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THE PHILOSOPHICAL
BASIS OF EDUCATION
By
HOLLAND MERRITT SHREVES,
PH.D., A.M., A.B.
Head 0/ the Department of Psychotngy
and Edutaiitm at the State Ifarmal
School. Kearney, Nebraska
BOSTON
RICHARD G. BADGER
THE GORHAM PRESS
.Hi.
COFyXIGBT, I918, BT RiCHABD G. BADGER
All Rights Reserved
ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO PUBLISHERS
I wish to express my indebtedness to several publishers for their per-
mission to use material published in whole or part in magazine form, bear-
ing the following titles:
Mid- West School Review, The Relations of Science to Life, March, 191 7.
The American Schoolmaster, The Field of Philosophy as seen by the
Educator, January, 191 7. Also, Relations Between Scientific and Philosophic
Method, February, 19 17.
School Science and Mathematics, Scope and Division of the Field of
Science, October, 191 7.
R. M. S.
• • 2 • ••
• • • • • •
• e • • » ■
• • • •
270562
e
Made in the United States of America
The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A*
TO THE LATE
JOSIAH ROYCE
Whose profound insight into the reality of life has constantly
inspired the author of this book to renew his interpretation
of human experience, this book is affectionately dedicated.
PREFACE
My only reason for writing a volume under the title of this
one is the fact that the present status of things in education
seems to me to demand a further clarification of our educa-
tional thought and practice. If we were all thinking clearly,
and getting the most efficient results possible, there would be no
need of adding another to the present stock of books.
It is my belief, however, that clearer thinking is possible,
based on the already accumulated experience of mankind. It
would be possible to gain much better results and do it more
easily, effectively, and with greater pleasure, if we would util-
ize the amazing power that comes from clear thinking. Now
clear thinking is not a secret and mysterious power given
to few and withheld from the many, but it is a power each
person may possess and make use of in his own experience.
This clearness of thought comes from our ability to utilize
to the best advantage our past experience. To do this, we are
obliged to make use of our powers of reflection in order to
determine the real nature and meaning of our experience. It
means little to have experience, but it means much to see by
the light of reflection what this experience means for life as
a whole. The significance of our experience does not float on
the surface, but it takes an experienced diver to bring it up
from the depths and mire of isolated and fragmentary bits
of human experience. There are experienced divers of pearls
and other precious materials, and so there are those experienced
in bringing to the light of clear thought the true significance
of human experience.
It is in the field of educational thought, as well as in other
departments of human knowledge, such as business, religion,
domestic and social life, that we are in great need of clear
thinking. Clear thinking will lead to more definite and exact
methods of habit formation and action. Clear thinking can be
induced only through persistent habits of reflection on the data
Preface
^^B of our experience. It takes insight to develop foresight. We
^f need more penetration and concentration if we would reach
the deeper meaning of our human experience. The meaning
and significance of our experience do not rise to the surface
like cream to be skimmed off with the crude instrumentality
of common sense. Rather it takes the pulling power of reflec-
tive thought, of analysis, synthesis, comparison and the like,
to bring out this deeper meaning.
It will be the object of this volume to aid as much as its
author is able to a clearing up of the thought process, in its
relation to the data of our educational experience. It should
aid in showing the need for guiding principles and reflective
analysis in the field of education. In short it should assist the
reader to see the necessity of developing a more systematic and
thoughtful way of approach to the great problems of educa-
tion. If it does this much it will contribute toward the de-
velopment of a philosophy of education.
The point of view here adopted is that of the idealist and
it reflects the voluntaristic tendency in idealism, rather than
the intellectualistic. The emphasis is rather on action than
on knowledge, and yet the two points of view arc here insep-
arably connected.
It will be noted that knowledge is essential to properly di-
rected activity, and that activity is essential to the best under-
standing. Knowing and doing are the two aspects of the same
psychophysical process and our deeper philosophical reflection
will rather tend to confirm this fact than to deny it.
The original manuscript of this book has been rewritten and
revised with the idea of making it a suitable text-book for col-
lege and normal school courses in the Philosophy of Education,
or the Theory of Education. It ought also serve a valuable
purpose as a reference book in courses in Philosofihy, Education
and Science.
It would be rather a hopeless task to attempt here any ade-
quate acknowledgment of the sources of help and inspiration
I have received along the line of the subject here under treat-
ment. My more enlightened conscience and my sense of loy-
alty to loyalty, as well as my hope of a larger self-realization,
I urge upon me the mention of a few names at least. I could
i not fail to mention Professor Josiah Royce, whose wonderful
n
I
Preface
.power of penetration helped to lead me into a field of larger
truth and reality. Nor should 1 fail to mention Professor George
Herbert Palmer, who made life's ideals a matter of serious con-
sequence to me. I have come through his teachings to regard
man's highest calling and duty that of pursuing worthy and
noble ideals. Ideals are not realizable unless we know the
means of realizing them. And just here the wonderful world
of psychology was opened up to me by that eminent psycholo-
gist, Professor Hugo Miinsterberg.
I owe much to other teachers and to scores of authors but
I cannot mention them here, and I sincerely hope that the writ-
ing of this volume will not cast discredit on those whose names
I have mentioned. The book that has meant more to me than
any other 1 have ever read is Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty.
I am indebted to my wife, Anna E. Shreves, for her patient
labor on both the Index of Names and the Index of Subjects and
for other helps with the manuscript.
If there is anything in this volume that will contribute to
higher, nobler, and deeper thinking in regard to our educa-
tional experience, I shall feel that my labor has not been spent
in vain.
R. M. Shreves.
jKearney, Nebraska
December i, 1917.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
Introduction 7
1 The Aim of This Volume 17
2 The Point of View Here Taken 17
3 The Need of Such a Work 18
4 The Plan of Treatment 23
BOOK I. THE AIMS, SCOPE. AND METHODS OF SCIENCE
I The Aims of Science 27
1 Science as Observation of Facts 27
2 Science as Correlation and Classification of Facts . . 28
3 Science as Description of Facts 29
4 Science as Explanation of Facts 29
5 Science as Generalization and Law 30
6 Science as Application- Applied Knowledge 31
7 The Aim of Science Stated in Full 32
8 The World of Science as the World of Description and Ex-
planation 32
9 The World of Description vs. The World of Appreciation . . 33
10 Summary of the Aims of Science 34
n The Scope, or Field of Science . 35
1 The Phenomenal World of Time and Space 35
2 The Special Fields of Science 35
3 The Physical Sciences and Chemistry, Physics, Geology, etc. . 36
4 The Biological Sciences — Botany, Zoology, and Physiology 36
5 The Science of Psychology 36
6 The Social Sciences — ^History and Sociology 37
7 The Abstract Sciences of Relations — Mathematics and Logic . 38
8 The Normative and Descriptive Sciences 38
9 Summary of the Scope of Science 39
III The Methods of Science 40
1 Observation, Classification, Description and Explanation as
Stages of Developments Rather than Methods of Science . 40
2 Analysis and S3rnthesis as Methods 40
3 Induction and Deduction as Methods 41
4 Experimental Method 42
5 The MeUiod of Introspection 43
6 Balance of Methods 44
7 Summary of the Methods of Science 44
zi
xU Contents
T
^^M CBAPTEK FAOK
^^H IV The Relations of Science to Life 4S
^^H I The Age of Science 45
^^H 1 Science and the Life of Reason 46
^^M 3 Sciente Gives Increased Facilities for Life but Does not Give
^^H Its Meaning 47
^^P 4 We Must Turn Co Philosophy for the Meaning of Life . . . 4S
^^F 5 Genera] Summary of the Aims, Scope. Methods, and Relations
of Science 4B
I PART 11. THE AIMS. SCOPE AND METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY
I Thf. Aims of Philosophy 53
1 The World of Description and the World of Appreciation . . 53
3 Philosophy, the Viewof the WboIeofLife: Science, of aPart . 54
3 The Aim of Philosophy 55
4 Philosophy as Appreciation 57
5 Summary of the Aims of Philosophy 5g
II The Scope or Field of Phiixjsophy 61
I Psychology and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted 61
a Data of Philosophy the Whole of Human Experience . . . 6j
3 Philosophy Always Views Experience from Normative Aspect 63
4 Philosophy Includes Several Special Viewpoints 64
5 Metaphysics as the Science of Reality 65
6 Epistemology as the Science of Knowledge 66
7 Logic as the Science of Correct Thinking 67
3 Ethics as the Science of Right Conduct 6S
g Aesthetics as the Science of the Beautiful 6g
10 Philosophy of Religion 69
11 Our Chief Concern is with Ethics 69
I a Summary of the Scope of Philosophy 69
in The Methods of Philosophy 71
I General Methods of Philosofjhy not Unlike Those of Science . 71
3 Philosophy Requires Reflection 72
3 Value of Reflection 74
4 Summary of the Methods of Philosophy 75
IV The Relations of Pinxosopav to Life 76
1 The Age in Which Philosophy Arises 76
2 Philosophy and the Life of Reason 77
3 Philosophy and the Meaning and Value of Life 78
4 General Summary jg
riENCE AND Philosophy Compared and Contrasted . . .
Aims of Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted
Scope of Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted ,
Methods of Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted
Description and Interpretation the Two Aspects of Reality .
CHAPTES
II Generai Summary and Conclusions or the First Three Parts
I Summary of the Relations of Science and Philosophy
Relations of the First Three Parts to Pari IV .....
[ PART IV. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION
The Philosophical Aspects of Education qj ■
Relations of Philosophy and Life 93
The Philosophy of Education as the Meaning and Value of
Education 93
Educational Experience 94
Various Philosophical Aspects , , 95
I H The Metaphysical Aspect of EbocAnoN 96
1 MeUphysies an Effort to Think Clearly 96
3 Eveiy One Has a. Metaphysics of Some Sort 96
3 Metaphysics as a Criticism of the Principles of Science 97
4 Metaphy^cs the Science of Sciences 97
5 Metaphysics a Search for First Principles 98
6 Metaphysics the Science of Reality 99^
7 Appearance and Reality 100
8 The Cardinal Principle of Voluntaristic Idealism: Reality the
Absolute Will or Purpose toi
9 The Problem of One and the Many: Fact and Purpose . 102
:o The Problem of Time and Space 103
:i The Relation of Mind and Matter 103
2 The Problem of the Infinite 103
.3 The Problem of Self or Personality 104
.4 God, Immortality, andthe Soul 104
5 Summary 104
.6 Educational Implications of Metaphysics 106
The Epistemological Aspects op Education . .
1 How Can One Thing Know Another? iolt,J
2 Relation of Epistemology and Metaphysics ioSj|
3 Relation of Epistemology and Psychology '^^VM
4 The Central Problem of Epistemology ....
5 Knowledge as a Search for the Uoivereal .... _
6 Scepticism as the Denial of the Universal i'5V
7 Kant to the Rescue of Knowledge 114 ¥
8 Naturalism and Positivism
9 Realism as a Theory of Knowledge
Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge ....
1 Empiricism and Rationalism
3 Intuitionism and Mysticism
3 Idealism as a Theory of Knowledge
4 Summary
5 Educational Implications of Epistemology
fJV Tke Logical Aspects OF Educational Theory 137 1
Definition and Meaning of Logic 1 17 j
The Data of Logic 118 J
'AD&^^^^I
88^H
80 ^^
ON 1
Contents
CHAKXS CMiK
3 Logic and Common Sense iiS
4 Logic and the Descriptive Scieoces 129
5 Logic and Psychology 131
6 Logic and Metaphysics 131
7 Logic and Epistemology 13a
8 Systems of Logic 133
General Methods of Logic 134
The Problems of Logic 135
The Logic of Mysticism 137
The Logic of Pragmatism 137
The Logic of Idealism 138
Summary 139
The Educational Implications of Logic 140
Educahonai lupucAiTONs o? the Philosopky or Religion 143
I The Definition of the Philosophy of Religion 143
1 Philosophy of Religion and Common Sense 144
3 Philosophy of Religion and Science 145
4 Philosophy of Religion and Metaphysics 146
5 Philosophy of Religion and Epistemology 147
6 Philosophy of Religion and Logic 148
7 Philosophy of Religion and Ethics 148
8 Philosophies of Religion 140
9 The Religion of Platonism 145
10 The Religion of Neoplatonism 130
11 The Religion of Epicureanism 151
13 The Religion of Stoicism 15J
13 The Religion of Positivism, Naturalism, and Materialism . 153
14 The Religion of Mysticism tS4
15 The Religion of Pragmatism 155
16 The Religion of Idealism 156
.58
Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion
VI The Aesthehc Aspects of Ediicationai. Theory .... 160
1 Meaning and Definition of Aesthetics 1 5o
2 The Relation of Common Sense and Aesthetics i6i
3 The Psychology versus the Philosophy of Art 161
4 The Ideal of Art 164
5 The Standards or Criteria of Art 165
6 The Relation of Metaphysics and Aesthetics 167
7 The Relation of Logic and Aesthetics 168
8 The Relation of Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics . 169
9 The Relation of Ethics and Aesthetics
10 The Problems of Aesthetics
11 The Different Theories of Act
13 The Aesthetics of Idealism
13 Summary
14 The Educational Implication of Aesthetics ....
Cttntentt
CSAPTXR PAGK^
Vn Tke Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory . . .
I The Meaning and De&nitioQ of Ethics
13 Ethics and Common Sense
3 Ethics as a Science _
4 The Relation of Metaphysics and Ethics tii'm
S The Relation of Epistemology and Ethics i8l I
6 The Relation of Ethics and Logic 183 1
7 The Relation of Ethics and Rehgion *
8 The Relation of Ethics and Aesthetics
9 The Problems of Ethics iSJl
10 Systems of Ethics "
II The Ethics of Hedonism
I II The Ethics of Stoidsm ^^tM
13 The Ethics of Platonism "
14 The Ethics of Naturalism
15 The Ethics of Pragraatiam ' , . .
t6 The Ethics of Idealism iQ^fl
17 Summary igr J
iS Educational Implications of Ethics [()3>3
IVm Retrospbci and Prospect
[ I The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Life
9 The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Educational Theory
3 The Special Philosophical Aspects of Educational Theory . .
PART V. EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATION OF THE ETHICS OF ■
IDEALISM
I Etsics as tbe Search pos the Highest Good ....
I Pre-Soeratic Philosophy
i Post-Socratic Philosophy lOt'M
3 The Meaning and Value of Experience
4 Facts and Purposes in Lite _
5 The Descriptive and Normative Aspects 304 I
6 The Ideal Values of Life 205 '
7 The Good as Will or Purpose . . . _ 207
S The Individual and Social Aspects of this Aim lag
g Self-Real iiation as the Ultimate Goal
10 The Reality of the Idea!
11 The Concept of Loyalty
II Summary
II Ams AM) Means in Eddcaiton
1 The Aim of Life and the Aim of Education ._ , ii?!
2 The Conflict m Modern Pedagogy . . - ...
3 Education aa a Normative Saence
t Education as a Descriptive Science
Aims and Means of Education
The Function of Supervision
Summary
ContenU
I CB AFTER piua-:!
\ ni The Am of Education as S elf-Re auzation 219 J
The Ideal Values of Education: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and
Religion
The Unity of the Ideal Values 229 I
The Personal Factor in the Educative Process 330 1
Self-Realization as the All-Comprehensive Educational Ideal 231' I
The Individual and Social Views of Education Reconciled . "
Summary .--.,,--,-,...,
I IV The Relation of This Ideal to Eddcational PRAcncE . . liiM
The Relation of Theory and Practice '3* J
Educational Theory as an Explanation oE Educational En-
The Actual and the Ideal as Part and Whole of Experience
The Value of a Life Ideal a^sl
The Meaninj! of Character and Personality 247 |
Individual Dificrences 24S 1
Self-Activity, Self-Responsibility, and Self-Reallzation .
Education and a Plan of Life
The Vocational and Cultural Ideals Reconciled 253 J
Summary ,, - ^ ,,-.,,, ,
The Teacher and the REaiATiON 258 1
The Teacher as a Factor in the Educational Process
The Recitation as a Factor [n the Educational Process .
Education through Directed Spontaneous Activity . .
Impression and ExpresMon
The Doctrine of Interest and Apperception z^Sfl
The Problem of Discipline " "
Connected Thought and Class Method . . .
Organization of Interests
The Unity of Personality through Self- Real Im. lion
Summary
\ VI Conclusion
Summary 272
Educational Readjustment 273
Philosophy and Science as a Basis for EMucationa) Theory and
Practice 273
Educational Guidance 374 '
5 Organization and Efficiency 274
6 The Schools of To-morrow 275
BiBUOOKAPBV 277
Index 285
INTRODUCTION
I The Aim of This Volume, The specific Aim of this
Volume as the title implies is to trace the educational impli-
cations of Voluntaristic Ethics. It is not meaningless to ask,
What is the significance of Ethics for Education ? What is the
Ethical Aspect of education? Especially these questions have
meaning if we start out on this journey of thought with the
metaphysical assumption of the unity of knowledge. We have
not time, nor is this the place, to trace the metaphysical or
cpistemological implications of this assumption. We shall,
however, set out with this assumption as part of our equipment.
As we journey along we hope to point out the reasonableness of
this assumption but our great task is to show what ethics has
to do with education.
^2 The Point of View Here Taken. In showing the re-
lations of ethics and education, or the educational implications
of ethics, two alternative methods of treatment are possible.
The historical method might be adopted and the several ethical
systems shown up in their relation to education. Again the
philosophical view might be taken and the underlying meaning
of these relations might be traced in their deeper significance.
The latter is the point of view here adopted. It will be my
aim to follow up the fundamental principles of ethical theory
and show the educational implications of these.
It has already been stated that my point of view is all the
way through that of voluntaristic idealism. Thus the work is
ethical rather than pedagogical, yet it is intended by showing
the meaning of the leading Ethical principles of idealism for
education to be of value in a pedagogical way. As it has been
briefly stated the object is to contribute to clearer thought in
education, and this is to be brought about by the observance of
(■ certain ethical principles, as well as by the use of more scien-
■ tific methods in education.
I
18 Introduction
3 The Need of Such a Work. There is a sad lack of
adherence to well thought out ethical principles in education.
We have scarcely taken time to look within our Education
to see what it is all about. Wc are still like children and pay
more attention to things that move about us than to the laws
and principles that govern our nature. Perhaps wc should not
be too harsh for it is only an evidence of our immaturity. But
individuals grow older and so do nations, and when we reach
the period that the reflection and insight begin to develop, wc
should make use of these powers in promoting the welfare of
man and society.
This present age of ours is best characterized as the age of
industrialism and commercialism. It is the age of rapid de-
velopments along these lines, and progress here has been made
possible mainly through recent developments in the physical
sciences. This is an evidence of the objectivity of our individ-
ual and national mind.
We find the present age in which we live making strong
demands on us from without, and scarcely any pressure to
bring about the development of the inner man, except in so
far as this is the natural consequence of this progress in a
material way. Certainly this material progress has had great
value in giving expression to a larger life, but the life that is
developing is not always consciously assisted in its advance, but
rather follows as a natural and fortuitous consequence of the
larger social and economic sphere in which recent years find
us moving.
'' But the ethical life of man demands more conscious and
rational guidance than this. Not only must the sphere of
activity grow larger, but there must be conscious guidance
from man's moral nature within. There is a call from the
great within as well as a pressure of economic and social neces-
sity from without. We are in danger under the exaggerated
pressure of necessity to live too much in the present and to give
too little attention to the demands of a truly purposive life.
Stevenson must have had a similar thought when he said,
"And when the present is so exacting, who can annoy himself
about the future," and this exacting circumstance of external
necessity has continued to act for a long time. When man
loses sight of a higher goal he will seize a lower one. His
Introduction
19
inds a goal, a purpose. Progress of any kind de-
mands a goal toward which movement is directed. And our
goal will be low or high, worthy or unworthy, according to the
kind of persons we are. The best way to estimate a person
or a nation is to ohserve what ideals are pursued and the pull-
ing power these have on the life. All ideals have pulling
power, and they sometimes pull at cross purposes. 'J'hey should
rather point to an ultimate purpose in which they all unite in
a higher unity, a deeper meaning and reality.
Our ideals would, if they are what they should be, lead us
to love and be loyal to our fellows and their true purposes,
and this would be vastly better than to go out to battle against
them. The right ideals will lead men to unite against evil,
waste and inefficiency, but not to kill each other. The present
great war that threatens the entire world is a symptom of a
sadly diseased condition of man, I do not think this is an
indication that man has fallen from grace; rather it looks as if
he had never worked himself into very good favor with his
God yet.
There are many evidences besides war that suggest man's
inhumanity toward man and his undeveloped nature. Strife
and destructive competition in industry, the chasm between
labor and industry, capitalist and wage earner, are other
evidences and perhaps follow as a natural consequence upon
our exaggerated emphasis of the industrial and commercial
ideals of our age.
X, And yet we see constantly an undercurrent moving in a
diflrerent direction. This deeper view and its significance for
life is not always observed, \ Man must train his reflective
powers to see the deeper movements and tendencies in life as
well as to select the proper goal of life. Indeed this is the
only correct way to select his goal at all.
We could not afford to lose a single inch gained by indus-
trialism and the material progress of our age. We need all
that has been gained and much more. But we cannot gain al!
that is needed in our life by advancing along these lines, for
this only produces more wealth and leisure without greater
power of enjoying either. Under such a regime our wants
and desires develop much more rapidly than the truer and
higher self to which these instrumentalities should minister.
Introduction
There has been a rapid growtli Jn the demand for luxury
in this our industrial age, and it is not to be discredited so
long as we know what we are doing and keep the balance of
our ideals that the higher ethical life demands. While we
are noticing the trend in this direction there comes the cry that,
"In the face of a growing desire for luxury and ease, there
must be a conscious effort to cultivate thrift, simplicity, and a
more spiritual sense of values." (Trowbridge: The Home
School, p. 37.} And this demand is quite as urgent as that
for luxury. Let us keep our balance so far as possible and
welcome any suggestion that gives a better insight into the true
rrieaning and values of a higher life.
V It is the business of ethics to reveal the higher values and
purposes of life, it is the duty of man through his personal
efforts and through the agencies and various institutions of
society to strive to the uttermost to realize these ideals and
purposes. In this book we are directly concerned with the
true ethical aims and values of life, and with the demands thus
placed upon the schools as an agency in realizing these ideals
and purposes. But we well know that the degree in which we
can expect the schools to realize the higher purposes of life is
determined largely by the nature and effectiveness of this or-
ganization within itself. Unfortunately the American public
schools are not a well organized system. They have developed
piece-meal and there has been little effort to correlate the parts
into a well organized whole. Indeed it will take several dec-
ades to systematize our education. But happily there are evi-
dences of growth in the direction of better organization. And
there is room for considerable development yet. The unscien-
tific patch-work of our American education is well put in the
following quotations.
William T, Harris in his preface to Boone's Education in
the United States (p. 6) says: "States first establish col-
leges and universities and next free common elementary schools,
and afterwards gradually fill in intermediate links of the sys-
tem, and then add supplementary institutions." J. F, Brown in
his The American High School (p. j66) says much the same
thing in the following words: "Historically the American
schools have developed from above downward and from below ^^
^^ upward, meeting in the middle. It is difficult to see how the^^U
Introduction
evolution of American education could have been different frt
what it actually has been ; but the time has certainly come when
we should begin at the bottom and rebuild our public educa-
tional system to the top. The guiding factors in this impor-
tant work should be a sound psychology and a sound philosophy
considered from both the individual and the social point of
view. Philosophical and social ideals will help us to define the
aim of education, psychology will teach the steps by which- thai
aim can best he attained.; both will assist in determining the
Best~ecIucationa! content, that is, the curriculum." Now it
should be mentioned here that the seriousness of this crazy-quilt
style of American education becomes evident when we remem-
ber that it is the business of this institution to realize in the
fullest measure possible the greatest purposes and values of
life, in other words the highest or best life. Lest it be thought
that I have placed too large a burden on education I here quote
a passage from The School and Society Magazine (Vol. I, p.
37), which reads as follows:
"In our industrial, social, dvic, and religious democracy
everything waits on education. No real progress and no last-
ing improvement in any line of life is possible except through
the better education of the people. The deepest meaning of
democracy is equality of opportunity. This is impossible with-
out equality of opportunity for citizenship, and for productive
occupations. Therefore the right education of all the people
becomes our chief concern, and to provide better and more
adequate means thereto must be the most important task of
society and state. Among the agencies of education the public
school may, I believe, fairly be considered the most impor-
tant."
From the foregoing it ought to he evident that more clear
thinking is needed in order to eliminate the crudities of modern
education and malce our schools more effective instrumenB for
good in the hands of society. Our very first duty is to clear
up our minds as to what is our aim in education. Educational
aims are the very first consideration in education. Nothing
can be placed before aims, or ideals, in education, — or in any
other field of activity. It is interesting to note that Harring-
Iton Emerson insists vigorously on "Ideals" as the first of the j
"Twelve Principles" of industrial efficiency. Just so it i "
Introduction
education. It is time we were clearing our ideas as to the goal
or purpose of education. There are no short-cuts in settling
this matter. The task can never be settled except by clear
and deep thinking along ethical and general philosophical lines.
It is not thought that ethical reflection alone will solve all
the problems of education. It cannot. The aim of ethics is
less ambitious than that. It can only give a point of view, and
as R, L. Stevenson says, it is a point of view rather than points
of view that we are so much in need of to-day. But the battle
is half fought at least when we are clear as to the aim of
education.
When it comes to a matter of deciding what are the means or
methods to be used in education we are no longer concerned
with ethics, but must turn to the descriptive sciences such as
psychology', biology and sociology for help. But this distinction
between the function of ethics and the descriptive sciences is
not so evident that it can be passed by with a mere mention.
It will occupy much of our time in this book to make clear
this important distinction, a distinction without which no clear
thinking on educational problems is possible, and without which
progress is uncertain and unscientific. But we have had enough
uncertainty in education. Let us now use our best efforts to
avoid past blunders, rule-of-thumb and trial-and-error methods.
Can't we see yet that aims are the first consideration in educa-
tion and means and methods serviceable only when we know
what ends we want to accomplish? What would you think of
a tool maker who set about making a tool without the least idea
of the use it was to be put to? What shall we think of our-
selves if we continue to develop means and methods without
knowing what ends they are to serve? Or, may it not be that
we already know the ends but that we have not questioned the
value of these ends to see whether they fit into a larger system
of things? Perhaps they are working at cross purposes with
one another. In which case there is danger of friction and lost
motion, which means a reduction of efficiency. It stands to
reason that we should not become less efficient than we are.
It takes a certain amount of genius to overcome our inertia to
the extent of re-thinking and re-shaping our educational aims
and methods.
A
introducli'.,, 23 ]
The Plan of Treatment. In order fully to develop j
pthe point of view here taken it is thought best to divide the '
' hook into five parts, shov\ ing in each part a different point of
view from which we might regard education. In Part I we
discuss The Aims, Scope and Methods of Science, ending with
a chapter on the relations of science to life. In Part II, The
Aims, Scope and Methods of Philosophy will be discussed, con-
cluding with a chapter on the relations of philosophy to life.
In Part III, we enlarge our field hy showing The Relations
of Science and Philosophy, thus clearing the way finally for a
separation of the two points of views, scientific and philosophi-
cal, the descriptive and the normative, so that we may give
greater emphasis to the special problems set for us, that of
showing the educational implications of modern idealism. In
Part IV, we consider The Relations of Philosophy and Educa-
tion, and prepare the way for a transition to the special point
of view of the ethical philosopher. In Part V, we work out
some of the more fundamental relations of the ethics of mod-
ern idealism and education. In this part will
important implications of the ethics of voluntaristic idealism for
modern educational theory.
It is to be hoped that the reader will enjoy the journey with
me through the fields we are to travel, and that we shall each
be the better for having had the other's company. We first
enter the field of science and this that we may gradually and
with a clearer vision enter the deeper fields of inquiry to be
studied later.
PART I
The Aims, Scope, Methods, and Relations of Science
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
BASIS OF EDUCATION
THE AIMS OF SCIENCE ■. ,.
Science as Observation of Facts. What fs'.rfit
rscientist trying to do? What is he making so much fuss abOut.
now-a-days? Everybody hears about the scientist and about,-
science, and most of us have been forced to give car to him,".
but what is he trjing to do? What is his aim, purpose, or
goal? Does he have a work that no one else is to accomplish,
. or is he merely exaggerating his own importance?
I These are questions of moment, for everybody has been
' forced to listen and no« it is time we arc bting told what it is
all about. The scientist is on the alert to-day. He is ambi-
tious to do great things. Indeed he is so alert that there is
danger in thinking him either overivise or a fool. But wc
like energy and ambition when it does not interfere with our
personal prejudices or traditions of too long standing. The
scientist is gaining attention because he is really found to have
a message. We can look on every hand and see the wonders
of his works, but do we really understand what his aim is?
It might be said that in general he has two aims, theoretical
and practical, but this would not do full justice to him. Wc
want to know more in detail what he would accomplish in
life. Indeed the foregoing statement would likely be very
misleading, for generally the sciences have developed rather far
before any effort has been made to show their practical useful-
ness in solving the problems of life.
Science aims at a careful, descriptive, and explanatory ac-
27
■■ ■ I
I
I
28 The Philosophiral Bash of Ediicath
count of experience. Observation is the scientist's first task.
He must observe carefully, record and verify by repeated ob-
servation and experiment the data he collects. He gets all his
facts from the realm of hutnan experience, forcing none of it
in from another world foreign to our own. Science starts
with facts of experienic'e -and ends with a complete descriptive
and explanatory account of these. In the case of applied science
v/c go a step farther, and show how the laws and generaliza-
tions of science are'to he used in the solution of the problems
of life; in other. ivords, how these laws can be made useful in
modifying, flut" future, or in controlling our experience.
The facto)" of careful observation is so important that we
are scarcely liable to overestimate it. There are so many of
us who have eyes and see not, ears and h^ar not, brains and
miiid-. an^ think not. We are in need of greater observation
arti attention to the world about us, to the facts of our experi-
ence. We make our own world by attending to that which we
"-."will, or to that in which we are interested, says James, But
■-'so many of us will do little and are interested in such a small
way, that we really ought to be ashamed of the world we do
make. Closer observation, greater attention, and a habit of
recording and verifying our experience carefully would result
in making a more habitable world for most of us. Let him
who thinks otherwise try it consistently for a time and see the
new meaning that life takes on as a result.
2 Science as Correlation and Classification of
Facts. But it is not enough that we observe and record the
data of our experience, we must classify and correlate them as
well. Merely to observe and record is to lose sight of the
deeper likenesses, and to aid in making our world disconnected
and uninhabitable, even for the most religious of us. All unity
is lost in isolation of facts from one another. One fact does
not stand alone. In reality a fact of experience is rather an
arbitrary thing and amounts to a certain dependable unit of
experience. Of course there is a deeper meaning of a fact of
experience, the inner meaning of this fact or idea, but this is
not the stage of our inquiry to unearth metaphysical problems,
and especially since science has no stock in this kind of busi-
^t and especially since science has no stock in this kind of buai- , J|
pr „,.._„ :
^^K Facts are merely units of experience conceived as objective
^^Vsnd belonging to a time and space world. Xbey are in this
sense not metaphysical realities, whatever sort of reality wc
may decide to attribute to them. So disregarding metaphysical
difSculties we may here safely say, that for science a fact en-
tirely isolated from all other facts has no meaning or value,
and no existence.. Facts are significant only in so far as they
point to a larger unity, a wider scope of relation. Science, then,
must not only observe, but correlate and classify its facts on the
■ grounds of their likeness or similarity. It is only in this way
that facts may lead to generalizations, and laws.
3 Science as Description of Facts. The scientist must \
also describe his facts as well as observe, classify, and correlate
them. That is, he must make his facts understandable. They
must not be confused with others, but have a character of their
own. Facts have an identity for the scientist which is not lost
by being merged in the whole, hut they do gain greater signifi-
cance when so related. In description we do not go beyond the
pointing out of likenesses and differences between facts and
showing their relation to a larger group of facts.
4 Science as Explanation of Facts, Another aim of
science is to explain the facts. And this it does by showing
their relation not to other facts but to laws and principles,
which are based upon facts similar to the ones to be explained.
We mean nothing more by scientific explanation than that of
showing that this particular fact of experience falls under such
and such a law of experience already determined scientifically,
that is, through the procedure already described in this chap-
ter. Explanation is thus the process of showing how a frag-
ment, or element of our experience is related to a larger group
of experiences. In other words, by explanation we mean sim-
ply pointing out the general law under which a given fact of
experience falb. There is no attempt in this process of scien-
tific explanation to go beyond the actual time and space rela-
tionships in which, as elements of experience, they are found.
That is, there is no attempt on the part of the scientist to give
I the absolute meaning of experience, either in whole or in part.
He is satisfied to live and think in a world of time and space.
30 The PhUosaphieal Basis of Education
He does not even try, so long as he is true to his calling, to
transcend these temporal and spatial boundaries of the world
of fact. He is not concerned with the deeper meaning and
relation of facts in a world to which the philosopher ascribes
reality in a metaphysical sense. The world for the scientist
is the same time and space world as for common sense. But
of course there is nothing in the nature of things why a scien-
tist may not also take the view of common sense, or the philos-
opher coo, but he must be careful and not mix these points of
view, when he is trying to give a scientific account of the world.
The scientist works in both the mental and physical fields
and so has to explain how both sets of facts are related, each in
its own way. Whether the facts be material or mental, — -and
for science facts are both material and mental despite their
metaphysical unity in a larger system of realities,— they must
be explained. And explanation everywhere means pointing out
the relation between the particular and the general, the fact
and the law that throws light on it from above. Just now
there is started in my mind a new set of ideas aroused by that
ubiquitous and joy-bringing invention, the graphophone. This
is the mental fact. The explanation of this fact lies in point-
ing out how these ideas are related, or associated, and this is
done by pointing out the relation of the ideas themselves to
the physical processes which accompany them. The law here
in operation is that of psycho-physical parallelism, which points
out the larger relations between body and mind. Laws of lesser
generality are operative too, but my point here is to show
what is meant by explanation in a genera! way.
5 SciENCR AS Generaf.ization and Law. The highest
stage of purely theoretical science is reached when the facts are
so grouped and related as to lead to generalizations and laws,
or principles. Explanation assumes that the stage of laws
and principle formation has been reached. Often the law or
principle is assumed rather than proved to form a starting
point. In this case the generalization is called a postulate, or
an hypothesis, and must later be supported by fact before it
can stand as a law or principle. Sometimes the nature of the
hypothesis is such as to preclude the possibility of being sup-
ported on the basis of fact or evidence; in which case it is said
The Aims of Sch
31
fnot to be logically supported. In a metaphysical sense such
. 1 hypothesis would not be true or real, and ethically it would
the unjustified on the grounds that it did not accord with the
llfiature of goodness.
The fact of the certainty of the law is then a very important I
matter for the scientist. He must use all precaution in get-
' ting, classifying, and explaining his facts, and to this end his
generalizations and laws must be well founded on fact, and
constantly verified by experience, and always pliable so as to
admit of a wider statement of fact. A principle and a law
differ in that the law may be disproved by the fact, but the
principle does not stand in such a relation of dependence on
fact. The principle must accord with a larger system of
reality and to do so may often give evidence of contradiction
with fact.
It is not until the method of science became inductive that .
any very substantial progress in science was made possible.
■ But since Bacon's time this method has yielded many wonderful
results and many of them in the form of laws and principles.
6 Science as Application-Applied Knowledge. But
the greatest gain was not made when the scientist discovered
his many laws and principles. It was not until the practical
motive began to operate that he could either prove the worth
»of his theories, or himself to the world. He has now justified
himself in the world of which he gives an account. We see
on every hand evidence of the wonderful works of the scientist.
We can no longer look upon the scientist as an impostor, or as
a mere disturber of our long-standing religious beliefs. His
work is greatly needed and his point of view cannot be ignored.
It must be reckoned with in the world of practical affairs. In-
deed we shall see that the world of truth, beauty, and goodness
must start with the world the scientist has evolved. Nowhere
can we afford to neglect the great accomplishments of science.
The greatest contributions of science so far have been made
to the industrial and commercial world, the field in which our
life is perhaps best reflected to-day. As instances of progress
In these material ways let us mention the "Seven Wonders" of
I American industry. I mention first the Panama Canal, that
peatest feat of American engineering. No less great in their
32 The Philosophical Basis of Education
own way are the New York railway terminal; the New York
Canal; internal waterways and irrigation projects; the subway
and the skyscrapers of New York. (I am indebted to Har-
rington Emerson for the "Seven Wonders" above mentioned.)
Thus it will he seen that the once theoretical sciences of
physics and mathematics have become preeminently practical.
The same is true of chemistry and other sciences. But theory
will continue, and it must precede practice by a good many
furlongs. To be sure, practice aids theory, and makes it
both more certain and more valuable. Theory and practice
tend to support each other. They may cripple each other. All
depends on the kind of theory, and how it is related to the
facts of experience. There is no conflict between theory that
grows out of experience and practice itself. It is through
theory that practice becomes enlightened and sees where it is
headed. Theory is the reflector that throws light and signifi-
cance on the facts of experience, and it is the projector that
lightens up the way ahead so that experience comes to have a
meaning.
7 The Aim of Science Stated in Full. XJlC sisijif
science, then, is to render a complete and accurate descriptu^
account of our human experience. This account is limited in its
scope and value in that it is not intended tn be either -compleS
or finaL The scientist aims at a purely descriptive and ex-
planatory account of the world. He starts with the world of
fact, and from these he ivorks up to laws and principles, which
are later applied in the solution of the practical problems of
life.
8 The World of Science as the World of Discrip-
TiON AND Explanation. But a mere descriptive and ex-
planatory account of experience falls short of giving to life any
meaning or real significance. It is not facts that give life its
meaning, nor is any greater meaning attached to laws and prin-
ciples, for they are only generalizations, or statements of th^
way that certain groups of facts work under certain specified
conditions. But all this account is external and the deeper
meaning of the facts is not revealed by any such an account.
It would be difficult metaphysically to sec how a descriptive
The Aimi of Science
account of the world and experience could reveal life as having
a meaning and a purpose, if the facts, which arc the data of
experience, have no such meaning involved in themselves.
Merely tying together meaningless fragments of life does not
give us a way of viewing life as purposeful. Science is no less
valuable because it does not give the deeper meaning of life.
This is not its business. Indeed the prog ress^and hope of _ '_
ence_rest in iust thk-imnar tiat and ' descri ptive arcoiint^ o{_cx-
BEnence. The field of science is the field of the "is", Saence
starts with facts and ends with laws and principles governing
these facts in a time and space world. It cannot go farther
than this and remain true to its purpose and has mixed two
points of view, the descriptive and the normative, but by com-
mon consent and agreement the scientist has come to take within
his field only facts and to hand them back to the world as
facts, not isolated and unrelated, but as united in most inter-
esting ways. He gives the facts back to society purified and
renovated of most of the crudeness which they possessed when
delivered by common sense.
9 The World of Description vs. the World of Ap-
preciation. If we are to get a full account of our experience,
what is needed more than common sense and science.? The an-
swer is — philosophy, It_ is the business of philosophy to do
just what a great many people Still try to force science to do,
an3~that is Co show the meaning and value of life. This sci-
ehce can never do, any more than philosophy can rest satisfied
with a descriptive account of the world. It is one thing to
I describe and explain; it is quite another thing to interpret and
[ ^ow the meaning and value of our experience for life as a
whole. Science develops the one point of view and philosophy
tbt Other, They are not essentially different in their aims.
The difference lies in the fact that science leaves the world as
described and related phenomena, while philosophy begins with
the conclusion of science as its data and passes on to give a
fuller account of experience by showing the meaning of all this
for life.
Summary of the Aims of Science. Let us briefly
irize the aim of science. Science by observation, corre-
I'of ^H
not ^^H
less ^H
life. ^^M
34 I'he Philosophical Basis of Education
ladon and classification, of the fact of experience aims to ren-
der a complete and accurate descriptive and explanatory account
of the world of human experience. The account is descrip-
tive rather than normative, for the reason that tlie conclusions
relate to the world as it is, and not as it should be. For a fuller
account of life we must turn to philosophy, but before we do
this it is our business to speak in detail of the scope or field
of science, in order that when a division of the field of human
experience is made later between science and philosophy we may
have a better understanding of the principles upon which the
division is based. Let us consider, then, the special field or
scope of science.
I
the scope or field of science
The Phenomenal World of Time and Spacb.
From the foregoing chapter we learned the special aim of sci-
ence as that of offering a descriptive and explanatory account
of our human experience. From this as our starting point in this
chapter, it is but a slight transition to a statement of the scope
or field of science. We have seen already that the scientist is
not dealing with matter foreign to our life, but with the very
facts of our experience as his data, or materials. And now we
are not only to state that the range of science is the whole range
of human experience, but we are to grow more specific in our ,
Statement as to what we mean by the range of human experi- I
ence.
We are still, however, in the field of the phenomenal world,
or the world of time and space, the fact world. This must
not he lost sight of, for it is the most essential guide post to
our further statement of the world of science. And this point
of view must be clearly seen if we arc later to see the relatioiB
between science and philosophy and the relation of each of these j
to education.
2 The Special Fields of Science. For practical pur-
poses the field of science has been divided into a number of
special fields, and developments are now made along each one
separately. Gradual growth and development has led to this
diEEerentiation of function, or division of labor, among the sci-
entists, and this division has been brought about as a result of
the specialized interests of our individual wills. We shall see
later that the whole creation of science is the product of the de-
mands of our practical will, or the concrete expression of a life
of purpose. The scope of science must be broad enough to in-
clude the special fields of all the subordinate sciences. Shall
36 The Phihsophica! Basis of Education
we look for a moment at the special fields, namely, the physi-
cal, biological, sociological, and psychological?
3 The Physical Sciences, Chemistry, Physics,
Geology, etc. The physical sciences have their aim giving a
complete descriptive account of the facts of experience, so far
as these are yet analyzed, in the world of inorganic matter.
This field includes the special sciences of physics, chemistry,
geology and allied sciences, and their applied forms. These
sciences are alike in that they all attempt to describe and explain
the facts of human experience. They are unlike in that each
science has its special aim and field, or range of facts which it
considers.
4 The Biological Sciences. The biological sciences
have the same general aim as all science, to give a description
and explanation of the facts of experience. But here the facts
lie in the organic rather than in the inorganic world. The spe-
cial sciences in this field are botany, or the science of the plant
as a living organism; zoology, or the science of the animal
organism; and physiology, or the science of the human organism.
It will be observed that the biological sciences deal with life,
or the organic world ; while the physical sciences deal with the
inorganic, inert world of matter. These two fields divide be-
tween themselves the whole world of material science. The
biological and the physical sciences are alike in that they deal
only with matter and not with mind. The sciences of mind
must now be mentioned in their relation to the whole field, or
scope of science.
5 The Science of Psychology. The field of psychology
is the whole range of consciousness, whether in plant, animal,
or man. And in this great field are found many divisions, but
the aim is always one, and consistent with the aim of science
generally. The special aim here is to give a careful and scien-
tific account of the states of consciousness in their relation to
each other and to life. The aim is not to show the meaning
of our ideas for reality, but simply to give a descriptive and
explanatory account of them.
Here the difficulty of explanation is much greater than tn
The Scope or Field of Science
37
I
the physical and biological sciences for the reason that the c
sal relationships cannot be discovered between ideas, or states
jnsciousness, tn the same way as is possible in the material
world. One idea is not the cause, and another the effect. The
idationship is not traceable between states of consciousness.
The demand for explanation of mental phenomena, then, must
be satisfied in quite a different way. This is done hy the hy-
pothesis that every state of consciousness has a corresponding
physical process, and receives its explanation by relating it to
the proper physical or nervous process, called neurosis, and
each psychosis is explained by reference to the neurosis that |
forms the other side of the psycho-physical process.
The only way that a scientific explanation of the states of
consciousness is possible at the present time is by relating each
mental process to a process of nerve action. This explanation
is not causal, nor I's it teleological or ideal, it is explanation
through correlation. The action is none the less intelligible
as explained by this psycho-physical correlation. And it is
greater intelligibility that science tries to give to the world,
through analysis, synthesis, and explanation. Science tries to
make the world in which we live rational, orderly, and thus J
intelligible. This is the demand of our will to live, giving e
pression to itself in a practical and concrete way,
6 The Social Sciences — History and Sociology. Tlit
social scienc es also aid in giving to the world greater rationality,
^[] ^ nrriff T History and sociology have here a great work in
explaining social phenomena. In the past, history has been too
descriptive at the cost of intelligent explanation, but this only
indicates the puerility of this science, and suggests that the final
history neither of the world nor of any part of it has yet been
written. If history is to be merely descriptive it has no hope
of becoming a science. If it is to be explanatory as well, and
this is essential to its being a science, it cannot afford to leave
us to guess the cause of the phenomena with which it deals.
Sociology is also young as a science. It would not even de-
serve the name of a science if its intentions were not so good.
On faith we may, then, regard it as a science of the future, and
its field will be to describe and explain the phenomena of social
L'iOc group life. It must show the laws operative in the forma-
The Philosophical Basis nf Educatio,
tioti and maintenance of the group relationship,
as these laws must necessarily be psychological, s
draw heavily on social psychologj'. In (act this is about as far
as sociology has gone to-day. It will certainly make more inde-
pendent advances in the future. It must gather carefully its
own data of social life, and classify, correlate, describe, and ex-
plain these phenomena.
7 The .Abstract Sciences of Relations — Mathe-
matics AND Logic. The abstract sciences of mathematics and
logic deserve special mention in any attempt to classify or
group the sciences now known to man. These are not physical,
psychical, or psycho-physical, in as much as the data of both
these sciences are not things or ideas, but pure relationships. In
the case of mathematics time and space relationships are the ele-
ments involved, the phenomenal world is the basis. In the case
of logic ideal relationships are involved, or the truth of our
ideas and thought constitutes the ground of its search. Logic,
hoivever, goes beyond the limits of mere description and ex-
planation and has a teleological reference. We must then leave
a further statement regarding logic to a later part of this vol-
ume.
Mathematics is the science of time and space relations. Its
data are simply these immaterial relations. It is thus an ab-
stract science, or in a sense ideal. The aim of this science is,
however, consistent with the aim of science generally, that of
giving an explanation of the world in which we live, so as to
make it more consistent, less fleeting, and more intelligible.
8 The Normative and Descriptive Sciences. There
is another great and important group of inquiries often called
sciences, but their aim is so different from all the groups men-
b'oned above in this chapter under the head of descriptive sci-
ences, that careful distinction must be made here, even though
we must be very brief. I refer to the philosophical disciplines,
or the several branches of philosophy, namely: metaphysics,
epistemology, logic, ethics, lesthetics, and philosophy of religion.
These are sciences in that they have their own respective fields
of enquiry, and collect, systematize and explain their respective
data. But all this is incidental and preliminary to the real
The Scope o
irld of Science
Ease of these sciences, which is to shnw the meaning of all I
for life. It is meaning here and not pure description and
rapianation that we are seeking. In distinction from the de-
scriptive sciences these are called normative, and particularly
for the reason that each one sets up a standard, so as to give
meaning and value to life. The word normative means a stand-
ard or norm
Metaphysics gives us the nature and standards of being aqj I
ICfllilXi e pistemologV i the nature and s^ta ndards o f knowledge;
( fagic, the standards of correct" thinking ; ethics, the nature of I
goodness ~an3~ the standards of conduct; esthetics gives us the j
nature and standards of the beautlt\il; philosophy of religio
the standards of right religious conduct and belief,
9 StTMMARY OF THE ScOPE OF SciENCE. The SCOpe of I
Kience can easily be seen from the foregoing eight sections of
this chapter. The field of science as here used means the de-
scriptive sciences. When the philosophical saences of section
eight are referred to, I shall speak of them as normative, or
call them by their special names.
We have observed already that the field of science is very
broad in that it includes the phenomenal world of matter, the
physical and biological sciences; the world of mind or con-
;, the psychological world; and the world of mind and
1 their relations, psycho-physics; and finally the world .
of pure and abstract relationships of time and space ideas. In ,
its broadest significance science includes the philosophical dis-
ciplines, «'hich «-e have called tljc normative sciences.
Now that the aim of science generally and the special aims
of the different sciences have been discussed, and the scope or
field of science has been rather lengthily reviewed, we are next
to pass in review the general and special methods of science.
This will pave the way better for a later separation of the two
points of view in regarding the world, the descriptive and the
f normative.
^H ' normative.
OF SCIENCE
1 Observation, Classification, Description and Ex-
planation AS Stages of Developments Rather Than
Methods of Science. From the foregoing two chapters it
will be seen readily what the general methods of science are.
It is, however, necessary that we gather together here for our
specific purpose these several methods and suggest their limits
and values in giving an account of the world of experience, for
it is only after we see clearly the place of science in life, that
we can see definitely what is reasonable to expect of it, and
what must be left for philosophy.
It is now time to point out that observation, classification,
description, and explanation, which were discussed in Chapter
I, are to be regarded as stages in development of complete sci-
ence. They are not methods in any technical sense, but more
immediate aims, or stages, in the realization of a complete
scientific account of the world of experience.
There are several methods at the disposal of the scientist.
These are analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, ex-
periment and introspection.
2 Analysis and SvNTHEsrs as Methods. Analysis and
synthesis will be treated together because the contrast in their
method of procedure throws light on the real value of each.
By analysis is meant the separation of any experience or object
of experience into its elements. It is an effort to understand
the whole better by better understanding its parts and their
relation to each other. But to analyze a complete experience
into its parts and leave it in this sh;ipe, is to rob it of the little
meaning it did have for common sense. It is not enough merely
to analyze or dissociate our experiences into their elements.
We must unite them again ; they must be synthesized. Analy-
40
^HBs and synthes
^pmethods. EacI
The Methods of Science
thesis arc correlative and co-operative processes or
Each adds clearness and significance to the other.
Through the function of consciousness in the acts of analysis
and synthesis of the elements of our experience there develops a
new understanding. Experience takes on a greater aspect of
rationality or unity, i.e., becomes more intelligible, for only that
which has unity is intelligible to us.
Common sense takes experience in the unrefined form in
which it presents itself to our perceptions. The scientist be-
gins with this common sense world of perception and tries to
refine it and make it more intelligible. This he docs by means
of the special methods at his disposal.
Analysis and synthesis must go on together. They arc the
two aspects of a larger process. It would be folly to ask which
is the more important, just as it would be to ask which is the
more important part of a circle, the inside or the outside, — they
we equally essential to the whole.
3 Indiiction and Deduction as Methods. Induction |
and deduction are tn'o other methods, closely related to each
other and to the methods of analysis and synthesis above dis-
cussed.
By induction is meant the process of reasoning by inference
from the concrete to the general, from the individual to the
universal, from the part to the whole. This pair of methods
is inseparable and marks a stage of development in science he-
rond that of analysis and synthesis of the elements of our ex-
perience, and indeed each of these processes employs the methods
of inductive and deductive inference.
By deduction is meant the process of inference where the
general direction of thoug^it is from the general to the con-
crete case, from the universal to the particular, from the whole
to the part. Throu^ inference in diese two ways we arrive
at judgments both universal and particular. And it is throu^
our ability to form judgments that we are able consciously to
adjust ourselves in a world of practical experience, and to
ascribe meaning and reality to this world also. But judgiDefltf
arrived at in the world of sdence arc never to outstrip dw
evidence of the facts upon which the judgments are based. The
jadgments nnist always be open to correction and rertnon
J
42 The Philosophical Basis of Education
necessitated by a larger experience. The laws of science are
judgments asserted in the form of a universal practical judg-
ment, and must always stand ready to include the widest range
of fact. The law must always be verified and supported on
the basis of experience. Scientific judgments always refer to
a time and space world, to the phenomenal world, and never
assert or deny reality to the world.
But the same methods of inference, induction and deduction,
are able to carry us over into a very different world from that
of perception and phenomenality, — into the world of truth, re-
ality, goodness, and beauty. Yet it is not the business of the
scientist to go so far in his inference. To be sure he makes
use of hypotheses and suppositions that his science cannot prove,
nor is it the business of the descriptive sciences, but the philo-
sophical, or normative sciences.
The scientist, then, in his use of induction and deduction
limits their use to the world of time and space, to verification
and proof by reference to the facts of experience. The logicii
extends his limits to the world of truth, reality, and values.
4 Experimental Method. The experimental method is
the one that best characterizes scientific procedure to-day. Un-
til the time of Bacon the progress of science was very slow and
uncertain, and the chief trouble was with the method, because
the material of science has always been the same — the facts of
human experience. But there has come a narrowing of the
field of science with this method, for it is of service as a method
only in the time and space world, — the world of perception and
phenomena. So it is too indefinite, as we have already seen,
to say that science deals with human experience. So does phi-
losophy deal with human experience, and we are now working
in the direction of a rather sharp division of the field of human
experience between science and philosophy. Science is con-
cerned with human experience only in so far as the data of
the same can be classified, described and explained in causal
or sequential order. When the field of science is thus limited
it becomes apparent that the experimental method becomes of
great value.
The experimental method is used wherever it is found pas-
sible to standardize conditions and operations, so that the given
iai^H
The Methods of Science
♦3
^W1
phenomena can be reproduced and studied at will. Under such
condition we can vary the modifying factors or set of factors
exerting the most positive and direct efEect upon the phenomena
studied. We can thus discover the variant and learn the law
of its variation.
The experimental method has now come to be used in prac-
tically every descriptive science known to man. It was not
until the day of experimental or inductive science, that any very
.rked progress was made in any of the descriptive sciences.
While this method is limited to the descriptive sciences, the
iults derived from these sciences are to be used in the nor-
well, we shall see later.
The Method of Introspection. The method of in-
trospection is the special method of the science of psychology.
All above-named methods are general and are used in all the
descriptive sciences, psychology included, but introspection is
specifically the method of psychology. While it is true that
psychology owes most of its advance in recent years to the
experimental metliod, it is nevertheless true that the method
that characterizes psychology is introspection. By introspec-
tion is meant self-analysis or self -observation. Analysis and
observation are general methods of science, but self-analysis
and self -observation are methods of psychology particularly,
lere is nothing mysterious about this method though it does
.ke patience and skill to learn to use it successfully in analyz-
experience into its elements. If we would find the
mental states that correspond to certain bodily expressions we
must look within our consciousness for this correlation. The
other scientific methods can take us a long way in psychology,
but no other can give us the real laws upon which the mind
acts, for after all experiments are performed, we still have to
refer this data to consciousness for the final word. Mind is
not understood in terms of matter alone, nor is it enough
merely to correlate physical and mental processes. Mind can
only be studied in terms of mind, and the only method here
available is introspection or self observation. There is grave
danger that we forget this important fact in this day of experi-
:ntalism. But forget it though we may, the logic of necessity
^ill drive us back to it again.
44 The Philosophical Bash of Education
6 Balance of Methods. It must be remembered that
these methods arc all available and all necessary in science.
We cannot get along without any one of them. At one time
one is more valuable or useful, at another time another, de-
pending on the nature of the material and the state of develop-
ment of the particular science. We must therefore govern our
method by the data to be handled, and in most cases this will
result in the striking of the proper balance between the different
methods which are available. Methods are our scientific tools
with which we shape our experience, and like the master me-
chanics, we use one tool at one time and another at another,
depending upon the material used and the aim to be reached,
for our methods are dependable both on the aim to be accom-
plished and the nature of the material to be wrought into shape.
7 Summary of the Methods of Science. Briefly sum-
marizing, then, we will say the methods of science are analysis
and synthesis, induction and deduction, experiment and intro-
spection. If we were looking for one word to cover all methods
perhaps the best one would be observation, for all methods are
expressed in observation, which may be either objective or sub-
jective. The subjective method here referred to is that of in-
trospection and is the particular method of psychology, as it
seems most fitting to deal with the materials of consciousness.
There is another subjective method called reflection, which is
the characteristic method of philosophy, or the normative sci-
ences, but it need not detain us here. Now the method to be
employed Jn any given science will be the one of those above
mentioned which is most useful in manipulating the data of
that particular science, but generally a balance between the
different methods will have to be struck if the greatest gains
are to be made.
Now that we have discussed the aims, scope and methods of
science, each in a separate chapter, let us turn to a chapter in
which we point out the relations of the various sciences to life ■
as a whole.
ciences to luc ^m
CHAPTER IV
THE RELATIONS OF SCIENCE TO LIFE
The Age of Science. For our purposes enough has
already been said as to the relation between the various sciences
to one another, but perhaps their place and value can better
be seen as a whole if we speak of the relations of science gen-
erally to life.
Our age has rightly been characterized as the age of science
and industrial progress. But our industrial progress is the
direct outcome or result of the growth of science. The scientist
not only has made wonderful strides in his own field, particu-
larly through the methods of induction and experiment, but
he has used this knowledge in the service of manlcind by aiding
in the solution of many of the practical problems of life.
Out of each one of the theoretical or pure sciences has devel-
oped an applied science. Our physics has grown out into the
fields of applied mechanics, electricity and' engineering, and all
sorts of construction work and invention of the practical utili-
ties of life. Chemistry has given us a science of dyeing and
manufacturing of foods and drinks, and it is applied in various
ways to mining, engineering, and metallurgy. And the end is
not yet.
From our biological and physiological studies, once purely
theoretical, has come the applied sciences of hygiene qnd physi-
cal education, with the result that the laws of growth and de-
velopment of the organism are being taken consciously into
account in our daily life. From chemistry and physiology has
come the science of medicine. The social sciences are promot-
ing on scientific bases constructive work in the way of improv-
ing society in accordance with the ideals of man, which ideals
are drawn from other fields of life but which largely depend
upon the advance in the descriptive sciences for theCr realization.
L And even psychology is coming to be extremely practical, and so
45
r
I
I
■ Scie
■ and r<
46 The Philosophical Basis of Education
is gathenng a great amount of human interest about itself.
From every quarter of the earth the cry comes to the psycholo-
gist: What can you do for society? The psychologist really
tries to keep from shoiving signs of great joy lest he be thought
not to be possessed truly of scientific dignity. But he has given
the answer to the world question in small part, and so he has
attacked with the other scientist the problems of the world.
Now it is well known that no amount of industrial or material
progress will settle all the problems of the business, social,
moral, religious, political, or educational world. For in all
these fields we have to deal with mind as well as matter, and
up to the present our chief concern has been with matter.
The great progress of the next decade is likely to be made
along the line of mental science. Already we have fairly re-
spectable sciences under the name of psychotechnics of business,
medicine, and education, and we are struggling to get as good
a hearing in the fields of law, social life, religion, domestic
life and a good many other fields too. We have only just be-
gun to develop a science of applied psychology. The next dec-
ade will see great things come about in the line of applied
a Science and the Life of Reason. The development
of science shows on the side of rationality a great advance in
reason beyond that of common sense. The mind of man was
at an early stage of his existence a very small force in con-
trolling his life. Man was a victim of circumstances and a
prey to all sorts of illusions and misconceptions. His only
teacher was the great cosmos about him. The forces of his
environment played incessantly upon him without revealing the
secrets of their nature or that of man. But after long ages man
came to take a hand in the shaping of his own destiny. The
cosmos is no longer his only teacher, he becomes a factor in
his own development. His adjustment to his environment be-
comes a conscious process. But not until the development of
science does man reach a high degree of ability to shape not
only his own destiny, but to modify the circumstances under
which he lives, so as to promote the realization of his best self.
Science then marks a stage in the evolution of intelligence
d reason beyond that of common sense, or the still more
J^P The Relations of Science to Life 47
primitive stage of his cosmic existence, before he consciously re-
garded himself as a factor in the creation of his own destiny.
We are not to say here that science marks the stage of highest
development of human reason, for unless the reflective sciences ,
of philosophy are included there is yet a higher stage of rational I
development. This will be considered later.
3 Science Gives Increased Facilities for Ltfi;. rut
Does Not Give its Meaning. We have greatly emphasized
the value of science for practical life, Wc can scarcely over-
estimate its value, provided we do not lose sight of the broader
point of view of the meaning and value of life. There is great
danger, however, that we become intoxicated, or at least light-
headed, under the influence of modern science. The progress in
science is so rapid and the pace of the scientist is ever being
accelerated. Movement is what grown people like as well as
babies, but the sober old cranks of society scratch their heads
and say, What does all this fuss mean anyway? Is the world '
going mad?
This is a very real and vital question, and much is at stake
in giving our answer. So we cannot aflord to answer it with
a shrug of the shoulder, or a look of disgust. The question
is real for it is concerning the deeper meaning and value of
life that we are seeking information in the answer to this ques-
tion. The world is in danger of going wild over science, more
particularly because its results are so noticeable, and can be ex-
posed in the many concrete and practical ways we have already
pointed out. Let us, then, proceed carefully in our estimate
of the place and value of science. Science does increase facili-
ties for our practical life. It does give us wonderful time and
labor-saving devices. Indeed in the purely time and space
world it has no equal, here it reigns supreme. It might also
be said with equal truth that science increases our human wants
as well as facilities for supplying them, but it does not give
us any true insight into our real needs. This takes descriptiv
science out of its provinces. A need implies an "ought" whic.
does not exist as fact, but as purpose or idea.
Science increases the facilities for living but does not create J
!■ necessarily a better life. The forces at work in the develop- 1
^B ment of a valuable life are purposes, — ideals and are not J
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48 The Philosopkical Basis of Education
economic, however important these latter are for our practical
existence. Man demands not only existence, but a purposeful
and valuable existence. Man does not live by bread alone.
4 We Must Turn to Philosophy for the Meaning
OF Life. We have observed that science fails to give tlie whole
account of life, for it leaves out its meaning and value, and this
is much like gathering in the husks and leaving the ears behind.
What is life without meaning and value? Indeed what would
science itself be if life had no meaning? The life we live must
"have a meaning of some sort, or it would have no existence as
idea. The quest for this meaning is not the business of science,
but of philosophy, or what we have called normative sciences.
True, some scientists occasionally turn philosophers without
knowing it, and attempt to give both a descriptive and a nor-
mative account of our experience, to explain it as fact and to
give it meaning and value as well, but such hybrids are for-
tunately not many, and it is well they are not, for they ivould
soon succeed in giving us a riddle of the universe, such as
would take many generations of thinking to clear up to the
mind of the average man.
5 General Summary of the Aims, Scope, Methods,
AND Relations of Science. In summarizing and concluding
Part I of this volume on the aims, scope, methods, and rela-
tions of science, we shall mention only the most salient points so
far brought out. We have found that it is the specific aim of
science to give a descriptive and explanatory account of the
world, and the stages of development or progress toward this
end are observation, correlation, and classification of facts of
experience and then follows description and finally explanation,
which amounts to the relation of the particular facts to the
laws to which they are subordinate. The fact looks to the law
for a fuller explanation of itself. After the stage of law and
principle Is reached, the practical interest of man shows itself
by applying these laws to the problems of life.
The scope or field of science was found to he as broad as
human experience, but not so deep. It includes all the data of
life, but it does not show their underlying meaning for life
as a whole.
The Relations of Science to Life
49
The methods of science are analysis and synthesis, induction
and deduction, experiment and introspection. These have equal
value in their own place, hut are not interchangeable. All have
been found serviceahle in gaining a larger and deeper insight
into the field of experience.
The various fields of sciences are related as are the parts of
any organic whole, and it is only in the interest of greater ef-
fectiveness and because of more special interests, that the field
of science has been divided at all. The practical relations of
science to life are many and important. But there is a limit
to what science can do. It must iie confined to the perceptual
or phenom enal world of time and space, tu the world of descrip-
tiori_and exphmatlon, and the deeper meaning and value of life
must be^eft to other inquirers. Otherwise two essential points
of view are taken at orice and the result is confusion.
It is now time to turn to the field of the normative sciences,
or generally speaking to philosophy, in order to trace out the
deeper significance or meaning of life to which reference has
several times been made. And here as in Part I we consider
the subject under the head of aims, scope, methods and rela-
tions giving a chapter to each one. After this detailed treat-
ment we can proceed to a final statement of the relations of
science and philosophy in Part III, and so divide the field of
human experience between them. We shall, then, be ready for
a specific account of the relations of philosophy and of educa-
tion, in Part IV, after which we may successfully treat the
ethical aspects of education in Part V,
PART II
The Aims, Scope, Methops and Relations of Philosophy
the aims of philosophy
The World of Description and the World of Ap-
preciation. We arc now to trace the aims, scope, methods,
and relations of philosophy, just as we did in the case of science
in Part I. In this chapter we are concerned with the aims of
philosophy. What is the aim of philosophy? What does the
philosopher try to accomplish ? Why does he regard science as
unable to give a complete account of the world? These arc
questions whose answers will come out more clearly as we pro-
ceed in this chapter.
We have already seen that the world the scientist lives in
is the world of description. He is concerned with the causal
world of sequence and phenomena, with the world of time and
space, the world of fact or the is. We shall, find that the
philosopher is concerned with a different world. To be sure he
is concerned with things temporal, as well as the scientist and
the man of common sense, but as a student he is concerned with
the word of eternal values. If we go no farther than the
world of science we see nothing as valuable, all is meaningless.
Vanity, vanity, nothing but vanitv', was not spoken of the world
of values, but of the fluctuating, vascillating world of the
senses. Heraclitus could see nothing but a ceaseless change or
(lux, nothing was stable. The only reason was because he could
not see far enough. There^KJuch.a .thing as philosophical
myopia, and he had a Ea3~i:ase of it. He could not see the
forest for the trees. The facts blinded him to the deeper under-
lying meaning and reality of things. There was even a certain
consistency or changclcssness about the changing, that should
have given a small ray of hope at least, for the thing that never
ceases to change is changeless and permanent in one sense at
, least.
Well, as long a
2 Stay in the world of science, wc are I
5+ The Philotof'hUoI Basis of Education
the world of time and space or sense-perception. And in last
analysis things are not what they seem. In reality seeing is
not believing. The man with a longing for truth docs not rest
satisfied with the storv' that perception tells of the world.
There is a more profound order of thinp, not so easily ob-
served. The world of sense- perception, the world of descrip-
tion, is the starting point in the quest for reality, but it is not
the end of the search. The data of science are the facts of
human experience, and certainly a philosophical account of life
must begin with these data. But unlike science, philosophy is
not done with its task when it has succeeded in arranging classi-
fying, and describing these facts. Philosophy begins here just
where science leaves off. It leaves out of account nothing that
science has gained, for this is the very beginning of its course.
It has been said that the relation of religion and morality can be
liltened unto two concentric circles of unequal radii, the smaller
circle representing morality and the larger one including it re-
ligion. Now I think that science and philosophy can be com-
pared in the same way. Philosophy can make no headway un-
less it takes account of all that has been gained by science in
understanding human experience. Philosophy starting here sets
out on a more extended search for the meaning and value of
life, This is the one great aim of philosophy, to find out what
life means as determined by our experience as a part nf this life.
2 Philosophy, the View of the Whole of Lifk; Sci-
ence, OF A Part. In as much as experience cannot be com-
plete, and further since it is the aim of philosophy to give the
meaning of life as a whole, it becomes clear at once that philoso-
phy must construct the whole out of the part of human expe-
So the aim of philosophy is seemingly rather ambitious and
yet not so much so, if we are to lemeroher that the philosopher
has no right to go farther than the facts of e.tperience warrant
on the grounds of rational inference. We cannot get away
from inference in philosophy any more than we saw we could
in science. When the scientist passes from mere correlation
and comparison to generalization, he arrived at a conclusion
which was not found in the premises, but yet which was war-
ranted by them. So it is in philosophy. The philosopher must
The Aims of Philosophy 55
{eneralize, from judgments and conclusions, but all these must
e consistent with the true principles of rational inference, both
(^Induction and deduction.
s the philosopher's aim to give 3 systematic way of viewing
pthe universe as a whole. James says, that the most important
.part of a man Is his vieiv of the universe. A man's view of the
iniverse is his way of looking at experience as a whole. It is
's grip on totality, to use James again. Without this view of
Rife, experience is meaningless, for it is only by reference to this
view of the totality of things that the fragmentary bits of
our experience have any meaning at all. The parts become
significant only in reference to the whole. What does the
balance wheel or the mainspring of a watch mean, if we have
never seen, or heard of a watch? What does each fragmen-
tary bit of our human experience mean unless we can relate it
to a whole, which is not given in any single experience or all
I mir experiences together?
L Now this idea of constructing a view of the whole is neither
•impracticable nor unthinkable. We are doing this same thing
"in a smaller way every day of our life. We find bones of ex-
tinct animals scattered all over the world. From these frag-
mentary bits the whole is gradually conceived and the missing
parts are filled in with plaster of paris, or some other material,
and these are displayed in our museums as the amazing handi-
craft of our scientists. And the wonder of it all is that no
man now living to tell the story has ever seen this specimen
of animal life! Or again, take the case of the construction
engineer, who sees ever^' part in its relation to the whole which
does not exist as fact at all, but as idea, but which idea of the
whole is nevertheless the ver>' thing that gives to each concrete
part the only meaning and value it has. Nor is the case of the
inventor any different. Thejdea of the whole is the standard
o|_ values foicach part. If the parts mean anything and have
any value it is only because they have relation as parts of this
r ^isanic whole, 01 unity.
r3 The A[m of Philosophy.
amples before us, how can we be so
philosopher is only chasing butterflie
sonable to suppose that the philosophe
With these several ex-
bold as to assert that the '
;? Is it any more unrea-
r with his broader aim can
I
I
56 The Philosophical Basis of Education
determine the meaning and value of life as a whole, than it
is that the scientist can construct an animal which he has never
seen or heard of with nothing but a few old dry bones; or that
a builder can design and construct a building the like of which
no one has seen; or that an inventor can construct a machine
about which no one else has ever dreamed? There is no rea-
son unless it is in the nature of mind to be so limited. But
the fact that it is not so limited is evidenced by its never end-
ing search for the yet unknown. Thciacts oi mind get t heir
meaning only by reference to the whole, or totality of the uni-
verse. And without some notion of the whole of things the
fragments of our experience arc as dry bones, for with them-
selves they have no meaning. The meaning and value of life
then rest in the relation of the whole to the parts and the_parts
to the whole. Where there is no unity there is no meaning p_r_.
value. Where there is unity and organization, the facts g et
their meaning by the place they occupy in the system of things.
Do we any longer have difficulty in seeing that science is
pressed too heavily when we expect it to give us a complete
account of our experience? Science can do nothing more tha n
organize. -and .arrange the facts of experience into regular aider
orjCQUCflEe. And this system of things in the phenomenal
world is the whole to which the parts are referred for their
explanation as phenomena. But the systems of the sciences
need to be ordered and arranged, and they need to be ex-
plained also. But all this does not imply more than a science
of sciences, and philosophy is more than that. A science.gl
sciences would still, demand a philosophy in order to give_tbe
wo rld of de scription nicaoing aiid value. A science of sciences
would still be less than the whole of human experience, for sci-
ence must rest content with a complete description and explana-
tion of the facts of experience, so far as experience has gone.
-'But experience is a constantly widening circle; it is ceaselessly *
changing and presenting new aspects. Science then gives us
not the whole but only a part of experience, and a smalt part
at that. But the word part implies a whole, and the part is
not the whole, but essential to the organism of the whole, and
depends upon this latter for its significance. The part, then,
must be related to the whole of which it is a part for its mean-
ing and value, and the whole which is not given in the part is
The Aims of Philosophy 57 '
nevertheless so related to it as to include it as a. part of its own
organization. A part is so related to the whole that the organi-
zation is incomplete without it, and the whole is so related to
the part that the latter has no significance or meaning except in J
relation to tlic organization as a whole,
Then_the_vv-orld of science is not only phenomena, and j,
mere paft ol.tlie laigei totality. of things, but it Is meaninglas
and va lueless except in reference to this larger whole. Now the
whole Ts never given in a part and so not all at one time as
fact or phenomena. The whole is thus not preceived in our
experience in the world of time and space. The part, however,
is so revealed. And it is from the part that the philosopher,
like, his brother scientist, constructs the whole, or his view q£
the totality of things. It isjilain, then, that the philosopher is i
■re drenmcr, but is engaged in the serious business of |
^ in^ the meaning and value of human experience by I
^Towmg^iu significance for the whole which the part implies. |
We have stated the aim of philosophy as that of rendering
experience significant, or that of showing the meaning and
value of life. We are now able to see that such meaning and
value are impossible except as the experience, which is the
part, is related to the larger whole which it implies. All fact s
then Eet_ jhcifc ^griificance by reference to the whole. In as
much as the part and the wliole are organically related, they are
functionally interdependent, that is the dependence works both
ways. Thx\iiole must be implied by the part, that is we naust
_Slart wis the phenomenal world of science and sense-percep-
tion, and the whole in turn gives significance and meaning to
the fact of part by showing its place in, or its relation to the
whole. There is, then, nothing mysterious about the aim of
philosophy, when we say it is to show the meaning and value
of life. And this we have seen to be the task of showing the
significance of our fragmentary experience for life as a whole.
4 Philosophy as Appreciation. But when we come to
this plane of understanding and sec life from the philosophical
point of view, human experience gains new significance, because
of the new and higher light shed upon it by the relation of
whole and part. We have thus been led through the world
pi description of facts to a realm of values, purposes and ideala,
I
58 The Phihsophical Basis of Education
no longer to be systematized for the mere purpose of causu
explanation, but to be appreciated. Indeed we have now left
the world of mechanical causality entirely, and are in the world
of appreciation and values, or the teleological world of aims
and purposes. The transition is not so abrupt as would seem
at first thought. We have not felt the world of mechanical
causation in one sense, for we are still limited by it in our
experience of fact, but by means of it as our starting point wc
have transcchded its limitations in thought. We can now see
the forest despite the trees, the particulars do not blind us to
the universal, the very foundation of their meaning and value.
When we pass from the world of mechanical causation to
the teleological world of values and meaning, we have made
the transition from the world of description and phenomena
to the world of appreciation. We are no longer to limit our
search to the causal relation of facts in the world that now is
realized in our limited experience, but by means of this worH
we reach out to its other, the great world of the whole or to-
tality of things. Experience in a limited world of time and
/ space gives way to a great world of meanings and purpose.
' Through understanding wc have come to appreciate, for now
I the facts are not isolated but related into a system of things and
so have value. Facts thus become values in their relation._to
the whole, and the world of experience ceases to be purely tem-
poral as implied" in science, but partakes of the external, in just
I the same way that the part is related to the whole. Man need
' not complain of his finitude. He might better complain of him-
self that he has not realized the external aspect of his nature.
The world of description and the world of appreciation are
the two aspects of the same world, the world of reality. This
world is temporal as viewed from the angle of a fragmentary
experience, but is eternal when seen from the angle of the
5vbole. The whole of our experience cannot be realized in any
one unit of time, for to make such a claim would be to identify
the whole with the part. ThE_reiditj'. o£ the \yorld is thus not
fully revealed in the facts of experience, hut rather as idea .or
purpose, which manifests itself in time as the world of fact of
the world of experience. This world of fact, the descriptive
world, is the aspect of reality that is presented to a temporal
md spatial view of experience, it is the external meaning of the
The Aims of Philosophy S9
idea of the whole, or the way reality is expressed in point of
time. But the deeper aspect of reality is not thus revealed in
time, for the whole cannot be expressed in a part, or in time.
The idea of \[}e; whnle is t\]e ipfj^rnal_ m eanin g of th g. i'iss-
Every id^a thus has its external WL iaterQaLaigaificaa(X.,iK
relation to the world of fact and the. world of meaning, the
woriS^qf scien.cp or phenomena and the. world of philosoplij;
the realm of values and meanings.
Now in this world of purposes and values the philosopher has
a task resemhling that of the scientist. These valij^s_and-piii?
poses must b e related and hatmonized just as the ^endat must
systema tize his facts. It is only by such a harmony of these in-
ternal meanings or values that anything like a complete philoso-
phy of life is possible. Here again the only meaning possible
is that derived through harmony and organization of purposes
or values in a larger system of purposes. Such a system of
values will always he incomplete on accoimt of the fallibility
of human thought, but this sort of reflection is necessary if
experience is to have any significance, if life is to be regarded as
worth the living.
It is not our purpose in this chapter to work out a complete
philosophy of life, but a,s its heading suggests to make clear
what the aim of the philosopher is.
5 Summary of the Aims of Philosophy. We have
now answered in brief the questions asked at the beginning of
this chapter. We see that it is the aim of phili-sophy to make
experience significant, or possess meaning. And this Is accom-
plished through the relation of the part of experience to the
whole which clearer reflection demands. The philosopher
has no quarrel with the scientist. On the contrary, he is grate-
ful to him for having made such a good beginning. But the
philosopher takes up experience ivhere the scientist leaves off,
— with causal description and explanation, and sets out to find
its other, the whole which the part implies. He knows the
whole must be, or exist, for the part implies it, just as the
bone of the extinct animal suggests the whole which is con-
structed from the part.
The phi losopher Jcayes. to the.iciencist-to . work out the rela;
1 of the parts to each other sn thc_tEtnPJ3?il. sid e of om
6o The Pkilosopkkal Bash of Edueatio
1
tttf
experiencej in the world of causality and sequence, but_llip
^nlosopli^er begins here and moves on in quest of the wIh^Ip, jj
totality of tTi Jng s . The world of reality presents one side of it-
s'elf to a limited view of time and space, the world of descrip-
tion ; it presents quite another to the view from the side of the
whole. The question as to which of the two aspects is more
real can be answered by asking, which is more real the whole or
the part? Both are real, for the whole would not exist without
the parts, and the parts would have no significance without
reference to the whole. The world of the scientist, or time and
space, is real then, but only as the part is real for the whole.
Science will never be able to give the whole account of life,
but as we saw in Part I it gives a very significant part, but yet
only a part, and this demands always its other, the whole. We
may contend for a world of isolated facts, or independent reals,
but our very idea of isolation involves the conception of the
unity of the whole. To get away from the whole is impossible.
The very limit*; of time and spnce, as our experiential \mild,
imply something not given and that cannot be given i n one
experience. We must transcend time and space if we a«- tQ
get meaning and unity out of our experience, but wheU-t^U
IS done by gaining a clear conception of the whole, which tjr
its very nature cannot he given as a part, we havf ^-
ready transcended the world of time and space, or thp phf-
nomenal world of science and common sense, and have eoieacd
into the world of spiritual values.
The scientist and the philosopher may live in the same world.
and they do (vhether they know it or not ; they may even live in
the same house and sleep in the same bed, or indeed be in the
same man, but it is only when they know what they are about
that they can give to the world the two points of view de-
manded by a consistent reality, a world of true being and
eternal. I hope the world of the scientist and the philosopher
are becoming more clearly distinguishable in thought as we
proceed, for much depends on this distinction if the reader is to
follow me through to the end of our journey.
Now that we have stated rather fully the aim of philosophy,
we will do well to turn to a more detailed examination of the
scope or field of philosophy. To this matter we give the fol-
lowing chapter.
CHAPTER II
THE SCOPE OR FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY
1 PSYCHOLOGV AND PhH.OSOPHV COMPARED AND CON-
TRASTED. We should have by this time a fair understanding
of the aim, scope, and methods of science, and its relation to
our practical life. From the foregoing chapter particularly,
we should see how the aims of science and philosophy differ.
In this present chapter we hope to get clearly in mind the
scope or field of philosophy, 50 that its field or range can be
more clearly distinguished from that of science.
The range of philosophy is limited to human experience and
what it means; the range or field of science to human experi-
ence and how it is related in time and space, or to its causal
sequence. Science has only to do with order and sequence; for
philosophy sequence has no meaning, except for the part of
the world viewed by science. Sequence is not of the whole but
of the part. Science deals with facts, both mental and physi-
cal, and the whole range of such facts. So does philosophy,
but in a very different way, and for a very different purpose.
The difference in purpose or aim has already been brought out.
In this chapter we are to emphasize the scope or field of phi-
losophy, in the next we shall emphasize the method. All along
we shall make comparisons and contrasts that will aid in seeing
the respective fields of science and philosophy.
Perhaps there is no field where science and philosophy seem
to the average man to overlap as much as in psychology, .There
is no reason for this confusion of thought, though it does exist.
Psychology is a descriptive science, and is like all the other
descriptive sciences in that it aims to give a full account of the
ways its facts or data are connected. The same stages of de-
velopment are passed through as in any other descriptive science,
namely observation, comparison, classification, and generaliza-
tion. The same methods are employed as in the other sciences.
62 The Phlloiophica} limis of FJjicalm.
with the addition of one particularly suited to its own special
purposes, that is, — introspection. The chief difference between
psychology and the other sciences is in the materials with which
it deals. For psychology the only facts dealt with are mental,
states of consciousness. Rut these facts are to be analyzed,
classified, described and explained in their own way, just as are
the material facts of our experience. No greater reality should
be a,«:ribed to the facts of psychology than to those of the
physical, biological, or sociological sciences. Indeed all facts
are of equal value in the world of description. It is in the very
nature of science that all values be eliminated so that a wholly
impartial view of the world be given. Not so in philosophy,
where values are ascribed lo facts as parts of a whole of reality.
For the botanist a weed is just as good, or valuable as a
rose. The distinctions in the scientific world are not made on
the basis of values at all. The system to which the facts of
science relate is not the system of values to which in the philo-
sophical world we ascribe reahty. No more does the true psy-
chologist ascribe values to his facts, the states of consciousness,
than does the botanist to his facts. It would be meaningless
for psychology to ask which is the more valuable, a memory
or state of feeling, a judgment or an emotion, an act of cogni-
tion or an act of will. You might just as well ask of the
physicist to tell which is the more valuable, black or white?
In a world of description, where values cut no figure, such
questions fall to the ground.
The psychologist is not to be feared by the philosopher any
more than the physicist, the chemist or the botanist. For while
all are to work on the basi-* of e\penence, the fact basis, they
have a different purpose in dealmg with these facts and there
is no cause for conflict. Like the other scientists the psycholo-
gist aims only to describe and explain his faas, and unlike them
all the philosopher attempts is to show the meaning and value
of these facts for life as a whole
2 Data of Philosophy the Whole of Human Ex-
perience. Since the data of philosophy is the whole of human
experience, it must take into account both mental and physical
facts, as its data. And yet tJiis is only another way of saying
what has already been said, that philosophy and science deal
■^ facts, as
L
The Scope or Field of Philosophy
63
with the same data, the facts of experience, but each in its own
way and for its own special purpose.
Neither in science nor in philosophy do we go outside experi-
ence for our data, but find our beginning in the actual world of
time and space. In science we not only have our beginning
here, but never get beyond this causal aspect of experience, but
in philosophy this serves only as our starting point. By use of
the special method of the philosopher, reflection, to be dis-
cussed in the next chapter, he passes beyond the world of mere
phenomena into the world of values and purposes. The philoso-
pher is in no sense a creator of values, on the contrary his world
is one of absolute and eternal values, that are to be shared by
all who know, fee!, and will correctly. It is here that the part
finds its other, the whole, the unity of all the parts.
3 Philosophy Always Views Experience From Nor-
mative Aspect. The data of life as facts of experience should
lead us on to the joys of this other world. Science may go
on forever and it will never satisfy the craving of man's soul
for the deeper values of life. No world of mere analyses, com-
parison and generalization can fully satisfy the demand for a
life with meaning and purpose. The part can never rest with-
out its other, the whole of which it is part. And value and pur-
pose cannot come from a mere causal inquiry. There arc no
values where there is no higher unity of purpose, and no ap-
preciation except of values.
Philosophy never loses sight of its one aim, that of giving
an account of the world as appreciation and value. The
view of philosophy is always normative, never descriptive. The
view of science is always descriptive and never normative.
Every single fragment of experience can be observed from two
points of view, descriptive and normative, causal and non-causal,
fact and purpose, sequential and anti-sequential, ideal. And
it is the business of philosophy to view the facts of experience
from the normative, non-causal, purposive or anti-sequential
point of view, or in short, the teleological view.
Let us take as examples of the above distinction a few facts
to he observed briefly from these two points of view. I let
loose a stone and it falls. I ask why, and then explain the
phenomena by referring it to the law of gravitation, which is
The PkSftt^pktJ Bak
only another fact of v5drr pw m^'j^'m* - Tiis h the pro-
cedure of ptnracal yamcr. Xov I aK m^ii s Ac nature of
gra^'itation. and ixnr it s rdafied to i^ ^*c a c as a wfaok,
and at once I go from jbvscs to sKta^cn^ks. or more gen-
crdly speaking, to phik»opfaT. Or aga5n. I nm mr eyes to-
ward an object and get a j^^uTm mmtal rEprcssmi wfaidi b
called a perception. I cxplafn t!us pfeeaccmscfi by stating that
a certain hypothetical mcdfom caDed cdicr was set in moCiOD,
and these ttndulatfoDS or e th e r eal vibratioDs set in motion a
certain chemical actxrity in die retinal area of die eye. and this
gave rise to die state of ooosciousness called p er ce ption. This
is pure description and cxplanatfco. Bur now let us ask. \Vhat
is the ultimate nature of this ether? \Vhat is its rdatKHi to
reality? How do the vibrations in the ether produce thb
state in the nerves called a stimulus? And what is still more
perplexing, how do these nervous excitements give rise to a
state of consciousness? All these questions go deeper than
mere description and explanatHm, they involve questions as to
reality, and hence are metaphysical and epistemologicaL
4 Philosophy Includes SEvotAL Specl%l Viewpoints.
We have up to the present been using philosophy as a blanket
term, much as we did sdence until a division of the field of
science was made in Part I corresponding to this one. We
must now become more specific, for the word philosophy is a
very broad term. The world of values and meaning belongs
to philosophy, but it is convenient to divide phflosophy into
several branches, corresponding to the several sets of values,
to be found in its province.
In this section we shall mention only the various branches
of philosophy and leave for later sections of this chapter such
detailed statements as the aim of this volume seems to justify.
These branches arc metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics,
aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion.
It is quite consistent with the general movement of experi-
ence toward sharper and more differentiated points of view, that
the philosophy of life has come thus to differentiate itself. All
it to be gained and nothing lost by this division of labor, or
differentiation of function, provided we keep clearly in mind
the one ultimate aim of all philosophy as that of revealing the
" The Scope or Field of Philosophy 65
meaning and value of life, or experience. Each one of the
branches mentioned above has a certain field of human experi-
ence with which it deals and it has its own alms, scope and
methods, and its own field of values.
A division of the field of philosophy here will not only
serve to make more clear the whole scope of philosophy, which
is the aim of this chapter, but it will aid greatly in the future
when we come to trace the relations of ethics, which is one
of the branches of philosophy, to education. Philosophy as
the view of the whole of life is necessarily so broad that a
division of the field is necessary if substantial progress is to
be made. These several branches of philosophy are variously
called, when taken together, the philosophical disciplines, the
philosophical sciences or the normative sciences. The first
phra-se sounds too scholastic while the second one is too apt
to confuse the distinction already made between philosophy and
science. The third will be used in this volume when refer-
ence is made severally to the branches of philosophy. The
particular reason for my choice of the phrase, normative science,
as applied to the branches of philosophy, is that it signifies by
the very word normative that standards and values are in-
volved, and this certainly separates these branches from the
descriptive sciences, where values and standards are in the
sense here used unknown.
5 Metaphysics as the Science of Reality. Meta-
physics is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with be-
ing or reality. It might he defined as the science of being or
reality. This is an old question for philosophy and has inter-
ested the world at least since Thales, and probably much
longer. Metaphysics is the search for an ultimate or first
principle of the universe, in terms of which all thinp may be
explained. This principle has been variously asserted to be
earth, air, fire and water, by many different philosophers in
the early stages of philosophy. In course of time this ultimate
principle came to be endowed with what seemed to be con-
sciousness. For Ana.\agoras this first principle was the Apiron,
or living, breathing matter. This marked the transition from a
crude materialism in metaphysics to a hylozoism. This hylozois-
tic element had the advantage of taking account both of the
1
66 The Phito^ophknl Basis of Education
world of matter and of mind, which were then 'not always
clearly defined, but it had the difficulty of failing to reconcile
the apparent dualism between the world of mind and the world
of matter.
Again the attempt has been made to find a common element
between mind and matter and in terms of this pan-psychistic
principle to define the reality of both mind and matter. And
still other philosophers have given up the idea of a materialistic,
hylozoistic and the pan-psychistic principle, and have regarded
the reality of the universe as definable only in terms of ideas
or purposes. These are the idealists. The crude and unreflec-
tive realists assert that the facts of mind and matter are equally
and independently real, while the newer realists hold that there
is no dependence between the knower and the known, or be-
tween consciousness and matter, as the idealist claims, but that
consciousness and its object become one and the dualism is rec-
onciled in the cognitive or knowing process.
But whatever the claims of metaphysics as to what consti-
tutes reality or being, the field and aim are practically the same
for them all, and that is to discover the nature of reality or
being. What is and what is not, what exists in time and space,
and what is independent of these, and in what sense are the
facts of the phenomenal world real at all? These are ques-
tions for metaphysics and they penetrate the innermost nature
of the universe.
6 Epistemology as the Science of Knowledge. Epis-
temology is concerned with knowledge. What is the nature
and extent of knowledge? How can we know the real if it
exists? What is the validity of knowledge in the search for
truth and reality? These are some of the questions of epis-
temology, and they have received many different answers
through the ages. Protagoras, chief of the Sophists during
Plato's time, asserted that knowledge is impossible. All is
opinion, sense-perception. "Man is the measure of all things,"
he said. There are no universal standards of knowledge. Every
man is his own individual standard. This proposition also as-
serts that there are no metaphysical standards of being or
reality. This is the extreme of scepticism. But the great ma-
jority of philosophers think knowledge is possible, but just
The Scope or Field of Philosophy 67
how it is to be derived is a matter on which there is much
disagreement. Some contend that the principles of knowledge
are all gained in experience, a posteriori. The former group
are called empiricists, and the latter rationalists. While they
differ as to the limits and possibilities and methods of getting
knowledge, yet their main aim is the same, what can be known,
and how can it be known?
7 Logic as the Science of Correct Thinking. Logic
is probably the most abstract of all the sciences. It deals with
relations. It stands in about the same relation to the sciences
generally as does mathematics to the descriptive sciences. It
is not to be understood that logic has nothing to do with the
descriptive sciences, for it does. The great question for logic
is what constitutes proof. The concern of logic is with propo-
sitions, which assert a certain relationship as existing between
things or ideas. Logic must decide the truth of these proposi-
tions by reference to its own norms or standards of value for
truth. It is the nature of truth and reality to be consistent,
and the logical test amounts to a proof that such consistency
exists. If a proposition is such as to assert a thing by denying
it, then the thing whose existence is denied exists as a reality.
For instance, Protagoras asserted the proposition that knowl-
edge is impossible and that man is the measure of all things.
In both these propositions we find a contradiction, for knowl-
edge is asserted by denying it, since this much knowledge at
least is certain. The second proposition is false, for by as-
serting that man is the measure of all things, we assert that
this standard at least is universal, and hence all is not par-
ticularity.
In logic we are concerned with the standards or ultimate
tests of proof, or what constitutes proof, or sufficient grounds
of knowledge. These standards are not given as data in
the world of descriptive science. They are not presented as
immediate data for consciousness, but come through reflection
on the relative values of experience as determined by the mean-
ing of the whole. Logic is, then, concerned with the values
of truth, and like the other normative sciences, its business is to
aid in giving richer meaning and content to life, by showing the
form our propositions or assertions of relation must assume.
68
The Philosophical Bnsis of Education
. 8 Ethics as the Science of Right Conduct. Ethics
IS the science of right conduct. What is the nature of good-
ness? What is evil? What Is the nature of freedom ? These
are imfMirtant questions for ethics. Just as metaphysics deter-
mines the nature and standards of being or reality, and epistem-
ology the nature and extent of knowledge, and logic what
constitutes proof, so ethics determines the nature of right con-
duct and action. Ethics must not be confused with morals,
for ethics is a science, and morality is an art. One has to do
with knowing the standards of right action, and the other
with right action itself. Ethics determines the principles of
our actions just as geometry determines the principles of our
carpentry. Ethics, then, is related to morality in the same way
that geometry is related to carpentry, as physiology is related
to hygiene, or as mathematics is related to civil engineering.
Just as metaphysics has always been in search for the one
ultimate and final principle of the universe, in terms of which
all things could be explained as constituents of reality, so ethics
has always been on the hunt for the highest good. There
arc many goods, but there can be only one highest good. This
good is of course the chief aim of life whatever it is. One
set of philosophers has given one name to St, and another has
given another. The Epicureans asserted the highest good to
he pleasure. The Stoics said it was duty. For Plato the idea
of the Good or the Beautiful was the summum bonum. The
Utilitarians held that it was the greatest happiness to the
greatest number. Others have held social efficiency, self-re-
nunciation, perfection, and self-realization to be the highest
aim of man, or the chief good.
Ethics is thus a normative science, for it sets up standards
of conduct, and does not merely describe conduct or action,
which is the business of the descriptive sciences. In this mat-
ter ethics is like all the other normative sciences. But we need
not discuss ethics further here, since our only aim in the chap-
ter is to give a clearer view of the scope or breadtJi of philos-
ophy or the normative sciences, and this in order that later
we may see more clearly the distinctions between science and
philosophy as a whole, and further how philosophy generally,
and ethics more particularly, are related to educati'
J
The Scope or Field of Philosophy/ 69
9 /Esthetics as the Science of the Beautiful.
i^^sthetics is the science of the beautiful, and is related to art
in the same way that ethics is to conduct. What is beauty?
What are the standards and values of the beautiful? These
arc questions for sesthetics. And here again the questions
have received many different answers in the history of aesthetics,
by as many different philosophers. Some identify the beautiful
with pleasure. One a^sthetician says, "A beauty not realized
is a pleasure not felt, and a contradiction" (Santayana). But
whatever the answers to these questions, and they concern us
very slightly here, the standards and values with which
lesdietics is concerned are those of the beautiful. A purely de-
scriptive account of the beautiful and the way it affects us,
would be a psychology of beauty. But ieslhetics is concerned
with the deeper questions of what constitutes beauty, and what
are its standards and values.
10 Philosophy of Religion. Philosophy of religion is
the last of the normative sciences we have listed. Here the
questions relate to conduct again, but this time with man's
conduct in relation to God. What are the principles of man's
religious actions, or of his relations to God, so far as conduct
is concerned ? What are the principles of right religious action
or conduct?
Again, the history of philosophy and religion shows many
answers. Here also we find the distinction made between
philosophy and religious knowledge and belief, also what con-
stitutes sufficient grounds of belief, and the nature of belief.
What are the religious values? From these questions that
ihilosophy of religion asks, we get a still broader conception
scpp_e or the range of philosophy, or the normative
liZ
11 Our Chief Concern Is with Ethics. The several
fields of philosophy have been mentioned and their respective
questions asked merely to get a better idea of the whole range
of philosophy. We have but one concern in this chapter, and
that is to determine the scope or range of field of philosophy.
UMMARY OF THE ScOPE OF PHILOSOPHY. It is DOW
H 12 Si
r
I
70
T/ic Phihiofikictil Bash of Educal'w
; to bring this chapter to a
1
1 end. Let us take an inven-
tory to see what we have really gained. We have discovered
that philosophy is a very general term, just like science, and
covers several subordinate fields of inquiry. This division of
the broad field seems justified in the interest of more profound
inquiries. The questions philosophy asks do not sound much
like those of science, and its answers arc much different, and
more far-reaching. In met.iphysics philosophy asks, what is
being, or reality ; in epistemology, what is the nature and extent
of knowledge; in logic, what constitutes sufficient evidence of
truth; in ethics, wliat are the standards of right conduct; in
Esthetics, what are the standards of beauty; and in the philos-
ophy of religion, what are the principles of right religious action
and belief? From these questions asked and answered by the
several fields of philosophy, a fair conception of its scope as a
whole should have been gained. In this way we arrive at a
clearer conception of the distinction between science and philos-
ophy as a whole.
CHAPTER III
THE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY
General Methods of Philosophy Not Unlike
Those of Science. That there are some very close resem-
blances between science and philosophy is indicated from the
fact that the branches of the latter are called normative sciences.
Philosophy must be in some sense scientific or this appellation
is a misnomer. It has been noted already that science and
philosophy are alike in that they both use the same data, the
facts of experience. We have noticed too tTiat their aims are
di He rent, the aim of science being to give a description of these
facts in their causal relation, while philosophy takes the same
facts of experience and aims to discover their meaning and
value. Now it stands to reason that although the facts of the
two fields of inquiry are the same, that their methods must
be in some respects at least di£ferent, since their aims are so
different.
Any systematic and orderly arrangement of facts, leading to
comparison and generalization, deserves to be called a science.
hi^ this sense philosophy is scientific, and in so fat, as it is, it
uses the gener a^ methods, of- science, analysis and syjithesiSj
induct) on "and deijuction, observation, comparison and geaerali-
zation. Philo sophy n Uo miikes use of the method of intro-
spection, wliTcIi IS partriTularly adaptable to tlic manipulation
of tile data oT consciousness. Nor does philosophy fail to use
the results of experiment, though this method serves no direct
purpose for the philosopher. In the hands of the descriptive
scientist these methods lead to generalization and explanation,
which is the end. So far so good, but the philosopher, gov-
erned by his own deeper purpose, must go farther, and since
this is the limit of usefulness of these methods, the philosopher
must look for a method better suited to go with him to the end
of his journey. All tliese methods lead only from fact to gen-
«
^
[
73 The PhUoiofikical Basis of Education
eralization, or fact to a larger fact. They do not give to the
facts any significance, or value in themselves. True, these
methods of descriptive science lead to ver^- important generali-
zations, without which the philosopher would have nothing to
do, since he begins where the scientist leaves off, he takes up
the B^^neralizations or conclusions, and shows their meaning
in a sjstcm of the whole. If they have no meaning for the
whole, they are rejected as unsound and unwarrantable gen-
eralizations, since they form no part of the organic, or func-
tional whole of reality.
Then perhaps we should modify somewhat our former as-
sertion, that the scientist and the philosopher deal with the
same facts of experience. They do, but the scientist leads
from fact to generalization and law, and the philosopher takes
up the work at this point and deals directly with these laws
and principles, and hence onlvJiuJIxectly. with, the partinilar
facts therqafelyes. It is in tliis wav that advances in scieace
sTiould aid in a better philosophical grasp of the mpaning- af
life as a ivEoIe. Lnless there were such a division of labor
as~tTi^Tielwee'n science and philosophy there would be needless
waste of energy. Unfortunately this distinction between the
two fields is not always observed. The result of mixing the two
points'of view is inevitably a "riddle of the universe," and un-
clear thin Icing.
As has been seen, the scope of philosophy is wider than that
of any one or all of the sciences. It is more than a "science
of sciences," as Spencer called it. For a science of sciences
would still be a science, and would remain descriptive and
explanatory, no matter how wide flowed the circles of its gen-
eralizations. But as we have noted, the aim of philosophy is
appreciation rather than description, to find the meaning and
value of life, rather than to explain the phenomena in time and
space. A method leading no further than generalization of
facts and laws will not go all the way with the philosopher,
hut will fail him before he has penetrated the deeper secrets
of life. A special method must aid the philosopher. This
method is that of reflection.
2 Philosophy Requires Reflection. The most gen-
eral methods of science are observation, comparison, and gen-
The Methods of Philosophy 73
eralization; of psychology particularly it is sel {-observation, or
introspection; of philosophy it is reflection. Of these methods,
all but the last one arc limited to pure description and ex-
planation, while the last one, reflection, leads to a new world,
that of values. Observation, comparison, and generalization
lead to an understanding of the world; reflection to an appre-
ciation of the world. The two points of view arc different,
but they are only two, wa)s of looking at the same world of
reality — the one view that of externa! relations, the other that
of internal relations.
If the meaning of the world as a whole were identical with
each fact no search for inner connections and meanings would
be worth while, since there would be no distinction between
the inner and the external meaning of our experience. The
inner meaning refers only to the meaning the part has for
the whole of experience or reality. But, as we have seen, this
inner meaning is not brought out in a mere causal or temporal
series of facts, and hence the methods of rendering a caus_al
KCplanatlon of things is not sufficient. There is just one way to
get at "tliis" Inner meaning of experience and this is by the
method of reflection. It is the special aim or purpose of philos-
ophy, then, that makes necessary a different method from that
of descriptive science. Ever ywhere in life the purpose deter-
i£ines__the method to be used~in realizing this purpose. This
. will come out more clearly in Parts IV and V. Here it is
1 enough to give one illustration further to indicate how the aim
' or purpose governs the means or methods to be employed in
any given cases. Gladstone said, "One example is worth a
thousand arguments."
If my aim is to ride in the air I take a flying machine; if
I prefer the ground I may go on foot, in a cart, an automo-
bile, or various other wajs. If I want to go to Europe I
lam obliged to choose means to serve this aim. I cannot go
P all the way by train. And so if I want to journey all the
way to the world of reality I cannot go the full distance in
the vehicle of science, for its aims are not with reference to
such a world, and consequently its means or methods are not
expedient for the complete journey. With science I get off
at the half-way house of description; the rest of the journey
I to the land of reality I make with philosophy, and our method
^
jj
74 The Philosophical Basis of Educatio
of travel is through reflection. Let us observe how it works.
3 Value of Reflection. Through reflection the deeper
meaning of life and experience is brought out. But how is
this done? There is no ra}'stery about it. Clear thinking is
the one essential. But so is clear thinking needed in science,
and just as clear as in philosophy. The only way experience
can he made to have significance is to. discover its relation to
the whole. We have already noticed in the aim of philosophy
that experience has no value unless it can be related to the
whole. The part when alone has no meaning, all meaning
is in the relation of part to whole. And the whole is not given
in experience, but only in reality. The methods of descriptive
science cannot discover this relation between the part and whole
of experience, fact and reality, for by their nature they arc
limited to data in their time and space relationship.
By reflection is meant nothing more than the careful study
of the parts of experience so well ordered and arranged by the
descriptive science, to see what sort of a whole or unity is
implied, and theD_.a--refleciive analysis and criticism jn the
li ght of this whole . By the whole of life is meant its reality,
its full meaning, and in the light of this whole all parts arc
studied and criticized and evaluated. EealiilJsthus jiQt_aBaxt
fromj_ or .Independent oi life and experience; it is rather jJi.e
completjon. of experi eoce. A complete view of life would not
reveal experience in its present limitations, but as a whole or
unity. It is this whole that philosophy attempts to construct
out of the parts that are given in a world of external mean-
ings, or time and space relations. And this whole it is, in all
iis.-Qieajli£-UJ3ill'._oi paj.tSj, that becomes the "stand.ard.jfi3Ll[5-
The whole, since it is dependent upon tlie parts, just as any
other organism is, hos no reality except as it is the unity of
all the parts. Whole and part are thus functionally interde-
pendent. The difference is that the whole is dependent upon
the relation of all the parts, whereas each part is directly de-
pendent upon the functional whole for its significance and
meaning. _
Reflection brings the meaning of our experiences out into
relief by showing their significance as fragments for the uni-
versal experience, reality. Now man never is able to construct
The Methods of Philosophy 75
a final reality of his own, for two reasons. First, because his
powers of reflection arc limited to his experience, and second,
because this experience can never be complete and final. We
arc, then, only approximating the whole, or final reality. Or-
ganic unity of the present experience within a whole which is
thereby implied is quite possible, but as the circle of experience
widens so must our view of reality also widen. But this is
far from saying there Is no final reality. Of course there i>
no final reality in time and space, but time and space are not
conditions of the real world at all, but only of the limited
world of partial and incomplete experience. Such conclusions
are arrived at only through reflection. No amount of gen-
eralization based on the relation of facts alone will give the
view of the whole, the meaning and value of life. It is only
through the relation of the facts of experience to the whole
which they imply, that any significance or meaning is attached
pb) the facts themselves. This relation of significance between
Lfact and reality can be revealed only by reflection.
" 4 Summary of the Methods of Philosophy. Shall we
triefly summarize the conclusions of this chapter? The meth-
ods of science are available for philosophy in so far as the
latter inquiry is concerned merely with the external relation-
ships of facts in the phenomenal world, but this limitation of
the methods of science renders them useless for the deeper in-
quiry as to the relation of fact and reality, or part and whole.
For this latter search the method of reflection is employed, and
for the reason that it is not limited to discovering the relation
of fact to fact, or fact to law, but goes beyond to the relation
of fact and reality, and this it does by discovering the relation
of part and whole.
We have now traced the aims, scope, and methods of philos-
ophy. Further light will be thrown on its relation to science,
if we trace its relations to life as we did in the c
• To this phase of the study we now turn.
1
I
I
w'i.o th[s phase ot trie s
CHAPTER IV
THE RELATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY TO LIFE
I The Age in Which Philosophy Arises. £iQpi_tlic
fore£2ifl£_!iafitcriin-Part JI it,wULbe.Dbs!y-ved jesdiliijjiat
philos ophy is^np.t a pureiy .iheoretlcal inquiry- Like sc ience it
IS purely theoretical up to a certain point, and tHen"~the ^^aCr
tical nioti\e may express itself, or evea predominate. We
have called philosophy a search for the meaning and value of
life. Another way to put it is to say that philosophy is tj je
summing up of the experience of any one given agg. A philos-
opliy of life and experience is limited by the extent and range
of that experience. The philosophy of any one nation js
not the philosophy of life as a whole. Philosophy projects
itself very far beyond experience, but this projection is la rgely
gove rned fiy The extent of experience behind jt. Philosqphv
follows life as well as precedes it. It must first follow "Befo^
it canTea^. And uhilc cvrn with a limited experience we can
through reflection discover the nature of reality, there Is still
something short on the lealization side, for the whole cannot
be realized In part, that is in time and space.
Every age has its own philosophy of life and sometimes sev-
eral of them compete vigorously for first place, but this is not
to be greatly regretted. Perhaps it is only significant of a
larger meaning of life trying to get expression in life and It
breaks through in different places. There is no harm in dif-
ferent philosophies, provided they arc all true and show the
real meaning and values of life. While philosophies change,
the truth contained in them never changes, for truth is eternal
and knows no limits of time and space. The manner of ex-
pressing this truth may vary greatly from time to time and I
think it will, but this is only expressing the old truth in new
form. It is the same truth, for truth is not determined by
the manner of its expression, or by external relations. Truth
The Relations of Philosophy to Life 77
is an Internal relation, and like reality is not exposed
surface of experience, nor exhausted in time.
The manner of expressing the meaning of life difFers, but
life means the same always. It may not seem so to the ordi-
nary views. The philosophy of any nation is the best that
nation has known, felt and willed, and not at all the final
edition of reality. Reality is eternal and never changing, but
so far as it is revealed in time it comes forth in many editions,
and some of these appear posthumously as far as certain in-
dividuals and nations are concerned. There are some just
ordinary philosophies, and other editions de luxe, and just so
with the lives of individuals and races, which are best reflected
in their philosophies.
2 Philosophy and the Life of Reason, Philosophy
marks one more step of advance in the age or life of reason.
Man now has passed through the hazy cosmic stage of his
existence where he took no conscious part in the shaping of
his own destiny, out into the somewhat clearer vistas of com-
mon sense, and then out into the broad areas of light shed by
science. This is not the extent of his development, for lo, man
is a philosopher too! This is not a new stage, for philosophy is
at least half as old as the history of man. But the full mean-
ing of this new point is far from being realized as yet. There
are those who see in philosophy only what Protagoras saw, an
expression of individual opinion. The expression may truly
be individual enough, with all the limitation that this implies,
but the truth therein contained, if there be any, is not of the
individual, but of the eternal reality. For truth is universal.
Man's reasoning will go on ; it will become broader and deeper,
just as it has in the past. No man has given a final edition
of the universe in his philosophy. He may see the nature of
reality and what significance it gives to life, but there is no
last edition so far as manners of expression, or "systems" go.
Reality will not change in time, but man's view of it will.
Philosophy is man's view of reality, and it is limited by his
experience and his nature. So great has been man's progress
K'~ thought that we wonder what will be his next advance. It
ill certainly be along present lines of achievement.
}
r
78 The Philosophical Basis of Education
3 Philosophy and the Meaning and Value of Life.
Who can say that the search for the meaning and value of life
as a whole has no practical value? It has been said that
philosophy bakes no bread. Truly it does not, but it will
give the baker a point of view that might add significance to
his life, and even lead greater significance to his bread-making
as a part of his life activity. Philosophy gives a point of view
and a standard by which all values of life are determined, and
what could be of greater worth? Indeed we often have been
reminded that whether life is worth living, depends on the
liver, — the one who fives the life. If life is to be considered
worth while it depends on the view we have of life in its rela-
tion to the whole. If man is only a meaningless cog in a great
machine of no purpose, then life is not worth living; but if
each person gains his significance by clearly perceiving his
relation to the whole of life, or reality, then we see it in a
different light altogether.
There is nothing in all the world we need to-day so much
as a definite point of view in regarding life in its full meaning.
Science has made wonderful time and labor saving devices, and
now we must use these in transcending the limits of time and
space, in order that we might regard life from a higher point
of view. In other words, science has increased our facilities
for living, philosophy must now increase our capacity for
life. Science cannot do it all, although there are plenty of
people who think it can. With a science there develop means
and aids for living, but with philosophy there comes the guid-
ing vision of the meaning and value of life. Are both not
practical, both indispensable, each equally valuable?
Our age, as was suggested earlier in this volume, is marked
by its scientific achievements along lines of commerce and in-
dustry. But what do "progress" and "achievement" mean
without reference to a goal toward which we are moving?
Every act of man implies action toward an end, and the great
quest of philosophy is the goal or end toward which life as
a whole is moving. With this end before us all parts of life
become significant. Lose sight of the end and all is void, life
becomes a hopeless vacuum, a mere dream of empty meaning-
less fancies. Is it any wonder that the cry comes from the
philosopher that we must cease our meaningless haste and cal-
The Relations of Philosophy to Life
79
dilate the point where we are coming out? Without an aim
there is no prt^ress and if the aim is wrong or incongruous
with the larger philosophical view of life or reality, there is
no such a thing as lasting progress. Much work has had ta
be undone because it was not well done in the first place.
And much of what seems like progress to-day will have to be
done over, or completely transform itself, so as to square with
a larger view of life. Whether we consider life as a whole,
or in its smallest part, there must he a goal, or purpose to
give meaning and significance to itself. Philosophy is, then,
not an impractical thing, but it represents man's search for
the reality of his own being, which quest becomes, as we shall
ultimately see, man's moral duty, as well as his greatest
opportunity. It is the end, or purpose, that comes first in any
action that is to have meaning, however paradoxical this may
seem.
4 General Summary. In this chapter we have seen that
it is the specific purpose of philosophy to discover the aim, or
meaning and value of life as a whole, and thus to render
experience significant. The field or scope of philosophy in-
cludes the whole range of human experience, but instead of
merely giving a causal explanation of these facts, it interprets
their meaning and value, and this it does through its char-
acteristic method of reflection, by which the relation to life gains
its significance. Ejnally philosophy is extremely .practical— in
the sense that it points out the aim or goal of life, and gives
us the end to he attained. This gives direction, unity and sig-
nificance to a world of otherwise disconnected and meaning-
less experience.
PART III
The General Relations of Science and Philosophy
science and philosophy compared and contrasted
Aims of Science and Philosophy Compared and
toNTRASTED. Any further distinction between science and
■philosophy would be useless if so much did not depend upon
it in the conclusion of this work. It is absolutely the first
essential in clearing away the confusion in modern educational
thought. Hence this part of our work gains its significance
by reference to the whole of which it is a part, and hence is
justified by virtue of it being part of that larger whole.
Life can be viewed from two angles of view. Either wc
may talce the causal, or descriptive view of the scientist, or
the teleological or purposive view of the philosopher. Both
points of view are essential, and are related as part and whole
to each other. By giving us the causal aspect of our experi-
ence, science enables us not only to see the relation of phe-
nomena, but it enables us to shape our life accordingly. Not
until the age of science was man very exact in his calculation
of probabilities, nor was be able to control his experiences to
any great extent. He was the victim of circumstances. But
a change has come with the inception of science. Man is
now able to control very largely his experience, and to foresee,
circumstances likely to arise that will affect his existence. So
maii_has come to create and control his own destiny to a great
extent, and this through the aid of science. But science can
never tell what destiny is fitting or becoming to a man. This
is left for philosophy. The aim of philosophy is to show the
aim of life, its meaning and value. Science may multiply
the material comforts of life a thousand fold, and all this by
taking account of the laws of causal existence, but it can
never assert or deny the value of life. It has no business with
values. To consider facts as having value ts to give up
entirely the causal point of view of science. Science can i
"" 83
[
I
84 The Philosophiciil Basis of Education
crease our means of living, but it cannot teach us how to liv
well, or that we ought to live well. It can teach us the
causal relation of phenomena, but it cannot teach us the mean-
ing of reality, or true being; it can show us the laws of
thought, but it cannot give us the limits and values of knowl-
edge; it can describe and explain its laws only as we would
the movement and course of a stream; it can define the laws
of mind action in the perception of a beautiful object, but it
cannot reveal the nature of beauty ; it can describe the se-
quence, but it cannot give the meaning of the truth. By
substituting the word philosophy for science in the above sen-
tence we reverse the order and meaning. Science is thus re-
lated to philosophy, as fact is to meaning, as law is to reality,
as the whole is to the part. Science cannot do what philosophy
is to do, any more than the part can do the work of the whole ;
nor can philosophy do what science is to do any more than
we can substitute the whole for the part. And the reason
for our. inability to substitute one for the other, is that we have
different aims or purposes. One describes life, while the other
interprets it; one gives description of phenomena, the other
leads to interpretation and appreciation. Their fields do not
overlap, nor interfere with each other. They have divided
the realm of human experience with mutual advantage to each
other.
2 Scope of Science and Philosophy Compared and
Contrasted, The scope of science is limited to the facts of
human experience. Science has entered every realm of experi-
ence, and has generally succeeded in reducing the chaos of
fact to orderly sequence and law, but it has always left and
always will leave this field of fact as fact, without attributing
to it value or meaning. The philosopher enters the same field
with the scientist and instead of setting to work to reduce
experience to law and order, he proceeds to discover the mean-
ing of this experience. He is concerned not with the external
order and relation of things, but with the internal relations
of meaning, purpose and values. It is one field in which we
operate for the purpuse of discovering order, sequence and law;
it is quite another in which we seek the meaning of these
phenomena, or their relations, not to each other merely,
p Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted 85
to the whole of life.
The same facts of life give rise to two sorts of problems,
or two fields of inquiry; the one field is that of description and
external relation, the other is that of interpretation and ap-
preciation; the former Is the world of fact, the latter of values,
and it is by reference of the former to the latter, that of the
part to the whole, that the world of experience gains its sig-
nificance, or meaning. In this way we see the relation of the
fields of science and philosophy.
3 Methods of Science and Philosophy Compared
AND Contrasted. The methods of value in reaching a de-
scriptive and explanatory, or causal view of the world, are
observation, comparison and generalization, while that em-
ployed in rendering a teleological, or purposive view of the
world is reflective. The former methods are suitable for as-
serting relationships between facts and phenomena; the latter
discovers inner connections of meaning and purpose. If I want
to discover how a thing acts, or what it does, I employ the
methods of causal science; if I want to know what a thing
means, or its value, I have recourse to the method of teleologi-
cal or normative science, that of reflection. Since the business
of philosophy is that of seeking inner connections, ji has only
incidental u se f or methpds_iiiose_yalucs lie in pointing out
purely external relationships, i.e., connection between things,
not purposes.
4 Description and Interpretation the Two Aspects
OF Reality'. But we have tried all the way along to keep
from making a purely arbitrary and artificial distinction be-
tween science and philosophy. There is no essential conflict
between facts, the data of science, and purposes and meanings,
the data of philosophy. We have insisted that these are only
the two aspects of the same reality, the temporal and eternal
aspects. There is no more conflict here than between the outer
and inner curvatures of a circle, its concavity and its convexity.
Indeed facts and purposes are related as part to whole, and
there is no conflict or antagonism here. The two views of
life are equally important; they are the two aspects of the
same reality. The world of science and the world of philos-
1
4
4
J
r
86 The Philosophical Basis of Education
ophy, fact and purpose, represent the external and internal
meaning of the same idea. Reality neither consists in facts
alone nor purposes alone, but a unity of facts and purposes.
Facts and purposes are, then, the two sides, or aspects of the
same reality, the external and the internal meanings. In
reality facts and purposes, external and internal relations, are
harmonized, by being discovered to he functional parts of
the same organic whole; the essential difference being that
the one aspect is temporal and partial, while the other is
eternal and whole.
There is another way of distinguishing science and philos-
ophy, which will no doubt be of greater value for our particu-
lar purpose later, in tracing the general philosophical and
ethical aspects of education. This distinction has already been
implied in the foregoing. Philosophy is concerned with the
aims of life; science with the means for realizing these aims.
Who does not recognize the folly of choosing certain aims,
while at the same time refusing to adopt the means for their
realization ? Too often in life we do not have clearly in mind
the ends or aims of life, and so are unable to choose intelli-
gently the means. In as much as the means chosen depend
upon the aim to be realized, it becomes an important matter
to know what these aims of life arc. Nor are all means equally
serviceable for given ends. Some must be refused altogether.
It has now become clear that philosophy is concerned with
the aims of life while science provides the means. Instead of
deploring the advance of science, the philosopher welcomes it,
for he sees in such developments the only possibility of realiz-
ing the aims of life. He docs, however, deplore the modern
tcndencj' to substitute facts for values, as is likely to be the
case in an age of such rapid material progress and discovery
as ours.
There is such a thing as making tools without knowing the
use to which they are to be put, but such procedure would
generally be regarded as folly. We do not always see so
clearly that we may fail to keep the proper balance beti^'een
means and ends, methods and purposes. There is of neces-
sity an end for every means, but for lack of clear vision the
wrong end may be selected, or indeed, as is often the case, a
means may be substituted for an end, and thus arises the con-
W Science and Pktlnsophy Compared find Contrasted 87
flict in modern life, and particularly is this noticed in such
fields as religion and education. It is characteristic of philo-
sophic myopia that a means be made to serve as end. Now
when this substitution of means for end is made with no
higher aim or purpose in mind there is certainly danger ahead.
There is just one cure for this substitution of means for
ends, or purposes, and that is clear thinking. Cleat and high
thinking will lead from fact to its other, from part to the
whole it implies, and when this whole is once perceived it
becomes the meaning of all life, the standard of all values, the
fulfillment of all purposes. Means and methods are then
chosen with reference to this end, and no substitution of
means for end is allowable, except as it be a more immediate
aim, and justifiable as a compromise to the limits of space and
time, between full and partial realization. The substitution
of a means for end, or of a lower for a higher aim, is not only
a blunder, but a crime. We shall hear more about this in a
later stage of this inquiry'.
CHAPTER II
I Summary of the Relations of Science and Philos-
ophy. It is now time to make a general inventory of our
gains up to the present time, for we have now come to a part-
ing of the ways. We are to regard the world of educational
experience from tlie point of view of the philosopher, and
then from the special point of view of the ethicist, or moral
philosopher.
In our summary of Part I we drew genera! conclusions as
to the aims, scope and method of science. In Part II we did
the same with respect to philosophy.
The aims of science and philosophy are alike in that both
attempt to give an account of human experience, but each
gives a different account of this experience. Science remains
satisfied when it has succeeded in connecting in orderly se-
quence or law the phenomena of life, while philosophy takes
up work where the scientist leaves oii, with his generaliza-
tions of experience, and proceeds to determine their meaning
for a larger life. In this sense, then, the scientist is limited
to the facts of experience both at the beginning and the end,
while the philosopher is so limited in the beginning, but the
end of his quest brings him to a world of values rather than
facts, interpretation rather than explanation, meaning rather
than description.
Science cannot satisfy all the demands of life, for it reads
no meaning and value into it. Philosophy cannot provide the
means, for its search carries it beyond the value of time
and space limitations, or causal and sequential relations. Both
fields are equally essential, but each has its decided limitations
for life. We must remember, then, that wherever in the
future we are concerned with aims, we have to call on philos-
General Summary and Conclusions of First Three Parts
ophy, and upon science, when we are concerned with means
and methods of realizing these aims.
The scope of philosophy differs from that of science in that
it uses the facts of human experience merely as the data out
of which to construct a larger life, while science uses these
facts only in the interest of connection, description and explana-
tion. The field of science is a temporal series of phenomena,
while that of philosophy is an eternal system of purposes and
values.
The methods of philosophy differ from those of science as
a direct result of their different aims. The descriptive, ex-
planatory method of science consists in showing how fact A is
related to facts B, C, D, etc.; or how the fact A is explained by
its falling under the head of generalization, or law X. The
reflective method of philosophy consists in showing how the
facts A, B, C, D, etc., and the law X are related to the
whole of life, or how the part is related to the whole, or what
the significance of the fact or law is for life.
And finally it is the philosophical view of life that gives
significance and purpose to our actions, that gives us a goal
to work toward. And it is science that makes at least partial
realization of this goal possible. Science and philosophy are
always related to each other as means to ends, as part to whole,
as facts and their fulfillment,
2 Relations of the First Thrke Parts to Part IV.
We are now to launch out into a special field of inquiry, and
we cannot afford to neglect the conclusions already arrived at.
Indeed these conclusions form the very basis of our further
inquiry. Our results so far accomplished are a clear separa-
tion of the fields of science and philosophy, as to aims, scope
and methods, and the general part they are to perform in life
as a whole. Since this distinction has now been made, wc
have no more concern with science except incidentally. Our
purpose now is to show how philosophy is related to the busi-
ness of education. We do not need to draw science along with
us any further, since it has served its purpose for us here in
aiding through comparison and contrast to bring out the
relative functions of science and philosophy for life. Our
further inquiry will be more distinctly philosophical.
90 The Philosophical Basis of Education
Now that we know the relation of philosophy to life as a
whole, it will not be difficult to show the relations to the
particular field of educational experience. The relations here
will be less generally stated, and perhaps much more enjoyed
by some people than the foregoing part of this inquiry. What
has education to do with philosophy? What business has the
philosopher with the field of education? Can the philosopher
aid the educator in any way; if so, how? These are some of
the questions that will occupy our attention in Part IV. In
Part V we will narrow the questions still more and attempt
to find the answers that the particular branch of ethics would
give to them. Philosophy now says good-bye to science, and
finishes the journey with education, enjoying frequently the
sweet recollections of his former associate.
PART IV
The Relation of Philosophy and Education
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION
Relations of Philosophy and Life. Any account of
the whole of experience certainly includes all the parts, and
education is one of the parts. Then, since science attempts to
describe and explain all phenomena of life, there would cer-
tainly be a science of education. In liltc manner, and since
philosophy aims to discover the meaning and value of all life
and experience, there would also be a philosophy of education.
We are here concerned with the latter view o" "
3 The Philosophy of Education as the Meaning
AND Value of Education, A philosophy of life attempts
to give the meaning of human experience by showing its rela-
tion to the whole, which is implied in the part. The philos-
ophy of education attempts in like manner to construct the
meaning of the whole out of the parts, or to show the meaning
and value of educational experience for life as a whole. There
is grave danger that the parts blind our eyes to the whole,
and hence cause us to lose sight of the larger significance of
our experience, which is always in part. There are many to
whom the penny looks larger than the moon, and who couM
scarcely be led to alter their opinions. We are constantly
reminded that when the present is so fleeting and exacting,
^that we have not time to bother about the past or future.
Perhaps the future is no better than the present, but certainly
the whole must be greater than the part. But it is so easy
to just drift along and not have to struggle at all, and so we
drift, but whence our origin or whither we go, is a matter of
no great concern to countless numbers. If these questions
do concern us they are usually answered by blind faith, rather
I than from an enlightened view of life as a whole. We arc so
Jwaj'ward, so prodigal. We need to find out the meaning
93
4
94 The Pliilosophicfil Basis of Educaiio
of life and then we will make better use of our time,
need more rationality and less sentimentality in education, and
perhaps in the other regions of human experience as well.
There is nothing quite so potent in driving away sentimental-
ity and blind faith as a wholesome philosophy of life. When
I all ctperience is counted of equal value and no selecting or
I hierarchy of values is made, we are certain to substitute the
part for the whole, and particularly because it is more immedi-
ate and tangible. Tangibility spells reality for a great many
short-sighted people. And not a few of these people have
much to do in directing the educational affairs of our state and
A philosophy of education will serve as a balance wheel in
the educational system. It will substitute meaning for facts,
values, and purpose for external connections, and give a goal
to work to, which obviates the necessity for setting up a
means as an end in itself, thereby robbing the means of its
real serviceableness for life as a whole. A philosophy of edu-
cation will prevent our working at cross purposes by keeping
the idea of the end in mind, and selecting the means accord-
ingly. This will aid the clear thinking so much needed in
education, and which was emphasized in the Introduction,
3 Educational Experience. We have spoken of edu-
cation as though it defines definitely a certain area of human
experience. But this area is not so clearly viewed by many
people. We must define the scope of what is included in
education in this dissension. In its broadest sense education is
almost synonymous with the whole of our experiences, for
there is no experience that cannot be said to have educational
significance, either positive or negative. But we must more
definitely define its limits. It will be granted that all expe-
rience has educational bearing, but as we use the term here it
means "systematic" education, to use Spencer's phrase. The
unsystematic, or "fortuitous" education is not under discus-
sion here. More strictly still we mean by systematic education,
institutional education, or the kind that is established and
organized by the church or nation, and provided for by private
or public money set aside for this purpose. Thus viewed edu-
cation becomes one of the functional organizations of society
The Philosophical Aspects of Education 95
for the promotion by organized effort of certain aims of life.
What these aims or purposes are, can be answered better fur-
ther on in our discussion.
4 Various Philosophical Aspects. We have spoken
so far of the philosophy of education with no attempt to
discuss at length the particular branches of this field. A
philosophy of education attempts to show what education
means, and what are its values, Wc have already seen that
philosophy is a very broad 1
account of life, philosophy has
different branches, each one of >
purposes.
Philosophy includes
reality; epistemology, ■
the tiieory of truth ;
In th(
divided ii
'hich has
fuller
field into several
:s special aims and
letaphysics, or the theory of being, or
r the theory of knowledge; logic, or
:s, or the theory of the good ; arethetics,
or the theory of beauty. Every problem of life can be ques-
tioned and answered either from the descriptive or from the
normative points of view, both by science and by philosophy.
From the philosophical side we can view the matter from the
more acute angles of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics,
sesthetics and the philosophy of religion. So when we speak
of the philosophy of education we mean to include all these
points of view with respect to education. We shal(\view
education from these several philosophical aspects, — first, the
metaphysical aspects of education. It must be remembered,
however, that only one of these points of view, namely, ethics,
concerns us in any but a general way in this work. There is
much to be gained from a brief look at education from these
several points of view.
CHAPTER II
THE METAPHYSICAL ASPECT OF EDUCATION
1 Metaphysics an Effort to Think Clearly. Meta-
physics has been defined already as the search for reality or
true beinE, and the starting point is always the experience
of life, and this includes education. It ought to be clear, then,
that metaphysical inquiries are of vital concern to education.
For each fragment of experience must be judged in the light
of the whole. Metaphysics asks concerning educational ex-
perience: What does it rnean for reality as a whole? In
what sense is it real?
James says that metaphysics is nothing more than a-vefy
obstinate effort. to think clearly. It takes nothing for granted
without careful consideration of what such an assumption
means for the whole of reality. It must be consistent with
the whole of reality or it is pronounced false or untrue. AV
ultimate or ^nal questions -must be triced at the courts of meta-
pHysics before the bar of reason. These jjltimate questioos
may just as well arise in the field of.e3ucatioa as any.whctC-
But usually we do not stop long enough in education to ask
questions, and if \i'e do we do not take time enough to
answer them so thoroughly. KanI thought that perhaps_illF
chief value of metaphysics comes not from our settling finally
any great problem, but from the fact that in the attempt our
own thought is made clearer. If this much is done in our
metaphysical inquiries we certainly ought to take courage.
The man was probably wrong, tlii'n, who defined metaphj'sics
as the art of putting things that everybody knows in language
that nobody can understand.
2 Every One Has a Metapuvsics of Some Sort,
Metaphysics, since it is concerned with the first principles ai
"^lysical and mental existence, is at the very bottom oljjl
— ' 96
The Milaphysical Aspect of Education 97
our thmking, and whether wjttingly or no every one of us
has a metaphysic, though it may be a poor one. As Emile
Faquet says, "II restille que ceux que sont le plus antimeto-
physiciens sont metaphysiciens encore" {Pour Quon Lise Pla-
ton, p. 97). "Those who are the most anti-metaphysical are
metaphysicians still." It is becoming to a man to have a sys-
tematic way of looking at life as a whole, and this involves
a metaphysic.
Metaphysics to the Germans has long been the very ground-
work of ail philosophy, since it is the branch concerned with I
the first principles of existence. Ethics was the groundwork I
of philosophy for the Greeks, while psychology was for a long |
time the foundation of the English schools. (Cf. Cushman,
History of Philosophy, Vol. 11, p. 332.)
3 Metaphysics as a Criticism of the Principles op
Science. Metaphysics criticises the first principles or pre-
suppositions of all science, both descriptive and normative.
Science takes many thinp for granted, metaphysics takes noth-
ing for granted. Time, space, and matter are taken as real
by science, but metaphysics tries to discover in what sense
they are real, if real at ail. We shall see later that logic,
ethics and a:sthetics make similar presuppositions at the be-
ginning, and it is the business of metaphysics to deal with
these also. It is not the business of metaphysics to displace
the other sciences, or to show their respective boundaries, but
rather to question the soundness of their fundamental con-
ceptions or principles in the light of being as a whole, fhe
sciences gives, the facts of experience in related and connect
order,_But from different angles, metaphysics must give th?
view'of experience as a related whol^
4 Metaphysics the Science of Sciences. But meta-
physics does more than simply criticise the principles and pre-
suppositions in their relation to the whole. It correlates the
results of the special sciences into larger generalizations. Some
have thought that it is the final aim of metaphysics merely to
give a systematic account of all the results of science, and so
it has been called the "science of sciences." Metaphysics
iJl -would, according to this view, contain the widest possible
The Philosophical Basis of Edticalio
r tfiw^^
generalizations of science, and nothing more. Further
this Spencer would not go, for all the rest is of the unknow-
able. Science exhausts the possibilities of knowledge and
philosophy can go no further than to systematize these spe-
cial results into a larger or universal whole. Titchener
says, "Metaphysics is the discipline that undertakes the cckh-
plete synthesis of scientific results," {Outlines of Psychology,
>■ 364-)
Metaphysics, according to the view here taken, goes much
farther than a criticism of the first principles of science oz
Lj^stematic generalization of the results of all science. It
IS constructive as well as destructive and polemic. It goes out
' I search of principles of its own. But instead of searching
for the principles of the part represented by the different
sciences, it searthes for the principles of true being, or those
upon which the whole universe is based. It asks what are
the basic principles of reality. How are these related to the
fragmentary experience of life? These are profound ques-
tions, and are important in every walk of life, so much so,
that if we do not go to the trouble to prove them, we assume
them in spite of our denial, thus asserting the truth of their
existence. The principles, or causes, here under consideratiqD
not tempriral, but eternal. They are real for they arc tju£
"for all time and, place, and for everybody.
The real cause of the universe is teleological or purposiyg,
lot material or sequential. There are several different kinds
of causes, but there is only one final, or the first cause, and
metaphysics is in search lor this first cause, or ultimate prin-
ciple of the universe,
i Metaphysics a Search for First Principles. We
then, that metaphysics is the universal ground of all
knowledge, as well as a criticism of the first principles of sci-
ence, a systematization of these into a larger group of generali-
zations, and a search for the ultimate principles of existence or
the first cause, or final principle of reality.
Metaphysics, as the science of being or reality, is the foun-
dafibn of knowledge, for it would be meaningless to ask the
nature and extent of knowledge, without first asking wh^t
there is to be known, or what is real. It might just
^m The MetaphysiceiJ Aspect of Education 99
be asked what is real if it cannot be known? How are wc
to approHcb the real if we cannot know it? This shows very
clearly the close relationship between metaphysics, as the science
of being or reality, and epistemology, or the science of knowl-
edge.
6 Metaphysics the Science of Reality. Metaphysics
is an inquiry into the first principles of reality, or final causes,
true being. This is its field, but what about the gains it has
made? In answering this question I stick to my point of
view of idealism, and the results must be judged accordingly.
For idealism the ultimate, or final principles of being or
reality is purpose, or idea. Hence the term idealism. All
reality is definable In last analysis in terms of ideas or pur-
pose Xhe final cause for which metiphysics is in search can
be def ned only n terms of deas But s n e deas ha e refer-
en e both to an e\ternal and to an nternal world to fact and to
fficln'ng V e si all refer to the external and the mternal mein-
ng (f our de It s the evter nl mein ngs ot our deas
thit a e tn ed n the desc pi e c en es h le the nternal
n an ngs are tra ed n tl e no mat e sc en e The evternal
referen e of deas a to tl e fa t o Id th nterml reference
s t p rpose ( )ur c! et n em s th nternal relatioocLidf
purgpses a relaropshtp Ti h sVe ce ann t tollo
Ideal ra ans ers the que t on as to hat the final pr nci-
ple of the un verse or the ult mate nat re of the un verse and
ground of knowledge by say ng that free njeJJ^ence ;g^tlje
onlj cauijc that reallj explajos anxtJu»g^ It s the onU means
of e\p!a n ng the hanges that take pi cc n the orld thout
con e ng t me as a sometl ng dependent of our e\per ences.
The latter onfu on g es r se to the mechan ca! oncept ons
of nature 1 cl g e us noth ng more than the seq ent al
order of phenomena nat re I tell gence the onlj cause
that s a satsfactor e\pl at on of th ngs and >; the only
ground for tiie unforntj ot o cxper ence Mechan k.al
causality vanislies with tbe independent existence of time, which
is its fundamental condition." (Bowne, Personniism, p. 214.)
The whole structure of the phenomenal world of science
thus is seen to rest on the supposition of the reality of time
and space. Science has a right to make such a supposition of
lOO The Philosophical Basis of Education
the reality of time and space, but inelaphysics must determine
its relation of the whole of realit>'.
7 Appearance and Reality. Just as soon as the ideal-
ist speaks, the whole army of his opponents is ready to
pounce upon him, A man must indeed ie ye ry sanguine, if
not altogether presumptuous, to attempt to deny the reality
of the world of common sense and science, as against the world
of ideals and purpose. The task of idealism Is not to deny
l£c reality of the world of common sense as real, but to show in
what sense it is real, or how it is related to reality as a whole.
The world of appearance, or sense-perception, is here not de-
nied as real, for it has a reality. In what sense is it real?
This is the great ontologica! question as to the relation .af
die world of sense to that of reality as a whole. The old at-
tempt to disprove the reality of the sense world has been given
up as unsuccessful by most metaphysicians, and the vital prob-
lem has come to be that of showing the relation of the world
of reality as a whole.
The plain man views sensation as altogether too simple a
process, and one that carries with it, its own meaning and
interpretation. According to this view sensations not only
give the immediate data of experience, but their own interpre-
tation as well. Thought is thus overlooked, and it is an easy
matter to overlook the function of thought, for it is so fleeting
in its function, but we stand a chance of seeing the meaning
of things only when we realize the organizing and rationalizing
power of the mind itself. Thus we do npt so much perceilie
our world as we think -if. Perception is a very compli-
cated process and never gives us the reality of things that
we are all in search of, but only the partial view out of
which we all make our world, Thus^ we see that reality_is
not immediately given but arrived at only through the thoi^t
process.
The phenomenal world is not an unreal world but one
which exists alone for thought or the intellect. It is the time
and space world, and has its reality, only in its being known.
It is not a nonentity else it could not be known, but it has
being only in its being known. This world of time and space
IS a manifestation of personal being that expresses himself in
The Metaphysical Aspett of Education
this way in the world of time and .soacc. The old conflict
between Hcraclitus and the Eleatics is" mjt possible of solution
except on grounds of personalism, or on the notion that reality
is personal. The jvorld js_bglh-pcnnancni: ajld.changifiE. It is
changing viewed from tlie point of view of (iipcand space, but
it is permanent when viewed from within. -There must be
something that is permanent, otherwise change .would have no
meaning at all. The changeless condition is in the mind itself
and it is the mind that knows the changing order ci" temporal
reality. ... - ^
The o nly real cause that can explain anything is pfi'scnul
causejtliicli we can Lnoiv. There is no fictitious, unknoy jole
noumenon that cannot be brought into the cognitive relatioft,
that cannot be known. The only reality is that of experieoi^p,
but our experience is only partial, but none the less real OD
account of its incompleteness. A more nearly complete ex-
perience would give us a reality of a larger content but not a
true reality. The larger reality expresses itself in the ex-
periences which we come to know. In this way we know
reality.
lO, ■
H T
■•v j
1
8 The Cardinal Principle of Voluntaristic Ideal-
ism: Reality the Absolute Will or Purpose. The car-
dinal principle of idealism is, then, that being consists in being
known, not known by any individual in time and space, but the
absolute intelligence of the universe. To be real is to stand in
cognitive relation to this infinite intelligence. The real worljj
L thus consists of ideas, and exists only in thought. This world
lot _ reality manifests itself in the time and space world as pur-
fcnose_and intelligence, but never is the whole of reality thus
[siyen, for this would mean the whole is given in the part,
gwhich is a contradiction. -.••-■•'
W" XhSueht Js the essential nature of reality, and it is intelli--^,'!«^«{
KEent or purposive action that characterizes thought. It is by .■
I emphasizing this purposive aspect of the world that the essen-
tial feature of voluntaristic idealism is revealed. The trend
of idealism is from that of emphasizing the rationality of the
Ohiver^e to an emphasis on its purposive aspect, yet both are ■
I^ential aspects to the world of leality. ^^^h
Idealism explains everything in terms of intellect. Itself ^^^|
I02 Tile l'hihso/>liicol'.Dasis of Education
it does not c.vplain, sint^it is the essential nature of reality
itself, the first prinqiRl^'of being. Bowne saj-s, "Intellect ex-
plains everything Jhiif-vitself. It exhibits other things as its
own product an^" aV'e.xemplifying its own principles; but it
never explains.^iiscH- It knows itself in living and only in
living, but it, ncj^r is to be explained by anything, being itself
the only printiftle of explanation." {Fersontilism, p. 216.)
We canqot gb' behind self-conscious existence to any further
explanatiofr.of things, for self-conscious existence is the ulti-
mate .eiifpl;'"^''')" in itself, and to attempt to go farther back
is ^iuipj^ to explain the explanation and this pushes us into
bartroi tautology. Thus we see that for Idealism, "Living.
a^cjng ihtelngence is the source of all truth and reality, and
;_'S^'-its own and only standard," and that "knowledge arises
. tn the mind only through its own activity." (Bowne,
'•Metaph., p. 425.) The same author says one of the main
theses of Idealism is that of "denying all extra mental exist-
ence and making the world of objective experience a thought
world which would have neither meaning nor possibility apart
from intelligence." {Mctaph., p. 423.)
9 The Problem of One and the Many: Fact and
Purpose. When any such a view as the above is held about
reality there at once arise a good many problems. Perhaps
first in importance is the problem of the one and the many.
Is reality one or is it many? This question has always stood
as one of the persistent problems of philosophy and there is
yet no universal agreement as to the answer. Every answer
of this sort must be given in the light of what is thought to
constitute the reality of the universe. So we must answer this
question in the light of the foregoing statement as to the
nature of reality. Reality is the whole, about which so njucb
has been said in this volume, ^nd its nature consists in .acuuf
intelligence, which needs no other by which to explain- itself.
The many are simply the different aspects of reality as viewed
in the world of sense, in time and space. The whole of reality
is not expressed in these successive partial views, but they
form the starting point for the view of reality as a whole,
which is one and self-contained, not many. The part always
implies the whole, but the whole is explained only by the inner
The Metaphysical Aspect of Education
^^treladonof allthejtartj. The many has no significance, as .]
^HtlioteH above, excepfas time and space are regarded as real.
^^B lo The Problem of Time and Space. Time and space
^^Bare only the forms in which the world reveals itself to our
^B^ intelligence. Time and space would mean nothing except as
the world is viewed in part. If our experience were of the
whole, rather than the part, time ind space would have no
meaning, but in a world of personality where each one is only
a part of the greater whole, or the absolute intelligence, we
see only in part. Since we see the world as parts by virtue of
our being a part of the whole, ^£JlXCSSHily see_jh£jmi1djn
sequence, in time and place . '
cai
re;
bu
BXI
rai
^K^l
The Relation of Mind and Matter. Probably
a perplexing question is that of the relation of mind
and matter. Like the other questions, they get their signifi-
cance and their answer by reference to reality as a whole. The
real question about the material world is not, does it exist,
but in what sense does it exist, or is it real?
This question has been answered already from our point
i view. Matter does not possess its reality by virtue of its
listence in time and space, as common sense would say, but
rather its reality lies in its relation to idea. We have said
that matter is the external meaning of our idea, or the partial
meaning of our idea expressed. This time and space world,
which is the framework of the world of matter, is created in
the interests of our will, which demands that the parts of our
experience be expressed in their unity. Matter is not properly
defined when it is termed the object of thought. Rathet
cnafter is the external reference of my idea, it is the partial
.ilment of any meaning or purpose in time.
The Problem of the Infinite. The problems al-
*■ ready raised suggest the relation of the finite and the infinite,
and the answers to the former suggest the answer to this lat-
ter question. The finite is the limited view of reality, reality
conceived in its external relation of time and space. The whole
Innot be conceived as existing in time, for this would mean
substitution of part of the whole. Reality Is the purpose of
104 The Phihiophkiil Bnsh of F.duailion
the universe, and purpose needs not time or space for its exist-
ence. Indeed, as we have noted already, time and space arc
themselves creations of our own interest or purpose.
The infinite purpose is the reality, and reality is_infinite, for
itjas_no Itmits.of time and space. SuclTa view is logically
necessary since reality musr, whatever its nature, be whole, or
the other of our fragmentary experience, and the whole cannot
be expressed in time and space relations.
Hegel regarded the whole world as the expression or relation
of a plan, or an idea. This plan is revealed in our successive
movements toward the other implied in our experience. Such
a universal plan can never be realized completely in experience,
because the part can never stand for the whole, and the whole
cannot exist in time. It is in this sense that the infinite is
represented in the finite.
13 The Problem of Self or Personality. Probably
the most important concept of metaphysics in its relation to
education is that of the self, or personality. This is. the cep-
tral problem of education. Personality, or the individual self,
is the infini_te, .e?(p_ressed in the finite; it is the union of the
internal and the external aspects of experience, relation of
the fact and its meaning, the union of the external and in-
ternal meaning of our ideas. Home says, "Idealism finds
ideas and purposes to be the realities of existence, and person-
ality, which is the union of ideas and purposes, to be the ulti-
mate reality. These views are in contrast with all forms of
materialism which would reduce ideas and purposes to some
form of physical existence." {Idealism in Edu., p. 7.)
14 God, Immortality, and the Soul. The questions of
God, immortality and the soul are religious concepts and are
metaphysical in so far as the reality of the objects to which
they refer are concerned. These are largely questions of value
for governing the conduct of man and are hence ethical or
religious. We may consider them to better advantage at an-
other time.
15 Summary. Let us, briefly summariw the main points
of this chapter. Metaphysics represents man's greatest effort
" The Metafihysical Aspect of Education log
to think clearly. The principles governing our way of view-
ing the world may not always be very well defined, but we
cannot get away from the metaphysic on that account. A
theory of first principles, or a metaphysic, is involved in our
every action and word, for each involves certain beliefs as to
the world order, and our reasons for our preference for these
beliefs rather than others, constitutes our metaphysics.
Bowne says that, "There is a growing insight into the fact
that metaphysics underlies all science." It is a part of the
function of metaphysics to criticize the first principles, or
ultimate assumptions of science. Another part of its work is
to generalize the results of all science. But the chief work
of metaphysics is its search for the ultimate principles, or the
true nature of reality, and it is in the light of such a view-
that the fir^t principles of science are criticized, and its results
generalized. Metaphysics is, therefore, more than a mere
"science of sciences." It is a science of reality, and reality is
not expressed as a whole in the world of fact. It thus be-
comes clear that metaphysics is the ultimate ground of all
knowledge, for knowing is out of the question until the prob-
^jem of reality or being is settled, for the question of the reality
©f knowledge is also at stake. Knowledge is thus first as-
^med and then proved.
The answer that the metaphysics 'of idealism gives to the
question of reality is that rts ultimate nature is intelligence,
infinite personality, the absolute will, which expresses itself
in the finite. In the individual self or personality. The real-
ity of experience consists in its relation to this infinite pcr-
sonalfty or will, and such relationship is expressed in our pur-
pose, which is the union of the external and internal meanings
of our ideas. Thus realitj- is one and unalterable, and the
many are only the appearance or the way in which the one
manifests itself in a temporal order of things, or to a finite
experience. The reality of this world of appearance, or spacc-
I perception, consists not in its objectivity, but rather in its be-
L mg known not by the part, but by the absolute will or intelli-
gence, which is the complete fulfillment of our meaning and
litxperieiice. For such a conception of being, time and space
f&e regarded as merely subjective forms of our experience.
Tic real or the absolute, is thus not in time but includes all I
lo6 The Philosophical Bash of Education
time. lo audi a conception the problem of the self or per-
sonality becomes central.
i6 Educational Implications of Metaphysics. But
what meaning has such a metaphysic for education? The
educator must start, like all other finite beings, with the facts
of experience, and the nature of the human mind. These
facts must be compared, unified and related organically in
the larger whole, and this must be interpreted in the light uf
universal being or reality. We are not to begin the work of
education by stamping out the evils of child nature, but by
relating all parts of our nature into an organic whole. This
is the only way all things find their place in relation to the
whole. There is no other way to determine what is good
and what is bad.
Our metaphysical presumptions profoundly influence our
whole view of life and of education. For Plato all education
was to be based on ontology, or an understanding of the true
nature of being, or reality. {Encyclopedia Brit., Vol. XXV,
p. 423.) All metaphysical presumptions influence education.
Some of these exert a more special influence on education.
What there is about the nature of reality that enables us to
have community of experience is an important problem con-
cerning life as a ivhole, j'ct is not so central in its relation
to education as others, for instance the self or personality.
'Metaphysics deals with the presuppositions of the material and
mental world, but the latter are of more special importance
for education. Yet all these views must fit into the view
of reality as a whole. Our theory of the origin and destiny
of the world, our cosmology, is essential to a view of reality
as a whole, but this is not so important for education as is that
of our relation as persons to this world.
There is another metaphysical problem that greatly con-
cerns the theory of education, and that is whether reality is
one or many. Monism and pluralism give different answers
to this question, and these answers greatly affect our view of
education, though it is not generally thought to be of such
consequence. Pluralism is the metaphysical doctrine that the
relations of things are external, not infernal, and so the same
thing can be in different relations at different times. Monism
The Metaphysical Aspect of Education 107
holds that the reality of relations is confluent in all things and
that relations are internal and one, everything is present to
everything at all times, its only relation being that of its mean-
ing for the whole. These metaphysical doctrines of pluralism
and monism usually give rise to two rather sharply defined
views of education, the one individual and the other social.
I hope the conception is growing that science cannot settle
all the questions and problems that arise in the field of edu-
cational experience, for "science concerns itself with what is
accessible to proof, not with what may possibly be true."
(Palmer's Field of Ethics, p. 9.) Now the field of what may
possibly be true is the field of philosophy, and the present chap-
ter should have led us to see that metaphysics, one of the
philosophical disciplines, is concerned with a view of reality
that profoundly influences all our theories of education and
life.
CHAPTER rir
THE EPISTEMOUXJICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION
I How Can One Thing Know Another? The cen-
tral problem for epistemologj' is, How can one thing know
another? If this problem cannot be answered, then the search
for the reality of the universe is meaningless so far as its being
an object of knowledge is concerned. Palmer says, "The
function of epistemology is to determine the extent and valid-
ity of the knowledge which consciousness affords." {Field of
Ethics, p. 13.) These might be regarded as two ways of stat-
ing the same prol>Iera, for in determining Hmits and values of
knowledge, we determine whether one thing can know another
or not.
Plato regarded this search for being through knowledge as
the greatest delight or pleasure of the world. He says in the
Republic, that "The delight which is to be found in the knowl-
edge of true being is known to the philosopher only." (Jow-
ett's, p. 292.) This claim for the pleasures of the intellect
was not original with Plato, however, for Socrates had already
given expression to the view that the exercise of the power of
knowledge was man's greatest joy, but as we shall see Socrates
places a certain limitation on knowledge, which had to be
removed before any great gains could be made from this
2 Relation op Epistrmology and Metaphysics, It has
been suggested already that the fields of epistemology and
metaphysics are not entirely separate, for the problem of be-
ing cannot be made intelligible except through the understand-
ing, otherwise we would not know being when we found it,
no matter how it was found. We are ohliged first to assume
the validity of knowledge in order to begin our search and
prove its value by the efficacy or fruitfulness of its search.
The Epislewalogieal Aspects of Education 109 J
^m Being and knowing are thus seen to be related intimately.
^F Fullerton says that "Epistemology is the study of the 'nature
of knowledge and its scope,' " and later he states that "it
should be remarked, in the second place, that the investigation
of our knowledge inevitably runs together with an investi-
gation into the nature of things known of the mind and the
world," (Introd. to Phil., p. 248.) The same close relation
is observed by Prof. E. B. Titchener, who says, "It is the
problem of epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, to ex-
plain how the concrete experience, originally one, has come to
be divided up under an objective and a subjective aspect;
what there is in the nature of truth to make this division
necessary and helpful; and what measure of truth attaches to
each side of the division at the present stage of the world's
thought. It is the problem of metaphysics, which unifies
and harmonizes the principles and laws of all the sciences, to
■make the conclusion reached by way of the two abstractions
from experience just mentioned, the conclusions of both the
natural and the mental sciences and in their light to explain
the given fact from which they are derived, the concrete ex-
perience self." {Outlines of Psychol., p, 367.) How is this
view greatly different taken by H. Sidgwick. He says: "I do
not myself regard the separation between Epistemology and
Ontology as other than formal and superficial; for in the main,
when we have decided the most important epistemo logical ques-
tions we have in my view implicitly though not explicitly
decided the most important ontological questions." {Phil.. Its
IScoKetc, p. 112.)
3 Relation ok Epistemology and Psychology. There
Is another distinction that should be made before we go into
the problems of epistemology. I refer to that between epistem-
ology, as the science of the limits and value of knowl-
edge, and psschology, which is the science of the states of con-
sciousness. Psychology never grows so ambitious, when it
understands its business, as to ask about the limits or value
of knovvledge, for as we learned in Part I of this volume,
^^ psychology is a descriptive and explanatory science purely, and ^^^J
^^Las such, it is not concerned with values, or ultimate principles, ^^^^|
^^Vbut alone with a mere description and explanation of the wa)r-^^^^|
4
>lo The Philosophical Basis of Education
the mind works under certain conditions. Epistemology. on
the contrary, begins witli these results and attempts to find
how it is possible for consciousness to know any object at all,
and to know itself. The world somehow has become dichotom-
ized, or cut into two parts, the knovver and the known, and
it is the business of epistemology to see how they can be put
together again in one whole, and it is the business of meta-
physics to answer in what sense these two worlds are different,
or if only different aspects of one real world, then what the
nature of this real world is.
So long as psychology minds its own business as a descriptive
science, it will never have any trouble with ep is tern o log}', which
is concerned with ultimate principles o£ bumoa. miiici&liiadiag,
and how consciousness can know its objects. Psychology has
to assume that consciousness does know its object, just as
epistemology must consider the results of psychology before set-
ting out on its journey to find the limits and values of knowl-
edge.
4 The Central Problem of Epistemology. The great
question for epistemology as we have said is, what is the extent
and validity of knowledge? This is not a very simple ques-
tion, nor is it meaningless, since no less a matter than our
relation to reality is at stake in our answer. There have been
many diflferent answers to this great problem all down the
ages. Some have dented even the possibility of knowledge,
and asserted that all is opinion. Of course such rank scepti-
cism commits suicide in that it assumes to know at least what
is asserted in this proposition.
The central difficulty seems to be after we have once as-
sumed a certain amount of knowledge, whether its range is
limited to a knowledge of the particulars of our experience
alone, or whether we can know the universal as well. In
other words, can we know what is not given in an act of
perception, that is as a concept, or general idea? The logical
difficulty involved here is, with what degree of certainly or truth
can a proposition be made about a content not presented im-
mediately to consciousness in a single act of perception? Some
have asserted that knowledge is limited to perceptive acts of
experience, others that the relation between these simple acts
r The Epistemojogkal Aspects of Education 1
of perception can also be known, and still others that the re-
lation of these to a content never given as a whole in experi-
ence can also be known. There is a narrow limit beyond
which some people refuse to go in trusting the validity of
knowledge, while others remove practically all limits from
knowledge, and assert that we can know even God. It is on
just this question of the limits and values of knowledge, that
most philosophies come to divide most sharply, — it is the point
of greatest divergence in a great many cases. Knowledge pre-
sents a great many difficulties. When it is said that we know
a thing, what does this mean? It certainly implies a certain
relationship between a perceiving consciousness and a perceived
object, but it does not yet appear what sort of relationship is
involved. These problems do not arise in the mind of the
casual observer. As Plato says, "But people imagine that they
know about the nature of things when they do not know about
them, and, not having come to an understanding at first be-
cause they think they know, they end, as might be expected, in
contradicting one another and themselves." {Works, Vol, I,
p. 442.)
With the common observer things are what they seem, and
that is the end of it. We open our eyes and see, and seeing
is for such a one, believing. It has been noted by more care-
ful observers that the senses are very deceiving. Anaxagoras as-
serted many centuries ago that "because of the weaknesses of
our senses we are unable to discern the truth." {Cf. Bake-
well: Source Bonk, p. 53.) Plato also asserted that "The eye
and the ear and the other senses are full of deception," and
only the mind disciplined in high thinking can attain true
knowledge {Phaedo, p. 226). There is, then, a certain weak-
ness in the senses so far as their being a source of knowledge
is concerned. This shortage may not he so much due to the
imperfection of our sense organs, as to lack in pure sensation
of the universal element so conspicuously absent in sensation.
Professor Dewey says that "Sensations, per se, never enter
into knowledge. Knowledge is constituted by interpretation
of sensations, that is, by their idealization," He says fur-
ther that "Knowledge is not the process by which ready-made
objects impress themselves upon the mind, but is the process
by which self renders sensations significant by reading itself
112 The Philosophical Basis of Education
into them." {Psychology, pp. 138, 143.) Further, "Mem-
ory and perception deal with the particular object as such.
Imagination deals with the universal in its particular mani-
festation, or with the particular as embodying some ideal
meaning, some universal element." ( Psychology, p. 201 . )
Hyde expresses a similar view when he says. "Sensations with
no intelligence acting upon them, and reacted upon them would
give no knowledge within and no world without." {Practical
Idealism, p. 34.) This distinction between sensation and a
complete act of knowledge does not always remain so clearly
in our minds. May it not be that something worth while is
omitted in the following statement from Professor James?
He says, "Out of what is in itself an undistinguishable swarm-
ing continuum devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses
make for us by attending to this motion and ignoring that a
world full of contrasts of sharp accents, of abrupt changes,
of picturesque light and shade." {Briefer Course, p. 171.)
Similarly something seems to be lacking in the following state-
ment: "Knowledge is the result of observation, comparison,
and classification; all of which result from the relationship of
one thing to another." (Carpenter: Witness to the Influ-
ence of Christ, p. 46.) We might pile fact upon fact, but
this would never result in knowledge. Knowledge is of rcU"
tions, and these do not appear in sensation alone, but only when
we reflect upon our experiences. To quote Professor Dewey
again: "Thinking transforms perception by bringing out ele-
ments latent in it, thereby completing it." {Psychology, p.
158.) Thus it appears according to his view, which is es-
sentially my own, that an act of knowledge is not circum-
scribed by an act of sensation, but that knowledge arises only as
a result of reflection, and consists of a conscious relation of
known object to perceiving subject.
5 Knowledge as a Search for the Universal, So
prominent was the universal as an essential in the knowing
process, that Socrates regarded knowledge as a search for the
universal element in experience. Perception is the first stage
in "the knowledge process, or perhaps it would not be incorrjct
to say it is the simplest form of knowledge. The second stage,
according to Plato, is that represented by a knowledge of the
M
^^F The Epistemologknl Aspects of Edur/iHon 113
relations of perceptions to each other, and the third and highest
stage of knowledge is represented by our consciousness of the
unity of knowledge as a whole. This unity of all knowledge, alt
reality, all beauty, truth and goodness, was represented in
the "Idea of the Good" and true joy comes only to him who
can see these broader relations, "The many," according to this
view, "are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but
not seen." (Cf., Jowett's Republic, p. 208.) The lover of
knowledge is the only pure in heart, and he alone shall sec God.
Plato asserts that "No one who has not studied philosophy and
who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed
to enter the company of the Gods, but the lover of knowledge
only." (fforks. Vol. 11, p. 26.}
»6 Scepticism as the Denial of the Universal. The
history of philosophy shows a considerable number of thinkers,
who have held very different views regarding the extent and
validity of knowledge from those mentioned in the foregoing
section. The. Sophists, in so far as they were philosophical at
all, were sceptics. They denied the validity of universal
knowledge, and reduced all to opinion and perception. Pro-
tagoras, chief of the Sophists, said that "Sense perception is
the only source and only kind of knowledge." (Cf., Cushman,
History of Phil., Vol. I, p. 6g.) Again he asserted that "Man
is the measure of all things." Gorgias said that nothing could
be known, and that if it could be known, it could not be
communicated, He did not notice the contradiction in that he
asserted by his denial of knowledge, that something can be
known, and also communicated.
The long search for the universal element in knowledge be-
fore Socrates had not resulted in much gain, and the extreme di-
vergence of philosophies leads to much doubt on the part of the
Sophists as to the validity of knowledge. There was no agree-
ment as to the first principle of all reality. It had been asserted
to be earth, air, fire, water, a combination of these, and the in-
finite, by as many different groups of philosophers. The Soph-
ists, seeing the instability of the philosophy of the physical
scientists, despaired of ever attaining truth by scientific methods
iin their disputation. They neglected truth for popular effect, ^h
Their scepticism thus grew out of the philosophical agnosticism ^^^H
114 Thf Philosophical Basis of Education
of the earlier cosmology and physical speculation. The search
of the Miletian school for the first principle had failed; the
doctrine of the universal flux asserted by Heraclitus; the de-
nial of the reality of the many by the Eliatic sceptics, the
proof of the inadequacy of the sense organs, and the depend-
ence of perception on these, by the physical philosophers, Etn-
pedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus; all these causes had
marked effect in producing the scepticism of the Sophists.
Men often become misologists, or haters of ideas, after
many times finding arguments which they considered sound,
proved false. Thus they come to discredit knowledge generally
and become sceptics, whereas such experiences should rather
point to the necessity of clear thinking, based on universal princi-
ples, rather than mere opinion based on what the senses reveal.
(Cf. Plato's Works, The Phado, pp. 235-236-) If Pro-
tagoras were correct, there would be no common standard of
truth or experience, and the only reality would be individual
opinion. Each man would be shut up in his own experience.
Here we find expression of the doctrine of Solipsism.
Hume gave expression to the sceptical view of knowledge,
but in a more refined form. His scepticism was based on his
theory of the association of ideas. The only principle of or-
ganizing experience was that of association of ideas, and this
association is purely empirical or a posteriori. This left his
world in the same perpetual flux as that of Heraclitus many
centuries before. His epistemo logical doctrine led to his scep-
ticism. Hume saw toward the end of his life that what was
needed was a norm or standard of some kind. His scepticism
was the refutation of his own empiricism. Kant came to the
rescue of this world of Hume by supplying the necessary norm.
The sceptic denies his own position by asserting the validity
of knowledge, for as Bradley reminds us, "To say that reality
is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know
reality; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must
fail to transcend appearance Itself implies that transcendence."
{Appearance and Reality, p. 2.)
7 Kant to the Rescue of Knowledge. Kant sa.vs that
a world of pure empiricism cannot hold together for it cannot
find the necessary principles in any given experience or series
The Efiislemologiial Aspects of Education 115 1
of experiences, which are necessary to unite the separate ele-
ment of experience. He supplied these in the form of his
famous categories as the original and innate forms of the
understanding. Thus he brought order out of the chaotic
world of Heraclitus and Hume by supplying principles of
organization in the form of categories. Understanding must
supply these principles, for experience cannot. Kant was a
rationalist, not an empiricist, yet he placed decided limitations
on knowledge. He held that the categories of the under-
standing cannot know reality but only phenomenality. Their
inly purpose was to give form to our sensations and in no
sense could they give us the noumena, or ultimate reality of
things. If it be true that the only function of the forms or
categories is to arrange our sense perceptions, then it is true
that they give us phenomena and not reality.
Kant did not remove consciousness from the phenomenal
realm nor did he see the contradiction in his theory, which is, '
Tiely, that one phenomenal thing cannot know another.
There must be a reality in thought that is indisputable, if
it be true that it can know phenomenality at all. "
It one phenomenon can know another, is to assign more than
f phenomenality to the one, — hence the contradiction.
S Naturalism and Positivism. Kant would thus limit '
knowledge to an understanding of the world of phenomena of
the descriptive sciences. This doctrine gained expression in
many ways. It was best expressed in the physical science
philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Spen-
cer held that "In its ultimate essence, nothing can be known ;"
without seemingly becoming conscious of the fact that this
assertion carried with it much more than is justifiable on
I purely empirical grounds. (Cf. First Principles, p. 21.)
Macpherson says rightly that "So long as the purely mechani-
cal conception of the universe obtained sway over the minds of
philosophers there was no getting beyond positivism, with its
theory that nothing can be known beyond co-existences and
sequences," {Spencer and Spencerism, p. 69.) Another short-
coming of naturalism is seen in the fact that, as H. Sidgwicfc
says, "Naturalistic or positive philosophy does not recognize
what ought to be as an object of knowledge, distinct from the ■
Il6 The Philosophical Bash of Education
knowledge of the existences and sequences of phenomena."
{Philosophy: Its Scope, etc., p. 76.) According to the philos-
ophy of naturalism there would be normative science as dis-
tinguished from the descriptive science. The world of the
ought is not distinguishable from the world of fact. As a
theory of knowledge, naturalism does not seem to he altogether
complete. It probably goes as far as the theories of Kant and
Spencer would allow. A somewhat different theory is ex-
pressed in the philosophy of realism.
g Realism as a Theory of Knowledge. Realism is of
two kinds, the one holding that wt know the external world
directly, and the other holding that we know the world only
through our ideas, which alone can know directly. The
former class are called naive realists, and the latter hypotheti-
cal realists. (Cf. FuUerton, Intro, to Phil. pp. 181-187.)
Exponents of naive realism were Thomas Reid, Sir William
Hamilton, and Herbert Spencer, but they were not always con-
sistent in this view. Exponents of hypothetical realism were
Descartes and Locke.
It has always been one of the fundamental tenets of realism
that ideas and their objects are independent realities, they are
in no sense dependent one upon the other. There is a modi-
fied form in recent times, going by the name of new realism,
that asserts that when an idea knows its object, the idea and
object are one, but in no sense does the reality of the object
depend upon its being known. Realists are rationalistic gen-
erally, but they do not trust knowledge to the extent that the
rational idealist does.
10 Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge, Pragma-
tism offers still another theory of knowledge. Professor Royce
defines pragmatism as the philosophical tendency "to charac-
terize and to estimate the process of thought in terms of prac-
tical categories, and to criticise knowledge in the light of its
bearings on conduct." {Phil. Rev.. Vol. XHI, p. 113.) We
must keep in mind Professor James's caution that "By 'prac-
tical,' pragmatists do not mean the opposite of 'theoretical,' nor
do they mean to exclude the latter interests. By 'practical'
they mean generally the deductively concrete, the individual
^.^
^^H The EpisUmological Aspects of Education I17
particular and effective, as opposed to the abstract, general and
inert." {Meaning of Truth, p. 206.)
Pragmatism is primarily a theory of knowledge and only
■ incidentally a theory of reality. I take the following quotation
.from the International Journal of Ethics: "Pragmatism it-
self, though it was many other things also, was primarily epis-
temological temporalism. It proposed to define meaning and
truth in terms of intertemporal relations between successive
phases of experience. Usually they had been defined in terms
which either ignored temporal distinctions of before and after,
or expressly professed to transcend all such distinction." (Vol.
XXI, p. 149.) Professor James, leader of the Pragmatisls,
says, "One of pragmatism's merits is that it is so purely
epistemological. It must assume realities but it prejudices
nothing as to their constitution, and the most diverse meta-
physics can use it as their function."
We have noted already that the chief task of epistemology
is to show how one thing can know another, or how conscious-
ness can know its object. Practically all philosophies are
^reed that this is the central problem of epistemology, but
the answers they give to the question are different. James says,
"It is reality's part to possess its own existence; it is thought's
part to get into 'touch' with it by innumerable paths of veri-
fication," {Meaning of Truth, p. 214.) "Knowing," he
says, "is the process that gets us into fruitful relations with
reality, whether copying be one of these relations or not."
{Meaning af Truth, p. 81.) We are reminded that, "know-
ing is only one way of interacting with reality and adding to
■ its effect." {Ibid., p. 96.)
Pragmatism offers an adaptation theory of truth. Adapta-
tion of the idea to its reality constitutes the truth relation.
This point is made clear in the following quotation: "What
meaning, indeed, can an idea's truth have save its power of
adapting us whether ^ mentally or physically to a reality?"
^^ (James, Meaning of Truth, p. 238.) Pragmatists do not go
^H BO far as to deny the universal in knowledge, but they do
^K restrict its operation to that of bringing us into fruitful and
^^Kpractical relations with the idea's object. Perceptual and con-
^^Kceptual knowledge, or "acquaintance w^ith" a thing, and
^^F'knowledge about it" arc thus contrasted by James: "Knowl-
Il8 The Philosophical Basis of Education
edge about a thing is knowledge of its relations. Acquaint-
ance with it is limitation to the hare impression which it
makes." [Briefer Course, p. 167.) In another place he says:
"Conceptual knowledge (or knowledge about) is made such
wholly by the existence of things that fall outside the knowing
experience itself," (Meaning of Truth, p. 114.) Conceptual
knowledge thus is limited to the field of verification and prac-
tical life, for "Concepts are made for purposes of practice
and not for purposes of 'insight.' " (Pluralistic Universe, p.
290.)
To get into fruitful and practical relations with the world
of reality, our concepts must always succeed in bringing us
back to the perceptual world of practical experience. This is
clearly James's meaning of truth, for he says: "To gain in-
sight into all that moving life, Bergson is right in turning us
away from conception and towards perception." (Pluralistic
Universe, p. 340.)
Pragmatism is not a test of the concrete, as is often sup-
posed, but a concrete test. Any idea is true if it only fulfills
the test of proving successful in adapting us to its object, no
matter how abstract the idea may be. My idea of God is
true if it succeeds in adjusting my life to my concrete experi-
ences in such a way as to prove of practical benefit to me.
This reminds us of the doctrine of the Sophist that the best
argument was the one producing the mast desirable effect.
II Empiricism and Rationaijsm, From the foregoing
section it is clear that there is considerable difference as to the
answer of the epistemological question, What is the extent
and validity of knowledge? The Sophists practically denied
its validity altogether. The naturalists restricted its range to
the descriptive world of science and proclaimed the rest "un-
knowable." The hypothetical realists broadened the field of
reason greatly, hut failed to reconcile the dualism between mind
and its object.
Those who restrict.thejJiRof of the .truth_.of .an idea to its.
empirical test in practical e.vpericnce are called empiricists.
Those who make the test of truth the logical test of the rela-
tion of ideas in a system arc rationalists. There are other
distinctions also, but we need not mention them here. This
The Episternohfficn! Aspects of Eiiucation 1
B-distinction is brought out by the following quotation from
1 Prof. Sorley : "While Plato insists on the creative function of
I mind, Bacon distrusts the mind left to itself, and forbids any
I anticipation of nature," {Int. Journal of Ethics, Vol. IX, p.
J 156,) Plato was a rationalist, while Bacon was an etnpiricist.
I Empiricism is the doctrine that all truth is given in experience
I Sh.^ '1^3' the method of arriving at Jt is through observation
I and verification, and not reflection. It is doubtful whether
I one can be a consistent empiricist. Locke certainly was not.
I The truths of a priori deductions from fundamental principles
I are often substantiated by a posteriori evidence from the facts
I of experience and history, hut we have no right to suppose on
I this account, that such truths are only empirically derived
\ irom experience.
12 Intuitionism and Mysticism, Intuitionism and
mysticism have to be reckoned with in any account of the ex-
tent of validity of knowledge. Intuitionism is the theory
that some things are known immediately and directly without
the mediation of the thought processes in the usual logical
way, through inference, either induction or deduction. In
Other words, the process of reasoning is not always necessary
as a means of arriving at knowledge or understanding.
When this theory is appropriated in the interest of a search
for reality, It is not uncommon to hear it said that knowledge
is of no avail in arriving at the true nature of being. The
only way to get at true being is to eliminate all differences
I arising from the thought process, and be swallowed up com-
pletely by the ultimate reality itself. There is thus no media-
tion of knowledge, between fact and reality, part and whole,
1)ut is one direct and immediate plunge into the very heart
■of reality. This is the answer of mysticism to the question
of the limits and value of knowledge; another aspect of the
doctrine will be mentioned in the next chapter. It must not
be inferred from the foregoing that all intuitionists are mys-
tics. There are a great many people not mystics in their
philosophy, who hold that some of our truths are arrived at
» directly or immediately, while others are arrived at through ^^
a process of logical inference. It is only when this doctrine ^^^H
jg^made one-sided and applied to the ontological quest for ^^^H
I
re and 1
. For
signi£- I
120 The Philosophical Basis of Education
reality that the term mysdcism is applied to it.
13 lUBAUSM AS A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. Id(
^ra a very different answer to the question of the nature
nlue of knowledge from those systems mentioned abo'
Uwlitm "The nature of intelligence is to seek order, signi
Cance, purpose. It cannot be irrational to trust this character
of our minds. It would look as if the highest faculty in us
uniwrrcd to the highest fact of the universe. The contrary
luppusitioii certainly reduces thought to mockery." (C. F,
I)(ile. Hope of Immortality.) It is "knowledge" that "gives
tia the value of truth." ( Vliinsterberg, Psychology and
TtacHtr, p. 56.) Or as Paul Carus sa>'s, "The ultimate cri-
terion of philosophy is the intellect." "The Knowing self,"
MtyK Uownc, "is the primal reality in knowledge, and the only
Tfalily of which we have proper consciousness." {Mela-
pkriii's, p. 331.) "The test of reality is that a thing acts and
in acted upon; this is the determining factor in the world of
ohitnge and cfliects." (/iirf, p. 337.) The intellect in the
HCt of thoufi^ht produces its own existence. Thought and
MJiteiivc are simultaneous. Intellect is the object of its own
lh<iU||hl nnd it supports the world on real existence, the world
ut Idem. The phenomenal world is never real existence. Real
milllClK'e i* not out of thought, or in time. Thought not only
lllllkfi* itk mentiii constructs but in the logical arrangement of
lit uilUPl'm it llives them their meaning also. It makes for
III iMir wmld o( meaning, it makes the world intelligible. In
lIlM Ht'l ot knowing tome content is not added to the thing
blluHHi Imi rHthcr the act of knowing is a reaction, a reprc-
l)l(llHlli<l> "' « fonteni already in the thing known,
nn tiitiiUlon liriiBO the world is only a succession of rapidly
lllliviM.tl |ihi'ii<>iiii^nii, hut when thought is ushered in the whole
lllllMlli'M )• iliuiiuod, and the world is more than a rapid move-
tl(HU "' tuiHiiliiult'i* lUla. It becomes a world of meaning and
tllH|lt|Vi H W'lUil lliut BHini significance in proportion as we
IIH lHlt-" li' illl('ll"P' '''" lii^'^e" meaning of things. The real
U(|(|l|| (liiiii, 14 lU'l »lmply the world of sense, nor is it the
IlilllllV tlH'")t*'"' *^'"^''' "' ''"^ "'""'■^' scientist, rather the
III Itmlll l( m Wtitltl "' P'Tpise and meaning underlying all
[HimilHI*! 'IH'l "" ""'P''V Hrrtiiiuaiient, and we are brought
The EpistemoloffUal Aspects of Education
relation with this world through consciousness.
The causality of common sense finds its explanation
infinite series of successive events in a time world where each
cause becomes in its turn a consequence. According to th:
view causation must be sought in a first cause and such a
search ends in an infinite regress. The difficulty of such a
conception arises from a mistaken notion of time which is
regarded as a separate reality independent of our experience
of it. This view, of course, fails to see the pbenomenality
of the time process itself, which exists in and for intelligence
only. Mechanical causation has its practical value which
cannot be denied it, but its value does not lie in its giving
any final answer as to nature, but rather in the fact that
describes for us the sequential order of phenomena, which
order has its reality In the intelligence that knows it as real.
Only volitional or purposive causation can give any final
answer as to the real nature of things. Mechanical causation
apart from purposive insight is a barren abstraction. The
'e of things can only be explained truly in terms of per-
sonality.
Idealism thus overcomes the apparent dualism of the
verse by showing that such a conception has its basis in
clear thoughts of men. There is no distinction between the
world of fact and that of purpose, since both exist in and for
consciousness. We thus find here what is "ep is temo logical
monism" which, to use professor R. B. Perry's words, "means
that when things are known they are identical element for ele-
ment, with the idea or content of the knowing state." {Ap-
proach to Philosophy, p. 331.)
According to the idealistic epistemology we have partial
truth only on account of our partial knowledge, and "absolute
knowledge" answers to "absolute truth." (Plato's Works,
Parmenides. p. 54.) Knowledge for Plato consists in becom-
ing conscious of the relation of the various ends to the end of
I all ends, the idea of the good, and this is made possible by the
concept of numbers. The good is the idea of all inclusive
being; by participation in it alone do other ideas, subordinate
ends gain any existence at all. This good, the final and all in-
clusive aim, is the object of alt knowledge, indeed it is knowl-
edge. The idea has its own other which is the idea of tfie
1
^
The Philosophical Basis of Educalh
^
good, but other than the good there is nothing, non-being.
James criticizes the idealist when he says in effect that
"knowing" is not a "static relation out of time," but rather a
"function of practical life." {Menning and Truth, p. lao.)
There is certainly one sense in which the idealist would agree
to this view. It is quite true that knowing has very practical
as well as external reference to a temporal and spatial order
of things, but he will not accept the view, without better rea-
sons than are so far apparent, that knowing is a "function of
practical life," if this is to mean that it is limited to the
temporal order of thinp,
14 SuMMARV. It is time that we summarize briefly the
results of this chapter and point nut their educational signifi-
cance. The chief problem of cpistemology is that as to the
limits and validity of knowledge and this problem is vitally
connected with that of the nature of reality, or being. It may
be held that the problem of the nature and limits of knowledge
should be determined before the search for reality is in order.
Some one has said, though I am not able to find who, that "It
is useless to endeavor to discover the real significance of the
world and being until we discover the nature and limits of
knowledge. In differences of psychological theory all differ-
ences among philosophers take their rise." This view not only
shows the close relation of epistemology and metaphysics
(though it reverses the usual order of procedure), hut also the
relations between ps5'chology and cpistemology. Psychology-
docs, however, deal with the nature and extent of knowledge,
but only with the description and explanation of this process
from a causal point of view.
Socrates asserted that the particular in experience, or that
given by perception, is only an incident in the knowing process,
and that the universal, or the concept, formed the real basis
of knowledge and inference. He did not, however, give this
concept separate existence as did Plato after him. The sophists
denied the validity of the universal altogether and claimed each
man to be measure of his own being. The naturalists and
positivists accepted the validity of the universal, but only so
far as it could be verified in experience. The pragmatist is
also afraid to trust knowledge outside of his sight and so keeps
I
The Epistemohgical Aspects of Education 123 1
rein on it, or in other words, limits the truthfulness
idea to its power of adapting us in a fruitful way to
reality.
Mysticism is a form of ontological intuitionism which as-
serts that being cannot really be known at all, and is realized
only by a denial of all knowledge and the distinctions which
it makes. Idealism goes much farther than empiricism in
asserting the validity of knowledge, and makes knowing the
creative function of the world of reality, or identifies knowing
and being, and thus eliminates the dualism betiveen mind and
matter, or more generally between the knower and the known,
and thus brings together again through intelligence the world
of fact and purpose, which distinction was made in answer to
the practical demands of our will.
t5 Educational iMPLiCATioNS of Epistemology. And
what is the significance of all this for education? The signifi-
cance of these points of view for education lies in the fact that
they do as a logical consequence modify our educational theory
since they modify our view of the world as a whole, and so
our practice also.
The sophists' denial of the validity of knowledge would re-
sult in a theory of education that would fail to make room
for any training of knowledge. It would result, as their own
practice showed, in teaching the exercise of free and unclari-
fied individual opinion for each man is his own measure both
of being and knowing. For the Socratic school of philosophy
the highest aim of education was virtue, which was synony-
mous with knowledge. The only vice is ignorance, the only
virtue knowledge, and knowledge consisted, as w'e have above
noted, in a search for the universal element of experience, as
against the particular of sense perception. Such knowledge
had its foundation in principles universally admitted by all
men. Teaching consisted in consciously bringing to light such
principles, and this was the highest duty of man, the call of vir-
tue itself. "Know thyself" is first in every man's life. Not sense-
perception, but judgment and reasoning with universals or
concepts, form the basis of such education as logically grows
out of the Socratic philosophy.
For all forms of naturalism and positivism, the chief bus!-
A
r
I
I
124 Tke Philosophical Bath of Education
ness of education would logically be dial of training the senses
and perception, for by these cpistemo logical theories knowl-
edge is limited to perceptions and their relations to one an-
other, to the field of actual experience. The science would
offer the best means for a training of this sort. Hence, when
Spencer aslted the question, "What knowledge is of most
worth?" he gave a logical answer when he said, "Science."
Nothing could be known outside the field of science, so why
bother about the "unknowable?" But one might well ask
of the positivist, when so much lime is given to the external
things, how is it possible to give sufficient attention to mind
which alone is capable of dealing intelligently with things?
For realism both the world of ideas and matter are equally
and independently real, and both sides of experience deserve
equal attention as a natural consequence. No partiality is
here shown for the physical science, as in the case of natural-
ism or for the abstract sciences, as with Socrates and Plato.
Pragmatism, as a pedagogical theory, holds that "We ought
to subordinate our abstract and theoretical to our concrete and
practical interests, and that, in particular, our educational cur-
riculum should be made to conform more than at present to
the personal needs and future vocations of our students."
(Montague, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VI, p. 463, footnote.)
Such an educational theory follows logically from the cpistem-
ological theory of pragmatism that the test of the truth of all
conceptions and propositions is "verification through sense per-
ception." In this sense it is much like naturalism, but indeed
is in other ways more generous. It would not rule out re-
ligion since such concepts are "valuable," if they aid in adapt-
ing us to ihe practical demands of life.
Mysticism denies entirely the value of knowledge, yet it
would teach its doctrine by trying to enlighten us about the
nature of reality. Mysticism is a theory of being rather than
a theory of knowledge, and so has but little to ofier to edu-
cation from the latter angle. Indeed it is very doubtful if
mysticism offers any more help from the ontological side.
Professor Fite says: "It is rather difficult to deal with mysti-
cism on logical grounds; for the mystic has renounced logic.
All that we can do is to follow his directions for the quest of
reality and ask ourselves where we are coming out. Pro-
The Ephiemohgical Aspects of Education 125
fessor Royee had applied this method to the mystical concep-
tion of being and finds that the result is nothing. A dis-
tinctionless being is simply no being whatever." {Individual-
ism, p. 197.)
Idealism regards the world as a conscious reality. Absolute
will or purpose is the ultimate reality, and this can be known
only by reflection. No amount of observation, experiment and
verification will ever reveal the world of purpose, yet all will
aid greatly in adjusting us to the practical demands of life, and
are indispensable to an understanding of the time and space
order of the world. Only reflection and interpretation of
facts thus revealed will ever disclose the world of meaning-
value, and reality. While the idealist gives due credit to
the world of the physical sciences, he never forgets that the
facts and laws revealed through this mechanical order of
things all have to be worked over by conscious reflection to
determine their significance for the whole. It is partly through
such interpretation of the fact order that the individual self
discloses its deeper relations to the world of purpose and value.
Other implications of idealism for educational theory will be
discussed in Part V.
Plato unfortunately separated his world of fact, the tem-
poral order, and the world of reality, or ideas. Since the ideas
are our only source of communication with the divine reality,
the good, he highly discredited the world of material, and
so would miike no place for physical science in his theory of
education. The best way to get in relation with the real
world was by abstraction from experience. It was for this
reason that Plato preferred the abstract science of mathematics.
Here he showed the influence of Pythagoras. For the same
reason he denied all passion music and poetry. He curbed
feeling and emotion through reflection and abstraction. He
denounced the products of imagination as unreal, and belong-
ing to the world of appearance and opinion, only reason and
judgment partaking of the real.
In this and the foregoing chapter we have tried to make
clear the fact that no educational theory can be understood
in its true setting unless it is seen in the light of the whole
view of life. We have shown briefly what several different
systems of metaphysics and epistemology imply as bases of
1
126 The Philosophical Basis of Education
educational theories and consequently how they modify prac-
tice. We shall continue to show the intimate relations of
philosophy and educational theory by observing the latter from
the points of view of logic, philosophy of religion, aesthetics and
ethics.
CHAPTER IV
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY^
Me,
' Logic. Logic is the ]
I
I Definition and
science of truth. It deals with the relations
objects. It is concerned with the establishment of the truth
relation between facts and idea. Practically all philosophers
are agreed that truth depends upon the relation of an idea
to its object, but the nature of this agreement is a matter
about which there is yet much difference of opinion. Some
contend that truth is established when our ideas bring us into
fruitful relations with our world of practical experiences, while
others hold that the truth of an idea consists in its relation to
the larger system of purposes, and that it is of the very nature
of the truth relation to be consistent throughout.
Logic is concerned with what constitutes evidence or proof
for the truth about a certain relation asserted in the form of a
proposition. We make a great many assertions about the facts
of the world in ivhich we live, but it is quite another matter
to be certain that these assertions do not outstrip the evidence.
Huxley said that the assertion that goes beyond the evidence
is a blunder and a crime. Kant meant the same thing when
he said that "it is not augmentation, but deformation of the
sciences, if we effect their limits." (Quoted by Miinsterberg,
Psy. and Life, p. 178.) Thus we see that what constitutes suf-
ficient evidence is a question of logic. We are constantly
asserting the truth of relations about objects or ideas which
are not contained in these particulars and there should be
some way of checking up to see whether we go too far in such
assertions of relationship. We constantly are making infer-
ence from one thing or fragment of our experience to an-
other. We affirm or deny something at almost every breath.
What is the ground of this inference? How can truth be
affirmed on the grounds of inference?
127
4
F
138
The Philosophical Basis of Education
; tnirii I
laying I
Logic then is concerned with the establishment of the
relations between an idea and its object, and this by laying
down the process of correct inference and what constitutes suf-
ficient grounds or evidence for the assertion or denial of cer-
tain relations.
2 The Data of Logic- Wc see from the foregoing that
logic is not a thing foreign to our experience, but is the very
ground of our understanding, our experience. Logic is not
concerned with the facts of our experience as isolated parts,
but with their relations one to another in a systematized whole.
For the logician nothing stands alone, all is connected or re-
lated in a large organization of parts. Indeed the only mean-
ing the part has, is for the larger system of things of which it
is a part. We are not, then, in the field that has nothing to
do without experience when we are studying the abstract rela-
tions that a system, of logic involves.
3 Logic and Common Sense. Logic has a certain rela-
tion to our common sense experience. It goes considerably
beyond common sense, hut it certainly deals with the same ex-
periences, although in a more thorough and rational manner.
The man of common sense is obliged to make his inferences
from particular to general, and to assert or deny truths about
certain relationships. We have seen already that the logician
is engaged in the same kind of business. One of the great
tasks of our life is to reach beyond the particular that is con-
tained in the present experience to a larger unit of experience.
Common sense makes this inference on the ground of pure
supposition and does not go into the more fundamental ques-
tions of relationship. The man of common sense is too apt to
mistrust the logician. He does not undersrand his procedure
and consequently considers his formula as barren abstraction,
totally unrelated to the world of actual experience. I think
Stevenson has very well put the common man's mistrust of
the logical procedure. I quote from an Inland Voyage. "On
the other hand, it is not at all a strong thing to put one's reli-
ance upon logic; and our own logic particularly, for it is gener-
ally wrong. We never know where we are to end if once we
begin following words of doctors. There is an upright stock
The Logical Aspects of Ediicdtinnal Theory
in a man's own heart, that is trustier than any syllogism; and
the eyes, and the sympathies and appetites, know a thing or
two that have never yet been stated in controversy." The
logician is more systematic in his inference and requires a cer-
tain amount of rational basis before he is wilUng to rest
certain of the conclusions to which his inference has brought
him.
4 Logic and the Descriptive Sciences. It would be
well at this point to restate the relationship between logic and
the descriptive science we have already discovered in Part I
of this volume. The scientists have made great progress in
modern times because of the scientific accuracy of the method
of procedure. This is only another way of stating that science
is logical in its methods. Logic has to do with all grounds
of inference whether inference is of the type expressed in
common sense, or by the man of science. The data of science
must be grouped in such a way as to show their connection,
otherwise there would be no meaning. The methods of classi-
fication and grouping of phenomena employed by the scientists
represent the practical application of the principle of logic.
The sciences are logically interdependent for the very reason
that the phenomena with which they deal are interdependent.
The principles of logic are universal and in no sense is their
application restricted to particular incidents, not to the preju-
dices of common sense. The distinct mark of the true scientist
is that he strive constantly for the elimination of self in his
judgment and provide conclusions which are in no sense re-
stricted to the particular judgment of the individual express-
There is grave danger to-day lest the world of mechanical
science be taken as the world of final reality. The logician
establishes the principles upon which inference is made from
such a world to a world of ultimate reality, just as he lays
down the principles for drawing conclusions and inferences
on the basis of particular facts. The mechanical world of the
time and space has its existence as we have already noted only
in the ideas which think it. Tills mechanical world of science
is therefore not a world indepcmtent of our will, but rather
it has been constructed out of tlie practical demands of this
r
I
130 The I'hihsophUnl Bash of Rduration
IvilL There is grave danger that we forget this matter whea
we become fully absorbed in our science. Note what Pro^
fessor Home says: "The view of the universe as a mechanism,
is made possible to modern minds through Newton's law of
universal attraction, is a construction of man's own intelli-
gence to satisfy his own purpose in understanding the universal
motion." {Idealism in Education, p. 173-) Macpherson in
in his Spencer and Spencerism argues much in the same way.
He says: "There is something more in the world of experi-
ence than a mere succession of sense data. Some experiences
set the mind to working on its own account and cause it
to deliver itself of the truths which are not contained in any
of our actual experiences or in all of them together, but which
extend over a wider ground than e.\perience possibly can
cover." We see from the su^estion thai the world of reality
is not contained in the sense data of our experience. There
must be a passage from this to a larger system of reality, that
is to say inference from these data is made necessary as a result
of our demand for the relationship between the particular and
the universal, or the part of the whole. Experience is alwaja
in P.^t, but this part is significant and real in the sense that
lYitUout it the whole could not cxla. The parts are necessary
to the conception of the whole, and the whole exists only as a
relationship of parts. Professor Bowne says: "When we
turn the contents of the infinite consciousness into a kind of
eternal and necessary logical mechanism we simply fall back
to the lower mechanical categories which thought alone makes
possible, and subject thought to its own implications and prod-
ucts. Such a view begins in confusion and ends in self-de-
struction."
The methods of analysis and synthesis employed by the scien-
tists are logical methods of procedure. They are the best rec-
ognized methods of inferring the universal from the particular,
or the whole from the part. Induction and deduction refer to
the same general process of reasoning or inference. In theJa*
ductive method we proceed from the parts to the whole. In
so far as the scientist or the man of common sense employs
these methods of inference he is logical. The case is not dif-
ferent when we select a particular field of our experience such
as that of education. We shall see more of this particular
The Logical Aspects of Educational Theory
iftpplication in the last section of this chapter.
_ Logic and PsycHOUx;y. There has often been con-
siderable confusion as to the relation of logic and psychology.
Psychology is generally defined as the science of the states of
consciousness. Lo^c rnay-Jie defined as- the science- of -c
thinking, or. tht. science which defines the necessary- principles
upon which all inference is based. Now there seems to be an
overlapping in the two cases. In so far as psychology and
logic are dealing with the mind, they have a common field,
but their questions concerning consciousness are very different.
Psychology merely asks, how the mind works, and why does
it happen to work this way? Logic^on_lhe-other handr^hows
ofi htJTfi thp mind works when we think correctly, and shows
— -■- iiprp^sa.ry before we can assert or deny anything -witt
)_the mind, or the world. Logic is concerned with the
ideas and their connection in a larger system
■oi reality. Psychology does not consider the question as to
whether the ideas are real or not. It never raises any question
i to reality at all, either as to its own existence, or that of
the world generally. This much it takes for granted, leaving
logic and metaphysics to sTiow the truth of such a supposition
^1 its relation to a larger system ai things. Thus we sec
that there is no necessary conflict between logic and psychology,
although they do have some common ground.
6 Logic and Metaphysics, There are certain relations I
between logic and metaphysics that should be spoken of here,
if we are to arrive at a complete view of the field of logic.
"We have found some common ground between common sense,
logic, and metaphysics. The, relationship is best defined ^
one _of interdependence or mutual dependence. Logic is c
irncd with the" truth" relation of an idea and its object. It
never asks the question as to whether either the idea or the
object is real. It takes this much for granted. Mejaphysic^
is the branch of inquiry that is concerned with the reality, of
^e world, and all questions as to the reality of ideas or of the
abject of our ideas must be referred to metaphysics for their
lyiswer. Logic is concerned simply with the relationship of
ideas and objects in a larger system. It raises the question
versal, \
132 The Philosophical Basis of Education
as to how we can pass from the individual to the universal,
or from the particular to the general. It does not ask
vi-hether either the particular or the general has any ultimate
or final reality. I think that this point can be made somewhat
clearer by quoting from Prof. Aikins. He says: "J VTptfi-
physics . . . inquires into the most fundamenul and general
relations " of all things, and tries to find out what the inipiigt
nature of anything must be in order that all of these relatioas
should belong to it together. Logic like metaphysics has a
very general aim; it too inquires into the raost fundamental
relations of things and the way in which one involves an-
other. But its inquiry is not so profound as that of meta-
physics ; it does not ask what the inmost nature of things must
be in order that these relations should e.xist together in them;
and the knowledge that it does try to gain about relations
and their mutual implications it regards as a means, not as an
end. . . Thus so far as logic tries to make us reason, correctly
by giving us correct conception of things and the way in which
their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple meW-
physics studied for a practical end." (Principles of Logic, pp.
6-7-)
7 Logic and Epistemology. There are also close rela-
tions between logic and epistemology, which if stated here will
aid somewhat in marking out the special field of logic. We
have defined already epistemology as the inquiry into the ques-
tion, What can be known? This shows us at once the close
relation between logic and epistemology. Since we have already
asserted that logic is concerned with the principles of infer-
ence, and it is through inference that knowledge is made pos-
sible, logic and epistemology, therefore, cannot be separated,
but rather there is a mutual dependence here, such as we have
noted between logic and the other fields of inquiry. These
difierent sciences and philosophical disciplines are simply dif-
ferent fields of knowledge made possible by different attitudes,
or points of view with respect to the world. The world of the
descriptive scientist is concerned with relations the same as
the logician, but here the relationships involved have an objec-
tive reference to phenomena which are grouped and classified
according to certain general principles of identity and differ-
J
The Logical Aspecis of Educational Theory 133
. It IS the business of logic to inquire more fundamentally
into the nature of such agreement and difference. It is left for
metaphysics to state whether such relationships have any mean-
ing for the world as a whole, that is, whether they in any sense
iditlon or reveal reality. Epistemology is concerned with
the nature or extent of knowledge. What would reality be if
we did not know it? And then the question of knowledge
raises the question, hoiv can. we proceed from the particular
to the general^and.lllis inquirj has grown so fundamental that
5 has been sec aside as a particular department of study called
logic. The relations of the descriptive sciences are with refer-
ence to the temporal world of fact. The r eal world is a
logical world, a world where facts exist onlyTiT ffieir relation
fo a larger whole. This is the world in which reality must be
lound if found at all. I quote from Prof. Bowne to make
point a little clearer. He says: "In fact, as our studies
in epistemology have taught us, in the temporal world of psy-
chology nothing abides. It is only in the ideal world of logic
that anything abiding can be found. It is not the sensations,
then, as mental events which abide, but rather and only the
constant meaning which they express, or of which they are the
hearers. This meaning, however, is a purely logical and ideal
function, and instead of constructing thought it is its product."
(Metapkysics, p. 385.)
Systems of Logic. Enough has been said already to
suggest that logic and metaphysics are so closely related that
our views as to the reality of the world necessarily affects
somewhat our logic, or our conceptions as to the relations of
the part and the whole. Logic may be a common ground on
which many metaphysical conflicts are fought and settled. It
is just as true, however, to say that every system of meta-
physics involves certain differences in logic. If this be true
then there are perhaps as many different systems of logic
as there are systems of metaphysics, and in as much as our view
of reality is the most fundamental of all of our views, it
perhaps follows as a necessary consequent that as our meta-
physics differ so do our logics also.
General Methods of Logic. Perhaps the two most
134 jfA^ Philosophical Basis of Education
widely contrasted methods of logic are those of empiricism and
rationalism. Empiricism is the logicai view which maintains
that the only jo^sibilily oi arriving at truth is through the
nie^TioJ"ot uiduction, leading to general conclusions or propoSL-
Tibns through the particulars of our experience, and whiui
(Conclusions or propositions can be verified and thus suppojtc^
by referring them to the facts whence they came. This is
the method of induction pushed probably to its extreme. Ra-
tionalism contends that this process of inductive inference is
not an end in itself, but leads us to the conclusions which,
though based upon an experience, cannot be denied always or
disproved by reference to such experience. That is, we are
able to pass beyond the particulars of experience to such a de-
gree that we are not forced to return to them for the veri-
fication and proof of the proposition asserted regarding these
particular relations. The proof of such propositions rests in
the relations of the facts thus asserted to a larger system of
things, which system is not contained in experience. Thus we
see that the primary difference between empiricism and ra-
analism is a difference in the extent to which the two groups
■ philosophers would trust knowledge. Empiricism depends
more on the common sense method of verification, or proof by
reference to sense-perception or by apperception. Rationalism
ofTthCofher hand has grown very distrustful of the evidences
our senses, and is not willing to leave the verdict in the
hands of sense experience. There is a certain rationality about
the mind, and a certain connectedness in our experience which
enable us to pass beyond that involved in each single experience,
to its relation to the other parts In a larger whole or system
of things, and the only way we can test the truth from such a
point of view is to refer the truth asserted in one proposition
to a larger system of truths.
Empiricism is concerned more with the a posteriori method,
while rationalism is quite as much concerned with a priori
forms of knowledge. The former set of evidences is based on
common sense experience and perception, while the latter is
concerned with the original forms of the understanding as well.
B. Russell says: "All a priori knowledge deals exclusively with
the relations of univcrsals." {Prob. of Phil., p. 162.) This
statement is correct, provided we do not deny the rational
The Logical Aspects of Edutational Theory l3Sl
method of a priori deduction the right to use the principles ttfj
inductive inference of the a posteriori evidences of our experi-
ence.
Professor H. Sidgwick warns us that if we are to be pro-
' tected against misleading inferences, \ve must be verj' caiefui
to see that the premises wjijch jve. accept as-^our starting, lioiot
are" seTf-eyideiU. {Methods of Ethics, p. 239.) It is also -
well that vve remind ourselves that these premises must not only 1
be self-evident to a superficial observation, but they must sur-
vive the test of reflection as well. Mere self-evidence is not
a suificient test of the validity of the premises from which we
draw conclusions. Professor Sidgwick suggests this thought in
his statement that the "Propositions accepted as self-evident
must be mutually consistent." {Ibid., p. 341.) In concluding
this section I desire to quote from Bosanquet, who states the
matter precisely as to the nature of inference. He says: "In-
| |ercace cannot p ossitdy tak g-cikce except. through the mediua?
"ffihiclLaCtS-^-aJjliilge froiaoni: case
_. If each particular were shut up withm
[T^elf as in die letttn taken as an instance just now, you could
never get from one which is given to another which is not
given, or to a connection not given between two which are I
given." (Bosanquet, The Essentials 0/ Logic, p. 139.) I
10 The Problems of Logic. In what has been said al-
ready we have suggested the problems of logic. They should
be restated here, however, in order that a better view of the
eld of logic as a whole may be obtained. The relalifiOjiLtbe
raal t o jhe particular has beeiji a probt'^'ip 'fac-JJ''' phJlfll-
t ffom'tKe beginninS-oLphilftSOpliy. From a clear
s to the relation of universal and the particular,
we get a clearer view of the relation between induction and
deduction. There ii nn t>-f[itijl oppniiriim between tiie uni-
versal and the particular. Knowledge !■; possible only, because
twe have general notions or ideas, xvhich are not restricted to
tKe particular incidents of our experience. There are certaiji
common elements of our experiences that enable us to pass by..
■ —
em
alt!
"jnlerence. from the..partjcula.r_ to the universal. With the
empiricist tlie emphasis is on the particular, while the ration-
alist emphasizes the universal. Professor James makes a plea I
■36
The Philosofihical Basis of Educatinn
I own-
scorn I
for particulars when he says: "Why from Socrates down-
wards, philosophers should have vied with each other in scorn
of the knowledge of the particular, and in adoration of that of
the general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more ador-
able knowledge ought to be that of the more adorable things,
and that the things of worth are all concretes and singulars.
The only value of universal characters is that they help us,
by reasoning, to know the truths about individual things."
(James, Briefer Course, p. 242.) It would seem from this
statement that there is a partiality shown in favor of the par-
ticular, but just what the logical reasons for such preference
are, is a little difficult to see. It seems to me that Professor
Hyde states the thing a little better when he says: "The uni-
versal is not opposed to the particular. They are not mutually
exclusive. Neither can exist apart from the other. The
particular has its existence in the universal, and the universal
has its expression through the particular." {^Practical Idealism,
P- 3I7') The one and the many raise the same problem as the
universal and the particular. It is the same problem expressed,
however, in broader terms. We have discussed this matter
sufficiently in its relation to metaphysics in a previous chapter.
Cause and effect are problems for the logician. Just what
is meant when we say that one thing is a cause and another
the effect? Cause from the scientific point of view means that
a certain change or modification in one phenomenon pro-
duces an effect which is noticeable in another. The whole
series of antecedents and consequents is found in a world of
time and space. Such causes do not act outside time. Time
includes them. The metaphysician, as we have noted, in-
quires as to whether or not this is what is meant by final
cause. The idealist answers the question by asserting that it is
the nature and essence of intelligence or purpose to givE^e
final explanation of all phenomena. The logician must show
how such a judgment is based on scientific and accurate logical
principles of inference, inductive and deductive.
The finite and the infinite are the problems of the one and
the many, the part and the whole, raised in a new form. We
need not discuss this matter further here, since considerable
space has been given to it already. Nominalism and concep-
tualism are problems which have long confronted the logician-
M
The Logical Aspects of Educalianal Theory 137
Does the universal term which asserts certain identity betwce
particulars, have any separate existence apart from the phe*J
nomena whose identical elements it suggests? With Socrates,!
the universal was not claimed to have separate existence. TheJ
concept was not a part of reality, but only that universal ele-t
ment of identity which was necessary to knowledge. Most!
philosophers have accepted the view of Socrates that the uni-
versal is essential to knowledge, but they do not stop with him
here. They go on to assert that it is of the nature of the
universal to have its essential relation to a larger system of
ideas and purposes, and that the concept gets its meaning the
same as the particular by reference to the larger system of ideas
and purposes, and by reference to the larger whole of which
a part.
I The Logic of Mysticism. It was suggested above
that the different systems of metaphysics form the basis for
different ways of viewing the world as a logical mechanism.
It would be well for us to bring together in this section certain
fundamental views with regard to the world conceived as
logically organized. Mysticism as a concept of reality or be-
ing, has no place for logic. The mystic has abandoned logic
altogether. He finds the only reality in the immediate experi-
ence, and denies altogether the value of knowledge as a means
nediating between the individual experience and reality as
hole. The mystic not only denies logic but makes it very
hard for the logician to criticise his system at all. The whole
of reality
himself,
I The Logic of Pragmatism. The logic of pragmatismJ
also is concerned extensively with the immediate particulars of
experience, and as we have seen the particular method ei8-
ployed by this system of logic is that of verification. We have
no grounds of asserting the truth of the proposition except that
of the fruitful and practical relationship with which our ideas
bring us in our experiences. The truth of an idea depends
)on how it worked, and not on its relation to the system of
e wh^c . Perhaps these two philosophies afford a sufficient.,
ickground for raising certain important distinctions betwe<
1 the immediacy in which the mystic finds i
r
138 The Philosophical Basis of Education
the logic of idealism and that of the other philosophies.
13 The Logic of Idealism. The idealist often has been
classed with the rationalists of whom we spoke above. Xfes
test of pragmatism is verification, \v-hile for idealism the orSy
ultimate test of truth is the consistency of this truth with aU
others. Consistency rather than verification through sen?.?
perception is the chief method of idealism. According .tQ_ the
idealist we make the world in which wc live Our experiences
must constantly be reshaped in order to assume the form of con-
sistency which is demanded by our logical will. Professor
Miinsterherg says that "Human knowledge has to remove and
reshape the material experience until it forms itself in scien-
tific theories in such a way that a world of order and law js
constructed. Our own truth-seeking will thus determine be-
forehand what forms of thought must mold experience in order
to give it the value of truth. Our own reason thus lays down
beforehand the real constitution of the only possible world
which can be an object of knowledge." {American Problems,
P- I47-)
This view is quite consistent with that expressed by Hyde
when he asserts that "Pessimism is the only consistent .jmd
logical attitude for any man to take who conceives the world
he lives in as a mere aggregate of facts; the mere presentation
in_^timc and space of objects and events."
Professor Bosanquet asserts the same truth when he says
that "It may be that consciousness is capable of continuing a
world, not as a copy of a ready-made original, hut as something
which it makes for itself by a necessary process, and which
refers beyond this finite and momentary consciousness." (£1-
sen. of Logic, p. 11.}
The idealist docs not believe that it is possible to express
the whole truth in a single proposition, nor advance so far in
our knowledge that there is no truth outside its borders, so
far as we finite beings are concerned. There is no truth out-
side knowledge, although there may be truth outside what we
know. The test of our knowledge is always its consistency
with the view of the whole and the whole is never given in the
part. Professor Welton says: "It appears, then, that con-
sistency with all other knowledge is the test of truth, and it
i
The Logical Aspects of Educational Theory 139
follows that, as knowledge is always advancing, it is often im-
passible to S3.y with absolute assurance that any particular
item of our interpretation of the world is true. Further
knowledge may, in many cases, necessitate a revision of such
interpretation in the future as in the past." {The Logical
Bases of Education, p. 22.)
Our knowledge is always asserted in the form of a judg-
The proposition asserts this judgment in the affirma-
tion or denial of a certain relationship that obtained betiveen
facts or ideas. Every judgment is the connection of parts
whole, and it is this whole which characterizes reality.
For it is the very essence of reality to be self-contained and to
Require no other to explain itself. Professor Bosanquet says:
"Judgment is always the analysis and synthesis of elements JQ
some one thing, or ideal content." (Essentials of Logic, p.
i"o6.)
Perhaps 1 could not state in a better way the idealistic theory
of the nature of a judgment than to quote from Profes-
sor Bosanquet again: "Knowledge is always judgment.
Judgment is constructive, for us of the real world. Construct-
ing the real world means interpreting or amplifying our pres-
ent perception by what we arc obliged to think, which we take
as all belonging to a single s}'stem one with itself, and with
what constrains us in sense perception, and objective in the
sense that its parts act on each other independently of our in-
dividual apprehension, and that we are obliged to think them
" (The Essentials of Logic, p. 58.)
Summary. We shall briefly summarize now the con-
clusion of this chapter. Logic deals with the data of human
experience. It will he remembered that in Part II of this
volume we said that it was the aim of philosophy generally to
determine the meaning and value of our human experiences.
We are now in a position to see more clearly that no such
I meaning or value is obtainable, except in so far as we see the
individual facts of our experience in their relation to the
whole, and that it is the business of logic to point out this
jelationship, and to show the logical ground of inference, o^
what is necessary in providing the truth of a certain relation-
ship. In this matter, logic is like the descriptive sciences,
1
this
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I
V
140 The Philosophical Basis of Education
they must proceed on similarly rational grounds of inference.
Logic differs from psychology in that H-e go beyond the mere
question of how the mind worked, or the laws that govern it,
as phenomena in sequence. Logic asks the question how can wc
proceed from what is known and given in experience, to what
is not known by the method of inference? It is just here that
we rote a distinction between logic and epistemology. Logic
assu!iies_that knowledge is- possible and proceeds -to show the
!aws up on which gorrect- ihinking must ba devdoped. Logic
t hus not only presupposes .the -possibility -»f- knowledge^ but
that reality exists also. It is the business of metaphysics and
epistemology to inquire into the grounds of such presupposi-
tion.
Methods of logic broadly defined are those of empiricism and
rationalism. Empiricism is less confident of the validity of
knowledge when it goes beyond the facts of our experience. It
always reserves the right to test the truth of the proposition
by reference to the particular facts. Rationalism makes con-
sistency the test of truth. The world in which we live is a
unit or systematization of parts, each one having a certain
meaning for the whole, but no meaning at all in and of it-
self.
15 The Educational Implications OF Logic, It has be-
come apparent already, from the foregoing, what some of the
educational implications of logic are. We shall proceed in
this section to point out some of these relations more closely.
We have noted that the logician is sceptical of all uncritical
thinking, and reserves the right to criticize our judgments
on the basis of their relations, not only to fact but to a larger
system of reality, '^e are much in need these days of more
critical thinking. Probably there is no greater reason for thf
confusion in modern pedagogy, than the fact that we have n^t
reflected to any great extent on our experience. This is per-
haps as noticeable in the field of our educational experience as
in any other field. The demands made upon the schools are
often irrational, and the pressure of circumstances such that
those in. authority yie]d without careful consideration- of -the
principles underlying their action. Again, we often find in
education those whose habits of mind are not particularly re-
flective and rational and consequently do not give very serious
M
The Logical Aspects of Educational Theory 14I '
attention to the problems in this field. The questions arc
answered on the basis of common sense or intuition and little
rational reflection is In evidence. We must here remind our-
selves of the often repeated thought In the earlier part of this
volume, that the only way of bringing out the deeper meaning
lation of our experience is through critical reflection, in-
volving both analysis and synthesis. Professor Dewey says that
"The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment; and
the essence of this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature
of the problem before proceeding to attempt its solution. This,
more than any other thing, transforms mere inference into
tested Inference, suggested conclusions Into proof." {How We
Think, p. 74.)
The second point I wish to emphasize as an educational Im-
plication of logic, is that the facts which we teach must not
be isolated and set off against each other, but rather they
must have a distinct relationship one to the other. Without
such relationship there can be no real meaning, for facts
cannot have meaning In themselves, but only as they arc re-
lated one to another. There must always be a "fusing prin-
ciple," as Dr. J. H. Stoutemycr says, to weld the ideas to-
gether. The materials of instruction, then, must be of
such a character, and so related, that the student may see
their unity and connection. Indeed he must be taught to
reflect upon his experience, in order that he may bring to light
this deeper meaning. Consistency is here made a practical test
of the truth of that which we teach. Professor Dewey makes a
remark in this connection that is so significant that I quote it
here at some length, "Another way of stating the same prin-
ciple Is that material furnished by communication must be such
I enter into some existing system or organization of ex-
penence. All students of psychology are familiar with the
ciple of apperception— that we assimilate new material with
what we have digested and retained from prior school lessons
instead of linking it to what the pupil has acquired In his
t-of-school experience. The teacher says, 'Do you not re-
member what we learned from the book last week?' instead
of saying, 'Do you not recall such and such a thing that you
have seen or heard?' As a result, there are built up detached
and independent systems of school knowledge that inertly over-
lay the ordinary systems of experience instead of reacting to
142
The Philosophical Basis of Education
a sepa- |
enlarge and refine them. Pupils are taught to live in two
rate worlds, one the world of out-of-school experience,
other the world of books and lessons,"
It generally results, I believe, from the teaching commonly
in practice that students get a certain number of disorganized
facts that result in but very little meaning of lliem. We
are constantly being reminded by critics that our schools do
not develop critical thinking, and this is because students are
not taught to search for the broader and deeper connections
of the facts of their experience. This totally neglects the
principles of logic which Welton so well states in the follow-
ing quotation. "Mere fact which cannot be brought into any
system is meaningless to us; and the greater the number of sys-
tems a fact can be placed in the more it means to us. Inci-
dentally it may be pointed out here that the aim of teaching
is not to impart facts but to develop systems; facts are only
of value in so far as they are starting points for such de-
velopment." {The Logical Bases of Education, p. ii8.)
The ordinary method of cramming, therefore, does not ac-
complish the purpose of true education, if by true education we
mean the power to grapple with the fundamental problems of
life, and to discover through our experience their meaning
and unity for reality as a whole. The school is too liable to
become one factor of the child's life, though often a very in-
cidental one, while his experiences outside of school are grouped
into quite a different system, This makes an artificial dis-
tinction between school and out of school life, which is not
altogether conducive to a thorough understanding of the prob-
lems of life.
According to the view here expressed cramming is a sin
against all principles of true logic. I quote a significant
passage from Professor Dewey in regard to cramming. "For
teacher or book to cram pupils with facts which, with little
more trouble, they could discover by direct inquiry is to violate
their intellectual integrity by cultivating mental servility. This
does not mean that the material supplied through communica-
tion of others should be meager or scanty. With the utmost
range of the sense, the world, of nature and history stretches
out almost infinitely beyond. But the fields within direct
observation if feasible should be carefully chosen and sacredly
protected." {How We Think, p. 198.)
icredly
CHAPTER V
, Educational implications of the philosophy of religion
I The Definition of the Philosophy of Religion.
We may view our religious life and nature from the point of
view of the philosopher, just the same as we may view any
other aspect of our life from this point of view. The philos-
opher raises certain fundamental questions as to our religious
life that cannot he pushed aside lightly. They go to the very
foundation of our belief and actions. The grounds of religion
lie in certain fundamental beliefs, which are not to be ac-
cepted without question or qualification, but are to be regarded
as sound only when they have been considered thoroughly in
the light of the whole of knowledge and reality. '
There is no more reason why we should accept our religious '
notions unquestioned than that we should leave the rest of our
life and experience to common sense. All the larger questions
of life must be viewed from the angle of philosophy, if we
to get the most satisfactory and complete answer which our ex-
perience affords.
Philosophy does not take the place of religion, any r
than a theory of morals takes the place of practical morality,
or than geometry takes the place of carpentry, or the laws of
hygiene the place of rest and recreation. The philosophy of
religion shows us how religion looks from the point of view
of the intellect. From this angle we see religion in its relation
to the other interests of mankind, we see their systematic
unity and organization. We also see from this angle the
nature, meaning, and values of religion in life.
The philosophy of religion is concerned with the problems
of God, immortality, and the soul. What is man's relation to
God in this life? Has man the qualities of eternal about him;
is he immortal? What duties does man owe to God? Thrae
are questions for the philosophy of religion. It will be s
I
144 The Philosophical Basis of Educalion
readily that such questions camiot be answered wholly apait
from mttiipliisks and epistcmology. All. -definitions -of- re-
Iigion~are an attempt to give intellectual expression- to this
set of valuFs of our experience. These definitions must be
subjected to the test of reality, truth, beauty, and goodness.
In other words, all values must fit into a logical system which
involves no contradiction, for this is the ultimate test of all
truth. The philosopher must not be partial to any set of val-
ues except as these point to a more complete system of value
than any other. He must assign values to our experience on
the basis of this standard or scale, and not on the individual
standard of his own narrower personal interests. All defini-
tions and conceptions of religion must harmonize with the
larger view of life as a whole. In this connection it will be
instructive and interesting to note several statements as to what
religion is. Dr. Shepard sa>s that "Religion is the way man
shows to himself and his fellows, by his thinking, feeling, and
conduct, what is his conception of God." Professor Carpenter
says: "Religion is the effort to establish relationship with the
unseen world." {Witness to the Influence of Christ, p. 51.)
Professor Emerton in his Unitarian Thought says: "By re-
ligion the Unitarian means a recognized dependence of man
upon the power greater than himself which he feels at the heart
of things, animating, guiding, reconciling all by the action of
a will that is neither above law nor subject to it, but is itself
Law." To this he adds, "the element of personal service.''
(Pp. 9-10.) Professor Bowne holds that "Religion
essence is righteousness and good-will toward men and reverent
humility and obedience toward God."
All these definitions are an attempt to express the ess
and underlying meaning of our religious experience.
2 Philosophy of Religion and Common Sense. There
are two attitudes we may take towards the religious life. We
may take all on faith and belief, or we may attempt to go the
limit of our understanding in this field of experience, and leave
the faith and belief all that is not open to direct evidence and
proof, or that cannot be put into a logical scheme of things.
The former point of view is that of common sense, the latter
that of the scientist and philosopher. Common sense never
n its
ercnt |
ssenc^^^l
^
Educational hnplkalions of the Philosophy of Religion 145
goes the full length of dependence upon thought and reflec-
tion. It sees as through a glass darkly. The diaracteristic
of common sense is its unret!ectivc and uncritical attitudi
wards the world and our experience. Philosophy onjthe_con-
tTarx_i5- rational- juid-critical. It subjects alt our experience
to a searching test of rationality. What is must be consistent
with itself and with the whole of life. The mere appearance
o satisfactory test of being or reality. Applied to our re-
ligious experience this means that common sense is satisfied
to rest all on faith "and belief, and makes no effort to clear up
conflicting difficulties or absurd hypotheses. It is enough for
common sense to hold to its faith, let alone to question the
foundations of its beliefs and its faith.
Philosophy of Religion and Science. Science is
highly refined thinking with the purpose of finding a causal
explanation and description of our experience. There is a
ntific aspect to every realm of our experience, just because
It IS possible for us to arrange and classify and explain the
phenomena in every phase of our experience. This is as true
of religion as of any field. The re is a science of religion pos-
sible, whether it has been developed yet or not, for we can
arranM, cl a^fj^_ and explain, the facts and phenomena of
our religious life. But as we have seen many times before in
this volume, scien ce only desc ribe s and explains and does not
concern its elf w ith values, oi .life, lor to do so it would be
partial and it is of the very essence of science that it render
an impartial account of the world of our experience as a
whole, and of its every part.
Philosophy, as we have seen, attempts to find out the mean-
ing and values, of the experience of oui religious life. A
pure science of religion would leave it barren of all values,
purposes, and ideals. A philosophy of religion would seek
) find the values of such experience. The science of religion
■ould be concerned with an elaboration of the principles of
ur religious life regardless of whether such a life had any
alue or worth, or not. Philosophy of religion seeks to know
the values of religious life in their meaning for life and the
universe as a wliole.
Science cannot argue for the existence or
n
nlitence of-^J
146
The Philosophical Basis of Education
God, or for im mortality, or the existence of an eternal soul,
for these are beyond the realm of existent fact as evidenced by
oiir world of actual experience. No man hath yet seen God.
Science will never enable us to see God, unless God be the
mechanical law of the universe of experience. God can be
seen only as mechanical and non-personal by science, for science
gives us only a mechanical construction of liic universe, a causal
or sequential series of phenomena. Science raises us to a plane
of dearer thinking on every problem of life than does com-
mon sense, but certainly science will always fall short of at-
tributing values to our experience and in this matter common
sense sees in life greater significance of meaning and purpose
than does science. Science may develop new conceptions that
will correct old errors of thought about religion and its ob-
ject, but it will not succeed successfully in denying the exist-
ence or reality of God, or His nature, for such questions take
us beyond the field of science into that of philosophy.
In connection with the thought just expressed about science
criticizing our false notions and religious belief, it may be in-
teresting to note the disagreement between the common sense
notions of the evidences of God, and the conclusions held as
a result of our advanced scientific knowledge of the world-
Common sense regards miracle or the lack of fixed law as suf-
ficient evidence of God. The fiat of God's will is the con-
trolling force of the world. The view is growing fast, how-
ever, that the strongest concrete evidence of God is the regula-
tion of the world order in conformity to rigid and exact laws.
It may be said that neither common sense nor science, nor
both of them together, can offer a satisfactory basis for re-
ligion, or a complete explanation of our religious experience.
Common sense must give way to science and philosophy, and
philosophy must not exclude any values of our life, if we are
to get a complete view of the religious life and experience.
4. Philosophy of Religion and Metaphysics. Enough
has been said already to show that the facts of our religious life
must be interpreted in the light of their relation to life as a
whole, if we are to gain an adequate conception of the values
of religion for life. That is, there must be a philosophy of re-
ligion. The philosophy of religion is only a part of the larger
M
I
Ed,.rnlif.,ud Impliva.
0/ //((' Philnsophy nf Rclig'wn
losophy of life, or experience in its relation to the whole.
It ought to be clear also that the deeper questions of religion
must always seek their answer by reference to the whole of
life and so it will never he possible to answer the questions
of religion independent of metaphysics and epistemology. The
questions of the philosophy of religion as to God, Immortality,
and the Soul, would be meaningless except as viewed in the
light of what we know about being and reality as a whole.
If these concepts of God, Immortality, and the Soul have no
reality, then there can be no real meaning or value attached ^
to them. It would seem rather strange from a thoughtful ,, ,
point of view to ask, what is our duty toward God until after
we had asked concerning the nature and reality, or being of
God. But the question as to our duty towards God i
for the philosopher of religion, and that concerning his nature
&nd reality is a general question, the answer to which must I
■be given by metaphysics. Similarly the questions as to imn;
t tality and the soul raise deeper questions of metaphysics.
We must rise above the low plane of common-sense thinking
ard to our religious life to the greater heights of science
I and philosophy. And all philosophical questions of religion
;taphysical questions of being
Band life go back ultimately to r
■Qr reality.
Philosophy op Religion and Epistemology. Just as
five have seen that the great questions of religion cannot gel
■ dieir final answer on the plane of common sense and science,
(but must go back to metaphysics, so we must now observe thai
^jiD question of the reality or being of a thing can be raised
without raising at the same time the question as to our knowl-
■ edge of such being or realit}'. We are here reminded again
p«f the inevitable connection between metaphysics and epistem-
■ ology. Hence the questions of religion raise not only meta-
Rphysical problems, but problems of knowledge, or epistemologi-
Kv&l problems. The objects to which the religious concepts
■ icfer could have no value for reality, if it is in their nature
■ to be unknown. Hence in our consideration of the religious
^aspects of our experience, we must not allow that any myopic
f^vision leads us into thinking that such ultimate questions as
; raised by metaphysics and epistemology' have no meaning
148 The Philosophical Basis of Education
for religion. We have defined already ultimate reality in terms
of personality. Our knowledge of reality as such is only our
knowledge becoming more completely self-conscious.
6 Philosophy of Religion and Logic. Nor can we
ignore logic in seeking the deepest questions and answers to our
religious nature. Logic, as we have seen, is the most abstract
and most exact of all the sciences, and defines the laws upon
the basis of which all truth is determined and all correct
methods of seeking answers to our problems are based.
The logical test of truth is that of consistency. Truths that
contradict each other are not truths at all, for it is the nature
of truth to be consistent with itself and the whole of experi-
ence. Truths that do not fit into a larger and more inclusive
organic whole are in need of greater refinement, made possible
only through greater rationality.
The truths claimed for religion, then, "must not outstep the
bounds of logical consistency, the ultimate test of all truth.
We must always be ready to subject every belief, theory,
or supposed truth, to this logical test of consistency with all
our experience in its unity. What will not find its place in
such a system of universality is no part of truth, and must be
rejected. If then, we find after reflection and reason, that our
views about God, his nature and reality, or the problem of
Immortality, or the Soul, or any other religious problem, are
not consistent with the whole of life and experience, or all
other truths, we must reject such views as are logically un-
tenable.
We are not to count it a loss if reflection forces us to aban-
don certain of our unsupportable religious views, but rather
count it a gain in the direction of a deeper insight into the
real nature of truth and reality. We should always stand
ready to sacrifice a lower interest, or truth for a higher. In-
deed this is ethically and religiously enjoined upon us in the
interest of a better and higher life.
7 Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, Little more
need be said to make clear the fact that religion and morality
are closely related, and hence philosophy and ethics, which de-
fine the principles underlying these fields of interest are also
J
Educational Implications of ike Philosophy of Religion 149
very closely related. Carpenter says: "The rant of a re-
ligion is settled by the degree in which ethics is linked with
" {Witness to the Influence of Christ, p. 50.)
If man's beliefs and theories affect his practices, and it
juld seem that no argument is necessary here to show that
such is the case, then it requires but little reflection to sec that
"Sooner or later fundamental errors of belief must reproduce
themselves in practice, and this is as true of education as that
of which it is said, namely, religion." (Bowne, The Essence
of Religion, p. 180.)
In both religion and morals the emphasis is placed on duty
and responsibility. Religion defines man's duties toward God ;
ethics defines man's duty towards man, T. Parker says that
''without a moral nature, we could have no duties in respect to
man; without a religious nature no duties in respect to God."
{Discourse of Religion, p. 29,}
Religion is related to mortality much as the larger of two
concentric circles is related to the smaller. Religion repre-
sents a wider system of interests or values but must always
include mortality, or it becomes barren formalism. Hoffding
says: "Religion represents the best means for the conserva-
tion of the finest human values." (Cf. International Journal
of Ethics, Vol. XX, p. 467-)
Philosophiks of Religion. From the foregoing we
see that the chief problems raised by the questions of re-
ligion from the philosophical point of view are the nature and
reality of God, immortality, and the soul. The problems of
the universe are given different answers by the different philos-
ophies. There are then as many different philosophies of
religion as there are different philosophies of life, for each
system of philosophy answers the special questions of religion
in the light of its own larger view of life as a whole. We
must now give some attention to the different answers pro-
posed by the different systems of philosophy to the problems
of religion here mentioned.
9 The Religion of Platonism. Let us consider first
le religious aspects of Plato's philosophy. According to Plato
religion consists of the contemplation of the idea of the good.
I
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150 TAc Philosophical Basis of Educatio
The higliest religious concept that it is possible for man to
obtain is the idea of the good. Which idea did not differ
materially from our conception of the ultimate reality. In-
deed it was the all-inclusive reality. It was the one idea
that included all lesser ideas. It was the one purpose that
included all other purposes, the highest of all value, the only
worthy object of contemplation, Man was most moral and
religious when his only occupation was that of the contempla-
tion of this idea of the good. It was possible to gain an in-
sight into this reality only through rational reflection. Such a
of the good was hidden from common sense. Only
the philosopher was able to conceive of the highest good. Good
was thus conceived by Piato to consist of the knowledge of ulti-
mate reality, as the system of purposes and ideals, or values.
This object of our understanding enjoined upon us certain
obligations. We could not if we desired, deny the reality of
■ such an object. Nor could we fulfill our obligation toward the
universe of which we are a part without showing obeisance
to the ideal. There was no other religious obligation accord-
ing to this philosophy than that of contemplating this ideal
of ultimate good or reality. The highest good was given
metaphysical reality and could be known, and it becomes our
ethical and religious duty to know this idea of the good.
It is plain to see the ascetic element in this sort of philos-
Iophy of religion, and as time went on this element became
more prominent in the different views of religion, as we shall
see in the next paragraph and later in mysticism.
Z
a
PI
m:
pa
W
m
sti
of
•
The Religion of Neoplatonism. Plotinus was the
intermediary between Plato and the Christian religion. He
rried out many of the doctrines of Plato into the field of
Christian religion and we find to this day distinct evidence of
Platonic philosophy. Especially do we find the elements of
mysticism drawn from oriental philosophy. Plotinus stressed
particularly the ascetic element of the Platonic philosophy.
We will remember that according to Plato religion as well as
morality consisted of contemplation of idea of the good. No
stress was laid on the side of religious duty or obligation,
other than that of contemplation and reflection. This feature
of the Platonic philosophy probably was more prominent than
I Educational Implications 0/ the Philosophy of Religion 151
any other, and certainly it was the aspect of his doctrine that
received the greatest emphasis at the hands of Plotinus and as
we have said, it was this element which was carried out into
the Christian religion and there gained such prominence in
the religion of the medieval ages, a period during which the
scholastic philosophy exercised its greatest influence, and
indeed was the chief philosophy of the times. It is strange that
our Christian religion to-day has not succeeded in getting away
entirely from this mystic element in Plato's philosophy. Wc
have not yet come to realize fully that faith alone without works
is dead. Man must act as well as think, in fact, thinking is
only one side of our life and cannot be substituted for the
whole. It may be true that exercise of our thought power is
productive of the highest pleasures, but this does not signify
that man can release himself from all moral obligation on the
grounds that he is exercising his capacity for thought and
pleasure. This is just as true in the field of religion as it is
in that of morality. We cannot excuse ourselves for our de-
linquency on the grounds that we are engaged in the contem-
plation of the idea of good, or God, We must engage our-
selves constantly in the attempt to realize this good in our
actual lives. It was this failure of the Platonic philosophy
that led perhaps more than any other single factor to the
asceticism of the medieval ages. Indeed there are plenty of
evidences that man has not overcome this false conception of
religion completely even to this day. There are plenty of
people who still think they are holy and religious just because
they fold their hands and contemplate their God. They have
not realized fully the force of Christ's statement when he said
that not ail who cry, "Father, Father," shall be received into
the Kingdom of Heaven. Man has duties to perform in the
world, and some of these are with respect to fellow-men and
others toward God. Not in all cases will our knowledge of
the object of our worship, or of the principle of our action
excuse us from the obligation of doing our part in the world.
II The Religion op Epicureanism. Epicureanism did
not distinguish the pursuit of happiness and the religious life.
The only religion for the Epicureans was that of pursuing
pleasure. There was no other duty toward God or man than
152
The Philosophical Basis of Education
that of so directing our actions as to secure the greatest amount
of pleasure. It can be seen readily what the answer to the
questions as referred to ahovc would be according to such a
philosophy as this. According to Epicureanism man cannot
Imow whether God exists or not. He does not trouble him-
self about such metaphysical questions as the being or reality
of the soul or its immortality. Our greatest thought was
to seek from life the greatest amount of happiness pos-
sible. We should eat, drink, and be merry to-day, for
we may die to-morrow, and we should not let any pleasure slip
from us in this life with no more grounds than the mere hope
of its being regained in some state of our future existence.
We cannot afford to give up a certain pleasure for one that
is so extremely doubtful. Such a practice would be hazardous
and would succeed in depriving us of the only real good that
life possesses, so far as we are able to know this end, Epi-
curus said: "Be virtuous, because virtue will bring the great-
est amount of happiness." Zeno said: "Be virtuous because
you ought to be." The only justification that any one would
have for holding to this faith in God would be that it brings
happiness to the individual who holds such a faith. This
faith did not, however, get full expression in the philosophy
of Epicureanism. It was left for modern pragmatism to give
further expression to this view.
12 The Religion of Stoicism. According to stoicism,
man's highest obligation consists in rigid conformity to duty and
to law. The stoic conceived the universe as the revelation of
a great law. It was a sort of pantheistic religion. God ex-
presses himself through all in our experience, which experi-
ence Is not fortuitous and unsystematic, but is governed ac-
cording to rigid mechanical law, and the highest obligation that
God has placed upon man is that of conforming rigidly to the
letter of this mechanical law. It expressed a sort of fatalism,
but asserted that man whether he desired to do so or not, must
conform to the laws of the universe and in so doing he
virtuous. Piety consists in reverent obedience to this mechai
cal law. The highest search that man could indulge in,
that of finding the law which controls his nature. Thus the
stoic doctrine did not lead toward asceticism as did Neoplaton-
Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion 153 I
sm as expressed by Plotinus. On the contrary, it was an co- |
crgetic doctrine of religion which defined man's highest ohli- '
gation to God as that of finding the secret law of the universe
by which his nature is ordered and governed. This i
. answer which stoicism gives to the problem underlying the
( field of our religious experience. In short, this is the philos-
y ophy of religion as outlined by stoicism.
The Religion of Positivism, Naturalism, and '
Materialism. There are certain religious aspects of the
philosophy of positivism, naturalism, and materialism of which
we must take account at this point. According to the philos-
ophy of positivism, religion is not a fundamental element in
the life of man. It is only a certain stage of his development.
It will soon pass away just as mysticism in many of its forms
has come and gone. There is, then, according to the philos-
ophy of positivism no distinct place in the life of man for re-
ligion. Consequently this aspect of his life is to be regarded
only as temporary and not needing any special training or
development. We can see plainly what this type of philosophy
would mean for education. Positivism is a radical sort of
empiricism, and relies on no truth which cannot be verified
in experience. It mistrusts all hypotheses beyond those which
1 he verified directly in this way.
Naturalism differs somewhat from positivism in that it does
: go quite so far in its sceptical attitude toward religion.
' It does not deny that there is a God, or assert that reverence
I to him is not worth while, but it does contend that nothing
I can be known beyond the realm of science. This practically
takes God out of the universe, since it is impossible to find,
L as we have seen many times before, sufficient warrant from
I science for the belief in a personality directing the affairs of |
I the mechanical world. Naturalism does not deny in such i
'positive fashion the value of religion, but it does assert that
all that is beyond the realm of science cannot be known, and
since God has a personality, if he exists at all he is outside
the mechanism of science. It follows logically that the exist-
ence of God cannot he known. Such conceptions refer to the
i unknowable. This amounts to practically the same thing as _
a positive denial of the existence of God, for what value is 'J
e:
ir
I
154 ^^^ Philosophical Basis of Education
there in such a being, if his existence cannot be known, or
in some way posited in our thoughts?
Materialism sees the whole story of life told in the mechani-
cal relationship of things. There is no God in the universe
unless you want to say that the mechanical order of the de-
scriptive science deserves to be personified and worshipped.
Materialism considers matter as the first and ultimate prin-
ciple of all life and existence. There is nothing behind or
beyond matter. If God is to be conceived of at all, it must be
in terms of these mechanical concepts of the world of descrip-
tive sciences.
It is plain from what has been said with regard to positivism,
naturalism, and materialism that these systems of philosophy
make very small place for religion in the life of man, and con-
sequently they would give no place for religion in the process
of education. All three forms are agnostic and sceptical as
regards the value of religion and the life of man and the
universe. There is not according to these philosophies, any
special set of religious values which man should strive to
realize in this life through the process of education.
14 The Religion of Mysticism. Let us turn our atten-
tion for a moment to another type of scepticism with regard
to the value of religion. Mysticism has as its central theme
the religious life, but religion cannot be subjected to the same
order of thinking as can other aspects of life. The only way
to know God is to perceive him in the moment of complete
immediacy. Knowledge as a means of passing from what is
known to something unknown is denied. The only way we
really can know is to deny that we have any knowledge of the
process by which thought moves toward its goal as having any
value whatsoever. Mediation through thought will not lead
man Godward. The only way by which he can gain any
clear understanding of God is by denying all thought as hav-
ing any value and plunging directly or immediately into the
perfect moment of immediate experience. In such moments
as these there is no distinction between the knower and the
known, but through the denial of the validity of the knowing
process we plunge into the very heart of reality itself. This
mystic element in philosophy has worked its way from the
Educational I in plications of the Philosophy of Religion 155
oriental philosophy up through Plato and Plotinus into thi
Christian religion of the present day. It is not an uncoinmon
thing to hciir ministers in our pulpit to-day deny the validi
of knowledge arriving at the f^pFricnce of true religious value.
Knowledge is regarded as having certain practical value for
the universal life of religious experience. It is probably that
this element of ascetic contemplation has occupied a more
prominent place in this type of philosophy than in any other.
The all perfect moment is a moment of isolation and abstrac-
tion from the world of time and space and a complete absorp-
tion into the world of ultimate reality. Mysticism is a type
of epistemological scepticism. No doubt there is great truth
in much that is contended for, in the philosophy of mysticism.
The value of the religious life as contemplated by the mystic
probably does not differ greatly from the esthetic contempla-
tion of the lover of the beautiful. Indeed it would be hard
to say just how much of the platonic conception of the idea
of the good has come down to religion. Mysticism is more
of a religion than it is a philosophy, and might more profitably
be classed as such, yet it has certain philosophical implications
which we cannot pass by lightly, if we are to gain a very
comprehensive view of the place of philosophy and religion in
the life of man. Philosophy broadly conceived, considers all
the interests and values in h\iman life, and religion aflords
one of these sets of values. It cannot be true, therefore, that
the philosopher can pass by unnoticed the field of religious
experience. He enters this field as a critic and as an evalaator
of experience, just the same as with any other field.
15 The Religion of Pragmatism. Pragmatism thus-
differs from materialism in that it does not deny the existence
of a personal God, and it differs from naturalism and posi-
tivism in that it does not confine this conception to the realm
of the untcnowable. The truth of the God hypothesis, of im-
mortality and the soul, can he tested in the same pragmatic way
that we can test the truth of the principle of gravitation. That
is, it can be tested in our actual life, and can be used in such
a way as to adjust our life to the truth it contains.
According to the religious aspects of the philosophy of
matism, it is quite consistent with the larger view of lifi
he
on
ty 1
The Philosophical Basis of Education
^
experience, that we attribute to it certain religious values. In
this respect we notice its conflict with positivism and natural-
i6 The Religion of Idealism. The religious aspects
of idealism will next be considered. It will not be difficult
to see, from what has gone before, what view the idealist has
of the religious life. It is upon the basis of this philosophy
that the present volume has been written and the reader need
' only be reminded of certain implications of idealism in order
to see what it has to offer in the way of a criticism and esti-
mation of the religious values of experience.
According to idealism the world is not a mechanical order
as materialism asserts. Neither is it a purely physical con-
nection beyond which nothing can be known, as positivism
and naturalism assert, nor again is it the common sense world
with the refinements of pragmatism, according to which the
highest truths are to be proved by verification through the facts
of experience. Idealism starts just where all the other philos-
ophies of life start, and should start, that is with the facts of
our experience. It does not end by denying the validity of
our experience, as does mysticism; nor does it end by de-
veloping a highly refined system of laws and connections be-
tween the facts of our experience and the denial of what is be-
yond such a connection, as do positivism and naturalism, nor
does it end by asserting that the truths of our experience are
to be verified ultimately by reference to facts of our experience.
On the contrary, idealism begins with the facts of our experience
and follows the naturalistic philosopher to the completion of
their physical and causally connected universe into one great
system, but he goes beyond them and asserts that the real mean-
ing of the universe is not to be found in such causal explana-
tions of physical science. He asserts that such connections
are only the expressions of the demands of our own purposive
will. The deepest truths and meanings of our experience, then,
are not to be found In the facts, or in their connections, but
rather in the relation of these facts to our will. The great
problem of the philosopher, according to the idealist, is that
of finding our deeper will connections, and not merely the
connections of facts related in a time and space order of things.
J
Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion 157
The study of the external facts of our experience merely re-
veals the inner connections and relatedness of man's will and
purposes, and the greatest of all problems is to see the relation
of these inner will connections in an over-individual will of the
absolute, who is the complete and infinite personality, and the
conspectus of all experience. This universal will is not to
be found in the temporal and spacial world. Rather time
and space are included within this infinite personality. God
is thus conceived as the final cause of the universe; as in
infinite personality, and the systematic unity and harmony of
all will and purposive attitude of life. God is the absolute
will and the infinite knower of the universe; he is the cause
of all cause; the beauty of all beauty; the reality of all reality;
the truth of all truth; and the good of all good. Thus we see
in the idealistic conception of God, or the Absolute, the sys-
tematic unity of all meaning and reality. According to this
conception of God, the highest concept is that referring to his
inner meaning and nature. Very different is this view from
that of naturalism and other forms of agnosticism referred to
in the above section.
17 Summary. According to the foregoing sections of this
chapter it is plain to see that philosophy attempts to criticize
experience, and to ascertain its meaning and value. Such a
view must include necessarily a religious element of our experi-
ence, and the philosophy of religion, therefore, becomes a criti-
cism of the principal beliefs, values, and .purpose of our re-
ligious life. Such criticisms and estimates of values cannot be
left entirely to any one or all of the sciences, for they give us
nothing of the nature of eternal values but instead they give us
a system of causally connected phenomena in a time and space
world. A mere description of facts of the religious experience
will not give us their meaning or value for life. It must he
left to the philosophy therefore to criticize and evaluate the
religious experience. Naturalism and positivism attempted
to deny all values of the religious sort, and materialism, by
virtue of its acceptance of the materialistic principle, denied
I to religious experience all value other than those of physical „ J
connection and causal relation. Mysticism attempted to es^t^^^H
cape the bonds of causal law and asserted that the value of esr^^^H
r
I
158
The Phihsophicnl Basis oj Education
pcncnce coiini
that it is only t
perience that v
values of life,
should start v.
■d for nothing in the religious life, and asseri
'hen wc proceed by denying the validity of ex-
e can become conscious of the truly religious
Idealism, on the other hand, asserted that we
ith the experience of this life, fragmentary
though it is, and using this as a starting point we should seek
to determine the inner connections of these facts, which con-
nections it is asserted must be found inevitably in the connec-
tion of our wills and purposes. Each individual will thus be-
come a part of tiic universal whole or absolute will which is
the supreme ideal for each part or individual.
18 Educational Implications of the Philosophy of
Religion. Let us brieiiy summarize the educational impli-
cations of these different philosophies. In general it must be
said that the philosophy of religion is only a part of the wider
philosophy of life. It has also been said repeatedly that the
philosophy of education is only a part of the wider philosophy
of life. Thus it becomes plain thai the philosophy of religion
and the philosophy of education are related as parts in the same
larger whole. From this we easily deduce the proposition
that the ethical and religious aspects of education are sim-
ply two aspects of a wider philosophy of life. We have
seen already and we later shall come to see more clearly that
the ethical aspects of education are most clearly seen when
we consider the aims and values in this field of experience.
It is in this same connection that we come into closest contact
with the religious aspects of education. Every educational aim
implies a certain concept of ethical and religious values. There
are certain reasons why we prefer certain ends to others, as
we shall see in Part V. The ultimate aim of education
implies certain religious as well as certain moral attitudes
toward the world. Thus it becomes impossible to separate
entirely the ethical and religious aspects of life and education.
With these principles in mind, we can see that the philosophy
ication based upon the philosophy of naturalism, positiv-
r materialism would leave no place for religious training.
According to mysticism the only training would be that of the
denial of the validity of our experience. Such a philosophy
mid contradict itsi-lf for such training would, according to
Tted 1
Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion 159
mysticism have the value of showing the futility of our ex-
perience at least, hence the contradiction. According to prag-
matism, the religious life has value, and it would not do to
neglect it; but here the test is insufficient . from the point of
view of strict logic, since it regards the ultimate test of all
truth as that of verification or apperception. James says:
"The truest scientific hypothesis is that which as . we say
works best; and it cannot be otherwise with religious hypoth-
esis." (James, fFill to Believe, p. 12.) Idealism makes
specific provision for training of the religious life. It regards
the values in this field as of equal importance with those of
truth, beauty, and goodness. As we proceed in this volume
we shall see reason for the belief that idealism provides a
more satisfactory philosophical basis for education than does
either one of the above-mentioned systems.
Let us now turn to the aesthetic field of experience. Here
our ideal will shift from that of religious life, or a life lived
in perfect harmony with the universe as a whole, to the ideal
of the beautiful. Our question will be, what is the nature of
the beautiful? We shall consider the different theories of the
beautiful, and finally their implication for educational theory.
CHAPTER VI
THE ESTHETIC ASPECTS OP EDUCATIONAL THEORY
I Meaning and Definition op jEsthetics. y^lsthetics
has been defined as the science of the beautiful. It aims to
give a complete account of the principles and laws underlying
art, in so far as it is a descriptive science. In so far as
asthetics is philosophical it has to do with the meaning and
value of the testhetic experience. Esthetics, then, is both a
descriptive and a normative science. It is to be regarded as a
descriptive science when we are considering the principles
and laws underlying the production of the work of art. It is
to be regarded as a normative science in so far as we are
concerned with the ideal values, p\irposes and meaning of the
arristic experience. We must distinguish between art and the
science of art, and also between art and the philosophy of art
and the science of art, and also between art and the philosophy
of art. In other words, we must distinguish between art as a
descriptive science and art as a normative science. Art is
related tg the descriptive sciences just as carpentry is related
to the science of geometry, or just as the art of practicing medi-
cine is to the science underlying it. Every art has its science,
which consists of a systematic and orderly grouping of the facts
and laws underlying it. From the point of view of descriptive
science, art is built upon certain laws or principles of physics,
mathematics, psychology, and other descriptive sciences. From
the point of view of normative science or philosophy, art has
certain meaning and value for life. The philosopher of art is
concerned with the underlying meaning and value in the
assthetic field of our experience. He is not concerned with art
as mere description and explanation, but rather is he interested
in the interpretation and evaluation of the esthetic experience
as viewed from the standpoint of a philosophy of life as a whole.
The scientist is interested in art as a connection of principles
The Msthetk Aspects of Edumlionul Theory l6( ■
laws. The philosopher is inEerested in art as having a
meaning and value for human life. The scientist conceives
s a connection, but the philosopher sees in art values for
life, he views it not as connection but as isolation. TheJ
greatest value of art, unlike that of science, does not consist 1
in its connection with other things, but in its isolation froml
all parts of our experience. It is this isolation which ma]ut|
possible the only value which art possesses.
The Relation of Common Sense and iEsTHETics,^
Common sense sees in art a certain value, but here, as in
every other field of experience, common sense is a poor judge
of meaning and value. It is characteristic of common sense
to see things dimly, and we have noted already that the par-
ticular difficulty with our education to-day lies in the fact
that it rests too much on common sense rather than on a scien-
tific and philosophical basis. The only hope of progress in
education lies in the same direction. The principles of art
must be determined on the basis of a thorough scientific
understanding of the descriptive laws that lie at its very
foundation, and from tlie philosophical point of view its only
hope lies in regarding it as a integral part of a wider life and
experience. Art must therefore be taken from the field of
common sense and placed upon a sound scientific and philo-
sophical basis. Its aims and purposes and values must be
defined clearly by philosophy, while its principles and laws
must be formulated by the descriptive sciences. Art must,
therefore, rely less on common sense and turn to a stricter
formulation of the principles, laws, and purposes than i«
made possible by common sense. From the foregoing it is
clear that art is both a descriptive and a normative science.
13 The Psychology versus the Philosophy of Art.
Let us now turn our attention to one particular view of
wt from the descriptive side. I refer to the psychology of
art. We shall note the distinction between the psychology
of art and the philosophy of an. This will help us
more clearly in mind the distinction between the Urger
of art taken by the descriptive sciences generally and [^
t
i
t62
Tlu- riiihsophird fiaus of Education
From the psychologic a I point of view art is to be regarded
as built upon certain principles and laivs of mental action.
Every work of art must conform to certain modes or princi-
ples of mental behavior. If the work of art fails to take
these into account it cannot be regarded from the psycho-
logical point of view as a real work of art. In short all real
works of art must take account of all the principles and laws
of psychology. Now the formulation of these principles which
underlie art is to be regarded as the work of a psychology
of art, or it is art viewed frtim one particular angle as a de-
scriptive science. The psychology of art like any other descrip-
tive attitude has no rig"ht to sas" what the aim, purpose, or
criteria of art shall be. It. is simply concerned with the
if psychology that are involved
n. The descriptive sciences including psyehol-
gnored by the philosophy of art. In other
:e jestbetic, or science of art, involves a con-
t from both the descriptive and normative
Furthermore, a complete theory of art in-
, purposes, and values of art
th the principles and statements
principle
artistic product ii
ogy cannot be
words a comple
si deration of a
paints of view,
volves a statement of the
on the one hand, together
or laws underlying art as formulated by the descriptive
sciences, particularly psychologj'. Psychology gives us a mere
piaure or description of the laws involved in the production
of a work of art. From the psychological point of view, we
are concerned with those laws that are active in conscious-
ness as we observe the work of the artist. We can describe
and explain the facts of esthetic experience from this point
of view, but we cannot go any farther than this. We cannot
say that art is valuable or not valuable, that it should exist
or not exist. When we take such an attitude as this, we are
viewing the work of the artist, not from the impartial point
of view of the descriptive scientist, but rather from the
ethiciJ or religious, or some other normative point of view,
where our will counts for more than mere connection and
description.
Psychoiogj', like the other sciences, is an artificial construc-
tion made for the purpose of satisfying the demand of our will
and its purposes; and the purpose of our will in setting up the
artificial construction of psychologj' is so that we may view
J
The JEslhelic Asprcts of Eiiiiriilinnnl Thenry
163 1
mental life not in its reality, but in its causal relations
sequence in the world of time and ■ space — that is, in
satisfying the logical demands of conception. Art, on the
other hand, is interested neither in the causa! relation of facts
of our experience, that is, not an artificial construction in
; interest of connection; nor is it interested in connection
all. Its value is in its isolation of a part from the whole,
which isolation brings us into more immediate contact with
reality of the thing represented. Art and science are thus
two independent approaches to the same reality — the one
through connection, the other through isolation. There is thus
no occasion for their interference. Much different does art ap-'
pear when we view it from the philosophical angle or the angle
of normative science. Here we are concerned with an interpre-
tation of art, with its relation to the whole of experience, its
meaning and value for life as a whole. From the psychological
point of view we were interested in the connection of one fact
or law with another, and so viewed art as a systematic unity of
these principles and taws. But in such a view we never get be-
yond the mere fact of the temporal and spacial order of
things, but a complete theory of art involves not only a state-
t of the is, but of the ought also. We must therefore call ,
upon the philosopher for a criticism of art in its relations to
life as a whole. The philosopher, unlike the psychologist,
s art in its relation to other activities and interest of life.
He criticizes art on the basis of its relation to life as a whole.
It is in just such a relation to the unity of life experience
t art gains its significance and value for life. And such
value and significance must be determined by the philosopher^
who views life in its unity.
From the point of view of descriptive science art, as
have already indicated, gains its significance through its con-
nection with other facts of our experience. From the norma-
tive, or philosophical aspect, art gains its significance through
its isolation. The work of art must be such as to be wanting
nothing; it must suggest the unity of life as a whole. It
must present a moment of complete satisfaction, where nothing
wanting or desired. The artist succeeds in showing life in
completion by rounding our partial experience. It is only
through the suggestion of the unity of our e.vperience that J
164 The Pliilosophkal Basis of Education
the artist is unable to present a picture of such a compli
state of existence. Art is the concrete embodiment of an ideal,
and like all ideals, it suggests a state of existence more nearly
perfect and complete than any obtained in actual experience.
This representation is not barren formalism, but actually sug-
gests a deeper reality which is felt, but which is not ex-
perienced in the world of causal connection, in the time and
space world of sequence and phenomena.
We can see, therefore, that it is possible to approach art
both from the descriptive and from the normative sides of
our experience. Miss Puffer says, "We can approach such
an aesthetic canon in two ways; from the standpoint of phil-
osophy, which develops the idea of beauty as a factor in the
system of our absolute values, side by side with the ideas of
truth and of morality, or from the standpoint of empirical
science. For our present purpose, we may confine ourselves to
the empirical facts of psychology and physiology". (The
Psychology of Beauty, p. 12.)
4 The Ideal of Art. As was suggested above, the
philosopher must decide upon the ideal of art, or perhaps it
would be better to say that the artist must view his art in
the light of a wider philosophy of life. The only way to
ascertain what is a reasonable and worthy ideal of art is to
consider it in the light of experience as a whole. A view less
comprehensive than this will not suffice for fixing upon a
worthy ideal of art. The ideal of the artist must be such
that when concretely embodied it provides for the complete
satisfaction and unity of life as a whole. It must realize the
perfect moment and suggest through its isolation the com-
pletion of what is only partially revealed in life viewed as
a causal order, H. C, King says: "Here lies one of the great
reasons for the place and power of art. It has an ideal but it
always presents this ideal concretely. It is no abstraction. It
is so far, therefore, akin to life itself, for the very problem of
life is the embodying of ideals. Art and literature therefore,
make an appeal that no abstract principle or ideal can make.
We can never speak in general. We can never act in gen-
eral. We can never be good in general. It is all in par-
ticulars. We have no way of expressing a general principle.
^
The Mstketic Aspects of Educational Theory 165
but by putting it into some definite concrete individual action.
Now, art and literature give us always such a concrete em-
bodiment of an ideal, and so approach the strongest of all in-
fluences, the influence of a person," (Rational Living, p.
214). In this connection it is worth while noticing Paulsen's
conception of the function of art. He says, "It is the highest
function of art to shape and express the ideals which the
spiritual life of a nation creates. The ideal world reaches
its highest expression in a supermundane superhuman world, in
which perfection has absolute reality for faith. Thus art be-
comes the organ of religion. Its highest function is to realize
the innermost cravings of a people, to contemplate its ideas
of perfection in concrete forms. So the plastic arts produced
concrete representations of the Greek gods, — glorious figures
in which the Greek's ideals of human culture were made
visible to him. Similarly Greek poetry gave to the people in
its epics and its dramas living pictures of divine and human
excellency, such as courage, loyalty, devotion, magnanimity,
prudence, wisdom, and piety. Christian art, too, has performed
the same necessary function of converting the realm of faith
into a world of concrete intuitions. The entire medieval art,
architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, had for
its sole object the presentation of the world of Christian faith,
in the form which this had assumed in the Germanic mind,
to the senses and the entire man." (Paulsen, System of
Ethia, p. 558.)
But from the point of view of the wider philosophy of life,
art must not only fulfill the conditions thus specified, but it
must also be in accord or harmony with life as a whole. The
purposes and values of art must not conflict with those of all
life. There is therefore a criticism of art which may be re-
garded as ethical or religious.
5 The Standards or Criteria of Art. What are the
standards, or criteria of art? This question has quite as much
significance for the artist as the question as to the criteria
of morality has for the ethicist or moral philosopher. Indeed
this is one of the central questions with regard to the practical
aspect of art and morality. We must have not only standards
of the beautiful and the good, but we must have means of
1
1 66
The Philosophical Basis of Educalio
■ ,..Kot ~
determining how far we are realizing these ideals or what
conditions are essential for their realization. The question
then, is what are the means for determining what a really good
work of art must be. From the foregoing section we learn
that the ideal of art is that of beauty. We found that the
a;sthetician in his philosophical criticism of art asserted that
beauty is the ideal toward which the artist should strive. But
just what does he regard as beautiful?
What are the essential attributes of beauty? What condi-
tions must be fulfilled in order that all of the requirements
of the beautiful may be satisfied? A criticism of the nature
of the beautiful reveals harmony, symmetry, proportion, bal-
ance and unity to be essential attributes of a work of art.
Without such qualities as these no real work of art is pos-
sible, for with the lack of balance there is suggested a defi-
ciency in one part of the M'ork of art, and this suggestion of
incompleteness is in direct opposition to the suggestion which
a real work of art affords, namely, that of completed perfection
and harmony of life, or, as we have said above, the concrete em-
bodiment of life's Ideals or purposes. The criteria or
standards of art, then, must be those of harmony, proportion,
and balance. There must be unity so complete and perfect
that there is no suggestion of anything lacking. Miinsterberg
says; "The painter shows us a spot of the world in complete
self -agreement. Every part harmonizes with every other part.
Unity is the great secret of the realm of beauty. Literature
shows us the life of man in this complete restful unity." (Psy.
and Teacher, p. 58.) "Art must inhibit action, if it is per-
fect. The artist is not to make us believe that we deal with
a real object which suggests a practical attitude. The sesthetic
forms are adjusted to the main esthetic aim, the inhibition of
practical desires." (Psy. £5" Ind. Efficiency, p. 273,) We
must always distinguish between the fine arts and the indus-
trial or practical arts, if we are to see clearly the sesthetic
ideal and criteria. Hyde says, "The aim of the mechanic arts
is utility, the satisfaction of felt physical or social needs. The
aim of the fine arts is beauty, or the satisfaction of the
xsthetic feelings." (Practical Idealism, p. 1 15,)
This unity and isolation in the fine arts is essential in
order that the ideal of art which is the complete satisfaction
The MslbetU Aspects of Edncathn,,! Tin'
57
Klife may be attained. Such a realization of the perfect
oment is possible when nothing is wanting. We must cease
vj regard things as connected and see all of the parts in their
perfect unity and organic wholeness. We must, then, in this
moment of appreciation or interpretation shift our point of
view from that of the descriptive sciences or causal connections
as the ideal, to the position of the sesthetic science, where unity
and completion are to be found in isolation, rather than in
connection.
»6 The Relation of Metaphysics and j^sthetics.
We must concern ourselves now Hith the deeper meaning of
the esthetic experience. We must seek whether or not the
ideal of art has any reality. Is the ideal of art simply a
vision, or does it possess reality? This is a question for the
metaphysics of art, and is a part of the wider philosophy of
art. It would be useless to inquire into the ideal of art if
such an ideal has no reality in the universal system of things.
We can view art from the metaphysical point of view the
same as from the ethical or religious, and from this angle the
question is always concerned with the reality, or being of art.
It is in this field that we concern ourselves with the most
fundamental questions of tJie lesthetic experience. We must
aslc ourselves the meaning of this ideal of art for the whole
life which we live. If the ideal of art has no reality, then
it is not worth striving for. It has no value. But philosophy
is searching for the value of life, and since the esthetic ex-
perience is a part of life as a whole, we must expect that
the ideal of art will constitute a part of ultimate reality, or
the final being or nature of things. 1 do not mean to suggest
that the artist constantly must ask himself concerning the reality,
or being of the ideal of his art, but I do mean to say that
unless such an ideal has reality and belongs to the total sys-
tem of things it is not worthy to be regarded from the philo-
sophical point of view as being any part of life. Miss Puffer
says well, that "Every introduction to the problems of esthet-
ics begins by acknowledging the existence and claims of two
methods of attack, — the general, philosophical, deductive,
t which starts from a complete metaphysics and installs beauty
fd its place among the other great concepts; and the empirical,
I
le of 1
fact I
l68 The Pkilotopkical Baiii of Educalian
or inductive, which seeks to disengage a general principle
beauty from the objects of sslhetic experience, and the
of jcsthetic enjoyment: Fechner's aesthetics from above and
from below." {The Piychology of Beauty, p. 29.) There is
no real occasion for conflict between the metaphysical and psy-
chological points of view in art, for as Miss Puffer says, "If a
general concept expresses, as it should, the place of beauty in
the hierarchy of metaphysical values, it is for the psychologist
of Esthetics to develop the means by which that end caa be
reached in the various realms in which works of art are found."
{The Piychology of Beauty, p. 138.)
Metaphysics, as we have seen before, raised the ultimate and
final question as to the nature and reality of all existence.
The case is not different when we concern ourselves with the
field of art. We have seen in the foregoing chapters that
metaphysics raises certain fundamental questions as to the re-
ligious view of life and also the logical. What value would
the religious experience have if after its ideal were realized
it were found to have no place in the reality of the universe,
or what would the logical values of truth be like if they had
no reality or true being in the internal structure of things?
We shall find in the following chapter that ethics raises sim-
ilar questions which must he answered by metaphysics. The
case is not different with education, business, politics, and so-
cial life. No matter from what position we regard life we
cannot begin to ask fundamental questions without regard to
the ultimate meaning and reality of experience,
7 Tffe Relation of Logic and jEsthetics. We must
remind ourselves also that a final philosophy of art cannot be
given unless we take account of the theory of knowledge, or
epistemology, Epistemologj' as we have noted already is the
philosophical discipline which concerns itself with the nature
and extent of knowledge. It raises such questions as, what
can be known, and how is knowledge possible at all? It
ought not to take a great deal of reflection to see that esthetics
raises certain epistemological issues, for example, how can we
know the ideal of art or the standard of art? How can we
distinguish the Ksthctic experience from any other set of ex-
periences in life? These questions raise the epistemological
The Msthetk Aspects of Educational Theory 169
problems. It is not my purpose in this chapter to settle the
I problems that are raised by Eesthetics in these special fields of
metaphysics and epistemology, but rather it is my purpose to
show how inevitably all these philosophical disciplines are
connected. It is not possible to settle the question of aesthetics
independently of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, religion and
ethics. If I succeed in pointing out these connections in the
chapters dealing with the special disciplines of philosophy I
shall have accomplished my purpose.
; also my purpose in this chapter to suggest, as I have
done many times before, the inevitable connection between
ion and the special disciplines of philosophy. It is no
lossible to settle the questions of education independently
of the wider philosophy of the universe, than it is to settle the
problems of scsthetics in this way. Indeed our studies thus
far should have brought us to the point where we can see
clearly the unity of all knowledge.
The Relation of Philosophv of Religion and
Esthetics. If the last statement be true that all knowledge
is inevitably and necessarily connected, it will not be difficult
to see the connection between logic and esthetics. As we
have seen from an earlier chapter on the logical aspects of edu-
cational theory, logic attempts to define the ideal of the truth
relationship. It attempts to show what is necessary in order
that truth may he established. It provides the necessary method
for asserting the tnith of any set of facts in the experience
of man. We can carry over this conception to the field of
assthetics without a great deal of difficulty, j^sthetics as we
have noted already is only one certain field of our human ex-
perience. Logic does not confine itself to the ideal of truth
in any one particular department of our experience, but at-
tempts to define truth in whatever field of experience we may
search for it. If the ideals of sesthctics are to be worthy of
our striving to realize, we must then be certain that they are
true, and their truth is to be determined by their connection
with the universal system of things. Nothing less than the
totality of relationships between phenomena can give us abso-
lute and final truth. According to this conception, as
perience broadens our conception of truth becomes correspond-;
4
4
as abso- ^^^(
our cx-^^^^l
3
IJO The PkO^sopkicml Bmas of Edmtmimm
in^ broader, provided our ioa^n mto the Goonectioo of things
a developed in the same proportioo. The truth of the ideal
of art, it developed in die same manner. The truth of the ideal
of art and its meaning and value in life are to be determined,
not independent of, but in relation to all the fidds of ex-
perience. We must, then« resiKt to the universal method of
truth provided In- logic in order to ascertain die validity or
truth of the ideal of aesdiedcs. Once more we ought to see
a little more clearly the dose relationship between all knowl-
edge. Stricdy speaking, every fact of our human experience
can be regarded either from the normative or die descriptive
point of view; and from the normative point of view it may be
regarded from the spedal angle of the se\'cral philosophical
disciplines, and any attempt to regard our experience from
one single point of vieu- is a sq)aration and abstraction which
often leads us to regard our experience as isolated and frag-
mentary, whereas the correct vic^- would show us the in-
evitable connection of all knowledge and life.
Logic attempts in the field of aesthetics to criticize its method
of proof, and to show how inference and judgment can be
made safely in this field of our experience, i^thetics can no
more separate itself from a wider philosophy than can the
normative view of the world separate itself entirely from the
descriptive. If we are to see experience as a whole we must
sec its several aspects in their relationship. The only mean-
ing and significance that art has is that which it derives from
the relation it sustains as a part to the universal whole of our
experience, and such a relationship is to be defined on the
basis of logical prindples. ^Esthetics, then, like any other spe-
cial field of experience, derives its ideal values and meaning
for life by its relations to the universal whole of things, and
such a relationship between part and whole is to be defined
in terms of logic. In our study of logic in a previous chapter
we have asserted already what the nature of this organic whole
or unity must be. A whole is such a relationship of parts
that it cannot exist without the parts and the parts have no
significance or meaning except in their relation to the whole.
We can thus see the logical aspects of aesthetics.
9 The Relation of Ethiqs and iEsxHEXigs, Fyoq^
The Mslkelk Aspects of Educational Theory , 171
&ie foregoing it is also easy to see that aesthetics cannot be
jevered completely from religion. The theory of art includes
a view of art in its relation to the totality of the universal ex-
(|ierience, as view*ed from the angle of philosophy. From the
KiBngle of the descriptive science, sesthetics is concerned with the
J^iinderlying laws and principles of this special field of ex-
I perience. We have noted already that religion can be viewed
I irom two similar stand-points. From the philosophical side
T religion is concerned with the principles that define the rela-
l.tionship between this special field of experience and life as
I a whole. Religion and esthetics are connected thus through
!■ being parts of a wider whole of experience, and logic must
t their respective rights and fields as parts of the unity
of our experience. With Plato the connection between re-
ligion and sesthetics was so great that it was very difficult to
distinguish between the two. The poet, according to Plato,
gets his visions and inspiration from on high. He says ". . , .
for not by art does the poet sing but by power Divine" {Dia-
logues, 1:224). Religion consisted in the contemplation of
the idea of the beautiful, or the good. With Plato there was
no clear distinction between the values of beauty and those
[■of conduct, or between beauty and goodness. The ideal of
'-the good was at the same time the object of Esthetic con-
' tcmplation. Indeed Plato's ideal of the good seemed to be
more of an aisthetic ideal than it was ethical, for it was not
) much of an ideal to govern man's conduct in this earthly
life as it was an object of beauty to be adored. This ideal was
, worthy of reverence and so was placed in the realm of religious
Man's highest life consisted in the worship of the
I ideal of the good, which was really a religious reverence and
\ mystical contemplation of the aesthetic ideal.
But Plato does not give us the picture of the most perfect
f relationship between religion and aesthetics. They must in
some essential respects be different, otherwise there would be
3 reason for regarding them as different models of experience,
prosthetics must always be regarded as having its own ideals
and criteria, if we are to regard it as a separate field of ex-
k perience, and the same is true of religion. We must dis-
tinguish between the ideal of the beautiful and the object of
religious worship or God, else the two fields of sesthetics and
li
Ii
;
The Philosophical Basis of Education
'^
religion coalesce, and there be no reason for regarding them as
separate fields of experience. We must not confuse the ideal
of religion with the attitude of religion. Any work which is
pursued with a deep and abiding faith and loj'alty, or belief
in its reality or being, comes to be a sort of religion, but it is
just as truly a kind of ethics as it is religion. It was just
at this point that Plato failed to distinguish carefully the rela-
tion between religion and a?stheiics. The artist must have
faith in his art, and in its ideal value, and he must pursue this
ideal loyally, but he must not imagine that in so doing he is
expressing the deepest meaning of religion, for it is only when
this attitude takes into account the whole of our experience
that it really becomes a religion. It must not only represent
man's faith in his art, but his faith in his fellow-men and in
his God, before it becomes truly a religion.
lo The Problems of j¥)sthetics. What we have just
said with regard to the relations between religion and art will
hold good as to the relations of assthetics and ethics, R. B,
Perry says well, "Art, like all other interests, can flourish
only in a sound and whole society, and the law of soundness
and wholeness In life is morality." {Moral Economy, p.
174) Santayana says, "Art being a part of life, the criticism of
art is a part of morals" {The Life of Reason, p. 178) Again
he says, "The subject matter of art is life, life as it actually is;
but the function of art is to make life better". {The Life of
Reason.) The same close relation between ethics and art is
brought out by Caffin when he asserts that "Beauty, then, is
that which stimulates and enhances our Need of Life and
Desire of Living". {Art for Life's Sake, p. gi.) "Beauty
and ugliness, in fact, are equivalent to good and bad." (CafKn,
Art for Life's Sake, p. I4I.)
Ethics and sesthetics are very closely interrelated. It would
be difficult to say whether assthetics owes more to ethics, or
whether ethics owes more to esthetics. The fact is that both
make contributions to a wider philosophy of life, and that they
are so closely related that it v>'ould be impossible to make any
hard and fast line between them, yet they have their different
ideals and their different standards, as well as their different
methods. The ideal of ethics is that of goodness, while that
The Mslhetk Aspects of Educalionni Tbenry
.73
^^K. of esthetics is beauty. The questions of ctliics are concerned ,
^^K with the values and standards of conduct, those of aesthetics
^■^ are concerned with the values and standards of beauty, but
^H the beautiful and the good can no more be separated finally
^V than can the beautiflil and the true, or beauty and religion,
^" Ethics has borrowed its conception of harmony and unity from
aesthetics, but instead of applying the standard to experience
in the field of the artist it is applied to conduct. The
standard of conduct is perfect unity and concord of all the
purposes and ideals in the life of the individual. This
standard is the same for art, the difference being that the
artist realizes his ideal in the concrete embodiment of his
picture or his statue, while the moralist never does completely
accomplish this organic wholeness of life, The moralist must
hold this as his ideal, and as Plato says set his house in order
by it, but he never can experience the complete unity and
harmwiy of all of this life's interests and purposes, and yet
this is his ideal, and this ideal is no less effective because it
is not fully realized. Indeed the ideals that are counted of
greatest value are those which are never fully attained, Wc
pursue them but never quite reach them. The moral ideal is
a flying goal. We think we are about to realize it, then it
dips away from us and moves further on. We do not give up
in despair, provided we have set up a rational ideal of life, but
rather we pursue this ideal with increased zest.
The ideal of conduct is, therefore, borrowed from esthetics
md may be defined as organic unity or wholeness, harmony,
rhythm, or balance, but the artist realizes his ideal in the crea-
tion of his art. The moralist, however, sees in each action only
a partial picture of the life he would live. We shall pursue
this thought further in another connection. Here our only i
object is to state certain fundamental relationships betvcecB'J
ethics and aesthetics.
The Different Theories of Art, The philosopher
of art cannot concern himself all the while with the relational
aspects of -cBsthetics. i^lsthetJcs has its own special problem,
md a profound consideration of this field of experience brings
to light certain special problems which belong to the aeslheti-
cian himself. The philosophical view of art regards the chief
r
174 The Philosophical Bnsii of Education
problem of esthetics as being that of defining clearly the ideal
of art. We have stated already that this ideal is that of
beauty, and we have asserted already that this problem cannot
be settled without calling upon metaphysics, epistemology, re-
ligion, logic and ethics, as well as the descriptive sciences, par-
ticularly psychology. In short, we can say that the problems
of art cannot be dealt with satisfactorily until iesthetics is
regarded as a part of a wider field of human knowledge. Miss
Pufifer says, "To find out what is beautiful, and the reason
for its being beautiful, is the esthetic task; to analyze the
workings of the poet's mind, as his conception grows arid rami-
fies and brightens, is no part of it, because such a study takes
no account of the {esthetic value of the process, but only uf
the process itself." (The Psychology of Beauty, p. 17)
Professor Peabody says, "The Problem of art is thus the sug-
gestion of the ideal by the description of the real," {jtp-
proach to the Social Question, p. I41)
12 The ^Esthetics of Idealism. So far we have con-
sidered the different answers that are given to the different
questions of art from the point of view of the several systems
of philosophy. Each system of philosophy has its own way of
stating the relationship between scsthetics and the other
branches of knowledge, between art and the other fields of ex-
perience. I shall not here go into the matter at any great
length, for only in a general way does it concern the special
purpose which I have in writing this chapter. I am here con-
cerned with the broader relationships between esthetics and the
other philosophical disciplines, i^sthcticians have not always
agreed that art must be criticized in the light of a larger phil-
osophy of life. There is, however, almost universal agreement
of this point at the present time, jEstheticians differ widely
as to the particular value of art, or purpose of art in life,
some have asserted that art is simply a play of the imagina-
tion. Art exercises the imagination and the mental powers
generally in the same wholesome \vay that outdoor play rec-
reates the physical organism. This is the play theory of art.
Other critics of art maintain that art is merely imitation of
the reality, Plato gives expression to this view. He con-
sidered that the work of the artist who creates the objects
The Msthntic .Aspects nf Educniinntil Thpory
175
pi beauty is thrice removed from the reality which he rep-
Such an artist does not deserve to be classed with the
r«al philosophers. The only true artist, according to Plato,
I is he who gives up his life in contemplation and reverence of
f the Idea of the Good. Other critics have asserted that there
I certain educational value in art and that while we are
I engaged in such play of the imagination and imitation of the
:ality we are developing our powers. This is called the
I educational theory of art. There is another theory that con-
I aiders art in the light of moral criticism, and refuses admission
\ to polite society all works of art that are not in perfect keep-
f'lth the moral sentiment of man. Plato was a puritanic
I in art and would refuse to let all artists into his great re-
l^jublic whose work had not been inspected thoroughly in order
■to ascertain whether or not it was suggestive of evil to the
jobserver. Another group of critics regards art not as a
fineans of imitating some object, real or unreal, but as a
s of idealizing some element or portion of our experience.
I According to this theory the work of the artist is not further
L lemoved from reality than the thing which the artist rep-
l^esents, but indeed is closer to realitj-. It suggests a unity
(and harmony without which life and reality would be mean-
Kingless. There is a certain variety of intuitionism which re-
' gards the ideal of art as that of perfection. He is the real
artist who can transform the fragment of our experience in
such a way as to suggest the ideal which should be the standard
both of religion and reality. According to another group of
theorists, art is simply a representation. It is simply the
presentation in a new form of some object in our experience.
In as much as we are concerned particularly with the phil-
osophy of idealism we are most concerned here with the
■ idealistic view of art. Let us turn our attention for a moment
to this view.
13 Summary. The idealist is a rationalist and therefore
sees and criticizes all fragments of experience in the light of
their universal connection. He views art, therefore, as a cer-
tain special field of experience which must he considered in
I its relation to the whole of experience. The idealist regards
art as having many of the purposes which have been sug-
176
The Philoiophical Basis of Education
:e here ^
gestcd in the above section, but it would be well to note here
that, as R. L. Stevenson says, "We are not so much in need
of views of the universe as in a view of the universe". And so
we are not concerned so much with the many different theories
of art as to its purposes and values in life, as we are in formu-
lating a single point of view with regard to this field of ex-
perience which is consistent with the whole of experience. If
art is to be properly criticized, it must be taken in the light
of the whole of our experience; and if the ideal of art is to be
defined clearly and accurately, it must be in the light of the
larger ideals of life as a whole. We must, then, consider
what the ultimate aim of life is. What is the chief good for
which we are striving, and how is this related to the universal
whole, the organic unity of all experience? According to
the esthetics of the type of idealism here reflected the ultimate
aim of all life is that of self-realization. The case is no dif-
ferent when we turn our attention to the special world of
art. Here the chief value of art must be defined in terms of
self-realization. Art is of value, like religion or morality, only
in so far as it is productive of the highest type of will and
personality. The ultimate aim of life and of art as well of
religion, morality, and science, must be expressed in terms of
self-realization. Art that is not productive of the highest
degree of self-realization is not the highest type of art. We
are not to specify the value of art in terms of its tendency
toward the development of the play instincts of man ; nor
in the degree of accuracy of its imitation, or representation of
some object which is embodied in the concrete idea of the beau-
tiful, nor is the value of art to be determined alone by its
exercise of our thought, judgment, and reason; nor again is its
value to be determined on the basis of its idealization of some
object of contemplation. The chief value of art lies In the
fact that it is conducive to a larger self -development. The
highest ideal of life, and the only sufficient ground and motive
of conduct, when rightly conceived will, I believe, be regarded
as self-realization. The chief value of art does not, then,
consist in the pleasure which it produces, but rather in the
complete life and organic unit^ which it tends to promote, and
which it is capable of producing in no small degree, chiefly
because the ideal of art is the concrete embodiment of this idcil
I
The Mslhelk Aspects of Educathnnl Theory
of complete self-realization or organic unity. We conclude i
this part of our inquiry by stating that the Ideal of esthetics' I
must conform to the ideal of life. This is only another way
of stating that the ideal of beauty is subordinate to the ideal
of self-realization. We shall find that the ideal of religion,
truth, and goodness must conform to the same ideal, for the
one universal end of all striving, of all life, is that of self-
realization. We cannot agree with Santayana, then, when
he says that, "A beauty not perceived is a pleasure not felt,
and a contradiction." {The Sense of Beauty, p. 45)
14 The Educational Implication of j^sthetics.J
We have now defined esthetics as the science of the beautiful,
and have shown that it has both descriptive and normative '
aspects as a complete theory of art. We have shown the ideal
of art to be that of beauty, and the essential criteria of such
a standard is that it must possess harmony, symmetry, propor-
tion, and unit}'. We have shown that the questions of
esthetics cannot he answered alone, but must be considered
from the wider point of view of the universal philosophy of all
experience, and that consequently esthetics has its close con-
nections with metaphysics, or the science of reality, epistem-
ology, or the science of knowledge, logic, or the science of
truth, and ethics, or the science of the good, and that it also
has its religious significance. We are to conclude, therefore,
that a^thetics is not strictly an independent inquiry in search
of ideals that have no connection with life as a whole ; on the
contrary, the ideal of esthetics must conform to the ideals of
life as a whole. This ideal is to be found only when we know
the deeper meaning and craving of our individual wills.
.Esthetics, then, must be viewed in the light of a complete
philosophy of life, and beauty, its ideal, must be conceived
in its relation to the ideal of life as a whole. This ideal is
best defined in terms of self-realization, for this is the only
adequate statement of what our deepest will and purpose in
life is, and art is to be considered as of value only in so far as
it is productive of the larger life or of self-realization. It must
not be inferred that assthetics does not have the privilege of 1
promoting self-realization according to its own standards,
which standards, however, must not be chosen arbitrarily, or |
■78
The Phihs
ohkal i
of Educnii
without regard to the whole of life.
Very little need be said as to the educational implic
concluding this chapter, of esthetics. It has been urged that
the ideal of iesthetics is to be regarded of value only in s
far as it is productive of the highest self-realization. Art,
therefore, does have an educational value, and like education,
it must at the same time it realizes its own purpose and ideals
tend to realize the larger purposes of life as a whole. Both
education and art arc to be considered in the light of this
larger aim. which expresses the deepest will of the individual.
We shall see later that the individualistic aspects of this
theory cannot rightly be considered as selfish, mean, or low.
On the contrary, it represents the highest conceivable ideal
both of the egoistic and altruistic Impulses, and is the only
adequate means of their reconciliation.
We are to remember that education is not a separate field
of experience, but that it is the common ground on which the
various values of life are to be realized. Education borrows
a part of its ideal from ajsthetics, just as truly as ethics has
borrowed its ideal of organic unity from aesthetics. Up to the
present time we have concerned ourselves with three realms
of human values, from which education raises a considerable
part of its ideal. From logic, education has borrowed its con-
ception of truth ; from aesthetics, it has borrowed its concep-
tion of beauty; from religion, it has borrowed its conception
of the absolute value of religion; from ethics, as we shall see
in the next chapter, it borrows the ideal of goodness. Educa-
tion owes a heavy debt to esthetics. It is the business of art
education to show how the ideals of beauty can be realized
through the various agencies of school life and organization.
Education thus borrows its ideals from logic, religion, iesthetics,
and ethics, and concerns itself with the development of plans
and purposes for the realization of these ideals in life.
In this connection it will be instructive to note what others
have said as to the relation of art and education. Plato makes
Protagoras, chief of the Sophists, say that "Poetry is the
principal part of Education." (Protat. p. i6i) Of all the
excellences of his ideal state, Plato says that nothing pleases
him more "upon reflection than the rule about poetry", which
ruled out all poetry that did not conduce to the ideal of the
The Msthelic Aspects of Educational Theory
■ 307)
179
rgood. {Rep. Bk., p. 307) Henry Turner Bailey says, "The
purpose of art education is the development of appreciation
for the beautiful and of power to produce beautiful tilings"
{Art Education, p. i) Prof. Santayana says, "j^sthetic edu-
cation consists in training ourselves to see the maximum of
beauty". [The Sense of Beauty, p. 136) Another aspect of
art is emphasized by Thompson when he says, "The biological
importance of living in beautiful surroundings is inestimable".
It makes for health of body and brain; it awakens long-dormant
buds; it fills up the life with wholesome delights; it produces
pleasant modifications of the individual; and who can tell
how its potent message may travel by the wireless telegraphy
of ante-natal life? {Darwinism and Human Life p. 229)
Professor Miinsterberg holds that "The beUef in the absolute
dignity of such true art must be instilled by education. As
far as this ideal is realized in the world of things, we have the
fine arts; as far as mankind and man's will is the material, we
have literature ; as far as the inner life comes to such perfect
expression, we have lyrics and music. No education can live
up to its true ends unless it helps throughout to stimulate the
enthusiasm for artistic beauty. Whether poems or dramas arc
read, whether the masterpieces of foreign literature are brought
near to the pupil, whether artistic drawing or singing are stud-
ied or the glory of historical art is proclaimed, the enthus
for the realm of beautiful art must be developed, together with
the belief in truth and harmony," {Psychology and Teacher,
p. 247.)
CHAPTER VII
THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY
1 The Meaning and Definition of Ethics, In this
chapter we are concerned with the meaning of ethics and its
relations to educational theorj'. Ethics has been defined often
as the science of right conduct. It is one of the normative
sciences. We say it is normative for the reason that it sets
up a standard or ideal. Ethics is not concerned alone with
the facts and laws that govern our conduct, but it is inter-
ested in what constitutes good conduct. Ethics can be re-
garded from the descriptive aspect of the world also. From
such an angle it is concerned with the description and ex-
planation of the facts of conduct. But when we take into ac-
count ideals and purposes, values and standards, we have passed
beyond the realm of mere description and explanation into
the world of norms and appreciation.
2 Ethics and Common Sense. Common sense does not
clearly define the moral issues nor do the descriptive sciences.
We must not stop with a mere description of conduct, but we
must concern ourselves with the ideals which it is worthy for
us to realize in conduct. The aim we have in view is deserving
of our consideration. We must, therefore, not confine ethics
to the realm of description and explanation, but must regard
it as a branch of philosophy. Common sense no more can
offer a sufficient basis for good conduct than it can offer a
satisfactory basis for religion, art, or business. We must take
a broader view of life and experience than that afforded by
common sense, if we are to understand the deeper purposes of
our life. It is just as essential that the principles of right con-
duct be clearly defined and the problems recognized as it is
that our business in the economic world should be established
on sound economic principles.
I
I
The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory i8l
3 Ethics as a Science. Ethics is thus both a normative
and a descriptive science. As a normative science it fs con-
cerned with what is, with the facts of experience and their
causal or sequential relations. From the normative point of
view, ethics is regarded as a science of values, purposes and
ideals and the chief concern of ethics from this point of view
is that of determining the worthy aims and purposes of life.
Ethics is constantly in search of the highest good, and with
the standards of right conduct, which conduct is measured
in terms of this ideal. Ethics has always been regarded as
a search for the highest good in life, but there have been a
great many different answers given to the question, what is
the highest good ? We must now turn our attention to some of
the broader relations of ethics in order that we may get a
comprehensive view of the whole field of our human ex-
perience and of knowledge. We have noticed that meta-
physics, epistemologj'. logic, religion, and jesthetics are very
closely interwoven. It is our purpose here to show that ethics
sustains a close relation to each of these branches of philosophy.
Let us first concern ourselves with the relation between meta-
physics and ethics.
4 The Relation of Metaphysics and Ethics. We
have stated already that the ideal of ethics is that of the high-
est good, and that this is the standard of our conduct. It
would be meaningless and valueless to concern ourselves with
the ideal of the good, if it had no reality or being. We must
then concern ourselves with the question, what reality or worth
has this ideal of the good? It would be a useless striving in-
deed if man were constantly in search of the ideal of the good
and he should find in the end that it is not real, or has no
true being. It would be like chasing a mere fancy. The meta-
physician must inquire into the ideal of the good in order to
determine its validity and its meaning, or reality in the uni-
versal system of human experience. It is, then, impossible
completely to withdraw ethics from the field of metaphysics.
To do so would mean great loss for ethics. Rogers says, "The
Ethics of the 'moral sense' school is the least dependent on
metaphysics, but this is not in its favor, being merely th«j
result of superficiality." (Short Hist, of Ethics, p. g.) With
l82
The Philosophical Basis of Education
out the metaphysical criticism of the first principles of ethic
ivc might be engaged constantly in chasing butterflies instead
of real ideals of worth. We must coristantly criticize our
ethical ideal in the light of the larger view of life as a whole.
It will always be true that "The widest truths of ethics like
those of other sciences, cannot fully be realized except by
reference to other branches of philosophy." (Shelton: Int.
Jour. Etk. 20:24:424) Rogers says, "It is a truth, which
should never be forgotten, that a complete philosophy of ethics
involves some very profound metaphysical problems." {Short
Hist, of Ethics, p. 8) The close relation between ethics
and metaphysics is expressed by Prof. R. B. Perry when he
asserts that "There can be no such thing as a judgment of
worth which is not a judgment concerning the fact or being
of the worth." {Int. Jour. Ethics 21 1295)
5 The Relation of Epistemology and Ethics.
What has been said with regard to the connections of ethics
and metaphysics can almost be repeated in showing the rela-
tionship between ethics and epistemology. The ideal of the
good must be knowable if it is to be of real value or worth
at all. What would be gained if the ideal of ethics were real,
and yet it could not be known? To know the reality of this
ideal is to see it in its relation to the universal system of
ideals and purposes, and svich a relationship is possible only be-
cause knowledge is possible. The relationship itself would not
exist were it not for knowledge. Indeed we mean nothing
more by such a relationship, than that the part of our ex-
perience is viewed in the light of a larger knowledge of the
whole. The common sense view of ethics, as we have observed
already, does not regard this science as having fundamental
connections with metaphysics and epistemology. We have
seen also that the ethics of common sense does not gain any-
thing by failing to perceive these fundamental relations: on
the contrary, it must all be counted as a loss and discredit of
the common sense view of ethics. The ideal of ethics, then,
must be not only true and stand the test of reality, as pro-
posed by metaphysics, but this ideal must be such that it may
be known. We must conclude, therefore, with Professor
I
The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory
Adier, that "Ethical science has its Epistemological foundation." I
{Int. Journal of Ethics. 22:5.)
6 The Relation of Ethics and Logic. There
also close connections between ethics and logic and these have i
appeared already, so we need do little more than bring 1
gether a few of the statements that we have made in other '
connections. From the logical point of view, the truths in the
field of ethics must conform to a wider system of truths. It '
is not a sufficient test of truth that a few of the facts fit har-
moniously together. They must be viewed in their relation
to a wider totality of things. So logic must enter the field of
ethics in order to ascertain whether or not the standards and
tests of truth are sufficient, and this is to be determined by their
consistency with the universal system of knowledge. If the
truths in one field of experience are seen to conflict with those
of another the logician does not hesitate to regard some of the
-called truths as untrue. We must apply this logical test of
truth no matter in what field of our experience we consider,
and unless the several fields of experience qualify in their use
:thod they fail to meet the logical standards of truth. So
m sum up the three preceding sections of this chapter by
asserting that the ideal of ethics as the standard of right con-
duct, that is the good, must not only be real, hut it must be
knowable and be true.
The Relation of Ethics and Religion. In the
chapter on the religious aspects of educational theory, we spoke
of the connections between ethics and religion. We must here
his same connection, this time from the point of view
of ethics rather than from that of religion. Ethics owes quite
as heavy a debt to religion as religion does to ethics. Ethics
has borrowed the conception of reverence, devotion, and loyalty
from religion, but with all the likenesses there are funda-
mental differences between ethics and religion. Ethics is con-
cerned with the relationship between man and man, while re-
ligion is concerned with the relationships thus defined with the
added notion of man's relation to his God. Professor Palmer
rightly says that "We must fix our moral minds on the man-
ward rather than on the goodward side of a. life which unites
r
184 The Pkilosophical Basis of Education
finite and infinite," (Palmer, Field of Ethics, p. 192.)
Ethics and religion are thus related as two concentric cir-
cles having unequal radii, the longer of which represents re-
ligion, and the one with the shorter radius that of ethics.
Professor Peabody says well, that "To prolong the radius of
goodness is to penetrate the sphere of faith. The outer edge
of ethics is the inner margin of religion." {App. to Soc. Ques.,
p. 179) Such a conception brings out clearly the notion that
ethics and religion are inseparably connected. The value of a
religion is to be determined very largely by its serviceableness
with respect to man, as well as by reverence and obedience
toward God, The ideal of ethics is that of goodness, and like
the ideal of beauty it must be tested in the light of a complete
view of the world. Ethics, religion, and ssthetics are thus all
to be subjected to a philosophical criticism of life as a whole,
8 The Relation of Ethics ano j^^sthetics. In our
discussion of the relation of ethics and aesthetics we have noted
the close relationship that obtains between these two sciences.
Wc have stated that ethics borrows its conception of unitj" and
harmony from lesthetics. We have also noted that the ideal
of icsthetics is realized as a concrete embodiment of human pur-
pose, and as the object of esthetic contemplation. Similarly we
have noted that ssthetics, while holding to the same ideal
of organic unity, fails to realize in any single act of ex-
perience this complete moment of perfection. Art idealizes
the fragment of our experience by taking account of the prin-
ciples of unity and harmony and thus makes possible the actual
realization of the ideal of the artist. The moralist, however,
is not able to point to any act of such complete unity. Yet
the difference is not so great as it might seem, for while the
moralist does not succeed in realizing completely his ideal in
any act of experience; with his eyes steadily fixed on this unity
of purpose, he governs his every act, and so it is possible to con-
ceive of each act as contributing to the realization of a larger
whole. Indeed this act of self-realization at times becomes
so apparent through our deeds that we shift our point of view
momentarily from that of the moralist to that of the sestheti-
cian, and regard the individual act as the consummation and
realization of our most complete meaning. The enjoymeat \
The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory 1S5 |
I of the moralist often resembles that of the artist, but his |
'product of art is embodied in the unity of his deeds and not .
in any concrete and objective unity. Instead of completing 1
the picture of life in actual concrete embodiment, it must to a
large extent be filled out in the mind of the moralist,
9 The Problems of Ethics. The problems of ethics arc
special, not in the sense that they have no connection with the
other problems of life, but in the sense that they require first
to be attacked by the moral philosopher. Later they must be
criticized in the light of general philosophy. The special
problems of ethics are those relating to the ideal of the good,
freedom, and the standards, or criteria, of conduct. As we
have found in the other special fields, so we will find here that
the solutions proposed by the different systems of ethics differ
considerably. It may be, however, that they do not differ
so widely as we think, for a man is psychologically predisposed
to regard his adversaries as inconsistent, even before he really
considers how far apart they really are. He usually excuses
his own inconsistency by regarding his opponent as inconsis-
»teit.
10 Systems of Ethics. I am disposed to believe that all I
the great systems of ethics are more closely related than is
often supposed, and yet I am keenly aware of the fact that
there are important differences here. The chief difference is
due probably to the fact that some of the systems are more
completely thought out in their universal relations than arc
others. There are a number of important systems of philos-
ophy which have concerned themselves with the problems of
ethics. As a matter of fact, every system of philosophy has
regarded as its chief task the search for the good, and such a ,
search is defined as the central problem of ethical inquiry.
complete system of philosophy is possible which does not con-
cern itself with the ideals of conduct, or the good. Some
systems of philosophy are primarily concerned with metaphysics,
some are distinctly epistemological, and others are more re-
ligious, aesthetic or ethical, but no matter from what angle
twe approach experience, wc are certain to find the connections
diat have been referred to above. In the systems of philosophy
\
this ?
P
1 86 The Philosophical Basis of Educalio
to which mention is made in the remaining portion of
chapter, 1 am concerned not with the metaphysical, epistemo-
logical, logical or esthetic aspects, but rather with the ethical
aspects. We arc to keep in mind the close relationship that
has already been defined as existing between these several dis-
ciplines. We shall refer to diflerent forms of hedonism, stoi-
cism, platonism, naturalism, pragmatism and idealism.
II The Ethics of Hedonism. According to the ethics
of hedonism, pleasure is the only worthy end and motive of
conduct. This idea! has been defined in a number of different
ways by Cyrenaicism, Epicureanism, and utilitarianism. Ac-
cording to Aristipus, leader of the Cyrenaics, pleasure is re-
garded as the highest good, but since bodily pleasures are more
intense it is this sort of pleasure that we should attempt to
realize in conduct. Then since the bodily pains are also more
intense than the mental, these are most to be avoided. Ac-
cording to Epicurus, however, pleasures of the mind are more
lasting. They have greater durability and possess greater in-
tensity, therefore pleasures of the intellect are to be regarded
as the chief aim of conduct. According to utilitarianism as
defined by the later hedonists, Bentham, Mill, and Spencer,
pleasure is regarded as the object of the greatest utility, and
consequently the highest aim of conduct. The Cyrenaics and
the Epicureans were alike in that both regarded the highest
aim of conduct as that of individual pleasure, but they differed
in that Aristipus regarded the bodily pleasures as of chief im-
portance, while Epicurus considered the pleasures of the mind
as of the greatest value.
Hobbs and Locke of the modern hedonists were alike in that
both regarded individual pleasures as the highest motives and
aim of conduct, and both differed from the utilitarian school
to which Bentham, Mill, and Spencer belong. These last
three were universalistic hedonists. The highest aim, accord-
ing to them was that of the "Greatest happiness to the greatest
number." Mill asserted that there is a standard of pleasure
to which all pleasure must conform. Pleasure not only had
duration and intensity, that is quantity, but they had quality
also. Mill asserted that it was better to be a Socrates dis-
satisfied than a pig satisfied. The introduction of this qualita-
I
The Ethical Aspects of Educal'ioiidi Theory 187
tive distinction in pleasure virtually denied pleasure as the
highest good in life. For if pleasures are not of the same
value qualitatively considered, then there must be some stand-
ard outside of pleasure by which all pleasures are measured.
This really was the death-knell of the pleasure theory of the
Jiighest good.
The Ethics of Stoicism. The Stoics, like the ]
Cyrenaics, were a branch of the, Socratic school. They con-
tended that not pleasure but duty and virtue are the highest
aims of conduct. We are not to he good in order that we
may get the greatest amount of pleasure out of life, as Epicurus
said, but we are to be good because it is right. Virtue for
virtue's sake was the doctrine of the Stoics. This necessarily
led to formalism, the chief results of which were to be found
in the philosophy of the schoolmen during the medieval ages.
According to the Stoics the highest good consisted in conform-
ing to law. Man's greatest moral duty was to govern his con-
duct in such a way as to conform to the laws of nature or the
universe. The Stoics were necessarists or determinists in ethics.
They regarded it man's highest duty to conform rigidly to the
laws of the universe. Here the Stoics, like a good many of
us to-day, mistook the means for the end. It is not that we
Id conform to the laws of nature with no ulterior aim
iew, but rather we must conform to these laws in order
we may be able to obtain the greatest good in life. Zeno,
the leader of the Stoics, maintained that the way to know
our duty is to know the secret laws of nature, and it is only I
by conforming to these laws that man can obtain the highest j
good in life. Indeed there was no good beyond mere con- I
formance with this law. There was an ascetic element in \
this philosophy, such as we have noticed in Platonism. This
ascetic element gained its high-water mark during the period
of scholasticism. The Stoics, believing that the hedonists were
on the wrong track entirely in their search for the highest
good, went to the opposite extreme, and instead of laying
emphasis on the content side of experience, they overempha-
sized the form.
13 The Ethics of Platonism. Enough has been said
^^
l88 The Philosophical Basis 0/ Education
already with regard to the ethical aspects of Plato's philosophy
to suggest what, according to his view, was the highest good.
Plato conceived that all ideas resolved themselves ultimately
into one supreme ideal which is called the idea of the good.
This idea of the good was by Plato regarded as the supreme
motive and end of all good conduct. It was man's highest
obligation to strive to gain a clear conception of this idea of
the good. It was possible to get this conception only by clear
philosophical thinking. The idea of the good according to
Plato was of such a character that only the philosophers, and
those most highly learned, could attain. Thus the ideal of
ethical conduct was rather exclusive in the mind of Plato, It
was only the philosopher who could see the real worth and
value of conduct. Morality thus became a matter too largely
of scholarship to serve as a satisfactory basis for universal
morality. The best that the artisans and laborers could attain
was to attend strictly to their own business. Every man re-
ceived his just dues by correlating properly the principles of
courage, wisdom, and temperance. But the virtue of wisdom
was withheld largely from the lower class. All individuals,
however, could practice the virtue of temperance, and the
warriors at least could practice the virtue of courage. Justice
was not a fourth virtue, but rather the union of the virtues of
courage, temperance, and wisdom.
The highest good according to this philosophy was removed
from experience, and this was its great defect. In whatever
terms the good may be defined, it must always attribute some
value to the experience of this world, otherwise the good is
unrealizable and we can do no more than contemplate it in
a mystical way. This is important for us to consider for the
reason that a complete educational theory, which we arc here
attempting to give in general outline, must always be pre-
sented in the light of a complete philosophy of life, which con-
tains a statement of the ultimate or highest good. We cannot
accept as final the highest good as stated by Plato. It consisted
too largely in abstraction from the world of experience, rather
than in a statement of a completed and rounded-out experience,
such as we know something about from our partial life in the
world of causal sequence.
The Ethical Aspects of Ediicationnl Theory
[14 The Ethics of Naturalism, When we spoke of the
igious aspects of naturalism, we noted that very little con-
tnbution to religious philosophy has been made by this theory
of life. It is different, however, when we view the matter
from the point of view of ethics. Naturalism as an ethical
theory asserts the highest good to be found in the realization of
pleasure, or some other content of this life. In this respect it
will be noticed that it differs widely from Platonism, which
found the chief good in a world above the world of our prac-
tical experience. Naturalism is really a science rather than a
philosophy. It does, however, have seme philosophical con-
nections. The conclusions arrived at by naturalism with re-
gard to the nature of the universe raise certain important
philosophical questions which cannot be passed by unnoticed.
Naturalism, true to its name, finds the highest good in some
factor of the natural life of man. As we have said, this is
expressed usually in terms of pleasure. A naturalistic, or
positivistic, philosophy is the logical background for utilitarian
ethics. According to Spencer, chief of the naturalistic ethical
philosophers, the highest good consisted in happiness. Not
the happiness of the moment or of the individual, but the
greatest happiness to the greatest number. This view regards
the only motive and the only worthy end of conduct to be
some form of pleasure or, better, happiness. Since the aim of
life is some good to be realized in the life of our present ex-
perience, this type of ethical theory is generally regarded as
utilitarian. The good is of some service to man in his present
Slate of existence. It is not something to be striven for that
belongs to another world, but rather something to be obtained
in this world of our partial experience. In this view, the
utilitarian philosopher is doubtless more accurate than was Plato,
and yet, whether or not such a good can be regarded as final,
is a question to which our attention will need to be drawn
further as we proceed.
15 The Ethics of Pragmatism. While pragmatism
has not yet developed a complete ethical theory, but is primar-
ily epistemo logical, there are, however, certain influences that
can be deduced logically from its fundamental principles. The
test of the truth of any hypothesis is that of i
I90
The Philosophical Basis of Education
cording to pragmatism. It is not different In the
ligious or moral hypotheses. I may regard as the highest good
that which is found to work most satisfactorily in my life. This
is the pragmatic tpst of all truth. Pragmatism does not formu-
late in any definite way its conception of the highest good, but
so far it has stated only the test of the ultimate truth and
validity of such a conception. This theory is too young to be
considered at any great length in this place. It has not well
formulated its own theories of the universe, and it need not,
therefore, be criticized to any great extent here. There are
certain epistemological implications of this doctrine that have
wider significance for educational theory, but it is difficult to
formulate these for the reason that the doctrine is itself not
very clearly formulated.
i6 The Ethics of Idealism. According to the idealistic
view which is maintained here, the highest good of life con-
sists in self-realization. Self-realization is possible only through
the realization of our own deepest will and purpose. The ulti-
mate reality of the universe is stated in terms of personality.
It is the development of this personality through self-realiza-
tion that constitutes the highest good in the individual, and
when he strives for ideal values that are not narrowly personal,
but over-individual, his strivings cease to be of a selfish, egoistic
nature, and come to be universal. The attempts to realize
such over-individual or super-personal ideals, which are valu-
able for every individual Is the highest motive and the chief end
of all conduct. There is no way of formulating specifically the
chief end of conduct e.\cept in terms of self-realization. It thus
becomes the duty of every individual to attempt to realize the
ideal values of life, truth, beauty, goodness, and religion, for
these are values which express the deepest and most abiding
reality of life. They are both personal and super- personal,
both individual and over-individual, or universal. They have
their value not in the fact that individuals strive for their
realization to satisfy certain narrow purposes, but rather be-
cause their nature is of the very essence of reality or life
itself.
According to the ethics of idealism, then, the highest good
does not consist in the pleasure either of the individual, or
" The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory 191
the greatest number of individuals, nor docs it consist in the
formal adherence to the super-personal laws of nature; nor
does it consist in the contemplation of the idea of the good,
which idea is removed from the world of practical experience;
nor yet is it found in the ethics of pragmatism, which asserts
that the highest good consists in the practical adaptation of our
hypotheses and theories to the facts of our experience. All
of these grand philosophies give us an ethical view of the
world which we cannot afford to neglect with impunity, but
they fail to give us a complete and systematic account of the
ultimate good or chief value of life. This is due probably
to the fact that the wider philosophy of which these different
ethical reflections are only a small part is insufficient to give an
account of the universe as a whole.
The good must always be conceived in terms of personality.
The reality of the universe is expressible in no other terms
than those of personality and will. The highest good in life
consists in the most complete development and realization
of our own inner purposes, interests, or will. H, C. King
says: "Not feelings, not sentiments, moral sensibilities, or
aspirations, not principles, not good resolutions, even but only
action, born of the will truly reveals us," {Rational Lriwg,
p. 145.) "Whenever we tap organic nature," said Romanes,
"it seems to flow with purpose." (Quoted by Thompson,
Darwinism and Human Life. p. 196.) Miinsterberg says;
"In the purposive view of our real life, only our vnW and our
personality have a meaning and can be related to the ideas and
higher aims." {Psychotherapy, p. 145.)
17 Summary. In summarizing briefly the contents of
this chapter let us say that ethical theory is a part of a larger
theory of life, just as are esthetics and religion. Ethics must
be viewed, therefore, always in its relation to the whole philos-
ophy of life. It is not an independent science in the sense
that it has no connection with other views of life. It is bound
up intimately with metaphysics, epistemology, religion, logic
and aesthetics. The ideal of the good, therefore, cannot be
detached completely from the ideals of truth, beauty, and re-
ligion.
The different systems of philosophy give different answers to
192 The Philosof-hical Basts of Education
if con- \
tlic question as to what constitutes the ultimate good of
duft. Each one of these philosophies makes some important
contributions to the conception of the value and meaning of
life as a whole. They do not, however, all offer an equally
satisfactory solution of the problems «hich they set out to
solve. The answers given by some of these philosophers are
indeed very partial and fragmentary, and yet the chief con-
clusions of them all must be incorporated in the larger con-
ception of the good. The hedonist is right in maintaining that
pleasure is an important element of the universe. The Stoic
is right in his conception of the good as involving duty, loyalty,
and strict adherence to ideals. He was mistaken, however, in
asserting that the highest ideal of conduct is living in strict
accortiance with the laws of the universe. This is to be re-
garded as a means, and not as an end in itself. Plato was
right in his contentions that the idea of the good deserves our
deepest loyalty and adoration. Our duty to this ideal is in-
deed so great that it becomes almost a matter of religion that
we show our loyalty to it.
Idealism takes account of all of these answers that have been
offered to the questions of ethics. It does not regard any one
of them, however, or all of them put together as offering a
final or satisfactory solution of the great ethical problems of
life- The idealist cannot see the ultimate values of the world
defined in materialistic terms, nor can he see these defined as
pleasure, or happiness, or strict conformity to physical law.
These things are external to man and consequently are out-
side the boundaries of the real man. Man's deepest reality is
expressed in terms of will or personality, and the highest good
must be conceived in such terms. The great problem of ethics
is to conceive how it is possible for man to develop to the high-
est possible degree his own inner meaning and purpose. This
he can do only by adhering strictly to the ideal values of life,
which are not expressed in terms extra- personal, but which
fall within the range of his own deepest will. These ideals
we have expressed as truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. We
have even gone so far as to suggest that these ideals have their
final unity in the development of our own personality. It is
only by loyalty and devotion to these ideals that man's inner
purpose or will develops.
The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory 193
18 Educational Implications of Ethics. We are
now in a position to see something of the ethical implications
of the ethics of voluntaristic idealism. I speak of voluntaristic
idealism in order to distinguish it from another type of ideal-
ism in which the chief emphasis is placed upon the intellect,
rather than on the will. According to the philosophy which
forms the background to the educational theory herein ex-
pressed, the chief reality of life is defined in terms of will, or
will directed toward a purpose, which I call personality. It is
not difficult to see, then, what significance this sort of a philos-
ophy has for educational theory. The chief aim of education,
as well as of every other institution and every vocation, is to
realize these ideal values. The school is an institution of
society, the chief business of which is to aid in the development
of the personality of immature individuals. In other words,
self-realization is the chief aim of education as well as the
chief aim of life, and briefly it is the business of the school to
aid individuals in this larger realization of their own life
interests and purposes.
CHAPTER VIII
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
I The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Life.
In Part I of this volume we concerned ourselves with the aims,
scope, methods, and relations of the descriptive sciences. In
Part li we gave our attention to the aims, scope, methods,
and relations of philosophy. In Part HI we made certain
sharper comparisons and contrasts betH'cen science and philos-
ophy from the several different aspects of philosophy. We
concluded this part with the statement that the descriptive
sciences cannot offer us a complete view of life. The descrip-
tive sciences are concerned with the formulation of the law's
and principles that govern the facts of our experience in a
causal order or sequence.
The chief aim of science is to render an accurate and com-
plete account of our experience from the point of view of their
eternal connections in a time and space order of things. This
sort of a formulation of our experience leaves out of account
man's will and purpose. The deeper cravings of the human
soul are not touched or disturbed by correlating thus our ex-
periences for the purpose of explanation. Indeed such an ex-
planation in terms of cau.sal relationship is in itself a direct
outgrowth of the deepest demands of our will and purpose.
Yet there are those who do not see this point clearly and
regard science as capable of offering a complete and accurate
account of life as a whole. Our own conclusion with regard to
this matter, however, was very different. Professor Miinster-
berg says: "It is one of the greatest dangers of our time that
the naturalistic point of view wliich decomposes the world
into elements for the purpose of causal connection, interferes
with the volitional point of view of the real life, which can
deal only with values and not with elements." Professor Hornc
says: "We need to-day a popular philosophy that shows j]
194
Retrospect and Prospect
195
the mechanism of science is itself a product of the free inquir-
ing spirit of man. To me it is a sad spectacle to see keenly
intelligent men throwing themselves as a mass of mere matter
before the Juggernaut of scientific necessity which they them-
selves have constructed." {Phil, of Edu., p. XII.)
We regarded it the business of philosophy to give a state-
ment of the final meaning and reality of life and the deepest
cravings of the human soul. The scientific aspect of the world
is necessary, indeed without it our world would fall back on
the plane of savagery. But we must be careful that we do
not make the barbarous blunder of confusing aims and means,
or causal connection and interpretation. The world of science
is the world of connection, the world of causal relationship,
and such a world is the result of the demands of our own
will. The world viewed from the philosophical aspect does
not thus disregard our will and its purposes. Indeed it con-
siders that it is the will that is deserving of the chief place
in our experience, and in terms of which the ultimate reality
of the universe is explained. The explanation of the descrip-
tive scientist, then, is not complete. The world stands as a
mere connection in a time and space order, so long as we
view it strictly from the scientific aspect. It is plain, then,
that there are two aspects of our life. The one is that con-
sidered by science, the other hy philosophy. A complete theory
of life cannot afford to leave out of account either one of these
aspects of our experience. Science considers man in relation
to the order of time and space. Philosophy conceives man in
his relation to the universe as a whole, which is not confined
within the limits of time and space, but which, on the con-
trary, includes time and space within its own being.
From this view we deduce easily the conclusion that no
complete and satisfactory account of our educational experience
can be given from the point of view of the descriptive sciences
alone. We need this knowledge and understanding of the
connections of the world's phenomena, but we need also some-
thing more than it is possible for the scientist to give, that is,
we need purposes, ideals, and values. We need appreciation as
well as description. We need to be able to interpret our ex-
perience in the light of its relation to the whole of which each
experience is but a fragment. The world of philosophy is the
196 The Philosophical Basis of Education I
I world of interpretation and appreciation, the world of science
is that of description and of explanation. From the point of
view of life as a whole, philosophy is concerned with the aims,
purposes, and values of our experience, while science is in-
terested in this experience in its causal connection. Philosophy
thus gives us the meaning and value of life, while the descrip-
tive sciences provide us with the means and the methods for 1
the realization of these ideal values and purposes.
2 The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Edu-
cational Theory. At this point in our inquiry we paused j
to regard education as a limited portion of our experience, |
and consequently falling within the bounds of the universal
experience. It was then necessary to regard the theory of edu-
cation in the light of a larger theory of life. Education
being only a part of life as a whole, the philosophy of educa- ■
tion is a part of the wider philosophy of life, and the same
can be said with respect to education when viewed from the
aspect of descriptive science. We are, therefore, to find the
aims of education in the broader field of the aims of life. And
science will be of service to us only in so far as it malces the
realization of our purposes in life possible. The philosophical 1
aspect of education, therefore, is found to be concerned with
the aims and purpose of education, with the meaning and
values of our educational experience. The scientific aspect
of education concerns itself with the means and methods by
which we realize our ideal values in life.
I
3 The Special Philosophical Aspects of Educa-
tional Theory. Then we considered the special disciplines '
of philosophy, one by one, showang their relations to educa-
tional theory. Philosophy was considered in a general way, ,
as providing the aims, purposes, and values of life until we ,
reached Part IV. There we began to divide the field into ;
the several divisions of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, re- ■
ligion, esthetics, and ethics. We found that metaphysics con- I
cerns itself with the reality and being of all experience, and |
that each fragment of our experience raises questions of ulti-
mate realit>'. We therefore found it impossible to sever edu- I
cation from Its metaphysical and epistemological bases without 1
J
Retrospect and Prospect 197
destroying the raenning of educational experience altogether.
We considered educational experience in the light of epistemo-
logical reflection and concluded that all reality must be know-
able, otherwise it would be meaningless to us. Thus we as-
serted the metaphysical and the epistemological bases of edu-
cational experience.
+ Ethics and the Educational Ideal. We concerned
ourselves with the normative science of logic, philosophy of re-
ligion, iesthetics, and ethics. We found that logic concerns
itself with the ideals and values of truth; that religion has
certain values of ultimate truth and reality of its own; that
esthetics concerns itself with the ideals of beauty; and that
ethics concerns itself with ideals of goodness. Now that we
are about to complete the survey of the relations of education
to the special branches of philosophy, or the normative sciences,
we must state that the ideal of ethics, since it must fall within
the larger ideal of life or experience as a whole, must not
neglect the truths and values already brought to light and
shown to form a necessary part of the ultimate nature of
the universe.
Education, then, must realize the ideal values of truth,
beauty, goodness, and religion. This is the aim of life as a
whole, and it is the business of education to prepare for life as
a whole. There can be no higher aim of education than that
of striving to realize these eternal values. They are not to be
conceived of as separate and isolated realms of value, but
must be considered in their organic unity. There are two
ways of expressing this organic unity, accordingly as they take
the point of view of the individual, or of society as a collection
of individuals. In the former case we regard the life of self-
realization as the highest expression of this organic unity of
the eternal values of life. When we view their unity from
the side of society, progress or social welfare comes to b(
garded as the highest ideal of life. We have already
that in our judgment self-realization is the proper
of the interrelation and organic unity of these ideals,
values.
ady stated ^^^S
expression ^^^H
or ^^^H
PART V
Educational Implication of the Ethics op
voluntaristic idealism
i
CHAPTER I
ETHICS AS THE SEARCH FOR THE HIGHEST GOOD
Pre-Socratic Philosophy. In order to get properly
before our minds the place of ethics in life and in educati
let us make a brief survey of the history of ethics. The
philosophy preceding Socrates gave little or no attention to
the ethical aspects of life. The chief concern of the philosophy
of the pre-Socratic period was the origin and nature of the
universe. The speculations of this period were cosmological
rather than ethical. The interest was in the universe rather
than in man. The attempt was to find some first principle to
which all things else could be reduced. It is natural that
under such conditions no great advance should be made in the
field of ethics. The search was not for an ethical principle
of the highest good, hut rather for a first principle of all real-
ity. The interest was metaphysical rather than ethical. It
is not intended that this period be regarded as having no value
for ethics, and yet it is to be understood that the chief interest
of man centered in the world about him rather than in his
own life. Instead of asking such questions as What is the high-
est good? and What should man strive to realize as his chief
aim in life? the questions related to the nature and origin of
r the world about him.
2 PosT-SocRATic PHILOSOPHY. With Sociates, however,
the scene changes. The interest drifted from the universe to
man. The change in point of view brought about by Socrates'
ethical Inquiries closely resembled that brought about by Coper-
nicus in astronomy. According to Ptolemy the earth was the
center of the universe and all the other heavenly bodies re-
volved about this as a center. But according to Copernicus
Sim is the center of the universe, and about it all heavenly
bodies rotate. According to the pre-Socratic philosophy the
202 The Philosophical Basis of Education
central problems of the universe lay in the search for the first
principle of all existence. With the coming of Socrates, how-
ever, the chief problem of philosophy lay in the search for the
highest good, and this highest good was to be found in some
aspect of man's own nature. Tbe problem came to concern
itself more vitally with man and less so with the universe of
the material order.
What has been said of Socrates was also true of the other
great systematic philosophers of the Periclean age, Plato and
Aristotle, It was only in deference to tlie popular notion of
things that Plato even condescended to give any consideration
whatsoever to the material universe. In his Dialogues he gives
but one discourse on the nature of the universe, in the Tim-
maus. With Aristotle the chief interest was also in man. I
believe that it is true to-day that we are more vitally concerned
with man than with the universe about man, or perhaps I
should say we are now seeking the first and vital principle of
all existence in the nature of man himself, rather than in the
physical universe, in the sequential order of time and space.
3 The Meaning and Value of Experience. What
has been said above simply brings out more clearly that since
the time of Socrates the philosopher has been engaged primar-
ily in the attempt to define the meaning and value of all of our
human experience. His speculations are concerning the facts
of our experience. This he uses as his starting point instead |
of looking for the origin of the universe. Indeed he has come
often to the conclusion that the real order and nature of the
universe is something not independent of man, but rather to
be found in man's own inner nature. Idealism finds this
first principle of all existence in the purpose of man himself.
The ultimate realitj' of the universe is purpose or will. The
physical speculations of the pre-Socratic philosophy did not
come to the position where they could see such a principle as
the essence of all reality. The idealist regards man not as
something extraneous and accidental in the world of reality,
but rather he regards the will and purpose of man as an or-
ganic part of the great will and personality of the universe,
the absolute. Man's highest obligation to himself and to the
universe thus consists in the striving to realize the innermost
Ethics as the Search for the Highest Good 203
meaning of this will.
Unlike the pre-Socratic philosopher, the idealist starts with
the facts and laws of our own experience, and passes beyond
these by a process of logical inference to their ultimate mean-
ing and significance, in their relation to the universe as parts
to the whole. The idealist finds every fragment of our experi-
ence to have meaning and value, contrary to the popular no-
tion of^ .'dealism which seems to regard it as an absolute de-
nial :)f: the reality of all experience. The idealist begins
with the fragmentary world of experience in which he lives.
He begins with facts but he does not end with facts alone, nor
is he satisfied with the world of mere connection, a world of
law. He passes beyond facts and laws to their ultimate signifi-
cance, or meaning and value. The meaning and value of our
fragmentary experience are not to be revealed simply by as-
serting their external connections as phenomena in a causal
system. On the contrary, the reaiity of each fragment of our
experience is to be determined by its integral and organic rela-
tion to the whole. Each part suggests the whole, and it is by
exercising our rational and reflective powers that we are able
to see the meaning of the whole in each part of this experience,
4 Facts and Purposes in Life. The reality of the uni-
verse is, then, according to modern idealism, to he found in
experience itself and not beyond experience in an eternal world
that is separated entirely from this present mundane world of
ours, as Plato would say, Man's highest duty, therefore, does
not consist in the contemplation of such a super-mundane
reality as that of the Platonic idea of the good. On the con-
trary, man finds the reality of the universe suggested in his
own experience, fragmentary and temporal though it be. No
one of these facts, or all of them in a causal order, such as is
determined by descriptive sciences, will ever give us the real na-
ture of the universe or the meaning of our experience. It is
only through the process of rational reflection and logical in-
ference that we pass from facts and laws to their meaning and
significance for life as a whole. The great problem of philos-
ophy, then, according to idealism, is that of finding the whole
tin each part, or in other words, finding the relation that neces-
sarily obtains between facts and the meaning of life as a whole.
I
I
I
204. The Philosophical Basis of Education
Logically conceived the universe can have existence only when
it is self-contained and self-maintained. We cannot think of
existence without conceiving of organic unity. That is self-
sufficient and beyond which no other is needed for its comple-
tion. Our (acts in this world of experience gain significance
and meaning only by reference to this universal whole, or or-
ganic unity of all experience.
Ethically considered the chief problem of the world''' wn sis ts
in regarding each act of our experience as the part of thfV'^ger
reality of the universe, Man is to regard his life not as a
series of facts, or even as a cau'^iUy related svstem of facts, but
rather he is to consider each fact m the light of the nhole. It
is only in this way that each act or deed of man comes to have
any abiding significance or me^nmg for ultimate reality. A
deeper inquiry into the real nature of man re\eals his mnermost
reality as definable in terms of purpose and ideals Man lives
not by bread alone, but b\ ideils also There are certain
cravings of the will that cin be sitisfied onh by the attachment
of each fragment or deed to a hrger svstem of purposive real-
ity. Philgsnpliy.h^, then, come tg be 3. search foi the r neanin g
and value of human experience. Ethics la a search ItULjhf
highest good in life. It_i_s not detached from the brgader_JD-
auirjes of philosophy, as we have seen already, but rather . its
l^ts. aie ddined by the meaning and reality. o£ life.
5 The Descriptive and Normative Aspects, It ought
to be clear by this time that ethics views men not as mere phe-
nomena, connected in a sequential order, but rather regards
them as purposive and willing beings. The attitude of the de-
scriptive sciences never can displace the deeper attitude taken
by the moral philosopher. From the descriptive point of view,
as well as the historical, man's acts are simply recorded and
their connection pointed out as law. Ethics, on the contrary,
views man as a purposive and willing being, expressing his in-
ner nature and reality in the deed. There is need of both at-
titudes in the life of man. They are probably equally impor-
tant points of view. The philosopher can no more disregard
the results of the descriptive sciences than the descriptive scien-
tist can afford to neglect the fact of experience. Indeed the
philosopher, as wc have seen, begins where the scientist '
leaves
■ off.
Ethics as the Search for the Highest Good 205
Science and philosophy ought to be of mutual help in their '
mquiries concerning the life of man, but these points of view '
must not be confused. Ethjcs. is. always concerned with, the
pur£qse_and value- o£-life, while the descriptive sciences never
Taise questions, as to .meaning, purpose, or value.
"We shall see later that much confusion has come about Jn
life, and more particularly in education, because of our failure
to keep dearly in mind the distinction between the normative
and descriptive aspects of life. The normative view of life
is concerned with our ideals and purposes, with our will atti-
tudes, our deeper meanings. The descriptive sciences are con-
cerned with the facts of our experience and their external
connections. Ethics provides us with the aims and purposes of
life, the descriptive sciences with the means and methods at
our disposal for realizing these aims and values.
6 The Ideal Values of Life. We have asserted already
)f our special inquiries into the various philosophical
I discipline, that these ideal values of life are truth, beauty, good-
, and religion. These are counted absolute values for no
T reason than that they represent the most complete satis-
I faction of human life, and the innermost craving of our will.
V We found that in order to ascertain the true value and the
I deeper meaning of life, it was necessary to divide our inquiry
[ into the fields of logic, Ksthetics, ethics, and religion. Through
■ separate inquiries we have arrived at the four sets of
I values thus defined. These are called ideal values for the
I reason that they satisfy not only the individual's will and pur-
l-poses, but they satisfy the deeper interests and cravings of life.
I There is nothing narrowly individualistic about such values
T as truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. These are not my
alone, neither are they yours alone. They are both
ind yours, they belong to the universe. They represent
L the innermost nature of the universe. I do not mean to sug-
t.gest that there are not other values more strictly individualistic
I than these from a narrower point of view, but I do mean to
: that it is not the only purpose of ethics to determine
t the narrower values. These ideal values, as we shall call them,
(are good not because they satisfy my own will alone, but bc-
; they satisfy all wills when their real natures are deter-
I
I
206 The Philosophical Basis of Education
mined.
If my own purposes and will in life thwarts yours, then there
is something wrong somewhere. Either I am going beyond my
limits or you arc going beyond yours. Thefe is no way of tell-
ing whose view is right except from the larger point of view
of the universal whole, in other words, the conception of the
organic unity and relation of our acts not only to each other
but to the whole of which they are a part. Every satisfaction
of the human will or purpose is a good, but not necessarily the
highest good. The good that tends to realize my purpose in
life while interfering with yours may be said to be good for
me but not good for you from the commonsense point of view.
But we have seen already that common sense does not make any
distingushed record for clear thinlcing. And so this judgment
of common sense now before us needs consideration. Is it
true that a thing may be good for you and not good for me?
Yes, in a certain sense this is true, for as we have noted any
satisfaction of my will, or anything that promotes the realiza-
tion of my purpose in life, is a good. But we have also re-
stored this statement to its proper balance by asserting that a
purely individual good is not the highest good. Professor R. B,
Perry well says that "If your action fulfills your interest and
thwarts mine, it is again mixed, both good and bad. In order
to define the good act in the premises it is necessary, as in the
previous case, to define a purpose which shall embrace both in-
terests and regulate action with a view to their joint fulfill-
ment." {The Moral Economy, p. 267.) Indeed it is really
a myth and not in the deepest sense our good at all.
When we gain a clear conception of the organic unity of life
we cease to regard that thing which we call a purely individual
good in any real sense at all. Individual good, then, in any
narrow sense must be ruled out of account. There are goods
of such a character that they are good for everybody. There
are values which are not strictly personal, neither mine nor
yours, but both mine and yours. The wider the circle of in-
dividuals included in such a consideration of values, the greater
the value of the good concerned. We have posited the ideal
values of truth, beauty, goodness, and religion, as those over-
idual or super- personal values which belong to the uni-
verse as a whole, and by virtue of their relation to this ulti-
^
Ethics as the Search {or the Highest Good 207
mate realit}', this organic unity of life, they belong to me and
to you, for we are essential attributes of the universal whole of
reality by virtue of the fact that we possess a will. A man
cannot be narrowly individualistic so long as he is serving these
ideal values of life. There is a little danger that he wiU be
denounced by his friends as egoistic. These values arc indi-
vidual, to be sure, but 1 would call them over-individual, or
super-personal because they represent not a set of values for
any one individual, but systems of values that are worthy of
all individuals, without regard to the individual, or the race.
Real values know no distinction whatsoever between persons.
This thought of the universal validity of these ideal values
must not be lost sight of, for it will occupy the central por-
tion of the remainder of this volume. Indeed it has been re-
garded up to the present as the central thought of the book.
The matter will not be different when we come to consider
in greater detail the aims and values of our educational experi-
ence.
The Good as Will or Purpose. We have defined
the highest good in life in terms of purpose or will. The hi^-
est good is not expressed in terms of our own individual will,
but rather in the over-individual will which gives meaning and
value to our own personal wills. The universal will we have
called the absolute, and it represents the organic unity of all
individual wills. The highest good, then, can be expressed
in no terms that fail to regard the absolute will. The satis-
faction of my own personal will is good and desirable only in
so far as this will is in harmony with the universal will of the
absolute. Protagoras was wrong, then, when he said that each
man is the measure of his own opinion and of his own value.
Man's value is to be determined rather by his relation to the
whole, to the absolute. It is only when my purpose and will
are harmonized with the deeper purpose or meaning of the
universe that I can be said to be morally good. The highest
obligation enjoined upon me by universalistic ethics is that
of seeking and striving to conform to the universal will. But
in so doing I am not simply bowing to the authority of an
individual or mechanical law, and there is no particular good
to be derived from such conformity to external law, as the
\
2o8 The Philosophical Basis of Education
Stoics would have us believe. On the contrary, my own deepest
will and purpose can be seen only when it is viewed in the
light of the universal whole, or the absolute experience. In
this search to conform our own will to the will of the universe,
1 am simply striving to ascertain my own inner meaning and
purpose, the essence of my own will, which is to be found only
in its relation to the whole, or absolute will. Man's moral
task does not consist in blind conformance with some authority
or law with which he has no personal concern. On the con-
trary, man realizes and satisfies the deepest and most abiding
cravings of his life in this search for the connections between
his own will and the will of the absolute, in other words, man
is his truest self only when he attempts to view the meaning
of his fragmentary experience, as an expression of his will, in
its relation to the universal experience of the absolute.
Man has both temporal and eternal aspects of his nature.
His acts and his deeds are discharged in a world of time and
space, a world of causal relationship, of external connection.
Again he lives in a world of purposes, ideals, meaning and
eternal reality, in other words in a world which is not limited
by time and space, A universal experience, or what Royce
calls a conspectus of all experience, such as the absolute experi-
ence, knows no such boundaries as time and space. Time and
space are included within the absolute experience, and do not
include such experience. But with us Individuals whose ex-
periences are limited the case is from one point of view dif-
ferent. Viewed from the aspects of separate individuals, our
experience is limited in time and space, but viewed from the
aspect of our purposes and will, we are integral parts of the
universal will and know no such limitations as those de6ncd
by the time and space world of causal connection,
Man Is not alone controlled by sequential causation. There
is Ideal causational, or what Professor Palmer calls anti-sequen-
tial causation, Man Is drawn toward his ideals from above,
as well as operated like the material aspects of his nature by
sequential causation from behind. Man thus has the power
of self -direct ion, is free. That is, he can decide upon his own
purposes in life, and what purpose he chooses is a matter of
very vital concern, Man is obliged to select between the va-
rious alternative possibilities of action. All possibilities do not
Ethic.
r the Search for the Highest Good
209
offer an equal opportunity for the realization of man's inner-
most nature; therefore, all choices and all actions are not of
equal value. Ethically viewed, man must choose the act which
is conducive to the largest degree of self-realization. No^t self-
realization from the narrower point of view, but such a self-
realization as promotes the realization of the ideal values of
life.
The Individual and Social Aspects of This Aim. I
I The highest aim of life when rightly conceived has been de-
\ fined as self-realization. In this section we must restate what
nt by self-realization, and consider some objections which
t have been offered against it. We must also point out more
y clearly the individual and the social aspect of this aim, for
e to maite use of this same aim in education, and are to
I assert it as the only satisfactory aim of education. By self-
i realization is meant the development or realization of the inner
r purposes of the individual. Self-realization is not possible un-
\ less the individual expresses his deeper purpose and meaning
" 5 act or deeds. Each individual's experience thus reveals,
t when viewed in its relation to the whole, his own inner pur-
I pose and meaning, and this defines for him what his life ought
I to be, or what he should attempt to realize through his ex-
perience.
It would be meaningless to assert that the individual's high-
m is to realize something which is beyond himself and
has no connection with his own real self, or his will. This
I something for which he is striving and which he considers the
highest good, must have some meaning for him and some defi-
nite relation to his own will or purpose, otherwise there is no
■motive for action. If the good to be realized is something en-
r tirely apart from the individual, then the individual sees no
t value in such good. In fact he sees the absurdity of regarding
I it as a good at all. The good for which we are all striving
L must have some relation to our own individual self, other-
\ wise it is meaningless and valueless, and consequently is no good
all. This is a very different thing from asserting that each
I individual should be the measure of his own opinion, or the
ultimate standard of his own conduct. In fact thorough-going .
I reflection on the meaning of our experience, as this is perceived
210 The Philosophical Basis of Education
in its relarion to the whole, shows very clearly that the uni-
versal good for which we are striving is actually realized in
part in our own acts. But this good is realized by each individ-
ual in his own way. The good then can never be regarded as
something extra-personal, but rather over-personal. That is to
say, a person is not to regard as good something which has no
connection with his own life, and the meaning of his own ex-
perience, but rather that which he regards as the highest good
must be the most complete satisfaction of his own deepest will
demands. And such a will demands a good that is not alone
personal. Indeed the universality of such a good makes its
personal value all the greater. That which is good for mc
alone is not very good. But that which is good for me and
for everybody else is of much greater good, it is a universal
good, and being universal it has greater value for each individ-
ual and greater meaning in total system of reality.
When we regard will or purpose as the chief good in life
there arc two aspects from which we may view this ideal.
We may consider it from the point of view of a strictly indi-
vidual will or from the point of view of the whole system or
organic unity of wills. We have already noticed the insuffi-
ciency of the former narrow individualistic point of view.
When we speak of the highest will or purpose being attainable
through self-realization, we are not to he understood as refer-
ring to self-realization in any narrow sense, for we have as-
serted already that self-realization as the expression of our
deepest will, is possible only through loyal adherence to the
ideal values of life. Such a view of self-realization cannot be
regarded as egoistic. It has often been denounced as such, how-
ever, but only by those who do not understand the self-realiza-
tion theory. A closer analysis of this concept of self-realization
as the highest expression of the good will reveals not only its
individualistic or personal attributes, but its universal signifi-
cance as well. The system of purposes and ideal values to
which I am to devote my life are not to be regarded as my
own values merely, but values which while they satisfy my
own deepest will demands are also worthy to be posited as the
chief value of all life. We are further to be reminded that
self-realization is possible only through the realization of these
ideal values, truth, beauty, goodness and reb'gion. Self-realiza-
I Ethics as the Starch for the Highest Goad 2ii
tion is not a fifth set of values, but rather it is a systematic
unity and organization of all values. It is the expression of
the life that is loyally devoted to the ideal values. Some have
argued that instead of laying the stress on the individual, we
should place it on society. Instead, therefore, of making self-
realization the aim we should regard social welfare, or social
progress the chief aim of life. The reason 1 personally believe
that social welfare does not properly express the highest ideal
of life is because it removes from the individual the ideal of
self- responsibility to too large a degree. In a world of will and
purpose, things are not to be taken lightly, but as expressions
of attitude. The individual must order, govern and control
his own experience by reference to an ideal which lies directly
in his own pathway, but which ideal can be seen from the
points of view of other men also. Self-realization through the
appropriation of the ideal values of life makes definite and
specific the end to be attained, and if such an end is attained
you have no occasion to fear that society will degenerate. So-
cial progress is conditioned by the degree to which each indi-
vidual realizes his larger and better self. We cannot raise
the level or standard of society except in so far as we raise the
standards of individuals. Society cannot be lifted to a higher
elevation as a unit, nor by the personality or force of any
great social leader. Society may use such devices and person-
alities in the direction of a larger self-realization on the part
of each individual but to lift society as a whole without regard
to the individual unit is an impossibility. On the other hand,
if the individual unit succeeds in a higher degree of self-realiza-
tion, society must improve as a necessary consequence, and so-
cial welfare would be assured, I regard, therefore, social
welfare as a necessary consequence of self-realization and not
as a necessary condition thereto. There is mutual interdepend-
ence between social welfare or human progress and individual
self-realization but the fundamental prerequisite of all prog-
ress is that of individual advancement, and individuals advance
in proportion to the degree that they realize their own inner
being and reality through the service of ideal values of life,
which ideal values are not alone individual, but social in as
much as they have universal application.
212 The Philosophical Basis of Education ^|
9 Self-Realizatiov as the Ultimate Goal. Self-real-
ization is thus regarded not only as the chief aim, or summum
bonum, or highest good of life, but it is to be regarded
as the chief motive of all human conduct. The motive that
expresses the innermost nature and harmony of man's will is
that idea which compels him in the direction of his highest sclf-
rcalization through obedient service, not to any mythical so-
ciety, bul to the actual and ideal values of life in the indi-
vidual which are the completion of his fragmentary experience.
Self-realization is not only an ideal toward which we strive
but it is the chief motive that prompts our actions in our most
moral and religious moments.
Instead of defining the highest good of life as that of pleas-
ure, duty, virtue, happiness or social welfare, we have defined
it as the most complete self-realization of the individual, and
have asserted that such self-realization is possible only through
the service of the ideal values of life, which are the deepest
expressions of our own inner purpose. With such self-realiza-
tion, pleasure, happiness, duty and social welfare, all have their
places. They come as natural consequences, however, rather
than as antecedents in a truly purposive life. There is no
pleasure conceivable that can equal that resulting from the
harmonization of the purpose and will of an individual will with
all other individual wills, and with the universal, or absolute
will. Royce well says that "Happiness involves the satisfac-
tion of desires. Your natural desires are countless and con-
flicting. What satisfies one desire defeats another, until your
desires are harmonized by means of some definite plan of life.
Happiness is therefore a mere accident. Now it comes and
now it flies, you know not why. And the mere plan to be
happy is by itself no plan. You therefore cannot adopt the
pursuit of happiness as your profession." (Philosophy of Loy-
alty, p. 8i.)
Such an organization of purposes is possible, it is real, and
furthermore it is ethically enjoined upon us to govern our
lives in accordance with such a plan. Man cannot realize his
highest self unless he devotes himself to values and purposes
which are not narrowly individual. Complete self-realization
is possible only when we regard the self to be realized as
part of a larger organization of purposes and wills. If i
Ethics as the Search for the Highest Got
213
own self-realization is such as to disregard your equally worthy
riglits and purposes, then I have not succeeded in finding my
own deeper purpose in life, and in just this degree I have
fallen short of my own highest self-realization. The only way,
then, that I can hope reasonably to reahze my own innermost
will, my truest self, is by striving to realize ideal values in
my experience which are not limited to my own narrow view
of the world. Such narrowness is the result of failure on the
part of the individual to see his relation to the universal whole
of which he is a part. When we substitute the part for the
whole, there is bound to be confusion and conflict of purposes,
but when I honestly and purposively strive to realize the ideals
of universal value my aim cannot be said to be individualistic
in any narrow sense. The trouble with the individualistic
moralists is due to the fact that they fail to regard the individ-
ual in his universal connection with the world of will and pur-
pose. There is no objection to individualism provided it is
universalized. However paradoxical this view may seem, it
is the view that I believe must be regarded as the most satis-
factory view of the meaning and value of life. The chief
good must be both universal and individual. But in as much
1 is only a part of the whole, his movement must be in
rection leading from the part to the whole. The stress
I must be laid on the individual rather than on society. My
> plan of life ceases to be narrow and egoistic when I take into
' account my relations to my fellow man and to the universe on
which my own individuality depends.
Thus exhibited, self-realization is the only worthy ideal and
L motive of life. If this be the case, the ideal of education must
[ conform to this larger aim of life. We shall consider this
f matter in its relation to education more fully in the following
[ chapters of this volume. In this view we believe we agree with
I Professor Wright when he says: "Self-realization has now
I to be exhibited as the only adequate motive of good conduct,
[ including the three just mentioned and raising each to a higher
I plane of meaning and efficiency. Self-realization does not com-
\ bine simply in an external fashion the egoistic, altruistic, and
1 religious motives. It unites them organically, making each a
L function of the central activity of volition and causing each to.
[ express within a certain department of human life the charac-
1
214 ^^^ Pkilosofihicnt Basts of Education
tcristic and insistent demand of volition for a compJctely oi^
ganized life." {Self-Realteation. p. 278.}
10 The Reality of the Ideal, The ideal of sclf-r
zation is not a mere myth, but is the unity and organization
of the ideal values of life, expressed in a personality c
dividual. The purpose of the individual is determined by t
degree to which he has realized the ideal values in his experi-J
ence, and through these has perceived his relation to the
versal experience, or absolute will. This ideal of self-realizaJ
tion, then, has metaphysical reality, in as much as it is realityj
itself from the point of view of the individual. From the poinB
of view of the absolute, each individual is to be regarded as ft)
part of the universal whole, from the point of view of the
individual, each person realizes himself in just that proportion!
that he accepts his highest obligation as that of perceiving hij!
relations to the universe through the recognition of the idealj
values of his own experience. The ideal of self-realizationi
thus being real as well as ideal, is deserving of our loyalty an»
the support of our deepest will. "By nature and apart fron*
some cause to which we are loyal, each of us is but ■
of caprice; a chaos of distracting passions, a longing for hapJ
piness that never attains its goal." (Royce, WilJiam Jai
etc., p. 56.}
11 The Concept of Loyalty. According to our viev
loyalty, no person can be loyal to that which does not cxpren
his own inner purpose, which does not satisfy the inner mean^
ing of his will. Self-realization, being both ideal and real"
being both over-individual and of the very nature of beinj
itself, and further being the expression of our deepest indivu]
ual will, is deserving of our most deep-seated loyalty and at
votion. Indeed our pursuit of self-realization through servio
to the values of life partakes of the spirit of religion. Mai
cannot be loyal to that which does not pertain to his own rui
ture. A thing that is purely external to me cannot elicit to^
highest loyalty. I can be loyal to the true spirit of loyalty onW
when I am loyal to that ideal which is not alone individual, bi^
has the universal in and round about it. My every act muJ
show ray loyalty to the cause which I have voluntarily chosec
Ethin as the Search for the Highest Good 215 i
If my ideal is self-realization, then I am betraying my cause
if I fail to organize my actions in such a way as to make ray
highest self-realization possible, and we have already noted
that my highest self-realization consists not in ideals that are
narrowly personal, but rather in ideals that are both individual
and universal. Once we get a deep spirit of loyalty we seek to
realize our cause in our every act. Indeed each act is a re-
flection of the unity and purpose of our lives. We cannot be
loyal to a cause and at the same time live a disorganized life.
Our life must be a unit and a part of the larger organic
reality of the world. It is only when I regard each act as a
part of the totality of the universe that I regard these acts as
significant. And it is only when I regard them as having this
significance that I act from a deep seated loyalty and purpose.
If I am to realize my highest self I must not only choose as
my ideals the highest good, which possesses reality, and which
can be known, but I must loyally devote myself to this cause.
If I fail to organize and adjust my several actions with refer-
ence to this ultimate aim m life I have betrayed my deepest
nature and am immoral. But if I devote myself loyally to the
realization of this highest ideal, which has value not only for
me, but for the great universe of which I am but a small
tliough important part, then my devotion characterizes my life
truly moral and religious. It is this spirit of loyalty which
the real test of the degree of effectiveness that my ideal of
life has for me. It is the index of the pulling power of this
ideal. It opens the secret of my inner nature. It shows
what I really am. It portrays my real character, my reality or
being. I
Summary. In summarizing the contents of this chap-
ter it is necessary for us to be reminded that ethics represents
man's search for the highest good in life, that such inquiries
are the results of man's own interests in life, and it is signifi-
cant that in the history of philosophy we discover that man's
chief interest has been in man from the beginning of the
Socratic period to the present. All ethical theories since this
period, have regarded man's highest good as something related
I to himself and in this respect I believe that all these theories J
are right. I believe, however, that some of these theories have T
I
I
I
2l6
The Philoiophical Basis of Education
failed to give an accurate formulation of a highest good. The
hedonists have placed pleasure as the highest good, something
which is really outside what a deeper view of man regards as
his true nature. When man succeeds in finding the reality of
his being, he will no doubt find that pleasure is one of the
essential attributes of the same, but he will certainly find that
pleasure alone does not express man's deepest worth and reality.
This worth is to be found in man as a willing being, as
a being expressing attitudes and purposes. The fulfillment of
all desires and purposes is not necessary nor is it desirable. It
IS essential, however, that we fulfill the deepest demands of
our will and this is possible only when we have harmonized
our own will with the will of the universe of which we are
a part. This ideal toward which every will tends to express
itself is best defined in terms of self-realization, which ideal is
not to be regarded in any narrow way, hut which expresses
the universality of our being in its relations to the whole. It
is this ideal of self-realization which is the highest expression
of our will. It is the ultimate goal of all human striving and
is in keeping with the inner nature and purpose of the universe
as a whole. It also represents not only the chief good, but the
highest motive of human conduct. Being an ideal of such
universal worth and further, since it represents the highest
demands of our human will, self-reali?;ation is to be regarded
as that ideal or purpose which deserves our highest loyalty,
and our moral worth and being are to be determined by the de-
gree to which we are loyal to this highest expression of our will.
CHAPTER II
AIMS AND MEANS IN EDUCATION
1 The Aim of Life and the Aim of Education. If •
the aim of life is to be regarded as self-realization, then the '
highest aim and motive of education is also that of self-realiza-
tion. However we define the aim of education, we irnist re-
member that it is essential to distinguish clearly between the
aims and the means of education. Ethics has to do with the
aim of life, and since education is a part of life it must define
the aims of education also. The highest aim of life has already
been defined as self-realization. None of this work will need
to be done over in order to define the highest aim of educa-
tion. Education is to be regarded as nothing more or less than
an institution set apart by society for the realization of the
highest aims and values of life. Therefore we regard not only
self-realization as the highest aim and chief motive of conduct
in life as a whole, hut also, from the point of voluntaristic
idealism, as the chief end and motive of education.
It would be very inconsistent on the part of an educator to
make the aim of life and that of education such as mutually
to conflict. It might be contended that since life is broader
in its significance than education, that the aim of life should
be broader than the aim of education. Professor Coe sa}^:
"The end of true education Js seen to fall within, not outside of
ethics." {Education in Morals and Religion, p. 17.) Educa-
tion is simply the process carried on by the school which has
been set aside as a social institution for the realization of the
higher values and purposes of life. Education can, therefore,
be of no greater service to man than to help immature persons
to realize their own deeper purposes. Education is, there-
fore, not to be regarded as an isolated process, but rather it
is the fundamental process through which the realization of
the most complete self -development is made possible.
217
3l8 The Phihi^pkkal Batis of EJmeatimm
2 Thb Conflict in Mooexv Pbxwogv. Tbcre k pnb*
ably no field in which a greater amount of AsDow lilc
hu been perpetrated upon the reading pubGc than io dut of
ujucation. unless it be in the cheap no^-el daas vi litcntf m e.
7*hc whole educational issue has been so befogged for so aaiif
gencrationi that it seems that clear tfainkiog in thk field ■
next fi an impossibility. Bowne sai-s: "Until principles »re
tettled there in no bar to the most fantastic theories and intcr-
pretaiinns." (Inlrndaclian Io Psjch, Thevrj, Preface.)
Miimtcrbcrg lays: "It is evident that there must be dispute
about the means as long as it is not settled what the ends ou^t
to be, or rather as long as we ignore the question of aims as
an independent question having the ri^t of precedence,"
{Piiich. and Teacher, p. 19.) "Briefly, only psychology and
ethics can tate education out of its purely empirical and nilc-
of-thiimb stagp." (McLcllan and Dewev, Piy. of Number.
If there is any one field in which investigators seem to be
completely submerged in facts and principles, it certain]}- is
in the field of education. If there is any one field of experi-
ence where the real issaes involved are less clearly defined than
in another it must be in education. If there is any field in
which facts and laws are not clearly distinguished from pur-
pimcd and ideals, again I say it must be in education. I do
not mean to portray the situation as hopeless. I am not at.
all pessimistic. It is quite consistent with my own view of:
life to believe that a man can be critical and at the same time
apprccifitc the good in the thing that he is criticizing. I have
no panacea to offer, no patent remedies for sale. Indeed I do
not know of any short cut in the matter. As far as I can see
there ia only one way to relieve the present situation, whidi
arises principally out of the confusion of aims and means in
education. Xl'^-^s!'* '!= '^ '"'!JL-1"''^- ^^ '^^^^ ^"" engaged
long enough In mere experience without attempting to dis-
cover the meaning and value of this experience. We have
been long enough merely pulling up facts and laws. It is novf
time that we cease to regard our past as completed, since wc
have succeeded in discovering the many facts and laws of the
universe. It ts time that we were making use of these lavra
and principles in the service of our ideal purposes and v^ura
jiims and Means in Education 219
of life.
The conflict in modern pedagogy is due principally to the
failure to distinguish between aims and means, purposes and
methods. Ends and purposes in life we have come to regard
as absolute necessities of existence. This is not more true in
education than in any other field of our experience. Ends we
must have and if the right ends are not available we will
select a wrong one. If the highest aim is not perceived, we
arc apt to select a lower one, or indeed, as is generally the case
in modern education, substitute a means for an end, If.wf
have the wrong conception of life, we are in constant danger of
substituting the part for the whole, or the means for the end.
From the foregoing inquiry, it ought to be clear that ethics, or
more troadly speaking philosophy, must provide us with the
aims, purposes and values in life, and science must contribute
the means, or possibilities of their realization. There is no
hope for education unless we can clear up the distinction be-
tiveen aims and means, or methods, unless we can perceive
education from both the normative and the descriptive, from
the ethical and the scientific aspects. We will work out
these distinctions In education. We may be a long time at
it, but we are certain to work them out, for this Js the condition
upon which man's highest self-realization depends.
There is a popular view to-day that the teacher is well
equipped for her business when she knows the biological laws
of health, growth, and development; the sociological laws, de-
fining the principles upon which tbe social relationship depends;
I and the psychological laws which govern mind action, but such
H view represents the unhealthy state of mind of common
gense, and its Immediate antecedent Is the lack of clear thinking,
and the willingness to rest education on a basis of custom and
tradition. Instead of reason. Very different does the matter
become when viewed from the greater heights and clearer vision
of a truer philosophy of life. According to the latter view, all
education and e.fperlence is a meaningless striving unless there
are purposes and ideals to be attained, and It Is only in such
attainment that life possesses any value whatsoever. Prof.
Santayana aptly remarks that "If you have no image of happi-
ness or beauty or perfect goodness, how arc you to judge what
portions of life are Important, and what rendering of them
I
220 The Philosophical Basis of Education
is appropriate?" {Winds of Doctrine, p. 183,)
Furthermore, all ideals and values are not of equal impor-
tance. Some arc narrow and conflicting, others are broad and
universal and have a meaning for life as a whole. It is the
latter type of ideal that must serve as the basis of all true
education. All true education must have a goal, and this goal
must conform to the deepest meaning and reality di life, "an3
it must be remembered, as Bowne says, that "The deepest
things cannot be argued out; they must be seen in life, and then
they justify themselves." {The Essence of Religion, p. 181.)
It must represent the highest good in our experience,_and
this aim we have defined as self-realization, which is maJe
possible through the realization of the ideal values of life. Clear,
pure, deep, philosophical thinking is the only salvation for
education, at the present time and for all time to come. The
conflicts in modern educational theory and practice are due to
a failure to regard education as a part of life as a whole,
and to distinguish clearly between aims and purposes in life,
and consequently in education. Progress ivill not be possible
until such a condition of affairs is cleared up. We may imagine
that we are progressing, and there is a certain element of prog-
ress in all our aimless strivings, but such progress is too stow
and uncertain. No question can be settled permanently which
is not settled right, and no question can be settled right which
is not viewed in its relation to the universal system of things.
Our philosophy of education, then, must conform to the wider
philosophy of life. And our ideal of education must conform
to our ideal of the highest good, which in our view is that of
self-realization.
3 Education as a Normative Science. We have sev-
eral times spoken of the relation of the normative and descrip-
tive sciences, showing that the former define our aims and pur-
poses in life, while the latter provide us with the means for
their realization. We have asserted, therefore, that the chief
normative science, so far as determining our aim of education
is concerned, is that of ethics. We must now lay stress on
the fact that so far as method is concerned, psychology becomes
fundamental in the preparation of a teacher for her practical
work. The teacher must have a broader view of the universe
Aims and Means m Education
than that given by ethics and psychology, but it nevertheless
remains true that these two sciences have most to do with the
actual worth of the teacher, the one providing the aims and
purposes, the other providing a means and method for their
realization. There is an important truth contained in the
following lines from the University of Denver catalog: "In
as much as education is not an unmixed science, but has its
foundation in other sciences, it requires an acquaintance with
the history of human thought, with the principles of psychology,
ethics and philosophy, to secure the best comprehension of the
methods and results of modern pedagogy, and of the ultimate
ends of education. It is advisable that some of these courses
accompany the work in education."
Contrary to the opinion of a great many popular views of
education, psychology can never tell us what we ought to do,
or what aims we ought to realize in education. This matter
of what ought to be is a matter for ethics and the normative
science generally, not for psychology. Miinslerberg says;
"Ethics, not psychology, must decide the ends to which educa-
tion has to lead the child, however often superficial educators
may believe that in their field the selection of the end is a
matter of course and needs no previous investigation." {Psych.
and Teacher, p. 24.)
Psychology can never give us the true aims and purposes
of life. It cannot even be of value in providing means and
methods for the teacher until after the aims have been decided
upon. We can never expect to see the true place of psychology
and the other descriptive sciences until we know what we want
to accomplish and what we ought to accomplish in education.
The first consideration of education, therefore, is with ethics
and it is only through such an inquiry that our aims and pur-
poses can ever be justified. It is unfortunate that teachers
do not conceive clearly, this distinction between aims and
means, for it inevitably results that when the proper aims of
education are not perceived a means will be substituted for
the end itself. We must not attempt to separate educational
theory from ethical theory. We must push inquiries as to the
aims and values in education farther and farther out into the
realm of ethics. Prof. Woodbridge says: "The most prac-
tical and useful opportunity open to the special student of
r
222 Thr Phittisofihical Basis of Education
philosophy is doubtless in education." {Columbia Univenifs
Quarterly, Vol. XIII.) It is only by regarding edui
a part of the larger field of experience that we can ever s
ceed in formulating clearly the real purposes which education
is to realize. Education becomes valuable only in so far as it
makes the realization of such ideals and values possible aod
actual.
4 Education as a Descriptive Science. After we have
once decided upon the aims and purposes of life and conse-
quently of education, it is then time to try and find out how
we are to use the results of the descriptive sciences. It will
inevitably be true in education as in life generally, that we
cannot make any use of the descriptive sciences until after we
have decided what aims and what purposes we are to realize.
Hut once we have gotten clearly in mind the ideal purposes for
which education exists, we are then in a position to make use
of our specialized knowledge contributed by the different de-
scriptive sciences, — psychology, biology, sociology, and the rest.
The sciences just mentioned are important contributors as means
in education. They provide us with laws that enable us to
understand the connections of our experience, — knowledge we
cannot dispense with at any price, unless it be the price we
would have to pay by giving up our ideals in the service of
which these laws and principles have their only meaning and
value.
No amount of progress in psychology, sociology, or biology
will ever be able to give us any knowledge of what we ought
to do. It is not the business of the descriptive sciences to tell
what man ought to do. It is rather the business of this de-
partment of our thinking to show the connections that exist
between the various facts or phenomena of life. It is only
after ideals and purposes are decided upon that a knowledge of
such connections can be made serviceable in the fields of edu-
cation and life generally. What has just been said with re-
gard to the field of education holds equally true in the fields
of business, religion, social life, and all other special fields
of experience. At no time and in no place will the facts of
laws contributed by the descriptive sciences ever take the place
of ideals and purposes of life. A mere description of what is,
I Aims and Meant in Education 223 ^^H
pw matter how accurate it may be, can never tell us what ^^^^
ought to be. No amount of science of mere description and ^^^H
explanation can ever tell us what purposes we should seek to ^^^|
realize in education. If we succeed in clearing up this con- ^^^|
fusion between the normative and descriptive aspects of our ^^^^
educational theory and come to regard ethics as we ought, as ^^H
giving us the aims and purposes of life, while the descriptive
sciences give us the means, we will then, and not until then,
succeed in banishing the confusion that obtains in present day
popular pedagogy. Fortunately this distinction is coming to
be more clearly perceived by our most prominent educators.
Indeed throughout all the history of educational theory there
have been some great thinkers who seem to have perceived this
relation between aims and means quite clearly. In our com-
mon practice, however, we do not distinguish clearly enough be-
tween these two attitudes of our will. We have asserted al-
ready that according to a broader philosophy science itself is
merely an artificial construction, which has been developed as
, a result of the logical demands of our own will and purposive
attitude toward the world.
Science must not, therefore, be regarded as the final court of
appeal for educational problems. Rather we must look to
ethics and general philosophy for the decision as to the real
values and purposes for which we strive. We can, then, go
to the descriptive scientists and ask them for all the informa-
tion they possess as to the external connections of the facts of
the universe. We can then call upon the psychologist for all
the laws that he knows with regard to the way that the mind
acts. We can ask the biologist, particularly the physiologist,
for all the laws he possesses with regard to the health, growth,
and development of our bodies. We can ask the sociologist to
give us the little that he knows at the present time of the laws
that govern the formation and the maintenance of the group
relationship. But until we have first gone to the ethical philos-
ophy in order to determine our purposes in life, or that for
which we ought to strive, all this information that the descrip-
tive scientist can give us will be of no value whatsoever, no
tmore value than so much scrap iron in the dump heap. But
die aspect is entirely changed when we see our educational
experience from these two points of view, and then from the
224 ^^^ Pliilosnphicril Basts of Education
larger, more inclusive philosophical point of view. The nor-
mative sciences must give us our aims. And once our aim is
decided upon we can make use of all the laws that descriptiv
science knows anything about and all that it ever will know
anything about.
5 Aims and Means of Education. The descriptive
sciences can be employed as contributors to the means and
methods of education, but only after the normative issues have
been settled. We must not expect, therefore, that any amount
of further development in the fields of science will ever suc-
ceed in defining the aims of education. In the very nature
of things, this is impossible, and the truth asserted here that
ethics must provide the aims of life, while the descriptive
sciences provide us with the means, is a universal truth, and is
not conditioned by time and space, or personality. If we are
successful in making this point clear between aims and means
of education we will have accomplished something in the direc-
tion of clearing up the conflict in modern pedagogy, about
which we have spoken so many times, and which confusion it is
the chief aim of this volume to clear up on the basis of the
idealistic philosophy. "Means," says H. C. King, "seem often
at war with ends, mechanism, with the ideals for which alone
it exists. Only the ends are of absolute value, yet the means
are indispensable to their attainment. The actual and neces-
sary are not the ideal ; the is and the must cannot give us the
ought; and yet only through the use of the actual and neces-
sary can anything ideal be achieved. The question of the final
harmony of the is and the must and the ought is for us all
the question of questions. Its complete answer would be a
final philosophy," {Rational Living, pp. 22-23.)
... defined in terms of self-
1 to which we have been
On the contrary nothing
decide this aim. It must
■ sciences that without the
attempt to realize such
The aim of life and of educ
realization is thus not a conclusit
driven by the descriptive science.
less than a philosophy of life can
he said in justice to the descriptiv
knowledge which they give us 01
ideals and values would be vain and hopeless, or at best, very
uncertain. Any one recognizes the "unreasonableness of adopt-
ing an end and refusing to adopt the means indispensable to its
ind Means in Education
225
attainment." (Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 39.) "The
method must be planned to accomplish certain definite ends
ii the teaching is to be purposeful and effective," (G. H.
■ Bestt, The Recitation, p. 29.)
6 The Function of Supervision. In this connection
we must state the real function of supervision. The superin-
tendent, above all others, must see clearly the direction which
education is to take. He must never confuse aims and means.
He must always distinguish between facts and purposes, be-
tween methods and the ideals to be realized. He must have
a broad philosophical perspective, if he is to see things in their
proper relation. If he does not have a clear view of the school
as a whole and of the relative functions of means and ends he
constantly will be confusing the two. He will mistake in-
creased equipment, facts, and principles for real progress and
development. If he does not have his eye constantly on the
goal to be realized, and select his aims and method and equip-
ment with this ideal constantly in mind, progress under his
direction is bound to he uncertain and unstable. W. T. Harris
says: "Finally, the first class superintendent is a sort of pilot
for the whole system, and must watch the rocks and breakers,
and winds and clouds, and look often from them to the eternal
stars to ascertain the drift of his course." It is interesting
to note that certain superintendents see the real meaning of
supervision. Supt. John Kennedy says: "The function of
supervision is one of the most interesting departments of Edu-
cational philosophy," {Educational Review, Vol. I, p. 469.) He
says further: "It is the function of supervision to breathe
upon a school system the breath of life, to infuse into it a gener-
ous purpose and to direct it toward beneficent ends. This
pre-supposes educational ideals and an expert knowledge of the
necessary machinery of the schools. It is not enough that a
merely intelligent man equipped with empirical notions should
assume the responsible duties of supervision. Intelligence and
executive ability are forceful qualities everywhere but they
alone do not equip the physician or the lawyer; neither do
they equip the educator. To the necessary basis of
sense must be superadded the science or philosophy of educa-
Ition. The educator must be deeply and fruitfully read in the
^■tioi
\ educa- ^^^H
in the ^^^H
226
The Philosophical Basis of Educatio
literature and philosophy of his profession." [Ibid., i :467.)
The following statement is so apt that I cannot refrain from
quoting it. He says of the superintendent that "When he
comes to the battle rojal with his subordinates and his official
superiors, he needs to be fortified with principles that are as
universal as nature and as eternal as truth itself." (i :467.)
I do not mean to imply that the teacher herself is not in
need of such distinction between aims and means. In fact
we have repeatedly emphasized the necessity for the teacher's
having in mind this distinction and of governing herself ac-
cordingly. But it is particularly important that the superin-
tendent be able to see the trend of things, or sec things in their
universal relation. Without this broad view it is impossible
for the superintendent to consider the different facts and prin-
ciples, equipment, means and methods in their proper relation.
All facts are of equal value, or perhaps it would be more ac-
curate to say of no value at all, if we have no definite pur-
pose or goal in mind. Suzzalo says: "At this point in our
progress, we have no larger need than for a philosophy of teach-
ing, which unifies our modern complexities from the view-
point of the teacher, and raises to attention again, in new and
accurate ways, the nature of the teaching personality and the
teaching life." (Preface, Hyde, Teacher's Phil. p. XIl.)
Above all others, then, it is necessary that the superintendent
have clearly in mind the relative function of means and meth-
ods. Any amount of understanding of the facts of our experi-
ence together with all the scientific improvements that modern
invention has made possible, without definite aims and means
would not make it possible to realize lasting progress, for as
we have seen, progress in last analysis, consists in the larger
self-realization of each individual in society, and such realiza-
tion is possible only through the consciously directed acts of
the individual toward a goal of universal value. Just as it is
necessary for individual progress that such a goal be kept con-
stantly in mind, and all our means and methods selected with
this aim in view, so, too, it is necessary that in order that the
school make real progress and development, it must be under
the direction of those who keep constantly in mind the ideal
purposes for which the school exists.
The superintendent is the chief pilot of the educational ship,
md Met.
n Education
227
and tie it is who must steer the course and register the progress
which education makes. WJieji. the jjjperimcadcot's iUDCUBO
is regarded f^rom this highest point of view of philosophy, it
becomes a rnatter of no little concern when we select those who
are to determine the direction of our educational affairs. The
superintendent must assume the obligation of steering the whole
system of schools toward the ultimate goal of education and
life, and the degree to which he is successful in realizing this
ideal m.irlts the degree of value of the system as a whole. Nor
should the superintendent forget that the school system itself, as
a material organization, must be in a true sense an organic
unity. Every part must fiioction in complete accord with all
of the. other, parts. Under no other condition is real progress
through the agency of the school system possible. If one part
of the system is working at cross purposes with some other
part, then there is lost energy and friction, resulting ultimately
in the waste of human purpose and energy, the most real and
valuable thing in all the universe. The schools of the future
will regard functions of organization as of increasingly greater
value. The real superintendent is the functional head of the
school system, who keeps constantly in mind the ideal purposes
itnd values and who, looking at the matter from the descriptive
view of science, regards every ejement of the system as a func-
tional and organic part of the whole. The value of a part
must be determined by its functional relationship to tnis
whole, which alone gives significance to the part. This is just |
as true in the case of the material organism of the school sys- f
tern as it is that each fragment of our human experience be as- |
signed its value in proportion as it functions in the interest \
of the whole, as an organic unit of all of the parts.
7 Summary. In summarizing the main points of this
chapter it is only necessary to point out briefly that the aim
of education, being a part of life, must conform to the aim of
life as a whole. It is true, then, that "Every aim proposed by
the educator which is not in harmony with the intrinsic aim
of human nature itself, ever>' method or device employed by
the teacher that is not in perfect accord with the mind's own
working, not only wastes time and energy, but results in posi-
tive and permanent harm, running counter to the true activi-
The Phihsophiral I
s of Education
ties of the mind, it certainly distorts and may possibly destrojj
them." (McLellan and Dewey, Psy, of Number, p. 4.) Th«
conflict in modern pedagogy arises out of the fact that no clea^
distinction is kept in mind between the aims and purposes oi
education. The only hope of reconciling this conflict is bp
substituting clear thinking for the clouded view of common
sense. Nothing short of a real philosophy of life will offer ^
satisfactory basis for educational theory and practice, '
The normative sciences, then, must be called upon in ordeB
to determine the real aims and purposes of education. Th«
descriptive sciences must contribute the laws and principles, or^
in other words, the means and methods at our disposal for th^
realization of these ideals of life. The school must functij
as an organic unity in the realization of these eternal -valuf
to the end that each individual may realize his big
(ruest self; and in order that such progress may be c
have placed upon the superintendent of schools, workinj
through his subordinates, the burden of directing the schoc
constantly toward its ideal aim. He must never lose !
of aims and purposes, nor must he confuse the ends w
education is to realize and the means or methods by w
they are realized.
It is also true that the teacher, if she is to perform her par
in the great educational system, must have this disi'
mind. The chief difference between the function of the teach^
and that of the superintendent is that the latter must keep id
mind the whole system of education, while the former 1
cerned more immediately and more directly with the ai
be brought about by direct teaching. We shall soon find!
however, that the aims of the teacher must conform to tha
wider educational aim, just as truly as the educational ainlj
must conform to the aim of life as a whole. We now turn
to the chapter in which self-realization is exhibited as the
highest educational ideal. We shall attempt to show how this
is made possible through the realization of the ideal values of
life.
The Ideal Values of Education: Truth, Beauty,
Goodness, and Religion. According to Chapter I of Part
V the highest aim of life was defined as that of self-realiza-
tion. This was asserted to be the chief end of all life and of
all human striving, as well as the primary motive of all con-
duct. We must sec now how such an ideal is possible. We
have asserted already that it is possible only through realiza-
tion of the ideal values of life, and these we have seen to be
truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. We have called them
ideal values for the reason that they are not purely individual,
but rather are universal in their meaning and worth. They
are individual in the sense that they are of value for everybody,
and they are universal because they arc the highest values of
life. Our aim of self-realization implies a constant training
of the immature minds in such a way that they will be willing
and able to serve these ideal values of life. Every worthy life
realizes all of these values in considerable degree. This
is what is meant by universalizing, broadening, and deep-
ening the life of the individual. These are values that
have their significance, not in their relation to any indi-
vidual alone, but to life as a whole. We gain our own
individual significance in the degree that we appropriate and
realize in our own lives these ideal values. "Education is an
effort to assist immature persons to realize themselves and theii
destiny as persons." (Coe, Edu. in Religion and Morals, p.
120.)
2 The UNiry of the Ideal Values. These are the
ideals. The question that naturally follows from the preced-
ing chapter is, "What are the means for attaining our
ideal?" As we have already noticed, educational theory
Ijo The Pliilosophkal Basis of Education
contrrns itself not only with tdtals and purposes to be realized,,
but also with the methods or means for realizing these. There
r a number of different means at our disposal for the realiza-
1
tion of the ideal values of life. We shall consider these
Rreater detail in Chapter V. It will sufSce here to remark
that these values are to he attained through the pursuit of the
different branches of knowledge, where these subjects of study
are regarded as means to an end and not substitutions for the
end itself. The curriculum, then, is one set of means for the
realization of the ideal values. The teacher is another meam
for aiding immature minds in their highest self-realization, ThiS
does not disregard the fact that each individual is an end m
himself, as well as a means for the realization of other ends.
The recitation is another factor, and the organization of thtf
school system is yet another means for promoting the highest
degree of self-realization. One's occupation or vocation in lif*
is yet another. Here we want merely to suggest that self-rcalir
Ration is an aim which is possible, and is not a pure myth.
Through the instrumentality of teachers, the program at.
niudics, the school organization, and the social life, or the
ichool, individuals are to be brought to their highest degree of
self-realization and loyal devotion to the ideal values of life^
truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. It is the organic unity
of these ideals that constitute the essence of true self-realization.
There is no danger that the school become narrowly prao-
ticul, or abstract, if the ideal of self-realization is kept clearl/j
in mind. For while the individual is to realize the
inl values, he is to do this in his own way, and in stijj
doina he is expressing his own deepest meaning and worth as a'
factor in the great world of value. j
,1 TttB Pkrsonal Factor in the Educative Procesb.J
Till* iiniverwl values of life are the same for every in-'
llivldlifil. There is no meaning to the statement that my'
IllKJirtl good may be your least good. The highest good ts
liiil(<|wndeiit nf my own narrower individual view of what
innitlliitcit my real good, and yet the ideal values themselves
liMvii II ilcf|i And abiding significance for me, and just because
\V*V i"i|ir»« mv tnimt «elf. They are in a sense the picture of
W\\H\ I Witlllii h» l( my mpnmng and experience were brought
ght f th f t
h
c and ui
Th as
m i 11
h h g 1
11 f
1 i pi
g^ dp
The Aim of Education as Self-Realization
to their full fruition. We must ne I
that each individual pursues the id 1 lu
purpose of education in his own char ti
tion that the goal of life and of edu
of us does not imply that each one f
by the same process, any more than h f
to he of some service in life, can b k
must perform the same deed. This Id b
cation and would represent endless is f
pose. We all have the same ideal v I f 1 i
deeper purpose is clearly perceived b 1
his own way of realizing these ideal 1
individual and universal aspects of p
no necessary conflict.
4 SELF-REALrZATION AS THE AlL-ComPREHENSIVE EDU-
CATIONAL Ideal. Self-realization is to be regarded as the
only sufficient motive and ideal of conduct, for the reason that
it places the estimate of value where it belongs, in the individ-
ual rather than in society. Whatever I regard as having value
must have some definite relation to my own being and reality.
Aside from such connection it has no value whatsoever. But
the individual's own particular value is to be derived from his
relation to the absolute experience, or the universal will of
which he forms a part. Self-realization is from this point
of view the most comprehensive and the most satisfactory ideal
for the individual, and carries with it as a natural corollary
the improvement and progress of society, or social welfare.
Professor John Adams aptly says that "This is not an acci-
dental difference, but indicates a characteristic attitude towards
human life. Self-realization is in itself an all -comprehensive
educational ideal, so wide, in fact, that we cannot treat it
satisfactorily as a whole till we have passed in review all the
educational systems. But in the present connection the aspect
suggested by the term self-expression calls for immediate treat-
ment. It emphasizes the side that is usually indicated by self-
assertion. Now the very notion of self-realization, even in its
highest form, necessarily implies a certain amount of
the self. It demands to come to its own, and mm
:ense bring itself into a certain prominence. But self-as-
Iof I
del.
self- ^^J
self-as- ^^^1
232
The Phitosophieal Bath of Edueaiion
scrtion is essentially individualistic, self-realization is not.
wider idea is based on the organic conception of societyd
and considers the self not so much as realizing itself agaiie
society as realizing itself in society.
There is no such thing as social ivelfare apart from the i
dividual who constitutes society. There is then no merit in
the ideal of social progress or welfare that is not contained iiK
the idea! of self-realization. The latter term is to be pro?
ferred for the reason that it more completely expresses ouij
own attitude toward life, and most completely represents outj
innermost attitude toward life as a whole. Sgcial welfare Jf
the fruit of self -realization as viewed from the aspect of oitfi
social relationshipj We must not substitute some hypothetiSB
unit in place of the individual himself. Seli-interesU or pefij
fionality have meaning and worth, and aside from such wort^j
society is a myth. We have gone too far already in placing;
stress on the value of society to the neglect of the individuaL]
At times it would seem that we have almost swallowed up tbft
individual in a mythical society which would have no existencJ
at all except as it is made up of individuals. Professor Ladff
says: "We are too much losing sight of the concrete indtj
vidual in a collective, but entirely mythical personality, called
'society.' " {The Teachers Practical Phi}., p. 273.) 1
5 The Individual and Social Views op Educatiow
Reconciled. We find in much of the educational literatuio
of our present day that the individual aspects of educatiom
are practically ignored, at least in theory, and sometimes this
is too much the case in actual practice. We seem to forgcQ
the fact that society has its only existence in the reality of thCi
individual, and we have found the most real nature of the \oA
dividual to be expressed in terms of his will attitude, and it vt
this will attitude or relation which gives meaning and signifH
cance to his life and makes possible the development of a tnMJ
self or personality, the only thing of worth in the univers
How, then, can we submerge the individual units of s
in a larger group and emphasize the value of the latter to t
neglect of the former? I do not mean to surest that all
our present day teaching lays the stress on society to the neglec
of the individual ; on the contrary, 1 see many hopeful signs iT
^" The Aim of Education at Self-Realizalion 233
a clearer vision of things is evident in the Held of education, and
yet the danger is too great that in order to escape the criticisoj
of being individuaUstic, we swini; to the opposite extreme
and proclaim the values of society to the neglect of the indi-
vidual's true worth and being.
There is no excuse for an individualistic theory of education,
if we mean by this an isolated view of the individualistic theory
of education, if we mean by this an isolated view of the in-
dividual's worlc. No individual has worth except in his re-
lation to the whole unity of life, of which he is but a single part.
Aside from such an organic unity expressible in terms of per-
sonality, the individual's life has no value or meaning, but in
such a relationship the individual secures the only value which
he possesses. We must, then, not stress the value of the in-
dividual as an isolated fragment of the universe when we are
seeking to know the ultimate aims of education, but we must
keep in mind the fact that the individual gains his only value
from his relation to the whole. The relation is to be de-
veloped through education of the individual in such a way
that he will be both willing and able to realize in his experience
the ideal value of life. In other words, through education the
individual is to actualize the universal in his experience.
When^ the individual devotes himself loyally to the ideal
vafues of liTe Tie~s' not'engaged in a search for values that be-
long to himself alone, but which are the essential attributes
of a world of meaning and worth. Such a loyal devotee of the
ideals of life cannot be regarded as individualistic in any
narrow sense. On the contrary, he is a highly socialized be-
ing, and is productive of the greatest possible degree of social
progress by virtue of the fact that he is actualizing the ideal
value in the life of his own experience, and thus bringing
into being the necessary condition for the only real progress
about which we know or can know anything. "The one and;
only reason why from the standpoint of self-realization the,
exercise of man's spiritual capacities is better than the grati-'.,
fication of his natural desires is that such spiritual activity re-l .
suits in a larger and more comprehensive life. Thus the at-l I
tainment of ideal ends, intellectual, practical, and lesthetic, I 1
t represents the realization of the whole self, in contrast to whicl)/ 1
^ material cpmfort and pleasure stand for the interest of the! 1
I
334 The PkUti$f,pkUal Bam «f
partial tdi." (Wright's Self-Keatitatwm. p. 217.)
Then t», therefore, no ntcouiy confikx b aa nin ibr ifi-
dividual and the todal aq>ccu of edmtioa. The tofvidoal
todtliza himaclf not by acccpdng some mrthkal ideal or ake,
■udi u Mcial progTCM. but nAer he demotes bnmdf to tbc
realization of the ideal values of life, and in so dome ^
univenultzea, or lodalizes, his own narrow ttic and thus not
only makes for sclf-rcaJization, but for sodal welfare and
human prugrcu, M-hich are the natural consequences of true
»e]f-reaJization. Much ha^ been said in recent jrears about
the individual and the social atm of educattoo. but very little
proKTCM has been made in the nay of recoodlii^ th^ two
pointi of view, notwithstanding the fact diat dierc s no e^
sential conflict between the t^to. The>' arc aspects of a nider
view which includes them both. The stress, tMnvder^, (busI
always be laid on the individual, >ct not on the csoitfK- i£c.
mu«t socialise the individuals of society before a rcal_MiI
fubftantial society U possible. This process of social izationjj
made pfjwibic through the willmg: ^nd" d^roted serrlcc al~me
individual to the ideal values of life. In sening thesejdeals
which arc of value to himself, and yet whose valu^arc not
fimTtcd EO himself, he comes to regard man as dependent upon
hirTeTTows. Tn3ecd he sees in the progress of his own dexelop-
fnent n broader and better societj-. and he sees sodal progress
through this individual self-realization contributing in return
to his own larger possibililies of self-realization. He regards
the universe an a great system and organic unity of purpose,
for the purpose of each individual must be consistent with all
other purposes, or must be viewed in the light of the whole-
President Hyde rightly holds that "The measure of 3 man is
the Tange of interests he makes his own." (Pracliail Idealism,
p. 165.)
It is true that man is a social being and his own 4uau
purposes cannot be determined without consulting society.^
he goes along. But rather than ask questions concerning the
ultimate values of the world for some mythical organization
such as society, he turns toward the ideal of life and through
constant individual efforts directed by a steady gaze upon his
purpose in life he sets the warring purposes and interests of
his life into a compatible system. Through such an organixa-
The Aim of Education as Self-Realization 235 1
tion of self-interest and self-will, he realizes constantly his I
deeper relation to the universal experience of the absolute.
His ideals are, therefore, not narrow and egoistic, but in thftj
highest sense, social and universal. In the service of such (
r3eals and values he is performing the greatest possible servicf 1
^ society. Instead of saying, therefore, that man owes serv-
i his feltow man. It would Ije tetter to say that his
Btant service niust be directed toward the realization of the
eternal value of life. In so doing society does not suffer
From bis misplacement of energj', but rather it profits to the
highest degree therefrom, for instead of being energy mis- .
directed, it is direction toward the only ideal from which we ]
can expect to reap any lasting reward in the form of real "
ial progress. Man's service to man is, therefore, not ;
' end in itself, but rather one of the ways of realizing the most
Rr society through the attainment of his own largest self-
[ realization.
We propose to reconcile the two apparently conflicting
Laims of education, the individual and the social, by regarding
I, these two aims as different aspects of a larger purpose. The^
jiindividualist is right in arguing that the ultimate aim of edu-'
I and life must be of some value to the individual. The
I social theorist is rig:ht in his contention that the ideal of life
\ must conduce to permanent social progress, but each is wrong,
I if he means that we regard the two views as essentially con-
I tradictory. On the contrary, both views are necessary and
I equally important, and we must not forget the one while we
have our eyes fixed on the other, but we must always remem-
ber that the individual's own deeper purposes must give us
the starting point as well as the end of our search for the
highest good. The only adequate motive for conduct is somp
good to the individual, but the only great good to the individ.-
I vCal IS tliat which Is universal, or over-personal and Is equally
1 good for all persons.
This ideal good of life is to be obtained by each one pur-
suing his own special purposes, but can be obtained only when
Tie considers his purposes and ideals in tlieir systematic or or-
unity with one another and with the other individuals
I ^ society. Man becomes more of an individual in his pursuit
L p tfic ideal values of life. He m ust constantly develop .to 4
r
236 The Pkiloso/iliical Basis of Education
higher degree his 0"n purposes and interests, that is, he must
move constantly in the direction of self -realization through
the attainment of the ideal values in his own experience. Thus
in becoming more of an individual, more truly a person, he is
coming to be at the same time more highly socialized. XllUi.
all true educatioa leads in the direction of a more highly
socialized individual, and this higher socialization is not in
conflict with the ideal of true personal development. Qn ^be
contrary, the individual becomes his truest self only in bis
broader social relations. Mnn docs pot lose his individuality
by taking the broader view of life which includes his ieUftW
beings as constituent parts of the same organic whole,, but
rather he becomes more truly a person or individual of the
same organic ivhole when he comes to regard himself ajL,so
related. There is. therefore, no conflict between individual-
ism and socialism in education. The conflict is only apparent,
being real only in the sense that clouded or befogged thinking
inevitably produces such an apparent conflict. According to
the philosophy of idealism, this conflict is neither necessary nor
real.
We thus overcome the apparent conflict between the in-
dividual and social views of education by changing our con-
ception of what a true individual is. An individual expresses
his truest self only when he regards his connection through jsill
and purpose with other individuals of the world. Man is
not isolated from his fellows but rather he is intimately bound
up with them. It is not possible to separate completely rny,
point of view from that of the universe, or my purpose in
life from the deeper meaning and reality of life as a whole.
It is necessary, however, that I regard my own individual pur-
poses as most truly expressed in the service of values that are
worthy not only for me but for all individuals, and it is the
business of the school to train immature individuals In such a
way that they will be willing to serve such ideal values, and it
is through such means that the development of the truest self or
personality is possible.
6 SuMM.ARY. By way of summary of the chief points of
this chapter we must remind ourselves that the ideal of educa-
tion is that of self-realization, and is made possible through the
The Aim of Education as Self-Renlieation 237 I
willing devotion of an individual to his cause in life, which i
cause is not independent of his fellows, but rather is closely "
bound up with them. Professor Euchen says: "Unless faith
in some lofty ideal infuse zest and gladness into every depart-
ment of our activity, we cannot realize the highest possibili-
ties of life." (Meaning and Value of Life, p. 1.) It is
through the devotion of an individual to the ideal values of ,
life that a truly socialized individual, or real personality i
developed. A man's worth is to be determined by the breadth '
and range of interest vvhicli he regards as belonging to himselfi
These individual purposes and will attitudes must be harmonized
with each other and reconciled with the larger view of the
totality of his experience and with his fellow beings. Pro-
fessor Miinsterberg rightly says that "Education is to make ,
youth willing and able to realize possibilities of life." (Psychol,
and Teacher, p. 70.) Again he says true education consists j
in training pupils in "Loyally to the ideal values of life," (Ibid.,
p. 75.) Shakespeare wisely says:
"To thine own self be true;
And it must follow as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."
CHAPTER IV
I
THE RELATION OF THIS IDEAL TO EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE
I The Relation of Theory and Practice, Before we
can answer specifically the question as to just how the ideal of
self-realization is to be made actual in our experience, we
must consider the larger question as to the relation of theory
and practice generally. Theory is not in necessary conflict
with practice any more than the social and individual aspects
of education or life are in necessary conflict. On the con-
trary, theory is our attempt to show the meaning of our ex-
perience. Every theory is a proposed explanation of a cer-
tain group of phenomena, or from the philosophical point of
view, it is the attempt to show the meaning of our fragmentary
experience for life as a whole. The theory of education,
therefore, is an attempt to offer an explanation of the mean-
ing and value, as well as the connection, of the tacts of our
educational experience. Theory acts as an ever present guide
to practice. If we do not have a theory in mind, practice be-
comes meaningless. Findlay speaks approving of: — "That
habit of associating theory with practice, of seeing the whole
in the details, which is the foundation for rational progress
not only in teaching but in every trade and profession."
Professor Whitehead says, "Wanting the theory, instruction
becomes aimless." W. T. Harris says, "The statesman or
the teacher knows practically when he knows the trend of the
system which he is to direct or manage." (Preface to Boone's
Edu. in U. S.. p. 6.)
It is only when a theory is offered as an explanation or an
interpretation that life gains any significance or value at all.
Our educational practice is to-day greatly in need of a sound
philosophy which brings together the various facts of our ex-
perience in order to show their meaning and value for life as
a whole. The broader theory of education must also inclu("
The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 239
rsn explanation from the point of view of the descriptive science
of the facts and phenomena of our experience. From the de-
scriptive point of view a theory of education becomes a science
of education and consists in the explanation of the phenomena
of our experience in their external connections one with an-
other. A theory of education from the philosophical point of
»view is an attempt to show the meaning and value of this ex- ,
perience which science attempts to relate in a causal scheme ■
of things.
The true scientist as well as the true philosopher recognizes
the value of theory as unbecoming in a man of real intelligence.
Common sense, as well as science and philosophy, proposes
theories, but her theories are so seldom correct, as a result of
unclear thinking, that she has grown sceptical of all theories,
except the theorj' that all theories are of little value. Our
attitude toward theory is very different from that of common
t sense. We regard theorizing as an essential part of life and
as the natural outcome of reflection and thought on the facts
■of our experience, and the doubts that are placed upon theory
are sufficient evidence of the fact that common sense has alto-
gether too large a place in the life of man, to the exclusion
of the clearer views of science and philosophy. The real
scientist and the true philosopher do not regard theory as
an end in itself, however, but as a means of getting on better
with the world. Every theory and hypothesis must be tested ■
by experience, but theory itself is possible only as a result j
of our attempt to explain, or to interpret the facts of our I
experience. I
It is the true theorist who has the vision or ideal of a better \
state of existence than is now realized. It is he who is the
real ideab'st in the world of practical life. It is he who ad-
justs his experience with reference to this larger view of
things and thus develops a systematic way of viewing life
from above. We cannot then dispense with the theory.
Professor Peabody truly says that "The abstractions of ethics
lead, not to remoteness and detachment, but to discernment
and horizon. The chief source of perplexity in the social
question is in seeing it from below, the chief source of courage
I in the social question is in seeing it from above." (Peabody,
App. to Soc. Ques.. p. 146.)
240 The Philosophical Basis 0/ Education
2 Educational Theory as an Explanation of Edu-
cational Experience. What has Heen said above with re-
gard to theory generally applies equally well to the particular
field of education. We are suffering either from the lack of
theories in education to-day, or from a superabundance of
theories with no stronger foundation than common sense, cus-
tom, or tradition. Education must be removed from this
Jjllfillf: thumb practice of common ^ense, and set upon the.
g eatcr heights of a truly scientific and philosophical planj
yt j'*'* In education we are greatly in need of a foundation
tnat will set each fragment of our educational experience in
proper relation to all others. In other words we are greatly
in need of a philosophy of cd\ication, which will show the
meaning of each part out of the rule of thumb methods of
common .sense, and consider it in the light of the larger sys-
temof causal connection. We are therefore, in need fl£_a
tetter theory of both the worthy aims of education, and, pf
the means and methods to be employed in their reaUzatiflP-
Such views of our educational experience would unite in our
larger theory or philosophy of life as a whole, and certainly
would result in untold good to the education of the present
day. We must cease to regard theory as having no connection
with the real practice of education. We must come rather
to the view that the only possibility of bringing order out
of tlie chaos and confusion of modern pedagogical doctrines i?
to view the whole of our educational experience in the iight
of this larger theory of life.
We are not to suppose, therefore, that the one who sets
about his problem without a theory will necessarily succeed
best in solving his problems. On the contrary the one who
does not set out with some definite theory or hypothesis is
almost certain to proceed in an aimless fashion. If we have
no theory to guide us we are in danger of wandering about
without accomplishing any very definite results. On the con-
trary, if we set out with a certain theory or hi'pothesis we
have something to guide us through the many isolated facts.
It is not possible for us to handle the problems of education
without having some definite theory, and this theory which
controls our educational experience must be large enough and
inclusive enough to take account of all the facts of our edu-
The Relation of this Ideal to Educalionnl Practice 24!
cational experience. In other words, we cannot get on in
diis business of education without a philosophy, and this phil-
osoph)- of our educational experience must harmonize with^
our broader philosophy of life.
We have suggested already that tlie piillosophy of life which
we hold regards the universe as best expressed in its reality
in terms of personality or will. The great meaning of all
of our human experience is to be found in the will, not in
any individual will to be sure, but in the will of the uni-
verse of which each individual is a necessary part. This in-
dividual will is constantly striving toward an end, which end
is not outside of itself, but rather it is expressed in terms of
its own self-realization. The wilt is seeking perfect rela-
tionship with the universe of which it is a part. We cannot- ]
express the meaning of our experience except in terms of this
will, and we cannot discover the significance of our individual
will except in terms of their relation to the will of the abso-
lute personality of the universe, which is the ultimate mean-
ing and reality of all experience and the absolute meaning of
life. This theory of life must always show itself in every
part and fragment of our life, education, art, religion, ethics,
politics, social and business life, — in fact in all fields of our
experience, we must aim at the realization of the complete
self. Now this aim of life, and consequently of education,
is the theory which we propose as the solution for our educa-
tional conflicts, in so far as they relate to the aim of educa-
tion. The only way to remove education from the common
sense basis upon which it now rests, and to reconcile the con-
flicts we find in this field of our experience, is to strive for
the realization of this ultimate aim. This will bring order
out of chaos, unity out of confusion and disorder. It is
only as we keep our eye on this ultimate goal that our ex-
perience begins to take order and significance. It is only in
such a system that facts of experience have any value and
that their relative values can be assigned. A part has signifi-
cance only in its relation to the whole. No part of experience
has any significance apart from such relationship. It is, there-
fore, meaningless to inquire into the value of any particular
^^pait of our educational experience, unless we are viewing
242 The Philosopk'unl Bash of Education
tlic only significance it has for life and experience.
In whai has been said above lies the suggestion that oui
aim wilt modify or affect our means or methods. We shall
see as we proceed in this and in the two following chaptcni
that such is the case. We shall give particular attention to
the necessary consequences of such a doctrine, or theory, as
that of self-realization. In fact we have suggested already,
a good many implications of this philosophical theory.
3 The Actual and the Ideal as Part and Whole
OK Experience. According to this view there is no necessary
conflict between the actual and the ideal. These are only
two aspects of the larger view of experience. They are thC'
part and whole about which we have so many times remarked,
the actual is the part of reality that exists in a temporal and
special order of the universe. We cannot deny reality toj
our world of time and space. This thing has been done in
the history of philosophy, but always without sufficient reasonsr
being stated for such a denial. According to idealism the.
actual is experience viewed from an angle of time and space,.
or from the world of causal reality. That is to say, it is the.
world viewed not from the point of view of the whole, but,
from the point of view of the part of our experience. The
actual and the ideal, therefore, are related as fragment and;
whole of the universal reality. It is meaningless to ascribe.
reality to the fragment of our experience, while at the same
time denying the reality of the whole represented in the ideal.
It is equally meaningless to ascribe reality to the whole or the
ideal while denying such reality to the fragmentary experience
of our life. The only way to view experience is to determine ita
relation as part in a time and space world of causality and
sequence, to the universal whole which is not confined by any
such temporal and spacial boundaries.
We do not, therefore, deny to the experience of our present
life, or to that of education particularly, any reality that it
possesses, but we do urge that such reality be ascertained in
the light of the larger experience, and in terms of this rela-
tionship we are to ascribe the value of our educational ex-
perience and determine the values which the various parts
possess. All of our talk about educational values is entjiejy
The Relation of tfi'ts Ideal to Educational Practice 243
ipcariingless unless we have an ideal in mind by which we
measure the relative values, or the different parts of our ex-
perience as determined by their relation to the whole. It is
only in the light of such a philosophy that educational values
can be determined, for such values are determined by the rela-
tion of the part to the whole, or another way of stating the
same thing, the values of our educational experience are to
be determined by their effectiveness in promoting the ideal
which has been set up as the aim toward which we are mov-
ing. According to the view here expressed the highest aim
of life and of education is that of self-realization.
In the light of such an educational theory each subject in
the program gains its significance by the degree to which it
promotes this ideal of life, and just here we must remind our-
selves that there is no arbitrary way of stating what subject
in the program of studies possesses the greatest educational
value. According to this philosophy all such important mat-
ters are removed from the common sense basis and are ele-
vated to a higher plane of thought. Our attempt to assign
relative values to subjects in the past, and even continuing
in our present, represents little more than an attempt to assign
values on the basis of such a common sense theory. Idealism
removes such important matters from common sense and
places them in charge of those who see values in their rela-
tion to experience as a whole. According to the ideal of self-
realization the only proper way to consider the value of a
subject is to ascertain the degree to which it promotes the
eternal values in the life of the individual.
We must always remember that individuals are different
and are not mere carbon copies of one another. Each indi-
vidual must have a right to express his ideal values of life,
that they must therefore attempt to do this in the same way.
On the contrary the most important thing in the individual
to take cognizance of in the educational process is that of
his own will and interests. If we are to go counter to the
educational process we are going to defeat the aim which we
set out to realize: namely that of the highest self-realization
of the individual. There is no possible way of realizing the
self unless we take account of its own mode of operation,
its own interests and purposes. This does not mean a laissez
244 T*^ I'liilosopliiral BasU of Education
/aire policy In education. It simply means that if the individual
is to realize hh greatest possibilities in life, it is. oeces&ai^
mat teaching, and the educational system generally, take ac-
count of the individuality of each pupil, and this jneans_lP
allow It to express itself in the way most natural to itself.
We are to estimate the value of the subjects, then, by their
relation to the will of the cducand, or the one who is to be
educated. The only eternal values in all the universe of
reality are those of truth, beauty, goodness, and religion.
All other values are only partial and hence relative. Whether
or not history is better for me than geography, depends on
whether or not 1 am able to see life in its truer proportions
through history than through geography. It is simply mean-
ingless to assert that history has greater educative value than
geography. Educaiici nal values depend and always _w_ill de^
pend, on the individuaI'~eJucanJ. A~ number of writers on
educational topics seem to lose sight of this truth, and assign
values to the different subjects in the program of study in
accordance with some arbitrary principle chosen in the light
of their own limited experience. There are those who assign
very little or no educative value to Latin and a great deal of
value to history, or mathematics, or literature. Just why they
do so is probably not so hard to explain as to justify in the
light of a larger philosophy of life and education. If a boy
can see his way in life move clearly through the language
of the Romans than he can in the modern scientific laboratories
of the chemist or the physicist, I see no reason why it should
be held that this subject does not have greater value for him
than do the laboratory sciences.
There is only one way to look at the matter from a larger
philosophy of life, and that is to regard the whole universe
as constituted of absolute values, and the world of our practi-
cal experience, which is but a part of such an absolute worli'
consists of only relative values, that is, they are only part or
a larger whole. We cannot realize completely the absolute
Lvalues in a world of time and space. For this would be to
realize the eternal in the temporal order of things, but cer-
tainly this is a very different thing from assigning values of a
rather absolute character of certain subjects and then arbi-
trarily placing others in certain definite relations to this
The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 245
standard, and on the basis of such a relationship defining the
relative values of the different subjects in the program. No,
there is but one way of handling this matter in the light of
general philosophy, and that is to regard each individual as
possessing absolute meaning and worth for life as a whole,
and of assigning to each individual's experience values in pro-
portion to the degree that such experience promotes his self-
realization. If, then, Latin is the subject through which a
given individual perceives his relation to life best, and through
which he sees the meaning and connection of his experience
and of the world, then this subject is for him of greatest rela-
tive educational value, and we must cease to allow pedagogues
arbitrarily to assign absolute values to certain subjects equally
arbitrarily chosen, and then define the value of all other sub-
jects in terms of this standard. On the contrary, we must hold
to no standard other than the idea! of completed self-realiza-
tion, and holding strictly to our theory we must view the
value of each subject in terms of its power of realizing the
possibilities of the individual concerned.
There is no such a thing as assigning absolute values to
the things which have only relative value. Every subject
has only relative value, and nothing In all the universe of our
partial experience can have absolute value in the sense of being
entirely complete and wanting nothing. On the contrary our
experience is always partial, and therefore relative, and the
value that we assign to each part must he determined always
by its relation to the whole, or by the degree to which it pro-
motes the realization or the Ideal. Viewed in the light of
such a theory, no one subject of the curriculum has any greater
value than any other for all individuals of the universe. Thus
we see one very important educational implication in so far
as educational experience is I'alued in the light of the theory
of self-realization. Such an educational doctrine follows as
a matter of natural and logical consequence from the theory
which defines the meaning and value of our temporal ex-
perience in its relation to the whole, or the relation of the
actual and the Ideal in life.
4. The Value of a Lifb Ideal. We must lay special
stress on the value of an ideal for life, for as we shall see this
1
246 The Philosopkkal Basis of Education
matter has great significance for our procedure in education.
"Ideals", Professor Ladd says, "arc certain conceptions which
have an emotional value, which have also a pull upon the
will and which set the aims of the workman at an altitude
appreciably higher than the facts and actualities of present
attainment. And the educational ideals must, like all other
ideals, "be considered in the light of the principles of a true
practical philosophy." (Teacher's Practical Piiilosopky, p. 19)
An ideal is an e\'er-present goal toward which we move.
We do not alwajs keep our eye on the ideal, and psychologi-
cally it would be unwise for us to attempt to do so, but it
is nevertlieless necessary that we have such an ideal in life,
and that we occasionally glance from the complex experience
of this temporal life toward this ideal, which represents the
picture of a completed life, such as is known to us through
the part. The ideal is, therefore, not meaningless, some-
thing outside of experience, but rather it is a picture of a more
ideal state of existence. It represents our experience run out
to its logical conclusion. The ideal and the practical must
not be regarded as different parts of our experience, rather
the ideal is the partial experience filled out to its completion.
To be sure the ideal changes somewhat as we enlarge our ex-
perience, and is therefore never a complete and final pic-
ture of our present fragmentary experience. Indeed it would
not be possible for a man in a partial world of time and
space to form a complete picture of life as a whole. This
does not mean that he cannot form an accurate picture of
it, nor does it suggest that such an ideal representation of
it has no reality, on the contrary it is the expression of a
more completely realized experience.
The ideal must be believed in. We must regard it as hav-
ing value and reality, otherwise we do not follow it with
the loyalty and devotion that is deserved by such a reality.
If we regard our ideals as simply ethereal visions, we will not
be able to use them in the realization of a larger life. Presi-
dent Briggs says, "Education is not in a high sense practical
unless it has an ideal in it and round about it," {Routine
and Ideals, p. 35) J. F. Brown says, "An ideal is an ever-
present guide, and, like the demon of Socrates, it serves in the
absence of parent, teacher, and friend." {Am. High School,
I
The Relation of this Ideal to Educatiannl Prnctire 247
p. 290) Again Briggs says, "He who loses his ideals loses
the very bloom of life." (School, College and Character^ p.
132.) Ruth M. Weeks says: "A clear-cut ideal is the first
step toward drafting a workable program." (Tke People's
School, p. 167)
Our ideal must represent a greater reality and it must lead
us on constantly toward a life of more complete self-realiza-
tion. If we lose faith in our ideals our experience loses its
significance and value. On the contrary if our ideal is re-
garded consistently as we enlarge our experience, we relate
each fragment of it to this ideal in order to ascertain the rela-
tive value which each part possesses.
The Meaning of Character and Personality.
|"Thc individual who does not govern his life in accordance
nth an ideal or a definitely definable purpose lacks consistency
I and uniformity, which are the essential attributes in the forma-
I tion of character or personality. Each individual establishes
his character by faith fully executing the acts or deeds which
I are determined by the ideal which is the ruling purpose of
I his life. "A purpose is possible only through an ideal which
realized by the adjustment of means to ends." (H.
' W. Dressier : Ed. and tke Phil. Ideal, p. 205 ) Without such an
I ideal there is no controlling motive or purpose in life and conse-
Lquently no well established character or personality. Now
■the most essential factor in the life of the individual is just
■ this factor of the will. We must, therefore, use every effort
tlo preserve the will in the process of education. The will
E^is a factor that can be governed and educated. It is the
I duty of the school to take part in the direction of this will.
• The school must provide an opportunity for each individual
Pwiil to seek the ideal values of life in its own way. We must
1 therefore, allow free play of individuality, except in so far
Jias^ the "Will, which ts the essential attribute of personality, ft
liontrolled by the ideal values indispensable to all complete
ISif-realization.
Character and personality have no meaning apart from ii
f.consistent organization of the interests and purpose of the
lal life, and such organization is not possible except
fivhere the life is governed by a clear ideal or purpose. Under
248
The Pkilaiophical Basis of Education
such conditions a deHnite organization of interests and purposes
is possible. In this connection we note what several writers
consider character to be. Professor Palmer says:— "By char-
acter we mean any established mode of feeling, willing and
thinking." (Prob. of Freedom, p. 78) Professor Coe says,
"Character is confirmed habit of moral choice." (Education
m Morals and Religion, p. 58) It will ever be true that
"Those who have a well-ordered character lead also a well-
ordered life." (Bakewell Source Book in Phil., p. 61)
The one thing absolutely indispensable to a life worth liv-
ing is an ideal purpose in accordance with which one directs
and organizes the affairs of his life. This is the chief m erit
or value of an ideal for each Individual, The school must
not Tose sight of this fact, and must help to instil ideals in
the minds of the pupils, but it must leave them to realize
these ideals in their own way, and cease trying to force every
individual into the same line,
6 Individual Differences. In the foregoing sections,
we have suggested the necessity of allowing to each individual
the right to realize the ideal values and purposes of life in
his own way. This is another way of stating the necessity
of taking account of individual differences. AU the. psychg-
logical and epistemological studies made in recent years, pgint
to the necessity for taking account of individual difEerengg^
Individuals are not all constructed on the same plan. Their
different environments, hereditary antecedents, and training
give certain shape and direction to their interests in life,
which must not be ignored by the school if it is to enlist the
co-operation of these natural influences in the process of edu-
cation.
The ideal values of life, truth, beauty, goodnes.s, and re-
ligion are universal, and their value does not consist in the
fact that they are related to any one single individual, but
rather because they are universal in their significance. They
are equally valuable for all individuals, but they are to be
realized by each individual in his own way, or through the
expression of his own interests and his own deepest will.
The school has too long acted as a barrier to the most com-
plete self-realization of individuals, just because it has at-
The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 249
tempted to force all persons into the same line by a narrowly
restricted program of study, or by certain artificial prescrip-
tions, or by restrained and unnatural election of studies. Pupils
must be given an opportunity to find tbemselves ; this is the
most important task that lays before every teacher, — to kelp
the pupil to find himself. The highest obligation placed upon
the teacher, and on the school as an organization, is that of
assisting the ptipll to find his own self, and how this can best
be expressed and developed in life.
It is not to be inferred from the above suggestion that I
believe in unrestricted election of studies; on the contrary, I
believe that such restriction is necessary to the best interests
of each individual and the school as a whole, as well as for
society. A pupil should be given an opportunity to select his
studies not on the basis of his own temporary likes, but his
deeper purpose must be found through the aid of the teaAr, or
Special adviser, who considers not only the pupil's side of the
case, but the parents' also, and the needs of society. The en-
vironmental or sociological conditions of the pupil must be con-
sidered. Once the selection has been made, there must be no
change allowed in the pupil's program until it is deemed ad-
visable by all concerned. The pupil should not be allowed to
take up a subject and drop it at will for any but the most con-
vincing reasons. Voluntary selection that does not take into ac-
count the deeper purposes does not make for self-realization, or
from the other side of the process, social welfare. In the inter-
ests of the individual and the society of which he forms a part,
certain restriction in keeping with the highest rationality are
not only desirable, but positively necessary.
We must not lose sight of the fact that each individual
should he allowed the opportunity of realizing the highest
values of life through the expression of his own individual will
and purpose. But such will and purpose must not be mis-
taken for mere momentary feelings of like or dislike. Pupils
govern their selection of studies and their pursuit of
the same with a higher degree of rationality than has been
evidenced in general up to the present time. The only safe
guide in this matter will always be found to be some life
ideal which controls our whole system and range of interests
life. Such an ideal I have defined in terms of self-realize-
250 The Pbilosopbknl Basis of Education I
tion. There may be other purposes, and I am sure there areJ
but to my mind do other ideal of life or education so coaw
plefcly and so adequately expresses the ultimate ideal and thel
chief motive of our conduct as individuals. j
7 Self-Activity, Sklf-Rksponsibihty, and Self-;
Realization, If the individual is to realize the ideal valuesj
of life in his own way we must allow unrestricted expression*
to the instinctive tendencies of the individual to act. AdanUj
rightly asserts that "Incessant 'directed' activity leaves no]
room for the development of qualities that are essential focj
the true self-realization of the cducand." {Evolution of Edu^
cational Theory, p. 155.) Hobhouse wisely remarks on this)
point that "To try to form character by coercion is to dw
stroy it in the making. Personality is not huilt up from with4
out but grows from within and the function of the outrti
order is not to create it, but to provide for it the most suit-|
able conditions of growth." {Liberalism, p. 143.) We wouldy
do well to remind ourselves often that, as Fichte said, "Th<M
most original thing in us is the impulse to action. It is givciM
before the consciousness of the world and cannot be derived!
from it."
Self-activity is the basis of self- responsibility and self C0O5]
trol, which are the essential conditions of self-realization.|
Herbart greatly stressed the value of self-activity in reali
the many-sided development of the individual. There
certain instinctive propensities leading in the direction of
activity, and such instincts must be exercised if the indivtdi
is to realize his own powers and his own weaknesses, whi(
must be realized if he is to take any important part in tl
process of his own education, and as we have already
education is not a one-sided process. Education is possiblj
only when the cducand reacts in such a way as to bring out
his own deeper meaning and purpose, and such meaning 01
purpose can be found only through self-activit>'. We must,
then, give an important place to self-activity, but we are no!
to conclude that any amount of self-activity will
produce an individual who measures up to the ideal whi
we have set.
Self-activity is a certain fundamental condition in the pn
1
The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 351
cess of education, rather than a completion of this process.
I Self-activity is necessary in order that a sense of self -responsi-
bility may be awakened, and this sense of self- responsibility
is a necessary condition of self-realization. Self-activity is,
therefore, not an end in itself, but lather a condition of the
individual's understanding his own limits and capacities. It
is through self-activity that he measures himself against his
I fellow-men and the world, and so gets an estimate of the
I points of his strength and his weakness. It is through the
I exercise of the instinct moving in the direction of self-activity
['that the individual finds how closely he measures up to his
I competitors, and this is the germ of his sense of individual
I capacity. It is this self-activity, also, which leads to self-
k responsibility, for it is soon discovered that an individual is
[not only a being that acts, but one who is held accountable
[ for his acts. He therefore awakens, through self -activity, a
ing of responsibility for the acts or deeds which he per-
I forms. Thus he begins to weigh his own conduct or pass
I comparative judgment on his acts, and this is the first abso-
' lute condition necessary for the development of character.
We must come to see that not all acts are of equal value.
They do not all tend to realize the end for which we strive
to the same degree. They are, therefore, not of equal im-
portance and the question of selection comes to be an im-
portant matter in conduct.
Only after self-activity has developed to the degree of self-
I responsibility is it possible for us to attain the ideal of self-
( realization in the individual. The individual at first con-
; the value of his acts in the light of their relations to
' other?, or their effects in maintaining the relationship of har-
' mony between individuals. Only after some maturity in
I the individual is it possible to substitute for this objective
Standard of measurement a more ideal standard, such as that
I of self-realization. But it is not possible for us to succeed
hi^est possible degree in the development of the indi-
f vidual self until we have assisted him In setting before himself
I an idea! or purpose toward which he unconsciously strives,
accordance with which he governs his own actions. We
F would say, therefore, that self-realization is to come about
Lonly through the exercise of the individual's own institKtive
1
252 The PhUnsophknl Basis of Education
tendencies toward action, and only after these tendencies have
been organised in accordance with a plan, or ideal in life
can the individual attain to his chief importance in life, or
we would say find himself.
8 Education and a Plan of Life. The chief busi-
ness of education according to the ideal here expressed is that
of helping each individual to realize his purpose in life, and
through the realization of this purpose his own largest self
is possible. Our ideal is that of self-realization, and the
only possibility of attaining it is through self-activity which,
under the proper direction and influence of the school, the
teacher, and all others concerned in his education, naturally
develops the feeling of self-responsibility. The pupil must be
led to formulate a plan of life. He must see that a life that
has no plan is a life that is not worth living. Plato said,
". . . the teacher should endeavor to direct the children's in-
clinations and pleasures by the amusements to their final
aim in life." {Laws, p. 21.) Findlay says, "The school is
adopted by the adult community as a vehicle for controlling
values and ideals." (The School, p. 55)
If a life is to be made harmonious and significant it is pos-
sible only through loyal devotion to an ideal or purpose. This
purpose we have suggested already to be most compre-
hensively stated in terms of self-realization. The pupil must
be led to see that his most important task in life is that of
finding his own interests and purposes, and through these his
larger self-realization is possible. Without taking account
of such individual differences in interests no such self-
realization is possible. We must lead the pupil to see this.
The whole atmosphere of the school must develop the feel-
ing that each individual has as his highest duty that of find-
ing himself, or his chief interests or capacities in life, and
through development of these interests his highest self-realiza-
tion. We must look for these ideal values in all parts of our
experience. We must be taught so to seek and to find them,
for they are contained in every element of our experience.
There is grave question whether or not it is possible for any
group of individuals to assert what parts of our experience,
or what subjects of the program of study, will yield the largest
The Relation of this Ideal to Educalianai Prnclice 253
returns in educational value. We have seen that an attempt
do this is nearly always fatal because we fail to take ac-
count of individual differences.
The rule and motive of the school should be to help each
pupil to find his interests and purposes in life, and on the basis
of these develop a plan of life consistent with the larger view
of ideal values. If the school does not help the pupil in the
development of this plan of life, it has failed to perform its
chief function. We must cease to regard it as the business of
the school to realize the ideal values of life and feed these
to the pupils through a siphon or a spoon, and come to the
larger way of thinking and regard it as our chief business in
the school to help a child to find his own life's interests and
purposes, through the search for the ideal values as realized in
the experience of the race and the individual,
9 The Vocational and Cultural Ideals Reconciled.
There is another matter which ought to be spoken of in
ction, and that is the relation of the vocational and
the cultural, or between the liberal and technical ideals in
' education. According to the philosophy underlying the theory
I'Of education here expressed, we do not make an absolute dis-
ft-tinction between the vocational and the cultural, or between
Y&x. liberal and the technical. Wc regard these two ideals as
mplementary to the larger ideal of self-realization. The
l;present vocational tendencies in education have their meaning
' and significance in life, although I believe it is true that this
significHnce is not always seen even by the most enthusiastic
advocates in such lines of work. The vocational and the cul-
tural are simply the expressions of two different Ideals of life,
ideals which are not essentially contradictory, but each of which
contains a truth. The vocational tendency is quite in line
with the expression of the doctrine of self-activity which was
spoken of above. It may lead toward self-control and self-
I realization and it may not. Sometimes it does lead toward
self-realization, but quite as often it does not. The vocational
tendencies in education will always be productive of good,
if they arc to be regarded as natural expressions of individual
interests and tendencies to self- activity, but which must lead
on toward the realization of the larger and more universal
254 '■'''^ Pliiloso/ihiriil Bush of Education
values of life. The vocational movement will always be pro-
ductive of harm if it fails to see its own limits.
There is no satisfactory reason, deducible from reflection
or experience, for supposing that vocational education need
of necessity be narrow, and consequently fall short of the
larger ideal of life. The practical educators must not lose
sight of the fact that man does not live by bread alone. He
lives the higher life on the basis of ideal values, which gain
their significance by their comprehensive meaning for life as
a whole. Practical education must ever be regarded not as
an aim or an end in itself, but as the most valuable means
for the realization of the ideal values of life for a very
large number of individuals. There are individuals who do
not find their highest self-realization possible through the
pursuit of vocational or technical studies. There are others,
however, who do find these lines of work most conducive to
their highest degree of self-realization. There is a large class
of individuals who find their own highest self-realization pos-
sible through the pursuit of the more liberal, or wrongly
called, cultural lines of study. There is no subject which
deserves to be called cultural that does not promote in the
individual who pursues it the ideal values of truth, beauty,
goodness, and religion. And on the other hand every subject
which does promote the realization of these ideals in life de-
serves to be called cultural in the best sense of this word.
There is, then, no conflict between the vocational and the
cultural, or between the liberal and the technical ideals
education. The only conflict lies in the unclear thinking
the individuals who swing to the one extreme or the otht
There is a balance possible between these ideals, but such
balance can be realized only when we take the larger view
education, such as I believe to be expressed in terms of self-
realization.
The great trouble with us in our modem day Is in striking
the balance between the liberal and the technical, between
the vocational and the cultural. The vocational and technical,
or what are often called the practical phases of education,
should be regarded simply as means for the development of
the individual's own chief interests and purposes in life, and
through this development he must be led to see the higher
The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 255
^P Ideal values of life. Indeed it becomes his chief duty to 1
^B realize these ideals in his own practical work. There f
^M grave danger in the complexitj- of modern industry that the
^P practical work leads to a narrow view of life, and conse-
^P quently closes the doors to the individual who would attain
^r the ideal values of life. I do not see that such a condition
is inevitable, however. If we regard our technical and our
practical life in its relation to life as a whole, we see
these parts in their proper significance and value. We thus
restore to each fragment of our experience its meaning through
our perception of its relation to the whole of which it is part.
It is just this training of the individual that enables him
to perceive each fragment of experience in its relation to the
whole that gives life its significance and value. There is,
then, no reason for regarding the industrial occupations as
necessarily narrow, and there is no more reason for regard-
Iing the so-called cultural or liberal subject as broad. Indeed,
Bome of the liberal subjects are narrow and contracted for cer-
tain individuals, whose lives gain significance in both breadth
Mid depth, if they were allowed to turn their attention in
the direction of some practical line of work. The distinction
between vocational and cultural, or liberal and technical, edu-
cation must either be given up entirely, or else we must dis-
tinguish more clearly than we have done in modern practice
between the views.
10 Summary. Let us now briefly survey the contents of
this chapter in order that we may see more clearly its signifi-
cance for the whole. In attempting to show the relations
between the aim of self-realization and educational practice
based upon this aim, we began by pointing out some significant
relations between theory and practice generally. We con-
cluded that theory and practice are not contradictory. Theory
is rather the attempt to explain the meaning of the frag-
mentary parts of our experience. It is the true theorist who
sees each element of our experience in its relation to the
whole. It is, therefore, the theorist who is most likely to see
things in their proper proportions. It is not true that the one
twho is ultra-practical, and who does not work with a definite ,
theory in mind, is the most valuable man for society. Nor ^
256 Tlif PhU'isofihical Basis of Education
is it true that this is the type of individual who is likely to
realize his larger self to the highest degree. On the con-
trary the man of theory is the one who is most apt to see life
as a whole, and each part of it in its proper perspective, and,
therefore, keep the balance and proportion whicli is necessary
in every life and tn every part of our experience. We made
application of his view to education and asserted that educa-
tion, quite as much as life as a whole, is in need of a funda-
mental theory which gives direction and significance to the
parts of our educational experience. Indeed we saw that the
relationship between a larger theory of life as a whole, and
that of education as a part, is so close that in order to see
the real meaning of our educational experience, we must
see it in the light of a larger theory or philosophy of life.
We attempted to break down the artificial distinction be-
tween the actual and the ideal by showing that the actual
stands to the ideal in the same relation that a part of our ex-
perience stands to the whole. The actual, or the fragment of
our experience, has meaning and significance not in itself, but
in its relation to the whole. We next considered the value
of an ideal for life, and showed that such an ideal is an essen-
tial condition of a valuable life, or the essential condition for
the development of the highest degree of character or person-
ality is that the individual possesses a definite ideal, which en-
ables him to formulate a plan of life. He must be allowed to
carry this plan of life out in accordance with his own individual
Interests and purposes, through his own activity, or the
exercise of his own instinctive interests and capacities or abili-
ties. It is through such self-activity that he comes to express
judgment as to the value of his acts, and consequently to de-
velop a sense of self -responsibility and self-control through
which the ideal of self-realization is made possible.
We regard it as the chief business of the school to conform
to this ideal, and to assist each pupil in developing a plan of
life, in accordance with his own interests and purpose, and
through the recognition of the significance of each part and
fragment of experience to that of the whole. This plan of
life may be worked out best by some individuals in the pursuit
of the vocational and the practical ideal, while others may
best attain their ideal in life through the pursuit of the cultural
The Relation of this Ideal to Eduralionnl Pra
257
rand liberal studies of the program, which are not so directly
concerned with the occupations of life. We are to take ac-
count of these differences in individuals in the formation and
administration of our program of studies, otherwise we will
fall short in the case of others. We do not regard vocational
or cultural education as contradictory in any sense. Such a
confusion arises in unclear thinking. They are only different
ways of arriving at the same goal, the ideal values of life,
through which alone we are able to perceive life in its signifi-
3 realize the highest degree of self-realization
through individual work. Professor Findlay aptly remarks
riiat "If in modem time a sharp antithesis has been discovered
between liberal and technical education it is only because men
.have failed to see how intimate is the alliance between the
[ two; the ends both of vocation and of leisure need to be pursued
if not always in conjunction". {The School, p.
157.) Dutton and Sneddon utter what seems to me to be a
J vital truth when they say that "Vocational efficieni^ is funda-
mental to cultural and social efBciencv," {Admin, of Pub.
[ £du. in U. S.)
CHAPTER V
I
THE TEACHER AND THE RECITATION
I The Teacher As a Factor in the Educational
Process. In this chapter we are to concern ourselves with
the teacher and the recitation as factors in the educational pro-
cess. In the following chapter we shall be concerned pri-
marily with the school organization as a factor in this process.
The teacher must always be regarded as a fundamental
factor in the process of education. She is the artist who
brings about the proper adjustment between aims and means
in education. We have noted already how important the
function of supervision is in the educational process. There
must be some one who keeps his eye on the ideal goal to be
realized throughout the educational process, and he must be
able to see the means, methods and organization necessary to
effect the purposes he sets out to reach. But in the last analysis
it is true that the teacher plays the important role of actually
adjusting means to ends so far as the classroom is concerned,
and we must here assert that no amount of organization will
take the place of the real teacher. On the other hand, it
must not be forgotten that the best teacher can realize the
highest possibilities only through effective organization, that
is, organization well adapted to the realization of the aims
for which the school exists.
The pupil- teacher-con tact which is possible in education to
a higher degree than anywhere else, is the most important
point of contact between the school and the pupil. It is
the recitation which provides the best opportunity for develop-
ing this relationship, unless it he on the playground. But
with the older pupils the playground does not afford as good
an opportunity for the development of the proper relationship
between pupil and teacher as does the recitation. The recita-
tion has always been regarded, and must always be regarded,
258
The Teacher and the Recitation
259
as a very important factor in the realization of whatever aims
the school strives for. Professor Palmer speaks to the point
when he says, "So conditional on morality is the process of
knowing, so inwrought is it in the very structure of the school,
that a school might well be called an ethical instrument and
its daily sessions hours for the manufacture of character."
(Palmer: Moral Inst, in the Schools, p. 2g) But it must
not be forgotten that the most important factor in the recita-
tion viewed from one side, is the teacher herself. The teacher
with her broader experience and more completely developed
self, should he in a position to understand the pupil and his
needs better than he understands himself, and this understand-
ing should lead to a greater interest, sympathy, and apprecia-
tion of the child and his point of view. The most important
obligation which rests upon the teacher as a factor in the edu-
cational process is to assist pupils to find themselves, to help
them find out their own deeper purposes in life. It is only
through such discovery that the pupil's real native capacities-
and abilities may be developed, and consequently his larger
self realized. There is no obligation that rests upon the
teacher greater than that of helping the pupil to make this
self discovery. In fact all of the organizations, machinery,
and recitations of the school system are as means to this aim
which we have defined as the highest aim of every individual
life. Professor Ladd, I take it, means the same thing when
he says, ". . . . the culminating function of the professional
teacher is the making of a person, or self". (Teacher's Phil-
osophy, p. 134)
The teacher must not only view the child from her own
larger experience which enables her to see his capacities and
powers, but she must realize fully that it is her primary func-
tion to help the child to see these possibilities for himself. The
teacher cannot always determine the capabilities of the child.
This must be determined by the interests and purposes of the
child as manifested through his activities in school life. The
things to which he gives his attention are those things which
more than likely will aid most in his process of self-realization.
It is the business of the teacher to make these discoveries as
to the pupil's chief interests and then help the pupil to realize
them himself. In its best sense this is what we mean by
26o TAf Philmnphiail Bmis of Edurathn
individiiiil reaction to experience of the school life. The
teacher must help the child to find the center of his own in-
terests and purposes in life, and from this aspect to view all
of life's Mperience.
1 am not advocating over-specialization, or premature spe-
cialization, but 1 do urge that every individual be led through
the influence of the teacher and the process of education gen-
erally to find his central interest in life, and once he has found
this interest the teacher must help the individual to view life
as a whole from this angle. In no other way is connected
and related experience possible. We have seen already that
life has no value except in its relation to our will and pur-
pose as the center and ultimate reality of life and the uni-
verse, and we must not forget this broader truth when we step
into the practical H'ork of the class-room. The teacher can
never afford to give up her primary function in life, that is
helping immature beings to find their own deeper wills and
purposes, in other words to find the things in life in which
they have the greatest interests, and through these interests to
assist the individual in realizing the larger values which are
over-individual and ideal, and hence universal in their nature.
The highest degree of self-realization is possible not until we
have reached these superior heights of ideal values. We have
only begun the process of self-realization so far as the pupil
is concerned when we have helped him to find his purpose in
life. We must go on and help him to see how the larger and
more ideal values of life are to be attained through the ex-
pression of this individual interest.
It is the function of school supervision to keep constantly
in mind the relation between aims and means and to keep the
whole system of education moving in the direction of the
proper ideal of life. It is the business of the class-room
teacher to take part in this great process, and upon her rests
the responsibility of immediately assisting the child toward
this highest degree of self-realization, through the wider ex-
perience of the school and the influence of the teacher and
pupils.
2 The Recitation As a Factor In the Educational
Process. We have noted already the importance of the
The Teacher and the Recitation
261
possible
of the race. It 1
I to the present.
[recitation as a factor in the educational process. We must j
suggest that it is in the recitation that the teacher realizes
I large degree her chief function as a teacher. It is here
that the teacher brings together the aims of education, and
the means through her own activity as a teacher, and it is also
[ in the recitation that the teacher has the best opportunity
, through the self-expression of the individual pupils to help
I them find their own interests and purposes in life. The recita-
• tion also aflords an opportunity for interchange of ideas, and
for discussion which make it possible to see our own purposes
more clearly and to define our deeper relationship to the world
in which we live.
Through the subjects offered in the program of study it is
' at a broader conception of the experience
5 possible to see the failures and successes of
nd to see what contributions they have made
We are thus able to get a larger view of
\ the universe, and through this perspective to see our own rela-
L tions to it more clearly, and this aids to a very large degree
' I the determination of our own purpose in the world. It is
I the recitation that these facts and these larger views arc
f brought to light through discussion. I am led to say that the
V primary function of the recitation as a factor in the educa-
I tional process is to provide an opportunity for the free ex-
l pression of the individual opinion, and for the mutual dis-
Icussion of topics that have a common interest. It is through
ich free expressions and discussion that we come into posses-
sion of our own better self. The recitation carried on in
this fashion will not stop with a mere consideration of the 1
facts and laws of our experience, but it will go on to a con- '
sideration of their meaning.
If the recitation stops short of bringing the pupil into a
and more sympathetic relation with his environments
[ and the world in which he lives, it has missed its real purpose.
1 It seems to me to be really pathetic, when I observe a
[ teacher who seems to have as her highest aim in the recita-
I tion that of imparting certain knowledge of facts and laws
> of our experience. We have noticed already that this casual
lyiew of the world is essential, but it is only a means to an
tend and must not be substituted for the end itself. We
362 The Philosophical Basis of Education
should not stop with the knowledge of facts and laws, but
show their meaning and siEnifitance for life. This is the only
way that we can make our recitation work have real signifi-
cance. Facts in themselves, and the laws governing these facts,
do not have any meaning for life except in so far as they are
viewed in the light of life as a whole. But it is so easy to
forget this when you get into the class-room. Often we con-
gratulate ourselves on the fact that our pupils have learned
much from certain books, not stopping to ask ourselves whether
or not they see the relation of these facts for life, or whether
the knowledge so derived leads the pupil to heights from which
he can see his own relation to life, in other words to attain
the ideal of self-realization.
We must sooner or later get over this pernicious habit of
substituting means for ends, and it is in the hope that such
distinction may he made clearer that this volume has been
written. There is no real excuse for such confusion. The
knowledge of facts can never be substituted for the real aim
of education. It is often so substituted for the very reason
that some end or other must be striven for and if our insight
is not sufficiently penetrating to see the real aim of life wc
substitute for this real aim an artificial one. That is, we
substitute a means for the end and reap the disaster which
inevitably follows unclear thinking. The future of our educa-
tional experience H'ill bring to light more clearly the folly
of such confusion and it will point to a new day when a
dearer vision will eliminate all such confusion. Then, and
not until then, the aims and means will find their respective
places as whole and part in the universal process of life.
3 Education Through Directed Spontaneous Activ-
ity, We have suggested the importance of the teacher and of
the recitation in the educational process. It must now be em-
phasized that the only way through which the recitation may
serve as a valuable means to self-realization is through that
of self-activity. Every child is endowed with certain inter-
ests and instinrts which motivate his being. It is the business
of the teacher to discover these spontaneous activities and give
them shape and guidance. Self-activity alone will not reach
the aim of life. There is no assurance that self-activity or
~ The Teacher and the Recitation 263
unguided play will even assist the individual toward his high-
est self-realization. On the other hand his immaturity points
to a certain deficiency in his nature and suggests the necessity
for supplementing this deficiency by the larger aid of the larger
experience of the teacher. If the individual is ever to realize
his ideal through activity or play, it will not be through free
or undirected play. The activity of the individual must always
be directed toward a definite goal. It is not by activity or play,
but directed activity through play that the child will attain
his ideal. We have already gone too far in the matter of
free and unrestricted play of children. We do not want
hampered activity to be sure, but vi*e do want the activity
of the child to be so directed and governed that his possibili-
ties of self-realization will increase thraugh the exercise of
this part of his nature. I believe that Montessorism has al-
ready done or will do an important service for education.
I do not believe that this service is in the direction that a
great host of people seem to think. On the other hand I
believe that this pedagogical doctrine will point to the folly of
undirected play. We must guide the child, and the only ex-
cuse for such guidance is the fact that he is not able himself
to take charge of bis own direction. Now it is not only with
the younger children that this statement applies. Some who
are beyond the age we call children are still in need of this
help and direction. Without it the possibilities that the
individual will find his true purpose in life, his larger self,
will be greatly decreased.
Impression and Expression, The teacher and the
Bcitation will perform their service as factors in the educa-
lal process only when we take account of the important
principle that such direction and guidance as has been sug-
gested above is regarded as absolutely essential to the end
that the individual may find himself.
The fundamental point in method is that the child be
given an opportunity to express his own interests. Much
harm has been done by forcing children to conform to certain
cramped methods of speech and certain restricted modes of
I expression. We must get away from all this nonsense and
jittempt to find out what the child's own real interest in life
mt
264 The riiilosophirnl Basis of Education
is, and allow him to exen-ise this interest in his own way. As
teachers we cannot assist pupils to find their own purpose until
their interests are discovered through individual initiative. The
child must first express himself before his own interests and
purposes can be determined, and such interests must be de-
termined before any high degree of self-realization is pos-
sible, for self-realization is possible only through the develop-
ment of the individual's own inner purpose or interests in life.
In our school work impression and expression must go to-
gether. There has been too much impression and too little
expression in the past, with the result that the impressions
have not been as lasting as they should have been, or at least
have not contributed as much as they should in the develop-
ment of the individual's own interests and will. When once
we have found the child's interests we must assist him to free
and unrestrained activity in the realization of the ideal values,
which realization is possible only in so far as we take account
of these individual interests. Instead of making the chief
methods of the recitation that of impression, it would be better
if we would reverse the process and give more attention to ex-
pression, for it is only through expression that the child can
be led to find himself. This is our only source of help in
finding out the real interests of the child. If he never said
anything or did anything in life, how could we find out his
purpose ? It is not true that the child is to be seen and
not heard. On the contrary we must see and hear much of
him if we are to stand as his guide and teacher in life.
It is not to be inferred from the foregoing that there is
no limit to the amount of help that the teacher should give
the pupil. On the contrary there is grave danger lest too
much help of the wrong kind be given, and that the will of
the child he left flabby and incapable of self-direction. As we
have noted, this self-direction is indispensable to a high degree
of self-realization. There is no better way of developing
self-control and initiative than through that of affording ample
opportunity for self-expression. And this is desirable, for with-
out it the child cannot be led toward the highest ideal of edu-
cation which is the realization of the highest values of life.
Impression and expression arc not different processes, but
rather they are the opposite aspects of a larger process of the
The Teacher and the Recitation
26s
recitation. It would be dangerous to separate the two. They
are complementary processes and must never be isolated any
more than the logical methods of analysis and synthetics should
be separated. The child learns by doing, for in so doing he
is given an opportunity to express himself. The inner and
the outer world of the child must not be separated, but rather
they must evolve together. A child is bound to get a false
notion of the universe as soon as he is led to make too sharp
a distinction between himself and the world about him. On
the other hand it is through the exercise of himself in his rela-
tions to this environment, to the universe of which he is a part,
that there evolves in his mind a higher conception of his rela-
tion to the universe as a part of the organic whole.
All the immediate aims of the class recitation must allow
for free and full expression of the pupil. In our teaching of
. new facts we must offer an opportunity for reaction on the
t part of the pupil, and it is only through such reaction that we
\ perceive the relation of these facts to the larger world of ex-
I perience. In our testing and drilling as well as our teaching,
■ we must offer freer opportunity for the expression of indi-
vidual initiative. We have noted already that we are different
by nature and surroundings, and these individual differences
always be taken account of in the attempt to realize the
special aims of the class-room which have been designated as
teaching, testing, and drilling. We must harmonize our con-
I ccption of all of these aims in their relation with the ultimate
aims of self-realization. Teaching is not merely the cramming
of facts; it is rather the conception of the relation of the
individual facts to the larger stock of knowledge which the
pupil already possesses.
The Doctrine of Interest and Appercepteon. In
the section above we have suggested the importance of the
knowledge which the pupil already has. This is another way
of stating what the psychologist means when he says that in
teaching we must always bear in mind the law of appercep-
tion. We cannot teach new facts unless we show their rela-
tion to the old, and this relation can be perceived only
far as the new facts can be interpreted in the light of what
: child alreadv knows and understands, as a result of hi!
i
[
266
The Philosoplikal Basis of Educatio
interaction with his environment, through the free expression
of his own individual it}'.
The doctrine of interest is essential in the process of teach-
ing. It is not possible for us to teach a child new facts unless
he take account of what he knows already; in other words,
unless we recognize the law of apperception. Neither is it pos-
sible for us to teach the child new knowledge unless wc take
account of the laws of interest. The child is interested in
that which relates to his own experience. If we take proper
account of the law of apperception, there will be little diffi-
culty in the matter of arousing interest in the subject matter
presented to the pupil, or in the enlargement of his experience
and the deepening of his insight into the real values of life.
The child is interested not in the isolated fragments of life,
but rather in those which relate to his own personality and
experience. If wc can succeed in arousing interest in the child,
and our only possibility of doing so is to take account of
the laws of apperception, then we need not fear as to the
result of our teaching. On the other hand, if we disregard
the laws of interest, the child does not properly react; that
is, he does not give his attention and the result is a loss of
time and energy and the failure to place the facts of ex-
perience before the child in such a way as to make them service-
able in perceiving more clearly his relations to the world in
which he finds himself.
There is always the danger that an unwise teacher will push
the matter of interest in the direction of purely temporary
desires. Professor Miinsterberg remarks to the point ^hen
he says, "The school methods which appeal always to the
neutral desire and the involuntary attention and interest do
not train the pupil in overcoming desires and in controlling
attention; they please instead of commending; they teach one
to follow the path of least resistance instead of the path of
duty and the ideal." {Piy. and Teacher, p. 77) Professor
Ladd says we have gone too far in the direction of making
school instruction "attractive and easy for instructing those
undergoing the process of education." (Teacher's Practical
Phil., p. 78)
6 The Problem
Discipline. The problem
The Teacher and the Recitation 267
discipline vanishes as soon as we take account of the law of |
interest. We are not likely to be troubled with a child i
has been led to the foundation of knowledge and who there
drinks with interest the experiences of a larger life. On the
other hand, if the child is not interested in the work that he
is doing, he is bound to be troublesome. Where there is no
interest there is no center or focus of attention, no abiding
purpose, and the result is distraction of attention with the
consequent troubles that we call problems of disdpline. It
was left to Herbart to point out to the world that the problem
of discipline decreases in direct proportion as interest is
awakened in the subject matter of instruction, and in the
school life as a whole. The great criminals in the world are
not those who have held clearly in mind the meaning of hfc
and their significant relation to it. On the contrary, they
have ignored just these es.?ential relations which the ideal of
self-realization places on the foreground, and have regarded
themselves for the moment of their misdeed as separated or
isolated parts of the larger life of which they are only a part.
Briggs says, "Once get a deep, high loyalty, and the problem
of discipline is gone." {Routine and Ideals, p. 179.)
We will not be able to awaken a deep interest in the child
unless we have found the center or core of interests in his
life. Having found this center of his life, it will be possible
then to relate the facts of experience to his own life in such
a way as to cause them to take on greater significance by
showing to the individual his larger relation to his fellow men,
and the world at large. There would be much less criminality
in the world if the schools that have exerted an influence on
the younger lives of these perpetrators had succeeded in help-
ing them to find their place in life, through the expression
of their own individuality. We seem to recognize this fact
in modern society, but the trouble is we do it too late. After
the individual has committed his crime, we confine him to an
institution which provides a variety of trade and industrial
work, and there we assist him to find himself and thus enable
him through some work of life to make a living, with the result
that many times criminals are cured of their evil propensities
I
I
I
I
I through this means of treatment, or I should say, education, ^^^fl
Why do we not do this in the schools before the evil days ^^^|
so, we 1
268 The Pkil>,s;pl,kal Bnsis uj Education
have come upon these unfortunates? If we would do
would greatly reduce the number of commitments to thi
institutions for detinquents. But we are getting wiser, and
no doubt we shall in the near future see our mistakes and
rapidly make amends for them.
7 Connected Thought and Class Method. There
is another matter to which we must call attention at this
point. The child will never be able to live a consistent and
well organized life unless his thoughts have also been organ-
ized; unless he is taught to organize and systematize his
thinking in accordance with the fundamental principles of
logical thought, the child will not be able after leaving school
to think either very consistently or very deeply. He will,
therefore, be deprived of one of the absolutely essential con-
ditions of his own highest self-realization,— that of dear, con-
sistent, logical thinking. It is, therefore, as important that
the pupil's work shall be guided by a "fusing principle" {cf
p. 141 ) as it is that the teacher he guided by such a principle.
Professor Adler well says that "To strengthen the will, there-
fore, it is necessary to give to the person of weak will, the
power to think connectedly, and especially to reach an end
by long and complex trains of ideas." {Moral Tnslniction
of Children, p. 260)
The habits that are developed in the child in his school
work will follow him through life, as a general rule. The
habit of unclear thinking is one of the habits that handicap
an individual, and make the highest degree of his self-realiza-
tion impossible. We must, then, exert ourselves to see that
the methods which we employ in our classes, and all the work
of the school, lead to the development of habits that are con-
ducive to clear and logical thinking. A muddled or cloudy
brain is not an instrument through which an individual is
likely to realize the ideal values of life, or the .best interests
even of his narrower self. If we take away from the world
the power of clear thinking, we deprive it of the essential
condition of human progress or development, which is pos-
sible through individual self -development.
All the work of the teacher, the recitation, and of the
school as a whole, must promote in the highest possible degree
The Tea
ind the Recitation
369 I
I this ideal of clear thinking. This is one of the immediate I
i of the school. In this connection it must be said that
[ such dear and consistent thinking is not possible, except ;
I it goes on in a being whose body is also properly functioning,
or organically related throughout its parts. Clear thinking
I and healthy bodies naturally go together. It is impossible for
dividual to realize to the highest degree the capacity
I for clear thinking unless his body is kept well and healthy.
I It is, therefore, not only consistent with the idealistic concep-
I tion of self-realization as the ultimate aim of education that
I we have a healthy body and a clear mind, but it is made one ,
[ of the absolute conditions upon which the realization of such
^ an ideal is possible.
Organization of Interests. We have seen from the j
I foregoing that it is not possible for the pupil to realize his '
I largest self unless the various factors of the school all co-
I operate to the end that his interests in life be organized
I around some definite purpose. The greatest thing that the
school can do for the pupil is to help him find this central
interest in life which will enable him to relate all about It.
The most valuable asset to the development of a strong and
noble character is that of a definite purpose or interest in
It is through the relation of all interests to this central
I purpose and the final relation of all of these interests of life
to the ideal values of life as a whole, that self-realization is
made possible and real. Professor Royce well says that "An
apliclt personality is one which shows itself through deeds
j that embody a coherent ideal." {ffilliam James, etc., p. '
I 390) I
Much of the work in the school of to-day is of such a na-
J ture as to prevent the development of personality instead of
j promoting it. The work is so disorganized and the school
an organization is so incomplete, that it is practically im-
isible for the pupil to succeed in the development of a
i definite line of interests. We have always noted that it is
impossible for a person to develop a definite purpose in life
I unless conditions are such as to aid in the development of con- j
L sis tent logical thinking. Our class methods must he of such
f a character as to promote this connected way of thinking. I
I
270 Thr i'hilnsophifal Basis of Education
We must teach in such a way that we take account of the
law of apperception, always relating the work of the class to
the pupils' interest. We must change from the logical pro-
cedure of the past to the psychological. Up to the present
time we have been concerned mainly in the logical de\-eIop-
ment of subject matter, rather than with the relation of the
subject matter to the interests and needs of the child.
9 The Unity of Personality Through Self-Rbali-
ZATioN. It is through the organization of the sdiool, the
teacher, .recitation and the program of studies, as well as the
other activities of the school, that the pupil is led to And his
interests in life, and once having found these interests, the
factors must co-operate to the end that the pupil be developed
to the highest possible degree through their influence. One
who thinks clearly and connectedly also will have a definite
organization of life's interest and purposes. It is through such
consistent thinking that the unity of personality is made pos-
sible, and our aim should be to strive always for such self-
realization, the organization of our own deeper purposes.
ID Summary. In this chapter we have shown the vari-
ous factors that must co-operate in the development of the
personality of the pupil. The teacher, the recitation, the
program of studies, all must co-operate to the end that the
child be discovered in his real nature. Having been dis-
covered, it is the aim of the school to assist his largest and
most complete sc! (-development. Through directed span-
taneous activity and the freedom of expression, the child is
led naturally to discover his own possibilities, and once hav-
ing discovered these, it is the business of the various factors
of the school to help the child in the larger self-realization.
We cannot succeed in awakening the child's interest unless
we take account of the laws of interest and apperception. If
we relate the experience of the race to the experience of the
child in such a way that it becomes meaningful to him through
his own self-expression and activity, he will appropriate this
larger experience as part of his own rightful inheritance, and
through the aid of this larger view of life he is brought to a
higher degree of self-realization. The problem of discipline
The Teacher and the Recitation 271
vanishes as soon as we find the true interests of the child.
We must not forget these points in our actual experience.
We must remember that our aim is the unity of personality
through self-expression directed toward the ideal of life.
Through such directed activity the child may be led to a
larger appreciation of life, and to appropriate as the most
significant part of his experience the ideal values of life, and
through loyal devotion to those ideals the pupil may attain the
highest aim of life, — that of self-realization.
In our efforts to realize this ideal, we will often make great
mistakes, but we must not grow discouraged but loyally
struggle on. Phillips Brooks saw well the meaning and worth
of such loyalty to our ideal when he said, "It seems to me
there is no maxim for a noble life like this: Count always
your highest moments, your truest moments. Believe that
in the time when you were the greatest and most spiritual
man, then you were your truest self."
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
I Summary, We have come now to the point when we
must briefly summarize the result up to the present time, and
make a few suggestions as to the future outlook for educa-
tional theory and practice. We have come to see that educa-
tional theory cannot be separated from a wider theory of
life. Viewing the matter of education from the aspect of
purpose, meaning, and value, we are concerned with the
broader philosophy of human experience. When we view it
from the angle of the connections of the various parts of our
experience in an external way, we are concerned with the
scientific aspects of education. Philosophy is concerned with
the meaning and value of our educational experience, with
our aims and purposes. Science is concerned with the means
and methods whereby we realize these aims.
We can look at education from various philosophical aspects.
From the metaphysical point of view, we regard our educa-
tional experience in its wider relation to reality as a whole.
From the epistemo logical point of view, we are concerned with
the nature and limit of knowledge. From the logical point of
view we are concerned with the ultimate standards of truth, or
with the wider truth relations of our educational experience.
From the lesthetic point of view we arc concerned with educa-
tion in its relations to the ideal of beauty. From the ethical
point of view, we consider education in its relation to the ideal
of goodness, or the highest aim in life. From the religious
point of view, we are concerned with education not as a time
and space process merely, but in its wider connections with time
and space. Thus we see that education cannot be separated
from the wider theory of life as a whole. It is intimately
bound up with the normative and the descriptive sciences.
From the descriptive point of view, we are concerned w;ilJ
273
Conclusion 373
the various means and methods to be employed in the service
of the ideal values of life. We have spoken of these means
as being contributed by the various descriptive sciences —
psychology, biology, sociology, economics, and others. These
sciences all contribute knowledge or information without which
it would be impossible to realize in the highest degree the aim
of education. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that
philosophy and science are not in necessary conflict, but on
the other hand, they are complementary aspects of life as a
whole, philosophy offering us the aims and purposes of life,
while the descriptive sciences give us the means through which
they are to be obtained. We concluded that self-realization
is the aim and chief motive of our life in its deepest will
aspects, and that a knowledge of these sciences is necessary to
the end that self-realization be made possible through the
service of the ideal values of truth, beauty, goodness, and re-
ligion. We concluded also that these ideal values are to be
I realized by each individual in his own way.
2 Educational Readjustment. We have expressed
the notion that the distinctions here mentioned between aims
and means in education, or between the normative and de-
scriptive sciences, are not always kept clearly in mind, and
hence confusion arises in our modern pedagogy. We have
suggested that the only way to clear up this conflict is through
clear pliilosophical thinking.
Our educational system to-day is in need of re-organization,
in order that we may take account of the best that has been
developed through our philosophical reflection and our scien-
tific discoveries. It is not an uncommon thing to find aims
and means warring with each other, or to find several aims
working at cross- purposes, nr to find means and methods un-
wisely chosen and ill-adapted to the service of any aim, for
the reason that these aims are not clearly held in mind.
3 Philosophy and Science as a Basis for Educa-
tional Theory and Practice. This reorganization which
we have suggested as desirable and necessary, must come about
through regarding education as a part of the larger experience
of life as a whole. The only way to remove education from
I
274 The Philoiophkal Basis of Educatl
the basis of common sense theory, upon which it too largely
rests at the present time, is to consider our educational ex-
perience in the h'ght of the larger view of life, and on the basis
of sudi reflection determine our aim or purpose. Once we
have gone so far as to establish an aim of education consistent
with the view of life as a whole, it will be possible for us to
call upon the various descriptive scientists in order to ascertain
all the knowledge which they possess, and to use this in the
service or realization of the ideal values of life. Everywhere
the "large underlying problem Is the same, — how to make the
great new industrial and commercial forces the servants and
not the masters of society." {World's fVork, Sept., igii, p.
"479 )
I believe that there are signs of a better day in education.
I think the people are coming to see the folly of relying upon
the descriptive sciences alone to give us the meaning and value
of life. We have learned already that such a thing is not
possible through the descriptive sciences.
4 Edijcational Guidance. We have seen that the chief
business of the school is that of helping the pupil to find him-
self, this being the necessary starting point for the most com-
plete realization of himself in the process of education. Too
little has been done in the past to help the individual to iina
himself, and consequently the school often has been an in-
effective instrument in helping the pupil to realize his truf
purpose in life. In the future the development of our re-
flective thinking will show us the folly of such a procedure. I
believe the day is not far off when philosophy will con-
tribute to the end that we regard the development of the
child's own interests in life as the highest service which the
school can render him, and to this end the descriptive sciences
will be of great service. We will regard vocational guidance
as a practical necessity and this as a result of our philosophical
conception of the worth of the individual, and of the necessity
of helping him to find his real meaning and purpose in life.
5 Organization and Efficiency. Another matter
which future development will no doubt bring about is that
of Increased emphasis to be laid on the side of organization.
Conclusion 2f$
In the past, we have overemphasized the necessity of having
great personalities at the head of our educational system to
the neglect of the very important matter of scientific organ-
izatinn. I believe with Frederick Taylor, one of our great-
est engineering experts, that the future development in the
world at large for some time to come will hinge largely on
the importance we attach to the factor of organization. It
is impossible for a person to realize his largest possibilities
as an individual unless the organization in which he finds
himself contributes to this end also. Ineffective organization
means the failure to adapt means to ends. In the future we
will not find excuses for poor organization, just because wc
think we have an important personality at the head of our
school system. We must always stress personality, for it is
the most valuable thing in all the world, but we must not
forget the important fact that the more ideal values and pur-
poses of our life are not attainable unless we select the means
which are appropriate for the realization of these ends.
The Schools of To-morrow. In the schools of to-
' morrow we shall see an effective organization composed of
the factors of teacher, pupil, parent, program of study, organ-
ized activities, and all other factors contributing to the larger
organizations of the school, co-operating as a unit for the
realization of the more ideal values of life, which are to be
seen through clearer reflective thought. The teachers in the
schools of to-morrow will be better prepared for their work,
I They will have both a clearer vision of the worthy aims and
purposes of life, and a better scientific equipment as the neces-
sary means for the realization of these ideal values of life.
Up to the present we have left out many worthy interests
in education are bound to assert themselves in due time and
make reorganization necessary. Professor R, B. Perry says
truly that, "Interests left out of account inevitably will
assert themselves, and through their steady pressure or violent
impact destroy the organization which has excluded them.
Hence the need of an order that shall provide for its own
gradual correction, stable enough for security, and pliant
enough to yield without shock to the claims of neglected (
abused interests," (The Moral Economy, p. 164)
I
r
I
276 The Philosophical Basis of Education
The most vital interest that has been left out of account is
that of the individual himself, hut the signs of the times point
to a better day. Professor Vliinsterberg says that. "The signs
are clear indeed that the days of idealistic philosophy, and
of art, and of religion, are approaching; that the world is
tired of merely connecting facts without asking what their
ultimate meaning is. The world feels again that technical
civib'zation alone cannot make life more worth living. The
aim of the last generation was to explain the world; the aim
of the next generation will be to interpret the world; the
one was seeking laws, the other will seek ideals." (Fsycho-
therapy, p. 3.)
Idealism must come to the rescue of the schools, or rather
the individual. It always has exerted a great influence, but
it will do a yet greater service for the future. Professor Home
asserts the same truth, when he says "Education is the pur-
poseful providing of an environment ; at bottom it is person-
ality in and behind the environment that counts most; so edu-
cating is really a relation between personalities of different
degrees of maturity,
"If these views are correct, it is evident that idealism is
the true philosophy in educating. The relation between
teachers and pupils, being personal and reciprocal, is some-
thing more than materialism either can allow or explain, than
commercialism of trade can understand, than any form of
egoism can attain." {Idealism in Education, Preface, p.
VIII)
Let us hope that the future will not lose sight of the in-
dividual in the confusion of aims, and means, but rather let
us hope that a clear vision is near at hand, and that it will
aid in clearing up the present confusion of aims and means
in education and restore to the individual his own rights, as de-
fined by his relation to the universal experience, and made
possible through his own self-realization as determined by
the degree to which he has made the absolute values his own.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SCIENCE
I General Works on Science
Cooley, Principles of Science.
Jevons, Principles of Science.
Pearson, Grammar of Science.
Poincarc, The Value of Science.
II The Scientific Aspect of Education
A THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF EDUCATION
Jones, Groiir As Education.
Tyler, Grou/lh and Education.
O'Shca, Education As Adjustment.
Halleck, Education of the Central Nervous System.
Donaldson, Growth of the Brain.
B PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF EDUCATION
De Garmo, Interest in Education.
Home, Psychological Aspects of Education.
Rusk, Introduction lo Experimental Education. ^^
Thorndyke, Educational Psychology/ (Briefer Courfe-)'^
Harris, Psychological Foundations of Educatmn^-
Baldwin, Psychology Applied to the Arf*f^eachinff.
Thorndyke, Principles of Teaching.
Claparede, Experimental Pedagogy.
Langc, Apperception.
'T»
Bibliography
Miller, The Piychohgy of Thinking.
Meumen, The Piychology of Learning.
Ross, Sodal Psychology.
Magnussen, Pifchology Applied /» Education.
Judd. Genetic Psychology for Teacher.
Judd, The Psychology of High School Subjects.
Winch. Children's Perceptions.
Welton, The Psychology of Education.
King, Rational Living.
CompajTC, Intellectual and Moral Development of Chil^
Le Bon, The Crowd.
Titchener, Psychology of Thought Process.
James, Talis to Teachers.
Titchener, Psychology of Feeling and Attention,
Arnold, Attention and Interest.
McKcever, Psychology and Higher Life.
Swift, Mind in the Mating.
Keatinge, Suggestion in Education.
Morgan, Psychology for Teachers.
Darroch, Psychology and Common Life.
Jacoby, Child Training as Science.
Preycr, The Infant Mind.
Hall, Aspects of Child Life and Education.
King. The Psychology of Child Development.
Miinsterberg, Psychology and the Teacher (Part II).
Phillips, Elementary Psychology.
C SOCIOLOGICAL
OF EDUCATION
Scott, Socinl Education.
King, Social Aspects of Education.
Dutton, Social Phases of Education.
King, Education for Social Efficiency.
O'Shea, Social Development and Education.
D GENERAL SClE^fTIFIC PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 1
Bain, Education as Science.
Boone, Science of Education.
Bolton, Principles of Education.
I
BibUography
Henderson, Tfxt-Boak in thf Principles of Education
Klapper, Principles of Educational Practice.
Ruediger, The Principles of Education.
McMurray, Confiicting Principles in Teaching.
Hall, Youth, Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene.
Gesell, The Normal Child and Primary Education.
Greenwood, Principles of Education.
Jones, Principles of Education.
Johnnost, Principles and Practice of Teaching.
Raymont, Principles of Education.
Colvin, The Learning Process.
PART 11
PHILOSOPHY
I Historical Aspects
Alexander, B. D., A Short History of Philosophy.
Bakewell, Source Book in Ave. Phil.
Been, The Greek Philosophers.
Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy.
Dickenson, The Greek View of Life.
Diogenes Laertius, Eminent Philosophers.
Erdmann, History of Philosophy.
Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of Greece.
Gomperz, Greek Thinkers.
Windelband, A History of Philosophy.
Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato.
Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus.
Rogers, J Student's History of Philosophy.
Watson, The Philosophy of Kant.
Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained.
Weber, History of Philosophy.
Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greet Philosophy.
II Introduction to Philosophy
Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.
Bowne. The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.
iSo
BibVuigraphy
Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
Calkins, The Persisltnl Problems of Philosophy.
Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy.
Hoffding, The Problems of Philosophy.
Hudson, To the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.
Hume, Treatise of Human Nature.
Watson, An Outline of Philosophy.
Uberweg, History of Philosophy.
Rogers, A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy.
Stuclcenhcrg, Introduction to the Study of Philosophy.
Robertson, Elements of General Philosophy.
Rand, Modern Classical Philosophies.
Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies.
Perry, Approach to Philosophy. ^
Paulsen, Introdurtion to Philosophy.
Kulpe, Introduction to Philosophy.
Knightbridge, Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations.
PART III
(See Reference List to Part I and Part II)
PART IV
RELATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION
I Metaphysics
Bowne, Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles,
Bradley, Appearance and Reality.
Deussen, The Elements of Metaphysics.
Fullerton, A System of Metaphysics.
Johnson, ff^hat Is Reality?
Lindsay, The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysi<
Mackenzie, Outlines of Metaphysics.
Read, The Metaphysics of Nature.
Royce, The World and the Individual.
Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics.
I
II EpISTEMOLOGY
Alexander, Foundations of Knowledge.
Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from
con to Aristotle.
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge.
Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge.
Ward, Epistemology, or The Theory of Knowledge.
Ill Logic
Atkins, Principles of Logic.
Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic.
Creighton, An Introductory Logic.
Creighton, Knowledge and Practice.
Hibben, Logic: Deductive and Inductive.
Jevons, Elements of Logic.
Lotze, Outlines of Logic.
Mill, System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive.
Russell, An Elementary Logic.
Ryland, Logic.
Wellon, Logical Bases of Education.
VVhitby, Logic of Human Character.
IV Religious Aspects of Phii^sophy
Bowne, Philosophy of Theism.
Crocker, Christianity and Greek Thought.
Dickinson, Religion and Immortality.
Hatch, The Influences of Greek Ideas and Usages Upon the \
Christian Church.
Royce, Religious Aspects of Philosophy.
Bowne, The Essence of Religion.
V J^STHETICS
Bosanquet, History of Mstketics.
Caffin, Art for Life's Sake.
Griggs, The Philosophy of /irt^ the Meaning and Relatiom I
of Sculpture, Painting, Poetry and Music.
ato liibliography
Hogart. The Analysu of Beauty.
Lotite. Outlines of Esthetics.
Milnsterberg, Art Education.
Pufier. Psychology of Beauty.
Raymond, Fundamentals in Education,
Santayatia, The Sense of Beauty.
VI Ethics
(Sm Reference List to Part V)
VII Pragmatism
Bcrgson, Creative Evolution.
Schiller, Humanism: Phil. Essays.
Bergson, Matter and Memory.
Bergson, Time and Free IVill.
Bowden, The Principles of Pragmatism.
Herbert, Le Pragmatisme et ses diverses formes angla-Ameri-
caines.
James, A Pluralistic Universe.
James, The Meaning of Truth.
James, Pragmatism.
Mackenzie, Lectures on Humanism.
Pratt, ffhal Is Pragmatiimf
Schiller, Studies in Humanism.
PART V
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION
I Ethics
Adler, The Moral Ideal.
Adler, The Relations of the Moral Ideal to Reality.
Albee, History of English Utilitarianism.
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of .Morals and
Legislation.
Bownc, Principles of Ethics.
Caird, The Theory of Ethics.
Bibliography 283
D'Arcy, A Short Study of Ethics.
MacCunn, The Making of Character,
Macpherson, Spencer and Spencerism.
Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory.
Mezes, Ethics: Description and Explanatory.
Mill, Utilitarianism.
Paulsen, A System of Ethics.
Peabody, Approach to the Social Question.
Ritchie, Natural Rights.
Royce, Herbert Spencer: Estimate and Review.
Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty.
Ryland, Ethics.
Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics.
Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics.
Sidgwick, Practical Ethics.
Spencer, Data of Ethics.
Spencer, The Principle of Ethics.
Spinoza, The Ethics of Spinoza.
Welldon, The Necomachean Ethics of Aristotle.
Wundt, Ethics.
II Ethical Aspects of Education
Rosenkranz, Philosophy of Education.
Butler, The Meaning of Education.
Bagley, Educational Values.
Home, Idealism in Education.
Home, Philosophy of Education.
Fleshman, The Educational Process.
Miinsterberg, Psychology and the Teacher (Part I).
Hyde, The Five Great Philosophies of Life.
Hyde, The Teachers' Practical Philosophy.
Kurchensteiner, Education for Citizenship.
Brown, Educational Theories.
Monroe, The Educational Ideal.
Griggs, Moral Education.
King, Personal and Ideal Elements in Education.
Ladd, The Teachers' Practical Philosophy.
Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty.
Wrightj Self -Realization.
284 Bibliography
III Supplementary Pedagogical References
Spencer, Education.
Plato, Education of the Young.
Rousseau, Emile.
Locke, On Education.
Adamson, Education in Plato's Republic.
Froebel, Education of Man.
Kant, Educational Theory.
Comenius, The Great Didactic.
S toner, Natural Education.
Berle, The School In the Home.
Palmer, The Teacher.
Montessori, The Montessori Method.
O'Shea, Everyday Problems in Teaching.
Perry, Problems of the Elementary School.
Seelejs Elementary Pedagogy.
Ward, Montessori Method and the American School.
Whittemore, The New Method of Education.
Ailing- Aber, An Experiment in Education.
Adams, Exposition and Illustration in Teaching.
Charters, Methods in Teaching.
Findlay, Principles of Class Teaching.
Hamilton, The Recitation.
McMurray, Methods of Recitation.
Betts, The Recitation.
INDEX OF NAMES
Adams, John. 231, 250. Ilcrbart. T. F., 267.
Adl«, Fcliit, 268. HobbhouK, L. T.. 250.
AikinB, H. A., 132. Hobbs, Thomas, 186.
AnaxaEoras, 65, 111, 114. Hoffding, Harald, 149.
Hornr. H. II.. 104. 130, 191, 376.
Bacon, Francis, H9. Hume, David, 114, 115.
Bailey, H. W„ 179. Hyde, William D., 112, 136, 166, ;
Bklwwdl. C. M., Ill, 248. 234.
BFntfaam, Jeremiab, 186.
Btrgaon, Henri. 117. James. William, 55. 96, 112, 116, 1
Belts. G. H., 225. 118, 122, 135, 136, 159, 269.
Boone, Daniel, 20, 238. Jowett. Benjamin, 108, 113.
Boaenquet, Bernard, 13S, 138. 139.
Bowne, Borden P., 99, 102, 105, 120, K"it. Emanuel, 114 IIS U7.
130. 133. 144, 149. 218, 220. S?""'^?' i"''"', ^^^'.^^
Bradley, F. H., 114. K'OS. H. C, 154. 19t, 224.
ir!>^, ^^r"Vl4l''- "'■ I-dd. G. T., 232. 247. 259, 266.
Brcoks, kniip^ 271. i:^S;'^5b^.'^-16, 119. .86.
ct^ii^l^M^B % 144 149 McLellar.. James A., 218, 228.
rorVio p.'i.i 'i7n" ' ' ' Mill, J. S., 186.
Cot GeorK 217 229 248 MacPhcrson. Hector, 115, 130.
r*nwmim« 'flfn ' ' ' Montflffus. FrofesBor, 124.
r,,.hm=n Tf F 07 iri Munslerberg, Hugo, 7, 120, 127. :
Lusbman, H. E.. 97, 113. j^g^ 179, 191, 194. 218, 221. :
Decartei, Rene, 116. ^^^ ^'*-
De^. John, 111, 112. 141. 142, 21B, p^„„_ George H., 7. 107. 108, 1
nnii r v 19(1 ^°^' ^^^- "'■
Uole, L. K,. 120. Parker T 149
nr.^f^n'''':^,,^'"'???' ■ Paal^;,, Frederick. 165.
Uullon, Samuel. 257. Peabody. F. G., 174, 184, 239.
„ . Perry. 8. B., 121, 182, 206, 275.
EmerBon, Harrington. 21. p|g,o^ gfi, 68, 106, 108, 111, 112. 1
Emetlon Ephtaiin, 144. J14 119, lai, 122, 124, 125. 1
Empedocles, 114. ,j,_ 171^ 172, 173, 174, 17B, j
Epiciiruj, 152, 186. igv, 202. 203, 252
Knatipag, 186. Plntinuit 153
Eacheu. 'Rudolph. 237. pCgora; 66, 67. 77. 207.
Ptolemy. 201.
Faguet, Emile, 97. PuBer. Ethel D., 164, 167. 168, 1
Ficbte. J. G., 250. Pythagoras. 125.
Findlay. John, 238, 252.
Fullerton, G. S„ 109, 116. Heid, Thomas. US.
_ , _ Hoge^^ A, K.. 181.
Gladstone, 72. Royce, Joaah. 6, 7, 116, 125. 2
Gorgias, 113. 214, 269.
RuskJI. Bertrand. 134.
Hamilton, Sir William. 116.
Harris WiUiam T., 20, 238. SanUyana. George, 69, 172, 177. )
Hegel, G. W, F.. 104. 219.
HeracliluB, S3, 101, 114, IIS. Shakespeare. Wm.. 237.
285
Shtpatd, Irwin, 144.
Sbehon. H. S., 1S2.
SIdgwick, Henrj W., IW, IIS. 13S.
Siuddin, DaTld, 2J7.
Sorley, W. R., 119.
Spencer, Herbert, 73, 94, 98, IIS, 116,
124, 1S6, 189.
Socritteti, 10S, 112, 113, 122, 124, 201,
202, 2*6.
StcrniKii. fi. L., IS, 22, 128, 176.
Stomemyer, J. Howard. HI, 268.
Surzalo, Henry, 336.
INDEX OF
t wni, 101-102.
Weeks, Ruth U.. 247.
WelUHi. Jamei, 13S, 14Z.
Whitehead. A. N., 238.
Wright. Henry W., 213. 233.
SUBJECTS
^■Ihctics, ai iden
of the beautiful.
iheofy, I
definition
-enst. 161; the
■ rdt of. 165;
ic^ 167: relati'
L'l68'''and
rt'hicr''lTo, T84!"prablenn oi 172;
iheorlo of, 173; and idealism, 174;
and piychology, 161.
Are. of pbilosophr, 76.
Aim. of this book, 17; of science, 27-
33; of philoiophy, 48. 53-60; of
education and life, 217; and means
of education. 217-238; of educalion
as aelf realiiallon. 229-237.
Analysis as scientific method, 40.
Appearance, la. reality. 100-101.
Appreciation, S3: the view of phiba-
ophy, S7i ai factor in recitation,
265-26S.
Art pbilosophji of, 161; philosophy
TS. psychology of, 161-164; ideal of.
164; standards of. 164-165; theories
Beauty, lesthelica the e
eational ideal, 329. '
Bibliography. 277-284-
Biologicaf Science. 36.
aaisifieation, as method of c
40.
Common Sense, end logic, 12(
philosophy of religion, 144
ssthetics. 16); and ethics. If
™5rM-B7:°of KOpe'^of^Kien
philosophy, 84: of method
science and philosophy, 85.
science, 97-98; ., _..
criticism of grounds of knowled
114; of trua. logic, 13"
lEMheticB, 161, 172; ol
_ philosophy. 145. 149.
vs. appreciation, S3 : and interpret
tlon. 8S; as view of reality, BS. J
definition, of esthetics, 160; 01
problem of. 266-267.
o^, 93-94*; pbiloiophy
cia] philosophici
con/usicn
itrasted. 197;
of, 217-238, i
normative science, 320-21U
Dws reconciled thi
in. Z32-237; prx _
of ideal of self-realkatii:
r
47; (ihiloMphT giTM meanioa of,
*S: philosophic VB. idnililic vkw
of. 54; philoiophy iceka meaaing
■nd value of, 78-99; scientific n
pbiloiophial ssptxtt of, 194-195;
■tici. 38;
!, 67; l08ical_
12S
I of.
and dew
and t
. ychology, 131; and
metaphysics. 131; and epialiniology,
132; synenn of, 133; methods of,
134-135: problems at, 135-136: and
myatidam, 137; and pragmatisni,
137: and ideah'sm. 138-139; its im-
plication! for education, 140-142:
and philoBoph; of rillsion. 148; and
TBlhetica, 168-169; truth as goal of,
Loyalty, at cxpresdon of self realiia-
I of, 2
Many, and the
93-95; VB,
194-19S.
view of life,'
48; vieos the
whole of life. 54; i
predation, 57; scope of, 61-fi2; i
of, 62; normatiye view of the »
itifie and philosophic
nd reScction, 75; age
!13 to life. 76-79; and
Metaphjsical, vie*
107.
Mrtaphyaics, as Bcl
leeks first and
epistemology, 108: and
; and philosophy of re-
; and sathetics, 167; and
43; balance of, 44; of philosophy,
71-75; of sdence and pbilosophv
compared. 71, 85; of logic, 133-13S.
f this book. 23-
cligiOQ I
of view, of this boot 17.
vism. in relation to natuntllua,
: aa theory of knowledge, 115;
gion of, 153.
ical, ETgnlticance of self r»Il»-
I aa the educational ideal
289
PractiFC, retUion to theory, 23S-240J
philosophy «od science as baaii of
educational theory and practice,
273.
Prasmatism, aa theory of knowledge,
116; and logic, 137; religion of,
155; ethics of. 189-190.
Problem, lime and ^lace, 103; mind
102; Infinite. 103; self, 104; God|
immortality and the soul, 104; of
logic, US-137; of ethics, 185; of
discipline, 266-267.
Psychology, as science, 36; relation to
epislemology. 109; and logic, 131.
Purpose, the absolute will, lOl-IOZ;
vs. facts in life, 203-204; as the
highest good or will, 207-206.
Balionalism
y of knowledge.
2'I2-24S.
RealisDi, as theory of knowledge, 116.
Readjustment, educaCioniil. 273.
Reality, the metaphysical view of ex-
perience 65; the goal of metaphys-
ics, 99; »». appearance, 100-10!; of
abeolute will, 101; of the ideal of
self realiutlon. 214.
and philosophy, ?7.
Redtillan, and the teichi
of, 263-265; interest and
appreciation in, 265-266; connected
thought in, 26B-269; as organiiation
and development of interest, 267.
, Z39-2<
n, 29, 32,
.. . -). 33, 33,
ion. 30; as applied
33, 40;
40; as f,
knowledge, 31; aim of, 27-
scope or field of. 35-39; physical,
35; biological,
36; social 37;
analy!
of. 40
iethnds"of. 40-44; obi.. _
:thad of, 40; stages of. 40;
is and synlheais a» '-^-
' ' -' d deduc
nental method, 42;
tion, 43; age of. 45; and reason. 46;
Increases facilities of life, 47; «nd
meaning, 47; relations to life. 45-
49; as panial view of life. 54; of
metaphysics. 65; of knowledge, epis-
lemalogy, 66; logic as. 67; of right
conduct, ethics. 68; of S!sthetics, the
beautiful, 69; relation of adentiSc
and phJIoBophic method, 71; and
philosophy compared, 83-87; scope
in relation to philosophy, 84; meth-
-■•- -' --' -■ -hilosophy c—
ed, 85;
1 for
nee, 46; ophy of religion, 145; and ethics,
181; as basia of educational theory
2S8-271; and practice 273.
process, Scientific, view of life, 194.
ipres»on Scope, of science. 35-39; of philos-
Eresl and ophy. 61-70; of science and philos-
ophy compared, B4.
Self, metaphymcs of, 104.
" F. 250-251.
Self R<
aocUl _-,— „
this ideal, 214; eompreheosi'
aspects. 209-213; nality of
leal. Z|- ■- ■ -
f. 231-232;
Religion, pbiloaopbical bB«s of. 69;
philosophy of, definition. 143; phi-
losophy of, 143-157; educational im-
plicalloo. 15B; and science, 145: and
meiaphysicA 146; and epistemology,
147; and logic, 148; and ethics, 148-
149; philoBOphiea of. 149; of Plal-
onism, 147; of NeoplalonW. 150;
of Epicureanism, 151; of Stoicism,
153; of Positivism, naturalism, and
materialism, 153-154; of Mysticism,
154; of Pragmatinn, 155; of Ideal-
ism. 156-157; philosophy and «s-
Ibedcs, 169-170; and ethics, 183.
self regponsibillty. 250-251; >
prises truth, beauty, f--'---
religion as ideal valncs,
unity of personality. 2
Self Responsibility. 250-2
Scepticism, as denial of t
Social. I
ual aspects of self I
rraiuation. evfiU; and individual I
vitwB of education reconciled 1
through self realisation. 232-237.
Social Sciences, history jind sociology, I
37. ■
Sociology, as social acleiue. 37.
Socrates. prc-Soc ratio ethics,
post-Socralic ethics. 201-202.
Soul, metaphysical problem, 104.
290
Index
Space, and the phenomenal world, 35,
103.
Spontaneous Acttrity, education
through, 262-263.
Stoicism, religion of, 152; ethics, 187-
188.
Supervision, function of from point
of view of ethics, 225-227.
Sjmthesis, as scientific method^ 40.
Systems, of logic, 133; of ethics, 185.
Teacher, and recitation, 258-271; as
factor in educational process, 258-
260.
Theory, relation to practice, 238-245;
as explanation of educational ex-
perience, 240-241; philosophy and
science as basis of educational the-
ory and practice, 273.
Thii^ng, relation to logic, 67; meta-
physical basis of, 96.
Thought, class recitation should de-
velop connection of, 114, 268.
Time, and the phenomenal world, 35,
103.
To-morrow, schools of, 275-276.
Truth, as aim of logic, 135; the edu-
cational ideal, 229.
Whole, ideal and real as whole and
part, 242-245.
Will, as good or purpose,. 207-208.
World, as description and apprecia-
tion, 53.
Value, of experience as aim of philos-
ophy, 78-79; of life, 205-207; the
ideal values of truth, beauty, good-
ness and religion united in id€al of
self realization, 229-230.
Viewpoints, of philosophy, 64.
Vocational, reconciliation of vocation-
al and cultural ideals, 253-254.
Voluntaristic Idealism, cardinal prin-
ciple of, 101; in relation to will or
purpose, 101-102.
Unity, of personality through self
realization, 270-271; of thought
teaching, 114, 268.
i7D,f
5561
370,1 .S661 C.1
Die philosophical basis of edu
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