an imperfect view. The Logos, 
the cosmic principle in the material universe, was really divine, 
being the rational energy, the formative Thought of God, and 
consequently it was not by a mere figure of speech that it was 
spoken of as God. Yet since it represented only the immanence 
and not the transcendence of God, since it was an expression 
of the eternal Cause and not that Cause itself, it was necessary 
to distinguish it from the supreme and infinite Being; and 
as the latter was called, in opposition to polytheistic and 
pantheistic schemes, the First God, the Logos, the highest 
term next to the Supreme, might be termed the second. This 
appellation is actually used, but only once, and that in a 
fragment preserved by Eusebius from the " Questions and 
Answers/ Philo asks 

" Why, as though speaking of another God, does he say, I made man 
in the image of God, but not in his own image ? " The answer is 
that nothing mortal could be made like tlie supreme Father of all, 
but only like the second God,J the Logos. For the rational impress in 
the soul of man must be stamped by divine Eeason, and cannot hare as 
its archetype God, who is above Eeason. 

Here the application of the term "God" to the Logos is 
rendered necessary by Philo s interpretation of the passage on 

* Trpoiroc 0o<r. f Abr., 15-16 (II. 11-12). 

Tov dtvrepov Qtbv. 

Fragments, II. 625, answering to Qu. et Sol. in Gen., II. 62. 



198 THE LOGOS. 

which he is commenting. According to his own conception, as 
expressed in the words before us, the Logos is simply the 
archetype of the rational principle in man, and this archetype, 
as we have seen, is the immanent Thought of the universe. 
Whether in the doctrine that the Logos was a God to the 
imperfect, whose conceptions could reach no higher, Philo had 
the Stoics in his mind, I will not undertake to decide. But 
at all events his language receives an interesting light from 
the Stoical doctrine, which recognised no God above the all- 
pervading Logos of the material system. When we remember 
the philosophical atmosphere of the time and the requirements 
of allegorical interpretation, we shall not be surprised that 
Philo three times in his voluminous works speaks of the Logos 
as a God, nor shall we be disposed to extract from such 
language a doctrine inconsistent with all that we have hitherto 
learned of the nature of the Logos and its relation to the 
eternal Cause. 

Little need be added to what has been already said respect 
ing the relation which the Logos bears to the universe ; but 
one or two forms of expression must be more distinctly 
noticed. From the doctrine hitherto described we should 
expect Philo to represent the Logos as the instrument of 
creation and of providence. This indeed has become apparent 
in some of the passages which we have quoted, and we need 
only allude to one or two others which possess more than 
usual interest. Having occasion to explain that God was a 
cause, and not an instrument, Philo observes that 

Four .things must concur in every act of creation namely, that by 
which, that out of which, that by means of which, and that on account of 
which ; or, in other words, the cause, the material, the instrument, and 
the reason or purpose. Accordingly, the cosmos has for its cause God, 
by whom it has been produced ; for its material the four elements, out of 
which it was compounded ; for an instrument God s Logos,* through 
which it was prepared ; and for its reason the goodness of the Creator.f 

* "Qpyavov ft \6yov Qtov. f Cherub., 35 (I. 161-2). 



INSTBUMENT OF CBEATION AND PBOVIDENCE. 199 

In what way the Logos is the instrument of creation has 
been so fully explained that it would be superflous to remark 
further upon this and similar statements.* Creation and 
providence naturally go together, and therefore these two 
agencies of the Logos are sometimes spoken of at the same 
time. Thus, we are told that the pilot of the universe, holding 
the Logos as a tiller, steers all things, and when he moulded 
the cosmos he used this as an instrument for the composition 
of the things produced ;f and, again, he employs fl Reason as a 
minister of his gifts, by which also he made the cosmos." J 
The supremacy of a rational law over the seeming drift of 
events is alluded to in a remarkable passage. The object of 
the passage is to show the vanity of mortal affairs, which differ 
nothing from false dreams. 

This is illustrated by the changing fortunes of nations. Once Greece 
flourished, hut the Macedonians took away its strength. Macedonia 
again had its period of bloom, but was separated and weakened till it 
was totally extinguished. Before the Macedonians the Persians prospered, 
but one day destroyed their mighty kingdom. And now the Parthians 
are more powerful than the Persians, who lately ruled them, and the 
former subjects are the masters. The welfare of the once brilliant Egypt 
passed away as a cloud. And so the whole habitable world is tossed up 
and down like a ship at sea, which now has favourable, and again contrary 
winds. For the divine Logos, which most men call fortune, moves in a 
circle. In constant stream it acts upon cities and nations, assigning the 
possessions of one to another, and those of all to all, merely exchanging 
the property of each by periods, in order that as one city the whole 
habitable world may have the best of governments, democracy. || 

This passage hints at rather than unfolds some very striking 
thoughts. First of all, it distinctly recognizes a rational 
direction in the fate of nations, and sets aside the common 
belief in chance. Secondly, as reason implies an end in view, 
it assumes that some end is being worked out by the rise and 



* See also SS. Ab. et Cain., 3 (1. 165), di ov jcai 6 
and Monarch., II. 5 (II. 225), where almost the same expression occurs. 
f Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 437). 

t Quod Deus immut., 12 (1.281), where we have $ instead of 81 ov. 
Tv X t]. !1 Quod Deus immut., 36 (I. 298). 



200 THE LOGOS. 

fall of successive empires. This end, in the case of divine 
Reason, must be good ; and Philo conjectures that the ultimate 
aim must be the good of mankind, the universal distribution 
of the blessings enjoyed by any, and the universal establish 
ment of that form of government which rests on the equal 
rights of all. So far as the Logos is concerned, it must, in 
conformity with previous statements, be simply the instrument 
through which the divine purpose is carried out. God directs 
the affairs of men through the operation of that rational law 
which is bound up in the very constitution of the world. In 
this capacity the Logos is spoken of not only as the tiller " 
held by God, but as itself the "steersman and pilot of the 
universe."* Thus, the two worlds of nature and of man are 
ruled by the same divine Reason, and the beneficent purposes 
of God are being fulfilled, not only through the sublime law 
which is interfused through every part of the material cosmos, 
maintaining its majestic and harmonious movements, but 
through a law no less sublime, though less easily discerned, 
which underlies the seeming fortuity of our human lot, and 
directs the vicissitudes of nations. These two laws are one : 
both alike are the Logos, the supreme idea imprinted upon 
the world, the rational energy of God acting within the realms 
of time and space. 

Such, then, in its broad outlines, is Philo s doctrine of the 
Logos, a doctrine which, when taken in connection with the 
previously established doctrines of the divine attributes and 
the divine powers, is sufficiently clear and consistent; and 
were we content to leave without discusion difficulties which 
Philo himself has not discussed, we might consider the duty of 
exposition as now discharged. There are, however, some 
passages, hitherto unnoticed, which raise ioevitable questions 
about the distinct essence and the personality of the Logos, 
and, having been variously understood by different writers, 

* Cherub., 11 (I. 145). Cf. SS. Ab. et Cain., 12 (I. 171). 



RELATION TO WISDOM. 201 

will require our serious attention. But before we enter 
upon these perplexities, it will be better to examine some 
peculiarities in Philo s phraseology, which will throw a 
further light upon his opinions. He speaks not only 
of the Logos, but [of the Wisdom,* of God, and though 
the relation between these two terms is evidently intimate, 
its precise character is rather obscure, and has been very 
differently conceived. They are frequently supposed to be 
identical in meaning, the former having been introduced under 
the influence of Greek philosophy, strengthened by the desire 
to obtain a masculine name for the mediating power, the latter 
being a survival of the old Hebrew expression. From this 
view Dahne and Baur diverge in opposite directions. Dahne 
declares that the divine Wisdom is one of the powers of the 
divine Logos,f and denotes that capacity for making wise 
arrangements which must necessarily be postulated in the 
mediating cause of the world s formation.;]; Baur, on the 
other hand, places it on the highest stage, in the most intimate 
union with the supreme Being, and along with it, though sub 
ordinate, the two principal powers, goodness and sovereignty, 
and assigns the Logos to the second stage, where it is the 
same unity for the divine power operative in the universe as 
Wisdom (or the supreme God himself, with whom it is one) 
is upon the highest stage. To decide among these conflicting 
opinions, it is necessary to review the passages on which our 
judgment must rest. 

We will notice first those places in which, notwithstanding 
some apparent distinctions, Wisdom and the Logos seem on 
the whole to be identified. In an allegorical interpretation of 
Eden, Philo says that generic virtue receives its beginnings 
from Eden, the Wisdom of God, which rejoices in its Father 
alone, and the four specific virtues are derived from the 
generic. Presently the former statement is repeated with an 

* 2o0m. J Eine Theilkraft desselben. J I. p. 221. 

Lehre von der Dreiein., I., p. 70. 



202 THE LOGOS. 

addition : generic goodness " goes forth out of Eden, the 
Wisdom of God. Now this is the Logos of God; for in 
accordance with this [Logos] generic virtue has been made."* 
Here, I think, the identity is not, as Gfrorer seems to suppose, f 
between the Logos and. "Wisdom, but between the Logos and 
generic goodness. Eden is Wisdom, and the river is generic 
goodness or the Logos, which divides itself into the four 
specific virtues. Thus Wisdom and the Logos are distinguished 
from one another, and if this passage stood alone, we should 
not refer to it at present; but when we compare it with 
corresponding passages, we receive a different impression. 
We have observed before that Philo s allegorical interpre 
tations follow a pretty regular system. We are accordingly 
told elsewhere that Scripture " calls the Wisdom of the Self- 
existent Eden" ;t and yet we are informed in another passage 
that " Eden is, symbolically, right and divine Reason." 
Farther on in the same treatise, Wisdom and the Logos seem 
to be used as interchangeable terms. The soul is "watered 
by the stream of Wisdom." || " The Logos of God gives drink 
to the virtues ; for it is the beginning and fountain of beautiful 
deeds." The virtues " have grown from the divine Logos, as 
from one root."^ " Whence is it likely that the understand 
ing thirsting for prudence should be filled except from the 
Wisdom of God, the unfailing fountain ?" Presently we hear 
again of " Wisdom, the divine fountain," and then of " the 
stream of Wisdom";** and farther on, "the sacred Logos which 
waters the sciences is itself the stream. "ff It would seem, 
then, that the distinction drawn in the first passage, whatever 
it may be, belongs to the thought rather than the terms ; for 
Wisdom and the Logos appear alike under the figures of Eden, 

* Leg. All., I. 19 (I. 56). t I- P- 225 - 

t Somn., II. 37 (I. 690). Post. Cain., 10 (I. 232). 

!! 36. II 37. ** 41. 

tf 45. The whole passage extends from I. 249 to 255. The argument is 
not affected by Tischendorf s reading ravrbv in the last quotation, instead of 
M angey s UVTOQ. 



EELATION TO WISDOM. 203 

of a fountain, of a stream. The words are similarly inter 
changed when it is said that " in those by whom the life of 
the soul has been honoured the divine Logos dwells and 
walks " , and a few lines farther on, f they have a secure and 
unshaken power, being fattened by the Wisdom which 
nourishes virtue-loving souls."* 

The impression thus received, that the Logos and Wisdom 
are, at .least to a certain extent, convertible terms is strengthened 
when we find that some of the most striking characteristics 
of the former are attributed to the latter. Thus, Wisdom is 
represented as the highest of the divine powers. This is done 
in a commentary on the passage in Deuteronomyt where Israel 
is exhorted not to forget the Lord, "who brought forth for 
thee out of a scarpedj rock a fountain of water, who fed thee 
with manna in the desert." So, spiritually, we thirst " until 
God sends upon us the stream of his own scarped Wisdom, 
and gives drink to the soul, ... for the scarped rock is the 
Wisdom of God, which he cut topmost and absolutely first 
from his own powers, out of which [Wisdom] he gives drink to 
God -loving souls." This language is evidently governed by 
the figure under which the thought is presented, and we must 
not insist on the word " cut," which, if taken strictly, would 
contradict the doctrine that the powers are stretched, and not 
severed ; but it seems sufficiently clear that Wisdom is regarded 
as the highest divine power operative in the world. Yet this 
is precisely the position we have already claimed for the 
Logos. In the sequel of the passage, however, it might 
seem as though the Logos were distinguished from Wisdom. 
When souls have received drink tc they are filled also with 
manna, the most generic thing ; . . . . now the most generic 
thing is God, and the Logos of God is second." || This dis 
tinction is rendered necessary by the allusion in Deuteronomy 

* Ib., 35 (I. 249). t viii. 15, 16 

J AKporo/iou, " top-cut." Aicpav Kai TTp(t)TiGTr]V 

|| Leg. All., II. 21 (I. 81-2). 



204: THE LOGOS. 

to food as well as drink; but that it is only verbal is apparent 
from another passage of very similar import. The nourish 
ment of the soul, it is said, is described by the Legislator as 
" honey from a rock and oil from a firm rock."* The rock is 
ec the solid and unsevered Wisdom of God," the nurse of those 
who desire incorruptible food. "The fountain of the divine 
Wisdom " sometimes comes with gentler flow, and sweetens like 
honey, sometimes more swiftly, and " becomes, as it were, the 
oil of mental light. " Here there is nothing in the Scriptural 
words to suggest a distinction between Wisdom and the Logos. 
But neither is there anything to require their identification. 
Nevertheless Philo proceeds to identify them in the most 
express terms. " In another place/ he says, " making use of 
a synonym, he calls this rock manna, the divine Logos which is 
the oldest of things, and is named the most generic c some 
thing, from which two cakes, the one of honey and the other 
of oil, are made. "I We need not pursue the explanation 
farther : it is clear that the rock, the fountain, the manna, 
Wisdom, and the Logos are one, and differ to the ear rather 
than to the understanding. Again, God, " the only wise," is 
" the fountain of Wisdom," just as we have seen that he is the 
fountain of rational power, and, as such, he delivers the 
sciences to mankind. J He is also " the sovereign of Wisdom," 
and as we have learned that some may recognise the Logos 
who cannot rise to the apprehension of the Self-existent, so 
some may perceive Wisdom who are not yet able to behold its 
sovereign. Wisdom is of course, like every divine power, 
"older than the creation of the entire cosmos" ;|| but, more 
than this, it is, like the Logos, instrumental in the production 
of the cosmos. God being the Father of the universe, Wisdom 
or Science^ is its mother. The details of this not very pleasing 
metaphor must not, I think, be pressed into the service of Philo s 

* Deut. xxxii. 13. t Quod det. pot. ins., 31 (I. 213-14). 

I SS. Ab. et Cain., 17 (I. 175). Quod det. pot. ins., 9 (I. 197). 

j| Human., 2 (II. 385). 



EELATION TO WISDOM. 205 

philosophy, but be treated as purely figurative. The figure is 
due to the direction in Deuteronomy, that, if anyone has a dis 
obedient son, the father and mother shall seize him and bring him 
to the elders of the city.* Now, none could bear the punitive 
powers of the parents of the universe ; but it is good to obey 
their followers who preside over the soul namely, as a father, 
the masculine and perfect and right Keason, and, as a mother, 
encyclical education. f Here Wisdom first of all takes the 
place which we have been accustomed to assign to the Logos, 
being the divine instrument in creation, and then the Logos is 
introduced as subordinate both to God and to Wisdom. We 
must presently seek for some explanation of this kind of incon 
sistency ; meanwhile we must not attach too much weight to 
passages which are written for purposes of edification, and not 
with a view to unfolding a philosophical doctrine, and especially 
when the manner of treatment is under the control of an 
allegory. Wisdom appears again as the medium of creation in 
connection with the commandment "Honour thy father and 
mother, that it may be well with thee/ J not, observes Philo, 
with those who receive the honour, but with thee. This is the 
case when we honour <e as a father him who begat the cosmos, 
and as a mother Wisdom, through which the universe was 
completed; .... for neither the full God nor the highest 
and perfect Science requires anything," so that in serving 
them you benefit yourself. The same figure of a mother 
recurs in yet another connection. " The high-priest is not 
man, but divine Eeason, free from participation in all un 
righteous deeds, not only voluntary, but even involuntary," for 
he cannot defile himself either " for father," the mind, or " for 
mother," sensation, || because "he had as his portion incor 
ruptible and most pure parents, as a father God, who is also- 
the Father of the universe, and as a mother Wisdom, through 
which all things came into being." Philo goes on to say, in 

* xxi. 18, 19. f Ebriet., 8-9 (I. 3G1-2). J Ex. xx. 12. 

Quod det. pot. ins., 16 (I. 201-2). || Lev. xxi. 11. 



206 THE LOGOS. 

words already quoted, that the " oldest Logos of the Self- 
existent puts on the cosmos as a garment/ and is the bond of 
all things.* Here the creative function usually assigned to the 
Logos is attributed to Wisdom, and yet the pervasive Logos 
of the universe apparently owns it as a mother. This seeming 
confusion will be noticed presently. In another passage the 
cosmos is simply spoken of as "fabricated by divine Wisdom. "f 
In one other place, although the creative action of Wisdom is 
not mentioned, it is referred to as " the mother of all things." 
Here, too, a Scriptural passage suggests the metaphor : " A 
man shall leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife," J 
that is, for the sake of sensation the mind leaves the Father, 
the God of the universe, and the mother of all things, the Virtue 
and Wisdom of God."|| The figure is somewhat modified 
when God is spoken of as " the husband of Wisdom," for here 
Wisdom is the generic virtue or wisdom of mankind, symbolized 
by Sarah, which cannot become fruitful unless visited by divine 
influence ;^[ but we may remark that it is not easy to dis 
tinguish this wisdom ontologically from the Logos or rational 
nature in which mankind participate. They are indeed used 
interchangeably by Philo in a passage which serves in other 
respects also to identify Wisdom aud the Logos. The state 
ment in Genesis** that " God planted a paradise in Eden 
towards the east" is under consideration. Divine and heavenly 
Wisdom, we are told, is many-named, ff for Scripture "has 
called it beginning and image and vision of God." This reminds 
us at once of the many-named Logos of the Stoics ; and it is 
noticeable that Philo himself elsewhere applies the same 
epithet to the Logos, and the very first name which he 
mentions is " Beginning." He also speaks of it as the image 
of God, and as " Seeing Israel," which is equivalent to " the 

* Prof.,^20 (I. 562). -j- Q u is rer. div. her., 41 (I. 501). 

J Gen. ii. 24. Apertjv Kai aotyiav. 

|| Leg. AIL, II. 14 (I. 75). j[ Cherub., 13, 14 (I. 147-8). 



EELATION TO WISDOM. 207 

vision o God " in tlie passage before us.* The resemblance 
becomes still more apparent as we proceed. Earthly wisdom 
is an imitation of the heavenly as an archetype, a fact which 
is symbolized by the planting of Paradise; for God plants 
in the mortal race earthly virtue, an imitation and copy of the 
heavenly. Now virtue is called metaphorically " Paradise ; " 
and the planting of Paradise is towards the east, " for right 
Reason does not set and become extinguished, but always ac 
cording to its nature rises, and as, I think, the sun, when it has 
risen, fills the darkness of the air with light, so also virtue, 
when it has risen in the soul, illumines its mist and disperses its 
great darkness/ f It thus appears that Wisdom, Virtue, and 
right Reason, are different names for the same thing, regarded, 
it is true, now on the earthly, now on the heavenly, side, but 
not distinguishable from one another in essence. Intellectual 
perception is associated with light; and hence Wisdom, like 
the Logos, is brought into connection with "the seeing Israel," 
and the Wisdom of God is declared to be " the archetypal light 
of the sun, of which [light] the sun is an imitation and 
image."J We have only to add that even the function of the 
" Logos the cutter " is ascribed to Wisdom, though it is not 
worked out so as to enable us to institute a detailed com 
parison. The fountain of judgment " or separation, || 
mentioned in Genesis xiv. 7, is turned into the Wisdom of 
God, " the judgment^ of all things, by which all opposites are 
disunited."** 

In some of the foregoing passages we have observed that, 
though Wisdom and the Logos are identified either expressly or 
"by the possession of. the same characteristics, yet they are also, 
under the pressure of allegorical interpretation, distinguished 
from one another. A few other places in which a distinction 
is assumed require notice. Wisdom, "the best dwelling of 

* See Conf. Ling., 28 (I. 427). f Leg. AIL, I. 14 (I. 51-2). 

J Migrat. Abr., 8 (I. 442). A6yo S roficve. 

j| Trjs Kpiaeuc. ^ Or separation. ** Prof., 35 (I. 575). 



208 THE LOGOS. 

virtue-loving souls/ is said to be the land of sacred Reason. 
This statement is founded on the commandment given to 
Jacob,* " Return to the land of thy father."t As the Logos 
in man takes the place of father, Wisdom was required to 
represent the land, and it would not be safe to infer from such 
figures that Philo had in his mind any clear relation between 
the two terms. If the language of Scripture had led him 
to do so, I have no doubt that he would without scruple have 
reversed the order, and represented the Logos as the land 
of Wisdom. We have an actual instance of this kind of 
inversion in the comparison of Wisdom and the Logos to a 
fountain and a stream. Where Eden is made to represent 
Wisdom, and its river the Logos, we learn that " the divine 
Logos, like a river, descends from Wisdom, as from a foun 
tain " { and yet, when the first of the cities of refuge does 
duty for " the highest divine Logos," we are informed, quite 
gratuitously, that the latter is the "fountain of Wisdom." 
Agreeably to this order of thought, it is said that he who 
is conducted by Wisdom arrives at the divine Logos, || and that 
all the branches of education and wisdom^" flow perennially 
from the " Word of God and divine Logos."** The latter 
passage is peculiarly instructive, because the Logos, which 
here stands for the heavenly bread or manna, presently 
becomes " ethereal Wisdom," which God showers down upon 
well-disposed minds. 

Before we remark on this curious identity, difference, and 
interchange of Logos and Wisdom, it will be advantageous 
to notice those passages in which the latter is brought into 
immediate connection with mankind, but without any expressed 
relation to the Logos, for we shall thus gain a fuller insight into 
its nature. " The divine spirit of Wisdom " may abide with 
men, as it did with the wise Moses, tf This Wisdom is the 

* Gen. xxxi. 3. f Migrat. Abr., 6 (I. 440). 

J Somn.,II. 37 (I. 690). Prof., 18 (I. 560). || Somn., I. 11 (I. 630). 

II UaiStlai Kai ffofiai. ** Prof., 25 (I. 566). ft Gigant., 11 (I. 269). 



KELATION TO WISDOM. 209 

perfect or royal way which leads to God,* and may be spoken 
of as "the way of wisdom," or "the way of prudence."t 
Human wisdom, however, is not the same as divine Wisdom, 
but is related to it as species to genus, or as imitation to 
archetype, J and whereas the universal prudence which inhabits 
the Wisdom of God is imperishable, the individual prudence in 
me perishes with me.|| Accordingly, the branches of human 
knowledge are the principles or theorems^" of God s own 
Wisdom.** Being itself equivalent, as we have seen, to science,tt 
the divine Wisdom is the fountain from which the individual 
sciences are watered. JJ It concerns not only the sciences, but 
the arts ; and Wisdom, as it appears in the wise man, is described 
as "the art of arts/ which, preserving its own true species 
unaltered, exhibits itself in a variety of applications. |||| We 
have only to add that Philo distinguishes wisdom and prudence 
by saying that the former relates to the service of God, while 
the latter is directed to the administration of human life.^f^f 

It is apparent from the preceding account that Wisdom 
does not receive from Philo the elaborate treatment which he 
bestows upon the Logos and upon the divine powers generally, 
and that if we were confined to this account the most striking 
features of his philosophy would become obscure or disappear. 
Nevertheless, it suggests a few questions to which we must 
attempt an answer. 

We must ask, first of all, how we are to understand the 
relation between the Logos and Wisdom when they are dis 
tinguished from one another. The most obvious reply is that 
given by Heinze,*** that the Logos or Wisdom regarded as 
a divine power working upon the world is different from the 
same power when at rest in God, and that, therefore, either 

* Quod Deus immut., 30 (I. 294) ; 34, p. 296. f Plantat. Noe, 22 (I. 343). 

I Quis rer. div. her., 25 (I. 490). 

II Leg. AIL, I. 25 (I. 59). H 
** Quod Deus immut., 20 (I. 286). ff 

Jt Prof., 35 (I. 575). Te X vr] 

J| |1 Ebriet., 22 (I. 370). i [ Praern. et Poen., 14 (II. 421). *** P. 253. 
VOL. II. 14 



210 THE LOGOS. 

may be represented as issuing forth from the other. I doubt, 
however, whether this is the true solution of the difficulty. 
There is only one passage which lends itself easily to this 
interpretation. When Wisdom is represented, apparently, as 
the mother of the universal cosmical Logos (symbolized by the 
high-priest), we may fairly take the latter to be the uttered 
Word, the former the eternal attribute of God. Yet even here 
it would be hazardous to say that Philo was clearly conscious 
of this distinction. In his allegory he wanted a mother for the 
Logos, and none could be found but Wisdom ; and if we look 
a little more closely at the details of the passage we shall find 
room for a different explanation. The high-priest, though 
standing for " divine Reason," represents in the main that por 
tion of it which dwells in each man as a judge and rebuking con 
science. " The oldest Logos of the Self -existent" is introduced 
only to point out the universal laws of reason, which necessarily 
reappear in its particular manifestations. When we are told 
that this Logos put on the universe as a garment, it is imme 
diately added that the individual soul puts on the body, and 
the understanding of the wise man the virtues ; and when it is 
said that the Logos of the Self-existent is the bond of all things, 
it is only to show that the individual soul exercises a similar 
faculty, and the purified mind of the wise man keeps the virtues 
unbroken. The death of the high-priest is the departure of 
"this most sacred Logos" from the soul, and the consequent 
inroad of sin. I believe, therefore, that the distinction in 
Philo s mind was not that between the inward and the uttered, 
but between the universal and the particular, and that what he- 
meant to teach was that the divine principle of righteous law 
in each one of us was the offspring of that cosmical law which 
" preserves the stars from wrong." This view is fully borne 
out by other passages. Human or earthly wisdom or virtue 
or right reason is related to the divine or heavenly as species 
to genus, and is a copy or imitation of it. If, therefore, 
Wisdom and the Logos be identical, you may say with equal 



EELATION TO WISDOM. 211 

propriety that human wisdom flows from the " highest divine 
Logos " as a fountain, and that human reason flows from the 
fountain of the divine Wisdom. It is as perennially flowing into 
God-loving souls, in the form of " words and ordinances/ * 
that the divine Logos is compared to a river ;f and such a 
stream, distributing itself specifically to individual minds, may 
be said, indifferently, to come from universal Wisdom or Reason* 
So, again, the Logos which is the father of the man is that 
portion of the Logos which belongs to him, and, as such, it 
owns universal Wisdom as its land. Reversing the terms, he 
who allows himself to be guided by the share of wisdom which 
dwells in him reaches the cosmic Reason from which it comes. 
In the passage where Wisdom is described as the mother of 
the universe, and the Logos is ranked below it, the latter is 
the right reason of men, which has received the care of souls, 
and is classed with encyclical education ; in other words, it 
is the species, and is justly made subordinate to the genus. 
There is, however, one passage to which this explanation will 
not apply. It is where Wisdom and the Logos are distinguished 
as the drink and food of man, for here they stand together 
in the same relation to man. The distinction is, as we have 
seen, forced upon Philo by his allegory ; but we may also say 
that Wisdom and the Logos, though identical in God, are 
distinguishable in human apprehension. Wisdom, being 
interchangeable with virtue and science, J carries with it the 
notions of moral soundness and acquired knowledge, which 
are not necessarily present in Logos, the rational principle by 
which men are separated from the brutes. Thus the apparent 
inconsistencies in Philo s language may be explained without 
violating the ultimate identity of the Logos and Wisdom. 

We must ask, in the next place, why Philo uses "Wisdom* 1 
at all, and is not content with Logos. The explanation given 
by Gfrorer and accepted by Heinze,|| that he adopts it 

* Aoyoir Kai Soyparwv. t P st - Cain., 37 (I. 250). 

rj and ImarfiM L P- 226 - II P< 25(L 

14 * 



212 THE LOGOS. 

principally when the mediating power is symbolized by some 
feminine word in the Scriptural passage under consideration, 
is certainly not sufficient. There are several passages in which 
the rule is applicable, especially those in which Wisdom is the 
mother of the universe, but there are also several (I have 
counted seven) in which no reason of the kind exists, and there 
are four others in which the rule is distinctly violated. Wisdom 
is represented by Isaac, 1 * by Paradise,t and by bread, J which 
are all masculine ; and, on the other hand, the Logos is signified 
by a city, which is feminine, although it is described as the 
fountain of Wisdom, and the relation might easily have been 
reversed. || We must, therefore, seek for some further 
explanation. One reason for its adoption is to be found, we 
can hardly doubt, in its traditional use by Jewish writers, a 
use sanctioned by the authority of the Old Testament. Philo 
himself appeals to Proverbs to prove the antiquity of Wisdom, 
( Grod acquired me absolutely first of his works, and founded 
me before the age."^[ But I think the prevailing reason is to 
be found in its greater suitability to express certain ideas. 
Heinze has noticed the fact that it is never represented as the 
all-penetrating bond of the universe.** But he might have 
gone further. It is almost invariably used in relation to man 
kind. It is the divine food and drink of the soul, the dwelling- 
place of those that love virtue, the perfect way of human life, 
the fountain from which the sciences are watered ; and even in 
the few passages where it is spoken of as instrumental in the 
act of creation, it is nearly always brought into connection 
with men. It is a reasonable inference that it is often used on 
account of its more distinct personal associations, and because 
it expresses a source and form of character and attainment 

* Quod det. pot. ins., 9 (1. 197). t Leg. All., I. 14 (I. 51-2). 

J "Aproi, Prof., 25 (I. 566). UoXig. 

|| Prof., 18 (I. 560). 

IF So he renders viii. 22-3, deviating from the text of the LXX. Ebriet. 8 
(I. 362). 
** P. 255. 






EELATION TO WISDOM. . 213 

which are not so well indicated by the less definite terra 
Logos. 

We must ask, then, in conclusion, why Logos is so con 
stantly preferred. One reason is probably to be found in its 
gender, a point to which Philo undoubtedly attached some 
importance. This is evident from a curious passage about 
Wisdom which we have not yet noticed : 

Bethuel, which, being interpreted, means the daughter of God, is a name 
of Wisdom. Nevertheless, Bethuel is called the father of Rebecca. How 
can the daughter of God be justly termed a father ? Because the name 
of Wisdom is feminine, but its nature masculine. So all the virtues have 
the titles of women, but the powers and actions of men ; for that which 
is after God, even though it be older than all other things, is feminine in 
comparison with that which makes the universe, the male always having 
the prerogative. Hence Wisdom, the daughter of God, is masculine and 
a father, generating in souls learning, instruction, science, prudence, 
beautiful and laudable actions.* 

If we may judge from this passage, Philo must have been 
pleased to find a term of the desired gender which he could 
conveniently substitute for the traditional "Wisdom," and 
which, moreover, was not without the sanction of Scriptural 
usage. It seems probable, however, that he was mainly 
influenced by the philosophical qualifications of the word. It 
was more flexible, and could be more easily used, in conformity 
with human analogy, now for the inward conception, now for 
the uttered or objective thought ; and its established position 
in the Stoical philosophy must have forced it upon the attention 
of one who was so strongly attracted as Philo by the moral 
ideal of that austere system. He must have found it no small 
advantage to have ready to his hand a theory of the universe 
which only needed to be removed from its pantheistic basis, 
and brought into harmony with the doctrine of the trans 
cendence of God, to become a fitting vehicle for his own 
speculations; and with the theory, however modified, he 
naturally adopted its characteristic term. 

* Prof., 9 (I. 553). 



214: THE LOGOS. 

There is another Old Testament term which is used by Philo 
with less frequency, "the divine Spirit;" and though his 
treatment of it does not greatly illumine our conceptions of 
the Logos, we must briefly notice the leading thoughts which 
he attaches to it. It is curious that, although Philo is unusually 
careful to furnish us with definitions, this subject has been 
thrown into confusion by more than one interpreter, from a 
failure to distinguish two completely different meanings of the 
Greek word Trvevpa,.* These two meanings are clearly pointed 
out by our philosopher himself. 

" The Spirit of God " [he says] signifies in one sense the air, tlie third 
element, and it is used in this sense at the beginning of Genesis, where it 
is said " the Spirit of God was borne above the water," for air, being light, 
is borne up, and uses water as its basis. In the other sense, it is the pure 
wisdom in which every wise man participate s.f 

Gfrorer quotes this passage, and then adds that irvev^a 
occurs only once more, so far as he is aware, in the physical 
sense. J The place referred to is one in which fresh water is re 
presented as one of the forces by which earth is held together, 
the other being 7rvevfjLa. The parallelism of spirit with water 
proves that it here denotes air. Gfrorer, however, might have 
observed that this article of the Stoical physics occurs else 
where. We have seen that spirit, in the sense of air, is the 
source of " habit " in inorganic objects, and of higher qualities 
in organized beings. || The term is also used in an enumeration 
of the elements ;H and when the question is asked whether 
the mind is " spirit or blood or body at all,"** we can hardly 
doubt that the sense of air or breath is intended. We have 
seen, in dealing with anthropology, that this is its meaning in a 
fragment where it is represented as the essence of the irrational 



* Heinze, generally so careful, is particularly unfortunate, p. 242-3. Dahne, 
also, I. p. 294-5, and Keferstein, p. 162, confound the physical with the 
metaphysical sense. 

t Gigant., 5 (I. 265). J I. p. 230. Mundi Op., 45 (I. 31). 

H See Vol. I. p. 281. U Ebriet., 27 (I. 373). ** Somn., I. 6 (I. 625). 






EELATION TO THE SPIRIT. 215 

soul ;"* and where, on the contrary, it appears as the essence of 
the rational, Philo is careful to explain that he does not mean 
tc air in motion."t It is- apparent, therefore, that the physical 
sense was sufficiently familiar, so familiar indeed that, when 
Philo departed from the Stoical view, he had to guard himself 
against misapprehension. 

Of the metaphysical sense two definitions are given which 
are intended to be precise. In the passage last cited the term 
is defined as a stamp and impress of a divine power which 
Moses calls by a proper name, Image. " As the " image" has 
been already identified with the Logos, it follows that the 
Spirit which forms the essence of man s rational soul is the 
impress of the Logos ; it is the communicated divine idea, the 
imitation or the share which each man enjoys of the universal 
Reason. According to this definition, it is the permanent 
principle of rationality in man, breathed into him by the 
Creator from his own essential life. According to the other 
definition, it is the universal Wisdom which manifests itself 
transiently and mutably in individual men. As we have 
seen, it is "the pure knowledge of which every wise man 
partakes." 

This [Philo proceeds to say] is shown by the words of Scripture, that 
" God called up Beseleel and filled him with divine Spirit, wisdom, 
understanding, knowledge, " J " so that what divine Spirit is is denned 
through these terms. " Of this kind is the Spirit of Moses also, which 
came upon the seventy elders ; for, though they were elders, they could not 
have been really superior to others unless they participated in that all- wise 
Spirit. For it is said, " I will take from the Spirit that is upon thee, and 
will put it upon the seventy elders.")] But this taking from the Spirit 
did not involve cutting and separation, but resembled what occurs in the 
case of fire, which, though it may kindle innumerable torches, remains in 
no respect diminished. Such is the nature of knowledge, which, when it 

* See Vol. I. pp. 320 sq. t Quod det. pot. ins. 23 (I. 207). 

{ Ex. xxxi. 2-3. The LXX has irvwpct Qtiov ffofiae, K.r.X.; Philo reads 
Otiov ao^iag, and evidently regards o-o^iaf, &c., as in apposition with 



To T I sari 7rvti>iJ,a Otlov opi/cwg did. TU>V 
\\ Num. xi. 17. 



216 THE LOGOS. 

has rendered all its votaries experienced, is not lessened, but often is even 
improved. If, then, the spirit of Moses himself, or of any other created 
being, were to be distributed to such a multitude, it would be divided 
into so many little pieces, and diminished ; " but, as it is, the Spirit on 
him is the wise, the divine, the indivisible, the inseparable, the excellent,* 
that which is everywhere entirely filled up," which is not injured by 
communication, nor lessened in understanding and knowledge and 
wisdom. Divine Spirit, accordingly, can remain,f but not permanently 
remain, J in the soul, because it is .hindered and oppressed by the flesh 
and other things, as it is said, " My Spirit shall not continue to remain 
in men for ever, because they are flesh."|| 

It is evident that the Spirit is here identified with. Wisdom 
in its highest generic sense, and is therefore ontologically the 
same as the Logos. The passage hardly requires comment; 
but we must pause for a moment upon one expression on 
account of the singular interpretation which is put upon 
it by KefersteinT and Heinze.*"* The words which I have 
rendered, "That which is everywhere entirely filled up/ ff 
are interpreted by both these writers as " Die Alles erfiillende 
Kraft/ the former translating them "Der Alles durch 
Alles erfiillende/ and explaining that by " Alles" nature 
and man are to be understood. Thus the Spirit is made 
into a cosmical power, and then Heinze, ignoring its double 
meaning, complains of Philo s inconsistency in making it 
elsewhere the binding force of only one part of the earth. 
Was ever "poor philosopher so badgered ? He is not the most 
precise of writers ; but when he is precise his precision affords 
him no shelter, and even his Greek is mistranslated to prove 
that he is inconsequent. The meaning ascribed to the phrase 
in question would be out of place even if it were legitimate to 
turn a perfect passive participle into a present active one. 
The notion to be established is that of a uniform, insepar 
able essence, which does not consist of parts, and is therefore 

* To aaTiiov. f Nevuv. J Atctfiivtiv. 

|1 Gen. vi. 3. Gigant., 5-7 (I. 265-6). See also 11 and 12. 
H Pp. 161 sq. ** P. 242. 

ft To iravTt] St 1 o\uv t 



THE SPIKIT. LOGOI. 217 

not lessened by communication, and this is presented under 
the figure of a substance which has been so completely filled 
throughout that there are no interstices such as mark a 
divisible object ; you may take from it, as from a flame, and 
still it remains exactly as it was. 

We need not dwell further on the relation of the Spirit to 
man, or consider its bearing on prophecy, till we treat of the 
higher anthropology. Sufficient has been said to show that it 
is ontologically the same as the Logos, though in its higher 
sense it is used of the Logos only in connection with mankind. 
The latter term is generally preferred, and Gfrorer points out 
that Trvevfjia is adopted only where it occurs in the text of 
Scripture which is under discussion.* We may now pass on 
to a term of more immediate interest. 

Philo, still following the example of the Stoics, frequently 
speaks, not only of the Logos, but of Logoi. A few instances 
of the use of the latter term will make it apparent that these 
Logoi are partial or limited expressions of the universal Logos. 
The Logos, we are told, is compared to a river, on account of 
the perennial flow of Logoi and ordinances, f by which God- 
loving souls are nourished. J So the high -priest, who is a 
recognized symbol of the Logos, is said to be " the father of 
sacred Logoi." || These figures represent with sufficient clear 
ness the logical dependence of the Logoi on the general prin 
ciple of Reason. This dependence is further exemplified by the 
occasional interchange of the singular and plural, the former 
exhibiting in its unity what the latter resolves into its parts. 
Thus the deeds of the wise man differ not from divine Logoi, 
because he walks in the steps of the Logos. If, it is argued, the 
Law is divine Reason, and the virtuous man keeps the Law, he 
keeps Reason also ; so that the Logoi of God are the actions of 
the wise man.T Here the Logos is used in its ethical relation. 

* I. p. 242. f Or opinions, Soypdruv. J Post. Cain., 37 (I. 250). 

See Migrat. Abr., 18 (I. 452) ; Prof. 20 (I. 562). || Somn., II. 28 (I. 683). 
t Migrat. Abr., 23 (I. 456). Cf. 31, p. 463. 



218 THE LOGOS. 

The entire life of the good man is controlled by Reason, but his 
particular acts correspond to special phases of that Reason, so 
that the Logoi become,, as it were, the special precepts of the 
one rational code which constitutes the law of nature. Hence 
the soul is nourished with unearthly and incorruptible Logoi, 
which God showers from that lofty and pure nature which he 
has called heaven,* the Logos pregnant with divine lights. f 
With this close relationship, they may well borrow a charac 
teristic epithet of the Logos, and be described as " the right 
words of wisdom."J They must share the same divine attri 
bute, and therefore, when they ascend and descend through 
the soul, they do not throw it down, but descend with it, out of 
humanity and compassion towards our race, " for neither God 
nor divine Reason is a cause of injury. " Like the Logos, 
they are not heard, but seen with the eye of the soul.|| Like 
it, too, they come to our knowledge before we rise to the 
highest apprehension of God. Abraham, the wise man, always 
desiring to understand the Sovereign of the universe, first 
converses with divine Logoi.^j" So also Jacob, when he came 
into Charran, sensible perception, met not God, but the divine 
Logos ; for- God, not disdaining to come into sensible percep 
tion,"^^ sends his own Logoi to assist the lovers of virtue ; and 
they heal the infirmities of the soul, laying down sacred 
admonitions as immovable laws. Accordingly, when he has 
entered into sensible perception, he meets no longer God, but 
the Logos of God. ft 

The above statements, while proving the subordination of 
the Logoi to universal Reason, direct our attention to another 
point, which will become more striking as we proceed. The 

* In allusion to Ex. xvi. 4, " I shower upon you loaves from heaven." 

t Leg. AIL, III. 56 (I. 119), and 34, p. 108. 

J Ol <ro0iac fipOoi Xoyoi, Somn., I. 34 (I. 651). See also Prof., 33 (I. 573), 
6pdol Kai rpo^ijuwraroi Xoyot. 

Somn. 23 (I. 643). |] Migrat. Abr. 9 (I. 443). f Post. Cain., 6 (I. 229). 

** Oy yap cnra^i&v 6 6tog tiQ alaOrjoiv tpxeaOat. The context, as well as 
Philo s prevailing view, seems to require d%iu>v instead of a 

ff Somn. I. 12 (I. 631). 



LOGOI. 219 

subdivisions of the Logos have hitherto been described as 
powers or ideas, and with these accordingly the Logoi must be 
identified. Philo, however, uses the latter term especially to 
denote the rational and ethical thoughts which present them 
selves in the mind, and serve to direct the life of man, and we 
can only appeal to a few passages in which the identity of the 
Logoi and the powers is immediately apparent. One is that 
which we last noticed, where converse with the sacred Logoi is 
attributed to the fact that God imparts mental representations, 
no longer of himself, but of the powers. A similar interchange 
takes place in the previous passage about Abraham : the 
divine Logoi, when referred to in their peculiar relation to 
God, become "the creative and punitive powers." Again, 
when the high-priest is described as the father of sacred Logoi, 
it is added that some of these are overseers and guardians of 
the affairs of nature, and others are ministers of God, desiring 
to kindle the heavenly flame. The former of these two classes 
must be the cosmical powers or ideas, the latter the ethical 
laws which present themselves in human consciousness.* As 
the overseers of nature they are equivalent to the " seminal 
Logoi" of the Stoics; and yet, for some reason, Philo never 
avails himself of this term. The only place where it occurs is 
in a speech which is put into the mouth of the Emperor Caius.f 
There is, however, at least one passage which proves that the 
notion expressed by it was not foreign to Philo s thought. In 
speaking of the creation of plants he says that 

" The fruits were not only food for animals, but were also preparations 
for the continual production of their like, containing the seminal sub 
stances in which exist, obscure and unseen, the Logoi of the universe, 
becoming, however, clear and manifest in the revolutions of seasons. 
For God intended nature to run the long race, immortalizing genera, and 
giving them a share of eternity. "J 

* For the reason why Philo gives this interpretation to the children of the 
high-priest, see Keferstein, p. 141 sqq. As it does not advance our philosophical 
doctrine, we need not dwell upon it. 

f Leg. ad Cai., 8 (II. 553). J Mundi Op., 13 (I. 9). 



220 THE LOGOS. 

The Logoi here must be the rational laws in accordance with 
which everything is evolved,, and of which the most striking 
exemplification is found in the seed ; or, in more logical phrase, 
they are the permanent essences which constitute genera. 
They are thus the precise equivalents of the powers or ideas. 
The comparison of natural processes to the long race refers to 
the way in which nature, as it were, doubles back upon its own 
course, and returns to its original position. The seed is at 
once the starting-point and the goal in the life of the plant, so 
that the same conditions are continually reproduced, and the 
permanence of .the type, idea, or Logos in each thing is 
secured. 

In one other passage the word Logoi seems to be used quite 
in the Stoical sense, if not indeed in express reference to the 
Stoics. Philo is speaking of different forms of error. 

Some denied the reality of immaterial ideas, and thereby virtually 
denied the existence of qualities. Others went farther, and along with 
ideas rejected the existence of God, declaring that he was only said to 
exist for the sake of benefiting men. A third class took exactly the 
opposite course, and, although pursuing atheism, nevertheless, owing to 
their reverence for that which seemed to be everywhere present and to 
survey all things, introduced a multitude of male and female, older and 
younger beings, filling the cosmos with a polyarchy of Logoi, in order 
to cut away the belief in the one really existing God from the under 
standing of men.* 

The parallelism which is here expressed between the ideas 
or their resulting qualities and the Logoi determines the 
meaning of the latter : they are the rational principles which, 
dwelling within material objects, make them what they are ; 
and Philo s objection is not to the philosophical assertion 
of their existence, but to their elevation into independent, 
personal powers which superseded in men s worship the one 
only God. 

In other passages where the Logoi are brought into con 
nection with the theory of ideas they describe, not cosmical, 

* Sacrificant., 13 (II. 261-2). 



LOGOI. 221 

but human relations. " The wise man .... dwells as in a 
native land, in intelligible virtues, which God speaks, not 
differing from divine Logoi."* The Logoi here must be the 
uttered thoughts, or divinely expressed ideals of virtue, in 
which the good are able to participate. These, of course, are 
species of the one supreme virtue or Reason, and hence the 
number of specific virtues corresponds with that of the Logoi. 
This notion is worked out in an allegorical interpretation of a 
passage in Deuteronomy : t 

" Ask thy father, and he will report to thee, thy elders, and they will 
tell thee ; when the Most High divided the nations, when he distributed 
the sons of Adam, he set boundaries of the nations according to the 
number of the angels of God, J and his people Jacob became the portion 
of the Lord, Israel the allotment of his inheritance." Father and elders 
cannot be meant literally, for they know no more than ourselves about 
the division of the nations. Therefore the reference must be to right 
Reason, the father of our soul, and to the divine Logoi, our elders, which 
were before everything earthly. It was these that first fixed the 
boundaries of virtue, and to these we must go for the necessary infor 
mation. When God apportioned and walled off the nations of the soul, 
he made the boundaries of the offspring of virtue equal in number to the 
angels ; " for as many as are the Logoi of God, so many are the nations 
and species of virtue." The specific virtues belong to the servants, but 
Israel, the chosen genus, to the sovereign. 

The relation of the Logoi to angels will be considered farther 
on; at present we only notice their identification with the 
divine ethical ideas of which the several species of virtue 
among men are the counterparts. 

As the Logos is the rational law of the universe, so the 
Logoi, considered as ethical ideas, are the laws, precepts, or 
admonitions by which the soul ought to be governed. The 
term is used in this sense very frequently ; but as the passages 
throw no important light on Philo s philosophy, it will be 
sufficient to cite a few by way of example, and content our 
selves with a bare reference to the remainder. The divine 
Logoi are the manna, the heavenly food, by which men may be 

* Conf. Ling., 17 (I. 417). t xxxii. 7-9. 

I According to the LXX reading. Post. Cain., 25-6 (I. 241-2). 



222 THE LOGOS. 

nourished,* "the immortal words of science and wisdom."-{- 
"In regard to justice and every virtue there is an ancestral 
law and ancient ordinance. But what else are laws and 
ordinances than nature s sacred Logoi, possessing firmness and 
fixity of themselves , so as not to differ from oaths ? "% Hence, 
the promise made to Abraham assumed the character of an 
oath, for (C the Logoi of God are oaths and laws of God and 
most sacred ordinances/^ In this sense the term is strictly 
applicable to the Ten Commandments. These were Logoi, not 
only in the ordinary sense according to which all rational 
statements are Logoi, but as the immediate expression of 
divine ideas, " the ten generic laws,"|| or " generic summaries^ 
roots and principles, of the countless individual ]aws/^[ spoken 
by God with that mysterious voice which, unlike the human, 
pierces with subtle swiftness the ears of the inspired under 
standing.** 

The only remaining question affecting the Logoi is involved 
in the one which we have reserved in regard to the supreme- 
Logos, namely, whether Philo regarded the latter as a distinct 
person. This question is not raised by the philosopher 
himself, and it may be that his conception of personality was 
not very strictly defined. Zeller s cautionff against judging of 
this matter from the postulates of our modern thought is- 

* Congr. erud. gr., 30 (I. 544). f Migrat, Abr. 14 (I. 448). 

} Spec. Leg., II. 4 (II. 272). 

Leg. All., III. 72 (I. 127-8). See also Leg. All., III. 4 (I. 90) ; SS. Ab. et 
Cain., 38 (1. 189) ; Conf. Ling., 13 (I. 413-14) ; Somn., I. 34 (I. 650-1) ; Dec. Orac.,. 
3 (II. 182); Praem. et Poen., 14 (II. 421) ; cf. Prof., 25 (I. 566), where the bread 
from heaven, the prjpa, is equivalent to rj Qtia avvra^iQ. 

|| Quis. rer. div. her., 35 (I. 496). IF Congr. erud. gr., 21 (I. 536). 

** Dec. Orac., 9 (II. 185-6). See also 29, p. 205 ; 33, p. 208 ; De Circurri- 
cisione, 1 (II. 210) ; Mutat. Norn., 3 (I. 582). 

ff III. ii. p. 378 sq. Zeller himself, I cannot but think, falls to some extent 
under his own rule. He says that people assume either that Philo s Logos is a 
person outside of God, or that he is only God under a definite relation. His 
own solution is that " according to Philo s view he is both, but for this very 
reason neither exclusively." Zeller thus admits that there is no other alterna 
tive, and so imposes upon Philo a contradiction of the most glaring kind. 
According to the exposition which we have given* the modern alternative may 



PERSONALITY. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 223 

perfectly just; and if we find that Philo habitually united 
notions which to our minds are totally incompatible, we must 
only endeavour to escape from our own sharpness of definition 
into his cloudy and vague speculation. Nevertheless we ought 
not to thrust this inconsistency upon him unless we are 
constrained to do so by a faithful exegesis. In this exegesis 
we have only to estimate the value of single passages and 
single expressions, and are not driven by the demands of 
the philosophy itself now to volatilize the Logos into a divine 
attribute and again to condense it into a person standing 
between God and man. In this our position differs from 
Zeller s. According to him the confused changes of meaning- 
belong to the very essence of the philosophy, and he is 
therefore less ready to admit the plea of poetical personifi 
cation in particular instances. But according to our view the 
separate personality of the Logos would be a purely disturbing 
element, and introduce a quite needless perplexity into an 
otherwise coherent system, and therefore we shall be inclined 
to make a large allowance for Philo s bold and figurative 
style. 

"When the same question came before us in connection with 
the divine powers, we noticed Philo s extreme fondness for 
personification, and we must bear in mind the instances which 
were then adduced. We may add here a few examples of the 
personification of the Logos, or, if it be thought by any that 
it is really regarded as a person, of the ascription to it of a 
clearly figurative kind of personality. The fool, it is said, 
casts off " the charioteer and umpire Reason," while a man of 
the opposite character chooses ft divine Reason as his pilot." 
That these expressions are metaphorical is evident, and that 

be dismissed. The Thought of God permanently impressed upon the universe 
cannot be properly described as God under a definite relation any more than the 
shape of York Minster can be described as the architect who conceived it ; but 
neither is it a person outside of God, or even possessed of any abiding reality 
apart from God. This is neither a modern conception nor an illogical mixture 
of two modern conceptions. 



224 THE LOGOS. 

no conception of real personality was attached to them by 
Philo may be inferred from his presently substituting for 
Logos the rational part of the soul " and " rational 
nature. "* In another passage the Logos is symbolized by 
the river which " makes glad the city of God/ f the soul of 
the wise man, in which God is said to walk as in a city, for 
Scripture says, " I will walk in you and will be God in you." J 
" And for a blessed soul holding forth the most sacred goblet, 
its own reflection, who is it that pours the sacred measuring- 
cups of true good-cheer except Reason, the cupbearer and 
toastmaster of God ? Though it differs not from the drink, but 
is itself unmixed in brightness, .... the ambrosial potion 
of good-cheer, that we ourselves, too, may make use of poetical 
terms. " \\ The succession of metaphors here is alone sufficient 
to show how remote is the idea of real personality, though it 
of course does not exclude it. Again, "the moderator 
Reason,"^]" arming itself with the virtues and their ordinances, 
attacks and mightily vanquishes the nine arbitrary govern 
ments of the four passions and the five senses.** Elsewhere 
we learn that " the right Reason of nature has the power at 
once of a father and of a husband ; " and this statement is 
exemplified by its relations to the soul, in which, among other 
things, it appears as a fe physician."tt By another figure " the 
right Reason of nature" becomes "a military officer," JJ in 
whose ranks the good man ought to be enrolled. Even the 
logos or speech of man does not escape from Philo s tend 
ency to personify : it is not only the defensive armour and 
panoply of men, but their " spear-bearer " and " champion." |||| 
This fondness for personification was strengthened by the 

* Migrat. Abr., 12 (I. 446). f Ps. xlv. 4 ; LXX. 

J Lev. xxvi. 12. Philo reads Iv vfjiiv Btos, instead of vfitiv QZOQ. 

Aoyr/idff. || Somn., II. 37 (I. 691). 

1F Tov auxppoviffrrjv Xoyov. ** Abr., 41 (II. 35). 

ft Spec. Leg., II. 7 (II. 275). { 
Human., 17 (II. 396). 

7r t ooayam<Tr//. Sonin., I. 17 (I. 636). 



PERSONALITY : INFLUENCE OF ALLEGORY. 225 

system of allegorical interpretation. The persons of Old 
Testament history become the symbols of abstract qualities, 
and consequently the allegory is frequently responsible for the 
ascription of personal attributes to the general idea. The 
Logos comes in for its share of this treatment. Abraham is 
first the representative of " the wise man/ and then, by a 
further abstraction, of the distinctive quality of the wise man, 
" divine Keason/ the parent of laughter and joy, for this is the 
signification of Isaac. A little farther on in the same passage 
it is said that, (t The Lord begat Isaac." This is the explana 
tion of the words " The Lord made laughter for me."* If we 
require a rigid consistency, the Logos thus becomes identical 
with the Lord, but it is very doubtful whether this is intended. 
" The Lord," in a subordinate sense, stands everywhere else 
for another power than the Logos, and therefore I believe it is 
here used in its highest meaning. What proceeds from the 
Logos proceeds from God, " the Father of the perfect nature. 1 " 
But if we decide that the Logos is the "Lord," this identifica 
tion results from the language of Scripture, and can no more 
prove the personality of the Logos than its previous identi 
fication with Abraham. f 

Again, Melchizedek, the righteous king " of peace, or 
Salem, gives injunctions by which men may have a good 
voyage through life, " being steered by the good artificer and 
pilot/ who is "right Eeason." Melchizedek also brings 
forward wine, and gives drink to souls ; " for Eeason is a priest, 
having the Self-existent as his portion, and entertaining high 
and sublime and magnificent thoughts about him," for this is 
the meaning of the statement that " he is a priest of the most 
high God/ J To entertain thoughts is a characteristic of per 
sonality ; but it is evident that the personality here is intro 
duced to suit the statement about Melchizedek. Nevertheless, 
the ascription of thoughts to the Logos must have some sort 

* Gen. xxi. 6. t Leg. All., III. 77 (I. 130-1). 

{ Gen. xiv. 18; Leg. All., III. 25-6 (I. 102-3). 

VOL II. 15 



226 THE LOGOS. 

of justification in experience, and a consideration of this may 
throw a clearer light upon our subject. The Logos is known 
to consciousness as the very essence of our personality ; it is 
by participation in reason that we are persons, and not merely 
animals or things. Our sublime thoughts about God are 
expressions of this reason ; and wherever right reason holds 
sway among men, there elevated thoughts about God arise. It 
is, I think, on this ground that Philo declares that " God has 
given to his Logos the knowledge of himself as a native land 
to dwell in/ * The Logos, in the connection where these 
words occur, stands in opposition to him who has committed 
involuntary manslaughter, and must therefore be viewed in 
relation to its function in the human mind. The meaning 
seems to be that whereas a man who has involuntarily com 
mitted a crime, owing to the absence of reason,t can attain to 
the knowledge of God only as an alien flies to a refuge, reason 
apprehends God by virtue of its birthright, and lives in this 
superior knowledge as in its native clime. Such are the facts 
of experience on which Philo might justly rest many state 
ments similar to that which we are considering. But though 
the Logos assumed personality the moment it appeared in finite 
individual minds, it does not at all follow that the abstract idea 
was conceived of as a person. A pantheistic philosophy can 
represent God as impersonal, and yet as evolved into personality 
at the various centres of finite consciousness. This mode of 
conception would suit all that we have hitherto learned of 
Philo s doctrine of the Logos. Philo, however, avoided pan 
theism by his belief that God was transcendent above the 
Logos. From the depths of the divine personality flowed forth 
the rational energy which pervaded creation, and in this its 
universal form it had no personality distinct from that of God ; 
but as it passed on and took possession of finite minds, per 
sonality once more appeared. Thus we meet with consciousness 
both at the upper and the lower ends, and the Logos is not a 
* Prof., 14 (I. 557). t See 21, p. 563. 



PEBSONALITY: INFLUENCE OP ALLEGOKY. 227 

person, but rather an essence of personality derived from God 
and communicated to man, and constituting the intermediate 
link of energy by which the infinite person imparts himself to 
his finite children. This explanation fully satisfies the passage 
which we are considering ; and, if it is not disproved by other 
passages, it will go far towards reconciling the apparent incon 
sistencies of language by which interpreters of Philo are so 
much perplexed. 

Another representative of the Logos is Moses. He, like 
Melchizedek, stands for the Logos, not in its cosmical aspects, 
but as the common reason of mankind, that higher principle of 
personality by which we are brought into contact with divine 
thoughts and precepts. He is " the prophet Logos " which 
bids us remember the way by which the Lord God has led us."* 
In even less ambiguous phrase, he is " the purest mind,t the 
truly excellent/ inspired at once with legislative and prophetic 
functions, the genus of the Levitical tribe, the adherent of 
truth. J By such language the general properties of human 
reason are described, and it is evident that we are moving 
in the region of abstract ideas. This is still more apparent 
when we find that Aaron represents the uttered Logos, the 
faculty of speech in man, which Moses, the mind or under 
standing, uses as his interpreter. "Moses, the prophetic 
Logos, says, When I go forth from the city/ the soul for this 
is the city of the animal, giving laws and customs I will 
spread out my hands *|| and spread forth and unfold all my 
actions to God, calling him as witness and overseer of each. " 
Now, all the disturbing voices of the senses cease " when the 
understanding has gone forth from the city of the soul, and 
attached its actions and purposes to God/ And the hands of 
Moses are heavy, ^f because the actions of the wise man are 
difficult to move or shake, for they are supported by Aaron, the 

* Congr. erud.gr., 30 (I. 543). f O KaQa^raroQ rove. 

Ib. 24, p. 538. Migrat. Abr., 14 (I. 448). 

|| Ex. ix. 29. T Ex. xvii. 12. 

15 * 



228 THE LOGOS. 

Logos, and Or,* which is light, that is, truth. Hence Aaron, 
when he comes to an end, that is, is made perfect, goes up 
into Or, which is light,fforthe end of Logos [speech] is truth. J 
These instances sufficiently illustrate the strange blending 
of historical persons with the abstract properties of human 
reason and speech, which justly induces us to give a very wide 
latitude to Philo s use of personification. 

From individual men we come to a class. Ifc was the func 
tion of the priests to act for men in their divine relations, 
and therefore they naturally represented reason, the true priest 
of mankind, while the high-priest, who presided over them all, 
stood, not only for human reason, but for the universal, cos- 
mical Logos. In reference to the procedure enjoined upon the 
priest in matters of jealousy, || it is said that " the priest and 
prophet Eeason has been commanded to set the soul before 
God.-"^" That the high-priesthood signifies something higher 
than a human office is proved by an injunction connected with 
the cities of refuge. The involuntary slayer of a man was to 
remain in his retreat till the death of the high-priest.** This, 
says Philo, is a most unequal punishment, and therefore it 
cannot be intended literally. The high-priest is not a man, 
but divine Eeason, which arrays itself in the cosmos as a 
garment, and lives in the soul as a judge. So long as this 
most sacred Reason survives in the soul, no involuntary change 
can enter it ; but if it dies, in the sense of being separated from 
our soul, there is an immediate lapse into voluntary faults. -ft 
In another connection we have seen that the dress of the 
high-priest symbolized the several constituents of the universe. 
The high-priest himself is the Logos, the bearer of the powers. 



* "Qp in the LXX. f Num - xx - 25 - t Le S- A11 - IIL 14 > 15 ( L 95 6 ) 

For Moses, Qta^oBkry Xdyy, see Migrat. Abr., 5 (I. 440) ; and for Aaron, 
6 ycywvoc Xoyog TTpo(pijrev(t)v Siavoiy, one of al TOV f3ctat\eviv aiov vov 
Sopvfopoi Swdpfig, ib., 31, p. 462 ; also Leg. AIL, I. 24 (I. 59), compared with 
Leg. AIL, III. 33 (I. 108). 

|| Num. v. 15 sqq. ^ Cherub., 5 (I. 141). 

** Num. xxxv. 25. ft Prof., 20-1 (I. 561-3). 



PEESONALITY : INFLUENCE OF ALLEGORY. 229 

If, says Philo, you examine the high-priest Reason, you will 
find his raiment variously wrought out of both intelligible and 
perceptible powers. Two examples will suffice, taken from 
the two extremes, the head and the feet. On the head is a 
pure golden plate having the impression of a seal, " holiness 
to the Lord;" and on the feet, on the extremity of the under 
garment are bells and flowered work.* That seal is an idea of 
ideas, according to which God stamped the cosmos, and is of 
course incorporeal and intelligible; but the flowered work 
and the bells are symbols of perceptible qualities, of which 
seeing and hearing are the criteria.f We must notice here the 
want of consistency in the figure. The idea of ideas is, as we 
have learned, the Logos, and it is suitably represented by the 
seal with which intelligible qualities were stamped. But at 
the beginning of the comparison the high-priest himself is the 
Logos, and thus becomes identical with the seal which was 
impressed upon his golden plate. How evident it is that we 
are dealing with logical, and not with personal relations. The 
same universal thought or genus is at once the bearer and the 
seal of all more partial ideas, bearing them as its species and 
at the same time impressing them with its essence. We cannot 
be too careful in distinguishing the serious doctrines of Philo 
from the strange garb in which they are so often clothed. 

We need notice in this connection only one other passage 
where the cosmical and the human reason are distinguished. 
" There are two temples of God : one this cosmos, in which 
also is a high-priest, his first-begotten divine Reason ; and the 
second, rational soul, of which the priest is the true man, 
whose perceptible imitation is he who offers the ancestral 
prayers and sacrifices."! 

From this cloud-land of shifting and dissolving imagery, 
where no one, I presume, will maintain that the limits of 
poetical personification are trangressed, we pass to the more 

* LXX; Ex. xxviii. 30, 32. f Migrat. Abr., 18 (I. 452). 

} Somn., I. 37 (I. 653). See also Gig., 11 (I. 269). 



230 THE LOGOS. 

serious arguments for the personality of the Logos. Some of 
these we have anticipated in our own exposition of Philo s 
doctrine, where we have explained certain terms consistently 
with the general scheme of thought ; and in regard to them I 
need do little more than refer back to what has been already 
said. This is the case with the titles " God/ " Son of God," 
" Image of God." Laughter also is the son of God, and we 
can hardly suppose that Philo looked upon laughter as a 
person. Moreover, the variety under which the connection is 
conceived proves that we are dealing only with the figurative 
relations of thought. God is the husband of Wisdom, and 
yet Wisdom is the daughter of God, the mother of the Logos, 
and the father of instruction. 

More stress may be laid upon the fact that the Logos is 
the image of God and the archetype of man ; for, if the two 
extremes be persons, must not the connecting link also be a 
person ? This question demands a fuller consideration, and 
our reply to it will throw an instructive light upon our 
previous conclusions. No one, I suppose, ever believed that 
the number seven was a person, and yet that number is an 
image of God. Not only does this statement bring it into 
connection with the Logos, but our fullest information respect 
ing the essence of the Logos is found in its conformity to 
seven. It is, in fact, "the Logos of seven/ * "the holy 
Logos according to seven/ t c the perfect Logos moving* 
according to seven/ J Philo s treatment of the number 
seven, therefore, may be expected to illustrate his meaning 
when he speaks of the Logos. We must next observe 
that by an image need be meant no more than an intellec 
tual conception possessing a property similar to that which 
distinguishes the object of which it is the image. Thus, the 
number two is the image of matter, because, like matter, it 
is divisible. Two is no doubt selected rather than any higher 
number because it gives us the most elementary notion of 

* Mundi Op., 40 (I. 28). f Leg. All. I. 6 (I. 46). J Ib. 8, p. 47. 



PERSONALITY : IMAGE OF GOD. 231 

division. Three is the image of solid body, because the solid 
has three dimensions.* Seven is the image of God for the 
following reason. Among the numbers up to ten it alone 
neither produces nor is produced, that is to say, it is not 
formed from any other number by multiplication, nor is any 
other number formed by multiplication from it. It is, therefore, 
the motherless virgin, who is said to have sprung from the 
head of Zeus, and remains immovable, for all genesis consists 
in movement. But the elder Kuler and Sovereign alone neither 
moves nor is moved, and consequently seven would be properly 
called his image. f Let us see, then, how this image is im 
pressed upon creation. By the number seven "all things are 
brought to perfection." It has numerous " ideas " or 
relations connected with numbers, harmonies, and ratios, on 
which we need not dwell. " But its nature extends also to 
the whole visible substance, heaven and earth, the limits of 
the universe ; for what part of the things in the cosmos is not 
enamoured of seven, being subdued by the love and desire of 
seven ? " J This number is " the idea of the planets," as unity 
is of the fixed sphere. For the immaterial heaven, the pattern 
of the visible, consists of unity and seven ; and so the actual 
sky has been made out of indivisible and divisible nature. 
Of the indivisible, u unity is the overseer }) ; " seven is