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PH.D., A.M., A.B. 
Head 0/ the Department of Psychotngy 
and Edutaiitm at the State Ifarmal 
School. Kearney, Nebraska 





All Rights Reserved 


I wish to express my indebtedness to several publishers for their per- 
mission to use material published in whole or part in magazine form, bear- 
ing the following titles: 

Mid- West School Review, The Relations of Science to Life, March, 191 7. 

The American Schoolmaster, The Field of Philosophy as seen by the 
Educator, January, 191 7. Also, Relations Between Scientific and Philosophic 
Method, February, 19 17. 

School Science and Mathematics, Scope and Division of the Field of 

Science, October, 191 7. 

R. M. S. 

• • 2 • •• 

• • • • • • 

• e • • » ■ 

• • • • 



Made in the United States of America 

The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A* 



Whose profound insight into the reality of life has constantly 
inspired the author of this book to renew his interpretation 
of human experience, this book is affectionately dedicated. 


My only reason for writing a volume under the title of this 
one is the fact that the present status of things in education 
seems to me to demand a further clarification of our educa- 
tional thought and practice. If we were all thinking clearly, 
and getting the most efficient results possible, there would be no 
need of adding another to the present stock of books. 

It is my belief, however, that clearer thinking is possible, 
based on the already accumulated experience of mankind. It 
would be possible to gain much better results and do it more 
easily, effectively, and with greater pleasure, if we would util- 
ize the amazing power that comes from clear thinking. Now 
clear thinking is not a secret and mysterious power given 
to few and withheld from the many, but it is a power each 
person may possess and make use of in his own experience. 

This clearness of thought comes from our ability to utilize 
to the best advantage our past experience. To do this, we are 
obliged to make use of our powers of reflection in order to 
determine the real nature and meaning of our experience. It 
means little to have experience, but it means much to see by 
the light of reflection what this experience means for life as 
a whole. The significance of our experience does not float on 
the surface, but it takes an experienced diver to bring it up 
from the depths and mire of isolated and fragmentary bits 
of human experience. There are experienced divers of pearls 
and other precious materials, and so there are those experienced 
in bringing to the light of clear thought the true significance 
of human experience. 

It is in the field of educational thought, as well as in other 
departments of human knowledge, such as business, religion, 
domestic and social life, that we are in great need of clear 
thinking. Clear thinking will lead to more definite and exact 
methods of habit formation and action. Clear thinking can be 
induced only through persistent habits of reflection on the data 


^^B of our experience. It takes insight to develop foresight. We 
^f need more penetration and concentration if we would reach 
the deeper meaning of our human experience. The meaning 
and significance of our experience do not rise to the surface 
like cream to be skimmed off with the crude instrumentality 
of common sense. Rather it takes the pulling power of reflec- 
tive thought, of analysis, synthesis, comparison and the like, 
to bring out this deeper meaning. 

It will be the object of this volume to aid as much as its 
author is able to a clearing up of the thought process, in its 
relation to the data of our educational experience. It should 
aid in showing the need for guiding principles and reflective 
analysis in the field of education. In short it should assist the 
reader to see the necessity of developing a more systematic and 
thoughtful way of approach to the great problems of educa- 
tion. If it does this much it will contribute toward the de- 
velopment of a philosophy of education. 

The point of view here adopted is that of the idealist and 
it reflects the voluntaristic tendency in idealism, rather than 
the intellectualistic. The emphasis is rather on action than 
on knowledge, and yet the two points of view arc here insep- 
arably connected. 

It will be noted that knowledge is essential to properly di- 
rected activity, and that activity is essential to the best under- 
standing. Knowing and doing are the two aspects of the same 
psychophysical process and our deeper philosophical reflection 
will rather tend to confirm this fact than to deny it. 

The original manuscript of this book has been rewritten and 
revised with the idea of making it a suitable text-book for col- 
lege and normal school courses in the Philosophy of Education, 
or the Theory of Education. It ought also serve a valuable 
purpose as a reference book in courses in Philosofihy, Education 
and Science. 

It would be rather a hopeless task to attempt here any ade- 
quate acknowledgment of the sources of help and inspiration 
I have received along the line of the subject here under treat- 
ment. My more enlightened conscience and my sense of loy- 
alty to loyalty, as well as my hope of a larger self-realization, 
I urge upon me the mention of a few names at least. I could 
i not fail to mention Professor Josiah Royce, whose wonderful 




.power of penetration helped to lead me into a field of larger 
truth and reality. Nor should 1 fail to mention Professor George 
Herbert Palmer, who made life's ideals a matter of serious con- 
sequence to me. I have come through his teachings to regard 
man's highest calling and duty that of pursuing worthy and 
noble ideals. Ideals are not realizable unless we know the 
means of realizing them. And just here the wonderful world 
of psychology was opened up to me by that eminent psycholo- 
gist, Professor Hugo Miinsterberg. 

I owe much to other teachers and to scores of authors but 
I cannot mention them here, and I sincerely hope that the writ- 
ing of this volume will not cast discredit on those whose names 
I have mentioned. The book that has meant more to me than 
any other 1 have ever read is Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty. 

I am indebted to my wife, Anna E. Shreves, for her patient 
labor on both the Index of Names and the Index of Subjects and 
for other helps with the manuscript. 

If there is anything in this volume that will contribute to 
higher, nobler, and deeper thinking in regard to our educa- 
tional experience, I shall feel that my labor has not been spent 
in vain. 

R. M. Shreves. 
jKearney, Nebraska 

December i, 1917. 



Introduction 7 

1 The Aim of This Volume 17 

2 The Point of View Here Taken 17 

3 The Need of Such a Work 18 

4 The Plan of Treatment 23 


I The Aims of Science 27 

1 Science as Observation of Facts 27 

2 Science as Correlation and Classification of Facts . . 28 

3 Science as Description of Facts 29 

4 Science as Explanation of Facts 29 

5 Science as Generalization and Law 30 

6 Science as Application- Applied Knowledge 31 

7 The Aim of Science Stated in Full 32 

8 The World of Science as the World of Description and Ex- 

planation 32 

9 The World of Description vs. The World of Appreciation . . 33 
10 Summary of the Aims of Science 34 

n The Scope, or Field of Science . 35 

1 The Phenomenal World of Time and Space 35 

2 The Special Fields of Science 35 

3 The Physical Sciences and Chemistry, Physics, Geology, etc. . 36 

4 The Biological Sciences — Botany, Zoology, and Physiology 36 

5 The Science of Psychology 36 

6 The Social Sciences — ^History and Sociology 37 

7 The Abstract Sciences of Relations — Mathematics and Logic . 38 

8 The Normative and Descriptive Sciences 38 

9 Summary of the Scope of Science 39 

III The Methods of Science 40 

1 Observation, Classification, Description and Explanation as 

Stages of Developments Rather than Methods of Science . 40 

2 Analysis and S3rnthesis as Methods 40 

3 Induction and Deduction as Methods 41 

4 Experimental Method 42 

5 The MeUiod of Introspection 43 

6 Balance of Methods 44 

7 Summary of the Methods of Science 44 


xU Contents 



^^H IV The Relations of Science to Life 4S 

^^H I The Age of Science 45 

^^H 1 Science and the Life of Reason 46 

^^M 3 Sciente Gives Increased Facilities for Life but Does not Give 

^^H Its Meaning 47 

^^P 4 We Must Turn Co Philosophy for the Meaning of Life . . . 4S 
^^F 5 Genera] Summary of the Aims, Scope. Methods, and Relations 

of Science 4B 


I Thf. Aims of Philosophy 53 

1 The World of Description and the World of Appreciation . . 53 

3 Philosophy, the Viewof the WboIeofLife: Science, of aPart . 54 

3 The Aim of Philosophy 55 

4 Philosophy as Appreciation 57 

5 Summary of the Aims of Philosophy 5g 

II The Scope or Field of Phiixjsophy 61 

I Psychology and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted 61 

a Data of Philosophy the Whole of Human Experience . . . 6j 

3 Philosophy Always Views Experience from Normative Aspect 63 

4 Philosophy Includes Several Special Viewpoints 64 

5 Metaphysics as the Science of Reality 65 

6 Epistemology as the Science of Knowledge 66 

7 Logic as the Science of Correct Thinking 67 

3 Ethics as the Science of Right Conduct 6S 

g Aesthetics as the Science of the Beautiful 6g 

10 Philosophy of Religion 69 

11 Our Chief Concern is with Ethics 69 

I a Summary of the Scope of Philosophy 69 

in The Methods of Philosophy 71 

I General Methods of Philosofjhy not Unlike Those of Science . 71 

3 Philosophy Requires Reflection 72 

3 Value of Reflection 74 

4 Summary of the Methods of Philosophy 75 

IV The Relations of Pinxosopav to Life 76 

1 The Age in Which Philosophy Arises 76 

2 Philosophy and the Life of Reason 77 

3 Philosophy and the Meaning and Value of Life 78 

4 General Summary jg 

riENCE AND Philosophy Compared and Contrasted . . . 
Aims of Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted 
Scope of Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted , 
Methods of Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted 
Description and Interpretation the Two Aspects of Reality . 


II Generai Summary and Conclusions or the First Three Parts 
I Summary of the Relations of Science and Philosophy 

Relations of the First Three Parts to Pari IV ..... 


The Philosophical Aspects of Education qj ■ 

Relations of Philosophy and Life 93 

The Philosophy of Education as the Meaning and Value of 

Education 93 

Educational Experience 94 

Various Philosophical Aspects , , 95 

I H The Metaphysical Aspect of EbocAnoN 96 

1 MeUphysies an Effort to Think Clearly 96 

3 Eveiy One Has a. Metaphysics of Some Sort 96 

3 Metaphysics as a Criticism of the Principles of Science 97 

4 Metaphy^cs the Science of Sciences 97 

5 Metaphysics a Search for First Principles 98 

6 Metaphysics the Science of Reality 99^ 

7 Appearance and Reality 100 

8 The Cardinal Principle of Voluntaristic Idealism: Reality the 
Absolute Will or Purpose toi 

9 The Problem of One and the Many: Fact and Purpose . 102 

:o The Problem of Time and Space 103 

:i The Relation of Mind and Matter 103 

2 The Problem of the Infinite 103 

.3 The Problem of Self or Personality 104 

.4 God, Immortality, andthe Soul 104 

5 Summary 104 

.6 Educational Implications of Metaphysics 106 

The Epistemological Aspects op Education . . 

1 How Can One Thing Know Another? iolt,J 

2 Relation of Epistemology and Metaphysics ioSj| 

3 Relation of Epistemology and Psychology '^^VM 

4 The Central Problem of Epistemology .... 

5 Knowledge as a Search for the Uoivereal .... _ 

6 Scepticism as the Denial of the Universal i'5V 

7 Kant to the Rescue of Knowledge 114 ¥ 

8 Naturalism and Positivism 

9 Realism as a Theory of Knowledge 

Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge .... 

1 Empiricism and Rationalism 

3 Intuitionism and Mysticism 

3 Idealism as a Theory of Knowledge 

4 Summary 

5 Educational Implications of Epistemology 

fJV Tke Logical Aspects OF Educational Theory 137 1 

Definition and Meaning of Logic 1 17 j 

The Data of Logic 118 J 


80 ^^ 

ON 1 



3 Logic and Common Sense iiS 

4 Logic and the Descriptive Scieoces 129 

5 Logic and Psychology 131 

6 Logic and Metaphysics 131 

7 Logic and Epistemology 13a 

8 Systems of Logic 133 

General Methods of Logic 134 

The Problems of Logic 135 

The Logic of Mysticism 137 

The Logic of Pragmatism 137 

The Logic of Idealism 138 

Summary 139 

The Educational Implications of Logic 140 

Educahonai lupucAiTONs o? the Philosopky or Religion 143 

I The Definition of the Philosophy of Religion 143 

1 Philosophy of Religion and Common Sense 144 

3 Philosophy of Religion and Science 145 

4 Philosophy of Religion and Metaphysics 146 

5 Philosophy of Religion and Epistemology 147 

6 Philosophy of Religion and Logic 148 

7 Philosophy of Religion and Ethics 148 

8 Philosophies of Religion 140 

9 The Religion of Platonism 145 

10 The Religion of Neoplatonism 130 

11 The Religion of Epicureanism 151 

13 The Religion of Stoicism 15J 

13 The Religion of Positivism, Naturalism, and Materialism . 153 

14 The Religion of Mysticism tS4 

15 The Religion of Pragmatism 155 

16 The Religion of Idealism 156 


Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion 
VI The Aesthehc Aspects of Ediicationai. Theory .... 160 

1 Meaning and Definition of Aesthetics 1 5o 

2 The Relation of Common Sense and Aesthetics i6i 

3 The Psychology versus the Philosophy of Art 161 

4 The Ideal of Art 164 

5 The Standards or Criteria of Art 165 

6 The Relation of Metaphysics and Aesthetics 167 

7 The Relation of Logic and Aesthetics 168 

8 The Relation of Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics . 169 

9 The Relation of Ethics and Aesthetics 

10 The Problems of Aesthetics 

11 The Different Theories of Act 

13 The Aesthetics of Idealism 

13 Summary 

14 The Educational Implication of Aesthetics .... 



Vn Tke Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory . . . 

I The Meaning and De&nitioQ of Ethics 

13 Ethics and Common Sense 

3 Ethics as a Science _ 

4 The Relation of Metaphysics and Ethics tii'm 

S The Relation of Epistemology and Ethics i8l I 

6 The Relation of Ethics and Logic 183 1 

7 The Relation of Ethics and Rehgion * 

8 The Relation of Ethics and Aesthetics 

9 The Problems of Ethics iSJl 

10 Systems of Ethics " 

II The Ethics of Hedonism 

I II The Ethics of Stoidsm ^^tM 

13 The Ethics of Platonism " 

14 The Ethics of Naturalism 

15 The Ethics of Pragraatiam ' , . . 

t6 The Ethics of Idealism iQ^fl 

17 Summary igr J 

iS Educational Implications of Ethics [()3>3 

IVm Retrospbci and Prospect 
[ I The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Life 
9 The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Educational Theory 
3 The Special Philosophical Aspects of Educational Theory . . 
I Etsics as tbe Search pos the Highest Good .... 

I Pre-Soeratic Philosophy 

i Post-Socratic Philosophy lOt'M 

3 The Meaning and Value of Experience 

4 Facts and Purposes in Lite _ 

5 The Descriptive and Normative Aspects 304 I 

6 The Ideal Values of Life 205 ' 

7 The Good as Will or Purpose . . . _ 207 

S The Individual and Social Aspects of this Aim lag 

g Self-Real iiation as the Ultimate Goal 

10 The Reality of the Idea! 

11 The Concept of Loyalty 

II Summary 

II Ams AM) Means in Eddcaiton 

1 The Aim of Life and the Aim of Education ._ , ii?! 

2 The Conflict m Modern Pedagogy . . - ... 

3 Education aa a Normative Saence 

t Education as a Descriptive Science 

Aims and Means of Education 

The Function of Supervision 



I CB AFTER piua-:! 

\ ni The Am of Education as S elf-Re auzation 219 J 

The Ideal Values of Education: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and 


The Unity of the Ideal Values 229 I 

The Personal Factor in the Educative Process 330 1 

Self-Realization as the All-Comprehensive Educational Ideal 231' I 
The Individual and Social Views of Education Reconciled . " 

Summary .--.,,--,-,..., 

I IV The Relation of This Ideal to Eddcational PRAcncE . . liiM 

The Relation of Theory and Practice '3* J 

Educational Theory as an Explanation oE Educational En- 

The Actual and the Ideal as Part and Whole of Experience 

The Value of a Life Ideal a^sl 

The Meaninj! of Character and Personality 247 | 

Individual Dificrences 24S 1 

Self-Activity, Self-Responsibility, and Self-Reallzation . 

Education and a Plan of Life 

The Vocational and Cultural Ideals Reconciled 253 J 

Summary ,, - ^ ,,-.,,, , 

The Teacher and the REaiATiON 258 1 

The Teacher as a Factor in the Educational Process 
The Recitation as a Factor [n the Educational Process . 
Education through Directed Spontaneous Activity . . 

Impression and ExpresMon 

The Doctrine of Interest and Apperception z^Sfl 

The Problem of Discipline " " 

Connected Thought and Class Method . . . 

Organization of Interests 

The Unity of Personality through Self- Real Im. lion 

\ VI Conclusion 

Summary 272 

Educational Readjustment 273 

Philosophy and Science as a Basis for EMucationa) Theory and 

Practice 273 

Educational Guidance 374 ' 

5 Organization and Efficiency 274 

6 The Schools of To-morrow 275 


Index 285 


I The Aim of This Volume, The specific Aim of this 
Volume as the title implies is to trace the educational impli- 
cations of Voluntaristic Ethics. It is not meaningless to ask, 
What is the significance of Ethics for Education ? What is the 
Ethical Aspect of education? Especially these questions have 
meaning if we start out on this journey of thought with the 
metaphysical assumption of the unity of knowledge. We have 
not time, nor is this the place, to trace the metaphysical or 
cpistemological implications of this assumption. We shall, 
however, set out with this assumption as part of our equipment. 
As we journey along we hope to point out the reasonableness of 
this assumption but our great task is to show what ethics has 
to do with education. 

^2 The Point of View Here Taken. In showing the re- 
lations of ethics and education, or the educational implications 
of ethics, two alternative methods of treatment are possible. 
The historical method might be adopted and the several ethical 
systems shown up in their relation to education. Again the 
philosophical view might be taken and the underlying meaning 
of these relations might be traced in their deeper significance. 
The latter is the point of view here adopted. It will be my 
aim to follow up the fundamental principles of ethical theory 
and show the educational implications of these. 

It has already been stated that my point of view is all the 
way through that of voluntaristic idealism. Thus the work is 
ethical rather than pedagogical, yet it is intended by showing 
the meaning of the leading Ethical principles of idealism for 
education to be of value in a pedagogical way. As it has been 
briefly stated the object is to contribute to clearer thought in 
education, and this is to be brought about by the observance of 
(■ certain ethical principles, as well as by the use of more scien- 
■ tific methods in education. 


18 Introduction 

3 The Need of Such a Work. There is a sad lack of 
adherence to well thought out ethical principles in education. 
We have scarcely taken time to look within our Education 
to see what it is all about. Wc are still like children and pay 
more attention to things that move about us than to the laws 
and principles that govern our nature. Perhaps wc should not 
be too harsh for it is only an evidence of our immaturity. But 
individuals grow older and so do nations, and when we reach 
the period that the reflection and insight begin to develop, wc 
should make use of these powers in promoting the welfare of 
man and society. 

This present age of ours is best characterized as the age of 
industrialism and commercialism. It is the age of rapid de- 
velopments along these lines, and progress here has been made 
possible mainly through recent developments in the physical 
sciences. This is an evidence of the objectivity of our individ- 
ual and national mind. 

We find the present age in which we live making strong 
demands on us from without, and scarcely any pressure to 
bring about the development of the inner man, except in so 
far as this is the natural consequence of this progress in a 
material way. Certainly this material progress has had great 
value in giving expression to a larger life, but the life that is 
developing is not always consciously assisted in its advance, but 
rather follows as a natural and fortuitous consequence of the 
larger social and economic sphere in which recent years find 
us moving. 

'' But the ethical life of man demands more conscious and 
rational guidance than this. Not only must the sphere of 
activity grow larger, but there must be conscious guidance 
from man's moral nature within. There is a call from the 
great within as well as a pressure of economic and social neces- 
sity from without. We are in danger under the exaggerated 
pressure of necessity to live too much in the present and to give 
too little attention to the demands of a truly purposive life. 
Stevenson must have had a similar thought when he said, 
"And when the present is so exacting, who can annoy himself 
about the future," and this exacting circumstance of external 
necessity has continued to act for a long time. When man 
loses sight of a higher goal he will seize a lower one. His 



inds a goal, a purpose. Progress of any kind de- 
mands a goal toward which movement is directed. And our 
goal will be low or high, worthy or unworthy, according to the 
kind of persons we are. The best way to estimate a person 
or a nation is to ohserve what ideals are pursued and the pull- 
ing power these have on the life. All ideals have pulling 
power, and they sometimes pull at cross purposes. 'J'hey should 
rather point to an ultimate purpose in which they all unite in 
a higher unity, a deeper meaning and reality. 

Our ideals would, if they are what they should be, lead us 
to love and be loyal to our fellows and their true purposes, 
and this would be vastly better than to go out to battle against 
them. The right ideals will lead men to unite against evil, 
waste and inefficiency, but not to kill each other. The present 
great war that threatens the entire world is a symptom of a 
sadly diseased condition of man, I do not think this is an 
indication that man has fallen from grace; rather it looks as if 
he had never worked himself into very good favor with his 
God yet. 

There are many evidences besides war that suggest man's 
inhumanity toward man and his undeveloped nature. Strife 
and destructive competition in industry, the chasm between 
labor and industry, capitalist and wage earner, are other 
evidences and perhaps follow as a natural consequence upon 
our exaggerated emphasis of the industrial and commercial 
ideals of our age. 

X, And yet we see constantly an undercurrent moving in a 
diflrerent direction. This deeper view and its significance for 
life is not always observed, \ Man must train his reflective 
powers to see the deeper movements and tendencies in life as 
well as to select the proper goal of life. Indeed this is the 
only correct way to select his goal at all. 

We could not afford to lose a single inch gained by indus- 
trialism and the material progress of our age. We need all 
that has been gained and much more. But we cannot gain al! 
that is needed in our life by advancing along these lines, for 
this only produces more wealth and leisure without greater 
power of enjoying either. Under such a regime our wants 
and desires develop much more rapidly than the truer and 
higher self to which these instrumentalities should minister. 


There has been a rapid growtli Jn the demand for luxury 
in this our industrial age, and it is not to be discredited so 
long as we know what we are doing and keep the balance of 
our ideals that the higher ethical life demands. While we 
are noticing the trend in this direction there comes the cry that, 
"In the face of a growing desire for luxury and ease, there 
must be a conscious effort to cultivate thrift, simplicity, and a 
more spiritual sense of values." (Trowbridge: The Home 
School, p. 37.} And this demand is quite as urgent as that 
for luxury. Let us keep our balance so far as possible and 
welcome any suggestion that gives a better insight into the true 
rrieaning and values of a higher life. 

V It is the business of ethics to reveal the higher values and 
purposes of life, it is the duty of man through his personal 
efforts and through the agencies and various institutions of 
society to strive to the uttermost to realize these ideals and 
purposes. In this book we are directly concerned with the 
true ethical aims and values of life, and with the demands thus 
placed upon the schools as an agency in realizing these ideals 
and purposes. But we well know that the degree in which we 
can expect the schools to realize the higher purposes of life is 
determined largely by the nature and effectiveness of this or- 
ganization within itself. Unfortunately the American public 
schools are not a well organized system. They have developed 
piece-meal and there has been little effort to correlate the parts 
into a well organized whole. Indeed it will take several dec- 
ades to systematize our education. But happily there are evi- 
dences of growth in the direction of better organization. And 
there is room for considerable development yet. The unscien- 
tific patch-work of our American education is well put in the 
following quotations. 

William T, Harris in his preface to Boone's Education in 
the United States (p. 6) says: "States first establish col- 
leges and universities and next free common elementary schools, 
and afterwards gradually fill in intermediate links of the sys- 
tem, and then add supplementary institutions." J. F, Brown in 
his The American High School (p. j66) says much the same 
thing in the following words: "Historically the American 
schools have developed from above downward and from below ^^ 
^^ upward, meeting in the middle. It is difficult to see how the^^U 


evolution of American education could have been different frt 
what it actually has been ; but the time has certainly come when 
we should begin at the bottom and rebuild our public educa- 
tional system to the top. The guiding factors in this impor- 
tant work should be a sound psychology and a sound philosophy 
considered from both the individual and the social point of 
view. Philosophical and social ideals will help us to define the 
aim of education, psychology will teach the steps by which- thai 
aim can best he attained.; both will assist in determining the 
Best~ecIucationa! content, that is, the curriculum." Now it 
should be mentioned here that the seriousness of this crazy-quilt 
style of American education becomes evident when we remem- 
ber that it is the business of this institution to realize in the 
fullest measure possible the greatest purposes and values of 
life, in other words the highest or best life. Lest it be thought 
that I have placed too large a burden on education I here quote 
a passage from The School and Society Magazine (Vol. I, p. 
37), which reads as follows: 

"In our industrial, social, dvic, and religious democracy 
everything waits on education. No real progress and no last- 
ing improvement in any line of life is possible except through 
the better education of the people. The deepest meaning of 
democracy is equality of opportunity. This is impossible with- 
out equality of opportunity for citizenship, and for productive 
occupations. Therefore the right education of all the people 
becomes our chief concern, and to provide better and more 
adequate means thereto must be the most important task of 
society and state. Among the agencies of education the public 
school may, I believe, fairly be considered the most impor- 

From the foregoing it ought to he evident that more clear 
thinking is needed in order to eliminate the crudities of modern 
education and malce our schools more effective instrumenB for 
good in the hands of society. Our very first duty is to clear 
up our minds as to what is our aim in education. Educational 
aims are the very first consideration in education. Nothing 
can be placed before aims, or ideals, in education, — or in any 
other field of activity. It is interesting to note that Harring- 

Iton Emerson insists vigorously on "Ideals" as the first of the j 
"Twelve Principles" of industrial efficiency. Just so it i " 


education. It is time we were clearing our ideas as to the goal 
or purpose of education. There are no short-cuts in settling 
this matter. The task can never be settled except by clear 
and deep thinking along ethical and general philosophical lines. 

It is not thought that ethical reflection alone will solve all 
the problems of education. It cannot. The aim of ethics is 
less ambitious than that. It can only give a point of view, and 
as R, L. Stevenson says, it is a point of view rather than points 
of view that we are so much in need of to-day. But the battle 
is half fought at least when we are clear as to the aim of 

When it comes to a matter of deciding what are the means or 
methods to be used in education we are no longer concerned 
with ethics, but must turn to the descriptive sciences such as 
psychology', biology and sociology for help. But this distinction 
between the function of ethics and the descriptive sciences is 
not so evident that it can be passed by with a mere mention. 
It will occupy much of our time in this book to make clear 
this important distinction, a distinction without which no clear 
thinking on educational problems is possible, and without which 
progress is uncertain and unscientific. But we have had enough 
uncertainty in education. Let us now use our best efforts to 
avoid past blunders, rule-of-thumb and trial-and-error methods. 
Can't we see yet that aims are the first consideration in educa- 
tion and means and methods serviceable only when we know 
what ends we want to accomplish? What would you think of 
a tool maker who set about making a tool without the least idea 
of the use it was to be put to? What shall we think of our- 
selves if we continue to develop means and methods without 
knowing what ends they are to serve? Or, may it not be that 
we already know the ends but that we have not questioned the 
value of these ends to see whether they fit into a larger system 
of things? Perhaps they are working at cross purposes with 
one another. In which case there is danger of friction and lost 
motion, which means a reduction of efficiency. It stands to 
reason that we should not become less efficient than we are. 
It takes a certain amount of genius to overcome our inertia to 
the extent of re-thinking and re-shaping our educational aims 
and methods. 


introducli'.,, 23 ] 

The Plan of Treatment. In order fully to develop j 
pthe point of view here taken it is thought best to divide the ' 
' hook into five parts, shov\ ing in each part a different point of 
view from which we might regard education. In Part I we 
discuss The Aims, Scope and Methods of Science, ending with 
a chapter on the relations of science to life. In Part II, The 
Aims, Scope and Methods of Philosophy will be discussed, con- 
cluding with a chapter on the relations of philosophy to life. 
In Part III, we enlarge our field hy showing The Relations 
of Science and Philosophy, thus clearing the way finally for a 
separation of the two points of views, scientific and philosophi- 
cal, the descriptive and the normative, so that we may give 
greater emphasis to the special problems set for us, that of 
showing the educational implications of modern idealism. In 
Part IV, we consider The Relations of Philosophy and Educa- 
tion, and prepare the way for a transition to the special point 
of view of the ethical philosopher. In Part V, we work out 
some of the more fundamental relations of the ethics of mod- 
ern idealism and education. In this part will 
important implications of the ethics of voluntaristic idealism for 
modern educational theory. 

It is to be hoped that the reader will enjoy the journey with 
me through the fields we are to travel, and that we shall each 
be the better for having had the other's company. We first 
enter the field of science and this that we may gradually and 
with a clearer vision enter the deeper fields of inquiry to be 
studied later. 

The Aims, Scope, Methods, and Relations of Science 



Science as Observation of Facts. What fs'.rfit 
rscientist trying to do? What is he making so much fuss abOut. 
now-a-days? Everybody hears about the scientist and about,- 
science, and most of us have been forced to give car to him,". 
but what is he trjing to do? What is his aim, purpose, or 
goal? Does he have a work that no one else is to accomplish, 
. or is he merely exaggerating his own importance? 
I These are questions of moment, for everybody has been 
' forced to listen and no« it is time we arc bting told what it is 
all about. The scientist is on the alert to-day. He is ambi- 
tious to do great things. Indeed he is so alert that there is 
danger in thinking him either overivise or a fool. But wc 
like energy and ambition when it does not interfere with our 
personal prejudices or traditions of too long standing. The 
scientist is gaining attention because he is really found to have 
a message. We can look on every hand and see the wonders 
of his works, but do we really understand what his aim is? 

It might be said that in general he has two aims, theoretical 
and practical, but this would not do full justice to him. Wc 
want to know more in detail what he would accomplish in 
life. Indeed the foregoing statement would likely be very 
misleading, for generally the sciences have developed rather far 
before any effort has been made to show their practical useful- 
ness in solving the problems of life. 

Science aims at a careful, descriptive, and explanatory ac- 

■■ ■ I 



28 The Philosophiral Bash of Ediicath 

count of experience. Observation is the scientist's first task. 
He must observe carefully, record and verify by repeated ob- 
servation and experiment the data he collects. He gets all his 
facts from the realm of hutnan experience, forcing none of it 
in from another world foreign to our own. Science starts 
with facts of experienic'e -and ends with a complete descriptive 
and explanatory account of these. In the case of applied science 
v/c go a step farther, and show how the laws and generaliza- 
tions of science are'to he used in the solution of the problems 
of life; in other. ivords, how these laws can be made useful in 
modifying, flut" future, or in controlling our experience. 

The facto)" of careful observation is so important that we 
are scarcely liable to overestimate it. There are so many of 
us who have eyes and see not, ears and h^ar not, brains and 
miiid-. an^ think not. We are in need of greater observation 
arti attention to the world about us, to the facts of our experi- 
ence. We make our own world by attending to that which we 
"-."will, or to that in which we are interested, says James, But 
■-'so many of us will do little and are interested in such a small 
way, that we really ought to be ashamed of the world we do 
make. Closer observation, greater attention, and a habit of 
recording and verifying our experience carefully would result 
in making a more habitable world for most of us. Let him 
who thinks otherwise try it consistently for a time and see the 
new meaning that life takes on as a result. 

2 Science as Correlation and Classification of 
Facts. But it is not enough that we observe and record the 
data of our experience, we must classify and correlate them as 
well. Merely to observe and record is to lose sight of the 
deeper likenesses, and to aid in making our world disconnected 
and uninhabitable, even for the most religious of us. All unity 
is lost in isolation of facts from one another. One fact does 
not stand alone. In reality a fact of experience is rather an 
arbitrary thing and amounts to a certain dependable unit of 
experience. Of course there is a deeper meaning of a fact of 
experience, the inner meaning of this fact or idea, but this is 
not the stage of our inquiry to unearth metaphysical problems, 
and especially since science has no stock in this kind of busi- 

^t and especially since science has no stock in this kind of buai- , J| 

pr „,.._„ : 

^^K Facts are merely units of experience conceived as objective 
^^Vsnd belonging to a time and space world. Xbey are in this 
sense not metaphysical realities, whatever sort of reality wc 
may decide to attribute to them. So disregarding metaphysical 
difSculties we may here safely say, that for science a fact en- 
tirely isolated from all other facts has no meaning or value, 
and no existence.. Facts are significant only in so far as they 
point to a larger unity, a wider scope of relation. Science, then, 
must not only observe, but correlate and classify its facts on the 

■ grounds of their likeness or similarity. It is only in this way 
that facts may lead to generalizations, and laws. 
3 Science as Description of Facts. The scientist must \ 
also describe his facts as well as observe, classify, and correlate 
them. That is, he must make his facts understandable. They 
must not be confused with others, but have a character of their 
own. Facts have an identity for the scientist which is not lost 
by being merged in the whole, hut they do gain greater signifi- 
cance when so related. In description we do not go beyond the 
pointing out of likenesses and differences between facts and 
showing their relation to a larger group of facts. 

4 Science as Explanation of Facts, Another aim of 
science is to explain the facts. And this it does by showing 
their relation not to other facts but to laws and principles, 
which are based upon facts similar to the ones to be explained. 
We mean nothing more by scientific explanation than that of 
showing that this particular fact of experience falls under such 
and such a law of experience already determined scientifically, 
that is, through the procedure already described in this chap- 
ter. Explanation is thus the process of showing how a frag- 
ment, or element of our experience is related to a larger group 
of experiences. In other words, by explanation we mean sim- 
ply pointing out the general law under which a given fact of 
experience falb. There is no attempt in this process of scien- 
tific explanation to go beyond the actual time and space rela- 
tionships in which, as elements of experience, they are found. 
That is, there is no attempt on the part of the scientist to give 

I the absolute meaning of experience, either in whole or in part. 
He is satisfied to live and think in a world of time and space. 

30 The PhUosaphieal Basis of Education 

He does not even try, so long as he is true to his calling, to 
transcend these temporal and spatial boundaries of the world 
of fact. He is not concerned with the deeper meaning and 
relation of facts in a world to which the philosopher ascribes 
reality in a metaphysical sense. The world for the scientist 
is the same time and space world as for common sense. But 
of course there is nothing in the nature of things why a scien- 
tist may not also take the view of common sense, or the philos- 
opher coo, but he must be careful and not mix these points of 
view, when he is trying to give a scientific account of the world. 
The scientist works in both the mental and physical fields 
and so has to explain how both sets of facts are related, each in 
its own way. Whether the facts be material or mental, — -and 
for science facts are both material and mental despite their 
metaphysical unity in a larger system of realities,— they must 
be explained. And explanation everywhere means pointing out 
the relation between the particular and the general, the fact 
and the law that throws light on it from above. Just now 
there is started in my mind a new set of ideas aroused by that 
ubiquitous and joy-bringing invention, the graphophone. This 
is the mental fact. The explanation of this fact lies in point- 
ing out how these ideas are related, or associated, and this is 
done by pointing out the relation of the ideas themselves to 
the physical processes which accompany them. The law here 
in operation is that of psycho-physical parallelism, which points 
out the larger relations between body and mind. Laws of lesser 
generality are operative too, but my point here is to show 
what is meant by explanation in a genera! way. 

5 SciENCR AS Generaf.ization and Law. The highest 
stage of purely theoretical science is reached when the facts are 
so grouped and related as to lead to generalizations and laws, 
or principles. Explanation assumes that the stage of laws 
and principle formation has been reached. Often the law or 
principle is assumed rather than proved to form a starting 
point. In this case the generalization is called a postulate, or 
an hypothesis, and must later be supported by fact before it 
can stand as a law or principle. Sometimes the nature of the 
hypothesis is such as to preclude the possibility of being sup- 
ported on the basis of fact or evidence; in which case it is said 

The Aims of Sch 


fnot to be logically supported. In a metaphysical sense such 
. 1 hypothesis would not be true or real, and ethically it would 

the unjustified on the grounds that it did not accord with the 

llfiature of goodness. 

The fact of the certainty of the law is then a very important I 
matter for the scientist. He must use all precaution in get- 

' ting, classifying, and explaining his facts, and to this end his 
generalizations and laws must be well founded on fact, and 
constantly verified by experience, and always pliable so as to 
admit of a wider statement of fact. A principle and a law 
differ in that the law may be disproved by the fact, but the 
principle does not stand in such a relation of dependence on 
fact. The principle must accord with a larger system of 
reality and to do so may often give evidence of contradiction 
with fact. 

It is not until the method of science became inductive that . 
any very substantial progress in science was made possible. 

■ But since Bacon's time this method has yielded many wonderful 
results and many of them in the form of laws and principles. 
6 Science as Application-Applied Knowledge. But 
the greatest gain was not made when the scientist discovered 
his many laws and principles. It was not until the practical 
motive began to operate that he could either prove the worth 

»of his theories, or himself to the world. He has now justified 
himself in the world of which he gives an account. We see 
on every hand evidence of the wonderful works of the scientist. 
We can no longer look upon the scientist as an impostor, or as 
a mere disturber of our long-standing religious beliefs. His 
work is greatly needed and his point of view cannot be ignored. 
It must be reckoned with in the world of practical affairs. In- 
deed we shall see that the world of truth, beauty, and goodness 
must start with the world the scientist has evolved. Nowhere 
can we afford to neglect the great accomplishments of science. 
The greatest contributions of science so far have been made 
to the industrial and commercial world, the field in which our 
life is perhaps best reflected to-day. As instances of progress 
In these material ways let us mention the "Seven Wonders" of 

I American industry. I mention first the Panama Canal, that 
peatest feat of American engineering. No less great in their 

32 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

own way are the New York railway terminal; the New York 
Canal; internal waterways and irrigation projects; the subway 
and the skyscrapers of New York. (I am indebted to Har- 
rington Emerson for the "Seven Wonders" above mentioned.) 
Thus it will he seen that the once theoretical sciences of 
physics and mathematics have become preeminently practical. 
The same is true of chemistry and other sciences. But theory 
will continue, and it must precede practice by a good many 
furlongs. To be sure, practice aids theory, and makes it 
both more certain and more valuable. Theory and practice 
tend to support each other. They may cripple each other. All 
depends on the kind of theory, and how it is related to the 
facts of experience. There is no conflict between theory that 
grows out of experience and practice itself. It is through 
theory that practice becomes enlightened and sees where it is 
headed. Theory is the reflector that throws light and signifi- 
cance on the facts of experience, and it is the projector that 
lightens up the way ahead so that experience comes to have a 

7 The Aim of Science Stated in Full. XJlC sisijif 
science, then, is to render a complete and accurate descriptu^ 
account of our human experience. This account is limited in its 
scope and value in that it is not intended tn be either -compleS 
or finaL The scientist aims at a purely descriptive and ex- 
planatory account of the world. He starts with the world of 
fact, and from these he ivorks up to laws and principles, which 
are later applied in the solution of the practical problems of 

8 The World of Science as the World of Discrip- 
TiON AND Explanation. But a mere descriptive and ex- 
planatory account of experience falls short of giving to life any 
meaning or real significance. It is not facts that give life its 
meaning, nor is any greater meaning attached to laws and prin- 
ciples, for they are only generalizations, or statements of th^ 
way that certain groups of facts work under certain specified 
conditions. But all this account is external and the deeper 
meaning of the facts is not revealed by any such an account. 

It would be difficult metaphysically to sec how a descriptive 

The Aimi of Science 

account of the world and experience could reveal life as having 
a meaning and a purpose, if the facts, which arc the data of 
experience, have no such meaning involved in themselves. 
Merely tying together meaningless fragments of life does not 
give us a way of viewing life as purposeful. Science is no less 
valuable because it does not give the deeper meaning of life. 
This is not its business. Indeed the prog ress^and hope of _ '_ 
ence_rest in iust thk-imnar tiat and ' descri ptive arcoiint^ o{_cx- 
BEnence. The field of science is the field of the "is", Saence 
starts with facts and ends with laws and principles governing 
these facts in a time and space world. It cannot go farther 
than this and remain true to its purpose and has mixed two 
points of view, the descriptive and the normative, but by com- 
mon consent and agreement the scientist has come to take within 
his field only facts and to hand them back to the world as 
facts, not isolated and unrelated, but as united in most inter- 
esting ways. He gives the facts back to society purified and 
renovated of most of the crudeness which they possessed when 
delivered by common sense. 

9 The World of Description vs. the World of Ap- 
preciation. If we are to get a full account of our experience, 
what is needed more than common sense and science.? The an- 
swer is — philosophy, It_ is the business of philosophy to do 
just what a great many people Still try to force science to do, 
an3~that is Co show the meaning and value of life. This sci- 
ehce can never do, any more than philosophy can rest satisfied 
with a descriptive account of the world. It is one thing to 
I describe and explain; it is quite another thing to interpret and 
[ ^ow the meaning and value of our experience for life as a 
whole. Science develops the one point of view and philosophy 
tbt Other, They are not essentially different in their aims. 
The difference lies in the fact that science leaves the world as 
described and related phenomena, while philosophy begins with 
the conclusion of science as its data and passes on to give a 
fuller account of experience by showing the meaning of all this 
for life. 

Summary of the Aims of Science. Let us briefly 
irize the aim of science. Science by observation, corre- 

I'of ^H 

not ^^H 

less ^H 

life. ^^M 

34 I'he Philosophical Basis of Education 

ladon and classification, of the fact of experience aims to ren- 
der a complete and accurate descriptive and explanatory account 
of the world of human experience. The account is descrip- 
tive rather than normative, for the reason that tlie conclusions 
relate to the world as it is, and not as it should be. For a fuller 
account of life we must turn to philosophy, but before we do 
this it is our business to speak in detail of the scope or field 
of science, in order that when a division of the field of human 
experience is made later between science and philosophy we may 
have a better understanding of the principles upon which the 
division is based. Let us consider, then, the special field or 
scope of science. 


the scope or field of science 

The Phenomenal World of Time and Spacb. 
From the foregoing chapter we learned the special aim of sci- 
ence as that of offering a descriptive and explanatory account 
of our human experience. From this as our starting point in this 
chapter, it is but a slight transition to a statement of the scope 
or field of science. We have seen already that the scientist is 
not dealing with matter foreign to our life, but with the very 
facts of our experience as his data, or materials. And now we 
are not only to state that the range of science is the whole range 
of human experience, but we are to grow more specific in our , 
Statement as to what we mean by the range of human experi- I 

We are still, however, in the field of the phenomenal world, 
or the world of time and space, the fact world. This must 
not he lost sight of, for it is the most essential guide post to 
our further statement of the world of science. And this point 
of view must be clearly seen if we arc later to see the relatioiB 
between science and philosophy and the relation of each of these j 
to education. 

2 The Special Fields of Science. For practical pur- 
poses the field of science has been divided into a number of 
special fields, and developments are now made along each one 
separately. Gradual growth and development has led to this 
diEEerentiation of function, or division of labor, among the sci- 
entists, and this division has been brought about as a result of 
the specialized interests of our individual wills. We shall see 
later that the whole creation of science is the product of the de- 
mands of our practical will, or the concrete expression of a life 
of purpose. The scope of science must be broad enough to in- 
clude the special fields of all the subordinate sciences. Shall 

36 The Phihsophica! Basis of Education 

we look for a moment at the special fields, namely, the physi- 
cal, biological, sociological, and psychological? 

3 The Physical Sciences, Chemistry, Physics, 
Geology, etc. The physical sciences have their aim giving a 
complete descriptive account of the facts of experience, so far 
as these are yet analyzed, in the world of inorganic matter. 
This field includes the special sciences of physics, chemistry, 
geology and allied sciences, and their applied forms. These 
sciences are alike in that they all attempt to describe and explain 
the facts of human experience. They are unlike in that each 
science has its special aim and field, or range of facts which it 

4 The Biological Sciences. The biological sciences 

have the same general aim as all science, to give a description 
and explanation of the facts of experience. But here the facts 
lie in the organic rather than in the inorganic world. The spe- 
cial sciences in this field are botany, or the science of the plant 
as a living organism; zoology, or the science of the animal 
organism; and physiology, or the science of the human organism. 
It will be observed that the biological sciences deal with life, 
or the organic world ; while the physical sciences deal with the 
inorganic, inert world of matter. These two fields divide be- 
tween themselves the whole world of material science. The 
biological and the physical sciences are alike in that they deal 
only with matter and not with mind. The sciences of mind 
must now be mentioned in their relation to the whole field, or 
scope of science. 

5 The Science of Psychology. The field of psychology 
is the whole range of consciousness, whether in plant, animal, 
or man. And in this great field are found many divisions, but 
the aim is always one, and consistent with the aim of science 
generally. The special aim here is to give a careful and scien- 
tific account of the states of consciousness in their relation to 
each other and to life. The aim is not to show the meaning 
of our ideas for reality, but simply to give a descriptive and 
explanatory account of them. 

Here the difficulty of explanation is much greater than tn 

The Scope or Field of Science 



the physical and biological sciences for the reason that the c 
sal relationships cannot be discovered between ideas, or states 
jnsciousness, tn the same way as is possible in the material 
world. One idea is not the cause, and another the effect. The 
idationship is not traceable between states of consciousness. 
The demand for explanation of mental phenomena, then, must 
be satisfied in quite a different way. This is done hy the hy- 
pothesis that every state of consciousness has a corresponding 
physical process, and receives its explanation by relating it to 
the proper physical or nervous process, called neurosis, and 
each psychosis is explained by reference to the neurosis that | 
forms the other side of the psycho-physical process. 

The only way that a scientific explanation of the states of 
consciousness is possible at the present time is by relating each 
mental process to a process of nerve action. This explanation 
is not causal, nor I's it teleological or ideal, it is explanation 
through correlation. The action is none the less intelligible 
as explained by this psycho-physical correlation. And it is 
greater intelligibility that science tries to give to the world, 
through analysis, synthesis, and explanation. Science tries to 
make the world in which we live rational, orderly, and thus J 
intelligible. This is the demand of our will to live, giving e 
pression to itself in a practical and concrete way, 

6 The Social Sciences — History and Sociology. Tlit 
social scienc es also aid in giving to the world greater rationality, 
^[] ^ nrriff T History and sociology have here a great work in 
explaining social phenomena. In the past, history has been too 
descriptive at the cost of intelligent explanation, but this only 
indicates the puerility of this science, and suggests that the final 
history neither of the world nor of any part of it has yet been 
written. If history is to be merely descriptive it has no hope 
of becoming a science. If it is to be explanatory as well, and 
this is essential to its being a science, it cannot afford to leave 
us to guess the cause of the phenomena with which it deals. 

Sociology is also young as a science. It would not even de- 
serve the name of a science if its intentions were not so good. 
On faith we may, then, regard it as a science of the future, and 
its field will be to describe and explain the phenomena of social 
L'iOc group life. It must show the laws operative in the forma- 

The Philosophical Basis nf Educatio, 

tioti and maintenance of the group relationship, 
as these laws must necessarily be psychological, s 
draw heavily on social psychologj'. In (act this is about as far 
as sociology has gone to-day. It will certainly make more inde- 
pendent advances in the future. It must gather carefully its 
own data of social life, and classify, correlate, describe, and ex- 
plain these phenomena. 

7 The .Abstract Sciences of Relations — Mathe- 
matics AND Logic. The abstract sciences of mathematics and 
logic deserve special mention in any attempt to classify or 
group the sciences now known to man. These are not physical, 
psychical, or psycho-physical, in as much as the data of both 
these sciences are not things or ideas, but pure relationships. In 
the case of mathematics time and space relationships are the ele- 
ments involved, the phenomenal world is the basis. In the case 
of logic ideal relationships are involved, or the truth of our 
ideas and thought constitutes the ground of its search. Logic, 
hoivever, goes beyond the limits of mere description and ex- 
planation and has a teleological reference. We must then leave 
a further statement regarding logic to a later part of this vol- 

Mathematics is the science of time and space relations. Its 
data are simply these immaterial relations. It is thus an ab- 
stract science, or in a sense ideal. The aim of this science is, 
however, consistent with the aim of science generally, that of 
giving an explanation of the world in which we live, so as to 
make it more consistent, less fleeting, and more intelligible. 

8 The Normative and Descriptive Sciences. There 
is another great and important group of inquiries often called 
sciences, but their aim is so different from all the groups men- 
b'oned above in this chapter under the head of descriptive sci- 
ences, that careful distinction must be made here, even though 
we must be very brief. I refer to the philosophical disciplines, 
or the several branches of philosophy, namely: metaphysics, 
epistemology, logic, ethics, lesthetics, and philosophy of religion. 
These are sciences in that they have their own respective fields 
of enquiry, and collect, systematize and explain their respective 
data. But all this is incidental and preliminary to the real 

The Scope o 

irld of Science 

Ease of these sciences, which is to shnw the meaning of all I 
for life. It is meaning here and not pure description and 
rapianation that we are seeking. In distinction from the de- 
scriptive sciences these are called normative, and particularly 
for the reason that each one sets up a standard, so as to give 
meaning and value to life. The word normative means a stand- 
ard or norm 

Metaphysics gives us the nature and standards of being aqj I 
ICfllilXi e pistemologV i the nature and s^ta ndards o f knowledge; 

( fagic, the standards of correct" thinking ; ethics, the nature of I 
goodness ~an3~ the standards of conduct; esthetics gives us the j 
nature and standards of the beautlt\il; philosophy of religio 
the standards of right religious conduct and belief, 
Kience can easily be seen from the foregoing eight sections of 
this chapter. The field of science as here used means the de- 
scriptive sciences. When the philosophical saences of section 
eight are referred to, I shall speak of them as normative, or 
call them by their special names. 

We have observed already that the field of science is very 
broad in that it includes the phenomenal world of matter, the 
physical and biological sciences; the world of mind or con- 
;, the psychological world; and the world of mind and 
1 their relations, psycho-physics; and finally the world . 
of pure and abstract relationships of time and space ideas. In , 
its broadest significance science includes the philosophical dis- 
ciplines, «'hich «-e have called tljc normative sciences. 

Now that the aim of science generally and the special aims 
of the different sciences have been discussed, and the scope or 
field of science has been rather lengthily reviewed, we are next 
to pass in review the general and special methods of science. 
This will pave the way better for a later separation of the two 
points of view in regarding the world, the descriptive and the 
f normative. 

^H ' normative. 


1 Observation, Classification, Description and Ex- 
planation AS Stages of Developments Rather Than 
Methods of Science. From the foregoing two chapters it 
will be seen readily what the general methods of science are. 
It is, however, necessary that we gather together here for our 
specific purpose these several methods and suggest their limits 
and values in giving an account of the world of experience, for 
it is only after we see clearly the place of science in life, that 
we can see definitely what is reasonable to expect of it, and 
what must be left for philosophy. 

It is now time to point out that observation, classification, 
description, and explanation, which were discussed in Chapter 
I, are to be regarded as stages in development of complete sci- 
ence. They are not methods in any technical sense, but more 
immediate aims, or stages, in the realization of a complete 
scientific account of the world of experience. 

There are several methods at the disposal of the scientist. 
These are analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, ex- 
periment and introspection. 

2 Analysis and SvNTHEsrs as Methods. Analysis and 
synthesis will be treated together because the contrast in their 
method of procedure throws light on the real value of each. 
By analysis is meant the separation of any experience or object 
of experience into its elements. It is an effort to understand 
the whole better by better understanding its parts and their 
relation to each other. But to analyze a complete experience 
into its parts and leave it in this sh;ipe, is to rob it of the little 
meaning it did have for common sense. It is not enough merely 
to analyze or dissociate our experiences into their elements. 
We must unite them again ; they must be synthesized. Analy- 


^HBs and synthes 
^pmethods. EacI 

The Methods of Science 

thesis arc correlative and co-operative processes or 
Each adds clearness and significance to the other. 
Through the function of consciousness in the acts of analysis 
and synthesis of the elements of our experience there develops a 
new understanding. Experience takes on a greater aspect of 
rationality or unity, i.e., becomes more intelligible, for only that 
which has unity is intelligible to us. 

Common sense takes experience in the unrefined form in 
which it presents itself to our perceptions. The scientist be- 
gins with this common sense world of perception and tries to 
refine it and make it more intelligible. This he docs by means 
of the special methods at his disposal. 

Analysis and synthesis must go on together. They arc the 
two aspects of a larger process. It would be folly to ask which 
is the more important, just as it would be to ask which is the 
more important part of a circle, the inside or the outside, — they 
we equally essential to the whole. 

3 Indiiction and Deduction as Methods. Induction | 
and deduction are tn'o other methods, closely related to each 
other and to the methods of analysis and synthesis above dis- 

By induction is meant the process of reasoning by inference 
from the concrete to the general, from the individual to the 
universal, from the part to the whole. This pair of methods 
is inseparable and marks a stage of development in science he- 
rond that of analysis and synthesis of the elements of our ex- 
perience, and indeed each of these processes employs the methods 
of inductive and deductive inference. 

By deduction is meant the process of inference where the 
general direction of thoug^it is from the general to the con- 
crete case, from the universal to the particular, from the whole 
to the part. Throu^ inference in diese two ways we arrive 
at judgments both universal and particular. And it is throu^ 
our ability to form judgments that we are able consciously to 
adjust ourselves in a world of practical experience, and to 
ascribe meaning and reality to this world also. But judgiDefltf 
arrived at in the world of sdence arc never to outstrip dw 
evidence of the facts upon which the judgments are based. The 
jadgments nnist always be open to correction and rertnon 


42 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

necessitated by a larger experience. The laws of science are 
judgments asserted in the form of a universal practical judg- 
ment, and must always stand ready to include the widest range 
of fact. The law must always be verified and supported on 
the basis of experience. Scientific judgments always refer to 
a time and space world, to the phenomenal world, and never 
assert or deny reality to the world. 

But the same methods of inference, induction and deduction, 
are able to carry us over into a very different world from that 
of perception and phenomenality, — into the world of truth, re- 
ality, goodness, and beauty. Yet it is not the business of the 
scientist to go so far in his inference. To be sure he makes 
use of hypotheses and suppositions that his science cannot prove, 
nor is it the business of the descriptive sciences, but the philo- 
sophical, or normative sciences. 

The scientist, then, in his use of induction and deduction 
limits their use to the world of time and space, to verification 
and proof by reference to the facts of experience. The logicii 
extends his limits to the world of truth, reality, and values. 

4 Experimental Method. The experimental method is 
the one that best characterizes scientific procedure to-day. Un- 
til the time of Bacon the progress of science was very slow and 
uncertain, and the chief trouble was with the method, because 
the material of science has always been the same — the facts of 
human experience. But there has come a narrowing of the 
field of science with this method, for it is of service as a method 
only in the time and space world, — the world of perception and 
phenomena. So it is too indefinite, as we have already seen, 
to say that science deals with human experience. So does phi- 
losophy deal with human experience, and we are now working 
in the direction of a rather sharp division of the field of human 
experience between science and philosophy. Science is con- 
cerned with human experience only in so far as the data of 
the same can be classified, described and explained in causal 
or sequential order. When the field of science is thus limited 
it becomes apparent that the experimental method becomes of 
great value. 

The experimental method is used wherever it is found pas- 
sible to standardize conditions and operations, so that the given 


The Methods of Science 



phenomena can be reproduced and studied at will. Under such 
condition we can vary the modifying factors or set of factors 
exerting the most positive and direct efEect upon the phenomena 
studied. We can thus discover the variant and learn the law 
of its variation. 

The experimental method has now come to be used in prac- 
tically every descriptive science known to man. It was not 
until the day of experimental or inductive science, that any very 

.rked progress was made in any of the descriptive sciences. 
While this method is limited to the descriptive sciences, the 

iults derived from these sciences are to be used in the nor- 
well, we shall see later. 

The Method of Introspection. The method of in- 
trospection is the special method of the science of psychology. 
All above-named methods are general and are used in all the 
descriptive sciences, psychology included, but introspection is 
specifically the method of psychology. While it is true that 
psychology owes most of its advance in recent years to the 
experimental metliod, it is nevertheless true that the method 
that characterizes psychology is introspection. By introspec- 
tion is meant self-analysis or self -observation. Analysis and 
observation are general methods of science, but self-analysis 
and self -observation are methods of psychology particularly, 
lere is nothing mysterious about this method though it does 

.ke patience and skill to learn to use it successfully in analyz- 
experience into its elements. If we would find the 
mental states that correspond to certain bodily expressions we 
must look within our consciousness for this correlation. The 
other scientific methods can take us a long way in psychology, 
but no other can give us the real laws upon which the mind 
acts, for after all experiments are performed, we still have to 
refer this data to consciousness for the final word. Mind is 
not understood in terms of matter alone, nor is it enough 
merely to correlate physical and mental processes. Mind can 
only be studied in terms of mind, and the only method here 
available is introspection or self observation. There is grave 
danger that we forget this important fact in this day of experi- 
:ntalism. But forget it though we may, the logic of necessity 

^ill drive us back to it again. 

44 The Philosophical Bash of Education 

6 Balance of Methods. It must be remembered that 
these methods arc all available and all necessary in science. 
We cannot get along without any one of them. At one time 
one is more valuable or useful, at another time another, de- 
pending on the nature of the material and the state of develop- 
ment of the particular science. We must therefore govern our 
method by the data to be handled, and in most cases this will 
result in the striking of the proper balance between the different 
methods which are available. Methods are our scientific tools 
with which we shape our experience, and like the master me- 
chanics, we use one tool at one time and another at another, 
depending upon the material used and the aim to be reached, 
for our methods are dependable both on the aim to be accom- 
plished and the nature of the material to be wrought into shape. 

7 Summary of the Methods of Science. Briefly sum- 
marizing, then, we will say the methods of science are analysis 
and synthesis, induction and deduction, experiment and intro- 
spection. If we were looking for one word to cover all methods 
perhaps the best one would be observation, for all methods are 
expressed in observation, which may be either objective or sub- 
jective. The subjective method here referred to is that of in- 
trospection and is the particular method of psychology, as it 
seems most fitting to deal with the materials of consciousness. 
There is another subjective method called reflection, which is 
the characteristic method of philosophy, or the normative sci- 
ences, but it need not detain us here. Now the method to be 
employed Jn any given science will be the one of those above 
mentioned which is most useful in manipulating the data of 
that particular science, but generally a balance between the 
different methods will have to be struck if the greatest gains 
are to be made. 

Now that we have discussed the aims, scope and methods of 
science, each in a separate chapter, let us turn to a chapter in 
which we point out the relations of the various sciences to life ■ 
as a whole. 

ciences to luc ^m 



The Age of Science. For our purposes enough has 
already been said as to the relation between the various sciences 
to one another, but perhaps their place and value can better 
be seen as a whole if we speak of the relations of science gen- 
erally to life. 

Our age has rightly been characterized as the age of science 
and industrial progress. But our industrial progress is the 
direct outcome or result of the growth of science. The scientist 
not only has made wonderful strides in his own field, particu- 
larly through the methods of induction and experiment, but 
he has used this knowledge in the service of manlcind by aiding 
in the solution of many of the practical problems of life. 
Out of each one of the theoretical or pure sciences has devel- 
oped an applied science. Our physics has grown out into the 
fields of applied mechanics, electricity and' engineering, and all 
sorts of construction work and invention of the practical utili- 
ties of life. Chemistry has given us a science of dyeing and 
manufacturing of foods and drinks, and it is applied in various 
ways to mining, engineering, and metallurgy. And the end is 
not yet. 

From our biological and physiological studies, once purely 
theoretical, has come the applied sciences of hygiene qnd physi- 
cal education, with the result that the laws of growth and de- 
velopment of the organism are being taken consciously into 
account in our daily life. From chemistry and physiology has 
come the science of medicine. The social sciences are promot- 
ing on scientific bases constructive work in the way of improv- 
ing society in accordance with the ideals of man, which ideals 
are drawn from other fields of life but which largely depend 
upon the advance in the descriptive sciences for theCr realization. 
L And even psychology is coming to be extremely practical, and so 



■ Scie 

■ and r< 

46 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

is gathenng a great amount of human interest about itself. 
From every quarter of the earth the cry comes to the psycholo- 
gist: What can you do for society? The psychologist really 
tries to keep from shoiving signs of great joy lest he be thought 
not to be possessed truly of scientific dignity. But he has given 
the answer to the world question in small part, and so he has 
attacked with the other scientist the problems of the world. 
Now it is well known that no amount of industrial or material 
progress will settle all the problems of the business, social, 
moral, religious, political, or educational world. For in all 
these fields we have to deal with mind as well as matter, and 
up to the present our chief concern has been with matter. 
The great progress of the next decade is likely to be made 
along the line of mental science. Already we have fairly re- 
spectable sciences under the name of psychotechnics of business, 
medicine, and education, and we are struggling to get as good 
a hearing in the fields of law, social life, religion, domestic 
life and a good many other fields too. We have only just be- 
gun to develop a science of applied psychology. The next dec- 
ade will see great things come about in the line of applied 

a Science and the Life of Reason. The development 
of science shows on the side of rationality a great advance in 
reason beyond that of common sense. The mind of man was 
at an early stage of his existence a very small force in con- 
trolling his life. Man was a victim of circumstances and a 
prey to all sorts of illusions and misconceptions. His only 
teacher was the great cosmos about him. The forces of his 
environment played incessantly upon him without revealing the 
secrets of their nature or that of man. But after long ages man 
came to take a hand in the shaping of his own destiny. The 
cosmos is no longer his only teacher, he becomes a factor in 
his own development. His adjustment to his environment be- 
comes a conscious process. But not until the development of 
science does man reach a high degree of ability to shape not 
only his own destiny, but to modify the circumstances under 
which he lives, so as to promote the realization of his best self. 
Science then marks a stage in the evolution of intelligence 
d reason beyond that of common sense, or the still more 

J^P The Relations of Science to Life 47 

primitive stage of his cosmic existence, before he consciously re- 
garded himself as a factor in the creation of his own destiny. 
We are not to say here that science marks the stage of highest 
development of human reason, for unless the reflective sciences , 
of philosophy are included there is yet a higher stage of rational I 
development. This will be considered later. 

3 Science Gives Increased Facilities for Ltfi;. rut 
Does Not Give its Meaning. We have greatly emphasized 
the value of science for practical life, Wc can scarcely over- 
estimate its value, provided we do not lose sight of the broader 
point of view of the meaning and value of life. There is great 
danger, however, that we become intoxicated, or at least light- 
headed, under the influence of modern science. The progress in 
science is so rapid and the pace of the scientist is ever being 
accelerated. Movement is what grown people like as well as 
babies, but the sober old cranks of society scratch their heads 
and say, What does all this fuss mean anyway? Is the world ' 
going mad? 

This is a very real and vital question, and much is at stake 
in giving our answer. So we cannot aflord to answer it with 
a shrug of the shoulder, or a look of disgust. The question 
is real for it is concerning the deeper meaning and value of 
life that we are seeking information in the answer to this ques- 
tion. The world is in danger of going wild over science, more 
particularly because its results are so noticeable, and can be ex- 
posed in the many concrete and practical ways we have already 
pointed out. Let us, then, proceed carefully in our estimate 
of the place and value of science. Science does increase facili- 
ties for our practical life. It does give us wonderful time and 
labor-saving devices. Indeed in the purely time and space 
world it has no equal, here it reigns supreme. It might also 
be said with equal truth that science increases our human wants 
as well as facilities for supplying them, but it does not give 
us any true insight into our real needs. This takes descriptiv 
science out of its provinces. A need implies an "ought" whic. 
does not exist as fact, but as purpose or idea. 

Science increases the facilities for living but does not create J 
!■ necessarily a better life. The forces at work in the develop- 1 
^B ment of a valuable life are purposes, — ideals and are not J 



48 The Philosopkical Basis of Education 

economic, however important these latter are for our practical 
existence. Man demands not only existence, but a purposeful 
and valuable existence. Man does not live by bread alone. 

4 We Must Turn to Philosophy for the Meaning 

OF Life. We have observed that science fails to give tlie whole 
account of life, for it leaves out its meaning and value, and this 
is much like gathering in the husks and leaving the ears behind. 
What is life without meaning and value? Indeed what would 
science itself be if life had no meaning? The life we live must 
"have a meaning of some sort, or it would have no existence as 
idea. The quest for this meaning is not the business of science, 
but of philosophy, or what we have called normative sciences. 
True, some scientists occasionally turn philosophers without 
knowing it, and attempt to give both a descriptive and a nor- 
mative account of our experience, to explain it as fact and to 
give it meaning and value as well, but such hybrids are for- 
tunately not many, and it is well they are not, for they ivould 
soon succeed in giving us a riddle of the universe, such as 
would take many generations of thinking to clear up to the 
mind of the average man. 

5 General Summary of the Aims, Scope, Methods, 
AND Relations of Science. In summarizing and concluding 
Part I of this volume on the aims, scope, methods, and rela- 
tions of science, we shall mention only the most salient points so 
far brought out. We have found that it is the specific aim of 
science to give a descriptive and explanatory account of the 
world, and the stages of development or progress toward this 
end are observation, correlation, and classification of facts of 
experience and then follows description and finally explanation, 
which amounts to the relation of the particular facts to the 
laws to which they are subordinate. The fact looks to the law 
for a fuller explanation of itself. After the stage of law and 
principle Is reached, the practical interest of man shows itself 
by applying these laws to the problems of life. 

The scope or field of science was found to he as broad as 
human experience, but not so deep. It includes all the data of 
life, but it does not show their underlying meaning for life 
as a whole. 

The Relations of Science to Life 


The methods of science are analysis and synthesis, induction 
and deduction, experiment and introspection. These have equal 
value in their own place, hut are not interchangeable. All have 
been found serviceahle in gaining a larger and deeper insight 
into the field of experience. 

The various fields of sciences are related as are the parts of 
any organic whole, and it is only in the interest of greater ef- 
fectiveness and because of more special interests, that the field 
of science has been divided at all. The practical relations of 
science to life are many and important. But there is a limit 
to what science can do. It must iie confined to the perceptual 
or phenom enal world of time and space, tu the world of descrip- 
tiori_and exphmatlon, and the deeper meaning and value of life 
must be^eft to other inquirers. Otherwise two essential points 
of view are taken at orice and the result is confusion. 

It is now time to turn to the field of the normative sciences, 
or generally speaking to philosophy, in order to trace out the 
deeper significance or meaning of life to which reference has 
several times been made. And here as in Part I we consider 
the subject under the head of aims, scope, methods and rela- 
tions giving a chapter to each one. After this detailed treat- 
ment we can proceed to a final statement of the relations of 
science and philosophy in Part III, and so divide the field of 
human experience between them. We shall, then, be ready for 
a specific account of the relations of philosophy and of educa- 
tion, in Part IV, after which we may successfully treat the 
ethical aspects of education in Part V, 

The Aims, Scope, Methops and Relations of Philosophy 

the aims of philosophy 

The World of Description and the World of Ap- 
preciation. We arc now to trace the aims, scope, methods, 
and relations of philosophy, just as we did in the case of science 
in Part I. In this chapter we are concerned with the aims of 
philosophy. What is the aim of philosophy? What does the 
philosopher try to accomplish ? Why does he regard science as 
unable to give a complete account of the world? These arc 
questions whose answers will come out more clearly as we pro- 
ceed in this chapter. 

We have already seen that the world the scientist lives in 
is the world of description. He is concerned with the causal 
world of sequence and phenomena, with the world of time and 
space, the world of fact or the is. We shall, find that the 
philosopher is concerned with a different world. To be sure he 
is concerned with things temporal, as well as the scientist and 
the man of common sense, but as a student he is concerned with 
the word of eternal values. If we go no farther than the 
world of science we see nothing as valuable, all is meaningless. 
Vanity, vanity, nothing but vanitv', was not spoken of the world 
of values, but of the fluctuating, vascillating world of the 
senses. Heraclitus could see nothing but a ceaseless change or 
(lux, nothing was stable. The only reason was because he could 
not see far enough. There^KJuch.a .thing as philosophical 
myopia, and he had a Ea3~i:ase of it. He could not see the 
forest for the trees. The facts blinded him to the deeper under- 
lying meaning and reality of things. There was even a certain 
consistency or changclcssness about the changing, that should 
have given a small ray of hope at least, for the thing that never 
ceases to change is changeless and permanent in one sense at 

, least. 

Well, as long a 

2 Stay in the world of science, wc are I 

5+ The Philotof'hUoI Basis of Education 

the world of time and space or sense-perception. And in last 
analysis things are not what they seem. In reality seeing is 
not believing. The man with a longing for truth docs not rest 
satisfied with the storv' that perception tells of the world. 
There is a more profound order of thinp, not so easily ob- 
served. The world of sense- perception, the world of descrip- 
tion, is the starting point in the quest for reality, but it is not 
the end of the search. The data of science are the facts of 
human experience, and certainly a philosophical account of life 
must begin with these data. But unlike science, philosophy is 
not done with its task when it has succeeded in arranging classi- 
fying, and describing these facts. Philosophy begins here just 
where science leaves off. It leaves out of account nothing that 
science has gained, for this is the very beginning of its course. 
It has been said that the relation of religion and morality can be 
liltened unto two concentric circles of unequal radii, the smaller 
circle representing morality and the larger one including it re- 
ligion. Now I think that science and philosophy can be com- 
pared in the same way. Philosophy can make no headway un- 
less it takes account of all that has been gained by science in 
understanding human experience. Philosophy starting here sets 
out on a more extended search for the meaning and value of 
life, This is the one great aim of philosophy, to find out what 
life means as determined by our experience as a part nf this life. 

2 Philosophy, the View of the Whole of Lifk; Sci- 
ence, OF A Part. In as much as experience cannot be com- 
plete, and further since it is the aim of philosophy to give the 
meaning of life as a whole, it becomes clear at once that philoso- 
phy must construct the whole out of the part of human expe- 

So the aim of philosophy is seemingly rather ambitious and 
yet not so much so, if we are to lemeroher that the philosopher 
has no right to go farther than the facts of e.tperience warrant 
on the grounds of rational inference. We cannot get away 
from inference in philosophy any more than we saw we could 
in science. When the scientist passes from mere correlation 
and comparison to generalization, he arrived at a conclusion 
which was not found in the premises, but yet which was war- 
ranted by them. So it is in philosophy. The philosopher must 

The Aims of Philosophy 55 

{eneralize, from judgments and conclusions, but all these must 
e consistent with the true principles of rational inference, both 

(^Induction and deduction. 

s the philosopher's aim to give 3 systematic way of viewing 

pthe universe as a whole. James says, that the most important 
.part of a man Is his vieiv of the universe. A man's view of the 
iniverse is his way of looking at experience as a whole. It is 
's grip on totality, to use James again. Without this view of 
Rife, experience is meaningless, for it is only by reference to this 
view of the totality of things that the fragmentary bits of 
our experience have any meaning at all. The parts become 
significant only in reference to the whole. What does the 
balance wheel or the mainspring of a watch mean, if we have 
never seen, or heard of a watch? What does each fragmen- 
tary bit of our human experience mean unless we can relate it 
to a whole, which is not given in any single experience or all 

I mir experiences together? 

L Now this idea of constructing a view of the whole is neither 

•impracticable nor unthinkable. We are doing this same thing 

"in a smaller way every day of our life. We find bones of ex- 
tinct animals scattered all over the world. From these frag- 
mentary bits the whole is gradually conceived and the missing 
parts are filled in with plaster of paris, or some other material, 
and these are displayed in our museums as the amazing handi- 
craft of our scientists. And the wonder of it all is that no 
man now living to tell the story has ever seen this specimen 
of animal life! Or again, take the case of the construction 
engineer, who sees ever^' part in its relation to the whole which 
does not exist as fact at all, but as idea, but which idea of the 
whole is nevertheless the ver>' thing that gives to each concrete 
part the only meaning and value it has. Nor is the case of the 
inventor any different. Thejdea of the whole is the standard 
o|_ values foicach part. If the parts mean anything and have 
any value it is only because they have relation as parts of this 

r ^isanic whole, 01 unity. 

r3 The A[m of Philosophy. 
amples before us, how can we be so 
philosopher is only chasing butterflie 
sonable to suppose that the philosophe 

With these several ex- 
bold as to assert that the ' 
;? Is it any more unrea- 
r with his broader aim can 



56 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

determine the meaning and value of life as a whole, than it 
is that the scientist can construct an animal which he has never 
seen or heard of with nothing but a few old dry bones; or that 
a builder can design and construct a building the like of which 
no one has seen; or that an inventor can construct a machine 
about which no one else has ever dreamed? There is no rea- 
son unless it is in the nature of mind to be so limited. But 
the fact that it is not so limited is evidenced by its never end- 
ing search for the yet unknown. Thciacts oi mind get t heir 
meaning only by reference to the whole, or totality of the uni- 
verse. And without some notion of the whole of things the 
fragments of our experience arc as dry bones, for with them- 
selves they have no meaning. The meaning and value of life 
then rest in the relation of the whole to the parts and the_parts 
to the whole. Where there is no unity there is no meaning p_r_. 
value. Where there is unity and organization, the facts g et 
their meaning by the place they occupy in the system of things. 
Do we any longer have difficulty in seeing that science is 
pressed too heavily when we expect it to give us a complete 
account of our experience? Science can do nothing more tha n 
organize. -and .arrange the facts of experience into regular aider 
orjCQUCflEe. And this system of things in the phenomenal 
world is the whole to which the parts are referred for their 
explanation as phenomena. But the systems of the sciences 
need to be ordered and arranged, and they need to be ex- 
plained also. But all this does not imply more than a science 
of sciences, and philosophy is more than that. A 
sciences would still, demand a philosophy in order to give_tbe 
wo rld of de scription nicaoing aiid value. A science of sciences 
would still be less than the whole of human experience, for sci- 
ence must rest content with a complete description and explana- 
tion of the facts of experience, so far as experience has gone. 
-'But experience is a constantly widening circle; it is ceaselessly * 
changing and presenting new aspects. Science then gives us 
not the whole but only a part of experience, and a smalt part 
at that. But the word part implies a whole, and the part is 
not the whole, but essential to the organism of the whole, and 
depends upon this latter for its significance. The part, then, 
must be related to the whole of which it is a part for its mean- 
ing and value, and the whole which is not given in the part is 

The Aims of Philosophy 57 ' 

nevertheless so related to it as to include it as a. part of its own 
organization. A part is so related to the whole that the organi- 
zation is incomplete without it, and the whole is so related to 
the part that the latter has no significance or meaning except in J 
relation to tlic organization as a whole, 

Then_the_vv-orld of science is not only phenomena, and j, 
mere paft ol.tlie laigei totality. of things, but it Is meaninglas 
and va lueless except in reference to this larger whole. Now the 
whole Ts never given in a part and so not all at one time as 
fact or phenomena. The whole is thus not preceived in our 
experience in the world of time and space. The part, however, 
is so revealed. And it is from the part that the philosopher, 
like, his brother scientist, constructs the whole, or his view q£ 
the totality of things. It isjilain, then, that the philosopher is i 
■re drenmcr, but is engaged in the serious business of | 
^ in^ the meaning and value of human experience by I 
^Towmg^iu significance for the whole which the part implies. | 

We have stated the aim of philosophy as that of rendering 
experience significant, or that of showing the meaning and 
value of life. We are now able to see that such meaning and 
value are impossible except as the experience, which is the 
part, is related to the larger whole which it implies. All fact s 
then Eet_ jhcifc ^griificance by reference to the whole. In as 
much as the part and the wliole are organically related, they are 
functionally interdependent, that is the dependence works both 
ways. Thx\iiole must be implied by the part, that is we naust 
_Slart wis the phenomenal world of science and sense-percep- 
tion, and the whole in turn gives significance and meaning to 
the fact of part by showing its place in, or its relation to the 
whole. There is, then, nothing mysterious about the aim of 
philosophy, when we say it is to show the meaning and value 
of life. And this we have seen to be the task of showing the 
significance of our fragmentary experience for life as a whole. 

4 Philosophy as Appreciation. But when we come to 
this plane of understanding and sec life from the philosophical 
point of view, human experience gains new significance, because 
of the new and higher light shed upon it by the relation of 
whole and part. We have thus been led through the world 
pi description of facts to a realm of values, purposes and ideala, 


58 The Phihsophical Basis of Education 

no longer to be systematized for the mere purpose of causu 
explanation, but to be appreciated. Indeed we have now left 
the world of mechanical causality entirely, and are in the world 
of appreciation and values, or the teleological world of aims 
and purposes. The transition is not so abrupt as would seem 
at first thought. We have not felt the world of mechanical 
causation in one sense, for we are still limited by it in our 
experience of fact, but by means of it as our starting point wc 
have transcchded its limitations in thought. We can now see 
the forest despite the trees, the particulars do not blind us to 
the universal, the very foundation of their meaning and value. 
When we pass from the world of mechanical causation to 
the teleological world of values and meaning, we have made 
the transition from the world of description and phenomena 
to the world of appreciation. We are no longer to limit our 
search to the causal relation of facts in the world that now is 
realized in our limited experience, but by means of this worH 
we reach out to its other, the great world of the whole or to- 
tality of things. Experience in a limited world of time and 
/ space gives way to a great world of meanings and purpose. 
' Through understanding wc have come to appreciate, for now 
I the facts are not isolated but related into a system of things and 
so have value. Facts thus become values in their relation._to 
the whole, and the world of experience ceases to be purely tem- 
poral as implied" in science, but partakes of the external, in just 
I the same way that the part is related to the whole. Man need 
' not complain of his finitude. He might better complain of him- 
self that he has not realized the external aspect of his nature. 

The world of description and the world of appreciation are 
the two aspects of the same world, the world of reality. This 
world is temporal as viewed from the angle of a fragmentary 
experience, but is eternal when seen from the angle of the 
5vbole. The whole of our experience cannot be realized in any 
one unit of time, for to make such a claim would be to identify 
the whole with the part. ThE_reiditj'. o£ the \yorld is thus not 
fully revealed in the facts of experience, hut rather as idea .or 
purpose, which manifests itself in time as the world of fact of 
the world of experience. This world of fact, the descriptive 
world, is the aspect of reality that is presented to a temporal 
md spatial view of experience, it is the external meaning of the 

The Aims of Philosophy S9 

idea of the whole, or the way reality is expressed in point of 
time. But the deeper aspect of reality is not thus revealed in 
time, for the whole cannot be expressed in a part, or in time. 
The idea of \[}e; whnle is t\]e ipfj^rnal_ m eanin g of th g. i'iss- 
Every id^a thus has its external WL iaterQaLaigaificaa(X.,iK 
relation to the world of fact and the. world of meaning, the 
woriS^qf scien.cp or phenomena and the. world of philosoplij; 
the realm of values and meanings. 

Now in this world of purposes and values the philosopher has 
a task resemhling that of the scientist. These valij^s_and-piii? 
poses must b e related and hatmonized just as the ^endat must 
systema tize his facts. It is only by such a harmony of these in- 
ternal meanings or values that anything like a complete philoso- 
phy of life is possible. Here again the only meaning possible 
is that derived through harmony and organization of purposes 
or values in a larger system of purposes. Such a system of 
values will always he incomplete on accoimt of the fallibility 
of human thought, but this sort of reflection is necessary if 
experience is to have any significance, if life is to be regarded as 
worth the living. 

It is not our purpose in this chapter to work out a complete 
philosophy of life, but a,s its heading suggests to make clear 
what the aim of the philosopher is. 

5 Summary of the Aims of Philosophy. We have 
now answered in brief the questions asked at the beginning of 
this chapter. We see that it is the aim of phili-sophy to make 
experience significant, or possess meaning. And this Is accom- 
plished through the relation of the part of experience to the 
whole which clearer reflection demands. The philosopher 
has no quarrel with the scientist. On the contrary, he is grate- 
ful to him for having made such a good beginning. But the 
philosopher takes up experience ivhere the scientist leaves off, 
— with causal description and explanation, and sets out to find 
its other, the whole which the part implies. He knows the 
whole must be, or exist, for the part implies it, just as the 
bone of the extinct animal suggests the whole which is con- 
structed from the part. 

The phi losopher Jcayes. to the.iciencist-to . work out the rela; 
1 of the parts to each other sn thc_tEtnPJ3?il. sid e of om 

6o The Pkilosopkkal Bash of Edueatio 



experiencej in the world of causality and sequence, but_llip 
^nlosopli^er begins here and moves on in quest of the wIh^Ip, jj 
totality of tTi Jng s . The world of reality presents one side of it- 
s'elf to a limited view of time and space, the world of descrip- 
tion ; it presents quite another to the view from the side of the 
whole. The question as to which of the two aspects is more 
real can be answered by asking, which is more real the whole or 
the part? Both are real, for the whole would not exist without 
the parts, and the parts would have no significance without 
reference to the whole. The world of the scientist, or time and 
space, is real then, but only as the part is real for the whole. 

Science will never be able to give the whole account of life, 
but as we saw in Part I it gives a very significant part, but yet 
only a part, and this demands always its other, the whole. We 
may contend for a world of isolated facts, or independent reals, 
but our very idea of isolation involves the conception of the 
unity of the whole. To get away from the whole is impossible. 
The very limit*; of time and spnce, as our experiential \mild, 
imply something not given and that cannot be given i n one 
experience. We must transcend time and space if we a«- tQ 
get meaning and unity out of our experience, but wheU-t^U 
IS done by gaining a clear conception of the whole, which tjr 
its very nature cannot he given as a part, we havf ^- 
ready transcended the world of time and space, or thp phf- 
nomenal world of science and common sense, and have eoieacd 
into the world of spiritual values. 

The scientist and the philosopher may live in the same world. 
and they do (vhether they know it or not ; they may even live in 
the same house and sleep in the same bed, or indeed be in the 
same man, but it is only when they know what they are about 
that they can give to the world the two points of view de- 
manded by a consistent reality, a world of true being and 
eternal. I hope the world of the scientist and the philosopher 
are becoming more clearly distinguishable in thought as we 
proceed, for much depends on this distinction if the reader is to 
follow me through to the end of our journey. 

Now that we have stated rather fully the aim of philosophy, 
we will do well to turn to a more detailed examination of the 
scope or field of philosophy. To this matter we give the fol- 
lowing chapter. 



TRASTED. We should have by this time a fair understanding 
of the aim, scope, and methods of science, and its relation to 
our practical life. From the foregoing chapter particularly, 
we should see how the aims of science and philosophy differ. 
In this present chapter we hope to get clearly in mind the 
scope or field of philosophy, 50 that its field or range can be 
more clearly distinguished from that of science. 

The range of philosophy is limited to human experience and 
what it means; the range or field of science to human experi- 
ence and how it is related in time and space, or to its causal 
sequence. Science has only to do with order and sequence; for 
philosophy sequence has no meaning, except for the part of 
the world viewed by science. Sequence is not of the whole but 
of the part. Science deals with facts, both mental and physi- 
cal, and the whole range of such facts. So does philosophy, 
but in a very different way, and for a very different purpose. 
The difference in purpose or aim has already been brought out. 
In this chapter we are to emphasize the scope or field of phi- 
losophy, in the next we shall emphasize the method. All along 
we shall make comparisons and contrasts that will aid in seeing 
the respective fields of science and philosophy. 

Perhaps there is no field where science and philosophy seem 
to the average man to overlap as much as in psychology, .There 
is no reason for this confusion of thought, though it does exist. 
Psychology is a descriptive science, and is like all the other 
descriptive sciences in that it aims to give a full account of the 
ways its facts or data are connected. The same stages of de- 
velopment are passed through as in any other descriptive science, 
namely observation, comparison, classification, and generaliza- 
tion. The same methods are employed as in the other sciences. 

62 The Phlloiophica} limis of FJjicalm. 

with the addition of one particularly suited to its own special 
purposes, that is, — introspection. The chief difference between 
psychology and the other sciences is in the materials with which 
it deals. For psychology the only facts dealt with are mental, 
states of consciousness. Rut these facts are to be analyzed, 
classified, described and explained in their own way, just as are 
the material facts of our experience. No greater reality should 
be a,«:ribed to the facts of psychology than to those of the 
physical, biological, or sociological sciences. Indeed all facts 
are of equal value in the world of description. It is in the very 
nature of science that all values be eliminated so that a wholly 
impartial view of the world be given. Not so in philosophy, 
where values are ascribed lo facts as parts of a whole of reality. 

For the botanist a weed is just as good, or valuable as a 
rose. The distinctions in the scientific world are not made on 
the basis of values at all. The system to which the facts of 
science relate is not the system of values to which in the philo- 
sophical world we ascribe reahty. No more does the true psy- 
chologist ascribe values to his facts, the states of consciousness, 
than does the botanist to his facts. It would be meaningless 
for psychology to ask which is the more valuable, a memory 
or state of feeling, a judgment or an emotion, an act of cogni- 
tion or an act of will. You might just as well ask of the 
physicist to tell which is the more valuable, black or white? 
In a world of description, where values cut no figure, such 
questions fall to the ground. 

The psychologist is not to be feared by the philosopher any 
more than the physicist, the chemist or the botanist. For while 
all are to work on the basi-* of e\penence, the fact basis, they 
have a different purpose in dealmg with these facts and there 
is no cause for conflict. Like the other scientists the psycholo- 
gist aims only to describe and explain his faas, and unlike them 
all the philosopher attempts is to show the meaning and value 
of these facts for life as a whole 

2 Data of Philosophy the Whole of Human Ex- 
perience. Since the data of philosophy is the whole of human 
experience, it must take into account both mental and physical 
facts, as its data. And yet tJiis is only another way of saying 
what has already been said, that philosophy and science deal 

■^ facts, as 


The Scope or Field of Philosophy 


with the same data, the facts of experience, but each in its own 
way and for its own special purpose. 

Neither in science nor in philosophy do we go outside experi- 
ence for our data, but find our beginning in the actual world of 
time and space. In science we not only have our beginning 
here, but never get beyond this causal aspect of experience, but 
in philosophy this serves only as our starting point. By use of 
the special method of the philosopher, reflection, to be dis- 
cussed in the next chapter, he passes beyond the world of mere 
phenomena into the world of values and purposes. The philoso- 
pher is in no sense a creator of values, on the contrary his world 
is one of absolute and eternal values, that are to be shared by 
all who know, fee!, and will correctly. It is here that the part 
finds its other, the whole, the unity of all the parts. 

3 Philosophy Always Views Experience From Nor- 
mative Aspect. The data of life as facts of experience should 
lead us on to the joys of this other world. Science may go 
on forever and it will never satisfy the craving of man's soul 
for the deeper values of life. No world of mere analyses, com- 
parison and generalization can fully satisfy the demand for a 
life with meaning and purpose. The part can never rest with- 
out its other, the whole of which it is part. And value and pur- 
pose cannot come from a mere causal inquiry. There arc no 
values where there is no higher unity of purpose, and no ap- 
preciation except of values. 

Philosophy never loses sight of its one aim, that of giving 
an account of the world as appreciation and value. The 
view of philosophy is always normative, never descriptive. The 
view of science is always descriptive and never normative. 
Every single fragment of experience can be observed from two 
points of view, descriptive and normative, causal and non-causal, 
fact and purpose, sequential and anti-sequential, ideal. And 
it is the business of philosophy to view the facts of experience 
from the normative, non-causal, purposive or anti-sequential 
point of view, or in short, the teleological view. 

Let us take as examples of the above distinction a few facts 
to he observed briefly from these two points of view. I let 
loose a stone and it falls. I ask why, and then explain the 
phenomena by referring it to the law of gravitation, which is 

The PkSftt^pktJ Bak 

only another fact of v5drr pw m^'j^'m* - Tiis h the pro- 
cedure of ptnracal yamcr. Xov I aK m^ii s Ac nature of 
gra^'itation. and ixnr it s rdafied to i^ ^*c a c as a wfaok, 
and at once I go from jbvscs to sKta^cn^ks. or more gen- 
crdly speaking, to phik»opfaT. Or aga5n. I nm mr eyes to- 
ward an object and get a j^^uTm mmtal rEprcssmi wfaidi b 
called a perception. I cxplafn t!us pfeeaccmscfi by stating that 
a certain hypothetical mcdfom caDed cdicr was set in moCiOD, 
and these ttndulatfoDS or e th e r eal vibratioDs set in motion a 
certain chemical actxrity in die retinal area of die eye. and this 
gave rise to die state of ooosciousness called p er ce ption. This 
is pure description and cxplanatfco. Bur now let us ask. \Vhat 
is the ultimate nature of this ether? \Vhat is its rdatKHi to 
reality? How do the vibrations in the ether produce thb 
state in the nerves called a stimulus? And what is still more 
perplexing, how do these nervous excitements give rise to a 
state of consciousness? All these questions go deeper than 
mere description and explanatHm, they involve questions as to 
reality, and hence are metaphysical and epistemologicaL 

4 Philosophy Includes SEvotAL Specl%l Viewpoints. 
We have up to the present been using philosophy as a blanket 
term, much as we did sdence until a division of the field of 
science was made in Part I corresponding to this one. We 
must now become more specific, for the word philosophy is a 
very broad term. The world of values and meaning belongs 
to philosophy, but it is convenient to divide phflosophy into 
several branches, corresponding to the several sets of values, 
to be found in its province. 

In this section we shall mention only the various branches 
of philosophy and leave for later sections of this chapter such 
detailed statements as the aim of this volume seems to justify. 
These branches arc metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, 
aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. 

It is quite consistent with the general movement of experi- 
ence toward sharper and more differentiated points of view, that 
the philosophy of life has come thus to differentiate itself. All 
it to be gained and nothing lost by this division of labor, or 
differentiation of function, provided we keep clearly in mind 
the one ultimate aim of all philosophy as that of revealing the 

" The Scope or Field of Philosophy 65 

meaning and value of life, or experience. Each one of the 
branches mentioned above has a certain field of human experi- 
ence with which it deals and it has its own alms, scope and 
methods, and its own field of values. 

A division of the field of philosophy here will not only 
serve to make more clear the whole scope of philosophy, which 
is the aim of this chapter, but it will aid greatly in the future 
when we come to trace the relations of ethics, which is one 
of the branches of philosophy, to education. Philosophy as 
the view of the whole of life is necessarily so broad that a 
division of the field is necessary if substantial progress is to 
be made. These several branches of philosophy are variously 
called, when taken together, the philosophical disciplines, the 
philosophical sciences or the normative sciences. The first 
phra-se sounds too scholastic while the second one is too apt 
to confuse the distinction already made between philosophy and 
science. The third will be used in this volume when refer- 
ence is made severally to the branches of philosophy. The 
particular reason for my choice of the phrase, normative science, 
as applied to the branches of philosophy, is that it signifies by 
the very word normative that standards and values are in- 
volved, and this certainly separates these branches from the 
descriptive sciences, where values and standards are in the 
sense here used unknown. 

5 Metaphysics as the Science of Reality. Meta- 
physics is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with be- 
ing or reality. It might he defined as the science of being or 
reality. This is an old question for philosophy and has inter- 
ested the world at least since Thales, and probably much 
longer. Metaphysics is the search for an ultimate or first 
principle of the universe, in terms of which all thinp may be 
explained. This principle has been variously asserted to be 
earth, air, fire and water, by many different philosophers in 
the early stages of philosophy. In course of time this ultimate 
principle came to be endowed with what seemed to be con- 
sciousness. For Ana.\agoras this first principle was the Apiron, 
or living, breathing matter. This marked the transition from a 
crude materialism in metaphysics to a hylozoism. This hylozois- 
tic element had the advantage of taking account both of the 


66 The Phito^ophknl Basis of Education 

world of matter and of mind, which were then 'not always 
clearly defined, but it had the difficulty of failing to reconcile 
the apparent dualism between the world of mind and the world 
of matter. 

Again the attempt has been made to find a common element 
between mind and matter and in terms of this pan-psychistic 
principle to define the reality of both mind and matter. And 
still other philosophers have given up the idea of a materialistic, 
hylozoistic and the pan-psychistic principle, and have regarded 
the reality of the universe as definable only in terms of ideas 
or purposes. These are the idealists. The crude and unreflec- 
tive realists assert that the facts of mind and matter are equally 
and independently real, while the newer realists hold that there 
is no dependence between the knower and the known, or be- 
tween consciousness and matter, as the idealist claims, but that 
consciousness and its object become one and the dualism is rec- 
onciled in the cognitive or knowing process. 

But whatever the claims of metaphysics as to what consti- 
tutes reality or being, the field and aim are practically the same 
for them all, and that is to discover the nature of reality or 
being. What is and what is not, what exists in time and space, 
and what is independent of these, and in what sense are the 
facts of the phenomenal world real at all? These are ques- 
tions for metaphysics and they penetrate the innermost nature 
of the universe. 

6 Epistemology as the Science of Knowledge. Epis- 
temology is concerned with knowledge. What is the nature 
and extent of knowledge? How can we know the real if it 
exists? What is the validity of knowledge in the search for 
truth and reality? These are some of the questions of epis- 
temology, and they have received many different answers 
through the ages. Protagoras, chief of the Sophists during 
Plato's time, asserted that knowledge is impossible. All is 
opinion, sense-perception. "Man is the measure of all things," 
he said. There are no universal standards of knowledge. Every 
man is his own individual standard. This proposition also as- 
serts that there are no metaphysical standards of being or 
reality. This is the extreme of scepticism. But the great ma- 
jority of philosophers think knowledge is possible, but just 

The Scope or Field of Philosophy 67 

how it is to be derived is a matter on which there is much 
disagreement. Some contend that the principles of knowledge 
are all gained in experience, a posteriori. The former group 
are called empiricists, and the latter rationalists. While they 
differ as to the limits and possibilities and methods of getting 
knowledge, yet their main aim is the same, what can be known, 
and how can it be known? 

7 Logic as the Science of Correct Thinking. Logic 
is probably the most abstract of all the sciences. It deals with 
relations. It stands in about the same relation to the sciences 
generally as does mathematics to the descriptive sciences. It 
is not to be understood that logic has nothing to do with the 
descriptive sciences, for it does. The great question for logic 
is what constitutes proof. The concern of logic is with propo- 
sitions, which assert a certain relationship as existing between 
things or ideas. Logic must decide the truth of these proposi- 
tions by reference to its own norms or standards of value for 
truth. It is the nature of truth and reality to be consistent, 
and the logical test amounts to a proof that such consistency 
exists. If a proposition is such as to assert a thing by denying 
it, then the thing whose existence is denied exists as a reality. 
For instance, Protagoras asserted the proposition that knowl- 
edge is impossible and that man is the measure of all things. 
In both these propositions we find a contradiction, for knowl- 
edge is asserted by denying it, since this much knowledge at 
least is certain. The second proposition is false, for by as- 
serting that man is the measure of all things, we assert that 
this standard at least is universal, and hence all is not par- 

In logic we are concerned with the standards or ultimate 
tests of proof, or what constitutes proof, or sufficient grounds 
of knowledge. These standards are not given as data in 
the world of descriptive science. They are not presented as 
immediate data for consciousness, but come through reflection 
on the relative values of experience as determined by the mean- 
ing of the whole. Logic is, then, concerned with the values 
of truth, and like the other normative sciences, its business is to 
aid in giving richer meaning and content to life, by showing the 
form our propositions or assertions of relation must assume. 


The Philosophical Bnsis of Education 

. 8 Ethics as the Science of Right Conduct. Ethics 
IS the science of right conduct. What is the nature of good- 
ness? What is evil? What Is the nature of freedom ? These 
are imfMirtant questions for ethics. Just as metaphysics deter- 
mines the nature and standards of being or reality, and epistem- 
ology the nature and extent of knowledge, and logic what 
constitutes proof, so ethics determines the nature of right con- 
duct and action. Ethics must not be confused with morals, 
for ethics is a science, and morality is an art. One has to do 
with knowing the standards of right action, and the other 
with right action itself. Ethics determines the principles of 
our actions just as geometry determines the principles of our 
carpentry. Ethics, then, is related to morality in the same way 
that geometry is related to carpentry, as physiology is related 
to hygiene, or as mathematics is related to civil engineering. 

Just as metaphysics has always been in search for the one 
ultimate and final principle of the universe, in terms of which 
all things could be explained as constituents of reality, so ethics 
has always been on the hunt for the highest good. There 
arc many goods, but there can be only one highest good. This 
good is of course the chief aim of life whatever it is. One 
set of philosophers has given one name to St, and another has 
given another. The Epicureans asserted the highest good to 
he pleasure. The Stoics said it was duty. For Plato the idea 
of the Good or the Beautiful was the summum bonum. The 
Utilitarians held that it was the greatest happiness to the 
greatest number. Others have held social efficiency, self-re- 
nunciation, perfection, and self-realization to be the highest 
aim of man, or the chief good. 

Ethics is thus a normative science, for it sets up standards 
of conduct, and does not merely describe conduct or action, 
which is the business of the descriptive sciences. In this mat- 
ter ethics is like all the other normative sciences. But we need 
not discuss ethics further here, since our only aim in the chap- 
ter is to give a clearer view of the scope or breadtJi of philos- 
ophy or the normative sciences, and this in order that later 
we may see more clearly the distinctions between science and 
philosophy as a whole, and further how philosophy generally, 
and ethics more particularly, are related to educati' 


The Scope or Field of Philosophy/ 69 

9 /Esthetics as the Science of the Beautiful. 
i^^sthetics is the science of the beautiful, and is related to art 
in the same way that ethics is to conduct. What is beauty? 
What are the standards and values of the beautiful? These 
arc questions for sesthetics. And here again the questions 
have received many different answers in the history of aesthetics, 
by as many different philosophers. Some identify the beautiful 
with pleasure. One a^sthetician says, "A beauty not realized 
is a pleasure not felt, and a contradiction" (Santayana). But 
whatever the answers to these questions, and they concern us 
very slightly here, the standards and values with which 
lesdietics is concerned are those of the beautiful. A purely de- 
scriptive account of the beautiful and the way it affects us, 
would be a psychology of beauty. But ieslhetics is concerned 
with the deeper questions of what constitutes beauty, and what 
are its standards and values. 

10 Philosophy of Religion. Philosophy of religion is 
the last of the normative sciences we have listed. Here the 
questions relate to conduct again, but this time with man's 
conduct in relation to God. What are the principles of man's 
religious actions, or of his relations to God, so far as conduct 
is concerned ? What are the principles of right religious action 
or conduct? 

Again, the history of philosophy and religion shows many 
answers. Here also we find the distinction made between 
philosophy and religious knowledge and belief, also what con- 
stitutes sufficient grounds of belief, and the nature of belief. 
What are the religious values? From these questions that 
ihilosophy of religion asks, we get a still broader conception 
scpp_e or the range of philosophy, or the normative 


11 Our Chief Concern Is with Ethics. The several 
fields of philosophy have been mentioned and their respective 
questions asked merely to get a better idea of the whole range 
of philosophy. We have but one concern in this chapter, and 
that is to determine the scope or range of field of philosophy. 


H 12 Si 



T/ic Phihiofikictil Bash of Educal'w 
; to bring this chapter to a 


1 end. Let us take an inven- 
tory to see what we have really gained. We have discovered 
that philosophy is a very general term, just like science, and 
covers several subordinate fields of inquiry. This division of 
the broad field seems justified in the interest of more profound 
inquiries. The questions philosophy asks do not sound much 
like those of science, and its answers arc much different, and 
more far-reaching. In met.iphysics philosophy asks, what is 
being, or reality ; in epistemology, what is the nature and extent 
of knowledge; in logic, what constitutes sufficient evidence of 
truth; in ethics, wliat are the standards of right conduct; in 
Esthetics, what are the standards of beauty; and in the philos- 
ophy of religion, what are the principles of right religious action 
and belief? From these questions asked and answered by the 
several fields of philosophy, a fair conception of its scope as a 
whole should have been gained. In this way we arrive at a 
clearer conception of the distinction between science and philos- 
ophy as a whole. 



General Methods of Philosophy Not Unlike 

Those of Science. That there are some very close resem- 
blances between science and philosophy is indicated from the 
fact that the branches of the latter are called normative sciences. 
Philosophy must be in some sense scientific or this appellation 
is a misnomer. It has been noted already that science and 
philosophy are alike in that they both use the same data, the 
facts of experience. We have noticed too tTiat their aims are 
di He rent, the aim of science being to give a description of these 
facts in their causal relation, while philosophy takes the same 
facts of experience and aims to discover their meaning and 
value. Now it stands to reason that although the facts of the 
two fields of inquiry are the same, that their methods must 
be in some respects at least di£ferent, since their aims are so 

Any systematic and orderly arrangement of facts, leading to 
comparison and generalization, deserves to be called a science. 
hi^ this sense philosophy is scientific, and in so fat, as it is, it 
uses the gener a^ methods, of- science, analysis and syjithesiSj 
induct) on "and deijuction, observation, comparison and geaerali- 
zation. Philo sophy n Uo miikes use of the method of intro- 
spection, wliTcIi IS partriTularly adaptable to tlic manipulation 
of tile data oT consciousness. Nor does philosophy fail to use 
the results of experiment, though this method serves no direct 
purpose for the philosopher. In the hands of the descriptive 
scientist these methods lead to generalization and explanation, 
which is the end. So far so good, but the philosopher, gov- 
erned by his own deeper purpose, must go farther, and since 
this is the limit of usefulness of these methods, the philosopher 
must look for a method better suited to go with him to the end 
of his journey. All tliese methods lead only from fact to gen- 




73 The PhUoiofikical Basis of Education 

eralization, or fact to a larger fact. They do not give to the 
facts any significance, or value in themselves. True, these 
methods of descriptive science lead to ver^- important generali- 
zations, without which the philosopher would have nothing to 
do, since he begins where the scientist leaves off, he takes up 
the B^^neralizations or conclusions, and shows their meaning 
in a sjstcm of the whole. If they have no meaning for the 
whole, they are rejected as unsound and unwarrantable gen- 
eralizations, since they form no part of the organic, or func- 
tional whole of reality. 

Then perhaps we should modify somewhat our former as- 
sertion, that the scientist and the philosopher deal with the 
same facts of experience. They do, but the scientist leads 
from fact to generalization and law, and the philosopher takes 
up the work at this point and deals directly with these laws 
and principles, and hence onlvJiuJIxectly. with, the partinilar 
facts therqafelyes. It is in tliis wav that advances in scieace 
sTiould aid in a better philosophical grasp of the mpaning- af 
life as a ivEoIe. Lnless there were such a division of labor 
as~tTi^Tielwee'n science and philosophy there would be needless 
waste of energy. Unfortunately this distinction between the 
two fields is not always observed. The result of mixing the two 
points'of view is inevitably a "riddle of the universe," and un- 
clear thin Icing. 

As has been seen, the scope of philosophy is wider than that 
of any one or all of the sciences. It is more than a "science 
of sciences," as Spencer called it. For a science of sciences 
would still be a science, and would remain descriptive and 
explanatory, no matter how wide flowed the circles of its gen- 
eralizations. But as we have noted, the aim of philosophy is 
appreciation rather than description, to find the meaning and 
value of life, rather than to explain the phenomena in time and 
space. A method leading no further than generalization of 
facts and laws will not go all the way with the philosopher, 
hut will fail him before he has penetrated the deeper secrets 
of life. A special method must aid the philosopher. This 
method is that of reflection. 

2 Philosophy Requires Reflection. The most gen- 
eral methods of science are observation, comparison, and gen- 

The Methods of Philosophy 73 

eralization; of psychology particularly it is sel {-observation, or 
introspection; of philosophy it is reflection. Of these methods, 
all but the last one arc limited to pure description and ex- 
planation, while the last one, reflection, leads to a new world, 
that of values. Observation, comparison, and generalization 
lead to an understanding of the world; reflection to an appre- 
ciation of the world. The two points of view arc different, 
but they are only two, wa)s of looking at the same world of 
reality — the one view that of externa! relations, the other that 
of internal relations. 

If the meaning of the world as a whole were identical with 
each fact no search for inner connections and meanings would 
be worth while, since there would be no distinction between 
the inner and the external meaning of our experience. The 
inner meaning refers only to the meaning the part has for 
the whole of experience or reality. But, as we have seen, this 
inner meaning is not brought out in a mere causal or temporal 
series of facts, and hence the methods of rendering a caus_al 
KCplanatlon of things is not sufficient. There is just one way to 
get at "tliis" Inner meaning of experience and this is by the 
method of reflection. It is the special aim or purpose of philos- 
ophy, then, that makes necessary a different method from that 
of descriptive science. Ever ywhere in life the purpose deter- 
i£ines__the method to be used~in realizing this purpose. This 
. will come out more clearly in Parts IV and V. Here it is 
1 enough to give one illustration further to indicate how the aim 
' or purpose governs the means or methods to be employed in 
any given cases. Gladstone said, "One example is worth a 
thousand arguments." 

If my aim is to ride in the air I take a flying machine; if 

I prefer the ground I may go on foot, in a cart, an automo- 

bile, or various other wajs. If I want to go to Europe I 

lam obliged to choose means to serve this aim. I cannot go 

P all the way by train. And so if I want to journey all the 

way to the world of reality I cannot go the full distance in 

the vehicle of science, for its aims are not with reference to 

such a world, and consequently its means or methods are not 

expedient for the complete journey. With science I get off 

at the half-way house of description; the rest of the journey 

I to the land of reality I make with philosophy, and our method 



74 The Philosophical Basis of Educatio 

of travel is through reflection. Let us observe how it works. 

3 Value of Reflection. Through reflection the deeper 
meaning of life and experience is brought out. But how is 
this done? There is no ra}'stery about it. Clear thinking is 
the one essential. But so is clear thinking needed in science, 
and just as clear as in philosophy. The only way experience 
can he made to have significance is to. discover its relation to 
the whole. We have already noticed in the aim of philosophy 
that experience has no value unless it can be related to the 
whole. The part when alone has no meaning, all meaning 
is in the relation of part to whole. And the whole is not given 
in experience, but only in reality. The methods of descriptive 
science cannot discover this relation between the part and whole 
of experience, fact and reality, for by their nature they arc 
limited to data in their time and space relationship. 

By reflection is meant nothing more than the careful study 
of the parts of experience so well ordered and arranged by the 
descriptive science, to see what sort of a whole or unity is 
implied, and theD_.a--refleciive analysis and criticism jn the 
li ght of this whole . By the whole of life is meant its reality, 
its full meaning, and in the light of this whole all parts arc 
studied and criticized and evaluated. EealiilJsthus jiQt_aBaxt 
fromj_ or .Independent oi life and experience; it is rather jJi.e 
completjon. of experi eoce. A complete view of life would not 
reveal experience in its present limitations, but as a whole or 
unity. It is this whole that philosophy attempts to construct 
out of the parts that are given in a world of external mean- 
ings, or time and space relations. And this whole it is, in all 
iis.-Qieajli£-UJ3ill'._oi paj.tSj, that becomes the "stand.ard.jfi3Ll[5- 
The whole, since it is dependent upon tlie parts, just as any 
other organism is, hos no reality except as it is the unity of 
all the parts. Whole and part are thus functionally interde- 
pendent. The difference is that the whole is dependent upon 
the relation of all the parts, whereas each part is directly de- 
pendent upon the functional whole for its significance and 
meaning. _ 

Reflection brings the meaning of our experiences out into 
relief by showing their significance as fragments for the uni- 
versal experience, reality. Now man never is able to construct 

The Methods of Philosophy 75 

a final reality of his own, for two reasons. First, because his 
powers of reflection arc limited to his experience, and second, 
because this experience can never be complete and final. We 
arc, then, only approximating the whole, or final reality. Or- 
ganic unity of the present experience within a whole which is 
thereby implied is quite possible, but as the circle of experience 
widens so must our view of reality also widen. But this is 
far from saying there Is no final reality. Of course there i> 
no final reality in time and space, but time and space are not 
conditions of the real world at all, but only of the limited 
world of partial and incomplete experience. Such conclusions 
are arrived at only through reflection. No amount of gen- 
eralization based on the relation of facts alone will give the 
view of the whole, the meaning and value of life. It is only 
through the relation of the facts of experience to the whole 
which they imply, that any significance or meaning is attached 
pb) the facts themselves. This relation of significance between 
Lfact and reality can be revealed only by reflection. 

" 4 Summary of the Methods of Philosophy. Shall we 
triefly summarize the conclusions of this chapter? The meth- 
ods of science are available for philosophy in so far as the 
latter inquiry is concerned merely with the external relation- 
ships of facts in the phenomenal world, but this limitation of 
the methods of science renders them useless for the deeper in- 
quiry as to the relation of fact and reality, or part and whole. 
For this latter search the method of reflection is employed, and 
for the reason that it is not limited to discovering the relation 
of fact to fact, or fact to law, but goes beyond to the relation 
of fact and reality, and this it does by discovering the relation 
of part and whole. 

We have now traced the aims, scope, and methods of philos- 
ophy. Further light will be thrown on its relation to science, 
if we trace its relations to life as we did in the c 

• To this phase of the study we now turn. 




w'i.o th[s phase ot trie s 



I The Age in Which Philosophy Arises. £iQpi_tlic 
fore£2ifl£_!iafitcriin-Part JI it,wULbe.Dbs!y-ved jesdiliijjiat 
philos ophy is^np.t a pureiy .iheoretlcal inquiry- Like sc ience it 
IS purely theoretical up to a certain point, and tHen"~the ^^aCr 
tical nioti\e may express itself, or evea predominate. We 
have called philosophy a search for the meaning and value of 
life. Another way to put it is to say that philosophy is tj je 
summing up of the experience of any one given agg. A philos- 
opliy of life and experience is limited by the extent and range 
of that experience. The philosophy of any one nation js 
not the philosophy of life as a whole. Philosophy projects 
itself very far beyond experience, but this projection is la rgely 
gove rned fiy The extent of experience behind jt. Philosqphv 
follows life as well as precedes it. It must first follow "Befo^ 
it canTea^. And uhilc cvrn with a limited experience we can 
through reflection discover the nature of reality, there Is still 
something short on the lealization side, for the whole cannot 
be realized In part, that is in time and space. 

Every age has its own philosophy of life and sometimes sev- 
eral of them compete vigorously for first place, but this is not 
to be greatly regretted. Perhaps it is only significant of a 
larger meaning of life trying to get expression in life and It 
breaks through in different places. There is no harm in dif- 
ferent philosophies, provided they arc all true and show the 
real meaning and values of life. While philosophies change, 
the truth contained in them never changes, for truth is eternal 
and knows no limits of time and space. The manner of ex- 
pressing this truth may vary greatly from time to time and I 
think it will, but this is only expressing the old truth in new 
form. It is the same truth, for truth is not determined by 
the manner of its expression, or by external relations. Truth 

The Relations of Philosophy to Life 77 

is an Internal relation, and like reality is not exposed 
surface of experience, nor exhausted in time. 

The manner of expressing the meaning of life difFers, but 
life means the same always. It may not seem so to the ordi- 
nary views. The philosophy of any nation is the best that 
nation has known, felt and willed, and not at all the final 
edition of reality. Reality is eternal and never changing, but 
so far as it is revealed in time it comes forth in many editions, 
and some of these appear posthumously as far as certain in- 
dividuals and nations are concerned. There are some just 
ordinary philosophies, and other editions de luxe, and just so 
with the lives of individuals and races, which are best reflected 
in their philosophies. 

2 Philosophy and the Life of Reason, Philosophy 
marks one more step of advance in the age or life of reason. 

Man now has passed through the hazy cosmic stage of his 
existence where he took no conscious part in the shaping of 
his own destiny, out into the somewhat clearer vistas of com- 
mon sense, and then out into the broad areas of light shed by 
science. This is not the extent of his development, for lo, man 
is a philosopher too! This is not a new stage, for philosophy is 
at least half as old as the history of man. But the full mean- 
ing of this new point is far from being realized as yet. There 
are those who see in philosophy only what Protagoras saw, an 
expression of individual opinion. The expression may truly 
be individual enough, with all the limitation that this implies, 
but the truth therein contained, if there be any, is not of the 
individual, but of the eternal reality. For truth is universal. 
Man's reasoning will go on ; it will become broader and deeper, 
just as it has in the past. No man has given a final edition 
of the universe in his philosophy. He may see the nature of 
reality and what significance it gives to life, but there is no 
last edition so far as manners of expression, or "systems" go. 
Reality will not change in time, but man's view of it will. 
Philosophy is man's view of reality, and it is limited by his 
experience and his nature. So great has been man's progress 

K'~ thought that we wonder what will be his next advance. It 
ill certainly be along present lines of achievement. 



78 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

3 Philosophy and the Meaning and Value of Life. 
Who can say that the search for the meaning and value of life 
as a whole has no practical value? It has been said that 
philosophy bakes no bread. Truly it does not, but it will 
give the baker a point of view that might add significance to 
his life, and even lead greater significance to his bread-making 
as a part of his life activity. Philosophy gives a point of view 
and a standard by which all values of life are determined, and 
what could be of greater worth? Indeed we often have been 
reminded that whether life is worth living, depends on the 
liver, — the one who fives the life. If life is to be considered 
worth while it depends on the view we have of life in its rela- 
tion to the whole. If man is only a meaningless cog in a great 
machine of no purpose, then life is not worth living; but if 
each person gains his significance by clearly perceiving his 
relation to the whole of life, or reality, then we see it in a 
different light altogether. 

There is nothing in all the world we need to-day so much 
as a definite point of view in regarding life in its full meaning. 
Science has made wonderful time and labor saving devices, and 
now we must use these in transcending the limits of time and 
space, in order that we might regard life from a higher point 
of view. In other words, science has increased our facilities 
for living, philosophy must now increase our capacity for 
life. Science cannot do it all, although there are plenty of 
people who think it can. With a science there develop means 
and aids for living, but with philosophy there comes the guid- 
ing vision of the meaning and value of life. Are both not 
practical, both indispensable, each equally valuable? 

Our age, as was suggested earlier in this volume, is marked 
by its scientific achievements along lines of commerce and in- 
dustry. But what do "progress" and "achievement" mean 
without reference to a goal toward which we are moving? 
Every act of man implies action toward an end, and the great 
quest of philosophy is the goal or end toward which life as 
a whole is moving. With this end before us all parts of life 
become significant. Lose sight of the end and all is void, life 
becomes a hopeless vacuum, a mere dream of empty meaning- 
less fancies. Is it any wonder that the cry comes from the 
philosopher that we must cease our meaningless haste and cal- 

The Relations of Philosophy to Life 


dilate the point where we are coming out? Without an aim 
there is no prt^ress and if the aim is wrong or incongruous 
with the larger philosophical view of life or reality, there is 
no such a thing as lasting progress. Much work has had ta 
be undone because it was not well done in the first place. 
And much of what seems like progress to-day will have to be 
done over, or completely transform itself, so as to square with 
a larger view of life. Whether we consider life as a whole, 
or in its smallest part, there must he a goal, or purpose to 
give meaning and significance to itself. Philosophy is, then, 
not an impractical thing, but it represents man's search for 
the reality of his own being, which quest becomes, as we shall 
ultimately see, man's moral duty, as well as his greatest 
opportunity. It is the end, or purpose, that comes first in any 
action that is to have meaning, however paradoxical this may 

4 General Summary. In this chapter we have seen that 
it is the specific purpose of philosophy to discover the aim, or 
meaning and value of life as a whole, and thus to render 
experience significant. The field or scope of philosophy in- 
cludes the whole range of human experience, but instead of 
merely giving a causal explanation of these facts, it interprets 
their meaning and value, and this it does through its char- 
acteristic method of reflection, by which the relation to life gains 
its significance. Ejnally philosophy is extremely .practical— in 
the sense that it points out the aim or goal of life, and gives 
us the end to he attained. This gives direction, unity and sig- 
nificance to a world of otherwise disconnected and meaning- 
less experience. 


The General Relations of Science and Philosophy 

science and philosophy compared and contrasted 

Aims of Science and Philosophy Compared and 
toNTRASTED. Any further distinction between science and 
■philosophy would be useless if so much did not depend upon 
it in the conclusion of this work. It is absolutely the first 
essential in clearing away the confusion in modern educational 
thought. Hence this part of our work gains its significance 
by reference to the whole of which it is a part, and hence is 
justified by virtue of it being part of that larger whole. 

Life can be viewed from two angles of view. Either wc 
may talce the causal, or descriptive view of the scientist, or 
the teleological or purposive view of the philosopher. Both 
points of view are essential, and are related as part and whole 
to each other. By giving us the causal aspect of our experi- 
ence, science enables us not only to see the relation of phe- 
nomena, but it enables us to shape our life accordingly. Not 
until the age of science was man very exact in his calculation 
of probabilities, nor was be able to control his experiences to 
any great extent. He was the victim of circumstances. But 
a change has come with the inception of science. Man is 
now able to control very largely his experience, and to foresee, 
circumstances likely to arise that will affect his existence. So 
maii_has come to create and control his own destiny to a great 
extent, and this through the aid of science. But science can 
never tell what destiny is fitting or becoming to a man. This 
is left for philosophy. The aim of philosophy is to show the 
aim of life, its meaning and value. Science may multiply 
the material comforts of life a thousand fold, and all this by 
taking account of the laws of causal existence, but it can 
never assert or deny the value of life. It has no business with 
values. To consider facts as having value ts to give up 
entirely the causal point of view of science. Science can i 
"" 83 



84 The Philosophiciil Basis of Education 

crease our means of living, but it cannot teach us how to liv 
well, or that we ought to live well. It can teach us the 
causal relation of phenomena, but it cannot teach us the mean- 
ing of reality, or true being; it can show us the laws of 
thought, but it cannot give us the limits and values of knowl- 
edge; it can describe and explain its laws only as we would 
the movement and course of a stream; it can define the laws 
of mind action in the perception of a beautiful object, but it 
cannot reveal the nature of beauty ; it can describe the se- 
quence, but it cannot give the meaning of the truth. By 
substituting the word philosophy for science in the above sen- 
tence we reverse the order and meaning. Science is thus re- 
lated to philosophy, as fact is to meaning, as law is to reality, 
as the whole is to the part. Science cannot do what philosophy 
is to do, any more than the part can do the work of the whole ; 
nor can philosophy do what science is to do any more than 
we can substitute the whole for the part. And the reason 
for our. inability to substitute one for the other, is that we have 
different aims or purposes. One describes life, while the other 
interprets it; one gives description of phenomena, the other 
leads to interpretation and appreciation. Their fields do not 
overlap, nor interfere with each other. They have divided 
the realm of human experience with mutual advantage to each 

2 Scope of Science and Philosophy Compared and 
Contrasted, The scope of science is limited to the facts of 
human experience. Science has entered every realm of experi- 
ence, and has generally succeeded in reducing the chaos of 
fact to orderly sequence and law, but it has always left and 
always will leave this field of fact as fact, without attributing 
to it value or meaning. The philosopher enters the same field 
with the scientist and instead of setting to work to reduce 
experience to law and order, he proceeds to discover the mean- 
ing of this experience. He is concerned not with the external 
order and relation of things, but with the internal relations 
of meaning, purpose and values. It is one field in which we 
operate for the purpuse of discovering order, sequence and law; 
it is quite another in which we seek the meaning of these 
phenomena, or their relations, not to each other merely, 

p Science and Philosophy Compared and Contrasted 85 

to the whole of life. 

The same facts of life give rise to two sorts of problems, 
or two fields of inquiry; the one field is that of description and 
external relation, the other is that of interpretation and ap- 
preciation; the former Is the world of fact, the latter of values, 
and it is by reference of the former to the latter, that of the 
part to the whole, that the world of experience gains its sig- 
nificance, or meaning. In this way we see the relation of the 
fields of science and philosophy. 

3 Methods of Science and Philosophy Compared 
AND Contrasted. The methods of value in reaching a de- 
scriptive and explanatory, or causal view of the world, are 
observation, comparison and generalization, while that em- 
ployed in rendering a teleological, or purposive view of the 
world is reflective. The former methods are suitable for as- 
serting relationships between facts and phenomena; the latter 
discovers inner connections of meaning and purpose. If I want 
to discover how a thing acts, or what it does, I employ the 
methods of causal science; if I want to know what a thing 
means, or its value, I have recourse to the method of teleologi- 
cal or normative science, that of reflection. Since the business 
of philosophy is that of seeking inner connections, ji has only 
incidental u se f or methpds_iiiose_yalucs lie in pointing out 
purely external relationships, i.e., connection between things, 
not purposes. 

4 Description and Interpretation the Two Aspects 
OF Reality'. But we have tried all the way along to keep 
from making a purely arbitrary and artificial distinction be- 
tween science and philosophy. There is no essential conflict 
between facts, the data of science, and purposes and meanings, 
the data of philosophy. We have insisted that these are only 
the two aspects of the same reality, the temporal and eternal 
aspects. There is no more conflict here than between the outer 
and inner curvatures of a circle, its concavity and its convexity. 
Indeed facts and purposes are related as part to whole, and 
there is no conflict or antagonism here. The two views of 
life are equally important; they are the two aspects of the 
same reality. The world of science and the world of philos- 






86 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

ophy, fact and purpose, represent the external and internal 
meaning of the same idea. Reality neither consists in facts 
alone nor purposes alone, but a unity of facts and purposes. 
Facts and purposes are, then, the two sides, or aspects of the 
same reality, the external and the internal meanings. In 
reality facts and purposes, external and internal relations, are 
harmonized, by being discovered to he functional parts of 
the same organic whole; the essential difference being that 
the one aspect is temporal and partial, while the other is 
eternal and whole. 

There is another way of distinguishing science and philos- 
ophy, which will no doubt be of greater value for our particu- 
lar purpose later, in tracing the general philosophical and 
ethical aspects of education. This distinction has already been 
implied in the foregoing. Philosophy is concerned with the 
aims of life; science with the means for realizing these aims. 
Who does not recognize the folly of choosing certain aims, 
while at the same time refusing to adopt the means for their 
realization ? Too often in life we do not have clearly in mind 
the ends or aims of life, and so are unable to choose intelli- 
gently the means. In as much as the means chosen depend 
upon the aim to be realized, it becomes an important matter 
to know what these aims of life arc. Nor are all means equally 
serviceable for given ends. Some must be refused altogether. 

It has now become clear that philosophy is concerned with 
the aims of life while science provides the means. Instead of 
deploring the advance of science, the philosopher welcomes it, 
for he sees in such developments the only possibility of realiz- 
ing the aims of life. He docs, however, deplore the modern 
tcndencj' to substitute facts for values, as is likely to be the 
case in an age of such rapid material progress and discovery 
as ours. 

There is such a thing as making tools without knowing the 
use to which they are to be put, but such procedure would 
generally be regarded as folly. We do not always see so 
clearly that we may fail to keep the proper balance beti^'een 
means and ends, methods and purposes. There is of neces- 
sity an end for every means, but for lack of clear vision the 
wrong end may be selected, or indeed, as is often the case, a 
means may be substituted for an end, and thus arises the con- 

W Science and Pktlnsophy Compared find Contrasted 87 

flict in modern life, and particularly is this noticed in such 
fields as religion and education. It is characteristic of philo- 
sophic myopia that a means be made to serve as end. Now 
when this substitution of means for end is made with no 
higher aim or purpose in mind there is certainly danger ahead. 
There is just one cure for this substitution of means for 
ends, or purposes, and that is clear thinking. Cleat and high 
thinking will lead from fact to its other, from part to the 
whole it implies, and when this whole is once perceived it 
becomes the meaning of all life, the standard of all values, the 
fulfillment of all purposes. Means and methods are then 
chosen with reference to this end, and no substitution of 
means for end is allowable, except as it be a more immediate 
aim, and justifiable as a compromise to the limits of space and 
time, between full and partial realization. The substitution 
of a means for end, or of a lower for a higher aim, is not only 
a blunder, but a crime. We shall hear more about this in a 
later stage of this inquiry'. 


I Summary of the Relations of Science and Philos- 
ophy. It is now time to make a general inventory of our 
gains up to the present time, for we have now come to a part- 
ing of the ways. We are to regard the world of educational 
experience from tlie point of view of the philosopher, and 
then from the special point of view of the ethicist, or moral 

In our summary of Part I we drew genera! conclusions as 
to the aims, scope and method of science. In Part II we did 
the same with respect to philosophy. 

The aims of science and philosophy are alike in that both 
attempt to give an account of human experience, but each 
gives a different account of this experience. Science remains 
satisfied when it has succeeded in connecting in orderly se- 
quence or law the phenomena of life, while philosophy takes 
up work where the scientist leaves oii, with his generaliza- 
tions of experience, and proceeds to determine their meaning 
for a larger life. In this sense, then, the scientist is limited 
to the facts of experience both at the beginning and the end, 
while the philosopher is so limited in the beginning, but the 
end of his quest brings him to a world of values rather than 
facts, interpretation rather than explanation, meaning rather 
than description. 

Science cannot satisfy all the demands of life, for it reads 
no meaning and value into it. Philosophy cannot provide the 
means, for its search carries it beyond the value of time 
and space limitations, or causal and sequential relations. Both 
fields are equally essential, but each has its decided limitations 
for life. We must remember, then, that wherever in the 
future we are concerned with aims, we have to call on philos- 

General Summary and Conclusions of First Three Parts 

ophy, and upon science, when we are concerned with means 
and methods of realizing these aims. 

The scope of philosophy differs from that of science in that 
it uses the facts of human experience merely as the data out 
of which to construct a larger life, while science uses these 
facts only in the interest of connection, description and explana- 
tion. The field of science is a temporal series of phenomena, 
while that of philosophy is an eternal system of purposes and 

The methods of philosophy differ from those of science as 
a direct result of their different aims. The descriptive, ex- 
planatory method of science consists in showing how fact A is 
related to facts B, C, D, etc.; or how the fact A is explained by 
its falling under the head of generalization, or law X. The 
reflective method of philosophy consists in showing how the 
facts A, B, C, D, etc., and the law X are related to the 
whole of life, or how the part is related to the whole, or what 
the significance of the fact or law is for life. 

And finally it is the philosophical view of life that gives 
significance and purpose to our actions, that gives us a goal 
to work toward. And it is science that makes at least partial 
realization of this goal possible. Science and philosophy are 
always related to each other as means to ends, as part to whole, 
as facts and their fulfillment, 

2 Relations of the First Thrke Parts to Part IV. 
We are now to launch out into a special field of inquiry, and 
we cannot afford to neglect the conclusions already arrived at. 
Indeed these conclusions form the very basis of our further 
inquiry. Our results so far accomplished are a clear separa- 
tion of the fields of science and philosophy, as to aims, scope 
and methods, and the general part they are to perform in life 
as a whole. Since this distinction has now been made, wc 
have no more concern with science except incidentally. Our 
purpose now is to show how philosophy is related to the busi- 
ness of education. We do not need to draw science along with 
us any further, since it has served its purpose for us here in 
aiding through comparison and contrast to bring out the 
relative functions of science and philosophy for life. Our 
further inquiry will be more distinctly philosophical. 

90 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

Now that we know the relation of philosophy to life as a 
whole, it will not be difficult to show the relations to the 
particular field of educational experience. The relations here 
will be less generally stated, and perhaps much more enjoyed 
by some people than the foregoing part of this inquiry. What 
has education to do with philosophy? What business has the 
philosopher with the field of education? Can the philosopher 
aid the educator in any way; if so, how? These are some of 
the questions that will occupy our attention in Part IV. In 
Part V we will narrow the questions still more and attempt 
to find the answers that the particular branch of ethics would 
give to them. Philosophy now says good-bye to science, and 
finishes the journey with education, enjoying frequently the 
sweet recollections of his former associate. 

The Relation of Philosophy and Education 


Relations of Philosophy and Life. Any account of 
the whole of experience certainly includes all the parts, and 
education is one of the parts. Then, since science attempts to 
describe and explain all phenomena of life, there would cer- 
tainly be a science of education. In liltc manner, and since 
philosophy aims to discover the meaning and value of all life 
and experience, there would also be a philosophy of education. 
We are here concerned with the latter view o" " 

3 The Philosophy of Education as the Meaning 
AND Value of Education, A philosophy of life attempts 
to give the meaning of human experience by showing its rela- 
tion to the whole, which is implied in the part. The philos- 
ophy of education attempts in like manner to construct the 
meaning of the whole out of the parts, or to show the meaning 
and value of educational experience for life as a whole. There 
is grave danger that the parts blind our eyes to the whole, 
and hence cause us to lose sight of the larger significance of 
our experience, which is always in part. There are many to 
whom the penny looks larger than the moon, and who couM 
scarcely be led to alter their opinions. We are constantly 
reminded that when the present is so fleeting and exacting, 

^that we have not time to bother about the past or future. 
Perhaps the future is no better than the present, but certainly 
the whole must be greater than the part. But it is so easy 
to just drift along and not have to struggle at all, and so we 
drift, but whence our origin or whither we go, is a matter of 
no great concern to countless numbers. If these questions 
do concern us they are usually answered by blind faith, rather 
I than from an enlightened view of life as a whole. We arc so 
Jwaj'ward, so prodigal. We need to find out the meaning 


94 The Pliilosophicfil Basis of Educaiio 

of life and then we will make better use of our time, 
need more rationality and less sentimentality in education, and 
perhaps in the other regions of human experience as well. 
There is nothing quite so potent in driving away sentimental- 
ity and blind faith as a wholesome philosophy of life. When 

I all ctperience is counted of equal value and no selecting or 
I hierarchy of values is made, we are certain to substitute the 
part for the whole, and particularly because it is more immedi- 
ate and tangible. Tangibility spells reality for a great many 
short-sighted people. And not a few of these people have 
much to do in directing the educational affairs of our state and 

A philosophy of education will serve as a balance wheel in 
the educational system. It will substitute meaning for facts, 
values, and purpose for external connections, and give a goal 
to work to, which obviates the necessity for setting up a 
means as an end in itself, thereby robbing the means of its 
real serviceableness for life as a whole. A philosophy of edu- 
cation will prevent our working at cross purposes by keeping 
the idea of the end in mind, and selecting the means accord- 
ingly. This will aid the clear thinking so much needed in 
education, and which was emphasized in the Introduction, 

3 Educational Experience. We have spoken of edu- 
cation as though it defines definitely a certain area of human 
experience. But this area is not so clearly viewed by many 
people. We must define the scope of what is included in 
education in this dissension. In its broadest sense education is 
almost synonymous with the whole of our experiences, for 
there is no experience that cannot be said to have educational 
significance, either positive or negative. But we must more 
definitely define its limits. It will be granted that all expe- 
rience has educational bearing, but as we use the term here it 
means "systematic" education, to use Spencer's phrase. The 
unsystematic, or "fortuitous" education is not under discus- 
sion here. More strictly still we mean by systematic education, 
institutional education, or the kind that is established and 
organized by the church or nation, and provided for by private 
or public money set aside for this purpose. Thus viewed edu- 
cation becomes one of the functional organizations of society 

The Philosophical Aspects of Education 95 

for the promotion by organized effort of certain aims of life. 
What these aims or purposes are, can be answered better fur- 
ther on in our discussion. 

4 Various Philosophical Aspects. We have spoken 
so far of the philosophy of education with no attempt to 
discuss at length the particular branches of this field. A 
philosophy of education attempts to show what education 
means, and what are its values, Wc have already seen that 

philosophy is a very broad 1 
account of life, philosophy has 
different branches, each one of > 

Philosophy includes 
reality; epistemology, ■ 
the tiieory of truth ; 

In th( 

divided ii 
'hich has 

field into several 

:s special aims and 

letaphysics, or the theory of being, or 
r the theory of knowledge; logic, or 
:s, or the theory of the good ; arethetics, 
or the theory of beauty. Every problem of life can be ques- 
tioned and answered either from the descriptive or from the 
normative points of view, both by science and by philosophy. 
From the philosophical side we can view the matter from the 
more acute angles of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, 
sesthetics and the philosophy of religion. So when we speak 
of the philosophy of education we mean to include all these 
points of view with respect to education. We shal(\view 
education from these several philosophical aspects, — first, the 
metaphysical aspects of education. It must be remembered, 
however, that only one of these points of view, namely, ethics, 
concerns us in any but a general way in this work. There is 
much to be gained from a brief look at education from these 
several points of view. 



1 Metaphysics an Effort to Think Clearly. Meta- 
physics has been defined already as the search for reality or 
true beinE, and the starting point is always the experience 
of life, and this includes education. It ought to be clear, then, 
that metaphysical inquiries are of vital concern to education. 
For each fragment of experience must be judged in the light 
of the whole. Metaphysics asks concerning educational ex- 
perience: What does it rnean for reality as a whole? In 
what sense is it real? 

James says that metaphysics is nothing more than a-vefy 
obstinate effort. to think clearly. It takes nothing for granted 
without careful consideration of what such an assumption 
means for the whole of reality. It must be consistent with 
the whole of reality or it is pronounced false or untrue. AV 
ultimate or ^nal questions -must be triced at the courts of meta- 
pHysics before the bar of reason. These jjltimate questioos 
may just as well arise in the field of.e3ucatioa as any.whctC- 
But usually we do not stop long enough in education to ask 
questions, and if \i'e do we do not take time enough to 
answer them so thoroughly. KanI thought that perhaps_illF 
chief value of metaphysics comes not from our settling finally 
any great problem, but from the fact that in the attempt our 
own thought is made clearer. If this much is done in our 
metaphysical inquiries we certainly ought to take courage. 
The man was probably wrong, tlii'n, who defined metaphj'sics 
as the art of putting things that everybody knows in language 
that nobody can understand. 

2 Every One Has a Metapuvsics of Some Sort, 
Metaphysics, since it is concerned with the first principles ai 

"^lysical and mental existence, is at the very bottom oljjl 
— ' 96 

The Milaphysical Aspect of Education 97 

our thmking, and whether wjttingly or no every one of us 
has a metaphysic, though it may be a poor one. As Emile 
Faquet says, "II restille que ceux que sont le plus antimeto- 
physiciens sont metaphysiciens encore" {Pour Quon Lise Pla- 
ton, p. 97). "Those who are the most anti-metaphysical are 
metaphysicians still." It is becoming to a man to have a sys- 
tematic way of looking at life as a whole, and this involves 
a metaphysic. 

Metaphysics to the Germans has long been the very ground- 
work of ail philosophy, since it is the branch concerned with I 
the first principles of existence. Ethics was the groundwork I 
of philosophy for the Greeks, while psychology was for a long | 
time the foundation of the English schools. (Cf. Cushman, 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 11, p. 332.) 

3 Metaphysics as a Criticism of the Principles op 
Science. Metaphysics criticises the first principles or pre- 
suppositions of all science, both descriptive and normative. 
Science takes many thinp for granted, metaphysics takes noth- 
ing for granted. Time, space, and matter are taken as real 
by science, but metaphysics tries to discover in what sense 
they are real, if real at ail. We shall see later that logic, 
ethics and a:sthetics make similar presuppositions at the be- 
ginning, and it is the business of metaphysics to deal with 
these also. It is not the business of metaphysics to displace 
the other sciences, or to show their respective boundaries, but 
rather to question the soundness of their fundamental con- 
ceptions or principles in the light of being as a whole, fhe 
sciences gives, the facts of experience in related and connect 
order,_But from different angles, metaphysics must give th? 
view'of experience as a related whol^ 

4 Metaphysics the Science of Sciences. But meta- 
physics does more than simply criticise the principles and pre- 
suppositions in their relation to the whole. It correlates the 
results of the special sciences into larger generalizations. Some 
have thought that it is the final aim of metaphysics merely to 
give a systematic account of all the results of science, and so 
it has been called the "science of sciences." Metaphysics 

iJl -would, according to this view, contain the widest possible 

The Philosophical Basis of Edticalio 

r tfiw^^ 

generalizations of science, and nothing more. Further 
this Spencer would not go, for all the rest is of the unknow- 
able. Science exhausts the possibilities of knowledge and 
philosophy can go no further than to systematize these spe- 
cial results into a larger or universal whole. Titchener 
says, "Metaphysics is the discipline that undertakes the cckh- 
plete synthesis of scientific results," {Outlines of Psychology, 
>■ 364-) 

Metaphysics, according to the view here taken, goes much 
farther than a criticism of the first principles of science oz 
Lj^stematic generalization of the results of all science. It 
IS constructive as well as destructive and polemic. It goes out 
' I search of principles of its own. But instead of searching 
for the principles of the part represented by the different 
sciences, it searthes for the principles of true being, or those 
upon which the whole universe is based. It asks what are 
the basic principles of reality. How are these related to the 
fragmentary experience of life? These are profound ques- 
tions, and are important in every walk of life, so much so, 
that if we do not go to the trouble to prove them, we assume 
them in spite of our denial, thus asserting the truth of their 
existence. The principles, or causes, here under consideratiqD 
not tempriral, but eternal. They are real for they arc tju£ 
"for all time and, place, and for everybody. 

The real cause of the universe is teleological or purposiyg, 
lot material or sequential. There are several different kinds 
of causes, but there is only one final, or the first cause, and 
metaphysics is in search lor this first cause, or ultimate prin- 
ciple of the universe, 

i Metaphysics a Search for First Principles. We 
then, that metaphysics is the universal ground of all 
knowledge, as well as a criticism of the first principles of sci- 
ence, a systematization of these into a larger group of generali- 
zations, and a search for the ultimate principles of existence or 
the first cause, or final principle of reality. 

Metaphysics, as the science of being or reality, is the foun- 
dafibn of knowledge, for it would be meaningless to ask the 
nature and extent of knowledge, without first asking wh^t 
there is to be known, or what is real. It might just 

^m The MetaphysiceiJ Aspect of Education 99 

be asked what is real if it cannot be known? How are wc 
to approHcb the real if we cannot know it? This shows very 
clearly the close relationship between metaphysics, as the science 
of being or reality, and epistemology, or the science of knowl- 

6 Metaphysics the Science of Reality. Metaphysics 
is an inquiry into the first principles of reality, or final causes, 
true being. This is its field, but what about the gains it has 
made? In answering this question I stick to my point of 
view of idealism, and the results must be judged accordingly. 

For idealism the ultimate, or final principles of being or 
reality is purpose, or idea. Hence the term idealism. All 
reality is definable In last analysis in terms of ideas or pur- 
pose Xhe final cause for which metiphysics is in search can 
be def ned only n terms of deas But s n e deas ha e refer- 
en e both to an e\ternal and to an nternal world to fact and to 
fficln'ng V e si all refer to the external and the mternal mein- 
ng (f our de It s the evter nl mein ngs ot our deas 

thit a e tn ed n the desc pi e c en es h le the nternal 
n an ngs are tra ed n tl e no mat e sc en e The evternal 
referen e of deas a to tl e fa t o Id th nterml reference 
s t p rpose ( )ur c! et n em s th nternal relatioocLidf 
purgpses a relaropshtp Ti h sVe ce ann t tollo 

Ideal ra ans ers the que t on as to hat the final pr nci- 
ple of the un verse or the ult mate nat re of the un verse and 
ground of knowledge by say ng that free njeJJ^ence ;g^tlje 
onlj cauijc that reallj explajos anxtJu»g^ It s the onU means 
of e\p!a n ng the hanges that take pi cc n the orld thout 
con e ng t me as a sometl ng dependent of our e\per ences. 
The latter onfu on g es r se to the mechan ca! oncept ons 
of nature 1 cl g e us noth ng more than the seq ent al 
order of phenomena nat re I tell gence the onlj cause 
that s a satsfactor e\pl at on of th ngs and >; the only 
ground for tiie unforntj ot o cxper ence Mechan 
causality vanislies with tbe independent existence of time, which 
is its fundamental condition." (Bowne, Personniism, p. 214.) 

The whole structure of the phenomenal world of science 
thus is seen to rest on the supposition of the reality of time 
and space. Science has a right to make such a supposition of 

lOO The Philosophical Basis of Education 

the reality of time and space, but inelaphysics must determine 
its relation of the whole of realit>'. 

7 Appearance and Reality. Just as soon as the ideal- 
ist speaks, the whole army of his opponents is ready to 
pounce upon him, A man must indeed ie ye ry sanguine, if 
not altogether presumptuous, to attempt to deny the reality 
of the world of common sense and science, as against the world 
of ideals and purpose. The task of idealism Is not to deny 
l£c reality of the world of common sense as real, but to show in 
what sense it is real, or how it is related to reality as a whole. 
The world of appearance, or sense-perception, is here not de- 
nied as real, for it has a reality. In what sense is it real? 
This is the great ontologica! question as to the relation .af 
die world of sense to that of reality as a whole. The old at- 
tempt to disprove the reality of the sense world has been given 
up as unsuccessful by most metaphysicians, and the vital prob- 
lem has come to be that of showing the relation of the world 
of reality as a whole. 

The plain man views sensation as altogether too simple a 
process, and one that carries with it, its own meaning and 
interpretation. According to this view sensations not only 
give the immediate data of experience, but their own interpre- 
tation as well. Thought is thus overlooked, and it is an easy 
matter to overlook the function of thought, for it is so fleeting 
in its function, but we stand a chance of seeing the meaning 
of things only when we realize the organizing and rationalizing 
power of the mind itself. Thus we do npt so much perceilie 
our world as we think -if. Perception is a very compli- 
cated process and never gives us the reality of things that 
we are all in search of, but only the partial view out of 
which we all make our world, Thus^ we see that reality_is 
not immediately given but arrived at only through the thoi^t 

The phenomenal world is not an unreal world but one 
which exists alone for thought or the intellect. It is the time 
and space world, and has its reality, only in its being known. 
It is not a nonentity else it could not be known, but it has 
being only in its being known. This world of time and space 
IS a manifestation of personal being that expresses himself in 

The Metaphysical Aspett of Education 

this way in the world of time and .soacc. The old conflict 
between Hcraclitus and the Eleatics is" mjt possible of solution 
except on grounds of personalism, or on the notion that reality 
is personal. The jvorld js_bglh-pcnnancni: ajld.changifiE. It is 
changing viewed from tlie point of view of (iipcand space, but 
it is permanent when viewed from within. -There must be 
something that is permanent, otherwise change .would have no 
meaning at all. The changeless condition is in the mind itself 
and it is the mind that knows the changing order ci" temporal 
reality. ... - ^ 

The o nly real cause that can explain anything is pfi'scnul 
causejtliicli we can Lnoiv. There is no fictitious, unknoy jole 
noumenon that cannot be brought into the cognitive relatioft, 
that cannot be known. The only reality is that of experieoi^p, 
but our experience is only partial, but none the less real OD 
account of its incompleteness. A more nearly complete ex- 
perience would give us a reality of a larger content but not a 
true reality. The larger reality expresses itself in the ex- 
periences which we come to know. In this way we know 

lO, ■ 

H T 

■•v j 


8 The Cardinal Principle of Voluntaristic Ideal- 
ism: Reality the Absolute Will or Purpose. The car- 
dinal principle of idealism is, then, that being consists in being 
known, not known by any individual in time and space, but the 
absolute intelligence of the universe. To be real is to stand in 
cognitive relation to this infinite intelligence. The real worljj 
L thus consists of ideas, and exists only in thought. This world 
lot _ reality manifests itself in the time and space world as pur- 
fcnose_and intelligence, but never is the whole of reality thus 
[siyen, for this would mean the whole is given in the part, 
gwhich is a contradiction. -.••-■•' 

W" XhSueht Js the essential nature of reality, and it is intelli--^,'!«^«{ 
KEent or purposive action that characterizes thought. It is by .■ 
I emphasizing this purposive aspect of the world that the essen- 
tial feature of voluntaristic idealism is revealed. The trend 
of idealism is from that of emphasizing the rationality of the 
Ohiver^e to an emphasis on its purposive aspect, yet both are ■ 

I^ential aspects to the world of leality. ^^^h 

Idealism explains everything in terms of intellect. Itself ^^^| 

I02 Tile l'hihso/>liicol'.Dasis of Education 

it does not c.vplain, sint^it is the essential nature of reality 
itself, the first prinqiRl^'of being. Bowne saj-s, "Intellect ex- 
plains everything Jhiif-vitself. It exhibits other things as its 
own product an^" aV'e.xemplifying its own principles; but it 
never explains.^iiscH- It knows itself in living and only in 
living, but it, ncj^r is to be explained by anything, being itself 
the only printiftle of explanation." {Fersontilism, p. 216.) 
We canqot gb' behind self-conscious existence to any further 
explanatiofr.of things, for self-conscious existence is the ulti- 
mate .eiifpl;'"^''')" in itself, and to attempt to go farther back 
is ^iuipj^ to explain the explanation and this pushes us into 
bartroi tautology. Thus we see that for Idealism, "Living. 
a^cjng ihtelngence is the source of all truth and reality, and 
;_'S^'-its own and only standard," and that "knowledge arises 
. tn the mind only through its own activity." (Bowne, 
'•Metaph., p. 425.) The same author says one of the main 
theses of Idealism is that of "denying all extra mental exist- 
ence and making the world of objective experience a thought 
world which would have neither meaning nor possibility apart 
from intelligence." {Mctaph., p. 423.) 

9 The Problem of One and the Many: Fact and 
Purpose. When any such a view as the above is held about 
reality there at once arise a good many problems. Perhaps 
first in importance is the problem of the one and the many. 
Is reality one or is it many? This question has always stood 
as one of the persistent problems of philosophy and there is 
yet no universal agreement as to the answer. Every answer 
of this sort must be given in the light of what is thought to 
constitute the reality of the universe. So we must answer this 
question in the light of the foregoing statement as to the 
nature of reality. Reality is the whole, about which so njucb 
has been said in this volume, ^nd its nature consists in .acuuf 
intelligence, which needs no other by which to explain- itself. 
The many are simply the different aspects of reality as viewed 
in the world of sense, in time and space. The whole of reality 
is not expressed in these successive partial views, but they 
form the starting point for the view of reality as a whole, 
which is one and self-contained, not many. The part always 
implies the whole, but the whole is explained only by the inner 

The Metaphysical Aspect of Education 

^^treladonof allthejtartj. The many has no significance, as .] 
^HtlioteH above, excepfas time and space are regarded as real. 

^^B lo The Problem of Time and Space. Time and space 
^^Bare only the forms in which the world reveals itself to our 
^B^ intelligence. Time and space would mean nothing except as 
the world is viewed in part. If our experience were of the 
whole, rather than the part, time ind space would have no 
meaning, but in a world of personality where each one is only 
a part of the greater whole, or the absolute intelligence, we 
see only in part. Since we see the world as parts by virtue of 
our being a part of the whole, ^£JlXCSSHily see_jh£jmi1djn 
sequence, in time and place . ' 





The Relation of Mind and Matter. Probably 
a perplexing question is that of the relation of mind 
and matter. Like the other questions, they get their signifi- 
cance and their answer by reference to reality as a whole. The 
real question about the material world is not, does it exist, 
but in what sense does it exist, or is it real? 

This question has been answered already from our point 
i view. Matter does not possess its reality by virtue of its 
listence in time and space, as common sense would say, but 
rather its reality lies in its relation to idea. We have said 
that matter is the external meaning of our idea, or the partial 
meaning of our idea expressed. This time and space world, 
which is the framework of the world of matter, is created in 
the interests of our will, which demands that the parts of our 
experience be expressed in their unity. Matter is not properly 
defined when it is termed the object of thought. Rathet 
cnafter is the external reference of my idea, it is the partial 
.ilment of any meaning or purpose in time. 

The Problem of the Infinite. The problems al- 
*■ ready raised suggest the relation of the finite and the infinite, 
and the answers to the former suggest the answer to this lat- 
ter question. The finite is the limited view of reality, reality 
conceived in its external relation of time and space. The whole 

Innot be conceived as existing in time, for this would mean 
substitution of part of the whole. Reality Is the purpose of 

104 The Phihiophkiil Bnsh of F.duailion 

the universe, and purpose needs not time or space for its exist- 
ence. Indeed, as we have noted already, time and space arc 
themselves creations of our own interest or purpose. 

The infinite purpose is the reality, and reality is_infinite, for 
itjas_no Itmits.of time and space. SuclTa view is logically 
necessary since reality musr, whatever its nature, be whole, or 
the other of our fragmentary experience, and the whole cannot 
be expressed in time and space relations. 

Hegel regarded the whole world as the expression or relation 
of a plan, or an idea. This plan is revealed in our successive 
movements toward the other implied in our experience. Such 
a universal plan can never be realized completely in experience, 
because the part can never stand for the whole, and the whole 
cannot exist in time. It is in this sense that the infinite is 
represented in the finite. 

13 The Problem of Self or Personality. Probably 
the most important concept of metaphysics in its relation to 
education is that of the self, or personality. This is. the cep- 
tral problem of education. Personality, or the individual self, 
is the infini_te, .e?(p_ressed in the finite; it is the union of the 
internal and the external aspects of experience, relation of 
the fact and its meaning, the union of the external and in- 
ternal meaning of our ideas. Home says, "Idealism finds 
ideas and purposes to be the realities of existence, and person- 
ality, which is the union of ideas and purposes, to be the ulti- 
mate reality. These views are in contrast with all forms of 
materialism which would reduce ideas and purposes to some 
form of physical existence." {Idealism in Edu., p. 7.) 

14 God, Immortality, and the Soul. The questions of 
God, immortality and the soul are religious concepts and are 
metaphysical in so far as the reality of the objects to which 
they refer are concerned. These are largely questions of value 
for governing the conduct of man and are hence ethical or 
religious. We may consider them to better advantage at an- 
other time. 

15 Summary. Let us, briefly summariw the main points 
of this chapter. Metaphysics represents man's greatest effort 

" The Metafihysical Aspect of Education log 

to think clearly. The principles governing our way of view- 
ing the world may not always be very well defined, but we 
cannot get away from the metaphysic on that account. A 
theory of first principles, or a metaphysic, is involved in our 
every action and word, for each involves certain beliefs as to 
the world order, and our reasons for our preference for these 
beliefs rather than others, constitutes our metaphysics. 

Bowne says that, "There is a growing insight into the fact 
that metaphysics underlies all science." It is a part of the 
function of metaphysics to criticize the first principles, or 
ultimate assumptions of science. Another part of its work is 
to generalize the results of all science. But the chief work 
of metaphysics is its search for the ultimate principles, or the 
true nature of reality, and it is in the light of such a view- 
that the fir^t principles of science are criticized, and its results 
generalized. Metaphysics is, therefore, more than a mere 
"science of sciences." It is a science of reality, and reality is 
not expressed as a whole in the world of fact. It thus be- 
comes clear that metaphysics is the ultimate ground of all 
knowledge, for knowing is out of the question until the prob- 

^jem of reality or being is settled, for the question of the reality 
©f knowledge is also at stake. Knowledge is thus first as- 
^med and then proved. 
The answer that the metaphysics 'of idealism gives to the 
question of reality is that rts ultimate nature is intelligence, 
infinite personality, the absolute will, which expresses itself 
in the finite. In the individual self or personality. The real- 
ity of experience consists in its relation to this infinite pcr- 
sonalfty or will, and such relationship is expressed in our pur- 
pose, which is the union of the external and internal meanings 
of our ideas. Thus realitj- is one and unalterable, and the 
many are only the appearance or the way in which the one 
manifests itself in a temporal order of things, or to a finite 
experience. The reality of this world of appearance, or spacc- 
I perception, consists not in its objectivity, but rather in its be- 
L mg known not by the part, but by the absolute will or intelli- 
gence, which is the complete fulfillment of our meaning and 
litxperieiice. For such a conception of being, time and space 
f&e regarded as merely subjective forms of our experience. 
Tic real or the absolute, is thus not in time but includes all I 

lo6 The Philosophical Bash of Education 

time. lo audi a conception the problem of the self or per- 
sonality becomes central. 

i6 Educational Implications of Metaphysics. But 
what meaning has such a metaphysic for education? The 
educator must start, like all other finite beings, with the facts 
of experience, and the nature of the human mind. These 
facts must be compared, unified and related organically in 
the larger whole, and this must be interpreted in the light uf 
universal being or reality. We are not to begin the work of 
education by stamping out the evils of child nature, but by 
relating all parts of our nature into an organic whole. This 
is the only way all things find their place in relation to the 
whole. There is no other way to determine what is good 
and what is bad. 

Our metaphysical presumptions profoundly influence our 
whole view of life and of education. For Plato all education 
was to be based on ontology, or an understanding of the true 
nature of being, or reality. {Encyclopedia Brit., Vol. XXV, 
p. 423.) All metaphysical presumptions influence education. 
Some of these exert a more special influence on education. 
What there is about the nature of reality that enables us to 
have community of experience is an important problem con- 
cerning life as a ivhole, j'ct is not so central in its relation 
to education as others, for instance the self or personality. 
'Metaphysics deals with the presuppositions of the material and 
mental world, but the latter are of more special importance 
for education. Yet all these views must fit into the view 
of reality as a whole. Our theory of the origin and destiny 
of the world, our cosmology, is essential to a view of reality 
as a whole, but this is not so important for education as is that 
of our relation as persons to this world. 

There is another metaphysical problem that greatly con- 
cerns the theory of education, and that is whether reality is 
one or many. Monism and pluralism give different answers 
to this question, and these answers greatly affect our view of 
education, though it is not generally thought to be of such 
consequence. Pluralism is the metaphysical doctrine that the 
relations of things are external, not infernal, and so the same 
thing can be in different relations at different times. Monism 

The Metaphysical Aspect of Education 107 

holds that the reality of relations is confluent in all things and 
that relations are internal and one, everything is present to 
everything at all times, its only relation being that of its mean- 
ing for the whole. These metaphysical doctrines of pluralism 
and monism usually give rise to two rather sharply defined 
views of education, the one individual and the other social. 

I hope the conception is growing that science cannot settle 
all the questions and problems that arise in the field of edu- 
cational experience, for "science concerns itself with what is 
accessible to proof, not with what may possibly be true." 
(Palmer's Field of Ethics, p. 9.) Now the field of what may 
possibly be true is the field of philosophy, and the present chap- 
ter should have led us to see that metaphysics, one of the 
philosophical disciplines, is concerned with a view of reality 
that profoundly influences all our theories of education and 



I How Can One Thing Know Another? The cen- 
tral problem for epistemologj' is, How can one thing know 
another? If this problem cannot be answered, then the search 
for the reality of the universe is meaningless so far as its being 
an object of knowledge is concerned. Palmer says, "The 
function of epistemology is to determine the extent and valid- 
ity of the knowledge which consciousness affords." {Field of 
Ethics, p. 13.) These might be regarded as two ways of stat- 
ing the same prol>Iera, for in determining Hmits and values of 
knowledge, we determine whether one thing can know another 
or not. 

Plato regarded this search for being through knowledge as 
the greatest delight or pleasure of the world. He says in the 
Republic, that "The delight which is to be found in the knowl- 
edge of true being is known to the philosopher only." (Jow- 
ett's, p. 292.) This claim for the pleasures of the intellect 
was not original with Plato, however, for Socrates had already 
given expression to the view that the exercise of the power of 
knowledge was man's greatest joy, but as we shall see Socrates 
places a certain limitation on knowledge, which had to be 
removed before any great gains could be made from this 

2 Relation op Epistrmology and Metaphysics, It has 

been suggested already that the fields of epistemology and 
metaphysics are not entirely separate, for the problem of be- 
ing cannot be made intelligible except through the understand- 
ing, otherwise we would not know being when we found it, 
no matter how it was found. We are ohliged first to assume 
the validity of knowledge in order to begin our search and 
prove its value by the efficacy or fruitfulness of its search. 

The Epislewalogieal Aspects of Education 109 J 

^m Being and knowing are thus seen to be related intimately. 

^F Fullerton says that "Epistemology is the study of the 'nature 
of knowledge and its scope,' " and later he states that "it 
should be remarked, in the second place, that the investigation 
of our knowledge inevitably runs together with an investi- 
gation into the nature of things known of the mind and the 
world," (Introd. to Phil., p. 248.) The same close relation 
is observed by Prof. E. B. Titchener, who says, "It is the 
problem of epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, to ex- 
plain how the concrete experience, originally one, has come to 
be divided up under an objective and a subjective aspect; 
what there is in the nature of truth to make this division 
necessary and helpful; and what measure of truth attaches to 
each side of the division at the present stage of the world's 
thought. It is the problem of metaphysics, which unifies 
and harmonizes the principles and laws of all the sciences, to 

■make the conclusion reached by way of the two abstractions 
from experience just mentioned, the conclusions of both the 
natural and the mental sciences and in their light to explain 
the given fact from which they are derived, the concrete ex- 
perience self." {Outlines of Psychol., p, 367.) How is this 
view greatly different taken by H. Sidgwick. He says: "I do 
not myself regard the separation between Epistemology and 
Ontology as other than formal and superficial; for in the main, 
when we have decided the most important epistemo logical ques- 
tions we have in my view implicitly though not explicitly 
decided the most important ontological questions." {Phil.. Its 

IScoKetc, p. 112.) 
3 Relation ok Epistemology and Psychology. There 
Is another distinction that should be made before we go into 
the problems of epistemology. I refer to that between epistem- 
ology, as the science of the limits and value of knowl- 
edge, and psschology, which is the science of the states of con- 
sciousness. Psychology never grows so ambitious, when it 
understands its business, as to ask about the limits or value 
of knovvledge, for as we learned in Part I of this volume, 
^^ psychology is a descriptive and explanatory science purely, and ^^^J 
^^Las such, it is not concerned with values, or ultimate principles, ^^^^| 
^^Vbut alone with a mere description and explanation of the wa)r-^^^^| 


>lo The Philosophical Basis of Education 

the mind works under certain conditions. Epistemology. on 
the contrary, begins witli these results and attempts to find 
how it is possible for consciousness to know any object at all, 
and to know itself. The world somehow has become dichotom- 
ized, or cut into two parts, the knovver and the known, and 
it is the business of epistemology to see how they can be put 
together again in one whole, and it is the business of meta- 
physics to answer in what sense these two worlds are different, 
or if only different aspects of one real world, then what the 
nature of this real world is. 

So long as psychology minds its own business as a descriptive 
science, it will never have any trouble with ep is tern o log}', which 
is concerned with ultimate principles o£ bumoa. miiici&liiadiag, 
and how consciousness can know its objects. Psychology has 
to assume that consciousness does know its object, just as 
epistemology must consider the results of psychology before set- 
ting out on its journey to find the limits and values of knowl- 

4 The Central Problem of Epistemology. The great 
question for epistemology as we have said is, what is the extent 
and validity of knowledge? This is not a very simple ques- 
tion, nor is it meaningless, since no less a matter than our 
relation to reality is at stake in our answer. There have been 
many diflferent answers to this great problem all down the 
ages. Some have dented even the possibility of knowledge, 
and asserted that all is opinion. Of course such rank scepti- 
cism commits suicide in that it assumes to know at least what 
is asserted in this proposition. 

The central difficulty seems to be after we have once as- 
sumed a certain amount of knowledge, whether its range is 
limited to a knowledge of the particulars of our experience 
alone, or whether we can know the universal as well. In 
other words, can we know what is not given in an act of 
perception, that is as a concept, or general idea? The logical 
difficulty involved here is, with what degree of certainly or truth 
can a proposition be made about a content not presented im- 
mediately to consciousness in a single act of perception? Some 
have asserted that knowledge is limited to perceptive acts of 
experience, others that the relation between these simple acts 

r The Epistemojogkal Aspects of Education 1 

of perception can also be known, and still others that the re- 
lation of these to a content never given as a whole in experi- 
ence can also be known. There is a narrow limit beyond 
which some people refuse to go in trusting the validity of 
knowledge, while others remove practically all limits from 
knowledge, and assert that we can know even God. It is on 
just this question of the limits and values of knowledge, that 
most philosophies come to divide most sharply, — it is the point 
of greatest divergence in a great many cases. Knowledge pre- 
sents a great many difficulties. When it is said that we know 
a thing, what does this mean? It certainly implies a certain 
relationship between a perceiving consciousness and a perceived 
object, but it does not yet appear what sort of relationship is 
involved. These problems do not arise in the mind of the 
casual observer. As Plato says, "But people imagine that they 
know about the nature of things when they do not know about 
them, and, not having come to an understanding at first be- 
cause they think they know, they end, as might be expected, in 
contradicting one another and themselves." {Works, Vol, I, 
p. 442.) 

With the common observer things are what they seem, and 
that is the end of it. We open our eyes and see, and seeing 
is for such a one, believing. It has been noted by more care- 
ful observers that the senses are very deceiving. Anaxagoras as- 
serted many centuries ago that "because of the weaknesses of 
our senses we are unable to discern the truth." {Cf. Bake- 
well: Source Bonk, p. 53.) Plato also asserted that "The eye 
and the ear and the other senses are full of deception," and 
only the mind disciplined in high thinking can attain true 
knowledge {Phaedo, p. 226). There is, then, a certain weak- 
ness in the senses so far as their being a source of knowledge 
is concerned. This shortage may not he so much due to the 
imperfection of our sense organs, as to lack in pure sensation 
of the universal element so conspicuously absent in sensation. 
Professor Dewey says that "Sensations, per se, never enter 
into knowledge. Knowledge is constituted by interpretation 
of sensations, that is, by their idealization," He says fur- 
ther that "Knowledge is not the process by which ready-made 
objects impress themselves upon the mind, but is the process 
by which self renders sensations significant by reading itself 

112 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

into them." {Psychology, pp. 138, 143.) Further, "Mem- 
ory and perception deal with the particular object as such. 
Imagination deals with the universal in its particular mani- 
festation, or with the particular as embodying some ideal 
meaning, some universal element." ( Psychology, p. 201 . ) 
Hyde expresses a similar view when he says. "Sensations with 
no intelligence acting upon them, and reacted upon them would 
give no knowledge within and no world without." {Practical 
Idealism, p. 34.) This distinction between sensation and a 
complete act of knowledge does not always remain so clearly 
in our minds. May it not be that something worth while is 
omitted in the following statement from Professor James? 
He says, "Out of what is in itself an undistinguishable swarm- 
ing continuum devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses 
make for us by attending to this motion and ignoring that a 
world full of contrasts of sharp accents, of abrupt changes, 
of picturesque light and shade." {Briefer Course, p. 171.) 
Similarly something seems to be lacking in the following state- 
ment: "Knowledge is the result of observation, comparison, 
and classification; all of which result from the relationship of 
one thing to another." (Carpenter: Witness to the Influ- 
ence of Christ, p. 46.) We might pile fact upon fact, but 
this would never result in knowledge. Knowledge is of rcU" 
tions, and these do not appear in sensation alone, but only when 
we reflect upon our experiences. To quote Professor Dewey 
again: "Thinking transforms perception by bringing out ele- 
ments latent in it, thereby completing it." {Psychology, p. 
158.) Thus it appears according to his view, which is es- 
sentially my own, that an act of knowledge is not circum- 
scribed by an act of sensation, but that knowledge arises only as 
a result of reflection, and consists of a conscious relation of 
known object to perceiving subject. 

5 Knowledge as a Search for the Universal, So 
prominent was the universal as an essential in the knowing 
process, that Socrates regarded knowledge as a search for the 
universal element in experience. Perception is the first stage 
in "the knowledge process, or perhaps it would not be incorrjct 
to say it is the simplest form of knowledge. The second stage, 
according to Plato, is that represented by a knowledge of the 


^^F The Epistemologknl Aspects of Edur/iHon 113 

relations of perceptions to each other, and the third and highest 
stage of knowledge is represented by our consciousness of the 
unity of knowledge as a whole. This unity of all knowledge, alt 
reality, all beauty, truth and goodness, was represented in 
the "Idea of the Good" and true joy comes only to him who 
can see these broader relations, "The many," according to this 
view, "are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but 
not seen." (Cf., Jowett's Republic, p. 208.) The lover of 
knowledge is the only pure in heart, and he alone shall sec God. 
Plato asserts that "No one who has not studied philosophy and 
who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed 
to enter the company of the Gods, but the lover of knowledge 
only." (fforks. Vol. 11, p. 26.} 

»6 Scepticism as the Denial of the Universal. The 
history of philosophy shows a considerable number of thinkers, 
who have held very different views regarding the extent and 
validity of knowledge from those mentioned in the foregoing 
section. The. Sophists, in so far as they were philosophical at 
all, were sceptics. They denied the validity of universal 
knowledge, and reduced all to opinion and perception. Pro- 
tagoras, chief of the Sophists, said that "Sense perception is 
the only source and only kind of knowledge." (Cf., Cushman, 
History of Phil., Vol. I, p. 6g.) Again he asserted that "Man 
is the measure of all things." Gorgias said that nothing could 
be known, and that if it could be known, it could not be 
communicated, He did not notice the contradiction in that he 
asserted by his denial of knowledge, that something can be 
known, and also communicated. 

The long search for the universal element in knowledge be- 
fore Socrates had not resulted in much gain, and the extreme di- 
vergence of philosophies leads to much doubt on the part of the 
Sophists as to the validity of knowledge. There was no agree- 
ment as to the first principle of all reality. It had been asserted 
to be earth, air, fire, water, a combination of these, and the in- 
finite, by as many different groups of philosophers. The Soph- 
ists, seeing the instability of the philosophy of the physical 
scientists, despaired of ever attaining truth by scientific methods 

iin their disputation. They neglected truth for popular effect, ^h 
Their scepticism thus grew out of the philosophical agnosticism ^^^H 

114 Thf Philosophical Basis of Education 

of the earlier cosmology and physical speculation. The search 
of the Miletian school for the first principle had failed; the 
doctrine of the universal flux asserted by Heraclitus; the de- 
nial of the reality of the many by the Eliatic sceptics, the 
proof of the inadequacy of the sense organs, and the depend- 
ence of perception on these, by the physical philosophers, Etn- 
pedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus; all these causes had 
marked effect in producing the scepticism of the Sophists. 

Men often become misologists, or haters of ideas, after 
many times finding arguments which they considered sound, 
proved false. Thus they come to discredit knowledge generally 
and become sceptics, whereas such experiences should rather 
point to the necessity of clear thinking, based on universal princi- 
ples, rather than mere opinion based on what the senses reveal. 
(Cf. Plato's Works, The Phado, pp. 235-236-) If Pro- 
tagoras were correct, there would be no common standard of 
truth or experience, and the only reality would be individual 
opinion. Each man would be shut up in his own experience. 
Here we find expression of the doctrine of Solipsism. 

Hume gave expression to the sceptical view of knowledge, 
but in a more refined form. His scepticism was based on his 
theory of the association of ideas. The only principle of or- 
ganizing experience was that of association of ideas, and this 
association is purely empirical or a posteriori. This left his 
world in the same perpetual flux as that of Heraclitus many 
centuries before. His epistemo logical doctrine led to his scep- 
ticism. Hume saw toward the end of his life that what was 
needed was a norm or standard of some kind. His scepticism 
was the refutation of his own empiricism. Kant came to the 
rescue of this world of Hume by supplying the necessary norm. 

The sceptic denies his own position by asserting the validity 
of knowledge, for as Bradley reminds us, "To say that reality 
is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know 
reality; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must 
fail to transcend appearance Itself implies that transcendence." 
{Appearance and Reality, p. 2.) 

7 Kant to the Rescue of Knowledge. Kant sa.vs that 
a world of pure empiricism cannot hold together for it cannot 
find the necessary principles in any given experience or series 

The Efiislemologiial Aspects of Education 115 1 

of experiences, which are necessary to unite the separate ele- 
ment of experience. He supplied these in the form of his 
famous categories as the original and innate forms of the 
understanding. Thus he brought order out of the chaotic 
world of Heraclitus and Hume by supplying principles of 
organization in the form of categories. Understanding must 
supply these principles, for experience cannot. Kant was a 
rationalist, not an empiricist, yet he placed decided limitations 
on knowledge. He held that the categories of the under- 
standing cannot know reality but only phenomenality. Their 
inly purpose was to give form to our sensations and in no 
sense could they give us the noumena, or ultimate reality of 
things. If it be true that the only function of the forms or 
categories is to arrange our sense perceptions, then it is true 
that they give us phenomena and not reality. 

Kant did not remove consciousness from the phenomenal 
realm nor did he see the contradiction in his theory, which is, ' 

Tiely, that one phenomenal thing cannot know another. 
There must be a reality in thought that is indisputable, if 
it be true that it can know phenomenality at all. " 

It one phenomenon can know another, is to assign more than 
f phenomenality to the one, — hence the contradiction. 

S Naturalism and Positivism. Kant would thus limit ' 
knowledge to an understanding of the world of phenomena of 
the descriptive sciences. This doctrine gained expression in 
many ways. It was best expressed in the physical science 
philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Spen- 
cer held that "In its ultimate essence, nothing can be known ;" 
without seemingly becoming conscious of the fact that this 
assertion carried with it much more than is justifiable on 

I purely empirical grounds. (Cf. First Principles, p. 21.) 
Macpherson says rightly that "So long as the purely mechani- 
cal conception of the universe obtained sway over the minds of 
philosophers there was no getting beyond positivism, with its 
theory that nothing can be known beyond co-existences and 
sequences," {Spencer and Spencerism, p. 69.) Another short- 
coming of naturalism is seen in the fact that, as H. Sidgwicfc 
says, "Naturalistic or positive philosophy does not recognize 
what ought to be as an object of knowledge, distinct from the ■ 

Il6 The Philosophical Bash of Education 

knowledge of the existences and sequences of phenomena." 
{Philosophy: Its Scope, etc., p. 76.) According to the philos- 
ophy of naturalism there would be normative science as dis- 
tinguished from the descriptive science. The world of the 
ought is not distinguishable from the world of fact. As a 
theory of knowledge, naturalism does not seem to he altogether 
complete. It probably goes as far as the theories of Kant and 
Spencer would allow. A somewhat different theory is ex- 
pressed in the philosophy of realism. 

g Realism as a Theory of Knowledge. Realism is of 
two kinds, the one holding that wt know the external world 
directly, and the other holding that we know the world only 
through our ideas, which alone can know directly. The 
former class are called naive realists, and the latter hypotheti- 
cal realists. (Cf. FuUerton, Intro, to Phil. pp. 181-187.) 
Exponents of naive realism were Thomas Reid, Sir William 
Hamilton, and Herbert Spencer, but they were not always con- 
sistent in this view. Exponents of hypothetical realism were 
Descartes and Locke. 

It has always been one of the fundamental tenets of realism 
that ideas and their objects are independent realities, they are 
in no sense dependent one upon the other. There is a modi- 
fied form in recent times, going by the name of new realism, 
that asserts that when an idea knows its object, the idea and 
object are one, but in no sense does the reality of the object 
depend upon its being known. Realists are rationalistic gen- 
erally, but they do not trust knowledge to the extent that the 
rational idealist does. 

10 Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge, Pragma- 
tism offers still another theory of knowledge. Professor Royce 
defines pragmatism as the philosophical tendency "to charac- 
terize and to estimate the process of thought in terms of prac- 
tical categories, and to criticise knowledge in the light of its 
bearings on conduct." {Phil. Rev.. Vol. XHI, p. 113.) We 
must keep in mind Professor James's caution that "By 'prac- 
tical,' pragmatists do not mean the opposite of 'theoretical,' nor 
do they mean to exclude the latter interests. By 'practical' 
they mean generally the deductively concrete, the individual 


^^H The EpisUmological Aspects of Education I17 

particular and effective, as opposed to the abstract, general and 
inert." {Meaning of Truth, p. 206.) 

Pragmatism is primarily a theory of knowledge and only 

■ incidentally a theory of reality. I take the following quotation 
.from the International Journal of Ethics: "Pragmatism it- 
self, though it was many other things also, was primarily epis- 
temological temporalism. It proposed to define meaning and 
truth in terms of intertemporal relations between successive 
phases of experience. Usually they had been defined in terms 
which either ignored temporal distinctions of before and after, 
or expressly professed to transcend all such distinction." (Vol. 
XXI, p. 149.) Professor James, leader of the Pragmatisls, 
says, "One of pragmatism's merits is that it is so purely 
epistemological. It must assume realities but it prejudices 
nothing as to their constitution, and the most diverse meta- 
physics can use it as their function." 

We have noted already that the chief task of epistemology 
is to show how one thing can know another, or how conscious- 
ness can know its object. Practically all philosophies are 
^reed that this is the central problem of epistemology, but 
the answers they give to the question are different. James says, 
"It is reality's part to possess its own existence; it is thought's 
part to get into 'touch' with it by innumerable paths of veri- 
fication," {Meaning of Truth, p. 214.) "Knowing," he 
says, "is the process that gets us into fruitful relations with 
reality, whether copying be one of these relations or not." 
{Meaning af Truth, p. 81.) We are reminded that, "know- 
ing is only one way of interacting with reality and adding to 
■ its effect." {Ibid., p. 96.) 
Pragmatism offers an adaptation theory of truth. Adapta- 
tion of the idea to its reality constitutes the truth relation. 
This point is made clear in the following quotation: "What 
meaning, indeed, can an idea's truth have save its power of 
adapting us whether ^ mentally or physically to a reality?" 
^^ (James, Meaning of Truth, p. 238.) Pragmatists do not go 
^H BO far as to deny the universal in knowledge, but they do 
^K restrict its operation to that of bringing us into fruitful and 
^^Kpractical relations with the idea's object. Perceptual and con- 
^^Kceptual knowledge, or "acquaintance w^ith" a thing, and 
^^F'knowledge about it" arc thus contrasted by James: "Knowl- 

Il8 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

edge about a thing is knowledge of its relations. Acquaint- 
ance with it is limitation to the hare impression which it 
makes." [Briefer Course, p. 167.) In another place he says: 
"Conceptual knowledge (or knowledge about) is made such 
wholly by the existence of things that fall outside the knowing 
experience itself," (Meaning of Truth, p. 114.) Conceptual 
knowledge thus is limited to the field of verification and prac- 
tical life, for "Concepts are made for purposes of practice 
and not for purposes of 'insight.' " (Pluralistic Universe, p. 

To get into fruitful and practical relations with the world 
of reality, our concepts must always succeed in bringing us 
back to the perceptual world of practical experience. This is 
clearly James's meaning of truth, for he says: "To gain in- 
sight into all that moving life, Bergson is right in turning us 
away from conception and towards perception." (Pluralistic 
Universe, p. 340.) 

Pragmatism is not a test of the concrete, as is often sup- 
posed, but a concrete test. Any idea is true if it only fulfills 
the test of proving successful in adapting us to its object, no 
matter how abstract the idea may be. My idea of God is 
true if it succeeds in adjusting my life to my concrete experi- 
ences in such a way as to prove of practical benefit to me. 
This reminds us of the doctrine of the Sophist that the best 
argument was the one producing the mast desirable effect. 

II Empiricism and Rationaijsm, From the foregoing 
section it is clear that there is considerable difference as to the 
answer of the epistemological question, What is the extent 
and validity of knowledge? The Sophists practically denied 
its validity altogether. The naturalists restricted its range to 
the descriptive world of science and proclaimed the rest "un- 
knowable." The hypothetical realists broadened the field of 
reason greatly, hut failed to reconcile the dualism between mind 
and its object. 

Those who restrict.thejJiRof of the .truth_.of .an idea to its. 
empirical test in practical e.vpericnce are called empiricists. 
Those who make the test of truth the logical test of the rela- 
tion of ideas in a system arc rationalists. There are other 
distinctions also, but we need not mention them here. This 

The Episternohfficn! Aspects of Eiiucation 1 

B-distinction is brought out by the following quotation from 
1 Prof. Sorley : "While Plato insists on the creative function of 
I mind, Bacon distrusts the mind left to itself, and forbids any 
I anticipation of nature," {Int. Journal of Ethics, Vol. IX, p. 
J 156,) Plato was a rationalist, while Bacon was an etnpiricist. 
I Empiricism is the doctrine that all truth is given in experience 
I Sh.^ '1^3' the method of arriving at Jt is through observation 
I and verification, and not reflection. It is doubtful whether 
I one can be a consistent empiricist. Locke certainly was not. 
I The truths of a priori deductions from fundamental principles 
I are often substantiated by a posteriori evidence from the facts 
I of experience and history, hut we have no right to suppose on 
I this account, that such truths are only empirically derived 
\ irom experience. 

12 Intuitionism and Mysticism, Intuitionism and 
mysticism have to be reckoned with in any account of the ex- 
tent of validity of knowledge. Intuitionism is the theory 
that some things are known immediately and directly without 
the mediation of the thought processes in the usual logical 
way, through inference, either induction or deduction. In 
Other words, the process of reasoning is not always necessary 
as a means of arriving at knowledge or understanding. 

When this theory is appropriated in the interest of a search 
for reality, It is not uncommon to hear it said that knowledge 
is of no avail in arriving at the true nature of being. The 
only way to get at true being is to eliminate all differences 

I arising from the thought process, and be swallowed up com- 
pletely by the ultimate reality itself. There is thus no media- 
tion of knowledge, between fact and reality, part and whole, 
1)ut is one direct and immediate plunge into the very heart 
■of reality. This is the answer of mysticism to the question 
of the limits and value of knowledge; another aspect of the 
doctrine will be mentioned in the next chapter. It must not 
be inferred from the foregoing that all intuitionists are mys- 
tics. There are a great many people not mystics in their 
philosophy, who hold that some of our truths are arrived at 

» directly or immediately, while others are arrived at through ^^ 
a process of logical inference. It is only when this doctrine ^^^H 
jg^made one-sided and applied to the ontological quest for ^^^H 


re and 1 
. For 
signi£- I 

120 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

reality that the term mysdcism is applied to it. 


^ra a very different answer to the question of the nature 
nlue of knowledge from those systems mentioned abo' 
Uwlitm "The nature of intelligence is to seek order, signi 
Cance, purpose. It cannot be irrational to trust this character 
of our minds. It would look as if the highest faculty in us 
uniwrrcd to the highest fact of the universe. The contrary 
luppusitioii certainly reduces thought to mockery." (C. F, 
I)(ile. Hope of Immortality.) It is "knowledge" that "gives 
tia the value of truth." ( Vliinsterberg, Psychology and 
TtacHtr, p. 56.) Or as Paul Carus sa>'s, "The ultimate cri- 
terion of philosophy is the intellect." "The Knowing self," 
MtyK Uownc, "is the primal reality in knowledge, and the only 
Tfalily of which we have proper consciousness." {Mela- 
pkriii's, p. 331.) "The test of reality is that a thing acts and 
in acted upon; this is the determining factor in the world of 
ohitnge and cfliects." (/iirf, p. 337.) The intellect in the 
HCt of thoufi^ht produces its own existence. Thought and 
MJiteiivc are simultaneous. Intellect is the object of its own 
lh<iU||hl nnd it supports the world on real existence, the world 
ut Idem. The phenomenal world is never real existence. Real 
milllClK'e i* not out of thought, or in time. Thought not only 
lllllkfi* itk mentiii constructs but in the logical arrangement of 
lit uilUPl'm it llives them their meaning also. It makes for 
III iMir wmld o( meaning, it makes the world intelligible. In 
lIlM Ht'l ot knowing tome content is not added to the thing 
blluHHi Imi rHthcr the act of knowing is a reaction, a reprc- 
l)l(llHlli<l> "' « fonteni already in the thing known, 

nn tiitiiUlon liriiBO the world is only a succession of rapidly |ihi'ii<>iiii^nii, hut when thought is ushered in the whole 
lllllMlli'M )• iliuiiuod, and the world is more than a rapid move- 
tl(HU "' tuiHiiliiult'i* lUla. It becomes a world of meaning and 

tllH|lt|Vi H W'lUil lliut BHini significance in proportion as we 
IIH lHlt-" li' illl('ll"P' '''" lii^'^e" meaning of things. The real 
U(|(|l|| (liiiii, 14 lU'l »lmply the world of sense, nor is it the 

IlilllllV tlH'")t*'"' *^'"^''' "' ''"^ "'""'■^' scientist, rather the 
III Itmlll l( m Wtitltl "' P'Tpise and meaning underlying all 
[HimilHI*! 'IH'l "" ""'P''V Hrrtiiiuaiient, and we are brought 

The EpistemoloffUal Aspects of Education 

relation with this world through consciousness. 

The causality of common sense finds its explanation 
infinite series of successive events in a time world where each 
cause becomes in its turn a consequence. According to th: 
view causation must be sought in a first cause and such a 
search ends in an infinite regress. The difficulty of such a 
conception arises from a mistaken notion of time which is 
regarded as a separate reality independent of our experience 
of it. This view, of course, fails to see the pbenomenality 
of the time process itself, which exists in and for intelligence 
only. Mechanical causation has its practical value which 
cannot be denied it, but its value does not lie in its giving 
any final answer as to nature, but rather in the fact that 
describes for us the sequential order of phenomena, which 
order has its reality In the intelligence that knows it as real. 
Only volitional or purposive causation can give any final 
answer as to the real nature of things. Mechanical causation 
apart from purposive insight is a barren abstraction. The 
'e of things can only be explained truly in terms of per- 

Idealism thus overcomes the apparent dualism of the 
verse by showing that such a conception has its basis in 
clear thoughts of men. There is no distinction between the 
world of fact and that of purpose, since both exist in and for 
consciousness. We thus find here what is "ep is temo logical 
monism" which, to use professor R. B. Perry's words, "means 
that when things are known they are identical element for ele- 
ment, with the idea or content of the knowing state." {Ap- 
proach to Philosophy, p. 331.) 

According to the idealistic epistemology we have partial 
truth only on account of our partial knowledge, and "absolute 
knowledge" answers to "absolute truth." (Plato's Works, 
Parmenides. p. 54.) Knowledge for Plato consists in becom- 
ing conscious of the relation of the various ends to the end of 
I all ends, the idea of the good, and this is made possible by the 
concept of numbers. The good is the idea of all inclusive 
being; by participation in it alone do other ideas, subordinate 
ends gain any existence at all. This good, the final and all in- 
clusive aim, is the object of alt knowledge, indeed it is knowl- 
edge. The idea has its own other which is the idea of tfie 



The Philosophical Basis of Educalh 


good, but other than the good there is nothing, non-being. 

James criticizes the idealist when he says in effect that 
"knowing" is not a "static relation out of time," but rather a 
"function of practical life." {Menning and Truth, p. lao.) 
There is certainly one sense in which the idealist would agree 
to this view. It is quite true that knowing has very practical 
as well as external reference to a temporal and spatial order 
of things, but he will not accept the view, without better rea- 
sons than are so far apparent, that knowing is a "function of 
practical life," if this is to mean that it is limited to the 
temporal order of thinp, 

14 SuMMARV. It is time that we summarize briefly the 
results of this chapter and point nut their educational signifi- 
cance. The chief problem of cpistemology is that as to the 
limits and validity of knowledge and this problem is vitally 
connected with that of the nature of reality, or being. It may 
be held that the problem of the nature and limits of knowledge 
should be determined before the search for reality is in order. 
Some one has said, though I am not able to find who, that "It 
is useless to endeavor to discover the real significance of the 
world and being until we discover the nature and limits of 
knowledge. In differences of psychological theory all differ- 
ences among philosophers take their rise." This view not only 
shows the close relation of epistemology and metaphysics 
(though it reverses the usual order of procedure), hut also the 
relations between ps5'chology and cpistemology. Psychology- 
docs, however, deal with the nature and extent of knowledge, 
but only with the description and explanation of this process 
from a causal point of view. 

Socrates asserted that the particular in experience, or that 
given by perception, is only an incident in the knowing process, 
and that the universal, or the concept, formed the real basis 
of knowledge and inference. He did not, however, give this 
concept separate existence as did Plato after him. The sophists 
denied the validity of the universal altogether and claimed each 
man to be measure of his own being. The naturalists and 
positivists accepted the validity of the universal, but only so 
far as it could be verified in experience. The pragmatist is 
also afraid to trust knowledge outside of his sight and so keeps 


The Epistemohgical Aspects of Education 123 1 

rein on it, or in other words, limits the truthfulness 
idea to its power of adapting us in a fruitful way to 

Mysticism is a form of ontological intuitionism which as- 
serts that being cannot really be known at all, and is realized 
only by a denial of all knowledge and the distinctions which 
it makes. Idealism goes much farther than empiricism in 
asserting the validity of knowledge, and makes knowing the 
creative function of the world of reality, or identifies knowing 
and being, and thus eliminates the dualism betiveen mind and 
matter, or more generally between the knower and the known, 
and thus brings together again through intelligence the world 
of fact and purpose, which distinction was made in answer to 
the practical demands of our will. 

t5 Educational iMPLiCATioNS of Epistemology. And 
what is the significance of all this for education? The signifi- 
cance of these points of view for education lies in the fact that 
they do as a logical consequence modify our educational theory 
since they modify our view of the world as a whole, and so 
our practice also. 

The sophists' denial of the validity of knowledge would re- 
sult in a theory of education that would fail to make room 
for any training of knowledge. It would result, as their own 
practice showed, in teaching the exercise of free and unclari- 
fied individual opinion for each man is his own measure both 
of being and knowing. For the Socratic school of philosophy 
the highest aim of education was virtue, which was synony- 
mous with knowledge. The only vice is ignorance, the only 
virtue knowledge, and knowledge consisted, as w'e have above 
noted, in a search for the universal element of experience, as 
against the particular of sense perception. Such knowledge 
had its foundation in principles universally admitted by all 
men. Teaching consisted in consciously bringing to light such 
principles, and this was the highest duty of man, the call of vir- 
tue itself. "Know thyself" is first in every man's life. Not sense- 
perception, but judgment and reasoning with universals or 
concepts, form the basis of such education as logically grows 
out of the Socratic philosophy. 

For all forms of naturalism and positivism, the chief bus!- 





124 Tke Philosophical Bath of Education 

ness of education would logically be dial of training the senses 
and perception, for by these cpistemo logical theories knowl- 
edge is limited to perceptions and their relations to one an- 
other, to the field of actual experience. The science would 
offer the best means for a training of this sort. Hence, when 
Spencer aslted the question, "What knowledge is of most 
worth?" he gave a logical answer when he said, "Science." 
Nothing could be known outside the field of science, so why 
bother about the "unknowable?" But one might well ask 
of the positivist, when so much lime is given to the external 
things, how is it possible to give sufficient attention to mind 
which alone is capable of dealing intelligently with things? 

For realism both the world of ideas and matter are equally 
and independently real, and both sides of experience deserve 
equal attention as a natural consequence. No partiality is 
here shown for the physical science, as in the case of natural- 
ism or for the abstract sciences, as with Socrates and Plato. 

Pragmatism, as a pedagogical theory, holds that "We ought 
to subordinate our abstract and theoretical to our concrete and 
practical interests, and that, in particular, our educational cur- 
riculum should be made to conform more than at present to 
the personal needs and future vocations of our students." 
(Montague, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VI, p. 463, footnote.) 
Such an educational theory follows logically from the cpistem- 
ological theory of pragmatism that the test of the truth of all 
conceptions and propositions is "verification through sense per- 
ception." In this sense it is much like naturalism, but indeed 
is in other ways more generous. It would not rule out re- 
ligion since such concepts are "valuable," if they aid in adapt- 
ing us to ihe practical demands of life. 

Mysticism denies entirely the value of knowledge, yet it 
would teach its doctrine by trying to enlighten us about the 
nature of reality. Mysticism is a theory of being rather than 
a theory of knowledge, and so has but little to ofier to edu- 
cation from the latter angle. Indeed it is very doubtful if 
mysticism offers any more help from the ontological side. 
Professor Fite says: "It is rather difficult to deal with mysti- 
cism on logical grounds; for the mystic has renounced logic. 
All that we can do is to follow his directions for the quest of 
reality and ask ourselves where we are coming out. Pro- 

The Ephiemohgical Aspects of Education 125 

fessor Royee had applied this method to the mystical concep- 
tion of being and finds that the result is nothing. A dis- 
tinctionless being is simply no being whatever." {Individual- 
ism, p. 197.) 

Idealism regards the world as a conscious reality. Absolute 
will or purpose is the ultimate reality, and this can be known 
only by reflection. No amount of observation, experiment and 
verification will ever reveal the world of purpose, yet all will 
aid greatly in adjusting us to the practical demands of life, and 
are indispensable to an understanding of the time and space 
order of the world. Only reflection and interpretation of 
facts thus revealed will ever disclose the world of meaning- 
value, and reality. While the idealist gives due credit to 
the world of the physical sciences, he never forgets that the 
facts and laws revealed through this mechanical order of 
things all have to be worked over by conscious reflection to 
determine their significance for the whole. It is partly through 
such interpretation of the fact order that the individual self 
discloses its deeper relations to the world of purpose and value. 
Other implications of idealism for educational theory will be 
discussed in Part V. 

Plato unfortunately separated his world of fact, the tem- 
poral order, and the world of reality, or ideas. Since the ideas 
are our only source of communication with the divine reality, 
the good, he highly discredited the world of material, and 
so would miike no place for physical science in his theory of 
education. The best way to get in relation with the real 
world was by abstraction from experience. It was for this 
reason that Plato preferred the abstract science of mathematics. 
Here he showed the influence of Pythagoras. For the same 
reason he denied all passion music and poetry. He curbed 
feeling and emotion through reflection and abstraction. He 
denounced the products of imagination as unreal, and belong- 
ing to the world of appearance and opinion, only reason and 
judgment partaking of the real. 

In this and the foregoing chapter we have tried to make 
clear the fact that no educational theory can be understood 
in its true setting unless it is seen in the light of the whole 
view of life. We have shown briefly what several different 
systems of metaphysics and epistemology imply as bases of 


126 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

educational theories and consequently how they modify prac- 
tice. We shall continue to show the intimate relations of 
philosophy and educational theory by observing the latter from 
the points of view of logic, philosophy of religion, aesthetics and 




' Logic. Logic is the ] 


I Definition and 
science of truth. It deals with the relations 
objects. It is concerned with the establishment of the truth 
relation between facts and idea. Practically all philosophers 
are agreed that truth depends upon the relation of an idea 
to its object, but the nature of this agreement is a matter 
about which there is yet much difference of opinion. Some 
contend that truth is established when our ideas bring us into 
fruitful relations with our world of practical experiences, while 
others hold that the truth of an idea consists in its relation to 
the larger system of purposes, and that it is of the very nature 
of the truth relation to be consistent throughout. 

Logic is concerned with what constitutes evidence or proof 
for the truth about a certain relation asserted in the form of a 
proposition. We make a great many assertions about the facts 
of the world in ivhich we live, but it is quite another matter 
to be certain that these assertions do not outstrip the evidence. 
Huxley said that the assertion that goes beyond the evidence 
is a blunder and a crime. Kant meant the same thing when 
he said that "it is not augmentation, but deformation of the 
sciences, if we effect their limits." (Quoted by Miinsterberg, 
Psy. and Life, p. 178.) Thus we see that what constitutes suf- 
ficient evidence is a question of logic. We are constantly 
asserting the truth of relations about objects or ideas which 
are not contained in these particulars and there should be 
some way of checking up to see whether we go too far in such 
assertions of relationship. We constantly are making infer- 
ence from one thing or fragment of our experience to an- 
other. We affirm or deny something at almost every breath. 
What is the ground of this inference? How can truth be 
affirmed on the grounds of inference? 




The Philosophical Basis of Education 

; tnirii I 
laying I 

Logic then is concerned with the establishment of the 
relations between an idea and its object, and this by laying 
down the process of correct inference and what constitutes suf- 
ficient grounds or evidence for the assertion or denial of cer- 
tain relations. 

2 The Data of Logic- Wc see from the foregoing that 
logic is not a thing foreign to our experience, but is the very 
ground of our understanding, our experience. Logic is not 
concerned with the facts of our experience as isolated parts, 
but with their relations one to another in a systematized whole. 
For the logician nothing stands alone, all is connected or re- 
lated in a large organization of parts. Indeed the only mean- 
ing the part has, is for the larger system of things of which it 
is a part. We are not, then, in the field that has nothing to 
do without experience when we are studying the abstract rela- 
tions that a system, of logic involves. 

3 Logic and Common Sense. Logic has a certain rela- 
tion to our common sense experience. It goes considerably 
beyond common sense, hut it certainly deals with the same ex- 
periences, although in a more thorough and rational manner. 
The man of common sense is obliged to make his inferences 
from particular to general, and to assert or deny truths about 
certain relationships. We have seen already that the logician 
is engaged in the same kind of business. One of the great 
tasks of our life is to reach beyond the particular that is con- 
tained in the present experience to a larger unit of experience. 
Common sense makes this inference on the ground of pure 
supposition and does not go into the more fundamental ques- 
tions of relationship. The man of common sense is too apt to 
mistrust the logician. He does not undersrand his procedure 
and consequently considers his formula as barren abstraction, 
totally unrelated to the world of actual experience. I think 
Stevenson has very well put the common man's mistrust of 
the logical procedure. I quote from an Inland Voyage. "On 
the other hand, it is not at all a strong thing to put one's reli- 
ance upon logic; and our own logic particularly, for it is gener- 
ally wrong. We never know where we are to end if once we 
begin following words of doctors. There is an upright stock 

The Logical Aspects of Ediicdtinnal Theory 

in a man's own heart, that is trustier than any syllogism; and 
the eyes, and the sympathies and appetites, know a thing or 
two that have never yet been stated in controversy." The 
logician is more systematic in his inference and requires a cer- 
tain amount of rational basis before he is wilUng to rest 
certain of the conclusions to which his inference has brought 

4 Logic and the Descriptive Sciences. It would be 
well at this point to restate the relationship between logic and 
the descriptive science we have already discovered in Part I 
of this volume. The scientists have made great progress in 
modern times because of the scientific accuracy of the method 
of procedure. This is only another way of stating that science 
is logical in its methods. Logic has to do with all grounds 
of inference whether inference is of the type expressed in 
common sense, or by the man of science. The data of science 
must be grouped in such a way as to show their connection, 
otherwise there would be no meaning. The methods of classi- 
fication and grouping of phenomena employed by the scientists 
represent the practical application of the principle of logic. 
The sciences are logically interdependent for the very reason 
that the phenomena with which they deal are interdependent. 
The principles of logic are universal and in no sense is their 
application restricted to particular incidents, not to the preju- 
dices of common sense. The distinct mark of the true scientist 
is that he strive constantly for the elimination of self in his 
judgment and provide conclusions which are in no sense re- 
stricted to the particular judgment of the individual express- 
There is grave danger to-day lest the world of mechanical 
science be taken as the world of final reality. The logician 
establishes the principles upon which inference is made from 
such a world to a world of ultimate reality, just as he lays 
down the principles for drawing conclusions and inferences 
on the basis of particular facts. The mechanical world of the 
time and space has its existence as we have already noted only 
in the ideas which think it. Tills mechanical world of science 
is therefore not a world indepcmtent of our will, but rather 
it has been constructed out of tlie practical demands of this 


130 The I'hihsophUnl Bash of Rduration 

IvilL There is grave danger that we forget this matter whea 
we become fully absorbed in our science. Note what Pro^ 
fessor Home says: "The view of the universe as a mechanism, 
is made possible to modern minds through Newton's law of 
universal attraction, is a construction of man's own intelli- 
gence to satisfy his own purpose in understanding the universal 
motion." {Idealism in Education, p. 173-) Macpherson in 
in his Spencer and Spencerism argues much in the same way. 
He says: "There is something more in the world of experi- 
ence than a mere succession of sense data. Some experiences 
set the mind to working on its own account and cause it 
to deliver itself of the truths which are not contained in any 
of our actual experiences or in all of them together, but which 
extend over a wider ground than e.\perience possibly can 
cover." We see from the su^estion thai the world of reality 
is not contained in the sense data of our experience. There 
must be a passage from this to a larger system of reality, that 
is to say inference from these data is made necessary as a result 
of our demand for the relationship between the particular and 
the universal, or the part of the whole. Experience is alwaja 
in P.^t, but this part is significant and real in the sense that 
lYitUout it the whole could not cxla. The parts are necessary 
to the conception of the whole, and the whole exists only as a 
relationship of parts. Professor Bowne says: "When we 
turn the contents of the infinite consciousness into a kind of 
eternal and necessary logical mechanism we simply fall back 
to the lower mechanical categories which thought alone makes 
possible, and subject thought to its own implications and prod- 
ucts. Such a view begins in confusion and ends in self-de- 

The methods of analysis and synthesis employed by the scien- 
tists are logical methods of procedure. They are the best rec- 
ognized methods of inferring the universal from the particular, 
or the whole from the part. Induction and deduction refer to 
the same general process of reasoning or inference. In theJa* 
ductive method we proceed from the parts to the whole. In 
so far as the scientist or the man of common sense employs 
these methods of inference he is logical. The case is not dif- 
ferent when we select a particular field of our experience such 
as that of education. We shall see more of this particular 

The Logical Aspects of Educational Theory 

iftpplication in the last section of this chapter. 

_ Logic and PsycHOUx;y. There has often been con- 
siderable confusion as to the relation of logic and psychology. 
Psychology is generally defined as the science of the states of 
consciousness. Lo^c rnay-Jie defined as- the science- of -c 
thinking, or. tht. science which defines the necessary- principles 
upon which all inference is based. Now there seems to be an 
overlapping in the two cases. In so far as psychology and 
logic are dealing with the mind, they have a common field, 
but their questions concerning consciousness are very different. 
Psychology merely asks, how the mind works, and why does 
it happen to work this way? Logic^on_lhe-other handr^hows 
ofi htJTfi thp mind works when we think correctly, and shows 
— -■- iiprp^sa.ry before we can assert or deny anything -witt 
)_the mind, or the world. Logic is concerned with the 
ideas and their connection in a larger system 
■oi reality. Psychology does not consider the question as to 
whether the ideas are real or not. It never raises any question 
i to reality at all, either as to its own existence, or that of 
the world generally. This much it takes for granted, leaving 
logic and metaphysics to sTiow the truth of such a supposition 
^1 its relation to a larger system ai things. Thus we sec 
that there is no necessary conflict between logic and psychology, 
although they do have some common ground. 

6 Logic and Metaphysics, There are certain relations I 
between logic and metaphysics that should be spoken of here, 
if we are to arrive at a complete view of the field of logic. 
"We have found some common ground between common sense, 
logic, and metaphysics. The, relationship is best defined ^ 
one _of interdependence or mutual dependence. Logic is c 

irncd with the" truth" relation of an idea and its object. It 
never asks the question as to whether either the idea or the 
object is real. It takes this much for granted. Mejaphysic^ 
is the branch of inquiry that is concerned with the reality, of 
^e world, and all questions as to the reality of ideas or of the 
abject of our ideas must be referred to metaphysics for their 
lyiswer. Logic is concerned simply with the relationship of 
ideas and objects in a larger system. It raises the question 

versal, \ 

132 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

as to how we can pass from the individual to the universal, 
or from the particular to the general. It does not ask 
vi-hether either the particular or the general has any ultimate 
or final reality. I think that this point can be made somewhat 
clearer by quoting from Prof. Aikins. He says: "J VTptfi- 
physics . . . inquires into the most fundamenul and general 
relations " of all things, and tries to find out what the inipiigt 
nature of anything must be in order that all of these relatioas 
should belong to it together. Logic like metaphysics has a 
very general aim; it too inquires into the raost fundamental 
relations of things and the way in which one involves an- 
other. But its inquiry is not so profound as that of meta- 
physics ; it does not ask what the inmost nature of things must 
be in order that these relations should e.xist together in them; 
and the knowledge that it does try to gain about relations 
and their mutual implications it regards as a means, not as an 
end. . . Thus so far as logic tries to make us reason, correctly 
by giving us correct conception of things and the way in which 
their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple meW- 
physics studied for a practical end." (Principles of Logic, pp. 


7 Logic and Epistemology. There are also close rela- 
tions between logic and epistemology, which if stated here will 

aid somewhat in marking out the special field of logic. We 
have defined already epistemology as the inquiry into the ques- 
tion, What can be known? This shows us at once the close 
relation between logic and epistemology. Since we have already 
asserted that logic is concerned with the principles of infer- 
ence, and it is through inference that knowledge is made pos- 
sible, logic and epistemology, therefore, cannot be separated, 
but rather there is a mutual dependence here, such as we have 
noted between logic and the other fields of inquiry. These 
difierent sciences and philosophical disciplines are simply dif- 
ferent fields of knowledge made possible by different attitudes, 
or points of view with respect to the world. The world of the 
descriptive scientist is concerned with relations the same as 
the logician, but here the relationships involved have an objec- 
tive reference to phenomena which are grouped and classified 
according to certain general principles of identity and differ- 


The Logical Aspecis of Educational Theory 133 

. It IS the business of logic to inquire more fundamentally 
into the nature of such agreement and difference. It is left for 
metaphysics to state whether such relationships have any mean- 
ing for the world as a whole, that is, whether they in any sense 
iditlon or reveal reality. Epistemology is concerned with 
the nature or extent of knowledge. What would reality be if 
we did not know it? And then the question of knowledge 
raises the question, hoiv can. we proceed from the particular 
to the general^and.lllis inquirj has grown so fundamental that 
5 has been sec aside as a particular department of study called 
logic. The relations of the descriptive sciences are with refer- 
ence to the temporal world of fact. The r eal world is a 
logical world, a world where facts exist onlyTiT ffieir relation 
fo a larger whole. This is the world in which reality must be 
lound if found at all. I quote from Prof. Bowne to make 
point a little clearer. He says: "In fact, as our studies 
in epistemology have taught us, in the temporal world of psy- 
chology nothing abides. It is only in the ideal world of logic 
that anything abiding can be found. It is not the sensations, 
then, as mental events which abide, but rather and only the 
constant meaning which they express, or of which they are the 
hearers. This meaning, however, is a purely logical and ideal 
function, and instead of constructing thought it is its product." 
(Metapkysics, p. 385.) 

Systems of Logic. Enough has been said already to 
suggest that logic and metaphysics are so closely related that 
our views as to the reality of the world necessarily affects 
somewhat our logic, or our conceptions as to the relations of 
the part and the whole. Logic may be a common ground on 
which many metaphysical conflicts are fought and settled. It 
is just as true, however, to say that every system of meta- 
physics involves certain differences in logic. If this be true 
then there are perhaps as many different systems of logic 
as there are systems of metaphysics, and in as much as our view 
of reality is the most fundamental of all of our views, it 
perhaps follows as a necessary consequent that as our meta- 
physics differ so do our logics also. 

General Methods of Logic. Perhaps the two most 

134 jfA^ Philosophical Basis of Education 

widely contrasted methods of logic are those of empiricism and 
rationalism. Empiricism is the logicai view which maintains 
that the only jo^sibilily oi arriving at truth is through the 
nie^TioJ"ot uiduction, leading to general conclusions or propoSL- 
Tibns through the particulars of our experience, and whiui 
(Conclusions or propositions can be verified and thus suppojtc^ 
by referring them to the facts whence they came. This is 
the method of induction pushed probably to its extreme. Ra- 
tionalism contends that this process of inductive inference is 
not an end in itself, but leads us to the conclusions which, 
though based upon an experience, cannot be denied always or 
disproved by reference to such experience. That is, we are 
able to pass beyond the particulars of experience to such a de- 
gree that we are not forced to return to them for the veri- 
fication and proof of the proposition asserted regarding these 
particular relations. The proof of such propositions rests in 
the relations of the facts thus asserted to a larger system of 
things, which system is not contained in experience. Thus we 
see that the primary difference between empiricism and ra- 
analism is a difference in the extent to which the two groups 
■ philosophers would trust knowledge. Empiricism depends 
more on the common sense method of verification, or proof by 
reference to sense-perception or by apperception. Rationalism 
ofTthCofher hand has grown very distrustful of the evidences 
our senses, and is not willing to leave the verdict in the 
hands of sense experience. There is a certain rationality about 
the mind, and a certain connectedness in our experience which 
enable us to pass beyond that involved in each single experience, 
to its relation to the other parts In a larger whole or system 
of things, and the only way we can test the truth from such a 
point of view is to refer the truth asserted in one proposition 
to a larger system of truths. 

Empiricism is concerned more with the a posteriori method, 
while rationalism is quite as much concerned with a priori 
forms of knowledge. The former set of evidences is based on 
common sense experience and perception, while the latter is 
concerned with the original forms of the understanding as well. 
B. Russell says: "All a priori knowledge deals exclusively with 
the relations of univcrsals." {Prob. of Phil., p. 162.) This 
statement is correct, provided we do not deny the rational 

The Logical Aspects of Edutational Theory l3Sl 

method of a priori deduction the right to use the principles ttfj 
inductive inference of the a posteriori evidences of our experi- 

Professor H. Sidgwick warns us that if we are to be pro- 
' tected against misleading inferences, \ve must be verj' caiefui 
to see that the premises wjijch jve. accept as-^our starting, lioiot 
are" seTf-eyideiU. {Methods of Ethics, p. 239.) It is also - 
well that vve remind ourselves that these premises must not only 1 
be self-evident to a superficial observation, but they must sur- 
vive the test of reflection as well. Mere self-evidence is not 
a suificient test of the validity of the premises from which we 
draw conclusions. Professor Sidgwick suggests this thought in 
his statement that the "Propositions accepted as self-evident 
must be mutually consistent." {Ibid., p. 341.) In concluding 
this section I desire to quote from Bosanquet, who states the 
matter precisely as to the nature of inference. He says: "In- 
| |ercace cannot p ossitdy tak g-cikce except. through the mediua? 
"ffihiclLaCtS-^-aJjliilge froiaoni: case 

_. If each particular were shut up withm 

[T^elf as in die letttn taken as an instance just now, you could 
never get from one which is given to another which is not 
given, or to a connection not given between two which are I 
given." (Bosanquet, The Essentials 0/ Logic, p. 139.) I 

10 The Problems of Logic. In what has been said al- 
ready we have suggested the problems of logic. They should 
be restated here, however, in order that a better view of the 
eld of logic as a whole may be obtained. The relalifiOjiLtbe 
raal t o jhe particular has beeiji a probt'^'ip 'fac-JJ''' phJlfll- 
t ffom'tKe beginninS-oLphilftSOpliy. From a clear 
s to the relation of universal and the particular, 
we get a clearer view of the relation between induction and 
deduction. There ii nn t>-f[itijl oppniiriim between tiie uni- 
versal and the particular. Knowledge !■; possible only, because 
twe have general notions or ideas, xvhich are not restricted to 
tKe particular incidents of our experience. There are certaiji 
common elements of our experiences that enable us to pass by.. 
■ — 

"jnlerence. from the..partjcula.r_ to the universal. With the 
empiricist tlie emphasis is on the particular, while the ration- 
alist emphasizes the universal. Professor James makes a plea I 


The Philosofihical Basis of Educatinn 

I own- 
scorn I 

for particulars when he says: "Why from Socrates down- 
wards, philosophers should have vied with each other in scorn 
of the knowledge of the particular, and in adoration of that of 
the general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more ador- 
able knowledge ought to be that of the more adorable things, 
and that the things of worth are all concretes and singulars. 
The only value of universal characters is that they help us, 
by reasoning, to know the truths about individual things." 
(James, Briefer Course, p. 242.) It would seem from this 
statement that there is a partiality shown in favor of the par- 
ticular, but just what the logical reasons for such preference 
are, is a little difficult to see. It seems to me that Professor 
Hyde states the thing a little better when he says: "The uni- 
versal is not opposed to the particular. They are not mutually 
exclusive. Neither can exist apart from the other. The 
particular has its existence in the universal, and the universal 
has its expression through the particular." {^Practical Idealism, 
P- 3I7') The one and the many raise the same problem as the 
universal and the particular. It is the same problem expressed, 
however, in broader terms. We have discussed this matter 
sufficiently in its relation to metaphysics in a previous chapter. 

Cause and effect are problems for the logician. Just what 
is meant when we say that one thing is a cause and another 
the effect? Cause from the scientific point of view means that 
a certain change or modification in one phenomenon pro- 
duces an effect which is noticeable in another. The whole 
series of antecedents and consequents is found in a world of 
time and space. Such causes do not act outside time. Time 
includes them. The metaphysician, as we have noted, in- 
quires as to whether or not this is what is meant by final 
cause. The idealist answers the question by asserting that it is 
the nature and essence of intelligence or purpose to givE^e 
final explanation of all phenomena. The logician must show 
how such a judgment is based on scientific and accurate logical 
principles of inference, inductive and deductive. 

The finite and the infinite are the problems of the one and 
the many, the part and the whole, raised in a new form. We 
need not discuss this matter further here, since considerable 
space has been given to it already. Nominalism and concep- 
tualism are problems which have long confronted the logician- 


The Logical Aspects of Educalianal Theory 137 

Does the universal term which asserts certain identity betwce 
particulars, have any separate existence apart from the phe*J 
nomena whose identical elements it suggests? With Socrates,! 
the universal was not claimed to have separate existence. TheJ 
concept was not a part of reality, but only that universal ele-t 
ment of identity which was necessary to knowledge. Most! 
philosophers have accepted the view of Socrates that the uni- 
versal is essential to knowledge, but they do not stop with him 
here. They go on to assert that it is of the nature of the 
universal to have its essential relation to a larger system of 
ideas and purposes, and that the concept gets its meaning the 
same as the particular by reference to the larger system of ideas 
and purposes, and by reference to the larger whole of which 
a part. 

I The Logic of Mysticism. It was suggested above 
that the different systems of metaphysics form the basis for 
different ways of viewing the world as a logical mechanism. 
It would be well for us to bring together in this section certain 
fundamental views with regard to the world conceived as 
logically organized. Mysticism as a concept of reality or be- 
ing, has no place for logic. The mystic has abandoned logic 
altogether. He finds the only reality in the immediate experi- 
ence, and denies altogether the value of knowledge as a means 
nediating between the individual experience and reality as 
hole. The mystic not only denies logic but makes it very 
hard for the logician to criticise his system at all. The whole 
of reality 

I The Logic of Pragmatism. The logic of pragmatismJ 

also is concerned extensively with the immediate particulars of 

experience, and as we have seen the particular method ei8- 

ployed by this system of logic is that of verification. We have 

no grounds of asserting the truth of the proposition except that 

of the fruitful and practical relationship with which our ideas 

bring us in our experiences. The truth of an idea depends 

)on how it worked, and not on its relation to the system of 

e wh^c . Perhaps these two philosophies afford a sufficient., 

ickground for raising certain important distinctions betwe< 

1 the immediacy in which the mystic finds i 


138 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

the logic of idealism and that of the other philosophies. 

13 The Logic of Idealism. The idealist often has been 
classed with the rationalists of whom we spoke above. Xfes 
test of pragmatism is verification, \v-hile for idealism the orSy 
ultimate test of truth is the consistency of this truth with aU 
others. Consistency rather than verification through sen?.? 
perception is the chief method of idealism. According .tQ_ the 
idealist we make the world in which wc live Our experiences 
must constantly be reshaped in order to assume the form of con- 
sistency which is demanded by our logical will. Professor 
Miinsterherg says that "Human knowledge has to remove and 
reshape the material experience until it forms itself in scien- 
tific theories in such a way that a world of order and law js 
constructed. Our own truth-seeking will thus determine be- 
forehand what forms of thought must mold experience in order 
to give it the value of truth. Our own reason thus lays down 
beforehand the real constitution of the only possible world 
which can be an object of knowledge." {American Problems, 
P- I47-) 

This view is quite consistent with that expressed by Hyde 
when he asserts that "Pessimism is the only consistent .jmd 
logical attitude for any man to take who conceives the world 
he lives in as a mere aggregate of facts; the mere presentation 
in_^timc and space of objects and events." 

Professor Bosanquet asserts the same truth when he says 
that "It may be that consciousness is capable of continuing a 
world, not as a copy of a ready-made original, hut as something 
which it makes for itself by a necessary process, and which 
refers beyond this finite and momentary consciousness." (£1- 
sen. of Logic, p. 11.} 

The idealist docs not believe that it is possible to express 
the whole truth in a single proposition, nor advance so far in 
our knowledge that there is no truth outside its borders, so 
far as we finite beings are concerned. There is no truth out- 
side knowledge, although there may be truth outside what we 
know. The test of our knowledge is always its consistency 
with the view of the whole and the whole is never given in the 
part. Professor Welton says: "It appears, then, that con- 
sistency with all other knowledge is the test of truth, and it 


The Logical Aspects of Educational Theory 139 

follows that, as knowledge is always advancing, it is often im- 
passible to S3.y with absolute assurance that any particular 
item of our interpretation of the world is true. Further 
knowledge may, in many cases, necessitate a revision of such 
interpretation in the future as in the past." {The Logical 
Bases of Education, p. 22.) 

Our knowledge is always asserted in the form of a judg- 
The proposition asserts this judgment in the affirma- 
tion or denial of a certain relationship that obtained betiveen 
facts or ideas. Every judgment is the connection of parts 
whole, and it is this whole which characterizes reality. 
For it is the very essence of reality to be self-contained and to 
Require no other to explain itself. Professor Bosanquet says: 
"Judgment is always the analysis and synthesis of elements JQ 
some one thing, or ideal content." (Essentials of Logic, p. 

Perhaps 1 could not state in a better way the idealistic theory 
of the nature of a judgment than to quote from Profes- 
sor Bosanquet again: "Knowledge is always judgment. 
Judgment is constructive, for us of the real world. Construct- 
ing the real world means interpreting or amplifying our pres- 
ent perception by what we arc obliged to think, which we take 
as all belonging to a single s}'stem one with itself, and with 
what constrains us in sense perception, and objective in the 
sense that its parts act on each other independently of our in- 
dividual apprehension, and that we are obliged to think them 
" (The Essentials of Logic, p. 58.) 

Summary. We shall briefly summarize now the con- 
clusion of this chapter. Logic deals with the data of human 
experience. It will he remembered that in Part II of this 
volume we said that it was the aim of philosophy generally to 
determine the meaning and value of our human experiences. 
We are now in a position to see more clearly that no such 

I meaning or value is obtainable, except in so far as we see the 
individual facts of our experience in their relation to the 
whole, and that it is the business of logic to point out this 
jelationship, and to show the logical ground of inference, o^ 
what is necessary in providing the truth of a certain relation- 
ship. In this matter, logic is like the descriptive sciences, 






140 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

they must proceed on similarly rational grounds of inference. 
Logic differs from psychology in that H-e go beyond the mere 
question of how the mind worked, or the laws that govern it, 
as phenomena in sequence. Logic asks the question how can wc 
proceed from what is known and given in experience, to what 
is not known by the method of inference? It is just here that 
we rote a distinction between logic and epistemology. Logic 
assu!iies_that knowledge is- possible and proceeds -to show the 
!aws up on which gorrect- ihinking must ba devdoped. Logic 
t hus not only presupposes .the -possibility -»f- knowledge^ but 
that reality exists also. It is the business of metaphysics and 
epistemology to inquire into the grounds of such presupposi- 

Methods of logic broadly defined are those of empiricism and 
rationalism. Empiricism is less confident of the validity of 
knowledge when it goes beyond the facts of our experience. It 
always reserves the right to test the truth of the proposition 
by reference to the particular facts. Rationalism makes con- 
sistency the test of truth. The world in which we live is a 
unit or systematization of parts, each one having a certain 
meaning for the whole, but no meaning at all in and of it- 

15 The Educational Implications OF Logic, It has be- 
come apparent already, from the foregoing, what some of the 
educational implications of logic are. We shall proceed in 
this section to point out some of these relations more closely. 
We have noted that the logician is sceptical of all uncritical 
thinking, and reserves the right to criticize our judgments 
on the basis of their relations, not only to fact but to a larger 
system of reality, '^e are much in need these days of more 
critical thinking. Probably there is no greater reason for thf 
confusion in modern pedagogy, than the fact that we have n^t 
reflected to any great extent on our experience. This is per- 
haps as noticeable in the field of our educational experience as 
in any other field. The demands made upon the schools are 
often irrational, and the pressure of circumstances such that 
those in. authority yie]d without careful consideration- of -the 
principles underlying their action. Again, we often find in 
education those whose habits of mind are not particularly re- 
flective and rational and consequently do not give very serious 


The Logical Aspects of Educational Theory 14I ' 

attention to the problems in this field. The questions arc 
answered on the basis of common sense or intuition and little 
rational reflection is In evidence. We must here remind our- 
selves of the often repeated thought In the earlier part of this 
volume, that the only way of bringing out the deeper meaning 

lation of our experience is through critical reflection, in- 
volving both analysis and synthesis. Professor Dewey says that 
"The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment; and 
the essence of this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature 
of the problem before proceeding to attempt its solution. This, 
more than any other thing, transforms mere inference into 
tested Inference, suggested conclusions Into proof." {How We 
Think, p. 74.) 

The second point I wish to emphasize as an educational Im- 
plication of logic, is that the facts which we teach must not 
be isolated and set off against each other, but rather they 
must have a distinct relationship one to the other. Without 
such relationship there can be no real meaning, for facts 
cannot have meaning In themselves, but only as they arc re- 
lated one to another. There must always be a "fusing prin- 
ciple," as Dr. J. H. Stoutemycr says, to weld the ideas to- 
gether. The materials of instruction, then, must be of 
such a character, and so related, that the student may see 
their unity and connection. Indeed he must be taught to 
reflect upon his experience, in order that he may bring to light 
this deeper meaning. Consistency is here made a practical test 
of the truth of that which we teach. Professor Dewey makes a 
remark in this connection that is so significant that I quote it 
here at some length, "Another way of stating the same prin- 
ciple Is that material furnished by communication must be such 

I enter into some existing system or organization of ex- 
penence. All students of psychology are familiar with the 
ciple of apperception— that we assimilate new material with 
what we have digested and retained from prior school lessons 
instead of linking it to what the pupil has acquired In his 
t-of-school experience. The teacher says, 'Do you not re- 
member what we learned from the book last week?' instead 
of saying, 'Do you not recall such and such a thing that you 
have seen or heard?' As a result, there are built up detached 
and independent systems of school knowledge that inertly over- 
lay the ordinary systems of experience instead of reacting to 


The Philosophical Basis of Education 

a sepa- | 

enlarge and refine them. Pupils are taught to live in two 
rate worlds, one the world of out-of-school experience, 
other the world of books and lessons," 

It generally results, I believe, from the teaching commonly 
in practice that students get a certain number of disorganized 
facts that result in but very little meaning of lliem. We 
are constantly being reminded by critics that our schools do 
not develop critical thinking, and this is because students are 
not taught to search for the broader and deeper connections 
of the facts of their experience. This totally neglects the 
principles of logic which Welton so well states in the follow- 
ing quotation. "Mere fact which cannot be brought into any 
system is meaningless to us; and the greater the number of sys- 
tems a fact can be placed in the more it means to us. Inci- 
dentally it may be pointed out here that the aim of teaching 
is not to impart facts but to develop systems; facts are only 
of value in so far as they are starting points for such de- 
velopment." {The Logical Bases of Education, p. ii8.) 

The ordinary method of cramming, therefore, does not ac- 
complish the purpose of true education, if by true education we 
mean the power to grapple with the fundamental problems of 
life, and to discover through our experience their meaning 
and unity for reality as a whole. The school is too liable to 
become one factor of the child's life, though often a very in- 
cidental one, while his experiences outside of school are grouped 
into quite a different system, This makes an artificial dis- 
tinction between school and out of school life, which is not 
altogether conducive to a thorough understanding of the prob- 
lems of life. 

According to the view here expressed cramming is a sin 
against all principles of true logic. I quote a significant 
passage from Professor Dewey in regard to cramming. "For 
teacher or book to cram pupils with facts which, with little 
more trouble, they could discover by direct inquiry is to violate 
their intellectual integrity by cultivating mental servility. This 
does not mean that the material supplied through communica- 
tion of others should be meager or scanty. With the utmost 
range of the sense, the world, of nature and history stretches 
out almost infinitely beyond. But the fields within direct 
observation if feasible should be carefully chosen and sacredly 
protected." {How We Think, p. 198.) 



, Educational implications of the philosophy of religion 

I The Definition of the Philosophy of Religion. 
We may view our religious life and nature from the point of 
view of the philosopher, just the same as we may view any 
other aspect of our life from this point of view. The philos- 
opher raises certain fundamental questions as to our religious 
life that cannot he pushed aside lightly. They go to the very 
foundation of our belief and actions. The grounds of religion 
lie in certain fundamental beliefs, which are not to be ac- 
cepted without question or qualification, but are to be regarded 
as sound only when they have been considered thoroughly in 
the light of the whole of knowledge and reality. ' 

There is no more reason why we should accept our religious ' 
notions unquestioned than that we should leave the rest of our 
life and experience to common sense. All the larger questions 
of life must be viewed from the angle of philosophy, if we 
to get the most satisfactory and complete answer which our ex- 
perience affords. 

Philosophy does not take the place of religion, any r 
than a theory of morals takes the place of practical morality, 
or than geometry takes the place of carpentry, or the laws of 
hygiene the place of rest and recreation. The philosophy of 
religion shows us how religion looks from the point of view 
of the intellect. From this angle we see religion in its relation 
to the other interests of mankind, we see their systematic 
unity and organization. We also see from this angle the 
nature, meaning, and values of religion in life. 

The philosophy of religion is concerned with the problems 
of God, immortality, and the soul. What is man's relation to 
God in this life? Has man the qualities of eternal about him; 
is he immortal? What duties does man owe to God? Thrae 
are questions for the philosophy of religion. It will be s 


144 The Philosophical Basis of Educalion 

readily that such questions camiot be answered wholly apait 
from mttiipliisks and epistcmology. All. -definitions -of- re- 
Iigion~are an attempt to give intellectual expression- to this 
set of valuFs of our experience. These definitions must be 
subjected to the test of reality, truth, beauty, and goodness. 
In other words, all values must fit into a logical system which 
involves no contradiction, for this is the ultimate test of all 
truth. The philosopher must not be partial to any set of val- 
ues except as these point to a more complete system of value 
than any other. He must assign values to our experience on 
the basis of this standard or scale, and not on the individual 
standard of his own narrower personal interests. All defini- 
tions and conceptions of religion must harmonize with the 
larger view of life as a whole. In this connection it will be 
instructive and interesting to note several statements as to what 
religion is. Dr. Shepard sa>s that "Religion is the way man 
shows to himself and his fellows, by his thinking, feeling, and 
conduct, what is his conception of God." Professor Carpenter 
says: "Religion is the effort to establish relationship with the 
unseen world." {Witness to the Influence of Christ, p. 51.) 
Professor Emerton in his Unitarian Thought says: "By re- 
ligion the Unitarian means a recognized dependence of man 
upon the power greater than himself which he feels at the heart 
of things, animating, guiding, reconciling all by the action of 
a will that is neither above law nor subject to it, but is itself 
Law." To this he adds, "the element of personal service.'' 
(Pp. 9-10.) Professor Bowne holds that "Religion 
essence is righteousness and good-will toward men and reverent 
humility and obedience toward God." 

All these definitions are an attempt to express the ess 
and underlying meaning of our religious experience. 

2 Philosophy of Religion and Common Sense. There 
are two attitudes we may take towards the religious life. We 
may take all on faith and belief, or we may attempt to go the 
limit of our understanding in this field of experience, and leave 
the faith and belief all that is not open to direct evidence and 
proof, or that cannot be put into a logical scheme of things. 
The former point of view is that of common sense, the latter 
that of the scientist and philosopher. Common sense never 

n its 
ercnt | 



Educational hnplkalions of the Philosophy of Religion 145 

goes the full length of dependence upon thought and reflec- 
tion. It sees as through a glass darkly. The diaracteristic 
of common sense is its unret!ectivc and uncritical attitudi 
wards the world and our experience. Philosophy onjthe_con- 
tTarx_i5- rational- juid-critical. It subjects alt our experience 
to a searching test of rationality. What is must be consistent 
with itself and with the whole of life. The mere appearance 
o satisfactory test of being or reality. Applied to our re- 
ligious experience this means that common sense is satisfied 
to rest all on faith "and belief, and makes no effort to clear up 
conflicting difficulties or absurd hypotheses. It is enough for 
common sense to hold to its faith, let alone to question the 
foundations of its beliefs and its faith. 

Philosophy of Religion and Science. Science is 
highly refined thinking with the purpose of finding a causal 
explanation and description of our experience. There is a 
ntific aspect to every realm of our experience, just because 
It IS possible for us to arrange and classify and explain the 
phenomena in every phase of our experience. This is as true 
of religion as of any field. The re is a science of religion pos- 
sible, whether it has been developed yet or not, for we can 
arranM, cl a^fj^_ and explain, the facts and phenomena of 
our religious life. But as we have seen many times before in 
this volume, scien ce only desc ribe s and explains and does not 
concern its elf w ith values, oi .life, lor to do so it would be 
partial and it is of the very essence of science that it render 
an impartial account of the world of our experience as a 
whole, and of its every part. 

Philosophy, as we have seen, attempts to find out the mean- 
ing and values, of the experience of oui religious life. A 
pure science of religion would leave it barren of all values, 
purposes, and ideals. A philosophy of religion would seek 
) find the values of such experience. The science of religion 
■ould be concerned with an elaboration of the principles of 
ur religious life regardless of whether such a life had any 
alue or worth, or not. Philosophy of religion seeks to know 
the values of religious life in their meaning for life and the 
universe as a wliole. 

Science cannot argue for the existence or 


nlitence of-^J 


The Philosophical Basis of Education 

God, or for im mortality, or the existence of an eternal soul, 
for these are beyond the realm of existent fact as evidenced by 
oiir world of actual experience. No man hath yet seen God. 
Science will never enable us to see God, unless God be the 
mechanical law of the universe of experience. God can be 
seen only as mechanical and non-personal by science, for science 
gives us only a mechanical construction of liic universe, a causal 
or sequential series of phenomena. Science raises us to a plane 
of dearer thinking on every problem of life than does com- 
mon sense, but certainly science will always fall short of at- 
tributing values to our experience and in this matter common 
sense sees in life greater significance of meaning and purpose 
than does science. Science may develop new conceptions that 
will correct old errors of thought about religion and its ob- 
ject, but it will not succeed successfully in denying the exist- 
ence or reality of God, or His nature, for such questions take 
us beyond the field of science into that of philosophy. 

In connection with the thought just expressed about science 
criticizing our false notions and religious belief, it may be in- 
teresting to note the disagreement between the common sense 
notions of the evidences of God, and the conclusions held as 
a result of our advanced scientific knowledge of the world- 
Common sense regards miracle or the lack of fixed law as suf- 
ficient evidence of God. The fiat of God's will is the con- 
trolling force of the world. The view is growing fast, how- 
ever, that the strongest concrete evidence of God is the regula- 
tion of the world order in conformity to rigid and exact laws. 

It may be said that neither common sense nor science, nor 
both of them together, can offer a satisfactory basis for re- 
ligion, or a complete explanation of our religious experience. 
Common sense must give way to science and philosophy, and 
philosophy must not exclude any values of our life, if we are 
to get a complete view of the religious life and experience. 

4. Philosophy of Religion and Metaphysics. Enough 
has been said already to show that the facts of our religious life 
must be interpreted in the light of their relation to life as a 
whole, if we are to gain an adequate conception of the values 
of religion for life. That is, there must be a philosophy of re- 
ligion. The philosophy of religion is only a part of the larger 



Ed,.rnlif.,ud Impliva. 

0/ //((' Philnsophy nf Rclig'wn 

losophy of life, or experience in its relation to the whole. 
It ought to be clear also that the deeper questions of religion 
must always seek their answer by reference to the whole of 
life and so it will never he possible to answer the questions 
of religion independent of metaphysics and epistemology. The 
questions of the philosophy of religion as to God, Immortality, 
and the Soul, would be meaningless except as viewed in the 
light of what we know about being and reality as a whole. 
If these concepts of God, Immortality, and the Soul have no 
reality, then there can be no real meaning or value attached ^ 
to them. It would seem rather strange from a thoughtful ,, , 
point of view to ask, what is our duty toward God until after 
we had asked concerning the nature and reality, or being of 
God. But the question as to our duty towards God i 
for the philosopher of religion, and that concerning his nature 
&nd reality is a general question, the answer to which must I 
■be given by metaphysics. Similarly the questions as to imn; 

t tality and the soul raise deeper questions of metaphysics. 

We must rise above the low plane of common-sense thinking 
ard to our religious life to the greater heights of science 

I and philosophy. And all philosophical questions of religion 

;taphysical questions of being 

Band life go back ultimately to r 
■Qr reality. 

Philosophy op Religion and Epistemology. Just as 
five have seen that the great questions of religion cannot gel 

■ dieir final answer on the plane of common sense and science, 
(but must go back to metaphysics, so we must now observe thai 
^jiD question of the reality or being of a thing can be raised 

without raising at the same time the question as to our knowl- 

■ edge of such being or realit}'. We are here reminded again 
p«f the inevitable connection between metaphysics and epistem- 

■ ology. Hence the questions of religion raise not only meta- 
Rphysical problems, but problems of knowledge, or epistemologi- 
Kv&l problems. The objects to which the religious concepts 

■ icfer could have no value for reality, if it is in their nature 

■ to be unknown. Hence in our consideration of the religious 
^aspects of our experience, we must not allow that any myopic 

f^vision leads us into thinking that such ultimate questions as 
; raised by metaphysics and epistemology' have no meaning 

148 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

for religion. We have defined already ultimate reality in terms 
of personality. Our knowledge of reality as such is only our 
knowledge becoming more completely self-conscious. 

6 Philosophy of Religion and Logic. Nor can we 
ignore logic in seeking the deepest questions and answers to our 
religious nature. Logic, as we have seen, is the most abstract 
and most exact of all the sciences, and defines the laws upon 
the basis of which all truth is determined and all correct 
methods of seeking answers to our problems are based. 

The logical test of truth is that of consistency. Truths that 
contradict each other are not truths at all, for it is the nature 
of truth to be consistent with itself and the whole of experi- 
ence. Truths that do not fit into a larger and more inclusive 
organic whole are in need of greater refinement, made possible 
only through greater rationality. 

The truths claimed for religion, then, "must not outstep the 
bounds of logical consistency, the ultimate test of all truth. 
We must always be ready to subject every belief, theory, 
or supposed truth, to this logical test of consistency with all 
our experience in its unity. What will not find its place in 
such a system of universality is no part of truth, and must be 
rejected. If then, we find after reflection and reason, that our 
views about God, his nature and reality, or the problem of 
Immortality, or the Soul, or any other religious problem, are 
not consistent with the whole of life and experience, or all 
other truths, we must reject such views as are logically un- 

We are not to count it a loss if reflection forces us to aban- 
don certain of our unsupportable religious views, but rather 
count it a gain in the direction of a deeper insight into the 
real nature of truth and reality. We should always stand 
ready to sacrifice a lower interest, or truth for a higher. In- 
deed this is ethically and religiously enjoined upon us in the 
interest of a better and higher life. 

7 Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, Little more 
need be said to make clear the fact that religion and morality 
are closely related, and hence philosophy and ethics, which de- 
fine the principles underlying these fields of interest are also 


Educational Implications of ike Philosophy of Religion 149 

very closely related. Carpenter says: "The rant of a re- 
ligion is settled by the degree in which ethics is linked with 
" {Witness to the Influence of Christ, p. 50.) 
If man's beliefs and theories affect his practices, and it 
juld seem that no argument is necessary here to show that 
such is the case, then it requires but little reflection to sec that 
"Sooner or later fundamental errors of belief must reproduce 
themselves in practice, and this is as true of education as that 
of which it is said, namely, religion." (Bowne, The Essence 
of Religion, p. 180.) 

In both religion and morals the emphasis is placed on duty 
and responsibility. Religion defines man's duties toward God ; 
ethics defines man's duty towards man, T. Parker says that 
''without a moral nature, we could have no duties in respect to 
man; without a religious nature no duties in respect to God." 
{Discourse of Religion, p. 29,} 

Religion is related to mortality much as the larger of two 
concentric circles is related to the smaller. Religion repre- 
sents a wider system of interests or values but must always 
include mortality, or it becomes barren formalism. Hoffding 
says: "Religion represents the best means for the conserva- 
tion of the finest human values." (Cf. International Journal 
of Ethics, Vol. XX, p. 467-) 

Philosophiks of Religion. From the foregoing we 
see that the chief problems raised by the questions of re- 
ligion from the philosophical point of view are the nature and 
reality of God, immortality, and the soul. The problems of 
the universe are given different answers by the different philos- 
ophies. There are then as many different philosophies of 
religion as there are different philosophies of life, for each 
system of philosophy answers the special questions of religion 
in the light of its own larger view of life as a whole. We 
must now give some attention to the different answers pro- 
posed by the different systems of philosophy to the problems 
of religion here mentioned. 

9 The Religion of Platonism. Let us consider first 

le religious aspects of Plato's philosophy. According to Plato 

religion consists of the contemplation of the idea of the good. 



150 TAc Philosophical Basis of Educatio 

The higliest religious concept that it is possible for man to 
obtain is the idea of the good. Which idea did not differ 
materially from our conception of the ultimate reality. In- 
deed it was the all-inclusive reality. It was the one idea 
that included all lesser ideas. It was the one purpose that 
included all other purposes, the highest of all value, the only 
worthy object of contemplation, Man was most moral and 
religious when his only occupation was that of the contempla- 
tion of this idea of the good. It was possible to gain an in- 
sight into this reality only through rational reflection. Such a 
of the good was hidden from common sense. Only 
the philosopher was able to conceive of the highest good. Good 
was thus conceived by Piato to consist of the knowledge of ulti- 
mate reality, as the system of purposes and ideals, or values. 
This object of our understanding enjoined upon us certain 
obligations. We could not if we desired, deny the reality of 

■ such an object. Nor could we fulfill our obligation toward the 
universe of which we are a part without showing obeisance 
to the ideal. There was no other religious obligation accord- 
ing to this philosophy than that of contemplating this ideal 
of ultimate good or reality. The highest good was given 
metaphysical reality and could be known, and it becomes our 
ethical and religious duty to know this idea of the good. 

It is plain to see the ascetic element in this sort of philos- 

Iophy of religion, and as time went on this element became 
more prominent in the different views of religion, as we shall 
see in the next paragraph and later in mysticism. 

The Religion of Neoplatonism. Plotinus was the 
intermediary between Plato and the Christian religion. He 
rried out many of the doctrines of Plato into the field of 
Christian religion and we find to this day distinct evidence of 
Platonic philosophy. Especially do we find the elements of 
mysticism drawn from oriental philosophy. Plotinus stressed 
particularly the ascetic element of the Platonic philosophy. 
We will remember that according to Plato religion as well as 
morality consisted of contemplation of idea of the good. No 
stress was laid on the side of religious duty or obligation, 
other than that of contemplation and reflection. This feature 
of the Platonic philosophy probably was more prominent than 

I Educational Implications 0/ the Philosophy of Religion 151 

any other, and certainly it was the aspect of his doctrine that 
received the greatest emphasis at the hands of Plotinus and as 
we have said, it was this element which was carried out into 
the Christian religion and there gained such prominence in 
the religion of the medieval ages, a period during which the 
scholastic philosophy exercised its greatest influence, and 
indeed was the chief philosophy of the times. It is strange that 
our Christian religion to-day has not succeeded in getting away 
entirely from this mystic element in Plato's philosophy. Wc 
have not yet come to realize fully that faith alone without works 
is dead. Man must act as well as think, in fact, thinking is 
only one side of our life and cannot be substituted for the 
whole. It may be true that exercise of our thought power is 
productive of the highest pleasures, but this does not signify 
that man can release himself from all moral obligation on the 
grounds that he is exercising his capacity for thought and 
pleasure. This is just as true in the field of religion as it is 
in that of morality. We cannot excuse ourselves for our de- 
linquency on the grounds that we are engaged in the contem- 
plation of the idea of good, or God, We must engage our- 
selves constantly in the attempt to realize this good in our 
actual lives. It was this failure of the Platonic philosophy 
that led perhaps more than any other single factor to the 
asceticism of the medieval ages. Indeed there are plenty of 
evidences that man has not overcome this false conception of 
religion completely even to this day. There are plenty of 
people who still think they are holy and religious just because 
they fold their hands and contemplate their God. They have 
not realized fully the force of Christ's statement when he said 
that not ail who cry, "Father, Father," shall be received into 
the Kingdom of Heaven. Man has duties to perform in the 
world, and some of these are with respect to fellow-men and 
others toward God. Not in all cases will our knowledge of 
the object of our worship, or of the principle of our action 
excuse us from the obligation of doing our part in the world. 

II The Religion op Epicureanism. Epicureanism did 
not distinguish the pursuit of happiness and the religious life. 
The only religion for the Epicureans was that of pursuing 
pleasure. There was no other duty toward God or man than 


The Philosophical Basis of Education 

that of so directing our actions as to secure the greatest amount 
of pleasure. It can be seen readily what the answer to the 
questions as referred to ahovc would be according to such a 
philosophy as this. According to Epicureanism man cannot 
Imow whether God exists or not. He does not trouble him- 
self about such metaphysical questions as the being or reality 
of the soul or its immortality. Our greatest thought was 
to seek from life the greatest amount of happiness pos- 
sible. We should eat, drink, and be merry to-day, for 
we may die to-morrow, and we should not let any pleasure slip 
from us in this life with no more grounds than the mere hope 
of its being regained in some state of our future existence. 
We cannot afford to give up a certain pleasure for one that 
is so extremely doubtful. Such a practice would be hazardous 
and would succeed in depriving us of the only real good that 
life possesses, so far as we are able to know this end, Epi- 
curus said: "Be virtuous, because virtue will bring the great- 
est amount of happiness." Zeno said: "Be virtuous because 
you ought to be." The only justification that any one would 
have for holding to this faith in God would be that it brings 
happiness to the individual who holds such a faith. This 
faith did not, however, get full expression in the philosophy 
of Epicureanism. It was left for modern pragmatism to give 
further expression to this view. 

12 The Religion of Stoicism. According to stoicism, 
man's highest obligation consists in rigid conformity to duty and 
to law. The stoic conceived the universe as the revelation of 
a great law. It was a sort of pantheistic religion. God ex- 
presses himself through all in our experience, which experi- 
ence Is not fortuitous and unsystematic, but is governed ac- 
cording to rigid mechanical law, and the highest obligation that 
God has placed upon man is that of conforming rigidly to the 
letter of this mechanical law. It expressed a sort of fatalism, 
but asserted that man whether he desired to do so or not, must 
conform to the laws of the universe and in so doing he 
virtuous. Piety consists in reverent obedience to this mechai 
cal law. The highest search that man could indulge in, 
that of finding the law which controls his nature. Thus the 
stoic doctrine did not lead toward asceticism as did Neoplaton- 

Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion 153 I 

sm as expressed by Plotinus. On the contrary, it was an co- | 

crgetic doctrine of religion which defined man's highest ohli- ' 

gation to God as that of finding the secret law of the universe 

by which his nature is ordered and governed. This i 

. answer which stoicism gives to the problem underlying the 

( field of our religious experience. In short, this is the philos- 

y ophy of religion as outlined by stoicism. 

The Religion of Positivism, Naturalism, and ' 
Materialism. There are certain religious aspects of the 
philosophy of positivism, naturalism, and materialism of which 
we must take account at this point. According to the philos- 
ophy of positivism, religion is not a fundamental element in 
the life of man. It is only a certain stage of his development. 
It will soon pass away just as mysticism in many of its forms 
has come and gone. There is, then, according to the philos- 
ophy of positivism no distinct place in the life of man for re- 
ligion. Consequently this aspect of his life is to be regarded 
only as temporary and not needing any special training or 
development. We can see plainly what this type of philosophy 
would mean for education. Positivism is a radical sort of 
empiricism, and relies on no truth which cannot be verified 
in experience. It mistrusts all hypotheses beyond those which 
1 he verified directly in this way. 

Naturalism differs somewhat from positivism in that it does 
: go quite so far in its sceptical attitude toward religion. 
' It does not deny that there is a God, or assert that reverence 
I to him is not worth while, but it does contend that nothing 
I can be known beyond the realm of science. This practically 
takes God out of the universe, since it is impossible to find, 
L as we have seen many times before, sufficient warrant from 
I science for the belief in a personality directing the affairs of | 
I the mechanical world. Naturalism does not deny in such i 
'positive fashion the value of religion, but it does assert that 
all that is beyond the realm of science cannot be known, and 
since God has a personality, if he exists at all he is outside 
the mechanism of science. It follows logically that the exist- 
ence of God cannot he known. Such conceptions refer to the 
i unknowable. This amounts to practically the same thing as _ 
a positive denial of the existence of God, for what value is 'J 



154 ^^^ Philosophical Basis of Education 

there in such a being, if his existence cannot be known, or 
in some way posited in our thoughts? 

Materialism sees the whole story of life told in the mechani- 
cal relationship of things. There is no God in the universe 
unless you want to say that the mechanical order of the de- 
scriptive science deserves to be personified and worshipped. 
Materialism considers matter as the first and ultimate prin- 
ciple of all life and existence. There is nothing behind or 
beyond matter. If God is to be conceived of at all, it must be 
in terms of these mechanical concepts of the world of descrip- 
tive sciences. 

It is plain from what has been said with regard to positivism, 
naturalism, and materialism that these systems of philosophy 
make very small place for religion in the life of man, and con- 
sequently they would give no place for religion in the process 
of education. All three forms are agnostic and sceptical as 
regards the value of religion and the life of man and the 
universe. There is not according to these philosophies, any 
special set of religious values which man should strive to 
realize in this life through the process of education. 

14 The Religion of Mysticism. Let us turn our atten- 
tion for a moment to another type of scepticism with regard 
to the value of religion. Mysticism has as its central theme 
the religious life, but religion cannot be subjected to the same 
order of thinking as can other aspects of life. The only way 
to know God is to perceive him in the moment of complete 
immediacy. Knowledge as a means of passing from what is 
known to something unknown is denied. The only way we 
really can know is to deny that we have any knowledge of the 
process by which thought moves toward its goal as having any 
value whatsoever. Mediation through thought will not lead 
man Godward. The only way by which he can gain any 
clear understanding of God is by denying all thought as hav- 
ing any value and plunging directly or immediately into the 
perfect moment of immediate experience. In such moments 
as these there is no distinction between the knower and the 
known, but through the denial of the validity of the knowing 
process we plunge into the very heart of reality itself. This 
mystic element in philosophy has worked its way from the 

Educational I in plications of the Philosophy of Religion 155 

oriental philosophy up through Plato and Plotinus into thi 
Christian religion of the present day. It is not an uncoinmon 
thing to hciir ministers in our pulpit to-day deny the validi 
of knowledge arriving at the f^pFricnce of true religious value. 
Knowledge is regarded as having certain practical value for 
the universal life of religious experience. It is probably that 
this element of ascetic contemplation has occupied a more 
prominent place in this type of philosophy than in any other. 
The all perfect moment is a moment of isolation and abstrac- 
tion from the world of time and space and a complete absorp- 
tion into the world of ultimate reality. Mysticism is a type 
of epistemological scepticism. No doubt there is great truth 
in much that is contended for, in the philosophy of mysticism. 
The value of the religious life as contemplated by the mystic 
probably does not differ greatly from the esthetic contempla- 
tion of the lover of the beautiful. Indeed it would be hard 
to say just how much of the platonic conception of the idea 
of the good has come down to religion. Mysticism is more 
of a religion than it is a philosophy, and might more profitably 
be classed as such, yet it has certain philosophical implications 
which we cannot pass by lightly, if we are to gain a very 
comprehensive view of the place of philosophy and religion in 
the life of man. Philosophy broadly conceived, considers all 
the interests and values in h\iman life, and religion aflords 
one of these sets of values. It cannot be true, therefore, that 
the philosopher can pass by unnoticed the field of religious 
experience. He enters this field as a critic and as an evalaator 
of experience, just the same as with any other field. 

15 The Religion of Pragmatism. Pragmatism thus- 
differs from materialism in that it does not deny the existence 
of a personal God, and it differs from naturalism and posi- 
tivism in that it does not confine this conception to the realm 
of the untcnowable. The truth of the God hypothesis, of im- 
mortality and the soul, can he tested in the same pragmatic way 
that we can test the truth of the principle of gravitation. That 
is, it can be tested in our actual life, and can be used in such 
a way as to adjust our life to the truth it contains. 

According to the religious aspects of the philosophy of 
matism, it is quite consistent with the larger view of lifi 



ty 1 

The Philosophical Basis of Education 


experience, that we attribute to it certain religious values. In 
this respect we notice its conflict with positivism and natural- 

i6 The Religion of Idealism. The religious aspects 
of idealism will next be considered. It will not be difficult 
to see, from what has gone before, what view the idealist has 

of the religious life. It is upon the basis of this philosophy 
that the present volume has been written and the reader need 
' only be reminded of certain implications of idealism in order 
to see what it has to offer in the way of a criticism and esti- 
mation of the religious values of experience. 

According to idealism the world is not a mechanical order 
as materialism asserts. Neither is it a purely physical con- 
nection beyond which nothing can be known, as positivism 
and naturalism assert, nor again is it the common sense world 
with the refinements of pragmatism, according to which the 
highest truths are to be proved by verification through the facts 
of experience. Idealism starts just where all the other philos- 
ophies of life start, and should start, that is with the facts of 
our experience. It does not end by denying the validity of 
our experience, as does mysticism; nor does it end by de- 
veloping a highly refined system of laws and connections be- 
tween the facts of our experience and the denial of what is be- 
yond such a connection, as do positivism and naturalism, nor 
does it end by asserting that the truths of our experience are 
to be verified ultimately by reference to facts of our experience. 
On the contrary, idealism begins with the facts of our experience 
and follows the naturalistic philosopher to the completion of 
their physical and causally connected universe into one great 
system, but he goes beyond them and asserts that the real mean- 
ing of the universe is not to be found in such causal explana- 
tions of physical science. He asserts that such connections 
are only the expressions of the demands of our own purposive 
will. The deepest truths and meanings of our experience, then, 
are not to be found In the facts, or in their connections, but 
rather in the relation of these facts to our will. The great 
problem of the philosopher, according to the idealist, is that 
of finding our deeper will connections, and not merely the 
connections of facts related in a time and space order of things. 


Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion 157 

The study of the external facts of our experience merely re- 
veals the inner connections and relatedness of man's will and 
purposes, and the greatest of all problems is to see the relation 
of these inner will connections in an over-individual will of the 
absolute, who is the complete and infinite personality, and the 
conspectus of all experience. This universal will is not to 
be found in the temporal and spacial world. Rather time 
and space are included within this infinite personality. God 
is thus conceived as the final cause of the universe; as in 
infinite personality, and the systematic unity and harmony of 
all will and purposive attitude of life. God is the absolute 
will and the infinite knower of the universe; he is the cause 
of all cause; the beauty of all beauty; the reality of all reality; 
the truth of all truth; and the good of all good. Thus we see 
in the idealistic conception of God, or the Absolute, the sys- 
tematic unity of all meaning and reality. According to this 
conception of God, the highest concept is that referring to his 
inner meaning and nature. Very different is this view from 
that of naturalism and other forms of agnosticism referred to 
in the above section. 

17 Summary. According to the foregoing sections of this 
chapter it is plain to see that philosophy attempts to criticize 
experience, and to ascertain its meaning and value. Such a 
view must include necessarily a religious element of our experi- 
ence, and the philosophy of religion, therefore, becomes a criti- 
cism of the principal beliefs, values, and .purpose of our re- 
ligious life. Such criticisms and estimates of values cannot be 
left entirely to any one or all of the sciences, for they give us 
nothing of the nature of eternal values but instead they give us 
a system of causally connected phenomena in a time and space 
world. A mere description of facts of the religious experience 
will not give us their meaning or value for life. It must he 
left to the philosophy therefore to criticize and evaluate the 
religious experience. Naturalism and positivism attempted 
to deny all values of the religious sort, and materialism, by 
virtue of its acceptance of the materialistic principle, denied 

I to religious experience all value other than those of physical „ J 
connection and causal relation. Mysticism attempted to es^t^^^H 
cape the bonds of causal law and asserted that the value of esr^^^H 



The Phihsophicnl Basis oj Education 

pcncnce coiini 
that it is only t 
perience that v 
values of life, 
should start v. 

■d for nothing in the religious life, and asseri 
'hen wc proceed by denying the validity of ex- 
e can become conscious of the truly religious 
Idealism, on the other hand, asserted that we 
ith the experience of this life, fragmentary 
though it is, and using this as a starting point we should seek 
to determine the inner connections of these facts, which con- 
nections it is asserted must be found inevitably in the connec- 
tion of our wills and purposes. Each individual will thus be- 
come a part of tiic universal whole or absolute will which is 
the supreme ideal for each part or individual. 

18 Educational Implications of the Philosophy of 
Religion. Let us brieiiy summarize the educational impli- 
cations of these different philosophies. In general it must be 
said that the philosophy of religion is only a part of the wider 
philosophy of life. It has also been said repeatedly that the 
philosophy of education is only a part of the wider philosophy 
of life. Thus it becomes plain thai the philosophy of religion 
and the philosophy of education are related as parts in the same 
larger whole. From this we easily deduce the proposition 
that the ethical and religious aspects of education are sim- 
ply two aspects of a wider philosophy of life. We have 
seen already and we later shall come to see more clearly that 
the ethical aspects of education are most clearly seen when 
we consider the aims and values in this field of experience. 
It is in this same connection that we come into closest contact 
with the religious aspects of education. Every educational aim 
implies a certain concept of ethical and religious values. There 
are certain reasons why we prefer certain ends to others, as 
we shall see in Part V. The ultimate aim of education 
implies certain religious as well as certain moral attitudes 
toward the world. Thus it becomes impossible to separate 
entirely the ethical and religious aspects of life and education. 
With these principles in mind, we can see that the philosophy 
ication based upon the philosophy of naturalism, positiv- 
r materialism would leave no place for religious training. 
According to mysticism the only training would be that of the 
denial of the validity of our experience. Such a philosophy 

mid contradict itsi-lf for such training would, according to 

Tted 1 

Educational Implications of the Philosophy of Religion 159 

mysticism have the value of showing the futility of our ex- 
perience at least, hence the contradiction. According to prag- 
matism, the religious life has value, and it would not do to 
neglect it; but here the test is insufficient . from the point of 
view of strict logic, since it regards the ultimate test of all 
truth as that of verification or apperception. James says: 
"The truest scientific hypothesis is that which as . we say 
works best; and it cannot be otherwise with religious hypoth- 
esis." (James, fFill to Believe, p. 12.) Idealism makes 
specific provision for training of the religious life. It regards 
the values in this field as of equal importance with those of 
truth, beauty, and goodness. As we proceed in this volume 
we shall see reason for the belief that idealism provides a 
more satisfactory philosophical basis for education than does 
either one of the above-mentioned systems. 

Let us now turn to the aesthetic field of experience. Here 
our ideal will shift from that of religious life, or a life lived 
in perfect harmony with the universe as a whole, to the ideal 
of the beautiful. Our question will be, what is the nature of 
the beautiful? We shall consider the different theories of the 
beautiful, and finally their implication for educational theory. 



I Meaning and Definition op jEsthetics. y^lsthetics 
has been defined as the science of the beautiful. It aims to 
give a complete account of the principles and laws underlying 
art, in so far as it is a descriptive science. In so far as 
asthetics is philosophical it has to do with the meaning and 
value of the testhetic experience. Esthetics, then, is both a 
descriptive and a normative science. It is to be regarded as a 
descriptive science when we are considering the principles 
and laws underlying the production of the work of art. It is 
to be regarded as a normative science in so far as we are 
concerned with the ideal values, p\irposes and meaning of the 
arristic experience. We must distinguish between art and the 
science of art, and also between art and the philosophy of art 
and the science of art, and also between art and the philosophy 
of art. In other words, we must distinguish between art as a 
descriptive science and art as a normative science. Art is 
related tg the descriptive sciences just as carpentry is related 
to the science of geometry, or just as the art of practicing medi- 
cine is to the science underlying it. Every art has its science, 
which consists of a systematic and orderly grouping of the facts 
and laws underlying it. From the point of view of descriptive 
science, art is built upon certain laws or principles of physics, 
mathematics, psychology, and other descriptive sciences. From 
the point of view of normative science or philosophy, art has 
certain meaning and value for life. The philosopher of art is 
concerned with the underlying meaning and value in the 
assthetic field of our experience. He is not concerned with art 
as mere description and explanation, but rather is he interested 
in the interpretation and evaluation of the esthetic experience 
as viewed from the standpoint of a philosophy of life as a whole. 
The scientist is interested in art as a connection of principles 

The Msthetk Aspects of Edumlionul Theory l6( ■ 

laws. The philosopher is inEerested in art as having a 
meaning and value for human life. The scientist conceives 

s a connection, but the philosopher sees in art values for 
life, he views it not as connection but as isolation. TheJ 
greatest value of art, unlike that of science, does not consist 1 
in its connection with other things, but in its isolation froml 
all parts of our experience. It is this isolation which ma]ut| 
possible the only value which art possesses. 

The Relation of Common Sense and iEsTHETics,^ 
Common sense sees in art a certain value, but here, as in 
every other field of experience, common sense is a poor judge 
of meaning and value. It is characteristic of common sense 
to see things dimly, and we have noted already that the par- 
ticular difficulty with our education to-day lies in the fact 
that it rests too much on common sense rather than on a scien- 
tific and philosophical basis. The only hope of progress in 
education lies in the same direction. The principles of art 
must be determined on the basis of a thorough scientific 
understanding of the descriptive laws that lie at its very 
foundation, and from tlie philosophical point of view its only 
hope lies in regarding it as a integral part of a wider life and 
experience. Art must therefore be taken from the field of 
common sense and placed upon a sound scientific and philo- 
sophical basis. Its aims and purposes and values must be 
defined clearly by philosophy, while its principles and laws 
must be formulated by the descriptive sciences. Art must, 
therefore, rely less on common sense and turn to a stricter 
formulation of the principles, laws, and purposes than i« 
made possible by common sense. From the foregoing it is 
clear that art is both a descriptive and a normative science. 

13 The Psychology versus the Philosophy of Art. 
Let us now turn our attention to one particular view of 
wt from the descriptive side. I refer to the psychology of 
art. We shall note the distinction between the psychology 
of art and the philosophy of an. This will help us 
more clearly in mind the distinction between the Urger 
of art taken by the descriptive sciences generally and [^ 




Tlu- riiihsophird fiaus of Education 

From the psychologic a I point of view art is to be regarded 
as built upon certain principles and laivs of mental action. 
Every work of art must conform to certain modes or princi- 
ples of mental behavior. If the work of art fails to take 
these into account it cannot be regarded from the psycho- 
logical point of view as a real work of art. In short all real 
works of art must take account of all the principles and laws 
of psychology. Now the formulation of these principles which 
underlie art is to be regarded as the work of a psychology 
of art, or it is art viewed frtim one particular angle as a de- 
scriptive science. The psychology of art like any other descrip- 
tive attitude has no rig"ht to sas" what the aim, purpose, or 
criteria of art shall be. It. is simply concerned with the 

if psychology that are involved 
n. The descriptive sciences including psyehol- 
gnored by the philosophy of art. In other 
:e jestbetic, or science of art, involves a con- 
t from both the descriptive and normative 
Furthermore, a complete theory of art in- 
, purposes, and values of art 
th the principles and statements 

artistic product ii 
ogy cannot be 
words a comple 
si deration of a 
paints of view, 
volves a statement of the 
on the one hand, together 

or laws underlying art as formulated by the descriptive 
sciences, particularly psychologj'. Psychology gives us a mere 
piaure or description of the laws involved in the production 
of a work of art. From the psychological point of view, we 
are concerned with those laws that are active in conscious- 
ness as we observe the work of the artist. We can describe 
and explain the facts of esthetic experience from this point 
of view, but we cannot go any farther than this. We cannot 
say that art is valuable or not valuable, that it should exist 
or not exist. When we take such an attitude as this, we are 
viewing the work of the artist, not from the impartial point 
of view of the descriptive scientist, but rather from the 
ethiciJ or religious, or some other normative point of view, 
where our will counts for more than mere connection and 

Psychoiogj', like the other sciences, is an artificial construc- 
tion made for the purpose of satisfying the demand of our will 
and its purposes; and the purpose of our will in setting up the 
artificial construction of psychologj' is so that we may view 


The JEslhelic Asprcts of Eiiiiriilinnnl Thenry 

163 1 

mental life not in its reality, but in its causal relations 
sequence in the world of time and ■ space — that is, in 
satisfying the logical demands of conception. Art, on the 
other hand, is interested neither in the causa! relation of facts 
of our experience, that is, not an artificial construction in 
; interest of connection; nor is it interested in connection 
all. Its value is in its isolation of a part from the whole, 
which isolation brings us into more immediate contact with 
reality of the thing represented. Art and science are thus 
two independent approaches to the same reality — the one 
through connection, the other through isolation. There is thus 
no occasion for their interference. Much different does art ap-' 
pear when we view it from the philosophical angle or the angle 
of normative science. Here we are concerned with an interpre- 
tation of art, with its relation to the whole of experience, its 
meaning and value for life as a whole. From the psychological 
point of view we were interested in the connection of one fact 
or law with another, and so viewed art as a systematic unity of 
these principles and taws. But in such a view we never get be- 
yond the mere fact of the temporal and spacial order of 
things, but a complete theory of art involves not only a state- 

t of the is, but of the ought also. We must therefore call , 
upon the philosopher for a criticism of art in its relations to 
life as a whole. The philosopher, unlike the psychologist, 
s art in its relation to other activities and interest of life. 
He criticizes art on the basis of its relation to life as a whole. 
It is in just such a relation to the unity of life experience 
t art gains its significance and value for life. And such 
value and significance must be determined by the philosopher^ 
who views life in its unity. 

From the point of view of descriptive science art, as 
have already indicated, gains its significance through its con- 
nection with other facts of our experience. From the norma- 
tive, or philosophical aspect, art gains its significance through 
its isolation. The work of art must be such as to be wanting 
nothing; it must suggest the unity of life as a whole. It 
must present a moment of complete satisfaction, where nothing 
wanting or desired. The artist succeeds in showing life in 
completion by rounding our partial experience. It is only 
through the suggestion of the unity of our e.vperience that J 

164 The Pliilosophkal Basis of Education 

the artist is unable to present a picture of such a compli 
state of existence. Art is the concrete embodiment of an ideal, 
and like all ideals, it suggests a state of existence more nearly 
perfect and complete than any obtained in actual experience. 
This representation is not barren formalism, but actually sug- 
gests a deeper reality which is felt, but which is not ex- 
perienced in the world of causal connection, in the time and 
space world of sequence and phenomena. 

We can see, therefore, that it is possible to approach art 
both from the descriptive and from the normative sides of 
our experience. Miss Puffer says, "We can approach such 
an aesthetic canon in two ways; from the standpoint of phil- 
osophy, which develops the idea of beauty as a factor in the 
system of our absolute values, side by side with the ideas of 
truth and of morality, or from the standpoint of empirical 
science. For our present purpose, we may confine ourselves to 
the empirical facts of psychology and physiology". (The 
Psychology of Beauty, p. 12.) 

4 The Ideal of Art. As was suggested above, the 
philosopher must decide upon the ideal of art, or perhaps it 
would be better to say that the artist must view his art in 
the light of a wider philosophy of life. The only way to 
ascertain what is a reasonable and worthy ideal of art is to 
consider it in the light of experience as a whole. A view less 
comprehensive than this will not suffice for fixing upon a 
worthy ideal of art. The ideal of the artist must be such 
that when concretely embodied it provides for the complete 
satisfaction and unity of life as a whole. It must realize the 
perfect moment and suggest through its isolation the com- 
pletion of what is only partially revealed in life viewed as 
a causal order, H. C, King says: "Here lies one of the great 
reasons for the place and power of art. It has an ideal but it 
always presents this ideal concretely. It is no abstraction. It 
is so far, therefore, akin to life itself, for the very problem of 
life is the embodying of ideals. Art and literature therefore, 
make an appeal that no abstract principle or ideal can make. 
We can never speak in general. We can never act in gen- 
eral. We can never be good in general. It is all in par- 
ticulars. We have no way of expressing a general principle. 


The Mstketic Aspects of Educational Theory 165 

but by putting it into some definite concrete individual action. 
Now, art and literature give us always such a concrete em- 
bodiment of an ideal, and so approach the strongest of all in- 
fluences, the influence of a person," (Rational Living, p. 
214). In this connection it is worth while noticing Paulsen's 
conception of the function of art. He says, "It is the highest 
function of art to shape and express the ideals which the 
spiritual life of a nation creates. The ideal world reaches 
its highest expression in a supermundane superhuman world, in 
which perfection has absolute reality for faith. Thus art be- 
comes the organ of religion. Its highest function is to realize 
the innermost cravings of a people, to contemplate its ideas 
of perfection in concrete forms. So the plastic arts produced 
concrete representations of the Greek gods, — glorious figures 
in which the Greek's ideals of human culture were made 
visible to him. Similarly Greek poetry gave to the people in 
its epics and its dramas living pictures of divine and human 
excellency, such as courage, loyalty, devotion, magnanimity, 
prudence, wisdom, and piety. Christian art, too, has performed 
the same necessary function of converting the realm of faith 
into a world of concrete intuitions. The entire medieval art, 
architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, had for 
its sole object the presentation of the world of Christian faith, 
in the form which this had assumed in the Germanic mind, 
to the senses and the entire man." (Paulsen, System of 
Ethia, p. 558.) 

But from the point of view of the wider philosophy of life, 
art must not only fulfill the conditions thus specified, but it 
must also be in accord or harmony with life as a whole. The 
purposes and values of art must not conflict with those of all 
life. There is therefore a criticism of art which may be re- 
garded as ethical or religious. 

5 The Standards or Criteria of Art. What are the 
standards, or criteria of art? This question has quite as much 
significance for the artist as the question as to the criteria 
of morality has for the ethicist or moral philosopher. Indeed 
this is one of the central questions with regard to the practical 
aspect of art and morality. We must have not only standards 
of the beautiful and the good, but we must have means of 


1 66 

The Philosophical Basis of Educalio 

■ ,..Kot ~ 

determining how far we are realizing these ideals or what 
conditions are essential for their realization. The question 
then, is what are the means for determining what a really good 
work of art must be. From the foregoing section we learn 
that the ideal of art is that of beauty. We found that the 
a;sthetician in his philosophical criticism of art asserted that 
beauty is the ideal toward which the artist should strive. But 
just what does he regard as beautiful? 

What are the essential attributes of beauty? What condi- 
tions must be fulfilled in order that all of the requirements 
of the beautiful may be satisfied? A criticism of the nature 
of the beautiful reveals harmony, symmetry, proportion, bal- 
ance and unity to be essential attributes of a work of art. 
Without such qualities as these no real work of art is pos- 
sible, for with the lack of balance there is suggested a defi- 
ciency in one part of the M'ork of art, and this suggestion of 
incompleteness is in direct opposition to the suggestion which 
a real work of art affords, namely, that of completed perfection 
and harmony of life, or, as we have said above, the concrete em- 
bodiment of life's Ideals or purposes. The criteria or 
standards of art, then, must be those of harmony, proportion, 
and balance. There must be unity so complete and perfect 
that there is no suggestion of anything lacking. Miinsterberg 
says; "The painter shows us a spot of the world in complete 
self -agreement. Every part harmonizes with every other part. 
Unity is the great secret of the realm of beauty. Literature 
shows us the life of man in this complete restful unity." (Psy. 
and Teacher, p. 58.) "Art must inhibit action, if it is per- 
fect. The artist is not to make us believe that we deal with 
a real object which suggests a practical attitude. The sesthetic 
forms are adjusted to the main esthetic aim, the inhibition of 
practical desires." (Psy. £5" Ind. Efficiency, p. 273,) We 
must always distinguish between the fine arts and the indus- 
trial or practical arts, if we are to see clearly the sesthetic 
ideal and criteria. Hyde says, "The aim of the mechanic arts 
is utility, the satisfaction of felt physical or social needs. The 
aim of the fine arts is beauty, or the satisfaction of the 
xsthetic feelings." (Practical Idealism, p. 1 15,) 

This unity and isolation in the fine arts is essential in 
order that the ideal of art which is the complete satisfaction 

The MslbetU Aspects of Edncathn,,! Tin' 


Klife may be attained. Such a realization of the perfect 
oment is possible when nothing is wanting. We must cease 
vj regard things as connected and see all of the parts in their 
perfect unity and organic wholeness. We must, then, in this 
moment of appreciation or interpretation shift our point of 
view from that of the descriptive sciences or causal connections 
as the ideal, to the position of the sesthetic science, where unity 
and completion are to be found in isolation, rather than in 

»6 The Relation of Metaphysics and j^sthetics. 
We must concern ourselves now Hith the deeper meaning of 
the esthetic experience. We must seek whether or not the 
ideal of art has any reality. Is the ideal of art simply a 
vision, or does it possess reality? This is a question for the 
metaphysics of art, and is a part of the wider philosophy of 
art. It would be useless to inquire into the ideal of art if 
such an ideal has no reality in the universal system of things. 
We can view art from the metaphysical point of view the 
same as from the ethical or religious, and from this angle the 
question is always concerned with the reality, or being of art. 
It is in this field that we concern ourselves with the most 
fundamental questions of tJie lesthetic experience. We must 
aslc ourselves the meaning of this ideal of art for the whole 
life which we live. If the ideal of art has no reality, then 
it is not worth striving for. It has no value. But philosophy 
is searching for the value of life, and since the esthetic ex- 
perience is a part of life as a whole, we must expect that 
the ideal of art will constitute a part of ultimate reality, or 
the final being or nature of things. 1 do not mean to suggest 
that the artist constantly must ask himself concerning the reality, 
or being of the ideal of his art, but I do mean to say that 
unless such an ideal has reality and belongs to the total sys- 
tem of things it is not worthy to be regarded from the philo- 
sophical point of view as being any part of life. Miss Puffer 
says well, that "Every introduction to the problems of esthet- 
ics begins by acknowledging the existence and claims of two 
methods of attack, — the general, philosophical, deductive, 

t which starts from a complete metaphysics and installs beauty 
fd its place among the other great concepts; and the empirical, 


le of 1 
fact I 

l68 The Pkilotopkical Baiii of Educalian 

or inductive, which seeks to disengage a general principle 
beauty from the objects of sslhetic experience, and the 
of jcsthetic enjoyment: Fechner's aesthetics from above and 
from below." {The Piychology of Beauty, p. 29.) There is 
no real occasion for conflict between the metaphysical and psy- 
chological points of view in art, for as Miss Puffer says, "If a 
general concept expresses, as it should, the place of beauty in 
the hierarchy of metaphysical values, it is for the psychologist 
of Esthetics to develop the means by which that end caa be 
reached in the various realms in which works of art are found." 
{The Piychology of Beauty, p. 138.) 

Metaphysics, as we have seen before, raised the ultimate and 
final question as to the nature and reality of all existence. 
The case is not different when we concern ourselves with the 
field of art. We have seen in the foregoing chapters that 
metaphysics raises certain fundamental questions as to the re- 
ligious view of life and also the logical. What value would 
the religious experience have if after its ideal were realized 
it were found to have no place in the reality of the universe, 
or what would the logical values of truth be like if they had 
no reality or true being in the internal structure of things? 
We shall find in the following chapter that ethics raises sim- 
ilar questions which must he answered by metaphysics. The 
case is not different with education, business, politics, and so- 
cial life. No matter from what position we regard life we 
cannot begin to ask fundamental questions without regard to 
the ultimate meaning and reality of experience, 

7 Tffe Relation of Logic and jEsthetics. We must 
remind ourselves also that a final philosophy of art cannot be 
given unless we take account of the theory of knowledge, or 
epistemology, Epistemologj' as we have noted already is the 
philosophical discipline which concerns itself with the nature 
and extent of knowledge. It raises such questions as, what 
can be known, and how is knowledge possible at all? It 
ought not to take a great deal of reflection to see that esthetics 
raises certain epistemological issues, for example, how can we 
know the ideal of art or the standard of art? How can we 
distinguish the Ksthctic experience from any other set of ex- 
periences in life? These questions raise the epistemological 

The Msthetk Aspects of Educational Theory 169 

problems. It is not my purpose in this chapter to settle the 
I problems that are raised by Eesthetics in these special fields of 
metaphysics and epistemology, but rather it is my purpose to 
show how inevitably all these philosophical disciplines are 
connected. It is not possible to settle the question of aesthetics 
independently of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, religion and 
ethics. If I succeed in pointing out these connections in the 
chapters dealing with the special disciplines of philosophy I 
shall have accomplished my purpose. 

; also my purpose in this chapter to suggest, as I have 
done many times before, the inevitable connection between 
ion and the special disciplines of philosophy. It is no 
lossible to settle the questions of education independently 
of the wider philosophy of the universe, than it is to settle the 
problems of scsthetics in this way. Indeed our studies thus 
far should have brought us to the point where we can see 
clearly the unity of all knowledge. 

The Relation of Philosophv of Religion and 
Esthetics. If the last statement be true that all knowledge 
is inevitably and necessarily connected, it will not be difficult 
to see the connection between logic and esthetics. As we 
have seen from an earlier chapter on the logical aspects of edu- 
cational theory, logic attempts to define the ideal of the truth 
relationship. It attempts to show what is necessary in order 
that truth may he established. It provides the necessary method 
for asserting the tnith of any set of facts in the experience 
of man. We can carry over this conception to the field of 
assthetics without a great deal of difficulty, j^sthetics as we 
have noted already is only one certain field of our human ex- 
perience. Logic does not confine itself to the ideal of truth 
in any one particular department of our experience, but at- 
tempts to define truth in whatever field of experience we may 
search for it. If the ideals of sesthctics are to be worthy of 
our striving to realize, we must then be certain that they are 
true, and their truth is to be determined by their connection 
with the universal system of things. Nothing less than the 
totality of relationships between phenomena can give us abso- 
lute and final truth. According to this conception, as 
perience broadens our conception of truth becomes correspond-; 


as abso- ^^^( 
our cx-^^^^l 


IJO The PkO^sopkicml Bmas of Edmtmimm 

in^ broader, provided our ioa^n mto the Goonectioo of things 
a developed in the same proportioo. The truth of the ideal 
of art, it developed in die same manner. The truth of the ideal 
of art and its meaning and value in life are to be determined, 
not independent of, but in relation to all the fidds of ex- 
perience. We must, then« resiKt to the universal method of 
truth provided In- logic in order to ascertain die validity or 
truth of the ideal of aesdiedcs. Once more we ought to see 
a little more clearly the dose relationship between all knowl- 
edge. Stricdy speaking, every fact of our human experience 
can be regarded either from the normative or die descriptive 
point of view; and from the normative point of view it may be 
regarded from the spedal angle of the se\'cral philosophical 
disciplines, and any attempt to regard our experience from 
one single point of vieu- is a sq)aration and abstraction which 
often leads us to regard our experience as isolated and frag- 
mentary, whereas the correct vic^- would show us the in- 
evitable connection of all knowledge and life. 

Logic attempts in the field of aesthetics to criticize its method 
of proof, and to show how inference and judgment can be 
made safely in this field of our experience, i^thetics can no 
more separate itself from a wider philosophy than can the 
normative view of the world separate itself entirely from the 
descriptive. If we are to see experience as a whole we must 
sec its several aspects in their relationship. The only mean- 
ing and significance that art has is that which it derives from 
the relation it sustains as a part to the universal whole of our 
experience, and such a relationship is to be defined on the 
basis of logical prindples. ^Esthetics, then, like any other spe- 
cial field of experience, derives its ideal values and meaning 
for life by its relations to the universal whole of things, and 
such a relationship between part and whole is to be defined 
in terms of logic. In our study of logic in a previous chapter 
we have asserted already what the nature of this organic whole 
or unity must be. A whole is such a relationship of parts 
that it cannot exist without the parts and the parts have no 
significance or meaning except in their relation to the whole. 
We can thus see the logical aspects of aesthetics. 

9 The Relation of Ethiqs and iEsxHEXigs, Fyoq^ 

The Mslkelk Aspects of Educational Theory , 171 

&ie foregoing it is also easy to see that aesthetics cannot be 
jevered completely from religion. The theory of art includes 
a view of art in its relation to the totality of the universal ex- 
(|ierience, as view*ed from the angle of philosophy. From the 
KiBngle of the descriptive science, sesthetics is concerned with the 
J^iinderlying laws and principles of this special field of ex- 
I perience. We have noted already that religion can be viewed 
I irom two similar stand-points. From the philosophical side 
T religion is concerned with the principles that define the rela- 
l.tionship between this special field of experience and life as 
I a whole. Religion and esthetics are connected thus through 
!■ being parts of a wider whole of experience, and logic must 
t their respective rights and fields as parts of the unity 
of our experience. With Plato the connection between re- 
ligion and sesthetics was so great that it was very difficult to 
distinguish between the two. The poet, according to Plato, 
gets his visions and inspiration from on high. He says ". . , . 
for not by art does the poet sing but by power Divine" {Dia- 
logues, 1:224). Religion consisted in the contemplation of 
the idea of the beautiful, or the good. With Plato there was 
no clear distinction between the values of beauty and those 
[■of conduct, or between beauty and goodness. The ideal of 
'-the good was at the same time the object of Esthetic con- 
' tcmplation. Indeed Plato's ideal of the good seemed to be 
more of an aisthetic ideal than it was ethical, for it was not 
) much of an ideal to govern man's conduct in this earthly 
life as it was an object of beauty to be adored. This ideal was 
, worthy of reverence and so was placed in the realm of religious 
Man's highest life consisted in the worship of the 
I ideal of the good, which was really a religious reverence and 
\ mystical contemplation of the aesthetic ideal. 

But Plato does not give us the picture of the most perfect 
f relationship between religion and aesthetics. They must in 
some essential respects be different, otherwise there would be 
3 reason for regarding them as different models of experience, 
prosthetics must always be regarded as having its own ideals 
and criteria, if we are to regard it as a separate field of ex- 

k perience, and the same is true of religion. We must dis- 
tinguish between the ideal of the beautiful and the object of 
religious worship or God, else the two fields of sesthetics and 



The Philosophical Basis of Education 


religion coalesce, and there be no reason for regarding them as 
separate fields of experience. We must not confuse the ideal 
of religion with the attitude of religion. Any work which is 
pursued with a deep and abiding faith and loj'alty, or belief 
in its reality or being, comes to be a sort of religion, but it is 
just as truly a kind of ethics as it is religion. It was just 
at this point that Plato failed to distinguish carefully the rela- 
tion between religion and a?stheiics. The artist must have 
faith in his art, and in its ideal value, and he must pursue this 
ideal loyally, but he must not imagine that in so doing he is 
expressing the deepest meaning of religion, for it is only when 
this attitude takes into account the whole of our experience 
that it really becomes a religion. It must not only represent 
man's faith in his art, but his faith in his fellow-men and in 
his God, before it becomes truly a religion. 

lo The Problems of j¥)sthetics. What we have just 
said with regard to the relations between religion and art will 
hold good as to the relations of assthetics and ethics, R. B, 
Perry says well, "Art, like all other interests, can flourish 
only in a sound and whole society, and the law of soundness 
and wholeness In life is morality." {Moral Economy, p. 
174) Santayana says, "Art being a part of life, the criticism of 
art is a part of morals" {The Life of Reason, p. 178) Again 
he says, "The subject matter of art is life, life as it actually is; 
but the function of art is to make life better". {The Life of 
Reason.) The same close relation between ethics and art is 
brought out by Caffin when he asserts that "Beauty, then, is 
that which stimulates and enhances our Need of Life and 
Desire of Living". {Art for Life's Sake, p. gi.) "Beauty 
and ugliness, in fact, are equivalent to good and bad." (CafKn, 
Art for Life's Sake, p. I4I.) 

Ethics and sesthetics are very closely interrelated. It would 
be difficult to say whether assthetics owes more to ethics, or 
whether ethics owes more to esthetics. The fact is that both 
make contributions to a wider philosophy of life, and that they 
are so closely related that it v>'ould be impossible to make any 
hard and fast line between them, yet they have their different 
ideals and their different standards, as well as their different 
methods. The ideal of ethics is that of goodness, while that 

The Mslhetk Aspects of Educalionni Tbenry 


^^K. of esthetics is beauty. The questions of ctliics are concerned , 
^^K with the values and standards of conduct, those of aesthetics 
^■^ are concerned with the values and standards of beauty, but 
^H the beautiful and the good can no more be separated finally 
^V than can the beautiflil and the true, or beauty and religion, 
^" Ethics has borrowed its conception of harmony and unity from 
aesthetics, but instead of applying the standard to experience 
in the field of the artist it is applied to conduct. The 
standard of conduct is perfect unity and concord of all the 
purposes and ideals in the life of the individual. This 
standard is the same for art, the difference being that the 
artist realizes his ideal in the concrete embodiment of his 
picture or his statue, while the moralist never does completely 
accomplish this organic wholeness of life, The moralist must 
hold this as his ideal, and as Plato says set his house in order 
by it, but he never can experience the complete unity and 
harmwiy of all of this life's interests and purposes, and yet 
this is his ideal, and this ideal is no less effective because it 
is not fully realized. Indeed the ideals that are counted of 
greatest value are those which are never fully attained, Wc 
pursue them but never quite reach them. The moral ideal is 
a flying goal. We think we are about to realize it, then it 
dips away from us and moves further on. We do not give up 
in despair, provided we have set up a rational ideal of life, but 
rather we pursue this ideal with increased zest. 

The ideal of conduct is, therefore, borrowed from esthetics 
md may be defined as organic unity or wholeness, harmony, 
rhythm, or balance, but the artist realizes his ideal in the crea- 
tion of his art. The moralist, however, sees in each action only 
a partial picture of the life he would live. We shall pursue 
this thought further in another connection. Here our only i 
object is to state certain fundamental relationships betvcecB'J 
ethics and aesthetics. 

The Different Theories of Art, The philosopher 
of art cannot concern himself all the while with the relational 
aspects of -cBsthetics. i^lsthetJcs has its own special problem, 
md a profound consideration of this field of experience brings 
to light certain special problems which belong to the aeslheti- 
cian himself. The philosophical view of art regards the chief 


174 The Philosophical Bnsii of Education 

problem of esthetics as being that of defining clearly the ideal 
of art. We have stated already that this ideal is that of 
beauty, and we have asserted already that this problem cannot 
be settled without calling upon metaphysics, epistemology, re- 
ligion, logic and ethics, as well as the descriptive sciences, par- 
ticularly psychology. In short, we can say that the problems 
of art cannot be dealt with satisfactorily until iesthetics is 
regarded as a part of a wider field of human knowledge. Miss 
Pufifer says, "To find out what is beautiful, and the reason 
for its being beautiful, is the esthetic task; to analyze the 
workings of the poet's mind, as his conception grows arid rami- 
fies and brightens, is no part of it, because such a study takes 
no account of the {esthetic value of the process, but only uf 
the process itself." (The Psychology of Beauty, p. 17) 
Professor Peabody says, "The Problem of art is thus the sug- 
gestion of the ideal by the description of the real," {jtp- 
proach to the Social Question, p. I41) 

12 The ^Esthetics of Idealism. So far we have con- 
sidered the different answers that are given to the different 
questions of art from the point of view of the several systems 
of philosophy. Each system of philosophy has its own way of 
stating the relationship between scsthetics and the other 
branches of knowledge, between art and the other fields of ex- 
perience. I shall not here go into the matter at any great 
length, for only in a general way does it concern the special 
purpose which I have in writing this chapter. I am here con- 
cerned with the broader relationships between esthetics and the 
other philosophical disciplines, i^sthcticians have not always 
agreed that art must be criticized in the light of a larger phil- 
osophy of life. There is, however, almost universal agreement 
of this point at the present time, jEstheticians differ widely 
as to the particular value of art, or purpose of art in life, 
some have asserted that art is simply a play of the imagina- 
tion. Art exercises the imagination and the mental powers 
generally in the same wholesome \vay that outdoor play rec- 
reates the physical organism. This is the play theory of art. 
Other critics of art maintain that art is merely imitation of 
the reality, Plato gives expression to this view. He con- 
sidered that the work of the artist who creates the objects 

The Msthntic .Aspects nf Educniinntil Thpory 


pi beauty is thrice removed from the reality which he rep- 
Such an artist does not deserve to be classed with the 
r«al philosophers. The only true artist, according to Plato, 
I is he who gives up his life in contemplation and reverence of 
f the Idea of the Good. Other critics have asserted that there 
I certain educational value in art and that while we are 
I engaged in such play of the imagination and imitation of the 
:ality we are developing our powers. This is called the 
I educational theory of art. There is another theory that con- 
I aiders art in the light of moral criticism, and refuses admission 
\ to polite society all works of art that are not in perfect keep- 
f'lth the moral sentiment of man. Plato was a puritanic 
I in art and would refuse to let all artists into his great re- 
l^jublic whose work had not been inspected thoroughly in order 
■to ascertain whether or not it was suggestive of evil to the 
jobserver. Another group of critics regards art not as a 
fineans of imitating some object, real or unreal, but as a 
s of idealizing some element or portion of our experience. 
I According to this theory the work of the artist is not further 
L lemoved from reality than the thing which the artist rep- 
l^esents, but indeed is closer to realitj-. It suggests a unity 
(and harmony without which life and reality would be mean- 
Kingless. There is a certain variety of intuitionism which re- 
' gards the ideal of art as that of perfection. He is the real 
artist who can transform the fragment of our experience in 
such a way as to suggest the ideal which should be the standard 
both of religion and reality. According to another group of 
theorists, art is simply a representation. It is simply the 
presentation in a new form of some object in our experience. 
In as much as we are concerned particularly with the phil- 
osophy of idealism we are most concerned here with the 
■ idealistic view of art. Let us turn our attention for a moment 
to this view. 

13 Summary. The idealist is a rationalist and therefore 
sees and criticizes all fragments of experience in the light of 
their universal connection. He views art, therefore, as a cer- 
tain special field of experience which must he considered in 
I its relation to the whole of experience. The idealist regards 
art as having many of the purposes which have been sug- 


The Philoiophical Basis of Education 

:e here ^ 

gestcd in the above section, but it would be well to note here 
that, as R. L. Stevenson says, "We are not so much in need 
of views of the universe as in a view of the universe". And so 
we are not concerned so much with the many different theories 
of art as to its purposes and values in life, as we are in formu- 
lating a single point of view with regard to this field of ex- 
perience which is consistent with the whole of experience. If 
art is to be properly criticized, it must be taken in the light 
of the whole of our experience; and if the ideal of art is to be 
defined clearly and accurately, it must be in the light of the 
larger ideals of life as a whole. We must, then, consider 
what the ultimate aim of life is. What is the chief good for 
which we are striving, and how is this related to the universal 
whole, the organic unity of all experience? According to 
the esthetics of the type of idealism here reflected the ultimate 
aim of all life is that of self-realization. The case is no dif- 
ferent when we turn our attention to the special world of 
art. Here the chief value of art must be defined in terms of 
self-realization. Art is of value, like religion or morality, only 
in so far as it is productive of the highest type of will and 
personality. The ultimate aim of life and of art as well of 
religion, morality, and science, must be expressed in terms of 
self-realization. Art that is not productive of the highest 
degree of self-realization is not the highest type of art. We 
are not to specify the value of art in terms of its tendency 
toward the development of the play instincts of man ; nor 
in the degree of accuracy of its imitation, or representation of 
some object which is embodied in the concrete idea of the beau- 
tiful, nor is the value of art to be determined alone by its 
exercise of our thought, judgment, and reason; nor again is its 
value to be determined on the basis of its idealization of some 
object of contemplation. The chief value of art lies In the 
fact that it is conducive to a larger self -development. The 
highest ideal of life, and the only sufficient ground and motive 
of conduct, when rightly conceived will, I believe, be regarded 
as self-realization. The chief value of art does not, then, 
consist in the pleasure which it produces, but rather in the 
complete life and organic unit^ which it tends to promote, and 
which it is capable of producing in no small degree, chiefly 
because the ideal of art is the concrete embodiment of this idcil 


The Mslhelk Aspects of Educathnnl Theory 

of complete self-realization or organic unity. We conclude i 
this part of our inquiry by stating that the Ideal of esthetics' I 
must conform to the ideal of life. This is only another way 
of stating that the ideal of beauty is subordinate to the ideal 
of self-realization. We shall find that the ideal of religion, 
truth, and goodness must conform to the same ideal, for the 
one universal end of all striving, of all life, is that of self- 
realization. We cannot agree with Santayana, then, when 
he says that, "A beauty not perceived is a pleasure not felt, 
and a contradiction." {The Sense of Beauty, p. 45) 

14 The Educational Implication of j^sthetics.J 
We have now defined esthetics as the science of the beautiful, 
and have shown that it has both descriptive and normative ' 
aspects as a complete theory of art. We have shown the ideal 
of art to be that of beauty, and the essential criteria of such 
a standard is that it must possess harmony, symmetry, propor- 
tion, and unit}'. We have shown that the questions of 
esthetics cannot he answered alone, but must be considered 
from the wider point of view of the universal philosophy of all 
experience, and that consequently esthetics has its close con- 
nections with metaphysics, or the science of reality, epistem- 
ology, or the science of knowledge, logic, or the science of 
truth, and ethics, or the science of the good, and that it also 
has its religious significance. We are to conclude, therefore, 
that a^thetics is not strictly an independent inquiry in search 
of ideals that have no connection with life as a whole ; on the 
contrary, the ideal of esthetics must conform to the ideals of 
life as a whole. This ideal is to be found only when we know 
the deeper meaning and craving of our individual wills. 
.Esthetics, then, must be viewed in the light of a complete 
philosophy of life, and beauty, its ideal, must be conceived 
in its relation to the ideal of life as a whole. This ideal is 
best defined in terms of self-realization, for this is the only 
adequate statement of what our deepest will and purpose in 
life is, and art is to be considered as of value only in so far as 
it is productive of the larger life or of self-realization. It must 
not be inferred that assthetics does not have the privilege of 1 
promoting self-realization according to its own standards, 
which standards, however, must not be chosen arbitrarily, or | 


The Phihs 

ohkal i 

of Educnii 

without regard to the whole of life. 

Very little need be said as to the educational implic 
concluding this chapter, of esthetics. It has been urged that 
the ideal of iesthetics is to be regarded of value only in s 
far as it is productive of the highest self-realization. Art, 
therefore, does have an educational value, and like education, 
it must at the same time it realizes its own purpose and ideals 
tend to realize the larger purposes of life as a whole. Both 
education and art arc to be considered in the light of this 
larger aim. which expresses the deepest will of the individual. 
We shall see later that the individualistic aspects of this 
theory cannot rightly be considered as selfish, mean, or low. 
On the contrary, it represents the highest conceivable ideal 
both of the egoistic and altruistic Impulses, and is the only 
adequate means of their reconciliation. 

We are to remember that education is not a separate field 
of experience, but that it is the common ground on which the 
various values of life are to be realized. Education borrows 
a part of its ideal from ajsthetics, just as truly as ethics has 
borrowed its ideal of organic unity from aesthetics. Up to the 
present time we have concerned ourselves with three realms 
of human values, from which education raises a considerable 
part of its ideal. From logic, education has borrowed its con- 
ception of truth ; from aesthetics, it has borrowed its concep- 
tion of beauty; from religion, it has borrowed its conception 
of the absolute value of religion; from ethics, as we shall see 
in the next chapter, it borrows the ideal of goodness. Educa- 
tion owes a heavy debt to esthetics. It is the business of art 
education to show how the ideals of beauty can be realized 
through the various agencies of school life and organization. 
Education thus borrows its ideals from logic, religion, iesthetics, 
and ethics, and concerns itself with the development of plans 
and purposes for the realization of these ideals in life. 

In this connection it will be instructive to note what others 
have said as to the relation of art and education. Plato makes 
Protagoras, chief of the Sophists, say that "Poetry is the 
principal part of Education." (Protat. p. i6i) Of all the 
excellences of his ideal state, Plato says that nothing pleases 
him more "upon reflection than the rule about poetry", which 
ruled out all poetry that did not conduce to the ideal of the 

The Msthelic Aspects of Educational Theory 
■ 307) 


rgood. {Rep. Bk., p. 307) Henry Turner Bailey says, "The 
purpose of art education is the development of appreciation 
for the beautiful and of power to produce beautiful tilings" 
{Art Education, p. i) Prof. Santayana says, "j^sthetic edu- 
cation consists in training ourselves to see the maximum of 
beauty". [The Sense of Beauty, p. 136) Another aspect of 
art is emphasized by Thompson when he says, "The biological 
importance of living in beautiful surroundings is inestimable". 
It makes for health of body and brain; it awakens long-dormant 
buds; it fills up the life with wholesome delights; it produces 
pleasant modifications of the individual; and who can tell 
how its potent message may travel by the wireless telegraphy 
of ante-natal life? {Darwinism and Human Life p. 229) 
Professor Miinsterberg holds that "The beUef in the absolute 
dignity of such true art must be instilled by education. As 
far as this ideal is realized in the world of things, we have the 
fine arts; as far as mankind and man's will is the material, we 
have literature ; as far as the inner life comes to such perfect 
expression, we have lyrics and music. No education can live 
up to its true ends unless it helps throughout to stimulate the 
enthusiasm for artistic beauty. Whether poems or dramas arc 
read, whether the masterpieces of foreign literature are brought 
near to the pupil, whether artistic drawing or singing are stud- 
ied or the glory of historical art is proclaimed, the enthus 
for the realm of beautiful art must be developed, together with 
the belief in truth and harmony," {Psychology and Teacher, 
p. 247.) 



1 The Meaning and Definition of Ethics, In this 
chapter we are concerned with the meaning of ethics and its 
relations to educational theorj'. Ethics has been defined often 
as the science of right conduct. It is one of the normative 
sciences. We say it is normative for the reason that it sets 
up a standard or ideal. Ethics is not concerned alone with 
the facts and laws that govern our conduct, but it is inter- 
ested in what constitutes good conduct. Ethics can be re- 
garded from the descriptive aspect of the world also. From 
such an angle it is concerned with the description and ex- 
planation of the facts of conduct. But when we take into ac- 
count ideals and purposes, values and standards, we have passed 
beyond the realm of mere description and explanation into 
the world of norms and appreciation. 

2 Ethics and Common Sense. Common sense does not 
clearly define the moral issues nor do the descriptive sciences. 
We must not stop with a mere description of conduct, but we 
must concern ourselves with the ideals which it is worthy for 
us to realize in conduct. The aim we have in view is deserving 
of our consideration. We must, therefore, not confine ethics 
to the realm of description and explanation, but must regard 
it as a branch of philosophy. Common sense no more can 
offer a sufficient basis for good conduct than it can offer a 
satisfactory basis for religion, art, or business. We must take 
a broader view of life and experience than that afforded by 
common sense, if we are to understand the deeper purposes of 
our life. It is just as essential that the principles of right con- 
duct be clearly defined and the problems recognized as it is 
that our business in the economic world should be established 
on sound economic principles. 


The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory i8l 

3 Ethics as a Science. Ethics is thus both a normative 
and a descriptive science. As a normative science it fs con- 
cerned with what is, with the facts of experience and their 
causal or sequential relations. From the normative point of 
view, ethics is regarded as a science of values, purposes and 
ideals and the chief concern of ethics from this point of view 
is that of determining the worthy aims and purposes of life. 
Ethics is constantly in search of the highest good, and with 
the standards of right conduct, which conduct is measured 
in terms of this ideal. Ethics has always been regarded as 
a search for the highest good in life, but there have been a 
great many different answers given to the question, what is 
the highest good ? We must now turn our attention to some of 
the broader relations of ethics in order that we may get a 
comprehensive view of the whole field of our human ex- 
perience and of knowledge. We have noticed that meta- 
physics, epistemologj'. logic, religion, and jesthetics are very 
closely interwoven. It is our purpose here to show that ethics 
sustains a close relation to each of these branches of philosophy. 
Let us first concern ourselves with the relation between meta- 
physics and ethics. 

4 The Relation of Metaphysics and Ethics. We 
have stated already that the ideal of ethics is that of the high- 
est good, and that this is the standard of our conduct. It 
would be meaningless and valueless to concern ourselves with 
the ideal of the good, if it had no reality or being. We must 
then concern ourselves with the question, what reality or worth 
has this ideal of the good? It would be a useless striving in- 
deed if man were constantly in search of the ideal of the good 
and he should find in the end that it is not real, or has no 
true being. It would be like chasing a mere fancy. The meta- 
physician must inquire into the ideal of the good in order to 
determine its validity and its meaning, or reality in the uni- 
versal system of human experience. It is, then, impossible 
completely to withdraw ethics from the field of metaphysics. 
To do so would mean great loss for ethics. Rogers says, "The 
Ethics of the 'moral sense' school is the least dependent on 
metaphysics, but this is not in its favor, being merely th«j 
result of superficiality." (Short Hist, of Ethics, p. g.) With 


The Philosophical Basis of Education 

out the metaphysical criticism of the first principles of ethic 
ivc might be engaged constantly in chasing butterflies instead 
of real ideals of worth. We must coristantly criticize our 
ethical ideal in the light of the larger view of life as a whole. 
It will always be true that "The widest truths of ethics like 
those of other sciences, cannot fully be realized except by 
reference to other branches of philosophy." (Shelton: Int. 
Jour. Etk. 20:24:424) Rogers says, "It is a truth, which 
should never be forgotten, that a complete philosophy of ethics 
involves some very profound metaphysical problems." {Short 
Hist, of Ethics, p. 8) The close relation between ethics 
and metaphysics is expressed by Prof. R. B. Perry when he 
asserts that "There can be no such thing as a judgment of 
worth which is not a judgment concerning the fact or being 
of the worth." {Int. Jour. Ethics 21 1295) 

5 The Relation of Epistemology and Ethics. 
What has been said with regard to the connections of ethics 
and metaphysics can almost be repeated in showing the rela- 
tionship between ethics and epistemology. The ideal of the 
good must be knowable if it is to be of real value or worth 
at all. What would be gained if the ideal of ethics were real, 
and yet it could not be known? To know the reality of this 
ideal is to see it in its relation to the universal system of 
ideals and purposes, and svich a relationship is possible only be- 
cause knowledge is possible. The relationship itself would not 
exist were it not for knowledge. Indeed we mean nothing 
more by such a relationship, than that the part of our ex- 
perience is viewed in the light of a larger knowledge of the 
whole. The common sense view of ethics, as we have observed 
already, does not regard this science as having fundamental 
connections with metaphysics and epistemology. We have 
seen also that the ethics of common sense does not gain any- 
thing by failing to perceive these fundamental relations: on 
the contrary, it must all be counted as a loss and discredit of 
the common sense view of ethics. The ideal of ethics, then, 
must be not only true and stand the test of reality, as pro- 
posed by metaphysics, but this ideal must be such that it may 
be known. We must conclude, therefore, with Professor 


The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory 

Adier, that "Ethical science has its Epistemological foundation." I 
{Int. Journal of Ethics. 22:5.) 

6 The Relation of Ethics and Logic. There 
also close connections between ethics and logic and these have i 
appeared already, so we need do little more than bring 1 
gether a few of the statements that we have made in other ' 
connections. From the logical point of view, the truths in the 
field of ethics must conform to a wider system of truths. It ' 
is not a sufficient test of truth that a few of the facts fit har- 
moniously together. They must be viewed in their relation 
to a wider totality of things. So logic must enter the field of 
ethics in order to ascertain whether or not the standards and 
tests of truth are sufficient, and this is to be determined by their 
consistency with the universal system of knowledge. If the 
truths in one field of experience are seen to conflict with those 
of another the logician does not hesitate to regard some of the 
-called truths as untrue. We must apply this logical test of 
truth no matter in what field of our experience we consider, 
and unless the several fields of experience qualify in their use 
:thod they fail to meet the logical standards of truth. So 
m sum up the three preceding sections of this chapter by 
asserting that the ideal of ethics as the standard of right con- 
duct, that is the good, must not only be real, hut it must be 
knowable and be true. 

The Relation of Ethics and Religion. In the 
chapter on the religious aspects of educational theory, we spoke 
of the connections between ethics and religion. We must here 
his same connection, this time from the point of view 
of ethics rather than from that of religion. Ethics owes quite 
as heavy a debt to religion as religion does to ethics. Ethics 
has borrowed the conception of reverence, devotion, and loyalty 
from religion, but with all the likenesses there are funda- 
mental differences between ethics and religion. Ethics is con- 
cerned with the relationship between man and man, while re- 
ligion is concerned with the relationships thus defined with the 
added notion of man's relation to his God. Professor Palmer 
rightly says that "We must fix our moral minds on the man- 
ward rather than on the goodward side of a. life which unites 


184 The Pkilosophical Basis of Education 

finite and infinite," (Palmer, Field of Ethics, p. 192.) 

Ethics and religion are thus related as two concentric cir- 
cles having unequal radii, the longer of which represents re- 
ligion, and the one with the shorter radius that of ethics. 
Professor Peabody says well, that "To prolong the radius of 
goodness is to penetrate the sphere of faith. The outer edge 
of ethics is the inner margin of religion." {App. to Soc. Ques., 
p. 179) Such a conception brings out clearly the notion that 
ethics and religion are inseparably connected. The value of a 
religion is to be determined very largely by its serviceableness 
with respect to man, as well as by reverence and obedience 
toward God, The ideal of ethics is that of goodness, and like 
the ideal of beauty it must be tested in the light of a complete 
view of the world. Ethics, religion, and ssthetics are thus all 
to be subjected to a philosophical criticism of life as a whole, 

8 The Relation of Ethics ano j^^sthetics. In our 
discussion of the relation of ethics and aesthetics we have noted 
the close relationship that obtains between these two sciences. 
Wc have stated that ethics borrows its conception of unitj" and 
harmony from lesthetics. We have also noted that the ideal 
of icsthetics is realized as a concrete embodiment of human pur- 
pose, and as the object of esthetic contemplation. Similarly we 
have noted that ssthetics, while holding to the same ideal 
of organic unity, fails to realize in any single act of ex- 
perience this complete moment of perfection. Art idealizes 
the fragment of our experience by taking account of the prin- 
ciples of unity and harmony and thus makes possible the actual 
realization of the ideal of the artist. The moralist, however, 
is not able to point to any act of such complete unity. Yet 
the difference is not so great as it might seem, for while the 
moralist does not succeed in realizing completely his ideal in 
any act of experience; with his eyes steadily fixed on this unity 
of purpose, he governs his every act, and so it is possible to con- 
ceive of each act as contributing to the realization of a larger 
whole. Indeed this act of self-realization at times becomes 
so apparent through our deeds that we shift our point of view 
momentarily from that of the moralist to that of the sestheti- 
cian, and regard the individual act as the consummation and 
realization of our most complete meaning. The enjoymeat \ 

The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory 1S5 | 

I of the moralist often resembles that of the artist, but his | 

'product of art is embodied in the unity of his deeds and not . 

in any concrete and objective unity. Instead of completing 1 

the picture of life in actual concrete embodiment, it must to a 

large extent be filled out in the mind of the moralist, 

9 The Problems of Ethics. The problems of ethics arc 
special, not in the sense that they have no connection with the 
other problems of life, but in the sense that they require first 
to be attacked by the moral philosopher. Later they must be 
criticized in the light of general philosophy. The special 
problems of ethics are those relating to the ideal of the good, 
freedom, and the standards, or criteria, of conduct. As we 
have found in the other special fields, so we will find here that 
the solutions proposed by the different systems of ethics differ 
considerably. It may be, however, that they do not differ 
so widely as we think, for a man is psychologically predisposed 
to regard his adversaries as inconsistent, even before he really 
considers how far apart they really are. He usually excuses 
his own inconsistency by regarding his opponent as inconsis- 

10 Systems of Ethics. I am disposed to believe that all I 
the great systems of ethics are more closely related than is 
often supposed, and yet I am keenly aware of the fact that 
there are important differences here. The chief difference is 
due probably to the fact that some of the systems are more 
completely thought out in their universal relations than arc 
others. There are a number of important systems of philos- 
ophy which have concerned themselves with the problems of 
ethics. As a matter of fact, every system of philosophy has 
regarded as its chief task the search for the good, and such a , 
search is defined as the central problem of ethical inquiry. 
complete system of philosophy is possible which does not con- 
cern itself with the ideals of conduct, or the good. Some 
systems of philosophy are primarily concerned with metaphysics, 
some are distinctly epistemological, and others are more re- 
ligious, aesthetic or ethical, but no matter from what angle 
twe approach experience, wc are certain to find the connections 
diat have been referred to above. In the systems of philosophy 


this ? 


1 86 The Philosophical Basis of Educalio 

to which mention is made in the remaining portion of 
chapter, 1 am concerned not with the metaphysical, epistemo- 
logical, logical or esthetic aspects, but rather with the ethical 
aspects. We arc to keep in mind the close relationship that 
has already been defined as existing between these several dis- 
ciplines. We shall refer to diflerent forms of hedonism, stoi- 
cism, platonism, naturalism, pragmatism and idealism. 

II The Ethics of Hedonism. According to the ethics 
of hedonism, pleasure is the only worthy end and motive of 
conduct. This idea! has been defined in a number of different 
ways by Cyrenaicism, Epicureanism, and utilitarianism. Ac- 
cording to Aristipus, leader of the Cyrenaics, pleasure is re- 
garded as the highest good, but since bodily pleasures are more 
intense it is this sort of pleasure that we should attempt to 
realize in conduct. Then since the bodily pains are also more 
intense than the mental, these are most to be avoided. Ac- 
cording to Epicurus, however, pleasures of the mind are more 
lasting. They have greater durability and possess greater in- 
tensity, therefore pleasures of the intellect are to be regarded 
as the chief aim of conduct. According to utilitarianism as 
defined by the later hedonists, Bentham, Mill, and Spencer, 
pleasure is regarded as the object of the greatest utility, and 
consequently the highest aim of conduct. The Cyrenaics and 
the Epicureans were alike in that both regarded the highest 
aim of conduct as that of individual pleasure, but they differed 
in that Aristipus regarded the bodily pleasures as of chief im- 
portance, while Epicurus considered the pleasures of the mind 
as of the greatest value. 

Hobbs and Locke of the modern hedonists were alike in that 
both regarded individual pleasures as the highest motives and 
aim of conduct, and both differed from the utilitarian school 
to which Bentham, Mill, and Spencer belong. These last 
three were universalistic hedonists. The highest aim, accord- 
ing to them was that of the "Greatest happiness to the greatest 
number." Mill asserted that there is a standard of pleasure 
to which all pleasure must conform. Pleasure not only had 
duration and intensity, that is quantity, but they had quality 
also. Mill asserted that it was better to be a Socrates dis- 
satisfied than a pig satisfied. The introduction of this qualita- 


The Ethical Aspects of Educal'ioiidi Theory 187 

tive distinction in pleasure virtually denied pleasure as the 
highest good in life. For if pleasures are not of the same 
value qualitatively considered, then there must be some stand- 
ard outside of pleasure by which all pleasures are measured. 
This really was the death-knell of the pleasure theory of the 
Jiighest good. 

The Ethics of Stoicism. The Stoics, like the ] 
Cyrenaics, were a branch of the, Socratic school. They con- 
tended that not pleasure but duty and virtue are the highest 
aims of conduct. We are not to he good in order that we 
may get the greatest amount of pleasure out of life, as Epicurus 
said, but we are to be good because it is right. Virtue for 
virtue's sake was the doctrine of the Stoics. This necessarily 
led to formalism, the chief results of which were to be found 
in the philosophy of the schoolmen during the medieval ages. 
According to the Stoics the highest good consisted in conform- 
ing to law. Man's greatest moral duty was to govern his con- 
duct in such a way as to conform to the laws of nature or the 
universe. The Stoics were necessarists or determinists in ethics. 
They regarded it man's highest duty to conform rigidly to the 
laws of the universe. Here the Stoics, like a good many of 
us to-day, mistook the means for the end. It is not that we 
Id conform to the laws of nature with no ulterior aim 
iew, but rather we must conform to these laws in order 
we may be able to obtain the greatest good in life. Zeno, 
the leader of the Stoics, maintained that the way to know 
our duty is to know the secret laws of nature, and it is only I 
by conforming to these laws that man can obtain the highest j 
good in life. Indeed there was no good beyond mere con- I 
formance with this law. There was an ascetic element in \ 
this philosophy, such as we have noticed in Platonism. This 
ascetic element gained its high-water mark during the period 
of scholasticism. The Stoics, believing that the hedonists were 
on the wrong track entirely in their search for the highest 
good, went to the opposite extreme, and instead of laying 
emphasis on the content side of experience, they overempha- 
sized the form. 

13 The Ethics of Platonism. Enough has been said 


l88 The Philosophical Basis 0/ Education 

already with regard to the ethical aspects of Plato's philosophy 
to suggest what, according to his view, was the highest good. 
Plato conceived that all ideas resolved themselves ultimately 
into one supreme ideal which is called the idea of the good. 
This idea of the good was by Plato regarded as the supreme 
motive and end of all good conduct. It was man's highest 
obligation to strive to gain a clear conception of this idea of 
the good. It was possible to get this conception only by clear 
philosophical thinking. The idea of the good according to 
Plato was of such a character that only the philosophers, and 
those most highly learned, could attain. Thus the ideal of 
ethical conduct was rather exclusive in the mind of Plato, It 
was only the philosopher who could see the real worth and 
value of conduct. Morality thus became a matter too largely 
of scholarship to serve as a satisfactory basis for universal 
morality. The best that the artisans and laborers could attain 
was to attend strictly to their own business. Every man re- 
ceived his just dues by correlating properly the principles of 
courage, wisdom, and temperance. But the virtue of wisdom 
was withheld largely from the lower class. All individuals, 
however, could practice the virtue of temperance, and the 
warriors at least could practice the virtue of courage. Justice 
was not a fourth virtue, but rather the union of the virtues of 
courage, temperance, and wisdom. 

The highest good according to this philosophy was removed 
from experience, and this was its great defect. In whatever 
terms the good may be defined, it must always attribute some 
value to the experience of this world, otherwise the good is 
unrealizable and we can do no more than contemplate it in 
a mystical way. This is important for us to consider for the 
reason that a complete educational theory, which we arc here 
attempting to give in general outline, must always be pre- 
sented in the light of a complete philosophy of life, which con- 
tains a statement of the ultimate or highest good. We cannot 
accept as final the highest good as stated by Plato. It consisted 
too largely in abstraction from the world of experience, rather 
than in a statement of a completed and rounded-out experience, 
such as we know something about from our partial life in the 
world of causal sequence. 

The Ethical Aspects of Ediicationnl Theory 

[14 The Ethics of Naturalism, When we spoke of the 
igious aspects of naturalism, we noted that very little con- 
tnbution to religious philosophy has been made by this theory 
of life. It is different, however, when we view the matter 
from the point of view of ethics. Naturalism as an ethical 
theory asserts the highest good to be found in the realization of 
pleasure, or some other content of this life. In this respect it 
will be noticed that it differs widely from Platonism, which 
found the chief good in a world above the world of our prac- 
tical experience. Naturalism is really a science rather than a 
philosophy. It does, however, have seme philosophical con- 
nections. The conclusions arrived at by naturalism with re- 
gard to the nature of the universe raise certain important 
philosophical questions which cannot be passed by unnoticed. 
Naturalism, true to its name, finds the highest good in some 
factor of the natural life of man. As we have said, this is 
expressed usually in terms of pleasure. A naturalistic, or 
positivistic, philosophy is the logical background for utilitarian 
ethics. According to Spencer, chief of the naturalistic ethical 
philosophers, the highest good consisted in happiness. Not 
the happiness of the moment or of the individual, but the 
greatest happiness to the greatest number. This view regards 
the only motive and the only worthy end of conduct to be 
some form of pleasure or, better, happiness. Since the aim of 
life is some good to be realized in the life of our present ex- 
perience, this type of ethical theory is generally regarded as 
utilitarian. The good is of some service to man in his present 
Slate of existence. It is not something to be striven for that 
belongs to another world, but rather something to be obtained 
in this world of our partial experience. In this view, the 
utilitarian philosopher is doubtless more accurate than was Plato, 
and yet, whether or not such a good can be regarded as final, 
is a question to which our attention will need to be drawn 
further as we proceed. 

15 The Ethics of Pragmatism. While pragmatism 
has not yet developed a complete ethical theory, but is primar- 
ily epistemo logical, there are, however, certain influences that 
can be deduced logically from its fundamental principles. The 
test of the truth of any hypothesis is that of i 


The Philosophical Basis of Education 

cording to pragmatism. It is not different In the 
ligious or moral hypotheses. I may regard as the highest good 
that which is found to work most satisfactorily in my life. This 
is the pragmatic tpst of all truth. Pragmatism does not formu- 
late in any definite way its conception of the highest good, but 
so far it has stated only the test of the ultimate truth and 
validity of such a conception. This theory is too young to be 
considered at any great length in this place. It has not well 
formulated its own theories of the universe, and it need not, 
therefore, be criticized to any great extent here. There are 
certain epistemological implications of this doctrine that have 
wider significance for educational theory, but it is difficult to 
formulate these for the reason that the doctrine is itself not 
very clearly formulated. 

i6 The Ethics of Idealism. According to the idealistic 
view which is maintained here, the highest good of life con- 
sists in self-realization. Self-realization is possible only through 
the realization of our own deepest will and purpose. The ulti- 
mate reality of the universe is stated in terms of personality. 
It is the development of this personality through self-realiza- 
tion that constitutes the highest good in the individual, and 
when he strives for ideal values that are not narrowly personal, 
but over-individual, his strivings cease to be of a selfish, egoistic 
nature, and come to be universal. The attempts to realize 
such over-individual or super-personal ideals, which are valu- 
able for every individual Is the highest motive and the chief end 
of all conduct. There is no way of formulating specifically the 
chief end of conduct e.\cept in terms of self-realization. It thus 
becomes the duty of every individual to attempt to realize the 
ideal values of life, truth, beauty, goodness, and religion, for 
these are values which express the deepest and most abiding 
reality of life. They are both personal and super- personal, 
both individual and over-individual, or universal. They have 
their value not in the fact that individuals strive for their 
realization to satisfy certain narrow purposes, but rather be- 
cause their nature is of the very essence of reality or life 

According to the ethics of idealism, then, the highest good 
does not consist in the pleasure either of the individual, or 

" The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory 191 

the greatest number of individuals, nor docs it consist in the 
formal adherence to the super-personal laws of nature; nor 
does it consist in the contemplation of the idea of the good, 
which idea is removed from the world of practical experience; 
nor yet is it found in the ethics of pragmatism, which asserts 
that the highest good consists in the practical adaptation of our 
hypotheses and theories to the facts of our experience. All 
of these grand philosophies give us an ethical view of the 
world which we cannot afford to neglect with impunity, but 
they fail to give us a complete and systematic account of the 
ultimate good or chief value of life. This is due probably 
to the fact that the wider philosophy of which these different 
ethical reflections are only a small part is insufficient to give an 
account of the universe as a whole. 

The good must always be conceived in terms of personality. 
The reality of the universe is expressible in no other terms 
than those of personality and will. The highest good in life 
consists in the most complete development and realization 
of our own inner purposes, interests, or will. H, C. King 
says: "Not feelings, not sentiments, moral sensibilities, or 
aspirations, not principles, not good resolutions, even but only 
action, born of the will truly reveals us," {Rational Lriwg, 
p. 145.) "Whenever we tap organic nature," said Romanes, 
"it seems to flow with purpose." (Quoted by Thompson, 
Darwinism and Human Life. p. 196.) Miinsterberg says; 
"In the purposive view of our real life, only our vnW and our 
personality have a meaning and can be related to the ideas and 
higher aims." {Psychotherapy, p. 145.) 

17 Summary. In summarizing briefly the contents of 
this chapter let us say that ethical theory is a part of a larger 
theory of life, just as are esthetics and religion. Ethics must 
be viewed, therefore, always in its relation to the whole philos- 
ophy of life. It is not an independent science in the sense 
that it has no connection with other views of life. It is bound 
up intimately with metaphysics, epistemology, religion, logic 
and aesthetics. The ideal of the good, therefore, cannot be 
detached completely from the ideals of truth, beauty, and re- 

The different systems of philosophy give different answers to 

192 The Philosof-hical Basts of Education 

if con- \ 

tlic question as to what constitutes the ultimate good of 
duft. Each one of these philosophies makes some important 
contributions to the conception of the value and meaning of 
life as a whole. They do not, however, all offer an equally 
satisfactory solution of the problems «hich they set out to 
solve. The answers given by some of these philosophers are 
indeed very partial and fragmentary, and yet the chief con- 
clusions of them all must be incorporated in the larger con- 
ception of the good. The hedonist is right in maintaining that 
pleasure is an important element of the universe. The Stoic 
is right in his conception of the good as involving duty, loyalty, 
and strict adherence to ideals. He was mistaken, however, in 
asserting that the highest ideal of conduct is living in strict 
accortiance with the laws of the universe. This is to be re- 
garded as a means, and not as an end in itself. Plato was 
right in his contentions that the idea of the good deserves our 
deepest loyalty and adoration. Our duty to this ideal is in- 
deed so great that it becomes almost a matter of religion that 
we show our loyalty to it. 

Idealism takes account of all of these answers that have been 
offered to the questions of ethics. It does not regard any one 
of them, however, or all of them put together as offering a 
final or satisfactory solution of the great ethical problems of 
life- The idealist cannot see the ultimate values of the world 
defined in materialistic terms, nor can he see these defined as 
pleasure, or happiness, or strict conformity to physical law. 
These things are external to man and consequently are out- 
side the boundaries of the real man. Man's deepest reality is 
expressed in terms of will or personality, and the highest good 
must be conceived in such terms. The great problem of ethics 
is to conceive how it is possible for man to develop to the high- 
est possible degree his own inner meaning and purpose. This 
he can do only by adhering strictly to the ideal values of life, 
which are not expressed in terms extra- personal, but which 
fall within the range of his own deepest will. These ideals 
we have expressed as truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. We 
have even gone so far as to suggest that these ideals have their 
final unity in the development of our own personality. It is 
only by loyalty and devotion to these ideals that man's inner 
purpose or will develops. 

The Ethical Aspects of Educational Theory 193 

18 Educational Implications of Ethics. We are 
now in a position to see something of the ethical implications 
of the ethics of voluntaristic idealism. I speak of voluntaristic 
idealism in order to distinguish it from another type of ideal- 
ism in which the chief emphasis is placed upon the intellect, 
rather than on the will. According to the philosophy which 
forms the background to the educational theory herein ex- 
pressed, the chief reality of life is defined in terms of will, or 
will directed toward a purpose, which I call personality. It is 
not difficult to see, then, what significance this sort of a philos- 
ophy has for educational theory. The chief aim of education, 
as well as of every other institution and every vocation, is to 
realize these ideal values. The school is an institution of 
society, the chief business of which is to aid in the development 
of the personality of immature individuals. In other words, 
self-realization is the chief aim of education as well as the 
chief aim of life, and briefly it is the business of the school to 
aid individuals in this larger realization of their own life 
interests and purposes. 



I The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Life. 
In Part I of this volume we concerned ourselves with the aims, 
scope, methods, and relations of the descriptive sciences. In 
Part li we gave our attention to the aims, scope, methods, 
and relations of philosophy. In Part HI we made certain 
sharper comparisons and contrasts betH'cen science and philos- 
ophy from the several different aspects of philosophy. We 
concluded this part with the statement that the descriptive 
sciences cannot offer us a complete view of life. The descrip- 
tive sciences are concerned with the formulation of the law's 
and principles that govern the facts of our experience in a 
causal order or sequence. 

The chief aim of science is to render an accurate and com- 
plete account of our experience from the point of view of their 
eternal connections in a time and space order of things. This 
sort of a formulation of our experience leaves out of account 
man's will and purpose. The deeper cravings of the human 
soul are not touched or disturbed by correlating thus our ex- 
periences for the purpose of explanation. Indeed such an ex- 
planation in terms of cau.sal relationship is in itself a direct 
outgrowth of the deepest demands of our will and purpose. 
Yet there are those who do not see this point clearly and 
regard science as capable of offering a complete and accurate 
account of life as a whole. Our own conclusion with regard to 
this matter, however, was very different. Professor Miinster- 
berg says: "It is one of the greatest dangers of our time that 
the naturalistic point of view wliich decomposes the world 
into elements for the purpose of causal connection, interferes 
with the volitional point of view of the real life, which can 
deal only with values and not with elements." Professor Hornc 
says: "We need to-day a popular philosophy that shows j] 

Retrospect and Prospect 


the mechanism of science is itself a product of the free inquir- 
ing spirit of man. To me it is a sad spectacle to see keenly 
intelligent men throwing themselves as a mass of mere matter 
before the Juggernaut of scientific necessity which they them- 
selves have constructed." {Phil, of Edu., p. XII.) 

We regarded it the business of philosophy to give a state- 
ment of the final meaning and reality of life and the deepest 
cravings of the human soul. The scientific aspect of the world 
is necessary, indeed without it our world would fall back on 
the plane of savagery. But we must be careful that we do 
not make the barbarous blunder of confusing aims and means, 
or causal connection and interpretation. The world of science 
is the world of connection, the world of causal relationship, 
and such a world is the result of the demands of our own 
will. The world viewed from the philosophical aspect does 
not thus disregard our will and its purposes. Indeed it con- 
siders that it is the will that is deserving of the chief place 
in our experience, and in terms of which the ultimate reality 
of the universe is explained. The explanation of the descrip- 
tive scientist, then, is not complete. The world stands as a 
mere connection in a time and space order, so long as we 
view it strictly from the scientific aspect. It is plain, then, 
that there are two aspects of our life. The one is that con- 
sidered by science, the other hy philosophy. A complete theory 
of life cannot afford to leave out of account either one of these 
aspects of our experience. Science considers man in relation 
to the order of time and space. Philosophy conceives man in 
his relation to the universe as a whole, which is not confined 
within the limits of time and space, but which, on the con- 
trary, includes time and space within its own being. 

From this view we deduce easily the conclusion that no 
complete and satisfactory account of our educational experience 
can be given from the point of view of the descriptive sciences 
alone. We need this knowledge and understanding of the 
connections of the world's phenomena, but we need also some- 
thing more than it is possible for the scientist to give, that is, 
we need purposes, ideals, and values. We need appreciation as 
well as description. We need to be able to interpret our ex- 
perience in the light of its relation to the whole of which each 
experience is but a fragment. The world of philosophy is the 

196 The Philosophical Basis of Education I 

I world of interpretation and appreciation, the world of science 

is that of description and of explanation. From the point of 
view of life as a whole, philosophy is concerned with the aims, 
purposes, and values of our experience, while science is in- 
terested in this experience in its causal connection. Philosophy 
thus gives us the meaning and value of life, while the descrip- 
tive sciences provide us with the means and the methods for 1 
the realization of these ideal values and purposes. 

2 The Scientific and Philosophical Aspects of Edu- 
cational Theory. At this point in our inquiry we paused j 
to regard education as a limited portion of our experience, | 
and consequently falling within the bounds of the universal 
experience. It was then necessary to regard the theory of edu- 
cation in the light of a larger theory of life. Education 
being only a part of life as a whole, the philosophy of educa- ■ 
tion is a part of the wider philosophy of life, and the same 
can be said with respect to education when viewed from the 
aspect of descriptive science. We are, therefore, to find the 
aims of education in the broader field of the aims of life. And 
science will be of service to us only in so far as it malces the 
realization of our purposes in life possible. The philosophical 1 
aspect of education, therefore, is found to be concerned with 
the aims and purpose of education, with the meaning and 
values of our educational experience. The scientific aspect 
of education concerns itself with the means and methods by 
which we realize our ideal values in life. 


3 The Special Philosophical Aspects of Educa- 
tional Theory. Then we considered the special disciplines ' 
of philosophy, one by one, showang their relations to educa- 
tional theory. Philosophy was considered in a general way, , 
as providing the aims, purposes, and values of life until we , 
reached Part IV. There we began to divide the field into ; 
the several divisions of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, re- ■ 
ligion, esthetics, and ethics. We found that metaphysics con- I 
cerns itself with the reality and being of all experience, and | 
that each fragment of our experience raises questions of ulti- 
mate realit>'. We therefore found it impossible to sever edu- I 
cation from Its metaphysical and epistemological bases without 1 


Retrospect and Prospect 197 

destroying the raenning of educational experience altogether. 
We considered educational experience in the light of epistemo- 
logical reflection and concluded that all reality must be know- 
able, otherwise it would be meaningless to us. Thus we as- 
serted the metaphysical and the epistemological bases of edu- 
cational experience. 

+ Ethics and the Educational Ideal. We concerned 
ourselves with the normative science of logic, philosophy of re- 
ligion, iesthetics, and ethics. We found that logic concerns 
itself with the ideals and values of truth; that religion has 
certain values of ultimate truth and reality of its own; that 
esthetics concerns itself with the ideals of beauty; and that 
ethics concerns itself with ideals of goodness. Now that we 
are about to complete the survey of the relations of education 
to the special branches of philosophy, or the normative sciences, 
we must state that the ideal of ethics, since it must fall within 
the larger ideal of life or experience as a whole, must not 
neglect the truths and values already brought to light and 
shown to form a necessary part of the ultimate nature of 
the universe. 

Education, then, must realize the ideal values of truth, 
beauty, goodness, and religion. This is the aim of life as a 
whole, and it is the business of education to prepare for life as 
a whole. There can be no higher aim of education than that 
of striving to realize these eternal values. They are not to be 
conceived of as separate and isolated realms of value, but 
must be considered in their organic unity. There are two 
ways of expressing this organic unity, accordingly as they take 
the point of view of the individual, or of society as a collection 
of individuals. In the former case we regard the life of self- 
realization as the highest expression of this organic unity of 
the eternal values of life. When we view their unity from 
the side of society, progress or social welfare comes to b( 
garded as the highest ideal of life. We have already 
that in our judgment self-realization is the proper 
of the interrelation and organic unity of these ideals, 

ady stated ^^^S 
expression ^^^H 
or ^^^H 


Educational Implication of the Ethics op 
voluntaristic idealism 




Pre-Socratic Philosophy. In order to get properly 

before our minds the place of ethics in life and in educati 
let us make a brief survey of the history of ethics. The 
philosophy preceding Socrates gave little or no attention to 
the ethical aspects of life. The chief concern of the philosophy 
of the pre-Socratic period was the origin and nature of the 
universe. The speculations of this period were cosmological 
rather than ethical. The interest was in the universe rather 
than in man. The attempt was to find some first principle to 
which all things else could be reduced. It is natural that 
under such conditions no great advance should be made in the 
field of ethics. The search was not for an ethical principle 
of the highest good, hut rather for a first principle of all real- 
ity. The interest was metaphysical rather than ethical. It 
is not intended that this period be regarded as having no value 
for ethics, and yet it is to be understood that the chief interest 
of man centered in the world about him rather than in his 
own life. Instead of asking such questions as What is the high- 
est good? and What should man strive to realize as his chief 
aim in life? the questions related to the nature and origin of 
r the world about him. 

2 PosT-SocRATic PHILOSOPHY. With Sociates, however, 
the scene changes. The interest drifted from the universe to 
man. The change in point of view brought about by Socrates' 
ethical Inquiries closely resembled that brought about by Coper- 
nicus in astronomy. According to Ptolemy the earth was the 
center of the universe and all the other heavenly bodies re- 
volved about this as a center. But according to Copernicus 
Sim is the center of the universe, and about it all heavenly 
bodies rotate. According to the pre-Socratic philosophy the 

202 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

central problems of the universe lay in the search for the first 
principle of all existence. With the coming of Socrates, how- 
ever, the chief problem of philosophy lay in the search for the 
highest good, and this highest good was to be found in some 
aspect of man's own nature. Tbe problem came to concern 
itself more vitally with man and less so with the universe of 
the material order. 

What has been said of Socrates was also true of the other 
great systematic philosophers of the Periclean age, Plato and 
Aristotle, It was only in deference to tlie popular notion of 
things that Plato even condescended to give any consideration 
whatsoever to the material universe. In his Dialogues he gives 
but one discourse on the nature of the universe, in the Tim- 
maus. With Aristotle the chief interest was also in man. I 
believe that it is true to-day that we are more vitally concerned 
with man than with the universe about man, or perhaps I 
should say we are now seeking the first and vital principle of 
all existence in the nature of man himself, rather than in the 
physical universe, in the sequential order of time and space. 

3 The Meaning and Value of Experience. What 

has been said above simply brings out more clearly that since 
the time of Socrates the philosopher has been engaged primar- 
ily in the attempt to define the meaning and value of all of our 
human experience. His speculations are concerning the facts 
of our experience. This he uses as his starting point instead | 
of looking for the origin of the universe. Indeed he has come 
often to the conclusion that the real order and nature of the 
universe is something not independent of man, but rather to 
be found in man's own inner nature. Idealism finds this 
first principle of all existence in the purpose of man himself. 
The ultimate realitj' of the universe is purpose or will. The 
physical speculations of the pre-Socratic philosophy did not 
come to the position where they could see such a principle as 
the essence of all reality. The idealist regards man not as 
something extraneous and accidental in the world of reality, 
but rather he regards the will and purpose of man as an or- 
ganic part of the great will and personality of the universe, 
the absolute. Man's highest obligation to himself and to the 
universe thus consists in the striving to realize the innermost 

Ethics as the Search for the Highest Good 203 

meaning of this will. 

Unlike the pre-Socratic philosopher, the idealist starts with 
the facts and laws of our own experience, and passes beyond 
these by a process of logical inference to their ultimate mean- 
ing and significance, in their relation to the universe as parts 
to the whole. The idealist finds every fragment of our experi- 
ence to have meaning and value, contrary to the popular no- 
tion of^ .'dealism which seems to regard it as an absolute de- 
nial :)f: the reality of all experience. The idealist begins 
with the fragmentary world of experience in which he lives. 
He begins with facts but he does not end with facts alone, nor 
is he satisfied with the world of mere connection, a world of 
law. He passes beyond facts and laws to their ultimate signifi- 
cance, or meaning and value. The meaning and value of our 
fragmentary experience are not to be revealed simply by as- 
serting their external connections as phenomena in a causal 
system. On the contrary, the reaiity of each fragment of our 
experience is to be determined by its integral and organic rela- 
tion to the whole. Each part suggests the whole, and it is by 
exercising our rational and reflective powers that we are able 
to see the meaning of the whole in each part of this experience, 

4 Facts and Purposes in Life. The reality of the uni- 
verse is, then, according to modern idealism, to he found in 
experience itself and not beyond experience in an eternal world 
that is separated entirely from this present mundane world of 
ours, as Plato would say, Man's highest duty, therefore, does 
not consist in the contemplation of such a super-mundane 
reality as that of the Platonic idea of the good. On the con- 
trary, man finds the reality of the universe suggested in his 
own experience, fragmentary and temporal though it be. No 
one of these facts, or all of them in a causal order, such as is 
determined by descriptive sciences, will ever give us the real na- 
ture of the universe or the meaning of our experience. It is 
only through the process of rational reflection and logical in- 
ference that we pass from facts and laws to their meaning and 
significance for life as a whole. The great problem of philos- 
ophy, then, according to idealism, is that of finding the whole 
tin each part, or in other words, finding the relation that neces- 
sarily obtains between facts and the meaning of life as a whole. 




204. The Philosophical Basis of Education 

Logically conceived the universe can have existence only when 
it is self-contained and self-maintained. We cannot think of 
existence without conceiving of organic unity. That is self- 
sufficient and beyond which no other is needed for its comple- 
tion. Our (acts in this world of experience gain significance 
and meaning only by reference to this universal whole, or or- 
ganic unity of all experience. 

Ethically considered the chief problem of the world''' wn sis ts 
in regarding each act of our experience as the part of thfV'^ger 
reality of the universe, Man is to regard his life not as a 
series of facts, or even as a cau'^iUy related svstem of facts, but 
rather he is to consider each fact m the light of the nhole. It 
is only in this way that each act or deed of man comes to have 
any abiding significance or me^nmg for ultimate reality. A 
deeper inquiry into the real nature of man re\eals his mnermost 
reality as definable in terms of purpose and ideals Man lives 
not by bread alone, but b\ ideils also There are certain 
cravings of the will that cin be sitisfied onh by the attachment 
of each fragment or deed to a hrger svstem of purposive real- 
ity. Philgsnpliy.h^, then, come tg be 3. search foi the r neanin g 
and value of human experience. Ethics la a search ItULjhf 
highest good in life. It_i_s not detached from the brgader_JD- 
auirjes of philosophy, as we have seen already, but rather . its 
l^ts. aie ddined by the meaning and reality. o£ life. 

5 The Descriptive and Normative Aspects, It ought 
to be clear by this time that ethics views men not as mere phe- 
nomena, connected in a sequential order, but rather regards 
them as purposive and willing beings. The attitude of the de- 
scriptive sciences never can displace the deeper attitude taken 
by the moral philosopher. From the descriptive point of view, 
as well as the historical, man's acts are simply recorded and 
their connection pointed out as law. Ethics, on the contrary, 
views man as a purposive and willing being, expressing his in- 
ner nature and reality in the deed. There is need of both at- 
titudes in the life of man. They are probably equally impor- 
tant points of view. The philosopher can no more disregard 
the results of the descriptive sciences than the descriptive scien- 
tist can afford to neglect the fact of experience. Indeed the 
philosopher, as wc have seen, begins where the scientist ' 


■ off. 

Ethics as the Search for the Highest Good 205 

Science and philosophy ought to be of mutual help in their ' 
mquiries concerning the life of man, but these points of view ' 
must not be confused. Ethjcs. is. always concerned with, the 
pur£qse_and value- o£-life, while the descriptive sciences never 
Taise questions, as to .meaning, purpose, or value. 
"We shall see later that much confusion has come about Jn 
life, and more particularly in education, because of our failure 
to keep dearly in mind the distinction between the normative 
and descriptive aspects of life. The normative view of life 
is concerned with our ideals and purposes, with our will atti- 
tudes, our deeper meanings. The descriptive sciences are con- 
cerned with the facts of our experience and their external 
connections. Ethics provides us with the aims and purposes of 
life, the descriptive sciences with the means and methods at 
our disposal for realizing these aims and values. 

6 The Ideal Values of Life. We have asserted already 
)f our special inquiries into the various philosophical 
I discipline, that these ideal values of life are truth, beauty, good- 
, and religion. These are counted absolute values for no 
T reason than that they represent the most complete satis- 
I faction of human life, and the innermost craving of our will. 
V We found that in order to ascertain the true value and the 
I deeper meaning of life, it was necessary to divide our inquiry 
[ into the fields of logic, Ksthetics, ethics, and religion. Through 
■ separate inquiries we have arrived at the four sets of 
I values thus defined. These are called ideal values for the 
I reason that they satisfy not only the individual's will and pur- 
l-poses, but they satisfy the deeper interests and cravings of life. 
I There is nothing narrowly individualistic about such values 
T as truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. These are not my 
alone, neither are they yours alone. They are both 
ind yours, they belong to the universe. They represent 
L the innermost nature of the universe. I do not mean to sug- 
t.gest that there are not other values more strictly individualistic 
I than these from a narrower point of view, but I do mean to 
: that it is not the only purpose of ethics to determine 
t the narrower values. These ideal values, as we shall call them, 
(are good not because they satisfy my own will alone, but bc- 
; they satisfy all wills when their real natures are deter- 



206 The Philosophical Basis of Education 


If my own purposes and will in life thwarts yours, then there 
is something wrong somewhere. Either I am going beyond my 
limits or you arc going beyond yours. Thefe is no way of tell- 
ing whose view is right except from the larger point of view 
of the universal whole, in other words, the conception of the 
organic unity and relation of our acts not only to each other 
but to the whole of which they are a part. Every satisfaction 
of the human will or purpose is a good, but not necessarily the 
highest good. The good that tends to realize my purpose in 
life while interfering with yours may be said to be good for 
me but not good for you from the commonsense point of view. 
But we have seen already that common sense does not make any 
distingushed record for clear thinlcing. And so this judgment 
of common sense now before us needs consideration. Is it 
true that a thing may be good for you and not good for me? 
Yes, in a certain sense this is true, for as we have noted any 
satisfaction of my will, or anything that promotes the realiza- 
tion of my purpose in life, is a good. But we have also re- 
stored this statement to its proper balance by asserting that a 
purely individual good is not the highest good. Professor R. B, 
Perry well says that "If your action fulfills your interest and 
thwarts mine, it is again mixed, both good and bad. In order 
to define the good act in the premises it is necessary, as in the 
previous case, to define a purpose which shall embrace both in- 
terests and regulate action with a view to their joint fulfill- 
ment." {The Moral Economy, p. 267.) Indeed it is really 
a myth and not in the deepest sense our good at all. 

When we gain a clear conception of the organic unity of life 
we cease to regard that thing which we call a purely individual 
good in any real sense at all. Individual good, then, in any 
narrow sense must be ruled out of account. There are goods 
of such a character that they are good for everybody. There 
are values which are not strictly personal, neither mine nor 
yours, but both mine and yours. The wider the circle of in- 
dividuals included in such a consideration of values, the greater 
the value of the good concerned. We have posited the ideal 
values of truth, beauty, goodness, and religion, as those over- 
idual or super- personal values which belong to the uni- 
verse as a whole, and by virtue of their relation to this ulti- 


Ethics as the Search {or the Highest Good 207 

mate realit}', this organic unity of life, they belong to me and 
to you, for we are essential attributes of the universal whole of 
reality by virtue of the fact that we possess a will. A man 
cannot be narrowly individualistic so long as he is serving these 
ideal values of life. There is a little danger that he wiU be 
denounced by his friends as egoistic. These values arc indi- 
vidual, to be sure, but 1 would call them over-individual, or 
super-personal because they represent not a set of values for 
any one individual, but systems of values that are worthy of 
all individuals, without regard to the individual, or the race. 
Real values know no distinction whatsoever between persons. 
This thought of the universal validity of these ideal values 
must not be lost sight of, for it will occupy the central por- 
tion of the remainder of this volume. Indeed it has been re- 
garded up to the present as the central thought of the book. 
The matter will not be different when we come to consider 
in greater detail the aims and values of our educational experi- 

The Good as Will or Purpose. We have defined 
the highest good in life in terms of purpose or will. The hi^- 
est good is not expressed in terms of our own individual will, 
but rather in the over-individual will which gives meaning and 
value to our own personal wills. The universal will we have 
called the absolute, and it represents the organic unity of all 
individual wills. The highest good, then, can be expressed 
in no terms that fail to regard the absolute will. The satis- 
faction of my own personal will is good and desirable only in 
so far as this will is in harmony with the universal will of the 
absolute. Protagoras was wrong, then, when he said that each 
man is the measure of his own opinion and of his own value. 
Man's value is to be determined rather by his relation to the 
whole, to the absolute. It is only when my purpose and will 
are harmonized with the deeper purpose or meaning of the 
universe that I can be said to be morally good. The highest 
obligation enjoined upon me by universalistic ethics is that 
of seeking and striving to conform to the universal will. But 
in so doing I am not simply bowing to the authority of an 
individual or mechanical law, and there is no particular good 
to be derived from such conformity to external law, as the 


2o8 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

Stoics would have us believe. On the contrary, my own deepest 
will and purpose can be seen only when it is viewed in the 
light of the universal whole, or the absolute experience. In 
this search to conform our own will to the will of the universe, 
1 am simply striving to ascertain my own inner meaning and 
purpose, the essence of my own will, which is to be found only 
in its relation to the whole, or absolute will. Man's moral 
task does not consist in blind conformance with some authority 
or law with which he has no personal concern. On the con- 
trary, man realizes and satisfies the deepest and most abiding 
cravings of his life in this search for the connections between 
his own will and the will of the absolute, in other words, man 
is his truest self only when he attempts to view the meaning 
of his fragmentary experience, as an expression of his will, in 
its relation to the universal experience of the absolute. 

Man has both temporal and eternal aspects of his nature. 
His acts and his deeds are discharged in a world of time and 
space, a world of causal relationship, of external connection. 
Again he lives in a world of purposes, ideals, meaning and 
eternal reality, in other words in a world which is not limited 
by time and space, A universal experience, or what Royce 
calls a conspectus of all experience, such as the absolute experi- 
ence, knows no such boundaries as time and space. Time and 
space are included within the absolute experience, and do not 
include such experience. But with us Individuals whose ex- 
periences are limited the case is from one point of view dif- 
ferent. Viewed from the aspects of separate individuals, our 
experience is limited in time and space, but viewed from the 
aspect of our purposes and will, we are integral parts of the 
universal will and know no such limitations as those de6ncd 
by the time and space world of causal connection, 

Man Is not alone controlled by sequential causation. There 
is Ideal causational, or what Professor Palmer calls anti-sequen- 
tial causation, Man Is drawn toward his ideals from above, 
as well as operated like the material aspects of his nature by 
sequential causation from behind. Man thus has the power 
of self -direct ion, is free. That is, he can decide upon his own 
purposes in life, and what purpose he chooses is a matter of 
very vital concern, Man is obliged to select between the va- 
rious alternative possibilities of action. All possibilities do not 


r the Search for the Highest Good 


offer an equal opportunity for the realization of man's inner- 
most nature; therefore, all choices and all actions are not of 
equal value. Ethically viewed, man must choose the act which 
is conducive to the largest degree of self-realization. No^t self- 
realization from the narrower point of view, but such a self- 
realization as promotes the realization of the ideal values of 

The Individual and Social Aspects of This Aim. I 
I The highest aim of life when rightly conceived has been de- 
\ fined as self-realization. In this section we must restate what 
nt by self-realization, and consider some objections which 
t have been offered against it. We must also point out more 
y clearly the individual and the social aspect of this aim, for 
e to maite use of this same aim in education, and are to 
I assert it as the only satisfactory aim of education. By self- 
i realization is meant the development or realization of the inner 
r purposes of the individual. Self-realization is not possible un- 
\ less the individual expresses his deeper purpose and meaning 
" 5 act or deeds. Each individual's experience thus reveals, 
t when viewed in its relation to the whole, his own inner pur- 
I pose and meaning, and this defines for him what his life ought 
I to be, or what he should attempt to realize through his ex- 

It would be meaningless to assert that the individual's high- 
m is to realize something which is beyond himself and 
has no connection with his own real self, or his will. This 
I something for which he is striving and which he considers the 
highest good, must have some meaning for him and some defi- 
nite relation to his own will or purpose, otherwise there is no 
■motive for action. If the good to be realized is something en- 
r tirely apart from the individual, then the individual sees no 
t value in such good. In fact he sees the absurdity of regarding 
I it as a good at all. The good for which we are all striving 
L must have some relation to our own individual self, other- 
\ wise it is meaningless and valueless, and consequently is no good 
all. This is a very different thing from asserting that each 
I individual should be the measure of his own opinion, or the 

ultimate standard of his own conduct. In fact thorough-going . 
I reflection on the meaning of our experience, as this is perceived 

210 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

in its relarion to the whole, shows very clearly that the uni- 
versal good for which we are striving is actually realized in 
part in our own acts. But this good is realized by each individ- 
ual in his own way. The good then can never be regarded as 
something extra-personal, but rather over-personal. That is to 
say, a person is not to regard as good something which has no 
connection with his own life, and the meaning of his own ex- 
perience, but rather that which he regards as the highest good 
must be the most complete satisfaction of his own deepest will 
demands. And such a will demands a good that is not alone 
personal. Indeed the universality of such a good makes its 
personal value all the greater. That which is good for mc 
alone is not very good. But that which is good for me and 
for everybody else is of much greater good, it is a universal 
good, and being universal it has greater value for each individ- 
ual and greater meaning in total system of reality. 

When we regard will or purpose as the chief good in life 
there arc two aspects from which we may view this ideal. 
We may consider it from the point of view of a strictly indi- 
vidual will or from the point of view of the whole system or 
organic unity of wills. We have already noticed the insuffi- 
ciency of the former narrow individualistic point of view. 
When we speak of the highest will or purpose being attainable 
through self-realization, we are not to he understood as refer- 
ring to self-realization in any narrow sense, for we have as- 
serted already that self-realization as the expression of our 
deepest will, is possible only through loyal adherence to the 
ideal values of life. Such a view of self-realization cannot be 
regarded as egoistic. It has often been denounced as such, how- 
ever, but only by those who do not understand the self-realiza- 
tion theory. A closer analysis of this concept of self-realization 
as the highest expression of the good will reveals not only its 
individualistic or personal attributes, but its universal signifi- 
cance as well. The system of purposes and ideal values to 
which I am to devote my life are not to be regarded as my 
own values merely, but values which while they satisfy my 
own deepest will demands are also worthy to be posited as the 
chief value of all life. We are further to be reminded that 
self-realization is possible only through the realization of these 
ideal values, truth, beauty, goodness and reb'gion. Self-realiza- 

I Ethics as the Starch for the Highest Goad 2ii 

tion is not a fifth set of values, but rather it is a systematic 
unity and organization of all values. It is the expression of 
the life that is loyally devoted to the ideal values. Some have 
argued that instead of laying the stress on the individual, we 
should place it on society. Instead, therefore, of making self- 
realization the aim we should regard social welfare, or social 
progress the chief aim of life. The reason 1 personally believe 
that social welfare does not properly express the highest ideal 
of life is because it removes from the individual the ideal of 
self- responsibility to too large a degree. In a world of will and 
purpose, things are not to be taken lightly, but as expressions 
of attitude. The individual must order, govern and control 
his own experience by reference to an ideal which lies directly 
in his own pathway, but which ideal can be seen from the 
points of view of other men also. Self-realization through the 
appropriation of the ideal values of life makes definite and 
specific the end to be attained, and if such an end is attained 
you have no occasion to fear that society will degenerate. So- 
cial progress is conditioned by the degree to which each indi- 
vidual realizes his larger and better self. We cannot raise 
the level or standard of society except in so far as we raise the 
standards of individuals. Society cannot be lifted to a higher 
elevation as a unit, nor by the personality or force of any 
great social leader. Society may use such devices and person- 
alities in the direction of a larger self-realization on the part 
of each individual but to lift society as a whole without regard 
to the individual unit is an impossibility. On the other hand, 
if the individual unit succeeds in a higher degree of self-realiza- 
tion, society must improve as a necessary consequence, and so- 
cial welfare would be assured, I regard, therefore, social 
welfare as a necessary consequence of self-realization and not 
as a necessary condition thereto. There is mutual interdepend- 
ence between social welfare or human progress and individual 
self-realization but the fundamental prerequisite of all prog- 
ress is that of individual advancement, and individuals advance 
in proportion to the degree that they realize their own inner 
being and reality through the service of ideal values of life, 
which ideal values are not alone individual, but social in as 
much as they have universal application. 

212 The Philosophical Basis of Education ^| 

9 Self-Realizatiov as the Ultimate Goal. Self-real- 
ization is thus regarded not only as the chief aim, or summum 
bonum, or highest good of life, but it is to be regarded 
as the chief motive of all human conduct. The motive that 
expresses the innermost nature and harmony of man's will is 
that idea which compels him in the direction of his highest sclf- 
rcalization through obedient service, not to any mythical so- 
ciety, bul to the actual and ideal values of life in the indi- 
vidual which are the completion of his fragmentary experience. 
Self-realization is not only an ideal toward which we strive 
but it is the chief motive that prompts our actions in our most 
moral and religious moments. 

Instead of defining the highest good of life as that of pleas- 
ure, duty, virtue, happiness or social welfare, we have defined 
it as the most complete self-realization of the individual, and 
have asserted that such self-realization is possible only through 
the service of the ideal values of life, which are the deepest 
expressions of our own inner purpose. With such self-realiza- 
tion, pleasure, happiness, duty and social welfare, all have their 
places. They come as natural consequences, however, rather 
than as antecedents in a truly purposive life. There is no 
pleasure conceivable that can equal that resulting from the 
harmonization of the purpose and will of an individual will with 
all other individual wills, and with the universal, or absolute 
will. Royce well says that "Happiness involves the satisfac- 
tion of desires. Your natural desires are countless and con- 
flicting. What satisfies one desire defeats another, until your 
desires are harmonized by means of some definite plan of life. 
Happiness is therefore a mere accident. Now it comes and 
now it flies, you know not why. And the mere plan to be 
happy is by itself no plan. You therefore cannot adopt the 
pursuit of happiness as your profession." (Philosophy of Loy- 
alty, p. 8i.) 

Such an organization of purposes is possible, it is real, and 
furthermore it is ethically enjoined upon us to govern our 
lives in accordance with such a plan. Man cannot realize his 
highest self unless he devotes himself to values and purposes 
which are not narrowly individual. Complete self-realization 
is possible only when we regard the self to be realized as 
part of a larger organization of purposes and wills. If i 

Ethics as the Search for the Highest Got 


own self-realization is such as to disregard your equally worthy 
riglits and purposes, then I have not succeeded in finding my 
own deeper purpose in life, and in just this degree I have 
fallen short of my own highest self-realization. The only way, 
then, that I can hope reasonably to reahze my own innermost 
will, my truest self, is by striving to realize ideal values in 
my experience which are not limited to my own narrow view 
of the world. Such narrowness is the result of failure on the 
part of the individual to see his relation to the universal whole 
of which he is a part. When we substitute the part for the 
whole, there is bound to be confusion and conflict of purposes, 
but when I honestly and purposively strive to realize the ideals 
of universal value my aim cannot be said to be individualistic 
in any narrow sense. The trouble with the individualistic 
moralists is due to the fact that they fail to regard the individ- 
ual in his universal connection with the world of will and pur- 
pose. There is no objection to individualism provided it is 
universalized. However paradoxical this view may seem, it 
is the view that I believe must be regarded as the most satis- 
factory view of the meaning and value of life. The chief 
good must be both universal and individual. But in as much 
1 is only a part of the whole, his movement must be in 
rection leading from the part to the whole. The stress 
I must be laid on the individual rather than on society. My 
> plan of life ceases to be narrow and egoistic when I take into 
' account my relations to my fellow man and to the universe on 
which my own individuality depends. 

Thus exhibited, self-realization is the only worthy ideal and 
L motive of life. If this be the case, the ideal of education must 
[ conform to this larger aim of life. We shall consider this 
f matter in its relation to education more fully in the following 
[ chapters of this volume. In this view we believe we agree with 
I Professor Wright when he says: "Self-realization has now 
I to be exhibited as the only adequate motive of good conduct, 
[ including the three just mentioned and raising each to a higher 
I plane of meaning and efficiency. Self-realization does not com- 
\ bine simply in an external fashion the egoistic, altruistic, and 
1 religious motives. It unites them organically, making each a 
L function of the central activity of volition and causing each to. 
[ express within a certain department of human life the charac- 


214 ^^^ Pkilosofihicnt Basts of Education 

tcristic and insistent demand of volition for a compJctely oi^ 
ganized life." {Self-Realteation. p. 278.} 

10 The Reality of the Ideal, The ideal of sclf-r 
zation is not a mere myth, but is the unity and organization 
of the ideal values of life, expressed in a personality c 
dividual. The purpose of the individual is determined by t 
degree to which he has realized the ideal values in his experi-J 
ence, and through these has perceived his relation to the 
versal experience, or absolute will. This ideal of self-realizaJ 
tion, then, has metaphysical reality, in as much as it is realityj 
itself from the point of view of the individual. From the poinB 
of view of the absolute, each individual is to be regarded as ft) 
part of the universal whole, from the point of view of the 
individual, each person realizes himself in just that proportion! 
that he accepts his highest obligation as that of perceiving hij! 
relations to the universe through the recognition of the idealj 
values of his own experience. The ideal of self-realizationi 
thus being real as well as ideal, is deserving of our loyalty an» 
the support of our deepest will. "By nature and apart fron* 
some cause to which we are loyal, each of us is but ■ 
of caprice; a chaos of distracting passions, a longing for hapJ 
piness that never attains its goal." (Royce, WilJiam Jai 
etc., p. 56.} 

11 The Concept of Loyalty. According to our viev 
loyalty, no person can be loyal to that which does not cxpren 
his own inner purpose, which does not satisfy the inner mean^ 
ing of his will. Self-realization, being both ideal and real" 
being both over-individual and of the very nature of beinj 
itself, and further being the expression of our deepest indivu] 
ual will, is deserving of our most deep-seated loyalty and at 
votion. Indeed our pursuit of self-realization through servio 
to the values of life partakes of the spirit of religion. Mai 
cannot be loyal to that which does not pertain to his own rui 
ture. A thing that is purely external to me cannot elicit to^ 
highest loyalty. I can be loyal to the true spirit of loyalty onW 
when I am loyal to that ideal which is not alone individual, bi^ 
has the universal in and round about it. My every act muJ 
show ray loyalty to the cause which I have voluntarily chosec 

Ethin as the Search for the Highest Good 215 i 

If my ideal is self-realization, then I am betraying my cause 
if I fail to organize my actions in such a way as to make ray 
highest self-realization possible, and we have already noted 
that my highest self-realization consists not in ideals that are 
narrowly personal, but rather in ideals that are both individual 
and universal. Once we get a deep spirit of loyalty we seek to 
realize our cause in our every act. Indeed each act is a re- 
flection of the unity and purpose of our lives. We cannot be 
loyal to a cause and at the same time live a disorganized life. 
Our life must be a unit and a part of the larger organic 
reality of the world. It is only when I regard each act as a 
part of the totality of the universe that I regard these acts as 
significant. And it is only when I regard them as having this 
significance that I act from a deep seated loyalty and purpose. 
If I am to realize my highest self I must not only choose as 
my ideals the highest good, which possesses reality, and which 
can be known, but I must loyally devote myself to this cause. 
If I fail to organize and adjust my several actions with refer- 
ence to this ultimate aim m life I have betrayed my deepest 
nature and am immoral. But if I devote myself loyally to the 
realization of this highest ideal, which has value not only for 
me, but for the great universe of which I am but a small 
tliough important part, then my devotion characterizes my life 
truly moral and religious. It is this spirit of loyalty which 
the real test of the degree of effectiveness that my ideal of 
life has for me. It is the index of the pulling power of this 
ideal. It opens the secret of my inner nature. It shows 
what I really am. It portrays my real character, my reality or 
being. I 

Summary. In summarizing the contents of this chap- 
ter it is necessary for us to be reminded that ethics represents 
man's search for the highest good in life, that such inquiries 
are the results of man's own interests in life, and it is signifi- 
cant that in the history of philosophy we discover that man's 
chief interest has been in man from the beginning of the 
Socratic period to the present. All ethical theories since this 
period, have regarded man's highest good as something related 

I to himself and in this respect I believe that all these theories J 
are right. I believe, however, that some of these theories have T 





The Philoiophical Basis of Education 

failed to give an accurate formulation of a highest good. The 
hedonists have placed pleasure as the highest good, something 
which is really outside what a deeper view of man regards as 
his true nature. When man succeeds in finding the reality of 
his being, he will no doubt find that pleasure is one of the 
essential attributes of the same, but he will certainly find that 
pleasure alone does not express man's deepest worth and reality. 
This worth is to be found in man as a willing being, as 
a being expressing attitudes and purposes. The fulfillment of 
all desires and purposes is not necessary nor is it desirable. It 
IS essential, however, that we fulfill the deepest demands of 
our will and this is possible only when we have harmonized 
our own will with the will of the universe of which we are 
a part. This ideal toward which every will tends to express 
itself is best defined in terms of self-realization, which ideal is 
not to be regarded in any narrow way, hut which expresses 
the universality of our being in its relations to the whole. It 
is this ideal of self-realization which is the highest expression 
of our will. It is the ultimate goal of all human striving and 
is in keeping with the inner nature and purpose of the universe 
as a whole. It also represents not only the chief good, but the 
highest motive of human conduct. Being an ideal of such 
universal worth and further, since it represents the highest 
demands of our human will, self-reali?;ation is to be regarded 
as that ideal or purpose which deserves our highest loyalty, 
and our moral worth and being are to be determined by the de- 
gree to which we are loyal to this highest expression of our will. 



1 The Aim of Life and the Aim of Education. If • 
the aim of life is to be regarded as self-realization, then the ' 
highest aim and motive of education is also that of self-realiza- 
tion. However we define the aim of education, we irnist re- 
member that it is essential to distinguish clearly between the 
aims and the means of education. Ethics has to do with the 
aim of life, and since education is a part of life it must define 
the aims of education also. The highest aim of life has already 
been defined as self-realization. None of this work will need 
to be done over in order to define the highest aim of educa- 
tion. Education is to be regarded as nothing more or less than 
an institution set apart by society for the realization of the 
highest aims and values of life. Therefore we regard not only 
self-realization as the highest aim and chief motive of conduct 
in life as a whole, hut also, from the point of voluntaristic 
idealism, as the chief end and motive of education. 

It would be very inconsistent on the part of an educator to 
make the aim of life and that of education such as mutually 
to conflict. It might be contended that since life is broader 
in its significance than education, that the aim of life should 
be broader than the aim of education. Professor Coe sa}^: 
"The end of true education Js seen to fall within, not outside of 
ethics." {Education in Morals and Religion, p. 17.) Educa- 
tion is simply the process carried on by the school which has 
been set aside as a social institution for the realization of the 
higher values and purposes of life. Education can, therefore, 
be of no greater service to man than to help immature persons 
to realize their own deeper purposes. Education is, there- 
fore, not to be regarded as an isolated process, but rather it 
is the fundamental process through which the realization of 
the most complete self -development is made possible. 

3l8 The Phihi^pkkal Batis of EJmeatimm 

2 Thb Conflict in Mooexv Pbxwogv. Tbcre k pnb* 
ably no field in which a greater amount of AsDow lilc 

hu been perpetrated upon the reading pubGc than io dut of 
ujucation. unless it be in the cheap no^-el daas vi litcntf m e. 
7*hc whole educational issue has been so befogged for so aaiif 
gencrationi that it seems that clear tfainkiog in thk field ■ 
next fi an impossibility. Bowne sai-s: "Until principles »re 
tettled there in no bar to the most fantastic theories and intcr- 
pretaiinns." (Inlrndaclian Io Psjch, Thevrj, Preface.) 
Miimtcrbcrg lays: "It is evident that there must be dispute 
about the means as long as it is not settled what the ends ou^t 
to be, or rather as long as we ignore the question of aims as 
an independent question having the ri^t of precedence," 
{Piiich. and Teacher, p. 19.) "Briefly, only psychology and 
ethics can tate education out of its purely empirical and nilc- 
of-thiimb stagp." (McLcllan and Dewev, Piy. of Number. 

If there is any one field in which investigators seem to be 
completely submerged in facts and principles, it certain]}- is 
in the field of education. If there is any one field of experi- 
ence where the real issaes involved are less clearly defined than 
in another it must be in education. If there is any field in 
which facts and laws are not clearly distinguished from pur- 
pimcd and ideals, again I say it must be in education. I do 
not mean to portray the situation as hopeless. I am not at. 
all pessimistic. It is quite consistent with my own view of: 
life to believe that a man can be critical and at the same time 
apprccifitc the good in the thing that he is criticizing. I have 
no panacea to offer, no patent remedies for sale. Indeed I do 
not know of any short cut in the matter. As far as I can see 
there ia only one way to relieve the present situation, whidi 
arises principally out of the confusion of aims and means in 
education. Xl'^-^s!'* '!= '^ '"'!JL-1"''^- ^^ '^^^^ ^"" engaged 
long enough In mere experience without attempting to dis- 
cover the meaning and value of this experience. We have 
been long enough merely pulling up facts and laws. It is novf 
time that we cease to regard our past as completed, since wc 
have succeeded in discovering the many facts and laws of the 
universe. It ts time that we were making use of these lavra 
and principles in the service of our ideal purposes and v^ura 

jiims and Means in Education 219 

of life. 

The conflict in modern pedagogy is due principally to the 
failure to distinguish between aims and means, purposes and 
methods. Ends and purposes in life we have come to regard 
as absolute necessities of existence. This is not more true in 
education than in any other field of our experience. Ends we 
must have and if the right ends are not available we will 
select a wrong one. If the highest aim is not perceived, we 
arc apt to select a lower one, or indeed, as is generally the case 
in modern education, substitute a means for an end, 
have the wrong conception of life, we are in constant danger of 
substituting the part for the whole, or the means for the end. 
From the foregoing inquiry, it ought to be clear that ethics, or 
more troadly speaking philosophy, must provide us with the 
aims, purposes and values in life, and science must contribute 
the means, or possibilities of their realization. There is no 
hope for education unless we can clear up the distinction be- 
tiveen aims and means, or methods, unless we can perceive 
education from both the normative and the descriptive, from 
the ethical and the scientific aspects. We will work out 
these distinctions In education. We may be a long time at 
it, but we are certain to work them out, for this Js the condition 
upon which man's highest self-realization depends. 

There is a popular view to-day that the teacher is well 
equipped for her business when she knows the biological laws 
of health, growth, and development; the sociological laws, de- 
fining the principles upon which tbe social relationship depends; 
I and the psychological laws which govern mind action, but such 
H view represents the unhealthy state of mind of common 
gense, and its Immediate antecedent Is the lack of clear thinking, 
and the willingness to rest education on a basis of custom and 
tradition. Instead of reason. Very different does the matter 
become when viewed from the greater heights and clearer vision 
of a truer philosophy of life. According to the latter view, all 
education and e.fperlence is a meaningless striving unless there 
are purposes and ideals to be attained, and It Is only in such 
attainment that life possesses any value whatsoever. Prof. 
Santayana aptly remarks that "If you have no image of happi- 
ness or beauty or perfect goodness, how arc you to judge what 
portions of life are Important, and what rendering of them 


220 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

is appropriate?" {Winds of Doctrine, p. 183,) 

Furthermore, all ideals and values are not of equal impor- 
tance. Some arc narrow and conflicting, others are broad and 
universal and have a meaning for life as a whole. It is the 
latter type of ideal that must serve as the basis of all true 
education. All true education must have a goal, and this goal 
must conform to the deepest meaning and reality di life, "an3 
it must be remembered, as Bowne says, that "The deepest 
things cannot be argued out; they must be seen in life, and then 
they justify themselves." {The Essence of Religion, p. 181.) 
It must represent the highest good in our experience,_and 
this aim we have defined as self-realization, which is maJe 
possible through the realization of the ideal values of life. Clear, 
pure, deep, philosophical thinking is the only salvation for 
education, at the present time and for all time to come. The 
conflicts in modern educational theory and practice are due to 
a failure to regard education as a part of life as a whole, 
and to distinguish clearly between aims and purposes in life, 
and consequently in education. Progress ivill not be possible 
until such a condition of affairs is cleared up. We may imagine 
that we are progressing, and there is a certain element of prog- 
ress in all our aimless strivings, but such progress is too stow 
and uncertain. No question can be settled permanently which 
is not settled right, and no question can be settled right which 
is not viewed in its relation to the universal system of things. 
Our philosophy of education, then, must conform to the wider 
philosophy of life. And our ideal of education must conform 
to our ideal of the highest good, which in our view is that of 

3 Education as a Normative Science. We have sev- 
eral times spoken of the relation of the normative and descrip- 
tive sciences, showing that the former define our aims and pur- 
poses in life, while the latter provide us with the means for 
their realization. We have asserted, therefore, that the chief 
normative science, so far as determining our aim of education 
is concerned, is that of ethics. We must now lay stress on 
the fact that so far as method is concerned, psychology becomes 
fundamental in the preparation of a teacher for her practical 
work. The teacher must have a broader view of the universe 

Aims and Means m Education 

than that given by ethics and psychology, but it nevertheless 
remains true that these two sciences have most to do with the 
actual worth of the teacher, the one providing the aims and 
purposes, the other providing a means and method for their 
realization. There is an important truth contained in the 
following lines from the University of Denver catalog: "In 
as much as education is not an unmixed science, but has its 
foundation in other sciences, it requires an acquaintance with 
the history of human thought, with the principles of psychology, 
ethics and philosophy, to secure the best comprehension of the 
methods and results of modern pedagogy, and of the ultimate 
ends of education. It is advisable that some of these courses 
accompany the work in education." 

Contrary to the opinion of a great many popular views of 
education, psychology can never tell us what we ought to do, 
or what aims we ought to realize in education. This matter 
of what ought to be is a matter for ethics and the normative 
science generally, not for psychology. Miinslerberg says; 
"Ethics, not psychology, must decide the ends to which educa- 
tion has to lead the child, however often superficial educators 
may believe that in their field the selection of the end is a 
matter of course and needs no previous investigation." {Psych. 
and Teacher, p. 24.) 

Psychology can never give us the true aims and purposes 
of life. It cannot even be of value in providing means and 
methods for the teacher until after the aims have been decided 
upon. We can never expect to see the true place of psychology 
and the other descriptive sciences until we know what we want 
to accomplish and what we ought to accomplish in education. 
The first consideration of education, therefore, is with ethics 
and it is only through such an inquiry that our aims and pur- 
poses can ever be justified. It is unfortunate that teachers 
do not conceive clearly, this distinction between aims and 
means, for it inevitably results that when the proper aims of 
education are not perceived a means will be substituted for 
the end itself. We must not attempt to separate educational 
theory from ethical theory. We must push inquiries as to the 
aims and values in education farther and farther out into the 
realm of ethics. Prof. Woodbridge says: "The most prac- 
tical and useful opportunity open to the special student of 


222 Thr Phittisofihical Basis of Education 

philosophy is doubtless in education." {Columbia Univenifs 

Quarterly, Vol. XIII.) It is only by regarding edui 

a part of the larger field of experience that we can ever s 

ceed in formulating clearly the real purposes which education 

is to realize. Education becomes valuable only in so far as it 

makes the realization of such ideals and values possible aod 


4 Education as a Descriptive Science. After we have 
once decided upon the aims and purposes of life and conse- 
quently of education, it is then time to try and find out how 
we are to use the results of the descriptive sciences. It will 
inevitably be true in education as in life generally, that we 
cannot make any use of the descriptive sciences until after we 
have decided what aims and what purposes we are to realize. 
Hut once we have gotten clearly in mind the ideal purposes for 
which education exists, we are then in a position to make use 
of our specialized knowledge contributed by the different de- 
scriptive sciences, — psychology, biology, sociology, and the rest. 
The sciences just mentioned are important contributors as means 
in education. They provide us with laws that enable us to 
understand the connections of our experience, — knowledge we 
cannot dispense with at any price, unless it be the price we 
would have to pay by giving up our ideals in the service of 
which these laws and principles have their only meaning and 

No amount of progress in psychology, sociology, or biology 
will ever be able to give us any knowledge of what we ought 
to do. It is not the business of the descriptive sciences to tell 
what man ought to do. It is rather the business of this de- 
partment of our thinking to show the connections that exist 
between the various facts or phenomena of life. It is only 
after ideals and purposes are decided upon that a knowledge of 
such connections can be made serviceable in the fields of edu- 
cation and life generally. What has just been said with re- 
gard to the field of education holds equally true in the fields 
of business, religion, social life, and all other special fields 
of experience. At no time and in no place will the facts of 
laws contributed by the descriptive sciences ever take the place 
of ideals and purposes of life. A mere description of what is, 

I Aims and Meant in Education 223 ^^H 

pw matter how accurate it may be, can never tell us what ^^^^ 
ought to be. No amount of science of mere description and ^^^H 
explanation can ever tell us what purposes we should seek to ^^^| 
realize in education. If we succeed in clearing up this con- ^^^| 
fusion between the normative and descriptive aspects of our ^^^^ 
educational theory and come to regard ethics as we ought, as ^^H 
giving us the aims and purposes of life, while the descriptive 
sciences give us the means, we will then, and not until then, 
succeed in banishing the confusion that obtains in present day 
popular pedagogy. Fortunately this distinction is coming to 
be more clearly perceived by our most prominent educators. 
Indeed throughout all the history of educational theory there 
have been some great thinkers who seem to have perceived this 
relation between aims and means quite clearly. In our com- 
mon practice, however, we do not distinguish clearly enough be- 
tween these two attitudes of our will. We have asserted al- 
ready that according to a broader philosophy science itself is 
merely an artificial construction, which has been developed as 
, a result of the logical demands of our own will and purposive 
attitude toward the world. 

Science must not, therefore, be regarded as the final court of 
appeal for educational problems. Rather we must look to 
ethics and general philosophy for the decision as to the real 
values and purposes for which we strive. We can, then, go 
to the descriptive scientists and ask them for all the informa- 
tion they possess as to the external connections of the facts of 
the universe. We can then call upon the psychologist for all 
the laws that he knows with regard to the way that the mind 
acts. We can ask the biologist, particularly the physiologist, 
for all the laws he possesses with regard to the health, growth, 
and development of our bodies. We can ask the sociologist to 
give us the little that he knows at the present time of the laws 
that govern the formation and the maintenance of the group 
relationship. But until we have first gone to the ethical philos- 
ophy in order to determine our purposes in life, or that for 
which we ought to strive, all this information that the descrip- 
tive scientist can give us will be of no value whatsoever, no 
tmore value than so much scrap iron in the dump heap. But 
die aspect is entirely changed when we see our educational 
experience from these two points of view, and then from the 

224 ^^^ Pliilosnphicril Basts of Education 

larger, more inclusive philosophical point of view. The nor- 
mative sciences must give us our aims. And once our aim is 
decided upon we can make use of all the laws that descriptiv 
science knows anything about and all that it ever will know 
anything about. 

5 Aims and Means of Education. The descriptive 
sciences can be employed as contributors to the means and 
methods of education, but only after the normative issues have 
been settled. We must not expect, therefore, that any amount 
of further development in the fields of science will ever suc- 
ceed in defining the aims of education. In the very nature 
of things, this is impossible, and the truth asserted here that 
ethics must provide the aims of life, while the descriptive 
sciences provide us with the means, is a universal truth, and is 
not conditioned by time and space, or personality. If we are 
successful in making this point clear between aims and means 
of education we will have accomplished something in the direc- 
tion of clearing up the conflict in modern pedagogy, about 
which we have spoken so many times, and which confusion it is 
the chief aim of this volume to clear up on the basis of the 
idealistic philosophy. "Means," says H. C. King, "seem often 
at war with ends, mechanism, with the ideals for which alone 
it exists. Only the ends are of absolute value, yet the means 
are indispensable to their attainment. The actual and neces- 
sary are not the ideal ; the is and the must cannot give us the 
ought; and yet only through the use of the actual and neces- 
sary can anything ideal be achieved. The question of the final 
harmony of the is and the must and the ought is for us all 
the question of questions. Its complete answer would be a 
final philosophy," {Rational Living, pp. 22-23.) 

... defined in terms of self- 

1 to which we have been 
On the contrary nothing 
decide this aim. It must 
■ sciences that without the 
attempt to realize such 

The aim of life and of educ 
realization is thus not a conclusit 
driven by the descriptive science. 
less than a philosophy of life can 
he said in justice to the descriptiv 
knowledge which they give us 01 

ideals and values would be vain and hopeless, or at best, very 
uncertain. Any one recognizes the "unreasonableness of adopt- 
ing an end and refusing to adopt the means indispensable to its 

ind Means in Education 


attainment." (Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 39.) "The 
method must be planned to accomplish certain definite ends 
ii the teaching is to be purposeful and effective," (G. H. 
■ Bestt, The Recitation, p. 29.) 

6 The Function of Supervision. In this connection 
we must state the real function of supervision. The superin- 
tendent, above all others, must see clearly the direction which 
education is to take. He must never confuse aims and means. 
He must always distinguish between facts and purposes, be- 
tween methods and the ideals to be realized. He must have 
a broad philosophical perspective, if he is to see things in their 
proper relation. If he does not have a clear view of the school 
as a whole and of the relative functions of means and ends he 
constantly will be confusing the two. He will mistake in- 
creased equipment, facts, and principles for real progress and 
development. If he does not have his eye constantly on the 
goal to be realized, and select his aims and method and equip- 
ment with this ideal constantly in mind, progress under his 
direction is bound to he uncertain and unstable. W. T. Harris 
says: "Finally, the first class superintendent is a sort of pilot 
for the whole system, and must watch the rocks and breakers, 
and winds and clouds, and look often from them to the eternal 
stars to ascertain the drift of his course." It is interesting 
to note that certain superintendents see the real meaning of 
supervision. Supt. John Kennedy says: "The function of 
supervision is one of the most interesting departments of Edu- 
cational philosophy," {Educational Review, Vol. I, p. 469.) He 
says further: "It is the function of supervision to breathe 
upon a school system the breath of life, to infuse into it a gener- 
ous purpose and to direct it toward beneficent ends. This 
pre-supposes educational ideals and an expert knowledge of the 
necessary machinery of the schools. It is not enough that a 
merely intelligent man equipped with empirical notions should 
assume the responsible duties of supervision. Intelligence and 
executive ability are forceful qualities everywhere but they 
alone do not equip the physician or the lawyer; neither do 
they equip the educator. To the necessary basis of 
sense must be superadded the science or philosophy of educa- 
Ition. The educator must be deeply and fruitfully read in the 


\ educa- ^^^H 
in the ^^^H 


The Philosophical Basis of Educatio 

literature and philosophy of his profession." [Ibid., i :467.) 
The following statement is so apt that I cannot refrain from 
quoting it. He says of the superintendent that "When he 
comes to the battle rojal with his subordinates and his official 
superiors, he needs to be fortified with principles that are as 
universal as nature and as eternal as truth itself." (i :467.) 

I do not mean to imply that the teacher herself is not in 
need of such distinction between aims and means. In fact 
we have repeatedly emphasized the necessity for the teacher's 
having in mind this distinction and of governing herself ac- 
cordingly. But it is particularly important that the superin- 
tendent be able to see the trend of things, or sec things in their 
universal relation. Without this broad view it is impossible 
for the superintendent to consider the different facts and prin- 
ciples, equipment, means and methods in their proper relation. 
All facts are of equal value, or perhaps it would be more ac- 
curate to say of no value at all, if we have no definite pur- 
pose or goal in mind. Suzzalo says: "At this point in our 
progress, we have no larger need than for a philosophy of teach- 
ing, which unifies our modern complexities from the view- 
point of the teacher, and raises to attention again, in new and 
accurate ways, the nature of the teaching personality and the 
teaching life." (Preface, Hyde, Teacher's Phil. p. XIl.) 

Above all others, then, it is necessary that the superintendent 
have clearly in mind the relative function of means and meth- 
ods. Any amount of understanding of the facts of our experi- 
ence together with all the scientific improvements that modern 
invention has made possible, without definite aims and means 
would not make it possible to realize lasting progress, for as 
we have seen, progress in last analysis, consists in the larger 
self-realization of each individual in society, and such realiza- 
tion is possible only through the consciously directed acts of 
the individual toward a goal of universal value. Just as it is 
necessary for individual progress that such a goal be kept con- 
stantly in mind, and all our means and methods selected with 
this aim in view, so, too, it is necessary that in order that the 
school make real progress and development, it must be under 
the direction of those who keep constantly in mind the ideal 
purposes for which the school exists. 

The superintendent is the chief pilot of the educational ship, 

md Met. 

n Education 


and tie it is who must steer the course and register the progress 
which education makes. WJieji. the jjjperimcadcot's iUDCUBO 
is regarded f^rom this highest point of view of philosophy, it 
becomes a rnatter of no little concern when we select those who 
are to determine the direction of our educational affairs. The 
superintendent must assume the obligation of steering the whole 
system of schools toward the ultimate goal of education and 
life, and the degree to which he is successful in realizing this 
ideal m.irlts the degree of value of the system as a whole. Nor 
should the superintendent forget that the school system itself, as 
a material organization, must be in a true sense an organic 
unity. Every part must fiioction in complete accord with all 
of the. other, parts. Under no other condition is real progress 
through the agency of the school system possible. If one part 
of the system is working at cross purposes with some other 
part, then there is lost energy and friction, resulting ultimately 
in the waste of human purpose and energy, the most real and 
valuable thing in all the universe. The schools of the future 
will regard functions of organization as of increasingly greater 
value. The real superintendent is the functional head of the 
school system, who keeps constantly in mind the ideal purposes 
itnd values and who, looking at the matter from the descriptive 
view of science, regards every ejement of the system as a func- 
tional and organic part of the whole. The value of a part 
must be determined by its functional relationship to tnis 
whole, which alone gives significance to the part. This is just | 
as true in the case of the material organism of the school sys- f 
tern as it is that each fragment of our human experience be as- | 
signed its value in proportion as it functions in the interest \ 
of the whole, as an organic unit of all of the parts. 

7 Summary. In summarizing the main points of this 
chapter it is only necessary to point out briefly that the aim 
of education, being a part of life, must conform to the aim of 
life as a whole. It is true, then, that "Every aim proposed by 
the educator which is not in harmony with the intrinsic aim 
of human nature itself, ever>' method or device employed by 
the teacher that is not in perfect accord with the mind's own 
working, not only wastes time and energy, but results in posi- 
tive and permanent harm, running counter to the true activi- 

The Phihsophiral I 

s of Education 

ties of the mind, it certainly distorts and may possibly destrojj 
them." (McLellan and Dewey, Psy, of Number, p. 4.) Th« 
conflict in modern pedagogy arises out of the fact that no clea^ 
distinction is kept in mind between the aims and purposes oi 
education. The only hope of reconciling this conflict is bp 
substituting clear thinking for the clouded view of common 
sense. Nothing short of a real philosophy of life will offer ^ 
satisfactory basis for educational theory and practice, ' 

The normative sciences, then, must be called upon in ordeB 
to determine the real aims and purposes of education. Th« 
descriptive sciences must contribute the laws and principles, or^ 
in other words, the means and methods at our disposal for th^ 
realization of these ideals of life. The school must functij 
as an organic unity in the realization of these eternal -valuf 
to the end that each individual may realize his big 
(ruest self; and in order that such progress may be c 
have placed upon the superintendent of schools, workinj 
through his subordinates, the burden of directing the schoc 
constantly toward its ideal aim. He must never lose ! 
of aims and purposes, nor must he confuse the ends w 
education is to realize and the means or methods by w 
they are realized. 

It is also true that the teacher, if she is to perform her par 
in the great educational system, must have this disi' 
mind. The chief difference between the function of the teach^ 
and that of the superintendent is that the latter must keep id 
mind the whole system of education, while the former 1 
cerned more immediately and more directly with the ai 
be brought about by direct teaching. We shall soon find! 
however, that the aims of the teacher must conform to tha 
wider educational aim, just as truly as the educational ainlj 
must conform to the aim of life as a whole. We now turn 
to the chapter in which self-realization is exhibited as the 
highest educational ideal. We shall attempt to show how this 
is made possible through the realization of the ideal values of 

The Ideal Values of Education: Truth, Beauty, 

Goodness, and Religion. According to Chapter I of Part 
V the highest aim of life was defined as that of self-realiza- 
tion. This was asserted to be the chief end of all life and of 
all human striving, as well as the primary motive of all con- 
duct. We must sec now how such an ideal is possible. We 
have asserted already that it is possible only through realiza- 
tion of the ideal values of life, and these we have seen to be 
truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. We have called them 
ideal values for the reason that they are not purely individual, 
but rather are universal in their meaning and worth. They 
are individual in the sense that they are of value for everybody, 
and they are universal because they arc the highest values of 
life. Our aim of self-realization implies a constant training 
of the immature minds in such a way that they will be willing 
and able to serve these ideal values of life. Every worthy life 
realizes all of these values in considerable degree. This 
is what is meant by universalizing, broadening, and deep- 
ening the life of the individual. These are values that 
have their significance, not in their relation to any indi- 
vidual alone, but to life as a whole. We gain our own 
individual significance in the degree that we appropriate and 
realize in our own lives these ideal values. "Education is an 
effort to assist immature persons to realize themselves and theii 
destiny as persons." (Coe, Edu. in Religion and Morals, p. 

2 The UNiry of the Ideal Values. These are the 
ideals. The question that naturally follows from the preced- 
ing chapter is, "What are the means for attaining our 
ideal?" As we have already noticed, educational theory 

Ijo The Pliilosophkal Basis of Education 

contrrns itself not only with tdtals and purposes to be realized,, 
but also with the methods or means for realizing these. There 

r a number of different means at our disposal for the realiza- 


tion of the ideal values of life. We shall consider these 

Rreater detail in Chapter V. It will sufSce here to remark 
that these values are to he attained through the pursuit of the 
different branches of knowledge, where these subjects of study 
are regarded as means to an end and not substitutions for the 
end itself. The curriculum, then, is one set of means for the 
realization of the ideal values. The teacher is another meam 
for aiding immature minds in their highest self-realization, ThiS 
does not disregard the fact that each individual is an end m 
himself, as well as a means for the realization of other ends. 
The recitation is another factor, and the organization of thtf 
school system is yet another means for promoting the highest 
degree of self-realization. One's occupation or vocation in lif* 
is yet another. Here we want merely to suggest that self-rcalir 
Ration is an aim which is possible, and is not a pure myth. 

Through the instrumentality of teachers, the program at. 
niudics, the school organization, and the social life, or the 
ichool, individuals are to be brought to their highest degree of 
self-realization and loyal devotion to the ideal values of life^ 
truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. It is the organic unity 
of these ideals that constitute the essence of true self-realization. 

There is no danger that the school become narrowly prao- 
ticul, or abstract, if the ideal of self-realization is kept clearl/j 
in mind. For while the individual is to realize the 

inl values, he is to do this in his own way, and in stijj 
doina he is expressing his own deepest meaning and worth as a' 
factor in the great world of value. j 

,1 TttB Pkrsonal Factor in the Educative Procesb.J 
Till* iiniverwl values of life are the same for every in-' 
llivldlifil. There is no meaning to the statement that my' 
IllKJirtl good may be your least good. The highest good ts 
liiil(<|wndeiit nf my own narrower individual view of what 
innitlliitcit my real good, and yet the ideal values themselves 
liMvii II ilcf|i And abiding significance for me, and just because 
\V*V i"i|ir»« mv tnimt «elf. They are in a sense the picture of 
W\\H\ I Witlllii h» l( my mpnmng and experience were brought 

ght f th f t 


c and ui 

Th as 

m i 11 
h h g 1 
11 f 

1 i pi 
g^ dp 

The Aim of Education as Self-Realization 

to their full fruition. We must ne I 
that each individual pursues the id 1 lu 
purpose of education in his own char ti 

tion that the goal of life and of edu 
of us does not imply that each one f 
by the same process, any more than h f 
to he of some service in life, can b k 
must perform the same deed. This Id b 

cation and would represent endless is f 
pose. We all have the same ideal v I f 1 i 
deeper purpose is clearly perceived b 1 

his own way of realizing these ideal 1 
individual and universal aspects of p 

no necessary conflict. 

CATIONAL Ideal. Self-realization is to be regarded as the 
only sufficient motive and ideal of conduct, for the reason that 
it places the estimate of value where it belongs, in the individ- 
ual rather than in society. Whatever I regard as having value 
must have some definite relation to my own being and reality. 
Aside from such connection it has no value whatsoever. But 
the individual's own particular value is to be derived from his 
relation to the absolute experience, or the universal will of 
which he forms a part. Self-realization is from this point 
of view the most comprehensive and the most satisfactory ideal 
for the individual, and carries with it as a natural corollary 
the improvement and progress of society, or social welfare. 
Professor John Adams aptly says that "This is not an acci- 
dental difference, but indicates a characteristic attitude towards 
human life. Self-realization is in itself an all -comprehensive 
educational ideal, so wide, in fact, that we cannot treat it 
satisfactorily as a whole till we have passed in review all the 
educational systems. But in the present connection the aspect 
suggested by the term self-expression calls for immediate treat- 
ment. It emphasizes the side that is usually indicated by self- 
assertion. Now the very notion of self-realization, even in its 
highest form, necessarily implies a certain amount of 
the self. It demands to come to its own, and mm 
:ense bring itself into a certain prominence. But self-as- 

Iof I 

self- ^^J 

self-as- ^^^1 


The Phitosophieal Bath of Edueaiion 

scrtion is essentially individualistic, self-realization is not. 
wider idea is based on the organic conception of societyd 
and considers the self not so much as realizing itself agaiie 
society as realizing itself in society. 

There is no such thing as social ivelfare apart from the i 
dividual who constitutes society. There is then no merit in 
the ideal of social progress or welfare that is not contained iiK 
the idea! of self-realization. The latter term is to be pro? 
ferred for the reason that it more completely expresses ouij 
own attitude toward life, and most completely represents outj 
innermost attitude toward life as a whole. Sgcial welfare Jf 
the fruit of self -realization as viewed from the aspect of oitfi 
social relationshipj We must not substitute some hypothetiSB 
unit in place of the individual himself. Seli-interesU or pefij 
fionality have meaning and worth, and aside from such wort^j 
society is a myth. We have gone too far already in placing; 
stress on the value of society to the neglect of the individuaL] 
At times it would seem that we have almost swallowed up tbft 
individual in a mythical society which would have no existencJ 
at all except as it is made up of individuals. Professor Ladff 
says: "We are too much losing sight of the concrete indtj 
vidual in a collective, but entirely mythical personality, called 
'society.' " {The Teachers Practical Phi}., p. 273.) 1 

5 The Individual and Social Views op Educatiow 
Reconciled. We find in much of the educational literatuio 
of our present day that the individual aspects of educatiom 
are practically ignored, at least in theory, and sometimes this 
is too much the case in actual practice. We seem to forgcQ 
the fact that society has its only existence in the reality of thCi 
individual, and we have found the most real nature of the \oA 
dividual to be expressed in terms of his will attitude, and it vt 
this will attitude or relation which gives meaning and signifH 
cance to his life and makes possible the development of a tnMJ 
self or personality, the only thing of worth in the univers 
How, then, can we submerge the individual units of s 
in a larger group and emphasize the value of the latter to t 
neglect of the former? I do not mean to surest that all 
our present day teaching lays the stress on society to the neglec 
of the individual ; on the contrary, 1 see many hopeful signs iT 

^" The Aim of Education at Self-Realizalion 233 

a clearer vision of things is evident in the Held of education, and 
yet the danger is too great that in order to escape the criticisoj 
of being individuaUstic, we swini; to the opposite extreme 
and proclaim the values of society to the neglect of the indi- 
vidual's true worth and being. 

There is no excuse for an individualistic theory of education, 
if we mean by this an isolated view of the individualistic theory 
of education, if we mean by this an isolated view of the in- 
dividual's worlc. No individual has worth except in his re- 
lation to the whole unity of life, of which he is but a single part. 
Aside from such an organic unity expressible in terms of per- 
sonality, the individual's life has no value or meaning, but in 
such a relationship the individual secures the only value which 
he possesses. We must, then, not stress the value of the in- 
dividual as an isolated fragment of the universe when we are 
seeking to know the ultimate aims of education, but we must 
keep in mind the fact that the individual gains his only value 
from his relation to the whole. The relation is to be de- 
veloped through education of the individual in such a way 
that he will be both willing and able to realize in his experience 
the ideal value of life. In other words, through education the 
individual is to actualize the universal in his experience. 

When^ the individual devotes himself loyally to the ideal 
vafues of liTe Tie~s' not'engaged in a search for values that be- 
long to himself alone, but which are the essential attributes 
of a world of meaning and worth. Such a loyal devotee of the 
ideals of life cannot be regarded as individualistic in any 
narrow sense. On the contrary, he is a highly socialized be- 
ing, and is productive of the greatest possible degree of social 
progress by virtue of the fact that he is actualizing the ideal 
value in the life of his own experience, and thus bringing 
into being the necessary condition for the only real progress 
about which we know or can know anything. "The one and; 
only reason why from the standpoint of self-realization the, 
exercise of man's spiritual capacities is better than the grati-'., 
fication of his natural desires is that such spiritual activity re-l . 
suits in a larger and more comprehensive life. Thus the at-l I 
tainment of ideal ends, intellectual, practical, and lesthetic, I 1 

t represents the realization of the whole self, in contrast to whicl)/ 1 
^ material cpmfort and pleasure stand for the interest of the! 1 


334 The PkUti$f,pkUal Bam «f 

partial tdi." (Wright's Self-Keatitatwm. p. 217.) 

Then t», therefore, no ntcouiy confikx b aa nin ibr ifi- 
dividual and the todal aq>ccu of edmtioa. The tofvidoal 
todtliza himaclf not by acccpdng some mrthkal ideal or ake, 
■udi u Mcial progTCM. but nAer he demotes bnmdf to tbc 
realization of the ideal values of life, and in so dome ^ 
univenultzea, or lodalizes, his own narrow ttic and thus not 
only makes for sclf-rcaJization, but for sodal welfare and 
human prugrcu, M-hich are the natural consequences of true 
»e]f-reaJization. Much ha^ been said in recent jrears about 
the individual and the social atm of educattoo. but very little 
proKTCM has been made in the nay of recoodlii^ th^ two 
pointi of view, notwithstanding the fact diat dierc s no e^ 
sential conflict between the t^to. The>' arc aspects of a nider 
view which includes them both. The stress, tMnvder^, (busI 
always be laid on the individual, >ct not on the csoitfK- i£c. 
mu«t socialise the individuals of society before a rcal_MiI 
fubftantial society U possible. This process of social izationjj 
made pfjwibic through the willmg: ^nd" d^roted serrlcc al~me 
individual to the ideal values of life. In sening thesejdeals 
which arc of value to himself, and yet whose valu^arc not 
fimTtcd EO himself, he comes to regard man as dependent upon 
hirTeTTows. Tn3ecd he sees in the progress of his own dexelop- 
fnent n broader and better societj-. and he sees sodal progress 
through this individual self-realization contributing in return 
to his own larger possibililies of self-realization. He regards 
the universe an a great system and organic unity of purpose, 
for the purpose of each individual must be consistent with all 
other purposes, or must be viewed in the light of the whole- 
President Hyde rightly holds that "The measure of 3 man is 
the Tange of interests he makes his own." (Pracliail Idealism, 
p. 165.) 

It is true that man is a social being and his own 4uau 
purposes cannot be determined without consulting society.^ 
he goes along. But rather than ask questions concerning the 
ultimate values of the world for some mythical organization 
such as society, he turns toward the ideal of life and through 
constant individual efforts directed by a steady gaze upon his 
purpose in life he sets the warring purposes and interests of 
his life into a compatible system. Through such an organixa- 

The Aim of Education as Self-Realization 235 1 

tion of self-interest and self-will, he realizes constantly his I 
deeper relation to the universal experience of the absolute. 
His ideals are, therefore, not narrow and egoistic, but in thftj 
highest sense, social and universal. In the service of such ( 
r3eals and values he is performing the greatest possible servicf 1 
^ society. Instead of saying, therefore, that man owes serv- 

i his feltow man. It would Ije tetter to say that his 
Btant service niust be directed toward the realization of the 
eternal value of life. In so doing society does not suffer 
From bis misplacement of energj', but rather it profits to the 
highest degree therefrom, for instead of being energy mis- . 
directed, it is direction toward the only ideal from which we ] 
can expect to reap any lasting reward in the form of real " 
ial progress. Man's service to man is, therefore, not ; 
' end in itself, but rather one of the ways of realizing the most 
Rr society through the attainment of his own largest self- 
[ realization. 

We propose to reconcile the two apparently conflicting 
Laims of education, the individual and the social, by regarding 
I, these two aims as different aspects of a larger purpose. The^ 
jiindividualist is right in arguing that the ultimate aim of edu-' 
I and life must be of some value to the individual. The 
I social theorist is rig:ht in his contention that the ideal of life 
\ must conduce to permanent social progress, but each is wrong, 
I if he means that we regard the two views as essentially con- 
I tradictory. On the contrary, both views are necessary and 
I equally important, and we must not forget the one while we 
have our eyes fixed on the other, but we must always remem- 
ber that the individual's own deeper purposes must give us 
the starting point as well as the end of our search for the 
highest good. The only adequate motive for conduct is somp 
good to the individual, but the only great good to the individ.- 
I vCal IS tliat which Is universal, or over-personal and Is equally 
1 good for all persons. 

This ideal good of life is to be obtained by each one pur- 
suing his own special purposes, but can be obtained only when 
Tie considers his purposes and ideals in tlieir systematic or or- 
unity with one another and with the other individuals 
I ^ society. Man becomes more of an individual in his pursuit 
L p tfic ideal values of life. He m ust constantly develop .to 4 


236 The Pkiloso/iliical Basis of Education 

higher degree his 0"n purposes and interests, that is, he must 
move constantly in the direction of self -realization through 
the attainment of the ideal values in his own experience. Thus 
in becoming more of an individual, more truly a person, he is 
coming to be at the same time more highly socialized. XllUi. 
all true educatioa leads in the direction of a more highly 
socialized individual, and this higher socialization is not in 
conflict with the ideal of true personal development. Qn ^be 
contrary, the individual becomes his truest self only in bis 
broader social relations. Mnn docs pot lose his individuality 
by taking the broader view of life which includes his ieUftW 
beings as constituent parts of the same organic whole,, but 
rather he becomes more truly a person or individual of the 
same organic ivhole when he comes to regard himself ajL,so 
related. There is. therefore, no conflict between individual- 
ism and socialism in education. The conflict is only apparent, 
being real only in the sense that clouded or befogged thinking 
inevitably produces such an apparent conflict. According to 
the philosophy of idealism, this conflict is neither necessary nor 

We thus overcome the apparent conflict between the in- 
dividual and social views of education by changing our con- 
ception of what a true individual is. An individual expresses 
his truest self only when he regards his connection through jsill 
and purpose with other individuals of the world. Man is 
not isolated from his fellows but rather he is intimately bound 
up with them. It is not possible to separate completely rny, 
point of view from that of the universe, or my purpose in 
life from the deeper meaning and reality of life as a whole. 
It is necessary, however, that I regard my own individual pur- 
poses as most truly expressed in the service of values that are 
worthy not only for me but for all individuals, and it is the 
business of the school to train immature individuals In such a 
way that they will be willing to serve such ideal values, and it 
is through such means that the development of the truest self or 
personality is possible. 

6 SuMM.ARY. By way of summary of the chief points of 
this chapter we must remind ourselves that the ideal of educa- 
tion is that of self-realization, and is made possible through the 

The Aim of Education as Self-Renlieation 237 I 

willing devotion of an individual to his cause in life, which i 
cause is not independent of his fellows, but rather is closely " 
bound up with them. Professor Euchen says: "Unless faith 
in some lofty ideal infuse zest and gladness into every depart- 
ment of our activity, we cannot realize the highest possibili- 
ties of life." (Meaning and Value of Life, p. 1.) It is 
through the devotion of an individual to the ideal values of , 
life that a truly socialized individual, or real personality i 
developed. A man's worth is to be determined by the breadth ' 
and range of interest vvhicli he regards as belonging to himselfi 
These individual purposes and will attitudes must be harmonized 
with each other and reconciled with the larger view of the 
totality of his experience and with his fellow beings. Pro- 
fessor Miinsterberg rightly says that "Education is to make , 
youth willing and able to realize possibilities of life." (Psychol, 
and Teacher, p. 70.) Again he says true education consists j 
in training pupils in "Loyally to the ideal values of life," (Ibid., 
p. 75.) Shakespeare wisely says: 

"To thine own self be true; 
And it must follow as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man." 




I The Relation of Theory and Practice, Before we 
can answer specifically the question as to just how the ideal of 
self-realization is to be made actual in our experience, we 
must consider the larger question as to the relation of theory 
and practice generally. Theory is not in necessary conflict 
with practice any more than the social and individual aspects 
of education or life are in necessary conflict. On the con- 
trary, theory is our attempt to show the meaning of our ex- 
perience. Every theory is a proposed explanation of a cer- 
tain group of phenomena, or from the philosophical point of 
view, it is the attempt to show the meaning of our fragmentary 
experience for life as a whole. The theory of education, 
therefore, is an attempt to offer an explanation of the mean- 
ing and value, as well as the connection, of the tacts of our 
educational experience. Theory acts as an ever present guide 
to practice. If we do not have a theory in mind, practice be- 
comes meaningless. Findlay speaks approving of: — "That 
habit of associating theory with practice, of seeing the whole 
in the details, which is the foundation for rational progress 
not only in teaching but in every trade and profession." 
Professor Whitehead says, "Wanting the theory, instruction 
becomes aimless." W. T. Harris says, "The statesman or 
the teacher knows practically when he knows the trend of the 
system which he is to direct or manage." (Preface to Boone's 
Edu. in U. S.. p. 6.) 

It is only when a theory is offered as an explanation or an 
interpretation that life gains any significance or value at all. 
Our educational practice is to-day greatly in need of a sound 
philosophy which brings together the various facts of our ex- 
perience in order to show their meaning and value for life as 
a whole. The broader theory of education must also inclu(" 

The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 239 

rsn explanation from the point of view of the descriptive science 
of the facts and phenomena of our experience. From the de- 
scriptive point of view a theory of education becomes a science 
of education and consists in the explanation of the phenomena 
of our experience in their external connections one with an- 
other. A theory of education from the philosophical point of 
»view is an attempt to show the meaning and value of this ex- , 
perience which science attempts to relate in a causal scheme ■ 
of things. 
The true scientist as well as the true philosopher recognizes 
the value of theory as unbecoming in a man of real intelligence. 
Common sense, as well as science and philosophy, proposes 
theories, but her theories are so seldom correct, as a result of 
unclear thinking, that she has grown sceptical of all theories, 
except the theorj' that all theories are of little value. Our 
attitude toward theory is very different from that of common 

t sense. We regard theorizing as an essential part of life and 
as the natural outcome of reflection and thought on the facts 
■of our experience, and the doubts that are placed upon theory 
are sufficient evidence of the fact that common sense has alto- 
gether too large a place in the life of man, to the exclusion 
of the clearer views of science and philosophy. The real 
scientist and the true philosopher do not regard theory as 
an end in itself, however, but as a means of getting on better 
with the world. Every theory and hypothesis must be tested ■ 
by experience, but theory itself is possible only as a result j 
of our attempt to explain, or to interpret the facts of our I 
experience. I 

It is the true theorist who has the vision or ideal of a better \ 
state of existence than is now realized. It is he who is the 
real ideab'st in the world of practical life. It is he who ad- 
justs his experience with reference to this larger view of 
things and thus develops a systematic way of viewing life 
from above. We cannot then dispense with the theory. 
Professor Peabody truly says that "The abstractions of ethics 
lead, not to remoteness and detachment, but to discernment 
and horizon. The chief source of perplexity in the social 
question is in seeing it from below, the chief source of courage 

I in the social question is in seeing it from above." (Peabody, 
App. to Soc. Ques.. p. 146.) 

240 The Philosophical Basis 0/ Education 

2 Educational Theory as an Explanation of Edu- 
cational Experience. What has Heen said above with re- 
gard to theory generally applies equally well to the particular 
field of education. We are suffering either from the lack of 
theories in education to-day, or from a superabundance of 
theories with no stronger foundation than common sense, cus- 
tom, or tradition. Education must be removed from this 
Jjllfillf: thumb practice of common ^ense, and set upon the. 
g eatcr heights of a truly scientific and philosophical planj 
yt j'*'* In education we are greatly in need of a foundation 
tnat will set each fragment of our educational experience in 
proper relation to all others. In other words we are greatly 
in need of a philosophy of cd\ication, which will show the 
meaning of each part out of the rule of thumb methods of 
common .sense, and consider it in the light of the larger sys- 
temof causal connection. We are therefore, in need fl£_a 
tetter theory of both the worthy aims of education, and, pf 
the means and methods to be employed in their reaUzatiflP- 
Such views of our educational experience would unite in our 
larger theory or philosophy of life as a whole, and certainly 
would result in untold good to the education of the present 
day. We must cease to regard theory as having no connection 
with the real practice of education. We must come rather 
to the view that the only possibility of bringing order out 
of tlie chaos and confusion of modern pedagogical doctrines i? 
to view the whole of our educational experience in the iight 
of this larger theory of life. 

We are not to suppose, therefore, that the one who sets 
about his problem without a theory will necessarily succeed 
best in solving his problems. On the contrary the one who 
does not set out with some definite theory or hypothesis is 
almost certain to proceed in an aimless fashion. If we have 
no theory to guide us we are in danger of wandering about 
without accomplishing any very definite results. On the con- 
trary, if we set out with a certain theory or hi'pothesis we 
have something to guide us through the many isolated facts. 
It is not possible for us to handle the problems of education 
without having some definite theory, and this theory which 
controls our educational experience must be large enough and 
inclusive enough to take account of all the facts of our edu- 

The Relation of this Ideal to Educalionnl Practice 24! 

cational experience. In other words, we cannot get on in 
diis business of education without a philosophy, and this phil- 
osoph)- of our educational experience must harmonize with^ 
our broader philosophy of life. 

We have suggested already that tlie piillosophy of life which 
we hold regards the universe as best expressed in its reality 
in terms of personality or will. The great meaning of all 
of our human experience is to be found in the will, not in 
any individual will to be sure, but in the will of the uni- 
verse of which each individual is a necessary part. This in- 
dividual will is constantly striving toward an end, which end 
is not outside of itself, but rather it is expressed in terms of 
its own self-realization. The wilt is seeking perfect rela- 
tionship with the universe of which it is a part. We cannot- ] 
express the meaning of our experience except in terms of this 
will, and we cannot discover the significance of our individual 
will except in terms of their relation to the will of the abso- 
lute personality of the universe, which is the ultimate mean- 
ing and reality of all experience and the absolute meaning of 
life. This theory of life must always show itself in every 
part and fragment of our life, education, art, religion, ethics, 
politics, social and business life, — in fact in all fields of our 
experience, we must aim at the realization of the complete 
self. Now this aim of life, and consequently of education, 
is the theory which we propose as the solution for our educa- 
tional conflicts, in so far as they relate to the aim of educa- 
tion. The only way to remove education from the common 
sense basis upon which it now rests, and to reconcile the con- 
flicts we find in this field of our experience, is to strive for 
the realization of this ultimate aim. This will bring order 
out of chaos, unity out of confusion and disorder. It is 
only as we keep our eye on this ultimate goal that our ex- 
perience begins to take order and significance. It is only in 
such a system that facts of experience have any value and 
that their relative values can be assigned. A part has signifi- 
cance only in its relation to the whole. No part of experience 
has any significance apart from such relationship. It is, there- 
fore, meaningless to inquire into the value of any particular 
^^pait of our educational experience, unless we are viewing 

242 The Philosopk'unl Bash of Education 

tlic only significance it has for life and experience. 

In whai has been said above lies the suggestion that oui 
aim wilt modify or affect our means or methods. We shall 
see as we proceed in this and in the two following chaptcni 
that such is the case. We shall give particular attention to 
the necessary consequences of such a doctrine, or theory, as 
that of self-realization. In fact we have suggested already, 
a good many implications of this philosophical theory. 

3 The Actual and the Ideal as Part and Whole 
OK Experience. According to this view there is no necessary 
conflict between the actual and the ideal. These are only 
two aspects of the larger view of experience. They are thC' 
part and whole about which we have so many times remarked, 
the actual is the part of reality that exists in a temporal and 
special order of the universe. We cannot deny reality toj 
our world of time and space. This thing has been done in 
the history of philosophy, but always without sufficient reasonsr 
being stated for such a denial. According to idealism the. 
actual is experience viewed from an angle of time and space,. 
or from the world of causal reality. That is to say, it is the. 
world viewed not from the point of view of the whole, but, 
from the point of view of the part of our experience. The 
actual and the ideal, therefore, are related as fragment and; 
whole of the universal reality. It is meaningless to ascribe. 
reality to the fragment of our experience, while at the same 
time denying the reality of the whole represented in the ideal. 
It is equally meaningless to ascribe reality to the whole or the 
ideal while denying such reality to the fragmentary experience 
of our life. The only way to view experience is to determine ita 
relation as part in a time and space world of causality and 
sequence, to the universal whole which is not confined by any 
such temporal and spacial boundaries. 

We do not, therefore, deny to the experience of our present 
life, or to that of education particularly, any reality that it 
possesses, but we do urge that such reality be ascertained in 
the light of the larger experience, and in terms of this rela- 
tionship we are to ascribe the value of our educational ex- 
perience and determine the values which the various parts 
possess. All of our talk about educational values is entjiejy 

The Relation of tfi'ts Ideal to Educational Practice 243 

ipcariingless unless we have an ideal in mind by which we 
measure the relative values, or the different parts of our ex- 
perience as determined by their relation to the whole. It is 
only in the light of such a philosophy that educational values 
can be determined, for such values are determined by the rela- 
tion of the part to the whole, or another way of stating the 
same thing, the values of our educational experience are to 
be determined by their effectiveness in promoting the ideal 
which has been set up as the aim toward which we are mov- 
ing. According to the view here expressed the highest aim 
of life and of education is that of self-realization. 

In the light of such an educational theory each subject in 
the program gains its significance by the degree to which it 
promotes this ideal of life, and just here we must remind our- 
selves that there is no arbitrary way of stating what subject 
in the program of studies possesses the greatest educational 
value. According to this philosophy all such important mat- 
ters are removed from the common sense basis and are ele- 
vated to a higher plane of thought. Our attempt to assign 
relative values to subjects in the past, and even continuing 
in our present, represents little more than an attempt to assign 
values on the basis of such a common sense theory. Idealism 
removes such important matters from common sense and 
places them in charge of those who see values in their rela- 
tion to experience as a whole. According to the ideal of self- 
realization the only proper way to consider the value of a 
subject is to ascertain the degree to which it promotes the 
eternal values in the life of the individual. 

We must always remember that individuals are different 
and are not mere carbon copies of one another. Each indi- 
vidual must have a right to express his ideal values of life, 
that they must therefore attempt to do this in the same way. 
On the contrary the most important thing in the individual 
to take cognizance of in the educational process is that of 
his own will and interests. If we are to go counter to the 
educational process we are going to defeat the aim which we 
set out to realize: namely that of the highest self-realization 
of the individual. There is no possible way of realizing the 
self unless we take account of its own mode of operation, 
its own interests and purposes. This does not mean a laissez 

244 T*^ I'liilosopliiral BasU of Education 

/aire policy In education. It simply means that if the individual 
is to realize hh greatest possibilities in life, it is. oeces&ai^ 
mat teaching, and the educational system generally, take ac- 
count of the individuality of each pupil, and this jneans_lP 
allow It to express itself in the way most natural to itself. 

We are to estimate the value of the subjects, then, by their 
relation to the will of the cducand, or the one who is to be 
educated. The only eternal values in all the universe of 
reality are those of truth, beauty, goodness, and religion. 
All other values are only partial and hence relative. Whether 
or not history is better for me than geography, depends on 
whether or not 1 am able to see life in its truer proportions 
through history than through geography. It is simply mean- 
ingless to assert that history has greater educative value than 
geography. Educaiici nal values depend and always _w_ill de^ 
pend, on the individuaI'~eJucanJ. A~ number of writers on 
educational topics seem to lose sight of this truth, and assign 
values to the different subjects in the program of study in 
accordance with some arbitrary principle chosen in the light 
of their own limited experience. There are those who assign 
very little or no educative value to Latin and a great deal of 
value to history, or mathematics, or literature. Just why they 
do so is probably not so hard to explain as to justify in the 
light of a larger philosophy of life and education. If a boy 
can see his way in life move clearly through the language 
of the Romans than he can in the modern scientific laboratories 
of the chemist or the physicist, I see no reason why it should 
be held that this subject does not have greater value for him 
than do the laboratory sciences. 

There is only one way to look at the matter from a larger 
philosophy of life, and that is to regard the whole universe 
as constituted of absolute values, and the world of our practi- 
cal experience, which is but a part of such an absolute worli' 
consists of only relative values, that is, they are only part or 
a larger whole. We cannot realize completely the absolute 

Lvalues in a world of time and space. For this would be to 
realize the eternal in the temporal order of things, but cer- 
tainly this is a very different thing from assigning values of a 
rather absolute character of certain subjects and then arbi- 
trarily placing others in certain definite relations to this 

The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 245 

standard, and on the basis of such a relationship defining the 
relative values of the different subjects in the program. No, 
there is but one way of handling this matter in the light of 
general philosophy, and that is to regard each individual as 
possessing absolute meaning and worth for life as a whole, 
and of assigning to each individual's experience values in pro- 
portion to the degree that such experience promotes his self- 
realization. If, then, Latin is the subject through which a 
given individual perceives his relation to life best, and through 
which he sees the meaning and connection of his experience 
and of the world, then this subject is for him of greatest rela- 
tive educational value, and we must cease to allow pedagogues 
arbitrarily to assign absolute values to certain subjects equally 
arbitrarily chosen, and then define the value of all other sub- 
jects in terms of this standard. On the contrary, we must hold 
to no standard other than the idea! of completed self-realiza- 
tion, and holding strictly to our theory we must view the 
value of each subject in terms of its power of realizing the 
possibilities of the individual concerned. 

There is no such a thing as assigning absolute values to 
the things which have only relative value. Every subject 
has only relative value, and nothing In all the universe of our 
partial experience can have absolute value in the sense of being 
entirely complete and wanting nothing. On the contrary our 
experience is always partial, and therefore relative, and the 
value that we assign to each part must he determined always 
by its relation to the whole, or by the degree to which it pro- 
motes the realization or the Ideal. Viewed in the light of 
such a theory, no one subject of the curriculum has any greater 
value than any other for all individuals of the universe. Thus 
we see one very important educational implication in so far 
as educational experience is I'alued in the light of the theory 
of self-realization. Such an educational doctrine follows as 
a matter of natural and logical consequence from the theory 
which defines the meaning and value of our temporal ex- 
perience in its relation to the whole, or the relation of the 
actual and the Ideal in life. 

4. The Value of a Lifb Ideal. We must lay special 
stress on the value of an ideal for life, for as we shall see this 


246 The Philosopkkal Basis of Education 

matter has great significance for our procedure in education. 
"Ideals", Professor Ladd says, "arc certain conceptions which 
have an emotional value, which have also a pull upon the 
will and which set the aims of the workman at an altitude 
appreciably higher than the facts and actualities of present 
attainment. And the educational ideals must, like all other 
ideals, "be considered in the light of the principles of a true 
practical philosophy." (Teacher's Practical Piiilosopky, p. 19) 

An ideal is an e\'er-present goal toward which we move. 
We do not alwajs keep our eye on the ideal, and psychologi- 
cally it would be unwise for us to attempt to do so, but it 
is nevertlieless necessary that we have such an ideal in life, 
and that we occasionally glance from the complex experience 
of this temporal life toward this ideal, which represents the 
picture of a completed life, such as is known to us through 
the part. The ideal is, therefore, not meaningless, some- 
thing outside of experience, but rather it is a picture of a more 
ideal state of existence. It represents our experience run out 
to its logical conclusion. The ideal and the practical must 
not be regarded as different parts of our experience, rather 
the ideal is the partial experience filled out to its completion. 
To be sure the ideal changes somewhat as we enlarge our ex- 
perience, and is therefore never a complete and final pic- 
ture of our present fragmentary experience. Indeed it would 
not be possible for a man in a partial world of time and 
space to form a complete picture of life as a whole. This 
does not mean that he cannot form an accurate picture of 
it, nor does it suggest that such an ideal representation of 
it has no reality, on the contrary it is the expression of a 
more completely realized experience. 

The ideal must be believed in. We must regard it as hav- 
ing value and reality, otherwise we do not follow it with 
the loyalty and devotion that is deserved by such a reality. 
If we regard our ideals as simply ethereal visions, we will not 
be able to use them in the realization of a larger life. Presi- 
dent Briggs says, "Education is not in a high sense practical 
unless it has an ideal in it and round about it," {Routine 
and Ideals, p. 35) J. F. Brown says, "An ideal is an ever- 
present guide, and, like the demon of Socrates, it serves in the 
absence of parent, teacher, and friend." {Am. High School, 


The Relation of this Ideal to Educatiannl Prnctire 247 

p. 290) Again Briggs says, "He who loses his ideals loses 
the very bloom of life." (School, College and Character^ p. 
132.) Ruth M. Weeks says: "A clear-cut ideal is the first 
step toward drafting a workable program." (Tke People's 
School, p. 167) 

Our ideal must represent a greater reality and it must lead 
us on constantly toward a life of more complete self-realiza- 
tion. If we lose faith in our ideals our experience loses its 
significance and value. On the contrary if our ideal is re- 
garded consistently as we enlarge our experience, we relate 
each fragment of it to this ideal in order to ascertain the rela- 
tive value which each part possesses. 

The Meaning of Character and Personality. 
|"Thc individual who does not govern his life in accordance 
nth an ideal or a definitely definable purpose lacks consistency 
I and uniformity, which are the essential attributes in the forma- 
I tion of character or personality. Each individual establishes 
his character by faith fully executing the acts or deeds which 
I are determined by the ideal which is the ruling purpose of 
I his life. "A purpose is possible only through an ideal which 
realized by the adjustment of means to ends." (H. 
' W. Dressier : Ed. and tke Phil. Ideal, p. 205 ) Without such an 
I ideal there is no controlling motive or purpose in life and conse- 
Lquently no well established character or personality. Now 
■the most essential factor in the life of the individual is just 
■ this factor of the will. We must, therefore, use every effort 
tlo preserve the will in the process of education. The will 
E^is a factor that can be governed and educated. It is the 
I duty of the school to take part in the direction of this will. 
• The school must provide an opportunity for each individual 
Pwiil to seek the ideal values of life in its own way. We must 
1 therefore, allow free play of individuality, except in so far 
Jias^ the "Will, which ts the essential attribute of personality, ft 
liontrolled by the ideal values indispensable to all complete 

Character and personality have no meaning apart from ii 
f.consistent organization of the interests and purpose of the 
lal life, and such organization is not possible except 
fivhere the life is governed by a clear ideal or purpose. Under 


The Pkilaiophical Basis of Education 

such conditions a deHnite organization of interests and purposes 
is possible. In this connection we note what several writers 
consider character to be. Professor Palmer says:— "By char- 
acter we mean any established mode of feeling, willing and 
thinking." (Prob. of Freedom, p. 78) Professor Coe says, 
"Character is confirmed habit of moral choice." (Education 
m Morals and Religion, p. 58) It will ever be true that 
"Those who have a well-ordered character lead also a well- 
ordered life." (Bakewell Source Book in Phil., p. 61) 

The one thing absolutely indispensable to a life worth liv- 
ing is an ideal purpose in accordance with which one directs 
and organizes the affairs of his life. This is the chief m erit 
or value of an ideal for each Individual, The school must 
not Tose sight of this fact, and must help to instil ideals in 
the minds of the pupils, but it must leave them to realize 
these ideals in their own way, and cease trying to force every 
individual into the same line, 

6 Individual Differences. In the foregoing sections, 
we have suggested the necessity of allowing to each individual 
the right to realize the ideal values and purposes of life in 
his own way. This is another way of stating the necessity 
of taking account of individual differences. AU the. psychg- 
logical and epistemological studies made in recent years, pgint 
to the necessity for taking account of individual difEerengg^ 
Individuals are not all constructed on the same plan. Their 
different environments, hereditary antecedents, and training 
give certain shape and direction to their interests in life, 
which must not be ignored by the school if it is to enlist the 
co-operation of these natural influences in the process of edu- 

The ideal values of life, truth, beauty, goodnes.s, and re- 
ligion are universal, and their value does not consist in the 
fact that they are related to any one single individual, but 
rather because they are universal in their significance. They 
are equally valuable for all individuals, but they are to be 
realized by each individual in his own way, or through the 
expression of his own interests and his own deepest will. 
The school has too long acted as a barrier to the most com- 
plete self-realization of individuals, just because it has at- 

The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 249 

tempted to force all persons into the same line by a narrowly 
restricted program of study, or by certain artificial prescrip- 
tions, or by restrained and unnatural election of studies. Pupils 
must be given an opportunity to find tbemselves ; this is the 
most important task that lays before every teacher, — to kelp 
the pupil to find himself. The highest obligation placed upon 
the teacher, and on the school as an organization, is that of 
assisting the ptipll to find his own self, and how this can best 
be expressed and developed in life. 

It is not to be inferred from the above suggestion that I 
believe in unrestricted election of studies; on the contrary, I 
believe that such restriction is necessary to the best interests 
of each individual and the school as a whole, as well as for 
society. A pupil should be given an opportunity to select his 
studies not on the basis of his own temporary likes, but his 
deeper purpose must be found through the aid of the teaAr, or 
Special adviser, who considers not only the pupil's side of the 
case, but the parents' also, and the needs of society. The en- 
vironmental or sociological conditions of the pupil must be con- 
sidered. Once the selection has been made, there must be no 
change allowed in the pupil's program until it is deemed ad- 
visable by all concerned. The pupil should not be allowed to 
take up a subject and drop it at will for any but the most con- 
vincing reasons. Voluntary selection that does not take into ac- 
count the deeper purposes does not make for self-realization, or 
from the other side of the process, social welfare. In the inter- 
ests of the individual and the society of which he forms a part, 
certain restriction in keeping with the highest rationality are 
not only desirable, but positively necessary. 

We must not lose sight of the fact that each individual 
should he allowed the opportunity of realizing the highest 
values of life through the expression of his own individual will 
and purpose. But such will and purpose must not be mis- 
taken for mere momentary feelings of like or dislike. Pupils 
govern their selection of studies and their pursuit of 
the same with a higher degree of rationality than has been 
evidenced in general up to the present time. The only safe 
guide in this matter will always be found to be some life 
ideal which controls our whole system and range of interests 

life. Such an ideal I have defined in terms of self-realize- 

250 The Pbilosopbknl Basis of Education I 

tion. There may be other purposes, and I am sure there areJ 
but to my mind do other ideal of life or education so coaw 
plefcly and so adequately expresses the ultimate ideal and thel 
chief motive of our conduct as individuals. j 

7 Self-Activity, Sklf-Rksponsibihty, and Self-; 
Realization, If the individual is to realize the ideal valuesj 
of life in his own way we must allow unrestricted expression* 
to the instinctive tendencies of the individual to act. AdanUj 
rightly asserts that "Incessant 'directed' activity leaves no] 
room for the development of qualities that are essential focj 
the true self-realization of the cducand." {Evolution of Edu^ 
cational Theory, p. 155.) Hobhouse wisely remarks on this) 
point that "To try to form character by coercion is to dw 
stroy it in the making. Personality is not huilt up from with4 
out but grows from within and the function of the outrti 
order is not to create it, but to provide for it the most suit-| 
able conditions of growth." {Liberalism, p. 143.) We wouldy 
do well to remind ourselves often that, as Fichte said, "Th<M 
most original thing in us is the impulse to action. It is givciM 
before the consciousness of the world and cannot be derived! 
from it." 

Self-activity is the basis of self- responsibility and self C0O5] 
trol, which are the essential conditions of self-realization.| 
Herbart greatly stressed the value of self-activity in reali 
the many-sided development of the individual. There 
certain instinctive propensities leading in the direction of 
activity, and such instincts must be exercised if the indivtdi 
is to realize his own powers and his own weaknesses, whi( 
must be realized if he is to take any important part in tl 
process of his own education, and as we have already 
education is not a one-sided process. Education is possiblj 
only when the cducand reacts in such a way as to bring out 
his own deeper meaning and purpose, and such meaning 01 
purpose can be found only through self-activit>'. We must, 
then, give an important place to self-activity, but we are no! 
to conclude that any amount of self-activity will 
produce an individual who measures up to the ideal whi 
we have set. 

Self-activity is a certain fundamental condition in the pn 


The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 351 

cess of education, rather than a completion of this process. 
I Self-activity is necessary in order that a sense of self -responsi- 
bility may be awakened, and this sense of self- responsibility 
is a necessary condition of self-realization. Self-activity is, 
therefore, not an end in itself, but lather a condition of the 
individual's understanding his own limits and capacities. It 
is through self-activity that he measures himself against his 
I fellow-men and the world, and so gets an estimate of the 
I points of his strength and his weakness. It is through the 
I exercise of the instinct moving in the direction of self-activity 
['that the individual finds how closely he measures up to his 
I competitors, and this is the germ of his sense of individual 
I capacity. It is this self-activity, also, which leads to self- 
k responsibility, for it is soon discovered that an individual is 
[not only a being that acts, but one who is held accountable 
[ for his acts. He therefore awakens, through self -activity, a 
ing of responsibility for the acts or deeds which he per- 
I forms. Thus he begins to weigh his own conduct or pass 
I comparative judgment on his acts, and this is the first abso- 
' lute condition necessary for the development of character. 
We must come to see that not all acts are of equal value. 
They do not all tend to realize the end for which we strive 
to the same degree. They are, therefore, not of equal im- 
portance and the question of selection comes to be an im- 
portant matter in conduct. 

Only after self-activity has developed to the degree of self- 
I responsibility is it possible for us to attain the ideal of self- 
( realization in the individual. The individual at first con- 
; the value of his acts in the light of their relations to 
' other?, or their effects in maintaining the relationship of har- 
' mony between individuals. Only after some maturity in 
I the individual is it possible to substitute for this objective 
Standard of measurement a more ideal standard, such as that 
I of self-realization. But it is not possible for us to succeed 
hi^est possible degree in the development of the indi- 
f vidual self until we have assisted him In setting before himself 
I an idea! or purpose toward which he unconsciously strives, 
accordance with which he governs his own actions. We 
F would say, therefore, that self-realization is to come about 
Lonly through the exercise of the individual's own institKtive 


252 The PhUnsophknl Basis of Education 

tendencies toward action, and only after these tendencies have 
been organised in accordance with a plan, or ideal in life 
can the individual attain to his chief importance in life, or 
we would say find himself. 

8 Education and a Plan of Life. The chief busi- 
ness of education according to the ideal here expressed is that 
of helping each individual to realize his purpose in life, and 
through the realization of this purpose his own largest self 
is possible. Our ideal is that of self-realization, and the 
only possibility of attaining it is through self-activity which, 
under the proper direction and influence of the school, the 
teacher, and all others concerned in his education, naturally 
develops the feeling of self-responsibility. The pupil must be 
led to formulate a plan of life. He must see that a life that 
has no plan is a life that is not worth living. Plato said, 
". . . the teacher should endeavor to direct the children's in- 
clinations and pleasures by the amusements to their final 
aim in life." {Laws, p. 21.) Findlay says, "The school is 
adopted by the adult community as a vehicle for controlling 
values and ideals." (The School, p. 55) 

If a life is to be made harmonious and significant it is pos- 
sible only through loyal devotion to an ideal or purpose. This 
purpose we have suggested already to be most compre- 
hensively stated in terms of self-realization. The pupil must 
be led to see that his most important task in life is that of 
finding his own interests and purposes, and through these his 
larger self-realization is possible. Without taking account 
of such individual differences in interests no such self- 
realization is possible. We must lead the pupil to see this. 
The whole atmosphere of the school must develop the feel- 
ing that each individual has as his highest duty that of find- 
ing himself, or his chief interests or capacities in life, and 
through development of these interests his highest self-realiza- 
tion. We must look for these ideal values in all parts of our 
experience. We must be taught so to seek and to find them, 
for they are contained in every element of our experience. 
There is grave question whether or not it is possible for any 
group of individuals to assert what parts of our experience, 
or what subjects of the program of study, will yield the largest 

The Relation of this Ideal to Educalianai Prnclice 253 

returns in educational value. We have seen that an attempt 
do this is nearly always fatal because we fail to take ac- 
count of individual differences. 

The rule and motive of the school should be to help each 
pupil to find his interests and purposes in life, and on the basis 
of these develop a plan of life consistent with the larger view 
of ideal values. If the school does not help the pupil in the 
development of this plan of life, it has failed to perform its 
chief function. We must cease to regard it as the business of 
the school to realize the ideal values of life and feed these 
to the pupils through a siphon or a spoon, and come to the 
larger way of thinking and regard it as our chief business in 
the school to help a child to find his own life's interests and 
purposes, through the search for the ideal values as realized in 
the experience of the race and the individual, 

9 The Vocational and Cultural Ideals Reconciled. 
There is another matter which ought to be spoken of in 
ction, and that is the relation of the vocational and 
the cultural, or between the liberal and technical ideals in 
' education. According to the philosophy underlying the theory 
I'Of education here expressed, we do not make an absolute dis- 
ft-tinction between the vocational and the cultural, or between 
Y&x. liberal and the technical. Wc regard these two ideals as 
mplementary to the larger ideal of self-realization. The 
l;present vocational tendencies in education have their meaning 
' and significance in life, although I believe it is true that this 
significHnce is not always seen even by the most enthusiastic 
advocates in such lines of work. The vocational and the cul- 
tural are simply the expressions of two different Ideals of life, 
ideals which are not essentially contradictory, but each of which 
contains a truth. The vocational tendency is quite in line 
with the expression of the doctrine of self-activity which was 
spoken of above. It may lead toward self-control and self- 

I realization and it may not. Sometimes it does lead toward 
self-realization, but quite as often it does not. The vocational 
tendencies in education will always be productive of good, 
if they arc to be regarded as natural expressions of individual 
interests and tendencies to self- activity, but which must lead 
on toward the realization of the larger and more universal 

254 '■'''^ Pliiloso/ihiriil Bush of Education 

values of life. The vocational movement will always be pro- 
ductive of harm if it fails to see its own limits. 

There is no satisfactory reason, deducible from reflection 
or experience, for supposing that vocational education need 
of necessity be narrow, and consequently fall short of the 
larger ideal of life. The practical educators must not lose 
sight of the fact that man does not live by bread alone. He 
lives the higher life on the basis of ideal values, which gain 
their significance by their comprehensive meaning for life as 
a whole. Practical education must ever be regarded not as 
an aim or an end in itself, but as the most valuable means 
for the realization of the ideal values of life for a very 
large number of individuals. There are individuals who do 
not find their highest self-realization possible through the 
pursuit of vocational or technical studies. There are others, 
however, who do find these lines of work most conducive to 
their highest degree of self-realization. There is a large class 
of individuals who find their own highest self-realization pos- 
sible through the pursuit of the more liberal, or wrongly 
called, cultural lines of study. There is no subject which 
deserves to be called cultural that does not promote in the 
individual who pursues it the ideal values of truth, beauty, 
goodness, and religion. And on the other hand every subject 
which does promote the realization of these ideals in life de- 
serves to be called cultural in the best sense of this word. 

There is, then, no conflict between the vocational and the 
cultural, or between the liberal and the technical ideals 
education. The only conflict lies in the unclear thinking 
the individuals who swing to the one extreme or the otht 
There is a balance possible between these ideals, but such 
balance can be realized only when we take the larger view 
education, such as I believe to be expressed in terms of self- 

The great trouble with us in our modem day Is in striking 
the balance between the liberal and the technical, between 
the vocational and the cultural. The vocational and technical, 
or what are often called the practical phases of education, 
should be regarded simply as means for the development of 
the individual's own chief interests and purposes in life, and 
through this development he must be led to see the higher 

The Relation of this Ideal to Educational Practice 255 

^P Ideal values of life. Indeed it becomes his chief duty to 1 

^B realize these ideals in his own practical work. There f 

^M grave danger in the complexitj- of modern industry that the 

^P practical work leads to a narrow view of life, and conse- 

^P quently closes the doors to the individual who would attain 

^r the ideal values of life. I do not see that such a condition 

is inevitable, however. If we regard our technical and our 

practical life in its relation to life as a whole, we see 

these parts in their proper significance and value. We thus 

restore to each fragment of our experience its meaning through 

our perception of its relation to the whole of which it is part. 

It is just this training of the individual that enables him 

to perceive each fragment of experience in its relation to the 

whole that gives life its significance and value. There is, 

then, no reason for regarding the industrial occupations as 

necessarily narrow, and there is no more reason for regard- 

Iing the so-called cultural or liberal subject as broad. Indeed, 
Bome of the liberal subjects are narrow and contracted for cer- 
tain individuals, whose lives gain significance in both breadth 
Mid depth, if they were allowed to turn their attention in 
the direction of some practical line of work. The distinction 
between vocational and cultural, or liberal and technical, edu- 
cation must either be given up entirely, or else we must dis- 
tinguish more clearly than we have done in modern practice 
between the views. 
10 Summary. Let us now briefly survey the contents of 
this chapter in order that we may see more clearly its signifi- 
cance for the whole. In attempting to show the relations 
between the aim of self-realization and educational practice 
based upon this aim, we began by pointing out some significant 
relations between theory and practice generally. We con- 
cluded that theory and practice are not contradictory. Theory 
is rather the attempt to explain the meaning of the frag- 
mentary parts of our experience. It is the true theorist who 
sees each element of our experience in its relation to the 
whole. It is, therefore, the theorist who is most likely to see 
things in their proper proportions. It is not true that the one 

twho is ultra-practical, and who does not work with a definite , 
theory in mind, is the most valuable man for society. Nor ^ 

256 Tlif PhU'isofihical Basis of Education 

is it true that this is the type of individual who is likely to 
realize his larger self to the highest degree. On the con- 
trary the man of theory is the one who is most apt to see life 
as a whole, and each part of it in its proper perspective, and, 
therefore, keep the balance and proportion whicli is necessary 
in every life and tn every part of our experience. We made 
application of his view to education and asserted that educa- 
tion, quite as much as life as a whole, is in need of a funda- 
mental theory which gives direction and significance to the 
parts of our educational experience. Indeed we saw that the 
relationship between a larger theory of life as a whole, and 
that of education as a part, is so close that in order to see 
the real meaning of our educational experience, we must 
see it in the light of a larger theory or philosophy of life. 

We attempted to break down the artificial distinction be- 
tween the actual and the ideal by showing that the actual 
stands to the ideal in the same relation that a part of our ex- 
perience stands to the whole. The actual, or the fragment of 
our experience, has meaning and significance not in itself, but 
in its relation to the whole. We next considered the value 
of an ideal for life, and showed that such an ideal is an essen- 
tial condition of a valuable life, or the essential condition for 
the development of the highest degree of character or person- 
ality is that the individual possesses a definite ideal, which en- 
ables him to formulate a plan of life. He must be allowed to 
carry this plan of life out in accordance with his own individual 
Interests and purposes, through his own activity, or the 
exercise of his own instinctive interests and capacities or abili- 
ties. It is through such self-activity that he comes to express 
judgment as to the value of his acts, and consequently to de- 
velop a sense of self -responsibility and self-control through 
which the ideal of self-realization is made possible. 

We regard it as the chief business of the school to conform 
to this ideal, and to assist each pupil in developing a plan of 
life, in accordance with his own interests and purpose, and 
through the recognition of the significance of each part and 
fragment of experience to that of the whole. This plan of 
life may be worked out best by some individuals in the pursuit 
of the vocational and the practical ideal, while others may 
best attain their ideal in life through the pursuit of the cultural 

The Relation of this Ideal to Eduralionnl Pra 


rand liberal studies of the program, which are not so directly 
concerned with the occupations of life. We are to take ac- 
count of these differences in individuals in the formation and 
administration of our program of studies, otherwise we will 
fall short in the case of others. We do not regard vocational 
or cultural education as contradictory in any sense. Such a 
confusion arises in unclear thinking. They are only different 
ways of arriving at the same goal, the ideal values of life, 
through which alone we are able to perceive life in its signifi- 
3 realize the highest degree of self-realization 
through individual work. Professor Findlay aptly remarks 
riiat "If in modem time a sharp antithesis has been discovered 
between liberal and technical education it is only because men 
.have failed to see how intimate is the alliance between the 
[ two; the ends both of vocation and of leisure need to be pursued 
if not always in conjunction". {The School, p. 
157.) Dutton and Sneddon utter what seems to me to be a 
J vital truth when they say that "Vocational efficieni^ is funda- 
mental to cultural and social efBciencv," {Admin, of Pub. 
[ £du. in U. S.) 




I The Teacher As a Factor in the Educational 
Process. In this chapter we are to concern ourselves with 
the teacher and the recitation as factors in the educational pro- 
cess. In the following chapter we shall be concerned pri- 
marily with the school organization as a factor in this process. 

The teacher must always be regarded as a fundamental 
factor in the process of education. She is the artist who 
brings about the proper adjustment between aims and means 
in education. We have noted already how important the 
function of supervision is in the educational process. There 
must be some one who keeps his eye on the ideal goal to be 
realized throughout the educational process, and he must be 
able to see the means, methods and organization necessary to 
effect the purposes he sets out to reach. But in the last analysis 
it is true that the teacher plays the important role of actually 
adjusting means to ends so far as the classroom is concerned, 
and we must here assert that no amount of organization will 
take the place of the real teacher. On the other hand, it 
must not be forgotten that the best teacher can realize the 
highest possibilities only through effective organization, that 
is, organization well adapted to the realization of the aims 
for which the school exists. 

The pupil- teacher-con tact which is possible in education to 
a higher degree than anywhere else, is the most important 
point of contact between the school and the pupil. It is 
the recitation which provides the best opportunity for develop- 
ing this relationship, unless it he on the playground. But 
with the older pupils the playground does not afford as good 
an opportunity for the development of the proper relationship 
between pupil and teacher as does the recitation. The recita- 
tion has always been regarded, and must always be regarded, 

The Teacher and the Recitation 


as a very important factor in the realization of whatever aims 
the school strives for. Professor Palmer speaks to the point 
when he says, "So conditional on morality is the process of 
knowing, so inwrought is it in the very structure of the school, 
that a school might well be called an ethical instrument and 
its daily sessions hours for the manufacture of character." 
(Palmer: Moral Inst, in the Schools, p. 2g) But it must 
not be forgotten that the most important factor in the recita- 
tion viewed from one side, is the teacher herself. The teacher 
with her broader experience and more completely developed 
self, should he in a position to understand the pupil and his 
needs better than he understands himself, and this understand- 
ing should lead to a greater interest, sympathy, and apprecia- 
tion of the child and his point of view. The most important 
obligation which rests upon the teacher as a factor in the edu- 
cational process is to assist pupils to find themselves, to help 
them find out their own deeper purposes in life. It is only 
through such discovery that the pupil's real native capacities- 
and abilities may be developed, and consequently his larger 
self realized. There is no obligation that rests upon the 
teacher greater than that of helping the pupil to make this 
self discovery. In fact all of the organizations, machinery, 
and recitations of the school system are as means to this aim 
which we have defined as the highest aim of every individual 
life. Professor Ladd, I take it, means the same thing when 
he says, ". . . . the culminating function of the professional 
teacher is the making of a person, or self". (Teacher's Phil- 
osophy, p. 134) 

The teacher must not only view the child from her own 
larger experience which enables her to see his capacities and 
powers, but she must realize fully that it is her primary func- 
tion to help the child to see these possibilities for himself. The 
teacher cannot always determine the capabilities of the child. 
This must be determined by the interests and purposes of the 
child as manifested through his activities in school life. The 
things to which he gives his attention are those things which 
more than likely will aid most in his process of self-realization. 
It is the business of the teacher to make these discoveries as 
to the pupil's chief interests and then help the pupil to realize 
them himself. In its best sense this is what we mean by 

26o TAf Philmnphiail Bmis of Edurathn 

individiiiil reaction to experience of the school life. The 
teacher must help the child to find the center of his own in- 
terests and purposes in life, and from this aspect to view all 
of life's Mperience. 

1 am not advocating over-specialization, or premature spe- 
cialization, but 1 do urge that every individual be led through 
the influence of the teacher and the process of education gen- 
erally to find his central interest in life, and once he has found 
this interest the teacher must help the individual to view life 
as a whole from this angle. In no other way is connected 
and related experience possible. We have seen already that 
life has no value except in its relation to our will and pur- 
pose as the center and ultimate reality of life and the uni- 
verse, and we must not forget this broader truth when we step 
into the practical H'ork of the class-room. The teacher can 
never afford to give up her primary function in life, that is 
helping immature beings to find their own deeper wills and 
purposes, in other words to find the things in life in which 
they have the greatest interests, and through these interests to 
assist the individual in realizing the larger values which are 
over-individual and ideal, and hence universal in their nature. 
The highest degree of self-realization is possible not until we 
have reached these superior heights of ideal values. We have 
only begun the process of self-realization so far as the pupil 
is concerned when we have helped him to find his purpose in 
life. We must go on and help him to see how the larger and 
more ideal values of life are to be attained through the ex- 
pression of this individual interest. 

It is the function of school supervision to keep constantly 
in mind the relation between aims and means and to keep the 
whole system of education moving in the direction of the 
proper ideal of life. It is the business of the class-room 
teacher to take part in this great process, and upon her rests 
the responsibility of immediately assisting the child toward 
this highest degree of self-realization, through the wider ex- 
perience of the school and the influence of the teacher and 

2 The Recitation As a Factor In the Educational 
Process. We have noted already the importance of the 

The Teacher and the Recitation 



of the race. It 1 

I to the present. 

[recitation as a factor in the educational process. We must j 

suggest that it is in the recitation that the teacher realizes 

I large degree her chief function as a teacher. It is here 

that the teacher brings together the aims of education, and 

the means through her own activity as a teacher, and it is also 

[ in the recitation that the teacher has the best opportunity 

, through the self-expression of the individual pupils to help 

I them find their own interests and purposes in life. The recita- 

• tion also aflords an opportunity for interchange of ideas, and 

for discussion which make it possible to see our own purposes 

more clearly and to define our deeper relationship to the world 

in which we live. 

Through the subjects offered in the program of study it is 
' at a broader conception of the experience 
5 possible to see the failures and successes of 
nd to see what contributions they have made 
We are thus able to get a larger view of 
\ the universe, and through this perspective to see our own rela- 
L tions to it more clearly, and this aids to a very large degree 
' I the determination of our own purpose in the world. It is 
I the recitation that these facts and these larger views arc 
f brought to light through discussion. I am led to say that the 
V primary function of the recitation as a factor in the educa- 
I tional process is to provide an opportunity for the free ex- 
l pression of the individual opinion, and for the mutual dis- 
Icussion of topics that have a common interest. It is through 
ich free expressions and discussion that we come into posses- 
sion of our own better self. The recitation carried on in 
this fashion will not stop with a mere consideration of the 1 
facts and laws of our experience, but it will go on to a con- ' 
sideration of their meaning. 

If the recitation stops short of bringing the pupil into a 
and more sympathetic relation with his environments 
[ and the world in which he lives, it has missed its real purpose. 
1 It seems to me to be really pathetic, when I observe a 
[ teacher who seems to have as her highest aim in the recita- 
I tion that of imparting certain knowledge of facts and laws 
> of our experience. We have noticed already that this casual 
lyiew of the world is essential, but it is only a means to an 
tend and must not be substituted for the end itself. We 

362 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

should not stop with the knowledge of facts and laws, but 
show their meaning and siEnifitance for life. This is the only 
way that we can make our recitation work have real signifi- 
cance. Facts in themselves, and the laws governing these facts, 
do not have any meaning for life except in so far as they are 
viewed in the light of life as a whole. But it is so easy to 
forget this when you get into the class-room. Often we con- 
gratulate ourselves on the fact that our pupils have learned 
much from certain books, not stopping to ask ourselves whether 
or not they see the relation of these facts for life, or whether 
the knowledge so derived leads the pupil to heights from which 
he can see his own relation to life, in other words to attain 
the ideal of self-realization. 

We must sooner or later get over this pernicious habit of 
substituting means for ends, and it is in the hope that such 
distinction may he made clearer that this volume has been 
written. There is no real excuse for such confusion. The 
knowledge of facts can never be substituted for the real aim 
of education. It is often so substituted for the very reason 
that some end or other must be striven for and if our insight 
is not sufficiently penetrating to see the real aim of life wc 
substitute for this real aim an artificial one. That is, we 
substitute a means for the end and reap the disaster which 
inevitably follows unclear thinking. The future of our educa- 
tional experience H'ill bring to light more clearly the folly 
of such confusion and it will point to a new day when a 
dearer vision will eliminate all such confusion. Then, and 
not until then, the aims and means will find their respective 
places as whole and part in the universal process of life. 

3 Education Through Directed Spontaneous Activ- 
ity, We have suggested the importance of the teacher and of 
the recitation in the educational process. It must now be em- 
phasized that the only way through which the recitation may 
serve as a valuable means to self-realization is through that 
of self-activity. Every child is endowed with certain inter- 
ests and instinrts which motivate his being. It is the business 
of the teacher to discover these spontaneous activities and give 
them shape and guidance. Self-activity alone will not reach 
the aim of life. There is no assurance that self-activity or 

~ The Teacher and the Recitation 263 

unguided play will even assist the individual toward his high- 
est self-realization. On the other hand his immaturity points 
to a certain deficiency in his nature and suggests the necessity 
for supplementing this deficiency by the larger aid of the larger 
experience of the teacher. If the individual is ever to realize 
his ideal through activity or play, it will not be through free 
or undirected play. The activity of the individual must always 
be directed toward a definite goal. It is not by activity or play, 
but directed activity through play that the child will attain 
his ideal. We have already gone too far in the matter of 
free and unrestricted play of children. We do not want 
hampered activity to be sure, but vi*e do want the activity 
of the child to be so directed and governed that his possibili- 
ties of self-realization will increase thraugh the exercise of 
this part of his nature. I believe that Montessorism has al- 
ready done or will do an important service for education. 
I do not believe that this service is in the direction that a 
great host of people seem to think. On the other hand I 
believe that this pedagogical doctrine will point to the folly of 
undirected play. We must guide the child, and the only ex- 
cuse for such guidance is the fact that he is not able himself 
to take charge of bis own direction. Now it is not only with 
the younger children that this statement applies. Some who 
are beyond the age we call children are still in need of this 
help and direction. Without it the possibilities that the 
individual will find his true purpose in life, his larger self, 
will be greatly decreased. 

Impression and Expression, The teacher and the 
Bcitation will perform their service as factors in the educa- 
lal process only when we take account of the important 
principle that such direction and guidance as has been sug- 
gested above is regarded as absolutely essential to the end 
that the individual may find himself. 

The fundamental point in method is that the child be 
given an opportunity to express his own interests. Much 
harm has been done by forcing children to conform to certain 
cramped methods of speech and certain restricted modes of 

I expression. We must get away from all this nonsense and 
jittempt to find out what the child's own real interest in life 


264 The riiilosophirnl Basis of Education 

is, and allow him to exen-ise this interest in his own way. As 
teachers we cannot assist pupils to find their own purpose until 
their interests are discovered through individual initiative. The 
child must first express himself before his own interests and 
purposes can be determined, and such interests must be de- 
termined before any high degree of self-realization is pos- 
sible, for self-realization is possible only through the develop- 
ment of the individual's own inner purpose or interests in life. 

In our school work impression and expression must go to- 
gether. There has been too much impression and too little 
expression in the past, with the result that the impressions 
have not been as lasting as they should have been, or at least 
have not contributed as much as they should in the develop- 
ment of the individual's own interests and will. When once 
we have found the child's interests we must assist him to free 
and unrestrained activity in the realization of the ideal values, 
which realization is possible only in so far as we take account 
of these individual interests. Instead of making the chief 
methods of the recitation that of impression, it would be better 
if we would reverse the process and give more attention to ex- 
pression, for it is only through expression that the child can 
be led to find himself. This is our only source of help in 
finding out the real interests of the child. If he never said 
anything or did anything in life, how could we find out his 
purpose ? It is not true that the child is to be seen and 
not heard. On the contrary we must see and hear much of 
him if we are to stand as his guide and teacher in life. 

It is not to be inferred from the foregoing that there is 
no limit to the amount of help that the teacher should give 
the pupil. On the contrary there is grave danger lest too 
much help of the wrong kind be given, and that the will of 
the child he left flabby and incapable of self-direction. As we 
have noted, this self-direction is indispensable to a high degree 
of self-realization. There is no better way of developing 
self-control and initiative than through that of affording ample 
opportunity for self-expression. And this is desirable, for with- 
out it the child cannot be led toward the highest ideal of edu- 
cation which is the realization of the highest values of life. 
Impression and expression arc not different processes, but 
rather they are the opposite aspects of a larger process of the 

The Teacher and the Recitation 


recitation. It would be dangerous to separate the two. They 
are complementary processes and must never be isolated any 
more than the logical methods of analysis and synthetics should 
be separated. The child learns by doing, for in so doing he 
is given an opportunity to express himself. The inner and 
the outer world of the child must not be separated, but rather 
they must evolve together. A child is bound to get a false 
notion of the universe as soon as he is led to make too sharp 
a distinction between himself and the world about him. On 
the other hand it is through the exercise of himself in his rela- 
tions to this environment, to the universe of which he is a part, 
that there evolves in his mind a higher conception of his rela- 
tion to the universe as a part of the organic whole. 

All the immediate aims of the class recitation must allow 
for free and full expression of the pupil. In our teaching of 
. new facts we must offer an opportunity for reaction on the 
t part of the pupil, and it is only through such reaction that we 
\ perceive the relation of these facts to the larger world of ex- 
I perience. In our testing and drilling as well as our teaching, 
■ we must offer freer opportunity for the expression of indi- 
vidual initiative. We have noted already that we are different 
by nature and surroundings, and these individual differences 
always be taken account of in the attempt to realize the 
special aims of the class-room which have been designated as 
teaching, testing, and drilling. We must harmonize our con- 
I ccption of all of these aims in their relation with the ultimate 
aims of self-realization. Teaching is not merely the cramming 
of facts; it is rather the conception of the relation of the 
individual facts to the larger stock of knowledge which the 
pupil already possesses. 

The Doctrine of Interest and Appercepteon. In 
the section above we have suggested the importance of the 
knowledge which the pupil already has. This is another way 
of stating what the psychologist means when he says that in 
teaching we must always bear in mind the law of appercep- 
tion. We cannot teach new facts unless we show their rela- 
tion to the old, and this relation can be perceived only 
far as the new facts can be interpreted in the light of what 
: child alreadv knows and understands, as a result of hi! 




The Philosoplikal Basis of Educatio 

interaction with his environment, through the free expression 
of his own individual it}'. 

The doctrine of interest is essential in the process of teach- 
ing. It is not possible for us to teach a child new facts unless 
he take account of what he knows already; in other words, 
unless we recognize the law of apperception. Neither is it pos- 
sible for us to teach the child new knowledge unless wc take 
account of the laws of interest. The child is interested in 
that which relates to his own experience. If we take proper 
account of the law of apperception, there will be little diffi- 
culty in the matter of arousing interest in the subject matter 
presented to the pupil, or in the enlargement of his experience 
and the deepening of his insight into the real values of life. 
The child is interested not in the isolated fragments of life, 
but rather in those which relate to his own personality and 
experience. If wc can succeed in arousing interest in the child, 
and our only possibility of doing so is to take account of 
the laws of apperception, then we need not fear as to the 
result of our teaching. On the other hand, if we disregard 
the laws of interest, the child does not properly react; that 
is, he does not give his attention and the result is a loss of 
time and energy and the failure to place the facts of ex- 
perience before the child in such a way as to make them service- 
able in perceiving more clearly his relations to the world in 
which he finds himself. 

There is always the danger that an unwise teacher will push 
the matter of interest in the direction of purely temporary 
desires. Professor Miinsterberg remarks to the point ^hen 
he says, "The school methods which appeal always to the 
neutral desire and the involuntary attention and interest do 
not train the pupil in overcoming desires and in controlling 
attention; they please instead of commending; they teach one 
to follow the path of least resistance instead of the path of 
duty and the ideal." {Piy. and Teacher, p. 77) Professor 
Ladd says we have gone too far in the direction of making 
school instruction "attractive and easy for instructing those 
undergoing the process of education." (Teacher's Practical 
Phil., p. 78) 

6 The Problem 

Discipline. The problem 

The Teacher and the Recitation 267 

discipline vanishes as soon as we take account of the law of | 
interest. We are not likely to be troubled with a child i 
has been led to the foundation of knowledge and who there 
drinks with interest the experiences of a larger life. On the 
other hand, if the child is not interested in the work that he 
is doing, he is bound to be troublesome. Where there is no 
interest there is no center or focus of attention, no abiding 
purpose, and the result is distraction of attention with the 
consequent troubles that we call problems of disdpline. It 
was left to Herbart to point out to the world that the problem 
of discipline decreases in direct proportion as interest is 
awakened in the subject matter of instruction, and in the 
school life as a whole. The great criminals in the world are 
not those who have held clearly in mind the meaning of hfc 
and their significant relation to it. On the contrary, they 
have ignored just these es.?ential relations which the ideal of 
self-realization places on the foreground, and have regarded 
themselves for the moment of their misdeed as separated or 
isolated parts of the larger life of which they are only a part. 
Briggs says, "Once get a deep, high loyalty, and the problem 
of discipline is gone." {Routine and Ideals, p. 179.) 

We will not be able to awaken a deep interest in the child 
unless we have found the center or core of interests in his 
life. Having found this center of his life, it will be possible 
then to relate the facts of experience to his own life in such 
a way as to cause them to take on greater significance by 
showing to the individual his larger relation to his fellow men, 
and the world at large. There would be much less criminality 
in the world if the schools that have exerted an influence on 
the younger lives of these perpetrators had succeeded in help- 
ing them to find their place in life, through the expression 
of their own individuality. We seem to recognize this fact 
in modern society, but the trouble is we do it too late. After 
the individual has committed his crime, we confine him to an 
institution which provides a variety of trade and industrial 
work, and there we assist him to find himself and thus enable 
him through some work of life to make a living, with the result 
that many times criminals are cured of their evil propensities 



I through this means of treatment, or I should say, education, ^^^fl 
Why do we not do this in the schools before the evil days ^^^| 

so, we 1 

268 The Pkil>,s;pl,kal Bnsis uj Education 

have come upon these unfortunates? If we would do 
would greatly reduce the number of commitments to thi 
institutions for detinquents. But we are getting wiser, and 
no doubt we shall in the near future see our mistakes and 
rapidly make amends for them. 

7 Connected Thought and Class Method. There 

is another matter to which we must call attention at this 
point. The child will never be able to live a consistent and 
well organized life unless his thoughts have also been organ- 
ized; unless he is taught to organize and systematize his 
thinking in accordance with the fundamental principles of 
logical thought, the child will not be able after leaving school 
to think either very consistently or very deeply. He will, 
therefore, be deprived of one of the absolutely essential con- 
ditions of his own highest self-realization,— that of dear, con- 
sistent, logical thinking. It is, therefore, as important that 
the pupil's work shall be guided by a "fusing principle" {cf 
p. 141 ) as it is that the teacher he guided by such a principle. 
Professor Adler well says that "To strengthen the will, there- 
fore, it is necessary to give to the person of weak will, the 
power to think connectedly, and especially to reach an end 
by long and complex trains of ideas." {Moral Tnslniction 
of Children, p. 260) 

The habits that are developed in the child in his school 
work will follow him through life, as a general rule. The 
habit of unclear thinking is one of the habits that handicap 
an individual, and make the highest degree of his self-realiza- 
tion impossible. We must, then, exert ourselves to see that 
the methods which we employ in our classes, and all the work 
of the school, lead to the development of habits that are con- 
ducive to clear and logical thinking. A muddled or cloudy 
brain is not an instrument through which an individual is 
likely to realize the ideal values of life, or the .best interests 
even of his narrower self. If we take away from the world 
the power of clear thinking, we deprive it of the essential 
condition of human progress or development, which is pos- 
sible through individual self -development. 

All the work of the teacher, the recitation, and of the 
school as a whole, must promote in the highest possible degree 

The Tea 

ind the Recitation 

369 I 

I this ideal of clear thinking. This is one of the immediate I 

i of the school. In this connection it must be said that 
[ such dear and consistent thinking is not possible, except ; 
I it goes on in a being whose body is also properly functioning, 
or organically related throughout its parts. Clear thinking 
I and healthy bodies naturally go together. It is impossible for 
dividual to realize to the highest degree the capacity 
I for clear thinking unless his body is kept well and healthy. 
I It is, therefore, not only consistent with the idealistic concep- 
I tion of self-realization as the ultimate aim of education that 
I we have a healthy body and a clear mind, but it is made one , 
[ of the absolute conditions upon which the realization of such 
^ an ideal is possible. 

Organization of Interests. We have seen from the j 
I foregoing that it is not possible for the pupil to realize his ' 

I largest self unless the various factors of the school all co- 

I operate to the end that his interests in life be organized 

I around some definite purpose. The greatest thing that the 

school can do for the pupil is to help him find this central 

interest in life which will enable him to relate all about It. 

The most valuable asset to the development of a strong and 

noble character is that of a definite purpose or interest in 

It is through the relation of all interests to this central 

I purpose and the final relation of all of these interests of life 

to the ideal values of life as a whole, that self-realization is 

made possible and real. Professor Royce well says that "An 

apliclt personality is one which shows itself through deeds 

j that embody a coherent ideal." {ffilliam James, etc., p. ' 

I 390) I 

Much of the work in the school of to-day is of such a na- 
J ture as to prevent the development of personality instead of 
j promoting it. The work is so disorganized and the school 
an organization is so incomplete, that it is practically im- 
isible for the pupil to succeed in the development of a 
i definite line of interests. We have always noted that it is 
impossible for a person to develop a definite purpose in life 
I unless conditions are such as to aid in the development of con- j 
L sis tent logical thinking. Our class methods must he of such 
f a character as to promote this connected way of thinking. I 


270 Thr i'hilnsophifal Basis of Education 

We must teach in such a way that we take account of the 
law of apperception, always relating the work of the class to 
the pupils' interest. We must change from the logical pro- 
cedure of the past to the psychological. Up to the present 
time we have been concerned mainly in the logical de\-eIop- 
ment of subject matter, rather than with the relation of the 
subject matter to the interests and needs of the child. 

9 The Unity of Personality Through Self-Rbali- 
ZATioN. It is through the organization of the sdiool, the 
teacher, .recitation and the program of studies, as well as the 
other activities of the school, that the pupil is led to And his 
interests in life, and once having found these interests, the 
factors must co-operate to the end that the pupil be developed 
to the highest possible degree through their influence. One 
who thinks clearly and connectedly also will have a definite 
organization of life's interest and purposes. It is through such 
consistent thinking that the unity of personality is made pos- 
sible, and our aim should be to strive always for such self- 
realization, the organization of our own deeper purposes. 

ID Summary. In this chapter we have shown the vari- 
ous factors that must co-operate in the development of the 
personality of the pupil. The teacher, the recitation, the 
program of studies, all must co-operate to the end that the 
child be discovered in his real nature. Having been dis- 
covered, it is the aim of the school to assist his largest and 
most complete sc! (-development. Through directed span- 
taneous activity and the freedom of expression, the child is 
led naturally to discover his own possibilities, and once hav- 
ing discovered these, it is the business of the various factors 
of the school to help the child in the larger self-realization. 

We cannot succeed in awakening the child's interest unless 
we take account of the laws of interest and apperception. If 
we relate the experience of the race to the experience of the 
child in such a way that it becomes meaningful to him through 
his own self-expression and activity, he will appropriate this 
larger experience as part of his own rightful inheritance, and 
through the aid of this larger view of life he is brought to a 
higher degree of self-realization. The problem of discipline 

The Teacher and the Recitation 271 

vanishes as soon as we find the true interests of the child. 
We must not forget these points in our actual experience. 
We must remember that our aim is the unity of personality 
through self-expression directed toward the ideal of life. 
Through such directed activity the child may be led to a 
larger appreciation of life, and to appropriate as the most 
significant part of his experience the ideal values of life, and 
through loyal devotion to those ideals the pupil may attain the 
highest aim of life, — that of self-realization. 

In our efforts to realize this ideal, we will often make great 
mistakes, but we must not grow discouraged but loyally 
struggle on. Phillips Brooks saw well the meaning and worth 
of such loyalty to our ideal when he said, "It seems to me 
there is no maxim for a noble life like this: Count always 
your highest moments, your truest moments. Believe that 
in the time when you were the greatest and most spiritual 
man, then you were your truest self." 



I Summary, We have come now to the point when we 
must briefly summarize the result up to the present time, and 
make a few suggestions as to the future outlook for educa- 
tional theory and practice. We have come to see that educa- 
tional theory cannot be separated from a wider theory of 
life. Viewing the matter of education from the aspect of 
purpose, meaning, and value, we are concerned with the 
broader philosophy of human experience. When we view it 
from the angle of the connections of the various parts of our 
experience in an external way, we are concerned with the 
scientific aspects of education. Philosophy is concerned with 
the meaning and value of our educational experience, with 
our aims and purposes. Science is concerned with the means 
and methods whereby we realize these aims. 

We can look at education from various philosophical aspects. 
From the metaphysical point of view, we regard our educa- 
tional experience in its wider relation to reality as a whole. 
From the epistemo logical point of view, we are concerned with 
the nature and limit of knowledge. From the logical point of 
view we are concerned with the ultimate standards of truth, or 
with the wider truth relations of our educational experience. 
From the lesthetic point of view we arc concerned with educa- 
tion in its relations to the ideal of beauty. From the ethical 
point of view, we consider education in its relation to the ideal 
of goodness, or the highest aim in life. From the religious 
point of view, we are concerned with education not as a time 
and space process merely, but in its wider connections with time 
and space. Thus we see that education cannot be separated 
from the wider theory of life as a whole. It is intimately 
bound up with the normative and the descriptive sciences. 

From the descriptive point of view, we are concerned w;ilJ 

Conclusion 373 

the various means and methods to be employed in the service 
of the ideal values of life. We have spoken of these means 
as being contributed by the various descriptive sciences — 
psychology, biology, sociology, economics, and others. These 
sciences all contribute knowledge or information without which 
it would be impossible to realize in the highest degree the aim 
of education. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that 
philosophy and science are not in necessary conflict, but on 
the other hand, they are complementary aspects of life as a 
whole, philosophy offering us the aims and purposes of life, 
while the descriptive sciences give us the means through which 
they are to be obtained. We concluded that self-realization 
is the aim and chief motive of our life in its deepest will 
aspects, and that a knowledge of these sciences is necessary to 
the end that self-realization be made possible through the 
service of the ideal values of truth, beauty, goodness, and re- 
ligion. We concluded also that these ideal values are to be 
I realized by each individual in his own way. 

2 Educational Readjustment. We have expressed 
the notion that the distinctions here mentioned between aims 
and means in education, or between the normative and de- 
scriptive sciences, are not always kept clearly in mind, and 
hence confusion arises in our modern pedagogy. We have 
suggested that the only way to clear up this conflict is through 
clear pliilosophical thinking. 

Our educational system to-day is in need of re-organization, 
in order that we may take account of the best that has been 
developed through our philosophical reflection and our scien- 
tific discoveries. It is not an uncommon thing to find aims 
and means warring with each other, or to find several aims 
working at cross- purposes, nr to find means and methods un- 
wisely chosen and ill-adapted to the service of any aim, for 
the reason that these aims are not clearly held in mind. 

3 Philosophy and Science as a Basis for Educa- 
tional Theory and Practice. This reorganization which 
we have suggested as desirable and necessary, must come about 
through regarding education as a part of the larger experience 
of life as a whole. The only way to remove education from 


274 The Philoiophkal Basis of Educatl 

the basis of common sense theory, upon which it too largely 
rests at the present time, is to consider our educational ex- 
perience in the h'ght of the larger view of life, and on the basis 
of sudi reflection determine our aim or purpose. Once we 
have gone so far as to establish an aim of education consistent 
with the view of life as a whole, it will be possible for us to 
call upon the various descriptive scientists in order to ascertain 
all the knowledge which they possess, and to use this in the 
service or realization of the ideal values of life. Everywhere 
the "large underlying problem Is the same, — how to make the 
great new industrial and commercial forces the servants and 
not the masters of society." {World's fVork, Sept., igii, p. 
"479 ) 

I believe that there are signs of a better day in education. 
I think the people are coming to see the folly of relying upon 
the descriptive sciences alone to give us the meaning and value 
of life. We have learned already that such a thing is not 
possible through the descriptive sciences. 

4 Edijcational Guidance. We have seen that the chief 
business of the school is that of helping the pupil to find him- 
self, this being the necessary starting point for the most com- 
plete realization of himself in the process of education. Too 
little has been done in the past to help the individual to iina 
himself, and consequently the school often has been an in- 
effective instrument in helping the pupil to realize his truf 
purpose in life. In the future the development of our re- 
flective thinking will show us the folly of such a procedure. I 
believe the day is not far off when philosophy will con- 
tribute to the end that we regard the development of the 
child's own interests in life as the highest service which the 
school can render him, and to this end the descriptive sciences 
will be of great service. We will regard vocational guidance 
as a practical necessity and this as a result of our philosophical 
conception of the worth of the individual, and of the necessity 
of helping him to find his real meaning and purpose in life. 

5 Organization and Efficiency. Another matter 
which future development will no doubt bring about is that 
of Increased emphasis to be laid on the side of organization. 

Conclusion 2f$ 

In the past, we have overemphasized the necessity of having 
great personalities at the head of our educational system to 
the neglect of the very important matter of scientific organ- 
izatinn. I believe with Frederick Taylor, one of our great- 
est engineering experts, that the future development in the 
world at large for some time to come will hinge largely on 
the importance we attach to the factor of organization. It 
is impossible for a person to realize his largest possibilities 
as an individual unless the organization in which he finds 
himself contributes to this end also. Ineffective organization 
means the failure to adapt means to ends. In the future we 
will not find excuses for poor organization, just because wc 
think we have an important personality at the head of our 
school system. We must always stress personality, for it is 
the most valuable thing in all the world, but we must not 
forget the important fact that the more ideal values and pur- 
poses of our life are not attainable unless we select the means 
which are appropriate for the realization of these ends. 

The Schools of To-morrow. In the schools of to- 
' morrow we shall see an effective organization composed of 
the factors of teacher, pupil, parent, program of study, organ- 
ized activities, and all other factors contributing to the larger 
organizations of the school, co-operating as a unit for the 
realization of the more ideal values of life, which are to be 
seen through clearer reflective thought. The teachers in the 
schools of to-morrow will be better prepared for their work, 

I They will have both a clearer vision of the worthy aims and 
purposes of life, and a better scientific equipment as the neces- 
sary means for the realization of these ideal values of life. 
Up to the present we have left out many worthy interests 
in education are bound to assert themselves in due time and 
make reorganization necessary. Professor R, B. Perry says 
truly that, "Interests left out of account inevitably will 
assert themselves, and through their steady pressure or violent 
impact destroy the organization which has excluded them. 
Hence the need of an order that shall provide for its own 
gradual correction, stable enough for security, and pliant 
enough to yield without shock to the claims of neglected ( 
abused interests," (The Moral Economy, p. 164) 




276 The Philosophical Basis of Education 

The most vital interest that has been left out of account is 
that of the individual himself, hut the signs of the times point 
to a better day. Professor Vliinsterberg says that. "The signs 
are clear indeed that the days of idealistic philosophy, and 
of art, and of religion, are approaching; that the world is 
tired of merely connecting facts without asking what their 
ultimate meaning is. The world feels again that technical 
civib'zation alone cannot make life more worth living. The 
aim of the last generation was to explain the world; the aim 
of the next generation will be to interpret the world; the 
one was seeking laws, the other will seek ideals." (Fsycho- 
therapy, p. 3.) 

Idealism must come to the rescue of the schools, or rather 
the individual. It always has exerted a great influence, but 
it will do a yet greater service for the future. Professor Home 
asserts the same truth, when he says "Education is the pur- 
poseful providing of an environment ; at bottom it is person- 
ality in and behind the environment that counts most; so edu- 
cating is really a relation between personalities of different 
degrees of maturity, 

"If these views are correct, it is evident that idealism is 
the true philosophy in educating. The relation between 
teachers and pupils, being personal and reciprocal, is some- 
thing more than materialism either can allow or explain, than 
commercialism of trade can understand, than any form of 
egoism can attain." {Idealism in Education, Preface, p. 

Let us hope that the future will not lose sight of the in- 
dividual in the confusion of aims, and means, but rather let 
us hope that a clear vision is near at hand, and that it will 
aid in clearing up the present confusion of aims and means 
in education and restore to the individual his own rights, as de- 
fined by his relation to the universal experience, and made 
possible through his own self-realization as determined by 
the degree to which he has made the absolute values his own. 



I General Works on Science 

Cooley, Principles of Science. 
Jevons, Principles of Science. 
Pearson, Grammar of Science. 
Poincarc, The Value of Science. 

II The Scientific Aspect of Education 


Jones, Groiir As Education. 

Tyler, Grou/lh and Education. 

O'Shca, Education As Adjustment. 

Halleck, Education of the Central Nervous System. 

Donaldson, Growth of the Brain. 


De Garmo, Interest in Education. 

Home, Psychological Aspects of Education. 

Rusk, Introduction lo Experimental Education. ^^ 

Thorndyke, Educational Psychology/ (Briefer Courfe-)'^ 

Harris, Psychological Foundations of Educatmn^- 

Baldwin, Psychology Applied to the Arf*f^eachinff. 

Thorndyke, Principles of Teaching. 

Claparede, Experimental Pedagogy. 

Langc, Apperception. 



Miller, The Piychohgy of Thinking. 

Meumen, The Piychology of Learning. 

Ross, Sodal Psychology. 

Magnussen, Pifchology Applied /» Education. 

Judd. Genetic Psychology for Teacher. 

Judd, The Psychology of High School Subjects. 

Winch. Children's Perceptions. 

Welton, The Psychology of Education. 

King, Rational Living. 

CompajTC, Intellectual and Moral Development of Chil^ 

Le Bon, The Crowd. 

Titchener, Psychology of Thought Process. 

James, Talis to Teachers. 

Titchener, Psychology of Feeling and Attention, 

Arnold, Attention and Interest. 

McKcever, Psychology and Higher Life. 

Swift, Mind in the Mating. 

Keatinge, Suggestion in Education. 

Morgan, Psychology for Teachers. 

Darroch, Psychology and Common Life. 

Jacoby, Child Training as Science. 

Preycr, The Infant Mind. 

Hall, Aspects of Child Life and Education. 

King. The Psychology of Child Development. 

Miinsterberg, Psychology and the Teacher (Part II). 

Phillips, Elementary Psychology. 



Scott, Socinl Education. 
King, Social Aspects of Education. 
Dutton, Social Phases of Education. 
King, Education for Social Efficiency. 
O'Shea, Social Development and Education. 


Bain, Education as Science. 
Boone, Science of Education. 
Bolton, Principles of Education. 



Henderson, Tfxt-Boak in thf Principles of Education 
Klapper, Principles of Educational Practice. 
Ruediger, The Principles of Education. 
McMurray, Confiicting Principles in Teaching. 
Hall, Youth, Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene. 
Gesell, The Normal Child and Primary Education. 
Greenwood, Principles of Education. 
Jones, Principles of Education. 
Johnnost, Principles and Practice of Teaching. 
Raymont, Principles of Education. 
Colvin, The Learning Process. 

PART 11 

I Historical Aspects 

Alexander, B. D., A Short History of Philosophy. 

Bakewell, Source Book in Ave. Phil. 

Been, The Greek Philosophers. 

Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy. 

Dickenson, The Greek View of Life. 

Diogenes Laertius, Eminent Philosophers. 

Erdmann, History of Philosophy. 

Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of Greece. 

Gomperz, Greek Thinkers. 

Windelband, A History of Philosophy. 

Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato. 

Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus. 

Rogers, J Student's History of Philosophy. 

Watson, The Philosophy of Kant. 

Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained. 

Weber, History of Philosophy. 

Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greet Philosophy. 

II Introduction to Philosophy 

Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 
Bowne. The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. 



Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. 

Calkins, The Persisltnl Problems of Philosophy. 

Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy. 

Hoffding, The Problems of Philosophy. 

Hudson, To the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. 

Hume, Treatise of Human Nature. 

Watson, An Outline of Philosophy. 

Uberweg, History of Philosophy. 

Rogers, A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy. 

Stuclcenhcrg, Introduction to the Study of Philosophy. 

Robertson, Elements of General Philosophy. 

Rand, Modern Classical Philosophies. 

Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies. 

Perry, Approach to Philosophy. ^ 

Paulsen, Introdurtion to Philosophy. 

Kulpe, Introduction to Philosophy. 

Knightbridge, Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations. 


(See Reference List to Part I and Part II) 


I Metaphysics 
Bowne, Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles, 
Bradley, Appearance and Reality. 
Deussen, The Elements of Metaphysics. 
Fullerton, A System of Metaphysics. 
Johnson, ff^hat Is Reality? 

Lindsay, The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysi< 
Mackenzie, Outlines of Metaphysics. 
Read, The Metaphysics of Nature. 
Royce, The World and the Individual. 
Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics. 



Alexander, Foundations of Knowledge. 

Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from 

con to Aristotle. 
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. 
Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge. 
Ward, Epistemology, or The Theory of Knowledge. 

Ill Logic 

Atkins, Principles of Logic. 

Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic. 

Creighton, An Introductory Logic. 

Creighton, Knowledge and Practice. 

Hibben, Logic: Deductive and Inductive. 

Jevons, Elements of Logic. 

Lotze, Outlines of Logic. 

Mill, System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. 

Russell, An Elementary Logic. 

Ryland, Logic. 

Wellon, Logical Bases of Education. 

VVhitby, Logic of Human Character. 

IV Religious Aspects of Phii^sophy 

Bowne, Philosophy of Theism. 

Crocker, Christianity and Greek Thought. 

Dickinson, Religion and Immortality. 

Hatch, The Influences of Greek Ideas and Usages Upon the \ 

Christian Church. 
Royce, Religious Aspects of Philosophy. 
Bowne, The Essence of Religion. 


Bosanquet, History of Mstketics. 
Caffin, Art for Life's Sake. 
Griggs, The Philosophy of /irt^ the Meaning and Relatiom I 
of Sculpture, Painting, Poetry and Music. 

ato liibliography 

Hogart. The Analysu of Beauty. 
Lotite. Outlines of Esthetics. 

Milnsterberg, Art Education. 
Pufier. Psychology of Beauty. 
Raymond, Fundamentals in Education, 
Santayatia, The Sense of Beauty. 

VI Ethics 

(Sm Reference List to Part V) 

VII Pragmatism 

Bcrgson, Creative Evolution. 

Schiller, Humanism: Phil. Essays. 

Bergson, Matter and Memory. 

Bergson, Time and Free IVill. 

Bowden, The Principles of Pragmatism. 

Herbert, Le Pragmatisme et ses diverses formes angla-Ameri- 

James, A Pluralistic Universe. 
James, The Meaning of Truth. 
James, Pragmatism. 
Mackenzie, Lectures on Humanism. 
Pratt, ffhal Is Pragmatiimf 
Schiller, Studies in Humanism. 



I Ethics 
Adler, The Moral Ideal. 

Adler, The Relations of the Moral Ideal to Reality. 
Albee, History of English Utilitarianism. 
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of .Morals and 

Bownc, Principles of Ethics. 
Caird, The Theory of Ethics. 

Bibliography 283 

D'Arcy, A Short Study of Ethics. 

MacCunn, The Making of Character, 

Macpherson, Spencer and Spencerism. 

Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory. 

Mezes, Ethics: Description and Explanatory. 

Mill, Utilitarianism. 

Paulsen, A System of Ethics. 

Peabody, Approach to the Social Question. 

Ritchie, Natural Rights. 

Royce, Herbert Spencer: Estimate and Review. 

Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty. 

Ryland, Ethics. 

Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics. 

Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics. 

Sidgwick, Practical Ethics. 

Spencer, Data of Ethics. 

Spencer, The Principle of Ethics. 

Spinoza, The Ethics of Spinoza. 

Welldon, The Necomachean Ethics of Aristotle. 

Wundt, Ethics. 

II Ethical Aspects of Education 

Rosenkranz, Philosophy of Education. 

Butler, The Meaning of Education. 

Bagley, Educational Values. 

Home, Idealism in Education. 

Home, Philosophy of Education. 

Fleshman, The Educational Process. 

Miinsterberg, Psychology and the Teacher (Part I). 

Hyde, The Five Great Philosophies of Life. 

Hyde, The Teachers' Practical Philosophy. 

Kurchensteiner, Education for Citizenship. 

Brown, Educational Theories. 

Monroe, The Educational Ideal. 

Griggs, Moral Education. 

King, Personal and Ideal Elements in Education. 

Ladd, The Teachers' Practical Philosophy. 

Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty. 

Wrightj Self -Realization. 

284 Bibliography 

III Supplementary Pedagogical References 

Spencer, Education. 

Plato, Education of the Young. 

Rousseau, Emile. 

Locke, On Education. 

Adamson, Education in Plato's Republic. 

Froebel, Education of Man. 

Kant, Educational Theory. 

Comenius, The Great Didactic. 

S toner, Natural Education. 

Berle, The School In the Home. 

Palmer, The Teacher. 

Montessori, The Montessori Method. 

O'Shea, Everyday Problems in Teaching. 

Perry, Problems of the Elementary School. 

Seelejs Elementary Pedagogy. 

Ward, Montessori Method and the American School. 

Whittemore, The New Method of Education. 

Ailing- Aber, An Experiment in Education. 

Adams, Exposition and Illustration in Teaching. 

Charters, Methods in Teaching. 

Findlay, Principles of Class Teaching. 

Hamilton, The Recitation. 

McMurray, Methods of Recitation. 

Betts, The Recitation. 


Adams, John. 231, 250. Ilcrbart. T. F., 267. 

Adl«, Fcliit, 268. HobbhouK, L. T.. 250. 

AikinB, H. A., 132. Hobbs, Thomas, 186. 

AnaxaEoras, 65, 111, 114. Hoffding, Harald, 149. 

Hornr. H. II.. 104. 130, 191, 376. 

Bacon, Francis, H9. Hume, David, 114, 115. 

Bailey, H. W„ 179. Hyde, William D., 112, 136, 166, ; 

Bklwwdl. C. M., Ill, 248. 234. 
BFntfaam, Jeremiab, 186. 

Btrgaon, Henri. 117. James. William, 55. 96, 112, 116, 1 

Belts. G. H., 225. 118, 122, 135, 136, 159, 269. 

Boone, Daniel, 20, 238. Jowett. Benjamin, 108, 113. 
Boaenquet, Bernard, 13S, 138. 139. 
Bowne, Borden P., 99, 102, 105, 120, K"it. Emanuel, 114 IIS U7. 

130. 133. 144, 149. 218, 220. S?""'^?' i"''"', ^^^'.^^ 

Bradley, F. H., 114. K'OS. H. C, 154. 19t, 224. 

ir!>^, ^^r"Vl4l''- "'■ I-dd. G. T., 232. 247. 259, 266. 

Brcoks, kniip^ 271. i:^S;'^5b^.'^-16, 119. .86. 

ct^ii^l^M^B % 144 149 McLellar.. James A., 218, 228. 

rorVio p.'i.i 'i7n" ' ' ' Mill, J. S., 186. 

Cot GeorK 217 229 248 MacPhcrson. Hector, 115, 130. 

r*nwmim« 'flfn ' ' ' Montflffus. FrofesBor, 124. 

r,,.hm=n Tf F 07 iri Munslerberg, Hugo, 7, 120, 127. : 

Lusbman, H. E.. 97, 113. j^g^ 179, 191, 194. 218, 221. : 

Decartei, Rene, 116. ^^^ ^'*- 

De^. John, 111, 112. 141. 142, 21B, p^„„_ George H., 7. 107. 108, 1 

nnii r v 19(1 ^°^' ^^^- "'■ 

Uole, L. K,. 120. Parker T 149 

nr.^f^n'''':^,,^'"'???' ■ Paal^;,, Frederick. 165. 

Uullon, Samuel. 257. Peabody. F. G., 174, 184, 239. 

„ . Perry. 8. B., 121, 182, 206, 275. 

EmerBon, Harrington. 21. p|g,o^ gfi, 68, 106, 108, 111, 112. 1 

Emetlon Ephtaiin, 144. J14 119, lai, 122, 124, 125. 1 

Empedocles, 114. ,j,_ 171^ 172, 173, 174, 17B, j 

Epiciiruj, 152, 186. igv, 202. 203, 252 

Knatipag, 186. Plntinuit 153 

Eacheu. 'Rudolph. 237. pCgora; 66, 67. 77. 207. 

Ptolemy. 201. 

Faguet, Emile, 97. PuBer. Ethel D., 164, 167. 168, 1 

Ficbte. J. G., 250. Pythagoras. 125. 
Findlay. John, 238, 252. 

Fullerton, G. S„ 109, 116. Heid, Thomas. US. 

_ , _ Hoge^^ A, K.. 181. 

Gladstone, 72. Royce, Joaah. 6, 7, 116, 125. 2 

Gorgias, 113. 214, 269. 

RuskJI. Bertrand. 134. 
Hamilton, Sir William. 116. 

Harris WiUiam T., 20, 238. SanUyana. George, 69, 172, 177. ) 

Hegel, G. W, F.. 104. 219. 

HeracliluB, S3, 101, 114, IIS. Shakespeare. Wm.. 237. 

Shtpatd, Irwin, 144. 

Sbehon. H. S., 1S2. 

SIdgwick, Henrj W., IW, IIS. 13S. 

Siuddin, DaTld, 2J7. 

Sorley, W. R., 119. 

Spencer, Herbert, 73, 94, 98, IIS, 116, 

124, 1S6, 189. 
Socritteti, 10S, 112, 113, 122, 124, 201, 

202, 2*6. 
StcrniKii. fi. L., IS, 22, 128, 176. 
Stomemyer, J. Howard. HI, 268. 
Surzalo, Henry, 336. 


t wni, 101-102. 

Weeks, Ruth U.. 247. 
WelUHi. Jamei, 13S, 14Z. 
Whitehead. A. N., 238. 
Wright. Henry W., 213. 233. 


^■Ihctics, ai iden 

of the beautiful. 

iheofy, I 

-enst. 161; the 
■ rdt of. 165; 
ic^ 167: relati' 


rt'hicr''lTo, T84!"prablenn oi 172; 

iheorlo of, 173; and idealism, 174; 

and piychology, 161. 
Are. of pbilosophr, 76. 
Aim. of this book, 17; of science, 27- 

33; of philoiophy, 48. 53-60; of 

education and life, 217; and means 

of education. 217-238; of educalion 

as aelf realiiallon. 229-237. 
Analysis as scientific method, 40. 
Appearance, la. reality. 100-101. 
Appreciation, S3: the view of phiba- 

ophy, S7i ai factor in recitation, 

Art pbilosophji of, 161; philosophy 

TS. psychology of, 161-164; ideal of. 

164; standards of. 164-165; theories 

Beauty, lesthelica the e 

eational ideal, 329. ' 
Bibliography. 277-284- 
Biologicaf Science. 36. 

aaisifieation, as method of c 

Common Sense, end logic, 12( 
philosophy of religion, 144 
ssthetics. 16); and ethics. If 

™5rM-B7:°of KOpe'^of^Kien 
philosophy, 84: of method 
science and philosophy, 85. 

science, 97-98; ., _.. 

criticism of grounds of knowled 
114; of trua. logic, 13" 
lEMheticB, 161, 172; ol 
_ philosophy. 145. 149. 

vs. appreciation, S3 : and interpret 
tlon. 8S; as view of reality, BS. J 
definition, of esthetics, 160; 01 

problem of. 266-267. 

o^, 93-94*; pbiloiophy 

cia] philosophici 

itrasted. 197; 
of, 217-238, i 

normative science, 320-21U 

Dws reconciled thi 

in. Z32-237; prx _ 

of ideal of self-realkatii: 


47; (ihiloMphT giTM meanioa of, 
*S: philosophic VB. idnililic vkw 
of. 54; philoiophy iceka meaaing 
■nd value of, 78-99; scientific n 
pbiloiophial ssptxtt of, 194-195; 

■tici. 38; 
!, 67; l08ical_ 


I of. 

and dew 

and t 

. ychology, 131; and 
metaphysics. 131; and epialiniology, 
132; synenn of, 133; methods of, 
134-135: problems at, 135-136: and 
myatidam, 137; and pragmatisni, 
137: and ideah'sm. 138-139; its im- 
plication! for education, 140-142: 
and philoBoph; of rillsion. 148; and 
TBlhetica, 168-169; truth as goal of, 

Loyalty, at cxpresdon of self realiia- 

I of, 2 

Many, and the 

93-95; VB, 

view of life,' 

48; vieos the 

whole of life. 54; i 

predation, 57; scope of, 61-fi2; i 

of, 62; normatiye view of the » 

itifie and philosophic 
nd reScction, 75; age 
!13 to life. 76-79; and 

Metaphjsical, vie* 

Mrtaphyaics, as Bcl 

leeks first and 

epistemology, 108: and 
; and philosophy of re- 
; and sathetics, 167; and 

43; balance of, 44; of philosophy, 
71-75; of sdence and pbilosophv 
compared. 71, 85; of logic, 133-13S. 

f this book. 23- 

cligiOQ I 

of view, of this boot 17. 
vism. in relation to natuntllua, 
: aa theory of knowledge, 115; 
gion of, 153. 

ical, ETgnlticance of self r»Il»- 
I aa the educational ideal 


PractiFC, retUion to theory, 23S-240J 
philosophy «od science as baaii of 
educational theory and practice, 

Prasmatism, aa theory of knowledge, 
116; and logic, 137; religion of, 
155; ethics of. 189-190. 

Problem, lime and ^lace, 103; mind 

102; Infinite. 103; self, 104; God| 
immortality and the soul, 104; of 
logic, US-137; of ethics, 185; of 
discipline, 266-267. 

Psychology, as science, 36; relation to 
epislemology. 109; and logic, 131. 

Purpose, the absolute will, lOl-IOZ; 
vs. facts in life, 203-204; as the 
highest good or will, 207-206. 


y of knowledge. 


RealisDi, as theory of knowledge, 116. 

Readjustment, educaCioniil. 273. 

Reality, the metaphysical view of ex- 
perience 65; the goal of metaphys- 
ics, 99; »». appearance, 100-10!; of 
abeolute will, 101; of the ideal of 
self realiutlon. 214. 

and philosophy, ?7. 
Redtillan, and the teichi 

of, 263-265; interest and 
appreciation in, 265-266; connected 
thought in, 26B-269; as organiiation 
and development of interest, 267. 

, Z39-2< 

n, 29, 32, 
.. . -). 33, 33, 
ion. 30; as applied 

33, 40; 
40; as f, 
knowledge, 31; aim of, 27- 

scope or field of. 35-39; physical, 

35; biological, 

36; social 37; 

of. 40 

iethnds"of. 40-44; obi.. _ 

:thad of, 40; stages of. 40; 

is and synlheais a» '-^- 

' ' -' d deduc 

nental method, 42; 
tion, 43; age of. 45; and reason. 46; 
Increases facilities of life, 47; «nd 
meaning, 47; relations to life. 45- 
49; as panial view of life. 54; of 
metaphysics. 65; of knowledge, epis- 
lemalogy, 66; logic as. 67; of right 
conduct, ethics. 68; of S!sthetics, the 
beautiful, 69; relation of adentiSc 
and phJIoBophic method, 71; and 
philosophy compared, 83-87; scope 
in relation to philosophy, 84; meth- 
-■•- -' --' -■ -hilosophy c— 

ed, 85; 

1 for 

nee, 46; ophy of religion, 145; and ethics, 
181; as basia of educational theory 
2S8-271; and practice 273. 
process, Scientific, view of life, 194. 
ipres»on Scope, of science. 35-39; of philos- 
Eresl and ophy. 61-70; of science and philos- 
ophy compared, B4. 
Self, metaphymcs of, 104. 
" F. 250-251. 

Self R< 

aocUl _-,— „ 

this ideal, 214; eompreheosi' 

aspects. 209-213; nality of 

leal. Z|- ■- ■ - 

f. 231-232; 

Religion, pbiloaopbical bB«s of. 69; 
philosophy of, definition. 143; phi- 
losophy of, 143-157; educational im- 
plicalloo. 15B; and science, 145: and 
meiaphysicA 146; and epistemology, 
147; and logic, 148; and ethics, 148- 
149; philoBOphiea of. 149; of Plal- 
onism, 147; of NeoplalonW. 150; 
of Epicureanism, 151; of Stoicism, 
153; of Positivism, naturalism, and 
materialism, 153-154; of Mysticism, 
154; of Pragmatinn, 155; of Ideal- 
ism. 156-157; philosophy and «s- 
Ibedcs, 169-170; and ethics, 183. 

self regponsibillty. 250-251; > 

prises truth, beauty, f--'--- 

religion as ideal valncs, 

unity of personality. 2 
Self Responsibility. 250-2 
Scepticism, as denial of t 

Social. I 

ual aspects of self I 

rraiuation. evfiU; and individual I 
vitwB of education reconciled 1 
through self realisation. 232-237. 

Social Sciences, history jind sociology, I 
37. ■ 

Sociology, as social acleiue. 37. 

Socrates. prc-Soc ratio ethics, 
post-Socralic ethics. 201-202. 

Soul, metaphysical problem, 104. 



Space, and the phenomenal world, 35, 

Spontaneous Acttrity, education 

through, 262-263. 
Stoicism, religion of, 152; ethics, 187- 

Supervision, function of from point 

of view of ethics, 225-227. 
Sjmthesis, as scientific method^ 40. 
Systems, of logic, 133; of ethics, 185. 

Teacher, and recitation, 258-271; as 
factor in educational process, 258- 

Theory, relation to practice, 238-245; 
as explanation of educational ex- 
perience, 240-241; philosophy and 
science as basis of educational the- 
ory and practice, 273. 

Thii^ng, relation to logic, 67; meta- 
physical basis of, 96. 

Thought, class recitation should de- 
velop connection of, 114, 268. 

Time, and the phenomenal world, 35, 

To-morrow, schools of, 275-276. 
Truth, as aim of logic, 135; the edu- 
cational ideal, 229. 

Whole, ideal and real as whole and 
part, 242-245. 

Will, as good or purpose,. 207-208. 

World, as description and apprecia- 
tion, 53. 

Value, of experience as aim of philos- 
ophy, 78-79; of life, 205-207; the 
ideal values of truth, beauty, good- 
ness and religion united in id€al of 
self realization, 229-230. 

Viewpoints, of philosophy, 64. 

Vocational, reconciliation of vocation- 
al and cultural ideals, 253-254. 

Voluntaristic Idealism, cardinal prin- 
ciple of, 101; in relation to will or 
purpose, 101-102. 

Unity, of personality through self 
realization, 270-271; of thought 
teaching, 114, 268. 



370,1 .S661 C.1 

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