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THE 


PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW 


EDITED  BY 

J.    E.    CREIGHTON   AND   ERNEST   ALBEE 

OF    THE    SAGE   SCHOOL   OF   PHILOSOPHY,    CORNELL   UNIVERSITY 

WITH   THE  COOPERATION  OF 

JAMES   SETH 

OF   THE   UNIVERSITY    OF    EDINBURGH 


VOLUME  XIII  — 1904 


NEW  YORK 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
1904 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1904,  by  the 

TREASURER  OF  CORNELL  UNIVERSITY 
in  the  Office  of  the  librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


PRESS  of 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRIKTIKG  COMPANY. 
LANCASTER,  PA. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  XIII. 


ARTICLES. 

PAGE. 

BAWDEN,  H.  HEATH.  —  The  Meaning  of  the  Psychical  from  the 

Point  of  View  of  the  Functional  Psychology  .  .  .298 
CREIGHTON,  J.  E.  — Purpose  as  a  Logical  Category  .  .  .  284 
DEWEY,  JOHN.  —  The  Philosophical  Work  of  Herbert  Spencer  .  159 
HUSIK,  ISAAC. — ;  On  the  Categories  of  Aristotle  .  .  .  514 
DE  LACUNA,  THEODORE.  —  Ethical  Subjectivism  .  .  .  642  * 
LEIGHTON,  J.  A.  —  The  Infinite  New  and  Old  .  .  -497 

PILLSBURY,  W.  B.  —  The  Psychological  Nature  of  Causality        .  409 
PROCEEDINGS  of  the   Fourth   Annual   Meeting  of  the    Western 

Philosophical  Association 529 

PROCEEDINGS   of  the  Third  Annual  Meeting  of  the  [American 

Philosophical  Association 176 

RITCHIE,  E.  — The  Reality  of  the  Finite  in  Spinoza's  System    .      16 
ROGERS,  A.  K.  —  Rationality  and  Belief  .         .         .         -30 

11          "       — Scepticism 627 

ROYCE,  JOSIAH. — The  Eternal  and  the  Practical        .         .         -113 

SANTA YANA,  G. — What  is  ^Esthetics  ? 320 

SINGER,  E.  A.  —  On  Mechanical  Explanation  .         .  .265 

SPILLER,      GUSTAV.  —  Voluntarism     and     Intellectualism :     A 

Reconciliation          .         .         .          .         .         .         .         .420' 

WARD,  JAMES. — The  Present  Problems  of  General  Psychology  .   603 
WASHBURN,  MARGARET  FLOY. — A  Factor  in  Mental  Develop- 
ment        .   622  - 

WATSON,  JOHN.  — Aristotle's  Posterior  Analytics. 

I.   Demonstration        ...  i 

II.   Induction       .          .          .          .  .    143 

WOODBRIDGE,  F.  J.  E.  —  Jonathan  Edwards     .  .         .   393 

DISCUSSIONS. 

ANDRUS,  GRACE  MEAD.  — Professor  Bawden's  Interpretation  of 

the  Physical  and  the  Psychical.        .  429 
"         "  "       — Professor  Bawden's  Functional  The- 

ory :    A  Rejoinder         .          .          .   660 


iv  CONTENTS. 

BAKEWELL,  CHARLES  M.  — A  Rejoinder  .  .  342 

«  «         "  — Professor     Strong    on     the    Passing 

Thought  .          .          .          -552 

BAWDEN,  H.  HEATH.  — The  Physical  and  the  Psychical     •         .  541 
DE  LAGUNA,  THEODORE.  —  Evolutionary  Method  in  Ethical  Re- 
search                        •  32& 

PRINCE,  MORTON.  —  The  Identification  of  Mind  and  Matter.      .  444 

STRONG,  C.  A. — Reply  to  Professor  Bakewell          .  .  337 

"  "       —  Professor  Bakewell  on  the  Ego      .  .  5  46 

BOOK  REVIEWS. 
BAIN,    ALEXANDER.  —  Dissertations   on    Leading   Philosophical 

Topics 46r 

BALDWIN,  J.    MARK,  AND    OTHERS.  —  Dictionary  of  Philosophy 

and  Psychology       .          .         .          .          .          .          .          -57 

BUSSE,  LUDWIG.  —  Geist  und  Korper,  Seele  und  Leib  .  .  68 
COHEN,  HERMANN. — Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnis  .  .  .207 
CRESSON,  ANDRE.  —  La  morale  de  la  raison  theorique  .  -65 
DEWEY,  JOHN,  AND  OTHERS.  — Studies  in  Logical  Theory  .  .  666 
DORNER,  A.  —  Grundriss  der  Religionsphilosophie  .  .  .564 
EVERETT,  CHARLES  CARROLL.  —  The  Psychological  Elements  of 

Religious  Faith         .         .          .          .          .         .          .          .72 

HALDANE,  RICHARD  BURDON.  —  The  Pathway  to  Reality  .  -51 
KRONENBERG,  M.  —  Kant  :  Sein  Leben  und  seine  Lehre  .  -358 
LIPPS,  THEODOR.  —  ^Esthetik,  Psychologic  des  Schonen  und  der 

Kunst ;  Erster  Teil  :  Grundlegung  der  ^Esthetik  .  -677 
MERZ,  JOHN  THEODORE.  — A  History  of  European  Thought  in 

the  Nineteenth  Century    .......   566 

MOORE,  GEORGE  EDWARD. — Principia  Ethica  .         .         -351 

RENOUVIER,  CHARLES.  — Le  personnalisme  suivi  d'une  etude  sur 

la  perception  externe  et  sur  la  force  .  .  .  .  .212 
ROYCE,  JOSIAH. — Outlines  of  Psychology  .  .  .  .229 
SABATIER,  ARMAND. — Philosophic  de  1' effort:  Essais  philoso- 

phiques  d'un  naturaliste    .          .          .          .          .          .         -569 

STEIN,  LUDWIG.  —  Der  Sinn  des  Daseins  :    Streifziige  eines  Opti- 

misten  durch  die  Philosophic  der  Gegenwart  .  .  .456 
STRONG,  C.  A.  — Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body  .  .  .  .220 
WALLACE,  ALFRED  RUSSELL.  — Man's  Place  in  the  Universe  .  560 

WARD,  LESTER  F. — Pure  Sociology 347 

WUNDT,   WILHELM.  —  Grundziige  der  physiologischen  Psychol- 
ogic.    Bande  III  und  IV,  Fiinfte  Auflage  .          .         .452 


CONTENTS.  v 

PAGE. 

WUNDT,  WILHELM.  —  Ethik  :   Eine  Untersuchung  der  Tatsachen 

und  Gesetze  des  Sittlichen  Lebens.    Dritte  Auflage      .          .681 

SUMMARIES  OF  ARTICLES. 

ADICKES,  ERICH. — Auf  wem  ruht  Kants  Geist  ?         .          .          -472 
ALEXEJEFF,  W.  G.  —  Uber  die  Entwickelung  der  hoheren  arith- 
mologischen  Gesetzmassigkeit  in  Natur-  und  Geisteswissen- 

schaften 690 

BAIRD,  W.  J.  — The  Influence  of  Accommodation  and  Conver- 
gence on  the  Perception  of  Depth 242 

BALDWIN,  J.  MARK. — The  Limits  of  Pragmatism  .  .  .236 
BAUSCH,  BRUNO.  —  '  Naiv  '  und  '  Sentimentalisch  '  —  '  Klassisch ' 

und  '  Romantisch '  .          ...          .          .          .         -          -377 

BELOT,  G. — La  veracite 96 

"       "  — Les  principes  de  la  morale  positiviste  et  la  con- 
science contemporaine          .  .          .          .    244 

BENEDICT,  W.  R.  —  Religion  as  an  Idea 89 

BINET,  A. — De  la  sensation  a  T intelligence     ....   579 

BONNIER,  P. — Le  sens  du  retour     .         .         .         .         .         .240 

BOUGLE.  — La  democratic  devant  la  science      .         .          .         -375 
BRADLEY,  F.  H.  —The  Definition  of  Will,  III.         .          .         .47° 

BREUER,  J.  — Senecas  Ansichten  von  der  Verfassung  des  Staates  376 
CALKINS,  M.  W.  —  The  Order  of  the  Hegelian  Categories  in  the 

Hegelian  Argument  .......     84 

CANTECOR,  G.  —  La  science  positive  de  la  morale  .  .  .  694 
CLAPAREDE,  EDOUARD. — The  Consciousness  of  Animals  .  -578 
DARLU,  A.  — La  morale  de  Renouvier  .  .  .  -374 

DAURIAC,  L.  —  Le  testament  philosophique  de  Renouvier  .  .582 
DAVIDSON,  WILLIAM  L.  —  Professor  Bain's  Philosophy  .  .  698 
DESSOIR,  MAX. — Anschauung  und  Beschreibung  .  .  581 

DUFF,  R.  A.  —  Proverbial  Morality 244 

DUMAS,  G.  —  Saint-Simon,  pere  du  positivisme  .  .  .  696 
EVELLIN,  F.  — La  raison  et  les  antinomies,  III.  .  .  47 2 

EVELLIN,  J. — La  dialectique  des  antinomies  kantiennes  .  .82 
FAIRBROTHER,  W.  H.  — The  Relation  of  Ethics  to  Metaphysics  374 
FITE,  WARNER.  —  The  Place  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  in  the  Func- 
tional Psychology  ....  .241 
FRANCKE,  KUNO.  —  Emerson  and  German  Personality  .  .  99 
FRANCKEN,  WIJNAENDTS.  — Psychologic  de  la  croyance  en  I'im- 

mortalite  .          .          .          .242 


vi  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

GEISSLER,   KURT.  —  1st   die  Annahme  von   Absolutem   in   der 

Anschauung  und  dem  Denken  moglich  ?    .          .          .          -367 
GOBLOT,  E.  —  La  finalite  en  biologic 

GORE,  GEORGE.  — The  Coming  Scientific  Morality    .  .   695 

GRANGER,  FRANK.  —  The  Right  of  Free  Thought  in  Matters  of 

Religion  .          .          .          .          .          .  .          -97 

GRASSET,  J. — La  sensation  du  '  deja  vu  '  .          .          .          -239 

HALL,  T.  C. — Relativity  and  Finality  in  Ethics       .          .          .    243 
VON  HARTMANN,  E.  —  Mechanismus  und  Vitalismus  in  der  mod- 

ernen  Biologic       .          .          .  85 

"  "  "  — Energetik,  Mechanik,  und  Leben  .          .   689 

HOUSSAY,  F.  —  De  la  contro verse  en  biologic  .          .          .240 

HYLAN,  J.  P. — The  Distribution  of  Attention          .          .          -93 
HYSLOP,  J.  H.  — Binocular  Vision  and  the  Problem  of  Knowl- 
edge      .         .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .692 

JASTROW,  J.  — The  Status  of  the  Subconscious  .         .         .   692 

JONES,  HENRY.  —  The  Present  Attitude  of  Reflective  Thought 

towards  Religion,  II         .......      90 

KIRSCHMANN,  A. — Deception  and  Reality        ....   687 

KLEINPETER,  HANS.  —  Kant  und  die  naturwissenschaftliche  Er- 

kenntniskritik  der  Gegenwart    .          .          .          .          .          .467 

KOIGEN,  DAVID. — :Die  Religionsidee 368 

KOZLOWSKI,  W.  M.  — L' evolution  comme  principe  philosophique 

du  devenir      .........   369 

LADD,  G.  T.  — Brief  Critique  of  Psychological  Parallelism         .     87 
LAING,  JAMES.  —  Art  and  Morality  .          .          .          .          .         .98 

LARGUIER  DES  BANCELS,  J. — De  la  memoire     .          .          .          -577 
LE  DANTEC,  F. — La  logique  et  1' experience     ....  470 

LEE,  VERNON.  — Psychologic  d'un  ecrivain  sur  1'art  .          .     90 

LEO,  O. — Folgerungen  aus  Kants  Auffassung  der  Zeit  in  der 

Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft         .          .          .         .          .          -83 
LUCKA,  EMIL.  —  Das  Erkenntnisproblem  und  Machs  Analyse  der 

Empfindungen          .         .          .          .          .          .          .          -575 

MclNTYRE,  J.  L. — A  Sixteenth  Century  Psychologist,  Bernardino 

Telesio 373 

MAUXION,  M.  — Les  elements  et  1'evolution  de  la  moralite          .     94 
MEIJER,  W.  — Spinoza's  demokratische  Gesinnung  undsein  Ver- 

haltnis  zum  Christentum  .          .          .          .          .          .          •   377 

MEYER,  MAX.  — On  the  Attributes  of  the  Sensations  .          -577 

MOORE,  G.  E. — The  Refutation  of  Idealism    ....  468 

NAVILLE,  A.  —  De  la  verite  :   remarques  logiques        .          .          .    688 


CONTENTS.  vii 

NOBLE,  JOHN  H.  —  Psychology  on  the  <  New  Thought  '   Move- 
ment        693 

PAULHAN,  F.  — La  simulation  dans  le  caractere  .          .         .370 

PIAT,  CLODIUS. — Le  naturalisme  Aristotelicien          .          .          .   376 

PIERON,  H. — L' association  mediate 238 

"  —  La  conception  generate  de  Passociation  des  idees  et 

les  donnees  de  Pexperience          .         .         .   693 
RAGEOT,  G. — Les  formes  simples  de  P attention        .         .         .   238 

RAUH,  F. — Science  et  conscience 580 

RIBOT,  TH.  — Sur  la  valeur  des  questionnaires  en  psychologic  .  237 
RIEHL,  A.  — Helmholtz  in  seinem  Verhaltnis  zu  Kant  .  -473 

RITCHIE,  E. — The  Tolerance  of  Error 244 

Ross,  G.  R.  T. — The  Disjunctive  Judgment    ....   369 

RUNZE,  G. — Emerson  und  Kant 583 

SANFORD,  E.  C. — The  Psychic  Life  of  Fishes  .  .  .  .93 
SIDIS,  BORIS.  — An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  Hallucinations  .  475 
SOREL,  G.  — Sur  divers  aspects  de  la  mecanique  .  .  .235 
STEIN,  L. — Der  Neo-Idealismus  unserer  Tage  .  .  .  -574 
SWOBODA,  HERMANN. — Verstehen  und  Begreifen,  I  .  .  .  91 
"  "  "  "  "  ,  II  .  .  .  476 

TARDIEU,  EMILE. — Le  cynisme  :  etude  psychologique.  .  .580 
UNDERBILL,  G.  E.  — The  Use  and  Abuse  of  Final  Causes  .  .  691 
WALSH,  C.  M.  — Kant's  Transcendental  Idealism  and  Empirical 

Realism  .  366 

WARD,  JAMES.  —  On  the  Definition  of  Psychology     .         .          .  474 
WEBER,    HEINRICH.  —  Der   heutige    Stand    der    mechanischen 

Weltanschauung       .         .          .          .         .         .         .          -573 

WENTSCHER,  ELSE. — Phanomenalismus  und  Realismus.  .  .  236 
WIEN,  W.  —  Die  Grundlagen  der  modernen  Physik  und  ihre 

Beziehung  zu  den  neuesten  Ergebnissen  der  Forschung         .   688 
DE  WULF,  M.  —  La  decadence  de  la  scolastique  a  la  fin  du  moyen 

age  .   584 

ZIEHEN,  TH.  —  Erkenntnistheoretische  Auseinandersetzungen,  II, 

Schuppe  :   Der  naive  Realismus 233 

NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS. 

ARMSTRONG,  A.  C.  — Transitional  Eras  in  Thought  .          .         .   589 
BASCH,  VICTOR. — La  poetique  de  Schiller        ....   383 

BUCHNER,   EDWARD  FRANKLIN.  — The   Educational  Theory  of 

Immanuel  Kant        ...          .          .         .          .         .          .   591 

CARUS,  PAUL. — The  Surd  of  Metaphysics        .          .          .          .106 


viii  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

CRESSON,  ANDRE.  —  La  morale  de  Kant 592 

D' ALFONSO,  N.  R.  — Lezioni  elementari  di  psicologia  normale  710 
DEANE,  SIDNEY  NORTON.  —  St.  Anselm's  Proslogium,  Monolo- 

gium,  An  Appendix  in  Behalf  of  the  Fool  by  Gaunilon, 

and  Cur  Deus  Homo -384 

DREWS,  ARTHUR.  —  Nietzsche's  Philosophic  .  .  387 

DUNN,  WILLIAM  A.  — Thomas  De  Quincey's  Relation  to  German 

Literature  and  Philosophy         .          .          .          .          .          .108 

DUPRAT,  G.-L. — L' instability  mentale    .....    707 

EISLER,  ROBERT. — Studien  zur  Werttheorie      .          .         .          .246 

EISLER,  RUDOLF. — Nietzsche's  Erkenntnistheorie  und  Meta- 

physik    .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .          -252 

EUCKEN,  RUDOLF.  —  Gesammelte  Aufsatze  zur  Philosophic  und 

Lebensanschauung   .          .          .          .          .          .  .701 

FITE,  WARNER.  —  An  Introductory  Study  of  Ethics  .  .  -379 
FOUILLEE,  ALFRED. — Nietzsche  et  immoralisme  .  .  .100 
HADLEY,  ARTHUR  TWINING.  — Freedom  and  Responsibility  .  387 
HANEY,  JOHN  Louis.  — The  German  Influence  on  Samuel  Taylor 

Coleridge .108 

HELLPACH,  WILLY.  —  Die  Grenzwissenschaften  der  Psychologic    488 
HOFFMAN,  FRANK  D.  — Psychology  and  Common  Life.     .          .   254 
JANET,  PAUL,  and  GABRIEL  SEAILLES.  —  A  History  of  the  Prob- 
lems of  Thought      ........    104 

KIDD,  BENJAMIN.  —  Principles  of  Western  Civilization  .  .  247 
KUHNEMANN,  EUGEN.  —  Schillers  philosophische  Schriften  und 

Gedichte 709 

LE  DANTEC,  F. — L' unite  dans  1'etre  vivant  .  .  .  .482 
"  "  "  — Les  limites  du  connaissable  ....  702 
LEVY-BRUHL,  L.  — The  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte  .  -594 
LOMBARDO-RADICE,  G.  — Osservazioni  sullo  svolgimento  della 

dottrina  delle  idee  in  Platone   .          .          .          .          .          .708 

MERRINGTON,  E.  N.  — The  Possibility  of  a  Science  of  Casuistry  247 
METCHNIKOFF,  ELIE. — The  Nature  of  Man       .         .         .         .381 

MONDOLFO,  RODOLFO.  —  Saggi  per  la  storia  della  morale  utilitaria  253 
MOULTON,  RICHARD  G.  — The  Moral  System  of  Shakespeare.  .  251 
MUFFELMANN,  LEO.  —  Das  Problem  der  Willensfreiheit  in  der 

neuesten  deutschen  Philosophic  .  .  .  .  .249 

PIAT,  CLODIUS.  — Aristote 585 

PILLON,  F. — L'annee  philosophique,  1902  ....  699 
RICHARD,  GASTON.  — L'idee  d' evolution  dans  la  nature  et  1'his- 

toire 253 


CONTENTS.  ix 

RICHTER,  RAOUL.  —  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  sein   Leben  und  sein 

Werk ioo 

RITTELMEYER,  FRIEDRICH.  —  Friedrich   Nietzsche   und   das  Er- 

kenntnisproblem      .          . I0o 

DE  ROBERTY,  EUGENE. —  Frederic  Nietzsche  :  Contribution  a  1'his- 
toire  des  idees  philosophiques  et  sociales  a  la  fin  du  XIXe 
siecle      ..........    ioo 

SABATIER,   AUGUST.  —  Religions  of  Authority  and  the  Religion 

of  the  Spirit  ........   480 

SALVADORI,  GUGLIELMO.  —  Saggio  di  uno  studio  sui  sentimenti 

morali    .  595 

SANGER,  ERNST. — Kants  Lehre  vom  Glauben  .         .         -255 

SCHMIDT,  KARL. — Beitrage  zur  Entwickelung  der  Kant'schen 

Ethik 487 

SEAILLES,  GABRIEL,  and  PAUL  JANET.  — A  History  of  the  Prob- 
lems of  Thought      ........    104 

STRUNZ,  FRANZ.  —  Naturbetrachtung   und    Naturerkenntnis   im 

Altertum 586 

' '      — Theophrastus  Paracelsus,  sein  Leben  und  seine 

Personlichkeit 587 

TAYLOR,  HENRY  OSBORN.  — The  Classical  Heritage  of  the  Middle 

Ages       .  255 

TROILO,  E.  — La  dottrina  della  conoscenza  nei  moderni  precur- 

sori  di  Kant    .........   705 

VAN  BECELAERE,  L.  —  La   philosophic  en   Amerique  depuis  les 

origines  jusqu'  a  nos  jours  (1607-1900)     ....    704 

VILLA,  GUIDO. — Contemporary  Psychology      .         .         .         .107 

WARD,  JAMES. — Naturalism  and  Agnosticism.  Second  Edition  .  478 
WEBER,  Louis.  — Vers  le  positivisme  absolu  par  1'idealisme  .  484 
WINDELBAND,  W.  —  Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  .  706 
WOODBRIDGE,  FREDERICK  J.  E.  — The  Philosophy  of  Hobbes  .  385 
ZIEHEN,  TH.  —  Ueber  die  allgemeinen  Beziehungen  zwischen 

Gehirn  und  Seelenleben    .....  .708 

NOTES. 

ALLIN,  ARTHUR      ......  .no 

AMERICAN  Journal  of  Psychology      .  .no 

AMERICAN  Philosophical  Association         .  .no 

ANGELL,  JAMES  R.  •   493 

BAIRD,  J.  W .712 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  .          .          .         .261 


x  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

BOLTON,  THADDEUS  L.    .         .  .  .  .   598 

BRITISH  Journal  of  Psychology          .  .   259 

BURNETT,  C.  T 598 

CONGRESS  of  Experimental  Psychology  at  Giessen      .         .         .260 

COOPER,  JACOB .  .260 

DEWEY,  JOHN          .  -493 

ELKIN,  W.  B 598 

ERDMANN,  BENNO .         .         .         -391 

FULLERTON,  GEORGE  S .         .         .260 

INTERNATIONAL  Congress  of  Arts  and  Sciences  .  .  .  597,  712 
INTERNATIONAL  Congress  of  Philosophy  at  Geneva  .  .  .260 
JOURNAL  de  Psychologic  Normale  et  Pathologique  .  .  -259 
JOURNAL  of  Comparative  Neurology  and  Psychology  .  .  -259 
JOURNAL  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods  .  259 
KANT  CENTENNIAL.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .no,  260 

LADD,  G.  T .  493 

MACDONALD,  STEWART    .         .         .         .         .          .         .         -598 

MEETING  OF  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGISTS  AT  CORNELL    .         .   390 
MILLER,  DICKINSON  S.    ........   598 

MYERS,  C.  S.          .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .no 

NIETZSCHE  LITERATURE  ........  490 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 259 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         -259 

RAND,  BENJAMIN    .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .261 

RlLEY,   I.   WOODBRIDGE    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -598 

SMITH,  W.  G no 

SOUTHERN  SOCIETY  FOR  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY        .         .  390 

SPENCER,  HERBERT no,   260 

STEELE,  W.  M 598 

STEPHEN,  SIR  LESLIE       .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .261 

STRATTON,  GEORGE  M .         .         .390 

THILLY,  FRANK 390 

TRUMAN,  N.  E .         .         .   599 

TUFTS,  JAMES  H.  ........  493 

TURNER,  WILLIAM  .         . 598 

WARD,  JAMES         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         -391 

WESTERN  Philosophical  Association 390 

ZELLER,  EDUARD  .......  -259 


Volume  XI II.  January,  1904.  Whole 

Number  i.  Number  73. 

THE 

PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 


ARISTOTLE'S    POSTERIOR   ANALYTICS:    I. 
DEMONSTRATION. 

LIKE  other  works  of  Aristotle,  the  Posterior  Analytics  has 
had  an  influence  upon  the  history  of  human  thought  out 
of  all  proportion  to  its  length.  Within  a  comparatively  short 
compass  the  author  succeeds  in  giving  a  tolerably  complete  and 
systematic  statement  of  the  processes  by  which  scientific  truth  is 
reached.  The  main  object  of  the  treatise,  it  is  true,  is  to  explain 
the  conditions  under  which  the  necessary  conclusions  of  science 
may  be  drawn,  a  fact  which  naturally  gave  countenance  to  the 
doctrine  that  truth  is  reached  by  a  deductive  process.  A  careful 
examination,  however,  shows  that  the  preeminence  assigned  to 
deduction  cannot  be  justified  by  the  contents  of  the  work  itself, 
in  which  the  necessity  of  induction  as  an  indispensable  prepara- 
tion for  the  deductions  of  sciences  is  everywhere  kept  in  view, 
and  indeed  expressly  stated.  The  treatise  is  so  interesting  in 
itself,  and  so  valuable  for  the  light  it  throws  upon  the  philosophy 
of  Aristotle  in  general,  and  especially  upon  his  Metaphysic,  that 
it  may  not  be  superfluous  to  give  a  summary  of  its  main  con- 
tents, and  to  attempt  some  estimate  of  their  value. 

"All  teaching  and  all  learning  of  a  reflective  character," 
Aristotle  tells  us,  "  start  from  knowledge  that  we  already  have."1 
As  we  learn  from  a  passage  in  the  Ethics,2  the  "  teaching  and 
learning"  here  referred  to  proceed  either  by  induction  or  by 
syllogism  ;  for,  it  is  by  induction,  as  Aristotle  goes  on  to  explain, 
that  we  obtain  universal  propositions,  and  it  is  from  these  uni- 

iPost.  Anal.,  71*  1-2. 
2Nich.  Ethics   VI,  3,  H39b  26-29. 
I 


2  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

versal  propositions  as  premises  that  syllogism  draws  its  conclu- 
sions. Thus  both  induction  and  syllogism  start  from  knowledge 
that  we  already  have ;  the  former  being  evolved  from  the  per- 
ceptions of  sense,  and  the  latter  from  the  premises  supplied  by 
induction.  These  two  processes,  as  Aristotle  points  out  in  the 
present  work,  are  common  to  dialectic,  rhetoric,  and  the  sciences. 
The  proper  subject  of  the  treatise,  however,  is  the  method  of 
science,  and  hence  the  two  former  methods  of  "teaching  and 
learning"  are  referred  to  merely  in  order  to  show  that  reflection 
follows  the  same  path  in  all  cases,  bringing  forward  universal 
propositions  derived  by  the  mind  from  perception,  and  deducing 
conclusions  from  them.  Aristotle  therefore  at  once  proceeds  to 
ask  what  is  the  character  of  the  data  with  which  science  starts, 
and  how  from  them  the  truths  which  constitute  it  are  derived.1 

The  view  just  stated  of  the  relation  of  science  to  induction  is 
Aristotle's  substitute  for  the  dvd/jtvycrez  of  Plato.  According  to 
the  doctrine  suggested  in  the  Meno,  learning  is  not  the  acquisi- 
tion of  knowledge  for  the  first  time,  but  the  recollection  of  what 
we  already  know.  Aristotle,  on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that 
we  have  no  knowledge  whatever  prior  to  sensible  perception,  no 
knowledge  of  the  universal  prior  to  induction,  and  no  scientific 
truth  prior  to  the  deductions  drawn  from  the  premises  supplied 
by  induction.  Thus  the  difficulty  raised  by  Plato,  that  we  either 
learn  nothing,  or  only  what  we  knew  beforehand,  is  solved,  when 
we  see  that  we  may  know  universal  principles,  and  may  yet  be 
ignorant  of  the  conclusions  involved  in  them,  until  these  are 
brought  to  light  by  the  deductions  of  science.2  Nor  can  we 
accept  the  doctrine  that  the  only  truth  which  is  possible  for  us  is 
limited  by  the  number  of  individual  instances  that  have  come 
under  our  observation ;  on  the  contrary,  the  principles  from 
which  science  draws  its  conclusions  are  universal,  and  so  also  are 
the  conclusions  derived  from  them.  From  arithmetic  we  learn, 
not  that  all  the  ' twos'  we  have  observed  are  'even,'  but  that  every 
possible  'two'  must  be  'even.'  Nothing  less  than  this  will  satisfy 
the  demands  of  science.3  In  other  words,  '  science '  (S 

1  Post.  Anal.,  71*  i-n. 
*Ibid.,  71*  II  ff. 
id.,  71*  30  ff. 


No.  i.]         ARISTOTLE S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  3 

in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  is  the  knowledge  of  the  '  cause/ 
or  of  that  which  '  cannot  be  otherwise.'  Now,  knowledge  of 
this  kind  is  obtained  by  means  of  demonstration  (dnodeesez),  or 
scientific  syllogism,  the  data  of  which  are  supplied  by  induction. 
The  character  of  those  data  may  be  deduced  from  the  conclu- 
sions which  have  to  be  reached.  If  the  judgments  of  science 
predicate  what  is  necessary,  the  premises  must  be  such  as  by 
a  valid  logical  process  will  yield  judgments  of  that  kind.  In 
the  first  place,  therefore,  the  premises  must  be  true.  And  this 
means  that  they  must  state  what  belongs  to  the  actual  nature  of 
things  ;  for  the  test  of  a  true  judgment  is  never  in  Aristotle  the 
mere  impossibility  of  thinking  the  opposite,  but  its  conformity  to 
the  object ;  a  judgment  is  true  when  it  combines  in  thought  what 
is  combined  in  the  thing,  or  separates  in  thought  what  is  sepa- 
rated in  the  thing.  The  reason  why  the  judgment,  "The  diago- 
nal is  commensurable,"  is  false,  is  that  it  affirms  a  connection  of 
subject  and  predicate  which  contradicts  the  actual  nature  of  the 
diagonal.  In  the  second  place,  the  premises  of  a  demonstrative 
syllogism  must  be  primary  or  indemonstrable.  For,  if  this  is  not 
admitted,  we  either  fall  into  an  infinite  series,  and  therefore  never 
reach  an  absolute  conclusion,  or  we  are  forced  to  hold  the  equally 
untenable  doctrine  that  nothing  is  true  except  what  can  be 
demonstrated.  There  must,  then,  Aristotle  contends,  be  certain 
immediate  or  primary  truths,  which  by  their  very  nature  are 
indemonstrable,  and  without  which  no  demonstration,  and  there- 
fore no  science,'  is  possible.  In  the  third  place,  our  premises 
must  contain  the  ground  or  cause.  For,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
judgments  of  science  are  in  all  cases  necessary,  or  express  the 
'  essence  '  or  '  ground  '  of  a  thing.  Hence  the  premises  must  be 
'  better  known '  than  the  conclusion  and  '  prior '  to  it.  This 
does  not  mean  that,  in  the  order  of  our  knowledge,  we  start 
from  what  is,  in  the  sense  indicated,  '  better  known '  ;  on  the 
contrary,  we  begin  with  particular  perceptions  of  sense,  and  only 
at  a  latter  stage  advance  to  the  universal.  What  we  mean  by 
saying  that  the  premises  of  science  are  '  better  known '  than  the 
conclusion,  is  that  they  contain  the  determination  of  the  '  neces- 
sary '  characteristics  of  a  thing,  and  therefore  the  '  cause '  or 


4  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

'  ground  '  why  it  is  what  it  is.  As  such  they  are  logically  'prior' 
to  the  conclusion,  forming  as  they  do  the  indispensable  presup- 
position of  the  conclusions  reached  in  science.1 

To  understand  more  fully  the  nature  of  the  premises  from 
which  the  necessary  truths  of  science  are  deduced,  there  are  cer- 
tain terms  which  must  be  defined,  (i)  When  a  proposition  is 
said  to  be  true  '  without  exception '  (xara  /ravroc),  we  mean  that 
it  is  true  of  every  member  of  a  class,  and  of  every  member  of 
that  class  at  all  times.  Thus,  if  it  is  true  that  "  every  man  is  an 
animal,"  it  is  also  true  that  every  person  who  can  be  called 
"  man,"  may  also  be  called  "  animal "  ;  and  if  at  any  given  mo- 
ment he  is  the  one,  he  must  also  at  the  same  time  be  the  other. 
(2)  By  '  essential '  (xad'  aoro)  it  is  meant  that  a  certain  element  is 
included  in  the  very  conception  or  definition  of  a  thing.  Aris- 
totle distinguishes  two  cases  in  which  this  principle  holds  good ; 
for  either  a  certain  property  is  '  essential '  to  the  definition  of  the 
subject,  or  the  subject  to  the  definition  of  the  property.  We 
cannot  define  a  '  line '  without  including  the  '  point/  and  we  can- 
not define  '  straight '  without  including  the  '  line.'  Again,  when 
a  property  is  predicated  of  an  individual,  it  is  said  to  be  predicated 
4  essentially/  whereas  a  property  which  is  not  predicated  of  an 
individual,  but  of  something  which  presupposes  an  individual,  is 
said  to  be  predicated  'accidentally.'  In  the  judgment,  "Socra- 
tes walks,"  the  predicate  belongs  to  the  subject;  but  in  the 
judgment,  "the  white  walks,"  the  predicate  does  not  belong  to 
the  subject,  but  to  something  else  not  expressed  —  ultimately, 
an  individual.  In  the  one  case  we  have  '  essential '  predication,  in 
the  other  '  accidental.'  Lastly,  that  is  said  to  be  '  essential '  which 
involves  a  causal  connection  ;  as,  e.  g.,  when  a  victim  dies  by  the 
stroke  of  the  sacrificial  knife.  These  two  last  cases  do  not  satisfy 
the  requirements  of  strict  science.  The  former  only  yields  judg- 
ments which  predicate  a  property  of  the  individual,  and  from 
singular  judgments  no  universal  conclusion,  such  as  science  de- 
mands, can  be  derived.  The  latter,  again,  only  gives  us  judg- 
ments which  are  conditionally  necessary,  whereas  strictly  scien- 
tific judgments  are  true  at  all  times.  Thus,  as  Aristotle  himself 

lPost.  Anal.,  71*  9  ff.     Cf.  72*  5  ff. 


No.  i.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  5 

points  out,1  there  remains  only  the  case  in  which  a  property  be- 
longs to  the  very  conception  of  the  subject,  or  the  subject  to  the 
definition  of  the  predicate.  (3)  There  is  a  third  term,  the  *  uni- 
versal '  (TO  xadoXov  ),  which  introduces  a  further  limitation.  Any 
predicate  is  '  essential '  which  is  involved  in  the  definition  of  the 
subject,  or  involves  the  subject  in  its  definition.  Thus,  in  the 
judgment,  "man  is  an  animal,"  the  predicate  '  animal'  is  part  of 
the  definition  of  '  man/  and  as  such  is  '  essential '  ;  but  the  judg- 
ment is  not  in  the  strict  sense  '  universal.'  To  be  '  universal,'  a 
judgment  must  state  that  which  is  true  (i)  '  without  exception  ' 
(xara  vravroc),  (2)  '  essentially  '  (xad'  auro),  (3)  of  a  class  '  as 
such  '  (YJ  mjTo).  Now,  to  be  true  of  a  class  '  as  such '  is  to  be 
true  of  a  primary  subject,  and  therefore  true  '  essentially '  and 
1  without  exception  ' ;  but  a  predicate  may  apply  to  every  mem- 
ber of  a  species  without  exception,  or  it  may  be  part  of  the  defi- 
nition of  a  species,  and  yet,  it  may  not  be  true  of  the  genus  or 
class  '  as  such.'  The  judgment  that  "the  isosceles  triangle  con- 
tains two  right  angles  "  is  true  of  all  isosceles  triangles,  and  the 
predicate  is  part  of  the  definition  of  the  subject  ;  but  it  is  not 
'  universal,'  because  '  isosceles  triangle '  is  not  the  '  primary  sub- 
ject '  to  which  the  property  of  having  two  right  angles  belongs. 
In  short,  we  only  obtain  a  truly  *  universal '  judgment,  such  as 
is  required  in  scientific  demonstration,  when  subject  and  predi- 
cate are  convertible  ;  in  other  words,  when  we  have  assigned  the 
'  cause  '  or  '  ground  '  of  a  thing.  Hence  Aristotle  refuses  to 
admit  that  we  can  reach  scientific  truth  per  enumerationem  sim- 
plicem.  Even  supposing  it  could  be  proved  of  each  species  of 
triangle  separately  —  equilateral,  scalene,  and  isosceles  —  that 
its  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles,  we  should  not  know  it 
to  be  true  of  the  triangle  '  universally,'  and  therefore  we  should 
not  know  whether  there  might  not  be  some  other  kind  of  trian- 
gle of  which  it  was  not  true.  The  necessary  basis  of  a  scientific 
syllogism  is,  therefore,  a  major  premise  which  predicates  an 
essential  attribute  belonging  to  the  primary  subject.  When  this 
is  the  case,  subject  and  predicate  must  be  coextensive.  No  doubt 
the  special  sciences  make  use  of  premises  that  are  not  '  univer- 

lOp.  cit.,  73^,  16-18. 


6  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

sal '  ;  but  these,  as  we  shall  immediately  see,  are  not  in  the  strict 
sense  'scientific/  because  they  only  prove  the 'fact,'  not  the 
'  cause ' ;  and  proof  of  the  '  fact '  is  only  a  step  towards  the 
end  of  science,  which  is  demonstration  of  the  '  cause.' l 

The  basis  of  a  demonstrative  syllogism,  then,  must  be  a  truly 
'  universal '  principle.  This  is  obvious,  if  we  consider  that  science 
in  the  strict  sense  consists  entirely  of  necessary  conclusions. 
You  can  infer  that  an  isosceles  triangle  contains  two  right  angles, 
granting  that  "  the  triangle  as  such  "  has  this  property  ;  but  no 
such  conclusion  can  be  drawn,  unless  the  major  premise  is,  in  the 
sense  defined,  '  universal.'  In  other  words,  the  middle  term  must 
contain  the  real '  ground  '  or  '  cause.'  If  the  middle  term  is  not 
necessary,  it  may  cease  to  be  predicable ;  hence  what  was  true 
may  cease  to  be  true ;  and  obviously,  from  what  may  not  be 
true,  no  absolute  conclusion  can  be  drawn.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  the  middle  term  is  necessary,  the  conclusion  must  also  be 
necessary,  and  such  necessary  conclusions  constitute  science. 
Our  result  then  is,  that  both  the  premises  and  the  conclusion  of  a 
demonstrative  syllogism  must  be  necessary ;  while  the  middle  term, 
on  which  the  conclusion  is  based,  must  contain  the  real  '  ground  ' 
or  '  cause  '  of  the  subject,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  the  attri- 
butes which  belong  to  it  in  itself,  and  therefore  to  every  member 
of  the  primary  genus  under  consideration.2 

The  premises  of  a  science,  then,  are  true  and  primary,  and 
they  contain  the  '  cause  '  or  '  ground  '  of  a  thing.  But,  while 
these  are  the  characteristics  of  all  the  premises  employed  by 
science,  there  is  a  distinction  in  the  character  of  the  premises 
themselves,  to  which  it  is  necessary  to  refer.  From  Aristotle's 
point  of  view,  there  is  no  single  science  which  contains  the  whole 
body  of  scientific  truth.  It  is  true  that  first  philosophy  or  meta- 
physic  has  as  its  object  the  highest  principles  of  being ;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  those  principles  do  not  enable  us  to  determine 
things  in  their  concrete  or  specific  character.  Thus,  metaphysic 
has,  as  one  of  its  tasks,  to  show  that  the  laws  of  contradiction 
and  excluded  middle  admit  of  no  possible  exception,  and  there- 
!0/.  «?.,  73*  21-74"  4. 


No.  i.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  7 

fore  must  be  presupposed  in  every  one  of  the  special  sciences. 
On  the  other  hand,  each  of  the  special  sciences  employs  these 
laws  only  in  so  far  as  they  apply  to  the  special  '  class  of  being ' 
with  which  it  deals.  While,  therefore,  Aristotle  calls  them 
'  common '  principles,  he  is  careful  to  add  that  they  are  not 
taken  in  their  abstract  generality  by  the  special  sciences,  but  only 
in  their  specific  application  to  the  subject  under  investigation. 
And  the  same  remark  holds  good  of  another  class  of  '  common 
principles'  or  'axioms,'  viz.,  those  which  apply,  not  indeed  to 
all  kinds  of  being,  like  the  laws  of  contradiction  and  excluded 
middle,  but  to  the  objects  of  two  or  more  sciences.  Of  this 
character  is  the  axiom  that  "  if  equals  be  taken  from  equals, 
the  remainders  are  equal,"  a  principle  which  is  common  to 
arithmetic  and  geometry.  But  here  again  the  axiom  is  not  em- 
ployed in  its  complete  generality.  In  arithmetic  it  is  interpreted 
to  mean,  that  "if  equal  numbers  be  taken  from  equal  numbers," 
etc.,  whereas  in  geometry  it  means  that  "if  equal  magnitudes 
be  taken  from  equal  magnitudes,"  etc.  In  actual  use,  therefore, 
the  axioms  are  not  really  '  common  '  principles,  but  in  their 
specific  sense,  as  employed  in  a  particular  science,  are  special  or 
determinate  principles.1 

This  view  of  the  so-called  '  common '  principles  is  in  accord- 
ance with  Aristotle's  whole  view  of  things.  For  him  there  is 
not  a  single  '  kind  of  being,'  but  various  mutually  exclusive 
spheres  of  being,  each  of  which  is  the  object  of  a  particular  sci- 
ence. Hence,  when  he  is  laying  down  the  conditions  of  science, 
he  tells  us  that  it  involves  three  things  :  (i)  The  class  of  being, 
which  is  the  object  of  a  particular  science,  (2)  the  axioms  or 
principles  from  which  we  argue,  (3)  the  conclusion,  which  states 
an  essential  determination  of  the  class  under  investigation.  It  is 
therefore  an  illegitimate  procedure  for  any  science  to  pass  out  of 
its  own  proper  sphere.  There  are  certain  absolutely  irreducible 
'kinds  of  being,'  each  of  which  has  its  own  special  determina- 
tions ;  and  therefore  the  geometer  can  no  more  apply  to  magni- 
tudes the  properties  of  numbers  than  the  arithmetician  can  char- 
acterize numbers  by  the  attributes  essential  to  magnitudes. 
*  Op.  at.,  75a38;  76a3°;  87*38. 


8  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 


There  must  be  no  jutSTdfJamz  ei£  dMo  yiuoz,  on  pain  of  illogical  and 
unscientific  reasoning.  It  is  therefore  natural  for  Aristotle  to 
point  out  that  the  '  common  '  principles  are  in  practice  really 
'  special.'  The  employment  of  so-called  '  common  '  principles  is 
therefore  no  real  violation  of  the  doctrine  that  science  must  con- 
tain only  '  universal  '  judgments  ;  for  the  axioms,  as  interpreted  by 
the  special  sciences,  express  what  is  '  essential  '  to  magnitude  or 
number  '  as  such,'  and  what  is  true  of  every  magnitude  or  num- 
ber at  all  times.1 

Each  of  the  special  sciences,  then,  assumes  the  truth  of  the 
common  principles  or  axioms  in  the  limited  sense  required  for  its 
special  purpose.  No  doubt  these  principles  may  be  called 
'special/  since,  in  the  meaning  assigned  to  them  by  a  given 
science,  they  are  not  applicable  to  any  other  science  ;  but,  as  in 
the  wider  sense  they  express  the  principles  common  to  all  being, 
or  at  least  to  more  than  one  '  kind  of  being,'  Aristotle 
distinguishes  from  them  the  principles  which  are  peculiar  to 
a  given  science.  These  are  'theses,'  i.  *.,  they  are  'posited' 
by  the  science.  They  state  the  primary  characteristics  of  the 
'  class  of  being,'  with  which  the  science  deals,  and  therefore  at 
once  define  it  and  affirm  the  existence  of  the  object  defined.  A 
principle  of  this  sort  is  called  a  "postulate"  (imbdeoes).  Thus 
geometry  not  only  presupposes  the  definition  of  '  magnitude,'  or 
'point'  and  'line,'  but  it  postulates  the  actual  existence  of  'mag- 
nitudes '  or  'points  and  lines.'  The  'point,'  e.  g.,  is  defined  as  '  that 
which  has  no  extension,'  or  '  that  which  is  indivisible  '  ;  the 
'  line  '  as  '  that  which  has  only  one  dimension  '  ;  and  geometry 
assumes  that  there  are  real  '  points  '  and  '  lines  '  corresponding  to 
these  definitions.  The  special  principles  or  postulates,  therefore, 
agree  with  the  common  principles  or  axioms  in  presupposing  the 
truth  or  reality  of  their  object.  Unless  the  truth  of  the  special 
principles  is  assumed,  the  science  to  which  they  belong  has  no 
premises  from  which  '  universal  '  conclusions  may  be  drawn  ;  for 
these  principles,  as  primary  determinations  of  a  certain  '  class  of 
being,'  do  not  admit  of  demonstration.  Assuming  them,  how- 
ever, it  is  possible  to  advance  to  the  concrete  determination  of  the 

1  Op.  «'/.,  76b  i3ff. 


No.  i.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR   ANALYTICS.  9 

genus ;  and  the  problem  of  a  given  science  is  just  to  deduce,  by 
means  of  demonstrative  syllogisms,  by  the  aid  of  induction,  the 
totality  of  the  essential  properties,  modifications,  and  functions  of 
the  class  of  being  with  which  it  deals.1 

Besides  these  special  principles  or  postulates,  each  science  em- 
ploys another  species  of  '  theses  '  viz.,  those  which  agree  with  the 
'  postulates '  in  being  definitions,  but  differ  from  them  in  not  be- 
ing presupposed  as  data  of  the  science  under  investigation.  This 
class  of  definitions  comes  to  light  in  the  course  of  the  demon- 
stration, and  therefore  presupposes  it.  They  are  therefore 
merely  verbal,  and  but  serve  to  embody  the  results  of  demonstra- 
tion, when  those  results  are  taken  as  the  premises  of  a  new  demon- 
stration. Thus,  in  geometry  the  essence  of  the  '  point '  and  the 
'  line  '  is  expressed  by  the  '  postulates  '  in  which  they  are  de- 
fined, but  the  content  of  the  conceptions  '  straight,'  '  commen- 
surable,' '  diverging  and  converging,'  is  expressed  in  the  definition 
of  these  properties,  which  states  what  belongs  '  essentially  '  to 
the  subject  determined  by  them.  Similarly,  the  definition  and 
reality  of  the  '  unit '  is  in  arithmetic  a  '  postulate,'  but  the  defini- 
tions of  '  odd  '  and  '  even,'  '  square  '  and  '  cube  '  numbers,  ex- 
press the  properties  of  numbers  which  are  established  in  the 
course  of  the  demonstration.  The  definitions  proper  are  there- 
fore data  of  demonstration,  not  in  the  sense  that  they  are  pre- 
supposed as  the  basis  of  all  the  demonstrations  of  a  particular 
science,  but  only  in  the  sense  that  they  are  presupposed  at  certain 
stages  in  the  process  of  demonstration.  The  truth  of  the  pri- 
mary determinations  of  the  genus  under  investigation  is  '  postu- 
lated,' the  truth  of  the  properties  which  characterize  the  species 
falling  under  the  genus  is  demonstrated.  Geometry  '  postulates  ' 
the  reality  of  the  '  point '  and  '  line  ';  it  '  demonstrates  '  the  truth 
that  '  the  triangle  has  two  right  angles '  from  these  postulates,  in 
combination  with  the  common  principles  or  axioms,  employing 
the  definition  of  '  right  angle  '  which  has  been  obtained  in  the 
course  of  prior  demonstrations,  and  has  been  embodied  in  a  ver- 
bal definition.2 

The  demonstrations  of  science,  as  we  have  seen,  enable  us  to 
1  op.  dt.y  7ia  13 ;  76a  31  ff- ;  76b  3 ;  72*  15  ff- 

*  Ibid.  *  71*  12  ;   76*  32  ;  76*  40  ;  76b  7. 


10  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

make  certain  'universal'  judgments  in  regard  to  the  'kind  of 
being'  with  which  a  particular  science  deals.  No  such  judg- 
ments are  intelligible,  if  we  adopt  the  view  of  the  Platonists,  that 
there  are  ideas  (el'drj),  or  abstract  unities,  which  have  an  existence 
apart  from  the  many  individuals.  Nor  is  the  assumption  of  such 
unities  essential  to  the  explanation  of  demonstrative  science.  No 
doubt  we  must  be  able  to  predicate  unity  of  many  individuals ; 
under  no  other  condition,  indeed,  can  we  have  a  truly  '  uni- 
versal'  judgment;  for  no  'universal'  conclusion  can  be  drawn, 
unless  we  have  a  middle  term,  comprehending  an  attribute  which 
is  identical  in  a  number  of  things,  and  identical  not  merely  in 
name  but  in  reality.  Thus,  if  '  man '  is  a  separate  and  independ- 
ent idea,  the  proposition  '  Socrates  is  a  man '  can  only  mean 
that  the  name  '  man '  is  applied  to  Socrates,  because  he  is  found 
to  resemble  Plato  and  Aristotle,  not  because  he  is  identical  in 
nature  with  them.  Only  if  there  is  absolute  identity  in  nature  can 
we  have  a  universal  and  necessary  judgment,  i.  ^.,  a  judgment 
which  expresses  the  '  essential '  nature  of  Socrates  as  '  man.' 
The  two  terms  Kara  noXX&v  and  ITTC  Tthtovaiv  indicate  the  doctrine 
of  Aristotle,  that  a  '  universal '  judgment  must  express  the  essen- 
tial connection  of  subject  and  attribute,  a  connection  which  is  not 
accidental,  but  is  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  the  object.1 

From  what  has  been  said  it  is  obvious  that,  in  Aristotle's  view, 
no  science  is  possible,  unless  there  are  certain  fixed  or  unchang- 
able  '  kinds  of  being/  which  can  be  grasped  and  defined  by 
thought.  It  is  indispensable  to  his  doctrine  that,  though  the 
accidental  properties  belonging  to  things  are  infinite,  the  prop- 
erties which  are  inseparable  from  a  given  '  class  of  being '  must 
be  limited  in  number.  This  is  the  main  argument  by  which  he 
seeks  to  show  that  scientific  demonstration  must  start  from  in- 
demonstrable premises.  In  all  predication,  as  he  argues,  there 
must  be  a  primary  subject  which  cannot  be  predicated  of  any- 
thing else.  We  can  no  doubt  say  either  'the  white  is  wood'  or 
'  wood  is  white,'  but  the  second  form  of  expression  alone  corre- 
sponds to  the  nature  of  things,  since  '  wood '  is  the  subject  of 
which  '  white  '  is  predicable,  whereas  '  white  '  is  not  the  subject 


No.  i.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  II 

of  which  '  wood '  can  be  predicated,  though  in  a  proposition  it 
may  occupy  the  position  of  subject.  Now,  in  predicating  in  the 
category  of  '  essence/  we  predicate  either  the  genus  or  the  spe- 
cies, and  whenever  we  predicate  in  any  other  category,  we  merely 
state  what  is  '  accidental '  or  separable  from  the  subject.  The 
judgment,  "man  is  an  animal,"  is  a  predication  of  'essence,'  be- 
cause it  is  implied  that  there  cannot  exist  a  man  who  is  not  as 
man  an  animal.  But  predication  in  any  other  category,  such  as 
'quality'  or  'quantity,'  is  of  a  different  character.  Thus  "man 
is  white  "  is  not  '  essential '  predication,  for  it  does  not  mean  that 
'white'  is  inseparable  from  'man';  if  it  were,  "man  is  white" 
would  mean  that  there  is  a  genus  or  species  '  white,'  and  that 
'  man  '  is  part  of  it.  Whatever  the  kind  of  predication,  however, 
there  must  be  a  subject  which  cannot  be  predicated  of  anything 
else  ;  in  other  words,  the  individual  is  the  real,  and  all  real  predi- 
cation is  a  determination  of  the  individual,  whether  that  determi- 
nation is  'essential'  or  'accidental.' 

Now,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  the  predicates  which  express  the 
'  essence  '  of  a  subject  must  be  limited  in  number.  It  is  essen- 
tial predication  to  say  "  Man  is  two-footed,"  for  here  we  are  pre- 
dicating a  species.  And  we  can  go  on  to  say,  "  The  two-footed 
is  animal,"  because  here  we  predicate  a  genus.  But  we  cannot 
go  on  to  say  "  Animal  is  —  something  else,"  since  here  we  have 
reached  the  summum  genus,  and  any  further  advance  in  this  up- 
ward direction  carries  us  beyond  the  genus  to  which  '  two- 
footed  '  and  '  man '  belong,  and  therefore  destroys  the  '  essential ' 
character  of  '  man.'  And,  in  the  descending  series,  we  can  say 
"  Man  is  animal,"  where  the  predication  is  of  the  genus  ;  then 
"  Callias  is  man,"  for  here  we  predicate  the  species  ;  but  if  we 
attempt  to  descend  further,  and  say  "  Something  else  is  Callias," 
we  are  stopped  by  the  impossibility  of  predicating  the  individual 
in  consistency  with  the  nature  of  things.  There  is  therefore  a 
fixed  limit,  both  upwards  and  downwards.  Nor  can  we  predi- 
cate genera  interchangeably,  for  this  would  mean  that  a  genus  is 
predicated  of  itself.  If,  e.  g.y  number  =  '  magnitude,'  and  '  mag- 
nitude' =  number  ;  then  number  =  '  number,'  and  '  magnitude' 
=  '  magnitude  ';  which  is  no  predication  at  all,  or  at  most  only 


12  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

verbal  predication.  For  the  same  reason  the  categories  cannot 
be  predicated  of  one  another.  In  short,  each  kind  of  being  has 
its  fixed  limits,  and  equally  each  kind  of  category. 

Now,  demonstration  is  only  possible  when  we  can  find  a  middle 
term.  If  we  know  that  "man  is  two-footed,"  and  that  "the 
two-footed  is  animal,"  we  can  reach  the  conclusion  that  "  man  is 
animal."  But  as  there  is  a  limit  both  upward  and  downward, 
there  must  be  a  limited  number  of  middle  terms.  If  this  is  de- 
nied, we  must  hold  that  everything  is  demonstrable,  a  view  which 
really  destroys  the  possibility  of  all  demonstration,  since  it  lands 
us  in  an  infinite  series.1 

This  conclusion  might  be  reached  by  a  simple  analysis  of 
demonstration.  The  judgments  of  demonstration  must  contain 
nothing  but  '  essential '  properties,  since  a  necessary  conclusion 
cannot  be  derived  from  what  is  '  accidental.'  Now,  essential  predi- 
cation, as  we  have  seen  above,  either  (a)  states  a  property  in- 
volved in  the  subject,  or  (b)  a  property  which  is  limited  to  the 
subject.  It  is  obvious  that  a  property  essential  to  the  determina- 
tion of  the  subject  must  be  '  universal '  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term ;  i.  e.,  it  must  be  a  determination  of  a  summum  genus  as 
such.  Hence  the  judgment  in  which  this  property  is  predicated 
must  be  primary,  and  therefore  indemonstrable.  And  a  judg- 
ment which  affirms  a  predicate  that  is  meaningless  apart  from  the 
subject  must  have  a  definite  or  limited  application.  Thus,  'odd' 
has  no  meaning  except  as  an  attribute  of  '  number,'  and  therefore 
nothing  is  '  odd '  except  a  '  number'  ;  it  is  accordingly  an  ultimate 
determination.  Hence  we  cannot  demonstrate  that  numbers  are 
'  odd,'  but  must  accept  the  determination  as  primary.  If  a 
demonstration  were  possible,  we  should  have  to  find  a  conception 
which  included  '  odd '  numbers  and  other  species  of  '  odd '  than 
that  of  number.  As  this  is  impossible,  we  cannot  demonstrate 
that  numbers  are  '  odd,'  but  must  accept  the  determination  as  a 
first  principle.  Our  general  conclusion,  then,  is  that  the  proper- 
ties involved  in  the  definition  of  a  class,  as  well  as  its  specific 
determinations,  must  as  ultimate  be  assumed  by  demonstration, 

not  proved  by  it.2 

i  Op.  cit. ,  82b  34-84*  6. 


No.  i.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  13 

The  sphere  of  a  given  science  is  evident  from  these  considera- 
tions. A  science  is  one  when  it  deals  with  a  single  class  of  being 
and  with  the  essential  properties  of  that  class.  When  the  first 
principles  are  different,  the  sciences  are  different.  Now  it  may 
be  shown,  in  the  first  place  dialectically,  that  there  cannot  be 
principles  common  to  all  the  sciences  — 'common '  in  the  sense  of 
having  the  same  specific  meaning.  It  will  be  admitted  that  there 
are  false  as  well  as  true  syllogisms.  But  false  premises  yield  a 
false  conclusion,  true  premises  a  true  conclusion.  And  as  the 
premises  are  the  dp%al  from  which  the  conclusion  is  derived,  the 
dp%at  of  false  syllogisms  must  be  generically  different  from  the 
dp%al  of  true  syllogisms.  And  not  only  so,  but  there  may  be  a 
generic  distinction  even  in  the  case  of  false  principles  themselves. 
Thus  we  may  form  false  syllogisms,  either  by  concluding  that 
justice  is  injustice,  or  that  it  is  cowardice.  Here  the  two  false 
conclusions  contradict  each  other,  and  must  therefore  be  derived 
from  generically  different  first  principles.  And  what  is  true  of 
false  syllogisms  is  even  more  obvious  in  the  case  of  true  syllo- 
gisms. We  cannot  establish  a  true  geometrical  conclusion  from 
arithmetic,  because  arithmetic  deals  with  points  that  have  no 
position,  whereas  geometry  deals  with  points  that  have  position. 
If  we  attempt  to  pass  from  units  to  points,  we  must  find  a  middle 
term  expressing  what  is  characteristic  of  the  unit  or  the  point, 
or  a  conception  predicated  of  both  as  the  genus  of  two  spe- 
cies, or  subsumed  under  both,  or  higher  than  the  one,  lower 
than  the  other.  But  (i)  a  specific  principle  cannot  be  a  mid- 
dle term,  since  a  middle  term  must  be  common  to  the  two 
extremes ;  (2)  it  cannot  be  related  to  the  extremes  as  genus  to 
species,  for  '  unit '  and  '  point '  would  then  have  the  same  '  essence ' ; 
(3)  nor  can  it  be  subsumed  under  both,  for  then  there  would 
obviously  be  two  genera ;  (4)  nor  can  it  be  higher  than  the  one, 
lower  than  the  other,  for  then  it  would  be  the  genus  of,  say,  the 
'  point,'  while  the  '  point '  would  be  the  genus  of  the  '  unit.'  As 
these  are  the  only  possible  suppositions,  the  principles  of  two 
sciences  cannot  be  the  same  in  kind.  It  is  no  real  objection  to 
this  view,  that  there  are  '  common '  principles,  for  these  must  be 
specified  before  they  can  be  employed  in  demonstration.1 

*Op.  cit.,  87*  38-87b  4  ;  88a  i8-8Sb  29. 


14  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  distinguish  between  science 
(intcrry pj)  and  opinion  (do£a).  The  conclusions  of  science  are 
'  universal,'  being  based  upon  premises  which  are  necessarily 
true  or  cannot  possibly  be  otherwise.  The  object  of  opinion,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  that  which  may  be  true,  but  is  not  necessarily 
true,  or  that  which,  though  necessarily  true,  is  not  known  to  be 
necessarily  true.  But,  strictly  speaking,  even  in  the  latter  case 
the  object  of  opinion  is  different  from  the  object  of  science.  Both 
may  relate  to  the  same  object,  but  the  mode  of  conception  is 
fundamentally  different,  and  therefore  the  object  is  really  differ- 
ent. The  same  person  cannot  at  once  have  an  opinion  in  regard 
to  a  thing,  and  a  scientific  knowledge  of  it ;  for  this  would  mean 
that  he  could  hold  contradictory  notions,  and  believe  both  to 
be  true.1 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  obvious  that  we  have  scientific 
knowledge  only  when  we  have  discovered  the  '  cause '  or 
'  ground.'  But  as  such  knowledge  must  from  its  very  nature  be 
true  of  actual  things,  there  can  be  no  knowledge  of  the '  cause ' 
(TO  3toT£\  unless  there  is  a  previous  knowledge  of  the  '  fact ' 
(TO  oTf).  In  the  progress  of  science  towards  its  goal,  it  is  not 
unusual  to  begin  by  demonstrating  the  '  fact,'  as  a  preparatory 
step  to  the  demonstration  of  the  '  cause  ';  a  procedure  which  is 
perfectly  natural,  because  the  fact  is  more  readily  accessible  to 
us  than  the  cause.  Thus  we  learn  from  induction  that  bodies 
whose  light  gradually  increases  are  spherical,  and  we  infer  that, 
since  the  moon  gradually  increases  in  light,  it  is  spherical.  This 
gives  us  the  syllogism  : 

Bodies  which  gradually  increase  in  light  are  spherical. 
The  moon  gradually  increases  in  light. 
Therefore,  the  moon  is  spherical. 

The  proof,  however,  does  not  satisfy  the  demands  of  scientific 
demonstation,  for  the  major  premise  states  a  '  fact,'  without  as- 
signing a  '  cause.'  It  is  true  that  bodies  which  gradually  in- 
crease in  light  are  spherical,  but  until  we  know  that  the  increase 
in  light  is  an  '  essential '  attribute  of  '  spherical '  bodies,  z.  e.,  that 
only  '  spherical '  bodies  possess  the  attribute  in  question,  we  can- 

9. 


No.  i.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  15 

not  obtain  a  really  '  universal '  conclusion.  Hence  the  proper 
form  of  the  demonstrative  syllogism  states  the  •  cause,'  and  as- 
sumes the  form  : 

Spherical  bodies  gradually  increase  in  light. 

The  moon  is  a  spherical  body. 

Therefore,  the  moon  gradually  increases  in  light. 
The  major  premise  is  a  '  universal '  judgment,  in  the  sense  defined 
above,  because  it  states  what  is  true  of  '  all '  spherical  bodies,  what 
is  '  essential '  to  the  class,  and  what  is  true  of  the  class  '  as  such.' 
Aristotle's  general  view  is,  that  we  never  have  a  premise  express- 
ing the  'cause,'  except  when  subject  and  predicate  are  conver- 
tible. The  demonstrative  syllogism,  therefore,  naturally  falls  into 
the  first  figure  —  the  favorite  figure  of  the  mathematical  sciences  — 
because  this  is  the  only  figure  in  which  we  have  a  universal  affir- 
mative conclusion.  It  may  be  added  that,  while  there  can  be  no 
science,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  until  a  knowledge  of  the 
'  cause '  has  been  obtained,  it  sometimes  happens  that  the  '  fact '  is 
the  object  of  a  subordinate  science,  while  the  '  cause '  is  brought 
to  light  by  another  science.  Thus  optics  deals  with  the  '  fact ' 
in  the  case  of  visible  phenomena,  while  geometry  assigns  the 
'  cause.'  But  this  division  of  labor  is  obviously  merely  a  matter 
of  convenience,  and  does  not  affect  the  general  principle  that 
scientific  truth  consists  in  the  knowledge  of  causes. 

In  this  article  a  summary  of  Aristotle's  general  view  as  to  the 
nature  of  science  has  been  given ;  a  subsequent  article  will  deal 
with  his  view  of  induction,  as  the  method  by  which  science  is 
supplied  with  the  premises  from  which  its  conclusions  are  drawn. 

JOHN  WATSON. 

QUEEN'S  UNIVERSITY, 
KINGSTON,  CANADA. 

1  Op.  cit.,  78*  22-7 9a  32- 


THE    REALITY    OF    THE   FINITE    IN   SPINOZA'S 

SYSTEM. 

IN  the  frequent  notices  of  Spinoza's  philosophy  which  we  find 
scattered  through  Hegel's  works,  the  German  thinker  em- 
phatically exonerates  his  Jewish  predecessor  from  the  accusation 
of  atheism  so  often  brought  against  him,  but  at  the  same  time 
himself  brings  the  counter  charge  that  his  system  is  an  "  Acos- 
mism,"  inasmuch  as  it  maintains  the  exclusive  reality  of  God  so 
strenuously  as  to  relegate  the  phenomenal  world  to  the  limbo  of 
the  illusory  and  unreal,  till  it  becomes  a  mere  semblance  of  the 
substantial  and  true.1  The  importance  of  this  objection,  if  it  is 
in  fact  well  taken,  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  For  in  spite  of 
Hegel's  genuine  and  warm  appreciation  of  Spinozism  as  an  essen- 
tial moment  in  the  development  of  philosophic  thought,  yet  his 
reading  of  the  system  really  resolves  it  into  a  mysticism  pure  and 
simple,  and  abrogates  its  claim  to  constitute  a  naturalistic  meta- 
physic.  If  it  is  Spinoza's  doctrine  that  the  matters  which  pertain 
to  our  everyday  experience,  or  which  are  the  objects  of  scien- 
tific investigation,  —  the  events  which,  whether  regarded  as  phys- 
ical or  psychical,  constitute  our  environment  and  make  up  our 
lives,  —  are  in  truth  nothing  but  illusion,  a  veil  hiding  by  its 
many  colored  folds  that  blank  undifferentiated  unity  which  alone 
deserves  the  name  of  reality,  then  is  he  in  harmony  not  with  the 
spirit  that  governs  our  modern  science,  but  rather  with  that 
deeply  contemplative  but  unprogressive  thought  of  the  East, 
which  presents  for  the  subtle  play  of  the  imagination  a  world 
composed  of  the  stuff  that  dreams  are  made  of,  but  offers  to  the 
eager  craving  of  the  human  intellect  no  vivifying  or  illuminating 
principle.  Spinoza's  whole  attitude  toward  knowledge,  —  the 
intense  intellectualism  pervading  both  his  psychology  and  his 
ethics,  and  dominating  his  philosophical  outlook,  —  might  of  it- 
self lead  us  to  doubt  the  correctness  of  the  Hegelian  interpreta- 
tion of  his  ontology.  An  examination  of  his  teaching  in  regard 

1  See,  for  example,  Encyclopcedie,  I,  S.  no,  300-303  ;  Geschichte  der  Philosophie, 
III,  S.  373,  374. 

16 


THE  FINITE  IN  SPINOZA'S  SYSTEM.  I/ 

to  the  phenomenal  world  may  perhaps  reveal  what  elements  in  it 
gave  rise  to  this  view  and  at  the  same  time  afford  material  for 
its  correction. 

The  heart  of  the  problem  lies  in  the  character  of  the  relation 
between  "modes"  and  "substance"  —that  "ens  absolute  in- 
finitum  "  which  Spinoza  calls  God.  The  explanation  ordinarily 
given  of  the  Spinozistic  "  mode  "  is  that  it  is  the  individual  exist- 
ent thing,  the  separate  or  separable  fact,  whether  psychical  or 
physical,  which  enters,  or  may  enter,  into  our  experience.  Nor 
is  this  incorrect ;  but  what  must  be  constantly  borne  in  mind,  if 
this  account  is  not  to  mislead  us,  is  that  Spinoza  asserts  emphat- 
ically the  entire  dependence  of  the  mode  and  its  relativity  to  sub- 
stance. The  individual  thing,  we  might  say,  is  never  wholly  in- 
dividual, for  it  is,  only  as  a  modification  or  affection  of  being  as 
infinite.  There  is,  therefore,  no  absolute  dualism  between  sub- 
stance and  its  mode,  between  the  real  and  the  phenomenal. 
Thus,  when  he  states  :  "  Extra  intellectum  nihil  datur  praeter  sub- 
stantias  earumque  affectiones,"  *  it  is  clear  that  the  only  existence 
the  mode  possesses  is  as  an  affection  of  substance.  This  is  still 
more  definitely  brought  out  in  Ethics,  I,  proposition  xv,  where 
it  is  said  that  modes  can  only  be  in  the  divine  nature,  and  only 
through  it  can  be  conceived.  So  also  in  the  corollary  to  propo- 
sition xxv,  in  Part  I,  we  read :  "  Individual  things  are  nothing 
but  modifications  of  the  attributes  of  God,  or  modes  by  which 
the  attributes  of  God  are  expressed  in  a  fixed  and  determined 
manner."  Reference  might  be  made  to  a  very  large  number  of 
passages  in  which  this  intrinsic  and  essential  dependence  of  mode 
on  substance,  —  that  is,  of  the  particular  thing  on  being  itself,  —  is 
strongly  asserted.  It  would  be  then  an  entire  misreading  of 
Spinoza  to  explain  "substance"  as  one  entity  and  the  "  mode" 
as  another,  inferior  to  and  different  from  it.  The  individual  thing 
is  an  "affection"  of  substance  —  a  manifestation,  within  limits, 
of  being,  which  taken  per  se  is  absolutely  infinite.  Hence,  if  the 
reality  of  the  things  presented  to  our  experience  can  only  be  re- 
tained by  regarding  them  as  independent  of  substance,  Spinoza's 
system  must  indeed  be  pronounced  vulnerable  to  the  imputations 

1  Ethics,  I,  prop.  iv. 


18  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

of  being  an  "  Acosmism,"  for  constantlyand  with  insistence  does 
he  assert  that  such  "  res  particulares  "  are  just  affections  of  sub- 
stance, apart  from  which  they  could  not  conceivably  exist. 

But  when  we  reflect  that  substance  or  God  is  equivalent  to 
existence  itself,  in  its  fullest  and  richest  significance,  we  find  that 
Spinozism  by  this  dogma  of  the  relativity  of  the  mode  is  not  de- 
nying, but  rather  most  strenuously  asserting,  the  reality  of  the 
individual  and  of  the  world  made  up  of  individuals.  To  say  that 
anything  was  independent  of  God,  would  mean,  could  the  phrase 
indeed  have  any  meaning,  that  such  thing  was  outside  the  sphere 
of  existence,  that  it  was  a  nonentity.  If  it  is  at  all,  an  object 
must  pertain  to,  and  be  included  in,  the  circle  of  being.  Only  in 
a  restricted  sense  can  Spinoza  even  be  said  to  deny  substantive 
existence  to  the  individual.  It  is  true  that,  qua  individual,  it  is 
not  substance.  We  are  told  in  Ethics,  Part  II,  proposition  x, 
that  "  the  being  of  substance  does  not  pertain  to  the  essence  of 
man,"  and  in  the  scholium  to  the  same  proposition  the  statement 
is  given  in  more  general  form  that,  while  individual  things  cannot 
be  or  be  conceived  without  God,  yet  "  God  does  not  appertain  to 
their  essence";  yet  none  the  less  the  mode  is  an  expression  of 
God's  nature,  though  a  conditioned  or  limited  manifestation.  We 
might  say  that,  though  God  does  not  appertain  to  the  essence  of 
the  particular  things,  yet  their  essence  must  appertain  to  God. 
"  All  things  are  in  God,  and  all  things  which  come  to  pass,  come 
to  pass  solely  through  the  laws  of  the  infinite  nature  of  God,  or 
follow  from  the  necessity  of  his  essence."  l  There  is  evidently 
no  barrier  set  up  between  the  mode  and  that  of  which  it  is  a 
mode.  The  latter  partakes  of,  though  as  finite  it  cannot  exhaust, 
the  reality  of  the  "  ens  absolute  infinitum."  Yet  obviously  we 
have  a  right  to  ask  for  a  clearer  and  fuller  account  of  the  relation 
between  the  particular  and  the  universal  in  existence,  than  is 
given  in  the  mere  statement  that  the  one  is  the  necessary  mani- 
festation or  expression  of  the  other.  To  grasp  Spinoza's  ex- 
planation, we  must  take  into  consideration  some  rather  obscure 
elements  in  his  system  of  thought. 

First,  let  us   look  at  his   use    of  the   scholastic    expressions 

1  Ethics,  I,  prop,  xv,  scholium. 


No.  i.]  THE  FINITE  IN  SPINOZA'S  SYSTEM.  1 9 

"  natura  naturans  "  and  "  natura  naturata."  It  is  not  improbable 
that  Spinoza  was  conscious  that  these  terms  were  not  wholly 
satisfactory  as  representations  of  his  ideas,  for  we  find  them 
dropping  out  of  the  Ethics  before  the  conclusion  of  the  first 
Part.  Of  their  meaning,  however,  there  is  no  doubt ;  they  sig- 
nify respectively  nature  regarded  as  active  and  nature  regarded 
as  passive  or  receptive.  By  nature  as  active,  we  are  told,  is  meant 
"  that  which  is  in  itself  and  is  considered  through  itself,  or  those 
attributes  of  substance  which  express  eternal  and  infinite  essence, 
in  other  words,  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  a  first  cause." 
"  By  '  natura  naturata,'  "  Spinoza  continues,  "  I  understand  all  that 
which  follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  God,  or  of 
any  of  the  attributes  of  God,  that  is,  all  the  modes  of  the  attri- 
butes of  God,  in  so  far  as  they  are  considered  as  things  which 
are  in  God,  and  which  without  God  cannot  exist  or  be  conceived."  l 
This  passage  would  alone  be  sufficient  to  show  that  Spinoza  does 
not  accept  any  ultimate  or  intrinsic  duality  between  the  real  and  the 
phenomenal,  between  the  unity  of  being  and  its  manifold  expres- 
sions, for  to  suppose  that  "natura  naturans  "  and  "natura  natu- 
rata "  are  two  natures  numerically  distinct,  would  be  to  upset  his 
fundamental  dogma  that  God,  nature,  the  "  ens  absolute  infinitum" 
is  one.  Of  importance  to  the  correct  understanding  of  Spino- 
za's meaning  is  the  statement  of  Proposition  xxxi,  that  "  intel- 
lectus  actu,"  whether  finite  or  infinite,  is  to  be  referred  to  "natura 
naturata."  In  the  proof  it  is  affirmed  that  by  the  intellect,  in  this 
sense,  is  meant  not  absolute  thought,  but  only  a  certain  mode  of 
thinking,  differing  from  other  modes,  and  therefore  requiring  to 
be  conceived  through  absolute  thought.  In  the  scholium  to 
the  same  proposition,  he  protests  against  the  assumption  that  by 
using  the  phrase  "  intellectus  actu  "  he  is  implying  a  belief  in  the 
existence  of  a  merely  potential  intellect ;  in  fact,  he  is  by  it  merely 
signifying  the  very  act  of  understanding  which  is  implicit  in  the 
v  perception  of  anything  whatever.  The  "intellectus  actu"  is 
modal,  whether  a  finite  or  an  infinite  mode,  and  thus  referable  to 
"natura  naturata,"  whereas  "  absolute  thought"  is  itself  an  attri- 
bute of  God,  or  God's  very  nature  in  one  of  its  infinite  aspects, 
and  so  is  referable  to  "natura  naturans." 

1  Op.  at.,  I,  prop,  xxix,  scholium. 


20  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

There  is  little  difficulty  attending  Spinoza's  conception  of  God 
as  "natura  naturans."  As  is  everywhere  made  apparent,  God,  or 
substance,  is  by  the  necessity  of  his  own  nature  active  ;  and  from 
this  same  necessity  "must  follow  an  infinite  number  of  things  in 
Infinite  ways."  Plainly,  "natura  naturans  "  is  being  per  se,  recog- 
nized by  us  as  force  or  activity.  But  "  natura  naturata  "  seems  at 
first  sight  more  puzzling,  if  it  is  taken  as  implying  a  passivity  in 
God.  To  conceive  of  God  as  inactive  is  impossible  ;J  it  might  seem 
then  that  we  must  regard  "natura  naturata"  as  a  merely  illusory 
and  deceptive  presentation  of  reality  —  giving  us  an  apparently 
passive  universe,  which  does  not  in  fact  exist.  This  interpretation 
would  lead  to  Hegel's  conclusion  already  referred  to.  But  the 
true  explanation  becomes  clear,  when  we  recall  Spinoza's  use  of 
the  conception  of  causation.  God  is  infinite  cause,  the  "  efficient " 
and  the  "first"  cause  of  all ;  from  him,  as  well  as  in  him,  are  all 
things ;  viewed,  then,  in  relation  to  the  infinite  things  which  fol- 
low from  him,  he  is  the  activity  of  nature.  But  such  necessarily 
infinite  things  are  in  no  sort  separate  from  their  divine  source ; 
they  do  not  exist  outside  of,  nor  along  with  it, — they  are  neither 
emanation  nor  creation, —  but  manifestations,  expressions  of  God 
or  being,  God  as  "  causa  sui."  Hence  we  may  regard  nature, 
taken  as  the  totality  of  such  manifestations,  as  the  effect  or  conse- 
quence of  which  God  ("natura  naturans")  is  the  cause  or  ground  ; 
but  in  so  doing  we  are  not  treating  it  as  though  it  were  something 
apart  from  God,  something  undivine,  unreal ;  rather  it  is  the  same 
being  which  is  now  presented  as  the  resultant  of  its  own  force. 
The  expression  "causa  sui,"  would  be  meaningless  were  it  not 
possible  to  conceive  of  substance  as  effect.  The  latter  conception 
gives  us  "natura  naturata,"  but  it  is  not  a  positing  of  an  inactive 
being,  a  dead,  inert  universe  ;  it  is  merely  a  view  of  reality  in  which 
the  results  of  activity  are  brought  out  rather  than  the  activity 
itself.  The  results  are  real,  not  illusory ;  indeed,  an  activity 
which  should  have  no  real  results  would  itself  be  non-real. 
From  proposition  xvi  of  Part  I,  and  from  not  a  few  other  pas- 
sages, we  gather  that  Spinoza  had  fully  grasped  the  idea  on  which 
modern  German  idealists,  and  Hegel  in  particular,  have  laid  such 

1  Ethics,  II,  prop,  iii,  scholium. 


No.  i.]  THE  FINITE  IN  SPINOZA'S  SYSTEM.  21 

stress,  that  an  absolute  being  which  should  not  imply  self-differ- 
entiation, evolution,  an  f  anders-sein,'  would  be  a  mere  non- 
entity. But  perhaps  more  firmly  than  any  other  philosopher  did 
he  hold  to  the  counter  proposition,  that  such  differentiation  is 
only  a  relative  one,  and  that  the  world  of  relation  is  unthinkable 
except  as  we  can  conceive  in  thought  the  unity  to  which  that 
world  belongs.  The  effect  is  not  something  quite  other  than  the 
cause,  but  the  same  fact  regarded  in  new  connections.  'Force' 
and  '  matter '  are  not  separable  '  things,'  but  two  ways  of  en- 
visaging the  physical  universe.  '  Thinking '  and  '  ideas  '  are 
similarly  two  aspects  of  the  one  mental  current  making  up  our 
consciousness.  So,  to  revert  to  our  immediate  subject,  "  natura 
naturans  "  and  "  natura  naturata  "  are  the  one  being,  viewed  now 
as  cause  or  ground  of  itself,  now  as  its  own  effect  or  consequence. 

"  Natura  naturata,"  or  nature  as  effect,  is,  however,  not  a  mere 
congeries  of  separable  and  finite  things.  The  modes  of  which  it 
consists  are  "infinite  modes"  ;  and  here  we  meet  with  a  group  of 
Spinozistic  conceptions,  highly  important  to  the  system,  yet  in- 
troduced so  apparently  at  haphazard,  and  presented  with  such 
perfunctory  and  vague  explanation,  as  to  leave  the  student  in 
some  doubt  as  to  whether  Spinoza  himself  had  thoroughly 
mastered  their  significance.  These  conceptions  are  "  the  things 
immediately  produced  by  God,"  or  "infinite  modes"  following 
necessarily  from  the  absolute  nature  of  some  attribute  of  God, 
and  "  things  produced  by  means  of  some  such  infinite  modifica- 
tions." Since  nowhere  else  do  we  find  Spinoza's  thought  so  ob- 
scured and  hampered  by  the  inadequacy  of  his  terminology  as  in 
this  connection,  it  may  be  desirable  to  trace  out  somewhat  care- 
fully the  various  stages  in  his  presentation  of  this  part  of  his 
teaching  ;  for  we  meet  with  these  same  ideas  differently  formu- 
lated in  most  of  his  philosophical  works. 

In  the  "  Short  Treatise,"  Part  I,  chapters  viii  and  ix,  we  find, 
after  an  account  of  "natura  naturans"  which  does  not  differ  essen- 
tially from  that  given  in  his  maturer  work,  the  following  descrip- 
tion of  "  natura  naturata."  "  '  Natura  naturata  '  we  shall  divide 
into  two,  a  universal  and  a  particular.  The  universal  consists  in 
all  the  modes  that  immediately  depend  on  God,  of  which  we  shall 


22  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

treat  in  the  following  chapter.  The  particular  consists  in  all  the 
particular  things  which  are  caused  by  the  universal  modes.  So 
that  '  natura  naturata '  requires  substance  in  order  that  it  may 
be  rightly  conceived."  "  Now  as  concerns  the  universal  'natura 
naturata '  or  the  modes  or  creatures  which  immediately  depend 
on,  or  are  made  by  God,  of  these  we  know  but  two,  namely, 
motion  in  matter  and  the  understanding  in  the  thinking  thing. 
Of  these  we  affirm  that  from  all  eternity  they  have  been  and 
throughout  all  eternity  will  remain  unchangeable.  Truly  a 
work  as  great  as  befitted  the  greatness  of  the  master- worker." 
"  Now  as  to  what  particularly  concerns  motion,  since  this  be- 
longs more  properly  to  the  treatise  on  natural  science  than  to 
this  —  how  that  it  has  existed  from  all  eternity  and  shall  re- 
main unchangeable  through  eternity;  that  it  is  infinite  in  its 
kind;  and  that  through  itself  it  can  neither  exist  nor  be  con- 
ceived, but  only  by  means  of  extension  —  of  all  this,  I  say,  we 
shall  not  treat  here,  but  only  affirm  of  it  this,  that  it  is  a  son, 
creature,  or  effect  immediately  produced  by  God." 

"As  concerns  understanding  in  the  thinking  thing,  this  too, 
like  the  first,  is  a  son,  creation,  or  immediate  product  of  God, 
made  by  him  from  all  eternity,  and  through  all  eternity  remaining 
unchangeable. ' ' 

Here,  then,  in  the  earliest  formulation  of  Spinoza's  philosophy 
(if  we  except  the  two  dialogues  contained  in  the  "  Short  Trea- 
tise "),  we  have  the  distinct  assertion  of  things  produced  immedi- 
ately by  God  as  identical  with  infinite  modes,  and  these  limited, 
so  far  as  our  knowledge  goes,  to  two  —  motion  in  being  as  ex- 
tended and  understanding  in  being  as  conscious  ;  while  a  strong 
emphasis  is  laid  on  their  unchangeableness  and  their  "  eternity." 
Allowance  being  made  for  the  figurative  language  of  the  early 
work,  there  seems  no  reason  to  believe  that  Spinoza  ever  de- 
parted from,  or  in  any  important  respect  modified,  the  position 
here  laid  down. 

In  the  second  Appendix,  which  is  certainly  of  later  date  than 
the  "  Treatise  "  itself,  v/e  find  the  correlation  of  "  infinite  modes  "  in 
the  physical  and  the  psychical  attributes  again  implied,  though  the 
phrase  "infinite  idea"  takes  the  place  of  "  understanding."  "  It 


No.  i.]  THE  FINITE  IN  SPINOZA S  SYSTEM.  23 

is  to  be  observed  that  the  most  immediate  modification  of  the 
attribute  which  we  call  thought,  has  in  itself  objectively1  the 
formal  existence  of  all  things.  .  .  .  From  the  all  or  thought  is 
produced  an  infinite  idea  which  contains  objectively  in  itself 
the  whole  of  nature  as  it  actually  is."2  "We  thus  take  it  as 
proved  that  in  extension  there  is  no  other  modification  than  mo- 
tion and  rest,  and  that  each  particular  bodily  thing  is  nothing 
else  than  a  definite  proportion  of  motion  and  rest."3  In  the 
Tractatus  de  intellectus  emendation*,  we  meet  with  these  same 
"creatures  immediately  produced  by  God,"  under  a  different 
name,  i.  e.,  the  "fixed  and  eternal  things."4  The  name  need 
not  surprise  us,  since  we  have  noticed  that  it  was  on  the  eternity 
and  unchangeableness  of  the  infinite  modifications  that  Spinoza 
laid  stress  in  the  "  Short  Treatise." 

It  is  necessary  to  study  somewhat  closely  the  account  given  of 
these  "fixed  and  eternal  things."  After  laying  down  the  rules 
for  the  definition  of  "  created  "  and  "  uncreated  "  things,  Spinoza 
asserts  the  paramount  importance  of  a  knowledge  of  particulars. 
Then,  in  regard  to  the  order  of  knowledge,  he  requires  that  first 
there  should  be  established  the  existence  and  nature  of  the  being 
which  is  the  cause  of  all  things,  so  that  its  "  objective  essence  " 
being  the  cause  of  all  our  ideas,  our  mind  may,  as  completely  as 
possible,  reflect  the  essence,  order,  and  union  of  nature.  For  this, 
he  says,  we  must,  avoiding  all  abstractions,  deduce  our  ideas  from 
the  sequences  of  "physical  things"  or  "real  entities."  But  he 
adds  that  these  latter  are  not  the  innumerable  mutable  things,  but 
"  fixed  and  eternal  things."  What  we  want  to  apprehend  is  the 
intrinsic  essence  of  things,  and  (since  the  mutable  individual  things 
only  give  us  what  are  external,  or  at  best  unessential  properties) 
"  this  is  to  be  sought  from  fixed  and  eternal  things  only,  and  also 
from  the  laws  inscribed  in  them,  as  it  were,  in  their  true  codes, 
according  to  which  all  particular  things  are  produced  and  or- 

JAs  has  often  been  pointed  out,  "objective  "  means  for  Spinoza  mental  or  subjec- 
tive, while  "formal"  signifies  "actual,"  or,  approximately,  what  we  mean  by 
"objective." 

2  Opera,  Ed.  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  IOO. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  103. 

4  On  this  point  see  the  admirably  clear  explanation  in  Pollock's  Spinoza :  His  Life 
and  Philosophy,  chapter  iv. 


24  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

dered."  .The  particular  mutable  things  are  wholly  dependent  on 
those  that  are  fixed  and  eternal,  and  the  latter,  he  goes  on  to 
state,  though  themselves  particular,  are,  owing  to  their  power 
and  presence  everywhere,  to  us  as  universal,  and  stand  as  genera 
to  the  mutable  things.  To  apply  the  knowledge  of  these  fixed 
and  eternal  things  is,  however,  peculiarly  difficult,  because  they  do 
not  exist  in  a  temporal  series,  but  are  "by  nature  simultaneous," 
so  that  something  more  than  an  apprehension  of  them  is  required 
if  we  are  to  understand  the  time-sequence  of  particulars.  What 
this  "  something  more  "  is,  Spinoza  does  not  tell  us.1 

At  first  sight,  this  account  of  the  "  fixed  and  eternal  things  " 
seems  full  of  the  most  curious,  because  the  most  obvious,  contra- 
dictions. Taken  by  itself,  the  passage  is  hardly  intelligible. 
What  can  they  be,  these  "physical  things,"  which  are  "real  en- 
tities" and  "fixed  and  eternal  things,"  which  are  not,  like  the 
"  mutable "  things,  innumerable,  and  so  beyond  the  reach  of 
human  weakness  to  compass,  which  are  "singular  things"  and 
yet  "  like  universals  to  us  "  ?  Undoubtedly  the  language  here 
is  highly  obscure,  and  we  can  hardly  believe  that  the  thoughts 
to  be  expressed  were  quite  clear  in  the  writer's  mind  when  these 
phrases  were  penned.  Some  correlation  between  these  "  fixed  and 
eternal  things  "  of  Spinoza  and  the  "  Ideas  "  of  Platonism,  at  once 
suggests  itself  to  every  reader.  Yet  it  is  impossible  to  introduce 
the  Platonic  "idea"  into  the  Spinozistic  ontology  without  pro- 
ducing utter  confusion.  It  seems,  indeed,  probable  that  the  pas- 
sage in  question  does  point  to  an  influence  on  Spinoza's  develop- 
ment, not  from  Plato  himself,  but  from  the  neo-Platonism  of 
Renaissance  thinkers.  But  the  expression  "physical  things" 
alone  would  prove  that  we  are  not  being  introduced  to  Plato's 
world  of  ideas.  Undoubtedly  what  Spinoza  has  in  view  here  is 
the  double  manifestation  of  reality  as  existence  moving  in  space 
and  the  same  existence  conditioned  by  mental  activity.  In  the 
cruder,  but  more  intelligible  language  of  the  "Short  Treatise,"  it 
is  "  motion,"  regarded  as  the  essence  of  the  material  world,  and 
"understanding,"  regarded  as  the  essence  of  the  mental  world, 
and  as  corresponding  to  and  coordinate  with  motion,  that  are  the 

1  Opera,  Vol.  I,  pp.  30-32. 


No.  i.]  THE  FINITE  IN  SPINOZA S  SYSTEM.  2$ 

"fixed  and  eternal"  things.  It  is,  however,  to  the  physical  side 
that  Spinoza  directs  attention,  probably  because  in  the  De  intel- 
lectus  emendatione  he  is  dealing  with  the  epistemological  problem, 
and  we  must  know  physical  things,  objects  moving  in  "space, 
before  we  know  them  as  reflexions  in  consciousness.  Putting 
together  the  statements  of  the  "Short  Treatise,"  of  its  second 
Appendix,  and  of  the  De  intellectus  emendatione,  we  can  see 
that  "  motion  "  is  for  him  the  dynamic  aspect  of  matter,  and  like 
the  latter  is  infinite  and  eternal,  and  that  the  activity  of  conscious- 
ness, variously  called  by  him  "  infinite  idea,"  "  understanding," 
and  "infinite  intellect,"  is  the  similar  dynamic  aspect  of  mind  or 
thought. 

Coming  now  to  Spinoza's  mature  expression  of  this  doctrine, 
we  find  in  the  Ethics,  Part  I,  proposition  xxi,  the  statement  that 
whatever  follows  from  the  absolute  nature  of  any  attribute  of 
God  must  be  eternal  and  infinite.  In  Letter  Ixiv,  in  answer  to 
Tchirnhausen's  questions,  Spinoza  states  that  examples  of  these 
are,  in  thought,  absolutely  infinite  understanding,  and,  in  exten- 
sion, motion,  and  rest,  precisely  the  teaching  of  his  earlier  works, 
as  we  have  seen.  Ethics,  I,  proposition  xxii,  asserts  that  what- 
ever follows  from  any  attribute  of  God,  as  modified  by  such  neces- 
sarily existent  and  infinite  modes,  is  itself  "  necessarily  existent," 
which  is  for  Spinoza  the  same  as  eternal  and  infinite.  The  one 
example  offered  Tchirnhausen  of  modes  of  this  kind  is  "  facies 
totius  universi,"  and  he  is  referred  for  further  explanation  to  the 
Ethics,  Part  II,  Lemma  vii,  scholium,  which  shows  clearly  that 
by  "  facies  totius  universi  "  is  meant  the  totality  of  physical  na- 
ture, "  conceived  as  an  individual,  whose  parts,  that  is  all  bodies, 
vary  in  infinite  ways  without  any  change  in  the  individual  as  a 
whole."  This  passage  enables  us  to  see  the  character  of  these 
mediated  infinite  modes,  as  we  may  call  them,  as  distinguished 
from  the  immediately  produced  motion  and  thought-activity. 
The  mediated  infinite  modes  are  not,  per  se,  indivisible  ;  they  con- 
sist of  '  parts,'  just  as  the  finite  mode,  e.  g.,  the  human  body, 
does  ;  only  these  parts  are  infinite  in  number.  No  student  can 
fail  to  observe  Spinoza's  omission  of  any  specified  mediated  infi- 
nite mode  in  the  psychical  sphere.  This  may  have  been  due  to 


26  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

his  unwillingness  to  introduce  into  a  letter  a  discussion  of  a  con- 
ception still  ill-defined  in  his  own  mind,  and  for  which  his  philo- 
sophical vocabulary  was  unprovided  with  an  appropriate  term. 
He  can  hardly  have  been  unconscious  of  the  gap  thus  left  in  his 
system.  Admitting  this  imperfection  in  his  account  of  God  as 
thinking  thing,  in  relation  to  the  facts  of  consciousness,  we  may 
tabulate  his  exposition  of  God's  being  in  relation  to  the  physical 
world  only  in  the  following  scheme. 

God  =  "ens  absolute  infinitum,"  existence /^r  se,  which  is  self- 
activity,  and  in  its  essential  nature  infinite,  timeless,  and  indivisible. 

Extension  =  Existence  in  one  of  its  "  attributes  "  or  aspects 
(that  is,  one  out  of  the  infinite  possible  ways  in  which  it  is  cog- 
nizable), and  therefore  necessarily  infinite,  timeless,  and  indivisible. 

Motion,  or  Motion  and  Rest  =  The  immediate  resultant  of  the 
infinite  activity,  when  that  is  regarded  as  extension,  —  timeless, 
infinite,  and  immutable. 

The  physical  universe  as  a  whole,  "  facies  totius  universi  " 
=  That  which  follows  from  extension  as  affected  by  motion,  or 
the  totality  of  matter  as  subject  to  the  laws  of  motion.  It  is,  as 
a  whole,  permanent  and  infinite,  but  is  made  up  of  an  infinite 
number  of  finite  and  mutable  facts. 

The  finite  modes  as  physical  =  The  individual  material  things. 
These  are  infinite  in  number,  divisible,  mutually  limited,  and 
susceptible  to  change  through  their  determination  by  each  other. 
Each,  however,  is  a  modification  or  manifestation  under  limiting 
conditions  of  the  infinite  activity,  working  under  spatial  condi- 
tions, or  of  "  God  as  an  extended  thing." 

A  corresponding  scheme  for  "  God  as  thinking  thing  "  could 
of  course  be  readily  formulated.  As  Sir  Frederick  Pollock  sug- 
gests, the  "  idea  Dei "  may  be  used  to  correspond  to  the  "  facies 
totius  universi,"  the  "infinite  intellect"  then  representing  the 
dynamic  expression  of  absolute  consciousness  ;  but,  as  he  points 
out,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  was  Spinoza's  own  procedure.1  In- 
deed, from  Ethics,  I,  proposition  xxi,  it  would  rather  seem  that 
the  "  idea  Dei  in  Cogitatione  "  was  one  of  the  things  which  fol- 
low immediately  from  the  nature  of  God,  and  therefore  analogous 

1  Spinoza  :  His  Life  and  Philosophy,  2d  ed.,  p.  176. 


No.  i.]  THE  FINITE  IN  SPINOZA'S  SYSTEM.  2/ 

with  motion  rather  than  with  the  "  fades  totius  universi."  Yet 
taking  together  the  various  passages  in  Parts  I  and  II  of  the 
Ethics,  and  reading  them  in  the  light  of  the  explanations  offered 
in  Letters  xxxii  and  Ixiv,  we  can  gather,  first,  that  Spinoza  did 
recognize  the  existence  of  consciousness  as  a  totality,  in  which 
each  individual  mind  and  fact  of  mentality  exists,  and  of  which 
each  forms  a  part,  and  that  such  totality  of  consciousness  is  infi- 
nite, its  '  parts '  being  finite  but  infinite  in  number.  It  must,  of 
course,  be  remembered  that,  according  to  the  Spinozistic  view, 
each  '  thing  '  great  or  small,  has  its  psychical  as  well  as  its  phys- 
ical existence.  Secondly,  this  conscious  totality  may  be  con- 
ceived dynamically,  its  existence  is  at  the  same  time  force.  The 
all-inclusive  consciousness  is  then  equivalent  to  the  "  facies  totius 
universi,"  it  is  this  viewed  under  the  attribute  of  thought ;  while, 
just  as  the  "  facies  totius  universi  "  is  the  total  "  res  extensa  "  as 
conditioned  by  motion,  so  is  this  all-inclusive  consciousness  the 
"  res  cogitans  "  as  conditioned  by  that  universal  and  ceaseless 
activity,  call  it  by  what  name  we  will,  which  is  the  psychical 
equivalent  of  physical  motion. 

As  regards  the  nature  of  the  actual  phenomenal  '  things ' 
which  compose  the  multiplicity  of  the  world  we  live  in,  Spinoza's 
teaching  is  clear  enough.  The  finite  mode,  like  the  existence  of 
which  it  is  the  limited  manifestation,  is  cognizable  as  physical 
and  psychical.  It  is  conditioned  by  its  fellows,  and  the  specific 
character  of  each  object  is  what  it  is  because  of  its  interaction 
with  other  modes.1  At  the  same  time,  each  is  "  conditioned  by 
the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  not  only  to  exist  but  to  exist 
and  operate  in  a  particular  manner."  If  we  do  not  firmly  hold 
to  the  conception  of  the  oneness  of  God,  or  "  ens,"  with  the  whole 
world,  we  shall  find  here  a  contradiction.  Each  thing  depends  on 
God  both  for  the  fact  and  the  manner  of  its  existence,3  and  yet 
each  is  determined  by  the  other  finite  existences  with  which  it  is, 
as  we  may  say,  in  touch.  Yet  Spinoza's  meaning  is  easily  grasped. 
Being  is  concrete  reality,  all -extensive,  all-embracing.  Of  that 
reality  the  particular  thing  —  this  atom,  this  plant,  this  human 

1  Ethics,  I,  prop,  xxvii. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  prop.  xxix. 
3 Ibid.,  I,  prop.  xxv. 


28  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

being  —  is  part  and  parcel ;  its  emergence  and  continuance  in  the 
world  are  existing  facts.  Nor  could  existence  be  without  things 
that  are,  things  infinite  in  number  and  in  variety.1  Yet  that  this 
particular  thing  should  be  so  and  not  otherwise,  is  obviously  not 
explained  by  a  mere  reference  to  the  "ens  absolute  infinitum." 
The  particularity  involves  relation  to  other  particulars,  each  of 
which,  of  course,  is  equally  "a  modification  or  affection  of  exist- 
ence itself,"  or  is  "God  as  modified  by  some  finite  modification." 
When  we  consider  any  individual  thing  as  a  psychical  fact,  we 
regard  it  as  a  phenomenon  of  being  as  "  res  cogitans  "  ;  it  is  a  fact 
of  consciousness  to  be  explained,  if  explicable  at  all,  by  its  rela- 
tions to  other  facts  of  consciousness.  Similarly,  the  physical  phe- 
nomenon can  only  be  understood  by  referring  it  to  the  physical 
events  on  which  it  depends.2 

The  foundation  by  Spinoza  of  this  restriction  of  the  explana- 
tion of  the  physical  and  psychical  to  the  respective  sphere  of 
each  order  of  fact,  has  been  of  capital  importance  to  the  cause  of 
clear  and  exact  thinking.  But  his  justification  of  the  restriction 
is  often  lost  sight  of  even  by  those  who  recognize  its  value. 
Mental  and  material  phenomena  do  not  interact,  just  because 
beneath  the  diversity  which  their  very  terms  express,  lies  the 
oneness  of  the  fact  which  each  partially  expresses.  So  far 
from  being  "separated  from  each  other  by  the  whole  diameter 
of  being,"  the  physical  and  psychical  are  just  the  two  expres- 
sions of  being  itself.  "  The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the 
same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things."  3  "  So  long  as  we 
consider  things  as  modes  of  thinking,  we  must  explain  the  whole 
of  the  order  of  nature,  or  the  whole  chain  of  causes,  through 
the  attribute  of  thought  only.  And  in  so  far  as  we  consider 
things  as  modes  of  extension,  we  must  explain  the  whole 
of  the  order  of  nature  through  the  attribute  of  extension  only, 
and  so  on  in  the  case  of  other  attributes.  Wherefore,  of  things 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  God  is  really  the  cause,  inasmuch  as 
he  consists  of  infinite  attributes."  4  The  reference  to  things  in 

1  Ethics,  I,  prop,  xvi. 

2  Ibid.,  II,  prop.  vi. 

3  Ibid.,  II,  prop.  vii. 

*  Ibid.,  II,  prop,  vii,  scholium.     It  is  curious  that,  while   these   statements  of 


No.  i.]  THE  FINITE  IN  SPINOZA S  SYSTEM.  29 

themselves  in  this  passage  shows  the  reality  as  well  as  the  limi- 
tations of  the  world  of  our  experience.  The  bounds  of  our 
knowledge  are  set  by  our  ignorance  of  more  than  two  of  the 
aspects  or  " attributes"  of  infinite  being.  Yet  this  knowledge  is 
not  illusory ;  for  we  really  understand  a  finite  manifestation  of 
existence,  a  "mode  of  substance,"  in  so  far  as  we  know  the  con- 
ditions on  which  all  its  physical  and  psychical  phenomena  de- 
pend. From  the  foregoing  examination  of  Spinoza's  doctrine, 
we  can,  I  think,  safely  conclude  that  the  dualism  which  differ- 
entiates between  an  Absolute,  as  an  intrinsic  and  independent  re- 
ality, and  a  phenomenal  world  of  manifold  appearance  having  no 
intrinsic  reality,  is  wholly  foreign  and  adverse  to  his  ontology. 
It  is  existence  itself,  existence  not  per  se  divisible,  yet  evidenced  in 
the  manifold,  that  is  the  center  round  which  his  whole  thought 
turns.  Being  is  by  him  fittingly  designated  God.  This  it  is 
which  is  at  -once  the  most  certain  and  obvious  of  truths,  and  the 
most  inexhaustible  of  mysteries.  With  it  all  knowledge  starts 
and  in  it  culminates.  Of  being  everything  partakes ;  and  so 
nothing  that  presents  itself  to  our  senses,  our  imagination,  or 
our  reason  is  altogether  illusory.  But  with  Spinoza,  as  with  all 
the  great  philosophers  from  Plato  to  Hegel,  we  constantly  find 
the  problems  of  being  passing  over  into  problems  of  knowledge. 
The  more  thorough-going  an  ontology  is,  the  more  directly  does 
it  lead  to  the  questions  that  lie  at  the  root  of  a  consistent  and 
rational  epistemology.  The  more  strenuously  we  endeavor  to 
define  adequately  the  forms  of  existence,  the  more  evident  does 
it 'become  that,  in  so  doing,  we  are  differentiating  between  modes 
of  apprehension.  Hence  the  student  of  Spinoza  is  not  surprised 
to  find  that  his  theory  of  being  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  his 
theory  of  knowledge,  and  that  each  requires  the  other  for  its 

complement  and  explication. 

E.  RITCHIE. 

Spinoza  offer  the  clearest  and  sharpest  contradiction  to  materialism  in  any  of  its 
forms,  yet  the  modern  materialist  constantly  appeals  to  the  authority  of  his  name. 
Haeckel  is  the  latest  offender  in  this  respect.  Of  course  Spinoza  is  equally  opposed 
to  subjective  idealism  as  an  ontology. 


RATIONALITY   AND    BELIEF. 

THE  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  attempt  an  adjustment  of  the 
relative  claims  of  the  logical  and  the  extra-logical  factors 
in  belief,  along  the  lines  of  certain  recent  discussions.  In  order 
to  do  this,  it  will  be  necessary  to  take  more  or  less  for  granted 
certain  views  about  the  nature  of  knowledge  which  cannot  be 
adequately  defended  in  so  brief  a  compass,  but  which,  it  may  be 
assumed,  are  familiar.  The  endeavor  will  be  to  give  a  general 
survey  of  the  field,  in  order  to  show  more  clearly  some  of  the 
bearings  of  these  views,  and,  possibly,  to  recommend  them  by 
guarding  against  certain  misunderstandings. 

And  the  first  point  I  should  make  is  this  :  that  the  funda- 
mental basis  of  the  sense  of  reality,  as  attaching  to  anything 
whatsoever,  lies  in  the  relationship  to  some  personal  need  or 
demand.  The  '  real '  is  that  which  enables  us  to  satisfy  our 
active  impulses.  That  is  accepted  as  real  which  can  be  used  as 
a  means  for  doing  whatever  our  nature  impels  us  to  do.  And 
this  is  as  true  of  what  we  call  physical  things  as  of  any  other 
object  of  belief.  If  we  could  conceive  the  animal  consciousness 
as  starting  out  with  a  purely  disinterested  attention  to  whatever 
turned  up,  backed  by  no  outgoing  tendencies  to  serve,  such  a 
consciousness,  even  if  it  were  possible  at  all,  could  hardly  be 
called  a  consciousness  of  reality.  It  would  take  the  form  at 
best  of  mere  floating  images,  something  of  the  nature  pf  that  with 
which  the  older  sensationalism  sets  out.  But  if  we  regard  the 
animal  as  from  the  beginning  active,  as  groping  more  or  less 
blindly  for  satisfaction,  the  sense  stimulus  which  represents  the 
satisfaction  of  this  need  has  the  possibility  of  quite  another  value. 
In  other  words,  what  we  call  real  things  are  things  which  stand 
for  the  satisfaction  of  the  organic  will.  They  are  the  means  to 
the  realization  of  the  bodily  life,  which  have  reality  just  because 
we  demand  that  they  should  be  real.  It  is  the  insistence  of  the 
need  which  lends  reality  to  that  which  will  satisfy  it.  And  when 
for  any  reason  this  insistence  fails, —  if,  for  example,  a  great  grief 

30 


RA  TIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  3  I 

deadens  the  springs  of  action, —  that  moment  we  begin  to  lose  our 
grip  on  the  actuality  of  things,  and  they  become  strange  to  us, 
far  away,  and  unsubstantial.  So  any  philosophy  which,  like  that 
of  the  East,  maintains  as  a  tenet  the  utter  unreality  of  the  world, 
grows  out  of,  and  necessarily  depends  upon,  a  starving  of  the 
active  nature ;  and  it  attains  the  goal  of  conviction,  to  the  extent 
in  which  it  is  successful  in  crushing  out  desires,  and  in  cultivating 
a  state  of  quiescence  and  indifference.  In  general,  conviction  is 
apt  to  fluctuate  with  the  strenuousness  of  our  mood,  and  the 
pressure  of  active  needs.  As  Montaigne  remarks:  "After 
dinner  a  man  believes  less,  denies  more.  Verities  have  lost  their 
charm."  This  is  why,  of  course,  as  a  final  criterion  of  the  reality 
of  a  thing,  we  appeal  to  the  sense  of  touch,  rather  than  of  sight 
or  hearing.  It  is  only  in  connection  with  active  touch  that  the 
thing  comes  to  perform  that  actual  service  for  the  bodily  needs, 
which  is  the  final  basis  of  its  reality. 

But  now,  while  this  seems  to  furnish  a  necessary  basis  for  any 
doctrine  of  reality,  I  do  not  mean,  of  course,  that  it  is  in  itself  a 
sufficient  account  of  how,  psychologically,  we  come  consciously 
to  recognize  a  physical  object  as  real,  in  its  distinction  from  other 
realities,  and,  especially,  from  the  reality  of  the  self,  and  of  con- 
sciousness. Immediate  sense  of  reality  is  not  necessarily  identi- 
cal with  objectivity.  A  thing  might  play  a  part  in  our  experi- 
ence, and  in  so  doing  be  present  to  feeling  as  in  some  sense 
actual,  while  yet  it  acted  so  smoothly  and  inevitably  as  never  to 
call  attention  to  itself,  or  be  marked  off  as  in  any  degree  separate. 
The  recognition  of  reality  implies  the  relation  to  needs,  but  it 
also  demands  other  special  conditions  beside.  And  in  order  to 
avoid  misunderstanding,  I  may,  before  going  further,  indicate 
briefly  what  seem  to  me  these  further  steps  in  the  process.  And, 
in  general,  the  special  conditions  may  be  summed  up,  I  think,  in 
the  failure  of  things  to  perform  their  function  easily  and  smoothly. 
In  other  words,  it  is  due  to  the  fact  that  there  are  recalcitrant  ele- 
ments in  experience.  We  do  not  find  it  the  case  that  a  need  has 
only  to  assert  itself  to  be  gratified.  A  special  stimulus  is  required 
to  set  off  the  activity ;  and  this  stimulus  does  not  always  stand 
ready  to  perform  its  duty.  We  have  to  look  about  us,  and 


32  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

exercise  more  or  less  coercion  upon  the  means  which  are  to  serve 
for  the  attainment  of  our  ends.  Now  it  is  this  check  upon  the 
perfect  freedom  of  our  self-assertion,  which  is  the  starting  point 
for  our  consciousness  of  the  separation  between  ourselves  and  the 
world.  The  failure  to  get  satisfaction  brings  up  a  dim  conscious- 
ness of  the  need  that  is  demanding  expression.  And,  at  the  same 
time,  there  comes  a  reference  to  that  which  will  serve  to  set  free 
again  our  checked  self-expression,  and  enable  the  impulse  to 
carry  itself  out.  In  psychological  terms,  it  is  the  sensation,  or 
perception,  which  plays  this  part.  The  sensation  stands  for  our 
contact  with  what  we  afterwards  learn  to  call  the  real  world. 
But  it  is  the  sensation  with  two  special  aspects  or  characteristics. 
In  the  first  place,  it  stands  as  a  means  for  gratifying  an  end  more 
or  less  clearly  present  to  consciousness,  and  as  in  some  degree, 
therefore,  distinguished  from  this  end.  And,  in  the  second  place, 
it  stands  as  a  means  not  wholly  under  control,  a  means  with 
a  will  of  its  own,  which  has  to  be  in  a  measure  compelled  to 
serve  its  purpose.  It  is  a  means,  therefore,  which  we  begin  to 
feel  as  independent  of  those  ends  which  we  recognize,  at  first 
blindly,  but  afterwards  with  more  and  more  distinctness,  to  be 
identical  with  our  own  life.  Between  the  consciousness  of  our 
needs  or  ends,  which  maintains  itself  through  the  changes  of 
bodily  position,  and  certain  other  groups  of  experiences,  we 
realize  gradually  that  there  is  a  difference.  These  last  are  not 
constant,  but  variable.  Nor  are  they  like  the  bodily  movements 
which  we  can  depend  on  for  the  attainment  of  our  end.  They 
are  not  dependable  in  anything  like  the  same  degree.  And  so 
the  bodily  self,  as  a  system  of  active  needs  expressing  themselves 
in  movements  bearing  a  relatively  direct  and  constant  relation  to 
ends  as  realized  in  consciousness,  comes  to  stand  over  against  the 
objects  which  it  has  to  utilize. 

It  is,  therefore,  I  should  say,  the  restraints  upon  the  free  exer- 
cise of  our  impulses,  which  lead  to  the  growing  separation  be- 
tween ourselves  and  the  external  world.  It  is  the  multiform  ex- 
perience of  the  uncertainty  of  the  world  of  things,  which  provides 
the  occasion  for  setting  them  off  as  things  by  themselves.  I  do 
not  see  that  we  need  to  appeal  exclusively  to  cases  of  physical 


No.  i .]  RA  TIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  3 3 

exertion  against  opposing  force.  Probably  this  plays  a  consider- 
able part  in  stamping  the  distinction  upon  consciousness.  The 
sense  of  effort  against  resistance  is  one  characteristic  form  of  the 
realization  of  an  end  to  be  attained,  which  we  identify  with  our- 
selves ;  and  the  attribution  of  this  same  active  force  to  the  objects 
which  resist  us,  helps,  by -personalizing  them,  to  sharpen  the  dis- 
tinction between  them  and  ourselves.  But  it  is  never  the  mere 
exertion  of  force  which  brings  about  this  result.  It  must  be 
force  exerted  for  an  end,  and  an  end  at  least  dimly  felt  in  con- 
sciousness. Otherwise  we  have  just  a  blind  feeling,  with  no 
objectivity  at  all  emerging. 

There  is  one  further  step  of  importance  in  the  growth  of  the 
recognition  of  objectivity.  We  have  the  object  now  set  over 
against  the  self  and  the  ends  at  which  the  self  aims.  But  the 
self  is  largely  in  terms  of  the  body  and  the  realization  of  bodily 
activities.  External  things  are  those  which  lie  outside  the  body 
in  space,  and  which  are  not  immediately  under  control,  as  the 
body  itself  is.  We  still  do  not  have  the  object  distinguished 
clearly  from  the  inner  life  of  consciousness,  and,  especially,  from 
the  conscious  state  which  represents  it  —  the  objective  thing  from 
the  sensation.  Evidently,  for  this  to  come  about,  an  occasion 
must  arise  for  the  clear  recognition  of  the  state  of  consciousness 
as  such.  Heretofore  this  has  simply  been  absorbed  in  its  objec- 
tive reference  or  meaning.  And  here,  again,  the  same  principle 
may  be  utilized  as  before.  The  recognition  will  not  come  about, 
until  attention  to  the  mental  state  as  such  is  demanded  by  some 
need  which  the  recognition  will  satisfy.  In  general  terms,  such 
a  recognition  may  be  said  to  go  back  to  periods  when  for  any 
reason  the  customary  external  motives  fail  to  work.  We  are 
forced,  then,  to  a  closer  examination  of  the  mechanism  of  the 
conscious  process  itself,  in  order  to  get  at  the  cause  of  the 
trouble,  and,  if  necessary,  to  discover  substitutes  for  the  old 
stimuli.  There  is  a  temporary  inversion  of  the  real  order  of 
things.  Subjectivism  for  the  time  being  gets  the  upper  hand ; 
the  inner  world  acquires  a  new  sort  of  reality.  It  is  not  when 
life  yields  most  pleasure  that  a  pleasure  philosophy  comes  to  the 
front.  Then  it  is  things  which  men  value.  The  consciousness 


34  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

that  pleasure  alone  is  worth  while  marks  a  failure  in  pleasure 
getting,  and  an  attempt  at  the  discovery  of  an  artificial  stimulus. 
So  it  is  not  when  the  emotional  life  is  at  its  height  that  we  have  a 
deification  of  the  emotions.  Then  men  are  religionists,  artists, 
patriots.  It  is  because  the  occasion  for  emotions  is  failing,  that 
their  reality  as  things  and  ends  in  themselves  begins  to  stand 
out.  As  regards  the  special  recognition  of  sensational  and  per- 
ceptual facts,  the  chief  occasion  would  appear  to  be  the  occur- 
rence of  perceptual  error  and  illusion.  The  fact  that  two  appar- 
ently similar  experiences  have  different  results,  one  that  for  which 
we  are  looking,  and  the  other  puzzling  and  disappointing,  grows 
gradually  into  the  recognition  of  the  subjective  fact,  —  the  ele- 
ment of  identity  in  the  two  different  situations,  —  as  having  an  ex- 
istence of  its  own.  So,  historically,  sensationalism  has  been  the 
outgrowth  of  scepticism  ;  and  scepticism  is  the  acute  recognition 
of  the  fact  of  error.  And  now,  when  we  do  once  recognize  the 
sensation  as  such,  we  feel  sure  that  our  meaning  with  reference 
to  it  is  not  the  same  as  our  meaning  when  it  is  directed  towards 
the  object.  It  is  not  the  sensation  itself  which  enables  us  to 
carry  out  our  ends.  The  sensation  is  a  state  of  ours.  It  simply 
stands  to  us  as  a  representative  of  that  active  agent  —  the  real 
object  —  which  has  a  direct  causal  relationship  to  our  lives,  and 
on  which  we  are  dependent.1 

1  This  implies  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  reality,  or  objectivity,  of  any  fact 
of  knowledge,  involves  its  correspondence  to  our  idea  of  it.  This  is  often  objected  to 
on  the  ground  that  the  words  'real,'  '  objective '  mean  simply  inclusion  within  a  system 
of  thought,  and  that  a  thing,  accordingly,  is  real,  not  as  it  is  correctly  copied  in  our 
subjective  ideas,  but  as  it  enters  into  relationships  to  other  things.  But  this  latter 
conception  might  very  well  be  true,  without  excluding  the  other.  In  thinking  of  the 
objective  world,  we  usually  abstract  from  our  act  of  knowledge.  And  when  we  do 
this,  what  we  mean  by  the  reality  of  a  thing  does  involve  its  relation  to  the  other  con- 
tents of  knowledge.  We  call  a  thing  real,  when  it  enters  into  this  complex  of  rela- 
tionships ;  unreal,  when  they  refuse  to  accept  it.  And  if  we  could  always  ignore  the 
specific  faculty  of  human  knowing,  this  might  be  a  sufficient  account.  But  when  we 
also  have  occasion  to  think  of  the  experience  of  knowing,  we  have  added  another 
fact  to  be  brought  into  relation ;  and  the  particular  relation  which  this  bears  to  the 
object  known  is  just  the  relation  of  correspondence. 

There  is,  no  doubt,  reason  for  the  discredit  into  which  the  copy  theory  of  knowl- 
edge has  latterly  fallen.  If  we  take  this  as  the  whole  of  the  problem  of  knowledge, 
it  is  obviously  insufficient.  There  is  a  sense,  certainly,  in  which  the  very  process  of 
human  knowing  itself  is  part  of  the  process  of  reality,  and  not  merely  a  pale- copy  or 
reflection  of  reality.  Knowledge  does  not  simply  stand  off  and  look  at  the  world,  re- 


No.  i.]  RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  35 

There  is  one  other  thing  which  plays  a  large  part  in  the  de- 
velopment of  our  final  conception  of  the  objective  world,  and  that 
is  the  social  experience.  This  has  been  emphasized  strongly  in 
recent  years,  and  undoubtedly  it  needs  to  be  reckoned  with  con- 
tinually in  any  complete  account  of  the  way  in  which  our  present 
notion  of  reality  has  grown  up.  Our  relationships  to  other  men 
supply,  in  one  way  or  another,  a  large  part  of  the  content  which 
enters  into  the  conception  for  any  one  of  us.  Social  contrast 
enters  largely  into  the  bringing  to  consciousness  of  the  ends 
which  we  identify  with  ourselves.  The  fact  of  social  agreement 
is  one  of  the  very  most  important  tests  for  determining  what  par- 
ticular contents  shall  permanently  be  accepted,  and  what  shall  be 
rejected  as  illusory.  Probably,  also,  disagreement  between  dif- 
ferent people  has  a  great  deal  to  do  with  bringing  about  a  recog- 
nition of  the  subjectivity  of  sensation.  But  when  one  goes  on  to 
hold  that  social  agreement  is  the  source  of  our  whole  idea  of  the 
external  world,  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that  the  position  is  justi- 
fied. This,  as  I  understand  it,  is  what  Professor  Royce  main- 
tains. We  react,  in  the  first  place,  by  way  of  imitating  other 
persons.  In  these  imitative  reactions,  we  get  certain  experiences 
by  means  of  which  our  conceptions  of  these  other  selves,  and 
then,  in  contrast  with  these,  of  our  own  self,  are  gradually  built  up. 
And  it  is  only  when  we  have  come  to  recognize  that,  in  the  ex- 
periences of  these  different  selves,  there  are  certain  similar  con- 
tents, that  the  similarity  leads  us  to  postulate  a  single,  separate, 
real  '  thing,'  to  which  they  all  alike  refer. 

I  find  it  difficult  to  make  this  conception  clear  to  myself.     It 

peating  in  less  glowing  colors  what  it  finds  there.  There  would  be  neither  rhyme  nor 
reason  in  that  alone.  Thought  lies  within,  not  outside,  the  charmed  circle  of  exist- 
ence ;  and  this  is  richer  with  every  new  achievement  of  reason.  But  surely  there  is 
another  side  also,  according  to  which  reality  and  the  process  of  human  thought  are 
not  identical.  And  it  is  easily  possible,  if  we  interpret  reality  in  terms  of  life,  to  com- 
bine the  two  demands  —  that  growing  knowledge  should  have  a  reference  to  reality 
beyond  itself,  and  yet  that  it  should  be  necessary  to  the  constitution  and  meaning  of 
this  reality  to  which  it  looks.  Our  lives  enter  into  the  great  unfolding  drama  of  the 
universe ;  and  so  our  growth  in  knowledge,  and  the  action  to  which  it  leads,  form  a 
real  step  in  the  progress  of  the  whole,  and  a  constitutive  part  of  the  real  world.  And 
yet  the  part  we  have  to  play  requires  a  knowledge  of  the  situation  in  which  we  are 
placed,  an  acquaintance  with  the  larger  reality  beyond  us  ;  and,  therefore,  the  repre- 
sentative aspect  of  knowledge  is  also  essential  to  its  whole  meaning.  • 


36  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

seems  to  make  an  unwarranted  distinction  between  certain  ma- 
terial things  and  others  ;  and  to  hold  that  recognition  of  these 
two  parts  of  the  same  world  is  brought  about  in  essentially  dif- 
ferent ways.  I  cannot  understand  what  form  the  recognition  of 
a  person  would  take,  which  was  not  also  the  recognition  of  the 
reality  of  a  body.  If  the  belief  in  the  substantial,  and  in  some 
sense  independent,  existence  of  the  body,  as  a  part  of  the  physi- 
cal world,  follows  in  point  of  time  not  only  the  recognition  of 
persons,  but  the  discovery  of  an  agreement  in  the  matter  of 
common  sensations,  the  early  stages  of  experience,  it  seems  to 
me,  are  hard  to  state  intelligibly.  If,  however,  the  bodily  organ- 
ism, as  a  part  of  our  idea  of  a  person,  stands  out  as  real,  it  does 
not  seem  plausible  to  make  it  stand  alone,  in  sharp  distinction 
from  all  other  physical  facts.  Why  would  it  not  be  simpler  to 
keep  more  closely  to  the  apparent  facts  of  experience,  as  they 
are  ordinarily  understood?  No  doubt  persons  are  especially 
interesting  objects  to  the  young  child.  But  they  are  not  the 
only  interesting  things.  And  if  we  grant  the  direct  postulation 
of  persons  as  real,  on  the  basis  of  social  needs,  I  see  no  difficulty 
in  granting  a  direct  postulating  of  the  reality  of  things,  on  the 
equally  immediate  basis  of  their  relation  to  more  physical  needs. 
All  physical  objects  which  are  recognized  at  all  would  thus  be 
on  an  equality.  We  should  not  have  to  suppose  that  we  notice 
first  the  similarity  of  perceptual  experiences,  and  then,  to  explain 
this,  infer  a  distinct  and  identical  object.  If  we  think  of  the 
matter  at  all,  we  assume  from  the  start  that  everyone  must  see 
the  object  as  we  do.  And  the  fact  that  they  do  not  always  see 
it  thus,  comes  with  a  shock  of  surprise,  and  is  one  of  the  things 
that  first  lead  us  to  think  about  our  experience  as  such. 

Now  the  outcome  of  the  whole  matter  is,  once  more,  that 
reality  is  at  bottom  a  postulate  of  the  will,  or,  if  one  prefers,  of 
life.  The  whole  concrete  content  of  knowledge  is  an  assumption, 
—  a  well-grounded  assumption,  it  may  be,  but  still  an  assump- 
tion. In  the  ultimate  sense,  I  cannot  demonstrate  aesthetic  truth, 
for  example.  I  take  it  as  true  because  it  appeals  to  certain  de- 
mands of  my  nature.  But  it  is  equally  impossible  to  demonstrate 
the  simplest  object  of  sense,  or  the  most  fundamental  physical 


No.  i.]  RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  37 

law.  Of  course,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  physical  beliefs  have  a 
certain  practical  and  historical  advantage  over  the  spiritual.  As 
Mr.  Balfour  has  said,  they  are  more  absolutely  essential  to  our 
existence,  and,  consequently,  have  become  more  firmly  organ- 
ized. A  man  may  disbelieve  in  beauty  and  goodness,  and  still 
maintain  an  existence ;  he  cannot  disbelieve  that  food  will  nourish, 
and  that  fire  will  burn.  This  necessary  relation  to  the  lowest 
conditions  of  existence  has  brought  about,  by  the  process  of 
selection,  a  uniformity  in  physical  beliefs  which  is  lacking  in 
others.  Every  man  believes  his  senses,  but  not  every  one  be- 
lieves his  higher  instincts.  But,  nevertheless,  at  bottom,  the 
evidence  is  the  same  in  nature.  We  believe  the  evidence  of  the 
senses,  not  because  we  can  prove  it,  but  because  we  have  to 
accept  it  as  true  if  life  is  to  go  on.  We  accept  the  validity  of  the 
spiritual  values  of  life  for  precisely  the  same  reason  —  because 
we  find  ourselves  so  constituted  that  we  demand  their  validity. 
To  reduce  human  nature  to  mere  physical  life,  shows  a  glaring 
insensibility  to  the  most  obvious  facts.  And,  logically,  there  is 
no  reason  why  certain  particular  impulses  in  the  nature  of  the  self 
should  be  selected  out,  as  alone  having  objective  validity. 

Now  this  involves  a  reference  to  another  aspect  of  the  conscious 
life.  It  is  not  only  as  the  demand  of  will  that  the  so-called 
spiritual  facts  are  accepted ;  it  is  as  the  demand  of  feeling  even 
more  obviously.  Indeed,  it  is  only  at  the  behest  of  emotion  that 
the  assertion  of  the  impulses  normally  takes  place  in  the  realm  of 
the  spiritual  life.  And  there  is  perhaps  an  even  greater  unwill- 
ingness to  admit  that  feeling  has  any  rights  in  the  search  for 
truth.  The  whole  business  of  thought,  it  is  said,  is  to  free  us 
from  the  enthrallment  of  feeling.  It  tries  to  look  upon  the  world 
with  the  eyes  of  cool  unprejudiced  reason,  leaving  behind  all  en- 
deavor to  find  things  as  we  want  to  find  them.  We  are  learning 
to  recognize  that  the  truth  is  not  necessarily  agreeable  ;  that  the 
world  is  not  built  to  meet  our  personal  demands  upon  it.  And 
it  is  the  part  of  the  wise  man  to  school  himself  to  discredit  the 
demands  of  feeling,  and  to  expect  but  little  from  life. 

To  this  attitude  I  wish  to  demur.  It  is  no  doubt  true  that 
emotions  are  often  dangerous  to  thought.  Certainly  it  is  not  to 


38  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

be  recommended  that,  when  we  sit  down  to  philosophize,  we 
should  be  in  a  highly  wrought  emotional  mood.  But,  on  the 
whole,  I  do  not  know  that  emotions  are  more  likely  to  lead  us 
astray  than  a  highly  cultivated  emotional  indifference.  Such  an 
indifference  is  as  abnormal  as  it  is  impossible  of  complete  attain- 
ment. It  is  not  well  for  us  to  make  too  slight  demands  upon  the 
universe  —  in  knowledge,  any  more  than  in  action.  Now  it  is  at 
least  to  be  noticed  that,  if  there  is  any  validity  at  all  in  the  world 
of  values,  emotion  must  have  some  place  in  knowledge.  It  is 
emotional  feeling  which  creates  values.  It  creates  them,  that  is, 
as  conscious  values,  though  in  another  sense  values  are  presup- 
posed by  feeling.  For  if  what  has  been  said  is  true,  facts  are  also 
values.  They  are  facts  because  they  meet  a  need,  because  they 
are  worth  something  to  us.  The  only  difference  between  facts 
and  values  in  the  ordinary  sense  is  that  due  to  the  presence  or 
absence  of  the  feeling,  or  emotional,  realization.  '  Facts  '  simply 
.represent  certain  values  for  the  physical  life  that  have  got  them- 
selves so  well  established  that  they  ordinarily  stand  in  no  need  of 
special  conscious  realization  in  feeling  terms. 

Now  the  nature  of  emotional  feeling,  and  its  part  in  experience, 
is  still  somewhat  obscure,  notwithstanding  the  large  amount  of 
attention  that  has  been  given  to  it  in  recent  years.  The  follow- 
ing account  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  complete  psychological 
statement,  but  only  a  suggestion  of  certain  aspects  which  bear 
more  directly  on  its  relation  to  knowledge.  And  two  character- 
istics of  emotion  would  perhaps  be  generally  accepted.  In  the 
first  place,  it  represents  an  active  disposition  ;  it  is  not  merely 
passive  and  acquiescent.  Furthermore,  it  has  a  more  or  less 
definite  objective  reference.  It  is  feeling  directed  towards  some 
object ;  and  therefore  it  involves  the  cognitive  side  of  experience, 
not  mere  feeling,  or  mere  impulse.  It  is  a  feeling  disposition, 
connected  primarily  with  the  conscious  recognition  of  something. 

Before  considering  the  next  characteristic,  it  seems  to  me  nec- 
essary to  make  a  distinction  between  two  different  classes  of 
emotional  experience.  The  characteristic  itself  T^-  this  :  That 
emotion,  as  we  are  apt  to  think  of  it,  is  tumultuous,  disturbing,  a 
hinderer  of  normal  and  rationally  effective  action.  As  I  shall 


No.  i.]  RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  39 

indicate  presently,  I  do  not  think  that  this  is  true  of  all  emotional 
feeling.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a  noteworthy  aspect  of  emotion  in  its 
most  striking  form,  —  the  form  which  most  easily  compels  at- 
tention to  itself;  and  therefore  we  naturally  tend  to  think  of  it  as 
a  normal  mark  of  the  emotional  experience.  It  is  this  feature, 
in  particular,  which  is  responsible  for  the  ill-repute  that  emotion 
has  among  philosophers,  as  a  disturbing  element  in  the  process 
of  thought. 

But  now,  in  the  first  place,  just  this  tumultuousness,  and  ap- 
parent interference,  may  be  held  to  have  a  real  importance  even 
for  the  process  of  knowledge.  To  put  it  roughly,  it  stands  for 
an  instrument  of  discovery,  a  means  of  bringing  to  consciousness 
the  value  of  our  native  impulses,  or  tendencies,  or  powers,  to 
which,  as  I  have  maintained,  the  life  of  knowledge  goes  back. 
In  this  particular  aspect  of  it,  emotion  would  seem  to  depend, 
almost  certainly,  on  bodily  processes,  largely  organic,  which 
stand  in  a  close  relation  to  instinctive  activities.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, the  free  expression  of  these  instinctive  reactions  which  con- 
stitutes the  typical  emotional  disturbance,  but  rather  the  check- 
ing of  such  free  expression.  Unchecked,  the  instincts  simply 
carry  themselves  out ;  we  act,  rather  than  feel.  Checked,  the 
outgoing  current  is  thrown  back  upon  itself.  As  organic,  it  at- 
tains to  a  heightened  consciousness.  As  both  organic  and  overt, 
it  overflows  into  those  relatively  unorganized  bodily  changes 
which  enter  largely  into  the  feel  of  the  ordinary  emotion.  But 
now  this  gets  its  completion  only  as  we  keep  clear  its  relation  to 
the  whole  process  of  which  it  is  a  part.  Apparently  unmeaning, 
such  a  feeling  may  be  of  the  greatest  importance,  if  it  forces  on 
our  consciousness  a  realization  of  the  significance  of  these  im- 
pulses which  are  checked,  and  which  might  never  have  been 
valued  justly  had  they  not  been  forced  to  struggle  for  expres- 
sion. The  great  problem  of  rational  life  is  to  adjust  our  origi- 
nally chaotic  impulses.  Asserting  themselves  too  easily,  they  pass 
and  are  forgotten  ;  and  when  the  day  of  deliberation  comes,  of 
taking  account  of  stock,  they  fail  of  their  right  estimate.  Or, 
blocked  by  more  imperious  needs,  they  simply  subside,  and  do 
not  get  expression  at  all.  But,  pushing  out  blindly  and  tenta- 


40  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

tively,  and  in  their  struggle  to  assert  themselves  bringing  about 
the  upheaval  of  our  whole  nature  in  an  emotional  crisis,  they  not 
only  force  us  to  attend  to  them,  but  at  the  same  time  they  give 
a  rough  measure  of  the  real  importance  we  should  assign  them 
in  the  economy  of  life.  Thus  the  emotional  feeling  of  grief,  e.g., 
is  one  of  the  surest  revelations  of  the  worth  that  things  really 
possess  for  our  lives.  A  great  grief  often  results  in  overthrowing 
our  conventional  estimates  completely,  and  giving  us  a  wholly 
new  outlook  upon  experience. 

Once  more,  then,  the  world  which  we  accept  is  the  world 
which  our  self-expression  demands  —  there  is  no  other  ground 
of  acceptance.  Growing  knowledge  is  thus  the  instrument  of 
self-realization  ;  it  is  the  satisfaction  of  the  will.  But  the  process 
of  self-discovery,  as  a  coordination  of  powers,  is  a  long  and 
tedious  one.  And  a  very  essential  step  in  the  process,  and  so  in 
knowledge,  is  the  emotional  disturbance  to  which  the  struggle 
for  expression  gives  rise.  It  may  be  useless  while  life  is  under 
the  dominance  of  unswerving  instincts.  But  when  the  pause  of 
deliberation,  on  which  the  rational  life  is  based,  once  enters  in, 
it  seems  to  be  a  necessary  accompaniment,  to  give  both  force  and 
direction  to  the  continuance  of  the  act,  and,  especially,  to  relate 
it  to  the  rest  of  our  lives.  It  is  this  originally  vague  feeling 
which  gives  our  first  clue  to  the  importance  of  the  impulse.  Of 
course,  the  claim  is  not  final.  It  has  to  be  scrutinized  and 
criticised.  No  doubt  it  often  leads  us  astray.  But  an  emotional 
claim  which  is  persistent,  and  which  is  a  human  claim,  rather 
than  my  peculiar  private  experience,  is  prima  facie  justified  in 
being  taken  very  seriously.  It  not  only  will  induce  belief;  it 
has  a  right  to  do  so.  Emotions  have  dangers  of  their  own.  In 
the  form  that  has  been  so  far  considered,  they  belong  to  periods 
of  readjustment,  of  coming  to  self  knowledge,  rather  than  to  the 
period  of  full  fruition,  when  we  have  entered  on  the  heritage  of 
ourselves.  The  period  of  great  emotional  intensity  is  thus  the 
period  of  youth,  when  habits  are  in  the  process  of  formation.  The 
same  degree  of  emotional  disturbance  later  on,  when  our  lives  are 
supposedly  set  in  definite  channels,  would  be  only  a  hindrance  to 
our  efficiency.  And  the  fact  that  thus  they  often  are  designed  to 


No.  i.]  RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  41 

bring  to  light  some  value  unrecognized,  or  in  danger  of  being  for- 
gotten, makes  it  necessary  that  they  should  have  an  imperiousness 
and  one-sidedness  which  are  likely  to  result  in  over-emphasis. 
And  yet  if  we  did  not  trust  them,  we  should  be  quite  at  a  loss  to 
estimate  the  relative  weight  of  the  various  impulsive  sides  of  our 
nature,  except  as  we  could  reduce  them  to  terms  of  their  con- 
tribution to  our  mere  physical  existence ;  in  other  words,  there 
would  be  no  means  of  attaining  to  a  knowledge  of  our  spiritual 
selves,  and  of  the  spiritual  world. 

But  now  is  this  a  complete  account  ?  Can  emotion  be  reduced 
wholly  to  the  bodily  sensations  which  are  aroused  in  connection 
with  instinctive  tendencies  to  action  ?  Is  its  function  merely  a 
preliminary  one,  as  a  means  for  bringing  about  a  proper  adjust- 
ment of  our  activities ;  and  does  it  therefore  lapse,  when  these 
activities  actually  become  effective  and  issue  in  free  expression  ? 
I  think  that  these  questions  are  to  be  answered  in  the  negative. 
That  the  emotion  is  not  wholly  identical  with  organic  sensations, 
seems  to  be  the  conclusion  toward  which  psychology  is  tending. 
To  me  it  appears  that  there  is  a  special  quale,  which  cannot  be  re- 
duced to  anything  more  simple  and  elementary.  It  would  take  too 
much  space  to  discuss  the  point  adequately.  In  so  far,  however, 
as  it  is  involved  in  an  answer  to  the  second  question,  the  matter 
is  less  complicated,  and  it  is  easier  to  appeal  to  the  testimony  of 
experience.  And  I  think  that  without  doubt  there  is  a  deeper 
and  steadier  quality  of  emotional  feeling,  which  not  only  is  not 
prejudicial  to  immediately  effective  action,  but  which  is  an  essen- 
tial element  in  all  our  higher  active  experience.  Even  Spinoza, 
with  all  his  hostility  to  emotion,  has  to  admit  the  metaphysical 
validity  of  the  emotion  of  intellectual  love.  There  is,  it  is  true, 
a  constant  tendency  in  human  life  for  action  to  become  auto 
matic  and  merely  habitual,  a  tendency,  therefore,  for  us  to  lose 
the  realization  of  its  meaning.  And  by  reason  of  this  dead- 
ening effect  of  habit,  we  never  wholly  outgrow  the  need  for  what 
I  have  called  the  emotional  disturbance,  to  break  through  the 
crust  of  indifference,  and  call  us  back  to  a  conscious  realizing  of 
ourselves,  and  of  what  we  are  doing.  But  just  so  far  as  this 
benumbing  influence  of  custom  gets  the  upper  hand,  we  fall 


42  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

short  of  the  truest  and  highest  kind  of  experience.  Experience 
that  is  real  and  spiritual  does  not  stop  with  mere  doing.  Our 
true  lives  are  lived  only  as  action  carries  with  it  the  full  con- 
sciousness of  its  end  and  relationships.  But  now,  furthermore, 
this  is  no  merely  intellectual  consciousness.  It  involves  also, 
and  necessarily,  a  feeling  attitude  towards  the  objects  which  are 
represented  in  our  consciousness  on  its  cognitive  side.  What 
would  social  life  be  worth,  that  did  not  carry  with  it  the  con- 
tinued presence  in  our  social  activities  of  those  human  feelings 
which  are  evoked  by  our  relationships  to  our  fellows?  How 
vastly  less  significant  would  be  our  dealings  with  the  objective 
world  of  nature,  were  we  to  lose  from  our  experience  the  per- 
vading sense  of  the  beauty  of  this  world.  Such  feelings  are  not 
merely  incidental,  merely  preliminary.  They  do  not  involve  any 
let  up  in  the  efficiency  of  action.  They  are,  rather,  inseparable 
aspects  of  the  spiritual,  or  significant,  side  of  active  experience 
itself. 

Accordingly,  the  function  of  the  emotional  disturbance,  in 
bringing  values  in  experience  to  light,  presupposes  this  other 
and  deeper  aspect  of  emotion.  As  a  feeling  attitude  toward  the 
objects  of  our  experience,  it  is  an  original  demand  of  man's 
nature,  and  points  to  that  which  we  may  regard  as  entering  into 
the  constitution  of  the  real  nature  of  the  world.  It  postulates, 
indeed,  not  primarily  what  we  are  accustomed  to  think  of  as  the 
existence  of  things  or  events,  but  certain  relationships  which  have 
to  do  with  their  value  and  meaning.  It  attaches  itself  commonly 
to  facts  of  which  some  knowledge  already  is  assumed ;  it  inter- 
prets its  object,  rather  than  creates  it.  It  is,  consequently,  different 
in  this  respect  from  the  immediate  physical  demand  on  the  basis 
of  which  we  posit  the  world  of  things.  And  yet  in  both  cases,  — 
the  practical  need  and  the  emotional  need,  —  we  have  what  is 
equally  a  demand  of  our  active  nature,  a  requirement  of  life. 
And  if  we  have  a  right  to  believe  that  things  exist  on  the  basis 
of  the  physical  demand,  we  have  just  the  same  right  to  believe 
that  they  have,  objectively,  the  direct  value  for  consciousness 
which  alone  will  satisfy  the  needs  of  feeling.  And,  furthermore, 
if  there  are  persistent  and  universal  emotional  needs  which, 


No.  i.]  '     RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  43 

apparently,  will  only  be  satisfied  by  attaching  themselves  to  a 
particular  objective  fact  of  a  certain  kind,  these  may  fairly  be 
given  some  weight  in  any  reasonings  about  the  probable  truth 
and  reality  of  that  fact,  and  of  whatever  it  involves. 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood,  however,  as  holding  that  this 
is  a  complete  statement  of  the  matter.  The  impression  which 
the  advocates  of  the  claims  of  will  or  feeling  sometimes  leave,  is 
that  a  man  has  a  right  to  believe  what  he  wants  to,  undeterred 
by  the  claims  of  logic.  Now,  as  I  have  indicated,  there  does 
seem  to  me  to  be  a  sense  in  which  we  may  say,  with  Hume,  that 
reason  is  the  slave  of  the  passions.  Reason  is  mediate.  It  does 
not  furnish  us  the  matter  of  knowledge ;  this  we  have  to  postu- 
late on  the  basis  of  fundamental  needs.  But  this  does  not  mean 
that  reason  has  nothing  more  to  do  than  find  for  us  the  way  in 
which  we  may  gratify  our  desires.  It  is  not  a  slave,  but  a 
trusted  servant,  —  a  servant  who  oftentimes  knows  his  lord's  will 
better  than  that  lord  himself.  For  the  higher  task  of  reason  is 
to  assist  in  self-knowledge ;  to  teach  the  impulse,  often  blind 
and  isolated,  to  understand  itself,  by  showing  its  relation  to  the 
rest  of  life.  Reason  is  the  adjusting,  the  harmonizing  factor  in  life. 
It  takes  the  data  which  the  assertion  of  the  will  supplies.  But 
it  transforms  these  data  essentially,  by  removing  them  from  their 
isolation,  and  throwing  on  them  the  light  of  a  larger  experience. 

This  makes  it  possible  to  place  the  so-called  sentiment  of 
rationality,  in  a  way  to  do  justice  both  to  reason  and  to  feeling. 
It  is  the  impulse  to  harmonize  our  experience.  Even  the  claim 
of  reason  is,  again,  at  bottom  practical.  If  a  man  does  not  want 
to  be  rational,  no  power  on  earth  can  make  him  admit  the 
necessity  of  not  contradicting  himself.  But  if  we  are  in  any 
sense  unitary  in  our  natures,  this  impulse  must  be  ultimately  a 
necessary  one.  As  philosophers,  we  cannot  without  self  stulti- 
fication deny  its  ideal  claim.  Still,  practically,  we  may  be  per- 
fectly justified,  on  occasion,  in  postponing  its  satisfaction  to  some 
more  imperious  need.  And,  theoretically,  its  satisfaction  may 
easily  be  premature  and  empty.  For  rationality  is  in  itself  an 
abstraction.  There  must  first  be  something  to  rationalize,  to 
harmonize.  A  harmony  may  be  won  on  too  easy  terms,  by 


44  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

ignoring  part  of  the  data.  And  it  is  primarily  to  our  willing 
and  feeling  selves  that  the  content  of  thought  goes  back. 
Thought  and  feeling  are  thus  alike  necessary  and  interdependent. 
We  must  harmonize  all  the  facts,  and  we  must  have  all  the  facts 
to  harmonize.  It  is  perhaps  unfortunate  that  a  defect  of  logic 
should  come  to  stand  so  exclusively  to  the  philosopher  as  the 
unpardonable  sin.  Consistency  is,  in  a  way,  his  special  business. 
But,  after  all,  philosophy  is  more  than  mere  logic  or  methodol- 
ogy ;  it  stands  for  content  as  well.  Whatever  growth  in  knowl- 
edge may  be,  growth  in  wisdom  is  most  assuredly  no  mere 
record  of  logical  analysis.  Great  changes  in  belief,  epochs  in 
our  intellectual  history,  are  seldom  due  primarily  to  mere  argu- 
ment, but,  rather,  to  the  half  unconscious  ripening  of  experience, 
the  transforming,  and  suffusing  with  new  meaning,  of  the  old 
facts,  brought  about  by  processes  lying  back  of  anything  we  can 
put,  at  the  time,  in  syllogistic  form.  What  Newman  says  of 
his  own  development  is  true  normally  :  "  For  myself,  it  was  not 
logic  that  carried  me  on ;  as  well  might  one  say  that  the  quick- 
silver in  a  barometer  changes  the  weather.  It  is  the  concrete 
being  that  moves  ;  paper  logic  is  but  the  record  of  it." 

As  I  have  said,  therefore,  an  emphasis  on  the  abstract  need  of 
harmony  may  sometimes  be  a  mistaken  one.  And  when  in  any 
downright  and  general  way  reason  is  opposed  to  the  claims  of 
feeling,  I  think  such  will  be  found  to  be  the  case.  The  appeal  to 
reason  which  the  scientist,  e.  g.t  makes,  may  often  involve  the 
assumption  that  the  sort  of  harmony  which  has  already  been 
brought  into  a  certain  group  of  facts  —  physical  facts  —  is  final, 
and  a  refusal  to  take  the  trouble  to  go  back  of  this.  And  so 
whatever  will  not  find  its  place  within  this  particular  synthesis, 
is  for  that  reason  to  be  rejected.  In  the  face  of  such  an  attitude, 
a  man  has  a  perfect  right  to  say,  if  he  chooses  :  I  am  not  able  to 
see  just  where  the  reconciliation  lies.  But,  meanwhile,  there 
are  requirements  of  my  nature  which  your  particular  synthesis 
does  not  satisfy ;  and  I  shall  continue,  in  spite  of  argument,  to 
hold  that  these  stand  for  reality  and  truth.  Intellectual  consis- 
tency is  a  jewel  which  may  be  purchased  at  too  dear  a  rate. 
And,  on  the  whole,  this  is  a  rational  position  to  take.  If  it  is  a 


No.  i.]  RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  45 

question  of  giving  up  a  good  share  of  the  content  of  life,  in  the 
interests  of  a  formal  consistency,  it  may  be  the  part  of  wisdom  to 
take  the  content.  Better  a  fulness  of  life  which  outstrips  the 
logical  insight,  than  an  intellectual  satisfaction  won  by  reducing 
life  to  Procrustean  limits.  This  ought  to  mean  no  disrespect  to 
logic  or  to  reason.  It  ought  not  to  deny  the  possibility  of  attain- 
ing to  a  harmonious  insight,  nor  the  desirability  of  this.  But  it 
may  well  be  the  wiser  part  to  regard  this  as  provisionally  an  un- 
attained  ideal ;  and  to  prefer  a  temporary  defeat  of  reason,  if  it 
leaves  room  for  a  richer  harmony  in  the  future,  to  a  present,  but 
barren,  victory. 

However,  it  is  not  well  to  give  the  impression  of  trying  to 
shelter  a  weakness  in  logic  under  the  protection  of  a  demand  of 
feeling.  The  philosopher  cannot  possibly  abdicate  the  task  of 
striving  for  consistency.  And,  in  the  long  run,  a  belief  which 
persistently  refuses  to  fall  in  line  with  the  less  emotional  aspects 
of  truth,  —  scientific  truth,  in  particular,  —  will  inevitably  suffer. 
Sooner  or  later,  any  remnant  of  blind  feeling  and  aspiration, 
any  mere  setting  of  the  will,  must  be  beaten  in  the  contest  with 
the  leadings  of  the  rational  insight.  Present  satisfactoriness  to 
feeling  alone  is  no  ultimate  test.  Man  cannot  get  away  from  the 
fact  that  he  is  a  rational  being,  a  searcher  for  truth ;  and  in  Plato's 
words,  4*  a  measure  of  such  things  which  in  any  degree  falls  short 
of  truth,  is  not  fair  measure."  I  only  insist  that  feeling  sets  a 
real  problem  for  reason,  which  is  entitled  to  serious  considera- 
tion. Other  things  being  equal,  an  intellectual  construction  to 
which  feeling  can  attach  itself,  —  the  feeling  of  mankind,  and  not 
simply  of  the  individual,  —  has  a  big  lead  in  the  struggle  for  sur- 
vival. It  is  to  the  other  side,  however,  that  I  wish  now  to  de- 
vote a  few  words  in  conclusion,  — the  side  which  has  to  do  with 
the  testing  of  truth.  And  what  must  in  one  sense  be  the  final 
test,  is  already  implied  in  the  statement  of  the  point  of  view. 
For  if  belief  depends  upon  the  needs  of  life,  if  reality  is  a  postu- 
late, then  that  in  the  end  will  be  accepted  which  actually  works, 
which  gives  the  possibility  of  free  and  harmonious  self-expres- 
sion. And,  accordingly,  there  is  continually  in  operation  in  the 
realm  of  our  beliefs  this  checking  and  selective  force.  We  have 


46  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIIL 

not  the  right  to  believe  everything  to  which  we  may  feel  inclined, 
It  is  not  enough  that  we  should  make  the  demand ;  in  addition, 
reality  must  stand  ready  to  meet  the  demand,  to  honor  our  drafts 
upon  it.1  To  the  holding  of  a  rational  belief,  it  js  quite  essential 
that  we  should  have  done  this  active  experimenting,  and  should 
have  been  willing,  moreover,  to  accept  the  results.  The  recog- 
nition of  this  qualification  will  take  a  good  deal  of  the  force  from 
protests  against  the  general  point  of  view,  on  the  ground  that  it 
makes  no  distinction  between  believing  a  thing  true  because  we 
wish  it  so,  and  because  we  actually  find  that  it  is  so.  The 
former  attitude  we  do  condemn.  But  our  condemnation  is  not 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  belief  is  a  postulate.  We  condemn  it, 
because  it  stops  with  a  mere  passive  acquiescence  in  the  first 
vague  and  half-formed  desire,  —  which  may  or  may  not  be  a  real 
and  permanent  demand,  —  without  recognizing  the  need  of  a 
further  test ;  or,  because  it  persists  stubbornly  in  its  first  opinion, 
in  the  face  of  new  and  conflicting  results  of  experience  that 
ought  to  be  taken  into  account.  Experiment,  then,  is  essential 
to  rationality ;  and,  along  with  the  demand,  there  must  go  the 
willingness  of  the  universe  to  meet  it.  And  here,  again,  physical 
and  spiritual  beliefs  are  on  no  different  footing.  Both  are  capable 
of  being  tested,  though  not,  of  course,  in  precisely  the  same  way. 
We  do  not  have  to  take  our  spiritual  beliefs  wholly  on  trust,  and 

1  We  can,  of  course,  actually  reconstruct  reality  to  an  extent ;  and  this  needs  to  be 
insisted  on  in  its  place.  But  it  does  not  seem  to  me  to  help  us  much,  if  we  over-em- 
phasize it  and  take  the  position  that  we  can  in  any  thoroughgoing  way  make  reality 
what  we  please  ;  that  the  truth  which  the  act  accepts  is  really  created  by  the  act.  It 
is  true  that  our  lives  enter  into  the  complex  of  the  world,  and  contribute  something 
to  the  process  of  reality.  Our  acts  make  certain  results  true.  But  they  can  do  so 
only  as  they  presuppose  a  certain  determinate  system  of  reality,  conducive  to  this 
result  which  they  did  not  make.  Moreover,  we  have  to  accept  not  merely  a  certain 
general  character  of  the  world,  but  a  vast  number  of  specific  truths  which  we  cannot 
make  or  unmake,  and  within  which  the  possibilities  of  our  action  are  definitely  limited. 
We  never  can  tell,  it  is  true,  what  things  are  possible,  except  by  assuming  at  the  start 
that  everything  is  possible,  and  then  trying  to  make  it  go.  But  we  do  not  get  very 
far  before  we  discover  that  everything  is  distinctly  not  possible ;  and,  moreover,  we 
cannot  succeed  in  the  real  possibilities,  save  as  we  recognize  clearly  the  limits  which 
experience  discloses,  and  mould  our  desires  into  harmony  with  the  real.  We  have 
scant  reason  to  believe  in,  most  certainly  we  have  no  reason  to  hope  for,  the  exist- 
ence of  a  being  at  the  center  of  things  whose  nature  is  so  indeterminate  as  to  present 
no  bar  to  the  satisfaction  of  any  and  every  wish  we  may  happen  to  form. 


No.  i.J  RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  47 

we  ought  not  to  do  so,  any  more  than  we  take  a  scientific  law 
wholly  on  trust.  Just  as  science  puts  all  sorts  of  tests  to  the 
universe,  in  order  to  verify  its  laws,  so  life  makes  its  experiments 
to  verify  its  intuitions  of  meaning.  And  until  the  experiments 
have  somehow  worked,  we  cannot  rest  with  any  assurance  that 
this  particular  demand  is  justified.  History  is  strewn  with  ideals, 
just  as  it  is  strewn  with  scientific  hypotheses,  which  further  ex- 
perience has  had  in  some  measure  to  discard  as  inadequate. 

In  the  large  sense  of  the  word,  therefore,  the  consistency  which 
truth  demands  is  a  practical,  rather  than  a  merely  theoretical  one. 
It  is  consistency,  not  of  facts  simply,  but  of  the  concrete  flow  of 
life.  The  intellect  is  not  a  thing  by  itself,  which  can  be  satisfied 
independently  of  life  as  a  whole.  The  attempt  to  take  it  so,  in- 
evitably leads  to  an  abstract,  contentless,  static  conception  of 
reality,  which  meets  no  need  except  the  need  of  bare  logical 
unity.  On  the  other  hand,  there  seems  to  be  an  obvious  sense 
in  which,  at  any  given  time  at  least,  the  final  test  is  the  test  of 
intellectual  consistency,  —  the  inclusiveness  of  the  system  of  re- 
lated facts,  in  terms  of  a  thought  content.  In  conclusion,  I  wish 
to  consider  briefly  the  relation  between  these  two  things,  —  in- 
tellectual consistency  and  practical  consistency. 

An  objection  may  be  brought  against  the  statement  that,  for 
us,  truth  is  that  which  will  work.  We  make  a  distinction,  it  is 
said,  between  what  is  practically  useful,  and  what  is  true.  Even 
more  sharply  do  we  distinguish  between  truth,  and  that  which 
merely  satisfies  our  feeling.  As  Sir  Leslie  Stephen  says  :  "The 
fact  that  I  act  upon  a  belief,  and  am  satisfied  with  my  action, 
proves  that  it  is  in  harmony  with  my  emotions,  not  that  it  is  a 
true  statement  about  facts."  Is  there  no  ground  for  these  dis- 
tinctions ? 

Undoubtedly,  of  course,  there  is.  And  a  somewhat  closer 
examination  of  what  their  justification  really  is,  will  serve  to 
bring  out  the  point  I  wish  to  emphasize.  And  first,  on  the  nega- 
tive side,  I  would  repeat  once  more  that,  in  the  largest  and 
most  ultimate  sense,  we  cannot  dissociate  truth  from  practical 
sufficiency  or  usefulness.  '  Facts '  come  themselves  to  be  facts, 
for  us,  by  their  relation  to  active  demands.  And  logical  proof 


48  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

always  involves  a  body  of  facts  already  accepted.     It  cannot 
move  in  a  vacuum,  or  create  its  own  subject  matter. 

What,  then,  is  the  justification  for  contrasting  a  merely  useful 
belief  with  a  true  belief?  It  goes  back,  I  think,  simply  to  the 
distinction  between  that  which  is  justified  by  its  practical  success 
in  a  single  limited  experiment  or  group  of  experiments,  and  that 
which  would  conceivably  give  a  satisfactory  outcome  in  the  case 
of  every  activity,  actual  or  possible,  that  enters  into  experience  in 
its  widest  sense.  A  certain  crude  hypothesis  which  the  scientist 

"  calls  erroneous,  will,  in  a  given  class  of  instances,  work  out  prac- 
tically all  right.  He  nevertheless  regards  it  as  erroneous,  be- 
cause there  are  other  cases  in  which,  if  it  were  acted  upon,  it 
would  fail  to  get  the  desired  results.  The  '  true  '  hypothesis  of 
the  scientist  does  not,  at  bottom,  rest  upon  evidence  different  in 
kind.  The  only  difference  is  that  it  is  successful  in  a  greater 
number  of  cases.  If  he  believes  that  it  will  apply  in  all  cases, 
then  he  holds  it  to  be  true  ;  and  he  contrasts  it  with  the  less  uni- 
versally successful  hypotheses  which  are  only  '  useful '  in  a  practi- 
cal way. 

If  a  given  man's  experience  were  absolutely  a  unit,  if  it  could 
be  summed  up  in  a  single  act,  in  which  all  the  elements  that 
ever  enter  into  his  life  were  consciously  present,  then  imme- 
diate practical  sufficiency,  as  opposed  to  intellectual  consistency, 

*  would  be  for  him  the  final  statement  of  '  truth.'  But  obviously 
this  is  not  the  case  for  human  beings,  whatever  it  may  be  for 
a  higher  intelligence.  Our  life  is  a  string  of  active  experi- 
ences, or  experiments,  of  a  widely  varied  sort.  Each  has  to 
recognize  conditions  of  its  own.  For  no  one  of  them  is  it  neces- 

r  sary,  or  possible,  to  take  into  account  all  the  facts  which  the 
more  inclusive  stream  of  experience  has  been  the  means  of  reveal- 
ing to  us.  On  the  other  hand,  any  one  of  these  facts  may  prove 
to  be  needed  at  almost  any  moment ;  and  therefore  it  is  desirable 
to  bring  them  into  some  sort  of  permanent  unity  for  our  thought. 
Since,  then,  no  single  practical  experience  can  ever  hope  to  uti- 
lize the  whole  mass  of  them  together,  the  test  of  truth  lies,  after 
all,  at  any  given  time,  in  a  real  sense  in  the  realm  of  intellectual 
consistency,  rather  than  of  immediate  practical  success.  Not 


No.  i.]  RATIONALITY  AND  BELIEF.  49 

that  practical  success  is  irrelevant  to  logical  consistency.  Any 
fact  that  logic  has  a  right  to  assume  in  its  attempt  at  harmoniz- 
ing, had  its  justification  originally  is  some  particular  practical  ex- 
periment, and  was  demanded  by  some  particular  need  of  life.  But, 
nevertheless,  the  only  way  in  which  to  get  the  complete  process  of 
experience  into  a  unity,  and  avoid  the  risk  that  practical  success 
in  any  particular  case  should  usurp  the  right  to  legislate  for  reality 
as  a  whole,  is  to  leave  the  immediately  practical  sphere,  and  turn 
to  the  work  of  intellectual  or  logical  construction.1  Any  given 
'belief  stands  not  simply  for  the  statement  that  a  certain  plan 
of  action  will  in  this  particular  instance  work.  Such  a  result 
tests  the  belief;  and  it  takes  its  place  in  the  system  of  facts  whiclj 
the  belief  represents.  But  this  system  involves  much  which  canv 
not  enter  directly  into  any  experiment  by  which  the  probability 
of  the  truth  of  the  belief  is  increased  ;  and  the  only  way  in  which 
this  can  all  be  brought  within  an  inclusive  unity  is  through  the 
medium  of  thought.  The  data,  once  more,  are  tested  by  experi- 
ment ;  but  the  unity  of  the  data  as  a  whole  can  only  exist  for  us 
in  the  intellectual  realm.  Even  the  testing  experiment  has 
validity,  a  rational  value,  not  as  the  mere  brute  fact  of  success, 
but  as  its  result  enters  for  our  consciousness  into  a  far  wider 
system  of  related  fact.2 

And  this  involves  also  the  relative,  though  not  the  absolute, 
justification  of  Sir  Leslie  Stephen's  condemnation  of  emotional '~ 
tests.     I  have  tried  to  show  that  emotions  have  their  rights  in^ 
knowledge.     But  when  they  are  taken  in  an  isolated  way,  they 
are  very  likely,  as  experience  shows,  to  prove  misleading.     In 

1  Unless,  of  course,  we  hold  that  the  validity  of  knowledge  is  absolutely  exhausted  , 
in  its  functional  use  in  particular  experiences.  I  have  assumed  throughout  that 
'  truth '  has  the  meaning  it  is  commonly  taken  to  have,  —  that  it  refers  to  an  objective 
system  of  reality,  to  be  utilized  in  our  experience,  but  having  also  a  relative  indepen- 
dence of  existence.  I  trust  I  shall  not  be  understood  as  meaning  that  this  intellectual 
construction,  and,  indeed,  the  very  aspect  of  it  according  to  which  it  represents  the 
whole  of  things,  does  not  have  its  practical  value  for  further  experience.  I  only 
meian  that  no  single  experiment  can  test  its  value  so  completely  as  to  enable  us  to 
sink  the  intellectual  in  the  practical  statement  of  the  criterion. 

2 'Facts,'  as  they  form  the  basis  of  our  intellectual  construction,  and  are  distin- 
guished from  hypotheses,  might  be  defined  as  postulates  which  are  based  upon  a  need 
in  so  far  as  it  can  find  expression  in  a  single  act,  and  which  do  not  look  beyond  this 
single  act  for  their  immediate  test. 


50  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

particular,  they  need  to  respect  the  claims  of  that  great  section  of 
experience  which  has  to  do  with  the  external  world,  and  whose 
basis  is  so  deep-seated  in  our  nature  that  we  can  hardly  avoid  the 
compulsion  to  take  it  as  'fact'  in  a  peculiar  sense.  Before  it 
can  really  justify  emotional  beliefs  in  detail,  a  philosophy  is 
bound  to  have  some  way  of  showing  that  the  two  sides  of  experi- 
ence can  consistently  be  thought  together,  without  prejudice  to 
either.  The  logical  problem  is  the  main  problem  for  the  philos- 
opher, and  can  never  be  put  by  him  in  the  background. 

A.  K.  ROGERS. 
BUTLER  COLLEGE. 


REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS. 

The  Pathway  to  Reality.  Giffbrd  Lectures  delivered  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  St.  Andrews,  1902-3.  By  RICHARD  BURDON  HALDANE. 
New  York,  E.  P.  Button  &  Co.,  1903. — pp.  xix,  316. 

This  volume  embodies  the  first  set  of  GifTord  Lectures  delivered  by 
the  author  in  the  University  of  St.  Andrews  in  the  winter  of  1902-3. 
Mr.  Haldane  has  long  been  known  to  the  philosophical  world  as 
(with  Professor  A.  Seth  Pringle-Pattison)  joint  editor  of  the  epoch- 
making  volume,  Essays  in  Philosophical  Criticism,  published  in  1883 
and  dedicated  to  the  memory  of  T.  H.  Green,  and  as  (with  Mr.  Kemp) 
the  translator  of  Schopenhauer's  World  as  Will  and  Idea.  Numerous 
philosophical  essays  and  reviews  from  his  pen  have  also  appeared  from 
time  to  time,  while  his  volumes  upon  Adam  Smith  and  upon  Educa- 
tion and  Empire  are  to  the  general  public  some  of  the  signs  of  his 
well-known  activity  in  the  realm  of  economics  and  politics. 

To  the  student  of  the  history  of  opinion  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
it  is  surely  one  of  the  signs  of  the  vitality  of  the  British  neo-Hegelian 
movement  that  it  had  the  power  (now  about  a  generation  ago)  not 
only  to  arrest  and  influence  some  of  the  best  minds  among  the  youth 
of  the  Scottish  and  English  universities,  but  to  send  forth  out  of  that 
number  into  the  different  avenues  of  life  men  who  are  now  occupying 
leading  positions  in  spheres  of  activity  other  than  that  of  the  merely 
professional  teacher  of  philosophy.  And  even  a  bare  perusal  of  some 
of  the  pages  of  the  Pathway  to  Reality  affords  ample  confirmation  of 
the  wisdom  of  the  University  of  St.  Andrews  in  affording  to  the  pub- 
lic the  opportunity  of  receiving  in  permanent  form  the  outcome  of  the 
reflections  of  a  man  like  Mr.  Haldane,  who  has  had  the  ability  not  only 
to  continue  into  middle  life  the  philosophical  studies  of  his  youth,  but 
to  incorporate  into  the  philosopher's  search  for  reality  the  results  of 
a  wide  experience  of  professional  and  public  life,  and  also  those  of  a 
persistent  attempt  to  comprehend  the  scientific  development  of  the 
last  half  of  the  century.  There  is  throughout  the  lectures  a  breadth 
of  perspective  and  a  maturity  and  a  freshness  and  an  air  of  rapport 
with  reality  and  real  living  that  distinguish  them  from  some  of  the  more 
strictly  scholastic  and  technical  outputs  of  the  Gifford  Trust.  And  even 
if  there  be  in  the  manner  of  their  presentation  what  the  layman  undoubt- 
edly feels  to  be  none  the  less  a  professional  cast  (that  of  the  pleading 
of  the  successful  barrister  who  is  always  marshalling  his  evidence  and 


52  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

recounting  his  points  and  positions  with  a  view  to  cumulative  proof 
and  conviction),  it  may,  it  seems  to  me,  be  safely  affirmed  that  the 
Pathway  to  Reality  will  easily  take  its  place  in  the  general  literature 
of  the  day  as  one  of  the  most  readable  presentations  of  the  idealism  of 
the  nineteenth  century. 

The  philosophical  student,  particularly  if  he  happen  to  be  a  student 
whose  fortune  it  was  to  pass  under  the  same  academic  influences  that 
shaped  the  thinking  of  Mr.  Haldane,  very  readily  perceives  in  the 
lectures  the  existence  and  operation  of  the  familiar  neo-Kantian  point 
of  view,  and  also  the  familiar  determination  of  the  loyal  neo-Hegelian 
to  think  himself  in  the  profession  of  his  philosophic  faith  as  free  as 
possible  from  the  characteristic  limitations  and  defects  of  the  first  pre- 
sentations of  British  academic  transcendentalism.  He  is  nevertheless 
compelled  to  admit  to  himself  that  old  as  may  be  (at  this  date)  the 
lesson  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  regarding  the  contribution  of  the 
thinking  subject  or  the  thinking  consciousness  to  what  we  believe  to  be 
reality  itself,  the  showing  made  in  Mr.  Haldane' s  book  of  the  bearings 
of  philosophy  upon  common  sense  and  common  sense  notions  of 
reality,  and  upon  the  speculations  and  constructions  of  science  and 
upon  the  desire  of  intelligent  free-thinking  persons  to  have  in  pal- 
pable and  definite  form  the  outcome  of  metaphysical  philosophy,  is 
something  that  pricks  to  the  quick  one's  sense  of  the  responsibility 
of  the  philosopher  to  endeavor  to  affect  the  thinking  of  his  day  and 
generation. 

The  contents  of  the  present  volume  fall  into  two  parts,  Book  I 
(covering  six  lecture-chapters),  on  the  Meaning  of  Reality,  and  Book 
II  (with  four  lecture-chapters),  on  the  Criticism  of  Categories.  The 
quest  of  Book  I  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  words  :  * '  To  me  it  seems 
that  by  God  we  mean  and  can  only  mean,  that  which  is  most  real,  the 
Ultimate  Reality,  into  which  all  else  can  be  resolved,  and  which  can- 
not itself  be  resolved  into  anything  beyond ;  that  in  terms  of  which 
all  else  can  be  expressed  and  which  cannot  be  itself  expressed  in  terms 
of  anything  outside  itself. ' '  On  Kantian  principles,  it  soon  becomes 
apparent  that  ' '  The  relation  of  object  to  subject  becomes  .  .  .  the 
deepest  relation  of  existence,  because  existence  has  now  resolved  itself 
into  the  fact  that  the  subject  thinks  the  object,  presents  itself  in  a 
fashion  which  is  not  arbitrary  but  determined  by  laws  of  thought ' '  ; 
and  the  next  question  accordingly  is :  "  What  must  be  the  nature  of  the 
mind  which  thinks  thus  objectively,  and  which,  even  as  manifested  in 
individual  form,  compels  the  individual  to  think  thus  objectively  ?  ' ' 
This  is  answered  negatively  in  the  second  chapter  (where  Mr.  Hal- 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  53 

dane's  enmity  to  the  construction  of  Hegelianism  as  Panlogism  comes 
out).  "  .  .  .  .  The  nature  of  Ultimate  Reality  cannot  be  sought  in 
a  world  of  universal," — the  universal  and  the  particular  being  ''only 
abstract  aspects  of  a  single  and  indivisible  reality  which  is  always 
individual  in  character ' '  [italics  mine] .  And  positively  in  Chapter  iii, 
where  in  accordance  with  much  Hegelian  tradition  "Spirit"  or 
"  Mind  "seems  to  be  the  best  phrase  "  to  express  the  view  of  the  ulti- 
mate reality  of  things  which  insists  on  the  indissoluble  union  so  far  as 
existence  is  concerned  of  subject  and  object,  of  universal  and  par- 
ticular." In  the  next  chapter  we  are  led  to  believe  "that  the  world 
seen  from  the  higher  standpoint  [of  Spirit]  is  disclosed  as  reality,  as 
compared  with  the  world  seen  from  the  lower  standpoint  of  what  by 
contrast  is  appearance  only. ' '  Then  a  chapter  is  devoted  largely  to  a 
defence  of  the  idea  that  "Hegel  never  tried  to  deduce  the  that, 
although  he  has  been  misrepresented  as  doing  so  and  abused  in  con- 
sequence. The  very  foundation  of  his  philosophy  was  that  you  could 
not  deduce  the  that,  and  agreeing  with  Aristotle  in  this  conclusion, 
what  he  endeavored  to  do  was  to  unfold  the  what,  the  characterization 
of  the  that  with  which  he  had  to  start."  The  last  chapter  of  Book  I 
closes  with  some  fresh  and  interesting  material  on  the  changes  that 
have  taken  place  in  German  idealism  or  transcendentalism  in  conse- 
quence of  "very  much  more  prominence  "  being  given  "to  the  ideas 
of  life,  of  growth,  and  of  volition  or  will  than  was  formerly  the 
case,"  and  of  the  influence  (i)  of  Schopenhauer  and  (2)  of  Herbart 
and  Lotze.  The  influence  of  the  last-mentioned  two  men  has  almost 
"  revolutionized  the  sciences  of  logic  and  psychology,"  and  study  of 
the  "  modernized  logic  and  psychology  "  leaves  the  student  with  the 
conviction  that  "neither  in  mere  reflection  nor  in  mere  feeling  is  the 
ultimately  Real  to  be  found  .  .  .  ,"  but  rather  in  the  "conception 
of  the  universe  ' '  as  the  '  <  unique  Individual  that  ultimately  discloses 
itself  as  the  totality  of  Experience,  or  as  all-embracing  Mind,  accord- 
ing as  it  is  looked  at  from  one  side  or  the  other."  This  bare  state- 
ment of  steps  and  stages  in  Mr.  Haldane's  argument  gives  but  the 
poorest  kind  of  idea  of  the  matter  and  manner  of  the  lectures  which, 
although  manifestly  reposing  on  what  is,  perhaps,  the  most  justifiable 
interpretation  of  the  Kanto-Hegelian  doctrines,  must  also  be  regarded 
as  a  series  of  fresh  and  broadly  conceived  efforts  on  the  part  of  a  com- 
petent and  independent  pupil,  who  is  fully  abreast  with  the  work  of 
modern  science,  to  unfold  the  analysis  of  the  real  that  is  opened  up  by 
the  Critical  Philosophy.  And  as  has  been  indicated,  in  this  analysis 
the  results  of  psycho-physics  and  of  post-Hegelian  philosophy  are  laid 


54  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

under  contribution,  as  well  as  the  facts  of  modern  science  and  the 
realities  of  life. 

The  practical  applications  of  Mr.  Haldane's  reflections  are  contained 
in  Book  II,  where,  in  accordance  with  his  idea  of  the  problem  of  phi- 
losophy as  the  effort  "  to  find  the  highest  categories  under  which  to 
think  the  individual,"  an  attempt  is  made  to  treat  critically  some  of 
the  leading  conceptions  of  physical  science,  of  mathematical  science, 
of  zoology  and  chemistry,  and  physiology  and  psychology  —  a  return 
being  made  in  the  closing  pages  to  the  philosophy  of  personality  or 
spirit  which  is  the  key-note  of  the  whole. 

Mr.  Haldane  is  under  no  misgivings  or  misapprehensions  about  his 
work,  nor  is  he  inclined  to  attach  much  importance  to  any  such  recent 
ideas  about  the  needs  of  "philosophical  reconstruction  "  as  he  might 
perhaps  have  been  expected  to  countenance  from  the  fact  of  his  pub- 
lished translation  of  Schopenhauer  or  his  evident  interest  (in  this 
volume)  in  the  phenomena  of  volition  and  of  science  and  of  psycho- 
physics.  He  talks  of  having  elaborated  but  a  ' l  single  conception  ' ' 
which  is  "by  no  means  new,"  that  of  the  union  of  the  universal  and 
the  particular  in  the  concrete  individual.  With  the  eyes  of  a  true 
Hegelian,  he  sees  this  union  in  both  ancient  and  modern  philosophy, 
in  Aristotle  as  well  as  in  Kant,  and  he  scruples  not,  either  when  hard 
pressed  or  when  perfectly  sure  of  his  ground,  simply  to  open  up  —  for 
all  purposes,  those  of  exposition  as  well  as  of  criticism  —  and  to  quote 
section  after  section  from  the  writings  of  the  master,  bringing  his  first 
set  of  lectures  to  a  close  with  the  outspoken  avowal  (in  the  manner  of 
many  men  of  to-day)  that  he  has  learned  "all  he  knows  "  from  Hegel, 
and  that  in  Hegel  as  the  modern  Aristotle  is  to  be  found  more  than 
twice  all  that  is  contained  in  the  Pathway  to  Reality. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  one  of  the  features  of  his  subject-matter 
is  the  fact  of  the  distance  at  which  he  shows  himself  to  be  from  the 
early  epistemological  versions  of  the  teaching  of  Kant,  or  from  the 
supposedly  panlogistic  interpretations  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  ;  and 
if  there  are  two  things  that  Mr.  Haldane  never  tires  of  impressing 
upon  his  hearers  (for  he  retains  in  his  publication  his  lecture  form  and 
method,  that  of  speaking  extempore  from  carefully  prepared  notes  — 
something  of  a  feat,  surely,  if  we  think  at  once  of  the  recondite  issues 
and  the  finished  phrase  and  diction  of  his  book),  these  are,  first,  the 
imperfect  character  of  the  representation  of  the  Kantian  philosophy 
that  is  expressed  in  the  notion  that  thought  makes  nature,  or  that  the 
world  is  but  a  plexus  of  intelligible  relations,  and  second,  the  fact 
that  Hegel's  real  strength  lay  in  his  hold  of  the  concrete  and  in  the 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  55 

true  interpretation  he  has  enabled  us  to  put  upon  the  teaching  of 
Aristotle  that  the  real  is  the  individual,  —  that  the  universal  cannot  be 
divorced  from  the  particular. 

Regarding  this  ground  point  of  Hegel's  supposed  panlogism  and 
the  partie  honteuse  of  Hegelianism  (the  passage  from  thought  to 
nature),  Mr.  Haldane  takes  occasion  to  canvass  (in  addition  to  the 
objections  of  Lotze)  some  of  the  well-known  criticisms  of  his  quondam 
literary  colleague,  Professor  Pringle-Pattison,  reminding  both  Pro- 
fessor Pringle-Pattison  and  Lotze,  after  a  comparison  of  passages  in 
Hegel  with  Pringle-Pattison 's  objections  and  after  some  reflection 
upon  the  nature  of  Lotze' s  work  and  personality,  that  "  Hegel  would 
not  have  recognized  that  there  was  any  real  issue  that  could  legiti- 
mately be  raised  between  his  point  of  view  and  theirs." 

Further  confirmation  for  his  broad  and  all-inclusive  interpretation 
of  Hegel  is  found  by  Mr.  Haldane  (and  here  he  opens  a  fruitful  line  of 
study  and  interpretation)  in  the  attitude  of  Professor  Royce  as  one  of 
the  "most  thoughtful  students  of  Hegel."  While  to  Royce  "Per- 
sonality ...  is  essentially  an  ethical  category, ' '  no  one  * '  would  more 
strenuously  refuse  than  he  to  separate  intelligence  from  will."  That 
is,  to  Mr.  Haldane,  Professor  Royce  is  a  student  of  Hegel  who  did  not 
come  to  the  idea  "that  reality  is  nothing  but  abstract  thought  or 
reason"  and  who  may  therefore  "be  set  against  Professor  Pringle- 
Pattison."  As  for  this,  the  reader  of  Professors  Pringle-Pattison  and 
Royce  is  inclined  to  ask  himself  whether  Mr.  Haldane  sufficiently 
allows  for  one  or  two  things,  viz.,  the  fact  that,  in  his  book  on  Hegel- 
ianism and  Personality,  Professor  Pringle-Pattison  is  scrupulous 
enough  to  arraign  against  each  other  passages  in  which  Hegel  leans 
now  to  a  panlogistic  and  now  to  a  concrete  view  of  reality,  and  also 
that  Professor  Royce  takes  pains  in  the  preface  to  his  second  set  of 
Gifford  Lectures  to  state  the  fact  of  the  gulf  that  separates  his  earlier 
(almost  completely  panlogistic  and  "  absolutist " )  from  his  later 
view  of  reality.  The  reviewer  speaks  thus  not  out  of  any  fatuous 
desire  to  raise  the  issue  of  the  letter  in  the  case  of  Hegel,  a  man  who 
has  indeed  taught  us  that  the  world  is  ultimately  Spirit  and  the  revela- 
tion of  Spirit,  but  to  raise  the  point  of  the  greater  apparent  justice 
accorded  by  Professor  Royce  in  his  second  set  of  lectures  to  the  note 
of  purpose  and  finite  individuality  and  ethical  personality  than  can 
well  be  accorded  by  Mr.  Haldane  in  his  first  set,  or  than  was  accorded 
by  Professor  Royce  in  his  earlier  philosophical  writings.  Nor  does  he 
desire  to  forget  that  Mr.  Haldane  says  of  Professor  Royce ;  "I  must 
say  for  myself  that  I  think  Professor  Royce  goes  to  the  other  extreme, 


56  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

and  that  to  be  logical  he  would  have  to  try  to  deduce,  as  he  almost 
seems  to  do,  the  individual  of  experience  itself  out  of  what  he  calls 
purpose  or  meaning."  Only  when  one  does  succeed  in  remembering 
this,  one  is  inclined  to  wonder  how,  after  this  censure  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Haldane,  Professor  Royce  can  still  do  duty  as  a  henchman  of 
Hegel,  except  in  the  general  sense  in  which  any  thoroughgoing 
believer  in  the  continuity  of  post-Kantian  metaphysic  is  necessarily  a 
Hegelian.  What,  in  short,  I  venture  to  opine  (in  all  admiration  and 
recognition  of  the  successful  execution  by  Mr.  Haldane  of  his  im- 
mediate and  confessed  purpose  in  his  first  volume)  is  whether  in  what 
Mr.  Haldane  concedes  to  Pringle-Pattison  and  to  Lotze  and  to  Royce 
and  to  Schopenhauer,  and  in  what  he  finds  (for  these  men)  in  Hegel, 
and  in  what  he  in  his  own  cogent  and  all-important  pages  (dealing 
with  human  personality)  teaches  about  the  impossibility  of  separating 
intelligence  and  will,  there  is  not  ample  indication  that  the  complete 
(or  completed)  critical  philosophy  demands  a  working  out  of  the 
categories  from  the  practical  as  well  as  from  the  theoretical  point  of 
view,  —  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  ends  of  action  and  of  human 
purposes  as  well  as  from  that  of  the  ends  or  the  end  of  knowledge. 
This  very  idea,  to  be  sure,  is  admitted  by  Mr.  Haldane  in  his  expressed 
concurrence  in  the  philosophy  of  Royce  and  Miinsterberg,  —  that  it  is 
for  social  and  practical  purposes  that  we  make  our  ordinary  distinctions 
about  the  supposed  realities  of  common,  sense  and  the  supposed 
realities  of  scientific  analysis.  But,  apart  from  the  emphatic  assertion 
(in  the  central  portions  of  the  volume)  just  referred  to  ("  The  world 
is  will  just  as  much  as  it  is  idea,  and  idea  just  as  much  as  it  is  will  "), 
we  are  led  to  look  beyond  the  present  volume  for  a  philosophy  of  the 
fact  suggested  in  the  following  typical  sentence :  "If  our  purposes 
determine  the  aspect  of  the  world  for  us  then  moral  ideals  must  have 
played  a  large  part  in  shaping  and  fashioning  that  world. ' '  We  shall 
wait,  therefore,  with  the  greatest  interest  for  Mr.  Haldane' s  second  set 
of  lectures,  in  which  he  promises  to  deal  with  the  meaning  of  the 
Hegelian  conception  of  the  world  as  one  intelligible  system  and  of  its 
supposed  realities  as  "only  abstract  aspects"  of  a  "single  and  indi- 
visible reality  which  is  always  individual  in  its  character  " /<?r  "  Con- 
duct and  Religion. ' '  In  particular,  we  shall  await  the  unfolding  of  the 
logic  that  shall  relate  the  distinctions  and  categories  arising  out  of  our 
moral  life  and  its  purposes  with  the  distinctions  and  categories  arising 
out  of  an  attempt  to  think  the  world  as  a  unity.  And  we  shall  await 
too  the  philosophy  that  shall  connect  our  views  regarding  the  impera- 
tive reality  of  the  moral  ideal  as  realizable  in  a  community  of  persons 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  57 

with  Mr.  Haldane's  promise  to  return  in  his  second  volume  "to  the 
conception  of  personality  in  the  highest  sense,"  in  which  "the  cate- 
gories of  the  One  and  the  Many  would  of  course  be  transcended. ' ' 
In  this  present  volume  he  mentions  in  one  place  as  conceivable  Pro- 
fessor Royce's  idea  "that  there  may  be  an  organic  and  conscious  life 
in  which  we  are  but  as  cells  in  a  larger  organism,"  and  in  another 
that  "along  certain  lines  there  is  a  possible  conception  of  personality 
so  much  above  the  plane  of  human  experience  that  it  must  properly 
become  an  object  of  what  we  call  worship  ;  "  but,  so  far  as  the  logical 
framework  and  foundation  of  his  argument  are  concerned,  it  would  at 
present  seem  that :  "  What  we  call  the  finite  self,  a  thing  with  a  proper 
name,  manifesting  itself  in  a  body,  one  day  to  be  carried  off  in  a 
coffin,  exists  only  within  the  sphere  of  experience,  and  the  notion  of 
it  is  a  secondary  and  derivative  one. ' '  I  must  confess,  however,  that 
it  is  part  of  my  object,  in  drawing  attention  to  these  antitheses  and 
these  questions,  to  show  how  thoroughly  Mr.  Haldane  has  confined 
himself  in  this  volume  to  that  freshly  conceived  and  remarkably 
modernized  version  of  that  unification  of  experience  and  reality  as 
conceived  along  Hegelian  lines  which  is  his  real  strength  and  his  real 
characteristic. 

An  admirable  feature  of  the  lectures  is  the  author's  persistent  and 
thoroughgoing  recognition  of  the  unity  and  continuity  of  philosophi- 
cal reflection  in  the  modern  and  in  the  ancient  world.  The  volume 
would  thus  be  valuable  either  to  the  young  student  as  a  fresh  introduc- 
tion to  metaphysical  problems  or  to  the  person  of  average  education 
who  is  desirous  of  obtaining  a  readable  presentation  of  the  main  issues 
of  German  metaphysic  in  relation  to  the  speculations  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  —  as  well  as  (as  has  been  suggested)  to  the  science  of  the 
century.  W.  CALDWELL. 

McGiLL  UNIVERSITY, 
MONTREAL,  CANADA. 

Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology.  Written  by  many  hands 
and  edited  by  JAMES  MARK  BALDWIN,  with  the  cooperation  and 
assistance  of  an  International  Board  of  Consulting  Editors.  In 
three  volumes,  with  illustrations  and  extensive  bibliographies.  New 
York,  The  Macmillan  Company;  London,  Macmillan  and  Co., 
Limited.  Vols.  I  (1901)  and  II  (1902). — pp.  xxiv,  644;  xvi, 
892. 

There  is  a  good  deal  of  presumption  in  any  attempt  by  a  single  in- 
dividual to  review  a  dictionary  of  the  compass  of  this  one.  The  two 


58  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

volumes  cover  an  immense  range  of  topics,  and  the  matter  is  written 
by  a  large  number  of  scholars  eminent  in  the  particular  subjects  on 
which  they  write.  A  reviewer  cannot  hope  to  do  more  than  say  how 
the  volumes  have  met  his  own  demands  in  a  working  use  of  them  as 
books  of  reference,  and  the  demands  of  any  given  reader  concern 
naturally  only  a  small  part  of  the  terms  and  subjects  handled.  The 
disciplines  specifically  mentioned  as  receiving  extended  treatment,  in 
addition  to  the  subjects  named  in  the  title,  are  Ethics,  Logic,  ^Es- 
thetics, Philosophy  of  Religion,  Mental  Pathology,  Anthropology, 
Biology,  Neurology,  Physiology,  Economics,  Political  and  Social  Phi- 
losophy, Philology,  Physical  Science  (and  Mathematics),  and  Educa- 
tion. A  work  covering  such  an  extensive  and  varied  field  can  be 
tested  only  by  persistent  use  over  a  long  period  of  time  and  by  the 
combined  judgment  of  many  scholars.  As  Aristotle  says,  6  xpovos  ra>\> 
TotouTcuv  ebpETys  77  ffovepYos  dyafto?  [£<m] ;  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  the 
judgment  of  time  will  be  favorable.  The  third  volume  will  contain 
classified  bibliographies,  and,  if  adequately  done,  should  prove  one  of 
the  most  serviceable  parts  of  the  work.  The  distribution  of  space  in 
the  treatment  of  the  several  disciplines  was  carefully  considered  and 
approximately  the  following  percentages  are  the  result : 

Per  cent  of  space.  Per  cent  of  space. 

Philosophy,  10.1  Psychology,  lo.l 

Ethics  and  Anthropology,  9.6  Mental  Pathology  and  Neurology,  9.6 

Esthetics,  9  Logic,  9 

Philosophy  of  Religion,  8.1  Biology,  8.1 

Social  and  Political  Philosophy,  6.5  Economics  and  Physiology,  6.5 

Philology,  4.4  Law,  4-4 

Education,  2.3  Physics  (Mathematics),  2.3 

As  to  this  distribution  of  space,  the  judgment  of  the  reader  will,  of 
course,  be  determined  somewhat  by  the  bias  of  his  individual  interest ; 
but  students  of  the  traditional  philosophical  disciplines,  as  they  are 
arranged  in  our  universities,  will  probably  feel  that  the  Dictionary 
would  have  gained  by  less  attention  to  terms  whose  interest  for  phi- 
losophy and  psychology  is  only  remote.  About  25  per  cent  of  the 
volumes  is  devoted  to  such  extraneous  matter.  Although  this  matter 
is  in  a  certain  sense  extraneous,  really  only  those  elements  in  eco- 
nomics, law,  philology,  physics,  etc.,  which  are  ancillary  to  phi- 
losophy and  psychology,  have  been  admitted  to  consideration  in  the 
Dictionary.  Their  incorporation,  while  perhaps  entailing  some  loss 
of  space  for  philosophy,  materially  increases  the  scope  of  the 
work's  usefulness.  It  is  not  likely  that  any  student  of  philosophy 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  59 

will  differ  from  the  judgment  of  the  editors  in  this  matter  after 
a  just  use  of  the  volumes  for  reference  purposes.  The  complaint  of 
such  readers  is  apt  to  be  not  "  too  much  "  but  "  too  little,"  and  it  is 
a  constant  grievance  in  the  use  of  dictionaries  and  encyclopedias  to 
discover  that  the  thing  one  is  looking  for  is  missing.  In  complete- 
ness of  definition  and  range  of  matter,  Baldwin's  Dictionary  far  out- 
strips all  its  predecessors.  The  title'  Dictionary '  is  here  used  in  a 
liberal  meaning.  The  work  is  a  composite  of  dictionary  and  ency- 
clopedia, /.  e. ,  it  is  made  up  of  vocabularies  and  definitions  of  terms  in 
the  manner  of  a  dictionary,  and  of  the  exposition  of  important  topics 
in  the  form  of  essays  or  articles,  in  the  manner  of  an  encyclopedia. 
This  composite  character  is  a  great  gain  to  the  work.  The  treatment 
of  Vision,  <?.  g.,  on  which  has  been  written  one  of  the  longest  and 
most  satisfactory  articles  in  the  work,  would  have  been  valueless  had 
it  been  dispatched  in  the  form  of  a  definition. 

The  completion  of  this  enterprise  is  a  notable  event  in  the  history 
of  philosophical  studies  in  this  country,  and  is  a  matter  of  congratula- 
tion not  only  to  the  editors,  but  to  all  students  of  the  disciplines  here 
discussed.  The  labor  has  fallen  most  heavily  on  Professor  Baldwin, 
the  editor-in-chief,  who  not  only  had  to  determine  the  general  plan 
of  the  volumes  and  see  them  through  the  press,  but  who  has  been  a 
large  contributor  to  their  content.  To  him  especially  the  obligations 
of  readers  are  due.  He  has  been  assisted  by  a  considerable  staff  of 
English,  German,  French,  and  American  editors,  who  have  executed 
the  plans  originated  in  the  main  by  the  editor-in-chief.  During  the 
progress  of  the  work  the  staff  was  diminished  by  the  death  of  three  of 
the  most  distinguished  editors,  Professors  Sidgwick,  Adamson,  and 
Marillier,  and  Dr.  Tosti  withdrew  on  the  publication  of  the  first  vol- 
ume. The  third  volume,  which  will  contain  classified  bibliographies, 
edited  by  Dr.  Rand,  is  expected  from  the  press  shortly. 

One  of  the  best  methodological  features  of  the  work  is  the  revision 
of  each  article  by  other  specialists,  who  become  jointly  responsible 
with  the  writer.  In  many  cases  an  article  is  the  joint  product  of  two 
authors  or  is  divided  into  parts  under  separate  authorship,  and  the 
varying  kinds  and  amounts  of  responsibility  are  made  known  by  con- 
venient marks.  This  cooperative  feature  in  the  work  has  doubtless 
been  of  the  utmost  importance  in  eliminating  errors,  one-sidedness, 
and  idiosyncrasies  or  inconsistencies  in  treatment.  Editorial  revision 
appears  to  have  been  planned  and  carried  out  with  success,  although 
necessarily  with  immense  cost  of  time  and  labor.  The  administrative 
aspect  of  the  work  is  marked  not  only  by  insight,  but  by  extraordinary 


60  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

patience  and  attention  to  details.  In  spite,  however,  of  the  plan  of 
cooperative  writing  and  revision,  the  Dictionary  exhibits  in  some 
cases  insufficient  editorial  stringency.  I  am  convinced  the  work  would 
have  gained  in  quality  had  greater  attention  been  paid  to  clearness 
and  significant  content  in  the  articles,  to  the  ideal  needs  of  a  reader 
seeking  compact  statements  of  fact  or  theory,  and  had  the  editorial 
knife  been  more  relentlessly  applied  to  the  excission  of  irrelevant  and 
trivial  matter. 

In  planning  and  writing  the  Dictionary,  the  editors  found  rela- 
tively little  assistance  in  foreign  works  of  a  similar  sort,  although 
the  help  derived  from  Noack,  Eisler,  and  Eucken  is  duly  acknowl- 
edged. These  works  are  of  entirely  different  structure  and  com- 
pass. Bayle's  great  work  {Dictionnaire,  historique  et  critique,  orig- 
inally published  at  Rotterdam  in  two  vols.,  1695-97,  and  thereafter 
in  different  languages  in  many  editions  —  the  last  edition  in  Paris  in  16 
volumes,  1820-24),  although  containing  a  great  mass  of  philosophical 
matter,  is  rather  a  general  encyclopedia.  Fleming's  Vocabulary  of 
Philosophy  (4th  ed.,  1887,  enlarged  by  Calderwood)  contains  no  biog- 
raphies and  a  relatively  small  number  of  terms  briefly,  though  often 
well,  defined.  Noack' s  Philosophie-geschichtliches  Lexikon  is  confined 
to  biography  and  is  valuable  in  its  field.  Kirchner's  little  volume 
in  the  Philosophische  Bibliothek  ( Worterbuch  der  philosophischen 
Grundbegriffe,  2d  ed.,  1890)  is  a  useful  compendium  of  salient  terms, 
rather  meagrely  defined,  and  lacks  bibliographies  and  etymologies. 
The  two  books  of  this  sort  that  have  left  most  traces  on  the  content 
of  the  present  dictionary  are  Rudolf  Eisler' s  Worterbuch  der  philo- 
sophischen Begriffe  und  Ausdrucke  (Berlin,  1900),  and  Eucken 's  Ge- 
schichte  und  Kritik  der  Grundbegriffe  der  Gegenwart  (2d  ed.,  1892, 
Eng.  trans,  under  the  title  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Modern  Philo- 
sophical Thought,  N.  Y.,  1880)  and  Geschichte  der  philosophischen  Ter- 
minologie  (1879).  The  first  named  book  by  Eucken  is  a  series  of 
essays  on  a  dozen  central  concepts  of  philosophy,  and,  if  the  method 
were  carried  out  in  a  dictionary,  the  result  would  be  an  encyclopedia 
of  monographs  of  the  compass  of  the  Britannica.  Eucken  is  a  his- 
torian of  the  first  order,  and  it  is  the  historical  evolution  of  a  concept 
that  has  for  him  the  greatest  attraction.  While  the  history  of  a  word, 
as  Coleridge  said,  often  conveys  more  knowledge  than  the  "history 
of  a  campaign, ' '  yet  it  is  not  with  the  historical  aspects  of  a  concept 
that  a  reader  is  apt  to  be  primarily  concerned  in  consulting  a  dictionary. 
He  wants  to  know  the  present  status  of  its  meaning,  the  present  content 
of  a  concept.  It  may  also  be  very  interesting  and  enlightening  to 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  6l 

know  how  it  grew  into  its  present  condition.  This  is  partly  provided 
for  in  Baldwin's  Dictionary  by  giving  Greek  and  Latin  origins,  and  by 
the  citation  of  meanings  in  the  writings  of  certain  philosophers  or 
periods.  Although  the  editor  says  (preface,  p.  x)  that  "  meanings, 
with  their  historical  development,  together  with  the  terms  that  have 
expressed  them  and  their  variations, —  these  are  the  essentials  of  our 
quest, ' '  the  reader  is  not  likely  to  feel  that  the  genetic  development 
and  life-history  of  terms  plays  a  very  considerable  role  in  the  work. 
Important  usages  in  ancient  and  mediaeval  philosophy  are  indeed  fre- 
quently noted,  and  this  would  necessarily  be  the  case  in  a  large  part 
of  the  terminology  of  deductive  logic,  theology,  and  in  such  meta- 
physical terms  as  substance,  essence,  form,  cause,  category,  idealism, 
etc.  While  I  should  like  to  see  the  biology  of  terms  and  meanings 
in  many  cases  more  thoroughly  considered,  I  am  not  disposed  to  say 
that  this  is  a  serious  lack  in  the  volumes,  for  after  all  it  is  the  main 
business  here  to  explain  meanings  in  their  being  rather  than  in  their 
becoming.  The  functions  of  the  Dictionary  are  definitely  conceived  : 
(i)  the  standardizing  of  terminology;  ( 2 )  the  pedagogical  function 
of  presenting  the  results  of  science  and  criticism  (/'.  <?.,  the  factual 
results  of  scientific  inquiry  and  their  meaning  for  life)  in  the  form  of 
clear  definitions.  As  to  what  success  the  work  will  achieve  in  the  first 
aim,  it  is  now  impossible  to  foretell,  but  so  far  as  my  use  of  the  vol- 
umes extends,  they  are  in  my  judgment  admirably  fitted  to  perform 
their  second  function. 

Of  the  parts  of  the  work  which  I  have  examined,  I  find  the  biog- 
raphies least  satisfactory.  The  fault  is  apparently  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  principle  of  editorial  cooperation  was  not  applied  in  these  articles 
as  it  was  elsewhere.  There  are  many  sins  of  omission  and  commission 
here, —  the  insertion  of  the  unfit  and  the  omission  of  the  fit.  While 
no  two  scholars  would  probably  agree  entirely  on  a  list  of  names  for 
this  philosophical  Who's  Who,  I  believe  particular  dissatisfaction  will 
be  felt  both  with  the  selection  of  this  list  and  with  the  character 
of  the  treatment.  Fortunately,  it  is  the  least  important  part  of  the 
Dictionary  and  can  best  afford  to  be  inadequately  treated.  One  of  the 
main  troubles  with  the  biographical  notices  is  that  they  do  not  tell 
us  the  really  significant  things.  Instead  of  mentioning  some  salient 
theory,  some  service  to  philosophy,  or  an  important  writing,  the 
articles  often  give  us  only  a  few  unimportant  or  even  trivial  facts. 
The  longest  biographies  are  those  of  Luther,  Lully,  Cicero,  and 
Mohammed,  while  Aristotle,  Plato,  Descartes,  and  Kant  get  more 
scanty  consideration.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  relative  impor- 


62  THE    PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

tance  of  these  men  as  forces  in  the  world's  history,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  about  their  relative  significance  for  philosophy.  We  find  Peter 
Browne,  but  not  Benjamin  Jowett ;  Emerson  and  Lessing,  but  not 
Lamenais  or  Coleridge.  Davidson  and  Atwater  are  noticed,  but  not 
Bekker  and  Bonitz,  whose  monumental  labors  on  the  Berlin  Aristotle 
certainly  earned  them  a  place  amongst  these  men ;  and  we  look  in  vain 
for  Longinus,  John  Fiske,  Jules  Simon,  Hegesias,  Rosmini,  von  Kirch  - 
mann,  Fr.  Th.  Vischer,  Frauenstadt,  Ueberweg,  and  a  long  list  of 
others,  who  might  well  have  replaced  less  significant  names. 

As  to  matters  of  detail,  I  have  the  following  more  or  less  unimpor- 
tant criticisms  to  make : 

It  is  rather  a  sweeping  statement  (Vol.  I,  p.  29),  that  Albertus 
Magnus  introduced  Aristotle's  system  to  his  time  by  the  "reproduction 
of  loose  Arabic  versions,"  when  we  consider  Moerbecke's  Politics  ((/. 
Susemihl-Hicks's  The  Politics  of  Aristotle,  1894,  p.  i,  and  Grant's 
Aristotle  in  series  of  Anc.  Classics,  p.  184),  which  is  so  clumsily  exact 
that  it  has  almost  the  value  of  a  codex.  Although  Moerbecke's  trans- 
lation was  made  when  Albert  was  advanced  in  years,  Latin  transla- 
tions of  the  Physics,  Metaphysics,  and  Psychology  based  on  Greek  MSS. 
(brought  into  Western  Europe  by  the  Crusaders)  were  earlier  accessi- 
ble to  him.  His  commentaries  on  Aristotle's  writings,  his  paraphrases, 
and  systematic  reconstruction  of  Aristotelian  doctrine  in  terms  of 
ecclesiastical  dogma,  depending  as  they  do  on  Arabic  (Alfarabi,  Avi. 
cenna,  Averroes),  Jewish  (Maimonides),  and  Graeco-Latin  sources, 
cannot  with  historical  correctness  be  characterized  as  "loose  repro- 
ductions of  Arabic  versions."  Kratylus  should  be  put  under  the 
C's  (Cratylus),  to  maintain  consistency  of  usage  with  other  parts 
of  the  Dictionary.  Similarly  Kritias  on  the  same  page  should  be 
Critias.  In  the  notice  on  Kratylus  we  have  Herarlitus,  —  and  else- 
where Carneades  (I,  155).  No  mention  is  made  of  Bayle's  great  work, 
the  Dictionary,  while  the  Critical  Monthly  Review  (I,  103),  is  singled 
out  for  mention.  Lotze  became  professor  at  Leipzig  in  1842  instead 
of  1843  (H,  31)-  Why  should  we  have  Scientific  Society  (II,  3) 
instead  of  the  now  usual  Academy  of  Sciences  (Akademie  der  Wissen- 
schaften  since  1744)?  The  Academy  was  founded  in  1700, 
not  1698,  and  was  formally  opened  in  1711  under  the  presi- 
dency of  Leibniz.  The  further  statement  that  it  "has  since 
become  Berlin  University"  is  incorrect.  Plato  can  scarcely 
be  said  to  have  lost  his  liberty  in  ^Egina  (II,  303).  He  was 
deprived  of  liberty  in  Syracuse  and  regained  it  in  ^gina  on  pay- 
ment by  Anniceris  of  his  sale  value  as  a  slave.  Why  not  Rabbi 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  63 

Moses  instead  of  R.  Moyses  (II,  36)?  The  date  1131  should  be 
1135.  Also,  we  have  here  Cordova  and  at  II,  514,  Corduba.  The 
general  matter  of  uniformity  of  spelling  has  not  been  strictly  followed 
up.  The  article  on  Aristocles  (I,  300)  should  be  (i)  original  name 
of  Plato,  the  latter  having  been  given  him  by  his  teacher  in  gymnas- 
tics;  (2)  of  Messina,  etc.  The  Ebionites  are  given  three  fourths  of  a 
column,  while  the  Therapeutae,  who  are  of  peculiar  interest  in  the 
history  of  philosophy  (cf.  Philo,  On  the  Contemplative  Life},  are  not 
noticed,  although  Conybeare's  book  is  cited  under  the  Essenes  (I, 
342).  The  definition  of  Aborigines  is  neither  clear  nor  adequate. 
"  Vision  and  hearing  are  the  aesthetic  senses  because  they  are  the 
cognitive  senses"  (I,  10)  is  an  unfortunate  sentence  and  untrue. 
On  p.  104  (Vol.  I)  we  have  TO  xaMv  for  xdtto$ ;  and  on  page  105  itpos 
T£  xaXd  for  Tzp6<$  n  xaXd  ',  II,  50,  xapa.Ss'iyfj.a  for  7rapdS£tffj.a  and  TO  ri  iffri 
for  TO  ri  Iffrt ;  I,  424,  and  II,  830,  /w?  for  /JL^IS',  II,  829,  #e/za  for 
#£/£a.  On  p.  72  (Vol.  I)  the  word  trans,  after  Ger.  should  be 
deleted.  The  reference  (I,  186)  is  apparently  not  to  Gross  but 
Groos  {Play  of  Animals,  pp.  166,  328).  The  second  paragraph  (II, 
8,  Line  of  Beauty)  seems  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  '  line  of 
grace  '  and  the  *  line  of  beauty, '  restricting  the  latter  to  the  waving 
line,  while  in  the  first  paragraph  it  is  defined  as  the  serpentine  line, 
much  to  the  confusion  of  the  reader,  a  confusion  which  is  not  re- 
moved by  referring  to  the  article  on  Grace.  It  would  be  difficult  for 
a  reader  to  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  decretum  salutis  (I,  258)  from  the 
article  on  that  subject.  Mackensie  (I,  21)  is  printed  for  Mackenzie. 
The  reference  (II,  337)  to  Arch.  f.  syst.  Philos.  is  apparently  for 
Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  In  Vol.  II,  588,  Stagyrite  (a  long  since 
abandoned  form)  is  printed  for  Stagirite.  The  reference  to  Windel- 
band  (II,  589)  should  be  Pt.  Ill  instead  of  Pt.  II.  Lycaean  (II, 
496)  is  incorrectly  used  for  Lycean.  Lycaean  is  an  epithet  of  Zeus, 
not  of  Apollo,  and  the  reference  is  not  to  a  mountain  in  Arcadia  (cf. 
Liddell  and  Scott  sub  voc.).  The  reference  to  the  Metaphysics  of 
Aristotle  (II,  613)  should  read  10743  35  f.  instead  of  10743  31  f. 
and  for  1701  b  10  one  should  read  perhaps  1071  b  21  or  1032  b  14; 
no  page  1701  is  found  in  the  Berlin  edition.  Nanna  (II,  256),  from 
the  way  in  which  it  is  printed,  would  appear  to  be  the  author  of 
Zend-Avesta.  On  p.  270  (Vol.  II)  Auroluxov  is  printed  for  AbroXoxov 
and  e£w  for  l£w.  The  date  470  B.C.  (II,  334)  apparently  refers  to 
the  floruit  of  Heraclitus,  whereas  on  p.  496  it  is  given  as  the  date  of 
his  death.  Instead  of  " until  the  time  of  Aristotle"  (II,  334),  one 
would  better  read  ' '  until  the  time  of  Plato. ' '  In  the  sentence  « '  he  held 


64  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

that  things  are  made  up  of  numbers  "  (II,  335),  does  "  he  "  refer  to  the 
unmentioned  Pythagoras  or  to  Philolaus  ?  A  similar  question  may  be 
raised  about  ' '  these  "  in  "  These  at  once  seek  to  explain. ' '  Klazomene 
(ibid.)  is  used  for  the  more  correct  form  Clazomense,  as  found  at  II, 
496.  The  Democritean  atoms  (ibid.)  differ  in  shape,  arrangement, 
and  position  (cf.  Aristotle's  Met.,  985  b  18).  On  the  whole,  the 
volumes  have  been  proof-read  with  great  care ;  slight  blemishes,  such 
as  I  have  mentioned,  are  few  when  one  considers  the  magnitude  of  the 
work. 

In  some  cases  fault  may  justly  be  found  with  excessive  bibliographi- 
cal citations,  as,  c.  g. ,  with  the  bibliography  attached  to  the  article  on 
Living  Matter.  In  view  of  the  explanation  in  the  Preface  regarding 
the  distinction  between  these  partial  bibliographies  and  the  fuller 
citations  of  literature  to  be  furnished  in  Vol.  Ill,  I  think  this  is  not 
only  unnecessarily  copious  but  confusing  to  any  reader  excepting  a 
student  specially  trained  in  biology,  containing  as  it  does  references 
to  many  highly  technical  publications.  And  although  the  article  itself 
is  written  with  remarkable  skill,  the  philosophical  reader  is  bewildered 
when  he  is  brought  face  to  face  with  this  army  of  titles  at  the  end  and 
he  has  not  the  slightest  idea  where  he  should  begin  the  attack.  The 
consequence  will  be  that  he  will  ordinarily  retreat.  Fortunately  this 
objection  applies  to  a  very  small  percentage  of  the  articles. 

In  the  etymology  of  Metaphysics  (II,  72)  the  meaning  of  //sra  is 
omitted,  although  it  is  accidentally  given  below  in  the  text  of  the 
article.  In  the  article  just  preceding  (Metamorphosis),  it  is  translated 
change,  a  meaning  which  is  not  applicable  here.  The  same  omission 
occurs  in  Metempirical  and  Metempsychosis.  In  such  words  as 
Melancholia  and  in  all  words  where  there  is  a  Greek  equivalent  of 
the  English,  I  should  like  to  see  the  entire  Greek  word  given  and  then 
its  parts  analyzed,  as  is  done  for  the  term  Method.  In  Mythology 
and  Paroxysm  the  entire  Greek  equivalent  is  given  without  analysis. 
The  Dictionary  would  have  gained  by  the  more  consistent  plan  of 
giving  Greek  and  Latin  equivalent  in  wholes  and  parts.  This  branch 
of  the  work,  however,  has  been  done  with  considerable  exactitude  and 
evident  care.  So  far  as  my  limited  use  of  the  Dictionary  goes,  the 
subjects  of  ^Esthetics,  Biology,  Philology,  and  parts  of  Psychology  are 
in  my  opinion  the  most  carefully  and  satisfactorily  treated,  and  the 
biographies  are  the  least  satisfactory.  The  Dictionary  as  a  whole  is  a 
monument  of  patient  labor  and  sound  scholarship,  and  as  a  work  of 
reference  it  is  without  a  rival  in  its  own  field.  To  its  mission  in  the 
world  of  philosophical  and  psychological  readers  we  apply  the  words 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  65 

of  good  omen  quoted  by  the  Roman  philosopher  :    Quod  bonum,  faus- 
tum,  felixj  fortunatumque  sit.     (Cic.  De  divin.,  I,  45,  102.) 

WM.  A.  HAMMOND. 

La  morale  de  la  raison  theorique.     Par  ANDRE  CRESSON.     Paris, 
Felix  Alcan,  1903. — pp.  301. 

M.  Cresson's  work  presents  another  attempt  to  sketch  a  morality, 
1  sans  sanction  ni  obligation.'  With  the  author's  point  of  view  thus  in- 
dicated at  the  outset,  the  reader  will  not  find  it  difficult  to  forecast  the 
general  drift  of  the  argument.  M.  Cresson,  however,  differs  from  most 
naturalistic  moralists  in  emphasizing  the  need  of  metaphysics.  This 
need  is  made  clear  in  Chapter  I,  On  Method.  The  position  one  main- 
tains in  regard  to  duty,  obligation,  moral  conduct,  must  depend  upon 
one's  view  of  the  place  man  occupies  in  the  universe  ;  and  this  is  a 
metaphysical  problem.  Man  may  hold  that  he  was  created  for  a  special 
destiny  by  an  all-good  and  all-powerful  Being,  or  he  may  deny  that 
he  was  created  for  any  such  divine  destiny,  for  any  end  external  to 
his  own  nature.  If  the  former  view  be  true,  one  may  still  attach  the 
traditional  significance  to  the  terms  moral  obligation,  duties,  good 
and  evil ;  in  short,  there  is  such  a  thing  as  imperative  morality.  But 
the  author  holds  that  the  '  deistic  '  view  of  the  world  (and  under  the 
term  '  deistic '  he  apparently  includes  all  theistic  conceptions)  with 
the  deistic  theory  of  morals  which  is  founded  upon  it,  is  an  exploded 
fiction.  The  presuppositions  of  a  deistic  moral  philosophy  are  not 
founded  in  reason,  but  are  contrary  to  it.  During  the  last  century 
many  philosophers  have  vainly  tried  to  found  a  rational  morality, 
while  ignoring  the  underlying  metaphysical  question.  These  philoso- 
phers may  be  put  in  three  groups, —  Kantians,  the  spiritualistic  school, 
who  maintain  the  morality  of  excellence,  of  beauty,  of  perfection  or 
dignity  of  human  nature,  and  the  Utilitarians.  Each  of  these  schools 
is  criticised  in  turn  with  the  object  of  showing  that  their  conclusions 
must  be  wrong,  because  they  have  followed  a  vicious  method.  There 
are  three  possible  positions  open  to  the  moralist,  the  choice  of  which 
must  determine  his  method.  .Either  reason  must  judge  that  man  has  a 
destiny  exterior  to  his  life,  a  role  to  play,  and  that  this  role  has  been 
given  him  by  a  creator  of  infinite  power  and  goodness.  In  this  case 
rational  morality  must  be  a  morality  of  duty  and  purely  deductive. 
Or,  reason  must  judge  that  this  way  of  understanding  the  situation  of 
man  in  the  world  is  inadmissible ;  in  which  case  rational  morality 
must  be  a  morality  of  wisdom  analogous  to  that  of  the  ancient  moral- 
ists. Or,  finally,  reason  must  recognize  that  it  is  equally  powerless  to 


66  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

establish  the  rational  or  the  irrational  character  of  this  supposition,  and 
hence  must  confess  that  it  is  incapable  of  discovering  a  solution  of  the 
moral  problem.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  evident  that  the  author 
decides  in  favor  of  the  second  alternative.  His  watchword  is  :  Back 
to  the  ancient  moralists.  They  alone  have  properly  understood  the 
nature  of  the  ethical  problem  and  have  followed  the  correct  method. 
The  conception  of  a  divine  destiny  is  a  religious  idea  foisted  upon  the 
world  by  Christianity.  The  ancient  moralists  were  free  from  this  super- 
stition and  sought  to  define  the  essence  of  natural  good.  But  natural- 
istic moralists  who  are  thus  far  agreed  have  followed  different  methods. 
Some  have  inquired  into  the  nature  of  the  desirable  life  without  analyz- 
ing actual  desires.  Others  have  studied  actual  desires  in  order  to  deter- 
mine the  good  or  desirable.  The  author  decides  in  favor  of  the  second 
method.  This  being  established,  the  remainder  of  the  discussion  is 
readily  formulated  in  the  three  following  questions  :  (i)  What  is  the 
end  that  the  fundamental  tendencies  of  human  nature  spontaneously 
tend  to  realize  ?  (  2 )  What  are  the  means  by  which  man  has  the  chance 
of  attaining  this  end,  or,  at  least,  of  progressively  approaching  it  ? 
(3)  What  must  we  think  of  the  moral  sentiment  and  the  value  of  its 
suggestions  in  relation  to  means  and  end  as  previously  defined  ?  Each 
of  the  three  succeeding  chapters  is  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  one  of 
these  questions. 

Chapter  II,  Le  Bonheur,  is  the  answer  to  the  first  question.  The 
author  here  criticises  four  different  types  of  eudaemonism.  The  hedo- 
nistic eudsemonists  define  happiness  in  terms  of  pleasure  and  pain. 
Negative  eudaemonists  make  happiness  consist  in  freedom  from  pain. 
Aristotelian  eudaemonists  hold  that  happiness  consists  in  activity  for 
its  own  sake  and  not  for  the  sake  of  the  result  of  action.  Pessimistic 
eudsemonists  regard  human  desires  as  without  rational  end  and  hold  that 
happiness  is  impossible.  M.  Cresson  holds  that  they  are  all  of  them 
wrong  and  that  happiness  consists  in  contentment  with  one's  lot. 

Chapter  III,  On  Wisdom,  lays  down  rules  for  the  attainment  of 
happiness  as  thus  defined.  Perfect  happiness  would  imply  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  desire  while  retaining  self-consciousness.  As  this  is  impos- 
sible, perfect  happiness  is  unattainable.  But  an  approach  to  happi- 
ness relatively  great  is  possible  by  the  observance  of  these  rules  :  Have 
few  desires ;  never  desire  anything  more  than  moderately;  desire  only 
what  you  will  be  pretty  certain  to  get.  Then  follow  some  equally 
obvious  rules  for  delivering  oneself  from  the  pressure  of  desire, —  think 
a  thing  impossible  and  the  desire  for  it  weakens,  etc.  The  Stoics  are 
right  in  emphasizing  the  internal  conditions  of  happiness ;  they  are 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  67 

wrong  in  saying  that  happiness  is  wholly  independent  of  material  con- 
ditions. The  Epicureans  are  right  in  distinguishing  between  necessary 
and  non-necessary  desires.  Some  external  goods  are  necessary  to  the 
preservation  of  life  and  the  attainment  of  happiness.  In  order  to 
attain  these  external  goods,  man  must  live  sociably  with  his  fellows, 
must  in  short  be  just  and  benevolent.  The  existence  or  non-existence 
of  society  cannot  affect  the  internal  conditions  of  happiness,  but  it 
does  affect  the  material  conditions.  Hence,  instead  of  homo  homini 
lupus,  the  wise  man  will  say  homini  nihil  utilius  homine ;  his  true 
interest  will  dictate  that  he  act  as  though  he  experienced  sentiments 
of  justice  and  benevolence  even  if  he  does  not  feel  them.  Reason  can 
only  counsel  the  wise  man  to  understand  his  own  nature  and  the  nature 
of  his  environment,  and  to  act  on  his  knowledge  of  the  conditions  of 
individual  happiness  so  as  to  attain  it  as  far  as  possible.  It  cannot 
command  him  to  do  anything,  can  impose  no  duty. 

How  comes  it,  then,  that  the  greater  part  of  mankind  feel  a  duty, 
and  that  this  duty  appears  contrary  to  the  tendencies  of  human  nature  ? 

This  question  is  answered  in  Chapter  IV,  On  the  Moral  Consciousness. 
Reason  advises,  in  the  name  of  prudence,  many  of  the  acts  that  con- 
science dictates  without  a  reason.  The  coincidence  is  accounted  for 
by  the  familiar  evolutionary  account  of  the  origin  of  conscience  as 
due  to  the  combined  action  of  education  and  heredity.  Natural  selec- 
tion has  eliminated  the  a-social.  The  socially- disposed  have  survived 
and  handed  on  the  disposition  to  live  sociably  to  their  descendants. 
Education  has  fostered  this  predisposition  until  men  have  come  to 
regard  it,  in  the  form  of  conscience,  as  something  sacred,  mystical, 
supernatural.  The  moral  consciousness,  however  (the  first  appear- 
ance of  which  the  author  apparently  attributes  to  '  chance  variation  ' ) , 
is  simply  the  voice  of  society,  it  is  a  '  thoroughly  respectable  social 
instinct.' 

The  last  chapter,  entitled  Conclusion,  is  a  superfluous  and  rather 
tedious,  restatement  of  positions  with  which  the  reader  has  already 
become  sufficiently  familiar.  To  relieve  this  summary  of  entire  color- 
lessness,  it  may  be  stated  that  M.  Cresson's  style  is  lucid,  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  book  is  good,  and  he  states  the  issues  between  imperative 
and  non-imperative  morality  with  unusual  frankness  and  decision.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  much  needless  repetition,  a  good  deal  of  com- 
monplace, and,  in  the  endeavor  to  avoid  a  hazy  eclecticism  and  state 
issues  sharply,  an  exaggeration  of  sharp  antagonisms.  There  is,  for 
example,  no  hint  that  the  evolutionary  theory  of  the  genesis  of  con- 
science may  be  perfectly  compatible  with  theism,  nor  that  the  latter  is 


68  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

not  inconsistent  with  a  view  which  finds  the  moral  end  in  man's  own 
nature  and  not  outside  of  self.  Whether  M.  Cresson's  reasoning 
would  prove  satisfying  to  any  one  who  still  preferred,  if  possible,  to 
have  a  rational  morality  more  inspiring  than  the  counsels  of  prudence, 
we  greatly  doubt.  At  any  rate,  his  notion  of  the  Good,  however  little 
inspiring,  would  seem,  in  view  of  what  he  says  about  the  function  of 
science  in  showing  the  means  to  its  attainment,  to  be  as  difficult  of 
realization  for  the  majority  of  mankind  as  a  more  inspiring  ideal.  The 
pig  is  content  without  philosophy ;  but  the  condition  of  human  con- 
tentment seems  to  be  a  rather  exhaustive  and  profound  knowledge 
which  only  the  sage  can  attain  by  keeping  abreast  of  the  results -of  con- 
temporary science.  In  answer  to  the  question,  Who  then  can  be 
saved?  M.  Cresson  would  have  to  reply,  "The  contented  school-mas- 
ter,"—  the  man  who  has  neither  poverty  nor  riches,  but  intelligence 
and  opportunity  to  study  the  internal  and  external  conditions  of  hap- 
piness, and  who  is  ready  to  accept  the  inevitable  with  resignation. 

GEORGE  S.  PATTON. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

Geist  und  Korper,  Seele  und  Leib.     Von  LUDWIG  BUSSE.     Verlag 
der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlung,  Leipzig,  1903.  — pp.  x,  488. 

This  volume  offers  us  a  thorough-going  discussion  of  the  relation  of 
body  and  mind,  so  far  at  least  as  that  can  be  restricted  to  the  '  pros ' 
and  '  cons  '  of  the  controversy  between  the  adherents  of  interaction 
and  those  of  the  doctrine  of  psycho-physical  parallelism. 

Busse  will  not  admit  that  more  than  two  of  the  four  possible  meta- 
physical hypotheses  of  the  nature  of  body  and  mind  are  consistent 
with  either  parallelism  or  interaction ;  these  are  dualism  and  a  paral- 
lelistic  monism.  Nevertheless  he  devotes  fifty  pages  to  a  refutation  of 
materialism.  It  is  interesting,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  later  chap- 
ters, to  note  that  the  basis  of  its  rejection,  aside  from  Lotze's  argu- 
ment from  the  unity  of  consciousness,  is  the  felt  dissimilarity  between 
the  mental  and  the  physical.  At  the  same  time,  he  hastens  to  add 
that  they  are  nearly  enough  alike  for  interaction  between  them  to  be 
possible. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  the  second  part,  the  different  forms  of  paral- 
lelism are  discussed,  and  all  are  rejected  as  invalid  that  are  in  any  way 
provisional  or  limited.  If  there  is  to  be  any  theory  of  the  relation  of 
body  and  mind,  it  must  be  complete  and  universal.  The  only  true 
forms  that  remain  are  the  three  classed  as  qualitatively  distinct,  dualism 
and  the  idealistic  and  realistic  monism.  But  so  far  as  regards  the 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  69 

essence  of  the  problem,  these  forms  are  so  closely  related  that  they  may 
be  discussed  together. 

The  second  chapter  of  this  part  is  devoted  to  a  statement  of  the 
advantages  of  parallelism.  These  may  be  summed  up  in  the  state- 
ment that  the  theory  renders  it  possible  for  the  results  of  science  to  be 
harmonized  with  an  idealistic  theory.  By  its  means  the  scientist  can 
continue  to  hold  to  his  fundamental  doctrines  without  bringing  them 
into  conflict  with  the  popular  ideals  and  cherished  beliefs  concerning 
mental  processes. 

The  list  of  disadvantages  in  the  following  chapter  is  much  more 
formidable  in  its  length.  As  a  beginning,  the  analogies  that  have 
prevailed  in  the  different  forms  of  monism  are  all  shown  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  facts.  They  are  at  best  mere  pictures  not  concepts, 
and  when  examined  are  found  not  to  make  clearer  the  relation. 

The  essential  problem  of  parallelism  is  discussed  under  three  heads, 
(i)  Does  the  conception  of  causality  harmonize  better  with  interac- 
tion or  with  parallelism  ?  (  2  )  Are  the  consequences  of  parallelism  such 
as  will  permit  it  to  be  held?  (3)  Does  the  doctrine  of  conservation 
of  energy  admit  of  interaction,  or  does  it  dictate  parallelism  ?  The 
author's  answer  to  the  first  question  is  that  interaction  is  the  simpler  and 
more  natural  explanation  ;  that  it,  rather  than  the  other,  corresponds  to 
the  natural  belief  of  the  popular  mind.  Furthermore,  causality  in  itself 
is  not  bound  up  with  the  closed  system  of  natural  law,  and  cannot  be 
made  to  take  the  form  of  equivalence  of  energy  between  cause  and 
effect  or  to  agree  with  the  assumption  that  every  physical  effect  must 
have  a  physical  cause.  There  is  nothing  more  inherently  improbable 
or  more  difficult  to  explain  in  the  action  between  a  mental  and  a  phys- 
ical process  than  between  two  physical. 

Busse  finds  great  difficulty,  also,  with  the  demand  which  the  paral- 
lelistic  theory  makes  that  there  shall  be  two  closed  series  of  causes  and 
effects.  At  first  sight  it  seems  hard  to  realize  the  demand  for  the 
independent  mental  series,  —  to  explain  a  pin-prick  in  purely  mental 
terms, — but  this  is  finally  admitted  to  be  conceivable.  A  closed 
physical  series,  on  the  contrary,  is  impossible.  There  are  three  conse- 
quences of  the  resulting  automatism  that  Busse  is  not  willing  to  accept. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  not  possible  to  find  a  parallel  for  the  relating  and 
logical  processes  in  the  physiological  activities.  There  is  no  possibility 
of  any  thing  as  the  parallel  of  distinct  cells,  except  an  atomistic 
mind.  The  crude  associationism  of  the  English  school  is  the  only 
possible  psychology  for  a  parallelist.  This  means  that  the  unity  of 
consciousness  cannot  be  explained,  and,  what  Busse  lays  even  more 


70  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

stress  upon,  it  robs  the  logical  categories  of  all  effective  action.  We 
arrive  at  any  conclusion,  not  through  the  law  of  identity  or  of  neces- 
sity or  sufficient  cause,  but  because  of  the  frequency  of  connection  of 
the  elements  that  compose  the  thinking  process.  Logic  has  no  real 
existence.  The  second  objection  is  that  there  is  no  room,  on  the 
parallelistic  hypothesis,  for  the  vital  force  of  the  neo-vitalists,  which 
must  be  a  non-physical  force  acting  upon  the  physical  elements.  And, 
thirdly,  he  insists  at  great  length  that  the  physiological  processes  are 
not  sufficiently  delicate  to  account  for  the  results  of  human  action.  It 
is  inconceivable  that  you  may  account  for  the  success  of  a  historical 
character  on  the  ground  of  the  adjustment  of  neural  paths,  or  that 
you  can  account  for  the  difference  of  the  effect  upon  a  parent  of  a 
change  in  two  letters  in  a  telegram  by  assuming  that  it  is  all  a  ques- 
tion of  nervous  reaction  to  stimulation. 

This  whole  section  of  the  discussion  seems  to  rest  upon  the  assump- 
tion that  our  present  knowledge  of  cerebral  physiology,  and  partic- 
ularly, the  author's  present  knowledge  of  physiology,  is  final,  and 
that  there  can  be  no  advance  in  knowledge  in  that  field.  The 
author  insists  that  the  very  most  schematic  and  elementary  nervous 
processes  alone  shall  be  considered,  and,  after  he  has  failed  to  explain, 
or  parallel,  mental  facts  with  them  he  exclaims  triumphantly  that  all 
explanation  is  impossible. 

The  great  weight  which  he  lays  upon  neo-vitalism  must  be  amusing 
to  the  chance  biological  reader.  Certainly  that  cult  has  no  such  gen- 
eral following  as  the  author  implies,  and,  moreover,  many  neo-vitalists 
are  at  pains  to  insist  that  what  distinguishes  them  from  the  older  vital- 
ists  is  that  they  do  not  believe  in  a  vital  principle,  but  only  in  a  special 
form  of  action  of  chemical  and  physical  forces  which  is  peculiar  to  the 
living  organism.  They  would  be  content  to  assume  that  the  law  that 
every  physical  action  must  have  a  physical  cause  held  even  in  the 
biological  realm. 

Again,  few  psychologists  would  be  willing  to  admit  that  parallelism 
necessarily  implied  the  acceptance  of  an  associationistic  atomism,  and 
Busse's  argument  for  that  relation  is  based  upon  his  ignorance  of 
modern  physiology.  The  plea  which  he  raises  against  the  reduction 
of  logical  processes  to  associations  between  ideas  would  hold  against 
any  psychological  explanation  whatsoever.  If  logic  is  to  lose  its  in- 
dependence, when  it  is  shown  that  the  processes  involved  in  reasoning 
are  in  some  way  capable  of  description  in  psychological  terms,  the 
course  of  logic  is  well-nigh  run. 

The  final  objection  to  parallelism  is  that  the  doctrine  is  incom- 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  71 

patible  with  the  validity  of  human  effort  and  the  immortality  of  the 
soul.  This  part  of  the  argument  is  a  sheer  ad  hominem,  for  he  admits 
at  the  end  of  the  section  that  the  interaction  theory  offers  just  as 
many  difficulties  to  the  carrying  through  of  these  conceptions. 

Under  the  advantages  of  interaction,  we  are  given  merely  a  resume 
of  the  disadvantages  of  parallelism.  The  disadvantages  of  the  former 
theory  are  that  it  cannot  be  made  to  harmonize  with  the  scientific 
doctrines  of  the  closed  series  of  physical  causes  and  with  the  law  of 
conservation  of  energy.  The  former  doctrine  is  dismissed  with  the 
statement  that  it  is  not  an  a  priori  principle  but  an  empirical  law 
which  must  fall  with  the  discovery  of  any  fact  in  contradiction  to  it, 
and  that  it  has  not  been  demonstrated  where  the  parallelist  needs  it 
most,  —  in  the  biological  processes.  The  difficulties  with  the  doctrine 
of  the  conservation  of  energy  receive  more  extended  treatment.  In 
the  first  place,  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  the  doctrine  of  equiva- 
lence and  the  doctrine  of  conservation.  The  former  is  said  to  be  com- 
patible with  interaction,  but  all  the  ingenious  attempts  to  harmonize 
interaction  with  the  doctrine  that  the  total  of  energy  in  the  physical 
universe  is  a  constant  are  shown  to  be  inadequate.  The  various 
theories  may  be  divided  into  two  groups.  One  assumes  that  the 
mental  processes  are  merely  different  forms  of  energy  into  which 
physical  energy  is  transformed,  but  this  is  practically  materialism. 
The  second  group  attempts  to  find  analogies  which  would  indicate 
that  it  is  possible  to  accomplish  results  without  doing  work,  but  these 
are  all  shown  to  overlook  certain  factors,  or  to  be  inadequate.  Noth- 
ing remains  but  to  choose  between  interaction  and  the  physical  doc- 
trine. Busse  chooses  interaction  on  the  assumption  that  the  other  is 
but  an  empirical  formula.  If  there  is  interaction  between  body  and 
mind,  then  ipso  facto  the  doctrine  of  conservation  falls.  To  argue  for 
parallelism  from  this  doctrine  is  petitio  principii.  It  is  time,  more- 
over, that  philosophy  were  dictating  laws  to  science,  not  blindly  ac- 
cepting scientific  principles. 

A  short  conclusion  affirms  Busse' s  faith  in  a  spiritualistic-idealistic 
view  of  the  universe. 

When  one  attempts  to  bring  together  the  net  result  of  the  argu- 
ments of  the  book,  it  seems  difficult  to  see  what  has  been  gained  in  the 
5oo-page  discussion  aside  from  a  statement  of  personal  opinion.  If 
one  is  a  vitalist,  or  believes  that  no  further  progress  in  physiology  is 
possible,  and  is  willing  to  accept  the  author's  statement  of  the  present- 
day  position  of  neurological  knowledge ;  if  one  has  a  belief  in  the 
unity  of  mind,  in  the  absolute  exclusiveness  of  the  old  logical  laws, 


72  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

and  in  the  necessity  of  the  common-sense  theory  of  the  nature  and 
supremacy  of  all  things  mental,  —  then  one  cannot  be  a  parallelist.  If, 
on  the  contrary,  one  is  inclined  to  accept  the  scientific  interpretation  of 
the  world  and  desires  an  explanation  of  the  facts  of  mind  as  well  as  of 
the  physical  world,  one  will  see  no  force  in  the  arguments  that  Busse  ad- 
vances. Even  if  one  admits  the  value  of  the  personal  opinion,  one  is 
surprised  at  the  accurate  gradations  of  which  this  opinion  is  capable. 
The  author's  main  contention  against  materialism  is  that  mind  and 
matter  are  so  totally  different  in  kind,  but  later  on  he  believes  that 
they  are  sufficiently  alike  to  interact.  No  criterion  of  similarity  or 
difference  is  given  in  either  case. 

One  other  flaw  seems  to  permeate  his  argument  in  connection  with 
conservation  of  energy.  We  must  admit,  I  think,  both  that  the  doc- 
trine is  an  empirical  formulation,  and  that  the  difficulty  in  picturing 
to  ourselves  the  nature  of  the  causal  relation  between  a  mental 
event  and  a  physical  event  is  not  appreciably  greater  than  between 
two  physical  events ;  but  nevertheless  it  does  not  seem  necessary  to 
give  up  a  widely  useful  scientific  hypothesis  unless  we  can  find  definite 
facts  that  are  in  conflict  with  it.  Certainly  there  is  no  specific  instance 
of  interaction  that  can  be  traced  through  accurately  in  the  way  that 
many  physical  events  can  be. 

Busse,  again,  I  think,  does  not  state  accurately  the  point  of  view  of 
most  parallelists,  —  most  psychological  parallelists,  at  least.  For 
what  the  latter  are  concerned  to  deny  is  not  that  there  exists  a  rela- 
tion between  body  and  mind,  but  that  one  can  adequately  conceive 
that  relation  under  the  ordinary  forms  of  causality.  Most  men  would 
be  very  free  to  admit  that  there  is  some  connection  between  mental 
and  physical  states,  but  insist  that  at  the  present  stage  of  our  knowl- 
edge we  can  find  no  analogue  for  it  in  any  physical  relation.  Their 
view  stands  to  interaction  in  very  much  the  same  relation  as  Hume's 
doctrine  of  cause  to  the  popular  idea  of  cause.  It  will  only  pass 
over  into  interactionism,  if  at  some  future  time  some  law  of  equivalence 
between  mind  and  body  can  be  empirically  established;  and  that 
seems  to-day  a  remote  contingency.  W.  B.  PILLSBURY. 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN. 

The  Psychological  Elements  of  Religious  Faith.  Lectures  by 
CHARLES  CARROLL  EVERETT.  Edited  by  EDWARD  HALE.  New 
York,  The  Macmillan  Company,  1902. — pp.  xiii,  215. 

I  remember  very  distinctly  hearing,  several  years  ago,  a  graduate 
of  the  Harvard  Divinity  School  express  an  earnest  wish  that  Dr.  Ever- 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  73 

ett  might  some  day  publish  his  lectures  on  theology.  Those  who 
moved  in  the  immediate  circle  of  his  influence  must  have  heard  fre- 
quent expressions  of  the  same  desire.  It  was  not,  however,  destined 
to  be  fulfilled.  Dr.  Everett  did  not  publish  these  lectures  during  his 
lifetime,  nor  did  he  leave  any  manuscript  of  them.  Indeed,  it  is 
doubtful,  we  are  told,  if  he  ever  wrote  them  out  in  full.  But  a  par- 
tial fulfilment  of  the  general  desire  of  Dr.  Everett's  students  and 
friends  was  still  possible  through  the  use  of  the  lecture-notes  taken  by 
some  of  his  pupils.  The  difficulties  and  limitations  incident  to  such 
an  undertaking  are  obvious  to  every  one  who  has  scanned  the  note- 
books of  his  own  students,  even  though  the  survey  may  have  been 
confined  to  those  of  the  most  intelligent  and  painstaking.  It  speaks 
well  for  the  faithfulness  and  skill  of  the  editor  that  the  result  of  the 
compilation  is  a  book  as  coherent  and  readable  as  is  The  Psychological 
Elements  of  Religious  Faith.  Naturally  there  are  lacunce  which  affect 
to  a  certain  extent  both  the  style  and  the  thought.  The  reader  is  fre- 
quently in  the  attitude  of  a  questioner  asking  for  a  fuller  statement  of 
some  point  or  conjecturing  what  position  Dr.  Everett  took  on  certain 
fundamental  problems  of  philosophy  and  religion.  Happily  the 
answer  to  some  of  these  queries  may  be  found  in  other  publications  of 
the  author,  notably  in  his  Science  of  Thought  and  in  various  essays 
and  articles. 

The  present  volume  is  not  a  psychological  study  of  religion  in  the 
sense  in  which  one  has  learned  in  recent  years  to  speak  of  the  psy- 
chology of  religion.  It  does  not  offer  any  detailed  account  of  the  ex- 
periences of  religious  people  or  of  the  laws  which  govern  the  develop- 
ment of  the  religious  life  from  childhood  to  maturity.  It  does  not, 
therefore,  enter  the  field  in  which  Professors  James,  Starbuck,  Coe, 
and  others  have  made  interesting  excursions.  It  is  rather  a  study  of 
the  concept  of  religion  in  its  most  universal  aspects,  and  has  for  its 
aim  the  unfolding  of  the  essential  nature  of  religion  and  the  construc- 
tion of  a  tenable  definition  of  its  form  and  content.  In  fact,  the  defi- 
nition of  religion  may  be  said  to  constitute  the  guiding  thread  of  the 
entire  discussion.  Starting  with  an  "extensive  "  definition  which  in- 
cludes all  religions,  the  lowest  as  well  as  the  highest,  our  author  ad- 
vances step  by  step  to  a  ' '  typical ' '  definition  which  represents  only  the 
higher  forms,  and  concludes  with  a  consideration  of  the  content  of  a 
religion  that  shall  satisfy  our  highest  ideals.  Although  not  in  the 
field  of  empirical  psychology,  the  work  is  not  without  an  empirical 
element.  This  appears  in  the  effort,  everywhere  manifest,  to  keep  to 
the  facts  of  religious  experience  by  reference  to  the  history  of  religion. 


74  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Dr.  Everett  preferred  rather  to  have,  in  his  own  words,  "a  very  im- 
perfect science  of  religion  than  a  very  perfect  science  of  something 
which  is  not  religion." 

The  material  presented  in  this  work  represents  essentially  a  course 
which  was  introductory  to  the  discussion  of  the  central  problems  of 
theology.  Naturally,  therefore,  it  deals  with  the  question  of  method 
in  theological  study.  To  this  topic  the  first  chapter  is  devoted. 
Four  different  methods  of  procedure  are  recognized.  They  are  (i) 
the  dogmatic,  (2)  the  critical,  (3)  the  psychological,  and  (4)  the 
speculative.  The  characteristic  feature  of  the  dogmatic  method  of 
the  past  has  been  the  ready  assumption  of  facts  and  the  appeal  to 
authority,  as  to  the  bible  or  to  the  church,  as  the  basis  of  belief.  The 
critical  method  aims  to  expose  the  defects  and  failures  of  dogmatic 
theology.  While  doing  good  service  in  this  field,  it  tends,  when 
carried  to  an  extreme,  towards  purely  negative  results.  Strauss  is 
cited  as  an  example  of  this  tendency.  The  third  method,  the  psy- 
chological, works  from  the  facts  of  religious  experience  to  the  con- 
ception of  God.  Thus  it  inverts  the  order  of  the  dogmatic  method, 
which  attempts  to  determine  what  religious  experience  should  be  from 
its  conception  of  God.  The  psychological  method  may  be  used 
negatively  as  well  as  positively.  Feuerbach's  procedure  was  of  this 
negative  kind,  for  he  reduced  religion  to  its  psychological  elements, 
displaying  their  subjective  origin  and  leaving  no  objective  standard. 
The  speculative  method  is  represented  as  occupying  a  place  between 
the  dogmatic  and  the  psychological  method.  It  accepts  the  results 
of  the  psychological  method  and  then  constructs  "  within  these  results 
a  world  for  itself."  "  It  fills  out  psychological  results  into  a  system. 
Whereas  the  psychological  method  is  satisfied  with  the  simpler  rela- 
tions, the  speculative  strives  to  bring  out  the  inner  relation  of  things, 
and  aims  to  show  the  perfection  of  the  whole  "  (p.  5).  The  nature 
of  the  speculative  method,  in  contrast  with  the  dogmatic,  is  well  ex- 
pressed in  the  following  characterization.  "  Here  results  are  reached 
by  a  process  of  speculative  construction  which  grows  like  a  plant. 
The  plant  takes  its  beginning  from  a  seed,  and  then,  as  it  grows, 
draws  from  earth  and  air  and  water,  translating  each  into  itself  and  at 
every  stage  of  its  growth  assimilating  new  material"  (p.  6).  Dr. 
Everett's  own  method  may  perhaps  be  fairly  described,  at  least  on 
its  positive  side,  as  a  combination  of  the  psychological  and  speculative 
methods  which  he  has  here  discussed.  Even  in  the  introductory 
material  of  the  present  volume,  he  constantly  tends  to  pass  from  psy- 
chological analysis  and  interpretation  to  speculative  construction. 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS.  75 

But  did  he  believe  that  one  can  erect  a  perfectly  secure  structure? 
Where  did  he  fix  the  limits  of  the  human  reason  ?  Was  he  a  ration- 
alist or  a  mystic  ?  These  are  questions  to  which  a  general  answer 
may  be  given  in  conclusion  from  the  results  of  the  discussionf. 

What  is  religion?  In  what  part  of  man's  nature  is  its  root  to  be 
sought  ?  Does  it  belong  primarily  to  intellect,  feeling,  or  will  ?  The 
answer  gives  the  primacy  to  feeling.  As  a  tentative  definition,  obvi- 
ously very  abstract  and  imperfect  but  "  inclusive,"  we  may  say  that 
"  religion  is  feeling."  While  it  is  true  that  all  three  elements  of 
consciousness  are  present,  feeling  is  the  "essential"  element.  In 
defending  the  emphasis  thus  placed  upon  feeling,  the  author  considers 
the  well-known  criticisms  which  Hegel  urged  against  the  primacy  of 
feeling.  Particularly  pertinent  is  the  brief  answer  to  the  third  count 
in  Hegel's  indictment  of  feeling,  to  the  effect  that  it  is  common  to 
the  brute  with  man,  and  therefore  belongs  to  the  lower  part  of  man's 
nature.  In  opposition  to  this  view,  it  is  said  that  "  the  brute  has  the 
beginnings  of  intellect  as  really  as  the  beginnings  of  feeling,"  and 
that  perhaps  ' '  the  brute  shares  thought  with  us  as  fully  as  feeling. ' '  For 
my  own  part,  I  believe  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  differences 
in  feeling  between  man  and  the  brute  are  not  as  great  as  the  differ- 
ences in  the  thought  processes,  or  that,  on  the  whole,  capacity  for 
feeling,  as  regards  its  range,  quality  and  intensity,  does  not  keep  pace 
with  the  development  of  the  other  elements  of  the  mental  life.  In 
fine,  man  may  be  said  to  share  feeling  with  the  brute  in  precisely  the 
same  sense  in  which  he  may  be  said  to  share  intellect  with  him. 

The  same  primacy  which  Dr.  Everett  gave  to  feeling  in  religion  he 
seems  also  to  have  given  to  it  in  all  other  spheres  of  human  life.  He 
says  :  "  It  is  the  more  important  to  recognize  the  primacy  of  feeling 
in  religion,  if  only  because  it  has  the  same  primacy  in  life  generally. 
Intellect  represents  the  environment,  feeling  represents  the  man.  In- 
tellect brings  to  man  his  material ;  feeling  is  his  response  to  this  ma- 
terial. Intellect  is  analytic  ;  feeling  recognizes  the  unity  of  the  ob- 
ject and  is  constructive.  Intellect  tries  to  explain  and  justify,  yet 
never  reaches  that  in  which  feeling  rejoices  "  (p.  20).  He  is  care- 
ful to  warn  us  against  confusing  this  feeling  with  "superficial"  feel- 
ing or  with  "  transient  emotion."  It  was  for  him  rather  a  profound 
and  permanent  attitude  of  the  self,  something  underlying  and  inte- 
grating all  experience.  But  one  must,  I  think,  question  the  use  of 
the  term  "feeling"  as  here  employed  for  the  total  reaction  of  the 
individual  in  any  environment.  It  seems  a  popular  rather  than  a 
correct  psychological  use  of  the  word.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that 


76  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIIL 

in  many  situations  and  towards  many  objects,  our  attitude  is  not  re- 
ducible to  clearly  denned  intellectual  judgments.  We  cannot  always 
tell  satisfactorily  why  we  love  our  friend  or  why  a  particular  work  of 
art  affects  us  so  powerfully.  We  ' '  feel ' '  in  both  cases  more  than  we 
can  adequately  express.  And  yet,  psychologically,  our  mental  state 
is  not  one  of  pure  feeling.  Closer  analysis  reveals  its  composite  char- 
acter. Intellect  and  will  are  both  playing  their  parts.  It  is  striking 
evidence  of  the  present  lack  of  agreement  in  psychological  theory 
and  terminology  that  precisely  what  Dr.  Everett  and  others  call  "  feel- 
ing "  the  voluntarists  call  "will."  To  the  voluntarist,  "will"  simi- 
larly "represents  the  man." 

The  question  of  the  criterion  of  value  of  religious  feelings  is  an  im- 
portant problem,  and  one  concerning  which  the  psychology  of  religion 
has  not  yet  given  a  univocal  or  satisfactory  answer.  No  direct  meas- 
ure of  value,  our  author  holds,  can  be  applied  from  without.  "  Large- 
ness ' '  and  ' '  intensity  ' '  are  the  two  standards  suggested.  Largeness 
is  used  as  synonymous  with  extension.  "Leaving  out  the  element 
of  intensity  for  the  time  being,  we  may  say  that  the  feelings  which 
refer  to  the  largest  portion  of  the  environment  are  the  most  worthy ' ' 
(p.  31).  According  to  this  criterion,  the  feeling  which  has  "the 
larger  sweep  ' '  has  the  greater  value.  This  criterion  is  supplemented 
by  that  of  "  intensity  "  or  "  depth."  He  would  reject  the  view  that 
the  ultimate  criterion  of  feeling  is  found  in  action,  for  he  maintains 
that  in  the  last  analysis  "any  act  has  worth  according  to  the  feeling 
manifested  through  it. ' '  This  is  consistent  with  his  rejection  of  all 
external  tests  of  feeling.  He  acknowledges  that  in  the  rough  esti- 
mates of  ordinary  life  we  regard  the  act  as  "  the  measure  of  the  feel- 
ing." But  it  is  a  "  very  imperfect  measure. "  "  All  expressions  of 
profound  feeling  are  as  rags  in  comparison  with  that  garment  without 
seam,  the  feeling  itself"  (p.  38).  The  ethical  implications  of  this 
position  are  obvious.  Utilitarianism  in  all  its  forms  is  inevitably  re- 
jected. 

The  second  step  in  the  definition  of  religion  is  presented  in  the 
statement  that  religion  is  "the  feeling  toward  the  supernatural." 
The  incompleteness  of  this  second  definition  is  frankly  recognized. 
It  is  still  ' '  inclusive, ' '  not  ' '  typical, ' '  and  is  applied  to  various  forms 
of  historical  religion  to  show  that  it  holds  good  of  them  all.  But 
what  is  meant  by  the  "  supernatural  "  ?  It  can  be  defined  only  in  re- 
lation to  the  term  "natural."  "What  we  here  mean  by  nature  is  a 
composite  whole,  and  the  supernatural  is  that  which  stands  in  antith- 
esis to  this  composite  whole"  (p.  89).  "But,  secondly,  the  term 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  77 

4  composite  whole,'  in  which  we  have  unity  of  combination,  may  also 
involve  a  non-composite  whole  not  made  up  of  elements  brought  to- 
gether ;  a  whole,  that  is,  forming  a  unity  in  and  through  which  all  these 
elements  of  the  composite  whole  have  their  being,  and  which  mani- 
fests itself  through  them  all.  .  .  .  The  one  perfect  illustration  is  the 
human  mind.  From  one  point  of  view  our  consciousness  would  seem 
to  be  made  up  of  various  thoughts  and  feelings.  In  another  aspect  all 
these  thoughts  and  feelings,  these  various  elements  of  consciousness, 
have  no  meaning  without  the  unity  of  consciousness  in  and  through 
which  they  exist,  and  which  in  turn  manifests  itself  through  them  " 
(p.  90).  The  distinction  is  essentially  that  of  Spinoza  between 
natura  naturata  and  natura  naturans.  In  itself,  however,  supernat- 
ural is  simply  a  negative  term.  It  does  not  involve  necessarily  "a 
conception  of  spiritual  beings  "  or  "even  superiority."  Buddhism, 
which  is  profoundly  atheistic,  satisfies  the  definition  thus  far  given. 
It,  too,  is  a  "feeling  toward  the  supernatural,"  for  there  is  mani- 
fest in  it  a  constant  reference  to  that  which  is  beyond  the  natural,  the 
earthly  life. 

"  The  feeling  toward  the  supernatural  "  may  be  regarded  as  the  uni- 
versal "form"  of  the  religious  consciousness.  The  question  now  arises 
as  to  its  "  content. "  Is  it  possible  to  classify  the  various  thoughts  and 
experiences  which  fill  out  the  religious  life  ?  There  is  a  classification 
which  comes  to  us  from  the  past,  according  to  which  the  content  of 
religion  is  found  in  the  "  three  ideas  of  the  reason,  — truth,  goodness, 
and  beauty."  Historically,  of  course,  the  religions  of  the  world  have 
very  imperfectly  united  these  ideas.  In  certain  religions  only  one  has 
been  clearly  recognized.  "  In  the  religion  of  the  Upanishads  the  wor- 
shipper recognizes  only  the  first  idea.  In  the  Mazdean  religion  good- 
ness is  recognized,  but  not  unity.  The  Greek  thought  emphasizes 
beauty.  In  each  case  worship  is  incomplete  "  (p.  138).  The  idea  of 
truth,  it  is  to  be  observed,  is  made  synonymous  with  that  of  unity. 
For  to  gain  the  truth  with  regard  to  any  object,  we  bring  it  into  rela- 
tion with  other  objects.  To  understand  it  fully,  to  know  the  whole 
truth  about  it,  would  be  to  see  it  in  relation  to  all  things.  "If  we 
knew  the  absolute  truth,  we  should  see  the  universe  as  a  great  organic 
whole,  the  manifestation  of  a  principle  in  and  through  which  all  things 
exist"  (p.  151). 

One  naturally  seeks  for  a  fuller  statement  of  the  nature  of  these 
"ideas  of  the  reason."  Are  they  the  result  of  experience,  or  do  they 
"  underlie  experience  and  make  it  possible  "  ?  The  latter  view  is  de- 
fended and  they  are  declared  to  be  "  innate,"  a  priori.  Further,  they 


78  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

are  not  three  distinct  principles,  but  reduce  upon  analysis  to  a  single 
principle,  that  of  unity.  The  idea  of  unity  is  "innate"  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  "  spontaneous  "  and  "  instinctive."  It  appears  even  in  the 
animal  organism,  which  "acts  as  it  would  if  it  knew  something  which 
it  does  not  know."  So,  too,  the  savage  does  not  explicitly  compre- 
hend this  unity,  but  he  assumes  it.  He  seeks  "to  annex  one  thing 
after  another  to  his  intellectual  world,  and  thus  begins  a  progress  into 
the  infinite."  "He  thinks  exactly  as  he  would  if  he  could  see  all 
and  know  that  there  was  absolute  unity ;  he  does  not  know,  but  he 
acts  as  though  he  knew"  (p.  155).  The  inductions  of  science  de- 
pend upon  "  an  unconscious  assumption  of  that  unity. ' '  In  truth,  the 
most  unqualified  recognition  of  the  unity  of  the  world-order  preceded 
the  beginnings  of  science.  In  the  Upanishads  the  unity  is  affirmed 
independently  of  external  supports,  and  the  same  is  true  of  Eleat- 
icism.  It  is  the  glory  of  science,  however,  to  have  brought  this 
unity  to  clear  consciousness  and  to  have  secured  for  it  general  recog- 
nition. Causation  is  interpreted  by  the  author  as  "a  form  under 
which  we  recognize  the  unity  of  the  world."  "  What  we  mean  by 
causation  is  that  there  is  some  inner  relation  between  what  we  call 
cause  and  what  we  call  effect ;  that  the  present  is  the  product  of  the 
past  because  of  an  inner  bond;  that  the  world  has  unity  so  that 
nothing  in  it  exists  by  itself  and  for  itself"  (p.  163). 

The  content  of  the  supernatural,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  uni- 
versal form  of  religion,  is  further  expressed  and  defined  by  the  con- 
cept of  moral  goodness.  For  morality  represents  the  supernatural. 
"In  the  same  way  in  which  the  savage  feels  that  his  little  life  is 
broken  up  by  the  power  of  the  supernatural,  so  the  moral  law  strikes 
into  the  relations  of  our  life  with  an  interference,  which,  when  really 
felt,  admits  no  compromise"  (p.  170).  Rejecting  the  various  at- 
tempts to  find  a  natural  basis  for  morality,  the  author  rested  it  upon 
the  social  relations.  But  the  social  order  in  which  individuals  are 
bound  together  by  a  common  moral  law,  represents  one  aspect  of  the 
principle  of  unity.  "The  moral  law  finds  its  basis  in  the  principle  of 
unity.  It  is  thus  supernatural  because  the  principle  of  unity  is  super- 
natural. It  breaks  in  upon  the  natural  world,  the  'noumenon,' 
to  use  Kant's  phrase,  <  breaking  in  upon  the  world  of  phenomena. '  " 
(p.  187).  Morality,  however,  does  not  arise  historically  from 
religion.  Its  development  is  largely  independent.  "As  in  the 
human  embryo  the  various  growths  are  from  different  centers,  yet  as 
development  continues  these  growths  unite,  so  religion  and  morality 
appear  to  have  their  rise  from  different  centers  and  to  unite  only  at 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  79 

length  in  their  highest  aspect  to  form  one  inseparable  whole.  When 
the  God  who  is  the  object  of  worship  comes  to  be  known  as  the  Abso- 
lute Goodness,  then  religion  adopts  as  its  own  the  higher  ethics  and 
gives  it  its  sanction  "  (p.  188). 

There  remains  the  third  idea  of  the  reason,  that  of  beauty.  This  is 
also  supernatural  in  the  sense  explained,  and  as  such  enters  into 
religion.  "  Just  as  morality  is  the  power  of  unity  binding  individual 
souls  into  a  whole  in  the  social  order,  so  beauty  is  the  manifestation 
of  the  principle  by  which  our  lives  and  the  surrounding  world  are 
taken  up  into  a  common  relationship  "  (p.  199).  "The  three  ideas 
of  the  reason  are  simply  different  manifestations  of  one  and  the  same 
principle.  The  first  affirms  that  which  is,  the  second  that  which 
ought  to  be,  while  in  the  third  we  find  that  which  is  as  it  ought  to  be, 
the  fulfilled  perfection"  (p.  200).  This  is  an  interesting  emphasis 
upon  the  aesthetic  principle.  Dr.  Everett  seems  to  have  regarded  it 
as  the  highest  expression  of  the  world  unity.  In  beauty  we  find  a  joy 
and  rest  not  possible  in  the  search  for  truth  or  the  struggle  for  good- 
ness. Here  we  possess  the  unity  without  conflict. 

The  final  definition  reached  is  as  follows :  "Religion  is  a  feeling 
toward  a  supernatural  presence  manifesting  itself  in  truth,  goodness, 
and  beauty."  It  is  suggested  that  in  a  further  course  of  study  the 
word  "spiritual"  may  be  substituted  for  "supernatural."  In  this 
definition,  form  and  content  are  united.  Historically,  they  often  ap- 
pear separate.  Primitive  religions  possess  the  form  with  very  little 
content.  "  On  the  other  hand,  we  may  find  devotion  to  the  content 
without  recognition  of  the  form.  A  man  may  follow  the  leading  of 
truth  and  goodness  and  beauty  without  recognition  of  the  super- 
natural, of  God,  just  as  he  may  recognize  God,  and  give  to  truth  and 
goodness  and  beauty  no  recognition"  (p.  210).  The  history  of  re- 
ligion is  interpreted  as  "  the  attempt  to  fill  the  form  with  the  content." 

It  seems  hardly  fair  to  subject  a  posthumous  work,  prepared  as  the 
present  volume  has  been,  to  precisely  the  same  criticism  that  under 
other  circumstances  would  have  been  appropriate.  Without  further 
critical  comment,  I  will  attempt  in  conclusion  a  brief  answer  to  the 
questions  already  raised  with  regard  to  the  author's  philosophical  and 
religious  position. 

In  the  book  which  we  are  considering,  the  "  ideas  of  the  reason  " 
are  spoken  of  as  "innate."  The  term  is  doubtless  an  unfortunate 
one,  for  it  suggests  certain  historical  forms  of  so-called  rationalism 
with  which  Dr.  Everett  seems  to  have  had  little  sympathy.  He  cer- 
tainly had  a  far  stronger  empirical  tendency  than  one  associates  with 


80  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

a  doctrine  of  "  innate  ideas."  It  is  only  when  the  word  is  translated 
into  terms  of  spontaneity  and  instinct  that  it  carries  its  appropriate 
meaning.  Instincts  we  do  have,  he  held,  which  are  fundamental. 
They  are  the  basis  upon  which  all  life  rests.  Instincts  of  action  are 
the  sure  guide  throughout  the  teeming  world  of  animal  life,  of  which 
man  forms  a  part.  And  just  as  we  have  instincts  of  action,  so  we  have 
what  he  calls  "  instincts  of  belief."  These  instincts  of  belief  are 
"  reasonable, "  although  they  are  not  reasoned,  are  not  the  result  of 
conscious  and  articulate  logical  processes.  What  he  means  by  them 
is  expressed  in  one  place  as  "a.  feeling  of  good  faith  in  things." 
Such  instinctive  confidence  in  the  coherency  and  unity  of  our  world 
cannot  be  transcended  or  annulled.  Even  scepticism  is  a  sturdy 
avowal  of  it ;  for  scepticism  proceeds  upon  the  assumption  that  we  can 
trust  our  impulse  to  know,  can  take  ourselves  and  the  world  seriously, 
in  good  faith.  All  particular  content,  however,  built  upon  our  in- 
stinctive demand  for  unity,  is  won  through  experience.  The  reason- 
ing process  is  required  to  develop  concepts  and  to  purge  them  pro- 
gressively from  error.  This  negative  function  of  reason  in  freeing  us 
from  the  illusive  and  false,  he  seems  to  have  regarded  as  important, 
and  was  willing  to  let  it  do  its  perfect  work.  But  can  the  reason  sat- 
isfactorily complete  its  structure?  In  religion,  for  example,  can  all 
the  facts  of  nature  and  of  history  be  interpreted  as  the  expression  of 
goodness  and  beauty  ?  Can  evil  be  reconciled  with  the  harmonious 
content  which  we  demand  in  our  ideal  of  the  supernatural,  of  God? 
I  think  his  view  would  frankly  admit  the  impossibility  of  a  thoroughly 
satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem,  and  would  affirm  that,  from  the 
contradictions  and  antinomies  in  which  the  reason  becomes  involved, 
we  are  thrown  back  upon  the  primal  instinctive  feeling  of  unity  and 
perfection.  While  he  had  evidently  learned  much  from  Hegel,  he  did 
not  fully  share  Hegel's  confidence  in  the  power  of  dialectical  criti- 
cism. Philosophical  and  religious  systems  are  not,  then,  in  the  stricter 
sense,  matters  of  knowledge,  but  of  belief.  With  ''reasonable" 
faith  we  must  be  content.  It  also  becomes  clear  to  what  extent  Dr. 
Everett  might  justly  be  termed  a  mystic.  He  was  a  mystic  in  so  far  as 
he  recognized  that  the  final  unity  cannot  be  demonstrated  or  made 
matter  of  universal  agreement ;  in  so  far,  in  fine,  as  he  believed  that 
there  is  always  more  in  experience  than  the  intellect  can  render  a  clear 
account  of.  For  the  mystic  is  one  who  rejoices  in  a  sense  of  that  di- 
vine unity  which  he  feels  powerless  to  prove.  Dr.^Everett's  mysti- 
cism, however,  was  clearly  not  of  that  type  which  he  himself  in  one 
passage  calls  "  abnormal."  He  did  not  "  prefer  darkness  rather  than 


No.  i.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  8 1 

light,"  nor  accept  the  immediate  feeling  of  the  individual  as  an  utter- 
ance of  the  Absolute  Truth. 

I  have  given  to  this  little  book  more  space  than  its  mere  size  might 
seem  to  demand.  But  I  have  done  so  because  the  book  is  in  a  real 
sense  representative.  For  it  represents,  however  imperfectly,  the  work 
of  a  teacher  who  for  a  generation  was  a  potent  influence  at  our  oldest 
American  university,  and  it  also  represents  a  movement,  a  tendency, 
in  theological  training.  Here  was  carried  on  an  earnest  study  of  re- 
ligion in  no  cloistered  seminary,  but  in  the  quickening  atmosphere  of 
university  life  and  in  the  most  intimate  relations  with  free  philosophical 
investigation.  It  stands  for  a  method  and  spirit  of  study  which  are  now 
finding  wider  recognition,  and  which  are  destined,  one  may  believe, 
to  work  important  changes  in  theological  education. 

WALTER  GOODNOW  EVERETT. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY. 


SUMMARIES   OF   ARTICLES. 

[ABBREVIATIONS. — Am.  J.  Ps.  =  American  Journal  of  Psychology  ;  Ar.  f.  G. 
Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic ;  Int.  J.  E.  =  International  Journal 
of  Ethics;  Rev.  Ph.  =  Revue  Philosophique  ;  R.  I.  d.  Fil.  =  Rivista  Italiana  di 
Filosofia  ;  V.  f.  w.  Ph.  =  Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  ivissenschaftlichc  Philosophic  ;  Z. 
f.  Ph.  =  Zeitschrift  fur  Philosophic  und  philosophische  Kritik  ;  Z.  f.  Ps.  u.  Phys. 
d.  Sinn.  =  Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic  und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane ;  Phil. 
Jahr.  =  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch  ;  Rev.  de  Met.  =  Revue  de  Metaphysique  et  de 
Morale ;  Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  systematische  Philosophic. — Other  titles 
are  self-explanatory.] 

LOGIC  AND  METAPHYSICS. 

La  dialectique  des  antinomies  kantiennes.     J.  EVELLIN.     Rev.  de  M6t., 
XI,  4,  pp.  455-494. 

In  the  third  and  fourth  antinomies,  Kant  admits  the  possibility  of  recon. 
ciliation,  because  reason  and  morals  are  in  conflict.  But  it  is  either  impos- 
sible here,  or  is  possible  in  the  case  of  the  other  two.  The  same  principle 
rules  all  the  antinomies.  The  theses  all  depend  on  the  method  of  pure 
reason,  on  the  fact  that  "reason  cannot  without  self-contradiction  assume 
as  complete,  a  synthesis  which  it  has  declared  not  capable  of  completion." 
The  antitheses  depend  upon  the  craving  to  perceptualize  the  object  of 
which  we  think.  All  the  theses  conclude  in  affirming  the  finite,  while  the 
antitheses  negate  it.  There  is  really  but  one  antinomy,  recurring  every- 
where because  the  intellect  is  both  imagination  and  reason,  which  may  be 
stated  thus:  "An  unconditioned  quantum  corresponding  to  an  absolute 
totality  is  conceivable  equally  as  finite  and  non-finite,"  according  to  our 
point  of  view.  The  duality  is  accidental  and  there  is  no  real  conflict  in  the 
reason  itself.  But  Kant  emphasized  the  duality  of  noumenon  and  phe- 
nomenon in  order  to  save  freedom.  In  choosing  this  distinction  as  his 
means,  he  was  correct ;  but  he  did  not  see  that  it  could  save  freedom  only 
by  rehabilitating  pure  reason,  and  that  the  form  he  gave  it  was  compromis- 
ing to  his  aim.  With  the  noumenon  are  associated  all  the  ideas  of  tele- 
ology and  free  moral  action  ;  with  the  phenomenon,  all  the  ideas  of  order 
on  which  science  is  based.  If  Kant  thought  that  the  ideas  of  an  absolute 
beginning  and  an  unconditioned  are  illusory,  then  is  his  affirmation  of 
liberty  merely  a  transcendental  appearance.  But  even  if  we  consider  his 
proofs  for  liberty  apart  from  the  rest  of  his  doctrine,  his  distinction  of 
noumenon  and  phenomenon  in  his  own  sense  will  prove  an  embarrassment. 
Space  and  time  are  for  Kant  essentially  subjective  ;  the  real  is  outside  of 
space  and  time.  A  great  objection  to  this  view  is  that  thought  cannot  con- 
tain a  priori  forms  which  are  the  absolute  negation  of  its  nature.  Mind  is 
a  rigorous  unity  ;  how  can  it  contain  the  multiplicity  of  extent  and  duration  ? 


SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  8$ 

More  than  this,  for  Kant  there  is  no  objective  ground  in  the  noumenon  for" 
time  and  space.  If  there  were,  time  and  space  would  necessarily  be  con- 
cepts known  a  posteriori,  derived  from  some  more  general  form.  The 
noumenon  is  then  not  of  this  world,  and  utterly  cut  off  from  the  phenom- 
enon. But  to  solve  the  problem  of  liberty,  phenomenon  and  noumenon 
must  be  distinct  enough  to  give  rise  to  two  different  points  of  view,  yet 
close  enough  to  be  reconciled  by  the  explanation  we  seek.  In  a  tentative 
outline  of  such  a  reconciliation,  we  might  assume  that  the  notions  of  space 
and  time,  or,  more  simply,  those  of  extent  and  duration,  are  analyzable 
into  their  elements.  Duration  would  then  be  a  composite  of  change,  or 
successive  multiplicity,  which  is  objective,  and  the  unity  of  reason.  To 
have  duration  is  to  be  in  contact  with  mutability  without  being  carried  on 
its  current ;  but  this  is  what  the  mind  does,  which  is  present  in  entirety  to 
each  one  of  its  acts  and  states.  If  duration  be  considered  on  the  side  of 
change,  the  noumenon  is  exterior  to  it  ;  if  on  the  side  of  unity,  the  nou- 
menon is  within  it  as  the  unchanging  element.  The  identity  of  conscious- 
ness is  a  noumenon  always  wholly  present  to  the  events  of  life,  not  in 
isolation  from  phenomena.  We  make  unity  and  change  equally  parts  of 
duration  ;  but  Kant  opposed  unity  not  only  to  change,  but  to  duration  as  a 
whole,  and  was  therefore  logically  forced  to  make  the  separation  between 
noumenon  and  phenomenon  complete.  We  have  shown  the  possible 
reconciliation,  though  it  was  by  recognizing  that  there  is  an  objective  factor, 
change,  in  duration  ;  but  this  is  the  exact  negation  of  the  Transcendental 
Aesthetic,  and  therefore  of  the  whole  Critique.  Kant  does  not  reconcile 
his  two  worlds,  he  merely  places  them  in  juxtaposition  ;  his  man  is  in 
extreme  dualism,  the  empirical  man  subject  to  the  law  of  necessity,  the 
rational  subject  to  that  of  reason.  Human  liberty  is  with  him  practically 
synonymous  with  necessity.  The  truth  is  that  the  phenomenon  is  not 
merely  the  negative  of  the  noumenon,  it  is  also  its  expression.  The  dis- 
tinction between  them  should  be  made  rather  by  subordination  than  by 
absolute  separation.  Thus  we  should  gain  the  right  to  a  simultaneous 
affirmation  of  the  two  apparently  contradictory  notions,  at  the  same  time 
showing  that  always  the  phenomenal  antithesis  is  explained  by  the  nou- 
menal  thesis.  The  infinite  and  continuous  are  in  themselves  inexplicable  ; 
the  finite  and  discontinuous  are  not  only  intelligible  but  also  explain  their 
opposites,  which  as  negations  gain  all  their  determination  from  them.  The 
first  are  phenomenal,  the  second  real.  Like  them,  liberty  is  truth,  neces- 
sity is  appearance,  and  we  may  hope  to  solve  the  problem  stated  by  follow- 
ing this  clue  in  our  succeeding  study.  EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

Folgerungen  aus  Kants  Aujfassung  der  Zeit  in  der  Kritik  der  reinen  Ver- 

nunft.     O.  LEO.     V.  f.  w.  Ph.,  XXVII,  2,  189-207. 

We  must  distinguish  in  Kant  two  conceptions  of  time  ;  first,  the  tem- 
poral determination  of  all  possible  presentations  in  consciousness  ;  and, 
secondly,  time  as  the  form  of  functioning  of  that  activity  which  brings 


&4  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

into  being  the  presentations  and  so  perception  itself.  It  is  in  the  former 
sense  that  "time  is  only  the  form  of  the  inner  sense."  But,  in  the  deduc- 
tion of  the  categories,  transcendental  imagination  itself,  though  attributed 
to  an  ego  unconditioned  by  time  as  the  form  of  inner  sense,  is  yet  charac- 
terized as  an  activity  ;  so  that  temporal  lapse  cannot  be  excluded  from  it. 
In  the  activity  of  understanding,  sense  and  thinking  are  not  to  be  sepa- 
rated ;  and  Kant  in  the  Analytic  maintains  this  separation  only  for  exposi- 
tory reasons.  Reason,  too,  is  an  activity,  in  which,  indeed,  sense  does 
not  participate,  but  which  is  unambiguously  characterized  as  a  temporal 
lapse  ;  so  that  time  is  presupposed  independently  of  the  inner  sense. 
Kant's  statement,  that  pure  reason  is  not  subject  to  the  form  of  time,  is 
reconcilable  with  the  necessity  of  temporal  lapse  in  the  activity  of  the  reason, 
if  we  understand  by  the  temporal  lapse,  not  time  as  the  form  of  inner 
sense,  not  duration  and  succession,  but  transcendental  time,  as,  in  the  trans- 
cendental ego,  it  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  inner  sense  as  the  condition  of  its 
possibility.  The  Critique  teaches  the  empirical  reality  of  time,  but  denies 
its  transcendental  reality.  But  to  time  as  the  form  of  all  spontaneous 
activity  we  cannot  deny  transcendental  reality  also.  The  empirical  reality 
of  time  is  possible  only  on  the  basis  of  transcendental  time  as  the  condi- 
tion of  all  reality.  Sensibility,  understanding,  and  reason  are  phenomena, 
to  which  as  the  real  corresponds  the  energy  of  sense-activity  and  thought. 
Kant  calls  this  the  Gemut.  The  transcendental  condition  of  all  being  and 
activity,  free  from  all  temporal  determination  (duration  or  succession), — 
energy  acting  in  ceaseless  flow  without  beginning  or  end,  — this,  too,  in- 
volves time  as  transcendental  reality.  Time  is  thus  real  not  as  existing  in 
itself,  but  as  that  logical  determination  under  which  the  transcendental 
activity  functions  in  our  consciousness.  If  now  the  transcendental  reality 
of  time  is  not  to  remain  exclusively  logical,  it  must  be  given  in  conscious 
being  and  activity  independent  of  thinking  and  inner  sense  ;  we  must  be 
conscious  of  it  as  of  a  continuous  ribbon  that  unites  all  the  items  of  con- 
scious life.  Temporal  continuity  is  given  us  a  priori,  the  certainty  of  flow- 
ing time  independent  of  the  particular  content  of  sensation, — time  that 
closes  all  the  gaps  of  conscious  being  (as  the  empty  time  of  sleep).  Time 
has  an  independent,  homogeneous  continuity,  not  due  to  inner  sense.  Our 
thinking  infinitely  transcends  the  temporal  limits  of  empirical  time.  The 
time  to  which  we  ascribe  transcendental  reality  is  the  condition  of  all  per- 
ception, and  therefore  cannot  be  given  or  known  through  perception. 

THEODORE  DE  LAGUNA. 

The  Order  of  the  Hegelian    Categories  in  the  Hegelian  Argument.      M. 
W.  CALKINS.     Mind,  47,  pp.  317-340. 

Hegel's  immediate  followers  regarded  the  order  of  the  categories  as  in- 
evitable. Modern  commentators  usually  hold  that  the  order  depends 
wholly  on  extraneous  grounds.  The  truth  probably  lies  between  these  two 
extremes.  Much  repetition  passes  for  progress  ;  and  identical  categories, 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  85 

under  different  names,  appear  not  only  in  close  succession  but  at  essen- 
tially different  stages  of  the  dialectic.  Yet  result  and  method  are  alike  of 
permanent  value  ;  and  the  essential  argument  must  be  retraced  by  all  who 
are  to  reach  the  standpoint  of  Absolute  Idealism.  This  paper  proposes  a 
rearrangement  of  the  Logic,  which  shall  disentangle  the  several  lines  of 
argument.  The  following  outline  is  offered  :  Introduction.  Metaphysics 
is  possible,  for  Ultimate  Reality  is  neither  undetermined  (Bk.  I,  Identity 
and  Difference)  nor  unknowable  (Bk.  II,  Essence,  Appearance,  etc.).  Ulti- 
mate reality  is  Absolute  One,  being  neither  a  single  reality  among  others,  — 
for  such  reality  is  same  and  other  (Bk.  I,  Determined  Being  ;  Bk.  II,  Iden- 
tity and  Difference),  and  like  and  unlike  (Bk.  II,  Likeness  and  Unlikeness  ; 
Bk.  Ill,  Notion  and  Judgment),  and  dependent  on  others  (Bk.  II,  Causality), 
—  nor  a  composite  of  ultimate  parts  (Bk.  I,  Finitude,  Infinity,  and  Being- 
for-Self;  Bk.  II,  Action  and  Reaction  ;  Bk.  Ill,  Mechanism).  Ultimate 
reality  is  Absolute  Self,  and  not  mere  life  (Bk.  Ill,  Life)  or  finite  con- 
sciousness (Bk.  Ill,  Cognition).  The  introductory  argument  is  directed 
against  Eleaticism  of  all  times,  on  the  one  hand,  and  against  Kant  in  par- 
ticular, on  the  other.  The  argument  for  the  unity  of  reality,  occupying 
much  the  greater  part  of  the  Logic,  has  two  parts  :  First,  that  Ultimate 
Reality  is  no  single  isolated  reality  ;  and  second,  that  it  is  not  a  sum  of  iso- 
lated realities.  On  the  first  point,  the  argument  from  "sameness"  or 
"likeness"  is  given  far  greater  prominence  than  that  based  on  "inter- 
dependence, ' '  doubtless  because  the  latter  is  due  to  Kant  and  was  common 
property  in  Hegel's  time.  On  the  second  point,  Hegel  shows  that  a  bare, 
unrelated  plurality  is  impossible  ;  but  he  never  seriously  considers  the 
theory  of  the  Absolute  as  a  system  of  related  individuals.  However,  he 
unequivocally  rejects  it,  and  the  omission  can  readily  be  supplied  on  his 
own  principles.  The  argument  that  ultimate  reality  is  a  self  is  also  not  so 
rigorously  treated  as  that  it  is  Absolute  One  ;  this  because  the  general  thesis 
of  idealism  was  sufficiently  accepted.  As  to  the  new  ordering  of  the  cate- 
gories, determinate  being  is  the  real  synthesis  of  being  and  naught,  not  be- 
coming, which  is  rather  a  universal  category,  the  common  method  of  dialec- 
tical procedure.  The  section  on  quantity  is  omitted,  because  the  whole  of 
it  is  elsewhere  duplicated,  and  its  omission  dispenses  with  the  worse  than 
useless  section  on  measure.  In  general,  the  changes  consist  merely  in  the 
juxtaposition  of  groups  of  equivalent  categories  ;  and  the  justification  for 
each  change  can  be  found  in  Hegel's  own  admission. 

THEODORE  DE  LACUNA. 

Mechanismus  und  Vitalismus  in  der  modernen  Biologie.     E.  VON  HART- 
MANN.     Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.,  IX,  2,  pp.  139-178;  3,  pp.  331-377. 

This  article  is  a  critical  resume  of  the  leading  mechanistic  and  vitalistic 
biological  views  from  Miiller  onward.  The  earlier  .vitalists,  von  Hum- 
boldt,  Bichat,  and  particularly  Muller,  hold  to  a  life  principle  the  advocacy 
of  which  is  now  impossible, — in  M.'s  definition  "an  unconsciously-working, 


86  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

yet  purposive  activity"  of  an  "imponderable  matter,"  in  its  turn  appar- 
ently a  manifestation  of  a  pantheistic  world-soul.  The  "imponderable 
matter"  aside,  M.  is  closely  akin  to  the  neo-vitalists.  To  this  life-force 
von  Liebig  would  add  the  working  of  natural  laws  ;  Du  Bois-Reymond, 
on  the  other  hand,  finds  life's  origin  solely  in  such  laws.  Neither  in  or- 
ganic nor  inorganic  nature  act  forces  other  than  simple  attractive  and 
repellent  '  central  forces'  ;  were  there  a  life-principle,  at  best  it  could  be 
only  a  complex  of  mechanical  energies.  Lotze,  though  repudiating  vital- 
ism, has  tendencies  thitherward,  clearly  visible  through  a  supplementation, 
in  the  case  of  vital  phenomena,  to  the  "forces  of  the  first  and  second 
order,"  of  a  divine  interference.  Fechner,  Virchow,  and  Rindfleisch, 
however,  as  also  Wundt  and  K.  von  Baer,  are  pronounced  mechanists. 
For  Fechner  all  physical,  chemical,  and  organic  laws,  — it  is  true  the  latter 
are  in  essentia  discriminated  from  the  former,  —  are  derivations  from  one 
law,  universal  and  supreme  ;  in  so  far,  then,  as  a  bodily  organ,  say  the 
eye,  may  be  likened  to  a  mechanical  contrivance,  e.  g.t  the  camera  ob- 
scura,  the  organ  acts  mechanically.  For  Virchow,  who,  distancing  his 
master,  seeks  the  distinguishing  feature  between  organic  and  inorganic, 
life  is  traceable  to  a  proper,  transferable  form  of  motion  possessed  by 
atom-combinations  of  a  peculiar  structure  ;  while  life's  appearance  is 
vaguely  placed  in  an  "entrance  of  unusual  conditions  at  a  specified  time 
in  the  earth's  evolution."  For  Rindfleisch  life  retreats  still  farther  to  an 
unknown  principle  in  intimate  union  with  the  protoplasm.  The  solutions 
of  Wundt  and  von  Baer  are  differently  conceived.  Life  is  a  "  goal- 
striving," — in  the  eyes  of  W.,  conscious,  but  only  accidentally  through 
over-shooting  of  its  mark  successful  ;  in  those  of  B.,  unconscious.  Such 
standpoints  may  seem  mechanistic.  To  materialistic  scientists,  intoxicated 
by  Darwinism,  they  were  not  sufficiently  iconoclastic  ;  to  vitalists  they 
were  pusillanimously  compromising.  Bunge  and  Hamann,  on  the  one  side, 
declare  that  the  death-sentence  of  mechanism  has  been  pronounced  ; 
activity  is  life's  insoluble  riddle,  and  each  scientific  advance  merely 
widens  the  chasm  between  quick  and  dead.  Conversely,  Kassowitz  dis- 
dains such  mysteries  ;  after  himself  exploding  the  various  warmth-theories, 
Ludwig's  osmosis  view,  the  ferment,  the  electrical,  and  the  equilibrium 
hypotheses,  he  presents  his  own  explication,  life  as  an  alternate  down- 
tearing  and  up-building  of  protoplasmic  cells.  Hertwig's  position  is  neu- 
tral. Life  is  a  product  of  both  an  incomprehensible  vital  force,  and  of  the 
interplay  of  mechanical  energies.  With  Haacke,  Weismann,  and  Biitschli 
occurs  a  somewhat  important  innovation.  In  the  last  resort,  viz. ,  so  far 
as  a  metaphysics  goes,  the  universe  is  teleological.  But  so  far  as  the 
organism  is  concerned,  purely  mechanical,  physical,  and  chemical  laws 
account  for  it.  All  three  of  these  men  cling,  more  or  less  absolutely,  to 
natural  selection  as  a  final  answer  of  life's  enigma  ;  W.,  perhaps,  in  his 
"hypothesis  of  a  mosaic  of  predispositions  in  the  plasm  "  working  selec- 
tively, begs  the  question.  Eimer's  and  Ziegler's  objections  to  vitalism  are 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  8/ 

more  characteristic.  Things  must  '  happen  naturally '  (materially)  and 
explanations  must  not  be  '  transcendental '  (transphysical).  Darwinism, 
nevertheless,  receives  keen  criticism  at  the  hands  of  Wolff,  and  particularly 
of  Driesch.  Mechanical  theories  can  never  explain  purposive  adaptation  ; 
although  in  general  the  causal,  as  well  as  the  teleological,  reference  has 
significance,  the  latter  is  dominant.  In  the  organism  the  vital  principle 
uses  physico-chemical  energies,  especially  in  reproduction  and  formative- 
ness.  A  mere  machine  could  never  renew  itself,  nor  could  it  determine 
the  specific  arrangement  of  its  parts.  Reinke,  however,  aims  to  dispute 
this.  The  body,  a  chemical  fabric,  runs  by  mechanical  contrivances. 
More  explicitly,  there  inhere  in  it  two  kinds  of  forces,  energetic  and  non- 
energetic  (but  not  vitalistic),  which  in  union  may  be  expressed  as  "  Ar- 
beitsdominante. ' '  At  first  mere  ' '  Summ'dtionsphanomene, ' '  these  appear 
later  as  immaterial,  unconscious,  psychic  activities,  governing  not  only 
parts  of  organisms,  organisms  themselves,  and  species,  but  ruling  all  as  a 
semi-mystical  "  Universaldominante , "  assimilating  all  the  lower  "  Domi- 
nante"  F.  Reinke,  although  on  somewhat  different  premises,  substan- 
tially agrees  with  his  brother.  Reinke  thus  seems  an  implicit  vitalist ; 
so  are  von  Helmholtz  and  Hertz.  Purpose  is  so  wonderful  as  to  transcend 
the  ken  of  human  exposition  (yet  Helmholtz  is  a  stanch  Darwinist)  and,  even 
though  in  the  organism  "conservation  of  energy"  is  valid,  its  workings 
are  inexplicable.  But  K.  Schneider  is  one  of  the  most  recent  and  ablest, 
though  mistaken,  leaders  of  vitalism.  Mechanism  is  an  obsolescent  error, 
lingering  only  through  mental  inertia  ;  it  utterly  fails  to  explain  purposive 
adaptation,  variations  in  plants  removed  to  unfriendly  climates,  etc.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  no  autonomous  vital  force,  no  Reinkean  "  Ar- 
beitsdominante,"  no  distinct  life-stuff.  The  vital  principle  is  a  physical 
energy  bound  to  physical  atoms  and  differentiated  from  other  physical 
forces  only  as  these  are  from  each  other  ;  perhaps  it  is  Ostwald's  "  nerve- 
energy."  How  it  arises  can  be  seen,  not  expounded  ;  the  most  to  be  said 
is  that  it  is  a  transformation  of  other  energies  through  the  medium  of 
molecular  rearrangement  in  the  plasm.  Beside  Schneider,  many  less- 
known  authors,  "children  who  dare  not  use  right  names"  might  be 
cited, —  the  chief  being  Albrecht,  Preyer,  and  Jager.  All  in  all,  the 
vitalist,  though  as  yet  his  cause  be  unproved,  may  look  hopefully  forward. 

A.  J.  TIETJE. 
4 

Brief  Critique  of  '  Psychological  Parallelism. '     G.  T.   LADD.     Mind,  47, 
pp.  374-380. 

The  '  stream  of  consciousness  '  is  no  mere  temporal  sequence.  Certain 
feelings  of  activity  or  passivity  are  inseparable  from  every  state  of  con- 
sciousness. To  these,  chiefly  or  wholly,  is  due  the  appearance  —  or,  as 
the  writer  believes,  experienced  fact  —  of  dynamical  connection  in  experi- 
ence. The  experienced  phenomena  suffer  a  diremption,  which  is  both  a 
condition  and  a  product  of  the  growth  of  the  intellect, — the  diremption 


88  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

into  phenomena  assigned  to  things  as  their  subject  and  those  assigned  to 
the  self.  This  distinction  is  rather  confirmed  than  confused  by  the  fact  that 
certain  psychoses  are  for  certain  purposes  assigned  to  the  body,  and  for 
other  purposes  assigned  to  the  self.  The  phenomena  of  which  the  ego  is 
subject  and  those  of  the  physical  organism  are  experienced  in  such  tem- 
poral connections  and  with  such  coloring  from  feeling  and  conation  that 
they  are  inevitably  conceived  as  standing  to  each  other  in  actual  dynam- 
ical relations.  The  consciousness  of  man  is  essentially  '  ontological. '  It 
is  reality  that  he  requires  as  the  account  of  his  experience, —  two  real  be- 
ings, his  body  and  his  mind,  dynamically  related  in  the  one  experience. 
Thus  mind  and  body  exist  in  actual,  reciprocal,  causal  relations.  For  it  is 
in  this  connection  that  the  very  conception  of  causality  arises.  From  the 
empirical  point  of  view,  the  hypothesis  of  parallelism  is  either  unintelligible, 
inadequate,  or  false.  The  '  parallelism  '  is  not  spatial ;  nor  can  it  be 
merely  temporal.  The  two  '  parallel '  time-series  differ  in  important  ways. 
The  life  of  the  mind  is  anything  but  a  continuous  '  stream  '  ;  and  there  are 
essential  factors  and  activities  of  psychic  life  and  development,  in  respect 
to  which  psychic  and  physical  phenomena  are  decidedly  not  parallel  in  any 
legitimate  sense.  When  the  hypothesis  of  parallelism  becomes  metaphys- 
ical, it  either  distorts  or  contradicts  the  proper  meaning  of  the  categories 
employed.  Psychophysical  science,  properly  understood,  does  not  essen- 
tially alter  the  popular  conceptions  of  body  and  mind.  What  the  science 
discovers  is  not 'parallelism,'  but  a  complex  network  of  relations.  The 
problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body,  like  other  ultimate  scientific 
problems,  appeals  to  philosophy  for  a  tenable  solution.  Philosophy  per- 
ceives with  increasing  clearness  that  the  bond  must  be  found  in  the  being 
of  the  cosmos  itself. 

THEODORE  DE  LAGUNA. 

Lafinalit'een  biologic.    E.  GOBLOT.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  10,  pp.  366-381. 

The  term  finality,  which  is  essential  in  biology,  is  not  even  legitimate 
elsewhere.  The  postulate  of  a  final  goal  in  cosmic  evolution, —  especially 
if  this  evolution  be  conceived  of  in  anthropomorphic  and  anthropocentric 
terms, —  is  untenable.  According  to  Renan'  s  teleology,  the  first  cause  of  the 
universe  is  divine  consciousness,  striving,  through  innumerable  failures,  to 
realize  itself  materially.  Human  consciousness,  the  cosmic  end,  is  a  good  in 
itself,  for  whose  production  the  infinite  resources  of  the  universe  are  drawn 
upon  as  means.  But  such  a  teleology  is  utterly  foreign  to  science.  Science 
demands  determinism,  rejecting  alike  occasionalism  and  preestablished 
harmony,  unless  by  the  creator,  involved  in  the  latter  be  meant  a  mere 
mathematical  or  logical  abstraction  ;  such  a  conception,  though  extra- 
scientific,  is  not  anti-scientific.  Finality  and  freedom,  which  are  really  in- 
compatible, Sully-Prudhomme  makes  inseparable.  Finality  and  necessity 
he  regards  as  alternatives,  and  so  eliminates  the  former  from  the  positive 
sciences,  maintaining  that  it  is  impossible  both  in  mechanical  and  in  psy- 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  89 

chological  determinism.  But  instead  of  being  thus  banished  from  nature, 
finality  is  really  conditioned  by  the  very  necessity  of  natural  laws.  A 
final  cause,  even  that  which  explains  the  operations  of  intelligence,  is  it- 
self blind.  Its  essence,  as  Darwin  has  shown,  is  the  causality  of  the  good, 
not  that  of  idea  or  intention.  The  theory  of  natural  selection  has  intro- 
duced into  science,  the  field  of  determinism,  a  positive  and  intelligible 
teleology,  having  its  own  method  and  logic.  A  theological  or  metaphys- 
ical finality  becomes  a  superfluity  when  it  is  seen  that  the  struggle  for 
existence  produces  as  excellent  results  as  could  the  most  beneficent  Provi- 
dence. Richet  affirms  that,  in  the  microcosmic  world  of  biology,  finality 
is  placed  beyond  a  doubt  by  the  continual  progress,  not  only  towards  life 

but  towards  the  best  possible  life. 

ANNIE  D.  MONTGOMERY. 

Religion  as  an  Idea.  W.  R.  BENEDICT.  Int.  J.  E.,  XIV,  i,  pp.  66-80. 
The  exact  connotation  of  the  word  '  Religion  '  is  desired.  Definitions 
emphasizing  its  sociological  and  biological,  as  well  as  its  expansive  and 
dynamogenetic,  functions  are  quoted.  These  fail  to  discriminate  between 
what  religion  is,  (i)  as  existing,  and  (2)  as  representing  the  highest  human 
mental  conception.  They  also  reject  the  idea  of  a  personal  God,  probably 
as  a  reaction  against  the  gross  popular  anthropomorphism  and  because  of 
a  conviction  that  enlightened  reason  cannot  accept  it.  A  concrete  definition 
is  submitted  :  ' '  Religion  is  the  binding  of  a  human  personality  to  a  su- 
preme personality," —  meaning  by  'personality'  self-conscious  intelligence. 
Is  the  human  mind  capable  of  a  higher  idea?  Spencer's  positing  of  God 
as  the  Unknowable  is  unsatisfactory,  while  to  say  that  the  finite  cannot 
conceive  the  infinite  because  the  latter  is  beyond  it,  is  false.  The  finite  is 
but  a  means  of  knowing  the  infinite.  Since  individual  self-conscious  in- 
telligence is  an  experienced  fact,  is  not  unlimited  self-consciousness  also 
possible  ?  Neither  experience  nor  logical  necessity  denies  the  possibility. 
A  supreme  self-conscious  intelligence  is  our  highest  concept  of  God,  a 
power  of  supreme  worth  which  knows  that  it  makes  for  righteousness. 
Spinoza's  idea  of  God  fits  exactly.  Scientific  evolution  also  emphasizes 
self-consciousness  as  a  reality  exhibited  by  the  universe.  As  regards 
religion,  two  facts  are  important :  (i)  Feeling  is  individual  and  fun- 
damental for  character  ;  (2)  feeling  should  be  trained.  Since  fact  is  the 
basis  of  feeling,  religion,  to  meet  emotional  needs,  must  have  intellectual 
content.  James's  opposing  view  is  unsound.  Religious  belief  must  be 
rationally  grounded  in  experience  and  the  universe  interpreted  in  the  light 
of  such  facts  as  consciousness,  conscience,  reverence,  etc.,  which  alone 
explain  it.  Man's  truest  feelings  spring  from  his  loftiest  religious  concep- 
tions, and  since  reverence,  which  is  the  highest  of  these,  can  be  felt  only  for 
a  person,  it  follows  that  a  personal  God  is  necessary  to  give  them  meaning. 

FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 


90  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

The  Present  Attitude  of  Reflective  Thought  Towards  Religion,  II.    HENRY 

JONES.     The  Hibbert  Journal,  II,  i,  pp.  20-43. 

The  contradiction  between  practical  faith  in  morality  and  religion  and 
distrust  of  their  theoretic  bases,  shown  in  a  previous  article  to  be  character- 
istic of  our  times,  demands  a  new  method  of  defense.  It  has  often  been 
held  that  religious  and  moral  phenomena  belong  to  a  separate  province  of 
experience  over  which  reason  has  no  control.  Rational  necessity  is  said  to 
be  merely  subjective,  and  to  hold  for  objects  only  as  thought,  and  not  for 
their  other  possible  modes  of  existence  in  experience.  In  place  of  this 
method  of  mutual  exclusion,  that  of  mutual  inclusion  is  proposed.  The 
intellectual  and  the  moral  life  alike  consist  in  the  realization  of  ideals. 
The  process  of  knowing  is  not  the  organization  of  the  wholly  unorganized, 
but  is  a  progress  from  incomplete  toward  complete  organization.  Its  pos- 
sibility rests  on  the  assumption  of  a  complete  unity  in  its  object,  as  well  as 
the  objective  validity  of  its  data.  The  conceptions  of  the  infinite  and  the 
absolute,  like  that  of  unity,  cannot  be  merely  regulative  criteria,  but  are 
implicit  in  actual  experience,  since  a  conception  cannot  suggest  what  it 
does  not  contain.  Knowledge  and  religion  are  thus  based  on  the  same 
presuppositions  and  must  share  the  same  destiny.  This  method  of  defense 
prevents  the  easy  attacks  of  scepticism,  but  involves  the  difficulty  of  ex- 
plaining the  relation  between  philosophy  and  religion.  This  relation  must 
be  conceived  as  organic,  i.  <?.,  as  that  of  mutual  inclusion.  Every  object 
of  experience  is  to  be  regarded  as  belonging  to  both  realms.  The  human 
spirit  is  not  '  will '  at  one  time  and  '  pure  reason  '  at  another,  but  the  one 
includes  the  other.  A  further  consequence  of  this  view  is  that  each  act  of 
the  soul  is  in  relation  to  the  whole  of  reality.  The  particular  end  sought  is 
a  partial  expression  of  the  universal  ideal.  Each  practical  or  theoretic 
judgment  is  supported  by  the  whole  of  experience  and  can  be  judged  false 
only  with  reference  to  an  absolute  experience.  The  truth  of  this  hypothesis 
of  an  absolute  is  implied  in  every  act  of  experience,  and  thus  becomes  an 
absolute  postulate.  Hence,  if  reason  and  religion  rest  upon  the  same  pre- 
supposition, whose  validity  is  continuously  demonstrated  in  experience,  the 
fundamental  truth  of  religion  cannot  be  denied  without  stultifying  the  in- 
telligence, and  so  cannot  be  denied  at  all.  GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

Psychologie  d'un  ecrivain  sur  V art.     VERNON  LEE.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII, 
9,  pp.  225-254. 

This  article  represents  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  author  to  throw  some 
light  upon  aesthetic  phenomena  in  general  by  a  psychological  analysis 
of  his  own  temperament.  A  brief  sketch  of  his  early  artistic  and  emotional 
life,  —  his  tastes,  ambitions,  and  pleasures,  —  is  followed  by  a  thoroughgoing 
account  of  his  mature  likes  and  dislikes  in  painting,  music,  sculpture,  archi- 
tecture, and  literature,  with  whose  ancient  and  modern  masterpieces  his 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  9! 

profession  of  art  critic  has  made  him  familiar.  The  role  played  by  the 
psychological  'type*  in  one's  aesthetic  life  is  suggestively  outlined.  For 
M.  Lee,  who  is  decidedly  '  motor,'  music  and  natural  scenery  are  preferred 
above  all  other  beautiful  things.  The  symphony  or  stream  moves,  de- 
velops, gives  rise  to  sensations  of  tension,  resistance,  etc.,  whereas  the 
greatest  visual  beauty  cannot,  by  itself,  arouse  keen  enjoyment  until  trans- 
lated into  terms  of  action.  Preferences  based  upon  type  remain  throughout 
life.  Following  Nietzsche's  classification  of  all  men  as  admirers  either  of 
Apollo  or  Dionysus,  L.  refers  himself  to  the  first  group  :  his  tastes  are 
classical,  not  romantic  or  dramatic.  Sensuous  art  he  finds  enervating  ;  that 
which  appeals  most  strongly  impresses  one  with  a  sense  of  power,  an 
intensity  of  organization.  Some  beauty,  though  recognized,  displeases 
because  it  moves  the  spirit  chaotically  ;  beauty  which  pleases  need  not  be 
greater,  but  its  effect  must  be  upon  the  spirit  as  a  whole.  Ugliness  and 
beauty  are  permanent  terms  in  the  aesthetic  life,  not  momentary  sources 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  but  the  enduring  conditions  of  satisfaction  and  dis- 
content. To  enjoy  works  of  art  only  subjectively,  by  reading  oneself  into 
them,  is  a  sign  of  immaturity  ;  maturity  regards  them  objectively,  as 
things  speaking  for  themselves.  Attraction  and  repulsion  in  art  are  based 
almost  entirely  upon  pleasant  and  unpleasant  associations  of  ideas.  This 
accounts  for  the  fact  that  technically  perfect  works  of  art  may  seem  trivial 
or  disagreeable,  while  far  less  perfect  productions  are  capable  of  causing 
intense  emotion.  In  a  word,  the  criterion  of  art  is  a  practical  one  ;  beauty 
is  not  a  thing  in  itself,  but  depends  upon  the  peculiar  interests  and  innate 
tendencies,  the  personal  equation,  of  the  individual  impressed. 

ANNIE  D.  MONTGOMERY. 

Verstehen  und  Begreifen,  I.  Eine  psychologische  Untersuchung.  HER- 
MANN SWOBODA.  V.  f.  w.  Ph.,  XXVII,  2,  pp.  131-188. 
Everyone  has  made  observations  such  as  gave  rise  to  this  discussion. 
Some  things  are  'understood,'  others  are  not.  Some  books,  paintings, 
etc.,  appeal  to  us  ;  others  leave  us  cold.  One  piece  of  music  wafts  us 
away,  the  other  does  not  find  its  way  into  our  hearts.  It  is  the  purpose 
of  S.  to  investigate  the  relation  of  spirit  to  spirit  ;  to  indicate  the  conditions 
and  the  means  of  communication  between  mind  and  mind  ;  in  short,  to 
define  more  nearly  than  is  popularly  done  the  meaning  of  the  terms  used 
in  the  title,  believing  that  a  more  thorough  appreciation  of  the  difficult 
conditions  for  complete  understanding  will  make  uncharitable  imputations 
of  bad  motives  less  frequent.  What  are  the  objects  of  expression  ?  What 
are  the  means  by  which  expression  is  secured  ?  In  what  relation  does 
another  individual  stand  to  expression  ?  How  does  expression  become  im- 
pression ?  These  are  some  of  the  questions  which  S.  proposes  to  answer. 
But  before  discussing  the  objects  and  means  of  expression,  there  should  be 
mentioned  a  general  condition  which  must  be  fulfilled,  if  two  minds  are  to 
understand  each  other  ;  there  must  be  in  both  the  same  '  psychical  situ- 
ation,' t.  e.,  all  the  elements  which  gave  rise  to  an  expression  must  exist 


92  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIIL 

already  in  the  mind  of  the  person  who  is  to  understand  the  expression. 
That  only  can  be  understood  adequately  by  an  individual  for  the  expres- 
sion of  which  conditions  are  ripe  in  his  own  mind  ;  which  he  might  have  ex- 
pressed himself.  It  is  evident  from  this  that  the  objective  is  more  easily 
understood  than  the  subjective,  which  presupposes  a  certain  Stimmung 
not  always  secured  in  another  at  will.  "  Wer  den  Dichter  will  verstehen, 
muss  in  Dichters  Lande  gehen. ' '  Goethe  relates  that  he  never  understood  the 
Odyssey  until  he  read  it  walking  on  the  sea  shore.  And  it  is  easily  seen  why 
there  is  more  agreement  on  questions  of  natural  science  than  on  other  ques- 
tions. The  erroneous  is  readily  eliminated  or  corrected  by  reference  to  the 
stability  and  uniformity  which  exists  among  natural  phenomena.  It  is  ex- 
tremely difficult,  on  the  other  hand,  to  secure  unanimity  of  opinion  as  to  the 
meaning  of  terms  and  the  significance  of  phenomena  in  literature,  history, 
and  philosophy,  where  so  much  depends  upon  the  '  point  of  view  '  of  the  per- 
son interpreting.  From  this  general  condition  of  understanding,  the  author 
passes  to  two  particular  conditions,  designation  and  expression,  the  signifi- 
cance and  limitations  of  which  as  means  of  communication  must  be  ex- 
plained. The  former  communicates  mostly  ideas,  the  latter  feelings. 
There  is,  however,  a  large  part  of  the  content  of  consciousness  which  is 
non-communicable  either  by  speech  designation  or  by  motor  and  art 
expression.  In  the  realm  of  ideas  only  such  designations  have  been 
formed  as  stood  for  commonly  received  notions,  the  individual,  the  infre- 
quent, remaining  nameless.  A  mutuus  consensus  is  necessary  in  order  to 
attach  a  designation  to  an  idea.  To  communicate  such  an  infrequent  idea 
the  person  must  have  recourse  to  description.  Nor  can  all  feelings  be  ex- 
pressed. The  more  violent  find  utterance  in  motor  expression,  but  the 
finer  feelings  do  not  find  such  a  ready  outlet.  Description,  wordy  circum- 
locution, will  not  do.  We  demand  direct  expression.  An  important  dif- 
ference between  designation  and  expression  must  here  be  mentioned.  Ex- 
pression has  primarily  a  significance  for  ourselves  ;  designation  is  prima- 
rily a  means  of  communication.  It  is  only  secondarily  that  designation 
satisfies  an  individual  need  and  that  expression  has  social  significance  or 
market  value.  S.  passes  next  to  describe  more  nearly  the  main  objects  of 
designation,  thoughts.  Thinking  means  envisaging.  True  thinking  is 
thinking  in  images  ;  and  abstract  thinking,  thinking  in  concepts,  is  only 
true  thinking  in  so  far  as  it  stands  for,  abbreviates,  symbolizes  images. 
Our  thought  moves  constantly  between  the  two  extremes  of  pure  sight  and 
pure  speech  ;  it  is  sometimes  more  of  the  one,  sometimes  more  of  the 
other.  A  word  may  designate  things,  qualities,  events,  and  relations  ;  it 
may  have  a  complete,  particularized,  detailed  reaction,  like  the  words 
tree,  chest,  etc.,  or  a  summary,  representative  one,  like  the  words  'insur- 
ance company,'  'transcendental  philosophy,'  etc.  Obscure  thought  can  be 
expressed  only  by  obscure  designations.  Ordinary  language  is  too  clear, 
too  definite.  Original  thought  is  always  '  intuitive  '  ;  just  as,  in  the  case  of 
new  words,  images  are  always  called  into  the  field  of  vision. 

EMIL  C.  WILM. 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  93 

The  Psychic  Life  of  Fishes.     E.  C.  SANFORD.     The  International  Quar- 
terly, VII,  2,  pp.  316-333. 

Fishes  possess  most  of  the  senses  which  belong  to  the  human  mind. 
The  visual  and  olfactory  senses  are  well  developed,  being  the  chief  factors 
in  the  detection  of  prey.  The  tactile  senses  are  exceptionally  acute,  as  is 
proved  by  the  ease  with  which  fishes  detect  disturbances  in  the  water. 
This  acuteness  probably  accounts  for  most  cases  of  supposed  audition. 
The  extent  to  which  fishes  are  able  to  sense  temperature,  pain,  and  muscu- 
lar changes  is  as  yet  doubtful,  and  it  has  been  supposed  that  they  have 
certain  senses  which  men  do  not  possess.  It  has  been  conclusively  shown 
that  fishes  have  some  capability  for  education.  The  apparently  intelligent 
instincts  of  fishes,  e.  g.,  the  spawning  habits  of  the  salmon,  are  to  be  ex- 
plained as  very  simple  reactions  to  immediate  external  conditions,  and  do 
not  presuppose  any  high  degree  of  mental  development.  It  may  be  con- 
jectured that  the  fish  mind  possesses  a  very  simple  form  of  perception,  that 
it  associates  these  percepts  according  to  recency,  frequency,  and  vividness, 
that  it  has  the  power  of  involuntary  memory,  and  perhaps  even  some  glim- 
merings of  consciousness. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

The  Distribution  of  Attention.     J.    P.    HYLAN.     Psych.   Rev.,  X,  4,  pp. 

373-403 ;  5.  PP-  498-533- 

These  articles  describe  an  experimental  investigation  of  the  possibility 
of  the  distribution  of  attention.  Previous  experiments  to  determine  this 
point  are  criticised  as  inconclusive  in  that  their  conditions  did  not  really 
make  distribution  necessary.  It  was  found  that,  in  counting  simultaneous 
series  of  sensations,  the  rate  of  counting  decreased  as  the  number  of  series 
increased.  This  decrease  was  much  greater  when  the  sensations  to  be 
counted  were  from  disparate  senses.  These  results,  together  with  the  in- 
trospection of  the  subjects,  were  interpreted  as  pointing  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  attention  was  not  really  distributed,  but  fluctuated  rapidly  from  one 
stimulus  to  another.  In  order  to  test  this  conclusion,  an  experiment  was 
devised  by  which  two  series,  differing  only  in  the  concentration  and  at- 
tempted distribution  of  attention,  could  be  compared.  Again  the  attempted 
distribution  caused  an  increase  in  the  reaction  time,  a  result  to  be  inter- 
preted in  favor  of  fluctuation  rather  than  distribution.  These  results  led  to 
an  investigation  of  Wundt's  tachistoscopic  experiments,  which  constitute 
the  strongest  evidence  for  distribution.  The  question  is  :  Was  the  atten- 
tion really  divided  in  Wundt's  experiments?  Elaborate  tachistoscopic  ex- 
periments showed  that  conscious  perception  did  not  take  place  during  the 
application  of  the  stimulus,  but  came  to  consciousness  in  the  form  of  a  men- 
tal after-image.  It  was  found  that  the  reaction  time  again  increased  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  objects  counted.  This  indicated  that  the  per- 
ception was  characterized  rather  by  separate  acts  of  attention  than  by  its 


94  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

distribution.  It  was  further  discovered  that  the  number  of  objects  per- 
ceived in  one  exposure  depended  upon  the  duration  of  the  mental  after- 
image, which,  in  turn,  depended  upon  the  distinctness  and  duration  of  the 
visual  impression.  In  other  words,  the  number  of  objects  perceived  de- 
pended rather  on  physiological  conditions  than  upon  a  specialized  form  of 
mental  activity.  Practice  tended  to  unite  in  close  perceptive  unity  impres- 
sions which  at  first  could  only  be  united  with  difficulty.  Hence  we  may 
conclude  that  things  which  we  perceive  as  single  objects  are  composed  psy- 
chologically of  a  group  of  elements  which  were  primarily  separate  objects 
of  attention.  Elements  habitually  found  together  become  so  closely  asso- 
ciated that  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  steps  which  bring  them  together. 
Distribution  of  attention,  therefore,  takes  place  only  when  the  elements  are 
so  closely  united  that  the  succession  has  disappeared.  But  when  this 
occurs,  the  object  is  no  longer  perceived  as  a  plurality  ;  it  has  become  a 
conscious  unity.  Simultaneous  distribution  is,  therefore,  a  psychological 
impossibility.  The  phenomena  usually  ascribed  to  distribution  are  explic- 
able by  the  duration  of  the  mental  after-image. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

ETHICS   AND   ESTHETICS. 

Les  elements  et  revolution  de   la   moralite.     M.  MAUXION.     Rev.   Ph., 

XXVIII,  7,  pp.  1-29  ;  8,  pp.  150-180. 

(I)  The  fundamental  problem  of  ethics  is  to  determine  the  origin  and 
genesis  of  the  fact  of  morality.  It  is  necessary  carefully  to  distinguish 
morality  from  its  concomitant  facts,  particularly  from  the  social  organiza- 
tion. To  determine  the  direction  of  moral  progress,  recourse  must  be  had 
to  all  available  material  in  the  shape  of  narratives  of  explorers  and  the 
history  and  literature  of  different  peoples.  The  speculative  demand  for 
unity  has  led  many  thinkers  to  consider  the  good  as  exclusively  the  beauti- 
ful, the  true,  individual  or  social  interest,  or  solidarity.  In  reality,  the 
moral  ideal  is  extremely  complex,  and  on  analysis  breaks  up  into  three  dis- 
tinct elements,  an  aesthetic,  a  logical  or  rational,  and  a  sympathetic  or 
altruistic.  These  three  elements  of  the  moral  ideal  are  closely  united  and 
capable  of  acting  upon  each  other.  Each  may  predominate  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  others,  according  to  races  or  individuals.  In  Buddhist  India, 
in  Greece,  and  in  Rome,  there  is  a  predominance  of  the  altruistic,  aesthetic, 
and  rational  elements  respectively.  (II)  The  two  lines  along  which  moral 
progress  has  proceeded,  those  of  intellect  and  sense,  did  not  advance  in  a 
rigorously  uniform  and  parallel  way,  and  consequently  the  evolution  of 
morality  has  been  marked  by  arrests,  regressions,  and  deviations,  deter- 
mined by  the  predominance  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  lines  of  improve- 
ment. These  irregularities  are  especially  noticeable  in  the  evolution  of  the 
aesthetic  element.  For  psychological  reasons,  largeness  appears  earlier 
than  order  and  proportion  as  an  aesthetic  factor.  Savages  and  children 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  95 

are  attracted  by  intensive  colors  and  sounds  and  by  manifestations  of 
physical  force.  As  early  as  the  Homeric  period,  the  aesthetic  and  moral 
ideal  of  beauty  as  identical  with  greatness  of  stature  is  modified  by  the 
added  requirement  of  harmony  and  proportion.  The  ideal  continued  to 
grow  by  the  incorporation  of  psychological  elements,  —  courage,  prudence, 
cunning,  strength  of  mind,  patience,  and  moderation.  The  external  ele- 
ments retained  their  value,  and  therefore  great  importance  still  attached  to 
another  element  of  the  external  order,  namely,  power,  which  originates 
from  a  union  of  strength,  courage,  and  prudence.  The  apotheosis  of  power 
in  the  caste  system  was  in  some  respects  favorable  to  the  development  of 
morality,  for,  through  the  sacerdotal  caste,  the  aesthetico-moral  ideal  was 
gradually  stripped  of  its  external  attributes,  and  there  arose  the  new  virtues 
of  self-denial,  humility,  continence,  and  knowledge.  This  was  in  one  re- 
spect a  real  advance  ;  in  another  respect  it  was  a  deviation,  accentuating 
by  glorification  the  purely  contemplative  life,  and  by  practice  the  most 
rigorous  and  excessive  asceticism.  The  apotheosis  of  power  did  not  appear 
among  the  Greeks  because  of  their  emphasis  on  measure  and  proportion, 
which  ended  in  the  conception  of  moral  beauty  as  harmony.  But  from 
Socrates  and  Plato  on,  the  moral  ideal  became  more  internal ;  there  was  a 
deviation  towards  the  contemplative  life  which  ended  in  the  ecstasy  of  the 
Alexandrian  School.  Religion,  the  influence  of  which  on  morality  has 
been  greatly  exaggerated,  is  the  expression  of  the  moral  state  of  a  people 
at  a  given  time.  In  virtue  of  their  traditional  character,  religions  often 
are  an  obstacle  to  moral  progress,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  are  often  a 
useful  barrier  against  rash  innovations.  Through  the  teachings  of  the 
church  there  arose  a  glorification  of  the  good  will,  a  deviation  from  the 
aesthetico-moral  ideal  more  or  less  dangerous  than  aceticism  or  mysticism. 
(Ill)  Like  the  evolution  of  the  aesthetic  element,  to  which  it  is  subordinated, 
the  evolution  of  the  rational  element  was  a  gradual  and  extremely  slow 
process.  The  idea  of  justice  grew  out  of  the  admiration  accorded  to  an  in- 
dividual in  proportion  to  his  prowess.  Once  established  in  its  rudimentary 
form,  it  would  be  first  applied  in  expeditions  against  dangerous  animals  or 
tribal  enemies  to  govern  the  distribution  of  booty,  each  person  receiving  in 
proportion  to  his  strength  and  courage.  Thus  the  idea  of  justice  from  the 
first  implies  proportionality,  and  this  proportionality  was  controlled  by  the 
aesthetic  elements  already  noticed,  each  new  element  as  it  appeared  being 
taken  account  of  in  the  division  of  spoil.  With  the  growing  realization  of 
the  equality  of  persons,  the  principle  of  proportionality  was  transformed  into 
one  of  equality  of  rights.  (IV)  Unlike  the  rational  element,  the  evolution 
of  which  has  followed  step  by  step  that  of  the  aesthetic  element,  the  altru- 
istic element  has  had  its  own  development,  not,  however,  without  in- 
fluencing and  being  influenced  by  the  aesthetico-moral  ideal.  The  most 
common  and  important  cause  of  altruism  is  the  attachment  of  men  and 
animals  to  familiar  objects  and  places,  and  to  the  beings  among  whom  they 
are  accustomed  to  live.  The  banding  together  of  primitive  men  would 


96  *  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

give  rise  to  certain  bonds  of  reciprocal  attachment.  An  increasing  solidar- 
ity would  appear  when  the  tribes  ceased  to  be  nomadic,  showing  itself  in 
a  strong  attachment  to  companions  in  arms,  to  familiar  objects,  and  to  the 
natal  soil.  And  with  the  origin  of  the  family  would  begin  the  growth  of 
the  altruistic  sentiments  and  their  corresponding  virtues. 

M.  S.  MACDONALD. 

La  veracite.     G.  BELOT.     Rev.  de  Met.,  XI,  4,  pp.  430-454. 

Ethical  theorists  define  their  object  as  the  search  for  the  true  good  or  the 
true  law.  But  a  good  or  a  law  are  things  determining  volition  and  action  ; 
a  truth  is  simply  a  matter  of  intellectual  affirmation.  How  can  a  good  be 
true  ?  This  paradox  at  the  basis  of  ethics  is  emphasized  by  the  conclusion 
of  modern  psychology  that  the  dynamic  functions  of  mental  life  cannot  be 
reduced  to  judgments.  Abstractly  and  historically,  we  have  a  solution  in 
the  identification  of  morality  and  truth.  But  this  definition  is  arbitrary  and 
does  not  correspond  with  morality  as  an  empirically  given  fact  in  human 
life.  Morality  should  be  defined,  by  universal  experience,  as  an  affective 
and  social,  not  an  intellectual  function.  It  may  be  asked  :  How  are  the 
ideals  of  such  a  morality  sanctioned  for  the  will  of  the  individual  ?  Here 
we  consider  only  one  side  of  this  problem,  viz. :  What  gives  its  value  to 
veracity  ?  This  virtue  seems  to  lie  midway  between  our  two  opposing  con- 
ceptions of  morality  ;  it  is,  on  the  one  side,  intellectual ;  on  the  other  and 
external  side,  social.  There  are  two  forms  of  veracity  as  a  social  virtue, 
one  entirely  practical,  regarding  actions  rather  than  thoughts  ;  and  another 
social  in  its  nature,  but  intellectual  in  its  matter,  —  the  scruple  to  make 
ourselves  instruments  of  error.  We  believe  that  this  intellectual  form  of 
veracity  is  latest  to  appear  in  conscience,  and  that  this  late  appearance 
shows  that  morality  is  not  an  extension  of  veracity,  as  intellectualism  holds, 
but  veracity  a  prolongation  in  the  intellect  of  a  morality  having  its  founda- 
tion elsewhere.  In  a  complete  study  of  veracity,  we  would  begin  with  the 
primitive  forms  of  active  deception  in  animals  and  men,  often  automatic, 
due  to  vanity  or  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  etc. ;  then  would  follow 
the  '  conventional  lies  '  of  social  life.  Obviously  the  immorality  here,  if 
any,  is  slight ;  the  origin  of  deceit  is  necessary  and  natural,  and  its  develop- 
ment step  by  step  with  the  other  relations  of  life  makes  sincerity  difficult. 
Only  with  the  cessation  of  the  struggle  for  life  is  sincerity  perfectly  possible. 
Beyond  these  primitive  forms  of  deceit,  we  have  '  contractual '  veracity  — 
to  'keep  one's  word,'  'be  what  one  seems  to  be ';  this  is  the  central  form 
under  which  veracity  is  recognized  as  a  virtue,  and  it  is  obviously  a  form 
of  active  probity  rather  than  of  intellectual  truthfulness.  How  then  does 
intellectual  veracity  develop  and  acquire  a  moral  value  ?  It  is  relatively 
late,  for  early  intellectual  activity  is  relatively  restricted  and  individual,  and 
such  veracity  is  more  than  a  simple  prolongation  of  reason  and  knowledge. 
It  implies  a  conception  of  truth  and  knowledge  as  social  goods  to  whic 
have  a  claim,  and  that  this  appears  late  is  shown  by  the  distinction  of  cor- 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  97 

rect  reasoning  and  the  social  duty  of  veracity  for  the  rationalists  of  the 
seventeenth  century,  by  the  late  development  of  the  historic  conscience, 
and  by  the  purely  social  end  of  intolerance  in  its  first  manifestations. 
Three  principal  causes  brought  about  the  appearance  of  intellectual  veracity 
as  a  virtue  :  (a)  the  increasing  importance  of  science  in  the  amelioration  of 
human  life  ;  (b)  the  diffusion  of  instruction  ;  (c)  the  division  of  scientific 
labor,  which  for  a  long  time  was  both  an  individual  task  and  purely  specu- 
lative. Technical  knowledge,  when  it  finally  appears,  is  a  social  interest 
of  the  first  rank.  It  required  division  of  labor,  and  thus  the  veracity  of  the 
collaborators  became  essential.  With  it  comes  the  recognized  need  of  uni- 
versal instruction,  as  the  value  of  a  man  to  society  depends  on  his  intel- 
lectual ability.  The  idea  of  the  duty  of  all  to  extend  truth  appears  side  by 
side  with  that  of  the  right  of  all  men  to  enjoy  truth.  Truth  thus  becomes 
a  social  good,  and  in  consequence  its  requisite,  intellectual  veracity,  be- 
comes a  virtue.  The  question  whether  veracity  is  nothing  more  than  a 
virtue  is  of  course  absurd,  if  one  defines  morality  a  priori  as  an  absolute, 
and  therefore  refuses  to  recognize  a  principle  as  moral  unless  it  is  at  the 
same  time  a  limit.  But  this  is  arbitrary,  and  it  is  not  absurd  to  say  that 
there  is,  in  a  certain  sense,  something  superior  to  morality,  and  to  ask  how 
morality  is  related  to  this  superior  principle.  This  principle,  which  makes 
us  averse  to  deception  even  when  salutary  or  ethically  justified,  is  the 
search  for  'harmony  with  one's  self,'  for  affirmation  instead  of  negation. 
But  by  its  generality  this  principle  is  logical  and  rational,  not  moral ;  its 
obligation  is  formal,  while  that  of  morality  is  real.  Yet  in  veracity  we  have 
a  special  case  in  which  the  real  matter  of  obligation  and  its  abstract  form 
almost  coincide.  Logically  and  psychologically,  then,  veracity  is  a  priv- 
ileged duty.  Its  reasons  extend  beyond  morality,  and  are  both  more 
general  and  more  special  than  those  of  other  duties.  Ideally  imposed  by 
metaphysical  necessity,  it  is  like  the  other  real  virtues  empirically  founded 
on  the  data  of  human  society.  The  mistake  of  the  intellectualist  theory  is 
that  it  does  not  see  the  specific  character  of  morality,  and  arbitrarily  makes 
it  absolute,  thus  losing  all  its  real  content.  EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

The  Right  of  Free   Thought  in  Matters  of  Religion.     FRANK  GRANGER. 
.Int.  J.  E.,  XIV,  i,  pp.  16-26. 

The  world  of  practice  should  share  in  those  benefits  which  philosophic 
thought  may  furnish.  Social  institutions  exist  that  they  may  minister  to 
human  needs,  but  in  their  effort  to  meet  man's  practical  wants  they  may 
overlook  his  higher  interests.  The  highest  of  these  is  the  free  movement 
of  thought  in  religion  and  the  question  is  :  How  far  is  conformity  to  be 
exacted  in  matters  of  religion  ?  In  particular,  what  attitude  ought  to  be 
taken  toward  the  imposition  of  religious  tests  upon  teachers  in  England 
and  elsewhere  ?  The  objection  to  such  tests  arises  from  the  fact  that  the 
results  of  the  scientific  method  which  are  authoritative  in  secular  investiga- 
tions conflict  with  traditional  Biblical  interpretation.  If  religion  is  to  be 


98  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [Vou  XIII. 

kept  in  the  schools  and  hypocrisy  avoided  by  teachers,  it  must  make 
terms  with  the  scientific  method.  The  legitimate  claims  of  each  must  be 
recognized.  Science  must  free  men  from  fears  of  their  own  creation. 
What  cannot  be  rationally  explained  in  the  Old  or  New  Testaments  should 
not  be  taught.  Science  is  the  only  consistent  revelation.  All  accounts  of 
miracles  and  even  the  resurrection  of  the  Christ  are  of  psychological  interest, 
but  for  the  uses  of  faith,  mere  rubbish.  The  spiritual  originality  of  Jesus 
and  the  influence  of  his  life  and  teaching  are  all  that  can  be  accepted  as 
valid.  As  regards  the  teacher's  relation  to  the  various  religious  bodies, 
that  is  part  of  the  wider  question  as  to  whether  one  who  holds  to  none  of  the 
creeds  should  be  allowed  to  teach.  Since  the  leaders  in  scientific  thought 
are  not  orthodox,  it  is  reasonable  that  atheists  should  be  admitted  to  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  teaching  profession.  Since  the  majority  of  English- 
men are  not  adherents  of  any  religious  sect,  and  since  it  appears  impossible 
to  frame  a  belief  satisfactory  to  all,  and,  further,  since  the  enforcement  of 
religious  tests  is  repugnant  to  the  commonly  accepted  principles  of  toler- 
ance, all  such  tests  should  be  abolished  and  all  the  penalties  attending  the 
expression  of  free  thought  removed.  FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 

Art  and  Morality.     JAMES  LAING.     Int.  J.  E.,  XIV,  i,  pp.  55-66. 

The  art  impulse,  when  it  has  issued  in  creation,  is  an  exponent  of  the 
moral  movement  of  its  time.  Primitive  forms  of  spiritual  expression  lack 
definiteness.  The  Egyptians,  Babylonians,  and  other  ancient  peoples  tried 
to  give  sensuous  form  to  their  ethical  and  religious  ideas,  and  the  remains 
of  their  work  testify  to  their  striving  and  failure.  Undeveloped  moral  in- 
stincts and  contradictory  moral  practices  are  concomitants  of  purposeless 
art.  The  Egyptian  sphinx  alone  shows  artistic  and  ethical  possibilities, 
for  it  expresses,  as  no  other  ancient  art  work,  the  eternal  dualism  of  matter 
and  spirit.  Yet  even  here,  barbarian  art  could  not  adequately  express  the 
conflict ;  its  medium  was  imperfect.  The  Greek  art  impulse  found  its  me- 
dium of  expression  in  the  human  form.  Unconscious  of  limitation,  thought 
clothes  itself  in  matter  which  becomes  responsive  to  its  highest  possibility. 
The  ethical  ideals,  freedom,  harmony,  beauty,  corresponded  for  once  to 
the  artistic  ;  and  so  long  as  art  strove  to  interpret  moral  truth,  it  flourished, 
the  decline  of  Greek  art  dates  from  its  abandonment  of  this  purpose 
and  the  substitution  of  'art  for  art's  sake.'  Henceforward  it  lacked 
moral  significance  and  degenerated  into  mere  sestheticism.  There  was  a 
parallel  tendency  in  the  state,  and  it  too  disintegrated.  Not  only  this  ; 
the  highest  Greek  art  was  selective.  Sensuous  beauty  appealed  to  it. 
The  form  of  the  courtesan  might  be  ideal ;  but  the  immorality  for  which 
she  stood,  when  translated  into  a  goddess  by  the  hand  of  Praxitiles,  was 
destructive  to  manhood  and  civic  welfare.  Mere  aesthetic  faith  killed  Greek 
art.  The  Stoic  ideal  spoke  last  in  ancient  art.  It  felt  life's  pathos,  but 
its  pessimism  was  fatal.  Then  Christianity  came.  Its  universal  moral 
ideal  and  pure  enthusiasm  for  beauty  flamed  out  in  form  and  color.  Be- 


No.  i.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  99 

yond  expression  even  in  painting,  it  yet  glorified,  exalted,  and  transfigured 
its  art.  The  Madonna,  which  represents  the  divinity  of  motherhood,  is 
the  grandest  ethical  conception  of  the  Middle  Ages.  In  its  representation 
of  Jesus,  it  recognizes  the  supreme  worth  of  man  and  idealizes  service 
through  sorrow.  Yet  it  too  perished  as  soon  as  it  ceased  to  portray  moral, 
which  is  to  say  religious,  truth.  Its  life  went  out  with  its  ideal.  Within  the 
past  century,  Goethe  and  Wordsworth  are  the  creative  artists  most  ade- 
quately representing  moral  progress.  Their  work  transcends  the  sensuous- 
ness  of  the  Greek  and  the  mysticism  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and,  with  perfect 
unity  of  spirit,  grasps  and  realizes  the  deeper  conception  of  the  eternal 
and  essential  unity  of  the  human  and  the  divine.  FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 

Emerson  and  German  Personality.     KUNO  FRANCKE.     The  International 
Quarterly,  VIII,  I,  pp.  93-107.- 

Essentially  American  as  he  was,  Emerson  had  little  appreciation  of 
German  life  and  manners,  yet  in  spirit  he  was  in  close  sympathy  with 
German  thought  and  feeling.  The  German,  restricted  in  his  external 
life  by  intense  supervision,  is  perhaps  for  this  very  reason  forced  into  a 
greater  individuality  of  intellectual  and  moral  life  than  is  the  American 
or  Englishman.  This  German  characteristic  is  preeminently  Emerson's. 
In  him  as  in  the  German,  this  spiritual  individuality  expresses  itself  in 
a  contempt  for  appearances  and  a  deep  seriousness  of  purpose.  From 
the  same  root  springs  also  their  common  delight  in  small  things,  which 
made  Emerson  love  to  "sit  at  the  feet  of  the  familiar,  the  low,"  and 
gave  him  the  German  conviction  of  the  dignity  of  scholastic  seclusion  and 
simplicity.  The  natural  counterpart  of  this  is  a  strongly  developed  sense 
of  the  unity  of  all  things,  and  a  consciousness  of  the  infinite  spiritual 
whole  of  which  they  are  parts.  This,  too,  is  characteristic  alike  of 
Emerson  and  the  idealistic  German  poets  and  thinkers.  The  last  and 
most  important  evidence  of  temperamental  affinity,  also  springing  from  the 
same  source,  is  courage  of  personal  conviction  and  disdain  of  intellectual 
compromise.  A  more  immediate  connection  lies  in  Emerson's  relation  to 
the  great  German  idealists.  From  them  he  drew  his  inspiration,  but  in 
applying  their  thought  to  the  needs  of  a  young  and  growing  nation  instead 
of  the  disorganized  society  to  which  they  spoke,  he  gave  it  a  new  vitality. 
The  condition  of  the  German  state  caused  a  certain  over-refinement  and 
aristocratic  spirit,  whereas  the  American  Emerson  was  intensely  democratic. 
While  Fichte  preached  the  entire  self-surrender  of  the  individual,  Emerson, 
in  a  more  wholesome  atmosphere,  taught  the  saner  doctrine  that  the  indi- 
vidual's highest  service  lies  in  his  own  complete  development.  Germany 
to-day  demands  the  payment  of  Emerson's  debt  to  her.  The  great  indus- 
trial development  of  the  nineteenth  century  has  stunted  her  spiritual 
growth,  and  its  scientific  specialization  has  dwarfed  her  scholarly  life.  As 
a  reaction  against  all  this,  a  new  spiritual  life  is  stirring,  which,  in  its 
demands  for  the  ideals  of  Emerson,  will  establish  a  new  intellectual  bond 
between  Germany  and  America.  GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 


NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS. 

Friedrich  Nietzsche,  sein  Leben  und  sein  Werk.     Von  RAOUL  RICHTER. 

Leipzig,  Verlag  der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1903.  —  pp.  vi,  288. 
Friedrich  Nietzsche  und  das  Erkenntnisproblem :     Rin  monographischer 

Versuch.     Von  FRIEDRICH  RITTELMEYER.     Leipzig,  Verlag  von  Wil- 

helm  Engelmann,  1903. — pp.  iv,  109. 
Frederic  Nietzsche:     Contribution  a  r histoire  des  idees  philosophiques  et 

sociales  a  la  fin  du  XIXe  siecle.     Par  EUGENE  DE  ROBERTY.     Paris, 

Felix  Alcan,  1903.  —  pp.  212. 

Nietzsche  et  Timmoralisnie.     Par  ALFRED  FOUILLEE.     Paris,  Felix  Alcan, 
1902.  —  pp.  xi,  294. 

While  Nietzsche  was  still  alive  and  even  before  he  became  insensible  to 
the  fate  of  his  doctrines,  a  course  of  lectures  was  given  upon  them  by 
Professor  Georg  Brandes  at  Copenhagen.  Since  that  time  similar  courses 
have  been  given  at  other  universities,  and  it  is  the  lectures  delivered  at 
Leipzig  that  form  the  contents  of  Dr.  Richter's  book.  Naturally  its  ar- 
rangement is  largely  determined  by  the  original  lecture  form,  and  the 
latter  is  doubtless  responsible  also  for  the  amount  and  kind  of  knowledge 
presupposed  in  the  reader.  So  far  as  I  am  acquainted  with  the  other 
books  which  are  devoted  to  Nietzsche's  philosophy  strictly  speaking,  they 
are  all  technical  in  language  and  treatment.  Dr.  Richter's  lectures,  on 
the  contrary,  presuppose  a  general  knowledge  of  philosophical  thinking 
sufficient  to  enable  the  reader  to  follow  a  philosophical  argument,  but  no 
acquaintance  with  special  doctrines,  even  those  of  Kant  and  Schopenhauer. 
For  this  reason  his  book  is  perhaps  the  best  that  has  appeared  for  the  gen- 
eral reader  interested  in  Nietzsche  who  wishes  a  critical  account  and  not 
condemnations  nor  panegyrics.  Moreover,  Dr.  Richter  is  fortunate  enough 
to  have  not  only  an  interesting  subject,  but  an  interesting  manner  of  pre- 
senting it. 

The  first  division  of  the  lectures  deals  with  Nietzsche's  life  and  person- 
ality, the  second  with  his  philosophy.  The  changes  that  took  place  in  the 
latter  are  regarded  as  due  to  the  gradual  recognition  on  Nietzsche's  part  of 
the  absurd  consequences  of  his  earlier  opinions,  if  pushed  to  their  logical 
extremes.  Just  as  Kant  ultimately  reached  his  critical  theory  of  knowledge 
by  being  first  led  to  positivism  through  the  absurd  consequences  of  the 
Leibniz-Wolffian  metaphysics  in  the  field  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  ;  so 
Nietzsche  was  forced  by  the  absurd  consequences  of  the  Wagner-Schopen- 
hauerian  metaphysics,  when  applied  to  the  problem  of  value,  to  adopt,  after 
a  similar  positivist  phase,  his  final  and  critical  theory  of  value.  The  im- 
portant position  given  by  Dr.  Richter  to  the  problem  of  value  during  the 
whole  of  Nietzsche's  philosophical  development  is  undoubtedly  correct  ;  and 


NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  IOL 


it  is  only  through  the  recognition,  which  is  strangely  enough  not  at  all 
eral,  of  the  manner  in  which  other  problems  always  ranged  themselves  in 
relation  to  this  one,  that  anything  like  a  clear  conception  of  Nietzsche's 
many-sided  thought  can  be  gained. 

Of  all  the  parts  of  Nietzsche's  philosophy,  that  which,  according  to  Dr. 
Richter,  is  most  sure  of  being  remembered  in  the  future,  is  the  relation  be- 
tween the  critical  positivism  of  the  middle  period  and  the  renewed  idealism 
of  the  later  works.  Nietzsche  had  rejected  the  current  values,  and  shown 
the  errors  in  which  they  were  rooted.  He  found  his  justification  for  setting 
up  new  values  in  his  discovery  that  value  does  not  belong  to  outer  object 
nor  to  inner  disposition,  but  is  given  by  ourselves  to  whatever  we  will. 
Whatever  we  strive  for  we  make  valuable.  Value  is  created  and  measured 
by  the  individual  will,  and  accordingly  everyone  has  a  right  to  set  up  new 
systems  of  value.  To  do  so  he  must  find  out  what  it  is  that  he  at  bottom 
really  wills,  and  if  he  goes  deep  enough  to  discover  some  original  value, 
individual  though  it  must  be,  he  is  serving  the  cause  of  philosophy.  To 
convince  his  fellowmen  that  his  value  is  not  an  end  for  his  own  will  alone, 
he  must  make  it  seem  desirable  to  them,  he  must  appeal  to  their  feelings 
rather  than  to  their  reason,  until  his  end  acquires  a  value  for  them  as  well 
as  for  himself.  This  is  exactly  what  Nietzsche  tried  to  do.  His  new 
system  consists  of  an  original  value  and  of  the  subordinate  values  derived 
from  it.  The  original  or  fundamental  value  is  life,  which,  upon  the  basis 
of  Darwinism,  is  explained  to  mean  the  production  of  the  over-man,  a  new 
species  as  superior  to  man  as  man  is  to  the  ape.  The  places  in  which 
Nietzsche  speaks  of  the  over-man  as  having  actually  existed  and  points  out 
particular  historical  characters  as  deserving  the  name,  are  to  be  regarded 
as  examples  of  ambiguous  terminology.  The  biological  meaning  is  the 
important  one  for  Nietzsche's  system,  the  other  is  a  slip  of  the  pen.  Per- 
haps it  is,  but  how  is  one  to  know  ?  However,  whatever  the  over-man 
may  be,  all  that  helps  to  produce  him,  all  that  is  strong,  thereby  acquires 
a  value,  and  there  results  a  scale  of  values  subordinate  to  the  fundamental 
biological  one. 

The  criticism  of  Nietzsche's  ethics  and  metaphysics,  at  once  keen  and 
appreciative,  is  nevertheless  not  so  distinctive  a  feature  of  the  book  as  the 
account  of  the  development  and  final  form  of  his  theories.  Others  have 
recognized  much  the  same  advantages  and  excellencies,  and  have  pointed 
out  much  the  same  defects.  No  one  else  has  given  us  an  exposition  of 
exactly  this  sort,  and  few  have  succeeded  in  producing  one  that  is  so  good. 

Herr  Rittelmeyer's  monograph  is  in  many  ways  different  from  that  just 
discussed.  In  the  first  place,  its  subject  matter  is  limited  to  Nietzsche's 
theory  of  knowledge,  and,  as  the  writer  himself  says,  Nietzsche's  influence 
and  significance  do  not  depend  upon  his  work  in  that  field.  Moreover,  the 
material  is  presented  book  by  book,  and,  save  a  general  division  into  three 
periods,  no  attempt  is  made  to  group  the  contents  of  the  different  volumes, 
even  those  containing  the  selections  from  the  papers  not  prepared  by 


102  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Nietzsche  for  publication.  So  strict  a  chronological  arrangement  neces- 
sarily gives  one  an  impression  of  scrappiness,  especially  in  the  pages  that 
deal  with  the  first  period,  when  Nietzsche  wrote  little  that  has  a  direct  or 
indirect  relation  to  a  theory  of  knowledge.  This  objection  does  not  of 
course  apply  to  the  second  and  smaller  portion  of  the  work,  which  is 
devoted  to  criticism,  as  the  first  is  to  exposition,  and  which  contains  much 
that  is  of  interest  and  value  upon  the  subject  of  Nietzsche's  theory  of 
knowledge  and  its  significance  for  the  present  and  the  future. 

The  other  two  books  to  be  considered  attack  their  subjects  from  a  different 
standpoint.  Both  M.  Fouillee  and  M.  de  Roberty  are  interested  first  of 
all  in  the  individualistic  nature  of  Nietzsche's  ethics,  although  they  arrive 
at  opposite  conclusions  concerning  it.  The  one  finds  in  its  anti- social 
tendencies  the  reason  for  its  condemnation,  the  other  denies  that  it  is  anti- 
social or  even  egoistic.  According  to  the  latter  account,  that  of  M.  de 
Roberty,  Nietzsche's  disciples  and  opponents  are  both  entirely  mistaken  in 
their  impressions  about  his  philosophical  position.  They  persist  in  taking 
his  poetic  statements  literally,  a  procedure  that  with  a  writer  of  Nietzsche's 
vivid  imagination  and  picturesque  style  necessarily  leads  to  a  total  lack  of 
comprehension  of  his  opinions.  In  reality  Nietzsche  was  an  altruist,  and 
his  famous  exhortation,  Werdet  hart,  points  out  the  helpful  relation  that 
should  exist  between  men.  Thinking  of  a  pity  that  was  of  a  higher  nature 
than  that  ordinarily  known  by  that  name,  and  not  wishing  to  confuse  the 
two,  at  a  loss  for  a  word  he  took  refuge  in  one  that  expressed  the  exact 
opposite  of  the  lower  pity  and  which,  therefore,  could  not  be  confounded 
with  it.  And  we,  fools  that  we  are,  have  thought  that  he  meant  literally 
what  he  said  ! 

The  daring  of  such  an  interpretation,  when  it  rests  upon  the  authority  of 
a  single  man  against  the  unanimous  opinion  of  both  friends  and  foes  of  the 
philosopher  in  question,  seems  to  demand  a  more  definite  vindication  than 
its  author  gives  it.  Upon  him  rests  the  burden  of  proving  his  position, 
and  until  he  goes  into  the  matter  more  in  detail,  his  general  statements 
require  no  refutation.  Moreover,  the  entire  absence  of  regard  to  the 
changes  that  Nietzsche's  views  underwent  during  the  years  of  his  literary 
activity,  renders  M.  de  Roberty 's  book  confusing  to  a  degree.  One  never 
knows  how  chronologically  general  he  intends  a  statement  to  be.  He  even 
speaks  of  the  utilitarian  origin  of  morality  as  if  it  belonged  to  the  Zara- 
thustra  period. 

Interested  especially  in  sociology,  he  devotes  a  large  share  of  his  atten- 
tion to  the  sociological  aspect  of  Nietzsche's  doctrines,  including  not  only 
their  theoretical  significance  but  their  practical  influence.  Indeed,  to  bor- 
row his  own  language,  he  honors,  admires,  and  loves  Nietzsche  because  the 
latter  is  a  health-making  force  (ass  aims  seur).  Nietzsche's  great  error, 
among  many,  is  his  failure  to  comprehend  the  relation  between  the  indi- 
vidual and  society,  which  must  from  their  origin  and  nature  be  of  assist- 
ance to  each  other,  not  deadly  foes,  as  Nietzsche  pictures  them. 


No.  i.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  103 

M.  Fouillee's  monograph  on  Nietzsche,  excellent  as  it  is  in  many 
respects,  is  too  much  concerned  with  a  catalogue  of  Nietzsche's  inconsis- 
tencies and  of  his  points  of  inferiority  to  Guyau,  to  leave  one  with  a  just 
impression  of  Nietzsche's  opinions.  To  be  sure,  as  Fouillee  explains  in 
the  first  lines  of  his  book,  the  study  was  undertaken  as  a  necessary  preface 
to  his  own  doctrines,  which  demanded  an  examination  of  the  problems  of 
the  existence  and  value  of  morality.  Viewed  in  the  light  of  this  explana- 
tion, the  book  becomes  comprehensible,  if  not  more  helpful  to  an  under- 
standing of  Nietzsche's  position. 

One  of  the  best  portions  of  the  book  is  the  introduction,  which  gives  an 
account  of  Stirner  and  of  Guyau.  In  fact,  the  chapter  dealing  with  the  latter 
is  the  most  satisfactory  short  exposition  the  writer  remembers  to  have  seen. 
The  contrast  between  Guyau  and  Nietzsche  is  made  to  depend  upon  the 
latter' s  extreme  individualism.  The  resemblances  in  their  doctrines  are 
emphasized  sufficiently  ;  but,  with  the  utmost  willingness  to  find  likenesses, 
these  can  hardly  be  made  to  extend  much  beyond  the  negative  and  critical 
portions  of  their  writings.  The  great  exception  to  this  general  fact  is  the 
predominant  position  given  by  both  to  abundance  of  life.  The  latter,  how- 
ever, is  a  favorite  conception  of  the  time,  and  the  use  made  of  it  by 
Nietzsche  and  Guyau  make  it  seem  two  entirely  different  doctrines  rather 
than  one.  While  both  set  up  life  as  the  supremely  valuable  and  denied 
that  any  ideal  limitations  should  be  opposed  to  its  free  development,  Guyau 
maintained  that  the  fullest  life  was  essentially  altruistic  in  nature,  while 
Nietzsche  regarded  it  as  egoistic.  For  the  one,  life  is  social ;  for  the  other, 
it  is  individualistic.  According  to  Fouillee,  such  a  biological  conception  is 
in  itself  unsatisfactory  ;  but  apart  from  such  initial  inadequacy,  the  form 
given  it  by  Guyau  appeals  both  to  reason  and  feeling  in  a  manner  totally 
foreign  to  Nietzsche's  parallel  doctrine.  The  latter  overlooks  or  denies  a 
large  share  of  the  facts  that  the  former  recognizes  and  appreciates. 

The  chapter  dealing  with  Nietzsche's  own  opinions  of  Guyau  is  a  valu- 
able contribution  to  Nietzsche  literature.  Nietzsche  did  not  discuss  Guyau' s 
theories  in  his  published  writings,  but  he  owned  some  of  Guyau' s  books  and 
in  them  underscored  and  criticized  whatever  caught  his  attention.  That 
he  recognized  the  likeness  between  himself  and  Guyau  seems  certain. 
That  he  was  not  altogether  fair  in  his  judgments  of  the  other's  theories  is 
almost  equally  so.  At  any  rate,  the  comments  throw  light  upon  the  vexed 
question  of  what  Nietzsche's  opinions  really  were. 

If  one  forgets  the  fact  that  M.  Fouillee's  book  is  about  Nietzsche,  — for, 
as  has  been  said,  it  is  too  unsympathetic  in  tone  to  be  helpful  to  an  under- 
standing of  Nietzsche's  theories,  — and  regards  it  as  an  examination  of  the 
general  question  of  the  foundation  of  morality,  too  much  can  hardly  be 
said  in  its  praise.  It  is  keen  in  its  analysis,  suggestive  in  the  best  sense 
of  the  word,  and  of  especial  interest  to  every  student  of  the  prevailing  ten- 
dencies in  ethics. 

GRACE  NEAL  DOLSON. 

WELLS  COLLEGE. 


104  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

A  History  of  the  Problems  of  Philosophy.  By  PAUL  JANET  and  GABRIEL 
SEAILLES.  Translated  by  ADA  MONAHAN.  Edited  by  HENRY  JONES. 
Vol.  I,  pp.  xxviii,  380  ;  Vol.  II,  pp.  xii,  375.  London,  Macmillan  and 
Co.,  1902. 

The  problems  of  which  this  work  gives  a  history  are  treated  under  the 
four  heads,  Psychology,  Ethics,  Metaphysics,  and  Theodicy.  Half  of  the 
work,  the  whole  first  volume,  with  the  exception  of  the  editor's  Introduc- 
tion and  a  preface  in  French  to  the  English  edition  by  one  of  the  authors, 
is  devoted  to  the  problems  grouped  under  the  first  of  these  heads.  The 
first  chapter  under  "Psychology,"  however,  is  entitled,  "What  is  Philos- 
ophy ? ' '  which  seems  a  rather  curious  inversion  of  what  might  naturally 
appear  as  the  logical  order.  Nor  do  we  get  a  very  illuminating  answer  to 
this  question  by  being  told,  at  the  close  of  the  historical  survey,  that  phil- 
osophy is  just  the  "striving  after  the  intelligible,"  the  "desire  to  under- 
stand the  meaning  of  things  "  (I,  26).  This  is  sufficiently  vague  and 
broad  to  include  any  and  every  science.  We  are  told,  however  (I,  52), 
that  philosophy  is  distinguished  from  other  sciences  by  two  of  its  data, 
namely,  (i)  the  fact  of  consciousness  —  whence  psychology,  and  (2)  the 
notion  of  the  universal,  or  of  unity  —  whence  metaphysics.  The  two 
divisions  of  philosophy  should,  accordingly,  it  would  seem,  be  psychology 
and  metaphysics.  Why  then  do  we  have  ethics  and  theodicy  introduced 
as  coordinate  divisions  ?  But  the  place  of  psychology  among  the  philo- 
sophical disciplines  appears  doubtful,  when  we  discover  (I,  46)  that  psychol- 
ogy, by  a  law  of  scientific  progress,  has  parted  from  metaphysics  and  be- 
come positivistic.  Still,  we  are  told,  there  remains  a  task  for  philosophy 
which  empirical  psychology  does  not  satisfy,  namely,  "the  criticism  of 
knowledge,"  "the  study  of  the  necessary  conditions  of  thought,"  whose 
end  is  metaphysics.  From  this  it  would  appear  that,  in  the  view  of  the 
authors,  the  proper  divisions  of  philosophy  should  be,  theory  of  knowl- 
edge and  metaphysics,  with  metaphysics  supreme.  But  this  view  is  not 
definitely  formulated,  nor  is  it  indicated  as  the  result  of  the  historical  evo- 
lution. It  is  uncertain,  therefore,  how  far  the  authors  regard  the  titles 
chosen  for  grouping  the  material  as  essential,  how  far  as  merely  traditional. 
If  meant  as  essential,  how  do  they  agree  with  the  indications  mentioned  ? 
If  as  merely  traditional,  why  do  they  not  include  also  logic  and  aesthetics, 
not  to  name  the  various  divisions  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the 
philosophy  of  mind,  which  are  only  incidentally  referred  to,  if  at  all  ? 

Besides  the  problems  as  to  what  philosophy  is  and  as  to  what  the  prob- 
lem of  psychology  is,  the  topics  treated  under  the  head  of  "  Psychology" 
are  :  the  senses  and  external  perception,  reason,  memory,  the  association  of 
ideas,  the  feelings,  freedom,  and  habit.  The  proper  psychological  and  the 
proper  philosophical  problems  are  all  here  more  or  less  blended  and  con- 
fused, as,  indeed,  they  appear  in  the  history  of  their  development.  The 
problems  of  ethics  are  not  thus  topically  subdivided,  the  divisions  here  be- 
ing :  (i)  The  Ethical  Problem  in  Ancient  Times,  and  (2)  The  Ethical  Prob- 


No.  6.]  •  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  105 

lem  in  Modern  Times.  The  problem  —  in  the  singular  —  is  said  to  be  (II, 
p.  89)  "to  discover  the  meaning  of  life,  to  discover  the  principles  which 
can  coordinate  all  its  acts."  But  what,  exactly,  the  logical  relation  of 
these  two  clauses  is,  is  doubtful  ;  they  certainly  cannot  mean  precisely 
the  same  thing.  There  are  four  problems  treated  under  "  Metaphysics"  : 
Scepticism  and  Certitude  (an  epistemological  problem,  which  would  seem, 
from  what  was  said  above,  to  belong  rather  under  the  chosen  title  of  Psy- 
chology), Matter,  Mind,  and  The  Relation  between  Matter  and  Mind. 
Then,  under  the  title  of  "Theodicy,"  we  again  have  a  chronological  divi- 
sion :  The  Religious  Problem  in  Ancient  Times  and  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  The  Religious  Problem  in  Modern  Times,  followed  by  a  chapter  treating 
of  the  special  Problem  of  a  Future  Life. 

Under  each  of  these  several  heads  the  authors  give  a  well-arranged  his- 
torical account  of  the  views  that  have  been  entertained  concerning  the  topic 
under  discussion,  with  some  indication,  in  conclusion,  of  what  they  regard 
as  the  most  important  results  of  the  development.  The  historical  survey 
extends  from  the  times  of  the  earliest  Greek  thinkers  down  to  times  com- 
paratively recent.  The  most  recent  phases  of  the  discussion  do  not  appear. 
And  there  is  considerable  unevenness  in  the  treatment ;  in  modern  philos- 
ophy, for  example,  much  space  is  given  to  the  opinions  of  French  writers, 
especially  those  of  the  Cartesian  school,  to  the  Scotch  school,  and,  among 
later  English  writers,  to  Mill  and  Spencer,  while  the  German  idealists  and 
their  English  successors  receive  practically  no  recognition  at  all.  Professor 
Jones  complains  of  this  defect  in  his  Introduction  (I,  xi)  ;  M.  Seailles  ex- 
plains it  by  saying  (p.  xix)  that  the  book  was  written  for  pupils  of  the 
French  lycees  and  for  students,  and  must,  therefore,  not  be  judged  as  a 
work  of  pure  science.  Even  so,  one  is  disposed  to  agree  with  Professor 
Jones,  who  says  that  the  defect  is  even  more  serious  for  French  students 
than  for  our  own.  One  wonders,  however,  whether  the  book  is  really  of 
the  sort  to  prove  especially  serviceable  to  young  students.  It  is  certainly 
not  adapted  for  use  as  a  text-book  in  an  American  college  ;  it  cannot  take 
the  place  of  a  general  history  of  philosophy,  and  it  could  not  well  serve  as 
an  introduction.  Its  chief  value  seems  to  be  as  a  book  of  reference  for  one 
interested  in  looking  up  the  history  of  a  special  topic.  For  such  a  reader 
the  book  is  certainly  useful,  though  it  would  have  been  still  more  useful 
had  its  scope  been  less  restricted.  The  instructed  reader  will  find  frequent 
occasion  to  disagree  with  the  judgment  of  the  authors  in  their  representa- 
tions and  estimates  of  writers  and  views  in  detail,  but  he  will  also  find  a 
large  amount  of  material  bearing  on  the  particular  subject  discussed  not 
brought  together  in  so  convenient  a  form  for  reference  and  comparison  in 
any  other  book.  The  large  number  of  well- selected  quotations  at  first  hand 
is  a  feature  of  the  work  especially  noteworthy. 

Each  volume  contains  an  index  of  the  proper  names,  with  dates  annexed, 
and  the  subject  in  connection  with  which  the  name  is  mentioned.  In  using 
the  book,  one  feels  constantly  the  lack  of  a  general  index  of  subjects. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  H.  N.  GARDINER. 


106  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

The  Surd  of  Metaphysics :  An  Inquiry  into  the  Question :  Are  there 
Things-in-  Themselves  ?  By  PAUL  CARUS.  Chicago,  The  Open  Court 
Publishing  Company,  1903. — pp.  225. 

Dr.  Carus,  as  a  positive  monist,  regards  the  problems  of  metaphysics 
as  being  like  the  mathematical  surd, — not  only  irreducible  but  wholly 
irrational.  He  therefore  declares  it  his  ambition  to  eliminate  from  phil- 
osophy the  "surd  of  metaphysics."  He  conducts  his  discussion  under 
three  heads:  (i)  The  Elimination  of  the  Metaphysical  Surd  from  Philos- 
ophy ;  (2)  The  Metaphysical  Residue  in  the  Systems  of  Modern  Thinkers  ; 
(3)  The  Soul  as  a  Thing-in-itself. 

The  second  division  of  his  treatment  is  an  exposition  and  criticism  of 
the  metaphysical  conceptions  of  various  representative  thinkers,  chiefly 
since  the  time  of  Comte,  and  really  adds  nothing  to  the  understanding  of 
the  author's  position.  The  other  sections  naturally  concern  the  two  grand 
divisions  of  metaphysical  speculation,  viz.,  the  objective  and  subjective 
reality. 

Like  all  the  positivists,  Dr.  Carus  seeks  to  solve  the  metaphysical 
problem  by  simply  denying  it.  He  even  abrogates  the  '  Unknowable '  of 
ordinary  positivism,  as  being  a  metaphysical  surd.  Accordingly  he  limits 
knowledge  to  mere  description  and  classification  of  experience,  and,  like 
Spencer,  reduces  the  legitimate  field  of  investigation  to  a  philosophy  of 
the  sciences. 

Although  Dr.  Carus' s  aim  is  to  eliminate  the  metaphysical  problem  from 
speculation,  nevertheless  he  appears  to  have  actually  reinstated  it,  simply 
in  new  dress,  at  every  step  of  his  discussion.  For  example,  he  opposes 
the  dualism  of  Kant  by  positing  a  verbal  monism,  in  which  the  subject 
and  object  are  regarded  as  mere  abstractions,  "aspects"  of  one  and  the 
same  reality.  Both  subject  and  object  he  regards  as  real,  yet  as  to  what 
the  reality  of  ' '  abstractions  "  or  "  aspects  ' '  consists  in,  we  are  not  informed. 
Nor  does  he  attempt  to  explain  how  one  reality  happens  to  have  these  two 
aspects.  The  dualism  of  Kant  would  appear  to  be  more  in  harmony  with 
empirical  facts,  to  which  positivism  limits  itself,  than  is  the  metaphysical 
"One"  of  Dr.  Carus.  When  from  the  two  "aspects"  he  goes  back  of 
empirical  facts  and  hypothesizes  only  "one"  reality,  he  thereby  posits  his 
"metaphysical  surd"  and  so  abandons  his  principle. 

We  have  a  unique  contribution  by  Dr.  Carus  in  his  doctrine  of  "  form," 
which,  however,  distinctly  suggests  Aristotle.  Thus  he  holds  that  space, 
time,  and  all  other  forms  in  the  objective  world  are  not  mere  abstractions 
or  mental  contributions,  but  have  reality  in  and  of  themselves.  There  are 
no  things  in  themselves,  but  there  are  forms  in  themselves.  In  this  manner 
he  transposes  into  the  objective  world  the  formal  categories  of  Kant,  and 
hypostasizes  them  into  realities.  But  how  this  is  an  improvement  upon 
Kant  is  not  manifest.  His  treatment  of  the  soul  is  but  a  special  applica- 
tion of  his  general  principle.  He  defines  soul  as  the  ' '  form  ' '  of  the  feelings  ; 
and  mind  forms  are  a  "reflection  "  of  the  forms  of  objective  existence.  As 


No.  i.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  IO/ 

to  what  the  reality  of  "  form  "  may  be,  in  any  case,  other  than  an  abstrac- 
tion, he  gives  us  no  explanation.  But  here  again,  in  fact,  it  is  evident  that 
his  "form"  is  but  the  reappearance  of  his  "metaphysical  surd." 

Although  we  are  unable  to  agree  that  Dr.  Carus  accomplishes  the  task 
he  has  given  himself,  his  book  may  be  regarded  as  an  interesting  contribu- 
tion to  the  literature  concerning  the.  metaphysical  puzzle. 

GEORGE  S.  PAINTER. 

BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE. 

Contemporary  Psychology.  By  GUIDO  VILLA.  London,  Swan  Sonnen- 
schein  &  Co.,  Ltd.;  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1903.  —  pp.  xiv, 
396- 

In  the  preface,  the  author  expresses  the  hope  that  his  book  may  serve 
as  a  critical  and  historical  introduction  to  modern  psychology.  Considered 
in  both  of  these  aspects,  —  the  critical  and  historical,  — the  book  can  hardly 
realize  the  expectation  of  the  author.  Indeed,  so  far  from  being  critical, 
the  main  impression  it  produces  is  lack  of  criticism.  On  the  historical 
side,  also,  the  presentation  strikes  one  as  scanty  and  unsystematic.  In 
addition  to  the  introduction  and  conclusion,  the  book  contains  eleven  chap- 
ters,—  one  each  on  The  Historical  Development  of  Psychology,  The  Object 
and  Scope  of  Psychology,  Mind  and  Body,  The  Methods  of  Psychology,  Psy- 
chical Functions,  The  Composition  and  Development  of  Mental  Life,  two  on 
Consciousness,  and  three  on  The  Laws  of  Psychology.  The  uncritical  char- 
acter of  the  work  is  exhibited  in  the  close  adherence  to  Wundt  in  matters 
of  opinion.  This  statement  is  evidenced  in  general  by  the  frequent  refer- 
ences to  Wundt' s  works,  but,  particularly,  by  the  treatment  of  the  laws 
of  psychology.  And  it  should  be  added  that  there  is  not  only  a  consider- 
able lack  of  clearness,  but,  in  many  cases,  sheer  lack  of  understanding  in 
the  avowed  exposition  of  Wundt' s  views.  This  is  notably  true  of  the 
account  (p.  210)  of  Wundt' s  doctrine  of  will,  in  which  nothing  is  said  of 
the  intimate  relation  between  affective  and  volitional  processes.  The  his- 
torical exposition  is  very  often  brief  and  vague.  This  charge  is  true  of  the 
chapters  on  the  methods  of  psychology,  particularly  the  discussion  of  psy- 
chophysical  methods  (pp.  143-147),  and  of  that  on  the  composition  and 
development  of  mental  life  (pp.  224-257),  which  attempts  to  sum  up  in  a 
few  pages  the  whole  matter  of  experimental  psychology.  Sentences  like 
the  following  are  too  frequent  for  serious  work  :  "Another  physiologist  in- 
cidentally connected  with  psychology  was  Carpenter,  whilst  Huxley  also 
makes  noteworthy  psychological  observations  in  his  numerous  zoological 
works"  (p.  43).  Again,  in  the  chapters  on  the  Object  and  Scope  of  Psy- 
chology, the  relation  of  psychology  to  logic,  ethics,  epistemology,  and 
aesthetics  is  disposed  of  in  a  page  and  a  half  (pp.  82—83).  The  list  of 
errata  is  long  ;  but  even  then  the  errors,  particularly  in  the  spelling  of  proper 
names,  are  not  exhausted.  Thus,  p.  14,  note,  ' '  Strumpf  "  for  "  Stumpf "  ; 
p.  46,  "Mennmam"  for  "  Meumann "  (this  spelling  occurs  through- 


108  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIIL 

out) ;  p.  47,  "  Kieson  "for  "  Kiesow  "  ;  p.  5  3,  ' '  Shima  "for  "  Shinn ' '  (Miss) ; 
p.  54,  "  Paulton  "  for  "  Paulhan."  One  serious  perversion  of  meaning  oc- 
curs on  page  192  :  "  Although  Lange  and  James  differ  on  certain  points, 
the  former  being  more  especially  a  psychologist  and  the  latter  a  physiolo- 
gist, they  agree  nevertheless  in  all  essentials. ' '  It  would  seem  that  the 
book  stands  in  need  of  a  thorough  revision,  before  it  can  hope  to  attain 
the  excellence  of  the  "  Library  of  Philosophy,"  in  which  it  appears. 

H.  C.  STEVENS. 

The  German  Influence  on  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge.  An  Abridgement  of 
a  Thesis  presented  to  the  Faculty  of  the  Department  of  Philosophy  of 
the  University  of  Pennsylvania.  By  JOHN  Louis  HANEY.  Philadelphia, 
1902.  —pp.  44. 

Thomas  De  Quincey  s  Relation  to  German  Literature  and  Philosophy. 
Inaugural-Dissertation  zur  Erlangung  der  philosophischen  Doctorwiirde 
an  der  Kaiser- Wilhelms-Universitat  Strassburg.  Vorgelegt  von  WIL- 
LIAM A.  DUNN.  Strassburg,  1900. — pp.  136. 

These  theses,  abounding  in  citations,  form  part  of  the  apparatus  for  any 
organized  study  of  the  relations  of  English  and  German  thought  in  the 
early  nineteenth  century.  The  theses  themselves  differ  in  methods  and 
results.  Dr.  Haney's,  centering  in  Coleridge's  literary  biography,  falls 
into  such  chapters  as  :  Before  the  Visit  to  Germany  (1772-1798)  ;  Cole- 
ridge in  Germany  (1798-1799)  ;  Immediate  Results  (1799-1800),  etc.  A 
chapter  of  summary  offers  fairly  positive  conclusions  :  "  Coleridge's  indebt- 
edness to  German  writers  was  twofold,  embracing  his  literary  obligation  to 
Lessing,  Schiller,  and  Schlegel,  and  his  philosophical  affiliations  with  Kant, 
Fichte,  and  Schelling.  .  .  .  How  much  of  his  criticism  Coleridge  owed  to 
Schlegel  is  difficult  to  determine  ...  in  developing  the  general  ideas  indi- 
cated by  Lessing,  both  critics  .  .  .  coincide  in  certain  utterances  "  (p.  40). 
Dr.  Haney,  Coleridge  notwithstanding  (cf.  Dejection,  and  a  forthcoming 
review  in  Jour.  Eng.  and  Germanic  Philol.),  holds  that  Gb'ttingen  turned 
the  poet  into  a  metaphysician. 

The  late  Dr.  Dunn's  thesis  takes  chief  authors, — Lessing,  Goethe, 
Schiller,  Kant,  Richter,  — for  chapter  subjects.  It  comes,  in  point  of  phil- 
osophical influence,  to  somewhat  negative  conclusions  :  De  Quincey  was 
affected  far  more  by  concrete  literary  models  than  by  philosophical  prin- 
ciples. Dr.  Dunn's  material  is  fuller,  yet  less  unified,  than  Dr.  Haney's. 

Both  theses,  however,  mark  the  specific  boundaries,  respectively,  of 
Coleridge's  and  De  Quincey 's  wide,  irregular  reading  of  German  authors. 
Both  show  the  nature  of  their  work  as  popularizers.  Both  belong  to  an 
unfortunately  meager  list  of  comparative  studies  in  the  period,  the  most 
recent  of  which  are  Dr.  Batt's  Contributions  to  the  History  of  English 
Opinion  of  German  Literature,  Mod.  Lang.  Notes,  Vol.  XVII,  p.  83  ;  Vol. 
XVIII,  p.  65,  etc.  Other  supplementary  apparatus  is  found  in  Dr.  Haney's 
thorough  Bibliography  of  Coleridge  (printed  for  private  circulation),  Phila- 


No.  i.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  109 

delphia,  1903.  We  welcome  the  announcement  from  France  of  a  through- 
going  study  of  Coleridge  and  the  German  philosophy  by  M.  Aynard,  a 
former  pupil  of  M.  Legouis,  the  authority  on  Wordsworth. 

L.  COOPER. 
CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

The  following  books  also  have  been  received : 
Naturalism  and  Agnosticism.    By  JAMES  WARD.    Second  edition.     2  Vols. 

London,  A.  &  C.  Black,  1903. — pp.  xx,  333  ;  xiii,  301. 
Studies  in  Logical  Theory.     By  JOHN  DEWEY,  with  the  cooperation  of  the 

members  and  fellows  of  the  Department  of  Philosophy  of  the  University 

of  Chicago.     Chicago,  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1903. — pp.  xiii, 

388. 

The  Republic  of  Plato.     Edited  with  critical  notes,  commentary,  and  ap- 
pendices by  JAMES  ADAM.     2  Vols.    Cambridge,  at  the  University  Press, 

1902.— pp.  x,  364  ;  532. 
The  Laws  of   Imitation.      By  GABRIEL  TARDE.      Translated  from  the 

French  by  E.  C.  PARSONS.     New  York,  Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  1903. — pp. 

xxix,  404. 
The  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte.    By  L.  LEVY-BRUHL.     London,  Swan 

Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  1903. — pp.  xiv,  363. 
Philosophy  in  Poetry.     By  E.  HERSHEY  SNEATH.     New  York,  Chas.  Scrib- 

ner's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  viii,  319. 
Principia  Ethica.     By  GEORGE  E.  MOORE.     Cambridge,  at  the  University 

Press,  1903. — pp.  xxvii,  232. 
The  Nature  of  Man  :  Studies  in  Optimistic  Philosophy.     By  £LIE  METCH- 

NIKOFF.     Translated  by  P.  C.  MITCHELL.     New  York  and  London,  G. 

P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  xvii,  309. 

The  Philosophy  of  Hobbes  in  Extracts  and  Notes  collated  from  his  Writ- 
ings. Selected  and  arranged  by  F.  J.  E.  WOODBRIDGE.  Minneapolis, 

The  H.  W.  Wilson  Co.,  1903. — pp.xxxvi,  391. 

Life  and  Teachings  of  Abbas  Effendi.    By  MYRON  H.  PHELPS.     New  York 

and  London,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  xliii,  259. 
The  Psychology  of  Child  Development.     By  IRVING  KING.     Chicago,  The 

University  of  Chicago  Press,  1903.  — pp.  xxi,  265. 
Animal  Education.     By  JOHN  B.  WATSON.     Chicago,  The  University  of 

Chicago  Press,  1903. — pp.  122. 
Humanism :    Philosophical  Essays.     By  F.    C.    S.    SCHILLER.     London, 

Macmillan  &  Co. ;  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,    1903.  —  pp.   xxxii, 

297. 

St.  Anselm :  Proslogium ;  Monologium  ;  An  Appendix  on  Behalf  of  the 
Fool  by  Gaunilon  ;  Cur  Deus  Homo.  Translated  from  the  Latin  by  S. 
N.  DEANE.  Chicago,  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co.,  1903. — pp. 
xxxv,  288. 


NOTES. 

As  we  go  to  press,  the  sad  news  of  the  death  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  is 
announced.  He  was  born  on  27  April,  1820,  and  died  on  8  December, 
1903.  It  will  be  remembered  that,  though  he  never  was  physically  strong, 
and  was  practically  an  invalid  toward  the  end,  his  literary  activity  extended 
through  the  entire  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  In  the  near  future 
we  hope  to  publish  an  estimate  of  his  contribution  to  philosophy. 

On  the  4th  of  February,  1904,  it  will  be  a  hundred  years  since  the  death 
of  Kant.  In  Germany  this  day  will  be  commemorated  by  academic 
addresses  at  various  university  centers  and  by  the  appearance  of  many 
books  and  articles  ;  while  the  Kant-Studien  will  be  issued  in  enlarged  form 
as  a  special  memorial  number.  German  scholars  who  are  interested  in  the 
philosophy  of  Kant  have  undertaken  to  provide,  as  a  memorial  to  Kant  on 
this  occasion,  an  endowment  for  the  Kant-Studien,  in  order  thus  to  secure 
its  continuance  as  a  special  organ  for  the  discussion  and  further  develop- 
ment of  the  principles  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  The  support  and  assist- 
ance of  friends  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  in  America  are  earnestly  invited 
and  requested.  Subscriptions  may  be  sent  to  the  editor,  Professor  H. 
Vaihinger,  Halle  a.  S.,  or  to  the  American  editor,  J.  E.  Creighton,  Cornell 
University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 

Dr.  W.  G.  Smith,  Lecturer  in  Experimental  Psychology  at  King' s  Col- 
lege, London,  has  accepted  a  similar  position  at  the  University  of  Liver- 
pool. Dr.  C.  S.  Myers  succeeds  Dr.  Smith  at  London. 

A  special  number  of  the  American  Journal  of  Psychology  has  recently 
been  issued  dedicated  to  President  Stanley  Hall  in  commemoration  of 
the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  his  attainment  of  the  Doctorate  in  Philos- 
ophy. There  are  twenty-six  papers  contributed  by  former  students  and 
colleagues,  making  a  total  of  four  hundred  and  thirty-four  pages. 

We  regret  to  announce  the  death  of  Professor  Arthur  Allin,  of  the  De- 
partment of  Psychology  in  the  University  of  Colorado. 

The  third  annual  meeting  of  the  American  Philosophical  Association  was 
held  at  Princeton,  December  29-3 1 . 

We  give  below  a  list  of  the  articles,  etc. ,  in  the  current  philosophical 
journals  : 

THE  MONIST,  XIV,  i  :  Ernst  Mack,  Space  and  Geometry  from  the  Point 
of  View  of  Physical  Inquiry  ;  August  Forel,  Ants  and  Some  Other  In- 
sects ;  Hugo  Radau,  Bel,  the  Christ  of  Ancient  Times  ;  Editor,  Christian- 
ity as  the  Pleroma  ;  Book  Reviews  and  Notes. 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL  OF  ETHICS,  XIV,  i  :  Alice  Henry,  The 
Special  Moral  Training  of  Girls  ;  Frank  Granger,  The  Right  of  Free 


NOTES.  Ill 

Thought  in  Matters  of  Religion  ;  John  A.  Ryan,  Were  the  Church  Fathers 
Communists  ?  George  Rebec,  Byron  and  Morals  ;  James  Laing,  Art  and 
Morality  ;  W.  R.  Benedict,  Religion  as  an  Idea  ;  /.  D.  Stoops,  Three 
Stages  of  Individual  Development ;  Discussion  ;  Book  Reviews. 

MIND,  No.  48  :  G.  E.  Moore,  The  Refutation  of  Idealism;  C.  M.  Walsh, 
Kant's  Transcendental  Idealism  and  Empirical  Realism  ;  W.  McDougall, 
The  Physiological  Factors  of  the  Attention-Process  (III)  ;  G.  R.  T.  Ross, 
The  Disjunctive  judgment  ;  Discussions  ;  Critical  Notices  ;  New  Books  ; 
Philosophical  Periodicals  ;  Notes. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  X,  6  :  /.  W.  Riley,  The  Personal  Sources 
of  Christian  Science  ;  G.  B.  Cutten,  The  Case  of  John  Kinsel  (II)  ;  War- 
ner Fife,  The  Place  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  in  the  Functional  Psychology  ; 
Discussion  ;  Psychological  Literature  ;  New  Books  ;  Notes. 

THE  HIBBERT  JOURNAL,  II,  I  :  Edward  Caird,  St.  Paul  and  the  Idea  of 
Evolution  ;  Henry  Jones,  The  Present  Attitude  of  Reflective  Thought 
Toward  Religion,  II  ;  G.  F.  Stout,  Mr.  F.  W.  H.  Myers  on  "  Human 
Personality  and  its  Survival  of  Bodily  Death"  ;  T.  K.  Cheyne,  Babylon 
and  the  Bible  ;  Lewis  Campbell,  Morality  in  vEschylus  ;  B.  Bosanquet, 
Plato's  Conception  of  Death  ;  C.  F.  Dole,  From  Agnosticism  to  Theism  ; 
C.  E.  Beeby,  Doctrinal  Significance  of  a  Miraculous  Birth  ;  Discussions  ; 
Reviews. 

THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  PSYCHOLOGY,  XIV,  3-4  :  H.  Beaunis, 
Contribution  a  la  psychologic  du  reve  ;  August  Kirschmann,  Deception 
and  Reality  ;  /.  H.  Hyslop,  Binocular  Vision  and  the  Problem  of  Knowl- 
edge ;  /.  M.  Bentley,  A  Critique  of  '  Fusion  '  ;  M.  F.  Washburn,  The 
Genetic  Function  of  Movement  and  Organic  Sensations  for  Social  Con- 
sciousness ;  Joseph  Jastrow,  The  Status  of  the  Subconscious  ;  Adolph 
Meyer,  An  Attempt  at  Analysis  of  the  Neurotic  Constitution  ;  G.  T.  W. 
Patrick,  The  Psychology  of  Football ;  W.  H.  Burnham,  Retroactive  Am- 
nesia ;  /.  H.  Leuba,  The  State  of  Death  ;  A.  F.  Chamberlain,  Primitive 
Taste-words  ;  Beatrice  Edgell,  On  Time  Judgments  ;  E.  B.  Titchener, 
Class  Experiments  and  Demonstration  Apparatus  ;  Max  Meyer,  Experi- 
mental Studies  on  the  Psychology  of  Music  ;  O.  Kiilpe,  Ein  Beitrag  zur 
experimentelle  Aesthetik  ;  A.  C  Ellis  and  M.  M.  Shipe,  A  Study  of  the 
Accuracy  of  the  Present  Methods  of  Measuring  Fatigue  \  J.  A.  Bergstrom, 
A  New  Type  of  Ergograph  ;  W.  B.  Pillsbury,  Attention  Waves  as  a 
Means  of  Measuring  Fatigue  ;  G.  M.  Whipple,  Studies  in  Pitch  Discrimi- 
nation ;  /.  McK.  Cattell,  Statistics  of  American  Psychologists  ;  Yujiro 
Motora,  A  Study  on  the  Conductivity  of  the  Nervous  System  ;  T.  L.  Bol- 
tont  The  Relation  of  Motor  Power  to  Intelligence  ;  F.  B.  Dresslar,  Are 
Chromaesthesias  Variable  ?  E.  C.  Sanford,  On  the  Guessing  of  Numbers  ; 
E.  F.  Buchner,  A  Quarter  Century  of  Psychology  in  America  ;  L.  N. 
Wilson,  A  Bibliography  of  the  Published  Writings  of  President  G.  Stanley 
Hall. 


112  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  THEOLOGY,  VII,  4 :  H.  Weinel,  Richard 
Wagner  and  Christianity ;  L.  M.  Conard,  The  Idea  of  God  held  by 
North  American  Indians  ;  W.  JR.  Betteridge,  The  Interpretation  of  the 
Prophecy  of  Habakkuk  ;  W.  B.  Smith,  The  Pauline  Manuscripts  F  and 
G,  II  ;  Recent  Theological  Literature. 

ARCHIV  FUR  SYSTEMATISCHE  PniLOSOPHiE,  IX,  3  :  Ludwig  Stein,  Der 
Neo-Idealismus  unserer  Tage ;  E.  von  Hartmann,  Mechanismus  und 
Vitalismus  in  der  modernen  Biologic  ;  James  Lindsay,  The  Nature,  End, 
and  Method  of  Metaphysics  ;  Jahresbericht. 

ARCHIV  FUR  GESCHICHTE  DER  PHILOSOPHIE,  X,  i  ;  Carl  Hebler,  Uber 
die  Aristotelische  Definition  der  Tragodie ;  Dr.  Eisele  in  Urach,  Zur 
Damonologie  Plutarchs  von  Charonea  ;  R.  Witten,  Die  Kategorien  des 
Aristoteles  ;  O.  L.  Umfrid,  Das  Recht  und  seine  Durchfiihrung  nach  K. 
Chr.  Planck  ;  P.  Schwartzkopff,  Nietzsche  und  die  Entstehung  der  sittlichen 
Vorstellungen  ;  Jahresbericht. 

ZEITSCHRIFT  FUR  PSYCHOLOGIE  UND  PHYSIOLOGIE  DER  SINNESORGANE, 
XXXIII,  3  :  E.  A.  McC.  Gamble  u.  M.  W.  Calkins,  Uber  die  Bedeutung 
von  Wordvorstellungen  fur  die  Unterscheidung  von  Qualitaten  sukzessiver 
Reize  ;  E.  P.  Braunstein,  Beitrag  zur  Lehre  des  intermittierenden  Licht- 
reizes  der  gesunden  und  kranken  Retina;  Literaturbericht. 

REVUE  DE  METAPHYSIQUE  ET  DE  MORALE,  XI,  5  :  F.  Houssay,  De  la 
controverse  en  biologic  ;  P.  Boutroux,  L'objectivite  intrinseque  des  mathe- 
matiques ;  F.  M.,  Essai  d'ontologie ;  H.  Delacroix,  Les  varietes  de 
1' experience  religieuse  par  William  James  ;  G.  Belot,  Le  secret  medical ; 
Livres  nouveaux  ;  Revues  et  periodiques. 

REVUE  PHILOSOPHIQUE,  XXVIII,  10  ;  E.  Paulhan,  Le  simulation  dans 
le  caractere  ;  E.  Goblot,  La  finalite  en  biologic  ;  Vte  Brenier  de  Mont- 
morand,  L'erotomanie  des  mystiques  Chretiens  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  ren- 
dus  ;  Revue  des  periodiques  ;  Necrologie. 

XXVIII,  ii  :  A.  Binet,  De  la  sensation  a  1' intelligence  (ier  article);  L. 
Dugas,  La  pudeur  :  e"tude  psychologique  ;  E.  de  Roberty,  Le  concept  sociol- 
ogique  de  liberte  ;  F.  Paulhan,  La  simulation  dans  le  caractere  (Fin)  ; 
Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ;  Revue  des  periodiques  etrangers  ;  Livres 
nouveaux. 

ARCHIVES  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE  II,  4:  M.-C.  Schuyten,  Sur  les  methodes 
de  mensuration  de  la  fatigue  des  ecoliers  ;  Th.  Flournoy,  Observations  de 
psychologic  religieuse  ;  H.  Zbinden,  Influence  de  la  vie  psychique  sur  la 
sante  ;  Faits  et  discussions  ;  Bibliographic. 

RIVISTA  FILOSOFICA,  VI,  4  :  G.  Vidari,  Le  concezioni  moderne  della 
vita  e  il  compito  della  filosofia  morale  ;  A.  Ferro,  La  teoria  del  parallel- 
ismo  e  la  theoria  dell'influsso  fisico  ;  G.  Vailati,  Di  un*  opera  dimenticata 
del  P.  Gerolamo  Saccheri  ;  G.  Rigoni,  Note  psicologiche  ;  Rassegna  biblio- 
grafica  ;  Notizie  e  pubblicazioni  ;  Necrologio  ;  Sommari  delle  riviste  strani- 
ere  ;  Libri  ricevuti. 


Volume  XIII.  March,  1904.  Whole 

Number  2.  Number  74, 

THE 

PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 


THE   ETERNAL  AND   THE   PRACTICAL.1 

THERE  are  two  general  tendencies  of  opinion  which  nearly 
all  recent  thinkers,  whatever  be  their  school,  seem  dis- 
posed to  favor.  The  first  of  these  tendencies  is  that  towards 
a  considerable,  although,  in  different  thinkers,  a  very  varying, 
degree  of  empiricism.  "  Radical  empiricism,"  such  as  that  of 
Professor  James,  has  its  defenders  in  our  days.  A  modified,  but 
still  pronounced,  empiricism  is  found  in  more  or  less  close  and 
organic  connection  with  the  teachings  of  recent  idealists,  and  of 
various  other  types  of  constructive  metaphysicians.  The  second 
of  the  contemporary  tendencies  to  which  I  refer  is  closely  asso- 
ciated with  these  modern  forms  of  empiricism.  It  is  the  tendency 
towards  what  has  been  lately  named  '  pragmatism,'  the  tendency, 
namely,  to  characterize  and  to  estimate  the  processes  of  thought 
in  terms  of  practical  categories,  and  to  criticise  knowledge  in  the 
light  of  its  bearings  upon  conduct. 

I  am  speaking,  so  far,  not  of  precisely  definable  theses,  but 
expressly  of  tendencies.  Whatever  may  be  the  rationalistic  bias 
or  tradition  of  any  of  us,  we  are  all  more  or  less  empiricists,  and 
we  are  so  to  a  degree  which  was  never  characteristic  of  the  pre- 
Kantian  rationalists.  Whatever  may  be  our  interest  in  theory  or 
in  the  Absolute,  we  are  all  accustomed  to  lay  stress  upon  practical 
considerations  as  having  a  fundamental,  even  if  not  the  most 
fundamental,  importance  for  philosophy  ;  and  so  in  a  general,  and, 
as  I  admit,  in  a  very  large  and  loose  sense  of  the  term,  we  are 

1  Read  as  the  Presidential  Address  at  the  third  annual  meeting  of  the  American 
Philosophical  Association,  at  Princeton,  December  30,  1903. 


114  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

all  alike  more  or  less  pragmatists.  These,  then,  are  common 
modern  tendencies,  which  thinkers  of  the  most  various  schools 
share.  In  view  of  these  facts,  we  have  a  right  to  rejoice  in  the 
degree  to  which  we  have  come,  despite  all  our  differences,  to  a 
certain  unity  of  spirit.  On  the  other  hand,  even  in  recognizing 
this  attainment  of  a  certain  degree  of  unity,  we  have  also  defined 
the  central  problems  of  modern  investigation.  They  are,  first, 
the  problem  as  to  the  place  which  our  acknowledged  and  indis- 
pensable empiristic  tendencies  ought  to  occupy  in  the  whole  con- 
text of  our  philosophical  opinions ;  and,  secondly,  the  problem 
as  to  the  share  which  our  practical  postulates,  our  ethical  under- 
takings, our  doctrine  of  conduct,  ought  to  have  in  determining 
our  entire  view  of  the  universe. 

I. 

Empiricism,  its  worth,  its  justification,  its  limitations,  its  lesson — 
these  together  form  an  old  story  in  controversy.  I  propose  in 
this  address,  which  the  kindness  of  the  Association  has  called  me 
to  prepare,  to  ask  your  attention  to  the  other  of  the  two  tenden- 
cies which  I  have  mentioned.  I  shall  try  to  discuss  some  of  the 
general  relations  between  our  ideals  of  conduct  and  our  acknowl- 
edgement of  truth.  I  need  not  pause  to  set  forth,  in  any  detail, 
the  well-known  fact  that  the  question  thus  indicated  is  in  its  gen- 
eral form  by  no  means  a  modern  question.  Both  Stoics  and  Epi- 
cureans made  it  prominent.  Earlier  still,  in  consequence  of  the 
methods  of  Socrates,  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  gave  it  a  signifi- 
cant place  in  their  theories  of  truth.  In  modern  thought,  again, 
as  I  also  need  not  at  length  describe,  this  problem  is  by  no  means 
confined  to  contemporary  philosophy.  Kant's  contrast  between 
the  theoretical  and  the  practical  reason  gave  our  question  central 
importance  for  the  structure  of  his  own  system  of  doctrine. 
Fichte's  philosophy  is  a  deliberate  synthesis  of  pragmatism  with 
absolutism.  Hegel  made  the  question  a  fundamental  one  in 
various  places  in  his  Logic.  In  the  Phanomenologie,  the  romantic 
biography  of  the  Weltgeist,  as  Hegel  there  narrates,  the  tale  has 
all  the  principal  crises  due  to  the  conflicts  of  the  theoretical  with 
the  practical  reason,  while  all  the  triumphs  of  the  hero  of  this 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL  AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  115 

story  consist  in  reconciliations  of  pragmatic  with  theoretical  in- 
terests. Thus,  then,  the  main  problem  of  pragmatism  is  no  more 
exclusively  modern  than  is  that  of  theism  or  of  empiricism.  The 
occasional  efforts  to  represent  the  newer  insights  upon  this  topic 
as  wholly  due  to  the  influence  of  the  most  recent  doctrines  of  evo- 
lution, and  as  wholly  replacing  certain  '  preevolutionary '  tenden- 
cies of  thought, —  these  efforts,  I  say,  where  they  exist,  result  from 
fondness  for  over-emphasizing  the  adjective  '  new,'  —  a  fondness 
from  which  we  all  in  this  day  suffer,  whether  we  are  philosophers 
or  business  men,  promotors  or  investors,  trustees  of  universities 
or  humble  investigators.  There  is,  indeed,  in  a  sense,  a  new 
pragmatism  ;  for  the  thought  of  to-day  has  its  own  inspirations, 
and,  like  any  individual  tendency  in  the  spiritual  world,  it  is  no 
mere  echo  of  other  tendencies  or  ages.  But  pragmatism  is  an- 
cient, is  human,  has  been  faced  countless  times  before  and  will 
be  considered  countless  times  again,  so  long  as  men  labor  for  the 
good,  and  long  for  the  true.  We  are  here  dealing  with  pervasive 
tendencies  of  modern  opinion  indeed,  but  not  with  startling  new 
discoveries,  —  with  questions  of  to-day,  but  with  ancient  issues 
also,  —  with  problems  which  modern  democracy  may  emphasize, 
but  which  old  religions  and  social  orders  already  made  familiar  to 
the  wise  men  of  yore. 

For  this  very  reason,  however,  now  that  I  attempt  to  discuss 
some  aspects  of  our  problem  in  the  light  of  contemporary  inter- 
ests, it  seems  to  me  advisable  not  to  limit  my  discussion  by 
attempting  to  keep  within  the  bounds  of  a  direct  polemic  against 
such  recent  expressions  of  opinion  upon  the  subject  as  I  do  not 
altogether  accept.  There  are  several  very  notable  volumes  that 
have  been,  of  late  years,  devoted  to  making  explicit  certain  forms 
of  pragmatism.  Professor  James's  inspiring  Will  to  Believe, 
the  recent  Chicago  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  by  the  mem- 
bers of  Professor  Dewey's  vigorous  and  productive  school,  Mr. 
F.  C.  S.  Schiller's  essays  published  under  the  title  Human- 
ism, —  these  are  books  of  the  day,  all  well  known  very  probably, 
to  every  one  of  you.  It  would  be  a  tempting  task  to  try  to 
review  some  one  or  perhaps  all  of  them.  But,  as  I  have  said, 
while  the  books  and  the  persons  are  indeed  new  and  unique,  the 


Il6  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

issues  are  old.  I  am  deeply  interested  in  the  persons  ;  but  I 
have  time  in  this  paper  only  for  some  few  of  the  main  issues. 
While  I  shall  freely  refer  in  general  to  the  current  literature  of 
pragmatism,  my  main  argument  is  one  that  would  remain  valid 
even  if  the  issues  of  pragmatism  were  to  come  to  our  notice  as  an- 
cient questions,  and  not  as  incidents  of  the  literature  of  our  times. 
While,  then,  I  shall  indeed  refer  now  and  then  to  this  literature, 
I  shall  not  try  to  treat  it  in  any  explicit  way.  Polemic,  when- 
ever it  refers  to  any  one  author,  must  rest  upon  exposition  ;  expo- 
sition requires  more  time  than  this  occasion  allows  me,  raises 
questions  of  an  exegetical  character,  and  usually  dissatisfies  the 
author  whom  you  expound,  unless  in  the  end  you  agree  with 
him  in  opinion.  As  Wundt  once  remarked  during  a  literary  con- 
troversy :  "  We  are  all  most  erudite  with  respect  to  our  own 
books"  ("  Sind  wir  doch  alle  in  unseren  eigenen  Buchern  am 
besten  bewandert").  I  constantly  try  to  become  more  or  less 
erudite  regarding  the  contents  of  other  men's  books  ;  but  this  is 
no  place  to  trouble  you  with  an  attempt  to  display  such  erudi- 
tion, or  to  force  my  colleagues  to  point  out  how  ill  I  may  have 
succeeded  in  understanding  them. 

I  propose,  then,  to  try  to  state  the  relation  of  the  doctrine  of 
conduct  to  the  theory  of  truth  as  if  the  question  were  not  espe- 
cially characteristic  of  to-day.  I  propose  to  treat  it  rather  as  a 
question  of  what  I  shall  call  eternal  importance.  This  question 
is  :  How  far  is  our  knowledge  identical  with  an  expression  of  our 
practical  needs  ? 

Nevertheless,  I  may  still  permit  myself  to  make  one  merely 
personal  confession  before  I  go  on  to  my  main  task,  —  a  confes- 
sion which  relates,  indeed,  to  a  totally  ephemeral  matter.  Being, 
as  I  just  said,  more  erudite  than  are  the  rest  of  you  regarding 
my  own  writings,  I  may  venture  to  tell  you  that  once  in  my  life, 
before  I  fell  a  prey  to  that  bondage  of  absolutism  wherein  now- 1 
languish,  there  was  a  time  when  I  was  not  a  constructive  idealist 
of  any  sort,  and  when,  if  I  understand  the  meaning  of  the  central 
contention  of  pragmatism,  I  was  meanwhile  a  very  pure  prag- 
matist.  Accordingly,  I  published  in  the  year  1881,  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Kant  centennial  celebration  of  that  year,  an  essay 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL  AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  llj 

entitled  :  "  Kant's  Relation  to  Modern  Philosophical  Progress." 
I  was  then  twenty-six  years  old  and  had  been  deeply  influenced 
by  Professor  James's  earlier  lectures  and  essays.  My  paper 
was  printed  in  Dr.  Harris's  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy. 
Nobody  amongst  you  is  likely  to  have  remembered,  even  if 
he  has  ever  read,  that  paper.  It  was  a  mere  sketch.  But 
since  it  expressed  a  sincere  effort  to  state  the  theory  of  truth 
wholly  in  terms  of  an  interpretation  of  our  judgments  as  present 
acknowledgments,  since  it  made  these  judgments  the  embodi- 
ments of  conscious  attitudes  that  I  then  conceived  to  be  essen- 
tially ethical,  and  to  be  capable  of  no  restatement  in  terms  of  any 
absolute  warrant  whatever,  I  may  assert  that,  for  a  time  at  least, 
I  did  seriously  struggle  not  only  to  be  what  is  now  called  a  prag- 
matist,  but  also  to  escape  falling  into  the  clutches  of  any  Abso- 
lute. When  later,  however,  I  fell,  and  came  to  believe,  as  I  now 
steadfastly  do,  that  it  is  one  function  of  the  truth  to  be,  amongst 
other  things,  actually  true,  I  do  not  think  that  I  ceased  to  be,  in 
a  very  genuine  sense,  still  a  pragmatist,  although  no  longer  pos- 
sessed, perhaps,  of  what  Hegel  would  have  called  the  pure 
agility  which  I  then  used  most  earnestly  to  cultivate.  I  still  am 
of  the  opinion  that  judging  is  an  activity  guided  by  essentially 
ethical  motives.  I  still  hold  that,  for  any  truth-seeker,  the  object 
of  his  belief  is  also  the  object  of  his  will  to  believe.  I  still  con- 
tend that  the  truth  cannot  possibly  be  conceived  as  a  merely  ex- 
ternal object,  which  we  passively  accept,  and  by  which  we  are 
merely  moulded.  I  still  maintain  that  every  intelligent  soul, 
however  confused  or  weak,  recognizes  no  truth  except  the  truth 
to  whose  making  and  to  whose  constitution  it  even  now  contri- 
butes, —  no  truth  except  that  which  genuinely  embodies  its  own 
present  purpose.  I  earnestly  insist  that  knowledge  is  action, 
although  knowledge  is  also  never  mere  action.  I  fully  accept  the 
position  that  the  judgment  which  I  now  make  is  a  present  reac- 
tion to  a  present  empirically  given  situation,  a  reaction  express- 
ing my  need  to  get  control  over  the  situation,  whatever  else  my 
judgment  may  also  express.  I  fully  accept  the  position  that  the 
world  of  truth  is  not  now  a  finished  world  and  is  now  in  the  act 
of  making.  All  this  I  accept,  even  although  I  may  nevertheless 


Il8  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

appear  to  be  bound,  by  reason  of  my  other  convictions,  fast  in  the 
chains  of  absolutism.  All  this  I  daily  teach,  even  while,  as  a 
fact,  my  only  final  hope,  as  a  seeker  of  truth  and  as  a  human  be- 
ing, is  in  the  eternal. 

At  all  events,  however,  now  that  I  can  say  all  this,  perhaps  it 
will  not  seem  to  you  as  if,  when  I  undertake  to  discuss  the  rela- 
tions of  the  principles  of  conduct  to  the  theory  of  truth,  I  shall 
be  doing  so  without  any  comprehension  of  the  meaning  and  the 
human  interest  of  pragmatism.  As  I  said  at  the  outset,  we  are 
totally,  all  of  us,  more  or  less  pragmatists.  The  question  is 
solely  one  regarding  the  due  place  of  that  side  of  our  doctrine  in 
the  whole  organism  of  our  convictions. 

II. 

Without  expressly  expounding  or  criticising  the  opinions  of 
anybody  else,  although  of  course  without  attempting  to  be 
original,  let  me  first  try  to  state  a  doctrine  that,  according  to  my 
conception  of  the  matter,  emphasizes,  as  fully  as  I  am  able  to 
emphasize,  the  motives  upon  which  I  suppose  pragmatism  to 
rest.  Then  let  me  try  to  explain  why  I  believe  that  this  view  of 
the  nature  of  the  knowing  process  must  be,  not  merely  set  aside 
(for  within  its  limits  it  is,  as  I  conceive,  a  partial  statement  of  the 
truth),  but  supplemented,  so  that  it  may  be  aided  to  state  the 
whole  truth. 

To  begin,  then,  the  exposition  of  what  I  take  to  be  the  spirit  of 
pragmatism, — thinking,  judging,  reasoning,  believing,  —  these 
are  all  of  them  essentially  practical  activities.  One  cannot  sunder 
will  and  intellect.  A  man  thinks  about  what  interests  him. 
He  thinks  because  he  feels  a  need  to  think.  His  thinking  may 
or  may  not  be  closely  linked  to  those  more  worldly  activities 
which  common  sense  loves  to  call  practical.  But  the  most 
remote  speculations  are,  for  the  man  who  engages  in  them, 
modes  of  conduct.  As  contrasted  with  other  men,  the  thinker, 
so  far  as  his  thoughts  do  not  directly  link  themselves  to  the 
motor  processes  usually  called  practical,  appears,  when  viewed 
from  without,  to  be  an  inactive  person.  An  anecdote  records 
how  a  servant  woman  in  Darwin's  household  ventured  to  sug- 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL   AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  \\g 

gest  that  the  old  gentleman  must  be  so  delicate  as  he  was  in 
health  because,  as  she  said,  he  lacked  occupation,  and  only 
wandered  about  looking  at  his  plants,  or  sat  poring  over  his 
papers.  Whether  the  anecdote  is  true  or  not,  the  thinker  often 
seems  to  casual  observers  to  be  inhibited,  held  back  from  action, 
hopelessly  ineffective.  But  this  appearance  we  know  to  be  but 
a  seeming.  The  thinker  plans  motor  processes,  and  in  the  end, 
or  even  constantly  while  he  thinks,  these  processes  get  carried  out. 
The  thinker  makes  diagrams,  arranges  material  objects  in  classes 
and  in  orderly  series,  constructs  apparatus,  adjusts  with  exquisite 
care  his  delicate  instruments  of  precision  ;  or  he  takes  notes,  builds 
up  formulas,  constructs  systems  of  spoken  or  written  words  to 
express  his  thoughts  ;  and  ultimately,  in  expressing  his  thoughts, 
he  may  direct  the  conduct  of  vast  numbers  of  other  men,  just  as 
Darwin  came  to  do.  Meanwhile,  even  if  viewed  from  within, 
from  his  own  conscious  point  of  view,  the  thinker's  ideas  are  not 
mere  objects  of  contemplation  upon  which  he  passively  gazes. 
They  are  known  to  him  as  his  own  deeds,  or  at  least  as  his  plans 
of  action,  whose  presence  to  his  mind  is  determined  by  a  series  of 
acts  of  attention,  —  of  acts,  too,  which  are  inseparably  associated 
with  tendencies  to  use  words  or  other  symbols,  to  arrange  external 
objects  in  orderly  series,  to  handle  his  instruments,  to  control  the 
material  objects  which  concern  him,  and  inwardly  to  affirm  and 
to  deny.  And  even  affirmation  and  denial  have  typical  outward 
expressions  in  conduct.  A  thought  which  has  no  conscious  refer- 
ence to  a  deed,  which  involves  no  plan  of  conduct,  which  joins 
nothing  together  that  was  so  far  divided,  which  dissects  nothing 
that  was  so  far  whole,  which  involves  no  play  of  active  attention 
from  object  to  object,  which  voluntarily  asserts  nothing,  and 
which  denies  nothing,  which  neither  accepts  nor  rejects,  but 
only  passively  contemplates,  is  no  thought  at  all,  but  is  a  vacant 
staring  at  nothing  in  particular  by  nobody  who  is  self-conscious. 
Thought,  indeed,  often  involves  a  temporary  suppression  of  outer 
conduct,  for  the  sake  of  considering  plans  of  conduct.  But  plans 
of  conduct,  so  far  as  they  are  not  yet  outwardly  expressed,  are 
known  to  our  inner  consciousness  only  when  possible  deeds  are 
begun,  but  are  more  or  less  completely  suppressed  as  soon  as 


120  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

they  are  fairly  initiated,  —  and  the  passage  to  the  outward  expres- 
sion of  thought  is  not  due  to  the  appearance  of  a  new  sort  of  con- 
sciousness, which  alone  is  to  be  called  volitional,  and  which,  as 
volitional,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  every  intellectual  process. 
No,  the  transition  from  thought  to  externally  significant  conduct  is 
rather  due  to  the  removal  of  certain  inhibitions.  These  inhibi- 
tions, so  long  as  they  persist,  keep  the  thinker  from  letting  those 
activities  which  he  inwardly  rehearses,  go  free  in  the  form  of  out- 
wardly manifest  words,  of  arrangements  of  external  objects,  and 
of  expressive  bodily  attitudes  such  as  are  those  of  affirmation  and 
denial. 

For  the  rest,  you  have  only  to  observe  the  motor  activities  of 
any  vivacious  disputant  or  lecturer  who  freely  expresses  his 
thought,  to  observe  how  intensely  practical  are  the  attitudes  in 
which  even  decidedly  abstract  thinking  processes  inevitably  dis- 
play themselves,  so  soon  as  such  inhibitions  are  actually  removed. 
The  vivacious  disputant  or  expounder  points  out  imaginary  ob- 
jects with  his  extended  forefinger,  and  imitates  their  contour, 
their  movement,  their  arrangement,  their  inner  structure,  by  an 
elaborate  display  of  gestures.  His  pointings  are  indices  of  his 
subjects ;  his  mimicry  portrays  his  predicates.  He  affirms  by 
pounding  with  clenched  fist  against  the  palm  of  his  other  hand, 
or  upon  his  desk.  Or,  again,  in  case  of  his  more  abstract  and 
less  contentious  assertions,  he  perhaps  gently  lays  his  forefinger 
across  the  palm  of  the  opposing  hand,  or  lays  it  upon  the  fore- 
finger of  this  hand,  thereby  quietly,  but  impressively,  showing 
you  how  he  has  learned  to  lay  his  finger  upon  the  very  truth 
itself.  He  denies  by  means  of  gestu  res  of  avoidance,  of  aversion,  or 
of  destruction,  He  harmlessly,  yet  in  a  spiritual  sense  seriously, 
threatens  you,  his  opponent,  with  frown,  with  glittering  eye,  with 
shaking  fist,  with  attitudes  of  defiance,  or  of  crushing  intellectual 
hostility.  He  invites  you,  if  you  are  nearer  to  him  in  opinion, 
by  winning  gestures  to  come  to  his  embrace.  If  the  controversy 
is  vigorous,  then  as  he  affirms  or  denies,  he  clenches  his  jaws  and 
shows  his  teeth.  Or  in  scorn  perhaps  at  your  errors,  he  makes 
the  well-known  but  less  marked  facial  gesture  that  Darwin  de- 
scribes as  the  act  of  slightly  uncovering  the  canine  tooth  on 


No.  2.]          THE  ETERNAL   AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  121 

the  side  towards  the  enemy.  If  he  becomes  very  calm,  pursuing 
in  his  thought  extremely  abstract  and  elusive  truths,  his  eye,  or 
his  pointing  hand,  begins  to  search  out  small  or  distant  objects. 
I  know  a  distinguished  public  lecturer  who,  whenever  his  topics 
grow  problematic,  follows  cautiously  with  his  eyes  the  lines 
where  the  wall  and  ceiling  of  the  room  meet,  then  perhaps  lets 
them  run  down  the  corner  of  the  room,  where  the  two  walls 
meet,  and  then  calmly  announces  in  words  the  result  of  his 
quest.  I  remember  an  aged  and  optimistic  philosopher,  now 
dead,  whose  every  expository  period  was  wont  to  begin  with  the 
suggestion  of  a  problem,  but  to  end  with  its  often  highly  abstract, 
yet  always  triumphant  solution.  His  thoughtful  and  extremely 
mobile  countenance  was  a  mass  of  wrinkles,  which  time  and  the 
defense  of  the  truth  had  worn.  As  each  new  sentence  set  out  upon 
its  lengthy  course,  and  as  the  problem  grew  intense,  this  vener- 
able thinker's  facial  wrinkles  used  to  twist  into  a  marvelous  and 
often  terrifying  lack  of  symmetry.  One  wondered  whether  those 
tangled  curves  could  ever  again  acquire  a  restful  aspect.  But  as 
the  end  of  the  sentence  approached,  they  always,  at  the  fitting 
moment,  triumphantly  passed  back  again  into  a  beautiful  sym- 
metry, and  through  this  blessed  relief  of  tension  the  evenness  of 
the  truth  was  at  the  close  made  quite  manifest  to  everybody 
present.  I  do  not  indeed  well  remember  what  this  philosopher's 
opinions  were,  so  busy  was  I  wont  to  become  in  watching  his 
countenance.  But  I  gathered  that  his  optimism  was  a  sort  of 
inner  comment  of  his  consciousness  upon  his  ceaseless  joy  in 
discovering  how  every  muscular  strain,  whereby  his  facial 
wrinkles  could  possibly  be  complicated,  was  certain  in  the  end 
to  pass  over  into  symmetry  and  quiescence.  As  he  had  for 
many  years  carefully  experimented  upon  this  topic,  and  as  no 
twist  of  his  wrinkles  had  ever  yet  failed  to  yield  to  this  mode  of 
treatment,  he  seemed  to  feel  very  sure  about  the  universe.  The 
subjects  of  his  assertions  might  be  as  contorted  as  fortune  chanced 
to  make  them  ;  his  predicates  were  sure  to  consist  of  symmetrical 
curves  of  relief,  and  so  of  peace.  Such,  you  see,  was  the  prag- 
matism of  this  venerable  sage. 

What  such    seemingly  trivial    facts    illustrate  holds  true,   in 


122  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

principle,  of  at  least  one  aspect  of  the  inner  life  of  all  of  us.  Our 
thinking  is  indeed  from  moment  to  moment  a  consciousness  of 
our  adjustment  to  our  present  experience.  This  adjustment  is 
our  own  act.  We  perform  this  act,  not  capriciously,  but  because 
we  find  therein  our  conscious  relief,  our  movement  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  fulfillment  of  our  own  purpose.  Unless  I  am  inter- 
ested in  expressing  myself,  in  actively  reading  my  own  purpose 
into  my  world,  you  shall  not  induce  me,  by  any  device,  to  know 
or  to  express  any  truth  whatever  about  what  is  not  myself. 

III. 

These,  then,  are  considerations  which  suggest  an  attempt,  not 
only  to  define  our  thoughtful  consciousness  in  essentially  practi- 
cal terms,  but  also  to  define  the  objects  about  which  we  think, 
yes,  the  very  reality  of  which  we  are  conscious,  in  similarly 
pragmatic  fashion.  For,  in  the  first  place,  although  objects  of 
experience  seem,  from  a  well-known  realistic  point  of  view,  to 
be  given  to  us  whole,  with  all  their  properties  and  relations,  as 
objects  independent  of  our  will,  and  so  as  objects  in  their  essence 
extraneous  to  our  consciousness,  —  still  an  equally  well-known 
critical  method  of  reflection,  when  linked  with  the  pragmatism 
whose  basis  we  have  now  expounded,  tends  to  destroy  this 
realistic  seeming.  For  what  is  directly  given  to  us  at  any 
moment  (that  is,  what  is  immediately  and  merely  given  to  us)  is 
simply  the  fact  of  our  special  momentary  need  for  further  insight 
and  for  further  action.  What  at  any  moment  we  actually  see, 
what  we  clearly  think,  what  we  make  out  of  the  given,  that  is 
not  merely  given  to  us,  but  is  also  ours, —  not  ours  as  our  mere 
caprice,  independent  of  the  given  need,  but  ours  as  what  Pro- 
fessor Dewey  rightly  calls  our  response  to  the  situation,  our 
furnishing  of  the  needed  predicates,  our  recognition  of  the 
object,  our  adjustment  of  deed  to  present  want,  in  brief,  as  I 
should  say,  our  expression  of  ourselves  under  the  conditions. 

Hence  it  is  not  true  that  we  merely  find  outer  objects  as  inde- 
pendent of  our  will,  and  as  nevertheless  possessed  in  all  their 
independence  of  their  various  predicates,  qualitative,  relational, 
substantial,  individual.  We  find  them  possessed  of  characters, 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL  AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  123 

only  in  so  far  as  we  ourselves  cooperate  in  the  construction,  in 
the  definition,  in  the  linkage  of  these  very  predicates,  which  we 
then  ascribe  to  the  objects.  Since,  to  be  sure,  our  need  of  thus 
defining  our  objects  is  indeed  given  to  us,  as  this  brute  fact  of  our 
momentary  need  itself,  as  the  bare  datum  that  we  must  indeed 
act  in  order  to  succeed,  and  since,  in  case  we  are  said  to  come  to 
an  understanding  of  our  objects,  we  succeed  in  dealing  with  our 
need  by  virtue  of  just  these  special  acts  of  ours,  that  is,  by  virtue 
of  making  these  assertions,  of  ascribing  these  predicates,  of  living 
out  just  these  beliefs, — since,  I  say,  all  this  is  true,  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  say  that  it  is  the  object  itself  whose  nature  forces  upon 
us  just  these  predicates.  For,  in  order  to  relieve  our  need,  we 
are  indeed  constrained,  in  general,  to  define  our  object  thus  and 
thus.  But,  as  a  fact,  nothing  can  force  you  except  your  own 
need.  If  you  have  no  interest  in  the  object,  its  supposed  inde- 
pendence of  your  will  can  impose  upon  your  will  no  recognition 
of  this  its  barely  external  nature.  You  observe  what  you  need  to 
observe  ;  and  in  observing  you  partly  fulfill  your  purpose  by 
diminishing  your  need  ;  and  what  you  find,  as  you  thoughtfully 
review  your  observations,  is  the  expression  of  your  own  thoughtful 
nature  in  the  object, —  an  expression  always  conditioned  by  your 
need,  but  .also  always  conditioned  by  your  devices  as  a  thinker, 
by  your  categories,  by  your  modes  of  activity.  For  instance, 
does  your  observed  object,  as  you  dwell  upon  it,  come  to  be  pos- 
sessed for  your  consciousness  of  definite  numerical  complexity  ? 
Then  that  is  because  you  have  needed  to  count,  and,  counting, 
have  not  merely  found,  but  have  constructed,  both  your  numerical 
predicate  and  the  relation  of  one  to  one  correspondence  between 
the  constituents  of  your  predicate  and  the  attentively  seized  con- 
stituents that  you  now  indeed  find  in  your  object,  but  find  only 
in  so  far  as  your  need  has  led  you,  dwelling  upon  these  ele- 
ments, to  divide  by  your  attention  what  sense  furnishes  to  you 
only  in  that  problematic  confusion  which  constituted  your  very 
need  of  counting.  Thus  counting  is  an  expression  of  your  pur- 
poses ;  and  sense,  when  uncounted,  shows  you  no  definitely 
numerical  groups  ;  but,  at  best,  furnishes  the  stimulus  and  the 
support  of  the  need  to  count.  This  case  is  typical. 


124  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

What  holds  of  numerical  complexity,  holds  of  every  intelligible 
aspect  of  experience.  What  you  find,  then,  as  barely  given  in  your 
experience,  are  needs  that  can  be  thus  or  thus  met,  tensions  that 
can  be  thus  or  thus  relieved  by  the  response  of  your  intelligence, 
and  objects  that  possess  a  meaning,  only  in  case  you  behold  in 
these  objects  the  expression  of  your  own  work  in  meeting  your 
needs.  As  Kant  said,  you  can  get  nothing  defined  and  intel- 
ligible out  of  your  object  except  what  you  have  put  into  it.  Yes, 
as  Kant  might  have  said,  you  get  nothing  defined  and  intelligible 
out  of  your  object  except  when  you  merely  reflect  upon  what 
even  now  you  are  putting  into  it,  by  active  responses  to  stimuli, 
that  is,  to  needs, —  responses  which  tell  you  what  your  object  is 
only  by  letting  you  see  what  just  now  you  must  do  about  your 
object.  To  be  sure,  since  your  need  at  every  point  accompanies, 
and  so  moulds  your  deed,  you  never  feel  free  to  think  this  or 
that  of  your  presented  object.  For  you  are  bound  fast  by  your 
own  need.  The  object  is  therefore  yours  to  construct,  but  not 
yours  to  create  ;  and  this  again  is  what  Kant  said.  And  this  is 
the  aspect  of  the  object  which  realism  falsely  emphasizes.  My 
need  is  the  controller  of  my  will ;  though  even  my  need,  although 
given,  is  not  given  as  an  object  independent  of  my  will.  When 
realism  asserts  that,  independently  of  me,  my  object  is  possessed 
of  the  characters  that  my  intelligence  is  forced  to  find  in  it,  the 
truth  of  the  realistic  assertion,  as  it  is  usually  formulated,  seems 
to  lie  mainly  in  the  validity  of  the  social  judgment  that  anybody, 
possessed  merely  of  my  needs  and  of  my  present  resources, 
would  perforce  define  his  world  just  as  I  now  do  mine.  This 
social  judgment  is  human  ;  but  it  is  itself  only  the  expression  of 
one  of  our  deepest  needs,  namely,  the  need  of  companionship, 
the  need  to  acknowledge  the  presence  of  our  fellows  and  to 
sympathize  with  their  needs.  Apart  from  this  social  basis  of 
realism,  the  ordinary  realistic  interpretation  of  experience  would 
turn  upon  the  most  barren  of  fancies.  The  object  is  never  merely 
given  to  me,  but  is  given  only  as  the  result  of  a  process.  It  is 
that  which,  through  my  own  construction,  I  find  as  the  momen- 
tary expression  of  my  own  effort  to  satisfy  my  needs.  Now 
sunder  that  which  I  thus  find  from  that  constructive  life  whose 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL  AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  12$ 

expression  it  is.  Say  that  not  only  before  I  needed,  but  before 
anybody  needed,  and  quite  independently  of  my  need,  or  of  any 
need,  there  was  and  is  that  which  my  need  led  me  to  find  as  my 
construction.  To  say  this  is  realism.  And  this  is  what  I  call 
a  barren  fancy,  because,  when  one  looks  closer,  one  finds  that  to 
say  this  becomes  needless. 

Over  against  such  realism,  the  pragmatism  that  we  are  now 
defining  rightly  insists,  I  think,  that  what  you  find  in  experience 
is  what  it  is  found  to  be,  namely,  an  object  in  so  far  as  it  is  char- 
acterized through  and  in  your  thoughtful  deeds. 

IV. 

So  far  we  have,  then,  the  statement  of  the  foundations  upon 
which  rests,  if  I  rightly  understand  the  matter,  what  I  shall  call 
pure  pragmatism.  This  pure  pragmatism,  as  we  shall  soon  see, 
is  held  unmodified  by  nobody.  Yet  there  exist  those  who  often 
speak  as  if  this  were  their  whole  doctrine  of  knowledge.  Let  us, 
then,  for  the  moment,  take  this  doctrine  as  it  stands,  and  try  to 
be  for  a  moment  pure  pragmatists.  If  what  we  have  just  stated 
shows  the  nature  of  our  thought  and  of  its  objects,  what  room 
is  there  left  for  any  form  of  absolutism  ?  This  fluent  realm  of 
transient  meanings,  where  whatever  is  merely  found,  as  brute 
datum,  is  nothing  more  than  a  query,  a  problem,  a  need,  while 
whatever  is  both  found  and  characterized,  that  is,  whatever  is 
experienced  as  a  whole,  intelligible,  present  object,  is  inevitably 
an  at  least  partial  fulfillment  of  a  present  need, —  well,  to  what 
universal  laws  of  thought  or  being  can  such  a  realm  conform  ? 
Can  such  a  realm  be  the  expression  of  any  truth  that  is  either 
eternal,  or  absolutely  authoritative  ?  You  have  your  needs 
I  mine.  We  both  change  our  needs.  What  youth  hopes  is  not 
what  age  demands.  The  morning  and  the  evening  bring  differ- 
ent needs.  Let  us  be  pluralists.  If,  like  my  venerable  friend, 
any  one  of  us  is  in  need  of  such  objects  as,  when  conceived,  give 
his  facial  wrinkles  symmetry,  and  his  soul  peace,  and  if,  by  chance, 
he  can  uniformly  get  what  he  needs,  —  well,  what  he  gets  is  his 
truth.  Who  amongst  us  has  any  better  truth  ?  Who  wants 
anything  but  a  prevailing  triumphant  state  of  mind  ?  If  thinking 


126  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

gives  us  such  a  state,  we  call  our  thoughts  true.  Has  the  word 
'  truth '  any  universal  meaning  whatever  except  this  ?  When  I 
say  :  "  This  belief  of  mine  is  true,"  what  can  I  mean  but :  "  This 
belief  of  mine  just  now  meets  my  conscious  needs  "  ? 

As  soon  as  we  raise  this  question,  we  all  indeed  begin,  even  as 
pure  pragmatists,  to  observe,  j  ust  a  little  uncomfortably,  one  need 
which  we  have  indeed  already  mentioned,  but  which  we  have  not 
yet  explicitly  defined.  It  is  the  need  that  I  before  called  the 
need  of  companionship,  the  need  not  only  of  thinking  for  our- 
selves, but  of  finding  somebody  who  either  will  agree  with  us,  or 
else  at  least,  to  our  mode  of  thinking,  ought  to  agree  with  us. 
This  need  also  is  a  human,  and  so  far,  in  our  account,  is  an  em- 
pirical fact,  a  brute  datum,  like  our  other  needs.  Perhaps  it  has 
no  deeper  meaning  than  has  any  rival  need  of  our  wavering  wits. 
But,  at  all  events,  it  is  a  need  that  goes  along  with  his  other  inter- 
ests to  make  the  philosopher.  For  a  philosopher,  however  much 
he  may  love  to  speak  with  tongues,  becomes  uncomfortable  if  he 
chances  to  observe  that  he  seems  to  be  edifying  only  himself  and 
not  the  brethren.  My  venerable  friend  aforesaid  obviously  de- 
sired that  we  who  listened  to  him  should  all  somehow  learn  to 
wrinkle  our  faces  just  as  he  did  and  just  when  he  did,  and  should 
so  attain  the  same  blessedness  as  that  which  he  enjoyed.  I  no- 
tice a  human  weakness  of  a  similar  sort  even  in  the  most  stub- 
born pluralists,  —  even  in  those  who  come  nearest  to  being  pure 
pragmatists.  I  find,  namely,  that  a  pluralist,  when  he  criticises  me, 
always  wants  me  to  come  into  unity  with  him.  And  I  notice  that 
this  weakness  also  shows  itself  in  a  very  marked  and,  as  I  think, 
partially  justified  disposition  to  expound  pragmatism  in  forms 
which  are  not  altogether  pure.  There  are  those  who  often  speak 
as  if  they  were  pure  pragmatists.  Yet  their  doctrine  has  always 
another  side ;  and  the  existence  of  such  additions  as  are  often 
made  to  doctrines  that  at  first  seem  to  be  pure  pragmatism 
shows,  I  judge,  that  there  is  some  difficulty  involved  in  leaving 
the  problem  of  knowledge  just  where  our  previous  exposition 
has  so  far  left  it.  Something  is  still  lacking  to  complete  our  pic- 
ture of  what  we  call  truth.  For  consider  :  You  shall  open  some 
accounts  of  modern  pragmatism  which,  to  judge  by  some  of  the 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL    AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  I2/ 

expressions  used,  seem  to  be  attempts  at  pure  pragmatism.  Yet, 
as  you  read  further,  you  shall  learn  that  philosophers  ought  to 
take  especially  careful  account  of  that  greatest  of  modern  discov- 
eries,—  the  doctrine  of  evolution.  Everything  is  a  product  of 
evolution.  Must  not  thought  be  such  a  product  ?  Obviously  it 
must.  But  now,  as  you  further  learn  from  such  expounders  of 
pragmatism,  one  great  merit  and  recommendation  of  such  prag- 
matism as  I  have  just  tried  to  illustrate  is  that  it  shows  how,  not 
only  thought,  in  general,  but  the  special  categories  of  thought, 
categories  such  as  truth,  objectivity,  reality,  are  all  products  of 
evolution,  and  of  a  process  of  evolution  which  is  determined  by 
need,  by  stimulation,  by  the  environment,  by  the  growth  of  our 
organisms.  What  we  believe  thus  appears  as  a  result,  like 
our  other  reactions,  —  like  fire-making,  like  engine-building,  like 
money-getting,  like  art,  like  the  family,  or  like  eating  and  foot- 
ball playing,  —  a  result  brought  about  by  the  character  of  our 
organisms,  by  the  environment  that  plays  upon  us,  by  the  desires 
that  burn  within  us.  Thought  and  its  inner  products  show  you, 
much  as  these  other  incidents  of  evolution  do,  reality  in  the 
making.  The  processes  of  thinking,  the  acknowledgment  of 
these  and  these  objects  as  real,  of  these  and  these  principles  as 
true,  the  toils  of  science,  the  warfare  of  the  creeds,  the  specula- 
tions of  the  philosophers,  —  these  are  all  like  the  cat's  pursuit  of 
the  mouse,  or  like  the  kitten's  flight  after  its  tail,  simply  forms  of 
adjustment  to  the  environment.  It  is,  then,  a  great  recommenda- 
tion of  pragmatism  that  it  comes  into  line  with  natural  history, 
that  it  drops  the  methods  which  were  common  in  'preevolu- 
tionary'  ages  of  thought,  and  that  it  conceives  truth,  being, 
logic,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  objects  of  philosophical  reflection, 
as,  like  eating  and  living,  mere  incidents  of  that  well-known  uni- 
versal process  of  evolution.  You  accept  evolution.  Well,  then, 
pragmatism  is  a  corollary  of  evolution.  Thus  are  philosophy  and 
science  to  be  reconciled.  Now  all  these  observations  about  the 
relations  between  pragmatism  and  the  doctrine  of  evolution  may 
have  their  great  value  in  another  context.  I  am  not  doubting 
their  intrinsic  interest.  What  I  inevitably  note  is,  however,  that 
when  a  man  talks  in  such  terms,  he  seems  to  me  not  to  be  any 


128  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

longer  expounding  a  pure  pragmatism.  I  do  not  blame  him  for 
this.  Bjjt  I  do  wonder  that  he  will  often  speak  as  if  he  meant  to 
be  a  pure  pragmatist. 

The  evidence  for  pure  pragmatism,  if  there  is  such  evidence, 
must  rest  on  what  you  now  can  observe  as  to  your  present 
thought  and  its  objects.  The  evidence  for  the  doctrine  of  evo- 
lution must  rest  upon  beliefs  that  relate  to  vast  numbers  of  objects 
such  as  are  supposed  somehow  to  have  existed  long  before  you 
or  I  or  any  human  being  could  have  been  there  to  acknowledge 
their  existence.  Tell  me  first  that  you  are  a  pure  pragmatist, 
and  that  you  accordingly  believe  whatever  you  just  now  find  it 
needful  for  you  to  believe  ;  and  I  can,  up  to  a  certain  point,  under- 
stand you.  Then  add  that,  having  read  modern  books,  or  having 
worked  in  the  field,  or  in  laboratories,  you  just  now  find  it  need- 
ful to  believe  in  something  called  evolution,  and  accordingly  to 
believe  in  a  world  that  existed  before  all  human  beings  existed, 
to  believe  also  in  an  object  called  an  organism,  in  an  object  called 
an  environment,  and  in  various  other  such  conceived  objects, 
and  still  I  follow  you.  But  tell  me  that  you  are  a  pragmatist 
because  pragmatism  logically  follows  from  the  truth  of  this  doc- 
trine of  evolution,  and  then  indeed  I  fail  to  see  what  you  mean. 
For  when  you  say:  "The  doctrine  of  evolution  is  true,"  I  ask 
you  :  "  In  what  sense  true  ?"  If  you  reply  :  "  True  in  the  prag- 
matist's  sense,  viz.,  as  the  object  of  my  present  conscious  and 
constructive  thought,  which  conceives  evolution  as  a  truth, 
because  just  now  I  need  so  to  conceive  it  ";  —  well,  then  you 
state  your  pragmatism  first,  and  define  your  belief  in  evolution 
solely  in  terms  of  your  pragmatism.  How,  then,  can  this  belief 
in  evolution,  —  a  belief  which  is  a  mere  instance  of  your  prag- 
matism, —  lend  back  any  of  its  borrowed  authority  to  furnish  a 
warrant  for  your  belief  in  the  very  doctrine  called  pragmatism, 
a  belief  which  you  presuppose  in  expressing  your  evolutionary 
creed  ? 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  you  say :  "  The  doctrine  of  evo- 
lution, as  a  universally  valid  result  of  modern  science,  is  to  be 
accepted,  not  in  the  pragmatist' s  sense  at  all,  but  because  this 
doctrine,  whether  we  happen  to  need  to  believe  it  or  not,  is 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL  AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  129 

true"  ;  well  —  then  you  have  once  for  all  either  abandoned,  or 
else  have  profoundly  modified,  your  pragmatism.  You  have, 
perhaps,  become  a  realist,  or  maybe  an  absolutist.  In  any  case, 
your  belief  in  evolution  can  then  furnish  no  warrant  for  your 
pragmatism  ;  because  in  that  case  you  have  denied  pragmatism 
in  order  to  define  the  sort  of  truth  that  you  attribute  to  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution. 

Why,  then,  does  a  pragmatist,  who  often  speaks  as  if  he  meant 
to  be  a  pure  pragmatist,  nevertheless  boast  of  his  fidelity  to  the 
doctrine  of  evolution?  Because,  I  answer,  despite  his  occasional 
speech  as  if  he  meant  pure  pragmatism,  he  is  not  a  pure  prag- 
matist. For  all  his  pragmatism,  he  does  not  quite  like  to  confess 
that  he  is  an  evolutionist  merely  because  he  just  now  feels  the  per- 
sonal need  of  being  an  evolutionist,  precisely  as  other  people  may 
feel  their  need  of  being  Mormons,  or  of  believing  in  witchcraft, 
or  of  squaring  the  circle  in  some  particular  way.  And,  as  a  fact, 
he  is  not  an  evolutionist  in  the  sense  of  such  pure  pragmatism.  He 
is  an  evolutionist  in  the  sense  of  supposing  not  only  that  he  does 
just  now  need  to  believe  in  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  but  that  he 
ought  to  need  so  to  believe.  And  he  strengthens  in  himself  this 
sense  of  the  ought  by  reflecting  that  he  lives  in  an  evolutionary 
age,  and  that  the  experts  have  settled  the  question  in  favor  of 
evolution,  and  that,  by  appealing  to  this  well-known  presupposi- 
tion, he  can  get  hearers  for  his  doctrine  of  pragmatism.  For  a 
pragmatist,  I  repeat,  is  a  companionable  person  ;  and,  moreover, 
he  rightly  thinks  that  he  ought  to  be  so.  He  is  not  content  to 
see  for  himself  that  his  opinions  have  merely  the  pragmatic  sanc- 
tion ;  he  wants  us  to  agree  with  him  about  this  very  matter.  In 
fact,  he  needs  that  we  shall  find  ourselves  needing  what  he  needs. 

Two  motives  that  tend  to  modify  pure  pragmatism  appear  even 
in  this  brief  sketch  of  its  complications.  Even  a  pragmatist  who 
wants  to  be  a  pure  one  has  an  inevitable  conception,  not  only  of 
what  he  now  needs,  as  he  utters  this  judgment,  but  of  what  he 
ought  to  need  in  order  to  get  a  warrant  for  the  judgment.  And 
he  also  has  a  conception  of  the  need  of  finding  companions  who 
shall  be  persuaded  to  agree  with  him,  or  who  at  least  ought  to 
be  persuaded.  Pure  pragmatism  would  be,  after  all,  a  lonesome 


130  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

kind  of  doctrine.  I  need,  and  need  just  now,  to  assert  myself 
thus.  Hence,  I  judge  thus.  Hence  this  is  true  for  me.  How 
obvious  all  that  is  !  Yes,  but  how  barren,  unless  I  can  add : 
"  My  need  is  the  human  one ;  it  defines  a  ruling,  a  standard 
need.  I  ought  to  need  just  this  assertion  of  just  this  object  in 
view  of  this  situation.  I  ought ;  you  ought ;  humanity  ought, 
to  characterize  this  object  thus."  Only  when  I  can  speak  thus 
do  I  feel  at  home.  Hence  a  natural  fondness  of  the  pragmatist 
for  using  terms  that  suggest  appeal  to  current  popular  opinion. 
Evolution  is  to-day  not  only  a  result  of  science ;  it  is  a  catch- 
word, a  name  for  a  celebrated  '  merger '  of  all  sorts  of  securi- 
ties. If  you  only  join  the  two  words  *  social '  and  '  evolution  ' 
in  your  speech  nowadays,  everybody  at  once  listens  to  find  out 
what  you  have  to  say.  Hence,  if  you  want  really  to  feel  at  home 
with  even  your  innermost  reflective  doctrine,  you  must  char- 
acterize it  as  having  an  important  bearing  on  the  structure  oi 
society ;  and  you  must  show  it  to  be  a  corollary  of  the  doctrine 
of  evolution.  Then  only  are  you  quite  sure  of  it ! 

But,  then,  in  what  sense  do  these  perfectly  normal  and  natural 
tendencies  inevitably  modify  your  pure  pragmatism  ?  I  reply,  on 
one  side,  they  illustrate  the  pragmatist' s  main  thesis  ;  on  the  other 
side,  they  indeed  do  modify  it.  They  illustrate  it ;  for  this  ten- 
dency to  define  pragmatism  in  terms  of  evolution  is  itself  the 
expression  of  an  inner  need  of  the  pragmatist  who  makes  the  evo- 
lutionary appeal.  This  fondness  for  companionship,  which  shows 
itself  in  a  tendency  to  confirm  pragmatism  by  a  use  of  popular 
catch-words,  notwithstanding  the  obvious  fact  that  the  only  log- 
ical basis  for  pragmatism,  apart  from  purely  expository  illustra- 
tions, must  be  a  purely  individual  and  interior  reflective  process, 
whereby  we  notice  what  happens  when  we  judge, —  this  fondness 
for  social  confirmation,  I  say,  is  again  the  expression  of  one  of 
the  needs  of  the  pragmatist  thinker,  who  all  the  while  teaches 
that  truth,  for  him,  is  merely  the  result  of  his  need  for  control 
over  his  own  experience. 

Yet  if  these  tendencies,  on  the  one  hand,  illustrate  pure  pragma- 
tism, on  the  other  hand,  they,  with  equal  obviousness,  modify  the 
form  that  it  assumes  in  the  consciousness  of  the  pragmatist  him- 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL   AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  131 

self.  He  needs, —  but  what  he  needs  is  to  recognize  that  his  truth 
is  something  more  than  the  result  and  expression  of  his  present 
need.  He  judges  of  his  objects  as  he  needs  to  judge  ;  but  one 
of  his  needs  is  to  be  satisfied  that  his  need  ought  to  be  what  it  is. 
He  expresses  himself  as  he  just  now  is  ;  but  he  aims  to  express 
himself  so  that  his  fellow  may  also  be  one  with  himself.  Inevit- 
ably, therefore,  the  very  need  of  the  moment  needs  control  by 
another  than  itself,  yet  by  somewhat  that  is  not  alien  to  itself.  It 
needs  control ;  for  so  soon  as  it  recognizes  that  it  is  logically  no 
better  than  any  other  possible  will  to  believe,  as  for  instance,  no 
better  than  a  will  to  believe  in  witchcraft,  or  in  fairyland,  it  recog- 
nizes its  own  emptiness.  It  needs,  therefore,  control  by  some 
other  than  itself;  for  a  valid  principle  that  should  determine 
what,  under  given  conditions,  is  the  right  and  rational  need,  is 
not  identical  with  the  passing  content  of  any  merely  momentary 
need.  But  when  the  need  of  the  moment  thus  needs  to  be  con- 
trolled, the  control  that  it  seeks  is  not  that  of  a  realistic  object, 
independent  of  itself,  but  that  of  some  universal  expression  of 
need, —  an  expression  that  simply  makes  conscious  what  the 
need  of  the  moment  is  trying,  after  all,  to  be,  namely,  a  rational 
and  binding  need.  Hence,  at  the  moment  of  expressing  one's 
pragmatism,  one  loves  to  appeal  to  well  recognized  objective 
truths, — to  evolution,  to  common  sense,  to  whatever  is  likely  to 
seem  universally  valid. 

V. 

We  have  thus  prepared  the  way  to  state  wherein  our  first 
statement  of  pragmatism  has  to  be  modified,  even  in  order  that 
its  own  need  should  be  expressed. 

"  I  believe  what  now,  with  my  conditions,  and  my  needs,  my 
judging  activity  constructs  as  the  present  truth  for  me :"  there  is 
one  form  of  the  assertion  of  pure  pragmatism.  All  this,  we  have 
said,  is  obvious  and  barren.  Why  barren  ?  Because  one  of  the 
things  that  I  seek,  when  I  judge,  is  to  express  something  that 
shall  have  some  value  as  a  standard.  A  judgment  is  not  only  a 
construction,  but  a  resolve  ;  not  only  a  response,  but  a  precept ; 
addressed  possibly  to  other  men,  to  myself  at  other  times,  to 
whatever  reasonable  being  there  may  be  who  has  wit  to  under- 


132  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

stand  me.  It  not  only  says  :  "  I  believe  ;  "  it  says  :  "  This  is  to 
be  believed."  The  one  who  judges  wills  not  only  his  own  state 
of  mind,  but  other  states  of  mind,  which  he  conceives  to  be 
constructed  in  accordance  with  the  rule  laid  down  in  his  judg- 
ment. Unless  he  does  this,  he  does  not  judge ;  he  merely 
croons,  or  wrinkles  his  face,  or  plays  with  his  mental  images. 
Whoever  judges  is  a  pragmatist ;  but,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
he  means  to  require  you  to  believe  him.  And  therein  he  becomes 
more  than  a  pragmatist. 

And  so,  in  case  you  first  judge,  and  then  as  a  pure  pragma- 
tist observe  that  your  judgment  is  merely  your  present  reaction 
to  this  present  conscious  situation,  the  very  observation,  if  it  is 
sufficient  to  your  mind  to  characterize  your  whole  process  of 
judging,  at  once  takes  the  whole  life  out  of  what  was  but  just 
now  your  assurance.  That  is  precisely  what  I  do  not  want  my 
present  judgment  to  be,  namely,  this  momentary  feat  of  attentive 
agility.  I  want  it  to  have  authority.  Suppose  that  I  assert 
something,  and  that  thereupon  my  critical  neighbor  pityingly 
says  :  "  Yes,  no  doubt  you  think  so."  Why  may  this  retort 
seem  insulting?  Because  it  pretends  to  reduce  my  judgment  to 
a  mere  attitude  of  my  own.  Now  that  is  just  what  I  do  not 
want  my  opinion  to  be.  But  suppose  that  just  this  retort  is  the 
only  one  that  I  am  able  upon  reflection  to  make  to  myself. 
Well,  then  indeed  I  am  a  pure  pragmatist.  But  hereupon  my 
judgments  lose  all  their  deepest  interest.  They  do  not  meet  the 
principal  need  that  they  all  the  while  believed  themselves  to  be 
meeting.  It  is  as  when  one  wakes  from  a  dream-conversation 
and  finds  himself  talking  alone  in  the  darkness.  He  was  but  just 
now  responding  to  the  situation  according  to  his  insight.  He 
hereupon  observes  that  both  situation  and  response  were  merely 
his  own  momentary  datum  and  construction,  How  lonesome  is 
this  new  insight !  Now  pragmatists,  indeed,  do  not  usually  feel 
lonesome.  They  are  excellent  companions  and  very  fond  of 
rational  society.  We  have  seen  why  they  do  not  feel  lonesome. 
It  is  because,  like  others,  they  take  their  judgments  about  evolu- 
tion, society,  humanity,  the  good,  and  the  like,  to  be  possessed 
of  a  character  that  no  pure  pragmatism  could  express.  Having 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL   AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  133 

first  believed  these  judgments  in  the  ordinary  way,  namely,  as 
having  an  authority  which  is  not  of  the  moment,  they  then  add 
to  all  these  insights  that  of  their  pragmatism ;  and  their  pragmatism 
now  seems  to  them  an  interesting  addition  to  the  rest  of  their 
natural  history.  And  so  at  moments  they  can  speak  as  if  this 
were  a  pure  pragmatism.  This,  however,  they  never  really  mean. 

"But,"  you  may  object,  "in  answering  thus  the  contention  of 
the  pure  pragmatist,  one  only  illustrates  the  more,  as  has  already 
been  admitted,  the  pure  pragmatist' s  own  position.  For  this 
need  to  give  our  judgments  authority,  this  longing  not  to  be 
merely  expressing  ourselves  as  now  we  are,  but  to  be  laying 
down  a  rule  for  ourselves  at  other  times,  and  for  other  selves, 
what  is  this  but  one  of  our  present  and  conscious  needs  ?  Do  we 
get  authority  by  merely  willing  to  have  it  ?  Do  we  legislate  for 
other  individuals  merely  by  longing  to  legislate  ?  What  have 
we,  after  all,  when  we  judge,  but  the  resolve  to  speak  for  others 
than  ourselves  ?  Is  the  resolve  the  accomplishment,  except  pre- 
cisely in  so  far  as  it  accomplishes  itself  in  just  the  present  judg- 
ment?" 

You  see  the  point  that  we  have  reached  in  following  our  prob- 
lem. The  situation  is  indeed  baffling.  If  the  pure  pragmatist 
speaks  to  us,  and  so  speaking  asserts  himself,  he  speaks  as  one 
having  authority.  He  may  talk  of  evolution,  or  he  may  other- 
wise bring  his  doctrine  into  line  with  what  he  conceives  to  be 
natural  facts  or  general  human  concerns  and  beliefs.  He  will 
talk  of  such  matters  as  if  he  were  a  realist,  or  an  absolutist. 
And  there  is  one  thing  that  at  the  very  least  he  will  assert, 
namely,  that  his  account  of  the  process  of  judgment,  and  of  the 
relations  of  the  judgment  to  its  objects,  is  a  sound  and  true 
account,  which  everybody  who  rightly  examines  the  process  of 
judgment  will  see  for  himself  to  be  true.  As  a  teacher,  then,  the 
pragmatist  is  much  like  any  other  professor.  He  has  his  little 
horde  of  maxims  ;  he  proclaims  the  truth  ;  he  refutes  errors  ;  he 
asserts  that  we  ought  to  believe  thus  or  so ;  and  thus  lays  down 
the  law  as  vigorously  as  do  other  men.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  the  pragmatist,  trying  for  the  moment  to  be  a  pure  pragmatist, 
reflects  upon  all  this  that  he  has  uttered,  and  upon  all  this  labor 


134  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

that  he  has  done  under  the  sun,  then  he  must  observe  that  in 
case  his  own  view  is  as  a  pure  pragmatism  correct,  he  has  in- 
structed nobody  at  any  time  but  himself  as  to  any  genuinely 
common  truth ;  since,  at  every  instant,  he  has  merely  been  as- 
suming fluent  attitudes  of  his  own,  attitudes  precisely  as  signifi- 
cant as  were  my  venerable  friend's  symmetrical  wrinkles.  For 
upon  each  occasion  of  thought,  he  has  faced  an  inner  situation  of 
his  own,  and  has  opposed  thereto  a  certain  gesticulation  called  a 
predicate,  and  has  therein  found  a  certain  triumph  of  what  some 
would  call  his  reason,  while  he  now  might  well  merely  call  it  his 
own  state  of  mind. 

These,  then,  are  the  two  aspects  of  the  situation  of  the  prag- 
matist  himself.  If  the  pragmatist  has  taught  us  a  truth,  then  he 
has  done  something  more  than  assume  his  needful  inner  attitudes. 
But  if  he  has  merely  adjusted  himself  to  his  conscious  environ- 
ment by  means  of  his  own  inner  mental  construction,  then  he  has 
instructed  nobody  and  has  refuted  nobody ;  and  has  said  nothing 
that  has  any  genuine  meaning  for  anybody  but  himself.  Ac- 
cordingly, even  when  he  has  contradicted  absolutism,  in  uttering 
such  a  contradiction  he  has  merely  assumed  an  anti-absolutist 
inner  attitude  of  his  own.  Hence  that  attitude  has  involved  no 
refutation  of  anybody  else.  The  pure  pragmatist,  therefore,  con- 
tradicts nobody  but  himself  when  he  asserts  that  other  people, 
say  absolutists,  are  wrong.  For  none  of  his  assertions  can  relate 
to  anybody  but  himself  as  he  happens  to  be  when  he  makes  them. 
So  much,  then,  for  the  situation  of  the  pragmatist,  just  in  so  far 
as  he  tries  to  be  a  pure  pragmatist.  But  our  situation,  as  his 
critics,  seems  to  be  for  the  moment  at  least  decidedly  compli- 
cated. For  we  can  criticise  him  only  by  pointing  out  to  him 
conscious  needs  that  his  account  of  the  judging  process  some- 
how does  not  meet.  If  these  needs  are  not  his  own,  we  have  not 
refuted  him.  If  they  are  his  own,  then  their  presence  refutes  him 
only  because  his  doctrine,  namely,  the  doctrine  that  a  true  judg- 
ment is  such  by  reason  of  its  success  in  meeting  the  needs  that  it 
attempts  to  meet,  is  illustrated  by  our  proposed  refutation. 

How  shall  one  sum  up  the  meaning  of  these  complications  ? 
They  are  not  arbitrary  inventions  of  anybody.  They  belong  to 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL   AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  135 

the  very  essence  of  the  situation  of  any  finite  thinker.  I  know  of 
no  way  but  to  accept  the  conscious  situation  that  we  find,  as  well 
as  to  observe  with  the  pragmatist  that  all  this  our  finding  is  in- 
evitably no  merely  passive  acceptance.  When  we  both  act  and 
reflect,  both  observe  and  construct,  are  both  pragmatists  and  the- 
orists, what  we  make  out  about  the  meaning  of  all  this  fluent 
process  of  knowledge  is  to  be  summed  up,  I  think,  as  follows. 
Hereby  our  pragmatism  will  be,  not  abandoned,  but  modified. 

VI. 

I  have  spoken  of  the  need  for  companionship  in  our  judgments 
as  itself  merely  one  of  our  given  and  human  needs.  But  my  il- 
lustrations have  brought  to  mind,  I  hope,  what  I  now  venture  to 
state  as  a  general  principle.  It  is  this  :  When  we  feel  the  need  of 
appealing  to  somebody  else,  or  to  ourselves  at  other  times,  in 
order  even  to  express  our  opinion  that  our  judgments  have  a 
warrant,  this  our  need  for  companionship  is  precisely  coincident 
with  our  need  to  regard  our  judgment  as  true.  When  the  cat 
pursues  the  mouse,  she  presumably  does  so  because  she  needs  the 
mouse.  But  if  she  consciously  asserted  :  "  This  is  a  mouse,"  she 
would  need  another  cat,  or  some  other  critic  of  truth,  as  the 
being  who  ought  to  agree  with  her  as  to  the  truth  of  this  asser- 
tion. I  react  to  my  environment  as  this  present  self.  But  if  my 
reaction  is  a  judgment,  it  is  not  only  a  bit  of  pure  pragmatism ; 
it  is  an  appeal  to  a  judge  of  truth  whom  I  conceive  either  to  be 
judging  as  one  ought  to  judge,  or  else  to  be  in  the  wrong.  That 
I  feel  the  need  of  such  appeal,  is  itself  at  any  moment,  indeed,  a 
mere  datum,  like  any  other  momentary  need  of  mine.  But  it  is 
just  this  need  that  constitutes  me  a  rational  being.  Let  a  pure 
pragmatist  undertake  to  deny  this  assertion  if  he  will.  In  deny- 
ing he  will  merely  assert  that  I  ought  not  to  make  it ;  and  in  so- 
denying  he  will  appeal  to  a  sound  and  rational  mode  of  judgment: 
passed  upon  consciousness  in  general.  As  for  his  own  pure- 
pragmatism,  he  either  judges  himself  that  it  is  a  true  account  of 
judging  in  general,  or  he  is  no  believer  in  his  own  doctrine.  But 
if  he  is  a  believer  in  his  own  doctrine,  then  he  judges  that  he 
characterizes  our  judging  consciousness  as  another  person  than 
his  present  self  ought  to  characterize  it. 


136  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

In  brief,  to  believe  that  my  judgment  is  true,  is  to  believe  that 
another  point  of  view  than  my  present  point  of  view,  in  case  this 
other  point  of  view  is  what  it  ought  to  be,  actually  confirms  my 
own  judgment  about  this  object.  This  other  point  of  view,  how- 
ever, is  a  point  of  view  that  relates  to  the  same  object,  or  else  it 
could  not  be  conceived  as  confirming  my  judgment  about  this 
object.  Whoever  believes  seriously  in  the  truth  of  his  judgment, 
not  only  explicitly  makes  this  present  judgment,  but  implicitly 
believes  two  further  things,  namely  :  (i)  That  there  is  another  con- 
scious point  of  view  than  his  own,  and  a  point  of  view  from  which 
this  same  object  is  viewed  ;  and  (2)  that  this  other  point  of  view, 
without  being  a  mere  copy  of  his  own,  and  without  his  own  be- 
ing a  mere  copy  of  it,  is  so  related  to  his  own  point  of  view  that 
each  ought  to  agree  with,  to  supplement,  to  enlarge,  and  to  con- 
firm the  other.  Now  while  the  need  to  assert  the  reality  of  this 
other  point  of  view  is,  indeed,  one  of  the  needs  of  the  present 
judging  consciousness,  it  is  utterly  vain  to  say  that  this  need  is 
fully  met  by  any  fact  that  the  present  judging  consciousness  of  a 
finite  being  itself  now  constructs  and  finds  present.  For  if  what 
I  find  is  for  me  merely  my  present  opinion  about  my  present  ob- 
ject, and  if  I  view  this  opinion  merely  as  my  present  construc- 
tion, then  I  simply  do  not  view  my  opinion  as  true  at  all.  I 
then  view  it  merely  as  my  state  of  mind.  But  if  I  view  my 
opinion  as  true,  I  demand  that  another  than  my  present  self 
shall  accept  this  opinion.  This  is  the  very  nature  of  the  truth- 
asserting  consciousness.  Such  a  consciousness  lives  in  the  light 
of  another  than  itself.  Yet  it  conceives  this  other  than  itself  not 
as  a  realistic  outer  and  independent  object,  but  as  a  constructive 
self,  like  itself,  yet  other  than  its  present  self, — its  own  companion, 
because  its  own  extension  and  wider  expression.  The  judging 
self  conceives  itself  as  not  fully  expressed  in  this  judgment,  but  as 
needing  its  own  alter  ego  to  aid  it  in  its  own  expression. 
Herein  the  cognitive  reactions  of  finite  beings  are  different  from 
other  reactions.  They  seek,  indeed,  their  own  ;  but  they  seek  it 
not  merely  as  their  own.  They  view  themselves  as  essentially 
partial  functions  in  a  process  whose  unity  is  subject  to  one  rule, 
the  ought  of  the  truth-seeking  activity,  whose  object  is  this  iden- 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL   AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  137 

tical  object,  but  whose  variety  is  the  actually  required  variety  of 
points  of  view  regarding  this  one  object.  % 

If  this  is  of  the  essence  of  the  judging  consciousness,  then  all 
that  pragmatism  asserts  is,  indeed,  as  far  as  it  goes,  valid  ;  but  a 
pure  pragmatist  is  nevertheless  self-refuting.  We  must  be  prag- 
matists,  but  also  more  than  pragmatists.  For  if  I  need  what  is 
not  my  present  self,  if  I  need  another  than  the  present  judging  con- 
sciousness, in  order  to  make  it  possible  for  me  to  assert  the  truth 
of  my  judgment,  then,  although  my  predicates  are,  as  pragmatism 
asserts,  the  constructions  of  the  present  moment,  still  the  truth  of 
my  judgment  is  not  a  mere  construction  of  the  present  moment, 
but  belongs  to  the  unity  of  the  various  constructive  processes  of 
momentary  selves,  all  of  which  are  various  expressions  of  the  pur- 
pose which  each  one  of  them  shares,  so  that,  despite  their  variety, 
their  selfhood  is  one. 

Yet  with  this  result  we  cannot  pause.  Our  account  is  still 
incomplete.  The  assertion  :  "  My  judgment  is  true,"  amounts  so 
far  to  the  judgment :  "  I  have  companions,  other  selves  who  view 
the  same  object  from  other  points  of  view,  —  but  who,  as  others, 
are  still  so  one  with  myself  that  despite  their  variety  they  still 
ought  to  agree  with  me,  since  my  ought  is  theirs,  and  since  we 
are  but  various  functions  in  the  unity  of  one  knowing  process." 
All  this  implies  the  notion  of  the  ought,  a  notion  without  the 
consciousness  of  which  my  present  judgment,  as  we  have  seen, 
becomes  even  for  myself,  in  case  I  reflect,  a  vain  crooning,  a  mere 
wrinkling  of  the  countenance,  an  empty  pounding  of  my  desk,  a 
helpless  shouting  at  nobody  and  about  nothing.  But  this  ought, 
what  can  it  mean  ?  A  realist  would  say  :  "  It  means  that  if  you 
judge  falsely  about  the  independent  object,  the  independent  object 
will  perchance  eliminate  you  as  an  unfit  variation  from  the  evo- 
lutionary process,  or  will  in  any  case  catch  you  and  hold  you  to 
facts,  squirm  though  you  may."  This  realistic  view,  so  far  as  it 
is  sound  at  all,  obviously  denies  the  very  independence  which  it 
pretends  to  attribute  to  the  object.  Nothing  can  refute  me  but 
an  experience  that  is  in  unity  with  my  own,  and  that  is  a  function 
of  the  very  selfhood  which  is  expressed  in  me.  So  realism  must 
be  translated  into  conscious,  and  so,  apparently,  into  directly 


138  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

pragmatic  terms.  Plainly  the  ought  means  that  my  judging  ac- 
tivity has  a  purpose  that  goes  beyond  my  present  partial  expres- 
sion. In  other  words,  my  present  judging  activity  has  a  place  in 
a  process  of  experience  such  that  if  my  judgment,  despite  its 
present  success,  still  on  the  whole  and  in  the  end  fails,  this  process, 
of  which  the  judgment  itself  is  a  part,  contains  somewhere  con- 
scious contents  which  will  show  my  partial  failure.  But  since  no 
self  whose  purposes  are  foreign  to  mine,  or  are  in  any  way  such 
as  not  to  include  mine,  can  possibly  observe  my  failure  in  judg- 
ment, or  can  be  conscious  of  what  I  mean  and  how  and  where  I 
fail  of  my  own  purpose,  it  follows  that  to  say :  "  I  ought  to 
judge  thus  or  thus"  is  to  say  :  "  I  myself,  in  a  more  fully  en- 
lightened expression  of  myself,  am  so  constituted  as  to  detect 
whether  my  judgment  wholly  fulfills  or  only  partially  fulfills  my 
purpose."  But  to  say:  "We  companions,  who  judge  together 
the  same  object,  we  are  all  subject  to  the  same  ought,"  is  there- 
fore to  say:  "All  our  various  selves  are  functions  not  only  one 
of  another,  but  of  one  conscious  Self  that  somewhere  and  some- 
how pragmatically  constructs  an  expression  of  itself  in  the  light 
of  which  our  various  partial  expressions  are  judged."  Such  a 
self  I  need  just  in  so  far  as  I  need  my  judgment  to  be  true.  Such 
a  self  is  real  if  my  judgment  has  either  truth  or  falsity. 

But  now,  regarding  any  grade  or  type  of  socially  communing 
selves  that  might  have  reached,  from  various  points  of  view, 
such  judgments  regarding  their  common  objects  as  rightly  ex- 
pressed so  much  of  their  ought  as  had  yet  come  to  their  own  con- 
sciousness, the  same  question  that  we  have  now  repeatedly  asked 
about  our  present  selves  would  arise  afresh.  You  do  not  escape 
the  needs  which  pragmatism  feels  by  merely  multiplying  the 
judges,  while  leaving  them  all  finite.  Is  their  view  of  the  ought 
the  view  that  they  ought  to  hold  ?  Are  their  conscious  ways  of 
judging  this  object  only  the  expression  of  their  social,  but  still 
relative,  temporary,  passing,  unstable  point  of  view  ?  Mere  multi- 
plicity of  opinions  alters  not  in  kind  the  difficulty  that  first  arose 
in  our  path  as  we  studied  the  single  momentary  judgment.  I 
appeal  to  my  companions  to  confirm  my  judgment  in  case  I 
believe  my  judgment  to  be  true.  If  they  disagree,  I  appeal  to 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL  AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  139 

our  common  ought,  that  is,  to  our  consciousness  of  our  one  self- 
hood. But  even  if  my  companions  all  agree  with  me,  and  even 
if  we  all  believe  together  that  we  ought  to  agree,  we  shall  no 
sooner  see  this  to  be  our  common  pragmatic  attitude  towards  our 
experience  than  we  shall  need,  in  order  to  maintain  that  our 
common  judgment  is  actually  true,  to  face  the  further  question  : 
"  Is  there  possibly  any  other  point  of  view  than  ours  regarding 
this  object,  —  and  one  which  renders  ours  in  any  sense  false  ?  Is 
there  any  ought  that  a  still  more  inclusive  view  of  our  common 
purpose  would  see  to  be  still  higher  than  our  ought?"  If  there 
is,  then  our  common  judgment  is  merely  our  present  reaction, 
which  is  not  true  even  of  its  own  object.  We  shall  need,  I  say, 
need  in  the  pragmatic  sense,  to  seek  for  the  answer  to  these  ques- 
tions. The  penalty  of  not  being  able  to  answer  them  will  simply 
be  that  we  shall  have  to  call  our  intellectual  constructions,  so  far 
as  we  shall  then  have  reached  them,  mere  attitudes  of  ours,  and 
not  any  genuine  truths  at  all.  For  truth  is  conformity  to  an 
ought.  And  a  true  ought  is  one  that  from  every  point  of  view 
confirms  or  refutes.  Are  such  questions  in  themselves  answer- 
able ?  Does  the  real  world  contain  anywhere  the  experiences 
that  do  answer  them  ?  Is  there  any  final  ought  of  judgment  at 
all  ?  Upon  this  question  depends  the  whole  issue  as  to  whether 
you  and  I  ever  make  any  true  judgments  at  all,  or  for  that  matter, 
whether  we  make  any  false  judgments.  Truth  and  falsity  are 
indeed  relative  to  insight,  to  experience,  to  life,  to  action,  to  the 
constructions  which  pragmatism  emphasizes.  But  unless  these 
constructions  are  what  they  ought  to  be  they  are  not  true.  And 
unless  there  is  an  objective  ought  they  are  not  even  false.  But  if 
there  is  a  true  and  a  false,  then  there  is  a  view  for  which  the  ought 
is  known,  —  known  not  as  simply  a  single,  transient,  unstable, 
chance  point  of  view,  but  as  the  object  of  one  self-possessed  and 
inclusive  insight  such  that  it  remains  invariant  whatever  other 
points  of  view  you  attempt  to  conceive  added  to  it.  Such  an  insight 
would  belong  to  a  self  that  did  not  fail  to  include  pragmatisms 
of  all  kinds,  but  that  simply  and  consciously  included  them  all,  in 
such  wise  that  if  you  conceived  other  points  of  view,  other  reac- 
tions to  situations,  other  judgments  added,  no  change  would 


140  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

result  in  the  characterizations  of  its  object  which  this  self  could 
view  as  fitting,  permissible,  and  so  true.  For  the  ought  is  either 
a  real  ought  or  it  is  nothing.  A  judgment  has  its  place  in  a  com- 
plete system  of  truth,  or  else  it  is  not  true. 

Now  when  we  declare  that  our  judgments  are  true,  we  appeal 
to  such  a  self  to  confirm  them.  Of  such  an  appeal  our  desire 
for  social  support  and  comradeship  is  merely  a  special  instance, 
a  fragmentary  example.  When  we  doubt  whether  our  judg- 
ments are  true,  we  doubt  whether  such  a  self  does  confirm  them. 
When  we  need  to  call  our  judgments  true  or  false,  we  need  to 
conceive,  to  define,  to  address,  such  a  self.  If  there  is  such  a 
self,  then  there  is  truth.  If  there  is  no  such  self,  pragmatism 
can  truly  assert  nothing,  can  truly  deny  nothing,  stands  in  the 
presence  of  no  genuine  reality,  and  can  only  continue  to  be  con- 
scious of  how  it  wrinkles  its  wholly  unreal  countenance  in  the 
echoless  void,  where  its  assertions  meet  no  genuine  response, 
have  not  even  any  real  spectators,  and  are  meaningless  both  to 
God  and  to  man,  since  then  neither  man  nor  God  exists  to  fill  the 
void. 

But  if  there  is  such  a  self,  then  for  every  finite  instance  of  life 
pragmatism  remains  a  perfectly  genuine  truth, —  genuine  as  our 
ceaseless  longing  for  the  eternal  is  genuine, —  genuine  as  love  and 
aspiration  are  genuine.  Everything  expresses  itself  according  to 
its  momentary  light.  Everything  finite  passes,  changes,  evolves, 
asserts  itself  and  resigns  itself,  utters  rules  that  are  sincerely  meant 
to  be  authoritative,  but  gives  way  to  the  authority  of  its  own 
higher  expression.  Everything  is  practical ;  and  everything  seeks 
nothing  whatever  but  its  own  true  self,  which  is  the  Eternal. 

For  the  Eternal  is  not  that  which  merely  lasts  all  the  time. 
Only  abstractions  temporally  endure.  And  they  are  not  the  life  ; 
they  are  either  only  a  dead  image,  or  again,  they  are  only  an 
aspect  of  the  life.  That  alone  is  eternal  which  includes  all  the 
varying  points  of  view  in  the  unity  of  a  single  insight,  and  which 
knows  that  it  includes  them,  because  every  possible  additional 
point  of  view  would  necessarily  leave  this  insight  invariant. 

The  possibility  of  such  an  eternal  is,  of  course,  the  possibility 
of  the  existence,  in  a  genuine  sense  together,  as  a  totum  simul, 


No.  2.]         THE  ETERNAL   AND    THE  PRACTICAL.  141 

of  the  contents  of  an  infinite  series  of  practical  and  evolutionary 
processes.  I  have  elsewhere  set  forth  at  length  my  grounds  for 
believing  both  in  the  possibility  and  in  the  actuality  of  such  an 
eternal  existence.  It  is  not  my  purpose,  in  this  address,  however, 
to  expound  a  metaphysical  theory  for  its  own  sake.  I  have  de- 
sired merely  to  indicate  what  we  need  when  we  attempt  to  make 
true  assertions. 

I  conclude,  then,  First :  That  pragmatism  is  right  in  asserting 
that  every  judgment,  whatever  else  it  may  prove  to  be,  is  the  ex- 
pression of  a  present  activity,  determined  by  a  consciousness  of 
need,  is  responsive  to  this  need,  and  is  such  as  this  need  deter- 
mines, —  in  brief,  is  a  constructive  response  to  a  situation,  and  is 
not  a  mere  copying  of  an  externally  given  object. 

Secondly  :  That  nevertheless,  in  so  far  as  we  ourselves  observe 
that  our  present  judgment  has  only  this  character  of  being  our 
present  and  passing  response  to  a  given  situation,  we  find  that 
we  need  the  judgment  to  be  more  than  this.  This  need  is  the 
peculiar  need  that  our  judgment  should  be  not  only  ours  but  true. 

Thirdly  :  That  this  need  for  truth  is  the  need  that  there  should 
be  other  points  of  view,  other  actual  judgments,  responsive  to  the 
same  situation,  in  other  words,  to  the  same  object.  These  other 
points  of  view  we  first  conceive  as  belonging  to  ourselves  at  other 
times,  or  to  other  selves,  those  of  our  companions.  We  conceive 
that  all  these  judgments  ought,  despite  their  diversity  of  points  of 
view,  so  to  agree  as  to  confirm  one  another,  and  so  to  unite  in  one 
system  of  truth  as  to  characterize  harmoniously  the  same  object. 

Fourthly :  That  these  various  points  of  view  (in  order  thus  to 
harmonize)  and  this  ought  (in  order  to  hold  for  all  of  them)  must 
be  conceived  as  belonging  to,  and  as  being  included  within,  a 
single  self,  whose  partial  functions  these  various  selves  are,  and 
whose  common  conscious  purpose  defines  the  ought  to  which 
each  of  the  various  judgments  is  to  conform.  Such  a  self  we 
need  to  conceive  in  order  to  conceive  our  judgments  as  true  ;  and 
we  need  to  conceive  it  as  having  the  same  sort  of  embodiment  in 
concrete  experience  that  our  present  judgment  now  has. 

Fifthly :  Meanwhile,  in  so  far  as  we  conceive  this  self  as  like 
ourselves  transient,  passing,  variable, — its  inclusive  constructive 


I42  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

judgments  become  once  more  like  our  own,  not  genuinely  true, 
but  only  special  points  of  view,  which  determine  no  genuine 
ought,  and  which  are  mere  states  of  mind,  or  stages  of  its  ex- 
perience. Mere  magnitude  and  multiplicity  cannot  constitute  that 
aspect  of  consciousness  which  makes  possible  a  genuine  ought. 

Accordingly,  in  the  sixth  place,  in  order  to  conceive  our  judg- 
ments as  true,  we  need  to  conceive  them  as  partial  functions  of  a 
self  which  is  so  inclusive  of  all  possible  points  of  view  regarding 
our  object  as  to  remain  invariant  in  the  presence  of  all  conceivable 
additional  points  of  view,  and  so  conscious  of  its  own  finished 
and  invariable  purpose  as  to  define  an  ought  that  determines  the 
truth  or  falsity  of  every  possible  judgment  about  this  object. 

Seventhly,  and  lastly :  If  there  is  such  an  inclusive  and  in- 
variant self,  it  is  of  course  complete  at  no  moment  of  time.  It 
is  inclusive  of  all  temporal  processes  of  evolution  that  could  alter 
our  view  or  any  view  of  our  object.  Such  a  self  is  invariant  and 
eternal,  without  thereby  ceasing  at  any  and  every  point  of  time 
to  be  expressed  in  finite  and  practical  activities,  such  as  appear 
in  our  own  judgments.  If  there  is  such  a  self,  our  need  to  make 
judgments  that  can  be  true  or  false  is  satisfied.  If  there  is  no 
such  self,  no  judgment  is  either  true  or  false.  The  need  for  the 
Eternal  is  consequently  one  of  the  deepest  of  all  our  practical 
needs.  Herein  lies  at  once  the  justification  of  pragmatism,  and 
the  logical  impossibility  of  pure  pragmatism.  Everything  finite 
and  temporal  is  practical.  All  that  is  practical  borrows  its  truth 
from  the  Eternal. 

JOSIAH  ROYCE. 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 


ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS  :  II. 
INDUCTION. 

IN  a  former  article  the  general  character  and  presuppositions 
of  demonstration  (ebro^&c),  as  conceived  by  Aristotle,  were 
pointed  out.  It  is  the  aim  of  science  in  all  cases  to  discover  the 
'  cause  '  for  the  existence  of  a  certain  property  in  an  individual 
thing,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  to  show  '  why  '  the  thing  cannot 
but  have  this  property.  For  science,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term,  consists  entirely  in  the  comprehension  of  the  reason  why 
the  individual  possesses  certain  properties  in  common  with  all 
the  other  individuals  of  the  same  species.  Demonstration  is 
therefore  the  method  by  which  the  particular  property  found  to 
belong  to  a  thing  is  proved  to  be  essential  to  it,  in  virtue  of  the 
possession  by  the  thing  of  characteristics,  which  determine  that 
it,  in  common  with  other  things,  must  have  that  property.  Aris- 
totle's view  of  science  thus  implies  that  every  demonstration 
proper  presupposes  that  actual  things  have  in  them  something 
permanent  and  unchangeable.  It  is  true  that  things  are  found  to 
have  properties,  the  '  cause  '  of  which  cannot  be  determined  ;  but 
such  properties  do  not  fall  within  the  sphere  of  science. 

Demonstration,  however,  is  only  one  side  of  the  total  process 
of  knowledge.  It  is  not  self-sufficient,  but  presupposes  that  we 
already  in  a  certain  sense  have  knowledge.  For  no  proof  of 
'  cause '  can  be  given,  unless  the  common  and  peculiar  princi- 
ples assumed  in  demonstration  are  absolutely  true.  The  ques- 
tion therefore  arises,  how  we  obtain  the  principles  from  which 
the  special  sciences  start,  and  which  indeed  as  ultimate  cannot  be 
demonstrated  by  any  science.  This  leads  us  to  the  special  sub- 
ject of  the  present  article,  the  nature  of  induction,  and  its  rela- 
tions to  other  processes  of  knowledge. 

Starting  from  immediate  and  indemonstrable  principles,  demon- 
stration seeks  to  deduce  all  the  properties  which  belong  to  indi- 
vidual things  of  a  certain  genus.  But  these  things  and  proper- 
ties must  be  actually  known  to  exist,  or  there  can  be  no  '  cause ' 

143 


144  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

or  '  ground '  of  their  existence.  There  are,  therefore,  as  Aris- 
totle points  out,  four  questions  that  have  to  be  answered  before 
the  special  problem  of  science  can  be  solved  :  The  '  fact '  (ort), 
the  '  cause '  (dibrc),  whether  a  subject  is  (ec  £<TZY),  '  what '  it  is 
(re  Ian).  The  first  two  questions  are  concerned  with  things 
and  their  properties,  the  second  two  with  the  primary  prin- 
ciples from  which  these  properties  are  to  be  derived,  or  shown  to 
be  essential  to  the  things  in  question.  Strictly  speaking,  there- 
fore, science  (£niarJ]faj)  is  concerned  only  with  the  '  fact '  and  the 
'  cause  ' ;  for  only  these  are  capable  of  demonstration.  We  may 
even  say  that  science  proper  has  to  do  only  with  the  '  cause/ 
since  knowledge  of  the  '  fact,'  though  it  is  indispensable  to  the 
demonstration  of  the  '  cause/  does  not  yield  a  strictly  scientific 
judgment.1 

Now,  demonstration  of  the  '  fact '  consists  in  showing  that  a 
certain  property  belongs  to  a  thing  in  common  with  all  the  indi- 
viduals of  the  species  to  which  it  belongs.  Thus,  we  may  demon- 
strate that  vines  are  broad-leaved  because  they  belong  to  the  class 
of  deciduous  trees,  all  of  which  are  broad-leaved.  This  is  only 
proof  of  a  '  fact ' ;  we  have  not  demonstrated  the  '  cause/  for 
trees  are  not  broad-leaved  because  they  are  deciduous.2  We  do 
not  assign  the  '  cause '  when  we  show  that  one  property  is  the 
invariable  concomitant  of  another,  but  only  when  we  show  that 
one  property  is  the  necessary  ground  of  another.  In  demon- 
strating the  '  fact '  we  have  to  find  a  middle  term.  But  there  are 
cases  in  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  demonstrate  the  fact,  and 
when,  therefore,  science  can  immediately  go  on  to  demonstrate 
the  '  cause.'  This  takes  place  when  the  concomitance  of  two 
properties  is  obtainable  by  induction,  without  recourse  being  had 
to  demonstration.  "  It  is  only  when  perception  fails  us,"  says 
Aristotle,  "  that  we  have  to  ask  the  question  whether  a  thing  is 
so  or  not.  If  we  were  on  the  surface  of  the  moon,  we  should  not 
have  to  ask  whether  eclipses  occur,  or  why  they  occur ;  both  fact 
and  cause  would  be  simultaneously  apparent.  The  universal  law 

1  Post.  Anal. ,  89b  23-90*  34. 

2  No  doubt  Aristotle  sometimes  uses  the  term  '  cause  '  in  the  sense  of  the  ratio  cog- 
noscendi,  but  in  the  strict  sense  '  cause '  is  the  ratio  essendi. 


No.  2.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  145 

would  arise  to  our  knowledge  from  the  visible  phenomena.     The 
present  interference  of  the  earth  is  visible  to  us  ;  the  simultaneous 
failure  of  light  is  also  apparent ;  the  universal  principle  would 
then  be  seized."  l    At  first  sight  this  passage  seems  to  assert  that 
'  both  fact  and  cause  '  are  discovered  by  perception.     But  this  is 
not  Aristotle's  meaning ;  what  he  wishes  to  show  is  merely  that 
induction  obtains  from  perception  the  data  for  the  conclusion  that 
there  is  a  concomitance  of  two  facts,  —  failure  of  light  in  the  moon 
and  the  interposition  of  the  earth.     For  induction  cannot  estab- 
lish a  '  cause '  and  still  less  can  perception  do  so.2     That  this  is 
Aristotle's  meaning  is  plain  from  another  passage,  in  which  he  uses 
precisely  the  same  illustration  :  "  Even  if  we  stood  upon  the  moon 
and  saw  the  earth  obstructing  it,  we  should  not  know  the  cause 
of  the  eclipse ;  we  should  only  perceive  the  phenomenon  of  the 
eclipse ;  the  cause  of  it  we  should  not  know  in  its  universality ; 
for   what  we    perceived   was    not   the    universal    principle.      Of 
course,  if  we   frequently  contemplated    the    occurrence  of  the 
fact,  we  should  get  on  the  track  of  the  universal  principle  and 
should  be  able  to  demonstrate   it ;  for  in  several  particular  oc- 
currences the  universal  becomes  manifest."       Aristotle's  view, 
then,  is  that    while  we  can  by  induction   obtain   a  knowledge 
of  the   concomitance  of  two  facts,  we  cannot  in  this  way  dis- 
pense with   demonstration ;  for   only  by  demonstration   can  we 
convert  a  mere  concomitance  into  a  causal  connection.     There 
are  cases,  however,  as  he  indicates,  in  which  induction  enables  us 
to  dispense  with  a  demonstration  of  the  '  fact.'     How  we  obtain 
a  knowledge  of  the  '  fact '  is  not  the  important  thing  ;  it  may 
be  through  induction  from  observed  facts,  or  it  may  be  by  syllo- 
gistic inference  from  facts  ;  but  in  all  cases  we  must  be  sure  of 
the  fact  before  we  have   any  ground  for  valid  demonstration  of 
the  cause,  and  we  cannot  even  demonstrate  a  fact  except  from 
knowledge  supplied  by  induction.     The  problem  of  science  is  to 
determine  the  essential  properties  of  things,  i.  e.,  to  show  why 
things  must  have  certain  properties,  and  this  problem  cannot  be 

»0/.  <•*/.,  90*  25-30. 

2  Ibid.,  I  c.  5  ;  cf.  II,  c.  7,  p2b  1-2  ;  I,  c.  xxxi. 
*J6M.,  87*  39-88*5. 


146  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

solved  unless  we  know  that  things  actually  have  those  proper- 
ties.    Induction  must  therefore  precede  demonstration. 

The  precise  relation  of  induction  to  demonstration  is,  however, 
not  free  from  difficulty.  An  induction  is  complete  when,  by  an 
examination  of  various  particulars,  we  are  enabled  to  reach  a 
proposition  which  is  true  without  exception  (xara  Travroc).  On 
the  other  hand,  Aristotle  distinctly  states  that  induction  can 
never  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  proposition  truly  '  universal ' 
(xaObXoo),  i.  e.,  one  which  is  true  of  all  the  members  of  a  class, 
true  essentially,  and  true  of  the  class  as  such.  How,  then,  is 
the  transition  to  be  made  from  the  inductive  result,  which  only 
establishes  the  '  fact/  and  the  demonstrative  conclusion,  which 
reveals  the  cause  ?  To  answer  this  question,  we  must  consider 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  Does  the  existence  of  an  effect 
necessarily  imply  the  existence  of  one,  and  only  one  cause? 
Thus,  if  there  is  an  eclipse  of  the  moon,  must  there  also  be  in- 
terposition of  the  earth  ?  If  trees  are  deciduous,  must  coagula- 
tion of  their  sap  take  place  ?  Aristotle's  answer  is  that  wherever 
we  have  discovered  the  real  or  essential  ground,  the  cause  and  the 
effect  are  necessarily  reciprocal ;  in  other  words,  there  is  only 
one  cause  and  one  effect.  Thus,  we  do  not  demonstrate  the 
cause  of  eclipse,  unless  we  show  that  it  takes  place  only  when 
there  is  interposition.1  But,  while  every  demonstration  of  cause 
is  based  upon  the  necessary  connection  of  the  cause  assigned 
with  the  given  effect,  we  usually  begin  by  discovering  an  invari- 
able concomitance  of  two  attributes.  In  this  case  we  may  not 
have  reached  the  '  cause';  for  though  the  invariable  concomitance 
of  two  phenomena  may  usually  be  taken  to  indicate  a  causal 
connection,  this  is  not  always  the  case,  nor  can  we  ever  conclude 
from  invariable  concomitance  to  necessary  connection.  Thus,  we 
may  discover  by  induction  that  those  trees  which  are  deciduous 
are  also  broad-leaved  ;  but  we  cannot  conclude  that  the  '  cause  ' 
of  their  being  deciduous  is  that  they  are  broad-leaved ;  the 
'  cause  '  is  in  fact  the  coagulation  of  the  sap  in  winter  in  this  class 
of  trees.  Wherever,  therefore,  we  do  not  discover  a  single 
cause  of  a  given  effect,  we  have  not  discovered  the  real  cause, 

1 Op.  cit.,  98*  35-b24. 


No.  2.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  147 

but  only  an  invariable  concomitant.  A  plurality  of  'causes,' 
when  the  term  '  cause  '  is  taken  in  its  proper  sense  as  that  without 
which  the  effect  cannot  be,  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.1  It  fol- 
lows that  induction  can  never  of  itself  prove  the  cause.  An  in- 
ductive syllogism  is  defined  by  Aristotle  as  one  in  which  we 
"  conclude  by  means  of  the  minor  term  that  the  major  term  is 
predicable  of  the  middle  ";  in  other  words,  it  is  the  process  by 
which  we  conclude  from  observed  facts  that  an  attribute  found  in 
all  of  these  is  invariably  conjoined  with  some  other  attribute 
found  in  all  of  them.2  We  find,  e.  g.,  that  man,  horse,  mule, 
etc.,  are  long-lived  ;  we  also  learn  by  induction  that  they  are  gall- 
less  ;  and  we  conclude  that  all  gall-less  animals  are  long-lived. 
Since  man,  horse,  mule,  etc.,  constitute  the  whole  of  the  species 
'  gall-less,'  the  minor  premise  may  be  converted  simply.  Thus 
we  obtain  the  syllogism  : 

Man,  horse,  mule,  etc.,  are  long-lived, 

The  gall -less  animals  are  man,  horse,  mule,  etc., 

Therefore,  the  gall-less  animals  are  long-lived. 

But,  though  in  this  way  we  establish  the  concomitance  of  the 
attributes  '  gall-less '  and  '  long-lived,'  we  do  not  thereby  prove 
that  '  gall-lessness '  is  the  'cause'  of  'long-life.'  The  inductive 
syllogism  only  enables  us  to  assert  that  '  gall-less '  and  '  long- 
lived  '  are  attributes  invariably  found  in  certain  animals,  not  to 
connect  the  attributes  as  cause  and  effect.  Induction  can  never 
establish  causal  connection.  Even  if  we  could  learn  from  induc- 
tive observation  that  isosceles,  scalene,  and  equilateral  triangles 
contain  two  right  angles,  we  should  only  establish  the  '  fact,'  not 
the  '  cause.' 3 

Now,  if  induction  never  takes  us  beyond  the  fact  of  concomi- 
tance, how  is  the  universal  principle  obtained  ?  It  it  obtained, 
Aristotle  answers,  by  the  direct  grasp  of  the  mind  (vouc)  which 
detects  in  the  concomitance  of  attributes  the  cause  or  ground. 

lop.dt.,  98"  25-99*  4. 

1  In  De  Part.  Antm.,  IV,  2,  Aristotle  says  that  induction  proves  the  «  cause.' 
This,  however,  can  only  be  reconciled  with  his  other  statements  by  supposing  that  in- 
duction includes  the  grasp  by  thought  ( wwf )  of  the  principle  involved  in  the  induction. 

3  Ana!.  Pr.,  II,  c.  23.     Cf.  Anal.  Post.,  I,  74*  25-33. 


148  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Having  obtanied  in  this  way  our  universal  principle,  we  are  able 
to  demonstrate  the  cause  in  regular  syllogistic  form.1  The  test 
of  our  having  really  obtained  the  principle  seems  to  be  that  it, 
and  only  it,  explains  the  fact,  though  it  can  hardly  be  said  that 
Aristotle  makes  this  clear.  In  any  case,  Aristotle's  doctrine  is 
that  induction  prepares  the  way  for  demonstration  by  revealing 
concomitant  phenomena,  the  transition  to  demonstration  being 
made  by  the  direct  intuition  of  the  principle  involved  in  the  vari- 
ous particulars. 

Though  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  the  transition  from  inva- 
riable concomitance  to  absolute  invariability  is  hard  to  justify,  it 
must  be  said,  in  defence  of  Aristotle,  that  his  doctrine  is  based 
upon  the  principle  that  nature  is  not  a  sphere  in  which  pure  con- 
tingency prevails,  but  is  on  the  whole  subject  to  law.  This, 
indeed,  is  a  presupposition  for  which  Aristotle  can  supply  no  ade- 
quate justification  ;  but,  granting  its  truth,  it  is  natural  to  suppose 
that  when  by  induction  we  have  discovered  certain  invariable 
conjunctions,  the  mind  is  able  to  seize  upon  the  universal  princi- 
ple which  these  conjunctions  suggest.  All  that  Aristotle,  how- 
ever, can  say  in  justification  of  the  transition  from  the  general  to 
the  universal,  from  '  fact '  to  '  cause,'  is  that  when  we  are  unable 
to  find  another  middle  term  without  going  beyond  the  class  in 
which  our  inquiries  are  carried  on,  we  must  accept  the  last  middle 
term  reached  as  expressing  the  cause.  Having  reached  this  stage, 
we  demonstrate  that  the  subject  under  consideration  must  have 
the  property  which  we  already  know  it  to  possess  by  connecting 
that  property  with  the  middle  term  or  '  cause.' 

Since  the  '  cause,'  or  at  least  the  '  formal  cause,'  is  identical 
with  the  definition  of  the  property,  it  may  be  said  that  the  object 
of  demonstration  is  to  enable  us  to  define  what  the  property  in 
question  is.  We  have  therefore  to  ask  what  is  the  general  rela- 
tion of  demonstration  to  definition.  In  seeking  to  answer  this 
question,  Aristotle  begins  with  a  '  dialectical '  treatment,  i.  e.,  he 

1  Thus,  if  '  gall-lessness '  is  the  '  cause '  of  '  long-life '  in  quadrupeds,  we  can  form 
the  demonstrative  syllogism : 

All  gall-less  animals  are  long-lived. 
Quadrupeds  are  gall-less  animals. 
Therefore,  quadrupeds  are  long-lived. 


No.  2.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR    ANALYTICS.  149 

starts  from  the  ordinary  view  of  definition  as  a  finished  product, 
which  is  independent  of  demonstration.  From  this  point  of  view 
not  only  does  definition  seem  to  have  no  relation  to  demonstra- 
tion, but  it  is  hard  to  see  how  it  can  be  justified  at  all.  A  defi- 
nition presupposes  the  existence  of  that  which  is  defined,  and 
though  we  can  understand  how  the  existence  of  objects  corre- 
sponding to  the  elementary  conceptions  of  a  science  may  be 
postulated,  we  cannot  postulate  the  existence  of  a  cause,  which 
is  only  known  as  the  result  of  a  demonstration,  as  is  the  case  in 
all  demonstrations  which  establish  a  cause  extraneous  to  the 
subject.  If  we  could  define  '  eclipse '  prior  to  demonstration, 
why  should  any  demonstration  be  needed  ?  Moreover,  definition 
is  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  unity,  containing  no  distinction  of  subject 
and  predicate,  whereas  demonstration  has  to  show  that  a  certain 
predicate  belongs  to  a  subject,  not  in  itself,  but  in  its  relation  to 
something  else.1 

After  this  dialectical  treatment,  Aristotle  proceeds  to  give  his 
own  solution.  Definition  only  seems  to  have  no  connection 
with  demonstration,  because  the  essence  of  the  thing  defined  is 
viewed  in  separation  from  the  concrete  nature  of  the  thing. 
But,  in  truth,  the  essence  is  the  reason  of  the  fact,  from  which  it 
cannot  be  separated  ;  and  therefore  it  can  only  be  discovered 
after  a  distinction  has  been  made  between  the  fact  and  the  reason 
of  the  fact.  Hence,  while  the  essence  or  cause  cannot  be  demon- 
strated, —  since  a  demonstration  of  it  would  mean  that  it  could  be 
brought  under  a  higher  conception,  —  it  is  only  when  demonstra- 
tion has  shown  the  necessary  connection  of  a  given  property  with 
its  cause  that  we  are  able  to  define  that  property.  The  definition 
of  the  property  is  therefore  subsequent  to  the  demonstration  of  its 
cause,  and,  indeed,  only  differs  verbally  from  the  demonstration. 
The  definition  is  in  this  case  just  the  succinct  statement  of  the 
demonstration  ;  eclipse,  e.  g.,  is  *  withdrawal  of  light  by  inter- 
position of  an  opaque  body.'  There  are  definitions,  however, 
which  are  prior  to  demonstration,  and  indeed  cannot  be  reached 
by  demonstration,  viz.,  the  definition  of  the  primary  elements  of 
a  genus,  as  we  find  them,  e.  g.,  in  geometry.  Merely  verbal 

1  Anal.  Post.,  cs.  3-7. 


150  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIIL 

definitions,  again,  are  preparatory  to  these  two  classes  of  defi- 
nition. It  is  thus  evident  that  real  definition,  like  demonstration, 
is  based  upon  the  essential  or  rational  ground  of  a  thing.1 

Now,  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  that  which  determines  the  char- 
acteristics by  which  individual  things  are  assigned  to  a  certain 
class ;  and  it  is,  therefore,  important  to  determine  the  sum  of  at- 
tributes which  constitute  the  conception  of  the  thing.  To  dis- 
cover the  definition  of  a  thing,  we  must  find  the  primary  genus 
and  the  attributes  belonging  as  a  whole  to  all  the  individuals  of 
a  species,  but  to  no  other  individuals.  This  constitutes  the  defi- 
nition of  the  thing.  The  definition,  therefore,  contains  the  genus 
and  the  specific  attribute  or  attributes.  Thus,  the  definition  of 
the  '  triad  '  is  a  '  number,  odd,  prime,'  —  a  sum  of  marks  which 
is  found  in  every  '  triad/  but  in  no  other  species  of  the  genus 
'  number.'  Since  the  specific  difference  is  the  main  thing  to  be 
attended  to  in  definition,  we  should  divide  the  genus  into  species 
in  accordance  with  these  three  rules  :  (i)  The  divisions  should  be 
based  upon  oppositions  actually  found  in  nature ;  (2)  we  should 
descend  in  regular  order  from  the  less  to  the  more  specific ;  (3) 
we  should  carry  on  the  division  until  we  reach  the  characteristic 
or  characteristics  which  constitute  the  lowest  species.  Division 
by  dichotomy  is,  therefore,  rather  barren  in  results,  for  nothing  is 
learned  from  mere  negatives  ;  the  true  method  of  division  is  to 
follow  the  natural  divisions  of  things  themselves.  Nor  is  there 
any  real  force  in  the  objection  of  Speusippus,  that  a  complete 
definition  demands  an  exhaustive  knowledge  of  all  the  individuals 
falling  under  a  genus.  For,  in  the  first  place,  we  do  not  need  to 
know  accidental  attributes,  which  do  not  affect  the  essence  of  a 
thing  ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  we  are  entitled,  in  accordance 
with  the  law  of  contradiction,  to  exclude  the  sum  of  attributes 
belonging  to  the  excluded  species,  and  thus  we  reach  the  attri- 
butes found  as  a  whole  only  in  the  species  defined.2 

We  have  seen  that  the  middle  term  of  a  demonstrative  syllo- 
gism may  be  (i)  the  'essence'  or  'formal  cause.'  But  besides 
the  formal  cause  the  middle  term  may  be  (2)  the  material  cause, 

*  Op.  «/.,  93*  30-94*  19. 

2  Ibid. ,  96*  22~97b  6. 


No.  2.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  151 

(3)  the  efficient  cause,  (4)  the  final  cause.  In  illustration  of  (2), 
the  '  material  cause,'  Aristotle  cites  the  demonstration  that  the 
angle  in  a  semicircle  is  a  right  angle.  The  '  matter '  here  spoken 
of  is  space,  which  is  capable  of  being  analyzed  into  its  elements. 
Such  an  analysis  is  performed,  when  it  is  ideally  divided,  by 
drawing  a  perpendicular  upon  a  straight  line,  the  space  being 
thus  divided  into  two  right  angles.  The  demonstration  in  Euclid, 
III,  31,  assumes  as  middle  term  "the  half  of  two  right  angles," 
and  thus  we  get  the  major  premise,  "  the  half  of  two  right  angles 
is  a  right  angle."  This  being  a  primary  proposition,  it  cannot  be 
demonstrated,  but  is  obtained  by  the  direct  intuition  of  the  figure. 
It  is  then  proved  that  the  angle  in  a  semicircle  is  equal  to  the 
half  of  two  right  angles ;  and  thus  we  obtain  the  conclusion  that 
it  is  a  right  angle.  The  middle  term,  again,  may  be  (3)  the  effi- 
cient cause.  As  an  illustration  Aristotle  gives  the  syllogism  : 

All  aggressors  are  naturally  subject  to  attack  from  those  they 
assail. 

The  Athenians  were  the  aggressors  in  assailing  the  Persians. 

Therefore,  the  Athenians  were  subject  to  attack  from  the  Per- 
sians. 

Lastly,  the  middle  term  may  be  (4)  the  l  final  cause.'  Aris- 
totle at  once  illustrates  the  final  cause,  and  shows  its  contrast  to 
the  efficient  cause.  In  the  syllogism  of  efficient  cause,  we  begin 
with  the  action  and  go  on  to  the  result ;  in  the  syllogism  of  final 
cause,  we  begin  with  the  '  end,'  and  go  back  through  the  means 
for  its  accomplishment.  Thus  we  have  the  two  syllogisms  : 

(1)  Good  digestion  promotes  health. 

Walking  after  dinner  promotes  good  digestion. 
Therefore,  walking  after  dinner  promotes  health. 

(2)  Healthy  men  have  good  digestions. 
Walking  after  dinner  makes  men  healthy. 

Therefore,  walking  after  dinner  promotes  good  digestion.1 

We  have  already  seen  how  induction  is  related  to  demonstra- 
tion in  those  cases  in  which  the  cause  is  extraneous  to  the  sub- 
1  Op.  cit.,  94a  21-95*  9. 


152  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

ject  under  consideration.  Here  induction  prepares  the  material 
for  demonstration  by  proving  the  invariable  concomitance  of  two 
phenomena,  thus  enabling  the  mind  by  an  intuitive  act  to  seize 
upon  the  universal  principle  necessary  for  a  demonstration  of  the 
cause.  But  induction  performs  a  still  more  important  service  in 
the  interest  of  deduction  :  it  is  by  means  of  it  that  the  special 
principles  from  which  a  given  science  reasons  are  discovered, 
though  the  discovery  is  not  made  by  induction,  but  by  the  intel- 
ligence itself.  Now,  these  principles,  as  we  know,  themselves 
presuppose  certain  common  principles  or  axioms,  and  we  have 
therefore  to  enquire  whether  these  also  are  obtained  through  the 
instrumentality  of  induction,  and,  if  not,  how  they  are  established. 
Can  we  justify  the  assumption  tacitly  made  by  every  special 
science  that  the  common  principles  or  axioms  are  absolutely  true  ? 
What,  for  example,  to  take  a  typical  instance,  is  the  rational 
ground  for  the  assumption  of  the  principle  of  contradiction  ?  No 
doubt  this  principle  is  seldom  or  never  explicitly  appealed  to,  but 
it  is  always  tacitly  assumed.  No  principle  has  the  same  degree 
of  importance ;  for  by  its  removal  the  whole  edifice  of  knowledge 
must  fall  in  ruins.  Can  we  then  show  ground  for  our  assumption 
of  its  absolute  truth  ?  The  axiom  states  that  if  a  thing  exists 
or  has  a  certain  attribute,  it  cannot  at  the  same  time  not  exist,  or 
not  have  that  attribute.  On  this  law  of  things  Aristotle  bases 
the  correspondent  law  of  thought,  that,  if  a  thing  is  affirmed  to 
exist  or  to  have  a  certain  attribute,  it  cannot  be  denied  to  exist 
or  to  have  that  attribute.  As  Aristotle's  general  doctrine  is 
that  the  truth  of  a  judgment  is  determined  by  its  correspondence 
with  that  which  is,  obviously  the  law  of  contradiction  is  primarily 
a  law  of  being.  His  view  is  not  that  things  must  conform  to  the 
law  of  contradiction,  because  thought  cannot  at  once  affirm  and 
deny ;  but  that  thought  cannot  at  once  affirm  and  deny,  because 
to  do  so  is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  things.  For,  if  a 
thinking  subject  may  at  once  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing,  it 
follows  that  the  same  thing  (the  thinking  subject)  may  at  the 
same  time  have  two  contradictory  attributes,  which  is  a  violation 
of  the  law  of  contradiction.  Now,  the  truth  of  this  law  may  be 
proved  in  a  certain  sense  by  showing  the  untenability  of  the  oppo- 


No.  2.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  153 

site  doctrine,  and  especially  by  a  presentation  of  the  absurd  con- 
sequences of  that  doctrine  ;  but  it  cannot,  properly  speaking,  be 
demonstrated.  Nor  can  it  be  reached  by  a  process  of  induction  ; 
for,  unless  its  truth  is  presupposed,  there  can  be  no  induction. 
This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  possessed  by  the  mind  prior  to  all 
experience,  but  only  that  its  truth  is  directly  grasped  by  the  in- 
telligence (vo5c)  as  involved  in  even  the  simplest  knowledge  of 
real  things.1 

When  Aristotle  comes  to  consider  the  basis  of  the  special  prin- 
ciples presupposed  in  the  several  sciences,  he  finds  it  more  diffi- 
cult to  give  a  satisfactory  answer.  The  problem  may  be  put  in 
this  way  :  If  each  science  presupposes  the  existence  and  defini- 
tion of  its  principles,  how  is  this  assumption  to  be  justified  ?  Or, 
since  our  problem  rather  is  how  the  existence  and  definition  of 
all  the  conceptions,  primary  and  subordinate,  can  be  legitimately 
assumed  in  demonstration,  we  have  to  ask  by  what  right  the 
truth  of  those  conceptions  is  so  assumed.  For,  though  we  can 
•demonstrate  that  a  given  subject  can  only  have  a  certain  prop- 
erty, because  that  property  is  involved  in  the  essence  of  the  spe- 
cies to  which  it  belongs,  or  is  inseparably  connected  with  an 
essential  property  of  the  class  to  which  it  belongs,  we  cannot 
demonstrate  the  essence  of  the  species,  or  the  definition  of  the 
property.  This  is  the  question  with  which  Aristotle  is  occupied 
in  the  last  chapter  of  the  Posterior  Analytics. 

Now,  we  know  that  science  is  impossible  unless  the  first  prin- 
ciples from  which  demonstration  starts  are  absolutely  true. 
How,  then,  are  those  principles  known  to  be  true  ?  Have  we  an 
innate  knowledge  of  them,  though  it  exists  at  first  in  an  uncon- 
scious form  ?  In  other  words,  is  the  mind  unconsciously  in  pos- 
session of  such  conceptions  as  'line,'  'triangle/  'circle,'  and 
does  it  obtain  a  definition  of  them  by  mere  analysis  ?  This  view 
can  hardly  be  accepted,  involving  as  it  does  the  absurdity  that 
we  are  unconscious  of  conceptions  without  which  demonstration  is 
impossible,  and  the  knowledge  of  which  is,  therefore,  the  presup- 
position of  all  demonstration.  Aristotle,  with  his  doctrine  that 
truth  consists  in  a  knowledge  of  the  actual  nature  of  things, 


154  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII, 

could  not  possibly  accept  a  view  which  derives  the  principles  of 
all  knowledge  from  ideas  that  cannot  be  shown  to  have  any  rela- 
tion to  actual  things.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  admit  that  knowl- 
edge of  these  principles  is  acquired,  how  has  this  knowledge  been 
obtained  ?  It  is  no  doubt  true  that  science  assumes  their  truth  ;; 
but  science  is  knowledge  which  exists  in  a  reflective  form  ;  and 
all  reflective  knowledge,  as  we  know,  is  '  derived  from  knowl- 
edge that  we  already  have.'  How  then  does  science  come  to 
have  this  prior  knowledge  ?  It  cannot  suddenly  come  into 
existence  out  of  absolute  ignorance  ;  as  in  other  cases,  there 
must  be  a  process  by  which  an  advance  is  made  from  implicit  to 
explicit  knowledge. 

It  is  thus  obvious  that  we  must  possess  a  peculiar  faculty  by 
which  we  are  brought  into  direct  contact  with  things,  and  this 
faculty  is  perception,  which  is  '  an  inborn  faculty  of  discriminat- 
ing '  the  sensible  properties  of  things.  Perception,  however,  is 
not  yet  the  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  science  ;  for  it  does  not 
tell  us  what  are  the  essential  as  distinguished  from  the  accidental 
properties  of  things.  It  is  only  through  induction  that  from 
the  confused  knowledge  of  perception  there  emerges  a  knowledge 
of  the  essential  determinations  of  things.  But  without  percep- 
tion no  induction  would  be  possible.  It  is  indeed  obvious  that 
the  lack  of  a  sense  would  shut  us  out  from  a  special  kind  of 
knowledge.  If  we  were  devoid  of  the  sense  of  sight,  how  could, 
we  have  a  science  of  optics  ?  If  we  had  no  sense  of  hearing,  how 
could  there  be  a  science  of  harmonics  ?  Induction,  therefore, 
presupposes  perception  ;  given  perception,  and  we  can  understand 
how  by  a  process  of  induction  the  conceptions  postulated  by 
demonstrative  science  may  be  obtained ;  but  without  induction 
there  can  be  no  demonstration.  Even  the  abstract  elements  with 
which  mathematics  deals  presuppose  the  inductive  process  by 
which  they  are  obtained.  If  this  is  true  of  mathematics,  it  is  still 
more  obvious  in  the  case  of  those  sciences  which  deal  with  con- 
crete things  and  events.  No  doubt  Aristotle,  in  a  passage  already 
referred  to,  speaks  as  if  perception  may  in  some  cases  do  the 
work,  not  only  of  induction,  but  even  of  demonstration.  But 
perception  can  never  of  itself  reveal  the  '  cause  '  of  a  fact.  Even  if 


No.  2.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR   ANALYTICS.  155 

we  could  see  the  pores  in  glass  and  observe  light  passing  through 
them,  we  should  not  get  beyond  the  fact  that  the  light  of  the 
lantern  perceived  is  in  this  case  due  to  the  porous  nature  of  glass  ; 
to  obtain  the  general  principle  we  must  have  repeated  percep- 
tions, and  the  activity  of  thought  (voDc)  by  which  the  law  is 
seized.  Induction  is  thus  in  all  cases  necessary  in  the  discovery 
of  a  principle.  To  perceive  that  which  is  in  the  strict  sense  uni- 
versal is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  perception,  which  is 
limited  to  the  apprehension  of  particular  phenomena  in  a  particu- 
lar place  and  at  a  particular  time.  Nor  can  induction  from 
repeated  perception  be  completed  without  the  intuitive  grasp  by 
thought  (voDc)  of  the  universal  principle.1 

Aristotle  tells  us  the  steps  by  which  the  transition  is  made  from 
sensible  perception  to  the  grasp  of  principles.  There  is  in  man, 
and  indeed  in  all  animals,  an  '  inborn  faculty  of  discrimination  ' 
which  we  call  sensible  perception.  This  faculty,  however,  only 
supplies  the  material  for  a  higher  stage  of  knowledge,  when,  as 
in  man,  some  trace  of  what  is  given  in  sense  is  retained  in  the 
soul  by  memory.  Experience,  again,  is  memory  working  in 
accordance  with  mechanical  laws  of  association,  and  many  suc- 
cessive .pictures  of  memory  are  required  to  make  a  single  experi- 
ence. In  experience  the  mind  simply  works  with  a  rule,  as  when 
the  empirical  physician,  finding  that  a  certain  remedy  cured  Callias 
Socrates,  and  others  of  a  particular  disease,  prescribes  it  in  the 
case  of  a  new  patient.  From  experience,  again,  art  and  science 
arise  when  the  law  implied  in  the  empirical  rule  is  definitely 
grasped  by  thought,  and  is  thus  seen  to  be  applicable  to  all  the 
individuals  which  have  certain  features  in  common.  Thus,  at  the 
stage  of  art,  the  physician  prescribes  for  a  particular  disease  in 
accordance  with  the  law  which  applies  to  all  individuals  suffering 
from  it.  We  thus  learn,  on  the  one  hand,  that  there  is  no  innate 
knowledge  of  principles,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  knowl- 
edge of  principles  is  not  derived  from  some  higher  form  of  knowl- 
edge, but  is  evolved  from  perception  by  the  activity  of  the  mind 
in  grasping  the  principle  presupposed  in  perception.  We  may 
compare  the  process  by  which  a  principle  becomes  known  to  us 

1  Anal.  Post.,  99*  22-35  5  8lb  3~9  J  9°b  26-30 ;  8;b  39-88"  6  ;  88a  12-16. 


156  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

to  the  way  in  which  order  is  restored  in  a  battle  after  a  rout. 
First  one  man  stops  in  his  flight,  then  another,  then  one  more, 
until  there  is  a  nucleus  for  real  work.  Similarly,  the  flow  of  fugi- 
tive impressions  stops  at  one  point ;  a  similar  impression  comes 
along,  is  arrested  by  the  first,  and  reinforces  it ;  thus,  after  a  time, 
there  is  formed  a  single  experience.  This  supplies  the  starting- 
point  for  the  conscious  process  by  which  a  system  of  conceptions 
is  formed.1 

The  formation  of  conceptions  may  be  further  explained  as 
follows  :  The  object  of  perception  is  always  a  sensible  thing  as 
here  and  now,  in  which  accidental  and  essential  qualities  are  not 
as  yet  discriminated.  Nevertheless,  the  repetition  of  perceptions 
naturally  leaves  in  the  soul  the  conception  of  what  is  common 
to  a  number  of  individuals.  In  this  way,  after  a  number  of  in- 
dividual men  have  been  observed,  there  remains  fixed  in  con- 
sciousness the  general  idea  of '  man/  the  special  characteristics 
of  Callias,  Socrates,  and  others  having  dropped  out  of  view. 
When  a  number  of  such  universals  are  formed,  higher  and  higher 
universals  arise,  until  a  universal  which  falls  under  no  higher 
conception  is  obtained.  We  begin,  for  example,  with  this  or 
that  species  of  animal,  advance  to  animal  in  general,  and  so  to 
living  being.  This  is  the  natural  process  of  abstraction  in  the 
formation  of  conceptions  ;  and  induction,  as  Aristotle  himself  tells 
us,  is  just  the  conscious  imitation  of  this  natural  process.  Hence 
the  principles  obtained  by  induction  must  be  derived  from  per- 
ception, though  the  intuitive  grasp  of  thought  is  always  implied.2 

We  may  sum  up  Aristotle's  view  of  induction  somewhat  as  fol- 
lows :  (i)  Induction  comes  to  the  aid  of  demonstration  either  by 
supplying  the  materials  necessary  for  the  demonstration  of  a 
'fact/  or  by  itself  establishing  the  concomitance  in  a  class  of 
things  of  certain  attributes.  (2)  No  definition  of  an  essential 
property,  as  distinguished  from  the  essence  of  a  thing,  can  be 
gained  by  induction  ;  this  can  be  effected  only  by  the  aid  of 
demonstration,  which  brings  to  light,  though  it  does  not  prove, 
the  cause  of  the  property.  (3)  Induction,  however,  is  closely  re- 

1  Op.  dt.,  99b  35-1 09a  2. 
2 Ibid.,  looa  3-ioob  17. 


No.  2.]         ARISTOTLE'S  POSTERIOR  ANALYTICS.  157 

lated  to  the  real  definition  of  the  primary  conceptions,  which  form 
the  basis  of  all  demonstration.  Definition  in  this  case  is  a  state- 
ment of  the  essential  content  of  things.  Now,  our  knowledge  of 
this  content  is  derived  in  the  first  instance  from  the  natural  process 
of  abstraction  (d<p ai psmz).  From  the  perception  of  individuals 
there  gradually  emerges,  in  the  way  already  explained,  the  con- 
ceptions which  ordinary  language  indicates  by  class-names,  e.  g.y 
'  man/  '  animal/  '  living  being/  With  this  process  of  abstraction 
induction  cannot  be  identified ;  but  the  two  processes  differ  mainly 
in  the  fact  that  abstraction  is  prior  to  reflective  thought,  whereas 
induction  is  essentially  reflective  and  proceeds  by  a  definite 
method.  In  many  cases,  therefore,  induction  starts  from  the 
conceptions  already  formed,  and  marked  by  a  name,  and  em- 
ploys these  as  a  guide  in  its  movement  upward  to  universals. 
Even  when  it  does  so,  however,  the  meaning  of  the  conceptions 
formed  by  abstraction  must  not  only  be  made  clear  and  dis- 
tinct by  analysis,  but  they  have  in  many  cases  to  be  rectified,  so 
that  induction  is  in  a  sense  a  re-formation  of  conceptions.  The 
complete  process  of  induction,  indeed,  always  presupposes  that  the 
ground  already  traversed  by  abstraction  should  be  gone  over 
again,  and  thus  induction  is  the  virtual  establishment  of  a  new 
hierarchy  of  conceptions.  Besides,  there  are  cases  in  which  we 
have  not  even  a  name  by  which  to  designate  an  important  con- 
ception ;  and  induction  has  therefore  to  form  the  conception  for 
the  first  time,  as,  e.  g.y  when  it  constitutes  the  new  conception  of 
*  ruminants/1  (4)  What  constitutes  the  distinctive  character  of 
induction  is  that  it  is  the  process  towards  the  first  principles  of 
science.  For,  in  all  its  operations,  it  is  guided  by  the  end  towards 
which  it  is  directed,  —  the  discovery  of  the  ultimate  grounds  or 
causes  of  things ;  and,  though  this  is  a  goal  that  it  can  never  of 
itself  attain,  it  is  the  indispensable  pathway  which  must  be  traversed 
before  thought  can  come  into  direct  contact  with  its  proper  ob- 
ject, the  intelligible  and  ultimate  grounds  of  things.  When  this 
last  point  has  been  reached,  the  data  for  demonstration  are  ready, 
and  the  descent  from  the  universal  to  the  particular  is  effected. 
Aristotle,  then,  finds  that  in  the  construction  of  the  sciences 
i  op.  dt.,  C.,  XII. 


158  THE   PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

induction  and  demonstration  each  contributes  its  share.  What, 
however,  gives  unity  to  the  whole  process  of  knowledge  is  the 
continual  presence  at  every  stage  of  the  activity  of  thought  (voDc), 
which  is  ever  seeking  to  grasp  the  universal  nature  of  things. 
Even  sensible  perception,  in  so  far  as  it  apprehends  properties 
which  are  indeed  found  in  the  sensible  thing  as  here  and  now,  but 
yet  are  not  peculiar  to  this  thing,  implies  the  exercise  of  thought. 
So  when  induction  discovers  in  various  objects  of  perception  the 
invariable  concomitance  of  attributes,  VG&C  rises  from  this  con- 
comitance to  the  universal  principle.  And,  finally,  when  induc- 
tion is  the  means  of  discovering  the  ultimate  principles  from  which 
a  given  science  starts,  the  discovery  is  possible  only  because  voDc 
grasps  them  directly  and  immediately.  As  these  principles  are 
the  pre-condition  of  all  demonstration,  voE>c  is  the  principle  or 
starting-point  of  science.  There  are,  therefore,  two  aspects  in 
which  we  can  view  vo&c :  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  the  source  of 
the  whole  body  of  science,  and,  therefore,  reveals  to  us  the  essen- 
tial nature  of  things,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  source  of 
the  first  principles  on  which  the  whole  edifice  of  science  is  based. 
Aristotle,  therefore,  holds  that  voDc  is  able  to  grasp  the  essential 
nature  of  things,  so  far  as  these  are  reducible  to  rational  system. 
It  cannot,  however,  be  said  that  he  conceives  of  nature  as  rational 
through  and  through.  From  this  conclusion  he  is  deterred  by 
his  conviction  that  there  always  is  in  things  an  accidental  or  irra- 
tional element,  which  reason  cannot  comprehend.  On  the  whole, 
law  prevails  in  nature,  and  so  far  as  this  is  the  case  science  is 
possible  ;  but  there  remains  a  large  margin  of  contingency,  which 
cannot  be  won  for  the  orderly  realm  of  science. 

JOHN  WATSON. 
QUEEN'S  UNIVERSITY, 
KINGSTON,  CANADA. 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORK  OF  HERBERT 
SPENCER. 

I  DO  not  know  whether  it  may  have  occurred  to  any  one  else 
to  associate  the  work  of  Emile  Zola  in  fiction  and  of  Herbert 
Spencer  in  philosophy.  I  find  myself,  however,  mentally  running 
together  the  careers  of  these  two  men,  different  as  they  were  in 
surroundings,  interests,  aims,  and  personalities.  The  two  somehow 
associate  themselves  in  my  mind,  at  least  to  such  an  extent  that 
I  find  no  words  of  my  own  so  apt  to  characterize  the  larger 
features  of  the  work  of  Herbert  Spencer  as  these  borrowed  from 
the  remarkable  critical  appreciation  by  Henry  James  of  Emile 
Zola,  published  in  the  August,  1903,  number  of  the  Atlantic 
Monthly.  Mr.  James  begins  by  referring  to  "  the  circumstance 
that,  thirty  years  ago,  a  young  man  of  extraordinary  brain  and  in- 
domitable purpose,  wishing  to  give  the  measure  of  these  endow- 
ments in  a  piece  of  work  supremely  solid,  conceived  and  sat 
down  to  Les  Rougon-Macquart,  rather  than  to  an  equal  task  in 
physics,  mathematics,  politics,  economics.  He  saw  his  under- 
taking, thanks  to  his  patience  and  courage,  practically  to  a 
close.  .  .  .  No  finer  act  of  courage  and  confidence,  I  think,  is 
recorded  in  the  history  of  letters.  The  critic  in  sympathy  with 
him  returns  again  and  again  to  the  great  wonder  of  it,  in  which 
something  so  strange  is  mixed  with  something  so  august.  En- 
tertained and  carried  out  almost  from  the  threshold  of  manhood, 
the  high  project,  the  work  of  a  lifetime,  announces  beforehand 
its  inevitable  weakness,  and  yet  speaks  in  the  same  voice  for  its 
admirable,  its  almost  unimaginable,  strength." 

With  few  verbal  changes,  this  surely  sets  forth  the  case  of  Mr. 
Spencer ;  and  in  saying  the  word  of  criticism  which  must  inevit- 
ably shadow  all  mortal  attempts,  I  again  find  nothing  more  ap- 
propriate than  some  further  sentences  of  Mr.  James.  "  It  was 
the  fortune,  it  was  in  a  manner  the  doom,  of  Les  Rougon-Mac- 
quart to  deal  with  things  almost  always  in  gregarious  form,  to 
be  a  picture  of  numbers,  of  classes,  crowds,  confusions,  move- 

159 


160  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

ments.  .  .  .  The  individual  life  is,  if  not  wholly  absent,  reflected 
in  coarse  and  common,  in  generalized  terms ;  whereby  we 
arrive  ...  at  the  circumstance  that,  looking  out  somewhere,  and 
often  woefully  athirst,  for  the  taste  of  fineness,  we  find  it  not  in  the 
fruits  of  our  author's  fancy,  but  in  a  different  matter  altogether. 
We  get  it  in  the  very  history  of  his  effort,  the  image  itself  of  his 
lifelong  process,  comparatively  so  personal,  so  spiritual  even 
.  .  .  through  all  its  patience  and  pain." 

The  point  that  seems  to  me  so  significant  (and,  indeed,  so 
absolutely  necessary  to  take  into  the  reckoning),  when  we  bal- 
ance accounts  with  the  intellectual  work  of  Mr.  Spencer,  is  this 
sitting  down  to  achieve  a  preconceived  idea,  —  an  idea,  moreover, 
of  a  synthetic,  deductive  rendering  of  all  that  is  in  the  Universe. 
The  point  stands  forth  in  all  its  simplicity  and  daring  every  time 
we  open  our  First  Principles.  We  find  there  republished  the 
prospectus  of  1860,  the  program  of  the  entire  Synthetic  Phi- 
losophy. And  the  more  we  compare  the  achievement  with  the 
announcement,  the  more  we  are  struck  with  the  way  in  which 
the  whole  scheme  stands  complete,  detached,  able  to  go  alone 
from  the  very  start. 

Spencer  and  his  readers  are  committed  in  advance  to  a 
definitely  wrought  out,  a  rounded  and  closed  interpretation  of 
the  universe.  Further  discovery  and  intercourse  are  not  to 
count ;  it  remains  only  to  fill  in  the  cadres.  Successive  volumes 
are  outlined ;  distinctive  sections  of  each  set  forth.  All  the 
fundamental  generalizations  are  at  hand,  which  are  to  apply  to 
all  regions  of  the  Universe  with  the  exception  of  inorganic 
nature,  attention  being  especially  called  to  this  exception  as  a  gap 
unavoidable  but  regrettable.  There  is  but  one  thing  more  ex- 
traordinary than  the  conception  which  this  program  embodies  : 
the  fact  that  it  is  carried  out.  We  are  so  accustomed  to  what  we 
call  systems  of  philosophy ;  the  '  systems '  of  Plato,  Aristotle, 
Descartes,  Kant,  or  Hegel,  that  I  suspect  we  do  not  quite  grasp 
the  full  significance  of  such  a  project  as  this  of  Mr.  Spencer's. 
The  other  systems  are  such  after  all  more  or  less  ex  post  facto. 
In  themselves  they  have  the  unity  of  the  development  of  a  single 
mind,  rather  than  of  a  predestined  planned  achievement.  They  are 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  l6l 

systems  somewhat  in  and  through  retrospect.  Their  completeness 
owes  something  to  the  mind  of  the  onlooker  gathering  together 
parts  which  have  grown  up  more  or  less  separately  and  in  re- 
sponse to  felt  occasions,  to  particular  problems.  Our  reflection 
helps  bind  their  parts  into  one  aggregative  whole.  But  Spencer's 
system  was  a  system  from  the  very  start.  It  was  a  system  in 
conception,  not  merely  in  issue.  It  was  one  by  the  volition 
of  its  author,  complete,  compact,  coherent,  not  in  virtue  of  a 
single  personality  which  by  ways  mainly  unconscious  continu- 
ally and  restlessly  reattempts  to  attain  to  some  worthy  and 
effective  embodiment  of  itself.  We  are  almost  inclined  to  believe 
in  the  identification  of  conscious  will  with  physical  force  as  we 
follow  the  steady,  unchanging  momentum  of  Spencer's  thought. 
It  is  this  fore-thought,  foreclosed  scheme  which  makes  so 
ominous  that  phrase  of  James  to  the  effect  that  '  the  high  project 
announces  beforehand  its  inevitable  weakness.'  It  is  this  which 
makes  so  unavoidable  the  appropriation  of  the  phrase  regarding 
absence  of  the  individual  life.  It  is  this  fact  which  gives 
jurisdiction  to  the  further  remark  that  " vision  and  opportunity 
reside  in  a  personal  sense,  and  in  a  personal  history,  and  no 
shortcut  to  them  has  ever  been  discovered."  It  is  this  same 
fact  that  moves  me  to  transfer  to  Spencer  a  further  phrase, 
that  the  work  went  on  in  "the  region  that  I  qualify  as  that 
of  experience  by  imitation."  It  may  seem  harsh  to  say  Spen- 
cer occupies  himself  in  any  such  way  as  to  justify  the  phrase 
"  experience  by  imitation."  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  one  may  say, 
however  the  case  stands  in  arts  and  letters,  that  in  philosophy 
one  must  perforce  work  in  and  with  a  region  of  experience  which 
it  is  but  praise  to  call  "experience  by  imitation,"  since  it  is 
experience  depersonalized,  from  which  the  qualities  of  individual 
contact  and  career,  with  their  accidents  of  circumstance,  and 
corresponding  emotional  entanglements,  have  been  intentionally 
shut  out.  But  whether  one  regard  the  phrase  as  harsh,  or  as 
defining  an  indispensable  trait  of  all  philosophizing,  it  remains 
true  that  one  who  announces  in  advance  a  system  in  all  its 
characteristic  conceptions  and  applications  has  discounted,  in  a 
way  which  is  awful  in  its  augustness,  all  individual  contingencies, 


162  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

all  accidents  of  time  and  place,  personal  surroundings  and  per- 
sonal intercourse,  new  ideas  from  new  contacts  and  new  expan- 
sions of  life.  It  is  upon  the  revelations  that  arise  from  the 
eternal  mixture  of  voluntary  endeavor  with  the  unplanned, 
the  unexpected,  that  most  of  us  learn  to  depend  for  shaping 
thought  and  directing  intellectual  movement.  We  hang  upon 
experience  as  it  comes,  not  alone  upon  experience  as  already 
formulated,  into  which  we  can  enter  by  ''imitation."  To  assure 
to  the  world  a  comprehensive  system  of  the  universe,  in  a  way 
which  precludes  further  development  and  shapings  of  this  personal 
sort,  is  a  piece  of  intellectual  audacity  of  the  most  commanding 
sort.  It  is  this  extraordinary  objectivity  of  Spencer's  work, 
this  hitherto  unheard  of  elimination  of  the  individual  and  the 
subjective,  which  gives  his  philosophy  its  identity,  which  marks 
it  off  from  other  philosophic  projects,  and  is  the  source  at  once 
of  its  power  and  of  its  "inevitable  weakness." 

The  austere  devotion,  the  singleness,  simplicity,  and  straight- 
forwardness of  Spencer's  own  life,  and  its  seclusion,  its  remote- 
ness, its  singular  immunity  from  all  intellectual  contagion,  are 
chapters  in  the  same  story.  Here,  we  may  well  believe,  is  the  re- 
venge of  nature.  The  element  of  individual  life  so  lacking  in  the 
philosophy,  both  in  its  content  and  in  its  style,  is  the  thing  that 
strikes  us  in  the  history  of  Spencer's  personal  effort.  No  system, 
after  all,  has  ever  been  more  thoroughly  conditioned  by  the 
intellectual  and  moral  personality  of  its  author.  The  impersonal 
content  of  the  system  is  the  register  of  the  personal  separation  of 
its  author  from  vital  participation  in  the  moving  currents  of  his- 
tory. 

The  seclusion  and  isolation  necessary  to  a  system  like  Spen- 
cer's appear  from  whatever  angle  we  approach  him.  Doubt- 
less his  autobiography  will  put  us  in  possession  of  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  educational  documents  the  world  has  yet  seen. 
But  even  without  this,  we  know  that  his  intellectual  life  was  early 
formed  in  a  certain  remoteness.  The  relative  absence  of  the 
social  element  in  his  education,  and  his  own  later  conscious  predi- 
lection for  non-institutionalized  instruction,  for  education  of  the 
tutorial  sort  apart  from  schools  and  classes,  at  once  constitute  and 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  163 

reflect  his  aloofness  from  the  ordinary  give  and  take  processes  of 
development.  The  lack  of  university  associations  is  another 
mark  on  the  score.  The  lack  of  knowledge  of  ancient  languages 
and  comparative  ignorance  of  modern  languages  and  literature 
have  to  be  reckoned  with.  Nor  was  Spencer  (in  this  unlike 
Bacon,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  John  Mill)  a  man  of  affairs, 
one  who  continually  renewed  the  region  of  "  experience  by  imi- 
tation," of  formulated  knowledge,  by  engaging  in  those  compli- 
cations of  life  which  force  a  man  to  re-think,  re-feel,  and  re- 
choose  ;  to  have,  in  a  word,  first-hand  experience.  It  would  be 
hard  to  find  another  intellect  of  first  class  rank  so  devoid  of  his- 
torical sense  and  interest  as  was  Spencer's  ;  incredible  as  is  this 
fact  taken  alongside  authorship  of  a  system  of  evolution  !  Cer- 
tainly the  world  may  wait  long  for  another  example  of  a  man 
who  dares  to  conceive  and  has  the  courage  and  energy  to 
execute  a  system  of  philosophy,  in  almost  total  ignorance  of  the 
entire  history  of  thought.  We  have  got  so  used  to  it  that  we 
hardly  pause,  when  we  read  such  statements  as  that  of  Spencer, 
that  after  reading  the  first  few  pages  of  Kant's  Critique  he  laid 
the  book  down.  "  Twice  since  then  the  same  thing  has  hap- 
pened ;  for,  being  an  impatient  reader,  when  I  disagree  with  the 
cardinal  purposes  of  a  work  I  can  go  no  further."  l 

It  is  not  Spencer's  ignorance  to  which  I  am  calling  attention. 
Much  less  am  I  blaming  him  for  his  failure  to  run  hither  and 
yon  through  the  fields  of  thought ;  there  is  something  almost 
refreshing,  in  these  days  of  subjugation  by  the  mere  overwhelm- 
ing mass  of  learning,  in  the  naive  and  virgin  attitude  of  Spencer. 
What  I  am  trying  to  point  out  is  the  absence  in  Spencer  of 
any  interest  in  the  history  of  human  ideas  and  of  acts  prompted 
by  them,  considered  simply  as  history,  —  as  affairs  of  personal 
initiation,  discovery,  experimentation,  and  struggle.  His  in- 
sulation from  the  intellectual  currents  of  the  ages  as  moving 
processes  (apart,  that  is,  from  their  impersonal  and  factual 
deposit  in  the  form  of  '  science ')  is  the  mirror  of  the  secluded- 
ness  of  his  early  education,  and  of  his  entire  later  personal 
life.  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  apologize  even  for  referring 

1  Essays  Scientific,  Political,  and  Speculative,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  206,  note. 


164  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

to  the  little  device  by  which,  when  wearied  of  conversation,  he 
closed  his  ears  and  made  himself  deaf  to  what  was  going  on 
about  him.  There  are  not  two  facts  here,  but  only  one.  His 
isolation  was  necessary  in  carrying  out  his  gigantic  task,  not 
merely  as  a  convenience  for  securing  the  necessary  leisure, 
protection  against  encroachment,  and  the  nursing  of  inadequate 
physical  strength  against  great  odds  ;  but  it  was  an  organic  pre- 
condition of  any  project  which  assigns  the  universe  to  volumes  in 
advance,  and  then  proceeds  steadily,  irresistibly,  to  fill  them  up 
chapter  by  chapter.  Such  work  is  possible  only  when  one  is 
immune  against  the  changing  play  of  ideas,  the  maze  of  points  of 
view,  the  cross-currents  of  interests,  which  characterize  the  world 
historically  viewed,  —  seen  in  process  as  an  essentially  moving 
thing. 

We  have  to  reckon  with  the  apparent  paradox  of  Spencer's 
rationalistic,  deductive,  systematic  habit  of  mind  over  against 
all  the  traditions  of  English  thought.  How  could  one  who 
thought  himself  the  philosopher  of  experience  par  excellence, 
revive,  under  the  name  of  a  "  universal  postulate,"  the  funda- 
mental conception  of  the  formal  rationalism  of  the  Cartesian 
school,  which  even  the  philosophers  whom  Spencer  despised  as 
purely  a  priori,  had  found  it  necessary,  under  the  attacks  of  Kant 
(whom  Spencer  to  his  last  day  regarded  as  a  sort  of  belated 
supernaturalist),  long  since  to  abandon  ?  It  is  too  obvious  to 
need  mention  that  Spencer  is  in  all  respects  a  thoroughgoing 
Englishman,  —  indeed  what,  without  disrespect  and  even  with 
admiration,  we  may  term  a  '  Britisher.'  But  how  could  the  em- 
pirical and  inductive  habit  of  the  English  mind  so  abruptly,  so 
thoroughly,  without  any  shadow  of  hesitation  or  touch  of  reserve, 
cast  itself  in  a  system  whose  professed  aim  was  to  deduce  all  the 
phenomena  of  life,  mind,  and  society  from  a  single  formula  regard- 
ing the  redistribution  of  matter  and  motion  ? 

Here  we  come  within  sight  of  the  problem  of  the  technical 
origins  and  structure  of  Spencer's  philosophy,  a  problem,  how- 
ever, which  may  still  be  approached  from  the  standpoint  of 
Spencer's  own  personal  development.  We  must  not  forget  that 
Spencer  was  by  his  environment  and  education  initiated  into  all  the 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  165 

characteristic  tenets  of  English  political  and  social  liberalism,  with 
their  individualistic  connotations.  It  is  significant  that  Spencer's 
earliest  literary  contribution,  —  written  at  the  age  of  twenty- 
two,  —  was  upon  the  proper  sphere  of  government,  and  was  in- 
tended (I  speak  only  from  second-hand  information,  never  having 
seen  the  pamphlet)  to  show  the  restrictions  upon  governmental 
action  required  in  the  interests  of  the  individual.  I  know  no 
more  striking  tribute  to  the  thoroughness  and  success  with  which 
earlier  English  philosophic  thought  did  its  work  than  the  fact 
that  Spencer  was  completely  saturated  with,  and  possessed  by,  the 
characteristic  traditions  of  this  individualistic  philosophy,  simply, 
so  to  speak,  by  absorption,  by  respiration  of  the  intellectual 
atmosphere,  with  a  minimum  of  study  and  reflective  acquaint- 
ance with  the  classic  texts  of  Hobbes,  Hume,  and  (above  all) 
John  Locke.  So  far  as  we  can  tell,  Spencer's  ignorance  of  the 
previous  history  of  philosophy  extended  in  considerable  measure 
even  to  his  own  philosophic  ancestry ;  and  I  am  inclined  to  be- 
lieve that  even  such  reading  as  he  did  of  his  predecessors  left 
him  still  with  a  delightful  unconsciousness  that  in  them  were  the 
origin  and  kin  of  his  own  thought.  The  solid  body  and  sub- 
stantiality of  Spencer's  individualism  is  made  not  less  but  more 
comprehensible  on  the  supposition  that  it  came  to  him  not 
through  conscious  reading  and  personal  study,  but  through 
daily  drafts  upon  his  intellectual  environment ;  the  results  being 
so  unconsciously  and  involuntarily  wrought  into  the  fibre  of  his 
being  that  they  became  with  him  an  instinct  rather  than  a  reflec- 
tion or  theory. 

It  is  this  complete  incorporation  of  the  results  of  prior  in- 
dividualistic philosophy,  accompanied  by  total  unconsciousness 
that  anything  was  involved  in  the  way  of  philosophic  prelimi- 
naries or  presuppositions,  which  freed  Spencer  from  the  lurking 
scepticism  regarding  systems  and  deductive  syntheses  which 
permeate  the  work  of  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  John  Stuart 
Mill.  It  was  this  thoroughgoing  unconscious  absorption  that 
gave  him  a  confident,  aggressive,  dogmatic  individualism,  — 
which  enabled  him  to  employ  individualism  as  a  deductive  in- 
strument, instead  of  as  a  point  of  view  useful  in  the  main  for 


166  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

criticising  undue  intellectual  pretensions,  and  for  keeping  the 
ground  cleared  for  inductive,  empirical  inquiries.  The  eigh- 
teenth century,  indeed,  exhibits  to  us  the  transformation  of  the 
sceptically  colored  individualism  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
taking  effect  mainly  in  a  theory  of  the  nature  and  limits  of 
human  knowledge,  and  employed  most  effectively  to  get  rid  of 
dogma  in  philosophy,  theology,  and  politics, — the  transformation 
of  this,  I  say,  into  an  individualism  which  aims  at  social  reform, 
and  thereby  is  becoming  positive,  constructive,  rationalistic,  op- 
timistic. 

Spencer  is  the  heir  not  of  the  psychological  individualism  of 
Locke  direct,  but  of  this  individualism  after  exportation  and  re- 
importation from  France.  It  was  the  individualism  of  the  French 
Encyclopedist,  with  its  unwavering  faith  in  progress,  in  the  ultimate 
perfection  of  humanity,  and  in  ' nature'  as  everywhere  beneficently 
working  out  this  destiny,  if  only  it  can  be  freed  from  trammels 
of  church  and  state,  which  in  Spencer  mingles  with  generaliza- 
tions of  science,  and  is  thereby  reawakened  to  new  life.  Seen 
in  this  way,  there  is  no  breach  of  continuity.  The  paradox  dis- 
appears. Spencer's  work  imposes  itself  upon  us  all  precisely 
because  it  so  remarkably  carries  over  the  net  result  of  that  indi- 
vidualism which  (contend  against  it  as  we  may)  represents  the 
fine  achievement  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  It 
preserves  it  in  the  only  way  in  which  it  could  be  conserved,  by 
carrying  it  over,  by  translating  it  into  the  organic,  the  systematic, 
the  universal  terms  which  report  the  presence  of  the  nineteenth 
century  spirit.  And  if  a  certain  constitutional  incoherency  results, 
if  the  compound  of  individualism  and  organicism  shows  cleavages 
of  fundamental  contradictions,  none  the  less  without  this  restate- 
ment the  old  would  have  been  lost,  and  a  certain  thinness  and 
remoteness  would  characterize  the  new.  The  earlier  and  more 
thorough-going  formulations  of  the  organic  standpoint  in  post- 
Kantian  thought  were,  and  had  to  remain,  transcendental  (in  the 
popular,  if  not  technical  sense  of  the  term)  in  language  and  idea 
just  because  the  expression,  though  logically  more  adequate,  was 
socially  and  psychologically  premature.  It  did  not  and  could 
not  at  once  take  up  into  itself  the  habits  of  thought  and  feeling 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  167 

characteristic  of  earlier  individualism  and  domesticate  them  in 
the  social  and  moral  attitude  of  the  modern  man. 

In  the  struggle  of  adjustment,  Spencer  is  without  a  rival  as  a 
mediator,  a  vehicle  of  communication,  a  translator.  It  is,  as  we 
shall  see,  the  successful  way  in  which  he  exercises  this  function 
that  gives  him  his  hold  upon  the  culture  of  our  day,  and  which 
makes  his  image  stand  out  so  imposingly  that  to  many  he  is 
not  one  creator  with  many  others  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  but 
its  own  concrete  incarnation.  In  support  of  the  idea  that 
Spencer's  work  was  essentially  that  of  carrying  over  the  net 
earlier  social  and  ethical  individualism  into  the  more  organic 
conceptions  characteristic  of  the  nineteenth  century  science  and 
action,  we  can  here  only  refer  to  the  Social  Statics  of  1850, — 
this  being  in  my  judgment  one  of  the  most  remarkable  docu- 
ments, from  the  standpoint  of  tracing  the  origins  of  an  intel- 
lectual development,  ever  produced.  This  book  shows  with  con- 
siderable detail  the  individualistic  method  of  the  English  theory 
of  knowledge  in  process  of  transformation  into  something  which  is 
no  longer  a  method  of  regulating  belief,  but  is  an  attained  belief 
in  a  method  of  action,  and  hence  itself  a  substantial  first  principle, 
an  axiom,  an  indisputable,  absolute  truth,  having  within  itself 
substantial  resources  which  may  in  due  order  —  that  is,  by  use 
of  a  deductive  method — be  delivered  and  made  patent.  It  shows 
the  individualistic  creed  dominant,  militant ;  no  longer  a  prin- 
ciple of  criticism,  but  of  reform  and  construction  in  social  life, 
and,  therefore,  of  necessity  a  formula  of  construction  in  the  intel- 
lectual sphere.  In  this  document,  the  world-formula  of  Devolu- 
tion '  of  later  philosophy  appears  as  the  social  formula  of  '  prog- 
ress.' It  repeats  as  an  article  of  implicit  faith  the  creed  of 
revolutionary  liberalism  in  the  indefinite  perfectibility  of  mankind. 
"  Man  has  been,  is,  and  will  long  continue  to  be,  in  process  of 
adaptation,  and  the  belief  in  human  perfectibility  merely  amounts 
to  the  belief  that  in  virtue  of  these  processes,  man  will  eventually 
become  completely  suited  to  his  mode  of  life.  Progress,  there- 
fore, is  not  an  accident,  but  a  necessity."1 

In  this   characteristic  sentence  we  have  already  present  the 

1  Social  Statics,  pp.  31  f.,  edn.  of  1892. 


168  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

conception  :  first,  of  evolution  ;  second,  of  the  goal  of  the  evolu- 
tion as  adaption  of  human  life  to  certain  conditions  beyond  itself; 
and  third  (although  implicitly  —  the  notion,  however,  being 
made  explicit  in  other  portions  of  the  same  book),  the  conception 
that  it  is  the  conditions  to  which  life  is  to  be  adapted  which  are 
the  causally  operating  forces  in  bringing  about  the  adaptation,  and 
hence  the  progress.  The  '  organism '  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy 
is  the  projection  of  the  individual  man  of  the  thought  of  1850. 
The  '  environment '  of  the  latter  system  appears  in  the  earlier 
sketch  as  '  conditions  of  life.'  The  '  evolution  '  of  later  syste- 
matic philosophy  is  the  '  progress '  figuring  in  the  early  social 
creed  as  the  continual  adaptation  of  human  life  to  the  neces- 
sities of  its  outward  conditions.  In  all,  and  through  all,  runs 
the  idea  of  '  nature,'  —  that  nature  to  which  the  social  and 
philosophical  reformation  of  the  eighteenth  century  appealed  with 
such  unhesitating  and  sublime  faith.  Load  down  the  formula  by 
filling  '  nature '  with  the  concrete  results  of  physical  and  biolog- 
ical science,  and  the  transformation  scene  is  complete.  The  years 
between  1850  and  1862  (the  date  of  the  First  Principles]  are 
the  record  of  this  loading.  '  Nature '  never  parts  with  its  eigh- 
teenth century  function  of  effecting  approximation  to  a  goal  of 
ultimate  perfection  and  happiness,  but  nature  no  longer  proffers 
itself  as  a  pious  reminiscence  of  the  golden  age  of  Rousseau,  or  a 
prophetic  inspiration  of  the  millenium  of  Condorcet,  but  as  that 
most  substantial,  most  real  of  all  forces  guaranteed  and  revealed 
to  us  at  every  turn  by  the  advance  of  scientific  inquiry.  And 
'  science  '  is  in  turn  but  the  concrete  rendering  of  the  '  reason  ' 
of  the  Enlightenment. 

Spencer's  faith  in  this  particular  article  of  the  creed  never 
faltered.  Eighteenth  century  liberalism,  after  the  time  of  Rous- 
seau, was  perfectly  sure  that  the  only  obstacles  to  the  fulfillment 
of  the  beneficent  purpose  of  nature  in  effecting  perfection  have 
their  source  in  institutions  of  state  and  church,  which,  partly  be- 
cause of  ignorance,  and  partly  because  of  the  selfishness  of  rulers 
and  priests,  have  temporarily  obstructed  the  fulfillment  of  nature's 
benign  aims.  The  laissez-faire  theory  and  its  extreme  typical 
expression,  anarchism,  did  not  originate  in  the  accidents  of  com- 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  169 

mercial  life,  much  less  in  the  selfish  designs  of  the  trading  class 
to  increase  its  wares  at  the  expense  of  other  sections  of  society. 
Whether  right  or  wrong,  whether  for  good  or  for  evil,  it  took  its 
origin  from  profound  philosophical  conceptions ;  the  belief  in  na- 
ture as  a  mighty  force,  and  in  reason  as  having  only  to  cooperate 
with  nature,  instead  of  thwarting  it  with  its  own  petty,  voluntary 
devices,  in  order  to  usher  in  the  era  of  unhindered  progress. 
Spencer's  insistent  and  persistent  opposition  to  the  extension  of  the 
sphere  of  governmental  action  beyond  that  of  police  duty,  prevent- 
ing the  encroachment  of  one  individual  upon  another,  goes  back 
to  this  same  sublime  faith  in  nature.  The  goal  of  evolution  of 
Spencer's  ethics,  the  perfect  individual  adapted  to  the  perfect 
state  of  society,  is  but  the  enlarged  projection  of  the  ideal  of  a 
fraternal  society,  which  made  its  way  into  the  Social  Statics  from 
the  same  creed  of  revolutionary  liberalism.  His  "  Absolute 
Ethics,"  deductively  derived  from  a  first  law  of  life,  has  in  its 
origin  nothing  to  do  with  science,  but  everything  to  do  with  the 
reason  and  nature  of  the  Enlightenment.  It  has,  of  course,  been 
often  enough  pointed  out  that  the  main  features  of  Spencer's  later 
ethics  were  already  well  along  before  he  came  to  that  conception 
of  evolution  upon  which  his  sociology  and  ethics  are  professedly 
based.  This  point  has,  however,  generally  been  employed  as  a 
mode  of  casting  suspicion  upon  the  content  of  his  moral  system, 
suggesting  that  after  all  it  has  no  very  intimate  connection  with 
the  theory  of  evolution  as  such.  But  I  am  not  aware  that  atten- 
tion has  been  called  to  this  converse  fact  of  greater  moment :  that 
Spencer's  entire  evolutionary  conception  and  scheme  is  but  the 
projection  upon  the  cosmic  screen  of  the  spectrum  of  the  buoyant 
a  priori  ideals  of  the  later  eighteenth  century  liberalism. 

Certain  essays,  now  mostly  reprinted  in  three  volumes,  entitled 
Essays  Scientific,  Political,  and  Speculative,  put  before  our  eyes 
the  links  of  the  transformation,  the  instruments  of  the  projection. 
We  may  refer  particularly  to  the  essays  on  "  Progress  :  Its  law 
and  Cause,"  "  Transcendental  Physiology "  (both  dated  1857); 
"The  Genesis  ofScience"  (1854),  and  "The  Nebular  Hypothesis" 
(1858),  together  with  "The  Social  Organism"  (1860).  What  we 
find  exposed  in  these  essays  is  the  increasingly  definite  and  solid 


I/O  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII, 

body  of  scientific  particulars  and  generalizations,  getting  them- 
selves read  into  the  political  and  social  formula,  and  thereby  effect- 
ing transformation  into  the  system  outlined  by  the  prospectus 
of  1860.  This  fusion  is,  indeed,  already  foreshadowed  in  the 
Social  Statics  itself. 

This  is  not  the  time  or  place  to  go  into  detail,  but  I  think  I 
am  well  within  the  bonds  of  verifiable  statement  when  I  say  that 
Spencer's  final  system  of  philosophy  took  shape  through  his 
bringing  into  intimate  connection  with  each  other  the  dom- 
inating conception  of  social  progress,  inherited  from  the  Enlight- 
enment, certain  larger  generalizations  of  physiology  (particularly 
that  of  growth  as  change  from  homogeneity  to  heterogeneity, 
and  of  '  physiological  division  of  labor '  with  accompanying  in- 
terdependence of  parts)  and  the  idea  of  cosmic  change  derived 
from  astronomy  and  geology,  —  particularly  as  formulated  under 
the  name  of  the  nebular  hypothesis.  Social  philosophy  furnished 
the  fundamental  ideals  and  ideas  ;  biological  statements  provided 
the  defining  and  formulating  elements  necessary  to  put  these 
vague  and  pervasive  ideals  into  something  like  scientific  shape ; 
while  the  physical-astronomic  speculations  furnished  the  causal,, 
efficient  machinery  requisite  for  getting  the  scheme  under  way, 
and  supplied  still  more  of  the  appearance  of  scientific  definite- 
ness  and  accuracy.  Such,  at  least,  is  my  schematic  formula  of 
the  origin  of  the  Spencerian  system.1 

1  If  our  main  interest  here  were  in  the  history  of  thought,  it  would  be  interesting  to 
note  the  dependence  of  the  development  of  Spencer's  thought,  as  respects  the  second 
of  the  above  factors,  upon  factors  due  to  the  post-Kantian  philosophy  of  Germany.  I 
can  only  refer  in  passing  to  some  pages  of  the  Social  Statics  (255  to  261),  in  which, 
after  making  the  significant  statement  that  "morality  is  essentially  one  with  physical 
truth  —  is,  in  fact,  a  species  of  transcendental  physiology,"  he  refers  in  support  of  his 
doctrine  to  "  a  theory  of  life  developed  by  Coleridge."  This  theory  is  that  of  tend- 
ency towards  individuation,  conjoined  with  increase  of  mutual  dependence,  —  a  fun- 
damental notion,  of  course,  of  Schelling.  An  equally  significant  foot-note  (page 
256)  tells  us  that  it  was  in  1864,  while  writing  "  The  Classification  of  the  Sciences," 
that  Spencer  himself  realized  that  this  truth  has  to  do  with  ' '  a  trait  of  all  evolving 
things,  inorganic  as  well  as  organic."  In  his  essay  on  "Transcendental  Physiol- 
ogy," Spencer  refers  to  the  importance  of  carrying  over  distinctions  first  observed  in 
society  into  physiological  terms,  so  that  they  become  points  of  view  for  interpretation 
and  explanation  there.  The  conception  also  dominates  the  essay  on  "  The  Social 
Organism."  In  fact,  he  makes  use  of  the  idea  of  division  of  labor,  originally 
worked  out  in  political  economy,  in  his  biological  speculations,  and  then  in  his  cos- 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  I/I 

We  are  now,  I  think,  in  a  position  not  only  to  understand  the 
independence  of  Spencer's  and  Darwin's  work  in  relation  to  each 
other,  but  the  significance  of  this  independence.  Because  Spen- 
cer's thought  descended  from  the  social  and  political  philosophy 
of  the  eighteenth  century  (which  in  turn  was  a  rendering  of  a  still 
more  technical  philosophy),  and  employed  the  conceptions  thus 
derived  to  assimilate  and  organize  the  generalized  conceptions  of 
geology  and  biology,  it  needed  no  particular  aid  from  the  special- 
ized order  of  scientific  methods  and  considerations  which  control 
the  work  of  Darwin.  But  it  was  a  tremendous  piece  of  luck  for 
both  the  Darwinian  and  Spencerian  theories  that  they  happened 
so  nearly  to  coincide  in  the  time  of  their  promulgation.  Each 

mological,  in  very  much  the  same  way  in  which  Darwin  borrowed  the  Malthusian 
doctrine  of  population.  The  social  idea  first  found  biological  form  for  itself,  and  then 
was  projected  into  cosmological  terms.  I  have  no  doubt  that  this  represents  the  general  ' ' 
course  of  Spencer's  ideas.  In  the  essay  on  "  Progress,"  Spencer  specifically  refers  to 
the  law  of  the  evolution  of  the  individual  organism  as  established  "  by  the  Germans  — 
the  investigations  of  Wolff,  Goethe,  and  von  Baer. ' '  The  law  referred  to  here  is  that 
development  consists  in  advance  from  homogeneity  to  heterogeneity.  He  there 
transfers  it  from  the  life  history  of  the  individual  organism  to  the  record  of  all  life ; 
while,  in  the  same  essay,  he  expressly  states  that,  if  the  nebular  hypothesis  could  be 
established,  then  we  should  have  a  single  formula  for  the  universe  as  a  whole,  inorganic 
as  well  as  organic.  And  upon  page  36  he  speaks  of  that  "which  determines  prog- 
ress of  every  kind  —  astronomic,  geologic,  organic,  ethnological,  social,  economic, 
artistic." 

One  need  only  turn  to  some  of  the  methodological  writings  of  Spencer  to  see 
how  conscious  he  was  of  the  method  which  I  have  attributed  to  him.  The  little  essay 
entitled  "An  Element  in  Method,"  and  certain  portions  of  his  essay  entitled,  "  Pro- 
fessor Tait  on  the  Formula  of  Evolution,"  are  particularly  significant.  The  latter  in- 
dicates the  necessity  of  making  a  synthesis  of  deductive  reasoning,  as  exhibited  in 
mathematical  physics,  with  the  inductive  empiricism  characteristic  of  the  biological 
sciences  ;  and  charges  both  physicist  and  zoologist  with  one-sidedness.  The  former 
essay  indicates  that,  in  forming  any  generalization  which  is  to  be  used  for  deductive  pur- 
poses, we  ought  to  take  independent  groups  of  phenomena  which  appear  unallied,  and 
which  certainly  are  very  remote  from  each  other.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  Spen- 
cer' s  method  of  taking  groups  of  facts,  apparently  wholly  unlike  each  other,  such  as 
those  of  the  formation  of  solar  systems,  on  one  side,  and  facts  of  present  social  life,  on 
the  other,  with  a  view  to  discovering  what  he  calls  "some  common  trait,"  has, 
indeed,  more  value  for  philosophic  method  than  is  generally  recognised.  In  a  way, 
he  has  himself  justified  the  method,  since  his  Synthetic  Philosophy  is,  speaking 
from  the  side  of  method,  precisely  this  sort  of  thing,  astronomy  and  sociology  forming 
the  extremes,  and  biology  the  mean  term.  But,  of  course,  Spencer's  erection  of  the 
"common  trait"  into  a  force,  or  law,  or  cause,  which  can  immediately  be  used 
deductively  to  explain  other  things,  is  quite  another  matter  from  this  heuristic  or 
methodological  value.  But  this  note  has  already  spun  itself  out  too  long. 


1/2  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

got  the  benefit  not  merely  of  the  disturbance  and  agitation 
aroused  by  the  other,  but  of  psychological  and  logical  rein- 
forcement, as  each  blended  into  and  fused  with  the  other  in  the 
minds  of  readers  and  students.  It  is  an  interesting  though 
hopeless  speculation  to  wonder  what  the  particular  fate  of  either 
would  have  been,  if  it  had  lacked  this  backing  up  at  its  own  weak 
point,  a  support  all  the  more  effective  because  it  was  so  sur- 
prisingly unplanned,  —  because  each  in  itself  sprang  out  of,  and 
applied  to,  such  different  orders  of  thought  and  fact. 

This  explains,  in  turn,  the  identification  of  the  very  idea  of 
'  evolution,'  with  the  name  of  Spencer.  The  days  are  gone  by 
when  it  was  necessary  to  iterate  that  the  conception  of  evolution  is 
no  new  thing.  We  know  that  upon  the  side  of  the  larger  philo- 
sophic generalizations,  as  well  as  upon  that  of  definite  and  de- 
tailed scientific  considerations,  evolution  has  an  ancient  ancestry. 
From  the  time  of  the  Greeks,  when  philosophy  and  science  were 
one,  to  the  days  of  Kant,  Goethe,  and  Hegel,  on  one  side,  and 
of  Lamarck  and  the  author  of  The  Vestiges  of  Creation,  on  the 
other,  the  idea  of  evolution  has  never  been  without  its  own  vogue 
and  career.  The  idea  is  too  closely  akin  both  to  the  processes 
of  human  thinking  and  to  the  obvious  facts  of  life  not  to  have 
always  some  representative  in  man's  schemes  of  the  universe. 
How,  then,  are  we  to  account  for  the  peculiar,  the  unique  position 
occupied  by  Spencer?  Is  this  thorough -going  identification  in 
the  popular  mind  of  Spencer's  system  with  the  very  idea  and 
name  of  evolution  an  illusion  of  ignorance  ?  I  think  not.  So 
massive  and  pervasive  an  imposition  of  itself  is  accountable  for 
only  in  positive  terms.  The  genesis  of  Spencer's  system  in 
fusion  of  scientific  notions  and  philosophic  considerations  gives 
the  system  its  actual  hold,  and  also  legitimates  it. 

Spencer's  work  is  rightfully  entitled  to  the  place  it  occupies  in 
the  popular  imagination.  Philosophy  is  naturally  and  properly 
technical  and  remote  to  the  mass  of  mankind,  save  as  it  takes 
shape  in  social  and  political  philosophy, — in  a  theory  of  conduct 
which,  being  more  than  individual,  serves  as  a  principle  of  criti- 
cism and  reform  in  corporate  affairs  and  community  welfare. 
But  even  social  and  political  philosophy  remain  more  or  less 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  173 

speculative,  romantic,  Utopian,  or 'ideal,'  when  couched  merely 
in  terms  of  a  program  of  criticism  and  reconstruction;  only  'sci- 
ence '  can  give  it  body.  Again,  the  specializations  of  science  are 
naturally  and  properly  remote  and  technical  to  the  interests  of 
the  mass  of  mankind.  When  we  have  said  they  are  specialized, 
we  have  described  them.  But  to  employ  the  mass  of  scientific 
material,  the  received  code  of  scientific  formulations,  to  give 
weight  and  substance  to  philosophical  ideas  which  are  already 
operative,  is  an  achievement  of  the  very  first  order.  Spencer 
took  two  sets  of  ideas,  in  themselves  abstract  and  isolated,  and  by 
their  fusion  put  them  in  a  shape  where  their  net  result  became 
available  for  the  common  consciousness.  By  such  a  fusion  Spen- 
cer provided  a  language,  a  formulation,  an  imagery,  of  a  reason- 
able and  familiar  kind  to  the  masses  of  mankind  for  ideas  of  the 
utmost  importance,  and  for  ideas  which,  without  such  amalgama- 
tion, must  have  remained  out  of  reach. 

Even  they  who  —  like  myself —  are  so  impressed  with  the 
work  of  the  philosophers  of  Germany  in  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  as  to  believe  that  they  have  furnished  ideas 
which  in  the  long  run  are  more  luminous,  more  fruitful,  pos- 
sessed of  more  organizing  power,  than  those  which  Spencer  has 
made  current,  must  yet  remember  that  the  work  of  German 
philosophy  is  done  in  an  outlandish  and  alien  vocabulary.  Now,, 
this  is  not  a  mere  incident  of  the  use  of  language,  —  as  if  a  man 
happened  to  choose  to  speak  in  Greek  rather  than  in  French. 
The  very  technicality  of  the  vocabulary  means  that  the  ideas 
used  are  not  as  yet  naturalized  in  the  common  consciousness  of 
man.  The  '  transcendental '  character  of  such  philosophy  is 
not  an  inherent,  eternal  characteristic  of  its  subject-matter,  but  is 
a  sign  and  exponent  that  the  values  dealt  in  are  not  yet  thor- 
oughly at  home  in  human  experience,  have  not  yet  found  them- 
selves in  ordinary  social  life  and  popular  science,  are  not  yet 
working  terms  justifying  themselves  by  daily  applications. 

Spencer  furnished  the  common  consciousness  of  his  day  with 
terms  and  images  so  that  it  could  appropriate  to  its  ordinary  use 
in  matters  of  "  life,  mind,  and  society,"  the  most  fundamental 
generalizations  which  had  been  worked  out  in  the  abstract 


1/4  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

regions  of  both  philosophy  and  science.  He  did  this  even  though 
he  failed  to  deduce  "  life,  mind,  and  society  "  from  a  single  formula 
regarding  '  force.'  This  is  a  work  great  enough  for  any  man,  — 
even  though  we  are  compelled  to  add  that  the  gross  obviousness 
with  which  it  was  done  shows  that  Spencer  after  all  measured  up 
to  the  level  of  the  intellectual  life  of  his  time  rather  than,  through 
sympathy  with  more  individualized  and  germinal  forces,  initiated 
a  new  movement.  Here,  again,  Spencer's  own  aloofness,  his  own 
deliberate  self-seclusion  counts.  Spencer  is  a  monument,  but, 
like  all  monuments,  he  commemorates  the  past.  He  presents 
the  achieved  culmination  of  ideas  already  in  overt  and  external 
operation.  He  winds  up  an  old  dispensation.  Here  is  the  secret 
of  his  astounding  success,  of  the  way  in  which  he  has  so  thor- 
oughly imposed  his  idea  that  even  non-Spencerians  must  talk  in  his 
terms  and  adjust  their  problems  to  his  statements.  And  here  also 
is  his  inevitable  weakness.  Only  a  system  which  formulates  the 
accomplished  can  possibly  be  conceived  and  announced  in  advance. 

Any  deductive  system  means  by  the  necessity  of  the  case  the 
organization  of  a  vast  amount  of  material  in  such  a  way  as  to  dis- 
pose of  it.  The  system  seems  to  fix  the  limits  of  all  further  effort, 
to  define  its  aims  and  to  assign  its  methods.  But  this  is  an  illusion 
of  the  moment.  In  reality  this  wholesale  disposal  of  material 
clears  the  ground  for  new,  untried  initiatives.  It  furnishes  capital 
for  hitherto  unthought  of  speculations.  Its  deductive  finalities 
turn  out  but  ships  of  adventure  to  voyage  on  undiscovered  seas. 

To  speak  less  metaphorically,  Spencer's  conception  of  evolu- 
tion was  always  a  confined  and  bounded  one.  Since  his  '  en- 
vironment '  was  but  the  translation  of  the  '  nature '  of  the 
metaphysicians,  its  workings  had  a  fixed  origin,  a  fixed  quality, 
and  a  fixed  goal.  Evolution  still  tends  in  the  minds  of  Spen- 
cer's contemporaries  to  "a  single,  far-off,  divine  event," — to  a 
finality,  a  fixity.  Somehow,  there  are  fixed  laws  and  forces 
(summed  up  under  the  name  '  environment ' )  which  control  the 
movement,  which  keep  it  pushing  on  in  a  definite  fashion  to  a 
certain  end.  Backwards,  there  is  found  a  picture  of  the  time 
when  all  this  was  set  agoing,  when  the  homogeneous  began  to 
•differentiate.  If  evolution  is  conceived  of  as  in  and  of  itself  con- 


No.  2.]         PHILOSOPHICAL    WORK  OF  SPENCER.  1/5 

stant,  it  is  yet  evolution  by  cycles,  —  a  never-ending  series  of  de- 
partures from,  and  returns  to,  a  fixed  point.  I  doubt  not  the 
time  is  coming  when  it  will  be  seen  that  whatever  all  this  is,  it  is 
not  evolution.  A  thoroughgoing  evolution  must  by  the  nature 
of  the  case  abolish  all  fixed  limits,  beginnings,  origins,  forces, 
laws,  goals.  If  there  be  evolution,  then  all  these  also  evolve, 
and  are  what  they  are  as  points  of  origin  and  of  destination  rela- 
tive to  some  special  portion  of  evolution.  They  are  to  be  defined 
in  terms  of  the  process,  the  process  that  now  and  always  is,  not 
the  process  in  terms  of  them.  But  the  transfer  from  the  world  of 
set  external  facts  and  of  fixed  ideal  values  to  the  world  of  free, 
mobile,  self-developing,  and  self-organizing  reality  would  be  un- 
thinkable and  impossible  were  it  not  for  the  work  of  Spencer, 
which,  shot  all  through  as  it  is  with  contradictions,  thereby  all 
the  more  effectually  served  the  purpose  of  a  medium  of  transition 
from  the  fixed  to  the  moving.  A  fixed  world,  a  world  of  move- 
ment between  fixed  limits,  a  moving  world,  such  is  the  order. 

JOHN  DEWEY. 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   THE   THIRD  MEETING  OF   THE 

AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION, 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY,  PRINCETON, 

N.  J.,  DECEMBER  29,  30,  AND  31, 

1903. 

REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY. 

THE  third  meeting  of  the  American  Philosophical  Associa- 
tion was  held  in  the  Murray-Dodge  Hall  of  Princeton 
University,  December  29,  30,  and  31,  1903,  and  was  attended  by 
over  fifty  members  and  others,  including  members  of  the  Amer- 
ican Psychological  Association,  who  had  been  invited  to  take 
part  in  the  program  and  discussions.  President  Wilson  wel- 
comed the  Association  to  Princeton  in  an  address  at  the  opening 
of  the  session  on  Tuesday  afternoon,  December  29,  and  the 
President  of  the  Association,  Professor  Royce,  responded.  Not- 
withstanding the  large  number  of  papers,  considerable  time  was 
found  for  discussion.  Besides  the  '  general  discussion '  on  the 
place  of  aesthetics,  that  on  '  pragmatism '  was  perhaps  the  most 
noteworthy.  This  was  continued  at  the  '  Smoker '  at  the 
Princeton  Inn  following  the  President's  address,  the  members 
from  Chicago  taking  a  special  part. 

At  the  business  meeting  the  following  report  of  the  treasurer 
was  read  and  accepted  : 

TREASURER'S  REPORT  FOR  THE  YEAR  ENDING  DECEMBER  31, 

1903-    v 

Receipts. 

Balance  on  hand,  Dec.  31,  1902 $  Jo-77 

Members'  Dues 105.10 

Interest 1.74 


Total $1 17.61 

176 


AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  1 77 

Expenses. 

Rent  of  room  for  '  Smoker '  at  the 

Washington  Meeting $  5.50 

Assessment  for  l  Smoker '  of  the  Affili- 
ated Societies  at  the  Washington 

Meeting i  o.  oo 

Printing , 40. 65 

Postage  and  Stationery 16.03 


$  72.18. 
Balance  on  hand 45-43 

Total #117.61 

Examined  and  found  correct,  Frederick  J.  E.  Woodbridge,  Decem- 
ber 30,  1903. 

The  following  officers  were  elected  for  the  ensuing  year  : 
President,  Professor  George  Trumbull  Ladd  (Yale)  ;  Vice-Presi- 
dent, Professor  Frank  Thilly  (Missouri);  Secretary -Treasurer, 
Professor  H.  N.  Gardiner  (Smith)  ;  Members  of  the  Executive 
Committee  for  Two  Years  (in  place  of  Professors  W.  Caldwell  and 
D.  Irons,  retired),  Professor  J.  H.  Tufts  (Chicago)  and  Professor 
H.  Heath  Bawden  (Vassar). 

Sixteen  new  members  were  elected. 

With  reference  to  the  action  of  the  Association  last  year  look- 
ing to  a  closer  affiliation  with  the  Western  Philosophical  Asso- 
ciation, it  was  voted,  on  recommendation  of  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee, that  the  subject  of  a  change  of  name  be  left  in  abeyance 
till  a  joint  meeting  is  arranged  with  the  Western  Association  and 
that  the  latter  be  invited  to  meet  with  us  next  year. 

Several  invitations  for  the  next  meeting  were  announced.  It 
was  voted  that  the  place  of  the  next  meeting  be  left  with  the 
Executive  Committee,  the  desire  being  expressed  that  it  should 
be  held,  if  possible,  in  conjunction  with  that  of  the  American 
Psychological  Association.  It  was  voted  that  the  decision 
of  the  committee  be  reported  to  the  members  as  early  as  prac- 
ticable. 

The  question  of  the  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  Association 
of  the  centenary  of  the  death  of  the  philosopher  Kant,  presented 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

by  an  outside  correspondent,  was  referred  to  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee with  power  to  act.1 

The  Executive  Committee  announced  that  Professor  Hammond 
had  been  appointed  to  examine  and  approve  for  publication  the 
secretary's  report. 

It  was  voted  that  the  thanks  of  the  Association  be  given  to 
Princeton  University  for  their  cordial  welcome  and  hospitality. 
Special  thanks  are  due  to  Dean  and  Mrs.  Fine  for  the  pleasant 
tea  given  to  the  Association  in  the  old  President's  house  on 
Tuesday  afternoon,  December  29,  to  President  and  Mrs.  Wilson, 
for  the  reception  at  "  Prospect "  the  same  evening,  and  to  Pro- 
fessor Hibben  and  other  members  of  the  Princeton  faculty  for 
the  completeness  and  smooth  working  of  all  the  arrangements 
for  the  conveniences  of  the  meeting  and  the  comfort  of  those 
attending  it. 

The  Eternal  and  the  Practical.     By  JOSIAH  ROYCE. 

[The    President's    Address,  which    appears    in    this    number 
(March,  1904)  of  the  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.] 
Theories  of  Truth  :  A  Contribution  to  Critique  of  Cognition. 

By  KARL  SCHMIDT.      [Read  by  title.] 

In  a  paper  read  before  the  Association  last  year,  I  formulated 
truth  as  a  group  of  two  conditions  :  The  first  determines  the 
truth  of  a  system  with  respect  to  its  generating  problem  ;  it  re- 
quires the  fulfillment  of  all  the  other  conditions  of  critique  of 
cognition ;  the  second  determines  the  truth  of  the  generating 
problem  itself  and  therewith  the  truth  of  the  system,  not  rela- 
tively to  its  own  problem,  but  with  respect  to  the  system  of  cog- 
nition. These  conditions  were  formulated  on  an  idealistic  basis. 

1  In  conformity  with  this  vote,  the  following  memorandum  was  published  about 
the  middle  of  January  in  several  journals,  and  the  Secretary  is  informed  that  a  num- 
ber of  institutions  have  acted  on  its  suggestion  : 

The  members  of  the  American  Philosophical  Association,  by  its  officers,  desire  to 
call  the  attention  of  all  teachers  of  philosophy  to  the  fact  that  next  February  1 2  is  the 
centenary  of  the  death  of  Immanuel  Kant.  They  respectfully  suggest  that  such 
memorial  notice  should  be  taken  of  this  fact  as  in  each  case  seems  practicable.  It  is 
hoped  that  a  more  formal  celebration  of  the  illustrious  service  of  this  great  thinker 
may  be  arranged  for  at  the  next  meeting  of  the  Association. 

GEORGE  TRUMBULL  LADD,  President. 
H.  NORMAN  GARDINER,  Secretary. 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  179 

The  paper  tries  to  justify  this  by  showing  the  insufficiency  of  the 
opposing,  the  realistic  or  dualistic  theory  in  one  particular  case, 
which  is,  however,  of  great  importance  for  the  whole  theory. 
Heinrich  Hertz,  the  eminent  physicist,  has  given  in  the  introduc- 
tion to  his  Prinzipien  der  Mechanik  a  theory  of  truth  of  the  real- 
istic type,  which  commands  the  attention  of  the  criticist,  because 
it  undertakes  to  determine  the  degree  of  correspondence  of  a  sys- 
tem B  with  the  realm  of '  nature  '  A,  which  is  necessary  to  make 
B  a  true  system.  A  and  B  are  determined  by  their  laws  of  neces- 
sity, A  by  the  '  Naturnotwendigkeit/  B  by  the  '  Denknotwen- 
digkeit,'  and  can  be  represented  as  realms  by  two  circles,  the 
elements  of  which  may  be  called  a^,  av  .  .  .  and  b^  bv  .  .  .  The 
a^ .  .  .  .  are  the  '  things/  the  bp  .  .  .  are  '  Scheinbilder  oder  Sym- 
bole,'  which  we  '  make  '  of  the  things  such  that  they  satisfy  a 
certain  condition,  which  he  calls  the  '  Grundforderung.'  These 
'  images  '  are  our  'representations  ';  "  they  have  with  the  things 
the  one  essential  correspondence  which  lies  in  the  fulfilment  of 
the  above-named  condition,  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  their  pur- 
pose that  they  have  any  further  correspondence  with  the  things. 
Indeed,  we  know  not  and  have  no  means  of  finding  out  whether 
our  representations  of  the  things  agree  with  them  in  anything 
else  except  in  just  that  one  fundamental  relation."  He  formulates 
the  '  Grundforderung  '  thus  :  We  make  our  images  such  that  "  die 
denknotwendigen  Folgen  der  Bilder  stets  wieder  die  Bilder 
seien  von  den  naturnotwendigen  Folgen  der  abgebildeten  Gegen- 
stande."  The  strength  of  the  condition  lies  in  this,  —  that  it  is  an 
expression  of  that  great  method  of  determining  truth  in  the  Nat- 
ural Sciences,  the  Experiment. 

The  Relation  of  Appreciation  to  Scientific   Descriptions  of 

Values.     By  WILBUR  M.  URBAN. 

The  antithesis  between  appreciation  and  description  is  unjusti- 
fied. No  appreciation,  still  less  progressive  appreciation,  is  possi- 
ble without  corresponding  description,  presentation  to  conscious- 
ness of  attitude,  as  a  basis  of  further  appreciation.  It  is  also  true 
that  there  is  no  description  without  some  degree  of  appreciation 
(purpose)  which  gives  it  its  meaning.  The  antithesis,  when  ex- 


ISO  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

amined,  really  reduces  itself  to  distinction  between  two  types  of 
description,  which  we  may  call  '  appreciative '  and  '  scientific/ 
'Appreciative'  description  is  a  type  of  communication  which 
seeks  to  describe  the  transgredient  moment  in  our  immediate 
attitudes  of  feeling  by  finding  prospective  equivalents  in  ideal 
projections.  It  proceeds  upon  the  postulate  of  indefinite 
increase  of  appreciation,  meaning,  through  this  ideal  rep- 
resentation and  projection.  Such  are  all  ethical  and  aesthetic 
categories.  '  Scientific '  description,  on  the  other  hand,  seeks 
retrospective  equivalents  in  some  abstract  aspect  or  content  of 
consciousness,  conceived  as  a  continuum  supplementing  our 
discrete  and  immediate  appreciations,  a  continuum,  which,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  doctrine  of  feeling  elements,  admits  of  the  reduc- 
tion of  appreciative  distinctions  to  quantitative  combinations  of 
the  elements.  This  type  of  description,  when  examined,  is  seen 
to  imply  a  given  quantum  of  intensity  of  feeling,  of  capacity  of 
valuation  within  the  system,  and  reduces  all  changes  in  the  worth 
consciousness  of  the  individual  to  mere  transformations  making 
the  postulate  of  appreciative  description  illusory.  Can  there  be 
a  scientific,  psychological  reconstruction  of  worths  ?  If  this  is 
the  true  type  of  psychological  description,  the  answer  must  be 
'  no.'  It  can  find  no  equivalents  for  the  transgredient  moment 
of  appreciative  description.  But  this  type  of  description  is  the 
result  of  a  false  abstraction  which  eliminates  the  conative  presup- 
positions of  our  feelings,  differences  in  which,  differences  of  sys- 
tematization  and  arrest,  alone  afford  the  equivalents  for  the 
transgredient  moments  in  our  worth  feelings  which  appreciative 
description  takes  account  of.  Psychological  equivalents  of  worth 
attitudes  will  be  functional,  therefore,  rather  than  given  in  terms 
of  content,  and  the  continuum  which  psychology  constructs  in  its 
description  of  worths  must  be  a  '  conative  continuity,'  a  continuity 
of  process,  in  which,  by  the  two  moments  of  systematization  and 
arrest,  new  attitudes  are  differentiated  for  appreciative  description. 
There  can  be  no  psychological  description  of  worths,  therefore, 
without  the  use  of  appreciative  description  as  a  heuristic  principle, 
for  it  is  this  description  which  first  differentiates  them.  The  pos- 
tulate of  this  type  of  description,  'increase  of  meaning/  must,  when 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.         l8l 

properly  interpreted,  be  used  as  a  regulative  principle  in  the  sci- 
entific description  of  worths.  Thus  used,  it  points  the  way  to  the 
discovery  of  the  conative  system  which  is  the  presupposition  of 
the  worth  feeling  and  the  psychological  equivalent  of  the  trans- 
gredient  moment  in  it. 

Purpose  as  a  Logical  Category.     By  J.  E.  CREIGHTON. 

This  paper  undertakes  to  examine  some  of  the  arguments 
urged  by  its  modern  advocates  in  support  of  the  position  that 
thought  is  instrumental  or  teleological  in  character  and  subor- 
dinate to  the  purposes  of  practical  life.  Through  the  discussion 
and  criticism  of  these  arguments  certain  fundamental  difficulties 
to  which  the  position  gives  rise  are  exhibited  and  developed. 

The  arguments  in  support  of  the  position  which  are  subjected  to 
criticism  are  :  (i)  The  obvious  utility  of  knowledge  for  practical 
life ;  (2)  the  intimate  psychological  connection  between  will  or  ac- 
tion and  idea  ;  (3)  the  alleged  fact  that  science,  as  well  as  the  idea- 
tional  life  in  general,  has  been  conditioned  in  its  genesis  by  the 
necessities  of  practical  life ;  (4)  the  support  that  the  instrumental 
view  appears  to  receive  from  biological  analogies  and  from  the  gen- 
-eral  theory  of  evolution ;  (5)  the  negative  argument  that  all  theories 
of  knowledge  which  suppose  thought  to  be  concerned  to  define 
or  determine  the  nature  of  an  ontological  reality  are  powerless  to 
explain  how  thought  can  thus  deal  with  a  transcendent  reality,  or 
can  find  in  such  a  reality  any  standard  of  truth  or  falsehood. 

The  objections  brought  forward  against  the  instrumental  posi- 
tion are :  (i)  The  ambiguity  in  the  use  that  it  makes  of  the  term 
'  practical  purpose/  which  at  one  time  denotes  material  ends  for 
the  attainments  of  which  physical  movements  are  necessary,  and 
at  another  includes  the  solution  of  purely  theoretical  problems  ; 
(2)  the  necessary  subjectivity  and  relativity  of  the  position  ;  (3) 
its  lack  of  any  principle  by  means  of  which  experience  can  be 
unified ;  (4)  the  sharp  opposition,  amounting  to  a  real  dualism, 
between  thought  and  the  antecedent  experience  out  of  which  it  is 
said  to  arise ;  (5)  the  fact  that  the  position  presupposes  as  its  in- 
dispensable background  a  logical  and  ontological  system  very  dif- 
ferent from  that  to  which  it  explicitly  appeals. 


1 82  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIIL 

A  Thesis  :  Hegel's  Voyage  of  Discovery  Reaches  as  its  Goal 
an  Insight  into  the  Necessity  of  Goodness  and  Righteous- 
ness in  an  Absolute  Being  and  into  the  Consequent  Neces- 
sity that  the  Absolute  has  the  Form  of  Personality.  By 
W.  T.  HARRIS. 

Hegel  is  said  (on  the  authority  of  Rosenkranz)  to  have  called 
his  Phdnomenologie  des  Geistes  his  'voyage  of  discovery.' 

In  the  Phenomenology  Hegel  recounts  to  us  the  insights 
which  he  arrived  at  from  time  to  time  in  perfecting  his  view  of 
the  world.  One  must  not  on  any  account  regard  the  Phenom- 
enology as  a  work  which  states  these  insights  in  the  order  of 
their  discovery  by  Hegel. 

Hegel  has  seen  the  necessity  of  goodness  and  righteousness 
in  the  Absolute  as  a  postulate  to  explain  the  existence  and  the 
preservation  of  the  finite  or  imperfect.  It  is  the  problem  of  all 
philosophy  to  explain  how  the  perfect  makes  the  imperfect.  It 
could  never  create  the  finite  unless  it  were  altruistic  to  the  deep- 
est depth  of  its  divine  nature. 

The  question  of  knowing  the  Absolute  appeared  to  Hegel  in 
this  wise  :  The  moral  insight  is  an  insight  into  true  Being.  The 
essence  of  morality  is  goodness,  because  creation  depends  on  it. 
If  God  gave  only  a  seeming  being  to  man,  if  all  finitude  were  illu- 
sion, He  would  not  have  goodness  ;  but  in  that  case  He  could 
have  no  Being  objective  to  Himself  and  could  not  be  Personal ; 
for  the  eternal  Word  or  Logos,  perfect  from  all  eternity,  is  not  to 
be  thought  without  the  idea  of  Derivation,  though  this  derivation 
must  have  been  completed  from  all  eternity,  or  else  God  could 
not  have  always  been  conscious.  It  is  by  the  thought  of  this 
derivation  that  the  Logos  creates  a  world  of  evolution. 

Hegel  says  (Philos.  of  Relig.,  Vol.  II,  p.  55):  "  His  absolute 
power  is  wisdom  whose  phases  of  manifestation  are  goodness  and 
righteousness.  Goodness  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  world  is. 
The  world  does  not  exist  of  its  own  right,  it  has  been  created  and 
given  its  right  to  exist.  This  act  of  sharing  his  being  manifests 
the  eternal  goodness  of  God." 

Hegel  sees  that  goodness  and  righteousness,  the  deepest  moral 
attributes,  cannot  belong  to  a  blind  force,  a  mere  substance,  but 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.          183 

that  they  can  belong  only  to  a  subject,  to  a  person  (Philos.  of 
Relig.y  Vol.  II,  p.  56):  "  Here  the  One  is  not  mere  substance, 
but  the  personal  One,  as  Subject." 

In  the  Phenomenology  he  states  this  insight  with  great  prolix- 
ity, but  in  terms  that  are  technical  in  the  extreme.  For  example 
(Phdn.  des  Geistes,  p.  5  77) :  "  The  moral  self-consciousness  knows 
its  knowing  as  the  absolute  essentiality  or  being  which  consists 
exclusively  of  pure  will  or  pure  knowing  ;  it  is  nothing  else  than 
this  will  and  knowing."  [This  is  the  knowing  of  the  moral  prin- 
ciples of  goodness  and  righteousness  as  constituting  the  nature 
of  Absolute  Being  itself — God  as  goodness  and  righteousness]. 

Jonathan  Edwards  as  Thinker  and  Philosopher.     By  ALEX- 
ANDER T.  ORMOND. 

The  first  part  of  this  paper  discussed  Edwards's  philosophical 
inheritance,  the  second  part  his  philosophy.  The  key  to  his  phi- 
losophy is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  youthful  Journal,  but  in  the 
treatise  on  Decrees  and  Election,  where  (58th  sect.)  a  conception 
of  God's  relation  to  the  ideal  and  actual  worlds  is  developed  strik- 
ingly similar  to  that  of  Lotze  in  his  Metaphysics.  There  is  first 
the  order  in  which  God  conceives  the  world-plan,  then  the  order 
of  the  real  world.  The  nexus  between  the  two  is  the  decree,  or 
choosing  will.  The  antecedent  motive  of  creation  is  love  ;  first, 
love  of  complacency,  God's  love  of  His  own  excellency,  secondly, 
love  of  benevolence,  His  regard  for  the  happiness  and  moral  ex- 
cellency of  His  creatures.  Material  things  exist  only  as  ideas  in 
minds,  finite  or  divine.  Nature  expresses  the  "continued  im- 
mediate efficiency  of  God."  Finite  spirits  exist  by  virtue  of  the 
decree  of  creation  ;  and,  as  the  act  of  creation  is  continuous,  they 
are  held  in  being  by  the  divine  agency.  There  is  a  sense,  Ed- 
wards says,  in  which  the  finite  spirit  is  each  instant  a  new  effect. 
Edwards  thus  anticipates  Lotze,  but  stops  short  of  the  latter's 
suggestion  that  the  soul  may  be  simply  like  notes  in  a  har- 
mony. The  soul  has  the  divine  image  in  it ;  its  true  end  is  iden- 
tical with  the  end  of  creation.  But  sin  enters  the  world  by  the 
permissive  decree  as  a  condition  of  ultimate  good.  Man  falls,  the 
result  being  the  natural  transmission  of  depravity  by  heredity  and 


1 84  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

the  consequent  original  sin  of  the  race.  Hence  determinism  of 
the  will.  Man  is  free  to  will  as  he  pleases,  but  the  pleasure  of 
his  fallen  nature  is  to  do  evil.  Hence  the  need  of  regeneration 
by  divine  grace.  Edwards  paints  the  evil  world  in  colors  darker 
than  those  of  Dante  or  Schopenhauer  ;  but  his  faith  in  the  scheme 
of  redemption  prevents  him  from  being  completely  pessimistic. 
In  the  working  out  of  the  scheme  of  grace,  Edwards  allows  of  no 
cooperation  of  human  and  divine  agencies ;  man  is  here  "  abso- 
lutely dependent."  He  says,  nevertheless,  that  while  God  must 
do  everything,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  man  must  do  everything. 
Just  as  in  creation  God  holds  man  in  being  while  man  lives  his 
own  life,  so  in  regeneration  God  creates  and  sustains  the  new 
heart  while  the  new  creature  lives  its  own  life.  Edwards  denies 
to  both  God  and  man  the  freedom  of  indifference.  Choice  is  de- 
termined by  motives  in  the  impulsive  nature  of  the  chooser,  and 
these  motives  are  causes.  Our  opinion  as  to  Edwards's  relation 
to  the  Kanto-Schopenhauerian  voluntarism  will  be  determined 
largely  by  our  judgment  as  to  what  constitutes  the  central  motive 
of  his  philosophizing.  If  we  find  it  in  his  doctrine  of  will,  the 
reasons  for  characterizing  him  as  a  voluntarist  are  plausible.  If, 
however,  we  find  the  central  motive  in  the  doctrine  of  creation 
and  the  decrees,  then  it  will  appear  that  Edwards  is  more  in 
agreement  with  the  older  thinkers  who  subordinate  the  divine  will 
to  the  divine  wisdom. 

General  Discussion  on  the  Question  :  What  Place  has  ^Es- 
thetics Among  the  Disciplines  of  Philosophy  ? 

By  GEORGE  SANTAYANA. 

While  it  would  be  easy  to  deliminate  any  sort  of  aesthetic  field 
ideally,  making  aesthetics  wholly  psychological,  or  wholly  appre- 
ciative, or  wholly  metaphysical,  actual  aesthetic  interests  cannot 
be  covered  by  any  one  discipline  of  any  kind.  Psychology,  in 
a  certain  sense,  can  retract  or  absorb  everything,  but  only  in 
retrospect  and  for  a  third  person  ;  aesthetic  judgment  and  poetic 
activity  are  in  their  living  intent  as  much  prior  to  psychology, 
and  as  independent  of  it,  as  mathematics  or  physics  can  be.  Ideal 
science,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  absorb  all  aesthetics,  since  the 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  185 

psychology  of  taste  and  the  history  of  art  are  subjects  for  natural 
philosophy  ;  nor  is  there  a  separate  branch  of  ideal  science  called 
aesthetics.  Appreciation  of  the  beautiful  involves  animal  interest 
and  sensuous  excitement ;  all  creation  and  judgment  of  an  aes- 
thetic kind  are  accordingly  based  on  vital  human  interests  and 
physical  aptitudes  ;  the  way  in  which  nature  has  determined  that 
life  shall  be  enjoyable — the  conditions  of  health  and  pleasure  — 
must  first  determine  aesthetic  appreciation  and  give  it  body  and 
direction.  Nor  can  aesthetic  values,  impregnated  in  this  way  by 
animal  joys,  remain  valuable  in  isolation  from  rational  goods. 
A  beauty  which  gave  no  foothold  to  reflection  and  had  no  affinity 
to  any  moral  or  intellectual  interest,  would  be  indescribably  poor 
and  trivial.  Indulgence  in  it  would  signify  a  witless,  foolish, 
arrested  state  of  mind.  Cultivation  makes  objects  acquire  for 
intuition  the  quality  which  their  effects  and  implications  have  for 
ulterior  experience,  so  that  to  a  cultivated  mind  the  insignificantly 
aesthetical  cannot  be  even  aesthetically  interesting.  All  wisdom 
must  color  a  judgment  which  is  truly  imaginative,  and  a  true 
beauty  must  be  a  premonition  of  benefit  or  an  echo  of  happiness. 
A  separate  aesthetic  science  is  therefore  impossible.  What  exists 
is,  first,  a  psychological  description  of  aesthetic  experience  in  its 
natural  conditions,  and  second,  an  art  of  rational  criticism  in 
which  aesthetic  values  are  compared  and  judged  according  to  the 
contribution  they  make,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  all  human  good. 

By  WILLIAM  A.   HAMMOND. 

The  discipline  of  aesthetics  was  distinctly  differentiated  from 
the  other  branches  of  philosophy  in  Aristotle's  classification  of 
the  sciences,  and  under  the  title  of  Poetics  Aristotle  developed  a 
fragmentary  Philosophy  of  Art.  The  current  designation  of  the 
discipline  as  ^Esthetics  was  originated  by  Baumgarten,  and  this 
name  was  applied  by  him  to  the  philosophy  of  sensible  knowl- 
edge. Beauty  and  ugliness  are  here  the  perfection  and  imperfec- 
tion of  sensible  knowledge.  The  modern  conception  of  aesthetics 
as  a  science  or  philosophy  whose  data  are  given  in  the  psychol- 
ogy of  the  aesthetic  sentiments,  the  phenomena  of  art,  and  the 
problems  of  artistic  genius,  was  first  developed  by  Kant  in  the 
Critique  of  Judgment.  The  original  differentiation  of  the  disci- 


186  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIIL 

pline  from  other  disciplines  is  Aristotelian,  the  name  is  Baum- 
garten's,  and  the  modern  statement  of  the  problem  is  Kant's. 
The  general  tendency  of  contemporary  aesthetic  studies  is  to  erect 
the  discipline  into  an  empirical  science.  The  disciplines  which 
are  most  intimately  connected  with  aesthetics  are  psychology,, 
ethics,  sociology,  and  metaphysics,  and  under  one  or  other  of 
these  aesthetics  has  at  various  times  been  subsumed.  As  a 
normative  science,  however,  dealing  with  values,  it  falls  outside 
of  psychology,  which  is  a  phenomenalistic  science.  As  a  norma- 
tive science,  whose  concern  is  with  the  standards  of  beauty,  sub- 
limity, humor,  etc.,  and  with  the  psychology  of  feeling,  it  is 
differentiated  from  ethics,  whose  concern  is  with  standards  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  with  the  psychology  of  volition.  From 
sociology  it  differs  in  its  main  concern  with  the  qualitative 
nature  of  the  aesthetic  standard-idea  and  in  its  concern  with  indi- 
vidual psychology.  From  metaphysics  it  differs  in  aiming  to 
become  a  particular  empirical  science,  deriving  its  laws  from 
induction  applied  to  a  specific  group  of  facts,  but  in  relating 
aesthetic  values  to  the  supreme  values  of  life  aesthetics  demands- 
ultimately  a  metaphysics. 

By  ETHEL  D.  PUFFER. 

The  aim  of  every  aesthetics  is  to  determine  the  nature  of  beauty 
and  to  explain  our  feelings  about  it.  Philosophical  aesthetics  is 
generally  held  to  have  failed  in  its  treatment  of  concrete  beauty. 
The  central  problem  of  empirical  aesthetics  is  to  determine  that 
conformation  of  the  object  which  is  the  correlative  of  aesthetic 
pleasure,  and  to  explain  aesthetic  pleasure  in  relation  to  it.  But 
pure  description  explains  nothing ;  the  genetic  study  of  art  can 
treat  it  only  as  a  social  product  without  touching  on  its  nature  as 
aesthetic,  while  psychological  aesthetics  has  not  succeeded  in 
doing  more  than  characterizing  the  general  aesthetic  conscious- 
ness. The  reason  for  this  failure  of  psychological  aesthetics  lies 
in  the  fact  that  aesthetic  pleasure  implies  a  judgment.  But  the 
presence  of  judgment  implies  a  teleological  view,  and  indicates 
that  the  foundation  of  aesthetics  must  lie  in  a  philosophical  anal- 
ysis. On  the  other  hand,  the  reputed  inadequacy  of  philosoph- 
ical aesthetics  is  due  to  the  illogical  attempt  to  apply  the  philo- 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  1 8? 

sophical  definition  of  beauty,  a  teleological  concept,  in  the  causal 
explanation  of  psychological  facts.  The  philosophical  definition 
of  beauty  must  set  forth  its  purpose  or  function  in  the  universe. 
The  nature  or  constitution  of  beauty,  then,  can  be  only  the  com- 
bination of  qualities  fitted  to  bring  about  this  end.  Philosophy  lays 
down  what  beauty  has  to  do.  But,  since  it  is  in  our  experience 
of  beauty  that  its  end  is  accomplished,  psychology  must  deal  with 
the  various  means  through  which  this  end  is  to  be  reached.  This 
principle  may  be  illustrated  as  follows  :  It  is  the  tendency  of 
modern  idealism  to  find  the  function  of  beauty  in  the  universe  a 
reconciling  one,  as  in  Schiller's  "  vindication  of  freedom  in  the 
phenomenal  world."  Reconciliation  in  its  full  sense  can  take 
place  only  in  immediate  experience ;  in  the  form  of  a  perfect 
moment,  rather  than  in  an  intuition  of  perfection.  A  state  of 
perfection  involves  the  unity  and  self-completeness  of  the  person- 
ality. Viewed  under  the  aspect  of  psychology,  the  personality 
appears  as  the  psychophysical  organism,  its  unity  as  a  state  of 
arrest,  inhibition,  repose  ;  its  self-completeness  as  a  state  of  height- 
ened tone,  functional  efficiency,  favorable  stimulation.  Thus  the 
positively  toned  aesthetic  consciousness  is  characterized  by  a  com- 
bination of  stimulation  and  inhibition.  This  is  possible  only  in 
the  case  of  inhibition  through  the  mutual  checking  of  antagonistic 
impulses.  The  psychologist  has  then  to  ask  what  colors,  lines, 
tones,  rhythms,  words,  etc.,  favorably  stimulate,  and  what  com- 
binations bring  to  repose ;  and  any  given  work  of  art  may  be 
analyzed,  and  its  effect  explained,  as  attaining  —  or  not  attaining 
—  to  this  combination  through  the  effect  of  its  elements  on  the 
psychophysical  organism  according  to  general  psychological  laws. 

By  FRANK  CHAPMAN  SHARP. 

The  value  of  an  attempt  to  exhibit  the  place  of  aesthetics 
among  the  philosophical  disciplines  lies  in  the  fact  that  an  under- 
standing of  the  exact  nature  and  relations  of  a  problem  tends  to 
ensure  directness  of  aim  and  definiteness  and  appropriateness  of 
method  in  its  solution.  A  large  proportion  of  the  problems  of 
aesthetics  are  admittedly  psychological  in  nature.  The  objec- 
tions urged  against  merging  aesthetics  in  psychology  are  two  : 
(i)  The  alleged  existence  of  a  standard  of  beauty,  the  recogni- 


188  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

tion  of  which  is  held  to  constitute  aesthetics  a  normative  science  ; 
(2)  the  alleged  impossibility  of  explaining  the  nature  of  beauty 
without  the  aid  of  metaphysics. 

(i)  The  word  'beauty'  has  in  common  speech  no  single  con- 
notation. However,  a  single  element,  always  present,  can  be 
shown  to  be  the  essential  one,  namely,  '  form.'  The  beautiful, 
then,  is  found  in  those  relations  of  sensations  or  images  which  tend 
to  give  pleasure.  For  those  who  accept  this  definition,  a  standard 
of  beauty  is  possible.  The  judgment,  "  That  is  beautiful,"  is  ob- 
jective in  so  far  as  it  asserts  the  existence  of  a  source  of  pleasure 
for  all  who  apprehend  the  object  in  its  entirety,  who  have  given 
it  an  opportunity  to  exert  its  entire  influence  upon  them,  and  who 
possess  a  mind  capable  of  responding  to  all  its  aspects.  This 
conclusion,  however,  may  be  reached  by  purely  psychological 
methods.  Therefore,  the  admission  of  an  objective  element  in 
beauty  is  not  incompatible  with  the  classification  of  aesthetics  as 
a  branch  of  psychology.  (2)  Of  those  who  hold  the  second 
view,  many  have  adopted  the  Hegelian  definition  :  Beauty  is  the 
appearance  of  the  Idea  to  sense.  Now  this  may  mean  either  one 
of  two  things :  The  object  by  its  qualities  suggests  the  Idea  to 
the  mind ;  or,  the  Idea  actually  transfuses  with  its  own  presence 
the  finite  object.  Only  the  former  could  be  maintained  by  any 
serious  student.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  view  of  Hegel.  What 
plausibility  the  latter  possesses  is  due  solely  to  a  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  other.  As  the  same  thesis  could  be  proved 
for  other  so-called  metaphysical  doctrines,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
second  contention  (above)  derives  its  vitality  solely  from  a  mis- 
understanding. 

The  Concept  of  Consciousness.     BY  RALPH  BARTON  PERRY. 

Consciousness  cannot  mean  everything  and  yet  mean  anything. 
In  connection  with  the  psychological  aspect  of  experience,  it  may 
be  shown  to  signify  something  definite  and  important ;  but,  so 
interpreted,  it  cannot  also  serve  as  an  account  of  being.  The 
present  paper  seeks  (i)  to  define  the  psychological  concept  of 
consciousness,  and  (2)  to  criticise  its  use  as  a  fundamental  meta- 
physical principle,  i.  The  first  intent  or  bearing  of  experience  is 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  189 

objective,  expressed  in  the  judgment,  "there  is  #."  But  experi- 
ence is  self-corrective.  The  content  of  a  grows  in  the  direction  of 
its  own  completeness.  While  the  direction  remains  the  same,  this 
experience  is  continuous  and  homogeneous,  an  experience,  as  we 
say,  of  the  same  object  or  context  of  objects.  But  an  act  of  atten- 
tion is  possible  whereby  the  direction  is  reversed.  With  this  new 
interest  there  appears  a  series  of  corrected  experiences,  to  any 
degree  of  retrogressive  adequacy.  The  corrected  or  discredited 
experience  in  contradistinction  to  the  experience  of  objects,  is  now 
regarded  as  merely  my  experience,  and  may  be  analyzed  as  such. 
These  data  cannot  be  called  objects  in  the  same  sense  as  the 
standard  objects,  for  they  are  completed  and  replaced  by  the 
latter.  We  provide  a  radically  different  catagory  for  them,  that 
of  subjectivity,  and  recognize  that  their  content  is  common  to 
themselves  and  to  objects,  while  their  specific  character  is  given 
them  by  their  limitations.  An  examination  of  the  early  develop- 
ment of  human  thought  and  of  contemporary  psychological 
method  tends  to  confirm  this  definition  of  the  field  of  subjectivity. 
2.  There  are  two  notable  attempts  to  make  a  fundamental  meta- 
physical principle  of  consciousness.  Perceptual  or  Psycho- 
logical Idealism  is  self-contradictory  in  that  it  attempts  to  define 
being  in  terms  of  relativity  or  invalid  experience.  Transcendental 
Idealism  commits  the  error  of  retaining  in  its  Absolute  the  very 
characters  of  subjectivity  that  such  a  conception  is  designed  to 
correct.  A  transcendental  consciousness,  like  absolute  relativity 
or  universal  standpoint,  can  mean  nothing.  Error  is  an  out- 
standing problem.  But  this  problem  is  at  least  equally  difficult 
for  the  subjective  idealist.  Grant  him  his  Absolute,  and  finite  ex- 
periences with  their  relativity  and  exclusiveness  are  a  totally  new 
problem  which  the  general  pervasiveness  of  consciousness  does 
nothing  to  solve. 

The  Analysis  of  Consciousness.  By  GEORGE  R.  MONTGOMERY. 
(i)  We  must  first  of  all  come  to  some  idea  and  agreement  as 
to  the  meaning  of  analysis.  It  is  not  mere  division,  for  the 
whole  must  not  be  lost,  nor  the  relation  of  the  parts  to  the 
whole  and  to  each  other.  These  requirements  are  fully  met  by 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

the  mathematical  conception  of  analysis,  where  a  number  is  anal- 
yzed by  its  relation  to  x  and  y  coordinates.  This  conception  of 
analysis  does  not  lead  to  pluralism  ;  it  avoids  the  remnant  of 
'  introjection '  retained  by  the  empirio-criticists  in  their  oppo- 
sition of  a  center-factor  and  a  counter-factor  ;  it  gives  the  true 
conception  of  space;  it  covers  the  parallelogram  of  forces  in 
mechanics ;  it  gives  a  significance  to  the  analysis  of  an  effect  into 
its  causes  in  physics ;  it  gives  the  true  meaning  of  chemical 
analysis,  where,  in  the  analysis  of  water  into  H  and  O,  the  H  is 
only  seemingly  independent.  We  may,  indeed,  think  of  H  with- 
out reference  to  O,  but  an  inalienable  part  of  its  being  is  its  re- 
lation to  O  to  form  water,  and  its  total  reality  is  its  relation  to 
all  other  elements.  That  this  mathematical  form  gives  the  best 
meaning  for  the  word  analysis  is  shown  further  by  its  represent- 
ing logical  analysis,  where  the  concept  '  mortals  '  is  analyzed 
into  '  men '  and  other  mortals,  and  the  concept  '  men  '  into 
'  Caesar '  and  other  men  ;  a  proposition  may  therefore  be  defined 
as  one  leg  of  an  analysis.  (2)  Having  defined  analysis,  we  must 
justify  our  taking  consciousness  as  the  primary  concrete.  Other 
suggestions  have  been  '  the  given,'  with  which  phrase  con- 
sciousness is  regarded  as  more  subjective  and  experience  more 
objective ;  or  the  word  '  experience,'  this  latter  especially  by 
the  empirio-criticists.  We  prefer  the  word  '  consciousness,'  be- 
cause, though  less  naive,  it  does  not  lead  to  the  opposition  of 
the  ego  and  non-ego  as  the  principal  coordination.  (3)  Conclu- 
sions :  In  a  true  analysis  the  whole  of  consciousness  must  not 
be  confused  with  one  of  the  elements  found  in  it.  The  parts  are 
abstract  in  relation  to  the  whole.  The  subject  is  not  the  sup- 
porter for  the  whole  of  experience.  The  ego  must  be  distin- 
guished from  the  epistemological  subject.  The  subject  can  be 
examined  quite  as  well  as  the  object. 

The  Meaning  of  the  Psychical  from  the  Standpoint  of  the 

Functional  Psychology.     By  H.  HEATH  BAWDEN. 

It  is  natural  to  expect  that  the  meaning  of  the  psychical  should 

undergo  modification  with  change  in  the  standpoint  and  method 

of  psychology  as  a  science.     This  change  is  simply  a  reflection 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.          191 

of  the  universal  change  in  science  to-day  from  a  static  to  a  dyna- 
mic point  of  view.  In  physical  science  this  means  the  substitu- 
tion of  the  concept  of  energy  for  that  of  matter.  In  psychology 
this  dynamic  standpoint  is  represented  in  the  functional  view  of 
the  nature  of  consciousness.  Consciousness,  like  matter,  is 
viewed  as  a  function  or  process  rather  than  as  a  structure  or  en- 
tity. More  specifically,  the  functional  view  regards  conscious- 
ness as  the  tensional  phase  of  action,  and  as  thus  developed 
within  action  and  for  the  sake  of  action.  There  are  two  questions 
of  fundamental  importance  :  (i)  How  do  unconscious  acts  be- 
come conscious  ?  Consciousness  results  from  the  interruption 
of  action.  This  is  the  law  of  tension,  the  law  of  consciousness. 
(2)  How  do  conscious  acts  become  unconscious  ?  Habitual  acts 
result  from  the  mechanization  of  conscious  acts.  This  is  the 
law  of  facilitation,  the  law  of  habit.  Psychophysics  and  ex- 
perimental psychology  define  the  limits  of  this  tension  and  facili- 
tation in  action.  Physiological  and  comparative  psychology 
show  the  types  of  experience  within  which  such  tension  arises. 
Both  show  that  the  psychical  and  the  physical  are  one  process, 
not  two,  with  phases  of  relative  tension  and  relative  equilibrium 
in  adaptation.  The  real  psychical  (as  distinct  from  the  psycho- 
logical) is  the  process  as  process.  The  psychical  is  experience 
undergoing  reconstruction.  The  psychical  as  process  must  be 
distinguished  from  the  psychical  as  content.  The  psychical,  which 
I  get  through  introspection  (really  retrospection),  is  a  content  no 
different  in  principle  from  the  physical  content  which  I  get 
through  so-called  external  observation.  The  difference  between 
the  real  psychical  (the  process)  and  the  physical  (or  any  other 
phase  of  the  content)  is  a  difference  of  function  only,  since  any 
phase  of  the  content  is  capable  of  reconstruction.  No  physical 
is  a  fixed  content ;  it  is  content  only  in  relation  to  some  center 
of  transformation.  No  psychical  is  simply  and  only  process  ;  it 
is  the  reconstruction  of  old  into  new  content.  There  is  no  mys- 
terious uniqueness  about  the  psychical.  It  is  unique,  to  be  sure, 
but  so  is  any  individual  object  in  the  universe.  The  psychical  is 
unsharable,  but  in  no  peculiar  sense.  The  psychical  individual 
is  the  social  whole  of  experience  at  one  nisus  of  its  development. 


192  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIIL 

A  Peculiar  State  of  Consciousness.     By  JAMES  H.  LEUBA. 

The  author  appropriates  the  too  loosely  used  word  '  faith  '  as  a 
name  for  the  peculiar  experience  of  which  he  wishes  to  speak. 
He  proposes  to  give  to  that  word  a  definite  connotation.  It  is 
to  be  understood  at  the  outset  that  faith  is  not  used  here  as 
a  synonym  of  belief,  i.  e.,  conviction  of  the  truth  of  a  proposi- 
tion. The  faith-state  involves,  it  is  true,  an  attitude  of  belief 
towards  certain  conceptions,  but  belief  is  no  more  the  whole  of 
faith  than  the  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a  rival  is  the  whole 
of  jealousy.  Faith  is  not  met  with  in  religious  life  only.  The 
condition  of  a  Joan  of  Arc  and  of  certain  other  heroic  souls, 
who,  after  having  conceived  a  great  task,  receive  the  joyous 
spirit  of  confiding  enthusiasm,  is  also  faith.  There  are,  in  addi- 
tion to  what  might  be  termed  the  patriotic  faith,  two  other  varie- 
ties :  the  aesthetic  and  the  intellectual  faith.  But  one  should 
carefully  guard  against  assimilating  faith  with  any  kind  of  emo- 
tion or  sentiment  which  might  be  called  patriotic,  aesthetic,  or 
intellectual.  Faith  belongs  to  the  class  of  experiences  techni- 
cally known  as  emotion.  It  is  an  emotion  of  the  sthenic  type. 
Like  all  other  emotions,  it  consists  in  a  unitary  process  (involv- 
ing conative,  affective,  and  intellectual  elements)  following  a  defi- 
nite course  and  subserving  a  particular  purpose.  Faith  may 
further  be  described  as  a  pleasurable  state  of  increased  intensity 
of  life,  manifesting  itself  in  a  heightened  confidence  in  one's  higher 
self,  and  in  an  unusually  high  capacity  of  self-realization.  It 
finds  neither  its  cause  nor  its  end  in  persons,  or  in  concrete 
objects,  but  arises  from  the  apprehension  of  abstract  conceptions 
and  from  the  desire  for  higher  forms  of  activity.  To  the  increased 
intensity  of  life  corresponds  a  narrowing  of  the  field  of  conscious- 
ness. The  reduction  in  the  breadth  of  the  mental  life  conjoined 
with  the  increased  affecto-motor  activity  within  certain  spheres,, 
make  the  faith-state  one  of  powerfully  increased  suggestibility  to 
the  ideas  connected  with  its  impulses  and  aspirations.  Belief  in 
these  ideas  follows  naturally,  if  not  logically,  from  these  circum- 
stances. The  closest  relative  of  faith  is  love  ;  not  the  love  for  a 
person  of  the  opposite  sex,  but  asexual  love,  the  divine,  fiery 
love  of  Plato.  Faith  and  asexual  love  seem  to  the  author  undis- 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  193 

tinguishable.  Both  asexual  love  and  faith  are  late  products  of 
human  development.  They  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  lower 
civilizations.  They  are  among  the  new  emotions  in  process  of 
formation  for  the  realization  of  a  higher  life.  In  a  concluding 
remark  concerning  the  genesis  of  this  new  emotion,  the  author 
claims  that  faith  is  neither  a  spontaneous,  fortuitous  variation 
(Darwinian  factor),  nor  the  result  of  adaptation  to  external  condi- 
tions under  the  stress  of  effort  (Lamarckian  factor),  but  that  it 
arises  as  a  purposive  internal  adaptation,  under  the  pressure  of  a 
desire  for  a  mode  of  life  unrealizable  without  it. 

The  Resemblance  of  Twins.     By  EDWARD  L.  THORNDIKE. 

A  preliminary  report  of  a  study  of  the  physical  and  mental  re- 
semblances of  twins  undertaken  by  means  of  a  grant  from  the 
Esther  Herrman  research  fund  of  the  Scientific  Alliance  of  New 
York.  The  provisional  results  presented  were  obtained  from 
thirty-five  pairs  of  twins,  9  to  1 5  years  old,  all  measured  and  tested 
by  the  same  person  in  the  same  manner.  The  mental  measure- 
ments taken  were  five  tests  of  perception  and  attention,  two  of  con- 
trolled association  of  ideas,  two  of  rate  of  movement,  and  two  each 
in  addition  and  multiplication.  The  only  physical  measurement 
so  far  taken  was  stature.  For  a  basis  of  comparison,  records  were 
at  hand  of  the  abilities  of  from  300  to  2,000  children  with  each  of 
the  tests.  The  amount  of  resemblance  was  measured  by  a  Pear- 
son coefficient  of  correlation,  calculated  directly  by  the  formula 

Ixy 


or  indirectly  from  a  comparison  of  the  difference  between  twin  and 
twin  with  that  between  any  child  and  any  other  child  of  the  same 
age,  the  formula  here  being,  difference  of  twins  =  chance  differ- 
ence i/ 1  —  r2.  The  resemblances  were  as  follows  : — 

Mean  Square 
Error  of  r  = 

1.  In  marking  A' s  on  a  sheet  of  printed  capitals  r= 73l        -°^2 

2.  In  marking  words  containing  a  and  t  on  a  printed  sheet  of 

Spanish  words 60         .15 

3.  In  marking  misspelled  words  on  a  page  of  English 80         .20 

4.  In  writing  opposites  to  given  words,  such  as  light,  tall,  happy.  .73         .10 


194  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

5.  In  addition 78  .15 

6.  In  multiplication 78  .15 

7.  In  rate  of  making  crosses  (with  a  pencil  on  paper) 51  .20 

8.  In  stature 69  .10 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  mental  traits  as  those  meas- 
ured are  largely  subject  to  the  influence  of  heredity.  The  gen- 
eral fact  found  years  ago  by  Galton,  and  more  recently  by  Pear- 
son, Earle,  Burris,  and  Thorndike,  is  confirmed  by  these  records. 
How  much  of  the  resemblances  is  to  be  credited  to  similarity 
of  training  is  not  known,  but  in  the  case  of  I,  2,  3,  and  7  the 
amount  is  surely  small.  The  following  facts  were  also  noted  : 
(i)  So  far  as  these  measurements  go,  mental  capacities  seem  as 
much  due  to  inborn  qualities  as  are  physical  traits.  (2)  The 
opinion  that  twins  are  divided  rather  sharply  into  two  classes, 
those  nearly  identical  and  those  little,  if  any,  more  alike  than  or- 
dinary siblings  is  entirely  at  variance  within  the  facts  in  these 
thirty-five  pairs.  Both  in  stature  and  in  the  mental  traits 
studied  they  shade  off  continuously  from  little  to  great  resem- 
blance. The  same  holds  of  their  general  appearance.  The 
corollary  to  this  opinion,  that  there  are  two  distinct  methods  of 
development  for  twin  embryos  is,  therefore,  in  need  of  initial  in- 
vestigation. (3)  The  opinion  of  Galton  that  physical  likeness 
need  not  imply  mental  likeness  is  supported  by  these  results. 
Indeed,  the  twins  most  alike  in  physique  are,  so  far  as  these 
thirty-five  pairs  go,  not  a  whit  more  alike  mentally  than  those 
physically  most  unlike.  (4)  Even  among  the  mental  traits,  there 
appears  a  very  decided  specialization.  For  instance,  twins  may 
be  closely  alike  in  tests  of  perception  and  very  little  alike  in  tests 
of  the  associative  processes.  This  accords  with  the  author's  pre- 
vious conclusions  from  a  study  of  brothers  and  sisters. 

1  i.oo  would  equal  perfect  identity,    o  would  equal  no  more  resemblance  than  any 
two  children  of  the  same  age  taken  at  random  would  manifest. 

2  The  mean  square  errors  were  assigned  on  the  basis,  not  merely  of  the  formula 


but  also  of  the  unreliability  of  the  individual  tests  and  of  the  basis  of  comparison  in 
each  case. 


No.  2.]     AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.          195 

An  Establishment  of  Association  in  Hermit  Crabs  (Eupagurus 

Longicarpus).     By  EDWARD  G.  SPAULDING. 

The  experiments  described  were  carried  on  at  the  Woods  Holl 
Laboratory  during  the  summer  of  1903  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Carnegie  Institution.  Bethe  and  Yerkes  have  each  made  experi- 
mental studies  on  habit  formation  in  the  Crustacea.  Bethe  found 
that  the  crab  Carcinus  mcenas  would  always  go  to  the  dark  not- 
withstanding its  seizure  there  by  an  Eledone,  and  concluded 
therefrom  that  it  could  not  learn  and  had  no  consciousness.  He 
overlooked  the  fact  that  he  had  really  only  disproven  that  the 
excitation  or  the  representation  of  the  after-affect  of  the  '  Eledone 
experience  '  was  not  strong  enough  to  inhibit  the  natural  instinct 
to  hide  ;  the  representation  might,  however,  be  present  though 
weaker.  This  illustrates  a  fundamental  principle  of  method  for 
comparative  psychology,  that  in  any  instance  where  the  question 
•of  the  presence  of  consciousness  is  admittedly  to  be  decided  by 
experimentation,  it  must  take  a  particular  form  ;  i.  e.,  the  pres- 
ence of  some  definite  kind  of  consciousness  must  be  investigated. 
Yerkes,  with  the  crawfish,  found  by  excluding  the  possibility  of 
the  animal's  merely  following  a  path  by  smell,  taste,  or  touch, 
all  of  which,  however,  play  a  part  in  the  formation  of  labyrinth 
habits,  that  upon  the  basis  of  one  sense  alone,  vision,  a  consistent 
selection  of  the  '  correct  path  '  is  possible.  Hermits  (Eupagurus 
longicarpus)  inhabit  gastropod  shells,  a  mode  of  life  correlated 
with  a  dextral  asymmetry,  and  have  eyes  and  sense  hairs  ;  the 
latter  are  gustatory,  equilibratory,  and  tactile.  The  eyes  are 
facetted  and  give  a  vague  distinct  vision.  The  brain  is  a  syn- 
cerebrum  and  supplies  all  the  end  sense-organs.  Thirty  crabs 
in  an  aquarium  were  made  to  enter  a  darkened  chamber  within  a 
limited  time  to  get  their  food,  thereby  being  given  opportunity  to 
form  an  association  between  gustatory  and  visual  '  constructs/ 
After  feeding,  the  darkening  screen  was  removed  and  washed. 
The  crabs  were  here,  and  also  in  controls,  shown  to  be  positively 
heliotropic.  The  ratio  of  improvement  was  from  .66,  2.3,  .66 
•entering,  on  the  first  three  days  respectively,  in  i'  to,  e.  g.,  32, 
100,  and  100  on  the  /th,  I2th,  and  I4th  days.  On  the  9th  day 
and  afterward  the  effectiveness  of  the  association  was  tested  with 


196  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

only  the  darkening  screen  ;  when,  e.  g.y  24  out  of  28  entered,  on 
the  1 5th  day  24  of  27,  the  i8th,  22  of  27,  within  3'.  This  is 
evidence  that  as  a  result  of  the  association  either  an  excitation  or 
a  representation  of  the  taste  construct  takes  place,  for  here  with 
one  stimulus  the  crabs  react  the  same  as  they  did  previously 
with  two  stimuli  and  against  a  natural  positive  heliotropism* 
These  results  were  confirmed  by  four  control  experiments. 

Report  on  Work  Done  at  the  Yale  Psychological  Laboratory. 

By  CLOYD  N.  MCALLISTER. 

By  means  of  a  kinetoscopic  camera  photographs  of  the  two 
eyes  were  taken  during  the  process  of  looking  at  a  Miiller-Lyer 
figure.  Measurements  were  taken  from  a  piece  of  Chinese  white 
placed  upon  the  cornea  to  two  fixed  spots  upon  the  face.  A 
specimen  record  and  diagrams  of  the  results  were  shown.  It 
was  found  that  the  oblique  lines  in  the  figure  have  an  influence 
upon  the  character  of  the  movement.  The  two  eyes  do  not 
move  in  exactly  the  same  way. 

The  Law  of  Veracity:    A  Study  in  Practical  Ethics.     By 

GABRIEL  CAMPBELL. 

The  anomalies  in  the  ethnic  valuations  of  truth  become  a  sug- 
gestive problem.  Can  Kant's  pronouncement  as  to  the  absolute 
valuation  of  truthfulness  be  justified  ?  Among  Greeks  and 
Romans  we  find  antithetic  developments.  Christ,  the  Truth, 
his  followers  fail  to  follow.  Utilitarian  morality  tends  to  com- 
promise. Jurisprudence  is  most  exacting  in  requirement  of 
veracity.  In  religion  there  is  less  exaction.  Physicians  have 
justified  false  assurances.  Passing  from  objective  to  subjective 
facts,  we  find  man  a  creator.  He  may  fancy,  imagine,  construct 
an  entire  unreal  cosmos.  The  fictitious  offers  uncounted  pos- 
sibilities. He  is  deceived ;  he  deceives.  In  bringing  man  to 
recognize  the  sovereignty  of  truth  we  must  observe  conditions, 
His  business  is  his  own.  Proper  concealment  is  his  right.  He 
will  be  misunderstood.  It  is  not  a  primal  duty  to  explain.  It 
is  claimed  that  falsehood  is  necessary  in  war.  But  warfare  pre- 
serves the  ethics  of  the  savage.  Modern  warfare  meets  facts, 
develops  a  science.  Truthfulness  becomes  revered.  Instead  of 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.         197 

false  assurances  for  the  sick,  they  need  to  be  trustful.  There 
are  truths  that  are  healing.  Can  we  prescribe  ?  Shall  we  add 
mendacity  to  imbecility  ?  There  is  demand  for  medical  practi- 
tioners who  can  be  trusted.  Finally,  may  we  lie  to  save  a  life  ? 
The  evidence  is  always  doubtful  that  truth  would  be  fatal. 
Moreover,  what  impairs  health  endangers  life.  Shall  we  dis- 
count accordingly  ?  The  question  as  to  such  risk  would  always  be 
an  open  one.  There  would  be  an  eternal  quandary  —  confusion 
worse  confounded.  The  rule  would  be  unworkable.  Man  is 
moral  because  be  is  rational.  God  cannot  lie.  He  knows. 
Intelligence  cannot  lie.  Trendelenburg  declares  :  "  It  is  conscience 
that  preserves  the  might  of  the  will."  Freedom  demands  a  per- 
fect moral  system.  The  soldier  offers  life  to  save  the  country. 
Ethics  cannot  recognize  a  lesser  loyalty.  Religion  needs  abso- 
lute sincerity  in  its  teachers.  In  business  the  goods  must  be 
equal  to  the  sample.  In  general  the  yea  must  be  equal  to  an 
adjuration.  Religious  faith  in  God  must  become  social,  political 
faith  in  man.  It  was  the  Nazarene  who  said  :  "  The  truth  shall 
make  you  free." 

The  Chief  Factors  in  the  Formation  of  the  Moral  Self.     By 

JAMES  H.  TUFTS. 

The  sources  for  the  elements  of  the  moral  self  are  :  (i)  Phys- 
ical, including  natural  selection,  operating  in  connection  with  va- 
riation and  heredity ;  (2)  social  heredity  and  education  ;  (3)  the 
individual's  original  contribution,  including  conscious  choice  and 
reflective  valuation  of  conduct,  (i)  Furnishes  the  instincts  and 
impulses  which  are  the  driving  forces  in  conduct.  Such  varia- 
tions as  those  of  sex-differentiation,  parental  care,  and  impulses 
for  possession,  or,  in  later  form,  property,  become  in  their  inter- 
action highly  important  for  the  moral  life.  (2)  Includes  two 
groups  of  factors  :  (a)  ends  and  ways  of  acting  suggested  to  the 
child  or  the  younger  generation,  and  adopted  without  reflection 
or  valuation  by  ideo-motor  processes  —  the  '  imitation '  of 
Baldwin  and  Royce ;  (fr)  ends  and  ways  of  acting  more  con- 
sciously commended  to  the  younger  generation,  and  involving 
more  valuation.  Initiation,  marriage  and  religious  ceremonies, 


198  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIIL 

direct  rewards  and  punishments,  either  physical  or  in  the  form  of 
honor  or  ridicule  and  contempt,  the  agencies  of  art  embodying 
the  values  of  the  race,  especially  its  religiously  sanctioned  ideals, 
impress  the  individual  with  the  views  and  values  attained  by  the 
previous  generation.  (3)  Actual  progress  in  morality  must  come 
through  active  rising  of  the  individual  above  the  previous  level. 
This  may  be  due  either  to  the  '  back-door '  method  of  a  fortu- 
nate variation,  or  to  the  *  front-door '  method  of  reaction  by  the 
self  to  a  new  situation,  either  physical  or  social.  The  specific 
conditions  under  which  this  takes  place  involve  the  whole  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  religious  progress,  and  find  illustration  in  the 
development  of  the  Hebrews  and  Greeks. 

Note  on  the  Idea  of  the  Moral  Sense  in  British  Thought  prior 

to  Shaftesbury.     By  JAMES  H.  TUFTS. 

Barrow,  a  preacher  commended  by  Shaftesbury,  uses  the  term 
"  mental  sense  "  to  characterize  the  moral  judgment,  and  empha- 
sizes its  immediacy.  He  emphasizes  likewise  the  social  instinct, 
and  asserts,  like  Shaftesbury,  that  even  a  true  regard  to  our  own 
private  good  will  prevent  an  excessive  pursuit  of  self-interest. 
His  sermons  were  published  in  1685. 

The  Summum  Bonum.     By  EVANDER  BRADLEY  MCGILVARY. 

The  good  is  the  desirable  ;  the  desirable  is  "  that  which  is 
worthy  of  being  desired  and  ought  to  be  desired"  (Janet)  or  that 
which  "  I  should  desire  if  my  impulses  were  in  harmony  with  my 
reason  "  (Sidgwick).  But  reason  is  not  a  separate  faculty  issu- 
ing mandates  to  desire.  A  thing  is  called  good  or  desirable  only 
if  we  actually  desire  it,  or  should  desire  it  if  we  knew  it  as  it  really 
is,  i.  e.y  as  adapted  to  satisfy  desires  that  under  certain  circum- 
stances would  arise.  What  differentiates  the  desirable  from  the 
desired  is  the  fact  that  when  obtained  it  does  not  cause  a  regret ; 
or  if  regret  does  arise,  in  the  case  of  a  desirable  object,  the  regret 
is  overborne  by  the  satisfaction.  Only  actual  experience  of  sub- 
sequent regret,  or  a  good  ground  for  supposing  that  there  will  be 
such  a  regret,  would  justify  us  in  saying  that  a  desired  object  is 
not  desirable.  Reason  sets  the  desirable  against  the  desired  only 
by  enlarging  the  scope  of  desire.  Among  desires  important  in 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.          199 

this  connection  are  the  desire  for  pleasant  reminiscences  and  the 
desire  to  be  seriously  engaged  in  some  absorbing  pursuit. 

The  good  being  thus  defined,  the  summum  bonum  may  be  de- 
fined either  as  that  single  object  which  is  most  desirable  (supre- 
mum  bonum),  or  as  that  series  of  objects  which  taken  altogether 
as  a  series  is  the  most  desirable  (bonum  consummatum).  The 
supremum  bonum  varies  from  man  to  man,  and  in  the  same  man 
from  time  to  time.  The  bona  consummata  of  different  men, 
though  not  without  diversity,  have  certain  points  of  identity 
(=  common  good)  with  each  other.  This  identity  is  due  (i)  to 
coincidence  of  more  or  less  independent  desires  in  different  per- 
sons ;  (2)  to  benevolent  desires  ;  (3)  to  contagiously  aroused  de- 
sires. The  common  good  exerts  a  controlling  influence  over 
moral  ideals  and  moral  practice.  The  influence  is  sometimes 
consciously  recognized ;  more  often  it  works  unconsciously  in 
morality  of  the  categorical  type. 

Intensity.     By  W.  H.  SHELDON. 

The  definitions  of  intensity  hitherto  given  show  obscurity  and 
disagreement  as  to  how  far  there  can  be  quantity  without  meas- 
urability.  If  we  examine  the  facts  called  intensive  (sensation, 
velocity,  temperature,  etc.),  we  find  them  all  to  be  such  that  their 
amounts  can  be  described  only  in  terms  of  time  or  tendency  to 
change.  That  is,  all  intensities  are  transitive  facts.  No  transi- 
tive fact  can  be  measured,  for  it  does  not  admit  superposition. 
Only  the  permanent  can  be  superposed,  as,  e.  g.y  figures  and 
bodies.  On  the  other  hand,  transitive  facts  are  immediately  seen 
to  differ  in  amount,  as  in  loudness  of  tone,  velocity,  or  tem- 
perature. Intensity,  then,  is  non-measurable  quantity,  where  the 
whole-past  relation  is  impossible,  because  it  is  the  kind  of  quan- 
tity found  in  transitive  facts  only. 

The  Scholastic  Notion  of  the  Infinite.     By  L.  VAN  BECELAERE, 

O.P. 

The  notion  of  the  infinite  gives  rise  to  two  principal  questions  : 
(i)  That  of  its  origin  ;  (2)  that  of  the  subject  in  which  infinitude 
may  be  found.  Contrary  to  Descartes's  view  that  the  idea  of  the 
infinite  is  innate  in  the  human  mind,  the  scholastics  would  main- 


200  THE    PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

tain  that  it  is  acquired  by  a  positive  action  of  our  mind,  sup- 
pressing the  notion  of  limits  from  the  idea  of  some  being. 
The  second  question,  by  far  the  more  interesting,  deals  princi- 
pally with  the  problem  :  Is  it  possible  that  there  should  exist  a 
quantitative  material  infinite  ?  For  the  existence  de  facto  of  a 
spiritual  infinite,  the  deity  or  God,  is  one  of  the  cardinal  tenets 
of  the  scholastic  system,  and  we  have  not  to  discuss  that  for  the 
present.  On  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of 
a  material  infinite,  the  mind  of  Saint  Thomas  himself  seems 
to  have  hesitated  at  times,  although  he  admits  with  Aristotle 
the  possibility  of  a  creation  ab  ceterno  and  therefore  of  a  suc- 
cessive infinite ;  still  in  his  Summa  (Ia  Pars,  q.  vii,  a.  3  et  4)  he 
asserts  most  strongly  that  the  existence  of  a  material  (viz., 
quantitative)  infinite,  either  as  magnitude  or  as  actual  multi- 
tude, is  an  impossibility ;  for  nothing  made  of  quantitative  (viz., 
finite)  elements  can  be  infinite.  He  has  been  followed  in  that 
conclusion  by  most  of  the  ancient  scholastics.  Some  modern 
'  Neo-scholastics,'  however,  such  as  Mgr.  Mercier,  of  the  Insti- 
tute of  Philosophy  at  the  Catholic  University  of  Louvain,  and 
several  of  his  associates,  find  the  arguments  of  the  Summa 
non-conclusive,  and  have  tried  to  solve  the  objections  raised 
against  the  notion  of  a  material  infinite.  But  the  undoubted 
ability  of  those  philosophers  cannot  be  said  to  have  shaken  the 
arguments  of  Aquinas.  Still,  the  question  is  obscure,  and  admits 
of  a  great  deal  of  discussion  pro  and  con.  The  problem  in  itself 
is  wholly  independent,  for  the  scholastics,  from  that  of  creation ; 
because  such  a  material  infinite,  if  it  could  exist  at  all,  would 
nevertheless  be  a  created  infinite,  exhibiting  in  itself  no  sufficient 
motive  to  account  for  its  existence  de  facto. 

The  Present  Want  of  an  Educational  Ideal.  By  FRANK  SEW  ALL. 
The  possibility  of  science  rests  in  the  uniformity  of  law 
throughout  all  the  realm  of  being.  This  uniformity  can  be  the 
result  of  no  convention  of  man  ;  it  can  be  no  aftermath  of  evolu- 
tion :  it  must  precede  evolution,  since  evolution  is  controlled  by 
it.  This  unity  of  law  upon  which  all  science  rests  implies  a  unity 
of  reason,  a  supreme  wisdom  infinite  and  eternal ;  and  this  wis- 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.          2OI 

dom  is  that  of  an  infinite  divine  personality.  The  effectiveness  as 
an  educational  idea  of  this  concept  of  the  divine  personality  in 
the  midst  of  all  reason,  of  all  nature's  processes,  and  of  all  human 
conduct,  lies  in  its  placing  before  the  student's  mind  a  form,  and 
that  the  human  form,  as  the  form  of  forms  because  reflecting  the 
divine  image  itself.  Form  is  here  understood  as  with  Aristotle 
in  its  metaphysical  sense ;  not  as  bodily  shape,  but  as  a  unit  or 
system  of  relations,  wherein  every  particular  is  seen  in  its  relation 
to  others,  and  all  in  their  relation  to  the  central,  common  end  or 
purpose.  The  human  form  is  the  highest  ideal  of  systematized 
knowledge,  because  it  unites  all  particulars  under  the  one  govern- 
ing purpose  of  a  personality,  that  is,  of  a  will  directed  by  reason  ; 
for  this  is  the  essential  quality  of  Deity  and  of  man  as  the  image 
of  God :  will  acting  by  reason  into  use.  Under  this  ideal  all 
particulars  in  education  are  capable  of  being  marshalled  into 
order  and  subordination.  The  systematizing  power  of  such  an 
education  lies  in  its  bringing  all  the  discoveries  of  science,  all  the 
experience  of  history,  all  the  motives  of  moral  conduct,  all  man's 
hopes  for  eternity  under  this  one  sublime  law  ;  the  eternal  good 
as  end,  working  by  eternal  wisdom  as  cause,  into  eternal  service 
and  use  as  effect,  which  is  eternal  happiness  itself.  It  brings 
back  the  dissevered  and  shattered  elements  of  knowledge  into  a 
system,  and  it  puts  into  that  system  a  sublime  unchanging  pur- 
pose. Man  was  not  made  by  accident ;  his  life  in  this  world  is 
not  a  flitting  fancy  that  goes  out  with  his  breath  ;  the  creator  of 
all  things  is  not  a  slumbering  abyss.  Rather  the  whole  of 
nature,  of  man,  yea  of  the  world  to  come,  reflects  the  Divine  Man 
in  its  midst,  an  infinite  love  ever  going  forth  by  wisdom  into  the 
accomplishment  of  its  purpose,  which  is  the  conferring  of  eternal 
blessedness  upon  its  intelligent  and  immortal  creature,  man. 

The  Interpretation  of  Aristotle.     Met.  Z.  4.  1029  b  29-1030 

a  6.     By  WM.  ROMAINE  NEWBOLD. 

[Text  :  1030  a  2,  3,  for  re  rj  read  reve,  elsewhere  read  with  Ab 
Punctuation  :  1030  a  2  £cvat,  dtta  TO  I  party)  elvat.  a  3.  oka)$ ; 
y  OL>.  Construe  1030  a  6  povov  with  5,  efaep."] 

Translation  and  Interpretation :  But  in  fact  this  also,  i.  e.,  the 
definition  of  X  as  "white  man"  does  not  belong  to  the  class 


202  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII.. 

"  defined  per  se,"  i.  e.,"  defined  as  it  really  is"  Now  the  words- 
"  not  per  se  "  have  two  meanings.  In  the  first  of  these  the  fault 
in  the  definition  springs  from  the  addition  of  words  denoting  a 
thing  to  the  predicate  of  a  proposed  definition  of  an  attribute  of 
that  thing,  in  the  second  it  does  not  spring  from  this  source  but 
from  quite  a  different  one.  In  an  alleged  definition  of  the  first 
type,  the  definition  is  faulty  because  words  denoting  the  thing  itself 
are  attached  as  a  predicate  to  something  else,  which  latter  is  to  be- 
defined  —  this  for  example  would  be  the  case,  if,  in  defining  the 
conceptual  being  of  "  white,"  one  were  to  give  a  definition  of 
"  white  man."  In  an  alleged  definition  of  the  second  type,  the 
definition  is  faulty  because  to  words  denoting  the  thing  itself 
something  else  is  attached  as  a  predicate,  as,  for  example,  if  "  X  " 
denotes  "  white  man  "  and  one  define  "  X  "  as  "  white."  The 
object  then  denoted  by  "white  man"  is  indeed  white,  its  conceptual 
being,  however,  is  not  that  of  "white  "  but  that  of  "X."  Is,  then,, 
tJte  latter  a  true  concept  of  some  thing  at  all  ?  No  ;  for  the  con- 
ceptual being  is  the  conceptual  equivalent  of  some  thing,  but 
when  we  have  one  element  qualified  by  another,  the  resulting 
complex  is  not  the  conceptual  equivalent  of  a  "  this  "  thing,  i.  e., 
of  an  individual,  unitary  thing — provided  only  that  the  "this," 
i.  e.,  individuality,  unity,  be  found  in  realities.  That  it  is  so  found 
I  have  just  shown  (2.3.  1029  a  27-8},  and  that  the  object  which 
I  have  designated  as  " X"  "white  man,"  is  a  reality  I  have 
assumed  (ibid.,  a  33-4),  Since  the  phrase  "  white  man  "  is  a  com- 
plex, it  does  not  define  the  unitary  object"  per  se"  i.  e.,  "as  it  really 
is" —  the  content  to  thought  of  the  phrase  "  white  man  "  is  different 
from  that  of  the  object,  and  its  use  as  the  predicate  of  a  proposed 
definition  is  an  attaching  to  the  thing  itself  of  a  predicate  different 
from  it.  It  belongs  then  to  the  second  of  the  types  of  faulty  defi- 
nition above  described. 

LIST  OF  MEMBERS. 

Adler,  Professor  Felix,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Aikins,  Professor  H.  A.,  Western  Reserve  Univ.,  Cleveland,  O. 
Albee,  Professor  Ernest,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
Armstrong,  Professor  A.  C.,  Wesleyan  Univ.,  Middletown,  Conn,. 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.          203 

Baldwin,  Professor  J.  Mark,  Johns  Hopkins  Univ. ,  Baltimore,  Md. 
Bawden,  Professor  H.  Heath,  Vassar  College,  Poughkeepsie,  N.  Y. 
Becelaere,  Rev.  L.  van,  Couvent  des  Dominicains,  Ottawa,  Can. 
Bigelow,  Rev.  Dr.  F.   H.,  1625  Massachusetts  Ave.,  Washington. 
Brandt,  Professor  Francis  B.,  Central  High  School,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Bryan,  President  W.  L.,  Indiana  University,  Bloomington,  Ind. 
Buchner,  Professor  E.  F.,  University  of  Alabama,  University,  Ala. 
Butler,  President  N.  M.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Caldwell,  Professor  W.,  McGill  University,  Montreal,  Can. 
Calkins,  Professor  Mary  Whiton,  Wellesley  College,  Wellesley,  Mass. 
Campbell,  Professor  Gabriel,  Dartmouth  College,  Hanover,  N.  H. 
Carus,  Dr.  Paul,  La  Salle,  111. 

Case,  Professor  Mary  S.,  Wellesley  College,  Wellesley,  Mass. 
Cattell,  Professor  J.  McKeen,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Chrysostom,  Brother,  Manhattan  College,  New  York. 
Churchill,  Dr.  William,  699  West  Div.  Hall,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
Coe,  Professor  George  A.,  Northwestern  University,  Evanston,  111. 
Crawford,  Professor  A.  W.,  Beaver  College,  Beaver,  Pa. 
Creighton,  Professor  J.  E.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
Curtis,  Professor  M.  M.,  Western  Reserve  University,  Cleveland,  O. 
Cutler,  Professor  Anna  A. ,  Smith  College,  Northampton,  Mass. 
Daniels,  Professor  Arthur  H. ,  University  of  Illinois,  Urbana,  111. 
Davies,  Dr.  Henry,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
Davis,  Mr.  William  H.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Dearborn,  Professor  G.  V.  N.,  Tufts  Medical  School,  Boston,  Mass. 
Dewey,  Professor  John,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 
Dodge,  Professor  R.,  Wesleyan  University,  Middletown,  Conn. 
Dolson,  Professor  Grace  Neal,  Wells  College,  Aurora,  N.  Y. 
Duncan,  Professor  George  M. ,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
Everett,  Professor  W.  G.,  Brown  University,  Providence,  R.  I. 
Farquahar,  Dr.  Edward,  Patent  Office  Library,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Fite,  Dr.  Warner,  University  of  Texas,  Austin,  Tex. 
Franklin,  Mrs.  Christine  Ladd,  1507  Park  Ave.,  Baltimore,  Md. 
French,  Professor  F.  C.,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln,  Neb. 
Fullerton,  Professor  G.  S.,  Univ.  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Gardiner,  Professor  H.  N.,  Smith  College,  Northampton,  Mass. 
Gillett,  Professor  A.  L.,  Hartford  Theological  Seminary,  Hartford. 
Griffin,  Professor  E.  H.,  Johns  Hopkins  University,  Baltimore,  Md. 
Gulliver,  President  Julia  H.,  Rockford  College,  Rockford,  111. 
Hall,  President  G.  Stanley,  Clark  University,  Worcester,  Mass. 
Hall,  Professor  T.  C. ,  Union  Theological  Seminary,  New  York. 


204  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Hammond,  Professor  W.  A.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
Harris,  Dr.  William  T.,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Education,  Washington. 
Hayes,  Professor  C.  H.,  General  Theological  Seminary,  New  York. 
Hibben,  Professor  J.  G.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 
Hitchcock,  Dr.  Clara  M.,  Lake  Erie  College,  Painsville,  O. 
Hodder,  Dr.  Alfred,  80  Washington  Sq.,  New  York. 
Hoffman,  Professor  Frank  S.,  Union  College,  Schenectady,  N.  Y. 
Home,  Professor  H.  H.,  Dartmouth  College,  Hanover,  N.  H. 
Hughes,  Mr.  Percy,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Hyde,  President  William  DeWitt,  Bowdoin  College,  Brunswick,  Me. 
Hyslop,  Dr.  J.  H.,  519  W.  i49th  St.,  New  York. 
Irons,  Professor  David,  Bryn  Mawr  College,  Bryn  Mawr,  Pa. 
Johnson,  Professor  R.  B.  C.,  Miami  University,  Oxford,  O. 
Jones,  Dr.  A.  L.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Jones,  Professor  Rufus  M.,  Haverford  College,  Haverford,  Pa. 
Judd,  Professor  Charles  H.,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
Kirk,  Mr.  Hyland  C.,  211  6th  St.,  N.  E.,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Knox,  Professor  G.  W.,  Union  Theological  Seminary,  New  York. 
Ladd,  Professor  G.  T.,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn, 
de  Laguna,  Dr.  T.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
Lefevre,  Professor  Albert,  Tulane  University,  New  Orleans,  La. 
Leighton,  Professor  J.  A.,  Hobart  College,  Geneva,  N.  Y. 
Lloyd,  Professor  A.  H.,  University  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor,  Mich. 
Lord,  Professor  Herbert  G.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Lough,  Professor  J.  E. ,  School  of  Pedagogy,  N.  Y.  Univ.,  New  York. 
Lovejoy,  Professor  A.  O.,  Washington  University,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 
MacCracken,  Chancellor  H.  M.,  New  York  University,  New  York. 
MacDougall,  Professor  R.  M.,  New  York  University,  New  York. 
MacVannel,  Dr.  J.  A.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Marshall,  Dr.  Henry  Rutgers,  3  West  2Qth  St.,  New  York. 
Marvin,  Dr.  W.  T.,  Western  Reserve  University,  Cleveland,  O. 
McAllister,  Dr.  C.  N.,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
McCormack,  Mr.  Thomas  J.,  La  Salle,  111. 
McGilvary,  Professor  E.  B.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
McNulty,  Professor  J.  J.,  College  of  the  City  of  New  York. 
Meiklejohn,  Professor  Alexander,  Brown  Univ.,  Providence,  R.  I. 
Miller,   Dr.   Dickinson  S.,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
Montague,  Dr.  W.  P.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Montgomery,  Dr.  G.  R.,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
Moore,  Professor  Addison  W.,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 
Moore,  Professor  Vida  F.,  Elmira  College,  Elmira,  N.  Y. 


No.  2.]    AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.          2O$ 

Miinsterberg,  Professor  Hugo,  Harvard  Univ.,   Cambridge,  Mass. 
Newbold,  Professor  W.  R.,  Univ.  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia. 
Oakeley,  Miss  Hilda  D.,  Royal  Victoria  College,  Montreal,  Can. 
Ormond,  Professor  Alexander  T.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton. 
Pace,  Professor  E.  A.,  Catholic  Univ.  of  America,  Washington. 
Patton,  President  Francis  L.,  Princeton  Theological  Seminary. 
Patton,  Professor  George  S.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 
Perry,  Dr.  Ralph  Barton,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
Puffer,  Dr.  Ethel  D.,  Radcliffe  College,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
Raymond,  President  B.  P.,  Wesleyan  Univ.,   Middletown,  Conn. 
Read,  Professor  M.  S.,  Colgate  University,  Hamilton,  N.  Y. 
Riley,  Professor  J.  W.,  Univ.  of  New  Brunswick,  Fredericton,  Can. 
Robbins,  Mr.  Reginald  C.,  373  Washington  St.,  Boston,  Mass. 
Rogers,  Professor  A.  K.,  Butler  College,  Irvington,  Ind. 
Royce,  Professor  Josiah,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
Schmidt,  Professor  Karl,  Bates  College,  Lewiston,  Me. 
Schurman,  President  J.  G.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
Sewall,  Rev.  Dr.  Frank,  1618  Riggs  Place,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Shanahan,  Professor  E.  T.,  Catholic  Univ.  of  America,  Washington. 
Sharp,  Professor  Frank  C.,  University  of  Wisconsin,  Madison,  Wis. 
Shaw,  Professor  C.  G.,  New  York  University,  New  York. 
Sheldon,  Dr.  W.  H.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Singer,  Dr.  Edgar  A.,  Jr.,  Univ.  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Sneath,  Professor  E.  Hershey,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
Spaulding,  Dr.  E.  G.,  College  of  the  City  of  New  York,  New  York. 
Squires,  Professor  W.  H.,  Hamilton  College,  Clinton,  N.  Y. 
Steele,  Reverend  E.  S.,  1522  Q  St.,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Sterrett,  Professor  J.  M.,  Columbian  Univ.,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Stewardson,  President  L.  C.,  Hobart  College,  Geneva,  N.  Y. 
Stroh,  Mr.  Alfred  M.,  Bryn  Athyn,  Pa. 
Strong,  Professor  C.  A.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Talbot,  Professor  E.  B.,  Mt.  Holyoke  Coll.,  South  Hadley,  Mass. 
Tawney,  Professor  Guy  A.,  Beloit  College,  Beloit,  Wis. 
Taylor,  Professor  A.  E.,  McGill  Univ.,  Montreal,  Can. 
Thilly,  Professor  Frank,  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia,  Mo. 
Thorndike,  Professor  E.  L.,  Columbia  University,  New  York. 
Tracy,  Professor  F.,  University  of  Toronto,  Toronto,  Can. 
Tufts,  Professor  J.  H.,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 
Urban,  Professor  Wilbur  M.,  Trinity  College,  Hartford,  Conn. 
Washburn,  Professor  M.  F.,  Vassar  Coll.,  Poughkeepsie,  N.  Y. 
Wenley,  Professor  R.  M.,  Univ.  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor,  Mich.. 


206  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

Whitney,  Dr.  G.  W.  T.,  Bryn  Mawr  College,  Bryn  Mawr,  Pa. 
Wilson,  Professor  G.  A.,  Syracuse  Univ.,  Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
Woodbridge,  Professor  F.  J.  E.,  Columbia  Univ.,  New  York. 
Woodworth,  Dr.  R.  S.,  New  York  University,  New  York. 
Wright,  Mr.  H.  W.,  Cornell  Univ.,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 

Members  are  requested  to  notify  the  Secretary  of  any  corrections  to 
be  made  in  the  above  list. 


REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS. 

Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntniss.     Von  HERMANN  COHEN.     Berlin, 
Bruno  Cassirer,  1902. — pp.  xvii,  520. 

This  volume  forms  the  first  part  of  a  complete  system  of  philosophy, 
and  contains  the  fundamental  principles  by  means  of  which  the  system 
itself  is  to  be  constructed.  These  principles  arise  in  the  sphere  of 
pure  knowledge ;  yet,  while  formal  in  origin,  they  serve  to  fashion 
their  own  content  in  the  world  of  experience.  They  are  not  merely 
guiding,  but  they  are  determining  principles  as  well.  Such  is  Pro- 
fessor Cohen's  main  contention.  In  the  development  of  his  thesis  he 
departs  in  many  radical  respects  from  the  teachings  of  his  master, 
Kant,  whose  interpreter  he  has  been  for  many  years,  and  in  which 
office  he  has  become  widely  known  and  appreciated.  He  has  departed 
also  in  many  essential  particulars  from  his  earlier  work  on  Kant' 's 
Theoric  der  Erfahrung.  That  which  is  peculiarly  characteristic  of  the 
present  work  is  its  insistence  upon  the  essential  purity  of  the  thought 
processes,  whose  activity  alone,  it  is  maintained,  produces  their  con- 
tent. The  following  sentence,  which  I  have  chosen  from  many  of  a 
similar  kind,  will  give  an  excellent  idea  of  his  general  point  of  view  : 
"  Die  verkehrte  Ansicht  dass  das  Denken,  als  Vereinigung,  im  Bilden 
von  Ordnungen  bestehe,  hat  ihren  Grund  in  dem  fundamentalen 
Vorurtheil,  dass  dem  Denken  sein  Stoff  von  der  Empfindung 
gegeben  werde,  und  dass  das  Denken  diesen  Stoff  nur  zu  bearbeiten 
habe.  Dagegen  denken  wir  auch  die  Mehrheit  als  zu  erzeugende 
Einheit ;  auch  fur  die  Mehrheit  die  Aufgabe  der  Erzeugungs-Vereini- 
gung.  In  dieser  Bestimmtheit  verstehen  wir  den  Satz,  dass  die 
Thatigkeit  den  Inhalt  erzeuge.  Der  ganze  untheilbare  Inhalt  des 
Denkens  muss  Erzeugniss  des  Denkens  sein.  Und  die  ganze  untheil- 
bare Thatigkeit  des  Denkens  selbst  ist  es  welche  den  Inhalt  bildet. 
Diese  Einheit  von  Erzeugung  und  Erzeugniss  fordert  der  Begriff  des 
reinen  Denkens  "  (p.  49). 

From  this  general  point  of  view,  the  author  attempts  to  show  how 
thought  develops  a  system  of  fundamental  judgments,  which  are  the 
result  of  the  pure  processes  of  thought  itself,  and  which  function 
as  determining  moments  in  constructing  the  world  of  knowledge. 
These  judgments  follow  in  a  general  way  the  Kantian  scheme  of  the 
categories.  They  are  as  follows  : 

207 


208  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII, 

1.  Corresponding   to  the  category  of  quality  are  the  judgments 
expressing  the  laws  of  thought,  which  are  divided  into  the  judgments 
of  (i)  origin  (Dtr  Ursprung},  (2)  identity,  and  (3)  contradiction. 

2.  Corresponding  to  the  category  of  quantity  are  the  judgments  of 
mathematics  which  are  divided  into  the  judgments  of  (i)  reality,  (2) 
multiplicity,  and  (3)  allness. 

3.  Corresponding  to  the  category  of  relation  are  the  judgments  of 
applied  mathematics,  which  are  divided  into  judgments  of  (i)  sub- 
stance, (2)  law,  and  (3)  concept. 

4.  Corresponding  to  the  category  of  modality  are  the  judgments  of 
method,  which  are  divided  into  judgments  of  (i)  possibility,  (2)  ac- 
tuality, (3)  necessity. 

Such  is  the  program  of  the  logical  foundations  of  the  philosophic 
system.  In  this  chain  of  the  elements  of  pure  thought,  the  primary 
link  is  found  in  the  judgment  of  origin  (Ursprung).  It  is  the  imme- 
diate conviction  that  every  element  of  thought,  every  object  of  con- 
sciousness, must  be  traced  to  its  first  principle  («/?/??') .  It  is  in  the 
analysis  of  the  implications  of  the  primary  principle  that  Professor 
Cohen  finds  the  '  promise  and  potency  '  not  only  of  the  form,  but  of 
the  stuff  of  all  thought.  For  he  discovers  the  common  Ursprungvi  the 
varied  forms  of  being  in  the  infinitely  small  elements  which  constitute 
the  ultimate  parts  of  the  world  of  reality.  All  that  is  finite  has  its 
origin  in  the  infinitesimal.  This  is  a  matter  of  pure  knowledge,  be- 
cause it  rests  upon  the  fundamental  principles  of  mathematics  as  con- 
tained in  the  infinitesimal  calculus.  He  contends,  moreover,  that  the 
process  of  integration  is  one  which  is  based  essentially  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  continuity,  and  inasmuch  as  the  process  from  the  infinitely 
small  to  the  finite  is  a  continuous  one,  there  is  in  the  unity  thus  estab- 
lished a  fundamental  basis  of  reality.  Thus  he  says  :  ' '  Die  Continu- 
itat bedeutet  daher  den  Zusammenhang  der  dx,  den  Zusammenhang  der 
infinitesimalen  Elemente.  Man  ist  nicht  mehr  angewiesen  auf  einen 
anderer  fraglichen  Zusammenhang;  nur  dieser  innerlichste  und  in- 
timste  wird  gefordert.  Nur  er  kann  geniigen ;  nur  er  ist  durch- 
schlagend ;  jede  andere  Art  des  Zusammenhangs  wird  entbehrlich. 
Alle  sonstigen  Zusammenhange  beruhen  und  bestehen  in  Vergleichen, 
die  Spriinge  machen  und  Liicken  lassen.  Die  Continuitat  der  infini- 
tesimalen Elemente  dagegen  bedeutet  den  stetigen  Zusammenhang, 
die  Continuitat  der  Realitat "  (p.  115). 

Moreover,  from  the  idea  of  continuity,  he  deduces  by  an  alleged 
necessary  implication  the  idea  of  number.  With  this  quantitative 
basis  of  reality,  he  passes  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  natural 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS    OF  BOOKS.  209 

sciences  which  he  reduces  to  the  one  ground  principle  of  motion. 
"Bewegung  ist  der  Grundbegriff  der  mathematischen  Naturwissen- 
schaft.  Der  moderne  Begriff  der  Bewegung,  wie  Galilei  ihn  bes- 
timmte,  hatte  die  Beharrung  zur  Voraussetzung ;  aber  diese  ist  und 
bleibt  die  Beharrung  der  Bewegung  ;  sie  ist  nichts  weniger  und  nichts 
mehr  als  ein  Correlat.  Ihre  Voraussetzung  ist  eben  die  infinitesimale 
Realitat.  Und  man  wird  sich  endlich  entschliessen  miissen,  das  Sein, 
an  welchem  es  der  Substanz  nun  einmal  gebricht,  in  jener  zu  begrun- 
den.  Diesen  Zusammenhalt  von  Substanz  und  Realitat  fordert  der 
Gang  der  Wissenschaft,  die  in  ihrem  dunkeln  Drange  des  rechten 
Weges  sich  wohl  nicht  immer  bewusst  ist,  nichtsdestoweniger  aber  so 
sicher  ihu  geht,  als  er  ihre  Geschichte  vollzieht "  (p.  502). 

The  concepts  substance,  energy,  force,  are  to  be  regarded  as  the 
various  manifestations  of  law ;  and  this  law  is  essentially  that  of 
motion.  Moreover,  the  idea  of  law  must  be  completed  by  that  of 
end  or  adaptation  which  affords  an  a  priori  foundation  for  the  bio- 
logical sciences.  Finally,  this  round  of  derived  notions  ends  in  the 
threefold  methodology  which  follows  the  lines  of  ihe  traditional  divi- 
sion of  the  modal  judgment.  Professor  Cohen,  however,  gives  a 
peculiar  interpretation  to  these  judgments  of  possibility,  actuality,  and 
necessity.  In  the  judgment  of  possibility  there  is  found  the  incen- 
tive to  research,  the  suggestion  of  hypothesis,  and  the  beginnings  of 
all  speculation.  In  the  judgment  of  actuality  the  real  is  determined 
under  the  conditions  of  space  and  time,  and  always  in  terms  of  magni- 
tude. In  the  judgment  of  necessity  is  found  the  ground  of  all  uni- 
versal judgments  and  of  their  combinations  in  the  syllogism. 

Such,  in  brief,  is  Professor  Cohen's  account  of  the  deduction  of  the 
various  constructive  principles  of  pure  knowledge  from  the  primary 
category  of  the  Ursprung.  Together  they  form  the  logical  founda- 
tions of  his  philosophical  system.  The  main  question,  however,  which 
suggests  itself  is  this  :  Are  the  foundations  firmly  grounded  ?  If  not, 
the  superstructure  must  fall  of  its  own  weight. 

The  central  principle  of  the  entire  system  is  the  mathematical  doc- 
trine of  the  infinitesimal  calculus,  by  means  of  which  Professor  Cohen 
endeavors  to  establish  a  continuous  process  from  non-being  to  being 
through  the  integration  of  infinitely  small  elements.  Such  a  process  he 
regards  as  the  primary  warrant  of  all  reality.  It  is  a  process,  moreover, 
which  occurs  in  pure  thought  alone,  because  the  infinitesimal  cannot 
be  an  object  of  perception,  nor  can  it  be  represented  by  the  imagina- 
tion. Thus  the  author  insists  that  "Das  Urtheil  des  Ursprungs 
besagt  nur,  dass  das  reine  Denken  mit  dem  Ursprung  beginnen  mlisse, 


210  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

sofern  es  das  Denken  der  Erkenntniss,  also  des  Seins  1st.  Jetzt  aber 
sehen  wir,  wie  auf  Grund  des  Ursprungs  das  Sein  als  Realitat  zur 
Definition  gelangt.  Das  Unendlichkleine  stellt  es  dar.  Nur  das 
Unendlichkleine  vermag  es.  Und  das  Unendlichkleine  kann  es 
vollstandig  zur  Vertretung  bringen.  Es  giebt  kein  anderes  Mittel, 
und  es  braucht  kein  anderes  Mittel  zu  geben.  Es  ist  nur  sen- 
sual istisches  Missverstandniss  des  Uriendlichkleinen  wenn  man  nach 
einem  anderen  Mittel  der  Realitat  verlangt ;  wenn  man  im  Besitze 
der  Infinitesimal-Rechnung  ein  Mittel  der  Realitat  vermisst  "  (p.  113). 

This  position,  however,  which  is  central  to  the  whole  system,  can- 
not be  maintained  in  the  light  of  modern  mathematics.  The  mathemat- 
ical theory  of  the  calculus  is  not  based  upon  the  doctrine  of  infinitesimals, 
as  Professor  Cohen  assumes.  On  the  contrary,  the  Leibnizian  theory  of 
infinitesimals  has  been  discarded,  and  the  doctrine  of  limits  has  taken  its 
place  ;  moreover,  in  the  doctrine  of  limits  the  idea  of  the  infinitesimal 
has  no  place  whatsoever.  In  support  of  this  position,  I  quote  the  follow- 
ing from  Russell's  The  Principles  of  Mathematics :  "  The  infinitesimal 
calculus  is  the  traditional  name  for  the  differential  and  integral  calculus 
together,  and  as  such  I  have  retained  it ;  although,  as  we  shall  shortly 
see,  there  is  no  allusion  to,  or  implication  of,  the  infinitesimal  in  any 
part  of  this  branch  of  mathematics  "  (Vol.  I,  p.  325).  Again:  "In 
his  (Leibniz's)  first  published  account  of  the  calculus,  he  defined  the 
differential  coefficient  by  means  of  the  tangent  to  a  curve.  And  by  his 
emphasis  on  the  infinitesimal  he  gave  a  wrong  direction  to  speculation 
as  to  the  calculus,  which  misled  all  mathematicians  before  Weierstrass 
(with  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  De  Morgan),  and  all  philosophers 
down  to  the  present  day.  It  is  only  in  the  last  thirty  or  forty 
years  that  mathematicians  have  provided  the  requisite  mathematical 
foundations  for  a  philosophy  of  the  calculus  ;  and  these  foundations, 
as  is  natural,  are  as  yet  little  known  among  philosophers  except  in 
France  "  (p.  326).  The  latter  reference  is  particularly  to  Couturat's 
De  finfini  mathematique .  Again,  Russell  says:  "It  is  the  doctrine 
of  limits  that  underlies  the  calculus,  and  not  any  pretended  use  of  the 
infinitesimal"  (p.  329). 

Moreover,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  limits,  the  differential  cannot 
possibly  be  regarded  as  an  intensive  element  of  reality  which  is  by 
nature  essentially  infinitesimal,  but  whose  summation  will  give  a 
finite  magnitude.  The  differential  has  only  a  relative  value  in  the 
mathematical  process  ;  it  is  a  symbol  or  index  of  the  limit.  The  gap 
between  it  and  the  limit  is  never  bridged.  It  only  indicates  the 
limit,  and  is  never  transformed  into  it.  It  is  in  no  sense  an  inten- 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  211 

sively  real  element  of  a  finite  continuum.  To  establish  this  point  one 
may  well  cite  the  following  quotation  from  Professor  Peano  :  "  From 
the  fact  that  the  infinitesimal  segment  cannot  be  rendered  finite  by 
means  of  any  actually  infinite  multiplication,  I  conclude  with  Cantor 
that  it  cannot  be  an  element  in  finite  magnitudes"  (Peano,  Rivista 
di  mathematica^  Vol.  II,  p.  62).  Also  on  this  same  point,  the  follow- 
ing from  Mr.  Russell:  "The  limit  does  not  belong  to  the  series 
which  it  limits ;  and  in  the  definition  of  the  derivative  and  definite 
integral  we  have  merely  another  instance  of  this  fact.  The  so-called 
infinitesimal  calculus,  therefore,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  infinitesi- 
mal, and  has  only  indirectly  to  do  with  the  infinite  —  its  connection 
with  the  infinite  being  that  it  involves  limits,  and  only  infinite  series 
have  limits."  These  quotations  will  suffice  to  show  Professor  Cohen's 
central  position  to  be  untenable.  The  infinitesimal  as  the  Ursprung 
of  all  reality  is  a  conception  which  has  no  place  in  modern  mathe- 
matics. But  this  conception  is  the  foundation  of  the  so-called  system 
of  pure  thought.  That  system,  therefore,  cannot  stand.  However 
excellent  the  details  of  the  superstructure  may  be,  and  there  are 
many  excellent  phases  of  the  system  as  presented  by  Professor  Cohen, 
nevertheless,  this  basal  weakness  renders  the  system  as  a  system 
wholly  worthless.  The  parts  cannot  be  built  together  upon  such  a 
foundation. 

But  suppose  Professor  Cohen's  fundamental  postulate  as  regards  the 
nature  and  function  of  infinitesimals  be  granted  for  sake  of  argument, 
would  his  system  then  be  able  to  justify  itself?  I  think  not,  and  for 
the  following  reason  :  Many  of  Professor  Cohen's  alleged  judgments 
of  pure  thought  could  never  have  been  framed  were  it  not  for  the 
empirical  data  out  of  which  they  have  arisen.  Therefore,  with  such 
a  dependence,  they  can  not  be  called  elements  of  pure  thought.  To 
take  one  example  which  will  serve  to  illustrate  a  general  tendency 
observable  throughout  this  work,  Professor  Cohen  declares  that  New- 
ton's Laws  of  Motion  are  essentially  judgments  of  pure  thought,  and 
that  they  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  entire  system  of  mathematical  physics : 
' '  Die  mathematische  Naturwissenschaft  ist  die  Wissenschaft  von  der 
Bewegung.  Dieser  Wissenschaft  Newtons  liegen  die  drei  Principien 
zu  Grunde,  die  Newton  als  Gezetze  der  Bewegung  {leges  motus) 
bezeichnet  hat"  (p.  219).  It  should  be  observed  that  this  passage 
occurs  as  a  part  of  the  author's  attempt  to  show  that  the  primary  laws 
of  the  mechanical  world  have  their  origin  in  the  sphere  of  pure  thought. 
It  is  well  known  that  Galileo,  who  formulated  the  two  first  of  these 
laws,  and  Newton,  whose  name  is  especially  associated  with  the  third, 


212  THE   PHILOSOPHICAL    REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

were  close  observers  of  nature,  and  that  these  laws  represent  the 
formulated  interpretation  of  what  they  observed  in  experience,  rather 
than  categories  of  pure  thought  disclosed  in  the  mind  prior  to  all 
empirical  suggestion.  Indeed,  the  bare  conception  of  laws  of  mo- 
tion came  to  them  primarily  through  the  observed  uniformities  of 
nature.  I  take  as  testimony  in  point  the  following  quotation  from 
Thomson  and  Tait :  "  An  axiom  is  a  proposition,  the  truth  of  which 
must  be  admitted  as  soon  as  the  terms  in  which  it  is  expressed  are 
clearly  understood.  But,  as  we  shall  show  in  our  chapter  on  '  Ex- 
perience,' physical  axioms  are  axiomatic  to  those  only  who  have  suf- 
ficient knowledge  of  the  action  of  physical  causes  to  enable  them  to 
see  their  truth.  Without  further  remark  we  shall  give  Newton's  Three 
Laws  ;  it  being  remembered  that,  as  the  properties  of  matter  might  have 
been  such  as  to  render  a  totally  different  set  of  laws  axiomatic,  these 
laws  must  be  considered  as  resting  on  convictions  drawn  from  observa- 
tion and  experiment,  not  on  intuitive  perception."  l 

Professor  Cohen  makes  the  radical  mistake  of  regarding  physics  as  a 
science  of  derived  mathematics.  It  is  essentially  a  science  of  applied 
mathematics,  but  not  a  science  of  derived  mathematics  ;  the  empirical 
data  cannot  be  separated  from  the  so-called  pure  elements  of  thought 
without  doing  violence  both  to  the  form  and  the  matter  of  natural 
phenomena. 

It  is  impossible,  owing  to  the  limitations  of  the  space  allotted  to  me, 
to  enter  into  a  detailed  criticism  of  this  volume.  Inasmuch  as  it  pur- 
ports to  be  the  beginnings  of  a  system  of  philosophy,  I  have  endeav- 
ored to  point  out  two  particulars  of  structural  defect  which  in  my 
opinion  imperil  the  system  as  a  whole.  My  contention  has  been  that 
the  system  rests  upon  a  mathematical  doctrine  which  is  regarded  by 
modern  mathematicians  as  wholly  unsound;  and  secondly,  that  the 
so-called  elements  of  pure  thought  out  of  which  the  system  itself  is 
constructed  disclose  an  obvious  admixture  of  the  stuff  of  experience. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

Le  personnalisme  suivi  d'une  etude  sur  la  perception  externe  et  sur 
la  force.     Par  CHARLES  RENOUVIER.     Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1903.  — 
PP-  537- 

The  scope  of  this  work,  the  last  M.  Renouvier  published  before  his 
death  in  September,  1903,  is  exceedingly  broad.  It  aims  at  a  demon- 
stration of  the  central  doctrine  of  the  Person  as  the  ultimate  reality, 

1  Thomson  and  Tait,  Treatise  on  Natural  Philosophy,  Vol.  I,  Part  I,  p.  240. 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  213 

the  First  Cause  of  the  world ;  as  a  perfect  Personality,  ground  of  the 
universe  in  its  moral  aspects,  and  also  the  principle  and  end  of  human 
cognition.  The  first  part,  entitled  Le  personnalisme,  deals  with  the 
metaphysics,  sociology,  and  eschatology  of  the  subject.  The  second 
part,  Une  etude  sur  la  perception  externe  et  sur  la  force,  begins  with 
what  M.  Renouvier  calls  a  psychology,  a  study  of  our  perception  of 
external  objects,  and  ends  with  a  discussion  of  the  real  world  from  the 
standpoint  of  physical  science.  Both  lines  of  treatment  converge  in 
the  support  of  his  main  contention,  that  reality,  whether  given  to 
us  in  internal  experience  of  states  of  consciousness,  or  in  external  rep- 
resentation of  objects,  or  described  by  physical  science  in  terms  of 
the  measurement  of  matter  and  force,  can  be  rationally  defined  only 
in  terms  of  the  properties  of  the  person  and  his  modes  of  conscious- 
ness, his  intellect,  his  feeling  or  desire,  and  his  will. 

M.  Renouvier  is  careful  to  emphasize  the  unity  of  the  two  main 
divisions  of  the  work.  An  admirably  lucid  and  concise  preface  out- 
lines his  purpose  substantially  as  follows  :  The  foundation  of  all  human 
knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  the  person  as  consciousness  and  as  will. 
This  primordial  knowledge  is  that  of  a  certain  relation  of  relations 
implied  in  all  possible  cognitions,  namely,  the  relation  of  the  subject 
to  the  mental  object.  The  problem  is  to  deduce  from  this  relation  the 
constitutive  relations  of  the  objects  of  experience,  for  these  objects  of 
experience  have  as  factors  and  coefficients  the  laws  of  conscious- 
ness. Consequently,  even  if  objects  are  represented  as  exterior,  they 
are  so  under  the  laws  of  external  representation  which  is  representa- 
tion in  us. 

We  regard  external  objects,  however,  not  only  as  representations  in 
us,  but  as  given  for  themselves.  This  suggests  a  double  problem,  that 
of  external  perception  and  of  body.  The  problem  of  external  per- 
ception asks  how  changes  represented  to  consciousness  by  sensations, 
but  which  consciousness  ascribes  to  objects  outside  itself,  are  related 
to  those  changes  which  consciousness  recognizes  as  changes  simply  of 
its  own  states.  Inseparable  from  this  is  the  question  :  What  is  the 
nature  and  in  what  can  consist  the  changes  of  body  ?  On  the  other 
hand,  if  we  are  considering  the  other  side  of  the  relation  of  mutual 
dependence  between  the  changes  of  the  self  and  the  changes  of  the 
external  object,  we  have  a  second  double  problem,  that  of  will  and  of 
force.  We  wish  to  know  how  it  comes  about  that  desires  and  acts  of 
will,  internal  phenomena  of  consciousness,  are  regularly  followed  by 
changes  of  external  objects,  whether  these  changes  appear  in  the  organic 
body  external  to  consciousness,  that  is  but  partially  and  specifically 


214  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

modifiable  by  the  will,  or  in  exterior  bodies  connected  with  this  or- 
ganic body  by  mechanical  laws. 

The  mechanical  propagation  of  changes  from  one  body,  whether 
organic  or  not,  to  other  bodies,  raises  the  question  of  the  nature  of 
force.  We  spontaneously  apply  the  name  '  force '  or  '  cause  '  to  unify 
two  laws  of  phenomena  which  from  the  standpoint  of  the  subject's 
own  feeling  are  widely  separated.  We  assign  as  the  cause  of  a 
phenomenon  of  movement  excited  in  a  body,  a  mental  phenomenon, 
a  desire.  Here  the  term  '  force'  is  applied  in  a  direct  sense  to  a 
case  of  volition.  In  the  second  case,  we  suppose  an  analogous  re- 
lation of  causality  between  two  bodies  whose  respective  and  suc- 
cessive states  of  repose  or  of  movement  are  mutually  determined, 
and  vary  according  to  modes  that  can  be  empirically  ascertained 
and  mathematically  formulated.  The  application  of  the  term  '  force  ' 
to  this  case  presents  to  the  philosopher  the  problem  of  the  nature  of 
bodies,  and  of  the  actions  exercised  by  bodies,  that  is,  an  inquiry  into 
the  rational  foundation  of  the  general  notions  of  physics,  and  the 
question  whether  these  can  be  reconciled  with  the  essential  features 
of  a  personalistic  doctrine  of  reality.  The  task  which  the  author 
undertakes  is  thus  the  establishing  of  the  postulate  of  the  person  as 
basal,  ultimate,  and  supreme,  unifying  the  fundamental  concepts  of 
metaphysics,  sociology,  psychology,  theory  of  knowledge,  rational 
mechanics,  thermodynamics,  etc. 

From  this  can  be  traced  the  main  points  of  difference  between  '  neo- 
Criticism,'  as  Renouvier  styled  his  method  in  previous  works,  and  the 
Criticism  of  Kant,  and  also  the  development  of  neo-Criticism  into  the 
more  positive  and  constructive  system  of  Personalism.  Neo-Criticism 
adopted  from  Kant  the  method  of  the  categories  and  the  substitution 
of  rational  belief  for  false  criteria  of  evidence  in  the  domain  of  meta- 
physics and  rational  psychology.  It  modifies  and  supplements  the 
Kantian  criticism  by  subsuming  all  the  categories  under  the  general 
principle  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  and  making  them  all  modes 
of  the  category  of  relation.  In  his  own  words  :  "  The  most  general 
relation  which  all  other  relations  presuppose  is  Relation  itself.  This 
first  of  the  categories,  considered  no  longer  abstractly  but  in  a  living 
theatre  of  representations,  is  a  law  of  consciousness  or  of  personality 
which  embraces  at  once  as  its  instruments  of  knowledge  and  its 
forms,  Time,  Space,  Quality,  Quantity,  Causality,  Finality.  It  is, 
then,  under  the  aspect  of  Personality  that  we  must  rationally  repre- 
sent the  total  synthesis  of  phenomena,  and  define  the  real  and  living 
world.  The  Unconditioned,  Substance,  Noumena  are  abstractions, 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  21$ 

pure  intellectual  fictions."  As  he  says  elsewhere,  his  theory  of  knowl- 
edge is  a  thorough-going  relativism  which  means  a  personalism. 
Renouvier  charges  Kant  with  an  inconsistent  adherence  to  the  real- 
ism of  substance  and  the  noumenon,  which  "  debases  the  real  person, 
all  whose  modes  are  phenomenal  and  relative  to  an  empirical  illusion," 
and  which  makes  "  the  Kantian  philosophy  practically  bent  upon  the 
ruin  of  the  person."  Renouvier  insists  that  the  person's  phenomenal 
knowledge  may  know  real  relations  and  therefore  true  existence. 
The  standard  of  knowledge  is  what  the  person  can  know,  and  not  what 
by  the  critical  hypothesis  he  can  not.  The  person  with  his  modes  of 
consciousness  is  the  ultimate  fact. 

This  serves  to  suggest  a  certain  difference  between  Kant  and  Re- 
nouvier in  their  attitude  toward  rational  belief.  With  Kant,  the  faith 
in  the  self  which  has  taken  the  place  of  knowledge  is  the  conscious- 
ness which  man's  practical  reason  has  of  himself  as  a  being  with  moral 
obligations  and,  consequently,  free,  but  a  person  only  in  the  noumenal 
world.  Renouvier  also  calls  the  affirmation  which  man  makes  of  his 
personality  a  moral  affirmation,  as  contrasted  with  his  natural  belief  in 
external  objects,  and  he  agrees  virtually  with  Kant  in  regard  to  the 
relation  between  moral  obligation  and  freedom,  although  he  rejects 
Kant's  thorough-going  determinism  as  regards  the  phenomenal  world, 
and  insists  upon  man's  real  free-will  in  the  living  world  of  nature. 
With  Renouvier,  however,  belief  in  the  person  as  a  real  knowing  sub- 
ject in  the  real  world  is  an  epistemological  rather  than  a  moral  postulate. 
It  is  the  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  the  irresistible  consciousness  that  I  exist  be- 
cause I  think  and  perceive  objects  in  relation  to  my  subject  in  a  phe- 
nomenal world,  —  rather  than,  as  with  Kant,  I  ought,  therefore  I  can, 
therefore  I  am  a  real  being  in  a  noumenal  world. 

In  metaphysics  Renouvier  takes  an  equally  definite  position  in  favor 
of  the  concrete  person  as  the  ultimate  reality.  The  search  for  a  syn- 
thetic concept  of  the  phenomenal  world  disposes  also  of  the  meta- 
physical question  of  the  infinite.  We  posit  a  first  beginning  of  phe- 
nomena, because  of  the  logical  impossibility  of  their  retrogression  ad 
infinitum.  The  personalistic  doctrine  thus  completes  itself  by  the 
"  recognition  of  an  act  of  creation  as  an  initial  fact,  and  of  the  unity 
of  the  first  and  creative  person  as  a  truth  imposed  upon  our  assent  by 
the  harmonious  unity  of  the  laws  which  rule  the  understanding  of 
intelligent  beings  and  that  world  whose  representation  is  given  to 
them.  The  notion  of  a  first  beginning  cannot  be  grounded  upon  any- 
thing else  than  the  feeling  of  willing,  the  sole  foundation  of  the  con- 
cepts of  cause  and  force."  The  person,  therefore,  both  as  will  and  as 


2l6  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

consciousness  is  the  ground  of  the  universe.  The  development  of  this 
positive  theism  is,  to  Renouvier's  mind,  the  chief  progress  which  per- 
sonalism  has  made  beyond  the  relatively  sceptical  and  negative  con- 
dition in  which  neo-Criticism  left  the  study  of  God  and  the  world. 

M.  Renouvier  devotes  the  earlier  chapters  of  his  Metaphysics  of 
Personalism  to  demonstrating  the  theistic  hypothesis.  He  chooses 
the  hypothesis  of  a  first  beginning  or  a  creation  of  the  world  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  opposed  hypothesis  of  an  infinite  series  of  past  phenomena 
without  a  beginning,  because  the  latter  involves  the  contradiction  of 
an  actual  infinite,  and  confuses  the  concept  of  numerical  quanity  with 
the  true  notion  of  causation.  M.  Renouvier  admits  that  everything 
which  begins  to  exist  has  a  cause,  but  denies  that  this  principle  can  be 
interpreted  as  meaning  that  every  cause  has  an  anterior  cause.  A  first 
beginning,  however,  involves  a  first  cause  as  the  first  reality. 

The  characteristics  of  this  first  real  being  which  are  to  serve  as 
principles  of  explanation  for  the  phenomenal  world  cannot  be  found 
in  abstract  ideas,  in  a  so-called  realism  of  essences,  substantified 
sensible  qualities,  or  a  realism  of  certain  abstract  notions  of  the 
understanding,  substance,  for  example,  or  in  such  a  mere  name  as  the 
Absolute.  The  condition  of  all  these  generalizations  from  particular 
possible  relations  is  consciousness,  the  relation  of  subject  and  object. 
This  first  real  being,  then,  must  be  conscious  in  order  to  be  real. 
Moreover,  the  creative  act  of  the  first  cause  in  the  first  beginning  of  phe- 
nomena must  have  been  an  act  of  will ;  for  we  have  no  idea  of  a  power 
of  producing  phenomena  which  is  not  will.  Our  first  cause,  however, 
is  not  will  apart  from  consciousness ;  for  this  is  an  unintelligible  abstrac- 
tion. "  The  creative  will  of  the  world  must  be  united  with  thought, 
intelligence,  and  desire  to  form  a  mental  synthesis  like  that  which  con- 
stitutes our  own  being,  the  human  person  in  the  consciousness  which 
it  has  of  itself"  (p.  n).  Consciousness,  then,  perception,  appeti- 
tion,  energy  in  relation,  is  the  essential  and  fundamental  nature  of  all 
real  being,  varying  in  clearness,  perfection,  and  adequateness  from  the 
simple  monad  to  the  Creator.  Renouvier's  thought  of  the  Creator  is, 
however,  that  of  a  perfect  Personality,  with  a  "  power  of  perceiving 
the  sequences  of  phenomena  in  order  to  represent  them  to  himself  in 
willing,  of  conceiving  the  relations  by  which  phenomena  are  eventu- 
ally determined,  and  establishing  the  general  laws  which  combine  to 
compose  a  world  in  time  and  space,  and  of  being  animated  by  the 
feeling  characteristic  of  his  intention,  the  love  of  his  work,  the  desire 
of  accomplishing  it"  (p.  16).  The  creative  act  is  not  a  mystery, 
but  a  fact,  inexplicable  because  it  cannot  be  deduced  from  other  facts, 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  21  / 

"but  neither  more  nor  less  intelligible  than  existence  itself.  The  creation 
is  the  "primordial  fact  of  the  excitation  by  the  supreme  conscious- 
ness and  will  not  only  of  phenomena  in  himself,  but  of  consciousness 
and  wills  outside  himself"  (p.  18).  The  unique  characteristic  of  the 
divine  act  of  creation  is  that  this  act  makes  the  creature  capable  of  a 
will  which  is  not  that  of  the  Creator. 

The  doctrine  of  the  perfect  Personality,  and  of  creation  by  his  will, 
finds  its  ultimate  logical  ground  in  the  principles  of  contradiction  and 
relativity.  Its  moral  proof  is  grounded  upon  the  moral  postulate  of 
perfection  ;  it  is  to  this  that  we  must  appeal  for  our  judgments  of  the 
creation  from  the  standpoint  of  its  value,  as  good  or  evil  for  its 
•creatures.  The  moral  argument  for  the  perfection  of  the  creative 
Personality  is  drawn  from  our  observation  of  syntheses  of  phenomena 
"  which  suggest  the  concept  of  a  final  purpose  in  nature,  while  the  idea 
of  finality  by  a  spontaneous  induction  suggests  that  of  a  personality  as 
its  efficient  cause"  (p.  25).  The  perfection  of  our  first  Person  must, 
however,  be  rightly  interpreted,  not  in  the  meaningless  sense  of  an 
Absolute,  indefinable  and  even  without  a  name,  or  in  the  contradic- 
tory sense  of  an  actual  infinite  quantity.  The  term  '  infinite, '  as  applied 
to  God,  means  only  indefinite  power.  The  true  sense  of  the  perfec- 
tion of  being  is  the  Being  "  entire,  complete,  which  unites  in  a  synthe- 
sis, real  and  without  any  defect,  all  the  elements  of  objective  and  sub- 
jective thought  of  which  we  conceive  only  partial  imperfect  ideas ' ' 
(p.  25).  If  applied  to  the  creation,  it  must  be  remembered  that  per- 
fection is  a  term  of  relation  between  the  will  and  its  achievement  of 
the  ends  which  it  has  proposed  to  itself,  that  it  is  thus  an  attribute  of 
persons  rather  than  of  work.  Perfection,  further,  is  of  two  kinds ; 
there  is  intellectual  perfection,  which  has  reference  to  the  "  coordina- 
tion of  all  the  relations  of  which  the  idea  of  the  world  is  composed, 
the  synthesis  of  all  the  directive  laws  of  the  understanding  and  forms  of 
the  sensibility,  and  moral  perfection,  which  respects  the  good  of  the 
creatures,  the  justice  and  goodness  of  creation"  (p.  28).  But  here 
is  suggested  the  problem  of  evil.  Why  is  the  work  of  the  perfect 
Creator  not  a  perfect  work?  Shall  we  call  evil  a  kind  of  good,  as  the 
determinists  do,  or  shall  we  attribute  it  to  the  act  of  the  creature  in  a 
world  which  was  originally  perfect  ? 

M.  Renouvier's  answer  to  these  questions  recapitulates  without  sub- 
stantial addition  the  treatment  of  the  problem  of  evil  given  in  earlier 
treatises.  He  ascribes  all  evil  to  the  free  will  of  man  choosing  to  act 
selfishly  in  the  perfect  human  society  of  the  perfect  primitive  world,  in 
which,  at  the  complex  beginning  of  things,  a  finite  number  of  per- 


218  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

sons  was  placed.  He  describes  the  destruction  of  this  primitive 
world  and  the  perishing  of  the  original  persons  as  a  result  of  the  revolt 
against  justice  in  human  society,  the  reappearance  of  human  life  in  a 
world  ill-adapted  to  the  human  species  and  in  forms  of  society  where 
injustice  reigns.  He  reiterates  his  belief  that  in  the  end  the  monads 
composing  the  original  persons,  now  living  through  the  lives  of  indi- 
viduals, will  return  to  their  original  combinations,  and  the  original 
finite  number  of  perfect  persons,  enriched  by  the  memories  of  the 
types  of  individuality  and  the  forms  of  society  through  which  they 
have  passed,  will  be  restored  in  the  restoration  of  the  originally  per- 
fect society  and  the  primitive  perfect  world.  The  world  process  thus 
has  a  beginning  and  end,  is  not  infinite  in  time,  nor  is  either  the 
original  or  the  final  world  infinite  in  space. 

In  the  study  of  external  perception,  a  running  commentary  upon 
the  representative  historical  theories  of  perception  contends  that 
relativism  or  personalism,  rightly  understood,  corrects  the  errors  and 
embodies  the  truths  of  both  idealism  and  realism.  The  true  sense  of 
idealism  is  that  "  no  objective  representation  can  be  more  than  sub- 
jectively objective,  of  whatever  nature  be  its  perception,  whatever 
form  it  affects,  by  whatever  judgment  it  is  accompanied"  (p.  24). 
Berkeley  was  right  in  affirming  that  sensible  qualities  have  all  their  ex- 
istence in  minds,  that  sensible  phenomena  are  always  modes  of  feeling 
or  of  thought.  We  have  no  real  perception  of  bodies  in  themselves, 
but  merely  ideas  which  the  presence  of  these  bodies  arouses  in  us,  and 
which  are  signs  of  their  presence  and  of  their  externality.  Body  is 
thus  simply  a  system  of  changes  in  us,  while  the  qualities  of  bodies, 
extension,  impenetrability,  resistance,  are  all  so  many  particular  forms 
of  relation  to  each  other  and  to  some  consciousness  which  represents 
them.  These  sentences  show,  however,  the  sense  in  which  relativ- 
ism contains  the  truth  of  realism.  Our  ideas  are  signs  of  the  presence 
of  bodies.  Representation  is  subjectively  objective.  With  the  con- 
sciousness which  the  subject  has  of  itself,  the  consciousness  of  the  ob- 
ject is  inseparably  combined,  but  by  a  kind  of  natural  belief.  For 
there  are  in  external  perception  no  intermediaries  between  objects 
and  ideas.  We  have  to  admit  the  perception  of  bodies  as  an  ultimate 
and  irreducible  relation. 

Resistance,  however,  is  a  so-called  property  of  bodies,  which  is  a  re- 
lation chiefly  for  will.  Our  experience  of  external  reality  does  not 
consist  purely  of  cognitive  representation.  It  involves  relations  of 
action  and  reaction.  We  act  upon  bodies  and  they  upon  us  ;  we  re- 
sist them  and  they  offer  resistance  to  us.  In  our  knowledge  of  the 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  2ig 

external  world,  the  living  experience  of  force  is  the  most  convincing 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  physical  reality  or  matter.  Force,  how- 
ever, so  far  as  it  represents  a  relation  between  the  will  of  the  subject 
and  that  will's  sensible  effects,  is  another  irreducible  relation.  There 
is  no  intermediary  which  can  be  perceived  between  the  will  as  con- 
scious cause,  and  the  phenomena  objectively  represented  in  the  phys- 
ical world,  and  no  rational  hypothesis  of  the  connection  can  be  offered 
beyond  the  fact  itself.  Will,  therefore,  is  an  inexplicable  first  fact, 
whose  feeling  can  be  evoked,  but  whose  idea  cannot  be  defined. 

We  use  the  term  '  force, '  however,  to  express  a  relation  between  objects 
in  the  physical  world.  We  speak  of  it  as  a  cause  of  movement  and  of 
heat,  and  of  the  different  kinds  of  force,  e.  g.,  kinetic  and  vibratory 
energy,  and  we  ask  physical  science  for  a  definition  of  its  nature  and  a 
formulation  of  its  laws.  M.  Renouvier's  reading  of  the  investigations 
of  rational  mechanics  and  thermodynamics  into  the  nature  of  force  as 
manifested  in  gravitation  and  heat,  the  laws  of  the  transmission  of 
movement  and  transmutation  of  energy,  the  question  whether  space  is 
continuously  filled  with  bodies  which  transmit  force  by  contact,  or 
whether  force  can  act  at  a  distance,  is  to  the  effect  that  none  of  these 
sciences  penetrates  the  real  nature  of  its  subject.  Physical  science  can 
know  and  measure  force  only  in  its  effects,  in  quantity  of  movement  or 
in  heat ;  it  deals  in  the  end  only  with  the  empirical  relation  of  antece- 
dent and  consequent,  not  with  the  nature  of  the  cause.  So  far,  how- 
ever, as  the  physicists  can  judge  of  the  nature  of  the  cause  from  its  ef- 
fects, it  acts  like  mental  force,  —  like  the  only  force  we  really  know, 
which  is  the  will.  That  is,  the  idea  of  a  transitive  force  transmitted 
from  body  to  body  has  been  given  up  ;  force  evidently  acts  at  a  dis- 
tance and  seems  to  be  spontaneously  radiated  from  bodies,  as  if  bodies 
were  accumulations  of  living  centers  with  wills  of  their  own.  Rational 
mechanics,  therefore,  seems  in  the  end  to  define  the  forces  of  nature 
by  mental  agents,  to  hand  over  its  paramount  problem  to  psychology, 
and  Renouvier  feels  that  his  thesis  of  the  conscious  person  as  the  foun- 
dation of  all  knowledge,  and  the  willing  person  as  the  center  and  core 
of  all  real  existence  and  happening,  stands  established. 

Only  a  word  of  criticism  can  here  be  given.  The  relation  of  the  cre- 
tive  Personality  to  the  world  composed  of  these  aggregations  of  centers 
of  will-force,  and  the  relation  of  this  will-force  to  human  persons,  is  left 
vague.  One  feels  also  throughout  the  work  the  lack  of  definite  and 
original  treatment  of  the  postulate  of  personality  from  its  ethical  side. 
The  author  places  practically  all  his  emphasis  on  the  intellectual  side  of 
personality,  and  borrows  what  recognition  he  accords  to  the  moral  self. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  ANNA  ALICE  CUTLER. 


220  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Why  the  Mind  has  a   Body.     By  C.  A.  STRONG.     New  York, 

The  Macmillan  Company;  Lopdon,  Macmillan  &  Co.  Ltd.,  1903. 
-PP-  x,  355. 

"  The  reader  will  find  in  this  book,"  writes  the  author  in  his  pref- 
ace, "  (i)  a  sketch  of  an  explanation  of  the  connection  of  mind  and 
body  ;  (2)  a  proposal,  based  thereon,  for  a  settlement  of  the  contro- 
versy between  the  parallelists  and  the  interactionists. ' '  The  explana- 
tion is  in  substance  the  one  "  which  is  implied  in  the  panpsychism  of 
Fechner  and  Clifford,"  and  the  striking  title  of  the  work  has  been 
chosen  "with  the  object  of  putting  this  panpsychist  pretension  dis- 
tinctly on  record. ' '  In  the  light  of  this  explanation,  Professor  Strong 
will  show  that  parallelism,  so  far  from  denying  the  efficiency  of  mind, 
involves  and  implies  it. 

The  inquiry  undertaken  is  thus  essentially  metaphysical.  But  con- 
temporary discussions  of  the  problem  as  to  the  relation  of  mind  and 
body  are  mainly  concerned  with  the  causal  issue.  Does  the  causal 
influence  run  in  both  directions,  from  body  to  mind  and  from  mind 
to  body,  as  interactionism  holds ;  or,  does  it  run  only  in  one  direc- 
tion, from  body  to  mind,  as  automatism  would  have  us  believe ;  or, 
finally,  are  the  parallelists  right  in  denying  the  causal  influence  in 
either  direction  ?  This  is  primarily  a  question  of  fact ;  but,  could 
we  settle  the  issue  by  empirical  considerations,  still  we  should  not  rest 
satisfied  without  going  further  and  seeking  in  some  ultimate  meta- 
physical theory  to  discover  how  and  why  mind  and  body  are  con- 
nected at  all.  So  one  is  bound  sooner  or  later  to  plunge  into  meta- 
physics in  order  to  make  any  one  of  the  theories  intelligible. 

But  it  happens  that  we  cannot  even  settle  the  question  as  to  the 
causal  relation  by  any  available  empirical  data,  nor  is  it  likely  that 
we  ever  shall  be  able  to  do  so.  The  facts  admit  of  interpretation  in 
terms  of  interactionism,  automatism,  or  parallelism  ;  and  there  are 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  accepting  any  one  of  these  views  as  usually 
interpreted.  Part  I  of  the  work  before  us  (pp.  1-160)  is  given  over 
to  this  empirical  inquiry.  Professor  Strong's  analysis  is  keen,  his  dis- 
cussion comprehensive  and  transparently  lucid.  The  study  of  the 
facts,  it  is  found,  lends  support  to  no  particular  causal  theory.  It 
gives  us  a  single  positive  result,  the  law  of  psychophysical  correlation. 
"This  law  includes  two  propositions:  first,  that  consciousness  as  a 
whole  never  occurs  except  in  connection  with  a  brain  process ; 
secondly,  that  particular  mental  states  never  occur  except  in  connec- 
tion with  particular  brain  events"  (p.  66).  It  might  be  fairly 
objected  that  the  facts  to  which  appeal  is  made  are  hardly  sufficient 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  221 

to  establish  the  universal  negative  of  this  second  proposition,  though 
they  may  point  that  way ;  and  certainly  we  want  more  evidence  when 
our  author  later  interprets  the  relation  in  terms  of  a  third  proposition 
to  the  effect  that  the  particular  brain-event  corresponding  to  the 
particular  mental  state  "  mimics  "  the  latter  "  in  all  its  details." 

The  demonstration  of  causal  relations  between  physical  events 
involves,  Professor  Strong  holds,  besides  the  determination  of  cause 
by  the  criterion  of  uniformity,  "the  construction  of  a  continuous 
phenomenal  series  reaching  from  the  cause  to  the  effect, ' '  and  ' '  the 
demonstration  of  qualitative  and  quantitative  relations."  Since  these 
things  clearly  cannot  be  established  as  between  mental  and  physical 
events,  the  causal  argument  would  seem  to  make  for  parallelism. 
"But  its  validity  is  hypothetical,  resting  on  the  assumption  that 
mental  events  are  simultaneous  with  their  cerebral  correlates.  .  .  . 
The  argument  from  the  principles  of  biology  appears  to  prove  the 
mind  efficient;  but  it  is  subject  to  the  difficulty  regarding  the  origin 
of  consciousness.  The  argument  from  the  principle  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy  raises  a  strong  presumption,  not  amounting  to  demon- 
strative proof,  that  the  contrary  is  the  case.  Thus  two  great  branches 
of  natural  science  seem  arrayed  against  each  other.  Physics  and 
biology  appear  to  authorize  opposite  conclusions  concerning  the 
efficiency  of  mind  "  (pp.  152—160). 

Thus  a  study  of  the  various  empirical  arguments  adduced  in  support 
of  the  several  theories  of 'the  relation  of  mind  and  body  reveals  their 
insufficiency  to  justify  a  final  decision ;  and  we  are  forced  over  into 
the  metaphysical  inquiry.  Here  we  must  first  determine  exactly 
what  we  mean  by  the  highly  ambiguous  terms  '  mind  '.  and  '  matter, ' 
which  are  generally  employed  in  a  most  uncritical  way.  Only  when 
we  have  succeeded  in  doing  this,  shall  we  be  able  to  assign  to  each  of 
the  causal  theories  its  definite  meaning,  and  to  decide  finally  between 
them. 

Body,  and  matter  generally,  is  resolved,  on  the  basis  of  the  usual 
phenomenalistic  arguments,  into  "our  perceptions."  But  this  Berk- 
leian  idealism  (and,  it  may  be  added  parenthetically,  no  other  form  of 
idealism  is  given  serious  consideration)  gives  us  a  "piecemeal  frag- 
mentary world,"  and  not  the  continuous  and  abiding  universe  of 
physics.  Hence,  though  a  logical  theory,  and  an  adequate  transcript 
of  the  facts,  it  is  not  convincing.  And  since,  according  to  it,  per- 
ceived events  cannot  be  explained  by  means  of  preceding  events 
which  were  not  perceived,  and  "  on  the  idealistic  theory  did  not  hap- 
pen at  all, "  it  "  leaves  the  need  for  genetic  understanding  unsatisfied. ' ' 


222  THE   PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Still,  the  continuous  and  abiding  matter  that  science  conceives  is  not 
accessible  to  perception,  has  none  of  the  sensible  qualities,  and  is, 
therefore,  properly  speaking,  not  material.  Make  the  scientist's 
realism  critical,  and,  our  author  holds,  physical  occurrences  acquire 
the  needed  permanence  by  being  regarded  as  the  symbols  of  extra- 
mental  realities,  things-in-themselves,  that  continue  to  exist.  It  is  as 
if  physical  occurrences  had  permanent  existence  just  as  the  scientist 
supposes.  They  do  not  thus  exist  as  physical  objects,  nor  yet  as  bare 
possibilities  of  perception,  but  rather  as  real  possibilities,  real  disposi- 
tions, as  it  were,  of  the  natural  order  (pp.  188—192). 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  the  scientist  would  recognize  his  realism 
in  this  guise ;  and  it  is  certain  that  any  form  of  idealism  that  involves 
the  belief  in  a  permanent  non-temporal  self,  —  any  that  is  not  sheer 
phenomenalism,  —  would  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  scientific 
mind,  and  "the  need  for  genetic  understanding,"  at  least  as  well  as 
the  author's  so-called  "critical  realism."  Of  course,  such  idealisms 
would  not  make  possible  a  genetic  understanding  of  the  real  self,  for 
that  self  is,  according  to  them,  not  subject  to  genesis.  But  does  Pro- 
fessor Strong's  theory  satisfy  either  the  scientist's  or  the  plain  man's 
realism?  It  evidently  depends  upon  the  meaning  given  to  these  extra- 
mental  realities,  or  things-in-themselves.  They  are  conceived  as 
"mental  in  their  nature."  But  what  is  mind  ?  The  mind  is  "re- 
solved into  a  series  of  mental  states. ' '  More  properly,  the  present 
ego  is  the  state  of  consciousness  at  present  immediately  intuited,  — 
"experienced,"  but  "not  known."  In  memory,  we  are  told,  the 
past  state  recalled  "really  is  another  consciousness. "  Apparently, 
then,  another  ego  witnessed  the  past  state.  This  is  introducing  dis- 
continuity with  a  vengeance.  The  scientist's  continuous  world  would 
seem  in  a  sad  case.  And  how  we  should  ever  know  the  series  of 
states,  those  different  consciousnesses,  how  '  the  other  fellow's '  experi- 
ence would  ever  get  to  be  mine,  remains  a  mystery. 

The  discussion  of  the  ego  in  the  brief  chapter  on  consciousness  is 
far  from  adequate.  For  example,  the  theory  of  a  non-phenomenal 
subject  is  disposed  of  cavalierly  in  a  couple  of  pages,  mainly  on  the 
ground  (for  this  error  is  common  to  the  three  objections  urged)  that 
that  theory  involves  "extruding  the  ego  from  experience,"  which  is 
precisely  what  that  theory  affirms  to  be  impossible.  However,  while 
not  extruding  the  ego  from  experience,  this  theory  may  indeed  con- 
sistently hold  that  the  non-phenomenal  ego  can  never  be  completely 
experienced,  in  the  sense  of  being  immediately  perceived,  in  any  one, 
or  in  the  sum  of  all  of  the  states  of  consciousness.  But,  properly,  the 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  223 

term  '  experience  '  should  not  be  taken  in  the  restricted  sense  seemingly 
implied  in  Professor  Strong's  criticism.  And,  of  course,  if  experience 
were  completely  intelligible  minus  the  permanent  non-phenomenal 
ego,  its  assumption  were  needless.  But  I  know  of  no  philosopher 
guilty  of  denying  this.  The  strictures  made  are  thus  wholly  wide  of 
the  mark.  Consciousness,  Professor  Strong  holds,  is  real  "  as  long  as  it 
lasts,"  —  "  as  real  as  anything  can  be.  It  is  the  very  type  of  reality,  an 
integral  part  of  the  universe  of  things  "  (p.  2 10).  But  what  we  should 
greatly  like  to  know  is  how,  on  the  author's  view  of  consciousness  and 
the  ego,  we  should  ever  be  able  to  conceive  that  universe  of  things. 

"The  relation  between  mind  and  body,"  writes  Professor  Strong, 
"will  evidently  be  an  essentially  different  thing,  according  as  the 
body  is  the  symbol  of  a  reality  external  to  consciousness,  or  only  a 
phenomenon  within  consciousness  "  (p.  212).  And  a  large  portion 
of  the  book  is  taken  up  with  the  discussion  of  the  possibility,  the 
proof,  and  the  nature  of  things-in-themselves,  which  are  defined  as 
"realities  external  to  consciousness  of  which  our  perceptions  are  the 
symbols."  The  existence  of  things-in-themselves  cannot  be  imme- 
diately known,  but  only  inferred ;  and,  as  they  never  could  be  given 
immediately  in  experience,  "the  hypothesis  of  their  existence  can 
never  be  verified, ' '  and  we  must  remain  more  or  less  in  the  dark  con- 
cerning their  nature  (cf.  p.  192).  But  "the  legitimacy  of  the  gen- 
eral class  to  which  things-in-themselves  belong"  is  established,  Pro- 
fessor Strong  thinks,  by  our  undoubted  knowledge  of  the  reality  of 
other  minds.  Other  minds  are  for  us  simply  other  existences,  and  our 
knowledge  of  them  is  ' '  transcendent  "  (  "  not  empirical  "  ) .  Neither 
the  external  nor  the  internal  senses  lend  the  slightest  testimony  to  their 
existence,  yet  we  know  "with  perfect  certainty"  that  they  exist.  In- 
asmuch, however,  as  the  senses  can  give  no  valid  testimony  on  this 
point,  we  have  a  kind  of  knowledge  that  is  founded  "neither  on  reason 
nor  [on]  experience,  but  solely  on  instinct"  (p.  219,  ff.).  It  would 
have  been  well  to  probe  deeper  into  the  grounds  of  this  belief,  instead 
of  proceeding,  as  the  author  does,  simply  to  "take  the  knowledge  of 
other  minds  for  granted  and  use  it  as  a  test  of  epistemological  prin- 
ciples. ' '  And  if  this  belief  is  founded  neither  on  reason  nor  on  expe- 
rience, by  what  right  do  we  call  it  knowledge  ? 

Professor  Strong  has  several  "proofs  of  things-in-themselves  "  : 

i.  Their  existence  must  be  assumed  "in  order  to  fill  in  the  gaps 

between  individual  minds,  and  give  coherence  and  intelligibility  to 

our  conception  of  the  universe.     Without  them,  the  universe  would 

consist  wholly  of  individual  minds  with  gaps  of  nothingness  between, 


224  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [You  XIIL 

and  our  philosophy  be  one  of  pluralism.  But  the  fact  that  causal  in- 
fluences get  across  the  gaps  proves  that  these  are  filled"  (p.  259). 
(But  would  not  this  interpolation  of  a  number  of  things-in-themselves 
merely  multiply  the  gaps  to  be  bridged,  substituting  many  small 
breaks  for  one  large  leap  ?  It  is  like  trying  to  make  a  line  out  of 
spots  by  filling  in  a  lot  of  mathematical  points.  For,  on  the  theory  of 
reality  which  this  book  presents,  these  things-in-themselves  are,  as  it 
were,  '  chopped  off  with  a  hatchet '  one  from  another  ;  and  will  prove 
as  intractable  in  philosophy  as  the  hard  unsociable  atoms  of  early 
physics  proved  in  natural  science.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  these  things- 
in-themselves  could  turn  into  a  continuous  world  of  reality  by  a  mere 
increase  in  their  number,  unless  we  tacitly  assume  the  existence  of  an 
inclusive  consciousness  or  a  non-phenomenal  subject. ) 

2.  Our  perceptions  are  undoubtedly  conditioned  by  physiological 
events.     Every  phenomenalistic  theory  must  go  to  ship-wreck  on  this 
fact.     But,  if  we  only  assume  the  existence  of  things-in-themselves, 
we  have  a  way  out.     For  then  the  physical  train  connecting  the  extra 
bodily  object  with  the  brain-event  can  be  regarded  as  symbolizing  a 
real  causal  train  acting  upon  the  mind  from  without.      ' '  The  physical 
train  that  appears  to  exist  in  advance  of  the  perception  is  simply  a, 
second  manifestation  of  the  constituent  links  of  that  real  train,  acting 
by  means  of  collateral  real  trains,  upon  some  other  mind,  or  conceiv- 
ably upon  the  same  mind  "  (p.  264). 

3.  "  The  phenomenalistic  account  of  the  origin  of  mind  is  like  the 
view  that  the  brain  process  does  not  arise  out  of  simpler  physical  facts. 
.   .   .  It  is  a  sort  of  psychological  vitalism,  which  not  only  denies  de- 
rivation from  the  inorganic  but  actually  ignores  the  latter' s  existence  " 
(p.  270).     If,  however,  we  assume  the  inorganic  world  to  be  symbolic 
of  things-in-themselves,  mental  in  their  nature  but  with  a  simpler  kind 
of  mentality,  the  evolution  of  minds  out  of  them,  and  simultaneously 
of  the  brain  out  of  their  symbols,  becomes  conceivable. 

We  need  not  examine  these  arguments  further,  for  we  are  told  that, 
after  all,  the  leap  is  "  irrational."  "  Things-in-themselves  cannot  be 
logically  demonstrated  in  such  a  way  as  to  extort  conviction  from  the 
skeptic. ' '  But,  Professor  Strong  adds,  other  minds  are  in  the  same 
case.  We  are  led  to  believe  in  them,  not  by  "reasoning,  but  by  some 
deep  pre-rational  instinct,  like  that  on  which  our  faith  in  memory 
rests."  Our  "  inference  of  things-in-themselves  is  exactly  analogous 
to  that  of  other  minds. ' '  For  our  part,  we  cannot  see  that  the  anal- 
ogy extends  any  further  than  this,  that  both  inferences  are,  on  our 
author's  showing,  founded  "neither  on  reason  nor  on  experience," 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS    OF  BOOKS.  22$ 

but  are  "non-rational,"  "instinctive,"  or  the  deliverance  of  some 
"deep  pre-rational  instinct."  This  is  almost  as  bad  as  resting  the 
case  on  an  "ultimate  inexplicability."  And  it  is  strange  that  Pro- 
fessor Strong  should  have  rested  content  with  the  appeal  to  a  non -ra- 
tional instinct  for  a  belief  he  holds  to  be  necessary  in  order  to  make 
the  world  "  intelligible." 

Bad  arguments  do  not  become  sound  by  being  repeated.  I  infer 
Gaius  to  be  a  rascal,  for  I  hate  him.  I  have  neither  reason  nor  ex- 
perience to  warrant  the  inference,  but  a  deep  pre-rational  instinct 
guides  me.  Titus  also  arouses  sentiments  of  hatred.  He  must  there- 
fore be  a  rascal  too,  for  —  the  cases  are  exactly  analogous.  Analogy 
with  an  inference  based  neither  on  reason  nor  on  experience  is  noth- 
ing to  brag  of.  By  this  sort  of  reasoning  almost  anything  might  be 
established.  A  believer  in  witches  and  warlocks  might  argue  thus. 
Their  existence  is  not  proved  by  reason  or  by  experience,  but  a  non- 
rational  instinct  is  enough,  and  he  feels  that  they  are  necessary  to 
make  his  world  "intelligible."  If,  however,  the  world  is  in  truth 
made  intelligible  by  any  hypothesis,  reason  and  experience  must 
supply  its  grounds.  The  method  which  Professor  Strong  employs 
in  this  part  of  his  work  is  a  dangerous  one,  and  above  all  to  be  de- 
precated in  philosophical  discussions.  Such  a  procedure  simply  con- 
fuses the  issue.  More  or  less  plausible,  but  logically  unsound,  reason- 
ings may  be  adduced  in  support  of  any  view  whatever.  But  the 
critical  thinker  should  avoid  these  snares,  which  usually  have  no  other 
effect  than  to  bolster  up  pre-rational  prejudices.  So  it  seems  to 
me  that  in  the  theory  of  things-in-themselves  here  set  forth  we  have 
nothing  but  an  attempted  faith-cure  of  the  ills  of  phenomenalism,  — 
defining  faith  scholastic-wise  as  voluntaries  certitude  absentium ;  and 
the  ' '  arguments  ' '  for  their  existence  should  be  entitled  fides  quarens 
intellectum. 

Having  reached  things  in  themselves,  Professor  Strong  argues  that 
they  must  be  mental  in  their  nature.  "Since  consciousness  is  the 
only  reality  of  which  we  have  any  immediate  knowledge,  and  there- 
fore our  only  sample  of  what  reality  is  like,  we  have  no  other  concep- 
tion of  a  reality  "  (p.  295).  Moreover,  "  individual  minds  arise  out 
of  them  by  evolution."  Unfortunately  the  argument  proves  too 
much ;  for  our  only  sample  is  shorn  of  all  that  makes  it  significant  in 
the  process  of  simplification  when  we  pass  back  to  our  progenitors 
in  the  hypothetical  "simpler  mental  facts"  corresponding  to  the 
"  simpler  physical  facts  "  (the  phenomena  of  physics  and  chemistry) 
out  of.  which  the  brain  process  arises.  Moreover,  the  unity  which 


226  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Professor  Strong  assumes  in  this  world  of  things-in-themselves  is 
purely  verbal,  until  we  can  explain  how  they  are  related,  what  their 
action  on  one  another  means,  how  we  are  to  think  it.  We  have 
called  them  all  mental,  by  a  somewhat  violent  hypothesis,  and  our 
mind  is  set  at  rest.  But  what  should  we  say  of  a  physicist  who  thought 
he  had  reached  unity  and  continuity  when  of  all  physical  occur- 
rences he  pronounced  the  word  '  material '  !  It  does  not  help  matters 
simply  to  say  that  these  things-in-themselves  together  "  constitute  a 
single  system,  whose  continuity  and  order  are  symbolized  by  the  con- 
tinuity and  order  of  the  physical  world"  (p.  346),  unless  we  can 
intelligibly  interpret  this  unity  and  continuity  as  it  holds  within  the 
real  or  mental  order. 

Professor  Strong  calls  his  view  "  psychophysical  idealism."  It 
combines  "psychological  solipsism"  with  ' '  ontological  realism," 
and  promises  a  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and 
body  that  will  guarantee  real  efficiency  to  the  mind,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  deny  its  physical  efficiency,  that  will  therefore  satisfy  the  de- 
mands alike  of  parallelist  and  interactionist.  The  resulting  doctrine, 
however,  while  supposed  to  "preserve  a  formal  parallelism,"  is  in 
truth  not  a  doctrine  of  parallelism  at  all,  but  one  of  "identity." 
Consciousness  is  the  reality  symbolized  by  the  brain  process.  The 
brain  process,  as  part  of  the  physical  order,  is  merely  a  phenomenon, 
and  its  reality  consists  in  its  being  perceived.  When  actually  per- 
ceived, the  mental  event  of  which  it  is  the  symbol  has  preceded  it, 
and  may  therefore  be  spoken  of  as  its  cause.  But,  adds  Professor 
Strong,  "what  if  the  parallelist,  by  the  brain  events  which  he  asserts 
to  be  simultaneous  with  mental  states,  means  not  the  perceptions  but 
the  events  perceived,  the  only  intelligible  explanation  of  the  latter 
being  that  they  are  events-in-themselves  ?  What  if  the  simultaneity 
he  asserts  is  really  between  mental  states  and  the  real  events  for  which 
the  brain-events  stand?"  (p.  342).  But  these  real  events  are  the 
identical  mental  states  in  question.  Hence,  to  keep  the  formal  paral- 
lelism, the  brain-event  must  be  regarded  simply  "as  the  mental  state 
itself  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  perception,"  and  then 
in  truth  we  have  "  no  parallelism,  but  a  single  series. ' '  I  find  it  hard  to 
carry  out  this  doctrine,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  the  author  himself  does 
not  succeed  in  doing  so.  Although  we  have  done  away  with  a  "  real 
parallelism,"  forthwith  a  phenomenal  parallelism  turns  up.  "  One  of 
the  two  series  is  not  real  but  only  phenomenal,  it  is  a  shadow  cast  by 
one  consciousness  on  another  or  on  its  latter  [later  ?]  self,  and  having 
no  existence  apart  from  the  two  ;  and  the  parallelism  necessarily  shares 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  22/ 

the  phenomenal  character  of  its  physical  member  ' '  (p.  343).  We  have, 
it  would  seem,  a  sort  of  rivalry  between  our  psychological  idealism, 
and  our  metaphysical  realism.  Thus  the  symbol,  the  physical  occur- 
rence, is  held  not  to  exist  save  in  being  actually  perceived,  but  then  it 
exists  no  longer  merely  as  symbol  but  as  reality  in  the  perceiving  con- 
sciousness. The  symbol  comes  into  existence  after  the  real  event  it 
symbolizes,  and  then  it  is  itself  a  real  event  in  another  consciousness. 
We  have  thus  only  realities,  and  a  single  series,  or  a  number  of  single 
series  in  the  various  perceiving  minds.  But,  again,  the  brain-event  is 
regarded  as  the  "shadow"  of  the  conscious  state,  which  would  seem 
to  make  its  appearance  simultaneous,  and  the  parallelism  returns. 
But,  whichever  way  we  take  it,  is  not  the  whole  problem  as  to  the  rela- 
tion of  mind  and  body  still  to  solve  ?  For  that  problem,  even  if  sub- 
sumed under  that  of  the  relation  of  reality  and  phenomenon,  still  calls 
for  an  explanation  of  the  latter  relation.  If  the  phenomenon,  the 
brain-event,  is  the  "  shadow  ' '  of  the  mental  event,  the  latter  is  thereby 
made  at  least  its  part  cause  ;  if  the  '*  symbol,"  its  regular  appearance 
in  the  wake  of  its  reality,  the  conscious  state,  without  some  causal 
bond  that  reaches  it  in  its  character  as  symbolic  just  the  mystery  of  the 
relation  of  mind  and  body.  And  if  we  reduce  the  parallelism  to  a 
single  series,  then  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body  is 
still  on  our  hands  in  the  fact  that  some  of  these  realities  are  percep- 
tions and  common  property,  with  a  unity  and  continuity  of  their 
own, —  and  that,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  are  supposed  to  get  their 
entire  reality  in  many  distinct  and  separate  minds,  — while  others  are 
not  perceptions  and  are  strictly  private  property  ;  and  the  puzzle  is 
how  one  group  of  these  realities  can  act  on  the  other  which  seems  to 
be  a  closed  system. 

The  solution  offered  may  perhaps  be  symbolized  as  follows  :  A  is 
angry  at  E  and  determines  to  strike  him.  Between  his  intention  and 
E*s  pain  a  number  of  physical  occurrences  intervene,  —  the  outgoing 
current,  the  muscular  contraction,  the  blow,  the  incoming  current, 
etc.  The  series  may  be  represented  thus  : 

A  J,     ;E 
—  b cd— , 

a  e 

—  a,  b,  c,  d,  and  e  being  phenomena,  and  giving  a  continuous  chain. 
But  A  causes  E.  How  is  this  possible,  with  the  gaps  existing  between 
them  ?  We  fill  in  the  gaps  by  supposing  the  actual  chain  to  be 


A\£]\C]  [Z>]  £ 
~a~l>~T  ~~d~  7' 


228  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

—  the  bracketed  capitals  representing  the  realities,  the  things-in- 
themselves,  of  which  b,  c,  and  d  are  the  symbols.  But  the  case  is  not 
so  simple  as  this.  We  have  apparently  for  the  old  dualism  a  continu- 
ous distinction  between  substance  and  shadow.  But  these  would-be 
shadows,  as  entering  into  some  consciousness  or  other,  are  '  real, '  — 
are  entitled  to  capitalization  in  our  formula.  Their  degredation  to 
'  lower  case  '  is  the  result  of  a  sort  of  metaphysical  illusion.  £,  c  and 
d,  as  they  actually  are,  are  mental  states  of  egos  active  in  A  and  E, 
and  of  any  other  consciousness  that  may  happen  to  experience  them. 
Only  after  we  have  first  ejected  them  from  the  mind  and  given  them 
a  kind  of  spurious  independent  existence,  do  we  feel  the  necessity  of 
in  some  way  regarding  them  as  representing  their  own  particular 
realities  (or  things-in-themselves).  Yet  it  is  this  very  illusion  that 
makes  the  gap  which  Professor  Strong  invents  his  things-in-themselves 
to  fill.  In  reality,  the  gap  does  not  exist ;  and,  if  it  did,  to  fill 
it  by  assuming,  corresponding  to  the  intervening  events  in  the  physical 
series,  things-in-themselves  J3,  C,  and  Z>,  is  to  satisfy  the  passion  for 
continuity  with  a  name.  The  continuity  between  A  and  E  via  B,  C, 
and  D  remains  unintelligible,  even  if  we  conceive  B,  C,  and  D  after 
the  analogy  of  consciousness.  It  is  as  if  Arthur,  wishing  to  com- 
municate with  Edgar,  Arthur's  familiar  (his  brain-event,  fidus 
Achates),  should  touch  Bob's  familiar,  who  should  stir  up  Charles's 
familiar,  who  should  arouse  Dick's  familiar,  who  should  awaken 
Edgar's  familiar,  when  lo  !  Edgar  is  appraised  of  Arthur's  resentment. 
But  why  shouldn't  Arthur  go  straight  to  Edgar  ?  Or,  if  there  must  be 
real,  as  well  as  phenomenal  go-betweens,  why  should  they  not,  being 
conceived  after  the  analogy  of  consciousness,  enter  into  the  game  as 
other  consciousnesses  do  ?  Professor  Strong  makes  the  gap  that  occa- 
sions the  difficulty,  and  that  because  of  his  inadequate  conception  of 
the  ego,  and,  in  general,  of  idealism.  The  ego,  he  holds,  is  not  in 
space.  Is  it  any  more  truly  in  time  ? 

Perhaps  philosophy  would  make  surer  progress  if  philosophers  would 
more  frequently  detach  problems,  as  Professor  Strong  has  done,  and 
give  them  separate  and  exhaustive  treatment.  And  I  think  this  is  the 
main  value  of  this  work.  It  brings  clearly  to  light  the  many  difficul- 
ties involved  in  the  problem  considered,  and  should  at  least  have  the 
negative  value  of  putting  an  end  to  such  superficial  solutions  of  the 
issue  as  are  generally  met  with  in  the  discussions  of  philosophers  who 
lightly  settle  the  matter  with  a  few  passing  comments.  It  may  indeed 
be  that  a  whole  system  is  involved  in  the  attempt  to  work  out  any 
serious  problem.  No  matter  for  that.  It  will  be  more  likely  to  be 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  229 

one,  and  not  several  conflicting  systems,  if  a  single  problem  is  held 
persistently  in  view  than  if  one  indite  a  book  de  omnibus  rebus.  Pro- 
fessor Strong's  book  also,  it  seems  to  me,  brings  out  very  clearly  the 
needs  that  must  be  met  before  we  can  expect  to  find  a  satisfactory  so- 
lution of  the  problems  that  it  considers.  Some  of  these  are  :  a  deeper 
discussion  of  the  basis  of  the  inference  to  other  minds,  and  of  the 
meaning  and  method  of  the  action  of  mind  on  mind,  and  thus  of  the 
significance  of  the  unity  and  continuity  in  the  world  of  mental  real- 
ities ;  a  fuller  investigation  of  the  nature  and  the  import  of  the  '  trans- 
cendence '  involved,  as  the  author  rightly  points  out,  in  memory  and 
perception,  as  well  as  in  our  knowledge  of  other  minds ;  a  more  com- 
prehensive treatment  of  idealism,  consciousness,  and  the  ego ;  and  a 
more  searching  examination  of  the  notion  of  causality. 

CHARLES  M.  BAKEWELL. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Outlines  of  Psychology.  An  Elementary  Treatise  with  Some 
Practical  Applications.  By  JOSIAH  ROYCE.  New  York,  The  Mac- 
millan  Co.,  1903. — pp.  xxvii,  379. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  Professor  Royce's  book  is  a  fresh  and 
independent  treatment  of  psychology,  rich  in  suggestion.  In  his 
introductory  chapter  on  "  Definitions  and  Explanations,"  he  first 
admirably  states  the  difference  between  the  inner  psychical  facts  and 
the  outer  facts,  which  are  "  public  property,"  and  then  —  in  the 
opinion  of  the  present  writer  —  rather  overstates  the  social  and  '  de- 
scriptive-' nature  of  the  science  of  psychology.  The  chapters  which 
follow,  on  the  "Physical  Signs  of  the  Presence  of  Mind"  and  on 
"Nervous  Conditions,"  include  nothing  new  except  a  statement  of 
Loeb's  conception  of  the  '  tropism '  and  the  suggestion  (later  to  be 
developed)  that  the  tropisrn  may  be  treated  as  a  parallel  to  some 
psychic  fact.  As  "  General  Features  of  Conscious  Life,"  Royce  next 
considers,  very  effectively,  the  unity  and  the  variety  of  conscious- 
ness, "  the  fact  that  at  any  time  whatever  is  present  tends  to  form  an 
always  incomplete  but  still  in  some  respects  single  conscious  condi- 
tion," and  the  "equally  obvious  fact"  that  "the  one  conscious  state 
of  the  moment  is  always  a  unity  consisting  of  a  multiplicity."  The 
chapter  concludes  with  a  criticism  of  the  theory  that  * '  our  total  mental 
state  is  ...  a  unity  consisting  of  certain  ultimate  sensations  and 
feelings  that  we  cannot  ourselves  detect  except  indirectly."  To  the 
present  writer  this  criticism  seems  unnecessary,  because  the  '  mind- 
stuff  '  hypothesis,  which  it  opposes,  so  long  ago  slipped  out  of  psycho- 


230  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

logical  systems.  The  psychologists  nowadays  still  talk  of  conscious 
elements ;  but  every  one  of  them  would  agree  with  Royce,  that  an  ele- 
ment is  an  abstraction,  that  "analysis  alters  the  consciousness  that  is 
analyzed,"  and  that  "for  any  ordinary  state  of  consciousness  an 
analyzed  state  or  series  of  states  may  be  substituted. ' ' 

From  this  point  onward,  the  book  discusses  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness on  the  basis  of  a  '  tripartite  division, '  not  indeed  the  tra- 
ditional division  into  feeling,  knowledge,  and  will,  but  a  classifica- 
tion under  the  three  heads,  —  admirably  chosen  from  the  standpoint 
of  pedagogical  application,  —  of  sensitiveness,  docility,  and  mental 
initiative.  The  study  of  sensitiveness  is  defined  (p.  117)  as  "a 
statement  of  the  principal  kinds  of  states  of  consciousness  that  occur 
within  the  range  of  our  psychical  experience  .  .  .  with  especial  re- 
lations to  the  sorts  of  physical  conditions  on  which  they  depend." 
The  study  of  docility  proves  to  be  a  discussion  of  ' '  the  relations 
that  bind  the  consciousness  of  any  moment  to  previous  experience. ' ' 
The  study,  finally,  of  mental  initiative  is  a  consideration  of  "the 
factors  that  make  possible  .  .  .  variation  of  our  conduct  and  of  our 
mental  processes." 

It  becomes  at  once  evident  to  the  reader  that  the  discussion  of  sen- 
sitiveness, that  is,  of  "principal  kinds  of  states  of  consciousness,"  is 
Royce' s  equivalent  for  a  study  of  the  conscious  elements.  It  is  not, 
however,  a  part  of  his  plan  to  consider  these  in  any  detail,  except  as 
they  offer  especial  features  of  practical  interest.  He  groups  them  under 
the  three  heads  :  sensory  experience,  mental  imagery,  and  feelings ; 
and,  so  far  as  the  first  two  classes  are  concerned,  offers  within  the  limits 
of  forty  pages  a  very  successful  sketch  of  fundamental  facts  concerning 
sense-experience  and  mental  imagery.  Of  especial  value  is  the  treat- 
ment of  extensity  as  an  attribute  of  sensation,  a  ' '  primitive  character 
upon  which  our  developed  notion  of  space  is  founded"  (p.  140). 
The  physical  parallel  of  the  sensory  consciousness  of  extensity  is  well 
described  as  "  reaction  of  orientation."  Significant,  also,  is  the  em- 
phasis laid,  throughout  the  discussion  of  mental  imagery,  upon  ' '  the 
connection  between  sensory  images  and  our  motor  response  to  our 
environment"  (p.  159). 

By  far  the  most  important  chapter  in  this  division  of  the  book  is 
that  which  discusses  the  feelings.  Professor  Royce  here  proposes  the 
hypothesis  of  at  least  two  relatively  independent  '  dimensions '  of 
feeling  and  at  least  four  kinds  of  feeling  :  feelings  of  pleasantness  and 
unpleasantness,  and  feelings  of  restlessness  and  of  quiescence.  These 
two  pairs  of  opposed  feelings  may  be  variously  combined  :  "  There 


No.  2.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  231 

are  sufferings  which  leave  us  relatively  quiescent,  while  there  are  suf- 
ferings which  are  accompanied  with  vigorous  restlessness  (p.  182). 
.  .  .  On  the  other  hand,  pleasure  may  be  of  the  restless  type  .  .  . 
although  we  like  what  we  have,  we  are  dissatisfied  with  the  situation, 
and  restlessly  seek  for  more  "  (p.  183).  The  description  and  illus- 
tration of  these  "  mixed  feelings"  form  one  of  the  most  significant 
portions  of  the  book. 

This  chapter  concludes  the  enumeration  of  "  the  kinds  of  conscious 
experience,"  and  therefore  provides  a  convenient  place  for  comment. 
The  first  question  which  suggests  itself  concerns  the  completeness  of 
the  enumeration.  One  is  surprised  to  find  that  the  book  contains  no 
analysis  of  the  consciousness  of  relations.  In  a  later  chapter,  to  be 
sure,  the  feeling  of  familiarity  is  incidentally  mentioned,  but  it  is  then 
too  summarily  assigned  to  the  class  of  "  feelings  of  quiescence." 
Again,  the  chapter  on  "Differentiation"  discusses  the  "consciousness 
of  difference,"  but  only  in  its  genesis  through  repeated,  yet  partially 
varying,  experiences.  No  thorough  analysis  of  the  content  of  the 
consciousness  of  relation  is  offered. 

With  reference,  in  the  second  place,  to  the  consciousness  of  quies- 
cence and  that  of  restlessness,  the  present  writer  ventures  to  question 
the  propriety  of  classing  them  with  the  "  feelings."  That  they  form 
a  significant  part  of  experience,  and  that  they  are  constantly  combined 
with  the  consciousness  of  pleasantness  and  of  unpleasantness,  Dr.  Royce 
has  abundantly  shown ;  but  to  the  writer  they  seem  to  be  contrasted 
with  the  life  of  feeling  as  the  active  to  the  passive,  and  to  be  more 
plausibly  described  as  aspects  of  will  and  belief. 

The  chapters  on  "Docility, ' '  study  perception,  memory,  and  thought, 
with  constant  emphasis  upon  the  irimitative  function,  —  the  tendency 
to  repetition,  not  only  of  one's  own  past  experience,  but  also  of  other 
conscious  selves.  The  social  nature  of  consciousnesss  and  the  close 
and  essential  connection  between  consciousness  and  motor  reaction  are 
the  most  significant  features  of  these  chapters.  It  may  be  questioned 
whether  the  very  interesting  discussion  of  generalization,  judgment,  and 
reasoning,  —  first,  with  reference  to  the  motor  reactions  which  they  in- 
volve, and  second,  as  results  of  social  conditions,  —  offers  an  entirely 
adequate  or  complete  analysis.  The  chapter  on  "Differentiation" 
considers  a  result,  rather  than  a  form,  of  docility. 

The  highly  suggestive  chapter  on  "  Mental  Initiative  "  disappoints 
the  reader  because  of  its  brevity  and  its  almost  exclusive  concern  with 
the  biological  and  physiological  conditions.  "The  basis  of  all  initia- 
tive," Royce  supposes  (p.  xxiii),  "are  to  be  found  in  <  tropisms ' 


232  THE   PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW. 

that  lead  to  a  restless  persistence  in  types  of  action  which  are  not  yet 
adaptive,"  and  "the  power  to  learn  decidedly  new  variations  of  our 
habits  will  usually  depend  upon  .  .  .  our  disposition  to  persevere 
either  in  repeating  with  variations  the  particular  acts  that  have  so  far 
proved  abortive,  or  in  searching  elsewhere  .  .  .  for  a  chance  solution 
of  our  problem." 

This  discussion  of  "the  apparently  spontaneous  variations"  in 
consciousness  brings  the  book,  as  outlined  in  the  preface,  to  an  end. 
Two  chapters  are,  however,  added,  consisting  for  the  most  part  of  a 
collection  of  practical  inferences  from  the  study  of  abnormal  emotions, 
of  intellectual  disorders,  and  of  "  abnormities  of  volition." 

It  should  be  added  that  Professor  Royce  has  throughout  defined 
with  admirable  precision  the  line  dividing  scientific  psychology  from 
philosophy,  and  that  he  has  kept  scrupulously  to  the  psychological  side 
of  the  line.  Not  every  treatise  on  psychology,  whether  written  by 
professed  philosopher  or  by  avowed  scientist,  merits  this  commenda- 
tion. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 

WELLESLEY  COLLEGE. 


SUMMARIES   OF   ARTICLES. 

[ABBREVIATIONS. — Am.  J.  Ps.  •=  American  Journal  oj  Psychology;  Am.  J. 
Th.  =  The  American  Journal  of  Theology  ;  Ar.  f.  G.  Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  Geschichte 
der  Philosophic ;  Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  systematische  Philosophic;  Int.  J. 
E.  =  International  Journal  of  Ethics  ;  J.  de  Psych.  =  Journal  de  Psychologic ; 
Psych.  Rev.  =  Psychological  Review ;  Rev.  de  Met.  =  Revue  de  Metaphysique ; 
Rev.  Neo.-Sc.  =  Revue  Neo-Scolastique  ;  R.  d.  Fil.  =  Rivista  di  Filosofia  e  Scienze 
Affini  ;  V.  f.  w.  Ph.  =  Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic ;  Z.  f. 
Psych,  u.  Phys.  =  Zeitschrift  fitr  Psychologic  und  Physiologie  der  Sinnesorgane. — 
Other  titles  are  self-explanatory.] 

LOGIC  AND  METAPHYSICS. 

Erkenntnistheoretische  Auseinandersetzungen.  2.  Schuppe :  Der  naive 
Rcalismus.  TH.  ZIEHEN.  Z.  f.  Psych,  u.  Phys.,  XXXIII,  i  u.  2,  pp. 
91-128. 

A  comparison  of  the  epistemological  theories  of  Schuppe  and  of  Ziehen 
is  difficult,  because  that  of  the  former  is  worked  out  from  logical  grounds. 
Both  philosophers,  however,  agree  with  Avenarius  in  rejecting  the  theory  of 
introjection.  Perceptions  are  given  in  space,  not  projected  into  an  empty 
space.  Schuppe  makes  ideas  dependent  upon  the  immediate  content  of 
perception  ;  but,  contrary  to  Ziehen' s  view,  regards  the  conscious  ego  as 
also  a  fundamental  epistemological  fact.  He  does  not  mean  that  the  ego 
is  found  as  a  content  of  perception,  but  that  it  makes  itself  objective  in  the 
act  of  self-consciousness.  In  reality,  however,  we  cannot  discover  this 
third  factor  together  with  the  perception  and  idea.  Schuppe  admits  that 
the  subject  exists  only  with  its  content ;  by  itself  it  is  an  abstraction.  But 
an  abstraction  cannot  be  a  fundamental  fact  for  epistemology.  To  neglect 
the  significance  of  "  content  of  consciousness  "  and  regard  it  as  a  concept 
of  a  species  which  necessarily  involves  the  concept  of  a  containing  "  con- 
sciousness "  is  a  petitio  principii.  Moreover,  Schuppe' s  view  presents  fur- 
ther difficulties.  He  cannot  show  how  the  ego  differs  from  the  totality  of 
conscious  content,  or  that  it  maintains  a  real  identity  in  its  changing  states. 
Necessity  of  thought  is  identified  with  reality.  The  genus  is  regarded  as 
the  ground  of  the  species,  and  the  actual  development  of  general  from 
specific  ideas  is  neglected.  The  essential  character  of  perceptions  does 
not  consist  of  the  factors  common  to  perception,  but  of  the  general  ideas 
as  such.  Further,  there  is  a  tendency  to  overlook  the  dependence  of  these 
general  ideas  upon  the  particular  thinker.  In  the  impression  we  have 
three  elements — sense  quality,  space  determination,  and  time  determination. 
The  particular  class  separates  from  the  species,  while  the  individual  is 
merely  a  union  of  specific  elements.  Schuppe' s  view  is  incorrect  in  making 
qualitative,  temporal,  and  spatial  determinations  condition  each  other  caus- 

233 


234  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

ally  ;  and  also  in  giving  to  the  elements  an  unmediated  universality.  Gen- 
eral ideas  do  not  result  from  isolating,  but  only  from  inclusive  abstraction. 
The  idea  '  red  '  is  capable  of  general  application,  but  is  not  a  general 
idea.  The  idea  '  red  thing, '  on  the  contrary,  is  a  general  idea,  but  is 
not  given  immediately  in  perception.  General  concepts  are  not  given  in- 
dependent of  induction  in  a  single  experience  of  sensation,  but  are  the 
products  of  a  plurality  of  experiences.  The  thing-concept  arises  from  the 
fact  that  our  representations  have  been  modified.  Schuppe's  opinion  on 
this  question  has  varied.  Recently  he  tends  to  make  thing-concepts  less 
dependent  upon  general  concepts.  The  important  factors  in  the  develop- 
ment of  this  concept,  which  he  names  respectively  motion,  individual 
spaces,  and  uniformity  of  change,  are  better  termed  contrast,  continuous 
spatial  extension,  and  continuous  change.  Schuppe  neglects  the  episte- 
mological  significance  of  the  physiological  process  of  sensation.  This 
process  furnishes  an  important  problem  to  any  theory  which  denies  intro- 
jection.  He  says  that  the  ego,  if  it  is  to  have  concrete  existence,  must  have 
the  faculty  of  vision  ;  but  he  does  not  solve  the  difficulty.  Ziehen  finds 
that  the  analysis  of  perception  discloses  two  laws.  The  one  corresponds 
to  the  causal  law  of  natural  science.  The  other  he  names  parallel,  or  re- 
action law.  According  to  the  latter,  every  psychic  process  corresponds  to 
a  particular  excitation  of  the  individual  brain,  and  consequently  ceteris 
paribus  to  a  determinate  stimulus.  Every  perception  is  a  resultant  of 
these  two  laws.  By  the  elimination  of  the  individual  reaction  we  reach 
the  reduction  elements.  The  reaction  law  is  a  fact,  and  is  inexplicable  in 
the  same  sense  that  the  laws  of  causality  and  of  attraction  are  inexplicable. 
Schuppe  is  unsatisfactory  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  unperceived  existence. 
He  equates  that  existence  with  the  uniformity  of  the  law  according  to  which, 
when  determinate  conditions  are  fulfilled,  it  will  be  perceived.  But  his 
law  is  here  a  general  concept.  In  reality,  the  analysis  of  the  phenomenal 
world  gives  reduction  elements  and  parallel  components.  The  former  do 
not  cease  to  be  psychical  on  account  of  the  reduction.  Merely  the  in- 
dividual reaction  of  the  individual  brain  has  been  eliminated.  Schuppe 
is  correct  in  regarding  the  thing  in  itself  as  a  concept  without  a  content, 
but  wrong  in  making  causality  an  a  priori  law.  He  treats  the  problem  of 
the  plurality  of  subjects  very  satisfactorily.  The  ego  is  not  spatially 
limited,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  reinterpret  the  common  view  that  dif- 
ferent subjects  perceive  the  same  object.  Differences  in  perception  are 
reducible  to  physical  or  psychical  factors  in  the  individual.  But  in  expla- 
nation of  the  characters  common  to  perceptions,  he  unnecessarily  refers  to 
the  generic  standard  of  consciousness  in  general.  The  reduction  element 
is  not  a  generic  concept,  but  the  common  substrate  of  individual  percep- 
tions. Schuppe  did  well  to  point  to  the  significance  of  reflective  predi- 
cates, since  these  refer  to  the  great  problem  of  the  relation  between  subject 
and  object.  They  cannot,  however,  be  distinguished  by  their  psychological 
content  from  other  forms  of  predication.  He  thinks  that  the  ego,  by  mak- 


No.  2.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  235 

ing  itself  an  object,  displays  its  nature  in  a  unique  manner.  But  it  really 
amounts  to  the  same  thing  whether  I  say  :  "A  rose  is  seen  by  me,"  or, 
"  I  see  a  rose."  His  view  of  the  essential  characteristic  of  a  reflective  pre- 
dicate seems  to  have  changed.  At  first,  mental  activity  in  the  form  of 
the  simple  spatial  perception  was  sufficient  ;  later,  he  demanded  activity 
through  logical  reflection.  Schuppe  postulates  a  definite  act  which  raises 
the  nerve-affection  to  thought,  or  takes  up  the  impression  in  its  positive 
determination.  In  the  process  an  unconscious  principle  of  identity  is 
active.  This  is  not  a  subjective  factor  ;  and  the  psychological  side  of  recog- 
nition is  not  relevant  to  the  present  problem.  Ziehen,  on  the  contrary, 
maintains  that  the  question  is  one  of  fact.  Further,  all  our  perceptions 
are  conscious.  Perception  wakens  by  means  of  associations.  The  idea  of 
a  positive  determination  in  the  impression  is  derived  from  the  Kantian  con- 
cept of  apprehension.  The  principle  of  identity  is  merely  an  important 
relational  idea  ;  and  it  would  be  better  named  the  principle  of  distinction 
or  of  similarity.  Schuppe  has  not  solved  the  difficulties  of  recognition  ; 
and  his  division  of  the  epistemological  factors  into  object,  ego,  and  an  ap- 
prehending, is  unsatisfactory. 

N.  E.  TRUMAN. 

Sur  divers  aspects  de  la  mecanique.    G.  SOREL.     Rev.  de  Met.,  XI,  6,  pp. 
716-748. 

Reuleaux  has  attached  an  importance  to  the  idea  of  the  development  of 
thought  independent  of  material  conditions  and  empirical  investigation 
which  is  unwarranted  by  the  facts  of  history.  He  speaks  as  if  there  is  a 
ready-made  body  of  logical  thought  which  science  must  master  in  order 
to  direct  men  in  its  practical  application,  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there 
is  no  body  of  thought  except  such  as  is  gradually  developed  from  empiri- 
cal solutions  of  practical  problems.  How  closely  the  development  of 
thought  corresponds  to  material  conditions  and  the  instruments  of  investi- 
gation at  man's  disposal,  is  well  illustrated  by  the  astronomy  of  the  Greeks, 
who  were  preeminently  rational  and  mathematical,  and  whose  principles 
were  largely  determined  by  cosmological  conceptions  not  subjected  to 
empirical  verification.  After  this  general  introduction,  Sorel  traces  the 
development  of  the  idea  of  motion  from  the  earliest  animistic  to  the  present 
mechanical  interpretations.  The  Greeks  recognized  two  kinds  of  force, 
muscular  force,  and  force  generated  by  a  moving  body.  Four  kinds  of  move- 
ment were  formerly  considered,  circular,  rectilinear,  continued,  and  alter- 
native. Huyghens  first  formulated  a  theory  of  falling  bodies  on  the  con- 
sideration of  forces.  Newton's  theory  is  based  on  the  law  of  inertia  ;  he 
did  not  comprehend  the  spirituality  of  the  force  of  attraction.  Modern 
mechanics  is  based  upon  the  law  that,  when  the  mass  of  a  material  point  is 
multiplied  by  its  acceleration,  the  product  expresses  force  which  can  be 
determined  by  physical  laws  and  geometrical  principles.  There  have  been 
three  distinct  sciences  in  mechanics  :  that  which  treats  of  central  forces, 


236  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

generalizing  Newton's  theory  of  gravitation,  that  which  studies  machines, 
and  that  which  treats  of  elasticity.  This  last  phenomenon  is  due  to  sev- 
eral causes,  and  has  baffled  the  best  scholars.  E.  C.  WILM. 

The  Limits  of  Pragmatism.     }.  MARK  BALDWIN.     Psych.   Rev.,  XI,  i, 

pp.  30-60. 

This  article  defines  the  limitations  of  the  view  which  regards  thought, 
truth,  and  reality  as  relative  to  ends.  The  discussion  is  arranged  as  an- 
swers to  three  questions  :  (i)  Are  there  realities  apprehended  apart  from 
the  cognitive  function,  or,  at  least,  not  adequately  apprehended  through  it  ? 
If  so,  what  is  their  relation  to  truth  ?  (2)  Are  there  any  realities  not  yet 
discovered  ;  and  if  so,  what  meaning  do  they  have  for  us  ?  (3)  Are  there 
any  types  of  thought,  or  modes  of  treating  reality  generally,  whose  mean- 
ing is  not  exhausted  in  the  statement  of  their  pragmatic  origin  ?  In  an- 
swer to  the  first  question,  Baldwin  holds  that  pragmatism  necessarily  pre- 
supposes an  environment  which  produces  the  tension  in  experience.  In 
confining  itself  to  the  thinking  principle  alone,  pragmatism  commits  the 
'  genetic  fallacy, '  because  it  has  already  depicted  the  genetic  processes  by 
which  consciousness  reaches  the  dualism  of  thinking  principle  and  reality. 
Hence  pragmatism  must  either  admit  the  reality  of  an  environment,  and 
so  entangle  itself  in  the  difficulties  of  a  representational  epistemology,  or 
it  must  find  some  guarantee  for  the  reality  of  mental  principles  not  purely 
pragmatic.  In  regard  to  the  second  question,  pragmatism  holds  that  real- 
ity grows  as  it  is  actually  discovered  ;  and  Baldwin  agrees  that  the  psychic 
movement  does  not  postulate  any  more  of  reality  than  is  given  in  the  datum, 
that  is,  the  real  subject  in  any  given  judgment  of  value  is  only  that  which, 
as  possibly  real,  already  exists  for  action.  He  holds,  however,  that 
thought  is  a  reflection  of  the  habits  of  actions,  an  organization  for  future 
safe  actions.  This  thought  is  static,  and  is  useful  precisely  because  it  is 
static.  As  the  reflection  of  all  previous  pragmatic  gains,  this  logical  reality 
is  more  real  even  than  the  concrete  thought  function.  The  third  question 
is  answered  by  showing  that  universal  and  normative  modes  of  thought 
cannot  be  adequately  justified  by  the  mere  criteria  of  concrete  experiences. 
Yet  the  pragmatist  cannot  deny  the  validity  of  these  modes,  because  of 
their  value  as  organizing  principles  of  experience.  Hence  pragmatism  is 
a  genetic  theory  to  explain  the  origin  of  the  thought  function,  not  a  logical 
theory  to  explain  its  validity.  In  the  light  of  this  criticism  the  problem  of 
philosophy  becomes  the  reconciliation  of  the  two  opposed  schemes  of  valu- 
ation :  logical  systematization  and  practical  manipulation. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

Phanomenalismus  und  Realismus.     ELSE  WENTSCHER.     Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph., 

IX,  2,  pp.  195-225. 

For  the  comprehension  and  refutation  of  Frey tag's  polemic  against 
phenomenalism  (Der  Realismus  und  das  Problem  der  Tranzenjlenz,  1902), 


No.  2.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  237 

% 

an  explication  of  the  latter' s  standpoint  is  necessary.  Phenomenalism, 
then,  as  represented  by  Erdmann,  postulates  the  real  as  unknowable  ; 
otherwise,  the  real  must  be  given  in  experience,  or  must  be  reached  by 
transcending  experience.  Nevertheless,  that  the  real  z's,  we  know,  since 
the  phenomena  of  perception  are  necessarily  and  apparently  objectively 
given  alike  to  all  ;  that  it  also  works  according  to  some  law  we  know. 
Evidently,  under  such  conditions,  a  representative  theory  of  knowledge  is 
impossible  ;  even  granting  that  the  phenomenal  might  be  a  copy  of  the 
real,  the  knowledge  of  such  a  state  would  be  unattainable.  But  the  proved 
'  synthesis  '  of  the  forms  of  the  understanding  with  the  raw  material  of  sen- 
sation obviates  even  this  remote  contingency.  Now,  against  such  a  phenom- 
enalism F.  prefers  two  main  counts  :  («)  that  phenomenalism  is  in  contradic- 
tion with  itself ;  (£)  that  it  can  never  be  reconciled  with  the  sovereignty  of 
natural  law.  In  general,  F.  merely  misinterprets  E.;  in  urging  against 
phenomenalism  that  by  postulating  the  real  as  a  'cause,'  it  has  "uncon- 
sciously become  complete  realism,"  he  has  ignored  the  fact  that  the  recog- 
nition of  a  noumenal  cause  does  not  preclude  the  unknowability  of  both 
that  cause  and  its  method  of  working.  He  himself  admits  :  ' '  Though  I 
know  that  A  causes  JB,  yet  do  I  not  know  that  A  is  like  or  unlike  B  ; 
above  all,  I  do  not  know  A  in  itself."  In  the  second  place,  although  all 
the  "natural  laws  "  be  in  their  sphere  valid,  yet  it  does  not  follow,  as  F. 
contends,  that  this  is  so  only  on  a  realistic  hypothesis.  F.  has  not  probed 
the  question.  Indeed,  as  the  quotation  above  indicates,  his  charges  re- 
coil on  his  own  head.  He  predicates  the  phenomenal  as  the  real  and  the 
knowable  ;  on  the  other  hand,  he  grants  the  subjectivity  of  our  sense-im- 
pressions, even  of  those  corresponding  to  the  Lockean  primary  qualities. 
He  demands  for  the  outer  order  an  objective  validity  and  attacks  idealism  ; 
contrariwise,  he  concedes  that  in  the  understanding  '  perception  '  becomes 
metamorphosed.  Finally,  he  it  is  whose  presuppositions  fail  to  harmonize 
with  the  validity  of  natural  laws  ;  the  transcendent  cause  of  these  causes 
removed,  nothing  is  left  for  him  save  a  theory  of  '  preestablished  har- 
mony.' ARTHUR  J.  TIETJE. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

Sur  la  valeur  des  questionnaires  en  psychologie.    TH.  RIBOT.    J.  de  Psych. , 
I,  i,  pp.  i-io. 

Ribot  distinguishes  two  forms  of  the  questionnaire  method:  (i)  The  in- 
direct method,  in  which  answers  are  asked  in  writing  from  a  large  and 
miscellaneous  body  of  persons  ;  (2)  the  direct  or  oral  method.  The  first 
method  is  almost  useless  for  psychology  because  of  the  extreme  vagueness 
and  heterogeneity  of  the  answers.  It  presupposes  the  veracity  of  respond- 
ents, a  presupposition  which  practically  can  never  be  guaranteed.  Even 
the  will  to  be  sincere  does  not  insure  the  veracity  of  the  results.  In  such 
investigations,'  questions  have  frequently  been  asked  to  which  reliable  an- 
swers were  quite  impossible.  When  questions  are  published  in  periodicals, 


238  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

those  who  answer  are  frequently  the  abnormal  and  unreliable  part  of  the 
communtiy.  The  oral  method  is  capable  of  being  applied  only  to  a  lim- 
ited number  of  subjects,  whose  habits,  education,  social  standing,  etc., 
must  be  thoroughly  known  in  order  to  insure  reliable  results.  It  is  much 
more  reliable  than  the  indirect  method,  but  it  introduces  the  personal  equa- 
tion of  the  operator.  Especially  in  dealing  with  very  suggestible  subjects, 
it  is  necessary  to  use  great  care  in  propounding  the  questions.  In  general, 
it  may  be  said  that  the  questionnaire  method  in  only  auxiliary  to  real  psy- 
chological procedure,  and  requires  much  closer  criticism  both  of  method 
and  of  evidence  than  has  been  used  heretofore. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

Les  formes  simples  de  V attention.     G.   RAGEOT.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  8, 

pp.  113-141. 

The  task  here  set  is  to  find  the  relation  between  the  affective  and  per- 
ceptive elements  which  the  author  postulates  in  attention.  The  emotional 
state  can  accompany,  but  not  cause,  that  attentive  state  which  is  a  particular 
mode  of  perception.  The  distinction  between  the  spontaneous  and  volun- 
tary types  is  merely  methodological  :  both  have  the  same  mechanism,  and 
both  are  measures  of  intelligence  in  activity.  Attention,  which  is  mere 
absorption  in  an  object,  is  efferent,  disinterested,  a  « monoideism  '  ;  where 
the  one  idea  attended  to  is  that  of  regaining  or  of  retaining  possession  of  this 
object,  the  attention  becomes  convergent  and  egoistic.  The  attention  of 
the  child  is  contemplation,  the  reflection  of  the  adult  is  action.  In  produc- 
ing the  former  state,  the  thought  of  utility  plays  no  part,  but  in  the  latter, 
thinking  is  pragmatic  and  the  standard  is  utility.  The  first  condition  of 
real  intellectual  independence  is  forgetfulness  of  self  and  of  one's  own 
organic  life.  Thus,  attention,  which  contributes  so  largely  to  intellectual 
power,  is  very  far  from  being  conditioned  by  organic  needs  and  demands. 
It  is,  in  fact,  best  studied  in  the  pure  form  in  which  it  occurs  in  play,  when 
the  personality  is  entirely  lost  sight  of.  Animals  which  play  most  are  the 
most  attentive  and  intelligent.  It  is  misleading  to  say  that  the  child, 
through  activity  of  imagination  and  attention,  creates  his  own  world  :  it  is 
rather  true  that  by  attending  fixedly  to  objects  he  identifies  himself  with 
them,  he  is  the  things  themselves.  Simple  attention  is  '  pre-ideism, '  an 
anticipatory  attitude  towards  a  perception  in  formation.  Perception  is  a 
more  complex  phenomenon,  a  synthesis  of  present  and  past  impressions. 
With  this  synthesis  comes  another  form  of  attention,  conditioned  by  the 
relation  of  memory  to  the  present  sensation.  Association  being  now 
involved,  the  emotional  element  of  attention  appears  for  the  first  time. 

ANNIE  D.  MONTGOMERY. 

L  association  mediate.     H.  PIERON.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  8,  pp.    142-150. 

In  investigating  the  existence  of  '  mediate  associations,'  negative  results 
predominate.  Yet  most  psychologists,  relying  upon  personal  experience, 


No.  2.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  239 

continue  to  postulate  such  associations.  Hamilton's  mechanical  explana- 
tion fails  to  explain  ;  Wundt  transposes  the  problem  without  solving  it ; 
Claparede  searches  and  is  unable  to  find  any  physiological  explanation. 
But  the  matter  can  be  conceived  of  psychically  and  intelligibly.  The  theo- 
retical difficulties  and  experimental  checks  are  due  to  certain  persistent 
prejudices  about  association  in  general,  and  to  the  elimination  of  conditions 
indispensible  to  the  appearance  of  the  phenomena.  In  spite  of  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  English  empiricists,  terms  associated  should  not  be  considered 
as  simple  elements,  nor  a  train  of  thought  as  a  chain:  The  latter  concep- 
tion is  rendered  inadequate  by  the  possibility  of  choice  or  suppression  of 
certain  elements  in  the  total  idea.  Actual  consciousness  tells  us  that  abso- 
lutely simple  psychic  unities  are  abstractions  ;  every  mental  phenomenon  is 
a  complex,  a  state.  Association,  instead  of  being  reducible  to  terms  of  con- 
tiguity and  resemblance,  is  a  particular  instance  of  the  general  law  of  psychic 
gravitation,  a  law  of  synthetic  affinity  (Janet)  or  of  attraction  and  inhibition 
(Paulhan).  An  inducing  idea  may  be  aroused  by  an  external  stimulus,  or  by 
another  induced  image.  The  presence  of  mediate  associations  is  frequently 
manifested  in  a  revery,  in  which  sense  impressions  are  interpreted  in  terms 
which  do  not  correspond  to  the  external  stimulus.  A  subconscious  idea  tends 
to  arouse  a  certain  psychic  element ;  but  to  the  latter  is  attracted  another  ele- 
ment, which,  being  more  interesting  than  the  first,  is  attracted  to  the  '  per- 
sonal synthesis, '  and  so  appears  alone  in  consciousness.  High  degree  of  in- 
terest and  sufficient  rapidity  of  thought-sequence  condition  this  substitution 
of  the  secondary  for  the  primary  element.  Experimental  investigators  defeat 
their  own  purpose  :  (i)  by  defining  the  terms  associated  and  so  forcing  the 
subject  to  choose  and  reflect,  and  (2)  by  trying  to  create  contiguous  lines 
of  association,  and  so  destroying  the  real  affinities  between  conscious  states. 

ANNIE  D.  MONTGOMERY. 


La  sensation  du  '  deja  vu.'     J.  GRASSET.     J.  de  Psych.,  I,  i,  pp.  17-27. 

The  phenomenon  to  be  explained  is  the  feeling  that  a  present  situation 
has  previously  been  experienced  though  it  never  actually  has  been.  There 
are  two  essential  elements  of  the  phenomenon  :  (i)  the  recognition  of  an 
image,  emotion,  or  a  psychic  state  never  experienced  ;  (2)  ignorance  of  the 
origin  of  the  impression  with  which  the  present  image  seems  identical. 
This  condition  is  attended  by  mental  confusion  amounting  frequently  to 
actual  pain.  Grasset  explains  the  phenomenon  by  supposing  that  there 
are  two  sets  of  psychic  centers  ;  the  higher,  whose  action  is  conscious  ;  and 
the  lower,  or  subconscious  centers.  These  subconscious  centers  possess 
memory  and  imagination,  and  accordingly  may  receive  impressions  from 
the  outside  and  store  them,  or  may  form  them  in  imagination.  In  either 
case,  these  subconscious  processes  may  arise  in  consciousness  and  give 
birth  to  a  feeling  of  recognition  though  the  situation  has  not  been  con- 
sciously experienced.  GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 


240  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Le  sens  du  retour.     P.  BONNIER,  Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  7,  pp.  30-50. 

Several  hypotheses  have  already  been  brought  forward  to  explain  the 
sense  of  direction  by  which  animals  are  enabled  to  return  to  a  distant 
home  :  (i)  The  return  is  accomplished  by  a  memory  of  the  route  pre- 
viously traversed.  This  fails  to  explain  the  cases  of  return  in  a  straight  line. 
(2)  Various  theories  of  magnetic  disturbance  in  the  semi-circular  canals. 
These  have  been  abandoned  since  the  experiments  of  Fabre  and  Exner. 
In  fact,  no  electrical  apparatus  can  be  discovered  in  those  organs.  (3)  An 
acute  sensitivity  to  various  qualities  of  winds  is  sometimes  held  to  explain 
the  return  of  birds.  Selection  of  favorable  winds  could  only  be  made,  if 
the  desired  direction  were  already  known.  (4)  Theory  of  Wallace  and 
Reynaud  that  the  return  is  made  by  following  in  inverse  order  the  odors 
observed  on  the  way.  This  last  hypothesis  approaches  most  nearly  the 
view  of  the  author.  According  to  this,  the  explanation  is  to  be  found  in 
the  sense  of  position  possessed  by  man  as  well  as  by  other  animals.  By 
this  sense  we  locate  the  various  parts  of  the  body,  objects  connected  with 
the  body,  and  even  distant  objects  like  the  door  of  the  room.  It  is  also 
this  sense  which  enables  us  to  remember  the  direction  of  a  building  in  a 
strange  city,  even  after  many  corners  have  been  turned.  In  man,  its  seat 
is  in  the  semi-circular  canals  ;  in  lower  animals,  the  function  is  performed 
by  various  organs,  always,  however,  by  the  impact  of  a  movable  part  upon 
a  fixed  part.  The  end-organs  thus  excited  record  upon  the  cortex  every 
movement  in  direction,  force,  and  form.  The  registering  of  a  series  of 
successive  displacements  involves  a  constant  orientation  with  the  point  of 
departure,  and  thus  makes  a  direct  return  possible.  By  frequent  repetition 
this  memory  becomes  an  hereditary  instinct,  as  in  migrating  animals,  in- 
corporated in  the  nervous  system  of  each  individual  of  the  species. 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 

De  la  controverse  en  biologie.     F.   HOUSSAY.     Rev.   de  Met.,  XI,  5,  pp. 

537-572. 

The  writer  maintains  that  the  various  controversies  in  the  field  of  biology 
are  due  not  to  differences  in  knowledge  of  facts ,  but  to  the  differences  of 
standpoint  from  which  the  facts  are  approached  and  interpreted.  Facts 
are  easily  manipulated,  and  the  same  data  are  used  in  support  of  contra- 
dictory theses.  On  none  of  the  important  points  in  biological  theory  is 
there  more  than  an  apparent  agreement.  The  '  differences  of  spirit '  are  a 
source  of  endless  conflict,  and  the  violence  and  duration  of  the  controversy 
are  proportional  to  the  generality  of  the  subject  in  question.  The  qualified 
adherence  of  embryologists  to  the  doctrine  of  epigenesis  is  an  instance  in 
point.  The  continual  controversy  between  the  men  representing  the 
'  static  '  and  dynamic  points  of  view  is  a  pertinent  illustration  of  this  same 
'difference  of  spirit.'  M.  Houssay  supports  his  thesis  by  a  rapid  survey 
of  the  history  of  biology,  in  which  the  theories  of  eminent  biologists  on  the 


No.  2.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  241 

most  controverted  points  are  briefly  outlined.  In  this  way  he  treats  the 
controversy  over  the  origin  of  life  with  its  opposed  doctrines  of  '  genesis ' 
and  'generation,'  the  problem  of  sex,  the  question  of  fixed  species,  the 
problem  of  individuality  in  biology,  and  the  controversy  over  the  opposed 
notions  of  preformation  and  epigenesis.  On  no  one  of  these  points  is  there 
universal  agreement,  though  the  same  data  are  open  to  all  investigators. 
Different  men,  working  with  the  same  material,  have  reached  wholly  differ- 
ent results,  not  only  at  the  present  day,  but  through  the  whole  history  of  the 
science.  There  is  usually  a  consensus  of  opinion  in  favor  of  a  particular 
doctrine,  as  at  present  in  favor  of  epigenesis  and  variability  of  species,  but 
there  are  wide  differences  even  among  the  avowed  supporters  of  these 
doctrines.  There  seems  to  be  no  way  to  explain  these  different  interpreta- 
tions of  the  same  data,  except  on  the  assumption  that  the  various  scientific 
constructions  correspond  to  diverse  intellectual  types  or  to  the  presupposi- 
tions that  accompany  the  adoption  of  a  particular  point  of  view. 

C.  E.  GALLOWAY. 

The  Place  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  in  the  Functional  Psychology.     WARNER 
FITE.     Psych.  Rev.,  X,  6,  pp.  633-644. 

The  question  whether  pleasure  and  pain  can  be  regarded  as  modifiers  in 
a  system  which  refers  activity  to  instinct,  leads  to  the  more  general  discus- 
sion of  their  place  in  a  functional  psychology.  Such  a  psychology  regards 
the  development  of  our  activity  as  a  process  of  modification  of  original  in- 
stincts through  interaction.  All  activity  is  primarily  impulsive.  Every 
instinct  sets  out  to  deal  with  an  object ;  an  instinct  in  the  narrower  sense 
reaches  its  goal  unhindered  ;  if  checked  by  another,  it  becomes  an  emo- 
tional reaction  whose  activity  is  confined  to  the  body  of  the  agent.  Re- 
flection is  the  cognitive  parallel  to  emotion,  which  is  conative.  According 
to  the  functional  view,  every  process  of  consciousness  begins  with  a  con- 
flict, which  is  both  emotional  and  reflective,  and  ends  with  a  coordination, 
which  is  both  voluntary  choice  and  conviction.  Adopting  the  functional 
method  of  studying  first  the  pleasures  and  pains  of  the  most  obvious  mental 
activities,  and  then  applying  this  analysis  to  all  the  other  forms  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  the  writer  concludes  that  not  only  is  conflict  a  condition  of 
consciousness,  but  it  is  specially  a  condition  of  pleasure-pain.  Pleasure  is 
succeeding,  pain  failing  in  the  process  of  resolving  a  conflict  ;  when  the 
process  ends,  there  is  no  feeling  of  either  kind.  The  conflict  itself  is  re- 
garded teleologically,  i.  e.t  as  brought  about  by  the  increasing  demands  of 
the  life  purpose  as  opposed  to  conditions  that  stand  in  the  way  of  its  reali- 
zation. To  establish  the  final  validity  of  the  functional  hypothesis,  this  ac- 
count of  conflict  must,  by  reference  to  physiological  detail,  be  shown  to  ap- 
ply also  to  the  relatively  passive  pleasures  and  pains  of  sense,  —  a  probability 
which  many  facts  clearly  suggest.  In  the  experimental  investigation  of 
pleasure-pain,  the  '  method  of  impression  '  is  scarcely  practicable.  The 
general  culture  of  the  subject  and  his  condition  just  before  the  experiment 


242  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.        [VOL.  XIII. 

are  the  significant  conditions  ;  that  a  given  affective  quality  is  inherent 
in  a  given  sensation-quality  is  merely  an  assumption.  Ethically  considered, 
the  functional  view  makes  it  impossible  to  regard  pleasure  as  an  end  to  be 
sought.  The  motive  power  of  action  is  instinct,  and  the  object  implied 
in  the  instinct  constitutes  the  end.  Pleasure  is  not  an  active  function,  but 
an  indication  that  the  object  is  being  attained  in  the  presence  of  a  diffi- 
culty. Pleasure,  since  it  exists  only  while  success  is  deferred,  is  irrecon- 
cilable with  desire  for  the  object.  ANNIE  D.  MONTGOMERY. 

The  Influence  of  Accommodation  and  Convergence  upon   the  Perception  of 
Depth.     J.  W.  BAIRD.     Am.  J.  Ps.,  XIV,  pp.  150-200. 

The  first  half  of  the  article  is  occupied  with  a  summary  of  previous 
theories  of  depth  perception  since  Leonardo  da  Vinci.  In  the  experi- 
mental investigation  of  the  problem,  it  was  found  that  accommodation  and 
convergence  do  contribute  to  the  perception  of  depth,  — at  least,  in  case 
of  near  objects.  Hering  and  Hillebrand  explain  the  perception  of  depth 
in  binocular  vision  from  the  presence  of  double-images,  and  in  monocu- 
lar vision  from  a  conscious  impulse  of  will.  Neither  explanation  is 
satisfactory.  It  is  impossible  to  see  how  double-images  can  furnish  an 
unequivocal  criterion  of  nearer  or  farther.  Nor  is  the  ocular  mech- 
anism adjusted  by  a  conscious  impulse  of  will.  Wundt's  explanation  is 
much  more  plausible.  Indeed,  the  experimental  results  cannot  be  ex- 
plained without  the  assumption  of  the  presence  and  operation  of  sensations 
of  accommodation  and  convergence.  Wundt  conceives  space-perception 
to  be  a  psychical  synthesis,  in  which  the  muscular  sensations  fuse  directly 
and  do  not  come  to  consciousness  as  sensations,  —  save  when  they  are 
extremely  intensive.  This  conception  enables  us  to  explain  the  possibility 
of  depth  estimation  even  when  we  have  no  consciousness  of  sensations  from 
the  ocular  muscles.  AUTHOR. 

ETHICS  AND  ESTHETICS. 

Psychologie  de  la  croyance  en  I '  im mortalite.     WIJNAENDTS   FRANCKEN. 
Rev.  Phil.,  XXVIII,  9,  pp.  272-282. 

This  article  discusses  the  psychological  motives  for  the  belief  in  personal 
immortality.  The  question  of  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  is  excluded.  Such  a 
belief  may  be  philosophic,  regarding  immortality  as  the  logical  consequence 
of  the  soul' s  essential  nature;  or  it  may  be  purely  religious,  regarding  it  as  the 
special  gift  of  God.  The  belief  in  God  and  that  in  immortality  have  the  same 
origin  ;  in  fact,  there  can  be  no  religion  without  the  sanction  and  support 
of  the  belief  in  a  future  life.  Both  beliefs  arise  in  large  part  from  the  de- 
sire to  see  the  imperfection  of  the  present  corrected  and  atoned  for.  But 
we  find  that  in  Buddhism,  as  originally  taught,  the  good  to  be  striven  for 
was  rather  the  annihilation  of  personality  ;  and  Confucius  taught  nothing 
of  immortality,  doubtless  because  he  wished  to  focus  the  moral  interest  of 


No.  2.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  243 

his  disciples  on  this  present  life.  Such  examples  show  that  a  strong  desire 
for  personal  survival  after  death  is  essential  for  the  origin  and  maintenance 
of  a  belief  in  immortality.  Where  this  desire  is  lacking,  the  belief  will  be 
lacking  also.  This  desire  is  but  another  form  of  the  natural  search  for 
self-preservation.  If  our  life  is  unhappy,  we  hope  for  another  which 
will  be  happy  ;  if  it  is  happy,  we  hope  that  death  will  not  end  it.  This 
hope  we  extend  to  those  dear  to  us  ;  but  the  image  of  the  future  life  will 
vary  with  the  individual,  — the  Northman's  Valhalla  is  not  the  Mohamme- 
dan's Paradise.  But  the  desire  to  live  is  not  the  sole  source  of  the  belief; 
another  source  is  the  power  of  the  imagination,  especially  as  seen  in  dreams. 
This  is  especially  operative  among  primitive  peoples,  whose  vivid  dreams 
of  the  dead  are  a  powerful  persuasive  to  such  a  belief.  By  a  contrary  path 
extreme  scepticism  may  lead  to  the  belief.  Men  regard  this  life  as  a  fleet- 
ing and  deceptive  dream  ;  religious  feelings  in  connection  with  this  thought 
arouse  the  hope  of  an  awaking  in  which  its  enigmas  shall  be  solved. 
Another  motive  is  the  connatural  appeal  of  dualism  as  a  theory  to  men  at 
large  ;  the  body  wastes  away,  but  the  soul  remains.  And  not  the  least  im- 
portant is  the  moral  motive,  the  revolt  against  the  apparent  injustice  of 
this  present  life,  and  consequent  expectation  of  future  compensation. 
Many  could  not  lead  a  thoroughly  moral  life  without  this  hope.  This 
sentiment  is  at  the  foundation  of  the  Buddhistic  doctrine  of  '  Karma.' 
Just  as  many  minds  feel  forced  to  believe  in  a  fundamental  order  in  the 
physical  world,  in  spite  of  the  multiplicity  of  phenomena  ;  so  others  are 
forced  to  believe  in  universal  moral  order,  and  not  seeing  it  realized  in  this 
world,  to  conceive  a  supersensible  world  as  a  postulate.  And  finally,  as  a 
motive  which  is  perhaps  less  weighty  in  logic,  but  of  great  moral  value, 
and  confined  to  a  small  number,  we  find  the  desire  for  moral  perfection, 
for  an  opportunity  in  a  future  life  of  closer  approach  to  the  moral  ideal. 

EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

Relativity  and  Finality  in  Ethics.     T.  C.  HALL.     Int.  J.  E.,  XIV,  2,  pp. 
150-161. 

A  need  is  universally  felt  for  authoritative  criteria  of  conduct  which 
possess  abstract  infallibility.  Though  relativity  in  other  spheres  of  knowl- 
edge is  accepted,  it  fails  to  satisfy  in  the  sphere  of  duty.  The  sense  of 
oughtness  in  the  child  is  first  awakened  by  training,  and  takes  form  in 
obedience  to  parental  commands.  Such  obedience  gives  rise  to  a  desire 
for  infallible  ethical  authority  in  the  tribe,  and  the  sense  of  being  bound  by 
unrationalized  obligation  is  the  essence  of  primitive  morality.  If  the  sense 
of  duty  be  necessary  to  human  progress,  how  discover  finality  for  it  ?  The 
social  advantages  of  symbols  of  abstract  authority  in  counteracting  selfish 
motives  are  patent;  but,  as  these  disappear,  the  sense  of  duty  must  be  culti- 
vated without  them.  Where  individual  and  group  interests  clash,  unrea- 
soned racial  impulses  must  afford  guidance.  Historically,  religion  has 
shown,  and  will  continue  to  show  to  men  the  value  of  obedience  to  duty,  as 


244  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.        [VOL.  XIII. 

experience  will  prove  what  is  useful.     This  demands  insistence  on  finality 
of  moral  obligation,  but  relativity  of  ethical  knowledge. 

FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 

The  Toleration  of  Error.     E.  RITCHIE.     Int.  J.  E.,  XIV,  2,  pp.  161-172. 

The  present  tolerant  attitude  of  educated  men  toward  ideas  believed 
erroneous  is  significant.  Present  day  leadership  is  effective  only  if  it  be 
broad  and  judicially  minded.  So,  too,  in  the  world  of  moral  ideals.  The 
consciousness  that  another's  views,  even  though  erroneous,  may  yet  do 
more  of  good  than  of  harm  has  insured  them  a  respectful  hearing.  The 
personal  point  of  view  is  emphasized,  and  it  is  admitted  that  each  has  his 
own  view  of  truth.  Such  an  open-minded  attitude  is  especially  noticeable 
towards  religion.  All  theological  dogmas  are  logically  inconclusive.  Each 
man  has  his  own  way  of  approaching  spiritual  truths.  Diversity  of  mental 
types  is  a  mark  of  progress.  That  only  has  spiritual  value  which  nourishes 
one's  inner  life,  and,  since  concrete  personality  alone  determines  value  for 
another,  we  must  not  outlaw  his  opinions  even  though  they  oppose  our  own. 
Does  such  recognition  of  subjectivity  imply  indifference  to  real  truth  ?  The 
danger  lies,  rather,  in  considering  justifiable  the  holding  of  any  opinion 
whatever.  True  toleration  regards  each  man's  view  of  reality  as  final  for 
himself,  though  his  view  be  not  equally  clear  and  the  adequacy  of  his 
philosophy  indicative  of  his  mental  and  moral  status. 

FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 

Proverbial  Morality.     R.  A.  DUFF.     Int.  J.  E.,  XIV,  2,  pp,  172-179. 

Proverbs  are  the  first  expressions  of  reflective  morality.  They  are  gen- 
eralizations of  typical  instances,  hold  universal  sway,  and  for  many  men 
form  a  supreme  moral  code.  Proverbial  literature  consists  chiefly  of  criti- 
cal and  judicial  maxims  of  caution  and  restraint.  These  are  not  general 
truths,  but  by  metaphors  embody  general  ideas  in  particular  cases.  Their 
only  proof  is  the  image  used,  and,  since  their  application  is  particular, 
maxims  may  be  inconsistent  or  antithetical,  the  difference  of  metaphor 
hiding  the  opposition.  Maxims  reflect  the  many-sidedness  of  life  with  its 
contradictions  and  perplexities.  They  have  aided  in  developing  the  moral 
consciousness  by  keeping  men's  thoughts  and  volitions  steady,  and,  as 
stimuli  to  thought,  they  have  had  great  value. 

FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 

Les  principes  de  la  morale  positiviste  et  la  conscience  contemporaine.     G. 
BELOT.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  12,  pp.  561-591. 

The  moral  philosophy  of  A.  Comte,  although  less  well-known  than  the 
scientific,  was  regarded  by  him  as  the  central  part  of  his  system.  Its  con- 
tinued importance  is  due  both  to  the  slow  development  of  morality,  and  to 
Comte' s  own  moral  character.  His  very  ignorance  of  critical  problems  is 


No.  2.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  245 

here  an  advantage  ;  for  ethics,  unlike  science,  needs  no  basis  other  than 
the  human  will.  Hence,  by  ignoring  metaphysical  questions,  he  escapes 
many  errors  common  to  moral  philosophies.  Further,  Comte's  aversion 
to  the  scientific  method  is  justifiable  in  ethics,  where  the  task  is  to  organize 
action  rather  than  to  explain  the  given.  The  supremacy  of  humanity 
reconciles  individual  freedom  and  subjection  to  law  ;  for  the  individual  at- 
tains freedom  only  in  so  far  as  he  incorporates  himself  with  humanity  by 
voluntarily  submitting  to  law.  Altruism  as  a  moral  law  can  be  justified 
only  by  assuming  it  to  be  innate  in  man.  The  family,  division  of  labor, 
and  intellectual  progress,  however,  have  aided  its  historical  development. 
The  religion  of  humanity  is  to  complete  the  subordination  of  egoism,  by 
investing  altruism  with  the  dignity  and  authority  of  its  ceremonial.  In  the 
substitution  of  the  idea  of  universal  duty  for  that  of  individual  rights, 
Comte  has  not  shown  himself  in  sympathy  with  contemporary  thought. 
The  individual,  however,  is  not  entirely  sacrificed  to  the  group.  His  in- 
corporation in  a  system  is  really  for  the  sake  of  individual  development. 
Since  the  discipline  thus  involved  is  voluntarily  submitted  to,  responsibility 
is  made  the  basis  of  morality.  Comte  attacked  only  the  absolute  right  of 
the  individual.  •  All  state  control  is  to  rest  on  universal  consent,  and  to  fol- 
low moral  and  intellectual  regeneration.  While  Comte's  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish between  individual  and  social  morality  is,  perhaps,  opposed  to 
current  ethical  theory,  it  is  his  religious  system  which  is  most  alien  to 
modern  thought,  owing  to  the  artificiality  and  arbitrariness  of  its  cere- 
monial. But  if  neither  his  political,  moral,  nor  religious  system  can  be  ac- 
cepted by  modern  thought,  they  can  be  of  the  utmost  service  to  it,  supple- 
menting its  critical  spirit  by  their  dogmatism,  and  teaching  a  greater 
devotion  to  the  spiritual  life.  GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 


NOTICES   OF   NEW   BOOKS. 

Studien  zur    Werttheorie.     Von  ROBERT   EISLER.     Leipzig,  Verlag  von 
Duncker  &  Humblot,  1902. — pp.  xii,  112. 

A  study  of  the  history  and  of  the  philosophy  of  art  led  the  author  to  take 
up  the  problem  of  the  general  theory  of  value  ;  and  the  result  of  his  reflec- 
tion is  to  be  found  in  this  brochure,  which  contains  five  essays  :  I,  The 
Problem  of  a  Law  of  Motivation  ;  II,  Formal  Analysis  of  the  Historical 
Process  and  Introduction  of  the  Concept  of  Value  ;  III,  Value  as  a  Quanti- 
tative Concept.  Measurement  of  Values  ;  IV,  The  Psychological  Correlates 
of  the  Historical  Process  ;  and  V,  The  Theory  of  the  Judgment  of  Value. 
The  solution  of  the  general  problem  involved  in  the  theory  of  value  is  found 
in  biological  and  not  in  psychological  terms.  Neither  the  common  sense 
view  that  value  is  a  quality  belonging  objectively  to  external  things,  nor  the 
psychological  view  that  it  is  the  pleasingness  or  the  desiredness  of  things 
is  accepted  as  satisfactory.  Although  the  author  uses  such  expressions  as 
'  voluntative  '  and  '  acts  of  will'  in  stating  his  doctrine,  these  terms  are 
used  ' '  without  any  reference  to  the  traditional  psychological  content  of 
these  concepts.  What  is  meant  is  always  only  the  process  in  its  biological 
significance."  A  voluntative  reaction  is  merely  the  change  that  takes 
place  in  a  '  biological  individuality, '  when  reacting  upon  an  environment. 
Thus  if,  upon  the  approach  of  a  heated  object,  I  withdraw  my  hand,  this 
withdrawal  is  a  '  voluntative  reaction,'  even  though  it  takes  place  without 
any  intervention  of  consciousness.  The  fundamental  thesis  that  is  pro- 
pounded is  found  in  the  following  sentence  :  "  We  say  that  a  definite  com- 
plex of  phenomena  is  evaluated  when  its  realization  appears  as  dependent 
upon  the  '  voluntative  '  action  of  a  biological  factor  ;  and  we  ascribe  to  it 
a  positive  value  when  its  realization  appears  as  brought  about  by  the 
activity  of  the  subject  in  question,  a  negative  value  when  its  realization 
appears  as  voluntatively  inhibited"  (pp.  23-24).  It  should  follow  that  if, 
while  standing  upon  the  edge  of  a  precipice,  I  am  startled  by  a  sudden 
noise  and  topple  over,  the  fall  has  a  positive  value  as  compared  with  the 
experience  of  hearing  the  noise.  This  theory  is  beautifully  simple  and 
removes  all  possibility  of  difficult  complications,  only  what  is  meant  by 
value  does  not  seem  to  correspond  in  the  least  with  what  is  usually  meant 
by  that  term. 

The  book,  however,  is  not  without  its  value  even  to  one  who  declines  to 
consider  his  biological  reaction  upon  it  as  definitive.  For  instance,  the 
fourth  essay  is  a  very  interesting  and  in  many  respects  convincing  discus- 
sion of  an  important  psychological  question,  that  of  the  will. 

It  may  be  a  lamentable  weakness  in  the  reviewer's  make-up,  but  he 
must  confess  that  the  introduction  of  mathematical  formulae  into  a  discus- 

246 


NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  247 

sion  where  no  mathematical  operation  is  performed  that  facilitates  and 
abbreviates  the  task  of  understanding  the  facts,  has  as  its  '  psychological 
correlate '  the  sense  of  extreme  weariness. 

EVANDER  BRADLEY  MCGILVARY.  • 
CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

The  Possibility  of  a  Science  of  Casuistry.     By    ERNEST   NORTHCROFT 
MERRINGTON.     Sidney,  Angus  and  Robertson,  1902. — p.  58. 

The  title  of  this  little  volume  indicates  clearly  the  question  which  the 
author  discusses.  Casuistry  is  recognized  as  "  a  neglected  branch  of  moral 
study  "  (Preface),  and  it  would  seem  therefore  idle  to  revive  it  only  to  show 
that  it  has  no  place  in  the  land  of  the  living,  but  this  is  what  the  author 
does.  Fortunately,  however,  he  gives  it  only  fifty-eight  pages  of  a  re- 
newed life,  which  is  all  spent  in  philosophical  court.  The  arguments  in 
favor  of  giving  it  a  new  lease  of  life  are  heard,  but  then  the  counsel  for  the 
plaintiff  brings  forth  Objections  to  the  Presupposition  of  such  a  Science, 
Objections  to  the  Claims  of  Casuistry  to  Scientific  Method,  and  Objections 
to  the  Practicability  of  such  a  Science.  The  gist  of  these  arguments  can 
be  got  from  the  following  quotation  :  "  It  is  just  because  man  is  a  free, 
aspiring,  and  self-conscious  agent  that  a  moral  science  is  needed.  There- 
fore to  bind  his  moral  and  spiritual  life  to  a  mechanical  system  of  dead 
rules  is  to  annul  his  high  vocation  and  unspeakable  glory.  It  is  equivalent 
to  degrading  him  to  the  level  of  a  non-moral  being,  and  therefore  it  dis- 
penses with  the  necessity  for  a  moral  science.  Thus  even  the  method  of 
Casuistry  involves  self-contradiction"  (p.  47).  Finally  the  defendant  is 
condemned  to  a  second  death,  and  the  reader  of  the  booklet  is  shown  "  the 
more  excellent  way."  "The  best  loyalty,  the  best  devotion,  the  truest 
service  is  that  prompted  by  a  loving  heart. ' '  Love  to  God  and  love  to 
man  "cannot  be  separated  in  a  truly  balanced  life.  In  Christianity  as 
taught  by  its  Founder,  and  expounded  by  the  Apostle  of  Love,  and  the 
Author  of  the  Chapter  on  Love  in  the  First  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians,  the 
union  of  Morality  and  Religion  is  perfectly  accomplished,  and  in  Love 
absolute  harmony  is  reached  "  (p.  57). 

EVANDER  BRADLEY  MCGILVARY. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

Principles    of    Western   Civilization.     By  BENJAMIN   KIDD.     New  York, 
The  Macmillan  Company,  1902. — pp.  vi,  538. 

As  Mr.  Kidd  looks  upon  himself  as  the  champion,  and  almost  the 
pioneer  of  a  new  political  order,  he  has  an  unreserved  enthusiasm  for  the 
era  which  is  about  to  dawn,  and  a  criticism,  almost  equally  unreserved,  of 
the  views  which  have  hitherto  prevailed.  "  Systems  of  theory  that  have 
nourished  the  intellectual  life  of  the  world  for  centuries  have  become 
in  large  part  obsolete.  They  may  retain  for  a  space  the  outward  appear- 
ance of  authority.  But  the  foundations  upon  which  they  rested  have 
been  bodily  undermined.  It  is  only  a  question  of  time  till  the  ruin  which 


248  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

has  overtaken  them  will  have  become  a  commonplace  of  Western  Civili- 
zation "  (p.  13  ;  for  similar  utterances  see  pp.  82  and  140). 

Relying  upon  the  "  evolutionary  hypothesis,"  and  accepting  in  the  main 
tKe  views  of  Weismann  (pp.  31-67),  Mr.  Kidd  concludes  that  the  principle 
of  evolution  is  "efficiency  in  the  future  "  (p.  53),  or  "  projected  efficiency  " 
(p.  65).  "  In  the  struggle,  as  we  now  begin  to  see  it,  the  interests  of  the 
individual  and  the  present  alike  are  presented  as  overlaid  by  the  interests 
of  a  majority  which  is  always  in  the  future  "  (p.  53).  Having  accepted, 
or  rather  formulated,  this  principle,  Mr.  Kidd  applies  it  directly  to  society 
as  a  political  ideal.  Accordingly,  a  survey  of  political  history  (Chaps.  VII- 
IX)  seems  to  him  to  prove  that,  "  in  the  struggle  the  winning  conditions 
are  those  of  a  people  who  already  most  efficiently  bear  on  their  shoulders 
in  the  present  the  burden  of  the  principles  with  which  the  meaning  of  a 
process  infinite  in  the  future  is  identified  "  (p.  345)  ;  and,  "  in  the  develop- 
ment in  progress  under  our  eyes  in  Western  history,  we  are  regarding  the 
main  sequence  of  events  along  which  the  meaning  of  the  cosmic  process 
in  human  history  is  descending  towards  the  future  "  (p.  398). 

The  very  vagueness,  as  it  seems  to  me,  with  which  Mr.  Kidd  uses  such 
words  as  "process,"  "  development,"  "the  future,"  etc.,  (notice  the  phrase 
"the  process  which  is  in  progress  in  the  evolution  of  society,"  p.  146,  and 
the  marvellous  sentence  quoted  above  from  p.  398),  makes  an  appeal  to 
the  imagination.  Just  now  it  is  a  very  popular  belief  that  we  are  all 
"travelling  upward  to  Zion,"  and  that  somehow  great  things  are  in  store 
for  the  race.  On  this  popular  idea,  indeed,  Mr.  Kidd,  I  think,  leans  for 
support,  and  at  the  outset  it  is  necessary  to  examine  into  its  value. 

The  power  of  self-criticism  (regarded  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  Descartes, 
Kant,  and  indeed  all  philosophers,  as  belonging  to  the  very  nature  of  mind) 
carries  with  it  the  power  of  enlargement  or  expansion  of  mind.  Mr.  Kidd 
thinks  that  this  conception  of  enlargment  is  due  to  the  discovery  of  evolu- 
tion ;  but  it  is  in  fact  as  old,  or  almost  as  old,  as  philosophy,  and  was  even 
declared  by  Plato  to  make  science  and  philosophy  possible. 

When  this  radical  fact  of  self-criticism  is  expressed  (inadequately,  I  be- 
lieve) in  terms  of  time,  there  arises  the  doctrine,  attributed  by  Mr.  Kidd 
to  evolution,  that  the  present  ought  never  to  be  ascendant  but  always 
subordinate  to  the  future.  Not  the  truth,  but  only  the  inadequate  expres- 
sion of  it,  comes  under  scrutiny  here. 

The  'future,'  strictly  taken,  is  necessarily  future.  It  is  not  Heaven, 
since  in  course  of  time  Heaven  becomes  present.  The  future  is  Heaven 
minus  all  but  the  time  factor  ;  hence,  to  realize  the  future,  z.  <?.,  to  make 
the  future  a  present  reality,  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  The  future,  strictly 
considered,  is  not  therefore  a  conceivable  ideal,  and  gets  a  secondary  value 
by  the  presence  of  elements  illogically  thought  into  it. 

It  would  seem  as  if  Mr.  Kidd  were  himself  aware  of  the  abstract  char- 
acter of  the  merely  future,  and  therefore  speaks  of  ' '  the  future  and  the 
universal  "  in  contrast  with  "  the  individual  and  the  present"  (pp.  58-59), 


No.  2.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  249 

and  identifies  the  future  with  the  "interests  of  the  majority"  (p.  65). 
But  if  mere  length  of  time  constitutes  universality,  the  past  has  equal 
claims  to  universality  with  the  future,  and  as  to  a  "majority,"  it  is  clear 
that  an  ideal  is  not  a  mathematical  quantity.  Whereas,  if  we  are  to  dis- 
cuss what  is  meant  by  "  interests  "  in  the  phrase  "  interests  of  the  major- 
ity," we  set  aside  the  contrast  of  present  and  future,  and  are  "transported 
back"  to  the  " pre-scientific  epoch  "  in  which  philosophers  inquired  into 
the  good  of  man  as  man.  But  to  open  up  such  an  inquiry  is  to  set  aside 
all  the  principles  regarded  by  Mr.  Kidd  as  characteristic  of  "Western 
Civilization." 

Mr.  Kidd,  in  his  brief  review  of  the  political  theories  of  English  philoso- 
phers, feels  "profound  surprise  "as  he  reads  in  Burke  the  remark  that 
"  the  State  ought  not  to  be  considered  as  nothing  better  than  a  partnership 
agreement  in  a  trade  of  pepper  and  coffee,  calico  or  tobacco,  or  some 
other  such  low  concern.  .  .  .  It  is  a  partnership  in  all  science,  a  partner- 
ship in  all  art,  a  partnership  in  every  virtue  and  perfection."  Burke  be- 
longs to  the  "  prescientific  epoch,"  it  is  true  ;  but  seems  to  be  ranked  by 
Mr.  Kidd  as  an  exception.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  parallel  Burke' s  view 
from  Plato,  who  thought  that  in  discussing  the  state  he  was  discussing 
justice,  or  from  Aristotle,  who  thought  that  the  best  citizens  were  partners 
in  all  science,  art,  statecraft,  and  wisdom,  or  from  Hegel,  the  Burke  of 
of  Germany,  who  subordinates  trade  and  commerce  to  the  higher  inter- 
ests of  the  citizens.  Hence  it  is  open  to  us  still  to  think  the  true  prophets 
in  political  theory  to  be  those  who,  like  all  the  greatest  thinkers,  look  not 
into  the  future  or  into  the  past,  but  down  to  the  bottom  of  what  is  before 
them.  S.  W.  DYDE. 

QUEEN'S  UNIVERSITY, 
KINGSTON,  Canada. 

Das  Problem  der  Willensfreiheit  in  der  neuesten  deutschen  Philosophie. 
Von  LEO  MUFFELMANN.  Leipzig,  Verlag  von  Johann  Ambrosius  Barth, 
1902.  — pp.  115. 

The  reader  will  find  this  book  a  rather  characteristic  product  of  German 
scholarship.  As  the  title  indicates,  it  contains  a  summary  account  of  the 
views  of  modern  German  thinkers  concerning  the  problem  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will.  It  also  offers  a  statement  of  the  questions  at  issue,  a  brief  re- 
view of  the  main  positions  taken  in  the  history  of  thought,  and  some  critical 
discussion  intended  to  define  the  writer's  own  attitude. 

Dr.  Miiffelmann  contends  that  the  problem  is  not  of  such  fundamental 
importance  as  has  often  been  represented,  and  that  the  possibility  of  ethical 
life  and  thought  cannot  be  made  dependent  upon  it.  He  denies  the  state- 
ment of  Mach  that  "the  problem  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  a  complete 
touchstone  of  one's  total  conception  and  view  of  the  world,"  and  that  of 
Du  Bois-Reymond  that  "the  stages  of  the  development  of  human  think- 
ing are  clearly  mirrored  in  the  treatment  of  the  problem  of  freedom."  In 


250  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

support  of  this  contention,  he  urges  that  we  often  find  the  same  general 
views  of  the  world  allied  with  different  solutions  of  the  problem  of  freedom, 
that  some  philosophers  of  high  rank  have  only  touched  this  question  in 
passing,  while  in  the  systems  of  many  thinkers  it  plays  no  role  whatever. 
Undoubtedly  there  is  a  certain  truth  in  this  view,  but  one  might  freely  admit 
the  propositions  offered  in  support  of  it  without  accepting  the  conclusion. 
A  neglect  of  the  problem  might  very  well  be  otherwise  explained,  as  e.  g., 
by  the  special  view-points  taken  by  different  thinkers,  or  even  by  the  ad- 
mitted imperfections  of  those  systems  in  which  a  discussion  of  this  problem 
finds  no  place. 

The  brief  historical  review  extends  from  the  period  of  Greek  philosophy, 
in  which  the  problem  of  freedom  ' '  did  not  attain  to  any  real  significance, ' ' 
to  thinkers  like  Hegel,  Herbart,  and  Schopenhauer.  Proceeding  with  later 
German  philosophy,  the  author  first  presents  Indeterminism.  Lotze  is 
naturally  made  the  great  representative  of  this  view,  and  with  Lotze  his 
disciple  Hugo  Sommer.  Considerable  attention  is  also  given  to  the  detailed 
exposition  of  indeterminism  very  recently  given  in  Wentscher's  Ethik, 
(1902).  The  next  section  is  devoted  to  "Intelligible  Freedom."  Kuno 
Fischer's  interpretation  of  freedom  is  placed  here,  although  it  is  acknowl- 
edged that  he  tends  strongly  to  determinism.  The  author  finds  not  a  little 
difficulty  in  defining  the  limits  of  Fischer's  deterministic  and  indeterministic 
thought,  but  concludes  that  it  is  to  be  assumed  from  his  whole  conduct  of 
the  discussion  that  he  places  freedom  in  a  "  non-temporal  choice  of  char- 
acter." Other  representatives  of  intelligible  freedom  are  Eucken  and 
certain  disciples  of  Schopenhauer,  Lamezan,  Mainlander,  and  Bahnsen. 
Succeeding  sections  deal  with  "Indeterminism  in  Catholic  Philosophy," 
"Agnostic  Indeterminism,"  and  "Indeterminism  in  Penal  Law  and  The- 
ology." 

Only  five  or  six  pages  are  devoted  to  fatalism,  and  the  only  names  which 
appear  in  the  text  are  those  of  Haeckel,  Paul  Ree  the  positivist,  and  Nietz- 
sche. A  footnote  points  out  what  every  student  of  Nietzsche's  works  must 
have  felt,  viz  :  that  at  different  periods  he  took  varied  and  even  opposite 
positions  on  this  question. 

From  the  long  list  of  writers  who  take  in  common  a  deterministic  view, 
but  among  whom  there  are  still  wide  differences  in  the  conception  and 
statement  of  the  problem,  the  author  selects  among  others,  Sigwart,  Wundt, 
Hartmann,  Paulsen,  Lipps,  Simmel,  Ktilpe,  Ziehen,  Riehl,  Windelband, 
Adickes,  and  Natorp.  In  the  case  of  Sigwart  and  Wundt,  Dr.  Miiffelmann 
finds  an  "indeterministic  residuum"  which  forbids  one  to  class  them  with 
the  pure  determmists.  He  therefore  gives  them  the  apparently  contradic- 
tory title  of  "indeterministic  determinists." 

The  author's  own  view  is  deterministic.  The  principal  part  of  his  defence 
of  the  theory  is  found  in  the  section  devoted  to  indeterminism,  where  he 
subjects  to  brief  but  detailed  criticism  the  arguments  of  Lotze,  Sommer,  and 
Wentscher.  The  constructive  part  of  the  work  would  have  gained  in  force, 


No.  2.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  251 

if  it  had  been  given  an  independent  place.  The  chief  service  of  the  book 
will  be  found  in  the  material  which  it  offers,  both  in  the  expositions  and 
references,  to  students  who  desire  an  orientation  in  German  thought  on  this 
much-debated  problem.  W.  G.  EVERETT. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY. 

The  Moral  System  of  Shakespeare  :  A  Popular  Illustration  of  Fiction  as 
the  Experimental  Side  of  Philosophy.  By  RICHARD  G.  MOULTON.  New 
York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1903.  —  pp.  vi,  381. 

In  Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic  Artist,  Professor  Moulton  made  one  of  the 
most  noteworthy  contributions  to  Shakespearian  criticism  of  this  generation. 
The  principles  there  stated  and  illustrated  he  now  applies  in  his  most  recent 
work  to  the  interpretation  of  certain  problems  of  the  moral  life  as  repre- 
sented in  Shakespeare's  plays.  The  title  he  has  chosen,  "  is  not  intended 
to  suggest  that  the  man  Shakespeare  had  formed  in  his  mind  a  certain  sys- 
tem of  morals,  which  he  proceeded  to  put  into  his  plays."  It  concerns 
itself  in  no  way  with  the  opinions  of  the  dramatist  on  ethical  problems,  if 
he  had  any  such  opinions,  but  confines  itself  exclusively  to  the  life  that  he 
saw  and  described.  What  theories  can  we  draw  from  the  data  which  he 
supplies  ?  is  the  only  question  that  is  anywhere  raised.  That  these  data  are 
of  unrivalled  value,  that  the  examination  of  them  affords  us  a  well-nigh 
infallible  means  of  testing  our  own  conceptions  of  human  nature,  is  the  fun- 
damental conviction  on  which  the  book  is  based.  "If  any  student," 
writes  Professor  Moulton,  "has  a  system  of  psychology  and  ethics  which 
will  not  bear  confronting  with  the  life  revealed  by  Shakespeare,  it  might 
be  well  for  him  to  doubt  whether  his  system  may  not  be  one-sided,  rather 
than  that  the  insight  of  Shakespeare  should  be  antiquated. ' '  Unfortunately 
this  unassailable  contention  is  followed  by  the  untenable  assertion  that  fic- 
tion stands  in  the  same  relation  to  such  disciplines  as  history  and  ethics  as 
does  experimental  to  merely  observational  science.  Obviously  the  forma- 
tion of  the  hypothesis  which  leads  up  to  the  experiment  is  here  confounded 
with  the  reading  off  of  the  results  of  the  experiment.  However,  little  use 
is  made  of  this  conception  in  the  course  of  the  work,  and  none  of  the 
author's  conclusions  depend  for  their  validity  upon  its  acceptance. 

Out  of  the  broad  field  open  to  the  explorer  two  problems  have  been 
selected,  the  discussion  of  which  occupies  the  larger,  and,  for  the  student 
of  philosophy,  the  more  interesting  portion  of  the  book.  They  are  :  the 
conditions  favoring  and  hindering  the  self-expression  of  character,  and  the 
relation  between  character  and  destiny.  Under  the  former  topic  are  dis- 
cussed the  influence  upon  character  of  our  own  past  volitions,  of  heredity, 
of  circumstances,  and  of  the  supernatural  elements  in  the  plays.  The 
' '  momentum  of  character ' '  is  exhibited  by  an  analysis  of  the  career  of 
Macbeth  ;  and,  in  this  analysis,  originality,  depth  of  insight,  and  power 
to  combine  scattered  data  unite  to  form  a  masterpiece.  The  study  of  in- 
heritance, on  the  other  hand,  is  sketchy  and  imperfect  ;  the  broader 


252  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

problem  of  the  place  of  congenital  endowment,  or  '  nature,'  in  its  relation 
to  '  nurture '  is  completely  ignored,  although  Shakespeare  supplies  interest- 
ing material  for  its  study  ;  and  the  only  thorough  inquiry  into  the  power 
of  circumstances  to  mould  character  is  confined  to  the  special  question  of 
the  influence  upon  personality  of  the  supernatural  beings  in  the  dramas. 

The  study  of  the  relation  between  character  and  destiny  is  conducted  by 
means  of  an  interesting  and  valuable  analysis  of  plot.  Professor  Moulton 
exhibits  the  workings  of  retributive  justice  as  they  appear  in  Henry  VI.  and 
Richard  III. ;  he  retells  and  interprets  the  story  of  wrong  and  suffering  fol- 
lowed by  restoration  that  forms  the  theme  of  Cymbeline  and  The  Winter' s 
Tale  ;  he  shows  how  in  Henry  VIII.  "  outward  "  failure  is  compensated 
for  by  a  gain  in  nobility  of  soul ;  finally,  in  a  careful  analysis  of  Romeo  and 
Juliet  and  of  certain  portions  of  King  Lear,  he  answers  the  question  of 
Eliphaz  the  Temanite  :  "Whoever  perished  being  innocent?  Or  where 
were  the  upright  cut  off  ?' ' 

Besides  the  discussion  of  the  above-named  topics,  the  book  contains 
many  matters  of  less  strictly  philosophical  interest  upon  which  it  would  be  a 
pleasure  to  dwell.  In  the  controversial  field  of  Shakespearian  criticism  no 
two  students  will  agree  at  every  point  in  their  interpretation  of  a  long  series 
of  characters.  But  Professor  Moulton  possesses  so  happy  a  combination  of 
originality  and  freedom  from  the  trammels  of  convention,  keenness  of 
vision  and  sanity  of  judgment,  that  the  majority  of  his  analyses  seem  des- 
tined to  prove  permanently  valuable  contributions  to  our  knowledge  of 
Shakespeare's  world.  FRANK  CHAPMAN  SHARP. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN. 

Nietzsche's  Erkenntnistheorie  und  Metaphysik :  Darstellung  und  Kritik. 
Von  RUDOLF  EISLER.     Leipzig,  Hermann  Haacke,  1902. — pp.  iv,  118. 

In  spite  of  the  number  of  monographs  concerning  Nietzsche,  none  of 
those  heretofore  published  is  devoted  particularly  to  his  epistemology  and 
metaphysics.  Dr.  Eisler's  pamphlet,  therefore,  fills  a  place  unoccupied 
by  any  of  its  predecessors,  and  is  additional  evidence  of  the  increasing 
attention  that  is  being  paid  to  Nietzsche  by  serious  students  of  philosophy. 
Dr.  Eisler  finds  much  in  Nietzsche's  views  that  is  akin  to  certain  contempo- 
rary writers,  especially  E.  Mach  and  Wundt.  The  plan  of  his  book  em- 
braces both  exposition  and  criticism,  the  latter  of  which  often  takes  the 
form  of  a  comparison  with  Dr.  Eisler's  own  views.  The  entire  discussion 
is  written  with  clearness  and  impartiality,  and,  while  there  is  little  or  noth- 
ing absolutely  new  in  the  interpretation  of  Nietzsche,  the  abundance  of  the 
details  and  the  care  with  which  they  are  set  forth  in  systematic  form  render 
the  monograph  one  of  the  best  that  has  yet  appeared  concerning  this 
much  praised  and  much  maligned  writer. 

GRACE  NEIL  DOLSON. 

WELLS  COLLEGE. 


No.  2.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  .      253 

L!  idee  cT evolution  dans  la  nature  et  r histoire.     Par  GASTON  RICHARD. 

Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1903.  —  pp.  iv,  406. 

This  work  gained  for  its  author  the  Crouzet  prize,  awarded  by  the  Acad- 
emy of  Moral  and  Political  Science.  As  its  title  indicates,  its  subject  is  a 
large  one,  and  it  is  dealt  with  seriously  and  at  considerable  length.  The 
general  thesis  it  maintains  is  that  evolution  should  be  regarded,  not  as  a 
universal  law  of  the  objective  universe,  but  as  a  regulative  concept  which 
finds  its  place  in  the  genetic  study  of  natural  processes.  With  this  notion  of 
evolution,  however,  the  author  finds  the  prevailing  evolutionary  philos- 
ophy of  the  present  day,  and  especially  that  of  Herbert  Spencer,  to  be  at 
variance.  The  "Synthetic  Philosophy"  he  regards  as  the  modern  rep- 
resentative of  the  pre-Kantian  speculation  which  led  to  a  purely  mathe- 
matical conception  of  reality,  and  of  which  Spinozism  is  the  extreme  and 
typical  example.  In  all  such  philosophies,  he  claims,  the  method  must  be 
deductive,  and  the  outcome  a  merely  abstract  knowledge.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  legitimate  employment  of  the  idea  of  evolution  is  to  be  found  in 
its  application  to  inductive  science,  which  deals  with  concrete  realities. 
Even  here  the  dominant  conception  is  not  that  of  evolution  as  a  mere 
series  of  metamorphoses,  but  that  of  a  cosmos,  implying  consciousness  or 
thought  as  the  subjective  aspect  of  the  life  of  the  universe.  To  reach  this 
conclusion,  a  critical  examination  is  made  of  the  idea  of  evolution  as  re- 
lated to  biology,  psychology,  and  sociology.  The  philosophical  position  of 
the  author  is  that  of  an  idealist,  and  the  trend  of  the  work  is  strongly  op- 
posed to  a  purely  mechanical  explanation  of  nature. 

Saggi  per  la  storia  del  la  morale  utilitaria.     /.  La  Morale  di  T.  Hobbes. 

Da  RODOLFO  MONDOLFO.    Verona  e  Padua,  Fratelli  Drucker,  1903. — 

pp.  275. 

There  are  few  works  that  would  be  more  warmly  welcomed  by  students 
of  ethical  science  than  an  adequate  and  comprehensive  exposition  of  Hob- 
bes's  moral  and  political  philosophy.  The  system  of  this,  in  some  respects, 
most  typically  English  of  speculative  thinkers,  has  received  but  scanty 
attention  at  the  hands  of  his  fellow  countrymen.  We  can,  therefore,  only 
receive  gratefully  the  monographs  relating  to  him  which  appear  from  time 
to  time  in  France,  Germany,  and  Italy,  though  they  but  to  a  limited  extent 
supply  what  is  needed.  The  book  before  us  covers  somewhat  the  same 
ground  as  that  of  Signer  Tarantino,  noticed  some  time  ago  in  this  REVIEW. 
While  the  latter  work,  however,  was  mainly  explanatory,  that  of  Signer 
Mondolfo  is  more  directly  critical.  His  contention  is  that  Hobbism  con- 
tains within  itself  such  inconsistencies  as,  when  developed,  render  the  system 
self-contradictory.  He  points  out  the  existence  of  two  imperfectly  reconciled 
factors  in  Hobbes' s  thought,  the  ethical  and  the  political  ;  wherever  the  first 
emerges,  it  is  admitted  that  morality,  or,  in  Hobbes' s  language,  'natural 
law, '  springs  from  human  reason,  and  has  an  objective  and  permanent  value. 
When  the  second  predominates,  there  is  a  denial  of  the  claim  of  reason  to 


254  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

be  the  source  of  morality,  which  emanates  from  the  '  sovereign  power  of  the 
state.'  Signer  Mondolfo  also  finds  in  Hobbes  a  shifting  of  the  conception 
of  the  Summum  Bonum  from  pleasure  as  the  progressive  satisfaction  of 
desires,  to  the  mere  conservation  of  life  ;  the  latter  being  all  that  remains  to 
the  individual  under  the  sway  of  such  an  absolutism  as  Hobbes  claims  to 
be  essential  to  organized  society.  The  author  seems  to  attribute  Hobbes' s 
restriction  of  the  moral  consciousness,  and  denial  of  personal  freedom,  to 
the  practical  interests  and  political  ends  which  he  had  in  view  in  writing  the 
Leviathan  and  his  other  works  ;  but  it  is  probable  that  his  politics  were  as 
much  influenced  by  his  speculative  theory  as  the  latter  was  by  the  former, 
both,  indeed,  being  due  to  the  character  of  his  genius  as  affected  by  the 
peculiar  conditions  of  the  time.  As  a  system  of  morality,  Hobbism  as  a 
whole  has  little  permanent  value,  its  psychological  foundation  being  obvi- 
ously weak  ;  but,  in  spite  of  all  crudities  and  verbal  inconsistencies,  there 
is  a  substratum  of  truth  in  his  philosophy  of  the  state  and  his  conception 
of  law,  and  to  disengage  and  expound  this  would  perhaps  be  more  useful 
than  any  merely  destructive  criticism  can  be.  E.  RITCHIE. 

Psychology  and  Common  Life.      By   FRANK  SARGENT  HOFFMAN.     New 
York,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  vi,  286. 

The  preface  of  this  work  tells  us  that  the  author  intends  "to  select  the 
most  important  facts  from  the  great  mass  of  material  now  accumulated  by 
students  of  psychical  research. ' '  What  the  reader  finds,  as  he  looks  at  the 
table  of  contents,  are  three  chapters  on  mind  and  body,  attention,  and  mem- 
ory respectively,  and  seven  on  the  abnormal  and  mysterious  phases  of  hal- 
lucinations, sleep,  hypnotism,  mind  and  disease,  telepathy,  and  the  second- 
ary self. 

At  its  best,  this  volume  is  an  inadequate  restatement  of  material  gathered 
from  sources  that,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  are  at  least  as  accessible  to  the  general 
reader  as  this  book  itself,  and  for  the  most  part  the  selections  are  not  well 
made  and  often  are  apparently  not  understood  by  the  writer.  The  stand- 
point suggests  phrenology  and  the  faculty  psychology,  with  an  occasional 
refreshing  infusion  of  common  sense.  The  first  chapter  on  body  and  mind 
is  particularly  full  of  misstatements  and  half  truths.  Much  of  the  material 
bears  internal  evidence  of  having  been  garbled  from  the  Sunday  papers. 
Space  forbids  the  citation  of  many  misstatements.  The  mention  of  Goltz 
among  those  who  would  place  the  '  concept  centers  '  in  the  frontal  lobes, 
and  the  statement  that  cerebral  lesions  are  due  to  the  fact  that  the  arteries 
of  the  brain,  unlike  those  of  other  parts  of  the  body,  do  not  connect  at  their 
extremities,  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  general  tenor  of  the  chapter. 

The  chapters  on  attention  and  memory  reach  some  common-sense  con- 
clusions that  must  certainly  be  familiar  to  even  the  least  initiated  of  readers. 
But  while  in  the  discussions  there  are  many  interesting  illustrations  of  the 
general  statements,  there  is  never  psychological  analysis  that  will  bear  close 
criticism,  and  the  argument  is  too  often  the  non  sequitur. 


No.  2.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  255 

The  latter  part  of  the  book  is  filled  with  anecdotes  from  more  or  less  well- 
known  sources.  The  general  conclusions  reached  are  more  in  harmony 
with  accepted  scientific  opinion  than  the  first  part  would  lead  us  to  suspect. 
The  attitude  toward  mind-cures  of  all  kinds  is  skeptical.  After  the  very 
numerous  unsubstantiated  cases  are  eliminated,  the  author  ascribes  the  re- 
maining fraction  to  the  influence  of  the  mental  on  the  bodily  states.  He 
takes  the  investigations  of  Mrs.  Piper  at  face  value,  and  so  asserts  the  exist- 
ence of  telepathy,  but  is  not  as  yet  ready  to  accept  the  spiritualistic  con- 
clusions that  have  been  drawn  by  many  psychical  researchers,  or  to  admit 
the  existence  of  a  secondary  self.  W.  B.  PILLSBURY. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN. 

Kants  Lehre  vom  Glauben.  Eine  Preisschrift  der  Krugsstiftung  der  Uni- 
versitat  Halle-Wittenberg.  Von  ERNST  SANGER.  Leipzig,  Verlag  der 
Durr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1903.  —  pp.  170. 

In  this  work  Dr.  Sanger  has  undertaken  a  critical  historical  exposition  of 
Kant's  doctrine  of  belief.  There  has  probably  been  nothing  more  impor- 
tant in  philosophical  development  than  the  proper  recognition  of  the  limits 
of  speculation.  The  immense  value  of  the  clear  epistemological  distinction 
between  knowledge  and  belief,  therefore,  is  evident.  This  distinction  has 
made  philosophy  more  cognizant  of  its  aims  and  more  sane  in  its  methods. 
It  must  always  be  of  interest,  therefore,  to  go  back  to  Kant  as  the  most 
fruitful  source  of  this  distinction  in  modern  philosophy.  Dr.  Sanger  has 
put  us  under  obligations  by  his  endeavor  to  supply  this  need  by  a 
fundamental  exposition  of  Kant's  doctrine  of  belief  from  the  original 
sources.  He  conducts  his  study  under  three  heads  :  (i)  Kant's  pre-critical 
writings.  (2)  Kant's  critical  writings.  This  naturally  comprises  the  chief 
part  of  the  work.  (3)  Kant's  writings  left  unpublished  at  his  death,  e.  g., 
his  lectures,  letters,  and  reflections. 

The  author  closes  his  work  with  a  brief  indication  of  the  influence  of  the 
critical  philosophy  on  subsequent  theology  ;  and,  in  particular,  its  relation 
to  the  systems  of  Schleiermacher  and  Ritschl  are  discussed  in  a  clear  and  in- 
teresting way.  The  work  has  been  thoroughly  done,  showing  a  real 
scientific  spirit,  and  will  be  permanently  valuable  as  a  work  of  reference  in 
connection  with  the  study  of  Kant.  It  contains  an  appreciative  introduc- 
tion by  the  hands  of  that  distinguished  Kant-scholar,  Professor  Hans 
Vaihinger.  GEORGE  S.  PAINTER. 

The  Classical  Heritage  of  the  Middle  Ages.  By  HENRY  OSBORN  TAYLOR. 
New  York,  The  Columbia  University  Press,  1901.  —  pp.  xv,  400. 

Although  this  account  of  the  sources  of  mediaeval  culture  is  in  the  main 
a  study  in  literary  origins,  there  are  several  chapters  in  the  work  which 
throw  a  good  deal  of  light  on  the  philosophy  of  the  period  from  400  to 
700  A.D.,  and  incidentally  on  that  of  subsequent  centuries.  These  chap- 
ters are  :  II,  "  The  Passing  of  the  Antique  Man  "  ;  V,  "  Pagan  Elements 


256  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Christianized  in  Transmission,"  in  which  the  pagan  and  Christian  ethical 
ideals  are  characterized,  and  Pseudo-Dionysius  the  Areopagite  interestingly 
discussed;  VI,  "Ideals  of  Knowledge,  Beauty,  and  Love."  The  remain- 
ing chapters  are  occupied  chiefly  with  questions  of  literature  and  art. 

W.  A.   H. 
The  following  books  also  have  been  received  : 

Evolution  and  Adaptation.  By  THOMAS  HUNT  MORGAN.  New  York, 
The  Macmillan  Co.,  1903.  — pp.  xiii,  470. 

A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century.  Vol.  II.  By 
JOHN  THEODORE  MERZ.  Edinburgh  and  London,  Wm.  Blackwood  & 
Sons,  1903.  — pp.  xiii,  807. 

Transitional  Eras  in  Thought.  By  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG.  New  York,  The 
Macmillan  Co.,  1904. — pp.  xi,  347. 

The  Nature  of  Goodness.  By  G.  H.  PALMER.  Boston  and  New  York, 
Houghton,  Mifflin&Co.,  1903. — pp.  xii,  247. 

The  Relations  between  Freedom  ahd  Responsibility  in  the  Evolution  of 
Democratic  Government.     By  ARTHUR  T.  HADLEY.     New  York,  Chas. 
Scribner's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  175. 

The  Canon  of  Reason  and  Virtue.  (Lao-Tze's  Tao  Teh  King.)  Trans- 
lated from  the  Chinese  by  PAUL  CARUS.  Chicago,  The  Open  Court  Pub- 
lishing Co.,  1903  — pp.  96—138. 

The  Free- Will  Problem  in  Modern  Thought.  By  WM.  H.  JOHNSON. 
Columbia  University  Contributions  to  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Edu- 
tion,  x,  2.  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1903,  pp.  94. 

A  Bird 's-  eye  View  of  the  Literature  of  Ethical  Science  since  the  Time  of 
Charles  Darwin.  By  WALTER  L.  SHELDON.  Transactions  of  the 
Academy  of  Science  of  St.  Louis,  xiii,  4,  1903. — pp.  87-142. 

Princeton  Contributions  to  Psychology,  III,  2.  Edited  by  J.  MARK  BALD- 
WIN. Princeton,  The  University  Press,  1902. — pp.  21-65;  same,  IV, 
i,  1903. —pp.  34. 

Ethik  :  Eine  Untersuchung  der  Tatsachen  und  Gesetze  des  sittlichen  Lebens. 
Von  WILHELM  WUNDT.  Dritte  umgearbcitetc  Auflage.  Zwei  Bande  ; 
Stuttgart,  F.  Enke,  1903. — pp.  x,  523  ;  vi,  409. 

Nietzsches  Philosophic.  Von  ARTHUR  DREWS.  Heidelberg,  C.  Winter, 
1904.  — pp.  x,  561. 

Der  Sinn  des  Daseins.  Von  LUDWIG  STEIN.  Tubingen  und  Leipzig,  J. 
C.  B.  Mohr,  1904.  — pp.  xi,  437. 

Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.  Von  W.  WINDELBAND.  Dritte, 
durchgeschene  Auflage.  Tubingen  und  Leipzig,  J.  C.  B.  Mohr,  1903.  — 
pp.  viii,  575. 

Immanuel  Kant :  Die  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Ver- 
nunft.  Herausgegeben  von  KARL  VORLANDER.  Dritte  Auflage.  Leip- 
zig, Verlag  der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlungen,  1903.  — pp.  xcvi,  260. 


No.  2.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  2$? 

Zur  Psychologic  des  asthetischen  Gtnusses.     Von  G.  WERNICK.     Leipzig, 

W.  Engelmann,  1903. — pp.  148. 
Die  Welt  ah  Wille  sum  selbst.     Von   MAX  DRESSLER.     Heidelberg,  C. 

Winter,  1904. — pp.  112. 
Kant  und  die  Platonische  Philosophic.     Von   THEODOR   VALENTINER. 

Heidelberg,  C.  Winter,  1904. — pp.  94. 
Das   Problem  der  Gegebenheit.     Von  PAUL  STERN.     Berlin,  B.  Cassirer, 

1903.  — pp.  viii,   79. 
Die  Theorie  der  Lokalzeichen.     Von  ERWIN  ACKERKNECHT.      Tubingen 

und  Leipzig,  J.  C.  B.  Mohr,  1904.  — pp.  viii,  88. 
Ueber  die  Grenzen  der  Geivissheit.     Von  ERNST  DURR.     Leipzig,  Verlag 

der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1903. — pp.  vii,  152. 
Tat  und  Wahrheit.     Von  HANS  VON  LUPKE.     Leipzig,  Verlag  der  Durr'- 

schen  Buchhandlung,  1903. — pp.  35. 
Der  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntnis.     Von  HEINRICH  RICKERT.     Tubingen 

und  Leipzig,  J.  C.  B.  Mohr,  1904. — pp.  viii,  244. 

Moralphilosophische  Streitfragen.     Erster  Teil :  Die  Entstehung  des  sitt- 

lichen   Bewtisstseins.     Von   GUSTAV  STORRING.     Leipzig,    W.    Engel- 
mann, 1903. — pp.  vii,  151. 
Kant.     Sechzehn  Vorlesungen  gehalten  an  der  Berliner  Universitat.     Von 

GEORG  SIMMEL.     Leipzig,  Duncker  &  Humblot,   1904. — pp.  vi,  181. 
Grundzuge  der  physiologischen  Psychologic.     Von  W.  WUNDT.     Fiinfte 

vollig  umgearbeitete  Auflage.     Gesamtregister  bearbeitet  von  WILHELM 

WIRTH.     Leipzig,  W.  Engelmann,  1903. — p.  133. 
Kant :   Sein   Leben   und  seine   Lehre.     Von    M.    KRONENBERG.     Zweite 

neubearbeitete  und  erweiterte  Auflage.     Miinchen,  C.  H.  Beck,  1904. — 

pp.  x,  403. 
Le  radicalisme  philosophique.     Par  ELIE  HALEVY.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. 

-pp.  v,  512. 

Travail  et plaisir.     Par  CH.  FERE.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. —  pp.  476. 
Pierre  Leroux,  sa  vie,  son  ceuvre>  sa  doctrine.     Par  P.-FELix  THOMAS. 

Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904.  — pp.  vi,  340. 
Nouveau  programme  de  sociologie.     Par  EUGENE  DE  ROBERTY.     Paris,  F. 

Alcan,  1904.  — pp.  268. 
L  education  fondee  sur  la  science.     Par  C.-A.  LAISANT.     F.  Alcan,  1904. 

—  pp.  xlv,  153. 
Le  bonheur  et  /'  intelligence.     Par  OssiP-LouRiE.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. 

pp.  20 1. 
Lorigine  des  idees.     Par  PAUL  REGNAUD.     Paris,   F.  Alcan,    1904. — pp. 

viii,  119. 
Le  langage  interieur  et  les  paraphasies.     Par  G.  SAINT-PAUL.     Paris,  F. 

Alcan,  1904. — pp.  316. 


258  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

Esquisse   d'un  systems  de  psychologie  rationnelle.     Par  £MILE  LUBAC, 

Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. — pp.  xvi,  248. 
Les  phenomenes  d?  autoscopie.     Par  PAUL  SOLLIER.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1903. 

—  pp.  175- 
Esquisse  d*  une  evolution  dans  r  histoire  de  la  philosophic.     Par  NICOLAS 

KOSTYLEFF.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1903. — pp.  224. 
L  ideal  esthetique.     Par   FR.    ROUSSEL-DESPIERRES.      Paris,    F.    Alcan, 

1904.  — pp.  1 86. 
//  pensiero  di  Francesco  Sanchez.     Per  CESARE  GIARRATANO.     Napoli, 

L.  Pierro  e  Figlio,  1903.  — pp.  104. 

Bosquejo  de  un  diccionario  technico  de  filosofia  y  teologta  musulmanas. 
Por  MIGUEL  ASIN  PALACIOS.     Zaragoza,  M.  Escar,  1903.  — pp.  41. 


NOTES. 

The  opening  of  the  new  year  has  been  marked  by  the  appearance  of 
several  new  journals  devoted  in  whole  or  part  to  philosophy  and  psychology. 
The  Journal  of  Comparative  Neurology  is  to  become  The  Journal  of  Com- 
parative Neurology  and  Psychology,  and  is  to  be  edited  by  Dr.  C.  L.  Her- 
rick,  with  Drs.  O.  S.  Strong  and  Robert  M.  Yerkes  as  associate  editors,  and 
a  strong  staff  of  collaborators,  among  whom  we  note  as  of  special  interest 
to  psychologists  the  names  of  J.  Mark  Baldwin,  H.  H.  Bawden,  C. 
Lloyd  Morgan,  Hugo  Munsterberg,  and  W.  H.  Davis.  The  editors  an- 
nounce that  it  is  their  intention  to  publish  abstracts  of  current  literature, 
synthetic  reviews,  and  editorial  discussions  of  movements  and  tendencies 
in  comparative  neurology  and  comparative  psychology  adapted  for  those 
whose  purpose  it  is  to  follow  the  main  lines  of  development  in  the  progress 
of  these  sciences. 

On  January  7  there  appeared  the  first  number  of  the  Journal  of  Phi- 
losophy, Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  edited  by  Professor  Frederick  J. 
E.  Woodbridge,  of  Columbia  University.  This  journal  is  to  be  published 
every  two  weeks,  and  aims  to  fulfil  the  functions  of  a  '  Central- Blatt,1  pub- 
lishing short  articles,  discussions,  prompt  reviews,  and  abstracts  of  literature. 

The  Psychological  Review,  which  is  henceforth  to  be  edited  by  Professor 
Baldwin,  of  Johns  Hopkins  University,  and  Professor  Warren,  of  Princeton 
(Professor  Cattell  retiring),  with  many  distinguished  collaborators,  has 
been  divided  into  two  somewhat  independent  sections.  The  first  section, 
devoted  exclusively  to  articles  will  appear  as  hitherto,  once  in  two  months. 
A  second  division,  entitled  The  Psychological  Bulletin,  will  be  published 
every  month,  and  will  contain  reviews  and  abstracts  of  literature,  discus- 
sions, and  scientific  notes  and  announcements. 

In  England  there  has  been  established  The  British  Journal  of  Psychology. 
This  will  be  edited  by  Professor  James  Ward  and  Dr.  W.  H.  R. '.Rivers  of 
Cambridge  University.  It  will  appear  in  parts  at  irregular  intervals,  about 
four  hundred  and  fifty  pages  constituting  a  volume,  the  price  of  which  is 
fifteen  shillings.  It  is  to  be  published  by  Messrs.  Clay  &  Sons,  of  London. 

The  first  number  of  the  Journal  de  Psychologic  normale  et  pathologique 
has  appeared  under  the  editorship  of  Professor  Pierre  Janet  and  Dr.  Georges 
Dumas.  This  journal  is  to  appear  every  two  months  and  proposes  also  to 
be  a  'Central- Blatt'  for  all  in  France  who  are  interested  in  psychological 
studies.  It  is  published  by  Alcan,  and  the  yearly  subscription  is  fourteen 
francs. 

On  the  22d  of  January,  Professor  Edward  Zeller  completed  his  ninetieth 
year.  The  REVIEW  joins  with  his  many  friends  throughout  the  world  in 
tendering  congratulations  to  the  venerable  scholar  whom  students  of  the 

259 


260  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

history  of  thought  acknowledge  as  '  the  master  of  them  that  know '  in*all 
things  pertaining  to  Greek  philosophy. 

We  regret  to  announce  the  death  of  Professor  Jacob  Cooper,  who  has 
occupied  the  chair  of  Logic  and  Mental  Philosophy  in  Rutgers  College 
since  1893,  having  previously,  from  1866,  been  professor  of  Greek  in  the 
same  institution.  Dr.  Cooper  received  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 
at  the  University  of  Gottingen  in  1854,  and  in  1873  was  awarded  the  degree 
of  D.C.L.  from  Jena.  He  has  published  several  books  and  many  arti- 
cles, though  most  of  them  lie  outside  the  field  of  technical  philosophy. 
He  was  seventy-three  years  of  age. 

A  congress  for  experimental  psychology  will  be  held  in  Giessen  from 
April  1 8  to  20.  The  invitations  for  the  congress  have  been  signed  by 
nearly  all  the  prominent  psychologists  in  Germany. 

The  Second  International  Congress  of  Philosophy  will  meet  in  Geneva 
from  the  4th  to  the  8th  of  September  in  five  sections,  occupied  respectively 
with  History  of  Philosophy,  General  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  Applied 
Philosophy  (Ethics,  Esthetics,  Philosophy  of  Religion),  Logic  and  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Sciences,  History  of  the  Sciences. 

By  the  terms  of  Herbert  Spencer's  will,  the  trustees,  after  certain  speci- 
fied conditions  in  connection  with  his  books  have  been  fulfilled,  are  di- 
rected to  sell  the  copyrights  and  other  property.  They  are  then  to  ' '  give 
the  sum  realized  in  equal  parts  to  the  Geological  Society,  the  Geographical 
Society,  the  Linnaean  Society,  the  Anthropological  Society,  the  Zoological 
Society,  the  Entomological  Society,  the  Astronomical  Society,  the  Mathe- 
matical Society,  the  Physical  Society,  the  Chemical  Society,  the  Royal 
Institution,  and  the  British  Association,  or  such  of  them  as  shall  then  be  in 
existence  and  shall  accept  the  gift  upon  the  condition  that  the  sum  received 
shall  within  five  years  from  the  date  of  payment  be  spent  by  the  governing 
body  for  the  purchase  or  enlargement  of  premises,  or  for  books  or  apparatus 
or  collections,  or  for  furniture  or  repairs,  or  for  equipment,  or  for  travellers 
and  donations  of  instruments  of  research,  but  in  no  way  or  degree  for  pur- 
poses of  endowment." 

Professor  George  Stuart  Fullerton,  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania, 
who  is  spending  this  year  in  Germany,  has  accepted  a  call  to  a  chair  of 
philosophy  in  Columbia  University. 

In  our  last  issue,  through  a  printer's  error,  it  was  stated  that  February 
4  was  the  date  of  the  death  of  Kant.  The  correct  date  is  February  12, 
and  on  that  day  memorial  exercises  were  held  in  many  American  univer- 
sities. It  is  hoped  that  the  interest  aroused  in  connection  with  this  obser- 
vance of  the  centenary  of  Kant's  death,  may  lead  to  the  endowment  of  the 
Kant-Studien,  as  a  permanent  organ  for  the  study  and  development  of  his 
philosophy.  Subscriptions  for  this  purpose  may  be  sent  to  the  editor,  Pro- 
fessor H.  Vaihinger,  Halle  a.  S.,  Germany,  or  to  the  American  represen- 
tative of  the  journal,  Professor  J.  E.  Creighton,  Cornell  University. 


No.  2.]  NOTES.  26l 

Dr.  Benjamin  Rand,  of  Harvard,  has  just  completed  the  printing  of  a 
' '  Bibliography  of  the  History  of  Philosophy. ' '  It  embraces  all  the  great  phi- 
losophers from  Thales  to  Spencer,  their  works,  and  the  works  written  upon 
them.  The  philosophers  number  550,  and  the  literature  about  them  com- 
prises 25,000  titles  of  articles  and  volumes.  The  work  now  equals  500 
pages  of  double  columns. 

He  has  also  prepared  Bibliographies  of  Systematic  Philosophy,  Logic, 
Esthetics,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Ethics,  and  Psychology.  These  will 
also  be  printed  in  succession  by  the  University  Press  at  Oxford.  These 
Bibliographies,  with  the  one  already  printed,  will  together  form  the  third 
volume  of  the  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology  edited  by  Professor 
J.  Mark  Baldwin,  and  will  also  appear  in  separate  form  as  Dr.  Rand's 
1  'Bibliography  of  Philosophy. ' '  The  publishers  are  the  Macmillan  Company. 

Just  as  we  are  going  to  press,  the  news  comes  of  the  death  of  Sir  Leslie 
Stephen.  He  was  born  in  1832,  and  educated  at  Eton  and  Trinity  Hall, 
Cambridge.  His  more  important  philosophical  works  are  :  History  of 
English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  (1876);  The  Science  of  Ethics 
(1882);  An  Agnostic's  Apology  (1893);  The  English  Utilitarians  (1900). 

We  give  below  a  list  of  the  articles,  etc.,  in  the  current  philosophical 
journals  : 

THE  MONIST,  XIV,  2  :  G.  Sergi,  Primitive  Rome  ;  A.  Forel,  Ants  and 
Some  Other  Insects  (concluded)  ;  Editor,  The  Still  Small  Voice  ;  A.  J. 
Edmunds,  A  Buddhist  Genesis  ;  G.  W.  Gilmore,  The  Higher  Criticism  ; 
Teitaro  Suzuki,  The  First  Buddhist  Council ;  Lucien  Arreat,  Literary  Cor- 
respondence, France  ;  Criticisms  and  Discussions  ;  Book  Reviews  and 
Notes. 

MIND,  No.  49  :  F.  H.  Bradley,  The  Definition  of  Will ;  W.  H.  Fair- 
brother,  The  Relations  of  Ethics  to  Metaphysics  ;  C.  M.  Walsh,  Kant's 
Transcendental  Idealism  and  Empirical  Realism,  II  ;  G.  D.  Hicks,  Pro- 
fessor Adamson's  Philosophical  Lectures  ;  Critical  Notices  ;  New  Books  ; 
Philosophical  Periodicals  ;  Notes. 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL  OF  ETHICS,  XIV,  2  :  W.  J.  Brown,  The 
True  Democratic  Ideal ;  T.  C.  Hall,  Relativity  and  Finality  in  Ethics  ; 
Eliza  Ritchie,  The  Toleration  of  Error  ;  R.  A.  Duff,  Proverbial  Morality  ; 
S.  J.  Barrows,  Crime  in  England  ;  John  MacCunn,  The  Cynics  ;  W.  A. 
Watt,  The  Individualism  of  Marcus  Aurelius  ;  H.  B.  Alexander,  The 
Spring  of  Salvation  ;  Discussion  ;  Book  Reviews. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  XI,  I  :  Raymond  Dodge,  The  Participa- 
tion of  Eye  Movements  in  the  Visual  Perception  of  Motion  ;  Boris  Sidisr 
An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  Hallucination  ;  /.  Mark  Baldwin,  The 
Limits  of  Pragmatism  ;  Discussion. 

THE  HIBBERT  JOURNAL,  II,  2  :  H.  C.  Corrance,  Progressive  Catholicism 
and  High  Church  Absolutism  ;  The  Alleged  Indifference  of  Laymen  to 
Religion  ;  E.  Carpenter,  The  Gods  as  Embodiments  of  the  Race-memory  ; 


262  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

W.  P.  Montague,  The  Evidence  of  Design  in  the  Elements  and  Structure 
of  the  Cosmos  ;  /.  H.  Beibitz,  The  New  Point  of  View  in  Theology  ;  L.  R. 
Farnell,  Sacrificial  Communion  in  Greek  Religion  ;  B.  W.  Bacon,  The 
Johannine  Problem,  II  ;  J.  Moffatt,  Zoroastrianism  and  Primitive  Christi- 
anity, II  ;  Alice  Gardner,  Some  Theological  Aspects  of  the  Iconoclastic 
Controversy  ;  Discussions  ;  Reviews. 

THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  THEOLOGY,  VIII,  i  :  A.  G.  B.,  The 
Religious  Situation  in  Paris ;  F.  C.  Porter,  Inquiries  Concerning  the 
Divinity  of  Christ ;  J.  E.  McFadyen,  Hellenism  and  Hebraism  ;  G.  T. 
Knight,  The  New  Science  in  Relation  to  Theism  ;  E.  Konig,  The  Problem 
of  the  Poem  of  Job  ;  Recent  Theological  Literature. 

THE  BRITISH  JOURNAL  OF  PSYCHOLOGY,  I,  i  :  James  Ward,  On  the 
Definition  of  Psychology  ;  C.  S.  Sherrington,  On  Binocular  Flicker  and 
the  Correlation  of  Activity  of  '  Corresponding '  Retinal  Points  ;  J.  L.  Mc- 
Intyre,  A  Sixteenth  Century  Psychologist :  Bernardino  Telesio  ;  W.  Mc- 
Dougall,  The  Sensations  Excited  by  a  Single  Momentary  Stimulation  of 
the  Eye  ;  Note  ;  Proceedings  of  the  Psychological  Society. 

THE  JOURNAL  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHODS, 
I,  i  :  Hugo  Munsterburg,  The  International  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science  ; 
G.  T.  Ladd,  The  Religious  Consciousness  as  Ontological .  C.  L.  Frank- 
lin, Some  Points  in  Minor  Logic  ;  The  Third  Meeting  of  the  American 
Philosophical  Association  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals 
and  New  Books  ;  Notes. 

I,  2  :  C.  J.  Keyser,  Concerning  the  Concept  and  Existence-Proofs  of 
the  Infinite  ;  E.  B.  Titchener,  Organic  Images  ;  M.  A.  Starr,  Cases  of 
Double  Consciousness  ;  J.  A.  Leighton,  The  Logic  of  History  ;  Editor  of 
Science,  The  Limitations  of  Minor  Logic ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of 
Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

I,  3  :  John  Dewey,  Notes  upon  Logical  Topics  ;  H.  H.  Batvden,  The 
Necessity  from  the  Standpoint  of  Scientific  Method  of  a  Reconstruction  of 
the  Ideas  of  the  Psychical  and  the  Physical  ;  W.  Lay,  Organic  Images  ; 
Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes 
and  News. 

I,  4 :  E.  B.  Delabarre,  Accuracy  of  Perception  of  Verticality,  and  the 
Factors  that  Influence  It ;  Wm.  Turner,  Recent  Contributions  to  the  Liter- 
ature of  Scholasticism  ;  J.  H.  Tufts,  Note  on  the  Idea  of  a  '  Moral  Sense ' 
in  British  Thought  Prior  to  Shaftesbury  ;  J.  H.  Hyslop,  Professor  Pierce  on 
Space  Perception  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and 
New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  I,  i  :  Wm.  James,  The  Chicago 
School  ;  Literature  ;  Notes  and  News  ;  Books  Received. 

I,  2  :  Proceedings  of  the  American  Psychological  Association  ;  Proceed- 
ings of  the  American  Philosophical  Association  ;  /.  M.  Baldwin,  Comment. 


No.  2.]  NOTES.  263 

I,  3 :  E.  F.  Buchner,  Psychological  Progress  ;  Psychological  Litera- 
ture ;  New  Books  ;  Notes  ;  Journals. 

VlERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT     FUR     WISSENSCHAFTLICHE     PHILOSOPHIE     UND 

SOZIOLOGIE,  XXVII,  4  :  F.  Oppenheimer,  Skizze  der  sozial-okonomischen 
Geschichtsauffassung,  II  ;  R.  Mutter,  Uber  die  zeitlichen  Verhaltnisse  in 
der  Sinneswahrnehmung  ;  Paul  Earth,  Zu  Herders  100.  Todestage ; 
Besprechungen  ;  Philosophische  Zeitschriften  ;  Bibliographic. 

KANTSTUDIEN,  VIII,  2-3  :  F.  Medicus,  Kant  und  Ranke  ;  A.  Thorn- 
sen,  Bemerkungen  zur  Kritik  des  kantischen  Begriffes  des  Dinges  an  sich  ; 
H.  Kleinpeter,  Kant  und  die  naturwissenschaftliche  Erkenntniskritik  der 
Gegenwart  ;  A.  Messer,  Die  "  Beziehung  auf  den  Gegenstand  "  bei  Kant  ; 
K.  Vorlander,  Rudolf  Sammlers  Lehre  vom  richtigen  Recht  ;  E.  Wille, 
Konjekturen  zu  mehreren  Schriften  Kants  ;  Selbstanzeigen  ;  Mitteilungen. 

VIII,  4  :  W.  Reinecke,  Die  Grundlagen  der  Geometric  nach  Kant  ;  E. 
Lucka,  Das  Erkenntnisproblem  und  Machs  "Analyse  der  Empfindun- 
gen  "  ;  van  der  Wyck,  Kant  in  Holland,  II  ;  E.  Wille,  Konjekturen  zu 
Kants  Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft  ;  Recensionen  ;  Selbstanzeigen  ; 
Redaktionelles. 

ZEITSCHRIFT  FUR  PSYCHOLOGIE  UND  PHYSIOLOGIE  DER  SINNESORGANE, 
XXXIII,  1-2  :  A.  Meinong,  Bemerkungen  liber  den  Farbenkorper  und 
das  Mischungsgesetz  ;  O.  Rosenbach,  Das  Ticktack  der  Uhr  in  akustischer 
und  sprachphysiologischer  Beziehung  ;  Th.  Ziehen,  Erkenntnistheoret- 
ische  Auseinandersetzungen,  II  ;  Literaturbericht. 

XXXIII,  4  :  E.  P.  Braunstein,  Beitrag  zur  Lehre  des  intermittierenden 
Lichtreizes  der  gesunden  und  kranken  Retina  (Schluss)  ;  Max  Meyer,  Zur 
Theorie  japanischer  Musik  ;  Literaturbericht. 

XXXIII,  5  :  Egon  Ritter  von  Oppolzer,  Grundziige  einer  Farbentheorie, 
II  ;  Hugo  Frey,  Weitere  Untersuchungen  iiber  die  Schalleitung  im  Schadel ; 
Literaturbericht. 

XXXIII,  6  :  H.  Zwaardemaker,  Die  Empfindlichkeit  des  Ohres  ;  F.  Kie- 
sow,  Zur  Psychophysiologie  der  Mundhohle  ;  F.  Kiesow,  Zur  Frage  nach 
der  Fortpflanzungsgeschwindigkeit  der  Erregung  im  sensiblen  Nerven  des 
Menschen  ;  F.  Kiesow,  Ein  Beitrag  zur  Frage  nach  den  Reaktionszeiten 
der  Geschmacksempfindungen  ;  Literaturbericht. 

XXXIV,  i  :  Alfred  Borschke,  Untersuchungen  liber  die  Herabsetzung  der 
Sehscharfe  durch  Blendung  ;  G.  Heymans,  Untersuchungen  uber  psychische 
Hemmung,  III  ;  Marx  Lobsien,  Uber  Farbenkenntnis  bei  Schulkindern  ; 
C.  A.  Strong,  Leib  und  Seele  ;  Literaturbericht. 

ARCHIV  FUR  GESCHICHTE  DER  PHILOSOPHIE,  X,  2  :  Theodor  Lorenz, 
Weitere  Beitrage  zur  Lebensgeschichte  George  Berkeleys  ;  /.  Chazottes, 
Sur  une  pretendue  faute  de  raisonnement  que  Descartes  aurait  commise  ; 
G.  Jaeger,  Locke,  eine  kritische  Untersuchung  der  Ideen  des  Liberalismus 
und  des  Ursprungs  nationalokonomischer  Anschauungsformen  ;  /.  Pollak, 


264  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

Entwicklung  der  arabischen  und  jiidischen  Philosophic  im  Mittelalter  ;  A. 
Hoffmann,  Die  Lehre  von  der  Bildung  des  Universums  bei  Descartes  ; 
Jahresbericht. 

REVUE  PHILOSOPHIQUE,  XXVIII,  12  :  Belot,  Les  principes  de  la 
morale  positiviste  et  la  conscience  contemporaine  ;  A.  Binet,  De  la  sensa- 
tion a  1' intelligence  (2e  article)  ;  L.  Marillier  et  J.  Philippe,  Sur  1'apercep- 
tion  des  differences  tactiles  ;  A.  Lalande,  Les  recents  dictionnaires  de  phi- 
losophic ;  Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ;  Revue  des  periodiques  etrangers  ; 
Livres  nouveaux  ;  Table  des  matieres. 

XXIX,  i :  £.  Tardieu,  Le  cynisme  ;  etude  psychologique  ;  Xenopol,  Le 
caractere  de  1'histoire  ;  f.  le  Dantec,  La  logique  et  1' experience  ;  J.-H. 
Leuba,  A  propos  de  I'erotomanie  des  mystiques  Chretiens  ;  P.  Fauconnet, 
"  La  morale  et  les  mceurs  "  d'apres  M.  Levy-Bruhl ;  Analyses  et  comptes 
rendus  ;  Revue  des  periodiques  etrangers  ;  Necrologie  ;  Livres  nouveaux. 

REVUE  DE  METAPHYSIQUE  ET  DE  MORALE,  XI,  6  :  /.  Lachelier,  L' 
observation  de  Platner ;  A  Espinas,  L'  organisation  ou  la  machine  vivante 
en  Grece,  au  IVe  siecle  avant  J.-C.  ;  G.  Sore/,  Sur  divers  aspects  de  la 
mecanique,  F.  Evellin,  La  dialectique  des  antinomies  kantiennes  ;  G. 
Milhaud,  La  science  et  1*  hypothese  par  M.  H.  Poincare  ;  A.  Darlu,  L' 
idee  de  patrie  ;  Tables  des  matieres  ;  Livres  nouveaux  ;  Revues  et  perio- 
diques ;  La  philosophic  dans  les  universites. 

XII,  i:  A.  Darlu,  La  morale  de  Renouvier  ;  L.  Couturat,  Les  principes 
des  mathematiques  ;  F.  Rauh,  Le  devenir  et  1'ideal  social  a  propos  d'une 
brochure  recente  ;  Bougie,  La  democratic  devant  la  science  ;  G.  Lechalas, 
Sur  la  theorie  geometrique  du  General  de  Tilly  ;  E.  Chartier,  Vers  le 
positivisme  absolu  par  1'idealisme  par  Louis  Weber  ;  Questions  pratiques  ; 
Necrologie  ;  Livres  nouveaux  ;  Revues  et  periodiques  ;  Theses  de  doctorat. 

REVUE  NEO-SCOLASTIQUE,  X,  4 :  C.  Besse,  Lettre  de  France  :  L'anti- 
clericalisme  sous  M.  Combes  ;  M.  De  Wulf,  La  decadence  de  la  scolastique 
a  la  fin  du  moyen  age  ;  H.  Meuffels,  Un  probleme  a  resoudre  ;  E.  Janssens, 
Charles  Renouvier  ;  Melanges  et  Documents  ;  Bulletin  de  1'Institut  de 
Philosophic  ;  Comptes-rendus  ;  Ouvrages  envoyes  a  la  redaction  ;  Table 
des  matieres. 

JOURNAL  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE  NORMAL  ET  PATHOLOGIQUE,  I,  i  :  Th.  Ribot, 
De  la  valeur  des  questionnaires  en  psychologic  ;  Th.  Flournoy,  Note  sur 
une  communication  typtologique  ;  J.  Grasset,  La  sensation  du  '  deja  vu '  ; 
F.  Raymond  et  P.  Janet,  Depersonnalisation  et  possession  chez  un  psy- 
chasthenique  ;  Bibliographic. 


Volume  X1IL  May,  1904.  Whole 

Number  j.  Number  75. 

THE 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW. 


ON   MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION. 

I.  On  the  Definition  of  the  Mechanical  Ideal.  —  In  philosophy 
and  in  science  we  are  frequently  called  upon  to  face  a  certain 
hypothesis,  — the  hypothesis,  namely,  that  all  the  phenomena  of 
the  world  in  which  we  live  are  susceptible  of  a  mechanical  ex- 
planation. In  discussing  method  we  are  in  the  habit  of  referring 
to  this  point  of  view  as  the  'mechanical  ideal.'  Now  we  all  feel 
that  in  a  way  we  understand  what  is  meant  by  the  mechanical 
ideal,  whether  or  not  we  are  willing  to  entertain  it,  and  yet  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  literature  of  philosophy  is  much  richer 
in  instances  of  an  instinctive  application  of  this  ideal  than  in  ex- 
amples of  a  serious  effort  to  define  its  meaning.  We  feel  no 
little  confidence  in  our  right  to  pronounce  certain  methods  of  ex- 
planation inharmonious  with  the  ideal,  but  such  exclusions  still 
leave  us  in  considerable  doubt  respecting  the  inclusion  of  the 
term. 

For  example,  it  would  probably  be  admitted  by  all  that  a  biol- 
ogist who  denied  the  possibility  of  finding  among  the  physico- 
chemical  conditions  of  an  organism  and  its  environment  at  any 
moment  the  determinants  of  the  growth  of  the  organism  at  that 
moment,  would  definitely  have  rejected  the  mechanical  ideal. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  would  the  adoption  of  a  physico-chemi- 
cal theory  of  growth  be  equivalent  to  the  acceptance  of  the  ideal  ? 
At  least,  we  can  understand  the  eagerness  of  an  Ostwald  to  re- 
place the  vague  concept  of  "chemical  affinity"  with  a  picture 
whose  details  are  wholly  physical  of  the  processes  which  are  in- 
volved in  neutralization,  solution,  and  so  forth.  This  sympathy 

265 


266  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

may  be  taken  as  the  expression  of  an  instinctive  feeling  that  the 
phenomena  of  chemistry  themselves  are  in  need  of  a  mechanical 
explanation.  A  like  satisfaction  attends  every  successful  effort 
to  reproduce  certain  physical  phenomena  (for  example,  those  of 
heat)  in  terms  of  concealed  mass-motions.  In  short,  a  type  of 
explanation  which  at  one  stage  of  our  progress  and  with  a  view 
to  certain  exclusions  we  may  advance  as  mechanical,  will  itself 
appear  at  another  stage  to  be  in  need  of  mechanical  explanation. 
It  would  thus  seem  that  the  use  of  the  concept  in  question  is 
subject  to  that  vacillation  which  makes  definition  of  it  at  once 
difficult  and  imperative. 

To  begin  with,  the  most  natural  suggestion,  and  the  one  most 
closely  in  accord  with  historical  development,  would  view  our 
ideal  as  arranging  the  sciences  in  a  series  of  subsumptions  of  such 
nature  that  we  might  regard  each  science  as  capable  of  reduction 
to  the  one  next  below  it,  until  at  last  we  arrived  at  a  fundamental 
science  to  which  all  the  others  might  be  reduced.  The  adjective 
*  mechanical '  attached  to  our  ideal  would  then  indicate  that  this 
fundamental  science  was  none  other  than  the  science  of  mechanics. 
Indeed,  it  would  seldom  occur  to  the  scientist  that  there  could 
be  any  sense  in  which  the  phenomena  of  mechanics  themselves 
were  in  need  of  further  explanation.  If  this  suggestion  be 
adopted,  our  task  of  defining  the  mechanical  ideal  will  be  accom- 
plished when  we  have  given  a  definition  of  mechanics  and  an  ex- 
planation of  the  sense  in  which  one  science  is  capable  of  reduc- 
tion to  another.  Such  an  insight  into  the  meaning  of  the  term 
having  been  obtained,  we  may  proceed  to  examine  the  grounds 
which  could  be  urged  for  the  acceptance  of  the  ideal  as  a  guide 
to  our  speculation. 

In  defining  the  science  of  mechanics,  it  is  necessary  that  our 
method  should  make  use  of  such  differentiae  as  are  of  general 
application.  The  problem  of  the  classification  of  the  sciences  is 
very  far  from  having  reached  solution,  but  as  a  contribution  to  it 
I  may  suggest  that  the  characteristics  which  best  distinguish  a 
science  are  those  which,  in  technical  language,  are  termed  the 
'  dimensions '  of  the  science.  The  concept  of  the  dimensions  of  a 
science,  although  of  familiar  application,  is  not  quite  easy  to  de- 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION.  267 

fine  ;  that  is,  it  is  difficult  to  bring  it  under  the  concept  of  dimen- 
sions in  general.  For  our  present  purpose,  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
illustrate  the  meaning  of  dimensions  and  to  show  in  what  sense 
they  may  be  used  to  differentiate  the  sciences. 

As  a  particularly  simple  case,  let  us  consider  the  dimensions 
of  a  system  of  bodies  to  which  we  might  give  the  name  of  a 
Laplacean  system.  Such  a  system  would  be  defined  in  terms  of 
the  familiar  image  once  offered  by  Laplace  ;  that  is,  it  would  be 
a  system  such  that,  if  we  knew  the  masses,  the  space  distribution, 
and  the  velocities  at  all  points  at  any  given  moment,  we  should 
be  able  to  calculate  the  masses,  the  space  distribution,  and  the 
velocities  of  all  points  for  any  other  moment.  The  formula  by 
which  such  a  calculation  would  be  made  might  be  called  the 
axiom  of  the  science  dealing  with  such  systems.  It  is  evident 
that  there  are  four  independent  observations  which  must  be  made 
at  every  point  in  the  system,  and  which  must  be  substituted  in 
the  formula,  before  any  determinate  problem  is  presented  to  us. 
These  four  independent  observations  are  mass,  length,  time,  and 
velocity ;  and  the  use  to  which  we  put  them  might  suggest  an 
analogy  with  the  way  in  which  we  use  independent  coordinates 
to  determine  the  position  of  an  element  in  any  dimensional  mani- 
fold. The  concept  of  the  dimensions  of  our  science,  however, 
differs  slightly  from  this,  in  that  we  consider  not  the  independent 
data,  but  the  independent  kinds  of  measurement  involved.  Thus 
velocity,  being  a  ratio  of  length  and  time,  is  not  regarded  as  a 
dimension  in  the  sense  now  contemplated,  but  implicitly  contains 
the  dimensions  length  and  time ;  so  that  in  the  end  the  dimen- 
sions of  a  science  dealing  with  Laplacean  systems  would  be  mass, 
length,  and  time. 

With  the  concept  of  a  dimension  now  clear,  we  may  proceed 
to  define  mechanics  as  the  science  whose  dimensions  are  mass, 
length,  and  time.  We  shall,  of  course,  not  be  understood  to  iden- 
tify mechanics  with  the  science  of  the  Laplacean  systems  in  the 
sense  of  the  preceding  illustration,  for,  while  such  a  science  would 
certainly  be  mechanical,  the  converse  is  not  implied,  that  me- 
chanics is  the  science  of  Laplacean  systems.  If,  in  fact,  we  were 
to  compare  this  definition  with  the  contents  of  an  ordinary  text- 


268  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.        [VOL.  XIII. 

book  of  mechanics,  we  should  see  that  our  definition  was  both 
broader  and  narrower  than  that  which  is  implied  in  the  subjects 
there  treated  of.  It  is  broader  for  the  reason  that  it  would  in- 
clude such  widely  divergent  systems  of  mechanics  as  those  based 
on  the  theory  of  rigid  connections,  on  the  one  hand,  and  those 
based  on  the  theory  of  action  at  a  distance,  on  the  other.  It  is 
narrower  in  that  it  would  exclude  certain  problems  which  are 
generally  handled  in  text-books  on  mechanics  and  yet  which  we 
cannot  regard  as  properly  mechanical,  —  for  example,  the  prob- 
lems of  impact.  For  evidently  no  knowledge  of  the  masses, 
space  distribution,  and  length-and-time  quotients,  would  inform  us 
whether  two  colliding  bodies  would  behave  as  elastic  or  as  in- 
elastic bodies.  Without  this  knowledge,  however,  the  problem 
of  impact  is  indeterminate.  The  knowledge  itself  can  only  be 
conveyed  in  terms  of  a  coefficient  of  elasticity,  which  must  at 
present  be  regarded  as  a  new  dimension.  The  breadth,  how- 
ever, is  evidently  proper  to  a  definition  which  is  to  include  the 
common  feature  of  all  schools  of  mechanics,  without  taking 
sides  on  questions  of  detail.  The  narrowness  succeeds  in  rele- 
gating to  the  domain  of  general  physics  phenomena  that  are  gen- 
erally recognized  as  lacking  a  purely  mechanical  solution. 

Mechanics,  then,  is  the  science  whose  dimensions  are  mass, 
length,  and  time ;  it  remains  to  be  seen  what  is  meant,  when.we 
speak  of  reducing  other  sciences  to  mechanics.  Our  method  of 
offering  such  an  explanation  must  depend  upon  the  acceptance  of 
our  suggestion  that  the  various  sciences  may  be  differentiated  in 
terms  of  their  dimensions.  This  suggestion  requires  some  de- 
fense. It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  it  is  neatly  applicable  to  the 
definition  of  certain  recognized  branches  of  physics.  For  ex- 
ample, thermodynamics  would  involve  the  additional  dimension 
temperature ;  electrostatics  and  electrodynamics,  the  additional 
dimension  quantity  of  electricity;  magnetism,  the  dimension 
strength  of  pole.  But  it  will  not  at  once  be  evident  that  there  is 
any  sense  in  which  we  could  define  chemistry  in  terms  of  a  spe- 
cific dimension  or  group  of  dimensions,  and  a  like  difficulty  would 
pertain  to  the  definition  of  biology,  psychology,  sociology,  etc. 

As  for  chemistry,  we  must  distinguish  between  its  condition  in 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION.  269 

the  past,  in  which  it  presented  a  series  of  more  or  less  general 
observations  which  could  not  be  united  in  any  single  formula, 
and  a  tendency  towards  systematization  which  characterizes  its 
present.  There  are,  it  would  seem,  two  main  problems  of  chem- 
istry :  (i)  to  deduce  the  properties  of  a  compound  from  the  prop- 
erties of  the  elements  entering  into  it ;  (2)  to  develop  a  formula 
by  which  the  various  properties  of  elements  may  be  expressed  as 
functions  of  one  of  their  number,  which  may  then  be  taken  as 
defining  the  element. 

In  connection  with  the  first  of  these  problems,  Ostwald  has  di- 
vided the  properties  of  compounds  into  the  '  additive,'  the  '  consti- 
tutive,' and  the  '  colligative.'  The  'additive'  properties  of  a 
compound  are  the  simple  sum  of  the  properties  of  the  elements 
combined  :  thus  the  molecular  mass  is  the  sum  of  the  atomic 
masses.  The  '  constitutive '  properties  are  those  which  depend 
not  only  on  the  elements  combined,  but  upon  a  factor  which  is 
usually  called  the  '  arrangement '  of  these  elements.  The  '  col- 
ligative,' finally,  depend  wholly  upon  the  arrangement  of  the  ele- 
ments. If,  now,  as  Ostwald  suspects,  it  should  be  found  that 
the  '  constitutive  '  and  '  colligative  '  properties  are  ultimately  re- 
ducible to  the  '  additive,'  or  if  the  factor  which  is  termed  '  ar- 
rangement '  may  be  conceived  to  depend  on  the  space  distribu- 
tion,—  or  space  order,  let  us  say, —  the  whole  problem  of  the 
properties  of  compounds  presents  no  dimension  which  does  not 
belong  to  the  elements  themselves.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
reduction  of  '  constitutive '  and  '  colligative '  properties  to  '  ad- 
ditive '  cannot  be  effected,  or  if  the  factor  of  '  arrangement'  cannot 
be  conceived  in  spatial  terms,  it  is  possible  that  the  science  of 
chemical  compounds  would  possess  a  specific  dimension  of  its 
own. 

Again,  the  immediate  result  of  the  attempt  to  express  all  the 
properties  of  elements  in  terms  of  one  of  their  number  taken  to  be 
characteristic,  is  illustrated  in  the  formulation  of  the  periodic  law. 
Imperfect  as  this  scheme  is  recognized  to  be,  it  was  still  possible 
for  MendelyefT  to  predict  the  properties  of  an  element  as  yet  un- 
observed from  the  assumption  of  its  atomic  mass,  and  to  find  his 
prediction  confirmed  by  later  observation.  The  possession  of 


2/0  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

such  a  formula  as  the  periodic  law  suggests  would  have  a  ten- 
dency to  make  atomic  mass  the  dimension  of  chemistry. 

May  we  not,  therefore,  say  that  in  so  far  as  chemistry  succeeds 
in  being  a  single  science  rather  than  tables  of  collated  observa- 
tions, that  single  science  is  definable  by  a  specific  dimension  ?  And 
conversely,  in  so  far  as  we  are  unable  to  assign  any  dimension  to 
chemistry,  does  not  the  application  of  a  single  name  to  entirely 
independent  observations  depend  rather  upon  an  association  of 
ideas,  upon  accidental  similarity  of  method,  than  upon  any  right 
to  regard  that  name  as  capable  of  a  unique  definition  ? 

As  to  the  other  sciences  mentioned,  biology,  psychology, 
sociology,  etc.,  it  is  clear  that  they  are  interested  in  laws  which 
apply  to  complex  wholes.  The  terms  in  which  these  laws  are 
stated  are  in  general  not  applicable  to  the  parts  of  which  the 
wholes  are  composed.  The  question,  then,  as  to  whether  these 
sciences  are  definable  in  terms  of  specific  dimensions,  is  not  iden- 
tical with  the  question  as  to  whether  they  are  definable  at  all.  If, 
for  example,  it  were  admitted  that  the  phenomena  of  organic  life 
could  not  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  physical  and  chemical  con- 
stituents of  an  organism,  it  might  be  possible  that  a  study  of  biology 
would  lead  to  the  discovery  of  a  dimension  which  the  physics  and 
chemistry  alluded  to  had  not  included.  So,  for  example,  it  has 
been  suggested  that  '  vital  force '  might  be  regarded  as  a  prop- 
erty, related,  say,  to  magnetic  force  as  magnetic  force  is  related  to 
gravitation.  To  appeal  to  such  a  force  would  be  to  attempt  to 
give  biology  a  specific  dimension.  But  if  no  such  appeal  is 
made,  and  if  the  biologist  admits  that  the  laws  of  the  totals  with 
which  he  is  dealing  can  be  constructed  out  of  the  physico-chem- 
ical laws  of  the  parts  which  compose  them,  the  science  does  not 
in  the  least  cease  to  be  definable,  but  it  ceases  to  be  an  inde- 
pendent science.  Its  definition  must  now  be  sought  in  the  nature 
of  the  totals  or  groups  with  which  it  deals.  For  this  reason  I 
am  in  the  habit  of  referring  to  a  science  thus  defined  as  a  'super- 
imposed, science.  It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  the  differentiation 
of  the  sciences  in  terms  of  their  dimensions  is  a  differentiation 
which  is  only  meaningful  in  case  these  sciences  are  independent  ; 
and  conversely,  to  define  a  science  as  a  '  superimposed  '  science  is 


No.  3-]  ON  MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION.  2/1 

to  admit  that  it  possesses  no  specific  dimensions.  For  the  rest,  we 
are  not  interested  in  the  question  as  ^to  whether  biology,  psy- 
chology, and  sociology  are  really  '  superimposed  '  sciences  or  not. 

Enough  has  perhaps  been  said  to  make  it  clear  in  what  sense 
our  suggestion  that  sciences  may  be  differentiated  in  terms  of 
their  dimensions  is  applicable  throughout  the  whole  range  of 
independent  sciences.  The  advantage  of  this  method  of  differ- 
entiation is  that  it  yields  us  immediately  the  statement  for  which 
we  have  been  in  search,  of  the  meaning  of  reduction.  We  may 
now  say  in  general  that  any  science  x,  dimensions  abed,  is  reducible 
to  any  science  y,  dimensions  abc,  when  it  may  be  shown  in  any 
manner  that  the  term  d  is  expressible  as  a  function  of  abc.  For 
example,  let  x  be  the  science  of  thermodynamics,  whose  dimen- 
sions are  mass,  length,  time,  and  temperature,  and  let  y  be  the 
science  of  mechanics.  The  reduction  of  thermodynamics  to 
mechanics  is  effected  when  we  show  that  temperature  is  a  func- 
tion of  mass,  length,  and  time,  or  of  any  pair  of  these  three 
terms.  This  reduction  is  exactly  the  one  that  has  been  effected 
by  the  mechanical  theory  of  heat,  in  which  it  has  been  made  to 
appear  that  temperature  is  a  function  of  the  velocity  of  certain 
concealed  mass-motions.  It  would  be  easy  to  find  in  the  phys- 
ical speculations  of  our  day  other  reductions  of  an  exactly  similar 
nature.  Such  a  reduction  having  been  made,  the  reduced  sci- 
ence loses  its  independence  with  its  specific  dimension,  and  if 
retained  in  our  thinking  at  all,  must  be  treated  as  '  superimposed  ' 
science. 

Thus  we  obtain,  as  the  most  general  statement  of  the  mechan- 
ical ideal,  the  hypothesis  that  mass,  length,  and  time,  are  the  dimen- 
sions of  natural  science. 

II.  On  the  Possibility  of  the  Mechanical  Ideal.  —  Having  defined 
the  mechanical  ideal  in  a  way  that  has  at  least  the  advantage  of 
displaying  its  own  motives,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  consider 
the  arguments  that  may  be  advanced  for  its  acceptance  or  its  re- 
jection. We  may  at  once  lay  aside  as  irrelevant  all  reference  to 
our  present  accomplishment  in  the  premises.  It  is  obvious  that 
we  are  indefinitely  remote  from  the  realization  of  the  ideal  as  it 
has  been  defined ;  it  is  no  less  plain  that  many  steps  of  modern 


2/2  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

progress  might  readily  be  looked  upon  as  conducting  us  toward 
such  a  goal.  But  if  no  discussion  of  this  problem  save  the  a  pos- 
teriori is  possible,  our  only  business  for  the  present  is  to  possess 
our  souls  in  patience  and  to  await  the  results  of  experimental 
science.  As  an  historical  fact,  however,  there  have  been  ad- 
vanced reasons  purporting  to  be  a  priori  for  supposing  that  the 
attainment  of  our  end  is  impossible,  and  other  reasons  laying  no 
less  claim  to  an  a  priori  character  for  expecting  with  confidence 
its  ultimate  realization.  It  is  to  a  consideration  of  these  a  priori 
grounds  for  acceptance  or  rejection  that  we  now  turn.  In  the 
present  paper  I  shall  confine  myself  to  the  former  class  of  argu- 
ments, reserving  the  discussion  of  the  latter  class  for  a  future 
occasion. 

That  a  mechanical  image  of  nature  can  never  be  constructed 
has  been  urged  on  one  of  two  grounds,  —  either  on  the  ground 
that  the  image  is  self-contradictory  and  so  meaningless,  or  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  essentially  untrue  to  nature.  The  former 
objection  goes  back  to  Parmenides  and  Zeno  ;  it  has  never  lacked 
representatives.  The  latter  has  been  insisted  upon  most  obsti- 
nately by  those  who  have  been  impressed  with  the  multitude  of 
purposeful  processes  in  nature,  and  who  cannot  convince  them- 
selves that  nature  could  be  described  or  its  happenings  predicted 
without  making  use  of  expressions  that  have  reference  to  ends  ; 
but  such  reference,  they  feel,  implies  other  laws  than  those  which 
enable  us  to  define  a  mechanical  system. 

Such  objections  to  the  meaningfulness  of  the  mechanical  image 
as  turn  on  the  difficulties  in  defining  mass,  length,  time,  and  their 
combinations,  cannot  be  discussed  in  this  connection  ;  we  should 
find  ourselves  involved  in  some  of  the  most  perplexing  chapters 
of  metaphysics.  Yet  we  are  not  prevented  from  taking  at  once 
a  certain  attitude  toward  this  class  of  objections.  To  any  one 
who  thinks  that  he  has  discovered  contradictions  or  insufficiencies 
in  the  definitions  ordinarily  offered  in  the  field  of  geometry,  kine- 
matics, and  mechanics,  we  can  only  reply  that  it  would  be  sur- 
prising if  such  imperfections  were  not  to  be  found.  The  history 
of  the  search  for  definitions  from  Socrates  to  the  present  time 
makes  nothing  plainer  than  that  the  terms  we  use  most  instinc- 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION.  273 

tively  are  the  ones  whose  meaning  it  is  most  difficult  to  set 
forth.  But  on  the  whole  we  make  progress.  The  particular 
inadequacy  of  mass,  as  defined  by  Newton,  is  not  to  be  found  in 
Mach's  definition.  Hertz,  while  admitting  this,  is  still  dissatisfied 
with  the  accomplishment  of  Mach,  and  if  Hertz  is  not  justified, 
nothing  is  more  likely  than  that  another  critic  will  be.  There  is 
every  reason  to  hope,  however,  that  since  the  modern  systematist 
has  detected  and  removed  the  imperfections  of  Newton,  the 
future  critic  will  be  able  to  detect  and  to  remove  the  flaws  that 
are  latent  in  our  current  system.  The  history  of  the  concept  of 
mass  is  repeated  in  that  of  the  other  dimensions.  No  one  who 
is  acquainted  with  the  problem  of  framing  the  axioms  of  geom- 
etry and  kinematics  is  going  to  stake  much  on  the  perfection  of 
any  system  that  has  yet  been  advanced,  but  neither  can  one  find 
any  single  difficulty  which  from  Euclid  to  Hilbert  and  Poincare, 
for  example,  has  not  been  overcome. 

We  may  then  take  this  attitude  toward  the  first  class  of  a  priori 
objections  to  the  mechanical  ideal,  namely  :  that  if  no  definition 
of  the  terms  in  which  we  have  presented  this  ideal  is  beyond 
danger  of  attack,  yet  no  one  inadequacy  has  been  discovered 
which  has  remained  beyond  remedy. 

Now  let  us  turn  to  the  second  class  of  a  priori  objections. 
They  are  advanced  by  the  heirs  to  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  that 
"everything  in  nature  takes  place  for  the  sake  of  an  end."  It 
is  not  easy  to  determine  just  how  broad  and  just  how  narrow  was 
the  '  nature '  contemplated  by  Aristotle,  nor  yet  to  what  extent 
things  taking  place  for  the  sake  of  an  end  were  also,  in  his  view, 
parts  of  a  mechanism.  But  in  the  sequel  the  possession  of  a 
nature  that  could  be  defined  in  the  terms  of  the  end  sought  and 
" always  or  for  the  most  part"  attained,  was  frequently  enough 
supposed  to  demonstrate  the  inadequacy  of  mechanical  explana- 
tion. Thus  Aquinas :  "  We  see  that  certain  things  lacking  percep- 
tion, sci.  natural  bodies,  act  for  the  sake  of  an  end .  .  .  But  things 
which  have  no  perception  can  only  tend  toward  an  end  if  directed 
by  a  conscious  and  intelligent  being.  Therefore  there  is  an  intel- 
ligence, by  which  all  natural  things  are  ordered  to  an  end."1 

1  Summa  theol.,  I,  quaest.  2,  art.  3. 


274  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW,         [VOL.  XIII. 

The  most  significant  modern  representative  of  the  point  of 
view  which  Aristotle  sought  to  make  final  is  the  science  of  biol- 
ogy. It  was  in  this  field,  it  will  be  remembered,  that  Kant  im- 
agined the  demonstration  of  the  inadequacy  of  mechanism  to  be 
complete.  "  It  is  quite  certain,"  he  writes,  "  that  we  can  never 
adequately  know,  still  less  explain,  organisms  and  their  intrinsic 
possibility  in  terms  of  the  purely  mechanical  principles  of  nature. 
It  is  so  certain,  indeed,  that  it  is  an  absurdity  for  men  even  to 
make  the  attempt,  or  to  hope  that  another  Newton  may  arise  who 
could  make  so  much  as  the  production  of  a  blade  of  grass  intel- 
ligible in  terms  of  natural  laws  that  are  not  directed  by  a  pur- 
pose. An  insight  of  this  kind  must  be  absolutely  denied  us." 

Perhaps  the  most  helpful  way  of  studying  the  present  attitude 
of  biology  toward  this  question  is  to  sketch  its  recent  history,  or 
at  least  a  typical  phase  of  that  history.  There  is  nothing  more 
characteristic  of  the  mechanical  ideal  in  its  practical  working  out 
than  the  effort  to  divide  the  larger  bodies  with  which  our  experi- 
ence presents  us  into  spatial  parts,  to  accord  to  these  parts  as 
few  attributes  as  possible,  then  to  seek  to  reconstruct  the  original 
body  out  of  these  primordia  rerum.  In  biology  the  structure 
that  first  suggested  itself  as  a  convenient  unit  of  composition  was 
the  cell,  and  the  method  which  considered  the  cell  to  be  related 
to  the  organism  as  the  Democritian  atom  is  related  to  the  body 
composed  of  such  atoms  has  been  called  the  '  cell  theory.'  The 
distinct  formulation  of  the  cell  theory  goes  back  to  Schleiden  and 
Schwann.  In  1838  Schleiden,  confining  his  attention  to  plants, 
writes :  "  Each  cell  leads  a  double  life,  an  independent  one  per- 
taining to  its  own  development  alone,  and  another  incidental  in 
so  far  as  it  has  become  an  integral  part  of  the  plant."  In  1839 
Schwann  extends  the  concept  to  all  organisms  :  "  Each  cell  is 
within  certain  limits  an  individual  and  independent  whole.  The 
vital  phenomena  of  one  are  repeated  entirely  or  in  part  in  all  the 
rest.  These  individuals,  however,  are  not  arranged  side  by  side 
as  an  aggregate,  but  so  operate  together  in  a  manner  unknown 
to  us  as  to  produce  an  harmonious  whole."  l  And  again,  "  The 

1  Taken  from  Whitman,  "Inadequacy  of  the  Cell  Theory  of  Development," 
Journal  of  Morphology ',  Vol.  viii,  pp.  639  ff. 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION.  275 

whole  organism  subsists  only  by  means  of  the  reciprocal  action 
of  the  single  elementary  parts." 

Except  for  an  occasional  vagueness,  such  as  the  reference  to 
"an  harmonious  whole,"  and  except  for  the  substitution  of  the 
'  life '  of  a  cell  for  the  mere  '  existence '  of  an  atom,  the  pre- 
ceding description  might  have  served  Newton  to  depict  the  anat- 
omy and  physiology  of  all  physical  bodies,  merely  changing 
'  cell '  into  '  atom.' 

Of  course,  the  cell  theory  is  not  yet  mechanical,  since  it 
merely  assumes  the  living  cell,  and  in  connection  with  it  implies 
terms  of  description  and  explanation  that  are  not  immediately 
susceptible  of  mechanical  definition,  nor  even  of  physico-chem- 
ical definition.  Yet  since  the  phenomena  of  cell  life  are  to  a 
much  greater  extent  capable  of  a  physico-chemical  treatment 
than  those  of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  it  is  natural  that  the  cell 
theory  should  be  looked  upon  by  those  who  defend  it,  as  well  as 
by  those  who  oppose  it,  as  an  effort  in  the  direction  of  mechan- 
ical explanation,  and  that  it  should  seem  to  an  onlooker  that  a 
biology  which  found  itself  to  be  drifting  away  from  the  cell 
theory  had  abandoned  the  hope  of  mechanical  explanation  in  its 
field.  That  biology  is  taking  this  course  is  the  view  of  some  of 
its  most  prominent  representatives. 

The  writers  in  question,  differing  as  they  do  on  points  of  de- 
tail, are  at  least  agreed  on  this  proposition  :  That  we  know  no 
laws  of  the  individual  cell  or  of  the  interaction  of  cells  such  as 
would  explain  the  behavior  of  that  aggregate  of  cells  we  call  an 
organism.  Some,  at  least,  of  the  laws  of  the  organism  must  treat 
it  as  indivisible.  A  favorite  figure  of  those  who  take  this  stand- 
point,—  the  "organism  standpoint,"  as  Whitman  calls  it, —  is 
borrowed  from  chemistry.  "  It  can  be  shown,  I  think,"  says 
Morgan,  "with  some  probability,  that  the  forming  organism  is 
of  such  a  kind  that  we  can  better  understand  its  action  when  we 
consider  it  as  a  whole  and  not  simply  as  the  sum  of  a  vast  num- 
ber of  smaller  elements.  To  draw  ...  a  rough  parallel ;  just 
as  the  properties  of  sugar  are  peculiar  to  the  molecule  and  can- 
not be  accounted  for  as  the  sum  total  of  the  properties  of  the 
atoms  of  carbon,  hydrogen,  and  oxygen  of  which  the  molecule  is 


276  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

made  up,  so  the  properties  of  the  organism  are  connected  with 
its  whole  organization  and  are  not  simply  those  of  its  individual 
cells,  or  lower  units."  1  So  Whitman  compares  the  organism  of 
many  cells  to  a  complex  molecule.  "  The  complex  unit  bears 
not  only  the  structure  of  its  individual  parts,  but  also  a  totally 
new  structure  formed  by  the  union  of  these  parts."  2 

The  concrete  facts  which   these   statements   are  intended  to 
summarize  are  these  : 

1.  The  relation  between  two  structures  which  the  biologist 
calls  '  homology,'  may  exist  between  a  unicellular  and  a  mul- 
ticellular  body.     "So  far  as  homology  is  concerned,  the  exis- 
tence of  cells  may  be  ignored."  3 

2.  In  the  process  of  development  a  unicellular  organ  may  re- 
place in  one  organism  a  multicellular  organ  in  another.     The 
laws  of  growth  of  an  organism  must  be  formulated  in  terms  of 
the  organism  as  a  whole,  and  not  in  terms  of  its  cells,  if  we  are 
to  have  "  continuity  of  organization."     "  Continuity  of  organi- 
zation means  only  that  a  definite  structure  foundation  must  be 
taken  as  the  starting-point  of  each  organism,  and  that  the  organ- 
ism is  not  multiplied  by  cell  division  but  rather  continued  as  an 
individuality  through  all  the  stages  of  transformation  and  sub- 
division in  the  cells."  4 

3.  The  important  phenomena  of  regeneration. 

(a)  The  phenomena  of  (  polarity.'     "We  find  that  a  piece  of  a 
bilateral  animal  regenerates  a  new7  anterior  end  from  the  part  that 
lay  nearer  to  the  anterior  end  of  the  original  animal,  a  new  right 
side  from  the  part  that  was  nearest  the  original  right  side,  and  a 
new  dorsal  part  from  the  region  that  lay  near  the  original  dorsal 
part,  etc."     Since  the  character  of  the  cells  constituting  the  two 
surfaces  of  a  single  section  cannot  greatly  differ,  the  nature  of  the 
growth  on  them  must  be  due  to  the  "  structural  relation  of  each 
to  the  whole  to  which  each  belongs."  5 

(b)  The  phenomena  of  growth.     For  example,  in  the  growth 

1  Regeneration,  p.  278. 

2  Whitman,  loc.  cit.,  p.  641. 
*  Ibid,,  p.  645. 

« /#</.,  p.  646. 

5  Morgan,  loc.  cit.,  p.  280. 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION.  277 

of  the  tail  of  a  fish  after  an  oblique  section,  that  part  is  found  to 
grow  the  faster  which  has  the  greater  growth  to  accomplish  be- 
fore it  recovers  its  normal  proportion  to  the  other  dimensions  of 
the  original.  "These  results  show  very  clearly  that  in  some  way 
the  development  of  the  typical  form  of  the  tail  influences  the  rate 
of  growth  at  different  points.  Although  the  physiological  con- 
ditions would  seem  to  admit  the  maximum  rate  of  growth  over 
the  entire  cut-edge,  this  only  takes  place  in  those  parts  that  give 
the  new  tail  its  characteristic  form."1 

So  much  for  the  organism  standpoint  and  the  concrete  facts 
upon  which  it  is  based.  Whether  it  does  or  does  not  present  an 
obstacle  to  the  realization  of  a  mechanical  ideal,  depends  upon  the 
way  in  which  it  is  interpreted,  and,  so  far  as  I  can  discover,  three 
constructions  have  been  put  upon  it. 

1.  The  cell  being  unsuitable  to  serve  as  a  biological  element 
which,   itself    without  organization,   produces  an  organism   by 
division,  combination,  and  interaction,  a  smaller  unit  is  sought. 
"  If  the  formative  processes  cannot  be  referred  to  cell  division,  to 
what  can  they  be  referred  ?     .     .    .     The  answer  to  our  question 
.    .     .    will  find  the  secret  of  organization,  growth,  and  develop- 
ment not  in  cell  formation,  but  in  those  ultimate  elements  of  living 
matter  for  which  idiosomes  seems  to  me  an  appropriate  name. 
What  these  idiosomes  are    ...    is  the  problem."1     Such  an 
outcome  means  that  the  organization  standpoint  is  far  from  being 
a  step  away  from  the  mechanical  ideal ;  instead  of  posing  the 
problem  of  physico-chemical  explanation  when  analysis  has  been 
carried  as  far  back  as  the  cell,  the  whole  discussion  is  postponed 
until  we  have  arrived  at  the   'idiosome.'     So    understood,  the 
organization   standpoint    means    to  correct,  not   the  ideal  of  a 
biological  unit,  but  the  identification  of  the  cell  with  that  unit. 

2.  A  second  point  of  view  is  that  defined  latterly  by  Driesch, 
to  whom  the  phenomena  which  we  have  referred  to  as  organic 
appeal    with    particular   force.     The  laws  of  regeneration    and 
growth  are  not  to  be  found  in   the  properties  of  the  cell,  nor  of 
any  smaller  organic  element,  nor  of  the  inorganic  constituents  of 

1  op.  dt.,  P.  133. 

2  Whitman,  loc.  cit.,  p.  65^. 


278  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

organic  matter.  They  "  do  not  fall  within  any  type  of  law 
known  to  the  inorganic  sciences,  but  require  us  to  assume  a  new, 
peculiar,  and  peculiarly  evidenced  kind  of  elementary  (that  is,  not 
further  analyzable)  law,  and  this  necessity  results  from  the  fact 
that  no  physico-chemical  mechanism  can  be  imagined  by  means 
of  which  the  phenomena  in  question  can  be  reproduced."  1  The 
observations  upon  which  Driesch  bases  so  important  a  conclusion 
are  not  particularly  recondite.  Organisms  can  be  found  which 
have  the  following  properties  :  (i)  from  any  part  the  whole  may 
be  regenerated  ;  (2)  any  part  can  be  made  to  yield  any  part  of 
the  regenerated  whole.2  These  characteristics  give  rise  to  two 
reflections.  In  the  first  place,  the  phenomenon  of  regeneration 
here  studied  cannot  be  subsumed  under  physico-chemical  laws. 
For,  observe  the  regeneration  of  any  segment ;  at  some  point  of 
the  segment  differentiation  begins.  If  we  are  to  explain  the 
process  in  physico-chemical  terms,  either  this  point  must  differ  in 
physico-chemical  structure  from  its  neighbors,  or  it  must  be 
differently  stimulated  from  without.  But  the  latter  alternative  is 
easily  excluded  by  experimental  control.  Nor  can  the  former  be 
true,  since  any  neighboring  point  could  have  been  made  the  seat 
of  differentiation  by  properly  choosing  the  site  of  section.  In  the 
second  place,  the  laws  which  the  process  of  regeneration  actually 
does  obey  are  not  mechanical,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  follow- 
ing analysis  of  them. 

Suppose  we  were  given  the  problem  to  predict  the  point  at 
which  differentiation  would  occur  in  a  given  case.  What  data 
should  we  need,  and  what  type  of  formula  should  we  make  use 
of?  We  should  have  to  know  (i)  the  type  of  organism  to  which 
the  experimental  fragment  belonged,  (2)  the  stage  of  the  growth 
of  each  part  operated  upon,  and  (3)  the  site  of  the  operation. 
We  may,  I  take  it,  conceive  the  first  datum  to  be  given  as  a 
system  of  ratios,  each  point  in  the  organism  being  characterized 
by  the  ratios  of  its  distance  from  certain  determinate  points  (say 
the  poles  of  the  axis  or  axes  of  symmetry).  Such  ratios  are 

1  Driesch,   "Die    Legalisation  morphogenetischer   Vorgange,"    Archiv  f.    Ent- 
ivickclungsmechanik  der  Organismen^  Vol.  viii,  p.  99. 

2  To  both  of  these  statements  there  are  obvious  limits,  which,  however,  do  not 
affect  the  present  discussion.     Cf.  loc.  cit.,  p.  72  f. 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION.  279 

obviously  independent  of  the  absolute  size  of  the  mature  organism, 
or  of  any  other  peculiarity  of  the  individual  case  experimented 
upon.  The  second  datum  is  given  in  the  same  way,  though, 
unlike  the  first,  it  depends  on  time  as  a  variable,  or  at  least  upon 
the  typical  ratio  of  the  time  taken  to  acquire  a  given  form  to  the 
time  taken  to  attain  the  typical  form  represented  in  (i).  For 
any  given  experimental  case  data  (i)  and  (2)  are  evidently  of  the 
nature  of  fixed  parameters,  and  the  point  of  differentiation  will 
depend  on  (3),  the  site  of  the  operation,  as  the  only  variable. 
We  may  readily  imagine  the  working  out  of  the  formula  in  an 
illustrative  case.  Suppose  the  segment  resulting  from  the  experi- 
mental operation  were  a  tube,  and  that  the  first  differentiation 
"  necessary  to  pass  from  this  form  to  the  type-form  (i)"  were 
recognized  to  be  a  constriction  of  the  tube,  we  may  imagine  that 
our  formula  would  yield  us  a  coefficient  dependent  upon  (i)  and 
(2)  and  an  absolute  dimension,  say  the  length  of  the  single  axis 
of  symmetry  from  section  to  section  determined  by  (3).  We 
should  then  locate  the  constriction  at  a  distance  from  one  pole  of 
the  axis  equal  to  a  fractional  part  of  the  whole  length  of  the 
axis,  the  value  of  this  fraction  being  the  coefficient  calculated 
from  the  formula. 

A  science  which  makes  use  of  such  formulae  as  the  foregoing 
must  be,  in  Driesch's  opinion,  sui  generis. 

There  are  many  points  in  Driesch's  article  that  would  make 
interesting  topics  for  discussion,  e.  g.y  his  conception  of  the 
'  type '  as  the  '  end '  of  regeneration  and  growth,  to  attain 
which  a  given  differentiation  is  *  necessary '  ;  but  the  whole  con- 
cept of  end  and  of  necessary  means  is  better  left  for  another 
occasion  when  it  may  be  given  fuller  treatment.  For  the  present, 
we  may  content  ourselves  with  examining  the  two  main  theses  of 
the  argument  as  now  explained.  The  first  maintained  that  what- 
ever the  laws  determining  differentiation  might  be,  they  could 
not  be  physico-chemical ;  the  second  supposed  itself  in  pos- 
session of  these  laws,  and  pointed  out  that  they  were  not  physico- 
chemical. 

As  to  the  first,  let  it  be  admitted  that  there  is  no  difference 
definable  in  physico-chemical  terms  between  the  point  at  which 


280*  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

differentiation  takes  place  and  its  fellows.  There  is  yet  a  differ- 
ence definable  in  geometrical  terms,  and  with  this  must  come  a 
difference  in  the  kind  of  stimuli  affecting  the  point.1  A  some- 
what analogous  case  is  presented  in  the  phenomenon  of  magnet- 
ization. Any  point  of  a  soft  iron  core  may  be  made  a  pole  by 
properly  sectioning  the  piece,  yet  the  piece  of  iron  is  physico- 
chemically  homogeneous  and  we  select  a  constant  magnetic  field. 
It  is  exactly  its  geometrical  peculiarity  that  differentiates  the 
physical  conditions  at  this  point  from  those  that  exist  at  neigh- 
boring points. 

The  second  consideration  points  to  the  laws  that  determine 
differentiation,  and  shows  that  they  are  not  physico-chemical  in 
their  nature.  The  chief  distinction  is  that  these  laws  state  the 
processes  that  take  place  at  one  point  to  be  a  function  of  its 
geometrical  relation  to  other  remote  points,  making  no  mention 
of  the  structures  that  are  located  between  these  points.2  In  the 
fact  that  the  laws  of  biology  do  neglect  certain  details,  I  think 
that  Driesch  has  put  his  finger  on  that  which  characterizes 
biology  as  a  science,  and  the  peculiar  way  in  which  this  elimi- 
nation is  effected  ought  to  serve  as  a  definition  of  this  science. 
But  the  fact  that  by  a  process  of  elimination  we  can  obtain  laws 
in  which  new  kinds  of  data  are  demanded,  new  kinds  of  formulae 
used,  does  not  mean  that  we  have  a  new  science,  or,  in  the  ter- 
minology of  this  article,  does  not  show  that  we  have  introduced 
a  new  dimension.  Nothing  is  more  common  in  the  handling  of 
purely  mechanical  problems  than  to  effect  just  this  kind  of  elim- 
ination. Thus,  to  take  one  case,  by  calling  approximately  rigid 
connections  absolutely  rigid,  we  are  able  in  mechanical  systems 
to  '  eliminate  '  coordinates,  that  is,  to  neglect  detail.  As  a  result 
of  this  elimination,  we  frequently  obtain  formulae  which  introduce 
new  terms.  The  law,  "  the  work  we  can  get  out  of  a  machine  is 
equal  to  the  work  we  put  into  it,"  is  such  a  formula,  and  can  be 

1  We  here  accept  Driesch' s  contention  that  the  stimulation  of  a  point  by  its  neigh- 
bors is  as  much  to  be  accounted  stimulus  (as  opposed  to  structure)  as  is  the  stimu- 
lation from  causes  quite  independent  of  the  organism. 

2  This  I  take  to  be  the  chief  outcome  of  Driesch' s  demonstration  of  vitalism.     His 
use  of  the  concept  '  action  at  a  distance '  is  a  help  to  the  imagination  to  which  the 
author  is  entitled  if  he  be  not  confused  thereby,  and  I  see  no  evidence  that  Driesch 
has  attached  any  undue  importance  to  the  device. 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION.  '  281 

applied  in  practice  to  the  measure  of  internal  work  without  con- 
sidering at  all  the  construction  of  the  machine. 

In  a  word,  Driesch  does  not  show  physico-chemical  explanation 
to  be  impossible  in  the  field  of  biology,  and  does  not  convince  us 
that  the  formulae  here  used  are  other  than  such  as  would  result 
from  eliminating  detail  in  the  physico-chemical  process,  after  a 
fashion  that  is  perfectly  familiar  to  us. 

3.  The  foregoing  criticism  of  Driesch  may  be  taken  as  a  fitting 
introduction  to  the  third  interpretation  of  the  organism  view, — 
the  one  which,  so  far  as  the  present  writer  has  observed,  is  the 
most  common  among  the  biologists  of  the  day.  This  view  ad- 
mits the  existence  of  laws  peculiar  to  biology,  making  it  for  the 
present  an  independent  science  in  the  sense  that  no  knowledge 
of  the  physics  and  chemistry  of  the  cell  or  of  any  other  unit  will 
enable  us  to  replace  these  laws  in  the  business  of  prediction. 
But  though  these  laws  may  at  present  be  indispensable  and  irre- 
ducible, though  they  may  be  permanently  true  and  useful,  the 
establishment  of  their  existence  cannot  constitute  a  '  demonstra- 
tion '  of  the  vitalistic  standpoint  in  the  sense  urged  by  Driesch. 
In  spite  of  the  absence  of  a  physico-chemical  explanation  of  such 
phenomena,  is  there  any  reason  to  suppose  such  an  explanation 
to  be  impossible  ?  Morgan  sums  up  the  data  upon  which  we 
can  base  an  answer,  as  follows,  (i)  The  action  of  poisons,  the 
formation  of  galls,  the  effect  of  lithium  salts  (Herbst),  changes 
due  to  light,  gravity,  contact,  etc.,  are  best  understood  from  the 
physico-chemical  standpoint.  (2)  The  effect  of  '  internal '  factors 
is  less  easily  brought  under  this  point  of  view.  Thus  the 
growth  of  an  egg  "  we  find  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  attribute 
to  external  causes,  yet  ...  the  first  steps  through  which  this 
takes  place  can  be  referred  to  physico-causal  principles.  These 
are  the  separation  of  the  piece  from  the  whole  ;  the  change  of 
the  unsymmetrical  piece  into  a  symmetrical  one,  brought  about, 
in  part  at  least,  by  contractile  phenomena  in  the  piece,  aided,  no 
doubt,  in  some  cases  by  surface  tension,  etc.  .  .  .  We  find  here 
the  beginning  of  a  physico-causal  change,  and  ...  we  have  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  at  one  step  in  the  process  this  passes  into 
the  vitalistic  causal  principle."  Having  insisted  upon  the  present 


282  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

impossibility  of  offering  a  complete  physico-chemical  explana- 
tion, the  author  concludes  :  "  Shall  we,  therefore,  call  ourselves 
vitalists  ?  .  .  .  I  see  no  ground  for  accepting  a  vitalistic  principle 
that  is  not  a  physico-causal  one,  but  perhaps  a  different  one  from 
any  known  at  present  to  the  physicist  or  chemist."  l 

The  preceding  sketch  of  a  certain  phase  of  development  in 
biological  science  has  been  given  in  the  belief  that  it  is  here,  if 
anywhere  in  experience,  that  we  must  look  for  facts  that  promise 
ultimately  to  resist  mechanical  explanation.  If  such  facts  were 
unanimously  urged  by  the  leading  biologists  of  the  day,  one 
would  still  accept  their  conclusion  with  caution,  realizing  how 
difficult  it  would  be  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  what  is  '  ultimately ' 
possible  and  impossible.  But  as  it  is,  the  weight  of  technical 
opinion,  and  of  that  branch  of  technical  opinion  which  is  most  im- 
pressed with  the  error  of  certain  hasty  steps  leading  too  directly 
toward  the  ^/tf^'-mechanical  theory  of  life  processes, —  the  weight 
of  this  opinion  will  recognize  neither  a  '  demonstration '  nor  a 
balance  of  probability  in  favor  of  the  failure  of  the  mechanical  ideal. 
If  a  layman  may  venture  to  estimate  the  best  biological  opinion,  it 
would  sum  up  to  this :  Laws  which  are  not  mechanical,  such  as  those 
having  reference  to  ends  (Pfluger  and  Wolff),  and  those  employ- 
ing concepts  like  actio  in  distans  (Driesch),  are  valuable  in  biology 
and  make  prediction  possible  where  it  would  not  be  possible  if 
we  were  to  confine  ourselves  to  mechanical  terms ;  but  this  value 
is  either  temporary,  while  we  await  a  better  mechanical  insight 
(Haacke),  or  if  permanent,  it  is  in  the  nature  of  an  economic  de- 
vice. In  any  case,  the  existence  of  non-mechanical  laws  does 
not  excuse  us  from  the  search  for  more  elementary  mechanical 
laws ;  still  less  does  it  give  an  assurance  that  such  a  search  must 
remain  permanently  unsuccessful. 

The  writer  has  advanced  the  opinion  that  if  the  inadequacy 
of  the  mechanical  ideal  cannot  be  demonstrated  from  those 
aspects  of  nature  studied  by  the  biologist,  then  in  no  other  region 
of  experience  can  we  expect  to  find  such  a  demonstration.  This 
opinion  must  be  left  for  the  present  as  a  conjecture  based  on  ex- 
perience ;  the  present  paper  does  not  pretend  to  have  exhausted 

1  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  285  ff. 


No.  3.]  ON  MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION.  283 

all  the  historical  motives  that  have  led  thinkers  to  oppose  the 
mechanical  ideal.  For  example,  it  takes  no  account  of  the  large 
body  of  opinion  which  opposes  to  the  mechanical,  not  another 
kind  of  law  (teleological,  vitalistic),  but  the  alternative  of  no  law 
at  all.  In  some  of  its  aspects  the  doctrine  of  liber  arbitrium  would 
have  to  be  so  interpreted.1  But  these  more  general  problems 
would  carry  us  beyond  the  regions  we  could  profitably  discuss  in 
brief  space.  We  must,  then,  be  content  with  the  best  example  of 
opposition  to  a  mechanical  ideal  with  which  history  presents  us, 
and  pass  on  to  a  new  question.  If,  namely,  we  can  find  in  expe- 
rience no  obstacle  to  our  progress  in  the  direction  indicated  by 
the  mechanical  ideal,  can  we  find  any  reason  for  supposing  this 
progress  to  be  necessarily  continuous  ?  Or,  again,  if  we  were  to 
attain  the  goal  defined,  should  we  have  reached  the  final  solution 
of  the  problem  of  explanation  ?  In  a  word,  if  there  is  no  justifi- 
cation in  present  knowledge  for  predicting  the  failure  of  the  me- 
chanical ideal,  is  there  any  safer  ground  for  predicting  its  success  ? 
But  this  chapter  of  the  discussion  must,  as  has  been  said,  be  re- 
served for  a  future  occasion. 

EDGAR  A.  SINGER,  JR. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

1  Perhaps  the  standpoint  taken  by  Renouvier  and  Piat  in  their  Nouvelle  monadologie 
may  be  taken  as  giving  the  most  systematic  presentation.  On  this  see  the  author, 
PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW,  Vol.  viii,  pp.  638  f. 


PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL  CATEGORY.1 

THE  category  of  purpose,  after  having  fallen  into  discredit  for 
a  long  time,  has  begun  recently  to  reassert  its  right  to  a 
central  place  in  philosophical  theories  and  discussions.  There 
is,  however,  an  important  difference  between  the  old  teleology 
and  the  new.  The  former  view  endeavored  to  interpret  the 
world  in  the  light  of  some  objective  purpose,  which  was  regarded 
either  as  immanent  in  the  world,  or  as  having  a  transcendent  ex- 
istence in  the  mind  of  God.  The  new  teleology,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  subjective  and  individual  in  character,  and  maintains  that 
in  the  needs  and  ends  of  our  personal  lives  we  find  the  only  possi- 
ble key  to  the  interpretation  and  evaluation  of  reality.  It  is  thus, 
as  has  sometimes  been  observed,  essentially  in  harmony  with 
that  modern  spirit  which,  as  a  foe  to  all  absolutism,  refuses  alle- 
giance to  external  standards,  and  judges  everything  in  accordance 
with  its  bearing  on  human  life  and  human  interests. 

There  is  nothing  essentially  new  in  principle,  I  think,  in  this 
general  tendency  of  current  thought.  There  is  much  in  the  doc- 
trine that  connects  it  with  Fichte,  and  still  more  closely  with 
Positivism,  and  with  many  forms  of  the  neo-Kantianism  of  our  own 
day.  During  the  last  dozen  years  or  so,  the  theory  has  been 
advanced  from  many  sides,  apparently  worked  out  from  dif- 
ferent standpoints,  and  with  a  correspondent  diversity  in  its  em- 
phasis upon  particular  points.  Mach,  Karl  Pearson,  and  many 
others  who  draw  their  material  primarily  from  the  physical  sci- 
ences, agree  with  those  who  have  approached  the  matter  from  the 
standpoint  of  philosophy  and  psychology  in  regarding  thought  as 
instrumental  in  character,  and  subordinate  to  the  practical  ends 
of  human  will.  Professor  James  has  expounded  the  doctrine  in 
a  number  of  essays,  bringing  into  popular  use  the  term  'Prag- 
matism '  proposed  some  twenty-five  years  ago  by  Mr.  C.  S. 
Peirce.  In  the  hands  of  Professor  Dewey  and  those  associated 
with  him  at  the  University  of  Chicago,  the  position  has  been  much 

1  Read  before  the  American  Philosophical  Association,  Princeton,  N.  J.,  Decem- 
ber 29,  1903. 

284 


PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL    CATEGORY.  285 

strengthened  and  elaborated  by  being  brought  into  connection 
with  the  general  standpoint  of  evolutionary  science.  It  thus  ap- 
pears as  a  comprehensive  theory  of  experience,  in  the  form  of  a 
genetic  and  evolutionary  psychology  that  furnishes  the  general 
standpoint  from  which  the  problems  of  logic,  ethics,  and  the  other 
philosophical  disciplines  are  to  be  worked  out  in  a  systematic  way. 
Whatever  one's  final  judgment  may  be,  one  cannot  fail  to  receive 
intellectual  stimulus  and  suggestion  from  this  new  movement,  or 
to  recognize  the  strength  and  persuasiveness  of  the  exposition  and 
illustration  that  it  has  received  at  Professor  Dewey's  hands.1 

I. 

The  general  theses  of  the  current  teleological  doctrines  have 
been  so  often  set  forth  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  attempt 
here  any  extended  summary.  Their  fundamental  postulates  or 
principles  may  perhaps  be  stated  in  the  following  way  :  Thought 
is  a  particular  function  or  activity  within  experience,  not  the  uni- 
versal form  or  constituent  element  of  conscious  life.  It  is  always 
instrumental  in  character,  having  for  its  object  the  discovery  of 
ways  in  which  the  purposes  and  needs  of  the  practical  life  can  be 
realized  in  action.  It  is  thus  always  determined  by  its  relation 
to  a  specific  situation  and  to  a  definite  problem.  Moreover,  its 
standard  of  success  and  test  of  adequacy  is  found  in  the  practical 
success  which  it  achieves.  From  this  it  follows,  negatively,  that 
thought  has  no  ontological  reference  beyond  experience.  It  is 
not  its  business  to  know  or  define  a  reality  in  any  sense  outside 
or  independent  of  the  experience  of  the  individual.  As  a  re- 
constructive function  of  experience,  it  necessarily  works  within 

1  As  I  do  not  intend  in  what  follows  to  refer  specifically  to  this  position,  though  I 
have  attempted  to  consider  the  principles  that  underlie  it,  a  word  in  criticism  of  a  gen- 
eral tendency  that  seems  to  be  present  in  many  if  not  all  of  its  advocates  may 
perhaps  be  allowed.  What  I  refer  to  is  probably  a  natural  expression  on  the  part  of 
these  writers  of  their  enthusiastic  belief  and  confidence  in  the  novelty,  importance,  and 
all-inclusiveness  of  the  method  they  are  pursuing.  It  results,  however,  in  a  tendency 
to  appropriate,  as  something  peculiar  to  their  own  position,  principles  and  insights 
that  have  long  been  common  property,  and  thus  to  leave  on  the  reader's  mind  an 
impression  of  hastiness  or  lack  of  accurate  historical  knowledge.  The  same  unfor- 
tunate impression  is  also  produced  by  the  impatience  shown  in  dealing  with  the  views 
of  others  that  leads  these  writers  occasionally  to  anathematize  their  opponents  as 
'belated,  prehistoric,  anti-evolutionary  ontologists.' 


286  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

the  limits  that  the  latter  sets,  and  in  the  service  of  the  practical 
ends  to  which  it  gives  rise. 

These  propositions  are  supported  by  various  lines  of  argument. 
The  obvious  use  and  importance  of  knowledge  for  practical  pur- 
poses, the  historical  fact  that  the  sciences  have  grown  up  in  re- 
sponse to  practical  necessities,  and  the  close  and  essential  con- 
nection between  idea  and  action  in  the  psychological  life,  are  all 
brought  forward  by  various  writers.  In  addition,  however,  there 
are  two  lines  of  argument  adduced  that  seem  still  more  signifi- 
cant. In  the  first  place,  the  purposive  or  teleological  view  is 
sustained  by  regarding  thought  as  a  function  of  life  in  general, 
which  in  itself  sets  no  new  ends,  but  appears  upon  the  scene  as  a 
favorable  variation  in  the  service  of  ends  already  present,  and  can 
therefore  be  treated  in  analogy  with  the  other  functions  of  life. 
And,  secondly,  the  supposed  difficulties  of  the  ontological  or  ab- 
solute view  are  made  to  furnish  indirect  or  negative  support  to  this 
position.  For  this  new  view  of  thought  avoids,  it  is  claimed,  the 
insuperable  difficulties  and  inevitable  contradictions  of  any  theory 
that  assumes  that  thought  has  to  know  a  transcendent  object. 
Quite  apart  from  the  impossibility  of  understanding  how  thought 
could  ever  set  itself  such  a  task,  the  ontological  view,  it  is  claimed, 
affords  no  possible  test  of  success  or  failure  in  its  performance. 
'No  bell  rings/  as  Professor  James  graphically  puts  it,  as  a  signal 
that  thought  has  reached  its  goal. 

When  we  turn  to  examine  these  arguments,  we  must  say  that 
at  least  those  first  enumerated  do  not  seem  conclusive,  even  if  we 
accept  them  in  the  form  in  which  they  are  commonly  stated.  That 
knowledge  is  actually  employed  as  a  guide  of  life,  does  not  imply 
that  this  is  its  sole  or  even  its  chief  function.  It  would  be  equally 
cogent  to  argue  that  the  practical  activities  exist  only  as  means  to 
knowledge,  since  we  do  frequently  find  them  employed  in  this  ser- 
vice. Nor,  in  the  second  place,  does  the  close  psychological  con- 
nection of  idea  and  action  require  us  to  conclude  that  the  former  is 
subordinated  to  the  latter.  The  process  of  knowing,  as  has  often 
been  pointed  out,  involves  will  and  purpose  in  the  form  of  interest, 
attention,  and  selection ;  but  this  is  not  a  complete  description  of 
the  psychological  situation.  In  any  genuine  case  of  knowing, 


No.  3.]  PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL    CATEGORY.  287 

there  must  also  be  present  an  objective  interest,  a  detachment 
from  the  personal  and  private  ends  of  our  will,  in  order  to  permit 
the  true  end  of  knowledge  to  be  realized.  The  facts  of  experi- 
ence, then,  when  we  look  at  all  sides,  seem  to  show  that  idea- 
tional  life  is  not  defined  or  determined  by  any  merely  individual 
end.  Instead  of  separating  the  ideational  and  the  volitional  ele- 
ments of  experience,  or  reducing  one  to  terms  of  the  other,  the 
facts  of  the  case  compel  us  rather  to  recognize  them  as  distin- 
guishable, though  not  distinct,  moments  in  the  total  attitude  of 
the  self  toward  reality. 

In  the  third  place,  it  does  not  follow,  even  if  we  grant  the  pre- 
mise, that  because  the  sciences  have  been  developed  through  the 
stimulus  of  practical  needs,  they  have  therefore  no  further  aim  or 
significance.  In  accordance  with  what  Wundt  calls  the  heter- 
ogony  of  ends,  we  may  suppose  that  the  process  of  development 
has  brought  into  view  in  more  highly  evolved  forms  of  conscious 
life  a  different  end,  —  that  of  knowledge,  —  which  may  now  be  of 
supreme  importance.  Apart  from  this,  however,  the  premise  of  the 
argument  may  well  be  questioned.  In  the  early  history  of  both  the 
individual  and  the  race,  practical  interests  and  needs  are  doubt- 
less most  insistent  and  absorbing,  and  largely  dominate  the  life. 
Freedom  from  the  most  pressing  needs  of  life  is  certainly  essen- 
tial to  any  progress  in  science.  But  it  is  doubtful  if  it  is  per- 
missible to  assume  that  the  disinterested  impulse  toward  knowl- 
edge is  entirely  absent  at  any  stage  of  human  consciousness.1 

II. 

However  confidently  we  may  turn  aside  these  commonplace 
ripples  of  argument,  we  cannot  forget  that  there  are  two  great 
waves  still  to  be  faced.  To  meet  these  we  shall  find  it  necessary 
to  lay  our  course  on  the  open  sea  with  philosophical  exactness, 
and  to  put  our  craft  in  the  best  possible  condition  to  meet  the 
shock. 

1  It  has  been  the  fashion  in  recent  genetic  studies  to  emphasize  the  dependence  of 
the  theoretical  on  the  practical.  But  there  are  many  facts  in  early  forms  of  conscious- 
ness that  are  plainly  expressions  of  a  genuine  wonder,  —  real  intellectual  curiosity, 
though  of  course  in  an  undeveloped  form,  —  that  conditions  in  various  ways  the  so- 
called  practical  activities. 


288  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

The  argument  from  biological  analogy  professedly  carries  with 
it  the  full  authority  and  weight  of  'current  evolutionary  science. 
It  points  out  that  the  idea,  like  everything  else,  is  developed  as 
a  necessary  function  within  experience.  The  idea,  it  is  said, 
comes  in  response  to  a  definite  demand  for  '  readjustment  and 
expansion  in  the  ends  and  means  of  life.'  It  thus  works  in  the 
service  of  life,  having  for  its  object  to  readjust  habits  in  the  light 
of  new  situations,  to  loosen  tensions  that  arise  within  experience, 
and,  in  general,  to  quiet  uneasiness,  restlessness,  and  pain.  Now, 
it  is  to  be  noted  that,  if  thought  is  to  be  regarded  as  analo- 
gous to  other  functions  of  life,  it  cannot  be  taken  as  setting  any 
new  ends  of  its  own  that  are  independent  of  the  ends  of  the  life 
of  the  organism  in  which  it  has  arisen.  The  problems  that  it  is 
called  to  solve  are  never  theoretical  problems,  difficulties  set  by 
the  intellect  itself.  For  if  this  were  the  case,  the  biological  view 
of  thought  would  be  completely  out  of  court ;  for  thinking  would 
be  no  longer  merely  performing  the  task  prescribed  by  the  organ- 
ism, or  by  unreflective  experience,  but  seeking  to  realize,  an  end 
which  is  quite  different  in  character. 

This  point  requires  to  be  carefully  noted ;  for  just  here,  as  we 
shall  see  more  explicitly  hereafter,  serious  ambiguity  arises  in  the 
use  that  is  made  of  terms  like  '  practical,'  and  '  the  demands  of 
life.'  It  is  surely  clear  that  one  cannot  blow  hot  and  cold  at  the 
same  time,  and  that  from  the  standpoint  of  the  present  argument 
'  practical  ends '  must  be  limited  to  those  which  belong  to  the 
organism,  or  which  are  in  some  sense  antecedent  to  thought. 
If  thought  sets  any  ends  of  its  own  and  works  for  their  realiza- 
tion, it  is  surely  clear  that  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  particular 
function  of  life,  and  treated  as  analogous  to  the  other  biological 
functions. 

The  whole  point  at  issue  here,  then,  is  whether  thought  can 
be  adequately  described  as  a  particular  function  of  experience. 
When  we  take  the  external  point  of  view,  looking  at  the  psycho- 
physical  individual  as  an  object  of  scientific  investigation,  we  can 
only  construe  thought  in  this  way,  and  such  an  interpretation  has  a 
certain  truth,  — it  may  be  that  this  is  the  only  truth  about  thought 
that  biological  science  is  able  to  furnish.  But  philosophy,  as  the 


No.  3.]  PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL    CATEGORY.  289 

science  of  experience,  occupies  a  different  view-point  from  that  of 
the  special  sciences.  It  looks  at  experience  from  within,  not  as 
an  object,  or  a  collection  of  objects,  but  in  its  immediate  rela- 
lations  to  the  knowing  and  willing  subject.  Now,  from  this 
point  of  view,  the  thought  function  is  seen  to  be  central  and  con- 
stitutive, not  an  external  process  of  reflection  superinduced  upon 
life  or  experience.  The  dualism  that  is  implied  between  the 
ideational  process  and  a  life  of  habit  or  feeling,  or  of  immediate 
values,  has  no  real  existence,  but  results  from  the  abstraction 
that  is  forced  upon  us  when  we  look  at  experience  from  the  out- 
side. From  the  internal  view-point  of  self-consciousness,  how- 
ever, thought,  —  not  as  an  abstract  reflective  principle,  but  as  the 
concrete  and  self-conscious  attitude  of  the  self,  which  includes 
will  and  purpose  as  an  essential  moment  of  its  own  life,  — 
thought,  in  this  sense,  is  seen  to  be  the  central  principle  that 
gives  to  experience  its  significance  and  its  possibility  of  inter- 
pretation. 

In  the  light  of  this  position  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  the 
so-called  '  practical '  ends  can  never  be  final  or  independent  ends 
for  a  rational  being.  They  only  find  a  place  within  such  a  life 
by  being  included  as  means  within  the  ultimate  ends  or  ideals  in 
which  the  self  expresses  the  unity  and  completness  of  its  own 
life.  In  the  realization  of  a  string  or  series  of  particular  pur- 
poses that  are  not  subordinated  to  an  ultimate  end,  there  can 
be  no  true  self-expression  or  self-realization. 

We  have  at  length  come  to  consider  the  indirect  support  that 
the  instrumental  view  of  knowledge  receives  through  the  alleged 
incapacity  of  all  ontological  systems  to  explain  how  thought  can 
deal  with  a  reality  that  in  any  sense  transcends  experience. 
There  is  no  test  of  thought,  it  is  urged,  but  the  practical  test  of 
success  as  shown  by  trial  and  experience  itself.  Reality  as  an 
ontological  system,  eternally  complete  and  finished,  and  thus 
contrasted  with  the  incompleteness  and  growing  adequacy  of  our 
experience,  is  an  unmeaning  abstraction,  something  that  does  not 
function  at  all  in  our  thought  and  is  dumb  to  our  successes  or 
failures. 


290  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

I  certainly  cannot  escape  the  conviction  that  those  who  put  their 
objections  in  this  form  have  not  understood  the  position  of  their 
opponents.  Everyone  would  admit  that  there  is  no  external  test 
of  truth,  and  that  the  standard  must  be  found  within  experience 
itself.  But  the  question  recurs  :  What  is  the  nature  of  experience  ? 
And  it  is  in  the  reading  or  interpretation  of  experience  that  many 
idealists  take  issue  with  those  whose  arguments  we  are  examin- 
ing. If,  as  the  latter  maintain,  the  experience  of  the  individual, 
in  its  essential  nature,  is  isolated  and  detached  as  a  finite  phe- 
nomenon, if  the  nature  of  a  larger  whole  does  not  function  con- 
stitutively  within  it  in  the  form  of  universal  principles,  then  all 
tests  of  truth  are  impossible,  practical  tests  no  less  than  theoretical, 
as  I  shall  presently  show.  But  if  (as  I  have  always  understood 
idealists  to  maintain)  experience  by  its  very  nature  involves  a  refer- 
ence to  reality,  the  case  is  not  so  hopeless.  For  then  the  reality 
which  is  taken  as  a  standard  is  not  external,  but  functions  as  an 
immanent  principle  within  experience.  It  does  not,  however, 
fall  wholly  within  any  individual  experience,  but  exists  as  the 
extension  and  supplementation  that  individual  experience  seeks 
and  demands.  It  is  this  relation  of  individual  thought  to  the 
reality  that  is  at  once  continuous  with  it  and  also  its  necessary  com- 
plement and  fulfilment,  that  finds  expression  within  experience  in 
the  aspects  of  universality  and  necessity.  These  are  not  char- 
acteristics of  ideas  as  such,  nor  is  an  idea  made  universal  through 
the  fact  of  its  existence  in  all  minds,  but  it  only  partakes  of  uni- 
versality and  necessity  through  being  an  element  within  an  ex- 
perience that  has  the  nature  of  reality  bound  up  with  itself. 

The  objective  or  ontological  view  does  not  then  have  to  under- 
take the  impossible  task,  which  its  opponents  would  thrust  upon 
it,  of  explaining  how  thought-in-itself  can  know  reality-in -itself. 
There  is  no  warrant  whatever  for  identifying  this  form  of  idealism 
with  the  older  representational  theories  of  knowledge.  The 
truth  is  that  it  was  just  this  school  of  thought  that  first  showed 
both  the  inadequacy  of  representationism,  and  the  possibility  of 
avoiding  its  difficulties  by  starting  from  a  truer  and  more  concrete 
view  of  experience.  Thought,  idealism  points  out,  has  no  ex- 
istence as  something  standing  apart  from  reality  ;  but,  in  Hegel's 


No.  3.]  PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL    CATEGORY.  291 

graphic  words,  it  is  its  very  nature  to  shut  us  together  with  things. 
No  bell  then  is  necessary  as  a  signal  that  our  thought  has  touched 
reality ;  every  real  thought  has  some  degree  of  truth,  even 
although  the  proposition  in  which  it  is  expressed  may  not  be 
adequate  to  the  expression  of  this  truth.  The  real  problem  in 
any  given  case,  therefore,  is  to  determine  which  of  two  or  more 
possible  ways  of  judging  about  reality  is  truer  and  more  adequate. 

Here  the  appeal  is  to  experience  itself,  but  to  experience  as 
systematized  by  thought.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  the 
system  to  which  we  appeal  is  not  a  fixed  circle  of  abstract  ideas 
that  have  the  power  of  determining  truth  through  their  own 
internal  consistency.  It  is  rather  the  concrete  and  fluid  process 
of  thinking,  in  which  the  nature  of  reality  functions  effectively, 
both  as  something  already  partially  determined,  and  also  as  that 
which  sets  the  ideal  for  further  determination.  As  thus  an  active 
process  of  transformation  directed  towards  the  realization  of  an 
ideal,  thought  seeks  to  extend  and  supplement  its  present  con- 
tent. It  looks  before  and  after,  and  seeks  guidance  and  direction 
from  every  quarter.  To  this  end,  it  appeals  to  direct  perceptive 
experence,  and  makes  use  of  trial  and  experiment  as  its  instru- 
ments. With  the  same  object  of  broadening  its  outlook,  it 
makes  use  of  the  opinions  of  other  men,  testing  and  correcting 
its  own  conclusions  by  the  light  which  these  results  afford. 
Herder  has  well  remarked  that  it  is  not  without  significance  that 
the  word  Vernunft  is  derived  from  Vernehmen,  to  learn  or  give 
ear  to.  For  reasoning  involves,  as  one  of  its  essential  moments, 
a  looking  abroad  and  learning  from  every  quarter,  not  in  an  atti- 
tude of  passive  receptivity,  but  with  a  mental  alertness  and  selective 
attention  that  employs  the  whole  process  of  experience  as  a 
means  of  realizing  and  fulfilling  its  own  ideal. 

For  this  view  of  reason  we  are  indebted  to  the  men  who  in- 
augurated the  historical  movement  at  the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  For  the  eighteenth  century  rationalists,  reason 
was  something  limited  and  self-enclosed.  That  is,  they  com- 
monly assumed  that  every  normal  person  had  only  to  look  into 
his  own  consciousness  to  know  what  is  reasonable.  Reason  was 
thus  regarded  as  an  infallible  organon,  which  each  individual  car- 


292  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

ried  with  him  as  a  private  possession,  and  which  had  the  power 
to  determine  truth  by  means  of  the  laws  of  formal  consistency. 

Now,  in  abandoning  this  abstract  conception  of  thought  or 
reason  as  a  thing-in-itself,  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  the  opposite 
error  of  resolving  thought  into  a  mere  plurality  of  experiences, 
into  consciousness  of  the  result  of  movement,  for  example.  For 
it  is  impossible  to  dispense  with  the  functional  reality  of  thought 
as  a  guiding  and  controlling  principle.  This  principle  is  not  merely 
regulative  of  experience,  but  constitutive  as  well ;  or,  rather,  we 
may  say  that  it  is  constitutive  just  through  the  fact  that  it  is  reg- 
ulative. In  other  words,  thought,  in  its  work  of  determining  re- 
ality as  a  system,  operates  not  only  through  retrospective  cate- 
gories, but  possesses  in  a  certain  sense  the  power  of  prevision, 
and  this  prospective  reference,  as  guiding  purpose  and  ideal, 
operates  effectively  in  building  up  the  system  of  truth. 

It  is  only  when  we  take  account  of  these  facts  that  we  can  find 
any  meaning  in  the  conception  of  '  workability'  as  a  test  of  truth. 
Those  who  emphasize  the  all-sufficiency  of  this  practical  standard, 
however,  usually  assume  that  it  is  a  new  principle  come  to  super- 
sede and  destroy,  not  to  fulfil,  the  claims  of  the  older  logical  prin- 
ciples. At  this  point  a  little  reflection  will  show  that  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  practical  test  is  applied  presuppose  logical 
thinking  as  their  necessary  framework  and  background.  It  may 
be  said  that  the  practical  criterion  of  '  workability '  merely  asserts 
that  the  test  of  any  present  system  of  experience  is  the  future  expe- 
rience that  comes  through  trial  and  experiment.  It  means  sim- 
ply, it  may  be  said,  that  present  ideas  must  be  tried  by  their 
future  results.  But  we  can  maintain  with  equal  reason  that  the 
present  system  of  knowledge  furnishes  the  standard  by  means  of 
which  we  must  judge  of  the  future.  This  antinomy  obviously 
has  its  source  in  the  abstract  separation  of  present  and  future 
experience.  Instead  of  being  external  and  independent  centers 
that  exercise  authority  from  the  one  side  or  the  other,  future  ex- 
perience and  present  experience  necessarily  imply  each  other,  the 
present  looking  forward  to  the  future  for  its  completion  and  cor- 
rection, the  future  looking  back  to  what  is  for  it  the  past.  Now, 
this  reciprocal  implication  and  determination  of  parts  presupposes 


No.  3.]  PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL    CATEGORY.  293 

that  these  parts  are  elements  of  a  rationally  coordinated  system. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  so-called  practical  test  that  judges 
of  the  truth  of  an  idea  by  its  results,  is  applicable  only  when  it  is 
used  within  a  rationally  determined  system  of  thoughts  that  con- 
tains as  immanent  ideal  its  own  principles  of  criticism.  (Every- 
thing works  in  some  way,  but  the  practical  question  always  is, 
How  does  it  work  ?) 

Passing  from  this  point,  we  may  find  that  some  further  expla- 
nation and  justification  are  still  demanded  of  the  proposition  that 
thought  is  necessarily  and  organically  connected  with  an  objec- 
tive reality.  How  is  it  possible,  it  may  be  asked,  for  reality  to 
be  at  once  both  within  and  without  an  individual  consciousness  ? 
It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  consciousness  of  each  person 
has  an  aspect  of  uniqueness,  in  virtue  of  which  it  may  be  said  to 
be  strictly  self-enclosed  and  particular.  But  the  facts  of  experi- 
ence, impartially  and  comprehensively  viewed,  compel  us  to  rec- 
ognize another  moment  of  mind  as  equally  essential  to  its  true 
individuality.  This  is  expressed  through  the  principles  of  uni- 
versality and  necessity,  which  are,  as  we  have  seen,  marks  of  the 
functional  efficiency  of  the  objective  ideal.  This  ideal,  though  a 
part  of  present  experience,  points  always  to  a  system  of  reality  in 
which  it  is  completely  fulfilled  and  realized.  Nevertheless,  the  fact 
that  the  objective  world  functions  in  individual  consciousness  as  an 
ideal,  does  not  exclude  its  reality  either  within  our  consciousness 
or  without  it.  For  the  ideal  and  the  real  are  continuous  with 
each  other,  and  complementary  in  nature,  not  separate  and  oppos- 
ing modes  of  existence.  It  is  the  presence  of  reality  as  ideal  in 
our  consciousness,  —  not  as  something  that  is  already  attained, 
but  as  the  mark  to  which  we  press  forward,  —  that  differentiates 
our  thinking  from  the  aimless  play  of  subjective  ideas. 

This  view,  I  venture  to  think,  makes  no  impossible  demands, 
and  appeals  to  no  questionable  hypotheses.  It  appears  to  me  to 
be  simply  a  more  complete  and  adequate  reading  of  the  facts  of 
experience  than  that  furnished  by  its  opponents.  The  relation  of 
the  mind  to  reality,  —  to  a  world  of  things  and  persons,  —  is  given 
with  the  very  fact  of  conscious  experience.  If  we  find  no  diffi- 
culty in  ascribing  an  objective  reality,  in  the  ontological  sense,  to 


294  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

persons,  — if  we  do  not  reduce  our  fellow  men  to  functions  within 
experience,  —  why  should  we  pronounce  it  unmeaning  to  give  the 
same  kind  of  reality  to  things  ?  Recent  investigations  into  social 
and  genetic  psychology  have  emphasized  in  a  striking  way  the 
fact  that  it  is  the  very  nature  of  the  individual  consciousness  to 
transcend  the  limits  of  its  own  particularity,  and  unite  with  other 
individuals.  This  social  relation,  we  say,  is  not  external  and  acci- 
dental, but  a  real  and  constituent  element  in  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  nature  of  the  Alter  being  essentially  involved  and  in- 
cluded in  the  nature  of  the  Ego.  Now,  if  we  find  no  obstacle  to 
prevent  us  from  admitting  the  transcendence  by  the  individual  of 
the  bounds  of  its  particularity  in  this  social  connection,  why  should 
we  make  a  difficulty  in  the  case  of  objects  in  general  ?  Our  re- 
lations to  persons  are,  indeed,  more  intimate  and  also  more  varied 
than  are  those  in  which  we  stand  to  things.  Moreover,  we  may 
perhaps  say  in  general  that  these  relations  continue  to  lose 
something  in  intimacy,  variety,  and  emotional  warmth,  as  we  pass 
downwards  through  the  various  forms  of  organic  life  to  the  ob- 
jects of  inorganic  nature.  But  there  is  no  difference  in  principle 
between  the  mode  in  which  we  know  persons  and  that  in  which 
we  know  things.  Furthermore,  we  have  also  to  admit  that  the 
feelings  and  emotions  that  seem  distinctive  of  our  attitude  toward 
persons  are  not  original,  but  have  grown  up  through  experience  : 
persons  are  only  gradually  distinguished  and  classified  by  the 
child  as  different  from  other  objects  of  the  real  world. 

III. 

I  have  thus  attempted  to  examine  the  main  arguments  of  those 
who  interpret  reality  in  terms  of  will  and  purpose,  and  to  answer 
the  objections  that  are  most  insistently  urged  against  the  older 
view.  It  now  remains  to  indicate  briefly  the  chief  difficulties  that 
seem  to  me  inherent  in  this  modern  form  of  teleology.  As  these 
objections  have  been  more  or  less  explicitly  anticipated  in  what 
precedes,  I  shall  confine  myself  to  a  brief  statement  that  will  to 
some  extent  serve  as  a  summary  of  my  paper.1 

1  It  is  somewhat  remarkable  that  those  who  uphold  the  teleological  or  instrumental 
view  of  knowledge  have  as  yet  devoted  almost  no  attention  to  answering  the  serious  and 
legitimate  objections  that  have  strongly  urged  against  their  position  from  many  sides. 


No.  3.]  PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL    CATEGORY.  295 

1.  We  have  already  had  occasion  to  refer  to  the  ambiguity 
that  in  this  use  attaches  to  the  word  '  practical/  as  well  as  to  the 
terms  'end'  and  'purpose.'     These  words  seem  to  be  employed 
by  this  theory  to  cover  two  modes  of  consciousness  that  are  usu- 
ally, at  least,  regarded  as  essentially  different.     In  some  cases  the 
'  practical '  end  for  the  realization  of  which  thought  acts  as  an  in- 
strument is  material  in  character  and  involves  physical  move- 
ments ;  as,  e.  g.,  to  supply  food,  provide  shelter,  or  in  some  way 
to  minister  to  the  needs  of  the  physical  organism.     In  other  con- 
nections, however,  the  term  'practical  purposes'  is  broadened  to 
include  intellectual  interests  and  problems  that  concern  only  the 
relation  of  the  thinking  process  to  itself,  and  have  no  discoverable 
relation  to  biological  needs  or  to  physical  movements.     The  em- 
ployment of  terms  in  this  shifting  sense  seems  to  have  resulted  in 
a  certain  confusion  of  the  issue,  and  to  have  led  to  a  slurring  over 
of  one  of  the  fundamental  difficulties  in  the  position.     Moreover, 
the  claim  of  the  position  to  novelty  depends  to  a  very  large  extent 
upon  its  adoption  of  the  narrower  and  more  usual  interpretation 
of  what  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  practical  purpose.     If  these  words 
are  used  to  include  the  ends  of  knowledge,  there  is  nothing  es- 
sential gained,  so  far  as  I  can  see ;  the  logical  problem  still  re- 
mains, and  here  analogies  with  the  course  of  biological  evolution 
and  arguments  based  on  these  analogies  cannot  help  us. 

2.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  position  we  have  been  examin- 
ing, one  cannot  consistently  speak  of  supplementing  or  broaden- 
ing the  individual  standpoint  by  reference  to  social  purposes. 
For,  as  we  have  seen,  the  recognition  of  other  individuals,  and  of 
our  own  relation  to  them,   requires  the  adoption  of  the  tran- 
scendent and  ontological  position  against  which  the  instrumental 
view  levels  its  heaviest  artillery. 

The  instrumental  view  must,  then,  logically  remain  purely  indi- 

(cf.,  e.  g.,  James  Seth,  "The  Utilitarian  Estimate  of  Knowledge,"  PHILOSOPHICAL 
REVIEW,  Vol.  X,  pp.  341  ff.  ;  W.  Caldwell,  "  Pragmatism,"  Mind,  No.  36,  pp.  433 
ff.  ;  B.  Bosanquet,  "  Imitation  and  Selective  Thinking,"  Psych.  Rev.,  X,  pp.  404  ff. ). 
The  explanation  of  this  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  belief  that  the  further  develop- 
ment of  their  principles  affords  the  best  answer  to  objections,  and  is  at  the  present  time 
of  fundamental  importance.  Nevertheless,  a  fuller  and  clearer  definition  of  the  view 
is  urgently  demanded  in  the  light  of  the  criticism  to  which  it  has  been  lately  sub- 
jected. 


296  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

vidualistic.  As  such,  it  necessarily  fails  to  do  justice  to  the  objec- 
tive and  universal  aspect  of  experience.  For  a  series  of  individual 
purposes,  as  a  description  of  objective  reality,  is  surely  open  to  all 
the  theoretical  objections  that  have  been  so  often  urged  against  a 
series  of  subjective  feelings  ;  while,  if  taken  seriously  as  a  stand- 
point for  ethics,  the  doctrine  seems  open  to  the  gravest  objections. 

3.  A  string  of  individual  purposes  also  fails  to  afford  any  unity 
to  life  and  experience.     But  there  is  actually  such  a  unity  present,  if 
not  in  realized  form  at  least  as  ideal,  in  all  rational  life.    We  must 
conclude,  then,  that  in  maintaining  that  it  is  always  in  the  light 
of  particular  definite  purposes  that  experience   must  be  inter- 
preted, the  instrumental  view  is  emphasizing  what  in  themselves 
are  not  true  ends  of  thought  at  all,  but  only  subordinate  ends 
that  find  their  meaning  and  place  in  rational  experience  from 
their  relation  to   a  universal  and  dominating  end.     Without  the 
reference  of  the  various  practical  purposes  to  the  unity  of  such 
an  end,  experience  would   remain  a  chaotic  assemblage  of  ele- 
ments completely  lacking  true  unity  and  consistency.1 

4.  In  spite  of  the  claim  made  by  its  advocates  that  this  theory 
avoids  dualism,  it  yet  introduces  a  sharp  opposition  between  im- 
mediate experience  and  the  ideational  process.     This  opposition 
does  not  seem  to  be  warranted  by  an  analysis  of  consciousness 
itself.     On  the  one  side,  the  theory  seems  to  place  experience  or 
conscious  life,  consisting  of  feelings,  impulsive  and  habitual  reac- 
tions, and  immediate  appreciations  of  values.     Out  of  this,  as  a 
ready-made  prius,  or  an  antecedently  existing  matrix,  thought 
arises  as  a  process  of  reflection,  or  a  function  of  transformation  and 
readjustment.     Thought  is  thus  necessary  to  the  further  develop- 
ment of  experience,  but  it  does  not  appear  to  be  in-  any  sense 
organic  to  it ;  for  experience  can  apparently  exist  in  independence 
of  thought.    Even  when  it  is  pointed  out  that  thought  arises  out  of 
experience,  the  difficulty  is  not  fully  met ;  for  it  comes,  not  as  the 
development  of  a  principle  already  immanent  in,  and  constitutive 
of,  the  earlier  stage,  but  as  a  variation,  or  deus  ex  machina,  that 
introduces  something  entirely  new.     There  is  thus  a  departure,  I 
think,  from  the  procedure  of  the  true  evolutionary  method. 

1  Cf.  Bosanquet,  Psych.  Rev.,  X,  pp.  404  ff. 


No.  3.]  PURPOSE  AS  LOGICAL    CATEGORY.  297 

5.  What  I  have  already  set  down  must  stand  at  present  as 
justification  for  the  final  statement  of  my  paper,  that  the  view  of 
experience  we  have  examined,  instructive  and  valuable  as  it  is 
in  many  of  its  aspects,  is  only  valid  in  so  far  as  it  rests  upon  a 
logical  and  ontological  basis  that  is  quite  different  from  that 
which  it  claims  for  itself.  It  seems  to  me  that  I  have  shown 
that,  in  several  of  its  arguments  at  least,  this  theory  does  im- 
plicity  rest  upon  such  a  basis.  Even  constructive  thinkers  do 
not  always  remember  that  the  underlying  principles  of  ex- 
perience are  not  explicitly  asserted  in  consciousness,  as  are  par- 
ticular facts,  but  rather  are  implicitly  asserted  or  assumed.  It  is 
therefore  easy,  from  the  standpoint  of  common  sense  and  natural 
science,  to  fail  to  recognize  consciously  a  background  that  is 
all  the  while  presupposed  as  the  support  which  gives  the  facts  of 
experience  their  meaning.  If  the  '  instrumental '  theory  were  to 
develop  consistently  its  presuppositions,  its  claim  to  be  an  inde- 
dependent  and  self-sufficient  method  of  philosophy  would,  in  my 
judgment,  at  once  appear  as  groundless  and  impossible. 

J.  E.  CREIGHTON. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


THE    MEANING    OF    THE    PSYCHICAL    FROM    THE 

POINT  OF  VIEW  OF  THE  FUNCTIONAL 

PSYCHOLOGY.1 

IN  two  papers  previously  read  before  this  Association,2  I  have 
maintained  that  the  distinction  of  the  psychical  and  the  phys- 
ical represents  simply  a  functional  division  of  labor  in  the  state- 
ment of  experience.  There  is  no  such  distinction,  or  it  is  in- 
operative (which  amounts  to  the  same  thing),  so  long  as  expe- 
rience flows  on  smoothly,  so  long  as  in  the  midst  of  our  action 
we  do  not  'stop  to  think.'  It  is  the  purpose  of  the  present 
paper  to  consider  somewhat  more  closely  the  meaning  of  the 
psychical  in  relation  to  that  process  of  tension  in  experience 
which  we  have  defined  as  the  condition  of  consciousness. 

I. 

With  the  advance  of  a  science  we  naturally  expect  to  find 
a  reconstruction  of  the  meaning  of  its  fundamental  concepts. 
This  is  true  in  psychology  of  the  concept  of  the  psychical.  The 
most  important  recent  advances  in  this  science  are  those  along 
the  lines  of  genetic  and  social  psychology.  A  genetic  and  func- 
tional mode  of  viewing  experience  has  been  taking  a  more  and 
more  prominent  place  in  psychological  discussions  in  the  past 
few  years,  as  contrasted  with  the  analytic  and  structural,  which 
still  is  the  prevailing  standpoint.  By  this  is  meant  that  experi- 
ence is  viewed  as  a  process,  with  moments  or  functional  phases, 
rather  than  as  an  entity  or  thing  capable  of  analysis  into  struc- 
tural elements  or  units.  The  structural  analysis  of  experience  is 
not  denied  value  in  its  proper  place,  but,  from  the  standpoint  of 
method,  it  is  shown  to  be  instrumental  to  this  functional  view. 
Cross-sections  of  the  process  are  taken  at  different  points,  and  an 
analysis  is  made  of  the  elements  found  in  these  cross-sections. 

1  Read  in  part  before  the  American  Philosophical  Association,  Princeton,  N.  J., 
December  30,  1903. 

2  Published  in  the  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW,  September,  1902,  and  May,  1903. 

298 


THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  299 

But  the  section  and  the  analysis  are  ultimately  for  the  sake  of 
getting  more  efficient  control  of  the  process. 

No  one  has  made  this  clearer  than  Professor  Royce  in  his  cri- 
tique of  the  doctrine  of  conscious  elements  in  his  recently  pub- 
lished Outlines  of  Psychology.  It  is  here  shown  that  the  ele- 
ment obtained  by  this  analysis  (for  example,  the  sensation)  is 
as  much  an  artifact  as  is  the  atom  in  physical  science.  It  is 
brought  into  existence  as  such  for  the  first  time  in  the  act  of 
analysis.  Hence  its  only  use  is  one  similar  to  that  of  the  atom 
in  physics.  It  is  a  convenient  tool  in  explaining  the  actual  facts 
of  the  stream  of  consciousness.  The  justification  of  the  whole 
range  of  analysis  in  the  structural  psychology  can  be  found  only 
in  its  methodological  utility  in  explaining  the  concrete  process 
of  experience. 

We  may  ask,  then,  how  experience  is  viewed  from  the  func- 
tional standpoint.  From  this  point  of  view,  experience  is  regarded 
primarily  as  a  process.  This  is  simply  carrying  over  into  psy- 
chology the  general  dynamic  standpoint  common  to  all  science 
at  the  present  time.  By  process  here  is  meant  activity,  without 
specifying  that  it  is  either  physical  or  psychical.  The  most  fun- 
damental statement  that  we  can  make  about  experience  is  that  it 
is  action.  It  is  as  much  action  when  it  is  conscious  as  when  it 
is  unconscious,  but  the  conditions  of  conscious  action  are  different 
from  the  conditions  of  unconscious  action. 

What  are  the  conditions  of  consciousness?  What  are  the 
laws  which  determine  when  an  act  becomes  conscious  or  ceases 
to  be  conscious  ?  These  are  :  the  law  of  tension  or  obstruction 
in  activity,  and  the  law  of  habit  or  facilitation  in  coordination. 

By  the  law  of  tension  is  meant  simply  this,  that  consciousness 
appears  only  when  the  process  of  action  is  relatively  impeded  or 
interrupted.  Action  is  going  on  all  the  time,  in  tropism,  reflex, 
and  instinct.  But  these  become  consciously  performed  acts  when 
there  arises  stress  in  adjustment,  whether  the  focus  of  the  tension 
be  intra-organic  or  extra-organic.1 

1  Why  there  ever  should  be  resistance  or  obstruction  in  action  is  an  ultimate  ques- 
tion here  as  much  (and  as  little)  as  in  physics.  The  Hegelian  doubtless  would  say 
that  pure  spontaneity  posits  resistance  as  its  own  other.  The  evolutionist  is  apt  to 
attribute  it  to  the  environment.  But  the  scientific  psychologist  no  more  asserts  that  he 


300  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

The  whole  of  psychophysics  is  but  an  illustration  of  this  law 
of  tension.  What  is  the  significance  of  the  determination  of 
thresholds,  of  the  lag  of  sensation  behind  stimulus,  of  the  sum- 
mation of  stimuli  in  order  to  produce  a  given  sensational  effect, 
of  the  Weber-Fechner  law,  unless  it  is  this,  —  that  tension  is  the 
condition  of  consciousness,  and  that  there  can  be  no  tension  un- 
less there  is  not  only  a  tendency  in  the  organism  in  one  direction, 
but  also  an  inhibitory  tendency  operating  with  reference  to  this 
in  the  opposite  direction?  Lag  of  sensation,  or  summation  of 
stimuli  (which  are  simply  obverse  sides  of  the  same  fact),  repre- 
sent the  limits  within  which  operates  that  tension  which  is  the 
condition  of  consciousness.  The  Weber-Fechner  law  marks  the 
working  limits  of  this  tension. 

But  why  just  this  relation,  it  may  be  asked?  Why  this  par- 
ticular law,  that  sensation  increases  as  the  logarithm  of  the  stim- 
ulus ?  It  may  be  replied  that  investigation  has  shown  that  this 
ratio  is  not  a  constant  one  for  all  intensities  of  stimulus ;  the 
formula  holds  only  for  stimulations  of  moderate  intensity.  It 
does  not  hold  for  either  maximal  or  minimal  ranges  of  stimula- 
tion. Moreover,  Heymans  l  has  restated  the  law  so  that  it  reads 
simply  that  sensations  increase  in  direct  proportion  to  the  increase 
of  the  stimulus.  That  is,  if  we  rule  out  the  influence  of  disturb- 
ing or  inhibitory  stimuli,  the  Fechner  part  of  the  statement  of  the 
law  is  not  true,  but  only  the  original  formulation  of  Weber,  that 
the  increase  of  sensation  is  proportional  to  the  increase  of  inten- 
sity of  the  stimulus.  The  Fechner  formulation  holds  only  of  a 
stimulus  operating  in  the  presence  of  innumerable  other  stimuli 
whose  inhibitory  effect  upon  the  operation  of  this  stimulus  is  thus 
roughly  expressed. 

The  tension  (and  thus  the  consciousness)  lasts  as  long  as  the 
dominance  of  the  relevant  stimulus  over  the  competing  stimuli. 

has  accounted  for  the  presence  of  this  element  of  opposition  which  polarizes  conscious- 
ness than  the  biologist  accounts  for  the  principle  of  variation  in  evolution  or  the 
physicist  for  the  collision  of  atoms  which  is  one  of  his  fundamental  postulates.  It 
may  be  that  tension  or  opposition  is  a  necessary  implication  of  the  idea  of  activity  or 
process. 

1 "  Untersuchungen  tiber  psychische  Hemmung,"  Z.f.  Psych,  u.  Phys.  der  Sinnes- 
organe,  Bd.  xxi,  Heft  3,  pp.  321-359 ;  Bd.  xxvi,  Heft  5  u.  6,  pp.  305-382.  Cf. 
Stratton,  Experimental  Psychology  and  Culture,  p.  13. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  301 

It  ceases  (and  consciousness  lapses  or  begins  to  lapse)  as  soon  as 
it  succumbs  to  these.  This  succumbing  to  these  other  stimuli  is 
just  what  we  mean  by  the  facilitation  of  a  coordination,  the  laps- 
ing into  an  habitual  mode  of  reaction.  Differences  of  reaction- 
time  mean  differences  in  facilitation  or  habituation  of  organic 
circuits  (sensorimotor  coordinations).  This  marks  the  time 
limits  of  the  tension,  as  psychophysics  marks  the  limits  of  in- 
tensity and  extensity. 

The  whole  study  of  sensation  in  modern  structural  psychology, 
especially  in  psychophysics,  is  really  a  technical  investigation  of 
the  nature  and  limits  of  this  tension.  Genetic  psychology  is  a 
study  of  the  types  of  experience  within  which  tension  arises 
and  of  the  changes  which  one  type  of  experience  (such  as 
instinct)  undergoes  in  the  process  of  the  emergence  of  conscious- 
ness (in  impulse),  and  its  transformation  into  another  type  of 
experience  (habit).  The  so-called  functional  psychology  is  sim- 
ply an  attempt  to  relate  the  results  of  both  these  forms  of  psy- 
chological investigation  to  the  process  of  reconstruction  of  ex- 
perience as  a  whole ;  it  interprets  structure  in  terms  of  function, 
and  function  in  terms  of  the  genesis  and  growth  of  structure. 

Biology  and  psychology  state  the  same  tension,  but  in  terms 
of  different  techniques.  Both  the  psychologist  and  the  neurolo- 
gist state  the  tension  in  terms  of  action  ;  but  they  start  from  such 
diverse  standpoints  and  their  technique  and  terminology  (because 
of  purely  historical  conditions)  are  so  different,  that  we  have  a 
problem,  or  think  we  have  a  problem,  of  conflict  between  them 
which  does  not  really  exist,  —  the  problem  of  the  psychical  and 
the  physical,  so  transparently  masqued  in  the  current  hypothesis 
of  parallelism. 

The  relatively  tensional  phase  of  action  is  continuous  with  the 
relatively  stable  phases  preceding  and  succeeding.  There  is  no 
infringement  of  the  law  of  conservation  of  energy.  We  simply 
have  one  name  (the  term  '  consciousness '  or  '  psychical ')  for 
describing  action  when  it  is  tensional,  and  another  name  (the  term 
'  habit '  or  '  physical ')  when  it  is  relatively  stable.1 

1  Professor  Ostwald  ("The  Philosophical  Meaning  of  Energy,"  International 
Quarterly,  June,  1903)  is  on  the  right  track  in  attempting  to  fuse  the  ideas  of  '  psy- 
chical' and  'energy,'  but  he  fails  to  distinguish  the  respective  functions  of  these 
important  aspects,  the  relatively  stable  and  tensional  phases  of  action. 


302  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

The  distinction  is  confessedly  a  practical  or  teleological  one,  a 
distinction  which  holds  for  the  situation  or  problem  only ;  but  it 
is  no  less  valid  as  a  distinction  because  it  is  relative  only  to  a 
given  type  of  situation  and  only  under  a  given  set  of  conditions. 

A  contribution  has  recently  been  made  to  the  understanding  of 
this  problem  in  a  paper  by  Professor  George  H.  Mead,  on  the 
"Definition  of  the  Psychical,"  in  the  University  of  Chicago  De- 
cennial Contributions  to  Philosophy  and  Education,  Volume  I. 
According  to  Professor  Mead,  my  experience,  as  I  am  at  this 
moment  experiencing  it,  the  actual  process  of  my  being  my 
present  conscious  self,  is  psychical.  My  feelings,  ideas,  voli- 
tions, as  I  now  am  having  them,  are  psychical.  But  the  mo- 
ment I  reflect  upon  these  experiences  as  mine,  as  soon  as  I 
make  this  feeling  or  idea  or  volition  the  subject-matter  (the  ob- 
ject-matter) of  my  thought,  it  ceases  as  process  and  becomes  con- 
tent. It  may  become  an  ethical,  an  economic,  a  political,  a  sci- 
entific content,  according  to  my  purpose  or  interest  in  studying 
it.  It  may  become  a  psychological  content,  i.  e.,  it  may  become 
a  datum  of  the  science  of  psychology.  But  if  we  use  the  term 
'  psychical '  in  describing  this  datum,  we  must  recognize  that  this 
use  of  the  term  is  a  very  different  one  from  that  indicated  above. 
We  must  distinguish  the  true  psychical  of  immediate  experience  from 
the  psychical  as  an  object  of  psychological  retrospection^  The  true 
psychical,  according  to  Professor  Mead,  is  the  immediate  fact  of 
experienczVz^-.  Any  experience  is  psychical  if,  and  in  so  far  as,  it 
is  not  the  content  of  reflection,  but  at  the  time  being  experi- 
enced, i.  e.y  is  the  process  of  reflection  itself.  As  soon  as  we  turn 
back  upon  this  experience  to  analyze  it  or  to  reflect  upon  it  in 
any  way,  it  ceases  to  be  the  process  of  my  experience  and  be- 
comes a  content  in  my  experience,  a  content  treated  either  as 
something  to  be  explained  (in  logical  terms,  the  subject  of  the 
judgment)  or  as  the  explanation  of  something  else  (the  predicate 
of  the  judgment).  In  order  actually  to  explain  this  content  or 
actually  to  use  it  in  explanation  of  another  content,  there  must,  of 
course,  be  a  new  judgment;  the  process  of  experience  must  be 
resumed,  it  must  become  psychical  again.  This  is  the  copula  of 

1  Cf.  Professor  Baldwin' s  distinction  between  the  '  psychic '  and  the  '  psycho- 
logical,' discussed  below. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  303 

the  judgment.  The  psychical  is  the  copula.  Thus  experience 
grows  out  of  one  content  into  another  content  in  and  through  the 
process  —  which  is  the  psychical.  New  social,  political,  ethical, 
economic,  aesthetic,  scientific,  philosophic,  psychological  values  or 
contents  are  achieved  only  in  and  through  psychical  individuality. 
The  psychical  is  experience  as  process,  and  psychology  is  the 
science  of  the  content  of  experience  with  the  reference  to  this 
process  of  reconstruction  made  explicit.  As  Kulpe  puts  it,  it  is 
the  dependence  of  facts  of  experience  upon  the  experiencing 
process  which  makes  them  psychological  data. 

This  thought  is  worked  out  from  a  different  point  of  view 
by  the  late  Professor  Adamson  in  his  Development  of  Modern 
Philosophy}  "  Facts  of  mind,  psychical  states  .  .  .  can  never 
be  directly  presented  as  objects."  "  When  we  describe  the 
facts  of  mind  as  a  series  of  events  in  time,  we  are  vainly  trying 
to  regard  them  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  outside  observer. 
We  are  not  describing  them  as  they  are  for  the  consciousness 
they  compose.  There  they  are  not  objects  of  which  the  subject 
is  aware,  but  ways  in  which  he  is  aware.  ...  It  seems  more 
true  to  say  that  the  subject  is  his  mental  states  than  that  he  has 
them."  2 

Strangely  enough,  Professor  Adamson  makes  this  the  basis 
for  rejecting  "the  conception  of  psychology  as  a  kind  of  natural 
science."3  The  truth  would  seem  to  be  rather  that  this  is  just 
what  furnishes  the  basis  for  conceiving  psychology  as  a  natural 
science,  since  if  there  can  be  no  science  of  the  psychical  as  such, 
psychology  must  deal  with  phenomena  on  the  same  level  with 
the  other  natural  sciences.  We  can  have  a  science  only  of  an 
objective  content ;  in  truth,  content  as  such  is  by  its  very  nature 
objective.  The  peculiarity  of  psychological  science  is  simply  the 
closeness  of  the  reference  of  the  content  to  the  process  from 
which  it  is  an  abstraction. 

In  psychology  we  treat  one  content  as  the  means  for  getting 
another  content.  This  involves  reference  to  the  mediation  of 
one  content  by  another,  i.  e.t  it  involves  reference  to  the  process 

1  Vol.  II,  chap,  iv,  "Psychology  and  Epistemology,"  especially  pp.  56 f. 

2  Pp.  58-59. 

3  P.   60. 


304  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

of  the  reconstruction  of  experience.  We  cannot  directly  state 
this  process.  To  state  it  would  be  to  stop  it ;  it  would  convert 
process  into  content.  The  psychological  is  a  good  deal  like  the 
histological  procedure  in  biology.  You  have  to  stop  the  dynamic 
life  functioning  and  cut  the  specimen  into  thin  sections,  artifi- 
cially distorted  by  hardening  reagents  and  staining  fluids,  in 
order  to  analyze  its  structure.  You  have  to  kill  it  in  order  to 
state  it.  "  Our  meddling  intellect  misshapes  the  beauteous  forms 
of  things.  It  murders  to  dissect."  Yet  we  recognize  that  there 
is  a  life  process,  and  we  attempt  to  interpret  this  structure  in  terms 
of  its  functional  importance  in  carrying  on  that  process. 

Ultimately,  every  content,  every  datum  of  science,  would  have 
to  be  stated  in  terms  of  every  other  content,  in  terms  of  the  data 
of  every  other  science,  before  the  scientific  statement  would  be 
complete,  and  this  would  involve  comparison  of  the  contents  in 
terms  of  their  different  degrees  of  mediation  in  experience ;  that 
is,  it  would  involve  reference  to  the  process  of  experience,  to  the 
psychical.  The  content  of  physics  or  chemistry  or  biology,  as 
truly  as  the  content  of  psychology,  would  have  to  be  brought 
back  to  this  ultimate  test  (its  availability  or  serviceability  for 
getting  further  experience)  before  it  could  be  said  to  be  scientific- 
ally (philosophically)  complete. 

The  distinctions  between  the  sciences,  in  the  last  analysis,  are 
only  divisions  of  labor,  and,  thus  viewed,  we  may  even  agree 
with  a  recent  writer  that  "  our  mental  life  must  be  interpreted 
ultimately  in  relation  to  the  physical  world,"  that  "the  ideal  psy- 
chology is  a  physiological  psychology."  l  This  does  not  mean 
that  psychology  reduces  to  the  physiology  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem, as  the  latter  is  ordinarily  conceived.  But  it  does  mean  that 
the  data  of  psychology  are  as  truly  objective  as  those  of  any 
other  science.  Both  psychology  and  physiology  are  ultimately 
a  study  of  the  reactions  of  the  organism,  and  both  must  be 
brought  back  to  the  process  of  experience  before  their  state- 
ments can  be  made  wholly  adequate.  The  difference  is  that  this 
reference  is  more  implicit  and  remote  in  physiology  than  in  psy- 
chology. Psychology  as  a  science  is  but  one  step  removed, 

1  W.  T.  Marvin,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  176. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF  THE  PSYCHICAL.  305 

while  physiology  is  two  steps  removed,  from  the  process  of  ex- 
perience. It  is  this  difference  in  the  remoteness  of  the  reference 
to  the  psychical  which  constitutes  the  lines  of  division  between 
the  various  sciences. 

It  is  only  recently  that  psychology  has  been  generally  con- 
ceded this  place  among  the  natural  sciences.  The  concession 
has  grudgingly  been  made,  and  many  who  by  the  logic  of  events 
have  been  forced  to  make  the  concession  are  not  even  yet 
willing  to  abide  by  all  its  implications.  One  of  these  implica- 
tions is  this  fact  that  the  data  of  psychology  are  as  objective  as 
those  of  any  other  science.  As  Professor  Baldwin  puts  it  in  his 
latest  book,1  this  concession  means  that  the  data  of  psychology 
are  "  viewed  from  the  outside  ;  that  is,  viewed  as  a  definite  set  or 
series  of  phenomena  .  .  .  recognized  as  'worth  while J  as  any 
other  facts  in  nature."  "The  occurrence  of  a  psychological 
change  in  an  animal  is  a  fact  in  the  same  sense  that  the  animal's 
process  of  digestion  is."  "For  science  all  facts  are  equal."  2 

But  many  who  would  agree  with  Professor  Baldwin  on  this 
point  do  not  seem  to  realize  that  this  necessitates  a  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  very  idea  of  psychology  and  of  the  psychical.  Of 
psychology,  because  it  has  been  supposed  that  the  data  of  psy- 
chology are  unique  and  that  psychology  on  this  account  is  funda- 
mental to  all  the  other  sciences,  while  this  view  places  it  along- 
'side  of  the  other  natural  sciences  with  no  special  privileges.  Of 
the  psychical,  because  it  has  been  supposed  that  psychology 
deals  with  the  psychical  as  its  datum,  while  on  this  view  the  data 
of  psychology  are  objective  and  not  subjective,  are  '  psychologi- 
cal' and  not  'psychic,'  to  use  Professor  Baldwin's  terms.3 

1  Development  and  Evolution,  pp.  4  f. 

2  Whether  Professor  Baldwin  consistently  adheres  to  this  point  of  view  in  his  sub- 
sequent statements,  is  a  question  which  has  been  discussed  by  the  present  writer  in  a 
review  of  the   book  in   the  Journal  of  Comparative  Neurology,  Vol.  xiii,  No.  4 
(Dec.,  1903). 

3  This  would  seem  to  be  the  thought  expressed  by  Professor  Royce  and  by  Profes- 
sor Munsterberg  in  the  distinction  between  the  world  of  '  appreciation '  and  the  world 
of  'description.'     There  is  no  science  of  appreciation  as  such,  because  it  is  process 
and  not  content.     The  same  thought  is  expressed  also  in  the  common  statement  of  the 
impossibility  of  studying  the  feelings  without  transforming  them.     In  studying  them 
we  make  them  objects  of  thought,  and  thus  no  longer  process  but  content. 


306  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

II. 

Now  what,  from  this  point  of  view,  is  the  true  meaning  of 
the  psychical  regarded  as  content  and  as  the  datum  of  psychol- 
ogy ?  We  are  accustomed  to  think  of  the  psychical  as  belong- 
ing exclusively  to  the  individual.  We  hear  much  concerning 
the  impossibility  of  constructing  a  psychic  series  for  other  minds 
than  our  own,  that  no  one  can  get  beyond  the  pale  of  his  own 
consciousness,  that  his  own  consciousness  is  the  only  conscious- 
ness of  which  he  has  any  direct  knowledge,  and  so  on. 

That  there  is  a  fallacy  here  somewhere  has  long  been  sus- 
pected, but  it  is  difficult  to  lay  one's  finger  upon  the  source  of 
the  error.  A  number  of  writers  have  insisted  that  introspection, 
strictly  speaking,  is  an  impossibility.  Its  validity  has  been  called 
in  question  by  such  writers  as  Comte,  Lange,  and  Maudsley. 
Others  insist  that  all  introspection  is  really  retrospection,  i.  e.,  not 
introspection  at  all.  But,  it  will  be  replied  that,  even  if  intro- 
spection does  reduce  to  retrospection,  we  have  in  the  latter  an 
immediate  type  of  experience  differing  from  all  other  experience. 
Is  this  true  ? 

If  there  were  a  perfect  mirror  at  the  end  of  the  room  in  which 
I  am  sitting,  and  I  had  never  tactually  explored  that  end  of  the 
room,  I  should  be  unable  to  distinguish  (visually)  between  the 
actual  room  and  the  reflected  image  of  the  room  in  the  mirror. 
Suppose,  as  Gustav  Spiller  puts  it,  "  I  now  shut  my  eyes,  and  re- 
develop the  sight  of  the  room.  Does  this  image  fundamentally 
differ  from  the  object  and  the  looking-glass  picture  ?  "  "  Except 
for  unimportant  circumstances,  the  primary  and  secondary  visual 
worlds,  or  the  visual  worlds  of  sense  and  imagination,  are  one."  l 
This  certainly  is  in  line  with  other  similar  explanations  of 
psychic  phenomena  in  physiological  psychology.  It  is  in  har- 
mony with  the  tendency  in  recent  years  to  explain  all  images 
as  simply  prolonged  after-images  (more  properly  called  after- 
sensations). 

Now  does  not  this  suggest  that  what  we  call  this  unique,  inner, 
immediate,  direct,  unsharable  experience  is,  after  all,  arrived  at 
as  inferentially  as  any  other  experience,  that  there  is  no  essential 

1  Spiller,  The  Mind  of  Man,  p.  322. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  307 

difference  in  principle  between  the  so-called  external  mirror  and 
the  internal  mirror,  that  the  image  in  the  mirror  of  memory  is  not 
essentially  different  from  the  image  in  the  looking-glass  ?  The 
more  will  this  appear  to  be  true,  when  we  recall  the  tendency  in 
recent  psychology  to  conceive  of  memory  (Hering)  and  associ- 
ation (James)  in  terms  of  habit  and  in  terms  of  physiological 
traces  in  the  brain.  In  principle,  as  a  mirror  for  reflecting  ob- 
jects, the  brain  does  not  differ  from  the  silvered  square  of  glass 
or  from  the  photographic  plate. 

If,  then,  memory  (retrospection)  is  essential  to  any  introspec- 
tion, and  the  brain  (the  organ  of  memory)  does  not  differ  essen- 
tially from  the  physical  mirror,  how  do  the  reflected  phenomena 
in  one  of  these  mirrors  differ  in  principle  from  the  reflected  phe- 
nomena in  the  other  ? 

Is  this,  perchance,  the  real  solution  of  the  old  puzzle  of  sub- 
jective idealism  ?  Is  the  distinction  between  the  introspective 
world  (the  world  of  consciousness  revealed  through  memory) 
and  the  external  world,  in  the  last  analysis,  simply  another  illus- 
tration of  a  self-made  problem,  —  a  problem  arising  out  of  the 
scientific  abstraction  of  things  that  in  reality  ( i.  e.,  in  concrete 
experience)  are  not  thus  separated  ?  And  is  this,  perhaps,  the 
core  of  meaning  in  the  insistence  by  certain  recent  writers  on  the 
fact  of  '  inter-subjective  intercourse '  and  the  essentially  social 
character  of  consciousness  ? 

From  this  point  of  view  there  is  no  mysterious  uniqueness 
about  consciousness.  A  great  deal  has  been  written  about  the 
unsharability  of  consciousness.  The  statement  has  repeatedly 
been  made  that  one  can  never  really  get  into  the  mental  life  of 
another  person,  that  one  cannot  get  at  another  person's  con- 
sciousness directly.  But  this  is  not  in  any  sense  a  unique  phe- 
nomenon in  nature,  if  we  take  an  organic  view  of  the  relation  of 
the  individual  to  society.  The  mere  fact  that,  in  the  case  of 
human  beings,  the  so-called  individuals  are  separated  from  one 
another  by  a  certain  distance  in  space,  rather  than  constitute  a 
colony  or  so-called  compound  individual,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
sponge,  does  not  render  it  any  less  true  that  they  really  all 
form  one  organic  whole.  Society  is  an  organism  in  the  same 


308  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

sense  that  the  human  body  is  an  organism.  "  The  cell,  the  indi- 
vidual, and  the  race,  are  merely  units  of  different  order  in  the 
world  of  living  substance."  1  Individuals  in  human  society  are 
most  of  the  time  separated  physically  by  inches  (Siamese  twins), 
by  feet  (members  of  the  same  family),  by  miles  (friends  and  ac- 
quaintances), by  a  hemisphere  (races  on  different  sides  of  the 
globe).  The  individuals  of  a  sponge  are  separated  only  by  a 
cell-wall.  In  both  cases  the  real  biological  connection  is  the 
reproductive  nexus,  the  germinal  substance.  What  is  the  fact 
of  a  micromillimeter  or  of  a  mile  ?  If  you  could  look  at  the  body 
with  a  microscope  of  sufficient  magnifying  powers,  it  would  be 
seen  that  its  molecules  are  relatively  as  far  apart  as  the  different 
individuals  which  make  up  society.  What  we  call  the  individual 
organism  is  a  fragment  arbitrarily  torn  from  nature,  a  part  dis- 
tinguished simply  for  convenience  from  the  rest  of  the  universe. 
It  is  a  scientific  fiction,  an  abstraction  from  the  whole.  The 
individual  organism,  except  for  practical  purposes,  does  not  stop 
with  the  cuticle.  At  what  point  does  the  air  that  is  breathed  or 
the  food  that  is  eaten  cease  to  be  a  part  of  the  environment  and 
become  a  part  of  the  organism  ?  Any  line  that  you  draw,  from 
a  scientific  point  of  view,  is  an  arbitrary  line,  a  mere  practical 
working  device  or  make-shift  in  explanation  of  the  facts  (though 
not  on  that  account  any  less  valuable  methodologically). 

From  this  standpoint,  the  so-called  individual  simply  represents 
a  fragment  of  the  whole  universe,  or,  taking  society  as  the  true 
human  individual,  the  so-called  individual  man  would  represent 
simply  a  member  or  organ  of  this  greater  (social)  organism. 
Now  if  an  adjustment  is  being  made  in  the  universe,  and  I  hap- 
pen to  be  in  the  focus  of  that  adjustment  (and  myself,  as  a  part  of 
the  whole,  cooperating  in  that  adjustment),  then,  of  course,  every 
other  part  of  the  universe,  every  other  part  of  the  great  human 
organism  (i.  e.,  every  other  individual  in  society)  will  be  out  of 
that  focus,  in  the  margin  somewhere.  And  if  consciousness  is 
simply  the  process  of  the  universe  where  and  when  it  is  ten- 
sional,  then  it  is  no  marvel  that  no  other  part  of  the  universe 
feels  this  tension  just  as  I  do.  I  am  this  tension,  this  focus  of 

aC.  B.  Davenport,  Psych.  Rev.,  Nov.,  1897,  p.  673. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  309 

adjustment,  and,  as  such,  the  whole  system  is  represented  there ; 
the  focus  is  the  focussing  of  the  entire  system  of  the  universe. 
(This  is  the  infinite  background  of  self-activity  about  which  the 
idealists  speak.)  Each  particular  adjustment  has  but  one  point 
of  highest  tension  (my  consciousness),  but  there  can  be  an  infinite 
number  of  adjustments  in  the  infinite  system  of  the  universe. 

Now  it  is  only  this  highest  center  of  stress  and  strain  that  is 
not  shared,  and  that  is  saying  no  more  than  that  a  thing  is  itself 
and  not  everything  else.  In  a  certain  sense,  it  is  true  that  every- 
thing is  identical  with  everything  else ;  but  if  it  were  absolutely 
identical  with  everything  else,  there  would  be  just  one  ' Thing'  in 
the  universe  ;  there  would  be  no  '  things.'  Identity,  so  far  from 
being  inconsistent  with  diversity,  is  just  the  unity  which  runs 
through  the  diversity  of  things  which  make  up  the  universe.  To 
apply  this  to  the  question  of  consciousness,  apart  from  the  reser- 
vation just  made,  it  simply  is  not  true  that  another  person  cannot 
and  does  not  share  in  my  struggles.  In  many  cases,  indeed, 
where  the  individual  organism  seems  to  be  in  the  focus  of  the 
adjustment,  the  real  center  of  tension  is  outside.  For  example,  a 
person  is  ill.  He  really  may  be  suffering  very  little ;  the  focal 
point  may  be  in  the  consciousness  of  the  friends.  They  suffer 
for  him.  If  the  focal  point  in  that  situation  is  there  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  those  friends,  it  is  not  in  the  man  who  is  ill,  that  is 
all !  There  cannot  be  two  tensions  unless  there  are  two  ad- 
justments, two  situations;  and  in  that  case,  of  course,  there  are 
two  consciousnesses.  Suppose  that  my  tension  did  get  over  into 
yours  somehow,  then  they  would  merge  into  one  tension.  If  I 
ever  did  get  a  direct  knowledge  of  your  consciousness,  then  it 
would  no  longer  be  your  consciousness  but  mine.  This  problem 
of  the  supposed  uniqueness  of  the  introspective  consciousness  is 
no  greater  than  the  problem  of  the  uniqueness  of  every  leaf  and 
blade  of  grass  in  nature.  Consciousness  is  not  another  realm  of 
reality ;  it  is  simply  the  one  world  that  we  know  in  its  process 
of  reconstruction.  The  individual  represents  a  node  or  nisus  of 
energies. 

Under  the  influence  of  the  individualistic  or  introspective  psychol- 
ogy, we  have  become  so  accustomed  to  regard  consciousness  as 


310  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

the  private  possession  of  the  individual,  that  we  have  failed  fully 
to  appreciate  the  very  obvious  fact  that  consciousness  is  essentially 
social  in  its  nature,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  "  inter-subjective 
intercourse,"  to  use  Professor  Stout's  term.1  Perhaps  its  very 
obviousness  has  retarded  insight  into  its  significance,  on  the 
principle  of  what  one  writer  has  called  the  "  illusion  of  the  near." 
Consciousness  is  no  more  confined  to  the  individual  than  is  ten- 
sion. It  is  focussed  in  the  individual,  but  just  as  the  so-called 
individual  organism  is  simply  one  part  of  the  greater  human 
organism,  so  what  we  call  individual  consciousness  is  essentially 
social  in  character.  It  is  focussed  here  and  there  in  what  we 
call  individuals,  but  it  is  the  focussing  of  the  whole  system. 

The  child  is  not  introspective ;  he  may  almost  be  said  at  first 
to  have  no  consciousness  of  his  own,  as  is  shown  by  his  extreme 
suggestibility.  So  with  the  hypnotic  patient.  So  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  primitive  man  and  of  savages.  Anthropologists 
tell  us  that  in  early  stages  of  social  evolution  the  individual  is 
still  merged  in  the  tribe ;  his  acts  are  the  expression,  not  of 
any  individual  initiative,  but  of  the  tribal  consciousness.2 

But  the  essentially  social  character  of  consciousness  can  be 
shown  even  in  terms  of  our  modern  highly  differentiated  and  in- 
dividualistic social  life,  for,  after  all,  we  are  more  social  than  we 
are  individualistic.  Let  us  take  a  concrete  case.  Here  is  a 
saintly  mother  and  her  profligate  son.  The  wicked  acts  of  the 
wayward  son  may  not  be  focal  in  his  own  consciousness  (focal 
morally,  that  is),  but  they  may  be  keenly  felt,  with  shame  and 
sorrow,  by  the  devoted  mother.  Often  a  person  is  more  sensi- 
tive to  slander  directed  against  the  good  name  of  another  person 
than  if  directed  at  himself.  Persons  who  have  grown  into  one 

1  Cf.  his  Ground-work  of  Psychology ',  Chap.  xiv. 

2  It  may  be  that  consciousness  began  in  this  generic  way,  that,  just  as  the  human 
individual  consciousness  emerged  by  slow  degrees  out  of  a  sort  of  group  consciousness, 
so  the  lower  forms  of  consciousness  first  represented  the  tensional  stress  of  some  life 
problem  of  the  species  rather  than  any  specific  crisis  in  the  life  of  any  so-called  in- 
dividual organism.     And,  ultimately,  on  this  principle,  mental  life  would  have  be- 
gun in  one  great  cosmic  throb  of  feeling  or  pulse  of  cognition.     But,  of  course,  all 
our  ordinary  categories  break  down  when  we  attempt  to  state  the  origin  of  anything. 
The  most  that  we  can  do  is  to  analyze  our  experience  as  we  find  it  nearest  home  in 
our  human  consciousness,  and  then  extend  the  explanation  as  far  as  possible,  on  the 
principle  of  continuity,  to  the  lower  organisms. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  311 

another's  lives  in  an  intimate  way  frequently  become  so  depend- 
ent each  upon  the  other,  that  neither  can  long  outlive  the  other. 
In  such  cases  the  psychological  center  of  gravity  of  each,  falls 
outside  of  himself,  as  it  were,  and  within  the  life  of  the  other. 

It  is  an  historical  accident,  one  might  say,  that  my  conscious- 
ness is  so  peculiarly  mine.  It  may  be  a  sign  of  my  limitation. 
Instead  of  being  a  mark  of  my  superiority,  it  may  be  rather  a 
sign  of  my  unsociality.  The  real  genius  is  not  only  a  striking 
individual  moulding  his  age  ;  he  is  likewise  a  representative  man, 
the  product  of  his  age.  Extreme  individuality  or  uniqueness  we 
treat  as  a  form  of  insanity.  The  perfect  type  of  consciousness 
towards  which  the  race  is  moving  is  one  in  which  the  individual 
will  become  increasingly  more  dependent,  not  less  dependent, 
upon  the  social  whole.  One  need  only  mention  industrial  or- 
ganizations as  illustrations  of  this  tendency.  Individuality  is 
coming  to  be  conceived,  not  as  uniqueness,  unlikeness,  isolation, 
the  possession  of  unsharable  consciousness,  but  as  the  ability  to 
bring  to  a  focus  the  greatest  range  of  social  influences.  Con- 
sciousness is  the  interaction  of  persons  in  society.  Con  +  scious- 
ness  originally  meant  two-persons-knowing-together.  Individuals 
are  nodes,  so  to  speak,  in  the  social  progress,  pivots  upon  which 
(social)  experience  turns,  loci  into  which  consciousness  converges 
and  whence  again  it  irradiates,  finite  centers  of  tension  in  adapta- 
tion whereby  and  wherein  the  universe  is  reconstructed.  The 
psychical  individual  is  the  medium  or  channel  in  and  through 
which  experience  is  handed  on  from  one  member  of  society  to 
another.  Each  member  of  society,  from  this  point  of  view,  is  an 
organ  of  the  social  whole  for  thus  transmitting  experience.  And 
psychology,  from  this  point  of  view,  "  is  the  attempt  to  state  in 
detail  the  machinery  of  the  individual  as  the  instrument  and 
organ  through  which  social  action  operates."1 

III. 

From  this  point  of  view,  it  will  be  instructive  to  criticize  the 
views  of  certain  writers  who  have  written  suggestively  on  the 
subject  of  the  psychical  and  the  physical  in  recent  publications. 

1  "  Significance  of  the  Problem  of  Knowledge,"  University  of  Chicago  Contribu- 
tions to  Philosophy ,  p.  19. 


312  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

The  view  outlined  above  is  consistent  with  certain  arguments 
urged  by  Mr.  Morton  Prince l  and  by  Professor  C.  A.  Strong 2 
concerning  the  relation  between  brain  and  consciousness,  though 
not  with  the  panpsychism  which  they  base  upon  these  argu- 
ments. The  argument  of  Mr.  Prince  is  as  follows  :  Your  brain 
state  is  a  part  of  my  experience  ;  it  is  an  object  of  my  percep- 
tion, not  of  yours.  For  you  this  brain  state  is  consciousness ; 
for  me  it  is  an  object  or  process  of  change  in  what  I  call  the 
material  world,  i.  e.,  in  the  objective  world  of  my  perception. 
"  In  other  words,  a  mental  state  and  these  physical  changes 
which  are  known  in  the  objective  world  as  neural  undulations 
are  one  and  the  same  thing,  but  the  former  is  the  actuality,  the 
latter  a  mode  by  which  it  is  presented  to  the  consciousness  of  a 
second  person."  3 

This  seems  to  be  a  true  statement  of  the  relation  between  the 
psychical  and  the  physical,  except  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  why 
the  brain  process,  when  thus  experienced  from  within,  should  be 
called  "  the  actuality,"  while  the  same  brain  process  when  viewed 
by  a  second  person  is  only  "  the  symbol  of  it."  The  focus  of  a 
system  is  no  more  real  than  the  margin  or  context ;  each  is  es- 
sential to  give  the  other  its  reality ;  in  truth,  each  is  necessary 
in  order  that  the  other  should  have  any  existence  at  all. 

The  problem  of  "  how  a  subjective  fact  comes  to  be  perceived 
as  an  objective  fact ;  or  how  a  feeling  comes  to  be  presented  to 
us  as  a  vibration  "  ;  i.  e.,  the  problem  of  why  the  focus  of  this 
system  appears  as  a  marginal  element  in  some  other  system,  is  a 
problem,  to  be  sure.  It  is  the  fundamental  problem  of  why 
Being  is  such  as  it  is.  But  it  is  no  more  of  a  problem  here  than 
it  is  elsewhere.  Why  what  is  mental  for  me  is  physical  for  you, 
is  no  more  of  a  problem  than  why  the  leaf  on  the  tree  is  different 
from  the  blade  of  grass. 

With  Dr.  Prince's  statement  that  "  there  is  only  one  process,"  4 
and  that  that  process,  as  process,  is  "psychical,"  we  may  fully 
agree ;  but  this  process  has  also  a  content,  not  only  when  viewed 

1  Summarized  in  the  Psych.  Rev.,  Nov.,  1903,  pp.  650-658. 

2  In  his  book  entitled  Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body. 

3  P.  651. 
*P.  653. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  313 

by  another  person,  but  when  introspectively  (retrospectively) 
viewed  by  myself.  Thus  viewed  as  content,  it  is  physical  (it  may 
be  social,  ethical,  economic,  psychological,  etc.).  It  is  not  a 
different  reality  when  viewed  thus  as  content,  any  more  than  the 
context  of  a  dynamic  system  is  a  different  system  from  the  focus. 
Why  should  we  attempt  to  reduce  the  context  to  terms  of  the 
focus  any  more  than  the  reverse?  Why,  that  is,  should  we 
seek  to  reduce  the  physical  to  the  psychical,  as  does  Dr.  Prince  ? 

Dr.  Prince's  illustration  of  the  kaleidoscope  is  admirably 
adapted  to  show,  not  the  exclusive  reality  of  the  "  wonderful 
variegated  mosaic"  seen  within,  but  the  reality  equally  of  the 
"  little  pieces  of  colored  glass  thrown  higgledy-piggledy  together  " 
which  are  seen  from  without.  The  one  is  as  true  and  as  real  a 
view  as  the  other.  Why  should  we  attempt  to  reduce  what  we 
see  from  the  outside  to  terms  exclusively  of  what  we  see  on  the 
inside? 

Another  interesting  phase  of  the  argument  presented  by  Dr. 
Prince  is  that  embodied  in  the  following  supposititious  case,  which 
is  here  modified  slightly  for  the  sake  of  simplification.  Let  us 
suppose  two  persons,  by  means  of  some  X-ray  appliance,  to  be 
perceiving  each  other's  brain  states.  Then,  according  to  the 
theory  propounded  by  both  Dr.  Prince  and  Professor  Strong, 
the  reality  is  the  consciousness  which  each  has.  The  brain  state 
which  each  perceives  is  simply  a  symbol  of  the  reality  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  other. 

But  now  suppose,  by  some  device,  that  one  of  these  persons 
turns  his  instrument  upon  his  own  brain  state.  He  still,  on  the 
theory  propounded  by  these  writers,  would  see  only  brain  state. 
His  own  brain  state,  in  this  case,  would  likewise  be  only  a  sym- 
bol. But  a  symbol  of  what  ?  A  symbol  of  his  own  conscious- 
ness, of  course.  But,  by  hypothesis,  this  symbol  is  a  part  of 
his  own  consciousness.1  The  symbol  must  then  be  as  real  as 
his  consciousness,  which,  according  to  Dr.  Prince,  is  the  only 
reality.  Reality,  then,  includes  both  the  psychical  and  the  physi- 
cal, both  the  consciousness  and  the  brain  state.  How,  then,  can 

1  "  That  which  we  call  the  physical  brain-process  is  my  consciousness  or  percep- 
tion of  it."  P.  652. 


314  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

consciousness  or  the  psychical  be  the  only  reality,  i.  e.,  how  can 
panpsychism  be  true  ? 

Professor  Strong  uses  the  following  illustration  :  Let  us  sup- 
pose that  some  future  physiologist  finds  means  "  to  isolate  the 
brain  and  keep  it  artificially  alive,  and  then,  connecting  his  in- 
struments with  the  stumps  of  the  cerebral  nerves,  impart  to  them 
impulses  so  like  those  they  have  been  accustomed  to  receive  from 
the  eye,  the  ear,  and  the  skin  that  the  brain's  possessor  .  .  .  will 
see,  hear,  and  feel  like  a  normal  person,  and  never  know  what 
had  happened  to  him."  l  "  We  have  only  to  suppose,  after  the 
laying-bare  of  the  brain-tissue  and  the  application  of  the  hyper- 
microscope,  an  arrangement  of  mirrors  to  be  brought  to  bear,  in 
such  wise  as  to  reflect  the  light-rays  traversing  the  microscope 
into  the  subject's  eyes.  This  happy  mortal  would  then  ...  be 
simultaneously  conscious  of  a  feeling  and  of  the  accompanying 
brain  event.  This  suggests  a  curious  deduction.  Suppose  the 
feeling  happened  to  be  a  perception,  and  the  perception  that  of 
the  very  brain  event  in  question  ;  then  mental  state  and  corre- 
lated brain-event  would  apparently  for  that  mind  be  fused  into 
one."  2 

This  "  curious  deduction,"  which  Professor  Strong  rejects, 
would  seem  rather  to  be  the  true  one.  He  rejects  it  on  the 
ground  that  the  object  of  perception  always  follows  and  is  the 
effect  of  the  consciousness  in  which  it  is  a  perception.  In  this 
case,  he  maintains  that  the  brain  state  would  be  subsequent  to 
the  mental  state,  i.  e.,  to  the  consciousness  of  the  brain  state. 
But,  waiving  the  question  of  the  validity  of  psychical  causality, 
and  waiving  the  question  of  how  the  content  could  be  temporally 
subsequent  to  the  process  of  a  perception,  is  not  this  an  indefen- 
sible position  even  on  the  basis  of  his  own  theory  of  conscious- 
ness ?  He  has  at  considerable  length  defended  the  doctrine  that 
"  consciousness  is  correlated,  strictly  speaking,  with  a  process 
occupying  the  entire  sensory-motor  arc  and  extending  from  the 
sense-organs  to  the  muscles." 3  How,  then,  in  this  instance, 
could  one  part  of  the  organic  circuit,  or  sensori-motor  arc,  be 

1  P.  41. 

2  Pp.  339-40. 

3  Pp.  46-47- 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF   THE  PSYCHICAL.  315 

subsequent  to  another,  if  consciousness  is  correlated  only  with 
the  whole  circuit?  How  could  my  brain  state,  which,  in  this 
supposititious  case,  is  the  object  of  my  perception,  be  subsequent 
to  my  consciousness  of  that  brain  state,  if  that  consciousness  is 
the  correlate,  not  of  any  part,  but  only  of  the  whole  circuit,  — not 
only  of  brain  states,  but  of  sense  organs  and  muscles  ? 

Of  course,  to  have  a  complete  perception  of  this  brain  state,  it 
would  be  just  as  incumbent  upon  me  to  touch  this  cerebral  tissue 
with  the  finger  or  dissecting  needle  as  to  see  it  with  the  retina 
and  microscope.  In  this  case,  the  two  portions  of  the  organic 
circuit  (brain  tissue  and  finger,  let  us  say)  would  be  immediately 
adjacent,  and  the  illustration  becomes  even  more  suggestive,  and 
the  absurdity  even  more  apparent,  of  supposing  that  the  per- 
ceived object  (the  brain  state)  could  be  subsequent  in  time  to  the 
percipient  subject. 

The  psychical  and  the  physical,  consciousness  and  brain  state, 
thus  are  one,  as  Professor  Strong  says,  but  not  in  the  sense  that 
the  brain  state  reduces  to  a  mode  of  consciousness,  not  in  the 
sense  of  panpsychism.  Consciousness  and  brain  state  are  one 
reality,  but  this  reality  is  no  more  truly  expressed  in  the  con- 
sciousness than  in  the  brain  state,  in  panpsychism  than  in  pan- 
physicism.  There  is  a  difference  between  consciousness  and 
brain  state,  but  it  is  not  the  difference  of  one  being  more  real 
than  the  other.  It  is  the  difference  between  that  reality  when  in 
a  tensional  phase  and  when  in  a  state  of  relative  equilibrium.  It 
is  a  distinction  of  function  or  meaning  rather  than  of  structure  or 
existence. 

Professor  Royce,  in  his  Outlines  of  Psychology,  distinguishes 
between  the  physical  (or  '  public ')  and  the  psychical  (or  '  pri- 
vate') kinds  of  experience.  "Physical  facts  are  .  .  .  'public 
property,'  patent  to  all  properly  equipped  observers.  .  .  But 
psychical  facts  are  essentially  '  private  property,'  existent  for 
one  alone."  "The  mental  life  of  each  one  of  us  can  be  directly 
present,  as  a  series  of  experienced  facts,  to  one  person  only."  * 
"The  fact  that  other  persons  cannot  directly  watch  our  inner 
physiological  processes,  is  itself  something  relatively  accidental, 

'P.  2. 


316  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

dependent  upon  the  limitations  of  the  sense  organs,  or  upon 
the  defective  instrumental  devices,  of  those  who  watch  us.  But 
the  fact  that  our  mental  states  are  incapable  of  observation 
by  anybody  but  ourselves  seems  to  be  not  an  accidental,  but 
an  essential  character  of  these  mental  states.  Were  physiologists 
better  endowed  with  sense  organs  and  with  instruments  of  exact 
observation,  we  can,  if  we  choose,  conceive  them  as,  by  some 
now  unknown  device,  coming  to  watch  the  very  molecules  of  our 
brains ;  but  we  cannot  conceive  them,  in  any  possible  case,  as 
observing  from  without  our  pains  or  our  thoughts  in  the  sense  in 
which  physical  facts  are  observable.  .  .  .  No  microscope  could 
conceivably  reveal  them.  To  me  alone  would  these  states  be 
known.  And  I  should  not  see  them  from  without ;  I  should 
simply  find  them,  or  be  aware  of  them.  And  what  it  is  to  find 
them,  or  to  be  aware  of  them,  I  alone  can  tell  myself."  l 

In  The  World  and  the  Individual?  Professor  Royce  suggests 
that  the  difference  between  the  psychical  and  the  physical  is 
simply  a  difference  in  time-span,  "  that  we  have  no  right  what- 
ever to  speak  of  really  unconscious  nature,  but  only  of  uncom- 
municative nature,  or  of  nature  whose  mental  processes  go  on  at 
such  different  time-rates  from  ours  that  we  cannot  adjust  our- 
selves to  a  live  appreciation  of  their  inward  fluency."  3 

It  may  be  pointed  out,  in  the  first  place,  that  these  two  views 
of  the  relation  between  the  psychical  and  the  physical,  are 
scarcely  consistent.  If  the  difference  is  simply  one  of  time-span, 
then  the  two  would  seem  to  belong  to  a  continuous  series  of 
phenomena,  their  difference  being  one  of  degree  rather  than  of 
kind.  The  problem  would  here  be  as  to  why  just  this  rather 
than  that  time-span  is  accompanied  by  the  particular  kind  of 
consciousness  which  we  know  in  ourselves.  A  very  important 
point  in  the  dynamic  theory  would  be  the  determination  of  the 
temporal  limits  of  the  tension  which  is  the  condition  of  con- 
sciousness. 

But,  according  to  the  view  set  forth  in  the  Outlines,  the  differ- 
ence is  one  of  kind.  "  Mental  life  has  thus  been  defined  by 

1  Pp.  4-5- 

2  Vol.  ii,  pp.  211-242. 
3 Ibid.,  pp.   22-56. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF  THE  PSYCHICAL.  317 

pointing  out  its  contrast  with  all  that  is  physical."1  "How 
shall  psychology  progress,  if,  in  our  various  mental  lives,  no  two 
observers  can  ever  take  note  of  precisely  the  same  facts  ?"2  The 
answer  finally  is  that  "psychology  is  concerned  with  what  is 
common  to  many  or  to  all  human  minds,"  3  the  position  taken 
being  the  same  as  that  of  Professor  Baldwin  in  his  Development 
and  Evolution,  when  he  says  that  the  data  of  psychology  are  psy- 
chological, not  psychic.  But,  if  this  is  true,  then  psychology  is 
on  no  different  basis  methodologically  from  biology  or  physi- 
ology ;  they  are  equally  objective  sciences. 

What,  then,  is  the  significance  of  this  discussion  of  the  psy- 
chical and  the  physical  as  '  private  '  and  '  public,'  respectively  ? 
The  psychical  as  such  is  never  the  datum  of  psychology.  Psy- 
chology is  "  concerned  with  what  is  common  to  many  or  to  all 
human  minds."  But  the  only  thing  that  is  common  or  public 
is  physical,  not  psychical.  Hence,  as  a  science,  psychology  no 
more  deals  with  the  psychical  than  does  physics  or  biology:  If 
by  the  psychical  is  meant  my  own  private  mental  states,  as  Pro- 
fessor Royce  insists  at  some  length,  then  we  are  forced  to  one  of 
two  conclusions  :  either  there  can  be  no  science  of  psychology 
(since  there  can  be  no  science  of  the  individual,  of  the  particular), 
or  the  psychical  is  not  the  datum  of  psychology.  But  neither 
he  nor  we  would  be  willing  to  accept  either  of  these  conclusions 
in  this  unqualified  form.  What  is  the  truth  in  the  matter  ? 

The  truth  lies  in  seeing  that  this  distinction  between  '  public  ' 
and  '  private  '  is  a  functional,  not  a  fixed  one.  A  psychical  fact 
is  no  more  private  than  any  other  fact,  except  as  it  is  taken  as 
.  such  ;  it  is  its  being  taken  as  such  that  makes  it  psychical.  This 
Professor  Royce  has  himself  well  illustrated  in  his  critique  of  the 
doctrine  of  conscious  elements  already  mentioned,4  where  he 
shows  that  the  element  or  unit  with  which  psychological  analysis 
operates  is  not  a  preexistent  conscious  state,  but  is  brought  into 
being  in  the  act  of  analysis  ;  the  element  is  only  as  it  is  thus  con- 
structed. It  is  a  fact  only  in  the  sense  in  which  every  scientific 
construct,  such  as  the  atom  or  the  electron,  is  a  fact. 


!.  5. 

3  P.  17.  «Pp.  97 


3l8  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

'  Public  '  and  '  private '  are  relative  or  functional  terms.  There 
is  no  experience  which  is  absolutely  public  or  absolutely  private. 
To  recur  to  the  illustration  of  the  focus  and  marginal  context, 
there  is  nothing  which  is  absolutely  focus  and  the  rest  context ; 
it  is  a  matter  of  the  interest  or  purpose  of  the  situation  whether 
the  focus  be  taken  as  a  mathematical  point,  as  a  spot,  or  as  a 
smaller  within  a  larger  area.  This  is  more  consistent  with  Pro- 
fessor Royce's  statement  that  the  distinction  is  "  only  a  relative 
distinction  due  to  the  special  conditions  to  which  our  human 
knowledge  of  both  these  worlds  is  subject."  l  The  implication 
of  this,  as  well  as  of  much  that  he  says  in  The  World  and  the 
Individual,  is  that  for  a  higher  intelligence  the  psychical  and  the 
physical  would  be  seen  to  be  one,  but  that  to  our  finite  minds 
there  are  two  worlds,  an  internal  and  an  external,  a  private  and 
a  public,  a  psychical  and  a  physical. 

But  it  is  just  the  contention  of  the  functional  view  that  these 
two  are,  under  certain  conditions,  one  in  our  experience  as  truly 
as  in  the  experience  of  a  transcendent  intelligence.  Psychical 
and  physical  are  a  unity  in  every  act ;  the  duality  is  the  duality 
of  consciousness,  of  thought.  Of  course,  the  unity  of  action  is 
not  a  bare  unity ;  it  is  a  unity  of  the  differences  represented  in 
consciousness.  So,  on  the  other  hand,  the  duality  or  diversity 
of  consciousness  is  not  a  bare  diversity  ;  it  is  a  diversity,  a  duality, 
set  up  within  the  unity  of  action,  and  is  thus  itself  a  phase  of 
activity. 

Like  Dr.  Prince  and  Professor  Strong,  Professor  Royce  uses 
the  illustration  of  the  brain  states.  "  Were  my  body  as  transparent 
as  crystal,  or  could  all  my  internal  physical  functions  be  viewed 
and  studied  as  easily  as  one  now  observes  a  few  small  particles 
eddying  in  a  glass  of  nearly  clear  water,  my  mental  states  could 
not  even  then  be  seen  floating  in  my  brain."  2  But  let  us  sup- 
pose, as  before,  that  I  turned  the  instrument  upon  my  own  brain, 
and  upon  the  very  brain  state  concerned  in  my  present  state  of 
consciousness.  Here  it  would  appear  that  this  brain  state  is  at 
once  '  public '  and  '  private,'  since  it  is  at  once  a  presentation  in 
my  consciousness  and  at  the  same  time  a  neural  state  observable 

1  P.  2,  note. 

2  P.  4. 


No.  3.]  THE  MEANING    OF  THE  PSYCHICAL.  319 

by  another.  What,  then,  here  becomes  of  the  distinction  between 
the  psychical  and  the  physical  ?  If  it  be  objected  that  the  brain 
state  as  presented  in  my  consciousness  is  not  the  consciousness 
of  the  brain  state,  that  the  content  of  perception  is  not  the  same 
as  the  process  of  perception  itself,  it  may  well  be  asked  how  a 
perception  of  a  brain  state  would,  in  that  case,  differ  from  any 
other  perception.  It  is  just  the  content  which  makes  one  state 
of  consciousness  different  from  another  state  of  consciousness. 

The  analysis  of  this  supposititious  case  suggests  two  important 
conclusions  :  first,  that  consciousness  is  to  be  correlated  with 
nothing  less  than  a  complete  organic  circuit,  involving  the  whole 
context  of  external  nature  as  truly  as  the  internal  mechanism  of 
the  nervous  system ;  second,  that  the  condition  of  consciousness 
is  a  certain  tension  within  this  system  or  organic  circuit,  and  that 
where  this  is  absent  (as  in  the  supposititious  case,  where  the  ob- 
ject of  the  perception,  —  the  brain  state, — is  itself  the  organic 
circuit)  the  psychical  and  the  physical  merge,  consciousness 
vanishes. 

That  the  time-span  is  an  important  condition  of  consciousness 
is  not  only  probable  but  demonstrable.  Experimental  psy- 
chology has  for  one  of  the  chief  objects  of  its  investigation  the 
measurement  of  the  temporal  limits  of  the  organic  tension  which 
finds  its  expression  in  consciousness. 

H.  HEATH  BAWDEN. 
VASSAR  COLLEGE. 


WHAT   IS   ESTHETICS? 

AN  accomplished  mathematician,  who  is  certainly  free  from 
those  prejudices  which  his  science  might  be  expected  to 
foster,  once  said  that  all  problems  are  divided  into  two  classes, 
soluble  questions,  which  are  trivial,  and  important  questions,  which 
are  insoluble.  This  epigram,  if  we  chose  for  the  moment  to  take 
it  seriously,  might  help  us  to  deal  in  a  quick  and  trenchant 
fashion  with  the  topic  before  us.  Our  problem  would  indeed  be 
soluble  and  trivial,  if  we  wished  merely  to  fix  the  relation  of  an 
aesthetics  arbitrarily  defined  to  other  sciences  of  our  own  delim- 
ination.  It  would  be  all  a  question  of  dragooning  reality  into  a 
fresh  verbal  uniform.  We  should  have  on  our  hands,  if  we  were 
successful,  a  regiment  of  ideal  and  non-existent  sciences,  to  which 
we  should  be  applying  titles  more  or  less  preempted  by  actual 
human  studies ;  but  in  its  flawless  articulation  and  symmetry  our 
classification  would  absolve  itself  from  any  subservience  to  usage, 
and  would  ignore  the  historic  grouping  and  genealogy  of  existing 
pursuits. 

Thus,  for  instance,  in  the  recent  Estetica,  by  Benedetto  Croce, 
we  learn  that  aesthetics  is  purely  and  simply  the  science  of  ex- 
pression ;  expression  being  itself  so  defined  as  to  be  identical  with 
every  form  of  apperception,  intuition,  or  imaginative  synthesis. 
This  imagined  aesthetics  includes  the  theory  of  speech  and  of  all 
attentive  perception,  while  it  has  nothing  in  particular  to  do  with 
art  or  with  beauty  or  with  any  kind  of  preference.  Such  sys- 
tem-making may  be  a  most  learned  game,  but  it  contributes 
nothing  to  knowledge.  The  inventor  of  Volapiik  might  exhibit 
considerable  acquaintance  with  current  languages,  and  much 
acumen  in  comparing  and  criticizing  their  grammar,  but  his  own 
grammar  would  not  on  that  account  describe  any  living  speech. 
So  the  author  of  some  new  and  ideal  articulation  of  the  sciences 
merely  tells  us  how  knowledge  might  have  fallen  together,  if  it 
had  prophetically  conformed  to  a  scheme  now  suggesting  itself 
to  his  verbal  fancy ;  much  as  if  a  man  fond  by  nature  of  archi- 

320 


WHAT  IS  ESTHETICS?  321 

tectural  magnificence,  but  living  by  chance  in  a  house  built  of 
mud  and  rubble,  should  plaster  it  on  the  outside,  and,  by  the  aid 
of  a  little  paint,  should  divide  it  into  huge  blocks  conjoined  with 
masterly  precision  and  apparently  fit  to  outlast  the  ages.  When 
this  brilliant  effect  was  achieved,  and  the  speculative  eye  had 
gloated  sufficiently  on  its  masterpiece,  the  truly  important  ques- 
tion would  still  remain ;  namely,  what  the  structure  of  that  house 
really  was  and  how  long  it  could  be  expected  to  retain  traces  of 
the  unmeaning  checkerwork  with  which  its  owner's  caprice  had 
overlaid  it. 

Perhaps  we  may  pursue  our  subject  to  better  advantage  if  we 
revert  to  our  mathematical  friend,  and  try  to  turn  his  satirical 
dictum  into  something  like  a  sober  truth.  Some  questions,  let 
us  say,  are  important  and  soluble,  because  the  subject-matter  can 
control  the  answer  we  give  to  them ;  others  are  insoluble  and 
merely  vexatious,  because  the  terms  they  are  stated  in  already 
traduce  and  dislocate  the  constitution  of  things.  Now  the  word 
'  aesthetics '  is  nothing  but  a  loose  term  lately  applied  in  academic 
circles  to  everything  that  has  to  do  with  works  of  art  or  with  the 
sense  of  beauty.  The  man  who  studies  Venetian  painting  is 
aesthetically  employed ;  so  is  he  who  experiments  in  a  laboratory 
about  the  most  pleasing  division  of  a  strip  of  white  paper.  The 
latter  person  is  undoubtedly  a  psychologist ;  the  former  is  nothing 
but  a  miserable  amateur,  or  at  best  a  historian  of  art.  ^Esthetic 
too  would  be  any  speculation  about  the  dialectical  relation  of  the 
beautiful  to  the  rational  or  to  the  absolutely  good ;  so  that  a 
theologian,  excogitating  the  emanation  of  the  Holy  Ghost  from 
the  Son  and  Jfrom  the  Father,  might  be  an  aesthetician  into  the 
bargain,  if  only  the  Holy  Ghost  turned  out  to  mean  the  fulness 
of  life  realized  in  beauty,  when  deep  emotion  suffuses  luminous 
and  complex  ideas. 

The  truth  is  that  the  group  of  activities  we  can  call  aesthetic  is 
a  motley  one,  created  by  certain  historic  and  literary  accidents. 
Wherever  consciousness  becomes  at  all  imaginative  and  finds  a 
flattering  unction  in  its  phantasmagoria,  or  whenever  a  work,  for 
whatever  purpose  constructed,  happens  to  have  notable  intrinsic 
values  for  perception,  we  utter  the  word  '  aesthetic ';  but  these  occa- 


322  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

sions  are  miscellaneous,  and  there  is  no  single  agency  in  nature, 
no  specific  organ  in  sense,  and  no  separable  task  in  spirit,  to 
which  the  aesthetic  quality  can  be  attributed.  ^Esthetic  experi- 
ence is  so  broad  and  so  incidental,  it  is  spread  so  thin  over  all 
life,  that  like  life  itself  it  opens  out  for  reflection  into  divergent 
vistas.  The  most  important  natural  division  in  the  field  of  re- 
flection is  that  between  the  vista  of  things  found  and  the  vista  of 
things  only  conceived  or  desired.  These  are  two  opposite  and 
centrifugal  directions  in  which  reasoned  knowledge  may  expand  ; 
both  diverge  from  the  common  root  furnished  by  practical  knowl- 
edge, memory,  and  history ;  one,  proceeding  by  observation, 
yields  natural  science,  and  the  other  yields  ideal  science,  which 
proceeds  by  dialectic.  Yet  even  these  two  regions,  the  most  dis- 
parate possible  in  speculation,  covered  respectively  by  pre-So- 
cratic  and  by  Socratic  philosophy,  are  themselves  far  from  separ- 
able, since  before  external  facts  can  be  studied  they  have  to  be 
arrested  by  attention  and  translated  into  terms  having  a  fixed  in- 
tent, so  that  relations  and  propositions  may  be  asserted  about 
them  ;  while  these  terms  in  discourse,  these  goals  of  intent  or 
attention,  must  in  turn  be  borne  along  in  the  flux  of  existence, 
and  must  interpret  its  incidental  formations. 

Now,  much  that  is  aesthetic  is  factual,  for  instance  the  phe- 
nomena of  art  and  taste  ;  and  all  this  is  an  object  for  natural  his- 
tory and  natural  philosophy ;  but  much  also  is  ideal,  like  the 
effort  and  intent  of  poetic  composition,  or  the  interpretation  of 
music,  all  of  which  is  concerned  only  with  fulfilling  intent  and 
establishing  values.  That  psychology  may  occasionally  deal 
with  aesthetic  questions  is  undeniable.  No  matter  how  clearly 
objects  may  originally  stand  out  in  their  own  proper  and  natural 
medium,  in  retrospect  they  may  be  made  to  retreat  into  the  ex- 
perience which  discovered  them.  Now,  to  reduce  everything  to 
the  experience  which  discloses  it  is  doubtless  the  mission  of  psy- 
chology,—  a  feat  on  which  current  idealism  is  founded  ;  so  that 
the  subject-matter  of  aesthetics,  however  various  in  itself,  may  be 
swallowed  up  in  the  psychological  vortex,  together  with  every- 
thing else  that  exists.  But  mathematics  or  history  or  judgments 
of  taste  can  fall  within  the  psychological  field  only  adventitiously 


No.  3.]  WHAT  IS  ESTHETICS?  323 

and  for  a  third  person.  An  eventual  subsumption  of  the  whole 
universe  under  psychological  categories  would  still  leave  every 
human  pursuit  standing  and  every  field  of  experience  or  faith 
distinct  in  its  native  and  persisting  hypostasis.  Intelligence  is 
centrifugal.  Every  part  of  rational  life,  in  spite  of  all  after- 
thoughts and  criticisms,  remains  in  the  presence  of  its  own  ideal, 
conscious  of  the  objects  it  itself  envisages,  rather  than  of  the 
process  imputed  to  it  by  another.  ^Esthetic  experience  will 
therefore  continue  to  elude  and  overflow  psychology  in  a  hun- 
dred ways,  although  in  its  own  way  psychology  might  eventually 
survey  and  represent  all  aesthetic  experience. 

If  psychology  must  sometimes  consider  aesthetic  facts,  so 
must  moral  philosophy  sometimes  consider  aesthetic  values. 
As  mathematical  dialectic,  starting  with  simple  intuitions,  de- 
velops their  import,  so  moral  dialectic,  starting  with  an  animal 
will,  develops  its  ideals.  Now  a  part  of  man's  ideal,  an  ingre- 
dient in  his  ultimate  happiness,  is  to  find  satisfaction  for  his  eyes, 
for  his  imagination,  for  his  hand  or  voice  aching  to  embody 
latent  tendencies  in  explicit  forms.  Perfect  success  in  this  vital, 
aesthetic  undertaking  is  possible,  however,  only  when  artistic  im- 
pulse is  quite  healthy  and  representative,  that  is,  when  it  js 
favorable  to  all  other  interests  and  is  in  turn  supported  by  them 
all.  If  this  harmony  fails,  the  aesthetic  activity  collapses  inwardly 
by  inanition, —  since  every  other  impulse  is  fighting  against  it, — 
while  for  the  same  reason  its  external  products  are  rendered  triv- 
ial, meretricious,  and  mean.  They  will  still  remain  symptomatic, 
as  excrements  are,  but  they  will  cease  to  be  works  of  rational 
art,  because  they  will  have  no  further  vital  function,  no  human 
use.  It  will  become  impossible  for  a  mind  with  the  least  scope 
to  relish  them,  or  to  find  them  even  initially  beautiful.  ^Esthetic 
good  is  accordingly  no  separable  value  ;  it  is  not  realizable  by  it- 
self in  a  set  of  objects  not  otherwise  interesting.  Anything  which 
is  to  entertain  the  imagination  must  first  have  exercised  the 
senses ;  it  must  first  have  stimulated  some  animal  reaction,  en- 
gaged attention,  and  intertwined  itself  in  the  vital  process  ;  and 
later  this  aesthetic  good,  with  animal  and  sensuous  values  im- 
bedded in  it  and  making  its  very  substance,  must  be  swallowed 


324  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

up  in  a  rational  life ;  for  reason  will  immediately  feel  itself  called 
upon  to  synthesize  those  imaginative  activities  with  whatever  else 
is  valuable.  As  the  underlying  sensuous  good  must  be  neces- 
sarily merged  in  the  imaginative  (their  product  being  what  we 
call  aesthetic  charm),  so  in  a  cultivated  mind  ulterior  rational 
interests,  never  being  out  of  sight,  will  merge  in  the  same  total 
and  immediate  appreciation.  It  will  be  as  impossible  wholly  to 
welcome  what  is  cruel  or  silly,  what  is  groundless,  mindless, 
and  purely  aesthetical,  as  wholly  to  welcome  what  gives  physical 
pain.  Reason  suffers  us  to  approve  with  no  part  of  our  nature 
what  is  offensive  to  any  other  part ;  and  even  mathematical 
cogency,  for  instance,  becomes  trivial,  in  so  far  as  mathematical 
being  is  irrelevant  to  human  good.  The  whole  of  wisdom  must 
color  a  judgment  which  is  to  be  truly  imaginative  and  is  to  ex- 
press adequately  an  enlightened  and  quick  sensibility. 

The  question  whether  aesthetics  is  a  part  of  psychology  or  a 
philosophic  discipline  apart  is  therefore  an  insoluble  question, 
because  aesthetics  is  neither.  The  terms  of  the  problem  do  vio- 
lence to  the  structure  of  things.  The  lines  of  cleavage  in  human 
history  and  art  do  not  isolate  any  such  block  of  experience  as 
aesthetics  is  supposed  to  describe.  The  realm  of  the  beautiful  is 
no  scientific  enclosure  ;  like  religion  it  is  a  field  of  sublimated  ex- 
perience which  various  sciences  may  partly  traverse  and  which  is 
wholly  covered  by  none.  Nor  can  we  say  that,  because  to 
analyze  the  sense  of  beauty  is  a  psychological  task,  this  analysis 
constitutes  a  special  science.  For  then  astronomy  too  would 
have  a  psychology  of  its  own,  and  even  its  special  aesthetics,  and 
a  fresh  science  would  spring  into  being  whenever  a  new  object 
offered  itself  to  any  observer. 

What  exists  in  the  ideal  region  in  lieu  of  an  aesthetic  science 
is  the  art  and  function  of  criticism.  This  is  a  reasoned  apprecia- 
tion of  human  works  by  a  mind  not  wholly  ignorant  of  their 
subject  or  occasion,  their  school,  and  their  process  of  manufac- 
ture. Good  criticism  leans  on  a  great  variety  of  considerations, 
more  numerous  in  proportion  to  the  critic's  competence  and 
maturity.  Nothing  relevant  to  the  object's  efficacy  should  be 
ignored,  and  an  intelligent  critic  must  look  impartially  to  beauty, 


No.  3.]  WHAT  IS  AESTHETICS?  325 

propriety,  difficulty,  originality,  truth,  and  moral  significance  in 
the  work  he  judges.  In  other  words,  as  each  thing,  by  its  exist- 
ence and  influence,  radiates  effects  over  human  life,  it  acquires 
various  functions  and  values,  sometimes  cumulative,  sometimes 
alternative.  These  values  it  is  the  moral  philosopher's  business 
to  perceive  and  to  combine  as  best  he  can  in  a  harmonious  ideal, 
to  be  the  goal  of  human  effort  and  a  standard  for  the  relative  esti- 
mation of  things.  Under  the  authority  of  such  a  standard  arts 
and  their  products  fall  of  necessity,  together  with  everything  else 
that  heaven  or  earth  may  contain.  Towards  the  rational  framing 
of  this  standard  must  go,  together  with  every  other  interest  and 
delight,  the  interest  and  delight  which  men  find  in  the  beautiful, 
either  to  watch  it  or  to  conceive  and  to  produce  it.  ^Esthetic 
sensibility  and  artistic  impulse  are  two  gifts  distinguishable  from 
each  other  and  from  other  human  gifts  ;  the  pleasures  that  accom- 
pany them  may  of  course  be  separated  artificially  from  the  mas- 
sive pleasures  and  fluid  energies  of  life.  But  to  pride  oneself  on 
holding  a  single  interest  free  from  all  others,  and  on  being  lost 
in  that  specific  sensation  to  the  exclusion  of  all  its  affinities  and 
effects,  would  be  to  pride  oneself  on  being  a  voluntary  fool. 
Isolated,  local  sensibility,  helplessness  before  each  successive 
stimulus,  is  precisely  what  foolishness  consists  in.  To  attempt, 
then,  to  abstract  a  so-called  aesthetic  interest  from  all  other  in- 
terests, and  a  so-called  work  of  art  from  whatever  work  minis- 
ters, in  one  way  or  another,  to  all  human  good,  is  to  make  the 
aesthetic  sphere  contemptible.  There  has  never  been  any  art 
worthy  t>f  notice  without  a  practical  basis  and  occasion,  or  with- 
out some  intellectual  or  religious  function.  To  divorce  in  a 
schematic  fashion  one  phase  of  rational  activity  from  the  rest  is 
to  render  each  part  and  the  whole  again  irrational ;  such  a  course 
would  lead  in  the  arts,  if  it  led  to  anything,  to  works  with  no  sub- 
ject or  meaning  or  moral  glow.  It  would  lead  in  other  fields  to 
a  mathematics  without  application  in  nature,  to  a  morality  without 
roots  in  life,  and  to  other  fantastic  abstractions  wholly  irrelevant 
to  one  another  and  useless  for  judging  the  world. 

Nor  would  such  an  insulation  of  the  aesthetic  ideal  secure  any 
permanent  division  of  functions,  nor  even  attain  an  ultimate  tech- 


326  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

nical  analysis.  For  after  the  alleged  aesthetic  sphere  had  been 
abstracted,  at  the  cost  of  making  it  a  region  of  pure  idiocy,  it 
would  turn  out  that  an  aesthetic  element  had  remained  imbedded 
in  men's  other  thoughts  and  actions.  Their  steam-engines,  their 
games,  their  prose,  and  their  religion  would  prove  incorrigibly, 
inherently,  beautiful  or  ugly.  So  that  side  by  side  with  pure 
aestheticism,  —  something  so  dubious  and  inhuman,  —  we  should 
have  to  admit  the  undeniable  beauties  of  the  non-aesthetic,  of 
everything  that  was  fit,  lucid,  beneficent,  or  profound.  For  what 
is  practically  helpful  soon  acquires  a  gracious  presence ;  the  eye 
learns  to  trace  its  form,  to  piece  out  its  characteristics  with  a 
latent  consciousness  of  their  function,  and,  if  possible,  to  remodel 
the  object  itself  so  as  to  fit  it  better  to  the  abstract  requirements 
of  vision,  that  so  excellent  a  thing  may  become  altogether  con- 
genial. ^Esthetic  satisfaction  thus  comes  to  perfect  all  other 
values  ;  they  would  remain  imperfect  if  beauty  did  not  supervene 
upon  them,  but  beauty  would  be  absolutely  impossible  if  they 
did  not  underlie  it.  For  perception,  while  in  itself  a  process,  is 
not  perception  if  it  means  nothing  or  has  no  ulterior  function  ; 
and  so  the  pleasures  of  perception  are  not  beauties,  if  they  are 
attached  to  nothing  substantial  and  rational,  to  nothing  with  a 
right  of  citizenship  in  the  natural  or  in  the  moral  world.  But 
happily  the  merit  of  immediate  pleasantness  tends  to  diffuse  itself 
over  what  otherwise  is  good,  and  to  become,  for  refined  minds,  a 
symbol  of  total  excellence.  And  simultaneously,  knowledge  of 
what  things  are,  of  what  skill  means,  of  what  man  has  endured 
and  desired,  reenters  like  a  flood  that  no  man's  land  of  mere 
aestheticism ;  and  what  we  were  asked  to  call  beautiful  out  of 
pure  affectation  and  pedantry,  now  becomes  beautiful  indeed. 

In  moral  philosophy,  then,  there  is  as  little  room  for  a  special 
discipline  called  '  aesthetics '  as  there  is  among  the  natural  sci- 
ences. Just  as  we  may  consider,  among  other  natural  facts,  the 
pleasures  incident  to  imagination  and  art,  as  we  may  describe 
their  occasions  and  detail  their  varieties,  so  in  moral  philosophy 
we  may  train  ourselves  to  articulate  the  judgments  vaguely 
called  aesthetic,  to  enlarge  and  clarify  them,  to  estimate  their 
weight,  catch  their  varying  message,  and  find  their  congruity  or 


No.  3.]  WHAT  IS  ESTHETICS?  327 

incongruity  with  other  interests.  This  will  be  an  exercise  of 
moral  judgment,  of  idealizing  reason  ;  and  its  very  function  of 
attributing  worth  reflectively  and  with  comprehensive  justice, 
will  forbid  its  arrest  at  the  face  value  of  dumb  sensation,  or  of 
abstract  skill,  or  of  automatic  self-expression ;  whatever  distin- 
guishable interests  may  be  covered  by  these  terms  will  be  only 
ingredients  in  the  total  appreciation  our  criticism  is  to  reach.  The 
critic's  function  is  precisely  to  feel  and  to  confront  all  values, 
bringing  them  into  relation,  and  if  possible  into  harmony. 

Accordingly,  the  question  whether  aesthetics  is  a  part  of  psy- 
chology or  a  separate  discipline  is,  I  repeat,  an  insoluble  ques- 
tion, because  it  creates  a  dilemma  which  does  not  exist  in  the 
facts.  A  part  of  psychology  deals  with  aesthetic  matters,  but 
cannot  exhaust  them  ;  parts  of  other  sciences  also  deal  with  the 
same.  A  single  and  complete  aesthetic  science,  natural  or  ideal, 
is  an  idol  of  the  cave  and  a  scholastic  chimera.  As  art  has 
hardly  prospered  where  men  were  barbarous  or  unintelligent,  or 
where  wealth  and  freedom  did  not  exist,  so  the  theory  of  aesthetic 
sensibility  cannot  advance  except  by  an  advance  in  history  and 
psychology;  while  to  produce  a  just  and  fruitful  appreciation  of 
beauty  it  is  first  requisite  to  ennoble  life,  to  purify  the  mind  with 
a  high  education,  with  much  discipline  of  thought  and  desire. 
Creative  genius  would  otherwise  find  no  materials  fit  to  interpret ; 
nor  could  art  otherwise  divine  what  direction  its  idealizations 
should  take,  so  as  to  make  them,  what  true  beauties  are,  so 
many  premonitions  of  benefit  or  so  many  echoes  of  happiness. 

G.  SANTAYANA. 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 


DISCUSSION. 

EVOLUTIONARY  METHOD  IN  ETHICAL  RESEARCH. 

I  WISH  to  recall  the  reader's  attention  to  the  two  essays  on  Evolu- 
tionary Method  and  Morality,1  published  by  Professor  John  Dewey  in 
this  REVIEW,  in  March  and  July,  1902.  The  object  of  the  first  paper 
is  to  show  that  scientific  ethics  is  possible  only  by  that  method.  Two 
distinct  propositions  are  thus  involved :  first,  that  the  method  in 
question  is  applicable  to  the  treatment  of  ethical  problems ;  and, 
secondly,  that  apart  from  this  method  no  scientific  ethics  is  possible. 
To  the  establishment  of  the  first  proposition,  the  whole  paper  is  really 
devoted.  For  the  second,  no  evidence  is  anywhere  offered, —  except, 
indeed,  a  direct  appeal  to  the  scientific  experience  of  the  reader. 
Yet  it  is  this  second  proposition  that  gives  the  essay  its  sub-title. 

Professor  Dewey  prefaces  the  discussion  with  a  consideration  of  the 
claims  of  the  experimental  method  to  rank  as  essentially  genetic.  The 
essence  of  the  experimental  method  is  said  to  be  "control  of  the 
analysis  or  interpretation  of  any  phenomenon  by  bringing  to  light 
the  exact  conditions,  and  the  only  conditions,  which  are  involved  in 
its  coming  into  being."  This  fact,  it  is  said,  is  hardly  warrant  for 
holding  it  to  be  in  a  true  sense  historical  or  evolutionary ;  in  the  first 
place,  because  the  historical  series  is  unique  both  in  itself  and  in  its 
context,  while  the  terms  with  which  experiment  deals  occur  and  recur 
without  essential  change  in  the  dislocation ;  and,  in  the  second  place, 
because  the  main  interest  in  experimental  science  is  not  in  the  individ- 
ual case  but  in  the  more  general  results  that  at  once  emerge.2  But  if 
not  strictly  historical,  the  experimental  method  is  yet  truly  genetic ; 
and,  indeed,  the  distinction  is  due  to  a  mere  abstraction  for  our  own 
ends.  The  serial  order,  with  which  experiment  deals,  is  perfectly 
individual ;  but,  since  our  ends  are  general,  we  can  have  substitution 
without  loss. 

Is  it  true  that  the  experimental  method  aims  at  bringing  to  light 
the  sole  and  sufficient  conditions  of  the  genesis  of  a  phenomenon  ? 
Prima  facie  the  very  opposite  is  true.  The  course  of  an  experiment 
is  the  natural  sequence  of  cause  and  effect.  It  is  the  causes  that  are  con- 

1  "  The  Evolutionary  Method  as  Applied  to  Morality.    I,  Its  Scientific  Necessity  ; 
II,  Its  Significance  for  Conduct." 

2  For  that  matter,  history  itself,  when  it  is  scientific,  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  scientific, 
finds  its  main  interests  in  the  universal  aspects  of  its  data. 

328 


DISCUSSION.  329 

sciously  predetermined,  not  the  effects.  The  immediate  problem,  at 
least,  is  not,  "What  was  the  cause?"  but,  "What  will  be  the  re- 
sult ?  "  A  vast  amount  of  experimentation  that  is  performed  on  each 
newly  discovered  chemical  element, —  as  the  present  investigations 
into  the  properties  of  radium, —  is  of  this  relatively  aimless  character. 
In  so  far,  however,  as  an  experiment  has  a  distinct  practical  purpose, 
Professor  Dewey's  formulation  holds  true, —  as  it  holds  true  of  all 
practical  research  by  any  method  whatsoever.  What  we  care  to  know 
is  the  means  to  our  end.  Thus  the  definitely  practical  experiment 
takes  the  form  :  "  Will  these  means  (suggested  by  analogy,  observed 
coincidence,  or  other  imperfect  induction)  lead  to  the  desired  end?  " 
But  the  actual  experiment  is  always  directly  a  synthesis,  and  only  in- 
directly ever  an  analysis. 

What,  then,  of  Prof.  Dewey's  illustration,  the  problem  of  the  nature 
of  water  ?  ' (  Water  simply  as  a  given  fact  resists  indefinitely  and  ob- 
stinately any  direct  mode  of  approach.  No  amount  of  observation  of 
it,  as  given,  yields  analytic  comprehension.  Observation  but  compli- 
cates the  problem  by  revealing  unsuspected  qualities  that  require 
additional  explanation  "  (p.  109).  On  a  first  reading,  these  sentences 
seem  incomprehensible.  For  the  writer  has  just  said  that  "by  nature, 
in  science,  we  mean  a  knowledge  for  purposes  of  intellectual  and 
practical  control."  Surely  a  great  mass  of  knowledge  of  water, 
enabling  us  to  turn  it  to  a  vast  number  of  practical  ends,  has  been 
obtained  by  direct  observation  and  scrutiny.  Why,  then,  with  the 
definition  just  given  of  the  nature  of  a  substance,  should  such  practi- 
cal knowledge  be  accounted  a  mere  complication  of  the  problem  of 
its  nature  ?  And  what  is  ' '  analytic  comprehension  ' '  ? 

The  next  few  sentences  furnish  a  seeming  explanation  of  Professor 
Dewey's  meaning.  "  What  experimentation  does  is  to  let  us  see  into 
water  in  the  process  of  making.  Through  generating  water  we  single 
out  the  precise  and  sole  conditions  which  have  to  be  fulfilled  that 
water  may  present  itself  as  an  experienced  fact."  Are  we,  then,  to 
understand  by  the  nature  of  water  its  chemical  constitution  ?  Is  that 
rather  to  be  accounted  its  nature  than  the  observed  facts,  that  it  evap- 
orates and  freezes  and  quenches  thirst?  Or  is  "analytic  compre- 
hension ' '  to  mean  knowledge  of  chemical  analysis  ?  Are  the  physi- 
cal properties  of  water  actually  explained  by  its  chemical  analysis? 
Surely  something  has  been  said  here  that  was  not  clearly  intended. 
But,  further,  does  the  chemical  composition  of  a  substance  constitute 
the  condition  of  its  genesis  ?  Decidedly  not.  Despite  all  that  the  ex- 
periment of  generating  water  proves,  not  a  particle  of  water  in  the 


330  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

universe, —  other  than  that  which  is  formed  in  the  experiment  itself, — 
may  have  come  into  being  by  the  uniting  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen. 
The  experiment  shows  us  the  analysis  of  water  and  a  simple  mode  of 
compounding  it ;  not  the  actual  mode  of  production, —  whether  we 
call  it  'genetic'  or  'historical,' — of  all  existing  water.  On  the 
whole,  we  must,  I  think,  conclude  that  the  experimental  method, 
while  perfectly  applicable  to  problems  of  genesis,  is  not  distinctly  a 
genetic  method. 

Proceeding  to  the  subject  of  ethical  research,  Professor  Dewey  an- 
nounces his  thesis :  "I  shall  endeavor  to  point  out  that  there  is  more 
than  an  analogy,  there  is  an  exact  identity,  between  what  the  experi- 
mental method  does  for  our  physical  knowledge,  and  what  the  histori- 
cal method  in  a  narrower  sense  may  do  for  the  spiritual  region  :  the 
region  of  conscious  values  "  (p.  113).  In  this  connection  he  gives 
what  appears  to  me  to  be  a  true  and  luminous  account  of  the  applica- 
tion of  the  evolutionary  method  to  ethics.  But  there  occur  occasional 
statements,  leading  to  the  above  thesis,  which  seem  somewhat  exag- 
gerated. "The  early  periods  present  us  in  their  relative  crudeness 
and  simplicity  with  a  substitute  for  the  artificial  operation  of  an  ex- 
periment." Surely  this  is  true  only  with  most  important  reservations. 
In  physical  research  we  exclude  complications  as  unessential ;  we  are 
justified  in  abstraction.  But  in  the  organism,  and  especially  in  society, 
the  complexity  is  all-important.  Just  what  we  cannot  tolerate  in 
ethics  is  over-simplification ;  and  this  has  hitherto  been  a  chief  crime 
of  evolutionary  moralists.  "  Following  the  phenomenon  into  the 
complicated  and  refined  form  which  it  assumes  later,  is  a  substitute 
for  the  synthesis  of  the  experiment. ' '  But  the  synthesis  of  the  experi- 
ment is  either  only  a  mere  check  upon  the  analysis,  or  it  is  a  novel 
combination,  motived  only  by  analogies  or  incomplete  inductions. 
But  in  evolutionary  research  "following  the  phenomenon"  is  the 
main  thing,  —  the  observation  of  influences  from  countless  sources,  not 
a  mere  shifting  of  the  elements  discovered  in  the  relatively  simple 
analysis.  From  the  point  of  view  of  method,  if  not  of  formal  logic, 
it  is  one  thing  to  note  the  results  of  an  intended  and  controlled  com- 
bination of  elements,  and  a  radically  different  thing  to  trace  the 
course  of  concrete  history, —  the  conflicting  results  of  infinitely  com- 
plex and  uncontrolled  forces,  only  gradually  coming  into  view  in  the 
advance  of  the  investigation. 

However,  when  all  reservations  are  made,  we  must  finally  admit 
both  that  the  historical  method  is  perfectly  applicable  to  ethical 
inquiry  and  that  the  simplicity  of  early  social  forms  permits  of  rela- 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSIOA'.  331 

tively  facile  analysis.  With  Professor  Dewey's  discussion  of  the 
popular  fallacy,  that  genetic  explanation  means  the  resolving  of  the 
later  into  the  earlier,  we  shall  also  have  no  quarrel.  In  this  connec- 
tion, however,  I  note  one  possible  misstatement.  It  is  said  :  "  The 
later  fact  in  its  experienced  qualify  is  unique,  irresolvable,  and  unde- 
rived. "  It  is  to  the  word  '  underived  '  that  I  would  take  exception, 
provided  it  implies  that  there  is  not  continuity  of  quality  as  well  as  of 
quantity  or  degree.  For,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  every  quantity  is  really 
as  unique  as  every  quality.  This  is  untrue  only  of  abstract  extension  ; 
an  inch  has  no  geometrical  properties  different  from  those  of  a  mil- 
limeter. But  every  concrete  extension,  as  well  as  every  number  or 
intensity,  is  thoroughly  unique, —  has,  in  short,  a  distinct  quality.  If, 
then,  quality  be  not  continuous  in  change,  neither  is  quantity.  Again, 
in  criticism  of  President  Schurman's  volume,  The  Ethical  Import  of 
Darwinism,  Professor  Dewey  makes  another  apparent  misstatement, 
which,  however,  is  surely  unintentional.  He  points  out  that  contin- 
uity of  process  must  not  be  confused  with  identity  of  content,  and 
that  knowledge  of  differences  is  not  less  important  than  that  of  the 
generic  identity  of  the  process.  He  then  says:  "  Supposing  (which 
does  not  seem  to  be  the  case)  that  an  identical  belief  regarding  the 
duty  of  parental  care,  or  of  conjugal  fidelity,  could  be  discovered  in 
human  societies  at  all  times  and  places.  This  would  throw  no  light 
whatsoever  upon  the  scientific  significance  of  the  phenomenon."  Of 
course,  this  is  literally  untrue.  The  supposed  fact  would  indicate  that 
the  development  of  the  belief  was  simultaneous  with,  or  prior  to,  the 
differentiation  of  the  human  species,  and  must,  therefore,  have  a 
relatively  universal  and  permanent  ground  in  human  character. 

It  remains  to  consider  the  few  passages  bearing  upon  the  second  of 
the  two  main  propositions  advanced  in  the  essay,  that  no  other  method 
than  the  historical  method  is  available  for  scientific  ethical  research. 
"We  cannot  apply  artificial  isolation  and  artificial  combination  [to 
an  ethical  phenomenon] ....  Only  through  history  can  we  unravel 
it.  ...  History  offers  to  us  the  only  available  substitute  for  the 
isolation  and  for  the  cumulative  recombination  of  experiment"  (p. 
113).  But  what  of  the  relative  isolations  and  recombinations  that 
repeatedly  occur  in  our  common  life,  and  are  ever  open  to  watch- 
ful and  intelligent  observation?  Not  all  of  modern  life  is  equally 
complex  and  defiant  of  analysis.  "That  which  is  presented  to  us  in 
the  later  terms  of  the  series  in  too  complicated  and  confused  a  form  to 
be  unraveled,  shows  itself  in  a  relatively  simple  and  transparent  mode 
in  the  earlier  members  "  (p.  114).  But  the  later  terms  have  the  not 


332  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

slight  advantage  of  being  recent  or  even  present  terms,  open  to  our 
observation  in  all  their  complexity, —  complete  as  they  are,  and  not 
schematized  as  they  may  have  been.  "  The  significance  of  conscious 
or  spiritual  values  cannot  be  made  out  by  direct  inspection,  nor  yet  by 
physical  dissection  and  recomposition.  They  are,  therefore,  outside 
the  scope  of  science  except  so  far  as  amenable  to  historic  method ' ' 
(p.  123).  Note  the  disjunction  :  "  direct  inspection  "  and  "  physical 
dissection  and  recomposition  "  are  the  only  methods  of  non-historical 
science.  Surely  this  needs  proof;  or,  if  by  definition  "  direct  inspec- 
tion ' '  is  made  to  cover  its  side  of  the  dichotomy,  we  certainly  need 
evidence  of  its  helplessness  in  the  field  of  ethics.  From  one  point  of 
view,  the  proposition  is  almost  self-contradictory.  For  if  direct 
inspection  be  intrinsically  incompetent,  then  the  historical  method 
cannot  even  be  attempted.  A  beginning  by  direct  inspection  must  be 
made  somewhere  in  the  historical  series ;  if  not  in  the  complex  pres- 
ent, then  in  the  relatively  simple  (but  dimly  seen)  past.  The  direct 
method  is  then  not  intrinsically  incompetent,  but  may  only  be  inade- 
quate to  the  relative  complexity  of  contemporary  morals.  But  if  even 
this  be  true,  it  is  none  the  less  a  surprising  proposition,  in  view  of 
the  great  mass  of  ethical  theory  which  it  wholly  discredits,  and 
extraordinarily  good  evidence  must  be  forthcoming,  if  the  world  is  to 
be  convinced  of  it. 

And  yet,  in  one  sense,  the  proposition  is  palpably  true, —  in  the  very 
modest  and  temperate  sense,  that  ethical  research  cannot  afford  to  neg- 
lect any  promising  instrument  of  analysis ;  that  no  one  method  has 
elicited,  or  will  probably  succeed  in  eliciting,  the  whole  truth ;  and 
that  each  new  point  of  view  means  a  new  perspective  which  brings 
into  clear  vision  something  that  was  before  obscured  or  concealed.  So 
we  should  say  of  the  introspective  and  evolutionary  methods  of  psy- 
chology, that  introspection,  whether  favored  or  not  by  experimental 
conditions,  has  revealed  much,  indeed,  and  will  doubtless  reveal  much 
more  ;  but  that  genetic  psychology,  too,  has  its  distinctive  powers  and 
honors ;  that,  in  particular,  certain  problems  lend  themselves  more 
readily  to  introspective,  and  certain  others  to  evolutionary  treatment. 

After  all,  evolutionary  ethics  is  not  so  much  a  science  as  the  hope 
of  a  science.  We  must  be  on  our  guard  against  too  extreme  statements 
either  of  its  accomplishments  or  of  its  potentialities.  "  Just  as  experi- 
ment transforms  a  brute  physical  fact  into  a  relatively  luminous  series 
of  changes,  so  evolutionary  method  applied  to  a  moral  fact  does  not 
leave  us  either  with  a  mere  animal  instinct  on  the  one  side,  or  with  a 
spiritual  categorical  imperative  on  the  other.  It  reveals  to  us  a  single 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSION.  333 

continuing  process  in  which  both  animal  instinct  and  the  sense  of  duty 
have  their  place  "  (p.  119).  True,  we  know  that  such  a  process  has 
throughout  vast  ages  been  going  on  ;  and  we  catch  glimpses  of  it  at 
various  points  in  its  development.  But  the  record  is  fearfully  imper- 
fect, except  of  the  very  latest  stages.  In  particular,  of  the  transition 
from  brute  to  savage,  we  have  very  little  precise  knowledge.  Perhaps 
this  is  all  that  Professor  Dewey  means  by  the  revelation  of  a  "  single 
continuous  process  ' '  ;  but,  if  so,  we  must  yet  remember  that,  for  pur- 
poses of  scientific  analysis,  the  fact  that  A  has  developed  from  B  does 
not  suffice  for  much  ;  we  must  have  definite  knowledge  of  closely  con- 
secutive stages  of  the  development.  Such  knowledge  of  a  vast  period 
of  the  history  of  moral  origins  we  do  not  possess,  and  seemingly  can 
never  possess, —  eke  out  our  ignorance,  as  we  may,  by  comparative 
and  child  psychology. 

In  his  second  paper,  Professor  Dewey  discusses  the  relation  of  the 
method  of  evolution  to  the  theories  of  intuitionalism  and  empiricism. 
There  would  seem,  at  the  outset,  to  be  no  necessary  incompatibility  of 
the  method  with  either  theory.  In  the  first  place,  as  to  intuitions, 
the  question  whether  we  possess  any  mental  states  that  deserve 
such  a  name  is  one  to  be  settled  by  immediate  reference  to  present 
facts ;  the  theory  of  evolution  has  nothing  directly  to  do  with  the 
matter.1  And,  in  the  second  place,  the  philosophical  doctrine  of  em- 
piricism, whether  false  or  true,  operates  on  a  level  of  thought  where  it 
could  hardly  come  into  conflict  with  a  biological  or  sociological  gen- 
eralization. An  associational  interpretation  of  the  evolution  of  mental 
phenomena  is  no  more  impossible  than  an  atomistic  interpretation  of 
the  evolution  of  a  world-system. 

But  Professor  Dewey  attacks  the  situation  on  a  different  side.  It  is 
the  epistemological  value  of  supposed  intuitions  that  he  questions. 
"The  mere  existence  of  a  belief,  even  admitting  that  as  a  belief  it 
cannot  in  any  way  be  got  rid  of,  determines  absolutely  nothing  regard- 
ing the  objectivity  of  its  own  content.  The  worth  of  the  intuitions 
depends  upon  genetic  considerations  "  (p.  357).  But  upon  what,  we 
may  ask,  has  rested  the  validity  of  ordinary  sense-perception?  Of 
course,  the  survival  value  is  evident ;  but  did  man  have  to  wait  for  the 
theory  of  psychophysical  evolution  to  give  him  a  warrant  for  an  abid- 
ing faith  in  the  evidence  of  his  senses  ?  It  is  their  present  functional 
value  apart  from  all  questions  of  origin,  that  is  the  direct  and  sufficient 
evidence  of  their  trustworthiness.  What  is  definitely  known  to-day  as 

1  Except,  perhaps,  negatively  ;  as  when  the  intuition  is  defined  as  not  having  arisen 
by  induction  from  experience. 


334  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

to  the  origin  and  development  of  the  reasoning  process  ?  Yet  the 
validity  of  the  process  does  not  wait  upon  genetic  psychology  for  its 
justification.  And  such  must  be  the  case  with  moral  intuitions,  if  any 
such  exist.  Their  experienced  inner  conformity,  one  with  another, 
throughout  the  moral  life  would  suffice.  In  short,  there  is  no  disjunc- 
tion between  mere  existence  and  genetic  considerations  as  exhausting 
the  evidences  of  validity. 

The  explanation  of  Professor  Dewey's  attitude  in  the  matter  is  not 
far  to  seek.  For  him,  present  functional  value  is  distinctly  and  de- 
cidedly a  genetic  consideration  ;  and  so  the  disjunction  which  we  have 
denied  he  finds  no  difficulty  in  maintaining.  No  doubt  there  is  a 
certain  force  in  his  contention.  The  genetic  account  of  function,  and 
the  functional  account  of  evolution,  have  become  indispensable  to 
complete  knowledge  of  either  function  or  history.  Moreover,  a  func- 
tion is  itself  a  process,  a  change,  a  development ;  so  that  Professor 
Dewey  feels  himself  amply  justified  in  merging  the  two  conceptions, 

—  in  consolidating  functional  theory  with  genetic  theory  as,  properly 
speaking,  a  single  theory.     In  this  spirit,  he  concludes  the  paragraph 
from  which  I  have  last  quoted  (p.   358).     Nevertheless  the  position 
does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  perfectly  correct.     Evolutionists  are  apt 
to  arrogate  to  themselves  the  view  of  present  life  as  a  process  ;  whereas 
scarcely  anyone  has  ever  looked  at  it  in  any  other  way.     If,  when  Hera- 
clitus  said  that  all  things  flow,  he  announced  himself  an  evolutionist, 
then  Professor  Dewey's  contention  is  altogether  proper.     But  the  es- 
sential point,  I  take  it,  especially  in  current  controversy,  is  that  the 
mode  of  flowing  has  itself  flowed,  —  that  the  process  itself  not  only 
is  history  but  has  a  history.     The  grinding  of  corn,  for  example,  is  a 
process,  a  change,  an  evolution,  if  you  please ;   the  grain  enters  into 
the  mill,  and  the  flour  comes  out.     But  the  process  of  changing  grain 
into  flour  has  itself  evolved  during  a  period  of  thousands  of  years.     It 
is  this  second  evolution,  —  not  the  evolution  in  the  process,  of  which 
no  sane  man  has  ever  been  ignorant,  but  the  evolution  of  the  process, 

—  that  is  the  relatively  new  conception,  the  application  of  which  to 
the  problems  of  morality  constitutes  evolutionary  ethics. 

Moreover,  where  questions  of  validity  are  concerned,  the  study  of 
present  results  has  at  least  two  decided  methodological  advantages  over 
the  study  of  origins.  First,  we  must  take  account  of  that  "heterog- 
ony  of  ends  ' '  with  which  Wundt  has  made  us  familiar.  A  knowledge 
of  the  sources  of  things  may  be  extremely  deceptive,  if  it  fails,  —  as  in 
so  many  fields  it  must  fail,  —  of  completeness.  The  second  advantage 
we  have  already  noticed,  —  the  simple  fact,  that  in  the  process  as  it  now 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSION.  335 

operates  we  have  a  well-nigh  infinitely  richer  field  for  observation 
than  in  all  the  records  of  the  past.  When  account  is  taken  of  these 
several  considerations,  we  may  not  readily  agree  with  Professor  Dewey 
that  aside  from  the  method  of  evolution  the  validity  of  a  supposed 
intuition  could  in  no  wise  be  established. 

One  other  of  Professor  Dewey 's  criticisms  upon  intuitionalism  we 
may  note,  though  it  has  little  direct  bearing  upon  this  discussion.  If 
an  intuition  fails  once,  he  says,  it  fails  always.  "Either  everything 
that  appears  to  the  individual  as  final  and  authoritative  is  such,  or  else 
such  appearance  lacks  competency  in  any  case  "  (p.  360).  That  this 
is  not  strictly  true,  the  analogy  of  sense- perception  may  again  convince 
us.  We  may  have  been  occasionally  subject  to  hallucinations  of  sight 
and  hearing ;  yet  the  ordered  consistency  of  our  present  waking  exist- 
ence leaves  us  no  doubt  as  to  the  truth  of  our  present  perceptions.  And 
so,  though  a  moral  intuition,  in  which  we  had  had  entire  confidence, 
should  prove  utterly  mistaken,  that  need  not  rob  our  life  of  all  further 
moral  guidance.  Of  course,  this  is  not  to  say  that  an  intuitionalism 
is  not  conceivable,  against  which  Professor  Dewey 's  criticism  holds. 
But  surely  intuitionalism  as  a  great  historical  school  of  thought  has 
more  to  say  for  itself  than  he  allows. 

''Empiricism,"  says  Professor  Dewey,  "is  no  more  historic  in 
character  than  intuitionalism.  .  .  .  The  genetic  method  determines 
the  worth  or  significance  of  the  belief  by  considering  the  place  that  it 
occupied  in  a  developing  series ;  the  empirical  method  by  referring  it 
to  its  components"  (p.  364).  Here,  again,  I  fail  to  discover  a  true 
disjunction.  Empiricism  may  or  may  not  be  genetic  in  method  and 
spirit.  The  associations  of  psychical  elements  are  temporary ;  they 
have  a  history  and  a  function.  For  the  empiricist,  as  for  another  man, 
the  idea  is  a  response  to  a  situation  and  issues  in  a  reconstruction  of 
the  situation.  So  far  from  dissolving  the  bonds  of  the  temporal  con- 
nection of  ideas,  he  distinguishes  himself  by  the  elaboration  of  a  dis- 
tinct as  well  as  comprehensive  theory  as  to  the  intimate  nature  and 
mechanism  of  that  bond.  Not  content  with  the  general  doctrine, 
"  that  the  idea  arises  as  a  response,  and  that  the  test  of  its  validity  is 
to  be  found  in  its  later  career  as  manifested  with  reference  to  the  needs 
of  the  situation  that  evoked  it "  (p.  363),  — not  so  easily  content,  I 
say,  the  empiricist  has  his  explicit  theory,  be  it  true  or  false,  as  to  the 
precise  manner  in  which  ideas  arise  in  response  to  situations,  and  of 
the  precise  mode  of  their  reference  to  temporary  exigencies. 

Again,  it  appears  unwarrantable  to  assert  an  antithesis  between  the 
empirical  and  genetic  methods  on  the  ground  that  for  the  one  method 


336  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

the  genesis  of  the  idea  is  a  process  of  repetition  or  cumulation  (allow- 
ing these  terms  to  stand  for  the  whole  associative  mechanism),  and 
that  for  the  other  method  the  genesis  is  a  process  of  adjustment  (p. 
365).  The  association  of  ideas,  as  empiricism  explains  it,  is  most 
assuredly  an  adjustment  of  the  psychophysical  organism  to  its  environ- 
ment, an  adjustment  whose  survival  value  is  not  hard  to  surmise. 

Nor  does  empiricism  lack  for  a  complete  account  of  historical 
change.  It  is  not  true,  that  "by  its  logic  change  of  quality  in  passage 
from  generating  elements  to  final  product  must  be  explained  away ' ' 
(p.  366).  The  unlimited  combination  even  of  a  finite  number  of 
distinguishable  elements  is  a  sufficient  ground  of  qualitative  change. 
It  is  the  fundamental  assumption  of  empiricism  that  each  new  arrange- 
ment has  qualitative  novelty  as  an  arrangement,  even  though  the  ele- 
ments be  old.  Moreover,  the  empiricist  need  not  deny  the  possi- 
bility of  the  development  of  new  elements,  by  gradual  differentiation 
from  the  old.  He  may  believe,  for  example,  that  auditory  sensation 
is  of  more  recent  origin  than  visual  sensation.  But  even  without  such 
differentiation,  continuous  change  is  sufficiently  provided  for  in  the 
premise,  that  the  intensity  of  each  element  may  vary  from  the  liminal 
to  the  maximal  value. 

A  further  criticism  of  the  adequacy  of  the  empirical  method  to  gen- 
etic problems  may  appear  to  be  more  truly  deserved,  —  that  empiricism 
fails  to  recognize  the  function  of  the  negative  elements  in  experience  as 
stimuli  to  the  building  up  of  a  new  and  more  comprehensive  experi- 
ence (pp.  367  f.).  A  persistent  biological  habit  is  conceived  as 
issuing  in  a  conscious  custom,  and  the  latter  (by  merely  cumulative 
effect)  in  a  moral  practice.  But  by  no  such  mere  repetition  can  con- 
sciousness or  moral  valuation  have  arisen ;  the  original  act  would  sim- 
ply have  been  hardened  as  it  was.  It  is  only  through  failure  of  the 
instinct  or  habit  to  effect  an  adequate  adjustment,  that  a  different  mode 
of  adaptation  could  become  necessary. 

Let  us  admit  the  general  historical  truth  of  this  criticism.  Empiri- 
cism is  a  far  older  method  than  that  with  which  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion has  provided  us  ;  and  even  the  latter-day  masters  of  the  empirical 
school  may  well  have  shown  a  fondness  for  the  tools  of  thought  tradi- 
tional among  them,  and  a  misappreciation  of  instruments  more  recently 
devised.  But  the  defect,  if  indeed  it  exist,  does  not  seem  to  be  fun- 
damental. In  Professor  Dewey's  criticism,  one  point  appears  to  me 
ambiguous,  —  whether  by  '  failure  '  he  means  necessarily  felt  failure, 
or  perhaps  simply  actual  failure,  of  adjustment.  But,  in  the  latter 
case,  it  is  surely  open  to  the  empiricist  to  assume  with  Professor 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSION.  337 

Devvey  that  the  failure  of  an  existing  mode  of  response  gives  survival 
value  to  a  supplementary  variation.  And  as  for  the  feelings  arising 
from  failure,  these  are  surely  a  part  of  the  empiricist's  stock  in  trade, 
however  he  may  in  the  past  have  undervalued  them.  The  "  negative 
elements  in  experience"  are  elements  which  empiricism  has  never 
failed  to  include  in  its  survey.  The  effect  of  dissatisfaction  upon  the 
association  of  ideas  is  a  problem  by  no  means  foreign  to  the  spirit  of 
empirical  speculation. 

THEODORE  DE  LACUNA. 

REPLY  TO  PROFESSOR  BAKEWELL. 

My  object  in  replying  to  Professor  Bakewell's  review  of  my  book 
Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body  in  the  last  number  of  this  journal  is  not  to 
complain  of  misrepresentation  or  ill-treatment,  for  his  article  seems  to 
me  on  the  whole  intelligent  and  fair;  but  to  call  attention  to  certain 
points  where  he  has  not  completely  understood  me,  and  where  a  com- 
plete understanding  would  involve  some  modification  of  the  judgments 
he  passes.  These  points  are  my  attitude  toward  the  theory  of  a  non- 
phenomenal  subject,  my  view  that  transcendent  knowledge  is  non- 
rational,  and  my  account  of  the  panpsychist  solution  of  the  problem 
of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body. 

I.  "The  theory  of  a  non-phenomenal  subject,"  says  Professor 
Bakewell,  "is  disposed  of  cavalierly  in  a  couple  of  pages,  mainly 
on  the  ground  .  .  .  that  that  theory  involves  '  extruding  the  ego 
from  experience,'  which  is  precisely  what  that  theory  affirms  to  be 
impossible."  This  would  be  telling  criticism  were  it  not  for  the  fact 
that  by  a  '  non-phenomenal  subject '  Professor  Bakewell  and  I  do  not 
mean  the  same  thing.  He  means  a  subject  which  is  experienced  but 
not  known  ;  I  mean  a  subject  which  is  not  even  experienced,  because 
it  is  conceived  as  being  '  that  which  '  experiences.  The  word  ' phenom- 
ena '  is,  in  fact,  currently  used  in  these  two  senses,  —  by  Professor  Ward, 
for  instance,  for  objects  of  thought  as  distinguished  from  feelings  and 
will,  and  by  Mr.  Bradley  (cf.  the  title  of  his  article  "A  Defence  of 
Phenomenalism  in  Psychology,"  in  Mind  for  1900)  for  whatever  is 
experienced,  a  view  which  Professor  Ward  characterizes  as  '  presen- 
tationism.'  Now,  against  the  theory  that  the  subject  is  not  and  can- 
not be  a  '  phenomenon '  in  the  sense  of  an  object  of  thought,  I  have 
not  a  word  to  say ;  that  is  rather  my  own  view.  But  those  who  begin 
by  making  the  subject  non-phenomenal  in  this  sense  often  end  by  mak- 
ing it  non-empirical.  Failing  to  distinguish  sharply  between  experi- 
ence and  thought,  they  imagine  that  not  merely  thought  but  experience 


338  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

requires  a  subject ;  they  think  that  anything  of  which  we  can  be  aware, 
not  merely  in  the  sense  of  knowing,  but  in  the  sense  of  immediate 
feeling,  requires  a  subject  to  be  aware  of  it ;  thus  they  make  the  sub- 
ject a  thing  of  which  we  cannot  be  in  any  sense  aware,  —  in  a  word, 
they  "extrude  it  from  experience."  And,  by  doing  so,  they  come  in 
conflict  with  the  principle,  which  I  take  to  be  absolutely  fundamental, 
that  experience  is  our  one  source  of  knowledge  about  the  mind. 

Perhaps  Professor  Bakewell  thinks  I  err  in  supposing  that  there  are 
philosophers  who  hold  this  view.  If  I  do,  I  err  in  good  company, 
for  Mr.  Bradley,  in  the  article  above  referred  to,  says:  "We  have 
(according  to  this  view)  on  one  side  the  experienced,  and  that,  if  for 
the  moment  we  disregard  pleasure  and  pain,  consists  in  the  perceived, 
in  objects  given  to  and  before  the  self.  This  forms  the  whole  content 
of  the  experienced.  The  experienced  in  short  is  but  one  aspect  of 
experience,  and  the  other  aspect  consists  in  the  activity  of  the  self. 
This  activity  is  itself  not  perceived  and  does  not  itself  enter  into  the 
experienced  content,  and  is  not  and  cannot  be  itself  made  into  an 
object.  But  beside  these  two  sides  of  experience,  one  experienced  and 
the  other  not  experienced,  we  have  also  feeling  in  the  sense  of  pleasure 
and  pain.  .  .  .  The  aspect  of  self  has  by  this  view  been  turned  out  of 
the  experienced"  (pp.  38,  39  —  italics  mine). 

Professor  Bakewell' s  view  seems  to  be  that  the  subject  is  experienced, 
but  not  completely  experienced.  I  admit  that  this  is  true  in  a  sense. 
But  it  seems  to  me  that  the  distinction  between  the  subject  so  far  as 
experienced  and  the  subject  as  lying  beyond  experience  is  the 
distinction  between  the  actual  and  the  potential  self  (I  have  given  an 
account  of  the  latter  in  my  suggestion  of  a  "substitute  for  the  soul," 
pp.  201-203)  \  and  I  do  not  see  how  the  potential  self  can  form  any 
part  of  the  momentary  subject.  In  my  view  it  becomes  the  subject 
only  so  far  as  it  becomes  experienced. 

Professor  Bakewell,  as  I  say,  seems  to  admit  that  the  subject  is 
partly  at  least  experienced.  But  why  then  does  he  speak  of  the  sub- 
ject as  "  intuiting  "  or  "  witnessing  "  states  of  consciousness,  — ex- 
pressions which  strongly  suggest  the  non-empirical  form  of  theory  re- 
ferred to  above  ?  One  is  tempted  to  doubt  whether  he  has  quite  made 
up  his  mind  between  the  view  that  the  subject  is  experienced  and  the 
view  that  it  is  '  that  which  '  experiences.  Why,  in  particular,  does 
he  employ  these  expressions  in  describing  my  empirical  view,  —  saying 
that,  according  to  me,  "the  present  ego  is  the  state  of  consciousness 
at  present  immediately  intuited  "  (as  though  by  some  other  ego), 
while  "  another  ego  witnessed  the  past  state  "  (instead  of  '  was  it ')  ? 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSION.  339 

These  sentences  do  not  show  him  to  be  very  familiar  with,  or  at  least 
very  skilful  in  stating,  James's  theory  of  the  subject  as  the  "  passing 
thought." 

I  allow  myself  to  express  this  theory  by  saying  that  in  memory  the 
past  state  remembered  "  really  is  another  consciousness."  This,  ac- 
cording to  Professor  Bakewell,  is  "  discontinuity  with  a  vengeance." 
How  we  should  ever  come  to  know  the  past,  how  the  past  selves 
should  ever  become  ours,  "  remains  a  mystery  "  on  such  a  view.  Ap- 
parently, on  the  theory  of  a  "  permanent  non-temporal  ego  "  all  is  ex- 
plained. The  truth  is  that  Professor  Bakewell  does  not  understand 
any  better  than  I  do  how  we  come  to  know  the  past  or  how  the  past 
self  becomes  the  present  self;  he  merely  feigns  that  they  are  identical, 
though  he  knows  very  well  that  they  are  only  partly  so  ;  and  this 
feigned  identity  seems  to  him  to  be  an  explanation,  though  it  is  in 
reality  only  a  restatement  of  the  facts. 

2.  Professor  Bakewell  admits  that  knowledge  of  the  past  and 
knowledge  of  other  minds  is  transcendent;  but  he  raises  a  great  out- 
cry over  my  doctrine  that  transcendent  knowledge  cannot  be  fully 
justified  either  by  experience  or  by  reasoning  from  experience,  and  is 
therefore  non-rational  or  pre-rational.  I  express  this  view  by  saying 
that  we  transcend  by  "  instinct,"  and  this  expression  comes  in  for 
his  special  reprobation.  Any  irrational  prejudice,  such  as  hatred  of  a 
fellow-man,  any  superstitious  belief,  such  as  that  in  "witches  and 
warlocks,"  might  be  justified  on  similar  grounds. 

And  yet  Professor  Bakewell,  as  a  student  of  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy, must  have  read  very  much  the  same  thing  in  Hume  (see  Trea- 
tise, Green  &  Grose's  ed.,  Pt.  Ill,  Sect.  XVI,  p.  471  ;  Enquiry, 
same  ed.,  Sect.  V,  Pt.  I,  p.  41,  Pt.  II,  p.  47  ;  Sect.  IX,  p.  88; 
Sect.  XII,  Pt.  II,  p.  131).  Did  he  feel,  I  wonder,  in  reading  it,  a 
similar  apprehension  lest  his  author  should  succumb  to  a  belief  in 
"  witches  and  warlocks"? 

Let  me  try  to  explain  what  I  mean  when  I  say  that  we  transcend  by 
' '  instinct. ' '  I  pointed  out  in  my  book  that  the  argument  from  analogy 
by  which  we  are  commonly  supposed  to  reach  our  belief  in  other 
minds  is  not  a  logically  valid  argument,  since  from  three  empirical 
facts,  — my  body,  my  mind,  another  person's  body,  —  you  cannot  in- 
fer a  non-empirical  existence,  —  the  other  person's  mind,  —  without  a 
logical  leap.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  argument  from  analogy  is 
worthless  and  to  be  cast  to  the  winds,  but  that  it  rests  on  a  suppressed 
premise  which  is  in  its  nature  incapable  of  proof ;  namely,  the  exis- 
tence of  anything  transcendent  at  all  (pp.  217-219).  Conceiving 


340  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

the  inference  of  things-in-themselves  to  be  exactly  analogous  to,  and 
merely  a  further  extension  of,  that  of  other  minds,  I  naturally  make 
the  same  distinction  here.  My  "  proofs  of  things-in-themselves  "  are 
in  the  same  position  as  the  argument  from  analogy ;  indeed,  one  of 
them  is  the  argument  from  analogy  (see  pp.  291,  292)  ;  they  mark  the 
places  where  things-in-themselves  must  be  assumed,  and  indicate  the 
character  of  the  things-in-themselves  to  be  assumed  there,  but  they  are 
powerless  logically  to  carry  us  outside  of  our  own  consciousness.  For 
this  we  need  the  force  of  instinct. 

By  '  instinct '  I  do  not  of  course  mean  the  social  instinct,  nor  yet 
a  special  instinct  ad  hoc,  but  merely  this :  that,  having  an  idea  which, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  represents  (/.  <?.,  symbolizes  and  enables  us  to  adjust 
our  relations  to)  an  extra-mental  thing,  we  both  act  and  think  as  if 
what  we  had  to  do  with  were  the  extra-mental  thing  and  not  the  idea. 
In  memory,  for  instance,  we  act  as  if  our  idea  were  the  past  experi- 
ence itself,  —  that  is,  we  act  as  if  it  were  useless  any  longer  to  act ;  in 
expectation,  we  act  as  if  the  experience  expected  were  on  the  point  of 
appearing  ;  in  the  assumption  of  other  minds,  we  act,  —  not  merely 
muscularly,  but  in  the  sequence  of  our  thoughts,  —  as  if  those  minds 
existed  now,  but  externally  to  our  own.  This  peculiar  habit  of  action, 
which  can  hardly  have  been  acquired  in  the  lifetime  of  the  individual, 
and  which  is  certainly  no  product  of  reasoning,  seems  to  me  to  corre- 
spond pretty  closely  to  the  definition  of  instinct. 

But  Professor  Bakewell  will  have  it  that  our  belief  in  other  minds  is 
capable  of  justification  on  rational  grounds.  I  cannot  but  regret  that 
it  did  not  occur  to  him  to  indicate  these ;  that  would  have  been  such 
a  simple  way  of  disposing  of  the  view  that  transcendent  knowledge  is 
instinctive.  If  he  should  reply  to  these  remarks,  I  count  on  him  to 
produce  the  reasons  which  in  his  opinion  justify  us  in  transcending. 

One  other  point  in  this  connection  I  desire  to  refer  to  before  passing 
on.  Professor  Bakewell  says  that,  by  projecting  physical  facts  beyond 
the  subject,  I  "myself  create  the  gaps  which  I  invent  my  things-in- 
themselves  to  fill. ' '  As  well  might  one  say  that,  by  conceiving  people's 
bodies  as  expressive  of  something  real,  we  ourselves  create  the  gaps  in 
which  we  place  their  minds.  Why  not  be  satisfied  with  their  mere 
bodies?  But  now,  I  have  shown  that  when  people's  minds  act  on  each 
other,  not  directly,  but  across  intervening  matter,  there  is  a  temporal 
gap,  in  so  far  as  the  groups  of  physical  events  that  are  accompanied  by 
consciousness  are  separated  from  each  other  by  physical  events  that  are 
not  so  accompanied  (see  pp.  255,  256).  Here,  then,  is  the  gap  which 
makes  things-in-themselves  necessary,  and  it  is  not  of  my  inventing  but 
of  Professor  Bakewell's  ignoring. 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSION.  341 

3.  Coming  to  the  third  matter,  —  the  panpsychist  solution  of  the 
problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body, — I  must  give  Professor 
Bakewell  credit  for  an  honest  and  partially  successful  effort  to  under- 
stand that  solution.  And  I  am  coming  more  and  more  to  see  that  it 
is  not  an  easy  solution  to  understand.  The  limits  of  space  set  me  by 
the  editor  are  so  narrow  that  I  am  not  sure  I  can  do  justice  to  the 
subject  here,  but  I  will  do  the  best  I  can,  promising  that  I  hope 
to  give  a  new  and  detailed  exposition  of  the  theory  in  an  early 
article. 

Perhaps  the  simplest  way  will  be  to  set  forth  the  explanation  first  in 
terms  of  Berkeleian  idealism,  and  then  to  correct  that  idealism.  Pro- 
fessor Bakewell  sees  that  A's  consciousness  might  be  conceived  to  call 
forth  in  B's  a  perception  which  should  be  that  of  A's  brain-process. 
Now,  if  physical  facts  were  identical  with  the  perceptions  of  them, 
this  would  be,  in  principle,  a  complete  explanation  of  the  relation  of 
mind  and  body.  But  Professor  Bakewell  points  out  that  the  object 
perceived  is  other  than  the  perception  of  it,  and  that  the  mystery  of 
the  relation  of  mind  and  body  is  precisely  how  the  mind  can  influence 
(or  run  parallel  with,  or  be  dependent  on)  the  l  content '  of  the  per- 
ception rather  than  the  perception. 

Here  I  would  observe  that,  if  the  panpsychist  had  only  succeeded 
in  resolving  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body  into  the 
problem  of  the  relation  of  perception  and  object,  he  would  at  least 
have  brought  the  former  problem  a  step  nearer  to  solution.  But  I 
shall  be  told  that  there  is  no  plausibility  in  the  resolution,  unless  it  can 
be  shown  that  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body  is  capa- 
ble of  solution  along  that  line.  Well,  this  can  be  shown. 

The  distinction  between  object  and  perception  is  not  a  numerical 
difference  between  a  physical  reality  and  a  mental  state,  the  latter 
'  intuiting  '  the  former,  but  a  logical  distinction  between  two  differ- 
ent ways  of  considering  the  same  sensation-stuff  in  our  thought,  ac- 
cording as  we  take  it  in  its  relations  with  other  similar  sensation-stuff, 
and  then  we  class  it  as  a  physical  object,  or  take  it  as  an  episode  in 
our  personal  history,  and  then  we  class  it  as  a  mental  state.  When 
we  do  the  former,  we  are  led  by  a  variety  of  causes  (of  which  I  have 
given  a  sufficient  account  in  Ch.  xii)  to  attribute  to  it  a  continuity 
and  permanence,  and  an  independence  of  our  minds,  like  those  which 
belong  to  things-in-themselves ;  and  our  ability  to  do  this  is  an  exhi- 
bition of  the  peculiar  instinct  above  referred  to,  by  which  we  act  and 
think  as  if  what  we  -had  to  do  with  were  the  transcendent  object  and 
not  the  mental  state. 


342  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

All  this  while,  the  object  so  conceived  has  no  existence  apart  from 
the  extra-mental  reality,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  mental  state,  on  the 
other  ;  it  is  a  purely  ideal  object.  But  an  ideal  object  has  no  exis- 
tence except  when  thought  of.  All  the  panpsychist  is  bound  to  ac- 
count for,  therefore,  is  the  existence  of  the  perception.  Hence  the 
passages  where  I  argue  that  the  only  way  to  influence  the  content  of 
a  perception  is  to  influence  the  perception  (p.  306);  that  content,  as 
a  subjective  fact,  means  simply  <  <  the  character  this  and  other  like 
perceptions  will  have  in  case  they  exist  "  (p.  305);  but  that,  in  every 
actual  case  (which  is  the  only  sort  of  case  we  need  consider),  "  the 
perceptions  actually  influenced  are  those  only  of  persons  physically 
near,  and  the  possible  perceptions  of  other  persons  are  as  a  matter  of 
fact  impossible  "  (p.  306). 

It  seems  to  me  that  in  these  suggestions  I  have  given  all  the  data 
that  are  necessary  for  a  complete  thinking  out  of  the  panpsychist  solu- 
tion. If  many  nimble  minds  are  so  prepossessed  against  the  theory 
by  the  names  of  its  sponsors  or  contributors,  —  Berkeley,  Hume,  Fech- 
ner,  Clifford,  —  that  they  will  not  take  the  trouble  to  think  it  out,  I 
am  willing  to  leave  it  to  the  future  to  decide  whether  the  loss  is  theirs 
or  mine.  Meanwhile  I  await  with  eagerness  some  account  of  the  ex- 
planation of  the  connection  of  mind  and  body  that  is  implied  in  trans- 
cendentalism or  in  personal  idealism. 

C.  A.  STRONG. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 

A  REJOINDER. 

The  chief  difficulty  that  I  find  in  Professor  Strong's  argument,  as 
he  has  elaborated  it  in  Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body,  and  again  briefly 
indicated  it  in  his  courteous  reply  to  my  review  of  that  work,  is  this  : 
His  conception  of  the  ego  as  the  "passing  thought"  does  not  bear 
the  strain  of  metaphysics  which  he  puts  upon  it.  (Whether  or  not 
this  notion  is  adequate  for  the  needs  of  the  science  of  psychology, 
where  "  the  father  of  the  brat  "  modestly  confines  it,  is  another  ques- 
tion and  does  not  concern  us  here. ) 

The  ego  is,  according  to  Professor  Strong,  the  present  ego,  and 
the  present  ego  is  the  present  state  of  consciousness.  The  ' '  past 
state  remembered  really  is  [or  was]  another  consciousness."  The 
mind  transcends  the  solipsistic  limitations,  in  which  experience  and 
reason  would  confine  it,  solely  by  "the  force  of  instinct."  And, 
thereupon,  the  real  world  is  taken  on  trust  in  this  instinct,  as  being 
made  up  of  many  such  minds,  —  now  called  things-in-themselves,  — 
each  one,  however,  as  helpless  to  reach  its  neighbors  either  by  reason 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSION.  343 

or  by  experience  as  were  the  "  windowless  monads"  of  Leibniz. 
Nothing  but  a  tour  de  force  can  set  up  relations  between  them,  —  and 
then,  indeed,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  these  relations  can  be  conceived  as 
real  and  as  between  them.  Moreover,  this  atomistic  pluralism  is  put 
in  a  still  worse  case  by  the  affirmation  of  the  purely  transient  character 
of  the  several  minds.  The  consciousness,  which  the  ego  is,  is,  we  are 
told,  "  real  #.$•  long  as  it  lasts."  Thus  our  "things-in-themselves" 
are,  it  would  appear,  realities  that  flash  into  existence  and  out  again, 
like  regular  ontological  Jack  o'  lanterns.  This  seems  to  me  to  make 
our  real  world  about  as  discontinuous  as  one  could  possibly  imagine 
it,  and  to  shroud  in  impenetrable  mystery  the  facts  of  memory.  To 
this  Professor  Strong  replies,  not  quite  pertinently,  that  I  do  not  un- 
derstand any  better  than  he  does  how  we  can  know  the  past.  I 
"  feign  an  identity."  And  this  feigned  identity,  he  adds,  I  seem  to 
think  an  explanation,  "though  it  is  in  reality  only  a  restatement  of  the 
facts. "  If  a  restatement  of  the  facts,  it  is  not  a  feigned  identity.  How- 
ever, I  certainly  did  not  maintain  that  a  mere  recognition  of  a  deeper 
identity  underlying  the  empirical  pulses  of  consciousness  was  itself  an 
explanation  of  memory.  It  is  very  far  from  being  such  an  explanation. 
What  I  do  maintain  is,  that  this  identity  once  admitted,  even  as  par- 
tial identity,  an  explanation  of  memory  becomes  at  least  not  incon- 
ceivable ;  whereas,  if  the  self  be  wholly  accounted  for  in  the  passing 
thought,  memory  involves  a  real  relation  between  wholly  sundered 
realities,  and  must  therefore  be  once  and  for  all  time  a  mystery,  since 
the  terms  in  which  the  problem  is  then  stated  are,  for  our  intelligence, 
self-contradictory. 

But  again,  as  opposed  to  this  view  of  the  ego,  Professor  Strong 
holds,  as  if  seeming  to  feel  its  inadequacy  (see  his  "Reply"),  that 
continuity  and  permanence,  as  well  as  independence,  belong  to  things- 
in-themselves  (that  is,  to  minds).  If  this  be  true,  then  his  account 
of  the  ego  needs  revision,  and  that  revision  would,  I  believe,  bring 
him  much  nearer  to  what  is  most  fundamental  in  the  doctrine  of  a  non- 
phenomenal  ego,  for  that  is  a  recognition  of  precisely  this  permanent 
aspect  of  the  ego,  which,  because  permanent,  can  never  be  "given  " 
in  the  phenomenal  as  such,  whether  the  phenomenal  be  taken  either  as 
the  immediate  object  of  thought  or  as  experience,  in  the  restricted 
sense  in  which  I  understand  Professor  Strong  to  use  this  term. 

Professor  Strong  objects  to  my  speaking  of  the  subject  as  "intuit- 
ing" or  "witnessing"  a  state  of  consciousness,  and  in  particular  to 
my  using  these  expressions  in  describing  his  view,  since  they  imply, 
what  he  denies,  the  existence  of  a  non-empirical  ego.  I  acknowledge 


»344  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

the  justice  of  the  complaint  and  withdraw  the  terms.  I  used  thern  to 
describe  the  character  of  immediate  awareness  that  is  supposed  to  be 
found  in  the  j^-experience,  and  I  added  in  explanation  Professor 
Strong's  own  phrase,  that  the  self  is  "experienced  but  not  known." 
I  refer  to  this  matter  again  here  because  the  difficulty  that  one  experi- 
ences in  trying  to  state  this  view  without  seeming  to  depart  from  it  is 
itself  a  significant  fact ;  and  others,  who  should  be  more  skilful  in 
manipulating  it  than  I  am,  seem  to  be  caught  in  the  same  snare.  For 
instance,  Professor  Strong,  in  his  "  reply,"  speaks  reprovingly  of  those 
who  "  imagine  that  not  merely  thought  but  experience  requires  a  sub- 
ject ;  they  think  that  anything  of  which  we  can  be  aware,  not  merely 
in  the  sense  of  knowing,  but  in  the  sense  of  immediate  feeling,  requires 
a  subject  to  be  aware  of  it. ' '  Why  bring  in  that  we  ?  And  he  con- 
tinues :  "  Thus  they  make  the  subject  a  thing  of  which  we  cannot  be 
in  any  sense  aware,"  as  if,  on  his  own  theory,  we  could.  Yet,  if  I 
understand  that  theory,  we  should,  in  strictness  of  speech,  say,  "  there 
is  simple  self-awareness. "  In  a  striking  passage  in  his  book,  which 
illustrates  the  difficulty  of  making  speech  conform  to  the  view  that 
would  identify  the  ego  with  "the  fresh  experience  as  it  comes,"  Pro- 
fessor Strong  writes :  "  The  ego  is  the  fresh  experience  as  it  comes, 
before  we  have  had  time  to  turn  round  upon  it  cognitively,  and  while 
we  —  that  is,  it — are  engaged  in  cognizing  other  things"  (p.  208; 
Italics  mine  in  this  paragraph).  This  difficulty,  which  seems  inevita- 
ble, is  one  of  the  reasons  for  suspecting  the  adequacy  of  the  account  of 
the  self  in  terms  of  the  ' '  passing  thought. ' ' 

Whether  the  "gaps,"  to  fill  which  Professor  Strong  introduces  his 
things-in-themselves,  are  found  or  invented,  will  depend  on  the  extent 
and  the  nature  of  the  "  transcendence  "  implied  in  our  knowledge  of 
the  past  and  oT  other  minds,  and  this,  in  turn,  will  depend  on  our 
account  of  the  ego.  Professor  Strong,  of  course,  thinks  that  they  are 
not  invented,  and  he  adds,  as  well  might  one  suppose  that,  by  "  con- 
ceiving peoples'  bodies  as  expressive  of  something  real,"  we  should 
create  the  gaps  in  which  we  place  their  minds.  But  in  this  case  we 
most  certainly  should  be  inventing  the  "gaps,"  if  by  calling  the 
bodies  expressive  of  something  real  we  meant  that  they  were  cut  off 
from  consciousness,  from  experience,  and  from  knowledge,  and  inde- 
pendently existing.  The  notion  of  transcendence  calls  for  careful 
scrutiny.  There  is  undoubtedly  a  transcendence  involved  in  memory 
and  in  perception ;  but  here  it  is  the  transcendence  of  the  momentary 
phenomenal  self,  of  the  "  passing  thought,"  and  not  of  the  real  self. 
There  is  a  kind  of  transcendence,  even  of  the  real  self,  in  passing  to 


No.  3.]  DISCUSSION.  345 

other  minds.  But,  even  in  this  case,  the  transcendence  is  not  com- 
plete and  absolute,  in  the  sense  that  the  individual  mind  is  wholly  cut 
off  from  real  communion  with,  real  relations  to,  other  minds, —  rela- 
tions that  are  discovered  by  reason  and  experience.  The  truth  of  this 
is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  isolated  ego  is  a  sheer  abstraction. 
We  do  not  'first  find  in  experience  such  an  ego,  and  then  have  to 
search  for  other  minds.  The  very  private  self  always  gets  part,  at 
least,  of  its  meaning  in  terms  of  other  minds.  Here  is  a  fact  that 
furnishes  a  problem  requiring  solution,  and,  with  a  true  conception  of 
the  ego,  it  is  soluble. 

But  Professor  Strong  cuts  the  knot  by  "  the  force  of  instinct."  Is 
it  not  true,  however,  that  any  reference  to  instinct  is  simply  naming 
a  problem  for  future  solution  ?  And  until  that  solution  is  found,  one 
can  never  be  sure  that  the  capacity  called  instinctive  is  a  power  "de- 
rived from  the  hand  of  nature,"  and  not  simply  a  habit  due  to  ignor- 
ance or  prejudice.  Professor  Strong  writes  :  "  This  peculiar  habit  of 
action  [whereby  we  do  transcend  the  self] ,  which  can  hardly  have  been 
acquired  in  the  lifetime  of  the  individual,  and  which  is  certainly  no 
product  of  reasoning,  seems  to  me  to  correspond  pretty  closely  to  the 
definition  of  instinct. ' '  But  we  must  observe  that  this  transcending 
he  further  holds  to  be  necessary  in  order  to  make  experience  intel- 
ligible. Now,  a  habit  of  the  mind  that  is  not  the  result  of  experience, 
nor  a  product  of  reasoning,  and  yet  is  necessary  to  make  experience 
intelligible,  is  not  so  far  from  being  a  definition  of  the  a  priori,  or  of 
reason  itself.  If,  now,  we  take  Professor  Strong  at  his  word  when  he 
endows  his  things-in-themselves  with  permanence  and  continuity,  and 
further  endow  them  with  instinct  in  this  sense,  we  are  still  nearer  to 
the  conception  of  the  non-phenomenal  ego. 

As  for  the  general  panpsychist  contention,  I  am  more  nearly  in 
agreement  with  Professor  Strong  than  perhaps  he  suspects.  Even 
the  term  '  panpsychism  '  I  could  adopt,  if  its  sponsors  had  not  so  re- 
stricted the  meaning  of  the  psytfo.  I  believe,  with  him,  that  the 
problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  to  body  is  brought  nearer  solution  by 
being  resolved  into  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  perception  to  ob- 
ject,—  though  I  think  these  terms  not  of  the  happiest, —  and  that  it  is 
capable  of  solution  along  these  lines.  And  I  follow  him  further  in 
making  the  distinction  between  object  and  perception  logical  rather 
than  ontological.  But  when  we  reach  this  point,  it  is  seen  that  the 
object  is  at  once  dependent  on  two  or  more  distinct  egos  ;  and  the 
puzzle  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body  returns  in  this  form  :  How 
can  I  influence  perception  in  another  consciousness  ?  To  say  that  I 


346  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

do  so  "by  influencing  the  perception,"  as  Professor  Strong  does,  and 
that  "  the  perceptions  actually  influenced  are  those  only  of  persons 
physically  near,"  is  merely  a  restatement  of  the  fact  calling  for  solu- 
tion. So,  when  we  reach  the  end  of  his  book,  we  are,  it  seems  to  me, 
just  ready  to  begin  to  discuss  the  real  problem,  and  we  should  be  in  a 
better  position  to  do  so  if  the  way  had  not  been  barred  by  the  author's 
conception  of  the  ego. 

C.  M.  BAKEWELL. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS. 

Pure  Sociology :  A  Treatise  on  the  Origin  and  Spontaneous  De- 
velopment of  Society.  By  LESTER  F.  WARD.  New  York,  The  Mac- 
millan  Co.,  1903. — pp.  xii,  607. 

To  attempt  an  account  of  this  work  or  an  estimate  of  its  value  as  a 
contribution  to  sociology  would  not  be  in  place  in  this  REVIEW,  even 
if  the  present  writer  were  competent  for  such  a  task.  An  appreciation 
of  the  results  attained  for  sociology  by  the  labors  which  have  extended 
through  so  many  years,  and  have  had  so  many  obstacles  to  surmount, 
must  come  from  fellow  workers  in  the  cause  of  determining  the  prin- 
ciples and  methods  of  the  still  inchoate  science.  The  interest  of  the 
student  of  philosophy  and  psychology  lies,  first,  in  seeing  what  the 
author's  conception  of  sociology  is,  and  therefore  what  relation  soci- 
ology is  conceived  to  occupy  to  social  psychology,  ethics,  the  phi- 
losophy of  history,  and  various  other  social  sciences  ;  and  secondly,  in 
case  the  author  covers  fields  which  are  worked  also  by  the  philosopher 
or  psychologist,  in  comparing  his  treatment  with  that  of  other  workers. 

Dr.  Ward's  view  of  sociology  inevitably  invites  such  comparison. 
For  the  subject  matter  is  declared  to  be  '  human  achievement. ' 
Another  definition  is  that  pure  (as  distinguished  from  applied)  soci- 
ology is  "  a  treatment  of  the  phenomena  and  laws  of  society  as  it  is, 
an  explanation  of  the  processes  by  which  social  phenomena  take  place, 
a  search  for  the  antecedent  conditions  by  which  the  observed  facts 
have  been  brought  into  existence,  and  an  aetiological  diagnosis  that 
shall  reach  back  as  far  as  the  state  of  human  knowledge  will  permit 
into  the  psychologic,  biologic,  and  cosmic  causes  of  the  existing  social 
state  of  man."  It  is  evident,  also,  that  Dr.  Ward  is  at  least  as  much 
interested  in  his  aetiological  diagnosis  as  in  the  phenomena  and  laws 
of  society.  In  round  numbers,  about  one  fourth  of  the  volume  is  de- 
voted to  the  general  logical  and  methodological  discussion,  one  fourth 
to  cosmic  and  biologic  material,  one  fourth  to  analytic  and  genetic 
psychology,  and  one  fourth  to  human  society.  Moreover,  the  author's 
view  of  what  may  properly  be  regarded  as  a  cause  of  the  existing 
social  state  is  very  catholic.  Something  over  thirty  pages  are  devoted 
to  a  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  sexes  in  plants  and  animals  as 
preface  to  the  author's  '  gynsecocentric  theory.'  In  tracing  the  '  bio- 
logic '  origin  of  the  subjective  faculties,  a  beginning  is  made  with  the 
nebular  hypothesis.  The  author's  interest  in  botany  prompts  frequent 

347 


348  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

excursions  into  that  field  for  analogies.  Many  topics  of  various  sorts 
are  adverted  to  in  passing,  as  if  on  the  theory  that  sociology  as  a  sci- 
entia  srientiarum  ' embraces  all  truth'  (p.  91). 

The  work  is  thus  constructed  on  lines  similar  to  those  of  Schopen- 
hauer's The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  or  of  Spencer's  "  Synthetic 
Philosophy  ",  rather  than  of  a  distinctive  treatise  on  society,  and  much 
of  its  subject  matter  covers  ground  which  the  philosopher  and  psy- 
chologist have  regarded  as  theirs.  Of  course  there  can  be  no  valid 
objection  to  this,  if  the  material  is  so  treated  as  to  yield  new  or  better 
results  than  at  the  hands  of  former  workers.  Philosophers  since  Plato 
have  written  of  society ;  there  is  no  reason  why  the  sociologist  should 
not  write  philosophy  and  psychology.  Social  and  genetic  psychology 
are  certainly  not  so  far  advanced  as  to  be  disposed  to  reject  aid  from 
any  source.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  almost  inevitable  that  the  writer 
who  comes  to  these  fields  from  a  different  line  of  work  should  fail  to 
be  acquainted  with  the  history  of  investigation,  or  at  least  should  miss 
the  full  significance  of  the  past  century  of  criticism  and  revision,  even 
when  certain  aspects  of  it  are  known.  Certain  points  in  which  the 
author  appears  not  to  be  in  agreement  with  the  views  of  philosophy 
and  psychology  will  be  noted  farther  on. 

The  book  is  divided  into  three  main  sections:  " Taxis,"  "Gen- 
esis," and  "  Telesis."  One  would  not  begrudge  a  new  science  any 
needful  assistance  in  the  way  of  technical  terms,  and  so  one  is  willing 
to  accept  ' '  taxis  ' '  instead  of  scope  and  method,  and  '  *  telesis  ' '  for 
the  treatment  of  phenomena  which  result  from  intention  or  design ; 
but  it  seems  quite  undesirable  to  give  the  perfectly  well-established 
terms  '  genesis '  and  <  genetic, '  a  meaning  at  once  narrower  and 
broader  than  that  of  current  usage.  For  the  author  means  by  genesis 
not  "  coming  into  being,"  or  origination  in  general,  but  only  proc- 
esses characterized  by  the  absence  of  intention,  and  calls  the  drifting 
of  an  iceberg  a  '  genetic  '  process. 

Perhaps  the  author  would  not  care  to  press  this  meaning  of  genetic 
in  his  definition  of  sociology  as  being  a  '  genetic  '  product  from 
the  other  sciences ;  for,  although  he  says  that  the  special  sciences 
' spontaneously  generate  it,'  he  yet  might  allow  some  element  of 
purpose  or  intention  in  the  ordering  of  the  materials. 

As  in  the  author's  former  works,  the  line  is  sharply  drawn  between 
the  dynamic  and  the  directive  agency.  The  dynamic  agency  is 
declared  to  be  feeling,  or  the  '  subjective  '  ( '  subjective  '  is  apparently 
used  as  a  synonym  for  '  relating  to  the  organism  ' )  ;  the  directive 
agency  is  the  intellect.  "The  distinction  is  generic  and  there  are  no 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  349 

intermediate  stages  or  gradations  from  one  to  the  other. ' '  One  is  a 
force,  the  other  is  a  relation  (p.  457).  From  the  former,  and  by 
'  genetic  '  processes,  spring  not  only  desire  and  will  but  all  forces, 
moral,  aesthetic,  and  intellectual.  The  latter,  viz.,  the  directive  agency 
having  as  its  root  '  indifferent'  sensation  (as  opposed  to  the  '  inten- 
sive,' or  pleasure-pain  sensation  which  is  the  basis  of  feeling)  gives 
rise  to  '  advantageous '  and  '  non -advantageous  '  faculties. 

The  question  at  once  arises :  Is  this  division  between  dynamic  and 
directive  agency,  regarded  by  the  author  as  absolute,  or  only  as  a  con- 
venient abstraction  in  treating  certain  aspects  of  a  complex  human 
nature  in  which  directive  and  dynamic  agencies  are  constantly  and 
reciprocally  shaping  or  affecting  each  other  ?  If  we  could  suppose 
that  the  author  views  the  division  merely  as  an  abstraction,  there  is 
much  in  the  treatment  with  which  the  psychologist  could  heartily 
sympathize.  For  Dr.  Ward  makes  a  serious  attempt  to  trace  the 
origin  and  growth  of  conation  and  pleasure-pain  feeling,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  of  intellect,  on  the  other,  and  the  psychologist's  treatment 
of  these  topics,  while  not  so  entirely  non-existent  as  the  author  seems 
to  think,  is  still  very  meagre.  If  the  author  would  write  impulse  or 
conation  for  feeling  (as  has  been  pointed  out  in  reviews  of  his  previous 
works),  present  psychology  would  go  along  with  him  in  giving  this  a 
relative  priority  to  intellect.  We  may  properly  call  the  instincts, 
feelings,  and  passions  the  driving  forces  in  society. 

But  the  distinction  does  not  seem  to  be  taken  merely  as  a  convenient 
abstraction.  The  claim  is  frequently  made  that  we  have  to  do  with 
distinct  agents  governed  by  distinct  laws.  "  Social  forces  are  natural 
forces  and  obey  mechanical  laws.  .  .  .  This  is  as  true  of  the  spiritual 
as  of  the  physical  forces"  (p.  462).  Where  there  is  purpose,  other 
laws  must  be  sought.  The  conception  of  *  idea  forces, '  which  in 
bringing  out  the  motor  nature  of  consciousness  has  certainly  performed 
important  service,  is  said  to  involve  a  psychological  jumble. 

The  author  is  indeed  aware  that  conation  as  it  develops  implies 
some  ideation,  but  his  treatment  of  this  is  certainly  nothing  less  than 
na'ive.  In  explaining  desire  (p.  137),  it  is  noted  that  "desire  pre- 
supposes memory,  which  must  therefore  be  one  of  the  earliest  aspects 
of  mind."  (It  seems  fair  to  suppose  that  '  mind  '  here  stands  for  in- 
tellect or  objective  mind,  cf.  the  collocation  on  p.  176.)  The  expla- 
nation now  follows  :  "In  fact  memory  is  nothing  but  the  persistent 
representation  of  feeling,  continued  sense  vibrations  after  the  stimulus 
is  withdrawn,  and  involves  no  mystery."  There  is  apparently  no 
consciousness  in  the  author's  mind  of  the  mixed  category  involved  in 


350  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

the  phrase  '  sense  vibration,'  and  no  difficulty  in  identifying  '  repre- 
sentation '  and  memory  with  continued  vibration.  And  lest  it  be 
thought  that  the  '  vibration  '  is  merely  a  metaphorical  term  which  is 
not  intended  literally,  the  next  sentence  amplifies  the  point  and  shows 
how  there  is  f  no  mystery. '  "  Just  as  a  bell  will  continue  for  a  time  to 
ring  after  the  clapper  ceases  to  beat  upon  it,  so  the  nerve  fibers  or 
protoplasmic  gelatine,  continues  to  vibrate  for  a  time  after  the  object, 
agreeable  or  the  reverse,  is  no  longer  in  contact  with  it  "  ;  and  a  little 
later  we  have  the  phrase  '  mnemonic  vibration. '  There  has  been 
some  progress  in  psychology  since  Hobbes,  and  while  it  goes  without 
saying  that  the  psychologist  supposes  some  nervous  process, —  not 
quite  so  simple,  perhaps,  as  that  of  mechanical  inertia, —  it  is  also  true 
that  modern  psychology  is  aware  that  it  cannot  solve  psychological 
problems  by  physical  or  biological  categories. 

Dr.  Ward  has  indeed  elsewhere  (p.  79ff.)  expressed  his  apprecia- 
tion of  a  principle  which,  if  carried  through  consistently,  would  have 
led  to  the  reconstruction  of  his  work.  This  is  the  principle  which 
Wundt  calls  '  Creative  Synthesis  '  and  states  :  "  There  is  absolutely  no 
form  which,  in  the  meaning  and  value  of  its  content,  is  not  something 
more  than  the  mere  sum  of  its  factors  or  more  than  the  mere  mechan- 
ical resultant  of  its  components. ' '  The  principle  is,  of  course,  as  old 
in  essence  as  Aristotle,  and  has  been  prominent  since  Kant,  but  its 
full  methodological  significance  is  not  always  seen.  Dr.  Ward  uses  it 
to  make  possible  a  connected  history  of  the  successively  higher  prod- 
ucts of  nature,  from  ether  through  chemical  elements,  organic  com- 
pounds, protoplasm,  to  man  and  society.  Each  higher  product  has  a  new 
and  distinctive  property  (pp.  92  ff. ).  Every  modern  worker  assumes 
that  there  must  be  such  historic  continuity  ;  but  this  principle  by  no 
means  explains  anything.  To  use  it  as  an  explanation  would  be  as 
unscientific  as  to  suppose  that  '  evolution '  is  itself  an  explanation 
rather  than  a  problem.  <  Creative  synthesis  '  and  '  evolution  '  are  both 
more  fruitful  ways  of  stating  the  problem,  but  they  are  statements,  not 
solutions.  For  the  principle  in  question  calls  attention  to  the  fact 
that  we  have  not  explained  any  form  completely  by  analyzing  it  into 
its  factors  and  components.  So  long  as  we  remain  scientists  in  a  lim- 
ited field,  it  means,  therefore,  that  the  biologist  cannot  complete  his 
work  by  a  chemical  statement,  nor  a  psychologist  his  by  a  biological 
—  much  less  by  a  mechanical  statement.  For  the  new  content  de- 
mands its  own  treatment.  If,  however,  we  become  metaphysicians  as 
well  as  scientists,  in  the  sense  of  trying  to  read  the  process  as  a  whole, 
then,  as  Aristotle  taught,  the  principle  means  that  the  earlier  must  be 
read  in  the  light  of  the  completed  process  as  truly  as  vice  versa. 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  351 

The  use  of  the  term  '  natural  '  is  also  somewhat  irritating  to  the 
student  who  is  familiar  with  the  ambiguities  in  that  term  and  with  the 
controversies  which  have  ;  raged.  To  him  it  does  not  seem  "a  para- 
dox that  the  artificial  is  superior  to  the  natural,"  if  by  natural  we 
mean  what  is  devoid  of  intelligence.  Nor  does  it  seem  important 
to  argue  that  all  faculties  have  a  natural  origin,  if  we  use  the  term 
nature  as  comprehending  all  experience.  But,  at  the  same  time,  such 
an  account  of  the  origin  of  perception  and  reason  as  is  found  on  pp. 
477  ff.  will  be  far  from  satisfactory.  '  Perception  of  relations,'  which  is 
here  made  so  easy,  involves  far  more  complex  processes  than  are  here 
suggested.  Numerous  other  illustrations  could  be  given  of  what  to 
the  student  of  philosophy  and  psychology  must  appear  as  instances  of 
explanations  which  ignore  the  difficult  points  of  the  problem.  The 
psychology  of  the  book  will  in  general  be  likely  to  serve  a  purpose  by 
provoking  the  psychologist  to  give  fuller  treatment  to  genetic  prob- 
lems, rather  than  as  a  positive  solution. 

J.   H.  TUFTS. 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

Principia  Ethica.     By  GEORGE  EDWARD  MOORE.     Cambridge,  at 
the  University  Press,  1903.  — pp.  xxvii,  232. 

"  One  main  object  of  this  book,"  says  the  author,  may  "  be  ex- 
pressed by  slightly  changing  one  of  Kant's  famous  titles.  I  have  en- 
deavored to  write  '  Prolegomena  to  any  future  Ethics  that  can  possibly 
pretend  to  be  scientific  '  ' '  (p.  ix). 

Fortunately  for  the  reviewer,  Mr.  Moore  has  made  the  task  of  pre- 
senting the  fundamental  theses  advocated  by  him  an  easy  matter,  for 
at  the  end  of  each  chapter  one  finds  an  adequate  summary  of  the  pre- 
ceding discussions.  By  quoting  these  summaries  the  reviewer  can 
therefore  put  the  reader  in  possession  of  the  contents  of  the  book. 
As  most  of  the  points  urged  cannot  be  debated  without  occupying 
more  space  than  a  review  puts  at  one's  command,  there  will  be  no 
attempt  to  criticise  the  positions  taken  by  the  author.  Many  of  them 
seem  to  be  extremely  questionable,  and  the  arguments  employed  to 
support  them  are  often  more  ingenious  and  subtle  than  convincing, 
but  this  is  not  the  place  to  canvass  them  satisfactorily. 

At  the  close  of  the  first  chapter,  which  deals  with  "The  Subject- 
Matter  of  Ethics, "  Mr.  Moore  tells  us  that  he  has  "  endeavoured  to  en- 
force the  following  conclusions.  ( i )  The  peculiarity  of  Ethics  is  not 
that  it  investigates  assertions  about  human  conduct,  but  that  it  investi- 
gates assertions  about  that  property  of  things  which  is  denoted  by  the 


352  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

term  '  good, '  and  the  converse  property  denoted  by  the  term  '  bad. ' 
It  must,  in  order  to  establish  its  conclusions,  investigate  the  truth  of 
all  such  assertions,  except  those  which  assert  the  relation  of  this 
property  only  to  a  single  existent.  (2)  This  property,  by  reference 
to  which  the  subject-matter  of  Ethics  must  be  defined,  is  itself  simple 
and  indefinable.  And  (3)  all  assertions  about  its  relation  to  other 
things  are  of  two,  and  only  two,  kinds :  they  either  assert  in  what 
degree  things  themselves  possess  this  property,  or  else  they  assert 
causal  relations  between  other  things  and  those  which  possess  it.  Fin- 
ally, (4)  in  considering  the  different  degrees  in  which  things  them- 
selves possess  this  property,  we  have  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  a 
whole  may  possess  it  in  a  degree  different  from  that  which  is  obtained 
by  summing  the  degrees  in  which  its  parts  possess  it  "  (p.  36).  This 
last  fact  Mr.  Moore  designates  by  the  name  of  "the  principle  of 
organic  unities." 

The  second  chapter  is  entitled  "Naturalistic  Ethics."  "In  this 
chapter,"  says  he,  "  I  have  begun  the  criticism  of  certain  ethical  views, 
which  seem  to  owe  their  influence  mainly  to  the  naturalistic  fallacy  — 
the  fallacy  which  consists  in  identifying  the  simple  notion  which  we 
mean  by  '  good '  with  some  other  notion.  They  are  views  which 
profess  to  tell  us  what  is  good  in  itself;  and  my  criticism  of  them  is 
mainly  directed  (i)  to  bring  out  the  negative  result,  that  we  have  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  which  they  declare  to  be  the  sole  good,  really 
to  be  so,  (2)  to  illustrate  further  the  positive  result,  already  estab- 
lished in  Chapter  I,  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  Ethics  must  be 
synthetic  propositions,  declaring  what  things,  and  in  what  degree,  pos- 
sess a  simple  and  unanalysable  property  which  may  be  called  '  intrinsic 
value  '  or  <  goodness. '  The  chapter  began  ( i )  by  dividing  the  views 
to  be  criticised  into  (# )  those  which,  supposing  '  good '  to  be  defined 
by  reference  to  some  supersensible  reality,  conclude  that  the  sole  good 
is  to  be  found  in  such  a  reality,  and  may  therefore  be  called  '  Meta- 
physical,'  (£)  those  which  assign  a  similar  position  to  some  natural 
object,  and  may  therefore  be  called  '  Naturalistic. '  Of  naturalistic 
views,  that  which  regards  '  pleasure  '  as  the  sole  good  has  received  far 
the  fullest  and  most  serious  treatment  and  was  therefore  reserved  for 
Chapter  III :  all  other  forms  of  Naturalism  may  be  first  dismissed,  by 
taking  typical  examples.  (2)  As  typical  of  naturalistic  views,  other 
than  Hedonism,  there  was  first  taken  the  popular  commendation  of 
what  is  *  natural '  :  it  was  pointed  out  that  by  '  natural '  there  might 
here  be  meant  either  '  normal '  or  '  necessary, '  and  that  neither  the 
'  normal '  nor  the  '  necessary  '  could  be  seriously  supposed  to  be  always 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  353 

good  or  the  only  good  things.  (3)  But  a  more  important  type,  be- 
cause one  which  claims  to  be  capable  of  system,  is  to  be  found  in 
'  Evolutionistic  Ethics. '  The  influence  of  the  fallacious  opinion  that 
to  be  '  better '  means  to  be  '  more  evolved  '  was  illustrated  by  an  ex- 
amination of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  Ethics  ;  and  it  was  pointed  out 
that,  but  for  the  influence  of  this  opinion,  Evolution  could  hardly  have 
been  supposed  to  have  any  important  bearing  upon  Ethics"  (p.  58). 
The  third  chapter  is  on  "Hedonism."  "The  most  important 
points,"  we. are  told,  "which  I  have  endeavoured  to  establish  in  this 
chapter  are  as  follows,  (i)  Hedonism  must  be  strictly  defined  as  the 
doctrine  that  'Pleasure  is  the  only  thing  which  is  good  in  itself: 
this  view  seems  to  owe  its  prevalence  mainly  to  the  naturalistic  fallacy, 
and  Mill's  arguments  may  be  taken  as  a  type  of  those  which  are  falla- 
cious in  this  respect ;  Sidgwick  alone  has  defended  it  without  commit- 
ting this  fallacy,  and  its  final  refutation  must  therefore  point  out  the 
errors  in  his  arguments.  (2)  Mill's  l  Utilitarianism  '  is  criticised  :  it 
being  shown  (a)  that  he  commits  the  naturalistic  fallacy  in  identifying 
'  desirable '  with  '  desired  '  ;  (<£)  that  pleasure  is  not  the  only  object  of 
desire.  The  common  arguments  for  Hedonism  seem  to  rest  on  these  two 
errors.  (3)  Hedonism  is  considered  as  an  '  Intuition,'  and  it  is  pointed 
out  (0)  that  Mill's  allowance  that  some  pleasures  are  inferior  in  quality 
to  others  implies  both  that  it  is  an  Intuition  and  that  it  is  a  false  one  ; 
(<5)  that  Sidgwick  fails  to  distinguish  '  pleasure '  from  '  consciousness 
of  pleasure,'  and  that  it  is  absurd  to  regard  the  former,  at  all  events, 
as  the  sole  good ;  (<:)  that  it  seems  equally  absurd  to  regard  '  con- 
sciousness of  pleasure '  as  the  sole  good,  since,  if  it  were  so,  a  world 
in  which  nothing  else  existed  might  be  absolutely  perfect :  Sidgwick 
fails  to  put  to  himself  this  question,  which  is  the  only  clear  and  de- 
cisive one.  (4)  What  are  commonly  considered  to  be  the  two  main 
types  of  Hedonism,  namely,  Egoism  and  Utilitarianism,  are  not  only 
different  from,  but  strictly  contradictory  of,  one  another ;  since  the 
former  asserts  '  My  own  greatest  pleasure  is  the  sole  good, '  the  latter 
'  The  greatest  pleasure  of  all  is  the  sole  good. '  Egoism  seems  to  owe 
its  plausibility  partly  to  the  failure  to  observe  this  contradiction  —  a 
failure  which  is  exemplified  by  SidgwicK ;  partly  to  a  confusion  of 
Egoism  as  doctrine  of  end,  with  the  same  as  doctrine  of  means. 
If  Hedonism  is  true,  Egoism  cannot  be  so ;  still  less  can  it  be  so,  if 
Hedonism  is  false.  The  end  of  Utilitarianism,  on  the  other  hand, 
would,  if  Hedonism  were  true,  be,  not  indeed  the  best  conceivable, 
but  the  best  possible  for  us  to  promote ;  but  it  is  refuted  by  the  refu- 
tation of  Hedonism  "  (pp.  108  f.). 


354  THE  PHILOSOlHiCAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

The  fourth  chapter  deals  with  "  Metaphysical  Ethics. "  "  The  main 
object  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  show  that  Metaphysics,  understood 
as  the  investigation  of  a  supposed  supersensible  reality,  can  have  no 
logical  bearing  whatever  upon  the  answer  to  the  fundamental  ethical 
question  'What  is  good  in  itself?'  That  this  is  so,  follows  at  once 
from  the  conclusion  of  Chapter  I.,  that  *  good  '  denotes  an  ultimate, 
unanalysable  predicate;  but  this  truth  has  been  so  systematically 
ignored,  that  it  seemed  worth  while  to  discuss  and  distinguish  in 
detail  the  principal  relations,  which  do  hold,  or  have  been  supposed 
to  hold,  between  Metaphysics  and  Ethics.  With  this  view  I  pointed 
out : — ( i )  That  Metaphysics  may  have  a  bearing  on  practical  Ethics  — 
on  the  question  '  What  ought  we  to  do  ?'  —  so  far  as  it  may  be  able  to 
tell  us  what  the  future  effects  of  our  action  will  be  :  what  it  can  not 
tell  us  is  whether  those  effects  are  good  or  bad  in  themselves.  One 
particular  type  of  metaphysical  doctrine,  which  is  very  frequently 
held,  undoubtedly  has  such  a  bearing  on  practical  Ethics  :  for,  if  it  is 
true  that  the  sole  reality  is  an  eternal,  immutable  Absolute,  then  it 
follows  that  no  action  of  ours  can  have  any  real  effect,  and  hence  no 
practical  proposition  can  be  true.  The  same  conclusion  follows  from 
the  ethical  proposition,  commonly  combined  with  this  metaphysical 
one  —  namely,  that  this  eternal  Reality  is  also  the  sole  good.  (  2  )  That 
metaphysical  writers,  as  where  they  fail  to  notice  the  contradiction 
just  noticed  between  any  practical  proposition  and  the  assertion  that 
an  eternal  reality  is  the  sole  good,  seem  frequently  to  confuse  the 
proposition  that  one  particular  existing  thing  is  good,  with  the 
proposition  that  the  existence  of  that  kind  of  thing  would  be  good,, 
wherever  it  might  occur.  To  the  proof  of  the  former  proposition 
Metaphysics  might  be  relevant,  by  shewing  that  the  thing  existed ; 
to  the  proof  of  the  latter  it  is  wholly  irrelevant :  it  can  only  serve  the 
psychological  function  of  suggesting  things  which  may  be  valuable  —  a 
function  which  would  still  be  better  performed  by  pure  fiction. 

"  But  the  most  important  source  of  the  supposition  that  metaphysics 
is  relevant  to  Ethics,  seems  to  be  the  assumption  that  <  good  '  must 
denote  some  real  property  of  things  —  an  assumption  which  is  mainly 
due  to  two  erroneous  doctrines,  the  first  logical,  the  second  epistemo- 
logical.  Hence  (3)  I  discussed  the  logical  doctrine  that  all  proposi- 
tions assert  a  relation  between  existents ;  and  pointed  out  that  the 
assimilation  of  ethical  propositions  either  to  natural  laws  or  to  com- 
mands are  instances  of  this  logical  fallacy.  And  finally  (4)  I  discussed 
the  epistemological  doctrine  that  to  be  good  is  equivalent  to  being  willed 
or  felt  in  some  particular  way ;  a  doctrine  which  derives  support  from 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  355 

the  analogous  error,  which  Kant  regarded  as  the  cardinal  point  of  his 
system  and  which  has  received  immensely  wide  acceptance — the 
erroneous  view  that  to  be  '  true '  or  '  real '  is  equivalent  to  being 
thought  in  a  particular  way.  In  this  discussion  the  main  points  to 
which  I  desire  to  direct  attention  are  these :  (a)  That  Volition  and 
Feeling  are  not  analogous  to  Cognition  in  the  manner  assumed  ;  since 
in  so  far  as  these  words  denote  an  attitude  of  the  mind  towards  an 
object,  they  are  themselves  merely  instances  of  Cognition  :  they  differ 
only  in  repect  of  the  kind  of  object  of  which  they  take  cognisance, 
and  in  respect  of  the  other  mental  accompaniments  of  such  cognitions  : 
(b}  That  universally  the  object  of  a  cognition  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  cognition  of  which  it  is  the  object ;  and  hence  that  in  no 
case  can  the  question  whether  the  object  is  true  be  identical  with  the 
question  how  it  is  cognised  or  whether  it  is  cognised  at  all :  it  follows 
that  even  if  the  proposition  '  This  is  good  '  were  always  the  object  of 
certain  kinds  of  will  or  feeling,  the  truth  of  that  proposition  could  in 
no  case  be  established  by  proving  that  it  was  their  object ;  far  less  can 
that  proposition  itself  be  identical  with  the  proposition  that  its  subject 
is  the  object  of  a  volition  or  a  feeling"  (pp.  139-141). 

Chapter  V  deals  with  the  "  Ethics  in  Relation  to  Conduct. ' '  "The 
main  points  in  this  chapter,  to  which  I  desire  to  direct  attention,  may 
be  summarised  as  follows :  —  (i)  I  first  pointed  out  how  the  subject- 
matter  with  which  it  deals,  namely  ethical  judgments  on  conduct, 
involves  a  question,  utterly  different  in  kind  from  the  two  previously 
discussed,  namely :  (a)  What  is  the  nature  of  the  predicate  peculiar 
to  Ethics?  and  (d)  What  kinds  of  things  themselves  possess  this  predi- 
date?  Practical  Ethics  asks,  not,  'What  ought  to  be?'  but  <  What 
ought  we  to  do  ? '  ;  it  asks  what  actions  are  duties,  what  actions  are 
right y  and  what  wrong :  and  all  these  questions  can  only  be  answered 
by  showing  the  relation  of  the  actions  in  question,  as  causes  or  neces- 
sary conditions,  to  what  is  good  in  itself.  The  enquiries  in  Practical 
Ethics  thus  fall  entirely  under  the  third  division  of  ethical  questions  — 
questions  which  ask,  '  What  is  good  as  a  means  ? '  which  is  equivalent 
to  *  What  is  a  means  to  good  —  what  is  cause  or  necessary  condition 
of  things  good  in  themselves  ?  '  But  ( 2 )  it  asks  this  question,  almost 
exclusively,  with  regard  to  actions  which  it  is  possible  for  most  men  to 
perform,  if  only  they  will  them ;  and  with  regard  to  these,  it  does 
not  ask  merely,  which  among  them  will  have  some  good  or  bad  result, 
but  which,  among  all  the  actions  possible  to  volition  at  any  moment, 
will  produce  the  best  total  result.  To  assert  that  an  action  is  a  duty, 
is  to  assert  that  it  is  such  a  possible  action,  which  will  always,  in 


356  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

certain  known  circumstances,  produce  better  results  than  any  other. 
It  follows  that  universal  propositions  of  which  duty  is  predicate,  so  far 
from  being  self-evident,  always  require  a  proof,  which  it  is  beyond 
our  present  means  of  knowledge  ever  to  give.  But  (3)  all  that  Ethics 
has  attempted  or  can  attempt,  is  to  shew  that  certain  actions,  possible 
by  volition,  generally  produce  better  or  worse  total  results  than  any 
probable  alternative  :  and  it  must  obviously  be  very  difficult  to  show 
this  with  regard  to  the  total  results  even  in  a  comparatively  near  future ; 
whereas  that  which  has  the  best  results  in  such  a  near  future,  also  has 
the  best  on  the  whole,  is  a  point  requiring  an  investigation  which  it 
has  not  received.  If  it  is  true,  and  if,  accordingly,  we  give  the  name 
of  '  duty  '  to  actions  which  generally  produce  better  total  results  in  the 
near  future  than  any  possible  alternative,  it  may  be  possible  to  prove 
that  a  few  of  the  commonest  rules  of  duty  are  true,  but  only  in  certain 
conditions  of  society,  which  may  be  more  or  less  universally  presented 
in  history  ;  and  such  a  proof  is  only  possible  in  some  cases  without  a 
correct  judgment  of  what  things  are  good  or  bad  in  themselves  —  a 
judgment  which  has  never  yet  been  offered  by  ethical  writers.  With 
regard  to  actions  of  which  the  general  utility  is  thus  proved,  the  indi- 
vidual should  always  perform  them ;  but  in  other  cases,  where  rules 
are  commonly  offered,  he  should  rather  judge  of  the  probable  results  in 
his  particular  case,  guided  by  a  correct  conception  of  what  things  are 
intrinsically  good  or  bad.  (4)  In  order  that  any  action  may  be  shown 
to  be  a  duty,  it  must  be  shown  to  fulfill  the  above  conditions ;  but  the 
actions  commonly  called  '  duties  '  do  not  fulfill  them  to  any  greater  ex- 
tent than  '  expedient '  or  '  interested '  actions :  by  calling  them 
'  duties  '  we  only  mean  that  they  have,  in  addition,  certain  non-ethical 
predicates.  Similarly  by  '  virtue  '  is  mainly  meant  a  permanent  dispo- 
sition to  perform  '  duties  '  in  this  restricted  sense  :  and  accordingly  a 
virtue,  if  it  is  really  a  virtue,  must  be  good  as  a  means,  in  the  sense 
that  it  fulfills  the  above  conditions ;  but  it  is  not  better  as  a  means 
than  non-virtuous  dispositions;  it  generally  has  no  value  in  itself; 
and,  where  it  has,  it  is  far  from  being  the  sole  good  or  the  best  of 
goods.  Accordingly  '  virtue '  is  not,  as  is  commonly  implied,  an 
unique  ethical  predicate  "  (pp.  180-182). 

The  final  chapter  discusses  ' 'The  ideal. "  "  The  main  object  of 
this  chapter  has  been  to  define  roughly  the  class  of  things  among 
which  we  may  expect  to  find  either  great  intrinsic  goods  or  great 
intrinsic  evils;  and  particularly  to  point  out  that  there  is  a  vast 
variety  of  such  things,  and  that  the  simplest  of  them  are,  with  one 
exception,  highly  complex  wholes,  composed  of  parts  which  have 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS    OF  BOOKS.  357 

little  or  no  value  in  themselves.  All  of  them  involve  consciousness 
of  an  object,  which  is  itself  usually  highly  complex,  and  almost  all  in- 
volve also  an  emotional  attitude  toward  this  object ;  but,  though  they 
thus  have  certain  characteristics  in  common,  the  vast  variety  of  quali- 
ties in  respect  of  which  they  differ  from  one  another  are  equally  essen- 
tial to  their  value :  neither  the  generic  character  of  all,  nor  the  spe- 
cific character  of  each,  is  either  greatly  good  or  greatly  evil  by  itself; 
they  owe  their  value  or  demerit,  in  each  case,  to  the  presence  of  both. 
My  discussion  falls  into  three  main  divisions,  dealing  respectively  ( i ) 
with  unmixed  goods,  (2)  with  evils,  and  (3)  with  mixed  goods,  (i) 
Unmixed  goods  may  all  be  said  to  consist  in  the  love  of  beautiful 
things  or  of  good  persons :  but  the  number  of  different  goods  of  this 
kind  is  as  great  as  that  of  beautiful  objects,  and  they  are  also  dif- 
ferentiated from  one  another  by  the  different  emotions  appropriate 
to  different  objects,  These  goods  are  undoubtedly  good,  even  where 
the  things  or  persons  loved  are  imaginary ;  but  it  was  urged  that, 
where  the  thing  or  person  is  real  and  is  believed  to  be  so,  these  two 
facts  together,  when  combined  with  the  mere  love  of  the  qualities  in 
question,  constitute  a  whole  which  is  greatly  better  than  that  mere 
love,  having  an  additional  value  quite  distinct  from  that  which  be- 
longs to  the  existence  of  the  object,  where  that  object  is  a  good  per- 
son. Finally  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  love  of  mental  qualities,  by 
themselves,  does  not  seem  to  be  so  great  a  good  as  that  of  mental  and 
material  qualities  together ;  and  that,  in  any  case,  an  immense  num- 
ber of  the  best  things  are,  or  include,  a  love  of  material  qualities. 
(2)  Great  evils  may  be  said  to  consist  either  (a)  in  the  love  of  what 
is  evil  or  ugly,  or  (b)  in  the  hatred  of  what  is  good  or  beautiful,  or 
(c}  in  the  consciousness  of  pain.  Thus  the  consciousness  of  pain,  if 
it  be  a  great  evil,  is  the  only  exception  to  the  rule  that  all  great  goods 
and  great  evils  involve  both  a  cognition  and  an  emotion  directed 
toward  its  object.  (3)  Mixed  goods  are  those  which  include  some 
element  which  is  evil  or  ugly.  They  may  be  said  to  consist  either  in 
hatred  of  what  is  ugly  or  of  evils  of  classes  (a}  and  (^),  or  in  com- 
passion for  pain.  But  where  they  include  an  evil,  which  actually  ex- 
ists, its  demerit  seems  to  be  always  great  enough  to  outweigh  the  posi- 
tive value  which  they  possess"  (pp.  224-225). 

These  summaries  show  the  great  number  of  questions  which  Mr. 
Moore  attacks ;  and  it  is  remarkable  that  in  the  compass  of  a  book  of 
only  a  little  more  than  two  hundred  pages  he  can  treat  them  all  so 
fully  as  he  does.  But  as  has  already  been  stated  above,  his  discussions 
are  anything  but  satisfactory.  His  main  thesis  that  the  predicate 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

'  good '  means  a  quality  that  is  unique  and  unanalyzable  is  ably  de- 
fended, but  the  reviewer  is  left  with  the  impression  that  more  dia- 
lectical skill  than  sound  judgment  on  matters  of  fact  is  displayed. 

This  review  should  not  close  without  a  word  with  regard  to  the 
great  aid  which  the  author  gives  his  reader  toward  an  easy  understand- 
ing of  his  position.  There  is  a  table  of  contents,  occupying  fourteen 
pages.  Here  the  central  point  of  each  section,  —  one  hundred  and 
thirty-five  in  all,  —  is  given  in  a  single  sentence.  By  reading  this 
table  of  contents  anyone  can  see  clearly  what  the  book  stands  for  even 
in  its  details.  Then  the  summaries  which  have  been  quoted  in  this 
review  recapitulate  chapter  by  chapter  the  main  points  established. 
In  addition  to  this  there  is  an  Index  of  six  pages.  Mr.  Moore  surely 
is  indulgent  to  his  reader,  who  cannot  but  be  duly  grateful  for  this 
assistance. 

The  work  as  a  whole  should  be  in  the  hands  of  every  advanced 
ethical  student,  not  so  much  because  he  will  find  in  it  solutions  of 
problems  that  have  been  occupying  him,  but  because  he  will  find 
there  extremely  clear  statements  of  these  problems  themselves.  And 
although  it  may  not  be  true,  as  Mr.  Moore  seems  to  think,  that  the 
difficulties  and  disagreements  of  which  the  history  of  ethics  is  full  "  are 
mainly  due  to  a  very  simple  cause  :  namely  to  the  attempt  to  answer 
questions,  without  first  discovering  precisely  what  question  it  is  that  you 
desire  to  answer  "  (p.  vii),  still  it  is  true  that  such  a  preliminary  effort 
to  comprehend  the  question  at  issue  does  much  to  clear  up  thought. 

EVANDER  BRADLEY  MCGILVARY. 
CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

Kant:  Sein  Leben  und  seine  Lehre.  Von  M.  KRONENBERG. 
Zweite  neubearbeitete  und  erweiterte  Auflage.  Munchen,  C.  H. 
Beck.  1904. — pp.  x,  403. 

That  Dr.  Kronenberg's  book  has  some  measure  of  popularity  in 
Germany  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  it  has  reached  a  second 
edition,  though  no  doubt  the  special  interest  aroused  by  the  recent 
celebrations  in  connection  with  the  centenary  of  the  philosopher's 
death  has  something  to  do  with  the  demand  for  popular  expositions  of 
Kantian  ideas  just  at  this  moment.  As  I  have  not  seen  the  original 
edition  of  Dr.  Kronenberg's  work,  I  am  unable  to  say  anything  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  modification  and  expansion  to  which  the  author  has 
subjected  it.  In  its  present  form  it  has  several  good  points  as  an 
account  for  the  general  reader  of  Kant's  life  and  his  significance  in 
t  e  history  of  modern  thought.  The  four  chapters  of  the  first  part  con- 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  359 

tain  a  full  biography  of  the  philosopher,  with  a  sympathetic  estimate 
of  his  character  and  a  clear  and  useful  sketch  of  the  development  of 
his  thought  in  the  pre-critical  era,  — a  topic  usually  too  lightly  passed 
over  in  the  current  expositions.  On  one  or  two  points  Dr.  Kronen- 
berg  is  perhaps  a  little  less  critical  than  might  have  been  desired. 
Thus  he  reproduces  without  any  mistrust  the  story  of  Kant's  supposed 
Scottish  ancestry  upon  which  recent  investigation  has  cast  doubts,  of 
which,  by  the  way,  the  Premier  of  Great  Britain  seems  as  ignorant  as 
he  professes  to  be  of  the  contents  of  the  daily  newspapers.  And 
English  and  American  readers,  at  any  rate,  while  they  agree  with  the 
author's  protest  against  the  bad  taste  which  has  coupled  Kant  with 
Frederick  William  II.  on  the  monument  in  the  Berlin  Sieges- Allee,  will 
probably  decline  to  take  as  seriously  as  it  is  meant  the  suggestion  that 
in  virtue  of  their  common"  ethical  elevation  "  the  philosopher  should 
have  been  associated  with  Frederick  the  Great. 

The  exposition  of  Kant's  critical  philosophy  which  fills  Chapters 
v-ix  has  the  double  merit  of  close  fidelity  to  the  original  texts  and  suc- 
cessful avoidance  of  the  mere  reproduction  of  Kantian  technicalities, 
and  may,  on  the  whole,  be  warmly  recommended  to  the  general  reader 
who  desires,  without  becoming  a  special  student  of  philosophy,  to 
obtain  an  intelligent  and  detailed  conception  of  Kant's  views  as  to  the 
general  character  of  human  mental  activity,  and  the  grounds  on  which 
those  views  are  based.  The  chief  defect  in  Dr.  Kronenberg's  exposi- 
tion, as  well  as  in  the  brief  chapter  on  the  "  Subsequent  Influence  of 
Kant's  Philosophy"  with  which  the  book  closes,  is,  in  my  own  opinion, 
that  he  is  content  to  play  too  much  the  part  of  the  mere  admiring  ex- 
positor, and  is  too  little  alive  to  the  gravity  of  the  objections  which 
recent  advances,  especially  in  empirical  psychology  and  in  pure 
mathematics,  have  made  it  possible  to  urge  against  the  fundamental 
doctrines  of  the  Kantian  Erkenntnisstheorie.  In  such  criticisms  as 
Dr.  Kronenberg  permits  himself,  he  appears  as,  on  the  whole,  more  in 
sympathy  with  Schopenhauer  than  with  any  other  idealistic  continu- 
ator  of  Kantian  views.  Thus  he  makes  it  a  reproach  to  Kant  in  his 
concluding  chapter  that  he  was  too  much  under  the  spell  of  the 
eighteenth  century  rationalism  to  do  justice  to  the  irrational  element 
which  is  everywhere  present  in  human  life.  Similarly,  in  the  chapter 
headed  ' '  Philosophic  des  Zweckes, ' '  Dr.  Kronenberg  insists  in  the 
spirit  of  Schopenhauer  upon  "  will-less  contemplation  "  as  the  charac- 
teristic attitude  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  Whatever  the  merits  of  this 
view  may  be,  as  a  piece  of  purely  aesthetic  theory  (and  even  as  aesthetic 
theory,  it  is  open  to  the  obvious  criticism  that  it  takes  no  account  at 


360  THE    PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

all  of  the  mental  attitude  of  the  artist  himself  to  his  work),  it  is  surely 
difficult  to  reconcile  it  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  Weltanschauung 
with  such  whole-hearted  championship  of  the  '  practical  reason  '  as 
the  essence  of  human  nature  as  Dr.  Kronenberg  has  displayed  in  his 
previous  account  of  the  Kantian  ethics.  Indeed,  I  should  be  inclined 
to  regard  it  as  a  very  serious  defect  that  the  author,  while  repeatedly 
and  emphatically  proclaiming  the  '  primacy  of  will '  as  one  of  his 
chief  philosophical  tenets,  'has  completely  forgotten  to  explain  whether 
he  means  the  doctrine  to  be  taken  in  the  Kantian  or  in  the  radically 
different  Schopenhauerian  sense.  It  can  hardly  be  that  the  omission 
is  due  to  failure  to  recognize  so  obvious  a  difference. 

For  the  rest,  I  trust  I  may  be  pardoned,  in  view  of  the  interest 
naturally  created  by  the  Kant  Centenary,  if  I  devote  this  notice  mainly 
not  to  Dr.  Kronenberg,  but  to  Kant  himself.  Now  that  Kant  has 
been  a  hundred  years  in  his  grave,  there  can  be  no  irreverence  towards 
a  great  name  in  seriously  asking  ourselves  whether  the  foundations  of 
the  Kantian  doctrine  are  so  firmly  laid  as  most  of  us  have  been  taught 
to  believe.  Has  Kant  really  been  the  Moses  commissioned  to  lead  us 
into  a  land  of  philosophic  promise,  or  are  there  grounds  for  suspecting 
that  after  all  he  has  brought  us  out  to  perish  in  the  wilderness  ?  There 
seem  to  me  grave  reasons  why  we  should  at  least  allow  the  advocatus 
diaboli  to  get  a  hearing,  and  I  suspect  that  one  result  of  the  hearing 
would  be  to  moderate  very  considerably  the  claims  made  by  the  more 
enthusiastic  Kantians  for  their  master,  while  another  would  certainly 
be  to  revive  the  interest  in  those  great  constructive  thinkers  of  the 
seventeenth  century  whom  Kant,  apparently  without  any  real  compre- 
hension of  their  meaning,  has  taught  philosophers  for  the  last  hundred 
and  twenty  years  to  dismiss  with  an  epithet  as  '  Dogmatists. ' 

Kant's  claim  to  be  the  central  figure  of  modern  philosophy  must 
manifestly  be  accepted  or  rejected  according  as  we  accept  or  reject 
the  doctrine  of  the  first  Critique  on  the  limits  and  nature  of  knowl- 
edge. If  the  peculiar  agnosticism  of  the  first  Critique  should  be  proved 
untenable,  then  no  number  of  profound  incidental  criticisms  of  life  and 
morals  such  as  the  most  determined  anti-Kantian  must  admit  to  abound, 
e .  g. ,  in  the  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  can  save  the  credit  of  the  Kantian 
system  as  a  whole.  Now  the  first  Critique,  while  open  to  attack  in 
all  its  parts,  has  of  late  been  subjected  to  especially  severe  attack  in  its 
two  most  vital  parts,  the  ALsthetik  and  the  Antinomies  of  the  Dialektik. 
Why  I  speak  of  these  as  the  vital  parts  of  the  Critique  should  be  at 
once  apparent.  If  the  doctrine  of  the  ^Esthetik  as  to  the  connection 
of  mathematical  truths  with  the  '  forms  of  intuition '  can  be  over- 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  361 

thrown,  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  will  be  shorn  of  its  one 
really  distinctive  positive  feature ;  while,  if  the  Antinomies  do  not 
really  prove  contradictory  results,  the  whole  Kantian  theory  of  the 
necessary  limitations  of  knowledge  is  left  without  any  proof  except 
such  proof  as  may  be  drawn  from  the  consideration  that  some  philoso- 
phers have  committed  paralogisms  about  God  and  the  soul.  Without 
the  Antinomies,  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  would  contain  no  solid 
ground  whatever  for  denying  that  we  may  have  a  real  and  valid 
knowledge  of  objects  which  have  never  been  presented  as  wholes  in 
sense- perception.  And  without  this  denial  what  would  be  left  of  the 
Kantian  system  ? 

Now  the  jEsthetik  in  particular  has  been  attacked  from  two  quite 
distinct  quarters,  and  in  both  cases,  as  it  seems  to  the  present  writer, 
with  complete  success.  To  begin  with,  it  is  a  difficulty  we  must  all 
have  felt  about  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  space  and  time  that  it  is  in 
part  psychology,  and,  as  such,  amenable  to  the  criticism  of  the  empir- 
ical psychologist.  And  there  seems  little  doubt  that  modern  psy- 
chology will  definitely  accept  Professor  James's  rejection  of  the  whole 
method  of  the  "Kantian  machine-shop,"  in  which  a  purely  timeless 
and  spaceless  "manifold  of  sensation  "  is  by  some  mysterious  process 
worked  up  into  temporal  and  spatial  order  ab  extra.  For  my  own 
part,  at  any  rate,  I  can  find  no  warrant  in  my  experience  for  the  the- 
ory of  the  double  origin  of  the  content  of  perception,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  its  form,  on  the  other,  which  Dr.  Kronenberg,  like  a  good  Kant- 
ian, repeats  as  if  no  doubt  had  ever  been  cast  on  any  of  its  parts.  It 
might  not  be  impossible,  perhaps,  to  disentangle  Kant's  logical  con- 
clusions from  the  medley  of  antiquated  psychological  errors  which  he 
offers  as  their  ground,  and  to  present  the  result  in  a  form  not  open  to 
the  strictures  of  the  psychologist,  but  so  far  as  I  know  the  thing  has 
never  yet  been  done,  at  any  rate  by  our  English  and  American  Kant- 
ians.  Till  this  is  done,  I  contend,  they  are  absolutely  debarred  from 
advancing  the  propositions  of  the  sEsthetik  as  admitted  philosophic 
truth,  or  even  as  evdoga  in  the  Aristotelian  sense,  "  things  admitted 
by  the  wise,  or  by  the  majority  of  them. ' ' 

Even  more  formidable  are  the  objections  which  the  labors  of  mod- 
ern mathematicians  have  made  it  possible  to  urge  against  the  logical 
positions  of  the  sEsthetik  themselves.  Philosophers,  I  fear,  are  still  too 
largely  unaware  of  the  absolute  contradictions  which  exist  on  almost 
every  point  of  importance  between  Kantianism  and  the  well-estab- 
lished results  of  modern  mathematical  theory.  I  shall  therefore  beg 
leave  to  refer  briefly  to  one  or  two  of  these  contradictions,  especially 


362  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

as  they  seem  entirely  unknown  to  Dr.  Kronenberg,  who  is  thus  in  the 
position  of  defending  a  fortress  in  ignorance  of  the  situation  of  its 
most  exposed  points. 

1.  Space  and  time,  as  studied  by  mathematical  science,  have  no 
special  connection  with  sensuous  intuition,  but  are  merely  two  among 
other  special  cases  of    the  more    general    concept   of   serial  order. 
This  truth  had  already  been  clearly  and  repeatedly  enunciated  by 
Leibniz,  and  it  is  not  the  least  of  Kant's  disservices  to  logic  that  his  in- 
fluence has  long  prevented,  and  still  continues  to  prevent,  philosophers 
from  recognizing  the  essential  superiority  of  his  predecessor  in  the 
logic  of  the  mathematical  sciences.     Even  the  devoted  Kantian,  how- 
ever, should  be  able  to  see  for  himself  that  in  number  we  have  a  form 
of  order  essentially  independent  of  space  and  time  and  devoid  of  any 
special  connection  with  sensuous  intuition. 

2.  The  one  thing  that  seems  certain  about  the  space  and  time  of 
mathematical  science,  though  it  is  expressly  denied  by  Kant,  is  that 
they  are  concepts,  and  in  fact  cfass-concepts.     Space,  for  the  geom- 
eter, is  now  known  to  be  simply  the  class  or  aggregate  si  points,  i.e., 
of  all  terms  which  can  be  defined  by  a  peculiar  complex  of  intelligible 
inter-relations  which  it  is  the  business  of  the  logician  to  enumerate 
and  distinguish.     Time,  in  the  only  sense  in  which  it  can  be  the  ob- 
ject of  scientific  analysis,  is  similarly  the  class  or  aggregate  of  moments. 
Hence  it  follows  that  it  is  a  mere  accident  for  our  mathematical 
knowledge  that  the  space  and  time  of  sensuous  perception  happen  to 
afford  instances  of  the  defining  relations   by  which  the  respective 
classes  of  points  and  moments  are  constituted.     Any  other  group  of 
terms  which  satisfy  our  constitutive  relations  may  equally  well  be  in- 
cluded under  our  mathematical  concept  of  points  or  moments. 

3.  It  follows  that  the  demonstrations  of  geometry  are  dependent 
solely  on  rigid  logical  deduction  from  our  original  definitions  and 
postulates,   and    absolutely  independent  of  the  construction  of  the 
diagrams  which  we  may  employ  as  aids  to  the  imagination.    Indeed,  a 
geometrical  conclusion  which,  like  so  many  propositions  of  Euclid 
(e.  g.,  I  i,  14,  I  32)  involves  an  appeal  to  sensuous  intuition  of  a 
diagram,  is  logically  not  demonstrated  at  all,  and  its  truth  must  remain 
problematic  until  some  one  succeeds  in  providing  a  purely  symbolic 
proof,  i.  e.,  a  proof  which  rests  only  on  rigid  logical  deduction  and 
is  independent  of  diagrams.     Kant,  as  Mr.  Russell  has  recently  told 
us,  may  be  held  largely  excusable  for  his  mistake  on  this  score,  seeing 
that  in  his  time  there  was  possibly  no  single  really  valid  piece  of 
mathematical  reasoning  in  existence.     It  is  less  excusable  in  Dr.  Kro- 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  363 

nenberg  to  talk  of  Euclid  as  having  once  for  all  laid  down  the  final 
principles  of  geometrical  method,  and  to  cite  as  his  stock  instance  of 
a  certain  universal  truth  a  proposition  (I  32)  which  we  actually  know 
to  depend  upon  the  purely  empirical  Euclidean  postulate  of  parallelism, 
and  thus  to  be  true  only  for  spaces  conformable  to  that  postulate. 

4.  Neither  Kant  nor  any  of  his  followers  has  ever  adduced  any  seri- 
ous reason  for  the  belief  that  arithmetic  depends  upon  sensuous  in- 
tuition. Indeed,  it  is  not  easy  to  understand  what  such  a  statement 
would  mean,  and  I  suspect  that  it  owes  its  presence  in  the  Kantian 
philosophy  solely  to  the  illogical  inference  that,  if  geometry  depends 
for  its  demonstrations  on  diagrams,  as  Kantianism  falsely  asserts,  arith- 
metic must  have  a  similar  dependence  on  something  sensuous,  though 
we  may  be  entirely  unable  to  say  what  that  something  is.  That  the 
proposition  in  question  is  false,  might  have  been  at  once  inferred  from 
the  simple  consideration  that  we  can  count  and  perform  all  the  opera- 
tions which  arise  from  counting  upon  objects  (e.  g.,  pure  concepts, 
acts  of  attention,  etc. )  which  involve  no  element  of  sensuous  percep- 
tion. Its  falsity  is  not  more  conclusively,  though  undoubtedly  more 
strikingly  demonstrated  a  posteriori  by  the  successful  extension  of 
arithmetic  to  the  transfinite  numbers,  objects  which  from  their  very 
nature  are  incapable  of  being  obtained  by  the  actual  counting  of  sen- 
sible things.  Kant  has,  however,  the  merit  of  having  avoided  the 
exquisitely  silly  conclusion  of  some  of  his  expositors  that  arithmetic 
must  depend  for  its  proofs  on  the  intuition  of  time,  because  it  takes 
time  to  count. 

Until  these  objections  to  Kant's  ^sthetik  have  been  seriously  met,  it 
seems  fair  to  infer  that  all  that  is  peculiar  to  Kant  in  his  theory  of 
mathematical  knowledge  is  at  least  under  grave  suspicion  of  falsity, 
and  that  the  only  Kantian  position  which  is  certainly  valid  is  the  asser- 
tion, common  to  Kant  with  the  despised  '  Dogmatists,'  Plato,  Descartes, 
Spinoza,  Leibniz,  that  mathematical  truths  are  certain  and  universal, 
and  therefore  non-empirical.  Whether,  because  a  priori  in  the  sense 
of  being  non -empirical,  they  are  also  a  priori  as  being  in  a  special 
sense  '  the  work  of  the  mind,'  appears  to  be  an  entirely  different  issue. 

I  have  spoken  at  such  length  of  the  apparent  paralogisms  of  the 
dELsthctik  that  I  must  be  content  with  a  very  brief  indication  of  similar 
weaknesses  in  the  Analytik  and  Dialektik.  The  Analytik,  again,  pre- 
sents a  difficulty  owing  to  its  extraordinary  jumbling  up  of  logic  with 
psychology.  Until  I  had  read  Dr.  Kronenberg,  I  had  supposed  that 
even  the  most  ardent  Kantian  must  feel  some  misgivings  about  the 
whole  tribe  of  faculties  and  operations  which  figure  in  the  deduction 


364  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

and  schematism  of  the  categories.  Apparently  I  was  mistaken.  Shall 
I  be  equally  mistaken  in  thinking  that  these  faculties  and  their  opera- 
tions have  at  least  no  place  in  a  scientific  psychology  ? 

More  serious  ground  for  dissatisfaction  is  afforded  by  the  perfunctory 
treatment  given  by  the  Critique  to  the  logical  forms  of  judgment 
themselves.  Nowhere  does  Kant  appear  less  favorably  in  comparison 
with  Leibniz  than  when  we  contrast  the  modicum  of  school  logic  bor- 
rowed by  Kant  from  the  text -books  as  the  foundation  of  the  scheme 
of  categories  with  the  systematic  logical  researches  of  his  predecessor 
which,  as  we  now  know,  thanks  to  M.  Couturat,  were  extended  over  a 
life-time,  and  succeeded  in  anticipating  the  most  remarkable  achieve- 
ment of  the  ninetenth  century  in  the  realm  of  pure  thought,  the  crea- 
tion of  the  logical  calculus  of  Boole. 

There  remains  the  Dialektik,  as  to  which  I  have  only  the  space  to 
observe  that  it  is  really  not  creditable  on  the  part  of  Kant's  disciples  to 
repeat  the  famous  antinomies  without  some  attempt  to  justify  their  logical 
characters  against  the  trenchant  criticisms,  e.  g.,  of  Mr.  Russell  and  M. 
Couturat.  It  cannot  ever  be  urged  in  defense  that  the  antinomies  hold 
the  floor  and  that  the  burden  of  proof  rests  with  their  assailants.  The 
work  already  done  in  recent  times  upon  the  transfinite  numbers  has  at 
any  rate  shifted  the  onus probandi  from  the  shoulders  of  the  consistent 
<  infinitist, '  with  whom  it  remained  from  Aristotle's  days  until  our 
own,  to  those  of  the  orthodox  Kantian  agnostic  who  maintains  the 
impossibility  of  genuine  scientific  knowledge  of  the  '  transcendent. ' 
But  if  knowledge  of  the  '  transcendent '  be  once  admitted,  in  the 
comparatively  harmless  form  of  knowledge  of  the  properties  of  the 
numerical  infinite,  what  becomes  of  the  pretended  demonstration  that 
God  and  the  soul,  because  '  transcendent '  objects,  must  be  purely 
unknowable,  though  it  is  morally  edifying  to  make  certain  logically 
groundless  affirmations  about  them  ? 

I  trust  the  foregoing  reflections  will  not  be  censured  for  deficiency 
in  reverence  towards  a  great  philosophical  reputation.  Assuredly  for 
all  of  us  Kant's  intellectual  greatness  and  the  inspiration  of  his  life 
must  remain  unaffected  by  our  judgment  upon  his  peculiar  logical 
theories.  My  interest  is  not  even  primarily  to  meet  uncritical  over- 
laudation  of  Kant  by  countervailing  depreciation.  What  I  hope  even 
these  few  hurried  reflections  may  help  to  do  is,  in  the  first  place,  to 
call  attention  to  the  pressing  need  for  us  to  get  back  from  Kantian 
prejudices  to  the  study  of  Kant's  greater  predecessor,  Leibniz,  now 
at  last  being  made  possible  by  the  labors  of  M.  Couturat,  and  next 
to  impress  on  any  readers  who  may  peruse  these  lines  the  need  for  a 


No.  3.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  365 

fresh  re-examination  of  the  problem  of  the  transcendent  object.  If 
the  transcendent  should  prove  to  be  knowable,  many  current  philoso- 
phies, notably  Phenomenalism  and  Pragmatism,  which  have  thriven 
by  popularizing  and  caricaturing  the  ideas  of  the  Dialektik,  will  need 
to  revise  their  first  principles. 

A.  E.  TAYLOR. 
McGiLL  UNIVERSITY, 
MONTREAL,  CANADA. 


SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES. 

[ABBREVIATIONS. — Am.  J.  Ps.  =  American  Journal  of  Psychology;  Am.  J. 
Th.  =  The  American  Journal  of  Theology  ;  Ar.f.  G.  Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  Geschichte 
der  Philosophic;  Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  systematische  Philosophic;  Br.  J. 
Ps.  =  The  British  Journal  of  Psychology  ;  Int.  J.  E.  =  International  Journal  of 
Ethics ;  J.  de  Psych.  =  Journal  de  Psychologic  ;  Psych.  Rev.  =  Psychological  Re- 
view ;  Rev.  de  Met.  =  Revue  de  Metaphysique  ;  Rev.  Neo.-Sc.  =  Revue  Neo-Scolas- 
tique  ;  R.  d.  Fil.  =  Rivista  di  Filosojia  e  Scienze  Affini ;  V.  f.  w.  Ph.  =  Viertel- 
jahrsschrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic  ;  Z.  f.  Psych,  u.  Phys.  =  Zeitschrift  fur 
Psychologic  und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane.  — Other  titles  are  self-explanatory.] 

LOGIC  AND  METAPHYSICS. 
Kan? s  Transcendental  Idealism  and  Empirical  Realism.     C.  M.  WALSH. 

Mind,  48,  pp.  454-472  ;  49.  PP-  54-7 1- 

Premising  that  by  idealism  Kant  understood  a  doctrine  of  unreality,  by 
realism  the  contrary,  we  may  name  four  doctrines  which  he  held,  and 
four  which  he  rejected.  Those  he  held  are:  (i)  transcendental  idealism 
of  intuitions  and  phenomena  ;  (2)  empirical  idealism  of  things-in-them- 
selves  ;  (3)  transcendental  realism  of  things-in-themselves  ;  (4)  empiri- 
cal realism  of  intuitions  and  phenomena.  The  four  opposite  doctrines 
he  rejected.  But  in  those  he  held,  while  (i)  and  (3)  are  perfectly  consistent 
with  themselves  and  with  each  other,  (4)  is  not  self-consistent,  or  altogether 
consistent  with  (i)  and  (3).  Kant  has  given  two  distinct  accounts  of  this 
empirical  realism.  In  one  the  phenomenally  real  is  the  matter  of  our 
sense-perceptions,  or  simply  our  sensations  themselves  ;  or  the  empirically 
real  is  only  either  the  by  us  experienced  or  the  by  us  experienceable.  In 
the  other  the  phenomenally  real  is  that  which  corresponds  to  the  matter  of 
our  sense-perceptions,  or  simply  to  our  perceptions.  Phenomenal  objects,  on 
the  one  definition,  cannot  exist  apart  from  our  perception  ;  on  the  other, 
they  can.  This  doubleness  of  Kant's  empirical  realism  is  most  apparent  in 
his  treatment  of  unexperienced  real  phenomenal  objects.  The  first  form 
of  it  is  consistent  with  his  transcendental  idealism  and  his  transcendental 
realism,  (i)  and  (3)  ;  but  the  second  is  not.  This  second  and  incon- 
sistent form  arises  from  Kant's  speaking  of  one  time  and  of  one  space, 
forgetting  that  there  must  be  as  many  distinct  though  similar  times  and 
spaces  as  there  are  distinct  persons,  and  even  going  further  to  speak 
of  one  experience,  one  consciousness,  and,  as  a  consequence,  one  phe- 
nomenal world  and  one  nature.  On  this  view,  phenomenal  objects  exist 
outside  us  in  an  outside  space  and  time,  and  correspond  to  our  represen- 
tations. Yet  they  are  not  transcendental,  but  empirically  real,  because 
they  are  objects  in  an  experience.  The  adoption  of  this  form  of  realism 
is  facilitated  by  four  ambiguities.  '  Outside  me '  is  ambiguously  used  by 

366 


"SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  367 

Kant  to  express  both  spatial  and  transcendental  externality.  '  Inside  me  ' 
is  used  to  describe  both  the  non-spatial  objects  as  merely  successive  in 
time,  and,  in  a  wider  sense,  to  cover  objects  extended  in  space,  since  these 
are  also  successive  in  time.  This  wider  use  is  more  prominent  in  the  sec- 
ond edition  of  the  Critique.  '  Phenomenon  '  is  also  ambiguously  used  to 
mean  both  the  appearance  of  a  thing  and  that  which  appears,  and  thus 
phenomena  become  both  subjective  and  objective.  Still  another  ambiguity 
exists  as  to  the  '  analogies '  or  principles  of  the  understanding.  In  the 
Analytic  they  are  distinguished  as  constitutive  or  regulative  ;  as  to  experi- 
ence they  are  all  constitutive  ;  but  in  the  Dialectic  the  constitutive  princi- 
ples are  frequently  treated  as  nothing  better  than  regulative  principles, 
though  they  are  still  retained  also  as  constitutive.  Examining  the  second 
Analogy,  that  of  the  '  Principle  of  Production,'  from  this  point  of  view,  we 
find  that,  as  constitutive,  it  fits  in  only  with  the  second  form  of  empirical 
realism  that  we  have  described  ;  but,  as  regulative,  it  agrees  only  with  the 
first  form.  Of  Kant's  two  accounts  of  empirical  realism,  the  first  turns 
out  to  be  not  empirical  realism  at  all,  since  it  reduces  all  real  sensible  ob- 
jects to  be  unreal  except  as  states  of  our  individual  consciousnesses.  And 
the  second  is  really  empirical  idealism,  since  it  is  transcendental  in  placing 
the  real  objects  of  experience  in  a  single  experience  which  is  not  yours 
or  mine.  Whose  this  experience  is,  or  how  the  phenomena  appearing 
in  it  are  caused,  Kant  does  not  tell  us.  Phenomenal  objects  outside  us 
must  be  either  things-in-God  or  things-in-themselves,  and  the  term  '  phe- 
nomena '  is  misleading  in  either  sense.  And  since  Kant  states  that  things- 
in-themselves  are  created  by,  and  depend  upon,  God,  for  whom  they  are 
noumena  in  active  intuition,  the  transcendental,  like  the  empirical  realism, 
must  reduce  to  either  Berkeleyan  idealism  or  Spinozistic  pantheism,  accord- 
ing as  the  subjects-in-themselves  are  regarded  as  existent  or  merely  sub- 
sistent.  Transcendental  realism  in  respect  to  sensible  objects  in  space  and 
time  Kant  rejects,  because  it  will  not  permit  of  our  possessing  certainty 
in  physics  and  mathematics,  yet  on  the  second  form  of  his  empirical  real- 
ism the  sensible  objects  are  just  as  far  removed  from  the  control  of  forms 
and  laws  in  us.  In  fact,  the  only  way  in  which  his  epistemological  argu- 
ment can  be  satisfied  is  by  Solipsism.  He  was  confused  in  his  treatment 
as  much  in  respect  to  phenomenal  objects  as  to  things-in-themselves,  and 
gave  to  philosophy  no  consistent  view  of  the  world  able  to  rank  with 
those  already  founded.  His  originality  —  and  his  weakness  —  lies  only 
in  founding  his  system  upon  the  argument  that  certain  elements  of  thought 
are  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  certain  cognitions  taken  as  of  facts. 

EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

1st  die  Annahme  von  Absolutem  in  dcr  Anschauung  und  dem  Denken  mo- 
glich?     KURT  GEISSLER.     Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.,  IX,  4,  pp.  417-432. 

Because  the  conception  of  the  Absolute  involves  difficulties,  it  cannot 
therefore  be  cast  aside  ;  only  inherent  contradiction  invalidates  a  concep- 


368  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

tion.  Preliminary,  however,  to  any  discussion  of  the  Absolute  should  be 
its  careful  definition.  The  absolutes  of  geometry  are  not  so  treated  ;  the 
point,  e.  g.,  although  perceived  as  pertaining  to  space,  yet  lacks  the  tri- 
dimensional  aspect  which  is  the  very  essence  of  space,  and  the  '  limitless,' 
while  not  free  from  dimension  (e.  g.t  the  infinite  projection  of  a  straight 
line  has  length),  yet  is  defined  as  that  not  to  be  exceeded.  Both  these 
potential  absolutes,  again,  depend  upon  the  a  priori  functioning  of  the 
mind.  What  is  true  of  these,  too,  is  true  of  the  absolutes  of  arithmetic 
and  logic.  The  zero,  although  loosed  from  the  contradiction  of  the  dimen- 
sionless  yet  endlessly  small  (z.  e.,  the  point),  is,  as  derived  by  subtraction, 
not  absolute  ;  unity,  whether  real  or  a  category,  has  always  opposed  to  it 
multiplicity.  In  metaphysics,  again,  the  Absolute  is  the  'Omnipotent,' 
that  which,  while  standing  in  relation,  still  need  not  do  so.  Either  of  its 
leading  ideals,  the  Schellingean  Identity,  wherein  is  neither  subject  nor 
object,  or  the  Hegelian,  "  an  eternally-developing  spirit  "  wherein  "the  con- 
tradictory is  itself  brought  to  a  higher  unity,"  is  open  to  objection.  Here, 
as  before,  our  mind  is  so  constituted  as  to  be  powerless  to  grasp  the  Abso- 
lute, even  though  it  exist.  ARTHUR  J.  TihTjE. 

Die  Religionsidee.     DAVID  KOIGEN.     Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.,  IX,  4,  pp.  433-462. 

The  development  of  emotion  is  the  unfolding  of  an  immanent  principle  ; 
it  may  be  represented  by  the  formula  :  x  =  a,  av  av  as,  .  .  .  Single  emo- 
tions, however,  have  real  significance  only  in  reference  to  one  central  prin- 
ciple ;  every  emotion  is  permeated  with  a  deep  striving  to  surround  the 
other  emotional  rings,  to  intermarry  with  them.  This  principle  is  best  de- 
fined as  the  life-force,  and  its  most  important  manifestation  is  the  universal 
emotion,  'religiosity,'  the  incarnation  of  the  most  inner  intensity  and  the 
most  outer  extensity.  Insistence  on  either  characteristic  to  the  detriment 
of  the  other,  e.  g.t  Nietzsche's  demand  for  the  suppression  or  absorption 
of  alien  extensities,  or  Guyau's  desire  to  aid  strange  social  intensities,  is 
undesirable.  But  '  religiosity  '  is  not  yet  the  religious  idea  ;  for  this  intel- 
lection and  volition  are  alike  needed.  That  is,  on  one  side,  knowledge,  striv- 
ing under  the  categories  of  cause  and  identity  to  interpret  the  ever-chang- 
ing phenomenal,  brings  to  light,  if  nothing  else,  the  principle  of  continuity  ; 
on  the  other,  the  will  for  culture,  seeking  the  broadening  and  deepening  of 
personality  and  the  illumination  of  the  social  consciousness,  together  with 
the  firm  grounding  of  ethical  ideals,  testifies  to  the  immanency  of  the 
world-idea.  The  development  of  the  religious  idea,  accordingly,  is  ever 
toward  a  more  perfect  conception  of  an  inner  teleology  ;  from  the  conquer- 
ing God  to  the  ruling  God,  from  the  corporeal  to  the  spiritual,  from  the  un- 
social to  the  social,  from  the  tribal  and  national  to  the  cosmic,  above  all, 
from  the  external  to  the  inherent  ;  such  has  been  religion's  advance.  Long 
steps,  indeed,  have  lain  between  the  clannish  Jehovah  of  the  Hebrews,  the 
external  yet  universal  Father  of  the  Lutheran  Reformation,  and  the  pres- 
ent tendency  toward  a  belief  in  an  eternally- self-realizing  Absolute  ;  in 


No.  3.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  369 

fact,  there  have  been  retrogressions.  Finally,  now,  connected  with  the 
religious  idea  is  the  destiny  of  the  individual.  All  religion  is  a  recognition 
of  his  dependence  upon  a  'something,'  be  that  something  what  it  may. 
Does  this  dependence  end  in  realization,  with  retention  of  individuality,  in 
absorption,  or  in  annihilation  ?  Surely  in  the  former  of  the  three  ;  the 
yearning  for  immortality  is  too  deeply-rooted  to  be  illusory,  is  the  very 
meaning  of  the  life-force.  ARTUHR  J.  TIETJE. 

The  Disjunctive  Judgment.     G.  R.  T.  Ross.     Mind,  48,  pp.  489-501. 

This  article  attacks  the  theory  of  Bosanquet  and  Bradley  that  the  alter- 
natives of  a  properly  interpreted  disjunctive  judgment  are  mutually  ex- 
clusive. They  may  be  so  in  the  case  of  a  priori  disjunction  by  the  law 
of  excluded  middle  ;  but  in  a  case  of  real  disjunction,  where  the  alterna- 
tive terms  both  stand  for  positive  concepts,  it  would  follow  on  this  theory 
that  the  judgments  '  A  is  either  B  or  C '  and  '  A  is  either  not  -B  or  not  -C' 
have  the  same  meaning.  This  is  against  the  meaning  of  language, 
and  would  destroy  the  compelling  force  of  the  dilemma,  since  its  minor 
premise  would  thus  always  be  equivalent  to  a  corresponding  negative  dis- 
junction. The  logical  uses  of  the  disjunctive  judgment  are  in  the  dilemma 
and  in  division.  It  meets  both  if  we  interpret  it  as  merely  exhaustive. 
The  minor  premise  of  a  dilemma  enters  the  argument  only  so  far  as  it  is 
exhaustive,  and  when  its  conclusion  is  disjunctive,  it  is  proved  only  in  so 
far  as  it  is  exhaustive.  The  chief  use  of  the  divisive  judgment  is  in  classi- 
fication, and  here  the  force  of  the  disjunction  lies  in  its  exhaustiveness, 
while  the  exclusiveness,  if  present,  depends  upon  the  predicates  involved 
in  each  case.  And  the  practical  value  of  a  classification  lies  in  its  ex- 
haustiveness, not  in  its  exclusiveness.  Theoretically  and  practically, 
therefore,  the  function  of  the  disjunctive  judgment  is  to  be  exhaustive,  not 
exclusive. 

EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

L evolution  comme  principe  philosophique  du  devenir.    W.  M.  KOZLOWSKI. 
Rev.  Ph.,  XXIX,  2,  pp.  113-135. 

As  the  conception  of  the  Cosmos  reduces  to  a  spatial  whole  all  coexistent 
phenomena,  so  the  general  formula  of  evolution  brings  unity  to  the  tem- 
poral order.  The  idea  of  evolution  involves  the  conception  of  a  determi- 
nate direction  of  all  change,  and  a  common  end,  or  goal,  of  the  evolu- 
tionary process.  Three  elements  may  be  distinguished  in  the  scientific 
conception  :  (i)  A  continual  change  of  state  in  the  universe  ;  (2)  the  me- 
chanical or  causal  character  of  this  change  ;  (3)  a  constant  direction  of  all 
change,  involving  an  end  to  be  reached  in  a  finite  or  indefinite  time.  While 
the  conception  of  a  mechanically  determined  evolution  is  as  old  as  philos- 
ophy itself,  the  modern  conception  differs  from  that  held  by  the  ancients 
in  the  assumption  of  the  irreversibility  of  the  process.  Science  admits  that 


3/0  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW,          [VOL.  XIII. 

a  particular  stellar  system  may,  owing  to  the  gradual  retardation  of  its 
motion,  again  reach  its  original  state  of  incandescence.  Yet  the  irreversi- 
bility  of  the  process  as  a  whole  is  the  logical  consequence  of  two  postulates  : 
the  mechanical  unity  of  the  universe,  and  the  causality  implied  in  the  prin- 
ciple of  evolution.  The  constancy  in  direction  is  not  reached  by  empirical 
observation,  but  is  deduced  from  a  priori  principles.  The  assumption  of 
complete  revolution  denies  the  determination  of  each  state  by  the  preced- 
ing state.  The  law  of  the  growth  of  entropy  is  merely  a  mathematical  for- 
mulation of  the  principle  of  constancy  in  direction,  and  is  complementary 
to  the  conservation  of  energy.  Conservation  expresses  constancy  in  the 
amount  of  energy,  and  entropy,  the  direction  of  its  transformations.  Were 
conservation  the  only  principle,  phenomena  would  be  reversible,  e.  g.,  heat 
might  pass  from  a  cooler  to  a  warmer  body.  The  law  of  entropy  states 
that  the  chance  of  such  reversion  is  infinitely  small.  The  reversibility  of  a 
single  phenomenon  seems  logically  possible  when  considered  in  isolation 
from  the  rest  of  the  universe.  But  just  as  this  would  require  external  in- 
tervention, so  the  total  reversion  of  the  evolutionary  process  presupposes 
the  agency  of  an  external  God.  The  law  of  entropy  is  only  one  expression 
of  the  modern  conception  of  the  immanence  of  law.  But  while  the  general 
direction  of  evolution  is  constant,  individual  variations  and  particular  phe- 
nomena retard  the  progress  toward  the  final  goal.  Thus  in  the  solar  sys- 
tem the  dissipation  of  radiant  energy  is  partially  counteracted  by  the  ab- 
sorption of  heat  by  the  planets.  A  new  problem  is  presented  by  organic 
life,  but  concerns  only  its  origin.  Once  established,  organic  processes  are 
entirely  subject  to  mechanical  laws  and  present  no  exception  to  the  laws  of 
conservation  and  entropy.  A  more  fundamental  objection  to  the  principle 
of  evolution  is  brought  forward  by  Poincare  and  Maxwell  in  the  theorem  of 
the  phase.  According  to  this,  a  limited  mechanical  system  returns  to  a 
state  similar  to  its  initial  state.  The  strength  of  this  objection  lies  in  the 
assumption  of  the  limitation  of  the  system.  While  this  was  implied  in  the 
theories  of  the  ancients,  it  is  not  admitted  by  modern  science.  The  prin- 
ciple of  a  constant  direction  in  evolution  becomes  a  particular  case  of  the 
law  of  periodicity,  corresponding  to  the  modern  assumption  of  the  infinite 
extension  of  the  universe.  A  transformation  of  scientific  ideas  would,  of 
course,  make  possible  a  different  conception  of  evolution. 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 
La  simulation  dans  le  charactere.     F.  PAULHAN.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  10, 

pp.  337-365 ;  ii,  pp.  495-527. 

Simulation  may  be  either  voluntary  or  involuntary.  In  either  case  it 
may  be  set  down  as  a  general  truth  that  its  raison  d'etre  lies  in  its  utility, 
in  the  facilities  it  secures  for  attack  and  defense,  for  living  and  for  self-de- 
velopment. The  stupidity  of  observers  insures  its  success  quite  as  much  as 


No.  3.]  SUMMARIES    OF  ARTICLES.  371 

does  its  own  excellence.  Simulations  vary  in  delicacy,  accuracy,  and  fre- 
quency, particular  kinds  predominating  in  particular  sets  of  psychological 
and  social  conditions.  Several  of  the  different  forms  are  examined,  begin- 
ning with  those  of  frankness  and  dissimulation.  Frankness  means  several 
things  :  hatred  of  lies,  a  moral  attitude,  'expansiveness,'  etc.  In  ordinary 
social  intercourse,  it  is  contrasted  with  reserve.  The  effect  of  the  two  op- 
posed attitudes  on  an  observer  will  be  determined  very  largely  by  his  own 
temperament.  The  motive  behind  both  is  security.  Each  is  a  means  of 
defense  and  may  indicate  little  or  much  as  to  the  real  character.  From 
simple  reserve  to  elaborate  hypocrisy  there  is  an  insensible  transition.  The 
former  may  be  a  matter  of  temperament  merely  or  may  involve  voluntary 
concealment.  From  this  the  passage  through  hypocrisy  to  plain  lying  is 
very  gradual,  and  involves  so  many  factors  that  it  can  be  traced,  if  at  all, 
only  with  extreme  difficulty.  A  strong  aversion  to  open  lying  is  quite  con- 
sistent with  a  high  degree  of  hypocrisy.  Aversion  to  lying  and  a  certain 
degree  of  <  expansiveness  '  are  the  characteristics  of  true  frankness,  the  pres- 
ence of  the  latter  being  generally  supposed  to  involve  the  former  ;  hence 
the  ease  with  which  frankness  may  be  simulated.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
the  '  expansive '  person  who  instinctively  simulates,  while  the  reserved 
person  reveals  more  nearly  his  true  character.  Expansiveness  is,  however, 
quite  as  often  sincere  as  it  is  a  mark  of  simulation.  Simulation  has  a  basis 
of  sincerity,  but  the  importance  of  this  in  the  particular  case  cannot  be  de- 
termined. There  is  some  truth  at  the  bottom  of  every  lie  and  no  sincerity 
is  entirely  free  from  pretense.  We  are  constantly  forced  to  imitate  others 
and  the  hypocrisy  of  politeness  is  a  social  necessity.  Individuals  differ  here 
by  reason  of  their  differences  in  the  intensity  of  feeling,  in  the  power  of  cer- 
tain tendencies,  etc.  Other  forms  of  simulation  group  around  such  traits  as 
naivete,  candor,  and  skepticism.  The  first  two  are  due  largely  to  a  lack 
of  mental  equilibrium,  to  want  of  experience  and  reflection.  Appearances 
correspond  to  very  different  realities  and  the  external  marks  of  naivete  may 
represent  inexperience,  ignorance,  stupidity,  natural  simplicity,  concentra- 
tion, lack  of  self-confidence,  etc.  Any  one  of  these  traits  may  pass  as 
naivete,  and  the  simulation  is  generally  involuntary  and  only  accidentally 
useful.  Skepticism  which  has  displaced  an  earlier  naivete  simulates  trust- 
fulness. The  skeptical  attitude  of  mind  seems  fond  of  cloaking  itself  in  a 
pretended  confidence  ;  and  it  is  not  wholly  pretense,  for  in  becoming  skep- 
tical the  spirit  remains  to  some  extent  naive.  Real  and  intense  skepticism 
is  often  painful  and  seeks  relief  in  the  pretense  of  belief.  The  man  who 
lacks  confidence  in  himself  pretends  to  a  general  suspicion  to  cloak  his  own 
weakness.  The  stress  of  social  life  leads  the  skeptic  to  simulate  sincerity 
and  confidence.  Here,  again,  utility  is  the  motive.  Pride  and  modesty 
have  very  complex  manifestations.  Modesty  is  characterized  by  the  ten- 
dency to  undervalue  one's  self,  and,  in  occasions  for  action,  to  retire  into 
the  background.  The  proud  man  may  simulate  modesty  from  an  exag- 
gerated notion  of  the  value  of  that  trait.  Anything  which  prevents  action 


372  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

gives,  in  the  absence  of  counter  indications,  an  appearance  of  modesty. 
Laziness,  egoism,  indifference,  desire  for  quiet,  fear  of  compromising  one's 
self,  contempt  for  one's  associates,  some  of  which  are  very  closely  allied  to 
pride,  all  give  rise  to  simulations  of  modesty,  for  the  most  part  involuntary. 
One  may  be  very  modest  in  certain  respects  and  exceedingly  proud  in  others; 
a  very  great  pride  may  work  as  modesty  because  of  a  repugnance  for  self- 
assertion  or  fear  of  disapproval.  Such  motives  as  devotion  to  an  idea  or 
sense  of  duty  may  lead  a  modest  man  to  involuntary  simulation  of  pride.  A 
false  modesty  is  created  by  the  demands  of  social  life,  conventional  formulae 
of  politeness,  etc.  Timidity  is  generally  accompanied  by  pride  and  frequently 
conceals  itself  under  a  simulated  aggressive  boldness.  Simulation  is  part  of 
the  nature  of  the  timid.  It  is  one  of  a  number  of  compensations  which  serve 
as  means  of  defense.  Simulation  of  impassivity,  indifference,  and  modesty 
(involuntary),  are  common  in  the  timid.  Timidity  has  its  source  in  a  dis- 
cord between  the  individual  and  his  environment,  and  implies  an  inner 
discord  as  well.  The  simulation  of  other  traits  to  hide  this  want  of  harmony 
is  a  means  to  safety.  Weakness  of  will  and  cowardice,  also,  imply  a  want 
of  harmony  between  individual  and  environment.  They  commonly  simu- 
late boldness,  audacity,  courage,  and  give  rise  to  bragging  and  undue  ex- 
citement in  the  presence  of  danger.  Lack  of  self-control  in  thought  and 
action  are  other  symptoms.  Social  support  and  the  habit  of  adaptation 
give  the  appearance  of  confident  courage  to  the  weak-willed,  which  is 
betrayed  by  any  change  of  environment  or  social  conditions.  An  unus- 
ually strong  will  simulates  timidity  at  times  through  voluntary  reserve. 
Mildness  of  disposition  is  a  sign  of  a  psychological  mechanism  that  func- 
tions easily  and  regularly  without  disturbing  influences.  It  is  readily  con- 
fused with  goodness,  which  may  or  may  not  accompany  it.  It  is  frequently 
simulated  by  the  weak-willed  and  timid.  A  strong  will  and  violent  pas- 
sions may  wear  this  same  guise,  but  they  usually  assert  themselves  after  a 
certain  point,  whereas  the  truly  mild  temperament  preserves  its  inner  har- 
mony in  the  face  of  the  most  hostile  circumstances.  Craving  for  variety, 
contrast,  and  action  may  induce  the  mild  to  simulate  harshness  and  rude- 
ness. Want  of  foresight  simulates  generosity,  affection,  goodness,  etc.  It 
springs  from  a  lack  of  coordination  in  the  mental  life,  a  weakness  of  the 
synthetic  functions,  and  is  readily  confused  with  other  characteristics  having 
the  same  source.  Generosity  is  often  but  a  mask  of  selfishness.  Prudence 
easily  simulates  harshness,  selfishness,  and  indifference.  Self-restraint  may 
cloak  violent  passions  and  impulses  with  indifference,  and  they  are  the  more 
enduring  for  the  subjection.  Simulation  pervades  all  life.  No  one  of  our 
actions  is  quite  unmistakable  in  its  meaning.  We  can  never  be  sure  that 
they  are  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  tendencies  that  produce  them. 
Every  manifestation  of  character  is  an  occasion  of  illusion  for  the  observer 
and  is  so  far  a  simulation.  It  cannot  be  an  absolute  expression  of  the  per- 
sonality behind  it.  Not  only  the  imperfection  of  the  means  of  expression, 
but  a  constant  warring  of  impulses  within  and  the  pressure  of  certain  neces- 


No.  3.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  373 

sary  ties  of  social  life  from  without  tend  to  make  simulation  universal.  All 
action  is  the  result  of  a  balancing  of  motives,  and  implies  some  degree  of 
the  tendency  opposed  to  that  which  it  directly  expresses.  The  elements  of 
every  trait  of  character  are  mixed,  and  the  feeling  that  determines  an  act  is 
made  up  of  antagonistic  tendencies  ;  some  of  these  are  inevitably  concealed, 
while  others  are  over-emphasized.  The  very  fact  that  simulation  is  univer- 
sal, however,  proves  that  it  is  never  absolute.  There  is  some  basis  in  the 
real  character  for  every  simulated  tendency  ;  we  pretend  to  no  characteristics 
that  have  not  some  place  in  our  nature.  Simulation  exists  only  because 
there  is  no  contradiction  between  the  systems  of  acts,  impressions,  and  ideas 
there  formed  and  the  real  state  of  the  subject ;  it  indicates  a  tendency  of  the 
mind  to  profit  by  its  own  weakness.  The  simulation  of  traits  of  character 
and  the  illusions  of  the  observer  tend  to  balance  in  the  end.  Simulation 
extends  to  deceiving  not  only  others  but  ourselves.  We  are  at  great  pains 
to  convince  ourselves  that  we  possess  the  virtues  and  capacities  that  we 
most  admire.  We  resort  to  various  acts  and  attitudes  for  this  purpose. 
Simulation  is  constantly  changing  in  both  quantity  and  quality,  in  epochs, 
in  the  sexes,  and  in  individuals.  On  the  whole,  it  seems  to  be  on  the 
decrease.  Nevertheless,  a  certain  amount  of  it  seems  inherent  in  all  life. 

C.  E.  GALLOWAY. 

A  Sixteenth  Century  Psychologist,  Bernardino  Telesio.     J.  L.  MC!NTYRE. 
Br.  J.  Ps.,  I,  i,  pp.  161-177. 

Telesio' s  great  work,  the  De  rerum  natura,  was  published  at  Naples  in 
1586.  The  purpose  of  his  system  was  to  dislodge  Aristotelianism  from  its 
dominant  place  in  the  philosophy  of  the  period.  The  method  which  he 
advocated  was  empiricism,  and  his  principle  of  inquiry  was  the  uniformity 
of  nature.  Though  Telesio  affirms  his  complete  acceptance  of  the  Scrip- 
tures and  the  dogmas  of  the  Church,  yet  the  spirit  of  his  philosophy  was 
fundamentally  naturalistic,  and  a  few  years  after  his  death  his  books  were 
placed  upon  the  Index.  For  the  explanation  of  nature,  Telesio  holds  that 
there  are  two  active  principles,  heat  and  cold,  and  a  passive  substrate 
through  which  the  first  two  act.  Heat  and  cold  are  endowed  with  sensation, 
and  from  their  action  in  the  bodies  of  animals  consciousness  arises.  The 
mind  is  regarded  as  corporeal,  a  delicate  and  rarefied  substance  enclosed 
in  the  nervous  system.  Telesio  explains,  however,  that  man  has  another 
soul  which  is  wholly  divine  and  which  acts  through  the  natural  soul.  This 
is  merely  a  theological  admission  and  has  no  real  connection  with  his 
theory.  The  natural  soul  of  man  differs  from  that  of  the  brutes  only  in 
degree.  Sensation  is  the  basis  of  all  mental  life  and  results  ultimately  from 
the  action  of  heat  upon  the  mind  stuff  in  the  ventricles  of  the  brain.  The 
functions  of  the  brain  are  :  discrimination,  retention,  intelligence,  organiza- 
tion of  movements,  and  nutrition.  Telesio' s  discussion  of  space  perception 
is  comparable  to  the  empirical  explanations  given  by  the  followers  of  Mill ; 
his  explanation  of  intelligence,  also,  is  roughly  analogous  to  the  position 


374  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

of  the  associational  psychologists.  It  is  based  upon  resemblances  observed 
between  objects  of  sense.  Telesio  carries  his  naturalism  into  ethics  also. 
The  only  end  which  man  can  pursue  is  his  self-preservation,  and  therefore 
virtue  and  vice  are  intellectual  merely.  The  influence  of  Telesio  was  felt 
mainly  through  Campanella  and  Bacon. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

ETHICS. 

The  Relations  of  Ethics  to  Metaphysics.     W.  H.  FAIRBROTHER.     Mind, 
49,  pp.  38-53. 

The  question  as  to  the  relations  of  ethics  and  metaphysics  may  be  put  in 
two  ways  :  (i)  Are  the  ethical  doctrines  taught  by  the  more  important  writers 
derived  from  their  respective  metaphysical  beliefs  ?  Or  (2)  in  abstracto,  is  the 
subject-matter  of  moral  science  of  such  a  kind  that  it  is  necessarily  affected 
by  our  belief  as  to  the  ultimate  nature  of  man  and  the  universe  ?  Taking 
up  the  first  form,  we  may  say  with  certainty  that  a  great  body  of  thinkers 
do  base  their  ethics  directly  upon  their  metaphysics.  Others  are  popularly 
regarded  as  reaching  their  ethical  results  by  other  roads  than  the  meta- 
physical, especially  Kant,  Spencer,  Mill,  and  the  English  moralists  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  But  Kant's  ethical  and  metaphysical  doctrines  are 
in  reality  completely  interdependent ;  it  is  the  same  reason  which  as  self- 
determining  is  practical,  and  as  determined  is  speculative,  and  the  uncon- 
ditioned causality  which  the  former  gives  in  moral  freedom  is  necessary 
for  the  systematic  unity  demanded,  but  not  supplied  by  the  latter.  Spencer 
states  definitely  that  the  object  of  moral  science  is  to  deduce  from  the  laws 
of  life  and  the  conditions  of  existence  what  kinds  of  action  tend  to  produce 
happiness.  The  popular  impression  that  his  ethics  is  independent  of 
metaphysical  ideas  is  caused  by  his  careless  use  of  utilitarian  language. 
As  for  Mill,  his  utilitarianism  is  confessedly  based  on  the  belief  that  men 
desire  nothing  but  happiness,  that  this  is  a  collective  happiness,  and  has  a 
concrete  intelligible  nature.  It  is  true  that  the  English  moralists  of  the 
eighteenth  century  employed  no  philosophical  theories,  but  this  was  be- 
cause their  attention  was  confined  to  the  facts  of  moral  approval  and  disap- 
proval, and  epistemological  difficulties  were  avoided  by  recourse  to  moral 
faculty  or  feeling.  The  truth  in  the  contention  that  ethics  is  independent 
of  metaphysics  is  simply  that  our  knowledge  of  ultimate  reality  is  not  yet 
complete  enough  to  enable  us  to  deduce  an  answer  for  every  particular 
problem  of  detail.  We  must  have  a  moral  code,  yet  such  a  code  cannot 
be  entirely  haphazard.  Ethical  theory  must  be  in  some  way  coordinated 
with  speculative,  since  both  deal  with  the  same  universe. 

EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

La  morale  de  Renouvier.     A.  DARLU.      Rev.  de  Met.,  XII,  I,  pp.  1-18. 

The  lack  of  clear  exposition    in  Renouvier' s  Science  de  la  morale  has 

caused  its  importance  to  be  overlooked.     Though  some  of  its  problems 


No.  3.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  37  S 

are  now  obsolete,  others  are  of  great  importance.  The  work  was  inspired 
by  the  French  Revolution.  As  a  disciple  of  Kant  who  had  also  felt  the 
effect  of  the  struggle,  he  adopted  Kant's  ethical  principle  and  made  it  the 
basis  of  his  work,  the  principle  that  ethical  science  is  distinct,  not  only  from 
religion  and  metaphysics,  but  also  from  natural  and  social  science.  Con- 
science is  the  supreme  datum.  Renouvier's  doctrine  is  individualistic  and 
personality  is  the  basis  of  his  philosophy.  Social  relations  exist  only  be- 
tween individuals.  Public  morality  is  not  distinct  from  private  morality, 
and  state  institutions  are  but  extensions  of  private  relationships.  Liberty 
is  the  starting-point  of  individual  and  social  progress.  The  ideal  state  of 
humanity  would  mean  a  state  of  peace  wherein  autonomous  nations  were 
in  harmonious  association.  Social  liberty  is  measured  by  the  amount  of 
individual  liberty,  and  the  multiplication  of  free  institutions  means  progress. 
Justice  arises  by  the  recognition  of  the  validity  of  contracts.  Opposed  to 
self-interest,  it  becomes  the  consciousness  of  obligation,  the  supreme  prin- 
ciple of  practical  morality,  and  the  basis  of  social  institutions.  In  applying 
moral  laws  to  social  needs,  morality  should  make  apparent  the  changes 
which  social  rights  and  duties  undergo.  Man's  first  duty  is  self-preserva- 
tion. In  the  clash  of  desires  incident  upon  satisfaction  of  personal  inter- 
ests, a  state  of  war  results,  the  temper  of  which  still  lingers  in  the  industrial 
and  moral  world.  Ethical  questions  resolve  themselves  into  economic 
ones.  Morality  condemns  as  unjust  the  unequal  distribution  of  wealth, 
and  amelioration  of  conditions  is  to  be  secured  by  giving  to  labor  a  share 
in  the  wealth  produced  proportionate  to  the  time  and  effort  spent  in  its 
production,  rather  than  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  supply  and  demand. 
Social  reform  is  possible  only  through  free  association  and  mutual  conces- 
sion. Warfare  and  militarism  are  condemned  as  the  source  of  social  cor- 
ruption. Permanent  peace  between  states  is  possible  only  if  there  be  a 
deeply  pacific  moral  purpose  within  them.  The  socialistic  ideas  of  peace, 
justice,  and  industry  are  the  steps  towards  progress,  the  end  of  which  is 
state  autonomy  and  personal  independence.  Though  overemphasizing  in- 
dividualism, Renouvier  produced  an  ethical  doctrine  clear  and  consistent, 
and  founded  upon  equity,  justice,  and  peace. 

FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 

La  democratic  devant  la  science.     BOUGLE.     Rev.  de  Met.,  XII,    i,  pp. 

57-73- 

Science  affirms  that  the  spirit  of  democracy  is  opposed  to  the  biological 
laws  of  nature,  and  hence  must  ultimately  fail.  In  answer  we  may  say 
that,  though  theoretically  rigid,  the  laws  of  heredity,  differentiation,  and 
competition,  are  really  not  without  exceptions.  Democracy  promotes  social 
well-being  by  obeying  the  law  of  heredity.  By  diminishing  arbitrary  in- 
equalities it  aids  competition,  and  by  division  of  labor  gives  completer  dif- 
ferentiation and  development  to  human  powers.  But  social  evolution  is 
different  in  nature  from  biological.  Unrestricted  competition  is  not  suffi- 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

cient  here.  Personal  rights  and  social  ties  must  be  safeguarded  by  assuring 
to  each  a  share  in  the  collective  wealth.  Democracy  transcends  the  laws 
of  biological  evolution,  applying  them  to  its  use  but  not  being  affected  by 
them.  Its  goal  is  the  attainment  of  a  higher  realm  of  being,  the  perfection 
of  spiritual  personality.  Here  the  scientific  judgment  is  inadequate  either 
to  determine  the  desirable  or  fix  the  limits  of  the  attainable.  A  sense  of 
the  supreme  worth  of  human  life  makes  necessary  measures  which  are 
opposed  to  the  suffering  incident  upon  natural  survival  through  competi- 
tion ;  and  such  a  feeling  for  humanity  is  not  amenable  to  judgment  in  the 
court  of  science.  Biological  analogy  is  inapplicable.  Human  societies 
must  be  subjected  to  historical  comparison  and  analysis,  and  the  so- 
ciological laws  found  to  obtain  must  be  made  the  basis  of  morality.  By 
these  laws  also  should  democracy  be  judged,  and  its  tendency  to  promote 
human  weal  or  woe  determined.  The  validity  of  the  findings  of  social 
science  will  depend  upon  the  recognition  of  individualism  coexisting  with 
a  social  spirit.  These  are  indispensable,  if  democracy  is  to  continue  ;  and 
there  is  likewise  need  of  humanizing  culture  and  the  rational  choice  of 
ends  in  accord  with  the  supreme  end  as  revealed  by  moral  philosophy. 
Though  the  conclusions  of  science  are  unsatisfactory,  and  though  we  cannot 
yet  foresee  the  results  which  sociological  science  may  bring  about,  there  is 
nevertheless  no  reason  to  believe  that  it  will  prove  otherwise  than  encour- 
aging. 

F.  P.  BUSSELL. 

HISTORY   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

Le  naturalisms  Aristotelicien.     CLODIUS  PIAT.     A.  f.  G.  Ph.,  IX,  4,  pp. 
530-544- 

M.  Piat  describes  the  philosophical  movement  from  the  supernaturalism 
of  Plato  to  the  naturalism  and  theory  of  immanency  of  Aristotle  and  the 
Aristotelians.  In  the  philosophy  of  Strato,  the  doctrine  of  immanence  is 
carried  to  its  logical  issue,  and  the  transcendency  of  a  divine  First  Cause 
and  of  a  Creative  Reason  is  characterized  as  a  metaphysical  illusion.  Aris- 
totle had  advanced  a  theory  of  nature  in  which  there  was  no  room  for  the 
idea  of  God  as  ' '  pure  form, ' '  and  in  the  historical  development  of  the 
school  the  idea  was  explicitly  excluded.  W.  A.  H. 

Senecas  Ansichten  von  der  Verfassung  des  Staates.     J.  BREUER.     A.  f.  G. 
Ph.,  IX,  4,  pp.  515-529. 

This  article  is  an  attempt  to  defend  Seneca's  political  philosophy  against 
Rubins' s  charges  of  inconsistency  and  inconstancy.  Breuer  points  out  that 
Seneca's  praise  of  Cato  was  part  of  the  fashion  of  the  time,  and  that  this 
praise  does  not  refer  to  Cato's  republicanism,  but  to  his  character.  It  was 
common  custom  to  rank  Cato  for  his  moral  grandeur  with  Socrates  and 
Rutilms.  Further,  Seneca's  censure  of  Caesar  and  Pompey  is  not  a  con- 


No.  3.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  377 

demnation  of  their  imperialistic  ideas,  but  of  the  ethical  character  of  their 
lives  and  policies.  Seneca  gives  emphatic  expression  in  the  De  clem,  to 
his  conviction  that  monarchy  is  necessary  for  the  Roman  empire  of  his 
day,  although  he  nowhere  says  that  monarchy  regarojed  absolutely  is  bet- 
ter than  a  republican  form  of  government.  On  the  contrary,  the  conclu- 
sion may  be  drawn  from  De  clem,  that,  under  ideal  conditions,  a  republic 
which  guarantees  to  the  people  the  maximum  of  freedom  is  absolutely  the 
best  constitution.  The  decline,  however,  of  the  ancient  morality  and 
simplicity  makes  Rome's  ancient  republican  liberty  politically  impracti- 
cable, and  it  is  no  evidence  of  contradiction  or  inconstancy  when  Seneca, 
as  a  sober,  practical  statesman,  with  his  eye  fixed  on  the  civic  needs  of  his 
time,  declares  the  republican  constitution  to  be  unsuited  to  the  conditions. 

W.  A.  H. 

Spinoza  s  demokratische   Gesinnung  und  sein    Verh'dltnis  zum   Christen- 
tum.     W.  MEIJER.     A.  f.  G.  Ph.,  IX,  4,  pp.  455-485. 

The  author  of  this  article  in  a  former  essay,  Wie  sich  Spinoza  zu  den 
Kollegiantenverhielt  (Arckiv,  October,  1901),  criticised  adversely  Menzel's 
statement  that  Spinoza's  democratic  sympathies  were  derived  from  the 
Arminians,  and  that  his  conversion  to  aristocracy  was  due  to  revulsion  at 
the  murder  of  De  Witt.  He  here  defends  his  position,  and  undertakes  to 
prove  from  the  Tract,  polit.,  Tract,  theol.  polit.,  and  from  the  life  and  letters 
of  Spinoza,  that  Spinoza's  political  views  never  really  changed,  and  that  he 
considered  democracy  (Tract,  polit.,  XI,  ii),  not  ochlocracy,  to  be  a  securer 
and  better  form  of  government  than  aristocracy.  Further,  in  regard  to 
Spinoza's  relation  to  Christianity,  the  author  undertakes  to  show  that  Chris- 
tianity and  Spinozism  are  incompatible.  Not  only  is  the  one  dualistic  and 
the  other  monistic,  but  Spinoza  explicitly  denies  the  two  central  dogmas  in 
Christianity,  viz.,  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  and  the  sonship  of  Christ 
(Letters  72,  73).  He  denies  also  the  creation  of  the  world,  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  the  existence  of  sin  and  the  devil,  the  biblical  attributes 
of  God,  and  the  historical  truth  of  miracles.  W.  A.  H. 

'  Naiv  '  und  '  Sentimentalise h  '  —  'Klassisch  '  und  '  Romantisch.''     BRUNO 
BAUCH.     A.  f.  G.  Ph.,  IX,  4,  pp.  486-514. 

The  author  discusses  the  historical  parallel  between  the  aesthetic  terms 
'  nai've  '  and  '  sentimental '  (Schiller),  on  the  one  hand,  and  '  classical ' 
and  '  romantic  '  (the  Hegelians),  on  the  other.  For  Schiller  as  for  Vischer, 
there  is  an  antithesis  between  ancient  and  modern  art.  The  former  art  is 
nai've  and  realistic  ;  the  latter  critical  and  reflective.  Schiller  applies  the 
term  '  nai've '  to  the  former,  and  '  sentimental '  to  the  latter.  Vischer 
characterizes  them  as  'classical'  and  'romantic.'  Naivete  in  art  is  the 
treatment  of  an  object  purely  as  nature.  Schiller's  unity  of  '  sense  '  and 
'reason,'  'nature'  and  'spirit,'  are  the  equivalent  of  Hegel's  unity  of 


3/8  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

'corporeality*  and  'significance,1  of  'phenomenon1  and  'idea;'  and 
Hegel's  conception  of  the  classical  and  Schiller's  conception  of  the  naive 
are  one.  The  poet  in  his  art  is  placed  between  two  principles  :  reality, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  idea,  on  the  other.  The  character  of  the  poet's  art 
is  determined  by  the  ascendency  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  princi- 
ples, and  the  two  feeling-modes  of  the  sentimental  (/.  <?.,  romantic  or 
modern)  poet  are  satire  and  elegy.  The  satirical  represents  the  incongruity 
of  real  and  ideal,  and  the  elegiac  feeling-mode  characterizes  the  poet 
whose  satisfaction  in  the  ideal  outweighs  his  consciousness  of  the  real. 
Although  for  Hegel  nothing  is  more  beautiful  than  the  classic  art,  yet  it  is 
a  higher  form  that  exhibits  the  return  of  the  spirit  upon  itself  ("  das  Zu- 
riickgehen  des  Geistes  auf  sich  selbst  "),  which  is  the  mark  of  romanticism, 
or  of  sentimentalism  in  the  terminology  of  Schiller.  In  this  sense,  the 
romanticism  of  Hegel  and  the  sentimentalism  of  Schiller  are  one.  Schil- 
ler's  sentimentalism  has  nothing  to  do  with  that  aspect  of  romanticism, 
which  Hegel  characterized  as  fantastic  and  quixotic.  W.  A.  H. 


NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS. 

An  Introductory  Study  of  Ethics.     By  WARNER  FITE.     London  and  Bom- 
bay, Longmans,  Green,  &  Company,  1903. — pp.  vi,  383. 

In  defining  the  scope  of  his  subject,  Mr.  Fite  says  that  ethics  is  a  study 
of  practical  life  in  its  more  general  aspects  ;  and  the  plan  of  his  book  is 
evidently  determined  by  the  conviction  that  theory  is  for  the  sake  of  prac- 
tice, and  by  the  desire  to  get  behind  the  antagonisms  of  ethical  theories  to 
some  agreement  or  compromise  which  can  serve  the  purpose  of  practical 
guidance.  He  starts  from  the  fact  that  there  is  a  contradiction  between 
the  ideal  and  the  practical,  and  between  the  interests  of  humanity  and 
those  of  self.  This  fact  gives  rise  to  two  fundamentally  different  types  of 
ethical  theory,  viz.,  hedonism,  which  represents  the  claims  of  material 
needs  and  self  interest ;  and  idealism,  representing  the  claims  of  ideal  and 
disinterested  aims  (pp.  6,  29-33). 

Although  the  same  dualistic  classification  is  reached  in  another  way  by 
tracing  back  ethical  theories  to  their  roots  in  one  or  the  other  of  two  diver- 
gent philosophies  (p.  17),  I  think  that  the  practical  aim  is  fundamental  in 
controlling  Mr.  Fite's  arrangement  of  material ;  and  this  is  also  its  best 
justification,  since  it  is  doubtless  true  that  from  the  practical  point  of  view, 
—  the  standpoint  of  tendency,  of  moral  attitude,  —  hedonism  and  idealism 
may  be  said  roughly  to  correspond  to  the  well  recognized  Epicurean  and 
Stoical  attitudes  toward  life.  If  we  must  describe  the  otiose  and  the 
strenuous  moral  attitudes  in  philosophical  language,  the  words  hedonism 
and  idealism  are  perhaps  accurate  enough  for  popular  and  practical  pur- 
poses, though  it  seems  to  me  that  the  moral  attitude  of  a  conscientious 
universalistic  hedonist  of  the  Sidgwick  type  is  more  properly  described  as 
Stoical  than  as  Epicurean  ;  and  Mill,  whether  consistently  or  not,  would 
certainly  make  the  claim  for  his  own  system  that,  like  Stoicism,  it  preaches 
a  morality  of  self-devotion  and  sacrifice.  No  objection,  however,  need  be 
taken  to  Mr.  Fite's  dualistic  classification  of  ethical  theories  ;  since  it  is 
true  that  all  types  of  ethical  theory  can  be  ultimately  reduced  to  varieties 
of  the  view  that  pleasure  is  the  supreme  good,  or  of  the  view  that  virtue  or 
perfection  of  character  is  the  good. 

And  yet,  in  spite  of  the  author's  simplicity  of  outlines  and  clearness  of 
style,  I  am  afraid  that  '  thoughtful  persons '  who  are  not  moral  philoso- 
phers, and  college  '  students  beginning  the  study, '  will  be  rather  confused, 
if  not  misled,  by  Mr.  Fite's  too  simple  classification  and  loose  exposition 
of  rival  theories.  In  failing  to  act  upon  the  familiar  adage  of  giving  the 
devil  his  due,  he  has  done  violence  to  the  history  of  ethical  opinion,  and 
has  set  up  an  idol  of  his  own  manufacture  as  the  typical  deity  of  hedonism. 
Hence,  I  say,  to  at  least  one  class  of  readers  to  whom  the  volume  is  ad- 

379 


380  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

dressed,  —  those  who  are  not  very  familiar  with  ethical  problems,  —  Mr. 
Fite'  s  presentations  may  well  prove  rather  confusing.  They  will  learn  in 
the  first  place  that  by  '  pleasure  '  the  hedonist  means  the  pleasures  of 
sense,  sensuous  gratification  ;  that  intellectual  pleasures  as  such  are  an 
illusion  ;  that  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  is  simply  a  more  refined  way  of 
seeking  sensuous  pleasure  (Chap.  Ill) ;  and  then  they  will  perhaps  quite 
logically  conclude  that  though  Aristippus  and  Helvetius  may  have  been 
hedonists,  Epicurus  and  Mill  and  Sidgwick  certainly  were  not.  They  may 
think  at  first  that  even  Bentham  was  not  a  hedonist,  because  he  held  that, 
provided  the  quantity  of  pleasure  is  the  same,  poetry  is  as  good  as  push- 
pin, —  /.  <?.,  he  regarded  the  source  of  the  pleasure  as  a  matter  of  indiffer- 
ence, and  did  not  confine  pleasure  to  the  sphere  of  the  senses  ;  but  they 
will  soon  learn  (p.  50)  that  reading  poetry  is  ultimately  sensuous  pleasure, 
since  its  only  real  value  is  in  contributing  to  material  needs  and  physical 
welfare. 

They  will  learn  further  that  to  the  hedonist  happiness  and  freedom  from 
pain  constitute  ultimately  our  sole  object  of  desire  ;  that  we  are  never  in- 
terested in  others  for  their  own  sake,  or  in  any  object  for  its  own  sake  ;  that 
all  our  actions  are  directed  toward  the  enjoyment  of  sensuous  pleasure  ; 
that  each  of  us  is  actuated  solely  by  self-interest,  — that  is,  by  the  demands 
of  the  bodily  self  (pp.  86,  225)  ;  but  they  will  fail  to  find  any  clear  distinction 
between  psychological  and  ethical  or  rational  hedonism,  or  between  the 
egoistic  and  the  universalistic  forms  of  the  pleasure  theory.  Sidgwick  will 
be  a  puzzle  to  them,  and  Leslie  Stephen  will  be  classed  as  an  idealist, 
since  idealists,  according  to  Mr.  Fite,  have  a  monopoly  of  the  conception 
of  society  as  an  organism. 

Again,  the  reader  will  learn  that  the  hedonistic  theory  may  be  regarded 
as  a  mechanical  view  of  conduct ;  that  the  general  opposition  between 
hedonism  and  idealism  rests  upon  the  distinction  between  mechanical  and 
conscious  action  ;  that  for  hedonism  the  human  being  is  a  machine  ;  that 
to  the  hedonist  and  materialist  nothing  but  the  individual  atom  is  abso- 
lutely and  permanently  self-identical ;  that  the  hedonistic  point  of  view  is 
that  of  external  observation  ;  that  it  denies  personal  identity  and  purposive 
activity  ;  that  the  self  of  hedonism  is  the  human  body  ;  that  a  state  of  feel- 
ing is  pleasurable  to  the  extent  that  effort  is  absent ;  that  the  quintessence 
of  pleasure  is  the  languorous  dreamy  state  pictured  in  the  Oriental  para- 
dise ;  that  in  relation  to  practice  hedonism  tells  us  to  conform  to  the  world 
of  mechanical  forces,  since  no  effort  of  ours  can  modify  conditions  so  as  to 
make  them  more  conformable  to  ideal  ends  (pp.  95,  in,  192,  203,  209, 
290,  324).  In  short,  hedonism  regards  man  as  a  conscious  automaton  irre- 
sistibly seeking  (if,  indeed,  he  can  be  said  to  seek  anything)  sensuous  grati- 
fication. The  reader  would  be  obliged  to  conclude  that  the  hedonist  is 
necessarily  a  materialist,  and  that  the  general  happiness  is  not  regarded  by 
any  as  an  ideal  end  ;  and  he  would  be  at  a  loss  to  explain  the  inconsis- 
tency of  the  English  utilitarians  in  their  effort  to  improve  social  conditions 


No.  3.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  381 

as  a  means  to  the  greater  happiness  of  mankind,  — or  else  he  would  decide 
that  they  were  not  hedonists,  but  idealists. 

Space  does  not  permit  me  to  touch  upon  Mr.  Fite's  discussion  of  idealism, 
or  his  method  of  solving  practical  moral  problems  by  a  compromising 
diagonal  between  hedonism  and  idealism  ;  but  perhaps  enough  has  been 
said  to  justify  the  opinion  that  if,  instead  of  attempting  to  reconstruct  the 
situation  as  a  whole,  from  the  standpoint  of  philosophical  consistency,  he 
had  more  closely  adhered  to  his  original  intention  of  furnishing  a  definition 
and  analysis  of  the  several  types  of  ethical  theory  as  actually  held,  he 
would  have  written  a  less  vulnerable  book.  I  agree  with  Mr.  Kite  that 
ethics  cannot  remain  permanently  divorced  from  metaphysics,  and  that 
there  is  a  logical  connection  between  the  moralist's  general  philosophical 
attitude  and  his  ethical  position  ;  but  in  forcing  the  views  of  the  hedonist  to 
what  he  regards  as  their  logical  implications,  in  identifying  them  with  a 
mechanical  philosophy,  an  associational  psychology,  a  Lamarckian  biology, 
and  a  sensualistic  view  of  pleasure,  —  and  in  identifying  idealism  with  the 
antithesis  of  all  this,  —  he  is  stating  what  he  thinks  should  be  the  logical 
position  of  hedonists  and  idealists  respectively,  but  he  is  also  giving  a  very 
inaccurate  and  misleading  presentation  of  the  facts  ;  and  this  because  he 
has  chosen  to  present  hedonism  as  of  a  single  stereotyped  form,  while  the 
word  idealism  is  regarded  as  broad  enough  to  include  everything  except 
the  crassest  form  of  egoistic  hedonism. 

GEORGE  S.  PATTON. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

The  Nature  of  Man  :  Studies  in  Optimistic  Philosophy.  By  £LIE  METCH- 
NIKOFF.  Translation  by  P.  CHALMERS  MITCHELL.  New  York  and 
London,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  xvi,  309. 

M.  MetchnikofFs  enquiry  is  essentially  teleological.  He  investigates 
the  nature  of  man  for  the  sole  purpose  of  describing  and  evaluating 
the  natural  end  of  human  life.  The  thesis,  which  embodies  the  author's 
biological  convictions  and  determines  the  argument  of  his  book,  is  that  cer- 
tain fundamental  disharmonies  exist  between  the  human  organism  and  its 
environment.  Because  of  these  disharmonies  man  is  unable  to  accomplish 
satisfactorily  the  round  of  his  existence  and  stumbles  along  through  many 
ills  to  an  unsatisfactory  end.  Self-consciousness  reveals  to  man  and  inten- 
sifies the  evils  which  disharmony  originates.  As  a  first  reaction,  man  con- 
fuses the  disharmony  with  the  total  life  process  and  conceives  of  life  here 
and  now  as  evil.  The  whole,  however,  asserts  its  preeminence  over  the 
parts  and  brings  about  a  second  reaction,  viz.,  the  thought  of  a  future  life 
in  which  evil  shall  be  removed  and  happiness  attained.  Thus  arise  religion 
and  philosophy,  the  one  a  blind  faith  in  immortality  as  a  palliative  for 
human  ills,  the  other  a  reflective  promulgation  of  the  same  error.  Philos- 
ophy refutes  religion  and  in  turn  resolves  itself  into  negation.  It  thus  pre- 
pares the  way  for  the  true  solution  of  life's  problem  by  the  exact  and  ob- 


382  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

j active  methods  of  science.  Before  proceeding  to  indicate  what  science 
has  to  say  by  way  of  positive  construction,  Metchnikoff  applies  his  criticism 
of  religion  and  philosophy  to  pessimism  and  optimism.  Both  religion  and 
positive  philosophy  regard  this  present  life  as  evil,  but  a  future  life  as  good. 
They  are  pessimistic  as  to  present  existence,  but  optimistic  as  to  the  life 
beyond  the  grave.  The  sceptical  form  of  philosophy,  to  which  a  larger 
knowledge  and  the  exact  methods  of  science  inevitably  lead,  destroys  the 
optimistic  outlook  and  brings  man  face  to  face  with  present  life  and  that 
which  scepticism  takes  to  be  the  truth,  viz.,  pessimism.  Mankind,  accord- 
ingly, appears  to  be  placed  in  the  following  dilemma.  Either  cast  aside 
reason  and  assuage  the  evils  and  sorrows  of  existence  by  passive  endurance 
now  and  ungrounded  hopes  for  the  future,  or  follow  reason,  abjure  will-o'- 
the-wisp  beliefs,  and  endure  without  hope  a  meaningless  and  miserable 
existence.  Science,  however,  frees  man  from  the  dilemma  by  cutting 
beneath  it.  Pessimism  recognizes  the  disharmonies  of  life,  but  stands  help- 
less before  them.  Optimism  also  recognizes  the  facts  of  disharmony,  stands 
blindly  before  them,  and  is  carried  away,  by  the  inner  impulse  of  the  desire 
to  live,  to  inadequate  and  unintelligent  conclusions.  Science  recognizes 
both  the  essential  evils  of  human  life  and  the  dominant  desire  of  man  to 
overtop  them.  But  it  neither  stands  helplessly  before  them  nor  flies  to 
impossible  conclusions.  It  seeks  to  understand  the  character  and  origin  of 
the  evil  as  also  to  take  practical  measures  for  its  removal.  Viewed  scien- 
tifically, evil  has  its  origin  in  disharmony  between  the  physical  organism  of 
man  and  his  environment.  This  is  accounted  for  by  man's  peculiar  de- 
velopment. For  man  must  be  regarded  in  some  senses  as  a  monster. 
Arising  as  a  sport  in  the  biological  world,  his  origin  was  probably  sudden 
after  the  fashion  of  species  whose  possibility  was  foreseen  by  Darwin,  but 
whose  actuality  was  first  demonstrated  by  De  Vries.  Man's  variation  con- 
sisted essentially  in  "  a  brain  of  abnormal  size,  placed  in  a  spacious  cran- 
ium." This  variation  enabled  him  to  outdistance  other  forms  of  life,  and 
laid  the  foundations  of  his  wonderful  historical  development.  The  sudden 
advantage  was  at  the  same  time  a  disadvantage.  It  too  quickly  put  out  of 
use  certain  structures  of  man's  physical  organism,  and  gave  opportunity  for 
a  greatly  enlarged  exercise  of  function  on  the  part  of  structures  inadequately 
developed  to  their  freer  and  more  complex  use.  Once  man  has  come  to 
appreciate  this  fact,  his  life  problem  ceases  to  be  a  useless  worrying  over 
the  actual  fact  of  disharmony  or  a  soothing  of  his  pain  by  senseless  pallia- 
tives which  do  not  relieve.  It  becomes  an  active,  aggressive  campaign, 
the  possibilities  of  which  Pasteur  has  so  brilliantly  illustrated. 

There  remains,  however,  the  final  fact  of  death.  How  can  science  meet 
that  fact  and  the  stubborn  development  of  the  instinct  to  live  ?  They  ap- 
pear to  stand  in  irreconcilable  antagonism.  The  difficulty  cannot  be  re- 
solved by  the  thought  of  a  continuance  of  life  after  death.  The  fact  that 
mind  is  a  function  of  a  physical  organism,  which  inevitably  decays  and  dis- 
integrates, effectively  disposes  of  any  such  conception.  Science  can  accom- 


No.  3.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  3^3 

plish  two  things.  By  studying  the  processes  of  repair  it  can  prolong  life, 
and  by  steady  adherence  to  its  own  doctrine  of  ultimate  dissolution  it  can 
restrain  and  ultimately  remove  the  fear  of  death. 

In  criticism  of  the  volume,  little  need  be  said.  M.  Metchnikoff  has 
thrown  a  great  light  upon  the  origin  of  evil  and  the  rational  method  of 
its  treatment.  It  appears  to  the  reviewer  that  Metchnikoff  has  found  the 
nerve  of  the  difficulty  common  to  pessimism  and  optimism  and  their  cor- 
responding factors  in  religion  and  philosophy.  That  his  treatment  of  re- 
ligion and  philosophy  is  one-sided  and  utterly  inadequate,  must  be  apparent 
to  any  one  seriously  acquainted  with  either.  But  this  should  not  blind  the 
reader  to  the  fact  that  the  author  finds  the  origin  and  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem of  evil  within  the  life  process  itself.  This  in  itself  is  a  tremendous 
gain  and  puts  the  problem  upon  a  firm  and  sure  foundation.  Agree- 
ment or  dissent  from  M.  MetchnikofFs  positivism  is  entirely  a  secondary 

consideration. 

S.  F.  MACLENNAN. 
OBERLIN  COLLEGE. 

La  poetique  de  Schiller.     Par  VICTOR  BASCH.     Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1902.  — 
pp.  297. 

The  author  of  this  able  book  first  discusses  the  sources  from  which 
Schiller's  theory  of  poetry  springs,  and  finds  them  especially  in  the  Kantian 
philosophy,  in  Winckelmann's  conception  of  Greek  art,  in  Herder's  doc- 
trine of  the  poetry  of  nature  and  the  poetry  of  art,  and  in  the  artistic 
practice  of  Goethe.  Then,  after  outlining  the  great  poet's  general  theory 
of  aesthetics,  he  makes  a  careful  analysis  of  Schiller's  theory  of  poetry  as 
it  is  set  forth  in  his  treatise  on  naive  and  sentimental  poetry,  his  works  on 
dramatic  poetry,  and  his  correspondence  with  Korner,  Wilhelm  von  Hum- 
boldt,  and  Goethe. 

In  conclusion,  he  subjects  the  principal  theories  of  Schiller  to  a  thorough 
criticism.  Professor  Basch  shows  first  that  the  method  employed  is  the 
a  priori  method,  and  rejects  it.  Poetics,  like  all  the  aesthetic  sciences,  is 
for  him  an  explicative  and  not  a  normative  science,  and  as  such  its  method 
must  be  psychological,  historical,  comparative,  classificatory,  and  genetic. 
Schiller  bases  his  theory  not  on  concepts  derived  inductively,  but  on  logical 
concepts,  concepts  deduced  from  the  concept  of  humanity,  and  his  whole 
system  consequently  lacks  reality.  It  is  necessary,  he  declares,  that  poetry 
in  general,  as  the  perfect  expression  of  humanity,  be  divided  into  nai've 
and  sentimental  poetry,  and  sentimental  poetry  into  satirical,  elegiac,  and 
idyllic  poetry.  Schiller  believes  that  sense  and  reason  were  originally  in 
harmony  in  man,  that  the  emotional,  intellectual,  and  moral  natures  acted  in 
unison,  and  that  the  nai've  poet  embodied  this  harmony.  As  civilization  ad- 
vances, he  proceeds  to  tell  us,  a  division  occurs  between  the  intellectual 
nature  and  the  senses,  the  will  becomes  conscious  of  itself  and  rebels  against 
the  demands  of  the  desires,  opposing  to  them  the  imperative  of  duty.  The 


384  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

sentimental  poet  represents  this  stage.  The  harmony  will  finally  be  re- 
established, the  senses  will  not  demand  more  than  the  reason  prescribes, 
the  unconscious  harmony  of  primitive  man  will  become  the  conscious  har- 
mony of  the  civilized  man.  The  ideal  poet  will  give  expression  to  this  stage. 

Professor  Basch  refuses  to  believe  that  primitive  men  are  the  perfect, 
serene,  and  harmonious  beings  that  Schiller  imagines  them  to  be.  Besides, 
among  the  nai've  beings,  as  Schiller  defines  them,  the  intellectual  faculties 
proper  have  not  yet  been  developed,  and  cannot  therefore  enter  into  rela- 
tions of  harmony  or  discord  with  the  senses.  It  is  also  a  mistake  to  call  the 
Greeks  naive  beings.  Moreover,  sense  and  reason  are  not  separated  by  an 
impassable  chasm,  as  Schiller  and  Kant  would  have  it,  but  the  intellectual 
faculties  cannot  be  conceived  without  the  faculties  of  sense  ;  the  psychical 
forces  constitute  an  organism  in  which  every  organ  works  for  a  common 
end.  Schiller  also  fails  to  give  a  satisfactory  definition  of  the  concept  of 
nature,  which  plays  such  a  fundamental  role  in  his  theory. 

Although  neither  the  method,  nor  the  premises,  nor  the  conclusions  of 
Schiller's  poetics  have  any  real  value,  Professor  Basch  admits  that  the 
problems  which  the  poet  raised  deserve  attention,  and  recognizes  the  specu- 
lative depth,  the  dialectical  vigor  and  subtlety,  and  the  eloquence  which  he 
brought  to  his  task.  Besides,  the  influence  exercised  by  him  on  the  devel- 
opment of  literature,  aesthetics,  philosophy,  and  literary  history  was  im- 
mense. Whatever  may  be  our  objections  to  Schiller's  theory,  it  must  be 
confessed  that  from  his  treatise  on  nai've  and  sentimental  poetry  dates  a 
new  era.  Without  this  work  we  should  not  have  had  the  critical  writings 
of  Friedrich  Schlegel  nor  the  Esthetics  of  Hegel. 

FRANK  THILLY. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  MISSOURI. 

St.  Anselm' s  Proslogium,  Monologium,  an  Appendix  in  Behalf  of  the 
Fool  by  Gaunilon,  and  Cur  Deus  Homo.  Translated  from  the  Latin  by 
SIDNEY  NORTON  DEANE.  Chicago,  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co., 
1903. — pp.  xxxv,  288. 

The  Latin  of  the  father  of  orthodox  scholasticism  is,  like  that  of  most 
of  the  schoolmen,  easy  to  read,  but  all  but  impossible  to  translate.  Neither 
the  niceties  nor  the  characteristic  ambiguities  of  the  scholastic  terminology 
can  be  easily  reproduced  in  such  a  language  as  English.  Any  translation, 
therefore,  is  likely  to  be  a  poor  substitute  for  the  original  ;  and  for  most  of 
those  who  are  competent  to  study  such  a  philosopher  as  Anselm  a  transla- 
tion should  also  be  a  superfluity.  Yet  the  publishers  of  this  volume  have 
done  a  useful  thing  in  giving  us  a  modern  English  version  of  Anselm' s 
most  important  philosophical  writings  ;  it  is  singular  that  the  thing  has  not 
been  done  long  since.  The  ontological  argument  is  so  much  talked  about, 
even  in  elementary  philosophical  teaching,  that  the  text  of  it  should  be 
made  accessible  to  all  students  and  to  the  general  reader.  Anselm' s  Cur 
Deus  homo  has  been  available  since  1855  in  the  translation  of  J.  G.  Vose  ; 


No.  3.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  385 

that  translation  is  reprinted  in  the  present  volume.  But  the  Monologium 
and  Proslogium  apparently  receive  their  first  presentation  in  English  in 
Mr.  Deane's  rendering.  The  translation,  to  judge  from  a  number  of  se- 
lected passages,  is  painstaking  and  for  the  most  part  fairly  trustworthy. 
Curiously,  the  translator  has  been  least  happy  in  his  handling  of  the  open- 
ing chapter  of  the  Monologium  (pp.  35-37).  In  the  very  first  sentence 
essentia  divinitatis  is  inexcusably  rendered  "the  being  of  God,"  — with 
the  effect  of  obscuring  the  contrast  between  the  theme  of  the  Proslogium 
(which  treats  de  Dei  existentid)  and  that  of  the  Monologium,  which  is  pri- 
marily a  meditation  on  the  divine  nature  and  attributes.  In  the  next  sen- 
tence, the  translator  mistakes  the  antecedent  of  a  pronoun  ;  instead  of 
"nothing  in  Scripture  should  be  urged  on  the  authority  of  Scripture  itself," 
read  "  nothing  in  this  meditation  should  be  urged  on  the  authority  of  Scrip- 
ture. ' '  Later  in  the  same  chapter,  Mr.  Deane  omits  to  translate  the  words  ut 
quidquid  facerem  illis  solis  a  quibus  exigebatur  esset  notum  et,  and  thereby 
makes  Anselm  say  rather  absurdly  :  "  I  was  led  to  this  undertaking  in  the 
hope  that  whatever  I  might  accomplish  would  soon  be  overwhelmed  with 
contempt."  Similar  errors  occur  occasionally,  but  less  frequently,  in  other 
passages.  In  Monol.  XV,  Anselm' s  peculiar  antithesis  of  ipsum  and  non 
ipsum  (melius  ipsum  esse  ac  non  ipsuiri)  is  rather  misleadingly  rendered 
"to  be  it  is  better  than  not  to  be  it  " ;  the  sense  is  simply  "it  is  better 
than  anything  not-itself."  The  translator  has  a  singular  fashion  of  ren- 
dering omnino  (which  assumes  almost  a  technical  sense  in  the  schoolmen) 
by  "in  general,"  (e.g.,  "what  is,  in  general,  better");  it  means,  of 
course,  just  the  opposite,  /.  <?.,  "absolutely."  In  Gaunilon's  Liber  pro  in- 
sipiente,  the  sense  of  §  2  pretty  completely  disappears  in  the  translation. 
These  occasional  failures  limit,  but  do  not  destroy,  the  general  serviceable- 
ness  of  the  volume  for  the  English  reader. 

Dr.  Carus  has  prefixed  to  the  translation  Weber's  summary  of  Anselm's 
system  (a  poor  summary  so  far  as  the  ontological  argument  is  concerned), 
and  comments  or  criticisms  on  the  ontological  argument  from  Des- 
cartes, Spinoza,  Locke,  Leibniz,  Kant,  Hegel,  Dorner,  Lotze,  and  Pro- 
fessor Flint.  It  would  have  been  well  to  include  with  these  one  or  two 
passages, — e.  g.y  Aquinas,  Summa  I,  q.  2,  a.  i,  2,  and  a  chapter  from 
Father  Boedder's  Natural  Theology, —  expressing  the  negative  attitude  of 
later  and  present-day  scholasticism  towards  Anselm' s  argument. 

ARTHUR  O.  LOVEJOY. 

WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY, 
ST.  Louis,  Mo. 

The  Philosophy  of  Hobbes,  in  Extracts  and  Notes  collected  from  his  Writ- 
ings. By  FREDERICK  J.  E.  WOODBRIDGE.  Minneapolis,  The  H.  W. 
Wilson  Co.,  1903.  —  pp.  xxxiv,  391. 

Professor  Woodbridge  has  rightly  felt  that  a  compact  and  inexpensive 
volume  of  selections  from  the  English  writings  of  Hobbes,  in  which  the 
whole  system  of  the  philosopher  of  Malmesbury  should  be  set  forth  briefly 


386  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

in  his  own  words,  would  meet  a  genuine  need.  The  non-political  parts  of 
Hobbes's  system  have  not  hitherto  been  very  easily  accessible  to  college 
students  or  to  the  general  reader  ;  yet  no  philosopher  is  better  qualified  to 
speak  for  himself,  instead  of  reaching  his  readers  through  the  medium  of 
second-hand  expositions.  The  present  volume  brings  together,  from  the 
Molesworth  edition,  the  first  six  chapters  of  the  English  version  of  the  De 
corpore  ;  the  important  second  chapter  of  the  Human  Nature  ;  Chapters  I- 
III  of  the  De  cive  (Philosophical  Rudiments  concerning  Government}  ;  a 
fragment  of  the  little  treatise  on  Liberty  and  Necessity  ;  and  the  greater  part 
of  Chapters  I-XVIII,  XXXI,  and  XLIII  from  the  Leviathan.  In  foot- 
notes, brief  citations  of  parallel  passages  from  other  writings  are  given. 
The  volume  contains  a  portrait  of  Hobbes  and  a  (rather  bad)  reproduction 
of  the  frontispiece  to  the  first  edition  of  the  Leviathan.  Aubrey's  delightful 
little  life  of  Hobbes  is  prefixed  to  the  selections.  There  are  no  notes  and 
no  introduction,  the  editor  desiring  to  leave  the  reader  "an  immediate  and 
uncolored  impression  of  the  author."  Certainly  Hobbes  has  small  need 
of  explanatory  aids. 

The  execution  of  the  compiler's  task  gives  some  occasion  for  criticism. 
The  selection  of  passages  for  inclusion  is  far  from  felicitous.  Hobbes's 
"First  Philosophy,"  with  his  fundamental  conception  of  motion  as  the 
principle  of  all  things  and  his  typical  attempt  at  a  mechanistic  cosmology, — 
one  of  the  more  important  and  less  accessible  parts  of  the  system, —  is 
wholly  unrepresented  ;  while  nearly  two-thirds  of  the  volume  are  given  up 
to  the  Leviathan,  of  which  several  cheap  and  convenient  editions  already 
exist.  Yet,  if  the  Leviathan  was  to  be  included,  it  is  not  clear  why  so 
important  a  part  of  that  book  as  Chapter  XXI  ("On  the  Liberty  of  Subjects  ") 
was  (except  for  a  few  unessential  sentences  in  a  footnote)  left  out.  There 
are  few  things  in  Hobbes  more  curious  than  the  limitations  which,  in  that 
chapter,  he  puts  upon  the  obligation  of  the  subject  to  obey  the  sovereign. 
Similarly  Chapters  XXVI  and  XXIX  ought  to  have  been  included.  The 
reader  should  have  been  warned  that  the  English  version  of  the  De  corpore 
is  not  from  Hobbes's  own  hand,  and  that  it  is  marred  by  occasional  omis- 
sions and  mistranslations.  The  editor  might  at  least  have  been  expected  to 
correct  the  radical  inversion  of  the  sense  at  the  beginning  of  §  13  of  Chapter 
VI  (pp.  65  f.),  since  the  error  has  already  been  pointed  out  by  Robertson. 
At  p.  161  n.  Molesworth' s  mangled  and  meaningless  printing  of  Hobbes's 
classification  of  voluntary  and  involuntary  actions  is  reproduced,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  Robertson  has  established  the  correct  text  (Hobbes,  p. 
234  n.}.  In  fine,  what  we  did  not  greatly  need, — an  incomplete  reprint  of 
the  Leviathan, —  has  been  given  us  ;  what  we  did  need, —  a  selection  of 
representative  passages  covering  the  whole  range  of  Hobbes's  theoretical 
philosophy,  carefully  edited,  with  corrections  of  the  errors  of  earlier  edi- 
tions,—  has  been  given  us  only  in  very  small  part.  For  that  part,  how- 
ever, we  may  be  grateful.  ARTHUR  O.  LOVEJOY. 

WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY, 
ST.  Louis,  Mo. 


No.  3.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  387 

Nietzsches  Philosophic.    Von  ARTHUR  DREWS.     Heidelberg,  Carl  Winter's 

Universitatsbuchhandlung,  1904. — pp.  viii,  561. 

Dr.  Drews  regards  Nietzsche  and  his  philosophy  as  a  striking  instance  of 
the  theoretical  and  practical  ruin  resulting  from  the  prevailing  tendency  to 
identify  consciousness  and  being  or  existence.  Like  Descartes  and  Kant 
too,  for  that  matter,  the  philosophers  of  to-day  assume  the  validity  of  cogito 
ergo  sum  and  make  it  the  basis  of  their  various  systems.  Such  an  assump- 
tion is  without  foundation  and  even  patently  false,  and  only  through  the 
recognition  of  a  reason  other  than  individual  in  that  it  is  absolute,  can  phi- 
losophy hope  to  escape  inherent  contradiction.  With  the  rest  Nietzsche 
endeavored  to  explain  being  directly  from  his  own  subjective  consciousness, 
the  essence  of  which  he  regarded  as  the  empirical  will.  He  identified  the 
true  culture  with  the  struggle  to  obtain  complete  inner  and  outer  freedom 
for  this  individual  ego,  and  his  entire  philosophy  is  an  attempt  to  describe 
the  nature  and  the  essential  conditions  of  such  freedom.  In  the  prosecu- 
tion of  his  task  he  fell  into  countless  absurdities,  which  are  themselves  in- 
structive because  they  are  due  to  the  falsity  of  the  original  premise.  The 
pathos  of  Nietzsche's  personality  lies  in  the  earnestness  with  which  he  lived 
out  his  convictions,  and  his  sad  fate  exhibits  the  practical  futility  of  his 
views  just  as  the  impossible  statements  in  his  books  show  their  theoretical 
absurdity.  If  carried  to  its  logical  consequences,  every  attempt  to  attain 
freedom  for  the  individual  apart  from  the  absolute  self  must  end,  as  his 
did,  in  unconsciousness. 

However  one  regards  this  view  of  the  nature  of  Nietzsche's  fundamental 
error,  the  account  of  his  life  and  philosophy  in  which  it  is  set  forth  must  be 
admitted  to  be  complete  and  in  most  respects  satisfactory.  The  criticism 
of  the  particular  theories  is  often  suggestive  even  where  one  is  compelled 
to  disagree  with  the  writer's  interpretation.  The  great  fault  of  the  book  is 
its  length.  All  that  is  essential  in  it  could  easily  have  been  contained  in 
one-third  the  present  number  of  pages,  and  such  compression  into  a  volume 
of  reasonable  size  would  have  added  greatly  to  its  attractiveness  and  value. 

GRACE  NEAL  DOLSON. 
WELLS  COLLEGE. 

Freedom  and  Responsibility.    By  ARTHUR  TWINING  HADLEY.     New  York, 

Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  174. 

President  Hadley's  Yale  Lectures  on  The  Responsibilites  of  Citizenship 
bear  the  full  title  of  The  Relations  between  Freedom  and  Responsibility 
in  the  Evolution  of  Democratic  Government.  The  book  is  thus  not  what 
its  abbreviated  title  might  imply,  and  what  some  passages  in  it  would  sug- 
gest, a  treatise  in  philosophy  ;  but  a  study  in  the  field  of  the  history  of 
social  institutions  with  what  the  preacher  would  call  an  '  application '  to 
current  conditions  in  the  United  States.  As  such,  it  contains  wholesome 
doctrine  which  deserves  the  approval  the  lectures,  as  delivered,  received 
at  the  hands  of  the  public  press. 


388  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Freedom,  Dr.  Hadley  holds,  is  not  an  inherent  human  right.  Its  historic 
development  and  its  essential  nature  indicate  that  it  has  come  into  being 
and  can  be  exercised  only  in  the  presence  of  restraints  and  sanctions.  It 
can  be  safely  exercised  in  democratic  government  only  where  the  ethical 
sense  of  responsibility  has  led  to  the  capacity  of  self  restraint.  A  laissez 
faire,  selfish  individualism  will  not  bear  the  fruits  of  a  true  freedom.  This 
conclusion  that  political  freedom  should  be  exercised  only  where  there  has 
been  training  in  responsibility  is  worth  emphasis  at  the  present  time,  as 
well  as  its  necessary  corollary  that  where  by  training  the  sense  of  responsi- 
bility has  been  produced,  there  freedom  should  be  allowed. 

The  effort  to  show  that  ' '  freedom  of  the  will  is  an  institution  rather  than 
a  metaphysical  conception,"  and  that  the  "historical  explanation  of  the 
idea  of  free  will  is  more  satisfactory  than  the  psychological  explanation  ' ' 
(p.  70),  rests  on  the  common  enough  confusion  current  as  regards  the 
meaning  of  freedom  of  the  will,  which  disregards  the  distinction  between 
freedom  as  the  capacity  of  self- direction  towards  an  ideal,  and  freedom  as 
the  right  to  shape  conduct  with  reference  to  any  freely  chosen  ideal, — be- 
tween choosing  one's  ends  and  doing  what  one  wants  to.  One  view  con- 
siders freedom  as  a  psychological  necessity  or  a  metaphysical  reality  ;  the 
other  regards  it  as  a  social  and  political  right.  The  two  points  of  view  are 
not  mutually  exclusive.  In  fact,  it  is  only  as  the  former  is  presupposed 
that  the  latter  presents  any  problem  but  one  in  mechanics. 

ARTHUR  L.  GILLETT. 

HARTFORD,  CONN. 

The  following  books  also  have  been  received  : 
Mans  Place  in  the  Universe.    By  ALFRED  R.  WALLACE.    New  York,  Mc- 

Clure,  Phillips,  &  Co.,  1904.  — pp.  viii,  326. 
Elements  of  Metaphysics.     By  A.  E.  TAYLOR.     London,  Methuen  &  Co., 

1903. — pp.  xvi,  419.      los.  6d. 
The  Grand  Survival :  A  Theory  of  Immortality  by  Natural  Law.     By 

OSWALD  STOLL.     London,  Simpkin,  Marshall,  Hamilton,  Kent,  £  Co., 

Ltd.,  1904. — pp.202.     35. 
Kanf  s  Educational  Theory.     By   EDWARD  F.  BUCHNER.     Philadelphia 

and  London,  J.  B.  Lippincott  &  Co.,  1904.  — pp.  xvi,  309. 
Columbia  University  Contributions  to  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Educa- 

cation,    Vol.   X,   No.   2  :   The  Free-  Will  Problem  in  Modern   Thought. 

By  WM.  H.JOHNSON.     New  York,    The   Macmillan  Co.,    1903. — pp. 

94.     75  cents. 
The  Same,   Vol.  XL  No.  2 :  Heredity,  Correlation,  and  Sex  Differences  in 

School  Abilities.     Edited  by   EDWARD   L.    THOKNDYKE.     New  York, 

The  Macmillan  Co.,  1903.  — pp.  60.     75  cents. 
University   Studies   Published   by    the    University   of  Nebraska,  Vol.  IV, 

No.  i.    I.    The  Kinetic  Theory  of  Economic  Crises.     By  W.  G.  L.  TAY- 


No.  3.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  389 

LOR  ;  II.    Validity  of  the  Ergograph  as  a  Meastirer  of  Work  Capacity. 

By  T.  L.  BOLTON  and  E.  T.  MILLER.     Lincoln,  Neb.,  1904. — pp.  150. 

$1.00. 
The  Heart  of  Ethics.     By  GEORGE  H.  PALMER.     Berkeley,    Cal.,   The 

University  Press,  1903. — pp.  20. 
Geschichte  der  griechischen  Philosophic.     Von  A.  DORING.     Zwei  Bande. 

Leipzig,  O.  R.  Reisland,  1903.  —  pp.  xi,  670  ;  vi,  585.     M.  20;  Gb.  M. 

22.40. 
Historische  Untersuchungen  uber  Kants  Prolegomena.     Von  BENNO  ERD- 

MANN.     Halle  a.  S.,  M.  Niemeyer,  1904. — pp.  vii,  144.     M.  3.60. 
Naturbetrachtung  und  Naturerkenntnis  im  Altertum.     Von.   FR.  STRUNZ. 

Hamburg  und  Leipzig,  L.  Voss,  1904. — pp.  168. 
Friedrich  Nietzsche  :  Darstellung  und  Kritik.     Von  J.  J.  HOLLITSCHER. 

Wien  und  Leipzig,  W.  Braumiiller,  1904.  — pp.  270.     M.  5. 
Die  Realitdt  der  Gottesidee.     Von  GUSTAV  CLASS.     Miinchen,  C.  H.  Beck. 

1904. — pp.  94.     M.  2. 
Ideen   zu   einer  jesuzentrischen    Weltreligion.      Von    KARL   ANDRESEX. 

Zweite  umgearbeitete  Auflage.     Leipzig,  Lotus-Verlag,  1904. — pp.  viii, 

373- 

Wissen  und  Glauben.     Sechzehn  Vortrage  von  C.  GUTTLER.     Zweite  Auf- 
lage,  Miinchen,  C.  H.  Beck,  1904. — pp.  vii,    210.     M.  3.     Gb.  M.  4. 
Leibnizens  Apriorismus  im  Verh'dltnis  zu  seiner  Metaphysik.     Von  A.  SIL- 

BERSTEIN.     Berlin,  Mayer  und  Miiller,  1904. — pp.  74.     M.  1.60. 
Egoismus  und  Altruismus  als  Grundlage  des  Sittlichen.     Von  G.  KUTNA. 

Berlin,  Mayer  und  Miiller,  1903. — pp.  108.     M.  2. 
Les  theories  socialistes  au  XIX6  siecle.     Par  E.   FOURNIERE.     Paris,  F. 

Alcan,  1904.  —  pp.  xxxi,  415.     7  fr.  50. 
Le  sentiment  du  beau  et  le  sentiment  poetique.    Par  MARCEL  BRAUNSCHVIG. 

Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. — pp.  240.     3  fr.  75. 
La  parole  interieure.     Par  VICTOR  EGGER.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904.  —  pp. 

vii,  326. 
Combat  pour  Vindividu.     Par  GEORGES  PALANTE.     Paris,    F.   Alcan.  — 

1904. —pp.  231.     3fr.  75. 
L  absolu,  forme  pathologique  et  normale  des  sentiments.     Par  L.  DUGAS, 

Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904.  — pp.  181.     2  fr.  50. 
La  philosophie  ancienne  et  la  critique  historique.     Par  CHARLES  WAD- 

DINGTON.     Paris,  Librairie  Hachette  et  Cie.,  1904. — pp.  xvi,  388. 
Descartes,  directeur  spirituel :  correspondance  avec  la  Princesse  Palatine  et 

la  Reine   Christine  de  Suede.      Par  VICTOR   DE  SWARTE.      Paris,  F. 

Alcan,  1904. — pp.  iii,  292. 
Notes   sur  r  histoire  generale   des   sciences.     Par    Louis    FAVRE.     Paris, 

Schleicher,  Freres  et  Cie.,  1904.  — pp.  131.     2  fr. 


NOTES. 

Professor  Frank  Thilly  of  the  University  of  Missouri  has  accepted  a  call 
to  the  Stuart  professorship  in  Psychology  in  Princeton  University. 

Professor  Geo.  M.  Stratton  of  the  University  of  California  has  been  ap- 
pointed Professor  of  Experimental  Psychology  in  the  Johns  Hopkins 
University. 

The  fourth  annual  meeting  of  the  Western  Philosophical  Association  was 
held  on  April  i  and  2,  at  the  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia,  Mo. 
The  following  officers  were  elected  for  the  ensuing  year  :  President,  Pro- 
fessor A.  Ross  Hill,  University  of  Missouri  ;  Vice-President,  Professor  E. 
L.  Hinman,  University  of  Nebraska  ;  Secretary  and  Treasurer,  Professor 
A.  O.  Lovejoy,  Washington  University  ;  additional  Members  of  Executive 
Committee,  Dr.  H.  W.  Stuart,  University  of  Iowa,  and  Professor  F.  C. 
Sharp,  University  of  Wisconsin.  A  full  report  of  the  proceedings  will  be 
published  in  the  next  issue  of  the  REVIEW. 

The  Southern  Society  for  Philosophy  and  Psychology  was  organized 
February  23  in  Atlanta,  Ga.  Its  officers  are  :  President,  Professor  J.  Mark 
Baldwin,  Johns  Hopkins  University  ;  Secretary,  Professor  Edward  Frank- 
lin Buchner,  University  of  Alabama  ;  Council,  the  President,  Secretary, 
and  Dr.  William  T.  Harris,  Washington,  D.  C.,  Mr.  Reuben  Post  Halleck, 
Louisville,  Ky.,  and  Professor  A.  Casewell  Ellis,  University  of  Texas. 
The  aim  of  the  organization  is  to  promote  the  welfare  of  philosophy  and 
psychology  in  southern  institutions. 

A  meeting  of  experimental  psychologists  was  held  at  Cornell  University, 
April  4  and  5.  The  papers. read  fell  into  four  main  groups,  (i)  Professor 
Sanford  described  Experiments  on  Idiots,  and  Professor  Witmer  discussed 
the  Laboratory  Investigation  of  Backward  children.  (2)  Professor  Judd 
read  a  paper  on  the  Analysis  of  Movements  made  in  Simple  and  Compound 
Reactions  ;  Dr.  Whipple  criticised  the  Simple  Reaction  as  a  Test  of  Mental 
Ability  ;  and  Professor  Seashore  offered  some  comments  on  the  psycho- 
logical term  '  Observer '  (paper  read  in  absence).  Professor  Witmer  also 
spoke  on  shortest  reaction  values,  and  on  the  distinction  of  sensory  and 
muscular  reactions.  (3)  Professor  Judd  reported  an  investigation  of  Eye 
Movements  studied  by  photography,  with  special  reference  to  the  Miiller- 
Lyer,  Poggendorff,  and  Zollner  Illusions  ;  and  Professor  Pillsbury  described 
an  Apparatus  for  investigating  Torsion  during  Eye  Movement,  with  some 
Results.  (4)  Mr.  Stevens  outlined  a  Study  of  Attention  by  the  Method  of 
Expression  ;  Professor  Pillsbury  spoke  upon  the  Influence  of  Closing  Eyes 
upon  Attention  Waves  ;  and  Mr.  Ferree  discussed  the  part  played  by  adap- 
tation in  the  phenomena  of  Visual  Attention.  Other  papers  read  were  : 
Dr.  Whipple,  Difficulties  in  the  Use  of  the  A-Test  ;  Dr.  Baird,  Recent 

390 


NOTES.  39 l 

Work  in  Perimetry  ;  Professor  Judd,  Imitation  of  Tones,  with  and  without 
Distraction.  Demonstrations  were  made  by  Professor  Sanford  (a  novel 
form  of  color  mixer),  Dr.  Whipple  (an  apparatus  for  determining  the  rela- 
tive legibility  of  the  small  letters),  and  Mr.  Sabine  (speed  regulator  for  the 
von  Frey  Limen  Gauge).  Five  papers  were  read  by  Jtitle  :  Dr.  Baird, 
Convergence  and  Accommodation  in  the  Perception  of  Depth  ;  Mr.  Gallo- 
way, Fluctuations  of  Attention  and  Vasomotor  Waves  ;  Miss  Castro  (paper 
introduced  by  Professor  Angell),  Experiments  on  the  Interrelations  of 
Taste  and  Smell  ;  Professor  Titchener,  The  '  Psychophysical  Series '  as  a 
Training  Experiment,  and  Type  vs.  Instruction  in  Psychophysical  Work. 
Some  time  was  also  spent  in  inspection  of  the  psychological  and  psycho- 
educational  laboratories. 

Professor  James  Ward,  of  Cambridge  University,  will  lecture  before  the 
Summer  School  of  the  University  of  California,  and  will  also  be  present  at 
the  Congress  of  Arts  and  Sciences  in  St.  Louis. 

Professor  Benno  Erdmann,  who  is  also  to  speak  at  the  St.  Louis  Con- 
gress, has  received  a  call  from  Bonn  to  the  University  of  Tubingen. 

We  give  below  a  list  of  articles,  etc.,  in  the  current  philosophical  peri- 
odicals : 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  XI,  2  :  W.  L.  Bryan,  Theory  and 
Practice  ;  Max  Meyer,  On  the  Attributes  of  the  Sensations  ;  Boris  Sidis, 
An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  Hallucinations,  II  ;  Discussion. 

THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  PSYCHOLOGY,  XV,  i  :  W.  P.  Montague, 
A  Theory  of  Time-Perception  ;  B.  R.  Andrews,  Auditory  Tests  ;  E.  B. 
Titchener,  Some  New  Apparatus  ;  /.  M.  Bentley  and  E.  B.  Titchener, 
Ebbinghaus's  Explanation  of  Beats  ;  C.  Spearman,  The  Proof  and  Measure- 
ment of  Association  between  two  Things  ;  /.  M.  Bentley,  Professor  Cat- 
tell' s  Statistics  of  American  Psychologists  ;  Nocturnal  Emissions  ;  Literature. 

THE  JOURNAL  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  PSYCHOLOGY,  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHODS, 
I,  5  :  A.  K.  Rogers,  The  Relation  of  the  Science  of  Religion  to  the  Truth 
of  Religious  Belief ;  H.  B.  Alexander,  The  Concept  of  Consciousness  ; 
Discussion  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  New  Books ;  Notes 
and  News. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1,4:  C.  E.  Seashore,  The  Experi- 
mental Study  of  Mental  Fatigue  ;  H.  H.  Bawden,  Recent  Tendencies  in 
the  Theory  of  the  Psychical  and  the  Physical  ;  Psychological  Literature  ; 
New  Books  ;  Notes  ;  Journals. 

ZEITSCHRIFT  FUR  PSYCHOLOGIE  UNO  PHYSIOLOGIE  DER  SINNESORGANE, 
XXXIV,  2  :  C.  M.  Giessler,  Das  Geschmackvolle  als  Besonderheit  des 
Schonen  und  speziell  seine  Beziehungen  zum  sinnlichen  Geschmack  ;  G. 
Abelsdorff 'und  H.  Feilchenfeld,  Uber  die  Abhangigheit  der  Pupillarreak- 
tion  von  Ort  und  Ausdehnung  der  gereizten  Netzhautflache  ;  Felix  Bern- 
stein, Das  Leuchtturmphanomen  und  die  scheinbare  Form  des  Himmels- 
gewolbes  ;  Literaturbericht. 


392  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

XXXIV,  3  u.  4  :  B.  Groethuysen,  Das  Mitgefiihl  ;  IV.  A.  Nagel  und 
K.  L.  Schafer,  Uber  das  Verhalten  der  Netzhautzapfen  bei  Dunkeladap- 
tation  des  Auges  ;  W.  A.  Nagel,  Einige  Beobachtungen  iiber  die  Wirkung 
des  Druckes  und  des  galvanischen  Stromes  auf  das  dunkeladaptierte  Auge  ; 
G.  Abelsdorff  und  W.  A.  Nagel,  Uber  die  Wahrnehmung  der  Blutbeweg- 
ung  in  den  Netzhautkapillaren  ;  Literaturbericht. 

REVUE  PHILOSOPHIQUE,  XXIX,  2  :  Kozloutski,  L'evolution  comme  prin- 
cipe  philosophique  du  devenir  ;  G.  Dumas,  Saint-Simon,  pere  du  positiv- 
isme  ( i er  article)  ;  G.  Batault,  L'hypothese  du  "retour  eternel "  devant  la 
science  moderne  ;  Lapie,  Recherches  sur  1'activite  intellectuelle  ;  Analyses 
et  comptes  rendus  ;  Revue  des  periodiques  etrangers  ;  Livres  nouveaux. 

XXIX,  3  :  Cantecor,  La  science  positive  de  la  morale  (ier  article)  ;  Bren- 
ier  de  Montmorand,  Ascetisme  et  mysticisme  :  etude  psychologique  ;  G. 
Dumas,  Saint-Simon,  pere  du  positivisme  (Fin). ;  G.  Milhaud,  Les  principes 
des  mathematiques  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ;  Revue  des  periodiques 
etrangers  ;  Livres  nouveaux. 

ARCHIVES  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE,  No.  9  :  E.  Yung,  Recherches  sur  le  sens 
olfactif  de  1'escargot ;  Ed.  Claparede,  Le  mental  et  le  physique  d'apres  L. 
Busse  ;  A.  Lemaitre,  Des  phenomenes  de  paramnesie  ;  Faits  et  Discus- 
sions ;  Bibliographic. 

No.  10:  J.  Larguier  des  Bancels,  De  la  memoire  ;  A.  Lamaitre,  Audi- 
tion coloree  hallucinatoire,  stabilite  et  heredite  des  photismes  ;  W.-M. 
Kozlowski,  Le  plein  et  le  vide  ;  Faits  et  discussions  ;  Bibliographic. 

JOURNAL  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE  NORMALS  ET  PATHOLOGIQUE,  I,  2 :  Pr. 
Pick,  Les  zones  de  head  et  leur  importance  en  psychiatric  ;  F.-L.  Arnaud, 
Idees  de  grandeur  precoces  dans  le  delire  de  persecution  chronique  ;  F. 
Houssay,  Moeurs  et  regimes  ;  G.  Durante,  Considerations  generales  sur  la 
structure  et  le  fonctionnement  du  systeme  nerveux  (ier  article)  ;  Notes  et 
discussions  ;  Bibliographic. 

RIVISTA  FILOSOFICA,  VI,  5  :  F.  Bonatelli,  Le  categoric  psicologiche  ; 
R.  Nazzari,  L'uomo  di  genio  per  gli  psichiatri  e  gli  antropologi  ;  O.  Na- 
zari,  La  concezione  del  mondo  secondo  il  Bhogavadgita  ;  A.  Gnessotto,  Nota 
sul  canone  del  metodo  indiretto  di  differenza  di  J.  S.  Mill ;  Rassegna  peda- 
gogica  ;  Rassegna  bibliografica  ;  Notizie  e  pubblicazioni  ;  Necrologio  ;  Som- 
mari  delle  riviste  straniere  ;  Libri  ricevuti  ;  Indice  dell'annata. 

RIVISTA  DI  FILOSOFIA  E  SCIENZE  AFFINI,  II,  5-6 :  E.  Zamorani,  A  chi 
legge  ;  R.  Ardigb,  Sentire  ;  G.  Vailati,  La  teoria  aristotelica  della  defi- 
nizione  ;  P.  Orano,  Max  Stirner  in  Italia  ;  F.  Momigliano,  Un  pubblicista, 
economista,  e  filosofo  del  periodo  Napoleonic©  (Melchiorre  Gioia);  Rassegna 
di  filosofia  scientifica  ;  Fra  i  libri  ;  Notizie  ;  Indice  degli  articoli  originali 
dell'annata  1903  ;  Libri  ricevute  e  sommari  di  riviste. 


Volume  XIII.  July,  1904..  Whole 

Number  4..  Number  j6. 

THE 

PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 


JONATHAN  EDWARDS.1 

IN  the  preface  to  his  book  on  Jonathan  Edwards,  Professor 
Allen  quotes  with  approval  the  remark  of  Bancroft :  "  He 
that  would  know  the  workings  of  the  New  England  mind  in  the 
middle  of  the  last  century  and  the  throbbings  of  its  heart,  must 
give  his  days  and  nights  to  the  study  of  Jonathan  Edwards." 
And  Professor  Allen  adds  :  "  He  that  would  understand  the  sig- 
nificance of  later  New  England  thought,  must  make  Edwards 
the  first  object  of  his  study."  Time  has  at  last  set  the  limit  to 
the  truth  of  such  remarks.  To  understand  the  philosophy  and 
theology  of  to-day  in  New  England  or  the  country  at  large,  the 
student  must  undoubtedly  seek  his  foundations  elsewhere  than 
in  the  thought  of  Edwards.  His  influence  is  now  largely  negli- 
gible. The  type  of  thinking  which  most  widely  prevails  is  so 
far  removed  from  him,  in  such  notable  contrast  to  him,  finds  its 
roots  so  markedly  in  other  sources,  that  interest  in  him  is  more 
antiquarian  than  vitalizing.  But  the  remarkable  thing  is  that 
these  statements,  true  to-day,  were  not  true  in  1889,  when  Pro- 
fessor Allen's  book  appeared.  To  question  then  the  soundness 
of  his  estimate  or  that  of  Bancroft's  could  at  best  involve  only 
the  censure  of  a  mild  exaggeration.  A  few  days  and  nights, 
even  at  that  time,  might  have  been  spared  the  student  of  New 
England  thought  from  surrender  to  Edwards. 

That  less  than  twenty  years  could  have  involved  such  a  change 
is  itself  a  significant  commentary  on  the  power  of  Ed  wards' s 
work.  It  has  failed  not  through  refutation,  but  through  inad- 

i  Read  at  the  Edwards  Commemmoration  at  Andover,  Mass.,  October  5,  1903. 

393 


394  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.        [VOL.  XIII. 

equacy.  To-day  we  get  so  much  more  elsewhere,  and  find  other 
richer  sources  to  stir  us  to  progress  or  controversy.  It  is  to 
Greek  philosophy  and  to  British  and  German  philosophy  and 
theology  that  the  student  must  give  his  days  and  nights,  if  he  is 
to  understand  our  thought.  And  so  for  us,  I  take  it,  New  Eng- 
land thought,  impressed  in  its  beginnings  so  potently  by  Edwards 
that  he  dominated  it  either  positively  or  negatively  for  a  century 
and  a  half,  has  failed  to  afford  a  foundation  for  progressive 
development  in  either  philosophy  or  theology.  It  is  to  be  noted 
further  that  the  foundations  we  now  rest  upon,  have  not  been 
laid  by  our  contemporaries.  They  reach  far  back  into  the  past, 
to  Edwards's  contemporaries  abroad,  to  his  predecessors  by  many 
centuries.  Significant  as  the  thought  of  New  England  has  been 
on  its  speculative  side,  it  has  not  contained  enough  native,  orig- 
inal strength  to  preserve  it  from  the  inadequacy  which  profoundly 
marked  it  through  its  ignorance  of  history.  The  courses  in  phi- 
losophy and  theology  offered  in  our  colleges,  universities,  and 
seminaries  to-day,  are  so  immeasurably  superior  to  those  offered 
twenty  years  ago,  that  one  can  readily  understand  why  the  types 
of  philosophy  and  theology  are  so  vastly  different  and  owe  such 
different  allegiance.  But  one  would  be  a  poor  observer,  if  his 
amazement  did  not  keep  pace  with  his  observation,  if  he  did  not 
recognize  the  peculiar  vigor  of  that  New  England  thought, 
which  may  have  ceased  to  influence  him  profoundly. 

I  would  not,  therefore,  have  these  remarks  of  mine  construed 
into  a  belittling  of  Edwards  or  his  influence.  I  have  made  them 
because,  in  connection  with  that  influence,  they  indicate  the  fact 
from  which  it  must  be  estimated.  More  than  this  :  this  fact, 
viewed  in  the  light  of  what  Edwards  himself  did  and  of  what  his 
early  years  gave  promise,  has  given  me  the  most  suggestive  in- 
sight into  the  man's  power  and  versatility,  and  a  more  satisfac- 
tory estimate  of  his  personality  as  a  thinker.  For  he  was  a  man 
with  an  undeveloped  possibility,  greater,  to  my  mind,  than  the 
actuality  attained.  He  did  not  belong  to  the  men  we  cannot 
imagine  different,  but  to  the  men,  whom,  the  better  we  know 
them,  the  more  we  seem  compelled  to  view  in  other  light.  What 
he  might  have  been,  becomes,  at  least  for  the  student  of  philos- 
ophy, as  insistent  and  suggestive  as  the  question  what  he  was. 


No.  4.]  JONATHAN  EDWARDS.  395 

One  cannot  write  history  as  it  ought  to  have  been.  Yet  this 
truth  ought  not  to  blind  us  to  the  fact  that  there  have  been 
great  persons,  whose  position  in  history  has  been  not  only  influ- 
ential, but,  more  significantly,  critical.  To  such  persons  is 
chargeable  not  only  what  their  influence  has  been,  but  also  what 
it  has  not  been.  If  the  thought  of  New  England  has  been 
largely  determined  by  Edwards  in  its  positive  achievements,  it 
has  been  almost  equally  determined  by  him  in  what  it  failed  to 
achieve,  for  he  undoubtedly  possessed,  although  he  did  not  carry 
through  in  his  work,  those  elements  which  in  large  measure  would 
have  made  that  thought  more  stable  and  lasting.  It  has  failed 
through  lack  of  real  philosophical  insight.  But  it  was  just  this 
insight  which  Edwards  possessed  in  a  very  remarkable  degree^ 
but  failed  to  carry  through  in  his  work.  And  this  is  the  more  sig- 
nificant because  no  other  American  has,  perhaps,  possessed 
philosophical  insight  of  equal  power. 

It  would  of  course  be  futile  to  attempt  to  say  what  American 
thought  would  have  been,  if  Edwards  had  not  lacked  philosophi- 
cal thoroughness.  Yet  it  appears  to  me  undoubtedly  true  that 
it  no  longer  finds  him  influential  because  of  just  this  lack,  and 
that  it  presents  to-day  little  continuity  with  its  past.  It  has  ap- 
peared to  me  instructive,  therefore,  to  consider  with  some  detail, 
this  lack  of  philosophical  thoroughness  in  Edwards's  work,  in 
order  to  an  appreciation  of  his  critical  significance  in  the  history 
of  American  thinking,  and  of  the  profoundly  interesting  character 
of  his  own  thought. 

Edwards's  early  "Notes  on  the  Mind,"  of  uncertain  though 
doubtless  early  date,  incomplete,  detached,  and  of  most  varying 
worth,  are  doubtless  for  the  student  of  philosophy  the  most  im- 
pressive products  of  Edwards's  thought.  While  they  reveal  his 
philosophical  ability  as  perhaps  none  of  his  publications  reveals 
it,  they  cannot  be  credited  with  contributing  to  his  influence. 
They  were  not  a  known  factor.  They  are  not  inconsistent  with 
his  elaborate  treatises,  as  Professor  Gardinei  maintains  that  they 
are  not,1  but  one  would  not  be  led  to  suspect  them  from  these 
treatises.  I  dismiss  consideration  of  them  for  the  present,  there- 

1  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW,  Vol.  IX.,  p.  573. 


396  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

fore,  to  return  to  them  after  speaking  of  some  of  his  completed 
works.  Foremost  among  these  is  undoubtedly  his  Enquiry 
into  Freedom  of  Will. 

The  reader  of  this  enquiry  to-day  must  add  his  tribute  to  the 
many  bestowed  by  others  on  its  greatness.  But  just  because  it 
is  so  great,  its  lack  of  philosophical  thoroughness  is  remarkable. 
What  amazes  one  about  it  is  that  an  analysis  of  the  will  so  acute, 
so  sane,  so  dispassionate,  so  free  from  prejudice  or  tricky  argu- 
ment, and  so  sound,  if  the  distinction  of  terms  made  by  Edwards 
is  admitted,  could  yet,  with  hardly  a  trace  of  rational  justification, 
be  linked  with  a  Calvinistic  conception  of  God  and  the  world.  I 
do  not  mean  that  it  is  at  all  amazing  that  Edwards's  conception  of 
the  will  should  be  held  by  Calvinists,  or  be  thought  consistent 
with  their  positions,  but  rather  that  a  mind  that  could  so  pro- 
foundly philosophize  about  the  will,  could  be  so  insensible  of  the 
need  of  further  philosophy  to  link  his  results  with  his  theological 
convictions.  More  than  this  —  that  a  mind  so  fair  and  dispas- 
sionate in  his  analysis  of  the  will,  could  be  so  unfair  and  passion- 
ate in  his  theological  setting  of  it. 

The  first  two  parts  of  the  Enquiry,  with  the  exception  of  Sec- 
tions 1 1  and  1 2  of  Part  II,  which  are  exegetical,  are  to  be  classed 
among  the  greatest  of  philosophical  writings.  That  Edwards  is 
not  unique  in  what  he  here  discloses  does  not  detract  from  his 
greatness.  Spinoza,  Hobbes,  and  Hume  have  all  the  same  doc- 
trine, but  exhibit  no  greater  philosophical  skill  in  the  exposition 
of  it.  Significant  too  for  his  remarkable  power  is  the  fact  that 
these  men  had,  at  first  hand,  acquaintance  with  other  philosophies 
which  he  altogether  lacked.  In  these  parts,  and  indeed  in  the 
whole  work,  wherever  Edwards  seeks  to  fix  or  distinguish  terms, 
he  is  remarkably  acute.  A  notable  illustration  of  this  among 
many  equally  notable  is  his  analysis  of  the  term  '  action '  in  Part 
IV,  Section  2.  His  clear  insistence  on  the  need  of  such  analysis, 
and  his  skill  in  executing  it,  rank  him  among  the  great  logicians. 
Simple  distinctions  in  argument,  but  of  weighty  import,  abound, 
such  as  this  :  "  Infallible  foreknowledge  may  prove  the  necessity 
of  the  event  foreknown,  and  yet  not  be  the  thing  which  causes 
the  necessity."  Everywhere  the  impression  is  left  that  such 


No.  4.]  JONATHAN  EDWARDS.  397 

simple  distinctions  are  the  fruit  of  careful  thought  and  the  utter- 
ances of  a  mind  sure  of  its  grasp.  So  long  as  Edwards  gives 
himself  up  to  the  analysis,  this  sureness  is  evident,  so  evident 
indeed,  that  he  lets  the  argument  carry  itself  by  its  own  worth 
without  any  attempt  at  persuasion. 

The  results  of  the  analysis  are  notable.  Necessity  may  be 
one  in  philosophical  definition,  but  is  as  diverse  in  existence  as 
the  realms  where  it  is  found.  Natural  and  moral  necessity  are 
both  necessity,  but  different  kinds  of  it.  Causal  relations  may 
exist  between  mental  events  as  well  as  between  physical  events, 
without  making  mental  events  physical.  What  makes  moral 
necessity  repugnant  is  its  confusion  with  natural  necessity,  which 
is  as  if  one  were  to  confuse  mind  with  matter.  We  should 
recognize  too  that  necessity  is  not  some  exterior  fate  compelling 
events,  but  the  actual  linkage  which  the  events  disclose  in  their 
existence,  and  that  they  do  disclose  such  linkage  wherever  they 
exist,  in  the  mind  as  well  as  in  nature.  Did  it  not  exist  in  the 
mind,  there  would  then  be  no  linkage  between  motive  and  act, 
between  end  and  means.  Again,  whether  an  act  is  voluntary,  and 
so  free,  depends  on  whether  it  is  the  result  of  volition  or  of  some- 
thing else.  The  causes  of  volition,  whatever  they  may  be,  do 
not  affect  its  voluntary  aspect  or  destroy  the  function  of  the  will 
any  more  than  the  causes  of  life  destroy  the  functions  of  life. 
Again,  moral  praise  or  blame  does  not  belong  to  the  causes  of 
men's  acts  but  to  the  acts  themselves,  just  as  natural  praise  or 
blame  belongs  not  to  the  causes  of  a  thing  but  to  its  value.  Yet 
moral  merit  is  different  from  natural  merit,  as  the  mind  is  differ- 
ent from  nature.  So  one  might  continue  until  he  had  exhibited 
all  the  results  of  the  analysis. 

I  am,  of  course,  aware  that  attempts  have  been  made  to  over- 
throw this  analysis  of  Edwards,  but  I  confess  that  I  find  nothing 
in  the  analysis  which  should  lead  one  to  make  the  attempt. 
Motives  to  that  effort  are  derived  from  other  sources,  and  almost 
exclusively  from  ethical  or  theological  interests.  Nothing  in  the 
whole  analysis  is  hostile  to  morality  until  that  analysis  ceases  to 
be  analysis,  and  becomes  instead  a  revelation  of  God's  activity  or 
the  secret  workings  of  some  ultimate  being.  It  is  not  hostile  to 


398  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

morality  because  it  discloses  most  powerfully  and  convincingly 
the  fact  that  man  by  the  necessity  of  his  own  nature  must  act  and 
judge  with  an  appreciation  of  the  value  and  responsibility  of  his 
acts,  just  as  the  sun  by  the  necessity  of  its  own  nature  must 
shine.  To  show  this  is  not  to  drive  morality  out  of  human  life, 
but  to  found  it  in  the  constitution  of  things.  It  is  philosophy  at 
its  best. 

And  just  because  it  is  philosophy  at  its  best,  we  look  eagerly 
for  its  continuance.  But  here  Edwards  fails  us.  He  does  not 
continue.  Perhaps  he  could  not.  And  the  fa-ct  that  he  did  not 
or  could  not  is  the  critical  thing  for  his  philosophy  and  his  influ- 
ence. As  we  proceed  to  the  remaining  parts  of  the  enquiry,  con- 
taining his  polemic  against  the  Arminians,  we  pursue  arguments 
which  have  no  philosophical  relation  to  what  has  preceded. 
There  is  no  longer  philosophical  analysis  and  construction  at  a 
sustained  height,  but  only  flashes  of  it  here  and  there,  amid 
pages  of  rhetorical  attempts  at  persuasion,  tricky  arguments,  and 
sophistry.  There  is  no  philosophical  carrying  through  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  will.  Repeatedly  he  is  content  to  dispose  of  a 
difficulty  in  Calvinism  by  pointing  out  that  Arminianism  has  the 
same  difficulty.  He  argues  that  if  total  moral  inability  excuses 
a  man  totally,  partial  inability  should  excuse  him  partially  and 
in  proper  numerical  proportion.  This  remarkable  argument  he 
illustrates  by  his  figure  of  the  balance  which  can  turn  ten  pounds 
but  no  more,  forgetting,  apparently,  the  deep  significance  of  the 
fact  that  it  can  turn  anything  less  than  ten  pounds,  forgetting,  in 
short,  the  vast  difference  between  degrees  of  ability  and  no  ability 
at  all.  To  the  objection  that  men  are  blameless  if  God  gives 
them  up  to  sin,  he  can  only  cry  :  "  Then  Judas  was  blameless 
after  Christ  had  given  him  over."1  To  such  instances  of  philo- 
sophical weakness  many  more  could  be  added,  especially  Part 
IV,  Section  9,  where  the  question  is  discussed,  "  How  God  is 
concerned  in  the  existence  of  sin."  It  is  exceptionally  remark- 
able that  the  man  who  wrote  the  first  two  parts  of  the  work 
could  have  written  this  section.  His  apparent  unconsciousness 
of  the  significance  of  the  fact  that  his  own  theory  of  the  will 

^Enquiry  into  Freedom  of  Will,  Boston,  1754,  p.  154. 


No.  4-]  JONATHAN  EDWARDS.  399 

might,  with  equal  justice,  be  linked  with  totally  different  ultimate 
positions,  is  also  noteworthy.  He  recognizes  the  simple  and 
cogent  truth  that  his  doctrine  is  not  false  just  because  Hobbes 
and  the  Stoics  held  it.  But  he  fails  to  see  that  their  holding  of 
it  may  point  to  other  conclusions  than  the  Calvinistic. 

It  is  not  that  Edwards  prostitutes  his  philosophy  to  his  theo- 
logical convictions.  To  my  mind  there  is  not  the  slightest  proof 
of  that,  and,  so  far  as  I  know,  it  has  never  been  seriously  main- 
tained. The  fact  is,  rather,  that  the  philosopher  never  became  the 
theologian  or  the  theologian  the  philosopher.  It  is  futile  to  try 
to  understand  Edwards's  Calvinism  from  his  philosophy  or  his 
philosophy  from  his  Calvinism.  In  him  they  are  juxtaposed,  not 
united.  But  they  are  not  equally  juxtaposed.  The  theology 
overshadows  the  philosophy.  The  latter,  however,  is  of  such 
superior  merit  to  the  former  in  depth  of  insight  and  cogency 
of  reasoning,  that  one  is  irresistably  led  to  speculate  on  what 
Edwards  would  have  been,  if  the  philosophy  had  overshadowed 
the  theology.  One  recognizes  that  his  influence  would  have 
been  vastly  different,  that  it  has  consequently  been  a  critical  in- 
fluence for  American  thought. 

This  juxtaposition  instead  of  union  of  philosophy  and  theology 
is  seen  in  Edwards's  other  work.  I  will  consider  it  in  the  two 
remaining  writings  which  are  of  particular  philosophical  interest, 
namely  the  dissertations  on  "God's  Last  End  in  the  Creation" 
and  the  "Nature  of  True  Virtue."  These  dissertations,  although 
never  published  by  Edwards,  were  written  earlier  than  his  last 
publication  in  1757.  They  are  not,  even  if  actually  written  after 
the  Enquiry  into  Freedom  of  Will,  unpremeditated  works. 
The  suggestion  of  them  is  frequent  in  his  sermons  and  other 
writings,  from  which  we  could  largely  construct  them.  One 
naturally  asks,  therefore,  why  they  were  not  published  ?  Un- 
published manuscripts  left  by  eminent  men  are  so  frequent  oc- 
currences, that  the  question  might  be  answered  by  this  common 
fact.  But  acquaintance  with  these  dissertations  gives  a  pointed 
interest  to  the  question.  For  while  they  present  a  general  agree- 
ment with  the  rest  of  Edwards's  work,  and  evince  that  juxtaposi- 
tion of  philosophy  and  theology  which  has  been  remarked,  they 


400  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

exhibit  a  real  simplification  of  his  thought  and  suggestive  indica- 
tions of  almost  conscious  attempts  at  unification.  Their  total 
effect  is  rather  to  weaken  than  to  strengthen  his  theology.  As 
they  are  not  essentially  polemic,  but  rather  more  the  work  of  a 
disinterested  inquirer,  the  logical  trend  of  the  thought  becomes 
more  natural  and  inevitable.  All  the  more,  logical  revulsion  is 
consequently  occasioned  by  the  juxtaposition  of  the  elements  of 
an  unrelated  theology.  One  is  led  to  suspect  that  Edwards  was 
becoming  conscious  of  his  intellectual  duality,  and  that  the  dis- 
sertations were  not  published  because  they  must  consequently 
appear  to  him  as  incomplete,  as  faulty,  as  demanding  the  work 
of  adjustment.  His  original  power,  his  versatility,  his  constant 
growth,  make  it  improbable  that  his  death  in  his  fifty-fifth  year 
occurred  when  his  intellectual  life  was  fixed  beyond  alteration. 
One  is  tempted,  therefore,  to  regard  these  later  writings,  not 
as  the  mere  conclusions  of  previous  positions,  but  as  works  of 
promise. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  dissertation  on  "  God's  Last 
End  in  the  Creation  "  begins,  after  an  explanation  of  terms,  with 
a  consideration  of  "  what  reason  dictates  in  this  affair,"  although 
it  is  admitted  that  the  affair  is  "  properly  an  affair  of  divine  reve- 
lation." The  justification  of  reason's  dictates  in  spite  of  this  fact, 
really  amounts  to  submitting  the  facts  of  revelation  to  the  judg- 
ment of  reason.  For  Edwards  contends  that  "  no  notion  of 
God's  last  end  in  the  creation  of  the  world  is  agreeable  to  rea- 
son, which  would  truly  imply  any  indigence,  insufficiency,  and 
mutability  in  God."  l  This  dictate  of  reason,  with  which,  as 
Edwards  would  show,  revelation  is  in  most  consistent  agreeable- 
ness,  contains  in  undeveloped  form  the  recognition  of  God's  last 
end  in  the  creation.  God  is  his  own  last  end.  The  developed 
form  of  this  statement,  we  read,  wondering  indeed  if  these  are  the 
words  of  the  greatest  of  American  theologians,  and  not  rather 
the  words  of  some  disciple  of  Plotinus  or  of  a  Christian  Spinoza : 
"  As  there  is  an  infinite  fulness  of  all  possible  good  in  God, —  a 
fulness  of  every  perfection,  of  all  excellency  and  beauty,  and  of 
infinite  happiness, —  and  as  this  fulness  is  capable  of  communica- 

1  Works,  Dwight's  Edition,  II,  13. 


No.  4.]  JONATHAN  EDWARDS.  40 1 

tion,  or  emanation  ad  extra  ;  so  it  seems  a  thing  amiable  and 
valuable  in  itself  that  this  infinite  fountain  of  good  should  send 
forth  abundant  streams.  And  as  this  is  in  itself  excellent,  so  a 
disposition  to  this  in  the  Divine  Being,  must  be  looked  upon  as  an 
excellent  disposition.  Such  an  emanation  of  good  is,  in  some 
sense,  a  multiplication  of  it.  So  far  as  the  stream  may  be  looked 
upon  as  anything  besides  the  fountain,  so  far  it  may  be  looked 
on  as  an  increase  of  good.  And  if  the  fulness  of  good  that  is  in 
the  fountain  is  in  itself  excellent,  then  the  emanation,  which  is  as 
it  were  an  increase,  repetition  or  multiplication  of  it,  is  excellent. 
Thus  it  is  fit,  since  there  is  an  infinite  fountain  of  light  and 
knowledge,  that  this  light  should  shine  forth  in  beams  of  com- 
municated knowledge  and  understanding:  and  as  there  is  an 
infinite  fountain  of  holiness,  moral  excellence  and  beauty,  that  so 
it  should  flow  out  in  communicated  holiness.  And  that,  as  there 
is  an  infinite  fulness  of  joy  and  happiness,  so  these  should  have 
an  emanation,  and  become  a  fountain  flowing  out  in  abundant 
streams,  as  beams  from  the  sun.  Thus  it  appears  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  it  was  God's  last  end,  that  there  might  be  a  glorious 
and  abundant  emanation  of  his  infinite  fulness  of  good  ad  extra, 
or  without  himself ;  and  that  the  disposition  to  communicate  him- 
self, or  diffuse  his  own  FULNESS,  was  what  moved  him  to  create 
the  world."1  Mystic  pantheism  could  not  be  more  explicit. 

Edwards  appears  not  to  have  been  wholly  insensible  to  the 
possibility  of  such  an  interpretation.  And  here  is  to  be  noted  an 
instance  of  that  apparent  consciousness  of  a  need  of  unification 
which  has  been  remarked.  The  first  objection  against  his  view 
which  he  considers  is  to  the  effect  that  his  position  may  be 
"  inconsistent  with  God's  absolute  independence  and  immutabil- 
ity ;  particularly,  as  though  God  were  inclined  to  a  communica- 
tion of  his  fulness,  and  emanations  of  his  own  glory,  as  being  his 
own  most  glorious  and  complete  state."  To  this  he  answers : 
"  Many  have  wrong  notions  of  God's  happiness  as  resulting  from 
his  absolute  self-sufficience,  independence,  and  immutability. 
Though  it  be  true  that  God's  glory  and  happiness  are  in  and  of 
himself,  are  infinite  and  cannot  be  added  to,  and  unchangeable, 

1  Loc.  cit.,  II,  20. 


402  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

for  the  whole  and  every  part  of  which  he  is  independent  of  the 
creature ;  yet  it  does  not  hence  follow,  nor  is  it  true,  that  God 
has  no  real  and  proper  delight,  pleasure  or  happiness,  in  any  of 
his  acts  or  communications  relative  to  the  creature,  or  effects  he 
produces  in  them  ;  or  in  anything  he  sees  in  his  creatures'  quali- 
fications, dispositions,  actions,  and  state.  God  may  have  a  real 
and  proper  pleasure  or  happiness  in  seeing  the  happy  state  of  the 
creature ;  yet  this  may  not  be  different  from  his  delight  in  him- 
self."1 To  let  this  answer  suffice,  reason  must  silence  its  ques- 
tions. It  is  no  answer  at  all,  but  simply  a  theological  proposition 
juxtaposed  to  the  philosophy. 

The  silencing  of  reason  is  still  more  apparent  in  his  second 
answer  to  the  objection.  "  If  any  are  not  satisfied  with  the  pre- 
ceding answer,  but  still  insist  on  the  objection,  let  them  consider 
whether  they  can  devise  any  other  scheme  of  God's  last  end  in 
creating  the  world,  but  what  will  be  equally  obnoxious  to  this 
objection  in  its  full  force,  if  there  be  any  force  in  it."2 

Surely  we  have  in  this  dissertation  no  thorough  consideration 
of  what  reason  dictates  in  the  affair.  He  has  in  effect,  as  Pro- 
fessor Allen  justly  remarks,  "  sacrificed  all  that  is  not  God,"  and 
all  the  theology  of  the  world  superimposed  and  insisted  on,  can- 
not avoid  that  sacrifice.  The  mind  that  produced  the  work  on 
the  will,  and  had  so  irresistably  followed  the  dictates  of  reason 
up  to  this  point,  may  have  been  unconscious  of  the  gap.  If  so, 
this  unconsciousness  reveals  anew  the  sharp  duality  in  this  great 
intellect.  If  not,  adjustment  of  some  sort  must  have  been  felt  to 
be  necessary,  before  the  work  could  be  given  to  the  world. 

If  the  Calvinistic  theology  it  contains  should  be  eliminated 
from  the  dissertation  on  the  "Nature  of  True  Virtue,"  there 
would  remain  a  conception  of  virtue  almost  identical  with  Spi- 
noza's. Disinterested  love  of  God  is  presented  as  the  highest 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  man,  who  will  exercise  it  highly  in  pro- 
portion to  his  knowledge  of  God,  and  also  will  desire  that  as 
many  as  possible  should  share  in  the  same  exercise  and  enjoy  its 
benefits.  These  benefits  do  not  really  consist  in  rewards,  but  the 

1  Loc.  cit.,  II,  27. 

2  Ibid.,  29. 


No.  4.]  JONATHAN  EDWARDS.  403 

virtuous  soul  finds  in  virtue  itself  its  true  good  and  highest  hap- 
piness. "  So  far  as  the  virtuous  mind  exercises  true  virtue  in 
benevolence  to  created  beings,  it  seeks  chiefly  the  good  of  the 
creature ;  consisting  in  its  knowledge  or  view  of  God's  glory  and 
beauty,  its  union  with  God,  conformity  and  love  to  him,  and  joy 
in  him." ] 

This  is  all  in  thorough  harmony  with  Spinoza.  But  Edwards's 
total  conception  differs  from  Spinoza's  in  one  very  important  par- 
ticular. With  Spinoza  man  must  love  God  in  proportion  as  he 
knows  God,  and  ignorance  of  the  divine  nature  is  consequently 
the  cause  of  all  wickedness,  is  indeed  wickedness  itself.  But 
with  Edwards  man  may  know  God  completely  and  yet  remain 
vicious.  The  devils  believe  and  tremble,  but  cease  not,  there- 
fore, to  be  devils.  For  while  virtue  grows  as  the  knowledge  of 
God  grows,  a  virtuous  disposition  must  first  be  given,  natural  or 
derived.  Without  such  a  virtuous  disposition  implanted  or  native 
in  the  heart,  there  can  be  no  virtuous  exercise.  Wherever  in 
intelligent  beings  this  disposition  is  lacking,  vice  must  prevail  in 
spite  of  perfect  knowledge  of  God  and  his  last  end  in  the  crea- 
tion. "Christians,"  says  Edwards,  "have  the  greatest  reason  to 
believe,  from  the  scriptures,  that  in  the  future  day  of  the  revela- 
tion of  the  righteous  judgment  of  God,  when  sinners  shall  be 
called  to  answer  before  their  judge,  and  all  their  wickedness,  in 
all  its  aggravations,  brought  forth  and  clearly  manifested  in  the 
perfect  light  of  that  day;  and  God  shall  reprove  them,  and  set 
their  sins  in  order  before  them,  their  consciences  will  be  greatly 
awakened  and  convinced,  their  mouths  will  be  stopped,  all 
stupidity  of  conscience  will  be  at  an  end,  and  conscience  will  have 
its  full  exercise ;  and  therefore  their  consciences  will  approve  the 
dreadful  sentence  of  the  judge  against  them ;  and  seeing  that 
they  have  deserved  so  great  a  punishment,  will  join  with  the 
judge  in  condemning  them.  .  .  .  Then  the  sin  and  wickedness 
of  their  heart  will  come  to  its  highest  dominion  and  completest 
exercise ;  they  shall  be  wholly  left  of  God,  and  given  up  to  their 
wickedness,  even  as  devils  are  !  When  God  has  done  waiting  on 
sinners,  and  his  Spirit  done  striving  with  them,  he  will  not  re- 

1  Loc.  cit.,  II,  109. 


404  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

strain  their  wickedness  as  he  does  now.  But  sin  shall  then  rage 
in  their  hearts,  as  a  fire  no  longer  restrained  and  kept  under."  l 

This  emphasis  on  the  necessity  of  a  virtuous  disposition  to  the 
exercise  of  virtue  was  one  of  the  important  principles  in  Edwards's 
doctrine  of  the  will.  Its  reappearance  here  is  natural.  But  it 
reappears  with  such  force  and  clearness  as  to  amount  to  the  rec- 
ognition of  something  arbitrary  in  the  scheme  of  things,  an 
element  persistently  refusing  to  be  related,  a  reality  naturally  and 
originally  obnoxious  to  God.  It  seriously  interferes  with  the 
divine  power.  It  can  have  no  place  in  a  world  which  is  the 
emanation  of  the  divine  fulness  of  perfection.  One  is  tempted  to 
think  that  its  presence  in  Edwards's  thinking  is  due  to  a  conces- 
sion to  his  theology,  that  it  is  another  instance  of  that  unrelated 
juxtaposition  I  have  insisted  on.  And  so  it  may  well  be.  But 
it  serves  to  make  that  juxtaposition  still  more  apparent.  It  is 
true,  however,  that  this  dissertation  on  the  nature  of  true  virtue, 
if  taken  by  itself,  exhibits  a  greater  degree  of  philosophical  thor- 
oughness than  is  to  be  found  elsewhere  in  Edwards's  work. 
Whatever  may  have  influenced  him  thus  to  emphasize  the  under- 
lying necessity  of  a  virtuous  disposition  to  the  exercise  of  virtue, 
this  dissertation,  with  the  principle  admitted,  is  most  thoroughly 
worked  out.  And  it  is  just  this  thoroughness  which  makes  the 
dissertation  emphasize  anew  the  duality  of  Edwards's  mind.  It 
emphasizes  it  so  emphatically,  that  the  suspicion  is  once  more 
aroused  that  he  was  beginning  to  feel  the  need  of  adjustment 
between  the  unrelated  elements  of  his  thought. 

Lack  of  adjustment,  the  juxtaposition  of  unrelated  principles 
in  an  ordinary  mind,  is  not  a  cause  of  interest.  But  I  have  tried 
to  point  out  that  in  Edwards  there  is  no  ordinary  juxtaposition. 
It  is  extraordinary.  It  is  crucial  for  our  understanding  of  the 
man.  It  is  necessary  for  a  clear  characterization  of  his  influence. 
It  reveals  itself  with  such  steady  accumulation  as  to  amount  to 
a  demand,  not  altogether  conscious  perhaps,  for  a  revision  of 
the  whole  system.  It  reveals  Edwards  not  as  a  man  of  a  single 
idea,  with  opinions  changelessly  fixed  and  doggedly  supported, 
but  as  a  man  of  remarkable  versatility,  of  steady  growth,  of  rich 

1  Loc.  cit.,  II,  134. 


No.  4.  ]  JON  A  THAN  ED  WARDS.  40  5 

promise,  but  as  a  man  too,  who  only  late  in  life  gave  evidence  of 
a  possible  unification  of  the  diverse  elements  of  his  nature.  Of 
these  elements  the  theological  was  the  most  prominent  both  by 
his  exposition  and  his  personal  influence.  It  was  his  theology 
that  he  bequeathed  to  New  England,  his  theology,  be  it  said, 
however,  stamped  with  the  peculiar  force  of  his  great  personality. 
And  it  was  not  a  philosophically  grounded  theology.  Its  own 
force  spent,  it  could  not  draw  on  Edwards's  other  work.  Its 
failure  of  continued  influence  becomes  his  failure.  Yet  philosophy 
was  there  with  unusual  excellence.  Surely  one  must  recognize 
that  Edwards  has  influenced  American  thought  critically,  gave  to 
it  in  its  first  significant  and  original  outburst  the  theological  in- 
stead of  the  philosophical  cast,  with  a  theology  left  so  unrelated 
to  a  real  insight  in  human  nature  and  the  world's  nature,  that  it 
was  bound  to  fail  with  the  failure  of  personal  conviction  of  its 
truth. 

A  man  so  profoundly  interesting  on  account  of  his  versatility 
and  the  peculiar  way  its  elements  were  composed  in  him,  so 
interesting  too  on  account  of  the  nature  of  his  influence,  cannot 
be  dismissed  without  some  attempt  at  an  understanding  of  his 
intellectual  character.  It  is  too  easy  an  explanation  of  him  which 
would  point  to  his  time,  his  education,  his  occupation.  For,  let 
me  insist  again,  he  was  distinctly  a  great  man.  He  did  not 
merely  express  the  thoughts  of  his  time,  or  meet  it  simply  in  the 
spirit  of  his  traditions.  He  stemmed  it  and  moulded  it.  New 
England  thought  was  already  making  toward  that  colorless 
theology  which  marked  it  later.  That  he  checked.  It  was 
decidedly  Arminian.  He  made  it  Calvinistic.  To  his  own  per- 
sonal convictions  he  was  forced,  through  his  removal  from 
Northampton,  to  sacrifice  the  work  in  which  he  had  unselfishly 
spent  his  best  years.  His  time  does  not  explain  him.  We 
must  look  to  his  intellectual  history. 

Perhaps  he  would  remain  altogether  enigmatic,  were  it  not  for 
what  he  has  told  us  of  himself,  and  for  what  his  early  notes  on 
the  mind  reveal.  These  notes  contain  an  outline  of  philosophy, 
which,  for  penetration  and  breadth  of  interest,  finds  no  superior  in 
the  work  of  other  minds  equally  mature.  More  than  this,  it 


406  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

surpasses  the  work  of  many  maturer  minds  which  have  yet  re- 
ceived the  recognition  of  history.  We  know  that  its  inspiration 
was  mainly  Locke,  but  its  promise  of  superiority  to  him  is  evi- 
dent. The  remarkable  verbal  similarity  these  notes  reveal  to  the 
writings  of  Berkeley,  have  led  to  a  comparison  of  Edwards  with 
the  Irish  bishop  and  a  search  for  traces  of  his  influence.  These 
have  not  been  found.  Nor  is  the  philosophy  unmistakably 
Berkeley's.  It  is  more  the  germ  of  that  mystic  pantheism  which 
was  disclosed  later  with  such  clearness  in  the  dissertation  on 
"  God's  Last  End  in  the  Creation."  The  trend  of  his  thinking  is 
not  so  much  revealed  in  such  Berkeleyan  expressions  as  these : 
"  When  we  say  that  the  World,  i.  e.,  the  material  Universe, 
exists  nowhere  but  in  the  mind,  we  have  got  to  such  a  degree 
of  strictness  and  abstraction,  that  we  must  be  exceedingly  careful, 
that  we  do  not  confound  and  lose  ourselves  by  misapprehension. 
That  is  impossible,  that  it  should  be  meant,  that  all  the  world  is 
contained  in  the  narrow  compass  of  a  few  inches  of  space,  in  little 
ideas  in  the  place  of  the  brain  ;  for  that  would  be  a  contradic- 
tion ;  for  we  are  to  remember  that  the  human  body,  and  the 
brain  itself,  exist  only  mentally,  in  the  same  sense  that  other 
things  do ;  and  so  that,  which  we  call  place,  is  an  idea  too. 
Therefore  things  are  truly  in  those  places ;  for  what  we  mean, 
when  we  say  so,  is  only,  that  this  mode  of  our  idea  of  place 
appertains  to  such  an  idea.  We  should  not  therefore  be  under- 
stood to  deny,  that  things  are  where  they  seem  to  be.  For  the 
principles  we  lay  down,  if  they  are  narrowly  looked  into,  do  not 
infer  that.  Nor  will  it  be  found,  that  they  at  all  make  void 
Natural  Philosophy,  or  the  science  of  the  Causes  or  Reasons  of 
corporeal  changes.  For  to  find  out  the  reasons  of  things,  in 
Natural  Philosophy,  is  only  to  find  out  the  proportion  of  God's 
acting.  And  the  cause  is  the  same,  as  to  such  proportions, 
whether  we  suppose  the  World  only  mental,  in  our  sense,  or  no."1 
The  trend  of  his  thinking  is  revealed  rather  in  such  pantheistic 
expressions  as  these  :  "  Seeing  God  has  so  plainly  revealed  him- 
self to  us  ;  and  other  minds  are  made  in  his  image,  and  are  emana- 
tions from  him ;  we  may  judge  what  is  the  excellence  of  other 

lLoc.  «'/.,  I.,  669. 


No.  4.]  JONATHAN  EDWARDS.  407 

minds,  by  what  is  his,  which  we  have  shown  is  Love.  His  Infinite 
Beauty  is  his  Infinite  mutual  Love  of  Himself.  Now  God  is  the 
Prime  and  Original  Being,  the  First  and  Last,  and  the  Pattern 
of  all,  and  has  the  sum  of  all  perfections.  We  may  therefore, 
doubtless,  conclude,  that  all  that  is  the  perfection  of  spirits  may 
be  resolved  into  that  which  is  God's  perfection,  which  is  Love." 
"  When  we  speak  of  Being  in  general,  we  may  be  understood  of 
the  Divine  Being,  for  he  is  an  Infinite  Being  :  therefore  all  others 
must  necessarily  be  considered  as  nothing.  As  to  Bodies,  we 
have  shown  in  another  place,  that  they  have  no  proper  being  of 
their  own.  And  as  to  Spirits,  they  are  the  communications  of  the 
Great  Original  Spirit ;  and  doubtless,  in  metaphysical  strictness 
and  propriety,  He  is,  as  there  is  none  else.  He  is  likewise 
Infinitely  Excellent,  and  all  Excellence  and  Beauty  is  derived 
from  Him,  in  the  same  manner  as  all  Being.  And  all  other 
Excellence,  is,  in  strictness,  only  a  shadow  of  his."  "We  shall 
be  in  danger  when  we  meditate  on  this  love  of  God  to  Himself, 
as  being  the  thing  wherein  His  infinite  excellence  and  loveliness 
consists,  of  some  alloy  to  the  sweetness  of  our  view,  by  its  appear- 
ing with  something  of  the  aspect  of  and  cast  of  what  we  call  self- 
love.  But  we  are  to  consider  that  this  love  includes  in  it,  or 
rather  is  the  same  as,  a  love  to  everything,  as  they  are  all  com- 
munications of  Himself.  So  that  we  are  to  conceive  of  Divine 
Excellence  as  the  Infinite  General  Love,  that  which  reaches  all, 
proportionally,  with  perfect  purity  and  sweetness."  l  Indeed,  if 
these  notes  inspire  one  to  curious  research  into  the  indebtedness 
of  Edwards  to  others,  Berkeley  is  but  one  of  several  philosophers 
that  will  be  suggested.  But  the  search  thus  far  has  been  vain, 
and  it  appears  true  that  its  vanity  is  due,  not  to  the  lack  of  evi- 
dence, but  to  the  fact  that  there  is  no  indebtedness  which  can  be 
counted  as  significant.  These  notes  are  all  the  greater  warrant, 
therefore,  for  ranking  Edwards  among  the  great,  original  minds. 
But  for  the  understanding  of  his  intellectual  history,  it  is  not 
mainly  important  to  discover  the  sources  of  his  ideas.  It  is 
important  rather  to  note  that  he  began  his  life  of  constructive 
thought  in  philosophy,  and  in  a  philosophy  grounded  in  reason, 
lLoc.  tit.,  I,  699,  700,  701. 


408  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

giving  little  promise  of  the  theologian  that  was  to  be,  but  abun- 
dant promise  of  the  philosopher  whose  mysticism  should  increas- 
ingly shine  forth  in  his  latest  works,  in  part  a  reminiscence,  in  part 
a  recovery  of  the  impulse  of  his  youth. 

This  philosophy,  however,  was  never  to  yield  its  proper  fruitage. 
It  was  arrested  by  emotional  experiences  for  which  Edwards  him- 
self could  not  account.  He  became  a  theologian  of  his  peculiar 
type,  not  through  the  logical  processes  of  his  thinking,  but  through 
a  kind  of  mystical  intuition.  He  gives  us  this  account  of  it :  "I 
remember  the  time  very  well  when  I  seemed  to  be  convinced  and 
fully  satisfied  as  to  this  sovereignty  of  God,  and  his  justice  in  thus 
eternally  disposing  of  men  according  to  his  sovereign  pleasure ; 
but  never  could  give  an  account  how  or  by  what  means  I  was 
thus  convinced,  not  in  the  least  imagining  at  the  time,  nor  a  long 
time  after,  that  there  was  any  extraordinary  influence  of  God's 
spirit  in  it,  but  only  that  now  I  saw  further,  and  my  mind  appre- 
hended the  justness  and  reasonableness  of  it.  ...  God's  abso- 
lute sovereignty  and  justice  with  respect  to  salvation  is  what  my 
mind  seems  to  rest  assured  of,  as  much  as  of  anything  that  I  see 
with  my  eyes." 

Supervening  upon  his  natural  philosophical  bent,  such  expe- 
riences, revealing  a  nature  swayed  as  much  by  unanalyzed  emo- 
tions as  by  reason,  accounts  for  those  aspects  of  Edwards's  thought 
which  have  been  noted.  So  potent  were  these  experiences  in 
their  effect  that  his  original  position  was  never  recovered  in  its 
simplicity  and  originality.  So  disrupting  were  they  intellectually 
that  his  philosophy  and  theology  remained  to  the  close  of  his  life 
almost  completely  divorced  and  unrelated.  Such  experiences 
were  so  consonant  with  Edwards's  native  mysticism,  that  one  can 
readily  understand  why  they  never  fully  rose  to  the  dignity  of  a 
contradiction  in  his  thinking.  So  significant  were  they  for  his 
influence,  that  we  remember  him,  not  as  the  greatest  of  American 
philosophers,  but  as  the  greatest  of  American  Calvinists. 

FREDERICK  J.  E.  WOODBRIDGE. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  NATURE  OF  CAUSALITY. 

SINCE  Hume's  attempt  to  make  a  purely  psychological  anal- 
ysis of  the  nature  and  conditions  of  the  origin  of  the  feeling 
of  causality,  there  seems  to  have  been  little  desire  to  trace  em- 
pirically the  marks  that  serve  to  distinguish  the  causal  connection 
of  two  mental  processes  from  mere  temporal  succession.  It 
seems,  then,  that  it  may  be  worth  while  to  attack  Hume's  problem 
in  his  own  spirit.  The  advances  in  psychology  since  his  day 
should  certainly  throw  new  light  on  the  problem  and  enable  us 
to  go  farther  than  he  did,  even  if  we  work  in  the  same  way. 

Hume's  answer  to  the  question,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
that  all  depended  upon  the  frequency  and  strength  of  the  con- 
nection between  the  two  events, —  that  mere  succession  frequently 
repeated  under  varying  conditions  serves  to  connect  the  two 
events  so  closely  that  we  say  one  is  the  cause  of  the  other  and 
always  think  them  together.  That  the  explanation  is  insufficient 
has  been  demonstrated  repeatedly.  The  two  considerations  that 
have  been  most  frequently  adduced  against  it  are  (i)  that  we 
have  many  pairs  of  events  that  succeed  each  other  frequently 
which  we  do  not  regard  as  causal,  as,  e.  g.,  the  succession  of  day 
and  night,  or  the  customary  relations  that  have  grown  up  between 
a  given  day  and  an  event,  as  eating  fish  on  Friday,  and  (2)  that 
there  are  many  pairs  of  events  that  are  regarded  as  causally  con- 
nected when  they  occur  for  the  first  time.  These  together  suffice 
to  mark  Hume's  answer  to  the  question  as  at  least  incomplete. 

If  we  attempt  to  attack  the  problem  for  ourselves,  bearing  in 
mind  Hume's  actual  achievements,  it  is  seen  at  once  that  the 
problem  divides  itself  into  two  parts,  corresponding  to  the  now 
familiar  classification  into  structure  and  function..  From  the  first 
point  of  view,  our  problem  is  :  What  are  the  characteristics  of  the 
two  members  of  the  conscious  stream,  or  of  their  relation,  which 
serve  to  mark  them  as  causally  connected  ?  This  is  merely  a 
problem  in  the  introspective  analysis  of  a  conscious  state.  From 
the  second  and  more  important  standpoint,  we  must  ask :  What  are 
the  conditions  that  cause  these  characteristics  to  attach  to  the  two 

409 


410  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

events  in  question  and  serve  to  mark  them  as  peculiarly  related 
and  not  as  merely  successive  ? 

It  is  easier  to  answer  the  first  question  than  the  second,  but 
even  here  there  is  undoubtedly  room  for  dispute  as  to  many  of 
the  elements  involved.  In  the  writer's  consciousness  the  sign  of 
the  causal  relation  takes  on  a  distinctively  anthropomorphic  form. 
There  is  invariably  a  marked  attribution  of  strain  sensations  to 
the' object,  which  is  represented  as  active,  and  just  as  distinct  pas- 
sivity ascribed  to  the  object  that  is  considered  the  effect.  With 
the  ascription  of  the  effort  to  the  causing  event,  there  also  go 
actual  contractions  of  the  muscles  of  the  body  that  would  be  in- 
volved in  accomplishing  some  purpose.  The  feeling  of  effort  is 
not  altogether  a  memory  image,  but  is  an  actual  sensation  from 
real  though  vain  contractions.  Nor  is  this  a  fact  peculiar  to  the 
writer.  If  you  will  watch  any  group  of  men  who  are  discussing 
the  problem  of  energy  in  any  of  its  forms,  you  will  notice  that,  as 
a  man  asserts  the  existence  of  a  real  cause,  there  is  often  a 
violent  gesture,  an  added  force  to  the  expression  of  the  word, 
and  in  many  cases  an  apparent  preparation  to  accomplish  the 
thing  that  he  asserts  his  cause  can  do.  If  you  will  picture  to 
yourself  the  relation  between  the  sun  and  the  earth,  you  will  find 
that  you  ascribe  to  the  sun  very  much  the  same  consciousness 
that  you  would  have,  if  you  were  trying  to  hold  a  large  dog  as  he 
circled  around  you  at  the  end  of  a  rope.  Even  if  we  try  to  think 
force  in  the  abstract,  it  is  very  difficult  to  obtain  a  concept  that 
will  not  be  accompanied  by  this  human  or  animate  element. 
When  you  picture  to  yourself  any  simple  form  of  physical  causa- 
tion, any  manifestation  of  energy,  as  cohesion,  electrical  potential, 
sound  waves,  or  light,  and  think  of  them  as  actually  effective,  the 
strain  sensations  seem  bound  to  enter.  One  who  is  not  very 
highly  trained  in  abstract  thought  and  very  familiar  with  me- 
chanical ways  of  thought,  can  hardly  think  two  particles  of 
matter  as  influencing  each  other  without  picturing  some  small 
force  concealed  in  them  somewhere  or  somehow.  If  you  can 
get  him  to  describe  the  actual  mental  imagery  that  he  uses  in 
representing  this  force  to  himself,  you  will  find  in  practically 
every  case  that  the  strain  sensations  constitute  its  kernel,  if  they 
do  not  compose  it  entirely. 


No.  4.]    PSYCHOLOGICAL   NATURE   OF  CAUSALITY.          411 

The  words  of  mechanics  are  all  merely  transferred  from  an 
original  human  application.  Force,  strain,  stress,  energy,  work, 
tension,  are  all  of  anthropomorphic  origin.  The  human  origin  is 
even  now  but  thinly  veiled  behind  the  impersonality  that  should 
have  complete  sway  after  centuries  of  technical  use.  But  the 
metaphor  seems  to  lie  deeper  than  the  word,  and  so  is  kept  alive 
by  the  mental  pictures  that  invariably  come  up  as  the  words  are 
spoken.  In  brief,  then,  the  one  object  or  event  seems  to  us  to 
be  the  cause,  the  other  the  effect,  when  we  think  of  the  two  as 
related  in  the  same  way  as  our  members  are  related  to  the 
weight  that  we  would  lift ;  while,  when  this  active  element  is  lack- 
ing and  we  picture  them  as  standing  to  each  other  as  our  bodies 
on  a  grassy  bank  to  the  swallows  flying  above  us,  we  regard  the 
events  as  merely  successive. 

So  close  is  the  connection  between  our  own  feeling  of  activity 
and  the  idea  of  cause  in  the  writer's  personal  experience  that  it 
has  frequently  been  noticed  when  registering  some  rhythmic 
process,  after  the  registration  movement  has  become  almost  reflex, 
that  the  movement  seems  to  be  the  cause  of  the  change  that  is 
recorded,  not  a  response  to  it. 

If  we  are  able  to  regard  the  sensations  of  strain  that  are 
ascribed  to  one  process  as  the  sign  that  it  is  the  cause  of  the 
event  that  succeeds  it,  the  more  important  of  the  two  partial 
problems  still  remains  to  be  solved  :  What  is  it  that  determines 
when  the  sign  is  to  attach  ?  It  might  seem  that  this  problem  be- 
longs to  some  other  science  than  psychology, —  either  to  episte- 
mology,  logic,  or  methodology.  This  must  be  admitted  as 
regards  some  of  the  aspects  of  the  problem,  and  that  it  be- 
longs in  part  to  the  different  sciences  that  are  concerned  with 
the  concrete  cases  of  connection  as  well ;  but,  in  addition,  it 
must  be  asserted  that  there  are  definite  conscious  conditions  that 
favor  its  entrance,  and  these  it  is  the  business  of  psychology  to 
deal  with. 

It  is  absurd  to  assume  that  psychology  may  with  propriety 
consider  the  conditions  of  sensation,  of  perception,  of  feeling  and 
action,  but  has  absolutely  nothing  to  say  concerning  reason  or 
belief  or  causality.  It  may  be  true  that  the  latter  problems  can 


412  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

only  find  their  final  explanation  in  logic  or  epistemology,  it  may 
even  be  that  their  most  important  phase  is  logical ;  but  it  is  also 
true  that  they  are  phenomena  which  take  place  in  the  same  mind 
as  that  with  which  we  feel  and  remember,  and  that  consequently 
they  have  a  psychological  aspect  that  must  be  considered,  if 
psychology  is  to  be  a  complete  science  of  mind. 

Perhaps  the  simplest  way  of  approaching  the  matter  is  to  con- 
sider the  arguments  pro  and  con  for  some  case  of  disputed  cau- 
sality. One  of  the  best  instances  that  can  be  found  on  the  bor- 
der-land of  science  is  as  to  the  existence  of  telepathy.  Here  we 
have  bandied  to  and  fro  the  question  as  to  whether  the  existence 
of  the  same  or  approximately  the  same  idea  in  two  minds  at  the 
same  time  is  or  is  not  to  be  explained  on  the  assumption  that  the 
one  idea  is  the  cause  of  the  other.  Three  tests  of  the  existence 
of  the  causal  relation  are  used  by  the  different  parties  in  the  con- 
troversy, the  number  of  instances  —  too  frequently  the  number 
of  positive  cases  with  no  reference  to  the  number  of  negative  — 
the  proportion  of  positive  to  negative  as  compared  with  the  ratio 
that  would  be  expected  were  there  no  causal  relation,  and  the 
degree  to  which  the  relation  can  be  made  to  harmonize  with  the 
remainder  of  our  knowledge. 

That  the  first  factor  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  make  us  regard 
two  events  as  causal  is  shown  by  the  immediate  reference  to  the 
law  of  probability,  practically  a  more  refined  application  of  the 
criterion  of  frequency  of  connection.  We  cannot,  of  course,  go 
into  a  discussion  of  the  mathematical  intricacies  here,  but  may 
satisfy  ourselves  with  noting  that,  in  cases  of  disputed  interpreta- 
tion, and  in  some  cases  where  the  probabilities  would  indicate  a 
causal  relation,  there  is  an  appeal  to  the  harmony  of  the  particu- 
lar connection  with  experience  as  a  whole.  In  the  instance  in 
hand,  the  question  of  excess  of  coincidences  over  the  probable 
chance  relations  is  very  much  in  dispute.  Each  man  who  dis- 
cusses the  census  of  hallucinations  adopts  a  different  method  for 
calculating  the  probabilities,  and  for  all  other  phenomena  that 
have  been  adduced  the  material  is  too  complicated  to  warrant 
any  attempt  at  mathematical  interpretation  and  we  are  left  with  a 
mere  series  of  uninterpreted  cases. 


No.  4-]    PSYCHOLOGICAL  NATURE   OF   CAUSALITY.          413 

The  lacking  element  is  supplied,  or  an  attempt  is  made  to  sup- 
ply it,  by  pointing  to  analogous  cases  of  connections  that  are  gen- 
erally recognized  as  causal.  In  the  case  in  question,  it  is  said  that 
two  minds  are  related  as  the  transmitter  and  receiver  of  the  wire- 
less telegraphy  apparatus.  Everyone  would  regard  this  method 
of  proof  as  in  a  large  measure  satisfactory,  were  it  only  possible 
to  indicate  in  the  brain  or  in  some  mental  process  anything  that 
could  easily  be  regarded  as  similar  in  function  to  trasmitter  and 
coherer,  or  to  anything  else  that  has  been  known  to  propagate 
electrical  waves  to  a  distance.  Those  who  do  believe  in  terms  of 
the  analogy  must  simply  overlook  the  differences  between  the 
two  functions  or  mechanisms,  and  keep  in  mind  the  similarities 
alone.  Even  the  result  of  the  calculation  of  probabilities  that 
is  made  by  the  different  protagonists  is  undoubtedly  influenced  in 
these  doubtful  cases  by  the  way  in  which  the  analogies  appeal  to 
the  computer.  One  predisposed  to  belief  is  very  likely  to  decide 
that  some  method  which  reaches  the  desired  result  is  the  correct 
one,  and  will  be  blind  to  its  deficiencies.  And  if  the  calculation 
of  probabilities  is  accepted  as  entirely  favorable  to  the  causal 
connection  between  the  two  mental  states  that  occur  simul- 
taneously, one  who  cannot  harmonize  the  belief  with  what  he 
knows  in  other  relations  will  regard  their  coincidence  as  merely 
a  curious  fact,  and  will  not  believe  that  there  is  any  deeper  lying 
connection  between  them.  It  is  harmony  with  experience  as  a 
whole  that  leads  us  to  assume  causality,  not  mere  counting  of 
instances,  or  calculation  of  probabilities. 

The  influence  of  the  elements  of  experience  other  than  the  two 
processes  actually  concerned  is  made  even  more  clear,  if  we  com- 
pare the  almost  universal  and  immediate  belief  in  the  Hertz  waves 
and  their  applications  with  the  general  skepticism  toward  telepathy. 
In  the  early  stages  the  number  of  cases  of  simultaneous  connection 
was  not  so  very  different, — the  differences  lay  entirely  or  very  largely 
in  the  fact  that  everything  we  knew  of  electrical  phenomena  agreed 
with  the  assumption  of  causal  relation  in  the  former  case  and  much 
of  experience  was  at  variance  with  the  assumption  in  the  latter. 

The  same  general  law  seems  to  hold  in  every  realm  of  science 
and  every-day  life.  We  feel  more  assured  of  the  causal  relation 


414  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

between  a  radiant  source  and  the  illumination  of  neighboring  sur- 
faces, when  we  picture  the  molecules  of  the  source  as  in  rapid 
vibration  and  waves  streaming  out  with  each  oscillation.  The 
added  certainty  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  picture  brings  the  new 
phenomenon  into  connection  with  the  very  familiar  means  of  pro- 
ducing waves  on  the  surface  of  the  water  or  with  the  methods 
of  producing  sounds.  Most  of  the  other  theories  of  science 
could  be  shown  to  consist  essentially  in  a  reduction  of  some  one 
phenomenon  to  another  form  which  was  more  familiar.  Each 
accepted  causal  connection  is  made  to  support  another,  as  well 
as  to  receive  support  from  those  already  believed  in.  From  this 
standpoint,  causality  would  seem  to  be  a  process  of  mutual  sup- 
port which  exists  between  the  analogous  relations  of  knowledge. 

In  every- day  life,  particularly  among  the  uncivilized  peoples,  a 
much  more  remote  analogy  will  serve  to  arouse  belief  in  a  cau- 
sal connection.  This  is  perhaps  best  seen  in  the  many  curative 
rites  of  savages.  It  is  believed  that  recovery  from  disease  of  an 
organ  has  occurred  because  a  part  of  that  organ  from  an  animal 
has  been  eaten  or  burned.  Even  if  the  analogy  will  not  with- 
stand rigid  examination,  it  fulfills  its  purpose  for  the  uncritical. 

We  may  sum  up  the  conditions  of  origin  of  the  causality  feel- 
ings so  far  as  they  are  conscious,  then,  in  the  two  considerations 
of  the  frequency  of  occurrence,  or  more  strictly  in  the  number  of 
connections  in  relation  to  the  number  of  occurrences  of  the  first, 
and  secondly,  in  the  degree  in  which  this  particular  connection 
can  be  made  to  harmonize  with  our  experience  as  a  whole. 

Much  more  frequently  than  otherwise,  however,  there  is  no  con- 
scious tracing  of  analogies,  but  the  harmony  with  experience  as 
a  whole  works  unconsciously  to  give  the  feeling  of  causality. 
We  do  not  stop  to  think  each  time  of  the  similarities  which  exist 
between  the  new  and  the  old  connections,  but  they  nevertheless 
work  unconsciously.  We  do  not  need  to  delay  our  decision  as 
to  the  reality  of  the  connection  between  the  shape  of  the  moon 
and  the  state  of  the  weather  while  we  analyze  the  two  facts  into 
their  elements  or  search  for  analogies.  We  are  content  with  the 
simple  statement  of  disbelief.  But  this  statement  rests  upon  very 
much  the  same  set  of  conditions,  working  unconsciously,  that 


No.  4.]    PSYCHOLOGICAL  NATURE   OF  CAUSALITY.          415 

were  consciously  at  work  in  the  preceding  case.  The  connection 
considered  is  either  in  harmony  with  what  we  have  known  before 
or  is  not  in  harmony  with  it.  In  the  one  case  we  are  ready  to 
accept  the  particular  connection  as  causal,  and  in  the  other  we 
affirm  there  is  only  a  chance  coincidence.  But  there  is  in  neither 
an  actual  presence  in  consciousness  of  the  related  experiences. 
The  only  sign  that  we  have  of  their  action  is  in  the  attribution  of 
strain  sensations  in  one  case  and  the  absence  of  strain  sensations 
in  the  other.  The  decision  comes  up  without  any  fore-knowl- 
edge that  the  decision  was  to  be  made.  The  process  is  never- 
theless one  in  which  the  sum  total  of  previous  knowledge  is  at 
work  in  reinforcing  the  final  conclusion. 

The  best  evidence  for  this  statement  is  to  be  found  in  the  way 
that  what  appears  a  causal  relation  varies  with  the  experi- 
ence of  the  individual.  Tell  a  child  that  the  morning  milk  was 
soured  by  the  pixies,  who  exchanged  old  milk  for  fresh,  and  it 
will  at  once  accept  the  explanation.  An  educated  adult  may 
scoff  at  the  statement  but  believe  that  the  electrical  phenomena 
accompanying  a  thunderstorm  are  responsible,  while  the  physical 
chemist  will  question  this  explanation  also.  The  difference  is 
due  entirely  to  the  knowledge  that  each  has.  Ascribe  the  fail- 
ure of  a  crop  to  the  fact  that  the  seed  was  planted  during  the 
waning  of  the  moon,  and  the  country  bumpkin  will  consider  it  as 
adequate  without  consideration  of  any  kind,  while  his  neighbor 
of  more  education  will  refuse  to  believe  with  just  as  little  hesita- 
tion and  just  as  little  apparent  reason.  In  both  these  cases  we 
must  assume  that  the  deciding  motive  is  the  past  experience  of 
the  individual,  his  knowledge  of  similar  and  related  facts,  but  that 
these  work  immediately  to  support  or  reject  the  causal  relation, 
and  that  we  are  not  conscious  of  them  but  merely  of  their  effect. 
It  is  a  process  of  physiological  reinforcement  between  the  dif- 
ferent nerve  cells  rather  than  a  conscious  and  reasoned  decision  in 
terms  of  one  interpretation  or  another.  In  this  case  it  seems  that 
we  have  reached  a  conclusion  not  very  different  from  Bosanquet's 
when  he  makes  causality  depend  upon  the  reception  of  the  par- 
ticular relationship  into  a  system  of  knowledge,  or  into  the  world 
of  meanings,  except  that  the  system  arises  from  the  organization 


416  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

of  the  individual's  knowledge,  and  is  in  no  sense  a  supra-mental 
process. 

In  short,  then,  the  anthropomorphic  feeling  of  strain,  which 
constitutes  an  essential  element  of  the  sign  of  causality,  will  be 
called  up  by  the  first  of  two  succeeding  events,  when  they  have 
occurred  together  frequently,  and  when  all  other  experiences  serve 
to  confirm  the  assumption  that  they  cannot  exist  apart.  While 
each  of  these  factors  plays  a  part,  it  can,  I  think,  be  said  that  the 
last  contributes  most.  The  closeness  or  frequency  of  connection 
usually  furnishes  the  occasion  for  the  belief  in  a  causal  relation, 
and  the  more  frequent  it  is,  the  more  likely  are  we  to  raise  the 
question  ;  but  frequency  of  connection  alone  will  never  satisfy  us. 
Even  if  we  should  put  the  matter  on  a  scientific  basis,  and  find  that 
there  is  always  a  quantitative  relation  between  the  variations  of 
the  two  elements,  we  would  not  ordinarily  be  led  beyond  the  state- 
ment that  it  was  a  curious  coincidence,  unless  the  relation  in 
question  could  be  articulated,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  with 
the  great  mass  of  our  experience.  The  causal  relation  is  merely 
affirmed  to  be  possible  on  the  basis  of  coincidence  or  succession  ; 
it  is  asserted  only  when  it  can  be  assimilated  to  the  body  of 
knowledge  already  acquired. 

If  this  analysis  of  the  psychological  nature  of  the  causal  rela- 
tion is  accepted  provisionally,  it  may  be  interesting  to  attempt  to 
apply  the  conclusions  reached  to  the  disputed  problem  of  the 
connection  of  mind  and  body.  This  should  at  once  furnish  a 
good  instance  for  throwing  light  on  our  own  problem,  and  also 
serve  to  make  clearer  the  difficulties  that  attend  a  formulation 
of  the  psycho -physical  relation. 

As  a  preliminary,  and  to  avoid  complicating  our  problem  with 
fundamental  differences  of  standpoint,  we  may  assume  that  both 
of  the  terms  in  the  relation  are  for  our  purposes  mental  states, 
parts  of  one  experience.  We  have  simply  the  question  as  to 
what  is  the  connection  that  is  to  be  understood  to  exist  between 
the  one  experience  that  we  call  sensation  and  the  other  experi- 
ence, the  acting  nerve-cell.  If  we  regard  them' as  two  series  of 
experiences  that  occur  together,  how  much  is  there  to  mark  them 
as  causally  related,  and  how  much  evidence  to  show  that  they 
are  merely  concomitant. 


No.  4.]    PSYCHOLOGICAL  NATURE   OF  CAUSALITY.          417 

It  may  be  assumed  by  universal  consent  that  they  possess  the 
first  two  conditions  of  causality, — they  are  always  found  together, 
one  invariably  accompanies  the  other.  There  is  a  certain  amount 
of  interpretation  even  in  this  statement,  but  it  is  an  interpretation 
that  can  hardly  be  avoided,  and  in  the  light  of  general  acceptance 
needs  no  discussion.  The  quantitative  relation  may  also  be 
assumed  to  hold,  roughly  at  least.  So  far  as  we  may  apply 
quantitative  terms  to  the  measurements  of  the  series,  we  may  say 
that  change  of  intensity  in  a  given  direction  in  one  series  is  always 
accompanied  by  a  change  in  a  similar  direction  in  the  other.  Of 
course,  no  identity  in  the  amount  of  energy  transferred  can  be 
established  between  them,  but  there  are  extremely  few  cases  of 
physical  causation  in  which  the  amount  of  energy  in  the  effective 
agent  and  in  the  process  affected  can  be  directly  measured  and 
shown  to  be  identical.  Evidently,  then,  the  simpler,  more 
direct  tests  would  indicate  unequivocally  that  the  set  of  experi- 
ences which  we  call  the  bodily  states  are  the  causes  of  the  mental 
states  and  that  mental  states  are  the  causes  of  bodily  movements. 

Still  there  is  by  no  means  general  agreement  that  the  one  is 
the  cause  of  the  other,  and  the  reason  very  evidently  is  that  to 
call  the  connection  causal  cannot  be  made  to  square  with  the 
remainder  of  our  experience.  In  the  first  place,  we  can  find  no 
analogy  for  the  relation  between  body  and  mind  in  any  other 
relation.  It  is  a  fact  sui  generis.  Nowhere  else  are  we  com- 
pelled to  connect  all  of  our  experience  with  a  single  small  ele- 
ment of  experience.  Again,  there  is  no  possibility  of  analyzing 
the  whole  relation  into  a  number  of  partial  relations.  We  can 
analyze  either  experience  separately  into  elements,  body  into 
brain  and  not-brain,  brain  into  nerve-cells,  nerve-cells  conceivably 
into  chemical  elements,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  experience  into 
ideas  and  sensations ;  but  nowhere  do  we  find  the  elements  related 
more  closely  than  are  the  two  series  as  a  whole.  We  can  never 
see  one  pass  over  into  the  other,  we  never  have  anything  more 
than  the  mere  brute  fact  that  the  two  processes  are  there  side  by 
side ;  there  is  no  resolving,  no  comparing  possible. 

When  specific  arguments  are  raised  against  regarding  the  two 
sets  of  experiences  as  causally  related,  it  is  always  because  the 


41 8  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

interpretation  cannot  be  harmonized  with  the  explanations  that 
have  been  given  for  other  facts  of  experience.  To  accept  it,  our 
conception  of  other  physical  laws  must  be  changed.  It  is  alleged 
that  we  cannot  hold  both  to  the  doctrine  of  conservation  of 
energy,  or  of  the  equivalence  of  energy  between  cause  and  effect, 
and  to  interaction  between  mind  and  body.  Even  when  it  is 
admitted  that  the  physical  doctrines  in  question  are  merely  work- 
ing hypotheses,  there  is  yet  a  marked  indisposition  to  abandon 
principles  of  explanation  that  have  served  so  useful  a  purpose  in 
the  organization  of  knowledge,  for  a  new  and  isolated  fact  or 
principle.  Even  those  writers  who  argue  in  favor  of  interaction 
furnish  equally  good  evidence  for  the  view  that  harmony  with 
experience  is  the  occasion  for  the  origin  of  the  feeling  of  causality. 
To  them  the  importance  of  explaining  more  definitely,  or 
rather,  of  picturing  to  themselves  more  distinctly,  the  rela- 
tion between  body  and  mind  seems  greater  than  to  retain  the 
fundamental  physical  hypotheses.  Experience  seems  less  ade- 
quately organized  when  they  leave  uncertain  the  relation  of 
body  and  mind  than  when  they  give  up  the  doctrines  of  conserva- 
tion and  equivalence  of  energy  in  the  physical  universe.  They 
are  ready  to  reorganize  their  knowledge  about  the  assumption 
that  there  is  a  real  interaction  between  body  and  mind,  and  will 
sacrifice  all  general  principles  of  organization  that  are  incompati- 
ble with  it. 

Many  of  the  historical  theories  of  the  relation  of  the  body  and 
mind  and  of  their  intimate  nature  can  be  seen  to  have  developed 
in  consequence  of  a  desire  to  find  an  analogy  for  the  relation 
which  would  permit  it  to  be  subsumed  under  some  general  cate- 
gory, without  at  the  same  time  displacing  some  equally  important 
fact.  On  the  one  hand,  mind  has  been  made  an  epiphenomenal 
accompaniment  of  the  material ;  on  the  other,  all  real  existence 
has  been  denied  to  the  group  of  experiences  usually  designated 
as  physical,  in  order  that  the  difficulty  of  settling  the  question  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  relation  might  be  avoided.  Or  both  groups 
of  experience  are  reduced  to  a  single  homogeneous  one,  now 
mental,  now  physical,  now  neither,  now  both,  that  a  causal  rela- 
tion may  be  assumed  and  other  fundamental  laws  be  retained ; 


No.  4-]    PSYCHOLOGICAL  NATURE   OF  CAUSALITY.          4*9 

but  no  suggestion  as  yet  seems  to  be  able  to  harmonize  the 
known  facts  of  the  relation  of  body  and  mind  with  the  mass  of 
knowledge  already  organized.  All  classifications  that  are  sug- 
gested seem  to  leave  some  facts  or  some  partial  generalizations 
unincluded. 

Furthermore,  the  attempts  of  Fechner  and  others  to  find  an 
analogy  which  will  permit  the  two  series  to  be  essentially  related 
to  each  other  without  assuming  a  causal  relation,  equally  well 
show  a  desire  to  harmonize  the  relation  with  other  experiences, 
even  if  causality  must  be  given  up,  and  illustrate  the  fact  that  it 
is  conceivable  that  there  may  be  a  complete  and  universal  con- 
comitance or  an  invariable  succession  —  even  a  quantitative  equiv- 
alence —  of  phenomena,  without  the  implication  of  causation. 

Two  conclusions  are  forced  upon  us  from  the  consideration  of 
the  arguments  as  to  the  relation  of  mind  and  body.  As  to  the 
latter,  it  is  evident  that  what  is  needed  for  a  general  agreement 
that  mind  acts  upon  body  and  body  upon  mind,  is  to  find  a  way 
of  conceiving  the  relation  that  can  be  taken  up  into  the  general 
mass  of  knowledge  without  doing  violence  to  any  of  the  partial 
organizations  already  completed.  This  may  come  either  by  the 
way  of  some  new  method  of  conceiving  the  relation  that  shall 
steer  between  the  Scylla  of  causal  nexus  and  the  Charybdis  of 
concomitance  without  essential  connection,  or  it  may  come 
through  a  reorganization  of  experience  that  shall  make  some  of 
the  general  hypotheses  which  now  stand  as  an  obstacle  seem 
unessential  or  disappear.  What  is  needed  is  not  an  increase  in 
the  number  of  instances,  but  a  new  way  of  formulating  the  con- 
nection, or  the  discovery  of  related  facts  that  may  illumine  the 
relation. 

As  regards  our  main  problem,  it  is  evident  that  it  is  an  essen- 
tial condition  for  the  origin  of  the  causal  feeling  that  the  connec- 
tion in  question  can  be  made  to  enter  into  relation  with  other 
events  which  are  already  regarded  as  causal.  The  causal  rela- 
tion arises  from  a  mutual  support  that  each  connection  gives  to 
all  others.  Mere  frequency  of  succession  or  of  concomitance 
alone  is  insufficient  to  bring  up  the  impression  of  causality. 

W.   B.   PlLLSBURY. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN. 


VOLUNTARISM  AND  INTELLECTUALISM  : 
A  RECONCILIATION. 

TNTELLECTUALISM  has  ruled  the  world  now  for  some 
•*•  centuries,  and  its  authority  has  grown  ever  stronger  until 
at  present  its  very  strength  has  roused  opposition.  So  trium- 
phant has  science  been  over  error,  wherever  it  has  come  into  col- 
lision with  it,  that  all  other  aims  have  tended  to  be  despised,  if 
not  denied  all  validity.  Science  was  said  to  be  objective,  perma- 
nent, and  consistent ;  but  as  to  the  feelings  or  desires,  these  were 
scorned  as  being  subjective,  transitory,  and  contradictory.  To 
accumulate  knowledge,  to  wrest  secrets  from  outward  nature,  to 
enter  into  the  inmost  constitution  of  matter,  to  know  the  uni- 
verse completely,  was  regarded  alone  as  a  worthy  aim.  Right, 
beauty,  happiness,  were  looked  upon  by  Intellectualists  as  either 
fictions  of  the  imagination  or  else  as  aspects  of  reason  ;  for  moral, 
aesthetic,  and  pleasurable  feelings,  just  because  they  are  feelings, 
were  held  to  be  shifting  and  unworthy  of  respect  of  a  reasonable 
being.  Only  reason,  according  to  this  theory,  is  rigid,  perma- 
nent, clear,  and  nothing  which  is  not  such  could  claim  authority. 
Such  a  view  of  reason  appears  irresistible  while  we  are  its 
enthusiastic  disciples,  for  our  enthusiasm  excludes  an  appreci- 
ation or  comprehension  of  any  other  attitude.  To  reason  we 
pay  respect,  because  it  is  the  reason ;  and  for  the  feelings  we 
express  contempt,  because  they  are  not  the  reason.  Our  Intel- 
lectualism  becomes  here  a  solid  proof  of  its  opponent  Voluntar- 
ism, since  the  defence  of  Intellectualism  is  grounded  in  the  fact 
that  we  have  such  and  such  feelings,  —  feelings  of  respect  for 
reason,  feelings  of  contempt  for  feelings.  As  regards  logically 
justifying  our  attitude,  we  might  with  equal  right  favor  the  new 
contention,  that  of  contempt  for  reason  and  respect  for  feelings  ; 
for  given  an  individualistic  defence,  and  there  is  nothing  to  make 
us  incline  to  the  one  attitude  rather  than  to  the  other.  Indeed, 
our  individual  inclinations  will  determine  what  we  assent  to, 
which  is  saying  that  we  agree  with  those  who  agree  with  us. 

420 


VOLUNTARISM  AND   INTELLECTUALISM.  421 

A  line  of  thought  of  this  nature  is,  however,  destructive  of 
itself,  for  it  removes  the  ground  underneath  us.  If  all  reason 
and  feeling  be  opinion,  and  all  opinion  be  final,  then  there  is  no 
common  truth  and  we  must  cease  to  be  propagandists.  Each 
one  ,must  be  satisfied  with  whatever  the  fancy  of  the  moment 
suggests,  and  we  must  never  think  that  that  fancy  will  live 
another  moment  or  find  an  echo  in  the  mind  of  anyone  else. 
Everything,  accordingly,  is  a  matter  of  capricious  taste,  and  we 
ought  never  to  argue  about  it  nor  ever  attempt  to  convert  others 
to  our  tastes.  Such  a  consummation  would  be  disappointing  to 
both  Intellectualist  and  Voluntarist,  for  they  do  defend  their  posi- 
tions and  do  try  to  convert  each  other ;  yet  since  this  line  of  thought 
would  bring  us  to  a  deadlock,  nothing  remains  but  to  forsake  it  and 
find,  if  possible,  some  more  consistent  way  out  of  our  difficulties. 

First,  we  must  recognize  that  the  disciple  of  exclusive  reason 
cannot  defend  his  position,  except  by  a  method  which  makes 
short  work  of  his  claims.  If  truths  of  nature  have  been  for 
centuries  accentuated  and  eagerly  sought,  we  are  only  entitled 
to  conclude  that  that  accentuation  was  due  to  certain  factors 
active  at  a  certain  period  of  human  history.  Accordingly,  it 
might  well  be  that  at  some  other  period  men  should  adopt  the 
same  exclusive  attitude  as  regards  aesthetics  or  morals,  and  look 
with  impatience  and  disdain  on  the  man  who  seeks  to  reveal 
truths  of  nature, —  as,  indeed,  many  an  artist  and  many  a  moral- 
ist in  the  past  has  adopted  such  a  point  of  view.  Apart,  there- 
fore, from  a  comprehensive  and  organic  conception  of  human 
nature,  we  may  expect  the  current  of  historic  thought  to  change 
its  direction  from  time  to  time,  and  to  favor  now  one  class  of 
conceptions  and  then  another,  without  being  able  to  justify  the 
changes.  How  many  a  pleasure  seeker  is  amused  at  the  per- 
versity of  the  man  who  pursues  truth  !  How  many  a  lover  of 
art  looks  down  on  him  who  seeks,  instead  of  enjoying  and  ad- 
miring !  And  how  many  a  moralist  regards  truth,  pleasure,  and 
beauty,  as  so  many  trifles  which  should  leave  the  serious  man 
unmoved  !  Manifestly,  men's  attitudes  differ. 

Intellectualism,  as  a  theory,  is  peculiarly  indefensible.  If  we 
examine  the  object  of  science  we  find  that  it  is  determined  by 


422  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

many  utilitarian  considerations.  Men  do  not  industriously  count 
the  pebbles  on  the  sea  shore  or  the  leaves  on  the  trees,  and  they 
do  not  merely  state  facts  as  such,  for  if  they  did  only  these 
things,  science,  as  we  know  it,  would  not  be ;  but  men  seek  gen- 
eral truths,  truths  which  tell  them  what  are  the  general  features 
of  the  world  they  live  in  to-day,  and  these  truths  they  mainly  seek 
so  as  to  remove  superstition,  fear,  and  helplessness.  The  very 
essence  of  science  is  thus  utilitarian,  for  the  object  of  generalizing 
is  human  nature's  shorthand  method  of  reaching  facts,  and  the 
reaching  of  facts,  in  its  turn,  implies  the  reaching  of  useful  facts. 

The  incompleteness  of  Intellectualism  may  be  demonstrated 
in  another  way.  Intellectualism  is  said  to  voice  the  demands  of 
truth  as  such  ;  and  yet  not  only  does  it,  as  we  have  just  seen,  seek 
only  for  general  truths,  but,  until  recently  at  least,  it  ignored 
everything  but  physics  and  philosophy.  Psychology,  human 
welfare,  ethics,  aesthetics,  education,  religion,  economics,  were 
left  on  one  side,  as  if  they  dealt  with  fictions,  or  else  they  were 
regarded  as  if  truth  were  not  concerned  with  them.  Instead  of 
being  placidly  impartial,  Intellectualists  pick  and  choose  their  facts 
and  apply  standards  of  value  to  orders  of  facts. 

Furthermore,  the  groundwork  itself  of  physical  facts  is  but  a 
mental  product,  since  the  various  senses  make  us  apprehend  the 
world  in  a  way  which  shall  be  satisfactory  to  us.  Except  for  this, 
the  eye  would  see  the  world  as  a  blur,  with  no  outlines  or  pat- 
terns, or  else  it  would  see  the  world  as  he  who  suffers  from 
hallucinations  sees  it.  The  normal  man  is  encouraged  by  hered- 
ity to  select  certain  features  in  the  environment  according  to  a 
certain  plan,  though  he  might  select  other  features,  or  unite  them 
according  to  a  different  plan.  For  this  reason  our  outer  world  is 
not  objective,  in  the  sense  of  being  'given'  such  as  it  is;  it  is 
rather  the  result  of  planful  selection,  the  conception  being  vitally, 
though  not  wholly,  determined  by  socio-utilitarian  considerations. 

Finally,  the  relevant  fact  in  reasoning  is  constituted  by  the  proc- 
ess of  a  need  seeking  satisfaction,  especially  when  that  process 
is  prolonged  and  difficult  and  takes  place  in  the  realm  of  ideas. 
Strictly  speaking,  then,  Intellectualism  is  Voluntarism,  and  Intel- 
lectualism approaches  nearest  to  itself  when  the  process  of  seeking 


No.  4.]       VOLUNTARISM  AND  INTELLECTUALISM.  423 

satisfaction  becomes  itself  a  need ;  but  even  here,  of  course,  a 
need  determines  what  is  done. 

Our  criticism  of  the  Intellectualist  method  has  limited,  but  not 
destroyed,  the  claims  of  science.  The  Voluntarist  must  prove 
science  to  be  Intellectualistic  before  he  condemns  it,  and  that, 
we  have  seen,  he  cannot  accomplish,  since  science  is  utilitarian  in 
principle.  His  claim  can  only  be  that  science  cannot  logically  arro- 
gate to  itself  the  position  of  a  despotic  ruler  in  the  mental  realm. 

The  Voluntarist  reasons  that  our  will  is  not  to  be  limited,  and 
that  truth  has  no  hall  marks.  Seeing  the  relative  anarchy  which 
prevails  among  needs,  he  posits  an  absolute  anarchy.  If  A  loves 
truth,  B  pleasure,  C  morality,  and  D  the  beautiful,  why  should 
not  others  seek  Nirvana,  Brahma,  or  the  Absolute,  as  a  haven  of 
rest  ?  Why  should  they  not  choose  for  their  faith  Christianity, 
Buddhism,  Confucianism,  or  Mohammedanism  ?  Why  not  be 
spiritists  ?  Why  not  live  in  a  world  of  their  own,  with  a  god 
or  gods  of  their  own  ?  Why  not  follow  the  inner  light,  or  intui- 
tions, or  private  revelations  ?  Once  truth  is  assumed  as  having 
no  signs  by  which  it  may  be  recognized,  once  it  is  regarded  as 
being  many-faced,  and  all  reasonable  discussion  must  cease. 
Anybody  may  be  right  and  everybody  may  be  right.  The  most 
reasonable  or  the  most  commonly  accepted  view  may  be  wrong, 
and  the  most  unreasonable  or  the  most  uncommon  view  may  be 
right.  As  error  is  assumed  to  be  in  appearance  the  same  as 
truth  and  as  appealing  to  us  as  strongly,  we  need  trouble  as 
little  about  error  at  about  truth,  and  simply  abide  in  our  faith, 
whatever  it  may  chance  to  be,  without  attempting  to  convert 
others,  if,  indeed,  such  an  attitude  does  not  transform  us  into 
pure  sceptics.  Voluntarism,  unless  it  is  organic  and  reasoned, 
thus  leads  to  superstition,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  scepticism,  on 
the  other.  By  comparison  the  inconsistent  intellectualist  position 
is  much  to  be  preferred. 

An  organic  conception  of  human  nature  readily  reconciles  the 
opposing  views.  We  are  social  beings,  and  we  can  only  remain 
in  society  if  truth  itself  is  social.  If  the  different  members  of 
society  practised  different  moralities  and  had  radically  diverging 
conceptions  of  government,  or  if  they  had,  what  would  be  worse, 


424  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

radically  different  ways  of  sensing  things  or  reasoning  about  them, 
government  and  society  would  cease.  Cannibals  and  altruists, 
sane  men  and  madmen,  are  irreconcilable  elements  with  which  no 
society  can  be  built  up.  Voluntarism  would  mean  here  anarchy 
and  anarchism ;  but  men,  up  to  the  present  at  least,  have  been 
social  beings,  and  they  will  collectively  meet  the  individual 
anarchist  and  convince  or  eradicate  him.  Madmen  and  an- 
archists do  not  organize,  and  hence,  leaving  aside  the  question  of 
right  or  wrong,  society  will  eliminate  the  anarchistic  Voluntarist. 
There  will  be  in  this  way  a  tendency  to  have  Voluntarists  of  one 
kind,  and  truth  will  thus  remain  social. 

Nature  also  has  a  summary  method  of  dealing  with  those  who 
do  not  care  to  agree  with  her.  Let  men  exalt  hunger,  thirst, 
uncleanliness,  wilfulness,  life-long  virginity,  and  nature  will  select 
for  survival  others  who  do  not  exalt  these  things.  Many  a  per- 
son has  said  that  he  defies  death  or  that  he  will  not  die  ;  but 
ancient  Rome,  Greece,  and  Judea  have  no  living  representatives 
to-day.  To  a  large  extent,  therefore,  truth  is  natural.  Absolute 
Voluntarism  would  allow  no  barriers  and  would  settle  every- 
thing for  itself  in  its  own  way  ;  but  nature  only  admits  of  a  rela- 
tive Voluntarism  which  shall  be  in  agreement  with  her  own  ways. 
Society  and  nature  thus  combine  to  shape  and  restrain  men's 
wills ;  the  individual  will  is  met  by  the  opposing  wills  of  others 
and  by  the  hard  and  fast  lines  drawn  by  nature,  and  either  he 
makes  peace  with  these  or  else  he  succumbs. 

However,  the  greatest  foes  of  Voluntarism  dwell  in  its  own 
household.  We  do  not  have  one  will,  at  least,  most  of  us ;  we 
have  many  wills.  We  love  truth,  pleasure,  morality,  humor,  the 
beautiful,  and  much  else.  We  believe  truth  to  be  discoverable 
and  universal,  and  we  are  anxious  that  others  should  share  our 
views.  We  wish  to  lead  a  consistent  life,  and  not  to  be  wavering 
or  changing.  We  are  not  satisfied  to  stand  isolated,  or  to  take 
each  moment  as  it  comes.  The  result  of  this  is  a  struggle 
among  the  needs.  Not  a  life  and  death  struggle  usually ;  but 
one  which  admits  of  constant  compromise.  When  one  need  is 
to  some  extent  opposed  to  another,  the  needs  adjust  themselves 
one  to  the  other  until  there  is  something  like  harmony  between 


No.  4.]        VOLUNTARISM  AND   INTELLECTUALISM.  425 

them.  The  need  most  important  to  the  organism  becomes  the 
ruling  principle,  and  needs  which  are  irreconcilable  with  the 
greater  good  are  checked,  suppressed,  or  eliminated.  For  a 
time,  indeed,  one  or  another  casual  need  may  prevail ;  but  most 
men  have  a  strong  desire  to  live  a  full  life  and  not  to  allow  them- 
selves to  be  imposed  upon  by  needs  which  may  have  to  be 
avoided.  Add  to  this  that  it  would  be  extravagant  to  assume 
that  human  nature  is  irrational  or  a  bundle  of  irreconcilable  ex- 
tremes, and  the  conclusion  is  forced  upon  us  that  human  nature 
is  after  all  an  organic  whole,  though  an  imperfect  one  which  has 
to  be  made  perfect.  Pleasure,  truth,  morality,  beauty,  have 
each  their  place,  or,  more  correctly  speaking,  they  are  one, 
though  they  may  seem  many. 

Voluntarism,  thus  conceived  as  organic,  represents  a  consistent 
and  cheerful  philosophical  view,  especially  if  we  bear  in  mind  that 
most  men  not  only  wish  to  be  at  peace  with  themselves  and  live 
a  harmonious  life,  but  that  they  almost  equally  wish  to  live  in 
harmony  with  their  fellows  and  with  nature.  The  last  statement 
is  as  important  as  it  is  true.  Conceiving  themselves  as  social 
beings,  men  deliberately  adapt  or  modify  their  needs  so  as  to  be 
in  harmony  with  society.  To  such  an  extent  is  this  true  that  it 
is  difficult  to  conceive  what  we  should  be  apart  from  our  social 
environment,  for  even  those  who  are  eccentric  are  largely  deter- 
mined in  their  eccentricity  by  the  doings  of  their  fellows.  In 
accordance  with  this,  men  think  it  natural  to  listen  to  remonstra- 
tions  and  praises,  and  to  be  influenced  by  them.  In  this  sense, 
we  and  our  fellows  form  a  single  whole,  just  as  the  various  needs 
in  the  self  form  one  single  whole.  Similarly,  though  not  quite 
to  the  same  extent,  we  are  in  sympathy  with  nature,  regarding 
ourselves  and  society  as  a  part  of  it,  and  respecting  it  consequently. 

The  self,  as  I  have  said,  is  an  imperfect  organism,  and  hence 
arise  difficulties.  Especially  is  this  so  with  the  many  men  who 
diverge  from  the  type  of  the  day.  We  need  not  consider  the 
extreme  instances  of  madmen,  for  the  unsocial  nature  of  madness 
is  evident  from  the  manner  in  which  society  isolates  and  restrains 
madmen.  In  numerous  cases,  however,  abnormality  not  only  ex- 
ists, but  is  scarcely  regarded  as  unsocial,  at  all  events  in  some  re- 


426  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

spects.  It  has  been  pointed  out,  by  Professor  James  and  others, 
that  great  sensitiveness  to  certain  facts  remains  a  valuable  quality, 
even  though  that  sensitiveness  is  connected  with,  or  is  due  to, 
abnormal  or  even  diseased  states.  Julius  Caesar,  St.  Paul,  King 
Alfred,  and  Mohammed  may  have  been  great  because  of  certain 
abnormalities  in  their  nature  that  led  to  beneficent  secondary 
changes,  i.  e.,  the  tendency  to  epilepsy  and  the  states  connected 
therewith.  But  even  if  we  subtract  the  illusions  which  may  have 
been  caused  by  the  abnormal  epileptic  state,  or  subtract  the 
epileptic  state  altogether  as  being  perhaps  the  result,  and  not  the 
cause,  of  great  sensitiveness,  it  yet  may  well  be  that  extreme 
sensitiveness  will  reveal  what  is  hidden  from  the  dull  average 
person.  The  '  sensitive '  may  have  his  place  in  society,  though 
it  would  be  better  if  he  had  the  advantages  without  the  disadvan- 
tages of  being  '  sensitive.'  At  all  events,  from  the  utilitarian 
point  of  view,  there  is  no  justification  for  condemning  or  depre- 
ciating a  man  simply  because  he  differs  from  the  average  member 
of  society.  The  profoundly  pious,  the  mystic,  the  spiritist,  the 
visionary,  are  perhaps  nearer  the  truth  than  their  fellows,  though 
it  is  very  far  from  true  that  it  is  a  peculiar  virtue  to  be  differently 
constituted  from  the  majority.  The  ideal  man  is  yet  to  be  dis- 
covered or  created,  and  until  then  we  must  allow  as  a  possibility 
that  a  deviation  from  the  normal  may  constitute  a  closer  approach 
to  the  ideal. 

A  palpable  instance,  which  illustrates  that  a  deviation  from  the 
normal  is  not  unreasonable,  is  seen  in  the  case  of  those  who  have 
special  susceptibilities.  A  great  singer,  a  great  composer,  a  great 
player,  a  great  painter,  differ  very  much  from  the  average  indi- 
vidual, and  yet  no  one  would  condemn  them  because  of  that. 
Abnormality  here,  because  it  is  useful,  is  envied  rather  than 
frowned  upon.  An  ideal  society  might  very  well  consist  of  men 
exceptional  in  some  respects,  that  is,  the  various  members  of  such 
a  society  would  each  have  some  particular  useful  trait  exception- 
ally developed.  Nor  does  a  dead  uniformity  represent  a  desir- 
able social  condition.  Rather  should  one  encourage  the  greatest 
diversity  among  the  members  of  a  society,  provided  only  that 
the  diversities  or  eccentricities  be  innocent  or  useful.  There  is 


No.  4.]       VOLUNTARISM  AND   INTELLECTUALISM.  427 

no  reason  why  each  one  should  be  a  copy  of  another,  why  we 
should  be  shocked  at  a  departure  from  the  normal,  or  why  we 
should  aim  at  similarity  of  character.  Ours  is  not  yet  the  per- 
fect state,  and  until  that  unattainable  state  be  attained,  we  may 
allow  persons  to  experiment  or  to  gratify  themselves  in  their 
own  way,  if  they  will  only  respect  the  more  essential  demands 
made  on  them.  In  small  matters,  liberty ;  in  large  matters, 
unity. 

The  fact  that  the  interest  in  science  will  perhaps  be  displaced 
by  an  interest  in  morality  or  aesthetics,  argues  no  anarchy,  since  it 
may  well  be  that  it  requires  extensive  favorable  periods  to  develop 
to  some  extent  some  one  department  of  life.  Accordingly,  if 
ethics,  theoretical  and  practical,  should  now  take  the  place  which 
physical  science  has  been  occupying  for  some  centuries,  and  if, 
in  its  turn,  the  reign  of  morality  be  but  a  precursor  to  an  aesthetic 
period,  this  ought  to  be  a  matter  for  congratulation,  as  arguing 
advance  along  many  lines.  In  a  highly  evolved  community, 
the  part  of  ourselves  to  be  developed  would  be  deliberately 
decided  upon ;  but  this  only  means  that  communities  still  far 
from  being  highly  evolved  have  to  grope  their  way  along,  and 
must  be  satisfied  with  approximations  and  with  betterments  which 
have  not  been  consciously  and  connectedly  thought  out. 

All  tastes  and  desires  are  individual,  and  the  taste  of  any  indi- 
vidual or  period  is  consequently  not  necessarily  right  or  wrong. 
This  has  to  be  allowed,  if  we  are  to  avoid  the  two  extremes, 
dogmatism  and  scepticism.  Also,  everything,  science  included,  is 
a  matter  of  needs,  and  men's  needs  do  not  completely  agree. 
Nevertheless,  the  various  needs  in  the  individual  tend  to  be 
shaped  in  the  light  of  a  common  ideal  of  the  individual  self,  and 
thus  certain  needs  come  to  be  modified,  discouraged,  or  elimi- 
nated, and  the  same  process  takes  place  when  the  needs  of  the 
individual  are  not  in  agreement  with  social  needs  or  with  nature. 
So,  also,  the  present  ideal  is  regarded  in  the  light  of  a  general  and 
progressive  social  and  moral  ideal.  Assuredly,  therefore,  Prag- 
matic morality  is  restricted  and  not  free,  and  the  Pragmatist  is  as 
one-sided  as  the  Intellectualist,  if  he  imagines  that  Pragmatism 
justifies  any  and  every  kind  of  opinion  as  being  of  equal  value. 


428  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

This  is  made  evident  by  the  fact  that  scarcely  any  one  is  satisfied 
with  splendid  isolation.  Individualist,  humanitarian,  socialist,  anar- 
chist, Tolstoyan,  they  all  set  up  social  codes  and  aim  at  convert- 
ing their  neighbors.  As  it  cannot  be  settled  a  priori  what  the 
ideal  is,  since  that  depends  partly  on  the  point  to  which  a  being 
or  a  society  has  developed,  it  is  naturally  right  for  people  to 
urge  their  own  standards  as  possibly  being  nearer  perfection 
than  those  of  their  neighbors. 

Modern  Voluntarism  is  chiefly  due,  if  I  mistake  not,  to  the 
effort  to  escape  the  relentless  conclusions  of  science,  which  are 
hostile  to  many  current,  especially  religious,  conceptions.  Yet, 
while  this  theory  is  successful  in  showing  that  physical  science 
has  no  right  to  claim  that  man  must  worship  at  no  other  shrine, 
its  extreme  champions  are  wrong  in  hinting  at  the  conclusion 
that  any  and  every  kind  of  belief  is,  therefore,  equally  justifiable. 
Voluntarism  should  mean  greater  circumspection,  less  dogma- 
tism, and  more  willingness  to  endure  and  to  appreciate  differ- 
ences. In  its  way,  therefore,  Voluntarism  is  only  a  purification 
of  Intellectualism,  and,  as  such,  it  is  as  much  the  enemy  of  super- 
stition and  anarchy  as  Intellectualism  itself.  It  came  to  curse  ; 
it  will  stay  to  bless.  It  is  the  foe  as  much  of  dogmatism  as  of 
scepticism,  though  it  meant  to  be  a  friend  to  both  of  these. 

GUSTAV    S FILLER. 


DISCUSSIONS. 

PROFESSOR  BAWDEN'S   INTERPRETATION  OF  THE 
PHYSICAL  AND  THE  PSYCHICAL. 

AMONG  the  recent  attempts  to  reach  a  new  formulation  of  the 
psycho-physical  problem  is  the  '  functional '  theory  which  has  been 
presented  by  Professor  Bawden  in  several  articles  lately  published.1 
Professor  Bawden  begins  his  discussion  in  the  first  article  by  con- 
demning the  traditional  statement  of  the  problem.  Its  very  formula- 
tion has  involved  the  point  at  issue,  namely,  the  existence  of  two 
orders  of  reality,  mind  and  matter,  the  psychical  and  the  physical. 
In  the  light  of  modern  thought,  however,  it  must  be  recognized  that 
the  distinction  has  no  existence  in  nature  apart  from  the  intelligence 
that  made  it.  Mind  and  matter,  the  entities  of  the  old  ontological 
theory,  are  merely  scientific  abstractions  made  for  methodological  pur- 
poses, which  have  become  hypostasized  as  real  existences.  It  is  be- 
cause the  psycho-physical  problem  has  been  stated  in  terms  of  these 
abstractions  that  a  solution  has  been  impossible. 

The  only  hope  for  a  solution  lies  in  a  restatement  of  the  problem, 
in  carrying  back  the  abstractions  to  the  concrete  unity  of  experience 
whence  they  were  drawn,  and  reinterpreting  the  problem  in  concrete 
terms.  The  universe  is  not  a  system  of  static  entities.  This  may 
have  been  a  useful  and  hence  legitimate  conception  for  the  thought  of 
Descartes,  but  it  is  hopelessly  inadequate  and  hence  untrue  for  the 
purposes  of  modern  thought.  The  only  true  reality  is  concrete  expe- 
rience. All  distinctions  concerning  reality,  all  formulations  of  law, 
are  responses  to  the  needs  of  conscious  life,  and  owe  their  validity  to 
their  ability  to  satisfy  those  needs.  To  solve  the  psycho-physical 
problem,  then,  we  must  consider  it  in  its  relation  to  practical  experi- 
ence, and  state  it  in  terms  of  function,  or  use,  in  that  experience. 
The  older  and  unsuccessful  efforts  toward  solution  "grow  out  of  the 
attempt  to  state  a  teleological  distinction  in  ontological  terms.  They 
grow  out  of  the  attempt  to  state  a  relative,  a  fluid,  or  functional 

!(l)  "The  Functional  View  of  the  Relation  between  the  Psychical  and  the 
Physical."  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW,  XI,  p.  474.  (2)  "  The  Functional  Theory  of 
Parallelism."  Ibid.,  XII,  p.  299.  (3)  "The  Necessity  from  the  Standpoint  of 
Scientific  Method  of  a  Reconstruction  of  the  Ideas  of  the  Psychical  and  the  Phys- 
ical." The  Journ.  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  I,  p.  62. 
(4)  "The  Meaning  of  the  Psychical."  PHIL.  REV.,  XIII,  p.  298. 

429 


430  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

division  of  labor  in  terms  of  absolute,  fixed,  structural  elements."  l 
The  only  statement  of  the  problem  making  possible  a  real  solution 
is  in  terms  of  concrete  practical  experience.  Such  a  statement  Pro- 
fessor Bawden  attempts  to  give  in  the  '  functional  '  theory. 

In  the  following  examination  of  this  theory  an  attempt  will  be  made 
(I)  to  show  that  the  articles  already  referred  to,  instead  of  giving  a 
single  consistent  statement  of  the  psycho  -physical  problem,  present 
no  less  than  four  distinct  and  mutually  incompatible  positions.  I  shall 
attempt  to  point  out  (  i  )  that  the  problem  is  stated  in  terms  of  con- 
crete experience  and  the  physical  and  psychical  defined  as  correlative 
functions  in  this  experience  ;  (2)  that  the  statement  is  made  in  terms 
of  biology,  the  physical  and  psychical  appearing  as  functions  of 
the  organism;  (3)  that  the  psychical  is  defined  as  the  meaning  of 
existence,  while  existence  itself  is  identified  with  the  physical  ;  and 
(4)  that  both  the  physical  and  the  psychical  are  reduced  to  the  com- 
mon term  'energy.'  (II)  The  significance  of  these  changes  in  the 
author's  mode  of  treating  the  problem  will  be  discussed,  and  an  attempt 
will  be  made  to  show  that  the  inconsistencies  may  be  traced  in  large 
part  to  a  fundamental  ambiguity  and  shifting  in  the  meaning  of  the 
chief  terms  employed,  viz.,  'experience,'  'function,'  and  'tension.' 
It  will  also  appear  that,  by  an  extension  in  the  application  of  the  term 
'tension,'  the  distinction  between  physical  and  psychical,  originally 
defined  as  a  distinction  existing  only  for  the  purposes  of  reflective 
thought,  is  erected  into  a  distinction  of  ultimate  ontological  signifi- 
cance, and  made  the  basis  of  a  system  of  metaphysics. 

I. 

(  i  )  As  has  already  been  said,  the  necessity  for  a  reinterpretation 
of  the  psycho-physical  relation  in  functional  terms  forms  the  point  of 
departure  for  Professor  Bawden'  s  treatment  of  the  problem.  In  the 
first  article  he  writes  :  "As  contrasted  with  all  the  ontological  theo- 
ries, the  functional  view  would  hold  that  all  our  reflective  distinctions 
arise  within  the  life  of  action.  We  begin  with  immediate  experience, 
and  within  this  emerges  the  distinction  between  means  and  ends. 
That  part  of  our  experience  which  is  already  under  control,  in  the 
form  of  available  habits,  becomes  means.  That  part  of  the  experience 
which  is  in  process  of  being  brought  under  control  or  is  still  beyond 
definite  control,  our  ideas  and  ideals,  presents  unrealized  values  or 
ends.  '  '  2  This  is  the  essence  of  the  distinction  between  physical  and 


REV.,  XI,  p.  479. 
2  Ibid. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  43 1 

psychical.  What  in  any  experience  or  situation  is  taken  as  given  be- 
comes means,  or  is  the  physical,  for  the  purpose  in  view.  What,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  not  given,  what  we  wish  to  attain,  our  purpose  or 
end,  is  psychical  for  that  particular  experience. 

This  distinction  is  not  always  present  in  experience.  While  ex- 
perience is  running  on  smoothly  and  no  interruptions  or  breaks  occur, 
we  are  conscious  of  our  surroundings  and  acts  as  neither  psychical  nor 
physical.  But  as  soon  as  a  difficulty  arises,  preventing  us  from  follow- 
ing our  usual  course  of  action,  we  become  conscious  at  once  of  what 
we  have  to  do  and  the  means  we  have  for  doing  it.  The  one  is 
psychical,  in  that  it  is  our  idea  or  ideal.  The  means  we  have  for  at- 
taining this  ideal  or  end,  /.  e.,  available  habits  and  fixed  modes  of 
action,  are  physical.  "  The  direct  experience  of  the  child  or  animal, 
or  even  of  the  human  adult  when  he  is  not  thinking,  is  made  up  of  a 
series  of  states  or  acts  which  present  no  conscious  distinction  between 
subject  and  object,  between  psychical  and  physical.  But  if  some  un- 
certainty or  doubt  or  difficulty  arises,  this  experience  is  broken  up  so 
that  a  duality  appears  in  it  —  a  duality  of  function  which  serves  to 
dichotomize  the  experience  into  a  part  which  is  regarded  as  uncertain 
or  problematic,  and  another  part  which  is  taken  as  certain  or  given."  l 

It  is  evident  from  this  that  not  only  is  the  distinction  between 
physical  and  psychical  dependent  on  the  needs  of  experience,  but  that 
what  is  physical  or  psychical  in  any  particular  case  is  determined 
solely  by  the  exigencies  of  the  situation.  The  end  will  vary  with  the 
nature  of  the  difficulty  interrupting  the  course  of  experience,  and  with 
it  the  means.  What  is  means  for  one  experience,  may,  under  the 
changed  conditions  of  another  situation,  become  end,  and  vice  versa. 

In  a  further  account  of  this  relation,  given  in  the  second  of  the 
articles,  the  break  or  interruption  occurring  in  the  habitual  course  of 
experience  is  described  as  a  *  tension  '  in  consciousness.  As  a  result 
of  this  tension,  a  certain  part  of  the  content  is  said  to  become  prob- 
lematic and  uncertain,  while  the  rest  remains  fixed  and  constant,  or  is 
taken  for  granted.  The  part  which  as  problematic  is  undergoing  re- 
construction is  said  to  occupy  the  focus  of  the  tension.  This  is  the 
psychical.  Similarly,  the  relatively  fixed  content  forms  the  marginal 
area,  and  as  such  is  the  physical.  "  Experience  at  one  time  is  equili- 
brated or  automatic;  at  another  time  it  is  tensional  or  conscious. 
When  it  is  conscious,  two  aspects  come  into  tension.  The  relatively 
stable  and  permanent  aspect  of  experience  is  taken  as  given,  as  there, 
as  actual.  The  relatively  fluid  and  changing  aspect  is  regarded  as  the 

1  Loc.  cit.,  XI,  p.  481. 


432  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

possible  or  potential  merely,  as  ideal.  Experience,  or  the  real,  is  the 
interaction  of  the  actual  and  the  ideal ;  it  is  the  realization  of  the  ideal 
in  the  actual.  One  throughout  as  to  content  (structurally),  as  to  form  it 
is  two-fold  —  actual  (physical)  and  ideal  (psychical),  according  to  the 
demands  of  the  reconstructive  or  growth  process  (/'.  e.,  functionally)."  l 
Again,  "  Every  experience  has  a  focal  point  in  consciousness  and  a  mar- 
ginal area  which  with  reference  to  this  focal  point  is  called  the  external 
world.  This  focus  of  attention  is  identified  with  the  subjective  or 
psychical  self;  this  external  world  is  called  the  objective  or  physical 
not-self.  But  both  are  aspects  of,  or  factors  within,  experience,  just 
as  the  center  and  circumference  are  essential  elements  in  the  circle. ' ' 2 

It  would  seem  from  these  passages  that  the  distinction  between 
focus  and  margin  corresponds  to  the  distinction  between  end  and 
means,  the  focus,  as  the  psychical,  being  identical  with  end,  while  the 
margin  of  the  tension  is  equivalent  to  means,  or  the  physical.  It 
must  be  asked,  however,  whether  it  is  possible  thus  to  equate  the  two 
pairs  of  terms.  The  question  arises  whether,  in  describing  the  psycho- 
physical  relation  as  a  relation  of  end  to  means,  the  author  is  not  giv- 
ing a  logical  account  of  the  distinction,  and  whether,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  definition  of  physical  and  psychical  as  margin  and  focus  of  attention 
is  not  essentially  psychological.3  It  may  be  maintained  that  logical 
and  psychological  descriptions  of  the  psycho  -physical  relation  are  quite 
capable  of  being  harmonized,  but  it  nevertheless  seems  doubtful 
whether  such  reconciliation  can  be  successfully  accomplished  by  as- 
suming without  discussion  the  equivalence  of  such  metaphors  as  means 
and  end,  and  margin  and  focus.  But  even  if  it  be  admitted  that  it  is 
possible  to  regard  these  terms  as  equivalent  when  used  abstractly,  their 
discrepancy  becomes  apparent  so  soon  as  the  attempt  is  made  to  ask 
what  they  really  mean,  and  to  apply  them  to  concrete  instances.  This 
may  best  be  shown  by  quoting  an  illustration  used  by  Professor  Baw- 
den  in  the  first  article  published. 

"  For  example,  my  experience  of  the  temperature  in  this  room  up 
to  the'  present  moment  has  been  neither  physical  nor  psychical, 
neither  objective  nor  subjective.  All  at  once  I  become  conscious,  let 

1  Loc.  fit.,  XII,  pp.  303 f. 

*Ibid.,  p.  318. 

3  It  is  perhaps  significant  that  Professor  Bawden  refers  indiscriminately  to  the 
physical  and  psychical  as  margin  and  focus  of  a  « tension'  and  of  '  attention.'  As  I 
understand  it,  '  tension  '  is  a  crisis  in  reflective  thought  and  as  such  is  a  logical  term, 
while  '  attention  '  is  of  course  a  psychological  term.  The  loose  use  of  terms  would 
seem  to  be  a  fruitful  source  of  confusion  throughout  the  articles,  as  I  have  attempted 
to  show  at  greater  length  later  in  the  discussion. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  433 

us  suppose,  of  the  fact  that  it  has  been  growing  colder  and  colder.  I 
feel  a  draft.  But  I  see  no  open  window,  no  open  door.  What  can 
be  the  cause  of  it  ?  Here  is  a  polarizing,  a  bifurcation,  in  my  experi- 
ence. There  is  something  which  is  uncertain, —  the  cause  of  this  chil- 
ling atmosphere.  This  occupies  the  foreground  in  consciousness  :  it 
is  the  salient,  the  absorbing  content  of  this  experience.  And  in  addi- 
tion there  is  the  general  background  of  things  in  the  environment, 
which,  being  irrelevant  in  this  situation,  are  simply  taken  for  granted, 
the  chairs,  the  desk,  the  blackboard,  etc.  The  door,  the  windows, 
the  draft,  are  in  the  focus  of  consciousness  :  they  are  psychical.  My 
overcoat  hanging  on  the  hat-rack  is  on  the  border-line  :  it  is  in  a  fair 
way  to  become  psychical  if  it  grows  cold  enough,  and  I  am  not  able 
to  discover  the  cause  of  the  draft.  That  is,  the  overcoat,  in  such  a 
case,  passes  into  the  foreground, —  and  this  is  what  we  mean  by  the 
functionally  psychical  aspect  of  the  experience.  The  draft,  the  door, 
the  windows,  and  the  overcoat  will,  then,  remain  the  psychical  aspect 
of  this  experience  until  I  locate  and  remove  the  cause  of  the  discom- 
fort. Then  the  experience  will  lapse  back  again  to  the  former  level 
of  direct  stimulus  and  response,  at  least  so  far  as  temperature  is  con- 
cerned. ' ' l 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  objects  in  the  margin  of 
the  tension,  the  chairs,  etc.,  which  are  physical  for  this  situation,  cer- 
tainly cannot  be  defined  as  means  to  ^ny  end.  They  are,  as  the  author 
says,  "  irrelevant  in  this  situation,"  and  consequently  can  have  no 
'  functional '  relation  whatever  to  this  experience.  Further,  the 
'  psychical '  elements,  the  door,  windows,  etc.,  scarcely  seem  to  repre- 
sent any  end.  Nor  does  the  overcoat ;  if  it  is  brought  into  the  fore- 
ground at  all,  it  would  seem  to  perform  the  function  of  means  rather 
than  end.  Again,  before  this  particular  difficulty  in  regard  to  the 
draft  arose,  the  temperature  of  the  room  might  be  supposed  to  have 
occupied  the  margin  of  the  preceding  tension,  to  have  been  ' '  irrele- 
vant "  in  that  situation,  just  as  the  chairs,  etc.,  are  said  to  be  in  this, 
and  consequently  to  be  defined  as  physical.  Yet  the  author  expressly 
states  that  his  experience  of  the  temperature  up  to  the  time  when  the 
tension  arises  "  has  been  neither  physical  nor  psychical." 

The  other  illustrations  used  by  the  author  present  similar  difficulties. 
In  no  case,  I  think,  has  it  been  shown  concretely  how  the  definition  of 
physical  and  psychical  as  means  and  end  is  to  be  reconciled  with  their 
description  as  margin  and  focus  of  attention.  But  however  incon- 
sistent these  two  definitions  appear,  especially  when  concrete  applica- 

1  Loc.  «'/.,  XI,  pp.  481  f. 


434  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

tion  of  them  is  attempted,  they  nevertheless  represent  a  certain 
community  of  standpoint.  The  distinction  between  physical  and 
psychical  has  so  far  been  consistently  described  as  a  distinction  called 
forth  and  determined  by  the  course  of  concrete  experience.  The 
contention  so  far  has  been  that  the  distinction  is  one  merely  of  meaning 
and  not  one  of  existence. 

(2)  Passing  now  to  what  has  been  already  referred  to  as  the  second 
position,  we  find  the  psycho -physical  problem  treated  in  biological 
terms.1  The  functioning  of  the  psycho-physical  organism  under  con- 
ditions of  complete  adaptation  to  environment  is,  it  is  said,  wholly 
physical.  It  is  only  when  new  conditions  arise,  demanding  readjust- 
ment of  the  organism,  that  the  customary  reactions  fail,  and  the 
habitual,  or  physical,  functions  become  conscious,  or  psychical.  Thus, 
under  normal  conditions,  the  processes  of  digestion  and  assimilation 
are  almost  wholly  unconscious,  and  come  to  consciousness  only 
when  prevented  by  some  interference  from  following  their  ordinary 
course.  The  case  is  similar  in  the  development  of  new  functions. 
Adjustments,  which  at  first  are  made  only  by  conscious  effort,  grad- 
ually become  habitual,  and  finally  lapse  into  unconscious  functioning. 
The  condition  which  calls  forth  the  new  function,  or  brings  the  habit- 
ual function  to  consciousness,  may  in  general  be  described  as  a  '  ten- 
sion '  between  organism  and  environment.  Habitual  or  stable  acts, 
which  are  performed  under  conditions  of  adaptation,  are  described  as 
'  non-tensional '  or  '  physical.'  On  the  other  hand,  acts  performed 
under  conditions  of  non-adaptation  are  '  tensional '  or  '  psychical. ' 
Thus  consciousness  "  simply  represents  the  life  of  the  organism  under 
a  given  set  of  conditions."2  "  Conscious  acts  may  be  viewed  as 
automatic  acts  in  the  making.  They  represent  '  the  felt  struggle  of  the 
organism  to  do  deliberately  what  later  it  comes  to  do  naturally  and  by 
way  of  habit'  "3 

A  few  pages  earlier  we  find  that  mental  life  "  is  simply  a  name  for 
the  orderly  continuous  functioning  of  an  organism  under  conditions  of 
tension  in  adaptation.  When,  therefore,  we  speak  of  mental  activity 
we  are  certainly  speaking  of  the  activity  of  this  living  machine  that  we 

1  This  position  appears  chiefly  in  the  second  article,  although  it  is  by  no  means  con- 
fined to  this,  but  may  be  found  more  or  less  explicit,  I  think,  in  each  of  the  articles 
published.  It  should  perhaps  be  stated  that  none  of  the  four  positions  which  have 
been  distinguished  as  involving  essentially  different  modes  of  treatment  of  the  psycho- 
physical  problem  by  Professor  Bawden,  is  developed  exclusively  in  any  one  article. 
While  the  various  positions  may  appear  more  prominently  in  certain  of  the  articles, 
yet  I  think  they  may  all  be  found  implicit,  at  least,  in  each  of  the  articles  published. 
2Loc.  cif.,  XII,  p.  310. 

3  Ibid, 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  435 

call  the  organism.  Mental  acts  are  not  different  from  other  acts  in  the 
world.  The  sole  difference  consists  in  their  being  tensional  or  con- 
scious acts  instead  of  stable  or  habitual  acts.  Not  all  the  activities  of 
the  organism  are  conscious.  Fully  nine-tenths  are  unconscious  or 
automatic.  Digestion,  assimilation,  circulation,  respiration,  etc.,  are 
under  normal  conditions,  almost  wholly  subconscious  operations. ' '  l 

The  briefest  examination  of  these  passages  is  sufficient  to  show  that 
the  position  here  taken  is  wholly  incompatible  with  the  description 
of  the  psycho-physical  problem  which  has  already  been  discussed.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  the  physical  and  psychical  were  defined  as 
'  meanings '  given  to  the  content  of  experience  only  when  a  tension 
arose  in  consciousness.  We  found  an  experience,  before  the  arising 
of  a  tension,  described  as  "  neither  physical  nor  psychical."  Now, 
however,  in  the  last  passages  quoted,  non-tensional  activity  is  identi- 
fied with  the  l  physical, '  while  tensional  or  conscious  activity  as  a 
whole  is  defined  as  '  psychical. '  That  is,  in  this  case,  physical  and 
psychical  are  mutually  exclusive  phases  or  stages  in  the  functioning  of 
a  biological  organism,  while  before  they  were  defined  as  coexistent 
meanings,  constituent  elements,  in  the  content  of  consciousness,  cor- 
relative in  the  sense  that  the  emergence  of  one  necessarily  involves 
the  appearance  of  the  other.  Again,  in  this  latter  account,  physical 
and  psychical  are  distinct  modes  of  existence,  determined  by  objective 
and  physical  conditions.  Before,  it  was  maintained  that  the  distinc- 
tion was  created  by,  and  existed  only  for  thought.  "  It  has  no  exist- 
ence in  nature  apart  from  the  intelligence  that  makes  it."  *  Instead 
of  being  determined  by  physical  conditions,  it  was  urged  that  the 
11  reality  of  the  distinction  is  conditioned  by  the  methodological  and 
epistemological  demands  which  first  gave  rise  to  it. ' ' 

The  real  significance  of  the  change  may  perhaps  be  stated  thus :  A 
distinction,  which  originally  was  defined  as  one  made  in  response  to  the 
needs  of  conscious  experience  and  existing  only  for  intelligence,  and 
which  was  further  described  as  shifting  with  every  change  of  conscious 
interest  and  purpose,  is  now  erected  into  a  distinction  obtaining  in 
objective  reality,  and  its  terms,  the  physical  and  psychical,  hyposta- 
sized  as  objective  existences.  Finally,  this  hypostasization  having  been 
accomplished,  one  of  these  terms,  the  psychical,  is  identified  with  con- 
scious life,  or  experience  itself,  which  was  originally  the  inclusive  term 
for  all  reality. 

lLoc.  cit.,  XII,  p.  308. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  305. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  305  f. 


436  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  further  that  this  change  in  treatment  in- 
volves a  complete  reversal  of  the  earlier  position  which  defined  the 
physical  as  means,  and  the  psychical  as  end.  For  if  perfect  adapta- 
tion means  wholly  habitual  or  physical  functioning,  and  if  conscious- 
ness emerges  only  when  this  is  interfered  with,  and  exists  only  until 
readjustment  is  secured/if  conscious  acts  are  only  automatic  acts  in 
the  making,  the  only  conclusion  possible  seems  to  be  that  the  physical 
is  the  true  end  for  which  the  psychical  is  the  means. 

Enough  has  now  been  said,  I  think,  to  show  that  there  is  a  funda- 
mental inconsistency  in  Professor  Baw den's  mode  of  treatment,  or 
rather,  that  there  is  a  fundamental  change  from  one  mode  of  treatment 
to  another.  Before  discussing  further  what  is  involved  in  this  change 
and  how  it  was  made  possible,  it  seems  best  to  proceed  at  once  to  the 
account  of  the  other  two  statements  of  the  psycho-physical  relation, 
after  which  it  will  be  possible  to  consider  these  questions  in  the  light 
of  the  whole  theory. 

(3)  The  statement  of  the  psycho -physical  problem  which  will  now 
be  considered,  seems  to  be  relatively  unimportant  and  to  have  but 
slight  connection  with  the  development  of  the  functional  theory  as  a 
whole.  We  have  already  seen  that,  in  the  first  position,  physical  and 
psychical  were  defined  as  correlative  meanings,  or  '  functions '  of  ex- 
perience. This  explicit  statement  was  made  with  reference  to  experi- 
ence :  "  One  throughout  as  to  content  (structurally),  as  to  form  it  is 
twofold  —  actual  (physical)  and  ideal  (psychical)  according  to  the 
demands  of  the  reconstructive  or  growth  process  (/.  e. ,  functionally*)."* 
In  the  second  or  biological  position,  we  saw  that  Professor  Bawden 
still  insisted  that  physical  and  psychical  must  be  defined  in  terms  of 
function  or  activity.  Now  as  a  third  position,  however,  we  find  the 
physical  described  as  *  structure, '  while  the  psychical  is  defined  as  its 
'  function, '  and  we  are  also  told  that  the  relation  between  the  two  is 
that  of  *  existence '  to  '  meaning  of  existence. '  "  And,  just  as  the  con- 
ception of  inert  matter  has  given  place  to  the  doctrine  of  energy  on 
the  physical  side,  so  the  conception  of  fixed,  ready-made  faculties  has 
given  place  to  the  doctrine  of  psychic  functions.  It  is  but  a  step  fur- 
ther to  say  that  these  functions  are  the  functions  of  this  energy,  that 
the  function  is  but  the  meaning  of  structure,  that  the  psychical  is  but 
the  significance  of  the  physical.  .  .  .  Why  not  go  the  whole  way  and 
say  that  the  psychical  has  no  existence  as  such  at  all,  but  is  simply  an 
expression  for  the  meaning  of  existence  ?' '  2 

1  Loc.  £it.,  XII,  p.  304.     Italics  mine. 
*Ibid.,  XI,  pp.  477  f.     See  also  XII,  p.  307. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  437 

It  is  evident  that  this  passage  is  incompatible  with  both  of  the 
earlier  positions.  The  contradiction  which  the  identification  of  the 
physical  with  structure  presents  both  to  the  original  definition  of  the 
physical  as  function  of  experience,  or  margin  of  attention,  and  to  its 
later  definition  as  the  functioning  of  the  organism  under  conditions  of 
adaptation,  is  too  obvious  to  require  elaboration.  It  may  be  pointed 
out,  however,  that  the  assertion  that  the  psychical  "has  no  existence 
as  such  at  all,"  and  the  further  identification  of  it  with  function, 
would  seem  to  imply  that  the  only  real  existence  is  structure,  which  is 
scarcely  compatible  with  the  author's  insistence  that  all  reality  must 
be  interpreted  in  terms  of  function  or  activity.  Indeed,  it  is  apparent 
that,  while  the  biological  position  transformed  both  the  physical  and 
the  psychical  from  mere  methodological  distinctions  into  actual  exist- 
ences, this  position  hypostasizes  merely  the  physical.  It  seems  diffi- 
cult to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  Professor  Bawden,  in  thus  invest- 
ing the  physical  alone  with  real  existence,  has  involved  himself  in 
materialism,  in  spite  of  his  repeated  repudiations  of  this  position. 
However  this  may  be,  it  is  sufficiently  evident  that  this  account  of 
the  psycho-physical  relation  represents  a  mode  of  treatment  funda- 
mentally incompatible  with  both  of  the  descriptions  already  given. 

(4)  The  statement  of  this  position  involves  again  the  necessity 
for  a  reconstruction  of  the  ontological  theory  of  the  universe.  Under 
the  influence  of  modern  science,  it  is  said,  the  interpretation  of 
reality  in  terms  of  static  entities  has  given  place  to  a  description  of 
all  existence  in  terms  of  action,  force,  or  energy.  In  the  physical 
sciences,  under  the  leadership  of  such  men  as  Professor  Ostwald,  the 
atomic  theory  is  being  superseded  by  the  new  doctrine  of  'energism.' 
Instead  of  conceiving  reality  as  reducible  to  atoms  and  their  move- 
ments, the  atom  is  conceived,  from  this  point  of  view,  as  itself  a  force 
or  center  of  motion.  "  The  existence  of  matter  has  not  been  dis- 
proved, but  its  utility  as  a  concept  in  its  old  static  form  has  vanished 
in  the  light  of  a  new  understanding  of  the  nature  of  motion.  In  place 
of  the  dead  inert  matter  have  been  put  the  positive  conceptions  of 
energy  and  force.  .  .  .  What  was  formerly  called  the  material  object 
or  thing  is  now  regarded  as  the  latent  or  potential  as  contrasted  with 
the  active  or  kinetic  form  of  energy. ' ' l 

Along  with  this  transformation  of  the  fundamental  concepts  of  the 
physical  sciences,  a  similar  change  is  taking  place  on  the  side  of  psy- 
chology. "We  no  longer  speak  of  mind  and  its  faculties,  of  func- 
tions and  that  which  has  the  functions.  The  mind  does  not  have 
1  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  I,  p.  63. 


438  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

functions ;  it  is  the  functions.  It  is  real  only  in  its  activity,  or 
rather,  its  activity,  its  functioning,  is  its  reality. ' '  * 

The  transformation  of  the  traditional  static  terms  into  dynamic 
terms  of  interpretation,  it  is  held,  makes  possible  a  new  state- 
ment of  the  psycho-physical  problem  in  a  form  admitting  of  its  solu- 
tion. The  physical  and  psychical  are  no  longer  distinct  ontological 
entities  incapable  of  being  brought  together,  but  they  are  alike  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  force  or  activity,  /".  e. ,  in  common  terms.  It  is 
true  that  the  concept  of  energy,  as  used  by  Professor  Ostwald,  "  is  too 
poor  to  express  the  contents  of  the  ideas  of  life  and  mind.  Unques- 
tionably, these  latter  concepts,  as  they  are  at  present  used,  will  have 
to  be  modified  before  they  will  form  a  continuous  series  with  the  con- 
cept of  energy."  z  But  "the  modification  cannot  be  all  on  the  side 
of  the  biological  and  psychological  categories.  The  concepts  of 
biology  and  psychology  must  reconstitute  the  concepts  of  physical 
science  as  truly  as  the  converse.  Indeed,  is  not  the  modern  concept 
of  energy  itself  a  good  illustration  of  the  idealization  of  a  material 
category,  of  the  spiritualization  of  matter  ?  Psychical  phenomena  are 
not  to  be  '  subordinated '  ...  to  the  concept  of  energy,  but  both 
concepts  are  to  be  reconstituted,  each  in  terms  of  the  other.  Viewed 
in  this  light,  we  may  even  accept  the  words  of  the  writer  just  men- 
tioned [Professor  Ostwald]  when  he  says  :  '  In  all  that  we  know  of 
intellectual  processes,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  us  from  regarding 
them  as  a  particular  form  of  energetic  activity. '  "  3 

This  position  proves  most  perplexing  when  we  try  to  coordinate 
it  with  the  other  statements  of  the  writer.  What  relation,  it 
must  be  asked,  can  a  psychical  which  is  a  phase  of  the  ulti- 
mate reality,  energy,  bear  to  a  psychical  which  is  merely  a 
convenient  distinction  made  by  men  for  the  practical  purposes  of 
everyday  life  ?  Or,  again,  to  a  psychical  which  is  equivalent  to  func- 
tioning of  the  biological  organism,  e.  g.,  digestion,  under  deranged 
conditions?  Or,  lastly,  how  can  the  psychical  be  at  once  "  the  mean- 
ing of  existence, "  and  "  a  particular  form  of  energetic  activity  "  ? 

From  this  last  account  we  again  see  how  a  distinction  which  was 
originally  described  as  one  created  and  determined  solely  by  the 
exigencies  of  practical  thinking,  has  been  transformed  into  a  distinc- 
tion inherent  in  ultimate  reality  itself.  Here,  again,  as  in  the  biolog- 
ical position,  the  physical  and  psychical  are  both  hypostasized.  How 

1  Loc.  dt.t  I,  p.  67. 
*Ibid.,  p.  64. 
8  Ibid.,  pp.  64  f. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  439 

complete  is  the  transformation  in  the  author's  mode  of  thought  may 
be  best  realized  by  comparing  this  last  position  with  a  few  of  the  sen- 
tences that  he  wrote  in  connection  with  the  first  account.  "  There 
is  constant  need  of  bringing  back  the  abstractions  which  we  employ 
methodologically  in  science  and  philosophy,  and  reinterpreting  them 
in  terms  of  that  concrete  experience  which,  since  the  time  when 
those  abstractions  took  definite  form,  has  been  undergoing  develop- 
ment and  evolving  new  meaning."  *  "  We  are  forced  to  interpret 
these  words  ['  mind  '  and  l  matter']  in  terms  of  our  present  under- 
standing of  that  concrete  experience  in  which  alone  their  true  reality 
is  found."  2  "The  solution  of  the  problem  lies  in  getting  back  to 
the  principle  involved  in  the  practical  attitude."  s 

After  this  repeated  insistence  on  the  necessity  for  tracing  scientific 
abstractions  back  to  the  practical  distinctions  of  immediate  experi- 
ence, and  for  the  definition  of  psychical  and  physical  in  terms  of  their 
function  or  use  in  concrete  experience,  we  find  the  psycho-  physical 
problem  solved  by  its  statement  in  terms  of  'energy,'  the  most  ab- 
stract conception,  perhaps,  which  is  employed  in  modern  science.  It  is 
true  that  the  author  states  that  the  term  energy,  as  ordinarily  used,  is 
'  '  too  poor  to  express  the  contents  of  the  ideas  of  life  and  mind,  '  '  and 
that  it  must  be  "reconstituted"  together  with  the  fundamental  con- 
cepts of  biology  and  psychology.  But  whatever  such  mutual  "re- 
constitution  '  '  may  mean,  it  certainly  is  not  an  interpretation  of  the 
abstraction  in  terms  of  concrete  experience,  nor  does  Professor  Baw- 
den's  employment  of  the  term  '  energy  '  suggest,  even  remotely,  a  re- 
turn to  the  "practical  attitude." 

II. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  analysis,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  the  *  functional  '  theory,  as  presented  by  Professor 
Bawden,  contains  irreconcilable  contradictions,  and  that  the  most 
serious  confusion  pervades  his  whole  treatment  of  the  problem.  It 
has  already  been  seen  that,  in  the  articles  published,  four  distinct  ac- 
counts of  the  psycho-physical  relation  have  been  given,  representing 
fundamentally  distinct  modes  of  treatment,  or  points  of  view.  We  are 
now  in  a  position  to  consider  further  the  significance  of  this  frequent 
change  in  standpoint,  and  to  ask  how  such  apparently  unconscious 
transitions  from  one  standpoint  to  another  have  been  made  possible. 

It  is  now  generally  recognized  that  the  sciences  do  not  give  final 

'PHIL.  REV.,  XII,  p.  306. 


3  Ibid.,  XI,  p.   478. 


440  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

and  complete  accounts  of  reality.  Each  represents  the  investigation 
of  only  a  particular  phase  or  aspect  of  reality.  In  each  case,  the 
reality  with  which  a  science  deals  is  the  reality  of  concrete  experience, 
but  in  no  case  does  it  remain  the  unchanged  concrete  experience. 
Each  science  abstracts  a  particular  phase  of  this  reality  as  its  own  field 
of  investigation.  The  laws  and  formulas  which  it  discovers  are  not 
final  truths  expressing  the  ultimate  nature  of  existence,  but  they  are 
abstractions  of  merely  methodological  validity,  made  for  particular 
purposes  of  thought.  They  are  true  so  long  as  applied  to  the  particu- 
lar abstractions  from  concrete  experience  with  which  the  science  deals, 
but  their  application  either  to  experience  as  a  whole,  or  to  the  subject- 
matter  of  other  sciences,  is  entirely  illegitimate. 

Since,  however,  the  subject-matter  of  every  science  is  an  aspect  of 
the  same  concrete  reality,  it  follows  that  the  same  fundamental  prob- 
lems may  exist  for  different  sciences.  Such  a  problem  is  that  of  the 
psycho-physical  relation.  Each  science  concerned  may  state  such  a 
problem,  provisionally  at  least,  in  terms  of  its  own  technique,  but  an 
ultimate  statement  and  solution  can  be  given,  as  Professor  Bawden 
says,  only  in  terms  of  concrete  experience.  The  provisional  solution 
made  by  each  science  is  valid,  but  valid  only  for  the  purposes  of  that 
science,  and  any  attempt  to  regard  it  as  an  ultimate  and  complete 
solution  must  lead  to  confusion.  As  a  further  result  of  this  com- 
munity in  subject-matter,  it  sometimes  happens,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
psycho-physical  problem,  that  the  same  terms  are  used  in  different 
sciences.  But  it  must  be  remembered,  —  and  this,  it  seems  to  me,  is 
what  Professor  Bawden  forgets,  —  that  while  these  terms  may  refer  to 
the  same  fundamental  reality  of  concrete  experience,  they  represent 
for  each  science  a  distinct  and  abstract  phase  of  this  reality,  each  bear- 
ing its  own  peculiar  connotations.  That  is,  the  reality  may  be  the 
same  for  each  science,  but  it  is  the  reality  as  it  appears  from  different 
points  of  view. 

The  firsjt  statement  of  the  psycho-physical  problem  given  by  Pro- 
fessor Bawden  seems  to  be  based  on  the  acceptance  of  this  general 
view.  The  attempt  seems  definitely  to  be  made  to  treat  the  problem 
from  the  standpoint  of  experience,  and  to  interpret  it  in  terms  of  con- 
crete reality.  In  the  second  position,  however,  we  find  this  stand- 
point left  behind,  and  an  account  frankly  given  in  terms  of  biology, 
which,  from  the  first  standpoint,  could  only  represent  a  view  that  is 
abstract  and  provisional.  Similarly,  in  the  other  positions,  instead  of 
an  interpretation  of  the  problem  as  it  exists  for  experience  as  a  whole, 
the  relation  is  defined  in  terms  of  scientific  technique,  and  the  physical 
and  psychical  reduced  to  energy,  a  term  in  the  highest  degree  abstract. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  441 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  consider  the  question  :  How  has  it  been 
possible  for  Professor  Bawden  to  effect  such  apparently  unconscious 
changes  in  standpoint  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  to  be  found, 
I  think,  in  the  fact  that  the  chief  terms  employed,  '  experience,' 
'function/  and  'tension,'  are  used  in  very  different  senses,  and 
transferred  from  the  description  of  one  standpoint  to  another  with  no 
apparent  recognition  of  the  changed  meaning  in  the  different  context.1 
When  the  first  point  of  view  is  taken  and  the  problem  is  stated  in 
terms  of  concrete  reality,  experience  seems  to  be  used  in  its  legitimate 
sense,  /.  e.,  as  the  conscious  life  of  the  individual.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  the  standpoint  of  concrete  experience  is  abandoned,  we  find 
passages  where  it  seems  undeniably  to  be  used  as  a  scientific  abstrac- 
tion. In  some  passages,  as  in  the  following  statement,  for  example,  it 
seems  to  be  equivalent  to  the  whole  of  organic  life  :  "  Experience  is 
not  psychical  all  the  time,  either  in  the  individual  or  in  the  race ; 
nor  is  it  physical ;  it  is  both,  or  either,  only  at  critical  points. ' ' 
When  we  interpret  the  term  in  this  biological  sense,  as  the  whole  of 
organic  life,  we  are  forced  to  the  paradoxical  conclusion  that  conscious 
life  is  merely  an  incident  in  experience. 

Again,  the  word  seems  to  be  used  in  the  psychological  sense  of 
process,  or  possibly  as  equivalent  to  energy.  "  From  this  [functional] 
point  of  view,  experience  is  regarded  primarily  as  process.  .  .  .  By 
process  here  is  meant  activity,  without  specifying  that  it  is  either 
physical  or  psychical.  The  most  fundamental  statement  we  can  make 
about  experience  is  that  it  is  action.  It  is  as  much  action  when  it  is 
conscious  as  when  it  is  unconscious,  but  the  conditions  of  conscious 
action  are  different  from  the  conditions  of  unconscious  action. ' ' 

The  biologist,  looking  at  life  from  his  particular  abstract  point  of 
view,  may  perhaps  regard  conscious  experience  as  a  .means  to  the 
maintenance  of  organic  life,  which  is  taken  as  an  end  ;  the  psychologist 
for  his  purposes  may  regard  it  as  a  process  ;  the  physicist  or  the  chemist 
may  even  define  it  as  a  form  of  energetic  activity ;  but  experience, 
when  regarded  from  any  of  these  special  points  of  view,  is  at  least  as 
much  an  abstraction  as  the  extended  substance  or  the  thinking  sub- 
stance of  the  older  ontologists.  To  call  such  abstractions  'experi- 
ence/ and  to  fail  to  distinguish  these  various  abstract  descriptions  from 
each  other  and  from  the  concrete  experience  which  includes  all  reality, 
must  inevitably  prove  disastrous  to  any  theory. 

1  It  is  difficult  to  decide  whether  this  loose  use  of  terms  is  the  cause  or  the  effect  of 
the  frequent  change  in  standpoint  and  mode  of  thought.  It  seems  probable,  however, 
that  these  are  factors  which  mutually  contribute  towards  the  total  result. 

2Loc.  cit.,  XII,  p.  318. 

^ Ibid.,  XIII,  p.  299. 


442  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

A  similar  ambiguity  may,  however,  be  found  in  the  use  of  the  term 
'  function. '  This  is  the  more  noticeable  because  a  considerable  part 
of  the  second  article  is  devoted  to  its  discussion  and  definition.  The 
word  is  there  defined  as  follows  :  "  By  function  is  meant  orderly,  con- 
tinuous activity  with  reference  to  an  end,  and  this  activity  consists  of 
changes  in  structure."1  This  definition  would  seem  to  be  made  from 
the  biological  standpoint,  and  to  be  applicable  to  organic  life.  Thus 
digestion  would  be  a  function  of  the  organism  in  that  it  subserves  an 
end,  the  nutrition  of  the  individual.  The  significance  of  function, 
Professor  Bawden  says,  lies  in  the  meaning  or  end  of  the  activity. 
The  most  serious  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the  term  '  function, '  how- 
ever, arises  from  the  fact  that  it  is  sometimes  used  to  signify  activity, 
and  sometimes  mere  meaning.  For  example,  it  sometimes  means  an 
organic  activity,  like  digestion,  having  a  definite  end,  while  again  it 
signifies  correlative  meanings  given  to  the  content  of  experience. 
Thus  consciousness,  or  the  psychical,  is  said  to  be  the  function  of  the 
organism  under  conditions  of  non-adaptation.  Again,  the  psychical  is 
a  function  of  experience,  correlative  to  the  physical,  in  that  they  are 
meanings  given  together  in  reflective  thought.  Still  a  different  use 
appears  in  the  following  passage  :  ' '  The  mind  does  not  have  functions, 
it  is  the  functions.  .  .  .  Its  various  '  faculties,' — sense-perception, 
memory,  imagination,  etc.,  —  do  not  '  belong  to  '  the  mind  ;  they  are 
the  mind."  We  thus  see  that  function  is  used  indifferently  in  the 
biological,  the  logical,  and  in  the  psychological  senses,  without  any 
apparent  appreciation  on  the  author's  part  of  the  shift  in  standpoint. 

While  this  confusion  prevails  in  the  use  of  the  terms  '  experience ' 
and  '  function,'  the  application  of  the  third  term  'tension,'  seems  to 
involve,  if  possible,  even  greater  difficulties.  In  the  earlier  articles 
the  usual  ambiguity  is  found.  When  the  author  is  writing  from  the 
point  of  view  of  experience,  tension  seems  to  be  used  in  Professor 
Dewey's  sense  of  a  conscious  difficulty,  an  interference  with  the 
habitual  course  of  our  experience,  which  gives  rise  to  the  distinctions 
of  reflective  thought.  Again,  it  is  somewhat  loosely  identified  with 
the  psychological  term  '  attention. '  In  the  second  position,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  a  biological  term  denoting  lack  of  adjustment  of 
the  organism  to  environment,  which  gives  rise  to  conscious  experi- 
ence itself. 

Moreover,  the  articles  last  published  show  another  important 
change.  From  signifying  an  interruption  in  experience,  or  a  biolog- 

1  Loc.  «'/.,  XII,  p.  301. 

2  The  Journal  of  Phil,,  etc.,  I,  p.  67. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  443 

ical  condition,  the  term  l  tension '  is  extended  to  describe  the  nature 
of  the  cosmic  process.  It  becomes  the  explanation  at  once  of  the 
origin  of  consciousness  in  the  universe,  of  the  evolution  of  society, 
and  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  individuality.  In  short,  by  this  exten- 
sion of  the  term  '  tension,'  the  l  functional '  theory,  originally  formu- 
lated as  a  solution  of  the  psycho -physical  problem,  is  expanded  into 
a  metaphysical  explanation  of  the  universe.  Instead  of  a  difficulty  giv- 
ing rise  to  reflective  thought,  or  a  lack  of  adjustment  between  organ- 
ism and  environment  marking  the  emergence  of  consciousness,  tension 
is  now  regarded  as  a  phase  of  the  ultimate  cosmic  reality,  energy. 
"  Now  just  as  an  organ  may  be  relatively  at  rest  or  in  active  operation, 
so  the  universe  .  .  .  may  be  in  a  relatively  stable  or  in  a  relatively 
tensional  state. ' ' l  While  we  saw  before  that  tensional  functioning  of 
the  organism  was  identified  with  the  psychical  or  consciousness,  so 
here,  by  making  tension  universal  in  its  application,  consciousness  is 
extended  from  a  phase  of  individual  life  to  an  aspect  of  the  cosmos. 
1 '  Consciousness  is  not  something  which  belongs  exclusively  to  you  O- 
to  me.  It  is  simply  our  name  for  tension,  for  variation,  for  progress, 
of  the  whole  system  of  reality."  "Consciousness  is  no  more  con- 
fined to  the  individual  than  is  tension.  ...  It  is  focussed  here  and 
there  in  what  we  call  individuals,  but  it  is  the  focussing  of  the  whole 
system. ' '  The  individuality  of  consciousness,  in  any  real  sense,  Pro- 
fessor Bawden  denies.  "It  is  an  historical  accident,  one  might  say, 
that  my  consciousness  is  so  peculiarly  mine. ' '  *  The  individual  con- 
sciousness is  to  be  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  universe,  or  from  the 
social  consciousness,  only  as  the  focus  of  a  tension  is  separated  from 
that  margin.  So,  biologically,  "  what  we  call  the  individual  organism 
is  a  fragment  arbitrarily  torn  from  nature,  a  part  distinguished  simply 
for  convenience  from  the  rest  of  the  universe. ' '  5 

It  is  evident  that  in  these  passages  Professor  Bawden  is  discussing 
the  question  of  individuality  and  consciousness  in  metaphorical  terms. 
If  we  pause  to  ask  what  real  meaning  these  metaphors  have,  it  seems 
to  be  impossible  to  obtain  any  satisfactory  answer.  Indeed,  the  whole 
account  seems  to  depend  so  largely  on  metaphorical  terms,  and  to 
contain  so  many  questionable  assumptions,  that  it  is  difficult  to  suppose 
that  it  is  meant  seriously.  How,  for  example,  can  my  individuality, 
which  is  constituted  by  my  being  the  focus  of  an  adjustment  in  the 

*Loc.  ctt.,  I,  p.  67. 

«/#</.,  I,  p.  67. 

8 PHIL.  REV.,  XIII,  p.  310. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  311. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  308. 


444  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

whole  system  of  reality,  be  "  an  historical  accident,"  be  "  a  sign  of 
my  limitation,"  or  "  a  sign  of  my  unsociality  "  ?  What  meaning  can 
be  ascribed  to  such  expressions  ? 

Again,  Professor  Bawden  suggests  that  the  individual  consciousness 
may  be  a  development  from  a  kind  of  racial  consciousness.  ' '  It  may 
be  that  consciousness  began  in  this  generic  way,  that  just  as  the  human 
individual  consciousness  emerged  by  slow  degrees  out  of  a  sort  of  group 
consciousness,  so  the  lower  forms  of  consciousness  first  represented  the 
tensional  stress  of  some  life  problem  of  the  species  rather  than  any 
specific  crisis  in  the  life  of  any  so-called  individual  organism.  And, 
ultimately,  on  this  principle,  mental  life  would  have  begun  in  one 
great  cosmic  throb  of  feeling  or  pulse  of  cognition.  But,  of  course, 
all  our  ordinary  catagories  break  down  when  we  attempt  to  state  the 
origin  of  anything."  Surely  we  are  justified  in  asking  for  the 
grounds  of  the  assumption  that  individual  human  consciousness  origi- 
nated from  a  "  sort  of  group  consciousness,"  as  well  as  for  some  inter- 
pretation of  the  latter  conception.  As  to  the  origin  of  mental  life  in 
a  cosmic  throb  of  feeling  or  pulse  of  cognition,  is  not  such  an  hypothe- 
sis both  unintelligible  from  the  standpoint  of  our  ordinary  categories, 
and  without  other  foundation  than  a  figure  of  speech  ? 

But  even  if  the  metaphysical  speculation  to  which  this  last  article 
is  devoted  were  acceptable  on  its  own  merits,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  '  functional '  theory,  as  here  expounded,  can  be  cleared  from 
the  imputation  of  ontology.  Here,  even  to  a  greater  extent  than  in 
the  earlier  positions  we  have  noted,  the  author  appears  to  have  for- 
gotten his  own  maxim  of  the  <  '  constant  need  of  bringing  back  the 
abstractions  which  we  employ  methodologically  in  science  and  philoso- 
phy and  reinterpreting  them  in  terms  of  ...  concrete  experience." 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

THE   IDENTIFICATION   OF   MIND   AND   MATTER. 

IN  the  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW  for  May,  Professor  Bawden  dis- 
cusses very  interestingly  "The  Meaning  of  the  Psychical."  As  a 
part  of  this  discussion,  he  enters  into  a  criticism  of  certain  arguments 
of  my  own,  published  in  1885,  for  panpsychism  in  general  and  in 
particular  for  this  explanation  of  the  relation  between  the  brain  and 
consciousness.  Unsettled  problems  seem  to  become  awakened  as  ob- 
jects of  interest  in  cycles,  and  the  time  now  seems  to  be  ripe  for  a  fresh 
consideration  of  this  important  question.  In  the  seventies  of  the  last 

1  Loc.  cit.,  XIII,  p.  310.     Footnote. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  445 

century,  wide  public  interest  was  attracted  to  this  problem  by  the 
writings  of  those  great  public  teachers,  Bain,  Huxley,  Tyndall,  Clif- 
ford, and  Fiske,  and  the  echoes  of  their  words  are  still  heard  to-day. 
Though  less  popular,  the  keener  analysis  of  Lewes  presented  the  prob- 
lem about  this  time  in  its  clearest  aspects,  while  the  posthumous  work 
of  Barratt  (whose  untimely  death  prevented  his  book l  from  becoming 
known  and  thereby  influencing  thought)  was  a  really  great  contribu- 
tion to  the  subject.  The  present  revival  of  interest  in  the  question, 
and  not  any  controversial  spirit,  prompts  me  to  take  exception  to 
some  of  Professor  Bawden' s  views  and  his  courteous  criticism  of  my 
arguments. 

I  feel  quite  certain  that  Professor  Bawden  has  not  yet  got  an  abso- 
lutely clear  conception  of  the  hypothesis  for  which  I  have  frequently 
contended,  and  which  I  have  again  tried  to  elucidate  in  the  short 
article  in  the  Psychological  Review*  which  is  the  subject  of  his 
criticism.  As  he  has  apparently  not  seen  my  original  book,3  the  fault 
is  probably  mine,  or,  at  least,  is  due  to  the  fact,  that  the  Review  article 
necessarily  contained  only  a  summary  of  my  argument.  Before  tak- 
ing up  the  objections  which  Professor  Bawden  has  raised,  iet  me 
endeavor  once  more  to  explain  the  hypothesis. 

The  panpsychic  hypothesis  is  not  easy  to  grasp  at  once,  owing  to 
the  conventional  habits  of  thought  by  which  we  conceive  of  matter 
and  mind,  and  to  the  difficulty  of  not  only  taking  a  new  point  of 
view  but  holding  that  new  point  of  view  steadily  in  mind  throughout 
the  inquiry.  But  I  have  found  that,  when  the  hypothesis  is  thoroughly 
grasped  and  held,  the  objections  usually  made  cease  to  be  offered.  If 
we  can  put  aside  for  the  moment  our  prearranged  conceptions,  like 
*  parallelism,'  and  '  mind  and  matter  being  facts  of  a  different  order,' 
etc.,  etc.,  the  hypothesis  becomes  a  very  simple  one.  It  seems  to 
me,  too,  that  it  does  not  embrace  any  very  deep  metaphysical  or  psy- 
chological notion.  We  need  not  concern  ourselves  with  the  *  content ' 
of  consciousness,  nor  with  such  questions  as  whether  consciousness  in 
retrospection  becomes  objective  or  not,  nor  with  the  nature  of  the  ego 
and  questions  of  that  sort.  It  really  involves  physiology  and  physics 
quite  as  much  as,  if  not  more  than,  psychology,  and  only  includes 
metaphysics  so  far  as  it  includes  panpsychism.  So  far  as  mind  and 

1  Physical  Metempiric.     Very  few  persons  seem  to  have  heard  of  Barratt.     My 
own  attention  was  called  to  his  work  only  comparatively  recently. 

2  Nov.,  1903. 

3  The  Nature  of  Mind  and  Human  Automatism.      J.   B.   Lippincott  Co.     The 
book  is  out  of  print,  but  I  have  a  few  copies  left  and  I  should  be  glad  to  send  a  copy 
to  any  one  interested  in  the  subject. 


446  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

brain  are  concerned,  we  deal  with  a  psychical  fact  and  a  physiological 
fact  and  an  inference  as  to  the  relation  between  them. 

From  its  nature  the  hypothesis  is  probably  not  open  to  objective  proof. 
At  most  we  can  offer  an  hypothesis,  and  then  inquire,  first,  whether 
it  explains  all  the  known  facts  involved  in  the  problem  itself,  and 
second,  whether  there  are  any  correlated  facts  known  which  contradict 
it.  If  these  questions  are  answered  satisfactorily,  it  is  all  that  can 
be  asked  of  any  hypothesis,  and  it  should  be  accepted  until  facts  are 
discovered  which  contradict  it. 

The  first  and  most  important  thing  is  to  set  before  ourselves  the  nature 
of  the  problem  we  are  trying  to  solve.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
Professor  Bawden  has  clearly  done  this,  when  he  says  :  * '  Why  what  is 
mental  for  me  is  physical  for  you  [meaning  brain  process]  is  no  more 
a  problem  than  why  the  leaf  on  the  tree  is  different  from  the  blade  of 
grass. ' '  In  difficulty  it  may  not  be  more  of  a  problem,  any  more  than 
one  in  geometry  may  be ;  but  it  is  an  entirely  different  kind  of  prob- 
lem, so  different  that  the  method  employed  to  solve  it  must  be  en- 
tirely different.  It  would  seem  that  it  must  be  owing  to  his  failure 
quite  to  grasp  the  problem  that  he  says  :  1 1  It  is  difficult  to  see  why 
the  brain  process,  when  thus  experienced  from  within,  should  be  called 
'  the  actuality, '  while  the  same  brain  process  when  viewed  by  a  sec- 
ond person  is  only  '  the  symbol  of  it. '  "  I  may  deceive  myself,  as 
we  are  all  liable  to  do,  but  the  reason  seems  clear  to  me.  What  Pro- 
fessor Bawden  calls  "  the  brain  process,  when  experienced  from 
within "  is  a  state  of  consciousness,  say  a  musical  note ;  but  that 
musical  note,  when  viewed  (ideally,  of  course)  by  a  second  person, 
would  be  perceived  as  brain  motion,  and  motion  could,  of  course, 
only  symbolize  a  musical  note.  It  is  true  that  the  brain  motion  is  an 
actuality  so  far  as  it  is  a  part  of  a  second  person's  consciousness ;  but 
so  far  as  it  is  the  reaction  to  the  first  person's  consciousness,  it  can 
only  be  a  symbol  of  the  latter.  Surely  a  visual  sensation  in  one  per- 
son cannot  more  than  symbolize  an  auditory  sensation  in  another 
person. 

All  this  will  become  clear,  if  I  may  be  permitted  to  explain  once 
more  the  hypothesis,  after  which  I  will  take  up  the  more  important 
objection  of  Professor  Bawden.  The  hypothesis,  so  far  as  the  mind 
and  brain  are  concerned,  is  this.  In  common  parlance  we  speak  of 
consciousness  and  brain  processes  as  two  events,  different  in  kind  and 
distinct  from  each  other,  which  occur  in  the  same  organism.  The 
one  is  psychical  and  the  other  material,  and  it  is  customary  to  say 
that  one  is  correlated  with  the  other.  But,  from  what  we  know  about 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  447 

the  matter,  we  all  agree  that  a  brain  process  is  a  mental  symbol  of 
something  else.  Now,  according  to  the  hypothesis,  consciousness  and 
this  something  else  (to  which,  for  the  convenience  of  language,  we 
give  the  name  of  the  symbol,  brain  process)  are  identical.  There  are 
not  two  correlated  processes  in  the  same  organism,  nor  during  the 
activity  of  that  organism  is  that  something  else  transformed  into  con- 
sciousness, or  consciousness  into  that  something  else.  That  some- 
thing else  is  consciousness. 

There  is  only  one  process,  which  you  may  call  as  you  like  brain 
process,  if  you  speak  symbolically,  or  psychical  process,  if  you  define 
it  as  it  actually  is.  The  problem,  then,  is  one  of  identification.  By 
identification  I  do  not  mean  the  identification  of  one  state  of  con- 
sciousness in  me  with  another  state  of  consciousness  in  you,  so-called 
'  brain-process,'  but  with  the  so-called  but  not  really  '  material '  event 
in  me  which  the  conscious  state  brain  process  in  you  stands  for.  But 
if  we  are  to  use  common  parlance,  instead  of  this  sort  of  explanatory 
language,  we  may  say :  Consciousness  and  the  brain  process  are  iden- 
tical. If  this  seems  contradictory,  the  significance  of  the  formula  will 
appear  as  we  proceed. 

If  the  hypothesis  is  correct,  we  have  to  explain  certain  facts  which 
appear  at  first  sight  absolutely  to  contradict  it.  The  chief  of  these 
facts  is  the  apparent  existence  of  two  processes  and  their  apparent  non- 
identity.  Is  this  apparent  existence  and  non-identity  true,  or  is  it  only 
a  sort  of  optical  illusion  ?  Let  us  be  more  specific,  and  speak  of  a 
definite  state  of  consiousness  and  a  brain  process.  Of  course,  we  do 
not  know  what  sort  of  thing,  physically  speaking,  a  brain  process  is, 
but  we  have  to  assume  it  to  be  some  sort  of  molecular  motion.  We 
will  assume  it  to  be  that.  For  our  psychical  fact  we  will  take  a  state 
of  pain.  Now  what  we  have  to  do  is  to  identify  the  brain  process, 
molecular  motion,  with  what  is  to  all  appearances  a  very  different 
thing,  a  feeling  of  pain.  Now  if  the  pain  feeling  and  the  molecular 
motion  are  the  same  thing,  why  do  they  appear  so  different  ?  Why 
do  there  appear  to  be  two  processes  in  my  organism,  one  correlated 
with  the  other  ?  How  does  it  happen  that,  ex  hypothesi,  at  one  time  I 
speak  of  it  as  pain  and  at  another  as  molecular  motion  ? 

The  answer  to  this  seems  not  difficult.  That  the  right  point  of  view 
may  at  the  outset  be  selected,  let  it  be  premised  that  the  recognition 
of  the  psychical  process  as  molecular  motion  is  due  entirely  to  a  special 
optical  device  by  which  (ideally)  I  artificially  apprehend  the  psychical 
state  (pain).  It  is  a  pure  artifact,  in  the  same  sense  that  it  is  by  an 
artifact  that  sound  (as  a  phenomenon  of  physics)  is  made  to  appear  as 


448  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

vibrations  of  the  atmosphere,  or  light  as  vibrations  of  ether,  or  heat 
as  molecular  motion  of  matter.  It  is  by  a  special  device,  by  another 
method  of  apprehending  these  physical  phenomena  of  sound  and  light 
and  heat,  that  we  perceive  them  as  forms  of  motion.  That  is,  it  is  by 
a  special  device  that  what  was  before  apprehended  by  the  sense  of 
hearing  is  now  apprehended  by  the  sense  of  sight  (vibration),  and 
what  was  apprehended  by  the  sense  of  temperature  is  now  apprehended 
by  the  sense  of  sight  also.  For,  of  course,  sound  is  not  vibrations, 
though  it  may,  as  an  artifact,  be  apprehended  as  such.  More  accu- 
rately speaking,  the  thing-in-itself  that  ordinarily  is  apprehended 
through  the  ears  as  sound,  is  now  made  by  a  device  to  be  apprehended 
through  the  eyes  as  vision.  Similarly,  also,  sound  or  pain  as  a  con- 
scious state  is  not  a  brain  process,  though  it  may  by  an  artifice  be 
made  to  appear  such.  Now  what  is  the  artifice  by  which  this  is  done  ? 

We  will  take  the  illustration  which  is  thought  by  Professor  Bawden 
to  destroy  the  hypothesis.  Suppose  that  a  person  could  turn  an  X-ray 
apparatus,  or  a  microscope,  or  some  other  kind  of  instrument  upon 
his  own  brain  (consciousness),  and  by  means  of  it  become  conscious 
of  his  psychical  state,  a  pain.  Now  how,  supposing  it  could  be  done, 
would  his  consciousness  be  apprehended  through  his  optical  apparatus  ? 
Plainly  it  could  only  be  in  terms  of  vision,  and  according  to  the  phys- 
iological laws  of  vision.  If  his  retina  were  acted  upon  by  his  con- 
sciousness, he  would  apprehend  the  latter  (see  it)  as  a  molecular 
vibration  (brain  process).  At  the  same  moment,  then,  that  he  had  a 
conscious  state  (pain),  or  a  fraction  of  a  second  later,  he  would  have 
another  conscious  state,  molecular  motion.  The  latter  would  be  his 
mode  of  apprehending  the  former,  which  is  the  real  process  or  con- 
sciousness. Suppose,  instead  of  using  an  optical  apparatus  to  appre- 
hend his  consciousness,  he  used  an  acoustic  apparatus  ;  he  would  then 
apprehend  his  conscious  state  (pain)  as  sound.  If  he  used  a  tactile 
apparatus,  he  would  perceive  it  as  some  sort  of  tactile  sensation,  and 
so  on. 

Suppose  we  approach  the  experiment  in  the  converse  way.  Sup- 
pose he  turned  his  optical  apparatus  on  his  brain  and  became  con- 
scious of  a  brain  process.  He  would  say,  of  course,  that  he  saw 
a  brain  process.  Now  he  asks  himself,  what  it  really  is  that  he 
sees,  /".  e.,  whether  the  brain  process  exists  as  such.  The  answer 
plainly  is,  that  the  so-called  brain  process  is  only  a  state  of  his  own 
consciousness  symbolizing  the  thing-in-itself.  But  what  is  the  thing- 
in-itself?  Observing,  now,  that  invariably,  while  looking  through  his 
microscope,  he  has  the  conscious  experience  called  the  brain  process 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  449 

at  the  very  same  instant  that  he  has  the  pain,  he  infers  that  it  is  the 
pain  that  he  apprehends  as  the  brain  process,  and  the  pain  is  the 
thing-in-itself,  the  reality  of  the  brain  process.  Thus  it  is,  according 
to  the  hypothesis,  that  the  brain  process  is  a  mode  of  apprehending 
consciousness  which  is  the  thing-in-itself. 

To  all  this  Professor  Bawden  raises  an  objection,  which  it  seems  to 
me  is  due  to  a  momentary  fogging  of  his  conception.  "But  now 
suppose,"  he  says,  "by  some  device,  that  one  of  these  persons  turns 
his  instrument  upon  his  own  brain  state.  He  still,  on  the  theory  pro- 
pounded by  these  writers,  would  see  only  brain  state.  His  own  brain 
state,  in  this  case,  would  likewise  be  only  a  symbol.  But  a  symbol  of 
what?  A  symbol  of  his  own  consciousness,  of  course.  But,  by 
hypothesis,  this  symbol  is  a  part  of  his  own  consciousness.1  The 
symbol  must  then  be  as  real  as  his  consciousness,  which,  according  to 
Dr.  Prince,  is  the  only  reality.  Reality,  then,  includes  both  the 
psychical  and  physical,  both  the  consciousness  and  the  brain  state. 
How,  then,  can  consciousness  or  the  psychical  be  the  only  reality, 
/.  e. ,  how  can  panpsychism  be  true  ?  ' ' 

Professor  Bawden  confuses  our  own  particular  consciousness  with 
the  psychical  in  general.  It  may  be  answered  at  once  :  Our  own  par- 
ticular consciousness  is  not  the  only  reality,  though  it  may  be  the  only 
reality  that  we  directly  know.  Professor  Bawden' s  difficulty  is  read- 
ily cleared  up,  as  it  seems  to  me,  when  we  remember  that  the  '  sym- 
bol, '  so  far  as  it  is  a  state  of  consciousness,  is  of  course  a  reality,  and 
if  it  is  a  symbol  of  one's  own  consciousness,  both  the  symbol  and  the 
object  are  real,  being  conscious  states.  But  they  are  not  the  same, 
but  different  states.  They  are  two  different  states  of  a  personal  con- 
sciousness. On  the  other  hand,  a  state  of  consciousness  which  is  a 
symbol  of  a  piece  of  the  external  world,  say  a  tree,  while  in  itself  a 
reality,  is  not  the  particular  reality  of  that  piece  of  the  external  world. 
That  particular  reality  is  the  tree-in-itself,  which,  by  the  hypothesis  of 
panpsychism,  is  a  piece  of  so-called  'mind-stuff.'  The  things-in- 
themselves  of  the  whole  external  world,  including  our  brains,  are  made 
up  of  mind-stuff. 

This  is  a  deduction  which  is  arrived  at  in  the  following  manner. 
All  material  things  are  of  the  same  nature,  and  amongst  material 
things  are  found  brain-processes  ;  but  when  we  come  to  analyze  our 
mode  of  perception  of  our  so-called  brain- processes,  we  find  that  the 
process  in  itself  is  consciousness,  or,  as  it  has  been  called,  '  mind- 

1 "  'That  which  we  call  the  physical  brain-process  is  my  consciousness  or  per- 
ception of  it.'  P.  652."  [Quoted  from  my  article  in  Psychological  Review.] 


450  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

stuff. '  Hence  we  deduce  the  theory  that  all  other  material  things-in- 
themselves  are  psychic  in  nature  or  are  elemental  forms  of  mind-stuff. 
This  does  not  mean  that  they  are  self-conscious  or  even  conscious,  but 
that  all  the  so-called  forces  of  the  universe  are  in  reality  the  same  in 
kind,  and  of  a  nature  which,  under  certain  conditions,  manifests  itself 
as  psychic.  This  is  '  panpsychism. ' 

Of  course,  we  might  as  properly  say  that  consciousness  is  of  the 
same  nature  as  things-in-themselves  and  the  '  forces '  of  the  universe. 
The  doctrine  would  then  be  called  '  pan-materialism.'  It  would  have 
the  advantage  of  explaining  the  more  complex  in  terms  of  the  more 
simple,  but  it  would  have  the  disadvantage  of  explaining  the  better 
known  in  terms  of  the  less  known.  Therefore,  we  are  obliged  to 
adopt  the  term  '  pan-psychism  '  rather  than  *  pan-materialism.'  '  Pan- 
materialism,  '  when  philosophically  understood,  and  '  pan-psychism  ' 
are  interchangeable  terms. 

Professor  Bakewell  *  also  seems  to  me  to  have  raised  an  untenable  ob- 
jection to  the  hypothesis.  He  is  willing  to  agree  "  that  the  problem 
of  the  relation  of  mind  to  body  is  brought  nearer  to  solution  by  being 
resolved  into  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  perception  to  object  .  .  . 
and  that  it  is  capable  of  solution  along  these  lines. "  "  But  when  we 
reach  this  point,"  he  adds,  "  it  is  seen  that  the  object  is  at  once  de- 
pendent on  two  or  more  distinct  egos ;  and  the  puzzle  of  the  relation 
of  mind  and  body  returns  in  this  form  :  How  can  I  influence  percep- 
tion in  another  consciousness  ? ' '  But  surely  we  are  not  obliged  to 
explain  the  '  how '  to  maintain  the  hypothesis.  That  I  influence 
another  consciousness  may  be  demonstrated  without  our  knowing  the 
'how.'  We  may  show  that  the  earth  attracts  other  bodies  without 
understanding  how,  and,  indeed,  we  do  understand  every  day  that 
one  state  of  consciousness  may  influence  another,  without  our  having 
the  slightest  idea  as  to  how  it  is  done.  Can  any  one  explain  how  one 
idea  induces  or  inhibits  another  idea,  how  the  presence  of  one  mental 
state  insures  another  by  the  so-called  <  law  of  association  '  ?  Or  how 
an  emotion  like  fear  influences  a  whole  rabble  of  ideas  ?  The  fact  is 
that  things-in-themselves  are  always  influencing  each  other  according 
to  what  are  called  '  natural '  laws,  and  there  is  no  difficulty  in  con- 
ceiving that  consciousness,  a  thing-in-itself,  may  influence  another  con- 
sciousness through  physiological  laws,  that  is,  through  the  five  senses. 

There  is  one  deduction  which  was  drawn  by  me  from  this  hypothesis, 
but  which  has  not  received  the  attention  that  it  merits  ;  for  either  it 
reduces  the  hypothesis  to  an  absurdity,  or  it  contains  a  great  philo- 

1  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW,  May  1904,  Vol.  XIII,  p.  345. 


No.  4.]  DISCUSSIONS.  45 1 

sophical  truth.  I  have  called  attention  to  the  fact,  that,  if  we  con- 
sider the  action  of  these  organisms  acting  on  each  other  in  such  a  way 
that  A  influences  B  and  B  influences  C,  then  a  conscious  state,  say 
color  in  A,  will  be  perceived  by  B  as  motion,  and  the  conscious  state  of 
motion  in  B  will  be  perceived  by  C  as  motion,  and  a  fourth  organism, 
D,  would  perceive  C's  consciousness  as  motion  also,  and  so  on  ad  in- 
finitum.  In  other  words,  notwithstanding  the  Berkeleian  doctrine,  and 
the  fact  that  things-in-themselves  are  unknown,  the  object  under  these 
particular  circumstances  would  substantially  exist  as  we  see  it,  /.  e., 
motion  would  exist  outside  of  our  own  consciousness.  And  if  brain 
motion  may  exist  as  such,  why  not  other  motion  ? 

Is  this  reducing  the  doctrine  to  an  absurdity?  Is  it  impossible 
that  motion  exists  as  such  independently  of  our  consciousness  ?  That 
it  is  only  a  state  of  consciousness  which  is  a  symbol  of  something  else, 
some  unknown  change  in  the  universe?  The  universality  of  the 
Berkeleian  doctrine  would  require  this,  and  yet  this  deduction  from 
this  doctrine  brings  us  back  to  the  recognition  of  motion  really  exist- 
ing as  we  see  it.  I  see  no  other  choice,  and  of  the  two  alternatives 
it  seems  to  me  more  probable  that  motion  does  exist  as  we  see  it ; 
that  a  comet  flying  through  space,  or  a  locomotive  racing  along  the 
rails,  does  change  its  relations  to  its  environment  in  a  way  that  is 
apprehended  really  by  consciousness  and  not  as  a  symbol  of  something 
else.  If  this  be  true,  and  I  believe  it  is  true,  the  hypothesis  embraces 
a  great  philosophical  truth,  and  reconciles  things-in-themselves  with 
a  true  though  limited  perception  of  the  universe. 

MORTON  PRINCE. 
TUFTS  COLLEGE  MEDICAL  SCHOOL. 


REVIEWS   OF   BOOKS. 

Gmndzuge  der  physiologischen  Psychologic.  Von  WILHELM 
WUNDT.  Fiinfte  vollig  umgearbeitete  Auflage.  Leipzig,  W.  En- 
gelmann,  1903.  Bd.  Ill,  pp.  ix,  796;  Bd.  IV,  Gesamtregister, 

PP-  I33- 

These  volumes  complete  the  revised  edition  of  the  Grundzuge.  The 
index  has  grown  to  such  proportions  as  to  demand  a  separate  cover. 
Volume  III  contains  the  last  chapter  of  Part  III,  the  chapter  on  Tem- 
poral Ideas ;  Part  IV,  on  Emotion  and  Volitions,  in  two  chapters 
treating  respectively  of  * '  Ideational  Feelings  and  Emotions  ' '  and  of 
"Volitional  Processes";  Part  V,  "The  Course  and  Combinations  of 
Psychic  Processes,"  in  three  chapters  entitled  "  Consciousness  and  the 
Course  of  Ideas,"  "Psychic  Combinations,"  "Anomalies  of  Con- 
sciousness"; and  a  completely  rewritten  final  division  containing  a 
chapter  on  "The  Natural  Science  Presuppositions  of  Psychology" 
and  one  on  "  The  Principles  of  Psychology. " 

As  in  the  preceding  volumes  of  this  edition,  a  very  considerable  re- 
arrangement of  material  is  apparent.  The  chapter  on  Temporal  Ideas 
takes  from  the  fourth  edition  as  follows :  The  sections  on  the  general 
time  sense  problems,  on  the  temporal  difference  limen,  and  on  tem- 
poral displacements  from  the  old  chapter  on  Apperception  and  the 
Course  of  Ideas ;  the  sections  on  temporal  auditory  ideas  from  the 
chapter  on  Auditory  Ideas.  The  sections  on  the  relative  importance 
of  different  senses  for  temporal  ideas,  on  temporal  tactile  ideas,  on 
complications  of  temporal  ideas,  on  the  absolute  time  limen,  on  quan- 
titative illusions  in  immediate  temporal  ideas,  and  much  of  that  on  the 
theory  of  temporal  ideas  are  new.  In  Chapter  xvi,  on  Ideational 
Feelings  and  Emotions,  everything  is  new  but  a  few  paragraphs  in  the 
discussion  of  aesthetic  feeling.  Chapter  xvii,  on  Volitional  Processes, 
has  the  sections  on  expression  of  emotion  practically  unaltered  from  the 
chapter  entitled  ' '  Expressive  Movements  ' '  in  the  fourth  edition  ;  the 
discussion  of  impulsive,  instinctive,  reflex,  and  automatic  movements, 
and  of  the  theory  of  will,  has  been  more  or  less  rewritten,  while  the 
sections  on  the  concept  of  will  and  the  course  of  volitional  processes 
are  entirely  new.  Emotion  and  volition,  it  will  be  seen,  are  now 
treated  in  the  same  division  of  the  work,  while  the  preceding  edition 
puts  the  one  in  Part  IV  and  the  other  in  Part  V. 

452 


REVIEWS  Of  BOOKS.  453 

The  next  chapter,  on  Consciousness  and  the  Course  of  Ideas,  con- 
tains, besides  the  material  from  Chapter  xv,  on  Consciousness,  in  the 
fourth  edition,  the  discussion  of  reaction  time  from  the  old  Chapter 
xvi,  on  Apperception  and  the  Course  of  Ideas,  and  adds  new  sections 
on  the  course  of  reproduced  ideas,  qualitative  and  spatial.  The  treat- 
ment of  reproduced  temporal  ideas  also  borrows  from  Chapter  xvi  of  the 
fourth  edition.  The  final  section,  on  the  course  of  memory  images 
under  complex  conditions,  is  new.  In  Chapter  xix  the  introductory 
survey  of  the  forms  of  psychic  combination,  and  the  section  on  com- 
plex intellectual  functions  (active  memory,  reading,  writing,  intel- 
lectual work  as  affected  by  fatigue  and  practice)  are  quite  new  ;  the 
treatment  of  successive  associations  is  almost  wholly  rewritten,  that  of 
intellectual  feelings  taken  from  the  chapter  on  emotions  in  the  fourth 
edition.  The  least  modified  chapter  in  the  book  is  the  one  on  Anom- 
alies of  Consciousness ;  while  Part  VI  is,  as  has  been  said,  entirely 
reconstructed. 

If  we  survey  the  material  alterations  and  additions  made  to  the 
book,  we  find  that,  aside  from  this  concluding  part  and  from  the  new 
experimental  material,  all  the  most  important  changes  arise  from  the 
new  theory  of  feeling.  Analysis  of  feeling  might  almost  be  termed 
the  chief  psychological  method  in  the  revised  Wundtian  system. 
Strain  and  relaxation,  excitement  and  depression,  pleasantness  and 
unpleasantness, — these  last  rather  less  prominent,  not  being  the  author's 
peculiar  property, — are  the  most  essential  elements  in  his  psychic 
chemistry.  The  following  details  will  illustrate  :  A  volition,  we  are 
told,  is  a  form  of  emotion  differing  from  other  emotions  in  its  final 
stage.  It  ends  suddenly,  instead  of  gradually,  as  emotions  proper  do  ; 
and  its  ending  is  brought  about  by  no  external  influence, — it  is  self- 
terminating  in  a  peculiarly  abrupt  manner.  Acts  of  will  may  differ 
in  their  preliminary  phases,  but  they  are  all  alike  in  the  feeling  course 
of  their  concluding  phase,  which  occurs  thus  :  An  increasing  feeling 
of  strain  is  joined  by  an  increasing  feeling  of  excitation ;  the  latter 
reaches  its  maximum  shortly  after  the  former,  which  then  gives  place, 
at  the  moment  of  the  external  movement,  to  a  relaxation  feeling, 
whereupon  the  feeling  of  excitation  disappears.  The  combination  of 
strain  and  relaxation  constitutes  the  feeling  of  activity.  When,  after 
a  preliminary  alternation  of  motives  (affectively  toned  ideas),  one 
motive  fuses  with  the  feeling  of  activity,  we  have  a  new  feeling,  that 
of  decision.  At  the  moment  when,  upon  action,  relaxation  takes  the 
place  of  strain,  the  total  feeling  is  one  of  fulfilment  (pp.  250  ff.). 
The  course  of  feelings  in  apperception  is  analogous;  in  prolonged 


454  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

attention  the  strain  and  relaxation  feelings  alternate  periodically 
(pp.  342  ff. ).  Passive  attention  to  an  unexpected  impression  is  dis- 
tinguished, aside  from  being  'eindeutig  bestimmt, '  by  the  occurrence  of 
a  relaxation  feeling  immediately  after  the  impression, — producing,  with 
the  other  feelings  present,  a  resultant  feeling  of  '  being  acted  upon  ' 
(Er let  den}. 

Temporal  ideas  are  another  realm  where  feelings  play  a  leading 
part.  Ideas  of  this  class  are  based  upon  the  regular  alternation  of 
strain  and  relaxation  feelings ;  the  temporal  sign  of  a  sensation  in  a 
given  series  is  formed  by  the  fusion  of  the  sensation  with  the  particu- 
lar intensity  of  strain  or  relaxation  that  belongs,  in  this  periodical 
course,  to  the  moment  of  its  occurrence  (p.  93).  Involuntary  rhythm 
arises  from  the  fact  that  the  strain  feelings  are  more  intense  in  alter- 
nate periods.  Further,  the  feeling  of  recognition  is  also  essentially  a 
relaxation  feeling.  It  takes  on  a  special  form  in  <  time  sense  '  experi- 
ments where  two  intervals  are  compared.  If  the  two  intervals  are 
equal,  the  assimilatively  reproduced  and  directly  experienced  feel- 
ings run  the  same  course,  and  the  relaxation  feeling  at  the  end  is  of 
increased  intensity ;  if  the  intervals  are  unequal,  the  reproduced  re- 
laxation feeling  at  the  end  of  one  may  have  to  fuse  with  a  strain  feel- 
ing in  the  other  which  has  not  yet  run  its  course,  or  vice  versa; 
whence  a  feeling  of  contradiction  (p.  510). 

In  his  treatment  of  the  more  obviously  affective  processes,  such  as 
aesthetic  feeling  and  emotion,  the  author  has  much  that  is  new  to  say 
about  the  feeling  components.  His  analysis  of  the  agreeableness  of 
rhythm,  for  instance,  is  as  follows :  It  is  a  pleasant  feeling  resulting 
from  the  alternation  and  fusion  of  strain  and  relaxation  feelings,  which 
have  a  double  source,  first,  the  alternation  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
involved  in  the  periodicity  of  attention,  and  second,  a  fusion  depend- 
ing on  the  similarity  of  each  rhythmic  period  to  the  preceding.  This 
fusion  is  produced  by  the  fact  that  along  with  the  strain  of  expecting 
the  next  impression  goes  the  relaxation  of  recognizing  the  likeness  of 
the  present  impression  with  the  corresponding  phase  of  the  preceding 
period  (p.  161).  Again,  one  of  the  associative  factors  in  the  aesthetics 
of  form,  e.  g.,  in  looking  at  a  pillar  and  its  capital,  is  recognized  to 
be  the  feelings  of  effort  upwards  and  resistance  to  that  effort.  These 
feelings  are  identical  in  composition  with  those  characteristic  of  voli- 
tion, hence  Lipps  is  right  in  speaking  of  a  projection  of  the  beholder's 
voluntary  activity  into  the  object  (p.  188).  Many  other  points  of 
great  interest  in  the  treatment  of  aesthetic  feelings  must  be  passed  over 
for  want  of  space  to  discuss  them.  The  classification  of  emotions  has 


No.  4-]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  455 

of  course  now  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  *  feeling  directions. ' 
Emotions  fall  into  two  main  classes,  according  as  the  predominant 
feelings  are  of  the  pleasure-pain  or  strain-relaxation  category.  Excita- 
tion and  depression,  when  added,  produce  various  sub-classes ;  for  in- 
stance, they  distinguish  the  objective  forms  of  pleasant  and  unpleasant 
emotion,  such  as  dislike,  from  the  subjective  forms,  such  as  unhappi- 
ness  (p.  225). 

This  brief  account  will  serve  to  illustrate  some  of  the  uses  to  which 
Wundt  puts  his  new  feeling  doctrine.  Without  attempting  any  thor- 
ough-going criticism,  the  reviewer  finds  two  points  suggesting  them- 
selves as  worthy  of  some  consideration.  The  first  is  that,  in  his  zeal 
for  feelings,  Wundt  lets  sensational  components  escape  him,  and,  in  par- 
ticular, treats  the  organic  sensations  entering  into  the  complex  processes 
analyzed  in  this  volume,  quite  cavalierly.  And  one  cannot  avoid  the 
impression  that  a  keener  introspective  search  for  organic  sensations 
would  find  them  essential  features  of  '  feelings  '  belonging  to  the  strain- 
relaxation  and  excitement-depression  categories.  The  second  point 
concerns  the  method  of  analysis  that  enables  the  author  to  discover  the 
components  of  a  given  feeling.  Much  of  this  analysis  is  avowedly  in- 
trospective ;  while  the  curves  obtained  from  the  various  instruments 
measuring  bodily  effects  are  held  to  confirm,  here  and  there,  the  re- 
sults of  introspection,  yet  most  of  the  dissection  of  feelings  is  quite 
unsupported  by  external  evidence.  Now  in  various  passages,  notably 
on  pp.  200-201,  the  peculiar  unity  of  feeling  fusions  is  dwelt  upon. 
In  sensation  fusions,  we  are  told,  the  manifoldness  of  the  content 
always  remains  recognizable  in  spite  of  the  dominance  of  certain  ele- 
ments. But  in  a  feeling  fusion,  "so  mannigfach  die  Gefuhlssaiten 
sein  mogen,  der  Totaleffect  ist  doch  fur  das  Gefiihl  ein  durchaus  ein- 
heitlicher,  darum  fur  die  unmittelbare  Wahrnehmung  im  Grunde  un- 
analysirbarer. ' '  This  unity  of  complex  feelings,  we  are  told,  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  feeling,  simple  or  complex,  is  always  the  reaction  of 
apperception  on  a  given  content.  How,  then,  can  apperception 
analyze  feelings  at  all?  If  strain,  relaxation,  etc.,  were  sensational, 
they  could  be  detected  in  a  complex  by  the  ordinary  methods  of  atten- 
tional  analysis ;  if  they  are  feelings,  how  is  their  presence  in  a  fusion 
to  be  introspectively  discovered  ?  Is  it  not  just  because  they  are  sen- 
sational that  all  this  analysis  has  been  possible  ? 

The  concluding  part  of  the  book  gives  clear  and  full  expression  to 
certain  well-known  Wundtian  doctrines  concerning  the  philosophical 
basis  of  psychology.  In  the  first  chapter  it  is  pointed  out,  among 
other  things,  that  scientific  explanation  merely  requires  the  avoidance 


456  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

of  contradictions,  not  the  subsumption  of  all  phenomena  under  a  single 
concept ;  and  that  the  causal  and  teleological  principles  of  explanation 
differ,  not  in  essential  nature,  but  only  in  direction,  the  former  working 
progressively,  from  cause  to  effect,  the  latter  regressively,  from  effect 
or  end  to  cause  or  means.  The  most  important  section  of  this  chapter 
is  the  last,  on  Causality  and  Teleology  of  Psychophysical  Life  Processes, 
where  examination  of  a  typical  psychophysical  process,  the  voluntary 
act,  prepares  the  way  for  the  discussion  of  psychic  causality  later  on. 
The  idea  of  the  end  is  a  cause  of  the  result  of  a  voluntary  act,  but 
only  one  among  other  causes  ;  hence  end  proposed  and  result  achieved 
do  not  coincide,  and  we  see  the  principle  of  the  heterogony  of  ends, 
which  Wundt  uses  so  frequently  in  his  ethical  theory.  From  an  ex- 
amination of  the  voluntary  act  in  its  psychological  aspect,  we  find  that  a 
psychic  causal  series  differs  from  a  causal  series  in  the  physical  world 
through  being  in  a  peculiar  sense  at  once  causal  and  teleological.  A 
physical  series  is  both  causal  and  teleological  after  the  event :  that  is,  it 
may  be  traced  either  forwards  or  backwards.  But  in  a  psychic  series  the 
effect  or  end  is,  as  idea,  one  of  the  causes  or  means  to  its  own  production. 
The  two  principal  topics  of  the  last  chapter  are  psycho-physical 
parallelism  and  psychic  causality.  'It  is  by  the  interpretation  he  gives 
these  terms  that  Wundt  thinks  to  save  the  science  of  psychology  from 
ultimate  absorption  into  physiology.  Parallelism,  which  is  a  heuristic, 
not  a  metaphysical  principle,  is  limited  to  a  correspondence  between 
elementary  psychic  processes  and  elementary  nervous  processes ;  there 
is  no  such  correspondence  between  psychic  combinations  and  nervous 
combinations,  hence  we  can  never  have  a  purely  physiological  explana- 
tion of  psychic  combinations,  no  matter  how  great  the  progress  of 
neurology.  Psychological  explanation,  based  on  the  principle  of 
psychic  causality,  will  always  be  demanded.  The  three  principles  of 
psychic  causality  are  the  principle  of  creative  resultants,  that  the 
combination  is  more  than  the  sum  of  its  elements,  the  principle  of 
relativity,  and  the  principle  of  contrast,  which  is  the  law  of  relativity 
in  the  affective  realm.  The  teleological  aspect  of  psychic  causality, 
finally,  is  expressed  in  the  principle  of  the  heterogony  of  ends. 

MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN. 
VASSAR  COLLEGE. 

Der  Sinn   des  Daseins :  Streifzuge   eines   Optimisten   durch   die 
Philosophic  der  Gegenwart.     Von  LUDWIG  STEIN.     Tubingen  und 
Leipzig,  J.  C.  B.  Mohr,  1904. — pp.  xi,  437. 
This  work  by  the  editor  of  the  Archiv  fur  Philosophic  is  divided 

into  four  parts  :  "A,  Der  Sinn  der  Welt  ";   "B,  Der  Sinn  des  Erken- 


No   4.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  457 

nens  ";  "  C,  Der  Sinn  des  personlichen  Lebens";  "D,  Der  Sinn  des 
sozialen  Lebens. ' '  The  first  three  parts,  taken  together,  constituteaseries 
of  essays  on  specifically  philosophical  topics,  while  the  last  part  is  a  col- 
lection of  discussions  in  sociology.  The  subtitle  indicates  Professor 
Stein's  attitude,  and  he  appears  everywhere  as  the  vigorous  and  im- 
placable foe  of  romanticism,  scepticism,  and  pessimism.  He  hits  hard, 
and  his  writing  always  has  liveliness,  color,  and  movement.  The  essays 
here  collected  have  previously  seen  the  light  in  various  journals,  and 
they  are  very  uneven  in  quality.  Some  of  them  hardly  deserved 
republication  and  others  would  bear  pruning.  But  nearly  all  are 
interestingly  written,  and  they  show  a  very  wide  acquaintance  with 
the  philosophical  and  sociological  literature  of  the  present  day,  as  well 
as  with  the  history  of  philosophy. 

Turning  now  to  the  first  group  of  essays,  the  properly  philosophi- 
cal, which  occupies  one  hundred  and  ninety- six  pages,  Professor 
Stein's  philosophical  attitude  is  expressed  in  the  fact  that  he  seems  to 
regard  Spencer,  Wundt,  and  Mach  as  the  three  greatest  contemporary 
philosophers.  He  also  has  a  predilection  for  Ostwald's  philosophy  of 
Energetics.  Professor  Stein  is  an  idealist  of  the  psychological  type,  and 
his  idealism  sits  easily  enough  on  him  to  accommodate  a  considerable 
variety  of  attitudes  and  views.  In  fact,  his  fundamental  position  seems 
to  be  a  sort  of  all-comprehending  phenomenalism.  He  quotes  Dil- 
they  with  approval,  and  agrees  with  him  that  metaphysics  has  done  its 
work  and  must  be  transformed  into  epistemology,  —  an  epistemology  on 
a  psychological  basis.  "  The  truth  lies  within  us,  not  outside  of  us." 

In  the  second  essay,  entitled  "  The  Contemporary  Movement  of 
Philosophical  Thought, ' '  Professor  Stein  draws  an  interesting  contrast 
between  Leibniz,  the  '  temperamental '  thinker,  with  his  emphasis  on  tel- 
eology, and  Spinoza,  the  thinker  of  cool  '  understanding, '  who  subordi- 
nates everything  to  mathematical  order.  Biologists,  he  says,  have  most 
affinity  with  Leibniz,  physicists  with  Spinoza ;  hence  Leibniz  is  more 
in  favor  now  since  biology  is  the  reigning  science.  The  fourth  essay 
is  entitled  "Causality,  Teleology,  and  Freedom."  Both  cause  and 
end  are  expressions  of  our  sense  of  order,  —  aids  furnished  by  thought 
for  our  orientation  in  the  external  world.  But  while  causality  pro- 
duces definitive  order,  teleology  only  formulatesprovisional  order ;  hence 
teleology  can  never  become  a  constitutive  principle  in  the  investi- 
gation of  nature.  Teleology  is  simply  a  heuristic  principle.  But  in 
sociology  the  teleological  method  is  at  home,  since  society  is  a  teleo- 
logical  unity  and  human  history  is  a  kingdom  of  ends.  The  social 
life  shows  no  laws,  but  only  rules.  And  Professor  Stein  argues  for  the 


458  THE  'PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

freedom  of  the  will  in  relation  to  the  environment  from  the  fact  that, 
at  the  most,  moral  statistics  only  show  regularity  of  action  in  about  95 
per  cent,  of  the  cases  considered. 

Under  "B,  The  Meaning  of  Knowledge,"  the  most  important  essay, 
and,  indeed,  the  best  essay  on  pure  philosophy  in  the  book,  is  that  on 
"The  Neo-Idealism  of  Our  Day  :  A  Contribution  to  the  Genesis  of  Phi- 
losophical Systems."  Professor  Stein  lays  down  the  proposition  that 
the  four  great  epochs  of  philosophical  thinking  have  each  stood  under 
the  domination  of  a  determinate  means  of  thinking  or  category,  and 
he  proposes  to  show  that  the  preeminent  category  of  present  day 
thinking  is  the  concept  of  l  relation,'  and  that  therefore  we  are  neces- 
sarily being  driven  back  to  phenomenalism  or  idealism.  These  propo- 
sitions he  proceeds  to  establish  with  great  wealth  of  historical  illustra- 
tion, chosen  with  insight  and  put  together  with  skill.  The  first 
category  was  that  of  '  thing '  or  '  person, '  apparently  regarded 
as  identical.  This  category  of  *  thing '  as  fixed  being  on  the 
whole  dominates  Greek  thought.  In  the  middle  ages,  through 
the  notion  of  the  divine  attributes,  stress  is  laid  on  the  '  proper- 
ties'  of  the  thing  (Eigenschaften).  The  category -of  thinghood  is 
passing  into  that  of  properties.  With  the  Renaissance  the  emphasis 
shifts  from  being  to  happening  (Geschehen).  The  ruling  category 
becomes  that  of  '  state'  or  '  condition  '  (Zustand).  Constancy  is  re- 
garded simply  as  the  regular  rhythm  of  states,  and  the  concept  of  thing 
is  transformed  into  that  of  a  regular  order  of  changing  states.  Qualities 
are  reduced  to  quantitative  relations.  The  laws  of  motion  are  un- 
changing states  of  matter.  Mechanical  explanation  reaches  its  high- 
est point  and  finds  its  philosopher  in  Spinoza.  Everthing  is  conceived 
according  to  the  geometrical  method.  Space  is  the  objective  and  un- 
changing condition  of  the  order  of  succession  in  things.  God  is  the 
timeless  state  or  condition  of  the  All.  God  is  nature,  the  unity  of 
things  through  law.  Spinoza  completes  mechanism  and  ontologism  ; 
Leibniz,  with  his  emphasis  on  becoming,  his  doctrine  of  continuity  in 
change,  makes  the  transition  from  static  (zustandlich)  to  relational 
thinking,  from  mechanism  to  dynamism.  The  monads  put  relational 
thinking  in  the  foreground.  The  world  is  no  longer  an  eternal  state, 
but  an  eternal  system  of  relations.  All  things  are  transformed  into 
relations.  The  principle  of  all  relations  is  proportion,  and  this  rests 
on  number.  The  number-series  symbolizes  the  synthetic  unity  of  the 
Ego.  "In  the  number-system  unity  signifies  the  identity  of  the  Ego- 
apperception,  multiplicity  the  distinction  from  the  Ego  according  to 
the  principle  of  contradiction. ' '  All  relations  spring  from  the  activity 


No.  4.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  459 

of  the  mind.  The  validity  of  relations  results  from  a  logical  neces- 
sity of  thought,  from  the  law  of  identity.  And  so  the  world  picture 
is  transferred  from  without  to  within  the  mind.  Truth  is  valid  only 
from  man  to  man.  Number  becomes  the  fundamental  measure  of 
permanence.  All  order  in  nature  rests  on  numerical  proportion,  and 
the  demands  of  the  exact  sciences  place  relational  thinking  at  the  apex 
of  the  categories.  Professor  Stein  tells  us  that  the  '  energetic  '  phi- 
losophers emphasize  relational  thinking,  and  that  the  category  of  rela- 
tion rules  alike  with  neo-idealists  (Cohen,  Natorp,  Bergmann,  Eucken, 
etc.)  and  with  neo-phenomenalists  (Stallo,  Mach,  Ostwald,  etc.). 
The  outcome  of  this  comparative  study  of  categories  is  that  human 
consciousness  is  the  bearer  and  measure  of  truth.  Only  subjectivism 
is  thoroughly  consistent.  This  latter  seems  to  me  an  over  hastily 
drawn  conclusion  ;  and  neither  here  nor  elsewhere  do  I  find  that,  in  the 
discussion  of  technical  philosophical  questions,  Professor  Stein  comes 
to  close  quarters  with  his  subject.  He  ranges  over  the  field,  cites 
literature  and  names  (sometimes  too  abundantly),  makes  striking  com- 
parisons and  contrasts,  hits  off  theories  and  attitudes  with  a  phethora 
of  antitheses  and  oratorical  phrases,  and  then  leaves  one  in  the  mists 
of  his  vague,  phenomenalistic  idealism. 

The  part  of  the  book  which  deals  with  "  The  Meaning  of  the  Personal 
Life  ' '  contains  nothing  worthy  of  notice  beyond  his  general  theory 
that,  although  ideals  may  be  illusions,  they  are  the  motive  forces  of 
progress.  Illusions  which  have  been  tried  and  tested  until  they  have 
attained  a  general  or  racial  significance  are  ideals. 

The  last  part,  on  "The  Meaning  of  the  Social  Life,"  occupies  more 
than  half  of  the  book,  and,  as  might  be  expected  from  Professor  Stein's 
previous  work,  it  is  the  most  valuable  part.  I  cannot  undertake  to 
notice  the  great  variety  of  subjects  discussed,  ranging  from  "The  Ori- 
gin of  Society"  to  "The  Aristocracy  of  Work,"  and  only  mention  what 
seem  to  me  the  more  important  essays.  In  ' '  Herbert  Spencer  and 
his  Swan  Song,"  an  interesting  contrast  is  drawn  between  Spencer  and 
Spinoza,  —  Spinoza  the  philosopher  of  changeless  Being,  Spencer  the 
philosopher  of  unresting  change.  Law  for  Spinoza  is  in  the  last  anal- 
ysis *  law  of  thought,'  for  Spencer  '  law  of  physics  '  or  '  law  of  motion. ' 
For  Spinoza  his  study  was  the  world,  for  Spencer  the  world  was  his  study, 
etc. ,  etc.  Professor  Stein  finds  Spencer's  great  weakness  to  be  his  almost 
total  neglect  of  the  mental  sciences,  and  with  this  he  connects  his  dis- 
like of  grammar  and  his  ignorance  of  foreign  languages.  It  seems  to 
me  quite  true  that  Spencer's  ignorance  of  foreign  thought  was  con- 
nected with  his  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  human  spirit  in  its  rich 


460  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

and  varied  manifestations  in  literature  and  art  and  history.  But  Spen- 
cer's dislike  of  grammar  is  no  sufficient  evidence  of  a  repugnance  to 
rule  and  law.  In  politics  and  morals  he  is  an  old  fashioned  British 
individualist,  but  no  one  has  tried  more  seriously  to  explain  the  whole 
cosmos  in  terms  of  law. 

In  a  very  interesting  essay  Professor  Stein  calls  attention  to  the 
hitherto  unrecognized  importance  of  Pestalozzi  as  Volkserzieher.  He 
shows,  that  Pestalozzi  really  treated  education  from  the  social  point  of 
view,  and  regarded  all  the  institutions  of  society  as  means  for  the  educa- 
tion of  the  individual  to  a  perfect  humanity.  For  him  the  four  chief 
points  of  social  legislation  were  popular  education,  proper  administra- 
tion of  police  and  the  judiciary,  good  military  institutions,  and  a  sound 
financial  system.  Pestalozzi  laid  his  finger  on  the  central  question  of  all 
social  pedagogics,  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  society.  He  may 
rightly  be  regarded  as  the  founder  of  a  new  science,  social  pedagogics. 

In  an  essay  on  "  The  Origin,  Foundation,  and  Limits  of  Authority," 
Professor  Stein  shows  that  all  authority  begins  either  in  fear  or  in  the 
imitative  impulse,  and  argues  that  as  the  state,  based  on  might,  devel- 
ops, it  forms  the  human  reason,  and  through  the  reason,  in  turn,  the 
transition  is  made  from  fear,  as  a  basis  of  authority,  to  faith,  and  finally 
to  rational  insight.  When  the  latter  stage  is  reached,  man  sees  at  once 
the  pedagogic  and  social  necessity  of  authority,  and  the  limits  set  to  it 
by  the  freedom  of  all,  as  the  true  basis  of  national  life.  In  practical 
social  politics  Professor  Stein  is  an  optimist,  with  a  leaning  towards  the 
conservative  state  socialism  represented  by  the  policy  of  the  German 
Empire.  But  he  has  too  wide  a  knowledge  to  think  that  such  a  policy 
could  be  carried  over  bodily  into  America  or  England.  He  sees  in  the 
trades-unions  the  new  aristocracy ;  and  the  social  problem  of  the  im- 
mediate future  consists,  he  thinks,  in  developing  in  these  by  education 
more  sense  of  responsibility  and  a  wider  outlook,  and  in  developing  in 
the  upper  classes  a  stronger  social  sentiment.  Professor  Stein  thinks 
that  the  leadership  of  the  world  will  remain  with  the  Germanic  peoples, 
and  he  advocates  a  closer  rapprochement  of  Germany,  England,  and 
America. 

The  last  essay  discusses  at  considerable  length  the  relations  of  equal- 
ity and  freedom.  It  is  pointed  out  that  the  attempt  to  institute  abso- 
lute equality  would  destroy  freedom,  and  vice  versa.  Professor  Stein 
finds  a  rhythmic  movement  in  history,  a  spiral  progress.  He  sketches 
ten  steps  in  the  development  of  equality,  beginning  with  equality  of 
the  members  of  the  same  caste  or  society,  and  ending  with  the  equality 
of  all  before  the  law.  The  latter  is  the  ideal  embodied  in  our  "  West- 


No.  4.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  461 

European-American  culture-system."  The  consequence  of  freedom  is 
inequality  and  of  equality  unfreedom  ;  therefore  society  can  advance 
only  by  a  compromise  between  the  two  ideals. 

I  have  found  almost  all  of  Professor  Stein's  essays  on  social  philos- 
ophy interesting  and  suggestive.  But  these,  too,  are  marred  at  times 
by  exaggerated  antitheses  and  rhetorical  repetitions.  Some  of  them 
first  appeared  in  popular  journals,  and  they  have  the  faults  of  popular 
journalism.  With  a  thorough  pruning  most  of  these  essays  would  be 
deserving  of  a  perusal  by  all  interested  in  social  philosophy. 

J.  A.  LEIGHTON. 

HOBART  COLLEGE. 

Dissertations  on  Leading  Philosophical  Topics.  By  ALEXANDER 
BAIN.  London,  New  York,  and  Bombay,  Longmans,  Green,  and 
Co.,  1903.— pp.  xii,  277. 

These  fourteen  papers  were  reprinted  by  their  author  in  the  present 
form  under  date  of  January,  1903.  "  Being  now,"  he  writes,  in  the 
Explanatory  Note,  "debarred  from  the  philosophical  arena  by  failure 
of  health,  I  do  not  come  under  any  pledge  to  vindicate  whatever  either 
critic  or  opponent  may  think  fit  to  challenge  or  impugn,  nor  to  recon- 
cile seeming  inconsistencies  in  these  reprints.  They  are  avowedly 
my  sole  amends  for  inability  to  execute  that  thorough  revision  of  The 
Emotions  and  the  Will  which,  although  at  one  time  resolved  upon,  had 
to  be  abandoned  for  the  reasons  given  in  the  Preface  to  the  Fourth 
Edition."  "They  contain,  with  some  little  difference  in  statement, 
my  latest  views  on  such  of  those  debated  issues  as  were  not  adequately 
expounded  or  not  given  in  final  shape  in  either  of  my  two  volumes  on 
Psychology. ' '  Twelve  of  the  papers  are  reprinted  from  the  pages  of 
Mind,  nearly  all  from  the  Old  Series.  With  these  is  reprinted  a  short 
discussion  by  Mr.  Bradley  upon  the  subject,  "  Is  there  Such  a  Thing 
as  Pure  Malevolence,"  serving  to  introduce  Professor  Bain's  longer 
paper  in  reply.  The  last  two  papers  in  the  volume  treat  of  "  The 
Scope  of  Anthropology  and  Its  Relation  to  the  Science  of  Mind,"  and 
of  "The  Pressure  of  Examinations,"  the  first  being  a  discussion 
read  to  the  Anthropological  Section  of  the  British  Association,  at  the 
Aberdeen  Meeting,  in  1885. 

A  thorough  review  of  the  Dissertations  would  involve,  first  of  all, 
a  careful  statement  of  the  teaching  of  Professor  Bain's  two  principal 
works  upon  the  several  points  treated  of  in  the  present  volume,  and 
then  a  critical  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  improvements  and  additions 
here  supplied.  The  task  would  require  a  thorough  and  special  knowl- 


462  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

edge,  on  the  part  of  the  reviewer,  of  Professor  Bain's  earlier  opinions, 
and  its  performance  would  exceed  the  proper  limits  of  a  short  notice. 
Moreover,  the  reprints  embrace  a  wide  and  varied  range  of  topics, 
which  might  well  discourage  even  the  most  adventurous  and  dextrously 
evasive  of  reviewers.  I  shall  accordingly  be  content  herein  merely  to 
mention  the  titles  of  the  several  papers,  with  an  occasional  word  of 
comment  which  may  serve  in  a  general  way  to  indicate  to  the  reader 
interested  in  the  particular  subject  in  question  the  nature  of  Professor 
Bain's  contribution  and  to  suggest  some  of  the  issues  which  the  discus- 
sion raises. 

Following  the  first  two  papers,  entitled  "The  Meaning  of  'Exist- 
ence '  and  Descartes's  '  Cogito  '  "  and  "  On  Moral  Causation,"  comes 
a  shorter  one  on  "  Mill's  Theory  of  the  Syllogism."  Mill's  argument 
in  defense  of  the  syllogism  against  the  charge  of  petitio  prindpii  Pro- 
fessor Bain  regards  as  in  itself  perfectly  sound,  but  as  exposing  him  in 
turn  to  the  charge  of  ignoratio  elenchi.  Mill  is  right  in  holding  that, 
as  Professor  Bain  expresses  it,  "the  affirmer  of  the  proposition,  'all 
matter  gravitates, '  is  speaking  of  some  things  that  he  knows  and  of  a 
great  many  things  that  he  does  not  know  :  his  proposition  is  a  mixture 
of  the  actual  and  the  potential ;  it  affirms  what  is  to  be  when  the  case 
arises.  ..."  But  "when  this  is  seen  to  be  the  character  of  the  gen- 
eral proposition,"  Professor  Bain  continues,  "the  inference  from  it  is 
no  longer  a  repetition.  The  process  of  investing  the  newly  discovered 
individual  with  the  attributes  belonging  to  the  previously  known  indi- 
viduals of  the  same  kind  is  something  to  be  gone  through  with ;  it  is 
not  mere  emptiness  or  nonentity"  (p.  23).  This,  however,  is  the 
process  of  "  Material  Deduction  "  and  is  of  the  same  nature  as  induc- 
tion. It  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  theory  of  the  syllogism.  Mill 
should  have  seen  that  the  syllogism  is  essentially  "  the  formal  relation 
between  the  premisses  and  the  conclusion,  whatever  the  matter  may 
be"  (p.  22),  and  hence  lies  apart  from  the  jurisdiction  within  which 
the  charge  of  petitio  prindpii  can  have  a  meaning.  It  would  be  out  of 
place  here  to  enter  into  the  merits  of  the  controversy  as  between  Mill 
and  Bain.  It  would  appear,  however,  that  Mill  (Logic,  Bk.  II,  chap, 
iii,  §  5)  recognizes  the  value  of  the  syllogism  as  a  form  or  criterion 
of  valid  inference  as  distinctly  as  could  be  desired.  As  against  Pro- 
fessor Bain's  sharper  separation  of  the  formal  and  material  aspects  of 
reasoning,  one  is  tempted  to  ask  whether,  as  a  simple  matter  of  fact,  a 
major  premise  can  '  subsume '  under  it  a  new  individual  without  suf- 
fering something  more  serious  than  a  mere  change  in  the  relative 
amounts  of  the  <  potential '  and  the  <  actual  '  of  which  it  is  the 


No.  4.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  463 

'mixture.'  Such  a  change  merely  transfers  Socrates  (in  the  inevita- 
ble example)  from  the  former  to  the  latter  term  of  the  binomial 
(#  -f-  a).  If,  however,  there  was  any  real  difficulty,  when  the  syllo- 
gism was  for  the  first  time  gone  through  with,  in  '  conceiving  '  Socrates 
as  a  man  (and  otherwise  why  should  the  syllogism  ever  have  been  gone 
through  with?),  the  major  premise  must  have  been  in  some  measure 
reconstructed  by  bringing  Socrates  within  its  scope.  Neither  '  man  ' 
nor  'mortal'  can  have  meant  thereafter  precisely  what  they  did  before; 
but  both  must  have  been  qualitatively  enriched  in  meaning.  Whether 
they  should  still  be  called  by  the  same  names,  was  a  question  of  practi- 
cal convenience.  Thus  only  by  reconstructing  the  concept '  man  '  can 
Socrates  be  shown  'mortal.'  If  we  regard  the  major  premise,  not  as 
a  '  mixture '  of  what  we  know  and  what  we  do  not  yet  know,  but  as 
a  working  hypothesis  whose  utility  lies  in  the  very  fact  that  it  admits 
of  reconstruction,  then  we  shall  see  no  possibility  of  separating  the 
form  and  the  material  of  inference,  and  we  shall  understand  in  a  deeper 
sense  Mill's  doctrine  that  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  "is  not  an  in- 
ference drawn  from  the  formula  but  an  inference  drawn  according  to 
the  formula"  (Joe.  cit.,  §4).  We  shall  also  be  unwilling  to  agree 
with  Professor  Bain  that  between  the  induction  A  is  B  and  the  '  ma- 
terial deduction '  by  which  another  A  is  gathered  in,  there  remains 
even  the  last  shred  of  difference  to  what  he  holds,  viz.,  that  the  latter 
operation  fails  of  absolute  identity  with  '  induction  '  "  in  not  looking 
to  the  conjunction  of  A  and  B  "  (p.  24). 

The  most  interesting  part  of  the  next  discussion,  on  "Association 
Controversies,"  is  an  extended  summary  of  Wundt's  theory  of  Apper- 
ception together  with  the  author's  critical  remarks  upon  it.  "To 
me,"  says  Bain,  "the  word  Apperception  as  employed  by  Wundt  is 
unnecessary  and  unmeaning.  All  that  it  is  intended  to  convey  is 
much  better  expressed  by  our  old  phraseology.  If  it  is  another  name 
for  the  voluntary  control  of  the  thoughts,  it  is  superfluous,  and  there- 
fore mischievous"  (p.  52).  "The  point  where  my  disagreement 
.  .  .  begins  is  in  the  drawing  of  a  hard  and  fast  line  between  the 
lower  and  the  higher  workings  of  Association, ' '  in  the  latter  of  which 
alone,  according  to  Wundt,  is  Apperception  (in  the  sense  of  "  will 
alone,  as  attention")  present  as  a  factor  (p.  51).  Both  in  the 
"original  forming  of  the  associating  links"  and  in  the  "subsequent 
rise  or  resuscitation  of  ideas  ' '  consequent  on  association,  there  are  pres- 
ent factors  "partly  physical,  partly  intellectual,  partly  emotional  and 
volitional.  To  confine  the  statement  to  the  factor  of  will  alone,  as  at- 
tention, would  be  insufficient  "  (p.  50).  The  vital  point,  however,  in 


464  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

the  discussion  of  Association  and  Apperception,  would  appear  to  be  not 
the  number  of  the  separate  influential  factors,  but  whether  we  are  to 
conceive  of  separate  factors  at  all  which  may  come  in  from  without  to 
strengthen  the  formed  or  the  forming  links,  —  as  Bain  expresses  it, 
" to  make  up  ...  for  the  feebleness  of  a  contiguous  linking"  or 
"to  favor  the  recall  of  a  resembling  image  "  (p.  51). 

The  next  essay  is  entitled  "  On  Some  Points  in  Ethics,"  and  consists 
in  the  main  of  a  running  criticism  of  Sir  Leslie  Stephen's  well-known 
treatise.  This  part,  however,  is  prefaced  by  some  noteworthy  remarks 
upon  Bentham  and  his  work.  Then  follows  Mr.  Bradley 's  short  paper 
on  "Pure  Malevolence  "  with  Professor  Bain's  long  rejoinder.  In  the 
latter  the  actual  existence  of  the  impulse  in  question  is  defended  with 
a  long  series  of  illustrations,  which,  if  they  do  not  convince,  are  never- 
theless not  easy,  all  of  them,  to  interpret  in  any  other  sense.  In  the 
case  of  these  more  difficult  ones,  the  bias  to  which  Mr.  Bradley  con- 
fesses will  probably  remain  in  the  reader's  mind  :  "  Even  if  I  did  not 
see  how  to  account  for  malevolence  I  do  not  think  I  could  conclude 
that  it  was  original "  (p.  85).  This  discussion  is  followed  by  a  long 
essay  on  "  Definition  and  Demarcation  of  the  Subject-Sciences." 

The  most  interesting  and  important  paper  in  the  whole  collection  is 
undoubtedly  the  one  which  follows,  on  "The  Empiricist  Position." 
The  introductory  paragraphs  express  the  author's  conjecture  and  belief 
that  ' '  perhaps  experience  is  merely  a  matter  of  degree,  the  contrast  of 
the  different  schools  pointing  only  to  greater  or  less  dependence  on  it. 
Possibly  too  the  empiricist  may  be  aiming  too  high ;  he  may  fancy 
that  he  is  trusting  to  experience  alone,  and  be  all  the  while  deluding 
himself.  I  have  little  doubt  that  this  is  more  or  less  true  of  the  earlier 
votaries  of  the  creed  "  (p.  134).  If  this  is  so,  then  the  older  distinc- 
tion of  Empiricism,  on  the  one  hand,  as  over  against ' ' Apriorism, ' '  Tran- 
scendentalism, Intuitionism,  is  no  longer  adequate  to  express  the  issue. 
"If  I  do  not  greatly  mistake,  the  most  definite  contrast  between 
empiricism  and  its  opposite  stateable  at  the  present  stage  is  that  in- 
tuition, to  whatever  length  it  may  be  suggestive,  is  in  no  case  valid 
without  the  confirmation  of  experience.  The  empiricist  may  not 
quarrel  with  intuitive  or  innate  ideas ;  his  quarrel  is  with  innate  cer- 
tainties ' '  (ibid. ) .  The  empiricist  position  is  then  defined  in  the  body 
of  the  paper  under  the  several  heads  of  Epistemology,  Cause  —  Uni- 
formity of  Nature,  Perception  of  a  Material  World,  and  Thought  and 
Reality. 

Under  the  first  head  Professor  Bain  defines  the  empiricist  contention 
as  declaring  that  there  is  no  need  of  a  separate  group  of  '  innate  ideas,' 


No.  4.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS. 

universal  forms  of  synthesis,  transcendental  principles,  in  order  to 
explain  the  origin,  nature,  and  validity  of  knowledge.  "  The  Kantian 
'  forms  '  ...  are  met  by  the  empiricist's  assertion  that  all  ideas  may 
be  accounted  for  by  our  ordinary  intellectual  powers,  cooperating  with 
the  senses.  .  .  ."  The  empiricist  accepts  "the  amendment  of 
Leibniz  —nisi  intellectus  ipse"  "Nay,  more — he  would  also  postu- 
late, as  being  equally  co-present,  all  the  emotional  and  volitional 
workings  of  the  mind  ;  and,  having  done  so,  he  would  endeavor  to 
dispense  with  every  other  pretended  source  of  our  ideas  "  (pp.  135  f. 
Italics  mine).  In  our  knowledge  "  the  particular  and  the  general, 
in  their  ultimate  nature,  must  move  together.  ...  If  it  were  said 
that  mere  sensation  .  .  .  could  not  do  all  this,  the  objection  must 
be  allowed.  But  sensation  does  not  work  in  pure  isolation;  it  is 
backed  by  the  entire  resources  of  the  intellect  .  .  .  When  ...  all 
such  forces  are  allowed  for,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  perceive  the  difficulty ' ' 
(pp.  138  f.).  Now  this  statement  manifestly  shows  an  appreciation 
of  the  force  of  modern  criticism  of  the  empiricist  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, but  shows  this  rather  in  its  distribution  of  emphasis,  and  its 
explicit  recognition  of  all  the  factors  involved  in  knowledge,  than  in 
any  difference  of  principle  as  compared  with  the  empiricism  of  Locke 
and  Hume.  This  very  fact,  however,  gives  to  Professor  Bain's  dis- 
cussion an  importance  which  might  not  attach  to  it,  taken  simply  as  a 
chapter  in  the  history  of  empiricism.  It  suggests  the  question  whether 
the  currently  accepted  criticism  of  empiricism  is  really  sufficiently  con- 
scious of  its  own  meaning,  and,  accordingly,  sufficiently  explicit  in  its 
utterances  to  render  the  empiricist  position  no  longer  respectable  or 
tenable.  Thus,  we  should  venture  to  say  in  reply  to  Professor  Bain's 
statement,  as  given  above,  that  no  one,  nowadays  at  least,  seriously  re- 
gards the  "  Kantian  forms"  as  other  than  abstracted  phases  of  the  intel- 
lectual, emotional,  and  volitional  "workings  of  the  mind,"  that  the 
construction  of  them  which  he  has  suggested  involves  a  misconception 
of  the  essential  meaning  of  Kant  and  the  '  Neo-Kantians.'  But  is  it 
clear  that  the  Neo-Kantians  have  entirely  freed  themselves  from  the 
master's  uncertainty  as  between  (i)  the  pure  conceptions  and  the  pure 
principles  of  the  understanding  as  abstract  presentations  of  modes  of 
intellectual  functioning,  and  (2)these  same  things  as  substantive  '  ele- 
ments '  having  a  certain  stateable  content  as  pure  knowledge  in 
abstraction  from  experience  ?  Our  objection  to  Professor  Bain's  revised 
and  articulate  empiricism  would,  in  this  controversy  as  above,  transfer 
itself  to  the  province  of  psychology,  and  there  press  for  an  explanation 
of  the  functional  relations  which  subsist,  as  he  conceives  them,  between 


466  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW. 

"our  ordinary  intellectual  powers  "  and  the  "  equally  co -present  .  .  . 
emotional  and  volitional  workings  of  the  mind."  The  essence  of 
empiricism,  Professor  Bain  declares,  lies  in  its  test  of  validity,  viz., 
"  consistency,  or  the  absence  of  contradiction,  throughout  a  sufficiently 
wide  range  of  conscious  experiences"  (p.  142).  The  '  Kantian,' 
one  might  suppose,  would  willingly  accept  this  criterion  ;  but  he  would 
like  to  know  how  wide  a  range  of  experiences  is  a  '  sufficiently '  wide 
one,  and  what  are  the  meaning  and  the  requisite  psychological  con- 
ditions of  an  agent's  recognition  of  '  inconsistency '  or  <  contra- 
diction '  between  a  hitherto  accepted  universal  judgment  and  a  judg- 
ment of  particular  fact.  Professor  Bain's  discussion  of  empiricism 
under  the  three  remaining  heads  of  the  paper  still  further  illustrates 
his  interpretation  of  universals  as  more  or  less  insecure  judgments  of 
fact,  rather  than  as  formulated  working  postulates  whose  proper  claim 
is  not  so  much  that  they  are  true  as  that  they  aid  in  the  discovery  of 
truth.  This  problem  of  universals  would  appear  to  be  the  ultimate 
problem  at  issue  between  "empiricism  and  its  opposite." 

The  next  four  papers  are  severally  entitled  "  Physiological  Expres- 
sion in  Psychology, "  "  Pleasure  and  Pain, "  "  Definition  and  Problems 
of  Consciousness,"  and  "  The  Respective  Spheres  and  Mutual  Helps 
of  Introspection  and  Psycho-Physical  Experiment  in  Psychology." 
The  first  is,  in  the  main,  a  protest  against  the  "  subjective  purism  "  of 
Dr.  Ward,  Dr.  Stout,  and  Mr.  Bradley.  The  last  is  an  interesting  and 
judicious  discussion  of  its  problem  read  before  the  International  Con- 
gress of  Experimental  Psychology  held  in  London  in  1892.  The 
volume  is  brought  to  a  close  with  the  two  papers  first  mentioned  by 
title  above. 

H.  W.  STUART. 

STATE  UNIVERSITY  OF  IOWA. 


SUMMARIES   OF   ARTICLES. 

[ABBREVIATIONS. — Am.  J.  Ps.  =  American  Journal  of  Psychology;  Am.  J. 
Th.  =  The  American  Journal  of  Theology  ;  Ar.  de  Ps.  =  Archives  de  Psychologic  ; 
Ar.  f.  G.  Ph.  =Archiv  fur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie ;  Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.  =  Ar- 
chiv  fur  systematische  Philosophie  ;  Br.  J.  Ps.  =  The  British  Journal  of  Psychology  ; 
Int.  J.  E.=  International  Journal  of  Ethics ;  J.  de  Psych.  =  Journal  de  Psy- 
chologic; Psych.  Rev.  =  Psychological  Review;  Rev.  de  Met.  =  Revue  de  Meta- 
1)hysique ;  Rev.  Neo.-Sc.=  Revue  Neo-Scolastique  ;  Rev.  Ph.  —  Revue  Philosophique; 
R.  d.  Fil.  =  Rivista  di  Filosofia  e  Scienze  Affini ;  V.  f.  w.  Ph.  =  Vierteljahrs- 
schrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philosophie;  Z.  f.  Ph.  u.  ph.  Kr.  =  Zcitschrift  fur 
Philosophie  und  philosophischc  Kritik ;  Z.  f.  Psych,  u.  Phys.  =  Zeitschrift  fur 
Psychologic  und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane.  — Other  titles  are  self-explanatory.] 

LOGIC  AND  METAPHYSICS. 
Kant  und  die  naturwissenschaftliche    Erkenntniskritik   der   Gegenwart. 

(Mach,  Hertz,  Stallo,  Clifford.)     H.  KLEINPETER.     Kantstudien,  VIII, 

2-3,  pp.  258-320. 

The  author  proposes  to  give  a  general  interpretation  of  Kant's  episte- 
mology,  a  criticism  of  this  from  the  standpoint  of  modern  scientific  theory, 
a  statement  of  such  of  Kant's  principles  as  have  positive  value,  and  an 
account  of  recent  progress  in  epistemology.  To  Kant  the  mathematics 
and  mathematical  physics  of  his  day  were  the  ideal  of  science.  Since  then 
a  new  conception  of  the  essence  of  science  has  arisen.  Mathematics  led 
the  way,  and  the  revision  of  its  fundamental  principles  still  proceeds. 
The  epistemology  of  physics  has  changed  even  more  radically  ;  not  one  of 
Kant's  a  priori  principles  of  natural  science  is  now  unquestioned,  not  even 
the  persistence  of  matter.  The  traditional  logic  is  now  seen  to  be  wholly 
inadequate.  Thus  Kant's  presuppositions  have  fallen  away.  Kant  is  a 
dualist :  the  existence  of  things-in-themselves,  in  the  sense  of  naive  real- 
ism, he  accepts  uncritically  ;  hence  arises  for  him  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge. His  answer  is  three-fold  :  That  things-in-themselves  are  as  such 
unknowable  ;  that  we  can  know  phenomena,  and  in  part  a  priori ;  that  we 
can  also  rightly  infer  the  truth  of  certain  metaphysical  ideas,  though  we 
cannot  know  them  as  we  know  phenomena.  We  can  know  the  phenome- 
nal world,  because  we  have  a  part  in  its  origin  ;  and  this  fact  is  logically 
necessary,  because  without  it  nothing  like  experience  could  come  to  pass. 
Kant's  thing-in-itself  is  a  mere  hypothesis  ;  all  that  is  given  us  is  the  psy- 
chological elements  or  rather  complexes  of  these.  The  transcendental 
nature  of  space  is  a  mere  unsupported  assertion.  There  is  no  ready-made 
space-perception  ;  it  perfects  itself  only  with  time.  Haptical,  optical,  and 
geometrical  space  are  diverse.  Space  is  a  concept,  a  product  of  abstraction. 
The  possibility  of  geometry  rests  simply  on  the  power  to  construct  spatial 
images  and  investigate  their  properties.  How  far  these  images  correspond 

467 


468  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

to  reality  is  for  experience  to  decide.  In  the  Analytic,  Kant  assumes  an 
ideal  logic,  as  formerly  an  ideal  mathematics.  The  table  of  the  categories 
omits  the  most  important  concept-forming  functions.  Kant  rightly  shows 
that  the  activity  of  understanding  is  necessary  to  the  conception  of  an 
object,  and  hence  that  the  conception  of  an  object  must  be  unchangeable 
on  its  formal  side  ;  but  he  wrongly  concludes  that  experience  is  possible 
only  under  certain  a  priori  determinations.  The  conception  of  an  object 
is  not  essential  to  experience.  The  given  is  not  the  object  but  the  sensa- 
tion complex  ;  the  rest  is  hypothesis.  The  Analytic  of  Judgments  adds 
nothing  to  the  argument.  Particularly  in  the  account  of  causality  there  is 
retrogression  from  Hume.  Kant  gives  no  criterion  between  the  causal 
judgments  of  science  and  those  of  superstition.  The  Dialectic  is  of  no 
present  significance,  because  we  now  dispense  with  the  notion  of  an  unde- 
termined. Besides,  Kant  assumes  an  infallible  reason  shared  in  by  all 
men,  an  assumption  that  we  do  not  make.  Kant  has  had  great  influence  on 
the  development  of  the  epistemology  of  natural  science,  as  represented  by 
Mach,  Pearson,  Stallo,  Hertz,  Cornelius,  and  Clifford.  These  men  follow 
him  in  his  criticism  of  the  older  ontology,  while  rejecting  his  own  unjusti- 
fiable metaphysics.  In  affirming  the  ideality  of  the  phenomenal  world, 
they  even  go  beyond  Kant  to  Berkeley.  They  recognize  the  self-activity 
and  freedom  of  thought.  While  rejecting  the  categories  as  such,  they 
hold  that  our  concepts  are  creatures  of  our  minds,  subject  to  mental  laws. 
They  go  beyond  Kant  in  affirming  that  the  causal  connection  may  be  vari- 
ously established  by  the  mind.  They  accept  an  a  priori  (as  in  the  most 
general  principles  of  physics),  but  not  in  Kant's  sense  as  before  all  experi- 
ence and  independent  of  it.  These  principles  are  in  part  axiomatic 
because  mere  definitions.  The  fundamental  ground  of  difference  with 
Kant  is  the  rejection  of  the  Platonic  ideal  of  science  as  confined  to  uni- 
versal and  necessary  truth.  Science  is  a  human  product ;  it  has,  there- 
fore, its  end,  namely,  to  spare  us  direct  experience.  The  certainty  of 
direct  experience  is  confined  to  the  moment  and  the  individual.  Science 
makes  available  the  experience  of  others  and  our  own  former  experience. 
The  conclusions  of  science  are  universal  and  necessary  for  all  who  accept 
its  presuppositions  ;  but  to  this  no  one  is  forced.  Of  two  rival  theories 
(both  being  logically  correct),  that  one  has  higher  worth  which  mediates  in 
the  simpler  way  tHe  knowledge  of  the  facts.  The  certitude  of  science  is,  of 
course,  never  equal  to  that  of  direct  experience.  Mediate  knowledge  rests 
on  the  acceptance  of  certain  fundamental  propositions.  The  direct  ex- 
perience can  only  show  their  incorrectness,  not  their  correctness  ;  they  are, 
therefore,  within  limits,  arbitrary.  THEODORE  DE  LACUNA. 

The  Refutation  of  Idealism.     G.  E.  MOORE.     Mind,  48,  pp.  433-453. 

It  is  intended  to  show  that  the  proposition  esse  est  percipi  is  false  in  all 
the  senses  ever  given  to  it,  especially  the  idealistic.  If  esse  is  percipit 
whatever  is,  is  indeed  something  mental ;  but  not  in  the  sense  in  which 


No.  4.]  SUMMARIES  OF  ARTICLES. 

reality  is  mental  for  the  idealist.  That  sense  is,  that  esse  is  percipere  ;  this, 
however,  has  always  been  proved  by  using  the  premise  that  esse  est  percipi. 
This  proposition  contains  three  very  ambiguous  terms.  Percipi  originally 
meant  sensation  only,  perhaps  ;  for  modern  idealism,  it  includes  thought, 
and  it  may  be  here  conveniently  understood  as  referring  to  what  is  common 
to  sensation  and  thought.  As  for  the  copula  est,  it  may  have  three  mean- 
ings :  (i)  That  esse  and  percipi  are  precise  synonyms  ;  this  does  not  need 
refutation  ;  (2)  that  what  is  meant  by  esse,  though  not  absolutely  iden- 
tical with  what  is  meant  by  percipi,  yet  includes  the  latter  as  a  part  of  its 
meaning.  On  this  statement,  the  reality  of  anything  would  consist  in  its 
being  experienced  and  something  more  besides.  This  meaning  is  impor- 
tant only  if  the  third  possible  meaning  is  valid,  viz.  :  (3)  That  wherever 
the  other  properties  of  reality  are  present,  percipi  is  also  present,  and 
may  be  inferred  from  them .  Esse  est  percipi  would  thus  be  a  necessary 
synthetic  proposition.  Understood  as  such,  it  is  not  refutable.  But  what 
the  idealists  maintain  is,  not  that  it  is  such,  but  the  proposition  that  what- 
ever is  experienced  is  necessarily  so  ;  the  object  of  experience  is  incon- 
ceivable apart  from  the  subject.  And  it  is  probable,  in  spite  of  their  dis- 
claimers, that  they  hold  this  principle  because  they  believe  it  to  be  proved 
by  the  law  of  contradiction  alone.  They  fail  to  see  that  subject  and  object 
are  distinct  at  all.  Many  would  object  to  this,  and  say  that  they  held  only 
that,  while  distinct,  they  form  an  inseparable  unity,  and  that  to  consider 
either  by  itself  would  be  to  make  an  illegitimate  abstraction.  But  abstrac- 
tions are  illegitimate  only  when  that  is  asserted  of  a  part  which  is  true  only 
of  the  whole  ;  Hegelians  and  others,  however,  use  this  principle  to  show 
that,  when  we  try  to  assert  anything  whatever  of  part  of  an  organic  whole, 
what  we  assert  can  only  be  true  of  the  whole.  This  is  necessarily  false. 
Leaving  the  question  :  '  Is  esse  percipi?  '  let  us  ask  :  '  What  is  a  sensation 
or  idea  ?  '  Let  us  call  the  common  element  in  sensations  '  consciousness,' 
and  that  in  which  they  differ  the  '  object '  of  sensation,  without  for  the  pres- 
ent attempting  to  define  the  meaning  of  either  term.  The  question  then 
arises  whether,  when,  e.  g.,  the  sensation  of  blue  exists,  it  is  the  conscious- 
ness which  exists,  or  the  blue  which  exists,  or  both.  These  three  alterna- 
tives are  all  different,  so  that  to  hold  that  to  say  '  blue  exists, '  is  the  same 
thing  as  to  say  'both  blue  and  consciousness  exist,'  is  self-contradictory. 
But  the  consciousness  must  exist  in  every  sensation  as"  a  mental  fact,  so 
that  either  both  exist  or  the  consciousness  exists  alone.  Hitherto  the 
universal  answer  to  this  alternative  has  been  that  both  exist.  The  '  object ' 
has  been  regarded  as  the  '  content '  of  a  sensation  or  idea,  one  '  inseparable 
aspect,'  the  other  being  'existence.'  What  does  this  mean?  Blue,  for 
example,  is  part  of  the  content  of  a  blue  flower.  If  it  is  part  of  the  content 
of  the  sensation  of  blue,  it  must  have  to  '  consciousness,'  the  other  element 
the  sensation  contains,  the  same  relation  it  has  to  the  other  parts  of  the 
blue  flower.  It  is  then  here,  as  in  a  flower,  the  quality  of  a  thing,  in  this 
case  of  a  mental  image.  But  this  traditional  analysis  does  not  correspond 


4/0  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

to  the  fact.  The  common  element  in  ideas  is  just  what  we  have  called  it, 
consciousness  or  awareness,  and  to  be  aware  of  blue  is  not  to  have  an  image 
in  the  mind  of  which  blue  is  the  content.  The  awareness  has  a  unique 
relation  to  blue,  and  this,  the  very  same  unique  fact  which  constitutes  every 
kind  of  knowledge,  has  been  neglected  in  the  prevailing  content  theory, 
because  philosophers  have  had  no  clear  conception  of  what  consciousness 
is,  it  being  much  more  elusive  for  inspection  than  the  'objective'  element 
in  sensations.  In  knowledge  we  transcend  the  circle  of  our  mere  experi- 
ence ;  we  know  objects,  not  mere  contents.  Nothing  we  experience  is  an 
inseparable  aspect  of  our  experience,  and  the  assumption  that  esse  est 
percipi  is  utterly  unfounded.  If  '  objects  '  were  merely  inseparable  con- 
tents, solipsism  could  never  be  disproved.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
clearly  recognize  the  nature  of  that  peculiar  relation  called  '  awareness  of 
anything,'  the  question  for  us  is  not:  '  Why  external  real  things?'  but 
rather  :  «  Why  not  external  reals,  since  there  is  the  same  evidence,  aware- 
ness, for  their  existence  as  for  that  of  our  sensations  ? '  The  only  reason- 
able alternative  to  such  a  dualism  of  matter  and  spirit  is  absolute  scepticism. 

EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

La  logiqueetT experience.    F.  LE  DANTEC.    Rev.  Ph.,  XXIX,  i,  pp.  46-69. 

The  notion  that  mind  or  intellect  is  an  implement  of  a  superior  kind,  and 
that  the  perfection  of  its  functioning  is  an  a  priori  truth,  is  inadmissible 
from  the  biological  point  of  view.  The  biologist  regards  mind  as  a  result 
of  evolution,  and,  therefore,  as  possessing  no  absolute  value.  Logic  is 
simply  the  resume  of  ancestral  experience,  the  outcome  of  centuries  of  con- 
tact between  our  ancestors  and  the  external  world.  This  admirable  mechan- 
ism is  not  a  divine  gift,  but  has  become  what  it  is  through  the  accumulation 
and  transmission  of  acquired  characteristics.  It  is  on  a  denial  of  this  bio- 
logical view  of  intellect  that  M.  Poincare  bases  his  La  science  et  r  hypothese. 
A  corollary  of  the  position  that  M.  Poincare  opposes  is  that  geometry  is  an 
experimental  science,  and  yet  is  neither  approximate  nor  provisional.  This 
thesis  M.  le  Dantec  attempts  to  establish  by  a  criticism  of  M.  Poincare,  and 
by  a  study,  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  of  human  experience,  ances- 
tral as  well  as  personal.  The  assertion  that  geometrical  conceptions  must  be 
a  priori  because  these  conceptions,  e.  g.,  the  straight  line  and  perfect 
circle,  are  ideal  and  not  met  with  in  experience,  can  be  made  only  when 
we  overlook  the  fact  that  our  knowledge  is  determined  by  our  human  needs 
and  powers.  I  can  conceive  perfect  lines  and  surfaces  because  I  have 
seen  them.  And  if  the  microscope  reveals  the  imperfection  of  these  lines 
and  surfaces,  the  fact  remains  that  they  present  themselves  as  perfect  to 
our  unassisted  observation.  M.  S.  MACDONALD. 

The  Definition  of  Will.     III.     F.  H.  BRADLEY.     Mind,  49,  pp.  1-37. 

Several  difficulties  regarding  the  author's  definition  of  will  are  here  dis- 
cussed. The  first  objection,  that  various  typical  volitions  are  irreducible, 


No.  4.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  47 l 

is  answered  by  showing  that  in  each  case  the  volition  consists  in  the  self- 
realization  of  an  idea,  and  that  the  various  types  differ  only  in  the  content 
of  the  idea,  (a)  Thus  in  Imperative  volition  the  idea  includes  both  the 
production  of  an  act  by  another,  as  end,  and  the  manifestation  of  my  will 
to  him,  as  means  to  this  end.  (6)  The  alleged  Hypothetical  type  of  will  as 
conditional  volition  is  not  admitted.  The  Disjunctive  will,  if  it  exists,  is  the 
self-realization  of  a  disjunctive  idea,  but  is  not  disjunctive  in  its  volition. 
(c)  In  Negative  volition  the  idea  to  be  realized  is  that  of  destruction  or 
removal,  and  hence  is  positive.  The  relation  of  desire  and  aversion  is  next 
discussed.  Desire,  while  negative  in  the  implication  of  change  in  existing 
conditions,  is  predominantly  positive.  In  aversion,  on  the  contrary,  the 
negation  of  that  which  is,  constitutes  the  main  end.  The  mistaken  coordi- 
nation of  desire  and  aversion  has  arisen  partly  from  transferring  to  them 
the  opposition  of  the  coordinates,  pain  and  pleasure.  This  is  confusing,  since 
in  desire,  although  the  idea  is  pleasant,  the  content  of  the  end  need  not  con- 
tain pleasure.  In  aversion,  also,  some  pleasure  must  be  felt  in  the  idea  of 
the  change,  although  the  object  itself  is  qualified  by  pain.  Hence  a  trans- 
formation of  desire  into  aversion  is  possible,  and  vice  versa.  From  this 
point  of  view,  the  possibility  of  willing  that  to  which  we  feel  aversion  must 
be  denied.  For,  so  far  as  will  exists,  the  positive  idea  has  prevailed,  and 
aversion  has  become  subordinate.  It  is,  of  course,  possible  to  will  or  desire 
that  to  which  we  are  averse,  for  this  implies  an  actual  aversion  no  more  than 
a  permanent  will  or  disposition  to  act  involves  an  actual  volition.  Against 
the  argument  that  all  desire  contains  conation,  it  is  answered  that  conation 
is  not  proved  to  be  essential  to  volition  because  the  two  are  related  in 
origin.  Wish  is  a  specialized  form  of  desire  whose  object  is  imaginary, 
and  hence  can  be  regarded  as  attained.  The  means  by  which  the  idea  in 
volition  realizes  itself  is  next  discussed.  To  deny  that  the  will  is  a  causal 
factor  in  the  production  of  the  action  is  to  reduce  will  to  mere  illusion. 
Desire  and  conation,  since  not  found  in  all  volition,  cannot  explain  the 
result.  Nor  can  pleasure  and  pain  produce  volition,  for  (a)  they  are  not 
always  present ;  (b)  they  are  not  identical  with  desire  and  aversion  ;  nor  (c) 
can  they  explain  the  detail  of  will.  The  actual  machinery  by  which  the 
idea  is  realized  is  found  in  the  redintegration  of  a  psychical  disposition. 
Through  experience  of  an  originally  physical  disposition,  the  result  of  the 
process  becomes  qualified  by  feelings  connected  with  its  beginning,  and 
hence  the  suggestion  of  these  feelings  tends  to  initiate  the  realization  of  the 
idea.  The  objection,  that  this  account  implies  the  sequence  of  a  physical 
effect  from  a  psychical  cause,  denies  the  real  existence  of  volition,  and  is 
based  merely  on  prejudice.  A  further  objection,  that  it  is  not  evident  from 
this  explanation  why  any  idea  should  not  realize  itself,  may  be  answered  by 
referring  to  the  fact  of  general  inertia,  the  need  of  support  in  existing  con- 
ditions, and  the  possibility  that  the  idea  of  change  may  itself  be  so  qualified 
as  to  preclude  immediate  realization.  In  the  origin  and  growth  of  disposi- 
tions and  habits,  pleasure  and  pain  are  important  factors,  although  they  do 


472  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

not  enter  the  essence  of  volition.  It  may  be  objected  that  will  cannot  be 
based  upon  dispositions,  since  dispositions  really  rest  upon  will.  But  the 
attempt  to  trace  dispositions  to  an  origin  in  volition  cannot  succeed,  for  dis- 
positions seem  to  be  physical  in  origin,  and  hence  not  subject  to  psycho- 
logical investigation.  Finally,  if  it  were  possible  to  trace  the  origin  of  dis- 
positions in  the  individual  to  pleasure  and  pain,  it  could  not  be  concluded 
that  pleasure  and  pain  were  essential  to  the  definition  of  will. 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 

La  raison  et  les  antinomies.    III.     F.  EVELLIN.     Rev.  de  Met.,  XII,  2, 
pp.  241-258. 

The  author,  continuing  the  treatment  begun  in  previous  articles  on  the 
Kantian  antinomies,  asks  whether  the  idea  of  spontaneity  can  be  reconciled 
with  the  demand  of  science  for  invariable  law.  Strict  necessity  and  bare 
contingency  are  both  abstractions.  In  the  homogeneity  of  the  primitive 
stages  in  reality,  spontaneity  appears  as  simple  undifferentiated  movement, 
uniform  and  therefore  apparently  necessary.  This  stage  of  expansion 
yields  to  one  of  concentration  and  individualization,  ending  in  the  first 
dim  appearance  of  liberty  in  man.  All  through  nature  we  find  the  ex- 
pression in  every  being  of  two  wills,  the  generic  will  to  continue  the  form 
of  the  species,  the  individual  will  to  continue  this  form  according  to  its 
own  conditions  and  desires.  The  generic  will  apart  from  the  individual  is 
a  mere  formula ;  the  individual  apart  from  the  generic  is  mere  caprice. 
Both  are  elements  in  all  sponaneity,  law  being  founded  on  the  first,  and 
the  variation  which  science  must  recognize  as  real  having  its  cause  in  the 
second.  Abstract  order  is  a  geometer's  dream  ;  real  order  is  composed  of 
variety  and  harmony.  Law  is  based  on  the  fixed  will  of  the  species,  the 
difference  between  the  law  and  the  facts  finds  its  cause  in  the  will,  always 
ultimately  free,  of  the  individual. 

EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

Aufivem  ruht  Kants  Geist?     ERICH  ADICKES.     Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.,  X,  i,  pp. 
1-19. 

Such  a  philosophy  as  that  of  Kant  can  never  be  appropriated  as  a  whole 
by  any  other  independent  mind.  Both  the  intellectual  environment  in 
which  he  lived  and  his  own  personal  character  contained  many  conflicting 
elements  such  as  could  never  be  identically  reproduced.  The  rationalism 
of  the  Enlightenment  was  dominant  in  his  thought  as  a  whole,  but  occa- 
sionally yielded  to  opposed  tendencies.  This  rationalism  shows  itself 
especially  in  the  demand  for  universal  validity  which  deprived  his  religion 
of  individual  adaptiveness,  made  an  ideal  of  mathematical  form  and 
method,  and  prevented  the  acceptance  of  Hume's  causal  theory.  Kant 
was  forever  compromising  between  his  theoretical  conclusions  and  the  needs 
of  his  feeling  and  willing  nature.  It  is  in  his  inconsistencies  as  a  thinker 


No.  4.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  473 

that  his  human  character  is  revealed.  No  other  thinker  could  support  just 
such  inconsistencies  as  Kant's.  Nor,  after  giving  up  the  system  as  a  whole, 
can  one  fairly  claim  to  be  thinking  and  teaching  as  Kant  would  do  under 
the  altered  conditions  of  to-day  ;  for  of  what  character  his  life-work  would 
be  to-day  no  man  knows.  To  be  a  Kantian  in  the  wider  sense  of  the  term, 
—  to  carry  on  this  or  that  tendency  of  his  and  transform  it  in  accordance 
with  present  needs,  —  is  scarcely  more  or  less  than  to  be  a  philosopher  at 
all. 

THEODORE  DE  LAGUNA. 

Helmholtz  in  seinem    Verhaltnis  zu  Kant.     A.   RIEHL.     Kant   Studien, 

IX,  I  u.  2,  pp.  261-285. 

Helmholtz  was  the  first  to  revive  interest  in  Kant  by  calling  attention  to 
the  agreement  between  the  results  of  the  Transcendental  Esthetic  and  those 
of  the  modern  physiologico-psychological  theory  of  sensuous  perception. 
But  it  is  not  in  the  physiological  interpretation  of  Kant,  now  recognized 
as  inadequate,  that  the  significance  of  Helmholtz  for  philosophy  is  to  be 
sought,  but  rather  in  his  reassertion  of  the  close  relationship  between  phi- 
losophy and  science,  which  had  been  broken  by  the  speculative  systems  of 
Schelling  and  Hegel,  by  recognizing  the  peculiar  domain  of  a  discipline 
which  had  been  placed  under  suspicion  by  the  exaggerated  claims  of  the 
Identity  Philosophy.  Philosophy  with  Helmholtz  was  identical  with  episte- 
mology,  and  its  rights  in  that  domain  he  asserted  again  and  again.  He  em- 
phasized, in  the  spirit  of  Kant,  the  distinction  between  metaphysics  and 
philosophy  ;  for  by  metaphysics  he  understood  "that  so-called  science  whose 
purpose  it  is  to  discover,  by  pure  thought,  the  final  principles  which  are  to 
explain  the  world."  There  is  also  a  metaphysics  in  science,  but  Helmholtz 
is  no  materialist,  and  he  censures  the  ' '  tirades  of  Vogt  and  Moleschott, ' '  and 
those  naturalists  who  have  taken  the  traditional  scientific  conceptions  of 
matter,  energy,  and  atoms,  and  have  made  them  mere  metaphysical  catch- 
words. Helmholtz  approaches  the  Kantian  doctrine  most  nearly  in  an  early 
sketch  which  contains  the  first  outlines  of  his  philosophy.  A  twofold  task 
of  science  is  distinguished  :  (i)  The  ordered  review  of  the  empirical,  and  (2) 
the  formulation  of  concepts  from  which  the  particular  perceptions  may  be 
deduced,  concepts  which  are  declared  to  be  universal  and  necessary  forms 
of  all  perception  of  nature.  Practically  the  same  views  are  expressed  in  the 
treatise  on  the  conservation  of  energy,  published  a  little  later,  at  the  age  of 
twenty-six,  but  Helmholtz  refers  to  them  in  later  life  as  having  been  influ- 
enced too  strongly  by  the  epistemological  doctrine  of  Kant.  While  the 
differences  between  his  early  and  his  later  views  are  not  so  great  as  he 
thought,  it  is  true  that  his  doctrine  of  causality  approached  more  nearly  to 
that  of  Hume  and  Mill  than  to  that  of  Kant.  The  reasons  for  this  change  of 
attitude  toward  Kant  are  to  be  found  in  his  physiological  interpretation  of 
the  critical  philosophy,  in  the  comparison  which  he  draws  between  the 
forms  of  perception  and  thought  and  Miiller's  theory  of  the  specific  energy 


474  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

of  the  senses.  This  way  of  regarding  the  Critique  led  to  a  misapprehen- 
sion. All  the  emphasis  was  necessarily  placed  upon  the  subjective  origin 
of  knowledge  a  priori,  while  Kant's  purpose  was  to  prove  the  objective 
validity  of  this  knowledge  although  it  was  a  priori.  Of  the  two  objections 
Helmholtz  brings  against  Kant's  doctrine  of  space,  the  first,  namely,  that 
the  axioms  which  determine  the  idea  of  space  are  not  necessities  of  thought, 
is  entirely  in  the  sense  of  Kant,  and  the  second,  that  the  axioms  of  geometry 
cannot  be  admitted  to  be  grounded  in  the  given  form  of  our  faculty  of  per- 
ception, does  not  disprove  but  rather  confirms  his  position.  The  argument 
of  pseudospherical  space  has  not  been  made  out.  Original  endowments 
play  less  and  less  part  in  Helmholtz' s  theory  of  knowledge  until  impulse 
and  reflex  movements  alone  remain.  Increased  emphasis  is  placed  on  the 
concept  of  uniformity  in  order  to  explain  the  correspondence  between 
thoughts  and  things,  cause  and  energy.  Helmholtz' s  later  doctrine  of  con- 
notations, his  argument  against  the  syllogism,  and  his  '  permanent  possi- 
bilities of  sensation  '  show  clearly  the  influence  of  Mill. 

EMIL  C.  WILM. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

On  the  Definition  of  Psychology.     JAMES  WARD.     Br.  J.  Ps.,   I,  i,  pp. 
3-25- 

Though  the  question  is  of  prime  importance  to  all  students  of  philosophy, 
a  precise  definition  of  psychology  has  never  been  formulated.  The  history 
of  psychology  shows  three  attitudes  toward  mental  phenomena :  (i)  The 
unduly  objective  attitude  by  which  mind  is  identified  with  life  ;  (2)  the  un- 
duly subjective,  by  which  mind  and  body  are  completely  separated  ;  (3) 
the  more  mature  balance  of  the  two  former  in  the  concept  of  concrete  ex- 
perience. Aristotle  is  the  chief  representative  of  the  first  attitude.  The 
soul  is,  for  him,  the  form  of  the  body.  His  conception  corresponds  closely 
to  the  modern  biological  notion  of  function.  Even  the  passive  intellect  he 
regards  as  in  close  relation  to  the  organism,  though  he  holds  that  there 
exists  also  an  active  intellect  by  which  man  participates  in  the  divine. 
Descartes  is  the  representative  of  the  subjective  psychology.  He  began  by 
regarding  mind  and  matter  as  two  incompatible  substances,  and  restricted 
psychology  to  the  immediate  facts  of  consciousness.  His  rationalism,  how- 
ever, led  him  into  analytic  distinctions  and  away  from  concrete  facts.  The 
complete  dualism  of  his  system  left  no  way  of  explaining  the  actual  con- 
nection of  mind  and  body  except  by  an  appeal  to  the  deity.  Descartes 
failed  to  see  that  objectivity  is  a  necessary  condition  of  conscious  experi- 
ence, and  that  the  separation  of  the  two  is  an  abstraction  from  concrete 
reality.  We  must,  therefore,  reject  all  definitions  of  psychology  as  the 
science  of  'mind,'  or  the  science  of  the  'internal  sense.'  Psychology 
deals  with  the  subjective  standpoint  of  individual  existence,  but  this  means 
the  standpoint  of  the  living  subject  in  intercourse  with  its  environment. 


No.  4.]  SUMMARIES  OP  ARTICLES.  475 

Physical  science  deals  with  the  aspects  of  experience  which  are  common  to 
all  individuals.  From  the  standpoint  of  psychology,  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  seen  to  be  mainly  volitional  and  emotional,  a  fact  which  was 
overlooked  by  the  prevailing  intellectualism  of  psychology  before  Kant. 
Cognition  and  perception  are  now  seen  to  be  instruments  for  the  guidance 
of  volition  and  action.  For  the  definition  of  psychology  the  term  '  experi- 
ence '  is  preferable  to  the  more  common  term  'consciousness,'  because  the 
latter  does  not  sufficiently  recognize  the  duality  of  subjective  and  objective, 
and  consequently  leads  to  ambiguity.  Since  we  know  no  experience  ex- 
cept our  own,  analytic  psychology  must  precede  genetic. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  Hallucinations.     BORIS  SIDIS.     Psych. 
Rev.  XI,  i,  pp.  15-29  ;  2,  pp.  104-137. 

Every  normal  percept  is  composed  of  a  sensory  nucleus  and  a  mass  of 
secondary  elements  which  are  organically  related  to  it.  The  nucleus  is 
the  prominent  and  vivid  portion  of  the  percept,  the  portion  corresponding 
to  direct  peripheral  stimulation  ;  the  other  elements,  though  indispen- 
sable, may  vary  considerably  without  vitally  affecting  the  quality  of  the  per- 
cept. These  secondary  elements  are  not  representative  memory  images, 
because  they  fuse  with  the  nucleus  and  are  sensory  in  character.  Thus, 
we  visually  perceive  hardness  and  smoothness.  Yet  they  are  not  really 
sensations,  for  there  is  no  external  stimulus  to  correspond  to  them.  They 
must  be  described,  therefore,  as  secondarily  sensory,  and  as  forming  an  inter- 
mediate stage  between  real  sensations  and  representative  ideas.  Physio- 
logically, it  may  be  assumed  that  these  perceptual  complexes  correspond  to 
the  functioning  of  organic  complexes  of  psycho-physical  elements  associated 
with  a  central  nucleus.  Hallucinatory  perception  arises  from  the  disso- 
ciation of  these  secondary  sensations  from  the  nucleus  of  the  percept.  In 
pathological  cases  the  directly  stimulated  portions  of  the  percept  frequently 
disappear  entirely  from  consciousness,  and  the  secondary  sensations,  to- 
gether with  other  associated  material,  appear  as  the  hallucinatory  percep- 
tion. These  facts  are  opposed  to  the  view  that  hallucinations  are  ever  of 
purely  central  origin.  They  point  to  the  belief  that  hallucinations  are 
always  of  peripheral  origin,  and  are  to  be  regarded  as  complex  cases  of 
secondary  sensations  from  which  the  primary  sensation  is  dissociated  and 
put  into  the  background  of  consciousness.  The  dissociation  and  subexci- 
tation  of  the  secondary  elements  are  the  central  conditions  of  hallucina- 
tion ;  peripheral  stimulation  supplies  the  nucleus  around  which  the  sec- 
ondary elements  crystallize.  The  dream  consciousness  is  an  example  of 
hallucinatory  perception.  Here  a  direct  sensation  (usually  coenaesthetic) 
associates  with  it  systems  of  secondary  sensations  almost  at  haphazard, 
though  the  associated  system  must  have  some  slight  degree  of  congruence 
with  the  primary  sensation.  The  dream  consciousness  shows  many  of  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.        [VOL.  XIII. 

characteristics  of  the  mental  dissociation  found  in  serious  mental  disorders  ; 
insane  hallucinations  are  in  many  respects  waking  dreams.  The  intense 
reality  which  attaches  to  hallucinations  arises  from  the  sensory  character 
of  their  contents,  for,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  senses  are,  so  to 
speak,  our  points  of  contact  with  reality.  Any  state  of  mental  dissociation, 
like  light  sleep,  favors  the  formation  of  hallucinations.  The  theory  of  the 
central  arousal  of  hallucinations  rests  on  the  fallacy  that  an  ideational  ele- 
ment, by  increase  of  intensity,  may  become  sensory,  a  view  which  is  un- 
tenable on  both  psychological  and  physiological  grounds.  The  theory  of 
dissociation  explains  also  the  phenomena  of  double  thinking,  in  which  the 
patient  hears  his  thoughts  uttered  aloud  by  an  external  voice.  This  is  due 
to  subconscious  whispering  of  the  thoughts  and  to  the  consequent  stimula- 
tion of  the  auditory  centers.  The  merely  central  and  the  merely  peri- 
pheral explanation  of  these  cases  are  alike  inadequate. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

Verstehen  und  Begreifen  :  Eine  psychologische  Untersuchung.  II.     HER- 
MANN SWOBODA.     V.  f.  w.  Ph.,  XXVII,  3,  pp.  241-295. 

Expression,  which,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  has  primarily  a  subjective 
significance  and  is  only  secondarily  a  means  of  communication,  may 
be  described  generally  as  a  secondary  excitation  in  the  motor  centers 
or  in  any  other  part  of  the  nervous  system.  In  many  cases  the  kind 
of  excitations  and  the  excited  field  are  not  dissimilar  in  different  per- 
sons, /.  <?.,  the  movements  have  become  conventional  as  gestures.  The 
primary  excitations  and  the  objects  of  expression  are  feelings.  How  feel- 
ings are  transferred  may  be  illustrated  by  the  art  of  music.  It  is  often 
denied  that  music  has  content ;  its  whole  content  is  said  to  consist  in  its 
form.  Opposed  to  this  claim  of  the  theorists  is  the  testimony  of  artists 
themselves,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  hearers,  on  the  other,  to  whom  music 
is  a  revelation  such  as  no  language  has  power  to  impart.  But  it  is  easy  to 
attach  too  much  importance  to  the  feeling  of  the  artist  or  the  hearer.  For 
the  artist  probably  undervalues  the  intimate  relation  of  his  work  to  his 
whole  personality,  and  ascribes  the  service  it  renders  him  to  its  objective 
quality  ;  the  dilettante  is  often  perplexed  because  a  song  into  which  he  has 
'  thrown  his  whole  soul '  is  utterly  without  effect  on  others.  And,  in  the 
case  of  the  hearer,  the  effect  that  a  piece  of  music  produces  on  him  depends 
upon  a  whole  series  of  circumstances  with  the  production  of  which  the 
music  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  ;  this  is  sufficiently  apparent  when  we 
consider  that  the  effect  is  often  very  different.  Music  is,  of  course,  a  means 
of  expression,  because  it  is  often  influenced  by  feeling  ;  but  this  is  repre- 
sented in  its  form.  The  characteristic  form  elements  of  a  feeling  are  trans- 
ferred to  a  definite  presentation  field.  To  illustrate  :  The  complex  '  love- 
longing,'  which  is  to  form  the  content  of  a  composer's  piece,  and  which 
may  be  represented  by  a  curve  showing  the  rise  and  fall  of  feeling,  has 
characteristic  form  elements  which  are  taken  up  by  the  form  elements 


No.  4.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  4/7 

produced  by  the  various  devices  known  to  the  musical  artist.  Expression 
may  be  defined  physiologically  as  the  uniforming  influence  upon  the  more 
sensitive  of  two  nervous  fields  simultaneously  excited  by  virtue  of  the  inti- 
mate connection  of  the  whole  nervous  system  and  its  economical  nature. 
The  stronger  and  more  persistent  the  excitation,  the  more  uniforming  the  in- 
fluence; hence  the  testimony  of  great  composers  that,  if  they  only  hold  before 
them  clearly  and  definitely  a  given  feeling,  the  musical  elements  of  a  com- 
position take  form  quite  spontaneously.  For  power  of  expression,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  designation  or  description,  spoken  language  has  a  great 
advantage  over  the  written  symbol  by  reason,  again,  of  the  greater  mobil- 
ity of  its  form.  The  symbol,  or  in  spoken  language  the  mere  articulation, 
communicates  the  thought  (designation)  ;  the  modulation  of  the  voice  ex- 
presses the  feeling  which  the  thought  produces  ;  it  is  the  commentary  of 
the  emotions  upon  the  propositions  of  the  intellect.  The  power  of  expres- 
sion is  far  less  in  language  than  the  power  of  impression  ;  for  while  it  serves 
the  subjective  needs  of  the  speaker  or  writer  only  indifferently,  it  is  able 
by  virtue  of  its  power  of  designation  to  produce  the  conditions  of  feeling, 
the  psychical  situation,  from  which  the  feelings  will  emerge  of  themselves. 
Understanding  has  heretofore  been  used  synonymously  with  apperception  ; 
but  when  we  come  to  the  understanding  of  predication,  an  important  distinc- 
tion must  be  made.  The  traditional  treatment  of  apperception  has  not 
sufficiently  distinguished  between  apperception  of  objects  and  that  of 
predication.  While  an  object  is  a  thing  apart,  a  predication  is  a  part  of  a 
greater  whole,  and  it  has  meaning  only  in  its  relation.  If  a  predication  is 
to  be  understood,  it  is  not  so  important  to  establish  a  relation  between  it  and 
the  hearer,  as  to  establish  in  him  the  same  relation  as  exists  between  it  and 
the  person  making  it.  Apperception  means  the  reception  and  modification 
of  a  percept  by  my  peculiar  mental  content,  which,  in  the  case  of  predication, 
can  mean  nothing  else  than  to  misunderstand  it.  To  understand  it  means  to 
construct  from  my  own  psychical  material  the  mental  content  of  the  speaker. 
Apperception  and  understanding  can  be  identical  only  if  the  mental  contents 
of  two  individuals  are  the  same.  According  to  Avenarius'  s  theory  of  the  vital 
series,  to  understand  a  thing  means  to  include  it  in  the  series ;  to  misunder- 
stand it  means  not  to  include  it  in  the  series  ;  and  the  whole  meaning  of  a 
predication  will  depend  upon  the  place  in  the  series  which  it  occupies.  A 
sure  criterion  by  which  to  determine  with  what  section  of  a  series  we  have 
to  do  is  the  feeling  by  which  it  is  accompanied.  The  initial  section  (vital 
difference)  is  accompanied  by  feelings  of  pain  ;  the  medial  section,  in  which 
we  are  groping  about  for  solutions,  by  feelings  of  uncertainty,  unclearness  ; 
while  the  conclusion  of  the  series  is  accompanied  by  the  pleasurable  feeling 
of  relief.  A  predication  in  the  initial  section,  in  order  to  be  understood,  needs 
only  to  contain  a  designation  of  the  circumstances  which  brought  about  the 
vital  difference.  Understanding  of  the  medial  section  demands  the  vital 
difference  belonging  to  it,  which  is  also  the  case  in  the  final  section  of  the 
series.  EMIL  C.  WILM. 


NOTICES   OF   NEW   BOOKS. 

Naturalism  and  Agnosticism.  The  Gifford  Lectures  delivered  before  the 
University  of  Aberdeen  in  the  years  1 896-1 898  by  JAMES  WARD.  Second 
edition.  Two  volumes.  London,  Adam  and  Charles  Black,  1903. — pp. 
xx,  333  ;  xiii,  301. 

This  second  edition  of  Ward's  well-known  Gifford  Lectures  is  distin- 
guished, first,  by  a  number  of  minor  corrections  in  the  text ;  thus,  e.  g.,  in 
place  of  ^r°  and  x~ n  as  symbols  of  "  indeterminate  "  forms,  we  have  now, 
correctly,  %  and  °°  /^  (II,  148),  and  in  place  of  having  the  St.  Lawrence  (!) 
pitching  over  Niagara  Falls,  we  have  now,  quite  safely,  "the  full  volume  of 
the  river"  (I,  208).  Secondly,  the  references  in  the  footnotes  are  made 
exact ;  in  particular,  the  numerous  references  in  Spencer' s  First  Principles 
are  now  made  to  the  sections  as  well  as  to  the  pages  of  the  earlier  editions, 
as  well  as  to  the  sections  corresponding,  but  differently  paged,  in  the  more 
recent  revised  edition.  Thirdly,  there  is  appended  to  each  volume  a 
number  of  notes,  explanatory  and  controversial,  dealing  especially  with  the 
more  important  published  criticisms  of  the  work.  As  there  is  no  modifica- 
tion of  any  point  of  doctrine,  the  chief  interest  of  this  new  edition  lies  in 
these  notes. 

The  longest  of  the  supplementary  notes  (I,  303-315)  discusses  the  defence 
of  physical  realism  undertaken  by  Principal  Riicker  in  his  Inaugural 
Address  as  President  of  the  British  Association  in  1901  in  opposition  to  the 
view  of  Ward  and  others,  that  our  developed  physical  conceptions,  so  far 
from  leading  to  ultimate  reality,  are  merely  an  intellectually  manageable 
descriptive  scheme  substituted  for  the  incomprehensible  complexity  of  con- 
crete facts.  This  '  symbolic  '  view  of  our  ultimate  physical  conceptions, 
which,  if  correct,  completely  undermines  the  foundations  of  the  mechanical 
theory  as  a  dogmatic  system,  was  absurdly  interpreted  by  some  of  Ward's 
critics  as  a  flagrant  attack  on  science  itself.  In  reply,  it  is  shown  that  the 
view  in  question  is  not  only  held  by  many  eminent  workers  in  science  at 
the  present  time,  but  is  virtually  conceded  in  the  end  by  Principal  Riicker 
himself ;  for  he  too  admits  that  the  realistically  thought  constructions  of 
atoms,  the  ether,  etc.,  are  only  'working  hypotheses,'  for  which  other 
hypotheses,  more  suitable,  may  conceivably,  in  the  course  of  time,  be  sub- 
stituted. In  Ward's  view  the  process  of  modification  or  substitution  is 
actually  going  on  ;  he  points,  for  example,  to  the  new  'energetics.'  And 
as  against  the  dogmatism  of  the  mechanical  theory,  the  argument  is  conclu- 
sive. The  physicist,  as  physicist,  has  a  natural  motive  for  regarding  his 
conceptions  as  real,  so  long,  at  least,  as  they  work  ;  he  has  surely,  how- 
ever, no  good  motive,  in  view  of  the  history  of  science  itself,  as  well  as  in 
view  of  reflection  on  thought  as  a  function  of  the  organization  of  a  develop- 

478 


NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  479 

ing  and  many-sided  experience,  for  putting  forth  his  conceptions  as  the 
foundation  of  an  ultimate  philosophy. 

There  is  an  important  series  of  notes  (I,  327-333)  on  the  principles  of 
organic  evolution,  in  which  the  author  defends  his  doctrine  of  "  subjective 
selection";  an  interesting  and  straightforward  reply  (II,  291)  to  the  criti- 
cisms of  Bradley  and  others  on  his  doctrine  of  activity  ;  also  a  note  (II,  293) 
of  exceptional  clearness  and  force  in  reply  to  certain  criticisms  of  Professor 
A.  E.  Taylor  and  the  late  Professor  Ritchie  on  his  doctrine  of  contingency 
and  freedom.  Finally,  there  is  a  large  number  of  notes  (I,  317-327)  deal- 
ing with  the  controversy  with  Spencer. 

In  the  original  lectures,  Ward  had  criticised  Spencer,  among  other  rea- 
sons, for  applying  his  doctrine  of  evolution  to  the  universe  as  a  single 
object,  for  teaching  that  there  was  an  alternation  of  evolution  and  dissolu- 
tion in  the  totality  of  things,  and  for  maintaining,  — to  get  the  evolutionary 
process  at  work,  — the  essential  instability  of  the  homogeneous.  The  criti- 
cism was  published  in  1899.  In  December  of  that  year,  Spencer  replied 
in  an  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  and  in  the  following  year  pub- 
lished a  revised  edition  of  the  First  Principles,  which  had  appeared 
unchanged  in  a  stereotyped  edition  for  thirty  years,  and  in  this  new  edi- 
tion quietly  modified  or  suppressed  all  the  most  damaging  passages  cited 
by  Ward  in  his  contention.  Then,  in  an  appendix  of  five  pages  dealing 
expressly  with  Ward's  criticism,  he  roundly  charges  the  author  with  follow- 
ing the  usual  course  of  controversy,  namely,  setting  up  a  man  of  straw  in 
order  to  knock  him  down  !  It  is  to  be  regretted,  in  view  of  these  changes 
of  position,  that  so  large  an  amount  of  space  was  devoted  to  Spencer  in  the 
lectures.  Doubtless,  if  Ward  were  writing  them  now,  the  treatment  of 
Mr.  Spencer  would  be  very  different.  But  with  the  text  and  the  notes  as 
mutually  explanatory,  it  is  perhaps  just  as  well  that  the  original  criticism 
should  stand  as  illustrative  of  Spencer's  intellectual  shiftiness  and  contro- 
versial methods.  In  addition  to  the  criticisms  here  offered  by  Ward,  it 
may  be  remarked  that,  in  spite  of  the  suppressions  in  Mr.  Spencer's  new 
text,  some,  at  least,  of  the  old  ideas  still  inadvertently  linger  as,  e.  g.,  §186, 
p.  497,  where  a  formula  is  desiderated  "  equally  applicable  to  existences 
taken  singly  and  in  their  totality, "  "to  the  whole  history  of  each  and  to 
the  whole  history  of  all." 

The  notes  in  this  second  edition  are  to  be  cordially  welcomed  as  enhanc- 
ing the  value  of  a  book  that  already  ranks  among  the  most  important  con- 
tributions to  recent  British  philosophy.  They  will  add  to  the  author's 
established  reputation  for  keen  and  subtle  dialectic  ;  still  better,  they  will 
serve  to  clear  up  not  a  few  of  the  most  disputable  points  in  the  discussion 
of  the  matters  treated  in  the  lectures. 

H.  N.  GARDINER. 

SMITH  COLLEGE. 


480  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Religions  of  Authority  and  the  Religion  of  the  Spirit.  By  AUGUSTE 
SABATIER.  Translated  by  LOUISE  SEYMOUR  HOUGHTON.  New  York, 
McClure,  Phillips,  &  Co. — pp.  xxxii,  410. 

This  work  was  completed  by  Dean  Sabatier  only  a  few  months  before  his 
death.  It  was  not  revised  by  him  for  publication,  and  its  form,  which  its 
editors  preferred  to  leave  unchanged,  is  not  without  defects.  There  is  a 
certain  amount  of  repetition  ;  the  order,  too,  would  admit  of  some  im- 
provement. Yet  these  defects  are  not  very  serious.  The  thought  of  Dean 
Sabatier  is  generally  precise  and  luminous  ;  his  exposition  is  singularly 
clear.  His  style  is  epigrammatic  ;  one  might  perhaps  say  of  him  what  he 
has  said  of  Lessing  :  his  mind  is  like  a  diamond  which  not  only  cuts  but 
sparkles.  The  work,  moreover,  may  be  taken  to  express  his  most  mature 
and  cherished  convictions  ;  on  its  completion,  he  said  to  his  wife  it  ' '  must 
come  out  whatever  happens." 

Sabatier  accords  ample  recognition  to  the  function  of  authority,  provided 
that  function  is  rightly  understood.  The  individual  life  is  determined  not 
only  physically,  but  morally  and  intellectually,  by  the  collective  life  in 
which  it  is  found.  The  authority  of  the  family,  of  the  school,  of  the  church 
is  a  conservative  and  educating  potency.  But  the  pedagogic  function  of 
authority,  which  is  its  justification,  is  also  its  limitation.  "Like  every 
good  teacher,  authority  should  labor  to  render  itself  useless."  Through 
authority  the  individual  and  the  race  should  develop  autonomy.  Not  that 
authority  can  ever  be  abrogated  ;  but  it  must  be  brought  under  the  criti- 
cism of  reason.  It  "is,  and  can  be,  no  other  than  relative  "  (p.  xxviii). 
But  this  is  not  the  conception  of  authority  which  the  churches  have 
adopted.  In  religion  authority  has  meant  infallibility  ;  there  is  an  infallible 
Church,  or  Pope,  or  Book. 

Sabatier' s  work  is  in  large  part  a  history  of  these  conceptions.  He  has 
chosen  this  historical  mode  of  treating  them  in  order  to  exhibit  their 
futility.  As  he  reminds  us,  Die  Geschichte  ist  ein  Gericht.  The  immanent 
dialectic  in  the  history  of  a  doctrine  exposes  its  contradictions.  The  churchly 
conceptions  of  authority  find  in  their  history  their  refutation. 

In  the  development  of  the  Roman  Catholic  dogma  of  authority,  there  can 
be  traced  separately  the  gradual  exaltation  of  tradition  and  the  growth  of 
the  episcopate.  The  tradition  of  the  primitive  church  was  in  fluid  form, 
consisting  of  the  various  narratives  of  Jesus' s  life.  But  by  the  stress  of  its 
conflict  with  heresies,  and  by  other  causes,  the  church  was  led  in  the  course 
of  the  centuries  to  adopt  the  conception  of  an  infallible  doctrine,  infallibly 
interpreted.  The  marks  of  this  tradition  were  finally  formulated  :  uni- 
versality, antiquity,  and  the  consent  of  all.  But  with  the  rise  of  modern 
historical  criticism,  trouble  began  ;  it  was  found  impossible  to  maintain  the 
immutability  of  the  church's  doctrine.  Curiously  enough,  help  came  to 
the  church  from  a  Protestant  source.  Schleiermacher  represented  tradition 
as  the  soul  of  a  religious  society  manifesting  itself  in  ever  new  creations. 


No.  4.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  481 

This  conception  was  eagerly  adopted  by  such  Catholics  as  Moehler  and 
Newman,  and  tradition  was  declared  to  be  the  reincarnation  of  Christ  from 
generation  to  generation.  But  the  infallibility  of  the  tradition  is  preserved, 
Sabatier  points  out,  only  by  a  deification  of  the  church  in  all  its  produc- 
tions, and  "to  deify  history  is  to  deny  it  in  its  essence  and  reality  "  (p.  67). 

The  dogma  of  tradition,  however,  is  in  reality  subordinate  to  the  dogma 
of  the  episcopate.  In  the  early  church  all  believers  were  '  priests,'  and  the 
constitution  of  the  individual  congregations  was  republican.  After  a  time 
the  authority  was  vested  in  one  episcopos.  Then  there  arose  a  strife  among 
the  bishops,  which  of  them  was  greatest ;  and  the  Roman,  by  virtue  of 
imperial  position  and  political  wisdom,  gained  the  supremacy.  The  com- 
bination of  the  conception  of  supernatural  knowledge  of  truth  with  the  con- 
ception of  the  supremacy  of  the  Roman  bishops  finally  resulted  in  the  dogma 
of  Papal  infallibility.  If  any  one  denies  the  infallible  authority  or  the 
supreme  power  of  jurisdiction  of  the  Roman  Pontiff,  let  him  be  anathema. 

But  the  irony  of  the  history  is  manifest.  As  Canon  Dollinger  has  said  : 
"  The  Catholic  believer  will  say,  '  I  believe  in  the  infallible  Pope  because 
the  Pope  has  said  that  he  is  infallible  '  "  (p.  135).  Moreover,  the  Papacy 
in  presence  of  the  great  modern  movements  is  in  a  dilemma.  Not  to  speak 
of  its  political  distress,  it  must,  in  the  domain  of  thought,  either  forbid  philo- 
sophical discussion,  or  accept  it.  In  the  former  case,  it  will  be  treated  to 
the  disdainful  neglect  of  modern  science  ;  in  the  latter,  it  will  abdicate  its 
prerogative  of  supernatural  authority. 

Protestantism  started  with  a  revival  of  the  early  Christian  spirit.  It 
rested  on  a  subjective  basis  :  the  Bible  was  true,  for  it  contained  Christi- 
anity. But  soon  the  Bible  became  an  external  authority  ;  and  every  word, 
even  the  Hebrew  vowel-points  had  to  be  regarded  as  inspired.  Sabatier 
shows  how  historical  criticism  has  worked  havoc  with  this  doctrine.  The 
last  bulwark  of  the  system  of  authority  is  found  in  the  words  of  Jesus  ; 
these,  at  least,  it  is  said,  are  infallible.  But,  Sabatier  asks,  is  there  evi- 
dence that  the  account  of  these  words  is  infallible  ?  Moreover,  some  con- 
servative theologians  feel  constrained  to  give  up  the  infallibility  of  Jesus  in 
regard  to  such  matters  as  cosmology  and  demoniac  possession. 

The  last  part  of  the  book  contains  a  more  explicit  account  of  the  author's 
view  of  true  religion,  the  religion  of  the  spirit.  Jesus  was  the  founder  of 
this  religion.  Not  that  Jesus  claimed  for  his  person  any  metaphysical 
dignity  ;  he  lived  this  religious  life,  and  in  the  consciousness  of  this  called 
men  to  him  that  he  might  give  them  what  he  had  in  himself. 

Thus  faith  is  ' '  God  consciously  felt  in  the  heart,  the  inward  revelation 
of  God."  Sabatier  rejects  as  inadequate  Schleiermacher's  definition  of 
religion  as  the  feeling  of  dependence.  "  Divine  law  and  human  law  are 
essentially  identical.  And  it  is  this  immanent  law  which  .  .  .  necessarily 
constitutes  man  at  the  same  time  dependent,  in  his  character  as  a  created 
being,  and  free,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  moral  and  spiritual  being.  .  .  .  Religion 
is  the  vital  and  happy  reconciliation  of  dependence  and  freedom  "  (p.  321). 


482  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.        [VOL.  XIII. 

It  is  "  the  sentiment  of  this  relation  between  the  moral  being  and  the  law 
which  governs  him.  For  this  it  is  not  necessary  to  believe  in  God  in  the 
traditional  sense  of  the  word."  Later  in  the  work  he  says,  with  doubtful 
consistency,  that  the  highest  stage  of  religion  is  reached  when  God  is 
revealed,  not  as  a  power  or  as  law,  but  as  love  ;  religion  then  also  takes 
the  form  of  love  (p.  374). 

The  relation  of  theology  to  the  religious  sentiment  is  discussed  at  some 
length.  Faith  precedes  theology.  The  moral  and  intellectual  elements  in 
the  act  of  faith  are  organically  connected,  yet  the  priority  of  the  moral 
factor  is  insisted  on.  Pure  abstract  logic  says  that  one  must  know  before 
he  can  adore,  historical  psychology  shows  that  in  the  first  instance  one 
desires,  prays,  adores,  and  thus  comes  to  know,  and  that  the  definition  of 
the  object  of  adoration  is  drawn  from  the  worship  offered  to  it  and  the 
benefit  expected  from  it  (p.  353).  Again:  "It  is  by  good  right  that 
Christians  say  that  faith,  the  earliest  manifestation  of  the  life  of  the  soul, 
comes  from  the  immanent  action  of  God.  Man,  therefore,  receives  life 
but  makes  his  own  belief."  The  character  of  this  intellectual  work  is 
"always  and  necessarily  subjective  and  contingent." 

Theology  can  become  scientific  by  adopting  the  method  of  observation 
and  experiment,  and  by  choosing  for  itself,  as  the  other  sciences  have  done, 
a  well-defined  field  of  study.  The  "  section  of  reality  which  it  is  the  duty 
of  theology  to  study  is  the  religious  phenomenon  in  general  and  the  Chris- 
tian phenomenon  in  particular"  (p.  348).  "Theology,  therefore,  has  two 
sources,  psychology  and  history."  It  knows  "  no  sources  of  information  " 
beyond  these. 

There  seems  no  place  for  philosophy  or  dogmatics.  Yet  it  is  said  in 
another  passage  that  dogmas  are  to  be  made  intelligible  and  respectable 
(p.  358)  ;  and  when  it  is  added  that  account  must  be  taken  of  the  experi- 
mental knowledge  of  the  universe  gained  by  astronomy,  geology,  etc. 
(p.  361),  there  seems  to  be  demanded,  not  a  mere  analysis  of  the  religious 
sentiment,  but  a  systematic  philosophy. 

Sabatier's  initial  error  is  in  separating  religion  from  cognition.  Prayer, 
adoration,  without  some  recognition  of  an  object,  is  unintelligible.  As 
religion  means  a  conscious  relation  to  an  object,  it  is  necessary  it  should 
know  that  object,  or  have  a  philosophy  of  it.  The  religious  life  may  depend 
on  other  factors  than  philosophical  cognition.  But  this  cognition  is,  at 
least,  one  factor,  and  till  it  is  fully  attained,  religion  cannot  reach  its  high- 
est form.  WALTER  SMITH. 

LAKE  FOREST  COLLEGE. 


L  unite  dans  V  etre  vivant  (Essai  d'une  biologic  chimique).     Par  FELIX 
LE  DANTEC.     Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1902. — pp.  viii,  412. 

Without  attempting  an  exposition  of  the  work  as  a  whole,  we  may  indi- 
cate certain  chapters  whose  problems  are  of  historic  interest,  such  as  the 


No.  4.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  483 

numerous  ones  dealing  with  the  definition  of  the  individual  organism  and 
the  species. 

The  author  takes  it  to  be  a  general  principle  of  all  classification,  that  "the 
definition  of  the  species  is  qualitative,  and  the  determination  of  the  individ- 
ual is  quantitative ' '  (p.  88).  The  analysis  is  not  sufficiently  close  to  enable 
one  to  say  how  the  author  would  define  the  distinction  between  qualitative 
and  quantitative  relations  ;  the  important  result  for  biological  classification 
is  that  identity  of  chemical  constituents  is  sufficient  to  establish  qualitative 
likeness,  while  the  proportions  in  which  constituents  enter  give  quantitative 
differences.  There  is,  then,  a  common  chemical  quality  in  all  individuals 
of  the  same  species,  with  quantitative  coefficients  defining  the  individual 
(pp.  88  ff.). 

Observe  the  place  accorded  to  the  fundamental  variations  that  biology  is 
obliged  to  recognize  :  variation  of  tissue,  variation  of  individuality,  varia- 
tion of  species.  Imagine,  namely,  the  chemical  substances  a,  b  .  .  .  to 
enter  with  coefficients  a,  /?,...  into  groups,  and  these  in  turn  to  enter, 
with  coefficients  A,  fit  .  .  .  into  the  cell  composition.  The  species  of  the 
organism  is  defined  by  a,  b  .  .  .  ;  the  individuality  by  a,  ft  .  .  .  which  at 
any  moment  are  the  same  in  all  the  groups  and  all  the  cells  of  a  single 
organism.  The  tissues  are  defined  by  the  factors  2,,  /",...  which  have  one 
set  of  values  in  the  blood,  another  in  the  muscles,  etc.  (Chap.  x). 

On  what  factors  do  these  variations  depend  ?  The  variation  of  tissue 
must  be  conceived  as  a  physico-chemical  reaction  of  the  embryo  to  its 
environment.  It  is  conceivable,  however,  that  this  environment  might  so 
affect  an  organism  as  to  alter  its  coefficients  of  individuality.  As  these  are 
common  to  all  the  cells,  the  supposition  requires  that  the  reproductive  cells 
be  modified  along  with  the  others  ;  a  hypothetical  basis  for  the  inheritance 
of  acquired  characteristics  is  thus  provided  (pp.  57  ff.,  150  ff).  Another 
way  in  which  the  coefficients  of  individuality  are  modified  in  offspring  is 
through  the  composition  of  the  factors  belonging  to  true  parent  organ- 
isms (p.  68). 

Are  we,  finally,  to  conceive  these  factors  which  modify  the  individual  in 
a  quantitative  way  as  effecting,  in  time,  a  qualitative  change,  i.  e. ,  varia- 
ation  of  species  ?  On  this  point  the  author  is  far  from  clear.  For  while  ad- 
mitting the  possibility  of  such  transformation  (p.  100),  while  forced  indeed 
to  admit  its  actuality  or  else  to  deny  common  ancestry  to  different  species, 
it  would  appear  that  all  his  studies  of  particular  cases  of  transformation  are 
within  the  species,  /.  e.,  involve  the  quantitative  coefficients  only  (pp.  149  ff.). 

We  may  compare  this  chemical  basis  of  definition  with  others.  How, 
for  example,  do  the  tissues,  individuals,  species  defined  chemically,  corre- 
spond to  those  of  the  usual  morphological  definitions  ?  The  correspond- 
ence is  complete  ;  for  the  form  of  an  organism  being  nothing  but  its 
configuration  of  equilibrium  in  a  given  medium,  and  this  being  dependent 
on  its  chemical  composition,  there  must  be  just  as  many  morphological  as 
chemical  differences  between  organisms.  In  particular,  it  is  the  inheritable 


484  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

form  of  equilibrium  that  is  the  best  test  for  the  coefficients  of  individuality, 
—  it  is  this  which  enables  us  to  distinguish  a  true  individual  from  a  colony 
(pp.  131  ff.).  Finally,  this  chemical  principle  of  classification  yields  the 
same  result  as  the  genetic,  now  commonly  adopted.  After  a  skilful  dis- 
play of  the  difficulties  attending  the  reconstruction  of  family  trees  on  the 
data  of  morphological  resemblances,  the  author  points  out  that  the  usual 
method  of  evading  these  difficulties  depends  on  an  unprovable  assumption, 
to  wit,  that  proximity  of  kinship  is  determined  by  the  lateness  of  the  stage 
at  which  the  embryos  develop  differences.  If  we  seek  a  basis  of  qualifica- 
tion that  is  free  from  this  hypothetical  factor,  it  must  be  found  in  the  chemi- 
cal. On  this  basis  we  can  understand  that  those  cells  which  have  the 
greatest  chemical  analogy  will  be  the  last  in  the  process  of  multiplication 
to  develop  noticeable  morphological  'differences.  The  embryological 
method  would  still  be  the  only  practicable  one,  but  it  would  stand  for  a 
delicate  test  of  chemical  likeness  and  difference,  not  relevantly,  for  a  cri- 
terion of  kinship  (Chap.  xv). 

EDGAR  A.  SINGER,  JR. 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

Vers  le  positivisme  absolu  par  ridealisme.     Par  Louis  WEBER.     Paris, 
Felix  Alcan,  1903. — pp.  396. 

The  main  thesis  of  M.  Weber's  book  is  one  which  is  familiar  in  recent 
philosophy.  It  represents  the  thoroughgoing  repudiation  of  realism  and 
ontology  in  all  its  forms.  On  the  critical  side,  it  has  not  indeed  much  to 
say  that  is  particularly  new  ;  and  while  the  arguments  are  acutely  put,  they 
have  the  defect,  not  uncommon  in  the  particular  type  of  thinking  which 
they  represent,  that  their  force  depends  largely  on  having  already  accepted 
presuppositions  which  involve  the  point  at  issue.  Nevertheless,  the  book 
is  of  considerable  significance.  Its  grasp  of  principles  and  its  clear-cut 
logic  are  admirable  ;  and  where  it  does  not  convince,  it  will  at  least  make 
clearer  some  of  the  issues. 

The  main  drift  of  the  argument  is  indicated  by  the  title.  Historically, 
Positivism  tends  to  regard  reflective  thought  as  sterile,  and  objective  experi- 
ence as  the  only  valid  source  of  knowledge.  Is  this  opposition  necessary  ? 
Or  may  not  rather  idealistic  reflection  be  required  to  give  a  basis  to  Posi- 
tivism such  as  empiricism  is  unable  to  give  ?  The  necessity  for  this  basis 
the  first  chapter  tries  to  show  by  retracing  the  story  of  modern  empirical 
idealism.  Reflective  thought  has,  in  the  first  place,  undermined  com- 
pletely common  sense  realism.  But  the  realism  which  science  attempts  to 
substitute  is  equally  untenable.  Full  of  self-contradictions,  and  incapable 
of  being  conceived  positively  save  in  psychical  terms,  the  concepts  of  science 
are  plainly  not  to  be  regarded  as  entities.  Or,  if  we  take  their  objects  as 
unknowable,  we  simply  have,  in  Agnosticism,  a  new  and  nebulous  ontology, 
equally  infected  with  the  vice  of  realism.  But  now,  while  the  outcome  of 
science  is  thus  idealistic,  this  idealism,  if  taken  dogmatically,  would  mean 


No.  4.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS. 

the  triumph  of  scepticism.  In  such  a  negative  ideality  and  relativism,  sci- 
ence destroys  itself.  Through  the  need  of  transforming  these  negations  into 
affirmations,  science  issues  in  Positivism  and  the  Positivistic  justification  of 
law  in  terms  of  human  action,  — the  interpretation  of  knowledge  as  pre- 
vision. Positivism  is  thus  an  attempt  at  a  philosophy  of  science.  But  this 
utilitarian  principle  is  incapable  of  being  justified  on  the  empirical  basis. 
Positivism,  nevertheless,  in  rejecting  all  knowledge  not  empirical  as  illusory, 
is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  setting  up  a  principle  of  authority.  But  since  the  only 
criterion  it  allows  is  practical  success,  it  cannot  give  any  universal  founda- 
tion to  scientific  authority  such  as  it  requires.  What  sort  of  a  principle  is 
that  which  is  subordinated  to  an  incessant  verification  ?  The  pretence  of 
assigning  the  first  rank  to  empirical  knowledge,  and  granting  it  sovereign 
authority,  is  itself  only  an  anticipation  of  experience,  which  contradicts 
empiricism.  And  so  unless  we  admit,  with  Hume,  that  knowledge  is  sub- 
mitted to  the  uncertainties  of  a  becoming  without  law  or  principle,  and 
undistinguishable  from  blind  chance,  we  must  find  a  metaphysical  solution 
for  the  problem  of  the  possibility  of  science.  Positivism  thus  becomes,  not 
a  self-sufficient  philosophy,  but  only  the  empirical  introduction  to  the 
critical  philosophy. 

The  second  and  third  chapters  examine  the  attempts  of  critical  idealism 
and  of  monadism  to  supply  this  need,  and  endeavor  to  point  out  the  linger- 
ing taint  of  realism  which  still  vitiates  these  in  their  historical  forms  ;  and 
the  remainder  of  the  book  is  devoted  to  a  constructive  formulation  of  the 
true,  /.  e.t  logical  idealism.  The  real  does  not  exist.  There  is  no  mode  of 
absolute  being,  —  call  it  thing,  self,  psychical  fact,  —  outside  of  logical 
being,  affirmed  as  such,  and  announced  in  discourse.  The  object  of  an  idea 
is  only  another  idea  more  immediate  ;  the  idea  of  an  object  is  another 
object  raised  to  a  higher  degree  of  reflection.  Reality  is  the  multiplicity  of 
logical  existences  constituting  science,  whose  unity  is  the  unity  of  thought, 
identical  in  all  its  infinite  manifestations.  This  is  of  course  quite  different 
from  the  reality  of  the  self  or  subject.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  subject, 
one  idea,  should  have  the  privilege  of  conditioning  the  idea  in  general,  — 
the  finite  become  the  principle  of  the  infinite.  All  that  remains  of  the  in- 
dependent real  is  simply  the  obscurity  and  opaqueness  due  to  a  meaning 
not  yet  made  explicit.  And  since  there  is  no  external  matter,  there  can  be 
no  separation  between  theoretical  and  applied  science.  The  applications 
are  simply  science  in  action ;  they  are  the  sciences  themselves  participating 
in  human  life  under  their  various  modalities. 

The  search  for  the  real  is  then  the  real  itself.  Science  is  no  completed 
system.  It  is  only  the  history  of  science,  its  abstract  side,  which  has  this 
appearance  ;  the  concrete  side  is  the  living  side,  its  existence  in  living 
minds.  The  difference  between  the  a  priori  and  the  a  posteriori,  between 
analytic  and  synthetic  knowledge,  is  only  one  of  degree.  The  deductive 
ideal  proceeds  from  the  illusion  that  the  truth  of  universal  being  can  be 
enclosed  in  a  particular  proposition  affirmed  by  a  particular  understanding. 


486  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

We  attribute  a  superior  truth  to  the  analytic  proposition,  because  we  are  so 
intimately  persuaded  that  the  most  perfect  certainty  is  that  of  the  individual 
subject,  just  as  the  supremacy  of  the  empirical  proof  by  the  touchstone  of 
fact  is  due  to  the  belief  in  the  independence  of  the  not-self.  Both  meth- 
ods alike  are  valid  only  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of  universal  and  neces- 
sary being.  It  follows  also  that  each  science  is  a  special  order  of  experi- 
ence, which  has  its  ground  of  certainty  in  itself.  The  Kantian  explanation 
of  experience  is  in  reality  a  psychology  of  physics.  But  to  go  outside 
science  itself  for  its  justification  is  to  admit  that  science  is  obscure  and 
unintelligible.  Reflection  on  the  results  of  science  performs  the  negative 
service  of  destroying  the  ontologcal  signification  of  the  judgments  of  science, 
but  it  does  not  touch  the  ground  of  scientific  certainty.  By  establishing 
the  principle  that  there  is  an  object  only  for  a  subject,  it  shows  that  the 
affirmation  of  physical  reality  implies  in  advance  an  implicit  intelligibility. 
But  this  does  not  replace  physical  knowledge.  It  simply  adds  a  new  sci- 
ence, a  new  system  of  affirmations.  Psychology  is  a  different  order  of  ex- 
perience, not  an  explanation  of  experience.  The  scientist,  as  a  scientist, 
necessarily  takes  his  results  as  reality  ;  and  the  only  test  of  their  truth  is  the 
way  in  which  they  fit  into  the  system  of  ideas  which  constitute  his  science, 
in  the  process  through  which  possible  truth  transforms  itself  into  necessary 
truth. 

In  this  a  priori  certainty  of  the  adequation  of  being  to  the  thought  which 
creates  it,  we  have  the  principle  which  Positivism  lacks.  The  objection  of 
Positivism  to  the  transcendent  character  of  metaphysics  no  longer  holds 
against  this  point  of  view.  Metaphysics  does  not  supplant  science.  It 
only  denies  the  extra-scientific  interpretation  of  scientific  judgments.  In 
the  nature  of  the  case,  it  can  only  be  a  logic.  It  will  thus  give  a  recon- 
ciliation of  the  universal  relativity  of  knowledge  and  the  absolute  neces- 
sity of  being.  The  principle  of  necessary  being,  —  the  principle  of  the 
essential  unity  of  being  in  all  degrees  of  reflection,  —  teaches  nothing  about 
the  real  multiplicity  of  being.  This  is  why  the  category  of  relativity 
maintains  its  importance,  —  relation,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  stands  for  the 
very  life  of  thought,  its  inner  characteristic  of  infinity.  This  is  quite  the 
opposite  of  scepticism,  though  it  involves,  of  course,  a  new  conception  of 
truth.  Instead  of  the  conformity  of  the  idea  with  its  object,  truth  is  the 
conformity  of  thought  with  itself,  of  thought  which  is  realizing  itself  with 
thought  realized.  There  is  no  absolutely  definitive  way  of  discerning  truth 
and  error  in  the  particular  positive  sciences,  just  because  no  particular 
judgment  can  enclose  absolute  truth.  We  cannot  tell  whether  synthetic 
truths  will  always  be  the  same,  whether  their  signification  will  not  change. 
But  what  we  do  know  with  entire  certainty,  is  that  their  negation  will  be 
possible  only  by  a  larger,  more  coherent,  and  more  intelligible  affirmation. 

An  adequate  criticism  of  the  book  would  take  more  space  than  is  available 
here.  Incidentally,  however,  attention  may  be  called  to  the  exaltation  of 
the  purely  scientific  experience,  which  is  assumed  somewhat  too  lightly  to 


No.  4.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS. 

represent  the  essence  of  the  life  of  spirit.  The  few  passages  which  recog- 
nize the  need  of  clearing  up  the  connection  between  science  and  practical 
life  are  decidedly  schematic,  not  to  say  obscure  ;  and  the  insistent  problem 
of  the  relation  of  knowledge  to  other,  i.  <?.,  emotional  values  is  quite  ignored. 
Perhaps  a  less  exclusively  logical  interest  might  have  led  to  a  less  secure 
conviction  of  the  sufficiency  of  certain  of  the  presuppositions  of  the 
argument.  A.  K.  ROGERS. 

BUTLER  COLLEGE. 

Beitrdge  zur  Entwicklung  der  Kanf  schen  Ethik.     Von  KARL  SCHMIDT. 

Marburg,  N.  G.  Elwert'sche  Verlagsbuchhandlung,  1900. — pp.  105. 

This  study  traces  the  development  within  Kant's  writings  of  the  con- 
ceptions prominent  in  his  ethical  theory.  Thirty-five  pages  are  given  to 
the  examination  of  the  precritical  writings,  and  sixty  pages  to  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason.  The  author  has  no  particular  thesis  to  maintain.  He 
conceives  his  task  as  entirely  expository,  and  couches  his  expositions  largely 
in  Kant's  own  words.  This  work  is  one  which  has  been  done  before.  At 
the  same  time,  Dr.  Schmidt's  contribution  is  a  helpful  one.  He  seizes 
upon  practically  all  of  the  ethically  significant  points  of  the  works  discussed, 
presents  them  with  clearness  in  their  relations  to  the  developing  ethical 
theory,  buttresses  them  with  quotations  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  his  inter- 
pretations convincing,  and  delivers  the  whole  within  a  very  manageable 
compass.  So  far  as  any  bias  or  tendency  shows  itself  in  the  work,  it  is  that 
of  finding  within  Kant's  early  writings  nearly  all  the  main  ideas  of  the 
critical  ethics.  The  essays  produced  in  the  years  immediately  following 
1 760,  for  instance,  are  made  to  reveal  in  simple  statement  the  larger  part 
of  what  is  later  developed  in  detail.  In  one  or  two  cases  I  have  found  Dr. 
Schmidt's  interpretations  of  these  earlier  passages  weakly  supported,  for 
instance,  in  the  discussion  of  the  Inaugural  Dissertation.  In  general,  how- 
ever, this  is  not  so.  He  comes  near  to  showing  that  Kant's  '  development ' 
of  ethical  theory  was  one  in  which  nothing  new  was  ever  learned  and 
nothing  old  forgotten.  As  the  discussion  advances  through  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason,  the  teachings  there  found  which  look  towards  the  ethics  are 
well  developed,  but  nothing  original  or  characteristic  is  presented.  The 
last  ten  pages  deal  with  the  critical  elucidation  of  "  Fragment  6."  This 
Kantian  fragment  was  first  published  in  1887,  and  has  been  interpreted  by 
Forster  and  Hoffding  as  implying  eudaemonism,  even  an  individualistic 
eudaemonism.  Dr.  Schmidt  shows  quite  clearly,  I  think,  that  these  views 
are  not  well  founded,  that  the  Kantian  emphasis  upon  rational  law  is  re- 
asserted. He  finds  the  meaning  of  the  fragment  in  the  fact  that  it  is  an 
attempt  on  Kant's  part  to  solve  the  problem  of  moral  obligation  without 
postulating  the  Ideas  of  God  or  immortality,  by  showing  that  a  pleasurable 
feeling  is  bound  up  a  priori  with  action  issuing  from  freedom. 

TT  E.   L.   HlNMAN. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  NEBRASKA. 


THE    PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Die  Grenzwissenschaften  der  Psychologie.     By  WILLY  HELLPACH.     Leip- 
zig, Verlag  der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1902. — pp.  viii,  515. 

Dr.  Hellpach  is  a  physician  and  a  former  pupil  of  Wundt.  The  gen- 
eral aim  of  his  book  is  to  set  forth  the  relations  of  psychology  to  the  bio- 
logical sciences.  He  has  meant  to  include  the  most  important  facts  of 
nervous  anatomy  and  physiology,  mental  pathology,  and  genetic  psychol- 
ogy, together  with  a  critical  exposition  of  their  chief  theories.  More  specifi- 
cally, the  volume  is  an  attempt  to  acquaint  medical  men  with  psychology, 
normal  and  abnormal,  and  also  to  instruct  pedagogists  in  those  facts  of 
biology  that  stand  closest  to  the  mental  disciplines. 

After  an  introductory  chapter  on  "  The  Chief  Results  of  Modern  Psy- 
chology," the  Grenzwissenschaften  are  considered  in  five  sections  on  "  The 
Anatomy  of  the  Nervous  System,"  "  Animal  Physiology,"  "  Neuro-pathol- 
ogy,"  "Psycho-pathology,"  and  "The  Psychology  of  Development." 
Modern  psychology  is,  for  the  author,  synonymous  with  Wundt' s  system, 
and  it  is  to  this  system  that  Hellpach  refers  throughout  the  book.  The  five 
main  divisions  of  the  work  are  made  up  of  short  essays  that  deal  mainly 
with  the  more  commonplace  facts  and  theories  of  anatomy,  physiology, 
pathology,  and  mental  development.  The  section  on  anatomy,  e.  g.,  con- 
tains chapters  on  the  nerve  cell,  nervous  morphology,  brain  and  mind, 
and  the  history  of  the  nervous  system.  Many  of  the  essays  are  quite 
detached,  or  else  they  are  united  only  by  the  author's  evident  purpose  to 
affect  a  rapprochement  between  psychology  and  her  quarrelsome  neighbors. 
Perspective  and  systematic  arrangement  are  especially  wanting  in  the  sec- 
tions on  "Animal  Physiology"  ("The  Physiology  and  Psychophysics  of  the 
Sensory  Apparatus"  would  have  been  a  less  ambiguous  title)  and  "  Neuro- 
pathology."  The  best  part  of  the  book  is  the  part  devoted  to  mental 
diseases.  The  influence  of  Wundt,  everywhere  apparent,  betrays  itself 
here,  indirectly,  in  the  author's  indebtedness  to  Kraepelin,  whose  method 
he  follows  somewhat  closely. 

Dr.  Hellpach' s  book  suffers  both  from  a  failure  to  appreciate  foreign 
systems  and  points  of  view,  and  from  an  imperfect  synthesis  of  subject- 
matter.  The  book  lacks  breadth  and  unity.  A  final  chapter  which  should 
have  picked  up  and  interpreted  the  author's  results  would  have  added 
much  to  the  value  of  the  work. 

Since  the  book  under  discussion  is  intended  for  the  use  of  persons  who 
are  not  professional  psychologists,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  exposi- 
tion of  specific  problems  is  concise  and  straightforward.  Although  the 
volume  is  written  rather  in  the  shadow  than  in  the  light  of  a  great  system, 
it  nevertheless  reflects  credit  both  upon  the  system  and  upon  psychology 
at  large.  I.  M.  BENTLEY. 

The  following  books  also  have  been  received  : 

Descartes,  Spinoza,  and  the  New  Philosophy.     By  JAMES  IVERACH.     New 
York,  Imported  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1904.  — pp.  xii,  245.   $1.25. 


No.  4.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS. 

The  Evolution  of  Modern  Liberty.  By  GEORGE  L.  SCHERGER.  New 
York,  London,  and  Bombay,  Longmans,  Green,  &  Co.,  1904. — pp. 
xiv,  284.  $1.10. 

Columbia  University  Contributions  to  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Education, 
Vol.  XII,  Nos.  1-4.  The  Professional  Training  of  Secondary  Teachers  in 
the  United  States.  By  G.  W.  A.  LUCKEY.  New  York,  The  Macmillan 
Co.,  January,  1903. — pp.  391.  $2.00. 

The  University  of  Missouri  Studies,  Vol.  II,  No.  j.  The  Process  of  Induc- 
tive Inference.  By  FRANK  THILLY.  Columbia,  Mo.,  The  University 
of  Missouri,  April,  1904. — pp.  40.  $0.35. 

Cornell  Studies  in  Philosophy,  No.  j.  Maine  de  Biran's  Philosophy  of 
Will.  By  NATHAN  E.  TRUMAN.  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1904. 

—  PP.  v,  93. 

The  Idea  of  God.     By  JAMES  PALMER.     New  York,  New  York  University, 

1904.  —  pp.  viii,  70. 
Where  Did  Life   Begin?     By    G.    H.    SCRIBNER.     New   York,   Charles 

Scribner's  Sons,  1903. — pp.  xiii,  75. 
The  Psychological  Index,  No.  10.     Compiled   by  H.   C.   WARREN   and 

others.     New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  April,  1904.  — pp.  viii,  142. 
Grundzifge  der  allgemeinen  Asthetik.     By  STEPHAN  WITASEK  .     Leipzig, 

J.  A.  Earth,  1904.  —  pp.  vii,  410.     M.  4  ;  Geb.  M.  5. 
Ausgeiv'dhlte  Werke.     Bd.  iv,  Schopenhauer.    Von  P.  J.  MOBIUS.     Leipzig, 

J.  A.  BARTH,  1904.  — pp.  xii,  282.     M.  3  ;  Geb.  M.  4.50. 
Die  Logenarbeit  und  das  ' Reich  Gottes.'      Von    DIEDRICH    BISCHOFF. 

Leipzig,  Max  Hesse,  1904. — pp.  v,  116.     M.  1.50. 
Das  idealistische  Argument  in  der  Kritik  des  Materialismus.     Von  M. 

WARTENBERG.     Leipzig,  J.  A.  Earth,  1904.  — pp.  72.     M.  1.60. 

Kants  Bedeutungfur  die  Gegenivart.     Von  W.   JERUSALEM.     Wien  und 

Leipzig,  W.  Braumiiller,  1904.  — pp.  51. 
Immanuel  Kant  und  seine  Weltanschauung.     Von  WILHELM  WINDEL- 

BAND.     Heidelberg,  C.  Winter,  1904.  — pp.  32. 
Das  Problem  der  Willensfreiheit.     Von  KARL  FAHRION.     Heidelberg,  C. 

Winter,  1904. — pp.  63. 
Labeaute  rationnelle.     Par  PAUL  SOURIAU.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904.  — pp. 

510.      10  fr. 
Essai  sur  T esprit  musical.    Par  LIONEL  DAURIAC.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. 

—  pp.  v,  304.     5  fr. 

La  philosophic  en  Amerique.  Par  L.  VAN  BECELAERE.  New  York,  The 
Eclectic  Publishing  Co.,  1904. — pp.  xviii,  180.  $1.50. 

L' individualisme  anarchiste  :  Max  Stirner.  Par  VICTOR  BASCH.  Paris 
F.  Alcan,  1904.  —  pp.  vi,  294.  6  fr. 


NOTES. 

SOME  ASPECTS  OF  THE  RECENT  NIETZSCHE  LITERATURE. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1900,  although  there  was  a  great  mass  of 
Nietzsche  literature  in  existence,  most  of  it  was  written  by  men  whose 
training  and  interests  were  other  than  philosophical.  Some  of  them  were 
essayists,  others  poets  or  dramatists,  and  a  still  larger  number  were  pro- 
fessional journalists.  There  was  a  plentiful  sprinkling  of  writers  upon 
social  questions  and  a  few  practical  reformers,  there  were  Lutheran  clergy- 
men and  followers  of  Ibsen,  physicians  for  whom  Nietzsche  was  merely  a 
problem  in  psychiatry,  and  young  men  and  maidens  who  accepted  him 
upon  his  own  valuation  and  regarded  his  lightest  word  or  deed  as  charged 
with  sacred  meaning.  Naturally  the  members  of  this  motley  company 
cared  little  for  Nietzsche's  philosophy  in  the  stricter  sense  of  the  term.  His 
sworn  followers,  to  be  sure,  endeavored  to  consider  the  whole  of  his  doc- 
trine, but  they  were  interested  particularly  in  its  practical  application,  and 
moreover  the  lack  of  philosophical  training  displayed  by  most  of  them 
rendered  their  treatment  of  theoretical  questions  of  little  or  no  value  to  the 
student.  Unacquainted  with  what  had  already  been  done  in  the  field  of 
philosophy,  they  hailed  as  new  everything  that  was  not  in  accord  with  pre- 
vailing tendencies,  and  accepted  without  blinking  arguments  that  had  long 
been  recognized  as  fallacious.  Those  whose  interests  were  less  compre- 
hensive, and  who  favored  or  opposed  Nietzsche  because  of  his  views  on 
some  one  or  two  subjects,  selected  these  as  a  matter  of  course  from  their 
context  and  confined  their  disquisitions  to  the  particular  opinions  by  which 
they  had  been  attracted  or  repelled.  The  result  was  a  long  series  of  mono- 
graphs upon  Nietzsche's  relation  to  Christianity,  to  current  morality,  to  the 
emancipation  of  women,  to  Wagner's  music,  to  the  social  and  political 
position  of  the  Jews,  and  so  on  almost  without  limit.  In  this  mass  of 
heterogeneous  material,  much  is  too  crude  to  be  of  value,  but  such  a  charge 
is  by  no  means  to  be  brought  against  the  whole.  Portions  are  well  worth 
reading,  and  this  is  especially  true  of  certain  articles  that  appeared  in  French 
and  German  periodicals.  From  the  best  of  them,  however,  not  much 
could  be  expected  that  would  serve  as  a  contribution  to  the  serious  study 
of  Nietzsche's  philosophy  in  the  technical  sense. 

In  fact,  at  the  beginning  of  1900,  with  the  exception  of  several  short 
accounts  in  magazines  and  collections  of  essays,  good  enough  in  them- 
selves, but  from  the  very  object  for  which  they  were  written  necessarily 
incomplete  and  one-sided,  only  two  expositions  had  been  published  that 
deserve  to  be  called  philosophical.  They  are  Friedrich  Nietzsche  :  Der 
Kunstler  und  der  Denker  by  Alois  Riehl,  and  La  Philosophic  de  Nietzsche 
by  Henri  Lichtenberger.  Perhaps  nothing  better  than  these  has  been  done 

49° 


NOTES.  49 l 

since,  but  four  years  ago  they  stood  alone.  Nietzsche  was  not  only  ignored 
by  the  philosophical  world,  but  it  was  considered  necessary  to  make  formal 
proclamation  of  the  neglect  to  which  he  was  subjected.  Even  in  Germany 
propositions  to  place  his  books  in  university  libraries  met  with  opposition 
on  the  part  of  the  professors  of  philosophy,  and  Nietzsche  was  almost  uni- 
versally held  up  to  shame  as  a  popular  charlatan. 

At  present  the  public  interest  in  Nietzsche  and  his  books  is  at  once  more 
serious  and  less  enthusiastic.  At  least  this  statement  is  true  with  regard  to 
the  continent  of  Europe,  and  in  Great  Britain  and  America  public  interest 
in  Nietzsche  can  hardly  be  said  to  exist.  Nietzsche's  works  are  now  found 
in  many  university  libraries,  and  in  at  least  one  university,  namely,  Leipzig, 
a  course  of  lectures  was  recently  given  upon  his  philosophy.  Monographs 
containing  the  results  of  serious  study  of  his  views  are  now  numerous,  and 
bear  the  names  of  well-known  men  such  as  Vaihinger  and  Fouillee.  Side 
by  side  with  the  more  general  accounts,  there  have  appeared  careful  studies 
of  particular  aspects  of  Nietzsche's  philosophy,  among  which  his  episte- 
mology  has  received  rather  more  than  its  due  share  of  attention.  Much 
work  has  been  done  in  tracing  the  development  of  his  theories  and  the 
influences  that  helped  to  shape  them,  and  in  showing  the  close  relationship 
existing  between  different  portions  of  his  philosophy.  At  present,  the  stu- 
dent who  wishes  a  knowledge  of  Nietzsche's  works  without  going  to  the 
original  sources  has  the  choice  of  a  dozen  different  expositions,  where  he 
can  find  impartial  statement  together  with  keen  and  often  sympathetic 
criticism.  Nietzsche  has  not  been  accepted  as  a  really  great  philosopher, 
but  he  has  been  recognized  as  historically  important,  and  as  worthy  at  least 
of  serious  study.  When  his  doctrines  are  rejected,  grave  arguments  are 
advanced  for  such  a  course  ;  his  views  are  no  longer  set  aside  with  a  sneer 
as  if  they  deserved  no  other  confutation. 

If  one  asks  what  influence  the  increased  study  of  Nietzsche  has  had  upon 
the  interpretation  of  his  doctrines,  one  finds  the  change  confined  largely 
to  the  standpoint  from  which  they  are  regarded,  which  has  of  itself  brought 
about  completer  and  less  superficial  criticism.  Moreover,  the  data  have  been 
somewhat  enlarged.  Not  only  two  volumes  of  Nietzsche's  letters,  but  also 
additional  material  from  his  notebooks  have  been  published.  Of  the  twelve 
volumes  of  the  Naumann  edition  of  1895,  four  were  posthumous.  These 
have  recently  been  withdrawn  from  circulation,  as  a  result  of  the  conviction 
that  they  misrepresented  Nietzsche,  their  contents  have  been  rearranged, 
and  they  have  now  been  republished  together  with  two  additional  volumes. 
The  second  corrected  edition  certainly  gives  more  emphasis  to  the  Darwin- 
ian aspect  of  Nietzsche's  philosophy  than  does  either  the  first  edition  or  the 
books  published  during  Nietzsche's  lifetime.  The  influence  of  the  theory 
of  evolution  upon  Nietzsche  has  been  widely  recognized,  and  his  philosophy 
has  even  been  described  as  an  attempt  to  carry  Darwinism  to  its  logical 
conclusion.  Whether  this  extreme  view  is  correct  or  not,  one  must  admit 
that  it  has  more  to  justify  it  now  than  formerly  when  the  contents  of 
Nietzsche's  notebooks  were  less  fully  known. 


492  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

The  radical  nature  of  the  change  described  in  the  attitude  of  the  philo- 
sophical world  toward  Nietzsche  is  the  more  marked  because  of  the  con- 
tinued activity  of  the  writers  of  less  technical  commentaries.  Everyone 
must  of  course  admit  that  there  is  no  reason  why  the  valuable  books  on 
Nietzsche  should  be  confined  to  those  written  by  the  professional  students 
of  philosophy  ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  majority  of  the  others  are  so  ex- 
travagant in  their  advocacy  or  so  bitter  in  their  opposition,  that  they  are 
found  helpful  only  by  people  who  share  the  same  standpoint.  At  present, 
those  who  praise  Nietzsche  are  making  the  more  noise  in  print  and  out  of 
it,  and  the  Nietzsche-cult  continues  to  spread.  Among  the  unquestioning 
believers  are  still  found  a  great  many  of  the  army  of  philosophical  amateurs, 
men  who,  without  much  training  in  their  chosen  field,  nevertheless  interest 
themselves  in  philosophical  questions  and  resent  any  suggestion  that  here 
as  elsewhere  some  special  knowledge  is  desirable  in  a  judge.  Like  their 
brothers  in  the  field  of  art,  these  philosophical  philistines  maintain  that  they 
know  what  they  like,  and  that,  if  anyone  else  has  a  different  taste,  so  much 
the  worse  for  him.  One  of  Nietzsche's  soberer  critics  goes  so  far  as  to  say 
that  the  readiness  with  which  a  man  accepts  Nietzsche's  theories  is  in 
inverse  proportion  to  his  knowledge  of  philosophy,  and  certainly  even  so 
sweeping  a  statement  as  this  is  partially  justified  by  the  manner  in  which 
some  of  Nietzsche's  admirers  combine  without  a  murmur  the  views  of  two 
different  periods  which  he  himself  recognized  as  contradictory,  discarding 
one  as  he  became  convinced  of  the  truth  of  its  opposite.  The  most  respect- 
able of  these  enthusiasts  are  the  artists,  especially  the  litterateurs,  who  find 
in  Nietzsche  the  theoretical  expression  of  a  standpoint  more  common  than 
is  usually  admitted,  and  who  are  doubtless  attracted  to  him  also  by  the 
beauties  of  his  style. 

By  one  of  those  exquisite  ironies  of  fate  that  go  so  far  towards  making 
life  worth  living,  some  of  the  most  ardent  of  Nietzsche's  followers  are 
1  emancipated  '  women.  Nietzsche,  who  regarded  woman's  function  as 
limited  entirely  to  the  bearing  of  children,  and  who  praised  the  Eastern 
view  of  the  sex  as  immeasurably  superior  to  that  of  Europe,  Nietzsche,  the 
bitter  opponent  of  all  that  led  to  Frauenemancipation,  has  been  taken  up 
by  the  advance  guard  of  the  movement.  In  breaking  through  all  the 
restraints  imposed  upon  women  by  the  customs  of  European  society,  their 
object,  forsooth,  is  the  production  of  the  Llbermensch.  Jesters  could  do  no 
more. 

Among  the  company  of  Nietzsche's  admirers,  a  few  feel  themselves  called 
upon  to  undertake  an  active  propaganda.  According  to  them,  only  the  pre- 
vailing ignorance  and  prejudice  prevent  Nietzsche's  doctrines  from  receiv- 
ing wide  acceptance,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  everyone  interested  in  the  cause 
of  truth  to  help  to  bring  about  its  triumph.  This  is  being  done  partly  by 
the  publication  of  monographs,  but  especially  through  the  establishment  of 
periodicals  devoted  to  the  spread  of  Nietzsche's  views.  The  latest  of  these 
is  entitled  Notes  for  Good  Europeans,  and  is  published  near  Edinburgh. 


No.  4.]  NOTES.  493 

Besides  these  literary  labors,  it  is  claimed  that  there  has  been  a  more  or 
less  organized  attempt  to  make  a  practical  application  of  Nietzsche's 
theories  concerning  the  structure  and  function  of  society.  Not  only  are  vari- 
ous classes  of  reformers  waiting  for  the  necessary  power  in  order  to  carry 
out  certain  of  Nietzsche' s  suggestions,  but  these  latter  are,  according  to  some, 
already  being  realized.  I  have  not  myself  seen  the  articles  in  question,  but 
I  have  been  told  that  the  recent  German  activity  in  the  East  has  been 
attributed  to  the  direct  influence  of  Nietzsche. 

On  the  whole,  then,  the  present  attitude  toward  Nietzsche  is  much  more 
encouraging  than  it  was  five  years  ago.  He  is  not,  as  he  believed  himself 
to  be,  a  philosopher  of  the  first  rank,  but  nevertheless  he  is  important 
enough  to  merit  serious  study,  and  this  he  is  now  receiving.  The  vagaries 
of  the  Nietzsche-cult  aside,  the  present  estimate  of  his  writings  avoids  both 
extravagant  praise  and  blame,  and  accords  them  a  real  though  possibly  not 
a  permanent  value. 

GRACE  NEAL  DOLSON. 
WELLS  COLLEGE, 
AURORA,  N.  Y. 

Professor  John  Dewey  of  the  University  of  Chicago  has  been  called  to  a 
newly  established  chair  of  philosophy  at  Columbia  University. 

Professor  James  H.  Tufts  has  been  appointed  to  the  headship  of  the 
department  of  philosophy  in  the  University  of  Chicago,  and  Professor 
James  R.  Angell  to  the  headship  of  a  newly  founded  department  of  psy- 
chology in  the  same  university. 

Professor  George  Trumbull  Ladd  has  resigned  his  chair  and  his  position 
as  head  of  the  department  of  philosophy  in  Yale  University  which  he  has 
held  since  1881. 

We  give  below  a  list  of  articles,  etc.,  in  the  current  philosophical 
journals  : 

MIND,  No.  50  ;  W.  L.  Davidson,  Professor  Bain's  Philosophy  ;  /.  E. 
McTaggart,  Hegel's  Treatment  of  the  Categories  of  Quantity  ;  B.  Russell, 
Meinong's  Theory  of  Complexes  and  Assumptions  (1)  ;  G.  E.  Underhill, 
The  Use  and  Abuses  of  Final  Causes  ;  /.  M.  Bentley,  The  Psychological 
Meaning  of  Clearness  ;  Critical  Notices  ;  New  Books  ;  Philosophical  Peri- 
odicals ;  Notes  and  Correspondence. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  XI,  3  :  H.  /.  Pearce,  The  Law  of  Attrac- 
tion in  Relation  to  some  Visual  and  Tactual  Illusions  ;  W.  R.  Wright,  The 
Relation  between  the  Vaso-Motor  Waves  and  Reaction  Times  ;  G.  T. 
Stevens,  On  the  Horopter  ;  C.  L.  Herrick,  The  Logical  and  Psychological 
Distinction  between  the  True  and  the  Real  ;  G.  A.  Tawney,  The  Period  of 
Conversion  ;  J.  M.  Baldwin,  The  Genetic  Progression  of  Psychic  Objects  ; 
Notes. 


494  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL  OF  ETHICS,  XIV,  3  ;  Felix  Adler,  The  Prob- 
lem of  Teleology  ;  J.  G.  James,  The  Ethics  of  Passive  Resistance  ;  W.  E. 
B.  DuBois,  The  Development  of  a  People  ;  C.  S.  Myers,  Is  Vivisection 
Justifiable?  J.  H.  Leuba,  Professor  William  James's  Interpretation  of 
Religious  Experience  ;  J.  H.  Muirhead,  Wordsworth's  Ideal  of  Early 
Education  ;  /.  C.  Murray,  What  Should  be  the  Attitude  of  Teachers  of 
Philosophy  towards  Religion  ?  A  Reply  ;  J.  Kindon,  Byron  versus  Spenser  ; 
Book  Reviews. 

THE  MONIST,  XIV,  3  :  Otto  Pfleiderer,  The  Christ  of  Primitive  Chris- 
tian Faith  ;  George  Gore,  The  Coming  Scientific  Morality  ;  Hans  Klein- 
peter,  The  Principle  of  the  Conservation  of  Energy  ;  H.  R.  Evans,  Madame 
Blavatsky  ;  J.  H.  Noble,  Psychology  on  the  '  New  Thought '  Movement ; 
TV.  Vaschide  and  G.  Binet-  Valmer,  The  Elite  of  Democracy  ;  Criticisms 
and  Discussions  ;  Book  Reviews. 

THE  HIBBERT  JOURNAL,  II,  3  :  Henry  Jones,  The  Moral  Aspect  of  the 
Fiscal  Question  ;  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  Suggestions  towards  the  Reinterpreta- 
tion  of  Christian  Doctrine  ;  H.  Henson,  The  Resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ ; 

W.  B.  Carpenter,  Gladstone  as  a  Moral  and  Religious  Personality  ; 
Andrew  Lang,  Mr.  Myers's  Theory  of '  The  Subliminal  Self ';  C.J.Keyser, 
The  Axiom  of  Infinity  ;  W.  J.  Brown,  The  Passing  of  Conviction  ;  Hugo 

Winckler,  North  Arabia  and  the  Bible  ;  Discussions  ;  Reviews. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  I,  5  :  R.  M.  Yerkes,  Variability  of 
Reaction-time  ;  Irving  King,  Recent  Works  on  Child  Psychology  and 
Education  ;  Psychological  Literature  ;  New  Books  ;  Notes  ;  Journals. 

I,  6  :  R.  M.  Ogden,  Memory  and  the  Economy  of  Learning  ;  M.  W. 
Calkins,  Voluntaristic  Psychology  ;  Recent  Experimental  Literature  ;  Dis- 
cussion and  Correspondence  ;  New  Books  ;  Notes  ;  Journals. 

THE  JOURNAL  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  PSYCHOLOGY,  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHODS, 
I,  6  :  A.  D,  Sorensen,  A  Criticism  of  Scientific  Method  as  Applied  by  Sociolo- 
gists ;  J.  A.  Leighton,  Pragmatism  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ; 
Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

I,  7  :  R.  B.  Perry,  Recent  Philosophical  Procedure  with  Reference  to 
Science  ;  John  Deivey,  Notes  upon  Logical  Topics,  II  ;  Discussion  ;  Reviews 
and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

I,  8  :  /.  H.  Tufts,  The  Social  Standpoint ;  Win.  Turner,  Recent  Liter- 
ature on  Scholastic  Philosophy  ;  Discussion  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of 
Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

1,9:  W.  B.  Pillsbury,  A  Suggestion  toward  a  Reinterpretation  of  Intro- 
spection ;  R.  MacDougall,  Recognition  and  Recall ;  W.  H.  Sheldon,  Defi- 
nitions of  Intensity  ;  Societies  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Jour- 
nals and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 


No.  4.]  NOTES.  495 

I,  10  :  C.  A.  Strong,  A  Naturalistic  Theory  of  the  Reference  of  Thought 
to  Reality  ;  W.  H.  Sheldon,  A  Study  of  Intensive  Facts  ;  Discussion  ; 
Societies  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ; 
Notes  and  News. 

ARCHIV  FUR  GESCHICHTE  DER  PHILOSOPHIE,  X,  3  :  Hobbes-Analekten  ; 
Paul  Ziertmann,  Ein  bisher  falschlich  Locke  zugeschriebener  Aufsatz 
Shaftesburys  ;  Alessandro  Chiappelli,  Uber  die  Spuren  einer  doppelten 
Redaktion  des  platonischen  Theaetets  ;  Paul  Tannery,  Sur  une  erreur 
mathematique  de  Descartes  ;  A.  Doring,  Die  beiden  Bacon  ;  Georg  Jaeger, 
Locke,  eine  kritische  Untersuchung  der  Ideen  des  Liberalismus  und  des 
Ursprungs  nationalokonomischer  Anschauungsformen  ;  A.  Hoffmann,  Die 
Lehre  von  der  Bildung  des  Universums  bei  Descartes  in  ihrer  geschicht- 
lichen  Bedeutung  ;  Jahresbericht. 

ARCHIV  FUR  SYSTEMATISCHE  PHILOSOPHIE,  X,  i  :  Erich  Adickes, 
Auf  wem  ruht  Kants  Geist  ?  Max  Dessoir,  Anschauung  und  Beschreibung  ; 
J.  N.  Szuman,  Der  Stoff  vom  philospphischen  Standpunkte  ;  Jahresbericht. 

VlERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT      FUR      WISSENSCHAFTLICHE     PHILOSOPHIE     UND 

SOZIOLOGIE,  XXVIII,  I  :  Demetrius  Gusti,  Egoismus  und  Altruismus,  I  ; 
Cay  von  Brockdorff,  Schopenhauer  und  die  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic, 
I  ;  W.  G.  Alexejejf,  Uber  die  Entwickelung  des  Begriffes  der  hohertn 
arithmologischen  Gesetzmassigkeit  in  Natur-  und  Geisteswissenschaften  ; 
Besprechungen  ;  Selbstanzeigen  ;  Philosophische  Zeitschriften  ;  Bibli- 
ographic. 

« 
KANTSTUDIEN,  IX,  i  und  2  :   O.  Liebmann,  Kant :  Zur  Erinnerung  an 

den  12.  Februar,  1804;  W.  Windelband,  Nach  hundert  Jahren  ;  E. 
Troeltsch,  Das  Historische  in  Kants  Religionsphilosophie  ;  F.  Neman, 
Immanuel  Kants  philosophisches  Vermachtnis  ;  B.  Bauch,  Die  Person- 
lichkeit  Kants  ;  F.  Staudinger,  Kants  Bedeutung  fur  die  Padagogik  der 
Gegenwart ;  E.  Kuhnemann,  Herder  und  Kant  an  ihrem  hundertjahrigen 
Todestage  ;  A.  Riehl,  Helmholtz  in  seinem  Verhaltnis  zu  Kant  ;  F.  Paul- 
sen,  Zum  hundertjahrigen  Todestage  Kants ;  G.  Runze,  Emerson  und 
Kant  ;  F.  A.  Schmid,  Kant  im  Spiegel  seiner  Briefe  ;  E.  v.  Aster,  Die 
neue  Kant-Ausgabe  und  ihr  erster  Band  ;  H.  Vaihinger,  Erklarung  der 
vier  Beilagen  ;  H.  Vaihinger,  An  die  Freunde  der  Kantischen  Philosophic. 

ZEITSCHRIFT  FUR  PSYCHOLOGIE  UND  PHYSIOLOGIE  DER  SINNESORGANE, 
XXXIV,  5  und  6 :  Leo  Hirschlaff,  Bibliographic  der  psycho-physiolo- 
gischen  Literatur  des  Jahres  1901  ;  Namenverzeichnis  der  Bibliographic  ; 
Namenregister. 

XXXV,  i :  H.  Feilchenfeld,  Uber  die  Sehscharfe  im  Flimmerlicht  ;  F. 
Kiesow,  Uber  die  einfachen  Reaktionszeiten  der  taktilen  Belastungsempfin- 
dung  ;  Beyer,  Beitrag  zur  Frage  der  Parosmie  ;  Literaturbericht. 

REVUE  DE  METAPHYSIQUE  ET  DE  MORALE,  XII,  2  :  Lewis  Prat,  Les 
derniers  entretiens  de  Charles  Renouvier  ;  F.  Colonna  d1  Istria,  Ce  que  la 


4  96  THE  PHIL  OSOPH1CAL  RE  VIE  IV. 

medecine  experimental  doit  a  la  philosophic  ;  L.  Couturat,  Les  principes 
des  mathematiques  ;  F.  Evellin,  La  Raison  et  les  Antinomies,  III  ;  A. 
Fouillee,  Le  '  devoir-faire '  et  le  '  devoir  '  ;  P.  Lacombe,  L'idee  de  patrie  ; 
Seconde  Congres  International  de  Philosophic  a  Geneve  ;  Livres  nouveaux  ; 
Revues  et  periodiques  ;  Theses  de  doctorat. 

REVUE  NEO-SCOLASTIQUE,  XI,  i  :  D.  Merrier,  La  liberte  d' indifference 
et  le  determinisme  psychologique  ;  J.  Halleux,  La  philosophic  d'  Herbert 
Spencer;  D.  Nys,  L'hylemorphisme  dans  le  monde  inorganique  ;  James 
Lindsay,  La  philosophic  de  St.  Thomas  ;  H.  Lebrun,  L'  Institut  Carnegie  ; 
A.  Pelzer,  Chronique  philosophique  ;  Comptes-rendus  ;  Ouvrages  envoyes 
a  la  Redaction  ;  Table  des  matieres  pour  1'annee  1903. 

REVUE  PHILOSOPHIQUE,  XXIX,  4  :  L.  Dauriac,  Le  testament  philo- 
sophique de  Renouvier  ;  F.  Rauh,  Science  et  conscience  ;  G.  Cantecor, 
La  science  positive  et  la  morale  (2e  et  dernier  article) ;  A.  Rey,  Les 
principes  philosophiques  de  la  chimie  physique  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  ren- 
dus  ;  Revue  des  periodiques  etrangers  ;  Correspondence. 

XXIX,  5  :  A.  Naville,  De  la  verite  :  remarques  logiques  ;  B.  Bourdon, 
La  perception  de  la  verticalite  de  la  tete  et  du  corps  ;  H.  Pi'eron,  La  con- 
ception generate  de  1' association  des  idees  et  les  donnees  de  1' experience  ; 
Vaschide,  La  conscience  des  agonisants  ;  Brunschivigg,  Vers  le  positivisme 
absolu  par  1'idealisme,  de  L.  Weber  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ;  Revue 
des  periodiques  etrangers  ;  Livres  nouveaux  ;  Necrologie. 

JOURNAL  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE  NORMALE  ET  PATHOLOGIQUE,  I,  3  ;  J.-J. 
Van  Biervliet,  La  mesure  de  1' intelligence  ;  G.  Durante,  Considerations 
generates  sur  la  structure  et  le  fonctionnement  du  systeme  nerveux  (Fin.)  ; 
A.  Mayer,  Influence  des  images  sur  les  secretions  ;  J.  Grasset,  La  peur, 
element-psychique  normal  de  defense  ;  Bibliographic. 

RIVISTA  FILOSOFICA,  VII,  i  \  A.  Faggi,  H.  Spencer  e  il  suo  sistema 
filosofico  ;  C.  Cantoni,  Uncapitolo  d'introduzionealla  '  Critica  della  Ragion 
pura '  di  E.  Kant  ;  E.  Juvalta,  La  dottrina  della  due  Etiche  di  H.  Spencer, 
I  ;  G.  Vidari,  Di  alcune  recenti  pubblicazioni  di  filosofia  morale  ;  Ras- 
segna  Bibliografica  ;  Notizie  e  Pubblicazioni  ;  Nel  primo  centenario  della 
morte  di  E.  Kant ;  Necrologio  ;  Sommari  delle  reviste  straniere  ;  Libri 
ricevuti. 

RIVISTA  DI  FILOSOFIA  E  SCIENZE  AFFINI,  I,  3-4  :  G.  Tarozzi,  Liberta  ; 
G.  de  Angelis,  Brano  di  Iogi9a  formale  della  geologia  ;  C.  Ranzoli,  La 
fortuna  di  Erberto  Spencer  in  Italia  ;  G.  del  Vecchio,  Diritto  e  personalita 
umana  nella  storia  del  pensiero  ;  F.  Moffa,  L'etica  di  Democrito  ;  G. 
Trespioli,  II  pensiero  giuridico  e  sociale  d1  Italia  nell'evo  moderno  ;  Ras- 
segna  di  filosofia  scientifica  ;  Rassegna  di  pedagogia  ;  Analisi  e  cenni  ; 
Notizie  ;  Sommari  di  riviste. 


Volume  XIII.  September,  1904.  Whole 

Number  5.  Number  77. 

THE 

PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW 


THE    INFINITE   NEW   AND    OLD. 

HO  the  technical  student  of  philosophy,  one  of  the  most  inter- 
esting and  important  parts  of  Professor  Royce's  recent 
book,  The  World  and  the  Individual,  is  the  discussion  of  the 
infinite  in  the  essay  supplementary  to  the  first  volume.1  This 
is  a  very  suggestive  piece  of  work,  and  whatever  one  may  think 
of  the  net  result  for  metaphysics,  one  must  admire  the  ingenuity 
with  which  Professor  Royce  applies  the  notion  of  a  self-repre- 
sentative system  to  the  philosophical  concept  of  the  infinite. 
For  my  own  part,  while  I  am  indebted  to  this  essay  for  directing 
my  attention  to  the  very  interesting  researches  of  Dedekind, 
Cantor,  Bolzano,  etc.,  I  am  not  convinced  that  we  have  thereby 
been  much  advanced  towards  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  an 
actually  infinite  and  absolute  mind,  or  that  much  light  has  been 
shed  on  the  interior  constitution  of  such  a  mind.  I  propose  first 
to  state  some  of  my  difficulties  in  regard  to  this  "  new  "  infinite  as 
a  preliminary  to  some  remarks  on  the  meaning  of  the  notion  of 
the  infinite  in  general. 

Self -representation  is  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  new 
infinite,  and  numberless  illustrations  can,  of  course,  be  offered  of 
self-representative  series.  For  example,  the  map  of  a  country, 
to  be  perfect,  must  contain  a  representation  of  the  spot  on  which  it 
itself  exists,  and,  hence,  a  representation  of  its  own  representation 
of  the  country,  again  a  representation  of  this  self-representation, 
etc.,  .  .  .  without  end.  A  picture-package  of  cereal,  to  be  perfect, 
must  have  a  picture  of  the  picture  on  the  package,  etc.,  .  .  .  with- 
out end.  More  abstract  illustrations  are  drawn  from  mathematics. 

1  See  also  Professor  Royce's  article  in  the  Hibbert  Journal,  Vol.  I,  No.  I. 

497 


498  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

In  general,  every  case  of  a  "  one-one  "  or  "  point-to-point  "  corre- 
spondence between  whole  and  part  gives  such  a  series.  The 
relation  here  is  said  to  be  one  of  similarity.  For  example,  the 
points  on  a  given  line  are  similar,  i.  e.,  stand  in  a  "one-one" 
relation  to  the  lines  drawn  through  a  given  point  and  meeting  the 
given  line.1  We  are  told  that  the  infinite  is  that  which  is  similar 
or  equivalent  to  a  proper  part  of  itself.  But  this  equivalence 
simply  consists  in  a  "  one-one  "  correspondence  of  elements.  Such 
a  correspondence  is  well  illustrated  by  simple  numerical  series. 
The  series  of  natural  numbers  and  the  series  of  even  numbers, 
1  +  24-3+4,  etc.,  and  2  +  4+6  +  8,  etc.,  are  both  infinite. 
In  the  second  series  there  is  a  term  corresponding  to  every  term 
in  the  first  series,  and  hence  the  relationship  between  the  two 
series  is  that  of  similarity  or  equivalence,  although  the  second 
series  is  part  of  the  first,  since  the  number  i  is  not  contained  in 
the  former.  Hence  we  have  here  a  perfect  similarity  of  whole 
and  part.  This  relationship  can  be  carried  out  so  as  to  produce 
an  infinite  number  of  correspondent  infinite  series,  respectively 
containing  and  contained,  by  writing  down  in  order  the  second, 
fourth,  sixth,  eighth,  etc.,  numbers  of  the  preceding  series.  In 
other  words,  the  law  of  production  of  an  infinite  number  of  series 
each  infinite  in  itself,  which  exist  in  a  relation  of  "  one-one " 
correspondence  or  equivalence,  is  here  perfectly  well-defined. 
The  infinite  is  a  clearly  defined  concept  in  the  sphere  of  numbers?" 
Dedekind  defines  the  concept  of  the  infinite  number-system  in 
this  way.  '  "  A  system  6*  is  said  to  be  infinite  when  it  is  similar 
to  a  proper  part  of  itself."  3  The  proof  that  there  exist  actually 
infinite  systems  is  drawn  from  the  mind's  power  of  self-represen- 
tation. "My  own  realm  of  thoughts,  i.  e.,  the  totality  5  of  all 
things,  which  can  be  objects  of  my  thought,  is  infinite.  For  if  s 
signifies  an  element  of  S,  then  is  the  thought  $',  that  s  can  be  the 
object  of  my  thought,  itself  an  element  of  >S.  If  we  regard  this 
as  transform  <p(s)  of  the  element  s  then  has  the  transformation 
<p  of  S,  thus  determined,  the  property  that  the  transform  S'  is 

1  Russell,  B.,  The  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Vol.  I,  pp.  305  f. 

2  For  further  illustrations  and  discussions  see  the  works  of  Royce  and  Russell  pre- 
^viously  cited. 

'Dedekind,  Essays  on  Number,  p.  63  (English  translation). 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD.  499 

part  of  5 ;  and  S'  is  certainly  proper  part  of  S,  because  there  are 
elements  of  5  (e.  g.,  my  own  Ego)  which  are  different  from  such 
thought  s'  and  therefore  are  not  contained  in  5'.  Finally  it  is 
clear  that  if  a,  b  are  different  elements  of  S,  their  transforms  a', 
b'  are  also  different,  that  therefore  the  transformation  <p  is  a  dis- 
tinct (similar)  transformation."  l,  "A  transformation  <p  of  a  sys- 
tem 5  is  said  to  be  similar  [ahnlich]  or  distinct,  when  to  different 
elements  a,  b  of  the  system  5  there  always  correspond  different 
transforms  a'  —  <p(a),  b'  =  ^>(£)"  ; 2  in  other  words,  when  there 
is  a  one-one  relation  between  the  parts  of  the  original  system 
and  the  parts  of  the  system  produced  by  transformation,  as  in 
the  illustrations  given  above  from  the  series  of  simple  numbers. 

Now  the  above  so-called  proof  of  the  actual  existence  of  infinite 
systems  is  simply  a  symbolical  way  of  stating  the  unlimited  self- 
reflective  or  self -mirroring  capacity  of  human  thought.  Instead  of 
proving  the  existence  of  an  infinite,  Dedekind  presupposes  that 
power  of  transcending  any  given  limit  to  which  philosophers  have 
often  called  attention  as  constituting  the  characteristic  infinitude 
of  human  self-consciousness.  /  do  not  know  the  totality  S  of  all 
things  which  can  be  objects  of  my  thought  as  an  actual  totality.  I 
do  know  that  I  can  reflect  on  or  think  the  thought  of  any  object  of 
my  thought,  and  I  presuppose  that  there  is  no  limit  to  my  thought 
and  hence  none  to  its  objects,  whether  these  be  primary  thoughts  or 
thoughts  of  thoughts,  etc.  The  so-called  actual  or  existential 
infinitude  of  any  thought-system  presupposes,  as  I  shall  maintain, 
the  eternity  of  the  thinking  mind.  All  these  arguments,  with  their 
illustrations  from  number-series  and  systems,  from  ideally  per- 
fect maps,  etc.,  show  nothing  more  than  the  potential  infinitude 
of  the  mind  as  this  is  revealed  in  thought's  power  of  continuous 
reflection  on  its  own  contents.  The  question  still  remains  open 
as  to  the  relation  of  this  infinitude  of  continuously  recurrent 
operations  of  self-conscious  thinking  to  existence  as  a  whole  and 
to  an  actually  infinite  and  absolute  mind. 

Further,  it  is  to  be  said  in  criticism  of  Dedekind's  proof,  that 
it  is  difficult  to  see  what  parts  of  system  5,  the  totality  of  things 

1  Dedekind,  op.  cit.,  p.  64. 
.  53. 


500  THE   PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

which  can  be  objects  of  my  thought,  can  be  outside  <p  (S)  or  S't 
i.  e.,  outside  the  transformation  of  5  wrought  by  the  reflection  that 
6"  can  be  the  object  of  my  thought.  Dedekind  says  that  the  thought 
of  my  own  Ego  is  not  subject  to  such  transformation.  But  so  soon 
as  I  attempt  to  think  distinctly  my  own  Ego  in  this  relation,  it 
becomes  a  part  of  the  totality. of  my  thoughts  on  which  I  can 
reflect,  i.  e.,  I  can  and  must  think  my  capacity  to  think  reflec- 
tively of  my  thought  as  itself  an  object  of  reflection.  As  soon 
as  my  Ego  is  distinctly  and  specifically  thought  about,  it  becomes 
subject  to  transformation  like  any  other  thought.  Until  it  is  so 
thought  about,  it  is  only  an  implicit  presupposition  of  thinking. 
This  presupposition  may  be  legitimate,  but  it  is  not  made  more 
so  by  Dedekind's  argumentation.  He  simply  assumes  that  the 
Ego's  unlimited  power  of  self-reflection  or  self-transcendence  is 
actually  realized  at  every  moment,  whereas  we  must  presuppose 
as  its  condition  the  existential  infinitude  of  the  thinker.  I  shall 
endeavor  to  show  that  this  existential  infinitude  is  something 
quite  different  from  potential  thought-systems,  and  that  it  is  the 
fundamental  condition  of  the  latter' s  validity.  The  self,  as  an 
object  of  thought,  is  but  one  thought-content  amongst  others. 
The  self  as  unreflected,  or,  in  Dedekind's  terms,  untransformed 
subject  is,  so  far  as  it  is  matter  of  direct  experience,  a  vague  feeling 
of  strain  of  attention,  emotional  tendency,  etc.  The  conversion  of 
this  feeling-self  into  that  which  may  be  called  an  object  of  thought 
is  its  transformation  into  an  empirical  content  of  consciousness 
subject  to  the  same  conditions  as  all  other  contents  of  consciousness, 
and  therefore  not  to  be  exempted  from  Dedekind's  process  of 
transformation.  The  Ego-thought  then  is  the  presupposition,  not 
the  proof,  of  the  existence  of  thought-systems  in  which  the  part 
is  similar  to  the  whole. 

Georg  Cantor,  in  his  discussions  of  the  subject,  makes  an  im- 
portant distinction  between  the  transfinite  and  the  absolutely 
infinite.  The  notion  of  the  transfinite  is  based  on  that  of  the 
smallest  definitely  fixed  number  which  is  greater  than  all  finite 
numbers.  This  notion  seems  to  be  equivalent  to  the  ordinary 
definition  of  the  infinite  for  the  purposes  of  the  calculus  as  that 
which  is  greater  than  any  assignable  quantity.  The  transfinite  is 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD.  5OI 

a  limit  which  finite  numbers  indefinitely  approach.  The  number 
of  finite  members  is  transfinite.  Call  this  number  «0,  then  there 
is  no  last  finite  number  before  «0.  The  transfinite  Cantor  also 
calls  the  created  infinite?-  It  is  capable  of  being  augmented 
(vermehrbar),  while  the  absolutely  infinite  (infinitum  aternum 
increatum)  cannot  be  augmented.  The  adoption  of  Cantor's  dis- 
tinction might  save  a  good  deal  of  confusion  in  the  discussion  of 
this  subject.  Cantor  says  that  the  transfinite  is  the  potentially 
infinite,  but  that  if  it  is  to  be  capable  of  strict  mathematical  treat- 
ment, it  presupposes  an  actual  infinite?1  He  gives,  however,  so  far 
as  I  know,  no  positive  determination  of  the  actual  infinite,  and  his 
discussion  does  not  carry  us  beyond  the  point  that  the  assumption 
of  an  actual  infinite  of  some  sort  may  be  implied  or  presupposed 
in  those  serial  operations  of  thought  in  number-systems  and 
other  self-representative  systems.  But  these  serial  operations 
themselves  all  fall  under  the  category  of  Cantor's  transfinite. 
We  have  in  all  these  cases  only  well-defined  laws  of  unending 
thought-operations.  We  are  still  in  the  dark  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  actual  infinite  and  its  existential  relation  to  our  minds. 

Couturat's  defence  of  the  infinite  in  his  Linfini  mathematique , 
cited  by  Professor  Royce,  seems  to  me  simply  to  vindicate  the 
infinite,  in  the  sense  above  defined,  as  a  logical  and  necessary 
function  of  thought  presupposed  in  mathematical  reasoning.  The 
logical  character  of  the  new  concept  of  the  infinite  perhaps  comes 
out  most  clearly  in  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell's  very  able  work,  The 
Principles  of  Mathematics.  Here  the  notion  of  the  infinite 
seems  to  be  removed  entirely  from  the  realm  of  quantity  into 
that  of  quality.  The  infinite  is  defined  by  him  purely  in  terms 
of  intensional  class-relations,  and  wholly  without  reference  to 
extension  or  enumeration.  "  The  definition  of  whole  and  part 
without  any  reference  to  enumeration  is  the  key  to  the  whole 
mystery."3  The  infinite  is  that  which  cannot  be  reached  by 
mathematical  induction  starting  from  I,  and  "it  is  that  which  has 
parts  which  have  the  same  number  of  terms  as  itself."  Now  this 
qualitative  definition  of  the  infinite  without  regard  to  enumera- 

1  Zeitschrift  fur  Philosophic,  Band  91,  pp.  105-111  ff. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  117. 

3  Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Vol.  I,  p.  361. 


502  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

tion  is  certainly  not  the  notion  present  to  the  lay  mind,  nor  even 
that  employed  in  ordinary  mathematics,  and  in  its  practical  appli- 
cations to  space  and  time.  In  the  light  of  this  new  conception, 
Mr.  Russell,  as  I  understand  his  arguments,  claims  to  remove 
the  difficulties  in  regard  to  the  infinitude  of  space  and  time,  i.  e., 
the  so-called  antinomies  of  Kant.  This  is  not  the  place  to  ex- 
amine Mr.  Russell's  doctrine  of  space  and  time.  But  the  space 
and  time  with  which  he  deals  can  hardly  be  the  space  and  time 
of  our  human  experience,  since  we  certainly  mean  by  the  infinite, 
as  applied  to  the  latter,  a  quantitative  infinite  involving  extension 
and  number.  How  we  can  know  without  reference  to  enumer- 
ation the  actual  existence  of  an  infinite  in  which  the  parts  have 
the  same  number  of  elements  as  the  whole,  I  do  not  quite  under- 
stand, and  if  the  true  infinite  must  be  conceived  entirely  without 
reference  to  enumeration,  the  relation  of  whole  and  part  must  be 
entirely  stripped  of  the  spatial  metaphor  which  so  persistently 
clings  to  our  thinking,  and  must  be  conceived  purely  in  terms  of 
intension  or  quality.  How  this  elimination  of  number  and  space, 
with  the  retention  of  the  relation  of  whole  and  part  as  analogous 
to  and  expressive  of  the  ultimate  relation  of  man  and  the  abso- 
lute, can  be  achieved  I  do  not  see.  And  therefore  I  am  not  able 
to  accept  the  new  concept  of  the  infinite  as  a  metaphysical 
illumination.1 

What  we  have  in  the  new  concept  of  the  infinite  is  the  defini- 
tion of  an  essential  quality  of  thought,  viz.,  the  capacity  of 
transcending  any  finite  limit  or  number.  In  the  definition,  "  any 
class  or  assemblage  which  is  infinite  is  similar  to  a  proper  part  of 
itself,"  we  have  a  symbolic  and  formal  expression  for  that  logical 
relation  of  the  mind  to  the  system  of  its  own  thoughts  which 
seems  to  be  implied  necessarily  by  the  mind's  own  power  of 

1  Mr.  Russell,  of  course,  makes  no  such  metaphysical  use  of  the  theory,  and  he  is 
enabled  to  assert  the  demonstrable  reality  of  infinite  systems  by  an  epistemology 
peculiar  to  himself  and  to  Mr.  G.  E.  Moore.  He  says  that  "  throughout  logic  and 
mathematics  the  existence  of  the  human  or  any  other  mind  is  totally  irrelevant,"  and 
"the  subject-matter  of  logic  does  not  presuppose  mental  processes,  and  would 
be  equally  true  if  there  were  no  mental  processes"  (Hibbert  Journal,  Vol.  II,  No. 
4,  p.  812).  I  confess  that  so  far  as  these  statements  have  any  meaning  to  me,  they 
seem  tantamount  to  asserting  that  truth  and  logic  are  material  entities,  unthought  and 
unthinking.  If  Mr.  Russell  is  right  every  argument  of  idealism  is  wrong. 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD.  503 

self-transcendence.  If  the  mind  be  eternal,  it  forever  transcends 
its  own  particular  thought-contents.  These,  as  a  potential  sys- 
tem, reflect  the  mind's  thinking  activity  and  yet  never  at  any 
moment  adequately  mirror  that  activity.  Is  it  not  plain  that 
actual  infinity  depends  on  the  relation  of  thought  to  time  ? 

So  far  we  have  not  gained  more  than  the  very  interesting  and 
significant  insight  that  our  minds  have  the  power  by  reflective 
thinking  to  transcend  their  existing  thought-contents,  and  to 
formulate  laws  for  the  production  of  endless  series  of  relations 
between  numbers  or  other  contents  of  thinking.  So  far,  indeed, 
our  minds  do  seem  to  transcend  their  own  existential  states  and 
imply  their  own  infinitude.  This  inherent  tendency  of  the  mind 
has  been  well  named  by  Poincare  the  axiom  of  infinity. 

But  while  this  new  mathematical  conception  affords  an  inter- 
esting and  important  illustration  of  thought's  power  to  transcend 
the  actual,  or,  as  I  have  otherwise  stated  it,  the  mind's  self-tran- 
scendence of  its  existential  states,  we  have  neither  a  new  proof  of 
an  actual  infinite  nor  a  new  insight  into  the  constitution  of  an 
infinite  and  absolute  mind.  The  whole  question  of  the  relation 
of  our  mathematical  reasoning  to  ultimate  reality  remains  open. 
The  "  new  "  concept  of  the  infinite  simply  gives  symbolic  expres- 
sion to  an  important  characteristic  of  human  thinking.  And  it 
is  in  other  quarters  that  the  problems  of  the  real  existence  and 
constitution  of  an  infinite  and  absolute  mind,  and  the  relation  of 
such  a  mind  to  our  apparently  finite  and  conditioned  existence, 
become  most  insistent  and  have  most  vital  import.  Nor  can 
appeal  be  made  at  this  point  to  Professor  Royce's  general  argu- 
ment from  the  internal  to  the  external  meaning  of  ideas.  For 
it  is  precisely  the  objective  or  existential  significance  of  these 
purely  abstract  thought-processes  that  is  in  question.  We  have 
a  law  or  concept  which  prescribes  the  rule  for  an  unending  opera- 
tion of  thought,  but  by  the  nature  of  the  case  this  operation  is 
never  actualized  as  human  experience.  We  may  not  affirm 
offhand  the  identity  of  thought  and  being.  We  may  legiti- 
mately assume  that  our  power  to  conceive  a  universe  of  thought- 
processes  as  infinite  in  an  infinite  number  of  ways  must  stand  in 
some  positive  relation  to  absolute  reality  —  that  it  must  be  some- 


504  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

how  included  in  the  latter.  But  precisely  what  this  relation  may 
be  is  an  entirely  different  question.  In  order  to  make  any  ad- 
vance towards  answering  the  question,  we  must  have  recourse  to 
other  considerations,  at  once  more  fundamental  and  far-reaching, 
than  iterative  processes  of  thought.  In  metaphysics  the  "new" 
infinite  does  not  advance  us  any  further  than  the  old  infinite. 
That  a  whole  which  is  similar  to  a  proper  part  of  itself  is 
infinite  does  not  tell  us  there  is  actually  such  a  whole  outside 
the  mathematician's  thinking.  The  "new"  infinite  brings  no 
new  insight  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  reality  or  man's  place 
in  reality. 

But  let  us  admit  for  the  moment  that  a  self-representative 
series  is  the  true  type  of  the  actual  infinite.  Now  an  absolute 
mind,  perfect  and  self-sufficient  in  knowledge,  in  power,  etc., 
must  transcend  time  and  change.  The  experience  of  the  abso- 
lute must  be  indivisible  and  timeless  —  a  totum  simul.  What 
insight  does  the  new  concept  of  the  infinite  give  us  into  the 
nature  of  an  indivisible  experience  in  which  is  neither  variable- 
ness nor  shadow  of  turning  ?  This  new  concept  furnishes  us 
with  a  determinate  law  or  rule  according  to  which  we  may  carry 
out  without  limit  an  iterative  process  of  thinking,  but  it  is  now 
and  forever  a  process.  Professor  Royce  and  others  lay  stress  on 
the  well-defined  character  or  determinateness  of  the  new  infinite 
series,  in  contrast  with  the  indeterminateness  and  negativity  of 
the  old  concept  of  the  infinite  as  a  "  boundless  contiguity  of 
shade,"  a  sort  of  penumbral  envelope  of  the  finite  in  space  and 
time.  And  it  is  quite  true  that  in  the  notions  of  infinite  series, 
etc.,  we  are  given  definite  prescriptions  for  unending  thought- 
sequences.  Nevertheless,  in  order  that  the  sequences  may  be 
conceived  as  actually  realized,  we  must  presuppose  a  mind  eter- 
nally thinking  according  to  the  prescription.  And  the  separate 
recurrent  acts  of  thought,  being  events  in  a  mind,  seem  to  involve 
time.  The  actuality  of  these  infinite  series  presupposes  an  existent 
eternal  mind.  All  we  are  entitled  to  say  in  the  premises  is  that 
if  a  mind  persist  throughout  what  we  call  time,  it  can  go  on 
thinking  these  determinate  series  ad  libitum.  But  the  vital  con- 
ditions of  such  a  timeless  or  time-transcending  existence  may 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD.  505 

be  quite  irrelevant  to  self-representative  series  in  mathematics  or 
picture  packages  of  cereal. 

Furthermore,  by  this  road  we  never  seem  to  get  any  nearer 
fatf.  single  indivisible  timeless  experience  or  totum  simul  which  our 
absolute  mind  must  have.  The  type  of  all  self-representative  series 
or  chains  (Kette)  is  the  selfs  own  representation  of  its  thoughts. 
I  may  go  on  indefinitely  thinking  my  experience,  thinking  the 
thought  of  my  experience,  etc.,  etc.,  but  my  own  Ego  eludes  my 
reflection  and  my  thought  never  attains  complete  self-representa- 
tion in  a  single  act  of  insight.  Therefore,  it  is  argued,  my  thought 
is  infinite.  But  in  truth  the  infinitude  here  is  incompletion  for- 
ever seeking  completion.  Never  at  a  single  blow  do  I  penetrate 
entirely  my  experience  and  see  in  one  pellucid  interval  the  thinker 
and  the  thought.  So  far  is  the  new  infinite  from  furnishing  in 
this  regard  a  positive  conception,  in  contrast  to  the  old  negative 
conception,  that  it  is  rather  drawn  from  a  limitation  of  human 
self-consciousness.  If  advanced  as  the  archetype  and  pattern  of 
an  absolute  experience,  it  appears  to  be  open  to  Hegel's  objec- 
tion against  leere  Wiederholung.  And  the  difficulty  is  not  met  by 
pointing  to  the  fact  of  apparently  timeless  experiences  of  series. 
For  example,  while  we  do  doubtless  experience  in  some  sense  in 
a  single  instant  the  succession  involved  in  a  musical  phrase,  we 
do  not  experience  the  music  at  once  in  the  same  sense  in  which 
we  experience  it  in  actual  succession.  I  do  not  deny  that  we 
have  apparently  timeless  experiences,  nor  that  truth  has  a  time- 
less aspect.  But  I  do  not  see  that  the  infinite  series  and  systems 
of  the  '  new '  infinite  are  actually  given  or  present  as  totalities  in 
timeless  instants.  The  only  timeless  element  is  the  law  or  princi- 
ple of  formation.  The  realization  of  the  series  involves  an  actual 
succession  or  time  sequence  in  thought,  and  all  that  is  required 
to  account  for  the  apparent  simultaneity  in  the  experience  of  ele- 
ments in  a  series  is  continuity  of  movement,  a  "smooth  passage 
of  ideas."  The  apparent  simultaneity  or  instantaneousness  in 
the  experience  of  series,  then,  does  not  entitle  one  to  assert  off- 
hand that  here  we  have  eternity  and  an  absolute  mind,  or  that  we 
have  been  let  wholly  into  the  secret  of  a  totum  simul  experience. 

In  the  metaphysical  application  of  the  new  concept  of  the  in- 


506  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

finite,  great  stress  is  laid  on  the  peculiar  relation  of  whole  and  part 
afforded  by  it.  This  relation  is  regarded  as  furnishing  a  key  to 
the  relation  of  the  apparently  finite  human  self  to  the  Absolute. 
The  whole  is  similar  to  the  part,  the  part  is  equivalent  to  the 
whole,  since  to  every  element  in  the  whole  corresponds  an  ele- 
ment in  the  part.  Professor  Royce  says  the  part  equals  the 
whole.  But  this  is  not  equality  in  the  ordinary  quantitative 
sense.  It  is  only  a  logical  relation  of  one-one  correspondence. 
The  relationship  may  be  called  one  of  similarity,  equivalence, 
one-one  correspondence,  etc.,  but  it  is  certainly  not  equality  in 
its  ordinary  meaning.1  This  extraordinary  sort  of  equality  has  no 
intelligible  bearing  on  the  relation  between  my  will  and  an  infinite 
will,  between  my  struggling  temporal  life  and  this  eternal  and 
unvarying  life,  between  my  experience  conditioned  by  change 
and  error  and  an  eternally  complete  and  indivisible  experience. 

In  short,  these  iterative  processes  of  human  thinking,  defined 
by  the  new  infinite,  significant  and  suggestive  of  a  timeless  thinker 
though  they  be,  neither  prove  the  reality  nor  clearly  illuminate 
the  inward  constitution  of  an  absolute  mind  or  self,  which  must 
somehow  have  a  timeless,  if  perfect  and  indivisible,  experience. 
Must  not  such  a  mind  know  all  things  in  a  radically  different 
way  from  our  minds  ?  Must  not  even  the  infinite  number  of 
infinite  series  present  themselves  differently  in  an  absolute  mind, 
if  they  present  themselves  to  it  at  all  ?  And  what  can  be  the 
connection  between  an  infinite  mind,  which  occupies  itself  ever  in 
thinking  numerical  and  other  forms  of  self-representative  relations, 
and  a  supreme  Self,  regarded  as  sustaining  human  ideals,  as 
making  possible  the  fulfilment  of  specific  human  and  practical 
purposes,  and  as  conserving  the  complex  and  uniquely  signifi- 
cant lives  of  human  persons.  The  eternal  play  of  an  endless  ap- 
proximative or  asymptotic  series  of  attempts  at  self- representation, 
or  the  notion  of  limitless  serial  orders,  does  not  seem  to  be  con- 
nected in  any  intelligible  fashion  with  the  existence  of  a  multitude 
of  imperfect  and  developing  sentient  beings.  Such  a  play  of 
purely  abstract  thought-relations  scarcely  affords  a  satisfactory 

1  Sir  Oliver  Lodge  has  pointed  out  this  fallacy  in  the  Hibbert  Journal,  Vol.  I, 
No.  2,  pp.  351  ff. 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD. 

foundation  for  human  endeavor,  or,  indeed,  for  the  growth  of  con- 
crete knowledge.  No  positive  relation  has  been  shown  to  exist 
between  the  "  new  "  infinite  and  the  actual  conditions  of  human 
action  or  common  experience.  Do  we  get  from  the  "  new  " 
infinite  any  light  on  the  place  of  our  temporal  activities  in  the 
universe  ?  I  fear  not.  If  the  notion  of  the  infinite  is  to  have  any 
vital  meaning  at  all  we  must  approach  it  from  some  other  quarter 
than  that  of  abstract  and  symbolic  logical  operations  developed 
in  that  department  of  science  which  is  admittedly  most  remote 
from  actual  experience,  and  in  which  the  very  abstractness  and 
aloofness  from  the  conditions  and  structure  of  concrete  experi- 
ence make  possible  these  new  and  beautiful  formulas  of  serial 
order,  etc.  We  are  expressly  informed,  e.  g.,  by  Mr.  Russell, 
that  mathematical  space  can  be  constructed  by  an  order  of  points, 
entirely  without  reference  to  the  sensuous  space-intuition  of  actual 
experience. 

The  notion  of  a  perfect  self  or  absolute  mind,  if  it  is  to  have 
any  real  meaning  for  us  humans,  must  be  determined  by  reference 
to  the  more  significant  aspects  of  human  life.  The  infinite  must 
be  interpreted  in  terms  of  the  fundamental  activities  and  ideals  of 
the  concrete  human  self,  and  here  at  once  we  are  faced  by  the 
antithesis  between  the  temporal  and  the  eternal,  between  the 
striving  and  growing  and  the  perfect  and  complete.  What  is  the 
relation  of  the  human  will  to  the  Absolute  as  will  ?  What  is  the 
relation  of  human  deeds  and  sentiments  and  thoughts  to  the 
entire  system  of  things  ?  Here  we  face  a  central  difficulty,  and, 
indeed,  I  am  disposed  to  think,  the  supreme  problem  of  syste- 
matic philosophy.  If  we  could  determine  the  place  of  our 
temporal  experiences  and  efforts  in  the  ultimate  reality,  if  we 
could  in  thought  lay  hold  on  the  permanently  significant  in  these 
experiences  and  efforts  and  see  the  ultimate  goal  and  meaning  of 
personal  growth  and  of  cosmic  change,  the  problem  of  philosophy 
would  be  solved,  and  the  "infinite"  would  cease  to  trouble  us. 
But  the  new  concept  of  the  infinite  does  not  advance  us  a  single 
definitive  step  further  towards  the  solution  of  these  problems. 
We  ask  for  bread  and  we  are  offered  a  stone. 

After  all    these  negations,  I  venture  with  hesitation  to  offer 


508  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

some  positive  considerations  on  the  meaning  of  the  infinite  ;  and, 
in  so  doing,  I  would  remind  the  reader  that  the  new  concept  of 
the  infinite  has  already  been  recognized  as  a  clear  and  beautiful 
illustration  of  the  mind's  power  of  self -transcendence.  In  the  first 
place,  we  must  distinguish  carefully  between  the  potential  infini- 
tude of  human  thought,  which  is  but  another  name  for  the  above- 
mentioned  quality  of  self-transcendence,  and  existential  or  actual 
infinitude.  The  latter  quality  we  may  suppose  to  belong  to  an 
absolute  being  or  ens  perfectissimum. 

The  human  mind  we  know  to  be  infinite  only  in  promise  and 
potency.  We  may  perhaps  assume  that  this  promise  and  potency 
has  somehow  its  roots  in  an  actual  infinite,  that  the  capacity  for 
transcending  its  existential  conditions,  for  going  beyond  the  data 
of  experience  and  transforming  the  latter  under  the  guidance  of 
norms  or  ideal  values  which  the  human  self  displays  both  in 
theoretical  thinking  and  in  practical  endeavor  and  preeminently 
in  the  very  discussion  of  its  own  final  destiny,  may  entitle  us  to 
assume  that  these  ideal  values  are  evidences  of  the  presence  un- 
awares of  the  actual  angel  of  the  infinite  and  perfect  in  the  mind 
of  man.  But  such  considerations  hardly  furnish  a  gnostic  insight 
into  the  synthesis  of  finite  and  infinite. 

Positively  regarded,  the  actual  or  existential  infinite  is  a  limit- 
ing notion  like  v/2.  We  indefinitely  approximate  to  it  in  our 
thinking  and  doing,  but  under  present  conditions  we  do  not 
actually  comprehend  it  or  attain  unto  it.  We  may  conceive  this 
existential  infinite  as  the  ideal  limit  of  thought  and  volition.  It 
is  not  present  to  our  minds  as  boundless  in  space  or  endless  in 
time,  but  rather  as  the  complete  and  perfect,  transcending  space 
and  time.  The  infinite,  then,  in  this  sense,  is  the  goal  of  thinking 
and  of  practical  endeavor.  It  is  really  the  limiting  notion  of 
the  indefinite  series  of  thoughts,  aspirations,  and  deeds  in  which 
we  strive  to  approach  and  realize  the  ideally  perfect  or  Absolute. 
This  series  seems  to  us  now,  as  we  look  before  and  after,  to  be 
endless.  And  just  as  a  life  is  presented  in  the  successive  steps 
of  its  development,  and  a  supreme  end  is  unfolded  in  the  succes- 
sive steps  towards  its  fulfilment,  we  may  presuppose  the  actual 
infinite  to  be  inherently  involved  in  our  approximations  towards 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD.  509 

it.  But  when  we  think  of  the  goal  or  end  as  a  reality  now,  the 
actual  infinite  becomes  the  limit  of  our  apparent  infinitude  of 
thought,  feeling,  and  action.  And  our  apparent  infinitude  is  the 
possibility  of  indefinite  continuance  in  thought,  deed,  etc. 

In  knowing  a  limit  we  transcend  it  and  set  it  further  on.  This 
self-transcendence,  whether  it  be  in  acquiring  knowledge  or  in  the 
deeds  which  go  to  make  character,  is  at  once  a  negation  and  an 
affirmation.  We  negate  that  which  is  for  us  now,  as  attained,  in 
seeking  to  transcend  it.  We  affirm  that  which  is  not  but  is  to  be. 
In  setting  forward  the  limit  or  goal,  we  at  once  confess  the  present 
unreality  for  us  of  that  which  we  seek,  and  we  postulate  its  reality 
as  that  unto  which  we  may  attain.  There  is  here  a  dialectic 
which  involves  the  mutual  implication  of  the  finite  and  the  infinite. 
The  existentially  finite  human  spirit  is  potentially  infinite.  But 
it  cannot  be  even  potentially  infinite  unless  its  repeated  self-trans- 
cendence is  grounded  on  a  reality  which  is  the  common  basis  of 
finite  and  infinite.  The  infinite  as  actual  now  appears  beyond  the 
finite  self.  It  is  at  once  the  goal  and  the  presupposition  of  the 
incessant,  self-transcending  efforts  of  the  human  spirit  in  thought 
and  deed,  i.  e.,  in  the  very  concrete  pulse  and  movement  of  life 
itself. 

If  we  should  come  to  possess  the  infinite  in  very  truth,  if  we 
should,  by  the  falling  away  of  the  veil  of  time,  apprehend  as  it 
really  is  that  which  we  now  call  the  infinite,  it  would  no  doubt 
at  once  seem  both  strange  and  familiar.  We  should  no  longer 
feel  our  own  finitude  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  merely  infinite 
would  no  longer  mean  anything  to  us.  As  the  attained  goal  of 
hitherto  indefinite  endeavor,  the  infinite  would  be  transformed 
into  a  more  positive  and  satisfying  reality.  In  truth  the  goal  is 
not  infinite.  It  is  more  concrete  and  individual.  It  must  be  a 
reality  which  transcends  the  opposition  of  finite  and  infinite  en- 
gendered by  the  temporal  character  of  our  present  activities. 
Now  it  appears  to  us  as  a  terminus  or  limit,  just  as  v/2,  although 
not  in  itself  infinite,  is  a  limit  which  is  approached  by  an  infinite 
series  of  numbers.  This  is  the  paradox  of  the  infinite,  viz.,  that 
the  fruition  of  our  experiences  and  the  fulfilment  of  our  purposes, 
in  other  words,  the  actual  attainment  or  possession  of  infinitude, 


510  THE    PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

would  mean  the  complete  evanescence  of  the  notion  of  an  infinite. 
In  so  far  as  we  attain  to,  or  apprehend,  perfection  and  the  completed 
reality  in  any  fundamental  activity  of  life,  for  the  nonce  at  least, 
the  contrast  between  our  existential  finitude  and  the  hitherto  in- 
definitely distant  goal  or  limit  of  our  striving  falls  away.  We 
feel  the  presence  of  an  Absolute,  and  the  infinite  is  lost  in  being 
attained,  since  our  state  of  being  then  seems  wholly  throbbing 
with  the  positive  and  the  actual.  Hence  the  very  notion  of  an 
infinite  springs  out  of  a  present  consciousness  of  impermanence 
and  imperfection  which  seeks  ever  the  permanent  and  perfect. 

The  notion  of  the  infinite  has  for  life  and  religion  the  signifi- 
cance of  a  limiting  concept.  In  this  respect,  it  is  akin  to  the  notion 
of  God ;  and,  like  the  latter,  it  represents  in  religious  feeling  and 
metaphysical  speculation  the  craving  for  completeness,  i.  e.,  time- 
less perfection.  Therefore,  the  positive  content  of  our  notion  of 
the  infinite  is  to  be  derived  from  the  chief  or  fundamental  direc- 
tions or  tendencies  in  which  feeling  and  thought  seek  complete- 
ness with  reference  to  life  as  a  totality.  The  infinite  is  the  limit- 
ing notion  or  point  of  fulfilment  for  certain  fundamental  tenden- 
cies of  the  human  spirit  in  relation  to  the  conditions  of  its  life 
and  activity.  I  shall  endeavor  in  the  space  left  to  indicate  very 
summarily  the  meaning  of  the  infinite  in  the  chiefest  of  these 
relations.  We  are  dealing  here  simply  with  tendencies  of  the 
life-process  in  the  human  self. 

The  infinite,  in  relation  to  existence  in  time,  is  not  the  endless 
but  the  timeless,  i.  e.,  its  being  and  life  are  not  in  any  sense  epi- 
sodes in  time,  are  neither  increased  nor  diminished,  nor  in  anyway 
realized  in  subjection  to  temporal  conditions  ;  and  yet,  of  course, 
since  the  infinite  is  a  limiting  concept  standing  in  relation  to  our 
finite  lives,  the  temporal  life  of  man  and  the  course  of  history 
must  have  positive  significance  in  relation  to  the  timeless  infinite, 
and  be  somehow  taken  up  into  the  thought  and  vitally  connected 
with  the  activity  of  the  latter.  But  this  starts  a  very  difficult 
problem,  perhaps  insoluble,  and  I  cannot  attempt  even  to  deal 
with  it  here.  In  relation  to  space,  the  true  infinite  is  not  the  in- 
definitely boundless  but  that  which  is  limited  to  no  space  and  is 
indeed  the  ultimate  limit  of  space-conditions  of  existence.  Here 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD.  511 

again,  of  course,  conditions  of  finite  existence  must  have  some 
positive  significance  for  the  infinite. 

In  relation  to  knowledge,  an  infinite  consciousness  means, 
primarily,  not  the  capacity  to  think  in  serial  order,  but  to  pene- 
trate directly  and  immediately  the  obstinate  facts  of  experience 
which  are  to  us  opaque,  and  into  which  we  gain  insight  only 
slowly  and  by  constant  effort.  An  infinite  intellect  must  be  intui- 
tive, i.  e.,  the  contents  of  its  own  immediate  consciousness  and  all 
forms  and  sorts  of  existence  must  be  present  to  its  thought 
luminously,  instantaneously,  and  continuously.  To  such  an  in- 
tellect, all  objects  of  thought  are  as  clear  in  every  relation  as  if 
directly  created  by  itself.  But  we  do  not  need  to  assume  that  it 
has  no  objects  of  thought  or  experience  that  are  not  directly 
created  by  itself.  We  need  not  assert,  in  order  to  admit  the  reality 
of  an  absolute  self,  that  there  is  in  the  universe  only  one  thinker  or 
doer.  Of  course,  we  do  not  understand  from  our  own  experience 
the  inner  constitution  of  such  an  infinite  intuitive  intellect.  But 
if,  as  I  have  maintained,  the  infinite  is  a  limiting  concept,  we  must 
be  satisfied  to  determine  negatively  its  meaning  in  this  relation, 
i.  e.,  as  the  limiting  condition  of  thought  and  knowledge  in  us. 

In  relation  to  goodness,  an  infinite  will  must  be  devoid  of  all 
inherent  temptation  or  struggle.  There  can  be  in  such  a  will  no 
gap  between  purpose  and  achievement,  no  interval  between  will 
and  deed,  and  no  conflict  of  desires.  In  other  words,  a  goodness 
positively  infinite  transcends  the  human  moral  struggle.  The 
infinitely  good  is  the  limiting  notion  of  the  humanly  good.  The 
latter  approaches  the  former  as  goodness  becomes  second  nature, 
as  it  passes  from  self-conscious  struggle  and  choice  into  moral 
habitude,  and  good  conduct  becomes  the  spontaneous  expression 
of  '  good  feeling.' x  The  opposing  concepts  of  duty  and  inclina- 
tion, then,  have  no  direct  application  to  the  action  of  an  infinitely 
good  will.  The  infinite  or  final  limit  of  our  consciously  sought 
moral  goodness  is  a  state  of  volition  other  and  higher  than  itself. 
This  other  seems  to  be  what  the  Christian  means  by  infinite  love. 
The  attainment  of  an  infinite  goodness  would  be  its  transforma- 

lCf.  Professor  Palmer,  "The  Three  Stages  of  Goodness"  in  his  Nature  of 
Goodness. 


512  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

tion  into  a  higher  and  spontaneous  state  of  action  in  harmony 
with  reality.  The  infinitely  good  is  that  goal  of  our  moral 
endeavor  which  sets  the  limit  to  our  struggles.  But  here  again 
we  know  not  how  many  efforts  lie  between  us  and  the  goal. 
Perfect  goodness,  being  indefinitely  removed  from  our  present 
attainments,  we  call  infinite. 

In  relation  to  power,  the  infinite  must  be  the  wholly  self-active. 
Its  action  can  in  no  way  be  originated  or  called  forth  by  any 
power  hostile  to  or  underived  from  itself.  This  action  can  be 
permanently  obstructed  by  no  obstacle  which  it  does  not  itself 
set  up  or  allow  (the  human  will,  for  example,  might  conceivably 
obstruct  the  Divine  will,  but  if  the  latter  were  infinite  in  power, 
we  should  have  to  assume  that,  from  the  depths  of  its  ethical 
nature  as  love,  the  Divine  will  consented  to  this  obstruction  as  a 
condition  of  human  moral  freedom).  No  sort  of  being  could  be 
said  to  possess  infinite  power  unless  it  were  the  creative  source 
of  all  power.  But  an  infinite  ethical  power  might2  give  rela- 
tively independent  power  to  created  or  finite  wills.  Indeed, 
unless  we  admit  in  the  infinite  power  or  will  the  reality  of  self- 
limitation,  it  follows  that  there  is  only  one  truly  active  being  in 
the  universe,  and  that  we  finite  doers  are  absorbed  in  the  infinite 
doer.  This  conception  would  make  the  realization  of  the  infinite 
the  absolute  negation  of  the  finite.  The  synthesis  of  finite  and 
infinite  would  be  that  of  the  lamb  and  the  wolf.  But  if  one  start 
from  the  assumption  of  a  reality  in  the  finite  and  individual,  the 
notion  of  infinite  power  must  be  subordinated  to  that  of  infinite 
love  or  ethical  will.  Otherwise,  the  ground  is  cut  from  under 
one's  feet,  the  potential  infinitude  of  the  human  self  is  denied, 
and  we  are  plunged  into  the  inane.  There  is  a  dialectic  here 
which  can  only  be  overcome  by  recognizing  that  omnipotence  is 
a  notion  to  be  transcended,  and  that  it  merely  represents  for  us 
the  limit  beyond  our  indefinite  consciousness  of  power  in  our- 
selves and  the  world. 

I  have  here  tried  to  indicate  very  briefly  the  meanings  of  a 
notion  which  has  its  deepest  roots  in  the  moral  and  religious  life 
and  in  the  accompanying  metaphysical  craving,  rather  than  in 

2 1  should  say  must  if  this  were  a  systematic  discussion  in  the  philosophy  of  religion. 


No.  5.]  THE  INFINITE  NEW  AND    OLD.  513 

pure  thought.  The  new  infinite  of  symbolic  logic  and  mathe- 
matics illustrates  clearly  from  the  side  of  pure  thought  the  mind's 
self-transcendence  of  the  actual ;  and  to  this  extent  it  shows  pure 
thought  to  be  in  harmony  with  ethical  and  religious  feeling  and 
speculation.  But  whether  such  notions  are  more  than  perennial 
illusions  of  the  human  mind,  whether  reality  ultimately  meets 
these  demands  of  feeling  and  action  as  well  as  of  thought,  must 
be  decided  on  other  and  more  fundamental  considerations.  The 
problem  of  the  place  of  the  developing  human  self  and  of  change  in 
general  in  the  universe,  still  remains  the  central  problem  to  which 
the  notion  of  the  infinite  is  auxiliary  and  supplemental. 

However  one  may  try  to  answer  this  metaphysical  question,  I 
venture  to  assert  that  the  most  positive,  comprehensive,  and 
fruitful  notion  of  the  infinite  is  that  of  the  ideal  limit  of  actual 
human  thoughts,  feelings,  and  deeds.  But  this  invites  the 
further  and  paradoxical  conclusion  that  the  infinite  has  signifi- 
cance for  us  only  so  long  as  we  fall  short  of  perfection,  and  that 
perfection  once  achieved,  the  notion  of  the  infinite  must  vanish 
from  thought. 

Here,  on  the  threshold  of  metaphysics,  the  present  discussion 
must  end,  and  I  will  only  say  in  conclusion  that  if  the  term  in- 
finite is  to  continue  to  be  used  in  philosophical  and  theological 
discussion,  a  sharp  distinction  must  be  made  between  the  potential 
and  the  actual  infinites,  i.  e.,  between  the  infinite  as  the  law  or 
principle  of  serial  order,  etc.,  in  human  thinking,  and  the  infinite 
as  the  absolute  limit  or  fruition  of  human  striving.  This  dis- 
tinction is  the  same  as  that  expressed  in  Cantor's  terms,  the 
"  transfinite  "  and  the  "  absolutely  infinite."  The  new  notion  of 
the  infinite  in  its  application  to  metaphysics  seems  to  fluctuate 
between  these  two  meanings. 

J.  A.  LEIGHTON. 

HOBART  COLLEGE. 


ON  THE  CATEGORIES  OF  ARISTOTLE. 

THE  little  treatise  of  Aristotle  which  stands  at  the  head  of 
the  Organon  has  caused  a  great  deal  of  difficulty  to  stu- 
dents, both  ancient  and  modern.  The  bulk  of  the  discussion  has 
centered  about  the  question  of  its  place  in  the  Organon  and  in 
Aristotle's  system,  and  the  character  of  the  ten  categories  to 
which  the  greater  part  of  the  book  is  devoted.  But  there  have 
been  found  also  critics  who  expressed  a  doubt  as  to  the  authen- 
ticity of  all  or  part  of  the  treatise  in  question.  To  say  nothing 
of  the  ancient  commentators  of  Aristotle,  the  earliest  attempt  in 
modern  times  to  cast  a  doubt  on  the  genuineness  of  the  work 
seems  to  be  that  of  Spengel  in  Munchener  Gelehrte  Anzeigen, 
1845,  Vol.  XX,  No.  5,  pp.  41  sq.  He  was  followed  by  Prantl 
in  Zeitschrift fur  Alterthumswissenschaft,  1 846,  p.  646,  and  in  his 
Geschichte  der  Logik,  I,  p.  90,  Note.  5,  also  by  Valentinus  Rose  in 
De  Aristotelis  librorum  ordine  et  auctoritate,  p.  234  sq.  Zeller, 
on  the  other  hand  (Philos.  d.  Griechen,  second  edition,  II,  pt.  2, 
p.  67,  note  i),  decides  in  favor  of  the  genuineness  of  the  first  part 
of  the  work,  the  Categories  proper,  and  against  the  so-called 
Postprcedicamenta  from  ch.  x  to  the  end. 

Before  I  take  up  the  examination  of  the  evidence  adduced 
by  the  scholars  just  mentioned,  it  is  important  that  I  dispose  of 
an  erroneous  statement  which  has,  to  my  knowledge,  remained 
unchallenged  from  the  time  it  was  written  down  by  Brandis  in 
1833  to  this  day.  I  refer  to  his  article  in  AbhdL  d.  Berlin. 
Akademie,  1833,  entitled  "Ueber  die  Reihenfolge  der  Bucher 
des  Aristotelischen  Organons,"  etc.  He  there  (p.  257)  argues 
that  the  Topics  was  written  before  the  Categories,  for  in  the 
former  (VII,  6,  p.  I53a  36)  we  find  the  statement  Ineedi]  dvdfxy 
ra  ivavTta  Iv  T(fi  abrw  y  Iv  roTc  ivavrlotz  fsvsaiv  elvcu,  whereas 
in  the  Categories  (ch.  1 1,  p.  I4a  19)  the  theory  of  IvavTta  reached 
a  more  developed  stage  and  the  case  is  stated  as  follows : 
de  ndvra  rd  ivavTta.  y  lu  TCJJ  aurqj  yivzi.  eJvae  y  ^v  roT 

)  rj  aura  ryevrj  elvai ;  i.  e.,  opposites  must  be  either  in  the  same 
5H 


THE   CATEGORIES  OF  ARISTOTLE. 

genus  or  in  opposite  genera,  or  be  themselves  genera.  The  addi- 
tion of  the  third  possibility  in  the  Categories,  which  was  omitted 
in  the  Topics,  is,  to  Brandis,  a  proof  of  the  priority  of  the  latter. 

Waitz  (Org.,  I,  p.  266),  fearing  that  yielding  this  point  would 
make  it  easier  for  the  critics  to  attack  the  authenticity  of  the 
Categories,  cannot  answer  it  otherwise  than  by  dividing  the  Post- 
prcedicamenta  from  the  first  part,  and  while  giving  up  the  latter 
to  Brandis  to  do  with  it  as  is  right  in  his  eyes,  saves  the  kernel  of 
the  treatise  from  attack  —  "  quae  feruntur  Postpraedicamenta  ab 
ipso  Aristotele  Categoriis  adjecta  esse  haud  probabile  est." 

In  the  case  of  Brandis,  it  looks  very  much  as  if  his  argument 
was  the  result  of  a  chance  lighting  on  the  particular  passage 
above  quoted ;  and  if  by  chance  he  had  hit  instead  on  p.  12/b  10, 
Ixeedrj  ™  SvavTia  iv  roTc  ^vavr/orc  fevsovv,  we  may  presume  his 
argument  would  have  been  considered  still  stronger  as  showing 
the  Topics  to  be  two  steps  behind  the  Categories. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  we  find  this  threefold  classifica- 
tion of  Ivavria  fully  developed  in  the  Topics  and  with  more 
definiteness  and  detail  than  in  the  Categories,  and  it  is  strange 
that  it  should  have  escaped  Waitz. 

P.  I23b  i  sq.,  Aristotle  points  out  how  we  can  examine  the 
correctness  of  a  given  genus  by  reference  to  opposite  species. 
If  a  given  species  of  which  the  genus  is  in  question  has  an  oppo- 
site, then  the  investigator  must  proceed  as  follows :  (i)  If  the 
given  genus  has  no  opposite,  we  must  see  whether  the  opposite 
of  the  given  species  is  in  the  same  genus  as  the  given  species. 
For  opposites  must  be  in  the  same  genus,  IF  THE  LATTER  HAS  NO 
OPPOSITE.  (2)  If  the  genus  in  question  has  an  opposite,  then 
we  must  see  whether  the  species  opposed  to  the  given  one  is 
in  a  genus  opposed  to  the  genus  in  question.  For  the  opposite 
must  be  in  an  opposite  [genus] ,  IF  THE  GENUS  HAS  AN  OPPOSITE. 
Finally,  (3)  the  species  opposed  to  the  given  one  may  not  be 
in  a  genus  at  all,  but  be  itself  a  genus,  as,  for  example,  the  good. 
In  that  case,  the  given  species  cannot  be  in  a  genus  either,  BUT 
MUST  ITSELF  BE  A  GENUS,  as  is  the  case  in  the  "  good  "  and  the 
'  evil,"  neither  is  in  a  genus,  but  each  is  itself  a  genus.  "Ere  dv 
T]  Ivavr/ov  rt  T(JJ  e?8ee,  GXOKSIV.  lart  de  7tAeova%wz  ifj  0xe</>ez, 


516  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 


ev  ei  iv  T(jy  al>T(f>  fevet  xal  TO  iuavTtov,  fiy  ovroc  IvavTtou  T<J>J 
?  yap  TO.  ivavTia  iv  T<JJ  ai)T(£>  fsvet  swat,  dv  fjydkv  Ivavrlov  TW 
37.  OVTOZ  5*  IvavTtQU  rqj  fevet,  (rxonetv  et  TO  Ivavriov  Iv  T(JJ 
foamier}  fdp  TO  Ivavrlov  £v  T(p  ivavTtw  ecvat,  avxsp  y 
Ivavztov  TI  TW  f£v&.  (pauepbv  de  TOVTCOV  exaffTov  dta.  r^ 
itdhv  ec  O^G>C  ^  fjcqdevc  fivzt  TO  TW  etdee  ivauriov,  dAX  auTO 
oiov  Tdf-adov  ei  yap  TOUTO  /JLTJ  iv  fevsi,  ouds  TO  IVQ.VTIQV  TOUTOU  li> 
fsvtt  10TCU)  d^A'  ai)TO  fivoz,  xaddnsp  Im  TOU  dyadou  xal  TOU  xaxoi) 
ovdsTepov  yap  TOUTCOV  iv  flvei,  dAA'  kxd.T£pov 


It  will  be  seen  that  not  only  is  the  three-fold  classification  found 
here  in  full,  but  the  circumstances  are  defined  which  accompany 
and  determine  every  one  of  the  three  possibilities.  If  there  is  a 
development  between  the  Categories  and  the  Topics,  it  is  undoubt- 
edly in  the  direction  of  the  Topics. 

But  how  are  we  to  explain  the  omission  of  the  third  condition 
in  the  passage  cited  by  Brandis,  and  the  omission  of  both  the 
second  and  third  in  12/b  10?  The  explanation  will  be  evident 
if  we  refer  to  I24a  I  sq.  In  12  3b  I  sq.  Aristotle  enumerates  the 
various  lines  of  argument  which  the  disputant  must  have  ready 
to  attack  the  genus  named  by  the  opponent.  In  1  243.  i  sq.  he 
names  the  lines  of  argument  to  be  followed  by  anyone  who  wishes 
to  establish  the  genus  of  a  given  species.  If  the  genus  he  wants 
to  establish  has  no  opposite,  he  must  show  that  the  species  opposed 
to  the  given  species  is  in  the  same  genus  as  the  given.  If  the 
genus  has  an  opposite,  then  he  must  show  that  the  opposed  spe- 
cies is  in  the  opposite  genus.  The  third  possibility  is  naturally 
left  out  here,  for  in  that  case  he  has  no  genus  to  establish. 

dvaepouvTe  p.sv  obv  ToaavTa%a)<;  intQXSTttiov  el  fdp  fj.Tj  ondp^t  TO. 
etpypeva,  drjhov  OTC  ou  fho$  TO  dnododev  xaraaxeod^o^Tc  8$  Tpi%a)<:, 
fjisv  et  TO  lva.vit.ov  T<JJ  stdei  iv  T(p  slpyfjLevqj  fivzt,  py  oWoc 
T(fi  fever  et  fdp  TO  Ivavriov    Iv  TOUTOJ,  dykov  OTC  xal  TC 

7tpOX£tfJL£VOV    .    .     .    Tldhv  dv  7}    IvaVTtOV  Tt  TW  f£V£t,    ffXOn&V  £1  XOt  TO 

IVO.VTIQV  Iv  T(p  Ivavr'Ki)'  dv  fdp  jj}  dyhov  OTC  xal  TO  npoxetuevov 
iv  TW  Trpoxeefievw. 

I2?b  10  is  evident  at  once,  for  the  condition  is  stated  at  the: 
beginning  of  the  paragraph  which  determines  the  first  of  the 


No.  5.]  THE   CATEGORIES   OF  ARISTOTLE.  $1? 


three  possibilities  —  "Ere  orav  ovroc  xae  T(jj  ei'dee  xae  Tip 
ivavTtou  TO  ftehcov  TWV  ivavTtwv  etc  TO  %e7pov  fevoc  0%'  a-O 
yap  TO  Xoenbv  lv  T(JJ  koe7t(jj  ecvae,  iTteediq  TO.  ivavTia  Iv  TO?C 
yivzatv  ...  If  we  now  go  back  to  the  passages  quoted  by 
Brandis,  i$3a  36,  we  shall  have  no  difficulty  in  explaining  the 
omission  of  the  third  condition.  Chapter  iii  deals  with  the  topics 
necessary  for  establishing  a  definition  (i53a  6  —  dvaepecv  fj.ev  odv 
opov  o5ro>c  xae  Sea  TOUTCM  [chs.  I  and  2]  dee  xeepaTeov  iav  Se  fcara- 
(ricevd&iv  poulwfjLeda,  xp&TOv  fj.ev  eeSevae  dec  .  .  .  ).  The  first 
element  in  the  definition  is  the  genus  ;  we  must  therefore  see 
that  the  genus  is  well  established  (ib.  32,  XOWTOV  fj.ku  ouv  OTe  TO 
tinododev  fivo$  dpd&s  dxodeSoTae).  If  the  thing  to  be  defined  is 
not  in  a  genus  at  all,  but  is  itself  a  genus,  it  cannot  be  defined  ; 
and  hence  the  third  possibility  is  out  of  place  here. 

Alexander,  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Topics  (Berlin  ed., 
P-  5°6,  3-5),  whom  Brandis  cites,  saw  the  explanation.  His 
words  are  :  ouxeTe  de  xpoffedyxsv  "  77  aLra  ?evrj  efvae,"  w$  iv  dttoec 
^£^er,  OTe  fiyde  yprjatfjiov  rp  Ttpbz  TO  xpoxei[j.evov  TOUTO  ~po0Tedefjte- 
vov  ov  yap  eaTiv  17  ^IJTTJO-IS  vvv  el  76^05  earl  TO  Trpo/ceijjievov,  a\Vi/7ro 
TL  7eVo9. 

Having  shown  that  there  is  no  reason  whatsoever  for  suppos- 
ing the  Topics  earlier  than  the  Categories,  I  will  take  up  the 
arguments  of  Spengel,  Prantl,  and  Rose  to  prove  the  spurious- 
ness  of  the  treatise.  The  purely  linguistic  peculiarities  cited  by 
Spengel  and  Prantl,  Rose  himself  admits  are  not  of  great  weight  ; 
hence  I  need  not  concern  myself  with  them  any  further.  The 
main  argument,  however,  of  all  the  three  critics  is  the  subjective 
one,  that  the  differences  of  style  and  the  "senseless"  repetitions 
of  the  Categories  are  unworthy  of  Aristotle  and  unlike  him. 
This  may  readily  be  answered  by  the  consideration  that,  though 
the  style  and  general  tone  of  the  Categories  is  very  different  from 
that  of  the  Metaphysics  or  the  Posterior  Analytics,  it  is  so  strikingly 
similar  to  that  of  the  middle  books  of  the  Topics,  both  in  tone, 
style,  and  method  of  treatment,  that  one  cannot  help  feeling  that 
they  belong  to  the  same  period.  The  following  passages  in  the 
Topics  (io6a  9-22,  b  17-20;  io/a  18-31  ;  io8b  12-19;  I22a 
31  sq.,  b  18-24;  12/a  3  sq.,  bi8-2O;  I29b  5-13,  30  —  i3Oa 


518  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 


14,  b  11-15;  HID  15-34;  I45b  9-Jo;  H^a  4~7>  etc.)  ex- 
hibit the  same  diffuseness  and  repetitions  as  the  Categories,  and 
Book  V  in  particular  is  characterized  by  the  same  uniformity  of 
formula  and  expression  that  Rose  finds  so  "  un-  Aristotelian  "  in 
the  Categories. 

The  title,  xpb  T&V  TOTTCM,  cited  by  Simplicius,  whether  it  goes 
back  to  Aristotle  or  not,  represents  a  true  notion  as  to  the  place 
of  the  categories  in  Aristotle's  scheme,  and  it  is  the  object  of 
this  paper  by  a  more  minute  comparison  than  has  hitherto  been 
made  of  the  two  treatises  in  question,  to  prove  this  statement. 

Besides  the  general  similarity  in  tone  and  style,  there  are  found 
single  words  and  phrases  common  to  the  two  works,  though  but 
rarely  if  at  all  found  elsewhere,  at  least,  in  the  Organon.  For 
example,  3a  36  :  ajrb  psv  yap  r^c  Ttpwryc  oitfflac  oudspta  iarl  fcarrj- 
yopia,  and  lOQb  4  air  ovdsvbz  yap  fivouz  xap&WfJiaH;  ^  KaTTrjyopia 
xara  TOV  ei'douz  Asf-erai.  xaryfopia  in  this  sense  is  rare  in  Aristotle 
(cf.  Trendelenburg,  De  Arist.  Categ.,  pp.  8-9  ;  Gesch.  d.  Kate- 
gorienlehre,  p.  5  ;  Bonitz,  "  Ueber  die  Kateg.  d.  Arist.,"  Sitzungsb. 
d.  phil.-hist.  Kl.  d.  Kais.  Akad.  d.  Wiss.  zu  Wien.y  X,  pp.  591  ff., 
esp.  602,  n.  2,  620-23),  and  with  the  combination  of  fab  as 
above  is  sufficiently  striking  to  argue  identity  of  authorship. 

Again,  8a  33,  b  de  TipOTepoe  opiate  Trapa/coXovQei  p.ev  110.01  ro2c 
re,  ov  fJirjv  TOVTO  <ye  iari  TO  7tpo<;  re  auro?<;  slvat  TO  OUTO. 

AsfsaOae,  and  1  2  5b  24  taa)Z  p.ev  ouv  a/co\ovdel 
TOtat>Ty  .  .  .  ov  fjirjv  TOVTO  f£  ecTTt  T(jj  fj.kv  dvdpelqj  TOJ  ds 
eJvae  .  .  .  Here  again  the  phrase  ou  nyv  TOUTO  ?&  IdTt  is 
rare,  if  at  all  found  anywhere  else,  and  in  the  passage  cited,  it  is  used 
in  both  instances  with  dxotoudeZ  or  xapaxotoudsc,  in  the  preceding 
clause  to  express  the  difference  between  the  real  definition,  which 
signifies  the  essence  of  the  thing  defined,  and  an  attribute  or  prop- 
erty, which,  while  always  present  with  the  thing,  does  not  repre- 
sent its  essence.  (Waitz  is  no  doubt  correct  in  adopting  in  8a  34 
the  reading  given  above,  TOUTO  ri  iffTt  TO,  in  preference  to  Bekker's 
TO.DTOV  fi  IffTf  T<JJ,  as  appears  from  the  similar  passage  in  the 
Topics,  I25b  26,  though  neither  Waitz  (I,  p.  302)  nor  Prantl 
(Ztschr.  /.  Alterthumswissensch.,  1846,  p.  650),  who,  in  fact, 
opposes  Waitz's  reading,  knew  of  the  passage  in  the  Topics.) 


No.  5.]  THE   CATEGORIES   OF  ARISTOTLE.  519 

The  mean  between  the  contraries  is  generally,  though  not 
always,  in  the  Physics  and  the  Metaphysics  designated  by  the 
term  fiera^u  ;  in  the  Categories  and  the  Topics,  in  the  former  exclu- 
sively, by  the  term  ava  psaov  ;  cf.,  for  example,  I2a  2,  3,  9,  10, 
n,  17,20,  23,24;  b  28,30,  32,  35,36;  I3a  7,  8,  13,  and  io6b 
4,  5,  8,  10,  ii  ;  I23b  18,  19,  23,  25,  27,  29;  I24a  6,  7;  is8b 
7,  22,  38. 

Compare  also  6  xara  Touvo/jta  hbfoz,  la  2,  4,  and  iO7a  20  ;  also 
I  a  1  3,  ryvxara  rouvofjia  npoarffopiav,  with  iO7a  3,  TOJV  xara 


ib  1  6,  T&V  krsptov  fwcov  xal  py  un  aXkqka  Tsrarfjtsvwv  STepae 
ei'det  xal  al  dtayopai,  olov  £(fjou  xal  intcry  pyz  .   .   .  =  I  O7b  1  9 
3s  TCOV  krepwv  fwwv  xal  ^  un  aXtyha  erepa:  rw  ei'dee  xal  al  dta- 
(popal,  olov  £woo  xal  iTZiOTyp.^  .   .  . 

The  opposite  of  avfymz  in  the  scientific  and  metaphysical  works 
of  Aristotle  is  invariably  (pOtffcs,  in  the  Categories  (i5a  13-14) 
and  in  the  Topics  (i22a  28)  it  is  /ze/oxrrc  (cf.  Prantl,  Ztschr.  d. 
Alterthumwiss,  1846,  p.  651).  In  one  instance  (32ob  31)  (pdiatz 
is  defined  by  /jteicofftz  (^  ds  <pdiatz  fjtelcofftc),  the  less  known  by  the 
more  known,  and  this  accounts  very  readily  for  the  use  of  the 
latter  in  the  Topics,  which  is  a  popular  treatise,  and  the  Cate- 
gories is  of  the  same  character.  The  other  kinds  of  motion  not 
being  mentioned  in  the  Topics,  there  is  no  possibility  of  the  Cate- 
gories having  borrowed  it  from  the  Topics. 

Compare  also   na  2,  rd  fs.  xara  Taurac  hfbus.va  .  .  . 
%£Tae  TO  /jtattov  xal  TO  YJTTOV,  and  I27b  20,  24  ro  S'etd 
[sc.  ro  fj.aXXov  xai  ^rrov]  IJL^T  auTO  JMJTS  TO  xaT  Ixewo 

So  much  for  purely  linguistic  similarities.  When  we  pass  over 
to  matters  of  doctrine,  it  is  surprising  how  many  points  of  contact 
there  are  between  the  two  works.  I  shall  follow  the  Categories 
and  point  out  the  parallels  in  the  Topics. 

The  homonymns,  which  are  given  a  definition  and  an  illustration 
in  the  beginning  of  the  Categories,  have  a  whole  chapter  devoted 
to  them  in  the  Topics,  the  I5th  of  the  first  book,  where  they 
are  also  called  7roMa%a)z  hf6fi.£va.  Of  particular  significance  is 
I07a  18-20,  for  in  20  we  seem  to  have  a  direct  allusion  to  the 
definition  in  the  Categories.  We  must  see,  Aristotle  says,  if  the 


520  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

genera  designated  by  the  given  name  are  different  and  not  subor- 
dinate to  one  another,  as,  for  example,  o'voc  applies  to  the  genera 
£&iov  and  axsuoz  (which  is  therefore  a  homonym),  for  the  defini- 
tion of  these  genera  as  connected  by  the  name  is  different 
(ere^oc  yap  o  xara  Toi>vofj.a  lofoz  aitTwv).  The  greater  space  given 
to  homonyms  in  the  Topics  is  not  due  so  much  to  a  develop- 
ment in  doctrine  as  to  the  necessities  of  the  subject.  The  object 
of  the  Topics  is  a  purely  practical  one,  to  provide  the  disputant 
with  ready  arguments  properly  pigeon-holed,  and  a  single  gen- 
eral definition  of  homonyms  is  not  adapted  to  such  use.  We 
must  needs  go  further  and  show  in  what  different  special  ways 
homonyms  can  be  detected.  The  Categories  have  more  the  ap- 
pearance of  materials  gathered  in  the  shape  of  preliminary  defi- 
nitions of  necessary  concepts. 

Synonyms  are  referred  to  in  the  Topics  logb  7,  1233.  27,  I27b 
5,  I48a  24,  and  i62b  37.  Of  these,  the  first  is  the  most  impor- 
tant, since  it  states  that  the  genera  are  predicated  synonymously  of 
their  species ;  for  the  latter  admit  both  the  name  and  the  definition  of 
the  former  (xal  yap  Towopa  xal  rov  kbfov  lmds%£Tou  rov  T&V  ftv&v 
TO.  e%),  assuming  it  as  established  that  this  condition  constitutes 
synonymity.  This  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  silent  refer- 
ence to  the  definition  in  the  Categories  (la  6)  —  aovcbvona  Ss  >te- 
ftran  tov  TO  TS  ovofjLa  xoivbv  xal  6  tofoz  6  afoot;.  Moreover,  we 
have  almost  the  very  words  of  the  Topics  in  another  place  in 
the  Categories,  3b  2,  Kal  rbv  \dyov  Se  eTrtBe^ovrai  a!  TtpajTot  ou- 
aicu  rov  TOJV  eidcov  xal  TOV  TMV  fsvajv,  /cal  TO  etSo?  £e  rbv  rov  ysvovs. 
I48a  24  also  gives  the  same  definition  of  synonyms  merely  in  pass- 
ing. Aristotle  is  dealing  with  the  definition,  and  makes  a  state- 
ment that  if  the  opponent  makes  use  of  one  definition  for 
homonyms  it  cannot  be  a  correct  definition,  for  it  is  synonyms 
and  not  homonyms  that  have  one  definition  connoted  by  the  name 
(ouvcjvufjLa  ?ap  wv  elc  6  xara  rouvoua  ^o^oc).  He  speaks  of  the 
definition  as  already  known.  Similarly  in  i62b  37,  xal  iv  offott;  TO 
ovo[j.a  xat  6  Xbfo^  TO  at>To  aynaivec  is  a  definition  of  "  am^vy/^c  " 
preceding ,  and  the  xal  is  epexegetic  (cf.  Trendelenburg,  Elemen. 
Log.  Arist.,  6th  ed.,  1868,  pp.  126-7). 

Paronyms  also  are  made  use  of  in  the  Topics,  logb  3-12,  in 


No.  5.]  THE   CATEGORIES  OF  ARISTOTLE.  521 

a  way  which  shows  that  the  definition  in  the  Categories  is 
not  purely  grammatical,  as  it  may  seem  at  first  sight,  but  has  a 
logical  significance  quite  as  important  as  that  of  the  former  two. 
Paronymous  predication  is  predication  per  accidens,  as  contrasted 
with  synonymous,  which  may  be  per  se  (cf.  also  Trendelenburg, 
Gcsch.  d.  Kaiegorienlehre,  p.  27  sq.  and  30).  Here  also  par- 
onyms are  not  defined.  It  is  assumed  that  the  reader  knows 
what  they  are. 

The  difference  between  xad'uxoxstfjtevou  liftaQai  and  Iv  uxoxst- 
/jtsvuj  eJvae,  stated  in  the  Categories  la  20  sq.,  is  assumed  as  known 
in  the  Topics  12/b  I  sq.,  STC  et  iv  uxoxstfjievuj  TOJ  etdsi  TO  dxododeu 
fivo$  tefSTcu,  xaddnep  TO  hvxbv  inl  r^c  ^rovoc,  OMTTS  drfiov  OTI  oux 
tiv  eiy  fsvoz-  xad'uxoxsefjLsuotj  yap  TOO  eedooc  fibvov  TO  fevos  ),S^TCU 
(cf.  also  I26a  3  and  144!)  31).  Strange  to  say,  however,  after 
these  distinctions  Aristotle  himself  uses  them  interchangeably  in 
I32b  19  sq. 

Categories  3,  p.  ib  10-15  expresses  very  much  the  same  thought 
as  Topics  IV,  i,  p.  I2ia  20-6.  The  former  states  that  whatever 
is  true  of  the  species  is  true  of  the  individuals  under  the  species 
(oaa  xaTa  TOU  xaTT^opoofj.s^oo  AsfSTat,  TtdvTa  xal  XOLTO.  TOU  bTroxstfjtsvou 
faOrjasTcu),  the  latter  that  to  whatever  the  species  applies  the 
genus  does  also  (xad'&v  fao  TO  ecdoz  xarqfops'tTou,  xal  TO  yevoz  3s? 
xaTrtfopetcrdat).  They  both  involve  the  logical  hierarchy  of  genus, 
species,  and  individual,  and  the  two  principles  are  :  (i)  The  genus 
applies  not  only  to  the  species,  but  also  to  the  individual ;  (2) 
to  the  individual  belongs  not  only  the  species  but  also  the  genus. 
What  is  especially  important  to  notice  is  that,  in  the  Topics,  the 
principle  is  stated  as  already  known  and  is  applied  to  the  particular 
case,  thus  assuming  the  existence  of  another  treatise  where  these 
principles  are  stated  and  proved  for  the  first  time. 

The  treatment  of  the  difference  develops  gradually  in  the 
Topics  in  the  following  passages  :  lO/b  19  sq.,  144!)  12  sq.,  and 
I53b  6.  The  first  of  these  is  word  for  word  the  same  with  the 
statement  in  the  Categories,  ib  16  sq.,  and  they  were  both  quoted 
above.  Moreover,  the  way  in  which  the  passage  in  the  Topics 
is  introduced,  Ixei  Se  TO>V  kTeptov  fevotv,  etc.,  makes  it  a  direct 
reference  to  the  Categories.  Aristotle's  doctrine  concerning  the 


522  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

difference  so  far  is  that  of  different  genera  which  are  not  subordi- 
nated one  to  the  other;  the  differences  are  different  in  species.  In 
the  second  passage  quoted  above,  I44b  12,  Aristotle  corrects  this 
view  by  adding  that  the  differences  in  the  given  case  need  not 
be  different  unless  the  different  genera  cannot  be  put  under  a 
common  higher  genus.  In  the  third  passage,  1 5  3b  6,  Aristotle  adds 
some  more  qualifications  which  make  it  clear  that  in  the  preced- 
ing statements  the  word  krepcov,  in  the  phrase  &epa)v  -yevcov,  must 
not  be  understood  as  including  contrary  genera  (£vavr/a).  For 
there  the  case  is  different.  If  the  contrary  genera  can  be  put 
under  the  same  genus,  then  some  or  all  their  differences  are  con- 
trary also.  If  the  contrary  genera  belong  to  higher  contrary 
genera,  their  differences  may  be  all  the  same. 

The  preceding  examination  seems  to  show  very  clearly  that 
the  Topics  build  upon  the  basis  laid  down  in  the  Categories  and 
carry  the  structure  higher  and  broader.  It  would  be  a  very  ab- 
surd alternative  to  suppose  that  a  later  writer,  making  use  of 
the  Topics,  found  nothing  else  on  the  subject  of  logical  difference 
than  the  first  passage,  which  he  copied  verbatim  in  his  treatise, 
where,  besides,  it  has  no  particular  reason  for  existence.  As  a 
thought  tentatively  suggested,  with  the  view  of  further  elaboration 
and  insertion  as  a  proper  link  in  a  chain,  the  passage  in  the  Cate- 
gories assumes  a  different  meaning,  and  its  lack  of  connection  with 
the  preceding  and  following  ceases  to  cause  us  serious  difficulty. 

If  the  view  of  the  Categories  taken  here  is  justified  by  the 
preceding  arguments  and  by  what  is  still  to  come,  it  might  even 
be  a  legitimate  procedure  to  make  use  of  the  Topics  in  deter- 
mining a  disputed  reading  in  the  Categories.  And  we  have  one 
at  hand  in  the  passage  quoted  above  on  the  difference. 

Of  genera  which  are  subordinated  one  to  the  other,  there  is 
nothing,  Aristotle  says,  to  prevent  the  differences  from  being  the 
same.  For  the  higher  genera  are  predicated  of  the  lower,  so  that 
all  the  differences  of  the  higher  are  also  differences  of  the  lower 
(wars  offae  roD  xa.TrjfOpovp.evou  dtayopai  etffl,  Tocraurcu  xac  roD 
bnoxsefjievou  saovrcu).  The  last  statement  is  manifestly  untrue  if 
it  means  that  all  the  differences  of  the  genus  are  also  differences 
of  any  of  its  species.  For  example,  the  differences  of  £ujov  are 


No.  5.]  THE   CATEGORIES   OF  ARISTOTLE.  523 

Trejov,  Tirjyvov,  evudpov,  etc.  But  surely  these  are  not  all  differ- 
ences of  dvdpwTtoz,  nor  is  any  one  of  them  a  difference  of 
dvOptdTioz  •  for  a  difference  of  any  class  is  that  which,  added  to 
the  name  of  the  class,  restricts  it  to  a  lower  species ;  but  Tre^ov 
added  to  dvdpwnoz  merely  repeats  it,  so  that  it  is  not  the  differ- 
ence of  dvOpwnoc. 

To  obviate  this  difficulty,  the  Greek  commentators,  Porphyry, 
Dexippus,  Simplicius,  and  the  rest  divide  differences  into  '  con- 
stitutive '  (aufJLxkrjpwTcxai)  and  *  divisive  '  (dtatpertxafy  so  that  TTS^OV, 
TZT^VOV,  and  ewdpov  are  divisive  or  specific  differences  of  £o>ov, 
because,  added  to  £(£ov,  they  divide  it  into  its  various  species ; 
at  the  same  time,  ;T££OV  is  a  constitutive  difference  of  dvdpwTios, 
as  forming  part  of  its  definition.  With  this  distinction  the 
meaning  of  the  text  is  supposed  to  be  that  all  the  constitutive 
differences  of  the  higher  are  also  constitutive  of  the  lower. 
This  is  not  satisfactory,  for  Aristotle  does  not  use  differences  in 
this  sense  (cf.  Waitz,  I,  p.  279).  Boethus  (ap.  Simplic.  Basileae, 
1551  f.  I4b)  emended  the  text  to  read  oaat  rou  bnoxstfitvoo  .  .  . 
TOffauTot  xal  TOU  xar^opoufjisvou  Haovrcu.  This  emendation  was  not 
adopted  by  the  later  commentators,  but  there  is  a  passage  in  the 
Topics  which  may  be  considered  to  favor  it — ma  25-29.  oy 
yap  dvafxatov ,  off  a  TW  fevet  &7tdp%ei,  xal  rqj  stdei  undp^w  £(pov  fi.kv 
ydp  Iffre  Ttryvov  xal  Terpdnoov,  dvdpuinot;  ffou.  oaa  ds  TW  ei'See 
undp%£t,  dva-fxdcov  xal  r<f)  fiver  si  fdp  Iffrw  foOpantoc  ffxoudacoc, 
xal  £&>ov  IffTe  ffnoudatov. 

The  ten  Categories  enumerated  ib  25  sq.,  are  very  frequently 
referred  to  in  the  various  Aristotelian  writings  (cf.  the  table  in 
Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik,  I,  p.  207,  note  356)  but  nowhere  do 
we  find  the  complete  number  ten  except  in  the  Topics  iO3b  22 
where  they  are  given  in  the  very  same  order  as  in  the  Categories. 
They  are  not  defined,  thus  showing  that  they  are  not  treated 
there  for  the  first  time. 

The  discussion,  3b  10,  whether  ouffla,  and  particularly  dsvrspa 
ouffta,  is  rode  re  or  not,  is  again  referred  to  in  Hspi  Soytartxatv 
*Ekef%a>v,  which,  according  to  Waitz  and  Pacius,  is  the  ninth  book 
of  the  Topics.  The  passages  are  i69a  35,  I78b  38,  I79a  8. 
Here  it  is  difficult  to  tell  which  was  written  first.  The  view  in 


524  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 


the  Categories,  that  the  dsuTspa  ouffta  Trspt  ouaiav  TO  notbv 
xotdv  ^dp  Ttva  oufftav  ffijfjtaivtt,  looks  like  a  compromise,  and,  as 
such,  might  be  supposed  to  be  later  than  the  similar  discussion 
in  the  Sophistic  Refutation  which  denies  the  character  of  rode  re 
to  the  universal  :  yavepbv  obv  ore  ou  dorsov  rods  re  elvat  TO  xoevy 
xaTfjfopo{)fj.svov  Irrt  naatv. 

One  of  the  arguments  that  Prantl  builds  much  on  to  prove 
the  Categories  spurious  is  the  corrected  definition  of  the  cate- 
gory of  relation,  8a  32  :  loTt  TO.  xpb$  Tt  ofc  TO  £vat  TOLUTOV  i0Tt  T(JJ 
Ttpoz  Tt  TTWC  £%£&.  This  definition  is  a  proof  to  Prantl  (Joe.  cit., 
p.  90,  n.  5)  that  the  Categories  was  not  written  before  the  time 
of  Chrysippus  ;  for,  he  continues,  what  occasion  could  one  possibly 
have  had  before  Chrysippus  to  ask  whether  irpos  n  is  the  same  as 
7T/30?  rt  7ro>9  z^Qv  f  The  expression,  TT/DO?  rl  TTW?  ex&v,  he  asserts 
further,  is  never  found  again  in  all  the  works  of  Aristotle.  In  the 
first  statement  he  has  reference  to  the  Stoic  division  of  existents 
into  four  classes,  unoxeifjtsva,  notdy  xpoz  Tt,  and  npoc  T'I  KOXZ  e%ovTa. 
The  difference  between  the  last  two  is  thus  expressed  by  Sim- 
plicius  (ap.  Prantl,  I,  p.  435,  n.  101)  :  xpoz  TV  pev  hefotHTtv  oaa. 
xa.Toix£?ov  %apaxT7Jpa  $eax€ifjt€vd  xcoz  drrovsuet  npbz  eTSpov,  7tp6<;  TC 
d&  7Tft>c  s/ovra  oaa  Tteyoxs  ffi>jy.flatv£M  Ttvl  xai  fjty  aopftaivetv  dveu 
TTfi  Kept  (WTO.  fjLSTaftoXrfi  xae  dJUoftwrcoc  fj.£Ta  TOL>  irpbz  TO  IXTO? 
As  examples  of  the  former,  he  gives  e&c,  ImffTijjuty, 
,  which,  while  being  related  to  something  else,  have  a  char- 
acter of  their  own  ;  of  the  latter  XOLTYJP,  uibz,  defroz,  whose  very 
essence  is  exhausted  in  their  relation  to  something  else.  Hence 
Prantl  jumps  to  the  conclusion  that  the  author  of  the  Categories 
was  a  late  Peripatetic  influenced  by  the  Stoic  doctrine. 

But  a  little  linguistic  analysis  will  show  us  that  Prantl  confused 
cause  and  effect.  Only  on  the  assumption  of  the  existence  of 
the  Categories  before  the  Stoics  can  we  rationally  explain  the 
origin  of  the  division  and  the  terms.  In  itself,  xpoz  ri  xwz  $%ov 
ought  to  signify  a  less  strict  relative  than  xpoz  Tt  ;  the  effect  of 
the  TTOJZ  would  be  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  TT^OC  re,  and  if  the 
Stoics  were  the  first  to  coin  these  terms,  they  would  have  probably 
changed  them  about.  But  the  process  becomes  transparent  when 
we  suppose  that  the  Stoics  had  the  book  of  the  Categories  before 
them.  Here  the  restrictive  force  in  the  second  definition  lies  not  in 


No.  5.]  THE   CATEGORIES   OF  ARISTOTLE.  525 

the  words  rrpbz  rr  TTOJZ  £££fv.  These  are  merely  a  repetition  of  the 
original  definition  (6a  36),  000.  aura  ftnep  ioriv  ere'pcov  clvai  Xejfrai, 
?}  oTrwaovv  a\X&>9  TT/OO?  erepov,  where  the  genitive  relation  of  krepcw 
and  the  other  relations  of  brrwffow  dttajz  are  briefly  summed  up 
in  xpoz  TC  7TO)?  e^srv.  The  restrictive  force  lies  in  the  few  words 
that  precede,  ol?  TO  iivai  ravrov  eV™  TU>  npbz  rl  xwc  l^crv.  Now 
the  Stoics  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  class  of  relation  ought  really 
to  be  divided  into  two  classes,  and  they  retained  the  name  xpbz  re 
for  the  first,  and  for  the  second  they  abbreviated  the  definition, 
and  the  result  was  the  catchword  (for  that  was  all  that  was 
wanted)  xpbz  TI  TTOK;  ££ov. 

For  the  second  statement  of  Prantl,  that  TT^OC  rl  TUDZ  e#£fv  is 
never  found  in  the  works  of  Aristotle,  rash  is  a  mild  term.  Waitz 
had  already  pointed  out  (Org.,  I,  p.  266)  that,  in  the  Topics,  Aris- 
totle makes  use  of  this  corrected  definition,  Zeller  (loc.  rzV.)  adds 
247a  2,  b  3  ;  I  loib  13,  and  we  may  add  also  i/ob  30,  39.  iv 
rw  rov  axoxptybfjisvov  zyztv  TTCOZ  xpbz  TO.  dedo/jtsva  .  .  .  o'j  rw  rov 


The  two  passages  in  the  Topics  where  use  is  made  of  the 
second  definition  are  I42a  29  and  I46b  4.  Of  these  both  have 
the  appearance  of  referring  to  something  that  is  already  known, 
particularly  the  second,  where  the  form  ^v  (i7is.cdrj  TWJIQV  ty  kxdarw 
TOJV  Trpoz  re  TO  efvat  oxsp  TO  xpbz  Tt  7ta>z  £/^f)  is  clearly  a  refer- 
ence to  another  place.  .  This  can  scarcely  be  an  allusion  to  the 
first  passage  in  the  Topics,  for  there  is  no  proof  of  any  kind 
there  ;  it  is  all  assumed.  The  close  connection  of  the  Categories 
with  the  Topics  is  shown  here  again,  for  these  are  the  only  two 
that  have  the  second  definition.  In  the  Metaphysics,  J,  15,  p. 
1  02  1  a  28,  the  first  alone  is  used. 

The  reciprocal  relation  obtaining  between  the  relative  and  its 
correlative,  and  the  care  necessary  to  properly  designate  the 
correlative  in  order  to  bring  about  this  reciprocal  relation  as 
treated  in  the  Categories,  6b  28  sq.,  are  again  referred  to  in  the 
Topics,  I25a  5  and  I49b  4  sq.,  12.  In  both  passages  cited, 
this  attribute  of  reciprocity  or  convertibility  (TT^OC  d.vTt0Tpe<povTa 
U^adai)  is  assumed  as  known,  and  the  necessity  of  getting  the 
proper  correlative  (TT^OOC  5  UfSTcu)  is,  in  the  latter  passage, 
deduced  from  this  attribute  of  the  category  of  relation. 


526  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

Topics,  J,  6,  p.  12/b  18-25,  reminds  one  of  the  similar  discus- 
sion and  phraseology  of  the  Categories,  pp.  10  b  26-11  a  2.  Par- 
ticularly the  phrase  TO  xa.Tix£vo  hfbfjtevov,  used  in  the  Topics 
without  any  further  explanation,  as  a  familiar  expression,  looks 
very  much  like  a  reminiscence  of  rd  ye  xara  raura^  hfb^va  in  the 
Categories,  which  in  turn  is  an  abbreviated  form,  or  at  least  is 
connotive  of  the  phrase  (loa  27),  ra  xara  rauraz  TrapojvijfjLO)^ 
^f6fj.eva  fj  bxwffouv  aMft>c  dbr'  avTwv,  and  of  the  illustrative  passage 
following. 

The  distinction  made  between  xpoz  re  xad'aM  and  xara  TO 
fiuo$  in  Categories,  p.  na  23-36,  and  the  question  which  this 
naturally  raises,  whether  it  is  possible  for  the  genus  to  be  in  a 
different  category  from  its  species,  are  mentioned  again  —  1 2ob  36 
sq.,  I24b  15  sq.,  I46a  36,  i/3b  2. 

If  we  examine  the  treatment  of  tivrtmifjisva  in  the  Topics,  io6a 
36  sq.,  lOQb  17  sq.,  I23b  i8-!24a9,  i24a  35  sq.,  I43b  35,  there 
will  be  no  doubt  left  in  our  minds  that  it  is  based  on  that  of  the 
Categories,  I  ib  34  sq.,  rather  than  on  the  discussion  of  the 
Metaphysics,  ioi8a  20  sq.,  or  105  5a  3  sq.  We  find  the  three-fold 
classification  of  IvavTia  as  found  in  Categories  (i4a  19),  viz. :  (i) 
in  the  same  genus ;  (2)  in  opposite  genera ;  (3)  not  in  genera  at 
all,  being  themselves  genera  (see  above).  The  mean  between 
the  two  extremes  is  designated  in  the  Categories  exclusively,  in 
the  Topics  all  but  exclusively  (the  only  exception  being  I23b  14, 
1 7,  1 8),  by  the  term  dud  psaou  instead  of  by  /zera£u,  which  is  the 
term  used  in  the  Metaphysics,  io57a  21  sq.  (cf.  Waitz,  I,  310), 
while  in  the  first  passage,  ioi8a  20,  where  the  classification  of 
dvTexstfjisua  is  given,  there  is  no  mention  at  all  of  the  mean. 

This  mean,  the  Categories  (i2a  20)  tells  us,  is  in  some  cases 
designated  positively  (ovo//ara  XS^TCU  ro?c  dvd  fj-saov),  in  some 
negatively  (rjy  &xa.Tspot>  TO>V  dxpwv  dxo<pdff£c),  and  examples  are 
given  to  substantiate  the  statement.  In  the  Topics,  I23b  20,  the 
truth  is  made  use  of  as  one  already  known):  y  se  la-ct  jusv  re.  dfj.<po!iv 
dvd  fjieffou,  xal  TOW  stdcou  xal  TOJV  YSVOJV,  py  bfj.oiax;  ds,  dkXd  TWV  fjtev 
Kara  aTroffracriv  TWV  £'&><?  vTrotceifievov.  An  illustration  is  given 
but  the  meaning  of  the  terms  is  not  explained.  The  definition 
of  aT&pyats,  in  the  Categories,  1 2a  29,  is  referred  to  in  the  Topics, 


No.  5.]  THE   CATEGORIES   OF  ARISTOTLE.  527 


io6b  27:  ore  dk  xara  arepr^aiv  xac  e£tv  duTtxeevTcu  ra  vuv 
[sc.  atffOdvsffdaf)  (dvalaOiqTOv  etvcu~\  ,  drfiov,  eTreiSrj  ire^vfcev  etcarepav 
TCOV  al<r0r)(T€a)v  e^eiv  ra  fiwa  .  .  .  and  I43b  35  TixpXbv  fdp  Ian 
TO  fJLYj  fyov  ofpw,  ore  nfyuxev  e^erv. 

Another  reminiscence  of  the  Categories  is  found  at  I3ia 
14-15,  where  Aristotle,  in  speaking  of  cdeov,  says  that  it  is 
not  proper  to  assign  as  tdeov  of  an  object  a  term  or  phrase 
involving  the  dv?YX£///£vov  of  the  object  or  what  is  ftfjta  TQ  <pi>aee 
with  it  or  what  is  utrrepov,  since  these  last  do  not  make  the  thing 
clearer,  and  it  is  for  the  sake  of  greater  clearness  that  the  ideov  is 
used.  Now  it  will  be  noticed  that  these  three  topics,  dvTtxetfjteva, 
ftfjLa,  and  uffTspov  are  actually  discussed  in  succession,  though 
not  in  the  same  order,  in  the  Categories,  nb  16,  I4a  26,  and 
I4b  24. 

The  term  dvrtdeflpyp&ov,  and  the  idea  denoted  by  it,  seem  to  be 
peculiar  to  the  Categories  and  the  Topics.  In  the  former  it  is 
defined  in  connection  with  the  treatment  of  dpa  (i4b  33),  and  in 
the  latter  it  is  made  use  of  as  a  familiar  term  (i36b  3,  I42b  7, 
1  43  a  34).  Another  consideration  which  makes  it  unlikely  that 
the  author  of  the  Postprtzdicamenta,  not  Aristotle,  based  his 
work  on  the  Topics  is  that  in  treating  of  dfjta  he  does  not  include 
dvrexslfjtsva  as  one  class  of  dpa  TTJ  yitffse,  whereas  he  must  have 
done  so  if  he  had  before  him  I3ia  16  (TO  /ULSV  yap  duTexei/jtsvov  dfjta 
rfl~<pi>0£e)  or  I42a  24  (<ifj.a  yap  TTJ  (phase  TO.  dvTexstfjtsva). 

Finally,  another  argument  made  much  of  by  those  who  deny  the 
authenticity  of  the  Categories  (cf.  espec.  Prantl,  Ztsch.  d.  Alterth., 
1846,  p.  651)  is  the  mention  of  six  kinds  of  motion  instead  of 
three,  or  at  most  four,  as  Aristotle  gives  in  the  Physics  (cf.  Waitz,  I, 
p.  3  1  8  sq.)  Since  the  kinds  enumerated  are  the  same  here  as  in 
the  Physics,  and  the  difference  lies  only  in  reckoning  fdveaez  and 
<pdopd,  avfyffic  and  peiaMTec  (<pOiffez)  as  two  or  as  four,  there  would 
be  little  in  the  argument  to  stay  our  conviction  of  the  authenticity 
of  the  work,  but  this  very  peculiarity  seems  to  make  my  case 
stronger;  for,  in  the  first  place,  I  have  already  shown  above  that 
whereas  in  the  other  works  of  Aristotle  <pdiatz  is  the  contrary  of 
ot&^fftc,  in  the  Categories  and  the  Topics  it  is  fjisiajfftz,  and  it  is  not 
likely  that  it  was  borrowed  in  the  Categories  from  the  Topics,  since 


528  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

the  complete  list  of  the  kinds  of  xivyms  is  nowhere  given  in  the 
Topics.  In  the  second  place,  it  appears  from  two  passages  in  the 
Topics  that,  at  the  time  of  its  composition,  Aristotle  regarded 
aufyfftz  and  fietcofftz  (ipOims),  as  two,  and  similarly,  feveais  and 
<p6opd  as  two.  The  passages  are  nib  7,  otov  aL^adat  y 
(pdeiptaOat  rj  fiyvsaQcu  y  oaa  dUa  xwyascoz  ei'dy,  and  I22a  28,  sc 
obv  f]  ftddtatz  fjnjr  aii^yazax;  /JUJTS  pteecoffeax;  pyre 


I  have  shown,  I  trust,  not  only  that  the  treatise  of  the  Cate- 
gories is  closely  related  to  that  of  the  Topics,  but  also  that  it  was 
written  before  the  latter  and  serves  as  a  basis  for  it  upon  which  it 
builds,  very  often  going  beyond  the  Categories.  This  applies  to 
the  first  nine  chapters,  properly  called  Categories,  in  the  same 
measure  as  to  the  Postpr<zdic  amenta.  The  unity  of  the  book' 
of  the  Categories  as  we  now  have  it  is  also  maintained  by  Valen- 
tinus  Rose  (Dc  Arist.  libr.  ord.,  etc.,  p.  235).  Ergo,  the  whole 
work  is  genuine,  and  its  peculiar  character  is  to  be  explained  on 
the  ground  of  its  being  one  of  the  earliest  attempts  of  Aristotle. 

ISAAC  HUSIK. 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


PROCEEDINGS    OF   THE   FOURTH   ANNUAL   MEET- 
ING   OF    THE   WESTERN    PHILOSOPHICAL 
ASSOCIATION,  HELD  AT  COLUMBIA, 
MISSOURI,   APRIL*  i    AND    2,    1904. 

REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY. 

r  I  "'HE  fourth  annual  meeting  of  the  Western  Philosophical  As- 
•*•  sociation  took  place  at  Columbia,  Missouri,  April  I  and 
2,  1904.  The  sessions  were  held  in  the  Academic  Hall  of  the 
University  of  Missouri.  In  the  regretted  absence  of  the  presi- 
dent, Professor  Patrick,  the  chair  was  taken  by  Professor  A.  R. 
Hill.  Not  more  than  two  papers,  and  in  some  cases  only  one, 
had  been  placed  upon  the  programme  for  any  one  session ;  the 
result  was  that,  for  the  most  part,  there  was  rather  general  and 
extended  discussion,  which  added  greatly  to  the  interest  and  value 
of  the  meeting.  Besides  a  considerable  attendance  of  non-mem- 
bers, seventeen  members  were  present,  including  representatives 
of  seven  universities  and  colleges.  The  hospitality  of  the  Faculty 
of  the  University  of  Missouri  was  most  generous  and  delightfully 
informal ;  so  that  the  social  purposes  of  such  a  gathering  of  fel- 
low-specialists were  successfully  realized. 

At  the  business  meeting,  the  question  of  affiliation  with  The 
American  Philosophical  Association  was  again  brought  up,  but 
after  some  discussion  was  laid  on  the  table.  The  selection  of 
time  and  place  for  next  year's  meeting  was  left  to  the  Execu- 
tive Committee.  The  following  resolution  was  adopted  :  "The 
members  of  The  Western  Philosophical  Association  desire  to  ex- 
press their  cordial  personal  regret  at  the  removal  of  Professor 
Frank  Thilly  out  of  the  section  represented  by  the  Association, 
and  to  wish  him  the  greatest  success  and  satisfaction  in  his  new 
field  of  work.  To  Dr.  Thilly,  as  one  of  its  founders  and  most 
active  supporters,  the  Association  is  under  great  obligations ;  to 
his  influence  have  been  in  no  small  measure  due  the  interest  of 
its  meetings  and  the  spirit  of  philosophical  good-fellowship  that 
has  characterized  them."  The  following  were  elected  to  office 

529 


530  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

for  the  ensuing  year :  President,  A.  Ross  Hill,  of  the  University 
of  Missouri ;  Vice-President,  E.  L.  Hinman,  of  the  University  of 
Nebraska;  Secretary-Treasurer,  Arthur  O.  Lovejoy,  of  Wash- 
ington University ;  members  of  the  Executive  Committee,  Frank 
Sharp,  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin,  and  H.  W.  Stuart,  of  the 
University  of  Iowa. 

Abstracts  of  the  papers  presented  are  appended,  in  so  far  as 
the  Secretary  has  been  able  to  secure  them. 

ARTHUR  O.  LOVEJOY. 

1.  The  Significance  of  Attitudes  in  Psychology.     By  THAD- 

DEUS  L.  BOLTON. 

2.  Memory    and    the    Economy    of    Learning.     By   ROBERT 
MORRIS  OGDEN. 

One  of  the  first  considerations  for  economy  in  learning  is  the 
analysis  of  types  of  learners  and  ways  of  learning.  There  are  three 
main  factors  in  the  fundamental  type  distinctions :  visual,  aural, 
and  kinaesthetic.  One  also  makes  a  functional  distinction  be- 
tween an  intellectual  and  a  sensory  type.  The  first  is  logical 
and  objective.  This  person  considers  the  presentation  as  it  is. 
Only  such  supplementary  ideas  as  are  requisite  to  a  clear  under- 
standing are  reproduced.  A  certain  mental  inertia  characterizes 
this  person,  in  that  he  has  a  tendency  to  persevere  along  lines  of 
thought  already  formulated.  The  second  is  subjective.  Sense 
perceptions  as  such  mean  much  to  him.  Each  furnishes  a  strong 
motive  for  reproduction.  This  person's  ideas  are  concrete  rather 
than  abstract. 

There  are  two  ways  of  learning  corresponding  to  these  two 
types,  a  slow  and  a  fast.  The  first  enables  the  learner  to  ob- 
serve carefully  and  reason  logically.  The  second  relies  more 
on  the  total  effect  produced  by  the  close  proximity  of  the  sense 
impressions.  Increased  speed  stimulates  the  attention,  which 
becomes  a  valuable  factor  in  this  method  of  learning. 

In  applying  these  facts  in  the  school  room,  greater  tolerance 
should  be  shown  the  quick -learning  pupil.  It  does  not  follow 
that  because  he  learns  quickly  he  will  forget  quickly.  Individuals 
who  are  sensory  in  type  and  accustomed  to  a  fast  method  of 


No.  5.]     WESTERN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  531 

learning  retain  more  by  it  than  when  compelled  to  learn  at  a 
slower  rate.  It  is  important  that  pupils  should  be  studied  with 
respect  to  their  typical  differences  and  an  attempt  made  to  appeal 
to  them  in  accordance  with  their  natural  tendencies.  It  seems 
highly  probable  that,  if  taken  at  an  impressionable  age,  children 
could  be  taught  to  overcome  tendencies  towards  extreme  inertia 
or  automatism  and  trained  to  greater  skill  and  efficiency  in  hand- 
ling their  fundamental  mental  factors. 

[Published  in  full,  Psychological  Bulletin,  Vol.  I,  No.  6.] 

3.  Spencer's  First  Principles.     By  EDGAR  L.  HINMAN. 

This  paper,  prepared  for  the  purpose  of  opening  the  general 
discussion  on  Herbert  Spencer's  philosophy,  divided  the  teachings 
of  the  First  Principles  into  three  portions :  The  doctrine  of  the 
unknowable  reality,  the  metaphysics  of  force,  and  the  deductive 
interpretation  of  evolution.  The  Unknowable  was  treated  as 
having  a  certain  relative  justification,  inadequate  to  the  establish- 
ment of  agnosticism ;  but  as  being  in  any  case  irrelevant  to  the 
genuine  work  of  philosophical  synthesis.  It  may,  therefore,  be 
disregarded.  The  theory  of  Force  was  regarded  as  resting  upon 
a  confusion  between  a  dynamical  metaphysic  of  matter  and  the 
physical  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy.  If  consistently 
taken  in  the  former  sense,  much  of  truth  may  be  found  in  the 
doctrine,  but  no  basis  is  afforded  for  the  naturalism  of  the  system. 
If  taken  in  the  latter  sense,  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the 
entire  system  of  natural  laws  and  processes  can  be  deduced  from 
the  persistence  of  force.  The  principle  of  the  conservation  of 
energy  is  purely  quantitative  and  determines  nothing  regarding 
the  qualitative  form  or  condition  in  which  its  quantitative  demands 
shall  be  met.  Regarding  the  nature  of  evolution,  it  was  shown 
that  Spencer's  philosophical  synthesis  depends  essentially  upon 
the  success  of  a  deductive  interpretation  derived  from  the  per- 
sistence of  force.  And  since  the  persistence  of  force  is,  in  prac- 
tice, generally  read  naturalistically,  this  implies  an  attempt  to  find 
the  meaning  of  an  evolutionary  process  in  the  cheapest  and  poorest 
categories  which  can  be  applied.  This  method  of  interpretation 
was  contrasted  with  the  Aristotelian  interpretation  in  terms  of  the 


532  THE  PHIL  OSOPHICAL  RE  VIE  W.  [VOL.  XIII. 

» 

end  or  perfect  product.  It  was  then  urged  that  Spencer  does  not 
succeed  in  carrying  through  his  naturalistic  rendering  of  evo- 
lution. On  the  other  hand,  at  every  stage  in  which  some  new 
element  or  factor  appears  in  his  philosophy,  the  true  source  of 
the  new  factor  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  elements  which  have 
previously  been  recognized,  but  rather  in  a  new  definition  of  the 
nature  of  the  Real.  In  spite  of  himself,  therefore,  he  is  driven 
to  a  basing  of  evolution  upon  what  is  virtually  its  goal  or  most 
perfect  expression.  His  failure  to  admit  this  leaves  his  evolution- 
ary theory  a  continuous  petitio.  These  points  were  illustrated  by 
an  analysis  of  four  important  steps  in  the  process  of  evolution,  as 
described  by  Spencer. 

4.  Spencer's  Sociological  Method.  By  CHARLES  A.  ELLWOOD. 
However  grateful  sociologists  may  be  to  Spencer  for  his  pio- 
neer work  in  their  field,  they  are  forced  to  criticize  his  scientific 
method.  Spencer  himself  characterized  his  method  as  "deduc- 
tion fortified  by  induction  "  ;  but  it  has  been  caricatured,  perhaps 
not  unfairly,  as  "  speculation  fortified  by  illustration."  It  is  cer- 
tain that  Spencer  made  many  wrong  uses  of  deduction  and  in- 
duction in  developing  his  sociological  theories.  Among  the 
more  obvious  criticisms  which  might  be  made  upon  Spencer's 
sociological  method  are  the  following:  (i)  Spencer  adopts  the 
'  leading-theory  '  method  of  investigation  rather  than  the  method 
of  multiple  working  hypotheses.  This  leads  him  to  select  his 
instances  to  support  his  theory  rather  than  to  build  up  a  theory 
from  the  facts.  In  the  case  of  his  leading  theory  of  evolution 
it  leads  him  to  extremes ;  he  is  anxious,  for  example,  to  evolve 
everything  from  chaos.  (2)  Spencer's  conception  of  evolution  is 
not  broad  enough  to  furnish  a  safe  basis  for  deduction.  It  is 
too  materialistic,  for  one  thing.  He  also  conceives  of  evolution 
mainly  as  a  linear  process.  (3)  Spencer  makes  an  illegitimate 
use  of  the  evolutionary  method  in  assuming  that  an  account  of 
the  evolution  of  things  can  determine  their  social  and  moral 
validity.  (4)  Spencer's  over-emphasis  on  the  evolutionary 
method  leads  him,  on  the  one  hand,  to  lay  too  great  stress  on 
the  facts  of  primitive  and  barbarous  societies  ;  on  the  other  hand, 


No.  5.]     WESTERN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  533 

to  neglect  the  facts  of  present  society.  (5)  Perhaps  to  Spencer's 
extreme  evolutionism  must  be  ascribed  also  his  failure  to  use 
definition.  He  seldom  clearly  defines  his  terms.  (6)  Spencer's 
sociology,  despite  his  assertion  to  the  contrary,  rests  more  upon 
his  biology  than  upon  psychology.  This  results  again  from  his 
materialistic  evolutionism.  (7)  Finally,  Spencer  may  be  criti- 
cized for  using  the  organic  conception  of  society  in  a  too  realistic 
way. 

5.  Ethics  and  its  History.     By  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 

Ethics  should  not  be  defined  as  in  any  way  peculiar  and  exclu- 
sive, for  example,  as  a  '  normative  '  science  ;  ethics  is  only  natural 
science  serving  life  ;  it  is  the  study  of  the  conditions  of  action  with 
a  view  to  action.  Those  who  find  that,  in  history,  ethics,  although 
condescending  to  use  natural  science,  has  never  really  depended 
on  it,  read  their  history  falsely,  forgetting  the  conditions  under 
which  ethical  inquiry  arises  and  the  demands  upon  the  answer 
that  these  conditions  inevitably  make.  Thus  the  inquiry  is  born 
of  life's  typical  struggle  between  the  old  and  the  new,  the  formed 
and  the  unformed,  and  the  rigoristic  and  hedonistic  answers  of 
duty  and  pleasure  are  only  abstractions  for  the  interests  of  the  two 
parties  to  this  struggle.  Neither  duty  nor  pleasure  really  answers 
the  inquiry,  because  as  an  asserted  ideal  it  becomes  (i)  extra- 
natural,  and  (2)  formal,  and  because  (3)  it  always  has  the  other 
in  opposition,  and  is  accordingly  in  itself  ex  parte  and  apologetic. 
Can  an  answer  to  any  question  come  exclusively  from  either 
party  to  the  conflict  that  has  made  the  question  ?  Moreover,  to 
argue  that  in  times  past  and  even  at  the  present  time  either  of 
them  has  often  been  ethically  satisfying,  making  an  adequate 
standard  for  large  classes  in  human  society,  may  be  favorable  to 
the  case  of  a  '  normative '  ethics,  but  it  commits  the  serious 
fallacy  —  so  common  in  historical  studies  —  of  confusing  a  class- 
character  with  a  well-rounded  experience,  with  the  true  unity 
of  experience,  which  belongs  only  either  to  the  personal  indi- 
vidual or  to  society  as  a  whole.  Class-characters  make,  not  self- 
sufficient  wholes  of  experience,  but  mere  professions,  which  taken 
all  together  only  divide  the  labor  of  maintaining  socially,  that  is, 


534  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

in  a  magnified,  specially  differentiated,  technically  developed  form, 
the  unity  of  experience  comprised  in  the  personal  individual. 
Accordingly,  history  shows  ethics  independent,  only  as  division 
of  labor  makes  things  independent,  and  it  suggests  that  in  social 
life,  while  the  professional  moralists,  by  their  controversies,  by 
their  rigorism,  and  by  their  hedonism,  may  formulate  the  demands 
that  the  conditions  of  ethical  inquiry  put  upon  the  answer,  they  do 
not  give  any  adequate  answer.  The  adequate  answer,  in  the 
form  of  something  concrete,  uniting  both  duty  and  pleasure,  can 
come,  and  in  history  always  has  come,  only  through  natural 
science ;  socially  and  historically,  history  being  so  different  from 
biography,  through  the  profession  of  natural  science ;  individu- 
ally and  biographically,  through  science  as  direct  personal  ex- 
perience, as  personal  study  of  a  personally  interesting  situation. 
Science,  as  study  of  the  conditions  of  action  manifested  in  the 
course  of  action,  reveals  to  the  inquirer,  not  an  impossible  choice 
of  two  abstract  ideals,  but  something  that  is  bound  to  be  at  once 
dutiful  and  pleasant,  and  that  is  something  to  do  instead  of  merely 
to  seek. 

[To  be  published  in  full  probably  in  the  American  Journal  of 
Sociology^ 

6.  The  Need  of  a  Logic  of  Conduct.  By  HENRY  W.  STUART. 
The  negative  criticism  directed  against  Intuitionism  and  Utili- 
tarianism by  advocates  of  the  ethical  theory  of  Self-realization 
may  be  regarded  as  conclusive.  Green  bases  his  ethics  upon  his 
epistemological  metaphysics,  and  it  is  from  this  latter  point  of 
view,  in  the  main,  that  he  examines  the  two  rival  ethical  theories 
opposed  to  his  own.  Nevertheless,  he  is  at  pains  to  show  that 
Utilitarianism  not  only  has  a  false  psychology  of  motive  and  can- 
not explain  the  distinctive  features  of  the  moral  consciousness  as 
we  know  it,  but  also  that  it  does  not  really  possess  the  high  de- 
gree of  practical  usefulness  which  its  authors  have  claimed  for  it. 
Accordingly,  he  feels  it  incumbent  upon  him  to  show  that  his  own 
theory  is  superior  to  Utilitarianism  in  this  respect.  The  chief  in- 
terest and  value  of  the  theory  of  Green  and  his  followers  lies  just 
in  this  suggestiveness  (thus  brought  to  light  through  constraint 


No.  5.]     WESTERN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  535 

of  controversial  necessity,  rather  than  from  the  impulse  of  a  clear 
and  direct  and  positive  persuasion  of  its  prime  importance)  in  the 
direction  of  a  method  of  logical  procedure  for  the  solution  of 
concrete  ethical  problems. 

It  is  from  this  point  of  view,  accordingly,  that  Green's  meta- 
physics must  be  judged.  What  is  its  logical  (i.  e.y  methodologi- 
cal) value  ?  Green  holds  that  belief  in  the  ideal  of  the  Absolute 
Self:  (i)  furnishes  the  agent  in  an  ethical  situation  with  an  ideal 
of  personal  perfection,  of  motive  without  reference  to  foreseen  con- 
sequences ;  and  (2)  directs  his  attention  to  the  history  of  his  own 
past  morality  and  that  of  the  race,  giving  him  assurance  that 
therein  is  to  be  found  such  approximate  delineation  of  the  self- 
realizing  Absolute  as  will  serve  his  present  need  of  guidance  in 
detail.  Here,  obviously,  is  the  metaphysics  of  the  Absolute  Self 
put  to  methodological  uses.  But,  we  must  urge:  (i)  The  dis- 
tinction of  motive  and  consequences  in  Green's  sense  is  utterly 
untenable,  and  with  it  must  be  given  up  also  the  ideal  of  a  per- 
fectly motivated  self  as  the  goal  of  endeavor ;  (2)  the  resort  to 
history  must  always  be  taken  in  the  light  of  the  present  concrete 
interest,  and  cannot  be  made  more  fruitful  of  results  if  taken  with 
the  presumption  that  history  is  a  texture  into  which  certain  threads 
of  absolute  meaning  have  been  woven. 

Instead  of  an  ethics  in  which  an  Absolutist  metaphysics  is 
made  to  serve  by  way  of  method,  we  therefore  need  a  logic  of 
conduct.  Thus  (i)  the  concept  of  a  self  to  be  realized  should  be 
interpreted,  not  as  a  descriptive  ideal,  but  as,  in  the  last  resort,  a 
stimulus  to  a  logical  procedure  constructive  of  objective  inten- 
tions. The  conscientious  questioning  of  motives  is  a  symptom 
of  the  process  of  reforming  the  intention  or  giving  it  over  for 
another ;  (2)  in  place  of  a  resort  to  history,  such  as  Green  con- 
ceives logically  possible  and  useful,  there  is  need  of  a  method 
whereby  history  (as  summarized  in  institutions  and  in  moral  ideals) 
may  be  drawn  upon  for  suggestions  toward  modes  of  conduct 
likely  to  hold  their  own  as  habits  in  the  individual  and  gain  ac- 
ceptance in  society.  Thus  ethics  should  be  neither  a  system  of 
dogmatic  morality,  avowed  or  in  disguise,  nor  (as  many  writers 
are  at  present  demanding)  a  descriptive  ('  scientific ')  analysis  of 


536  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

actual  moral  judgments.  It  should  be  a  doctrine  of  logical 
method,  having  the  same  relation  to  impulse  and  purpose  in  the 
practical  life  as  inductive  logic  has  to  conjecture  in  the  theoret- 
ical. So  likewise  will  it  have  its  metaphysical  implications. 

7.  Kant's  Antithesis  of  Criticism  and  Dogmatism.    By  A.  O. 

LOVEJOY. 

The  antithesis  that  Kant  draws  between  two  sharply  contrasted 
types  of  philosophical  method  is  commonly  supposed  to  corre- 
spond to  actual  historic  differences  that  are  both  definite  and 
important.  But  the  truth  is  that  Kant's  'dogmatic'  predecessors, 
Leibniz  and  Wolff,  had  an  entirely  explicit  doctrine  as  to  the 
nature  and  the  scope  of  valid  knowledge  a  priori ;  and  their 
criterion  for  such  knowledge  was  one  of  which  Kant  himself, 
though  somewhat  confusedly,  admitted  the  legitimacy.  That 
criterion  was  the  principle  of  contradiction,  which  for  them  was 
not  merely  a  principle  of  tautological  judgments,  but  included  all 
relations  of  necessary  coherence  between  concepts — all  judg- 
ments of  which  the  opposite  is  inconceivable  because  it  involves 
the  combination  of  '  incompossible  '  predicates.  An  examination 
of  Kant's  earlier  and  later  writings  shows  that  he  nowhere  expli- 
citly rejects  or  invalidates  this  criterion  —  although,  as  a  result 
of  his  confused  and  self-contradictory  conception  of  the  distinction 
between  analytical  and  synthetical  judgments,  he  failed  to  realize 
the  full  meaning  and  importance  of  the  acceptance  of  such  a 
criterion.  Thus  Kant's  negative  criticisms  upon  his  predecessors 
bear  effectively  only  upon  their  special  arguments,  not  upon  their 
general  methodology ;  and  between  him  and  them  there  was  no 
such  great  gulf  fixed  as  he  supposed. 

Moreover,  what  Kant  regarded  as  the  most  original  and  dis- 
tinctive of  his  own  special  contentions  —  namely,  his  '  reply  to 
Hume '  upon  the  question  of  causality,  expressed  in  the  "  Second 
Analogy  of  Experience" — conspicuously  fails  to  exhibit  an 
essential  divergence  of  his  doctrine  from  that  of  the  so-called 
'  dogmatists.'  For  the  negative  part  of  it  —  the  contention  that 
judgments  about  causation  are  '  synthetical,'  incapable  of  demon- 
stration by  any  analysis  of  the  direct  implications  of  the  concepts 


No.  5.]     WESTERN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  537 

involved,  and  hence  not  susceptible  of  apodictic  proof — was  as 
fully  accepted  by  Leibniz  as  it  was  by  Hume  and  Kant.  And  the 
positive  part  of  Kant's  theory  of  causality  —  i.  e.,  the  curious 
piece  of  reasoning  by  which  he  attempts,  after  all,  to  establish  the 
thesis  of  the  Second  Analogy,  that  "  every  event  presupposes 
some  antecedent  event  upon  which  it  follows  according  to  a 
rule" — is  little  more  than  the  elaboration  of  an  argument 
sketched  out  in  Wolff's  Vernunftige  Gedanken  von  Gott,  der 
Welt,  und  der  Seele  des  Menschen,  auch  alien  Dingen  uberhaupt, 
over  sixty  years  before  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  was 
published. 

A  consideration  of  these  facts  should  (i)  somewhat  qualify 
the  prevailing  estimate  of  Kant's  originality ;  (2)  put  an  end  to 
the  idea  that  there  was,  at  Kant's  time,  a  solution  of  continuity 
in  the  historic  working  out  of  metaphysical  problems ;  and  (3) 
make  clear  that  Kant's  general  negative  position  with  respect  to 
the  possibility  of  metaphysical  knowledge  was  undermined  by  his 
own  unmistakable,  if  somewhat  ill-understood,  acceptance  of  a 
rationalistic  logic  of  concepts. 

8.  The  Platonic  Doctrine  of   Immortality.     By  THOMAS  M. 

JOHNSON. 

Many  absurd  opinions  about  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  immor- 
tality are  extant.  To  Plato  have  been  attributed,  utterly  without 
warrant,  the  theories  of  monism,  absorption  of  the  soul  into  the 
Deity,  and  race  immortality  (which  is  a  denial  of  immortality 
from  the  Platonic  standpoint),  and  finally  it  has  been  asserted  by 
some  that  he  did  not  believe  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul  at  all. 
All  these  theories  are  totally  alien  to  the  Platonic  conception  of 
the  nature  of  the  soul.  The  constituent  elements  or  essential 
characteristics  of  the  rational  soul  are  :  unity,  vitality,  individu- 
ality, self-activity,  self-consciousness,  personal  identity,  immateri- 
ality, immortality.  The  soul  is  essentially  immortal ;  its  immor- 
tality does  not  date  from  its  connection  with  the  body.  That 
the  nature  of  the  soul  is  eternal,  is  one  of  Plato's  cardinal  dogmas, 
(i)  The  soul  is  immortal,  because  it  is  incorporeal.  There  are 
two  kinds  of  being  —  one  composite,  the  other  simple;  the  former 


538  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIIL 

subject  to  change  and  dissolution,  the  latter  immutable  and  per- 
manent ;  one  perceived  by  sense,  the  other  apprehended  by  mind 
alone ;  the  one  is  visible,  the  other  invisible.  When  the  soul 
employs  the  corporeal  senses,  it  wanders,  errs,  and  is  confused ; 
but  when  it  separates  itself  from  the  body  and  acts  per  se  or  inde- 
pendently, it  attains  to  knowledge  which  is  permanent,  immutable, 
and  immortal.  The  soul,  therefore,  being  uncompounded,  incor- 
poreal, and  invisible,  must  be  indissoluble  or  indestructible,  i.  e., 
immortal.  (2)  The  soul  is  immortal,  because  it  has  by  virtue 
of  its  nature  self-activity  and  self-determination.  No  matter  or 
body  can  be  conceived  as  the  originator  of  movement  or  activity. 
That  which  cannot  act  from  itself,  but  derives  its  activity  from 
another,  may  cease  to  move  and  perish.  But  that  which  is  self- 
moved  never  ceases  to  be  active,  and  is  also  the  cause  of  motion 
or  activity  in  all  other  things  which  are  moved.  And  whatever 
is  perpetually  active  is  immortal.  This  self-activity,  says  Plato, 
is  the  very  essence  and  true  notion  of  the  soul.  Being  a  cause, 
the  soul  is  therefore  a  principle,  and  it  is  the  nature  of  a  principle 
to  exclude  its  contrary.  That  which  is  essentially  self-active  and 
self-determined  can  never  cease  to  be  active ;  that  which  is  the 
cause  of  activity  and  of  change  cannot  be  destroyed  by  the  change 
called  death.  (3)  The  soul  is  immortal,  because  it  possesses 
universal,  necessary,  and  absolute  ideas,  which  are  essentially 
superior  to  the  spheres  of  matter  and  sense,  and  participate  in  no 
respect  in  the  corporeal  or  the  corruptible.  No  form  or  species 
of  matter,  however  subtle  or  refined  it  may  be,  can  give  the 
absolute,  the  necessary,  the  eternal.  But  the  soul  has  the  ideas 
of  absolute  beauty,  goodness,  perfection,  and  identity,  to  name 
only  a  few,  and  it  has  these  by  reason  of  its  nature,  which  is  one, 
simple,  identical,  and  eternal.  This  is  an  argument  of  extraor- 
dinary strength  and  force  to  those  who  are  able  to  grasp  the 
essential  distinction  between  ideas  and  sensations. 

LIST   OF   MEMBERS. 

Andrews,  Chancellor  E.  Benjamin,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln. 
Angell,  Professor  J.  R. ,  University  of  Chicago. 
Bagley,  Dr.  Wm.  Chandler,  State  Normal  School,  Dillon,  Montana. 


No.  5.]     WESTERN  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASSOCIATION.  539 

Bagley,  Mrs.  Florence  Winger,  Dillon,  Montana. 

Benedict,  Dr.  Mary  K.,  State  Normal  School,  Warrensburg,  Mo. 

Bergstroem,  Professor  J.  A.,  Indiana  State  University,  Bloomington. 

Bolton,  Professor  F.  E.,  University  of  Iowa,  Iowa  City. 

Bolton,  Dr.  Thaddeus  L.,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln. 

Boodin,  Professor  John  E.,  Iowa  College,  Grinnell. 

Brown,  Dr.  John  F.,  University  of  Iowa,  Iowa  City. 

Bryant,  Dr.  W.  M.,  Webster  Groves,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Carson,  Professor  L.  C.,  Indiana  State  University,  Bloomington. 

Colvin,  Professor  S.  S.,  University  of  Illinois,  Urbana. 

Craighead,  President  E.  B.,  Warrensburg,  Mo. 

Daniels,  Professor  A.  H.,  University  of  Illinois,  Urbana. 

Davies,  Dr.  A.  E.,  Ohio  State  University,  Columbus. 

Dewey,  Professor  John,  University  of  Chicago. 

Dodson,  Dr.  G.  R.,  2110  Waverley  Place,  St.  Louis. 

Elkin,  Dr.  W.  B.,  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia. 

Ellis,  Professor  Frederick  W.,  Washburn  College,  Topeka,  Kansas. 

Ellwood,  Professor  Charles  A.,  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia. 

Fracker,  Professor  G.  C.,  Coe  College,  Cedar  Rapids,  Iowa. 

French,  Professor  F.  C.,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln. 

Fruit,  Professor  J.  P. ,  William  Jewell  College,  Liberty,  Mo. 

Gore,  Dr.  W.  C.,  Chicago  City  Normal  School. 

Heidel,  Professor  W.  A.,  Iowa  College,  Grinnell. 

Hill,  Professor  A.  Ross,  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia. 

Hinman,  Professor  Edgar  L.,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln. 

Hogg,  Professor  Archibald,  University  of  Kansas,  Lawrence. 

Huey,  Dr.  Edmund  B.,  Miami  University,  Oxford,  Ohio. 

Hugh,  Professor  D.  D.,  State  Normal  School,  Greeley,  Colorado. 

Johnson,  Dr.  Thomas  M.,  Osceola,  Mo. 

King,  President  H.  C.,  Oberlin  College,  Oberlin,  Ohio. 

Knowlton,  President  P.  G.,  Fargo,  N.  D. 

Libby,  Professor  M.  F.,  University  of  Colorado,  Boulder. 

Lindley,  Professor  E.  H.,  Indiana  State  University,  Bloomington. 

Lloyd,  Professor  A.  H.,  University  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor. 

Lovejoy,  Professor  A.  O.,  Washington  University,  St.  Louis. 

Luckey,  Professor  G.  W.  A. ,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln. 

Major,  Professor  David  R.,  Ohio  State  University,  Columbus. 

MacLennan,  Professor  S.  F.,  Oberlin  College,  Oberlin,  Ohio. 

MacMillan,  Dr.  D.  P.,  Board  of  Education,  Chicago,  111. 

Meyer,  Professor  Max,  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia. 

Millard,  Professor  Clara,  Iowa  College,  Grinnell. 


540  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

Moore,  Professor  A.  W. ,  University  of  Chicago. 
Ogden,  Dr.  R.  M.,  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia. 
O'Shea,  Professor  M.  V.,  University  of  Wisconsin,  Madison. 
Patrick,  Professor  G.  T.  W.,  University  of  Iowa,  Iowa  City. 
Pillsbury,  Professor  W.  B. ,  University  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor. 
Powers,  Professor  J.  H.,  Doane  College,  Crete,  Neb. 
Raub,  Professor  W.  L.,  Knox  College,  Galesburg,  111. 
Rebec,  Professor  George,  University  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor. 
Rogers,  Professor  A.  K.,  Butler  College,  Irvington,.  Ind. 
Ross,  Professor  E.  A.,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln. 
Scott,  Professor  W.  H.,  Ohio  State  University,  Columbus. 
Seashore,  Professor  Carl  E. ,  University  of  Iowa,  Iowa  City. 
Sharp,  Professor  Frank,  University  of  Wisconsin,  Madison. 
Sheldon,  Walter  L.,  4065  Delmar  Avenue,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 
Sherman,  Dean  L.  A.,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln. 
Slocum,  President  W.  F.,  Colorado  College,  Colorado  Springs. 
Smith,  Professor  Walter,  Lake  Forest  University,  Lake  Forest,  111. 
Stephens,  Chancellor  D.  S.,   Kansas  City  University,  Kansas  City. 
Stuart,  Dr.  H.  W.,  University  of  Iowa,  Iowa  City. 
Swenson,  Mr.  David,  University  of  Minnesota,  Minneapolis. 
Swift,  Professor  E.  J.,  Washington  University,  St.  Louis. 
Templin,  Professor  Olin,  University  of  Kansas,  Lawrence. 
Thilly,  Professor  Frank,  University  of  Missouri,  Columbia. 
Thompson,  President  J.  H.,  Tarkio  College,  Tarkio,  Mo. 
Tufts,  Professor  J.  H.,  University  of  Chicago. 
Turner,  Professor  William,  Saint  Paul  Seminary,  St.  Paul,  Minn. 
Wenley,  Professor  R.  M. ,  University  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor. 
Wilde,  Professor  Norman,  University  of  Minnesota,  Minneapolis. 
Williams,  Dr.  Mabel  Clare,  Iowa  State  University,  Iowa  City. 
Wolfe,  Dr.  H.  K.,  Lincoln,  Nebraska. 


DISCUSSIONS. 

THE  PHYSICAL  AND  THE  PSYCHICAL. 

THE  criticism  which  Miss  Andrus  has  made  of  the  point  of  view 
set  forth  in  my  various  articles  on  the  psychical  and  the  physical 
merits  a  reply.  She  finds  "four  distinct  and  mutually  incompatible 
positions  ' '  in  my  writings,  and  says  that  they  grow  out  of  ' '  a  funda- 
mental ambiguity  and  shifting  of  meaning  of  the  chief  terms 
employed."  l 

This  raises  a  question  which  has  been  present  in  the  writer's  mind 
from  the  first  in  his  attempts  to  throw  light  on  the  problem — the  ques- 
tion of  terminology.  It  is  not  strange  that  the  critic  finds  the  problem 
approached  from  diverse  points  of  view,  since  this  was  the  deliberate 
intent  of  the  writer.  The  issue  concerns  the  alleged  ambiguity  and 
incompatibility  of  the  terms  used. 

Professor  Herrick  has  called  the  mind-matter  problem  "the  Great 
Bad ' '  in  modern  metaphysics,  because  of  the  unformulated  assump- 
tions and  flagrant  contradictions  which  lurk  in  the  very  language  we 
are  compelled  to  use,  if  we  are  to  speak  of  the  subject  at  all.  Nothing 
has  impressed  the  writer  more  forcibly  from  the  beginning  than  the 
great  difficulty  of  expressing  one's  self  intelligibly  in  discussing  the 
problem.  It  was  his  original  intention  to  begin  by  showing  up  some 
of  the  inconsistencies  of  current  theories  on  the  subject ;  but  this  plan 
was  abandoned  on  the  principle  that  the  best  way  to  remove  false 
theories  is  to  erect  true  ones  in  their  stead.  Moreover,  it  was  recog- 
nized that  the  only  true  method  is  that  of  immanent  criticism  which, 
in  the  case  of  the  prevailing  doctrine  on  the  subject,  is  impossible 
because  the  error  lies,  not  in  the  arguments  used,  but  in  the  presup- 
positions involved  in  the  terms  themselves. 

The  matter  is  an  exceedingly  important  one,  and  one  calling  for  the 
greatest  skill  in  logical  and  psychological,  if  not  philological,  analy- 
sis, in  order  to  treat  it  adequately.  The  present  writer  cannot  hope 
to  do  more  than  indicate  the  nature  of  the  problem  as  it  appears  to  him. 

Before  going  further,  however,  it  may  be  said  here  that  all  that  is 

written  in  the  articles  criticized  was  intended  seriously.     It  was  not 

meant  as  a  joke,  nor  written  merely  to  make  copy.     The  writer  did 

his  best  at  that  time  to  express  his  serious  beliefs.     He  is  still  open  to 

1  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW,  Vol.  XIII,  No.  4  (July),  p.  429. 

541 


542  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

conviction.  These  remarks  are  made  for  the  reassurance  of  the  critic, 
who  seems  to  be  in  doubt  on  the  point. 

A  famous  German  philologist  has  said  that  language  is  but  a  dic- 
tionary of  faded  metaphors.  Some  are  more  obviously  metaphorical 
than  others,  but  words  are,  after  all,  in  the  last  analysis,  merely 
reduced  acts.  And  just  as  our  various  modes  of  behavior  become 
grafted  one  upon  another,  producing  in  habit  a  sort  of  composite  pho- 
tograph of  all  past  reactions,  so  words,  no  matter  how  careful  we  may 
try  to  be,  represent  a  sort  of  composite  photograph,  at  once  preserving 
and  blurring  the  ideas  of  the  past. 

Nowhere  is  this  clearer  than  in  the  case  of  all  the  terms  used  to 
describe  our  spiritual  life,  which  terms  have  found  their  way  into 
philosophy  and  psychology  with  all,  or  with  most,  of  the  ambiguities 
which  they  have  in  ordinary  usage.  Such  terms  as  '  experience, ' 
'consciousness,'  ' function,'  ' tension'  are  illustrations. 

What  is  "experience'  ?  It  is  used  in  the  articles  by  the  present 
writer  in  the  most  general  sense  possible,  as  identical  with  the  whole 
of  reality.  Whether  this  is  a  defensible  use  of  the  term  is,  of  course, 
a  question  admitting  of  discussion.  But  it  would  seem  that  this  is  at 
least  an  intelligible  use  of  the  term. 

Now,  it  is  perfectly  compatible  with  such  a  use,  to  describe  expe- 
rience as  'process,'  as  'activity,'  or  even  as  'energy,'  though  this 
last  was  not  done  without  an  explicit  proviso.  To  be  sure,  this 
is  to  describe  concrete  experience  in  terms  of  an  abstraction.  But 
even  to  call  experience  "concrete"  is  to  use  an  abstraction.  One 
cannot  say  anything  without  using  abstractions.  It  is  the  very  nature 
of  a  proposition  to  abstract  and  hold  in  tension  predicate  and  subject, 
while,  at  the  same  time  and  in  that  very  act,  they  are  being  referred 
to  each  other.  '  Activity, '  '  process, '  even  '  experience  '  itself,  in 
one  sense,  is  an  abstraction.  If  we  are  going  to  philosophize  at  all, 
we  are  compelled  to  operate  with  abstractions  or  partial  aspects. 
But  one  abstraction  may  be  more  fundamental  than  another  abstrac- 
tion, and  we  may  seek  to  show  the  morphology,  as  it  were,  of  our 
abstractions,  while  recognizing  that,  in  the  end,  so  long  as  we  are 
making  any  statements  at  all,  they  must  remain  abstractions  and  can- 
not be  the  full  reality. 

This  is  one  of  the  difficulties  which  has  doubtless  baffled  every 
writer  in  his  attempt  to  express  himself  on  a  question  of  ultimate  or 
philosophical  significance  —  how  to  state  something  which  in  its  full 
reality  is  essentially  unstateable,  how  to  express  one's  view  of  the 
matter  when  one  is  certain  that  the  very  fact  of  stating  it,  distorts  and 
depletes  it. 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  543 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  term  '  function,'  which  the  critic 
declares  to  be  used  inconsistently.  The  term  is  defined  by  the  writer 
as  " orderly,  continuous  activity  with  reference  to  an  end."  The 
critic  objects  that  this  definition  is  "made  from  the  biological  stand- 
point," and  objects  to  the  application  to  experience  at  large  of 
abstractions  made  from  the  point  of  view  of  special  fields  of  inquiry 
like  the  different  sciences. 

But  if  philosophy  is  anything,  it  is  the  attempt  to  do  just  this :  to 
interpret  experience  in  general  in  terms  of  a  synthesis  of  the  abstrac- 
tions of  the  special  sciences.  Each  science  itself  represents  only  a 
special  mode  of  experience.  Each  science  represents  an  abstraction. 
Its  significance  for  concrete  experience,  then,  can  only  be  got  by 
bringing  it  into  the  common  clearing-house  of  philosophy  with  other 
similar  abstractions,  where  they  may  all  be  adjusted  in  some  mutual 
synthesis. 

The  articles  criticized  are  an  attempt  at  such  a  synthesis.  And  if, 
as  the  critic  finds,  the  term  '  function  '  is  used  in  three  different  senses 
in  the  articles,  it  seems  that  the  author  has  at  least  been  successful  in 
bringing  them  together.  Whether  his  particular  view  of  the  synthesis 
is  adequate  or  not,  is,  of  course,  another  question. 

The  critic  has  touched  the  nerve  of  the  terminological  difficulty  in 
this  criticism  of  the  concept  of  ' function.'  The  author,  in  com- 
paring the  psychical  and  the  physical  to  the  complementary  concepts 
of  function  and  structure,  speaks  of  the  conscious  acts  as  tensional  and 
the  unconscious  acts  as  relatively  equilibrated.  A  reconsideration  of 
the  passage,  in  the  light  of  the  criticism,  has  led  the  author  to  see  that 
the  matter  is  there  stated  in  a  misleading  way.  But  the  author  still 
feels  that  the  meaning  is  clear  enough  and  is  perfectly  consistent  with 
the  other  arguments  presented.  Conscious  acts  are  tensional  acts, 
/.  e. ,  acts  in  which  the  psychical  and  the  physical  aspects  come  into 
opposition.  Other  acts,  as  is  clearly  enough  stated  in  several  places, 
are  pre-conscious  or  pre-reflective ;  they  belong  to  an  immediate  type 
of  experience  which  is  neither  psychical  nor  physical,  or  may  be  said 
to  be  both.  Instinct  and  habit  are  such  immediate  types  of  experi- 
ence, and  the  fact  that  they  at  the  present  time  figure  equally  in  bio- 
logical and  in  psychological  discussions  bears  out  the  contention  here 
made,  that  they  are  modes  of  experience  in  which  are  merged  the 
phases  which,  in  conscious  life,  are  held  apart. 

Moreover,  the  author  took  distinct  pains  to  avoid  this  possible 
interpretation  of  this  very  passage,  by  adding  as  a  concluding  remark, 
that  "instead  of  saying  that  the  psychical  is  the  functioning  of  the 


544  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

physical,  it  would  be  truer  to  say  that  the  psychical  and  the  physical 
are  constituent  and  correlative  functions  within  experience"  (PHILO- 
SOPHICAL REVIEW,  XII,  p.  301).  On  page  303,  it  is  distinctly  indi- 
cated that  the  application  of  the  term  '  physical '  to  this  equilibrated 
state  is  a  concession  to  ordinary  usage.  Again,  it  ought  to  have  been 
clear  from  a  reading  of  the  discussion  in  the  immediate  context  (on 
pp.  309  f. )  that  there  was  no  intention  of  identifying  reality  with 
the  physical  or  of  identifying  experience  with  the  psychical  (the  two 
charges  made  by  the  critic).  In  this  passage,  the  difference  between 
consciousness  and  habit  is  distinctly  referred  to  as  the  difference 
between  a  "  tensional  equilibrium  "  and  a  "  relatively  stable  equilib- 
rium." Here,  obviously,  the  distinction  between  the  two  is  one  of 
degree  of  explicitness  of  the  factors  in  tension.  They  could  not  be  in 
equilibrium  without  at  least  the  possibility  of  their  being  in  tension, 
and,  conversely,  their  being  in  tension  is  at  the  same  time  a  state  of 
relatively  unstable  equilibrium. 

Nowhere  does  the  author  say,  what  the  critic  represents  him  as  say- 
ing, that  the  " physical  and  psychical  are  distinct  modes  of  existence" 
(italics  not  mine,  p.  435).  This  is  the  exact  position  that  the  articles 
set  out  to  combat.  The  critic  seems  to  the  author  to  have  subordinated 
the  statements  which  clearly  set  forth  the  main  argument  of  the  articles 
to  certain  minor  passages  which,  it  must  be  conceded,  are  open  to  the 
interpretation  which  she  has  put  upon  them,  and  which  the  author  has 
taken  this  opportunity  of  setting  right.  One  cannot  say  everything 
at  once,  and,  in  a  controversy  where  it  is  so  difficult  to  say  anything 
intelligible  at  all  and  still  use  the  terms  of  common  speech,  it  is  a 
source  of  gratification  to  the  author  that  the  errors  detected  have  been 
in  details  rather  than  in  any  of  the  fundamental  postulates. 

Once  more,  consider  the  term  '  tension, '  which  comes  in  for  a 
good  share  of  the  "ambiguity,"  and  thus  of  the  criticism.  The  critic 
objects  that,  in  one  place,  this  term  is  significant  only  for  the  intelli- 
gence that  makes  it,  and  is  thus  methodological  only,  while  in  another 
place  it  is  given  ontological  value.  Here  is  a  good  illustration  of  the 
impossibility  of  escaping  the  thrall  of  the  very  conceptions  one  is  try- 
ing to  transcend.  In  defending  a  functional  view  of  experience  and 
of  all  its  categories,  one  does  not  deny  a  validity  to  the  ontological 
category ;  he  simply  tries  to  give  it  a  defensible  meaning.  He  shows 
that  experience  becomes  conceived  in  terms  of  existence  only  when  it 
is  proving  inadequate  as  a  progressive  activity.  This  is  not  to  deny 
that  the  activity  is  existent ;  it  denies  only  that  it  is  existent  in  the 
static  sense  of  the  term. 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSJONS.  545 

In  this  sense  it  may  be  said  (what  the  critic  seems  to  object  to  the 
most)  that  reality  is  experience,  existence  is  meaning,  significance, 
utility.  If  I  am  going  to  predicate  anything  whatever  of  bare  existence 
or  of  blank  reality,  whither  can  I  go  better  than  to  experience  for  the 
predicates  ?  To  make  the  statement  at  all  is,  of  course,  in  so  far  forth 
to  put  apart  what  are  fully  real  only  when  together,  but  if  this  tempo- 
rary putting  apart  is  necessary  to  their  really  being  together,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  what  else  one  could  do. 

To  the  objection  mat  the  relation  of  the  psychical  and  the  physical 
is  represented  in  various  ways,  as  the  means-end  relation,  as  the  relation 
of  existence  to  meaning,  as  the  relation  of  structure  to  function,  under 
the  figure  of  the  margin  and  focus  of  a  visual  field,  what  has  already 
been  said  will  perhaps  be  sufficient  answer.  But,  as  a  possible  further 
clarification,  it  might  be  added  that  it  is  nothing  against  the  theory 
that  all  these  various  statements  should  prove  to  be  true.  Whatever 
may  be  the  special  difficulties  involved  in  each  conception  (and  the 
author  does  not  wish  to  minimize  these),  they  all  equally  show  the 
functional  character  of  the  relation  between  the  two  factors  involved, 
and  this  is  the  main  contention  of  the  articles.  Structure  and  function, 
existence  and  meaning,  means  and  ends,  like  the  periphery  and  center 
of  a  dynamic  system,  have  significance  only  in  relation  to  one  another. 
They  appear  and  disappear  together.  They  emerge  within  what,  for 
want  of  a  better  term,  we  have  described  as  a  pre-reflective  experi- 
ence, which  is  no  more  (and  no  less)  to  be  described  in  terms  of  one 
than  in  terms  of  the  other  of  these  two  factors. 

What  this  pre-reflective  experience  may  be,  we  can  only  describe  in 
terms  of  what  it  becomes  in  our  reflective  consciousness.  And,  on 
the  scientific  principle  of  continuity,  we  extend  to  the  rest  of  the  uni. 
verse  the  psychological  law  of  tension,  which  we  find  to  be  basal  in 
the  explanation  of  what  we  call  reflective  experience,  just  as  we  do 
with  the  corresponding  laws  of  biology  and  physics.  The  only 
assumptions  underlying  the  extension  of  the  principle  in  this  way  are 

(1)  the  scientific  principle  of  the  unity  and  continuity  of  nature,  and 

(2)  the  assumption  that  reality  is  only  as  it  is  experienced. 

The  first  of  these  assumptions  may  be  passed  over  here,  as  not  being 
involved  in  the  criticism  of  the  articles.  The  second  assumption  is 
cleared  of  the  charge  of  subjective  idealism  by  the  conception  urged 
in  the  last  of  the  articles  mentioned  (as  also  in  another  article  by  the 
writer  in  the  Elementary  School  Teacher  for  February,  1904),  in 
which,  at  some  length,  the  view  is  defended  that  experience  is  not 
the  mere  private  and  limited  possession  of  any  finite  individual,  but  a 


546  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

universal  medium,  as  Professor  MacLennan  puts  it,  of  which  or  in 
which  the  individual  consciousness  is  but  a  center  of  transformation. 

The  author  is  grateful  for  the  criticism  of  details,  and  will  profit  by 
some  of  the  strictures  made.  But  his  chief  interest  is  in  the  validity 
of  the  method  which  is  at  stake.  And  none  of  these  criticisms  touch 
the  main  thesis  of  the  point  of  view  in  question,  viz.,  the  emphasis 
upon  the  functional  character  of  all  the  categories  of  experience. 
Whether  this  is  materialism  or  idealism,  will  not  matter  much  to  those 
who  are  aware  of  the  existing  ambiguity  of  these  terms.  The  impor- 
tant point  is  :  Is  it  true  ?  H.  HEATH  BAWDEN. 

VASSAR  COLLEGE. 

PROFESSOR  BAKEWELL   ON   THE   EGO. 

THE  question  of  the  nature  of  the  ego,  on  which  the  controversy 
between  Professor  Bakewell  and  myself  in  the  last  number  of  this 
journal  turns,  is  so  fundamental,  and  my  sense  of  the  desirability  of 
arguing  these  questions  out,  where  they  can  be  argued  out,  is  so  strong, 
that  I  venture  to  return  to  the  charge  and  to  discuss  Professor  Bake- 
well's  "Rejoinder"  to  my  "Reply." 

I  remark,  to  begin  with,  that  a  conception  of  the  ego  which  is 
"adequate  for  the  needs  of  the  science  of  psychology,"  but  which 
"  will  not  bear  the  strain  of  metaphysics,"  seems  to  me  a  very  equiv- 
ocal kind  of  thing.  I  prefer  to  believe  that  what  is  true  in  psychology 
will  "bear  the  strain"  of  any  metaphysical  conclusions  that  can  be 
logically  deduced  from  it. 

Now  the  ego,  it  will  be  admitted,  is  primarily  a  fact  of  psychology. 
It  does  not  follow,  of  course,  that  Professor  James's  account  of  it  as 
the  "  passing  thought  "  is  the  correct  account.  Nevertheless,  I  per- 
sonally believe  this  to  be  the  fact.  It  seems  to  me  that  Professor 
James's  positive  discussion  of  the  matter,  and  Mr.  Bradley 's  destruc- 
tive criticism  of  the  opposing  view  of  Professor  Ward,  place  almost 
beyond  doubt  the  validity  of  a  theory  which  is  simply  the  application 
to  the  ego  of  the  experientialist  method  of  modern  psychology. 

Nor  can  I  admit  that  the  difficulty  of  stating  this  theory  in  words 
which  shall  not  seem  to  contradict  it  is  a  reason  for  suspecting  its 
adequacy,  if  the  contradiction  can  be  easily  rectified  and  can  be 
shown  to  be  the  result  of  our  inveterate  tendency  to  describe  our 
experience,  not  as  it  is  in  itself,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of  later 
reflection.  When  Professor  Bakewell  spoke  of  the  subject  as  "intu- 
iting" or  "witnessing"  states  of  consciousness,  he  used  expressions 
which  contradict  the  theory,  because  '  <  intuiting  ' '  and  < '  witnessing  ' ' 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  547 

imply  the  separate  reality  of  that  which  sees  and  that  which  is  seen  — 
imply,  in  other  words,  what  I  have  called  the  "eye  theory"  of  the 
mind.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  deny  that  he  has  caught  me  in  verbal 
contradictions,  which,  if  not  quite  so  glaring  as  this,  are  at  least  not 
wholly  dissimilar  to  it.  I  confess  them  the  more  willingly,  since  I 
believe  that  a  frank  discussion  of  them  will  only  place  in  a  clearer  light 
the  essential  correctness  of  the  theory. 

Quoting  my  remark,  that  those  who  believe  in  a  non-empirical  ego 
"think  that  anything  of  which  we  can  be  aware,  not  merely  in  the 
sense  of  knowing,  but  in  the  sense  of  immediate  feeling,  requires  a  sub- 
ject to  be  aware  of  it,"  Professor  Bakewell  asks:  "Why  bring  in 
that  'we'?"  And  on  my  next  sentence,  "Thus  they  make  the 
subject  a  thing  of  which  we  cannot  be  in  any  sense  aware,"  he 
makes  the  comment,  "As  if,  on  his  own  theory,  we  could."  My 
first  impulse,  on  reading  this  comment,  was  to  exclaim :  '  <  But  of 
course  we  can ;  my  theory  is  precisely  that  the  subject  is  a  thing  of 
which  we  can  be  aware."  And  it  seemed  to  me  that  by  the  remark 
first  quoted  I  meant  that  immediate  feeling  does  not  require  a  subject 
distinct  from  itself. 

But,  on  further  reflection,  I  saw  both  that  this  was  not  what  I  had  said, 
since  I  had  affirmed  quite  distinctly  that  experience  or  immediate  feel- 
ing does  not  require  a  subject  at  all,  and  that  it  is  open  to  doubt  whether 
the  notion  of  immediate  feeling  being  its  own  subject  is  one  which  is 
capable  of  being  thought  out  clearly.  It  may  be  questioned  whether 
there  is  any  meaning  in  saying  that  immediate  feeling  feels  itself.  On 
the  other  hand,  nothing  can  be  truer  than  that  feeling  is  felt.1  Take 
pleasure,  for  example  :  the  pleasure  does  not  feel  the  pleasure,  but  the 
pleasure  is  felt.  I  incline,  therefore,  to  think  that  the  relation  of 
subject  and  object  is  not  applicable  to  immediate  feeling,  and  that  the 
expression,  "We  are  aware  of  ourselves  as  subjects,"  cannot  be 
defended  as  a  description  of  the  subject  as  it  originally  exists.  The 
subject  exists  none  the  less  as  immediate  feeling  (and  not  as  an 
unknowable  thing-in -itself  or  psychic  atom) ;  but  it  has  no  retroactive, 
self-appropriative  relation  to  itself  that  could  justify  us  in  speaking  of 
it  as  aware  of  itself.  It  is  rather  awareness  pure  and  simple — aware- 
ness of  a  definite,  qualitatively  determinate  kind.  And  the  content 
or  quality  of  the  awareness  is  as  little  separate  from,  and  the  object  of, 
the  awareness  as  the  awareness  is  the  subject  of  the  content  or  quality. 

Professor  Bakewell' s  criticism,  then,  is,  from  this  point  of  view,  per- 

1  Or  does  this  passive  form  connote  the  point  of  view  of  later  reflection  ?  See 
further  on. 


548  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

fectly  justified.  I  do  not  express  the  theory  in  terms  which  are  lit- 
erally exact.  The  literal  statement  of  the  theory  would  be  that  the 
subject,  or  we,  is  something  of  which  there  is  awareness,  though  the 
awareness  is  not  a  property  or  attribute  of  the  subject  or  we.  The 
"fresh  experience"  (/'.  e.,  immediate  feeling)  is  the  we}  this  we  is 
not  the  subject  of  an  awareness;  it  is  the  awareness  itself,  which 
needs  no  separate  subject.  Professor  Bakewell  is  therefore  perfectly 
right  in  adding  that,  on  my  theory,  we  should  in  strictness  of  speech 
say,  "There  is  simple  self-awareness,"  meaning  by  this  "awareness 
of  its  own  quality." 

But  why,  if  the  foregoing  is  correct,  do  we  so  persistently  attribute 
our  feelings  to  a  self?  If  immediate  feeling  does  not  require  a  sub- 
ject, if  it  exists  merely  as  unappropriated  awareness,  whence  our 
tendency  nevertheless  to  ascribe  it  to  a  subject,  to  say  that  'we  feel,' 
'  have  a  feeling, '  '  are  aware  of  a  feeling  '  ?  The  tendency  is  due  to 
the  fact  that  a  feeling  which  existed  at  one  moment  as  unappropriated 
awareness  may,  at  the  next  moment,  become  the  object  of  the  awareness 
of  a  reflective  state  which  itself  exists  in  an  unappropriated  way,  and 
is  the  new  we  ("  the  fresh  experience  as  it  comes  ").  It  is,  as  Pro- 
fessor James  says,  "this  trick  which  the  nascent  thought  has  of  im- 
mediately taking  up  the  expiring  thought  and  'adopting'  it,"  /.  e., 
becoming  cognitive  of  it,  which  is  at  the  bottom  of  our  ascription  of 
our  states  of  consciousness  to  a  subject.  Many  have  been  the  subjects 
which  in  the  course  of  our  history  have  constituted  our  awareness  of 
other  things.  But  the  only  ones  among  them  that  have  entered  the 
field  of  our  vision  as  psychologists  are  subjects  which  have  happened 
to  become  the  objects  of  later  states.  Hence  our  inveterate  tendency 
to  conceive  them  as  "  something  of  which  we  are  aware."  We  (the 
present  we)  were  not  aware  of  them  at  the  moment,  nor  were  they 
aware  of  themselves  as  subjects  or  as  pertaining  to  subjects ;  they  ex- 
isted solely  as  awareness  —  the  original  stuff  of  which  all  mental  facts, 
up  to  the  most  complex  and  knowing,  are  composed.  Never  has  a 
mental  fact  existed  which  in  itself  considered  was  anything  more 
than  awareness  —  awareness  of  a  certain  definite,  concrete  kind  —  and 
this  is  as  true  of  the  subject  or  ego  as  it  is  of  any  other  mental  fact. 

The  third  passage  of  mine  which  Professor  Bakewell  quotes  will 
now  be  intelligible :  ' '  The  ego  is  the  fresh  experience  as  it  comes, 
before  we  have  had  time  to  turn  round  upon  it  cognitively,  and  while 
we  —  that  is,  it  —  are  still  engaged  in  cognizing  other  things. ' '  Here 
the  identification  of  "we"  and  "it"  should  cause  no  trouble;  it 
simply  expresses  the  main  tenet  of  the  theory  that  what  we  mean  by 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  549 

we  is  the  present  state  of  consciousness.  I  call  the  latter  sometimes 
"we"  and  sometimes  "it,"  because  "we"  is  more  appropriate  to 
it  in  its  character  of  subject,  "  it  "  in  its  character  of  state  of  con- 
sciousness or  object  of  psychological  thought.  It  is  more  important 
to  notice  that  the  meaning  of  "  we  "  changes  in  the  course  of  the 
sentence.  The  first  "we"  is  the  reflective  state  which  cognizes  the 
ego,  the  second  "we"  is  the  ego  itself  as  cognizing  other  things. 
But  this,  I  think,  is  ordinary  usage,  and  the  sentence  quite  unexcep- 
tionable if  correctly  understood. 

It  might,  however,  be  contended  that  this  catholic  use  of  the  "  we  " 
implies  the  recognition  of  a  "deeper  unity"  or  identity  binding  to- 
gether the  different  phases  of  the  stream  of  consciousness,  and  that  it 
is  therefore  not  true  that  ' '  what  we  mean  by  we  is  the  present  state  of 
consciousness. ' '  I  cannot,  of  course,  agree  to  this  :  I  regard  the  usage 
as  simply  a  manner  of  speaking,  nor  would  it  occur  to  me  to  expect, 
on  the  empirical  theory,  a  different  pronoun  for  each  successive  phase 
of  the  stream  of  consciousness.  I  cannot  discuss  here  the  general 
question  of  the  nature  of  personal  identity,  but  I  may  say  that,  in  my 
opinion,  the  plain  man  never  meant  by  personal  identity  the  abstract 
and  mathematical  identity  of  an  ego  not  given  in  experience,  but  only 
the  continuity  of  the  stream  of  consciousness  and  the  relations  of  re- 
semblance and  cognition  between  its  later  and  its  earlier  phases  which 
experience  actually  reveals.  The  abstract  and  mathematical  identity 
is  an  invention  of  the  philosophers,  and  Professor  Bakewell  is  not  to 
be  congratulated  on  lending  his  countenance  to  it  so  long  after  the 
fallacy  of  the  notion  was  exposed  by  Hume.  I  must  correct  a  mis- 
understanding of  Professor  Bakewell' s  in  this  connection.  I  said  that 
an  absolute  identity  could  only  be  "feigned,"  and  added  that  the 
notion  of  identity  cannot  be  used  to  explain  the  facts  of  memory,  be- 
cause it  is  "in  reality  only  a  restatement  of  them."  To  this  Professor 
Bakewell  replies  :  "  If  a  restatement  of  the  facts,  it  is  not  a  feigned 
identity. "  No  ;  it  is  not  a  feigned  identity  if  you  mean  by  '  identity  ' 
the  relations  of  continuity,  resemblance,  and  cognition  above  referred 
to.  But  if  you  mean  something  more  than  this,  something  that  would 
explain  (or  assist  in  the  explanation  of)  memory,  if  in  short  you 
mean  a  real  identity,  then  it  is  a  "feigned  identity" — that  is 
one  for  which  there  is  no  warrant  in  the  facts.  And,  if  my  sugges- 
tion be  true  that  the  whole  notion  of  such  an  identity  is  simply  a 
sublimation  or  inexact  version  of  the  relations  of  continuity,  re- 
semblance, and  cognition  which  experience  reveals,  then  it  appears 
quite  plainly  that  the  conception  of  such  an  explanation  of  memory 


550  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

is  a  pseudo-scientific  one,  after  the  type  of  the  principle :    '  Nature 
abhors  a  vacuum.' 

That  the  transcendence  involved  in  memory  does  not  require  the  theory 
of  a  non-empirical  ego,  appears  further  from  the  fact  that  in  our  knowl- 
edge of  other  minds  we  have  a  transcendence  which  cannot  be  ex- 
plained in  this  way.  The  other  mind  and  mine  are,  even  on  Professor 
Bakewell's  theory,  not  merely  phenomenally  but  really  distinct  from 
each  other.  He  would  apparently  distinguish  kinds  and  degrees  of 
transcendence ;  in  memory  we  transcend  the  phenomenal  self,  not  the 
real  self;  in  the  knowledge  of  other  minds  "  there  is  a  kind  of  trans- 
cendence even  of  the  real  self,"  but  "the  transcendence  is  not  com- 
plete and  absolute  ..."  It  seems  to  me  that  this  is  playing  fast 
and  loose  with  identity  and  difference.  I  know  of  but  one  kind  of 
transcendence,  and  that  is  exemplified  whenever  the  object  known  is 
a  reality  distinct  from  the  state  that  knows  it.  Nor  can  the  fact  of 
this  mutual  separateness  of  mind  and  mind  be  mitigated  by  asserting 
that  they  are  not  "  wholly  cut  off  from  real  communion  with,  real  rela- 
tions to,"  each  other —  "relations  that  are  discovered  by  reason  and 
experience. ' '  That  we  have  any  immediate  experience  of  other  minds 
or  of  our  relations  to  them,  is  a  proposition  manifestly  contrary  t.o  fact. 
I  called  upon  Professor  Bakewell  to  specify  the  reasons  which,  in  the 
absence  of  immediate  experience,  justify  us  in  assuming  them.  The 
only  thing  in  his  "  Rejoinder  "  that  looks  like  a  response  to  this  invi- 
tation is  the  statement  that  "the  isolated  ego  is  a  sheer  abstraction. 
.  .  .  The  very  private  self  always  sets  part,  at  least,  of  its  meaning 
in  terms  of  other  minds."  This  statement  obviously  confuses  our 
conception  of  self,  of  which  it  is  true  that  it  always  includes  some 
conception  of  our  relation  to  other  minds,  with  the  immediate  experience 
that  constitutes  the  self,  of  which  it  is  not  true  that  it  ever  includes 
any  immediate  experience  of  other  minds.  The  latter  is  alone  in 
question  in  my  controversy  with  Professor  Bakewell. 

Finally,  I  must  protest  against  the  charge  of  discontinuity  which 
Professor  Bakewell  brings  against  my  theory,  and  particularly  against 
his  description  of  it  as  an  "  atomistic  pluralism. ' '  Pluralism  it  is — 
that  is,  I  conceive  the  distinguishable  parts  of  the  world  to  be  distinct 
as  to  their  reality — but  I  assume  no  atomistic  discreteness  ;  one  phase 
of  the  stream  of  consciousness  merges  into  another,  and  the  separate 
streams  are  continuous  through  the  medium  of  the  things-in-themselves 
that  divide  them.  The  psychical  world,  in  short,  is  as  little  discreet 
as  the  physical.  Discontinuity  is  Professor  Bakewell's  gloss  upon  my 
view,  not  my  own  characterization  of  it.  And  the  contradiction  he 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  55 1 

finds  between  the  '  momentary  and  fleeting '  character  of  all  things 
mental  and  the  "continuity  and  permanence  "  which  I  attribute  to 
things-in-themselves,  and  therefore  to  minds,  is  the  result  of  a  mis- 
understanding. The  "  continuity "  I  mean  is  exemplified  by  the 
continuity  of  the  stream  of  consciousness;  the  "permanence"  is  a 
relative  permanence,  due  to  the  continued  repetition  of  a  process,  and 
paralleled  (in  the  case  of  the  minds)  by  the  continued  repetition  of 
the  brain-process. 

I  do  not  wholly  disagree  with  Professor  Bakewell's  remark  that 
"  when  we  reach  the  end  of  the  [my]  book  we  are  just  ready  to  begin 
the  study  of  the  real  problem."  This  is  in  so  far  true,  that  the 
problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body  leads  up  to  that  of  the 
nature  of  consciousness,  and  requires  a  treatment  of  this  last  for  its 
full  elucidation.  But  I  said  as  much  in  my  closing  lines,  and  held 
out  the  prospect  of  a  later  work  dealing  with  the  nature  of  conscious- 
ness. As  regards  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body,  of 
course  I  cannot  admit  that ' '  the  way  is  barred  by  his  [my]  conception  of 
the  ego  ' '  ;  what  would  rather,  in  my  opinion,  effectually  bar  the  way 
would  be  the  (as  I  think)  unwarranted  and  unscientific  conception  of 
a  non-empirical  ego  which  Professor  Bakewell  recommends.  He  says 
that  "  the  puzzle  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body  returns  in  the  form  : 
How  can  I  influence  perception  in  another  consciousness?"  This 
question  is  not  free  from  ambiguity.  In  one  sense,  I  have  already 
answered  it  by  saying  that  the  two  minds  are  parts  of  a  continuous 
world,  and  act  on  each  other  through  the  medium  of  the  things-in- 
themselves  that  separate  them,  in  the  same  way  in  which  the  two 
brain-processes  act  on  each  other  through  the  medium  of  interven- 
ing matter.  But  presumably  Professor  Bakewell  would  return  with  the 
question  :  How  do  the  minds  act  on  things-in-themselves,  and  how  do 
these  act  on  the  minds  ?  How,  in  short,  does  one  thing  ever  act  on 
another  ? 

I  confess  I  can  neither  offer  nor  conceive  an  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion. Whatever  other  metaphysical  ambitions  I  may  entertain,  I  do 
not,  in  my  most  sanguine  moments,  look  forward  to  a  time  when  I  shall 
be  able  to  get  beneath  the  separateness  of  minds  and  of  things-in- 
themselves,  and  explain  how  influence  passes  about  among  them.  I 
consider  that  the  utmost  we  can  do  is  to  ascertain  the  order  in  which 
it  does  actually  pass  about,  and  that,  when  we  have  done  this,  we  have 
formulated  an  ultimate  fact  which  neither  science  nor  metaphysics  will 
ever  succeed  in  getting  beneath  or  explaining.  Least  of  all  does  it 
seem  to  me  that  the  explanation  of  action  by  means  of  "  underlying 


552  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

unities  "  sheds  any  light  on  the  matter.  Such  "  unities  "  are  in  truth 
only  a  hypostatization  of  the  facts,  and  must,  therefore,  fail  in  the 
occasionalist  office  they  are  called  in  to  perform.  I  think  an  instruc- 
tive analogy  might  be  drawn  between  the  method  of  explanation  in 
metaphysics  which  consists  in  submerging  phenomenally  separate 
things  in  "underlying  unities,"  and  the  employment  of  non-phenom- 
enal principles  of  explanation  in  physical  science. 

But  if  the  very  conception  of  an  explanation  of  action  is  a  mistaken 
one,  then  I  have  already  done  all  I  could  reasonably  be  expected  to 
do  in  reducing  the  connection  of  mind  and  body  to  an  action  of  one 
mind  on  another  through  the  medium  of  things-in-themselves.  This 
reduction  explains  the  connection  in  its  main  outlines.  That  it 
explains  all  its  details,  e.  g.,  the  relation  of  consciousness  to  the  molec- 
ular structure  of  the  cortex,  I  have  never  thought  of  maintaining. 

C.  A.  STRONG. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 

PROFESSOR   STRONG   ON   THE   PASSING   THOUGHT. 

BEFORE  reverting  to  the  central  issue  in  the  discussion  between 
Professor  Strong  and  myself,  I  should  like  to  enter  a  protest,  in  all 
courtesy,  against  being  clubbed  with  the  names  of  the  mighty. 
Philosophus  dixit  is  hardly  more  admissible  as  an  argumentative  instru- 
ment when  Hume,  or  James  —  or  even  "the  plain  man"  — is  made 
to  play  the  role  of  philosophus  than  it  was  in  mediaeval  times,  when 
that  part  was  assigned  to  Aristotle.  It  is  always  a  double-edged 
instrument.  For  example,  many  are  the  reverend  names  one  might 
invoke  of  philosophers  who  have  committed  the  unpardonable  sin  of 
regarding  Hume's  account  of  "  identity  "  as  incomplete. 

That  the  ego  is  ' '  primarily  a  fact  of  psychology, ' '  is  true  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  it  might  be  averred  that  matter  is  primarily  a  fact 
of  physics  and  chemistry,  and  in  no  other.  But  every  special  science, 
psychology  not  excepted,  deals  with  experience,  or  with  groups  of  facts 
within  experience,  from  a  deliberately  selected,  and  in  so  far  partial, 
point  of  view.  It  thereby  gains  in  defmiteness  and  precision,  but  at 
the  cost  of  remaining  cut  off  from  the  world  of  experience  in  all  the 
fulness  of  its  concrete  reality.  To  get  back  to  this  world,  these  partial 
points  of  view  must  be  correlated,  the  synoptic  view  of  the  several 
sciences  must  be  discovered  by  the  more  inclusive  science,  that  is,  by 
metaphysics.  Now  nothing  is  more  obvious  than  that  a  conception 
may  work  well,  and  be  thoroughly  adequate  for  the  needs  of  a  special 
science,  which  none  the  less  fails  to  reach  the  root  of  the  matter,  and 
remains  incomplete  and  inadequate  when  we  pass  on  to  the  more  com- 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  553 

prehensive  science.  Thus,  for  example,  as  Professor  Strong  has  shown 
in  his  book,  modern  scientific  conceptions  of  matter  are  far  enough 
removed  from  the  ordinary  conception  of  the  unscientific  man.  Yet 
the  latter  suffices,  at  least  quite  as  well  as  the  former,  for  the  plain 
needs  of  every-day  life  —  for  buying  and  selling,  sowing  and  reaping, 
and  leading  the  life  of  the  good  citizen.  Again,  the  metaphysical 
conception  of  matter  which  he  develops  is  equally  remote  from  that  of 
the  scientist.  And  yet  I  suppose  Professor  Strong  would  hardly  think 
of  maintaining  that,  for  the  development  of  natural  science,  the  physi- 
cist, for  example,  should  accept  his  conception  of  matter  as  "  phenom- 
ena which  are  symbols  of  things-in -themselves,"  which  latter  are  to  be 
conceived  after  the  analogy  of  consciousness.  And  so  it  is  legitimate  to 
separate  the  question  as  to  the  metaphysical  sufficiency  of  the  concep- 
tion of  the  ego  as  the  passing  thought,  from  that  of  its  adequacy  for  the 
needs  of  the  science  of  psychology,  precisely  as  is  done  by  the  father 
of  the  theory  in  question.  That  theory,  he  holds,  is  at  all  events 
adequate  for  "  expressing  the  subjective  phenomena  of  consciousness 
as  they  appear,"  but  he  explicitly  waives  the  question  as  to  its  suffi- 
ciency for  other  and  more  metaphysical  demands.1  Therefore,  until 
Professor  James  himself  faces  the  problem  which  in  his  psychology  he 
expressly  waives,  I  deem  it  not  pertinent  to  draw  him  into  the  discus- 
sion, or  to  make  him  sponsor  for  Professor  Strong's  metaphysics.  I 
for  one  am  looking  forward  with  keen  anticipation  to  the  metaphysics 
of  Professor  James's  forthcoming  book,  and  I  expect  it  to  be  quite  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  we  are  considering,  for  there  are  not  wanting 
in  his  recent  utterances  evidences  of  dissatisfaction  with  a  certain 
absolutism  that  has  crept  into  the  very  camp  of  the  '  flowing  philos- 
ophers. ' 

The  sole  question  now  before  us,  as  I  conceive  the  matter,  relates 
to  the  consistency,  adequacy,  and  intelligibility  of  Professor  Strong's 
metaphysical  use  of  the  '  passing  thought '  theory  of  the  ego,  —  of  his 
conception  that  the  true  nature  of  the  ego  is  sufficiently  described  as 
the  passing  thought ;  that,  as  such,  it  is  real,  and  is  in  fact  our  only 
type  of  reality.  My  excuse  for  continuing  the  discussion  is  that  his 
lucidity  of  statement,  and  his  frank  endeavor  to  stand  by  his  guns,  only 
make  it  the  clearer  that  his  view,  when  made  consistent  and  freed 
from  ambiguity,  reveals  its  own  limitations.  I  have  not  attempted, 
and  shall  not  attempt,  to  develop  a  rival  theory  of  the  ego  —  which, 
indeed,  in  the  brief  space  allowed  me  by  the  editor  of  this  journal 
would  be  out  of  the  question  —  and  the  most  that  could  be  said  is 
1  James,  Psychology,  I,  p.  344 ;  cf.  p.  401  et passim. 


554  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

that  my  criticisms  indicate  the  direction  in  which  I  believe  one  must 
look  for  the  complementary  aspect  of  the  situation  which  Professor 
Strong  ignores. 

The  two  most  striking  features  of  Professor  Strong's  view  of  the 
self  are  (i)  his  attempt  consistently  to  hold  to  the  view  that  the 
nature  of  the  ego  is  to  be  read  in  terms  of  sheer  immediacy,  and 
his  consequent  reduction  of  the  passing  thought  to  the  passing  feel- 
ing; and  (2)  his  doctrine  that  the  ego  thus  regarded  is  reality,  our 
only  sample  of  it,  and  the  only  type  of  reality  we  can  conceive  of. 

With  regard  to  the  first  point,  my  contention  is  that  it  is  difficult,  if 
not  altogether  impossible,  to  state  the  view  without  using  terms  which 
contradict  it.  Professor  Strong  admits  the  difficulty  and  offers  an  ex- 
planation which  is  a  simple  evasion.  It  is  due,  he  writes,  to  "our 
inveterate  tendency  to  describe  our  experience,  not  as  it  is  in  itself, 
but  from  the  point  of  view  of  later  reflection."  But  why  should  the 
tendency  be  so  inveterate  and  so  obstinate  that,  even  when  specially 
on  one's  guard,  one  is  unable  to  free  one's  self  from  its  influence  and 
to  describe  "our  experience"  "as  it  is  in  itself"?  Furthermore, 
in  so  far  as  one  approximates  success  in  avoiding  the  contradiction 
the  conception  is  depleted  of  meaning.  Could  one  succeed  perfectly, 
the  ego  would  be  utterly  unknowable,  and  we  should  have  for  our  one 
sample  of  reality  simply  the  mystic's  ineffable  experience. 

With  regard  to  the  second  point  referred  to  above,  I  would  point 
out  that  the  pulse  of  feeling  to  which  the  ego  is  reduced  is  not  experi- 
ence but  only  an  abstract  phase  of  experience,  and  just  that  phase 
which,  by  itself  considered,  is  most  unreal. 

Moreover,  could  we  conceive  the  world  of  reality  as  made  up  of 
such  egos,  we  should  have  as  a  result  a  most  hopelessly  puzzling  onto- 
logical  atomism,  inasmuch  as  each  of  these  reals  is,  by  hypothesis,  at 
any  given  moment  absolutely  sundered  from  all  other  reals  existing  at 
the  same  time,  and  all  of  the  reals  existing  at  any  moment  are  abso- 
lutely sundered  from  reals  that  went  before  or  are  to  come  after  in 
time.  For  Professor  Strong  has  told  us  that  reason  and  experience 
give  but  the  single  isolated  ego.  It  fades  and  ceases  to  be,  though 
another  ego  may  appear  as  its  heir,  so  to  speak,  and  in  some  myste- 
rious way  possess  its  life  in  memory.  Imagination,  under  the  lead  of 
instinct,  may  people  the  world  with  many  such  egos,  and  interpolate 
many  lesser  egos  called  things-in-themselves.  But  each  one,  so  far  as 
reason  and  experience  are  concerned,  is  shut  in  its  separate  sphere. 
The  world  of  reality  thus  is  granular  in  structure,  and  the  granules  are 
ephemeral,  and  between  them  instinct  alone  is  the  bridge.  Professor 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  555 

Strong  resents  the  charge  of  atomism.  He  believes  that  "  influence 
passes  about ' '  among  minds  and  things  in  themselves.  He  would 
escape  the  discreteness  in  time  by  resorting  to  the  metaphor  of  "  the 
stream  of  consciousness, ' '  and  he  believes  that  '  *  the  separate  streams 
are  continuous  through  the  medium  of  things  in  themselves  that  divide 
them."  I  never  meant  to  deny  that  Professor  Strong  holds  such  a 
belief,  and  I  have  called  special  attention  to  this  fact  in  my  review  of 
his  book.  By  means  of  instinct,  and  with  the  aid  of  metaphors,  the 
notion  of  continuity  is  recovered.  I  am,  however,  chiefly  concerned 
with  testing  the  conception  of  the  ego  and  of  reality  which  he  gets 
through  reliance  upon  reason  and  experience.  This  conception  must  be 
kept  apart,  and  examined  by  itself,  if  we  are  ever  to  discover  whether 
or  no  it  is  the  one  to  which  reason  limits  us,  and  which  experience 
bears  out.  This  conception  it  is  that  gives  Professor  Strong's  real 
world  its  atomic  appearance,  and  seems  to  make  the  continuity  and 
interaction  which  he  would  by  other  means  discover  unintelligible. 
But  Professor  Strong  will  reply  that  he  is  not  called  upon  to  explain 
how  ego-realities  act  upon  one  another.  Sufficient  to  show  that  they 
do,  and  the  order  in  which  they  do  so.  And  yet,  if  he  is  right  in  his 
account  of  the  ego,  we  cannot,  so  long  as  we  confine  ourselves  to  the 
testimony  of  reason  and  experience,  be  sure  that  they  do  act  on  each 
other.  Moreover,  the  that  and  the  how  cannot  be  thus  easily  sundered. 
We  never  can  be  sure  that  we  have  precisely  the  that  of  any  situation 
until  we  are  able  to  reenforce  the  that  through  an  exhibition  of  the 
how.  And,  on  scientific  principles,  we  are  certainly  debarred  from  so 
conceiving  of  the  realities  related  as  to  make  the  how  of  their  relations 
an  ultimate  mystery. 

The  history  of  natural  science  is  full  of  instructive  instances  in  this 
connection.  How  often  has  it  happened  that  the  explanation  of  rela- 
tions between  physical  occurrences  has  been  made  impossible  because 
of  an  initial  misconception  of  the  true  nature  of  the  things  related  ! 
If  a  scientist  feels  hopelessly  baffled  in  exhibiting  the  how,  that  is,  in 
discovering  and  making  intelligible  the  real  continuity  of  experience, 
he  is  likely  to  set  about  to  revise  the  conception  of  his  ultimate  reali- 
ties. And  one  thing  at  least  is  now  obvious  with  regard  to  the  phys- 
ical order,  and  that  is  that  the  isolated  item,  whether  thing,  or  atom, 
or  force,  or  what  not,  is  in  nature  nowhere  found.  Such  an  item  is  a 
pure  abstraction,  however  convenient  it  may  be  for  certain  purposes 
to  make  such  abstractions.  And  if  we  were  really  to  conceive  of  the 
unity  and  continuity  of  the  world  of  mental  realities  after  the  analogy 
of  the  physical  world,  as  Professor  Strong  professes  to  do,  it  would 


556  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

seem  as  if  the  first  thing  that  we  should  have  to  do  would  be  to  regard 
the  isolated  ego,  the  "unappropriated  awareness,"  as  an  abstraction. 
Moreover,  that  it  is  such,  appears  evident  when  one  attempts  to  clear 
the  conception  of  other  connotations,  as  Professor  Strong  does. 

The  real  —  the  < '  ego, "  *  *  subject, "  or  "  we  "  —  is  described  by  him 
as  "experience,"  as  "immediate  feeling,"  as  "awareness  pure  and 
simple,"  as  "something  of  which  there  is  awareness,"  l  as  "unappro- 
priated awareness, ' '  as  the  *  <  fresh  experience, ' '  and  as  ' '  awareness  of 
a  definite  qualitatively  determinate  kind."  •  This  immediate  feeling 
"does  not  require  a  subject;"  in  fact,  the  relation  of  subject  and 
object  is  inapplicable  to  it,  and  in  it  is  experienced  "  the  original  stuff 
of  which  all  mental  facts  are  composed." 

Now  I  am  far  from  denying  that  the  conception  of  immediacy,  of 
simple  awareness,  is  legitimate  and  can  be  made  perfectly  definite. 
Otherwise,  we  should  not  be  able  to  frame  any  clear  idea  of  feeling. 
What  I  do  deny  is  that  this  conception  can  be  regarded  as  an  adequate 
transcript  of  any  actual  experience.  It  describes  a  phase  of  experience 
merely,  which  can  be  separated  from  other  correlative  phases  in  the 
same  way  that  the  form  of  things  can  be  viewed  apart  from  their 
matter.  But  I  should  as  soon  expect  to  see  a  disembodied  triangle 
running  a  race  down  Beacon  street  with  a  disembodied  pentagon  as  to 
stumble  across,  in  actual  experience,  an  unappropriated  awareness  in 
all  its  unblushing  nakedness.  If  such  experiences  are  ever  real  they 
must  happen  in  dreamless  sleep.  And,  in  fact,  that  one  of  the 
most  significant  and  most  definitive  advances  made  by  modern  psy- 
chology, one  to  which  Professor  James  has  contributed  perhaps  more 
than  any  other  writer,  lies  precisely  in  the  establishment  of  the  truth 
that  pure  cognition,  pure  feeling,  pure  will,  are  abstractions,  and  that 
in  every  concrete  experience  these  three  phases  are  inextricably  con- 
joined. 

But  to  return  to  Professor  Strong's  statement  of  the  case.  The 
"immediate  awareness  that  constitutes  the  self"  is  first  of  all  some- 
how given,  is  the  initial  experience  that  later  is  "transcended." 
Otherwise  the  transcendence  would  itself  be  given  in  experience, 
which  he  will  not  allow.  Still  this  ego-experience  is,  on  his  showing, 
not  the  entire  experience  of  any  given  moment,  but  only  a  portion  of 
it:  that  portion,  namely,  which  "is  engaged  in  cognizing  other 

1  Is  not  this  introducing  the  contradiction  again  ?  The  more  consistent  interpreta- 
tion of  "  there  is  simple  self-awareness,"  of  which  the  phrase  in  the  text  seems  in- 
tended as  an  expansion,  would  rather  be  had  by  changing  the  hyphen  to  a  vinculum, 
and  letting  the  concepts  merge  in  one  another  :  ' '  there  is  self  that  is  awareness,  and 
awareness  that  is  self. 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  557 

things. ' '  This  cognizing  of  other  things,  however,  as  he  has  shown, 
involves  transcendence  of  immediacy.  If,  therefore,  we  are  ever  to 
find  a  sample  of  the  ' '  original  stuff  "  of  ' '  awareness  pure  and  simple, ' ' 
we  should  eliminate  this  cognizing  of  other  things.  The  "  first  expe- 
rience ' '  should  be  wholly  absorbed  in  a  blind  stare  at  vacuity  —  not 
even  defined  as  such.  The  truth  is,  however,  that  a  part  of  the  life  of 
every  feeling,  inseparable  from  it  except  by  abstraction,  is  this  refer- 
ence to  a  specific  group  of  "  other  things."  Without  this,  the  feeling 
would  lose  its  definiteness,  and  inasmuch  as  this  admittedly  involves 
transcendence,  that  transcendence  is  an  inseparable  part  of  the  definite 
feeling.  Moreover,  if  we  are  to  maintain,  as  Professor  Strong  does, 
that  this  initial  feeling-stuff  is  "awareness  of  a  definite,  qualitatively 
determinate  kind, "  is  it  not  clear  that  in  still  another  way  that  very 
awareness  involves  its  own  transcendence?  It  can  only  be  expe- 
rienced as  definite  and  qualitatively  determinate  in  so  far  as  it  is 
actually  experienced  in  contrast  with  that  by  means  of  which  it  is 
rendered  definite  and  determinate.  The  truth  is  that  in  conceiving 
it  as  thus  definite  we  are  already  occupying  "the  standpoint  of  later 
reflection  "  ;  that  is,  the  awareness  has  been  "  appropriated."  If  an 
ego-experience  were  conceivable  in  terms  of  sheer  immediacy,  and  if 
that  were  succeeded  by  another  ego-experience  similarly  immediate, 
and  if  these  were  not  held  simultaneously  in  view  and  contrasted, 
could  it  be  said  that  either  of  them  was  experienced  as  definite  ?  But 
Professor  Strong  will  probably  reply  that  I  am  confusing  the  ' '  con- 
ception of  self"  with  the  "experience  that  constitutes  the  self." 
Not  so.  I  am  merely  pointing  out  that  a  feeling  which  can  even 
be  said  to  be  experienced  as  definite  involves  thought  distinctions 
which  transcend  the  immediacy  of  experience,  that  that  very  contrast 
which  Professor  Strong  draws  is  merely  a  logical  and  methodological 
device,  precisely  analogous  to  the  contrast  between  the  that  and  the 
what  of  things,  and  possibly  a  useful  device  provided  one  is  not  mis- 
led by  it  into  fancying  that  experience  countenances  any  real  sunder- 
ment.  And  so  I  conclude  that  it  is  not  true  that  we  are  conducted 
by  reason  and  experience  to  reality  in  the  guise  of  an  isolated  ego- 
feeling,  an  unappropriated  awareness,  beyond  which  instinct  then 
carries  us,  but,  rather,  that  in  the  simplest  experience,  make  it  ap- 
proximate as  far  as  possible  the  immediacy  of  feeling,  if  it  be 
anything  definite  at  all,  as  experienced,  we  are  already  beyond  simple 
awareness. 

Professor  Strong  admits  that  there  is  another  and  a  more  ' '  catho- 
lic ' '  use  of  the  we  than  that  which  is  employed  when  the  ego  is 


558  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

viewed  as  the  passing  feeling,  but  he  lightly  dismisses  it  as  "  simply  a 
manner  of  speaking, ' '  and  adds  :  "It  would  not  occur  to  me  to  ex- 
pect, on  the  empirical  theory,  a  different  pronoun  for  each  successive 
phase  of  the  stream  of  consciousness. ' '  Perhaps  not ;  but  this  cath- 
olic we  is  not  simply  one  of  the  successive  phases  of  the  stream.  Its 
peculiar  meaning  is  given  in  the  fact  that  it  is  thought  as  transcending 
the  successive  phases  and  being  continuously  present  throughout  the 
succession.  So  Professor  Strong  writes  :  "  Many  have  been  the  sub- 
jects [egos]  which  in  the  course  of  our  history  have  mediated  our 
awareness  of  other  things.  But  the  only  ones  among  them  that  have 
entered  the  field  of  our  vision  as  psychologists  are  subjects  which  have 
happened  to  become  objects  of  later  states."  (Italics  mine.)  That 
our  is  the  inevitable  reappearance  of  the  catholic  we,  and  it  would 
certainly  seem  as  if  we  might  fairly  expect,  above  all  from  one  who 
prides  himself  on  his  empiricism,  some  more  serious  explanation  of 
such  an  inveterate  tendency. 

And,  in  passing,  I  would  remark,  that  although  Professor  Strong 
affirms  that  he  knows  but  one  kind  of  transcendence,  it  would  seem 
to  me  that,  on  the  basis  of  empiricism,  one  must  admit  that  a  very 
significant  mark  of  difference  characterizes  that  transcendence  which 
is  involved  in  passing  to  other  states  of  consciousness  which  we  can 
and  do  call  ours,  which  clearly  marks  it  off  from  the  kind  of  tran- 
scendence that  is  involved  in  passing  to  other  selves  that  we  never 
think  of  appropriating  in  the  same  way  as  'ours.'  And  when 
Professor  Strong  writes,  "That  the  transcendence  involved  in 
memory  does  not  require  the  theory  of  the  non-empirical  ego,  appears 
further  from  the  fact  that,  in  our  knowledge  of  other  minds,  we  have 
a  transcendence  which  cannot  be  explained  in  this  way, ' '  the  conclu- 
sion is  irrelevant. 

In  speaking  of  personal  identity,  Professor  Strong  remarks  that,  in  his 
opinion,  "  the  plain  man  never  meant  by  personal  identity  the  abstract 
and  mathematical  identity  of  an  ego  not  given  in  experience,  but  only 
the  continuity  of  the  stream  of  consciousness  and  the  relations  of  re- 
semblance and  cognition  between  its  later  and  its  earlier  phases  which 
experience  actually  reveals."  And  he  goes  on  to  say  that  "the  ab- 
stract and  mathematical  identity  is  an  invention  of  the  philosophers, ' ' 
and  to  score  me  for  giving  it  countenance.  As  for  the  plain  man,  I 
rather  think  that  he  would  require  a  good  deal  of  coaching  before  he 
could  grasp  the  notion  that  Professor  Strong  credits  him  with.  And 
judging  from  my  own  acquaintance  with  him,  I  should  say  that  the 
plain  man,  in  his  unreflective  purblindness,  does  come  about  as  near 


No.  5.]  DISCUSSIONS.  559 

as  one  can  to  an  abstract  and  mathematical  conception  of  identity.1 
And  the  history  of  the  development  of  human  thought,  as  this  is 
revealed  in  language  and  in  moral  codes,  as  well  as  in  the  history 
of  philosophy  proper,  seems  to  point  to  the  same  conclusion.  But 
as  for  my  own  view,  I  certainly  am  very  far  from  believing  in  a 
merely  ' '  abstract  and  mathematical ' '  identity  of  the  ego  ;  nor  have 
I  written  anything  to  warrant  the  charge,  unless,  indeed,  Professor 
Strong  proceeds  on  the  assumption  that  that  view  and  his  own  view  of 
the  ego  as  the  passing  feeling  exhaust  the  possible  alternatives.  Were 
one  confronted  with  just  this  pair  of  alternatives,  it  would  be  hard  to 
choose  between  them,  but  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  what  Professor 
Strong  calls  the  "  abstract  and  mathematical  "  identity-theory  would 
be  found  nearer  the  truth,  and  even  less  abstract,  than  that  which 
would  describe  the  ego  as  the  passing  feeling. 

CHARLES  M.  BAKEWELL. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

1  So  Professor  James,  Psychology,  I,  p.  343:  "The  theory  of  the  soul  is  the 
theory  of  popular  philosophy  and  of  scholasticism,  which  is  only  popular  philosophy 
made  systematic,"  etc. 


REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS. 

Man's  Place  in  the  Universe.     By  ALFRED  RUSSELL  WALLACE. 

New  York,  McClure,  Phillips  &  Co.,  1904.  — pp.  viii,  320. 

The  problem  which  the  author  undertakes  to  investigate  is  whether 
or  not  the  logical  inferences  to  be  drawn  from  the  various  results  of 
modern  science  lend  support  to  the  view  that  our  earth  is  the  only 
inhabited  planet,  not  only  in  the  solar  system,  but  in  the  whole  stellar 
universe.  A  thoroughgoing  review  of  such  a  book  should  be  under- 
taken only  by  an  astronomer  who  possesses  a  first  hand  knowledge  of 
the  facts  which  form  the  ground  of  the  many  inferences  of  which  Mr. 
Wallace's  long  and  careful  argument  consists.  It  is  possible,  how- 
ever, in  viewing  the  subject  from  the  standpoint  of  a  layman,  to  judge 
as  to  whether  or  not  the  conclusions  are  justified  by  the  premises,  sup- 
posing of  course  that  the  premises  rest  upon  undisputed  facts.  There- 
fore, without  challenging  Mr.  Wallace's  alleged  facts  and  general- 
izations, it  is  a  matter  of  considerable  interest  to  inquire  as  to  their 
bearing  upon  his  ultimate  conclusion  that  our  earth  is  the  only  inhabit- 
able planet  within  the  vast  stretches  of  the  universe. 

The  argument  is  based  upon  the  following  considerations,  which  can 
be  outlined  here  only  in  a  very  brief  and  general  manner,  —  merely  a 
rough  sketch  of  the  chief  points  of  his  position.  The  universe  pre- 
sents a  unity  of  structure  and  arrangement.  The  stars  are  not  infinite 
in  number  and  extent,  but  fall  within  a  single  system.  The  earth 
occupies  a  central  position  within  the  stellar  universe,  whose  outer 
bounds  are  marked  by  the  enclosing  circle  of  the  Milky  Way.  Within 
the  sweep  of  the  solar  cluster  near  the  center  of  this  vast  system,  all 
planetary  motions  are  less  rapid  and  more  controlled,  and  therefore 
there  is  less  danger  of  catastrophic  collision,  and  greater  stability  of 
conditions  is  possible.  Were  the  solar  system  nearer  or  within  the 
bounding  circle  of  the  Milky  Way,  confusion  and  instability  would 
prove  wholly  inimical  to  the  evolution  of  organic  forms  of  life,  which 
require  stable  conditions  continuing  throughout  unthinkable  aeons  of 
time.  Moreover,  throughout  the  entire  universe  there  is  evidence  of 
a  mechanical,  physical,  and  chemical  uniformity.  All  living  organisms 
such  as  appear  upon  the  earth  result  from  exceedingly  complex  com- 
binations, adaptations,  and  adjustments  within  the  scope  of  the  well- 
known  and  recognized  laws  of  nature.  The  conditions  essential  to 
life  are  solar  light  and  heat,  an  adequate  distribution  of  water  upon 

560 


REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS..  5^1 

the  earth's  surface  and  in  its  atmosphere,  alternations  of  day  and  night, 
an  equable  temperature,  a  sufficient  density  of  the  atmosphere  to 
retain  the  gases  which  are  necessary  to  the  support  of  life.  In  order 
to  maintain  these  terrestrial  conditions,  the  following  astronomical 
conditions  must  obtain  :  The  proper  distance  of  earth  from  the  sun, 
the  mass  of  the  planet  falling  within  certain  defined  limits,  the 
obliquity  of  the  ecliptic,  the  amount  of  water  as  compared  with  land, 
the  surface  distribution  of  land  and  water,  the  permanence  of  this 
distribution,  dependent  probably  on  the  unique  origin  of  our  moon 
/.  e.,  its  being  a  detached  portion  of  the  earth  leaving  behind  suitable 
ocean  basins,  an  atmosphere  of  sufficient  density  and  composed  of 
suitable  gases,  an  adequate  amount  of  dust  in  the  atmosphere,  and 
atmospheric  electricity.  Finally,  none  of  the  other  planets  of  the 
solar  system  combine  all  these  complex  conditions,  which,  upon  the 
earth,  work  harmoniously  to  the  production  and  the  support  of  life  ; 
therefore,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  the  other  planets  to  be  unin- 
habited ;  and  moreover,  the  probabilities  are  almost  as  great  against  any 
other  sun  possessing  inhabited  planets.  Such  being  the  line  of  argu- 
ment, it  will  be  readily  seen  that  the  force  of  Mr.  Wallace's  contention 
depends  upon  the  exceedingly  great  complexity  of  living  organisms, 
and  the  nice  balancing  of  conditions  which  it  is  necessary  to  maintain 
in  order  to  produce  and  preserve  such  organisms  on  any  planet,  and 
the  improbability  that  such  correlated  conditions  exist  anywhere  in 
the  universe  except  upon  our  earth.  It  may  be  well,  perhaps,  to 
have  before  us  Mr.  Wallace's  position  as  expressed  in  his  own  words  : 
"The  combinations  of  causes  which  lead  to  this  result  [the  presence 
of  living  organisms]  are  so  varied,  and  in  several  cases  dependent  on 
such  exceptional  peculiarities  of  physical  constitution  that  it  seems  in 
the  highest  degree  improbable  that  they  can  all  be  found  again  com- 
bined either  in  the  solar  system  or  even  in  the  stellar  universe  "  (p. 


This  method  of  reasoning  from  known  conditions  which  produce 
known  results  to  the  conclusion  that  the  absence  of  these  conditions 
renders  the  same  or  similar  results  impossible,  must  be  regarded  as 
possessing  cogency  only  when  extended  to  adjacent  cases.  As  re- 
gards the  cases  which  are  necessarily  so  far  removed  from  the  sphere 
of  direct  observation,  the  unknown  so  far  overbalances  the  known 
that  the  inference  as  to  what  must  be  considered  impossible  is  exceed- 
ingly precarious.  What  seems  to  be  impossible  in  a  setting  which  is 
completely  within  the  compass  of  our  knowledge,  may  be  quite  pos- 
sible in  a  setting  which  transcends  our  knowledge.  No  one  has 


562  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

brought  out  more  clearly  than  has  Mr.  Wallace  in  this  work  the  in- 
definite variety  and  unknown  possibilities  of  the  forces  of  nature. 
Under  changed  conditions,  without  violating  at  all  the  general  uni- 
formity of  nature,  other  forms  of  organisms  may  be  evolved  which 
the  limited  conditions  prevailing  upon  the  earth  will  not  allow,  and 
which  our  limited  experience  can  not  even  conceive.  We  have  been 
reminded  very  forcibly  of  late  that  new  discoveries  produce  many 
revolutionary  movements  within  the  general  body  of  received  opin- 
ions. How  tremendously  have  the  Roentgen  rays  and  the  radio-activ- 
ity of  radium  changed  our  views  as  to  the  possibilities  of  physical 
forces.  Moreover,  as  regards  the  stellar  motions,  it  was  held  to  be  a 
matter  of  most  obvious  certainty  that  they  were  to  be  accounted  for 
solely  by  the  laws  of  gravitation.  This  position,  however,  has 
been  recently  questioned.  The  following,  which  Mr.  Wallace  has 
quoted  in  the  work  before  us,  bears  testimony  to  a  radical  shifting  of 
fundamental  considerations  :  "I  doubt  whether  the  principal  phe- 
nomena of  the  stellar  universe  are  consequences  of  the  law  of  gravi- 
tation at  all.  I  have  been  working  myself  at  spiral  nebulae,  and 
have  got  a  first  approximation  to  an  explanation  —  but  it  is  electro- 
dynamical  and  not  gravitational.  In  fact,  it  may  be  questioned 
whether,  for  bodies  of  such  tremendous  extent  as  the  Milky  Way  or 
nebulae,  the  effect  which  we  call  gravitation  is  given  by  Newton's 
law  ;  just  as  the  ordinary  formulae  of  electrostatic  attraction  break  down 
when  we  consider  charges  moving  with  very  great  velocities' '  (p.  292) . 
This  statement  is  taken  from  a  letter  of  Mr.  E.  T.  Whittaker,  Secre- 
tary to  the  Royal  Astronomical  Society,  written  in  reply  to  certain 
questions  which  had  been  sent  out  by  Mr.  Wallace  to  various  men  of 
science.  Now,  inasmuch  as  such  changes  in  the  fundamental 
conception  of  the  constitution  of  matter  and  the  nature  of  physical 
forces  have  taken  place,  and  are  taking  place,  is  it  not  reasonable  to 
insist  that  the  possibilities  of  unknown  conditions  which  may  obtain 
in  unknown  regions  are  wholly  incalculable  ?  It  is  extremely  hazard- 
ous to  state  any  exact  limits  which  even  present  known  conditions  may 
be  regarded  as  necessitating.  The  possibility  of  variation,  of  new 
developments,  of  the  manifestation  of  newly  discovered  properties  in 
connection  with  phenomena  of  exceedingly  great  complexity  must  be 
reckoned  with. 

Moreover,  essential  conditions  so  regarded  might  prove  to  be  unes- 
sential, or  at  least  capable  of  radical  modification,  if  only  the  horizon 
of  knowledge  were  lifted  somewhat.  And  even  in  the  world  of  sci- 
ence at  present,  there  is  much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  are  to 


No.  5.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS. 

be  regarded  as  essential  conditions  in  reference  to  certain  phenomena. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  question  as  to  the  age  of  the  earth  upon  which 
we  live.  The  geologist  tells  us  that  at  least  two  hundred  millions  of 
years  are  required ;  the  physicist,  on  the  other  hand,  tells  us  that  the 
life  of  the  sun  cannot  be  stretched  to  nearly  that  number  of  years. 
Lord  Kelvin  says :  ' '  It  would,  I  think,  be  exceedingly  rash  to  assume 
as  probable  anything  more  than  twenty  million  years  of  the  sun's  light 
in  the  past  history  of  the  earth,  or  to  reckon  more  than  five  or  six 
million  years  of  sunlight  for  time  to  come."  l 

Such  radical  difference  of  opinion  naturally  gives  us  pause  when 
we  undertake  to  state  just  what  can  and  cannot  come  to  pass  in 
regions  and  ages  which  lie  wholly  beyond  our  ken.  If  we  cannot 
easily  interpret  the  past  when  we  have  the  data  before  our  eyes,  how 
can  we  expect  to  interpret  the  future  or  the  far  remote  when  we  are 
precluded  from  knowing  so  vast  an  amount  of  the  data. 

Mr.  Wallace  no  doubt  would  take  exception  to  our  strictures  upon 
his  argument  on  the  ground  that  the  progress  of  science  has  been  so 
uniform  and  so  comprehensive  as  to  determine  quite  definitely  the 
essential  conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled  in  order  that  living  organ- 
isms should  be  produced  and  preserved.  In  the  marvelous  advance  of 
knowledge,  however,  we  have  as  yet  before  us  great  and  undiscovered 
countries  whose  outskirts  we  have  not  commenced  to  penetrate.  What 
is  known  of  the  potential  properties  of  matter,  and  the  forces  of  nature 
whose  operations  are  still  undisclosed  ?  Is  our  scientific  knowledge 
such  as  to  set  a  necessary  limit  to  the  nature  and  scope  of  such  forces, 
should  they  be  discovered  ?  We  think  not.  The  difficulty  of  inter- 
preting comprehensively  any  known  conditions,  even  of  the  simplest 
nature,  should  deter  us  from  too  dogmatic  conclusions  concerning 
hypothetical  relations  under  unknown  conditions. 

Moreover,  it  is  quite  impossible  for  us  to  know  certainly  that  mind 
manifests  itself  only  through  the  medium  of  brain  structure  central  to 
a  highly  developed  living  organism.  There  may  be  other  forms  which 
intelligible  beings  assume  in  the  outer  confines  of  the  universe.  This 
is,  of  course,  merely  conjectural ;  nevertheless,  the  mere  possibility  of 
unknown  forms,  through  whose  media  thought  may  find  expression, 
should  cause  us  to  hesitate  in  our  inferences  as  to  what  does,  and  what 
does  not,  transcend  the  sphere  of  the  possible,  or  even  of  the  probable. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

1  Quoted  by  Wallace,  p.  275. 


564  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Grundriss  der  Religionsphilosophie.  Von  A.  DORNER.  Leipzig, 
Verlag  der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1903.  — pp.  xviii,  448. 
This  book  may  be  commended  to  those  who  have  fancied  that  the 
day  was  past  when  vigorous  speculative  thinking  could  be  reckoned 
among  the  products  of  Germany.  Dr.  Dorner  is  a  metaphysician  in 
the  full  sense  of  the  word — the  sense  in  which  it  could  be  applied  to 
a  Fichte  or  a  Schopenhauer,  and  he  is  quite  ready  to  give  a  reason  for 
the  philosophic  faith  that  is  in  him.  His  work  is  comprehensive  and 
thorough,  and  while  some  readers  may  think  that  he  has  not  entirely 
overcome  all  the  difficulties  in  his  path,  they  will  hardly  be  able  to 
complain  that  he  has  failed  to  confront  and  grapple  with  them. 

In  Dr.  Dorner' s  view,  a  philosophy  of  religion  must  be  based  upon 
a  metaphysic,  and  this,  in  turn,  implies  an  idealistic  and  in  some  sort  a 
monistic  conception  of  reality.  Religion  itself  originates  in,  and  is 
conditioned  by,  the  impulse  of  the  human  reason  to  transcend  the 
dualism  of  the  phenomenal  world,  through  its  recognition  of  that 
divine  unity  by  which  all  reality  is  embraced  in  one  harmonious 
whole.  In  discussing  the  phenomenology  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness, he  shows  how  the  manifold  forms  which  religion  takes  on  corres- 
pond to  the  stages  of  the  ever-evolving  process  by  which  the  spirit 
grows  to  fuller  power  and  more  perfect  freedom.  In  tracing  the 
steps  of  this  development  from  the  crudest  fetishism  up  to  the 
11  absolute  religion"  of  an  ideal  Christianity,  Dr.  Dorner  follows  pretty 
closely  in  the  footsteps  of  Hegel,  to  whom,  indeed,  his  whole  system 
evidently  owes  much.  But  his  exposition  has  for  the  student  many 
points  of  advantage  over  that  of  his  great  predecessor.  The  advance 
during  the  last  three  quarters  of  a  century  in  the  science  of  compara- 
tive religions  and  in  the  fields  of  investigation  nearly  related  to  it, 
has  provided  the  observer  of  religious  phenomena  with  a  vast  mass  of 
material  and  has  made  possible  its  due  correlation,  and  Dr.  Dorner 
has  the  power  of  seizing  upon  and  exhibiting  the  essential  and  vital 
characteristics  of  each  form  of  religion.  Moreover,  in  following  him, 
we  are  not  led  to  regard  this  evolution  as  having  already  culminated 
and  reached  its  fruition  in  some  now  existing  form  of  cult,  creed, 
or  church  organization.  It  is  true  that  Christianity  is  considered  by 
him  to  embrace  in  its  synthesis  the  true  and  permanent  elements  of 
the  less  perfected  religions,  but  it  is  not  represented  as  free  from 
defects,  or  as  having  worked  out  as  yet  its  own  highest  capabilities. 
It  may  be  added  that  if  Dr.  Dorner' s  style  lacks  something  of  the 
Hegelian  grip  and  vigor,  it  has  the  merit  of  being  always  clear  and 
intelligible. 


No.  5.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  565 

Perhaps  to  many  readers  the  most  interesting  and  suggestive  part  of 
the  book  will  be  found  to  be  that  dealing  with  the  modes  in  which  the 
religious  consciousness  finds  expression.  It  is  the  opinion  of  our 
author  that  in  the  highest  form  of  the  religious  life,  the  religion  of  a 
Divine  Humanity  (GottmenschJuif),  the  specific  manifestations  of  the 
religious  spirit,  such  as  sacrifice,  sacraments,  vaticination,  and  prayer, 
must  first  become  spiritualized  and  free  from  material  associations, 
and  with  this  increasing  idealization,  they  tend  to  merge  and  become 
lost  in  an  ethic,  aesthetic,  and  science,  all  of  which  are  religious  in 
spirit.  The  evolution  of  religion  is,  in  fact,  the  progressive  liberation 
of  the  spiritual  from  the  sensual  and  imaginative  supports  on  which 
at  first  it  relies,  accompanied  by  the  ever  more  direct  and  adequate 
consciousness  of  the  relation  of  the  self  to  that  Divine  unity  which,  in 
the  author's  view,  is  implied  in  all  knowledge,  art,  and  rational  activity. 
Hence,  even  church  organization  is  represented  as  at  best  a  temporary 
and  pedagogic  expedient,  which,  at  the  highest  stages  of  the  religion  of 
Divine  Humanity,  may  be  laid  aside,  since  it  is  in  the  conscious  relating 
of  a  fully  developed  personality  to  its  divine  source  and  origin  that 
the  ideal  religious  life  consists. 

It  is  hardly  possible  within  the  limits  of  a  brief  review  to  criticize  in 
detail  a  work  containing  so  much  debatable  matter  as  is  necessarily 
included  in  a  treatise  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  It  must  suffice 
in  the  present  instance  to  indicate  but  two  points  on  which  the^con- 
clusions  of  Dr.  Dorner  may  be  open  to  question.  One  of  them  is  his 
rather  arbitrary  exclusion  of  certain  philosophic  systems  from  the 
sphere  of  religious  belief.  We  have  seen  that  he  claims  that  religion, 
embracing  as  it  does  a  cognitive  element,  must  rest  on  an  underlying 
philosophy ;  and  that  this,  however  vague  and  imperfect,  must  be  in 
some  sort  monistic  and  spiritualistic,  growing  more  definitely  so  as 
religion  develops  into  purer  and  higher  forms.  A  materialistic  or 
pluralistic  theory  of  reality  is,  therefore,  so  far  forth,  anti-religious ;  as 
is  also  any  form  of  solipsism  which  finds  the  only  unifying  principle 
within  the  subjective  ego,  while  positivism,  which  is  content  to 
elevate  altruism  into  a  religion,  is  condemned  as  anti-religious  as  well 
as  anti-metaphysical.  But  is  there  not  here  an  unnecessary  restriction 
of  the  content  of  the  cognitive  element  in  religion  ?  Is  it,  in  fact, 
essential  to  the  latter  that  there  should  be  any  one  particular  mode  of 
envisaging  the  facts  of  the  universe?  That  the  higher  and  more 
spiritual  manifestations  of  religion  are  the  outcome  of  a  temper  and 
outlook  which  may  justly  be  called  philosophical  is*  beyond  question, 
but  the  very  freedom  of  personality  on  which  Dr.  Dorner  insists  as 


566  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VoL.  XIII. 

essential  to  the  religious  ideal  would  demand  first  that  wide  divergence 
of  character  and  variety  of  standpoint  from  which  result  the  many  and 
unlike  answers  offered  to  the  riddle  of  existence.  Religion,  as  the 
effort  of  the  soul  to  establish  a  harmony  between  itself  and  the  whole 
of  which  it  is  a  part,  would  seem  to  be  consistent  with  any  and  every 
sincere  and  earnest  endeavor  to  conceive  rationally  of  this  whole, 
irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  theory  in  which  this  endeavor  may 
result.  Certainly  it  would  be  hard  to  prove  from  history  or  biography 
that  the  religious  spirit,  in  the  case  of  men  who  formed  speculative 
theories,  was  confined  to  the  representatives  of  an  idealistic  meta- 
physics ;  examples  to  the  contrary  spring  readily  into  the  mind. 

Another  part  of  Dr.  Dorner's  exposition  which  seems  to  the  present 
writer  to  be  not  wholly  satisfactory  is  his  attempt  to  rehabilitate  those 
classic  "proofs  of  the  existence  of  God"  which  played  such  a 
prominent  part  in  philosophy  and  theology  before  Kant  undertook 
their  overthrow,  and  which,  since  his  day,  have  been  from  time  to  time 
reasserted  with  various  modifications  and  amplifications.  The  subject 
is  too  large  a  one  to  be  entered  into  here,  but  Dr.  Dorner's  reasoning 
seems  in  this  regard  less  cogent  and  less  clear-sighted  than  is  usual  with 
him.  Do  we  not  indeed  realize  the  futility  of  any  such  attempt  to  put 
new  wine  into  old  bottles  when  we  ask  whether  we  would  expect  any 
one  not  already  believing  in  the  existence  of  God  to  be  convinced  by 
any  or  all  of  these  so-called  '  proofs '  ?  But,  indeed,  till  we  have 
determined  what  content  the  concept  of  God  is  to  carry  with  it,  the 
attribution  of  existence  avails  little  either  for  thought  or  for  life,  and 
perhaps  when  its  meaning  is  unfolded  no  proof  of  existence  is  needed. 

E.  RITCHIE. 

HALIFAX,  N.  S. 

A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century.  By 
JOHN  THEODORE  MERZ.  Vol.  II.  Edinburgh  and  London,  William 
Blackwood  and  Sons,  1903.  — pp.  xiii,  807. 

In  this  volume  the  author  brings  to  a  successful  conclusion  the  first 
part  of  his  extended  survey  of  the  progress  of  nineteenth  century 
thought,  dealing  with  the  development  of  scientific  thinking.  The 
first  volume  (noticed  in  this  REVIEW,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  415-418)  con- 
tained the  introduction  to  the  entire  work  and  the  earlier  chapters  on 
scientific,  especially  astronomical  and  chemical,  thought.  The  present 
treatise  completes  this  division  of  the  history  with  chapters  on  the 
kinetic  or  mechanical  view  of  nature,  the  physical  view,  the  mor- 
phological view,  the  genetic  view,  the  vitalistic  view  (in  which  the 
deeper  biological  problems  are  considered,  not  merely  any  one  of 


No.  5.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  $6? 

them  or  any  special  solution  of  the  question  of  life),  the  psycho- 
physical  view,  the  statistical  view,  and  the  development  of  mathemat- 
ical thought  during  the  century  ("the  first  attempt  to  give  to  this 
abstract  region  of  thought  a  place  in  a  general  history  of  intellectual 
progress,"  p.  vi). 

The  wide  range  of  subjects  considered  is  evident  from  these 
heads  of  discussion.  Equally  remarkable  is  the  body  of  first-hand 
information  exhibited  by  the  author,  in  refreshing  contrast  to  the 
imperfect  information  and  faulty  workmanship  so  often  displayed  in 
the  various  "  histories  "  of  this  or  that  form  of  nineteenth  century  cul- 
ture which  recent  years  have  brought.  The  long  years  of  severe  re- 
search which  Mr.  Merz  has  given  to  the  preparation  of  his  work  have 
been  well  worth  the  while.  So  much  is  plain  beyond  a  doubt  from 
this  first  completed  portion  of  his  task.  If  the  remaining  divisions  on 
philosophical  thought  and  religious  thought  (taken  in  a  broad  interpre- 
tation of  the  term,  cf.  Vol.  I,  pp.  68-69)  ^^  tne  promise  of  the  one 
which  is  here  given  us,  the  total  result  will  be  a  work  of  moment  for 
the  progress  of  thought  itself. 

Meanwhile,  we  have  a  much-needed  history  of  science  during  the 
past  century,  or,  rather,  of  scientific  thought ;  for  Mr.  Merz  has 
rightly  chosen  to  write  a  history  of  the  thinking  in  virtue  of  which 
science  has  proceeded,  and  of  the  great  constructive  ideas  in  which  it  has 
issued,  instead  of  a  detailed  record  of  scientific  discovery  (cf.  Vol.  I, 
p.  81,  Vol.  II,  pp.  627-628,  et  passim).  Thus  the  treatise  is  con- 
ceived from  a  point  of  view  genuinely  philosophical,  and  the  results 
attained  prove,  as  might  have  been  expected,  of  intrinsic  value  even 
for  the  student  of  philosophy  in  the  restricted  technical  sense.  In- 
deed, it  is  often  tantalizing  to  have  the  full  consideration  of  the  phi- 
losophical questions  suggested  by  the  purely  scientific  argument  de- 
ferred, as  the  plan  of  the  work  necessitates,  to  the  subsequent  portions 
of  the  inquiry.  'Energy,'  'life,'  'genesis,' — of  course,  no  thor- 
ough description  of  the  fundamental  scientific  conceptions  such  as  the 
author  has  given  could  fail  to  lead  up  to  the  problems  of  philosophy ; 
so  that  the  reader  is  tempted  to  wish  that  summary  accounts  of  them 
had  been  vouchsafed  at  the  places  where  they  first  come  up,  even  at 
the  risk  of  reduplication.  At  certain  special  points  this  absence  of 
complete  discussion  becomes  peculiarly  noticeable.  In  regard  to  the 
theory  of  evolution,  for  example,  Mr.  Merz  appreciates,  as  many 
later  writers  have  not  done,  the  relative  importance  of  the  parts 
which  philosophy  (Hegel  as  well  as  Spencer,  cf.  Vol.  II,  p.  278, 
note)  and  science  have  played  in  the  origin  and  spread  of  genetic 


568  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

principles ;  but,  although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  juster  views  on  the 
matter  than  those  which  are  ordinarily  entertained  by  English  and 
American  thinkers  would  conduce  to  progress  in  our  thinking,  few 
readers  except  those  who  are  antecedently  informed  will  gather  the 
full  truth  from  the  discussions  in  Chapter  ix. 

The  treatment  of  evolution  may  serve  to  illustrate  further  questions 
of  method.  The  principal  subject  is  the  history  of  scientific  thought, 
the  history  of  science  proper  being  attempted  only  in  so  far  as  it  may 
be  expected  to  promote  the  main  purpose.  But  it  is  often  a  difficult 
matter  to  decide,  on  the  one  hand,  just  what  concrete  advances  in 
the  solution  of  scientific  problems  have  accompanied  or  occasioned 
progress  in  the  broader  reaches  of  scientific  thinking,  and  on  the  other, 
with  how  much  detail  it  is  necessary  to  explain  particular  ideas  or 
principles  in  order  to  bring  out  their  influence  upon  the  general 
course  of  intellectual  development.  The  question  is  further  compli- 
cated by  the  chronological  factor  —  the  order  of  time  and  the  order  of 
logic  notoriously  diverging  in  repeated  instances  —  and  by  the  order 
and  necessary  limitations  of  expository  treatment.  So  in  the  case  be- 
fore us.  It  would  be  too  much  to  say  that  an  adequate  statement  of 
the  great  biological  advance  which  marked  the  culminating  period  of 
the  last  century  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  two  chapters  of  the  present 
work  which  are  devoted,  respectively,  to  the  genetic  view  of  things 
and  to  the  larger  questions  of  biology ;  but  unless  the  reader  starts 
with  a  fair  knowledge  of  the  Darwinian  theory  at  least,  he  will  be 
embarrassed  to  estimate  the  nature  of  organic  development  in  its 
bearing  on  genetic  theory.  Part  of  the  difficulty  arises  from  the  very 
excellence  of  the  work.  In  the  text,  there  is  not  infrequently  to  be 
found  a  successful  simplification  of  principles  (even  a  layman  can 
gather  some  comprehension  of  mathematical  progress  from  the  remark- 
able final  chapter),  which,  while  it  enhances  the  clearness  of  the  dis- 
cussion, may  mask  the  full  purport  of  a  doctrine.  In  the  notes,  the 
author  has  preferred  to  give  extended  bibliographical  references  and 
even  biographical  summaries,  somewhat  to  the  exclusion  of  elaborations 
of  special  scientific  ideas.  Throughout  the  book  the  proportion  of 
notes  to  text  will  seem  to  many  excessive ;  if  in  the  later  volumes  the 
same  balance  is  to  be  preserved,  a  different  selection  of  topics  in 
the  direction  indicated  might  well  be  adopted. 

Of  greatest  interest  to  students  of  psychology  and  philosophy  is 
Chapter  xi,  which  treats  of  "The  Psycho-physical  View  of  Nature." 
The  term  psycho-physics  is  used  here  in  its  broader  rather  than  its 
narrower  meaning,  in  particular,  to  cover  the  entire  field  of  physio- 


No.  5.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS. 

logical  and  experimental  psychology.  The  discussion  turns  for  the 
most  part  about  the  earlier  developments  of  the  new  science,  with  less 
notice  taken  than  the  specialist  could  wish  of  the  later  or  most  recent 
phases  of  psychological  thinking.  It  is  for  this  reason,  among  others, 
that  the  chapter  falls  out  less  complete  than  is  the  case  with  the 
author's  accounts  of  other  divisions  of  the  scientific  field ;  the  psy- 
chologist, at  least,  misses  a  discussion  of  the  interpretation  of  Weber's 
law,  of  psychometry,  in  the  sense  of  the  time-measurement  of  psychi- 
cal states,  and  what  is  remarkable  in  view  of  the  author's  decided 
tendency  to  equate  science  with  exact  knowledge  mathematically  for- 
mulated, a  full  and  thoroughgoing  discussion  of  the  general  question 
of  mental  measurement. 

It  would  be  misleading,  however,  to  suggest  such  possible  criticisms 
without  dwelling  once  more  on  the  importance  of  Mr.  Merz's  under- 
taking, and  the  great  success  with  which  he  has  executed  this  first  part 
of  his  elaborate  programme.  The  two  volumes  now  completed 
form,  with  their  detailed  analytic  index,  a  treatise  complete  in  itself 
and  of  the  highest  value  for  all  who  desire  an  intelligent  understanding 
of  the  thought  of  the  age.  Nowhere  in  English  will  the  student  find 
a  record  of  modern  science  so  comprehensive  in  its  plan  and  so  excel- 
lently carried  out  in  details,  by  a  writer  who  himself  has  gained  a 
sympathetic  mastery  of  the  subject  which  he  treats.  Few  things  could 
be  more  helpful  to  philosophical  inquirers  than  a  careful  study  of  this 
history  of  the  phenomenal  thinking  on  which,  as  we  now  agree,  their 
own  speculative  endeavors  must  so  largely  be  based ;  and  few,  it  may 
also  be  added,  more  salutary  for  the  man  of  science  proper,  who,  as 
now  too  often  happens,  lacks  just  that  broad  outlook  over  the  field  of 
phenomenal  investigation  which  the  present  treatise  is  fitted  to  afford. 

A.  C.  ARMSTRONG. 
WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY. 

Philosophic  de  I ' effort — essais philosophiques  d'un  naturaliste.  Par 
ARMAND  SABATIER.  Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1903.  — pp.  480. 
As  the  subtitle  indicates,  this  book  may  be  regarded  as  an  expres- 
sion of  a  renaissance  of  cooperation  beween  scientists,  especially 
biologists,  and  philosophers.  The  book  is  not  a  systematic  treatise, 
but  consists,  in  the  fashion  of  books  nowadays,  of  an  introduction  and 
a  collection  of  essays,  some  of  which  have  been  published  before. 
The  headings  are  as  follows :  Introduction :  Responsabilite  de  Dieu 
et  responsabilite  de  la  nature;  I.  De  1' orientation  de  la  methode  en 
£volutionisme  ;  II.  Evolution  et  libertS  ;  III.  Evolution  et  socialisme  ; 
IV.  La  priere  ;  V.  Dieu  et  le  monde ;  VI.  Finalisme ;  VII.  Conscience 


5/0  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

et  conscience ;  VIII.  L' instinct;  IX.  Creation:  Role  de  la  matiere, 
Immortalite  ;  X.  Energie  et  matiere  ;  XI.  L' universe  materiel  est  il 
eternel?  XII.  Vie  et  esprit  dans  la  nature. 

The  unifying  ideas  of  this  somewhat  heterogeneous  collection,  as 
stated  by  the  author  (p.  17)  are  :  "  There  is  in  nature  an  ideal  which 
may  be  stated  as  the  development  and  perfection  of  spirit  in  the  form 
of  ever-stronger  individualities  and  ever  higher  personalities. ' ' 

' '  There  is  in  nature  a  manifest  impulse  to  the  pursuit  and  realiza- 
tion of  that  ideal  and  a  will  which  corresponds  to  that  impulse.  This 
evolving  impulse  constitutes  a  feeling  of  biological  obligation  immanent 
in  nature." 

"  Effort  is  the  result  of  this  impulse.  It  expresses  the  activity  of 
nature  .  .  .  exhibited  in  realizing  this  ideal.  Effort  is  omnipresent. 
It  is  the  ' promoteur  par  excellence  '  of  the  ascending  evolution  of  the 
universe." 

"  The  moral  ideal  as  the  end  of  nature,  the  aspirations  and  power 
to  realize  this  ideal,  nature  owes  to  its  divine  origin  in  the  sense  that  it 
is  precisely  the  result  of  the  evolution  of  a  germ  detached  from  the 
Creator,  that  is,  a  germ  of  the  supreme  Wisdom,  of  the  supreme  Love, 
of  the  divine  Energy. ' ' 

In  view  of  the  present  widespread  circulation  of  pragmatic  doctrines, 
the  title  is  likely  to  arouse  in  some  expectations  which  the  book 
does  not  realize.  One  might  expect  in  a  Philosophie  de  V  effort  to 
find  some  attempt  at  a  'Logiquede  1' effort' — at  a  reinterpretation 
of  some  fundamental  categories  from  the  standpoint  of  effort,  and 
thereby  a  reconstruction  and  enrichment  of  the  meaning  of  effort  itself. 
Such  a  systematic  treatment  as  this  would  require  should,  however, 
scarcely  be  expected  from  the  laboratory  of  a  biologist  —  not  that  it 
might  not  be  better  done  there  than  in  the  logician's  den,  if  only  the 
infusoria,  etc. ,  did  not  require  too  much  sensorial  attention. 

As  might  easily  be  anticipated  from  the  statement  of  the  theses  given 
above,  much  of  the  book  is  frankly  apologetic  in  character.  This,  of 
course,  should  not  in  itself  prejudice  its  philosophic  claims,  provided 
the  latter  are  made  good.  This,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  has  not 
been  accomplished  with  great  success.  Too  often  rather  dogmatic 
generalities,  and,  at  times,  somewhat  mystical  analogies,  take  the  place 
of  expository  and  argumentative  details.  For  example,  one  would  ex- 
pect somewhere,  say  in  the  essay  on  "  The  Method  of  Evolution,"  or 
in  the  one  on  "  God  and  the  World,"  some  detailed  development  of 
the  statement  given  above  that  ' '  Nature  is  precisely  the  result  of  the 
evolution  of  a  germ  detached  from  the  Creator. ' '  But  we  find  there 


No.  5.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  571 

discussions,  supported  by  plenty  of  interesting  facts  to  be  sure,  of  such 
general  and  now  rather  familiar  considerations  as  that  all  life  must  have 
its  source  in  other  life,  that  life  pervades  all  matter,  and  that  "  men- 
talite"  pervades  all  life,  is  the  essence  of  all  life. 

In  dealing  with  the  relations  between  God  and  the  world,  which  is 
really  the  author's  central  theme,  a  very  old  difficulty  is  encountered. 
The  omnipresence  of  a  rational,  patient,  powerful,  loving  effort,  in 
the  world  (p.  224  et passim)  is  taken  as  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a 
certain  eternal  ideal  to  the  realization  of  which  all  this  effort  is  directed. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  maintaining  and  defending  the  "  transcend- 
ence and  independence  "  of  the  source  of  this  ideal,  the  imperfection, 
disorder,  weakness,  and  evil  of  the  world  (pp.  214,  270)  are  pointed 
to  as  incapable  of  generating  this  ideal.  The  problem  of  evil,  by  the 
way,  is  not  systematically  discussed. 

In  common  with  many  other  defenders  of  a  fixed  infinite  ideal,  the 
author  does  not  seem  to  feel  certain  difficulties  connected  therewith  — 
difficulties  especially  acute  for  one  who  makes  the  standpoint  of  evolution 
so  absolute  as  he  does.  If  evolution  is  a  universal  process,  how  can  the 
ideal  avoid  participating  in  it  ?  Must  there  not  be  an  evolution  of  the 
ideal  ?  Yet  the  author  rejects  this  as  degrading  to  the  source  of  the  ideal 
(p.  214).  If  effort  and  development  are  so  glorious  in  the  creature,  why 
should  they  be  degrading  to  the  Creator  ?  Again,  if  we  seek  to  escape 
by  placing  the  ideal  at  an  infinite  remove  from  finite  activity,  how  can 
it  be  applied  day  by  day  to  specific  cases  as  a  criterion  of  truth  and 
goodness  and  as  a  concrete  developmental  stimulus  in  finite  life  ?  On 
the  other  hand,  if  it  be  actually  realizable,  how  is  evolution  to  go  on 
after  the  realization  is  accomplished  ? 

The  author  appeals  especially  to  moral  experience  (p.  224)  as  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  this  fixed  and  infinite  ideal.  He  evidently 
does  not  see  that  the  difficulty  of  applying  to  changing,  finite  con- 
duct a  fixed  infinite  standard  is  just  as  great  in  the  ethical  as  in  the 
logical  case,  —  inevitably  so,  of  course,  since  each  is  but  a  different 
phase  of  the  same  situation. 

Evolution,  as  the  march  toward  this  eternal  ideal,  is  sharply  opposed 
to  the  mechanical  monism  of  Haeckel.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
a  process  whose  goal  is  definitely  fixed,  and  whose  steps  are  inexora- 
bly and  transcendently  ordered  toward  it,  is  itself  to  escape  all  sus- 
picion of  being  mechanical.  What  could  be  more  mechanical  than  a 
system  the  end  and  means  of  which  are  completely  and  finally 
determined  ? 

In  the  fourth  essay,    the   author  offers   a  '  vibration '   theory  of 


5/2  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

prayer  that    will    appear  to  some  grotesque,  to  others  a  substantial 
contribution  "to  the  science  of  prayer." 

The  paper  on  instinct  is  the  best  of  the  more  scientific  discussions, 
though  it  too  is  written  from  the  speculative  standpoint.  The  '  lapsed- 
intelligence  '  theory  of  instinct  is  rejected.  In  its  place  is  offered  a 
general  '  biologic  '  or  '  bionomic  '  consciousness  precipitated  into  the 
specific  forms  of  the  original  instincts  apparently  according  to  the 
Creator's  original  and  eternal  plan.  Some  questions  concerning  the 
relation  between  what  the  author  calls  *  biologique '  or  '  bionomique ' 
consciousness,  the  basis  of  ' individualite , '  and  < fsychologique'  con- 
sciousness, the  basis  of  '  personalite,'  remain  unanswered. 

In  his  exposition  of  the  significance  of  consciousness,  in  explaining 
the  facts  of  animal,  vegetable,  and  mineral  activities,  the  author  works 
out  a  pan-psychic  conception  of  the  world,  interesting  and  suggestive, 
but  again  difficult  to  connect  with  the  transcendent  and  independent 
Creator. 

The  style  is  very  easy  and  clear,  but  suffers  from  repetition.  Some 
of  the  essays  could  be  condensed  a  third  or  a  half  without  serious 
damage  to  the  matter. 

A.  W.  MOORE. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES. 

[ABBREVIATIONS. — Am.  J.  Ps.  =  American  Journal  of  Psychology ;  Am.  J. 
Th.  =  The  American  Journal  of  Theology  ;  Ar.  de  Ps.  =  Archives  de  Psychologic  ; 
Ar.  f.  G.  Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie ;  Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.  =  Ar- 
chiv fur  systematische  Philosophie  ;  Br.  J.  Ps.  =  The  British  Journal  of  Psychology  ; 
Int.  J.  £.  =  International  Journal  of  Ethics ;  J.  de  Psych.  =  Journal  de  Psy- 
chologic; Psych.  Rev.  =  Psychological  Review;  Rev.  de  Met.  =  Revue  -de  Meta- 
1>hysique  ;  Rev.  Neo-Sc.=  Revue  Neo-Scolastique  ;  Rev.  Ph.  =  Revue  Philosophique  ; 
R.  d.  Fil.  =  Rivista  di  Filosofia  e  Scienze  Ajfini ;  V.  f.  w.  Ph.  =  Vierieljahrs- 
schrift  fur  -wissenschaftliche  Philosophie ;  Z.  f.  Ph.  u.  ph.  Kr.  =  Zeitschrift  fur 
Philosophie  und  philosophische  Kritik ;  Z.  f.  Psych,  u.  Phys.  =  Zeitschrift  fur 
Psychologic  und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane.  — Other  titles  are  self-explanatory.] 

LOGIC   AND   METAPHYSICS. 

Der  heutige  Stand  der  mechanise  hen  Weltanschauung.     HEINRICH  WEBER. 

Deutsche  Revue,  XXIX,  2,  pp.  155-164. 

The  Mechanik  of  Hertz  represents  the  most  recent  advance  in  physical 
science.  It  is  mainly  an  attempt  to  oust  from  its  hitherto  impregnable 
position  the  conception  of  '  force  '  or  '  energy  '  as  a  mysterious  somewhat, 
different  from  time,  space,  or  mass.  Four  propositions  concerning  the  outer 
world  are  necessary  to  a  correct  conception  of  it,  /.  e.,  any  theory  of  the 
outer  world  must  be  (i)  logically  admissible  ;  (2)  not  in  contradiction  to  the 
facts  as  presented  ;  (3)  complete  ;  (4)  simple.  Hertz  is  especially  con- 
cerned with  the  fourth  proposition.  In  the  history  of  science  two  systems 
especially  have  been  dominant.  The  system  of  Hertz  differs  from  both. 
All  three  recognize  time,  space,  and  mass.  But  in  the  Newtonian  scheme 
'force'  (gravitation),  and  in  the  modern  theories  'energy,'  play  an  unwar- 
rantable role.  Hertz,  on  the  other  hand,  makes  reality  at  bottom  a  mathe- 
matical abstraction.  Somehow  there  must  be  an  '  overspace  '  of  n  dimen- 
sions. In  such  a  world,  then,  say  one  of  six  dimensions,  "a  system  of 
two  points  of  ordinary  dimension  may  signify  only  a  point"  ;  so  in  a  nine- 
dimensional  world,  also,  a  solid  body  would  be  but  a  point.  Now,  if, 
in  the  three-dimensional  world,  two  objects  be  connected  by  an  invisible 
string  and  made  to  revolve,  it  might  seem  that  these  two  bodies  exerted 
'  force '  upon  one  another.  In  reality,  of  course,  they  do  not.  So,  how- 
ever, with  the  planets,  etc.,  of  the  visible  world.  The  mind,  ignorant  of  the 
fact  that  solid  bodies  are  but  'representative  points'  in  the  'overspace,' 
through  its  inability  to  prefigure  n  dimensions,  cannot  simultaneously  grasp 
said  two  bodies,  and  so,  thinking  first  one,  then  the  other,  falls  back  upon 
the  erroneous  conception  of  'force.'  Nevertheless,  concludes  Weber, 
Hertz's  theory  leaves  still  unexplained  the  connection  of  masses. 

ARTHUR  J.  TIETJE. 
573 


5/4  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Der  Neo-Idealismus  unserer  Tage.     L.  STEIN.     Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.,    IX,   3, 
pp.  265-330. 

For  half  a  century,  academic  philosophy  has  been  reminiscent  of  older 
phenomenalistic  and  idealistic  systems.  This  is  due  to  the  influence  of  the 
now  predominant  category  of  thought.  The  four  great  epochs  of  thought 
are  marked  by  the  supremacy  of  four  different  categories,  —  object,  prop- 
erty, condition  (state),  and  relation.  The  earliest  thought  finds  the  per- 
manent only  in  a  thing  or  person.  Scholastic  philosophy  dwells  upon  the 
eternal  attributes  of  God.  The  renaissance  (up  to  Leibniz)  emphasizes 
permanent  conditions  based  especially  upon  spatial  order  —  as  in  the  me- 
chanical theory.  Teleology  is  discarded  ;  natural  order  reduces  to  the  laws 
of  motion  ;  theism  becomes  deism  or  pantheism.  All  schools  of  the  period 
ascribe  transsubjective  reality  to  space.  The  eternal  condition  manifests 
itself  doubly  —  as  the  laws  of  motion  in  space,  and  as  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion in  thought.  The  geometric  method  of  Spinoza  is  the  highest  develop- 
ment of  the  period.  In  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  the 
category  of  relation  is  dominant.  Uniformity  is  transferred  from  space 
to  number  and  time ;  geometrical  method  becomes  arithmetical ;  dead 
mechanism  gives  place  to  teleological  dynamism,  the  atom  to  the  concep- 
tion of  energy  ;  activity  replaces  being  as  the  essential  nature  of  substance. 
Truths  are  either  logical,  necessary,  resting  upon  the  principle  of  identity  ; 
or  factual,  contingent,  resting  upon  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason. 
Every  valid  universal  judgment  is  an  act  of  relational  thinking  which  trans- 
cends spatial  and  temporal  limitation.  Natural  laws,  resting  on  induction, 
never  attain  complete  certainty.  In  relational  thinking,  the  understand- 
ing, so  far  as  it  merely  ascertains  the  uniformity  in  the  succession  of  its 
ideas,  has  to  do  only  with  its  own  functions.  Apodictic  judgments  are 
limited  to  necessary  relations  ;  unconditioned  necessity  means  inconceiv- 
ability of  the  opposite.  Necessities  of  perception,  as  distinguished  from 
logical  necessities,  arise  from  the  organization  of  the  perceptive  faculty. 
Such  are  the  geometric  axioms,  —  synthetic  propositions  a  priori.  The 
principle  of  all  relation  is  numerical  proportion.  All  numbers  refer  back 
to  unity,  as  all  judgments  to  the  unifying  ego.  Relational  thinking  has 
become  our  second  nature.  Instead  of  reducing  qualities  to  quantities,  we 
reduce  quantities  to  qualities,  i.  <?.,  proportions.  Everything  geometrical, 
everything  logical,  becomes  arithmetical  to  attain  complete  certainty.  In 
number  we  have  what  is  completely  subjective,  mere  judgment  of  identity, 
and  so  eternal  logical  truth.  The  predominance  of  relational  thinking  and 
of  the  numerical  elements  as  criteria  of  reality  and  truth,  with  the  conse- 
quent acceptance  of  human  consciousness  as  the  ultimate  measure  of  all 
things,  is  the  root  of  the  phenomenalism  and  neo-idealism  of  to-day. 
When  the  relation  is  substantialized,  and  number  (as  with  Cohen)  is  raised 
to  a  category,  strict  neo-idealism  results.  When  all  relation  is  referred  to 
the  sensation-complexes  of  individuals,  we  have  the  neo-phenomenalism 


No.  5.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  575 

of  Mach,  Stallo,  and  Ostwald.     Both  parties  take  as  their  common  starting- 
point  human  consciousness,  the  inner  side  of  the  world  process. 

THEODORE  DE  LACUNA. 

Das  Erkenntnisproblem  und  Machs  Analyse  der  Empfindungen.     EMIL 

LUCK  A.     Kantstudien,  VIII,  4,  pp.  396-447. 

(I)  The  great  advance  made  by  science  during  the  last  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  has  led  some  investigators  to  believe  that  science  exhausts 
human  knowledge,  and  that  philosophy  with  its  bold  constructions  is  super- 
fluous. But  within  the  past  twenty  years  it  has  been  felt  that  scientific 
investigation  cannot  take  the  place  of  a  systematic  view  of  the  world.  The 
systems  of  Avenarius  and  Mach  are  the  most  original  attempts  at  a  world- 
view  based  on  scientific  methods.  These  men  exclude  all  but  the  purely 
phenomenal,  and  substitute  for  the  comprehensive  thought  of  earlier  cen- 
turies a  biological  method,  in  which  only  superficial  facts  are  dealt  with 
and  the  problems  of  the  older  philosophy  are  explained  away.  Though 
denying  that  he  has  a  system,  Mach  speaks  of  his  'standpoint,'  which  is 
really  a  system  of  phenomenalism  with  a  mixture  of  will-metaphysics. 
Mach  makes  no  distinction  between  physical  and  psychical  elements. 
Self-consciousness  is  set  aside,  and  the  kinds  of  elements  are  reduced  to 
one.  Points  of  view  other  than  the  biological  are  rejected,  the  causal  law 
is  extended  to  all  fields,  and  sensation  is  made  the  source  of  experience. 
In  criticism  of  this  method,  the  writer  points  out  that  an  investigator  who 
does  not  make  experience  itself  a  problem  can  say  nothing  about  problems 
which  cannot  be  abstracted  from  experience  by  observation.  In  particular, 
he  can  never  determine  whether  there  are  elements  in  experience  which 
occupy  an  exceptional  position  in  regard  to  other  elements.  He  lacks  a 
standard  of  measure  for  the  worth  of  particular  events,  since  for  him  they 
are  all  actual,  not  necessary.  He  cannot,  without  being  false  to  the  logic 
of  his  hypotheses,  attempt  to  answer  questions  as  to  the  greater  or  less 
necessity  of  thought.  And  judgments  which  refer  not  only  to  the  reality 
but  to  the  possibility  of  experience  can  have  no  place  in  his  investigations. 
(II)  Mach's  merely  descriptive  epistemology  cannot  explain  the  concept  of 
necessity.  Grounds  of  knowledge  which  do  not  spring  from  experience 
and  which  lead  to  logically  necessary  conclusions  are  recognized  but  left 
unexplained.  There  is  a  failure  to  see  that  the  peculiar  nature  of  causality 
is  to  be  conceived,  not  from  the  standpoint  of  psychology,  but  from  the 
standpoint  of  transcendental  logic.  The  argument  from  uncertainty  of 
the  cause  can  have  to  do  only  with  the  special  ground  of  a  special  event, 
not  with  the  formal  principle  of  causality.  This  distinction  between  the 
formal  and  material  principle  it  is  that  Mach  neglects  in  his  attempted 
reduction  of  causality  to  customary  succession.  (Ill)  Lucka  gives  a  short 
account  of  the  problem  of  substance  in  its  various  stages  :  nai've  realism, 
modified  realism,  inconsistent  idealism,  and  pure  idealism.  Except  for  his 
misunderstanding  of  the  distinction  between  substance  and  thing-in-itself, 


576  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.        [VOL.  XIII. 

Mach  arrives  at  a  pure  idealism.  He  denies  substance,  yet  falls  back  on 
the  functioning  of  that  category  to  account  for  the  union  of  perceptions 
with  one  another  and  with  objects.  (IV)  Mach  gives  no  special  account 
of  space,  but  his  position  is  similar  to  that  of  James,  Mill,  and  Bain.  He 
believes  that  geometry  is  an  empirical  science  deriving  its  certainty  from 
the  frequency  with  which  its  axioms  are  verified  in  experience.  Lucka 
maintains  that  it  is  absurd  to  think  that  geometrical  axioms  might  have 
been  evolved  in  different  forms.  A  good  proof  of  the  necessary  character 
of  geometry  is  afforded  by  the  possibility  of  applying  its  results  to  space, 
e.  g.,  in  the  determination  of  an  eclipse.  Time  is,  for  Mach,  a  sensation. 
In  common  with  other  physiological  accounts  of  time,  Mach's  is  unsatis- 
factory, inasmuch  as  time  is  postulated  in  the  explanation  of  time.  His 
theory  can  at  best  only  show  why  a  definite  time  seems  subjectively  long  or 
short,  and  is  quite  unable  to  explain  the  one-dimensional  character  of 
time.  (V)  In  the  main,  Mach's  psychophysics  follows  that  of  Fechner. 
It  affirms  a  complete  parallelism  between  the  psychical  and  the  physical, 
and  assumes  corresponding  nerve-processes  for  the  sensations  of  space  and 
time.  Mach's  attempt  to  make  clear  the  phenomena  of  thought  by  means 
of  physical  events  is  unscientific,  because  an  attempt  to  explain  the  partially 
known  process  of  ideas  by  unknown  processes  in  the  brain.  Lucka  objects 
against  psychophysics  in  general  that  it  cannot  explain  the  recurrence  of 
childhood  memories  when  the  material  structure  of  the  brain  has  become 
completely  changed  ;  it  cannot  parallel  the  spiritual  differences  of  the 
sexes  by  a  corresponding  difference  in  brain  structure  ;  and  it  cannot  justly 
make  extensive  stimulus  magnitudes  commensurate  with  intensive  sensa- 
tional magnitudes.  (VI)  As  Mach  admits  only  one  kind  of  elements,  he 
is  forced  to  explain  the  difference  between  concepts  and  percepts  as  a 
difference  in  the  manner  in  which  elements  are  united.  In  this  excessive 
relativism  all  criteria  of  actuality  are  lost,  and  the  ego  is  not  real  but  only 
an  ideal  economic  unity.  Mach's  system  is  consistently  monistic  because 
only  one  kind  of  world-element  is  recognized,  while  all  idealisms  agree 
that  from  the  ethical  viewpoint  the  world  is  dualistic.  (VII)  Though  repu- 
diating metaphysics  in  general,  Mach  displays  great  attachment  to  evolu- 
tion. He  touches  ethics  but  lightly,  and  does  himself  honor  by  avoiding 
evolutionary  utilitarianism.  He  agrees  in  general  with  social  ethics,  but 
his  conception  has  a  nobler  individual  character.  But  his  explaining  away 
of  personality  leaves  Mach  without  a  standard  of  morality,  and  bears 
witness  to  his  failure  to  establish  ethical  postulates  on  a  biological  basis. 
Mach's  error  lies  in  his  belief  that  all  problems  can  be  solved  or  excluded 
by  an  analysis  of  experience-data.  His  point  of  view  is  not  critical  but 
dogmatic,  and  his  tendency  to  set  aside  problems  is  manifestly  unphilosophi- 
cal.  A  view  of  the  world  which,  neglecting  the  higher  capacities  of  man, 
gives  worth  only  to  a  knowledge  of  physics  and  physiology,  stands  upon 
a  false  basis. 

M.  S.  MACDONALD. 


No.  5.]  SUMMARIES  OF  ARTICLES.  577 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

De  la  memoire.     J.  LARGUIER  DES  BANCELS.     Ar.  de  Psy.,  No.    10,  pp. 
145-163. 

Memory  furnishes  the  content  for  intelligence.  Analysis  of  its  function 
shows  that  it  determines  the  character  of  perceptual  experience  by  giving 
it  coherence.  It  is  also  the  chief  factor  in  governing  volitional  action. 
Experiment  shows  that  modifications  of  activity  and  its  adaptation  to 
environment  are  due  to  memory,  affording  as  it  does  matter  upon  which 
intelligence  may  work.  The  power  of  memory  in  any  given  case  is  a 
measure  of  intellectual  capacity.  When  modifications  of  activity  in  response 
to  stimuli  occur,  the  correlated  mental  change  is  a  reproduction  in  memory 
of  past  experience.  For  reproduction  retention  is  necessary.  This  is  a 
physical  process,  though  the  nervous  change  corresponding  to  it  is  unde- 
termined. That  a  kind  of  connection  is  formed  between  the  nervous  ele- 
ments of  the  brain,  seems  a  necessary  presupposition  in  maintaining  an 
adequate  theory  of  retention.  By  this  cerebral  retention  of  past  mental 
activity,  subsequent  experience  is  modified.  Constant  reproduction  tak- 
ing effect  in  activity  becomes  automatism.  Memory  is  thus  the  germ  of 
habit,  which,  when  fully  developed,  becomes  human  nature  itself.  And 
not  only  is  the  animal  organism  susceptible  to  a  modification  of  activity 
through  habit,  but  a  similar  phenomenon  occurs  in  the  endeavor  of  the 
plant  to  adapt  its  life  to  changed  environment.  The  hereditary  transmis- 
sion of  acquired  characteristics  is  a  transmission  of  organic  memory  through 
permanent  modifications  in  the  germ  plasm.  Even  the  inorganic  world  is 
in  a  sense  amenable  to  the  law  of  habit.  The  effect  of  changes  there  per- 
sists in  a  tendency  to  more  easy  modification  in  accord  with  previous 
changes,  e.  g.%  a  violin.  In  this  sense,  memory  is  a  function  of  inorganic 
as  well  as  of  organic  bodies,  and  a  correct  interpretation  of  the  physical 
world  aids  in  a  complete  understanding  of  the  memory  problem. 

FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 

On  the  Attributes  of  the  Sensations.     MAX  MEYER.     Psych.  Rev.,  XI,  2, 

pp.  83-103. 

A  classification  of  conscious  elements  can  be  legitimately  criticised  only 
by  an  inquiry  into  the  scientific  usefulness  of  the  classification.  Obviously 
a  scientific  terminology  is  useful  in  proportion  as  it  fits  our  present  knowl- 
edge without  distorting  or  prejudicing  facts,  and  is  plastic  enough  to  admit 
of  change  as  new  facts  are  discovered.  The  principle  of  independent 
variability,  which  is  often  proposed  as  a  method  of  classifying  sensations, 
lacks  scientific  usefulness  because  the  quality  and  pitch  of  a  tone,  though 
certainly  distinct  attributes,  cannot  be  independently  varied.  The  scheme 
of  classification  here  proposed  is  intended  to  apply  only  to  peripherally 
aroused  sensations,  and  does  not  involve  the  question  whether  sensations 
are  the  only  elements  of  consciousness.  A  complex  state  of  consciousness 
peripherally  aroused  can  be  simplified  (i)  by  simplifying  objective  condi- 


578  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

tions  ;  (2)  by  concentration  of  attention.  If  the  two  methods  turn  out 
similarly,  the  result  is  called  a  single  sensation  or  an  element  of  conscious- 
ness. If  a  complex  state  can  be  simplified  by  concentration  of  attention 
only  (not  by  simplifying  external  conditions),  the  result  is  called  an  attri- 
bute of  a  sensation  or  an  atom  of  consciousness.  Suppose,  for  example, 
that  consciousness  could  be  reduced  merely  to  peripherally  stimulated 
visual  sensations.  Objectively,  any  stimulus  is  expressible  in  Helmholtz's 
formula,  F=  xR-\-yG  -}-zV,  and  this  stimulus  can  be  simplified  objectively 
only  by  reducing  x,  y,  or  z  to  zero.  We  find,  therefore,  that  any  visual 
sensation  which  is  uniform  over  a  certain  area  of  the  field  of  vision  must 
be  called  a  single  sensation,  because  it  cannot  be  objectively  simplified. 
By  concentration  of  attention,  however,  we  can  still  further  simplify  any 
single  visual  sensation.  Seven  attributes  or  atoms  of  sensation  can  be 
thus  distinguished  :  duration,  extent,  brightness,  bluishness,  yellowishness, 
greenishness,  and  reddishness,  though  all  these  can  never  be  united  in  one 
sensation.  Thus,  blue  has  bluishness,  extent,  duration,  and  brightness, 
while  violet  has  all  these  and  reddishness  besides.  By  a  similar  process 
all  the  sense  departments  are  classified  and  a  table  of  all  known  sensa- 
tions and  their  attributes  is  worked  out. 

GEORGE  H.  SABINE. 

The    Consciousness  of  Animals.     EDOUARD    CLAPAREDE.     International 
Quarterly,  VIII,  2,  pp.  296-315. 

Loeb,  Edinger,  and  other  biologists,  have  sought  to  determine  the  objec- 
tive criterion  of  consciousness  in  order  to  mark  the  place  in  the  animal  scale 
where  this  new  factor  must  be  reckoned  with.  According  to  them,  con- 
sciousness is  the  function  of  a  physiological  process  wholly  determined  by 
the  associative  activity  of  memory.  An  animal  possesses  '  psychic  qualities  ' 
when  it  knows  how  to  accommodate  itself  to  new  conditions,  when  it  is  able 
to  learn.  By  aid  of  this  criterion,  the  line  has  been  roughly  drawn  between 
vertebrates  and  invertebrates.  But  this  ability  to  learn,  to  associate,  can- 
hot  be  accepted  as  a  test  of  the  process  of  mental  life.  For  there  are  sim- 
ple, primitive  acts  resulting  from  no  experience  which  are  clearly  conscious, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  acts  evidently  associative  which  are  un- 
conscious. Another  criterion  has  been  formulated  by  Watkins,  who  makes 
it  the  abrupt  change  of  behavior  shown,  <?.  g.,  by  an  infusorium  ;  but  this 
test  is  also  illegitimate,  for  a  drop  of  mercury  has  the  same  appearance  of 
spontaneity  in  the  presence  of  a  small  crystal  of  bichromate  of  potash,  when 
placed  in  a  saucer  containing  some  water  acidulated  with  sulphuric  or  nitric 
acid.  But  the  impossibility  of  an  objective  criterion  of  consciousness  for 
animals  might  have  been  proved  a  priori  by  recalling  the  fundamental 
principle  of  physiological  psychology  ;  the  principle  of  concomitance  or 
parallelism  teaches  the  absolute  distinction  between  the  subjective  and  the 
objective,  from  which  it  follows  that  we  cannot,  the  one  being  given,  con- 
struct the  other.  In  virtue  of  this  principle,  it  is  only  empirically  that  we 


No.  5.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  579 

can  establish  the  criterion  by  noting  or  comparing  the  simultaneously  cor- 
responding moments  of  the  two  series,  physical  and  psychic.  The  estab- 
lishment of  a  criterion,  then,  requires  that  the  two  series  should  have  been 
previously  given  ;  but  they  are  not.  But  of  what  use  is  such  an  objective 
criterion  to  science  ?  From  the  point  of  view  .of  parallelism,  the  fact  that  a 
biological  process  may  or  may  not  be  conscious  makes  absolutely  no  differ- 
ence ;  for  even  if  we  prove  certain  animals  to  be  conscious,  we  should  be 
obliged  to  regard  this  consciousness  as  playing  no  part  whatever,  and  to 
consider  all  the  processes  as  if  they  were  unconscious,  which  shows  that  an 
objective  criterion  of  consciousness,  supposing  it  could  be  established,  would 
not  respond  to  any  need.  EMIL  C.  WILM. 

De  la  sensation  a  r intelligence.     A.  BINET.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  11,  pp. 

449-467;  12,  pp.  592-618. 

In  some  experiments  on  school  children  the  author  found  that  the  limen 
of  '  twoness  '  varied  widely  with  different  subjects,  the  keenness  of  sensibility 
apparently  standing  in  a  fairly  definite  relation  to  intellectual  capacity.  He 
then  modified  the  usual  methods,  using  a  standard  and  a  variable  separa- 
tion, and  requiring  his  subjects  to  compare  the  two  and  tell  how  their  con- 
clusion was  reached,  and  carried  out  a  series  of  further  experiments  with 
reference  to  the  relation  just  mentioned.  The  subjects  fall  into  two  classes, 
'conscious'  and  'unconscious/  those  able  and  those  unable  to  explain 
how  their  judgments  were  reached.  In  the  latter  class,  there  was  frequent 
lack  of  interest  —  these  subjects  were,  for  the  most  part,  uneducated  —  and 
very  often  the  judgments  were  given  haphazard  ;  but  even  then  the  larger 
part  were  correct,  showing  that  a  subconscious  influence  was  at  work. 
These  subjects  declared  that  they  "felt"  the  difference  —  it  was,  for 
them,  a  sensation.  The  '  conscious '  subjects  are  divided  into  two 
groups,  which  the  author  calls  the  '  normal '  and  '  aberrant '  types.  Those 
belonging  to  the  former  fall  into  four  classes  according  to  the  methods  of 
comparison  which  they  use.  (i)  In  the  first,  the  judgment  is  based  on  the 
form  and  simple  character  or  '  twoness  '  of  the  contact.  (2)  In  the  second, 
the  comparison  is  by  abstract  localization,  i.  e.,  the  subject  visualizes  the 
stimulated  points  on  a  plane  surface.  (3)  In  the  third,  the  comparison  is  by 
concrete  localization,  t.  e.,  the  points  are  visualized  on  the  skin  and  in 
definite  relation  to  particular  parts  of  it.  (4)  In  the  fourth,  the  judgment  is 
based  on  the  keenness  of  sensation.  Some  of  the  subjects  used  two  of  these 
methods,  e.  g.,  the  second  and  third.  The  subjects  of  the  'aberrant' 
type  are  characterized  by  the  development  of  some  special  faculty.  The 
author  discusses  two  cases,  a  visual  and  a  verbal.  The  former  visualized 
the  stimulated  points  and  was  able  to  '  see '  all  four  points  at  once  in  his 
comparisons.  The  latter  was  a  very  poor  visualizer  and  reached  his  con- 
clusions by  way  of  verbal  imagery  or  metaphor.  This  dependence  on 
the  verbal  image  seems  to  be  due  to  the  weakness  of  the  memory  for  sen- 
sations and  the  inability  to  visualize.  When  words  or  verbal  images  are 


580  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

lacking  for  the  finer  differences  of  sensation,  the  power  of  discrimination 
is  slight,  indicating  the  relationship  between  mental  type  and  perception. 
Hyperaesthesia  of  the  sense  organ,  shown  by  exceptional  acuity  of  percep- 
tion, is  frequent.  It  seems  to  be  a  periodic  phenomenon  in  the  cases  in 
which  it  appears  at  all.  The  author  performed  another  series  of  experi- 
ments with  the  object  of  determining  the  mental  processes  involved  in  the 
perception  of  'twoness.'  Here  the  emphasis  was  placed  entirely  on  the 
introspective  data.  Here  again  there  were  large  individual  differences. 
In  some  cases  the  subjects  confined  their  responses  to  the  statement  that 
two  points  were  felt  and  no  further  analysis  of  the  mental  processes  involved 
could  be  reached.  The  other  subjects  fell  into  two  classes,  determined  by 
the  one  of  two  processes  of  interpretation  reported  —  the  verbal  and  the 
visual.  The  verbal  process  of  interpretation  is  a  judgment  which  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  sensations  which  it  interprets  ;  the  visual  process  involves 
either  visual  or  tactual  imagery  or  both,  and  it  is  by  means  of  these  that 
the  perception  of  '  twoness  '  is  reached  ;  and  these  different  methods  of 
interpreting  sensations  are  determined  by  the  mental  type  or  the  peculiar 
modes  of  psychical  activity  which  prevail  in  the  mental  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual. C.  E.  GALLOWAY. 

ETHICS  AND  ESTHETICS. 
Science  et  conscience.     F.  RAUH.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXIX,  4,  pp.  359-367. 

The  author  contrasts  his  views  with  those  of  Levy-Bruhl.  Should  man 
in  moral  action  consult  his  conscience,  or  regulate  his  conduct  exclusively 
by  the  objective  standards  set  up  in  society  ?  The  verdict  in  the  last  resort 
belongs  to  conscience,  since  man  is  not  a  simple  spectator  of  reality,  and 
the  moral  idea,  like  all  others,  is  not  a  fixed  entity,  but  the  product  of  in- 
dividual observation.  The  standpoint  of  all  moral  observation  is  the  pres- 
ent, not  as  a  mere  datum,  but  as  the  solution  of  moral  problems  which  is 
coming  into  being  in  the  really  free  and  unprejudiced  consciences.  The 
sociological  moralist  runs  the  risk  of  destroying  the  individual  initiative  of 
conscience  in  his  submission  to  physical  and  biological  concepts  from 
which  sociology  has  already  freed  itself.  His  hypotheses  are  static  instead 
of  constructive.  Between  sociology  and  the  metaphysic  of  morals  there  is 
room  for  a  positive  ethics,  which  might  be  called  the  experimental  study  of 
an  ideal  type  of  action.  EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

Le  cynisme :  etude  psychologique.     £MILE  TARDIEU.     Rev.  Ph. ,  XXIX, 

i,  pp.  1-28. 

(I)  Cynicism  may  be  briefly  defined  as  the  approbation  of  our  immoral 
instincts,  the  determination  to  vilify  and  despise  our  nature.  It  is  a 
deliberate  egoism  that  vaunts  itself  and  smilingly  avows  our  unworthiness. 
As  a  philosophy,  cynicism  affirms  the  nothingness  of  all  things  and  pro- 
fesses complete  contempt  for  human  nature.  (II)  Cynicism  has  its  theorists, 
who  defend  it  as  justifiable  and  legitimate.  Their  whole  defence  rests 
on  a  condemnation  of  humanity  and  of  life.  The  justification  of  cynicism 


No.  5.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  581 

lies  in  its  teaching  us  to  meet  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of  life  with  irony 
and  smiles  :  "  This  world  is  hideous,  but  it  is  all  the  same  to  me."  (Ill) 
The  metaphysical  basis  of  cynicism  is  the  immorality  of  nature  and  of  life, 
and  the  inexorable  necessity  of  egoism.  Nature  is  immoral  in  that  it 
makes  no  distinction  between  the  just  and  the  unjust,  and  promises  neither 
punishment  nor  reward.  Life  is  immoral  in  that  it  is  blindly  given  and 
taken  away  without  reference  to  our  wishes  or  demands.  It  is  uncertain, 
ephemeral ;  death  pursues  us  and  at  the  same  time  bids  us  seek  in  passing 
pleasures  forgetfulness  of  its  presence.  Egoism  is  the  law  of  our  being, 
the  rule  of  our  every  action.  Friendship  is  but  an  exchange  of  services  ; 
we  give  that  we  may  receive.  (IV)  Cynicism  is  necessarily  connected 
with  certain  types  of  character  and  foreign  to  others.  It  is  characteristic 
of  the  forceful,  the  wicked,  the  passionate  ;  it  is  the  refuge  of  the  van- 
quished, and  the  propensity  of  vulgar  minds.  (V)  Cynicism  shows  itself 
in  a  thousand  different  ways  and  situations,  (a)  There  is  collective  cyni- 
cism, revealing  itself  in  the  indifference  or  amusement  with  which  we  daily 
read  of  crime  and  disaster,  and  the  pleasure  with  which  we  hear  of  an 
advantage  gained  for  the  nation  through  force  or  fraud,  (b)  Cynicism  of 
masters  manifests  itself  in  the  supercilious  airs  of  the  thinker,  the  wealthy , 
and  the  physically  strong,  (r)  Cynicism  of  slaves  arises  from  lack  of  free- 
dom and  its  consequent  excess  of  suffering.  Belonging  to  this  class  are 
the  man  in  public  life,  the  servant,  and  the  infirm,  (d)  Cynicism  of  mar- 
ried life  is,  in  its  extreme  form,  typified  in  the  tolerance  of  adultery,  (e) 
A  fifth  form  is  cynicism  in  the  relation  of  parents  to  their  children.  The 
father  gives  himself  the  air  of  a  superior  being,  and  strengthens  his 
authority  by  teaching  religious  views  in  which  he  does  not  believe.  (/) 
Cynicism  in  the  practice  of  a  profession  is  exemplified  in  those  who, 
through  accident  or  constraint,  have  chosen  a  profession  for  which  they 
have  no  love,  and  which  they  regard  as  a  means  of  exploiting  the  public. 
(g)  Inward  cynicism  is  the  cynicism  of  the  Ishmael  who,  in  his  loneliness, 
curses  the  world  and  God.  (K)  An  example  of  cynicism  in  our  relation  to 
God  is  our  invoking  the  Deity  at  the  approach  of  death,  and  giving  up 
worldly  pleasures  when  we  can  no  longer  enjoy  them.  (/)  There  is  cyni- 
cism in  our  attitude  towards  the  feeble,  whom  we  treat  with  no  considera- 
tion, or  are  kind  to  only  through  fear  that  we  ourselves  may  sometime  be 
in  a  like  plight.  (/)  Lastly,  there  is  the  cynicism  familiar  in  all  the  com- 
mon acts  of  life.  The  waiter  gives  scant  attention  to  those  from  whom  he 
expects  no  tip  ;  the  upstart's  insolence  grows  with  his  rising  fortunes  ;  and 
our  friends  are  held  or  lost  according  as  our  life  is  a  success  or  a  failure. 

M.  S.  MACDONALD. 

Anschauung  und  Beschreibung.     MAX  DESSOIR.     Ar.   f.  sys.  Ph.,  X,  I, 

pp.  20-55. 

Two   problems   are   investigated, — the   relation   of  words   to   sensory 
images  in  poetical  description,  and  the  adequacy  of  verbal  description  to 


582  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

the  ends  of  art-history.  Language  arose  from  the  transposition  of  a  sensory 
presentation  into  a  vocal  gesture  ;  and  even  now,  in  speaking,  we  often  have 
to  do  with  the  translation  of  single  perceptible  details  into  verbal  ideas. 
For  the  poet  this  procedure  is  the  rule.  The  sense-presentation  does  not 
remain  in  the  verbal  idea  ;  nor  can  a  word  become  an  act  of  perception, 
though  in  disappearing  from  consciousness  it  may  call  up  a  sensory  image. 
Does  the  poet's  art  consist  in  exciting  in  memory  and  imagination  images 
of  the  greatest  vividness  ?  With  each  single  word  various  images  are  asso- 
ciable,  and  each  sentence  permits  of  various  supplementations.  We  bring 
forward  images  from  our  own  experience,  which  probably  never  coincide 
with  the  picture  that  presented  itself  to  the  poet.  The  suggested  images 
are  much  too  weak  to  explain  the  strength  of  the  aesthetic  impression. 
Poetical  moods  are  produced  by  phrases  which  could  not  possibly  have  a 
perceptual  character.  The  aesthetic  impression  proceeds  not,  as  is  com- 
monly thought,  from  the  images  casually  suggested  by  the  language,  but 
from  the  language  itself  and  the  structures  peculiar  to  it.  Poetical  descrip- 
tions represent  reality  in  the  sense  that  similar  psychical  consequences 
attach  to  them.  As  for  descriptions  of  works  of  art,  since  the  most  various 
accounts  are  often  given  of  the  same  picture,  it  is  clear  that  in  each  account 
something  essential  is  lacking.  The  most  brilliant  verbal  descriptions  lack 
the  exactness  which  would  restrict  them  to  a  particular  artist  or  school. 
Only  within  narrow  limits  and  without  entire  certainty  can  words  place  the 
rough  outlines  or  arrangement  of  a  picture  before  the  eyes  of  one  who  has 
not  seen  it.  The  proper  recourse  is,  with  Winkelmann,  to  forego  exact 
description  and  attempt  to  reproduce  only  the  subjective  impression. 

THEODORE  DE  LACUNA. 

THE   HISTORY   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 
Le   testament  philosophique  de  Renouvier.      L.    DAURIAC.      Rev.    Ph., 

XXIX,  4,  PP.  337-358. 

Renouvier  emphasized  the  dependence  of  the  metaphysical  problem  of 
nature  on  the  psychological  problem  of  perception.  His  philosophy  of 
nature  was  monadist ;  but,  unlike  Leibniz,  he  repudiated  mechanism  as  im- 
plying two  inexplicable  notions,  space  and  movement.  Though  he  was  a 
phenomenalist,  he  denied  the  infinity  of  the  universe,  and  was  able  to  do 
so  because  he  perceived,  as  Leibniz  had  not,  that  the  monads  as  centers 
of  perception,  as  acts,  were  discrete  and  capable  of  enumeration.  His 
criticism  is  not  that  of  Kant,  since  he  knows  of  no  '  things-in-themselves  ', 
and  his  all-inclusive  category  is  that  of  personality.  His  doctrine  of  per- 
sonalism  rests  on  four  postulates  :  (i)  the  moral  imperative  ;  (2)  the  moral 
necessity  of  recompense  ;  (3)  the  creation  of  the  world  ;  (4)  the  pre- 
existence  and  fall  of  souls.  The  present  condition  of  things  is  evil ;  but 
the  world  was  created  good  and  men  placed  in  it  endowed  with  freedom  of 
will.  Its  forces  were  perverted  in  consequence  of  their  perversion,  and  it 
fell  into  chaos.  As  its  present  state  gradually  evolved  from  the  nebula, 


No.  5.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES. 

the  living  germs  of  the  first  men,  hidden  in  matter,  were  reborn,  so  that 
we  are  our  ancestors.  Renouvier,  at  first  inclined  towards  a  kind  of  poly- 
theism, came  in  1885  to  hold  that  the  finitude  of  the  world  in  space  and 
time,  since  the  actual  infinite  contradicts  itself,  involves  a  creator.  Also, 
since  he  saw  the  categories,  with  personality  at  their  head,  as  universal 
laws,  he  came  to  believe  that  there  must  be  a  thinker  who  has  this  objectively 
necessary  thought.  In  his  cosmogony,  Renouvier  asserts  the  right  to 
employ  imagination,  working  under  the  guidance  of  reason,  in  the  con- 
struction of  hypotheses  to  assist  in  the  task  of  philosophy. 

EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

Emerson  und  Kant.     G.  RUNZE.     Kantstudien,   IX,  i  u.  2,  pp.  292-306. 

It  is  a  matter  of  surprise  that  Emerson,  who  was  acquainted  with  Luther, 
Boehme,  and  Goethe,  and  who  named  at  one  time  or  another  not  only  all 
the  leading  but  many  of  the  secondary  philosophers  of  England  and  France, 
should  have  completely  ignored  Kant.  Simple  ignorance  of  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  great  German  cannot  be  assumed  ;  he  either  did  not  under- 
stand him,  or,  what  is  more  probable,  he  found  nothing  in  him  which  was 
foreign  to  his  own  way  of  thinking.  The  similarity  between  the  two  men 
certainly  does  not  strike  one  at  first  sight ;  the  contrast  between  them  is  in 
some  respects  complete.  Kant's  style  is  prosy,  heavy,  pedantic  ;  Emer- 
son's figurative,  brilliant,  powerful.  Kant's  thought  is  careful,  laborious, 
acute  ;  Emerson's  ideas  are  suggestive,  rich,  many-sided  ;  he  overwhelms 
his  readers  with  a  wealth  of  details,  scientific,  historical,  psychological. 
Kant  is  exhaustive  ;  Emerson  merely  suggests  a  problem  and  passes  on  ; 
but  he  leaves  the  reader  stimulated,  as  if  he  had  read  a  severely  philo- 
sophical treatise.  One  of  the  most  striking  things  about  Kant's  philosophy, 
the  duality  of  the  world  of  sense  and  the  world  of  morality,  Emerson 
apparently  transcends.  The  great  heroes  of  humanity  stand  above  the 
distinctions  good  and  bad.  In  the  essay  on  Montaigne  sensibility  is  op- 
posed to  morality,  and  the  opposition  can  be  transcended  only  by  the  dis- 
interested spectator  who,  with  his  aesthetic  and  teleological  judgment,  recog- 
nizes both  worlds  and  leaves  out  of  account  neither  the  objects  of  the  one 
nor  the  tasks  of  the  other.  There  is  a  similarity  in  the  two  thinkers'  views 
on  determinism,  on  the  good  will,  in  their  belief  in  a  moral  world  order,  in 
their  efforts,  by  criticism,  to  set  limits  to  the  powers  of  theoretical  reason 
and  thus  to  reclaim  for  faith  the  field  vacated  by  a  pretended  knowledge. 
The  autonomy  of  the  intellect  and  the  moral  will  is  recognized  by  Emerson  ; 
his  idealistic  theory  of  knowledge  is  akin  to  the  Kant-Fichtean,  the  funda- 
mental conceptions  of  Kant's  transcendental  idealism,  however  he  may 
have  come  by  them,  being  hinted  at  throughout  his  writings.  The  stamp 
of  human  reason  is  upon  the  external  world  ;  its  laws  are  not  derived  from 
the  nature  of  things,  but  are  imposed  on  them.  Without  the  active,  syn- 
thetic function  of  the  understanding,  the  world  would  be  but  an  indistinct 
mass  of  sense  impressions.  While  Emerson  is  preeminently  a  poet  in  his 


584  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

sympathies,  and  is  perhaps  not  directly  indebted  to  Kant  for  anything,  yet 
the  roots  of  his  philosophy  may  be  traced  to  scientists,  poets,  and  thinkers 
who  have,  all  of  them,  gone  to  the  school  of  Kant  for  their  starting  point 
and  inspiration.  EMIL  C.  WILM. 

La  decadence  de  la  scolastique  a  la  fin  du  moyen  age.     M.  DE  WULF.     Rev. 

Neo-Sc.,  X,  4,  pp.  359-371- 

That  Mediaeval  scholastic  philosophy  was  not  wholly  barren  is  shown  by 
its  sixteenth  century  development  in  Spain  and  Portugal.  It  declined  be- 
cause it  lacked  method  and  proper  linguistic  expression,  and  because  of  the 
blind  dogmatism  of  its  advocates.  Thought  was  swamped  amid  dialectical 
subtleties  ;  men  were  copiers  and  commentators,  rather  than  creative 
thinkers.  Science  suffered  likewise.  Aristotle's  theory  of  spiritual  astral 
substance  as  immutable  still  held  sway  and  affected  all  scientific  theories  of 
astronomy,  physics,  and  mechanics.  The  heavens  were  composed  of  pure 
ethereal  substance  indissolubly  linked  with  substantial  form,  but  the 
scholastic  thinkers  rejected  the  eternal  existence  and  divinity  which  Aristotle 
had  ascribed  to  them.  They  accepted  the  Ptolemaic  theory,  together  with 
Aristotle's  view  that  there  are  four  sublunary  elements,  earth,  air,  fire,  and 
water,  all  homogeneous  in  nature,  and  that  a  fifth  exists  as  substratum  and 
forms  the  heavenly  bodies.  The  successive  transformations,  one  into 
another,  explain  change.  His  theory  of  the  unmoved  mover  was  also 
accepted.  Belief  in  these  doctrines  explains  much  of  the  attention  given 
to  astrology  and  alchemy.  Copernican  astronomy  destroyed  these 
theories.  All  astronomical  and  physical  theories  had  to  be  remade  or 
modified.  Many  thinkers,  however,  still  clung  to  them,  believing  that  their 
destruction  meant  destruction  of  metaphysics  itself.  Scholastic  philosophy 
thus  fell  into  disrepute  as  a  result  of  the  discoveries  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  Bacon  reproached  the  scholastics  for  their  ignorance  of  history 
and  natural  science.  Other  open-minded  thinkers  developed  their  philos- 
ophy in  accord  with  the  demands  of  scientific  studies.  The  vital  prob- 
lems of  philosophy  still  remained,  though  the  blindness  of  its  advocates 
had  for  the  time  lost  sight  of  them. 

FRANK  P.  BUSSELL. 


NOTICES   OF   NEW   BOOKS. 

Aristote.    Par  CLODIUS  PIAT.     Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1903.  — pp.  viii,  396. 

The  volume  before  us  belongs  to  the  series  entitled  "  Les  grands  philos- 
ophies," in  which  the  study  of  Socrates  by  the  same  author,  who  is  also 
editor-in-chief,  appeared  in  1900.  The  author's  point  of  view  is  that  of 
the  scholar  who  gives  an  exposition  of  a  system  from  within,  aiming  to 
reproduce  in  outline,  but  in  their  intrinsic  proportions,  the  doctrines  as  held 
by  the  philosopher. 

This  '  internal '  method  has  unquestionable  advantages.  It  enables  the 
expositor  to  proceed  to  his  task  directly  and  to  pursue  his  aim  steadily  to 
the  end,  without  pausing  to  notice  every  question  in  controversy.  The 
account  may  thus  be  made  thoroughly  objective,  and  there  may  be  attained 
a  symmetry  and  a  perspicuity  otherwise  well  nigh  impossible.  The  plan 
would  be  an  ideal  one  if  the  reader's  interest  should  prove  to  be  that 
of  the  man  who  cares  only  for  the  thinker,  and  for  his  thought  only  so  far 
as  it  may  be  related  to  itself  in  its  various  phases.  But  even  so,  to  be 
entirely  successful,  the  account  thus  given  would  require  for  the  careful 
student  copious  notes  designed  to  mark  disputed  points  of  interpretation. 
For  this  purpose,  an  adequate  acquaintance  with  the  latest  literature  of  the 
subject  would  be  indispensable.  But  in  the  volume  before  us  M.  Piat  gives 
no  evidence  of  such  knowledge,  and  indeed  the  bibliographical  appendix 
is  sadly  discouraging  to  one  who  looks  for  the  latest  and  best  books  on 
Aristotle. 

The  disadvantages  of  the  method,  especially  as  here  exemplified,  must 
be  patent  to  every  student.  The  intelligent  reader  of  to-day,  whether  a 
professed  student  of  the  history  of  thought  or  not,  is  not  so  much  concerned 
to  know  the  precise  place  which  a  particular  conception  held  in  the  sys- 
tematic exposition  of  Aristotle's  thought,  as  to  ascertain  the  antecedents 
and  consequents  of  that  conception  —  in  a  word  to  discover  the  historical 
value  of  the  system  and  of  its  constituent  parts.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
say  that  M.  Piat  has  done  nothing  to  satisfy  this  natural  demand.  It 
might,  indeed,  have  been  met  by  the  judicious  use  of  footnotes,  but  our 
author  preferred  to  ignore  it.  At  the  beginning  he  plunges  in  medias  res 
and  never  really  takes  up  the  question.  Only  one  exception  is  made  : 
here  and  there  a  remark  is  added  to  make  clear  the  relation  between  the 
doctrines  of  Aristotle  and  of  Saint  Thomas. 

Two  instances  will  serve  to  illustrate  what  I  mean.  There  is  perhaps  no 
other  conception  of  ancient  philosophy  so  fruitful  of  good  and  evil  as  that 
of  potentiality.  While  it  is  true  that  Aristotle  himself  tends  to  keep  the 
direct  consideration  of  it  in  the  background,  there  can  hardly  be  a  reason- 
able doubt  that  it  is  in  fact  the  master  key  with  which  he  opens  every  door 
that  threatens  to  impede  his  progress.  Of  all  this  there  is,  of  course,  not  a 

585 


586  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

hint  in  the  account  given  by  M.  Piat.  The  very  notion  of  potentiality 
receives  scant  justice,  being  noticed,  as  it  were  in  passing,  in  connection 
with  other  allied  conceptions.  Regarded  also  from  the  historical  point  of 
view,  as  it  concerns  either  logical  or  physical  science,  the  notion  is  of 
extraordinary  interest.  Another  case  in  point  is  the  idea  of  qualitative 
change  (Moiucir).  When  one  surveys  the  thought  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
which  is  Aristotelianism  writ  large,  one  is  astounded  at  the  fruitfulness  of 
this  conception.  One  has  only  to  refer  to  two  among  the  many  aspects 
under  which  it  reappears  in  order  to  make  clear  its  significance.  One  is 
the  idea  of  transmutation,  met  in  alchemy  in  its  firm  belief  in  a  phi- 
losopher's stone.  The  other  is  the  theological  doctrine  of  transsubstan- 
tiation.  What  cognizance  does  M.  Piat  take  of  this  conception  ?  He  passes 
over  it  with  only  a  citation  from  Aristotle,  enumerating  it  with  the  other 
forms  of  change  (//era/So^)  in  the  chapter  on  Motion  (pp.  96  fT). 

I  have  said  enough  to  characterize  the  book  in  hand  ;  it  is,  in  spite  of  its 
bulk,  a  meager  though  fairly  faithful  restatement  in  outline  of  the  Aristo- 
telian philosophy  from  the  point  of  view  of  Aristotle  himself.  It  casts  no 
glance  behind  or  before  to  take  in  the  relation  of  the  system  or  of  its  several 
doctrines  to  the  larger  movement  of  thought  which  we  call  the  history  of 
philosophy.  It  may  well  be  doubted  whether  such  a  book  was  greatly 
needed.  W.  A.  HEIDEL. 

IOWA  COLLEGE,  GRINNELL. 

Naturbetrachtung  und  Naturerkenntnis  im  Altertum  :   Eine  Entwicke- 

lungsgeschichte  der  antiken  Naturivissenschaften.     Von  FRANZ  STRUNZ. 

Hamburg  und  Leipzig,  Verlag  von  Leopold  Voss,  1904. — pp.  viii,  168. 

This  book  contains  six  chapters  :  I.  Introduction  ;  II.  The  Theoretical 
Basis  of  the  Conception  of  Nature  among  the  Oriental  Peoples  ;  III.  The 
Practical  Study  of  Nature  among  the  Oriental  Peoples  ;  IV.  The  Concep- 
tion and  Philosophy  of  Nature  in  Classical  Antiquity  ;  V.  Scientific  Prac- 
tice in  Classical  Antiquity  and  in  its  Decline  ;  VI.  Epilogue. 

The  most  marked  difference  between  the  present  work  and  others  of 
similar  scope  that  have  recently  appeared  is  that  its  main  concern  is  with 
science  rather  than  with  philosophy.  One  thinks  naturally  of  such  books  as 
Gomperz'  s  Griechische  Denker  and  Benn'  s  The  Philosophy  of  Greece  ;  yet 
the  fields  occupied  by  the  three  works  is  by  no  means  the  same.  The 
scheme  adopted  by  Dr.  Strunz  is  that  of  a  parallel  account  of  the  theo- 
retical and  the  practical  aspects  of  the  conscious  relations  of  the  ancients 
to  nature.  The  subject  is  one  to  awaken  curiosity,  and  the  Introduction  is 
such  as  to  raise  expectations  of  great  results.  I  regret  to  say  that  one's 
high  hopes  are  somewhat  rudely  dashed  as  one  proceeds  with  the  reading 
of  the  book. 

The  Introduction  contains  some  striking  aphorisms  on  the  proper  method 
to  be  observed  in  writing  the  history  of  thought.  With  much  that  is  there 
said  the  present  reviewer  finds  himself  in  the  heartiest  agreement.  But 


No.  5.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  587 

there  appears  in  the  body  of  the  book  no  serious  effort  to  apply  the 
method  ;  hence  it  will  be  of  no  avail  to  transcribe  what  we  must  regard 
merely  as  fine  phrases. 

Few  things  would  be  more  cordially  welcomed  by  scholars  than  an  honest 
attempt,  — however  much  questioned  its  results  in  detail,  — fully  to  state 
and  intimately  to  relate  the  two  series  of  ascertainable  facts  :  first,  the  prac- 
tical knowledge  had  by  mankind  at  various  epochs  of  the  phenomena  and 
processes  of  nature,  as  manifested  in  the  arts,  sciences,  and  handicrafts,  as 
well  as  in  the  social  institutions,  such  as  the  domestic,  the  political,  the 
religious  ;  second,  the  theoretical  evaluation  and  interpretation  of  life  and 
nature,  as  displayed  in  mythology,  religion,  morals,  and  philosophy.  It 
was  not  precisely  this,  but  something  like  this,  that  Dr.  Strunz  contem- 
plated. What  he  has  actually  done  is  this.  He  has  with  commendable 
diligence  collected  from  many  sources, — good,  bad,  and  indifferent, — 
much  matter  that  may  serve  another  more  competent  to  deal  critically  with 
it,  when  the  right  man  undertakes  to  set  ancient  theory  and  practice  in 
things  pertaining  to  nature  into  clearer  relations.  Dr.  Strunz  himself  has 
done  little  or  nothing  in  this  direction,  leaving  the  two  series  of  facts  quite 
unrelated. 

While  the  work  before  us  is,  in  a  sense,  a  rudis  indigestaque  moles,  it  is  not 
a  useless  book;  indeed,  there  are  here  and  there  portions  worthy  of  most 
diligent  perusal.  Students  of  ancient  thought  will  find  little  of  value  in  the 
brief  characterization  of  the  philosophical  opinions  of  the  Greeks  ;  but  on 
the  side  of  science  and  technology,  where  the  author's  interest  manifestly 
centers,  there  is  much  to  stimulate  thought. 

In  his  treatment  of  the  oriental  peoples,  Dr.  Strunz  quotes  freely  from  the 
less  technical  recent  literature,  giving  the  results  which  may  be  regarded 
as  on  the  whole  at  present  received  ;  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  history  of 
occidental  thought  he  is  not  always  so  fortunate,  quoting  with  approval 
sometimes  from  the  briefer  handbooks,  sometimes  from  recent  literature, 
statements  which  it  were  wiser  to  ignore.  On  the  other  hand,  his  previous 
occupation  with  Theophrastus  Paracelsus  has  familiarized  him  with  certain 
phases  of  the  influence  exerted  by  Aristotelianism  on  mediaeval  thought, 
which  he  brings  out  clearly  and  forcibly, 

I  dare  not  finish  this  brief  notice  of  the  book  without  saying  that  its  author 
appears  to  recognize  in  some  degree  its  shortcomings,  and  holds  out  a  hope 
of  amendment  in  the  future.  In  his  brief  preface  he  says,  "  Vielleicht  wird 
das,  was  vorlaufig  stark  aphoristische  Akzente  tragt,  spater  breiter  und 
tiefgriindiger  ausgearbeibet  werden."  W.  A.  HEIDEL. 

IOWA  COLLEGE,  GRINNELL. 

Theophrastus  Paracelsus,  sein  Leben  und  seine  Personlichkeit.     Ein  Beitrag 
zur  Geistesgeschichte  der  deutschen  Renaissance.     Von  FRANZ  STRUNZ. 
Leipzig,  Diederichs,  1903. — pp.  127. 
The  labors  of  Dr.  Karl  Sudhoff  have  thrown  much  light  on  the  life  and 

character  of  Paracelsus,  the  famous  natural-philosopher  and  professor  of 


588  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

medicine  at  Basel.  In  his  Kritik  der  Echtheit  der  paracelsischen  Schriften 
(Berlin,  1894-9),  Sudhoff  has  given  us  the  results  of  years  of  investigation 
of  the  manuscripts  and  printed  works  attributed  to  Paracelsus  ;  while  the 
Paracelsus-Forschungen  of  Schubert  and  Sudhoff  (Frankfurt  a.  M., 
1887-9)  have  disclosed  the  falsity  of  many  of  the  traditions  respecting  his 
life  which  have  been  handed  down  by  his  enemies.  In  the  gentle  art  of 
making  enemies,  indeed,  Paracelsus  seems  to  have  been  an  adept ;  witness 
the  celebrated  Latin  poem  Manes  Galeni  adversus  Theophrastum  sed 
potius  Cacophrastum ;  also  the  judgment  pronounced  on  him  not  many 
years  after  his  death  by  Bernhard  Dessen,  professor  in  Lowen  :  ' '  Paracelsus 
est  magnus  p.  e.,  magus]  monstrosus,  superstitiosus,  impius  et  in  Deum 
blasphemus,  infandus  impostor,  ebriosus,  monstrum  horrendum."  Only  a 
few  years  ago,  moreover,  Professor  Dalton,  in  a  lecture  before  the  New 
York  Academy  of  Medicine,  spoke  of  Paracelsus  as  "the  most  complete 
and  typical  representative  in  history  of  the  thorough-paced  charlatan." 

Such  extremely  hostile  views,  however,  are  now  a  thing  of  the  past. 
Full  of  enthusiasm  and  at  the  same  time  thoroughly  imbued  with  the 
scientific  spirit,  Herr  Strunz  has  given  us  a  new  and  sympathetic  portrait 
of  the  great  Swiss  humanist.  In  the  new  light  of  recent  researches,  Para- 
celsus stands  out  as  one  of  the  important  figures  of  the  German  Renais- 
sance, not  merely  as  a  reformer  of  medicine  but  as  a  bold  and  original 
thinker. 

With  the  sketch  of  Hohenheim's  life  we  are  not  here  especially  con- 
cerned ;  suffice  it  to  say  that  Strunz  has  nothing  to  say  of  the  charlatan, 
the  drunkard,  the  devotee  of  vice,  the  Faust-type  which  the  name  of 
Paracelsus  has  connoted  for  many.  We  would  call  attention  to  the  chapter 
on  "Hohenheim  als  Personlichkeit "  as  a  brilliant  exposition  of  the 
position  of  Paracelsus  in  the  history  of  the  Renaissance,  and  of  some  of 
his  moral  and  religious  ideas.  For  Paracelsus,  nature  was  the  open  book  in 
which  man  reads  of  God  and  eternal  life.  Not  in  himself  but  in  nature 
was  man  to  seek  the  interpretation  of  the  unity  of  human  experience  ;  then 
God  should  be  the  guide,  reason  the  light,  and  the  mind  the  witness 
(p.  84).  The  nearer  reason  keeps  to  the  evidence  of  sense,  the  more 
capable  and  efficient  it  will  become  ;  and  conversely,  the  more  it  turns 
from  what  the  senses  have  observed  toward  the  uncertain  and  unknown, 
the  greater  the  danger  of  wandering  into  fanciful  errors.  According  to  the 
light  of  nature,  then,  the  universe  was  reconstructed  by  the  scholars  of  the 
Renaissance.  A  frank,  sincere,  and  pious  seeker  after  truth,  Paracelsus 
was  a  Christian  Humanist  of  the  Old-Evangelical  type.  He  opposed  both 
rationalism  and  the  dreams  of  the  transcendentalists.  He  saw  God  in 
nature,  the  macrocosm,  as  much  as  he  marveled  at  the  Divine  reflection  in 
the  microcosm  of  mankind. 

A  mystic  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  he  was  not  (p.  98).  He  was  too 
much  of  a  realist,  too  much  of  a  follower  of  scientific  methods  of  observa- 
tion and  experiment,  too  insistent  on  the  concrete,  the  actual.  Yet  he  had 


No.  5.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  589 

some  of  the  finer  traits  of  the  mystic.  He  thought  to  find  God  in  himself, 
and  sought  with  fervor  to  know  Him.  Nothing  should  come  between  his 
soul  and  God.  His  piety,  however,  was  not  merely  a  deep  inner  life,  not 
merely  the  excitement  of  emotion  ;  it  was  neither  the  personal  religion  of 
the  Catholic  nor  the  subjective  philosophy  of  the  Neo-Platonist.  It  was 
rather  as  a  Christian  Humanist  that  he  was  related  to  the  great  mystics 
(p.  100).  Nature  with  its  various  phenomena  was  the  explanation  of  the 
Godhead ;  the  Godhead  was  the  foundation  of  the  world.  God  and  the 
world  were  the  same. 

Space  forbids  us  to  give  further  hints  of  the  contents  of  this  most  interest- 
ing chapter,  which  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  Paracelsus 's  ideas  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God  and  of  the  work  of  the  physician  in  its  ethical  aspects. 
With  all  his  enthusiasm,  Herr  Strunz  has  shown  commendable  restraint  in 
his  statements,  and  has,  wherever  possible,  allowed  Paracelsus  to  tell  his 
own  story.  The  volume  forms  a  worthy  introduction  to  the  new  edition  of 
Paracelsus.  CLARK  S.  NORTHUP. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

Transitional  Eras  in  Thought  with  Special  Reference  to  the  Present  Age. 

By  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG.     New  York,   The  Macmillan  Co.,  1904. — pp. 

xi,  347- 

Professor  Armstrong  claims  to  furnish  an  enquiry  into  the  development 
of  western  thought  and  culture  suggested  by  analogies  that  exist  between 
the  age  of  the  Sophists  and  the  later  eighteenth  century  in  France.  No 
attempt  is  made  to  analyze  these  two  periods  or  to  point  out  in  detail  the 
analogies  of  these  two  widely  separated  ages,  but  it  is  postulated  that  the 
conclusions  from  these  analogies  hold  good  for  transitional  eras  generally. 
' '  The  outcome  of  this  inquiry  is  given  in  the  present  volume.  The  ques- 
tions proposed  are  considered  in  the  first  instance  from  the  standpoint  of 
reflective  thinking  and  with  reference  to  its  problems  ;  of  thought  always, 
however,  in  its  broader  reaches,  as  connected  with  life,  individual  and 
social,  as  related  to  the  state  and  bearing  on  civil  government,  as  influenc- 
ing conduct,  and  affecting  not  only  theological  beliefs,  but  religious  prac- 
tice" (Preface,  p.  viii).  The  feeling  that  we  are  dealing  with  an  inter- 
pretation of  an  interpretation,  in  generalities  covering  a  very  large  field,  is 
unavoidable  especially  as  the  logical  connection  between  the  essays  and 
lectures  which  constitute  the  volume  does  not  profess  to  be  close. 

The  first  chapter  bears  the  title  of  the  book.  Passing  over  the  question 
of  titular  ethics,  we  may  note  that  transitional  eras  are  regarded  as  eras  of 
scepticism  or  agnosticism,  "  abnormal  periods  in  the  intellectual  develop- 
ment of  the  race, ' '  periods  of  theoretical  and  practical  disorders,  periods 
that  have  a  definite  rise  and  a  definite  termination.  Such  periods  are  the 
Sophistic,  the  post- Aristotelian,  the  decline  of  Rome,  the  centuries  of 
transition  from  the  medieval  to  the  modern  world,  the  eighteenth  century, 
and  the  present  age  (pp.  6  f.).  On  such  a  showing,  it  might  be  enquired  if 


590  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

transition  does  not  belong  to  the  nature  of  thought  and  history  ;  also,  if 
transitional  eras  are  not  after  all  but  matters  of  emphasis  from  various 
points  of  view.  But  if  we  understand  Professor  Armstrong,  he  will  not 
have  it  quite  this  way, — he  will  not  use  evolution  as  an  eirenicon.  In 
the  second  essay,  ' '  Typical  Eras  of  Transition, ' '  we  are  told  that  reflec- 
tive thought  moves  in  cycles,  ' '  though  it  would  undoubtedly  be  more 
agreeable  if  the  fact  were  otherwise,  that  reflective  thought  may  be  taken 
in  the  sense  of  philosophy  and  that  philosophy  in  turn  may  be  technically 
defined  as  a  rational  system  of  fundamental  principles."  The  union  of 
this  metaphor  and  this  definition  gives  precisely  the  philosophic  spirit  in 
which  the  volume  is  written.  While  Professor  Armstrong  is  clear  that  an 
abstract  separation  of  science  and  philosophy,  or  science  and  faith,  or 
science  and  theology,  is  artificial  and  unsound  in  theory  and  practice,  he 
still  holds,  as  regards  science  and  philosophy,  that  "the  two  spheres  of 
enquiry  are  radically  different. "  How  such  a  radical  difference  is  possible, 
even  on  methodological  grounds,  is  not  apparent  if,  as  in  the  chapter  on 
"Science  and  Doubt"  it  is  maintained,  science  encourages  the  belief  in  a 
fixed  order  of  the  world  and  supplies  new  motives  or  '  'fresh  reasons  for 
belief  in  God." 

Chapter  v,  on  "Thought  and  Social  Movements,"  is  replete  with  excel- 
lent observations  and  suggestions,  but  one  might  demur  to  such  phrases  as 
"economic,  political,  and  other  non-moral  forces"  (p.  225).  In  Chapter 
vi,  "The  Appeal  to  Faith,"  the  author's  continental  rationalism  comes 
to  the  front  in  the  assertion  that ' '  of  greater  moment  than  the  source  of  the 
appeal  is  the  question  of  its  legitimacy."  The  appeal  to  faith  is  regarded 
as  jeopardizing  the  permanent  for  the  satisfaction  of  present  and  pressing 
needs.  We  are  called  upon  to  endure  the  "pains  and  miseries  "  of  doubt 
until  "rational  thought  has  rendered  a  deliberate,  a  complete,  a  final 
decision."  This  might  pass  for  a  new  theory  of  eternal  punishment.  The 
splendid  depravity  of  the  pure  rationalist's  faith  is  well  expressed  in  the  last 
chapter.  "  Better,  far  better  to  grope  in  mental  darkness,  better  to  abandon 
any  cherished  conviction,  no  matter  how  bereft  its  loss  may  leave  the  soul, 
than  to  depart  from  this  central  principle  of  intellectual  integrity,  which  is 
at  the  same  time  the  condition  of  intellectual  power."  Is  philosophy  forced 
to  contemplate  such  an  alternative,  to  leave  life  and  indentity  itself  with 
abstractions,  to  exist  in  pain  and  misery  until  a  body  of  fixed  and  unchange- 
able principles  is  established  by  rational  thought  ? 

But  what  is  the  outlook  for  our  period  of  transition  ;  how  are  transitional 
periods  brought  to  a  close  ?  Not  by  a  return  to  doctrines  in  honor  before 
the  period  of  doubt  began  ;  not  by  eclecticism,  which  has  always  proven  a 
failure,  but  by  a  synthetic  development  ' '  worked  out  by  the  activity  of 
thought  at  large. ' '  Considering  the  number  and  extent  of  the  transitional 
eras,  we  might  ask  when  and  where  has  this  synthesis  occurred  in  the  past, 
and  what  are  the  rational  grounds  of  expectation  that  it  will  occur  in  future 
time  and  space.  Are  we  not  looking  in  simple  faith  to  a  far  off  divine 


No.  5.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  591 

event  ?  Of  all  appeals  to  faith  is  not  rationalism  the  most  complete  and 
arbitrary  ? 

But  it  is  time  to  make  amends  for  our  somewhat  querulous  attitude 
toward  the  form  and  spirit  of  the  book.  The  treatise  is  well  worth  careful 
consideration  both  for  its  composition  and  content.  If  its  judgments  are  a 
little  too  depressing  at  times,  the  brief  analyses  and  reflections  are  often 
illuminating.  As  an  example  of  the  bookmaker's  art  the  work  cannot  be 
too  highly  commended.  M.  M.  CURTIS. 

WESTERN  RESERVE. 

The  Educational  Theory  of  Immanuel  Kant.     Translated  and  Edited  with 

an  Introduction  by  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER.     Philadelphia  and 

London,  J.  B.  Lippincott  Company,  1904.  — pp.  309. 

The  present  volume  consists  of  an  introduction  and  bibliography  of 
eighty  pages  by  Professor  Buchner  ;  Kant's  Lecture-Notes  on  Pedagogy, 
one  hundred  and  twenty-one  pages  ;  and  sixty-six  pages  of  selections  bear- 
ing on  Education  from  Kant's  other  writings. 

Professor  Buchner  has  been  a  student  of  Kant  for  a  number  of  years  and 
is  well  prepared  to  relate  Kant's  pedagogy  to  his  philosophy  so  far  as  that 
can  be  done  at  all.  He  enters  upon  his  task  with  sympathy  and  spirit, 
but  there  is  nothing  to  lead  one  to  suppose  that  his  great  admiration  for 
Kant  the  philosopher  has  caused  him  to  magnify  unduly  Kant's  contribution 
to  educational  theory.  Moreover,  any  fear  that  one  may  have  had  that  a 
new  idol  was  to  be  offered  to  school-masters,  or  a  new  school  established, 
is  quieted  as  one  passes  from  page  to  page  of  Professor  Buchner' s  judicious 
and  discriminating  account  of  Kant's  pedagogical  ideas. 

Kant's  Lecture-Notes,  which  constitute  the  second  part  of  the  volume, 
consist  of  an  Introduction  and  the  Treatise  proper.  The  former  is  con- 
cerned mainly  with  a  statement  of  the  grounds  of  the  necessity  and  possi- 
bility of  education.  The  Treatise  opens  with  a  statement  of  the  scope  of 
education,  which  is  either  'physical'  or  'practical.'  The  editor  makes 
the  interesting  observation  that  we  have  in  this  division  a  prophecy  or 
reference  back  to  the  third  antimony  of  the  first  Critique.  '  Physical ' 
relates  to  nature,  while  '  practical '  relates  to  freedom. 

In  the  first  part  of  the  Treatise,  which  deals  with  the  physical  care  of 
children,  Kant  probably  merely  summed  up  the  medical  wisdom  and  en- 
lightened popular  opinion  of  his  time  regarding  the  proper  care  of  children. 
As  one  runs  through  these  paragraphs,  one  cannot  help  thinking  of  the  lofty 
heights  of  the  inquiry  concerning  the  possibility  of  synthetic  judgments 
a  priori,  in  contrast  with  Kant's  quaint  and  homely  observations  regarding 
the  evils  of  over-swaddling  and  swinging  cradles.  If  one  were  so  inclined, 
one  might  draw  a  curious  parallel  of  extracts  from  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  and  the  Lecture  Notes  on  Pedagogy,  and  get  the  impression  that  it 
is  a  far  leap  from  philosophy  to  pedagogy.  And  yet  it  quickens  our  ad- 
miration for  Kant' s  versatility  to  see  how  easily  he  passes  from  the  severe 


592  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

reflections  of  the  critical  philosophy  to  good  advice  concerning  the  proper 
method  of  feeding  babies,  and  it  affords  a  certain  delight  to  be  reminded 
that  after  all  Kant  was  human  and  possessed  of  deep  and  abiding  human 
interests. 

The  antithesis  between  nature  and  freedom  appears  again  in  a  striking 
form  when  we  come  to  his  treatment  of  what  would  now  be  called  intel- 
lectual education,  which  Kant  refers  to  as  the  physical  culture  of  the  mind 
or  soul,  as  contrasted  with  moral  culture  which  aims  solely  at  freedom. 

On  the  basis  of  the  '  faculty  '  psychology  which  he  accepted  and  further 
developed,  Kant  established  the  theory  of  the  formal  discipline  of  the 
various  faculties  —  memory,  imagination,  judgment,  understanding,  etc. 

In  the  sections  on  Moral  Education,  Kant  approaches  more  nearly  the 
spirit  and  leading  conceptions  of  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  and  one 
catches  something  of  the  moral  rigorism  of  that  Critique.  The  words 
"duty,"  "obedience  to  law,"  "conscience,"  "reverence  for  the  moral 
law,"  are  written  large.  "  Moral  education  consists  in  furnishing  children 
with  certain  laws  which  they  must  follow  exactly  "  (p.  190). 

Six  sections  of  the  Treatise  set  forth  briefly  Kant's  views  concerning 
religious  education.  The  Treatise  concludes  with  sections  on  the  pedagogy 
of  adolescence,  guidance  of  the  sex  instincts,  etc. 

Selections  (sixty-six  pages)  and  numerous  footnotes  from  Kant's  other 
writings  (mainly  the  Anthropology  and  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason}, 
make  a  valuable  addition  to  the  Lecture-Notes,  which  constitute  Kant's 
formal  treatment  of  pedagogy.  DAVID  R.  MAJOR. 

OHIO  STATE  UNIVERSITY. 

La  morale  de  Kant  (deuxieme  edition,  revue  et  augmentee).    Par  ANDRE 

CRESSON.    (Bibliotheque  de  philosophic  contemporaine.)     Paris,   Felix 

Alcan,  1904. — pp.  212. 

This  work,  the  first  edition  of  which  appeared  in  1897,  consists  of  four 
approximately  equal  parts.  In  the  first  two,  dealing  respectively  with  the 
' '  form  ' '  and  the  ' '  content  of  the  moral  life, ' '  the  author  gives  a  beauti- 
fully clear  statement  of  Kant's  theory.  The  third  division  is  a  "critical 
examination  "  of  the  system  ;  while  the  fourth  is  devoted  to  the  "  historical 
position  of  the  Kantian  ethics." 

In  the  critical  part  of  the  book,  after  noting  the  great  influence  which 
Kant  actually  exerts,  Cresson  indicates  the  reasons  for  relegating  the  sys- 
tem to  a  merely  historical  position.  His  arguments  fall  into  two  series, 
those  attacking  the  logic  of  Kant's  conclusions,  and  those  directed  against 
the  fundamental  principles  themselves.  Taking  up  the  first  class,  the 
author  finds  that  Schopenhauer's  criticism,  in  which  happiness  is  said  to 
be  the  criterion  for  determining  if  a  maxim  can  possess  universal  value, 
applies  in  particular  cases  but  not  to  the  doctrine  as  a  whole.  The  deriva- 
tion of  appropriation,  however,  is  incorrect  because  intelligible  possession 
is  an  encroachment  on  the  external  freedom  of  other  men.  Moreover,  to 


No.  5.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  593 

limit  the  right  of  territory  to  the  power  of  defence,  is  a  confusion  of  right 
and  fact.  The  doctrines  of  three  separate  powers  in  the  state  and  of  non- 
resistance  to  executive  authority  are  not  proved.  In  many  other  cases, 
Kant  is  not  consistent  with  his  principles  when  he  attempts  to  deduce  con- 
sequences, for  example,  in  the  explanation  of  the  marriage  relation,  and  in 
the  treatment  of  physical  perfection  as  a  moral  end. 

In  regard  to  the  principles,  Cresson  finds  still  greater  difficulties.  The 
religious  postulates  become  necessary  hypotheses  only  because  they  depend 
upon  the  duty  of  realizing  as  far  as  possible  the  sovereign  good.  This,  in 
turn,  involves  not  only  virtue  but  also  happiness.  But  moral  good  is  doing 
one's  duty  out  of  respect  for  the  law.  By  what  right  can  Kant  make  it  a 
duty  to  aim  at  happiness  as  well  as  at  virtue  ?  Ethics,  however,  could 
dispense  with  the  religious  postulates  if  the  doctrine  of  freedom  were  ca- 
pable of  proof.  But  even  admitting  noumenal  freedom,  it  is  only  man  as 
phenomenal  who  has  consciousness  of  obligation,  while  it  is  the  noumenal 
man  who  can  believe  himself  free.  And  the  idea  of  noumenal  freedom 
implies  two  doubtful  propositions,  that  obligation  is  a  universal  fact,  and 
that  it  cannot  be  understood  apart  from  freedom.  The  first  proposition 
cannot  be  proved  from  experience.  Kant's  proof  is  fallacious  because  a 
speculative  reason  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  practical  reason  as  well. 
Two  arguments  are  advanced  in  support  of  the  second  proposition.  Obli- 
gation is  said  to  presuppose  freedom,  because  it  is  impossible  for  anything 
to  be  categorically  ordered  if  the  being  in  question  is  incapable  of  deter- 
mining himself  by  simple  examination  of  the  categorical  form  of  the  order. 
Such  a  freedom,  however,  would  be  phenomenal  not  noumenal.  Again, 
freedom  is  said  to  be  the  ratio  essendi  of  obligation.  The  concept  cause 
must,  in  Kantian  philosophy,  be  limited  to  a  phenomenal  application. 
Kant  rejected  a  material  morality  because  he  did  not  think  it  admitted  of 
universal  laws.  It  must  be  a  science  of  happiness  or  of  the  good.  He 
made  happiness  equal  pleasure  and  thus  reduced  it  to  dependence  upon 
individual  sensibility.  Moreover,  there  is  no  law  of  the  production  of  pleas- 
ure. And  a  science  of  the  good  is  not  a  real  morality  because  man  strives 
for  happiness,  not  for  the  good.  But,  since  happiness  depends  not  upon  the 
presence  of  pleasure  but  upon  the  state  of  desire,  Kant  does  not  show  the 
impossibility  of  a  material  morality.  Finally,  he  assumes,  but  cannot  prove, 
that  the  categorical  imperative  is  an  immediate  product  of  reason. 

In  the  fourth  part  of  the  book,  there  is  a  comparison  of  the  system  with 
the  ethics  of  Stoicism  and  of  Christianity.  It  resembles  the  former  in  respect 
to  conclusion,  but  not  in  respect  to  principles.  It  differs  from  the  latter  in 
regard  to  its  criterion.  The  author  concludes  that  obligation  is  conceivable 
when  dependent  upon  human  nature  or  upon  divine  command  ;  but  that 
an  absolute  obligation  is  an  illogical  conception. 

N.  E.  TRUMAN. 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  SOUTH  DAKOTA. 


594  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

The  Philosophy  of  Augusts   Comte.     By   L.    L£VY-BRUHL.     Authorized 

Translation.     London,  Swan  Sonnenschein  and  Co.,    1903. — pp.  xiv, 

363- 

It  was  no  less  than  the  due  of  Professor  Levy-Bruhl's  careful  work  that  an 
English  translation  should  follow  rapidly  upon  the  German  version.  The 
work  of  translation  has  been  performed  by  Mme.  de  Beaumont-Klein  with 
a  general  accuracy  and  felicity  to  which  one  is  not  accustomed  in  the 
majority  of  the  English  versions  of  French  scientific  and  philosophical 
books.  Indeed,  with  the  trifling  exception  of  one  or  two  un-English  con- 
structions which  have  been  allowed  to  remain  by  a  palpable  oversight 
(notably  the  rather  irritating  expression  'to  substitute  to'),  there  would  be 
little  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  book  is  not  an  original  composition  in 
English,  but  for  the  translator's  odd  practice  of  citing  the  works  of  Kant 
to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  course  of  the  exposition  by  the  titles  of 
their  French  translations.  Mr.  Frederic  Harrison  contributes  a  brief  intro- 
duction, for  the  most  part  of  a  non-controversial  character,  though  one  is 
tempted  to  think  that  the  statement  on  p.  xii,  that  the  "rational  systema- 
tic foundation  [of  psychology]  dates  from  Comte' s  suggestions,"  is  a  little 
more  than  generous  towards  Comte  and  a  little  less  than  just  towards  Her- 
bart,  Beneke,  Fechner  and  other  eminent  psychologists  whose  inspiration, 
to  say  the  least  of  it,  was  not  drawn  from  the  Positive  Philosophy. 

Of  the  merits  of  Professor  Levy-Bruhl's  study  of  Comtism  it  would  be 
superfluous  to  speak  at  length  in  a  notice  of  the  present  translation.  The 
acceptance  his  work  has  found  both  in  France  and  in  Germany  has  already 
stamped  it  as  a  valuable  and  faithful  exposition  of  the  central  thought 
of  the  founder  of  Positivism.  The  author  deserves  special  credit  for  the 
skill  with  which  he  has  shown  by  historical  evidence  that  the  subsequent 
invention  of  the  '  positive '  policy  and  religion  was  implicit  in  Comte' s  scheme 
for  the  reorganization  of  social  conditions  from  its  first  inception.  After 
Professor  Levy-Bruhl's  masterly  treatment  of  this  question,  we  ought  to  hear 
little  more  of  the  existence  of  two  sharply  opposed  periods  of  Comtist  thought. 
This  is,  it  may  be  noted,  a  remark  which  has  a  very  practical  application. 
Professor  Le  vy-Bruhl  seems  to  have  made  it  quite  clear  that  it  is  with  the  semi- 
Comtists,  who  accept  the  principles  of  the  '  positive  philosophy '  but  reject 
their  logical  development  into  '  positive '  politics  and  religion,  that  the  onus 
of  exculpating  themselves  from  the  charge  of  inconsistency  really  lies. 
One  may  distrust  the  practical  applications  of  the  Comtist  principles  (I  own 
that  it  is  a  distrust  which  I  largely  share  myself ),  but  it  seems  no  longer 
possible  with  logical  consistency  to  discriminate  between  the  applications 
and  the  principles.  If  we  reject  the  applications,  we  must  henceforth  be 
prepared  to  draw  the  inevitable  inference  that  there  is  something  unsound 
in  the  principles  from  which  they  flow. 

Professor  Levy-Bruhl's  thoroughly  "objective"  method  does  not  to  any 
considerable  extent  allow  him  to  combine  the  part  of  critic  with  that  of 
expositor.  For  my  own  part,  I  could  have  wished  that  he  had  seen  his  way 


No.  5.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  595 

to  modify  the  rigor  of  the  rules  which  have  guided  his  composition,  at  least 
here  and  there.  I  would  gladly  have  learned  from  so  competent  an 
authority,  for  instance,  what  he  takes  to  be  the  real  logical  worth  of  the 
evidence  by  which  the  ' '  law  of  the  three  stages ' '  is  supposed  to  be 
established.  But  alas  !  the  author  contents  himself  with  reproducing 
Comte's  own  estimate  of  the  "law"  and  its  foundation  in  fact,  and  does 
not  allow  us  to  conjecture  what  he  thinks  in  his  own  heart  of  the  matter. 
Similarly,  the  interesting  exposition  of  Comte's  views  on  the  nature  of 
mathematical  truth  would  gain  immensely  if  it  were  brought  into  contrast 
with  subsequent  theories  of  the  nature  of  axioms  and  the  character  of  formal 
demonstration.  As  it  is,  Professor  Levy-Bruhl's  method  inevitably  has  the 
drawback  that  it  tends  to  produce  the  impression  that  the  Comtist  views 
which  are  being  expounded  are  the  only  well  thought-out  and  seriously 
defended  philosophical  views  now  in  existence.  But  to  complain  of  so 
admirable  an  exposition  of  a  philosophy  because  it  is  not  accompanied  by 
an  equally  valuable  critical  examination  savors  something  of  hypercriticism. 

A.  E.  TAYLOR. 
McGiLL  UNIVERSITY, 
MONTREAL,  CANADA. 

Saggio  di  uno  studio  sui  sentimenti  morali.  Dal  GUGLIELMO  SALVADORI. 
Firenze,  Francesco  Lumachi,  1903. — pp.  viii,  138. 

We  have  here  a  good  example  of  the  eclecticism  which  is  almost  all  that 
most  writers  of  ethical  theory  offer  to  their  readers  at  the  present  day.  It 
would  be  hard  to  say  whether  Dr.  Salvador!  owes  more  to  Kant  or  to 
Spencer,  to  Schopenhauer  or  to  Mill,  and  numerous  are  the  names  of  other 
philosophers  with  which  his  pages  are  liberally  strewn.  He  indeed  acknowl- 
edges this  eclectic  spirit  very  frankly  in  his  preface,  and  his  position  and 
method  may  best  be  indicated  by  quoting  his  own  words:  "The  doctrine 
followed  by  me  is  a  species  of  rational  eudaemonism  founded  upon  empiri- 
cism, in  which,  by  an  application  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  I  endeavored 
to  conciliate  the  empirical  realism  of  the  utilitarian  school  with  the  abstract 
idealism  of  the  metaphysical  school.' '  To  some  minds  the  philosophical 
"  olla  podrida"  which  is  the  result  of  this  synthesis  of  theories  does  not 
seem  the  most  stimulating  diet.  But  if  there  is  not  much  that  is  novel  or 
striking  in  the  analysis  here  offered  of  the  moral  sentiments,  or  in  the 
ethical  doctrine  based  upon  it,  there  is  yet  a  good  deal  which  is  not  only 
sound  and  just  but  clearly  and  convincingly  presented. 

E.  RITCHIE. 

HALIFAX,  N.  S. 

The  following  books  also  have  been  received  : 

The  Evolution  of  Theology  in  the  Greek  Philosophers.  2  vols.  By  EDWARD 
CAIRO.  Glasgow,  James  MacLehose  &  Sons,  1904. — pp.  xvii,  382  ;  xi, 
377.  145. 


596  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

Evolution   of  Ethics,    Vol.  I:    The    Greek   Philosophers.     By  JAMES  H. 

HYSLOP.     New  York,  published  for  the  Brooklyn  Ethical  Association  by 

C.  M.  Higgins  &  Co.,  1903. — pp.  xxvi,  333. 

The  Principles  of  Knowledge.     Vol.  II.     By  J.  E.  WALTER.     West  New- 
ton, Pa.,  Johnston  and  Penney,  1904. — pp.  331.     $2.00. 
Investigations  of  the  Departments  of  Psychology  and  Education  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Colorado,  Vol.  II,  No.  I.     Boulder,  Colo.,  The  University  of 

Colorado,  March,  1904. — pp.  51. 
Der    Skeptizismus    in    der  Philosophie.      Erster    Band.      Von    RAOUL 

RICHTER.     Leipzig,  Verlag  der  Durr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1904. — pp. 

xxiv,  364. 
Geistige  Stromungen  der  Gegenivart.     Von  RUDOLF  EUCKEN.     Leipzig, 

Veit  &  Co.,  1904. — pp.  xii,  398.     M.  8. 
Moralphilosophische  Streitfragen.     Erster  Teil :  Die  Entstehung  des  sitt- 

lichen  Bewusstseins.     Von  GUSTAV  STORRING.      Leipzig,  W.   Engel- 

mann,  1903. — pp.  vii,  151. 
Griechische  Philosophie  im   alien    Testament.     Von  M.    FRIEDLANDER, 

Berlin,  Georg  Reimer,  1904. — pp.  xx,  223.     M.  5.40. 
Kan? s  Revolutionsprincip.     Von  ERNST  MARCUS.       Herford,  W.  Menck- 

hoff,  1902. — pp.  xii,  1 8 1. 
Wissenschaftliche  Beilage  zum  sechzehnten  Jahresbericht  (fpoj)  der  Philo- 

sophischen  Gesellschaft  an  der  Universitat  zu    Wien.     Vortrage  und 

Besprechungen.     Leipzig,  J.  A.  Barth,  1903. — pp.  139.      M.  3.60. 
Einfluss  der  Geschwindigkeit  des  lauten   Lesens  auf  das  Erlernen  und 

Behalten  von  sinnlosen  und  sinnvollen  Stoffen.     By  Von  R.  M.  OGDEN. 

Leipzig,  W.  Engelmann,  1903. — pp.  103. 
Edgar  Poe,  sa  vie  et  son  O2uvre.      Par  £MILE  LAUVRIERE.      Paris,   F. 

Alcan,  1904. — pp.  xiii,  732.     10  fr. 
L'annee  philosophique,  1903.     Publiee  sous  la  direction  de  F.  PILLON. 

Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. — pp.  314.     5  fr. 
Essaisur  les  elements  et  I '  evolution  de  la  moralite.    Par  MARCEL  MAUXION.. 

Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. — pp.  vi,  169.     2  fr.  50. 
Histoire  du  dogme  de  la  divinite  de  Jesus-Christ.     Par  ALBERT  REVILLE. 

Troisieme  edition,  revue.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. — pp.  xii,  184.    2  fr.  50. 
Le  Neo-criticisme  de  Charles  Renouvier.     Par    E.  JANSSENS.     Paris,   F. 

Alcan,  1904. — pp.  viii,  318.     3  fr.  50. 
Lafonction  de  la  memoire  et  le  souvenir  affectif.    Par  FR.  PAULHAN.    Paris,. 

F.  Alcan,  1904.  — pp.  177.     2  fr.  50. 
La  dottrina  della  conoscenza  nei  moderni  precursori  di  Kant.     Per  E. 

TROILO.     Torino,  Fratelli  Bocca,  1904.  — pp.  x,  304. 
La  dottrina  della  conoscenza  di  Herbert  Spencer.     Per  E.  TROILO.     Bo- 
logna, Zamorani  e  Albertazzi,  1904.  —  pp.  46. 


NOTES. 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS  OF  ARTS  AND  SCIENCE. 

As  our  readers  are  doubtless  already  aware,  the  International  Congress 
of  Arts  and  Science  will  take  place  in  connection  with  the  Universal  Expo- 
sition at  St.  Louis,  September  19  to  25.  The  general  purpose  of  the 
Congress  is  to  bring  together  a  large  number  of  specialists  in  all  branches 
of  science  and  thus  aid  the  unification  of  knowledge.  The  plan  is  as  fol- 
lows :  The  whole  field  of  knowledge  has  been  divided  into  twenty-four 
departments,  which  are  arranged  in  seven  grand  divisions.  Each  depart- 
ment, in  turn,  is  divided  into  a  number  of  sections.  A  speaker  has  been 
appointed  for  each  division,  and  a  chairman  and  two  speakers  for  each 
department  and  for  each  section.  After  the  formal  opening  of  the  Con- 
gress on  Monday  afternoon  (September  19),  will  follow,  Tuesday  morning, 
the  addresses  on  the  main  divisions  of  science  and  its  applications,  the  gen- 
eral theme  being  the  unification  of  each  field.  These  will  be  followed  by 
the  two  addresses  on  each  of  the  twenty-four  departments,  one  dealing  with 
the  fundamental  concepts  of  the  science,  the  other  with  its  progress  during 
the  last  century.  The  rest  of  the  time  will  be  devoted  to  the  meetings  of 
the  various  sections. 

Philosophy  occupies  the  position  of  Department  i  in  the  division  of 
Normative  Science.  The  speaker  for  the  division  is  Professor  Josiah  Royce, 
of  Harvard  University.  The  chairman  of  the  department  is  Professor 
Borden  P.  Bowne,  of  Boston  University  ;  the  speakers  are  Professors  G. 
T.  Ladd,  of  Yale,  and  G.  H.  Howison,  of  the  University  of  California. 
The  sections  of  philosophy  are  as  follows  : 

Section  a.  ' Metaphysics. — Chairman:  Professor  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG, 
Wesleyan  University.  Speakers  :  Professor  A.  E.  TAYLOR,  McGill  Uni- 
versity, Montreal ;  Professor  ALEXANDER  T.  ORMOND,  Princeton  Uni- 
versity. 

Section  b.  Philosophy  of  Religion.  —  Chairman  :  Professor  THOMAS  C. 
HALL,  Union  Theological  Seminary,  N.  Y.  Speakers :  Professor  OTTO 
PFLEIDERER,  University  of  Berlin  ;  Professor  ERNST  TROELTSCH,  Univer- 
sity of  Heidelberg. 

Section  c.  Logic.  —  Chairman:  Professor  GEORGE  M.  DUNCAN,  Yale 
University.  Speakers  :  Professor  WILHELM  WINDELBAND,  University  of 
Heidelberg ;  Professor  FREDERICK  J.  E.  WOODBRIDGE,  Columbia  Uni- 
versity. 

Section  d.  Methodology  of  Science.  —  Chairman  :  Professor  JAMES  E. 
CREIGHTON,  Cornell  University.  Speakers  :  -Professor  WILHELM  OST- 
WALD,  University  of  Leipzig ;  Professor  BENNO  ERDMANN,  University  of 
Bonn. 

597 


598  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

Section  e.  Ethics. — Chairman:  Professor  GEORGE  H.  PALMER,  Har- 
vard University.  Speakers  :  Professor  WILLIAM  R.  SORLEY,  University  of 
Cambridge  ;  Professor  PAUL  HENSEL,  University  of  Erlangen. 

Section/.  ^Esthetics. — Chairman:  Professor  JAMES  H.  TUFTS,  Uni- 
versity of  Chicago.  Speakers :  Mr.  HENRY  R.  MARSHALL,  New  York 
City  ;  Professor  MAX  DESSOIR,  University  of  Berlin. 

Psychology  forms  Department  15  in  the  Division  of  Mental  Science,  of 
which  President  G.  Stanley  Hall  is  the  speaker.  The  Chairman  of  the 
Department  is  Noah  K.  Davis,  of  the  University  of  Virginia,  and  the 
speakers,  Professor  J.  Mark  Baldwin,  of  Johns  Hopkins  University,  and 
Professor  James  McK.  Cattell,  of  Columbia.  The  Sections  are  as  follows  : 

Section  a.  General  Psychology.  —  Chairman  :  Professor  CHARLES  A. 
STRONG,  Columbia  University.  Speakers :  Professor  HARALD  HOEFFDING, 
University  of  Copenhagen ;  Professor  JAMES  WARD,  University  of  Cam- 
bridge, England. 

Section  b.  Experimental  Psychology.  —  Chairman  :  Professor  EDWARD 
A.  PACE,  Catholic  University  of  America.  Speakers  :  Professor  HERMANN 
EBBINGHAUS,  University  of  Breslau ;  Professor  EDWARD  B.  TITCHENER, 
Cornell  University. 

Section  c.  Comparative  and  Genetic  Psychology.  —  Chairman  :  Pro- 
fessor EDMUND  C.  SANFORD,  Clark  University,  Worcester,  Mass. 
Speakers  :  Principal  C.  LLOYD  MORGAN,  University  College,  Bristol ;  Pro- 
fessor MARY  W.  CALKINS,  Wellesley  College. 

Section  d.  Abnormal  Psychology.  —  Chairman  :  Professor  MOSES  ALLEN 
STARR,  Columbia  University.  Speakers  :  Dr.  PIERRE  JANET,  Professor  at 
the  Sorbonne,  Paris  ;  Dr.  MORTON  PRINCE,  Boston. 

Dr.  W.  B.  Elkin  has  been  appointed  acting  assistant  professor  of  philos- 
ophy at  the  University  of  Missouri. 

Dr.  Thaddeus  L.  Bolton  has  been  appointed  professor  of  psychology  at 
the  University  of  Nebraska. 

Mr.  W.  M.  Steele,  late  assistant  in  the  Yale  psychological  laboratory, 
has  been  appointed  professor  of  philosophy  in  Furman  University,  Green- 
ville, S.  C. 

Dr.  Dickinson  S.  Miller,  of  Harvard  University,  has  been  appointed 
lecturer  in  philosophy  at  Columbia. 

Professor  I.  Woodbridge  Riley  has  resigned  his  professorship  of  philos- 
ophy at  the  University  of  New  Brunswick  ;  he  will  be  succeeded  by  Dr. 
Stewart  Macdonald,  who  was  last  year  Fellow  in  Philosophy  at  Cornell 
University  and  received  his  doctorate  from  that  institution. 

Dr.  C.  T.  Burnett,  of  Harvard,  has  been  elected  professor  of  philosophy 
at  Iowa  College,  Grinnell,  Iowa. 

Professor  William  Turner,  of  St.  Paul  Seminary,  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  has 
been  granted  a  year's  leave  of  absence  which  he  will  spend  in  Europe 
gathering  material  for  a  study  of  the  beginnings  of  scholasticism. 


No.  5.]  NOTES.  599 

Dr.  Nathan  E.  Truman,  Ph.D.  (Cornell,  1902),  has  been  appointed  as- 
sistant professor  of  Greek  and  philosophy  at  the  University  of  South  Dakota. 

We  give  below  a  list  of  the  articles,  etc. ,  in  the  current  philosophical 
journals  : 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  XI,  4-5  :  L.  Pearl  Boggs,  An  Experi- 
mental Study  of  the  Physiological  Accompaniments  of  Feeling  ;  T.  H. 
Haines  and  A.  E.  Davies,  The  Psychology  of  ./Esthetic  Reaction  to  Rec- 
tangular Forms  ;  R.  B.  Perry,  Conceptions  and  Misconceptions  of  Con- 
sciousness ;  W.  F.  Dearborn,  Retinal  Local  Signs  ;  Studies  from  the  Cali- 
fornia Psychological  Laboratory :  VI.  Knight  Dunlap,  Some  Peculiarities 
of  Fluctuating  and  of  Inaudible  Sounds  ;  H.  B.  Alexander,  Some  Ob- 
servations on  Visual  Imagery  ;  C.  Caverno,  Incipient  Pseudopia. 

INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL  OF  ETHICS,  XIV,  4  :  H.  M.  Thompson,  Moral 
Instruction  in  Schools  ; /.  H.  Hyslop,  Has  the  Universe  an  Intelligent  Back- 
ground and  Purpose  ?  C.  A.  Barnicoat,  The  Government  Prison  Settlement 
at  Waiotapu,  New  Zealand  ;  Chester  Holcombe,  The  Moral  Training  of  the 
Young  in  China  ;  F.  M.  Stawell,  The  Practical  Reason  in  Aristotle  ;  Earl 
Barnes,  Student  Honor  :  A  Study  in  Cheating  ;  Gustav  Spiller,  An  Ex- 
amination of  the  Rationalistic  Attitude  ;  F.  H.  Giddings,  The  Heart  of  Mr. 
Spencer's  Ethics  ;  Book  Reviews. 

THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  PSYCHOLOGY,  XV,  2  :  L.  D.  Arnett,  The 
Soul— A  Study  of  Past  and  Present  Beliefs  ;  C.  Spearman,  General  Intelli- 
gence Objectively  Determined  and  Measured  ;  Literature. 

THE  HIBBERT  JOURNAL,  II,  4  :  E.  S.  Talbot,  Sir  Oliver  Lodge  on  '  The 
Re-interpretation  of  Christian  Doctrine';  A.  C.  Bradley,  Hegel's  Theory 
of  Tragedy  ;  T.  B.  Saunders,  Herder  ;  W.  R.  Sorley,  The  Two  Idealisms  ; 
S.  H.  Mellone,  Present  Aspects  of  the  Problem  of  Immortality  ;  W.  F. 
Cobb,  L'hypocrisie  biblique  britannique  ;  Wm.  Knight,  The  Value  of  the 
Historical  Method  in  Philosophy  ;  St.  George  Stock,  The  Problem  of  Evil ; 
C.  M.  Bakewell,  Art  and  Ideas  ;  Discussions  and  Reviews. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  I,  7-8:  Adolf  Meyer,  A  Few  Trends 
in  Modern  Psychiatry  ;  A.  Hoch,  A  Review  of  Psychological  and  Physio- 
logical Experiments  Done  in  Connection  with  the  Study  of  Mental  Diseases  ; 
Adolf  Meyer,  Recent  Literature  in  Neurology  and  Psychiatry  ;  New  Books  ; 
Notes  ;  Journals. 

THE  JOURNAL  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  PSYCHOLOGY,  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHODS, 
I,  1 1  :  C.  L.  Herrick,  Fundamental  Concepts  and  Methodology  of  Dynamic 
Realism  ;  Warner  Fite,  Herbert  Spencer  as  a  Philosopher  ;  Discussion  ;  Re- 
views and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and 
News. 

I,  12  :  H.  R.  Marshall,  Of  Neururgic  and  Noetic  Correspondence;  C. 
E.  Magnusson,  Dimensional  Equations  and  the  Principle  of  the  Conserva- 
tion of  Energy  ;  Discussion  ;  Societies  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Litera- 
ture ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 


600  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

I,  13  :  G.  A.  Tawney,  Utilitarian  Epistemology  ;  H.  W.  Stuart,  The 
Need  of  a  Logic  of  Conduct ;  Discussion ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of 
Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

I,  14  :  H.  R.  Marshall,  Of  Simpler  and  More  Complex  Consciousnesses  ; 
C.  L.  Herrick,  The  Dynamic  Concept  of  the  Individual ;  Discussion  ; 
Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes 
and  News. 

ZEITSCHRIFT  FUR  PHILOSOPHIE  UND  PHILOSOPHISCHE  KRITIK,  CXXIV, 
i  :  L.  Busse,  Immanuel  Kant ;  P.  Beck,  Erkenntnistheorie  des  primitiven 
Denkens  (Schluss)  ;  G.  v.  Glasenapp,  Der  Wert  der  Wahrheit  (Schluss) ; 
Hans  Schmidkunz,  Neues  von  den  Werten  ;  Georg  Ulrich,  Bewusstsein  und 
Ichheit ;  Erich  Adickes,  Bericht  iiber  philosophische  Werke,  die  in  engli- 
scher  Sprache  in  den  Jahre  1897  bis  1900  erschienen  sind  ;  G.  Kohfeldt, 
Ein  bisher  noch  ungedruckter  Brief  Kants  v.  J.  1790.  Mit  Nachschrift 
des  Herausgebers  ;  Recensionen. 

VlERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT      FUR    WISSENSCHAFTLICHE     PHILOSOPHIE     UND 

SOZIOLOGIE,  XXVIII,  2  :  Demetrius  Gusti,  Egoismus  und  Altruismus, 
II  ;  Franz  Oppenheimer,  Ein  neues  Bevolkerungsgesetz  ;  Cay  von  Brock- 
dorff,  Schopenhauer  und  die  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic,  II  ;  Paul 
Barth,  Herbert  Spencer  und  Albert  Schaffle  ;  Besprechungen  ;  Notiz. 

ARCHIV  FUR  GESCHICHTE  DER  PHILOSOPHIE,  X,  4  :  /.  Pollak,  Entwick- 
lung  der  arabischen  und  jiidischen  Philosophic  im  Mittelalter,  II  ;  E.  Bickel, 
Ein  Dialog  aus  der  Akademie  des  Arkesilas  ;  P.  Ziertmann,  Beitrage  zur 
Kenntnis  Shaftesburys  ;  K.  Worm,  Spinozas  Naturrecht ;  C.  Sauter,  Die 
peripatetische  Philosophic  bei  den  Syrern  und  Arabern  ;  G.  Jaeger,  Locke, 
eine  kritische  Untersuchung  der  Ideen  des  Liberalismus  und  des  Ursprungs 
nationalokonomischer  Anschauungsformen  (Schluss)  ;  Jahresbericht. 

ARCHIV  FUR  SYSTEMATISCHE  PHILOSOPHIE,  IX,  4  :  Kurt  Geissler,  1st 
die  Annahme  von  Absolutem  in  der  Anschauung  und  dem  Denken 
moglich  ?  David  Koigen,  Die  Religionsidee  ;  H.  Bergson,  Die  franzo- 
sische  Metaphysik  der  Gegenwart.  Aus  dem  Nachlass  von  A.  Gurewitsch  ; 
B.  Weiss,  Gesetze  des  Geschehens  ;  Jahresbericht. 

X,  2 :  Jonas  Cohn,  Psychologische  oder  kritische  Begriindung  der 
Asthetik?  Vincenzo  Allara,  Sulla  quistione  del  Genio  ;  A.  Mutter,  Die 
Eigenart  des  religiosen  Lebens  und  seiner  Gewissheit ;  Jahresbericht. 

ZEITSCHRIFT  FUR  PSYCHOLOGIE  UND  PHYSIOLOGIE  DER  SINNESORGANE, 
XXXV,  2  :  W.  Sternberg,  Zur  Physiologic  des  siissen  Geschmacks  ;  F. 
Kiesoiv,  Nochmals  zur  Frage  nach  der  Fortpflanzungsgeschwindigkeit 
der  Erregung  im  sensiblen  Nerven  des  Menschen  ;  W.  Schoen,  Paradoxes 
Doppelsehen  ;  Literaturbericht. 

XXXV,  3-4  :  Alfred  Borschke,  Uber  die  Ursachen  der  Herabsetzung  der 
Sehleistung  durch  Blendung  ;  Otto  Lipmann,  Die  Wirkung  der  einzelnen 
Wiederholungen  auf  verschieden  starke  and  verschieden  alte  Assoziationen  ; 
F.  Kiesoiv,  Uber  die  Tastempfindlichkeit  der  Korperoberflache  fur  punktuelle 


No.  5.]  NOTES.  601 

mechanische  Reize  (Nachtrag) ;  F.  Kiesow,  Zur  Kenntnis  der  Nervenen- 
digungen  in  den  Papillen  der  Zungenspitze  ;  H.  Beyer,  Nasales  Schmecken  ; 
Wilibald  Nagel,  Einige  Bemerkungen  uber  nasales  Schmecken  ;  Literatur- 
bericht. 

XXXV,  5  :  y.  Richter  und  H.  Wamser,  Experimentelle  Untersuchung 
der  beim  Nachzeichnen  von  Strecken  und  Winkeln  entstehenden  Grossen- 
fehler  ;  Fritz  Weinmann,  Zur  Struktur  der  Melodic  ;  E.  Diirr,  Erster 
Kongress  fur  experimentelle  Psychologic  in  Deutschland  ;  Literaturbericht. 

JOURNAL  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE  NORMALE  ET  PATHOLOGIQUE,  I,  4  :  F.  Paul- 
han,  Histoire  d'un  souvenir;  Drs.  Marie  et  Viollet,  Spiritisme  et  folie  ; 
/.  Lachelier  et  D.  Parodi,  A  propos  de  la  perception  visuelle  de  1'etendue  ; 
Ch.  Feret  Sur  une  forme  d'impuissance  sexuelle  ;  Bibliographic. 

REVUE  PHILOSOPHIQUE,  XXIX,  6:  J.-J.  Van  Bieruliet,  L'6ducation  de 
la  me"moire  a  l'6cole  ;  Th.  Ribot,  La  logique  des  sentiments  —  I.  Ses 
elements  constitutifs ;  A.  Rey,  Ce  que  devient  la  logique ;  Segond, 
Quelques  publications  recentes  sur  la  morale  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ; 
Revue  des  p£riodiques  etrangers  ;  Livres  nouveaux  :  Table  des  matieres. 

XXIX,  7  :  G.  Dumas,  Le  sourire  :  etude  psychophysiologique  (iflr  arti- 
cle) ;  Goblot,  La  finalite  en  biologic  ;  Th.  Ribot,  La  logique  des  sentiments 
(2°  et  dernier  article)  ;  A.  Fouill'ee,  La  priorite  de  la  philosophic  des  idees- 
forces  sur  la  doctrine  de  M.  R.  Ardigo  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ; 
Revue  des  periodiques  etrangers  ;  Livres  nouveaux. 

REVUE  NEO-SCOLASTIQUE,  XI,  2  :  /.  Halleux,  La  philosophic  d'  Herbert 
Spencer  (suite  et  fin)  ;  G.  M.  Sauvage,  De  1'histoire  de  la  philosophic  ;  N. 
Kaufmann,  Elements  aristoteliciens  dans  la  cosmologie  et  la  psychologic 
de  S.  Augustin  ;  M.  Defourny,  La  philosophic  de  1'histoire  chez  Condorcet ; 
Melanges  et  documents  ;  Comptes-rendus. 

REVUE  DE  METAPHYSIQUE  ET  DE  MORALE,  XII,  3  :  P.  Natorp,  A  la 
m6moire  de  Kant ;  F.  Paulsen,  Pour  le  centenaire  de  la  mort  de  Kant  ;  C. 
Cantoni,  L'apriorite"  de  1'espace  ;  L.  Couturat,  La  philosophic  des  mathe- 
matiques  de  Kant  ;  G.  Milhaud,  La  connaissance  mathematique  et  1'ideal- 
isme  transcendental ;  A.  Hannequin,  Les  principes  de  1'entendement  pur, 
de  leur  fondement  et  de  leur  importance  dans  la  "  Critique  de  la  raison 
pure";  V.  Basch,  L' imagination  dans  la  the"orie  kantienne  de  la  connais- 
sance ;  R.  Eucken,  L'ame  telle  que  Kant  1'a  depeinte  ;  B.  Erdmann,  La 
critique  kantienne  de  la  connaissance  comme  synthese  du  rationalisme  et 
de  rempirisme  ;  H.  Blunt,  La  r6futation  kantienne  de  ride~alisme  ;  A. 
Fouillee,  Kant  a-t-il  6tabli  1' existence  du  devoir  ?  E.  Boutroux,  La  morale 
de  Kant  et  le  temps  present  ;  Th.  Ruyssen,  Kant  est-il  pessimiste  ?  V. 
Delbos,  Les  harmonies  de  la  pensee  kantienne  d'apres  la  "  Critique  de  la 
faculte  de  juger  ";  H.  Delacroix,  Kant  et  Swedenborg  ;  A.  Riehl,  Helm- 
holtz  et  Kant  ;  D.  Parodi,  La  critique  des  categories  kantiennes  chez 
Charles  Renouvier  ;  Supplement. 


602  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

RIVISTA  FILOSOFICA,  VII,  2  :  V.  Alemanni,  Dell'odierno  concetto  della 
storia  della  filosofia ;  R.  Nazzari,  Nota  psicologica  intorno  al  significato 
dell'argomento  di  Sant'Anselmo  d'Aosta  ;  A.  Aliotta,  Psicologia  della  cre- 
denza ;  E.  Juvalta,  La  dottrina  dell  due  etiche  di  H.  Spencer  (Parte  II)  ; 
A.  Manzari,  Nota  estetica ;  Rassegna  bibliografica ;  Bollettino  biblio- 
grafico  ;  Notizie  e  pubblicazioni ;  Sommari  delle  riviste  straniere ;  Libri 
ricevuti. 

RIVISTA  DI  FILOSOFIA  E  SCIENZE  AFFINI,  I,  5-6;  G.  A.  Colozza — G. 
Marchesmi,  La  coordinazione  delle  materie  e  gli  insegnanti  special!  nelle 
nostre  scuole  medie  ;  G.  Vailati,  A  proposito  di  un  passo  del  Teeteto  e  di 
una  dimostrazione  ai  Euclide  ;  F.  Mqffa,  L'etica  di  Democrito  (cont.  e  fine) ; 
G.  Trespioli,  II  pensiero  guiridico  e  sociale  d' Italia  nell'evo  moderno  (cont. 
e  fine)  ;  C.  Ranzoli,  La  fortuna  di  Erberto  Spencer  in  Italia  (cont.  e  fine) ; 
G.  Pantaleone,  La  critica  estetica  ;  B.  Varisco,  Di  alcune  false  reminis- 
cenze  ;  Rassegna  di  filosofia  scientifica  ;  Rassegna  di  sociologia  e  scienze 
affini ;  Rassegna  di  pedagogia  ;  Analisi  e  cenni  ;  Notizie ;  Sommari  di 
Riviste. 


Volume  XIII.  November,  1904.  Whole 

Number  6.  Number  j8. 

THE 

PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 


THE    PRESENT    PROBLEMS    OF    GENERAL 
PSYCHOLOGY.1 

^T^HE  psychology  of  our  day  needs  reforming  from  its  very 
foundations,"  said  Professor  Lipps  not  very  long  ago, 
and  indeed  proposals  for  its  radical  reconstruction  are  being 
offered  us  on  every  side.  Psychology  must  be  thoroughly  atom- 
istic and  structural,  says  one  :  it  should  be  altogether  functional, 
says  another.  For  some  it  is  the  central  philosophical  discipline  ; 
for  others  it  is  but  a  department  of  biology.  According  to  one 
view,  it  is  merely  a  descriptive  science  ;  according  to  another,  it  is 
explanatory  as  well.  Plainly,  then,  one  of  the  present  problems 
of  psychology  is  the  definition  of  psychology  itself.  Yet  even 
this  has  been  denied.  "  It  is  preposterous  at  present  to  define 
psychology,"  says  a  recent  critic  of  such  an  attempt  on  my  part, 
"  preposterous  to  define  psychology  save  as  Bleck  long  ago  de- 
fined philology  :  es  ist  was  es  wird.  It  is  in  a  process  of  rapid 
development.  It  has  so  many  lines  and  departments  that  if  it 
could  be  correctly  described  to-day,  all  the  definitions  might  be 
outgrown  to-morrow."  2  There  may  be  a  grain  of  truth  in  this 
somewhat  extravagant  contention.  Eke  es  einen  guten  Weingiebt, 
muss  der  Most  sich  erst  toll  gebdrden,  it  has  been  said.  But  surely 
if  we  could  define  what  is  common  ground  for  us  all  to-day,  we 
might  leave  to-morrow  to  take  care  of  itself.  This  common 
ground  we  call '  General  Psychology,'  and  the  assumption  upon 
which,  I  take  it,  we  are  here  proceeding  is  that  the  concepts  of 

1  Read  before  the  Section  of  General  Psychology  of  the  Congress  of  Arts  and 
Sciences,  held  at  St.  Louis,  Sept.  19-26,  1904. 
*Am.  J.  of  Psy.,  Vol.  XV,  p.  295. 

603 


604  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

this  general  psychology  are  presupposed  in  the  many  special 
departments  which  we  speak  of  as  experimental  (or  physiologi- 
cal), comparative,  pathological,  etc.,  and  further  that  these  con- 
cepts will  be  presupposed  in  whatever  new  developments  of  the 
science  the  future  may  have  in  store. 

To  ascertain,  describe,  and  analyze  the  invariable  factors  of 
psychical  life,  consciousness,  or  immediate  experience  is,  —  it  will 
I  presume  be  agreed,  — the  main  concern  of  general  psychology. 
"  I  find  myself  in  a  certain  situation,  which  affects  me  pleasantly 
or  painfully,  so  that  in  the  one  case  I  strive  to  prolong  the  situ- 
ation, and  in  the  other  to  escape  from  it."  So  in  ordinary 
language  we  might  any  of  us  describe  a  moment  of  our  own  ex- 
perience. How  much  of  this  is  essential  ?  If  we  are  to  leave 
any  place  for  genetic  or  comparative  psychology,  it  is  said,  we 
must  answer  :  What  is  found  as  distinct  from  the  finding,  in  other 
words,  a  self  or  subject  cognitively  and  conatively  related  to  an 
objective  situation  in  which  it  is  interested.  Such  subject  we 
should  say  was  conscious,  but  not  self-conscious.  In  order  to 
find  myself  feeling,  in  order  to  know  that  I  feel,  I  must  feel. 
But  I  may  feel  without  knowing  that  I  feel.  In  order  to  know 
that  I  am,  I  must  be,  but  I  may  be  without  having  any  knowledge 
-of  that  fact.  In  short,  the  advance  to  self-consciousness  is  said 
to  presuppose  mere  consciousness.  Here,  then,  the  irreducible 
minimum  is  the  functional  relation  of  subject  and  object  just 
nnentioned,  a  duality  in  which  the  subject  knows,  feels,  and  acts, 
and  the  object  is  known  and  reacted  to.  But  at  this  lower  level 
of  experience,  at  which  the  subject's  functions  are  not  immedi- 
ately known,  have  we  not  a  relation  with  only  one  term  ?  And 
that  is  surely  a  contradiction.  At  the  higher  level  where  con- 
sciousness of  self  is  present,  —  where,  that  is  to  say,  the  subject 
and  its  functions  are  known,  —  we  have  indeed  two  terms,  but  both 
are  then  objective,  for  self  as  known  is  certainly  objective.  We 
have  two  terms  now,  but  so  far  the  essential  distinction  of  subject 
and  object  can  no  longer  be  maintained.  So  far  as  both  terms 
are  known  or  objective  the  distinction  lapses,  it  is  allowed  ;  but 
even  in  self-consciousness  the  '  I  knowing  ' —  Kant's  pure  Ego  — 
is  still  distinct  from  '  the  Me  known  ' —  Kant's  empirical  or  phe- 


No.  6.]        PROBLEMS   OF  GENERAL   PSYCHOLOGY.  605 

nomenal  Ego.  Very  good,  but  then  in  that  case,  it  is  rejoined, 
we  are  back  at  the  original  difficulty.  You  talk  of  this  duality 
of  experience,  but  it  is  still,  it  seems,  at  bottom  a  duality  with  only 
one  known  term.  At  the  best  your  pure  Ego  or  subject  is  -a 
metaphysical  notion  of  a  soul  or  something  that  lies  hopelessly 
beyond  any  immediate  verification. 

Now  this  disjunction:  Either  in  consciousness,?',  e.,  'content 
of  consciousness/  and  then  objective,  phenomenal,  presentational, 
ultimately  sensational ;  or  out  of  consciousness,  and  then  metem- 
pirical,  hypothetical,  and  unverifiable,  —  this  disjunction,  I  say, 
constitutes  a  difficult  problem,  which  at  the  present  time  demands 
the  most  thoroughgoing  discussion.  But  instead  of  thinking  out 
the  problem,  psychologists  seem  nowadays  content  for  the  most 
part  to  accept  this  disjunction.  Some,  whom  we  may  call  '  ob- 
jective '  psychologists,  also  known  as  '  presentationists,'  confining 
themselves,  as  they  suppose,  to  what  is  empirically  '  ven,'  — to 
whom  '  given '  and  how  received,  they  do  not  ask,  —  regard  the 
facts  of  experience  as  a  sort  of  atomic  aggregate  completely 
dominated  by  certain  quasi-mechanical  laws.  In  conformity  to 
these  laws,  —  laws,  that  is,  of  fusion,  complication,  association, 
inhibition,  and  the  like,  —  the  elements  of  the  so-called  '  contents 
of  consciousness '  differentiate  and  organize  themselves ;  and 
what  we  call  the  duality  of  subjective  and  objective  factors  is  the 
result.  The  Herbartian  psychology,  if  we  leave  its  metaphysical 
assumptions  aside,  as  we  well  may,  is  still  the  classic  example  of 
this  type.  This  is  the  psychology  which  most  easily  falls  into 
line  with  physiology,  and  is  apt  *in  consequence  to  have  a  mate- 
rialistic bias.  Another  school,  which  may  we  call  '  subjectivist,'  or 
perhaps  '  idealist,'  recognizes  indeed  the  necessity  of  a  subject  from 
the  outset  whenever  we  talk  of  experience,  but  recognizes  it,  not 
because  the  actual  existence  of  this  subject  is  part  of  the  facts, 
but  because  psychical  phenomena,  it  is  said,  are  unthinkable 
without  a  substratum  to  sustain  their  unity.  This  is  the  psy- 
chology that  still  —  notwithstanding  the  brave  words  of  Lange 
—  cannot  get  on  without  a  soul.  I  call  it  'idealist,'  because  it 
tends  to  treat  all  the  facts  of  immediate  experience  as  subjective 
modifications,  after  the  fashion  of  Descartes,  Locke,  and  Berke- 


6o6  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

ley.  The  hopeless  impasse,  into  which  the  problem  of  external 
perception  leads  from  this  standpoint,  is  a  sufficient  condemnation 
of  subjective  idealism.  Further,  —  and  this  I  take  to  be  the  main 
lesson  of  Kant's  'Refutation  of  Idealism/ — such  bare  unity  of 
the  subject  will  not  suffice  to  explain  the  unity  of  experience.  In 
a  chaos  of  presentations,  without  orderly  sequence  or  constancy, 
we  might  assume  a  substantial  unity  of  subject ;  but  it  would  be 
of  little  avail,  as  the  facts  of  mental  pathology  amply  show. 
Returning  now  to  the  presentationist  standpoint,  —  the  one  ob- 
vious objection  to  that  is  its  incompleteness.  As  I  have  else- 
where said l,  it  may  be  adequate  to  nine  tenths  of  the  facts,  or 
—  better  perhaps — to  nine  tenths  of  each  fact,  but  it  cannot 
either  effectively  clear  itself  of,  or  satisfactorily  explain,  the  re- 
maining tenth.  No  one  has  yet  succeeded  in  bringing  all  the 
facts  of  consciousness,  as  Professor  James  thinks  we  may,  under 
the  simple  rubric  :  "  Thought  goes  on."  Impersonal,  unowned 
experience,  a  mere  Cogitatur,  is  even  more  of  a  contradiction  than 
the  mere  Cogito  of  Descartes. 

But  of  late  there  have  been  attempts  to  mediate  between  these 
antitheses,  so  that,  to  use  Hegelian  phraseology,  their  seeming 
contradiction  may  be  aufgehoben.  Noteworthy  among  such  at- 
tempts is  the  so-called  '  actuality  theory '  of  Wundt,  already  more 
or  less  foreshadowed  by  Lotze.  There  is,  I  fear,  a  certain  vague- 
ness in  Wundt's  view,  due  perhaps  to  his  general  policy  of  non- 
committal ;  at  any  rate,  I  am  not  sure  that  I  understand  him.  I 
prefer,  therefore,  to  suggest  what  seems  to  me  the  true  line  of 
mediation  in  my  own  way.  A  relation  in  which  only  one  term 
is  known,  it  is  said,  is  a  contradiction.  Yes,  for  knowledge  it 
certainly  is.  But  the  objection  only  has  force  if  we  confound  ex- 
perience with  knowledge,  as  the  term  '  consciousness '  makes  us 
only  too  ready  to  do.  If,  however,  experience  be  the  wider  term, 
then  knowledge  must  fall  within  experience  and  experience  extend 
beyond  knowledge.  Now  we  may  perhaps  venture  without  fear  of 
metaphysical  cavil,  to  maintain  that  being  is  logically  a  more  fun- 
damental concept  than  knowing.  Thus  I  am  not  left  merely  to 
infer  my  own  being  from  my  knowing  in  the  fashion  of  Des- 

l"  Modern  Psychology,"  Mind,  N.  S.,  Vol.  II,  p.  80. 


No.  6.]    PROBLEMS  OF  GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY.     607 

cartes's  "  Cogito,  ergo  sum."  Nor  would  I  even  say  that  the 
being  supposed  to  be  known,  the  object,  is  in  fact  only  inferred,  as 
Descartes  was  driven  to  suppose.  Objective  reality  is  immediately 
'  given '  or  immediately  there,  not  inferred.  But  now  I  am  not 
going  on  to  say  that  the  subjective  reality  also  is  immediately 
given,  is  immediately  there,  as  Hamilton  and  others  have  done. 
There  is  no  such  parallelism  between  the  two  :  that  would  not 
end  our  quest,  but  only  throw  us  back.  Es  giebt,  you  say  :  yes, 
but  to  whom  given  :  cui  bono  f  The  dative  relation  is  not  a  com- 
mutable  one.  The  subjective  factor  in  experience  then  is  not 
datum  butrecipiens  :  it  is  not  '  there,'  but  '  here,'  whereto  '  there  ' 
is  relative. 

And  now  this  receptivity  is  no  mere  passivity.  It  is  time  to  dis- 
card the  ancient  but  inappropriate  metaphor  of  the  stylus  and  tabula 
rasa.  The  concept  of  pure  passivity  or  inertia  is  a  convenient 
analytical  fiction  in  physics,  but  we  find  no  such  reality  in  concrete 
experience.  Even  receptivity  is  activity,  and  though  it  is  often 
non-voluntary,  it  is  never  indifferent.  In  other  words,  not  mere 
receptivity  but  conative  or  selective  activity  is  the  essence  of  sub- 
jective reality ;  and  to  this,  known  or  objective  reality  is  the  es- 
sential counterpart.  Experience  is  just  the  interaction  of  these 
two  factors,  and  this  duality  is  a  real  relation  antecedent  to,  but 
never  completely  covered  by,  the  reflective  knowledge  we  come 
to  attain  concerning  it.  It  cannot  be  resolved  either  into  mere 
subjective  immanence  nor  into  mere  objective  position.  The  iden- 
tification of  its  two  terms  equally  with  their  separation  altogether 
transcends  experience;  their  identification  is  sometimes  said  to 
lead  to  the  Absolute,  and  their  separation,  we  may  safely  say, 
leads  to  the  absurd.  A  subject  per  se  and  an  object  per  se  are 
alike  not  so  much  unknowable  as  actually  unreal.  A  psychi- 
cal substance,  to  which  experience  is  only  incidental,  is  an  abstract 
possibility  of  which  psychology  can  make  no  use  ;  but  for  every 
experience  an  actual  subject  to  which  it  pertains  is  essential,  so 
surely  as  experience  connotes  presentation  and  feeling  and  im- 
pulse. If  we  are  to  be  in  downright  earnest  with  the  notion  of 
substance,  we  shall  probably  find  that  Spinoza  was  right,  and  there 
is  only  one.  But  though  we  stop  short  of  regarding  the  subject 


608  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

of  experience  as  a  substance,  it  is,  I  think,  a  mistake  to  speak  of 
it  as  a  phenomenon.  If  the  actual  subject  of  experience  is  to  be 
a  phenomenon,  it  must  be  such  for  some  other  experience  ;  and 
one  experience  may,  of  course,  have  phenomenal  relations  to 
another.  But  as  I  cannot  be  my  own  shadow,  so  there  is  a  like 
inconvenience  —  as  Kant  humorously  put  it  —  in  my  being 
wholly  the  subject  and  yet  solely  the  object  in  my  own  experience. 
Just  as  little  as  we  can  identify  centre  and  circumference,  organ- 
ism and  environment,  because  the  one  implies  the  other:  just 
so  little  can  subject  and  object  be  identified,  because  the  one  im- 
plies the  other.  The  real  contradiction  then  lies  not  in  accepting, 
but  in  denying,  this  dual  relation,  one  term  of  which  is  being  sub- 
ject and  the  other  a  certain  continuity  of  known  object.  For  psy- 
chology the  being  of  this  subject  means  simply  its  actual  knowing, 
feeling,  and  striving  as  an  Ego  or  Self  confronted  by  a  counter- 
part non-Ego  or  not  self:  the  two  constituting  a  universe  of  ex- 
perience, in  which,  as  Leibniz  held,  activity  is  the  fundamental 
fact,  —  am  Anfang  war  die  That. 

But  this  subjective  activity  itself  furnishes  us  with  another 
problem,  and  one  of  the  acutest  at  the  present  time.  Bradley 
some  years  ago  went  so  far  as  to  call  the  existing  confusion  con- 
cerning this  topic  the  scandal  of  psychology.  Quite  recently, 
however,  views  have  been  propounded  that  make  the  old  confusion 
worse  confounded.  One  distinguished  psychologist,  whilst  seem- 
ingly accepting  entirely  an  analysis  of  experience  such  as  I  have 
just  endeavored  to  sketch  and  admitting  its  validity  within  the 
moral  sciences,  or  Geisteswissenschaften,  as  he  terms  them,  never- 
theless regards  subjective  activity  as  lying  altogether  beyond  the 
purview  of  psychology,  because  it  can  neither  be  described  nor 
explained.  Another,  starting  from  a  diametrically  opposite  stand- 
point, finds  subjective  activity,  or  psychical  energy,1  essential  to 
the  explanation  of  any  and  every  experience,  but  finds  it  actually 
experienced  in  none.  According  to  his  view,  it  belongs  entirely 
to  the  unconscious  processes  underlying  the  contents  of  con- 
sciousness or  experience  :  in  these  contents  as  such  there  is  no 
working  factor,  but  only  the  symptoms  or  phenomenal  accompani- 

1  Lipps  distinguishes  between  Kraft  and  Energie. 


No.  6.]        PROBLEMS  OF  GENERAL   PSYCHOLOGY.  609 

ments  of  one.  A  'feeling  of  activity/  he  allows,  has  place  within 
those  contents  ;  but  it  is  only  a  feeling,  it  is  not  activity.  A 
necessity  of  thought,  he  holds,  constrains  us  to  affirm  the  existence 
of  real  psychical  activity,  power  or  energy  ;  though  we  never  ac- 
tually experience  it,  because  it  resides  ultimately  in  the  '  world- 
ground,'  and  how  experience  proceeds  from  this  is  ineffable 
(unsagbar).  Yet  a  third  psychologist  thinks  that  he  has  disposed 
of  subjective  activity  by  maintaining  that  introspection  discovers  no 
causal  laws.  In  agreement  with  the  first  author  mentioned  and  in 
opposition  to  the  second,  he  regards  all  psychological  connexions 
as  really  psychophysical.  Efficaciousness,  as  he  calls  it,  he 
derides  as  a  '  mere  bauble.'  The  vitally  important  thing  in 
experience  is  a  certain  teleological  quality  or  significance  which 
the  talk  about  *  capacity  to  accomplish  the  causal  production  of 
deeds '  does  but  obscure.  Self-activity  he  proposes  to  regard, 
"from  the  purely  psychological  point  of  view,"  as  the  conscious 
aspect  or  accompaniment  of  a  collection  of  tendencies  of  the  type 
which  Loeb  has  called  '  tropisms,'  or  movements  "  determined 
by  the  nature  of  the  stimulus  and  of  the  organism."  In  brief,  we 
have  in  three  recent  writers  of  mark  three  conflicting  positions  : 

(1)  Subject  activity  is  a  fact  of  experience,  but  psychology  can- 
not deal  with  it,  because  it  is  neither  describable  nor  explicable. 

(2)  Subject  activity  is  not  a  fact  of  experience,  but  it  is  a  tran- 
scendent reality  without  which  psychology  would  be  impossible. 

(3)  Subject  activity  is  neither  phenomenal  nor  real :  the  apparent 
1  originality  '  or  '  spontaneity  '  of  the  individual  mind  is,  for  psy- 
chology at  any  rate,  but  the  biologist's  '  tropisms.' 

I  cannot  attempt  fully  to  discuss  these  views  here,  but  I  trust 
I  have  described  them  sufficiently  to  show  that  the  scandal  of 
which  Bradley  complained  is  still  a  stumbling-block  in  the  way 
of  psychological  advance.  On  one  or  two  remarks  I  will  how- 
ever venture.  In  the  first  place  these  authors  seem  entirely  to 
ignore  the  distinction  between  immanent  action  or  doing  and 
transcendent  action  or  effectuating :  the  former  directly  implies 
an  agent  only,  the  latter  a  patient  also.  Nor  do  these  authors 
appear  to  distinguish  between  the  so-called  logical  principle  of 
causation  or  natural  uniformity  and  the  bare  notion  of  cause, 


6lO  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

Ursache,  as  active.  They  must  of  course  be  well  aware  that  these 
distinctions  exist ;  and  we  are  therefore  left  to  conclude  that  they 
regard  them  as  invalid ;  for  otherwise  these  distinctions  have 
surely  an  important  bearing  on  the  problem  before  us.  The 
so-called  logical  —  I  should  prefer  to  say  epistemological  — 
principle  of  causal  connexion  has  two  forms  :  (i)  Given  a  certain 
complex  of  conditions  A,  then  a  certain  event  B  must  follow,  as 
we  say  in  the  more  empirical  sciences ;  and  (ii)  The  cause  is 
quantitatively  equivalent  to  the  effect,  as  we  say  in  dynamics. 
Into  neither  of  these  does  the  notion  of  activity  enter  at  all :  the 
inductive  sciences  find  no  place  for  it  and  the  exact  sciences  have 
no  need  of  it.  "  Causation,"  as  one  of  these  writers  says,  "  '  marries 
only  universals  '  .  .  .  and  universals  conceived  as  the  common  ob- 
jects of  the  experience  of  many."  On  this  point  they  seem  to  be  all 
agreed,  and  we  also  shall  probably  assent.  Very  good  ;  but  if  so, 
they  argue,  must  you  not  admit  that  this  causation  has  no  place 
in  individual  experience?  Granted,  but  then  comes  the  question  : 
Does  the  fact  that  I  find  no  laws  within  my  individual  experience, 
but  only  a  succession  of  unique  events,  eo  ipso  preclude  me  from 
experiencing  immanent  activity,  and  convict  me  of  contradiction 
when  I  talk  of  myself  as  a  real  agent  or  Ursache  ?  Quite  the 
contrary,  as  it  seems  to  me  :  precisely  because  I  am  an  individual 
agent  or  Ego  with  an  equally  individual  counterpart  Non-Ego  is 
my  experience  unique  :  were  it  in  fact  from  end  to  end  but  the 
outcome  of  universal  laws  or  deducible  from  such,  as  the  psycho- 
physical  theory  implies,  then  certainly  all  efficient  activity  would 
be  as  absent  from  it  as  from  other  mere  mechanisms.  It  is  just 
this  uniqueness  and  seeming  contingency,  which  defy  mechanical 
explanations,  that  conative  activity  explains.  True,  this  activity 
is  itself  indescribable  and  inexplicable  in  other  terms.  But  to 
say  this  is  only  to  say  that  it  is  our  immediate  actual  being,  that 
we  cannot  get  behind  or  beyond  it,  cannot  set  it  away  from  us 
or  project  it. 

To  admit  this  eigene  Aktivitdt  as  das  wirklich  Wirksarne,  die 
zentrale  Innerlichkeit  that  for  immediate  experience  leaves  '  kein 
unerkldrter  Rest,'  as  the  first  of  these  writers  does,  and  yet  to 
eliminate  it  from  psychology  in  order  with  the  help  of  psycho- 


No.  6.]   PROBLEMS  OF  GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY.     6l  I 

physics  to  convert  psychology  into  a  natural  science,  is  surely  a 
desperate  procedure,  the  motives  for  which  it  is  hard  to  conjec- 
ture. To  turn  ' geistige  Aktivitdt'  out  of  the  science,  in  order 
to  separate  it  from  the  Geistesivissenschaften,  is  like  giving  a  dog  a 
bad  name,  taking  away  his  character,  in  order  to  hang  him. 

With  the  views  of  the  second  writer  I  have  personally  much 
more  sympathy.  There  is  here  no  heroic  inconsequence  to  bring 
psychology  into  line  with  mechanism  at  any  cost ;  but  a  serious 
metaphysical  problem,  perhaps  the  most  fundamental  of  all 
problems,  that,  namely,  of  the  Absolute  One  and  the  Finite 
Many,  seems  to  have  biased  him  in  the  treatment  of  the  problem 
before  us.  For  the  Finite  Many  he  conceives  that  we  are  neces- 
sitated to  postulate  a  transcendent  '  real '  as  substratum  ^  and  so 
they  figure  as  phenomena,  dominated  and  determined  by  the  law  of 
causality,  and  this  in  precisely  the  same  sense,  whether  they  are 
psychical  or  physical.  For  the  Absolute  One,  the  World-ground, 
however,  there  is  no  transcendent,  no  substratum  ;  here  the  causal 
becomes  the  teleological,  and  we  have  pure  actuality.  The 
Absolute,  in  short,  is  a  World-consciousness.  But,  if  so,  we 
naturally  ask  at  once,  must  there  not  be  a  correspondence  be- 
tween this  absolute  consciousness  and  phenomenal  consciousness 
which  does  not  exist  between  it  and  the  physical  phenomena,  over 
which  the  law  of  causality  is  supreme  ?  Or,  if  there  is  no  such 
correspondence,  if  what  the  author  calls  the  voluntarisch-teleolo- 
gischer  Standpunkt  has  no  place  in  finite  experience,  whence  do 
we  derive  this  concept  of  actuality,  which  in  absolute  purity  is 
predicated  of  the  One  ?  I  admit  the  utter  disparity  between  the 
finite  and  the  Infinite,  but  may  there  not  be  degrees  of  reality, 
and  may  not  the  continuity  of  these  be  infinite  ?  Such  degrees 
of  reality  our  author  recognizes.  He  says  :  "  Je  mehr  Realitat, 
d.  h.  je  mehr  Kraft,  Reichthum  und  innere  Einstimmigkeit  das 
einzelne  Individuum  hat  .  .  .  desto  mehr  wird  [es]  von  seiner 
Vereinzelung  befreit.  Es  wird  zu  jenem  '  iiberempirischen  und 
iiberindividuellen.'  Dies  ist  nicht  ein  '  Sichverlieren '  derselben 
in  Welt-ich,  sondern  ein  Finden  des  wahren  oder  postiven  Ich  in 
ihm."  If  this  progressive  development  is  to  mean  anything,  it 
surely  must  imply  an  experienced  efficiency  and  not  merely  a 


6l2  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

higher  reality,  of  which  there  is  no  immediate  experience,  —  which 
in  truth  is  never  '  found.'  How  there  can  be  a  finite  actuality, 
which  is  yet  not  pure  actuality  ;  in  other  words,  how  I  can  be  for 
myself  more  than  phenomenon  and  yet  not  absolute  reality,  we 
cannot  say.  But  our  author,  as  I  have  already  observed,  acknowl- 
edges that  even  the  procession  of  phenomena  from  the  Absolute  is 
*  unsagbar?  But  surely,  if  either  way  the  problem  of  the  One 
and  the  Many  is  insoluble,  it  is  better  to  accept  that  alternative 
which  does  not  seem  in  direct  conflict  with  our  actual  experience. 
The  third  writer  too  finds  a  justification  for  his  position  in 
philosophical  views  to  which  he  refers  as  "  elsewhere  in  part 
already  set  forth."  I  do  not  propose  to  follow  him  in  search  of 
these,  but  only  to  question  the  possibility  of  explaining  the 
initiation  of  new  forms  of  behavior  by  means  of  the  biological 
doctrine  of  tropisms.  This  question  leads  us  to  a  new  problem. 
The  idea  of  tropism  is  due,  I  believe,  to  the  botanists.  Certain 
plants  flourish  only  in  the  full  sunshine,  others  only  in  the  deepest 
shade  :  the  first  the  botanist  would  call  positively,  the  second 
negatively,  heliotropic.  In  like  manner  certain  animals  seek  the 
light  while  others  shun  it ;  and  their  behavior  Loeb  would  de- 
scribe in  the  same  fashion,  that  is  to  say,  as  due  respectively  to 
positive  and  negative  heliotropisms :  and,  like  some  botanists,  he 
looks  solely  to  the  physical  and  chemical  properties  of  the  sev- 
eral protoplasms  concerned  to  explain  this  difference.  Instincts, 
again,  are  for  him  but  complexes  of  tropisms  ;  and  so  throughout. 
The  striking  diversities  in  the  habitats  and  behavior  of  animals, 
equally  with  the  like  diversities  among  plants,  he  regards  as  rest- 
ing at  bottom  on  the  physics  of  colloidaj  substances.  A  satis- 
factory development  of  this  branch  of  physics  Professor  Loeb  is 
expecting  "in  the  near  future."  I  very  much  doubt  if  there  is  a 
single  physicist  who  shares  his  confidence,  and  shall  be  surprised 
if  this  physics  of  the  near  future  does  not  prove  to  be  that  sort  of 
hylozoism  which  Zollner  and  Haeckel  have  championed,  and 
which  Kant  long  ago  declared  would  be  the  death  of  natural 
philosophy  or  physics  proper.  For  hylozoism  in  so  many  words 
attributes  to  matter  a  certain  sensibility  incompatible  with  the 
absolute  inertia  essential  to  matter  in  the  proper  sense  of  the 


No.  6.]        PROBLEMS   OF  GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  613 

word.  Such  sensibility  implies  a  psychical  factor  operative 
throughout  organic  life ;  whereas,  if  biology  is  to  be  reduced  to 
physics  in  the  strict  sense,  such  a  factor  is  then  and  there 
altogether  excluded.  Philanthropy  and  misanthropy,  likes  and 
dislikes  of  all  sorts,  everything  we  call  conative  in  short,  will  fall 
into  line  with  other  physical  '  polarities '  or  tropisms,  and  psy- 
chology and  biology — so  far  from  working  together — must  each 
give  the  other  the  lie.  Either  way,  then,  it  is  important  to  con- 
sider how  far  psychology  can  explain  the  bewildering  variety  of 
forms  under  which  life  now  appears.  Structure  and  function  are 
undoubtedly  correlative,  but  which  is  the  determining  factor? 
At  one  extreme  we  have  the  answer  suggested  by  the  conception 
of  lvreU%eia  or  formative  principle,  which  we  find  in  Aristotle, 
Leibniz,  Lamarck,  and  other  vitalists  ;  at  the  other  we  have  the 
answer  of  Lucretius,  Loeb,  and  the  neo-Darwinians.  According 
to  the  one,  function  is  primary  and  determines  structure  ;  accord- 
ing to  the  other,  structure  is  primary  and  determines  function. 
In  the  first,  what  I  have  called  subjective  selection,  the  selection 
of  environment  by  the  individual  would  be  important ;  in  the 
other,  natural  selection  and  '  the  physics  of  colloidal  substances ' 
would  be  everything.  For  the  one,  subjective  initiative  will  be 
real  and  effective ;  for  the  other,  it  will  be  illusory  and  impotent. 
Among  ourselves  subjective  selection  shows  itself  in  the  choice 
of  a  career,  and  in  the  acquisition  of  the  special  knowledge  and 
skill  which  entitle  a  man  to  be  called  an  expert  or  a  connoisseur. 
It  would  surely  be  regarded  as  extravagant  to  maintain  that 
human  proficiencies  in  all  their  manifold  variety  were  the  outcome 
solely  of  physical  conditions  and  natural  selection,  and  that 
they  were  altogether  independent  of  subjective  initiative  and 
perseverance.  The  spur  of  competition  may  be  necessary  to  urge 
a  man  to  seek  new  openings  and  to  try  new  methods,  but  the 
enterprise  and  the  inventiveness  are  due,  none  the  less,  to  his  spon- 
taneity and  originality.  Now  it  seems  to  me  reasonable  to  assume 
that  the  like  holds  in  varying  degree  among  lower  forms  of  life, 
that  here  too  it  is  through  subjective  selection  that  the  poet's 
words  are  fulfilled  : 

"All  nature's  difference  keeps  all  nature's  peace." 


614  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

So,  and  not  by  calling  the  one  negatively,  the  other  positively 
heliotropic,  I  would  explain  the  fact  that  the  owls  and  the  moths, 
for  example,  are  active  by  night,  while  the  hawks  and  the  butter- 
flies are  active  by  day.  And  similarly  in  innumerable  other 
cases.  No  doubt  plant  life  raises  a  difficulty.  Here  there  is  a 
diversity  at  least  as  great  as  that  which  we  find  in  the  animal 
world,  and  here  again  there  is  as  striking  a  differentiation  of 
special  environment.  Can  we  refer  this  to  anything  psychical  or 
subjective,  or  must  we  here  at  last  fall  back  solely  on  '  fortuitous  ' 
variation  of  structure  and  natural  selection  ?  This  is  a  perplex- 
ing and  in  some  ways  a  crucial  question.  On  the  whole,  it  seems 
safest  to  assume  with  Aristotle  a  certain  continuity  between  life 
and  mind,  the  psychical  and  the  organic.  Anyhow,  the  higher 
we  ascend  the  scale  of  life,  the  more  the  concept  of  subjective 
initiative  and  adaptation  forces  itself  upon  us ;  and,  till  the 
chemical  theory  of  life  which  Professor  Loeb  awaits  is  forth- 
coming, the  principle  of  continuity  forbids  us  to  dogmatize  as  to 
the  limits  within  which  subjective  selection  is  confined  and 
beyond  which  tropisms  take  the  place  of  conations. 

Passing  now  from  the  subjective  factor  in  experience  to  the 
objective  factor,  we  are  confronted  by  a  new  problem  in  the 
recrudescence  of  atomistic  or  sensationalist  psychology  that  we 
find  amongst  us  to-day.  "  Atomism  in  psychology  must  go 
wholly,"  it  was  said  some  twenty  years  ago  by  a  writer  much 
given  to  dicta.  But  atomism  has  not  gone ;  on  the  contrary,  in 
certain  quarters  it  is  advocated  more  strenuously  than  ever.  It 
is  easy  to  see  the  causes  for  this,  but  hard  to  justify  it.  These 
causes  lie  partly  in  the  influence  of  analogy,  partly  in  a  natural 
tendency  to  imitate.  The  order  of  knowledge,  it  is  said,  is  from 
exteriora  to  interiora,  and  accordingly  the  whole  history  of  psy- 
chology and  its  entire  terminology  is  full  of  analogies  taken  from 
the  facts  of  the  so-called  external  world.  The  ancient  species 
sensibiles,  the  impressions  of  Locke  and  Hume,  the  adhesions, 
attractions,  and  affinities,  in  a  word,  the  mental  chemistry  of 
Brown  and  Mill,  are  instances  of  this.  Again,  the  tendency  of 
the  moral  sciences  to  imitate  the  methods  of  the  more  advanced 
physical  sciences  is  shown  in  the  dominance  of  mathematical 


No.  6.]        PROBLEMS   OF  GENERAL   PSYCHOLOGY.  615 

ideals  from  Descartes  up  to  Kant,  as  in  the  Ethics  of  Spinoza,  the 
theological  demonstrations  of  Clarke,  and  the  formalism  of  the 
Leibniz-Wolffians.  When  a  gifted  mathematician  and  physicist 
in  our  own  day,  W.  K.  Clifford,  turned  his  attention  to  the  facts 
of  mind,  he  at  once  broached  a  psychological  atomism  of  the 
extremist  type.  It  is  indeed  only  natural  that  the  wonderful 
grasp  which  the  atomic  theory  has  given  of  the  physical  world 
should  have  provoked  anew  the  emulation  of  psychologists  to 
proceed  on  similar  lines.  Moreover  the  structure  of  the  brain  — 
when  superficially  regarded  as  a  congeries  of  isolated  neurones  — 
encourages  a  like  attempt.  And  yet  the  moment  we  regard  the 
brain  functionally  —  and  not  the  brain  merely,  but  the  whole 
organism  —  the  atomistic  analogy  fails  us  at  once.  Functionally 
regarded,  the  organism  is  from  first  to  last  a  continuous  whole ; 
phylogenetically  and  ontogenetically  it  is  gradually  differentiated 
from  a  single  cell,  not  compounded  by  the  juxtaposition  of 
several  originally  distinct  cells.  There  is  in  this  respect  the 
closest  correspondence  between  life  and  mind ;  one  of  the  best 
things  Herbert  Spencer  did  was  to  trace  this  correspondence  in 
detail.  If  a  chemical  theory  of  life  is  for  the  present  improbable,  a 
quasi-chemical  theory  of  mind  is  more  improbable  still.  The 
individual  subject  we  must  regard  —  so  it  seems  to  me  —  as  en 
rapport  with  a  certain  objective  continuum  characterized  by 
indefinite  plasticity,  or  possibility  of  differentiation,  retentiveness, 
and  assimilation.  The  progress  of  experience,  alike  in  the  indi- 
vidual life  and  in  the  evolution  of  mind  as  a  whole,  may  then  be 
described  as  one  of  continuous  differentiation  or  specialization  ; 
diffused  and  simple  changes  of  situation  giving  place  to  restricted 
and  complex  ones,  vague  presentations  to  definite  ones.  But 
under  all,  the  objective  unity  and  continuity  persists,  and  we 
never  reach  a  mere  aggregate  or  manifold  of  chaotic  particulars, 
such  as  Kant  assumed  to  start  with. 

Yes,  but  to  describe  experience  as  progressive  differentiation 
and  organization  on  more  or  less  biological  lines  is  mere  natural 
history,  the  psychological  atomist  objects  :  it  is  only  description, 
not  explanation.  But  then  psychology,  or  more  exactly  its  sub- 
ject-matter, individual  experience,  is  historical;  that  is  to  say, 


6l6  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

though  psychology  is  not  biography*  but  science,  does  not  nar- 
rate but  generalizes,  yet  its  generalizations  all  relate  to  individual 
experience  as  such  ;  and  here  what  we  may  call  the  historical  or 
biological  categories,  —  teleological  categories,  in  other  words,  — 
are  surely  supreme.  It  is  remarkable  how  long  the  physical  or 
atomistic  bias  has  prevailed  in  human  thought,  but  happily  at 
length  modern  ideas  of  evolution  have  secured  a  juster  recogni- 
tion of  the  claims  of  the  historical :  I  may  refer  in  passing  to 
the  admirable  philosophical  expositions  of  these  claims  which  we 
owe  to  Professors  Windelband  and  Rickert.  And  surely  it  may 
be  contended  that  an  orderly  and  coherent  account  of  the  develop- 
ment of  individual  experience,  —  one  exhibiting  its  rationale,  so 
to  speak,  —  is  better  entitled  to  be  called  explanatory  than  any 
theory  can  be  that  sets  aside  the  essential  features  of  experience 
as  life  in  order  to  make  room  for  the  categories  of  mechanism 
and  chemism,  which  are  inadequate  and  inappropriate  to  the  liv- 
ing world.  As  I  have  just  said,  such  attempts  are  natural  enough, 
but  they  are  also  naive,  and  their  inaptness  becomes  increasingly 
manifest  as  reflection  and  criticism  deepen.  At  the  outset  men 
talk  of  thoughts  as  if  they  were  isolated  and  independent  exist- 
ences, just  as  they  talk  of  things  ;  nay,  ideas  are  then  but  off- 
prints or  copies  of  things.  Locke's  '  simple  ideas,'  for  example, 
are  pretty  much  of  this  sort :  as  simple  and  single  they  come, 
and  as  such  they  ar,e  retained  save  as  they  may  be  afterwards 
variously  compounded  and  related.  True,  for  Locke  such  com- 
pounding and  relating  was  '  the  work  of  the  mind,'  the  result, 
that  is  to  say,  of  subjective  interest  and  initiative.  But  soon  the 
inevitable  further  step  was  taken  :  the  '  compounding  and  relat- 
ing '  of  these  isolated  and  independent  elements  was  transferred 
by  Hume  to  certain  'natural'  processes,  and  then  connected  by 
Hartley  with  brain  vibratiuncles  ;  and  thus  the  supremacy  of  psy- 
chological atomism  was  assured  for  a  century  or  more.  But  it 
is  the  first  step  that  costs,  as  the  French  say,  and  that  is  what 
we  have  to  challenge.  The  disorderly,  unrelated  aggregate  of 
simple  sensations  is  a  pure  chimaera,  an  Unding.  If  genetic  and 
comparative  psychology  prove  anything,  they  prove  this.  The 
earliest  phases  of  experience  are  as  little  chaotic  and  fragmen- 


No.  6.]        PROBLEMS   OF  GENERAL   PSYCHOLOGY.  6l? 

tary  as  are  the  earliest  forms  of  life.  In  the  so-called  '  contents 
of  consciousness '  at  any  moment,  the  psychologist  may  distin- 
guish between  field  and  focus,  what  is  perceived  and  what  is  ap- 
perceived,  and  may  allow  that,  as  we  descend  in  the  scale  of  life, 
this  distinction  is  less  pronounced  or  even  disappears  altogether ; 
but  discontinuity  he  never  reaches,  either  in  the  objective  or  in 
the  subjective  factor  of  experience.  And  when  similar  situations 
recur,  the  new  is  not  ranged  beside  the  old  like  beads  on  a  thread, 
but  the  one  is  assimilated  and  the  other  further  differentiated ; 
and  so  there  results  a  growing  familiarity  and  facility,  as  long  as 
such  situations  awaken  interest  at  all.  Presentations,  in  short, 
have  none  of  the  essential  characteristics  of  atoms,  they  may 
come  to  signify  things  but  never  to  be  them,  —  and  the  growing 
complexity  of  psychical  life  is  only  parodied  by  treating  it  as 
mental  chemistry. 

How,  then,  it  may  reasonably  be  asked,  do  I  propose  to 
account  for  the  long  predominance  of  associationism  and  for  the 
recent  revival  of  psychological  atomism  in  a  modified  form  ? 
For  instance,  it  has  been  said  that  the  so-called  '  laws '  of  asso- 
ciation are  for  psychology  what  the  law  of  gravitation  is  for 
physics  ;  surely  they  must  be  of  substantial  importance  to  make 
so  extravagant  a  claim  even  possible  ?  Yes  ;  as  I  have  allowed, 
they  deal  with  nine  tenths  of  the  facts.  A  man  at  forty  is  a 
bundle  of  habits,  we  say ;  and  a  bee  seems  to  be  such  a  bundle 
from  the  first.  Again,  the  poet  exhorts  us  to  rise  on  stepping- 
stones  of  our  dead  selves  to  higher  things.  Now  it  is  solely  in 
the  wide  region  of  already  fixed,  already  organized,  experience 
that  associationism  finds  its  province.  It  can  deal  with  so 
much  of  experience  as  is  already  grown,  formed,  and  so  far,  in  a 
sense,  dead ;  with  what  has  become  reflex,  "  secondarily  auto- 
matic," to  use  Hartley's  phrase,  /.  e.,  more  or  less  mechanical. 
But  here  as  little  as  elsewhere  can  the  mechanical  account  for 
itself;  these  psychical  *  quasi-mechanisms '  have  to  be  made, 
and  the  process  of  making  them  is  the  essential  part  of  psychical 
life.  Presentations  do  not  associate  themselves  in  virtue  of  some 
inherent  adhesiveness  or  attraction  :  it  is  not  enough  that  they 
"occur  together,"  as  Bain  and  the  rest  of  his  school  imply. 


618  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW,         [VOL.  XIII. 

They  must  be  attended  to  together :  it  is  only  what  subjective 
interest  has  integrated  that  is  afterwards  automatically  redinte- 
grated. Were  association  a  purely  passive  process  so  far  as  the 
experient  is  concerned,  it  would  be  difficult  to  account  for  the 
diversities  which  exist  in  the  organized  experiences  of  creatures 
with  the  same  general  environment ;  but  subjective  selection  ex- 
plains this  at  once. 

But  the  plasticity  of  the  objective  continuum,  upon  which  this 
process  of  organizing  experience  depends,  opens  up  a  whole  group 
of  problems,  which  I  may  perhaps  be  permitted  briefly  to  mention, 
though  they  may  seem  to  belong  to  psychophysics  rather  than 
to  general  psychology.  How  are  we  to  conceive  this  plasticity  ? 
J.  C.  Scaliger  is  reported  to  have  said  that  two  things  especially 
excited  his  curiosity,  the  cause  of  gravity  and  the  cause  of 
memory,  meaning  thereby,  I  take  it,  pretty  much  what  we  are 
here  calling  plasticity.  Had  Scaliger  known  what  we  now 
know  about  heredity,  his  curiosity  would  have  been  still  more 
keenly  excited.  The  facts  of  heredity  have  led  biologists  again 
and  again  to  more  or  less  hazy  —  but  withal  interesting  —  spec- 
ulations concerning  '  organic  memory,'  as  Hering  has  called  it ; 
'  organic  memoranda '  would  perhaps  be  a  better  name.  Memo- 
randa, however,  imply  both  the  past  and  the  future  presence  of 
mind,  of  experiencing  subject,  though  they  may  exist  as  materi- 
alized records  independently  of  past  writer  or  future  reader. 
Heredity  treated  on  these  lines  commits  us  to  a  more  or  less 
poetical  personification  of  nature  ;  it  is  nature,  the  biologist  sup- 
poses, who  makes,  and  equally  it  is  nature,  he  supposes,  who 
uses  these  organic  memoranda.  The  continuity  of  life  —  as  the 
biologist  is  wont  to  regard  it  —  renders  such  a  view  possible. 
Omne  vivum  e  vivo  is  the  formula  of  this  continuity.  But  of  any 
corresponding  psychical  continuity  we  not  only  know  nothing, 
but  what  else  we  do  know  leads  us  to  regard  it  as  inconceivable. 
We  have,  then,  continuity  of  life  between  parental  and  filial  or- 
ganisms, and  yet  complete  discontinuity  between  parental  and 
filial  experiences.  But  is  there  after  all  complete  discontinuity 
even  between  the  two  experiences  ?  Yes,  we  incline  to  answer, 
the  more  we  consider  feeling,  attention,  initiative,  the  individual- 


No.  6.]       PROBLEMS   OF  GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  619 

izing  aspect  of  experience,  or  the  higher  and  later  phases  of  it 
in  which  these  are  most  pronounced.  No,  we  are  tempted  to 
answer,  the  more  we  consider  the  instinctive  and  inherited  apti- 
tudes which  constitute  most  of  what  is  objective  in  the  lowest 
forms  of  life,  and  the  beginning  of  what  is  objective  in  all  forms. 
May  it  not  be  said  that  we  here  come  upon  the  problem  of  the 
One  and  the  Many  in  a  very  concrete  form,  and  that  it  is  as  in- 
tractable for  psychology  as  is  the  more  abstract,  perhaps  more 
legitimate  fortn,  in  which  it  presents  itself  to  metaphysics  ? 

Simpler  and  less  intractable  is  the  somewhat  cognate  problem 
of  subconsciousness.  We  hear  of  subconscious  sensations  as 
well  as  of  subconscious  memories  or  ideas  :  here  I  refer  only  to 
the  latter.  They  are  sometimes  spoken  of  as  traces  or  residua  ; 
sometimes  as  '  dispositions,'  psychical  or  neural  or  both  ;  the 
one  term  implying  their  actual  persistence  from  the  past,  the  other 
their  potentiality  as  regards  the  future.  The  nature  of  this 
potentiality  is  what  chiefly  concerns  us.  Even  here  there  must 
be  something  actual  if  we  are  to  escape  the  absurdity  of  puis- 
sances ou  facultes  nues,  with  which  in  this  very  connection  Leibniz 
twitted  Locke.  Disposition  is  a  somewhat  ambiguous  term.  It 
means  primarily  an  arrangement  or  collection,  as  when  we  talk 
of  the  disposition  of  stones  in  a  mosaic  or  of  troops  in  a  battle. 
But  it  usually  carries  a  second  meaning,  which  however  presup- 
poses, and  is  consequential  on,  the  first.  Every  actual  combi- 
nation entails  a  definite  potentiality  of  some  sort  and  usually 
several,  one  or  other  of  which  will  on  a  certain  condition  become 
actual.  Sometimes  this  condition  is  something  to  be  added, 
sometimes  it  is  something  to  be  taken  away.  A  locomotive  with 
the  fire  out  has  no  tendency  to  move,  but  with  '  steam  up '  it  is 
only  hindered  from  moving  by  the  closure  of  the  throttle-valve 
or  the  grip  of  the  brake.  Now  presentational  dispositions  may 
be  assumed  to  be  of  this  latter  sort,  to  be,  that  is  to  say,  proc- 
esses or  functions  more  or  less  '  inhibited,'  the  inhibition  being 
determined  by  their  relation  to  other  presentational  processes  or 
functions.  This,  of  course,  is  the  Herbartian  view.  On  this 
view  the  use  of  the  term  '  subconscious '  is  justifiable,  as  long 
as  the  latency  is  relative  and  not  absolute.  But  if  we  regard  the 


620  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

so-called  disposita  merely  structurally,  if  such  an  expression 
may  be  allowed,  if,  in  other  words,  we  suppose  all  functioning  to 
be  absent,  then  there  seems  no  warrant  for  the  term  'sub- 
conscious/ nor  yet  for  such  a  phrase  as  '  physiological  disposition/ 
meaning  tendency,  and  still  less  for  that  of  '  psychical  disposition  ' 
or  tendency.  But  on  the  physiological  side,  at  any  rate,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  assume  the  persistence  of  a  certain  neural  '  tone ' 
or  activity  :  what  is  known  as  '  skeletal  tone '  or  muscular 
tonicity  is  indeed  evidence  of  such  persistence.  Yet  from  the 
psychological  side  there  comes  the  supposed  fatal  objection :  It 
is  surely  incredible  that  all  the  incidents  of  a  long  life  and  all  the 
items  of  knowledge  of  a  well-stored  mind,  that  may  possibly 
recur,  are  continuously  presented  in  the  form  and  order  in  which 
they  were  originally  experienced  or  acquired.  But  no  advocate 
of  subconsciousness  has  ever  maintained  anything  so  extravagant. 
Subconsciousness  implies  what  Leibniz  called  involution  or  the 
existence  of  what,  taking  a  hint  from  Herbart,  I  have  ventured 
to  call  the  ideational  tissue  or  continuum.  Though  the  explicit 
revival  of  what  is  retained  is  successional,  recurs,  so  to  say,  in 
single  file,  yet  a  whole  scheme,  in  which  a  thousand  ideas  are 
involved,  may  rise  towards  the  threshold  together ;  and,  con- 
versely, in  the  case,  say,  of  a  play  which  we  have  followed 
throughout,  there  is  a  like  involution  when  at  the  end  we  ex- 
press our  opinion  of  it.  It  is  a  mistake  then  to  suppose  that  all 
the  impressions  that  have  successively  occupied  our  attention 
persist  item  for  item  in  that  multum  in  parvo  apparatus  which 
—  with  due  reserve  —  we  may  call  our  ideational  mechanism. 
But  of  their  subconscious  persistence  as  thus  assimilated  and 
elaborated  there  is,  I  think,  abundant  evidence.  If  such  sub- 
conscious continuity  be  denied,  we  can  accord  to  voluntary  at- 
tention no  more  initiative  in  the  revival  and  grouping  of  ideas  than 
belonged  to  non-voluntary  attention  in  the  reception  of  the 
original  impressions  :  the  immediate  determinants  of  both  alike 
would  be  physical  stimuli.  And  apparently  —  to  judge  by  their 
terminology  —  some  psychologists  believe  this  .to  be  the  case. 

This  whole  topic  of  the  growth  and  development  of  reminis- 
cence and  ideation  has  been  too  much  neglected,  largely  in  con- 


No.  6.]        PROBLEMS  OF  GENERAL   PSYCHOLOGY.  621 

sequence  of  the  spurious  simplicity  of  the  atomistic  psychology ; 
particularly  its  crude  doctrine  that  ideas  are  mere  copies  or  traces 
of  impressions,  its  adoption  of  a  physiological  hypothesis,  now 
seriously  discredited,  viz.,  that  the  seat  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the 
seat  of  sensations,  and  its  failure  adequately  to  distinguish  between 
assimilation  and  association,  or  to  recognize  the  wide  difference 
that  exists  between  the  processes  which  it  describes  as  association 
through  contiguity  and  association  through  similarity.  We  owe 
much,  I  think,  in  the  treatment  of  this  topic  to  Professor  Hoff- 
ding's  article,  Ueber  Wiederkennen,  Association  und  psychische 
Akt^^4tat,  especially  to  his  distinction  of  '  tied  '  and  '  free  '  ideas, 
a  distinction,  however,  which  I  find  Drobisch  had  previously 
drawn.  I  regret  that  there  is  no  time  left  for  further  remarks  on 
this  problem. 

Among  other  problems  particularly  deserving  of  consideration, 
I  should  like  at  least  to  mention  the  genesis  of  spatial  and  tem- 
poral perception  ;  the  whole  psychology  of  language,  analytic  and 
genetic  ;  psychical  analysis,  objects  of  a  higher  order,  the  so-called 
Gestalt-qualitaten,  in  a  word,  the  psychology  of  intellection  gener- 
ally. All  of  these,  including  the  topic  of  ideation  previously 
mentioned,  lead  up  to  what  might  be  termed  epistemological  psy- 
chology, the  psychology,  that  is,  of  universal  experience  on  its 
individualistic  side.  Perhaps  other  members  of  this  congress  may 
see  fit  to  broach  one  or  other  of  these  problems.  But  I  confess 
that  those  on  which  I  have  enlarged  somewhat,  the  definition  of 
psychology,  the  nature  of  subject  activity,  and  the  criticism  of  the 
atomistic  theory,  seem  to  me  now  fundamentally  the  most  import- 
ant. I  wish  I  had  been  able  to  deal  with  them  in  a  way  less 
unworthy  of  my  audience. 

JAMES  WARD. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CAMBRIDGE. 


A  FACTOR  IN  MENTAL  DEVELOPMENT. 

WHEN  we  trace  the  development  of  mental  life  upward  from 
the  lowest  forms  of  the  animal  kingdom,  we  are  led  to 
believe  that  the  process  has  been  marked  chiefly  by  progress  in 
two  respects  :  first,  advance  in  the  power  to  discriminate  among 
stimuli,  and  second,  the  rise,  somewhere  in  the  course  of  develop- 
ment, of  the  power  to  form  'free  ideas.'  Another  mile-stone  in 
the  path  of  development  is  the  beginning  of  social  or  ejective 
consciousness  ;  but  this,  as  the  writer  has  elsewhere  attempted  to 
suggest,  may  have  grown  out  of  the  power  to  form  free  ideas  in 
situations  where  motor  reactions  of  a  social  nature  have  already 
been  produced  through  the  influence  of  the  creature's  needs.  It 
is  the  aim  of  the  present  paper  to  indicate  how  both  these  great 
gains  of  psychic  evolution,  discrimination  of  present  experiences 
and  clearly  conscious  recall  of  past  experiences,  have  been 
dependent  in  part  at  least  upon  one  factor  :  the  organism's  grow- 
ing power  to  react  to  stimuli  not  in  immediate  contact  with  the 
•body. 

Let  us  take  up  first  the  matter  of  discrimination.  The  external 
senses  are  grouped  as  higher  and  lower  according  to  the  number 
of  discriminable  qualities  they  furnish,  from  sight  with  its  thou- 
sands down  to  warmth  and  cold  with  their  one  each.  In  the 
course  of  organic  development,  the  power  of  primitive  living  beings 
to  react  to  light  and  darkness  has  grown  into  the  painter's 
capacity  to  distinguish  color  tones  and  saturation  grades ;  the 
original  shock  from  oscillations  of  air  or  water  has  developed 
into  the  tone  discriminations  of  the  skilled  violinist ;  the  undiffer- 
entiated  response  of  the  protozoon  to  mechanical  stimulation  at 
any  part  of  its  body  has  become  the  finger  sense  of  the  mechani- 
cian. Now  an  increase  in  the  number  of  discriminable  sensations 
within  a  given  sense  department  means  one  of  two  things,  some- 
times both.  Either  qualitative  discrimination  becomes  more 
highly  developed,  or  local  discrimination  grows  finer.  We  have  an 

622 


A   FACTOR   IN  MENTAL   DEVELOPMENT.  623 

example  of  the  first  in  the  series  of  auditory  sensations ;  of  the 
second  in  the  sense  of  touch,  where  qualitative  uniformity,  com- 
paratively speaking,  is  compensated  for  by  exceedingly  fine 
localization  ;  and  of  both  in  the  sense  of  sight. 

Further,  this  process  of  growth  in  discriminative  power  has 
been  conditioned,  like  all  the  phenomena  of  organic  development, 
by  the  vital  needs  of  the  organism.  At  every  stage  of  evolution, 
the  creature's  energy  of  discrimination,  so  to  speak,  is  limited, 
and  must  be  expended  in  a  direction  that  will  best  aid  its  pos- 
sessor to  survive.  From  this  point  of  view,  we  find  that  the 
facts  concerning  the  power  to  discriminate,  qualitatively  and 
locally,  in  different  sense  departments  may  be  grouped  under  two 
laws. 

First,  qualitative  discrimination  has  been  developed  with  refer-, 
ence  to  stimuli  that  do  not  immediately  hurt  or  help  the  organism. 

Second,  stimuli  that  are  or  may  be  harmful  or  helpful  at  the 
moment  of  their  application  have  given  rise  to  local  discrimina- 
tion at  the  expense  of  qualitative  distinctions. 

As  regards  the  first  principle,  it  is  clear  that  stimuli  such  as 
light  or  sound,  which  cannot  directly  and  instantaneously  affect 
the  organism's  life,  are  those  which  have  given  rise  to  the 
greatest  number  of  qualitatively  distinguishable  sensations.  The 
reason  is  that,  since  it  is  unnecessary  for  the  organism  to  make,  in 
instant  response  to  such  stimuli,  movements  accurately  adapted 
to  their  location,  it  is  at  liberty  to  expend  its  psychic  energies  on 
qualitative  analysis.  Time  can  be  taken  to  discover  what  the 
stimuli  are,  because  it  is  not  so  desperately  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish where  they  are  and  act  accordingly.  Local  discrimina- 
tion in  these  senses  may  go  hand  in  hand  with  qualitative  dis- 
crimination, as  in  the  case  of  sight,  but  it  will  not  obscure  it. 
The  sense  of  taste  is  a  further  illustration.  It  is  the  poorest  of 
the  group,  sight,  hearing,  smell,  and  taste,  in  the  number  of  its 
qualities.  It  is  also  the  one  of  these  four  whose  stimuli  do  come 
into  direct  contact  with  the  body.  That  it  should  possess  as  many 
qualities  as  it  does  may  well  be  due  to  the  fact  that  its  stimuli, 
though  touching  the  body,  do  not  touch  it  at  the  localities  where 
they  can  harm  or  help ;  hence  local  discrimination  is  unnec- 


624  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

essary.  Taste  stimuli  come  into  contact  with  the  body  in  the 
mouth ;  their  first  chance  to  hinder  or  help  the  organism's  wel- 
fare comes  ordinarily  further  on  in  the  alimentary  canal. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  two  classes  of  sensations  that  illustrate 
clearly  how  qualitative  discrimination  may  be  swamped  through 
the  immediate  need  for  local  discrimination  are  touch  sensations 
and,  preeminently,  sensations  of  pain.  Here  the  stimulus  is  not 
merely  in  contact  with  the  organism  ;  it  is  where  it  may  injure, 
or  actually  is  injuring.  Immediate  motor  response  adapted  to 
the  location  of  the  stimulus  is  demanded ;  there  is  no  time  for 
qualitative  investigation.  To  say  that  the  contact  senses  have 
fewer  qualities  than  sight  and  hearing  because  the  variety  of 
stimuli  for  sight  and  hearing  is  greater,  is  obviously  to  beg  the 
question  completely.  There  is  as  much  variety  in  the  chemical 
constitution  of  bodies  as  there  is  in  the  ether  or  air  disturbances 
which  they  send  to  us.  A  priori,  this  variety  might  well  have 
been  represented  by  an  equal  variety  of  touch  and  pain  qualities  ; 
what  is  lacking  is  not  stimulus  differences,  but  sensory  discrimi- 
nation. The  motor  reaction  demanded  by  such  stimuli  has  been 
too  immediate ;  there  has  been  no  time  for  more  than  a  vague 
cognition  of  the  '  what.' 

We  said  at  the  outset  that  this  principle  would  throw  light  also 
upon  the  problem  of  the  rise  of  free  images.  Whatever  one's 
theory  of  the  nature  of  nervous  action  may  be,  it  is  evident  that 
the  reproduction  of  a  sensory  image  by  central  excitation  de- 
mands that  its  original  stimulus  shall  have  left  upon  the  nervous 
substance  a  relatively  permanent  effect.  The  stages  of  develop- 
ment in  response  to  stimulation  may  be  classed  as  three.  First, 
there  is  the  primitive  condition  where  the  animal  does  not  learn 
by  individual  experience.  A  stimulus  entering  such  an  organism, 
and  sending  its  energy  out  again  through  whatever  motor  paths 
are  available,  leaves  so  little  effect  upon  the  substance  through 
which  it  passes  that  the  animal  behaves  towards  a  second  stimu- 
lus of  the  same  kind  precisely  as  it  did  towards  the  first.  In  the 
next  place,  we  have  that  stage  of  development  where  the  animal 
learns  by  experience,  without,  however,  having  the  power  to  recall 
an  image  of  its  experience.  This,  if  we  are  to  believe  recent 


No.  6.]       A    FACTOR   IN  MENTAL  DEVELOPMENT.  625 

investigations  of  the  animal  mind,  is  probably  the  stage  at  which 
many  animals  quite  high  in  the  scale  remain.  The  chick  stung 
by  a  bee  cannot  later  have  the  image  of  a  bee  suggested  to  him, 
but  he  can  and  does  refrain  from  picking  up  the  next  bee  he  sees. 
Here  the  stimulus  has  modified  the  behavior  of  the  animal.  The 
permanent  effect  it  has  left  upon  the  nervous  substance  would 
seem  to  involve  chiefly  the  motor  paths,  the  direction  of  the 
outgoing  current.  But  renewed  stimulation  from  without  is 
necessary  before  this  modification  makes  itself  apparent.  Finally, 
when  we  have  the  possibility  of  an  image,  purely  centrally  ex- 
cited, and  not  leading  immediately  to  movement,  when  a  process 
similar  to  the  original  one  may  be  set  up,  not  by  an  influx  of 
energy  from  without,  but  by  the  weaker  nervous  current  coming 
from  some  other  central  sensory  region,  it  is  evident  that  the  nerv- 
ous substance  must  have  been  far  more  profoundly  affected  by  the 
original  stimulus  than  it  was  at  either  of  the  earlier  stages.  Now 
what  characteristics  of  a  stimulus  would  determine  how  thor- 
oughly and  deeply  it  would  affect  the  nervous  substance  through 
which  it  passed  ?  Its  intensity,  the  quantity  of  energy  in  it,  of 
course ;  but  still  more  emphatically  the  length  of  time  that 
energy  remained  in  the  centers  in  question,  without  being  drained 
off  into  motor  paths  and  transformed  into  bodily  movement. 
Not  merely  the  strength,  but  the  duration  of  the  current  deter- 
mines how  deep  a  path  it  shall  dig  out  for  itself. 

We  have  already  seen  that  stimuli  which  are  in  a  position  to 
help  or  harm  an  organism  at  the  instant  of  their  contact  with  its 
body  are  stimuli  demanding  immediate  motor  reaction,  adapted 
especially  to  their  location.  In  such  cases,  the  energy  of  the 
stimulus  is  deflected  at  once  into  the  appropriate  motor  path  ;  its 
modifying  effect  is  produced  upon  the  regions  of  motor  dis- 
charge, but  it  is  not  delayed  long  enough  in  the  sensory  regions 
to  produce  any  permanent  change  there.  It  is  probable  that  the 
consciousness  of  such  stimulation  is  not  very  intense  or  distinct. 
But  when  the  creature  has  developed  a  capacity  to  be  affected  by 
light  and  sound,  which  cannot  help  or  harm  at  the  moment  of 
their  action  upon  its  body,  then  reaction  may  be  postponed  ;  then 
the  current  of  energy  sent  by  the  stimulus  into  the  nervous  sub- 


626  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

stance  is  not  at  once  drained  off,  but  may  linger  sufficiently  long 
to  produce  whatever  alteration,  whatever  impress  upon  sensory 
centers,  is  needful  to  insure  their  subsequent  functioning  as  the 
basis  of  a  free  image.  Delayed  reaction,  made  gradually  pos- 
sible by  increasing  sensitiveness  of  the  organism  to  stimuli  only 
indirectly  affecting  its  welfare,  is  then  the  source  of  the  image- 
forming  power.  May  not  the  same  principle  help  to  explain 
also  why  it  is  that  the  fully  developed  mind  gets  its  clearest  and 
most  controllable  images  from  the  senses  whose  stimuli  do  not 
indicate  direct  contact  of  a  beneficial  or  harmful  object  with  the 
body ;  while  the  closer  and  more  direct  the  stimulation,  as  for 
instance  in  touch  and  organic  sensations,  the  obscurer  is  the 
image  ? 

A  final  thought  suggests  itself  in  this  connection.  The  so- 
called  higher  senses,  those  with  greatest  qualitative  differentia- 
tion, with  clearest  images,  and  with  stimuli  demanding,  under 
primitive  vital  conditions,  least  immediate  and  instant  reaction, 
are  also  the  senses  giving  rise  to  aesthetic  feelings.  That  is,  the 
affective  tone  of  impressions  from  these  senses  is  largely  de- 
pendent on  the  relations  of  the  elements  rather  than  on  their 
character.  This  fact  is  surely  connected  with  the  possibility  of 
delayed  motor  response  in  the  higher  senses.  The  relation  be- 
tween two  simple  sense  impressions  could  not  come  into  clear 
consciousness,  either  on  its  own  account  or  as  represented  by  a 
feeling,  unless  neither  of  the  impressions  required  instant  reac- 
tion. There  is  no  such  thing  as  an  aesthetics  of  touch  or  organic 
sensations,  because  here  there  has  been  no  time,  between  stimulus 
and  reaction,  for  dwelling  on  the  relation  between  the  sensory 
effects  of  different  stimuli.  In  a  word,  upon  the  possibility  of 
reacting  to  stimulation  that  neither  hurts  nor  helps  the  organism 
at  the  moment  of  its  operation,  may  rest  the  basis  of  all  higher 

mental  development. 

MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN. 
VASSAR  COLLEGE. 


SCEPTICISM. 

F  N  the  present  article  I  shall  have  in  mind  chiefly,  as  the  objec- 
tive point,  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  a  final  and  satisfac- 
tory philosophy.  And  by  scepticism  I  shall  mean  here  that  some- 
what unsystematic  attitude  whose  ground  is  to  be  found  primarily 
in  an  appeal  to  the  fact  of  error,  and  a  challenge  to  point  out  the 
marks  by  which  we  might  recognize  truth  if  we  once  were  to 
stumble  on  it.  "  I  am  quite  willing,"  the  sceptic  may  say,  "  to 
renounce  the  task  of  proving  dogmatically  that  we  cannot  know 
reality  as  it  is.  I  only  reserve  the  right  to  ask  :  If  we  can  know 
truth,  pray  where  is  it  ?  Produce  a  specimen  of  truth  that  is 
certain,  admitted,  indubitable.  Until  this  can  be  done,  you  can 
hardly  complain  if  I  exercise  the  privilege  of  withholding  judg- 
ment. And  now  what  likelihood  is  there  that  you  will  be  suc- 
cessful in  such  a  task  ?  Let  me  point  out  first  that  there  is 
indubitably  the  thing  which  we  are  accustomed  to  call  error. 
Men  have  proved  to  be  mistaken  in  their  most  cherished  beliefs  ; 
or,  better,  these  beliefs  have  come  to  be  rejected,  and  rejected 
almost  universally.  In  the  life  of  the  individual  thinker  the 
same  thing  is  true.  That  man  is  rare  indeed,  if  he  exists  at  all, 
who  has  not  been  compelled  to  discard  beliefs  which  once  seemed 
to  him  fully  warranted.  Indeed,  the  more  we  examine  into  it, 
the  more  we  recognize  in  how  thoroughgoing  a  way  human  ex- 
perience is  infected  with  the  disease  of  uncertainty.  Essentially 
every  belief  is  fluctuating,  subject  to  dispute  and  contradiction, 
transitory  in  the  sway  which  it  holds  over  men's  minds.  Even 
the  testimony  of  the  senses  is  constantly  leading  us  astray ; 
judged,  indeed,  by  the  standard  of  science,  it  never  even  approxi- 
mates the  truth.  And  in  the  realm  of  opinion,  as  opposed  to 
judgments  of  sense  perception,  an  even  greater  confusion  exists. 
It  is  worst  of  all  in  philosophy.  Perhaps  there  never  was  a  time 
when  men  were  more  divided  than  at  the  present,  and  that,  too, 
not  upon  details  merely,  but  on  the  great  essentials.  One  man 
says  mind  is  real  and  not  matter  ;  another  matter,  and  not  mind. 

627 


628  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

One  says  that  they  have  equal  reality,  and  one  that  neither  rep- 
resents the  truth.  And  none  of  these  philosophers,  with  all  his 
arguments,  can  convince  the  others,  although  all  are  sincere  and 
honest  men,  who  love  the  truth,  and  have  their  minds  open  to 
admit  it.  And  if  the  most  of  them  are  certainly  wrong,  why 
may  not  this  be  true  of  all  ?  Rather,  must  not  this  be  so,  since 
otherwise  someone  surely  would  be  able  to  give  reasons  for  his 
belief  that  should  carry  conviction  ?  " 

What,  now,  seem  to  be  the  essential  facts  of  the  case,  in  view 
of  this  sceptical  complaint  ?  And  first  of  all,  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  to  be  a  consistent  sceptic,  a  man  should  be  ready  to  commit 
himself  to  the  definite  position  that  he  has  no  reason  to  accept 
any  one  thing  as  true  above  any  other  thing.  But,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  in  any  reasonable  being  this  can  only  be  the  veriest  pre- 
tence ;  one  who  makes  such  an  assertion  may  without  hesitation 
be  set  down  as,  consciously  or  not,  posing  for  effect.  We  are, 
as  Montaigne  says,  natural  believers,  A  man  can  no  more  help 
believing  something,  if  he  is  still  a  thinking  animal,  than  he  can 
help  breathing,  and  still  remain  alive.  Whether  or  not  he  can 
justify  his  belief  to  others,  whether  or  not  he  can  point  out  any 
standard  to  which  belief  must  conform,  he  still  inevitably  will 
find  himself  believing.  He  may  realize  that  there  is  the  abstract 
possibility  that  every  one  of  his  beliefs  will  sometime  in  the 
future  be  overturned.  But  the  present  truth  still  seems  to  him 
to  be  true ;  he  still  asserts  it  to  the  exclusion  of  its  opposite. 
At  the  very  least  he  asserts,  i.  e.,  he  believes  in,  the  truth  that  he 
is  sceptical  of  all  truth.  Otherwise  he  would  be  trying  to  adopt 
the  impossible  attitude  of  asserting  and  denying  the  same  thing 
at  the  same  time. 

The  first  point  is,  then,  that  all  men  do  believe  something,  and 
that  no  possible  difficulties  about  the  theory  of  belief  will  ever 
stop  their  doing  this,  so  long  as  they  choose  to  think  at  all. 
Of  course  a  man  may  stop  thinking.  But  then  he  is  no  longer 
a  sceptic ;  he  is  intellectually  a  nonentity.  In  other  words,  a 
man  cannot  think,  and  at  the  same  time  really  and  fundamentally 
doubt  the  power  of  thought  to  attain  to  some  degree  of  truth. 
I  may  doubt  a  former  result  of  thought,  but  only  by  accepting 


No.  6.]  SCEPTICISM,  629 

for  the  time  being  the  validity  of  the  process  by  which  I  doubt 
it.  For  the  doubt  itself  presupposes  the  very  thing  that  is 
doubted.  Doubt  is  not  mere  absence  of  belief.  In  doubting,  I 
am  also  thinking.  I  am  using  thought  to  overthrow  thought. 
I  am  using  premises,  that  is,  which  my  conclusion  says  are  false, 
in  order  to  reach  this  very  conclusion.  Any  particular  truth  I 
may  perhaps  doubt,  except  the  truth  that  in  the  thinking  process 
truth  is  implied. 

And  now  the  second  point  is  this  :  that  if  we  do  necessarily 
believe  something,  we  have  no  right  on  the  basis  of  the  sceptic's 
argument  merely  to  stop  at  any  particular  point,  and  say  that 
beyond  this  belief  cannot  go.  All  I  am  justified  in  saying  is, 
that  I  cannot  at  present  come  to  any  conclusion  about  the 
matter ;  not  that  some  one  else  may  not  have  valid  reasons  for 
belief,  or  that  I  myself  may  not  in  the  future  see  my  way  clearer. 
The  fact  that  I  am  not  as  yet  convinced,  furnishes  no  ground 
whatever  for  the  conclusion  that  the  truth  will  never  be  known. 
It  may,  indeed,  induce  me  to  give  up  the  search  as  hopeless. 
But  this  is  just  the  theoretical  weakness  of  scepticism.  Scepti- 
cism, in  other  words,  stands  primarily  as  a  disinclination  to 
prosecute  the  search  further.  It  is  a  personal  confession  that,  in 
the  face  of  a  certain  problem  or  group  of  problems,  I  feel  myself 
baffled  and  ready  to  quit.  And  it  is  significant  that  commonly 
it  is  the  attitude  of  the  amateur,  of  the  one  who  approaches  a 
subject  with  only  a  subsidiary  interest  in  it,  and  who  has  not  the 
time  or  the  will  to  push  through  to  the  end.  No  man  is  a  sceptic 
in  every  direction.  Few  men  are  sceptics  in  the  special  field 
which  they  have  made  their  own.  We  have  had  in  our  own 
day  a  striking  illustration  of  this  in  the  case  of  Professor  Huxley. 
Professor  Huxley  is  a  sceptic  in  ultimate  questions  of  philosophy. 
He  has  thought  far  enough  to  see  the  difficulties  of  the  problem, 
and  his  interest  is  not  sufficient  to  carry  him  through  these 
difficulties  which  loom  up  before  him.  In  precisely  the  same 
way,  and  for  the  same  reason,  he  is  a  sceptic  in  another  field  also. 
He  has  an  interest  in  a  certain  complicated  literary  problem,  —  the 
relationship  of  the  first  three  Gospels,  — and  he  has  followed  the 
discussions  far  enough  to  be  aware  of  the  differences  of  the 


630  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

result,  and  the  great  complexity  of  the  data.  And  the  conse- 
quence is  that  here  too  he  is  satisfied  to  stop  the  inquiry  in 
despair  of  any  final  settlement.  The  problem,  he  says,  is  in  all 
probability  incapable  of  being  "solved.  And  yet  there  really  is 
no  ground  for  such  an  attitude.  To  the  one  who  has  made  a 
business  of  it,  to  the  expert  in  that  particular  field,  there  seems 
every  reason  to  believe  that  the  solution  is  not  very  far  away. 
The  differences  are  on  the  surface ;  but  underneath  there  is  a 
solid  basis  of  secure  result,  which  gives  every  promise  of  success. 
And  the  significant  thing  about  it  is  this,  that  Professor  Huxley 
was  himself  the  very  opposite  of  a  sceptic  in  other  directions,  in 
which  scepticism  seems  at  least  equally  justified.  Nothing  can 
be  finer  than  his  robust  faith  in  the  future  of  science,  and  in  the 
possibility  of  an  answer  to  the  most  intricate  questions,  which 
science  has  as  yet  scarcely  proposed  to  herself.  Professor 
Huxley  would  have  been  the  first  to  decry  a  despair  of  science 
as  weak  and  wholly  baseless.  And  yet  here,  surely,  we  have 
difficulties  quite  as  great  as  in  the  synoptic  problem,  at  least. 
The  difference  is  simply  a  difference  of  interest.  One  problem 
he  approaches  as  an  avocation,  the  other  as  a  business.  He  is 
ready  to  give  up  the  first  because  he  does  not  care  for  it  sufficiently 
to  carry  it  to  its  issue.  The  other  he  is  determined  to  solve, 
and  so  he  thinks  it  solvable. 

The  point  is,  then,  that  scepticism  means  a  personal  defeat  and 
loss  of  interest.  There  may  be  nothing  that  can  compel  the 
sceptic  to  believe  that  a  solution  is  possible.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  his  attitude  contains  absolutely  no  reason  why  the  problem 
should  be  given  up,  or  why  another  man  should  feel  the  least 
hesitation  about  grappling  with  it,  if  he  wants  to  do  so.  It  is 
wholly  a  matter  whether  or  not  the  jjesire  for  the  solution  exists. 
If  it  does  exist,  a  mere  appeal  to  past  failures  will  only  act  as  a 
spur  to  endeavor.  And  this  is  just  as  true  of  an  ultimate  philo- 
sophical inquiry,  as  it  is  of  any  minor  problem  of  knowledge. 
The  line  cannot  be  drawn  at  any  particular  point.  Now  the  fact 
is  that  the  philosophical  or  the  metaphysical  impulse  does  exist. 
It  shows,  indeed,  no  sign  of  diminution.  And  this  is  a  sufficient 
reason,  not  only  why  metaphysics  will  continue,  but  why  it  has 


No.  6.]  SCEPTICISM.  631 

a  right  to  continue.  The  sceptic  has  no  more  business  to  uni- 
versalize his  own  attitude,  than  a  child  would  have  to  demand 
that  everybody  should  stop  playing  because  he  himself  is  tired. 
And  yet  to  stop  here  would  be  doing  an  injustice  to  the  real 
significance  to  which  scepticism  undoubtedly  may  lay  claim. 
And,  first,  its  practical  significance.  Taken  merely  as  one  aspect 
of  the  thought  process,  scepticism  has  an  important  function  to 
perform.  It  stands  for  a  criticism  of  all  positive  results,  and  the 
demand  that  we  should  not  stop  with  too  easy  a  conviction  of 
truth.  The  thinker  has  always  need  to  be  on  the  alert  lest  he 
acquiesce  too  hastily  in  a  particular  solution,  and  allow  the  plastic 
spirit  of  thought  to  harden  into  some  narrow  mould.  Scepticism 
is  the  crystallization  of  the  attitude  of  a  distrust  of  finality.  It 
calls  for  continued  criticism,  for  constant  openness  of  mind  to  new 
evidence.  Looked  at  in  this  way,  scepticism  will  always  be  a 
necessary  moment  of  thought.  Ideally,  every  man  his  own 
sceptic  might  represent  the  highest  point  of  efficiency  in  thought. 
But  since  it  is  a  hard  matter  for  the  philosopher  to  play  the  scep- 
tic towards  his  own  attained  results,  it  perhaps  is  well,  in  addition 
to  the  criticism  that  comes  from  rival  theories,  to  have  the  atti- 
tude of  scepticism  somewhat  specialized,  and  put  in  the  hands  of 
a  few  whose  movements  are  as  little  as  possible  hampered  by  a 
committal  to  positive  results.  But  at  the  same  time,  the  need  is 
relative,  not  absolute.  Far  from  denying  the  validity  of  thought, 
it  rather  presupposes  it.  In  other  words,  the  very  possibility  of 
doubt  rests  upon  the  assumption  of  truth.  It  presupposes  not 
only  that  truth  is  attainable,  but  also  that  in  some  degree  it  has 
already  been  attained.  No  general  doubt  of  the  senses,  e.  g.y 
becomes  possible,  except  as  a  new  standard  of  truth  has  been 
erected,  by  reference  to  which  we  are  able  to  condemn  the  senses 
as  fallacious.  Any  real  doubt  is  based  upon  reasons  ;  and  reasons 

•  imply  that  already  we  take  ourselves  to  be  in  possession  of  some- 

'  thing  in  the  nature  of  truth. 

But  there  is  also  another  and  theoretical  aspect  of  scepticism, 
which  has  not  received  justice  in  what  has  hitherto  been  said.  For 
there  is,  after  all,  a  real  problem  which  scepticism  proposes.  "  I 
will  grant  to  you,"  the  sceptic  might  be  supposed  to  say,  "  all  that 


632  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

you  have  claimed.  I  will  allow  that  certain  general  assumptions 
about  the  existence  and  nature  of  truth  are  involved  in  the  attempt 
to  think  at  all.  I  will  allow  that  we  always  do,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  find  ourselves  believing  many  things.  But  that  does  not 
touch  the  main  point  at  issue.  What  I  am  chiefly  concerned 
about,  is  not  to  know  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  truth,  but  to 
discover  what  particular  concrete  beliefs  are  true,  and  what  are 
not  true.  And  just  this  is  what  I  claim  we  have  no  grounds  for 
determining.  At  a  given  time,  no  doubt,  I  believe  that  a  certain 
thing  is  true.  But  I  also  in  the  past  have  had  the  experience  of 
believing  things  just  as  strongly,  which  I  afterwards  came  to 
doubt.  What  confidence  can  I  have  that  history  will  not  repeat 
itself?  This  is  in  a  sense  an  abstract  possibility,  no  doubt.  But 
does  not  the  bare  possibility  throw  a  wavering  and  uncertain  light 
over  all  our  supposed  knowledge  ?  And  must  not  any  reason- 
able man  admit  the  possibility  that  in  any  particular  case  he  may 
be  mistaken?  He  does  not  believe. that  he  is  mistaken.  But 
would  not  the  denial  of  the  bare  possibility  that  he  may  be,  mark 
him  at  once  as  a  dogmatist  ?  For,  again,  how  is  he  to  single  out 
these  beliefs  of  his  which  by  no  possibility  can  change  ?  He 
surely  does  not  consider  that  all  his  present  beliefs  are  eternally 
and  unalterably  fixed.  If  past  experience  be  any  guide,  some  of 
them  are  sure  to  change  in  the  future.  How  is  he  to  be  certain 
that  any  particular  belief  is  not  among  the  altogether  indetermi- 
nate number  of  these  convictions  that  are  destined  to  alter?  Has 
he  any  guarantee  beyond  the  degree  of  assurance  which  he  feels, 
the  clearness  with  which  the  truth  comes  home  to  him  ?  But  is 
not  this  also  a  clear  truth  of  experience,  that,  as  a  criterion,  clear- 
ness and  warmth  of  conviction  may  be  misleading  ?  Such  an 
assurance  may  fail  us  again,  as  it  has  often  failed  us  in  the  past. 
"  And  still  less  does  it  give  us  any  rational  ground  for  coming 
to  a  decision  between  the  beliefs  of  different  men.  I  have  certain 
beliefs  which  seem  to  me  true ;  and  I  have  confidence,  therefore, 
that  when  these  beliefs  are  denied  by  some  other  man,  it  is  he 
who  is  mistaken,  and  not  myself.  But  what  right  have  I  to  this 
confidence  ?  Surely  I  am  not  ready  to  set  myself  up  as  the 
standard  of  truth,  and  maintain  that  whoever  differs  from  me  is 


No.  6.]  SCEPTICISM.  633 

thereby  proved  to  be  wrong.  Every  man  will  no  doubt  decide 
that  his  own  final  conviction  is  justified.  But  this  rationally  is 
not  satisfying.  Must  we  not,  in  short,  fall  back  upon  the  state- 
ment that  we  believe  a  thing  simply  because  we  feel  sure  that  it 
is  true ;  and  is  not  this  practically  admitting  the  sceptic's  conten- 
tion ?  There  is  no  criterion  which  will  enable  us  to  give  a  dem- 
onstration for  our  certainty  that  any  particular  concrete  judgment 
about  the  world  is  unalterably  true." 

There  is  much  in  this  position  with  which  I  find  myself  in 
agreement.  In  the  first  place,  I  cannot  but  think  there  is  a  sense 
in  which,  in  the  last  analysis,  we  have  to  depend  upon  our  own 
private  assurance,  or  feeling  of  conviction.  For  himself,  each 
man  is  necessarily  the  court  of  last  resort.  In  spite  of  his  dis- 
agreement with  other  men,  in  spite  of  his  own  past  changes  of 
opinion,  he  believes  a  certain  thing  ;  and,  while  he  may  be  able  to 
give  good  reasons  for  this  belief,  after  all  the  main  point  is,  in  the 
case  of  his  reasons  as  well  as  of  the  opinion  which  these  support, 
that  he  finds  himself  believing.  There  is  something  in  him  to 
which  the  belief  appeals.  He  finds  satisfaction  in  it.  His  whole 
nature  seems  to  flow  harmoniously  in  this  direction.  There  is 
no  sense  of  conflict.  In  a  word,  he  is  assured  of  its  truth. 

The  second  point  is  closely  related  to  the  first.  I  think  that  it 
needs  also  to  be  admitted  that  logical  certainty  belongs  only  to 
the  abstract  statement  of  the  conditions  of  belief,  and  not  to  any 
single  concrete  belief  about  the  actual  nature  of  things.  We  are 
justified,  if  we  think  at  all,  in  saying  that  true  thought  must  be 
consistent,  that  it  must  not  contradict  itself.  But  what  the  con- 
crete nature  is  of  the  real  existence  which  is  absolute  and  self- 
consistent,  we  are  not  justified  in  asserting,  except  with  the 
proviso,  in  each  particular  case,  that  we  may  possibly  be  mistaken 
in  our  judgment.  Of  course  I  do  not  mean  that  we  may  not 
believe  with  very  great  confidence  that  we  are  in  possession  of  a 
final  and  essentially  unchangeable  truth.  It  is  only  the  justifica- 
tion of  the  impossibility  of  the  contrary  that  is  lacking.  The 
only  thing  that  we  can  rest  upon  is  the  abstract  law  of  contradic- 
tion. If  we  are  going  to  think,  we  are  bound  to  think  in  a  way 
which  does  not  involve  both  the  assertion  and  the  denial  of  the 


634  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

same  thing  at  the  same  time.  No  man  can  consciously  and 
intentionally  do  this,  any  more  than  he  can  move  backward  and 
forward  at  the  same  time,  or  lift  his  hand  at  the  same  time  that 
he  leaves  it  at  rest.  Indeed,  the  law  of  contradiction,  put  in 
psycho -physical  terms,  would  seem  to  involve  precisely  this 
physical  impossibility ;  the  motor  aspects  of  assertion  and  of  nega- 
tion are  contrary,  and  mutually  inhibit  each  other.  But  any 
concrete  belief  whatsoever,  intended  to  refer  to  the  real  world, 
may  conceivably  be  outgrown.  Such  a  concrete  belief  is  in 
every  case  an  hypothesis  merely,  held  subject  to  correction  by 
further  knowledge.  If  our  belief  truly  represents  the  facts,  then 
the  contrary  cannot  possibly  be  true.  Valid  knowledge  must  be 
consistent.  But  are  we  ever  justified  in  saying,  absolutely  and 
beyond  the  possibility  of  question  :  In  this  particular  concrete 
judgment  about  reality,  I  have  reached  the  bed  rock  of  truth, 
and  it  is  inconceivable  that  either  now  or  in  the  future  new  light 
should  be  thrown  upon  it,  or  that  it  should  get  a  different 
interpretation  P1  Again,  this  does  not  deny  the  practical  fact  of 
assurance.  It  only  is  meant  to  point  out  that,  however  strong 
our  conviction,  it  never  warrants  us  in  shutting  out  the  possibility 
of  what  may  be  a  truer  interpretation,  an  interpretation  which 
may  conceivably  involve  a  modification  in  our  present  belief. 

But  now  if  we  grant  this,  does  the  sceptical  conclusion  follow, 
that  therefore  we  have  no  ground  for  preferring  one  belief  to 
another  ?  Does  it  make  the  mere  fact  that  we  feel  assurance  the 
sole  guarantee  or  criterion  of  truth,  and  so  take  away  all  possi- 
bility of  deciding  in  case  of  conflict  ?  It  seems  clear  that  this  is 
not  necessarily  a  consequence  at  all. 

Let  me  attempt  once  more  to  state  the  problem.  There  is  a 
sense  in  which  it  seems  to  be  true  that  the  final  guarantee  of  our 
belief  is  the  fact  that  we  believe.  The  thing  is  felt  to  be  true  and 
self-consistent,  and  that  is  the  end  of  the  matter.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  test  has  frequently  failed.  It  has  not  prevented  our 
convictions  from  changing ;  and  it  has  not  prevented  men  from 

1 1  emphasize  the  word  '  concrete.'  In  abstract  thought  we  may  indeed  be  sure 
that  nothing  will  come  in  to  change  our  conclusion,  because  we  have  arbitrarily  limited 
the  field  by  choosing  to  confine  our  meaning  to  certain  particular  data.  This  furnishes 
a  special  problem,  but  I  do  not  think  it  interferes  with  my  present  contention. 


No.  6.]  SCEPTICISM.  635 

holding  opposite  beliefs  about  the  same  thing.  Why,  then,  if  its 
claim  has  been  discredited  once,  should  we  trust  just  the  same 
claim  again  ?  Or  how,  if  two  such  claims  come  in  conflict,  should 
we  judge  between  them  ?  If  the  test  is  sufficient  in  one  case, 
it  is  sufficient  in  all,  and  all  beliefs  are  justified.  If  it  is  not 
sufficient  in  every  case,  it  is  sufficient  in  none. 

Now  practically,  in  spite  of  everything  that  may  be  said,  we 
do  consider  ourselves  to  be  in  possession  of  some  criterion  be- 
yond the  bare  feeling  of  clearness  or  certainty.  How  is  it  that 
this  actually  works?  And  I  may  take  the  case  where  two 
opposite  opinions  about  a  given  matter  are  held  by  different 
men.  Now,  in  such  a  case,  each  man  must  be  for  himself  the 
final  judge.  But  does  this  mean,  practically,  that  a  man  has  no 
guarantee  of  the  superiority  of  his  own  belief,  beyond  the  mere 
fact  that  it  is  his  ?  Each  man  will  say  for  himself:  My  conclu- 
sion seems  to  me  to  be  the  truer ;  for  otherwise  it  could  not  be 
mine.  But  it  is  quite  possible  that  he  should  see  a  logical  justi- 
fication also  for  this  partiality  towards  himself,  so  that  his  recog- 
nition of  the  other  man's  equal  confidence  would  have,  and  ought 
to  have,  no  tendency  to  disturb  his  own  opinion.  There  are  two 
ways  in  which  beliefs  actually  are  held,  both  of  them  quite  apart 
from  the  unthinking  appeal  to  mere  blind  personal  prejudice. 
Some  beliefs  we  hold  as  probable,  and  yet  when  we  come  up 
against  a  strong  difference  of  opinion,  it  shakes  our  confidence  a 
little.  We  find  ourselves  hesitating  and  wavering,  and  if  at  last 
we  come  to  a  decision  and  reassert  our  belief,  we  still  feel  that 
we  have  no  way  of  showing  decisively,  either  to  ourselves  or 
others,  that  our  opponent  may  not  possibly  be  right.  It  remains 
to  some  extent  just  a  conflict  of  authority,  and  we  decide  for  our 
own  side  simply  because  we  are  ourselves,  and  no  man  can  in  the 
last  resort  go  back  of  what  seems  true  to  him.  Most  of  our  be- 
liefs into  which  we  grow  without  any  careful  examination  of  their 
foundations,  are  likely  to  meet  with  such  an  experience  as  this. 
But  there  also  are  cases  where  none  of  this  hesitation  is  felt.  The 
fact  that  some  one  disagrees  with  us  does  not  in  the  least  affect 
our  confidence.  Indeed,  it  may  even  strengthen  our  conviction. 
We  feel  that  our  final  decision  is  dictated,  not  by  the  fact  that  it 


636  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

is  to  us  as  individuals  that  the  casting  vote  falls,  but  by  some- 
thing in  the  situation  which  gives  us  a  logical  precedence  which 
it  denies  to  our  adversary,  and  enables  us  to  play  the  part  of 
abstract  and  impartial  reason. 

The  practical  ground  for  this  distinction  it  is  of  course  not 
difficult  to  discover.  Generally  speaking,  we  have  a  logical 
right,  as  opposed  to  a  psychological  disposition,  to  prefer  our 
own  assurance  to  that  of  another,  only  when  we  are  able  to 
recognize  the  relative  truth  of  all  for  which  our  opponent  con- 
tends, see  it  from  his  point  of  view,  and  understand  fully  the 
reasons  which  appeal  to  him,  and  still  can  find  that  we  are  able 
to  hold  to  our  own  standpoint  as  more  adequate  and  inclusive,  — 
as  accounting  for  all  the  facts  that  he  recognizes,  and  others  be- 
side. No  one  is  in  a  position  definitely  and  finally  to  reject  an 
opposing  opinion,  until  he  can  put  himself  sympathetically  in  the 
place  of  the  one  who  holds  it,  and  understand  why  it  seems  to 
him  true.  Just  so  long  as  we  are  simply  in  the  polemical  atti- 
tude, and  find  the  view  that  we  are  opposing  wholly  irrational 
and  absurd  and  false,  so  long  as  there  is  anything  in  it  which 
strikes  us  as  entirely  without  ground  and  motive,  we  may  take 
this  as  equally  a  reflection  upon  ourselves,  and  suspect  that  the 
grounds  of  our  own  judgment  are  still  incomplete  and  in  need  of 
partial  reconstruction.  When,  however,  it  is  possible  for  us  to 
say :  I  also  should  hold  to  my  opponent's  opinion,  if  I  were  lim- 
ited to  his  data ;  but  these  new  facts,  or  new  aspects  of  the  old 
facts,  which  he  has  failed  to  recognize,  compel  a  different  answer, 
—  when  one  can  say  this,  one  feels  oneself  on  safe  ground.  The 
new  facts  need  not  be  part  of  the  immediate  subject  matter  of  the 
problem  in  hand.  They  may  be  obscure  presuppositions  that 
exist  in  the  background  of  our  opponent's  consciousness,  and 
create  prejudices  which  affect  his  attitude  toward  concrete  mat- 
ters of  opinion.  Then  we  give  what  we  call  in  a  special  sense  a 
psychological  explanation  of  his  belief,  and  show  how  it  springs 
naturally  from  these  limitations  of  his  mental  outlook,  which 
make  it  impossible  for  him  to  approach  the  evidence  in  a  way  to 
see  what  it  actually  contains.  But  in  either  case  the  general 
method  is  the  same.  We  feel  ourselves  logically  justified  in 


No.  6.]  SCEPTICISM.  637 

overriding  another's  opinion,  because  we  think  that  we  have  a 
point  of  view  which  includes  all  that  our  opponent  sees,  and 
enables  us  to  admit  its  relative  justification,  but  which  also  goes 
beyond  this,  and  presents  a  more  inclusive  system  of  facts. 

It  is  clear  that  the  criterion  which  this  suggests  goes  back  to 
the  conception  of  the  logical  nature  of  thought  as  a  unified  sys- 
tem of  related  facts.  Without  amplifying  this  conception  any 
further,  I  shall  try  merely  to  sum  up  the  bearing  which  it  has 
upon  the  claims  of  scepticism. 

In  the  first  place,  it  furnishes  a  working  criterion  of  belief. 
We  no  longer  have  to  hold  that  any  and  every  belief  has  an 
equal  justification,  or  lack  of  justification.  The  mere  feeling  of 
conviction,  when  interpreted  as  the  feeling  of  consistency,  can  be 
supplemented  by  the  logical  and  rational  test  which  consistency 
itself  implies.  The  idea  of  a  consistent  system,  even  though  it 
comes  home  to  us  ultimately  in  feeling,  carries  with  it  the  means 
of  comparison  between  beliefs,  on  the  basis  of  the  degree  in  which 
the  belief  is  inclusive  of  the  facts.  Of  course  this  would  not  work 
apart  from  the  presupposition  of  common  data  of  experience.  If 
beliefs  were  based  upon  wholly  different  sets  of  facts,  there  would 
be  no  way  of  judging  between  them.  Practically  this  often  is  the 
case.  There  are  men  who,  just  for  this  reason,  never  can  by 
any  possibility  come  to  a  rational  modus  vivendi,  who  live  in 
different  thought  worlds,  and  have  no  common  ground  of 
argument.  But  fortunately  this  is  not  the  universal  rule. 
There  is  a  general  fund  of  experience  on  which  we  all  are  ac- 
customed to  draw.  On  the  whole,  there  is  as  much  agreement 
as  there  is  disagreement,  at  least  in  the  general  data  on  the 
basis  of  which  our  interpretation  of  the  world  rests.  And  wher- 
ever this  is  true,  there  the  criterion  will  work,  at  any  rate  in  a 
rough  way. 

And  now,  in  the  second  place,  it  may  be  seen,  I  think,  how  it 
is  still  possible  to  say  that  our  confidence  rests  in  the  last  resort 
upon  itself,  upon  the  fact  that  we  do  actually  give  assent  to  the 
truth  of  things,  and  yet  do  not  find  it  necessary  to  allow  our  changes 
in  belief  to  affect  this  confidence  seriously.  In  two  ways  belief 
goes  back,  in  the  final  analysis,  not  to  anything  we  can  demon- 


638  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

strata,  but  to  an  assumption,  and  even  a  personal  assumption. 
The  content  of  our  belief,  the  data  out  of  which  the  system  of 
belief  is  formed,  are,  as  I  believe,  postulated  on  the  basis  of  cer- 
tain existing  demands  of  our  nature,  and  have  no  further  war- 
rant. And  so  also  the  consistency  into  which  we  try  by  think- 
ing to  bring  this  content,  is  evidenced  ultimately  by  the  sense  of 
intellectual  satisfaction,  whose  attainment  is  the  goal  which  we 
set  for  ourselves  when  we  aim  to  be  consistent,  and  in  terms  of 
which  we  have  practically  to  be  content  to  describe  this  goal. 
Now  it  is  true  that  we  never  can  have  logical  ground  for  the  cer- 
tainty that  any  particular  state  of  mind  characterized  by  this 
sense  of  consistency  will  be  final.  And  yet  this  does  not  pre- 
vent the  feeling  from  being  a  valid  test.  There  is  even  a  sense 
in  which  it  might  be  maintained  that  the  feeling,  in  so  far  as  it 
has  a  logical  value,  is  never  mistaken.  For  all  that  it  really 
claims  is  this :  If  the  facts  as  I  now  see  them  are  a  complete  and 
adequate  expression  of  the  real  facts,  then  my  understanding  of 
them  is  the  only  consistent  understanding,  and  is  the  truth.  If 
an  opinion  seems  consistent  to  any  man,  it  is  actually  consistent 
on  the  basis  merely  of  the  data  which  enter  consciously  into  the 
forming  of  that  opinion ;  and  it  justly  claims  the  \miversality  of 
any  judgment.  Any  man  whatsoever,  seeing  no  more  and  no 
different  facts,  would  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion.  Moreover, 
so  far  as  it  goes,  the  basis  on  which  the  judgment  is  formed 
represents  reality.  Nothing  whatever  that  is  ever  taken  for  a 
fact  is  wholly  unreal.  The  interpretation  may  be  wrong.  But 
some  modicum  of  reality  does  underlie  it,  which  a  complete 
knowledge  would  have  to  take  into  account.  Every  conviction 
of  truth,  then,  rests  upon  reality,  and  would  be  justified  were 
there  no  other  facts  which  it  leaves  out  of  account. 

The  reason,  accordingly,  why  we  cannot  set  down  any  partic- 
ular interpretation  of  things  as  fully  and  irrevocably  adequate, 
is  evidently  this  :  that  we  never  can  be  sure  that  we  have  ex- 
hausted the  relevant  data.  So  long  as  there  is  any  outlying 
fact,  or  aspect  of  a  fact,  which  we  have  not  recognized,  so  long 
there  is  the  possibility,  based  upon  our  experience  of  previous 
changes  of  conviction,  that  we  should,  were  we  in  possession  of 


No.  6.]  SCEPTICISM.  639 

it,  alter  our  present  point  of  view.1  The  sense  of  consistency  is 
the  only  rational  test.  For  practical  purposes  it  is  ultimate. 
Any  concrete  present  judgment  has  to  be  formed  on  the  basis  of 
the  data  which  we  possess.  On  such  a  basis,  we  feel  that  our 
sense  of  conviction  justifies  itself,  and  is  for  us,  for  the  moment, 
final.  If  we  judge  at  all,  we  must  do  it  with  the  material  at 
hand.  We  cannot  judge  on  the  basis  of  that  which  we  may  pos- 
sibly know  in  the  future,  but  which  by  hypothesis  is  to  us  at 
present  nothing  at  all.  So,  again,  the  criterion  enables  us  to 
compare  present  with  past  beliefs,  and  say  definitely  that  one  is 
at  least  truer  than  the  other.  And,  finally,  in  the  case  even  of 
the  judgments  —  any  possible  judgment —  we  imagine  ourselves 
passing  in  the  future,  we  may,  although  we  cannot  forecast  its 
concrete  form,  still  recognize  that  the  same  criterion  will  have  to 
attend  it,  if  it  is  rationally  justified.  But  what  the  possibilities 
are  in  the  way  of  new  facts  of  experience,  we  never  by  any  chance 
can  say  ;  and  therefore  it  is  that  any  belief  must  be  held  by  us 
as  conceivably  capable  of  being  modified  by  further  experience. 
It  will  always  remain  a  logical  impossibility,  therefore,  to 
demonstrate  the  necessity  of  any  particular  view  of  the  world. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  needs  once  more  to  be  pointed  out 
that  this  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  practical  assurance. 
The  root  of  assurance  lies  back  of  logical  necessity,  in  the  depths 
of  our  active  and  practical  nature.  No  amount  of  reasoning  can 
ever  leave  us  absolutely  without  belief,  simply  because  we  are 
more  than  reasoning  beings,  and  we  never  can  possibly  get  away 
from  ourselves.  And  in  the  realm  of  logic  itself,  we  must  dis- 
tinguish between  an  abstract  possibility  and  a  real  possibility. 
That  I  have  a  right  to  believe,  is  the  one  thing  scepticism  cannot 
touch.  It  must  presuppose  the  right  in  order  to  be  scepticism. 

1  In  making  this  statement  universal,  I  have  reference  to  beliefs  which  deal  with 
the  interpretation  of  facts,  and  their  place  in  reality.  I  do  not  mean  to  maintain 
that  we  may  not  know  with  certainty  present  facts  of  personal  experience.  I  should 
hold  that  we  cannot  be  mistaken  in  the  belief  that  some  fact  of  experience  exists. 
Nor  do  I  see  how  we  could  well  go  wrong  in  our  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  at  least 
some  of  the  simpler  phases  of  our  experience,  so  long  as  they  are  regarded  simply  as 
facts  of  our  own  immediate  experiencing  or  meaning.  Even  here,  however,  one 
needs  of  course  to  exercise  great  caution,  by  reason  of  the  well  known  dangers  that 
attend  introspection  and  memory. 


640  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

What  in  particular  I  am,  or  am  not,  justified  in  believing,  depends 
upon  concrete  conditions.  In  order  to  shake  my  confidence  in 
my  own  assurance,  it  is  not  enough,  practically,  to  make  me 
recognize  the  possibility  that  my  judgment  may  be  mistaken.  I 
must  have  some  solid  and  positive  reason,  in  terms  of  concrete 
experience,  for  believing  that  it  is  mistaken.  Now  evidently  all 
the  concrete  grounds  for  my  judgment  are  the  outcome  of  past 
experience.  New  experiences  may  alter  my  opinion  when  they 
come.  But  until  they  come,  or  until  I  have  some  definite  reason 
to  look  for  them,  they  may  rightly  be  disregarded.  If  my  pres- 
ent point  of  view  seems  to  me  sufficient,  if  apparently  it  harmo- 
nizes all  the  facts,  and  if,  as  time  goes  on,  it  continues  permanently 
to  approve  itself  to  me  as  essentially  adequate,  after  being  sub- 
jected to  the  testing  process  of  added  experience,  then  I  should 
be  foolish  if  I  were  not  practically  to  acquiesce  in  it,  and  take  it 
as  for  me  an  assured  result,  to  be  accepted  as  governing  my  life, 
without  the  abiding  sense  of  uncertainty,  or  a  continual  looking 
to  see  it  overthrown.  Indeed,  I  cannot  help  taking  this  attitude, 
so  long  as  the  system  of  belief  is  the  outcome  of  my  practical 
needs.  Apart  from  particular  grounds  for  disbelief,  there  is,  to 
be  sure,  this  general  ground  once  more,  that  many  beliefs  in  the 
past  have  changed.  This  is,  of  course,  so  far  as  it  goes,  a  positive 
reason,  and,  as  I  have  argued,  it  ought  to  teach  us  caution.  But 
to  make  it  an  absolutely  general  reason  for  hesitation,  is,  I  think, 
only  possible  if  we  exaggerate  enormously  the  facts  about  the 
actual  fluidity  of  belief.  If  a  man's  intellectual  experience  has 
been  entirely  discontinuous  and  chaotic,  there  is  indeed  for  him 
good  reason  to  distrust  his  newest  opinion.  But  this  is  the  case 
at  most  only  very  rarely.  If,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  our  intellectual 
growth  is  more  or  less  continuous,  if  the  relation  to  earlier  beliefs 
is  normally  one  of  absorption,  rather  than  of  destruction  and 
entire  reversal,  then  the  weight  of  the  consideration  will  not  be 
the  same  for  all  cases  of  belief,  but  will  differ  according  to  the 
-concrete  circumstances ;  and  sometimes  it  may  rightly  be  very 
small  indeed.  If  the  new  experience  ever  does  occur  which 
throws  doubt  upon  my  past  generalization,  then,  indeed,  I  should 
not  allow  any  attained  result  to  lead  me  to  refuse  it  welcome.  I 


No.  6.]  SCEPTICISM.  641 

should  be  ready  to  revise  my  belief  as  occasion  requires.  But 
until  this  comes  about,  I  am  justified  in  trusting  to  what  I  know. 
And  the  more  my  experience  attains  a  certain  weight  and  com- 
prehensiveness, the  more  confident  I  may  feel,  and  rightly  feel, 
that  no  new  fact  is  likely  to  overthrow  so  assured  an  edifice  of 
belief,  or  do  more  than  alter  it  in  its  minor  features. 

A.  K.  ROGERS. 
BUTLER  COLLEGE. 


ETHICAL  SUBJECTIVISM. 

OVER  against  the  doctrinaire  who  looks  thrice  at  the  datum 
that  bids  fair  to  contradict  his  presuppositions,  stands  the 
scientific  observer  who  will  let  theories  wait  while  he  gathers  his 
facts.  This  latter  is  the  true  eclectic.  He  welcomes  all  truth, 
and  he  is  committed  to  -none.  He  presses  no  single  theory  to  its 
outcome,  because  in  no  one  rather  than  another  does  he  find  the 
promise  of  a  complete  explanation  of  the  observed  phenomena. 
Against  any  school  or  tendency  of  thought  that  shows  signs  of 
narrowness  or  partiality,  his  hostility  is  unwavering.  He  must 
have  candor  in  the  presence  of  the  facts. 

To  men  of  this  temper,  no  doctrine  is  more  thoroughly  dis- 
tasteful than  the  ethical  subjectivism,  which  holds  that  conduct 
invariably  right  which  the  agent  believes  to  be  right.  The  posi- 
tion has,  it  is  true,  some  support  in  popular  philosophy.  "  A 
man  can  but  do  his  best,"  say  the  proverb-mongers.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  they  tell  us  that  "ignorance  is  no  excuse  "  ;  and  no 
character  is  more  generally  detested  than  the  self-righteous  bigot. 
Shall  we  adopt  as  our  moral  ideal  the  psalm-singing  dolt  who 
has  not  wit  enough  to  perceive  his  own  egotism  ?  Ethical  sub- 
jectivism —  we  hear  it  said  —  fails  doubly :  first,  to  satisfy  the  in- 
tellectual need  of  a  standard  of  moral  evaluation ;  and,  second, 
to  satisfy  the  practical  needs  of  social  conservatism.  For  what 
possibility  is  there  of  ethical  science,  when  the  man  in  his  indi- 
vidual finitude,  with  all  the  accidents  and  distortions  of  his 
peculiar  environment,  becomes  the  measure  of  things  ?  And 
what  escape  is  there  from  social  anarchy,  if  each  may  do  what  is 
right  in  his  own  eyes  ? 

But  the  theory  not  only  offends  the  common  good-sense  of  the 
eclectic ;  it  comes  into  conflict  also  with  the  principles  of  a  most 
ancient  and  worthy  body  of  ethical  thought.  Scarcely  a  thinker 
of  importance,  from  Plato  down,  if  he  does  not  hold  that  virtue 
is  knowledge,  would  go  so  far  as  to  deny  that  it  includes  knowl- 

642 


ETHICAL   SUBJECTIVISM.  643 

edge.  Moreover,  few  men  subject  either  to  Aristotelian  or  Pla- 
tonic influence  would  be  apt  to  frame  a  summum  bonum  empty  of 
wisdom  ;  and  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find  the  free  life  of  increas- 
ing intelligence  upheld  as  the  very  highest  end  of  rational  en- 
deavor, —  a  final  intrinsic  good,  to  which  all  other  goods  are  in 
the  last  resort  contributory.  This  '  intellectual  pragmatism  '  is 
not  only  shared  by  the  greatest  of  professed  thinkers  ;  it  is  the 
religious  belief  of  multitudes  of  men  of  culture,  who,  in  devot- 
ing their  lives  to  the  enlargement  of  human  knowledge,  conceive 
that  no  higher  ambition  could  have  been  chosen.  To  men  of 
this  class,  the  ideal  of  mere  willingness  to  do  the  right  can 
scarcely  seem  other  than  brutal  and  contemptible. 

And  yet,  when  we  attempt  to  indicate  the  exact  place  of 
knowledge  in  the  moral  ideal,  we  find  the  task  not  easy.  If  any 
knowledge  is  to  be  so  considered,  none  will  more  naturally  be 
fixed  upon  than  that  of  the  consequences  of  conduct.  Asking, 
then,  the  question,  how  far  the  moral  agent  is  responsible  for  the 
actual  (as  distinguished,  on  the  one  hand,  from  the  foreseen,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  from  the  probable)  consequences  of  his  acts, 
we  find  the  answer  in  general  wavering  and  uncertain,  but,  on 
the  whole,  inclining  to  an  extreme  negative,  —  that  the  agent  is 
not  in  the  least  responsible  for  such  consequences.  We  find, 
indeed,  some  very  forcible  expressions  of  opinion  to  this  effect. 
Clifford,  for  example,  devotes  some  admirable  rhetoric  to  this 
point ; 1  and  so  circumspect  a  thinker  as  Meinong  declares  for  this 
view  no  less  unreservedly.2  Suppose  we  accept  this  opinion  for 
the  moment,  and  proceed  to  ask  what  bearing  the  probable,  but 
not  actually  foreseen,  consequences  may  have  upon  the  morality 
of  the  act.  The  '  probability '  of  such  consequences  may  have 
two  meanings :  either  that  they  were  foreseen,  or  would  have 
been  foreseen,  by  the  wiser  individual  who  passes  judgment ;  or 
that  the  agent  himself  would  not  have  overlooked  them  had  he 
used  proper  deliberation.  Now  when  the  act  is  condemned,  let 
us  say  on  account  of  the  evil  nature  of  such  consequences,  it  is 

1  "  When  an  action  is  once  done,  it  is  right  or  wrong  forever  ;  no  accidental  failure 
of  its  good  or  evil  fruits  can  possibly  alter  that."     Lectures  and  Essays,  p.  340. 

2  Psychologisch-ethische  Untersuchung  zur  Werththeoric,  p.  197. 


644  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

clear  that  a  moral  judgment  of  some  such  import  as  the  following 
is  implied,  —  that  the  agent  ought  to  have  possessed,  and 
ought,  therefore,  previously  to  have  acquired,  the  greater  knowl- 
edge possessed  by  the  external  observer ;  or  that  he  ought  to 
have  used  greater  deliberation  before  the  act.  In  either  case, 
it  is  not  the  knowledge  as  such,  but  a  willingness  to  acquire 
and  employ  knowledge,  that  is  deemed  requisite  and  is  thus 
posited  in  the  moral  ideal.1  But  if  knowledge  of  the  conse- 
quences of  conduct  has  no  assured  place  in  the  ideal,  it  becomes 
at  least  doubtful  whether  any  knowledge  is  thus  distinguished. 

It  may  interest  us  in  this  connection,  to  recall  to  mind  a  certain 
very  profound  change  which  has  affected  the  moral  ideal  in  the 
course  of  the  history  of  civilization,  —  the  gradual  inwardizing  of 
the  ideal,  its  purging  of  all  that  is  external  to  the  volitional  dis- 
position of  the  agent.2  Thus  strength  and  personal  beauty  have 
been  stripped  away,  together  with  excellence  of  birth  and  repu- 
tation. Only  in  highly  organized  societies  is  intentional  injury 
legally  distinguished  from  unintentional,  both  being  in  earlier 
societies  equally  exposed  to  the  resentment  and  vengeance  of  the 
injured  party ;  and,  according  to  the  religious  belief  of  even 
highly  civilized  peoples,  divine  punishment  falls  as  rigorously 
upon  the  unwilling  as  upon  the  willing  offender.  Now  the  unex- 
pected outcome  of  an  act  is  as  thoroughly  external  to  the  dispo- 
sition which  the  act  evinces  as  physical  strength  is  to  integrity. 
And  so  one  might  be  tempted  to  describe  any  disagreement  with 
Clifford  and  Meinong  in  this  matter,  as  an  ethical  atavism,  —  a 
reversion  to  an  earlier,  though  very  recent,  type  of  conscience. 

What  has  just  been  said  will  fail  altogether  of  its  object,  if  it 
be  understood  as  an  argument  against  what  I  have  called  '  intel- 
lectual pragmatism.'  My  purpose  has  been  simply  to  show  that 
if  intellectual  pragmatism  is  to  be  maintained,  it  may  well  be  in  a 
form  not  inconsistent  with  ethical  subjectivism.  As  for  the 
eclectic's  notion  of  subjectivism,  that,  as  I  hope  to  make  clear,  is 

1  So  Clifford,  in  the  same  passage,  says  of  belief :   "  The  question  of  right  or  wrong 
has  to  do  with  the  origin  of  his  belief,  not  the  matter  of  it ;  not  what  it  was  but  how 
he  got  it ;  not  whether  it  turned  out  to  be  true  or  false,  but  whether  he  had  a  right  to 
believe  on  such  evidence  as  was  before  him."     Cf.  Meinong,  loc.  cit.,  p.  ill. 

2  Cf.  Ehrenfels,  System  der  Werttheorie,  Vol.  II,  pp.  64  ff. 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL   SUBJECTIVISM.  645 

at  least  unnecessarily  crude.  False  the  theory  may  be,  but  not 
so  flagrantly  and  obviously  false  as  he  supposes.  A  more  search- 
ing and  sympathetic  examination  than  he  feels  called  upon  to  give 
will  easily  convince  us  that  an  extreme  subjectivism  is  far  removed 
from  issuing  in  an  anarchy  of  sentiment  and  practice.  Moral 
anarchy  springs  from  an  exactly  opposite  source,  —  from  the 
fatalism  that  posits  the  ethical  quality  of  the  act  in  its  uncon- 
trolled event,  making  the  agent  wicked  or  beneficent  in  his  own 
despite. 

Without  for  the  present  expressing  either  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement with  the  subjectivist  view,  it  may  repay  us  to  remove 
some  frequent  and  not  unnatural  misunderstandings  of  its  mean- 
ing. It  does  not  mean  that  in  view  of  the  consequences  of  an 
act  committed  in  the  belief  of  its  entire  tightness,  the  agent  may 
not  conclude  that  on  a  similar  occasion  it  would  be  well  to  act 
differently.  It  does  not  mean  that,  though  all  took  place  as  he 
had  looked  for,  a  deeper  consciousness  of  the  manifold  interests 
involved  may  not  convince  him  of  the  folly  of  his  act.  It  does 
not  mean  that  he  may  not  keenly  and  lastingly  regret  that  folly. 
But  it  does  mean  that  the  act  was  nevertheless  a  good  act ;  and 
that  the  contrary  course,  though  justified  by  later  reflection  and 
by  the  fortunate  issue  of  events,  would  have  been  wrong, 
absolutely  and  eternally  wrong. 

Again,  it  does  not  mean  that  the  good  man  is  to  rest  self- 
satisfied,  content  with  his  ignorance,  trusting  to  the  innocence 
of  his  intentions,  without  troubling  himself  to  make  those  inten- 
tions as  enlightened  as  possible.  For  it  is  at  least  possible  that 
increase  of  knowledge  may  be  among  the  ends  for  which  he 
considers  it  right  to  strive.  Speaking  more  generally,  it  is  not 
to  be  supposed  that  according  to  an  ethical  subjectivism  the  ob- 
ject of  volition  is  morally  indifferent,  and  that  it  is  only  a  mys- 
terious abstract  quality  of  Tightness  or  wrongness,  attaching 
somehow  to  the  volition  apart  from  its  objective  content,  that  is 
of  moment.  On  the  contrary,  for  such  a  theory,  the  whole 
contemplated  act,  as  it  presents  itself  to  the  agent's  judgment, 
is  of  moment.  Because  unforeseen  consequences  and  unweighed 
considerations  are  eliminated  from  the  act,  it  does  not  therefore 


646  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

follow  that  the  precise  nature  of  the  foreseen  consequences  and 
effectual  considerations  is  in  the  least  to  be  ignored.  No  ele- 
ment that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  does  enter  into  the  determination 
of  moral  judgment  upon  the  contemplated  act,  can  be  without 
interest  for  such  a  theory.  The  view  with  which  this  must  not  be 
confused  is  that  quasi-Stoicism, —  never,  I  suppose,  entertained  by 
a  serious  thinker,  though  frequently  imputed  to  many, —  that  the 
good  will  is  simply  the  will  to  be  good,  to  which  any  particular 
content  is  merely  accidental,  wealth  and  poverty,  sickness  and 
health,  honor  and  disgrace,  having  no  interest  for  it.  The  good 
will  must  not  only  have  its  particular  object ;  it  is  the  desire  for 
that  object,  and  it  is  only  as  such  that  it  receives  its  moral 
predicate. 

That  these  statements  cannot  here  be  made  more  definite  is 
due  to  the  empty  formalism  in  which  we  have  left  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  subjectivism,  —  that  the  right  conduct  is  that 
which  the  agent  believes  to  be  right.  Rightness  is  left  in  the 
guise  of  a  mere  immediate  quality ;  as  if  it  should  be  said, 
"  That  is  sweet  which  tastes  sweet  to  me."  But  this  defect  is  by 
no  means  irremovable  or  inherent  in  the  general  theory.  It  is 
open  to  its  advocate,  as  to  another  man,  to  analyze  the  meaning 
of  lightness,  to  investigate  the  evolution  and  present  functioning 
of  the  moral  judgment,  and  to  take  into  account  the  manifold 
social  relations  which  constitute  the  environment  of  the  moral 
being  as  such.  An  ethical  subjectivism,  if  it  were  held  to-day, 
would  differ  from  all  similar  theories  of  the  past,  in  proportion 
as  it  was  permeated  with  the  theories  and  results  of  modern  psy- 
chology and  sociology. 

One  necessary  characteristic  of  every  ethical  subjectivism  is  to 
be  found  in  the  prime  importance  which  it  sets  upon  the  prospec- 
tive judgment,  the  judgment  of  the  contemplated  act.  If  that 
was  right  which  I  believed  right,  my  present  judgment  becomes 
a  mere  echo  and  abridgement  of  the  former  judgment.  Simi- 
larly, criticism  of  the  conduct  of  others  takes  upon  itself  a 
halting  uncertainty  due  to  the  impossibility  of  arriving  at  their 
secret  self-judgment ;  it  must  operate  by  means  of  general  anal- 
ogies that  may  not  seldom  be  misleading.  Now  so  much  I  be- 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL   SUBJECTIVISM.  647 

lieve  to  be  true  :  that  the  judgment  upon  the  contemplated  act  is, 
indeed,  the  archetypal  moral  function,  fountain  and  origin  of  the 
moral  life;  that  to  judge  after  this  fashion  is  first  and  foremost 
what  it  is  to  be  a  moral  being ;  that  all  other  moral  judgments 
are  relatively  incomplete ;  and  that,  in  particular,  the  approval 
or  condemnation  of  the  conduct  of  others  is  virtually  a  projec- 
tion of  the  judgment  upon  oneself,  and  must  have  been  impos- 
sible prior  to  the  emergence  of  that  judgment.  This  is  not  to 
say  that  the  judgment  upon  the  contemplated  act  is  the  earliest 
member  of  the  whole  group,  and  that  from  it  all  the  others  have 
lineally  descended.  Mental  evolution  can  hardly  have  proceeded 
on  such  lines.  It  is  more  probable  that  the  whole  group  had  a 
common  development,  facilitated  by  constant  interaction  ;  and 
that  the  critical  point  of  this  development  was  the  attainment  of 
the  distinctively  moral  phase  by  the  leading  member  of  the 
group,  this  phase  being  immediately  communicated  to  the  others 
through  the  constant  relationship  subsisting  between  them.  It 
is  impossible  that  the  prospective  judgment  should  be  a  distinc- 
tively moral  evaluation,  and  the  retrospective  judgment  fail  to 
catch  its  tone  ;  or  that  a  moral  agent  should  not  apply  to  the 
conduct  of  others  the  same  type  of  judgment  which  he  applied 
to  his  own.  On  the  other  hand,  there  can  have  been  no  veri- 
table morality  without  self-judgment,  and,  indeed,  the  prospec- 
tive self-judgment ;  for  the  judgment  upon  another  that  does  not 
apply  (hypothetically)  to  the  self  is  a  mere  expression  of  gratifi- 
cation or  anger ;  and  the  judgment  of  the  past  act  that  does  not 
apply  (hypothetically)  to  the  future  is  so  much  colorless  exulta- 
tion or  regret.  These  are  plain  facts  which  are  at  times  lost  sight 
of  in  recent  studies  of  moral  evolution.  I  feel,  therefore,  that  it 
is  on  the  whole  an  advantage  rather  than  a  defect  in  the  subjec- 
tive theory,  that  it  lays  such  extraordinary  stress  upon  the  judg- 
ment of  the  contemplated  act. 

Non-committal  as  our  language  has  been,  the  reader  cannot 
have  failed  to  suspect  that  it  cloaks  a  strong  sympathy,  if  not  an 
entire  agreement,  with  the  theory  under  discussion.  Let  this 
stand  confessed.  What  I  would  maintain  is  that  ethical  subjec- 
tivism, if  not  right,  is  nevertheless  right  as  against  its  enemies  ; 


648  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIIL 

that  its  failings,  pronounced  as  we  shall  find  them,  are  not  the 
transparent  errors  with  which  it  is  commonly  charged ;  and, 
more  than  this,  that  such  correction  as  it  needs  it  can  obtain 
from  within,  by  the  development  of  its  own  plain  implications. 
A  subjectivism  thus  criticized  and  developed  v/ill  be  found  to 
contain  all  the  theoretical  and  practical  objectivity  that  the  eclec- 
tic believes  must  be  imported  into  it ;  all  the  emphasis  upon  the 
wisdom-element  in  virtue  that  the  intellectualist  can  desire  ;  and, 
I  hope,  all  the  sanctity  of  moral  values  that  the  spirit  of  piety 
requires.  Whether,  when  all  is  said  and  done,  the  developed 
theory  deserves  to  retain  the  name  of  its  simpler  form  is  a  ques- 
tion not  worth  discussion  here. 

The  fundamental  weakness  of  the  cruder  subjectivism  lies  in 
the  fact  that  it  treats  conduct  atomistically,  —  breaks  up  the 
course  of  a  man's  life  into  a  series  of  absolutely  independent 
volitions,  of  each  of  which  in  its  isolation  the  dictum  runs,  that 
if  meant  well  it  is  well.  Now  this  is  neither  true  to  fact  nor 
true  to  the  inner  spirit  of  subjectivism  itself;  for  if  such  a  theory 
means  anything,  it  means  that  the  act  is  judged  as  the  expression 
of  a  subject,  a  character ;  and  the  character  thus  expressed,  the 
intellectual  and  emotional  constitution  of  the  agent,  is  itself  the 
issue  of  previous  conduct.  We  might  perhaps  add  that  ethical 
subjectivism  is  atomistic  in  its  view  of  society,  that  each  man 
appears  to  move  in  the  light  of  an  eternally  separate  and  self- 
sufficient  conscience.  The  opinion  has,  however,  already  been 
expressed,  that  this  defect,  where  it  exists,  is  quite  superficial ; 
and  that  subjective  ethics  may  without  violence  be  combined 
with  modern  theories  of  the  social  genesis  and  inheritance  of 
ethical  norms. 

The  moral  judgment  has  for  its  objects  volitions,  actual  or 
ideal.  Although  thus  restricted  in  its  field,  it  does  not  at  the 
same  time  exclusively  possess  this,  even  as  against  other  judg- 
ments of  worth.  The  same  conduct  which  is  good  or  bad  may 
likewise  be  beautiful,  sublime,  tragical,  or  ridiculous, —  attributes 
proper  to  various  phases  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  There  is,  in 
fact,  no  good  or  evil  which  may  not  to  a  properly  receptive 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL  SUBJECTIVISM.  649 

observer  appear  as  beautiful  or  ugly.  The  moral  and  aesthetic 
judgments  are,  indeed,  closely  akin  ;  the  similarity  of  their  mode 
of  functioning,  —  which  has  even  led  some  thinkers  to  regard  the 
one  as  a  species  of  the  other,  or,  at  times,  to  posit  an  aesthetic 
element  in  moral  feeling,  —  points  to  a  recent  genetic  connection. 
In  defining  the  distinction  between  the  two,  it  is  not  sufficient  to 
say,  as  we  may,  that  the  moral  judgment  views  the  volition 
as  an  expression  of  character ;  for  character  also  is  not  beyond 
the  range  of  aesthetic  objects.  An  act  of  treason,  for  example, 
may  be  superbly  tragic  in  its  revelation  of  egoistic  depravity. 

The  distinctive  mark  of  that  species  of  worth  which  we  call 
moral  is  that  it  is  measured  by  the  satisfaction  of  a  self-conscious 
person  as  a  harmonious  totality.  Such  a  person  is  aware  within 
himself  of  many  appetites  and  desires  pressing  for  satisfaction  ; 
and,  recognizing  himself  to  be  other  and  more  than  any  particu- 
lar want,  he  conceives  his  peculiar  satisfaction  or  happiness  as 
realized,  not  in  the  satisfaction  of  any  one  of  them  or  arbitrary 
sum  of  them  as  such,  but  in  a  certain  coordination  which  allows 
to  each  a  measured  place.  The  notion  of  a  character,  or  voli- 
tional disposition,  in  which  such  a  coordination  is  effected,  is  the 
moral  ideal. 

The  term  '  harmonious '  raises  more  questions  than  it  puts  to 
rest.  A  harmony  of  whatever  sort  must  have  its  one  or  several 
underlying  principles  or  laws,  which  fix  within  certain  limits  the 
proportions  of  its  parts.  Thus  the  harmony  of  aesthetic  sym- 
metry may  depend  upon  the  natural  and  immediate  pleasantness 
of  curves  or  rhythms,  or  of  combinations  of  colors  or  sounds 
presented  in  fitting  masses  and  intensities.  The  beautiful  object 
is  no  mere  many  in  one ;  it  is  a  many  that  has  a  reason  for  com- 
bining in  one  in  just  such  fashion  as  it  exemplifies.  So  the  moral 
ideal,  as  a  peculiar  harmony,  must  have  its  peculiar  rational 
ground,  which  it  is  incumbent  upon  ethical  science  to  discover. 
Among  the  many  methods  which  have  been  applied  to  this  end, 
the  genetic  study  of  the  life  of  ethical  norms  in  societies  and  in 
individuals  furnishes  one  of  the  most  promising.  However,  let 
us  leave  the  question  aside  for  the  present,  remembering  still  that 
without  such  supplementation  the  definition  of  morality  is  con- 
fessedly abstract  and  inadequate. 


650  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

It  has  been  a  familiar  subject  of  inquiry,  whether  to  moral 
worth  corresponds  a  specific  appetite  or  desire,  —  as  hunger  is 
distinct  from  fatigue,  and  both  from  the  craving  for  society.  Of 
late,  it  has  been  customary  to  answer  in  the  negative,  on  the 
ground  that  the  satisfaction  of  this  appetite  would  be  but  another 
element  in  the  synthesis  of  character,  to  be  restricted  like  the  rest. 
The  answer  is  essentially  correct,  but  the  problem  is  obscured 
by  the  crude  psychology  in  which  it  had  its  origin.  Any  con- 
ceivable experience  may  be  connected  in  consciousness  with  a 
pleasant  or  unpleasant  affective  reaction,  and  thus  be  correlated 
with  a  specific  desire.  I  may  have  a  desire  to  do  right,  just  as  I 
may  desire  to  desire  food ;  and  these  desires,  like  any  others, 
have  their  appropriate  limits  in  a  well  ordered  life.  But  the 
limits  of  the  desire  to  do  right  or  be  good  are  practically  infinite, 
because  the  satisfaction  of  this  desire  cannot  interfere  with  the 
proper  satisfaction  of  any  other  desire ;  except,  perhaps,  that  an 
absorbed  regard  to  so  general  an  end  might  interfere  with  a  man's 
attention>to  each  particular  occasion  for  action.  In  so  far,  then, 
the  above  answer  is  erroneous  ;  for  there  may  well  enough  be  a 
desire  to  do  right ;  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  such  a  desire  operates 
strongly  in  the  life  of  normal  men.  Whether  this  desire  is  ever 
stimulated  or  reinforced  by  a  peculiar  organic  complex  compara- 
ble to  hunger  or  fatigue,  need  not  concern  us  here.  But  we 
note  that  the  answer  which  we  have  criticised  is  correct  in  this, 
—  that  to  any  particular  act  of  right  conduct  the  general  desire 
to  do  right  is  not  essential.  No  other  desire  is  necessary  than 
the  desire  for  the  object  in  question.  Moral  worth  attaches,  in- 
deed, not  to  the  desired  object  as  such,  but  to  the  desire  itself 
as  a  manifestation  of  character.  We  are  pleased  or  displeased  at 
being  pleased  or  displeased  to  act  thus  and  thus,  —  a  species  of 
affective  self-consciousness. 

A  thorough-going  subjectivism  would  now  declare  that  every 
act  to  which  a  moral  judgment  can  apply  must  be  preceded  (or 
accompanied)  by  a  moral  sentiment  with  its  implicated  judgment 
of  right  and  wrong ;  for,  according  to  such  a  theory,  any  later 
judgment  of  the  act  is  simply  an  approximate  reproduction  of 
that  which  gave  the  act  its  moral  quality.  As  we  have  already 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL  SLBJECTIV1SM.  651 

observed,  it  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  dissent  from  this  view,  on 
the  ground  that  it  asserts  an  unreal  atomism  of  moral  acts,  —  as 
if  each  in  itself  were  a  complete  moral  life.  We  must  there- 
fore restrict  the  proposition  to  acts  in  themselves  moral,  and  to 
these  in  so  far  as  they  are  in  themselves  moral ;  recognizing  that 
an  act,  whether  with  or  without  a  lightness  or  wrongness  of  its 
own  (when  viewed  in  isolation),  may  be  given  a  new  moral  sig- 
nificance when  regarded  as  the  continued  expression  of  previous 
sentiments  and  choices.  With  this  reservation  in  mind,  we  may 
then  hold  that  every  moral  act  is  accompanied  by  a  specific 
sentiment  which  determines  its  quality  as  right  or  wrong. 

Perhaps  this  position  may  be  made  more  clear  by  contrast 
with  a  certain  celebrated  theory,  to  which  it  bears  an  external 
resemblance.  It  has  been  held  that  the  desire  to  do  right  (which 
we  have  admitted  to  be  a  possible  desire)  must  accompany  every 
right  action  ;  so  that  in  such  action  the  particular  end  in  view  is 
desired  only  for  the  general  end  of  doing  right.  The  experi- 
ence of  men  has  not  confirmed  this  theory,  and  it  has  not  now 
a  wide  acceptance.  The  misconception  upon  which  it  rests  is 
apparent  when  we  consider  the  parallel  proposition  for  negative 
worth.  That  every  morally  wrong  action  is  accompanied  by  a 
desire  to  do  wrong  (which,  by  the  way,  is  a  perfectly  possible 
desire)  ;  that  wrong  conduct  is  essentially  constituted  as  such  by 
the  desire  to  do  wrong,  so  that  the  immediate  end  is  desired  only 
for  the  sake  of  the  ultimate  end  of  wrong-doing, —  these  are  prop- 
ositions which  no  one  would  for  a  moment  consider  ;  yet  they 
are  scarcely  more  unreasonable  or  untrue  to  fact  than  the  above. 
Our  own  belief  is  far  simpler,  —  that  in  moral  conduct  the  agent 
is  conscious  of  his  volition  as  right  or  wrong. 

If  even  this  proposition  seems  too  extreme,  that  may  be  due 
to  the  narrowness  of  our  terminology,  according  to  which  a 
whole  host  of  apparent  exceptions  (hereafter  to  be  briefly  con- 
sidefed)  must  be  recognized  as  only  apparent.  Or  the  disagree- 
ment may  be  in  a  measure  due  to  a  current  misapprehension  of 
the  problem,  whether  any  conduct  (conscious  human  action)  is 
ethically  indifferent.  The  question,  be  it  observed,  is  not  whether 
between  right  and  wrong  there  is  a  neutral  region,  a  null-point ; 


652  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

but  whether  there  is  conduct  to  which  the  distinction  of  right 
and  wrong  is  not  pertinent.  Even  as  thus  formulated,  the  ques- 
tion is  still  ambiguous.  It  may  be  taken  to  mean,  whether  the 
doing  or  omitting  of  any  act  is  morally  indifferent ;  and  in  this 
sense  the  question  is  now  answered  in  the  negative  by  most  care- 
ful thinkers,  —  exception  being  sometimes  made  of  alternative 
means  to  a  desired  end.  But  this  is  distinctly  different  from  the 
question,  whether  any  actual  conduct  is  non-moral.  For  the 
fact  that  the  omission  of  the  act  may  have  been  comparatively 
desirable  or  undesirable  is  not  to  the  point,  when  there  was  simply 
no  question  of  its  omission.  Confusion  seems  to  have  arisen  from 
the  circumstance,  that  the  investigator,  in  the  very  process  of 
inquiry,  is  apt  ideally  to  transform  his  material.  In  asking 
whether  such  or  such  an  act  was  moral,  he  imagines  himself  as 
about  to  commit  the  act  and  passes  a  deliberate  judgment  about 
its  desirability ;  he  finds  that  its  commission  or  omission  is  not 
indifferent ;  and,  accordingly,  he  gives  his  answer  in  the  affirma- 
tive. After  a  careful  review  of  the  evidence,  we  are  brought  to 
the  old-fashioned  conclusion,  supported  by  the  general  testimony 
of  common  experience,  that  by  far  the  greater  part  of  our  more 
•simply  impulsive  action  is  not  properly  moral,  —  except,  indeed, 
,as  it  may  be  included  in  larger  moral  purposes.  We  do  not 
?imply  that  moral  action  is  necessarily  deliberative,  in  the  sense 
-that  the  agent  previously  considers  the  probable  consequences  of 
the  several  alternatives,  or  the  general  principles  involved,  and 
acts  upon  the  basis  of  such  deliberation.  But  it  must  be  insisted 
that  every  moral  act  is  a  choice,  —  without  some  conscious  inhi- 
bition the  conditions  of  moral  activity  could  not  arise,  —  and 
that  the  agent  is  aware  of  the  choice  as  right  or  wrong. 

So  far  we  are  in  accord  with  the  cruder  subjectivism.  But  we 
must  now  make  explicit  the  reservation  of  which  warning  was 
given  above.  It  is  important  to  note  that  an  act  committed 
-without  consciousness  of  any  moral  quality  attaching  to  it,  may 
nevertheless  upon  reflection  be  recognized  as  an  indirect  expres- 
sion of  character,  and  may  accordingly  be  judged  as  such.  I 
refer  not  simply  to  the  acts  of  men  carried  away  by  extreme 
passion  or  intoxication,  but  to  the  whole  host  of  habitual  or 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL   SUBJECTIVISM.  653 

impulsive  acts  which  may  be  as  certain  an  index  of  the  good  or 
bad  will  as  the  most  highly  self-conscious  acts.  Conduct  ex- 
pressly moral  is  a  potent  factor  in  the  formation  of  habit ;  and 
habits  formed  through  its  agency  may  bear  the  evident  marks  of 
its  origin.  The  impulses,  simple  as  they  may  be,  are  yet  the 
impulses  of  a  moral  being ;  and  he  cannot  wholly  disclaim  re- 
sponsibility for  them.  Thus  occasion  is  found  for  a  species  of 
indirect  moral  judgments.  The  present  act  is  judged  as  the 
consequence  of  a  (known  or  probable)  series  of  acts,  it  being 
this  former  conduct  that  is  the  ultimate  object  of  the  judgment. 

In  like  manner,  an  explicitly  moral  act,  accompanied  by  a  clear 
conviction  of  its  entire  goodness,  may,  nevertheless,  become  the 
object  of  adverse  moral  judgment  when  its  relation  to  previous 
conduct  is  considered.  The  choice  may  be  shown  to  have  been 
misdirected  by  reason  of  previous  immorality,  and  thus  to  be 
virtually  an  additional  expression  of  the  weakness  of  character 
formerly  displayed.  Here,  then,  without  departure  from  the  real 
spirit  of  ethical  subjectivism,  we  have  arrived  at  what  is  appa- 
rently a  complete  reversal  of  its  most  formidable  dogma,  that 
that  is  right  which  I  believe  to  be  right.  For  my  very  belief  is 
the  fruit  of  past  endeavor  and  cannot  legitimately  be  separated 
in  reflection  from  the  circumstances  of  its  origin.  And  yet  the 
solid  core  of  the  dogma  is  retained,  — that  the  good  of  my  present 
conception  is  so  far  good,  and  is,  indeed,  the  only  good  which  is 
now  open  to  me.  To  act  against  the  best  judgment  of  the  mo- 
ment, however  careless  or  otherwise  inadequate  may  have  been 
its  premises,  and  however  happy  the  event  may  prove,  is  simply 
to  commit  an  additional  wrong.  And  since,  after  all,  human 
life  is  one  that  must  be  lived  forward,  the  good  of  ethical  sub- 
jectivism, poor  as  it  may  seem  in  retrospect,  is  the  highest  ideal 
toward  which  a  man  can  ever  strive. 

The  distinction  is  currently  made,  that  whereas  independently 
of  its  actual  consequences  a  volition  may  be  judged  as  formally 
right  or  wrong,  its  material  Tightness  or  wrongness  must  be  de- 
termined by  reference  to  the  actual  outcome  of  the  act.  For  a 
well-meant  act  may  turn  out  ill,  and  the  worst  intentions  may 
have  a  fortunate  issue.  Now,  if  our  analysis  be  correct,  the  for- 


654  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

mal  quality  of  the  volition  is  its  proper  moral  quality,  as  an  ex- 
pression of  the  character  of  its  agent ;  and  that  which  with 
greater  honor  is  termed  the  material  rightness  is  simply  the  de- 
sirability of  the  object  as  such,  or  of  the  volition  as  its  cause, 
not  an  ethical  determination  at  all. 

This  view  of  the  matter,  shared  by  every  possible  ethical  sub- 
jectivism, is  the  point  to  which  the  broad-minded  eclectic  takes 
particular  exception.  Why  such  violence  to  the  facts  ?  he  asks. 
Why  thus  disrupt  the  act  as  it  occurs,  making  so  much  ethical 
and  so  much  non-ethical  ?  Why  not  include  the  whole  act  in 
the  judgment, —  motive,  intention,  real  and  expected  conse- 
quences, and  all  ?  We  reply  that  we  do  include  the  whole  act 
through  the  entire  history  of  its  inception  and  through  the  whole 
course  of  its  influence  upon  later  conduct.  But  distinctions 
must  be  drawn.  In  the  first  place  (to  begin  at  the  beginning), 
the  so-called  '  real '  consequences  of  the  act  do  not  flow  from  it 
alone,  but  from  the  whole  present  constitution  of  the  universe, 
and  in  their  extent  include  all  future  history.  If,  in  our  desire 
for  objectivity,  we  will  indeed  have  nothing  less  than  the  whole 
act,  we  forbid  judgment  altogether.  But  this  is  clearly  not  the 
objector's  meaning.  There  is,  or  may  be,  a  more  or  less  clearly 
defined  series  of  events  which  stand  in  obvious  relation  to  the  act 
as  their  cause,  in  such  a  manner  that,  other  things  being  equal,  its 
omission  would  have  meant  (and  would  in  general  mean)  their 
non-occurrence.  These  are  the  consequences  of  the  act  which 
he  would  have  us  include  in  our  judgment  upon  the  act  itself. 
But  his  meaning  is  not  yet  clear.  He  may  mean  simply  that 
these  recognized  consequences  are,  or  are  not,  desirable  in  them- 
selves ;  but  that  is  not  a  moral  judgment.  He  is  more  apt  to 
mean  that  the  consequences  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  make  the 
repetition  of  the  act  under  like  circumstances  advisable  or  inadvis- 
able ;  but  this  also  is  not  a  moral  judgment,  though  it  may  easily 
enter  into  or  be  combined  with  a  moral  judgment.  A  deliberate 
change  of  practice,  consequent  upon  observation  of  previous 
results,  may  easily  take  place  without  the  slightest  adverse  reflec- 
tion upon  the  moral  quality  of  the  former  mode  of  conduct.  But 
the  objector's  meaning  is  still  more  likely  to  be,  that  the  conse- 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL  SUBJECTIVISM.  655 

quences  to  be  included  in  the  act  are  such  as  the  agent  might 
reasonably  have  been  expected  to  foresee  ;  and  in  this  the  sub- 
jectivist  is  perfectly  free  to  acquiesce,  on  grounds  which  we  have 
already  in  part  related.  In  a  word,  the  object  of  moral  judgment 
is  a  psychical  event ;  and  no  ends  of  liberal,  candid  thought  are 
to  be  gained  by  obscuring  this  fundamental  truth. 

There  is,  however,  an  ulterior  motive  to  this  charge  of  one- 
sidedness  in  subjective  ethics,  —  a  hatred  of  mawkish  sentimen- 
talism  and  the  felt  need  of  a  social  uniformity  which  shall  be 
strong  enough  to  put  a  stop  to  unsafe  individual  vagaries.  No 
refutation  of  the  charge  can,  therefore,  be  adequate  which  fails 
to  show  that  the  social  binding  force  of  the  moral  ideal  is  not 
weakened  by  this  theory.  We  have  defined  the  moral  ideal 
(substantially)  as  the  notion  of  a  man's  complete  self-satisfaction 
in  his  conduct,  —  terms  which  are  in  themselves  not  free  from 
opprobrium.  How,  from  such  a  standard,  can  anything  more 
than  a  system  (or  chaos)  of  individual  caprices  be  derived  ?  The 
problem  is  a  real  one  and  must  be  squarely  faced. 

A  partial,  but  ultimately  unsatisfactory,  answer  is  derived  from 
the  general  theory  of  values.  Though  the  immediate  criterion  is 
individual  sentiment,  yet  we  must  observe  that  in  this  respect,  as 
in  others,  men  are  not  altogether  peculiar.  In  fact,  within  cer- 
tain social  groups  men's  conceptions  of  right  and  wrong  are 
remarkably  uniform,  a  circumstance  to  be  partly  attributed  to 
the  survival  value  of  such  uniformity  in  the  various  grades  of  the 
social  struggle  for  existence.  The  value  of  a  bushel  of  wheat 
depends,  in  the  last  resort,  on  the  varying  appreciation  of  many 
individuals  ;  but,  despite  striking  exceptions,  there  is  an  approach 
to  similarity  in  their  needs  and  tastes  for  such  a  staple,  and  the 
demand  for  it  is  sufficiently  dependable  to  give  it  a  market  price. 
The  appreciation  of  veracity  varies  also  from  man  to  man  and 
from  age  to  age,  but,  for  the  most  part,  within  narrow  limits  ; 
and  its  worth  in  comparison  with  the  various  other  ends  with 
which  it  comes  in  conflict, —  such  as  reputation,  personal  safety, 
mercenary  gain, —  is  satisfactorily  constant.  But  there  are  excep- 
tions, and  what  of  them  ?  What  of  the  habitual  liar,  to  whom 
the  telling  of  an  untruth  is  an  innocent  pleasantry  ?  What  of  the 


656  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

confirmed  libertine,  to  whom  the  pursuit  of  his  prey  seems  the 
natural  occupation  of  a  gentleman  ?  What  of  the  insensate  bigot, 
to  whom  persecution  of  the  unbeliever  is  a  holy  task  and  a 
delight  ?  Shall  we  say  of  these  men  that  because  their  conduct 
meets  with  no  condemnation  in  their  own  eyes,  we  also  must 
hold  them  innocent  ?  Because  they  believe  that  what  they  do  is 
right  and  proper,  have  we  therefore  no  motive  to  correct  their 
conduct  ?  If  the  formally  good  is  the  morally  good,  why  not 
let  ignorance  enjoy  its  bliss  and  depravity  rest  comfortably  in  its 
congenial  sty  ? 

A  further,  but  still  partial,  answer  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
men  live  in  such  social  union  that  the  conduct  of  each  individual 
is  in  various  degrees  subject  to  check  and  correction  by  his  fel- 
lows, and  the  acquiescence  of  one  man  in  the  conduct  of  another 
is  part  and  parcel  of  his  own  conduct.  The  act  which  is  formally 
but  not  materially  right  is  not  only  an  occasion  for  present  and 
later  reflection  by  the  agent,  but  concerns  his  associates  also  ; 
and,  however  they  may  concede  its  formal  Tightness,  their  con- 
cern is  none  the  less  to  prevent  its  repetition.  I  am  so  far  my 
brother's  keeper,  his  conduct  is  so  far  my  conduct,  that  it  is  for- 
mally right  for  me  to  endeavor  —  by  such  means  as  expediency 
may  dictate  —  to  keep  him  from  doing  material  wrong.  Public 
opinion  thus  constitutes  an  external  standard  of  Tightness,  to 
which,  in  general,  a  man  is  somewhat  narrowly  bound.  If  his 
ethical  sentiments  are  extraordinary,  he  may  expect  to  have  his 
personal  liberty  forcibly  curtailed.  Furthermore,  where  the  pos- 
sibility of  instruction  exists,  no  unimportant  part  of  the  conduct 
of  a  man  is  made  up  of  the  lessoning  in  morals  which  he  gives 
to  those  who  are  under  his  influence  ;  and  in  the  performance  or 
negligence  of  the  duties  thus  involved,  he  is  subject  to  his  own 
moral  judgment.  We  may  say,  therefore,  that  the  content  of 
another  man's  moral  ideal  is  not  indifferent  to  me,  because,  and 
in  so  far  as,  it  lies  within  the  sphere  of  my  own  conduct. 

But  the  question  remains  :  Are  such  men  as  we  have  described 
subject  to  our  adverse  moral  judgments  ;  or  does  our  reaction  to 
their  misdeeds  stop  short  with  instruction  and  forcible  inter- 
ference ?  The  answer  concerns  the  place  of  knowledge  in  the 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL  SUBJECTIVISM.  657 

moral  ideal,  and  to  determine  this  we  must  resort  to  a  depart- 
ment of  ethical  research  which  we  have  hitherto  only  touched 
upon  in  passing. 

The  facts  to  which  we  must  refer  are,  however,  among  the 
patent  conclusions  of  contemporary  thought.  The  moral  ideal 
of  a  man  is,  in  the  first  place,  a  social  inheritance,  an  imitatively 
accepted  body  of  sentiments,  which  constitutes  the  product  of 
the  accumulated  experience  of  ages  with  regard  to  the  con- 
duciveness  of  various  ways  of  action  to  the  general  welfare.  The 
manner  in  which  this  accumulation  takes  place  is  familiarly  illus- 
trated by  the  figure  of  the  bow  and  arrow,  —  a  complex  instru- 
ment brought  to  perfection  by  successive  modifications,  each 
occasioned  by  experience  of  some  failure  of  the  existing  form  to 
meet  some  felt  emergency.  Even  so  the  common  opinion  as  to 
what  conduct  is  best  adapted  to  the  general  welfare  has  been 
developed  from  the  observed  inadequacy  of  earlier  conceptions. 
This,  then,  may  be  said  to  be  that  principle,  which  we  were 
aware  must  needs  underly  the  harmonious  unity  of  the  moral 
ideal,  —  an  adaptation  to  super-individual  interests,  which  has 
been  secured  by  a  certain  phase  of  social  evolution.  But,  in  the 
second  place,  the  moral  ideal  of  a  man  is  not  merely  passively 
received  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  undergoes  in  the  individual  a 
development  very  closely  analogous  to  its  evolution  in  society. 
The  judgments  which  he  receives,  he  acts  upon  ;  and  in  so  doing 
he  is  occasionally  brought  into  conflict  with  a  certain  more  or 
less  powerful  motive,  a  feeling  of  concern  for  the  interests  of  his 
associates  ;  and  the  dissatisfaction  thus  arising  becomes  the  core 
of  a  modified  moral  sentiment.  This  is  the  process  by  which 
each  of  us  has  arrived  at  what  appreciation  he  possesses  of  the 
requirements  of  the  actual  social  relations  in  which  he  stands. 
It  is  only  by  the  expression  of  the  ideal  in  conduct,  that  the 
imperfections  of  its  immaturity  are  revealed  and  corrected. 

Let  us  return  to  the  question  of  the  relation  of  knowledge  to 
virtue,  and  to  the  charge  against  ethical  subjectivism,  that  it 
makes  goodness  a  mere  willingness  to  be  good,  wholly  divorced 
from  practical  wisdom.  The  charge  is  unjust  simply  because  the 
willingness  to  be  good  is  so  far  from  being  a  trait  unconnected 


658  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

with  knowledge  of  the  right,  that  it  is  only  by  the  manifestation 
of  this  trait  that  such  knowledge  can  be  acquired.  The  knowl- 
edge of  the  material  good  and  the  disposition  to  act  rightly  are 
by  no  means  wholly  separable  factors  in  conduct.  To  a  certain 
extent  the  future  event  is  ever  hidden  from  us,  and  no  peculiar 
goodness  of  heart  can  enable  a  man  to  choose  the  fortunate  means 
to  each  desired  end.  But  to  a  very  large  extent  the  material 
Tightness  of  conduct  depends  upon  the  agent's  recognition  of  the 
concrete  social  relations  which  envelop  him  ;  and  the  essential 
condition  of  such  recognition  is  his  previous  willingness  to  act 
upon  such  insight  as  he  has  possessed.  For,  I  repeat,  it  is 
exactly  by  this  means  that  the  force  of  these  relations  has  become 
generally  recognized,  and  that  they  have  accordingly  become 
inherent  in  the  very  constitution  of  society.  There  are  things 
which  a  man  ought  to  know ;  the  ignorance  of  which,  though  it 
may  be  moral  justification  for  a  particular  act  considered  by 
itself,  is  none  the  less  convincing  evidence  of  his  general 
worthlessness. 

This  relation  between  knowledge  and  disposition  is,  moreover, 
a  reciprocal  one.  Not  only  is  knowledge  of  the  right  only  to 
be  developed  by  right  conduct,  but  such  knowledge  is  itself  an 
element  in  the  disposition  which  issues  in  right  conduct,  —  a 
logical  circle,  which,  in  this  day  of  the  world,  should  dismay  no 
one.  Will  and  intellect  are  no  longer  regarded  as  separately 
explicable  functions.  It  is  not  an  accident  to  knowledge  that  it 
issues  in  practice  ;  it  is  essentially  practical.  True,  the  devel- 
opment of  knowledge  and  of  virtue  may  be  conveniently  distin- 
guished, and  it  is  quite  permissible  to  say  that  such  a  one  is 
better,  though  not  wiser,  than  another.  But  we  must  recognize 
that  the  ideal  which  is  lived  up  to  is,  in  its  very  content,  a  dif- 
ferent ideal  from  the  same  '  ideal '  when  it  is  comparatively 
ineffectual.  The  latter  lacks  the  minor  premises  that  bind  the 
vague  universal  with  the  definite  particular  instances, —  premises, 
it  is  true,  which  are  themselves  no  unfeeling  intellections,  but 
appreciations  of  the  worth  of  things,  while  they  are  quite  as  far 
from  being  abstractly  affective,  devoid  of  logical  intention.  The 
very  motive  of  sympathy,  through  whose  agency  the  individual 


No.  6.]  ETHICAL   SUBJECTIVISM.  659 

development  of  the  moral  ideal  takes  place,  is  never,  in  an 
incipiently  moral  being,  a  mere  blind  affect,  but  has  its  essential 
core  in  an  intellectual  recognition  of  a  human  society. 

For  ethical  subjectivism,  virtue  is  indeed  knowledge,  but  not 
any  knowledge.  It  is  real  khowledge,  actual  knowledge,  knowl- 
edge as  the  determining  motive  of  conduct. 

THEODORE  DE  LACUNA. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


DISCUSSIONS. 

PROFESSOR   BAWDEN'S   FUNCTIONAL    THEORY:     A 
REJOINDER. 

Before  the  discussion  of  Professor  Bawden 's  functional  theory  of 
the  psycho-physical  relation  is  finally  closed,  there  are  a  few  remarks 
which  I  should  like  to  make  by  way  of  rejoinder  to  his  reply  in  the 
September  issue  of  this  journal.  In  what  follows  I  shall  attempt  to 
avoid  discussion  of  details  so  far  as  possible  and  to  consider  directly 
the  chief  points  at  issue.  It  seems  the  more  advisable  to  adopt  this 
plan,  since  Professor  Bawden  believes  that  the  earlier  criticism  of  his 
articles  failed  to  bring  into  question  the  validity  of  his  method,  and 
left  untouched  what  he  regards  as  his  main  thesis,  ' '  the  emphasis 
upon  the  functional  character  of  all  the  categories  of  experience. ' ' 

In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  said  that  a  functional  view  of  the  cate- 
gories of  experience  is  a  conception  which  not  only  has  been  current 
in  philosophy  at  least  since  the  time  of  Hegel,  but  one  which  is 
almost  universally  accepted  by  the  best  philosophical  thought  of  the 
present  time.  But  while  this  is  the  case,  it  is  also  true,  as  Professor 
Bawden  has  said,  that  the  '  functional  '  method  has  up  to  the  present 
time  failed  to  receive  due  recognition  in  the  investigation  of  such  a 
problem  as  that  under  discussion.  The  conception  is  one  whose  im- 
portance for  the  psycho-physical  problem,  I  most  heartily  agree, 
is  quite  fundamental,  and  the  attempt  of  the  author  to  apply  it  syste- 
matically to  the  solution  of  the  problem  must  be  recognized  as  sig- 
nificant and  interesting.  But  the  mere  recognition  of  the  importance 
of  the  concept  of  function  is,  after  all,  a  very  short  step  toward  a  satis- 
factory solution  of  the  problem.  We  may  grant  the  fundamental 
importance  of  a  functional  view  of  all  the  categories  of  experience ; 
but  when  an  attempt  is  made  to  apply  the  functional  method  to  the 
solution  of  a  particular  problem,  the  important  considerations  are  the 
adequacy  with  which  the  functional  method  is  conceived,  and  the  con- 
sistency with  which  it  is  applied  to  the  given  problem.  As  I  under- 
stand it,  the  articles  under  discussion  are  an  attempt  to  apply  the 
functional  method  to  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  physical  and 
the  psychical.  Now  it  is  just  because  they  fail,  as  my  former  criticism 
attempted  to  point  out,  to  give  an  adequate  account  of  the  method 

660 


DISCUSSIONS.  66 1 

itself,  or  to  apply  it  consistently  to  the  problem  under  discussion,  that 
the  treatment  appeared  unsatisfactory  and  disappointing. 

In  the  former  discussion  I  attempted  to  show,  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  articles,  instead  of  giving  any  single  and  consistent  statement 
of  the  psycho-physical  relation,  exhibited  several  distinct,  and  even 
contradictory,  modes  of  treatment,  representing  distinct  points  of 
view.  My  paper  also  maintained,  in  the  second  place,  that  certain  fun- 
damental terms,  notably  '  function  '  and  '  experience,'  seemed  not  to 
denote  any  fixed  and  definite  conceptions,  but  were  markedly  unstable 
in  meaning,  this  instability  seeming  at  once  to  facilitate  and  obscure 
the  shift  in  standpoint.  In  reply  to  this,  Professor  Bawden  has  assured 
us  that  it  was  his  deliberate  intention  to  treat  the  subject  from  diverse 
points  of  view,  and  that,  if  the  term  '  function '  is  used  in  different 
senses,  which  the  author  seems  to  admit,  he  "  has  at  least  been 
successful  in  bringing  them  together."  In  regard  to  the  first  point, 
it  may  be  said  that  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  author  intended  to 
approach  the  subject  from  diverse  points  of  view.  But  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  the  various  and  contradictory  modes  of  treatment  whose 
existence  my  criticism  attempted  to  point  out,  were  by  no  means 
explicitly  differentiated  in  the  articles.  Indeed,  they  seemed  to  be  so 
confused,  two  or  three  apparent  changes  in  standpoint  being  found  in 
the  same  article,  and  sometimes  even  on  the  same  page,  that  only 
after  the  most  careful  study  was  it  possible  to  distinguish  them  at  all. 
But  we  must  hasten  to  ask  :  What  is  the  significance  of  this  "  bringing 
together  "  of  the  different  senses  of  '  function  '  ?  If  the  problem  was 
deliberately  discussed  from  diverse  points  of  view,  it  must  have  been 
because  these  various  forms  of  treatment  were  regarded  as  implicitly 
united  through  the  concept  of  function.  But  if  the  term  «  function  ' 
itself  is  used  indifferently  in  three  distinct  and  unrelated  senses,  how 
can  this  union,  this  "  bringing  together,"  be  more  than  verbal  ? 

To  the  same  charge,  that  the  author's  treatment  has  involved  changes 
in  standpoint,  he  has  further  replied  that  "  it  is  nothing  against  the 
theory  that  all  these  various  statements  should  prove  to  be  true. ' '  It 
will  be  remembered,  however,  that  these  various  formulations  of  the 
psycho-physical  relation  were  found  to  be  not  only  unrelated,  but  in 
some  cases,  mutually  contradictory.  For  example,  it  was  pointed  out 
that  the  physical  and  the  psychical  were  originally  described  as  cor- 
relative meanings  or  functions  arising  together  only  under  conditions 
of  tension,  while  later  the  psychical  was  identified  with  tensional 
activity  itself,  and  the  physical  described  as  non-tensional.  Such  an 
obvious  contradiction  as  this,  and  others  which  might  be  cited,  it 


662  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

surely  is  impossible  to  reconcile.  But  even  if  it  could  be  admitted 
that  the  various  accounts  given  by  the  author  all  represented  different 
truths,  this  would  be  of  comparatively  little  moment.  The  real  task 
would  still  remain  to  be  accomplished,  that  is,  the  task  of  showing 
that  the  different  truths  thus  stated  were  all  alike  aspects  of  one  funda- 
mental and  inclusive  truth,  and  that  the  truth  which  each  represented 
was  really  the  truth  common  to  all.  If  these  partial  truths  are  to  be 
brought  together  in  any  real  sense,  it  must  be  shown  that  they  are  all 
cases  included  under  one  concept,  —  that  the  '  functional  '  relation  is 
in  all  cases  fundamentally  the  same.  Now  it  is  just  this  reconciliation, 
this  synthesis,  which,  it  seems  to  me,  the  author's  account  has  failed 
to  accomplish.  Nowhere  does  he  relate  these  different  standpoints  to 
a  single  principle.  True,  he  calls  them  all  '  functional. '  But,  as  I 
have  tried  to  show,  '  function  '  and  '  functional  '  are  terms  of  varying 
meaning.  The  only  possible  sense  in  which  the  term  '  functional ' 
can  be  applied  to  them  all  is  that  of  correlativity.  That  is,  the  terms 
in  each  pair  have  significance  only  in  relation  to  each  other.  But  it 
might  be  possible  to  select  an  indefinite  number  of  such  correlative  or 
'  functional  '  pairs  which  could  be  applied  to  the  physical  and  the 
psychical,  without  making  the  slightest  approach  toward  a  solution  of 
the  problem.  Merely  to  set  down  side  by  side  a  number  of  separate 
partial  descriptions  of  the  psycho -physical  relation,  even  if  thes^  were 
not  mutually  incompatible,  without  showing  some  fundamental  rela- 
tion between  them,  is  certainly  to  fail  in  giving  a  satisfactory  philo- 
sophical treatment  of  the  subject. 

Professor  Bawden  has  also  urged  in  his  reply  that  my  former  dis- 
cussion was  merely  a  criticism  of  details,  and  that  the  main  position 
remained  untouched.  But  it  was  precisely  the  main  contention  of  my 
former  paper  that  one  searches  in  vain  for  any  single  fundamental  posi- 
tion consistently  maintained  throughout  the  author's  treatment  of  the 
problem.  The  very  purpose  of  the  criticism,  as  was  stated  at  the 
outset,  was  to  show  that  the  articles,  "  instead  of  giving  any  single 
consistent  statement  of  the  psycho-physical  problem,  present  no  less 
than  four  distinct  and  mutually  incompatible  positions."  In  order 
to  show  this,  it  was  necessary  to  enter  into  a  somewhat  detailed  exam- 
ination and  comparison  of  passages.  The  author  seems  to  feel  that, 
in  this  examination,  certain  opinions  have  been  imputed  to  him  which 
he  does  not  entertain  and  which  he  had  been  at  express  pains  to  avoid. 
Now  I  certainly  never  intended  to  assert  that  these  conclusions  neces- 
sarily represented  the  views  actually  held  by  the  author.  They  were 
set  down  rather  as  the  logical  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  various 


No.  6.]  DISCUSSIONS.  663 

passages  appearing  throughout  the  articles.  It  may  be  added  that 
great  care  was  taken  to  quote  such  passages  wherever  possible,  and 
that,  after  further  consideration,  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that  my  criti- 
cism misrepresented  the  statements  actually  made  by  the  author. 

But  we  must  hasten  to  what,  it  seems  to  me,  is  the  chief  question 
raised  by  Professor  Baw den's  reply,  the  question  as  to  what  is  involved 
in  the  philosophical  treatment  of  a  subject,  how  such  treatment  dif- 
fers from  the  account  given  by  the  special  sciences.  It  is  agreed  that 
the  subject-matter  with  which  each  science  deals  represents  only  a 
partial  and  abstract  view  of  reality  as  a  whole,  and  that  consequently 
the  results  of  science  have  methodological  value  only,  and  cannot  be 
accepted  by  philosophy  as  ultimate  and  complete  accounts  of  reality. 
The  philosophical  significance  of  any  of  these  scientific  abstractions, 
as  Professor  Bawden  says,  "  can  only  be  ,got  by  bringing  it  into  the 
common  clearing-house  of  philosophy  with  other  similar  abstractions, 
where  they  may  all  be  adjusted  in  some  mutual  synthesis. ' '  This  at 
once  raises  the  question:  What  is  implied  in  such  a  synthesis?  If 
each  science  has  its  own  special  standpoint,  and  concerns  itself  merely 
with  a  partial  and  abstract  phase  of  concrete  reality,  it  would  seem 
that  the  only  method  by  which  a  synthesis  of  these  partial  aspects  can 
be  effected  is  to  take  a  standpoint  at  once  distinct  from,  and  inclusive 
of,  the  special  fields  which  the  sciences  investigate.  From  this  higher 
standpoint  it  will  be  possible  to  trace  the  relations  existing  between 
the  different  sciences,  and  to  reinterpret  their  abstractions  in  terms  of 
the  whole  of  reality.  It  would,  of  course,  be  absurd  to  demand  that 
such  a  reinterpretation  be  couched  in  concrete  words,  or  to  suppose 
that  it  could  ever  express  the  fulness  of  reality.  But  it  should,  it 
seems  to  me,  scrupulously  avoid  the  technical  abstract  terms  of  the 
special  sciences.  The  author's  account  was  criticised,  not  because  it 
employed  abstract  words,  but  because  it  appeared  to  have  taken  over 
technical  scientific  abstractions  such  as  'energy'  and  'function'  (in 
the  biological  sense),  and  to  have  applied  them  to  experience  at 
large.  The  result  of  this  procedure,  — as  in  my  opinion  the  author's 
conclusions  show,  —  is  the  loss  of  the  more  inclusive  viewpoint  of 
philosophy,  and  the  inevitable  shifting  to  the  restricted  view  of  the 
science  whose  abstractions  are  employed ;  but  this  must,  of  course, 
make  impossible  any  real  synthesis. 

But  the  characterization  so  far  given  of  the  method  of  philosophy 
still  fails  to  take  into  account  the  most  important  distinction  between 
it  and  the  method  of  the  special  sciences.  Not  only  must  the 
treatment  of  philosophy  be  broader  and  more  inclusive  than  that 


664  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

of  any  science,  but  in  order  to  deal  with  reality  in  its  fulness  and 
concreteness  at  all,  it  must  definitely  take  its  stand  within  the  life  of 
self-consciousness,  and  reinterpret  the  abstractions  of  science  with 
reference  to  concrete  individual  experience.  This  distinction  is  one 
which  seemed  to  be  recognized,  implicitly  at  least,  in  the  position  taken 
by  the  author  at  the  beginning  of  his  treatment  of  the  problem.  The 
repeated  insistence  in  the  earlier  articles  published,  that  the  only  hope 
for  a  solution  of  the  problem  lies  in  a  return  to  the  principle  involved 
in  the  practical  attitude,  in  the  reinterpretation  of  the  abstractions  of 
science  in  terms  of  immediate  concrete  experience,  seems  undoubtedly 
based  on  the  implicit  acceptance  of  this  very  distinction  between 
philosophy  and  the  natural  sciences.  Moreover,  as  I  tried  to  show  in 
my  former  paper,  the  first  definitions  of  the  psycho-physical  relation 
seemed  even  to  be  made  with  this  distinction  definitely  in  mind.  It 
was  only  after  what  I  have  called  the  'biological'  view  of  function  was 
introduced  that  the  standpoint  of  natural  science  was  frankly  assumed 
as  the  plane  of  discussion. 

This  same  point  comes  up  again  when  we  consider  the  author's  use 
of  the  term  l  experience.'  In  the  former  discussion  I  objected 
that  Professor  Bawden  had  identified  this  term  with  '  process  '  and 
'  energy,'  thus  reducing  it  to  a  mere  scientific  abstraction.  He 
replies  that  he  has  used  the  term  '  experience  '  "  as  identical  with 
the  whole  of  reality,"  and  that,  therefore,  he  is  perfectly  justified 
in  his  use  of  terms.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  in  the 
passages  where  experience  is  expressly  described  as  '  process  '  and 
'activity,'  it  is  undeniably  the  experience  which  forms  the  subject- 
matter  of  psychology  which  is  meant.  Now  the  experience  of  psy- 
chology is  surely  not  "  identical  with  the  whole  of  reality,"  but  is 
very  decidedly  a  scientific  abstraction.  But  even  if  we  accept  the 
definition  of  experience  given  by  Professor  Bawden,  the  important 
question  remains  to  be  answered  :  If  experience  means  simply  "  the 
whole  of  reality,"  what  is  the  significance  of  the  appeal  to  concrete 
experience  which  is  so  emphasized  in  the  earlier  articles  ?  Of  what 
significance  is  the  demand  that  the  concepts  of  science  be  recon- 
structed in  terms  of  our  actual  experience,  or  the  emphasis  on  the 
need  of  a  return  to  the  practical  attitude  of  immediate  experience  ? 
In  raising  this  question,  it  is  not  intended  to  imply  that  experience  is 
less  than  the  whole  of  reality,  or  that  there  is  a  realm  of  reality  lying 
beyond  experience.  But  it  does  seem  that  if  the  appeal  to  experi- 
ence, which  philosophy  so  constantly  makes,  is  to  have  any  real  sig- 
nificance, experience  needs  a  more  exact  definition  than  is  afforded  by 


No.  6.]  DISCUSSIONS.  665 

describing  it  as  ' '  identical  with  the  whole  of  reality. ' '  Does  not  experi- 
ence mean  reality  as  it  exists  in  the  self-conscious  life  of  the  individual, 
concrete  reality  as  it  is  immediately  given  in  relation  to  the  needs  of 
self-conscious  life  ?  Surely  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the  author  uses  the 
term  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  treatment.  And  it  is  because  he  has,  as 
it  seems  to  me,  left  this  inner  standpoint,  which  may  be  regarded  as 
the  peculiar  standpoint  of  philosophy,  and  taken  the  external  point  of 
view  of  the  special  sciences,  that  his  account  has  failed  to  give  an 
adequate  or  consistent  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  psycho-physical 
relation. 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 
CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS. 

Studies  in  Logical  Theory.  By  JOHN  DEWEY,  with  the  coopera- 
tion of  members  and  Fellows  of  the  Department  of  Philosophy  of 
the  University  of  Chicago.  Chicago,  The  University  of  Chicago 
Press,  1903. — pp.  xiii,  388. 

The  preeminent  obligation  which  the  writers  of  this  book  express 
to  Professor  James,  as  well  as  the  general  trend  of  the  doctrines  they 
expound,  connect  the  volume  obviously  with  the  philosophical  atti- 
tude which  calls  itself  Pragmatism,  and  which  is  so  much  in  evidence 
at  the  present  time.  But  it  is  not  always  easy  to  harmonize  the  utter- 
ances of  the  adherents  of  this  creed,  nor,  in  some  cases,  is  it  easy  to 
know  what  precisely  they  intend  by  their  principle.  Hence  it  will 
be  best  in  dealing  with  the  book  to  limit  the  discussion  to  the  posi- 
tions actually  advanced,  or  apparently  accepted,  by  the  writers,  and, 
for  the  rest,  to  treat  it  as  a  serious  and  detailed  discussion  of  logical 
doctrines  in  a  new  light,  rather  than  as  a  <  manifesto  '  in  support  of 
a  new  philosophical  faith.  In  so  doing,  I  believe  we  shall  best  con- 
sult the  wishes  of  the  editor  and  his  contributors ;  for  though  they 
speak  with  the  confidence  of  those  who  find  themselves  in  possession 
of  a  fresh  clue  to  old-standing  difficulties,  they  speak  without  preten- 
tiousness or  undue  contempt  for  the  theories  they  claim  to  supersede. 
They  make  no  claim  of  finality  or  of  systematic  completeness.  "  The 
point  of  view,"  says  the  editor,  referring  to  possible  divergencies 
among  the  eight  contributors  to  the  volume,  "  is  still  (happily)  de- 
veloping, and  showing  no  signs  of  becoming  a  closed  system."  The 
divergencies,  however,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  are  really  remarkably 
slight,  observable  for  the  most  part  only  in  the  greater  emphasis  or 
sweep  with  which  one  writer  or  another  states  principles  or  doctrines 
common  to  all.  It  is,  indeed,  most  unusual  to  find  a  series  of  philo- 
sophical papers  by  different  writers  in  which  (without  repetition  or 
duplication)  there  is  so  much  unity  in  the  point  of  view  and  harmony 
in  results.  That  this  is  so  is  a  striking  evidence  of  the  moulding  influ- 
ence of  Professor  Dewey  upon  his  pupils  and  coadjutors  in  the  Chicago 
School  of  Philosophy.  The  unfamiliar  phraseology  in  which  the 
writers  sometimes  couch  their  meaning  makes  the  volume  far  from 
easy  reading  at  first,  but  there  always  is  a  meaning  to  be  grasped  ;  and, 
as  a  carefully  thought-out  contribution  to  the  '  live  '  thought  of  the 

666 


REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  66? 

day,  the  book  reflects  honor  upon  the  university  among  whose  publi- 
cations it  appears. 

The  chief  points  of  agreement,  —  and  therefore  the  main  contentions 
of  the  book,  —  are  concisely  stated  by  the  editor  in  his  prefatory  note  ; 
and,  as  the  statement  may  be  regarded  as  in  a  sense  official,  it  may 
profitably  be  set  down  here  for  reference.  "  All  agree  that  judgment 
is  the  central  function  of  knowing,  and  hence  affords  the  central  prob- 
lem of  logic ;  that  since  the  act  of  knowing  is  intimately  and  indis- 
solubly  connected  with  the  like  yet  diverse  functions  of  affection, 
appreciation,  and  practice,  it  only  distorts  results  reached  to  treat 
knowing  as  a  self-enclosed  and  self-explanatory  whole  —  hence  the 
intimate  relations  of  logical  theory  with  functional  psychology;  that 
since  knowledge  appears  as  a  function  within  experience,  and  yet 
passes  judgment  upon  both  the  processes  and  contents  of  other  func- 
tions,, its  work  and  aim  must  be  distinctively  reconstructive  or  trans- 
formatory ;  that  since  Reality  must  be  defined  in  terms  of  experience, 
judgment  appears  accordingly  as  the  medium  through  which  the  con- 
sciously effected  evolution  of  Reality  goes  on  ;  that  there  is  no  reason- 
able standard  of  truth  (or  of  success  of  the  knowing  function)  in 
general,  except  upon  the  postulate  that  Reality  is  thus  dynamic  or 
self-evolving,  and,  in  particular,  through  reference  to  the  specific 
offices  which  knowing  is  called  upon  to  perform  in  readjusting  and 
expanding  the  means  and  ends  of  life."  The  obligation  of  the  writers 
is  further  expressed  "to  those  whose  views  are  most  sharply  opposed. 
To  Mill,  Lotze,  Bosanquet,  and  Bradley  the  writers  then  owe  special 
indebtedness."  The  inclusion  in  a  common  category  of  thinkers  so 
different  in  standpoint  as  those  named  strikes  the  reader  at  first  with 
surprise,  but  its  meaning  and  justification,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  essayists,  becomes  apparent  in  the  detailed  criticism  to  which  Pro- 
fessor Dewey  subjects  Lotze's  theory  of  knowledge  (in  Essays  2,  3,  and 
4),  and  in  Miss  Thompson's  critical  analysis  of  Bosanquet' s  theory  of 
judgment  in  the  paper  which  follows.  The  opposition  of  what  we 
may  call  the  new  view  to  that  which  the  essayists  regard  as  held  in 
common  by  the  authors  mentioned,  and  substantially  as  the  logical 
tradition  of  previous  philosophers,  is  summarily  expressed  by  Professor 
Dewey,  when  he  contrasts  the  '  epistemological '  with  the  '  instru- 
mental '  type  of  logic.  This  antithesis  introduces  us  at  once  to  the 
main  thesis  of  the  volume.  Thought,  it  is  urged,  is  not  something 
'pure,'  'absolute,'  or  by  itself, — whose  occupation  is  to  mirror 
or  represent  an  independently  complete  and  self-existent  world  of 
reality ;  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  one  function  among  others  arising  in 


668  THE   PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

the  course  of  experience,  and  as  having  for  its  sole  purpose  the  trans- 
formation, re-construction,  or  re-organization  of  experience.  Now  in 
such  a  statement  it  seems  to  me  there  is  much  to  which  we  may  cor- 
dially assent,  though  perhaps  without  regarding  it  as  the  exclusive  dis- 
covery of  the  pragmatists ;  while  there  are  other  implications  of  the 
words  which  we  should  be  compelled  to  regard  as  false,  or  at  least  as 
misleading,  in  the  form  stated.  We  may  agree,  for  instance,  in  the 
emphatic  condemnation  of  the  representational  view  of  knowledge 
which  has  so  disastrously  dominated  modern  philosophy.  Professor 
Dewey  and  his  fellow-essayists  argue  convincingly  that  the  view  of 
knowledge  as  copying  or  reproducing  an  independent  reality  inev- 
itably issues  in  scepticism,  because  in  the  very  mode  of  stating  the  ques- 
tion it  opens  a  gulf  between  thought  and  reality  which  no  subsequent 
effort  is  able  to  bridge.  "  In  whatever  form  the  'copy'  theory  be 
stated,"  says  Professor  MacLennan,  "  the  question  inevitably  arises, 
how  we  can  compare  our  ideas  with  reality  and  thus  know  their  truth. 
On  this  theory  what  we  possess  is  ever  the  copy ;  the  reality  is  be- 
yond. In  other  words,  such  a  theory,  logically  carried  out,  leads  to 
the  breakdown  of  knowledge."  Professor  Dewey 's  exposure  of  the 
shifts  to  which  Lotze  is  driven  by  his  initial  acceptance  of  this  dualism 
is  a  masterly  piece  of  analysis,  running  for  a  considerable  part  of  the 
way  on  the  same  lines  as  Professor  Jones's  criticism  in  his  Philosophy 
of  Lotze.  The  whole  conception  of  '  two  fixed  worlds '  must  un- 
doubtedly be  abandoned.  As  Professor  Dewey  excellently  puts  it  in 
his  opening  pages  :  "  Neither  the  plain  man  nor  the  scientific  enquirer 
is  aware,  as  he  engages  in  his  reflective  activity,  of  any  transition  from 
one  sphere  of  existence  to  another.  He  knows  no  two  fixed  worlds 
—  reality  on  one  side  and  mere  subjective  ideas  on  the  other ;  he  is 
aware  of  no  gulf  to  cross.  He  assumes  uninterrupted,  free,  and  fluid 
passage  from  ordinary  experience  to  abstract  thinking,  from  thought 
to  fact,  from  things  to  theories  and  back  again.  Observation  passes 
into  development  of  hypothesis  ;  deductive  methods  pass  to  use  in 
description  of  the  particular ;  inference  passes  into  action  with  no 
sense  of  difficulty  save  those  found  in  the  particular  task  in  question. 
The  fundamental  assumption  is  continuity  in  and  of  experience.  .  .  . 
Only  the  epistemological  spectator  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  ordinary 
man  and  the  scientific  man  in  this  free  and  easy  intercourse  are  rashly 
assuming  the  right  to  glide  over  a  cleft  in  the  very  structure  of  reality. " 
If  epistemclogy  is  understood  to  imply  belief  in  a  cleft  of  this 
nature,  then  the  sooner  both  the  name  and  the  thing  are  banished  from 
philosophy  the  better.  In  this  shape  the  supposed  problem  is  in- 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  669 

herited  from  Descartes' s  individualistic  starting-point  and  the  two- 
substance  doctrine  which  he  impressed  on  modern  thought.  But  the 
isolation  of  the  mind  as  a  subjective  sphere,  intact  and  self-contained, 
outside  and  over-against  reality,  necessarily  implies  that  reality  is  in  a 
strict  sense  unknowable.  Hence  the  scepticism  and  agnosticism  which 
infect  so  many  modern  theories  of  knowledge.  But  reality  is  one ; 
the  knowing  mind  and  its  thought  are  themselves  within  the  course  of 
reality,  parts  of  its  process,  immersed  in  the  give-and-take  of  living 
experience.  Whether  we  talk  of  reality  or  of  experience  does  not 
seem  greatly  to  matter,  if  we  are  agreed  that  there  is  no  real  world 
except  the  world  which  reveals  itself  to  us  in  our  experience  and  of 
which  we  feel  ourselves  to  be  a  moving  part.  Whatever  term  we  use, 
the  essence  of  our  contention  is  the  unity  and  continuity  of  the  world. 
And  if  I  read  the  signs  of  the  intellectual  world  aright,  this  conviction 
has  so  penetrated  recent  philosophical  thought  that  the  long-drawn 
discussions  as  to  the  possibility  and  validity  of  knowledge  which  so 
keenly  occupied  the  theorists  of  the  iyth  and  i8th  and  much  of  the 
1 9th  century  seem  to  revolve  round  a  self-made  difficulty,  and  have 
ceased  to  that  extent  to  possess  a  vital  interest  for  us.  We  may  be 
vividly  enough  aware  of  the  poverty  of  our  knowledge  both  in  extent 
and  intent,  but  that  there  should  be  in  knowledge  an  inherent  incapacity 
to  know  at  all,  is  too  topsy-turvy  a  notion  to  give  us  a  moment's  un- 
easiness. This  conviction  of  the  unity  of  existence,  I  repeat,  has  so 
permeated  the  best  thought  of  the  time  that  it  cannot  be  claimed  by  the 
Pragmatists  as  an  insight  specifically  their  own  ;  and  it  strikes  one  there- 
fore with  a  sense  of  surprise  to  find  Bosanquet's  theory  of  judgment 
selected  for  critical  analysis  as  typical  of  the  old  representational  view. 
There  are  certainly  phrases  in  Mr.  Bradley 's  work  which  might  seem 
to  leave  us,  contrary  to  the  author's  intention,  with  an  unknowable 
Reality  lurking  behind  the  world  of  ideas  which  we  predicate  of  it. 
But  Professor  Bosanquet,  one  would  have  thought,  had  taught  more 
persuasively  than  any  other  living  writer,  the  unity  of  experience  and 
the  fallacy  of  all  dualistic  conceptions.  And  perhaps  it  is  really  be- 
cause he  so  nearly  approaches  what  they  consider  the  true  position 
that  the  Chicago  logicians  have  undertaken  to  show  to  what  extent  the 
old  leaven  still  works  in  him  and  makes  him  fall  short  of  the  perfect 
truth.  On  turning  to  the  essay  in  question,  I  cannot  help  thinking 
that  Miss  Thompson  lays  undue  stress  on  expressions  which  are  per- 
fectly legitimate,  and  indeed  unavoidable,  in  any  theory  which  re- 
cognises objectivity  in  knowledge  at  all.  After  all,  there  is  a  nature 
of  things,  to  which  our  ideas  have  to  adapt  themselves  if  it  would  be 


670  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

well  with  us  ;  and  in  this  sense  the  real  world  is  certainly  independent 
of  our  ideas  and  unmodified  by  what  we  think  about  it.  Why,  accord- 
ing to  the  pragmatists  themselves,  it  is  the  difficulty  of  coping  with 
'a  situation,'  which  is  the  evoking  cause  of  thought.  Such  a  'sit- 
uation '  is  the  very  type  of  an  independent  world,  whose  precise  nature 
we  have  to  learn  with  more  or  less  expenditure  of  labor,  if  we  are 
successfully  to  extricate  ourselves  from  our  difficulty.  The  primary 
function  of  knowledge,  in  such  a  case,  is  to  represent  the  situation 
accurately,  in  order  to  find  a  way  out  of  it.  But  if  such  phrases  are  at 
once  innocent  and  inevitable  in  the  mouth  of  a  pragmatist,  they  can- 
not in  themselves  fairly  be  held  to  convict  Professor  Bosanquet  of 
dualism. 

But  the  main  objection  of  the  critic  seems  to  be  to  Bosanquet' s 
description  of  knowledge  as  a  system  of  judgments  about  reality  as 
ultimately  given  for  each  individual  "in  present  sensuous  perception 
and  in  the  immediate  feeling  of  my  own  sentient  existence  that  goes 
with  it."  This  position  (which,  again,  I  hold  to  be  beyond  dispute) 
is,  I  submit,  entirely  transformed  when  it  is  paraphrased  as  "  the  mere 
assurance  that  somewhere  behind  the  curtain  of  sensuous  perception 
reality  exists"  (p.  92).  This  is  a  version  of  the  critic's  preconcep- 
tion rather  than  of  the  author's  natural  meaning.  Similarly  Professor 
Bosanquet  may  be  venturing  on  slippery  ground  when  he  permits  him- 
self to  speak  of  the  individual's  "  point  of  contact  with  reality  as  such," 
and  (still  more  so)  when  he  describes  the  immediate  subject  as  "the 
point  at  which  the  actual  world  impinges  on  my  consciousness. ' '  But 
it  is  a  far  cry  from  such  lapses  of  expression  to  speaking  of  Bosanquet' s 
real  world  as  "that  against  which  we  have  bumped."  The  first  of 
the  two  phrases  would  not  indeed,  I  think,  in  the  context  of  Bosan- 
quet's  theory,  suggest  any  suspicion  of  the  old  dualism,  except  to  one 
morbidly  on  the  outlook  for  symptoms  of  that  virus.  An  alternative 
phrase  of  Professor  Bosanquet  is  that  the  real  world  is  present  in  per- 
ception ;  and  while  such  phrases  imply  that  there  is  more  of  the 
world,  and  more  in  the  world,  than  is  apprehended  by  us  at  the 
moment,  they  cast  no  doubt  upon  the  actuality  of  the  apprehension. 
Indeed,  I  cannot  see  how  this  immediate  apprehension  of  reality  differs 
from  "the  immediate  experiences,"  or  the  unreflective  "ways  of  liv- 
ing," which  the  essayists  everywhere  assume  as  the  matrix  out  of 
which  reflective  or  logical  thinking  develops,  and  into  which  it 
resolves  itself  again.  And  when  Green's  criticism  upon  the  logic  of 
Locke  and  Hume,  namely  that  "  the  more  thinking  we  do  the  less  we 
know  about  the  real  world,"  is  applied  to  Bosanquet' s  theory,  and  the 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  6jl 

result  is  said  to  be  avoided  only  "  by  a  pure  act  of  faith,"  it  is  surely 
as  open  to  Professor  Bosanquet  as  to  his  critic  to  reply  that  the  results 
of  thinking  validate  themselves  by  the  harmony  or  system  which  they 
introduce  into  our  experience.  All  thinking  starts  in  faith  and  is 
justified  by  its  works.  If  that  is  pragmatism,  then  we  may  all  set  up 
as  pragmatists.  But  the  badge  of  pragmatism,  in  the  ordinary  sense 
attached  to  the  term,  is  the  utilitarian  estimate  of  knowledge  as  every- 
where ultimately  a  means  to  practical  activity  of  the  biological  and 
economic  order.  And  in  regard  to  this  estimate  I  cannot  do  better 
than  quote  a  few  sentences  from  Professor  Bosanquet's  Inaugural 
Address  at  St.  Andrews  last  year,  in  which  he  aptly  traces  the  prag- 
matist  contention  to  the  very  same  obsolete  view  of  knowledge  which 
his  critic  here  attempts  to  fasten  upon  him.  After  referring  to  the 
"debasement  of  the  conception  of  knowledge  which  followed  from  the 
separation  between  world  and  individual,  characteristic  of  the  modern 
mind,"  he  proceeds:  "In  this  whole  conception,  that  cognition  is 
something  secondary,  it  seems  to  me  that  we  have  a  mingling  of 
obsolete  logic  and  meaningless  spatial  metaphor.  The  entire  fabric  is 
annihilated  when  we  realize  a  single  point.  Knowledge  is  not  a 
reproduction  of  an  outside  world,  but  an  endeavour  to  realise  our 
nature  by  the  construction  of  a  harmonious  experience.  The  truth  of 
Cognition  is  not  its  correspondence  to  something  else,  but  its  degree 
of  individuality  in  itself.  In  a  word,  Cognition  is  one  great  aspect  of 
the  life  of  the  soul,  in  so  far  as  it  is  lived  apart  from  the  struggle 
against  matter.  I  have  not  repeated  the  ancient  doctrine  that  it 
forms  by  itself  the  essence  of  morality  and  religion ;  but  genuinely  to 
understand  how  this  doctrine  fails  to  be  true,  is  a  problem  which 
modern  popular  philosophy  has  never  approached  at  all.  Certainly 
it  is  true  that  in  Cognition  our  nature  affirms  itself  after  a  completer 
type  than  in  the  Volition  of  everyday  life." 

The  eloquent  vindication  of  Theoria  in  the  Aristotelian  sense,  of 
which  these  sentences  form  part,  raises  the  whole  question  whether  the 
pragmatists'  view  of  knowledge  is  not  due  to  the  limitations  which 
they  themselves  put  upon  the  term.  The  writers  in  this  volume  insist 
upon  the  "derivative  and  secondary,"  the  "intermediate  and  instru- 
mental character ' '  of  thought,  and  by  thought  they  agree  in  meaning 
"reflective  thought,"  or  reasoning.  Thought,  in  this  sense,  as  Pro- 
fessor Dewey  puts  it  in  his  opening  sentences,  "  comes  after  something 
and  out  of  something  and  for  the  sake  of  something."  "Thinking  is 
a  kind  of  activity  which  we  perform  at  specific  need,  just  as  a£  other 
need  we  engage  in  other  sorts  of  activity :  as  converse  with  a  friend  ; 


6/2  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

draw  a  plan  of  a  house  ;  take  a  walk ;  eat  a  dinner ;  purchase  a  suit  of 
clothes  ;  etc. ,  etc. ' '  This  view  of  thought  as  a  specific  function  within 
experience  is  fundamental  with  all  the  writers,  and  they  use  a  variety 
of  terms  to  express  the  other  phases  of  experience  with  which  they 
contrast  it.  It  is  said  to  arise  out  of  ' ' unreflective  antecedents," 
which  are  sometimes  described  as  ' '  ways  of  living ;  ' '  and  when  the 
thinking  process  has  been  successfully  carried  through,  it  ' '  allows  us 
to  proceed  with  more  direct  modes  of  experiencing. ' '  Its  aim,  indeed, 
is  "the  resumption  of  an  interrupted  experience."  Experience,  with 
or  without  some  adjective,  is  thus  the  term  on  which  the  writers  most 
generally  fall  back.  Reality  is  described  by  Professor  Dewey  as  ' '  the 
drama  of  evolving  experience,"  a  "world  of  continuous  experiencing." 
Conflict  in  the  contents  of  our  "experiences"  makes  them  "assume 
conscious  objectification.  They  cease  to  be  ways  of  living  and  be- 
come distinct  objects  of  observation  and  consideration."  Objects 
thus  "  only  gradually  emerge  from  their  life-matrix."  "  The  object 
as  known  "  is  accordingly,  we  are  told,  "  not  the  same  as  the  object  as 
apprehended  in  other  possible  modes  of  being  conscious  of  it"  (p.  251). 
When  even  the  conclusion  or  the  completed  judgment, — the  insight  at 
which  we  arrive,  —  is  emphatically  denied  to  be  a  judgment  at  all  (p. 
122),  it  becomes  plain  that  the  terms  thought  and  knowledge  are 
being  used  exclusively  of  the  psychological  process  of  solving  a  diffi- 
culty or  arriving  at  a  conclusion  on  some  matter  about  which  we  are 
in  doubt.  Judgment  is  therefore  described  as  essentially  dynamic, 
"developmental,"  "transitive  in  effect  and  purport."  That  is  to 
say,  it  exists,  as  it  were,  only  momentarily  in  the  passage  from  one 
mode  of  activity  to  another ;  as  soon  as  a  "re-adjustment ' '  is  effected, 
"experience"  flows  on.  "There  is  always  antecedent  to  thought," 
says  Professor  Dewey,  "an  experience  of  some  subject-matter  of  the 
physical  or  social  world,  or  organized  intellectual  world,  whose  parts 
are  actively  at  war  with  each  other  —  so  much  so  that  they  threaten  to 
disrupt  the  entire  experience,  which  accordingly  for  its  own  mainte- 
nance requires  deliberate  re-definition  and  re-relation  of  its  tensional 
parts.  This  is  the  reconstructive  process  termed  thinking ;  the  recon- 
structive situation,  with  its  parts  in  tension  and  in  such  movement 
toward  each  other  as  tends  to  a  unified  experience,  is  the  thought  situ- 
ation "  (pp.  39-40).  He  calls  it  elsewhere  "  the  particular  functional 
situation  termed  the  reflective  "  (p.  18). 

But  in  proportion  as  we  narrow  in  this  way  the  application  of  the 
term  '  thought '  by  emphasizing  its  '  intermediate  '  character  and  its 
double  dependence,  —  "its  dependence  upon  unreflective  experience 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  673 

for  existence  and  upon  a  consequent  experience  for  the  test  of  final 
validity,"  —it  is  plain  that  debate  as  to  the  exclusively  practical  refer- 
ence of  thought  becomes  inept ;  the  question  as  to  this  particular  mode 
of  expression  being  settled  by  definition,  and  everything  turning,  as 
to  the  general  question,  on  the  nature  of  those  antecedent  and  sub- 
sequent modes  of  expression  which  admittedly  include  so  much  of  our 
conscious  life.  For  by  the  antecedents  of  thought  is  not  to  be  under- 
stood a  pre-rational  or  merely  animal  consciousness,  but  the  general 
course  of  our  lives,  so  far  as  it  flows  on  smoothly  without  working 
itself  up  into  those  express  efforts  of  purposive  attention  which  con- 
stitute a  '  thought -crisis. '  The  antecedents  are,  in  short,  as  Professor 
Dewey  puts  it,  "our  universe  of  life  and  love,  of  appreciation  and 
struggle."  And  each  crisis,  in  turn,  has  for  its  result  a  unified  or 
harmonized  experience  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  test  of  its 
validity.  "The  test  of  thought,"  says  Professor  Dewey,  "is  the 
harmony  or  unity  of  experience  actually  effected.  In  that  sense  the 
test  of  reality  is  beyond  thought  as  thought,  just  as  at  the  other  limit 
thought  originates  out  of  a  situation  which  is  not  reflectional  in  charac- 
ter." Those  experiences  beyond  thought  as  thought,  —  "  pauses  of 
satisfaction,"  to  employ  a  phrase  of  Professor  Royce's  adopted  by 
Professor  Moore  in  the  last  essay,  — are  obviously  the  end  for  which 
the  thought-process  in  the  sense  defined  exists.  But  to  regard  them 
in  turn  as  merely  practical  or  instrumental  is  gratuitously  to  fall  into 
the  snare  of  the  infinite  regress ;  while  to  speak  of  them  as  volitional 
or  active  states  is  true  only  in  the  sense  that  all  our  states  are  ener- 
gizings  of  the  conscious  self.  The  satisfaction  may  be  gained  in  the 
theoretic  insight  of  the  man  of  science  and  the  philosopher,  or  in  the 
aesthetic  contemplation  of  a  landscape  or  a  picture,  as  well  as  in  the 
smoother  working  of  some  practical  activity  in  the  ordinary  sense  of 
the  word.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  acknowledgment,  at  the  close  of 
the  long  essay  on  "Valuation  as  a  Logical  Process,  "  that  "the 
aesthetic  experience  would  appear  to  be  essentially  post-judgmental 
and  appreciative.  ...  As  an  immediate  appreciation,  it  has  no  logical 
function  and  on  our  principles  must  be  denied  the  name  of  value.  .  .  . 
It  may  have  its  origin  in  past  processes  of  the  reflective  valuational 
type.  Nevertheless,  viewed  in  the  light  of  its  actual  present  character 
and  status  in  experience,  the  aesthetic  must  be  excluded  from  the 
sphere  of  values."  Without  commenting  on  this  arbitrary  inversion 
of  terms,  which  refuses  the  title  of  value  to  what  might  more  reason- 
ably be  taken  as  the  typical  instance  of  an  experience  possessing  inde- 
pendent value,  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that,  on  this  showing,  this  whole 


6/4  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

realm  of  aesthetic  experience,  as  post-judgmental  and  extra -logical,  is 
excluded  by  the  writers  of  the  volume  from  what  they  mean  by  thought. 
Now  the  insight  and  the  glow  of  art,  of  knowledge  as  such  or  of  re- 
ligious vision,  certainly  displays  what  we  may  call  the  static  character 
of  intuition  rather  than  the  features  of  what  one  of  the  essayists  aptly 
labels  "the  doubt-enquiry  process"  of  discursive  thinking.  But  in- 
telligence, reason,  or  thought  in  the  highest  sense,  is. of  the  very 
essence  of  such  states,  —  is  indeed  the  basis  of  their  possibility,  —  for 
art,  science,  and  religion  are  the  triple  differentia  of  the  human  from 
the  merely  animal  consciousness.  And,  in  spite  of  "  our  reigning  bio- 
logical categories,"  it  is  in  the  vision  of  truth  and  of  beauty  and  of  a 
perfect  Good  that  man  realizes  a  satisfaction  which,  though  it  may  be 
transient  in  his  individual  experience,  he  recognizes  as  not  merely 
instrumental  but  an  end-in -itself, — the  satisfaction  of  his  specific 
nature. 

It  is  the  more  to  be  regretted,  therefore,  that  these  essays  throw  no 
light  on  the  nature  of  these  non-reflective  experiences,  which  appar- 
ently include  so  much  more  of  our  life,  and  which  are  certainly  so 
much  more  valuable  than  the  function  of  thought  in  the  narrower 
sense,  which-  is  differentiated  from  them.  Professor  Dewey  recognizes 
the  existence  of  the  problem,  but  he  passes  from  it.  "The  nature 
of  the  organization  and  value  that  the  antecedent  conditions  of  the 
thought-function  possess  is  too  large  a  question  here  to  enter  upon  in 
detail. ' '  It  may  be  hoped  that  in  another  place  he  will  undertake 
"  the  wholesale  at  large  consideration  of  thought "  which  he  says  that 
he  is  here  ' '  striving  to  avoid. ' '  He  draws  a  distinction  in  the  opening 
essay  between  logic  in  the  narrower  sense,  as  the  theory  of  "  the  par- 
ticular functional  situation  termed  the  reflective,"  and  "  the  logic  of 
experience,  logic  taken  in  its  wider  sense."  "In  its  generic  form," 
he  says,  the  latter  "deals  with  this  question:  How  does  one  type 
of  functional  situation  and  attitude  pass  out  of  and  into  another  •  for 
example,  the  technological  or  utilitarian  into  the  aesthetic,  the  aesthetic 
into  the  religious,  the  religious  into  the  scientific,  and  this  into  the 
socio-ethical  and  so  on  ?' '  Such  an  investigation,  involving  as  it  neces- 
sarily would,  an  analysis  of  the  attitudes  in  question,  could  not  fail  to 
prove  instructive  in  Professor  Dewey 's  hands.  Its  result  would  be,  I 
think,  to  limit  and  qualify  the  pragmatist  position  in  such  a  way  as  to 
deprive  it  of  much  of  its  paradox  and  novelty,  without  robbing  it  of 
the  truth  and  interest  it  undoubtedly  possesses. 

In  the  narrower  sphere  of  logic  just  indicated,  —  in  logic  proper, 
apart  from  epistemological  or  metaphysical  issues  of  a  general  nature,  — 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS.  675 

the  discussions  of  the  present  volume  are  markedly  fresh  and  sugges- 
tive ;  and  it  need  not  be  denied  that  they  owe  these  qualities  in  no 
small  degree  to  the  stimulus  which  the  writers  derive  from  their  gen- 
eral point  of  view,  and  to  the  systematic  way  in  which  they  utilize 
for  the  purposes  of  logic  the  results  of  functional  psychology.  Pro- 
fessor Dewey's  incisive  criticism  of  Lotze  has  already  been  mentioned. 
Special  reference  might  perhaps  be  made  to  his  criticism  of  Lotze's  met- 
aphors of  ihe  scaffolding  which  is  taken  down  when  the  building  is  com- 
pleted and  the  path  to  the  view-point  at  the  mountain-top.  Such  a 
view  of  our  thinking  procedure,  he  contends,  makes  thought  a  tool  in 
the  external  sense  or  a  merely  formal  activity.  The  work  of  erecting 
should  not  be  set  over  against  the  completed  building  as  a  mere 
means  to  an  end ;  "it  is  the  end  taken  in  process  or  historically.  .  • .  . 
The  outcome  of  thought  is  the  thinking  activity  carried  on  to  its  own 
completion ;  the  activity,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  outcome  taken 
anywhere  short  of  its  own  realization  and  thereby  still  going  on.  .  .  . 
Thinking  as  a  merely  formal  activity  exercised  upon  certain  sensations 
or  images  of  objects  sets  forth  an  absolutely  meaningless  proposition. 
The  psychological  identification  of  thinking  with  the  process  of  asso- 
ciation is  much  nearer  the  truth.  It  is,  indeed,  on  the  way  to  the 
truth.  We  need  only  to  recognize  that  association  is  of  contents  or 
matters  or  meanings,  not  of  ideas  as  bare  existences  or  events ;  and 
that  the  type  of  association  we  call  thinking  differs  from  the  associa- 
tions of  casual  fancy  and  reverie  in  an  element  of  control  by  reference 
to  an  end  which  determines  fitness,  and  thus  the  selection  of  the  asso- 
ciates, to  apprehend  how  completely  thinking  is  a  reconstructive  move- 
ment of  actual  contents  of  experience  in  relation  to  each  other,  and  for 
the  sake  of  a  redintegration  of  a  conflicting  experience  "  (pp.  79-80). 
Miss  Thompson's  analysis  of  "every  live  judgment"  as  involving 
a  situation  in  part  determined  and  taken  for  granted  and  in  part  ques- 
tioned is  very  ably  stated.  In  the  doubt-enquiry  process  of  the  judg- 
ment the  subject  represents  what  is  given  or  taken  for  granted  in  each 
case  j  while  the  predicate  is  that  part  of  the  total  expression  which  is 
taken  as  doubtful  or  tentative.  As  soon  as  the  doubt  arrives  there 
is  always  present  some  sort  of  tentative  solution  ;  and  if  the  subject 
may  be  described  as  fact  or  real,  the  predicate  is  for  the  time  being 
ideal.  The  opposition  of  fact  and  idea  thus  becomes,  a  relative  oppo- 
sition within  the  total  process  of  experience,  and  one  which  is  con- 
tinually being  resolved.  As  Miss  Thompson  puts  it :  "  All  judgment 
is  in  its  earliest  stages  a  question,  but  a  question  is  never  mere  ques- 
tion. There  are  always  present  some  suggestions  of  an  answer,  which 


676  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

makes  the  process  really  a  disjunctive  judgment.  A  question  might 
be  defined  as  a  disjunctive  judgment  in  which  one  member  of  the  dis- 
junction is  expressed  and  the  others  implied.  If  the  process  goes  on 
to  take  the  form  of  affirmation  or  negation,  one  of  the  suggested 
answers  is  selected.  .  .  .  The  question  as  to  whether  a  judgment  turns 
out  to  be  negative  or  positive  is  a  question  of  whether  the  stress  of 
interest  happens  to  fall  on  the  selected  or  on  the  rejected  portions  of 
the  original  disjunction.  Every  determination  of  a  subject  through  a 
predicate  includes  both."  The  same  point  is  well  put  by  Professor 
Dewey  in  his  introductory  essay  in  connection  with  the  growth  of 
science  and  the  passage  of  mere  hypothesis  into  accepted  theory  ;  and 
the  idea  is  instructively  worked  out  in  Dr.  Ashley's  essay  on  "The 
Nature  of  Hypothesis,"  to  which  Professor  Dewey  contributes  an 
interesting  comparison  of  Mill  and  Whewell.  The  whole  discussion 
is  eminently  fresh,  and  seems  to  me  an  illuminative  contribution  to 
logical  theory,  though  I  do  not  believe  that  the  interpretation  given 
is  bound  up  so  closely  with  "  the  practical  and  biological  criterion  of 
fact  "  as  some  of  the  writers  seem  to  suppose. 

Dr.  Gore's  treatment  of  the  relation  of  the  image  to  the  symbolic 
idea  (which  may,  as  one  of  the  essayists  puts  it,  become  a  mere  index- 
sign)  is  one  of  the  most  convincing  parts  of  the  book.  The  idea  as 
working  symbol  connects  itself,  he  contends,  with  the  final  stage  in 
thinking,  when  the  content  of  the  image  has  become  so  familiar  that 
it  acts  as  a  direct,  or,  so  to  speak,  automatic  stimulus.  "We  are 
working  along  lines  of  habitual  activity  so  familiar  that  we  can  work 
almost  in  the  dark.  We  need  no  elaborate  imagery.  Guided  only 
by  the  waving  of  a  signal  flag  or  by  the  shifting  gleam  of  a  semaphore, 
we  thread  our  way  swiftly  through  the  maze  of  tracks  worn  smooth  by 
use  and  habit.  But  suppose  a  new  line  of  habit  is  to  be  constructed. 
No  signal  flags  or  semaphores  will  suffice.  A  detailed  survey  of  the 
proposed  route  must  be  had,  and  here  is  where  imagery  with  a  rich 
and  varied  yet  flexible  sensuous  content,  growing  out  of  previous  sur- 
veys, may  function  in  projecting  and  anticipating  the  new  set  of 
conditions,  and  thus  become  the  stimulus  of  a  new  line  of  habit,  of  a 
new  and  more  far-reaching  meaning.  As  this  new  line  of  habit,  of 
meaning,  gets  into  working  order  with  the  rest  of  the  system,  imagery 
tends  normally  to  decline  again  to  the  role  of  signal  flags  and  sema- 
phores "  (pp.  198-9).  Some  mention  should  also  be  made  of  Dr. 
Stuart's  analysis  of  the  process  of  ethical  deliberation  as  consisting 
essentially  in  the  action  and  reaction  of  the  previously  accepted  moral 
standard  and  the  new  mode  of  conduct  contemplated,  (pp.  196-202). 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  677 

But  it  would  obviously  be  impossible  in  a  notice  like  the  present  to 
enumerate  all  the  points  of  interest  in  the  volume.  The  specimens 
given  may  suffice  to  suggest  how  much  stimulus  and  instruction  it 
provides  for  all  genuine  students  of  logic. 

A.  SETH  PRINGLE-PATTISON. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  EDINBURGH. 


)  Psychologic  des  Sctidnen  nnd  tier  Kunst  ;  Erster  Teil, 
Grundlegung  der  ^sthetik.  Von  THEODOR  LIPPS.  Hamburg  und 
Leipzig,  Voss,  1903.  —  pp.  xiii,  60  1. 

Readers  of  Dr.  Lipps's  numerous  and  stimulating  monographs  on 
aesthetic  subjects  will  be  prepared  to  give  a  cordial  welcome  to  this 
massive  systematic  treatise  of  which  the  first  volume  is  now  before  us. 
The  author's  central  principle  of  Einfiihlung,  and  many  details  of  his 
views  on  the  aesthetics  of  spatial  forms,  of  musical  harmony,  of  humor 
and  the  comic,  and  of  tragedy,  have  found  expression  from  time  to 
time  ;  and,  as  editor  of  the  Beitrdge  zur  ^Lsthetik,  he  has  given  addi- 
tional evidence  of  interest  in  this  department.  This  volume  and  its 
successor  will  furnish  a  more  comprehensive  treatment  of  aesthetic 
problems  from  the  psychological  standpoint  than  has  yet  appeared  ; 
and,  while  the  central  principle  of  Einfuhlung  is  everywhere  applied, 
the  value  of  the  book  does  not  depend  solely  upon  one's  estimate  of 
that  principle.  For  there  is  analysis  of  aesthetic  form  in  general,  of 
space  forms,  of  rhythm,  of  color  and  sound,  and  of  the  sublime  and 
other  aesthetic  species,  which  is  preliminary  to  their  interpretation. 
And  this  analysis  is  acute,  sympathetic,  and  usually,  if  not  always, 
convincing.  Since  Kostlin's  masterly  analysis  of  aesthetic  form,  no  such 
important  study  of  these  problems  has  appeared,  and  as  compared 
with  Kostlin's  work  this  proceeds  more  definitely  from  a  psycholog- 
ical standpoint,  as  is  natural  from  the  author  of  the  Grundtatsachen 
des  Seelenlebens. 

As  already  indicated,  the  standpoint  and  method  of  the  book  are 
psychological.  ^Esthetics  is  defined  as  the  science  of  the  beautiful. 
But  an  object  is  called  beautiful,  if  it  wakens  or  is  adapted  to  waken  in 
one  a  peculiar  feeling.  This  effect,  produced  by  certain  objects,  it  is 
the  task  of  aesthetics  to  analyze,  describe  and  delimit,  and  then  to 
explain.  As  such  a  science,  aesthetics  is  a  discipline  of  applied  psy- 
chology. What,  then,  becomes  of  the  common  designation  of  aes- 
thetics as  a  normative  science,  studying  not  what  is,  but  what  ought  to 
be  ?  The  answer  is  simple  :  If  we  know  the  conditions  for  producing 
the  feeling  in  question,  we  have  the  precepts  which  must  be  fulfilled 


678  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

if  the  effect  is  to  be  produced.  Insight  into  facts  becomes  here,  as  in 
all  cases  where  a  theory  and  a  technique  stand  over  against  each  other, 
at  the  same  time  a  precept  for  aesthetic  technique.  And  if  it  be  ob- 
jected from  another  quarter  that  the  artist  is  free,  and  that  no  one  has 
any  right  to  give  precepts  to  one  whose  sole  law  is  to  live  out  his  in- 
dividuality with  no  limitations,  the  answer  is  again  simple.  It  is  that 
all  this  is  true  provided  we  ask  first :  "  Who  is  an  '  artist '  ?  "  When 
and  in  how  far  is  he  who  so  calls  himself,  or  is  so  called,  an  artist  ? 
How  far  has  he  shown  himself  such  in  a  given  case?  Normative 
aesthetics  has  its  secured  place  in  the  answer  to  these  questions. 

If  the  volume  were  viewed  as  a  treatise  of  applied  psychology,  it  would 
be  my  first  criticism  that  the  psychology  is  solely  individual  psychology. 
Granting  that  the  aesthetic  feeling  is  always  the  feeling  of  some  indi- 
vidual, it  is  nevertheless  possible,  and  I  should  hold  certain,  that  this 
feeling  cannot  be  fully  explained  by  considering  solely  the  individual 
—  observer,  artist,  critic  —  and  his  object.  Nor  is  the  additional  factor 
supplied  entirely  by  the  history  of  art,  as  usually  understood.  Social 
psychology  has  a  distinct  line  of  approach  and  a  distinct  contribution 
to  make  toward  the  explanation  of  the  aesthetic  feeling,  some  aspects 
of  which  I  have  attempted  elsewhere  to  indicate.  In  this  connection 
another  criticism  may  also  be  made,  which,  while  itself  a  detail,  also 
relates  itself  to  the  general  standpoint  and  method.  No  examination 
is  made  of  the  relation  of  sexual  to  aesthetic  feeling.  The  topic  is 
mentioned  in  connection  with  the  discussion  of  the  beauty  of  the 
human  body  (pp.  148  f. ),  but  is  dismissed  with  the  dictum  :  "The 
sexual  has  nothing,  not  even  the  least  possible,  to  do  with  the  aesthetic. 
Those  who  employ  it  for  the  explanation  of  the  aesthetic  feeling  know 
as  little  of  the  meaning  of  beauty  and  aesthetic  contemplation  as  those 
who  warn  against  l  nudity  '  in  art,  because  they  fear  for  morality,  even 
in  the  case  of  chaste  nudity  ;  first  for  their  own  morality,  then  for  that 
of  others  to  whom  they  ascribe  their  own  crudity. "  It  is  doubtless 
true  that  the  aesthetic  as  such  is  not  the  sexual  as  such,  but  to  say  that 
the  sexual  has  not  the  least  to  do  with  the  aesthetic  is  to  leave  unex- 
plained the  favorite  theme  of  all  romance,  of  modern  drama,  of  lyric 
poetry,  not  to  speak  of  the  relations  between  the  lover  and  the  lover 
of  beauty  which  had  such  a  fascination  for  Plato. 

The  volume  is  divided  into  six  nearly  equal  sections,  dealing  respec- 
tively with  the  general  principles  of  aesthetic  form  ;  man  and  nature  ; 
aesthetics  of  space  ;  rhythm ;  color,  tone,  and  word  ;  the  modifica- 
tions of  the  beautiful,  including  the  sublime,  the  tragic,  the  comic, 
humor,  the  ugly,  and  certain  mixed  aesthetic  feelings. 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  .  679 

The  formal  aesthetic  principles,  —  unity,  unity  in  variety,  '  monar- 
chical '  subordination  (not  of  parts  under  the  whole,  but  of  certain  parts 
under  some  other,  as  the  unaccented  beneath  the  accented  beat  in 
rhythm),  — do  not  call  for  special  comment.  The  analysis  is  much 
less  detailed  here  than  that  of  Kostlin.  The  brief  general  discussion 
of  pleasure  which  is  prefixed  to  the  consideration  of  the  formal  princi- 
ples, is  excellent.  For  while  recognizing  fully  the  pleasurable  aspect 
of  aesthetic  feeling,  the  author  does  not  commit  the  fallacy  of  hedo-4 
nistic  aesthetics  (as  of  hedonistic  ethics),  and  regard  the  aesthetic  con- 
sciousness as  solely  a  species  of  pleasure.  Pleasure  is  an  accompanying 
symptom  of  a  total  process,  viz. ,  a  process  of  apperception  in  which  there 
is  on  the  part  of  the  object  a  laying  claim  to  our  attention,  a  power  to 
interest,  and  on  the  part  of  the  mind  a  turning  to  the  object  and  an 
apperception  of  it  with  especial  ease.  Pleasure  is  not  the  cause  of  the 
interest,  nor  is  the  apperception  the  cause  of  the  pleasure  ;  rather 
pleasure  "  is  the  accompanying  symptom  of  the  ease  with  which  the 
mind  turns  toward  its  object  in  such  cases. ' '  Otherwise  stated,  pleas- 
ure follows  in  proportion  as  psychical  processes  are  '  natural '  to  the 
mind,  or  as  they  give  the  mind  opportunity  to  evince  itself.  This 
does  not  differ  essentially  from  the  two  sources  of  aesthetic  pleasure 
as  given  by  Kostlin,  stimulation  and  ease  of  apperception ;  or  from 
Kant's  '  furtherance  of  (psychical)  life  in  a  free  play  of  the  mental 
powers. '  Indeed,  it  is  matter  for  congratulation  if  certain  of  the  more 
fundamental  principles  are  gaining  an  assured  acceptance.  But 
Lipps's  formulation  and  enforcement  of  the  position  is  especially  good. 

The  heart  of  the  book  is  in  the  second  section,  for  here  we  have  the 
doctrine  of  Einfuhlung  introduced.  Objects  aesthetically  valuable 
have  not  merely  a  form ;  they  have  also  a  content.  If  one  would 
know  what  content  is  valuable,  let  him  reflect  on  what  he  values  in 
his  own  experience.  He  will  find  this  to  be  his  activity,  his  '  doing. ' 
The  feeling  which  accompanies  this  activity  of  the  self  is  pleasurable 
self-feeling  or,  otherwise,  a  Selbstwertgefiihl, — feeling  in  which  one 
experiences  the  value  of  self.  So  far  as  this  feeling  is  referred  to  my 
own  self,  it  is  not  aesthetic  value,  for  aesthetic  value  is  value  of  some 
object  distinct  from  me.  But  inasmuch  as  what  I  value  in  myself  I 
value  also  when  I  find  it  in  another,  it  follows  that  when  I  find  life 
actual  or  potential  in  another  I  value  it.  This  is  the  essence  of  aes- 
thetic feeling.  "All  enjoyment  of  beauty  is  an  impression  of  the 
quality  of  life,  actual  or  potential,  which  lies  in  an  object ;  and  all 
ugliness  is  in  its  ultimate  nature,  negation,  defect  of  life,  obstruction, 
pining  away,  destruction,  death"  (pp.  96-102).  The  psyphology 


680  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

of  the  process  by  which  I  enter  into  the  movements  or  other  life  ex- 
pressions of  objects  is  to  be  distinguished  from  "inner  imitation," 
for  in  Einfuhlung  proper  there  is  no  copying  of  an  already  present 
image.  Nor  is  the  process  that  of  imagining  the  motions,  etc.,  of  the 
object.  It  is  rather  an  experiencing  of  the  real  activities  which  neces- 
sarily belong  to  an  object  of  the  imagination.  It  may  be  designated 
as  '  Sympathy,'  and  the  object  regarded  as  expressing  life  (or  its 
antithesis  as  in  the  ugly)  may  be  called  a  '  Symbol. '  Subsequent 
chapters  apply  this  conception  of  Einfuhlung  to  bodily  forms  and 
movements,  and  to  the  forces  and  objects  of  nature,  to  spatial  forms, 
and  to  the  other  aesthetic  fields  indicated  in  the  main  divisions  of  the 
book  as  already  given.  It  is  evidently  easier  to  make  the  application 
to  the  human  body  than  to  the  colors ;  it  is  evidently  easier  to  find 
in  rhythm  and  music  a  flow  of  feeling  than  to  prove  that  the  principle 
is  exclusively  responsible  for  all  the  aesthetic  value  of  tones  and  dis- 
cords ;  but  there  is  manifest  everywhere  psychological  acumen  and 
aesthetic  judgment. 

What  is  to  be  said,  in  general,  as  to  the  principle  of  Einfuhlung? 
It  is,  in  the  first  place,  scarcely  to  be  disputed  that  the  most  profound 
aesthetic  values  involve  the  humanly  significant  as  their  content.  In 
the  second  place,  the  formal  aspects  of  beauty,  as  noticed  above,  have 
quite  generally  been  traced  to  their  power  to  stimulate  or  promote 
'life.'  In  these  two  phases  of  the  problem,  the  question  would  be 
chiefly  as  to  the  appropriateness  of  the  term  used  to  describe  the 
process.  One  objection  to  this  term,  in  my  opinion,  is  that  is  seems 
almost  inevitably  to  convey  the  meaning  of  a  sort  of  transfer  of  feel- 
ing from  the  self  over  into  the  object,  and,  in  the  case  of  aesthetic 
forms,  of  a  conscious  recognition  of  freedom,  ease,  or  other  life  qual- 
ities in  a  geometric  form.  Lipps  tries  to  avoid  these  implications  in 
his  explanations,  but  the  word  certainly  suggests  them.  The  term 
'  sympathy  '  is  liable  to  a  similar  objection.  There  is  doubtless  feeling 
in  the  aesthetic  psychosis ;  this  feeling  further  is  regarded  as  the 
property  of  the  object ;  so  far  we  all  agree  since  Kant.  The  point 
still  at  issue  is  as  to  the  psychology  of  this  attitude,  and  I  do  not  think 
this  point  can  be  satisfactorily  settled  without,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
fuller  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  aesthetic  to  the  other  attitudes, 
theoretical  and  practical,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  consideration  of 
the  social  aspects  of  the  judgment. 

The  section  dealing  with  geometrical  forms  presents  views  and 
analyses  already  published  by  the  author.  The  section  on  rhythm, 
so  far  as  I  am  aware,  is  new,  and  is  admirable  in  its  analysis.  Here, 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  68 1 

too,  some  reference  to  the  work  of  Bucher  is  necessary  to  bring  out  the 
full  significance  of  rhythm  as  a  life  activity.  No  such  reference  is 
made,  however.  In  fact,  the  author  makes  no  citation  in  the  volume 
of  any  writings  except  his  own,  and  refers  to  no  writer  by  name,  so  far 
as  I  have  observed,  although  there  is  occasional  allusion  to  other 
theories.  From  the  treatment  of  musical  tones  which  makes  them 
rhythms,  and  makes  their  harmony  depend  upon  coincidences  of 
rhythms,  I  think  most  psychologists  would  completely  dissent.  Psy- 
chological analysis  seems  here  to  be  sacrificed  to  a  theory. 

The  book  is  certainly  to  be  characterized  as  a  highly  important  and 
valuable  contribution  to  the  scientific  treatment  of  aesthetics.  It  should 
do  much  to  lift  the  study  out  of  the  region  of  vagueness  into  the  light 
of  clear  and  definite  method.  The  second  volume,  which  the  author 
hopes  to  present  soon,  is  to  treat  aesthetic  contemplation,  especially  of 
the  work  of  art,  and  to  give  an  introduction  to  the  theory  of  the  par- 
ticular arts,  so  far  as  this  has  not  been  given  in  the  present  volume. 

JAMES  H.  TUFTS. 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

Rthik  :  eine  Untersuchung  der  Tatsachen  und  Gesetzc  dcs  sittlichen 
Lebens.  Von  WILHELM  WUNDT.  Dritte  umgearbeitete  Auflage. 
Zwei  Bande.  Stuttgart,  Verlag  von  Ferdinand  Enke,  1903. — 
PP-  x,  523;  vi,  409. 

"  The  third  edition  of  this  work  is  in  many  places  entirely  rewritten, 
in  others  supplemented  by  additions.  Least  material  are  these  altera- 
tions in  the  First  Part.  Aside  from  the  consideration  given  to  the 
more  important  recent  literature  in  the  history  of  religion  and  the 
history  of  custom,  I  have  here  confined  myself  to  working  out  more 
clearly  the  views  as  to  the  relation  of  myth,  religion,  and  custom  to 
each  other  and  to  the  development  of  the  moral  life.  The  Second 
Part  is  almost  completely  rewritten.  It  appeared  to  me  desirable  to 
change  this  part  from  a  history  of  philosophical  ethics,  which  it 
essentially  was  before,  rather  into  an  actual  history  of  moral  views  of 
life,  and  accordingly  above  all  to  trace  the  relations  of  philosophical 
systems  to  contemporaneous  culture-movements.  In  the  Third  Part 
the  doctrine  of  the  will  has  been  revised  in  conformity  to  the  advances 
of  recent  years  and  to  the  partial  change  in  my  own  views  on  this  sub- 
ject. Consequently  the  discussions  of  moral  motives,  ends,  and  norms 
have  undergone  numerous  alterations.  In  the  last  part,  finally,  I  have 
endeavored  to  substitute  for  the  merely  general  hints,  given  in  the 
previous  editions,  on  the  practical  questions  of  the  moral  life,  more 


682  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

detailed  and  definite  discussions.  If  knowledge  of  the  truth  is  the  goal 
of  every  scientific  work,  whatever  sphere  it  may  belong  to,  then  for 
the  ethicist,  if  he  is  to  do  justice  to  his  subject,  this  aspiration  is  natu- 
rally combined  before  all  with  the  duty  of  truth  to  himself  and  of 
unreserved  frankness  in  the  expression  of  his  convictions.  I  have 
earnestly  tried,  especially  in  the  discussions  of  the  religious  and  social 
problem,  to  fulfill  this  duty  "  (I,  p.  vi).  This  "  Preface  to  the  Third 
Edition  ' '  gives  an  accurate  statement  of  the  relation  of  this  edition  to 
the  preceding  ones. 

The  First  Part  of  the  work,  therefore,  retains  all  that  has  been  char- 
acteristic of  this  division  of  the  book.  We  find  here  the  same  defi- 
nition of  religion.  "  All  ideas  and  feelings  are  religious,  which  refer 
to  an  ideal  existence,  an  existence  that  fully  corresponds  to  the  wishes 
and  requirements  of  the  human  mind"  (I,  p.  50,  Eng.  translation  of 
the  2d  edition,  I,  p.  59).  It  is  easy  to  see  how  with  this  definition 
of  religion  there  should  be  such  an  intimate  relation  between  religion 
and  morality  as  is  contended  for  in  this  book.  The  two  would  be  to 
a  large  extent  identical.  But  surely  the  definition  is  both  too  broad 
and  too  narrow.  It  would  give  a  religious  character  to  all  Utopian 
fancies,  while  it  confessedly  excludes  fetichism  and  spiritism  from  the 
realm  of  religious  phenomena  ! 

Again,  we  find  it  still  maintained  that  "in  the  great  majority  of 
cases,  religious  ideas  appear  to  constitute  the  primary  sources  from 
which  custom  has  been  derived  "  (I,  p.  113;  English  translation  of 
the  2d  edition,  I,  p.  134).  This  seems  a  strange  statement  when  for 
Wundt  what  differentiates  custom  from  usage  is  the  obligatoriness  of 
the  former.  Surely  in  civilized  countries  a  very  large  part  of  the 
current  customs,  that  is,  of  obligatory  usages,  can  be  traced  back  to 
sources  that  have  no  religious  significance.  The  wearing  of  trousers 
by  us  men  is  about  as  obligatory  as  the  giving  of  tips.  Wundt  con- 
siders the  latter  a  custom  with  a  religious  origin.  The  former  is  by 
implication  merely  a  usage,  for  it  does  not  have  a  religious  origin. 
At  least  it  would  be  interesting  to  have  Wundt  give  us  the  religious 
history  of  culottism. 

But  while  there  may  be  many  objections  raised  to  the  details  pre- 
sented in  this  part  of  Wundt's  work,  it  remains  true  that  we  have  here 
one  of  the  most  valuable  discussions  to  be  found  anywhere  of  the  facts 
of  the  moral  life. 

The  Second  Part,  which  deals  with  the' development  of  moral  views 
of  the  world,  is  the  one  which  will  attract  the  most  attention  to  this 
edition.  Those  acquainted  with  the  former  editions  of  the  Ethik  have 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  683 

probably  felt  that  the  Second  Part  was  most  unsatisfactory.  Neither 
the  beginner  nor  the  advanced  student  could  get  from  it  what  he 
needed.  In  this  edition,  however,  the  Second  Part  becomes  of  the 
greatest  value  both  to  the  specialist  and  to  the  general  reader.  This 
change  of  value  is  brought  about  by  changing  the  subject-matter 
treated.  As  the  Preface  says,  we  have  here  no  longer  a  history  of 
ethical  systems  but  a  history  of  moral  views  of  life  and  a  statement  of 
the  connection  of  these  views  with  the  contemporary  movements  of 
culture.  The  result  is  that  the  student  finds  here  an  invaluable  help 
toward  the  understanding  of  the  historical  situations  that  gave  rise  to 
different  ethical  theories.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  second  and 
third  chapters,  dealing  with  the  Christian  and  the  modern  moral 
theories. 

In  treating  of  ancient  moral  theories,  Professor  Wundt  seems  to  lay 
too  much  stress  on  the  social  solidarity  of  Greek  life,  while  as  a  matter 
of  fact  the  Greek  was  of  all  men  the  most  individualistic.  It  is  true 
that  for  the  Greek  the  political  side  of  life  was  all-important.  His 
activity  was  a  social  activity ;  and  yet  for  all  that  he  was  a  transcendent 
egoist.  Society  was  for  him  rather  a  means  than  an  end.  The 
sophists,  therefore,  were  probably  truer  exponents  of  the  Greek  point 
of  view  than  were  Socrates  and  Plato.  At  any  rate,  it  would  be  hard 
to  see  how  the  selfish  Greek  could  have  found  his  views  of  life  truly 
reflected  in  Plato's  Republic.  In  Aristotle  we  meet  with  what  is 
perhaps  a  truer  representation  of  the  Greek  attitude.  Here  we  see 
man  regarded  as  indeed  a  political  animal,  but  in  spite  of  this  fact  we 
have  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  a  predominantly  individualistic  theory 
of  morality.  Aristotle's  ideal  man  was  one  who  of  course  lived  a  social 
life,  but  also  one  whose  aspirations  were  decidedly  self-centered.  De- 
votion to  the  state  or  to  humanity  was  not  one  of  the  virtues  discussed 
in  this  treatise  on  ethics. 

The  chapter  on  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  and  the  changes  it 
underwent  is  a  masterpiece  of  clearness  and  conciseness.  The  life- 
ideal  of  primitive  Christianity  is  presented  as  differing  radically  from 
that  of  modern  Christianity.  Here  Professor  Wundt  follows  the  lead- 
ing historians  of  this  great  movement,  who  decline  to  take  the  words 
of  Jesus  in  the  metaphorical  sense  that  orthodoxy  gives  them.  This 
view  has  been  made  familiar  to  the  English  reader  by  the  translations 
of  Tolstoy's  religious  works.  "  One  can  well  agree  with  Leo  Tolstoy 
in  regarding  those  wonderful  chapters  of  the  Gospel  of  Matthew, 
in  which  Jesus  preaches  with  peculiar  emphasis  his  doctrine  to  the 
assembled  multitude,  as  the  essential  contents  of  this  new  life-ideal ; 


684  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

and  one  can  also  admit  that  he  is  right  —  whether  or  not  his  concep- 
tion here  and  there  is  erroneous  in  detail  —  when  he  says  that  these 
words  must  be  taken  just  as  they  are  written,  literally,  without  arbi- 
trary re-interpretation"  (p.  330).  In  this  sermon  on  the  mount 
Wundt  sees  no  brand-new  moral  ideas.  The  Stoics  had  long  ago  al- 
ready praised  love  of  neighbor,  kindness  without  reference  to  recom- 
pense, helpfulness,  and  mercy  without  respect  to  persons,  as  the  highest 
virtues.  "In  two  respects,  however,  this  primitive  Christian  ethics 
was  a  new,  peculiar  phenomenon.  One  was  the  unconditioned,  ab- 
solute character  of  these  moral  commands,  repudiating  all  exter- 
nal limitation.  .  .  .  This  gives  to  primitive  Christian  morality  that 
homely  sublimity  with  which  neither  the  dialectical  subtilty  of  the 
Platonic  Socrates  nor  the  rhetorical  pomp  of  the  Stoics  can  compare. 
It  gives  to  this  morality,  however,  at  the  same  time,  the  impression 
of  an  ideal  of  life  which  can  arise  and  be  approximately  carried  out 
only  in  a  narrow  community  of  like-minded  men,  and  which,  the 
moment  the  attempt  is  made  to  realize  it  in  intercourse  with  the  larger 
world  outside,  must  lose  its  validity  in  face  of  the  compelling  power 
of  reality.  The  second  feature  that  distinguishes  this  ideal  of  life  is 
that  it  is  the  immediate  expression  of  a  religious  feeling  that  fills  the 
whole  man.  That  saying  of  Jesus  to  the  scribe  :  Thou  shalt  love  the 
Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all 
thy  mind,  and  with  all  thy  strength  :  this  is  the  first  commandment. 
And  the  second  is  like,  namely  this,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as 
thyself  (Mark  12,  30),  — this  saying  throws  a  clear  light  on  the  over- 
flowing religious  enthusiasm,  in  which  the  love  of  God  and  the  love  of 
neighbor  fuse  into  a  single  feeling  of  religious  devotion  "  (pp.  330- 
i).  Ideals,  however,  can  arise  only  where  there  is  faith  in  the  possi- 
bility of  realizing  them.  Such  faith  in  such  ideals  could  never  have 
grown  up  in  the  soil  of  mere  moral  demands,  or  even  of  a  general  be- 
lief in  providence  like  that  of  the  Stoics ;  it  could  only  have  arisen  on 
those  confident  hopes  that  filled  the  first  Christians.  These  hopes 
centered  in  the  Messianic  idea.  "  Without  this  firm  faith  in  the  com- 
ing Messiah,  the  ethics  of  primitive  Christianity  would  never  have  been 
what  it  is :  the  life-ideal  of  a  man  who  completely  forgets  himself 
in  his  devotion  to  humanity.  But  of  course  an  ideal  which  owes  its 
origin  to  the  delusive  phantoms  of  a  highly  developed  need  of  happi- 
ness, cannot  itself  possibly  remain  free  from  the  turbidities  of  its 
source.  Over  against  the  extremely  intense  moral  force  that  is  here 
operative  there  stands  an  extremely  aggravated  selfishness,  an  insati- 
able need  of  happiness  which  would  infinitely  enhance  the  pleasure  of 


No.  6.]  REVIEWS   OF  BOOKS.  685 

life.  However,  just  this  is  the  psychological  secret  of  human  nature, 
which  yet  is  no  secret  but  is  bound  up  with  its  most  every-day  weak- 
nesses and  excellences,  the  secret  that  the  good  has  the  evil  as  its  pre- 
supposition. This  birth  of  the  highest  from  the  lowest,  of  the  most 
exalted  ideals  from  the  vulgarest  (gemeinsten)  motives  —  from  delusion 
and  selfishness  —  this  is  no  mysterious  conflict  of  superhuman  beings 
or  of  cosmic  forces,  as  mythology  and  mysticism  pictures  it,  but  it  is 
the  work  of  an  orderly  psychological  process,  which  is  peculiar  to  the 
human  consciousness  from  its  simplest  to  its  most  developed  activities. 
As  the  contrast  of  the  feelings  make  sour  every-day  life  tolerable,  and, 
if  luck  will  have  it,  pleasant,  so  it  lends  its  help  in  the  great  crises  of 
history  to  the  new  creations  of  the  moral  consciousness.  It  is  the 
same  principle  of  the  heterogony  of  ends  that,  just  because  it  is  bound 
up  with  the  most  intimate  nature  of  the  psychic  life,  has  met  us  al- 
ready at  all  the  stages  of  religious  and  moral  development,  —  it  is  the 
same  principle  which  here,  at  this  deeply  significant  crisis  of  spiritual 
history,  meets  us  again  with  overwhelming  power  just  because  of  the 
immense  force  of  the  contrasts  which  it  binds  together"  (I,  pp. 

332-3)- 

The  account  Professor  Wundt  gives  of  the  influence  of  Graeco- 
Roman  culture  upon  Christianity  follows  that  given  by  Harnack  in 
his  great  work.  The  general  reader  will  find  here  an  excellent  suc- 
cinct statement  of  the  development  of  the  Christian  thought  and  prac- 
tice through  this  formative  period  of  Catholic  doctrine. 

The  Christian  middle  ages  are  discussed  in  eighteen  pages,  and  here 
again  the  impression  left  is  clear  and  accurate.  The  reader  does  not 
get  the  details  of  the  ethical  views  propounded  by  the  mediaeval 
thinkers,  but  he  does  obtain  very  clarifying  statements  of  the  general 
tendencies  of  the  time,  and  of  the  spirit  that  pervaded  these  thinkers. 
The  same  holds  true  of  the  sections  devoted  to  the  Reformation  and  to 
the  Renaissance. 

In  the  chapter  on  modern  times,  the  general  characterization  of 
broad  tendencies  is  curiously  blended  with  more  or  less  detailed  ex- 
position of  certain  ethical  systems.  It  would  seem  as  if  here  Professor 
Wundt  had  lost  somewhat  of  his  fine  sense  of  proportion.  Thus,  while 
he  gives  to  Hegel  only  three  pages  of  his  work,  he  gives  to  Krause 
four  and  to  Schleiermacher  nine  pages.  Comte  gets  a  bare  five,  but 
Nietzsche  gets  almost  ten.  Leslie  Stephen  has  a  page,  while  Sidg- 
wick  is  dismissed  in  one  line  of  a  footnote.  Butler,  like  Sidgwick,  is 
relegated  to  a  short  footnote,  and  there  we  learn  that  before  Paley's 
time  Butler  advocated,  somewhat  more  temperately  than  Paley,  Paley's 


686  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW, 

theological  Utilitarianism  !   (I,  p.  402).     Green  and  Martineau  are 
ignored. 

The  discussion  of  Hume  follows  traditional  lines.  Hume's  sympa- 
thy has  an  egoistic  basis,  and  his  justice  is  also  egoistic  in  origin  (I, 
pp.  417-20),  whereas  Hume  himself  says,  and  italicises  the  saying, 
that  "  '/&  \only  from  the  selfishness  and  confined  generosity  of  men , 
along  with  the  scanty  provision  nature  had  made  for  his  wants,  that 
justice  derives  its  origin"  (Treatise,  Selby-Bigge's  ed.,  p.  495). 

The  account  of  Bentham's  views  is  evidently  based  on  Dumont's 
redaction  of  Bentham's  work,  rather  than  on  Bentham's  own  Intro- 
duction to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation  and  on  his  Deontology. 

Spencer's  doctrine  as  to  the  relation  between  egoism  and  altruism 
seems  to  be  taken  from  the  eleventh  chapter  of  the  Data  of  Ethics, 
while  the  twelfth  chapter,  which  supplements  and  to  a  certain  extent 
offsets  the  preceding  chapter,  is  left  out  of  the  reckoning.  This  is  the 
only  way  in  which  one  can  account  for  the  statement  of  Wundt  that 
Spencer  holds  to  the  "gradual  development  of  altruism  out  of  egoism  ' ' 
(I,  p.  495).  The  twelfth  chapter  of  the  Data  begins  with  the  state- 
ment that  "  from  the  dawn  of  life,  altruism  has  been  no  less  essential 
than  egoism."  Though  Spencer  goes  on  to  say  that  "  primarily  it  is 
^dependent  on  egoism,  yet  secondarily  egoism  is  dependent  on  it," 
two  pages  further  on  he  makes  the  flat  assertion  that  "self-sacrifice, 
then,  is  no  less  primordial  than  self-preservation. ' '  It  may  be  diffi- 
cult to  get  anything  like  consistency  from  Spencer  on  this  point,  but 
at  any  rate  both  sides  of  Spencer's  view  should  be  stated  even  if  the 
expositor  cannot  reconcile  them. 

But  in  spite  of  these  and  other  defects  in  the  presentation  of  his- 
torical views,  it  may  be  said  that  for  a  general  introduction  to  the 
history  of  ethics,  not  for  an  actual  history  of  ethical  theories,  there  is 
no  other  work  to  be  named  along  with  this.  The  reader  can  get  from 
it  a  satisfactory  conception  of  the  intellectual  atmosphere  in  which  the 
individual  ethical  thinkers  lived  and  worked,  and  which  helped  deter- 
mine their  views. 

The  limits  of  this  review  make  it  impossible  to  examine  Parts  III 
and  IV  of  this  treatise.  The  Preface  quoted  above  fortunately  makes 
it  unnecessary. 

Two  full  indices,  a  Namenverzeichnis  arid  a  Sachregister,  make  it 
easy  to  use  the  volumes  for  consultation  and  reference. 

EVANDER  BRADLEY   McGiLVARY. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


SUMMARIES   OF   ARTICLES. 

[ABBREVIATIONS.—  Am.  J.  Ps.  =  American  Journal  of  Psychology ;  Am.  J. 
Th.  =  The  American  Journal  of  Theology;  Ar.  Je  Ps.  =  Archives  de  Psychologie  ; 
Ar.  f.  G.  Ph.  =  Archiv  fur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic ;  Ar.  f.  sys.  Ph.  =  Ar- 
chiv  fur  systematische  Philosophic  ;  Br.  J.  Ps.  =  The  British  Journal  of  Psychology  ; 
Int.  J.  E '.  =  International  Journal  of  Ethics ;  J.  de  Psych.  =  Journal  de  Psy- 
chologie ;  Psych.  Rev.  =  Psychological  Review ;  Rev.  de  Met.  =  Revue  de  Meta- 
physique  ;  Rev.  Neo-Sc.=  Revue  Neo-Scolastique  ;  Rev.  Ph.  =  Revue  Philosophique  ; 
R.  d.  Fil.=Rivista  di  Filosofia  e  Scienze  Affini  ;  V.  f.  w.  Ph.  =  Vierteljahrs- 
schrift  fiir  ivissenschafiliche  Philosophic ;  Z.  f.  Ph.  u.  ph.  Kr.  =  Zeitschrift  fur 
Philosophic  und  philosophise  he  Kritik ;  Z.  f.  Psych,  u.  Phys.  =  Zeitschrift  fiir 
Psychologie  und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane.  — Other  titles  are  self-explanatory.] 

LOGIC   AND   METAPHYSICS. 

Deception  and  Reality.     A.  KIRSCHMANN.     Am.  J.  Ps.,  XIV,  3-4,     pp. 
24-41. 

The  question  :  What  is  reality  ?  is  not  a  legitimate  one  ;  it  is  in  itself 
a  vicious  circle.  We  are  in  the  midst  of  realities  and  the  question  that 
confronts  us  is  :  Is  there  anything  unreal  and  what  is  unreal  ?  The  notion 
that  the  senses  deceive  us  is  a  mistaken  one  :  the  senses  cannot  deceive  us, 
but  our  interpretation  of  what  they  give  us  is  often  incorrect.  Certainty  is 
confined  to  mathematical  relations  and  to  the  actual,  the  present,  content 
of  consciousness.  The  perceptions  in  dreams,  hallucinations,  and  optical 
illusions  are  as  '  real  '  as  those  of  ordinary  life  ;  their  '  deception  '  depends 
on  the  interpretation  we  put  upon  them.  The  reality  of  an  impression 
obviously  cannot  be  based  on  the  reality  of  the  object  to  which  it  is  referred. 
We  can  have  certain  knowledge  only  about  what  takes  place  in  our  own 
consciousness,  but  there  is  an  unlimited  sphere  of  belief.  The  terms  '  real ' 
and  'reality'  are  used  ambiguously;  all  states  of  consciousness  are  real, 
but  there  are  different  kinds  of  reality.  A  memory  image  is  as  real  as  a 
perception,  but  in  a  different  sense.  The  term  '  Realism  '  is  always  mislead- 
ing ;  for  it  suggests  an  opposite  contrary  to  the  real,  and  no  such  opposite  is 
possible.  But  if  you  identify  the  real  with  the  true,  then  the  opposite  of 
truth,  lying,  may  be  called  unreal ;  but  what  is  unreal  here  is  still  the 
meaning  attributed  to  the  action  or  words,  and  not  the  action  or  words  as 
states  of  consciousness.  The  lie  or  untruth  or  unreal  is  never  a  matter  of 
fact  but  a  matter  of  interpretation.  There  can  be  nothing  unreal  but  the 
product  of  a  human  lie,  and  hence  nothing  unreal  without  the  will  to  pro- 
duce such  by  lying.  If  we  should  never  lie,  there  would  be  no  error. 
Even  errors  in  a  mathematical  deduction  reduce  to  statements  that  some- 

687 


688  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

thing  is  certain  or  necessary  which  is  not  so.  Error  is  so  universal  because 
men  are  unwilling  to  admit  the  narrowness  of  their  knowledge,  and  insist 
on  substituting  the  agreeable  for  the  true.  Objectivity  consists  in  adher- 
ence to  subjective  truth.  On  the  ethical  side,  the  only  sound  principle  is  to 
have  no  principles  but  to  act  according  to  the  sense  of  truth.  As  for  peda- 
gogy, we  should  have  no  positive  ideals  of  education.  The  best  method  is 
negative  and  preventative, — the  elimination  of  falsehood  and  error.  This 
involves  the  cultivation  of  originality.  Education  to  perfect  truthfulness  is 
the  only  pedagogical  ideal  we  can  admit ;  the  real  may  safely  be  left  to 
nature.  C.  E.  GALLOWAY. 

Die  Grundlagen  der  modernen  Physik  und  ihre  Beziehung  zu  den  neuesten 
Ergebnissen  der  Forschung.  W.  WIEN.  Deutsche  Revue,  XXIX,  i, 
PP-  39-5 I- 

Physicists  of  the  last  generation  were  fully  convinced  that  such  scientific 
generalizations  as  the  laws  of  the  conservation  of  energy  and  the  persistence 
of  matter  were  ultimate  and  universally  valid  propositions.  This  point  has 
become  a  matter  of  doubt,  however,  among  scientists  of  the  present,  espe- 
cially as  a  result  of  the  discovery  of  the  Roentgen  rays  and  the  more  recent 
discovery  of  the  radio-active  substances.  Some  of  the  emanations  from 
these  substances  seem  to  be  composed  of  particles  whose  mass  cannot  be 
more  than  one  thousandth  that  of  a  hydrogen  atom,  and  whose  velocity  is 
so  great  that  the  usual  formula  for  kinetic  energy  (E=  \MV'i~)  seems  not  to 
hold.  Already  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  concept  of  electric  charge 
can  be  substituted  for  that  of  mass,  thus  reducing  mechanics  to  a  branch 
of  electromagnetism.  For  epistemology,  these  results  are  not  less  important 
than  for  science.  They  seem  to  show  that  our  so-called  laws  of  nature  are 
merely  pictures  which  we  make  to  represent  nature,  and  which  depend  on 
inner  logical  relationships  as  much  as  on  external  facts.  They  are  not  ulti- 
mate, but  mere  approximations  to  the  truth  which  science  is  continually 
approaching.  G.  H.  SABINE. 

De  la  verite :  remarques  logiques.  A.  NAVILLE.  Rev.  Ph.,  XXIX,  5, 
pp.  449-461. 

True  and  truth  are  used  in  many  senses.  The  ordinary  logical  defini- 
tion, however,  is  the  agreement  of  thought  with  its  object,  its  resemblance 
to  such  object.  "The  mind  of  the  scientist  should  be  a  mirror  of  the 
world."  To  such  a  definition  objection  arises.  Thought,  since  the 
'  object '  must  itself  be  thought,  can  resemble  only  thought,  not  things. 
Even  in  the  mental  and  moral  realm,  the  objection  holds  good  ;  in  the 
mind  of  the  observer  psychological  states  cannot  be  reproduced.  Accord- 
ingly, there  are  two  kinds  of  truth,  relative  and  absolute,  the  former 
being  the  relation  between  object  and  perception,  the  latter  that  arising 
between  perception  and  remembered  image.  The  one  is  of  sensation  ;  the 


No.  6.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  689 

other  of  thought.  Error  in  the  former  case  consists  in  the  observer  not 
being  in  the  most  favorable  circumstances  for  scrutiny.  What,  now,  are 
the  criteria  of  truth  ?  Sigwart  distinguishes  two,  — necessity  and  univer- 
sality. But  these  are  not  sufficient.  Both  in  the  physical  and  moral  world 
one  must  add,  "for  the  normal  subject  placed  under  normal  conditions." 
Still,  this  does  not  bring  satisfaction.  The  normal  impression  of  the 
normal  person  is  frequently,  as  in  case  of  a  stick  held  under  water  appear- 
ing broken,  at  fault. 

ARTHUR  J.  TIETJE. 

Energetik,    Mechanik,    und    Leben.     E.    VON    HARTMANN.       Z.    f.    Ph. 
u.  ph.  Kr.,  CXXIV,  2,  128-154. 

Energetics  in  its  fundamental  laws  embraces  only  net  results  and  leaves 
the  precise  mode  and  duration  of  the  physical  process  undetermined.  In 
a  qualitative  energetics  —  to  which  the  several  modes  of  energy  are  ulti- 
mate —  the  defect  is  irremediable  ;  a  non-qualitative  energetics  may  remedy 
it  by  resort  to  molecular  mechanics.  If  the  constancy  of  energy  in  each 
axis  of  tri-dimensional  space  be  granted,  an  adequate  mechanical  ener- 
getics is  possible  ;  but  this  principle  is  derivable  from  that  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy,  only  on  the  supposition  that  all  forces  are  energetic.  There 
may,  however,  be  non-energetic,  uncentered  forces,  the  lines  of  whose 
simultaneous  manifestations  do  not  meet  in  a  point ;  which  have  no  defi- 
nite position  in  space,  so  that  potential  energy  has  no  meaning  in  connec- 
tion with  them  ;  and  which  can  never  give  rise  to  the  appearance  of  matter. 
Non-energetic  forces  may  be  active  in  the  turning  of  compound  atoms  or 
molecules,  and  in  the  displacement  of  the  component  parts  of  unstable 
chemical  compounds.  The  assumption  of  such  forces  gives  rise  to  an 
energetics  that  is  adequate  to  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  vital 
autonomy.  The  sole  supremacy  of  mechanical  laws  is  then  restricted  to 
inorganic  nature  ;  in  organic  nature  they  form  the  necessary  groundwork 
upon  which  vital  autonomy  plays.  The  question  is  raised  as  to  the  relation 
of  organic  evolution  to  the  law  of  the  deterioration  of  energy.  Plasm- 
organisms  could  only  arise  when  the  temperature  of  the  earth's  surface  fell 
below  the  congealing  point  of  albumen  ;  they  will  cease  to  exist  when  it 
sinks  permanently  below  the  freezing-point  of  water.  The  increasing 
habitability  of  the  earth  is  followed  by  a  higher  and  higher  biological  evo- 
lution. The  lowest  organisms  are  the  first  to  come  and  the  last  to  go,  on 
account  of  their  greater  power  of  adaptation.  In  man  the  faculty  of  organic 
adaptation  is  least,  and  technical  adaptation  takes  its  place.  Neither 
adaptation  is  without  absolute  limits.  We  may  safely  assume  that  as  the 
conditions  of  life  on  the  earth  deteriorate,  first  the  highest  organisms,  as 
soon  as  their  improved  arts  cannot  make  good  the  loss  of  light  and  heat, 
will  die  out  ;  then  the  lower  ;  until  finally  the  unicellular  organisms  will  be 
left  alone.  The  '  increase  of  psychical  values '  has  thus  its  presumably 
certainlim.it.  Even  if  other  than  plasm -organisms  —  as  flame  or  silicon- 


690  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.         [VOL.  XIII. 

organisms  —  ever  existed,  they  surely  had  their  absolute  limits  also  ;  and 
on  the  frozen  earth  that  puts  an  end  to  plasm-organisms,  no  other  kind  will 
be  physically  possible.  The  possibility  of  life  depends  on  three  conditions  : 
first,  the  absolute  temperature  ;  second,  the  conversion  of  chemical  energy 
into  and  out  of  other  forms  of  energy  ;  third,  a  certain  difference  in  the 
temperature  of  the  sun  and  that  of  the  earth.  It  may  be  objected,  that  the 
operation  of  the  law  of  the  deterioration  of  energy  is  asymptotic  ;  but  that 
means  that  within  finite  time  it  will  pass  the  limits  of  possible  life.  What 
has  been  said  presupposes  the  indefinite  continuance  of  the  physical  laws 
involved.  The  possibility  of  the  contrary  supposition  must  not  be  lost 
sight  of. 

THEODORE  DE  LAGUNA. 

Ueber  die  Entwickelung  des  Begriffs  der  hoheren  arithmologischen  Gesetz- 
m'dssigkeit  in  Natur-  und  Geisteswissenschaften.  W.  G.  ALEXEJEFF. 
V.  f.  w.  Ph.,  XXVIII,  i,  pp.  73-92. 

G.  Teichmiiller  first  applied  the  mathematical  concept  of  discontinuity 
(Unstetigkeit)  to  biology  and  sociology  in  his  criticism  of  Darwinism  in 
1877.  He  pointed  out  that  continuity  implied  discreteness,  and  that,  since 
plants  and  animals  are  not  sums  but  products  of  factors  having  different 
functions,  we  must  not  expect  to  find  their  different  forms  connected  by 
imperceptible  changes.  Alexander  von  Oettingen,  in  his  Moralstatistik , 
has  dwelt  on  the  necessary  correlation  of  the  natural  realm  of  necessity  and 
the  mental  realm  of  freedom.  N.  W.  Bugajew  has  recently  shown  the 
connection  between  mathematics  and  the  modern  science  and  philosophy. 
Quantitative  changes  may  be  independent  or  dependent,  they  may  also  be 
continuous  or  discontinuous  ;  this  last  distinction  divides  mathematics  into 
the  two  fields,  of  analysis  and  arithmology.  Analysis  has  reached  an  ad- 
vanced stage  of  development  in  the  differential  and  integral  calculus  ;  but 
arithmology,  because  of  its  greater  complication,  has  not  been  so  fully 
worked  out.  By  the  aid  of  analysis,  mechanics,  astronomy,  mathematical 
physics,  and  finally  physical  chemistry  have  developed,  and  our  modern 
point  of  view  is  on  the  whole  analytical.  This  method  applied  to  biology, 
psychology,  and  sociology,  has  issued  in  the  attempted  exclusion  of  tele- 
ology from  nature.  But  such  attempts  ignore  the  ethical,  aesthetic,  and 
religious  aspirations  natural  to  man.  The  higher,  .arithmological  point  of 
view  must  be  taken,  and  this  will  not  exclude  individuality  and  freedom, 
since  it  does  not  demand  absolute  continuity  and  invariability  of  phenom- 
ena, and  mechanical  interdependence  of  functions.  The  author  points' 
out  different  applications  of  arithmology  in  the  theory  of  numbers,  enume- 
rative  geometry,  and  the  arithmization  of  algebraic  functions.  Modern 
chemistry,  with  its  atomistic  theory  and  periodic  system,  has  abandoned  the 
analytic  tendency  for  the  arithmological.  The  schematism  of  atomistic 
structure  in  chemistry,  developed  independently,  is  yet  identical  with  the 
symbolic  theory  of  algebraic  invariants.  The  universalism  of  analysis  must 


No.  6.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  691 

certainly  yield  to  arithmological  individualism  in  biology  and  sociology. 
Nekrassow  shows  that  Quetelet,  in  his  conception  of  the  '  law  of  great  num- 
bers,' has  disregarded  the  fact  that  an  average  applies  only  when  the  acci- 
dental phenomena  of  magnitude  concerned  are  independent  of  one  an- 
other. Since  the  law,  however,  yields  verifiable  results,  a  free  teleological 
factor  must  be  present,  isolating  human  actions  from  one  another.  Hu- 
man needs,  not  necessities,  are  constant.  The  theory  of  probabilities 
promises  us  more  light  here  ;  mathematics  as  a  whole  must  assist  our 
speculation.  EDMUND  H.  HOLLANDS. 

The  Use  and  Abuse  of  Final  Causes.     G.  E.  UNDERBILL.     Mind,  50,  pp. 
220-241. 

Bacon's  condemnation  of  final  causes  referred  to  the  sciences  of  physics 
and  chemistry,  and  threw  no  light  on  the  significance  of  a  teleological  view 
in  the  biological  sciences  or  in  metaphysics.  Spinoza  regarded  final  causes 
as  mere  human  illusions  which  sprang  from  a  tendency  to  view  the  uni- 
verse from  the  standpoint  of  man's  convenience.  Neither  Spinoza  nor» 
Bacon  had  the  biological  conception  of  function  as  an  end,  but  they  were 
right  in  excluding  the  notion  of  final  cause  from  mechanical  explanations. 
Kant  established  the  place  of  final  causes  in  biology  by  drawing  a  distinc- 
tion between  external  ends,  or  final  cause  as  utility,  and  internal  ends,  or 
the  functions  which  an  organism  is  adapted  to  fulfill.  The  conception  of 
internal  final  cause  is  of  great  value  to  biology,  and,  like  any  other  metho- 
dological assumption,  is  justified  by  its  success.  It  leads  to  an  assumption 
of  general  purposiveness  in  nature,  and  of  external  ends  in  the  relation  of 
organism  to  environment,  both  of  which  are  to  be  tested  by  their  success 
as  working  hypotheses.  Such  assumptions,  however,  are  drawn  from  the 
analogy  with  means  and  ends  in  deliberate  human  actions,  and  do  not 
mean  that  nature  is  an  intelligent  cause  working  for  preconceived  ends. 
As  to  the  metaphysical  significance  of  this  demand  for  final  causes  in 
biology,  Kant  argued  to  a  rational  faith  in  an  intelligent  cause,  God. 
Further,  he  conceived  man  as,  in  his  moral  nature,  independent  of  natural 
causes,  and  able  to  set  for  himself  independent  ends.  He  regarded  man 
in  this  aspect  as  the  supreme  end  of  nature.  Nature  is  the  means  of  moral 
discipline,  whereby  man  develops  that  power  of  setting  ends  to  himself  which 
constitutes  him  the  highest  end.  Moral  necessity  also  demands  a  cause 
outside  nature  which  shall  determine  nature  to  that  end,  and  postulates 
God  as  a  rational  Being  who  is  guided  by  the  idea  of  an  end  and  who  uses 
nature  as  means  to  it.  Modern  philosophy  can  better  estimate  the  value 
of  the  conception  of  final  cause  than  Bacon  or  Spinoza  or  Kant,  having 
seen  its  success  in  biology.  Like  other  principles  which  have  been  suc- 
cessful in  making  the  world  intelligible,  final  cause  is  no  mere  illusory 
hypothesis,  but  a  constituent  element  in  nature.  Its  successful  scientific 
application  is  a  most  important  piece  of  evidence  for  the  unity  of  the  active 
principle  at  work  in  nature  and  in  man. 

MARY  WINIFRED  SPRAGUE. 


692  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL    REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

Binocular  Vision  and  the  Problem  of  Knowledge.     J.  H.  HYSLOP.     Am. 
J.  Ps.,  XIV,  3-4,  pp.  42-59- 

The  phenomena  of  binocular  vision  threw  a  new  light  on  the  problem  of 
space  perception,  which  the  speculations  of  Berkeley  and  Kant  had  left  in  a 
very  unsettled  state.  Wheatstone  showed  that  the  perception  of  solidity  is 
associated  with  the  existence  of  disparate  images.  This  solidity  is  not 
present  in  the  retina,  though  we  may  say  it  is  represented  there.  In  short, 
we  see  what  is  not  in  the  impression.  There  is  an  organic  function  for  the 
perception  of  solidity  in  vision  without  having  this  quale  present  in  the 
image.  Tactual  and  muscular  space  may  well  become  associated  with  the 
visual  quale,  but  this  involves  no  identification  of  the  tactual  and  muscular 
quale  with  the  visual.  The  interpretation  of  '  experience, '  association,  and 
*  motor '  phenomena,  is  indifferent  to  this  conclusion.  The  phenomena  of 
upright  vision  indicate  that  we  see  objects  as  they  are  without  any  identity 
between  the  image  or  impression  and  the  object.  That  is  to  say,  we  may 
have  objects  of  consciousness  which  are  not  '  in  '  consciousness,  and  per- 
ception may  transcend  the  states  and  affections  of  the  sensorium.  This 
seems  to  establish  the  doctrine  of  realism  in  the  problem  of  knowledge. 
But  this  discrepancy  between  the  percept  and  impression  is  evidence  that 
the  quale  is  a  purely  mental  construction,  and  it  may  be  argued  that 
therefore  the  entire  percept  is  a  construction  of  the  mind.  It  remains  true, 
however,  that  the  ideal  construction  may  correctly  represent  an  objective 
fact,  though  it  has  a  purely  subjective  genesis  not  in  the  impression.  In  the 
tendency  of  individuals  to  adjust  themselves  to  their  environment,  we  find 
evidence  of  a  capacity  of  ideal  action  which  would  represent  correctly  the 
nature  of  objective  reality  ;  and,  in  the  case  of  upright  vision,  the  act  of 
perception  reports  the  objective  fact  and  not  the  subjective. 

C.  E.  GALLOWAY. 

The  Status  of  the  Subconscious.     J.  JASTROW.     Am.  J.  Ps.,  XIV,  3-4,  pp. 
79-89. 

The  subconscious  presents  itself  in  two  aspects  :  as  a  subliminal  activity 
which  might  be  consciously  recognized,  and  as  an  organized  aggregate  of 
such  activities.  The  problem  begins  with  subconscious  sensations  and  the 
stimuli  necessary  to  arouse  them.  The  psychophysical  process  accompany- 
ing the  existence  of  the  imperceptible  sensations  is  probably  different  only 
in  degree  from  that  which  accompanies  the  perceptible.  Thus  there  is  no 
arbitrary  boundary  between  the  conscious  and  the  subconscious,  and  the 
imperceptible  impressions  influence  the  behavior  of  consciousness.  The 
activity  of  mind  is  broader  than  the  account  of  it  given  by  direct  percep- 
tion, and  the  meaning  of  the  term  '  consciousness  '  should  be  extended  to 
cover  the  subconscious  forms  of  psychical  activity.  The  subvoluntary  ele- 
ments, which  are  real  and  typical  factors  of  conduct,  we  refer  to  '  autom- 


No.  6.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  693 

atism '  and  'habit.'  This  does  not  fully  explain  them  but  shows  where 
an  explanation  must  be  sought.  If  we  could  explain  memory  and  sensory 
and  motor  habit,  the  problem  would  be  solved.  Psychology  is  as  inti- 
mately concerned  with  the  subconscious  as  with  the  conscious,  and  all  men- 
tal activities  must  be  interpreted  with  reference  to  both  phases  of  the  psychic 
life.  C.  E.  GALLOWAY. 

La  conception  generate  de  /'  association  des  idees  et  les  donnees  de  I  'experi- 
ence.    H.  PIERON.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXIX,  5,  pp.  493-517. 

The  current  theory  of  the  association  of  ideas  has  never  been  ade- 
quately refuted  ;  experiment  alone  can  truly  reveal  its  fallacies.  These  are 
mainly  four.  To  say  that  an  idea  always  or  even  usually  evokes  a  simple 
idea  is  false  ;  frequently  in  the  course  of  experiments  the  ideas  evoked,  espe- 
cially in  the  case  of  introspective  subjects,  were  highly  complex  and  remote. 
Different  persons,  moreover,  responded  to  the  same  inductive  word  with 
different  associations  (occasionally,  as  with  a  mentally  idle  invalid,  with 
unintelligible  ones,  <?.  g.t  philosophy  —  to  sing,  butter  —  to  sleep,  teeth  — 
table)  ;  similarly,  the  same  subjects,  at  different  periods,  and  among  dif- 
ferent surroundings,  answered  with  widely  different  associations.  In  the 
third  place,  hesitation,  not  merely  at  ambiguous  inductive  terms,  such  as 
goutte,  but  at  very  ordinary  definite  ones,  such  as  fumee,  was  visible  ;  in 
the  last-mentioned  instance  the  mind  of  the  subject  halted  between  pipe, 
cannon,  chimney.  Finally,  the  existence  in  the  hypothetical  idea-chain 
of  gaps  and  reversions  incontestably  disproved  the  current  theory.  Nega- 
tively, then,  the  experiments  have  established  that  there  is  no  fixed  chain 
growing  link  by  link  ;  associations  follow  habits  of  mind,  occupations, 
interests,  sometimes  nothing  at  all.  Positively,  results  were  not  so  good. 
Evidently  for  association  of  ideas  '  attraction  of  ideas '  should  be  substi- 
tuted. The  inductive  term,  "radiating,"  attaches  itself  to  a  system,  and 
to  that  part  of  a  system  determined  by  the  personal  equation,  time  of  life, 
environment,  etc.  Of  the  laws  governing  this  'attraction,'  little  can  be 
said  as  yet.  Quantitatively,  "the  value  of  attractions  will  be  propor- 
tionate to  the  number  and  to  the  convergence  of  directions  of  various 
forces."  Qualitatively,  "two  states  that  have  already  coexisted  in  con- 
sciousness so  as  to  form  two  parts  of  the  same  systematic  group,  will  tend 
to  attract  each  other,  thus  establishing  an  analogous  group ,  the  strength  of 
attraction  varying  as  the  coherence  of  the  first  group,  and  as  the  number 
of  times  the  ideas  have  appeared  united  in  the  same  system." 

ARTHUR  J.  TIETJE. 

Psychology  on  the  ' New  Thought'  Movement.     JOHN  H.  NOBLE.     The 
Monist,  XIV,  3,  pp.  409-426. 

In  this  article  the  author  gives,  without  criticism,  an  account  of  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  'New  Thought'  movement  in  Professor  James's  Varieties 


694  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

of  Religious  Experience.  This  movement  is  regarded  by  Professor  James 
as  belonging  to  the  general  tendency  toward  '  healthy-mindedness, '  or  a 
deliberately  adopted  attitude  of  optimism,  which,  in  his  opinion;  is  psy- 
chologically reasonable.  The  rapid  spread  of  the  '  New  Thought '  among 
the  American  people  is  due  chiefly  to  its  practical  appeal.  Its  speculative 
side,  which  is  the  aspect  of  interest  to  psychology,  rests  on  the  same  basis 
as  does  all  religious  experience,  — the  existence  of  a  dual  nature  in  man. 
All  religions  agree  in  the  belief  in  a  higher  or  spiritual  nature  in  man, 
which  is  in  direct  relation  to  a  Divine  Order,  and  in  the  possibility  of  escape 
from  evil  by  habitually  living  in  harmony  with  this  higher  nature.  The 
relation  of  the  '  New  Thought '  to  modern  psychology  is  found  in  the 
identification  of  this  higher  nature  with  the  subliminal  consciousness.  By 
relaxation,  which  is  a  practical  recognition  of  the  union  of  the  higher  self 
with  the  Universal  Mind,  the  '  New  Thought '  asserts  that  it  is  possible 
to  obtain  divine  help,  and  to  gain  a  revelation  of  truth  transcending 
ordinary  knowledge.  As  a  religious  practice,  this  is  not  new,  but  is  similar 
to  '  conversion '  and  to  various  phenomena  of  mysticism  found  thoughout 
religious  history.  Psychologically,  relaxation  means  a  shift  of  the  center 
of  the  field  of  consciousness,  which  allows  subliminal  processes,  hitherto 
inhibited,  to  cross  the  threshold.  An  analogous  experience  is  the  recovery 
of  a  forgotten  name,  when  the  direct  effort  to  recall  it  is  relaxed.  This 
attitude  of  relaxation,  even  if  admitted  to  be  merely  a  subjective  condition, 
has  marked  effects  upon  action  and  endurance,  and  must  hence  be 
regarded  as  an  important  biological  function.  But  while  psychology 
affirms  the  existence  of  a  subliminal  consciousness,  and  emphasizes  its 
importance  as  a  factor  in  experience,  it  offers  neither  proof  nor  disproof  of 
its  relation  to  a  Divine  consciousness. 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 


ETHICS   AND    ESTHETICS. 

La  science  positive  de  la  morale.     G.  CANTECOR.     Rev.  Ph.,  XXIX,  3,  pp. 
225-241 ;  4,  pp.  368-392. 

The  title  of  this  article  suggests  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  recent 
movements,  as  represented  by  MM.  Levy-Bruhl,  Durkheim,  Wundt, 
Bougie,  and  Simmel.  According  to  the  first  of  these,  morality  is  a  political 
or  pedagogical  art,  its  object  being  society  or  the  individual.  But  really 
this  presupposes  the  true  morality  of  which  an  account  is  to  be  given.  Con- 
flicting ends  necessitate  choice,  and  this,  in  turn,  deliberation,  a  hierarchy 
of  goods,  a  criterion  of  ends,  and  moral  formulae.  The  criterion  is  the 
concept  of  the  summum  bonum,  the  formulae  are  the  moral  laws.  Erro- 
neous moral  theory  no  more  destroys  obligation  than  an  erroneous  theory  of 
light  alters  the  retinal  sensation.  Since  reason  and  instinct  may  conflict, 
moral  rules,  to  have  any  validity,  must  be  based  on  the  acknowledged 
authority  of  reason  to  arbitrate  in  conduct.  Traditional  morality  has  only 


No.  6.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  695 

the  appearance  of  real  existence.  All  the  moralists  of  a  given  age  give 
practically  the  same  precepts,  yet  the  precepts  of  one  age  are  not  those  of 
another.  Even  if  the  moral  idea  could  be  determined  speculatively,  this 
would  not  prove  the  resulting  conception  to  be  either  practically  applicable 
or  obligatory  ;  abstract  reason  is  as  incapable  of  producing  the  form  as  the 
matter  of  morality.  It  is  not  abstract  man,  but  men,  to  whom  morality 
applies.  Modern  moral  theory  ascertains  rather  than  constructs.  Duty 
is  only  an  abstraction,  not  a  'fact  of  reason '  ;  theory  and  logic  do  not 
confer  the  character  of  reality  or  of  obligation,  any  more  than  they  alter 
the  situation  of  an  object  or  act.  Moral  laws  are  imposed  upon  individuals 
by  the  material  and  moral  sanction  of  society.  It  is  this  sanction  and  not 
reason  which  gives  birth  to  obligation.  Thus  an  action  is  not  obligatory 
because  good,  but  good  because  obligatory.  Duty  is  imposed  by  custom 
and  social  inertia.  Tendency  is  not  reason,  yet  psychology  shows  the 
former  to  be  the  source  of  action.  The  deliberative  consciousness  is  con- 
cerned with  means  ;  from  it  we  learn,  not  what  we  must  reasonably  wish, 
but  how  to  fulfill  our  (possibly  irrational)  inclinations.  The  conclusion 
that  reason  imposes  an  ideal  upon  us  is  falsely  reached  by  arguing  that  we 
first  desire  a  thing  because  it  is  beautiful,  and  then  think  it  is  beautiful 
because  of  the  intensity  of  our  desire.  The  scientific  analysis  of  morality 
originated  in  German  historicism  and  French  positivism,  in  the  absorption 
of  the  individual  in  society,  and  in1  the  historical  study  of  his  rights.  An 
intellectual  and  a  social  factor  are  here  involved. 

ANNIE  D.  MONTGOMERY. 

The  Coming  Scientific  Morality.     GEORGE  GORE.     The  Monist,  XIV,  3, 

PP-  355-377- 

Despite  the  apparent  lack  of  relation  between  morality  and  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  mechanical  science,  the  only  permanent  basis  for 
morality  and  guide  for  human  conduct  are  to  be  found  in  the  principles  of 
universal  motion  and  universal  causation.  Evidence  has  shown  that  all 
bodies  are  in  a  state  of  constant  internal  motion  involving  conversion  of 
energy.  In  man,  this  conversion  of  energy,  particularly  in  its  relation  to 
similar  action  in  other  human  beings  and  throughout  the  environment 
generally,  produces,  through  the  medium  of  the  nervous  system,  conscious- 
ness and  the  phenomena  of  morality.  Thus  man's  moral  life  is  inexora- 
bly governed  by  material  necessity,  and  the  rate  of  human  progress  is  as 
definitely  fixed  as  the  speed  of  the  celestial  bodies.  Mind  or  soul  is  not  a 
distinct  entity,  but  is  merely  the  collection  of  faculties  termed  conscious- 
ness, observation,  comparison,  etc.  It  is  a  species  of  life,  which  may  in 
turn  be  defined  as  a  kind  of  motion,  viz.,  motion  in  organic  structure. 
Wherever  this  exists,  questions  of  morality  arise.  Moral  and  immoral 
acts  are  as  much  cases  of  cause  and  effect  as  is  the  motion  of  a  steam- 
engine,  and  are  apparently  less  certain  only  because  more  complex.  Since 
all  men  act  under  compulsion,  even  in  committing  crime,  they  should  not 


696  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [You  XIII. 

be  held  entirely  responsible  for  such  acts.  '  Good '  is  that  which  serves 
some  useful  purpose,  not  merely  to  mankind  but  to  the  universe.  '  Evil ' 
is  the  unjustifiable  infliction  of  pain  or  injury  on  sentient  creatures.  Pain 
in  itself  is  not  an  evil,  but  is  merely  a  sensation  which  is  feared  and  dis- 
liked. The  problem  of  evil,  although  complex,  may  be  solved  upon  re- 
course to  scientific  principles.  Viewed  scientifically,  the  universe  is  seen  to 
be  perfect  and  to  contain  no  evil.  Pain,  which  is  commonly  called  evil, 
may  in  every  case  ultimately  be  proved  to  be  necessary  to  human  welfare. 
This  conclusion,  would,  if  adopted  and  applied  scientifically,  relieve 
human  suffering,  for  scientific  knowledge  is  the  greatest  preventive  of 

pain. 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 


HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY. 
Saint-Simon,  pere  du  positivisme.     G.  DUMAS.     Rev.   Ph.,  XXIX,  2,  pp. 

136-157;  3.  PP-  263-287. 

There  has  been  much  controversy  between  the  followers  of  Saint-Simon 
and  the  Comtists  concerning  the  relation  of  Comte  to  Saint-Simon,  the 
former  holding  that  Comte  was  merely  a  disciple  who  had  denied  his  mas- 
ter, the  latter  that  Saint-Simon  exercised  no  influence  over  the  philosophy 
of  Comte.  The  author  takes  the  former  position,  and  attempts  to  show 
that  Saint-Simon  had  reached  the  general  conception  of  Positivism  before 
Comte,  and  that  the  relation  of  the  two  systems  can  be  understood  only 
in  view  of  the  personal  relations  of  the  two  men.  Comte  met  Saint-Simon 
in  1817,  shortly  after  his  expulsion  from  the  £cole  polytechnique.  Attracted 
both  by  the  personality  of  the  older  man  and  by  the  theories  which  Saint- 
Simon  held  even  at  that  time,  Comte  fell  under  his  influence  and  soon  be- 
came his  secretary  and  collaborator,  a  position  which  he  occupied  until  1825 . 
Various  letters  written  by  Comte  during  this  period  not  only  attest  his  great 
admiration  and  friendship  for  Saint-Simon,  but  also  acknowledge  the 
latter' s  influence.  During  these  years  he  wrote  under  his  master's  direc- 
tion the  third  volume  of  L' Industrie,  and  aided  in  the  production  of  La 
politique  and  L' organisation.  At  the  same  time  Comte  also  conceived 
and  partly  carried  out  a  work  whose  aim  was  to  systematize,  according  to 
Positive  methods,  all  the  sciences,  including  those  of  mind  and  society. 
While  Saint-Simon's  ignorance  of  the  special  sciences  precluded  the  pos- 
sibility of  his  influence  on  the  details  of  this  work,  yet  his  general  concep- 
tion of  a  synthesis  of  the  human  sciences,  which  he  had  held  as  early  as 
1808,  was  undoubtedly  known  to  Comte.  For  five  years  Comte  published 
all  his  writings  under  the  patronage  of  Saint-Simon,  not  even  demanding 
the  appearance  of  his  name  in  connection  with  that  of  his  master.  In 
1822  he  refused  to  continue  this.  Instead  of  accepting  Comte' s  refusal, 
Saint-Simon  delayed  the  appearance  of  a  part  of  Le  catechisme  ;  and,  when 
he  finally  published  it,  incorporated  in  it  some  work  of  Comte' s  without 


No.  6.]  SUMMARIES   OF  ARTICLES.  697 

recognition  of  his  independent  authorship.  The  breach  between  them  was 
now  complete,  and  from  this  time  Comte's  personal  attitude  toward  Saint- 
Simon  changed  entirely.  In  letters  written  after  this  time,  Comte  speaks 
in  the  most  slighting  terms  of  his  former  master,  and  even  denies  abso- 
lutely that  Saint-Simon  had  influenced  his  thought.  The  second  article  is 
devoted  to  a  comparison  of  the  systems  of  Saint-Simon  and  Comte.  The 
end  which  Comte  proposed  to  himself  was  the  establishment  of  a  unity  of 
thought  and  feeling  such  as  had  been  destroyed  in  the  overthrow  of  the 
power  of  Catholicism.  This  he  believed  could  only  be  accomplished  by 
hastening  the  necessary  course  of  human  progress  from  the  theological  and 
metaphysical  stages  to  the  final  positive  stage.  To  this  end,  he  attempted 
first  a  synthesis  of  all  human  knowledge  in  a  hierarchy  of  sciences  culmi- 
nating in  sociology.  His  next  aim  was  the  organization  of  separate 
spiritual  and  temporal  powers.  The  spiritual  organization  he  hoped  to 
achieve  through  the  establishment  of  the  religion  of  Humanity,  which  was 
modelled  in  form  and  ceremonial  on  Catholicism.  A  central  industrial 
power,  organized  under  a  system  of  district  administration,  was  to  control  the 
economic  life  of  Europe,  and  eventually  that  of  the  world.  Toward  the 
end  of  Comte's  life,  the  influence  of  Clotilde  de  Vaux  gave  his  thought  a 
more  mystical  and  religious  character,  and  led  to  a  greater  insistence  on 
the  love  and  wofship  of  humanity.  The  central  aim  of  Saint-Simon  was 
to  put  an  end  to  the  moral  confusion,  prevalent  since  the  decline  of  theo- 
logical beliefs,  by  organizing  a  new  spiritual  power.  This  he  proposed  to 
attain  by  a  council  of  scholars  called  the  Council  of  Newton,  which  should 
represent  God  upon  earth,  and  divide  Europe  into  districts  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  new  religion.  He  also  believed  it  was  necessary  to  construct 
a  synthesis  of  human  knowledge.  At  first  he  attempted  this  by  tracing  all 
phenomena,  including  those  of  life  and  society,  to  the  law  of  gravitation, 
although  he  had  realized  the  impossibility  of  this  before  his  meeting  with 
Comte.  Like  Comte,  he  believed  that  all  knowledge  must  pass  through 
two  earlier  stages  to  the  final  positive  stage,  and  that  the  extension  of  the 
positive  method  to  the  science  of  man  must  precede  other  forms  of  progress. 
He  approached  Comte  also  in  the  incorporation  in  his  new  religion  of  the 
moral  and  social  philosophy  of  Catholicism.  He  also  proposed  the 
organization  of  industry  as  a  separate  temporal  power,  which  should  be 
united  to  science  as  feudalism  had  been  related  to  theological  power.  A 
further  similarity  to  Comte  is  found  in  the  emphasis  placed  by  Saint-Simon 
in  his  later  years  on  the  religious  sentiment,  which  he  defined  as  love  for 
humanity.  From  this  examination  of  the  theories  of  the  two  men,  as  well 
as  from  the  facts  of  their  personal  relations,  it  seems  impossible  to  deny 
that  Comte,  although  he  developed  Positivism  in  a  way  impossible  to 
Saint-Simon,  nevertheless  owed  all  his  chief  conceptions  to  the  latter. 

GRACE  MEAD  ANDRUS. 


698  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW. 

Professor  Bain's  Philosophy.     WILLIAM   L.    DAVIDSON.     Mind,   50,   pp. 
161-179. 

Professor  Bain's  philosophy  is  a  study  of  experience  from  the  point  of 
view  of  scientific  psychology  rather  than  of  metaphysics.  In  his  analysis 
and  description  of  mental  processes  he  started  psychology  on  new  lines  of 
research  by  his  strict  use  of  the  physiological  method.  He  recognized  three 
native  capacities  as  the  basis  of  acquisition.  First,  he  assumed  the  spon- 
taneity of  the  nervous  system,  producing  random  movements.  These  would 
be  afterwards  avoided  or  sought  for,  as  they  produced  pain  or  pleasure. 
Secondly,  he  recognized  the  instincts  as  a  class  of  native  and  useful  endow- 
ments which  become  "primordial  elements"  in  education.  This  is  owing 
to  the  law  of  self-conservation,  viz.,  'that  states  of  pleasure  are  connected 
with  an  increase,  and  states  of  pain  with  an  abatement  of  some,  or  all,  of  the 
vital  functions.'  Finally,  the  mind  has  active  powers  of  retention  and  dis- 
crimination in  regard  to  sense-presentations.  This  activity  of  the  mind 
leads  to  a  statement  of  the  law  of  relativity,  so  important  in  Professor 
Bain's  system,  viz.,  '  an  object  has  no  meaning  without  a  subject,  a  subject 
none  without  an  object.'  The  structure  of  the  intellect  is  built  up  from  the 
three  elements  mentioned  above,  by  association.  Professor  Bain's  use  of 
the  principle  of  association  in  explaining  mind  thoroughly  did  away  with 
the  treatment  of  it  as  composed  of  separate  'faculties.'  In  explaining 
the  higher  instincts  he  recognized  the  influence  of  heredity.  Professor  Bain 
attempted  no  strict  classification  of  the  emotions,  but  he  made  use  of  the 
physiological  method  of  description.  The  will  arises  in  the  control  of  spon- 
taneous random  movements,  under  motives  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Its 
growth  from  this  primitive  beginning  is  explained  on  the  principle  of  asso- 
ciation. The  problem  of  the  will's  freedom  Professor  Bain  regarded  as  a 
metaphysical  puzzle  of  small  importance.  In  ethics,  Professor  Bain  was  a 
utilitarian,  but  was  peculiar  in  advocating  the  existence  of  disinterested- 
ness in  man  uncontrolled  by  the  ultimate  tests  of  pleasure  and  pain.  The 
moral  sense  he  believed  to  be  a  unique  emotion,  developed  only  under  the 
influence  of  education  and  authority.  Conscience,  in  his  system,  was 
derivative  and  analyzable,  but  none  the  less  valuable  ethically  for  that. 
Idealistic  ethics  he  thought  visionary.  His  philosophy  was  practical, 
especially  in-  its  application  to  education.  For  the  purpose  of  stimulating 
philosophical  research  in  Great  Britain  he  established  Mind,  and  made  it 
a  success.  It  is  striking  testimony  to  his  influence  that  much  of  his  psy- 
chology has  passed  into  the  commonplaces  of  the  science. 

MARY  WINIFRED  SPRAGUE. 


NOTICES   OF   NEW    BOOKS. 

L  annee  philosophique.     Publi6e  sous  la  direction  de  F.   PILLON  :    Trei- 
zieme  annee,  1902:  Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1903. —  pp.  308. 

Besides  the  customary  summary  of  the  French  philosophical  literature 
of  the  year,  with  which  its  distinguished  editor  has  enriched  the  review, 
this  number  contains  four  contributions,  each  possessing  a  peculiar  interest. 
M.  Pillon  treats  of  Bayle's  critique  of  the  metaphysical  attributes  of  God, 
infinity  and  unity,  and  sets  forth  his  own  views  of  these  attributes.  M. 
Hamelin  discusses  reasoning  by  analogy,  taking  particular  account  of  the 
definitions  of  analogical  reasoning  proposed  by  Kant,  Cournot,  Mill,  and 
Rabier,  and  arriving  at  his  own  conception  in  the  course  of  a  careful  criti- 
cism. M.  Dauriac  presents  a  study  on  the  conception  of  the  Absolute  in 
immanent  metaphysics,  criticising  the  main  theses  of  the  successors  of 
Kant,  founded  on  the  distinction  between  phenomenon  and  noumenon. 
M.  Victor  Brochard,  finally,  has  here  given  a  most  admirable  essay  on 
Plato's  Laws  and  the  theory  of  Ideas,  to  which  we  shall  address  our 
particular  attention,  because  of  its  intrinsic  value  and  its  especial  interest 
at  this  time  as  marking  the  reaction  against  views  but  recently  greeted 
with  much  enthusiasm. 

Lutoslawski's  The  Origin  and  Growth  of  Plato" s  Logic,  which  was 
received  upon  its  publication  with  so  much  favor  even  by  scholars  of 
distinction,  is  now  rather  tardily  provoking  a  growing  protest.  The  deluge 
of  Platonic  literature,  written  largely  by  those  whose  knowledge  of  Plato  is 
limited  and  whose  interpretation  is  of  the  piece-meal,  literal-minded  kind, 
invited  the  production  of  such  a  summary  as  Lutoslawski  offered.  But  it 
was  hardly  to  be  expected  that  men  who  read  Plato's  thought  rather  than 
his  language,  and  grasped  the  logic  of  the  exposition  of  his  doctrine,  should 
long  postpone  the  inevitable  reply.  Among  the  scholars  who  may  lay  just 
claim  to  an  understanding  of  Plato,  M.  Victor  Brochard  is  deserving  of 
honorable  mention. 

The  main  thesis  of  Lutoslawski  is  that  Plato  in  his  latest  works  aban- 
doned the  realism  of  the  theory  of  Ideas,  and  adopted  a  conceptualism 
essentially  anticipating  Descartes  and  Kant.  Indeed,  according  to  Lutos- 
lawski, it  would  perhaps  be  fair  to  say  that  Plato's  "  real  object  is  to  elim- 
inate the  self-existent  Idea  altogether,"  as  Professor  Shorey  expresses  it 
(The  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,  p.  33,  n.  216).  Against  this  thesis,  M. 
Brochard  directs  his  attack,  showing  that  the  Platonic  dialectic  and  the 
doctrine  of  Ideas  are  distinctly  assumed  in  Plato's  latest  work,  the  Laws. 

M.  Brochard  begins  by  clearly  characterizing  the  aim  and  scope  of  the 
Lctws,  showing  that  these,  as  well  as  the  personality  of  Clinias  and  Megil- 

699 


700  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

lus,  the  interlocutors  of  the  Athenian  stranger  (compare  Shorey,  The  Unity 
of  Plato  s  Thought,  p.  87),  exclude  metaphysical  problems  (pp.  5  ff.),  and 
that,  when  Plato  chances  to  touch  upon  a  fundamental  question  (as,  e.  g., 
859  B  ff.),  he  does  it,  so  to  speak,  in  self-defence  (p.  8  ff.).  M.  Broch- 
ard  then  proceeds  to  consider  in  detail  the  following  passages  :  668  C  ff. ; 
859  B  ff. ;  892  D  ff. ;  818  B  ff. ;  and  the  close  of  Book  xii. 

The  reference  to  dialectic  at  965  B  ff.  is  unmistakable  (compare  also 
Shorey,  ibid.,  pp.  86  ff.  and  no.  662),  if  one  bears  in  mind  the  similar 
instructions  of  the  Republic  and  the  words  of  Plato  in  Meno  74  A  and 
Protagoras  329  C.  Indeed,  the  manifest  relation  of  the  Laws  to  the 
Republic  as  a  whole  is  in  itself  conclusive  ;  for  Plato,  in  his  later  treatise 
on  legislation,  does  not  retract  the  earlier  theory,  but  merely  endeavors  to 
adapt  it  to  the  frailties  of  human  mind  and  character. 

M.  Brochard  also  calls  attention  (p.  15,  note)  to  the  inconsistency  of 
Lutoslawski  in  regarding  the  Ideas  now  as  conceptions  of  the  human 
understanding  and  now  as  thoughts  of  God,  justly  remarking  that  the 
latter  view  first  appears  among  the  Neo-Platonists.  The  attempt  to  repre- 
sent Plato  rather  than  Aristotle  as  the  originator  of  the  science  of  logic  is 
likewise  properly  rejected  (pp.  16  ff.). 

The  author  suggests  a  classification  of  the  dialogues  of  Plato  in  three 
groups  (p.  1 6)  :  the  first  deals  with  the  Ideas,  or,  if  you  please,  the  problem 
of  Being;  the  second  has  to  do  with  the  problem  of  Participation ;  the 
third,  with  that  of  Becoming.  No  effort  is  made  to  elaborate  the  sugges- 
tion, but  it  needs  only  to  be  stated  to  be  accepted,  however  much  difficulty 
may  be  met  in  the  assignment  of  particular  dialogues  to  these  groups.  I 
prefer  to  state  the  same  view  somewhat  differently.  In  his  first  period, 
Plato  was  concerned  with  the  Socratic  quest  of  the  Idea,  as  of  something 
fixed  and  stable,  in  opposition  to  the  teachings  of  the  flowing  philosophy, 
whether  in  logic,  in  psychology  and  ethics,  or  in  metaphysics  ;  in  the 
second,  he  endeavored  to  relate  the  Ideas  to  each  other  and  to  establish 
a  modus  vivendi  between  them  ;  in  the  third  and  last,  he  made  an  heroic 
effort  to  mediate  the  Ideas  to  the  world  of  sensuous  reality,  whether  in 
ethics  (Republic,  Philebus,  Laws  )  or  in  matters  physical  (Timceus). 

M.  Brochard  concludes  his  essay  with  these  words  :  "  Tout  ce  que  nous 
nous  sommes  propose  dans  le  present  travail,  c'est  de  montrer  que,  dans  sa 
vieillesse,  Platon  n'a  pas  desavoue  les  doctrines  de  son  age  mur  ;  il  est 
demeure  fidele  a  lui-meme.  On  pourrait  faire  le  meme  travail  pour  les 
dialogues  de  la  meme  periode,  pour  le  Timee  et  le  Philebe  notamment.  La 
conclusion  serait  la  meme  et  on  retrouverait  ainsi,  d'un  bout  a  1'autre  de 
1'  ceuvre  de  Platon,  cette  unite  que  le  philosophe  cherchait  en  toutes  choses, 
qu'il  considerait  comme  le  principe  de  toute  perfection  et  qu'il  ne  separait 
pas  du  bien  lui-meme."  What  M.  Brochard  here  says  might  be  done  was 
indeed  being  done,  even  as  he  wrote,  by  Professor  Shorey  in  his  splendid 
study  entitled  The  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,  to  which  occasional  reference 
was  made  above.  These  two  essays,  appearing  together,  admirably 


No.  6.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  7OI 

supplement  each  other,  and  give  us  ground  for  the  hope  that  Plato  will 
soon  be  restored  to  us  with  a  deeper  and  fuller  appreciation  of  the  essential 
harmony  of  his  central  doctrines  at  all  periods  of  his  thinking. 

W.  A.   HEIDEL. 

IOWA  COLLEGE,  GRINNELL. 

Gesammelte  Aufsatze  zur  Philosophic  und  Lebensanschauung.  Von 
RUDOLF  EUCKEN.  Leipzig,  Verlag  der  DUrr'schen  Buchhandlung, 
1903. —pp.  242. 

This  collection  of  essays  by  Professor  Eucken  is  divided  into  two  main 
parts.  The  first  group  deals  with  morals  and  views  of  life,  the  second  with 
problems  of  religion  and  of  its  philosophy.  The  first  group  is  again  divided 
into  essays  that  deal  with  general  questions,  and  essays  that  concern 
personalities. 

The  first  essay  in  the  first  group  is  entitled  "A  Vindication  of  Morals." 
Professor  Eucken  shows  the  great  influence  that  moral  ideas  have  exerted 
in  history,  selecting  the  cases  of  Plato,  the  Stoics,  primitive  Christianity,  the 
Reformation,  and  Kant,  as  illustrations  of  the  concomitance  of  an  emphasis 
on  moral  ideas  with  a  deepening  of  spiritual  insight.  On  this  historical 
basis,  the  author  argues  for  the  creative  spirit-freeing  power  of  moral  ideas, 
and  points  out  the  need,  in  the  face  of  the  present  tendency  to  reduce 
morals  to  social  custom,  of  a  renewed  emphasis  on  those  inner  and  spiritual 
tendencies  in  the  individual  life  to  which  morality  bears  witness.  In  the 
next  two  essays,  on  ' '  The  Moral  Impulses  in  the  Life  of  the  Present ' ' 
and  on  "The  Inner  Movement  of  Modern  Life,"  the  failure  of  social  cus- 
tom and  public  opinion  to  furnish  adequate  guidance  for  the  higher  life  is 
further  insisted  upon,  and  the  present  divorce  between  the  soul  of  civilized 
man  and  the  complex  mechanism  of  his  outer  life  and  work  is  made  the 
ground  for  a  demand  for  the  earnest  search  and  discovery  in  man  of  a 
spiritual  world,  which  is  more  than  merely  human,  and  which  will  heal  the 
breach  between  the  spirit  and  the  outer  labors  of  our  civilization.  In  the 
fourth  essay,  "A  Speech  in  Celebration  of  the  New  Century,"  delivered  at 
Jena,  Professor  Eucken  connects,  in  a  very  interesting  manner,  the  ideas 
and  problems  brought  out  in  the  previous  essays  with  the  history  and  present 
duty  and  destiny  of  the  University  of  Jena  as  a  center  of  humane  and  spir- 
itual culture.  The  fifth  and  last  essay  in  the  first  section  is  an  argument 
for  the  preservation  of  Finnish  nationality  from  the  significance  of  small 
nations  as  embodiments  of  historical  and  spiritual  individualites. 

In  section  B,  "  Relating  to  Personalities,"  the  essays  of  most  general  in- 
terest are  on  "Aristotle's  Judgment  on  Man,"  "Goethe  and  Philosophy," 
and  "  Fichte  and  the  Problems  of  our  Time."  In  the  latter  essay  the 
author  shows  very  forcibly  and  clearly  the  pertinency  of  the  elder  Fichte' s 
doctrine  to  the  moral  and  spiritual  problems  sketched  in  the  first  section, 
and  the  saving  value  of  his  ethical  philosophy  of  nationality  in  the  face  of 
present  tendencies  towards  a  materialistic  and  chauvinistic  conception  of 


702  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

German  nationality.  Fichte's  teaching  is  needed  as  a  corrective  to  the 
emphasis  on  outward  achievement  as  the  test  of  national  greatness  and 
progress.  The  essay  on  Goethe  is  of  very  unusual  interest.  Professor 
Eucken  gives  in  the  brief  compass  of  twenty-one  pages  a  full  and  forceful 
presentation  of  Goethe's  Weltanschauung.  He  shows  that  Goethe,  al- 
though temperamentally  hostile  to  the  technical  apparatus  and  procedure 
of  school  philosophy,  yet  had  a  very  distinctive  and  well-knit  view  in 
which  the  stock  oppositions  of  world  and  life,  inner  and  outer,  time  and 
eternity,  etc.,  are  overcome.  He  finds  Goethe's  significance  for  the  present 
in  his  synthesis  of  freedom  and  truth,  his  emphasis  on  the  inner  and  spir- 
itual life  as  the  essence  of  the  real  universe.  The  last  essay  in  this  section, 
"  In  Memory  of  Carl  Steffensen,"  gives  an  interesting  sketch  of  the  person- 
ality and  work  of  an  able  and  profound  thinker  scarcely  known  even  by 
name,  I  suppose,  to  English-speaking  students  of  philosophy. 

In  the  second  main  division  of  the  book,  "  On  the  Problems  of  Religion 
and  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  Professor  Eucken  presents  some  of  the 
ideas  already  embodied  in  fuller  form  in  his  Wahrheitsgehalt  der  Religion. 
He  argues  strongly  for  the  need  and  affinity  of  the  modern  soul,  which 
cannot  be  satisfied  by  the  mere  mechanism  of  science  and  civilization,  for 
that  realm  of  independent,  world-transcending  spiritual  life  which  is  the 
essence  of  religion.  There  is  also  an  interesting  analysis  of  Pierre  Bayle 
as  sceptic. 

The  work  closes  with  an  appendix  on  the  improvement  of  instruction  in 
philosophy.  American  teachers  will  be  interested  in  the  author's  demand 
for  the  institution  in  German  universities  of  reading  courses  in  classical 
author's,  e.  g.,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Kant,  etc. 

J.  A.  LEIGHTON. 

HOBART  COLLEGE. 

Les  limites  du  connaissable  :  La  vie  et  les  phenomenes  naturels.     Par  FELIX 
LE  DANTEC.     Paris,  Felix  Alcan,  1903. — pp.  238. 

This  book  derives  its  sub-title  from  the  first  and  most  extended  of  six 
related  essays.  There  is,  however,  an  introduction  devoted  to  Lamarck's 
Philosophic  zoologique.  Dantec  makes  a  plea  for  more  adequate  recog- 
nition of  Lamarck's  great  contribution  to  the  theory  of  evolution.  He 
estimates  the  value  of  the  Lamarckian  views  concerning  gradations  of 
species,  spontaneous  generation,  transformation  of  species  ;  also  of  the 
denial  of  disappearance  of  species,  and  of  catastrophes  ;  and,  finally,  of  the 
factors  of  evolution,  use  and  disuse,  inheritance  of  acquired  character- 
istics, function  creating  structure,  and  influence  of  environment.  Lamarck 
regards  life  as  a  natural  phenomenon. 

Dantec' s  essay  on  the  place  of  life  among  natural  phenomena  falls  into 
two  parts.  In  the  first  chapter,  "  An  Objective  Study  of  Phenomena,"  he 
takes  the  following  position.  Rest  is  an  illusion.  All  matter,  as  far  as  we 
know  it,  is  in  motion.  But  this  motion  may  be  molecular  {particulaire)  or 


No.  6.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  703 

molar.  The  different  conduct  of  a  very  small,  and  of  a  larger  quantity  of 
water,  when  poured  on  a  horizontal  polished  surface,  is  taken  as  a  proof  of 
molecular  structure.  Molecular  movement  is  the  cause  of  those  phenom- 
ena which  have  been  attributed  to  physical  forces.  These  latter  are 
merely  anthropological  concepts.  Chemical  reactions  are  molecular  cata- 
clysms after  which  the  movement  of  atoms  goes  on  unnoticed  as  before. 
The  erroneous  idea  of  action  at  a  distance  has  lent  support  to  vitalism. 
Ether,  though  imponderable,  is  material.  There  is  no  experimental  proof 
of  freedom.  Animals  are  transformers,  not  creators,  of  motion.  Life  need 
not  be  referred  to  an  immaterial  principle.  The  common  characteristic  of 
living  beings  is  assimilation,  which  belongs  to  the  chemical  order  of  phe- 
nomena. It  differs  from  other  varieties  of  chemical  reaction  by  recon- 
structing a  more  considerable  quantity  of  molecules  of  the  same  kind. 
Assimilation  is  itself  the  source  of  the  molar  movement  in  consequence  of 
which  it  can  continue.  It  is,  moreover,  the  source  of  specific  cellular 
form  and  of  the  phenomena  of  heredity  and  sex.  In  short,  all  the  organic 
manifestations  are  ultimately  derived  from  assimilation.  A  modification 
of  the  properties  of  an  organism  is  a  modification  of  its  constituent  mole- 
cules ;  that  is  to  say,  organic  evolution  is  a  phenomenon  of  the  chemical 
order. 

The  second  chapter  is  "  A  Study  of  the  Knowledge  of  Living  Beings." 
The  author  generously  devotes  three  pages  to  a  discussion  concerning  the 
nature  of  knowledge.  According  to  a  possible  view,  a  mind  atom  is  indis- 
solubly  attached  to  each  material  atom.  He  does  not  insist  on  the  validity 
of  this  hypothesis,  but  apparently  considers  it  quite  good  enough  for  "  the 
lovers  of  immaterial  principles."  A  living  being  can  know  only  those 
movements  which  directly  or  indirectly  influence  its  chemical  reactions. 
This  knowledge  is  limited  by  the  extent  of  ether  vibrations,  and  by  the 
atom,  which  we  call  unchangeable  because  we  cannot  know  what  occurs 
within  it.  We  have  restricted  the  term  form  to  vision  ;  but  there  is,  prob- 
ably, also  an  auditory  and  an  olfactory  form. 

The  second  division  of  the  book  is  a  criticism  of  Grasset's  Les  limites  de 
la  biologie.  The  third  division  is  a  review  of  Marcel  Hebert's  Le  dernicre 
idole.  Hebert  correctly  rejected  the  concept  of  a  personal  God,  but  wrongly 
substituted  the  idea  of  an  impersonal  divinity  striving  toward  the  better. 
The  fourth  essay,  entitled  "  The  Retrograde  Movement  in  Biology,"  is  an 
objection  to  Paul  Vignon's  theory  of  a  central  cause  in  the  living  being. 
"Evolution  and  the  Apologists"  is  an  answer  to  Brunetiere's  Les  motifs 
d' esperer.  The  last  essay  demonstrates  that  certain  knowledge  of  the 
future  is  impossible.  The  work  is  concluded  by  three  appendices  dealing 
respectively  with  Darwin,  The  Maturation  of  the  Egg,  and  Heredity. 

N.  E.  TRUMAN. 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  SOUTH  DAKOTA. 


704  THE   PHILOSOPHICAL    REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

La  philosophie  en  Amerique  depuis  les  origines  jusqu  a  nos  jours  (1607- 

1900):  Essai  Historique.     Par  L.  VAN  BECELAERE,  O.P.      New  York, 

The  Eclectic  Publishing  Co.,  1904.  — pp.  xvii,  180. 

It  is  an  interesting  circumstance  that  the  first  extended  survey  of  phi- 
losophy in  the  United  States  should  have  been  written  by  a  scholar  of 
foreign  origin  and  a  minister  of  religion  in  a  communion  whose  tenets  did 
not  appeal  to  the  early  American  thinkers,  whose  attention  to  speculative 
questions  was  so  largely  motived  by  their  theological  aims.  In  its  first 
form  the  present  treatise  was  published  as  a  series  of  articles  during  the 
years  1902-1903  in  the  Revue  Thomiste  of  Paris.  Since  their  original  issue 
the  author  has  "worked  over,  revised,  and  completed"  his  papers,  until 
now  he  has  woven  them  into  a  connected  account  of  American  philosoph- 
ical thinking  from  its  beginnings  down  to  the  present  time.  In  the  prose- 
cution of  this  task,  Father  van  Becelaere  has  enjoyed  the  sympathy  and 
counsel  of  a  number  of  American  scholars  in  the  philosophical  field, — 
Harris,  Royce,  Hall,  Curtis,  Creighton,  Duncan,  Cattell,  and  others,  and 
his  own  treatise  is  happily  brought  to  the  notice  of  students  in  the  felicitous 
Introduction  in  which  Professor  Royce  has  at  once  characterized  in  outline 
;the  spirit  of  American  thinking  and  expressed  his  discriminating  commen- 
idation  of  the  historical  essay  which  follows.  Father  van  Becelaere  has 
,also  been  at  pains  to  acquaint  himself  with  the  briefer  descriptions  of 
.American  philosophy  which  have  from  time  to  time  been  printed  in  the  dif- 
ferent histories  of  philosophy  (by  ex-President  Porter,  for  example,  in  the 
.  American  translation  of  Ueberweg,  and  Professor  Curtis  in  the  later  edi- 
ftions  of  Ueberweg-Heinze),  or  in  the  reviews  (e.  g.,  by  Hall  in  Mind,  and 
'Creighton  in  the  Kant  Studien),  as  well  as  with  the  occasional  monographs 
(e.  g.,  Hall  on  "American  College  Textbooks  "  etc.,  in  the  Proceedings  of 
the  American  Antiquarian  Society,  Jones,  Early  American  Philosophers), 
which,  together  with  the  former,  may  be  said  to  constitute  materials  for  the 
more  complete  historical  treatment  of  our  thought.  More  especially,  he  has 
given  careful  attention  to  the  collateral  literature  bearing  on  his  subject,  and 
by  means  of  diligent  study  has  succeeded  in  grasping  the  American  point 
of  view  as  well  as  in  reading  himself  into  the  spirit  of  our  classical  authori- 
ties. And  if  he  has  not  in  every  case  arrived  at  results  free  from  all  sugges- 
tion of  dogmatic  prepossessions,  he  has  so  nearly  approached  his  ideal  that 
it  may  be  questioned  whether  a  native-born,  Protestant  scholar  could  have 
so  well  maintained  an  impartial  attitude  in  recounting  the  history  of  move- 
ments in  regard  to  which  his  own  sympathies  would  in  the  nature  of  the 
case  have  been  engaged. 

La  philosophie  en  Amerique  divides  into  eight  chapters,  an  ' '  Epilogue, ' ' 
;and  a  brief  appendix  devoted  to  the  work  of  American  thinkers  who  have 
been  members  of  the  Church  of  Rome.  Of  the  principal  chapters,  the  first 
four  deal  with  the  origins  of  American  philosophical  thinking  and  the  course 
of  its  development  down  to  the  period  which  includes  the  present  time.  They 
.are  severally  entitled  :  I,  "  L'esprit  americain  et  la  pensee  speculative  ;" 


No.  6.]  NOTICES  OF  NEW  BOOKS.  705 

II,  "  La  periode  coloniale,  1607-1765;"  III,  "  L' influence  ecossaise  ;"  IV, 
"  L'influence  de  la  philosophic  allemande."  The  discussions  comprised 
in  this  group,  which  amounts  to  rather  more  than  one-half  of  the  whole 
essay,  not  only  describe  our  thought  in  its  beginnings  and  earlier  progress, 
but  also  exemplify  the  author's  purpose  to  treat  the  connection  of  reflective 
thinking  with  the  intellectual,  social,  and  moral  development  of  the  nation. 
Toward  their  close  they  lead  naturally  over  to  the  consideration  of  contem- 
porary movements,  which  are  recorded  in  a  series  of  expositions  of  a  little 
less  than  equal  length  :  Chap.  V,  "  Ecoles  contemporaines  —  idealistes  ;  " 
VI,  "La  philosophic  de  1'evolution;"  VII,  "  La  psychologic ;"  VIII,  "A 
1'heure  presente. ' '  In  this  division  of  his  field  and  organization  of  his  mate- 
rial, Father  van  Becelaere  has  encountered  the  difficulties  of  arrangement 
which  always  confront  the  historian  of  opinion,  and  in  addition  certain  others 
which  are  incident  to  the  special  development  of  American  thought.  In 
spite  of  the  dangers  which  lurk  in  such  conditions,  the  suggestiveness  of 
his  historical  conception  and  its  fruitfulness  will  be  evident  from  the  outline 
of  the  argument  which  the  statement  of  these  heads  of  chapters  may  serve 
to  furnish.  With  omissions  of  a  substantive  sort  he  is  seldom  to  be  charged. 
Of  the  three  suggested  in  the  Introduction  by  Professor  Royce,  who  holds 
that  the  treatise  would  gain  by  being  enlarged,  the  most  serious  is  the  ab- 
sence of  a  full  account  of  recent  Pragmatism,  though  in  regard  to  this  it 
might  perhaps  be  said  that  the  movement  has  attained  its  greatest  promi- 
nence since  the  date  with  which  the  author's  survey  closes. 

Concerning  the  historical  treatment  of  details,  a  similar  judgment  is  in 
place  :  while  Father  van  Becelaere' s  work  is  open  here  and  there  to  criti- 
cism, he  is  to  be  congratulated  that  he  has  successfully  accomplished  so 
much.  Or,  in  the  words  of  the  Introduction,  which  may  stand  as  an  antici- 
pation of  the  probable  verdict  of  philosophical  scholars  at  large  :  ' '  Every- 
where the  earnest  effort  to  collect  the  material  and  to  present  fairly  the 
result,  is  evident.  And  we  students  of  philosophy  in  America  will  cer- 
tainly feel  thankful  for  what  we  get  in  this  study  in  the  way  of  exposition 
and  comparison  ;  and  we  shall  hope  for  more  in  the  same  spirit.  We  our- 
selves possess  no  study  made  by  one  of  ourselves  that  is  anywhere  nearly 
as  adequate  "(p.  xi). 

A.  C.  ARMSTRONG. 

WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY. 

La  dottrina  delta  conoscenza  nei  moderni  precursori  di  Kant.      Per  E. 
TROILO.     Torino,  Fratelli  Bocca,  1904. — pp.  x,  304. 

The  precursors  of  Kant  whose  theories  of  knowledge  are  expounded 
and  criticised  in  Dr.  Troilo's  book  are  Bacon,  Galileo,  Descartes,  Leibniz, 
Wolff,  Berkeley,  Locke,  and  Hume.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  almost 
the  whole  of  pre-Kantian  epistemology  since  the  sixteenth  century  is  in- 
cluded in  the  scope  of  his  work,  and  it  is  perhaps  to  be  regretted  that  it 
could  not  have  been  so  far  extended  as  to  have  included  some  notice  of 


706  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.  [VOL.  XIII. 

Hobbes  and  Spinoza  ;  since,  though  neither  philosopher  can  in  strictness 
rank  as  a  "precursor  of  Kant,"  each  contributed  something  to  the  work- 
ing out  of  the  epistemological  problem,  and  exerted  an  influence  upon  the 
streams  of  thought  that  finally  mingled  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 
Within  the  limits  which  he  has  set  for  himself,  Dr.  Troilo  has  accomplished 
his  task  well  ;  it  would  not  be  easy  to  find  elsewhere  in  such  brief  compass 
so  lucid  and  thorough  a  setting  forth  of  these  several  theories  of  knowl- 
edge. The  doctrine  of  Galileo,  often  ignored  in  English  and  German 
histories  of  philosophy,  has  sufficient  interest  to  be  well  worth  recalling. 
The  value  of  Bacon's  contributions  to  epistemology  is  perhaps  a  little  over- 
rated. The  analysis  and  criticism  of  Locke's  teaching  is  excellent,  and 
the  importance  of  his  philosophy  as  opening  the  road  which  led  to  Kantian- 
ism is  fully  brought  out.  The  treatment  of  Berkeley  seems  to  the  present 
writer  a  little  less  satisfactory,  partly  because  he  is  regarded  as  having  his 
place  in  the  idealistic  current  of  thought  to  which  Descartes  and  Leibniz 
belonged,  and  it  is  not  sufficiently  recognized  to  how  great  an  extent,  in 
epistemology  as  well  as  in  psychology,  he  was  a  faithful  follower  of  Locke. 
The  relation  of  Hume  to  Kant  has  been  so  often  and  so  exhaustively  dis- 
cussed that  there  is  not  much  new  to  be  said  on  the  subject ;  but  the  author, 
who  has  wisely  drawn  his  account  of  Hume's  doctrine  from  the  Essays 
and  the  Inquiry  as  well  as  from  the  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  gives  a 
clear  and  appreciative  statement  of  the  great  sceptic's  position.  We  are 
promised  in  the  final  chapter  another  book  dealing  with  the  adequacy 
of  Kant's  solution  of  the  problem  left  to  him  by  Hume  ;  Dr.  Troilo' s  con- 
tribution to  this  much-debated  question  will  be  awaited  with  interest. 

E.  RITCHIE. 
HALIFAX,  NOVA  SCOTIA. 

LehrbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie.  Von  W.  WINDELBAND.  Dritte, 
durchgesehene  Auflage.  Tubingen  und  Leipzig,  J.  C.  B.  Mohr,  1903. — 
pp.  viii,  575. 

This  third  edition  of  Windelband's  work  involves  no  very  extensive  revi- 
sion, as  but  three  years  have  passed  since  the  second  edition  appeared. 
"  Still  the  reader  will  find  not  only  that  the  bibliography  and  literature  have 
been  carefully  revised  and  supplemented,  but  also  that  the  text  has  been 
altered  in  many  places,  where  recent  works  seemed  to  require  corrections, 
or  a  shortening  or  expanding  of  the  treatment. ' '  Examination  shows  that 
the  additions  to  the  literature  are  frequent,  with  notable  omission  of  many 
important  English  editions  and  monographs.  Perhaps  the  most  surprising 
is  the  persistence  under  the  Kantian  literature  of  the  reference  to  Caird's 
first  book  on  Kant  (1877)  unaccompanied  by  any  reference  to  the  more 
comprehensive  work  of  1889.  The  additions  to  the  text  are  largely  in  the 
form  of  notes  calling  attention  to  recently  published  results  of  investigation. 
Happy  the  system  of  printing  and  publishing  which  permits  such  constant 
revision  !  The  permanent  value  of  the  book  as  a  history  of  problems  and 


No.  6.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  707 

conceptions  is  evidently  sufficiently  appreciated  to  make  possible  the  addi- 
tional value  of  being  up-to-date. 

J.  H.  TUFTS. 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


L   instabilite  mentale  :  Essai  sur  les  donnees  de  la  psycho-pathologie.    Par 
G.-L.  DUPRAT.     Paris,  Fe~lix  Alcan,  1899. — pp.  310. 

This  volume  appears  in  the  Bibliotheque  de  philosophic  contemporaine. 
"One  will  be  deceived,"  says  the  author  in  the  introduction,  "if  one 
expects  to  find  under  this  title  more  than  an  essay  in  philosophy.  Our 
role  is  not  so  much  to  write  a  work  of  science  as  to  criticise  the  results  of 
science  and  to  examine  the  first  principles  of  each  particular  science,  in 
order  to  give  them  a  philosophic  foundation."  In  accordance  with  this 
purpose,  the  book  is  divided  into  three  parts.  The  first  part  treats  of  the 
general  relations  between  the  normal  mind  and  the  pathological  mind  ; 
the  second  part  reviews  the  facts  of  mental  pathology  ;  the  third  part  is 
given  over  to  practical  conclusions.  In  the  first  part,  the  author  argues 
against  the  view  that  mental  disorders  are  caused  solely  by  anatomical 
and  physiological  defects.  In  support  of  his  opinion,  he  adduces  the  fact 
that  mental  disorders  occur  without  lesions  of  the  brain.  But  even  when 
lesions  are  present,  he  holds  that  mental  diseases  have  mental  causes, 
because  the  biological  centers  are  also  psychic  centers.  Another  question 
which  the  author  takes  up  in  the  first  part,  is  the  meaning  of  consciousness. 
Is  it  to  be  regarded  as  unity  or  plurality,  as  '  thing  divisible  '  or  '  act  indi- 
visible '  ?  He  decides  in  favor  of  the  latter  view,  on  the  ground  that  the 
unity  of  the  individual  comes  about  by  the  subordination  of  the  psycho- 
physiological  centers  to  one  another  and  to  a  unique  center  ;  and,  further, 
because  every  state  of  consciousness  is  a  synthesis  of  common  elements 
which  could  not  subsist  alone.  The  result  that  emerges  from  this  discus- 
sion is  that  the  normal  consciousness  is  systematic,  while  the  abnormal 
consciousness  is  asystematic.  The  survey  of  the  facts  of  mental  pathology 
constitutes  the  bulk  of  the  book.  The  facts  are  arranged  under  two  heads  : 
the  pathology  of  mental  functions,  and  the  pathology  of  personality.  Under 
the  former  head  are  grouped  instability  of  intellect ;  of  tendency  ;  of  emo- 
tion ;  of  action.  Under  the  latter  head,  diseases  of  personality  ;  morbid 
stability  ;  mental  pathology  according  to  sex,  age,  and  function.  In  the 
practical  conclusions,  the  question  of  the  cure  of  mental  diseases  is  rather 
hopefully  discussed.  Suggestion  may  be  of  use  in  some  cases  ;  but  the 
most  favorable  time  and  place  for  correction  and  cure  is  during  youth  in 
the  schools.  While  the  author  has  no  theory  of  treatment,  he  advocates 
such  a  system  of  education  as  will  curb  all  tendency  to  instability. 

H.  C.  STEVENS. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


708  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Leber  die  allgcmeinen  Beziehungen  zwischen  Gehirn  und  Seelenleben.     Von 
TH.  ZIEHEN.     Leipzig,  J.  A.  Earth,  1902. — pp.  66. 

Professor  Ziehen's  essay,  which  was  originally  an  address  delivered  at 
Utrecht,  belongs  to  the  large  current  literature  on  the  mutual  relations  of 
mind  and  body.  The  author  traces  the  history  of  psychophysical  facts  and 
theories  from  primitive  times  to  the  present.  He  draws  the  important  dis- 
tinction between  the  factual  dependence  of  mental  processes  upon  the 
brain,  a  dependence  that  has  been  set  forth  circumstantially  only  within 
the  last  few  years,  and  the  significance  of  this  dependence,  the  problem  in 
which  present  discussion  centers.  For  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  sig- 
nificance, the  author  turns  to  modern  systems  of  philosophy  and  considers 
the  three  typical  answers  returned  by  dualism,  monism,  and  idealism.  The 
last  few  pages  of  the  essay  contain  his  own  explanation  of  psychophysical 
parallelism,  an  explanation  based  upon  the  Berkeleian  form  of  idealism 
known  at  present  as  '  immanente  Philosophic.'  The  well-known  doctrine 
of  immanence,  as  elaborated  by  Avenarius,  Schuppe,  Ziehen  (in  his  Psycho- 
physiologische  Erkenntnistheorie,  1898),  and  others,  seeks  to  avoid  repre- 
sentationism  by  reducing  the  world  of  objects  to  '  sensations '  (simple 
sensory  experiences)  and  '  ideas  '  (simple  memory  images).  No  '  extra- 
mental  '  thing  is  '  given '  in  experience,  and,  therefore,  no  final  relation 
obtains  between  mental  and  physical  phenomena  or  substances,  such  as 
psychophysical  theories  are  accustomed  to  assume.  A  parallelistic  law  re- 
mains, it  is  true  ;  but  it  concerns  only  the  modifications  by  the  brain  of 
the  world  of  sensation.  It  is  thus  merely  a  law  of  dependence  within  the 
homogeneous  world  of  mind.  The  easy  success  of  the  theory  seems  to 
rest  upon  its  disregard  of  the  problem  of  validity  in  assuming  the  ultimate 
identity  of  the  vehicle  and  the  object  of  knowledge.  The  historical  part 
of  the  essay  is  clear  and  concise,  and  is  supplemented  by  a  series  of  useful 
references  to  the  literature. 

I.  M.  BENTLEY. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


Osservazioni  sullo  svolgimento  della  dottrina  delle  idee  in  Platone.  Parte 
I.  Per  G.  LOMBARDO-RADICE.  Firenze,  Tipografia  Galileiana,  1903. 
-pp.  91. 

Exclusive  of  the  introduction,  this  work  consists  of  three  chapters  on  the 
following  subjects  respectively:  "The  Value  of  Philological  Studies"  (for 
an  understanding  of  the  growth  of  Plato's  system),  "The  Fanciful  Element 
in  Plato's  Dialogues,"  and  "The  Postulates  of  Plato's  Philosophy." 

From  the  preface  we  learn,  what  is  not  suggested  by  the  title,  that  the 
present  volume  is  only  the  introduction  to  a  comprehensive  work  on  "Aris- 
totle's Criticism  of  Plato's  Theory  of  Ideas." 

Undertaking  for  this  purpose  to  write  a  history  of  Plato' s  thinking,  the 
author  feels  called  upon  to  determine  the  significance  of  recent  philological 


No.  6.]  NOTICES    OF  NEW  BOOKS.  709 

investigations  for  the  question  of  the  chronological  order  of  Plato's  writings. 
He  takes  the  position  that  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  of  Plato, 
the  logical  order,  although  not  always  a  sure  proof,  is  in  general  the  most 
reliable  indication  of  the  chronological  order.  The  attempts  of  Lutoslawski 
to  determine  this  order  by  tabulating  and  comparing  characteristics  of  style, 
with  little  reference  to  the  contents  of  different  writings,  are  shown  to  be 
entirely  too  pretentious.  The  historical  exposition  of  Plato's  thought  must 
depend  chiefly  upon  an  analysis  of  the  logical  contents  of  the  various 
dialogues  and  not  upon  philological  data. 

In  regard  to  the  fanciful  element  in  Plato,  by  which  he  means  not  merely 
the  mythical  representations,  but  all  sensuous  imagery,  he  repudiates 
Teichmiiller's  assumption  that  this  element  is  generally  a  pedagogical 
device,  as  the  view  implies  that  the  poetic  imagery  of  the  Dialogues  is  the 
symbolical  expression  of  convictions  already  definitely  attained.  He  also 
regards  as  inexact  Zeller's  view  that  the  myths  are  employed  to  supply 
"  eine  Lilcke  der  wissenschaftlichen  Erkenntniss"  as  this  formula  is  not 
applicable  to  the  greater  part  of  the  fanciful  element,  describing  in  fact  only 
the  imagery  employed  to  portray  the  states  of  the  soul  and  the  relation  of 
the  soul  to  the  ideas.  The  author  shows  that,  on  the  contrary,  this  element 
in  the  Dialogues  represents  the  first  step  in  the  solution  of  a  problem. 

In  the  Theaetetus,  which  he  calls  both  the  last  of  the  Socratic  and  the 
first  of  the  Platonic  dialogues,  he  finds  the  most  elementary  form  of  Plato's 
doctrine  of  knowledge,  it  being  the  foundation  for  all  the  different  phases 
that  his  doctrine  subsequently  assumes.  Natorp  and  Lutoslawski,  who  find 
in  Plato's  description  of  sensation  and  thought,  not  a  doctrine  in  embryo 
merely,  but  a  virtually  complete  anticipation  of  Kant,  have,  as  the  author 
shows,  read  into  Plato  much  more  than  can  legitimately  be  found  there. 

The  work  is  evidently  the  fruit  of  a  protracted  and  independent  study  of 
Plato's  writings  and  of  the  best  recent  literature  on  Plato. 

E.  E.  POWELL. 

LANCASTER,  PA. 

Sc killers  philosophische  Schriften  und  Gedichte  (Auswahl).  Zur  Ein- 
fuhrung  in  seine  Weltanschauung.  Mit  ausfiihrlicher  Einleitung  heraus- 
gegeben  von  EUGEN  KUHNEMANN.  Leipzig,  Verlag  der  Durr'schen 
Buchhandlung,  1902. — pp.  328. 

Kiihnemann's  is  not  a  new  name  in  the  field  of  Schiller  literature,  being 
Icnown  especially  through  his  Kants  und  Schillers  Begrundung  der 
Asthetik,  and  he  comes  eminently  qualified  for  the  work  he  has  here  under- 
taken.  The  book  before  us,  Number  103  of  the  "Philosophische  Biblio- 
thek,"  is  a  companion  volume  of  F.  A.  Lange's  Introduction  and  Commen- 
tary to  Schiller  s  Philosophical  Poems,  and  will  be  welcomed  by  those  who 
are  interested  in  the  more  strictly  philosophical  writings  of  the  German 
poet.  It  contains  reprints,  in  modern  orthography,  of  "  Uber  Anmut  und 
Wiirde,"  "  Uber  die  Asthetische  Erziehung  des  Menschen,"  "  Uber  das 


/IO  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW.          [VOL.  XIII. 

Erhabene,"  "  Das  Ideal  und  das  Leben,"  "  Uber  naive  imd  sentimental- 
ische  Dichtung, "  and  "  Votivtafeln."  There  is  prefixed  an  introduction 
of  ninety-seven  pages,  in  which  the  author  outlines,  in  a  charming  style 
but  with  a  firm  hand,  the  leading  points  of  Schiller's  ethical  and  aesthetical 
views  ;  his  treatment  of  the  poet's  relation  to  the  Kantian  philosophy  is 
pretty  much  along  traditional  lines.  This  introduction  will  be  a  welcome 
aid  to  those  not  familiar  with  Schiller's  terminology  and  treatment  of  philo- 
sophical subjects,  and  it  stimulates  interest  in  the  essays  themselves  not  a 
little.  The  volume  contains  a  full  index  both  of  names  and  topics  and  a 
table  of  contents. 

EMIL  C.  WILM. 
CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

Lezioni elementari  di  psicologianormale.     Di  N.  R.  D'ALFONZO.     Seconda 

edizione.     Torino,  Fratelli  Bocca,  1904. — pp.  192. 

This  book  exhibits  those  qualities  of  freshness  of  treatment  and  succinct- 
ness and  lucidity  of  style  which  characterize  the  other  writings  of  Signor 
D'Alfonzo.  The  guiding  thread  of  which  he  makes  use  in  leading  his 
students  through  the  labyrinth  of  psychological  phenomena  is  the  constant 
and  necessary  correlation  of  the  conscious  process  with  its  physical  basis, 
the  psychical  life  being  treated  throughout  as  the  essential  function  of  the 
organism.  At  the  same  time,  we  do  not  discern  here  that  materialistic  bent 
which  so  often  leads  to  the  depreciation  and  minimizing  of  the  value  and 
significance  of  the  mental  factor.  The  account  given  of  the  development 
and  functioning  of  the  nervous  system  is  extremely  clear,  and  provides  the 
beginner  with  all  the  information  necessary  to  entering  upon  a  study  of 
recent  discoveries  in  physiological  psychology  or  to  a  comprehension  of  its 
problems.  The  discussion  of  the  higher  forms  of  conscious  intelligence 
and  will  is  very  good,  but  if  those  subjects  had  been  treated  with  greater 
fullness,  the  book  would  have  gained  in  interest  for  the  general  reader. 

E.  RITCHIE. 

HALIFAX,  N.  S. 

The  following  books  also  have  been  received  : 
Elements  of  Metaphysics.     By  A.  E.  TAYLOR.     London,  Methuen  &  Co., 

1903.  — pp.  xvi,  419.     $2.60. 
Hobbes.     By  LESLIE  STEPHEN.     New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1904.  — 

pp.  v,  243.     $0.75. 
A  Treatise  on  Cosmology.     Vol.  I.     By  HERBERT  NICHOLS.     Cambridge, 

Mass.,  Herbert  Nichols,  1904. — pp.  455.     $3.50. 
From  Epicurus  to  Christ :     A  Study  in  the  Principles  of  Personality.     By 

WILLIAM  DE\VITT  HYDE.     New  York,   The  Macmillan  Co.,  1904. — 

pp.  viii,  285.     $1.50. 
Faith  and  Knowledge.      By  W.  R.  INGE.      Edinburgh,    T.    &  T.   Clark, 

Imported  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1904. — pp.  x,  292.     $1.50. 


No.  6.]  NOTICES   OF  NEW  BOOKS.  71  I 

Selections  from  the  Literature  of  Theism.  Edited  by  ALFRED  CALDE- 
COTT  and  H.  R.  MACKINTOSH.  Edinburgh,  T.  &  T.  Clark,  Imported 
by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1904. — pp.  xiii,  472. 

The  Theology  of  the  Reformed  Chtirch  in  its  Fundamental  Principles.     By 

WILLIAM  HASTIE.     Edinburgh,  T.   &  T.   Clark,  Imported  by  Charles 

Scribner's  Sons,  1904. — pp.  xvi,  283.     $2.00. 
The  Theory  of  Business  Enterprise.     By  THORSTEIN  VEBLEN.     New  York, 

Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1904. — pp.  vii,  400.     $1.50. 
The  Miracles  of  Unbelief.     By  FRANK   BALLARD.      Edinburgh,  T.  &  T. 

Clark,  Imported  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,   1904. — pp.  xxviii,  382. 

$1.00. 

The  Origin  and  Economy  of  Energy  in  the   Universe.     By  ISRAEL  KAUF- 
MAN.    New  York,  The  Chief  Press,  1904. — pp.  422. 
Scientific  Order  and  Law  as  Traced  by  the  Method  of  Christ  and  Conceived 

to  be  the  Revealed  Will  of  God.     By  JOHN  COUTTS.     London,  National 

Hygienic  Co.,  1904. — pp.  viii,  520. 
Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1903-1904.      London,  Williams  & 

Norgate,  1904. — pp.  170.      IDS.  6d. 
The  University  of  Colorado  Studies,  Vol.    II,  No.  2.     Edited  by  FRANCIS 

RAMALEY  and  ARNOLD  EMCH.     Boulder,  Colo.,  The  University  of  Colo- 
rado, 1904. — pp.  67-154.    $0.50. 
At  the  Deathbed  of  Darwinism.     By  E.    DENNERT.     Burlington,  Iowa, 

German  Literary  Board,  1904. — pp.   146.     0.75. 
Ants  and  Some   Other  Insects.     By  AUGUST  FOREL.     Chicago,  The  Open 

Court  Publishing  Co.,   1904. — pp.  49.     $0.50. 
Einfuhrung  in  die  Psychologie.     Von  ALEX.   PFANDER.     Leipzig,  J.  A. 

Barth,  1904. — pp.  vii,  423.     M.  6. 
Beitrdge  zur  religiosen   Psychologie  :   Psychologie  und  Gefiihl.     Von   G. 

VORBRODT.     Leipzig,  A.  Deichert,  1904.  —  pp.  v,  173.     M.  3.60. 
Aristoteles'    Metaphysik.     Ubersetzt  und  mit  einer  Einleitung  und  erklar- 

enden  Anmerkungen   versehen  von   EUG.    ROLFES.       Leipzig,    Verlag 

der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1904.  —  pp.  216.     M.  2.50. 
Das  Problem  des  Ich.     Von  MAX  WALLESER.     Heidelberg,  Weiss' sche 

Universitats-Buchhandlung,  1903. — pp.  vii,  88. 
Naturwissenschaft  und  Weltanschauung.     Von  MAX  VERWORN.     Leipzig, 

J.  A.  Barth,  1904.  — pp.  48. 
L intelligence  et  le  rythme  dans  les  mouvements  artistiques.     Par  MARIE 

JAELL.     Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1904. — pp.  172.     2  fr.  50. 
Index philosophique.     Premiere  Annee,  1902.     Par  N.  VASCHIDE  et  YON 

BUSCHAN.     Paris,  Chevalier  &  Rivie*re,  1903. — pp.  vi,  345. 
L imaginazione    creatrice    nella  filosofia.      Per    ANTONIO    MARCHESINI. 

Torino,  G.  B.  Paravia  e  comp.  —  pp.  131. 


NOTES. 

The  International  Congress  of  Arts  and  Sciences  met  in  connection 
with  the  Universal  Exposition  at  St.  Louis,  September  19  to  25.  The 
program  was  carried  out  as  detailed  in  the  last  number  of  the  REVIEW. 

Dr.  J.  W.  Baird,  last  year  research  fellow  of  the  Carnegie  Institution, 
has  been  appointed  instructor  in  psychology  at  Johns  Hopkins  University. 

We  give  below  a  list  of  the  articles,  etc.,  in  the  current  philosophical 
journals  : 

MIND,  No.  51:  F.  H.  Bradley,  On  Truth  and  Practice  ;  B.  Russell, 
Meinong's  Theory  of  Complexes  and  Assumptions  (II)  ;  /.  S.  Mackenzie, 
The  Infinite  and  the  Perfect ;  H.  G.  Wells,  Scepticism  of  the  Instrument ; 
7!  M.  Forsyth,  The  Conception  of  Experience  in  its  Relation  to  the  De- 
velopment of  English  Philosophy  ;  Critical  Notices  ;  New  Books  ;  Philo- 
sophical Periodicals  ;  Correspondence. 

THE  MONIST,  XIV,  4  :  O.  F.  Cook,  The  Biological  Evolution  of  Lan- 
guage ;  /.  W.  Hey  singer,  On  some  Conceptual  Errors  Relating  to  Force  and 
Matter  ;  Enno  Liftman,  The  Stele  of  Teima  in  Arabia  ;  A.  H.  Godbey,  The 
Front  Door  of  Palestine  ;  Maurice  Bloomfield,  Cerberus,  the  Dog  of  Hades  ; 
F.  W.  Fitzpatrick,  Justice  ;  L.  Arreat,  An  International  Auxiliary  Lan- 
guage ;  Editor,  Pasigraphy  —  A  Suggestion  ;  L.  Arreat,  Literary  Corre- 
spondence—  France;  Criticisms  and  Discussions  ;  Book  Reviews. 

THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  PSYCHOLOGY,  XV,  3  :  James  P.  Porter, 
A  Preliminary  Study  of  the  Psychology  of  the  English  Sparrow  ;  L.  D. 
Arnett,  The  Soul  —  A  Study  of  Past  and  Present  Beliefs  ;  Robert  Mac- 
Dougall,  Facial  Vision  :  A  Supplementary  Report,  with  Criticisms  ;  F. 
Kuhlmann,  Experimental  Studies  in  Mental  Deficiency  ;  Literature  ;  Notes. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  I,  9  :  E.  /.  Swift,  The  Acquisition 
of  Skill  in  Typewriting  ;  Psychological  Literature  ;  New  Books  ;  Notes  ; 
Journals. 

I,  10  :  John  Dewey,  Schiller's  Humanism;  Psychological  Literature; 
Discussion  ;  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News  ;  Journals. 

THE  JOURNAL  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  PSYCHOLOGY,  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHODS, 
1,15:  H.R.  Marshall,  The  Field  of  Inattention  ;  A .  //.  Pierce,  An  Experi- 
ence and  an  Inquiry  ;  Discussion  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ; 
Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

I,  16:  H.  Heath  Bawden,  What  is  Pragmatism?  L.  P.  Boggs,  The 
Attitude  of  Mind  called  Interest  ;  Discussion  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of 
Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

712 


NOTES.  713 

I,  17  :  W.  H.  Sheldon,  Is  the  Abstract  Unreal  ?  H.  R.  Marshall,  Of 
Conscious  Efficiency  ;  Discussion  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ; 
Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

I,  18:  William  James,  Does  Consciousness  Exist?  M.  F.  Washburn, 
The  Genetic  Method  in  Psychology  ;  Discussion  ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts 
of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes  and  News. 

I,  19:  H.  R.  Marshall,  Of  Noetic  Stability  and  Belief;  H.  A.  Over- 
street,  The  Process  of  '  Reinterpretation  '  in  the  Hegelian  Dialectic  ;  Dis- 
cussion ;  Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ; 
Notes  and  News. 

I,  20  :  William  James,  A  World  of  Pure  Experience  ;  Discussion  ; 
Reviews  and  Abstracts  of  Literature  ;  Journals  and  New  Books  ;  Notes 
and  News. 

ZEITSCHRIFT  FUR  PSYCHOLOGIE  UND  PHYSIOLOGIE  DER  SINNESORGANE, 
XXXV,  6  :  Fritz  Weinmann,  Zur  Struktur  der  Melodic  (Schluss)  ;  Wil- 
helm  Schuppe,  Meine  Erkenntnistheorie  und  das  bestrittene  Ich  ;  Namen- 
register. 

ARCHIV  FUR  SYSTEMATISCHE  PHILOSOPHY,  X,  3  :  Victor  Kraft,  Das 
Problem  der  Aussenwelt ;  A.  Levy,  Vorbedingungen  einer  jeden  wahren 
philosophischen  Erkenntnis  ;  Julius  Fischer,  Zum  Raum-  und  Zeitproblem  ; 
Theodor  A.  Meyer,  Das  Formprinzip  des  Schonen  ;  Jahresbericht. 

REVUE  PHILOSOPHIQUE,  XXIX,  8  :  D.  Parodi,  Morale  et  Biologic  ; 
G.  Dumas,  Le  sourire  :  6tude  psychophysiologique  (2e  et  dernier  article)  ; 
P.  Landormy,  La  logique  du  discours  musical  ;  P.  Hartenberg,  Les  emo- 
tions de  bourse  ;  notes  de  psychologic  collective  ;  H.  Pieron,  Les  methodes 
de  la  psychologic  zoologique  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ;  Revue  des 
peViodiques  etrangers  ;  Correspondance  ;  Livres  nouveaux. 

XXIX,  8  :  R.  de  la  Grasserie,  De  1'expression  de  1'idee  desexualite  dans 
le  langage  ;  P.  Gaultier,  Ce  qu'enseigne  une  ceuvre  d'art ;  Marie-J.  Dai- 
reaux  La  sur-action  ;  F.  Clement,  Un  document  contemporain  sur  1'incon- 
scient  dans  I'imagination  creatrice  ;  Analyses  et  comptes  rendus  ;  Revue 
des  periodiques  etrangers. 

REVUE  DEMETAPHYSIQUE  ET  DE  MORALE,  XII,  4  :  G.  Lanson,  L'histoire 
litteraire  et'la  sociologie  ;  Ch.  Rist,  Economic  optimiste  et  economic  scien- 
tifique  ;  L.  Couturat,  Les  principes  des  mathematiques  ;  A.  Rey,  La  philo- 
sophic scientifique  de  M.  Duhem  ;  L.  Weber,  La  question  de  l'£cole  Poly- 
technique  ;  Supplement. 

XII,  5  :  L.  Brunschvicg,  La  revolution  cartesienne  et  la  notion  spino- 
ziste  de  la  substance  ;  G.  Vailati,  Sur  une  classe  remarquable  de  raison- 
nements  par  reduction  a  1'absurde  ;  L.  Couturat,  Les  principes  des  mathe- 
matiques :  G.  Lechalas,  Une  nouvelle  tentative  de  refutation  de  le  geometric 
general.  ;  F.  Margitet,  Sur  1' idee  de  patrie  ;  Supplement. 


714  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL   REVIEW. 

REVUE  NEO-SCOLASTIQUE,  XI,  3  :  M.  Defourny,  La  philosophic  de  1'his- 
toire  chez  Condorcet  (suite  et  fin)  ;  E.  Janssens,  Renouvier  et  Kant ;  C. 
Alibert,  Les  etapes  de  la  methode;  C.  Sentroul,  La  verite  selon  Kant ;  G. 
Legrand,  Philosophie  morale  et  science  des  moeurs  d'apres  un  livre  recent ; 
Th.  Gollier,  Revue  d' ethnographic  (suite)';  Bulletin  del'  Institut  de  Philoso- 
phie ;  Bulletins  bibliographiques  ;  Comtes  rendus. 

JOURNAL  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE  NORM  ALE  ET  PATHOLOGIQUE,  I,  5  :  Pierre 
Janet,  L' amnesic  et  la  dissociation  des  souvenirs  par  1' emotion  ;  P.  Sollier, 
Le  langage  psychologique  ;  F.  Houssay,  Une  curieuse  illusion  d'optique  ; 
Kahn  et  Carteron,  Experiences  de  dynamometrie  ;  Bibliographic. 

RlVISTA      DI     FlLOSOFIA     ET    SdENZE   AFFINI,     II,       1-2  :      R.     ArdigO, 

Per  una  nota  del  sig.  A.  Fouillee  ;  F.  Pietropaolo,  La  sintesi  a  priori  ; 
A.  Ferro,  II  materialism©  ;  G.  Cimbali,  Le  correnti  inconsciamente  nega- 
tive e  la  filosofia  del  diritto  ;  G.  Chiabra,  La  "  Favola  delle  api,"  di 
G.  Mandeville  ;  F.  Momigliamo,  Un  pubblicista,  economista,  e  filosofo  del 
periodo  Napoleonico  ;  G.  Prever,  La  confessione  nel  Buddismo  e  nel  Cris- 
tianesimo  ;  Rassegna  di  filosofia  scientifica  ;  Analisi  e  cenni  ;  Notizie  ; 
Sommari  di  Riviste. 

RIVISTA  FILOSOFICA,  VII,  3  :  C.  Cantoni,  L'apriorita  dello  spazio  nella 
dottrina  critica  di  Kant  ;  E.  Sacchi,  L'immoralismo  di  Nietzsche  giudicato 
da  A.  Fouillee  ;  A.  Piazzi,  Ancora  sulla  liberta  degli  Studi  nello  scuola 
media  ;  E.  Juvalta,  La  dottrina  delle  due  etiche  di  H.  Spencer  ;  Rassegna 
Bibliografica  ;  Notizie  e  Pubblicazioni  ;  Necrologio  —  Pietro  Luciano,  Ga- 
briele  Tarde  ;  Sommari  delle  riviste  straniere  ;  Libri  ricevuti. 


INDEX. 


[N.  B.  —  (a)  stands  for  original  articles,  (b)  for  book  notices,  (d)  for  discussions, 
(ri)  for  notes,  (r)  for  reviews  of  books,  and  (s)  for  summaries.] 


A 

Absolute,  The  Goodness  and  Righteous- 
ness of  the,  (s)  182;  The  Assumption 
of  the,  in  Perception  and  Thought, 

(s)  367. 

Accommodation  and  Convergence,  The 
Influence  of,  in  the  Perception  of 
Depth,  (s)  242. 

^Esthetics,    The    Place    of,    among    the 
Disciplines   of  Philosophy,    (s)    184; 
What  is,  (a)  320;  (r)  677. 
Agnosticism,  Naturalism  and,  (b)  478. 
America,  Philosophy  in,  (b)  704. 
American  Philosophical  Association,  Pro- 
ceedings of  the  Third  Annual  Meeting 
of  the,  (a)  176;  List  of  Members,  202. 
Animals,  The  Consciousness  of,  (s)  578. 
Antinomies,  The  Dialectic  of  the  Kantian, 
(s)  82 ;  The  Reason  and  the,  (s)  472. 
Appreciation,  The  Relation  of,  to  Scien- 
tific Descriptions  of  Values,  (s)  179. 
Apprehension,    Comprehension    and,    I, 

(s)  91;  II,  (s)  476. 

Aristotle,  The  Posterior  Analytics  of,  I. 
Demonstration,  (a)  I;  II.  Induction, 
(a)  143;  The  Interpretation  of,  (s) 
201;  The  Naturalism  of,  (s)  376; 
The  'Categories'  of,  (a)  514;  (b)  585. 
Art,  The  Psychology  of  a  Writer  on,  (s) 
90;  and  Morality,  (s)  98;  The  Psy- 
chology of,  (r)  677. 

Association,    An    Establishment    of,    in 
Hermit  Crabs,  (s)  195;   Mediate,  (s) 
238 ;  of  Ideas  and  the  Datum  of  Ex- 
perience, (s)  693. 
Attention,  The  Distribution  of,  (s)  93  ; 

The  Simple  Forms  of,  (s)  238. 
Attitudes,  The   Significance  of,  in  Psy- 
chology, (s)  530. 


Authority,  Religions  of,  and  the  Religion 
of  the  Spirit,  (b)  480. 


Bain,  Alexander,  The  Philosophy  of,  (s) 

698. 
Bakewell,  Charles  M.,  On  the  Ego  (d) 

546. 

Bawden,  H.  Heath,  His  Interpretation 
of  the  Physical  and  the  Psychical,  (d) 
429. 
Belief,  Rationality  and,  (a)  30;    Kant's 

Doctrine  of,  (b)  255. 
Binocular   Vision    and   the    Problem   of 
Knowledge,  (s)  692. 

Biology,  Mechanism  and  Vitalism  in,  (s) 
85  ;  Finality  in,  (s)  88  ;  The  Contro- 
versy in,  (s)  240;  An  Essay  on  Chem- 
ical, (b)  482. 

Body,  Soul  and,  (r)  68 ;  Why  the  Mind 
has  a,  (r)  220;  (d)  337,  342. 

Brain,  The  Universal  Relations  between, 
and  Consciousness,  (b)  708. 

British  Journal  of  Psychology,  The,  (n) 
259- 

C 

Casuistry,  The  Possibility  of  a  Science  of, 
(b)  247. 

Categories,  The  Order  of  the,  in  the 
Hegelian  Argument,  (s)  84;  of  Aris- 
totle, (a)  514. 

Category,  Purpose  as  a  Logical,  (s)  181; 
(a)  284. 

Causality,  The  Psychological  Nature  of, 
(a)  409. 

Causes,  The  Use  and  Abuse  of  Final, 
(s)  691. 

Change,  Evolution  as  the  Philosophical 
Principle  of,  (s)  369. 


715 


7i6 


INDEX. 


[VOL.   XIII. 


Character,    Simulation    in    Relation    to, 

(s)  370. 
Christianity,  Spinoza's   Relation  to,   (s) 

377- 
Civilization,  Principles  of  Western,  (b) 

247. 

Classical  and  Romantic,  (s)  377. 
Classical  Heritage  of  the  Middle  Ages, 

The,  (b)  255. 
Cognition,  A  Contribution  to  Critique  of, 

(s)  I78. 
Coleridge,  S.  T.,  The  German  Influence 

on,  (b)  108. 
Comprehension    and    Apprehension,    I, 

(s)  91  ;  II,  (s)  476. 
Comte,  Auguste,  The  Philosophy  of,  (b) 

594- 

Concept,  of  Consciousness,  The,  (s)  188  ; 
The  Development  of  the,  of  Higher 
Mathematical  Regularity  in  the  Natural 
and  Mental  Sciences,  (s)  690. 

Conception  of  the  Association  of  Ideas 
and  the  Datum  of  Experience,  The, 
(s)  693. 

Conduct,  The  Need  of  a  Logic  of,    (s) 

534. 

Conscience,  Positivistic  Ethics  and  the 
Contemporary,  (s)  244;  Science  and, 
<s)  580. 

Consciousness,  The  Concept  of,  (s)  188  ; 
The  Analysis  of,  (s)  189 ;  A  Peculiar 
State  of,  (s)  192;  Conditions  of,  v. 
The  Meaning  of  the  Psychical  from  the 
Point  of  View  of  the  Functional  Psy- 
chology, (a)  298;  of  Animals,  (s) 
578;  The  Universal  Relations  between 
Brain  and,  (b)  708  ;  according  to  the 
Modern  Precursors  of  Kant,  (b)  705. 

Contact  and  Distance  Stimulation  as  Fac- 
tors in  Mental  Development,  v.  A  Fac- 
tor in  Mental  Development,  (a)  622. 

Convergence,  The  Influence  of  Accommo- 
dation and,  in  the  Perception  of  Depth, 
(s)  242. 

Criticism  and  Dogmatism,  Kant's  Anti- 
thesis of,  (s)  536. 

Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Consequences  of 
Kant's  Conception  of  Time  in  the,  (s) 


Cur  deus  homo  of  St.  Anselm,  (b)  384. 
Cynicism,   A    Psychological    Study,    (s) 

58o. 

D 

Deception  and  Reality,  (s)  687. 
Democracy  and  Science,  (s)  375. 
Democratic  Tendency  of  Spinoza  and  his 

Relation  to  Christianity,  The,  (s)  377. 
Demonstration :      Aristotle's      Posterior 

Analytics,  (a)  I. 
Depth,  The  Influence  of  Accommodation 

and  Convergence  in  the  Perception  of, 

(s)  242. 
DeQuincey,    Thomas,    His   Relation   to 

German    Literature  and    Philosophy, 

(b)  108. 

Description,  Perception  and,  (s)  581. 
Dialectic   of    the    Kantian   Antinomies, 

The,  (s)  82. 
Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology, 

(')  57- 

Dimensions  of  a  Science,  v.  On  Me- 
chanical Explanation,  (a)  265. 

Direction,  The  Sense  of,  (s)  240. 

Dissertations  on  Leading  Philosophical 
Topics,  (r)  461. 

Distance  Stimulation  and  Contact  as  Fac- 
tors in  Mental  Development,  v.  A  Fac- 
tor in  Mental  Development,  (a)  622. 

Dogmatism,  Kant's  Antithesis  of  Criti- 
cism and,  (s)  536. 


Educational  Ideal,  The  Present  Want  of 

an,  (s)  200. 
Educational  Theory  of  Immanuel  Kant, 

The,  (b)  591. 
Edwards,  Jonathan,  As  a  Thinker  and 

Philosopher  (By  A.  T.  Ormond),  (s) 

183;   (By  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge),  (a) 

393- 

Effort,  The  Feeling  of,  in  Causality,  v. 
The  Psychological  Nature  of  Causality, 
(a)  409  ;  The  Philosophy  of,  (r)  566. 

Ego,  Professor  Bakewellon  the,  (d)  549. 

Emerson,  and  German  Personality,  (s) 
99;  and  Kant,  (s)  583. 

Emotions  as  a  Factor  in  Belief,  v.  Ration- 
ality and  Belief,  (a)  30. 


No.  6.] 


INDEX. 


717 


Empirical  Realism,  Kant's  Transcen- 
dental Idealism  and,  (s)  366. 

Energetics,  Mechanics,  and  Life,  (s)  689. 

Epistemology,  and  Metaphysics  of  Nietz- 
sche, (b)  252  ;  Kant  and  the,  of  Nat- 
ural Science,  (s)  467. 

Error,  The  Toleration  of,  (s)  244. 

Eternal  and  the  Practical,  The,  (a)  113. 

Ethical  Research,  Evolutionary  Method 
in,  (d)  328. 

Ethical  Subjectivism,  (a)  642. 

Ethics,  of  the  Theoretical  Reason,  (r) 
65 ;  Relativity  and  Finality  in,  (s) 
243 ;  Positivistic,  and  the  Contempor- 
ary Conscience,  (s)  244;  of  Hobbes, 
(b)  253;  Principles  of,  (r)  351;  The 
Relations  of,  to  Metaphysics,  (s)  374  ; 
of  Renouvier,  (s)  374;  An  Introduc- 
tory Study  of,  (b)  379  ;  The  Develop- 
ment of  Kant's,  (b)  487  ;  and  its  His- 
tory, (s)  533  ;  of  Kant,  (b)  592  ;  An 
Investigation  into  the  Facts  and  Laws 
of  the  Moral  Life,  (r)  68 1  ;  The  Posi- 
tive Science  of,  (s)  694. 

Eupagurus  Longicarpus,  An  Establish- 
ment of  Association  in,  (s)  195. 

European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury, A  History  of,  (r)  566. 

Evolution,  of  Morality,  The,  (s)  94;  in 
Nature  and  History,  (b)  253  ;  as  the 
Philosophical  Principle  of  Change,  (s) 
369 ;  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Idea  in 
Plato,  (b)  708. 

Evolutionary  Method  in  Ethical  Research, 
(d)  328. 

Experience,  Logic  and,  (s)  470;  The 
Concept  of  the  Association  of  Ideas 
and  the  Datum  of,  (s)  693. 


Faith,  The  Psychological  Elements  of 
Religious,  (r)  72. 

Fiction  as  the  Experimental  Side  of  Phi- 
losophy, (b)  251. 

Final  Causes,  The  Use  and  Abuse  of,  (s) 
691. 

Finality  in  Biology,  (s)  88. 

Finite  in  Spinoza's  System,  The  Reality 
of  the,  (a)  16. 


First  Principles,  of  H.  Spencer,  (s)  531. 
Fishes,  The  Psychic  Life  of,  (s)  93. 
Force,  A  Study  of  Perceptions  and,  (r) 

212. 
Freedom  of  the  Will,  in  the  Latest  Ger- 

man Philosophy,  (b)  249;  and  Respon- 

sibility, (b)  387. 
Functional  Psychology,  The  Meaning  of 

the  Psychical  from  the  Point  of  View 

of  the,  (s)  190;   (a)  298;  The  Place 

of  Pleasure  and  Pain  in  the,  (s)  241  ; 

v.  Professor   Bawden's   Interpretation 

of  the  Physical  and  the  Psychical,  (d) 

429. 

Q 
Gaunilon,   Appendix   in   Behalf  of    the 

Fool  by,  (b)  384. 
General  Psychology,  The  Present  Prob- 

lems of,  (a)  603. 
German    Personality,  Emerson  and,  (s) 

99- 
German  Philosophy,  The  Freedom  of  the 

Will  in  the  Latest,  (b)  249. 
Gifford  Lectures  at  the  University  of  St. 

Andrews,  1902-1903,  (r)  51. 
God,  v.   The   Reality  of  the   Finite  in 

Spinoza's  system,  (a)  16. 


Habit,  The  Law  of,  v.  The  Meaning 
of  the  Psychical  from  the  Point  of  View 
of  the  Functional  Psychology,  (a)  298. 

Hallucinations,  An  Inquiry  into  the 
Nature  of,  (s)  475. 

Hegel,  The  Order  of  the  Categories  in 
the  Hegelian  Argument,  (s)  84  ;  The 
Objective  Point  of  his  Phanomenolcgie 
des  Gfistes,  (s)  182. 

Helmholtz's  Relation  to  Kant,  (s)  473. 

History,  Evolution   in   Nature  and,   (b) 

253- 

Hobbes,  The  Ethics  of,  (b)  253  ;  The 
Philosophy  of,  (b)  385. 


Idea,  Religion  as  an,  (s)  89;  The  Evo- 
lution of  the  Doctrine  of  the,  in  Plato, 
(b)  708. 

Idealism,    Kant's    Transcendental,    and 


7i8 


INDEX. 


[VOL.   XIII. 


Empirical  Realism,  (s)  366;  The  Refu- 
tation of,  (s)  468  ;  and  Absolute  Posi- 
tivism, (b)  484. 

Ideas,  The  Conception  of  the  Association 
of,  and  the  Datum  of  Experience,  (s) 

693- 

Immoralism,  Nietzsche  and,  (b)  loo. 

Immortality,  The  Psychology  of  the  Be- 
lief in,  (s)  242  ;  The  Platonic  Doctrine 
of,  (s)  537- 

Impulse  in  Relation  to  Objectivity,  v. 
Rationality  and  Belief,  (a)  30. 

Individualism  in  Spencer's  Philosophy, 
v.  The  Philosophical  Work  of  Herbert 
Spencer,  (a)  159. 

Infinite,  The  Scholastic  Notion  of  the,  (s) 
199  ;  New  and  Old,  (a)  497. 

Instability,  Mental,  (b)  707. 

Intellectualism,  Voluntarism  and,  (a) 
420. 

Intelligence,  The  Relation  of  Sensation 
to,  (s)  579- 

Intensity,  (s)  199. 

Interest,  The  Relation  of  Belief  and 
Judgment  to,  v.  The  Eternal  and 
the  Practical,  (a)  113. 

International  Congress  of  Arts  and  Sci- 
ences, The,  (n)  597;  (n)  712. 


Judgment,  The  Disjunctive,  (s)  369. 

K. 

Kant,  The  Dialectic  of  his  Antinomies, 
(s)  82  :  Consequents  of  his  Conception 
of  Time  in  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason, 
(s)  83  ;  His  Doctrine  of  Belief,  (b) 
255  ;  His  Life  and  Doctrines,  (r)  358  ; 
His  Transcendental  Idealism  and 
Empirical  Realism,  (s)  366  ;  and  the 
Present  Epistemological  Criticism  of 
Natural  Science,  (s)  467  ;  Who  is  his 
Successor?  (s)  472;  Helmholtz's 
Relation  to,  (s)  473  ;  The  Develop- 
ment of  his  Ethics,  (b)  487  ;  His 
Antithesis  of  Criticism  and  Dogmatism, 
(s)  536  ;  Emerson  and,  (s)  583  ;  The 
Educational  Theory  of,  (b)  591;  The 
Ethics  of,  (b)  592  ;  Consciousness  ac- 


cording to  the  Modern  Precursors  of, 
(b)  705. 

Knowable,  The  Limits  of  the,  (b)  702. 

Knowledge,  Fr.  Nietzsche  and  the  Prob- 
lem of,  (b)  loo;  The  Social  Postulate 
of,  v.  The  Eternal  and  the  Practical, 
(a)  113;  The  Logic  of  Pure,  (r)  207; 
The  Instrumental  View  of,  v.  Purpose 
as  a  Logical  Category,  (a)  284;  The 
Problem  of,  and  Mach's  Analysis  oj 
Sensations,  (s)  575  ;  Binocular  Vision 
and  the  Problem  of,  (s)  692. 


Learning,  Memory  and  Economy  of,  (s) 
530. 

Life,  Spirit  and,  (r)  68 ;  Energetics, 
Mechanics,  and,  (s)  689  ;  and  Natural 
Phenomena,  (b)  702. 

Literature,  De  Quincey's  Relation  to 
German,  (b)  108. 

Logic,  of  Aristotle,  The  Posterior  Ana- 
lytics, I.  Demonstration,  (a)  I  ;  II. 
Induction,  (a)  143  ;  of  Pure  Knowl- 
edge, (r)  207;  and  Experience,  (s) 
470;  of  Conduct,  (s)  534;  Logical 
Theory,  Studies  in,  (r)  666. 

M 

Mach,  The  Problem  of  Knowledge  and 
his  Analysis  of  Sensations,  (s)  575. 

Man,  The  Nature  of,  (b)  381  ;  His 
Place  in  the  Universe,  (r)  560. 

Mathematical  Regularity,  The  Concept 
of,  in  the  Mental  and  Natural  Sciences, 
(s)  690. 

Matter,  The  Identification  of  Mind  and, 
(d)  444. 

Mechanical  Explanation,  (a)  265. 

Mechanical  Metaphysics,  The  Present 
Status  of  the,  (s)  573. 

Mechanics,  The  Reduction  of  other 
Sciences  to,  v.  On  Mechanical  Ex- 
planation, (a)  265  ;  Energetics  and 
Life,  (s)  689. 

Mechanism,  and  Vitalism  in  Modern 
Biology,  (s)  85  ;  Various  Aspects  of, 
(*)  235. 


No.  6.] 


INDEX. 


719 


Memory,  and  Economy  of  Learning,  (s) 
530;  (s)  577- 

Mental  and  Natural  Sciences,  The  Con- 
cept of  Higher  Mathematical  Regu- 
larity in  the,  (s)  690. 

Mental  Development,  A  Factor  in,  (a)  622. 

Mental  Instability,  (b)  707. 

Metaphysics,  The  Surd  of,  (b)  106 ; 
Nietzsche' s  Epistemology  and,  (b)  252; 
The  Relations  of  Ethics  to,  (s)  374. 

Middle  Ages,  The  Classical  Heritage  of 
the,  (b)  255. 

Mind,  Why  it  has  a  Body,  (r)  220;  (d) 
337>  342  5  The  Relation  between  Body 
and,  v.  The  Psychological  Nature  of 
Causality,  (a)  409  ;  The  Identification 
of  Matter  and,  (d)  444. 

Mode,  v.  The  Reality  of  the  Finite  in 
Spinoza's  System,  (a)  16. 

Monologium  of  St.  Anselm,  (b)  384. 

Moral  Life,  The  Facts  and  Laws  of  the, 
(r)  681. 

Moral  Self,  The  Chief  Factors  in  the 
Formation  of  the,  (s)  197. 

Moral  Sense  in  British  Thought  Prior  to 
Shaftesbury,  The,  (s)  198. 

Moral  Sentiment,  A  Study  of  the,   (b) 

595- 

Morality,  The  Elements  and  Evolution 
of,  (s)  94  ;  Art  and,  (s)  98  ;  Proverbial, 
(s)  244;  The  Coming  Scientific,  (s) 
695. 

N 

Naive  and  Sentimental,  (s)  377. 

Naive  Realism,  (s)  233. 

Natura  Naturans,  v.  The  Reality  of  the 
Finite  in  Spinoza's  System,  (a)  16. 

Natura  Naturata,  v.  The  Reality  of  the 
Finite  in  Spinoza's  System,  (a)  16. 

Natural  Sciences,  The  Development  of 
the,  in  Antiquity,  (b)  586  ;  The  Con- 
cept of  Higher  Mathematical  Regularity 
in  the  Mental  and,  (s)  690. 

Naturalism,  of  Aristotle,  The,  (s)  376; 
and  Agnosticism,  (b)  478. 

Nature,  of  Man,  The,  (b)  381  ;  Knowl- 
edge of,  in  Antiquity,  (b)  586. 

Neo-Idealism  of  the  Present,  The,  (s) 
574- 


'  New  Thought '  Movement,  Psychology 
on  the,  (s)  693. 

Nietzsche,  Friedrich,  Life  and  Work  of, 
(b)  loo;  and  the  Problem  of  Knowl- 
edge, (b)  loo ;  and  Immoralism,  (b) 
loo ;  The  Epistemology  and  Meta- 
physics of,  (b)  252  ;  The  Philosophy 
of,  (b)  387  ;  Recent  Literature  on,  (n) 
490. 

Normal  Psychology,  Elementary  Lectures 
on,  (b)  710. 

O 

Objectivity,     The     Recognition     of,    v. 

Rationality  and  Belief,  (a)  30. 
Optimistic    Philosophy,  Studies  in,    (b) 

381. 

Organic  Standpoint  and  the  Mechanical 
Ideal,  The,  v.  On  Mechanical  Ex- 
planation, (a)  265. 


Pain  and  Pleasure,  The  Place  of,  in  the 
Functional  Psychology,  (s)  241. 

Panpsychism,  v.  The  Identification  of 
Mind  and  Matter,  (d)  444. 

Paracelsus,  His  Life  and  Personality,  (b) 
587. 

Parallelism,  A  Brief  Critique  of  Psycho- 
logical, (s)  87. 

Passing  Thought,  Professor  Strong  on  the, 
(d)  552- 

Perception,  A  Study  of,  and  of  Force, 
(r)  212  ;  The  Assumption  of  the  Abso- 
lute in,  (s)  367  ;  and  Description,  (s) 
58i. 

Personalism,  (r)  212. 

Personality,  Emerson  and  German,  (s) 
99  ;  As  the  Form  of  the  Absolute,  (s) 
182. 

Phenomena,  Life  and  Natural,  (b)  702. 

Phenomenalism  and  Realism,  (s)  236. 

Philosophical  Association,  Proceedings  of 
the  Third  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Amer- 
ican, (a)  176  ;  List  of  Members,  202  ; 
The  Western,  (n)  390  ;  Proceedings 
of  the  Fourth  Annual  Meeting  of  the 
Western,  (a)  529  ;  List  of  Members, 
538. 


720 


INDEX. 


[VOL.  XIII. 


Philosophical  Essays  and  Poems  of  Schil- 
ler, (b)  709. 

Philosophical  Topics,  Dissertations  on, 
(r)  461. 

Philosophical  Yearbook,  The,   (b)   699. 

Philosophy,  and  Psychology,  Dictionary 
of,  (r)  57  ;  A  History  of  the  Problems 
of,  (b)  104;  DeQuincey's  Relation  to 
German,  (b)  108  ;  of  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, (a)  159;  The  Place  of  Esthetics 
among  Disciplines  of,  (s)  184;  The 
Freedom  of  the  Will  in  the  Latest  Ger- 
man, (b)  249;  Fiction  as  the  Experi- 
mental side  of,  (b)  251  ;  Studies  in 
Optimistic,  (b)  381  ;  of  Nietzsche,  (b) 
387 ;  of  the  Present,  Attacks  of  an 
Optimist  on,  (r)  456  ;  of  Religion,  An 
Outline  of  the,  (r)  564;  of  Effort, 
(r)  569  ;  of  A.  Comte,  fb)  594  ;  of 
Alexander  Bain,  (s)  698;  Collected 
Essays  of  Rudolf  Eucken  on,  (b)  701  ; 
in  America,  (b)  704  ;  A  Textbook  of 
the  History  of,  (b)  706. 

Physical  and  the  Psychical,  Professor 
Bawden's  Interpretation  of  the,  (d), 
429  ;  (d)  541. 

Physics,  The  Principles  of  Modern,  and 
their  Relation  to  the  Latest  Results  of 
Investigation,  (s)  688. 

Physiological  Psychology,  Principles  of, 
(r)  452. 

Plato,  The  Doctrine  of  Immortality  in, 
(s)  537  ;  The  Evolution  of  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Idea  in,  (b)  708. 

Pleasure  and  Pain,  The  Place  of,  in  the 
Functional  Psychology,  (s)  241. 

Poetics  of  Schiller,  The,  (b)  383. 

Positivism,  From  Idealism  to  Absolute, 
(b)  484;  Saint-Simon,  The  Father  of, 
(s)  696. 

Positive  Ethics  and  the  Contemporary 
Conscience,  (s)  244. 

Positive  Science  of  Ethics,  The,  (s)  694. 

Posterior  Analytics,  Aristotle's,  I. 
Demonstration,  (a)  I  ;  II.  Induction, 
(a)  143. 

Practical,  The  Eternal  and  the,  (a)  113. 

Pragmatism,  v.  The  Eternal  and  the 
Practical,  (a)  113;  The  Limits  of, 


(s)  236 ;  v.  Purpose  as  a  Logical 
Category,  (a)  284. 

Present,  The  Meaning  of  the,  (r)  456. 

Proslogiwn  of  St.  Anselm,  The,  (b)  384. 

Proverbial  Morality,  (s)  244. 

Psychical,  The  Meaning  of  the,  from  the 
Point  of  View  of  the  Functional  Psy- 
chology, (s)  190;  (a)  298;  Professor 
Bawden's  Interpretation  of  the  Physi- 
cal and  the,  (d)  429  ;  The  Physical 
and  the,  (d)  541. 

Psychological  Elements  of  Religious 
Faith,  The,  (r)  72. 

Psychological  Nature  of  Causality,  The, 
(a)  409. 

Psychological  Parallelism,  Brief  Critique 
of,  (s)  87. 

Psychology,  Dictionary  of  Philosophy 
and,  (r)  57  ;  of  a  Writer  on  Art,  (s) 
90 ;  Contemporary,  (b)  107 ;  Out- 
lines of,  (r)  229 ;  The  Value  of  the 
Questionnaire  Method  for,  (s)  237 ; 
The  Place  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  in  the 
Functional,  (s)  241  ;  of  the  Belief  in 
Immortality,  (s)  242;  and  Common 
Life,  (b)  254;  The  Meaning  of  the 
Psychical  from  the  Standpoint  of  the 
Functional,  (s)  190;  (a)  298;  v. 
Professor  Bawden's  Interpretation  of 
the  Physical  and  the  Psychical,  (d) 
429,  (d)  541  ;  Principles  of  Physio- 
logical, (r)  452  ;  On  the  Definition  of, 
(s)  474 ;  The  Sciences  Allied  to,  (b) 
488  ;  The  Significance  of  Attitudes  in, 
(s)  530  ;  Present  Problems  of  General, 
(a)  603  ;  of  the  Beautiful  and  of  Art, 
(r)  68 1  ;  on  the  'New  Thought' 
Movement,  (s)  693  ;  Elementary  Lec- 
tures on  Normal,  (b)  710. 

Purpose  as  a  Logical  Category,  (s)  181  ; 
(a)  284. 


Questionnaire  Method,  The  Value  of  the, 
for  Psychology,  (s)  237. 

R 

Rationality  and  Belief,  (a)  30. 
Realism,  Naive,  (s)  233;  Phenomenalism 


No.  6.] 


INDEX. 


721 


and,  (s)  236;  Kant's  Transcendental 
Idealism  and  Empirical,  (s)  366. 

Reality,  The  Sense  of,  v.  Rationality 
and  Belief,  (a)  30 ;  The  Pathway  to, 
(r)  51  ;  Deception  and,  (s)  687. 

Reason,  Ethics  of  the  Theoretical,  (r) 
65  ;  Different  Conceptions  of,  v.  Pur- 
pose as  a  Logical  Category,  (a)  284; 
and  the  Antinomies,  (s)  472. 

Religion,  as  an  Idea,  (s)  89;  The  Present 
Attitude  of  Reflective  Thought  towards, 
(s)  90 ;  The  Right  of  Free  Thought  in 
Matters  of,  (s)  97;  The  Idea  of,  (s) 
368  ;  An  Outline  of  the  Philosophy  of 

(0  564. 

Religions  of  Authority  and  the  Religion 
of  the  Spirit,  (b)  480. 

Religious  Faith,  The  Psychological  Ele- 
ments of,  (r)  72. 

Renouvier,  The  Ethics  of,  (s)  374;  The 
Philosophical  Bequest  of,  (s)  582. 

Responsibility,  Freedom  and,  (b)  387. 

Romantic,  Classical  and,  (s)  377. 

Royce,  Josiah,  The  World  and  the  Indi- 
vidual, v.  The  Infinite  New  and 
Old,  (a)  497. 


St.    Anselm,    His    Proslogium,    Mono- 

logium,  An  Appendix  in  Behalf  of  the 

Fool  by  Gaunilon,  and  Cur  deus  homo 

(b)  384. 
Saint-Simon,   the  Father   of  Positivism, 

(s)  696. 

Scepticism,  (a)  627. 
Schiller,  The  Poetics  of,   (b)  383;   His 

Philosophical  Essays  and  Poems,  (b) 

709. 
Scholasticism,  The  Decadence  of,  at  the 

Close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  (s)  584. 
Schuppe's  Naive  Realism,  (s)  233. 
Science,  Democracy  and,  (s)  375;  and 

Conscience,  (s)  580. 
Scientific  Morality,  The  Coming,  (s)  695. 
Seneca's  Conception  of  the  State,  (s)  376. 
Sensations,  The  Problem  of  Knowledge 

and  Mach's  Analysis  of  the,  (s)  575  ; 

The  Attributes  of  the,  (s)  577  ;  The 

Relation  of,  to  Intelligence,  (s)  579. 
Sentimental,  Naive  and,  (s),  377. 


Shakespeare,  The  Moral  System  of,  (b) 

251- 
Simulation  in  Relation  to  Character  (s) 

370- 
Society,  A  Treatise  on  the  Origin  and 

Development  of,  (r)  347. 
Sociological   Method   of  Spencer,    The, 

(s),  532. 

Sociology,  Pure,  (r)  347. 
Soul  and  Body,  (r)  68. 
Spencer,    Herbert,    The     Philosophical 

Work  of,  (a)  159;  His  Will,  (n)26o; 

His   Pint  Principles,   (s)   531  ;    The 

Sociological  Method  of,  (s)  532. 
Spinoza,  The  Reality  of  the  Finite  in  his 

System,     (a)     1 6 ;     The    Democratic 

Tendency    of,    and    his    Relation    to 

Christianity,  (s)  377. 
Spirit,  and  Life,  (r)  68  ;    Religions  of 

Authority  and  the  Religion  of  the,  (b) 

480. 
State,   Seneca's  Conception   of  the    (s) 

376. 
Strong,  C.  A.,  on  the  Passing  Thought, 

(d)  552. 

Subconscious,  The  Status  of  the,  (s)  692. 
Subjectivism,  Ethical,  (a)  642. 
Substance,  v.  The  Reality  of  the  Finite 

in  Spinoza's  System,  (a)  1 6. 
Summum  Bonttm,  The  (s)  198. 


Teleology,  v.  Purpose  as  a  Logical  Gate- 
Category,  (a)  284. 

Telesio,  Bernardino,  A  Sixteenth  Century 
Psychologist,  (s)  373. 

Tension,  The  Law  of,  v.  The  Meaning 
of  the  Psychical  from  the  Point  of  View 
of  the  Functional  Psychology,  (a)  298  ; 
v.  Professor  Bawden's  Interpretation 
of  the  Physical  and  the  Psychical,  (d) 
429,  (d)  541. 

Theophrastus  Paracelsus,  His  Life  and 
Personality,  (b)  587. 

Theory  of  Values,  The,  (b)  246. 

Things-in-Themselves,  (b)  106. 

Thought,  The  Assumption  of  the  Abso- 
lute in  Perception  and,  (s)  367 ;  A 
History  of  European,  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century,  (r)  566;  Transitional  Eras 


722 


INDEX. 


in,  with  Special  Reference  to  the  Pres- 
ent Age,  (b)  589. 

Time,  Consequences  of  Kant's  Conception 
of,  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  (s) 

83. 

Toleration  of  Error,  The,  (s)  244. 

Transcendental  Idealism  and  Empirical 
Realism,  Kant's,  (s)  366. 

Transfinite,  Distinguished  from  the  True 
Infinite,  z>.  The  Infinite  New  and  Old, 
(a)  497. 

Transitional  Eras  in  Thought  with  Spe- 
cial Reference  to  the  Present  Age,  (b) 

589. 
Truth,   (s)  96 ;    Theories   of,   (s)   178 ; 

(s)  688. 
Twins,  The  Resemblance  of,  (s)  193. 

U 

Unity  in  Living  Beings,  The,  (b)  482. 
Universe,  Man's  Place  in  the,  (r)  560. 

V 

Values,  The  Relation  of  Appreciation  to 
Scientific  Descriptions  of,  (s)  179  ; 
Theory  of,  (b)  246. 


Veracity,  The  Law  of,  (s)  196. 

Vision,  Binocular,  and  The   Problem  of 

Knowledge,  (s)  692. 
Vitalism,    Mechanism    and,    in   Modern 

Biology,  (s)  85. 
Voluntarism    and    Intellectualism,     (a) 

420. 

w 

Western  Civilization,  Principles  of,  (b) 
247. 

Western  Philosophical  Association,  (n) 
390  ;  Proceedings  of  the  Fourth  Annual 
Meeting  of  the,  (a)  529  ;  List  of  Mem- 
bers, 538. 

Will,  Reality  as  a  Postulate  of,  v. 
Rationality  and  Belief,  (a)  36;  The 
Problem  of  the  Freedom  of  the,  in  the 
Latest  German  Philosophy,  (b)  249  ; 
The  Definition  of  the,  III,  (s)  470. 


Yale    Psychological    Laboratory,  Report 

on  Work  Done  in  the,  (s)  196. 
Year  book,  The  Philosophical,  (b)   699. 


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