LIBRARY
OF XHE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
GIFT OFS
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN
BY
HERMAN G. A. BRAUER, M. A.
A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OP DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OP {WISCONSIN, 1902
(Reprinted from the Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin,
Philology and Literature Series,
Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 205-379)
MADISON, WISCONSIN
OCTOBER, 1903
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN
BY
HERMAN G. A. BRAUER, M. A.
A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OP DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN, 1902
(Reprinted from the Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin,
Philology and Literature Series,
Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 205-379)
MADISON, WISCONSIN
OCTOBER, 1903
Co fay 2>ear fl&otber
FROM WHOM I HAVE ALL THAT IS BEST IN MY LIFE
I DEDICATE THIS LITTLE BOOK
A TRIBUTE OF LOVE
AND ESTEEM
".:
or THE
UNIVERSITY
01
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN.
CHAPTEK I.
INTRODUCTORY.
"Kenan pout etre defini d'un soul mot, qui, heureusement,
n'est pas une formule: ce fut Fhomnie le plus intelligent du
XIXe siecle." fimile Faguet, in the Histoire de la Langue et
de la Litterature francaise, Paris, 1899, tome VIII, pp. 397.
Of. Monod: Renan, etc., 40, 48.*
"Personne n'a parle d© nos jours un frangais plus savant k
la fois et plus simple, plus limpide, plus sincere, a travers lequel
s'apercoive mieux la pensee." Gaston Boissier, L'Academie
Frangaise, Recueil des Discours, Rapports et Pieces diverges,
tome I, p. 808.
On the two qualities emphasized in these judgments the fame
of Renau chiefly rests: the clearness, simplicity and sincerity
of his matchless prose, and the extraordinary fertility and com-
prehensive culture of his many-sided mind. In this paper it is
from the side of his thought, and not of his style, that he is
approached.
A study of Renan as a philosophic; thinker would seem to re-
veal a third quality in respect of which he stands unexcelled,
if not unequalled, in the century just closed. If it is true that
he was the most intelligent man of the nineteenth century, it
certainly is true no less that he was the most inconsistent.
Even more remarkable than his wonderful fertility in ideas is
the amazing incongruity of these ideas among themselves.
Lest this should seem an exaggeration, I hasten to' adduce his
*Fo'r this and all other abbreviations see Appendix C, page 378.
210 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
own testimony in support of these statements. That Renan
was abundantly aware of the many contradictions in his writ-
ings, the following passage alone would sufficiently prove.
"Bon gre, mal gre, et nonobstant tous mes efforts conscien-
tieux en sens contraire, j'etais predestine a etre: ce que je suis,
un romantique protestant contre le romantisme, un utopiste
prechant en politique le terre-a-terre, un. idealiste se donnant
inutilement beaucoup de mal pour paraitre bourgeois, un tissu
de contradictions, rappellant Vhircocerf de la scolastique, qui
avait deux natures. line de mes moities devait etre occupee
a demolir 1'autre, comme cet animal fabuleux de Ctesias qui
se mangeait les pattes sans s'en douter." Souv.,* 73. Cf.
Ibid., 62, 116-7.
This confession is amply endorsed by a careful study of Eo-
nan's writings, except ^perhaps the phrase: "nonobstant tous
mes efforts conscientieux en sens contraire," which certainly
does not accord very well with the following statement, written
about the same time, and in which he seems rather to glory in
his very inconsistencies:
ffln utrumque paratiLs! fitre pret a tout, voila peut-etre la
sagesse. S'abandonner, suivant les heures, a la confiance, au
scepticisme, a Toptimisme, a Tironie, voila le moyen d'etre sur
qu'au moins par momients on a ete dans le vrai." F. Det.,
396. Cf. A. S., 43. Similar utterances abound in his books,
especially those of the later period.
Such cavalierly indifference to logic might seem, at first sight
to be only an expression of certain moods in his later phase,
when experience had shown that his "efforts conscientieux" at
consistency remained stubbornly fruitless. But such an ex-
planation is forbidden by the facts. For nowhere is the incon-
sistency of his opposite ideals more frankly avowed, or the pol-
icy of alternative contradictory assertion more deliberately em-
braced, than in his earliest writings.
As early as 1845, for example, in a personal letter, he says:
"J'ai pris la-dessus franchement mon parti; je me suis de-
barrasse du joug importun de la consequence, au moins provisoi-
rement. Dieu me condamnera-t-il pour avoir admis simulta-
BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 211
nement ce quo reclament simultanement mes different©® fao-
ultes, quoique j© n© puiss© concilier lours exigences contraires f"
Souv., 321.
This casting aside of the importunate fetters of logic, reluc-
tantly accepted in this letter as a provisional compromise, was
destined soon to become a settled policy. Three years later,
in the Avenir de la\ Science, the impossibility of expressing the
whole truth within the limits of logical consistency, is already
proclaimed in a very different tone:
"Le premier pas de celui qui veut penser est de s'enhardir
aux contradictions, laissant a Pavenir le soin d© tout concilier.
Un homme consequent dans son systeme de vie est certainement
un esprit etroit. Car je le den©, dans Petat actuel de Pesprit
humain, de faire concorder tous les elements d© la nature 1m-
maine. S'il veut un systeme tout d'une piece, il sera done
reduit a nier et exclure." A. S., 100.
The unhesitating firmness; of tone in this passage, when con-
trasted with the apologetic timidity of his earlier statements,
seemjs to indicate a more settled conviction. Unwilling com-
pulsion has already become deliberate choice.
The same position is reaffirmed in his first published book,
L'Ave-rroes et I'averro'isme, 1852 :
"L'inconsequence est un element essential de toutes les
choses hwnaines. La logique mene aux abimes. Qui peut
sonder Pindiscernable mystere'de sa, propre conscience, et, dans
le grand chaos de la vie humaine, quelle raison sait au juste oil
s'arretent ses chances de bien voir et son droit d'affirmer??>
Averr., 1YO. Of. ibid., X.
Kenan does not mean of course to advocate a systematic
disregard of logical rules as such. He merely contends that
the various "faculties" and "capacities" of what w© call human
nature habitually and spontaneously, and perhaps inevitably,
tend to affirm propositions and imply points of view which can-
not be brought into logical accord with each other. A few typ-
ical passages from his later books will help to make clear his
meaning, and incidentally show how deliberately and persist-
212 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
ently this indifference to self-contradiction prevailed in his own
practice.
In his Discours de reception before the Academ-ie Frangaise,
1878, he says:
"Pestime qu'il est des sujets sur lesquels il est bon de se con-
tredire; car aucune vue partielle n'en saurait epuiser les in-
times replis. Les verites de la conscience sont des phares a
feux changeants. A certaines heures, ces verites paraissent e-
videntes; puis, on s'etonne qu'on ait pu j croire. . . Vingt
fois rhumanite les a niees et afnrmees; vingt fois I'humanite
les niera et les affirmera encore." Disc., 41-2.
And two years later, in his address before the Royal Society
of London, speaking of Marcus Aurelius:
"II vit bien que lorsqu'il s'agit de 1'infini aucune formule
n'est absolue, et qu'en pareille matiere on n'a quelque chance
d^avoir aper§u la verite une fois en sa vie que si 1'on s'est beau-
coup contredit." C. d'Angl., 237-8.
In his Introduction to the Book of Job and his Essay on Ec-
clesiastes, once more, he declares that consistency, in matters
of metaphysical speculation, is a mark of pedantry and narrow-
ness, and inconsistency rather a sign of truth:
"La question que Fauteur se propose est precisement celle
que tout penseur agite, sans pouvoir la resoudre; ses embarras,
ses inquietudes, cette fagon de retourner dans tous les sens le
noeud fatal sans en trouver Tissue, renferment bien plus de
philosophic que la scolastique tranchante qui pretend imposer
silence aux doutes de la raison par des reponses d'iine appar-
ente clarte. La contradiction, en de pareilles matieres, est le
signe de la verite." Job, LXVII. Of. Dr. Ph., 176.
"Malheur a qui ne se contredit pas au moins une fois par
jour. On ne fut jamais plus eloigne du pedantisme que Tau-
teur de 1'Ecclesiaste. La vue claire d'une verite ne Tempeche
pas de voir, tout de suite apres, la verite contraire, avec la
mieme clarte." EccL, 24.
I have purposely quoted at length from Kenan's own words,
in order to leave no doubt that he was quite aware of the many
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 213
inconsistencies in his own writings, and that he was rather
proud than otherwise of their presence.
When a writer thus boldly admits logical contradictions
among his first principles., it of course becomes a difficult task
to exhibit his thoughts in coherent form. "Abandon logic all
who enter here," might be written over the entrance of Kenan s
temple of philosophic truth.
In the present instance this difficulty of exposition is
increased by the fact that many of his characteristic doctrines
are most clearly developed in his Dialogues and his Drames
Philosophiques ; but he expressly declines to be held responsible
for the opinions professed by his interlocutors:
"Je me resigne d'avance a ce que Ton m;attribue directe-
ment toutes les opinions professees par m|es interlocuteurs,
meme quand elles sont contradictoires. Je n'ecris que pour des
lecteurs intelligent et eclaires, Ceux-la admettront parfaite-
ment que je n*aie nulle solidarite avec mes personnages et que
je ne doive porter la responsabilite d'aucune des opinions qu'ils
expriment." Dial., VII. Cf. Dr. Ph., 257; Souv., 377.
From most writers such a disclaimer would be entirely rea-
sonable, or rather unnecessary. But Renan, surely, should be
the last of all men to repudiate opinions professed in his
dramas merely on the ground of their contradicting each other ;
and to absolve him from responsibility for those opinions, on
that ground alone, would seem] to> be going counter to his own.
professed principles.
But there is, in fact, a special reason, in his case, for insist-
ing on this responsibility. It would not be hard to show that
every doctrine of importance developed in \hoDialogues and the
Drames PhilosopJiiques is put forward elsewhere in his writ-
ings, explicitly or implicitly, by himself directly. Cf. Seailles,
E. R,, 280-1.
The following example is typical. In his preface to tihe
Pretre de Nemi, he complains that certain critics, have imputed
to him, the subversive doctrines of Ganeo, the least attractive
character in the play, to whom he himself refers in the same
connection as "le vil coquin."
BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
"Pai mis en scene Ganeo, % vil coquin/ trouvant un dis-
ciple digne do lui dans Leporinus, et lui enseignant la derniere
consequence de regoisme, la lachete. C'est la doctrine de
Ganeo qu'on a presentee comme la mienne. J'aurais preche
justement ce dont j'ai voulu inspirer le mepris! C'est comme
si Ton soutenait que les Spartiates montraient des esclaves ivres
a leurs eofants, non pour les lenr f aire prendre en horreur,
mais pour les engager a les imiter." Dr. Ph., 259.
Now what is this doctrine of Ganeo, so indignantly repudi-
ated by E-enan? Briefly this: that courage in battle is
frequently punished by death, and cowardice rewarded by es-
cape from death ; the brave man dies on the field while cowards
at home enjoy the fruits of his bravery.
"La lachete est presque toujours recompensee; quant an
courage, c'est une vertu qui est le plus souvent punie de la
peine de mort."
"N'est-ce pas1?" continues Ganeo, "Le vrai vainqueur, c'est
celui qui se sauve. Vaincre, c'est ne pas se f aire tuer. On a
Tair de supposer que le vainqueur mort jouit de sa victoire.
Mais il n'en salt rien. Les honneurs qu'on rend a son cadavre,
c'est compne si on les rendait a un tronc d'arbre."
"Mais on dit que les dieux aiment les braves," objects Lepo-
rinus.
"Tant mieux pour les dieux," retorts Ganeo, "s'il y en a.
"J'aime mieux ma peau que ramour des dieux. Avec ramour
des dieux, on pouirit bel et bien sous terre."
"On a a,ussi Testime des hommes."
"Oui, 1'estime de vos deux voisins de rang, a condition qu'ils
n'aieiit pas ete tues comme vous."
"Mais il y a la nation,"
"Ah! si je te disais que la nation aussi a interet a etre vain-
cue. Malheur a la nation victorieuse.' . . . Le vain-
queur est le pire des maitres, le plus oppose aux reformes.
O?est au lendemain d^une defaite qu'une nation fait des pro-
gres. O?est au lendemain d'une defaite que Ton est libre, heu-
reux. Dieu nous preserve de la victoire ! Eh bien,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 215
reflechis done, mon cher. A moins de conserves rimmortalite
de Fame pour les militaires, 1'essentiel, dans une bataille, est
de se sauver." ... La mort est la faute irreparable.
. . ." Dr. PL, 355-358.
Embarrassing reflections, truly; reflections1 which, encour-
aged by the authoritative pen of M. 1' Administrates du Col-
lege de France, might well provoke objections from French pa-
triots. But in what respect does Ganeo's doctrine differ from
the following declaration, published by our author himself four-
teen years earlier?
"L'interet personnel ne conseille jamais le courage militaire;
car aucun des inconvenients qu'on encourt par la lachete
n'equivaut a ce que Ton risque par le courage. II faut, pour
exposer sa vie, la foi a quelque chose d'immateriel. OT, cette foi
disparait de jour en jour." Kef. Int., 116. Of. Dr. Ph., 258.
What effort did Kenan ever make, one cannot help wonder-
ing, to encourage men's faith in a future life ?
The further assertion of Ganeo, that individual welfare is
not necessarily proportioned to national strength, is likewise
endorsed by Kenan directly:
"Le gouvernement representative est etabli presque partout.
Mais des signes evidents de la fatigue causee par les charges
nationales se montrent a 1'horizon. Le patriotisms devient lo-
cal; Tentrainement national diminue. . . Dans cinquante
ans le principe national sera en baisse. . . II est devenu
trop clair, en effet, que le bonheur de Tindividu n'est pas en
proportion de la grandeur de la nation a laquelle il appartient.
. . ..." A. S., XY-XVI.
The truth is< that Kenan's disavowal of the teachings of his
interlocutors whenever they contradict his own, must be re-
garded as adding another contradiction to the number, for in
point of fact they never do contradict him. The opposite
points of view which these characters are usually made to es-
pouse, in reality represent the opposite conceptions of the two
lobes of his own brain. His very reason, indeed, for giving
to his thoughts the form of a dialogue was because in this way,
216 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN.
as he himself says, he could best give expression to his own
two-sided philosophic beliefs.
"Prive de mes livres et separe de mes travanx," he writes
in the preface: to his Dialogues pliilosopliiques, "j 'employ ais
ces loisirs forces a f aire un retour sur moi-meme> et a dresser
une so-rte d'etat sommaire de mes croyances philosophiques.
La forme du dialogue me parut bonne pour cela, parce qu'elle
n'a rien de dogmatique et qu'elle permet de presenter succes-
sivement les diverses faces du probleme, sans que 1'on soit
oblige de condom Moins que jamais je me1 sens 1'audace de
parler doctrinalement en pareille matiere." Dial., V-VI.
But on the next page in the same preface he writes :
"Chacon de ces personnages represente . . . les cotes
successif s d'one pensee libre ; aucun d'eux n'est un pseudonyme
que j'aurais choisi . . . pour exposer mon propre senti-
ment."
These statements, taken both together, can only mean that,
while each of his' interlocutors represents a certain phase of Re-
nan's own dootrinei, no one of them represents that doctrine com-
pletely. And this is true. Any one of his characters, taken
alone, would certainly misrepresent Kenan's position. But the
misrepresentation would be due not to a real contradiction, but
rather to the consistent advocacy of a single phase of the ques-
tion at any one time.
In view of our author's protest, however, the Dialogues and
the Drames philosophiques are quoted in this paper only as con-
firming positions taken by the author elsewhere, which they
often express more briefly and more clearly.
Few men have been more written about, by friends and by
foes, than Kenan. All the eminent literary critics, and many
others, have had their say; and several biographers have told
the story of his life. A list of these works will be found in
Appendix B.
The most elaborate attempt yet made to explain, from a psy-
chological point of view, the complex personality of Kenan, and
the many contradictions in his writings resulting therefrom, is
BKAUEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EKNEST BEN AN. 217
that of M. Gabriel Seailles: Ernest Renan, Essai de Biogra-
phie psychologique>, 2e edition, Paris, 1895.
This writer tries to show that Kenan's inconsistencies are
the logical outcome of his rejection of metaphysics, and his ex-
clusive reliance upon the experimental method.
"Renan attend tout de la science, il n'y a pas une verite qui
lie vienne d'elle, il lui demande non settlement les faits et les
lois, mais, plus hardi qu'A. Comte, Tidee qui domine les faits
et coordonne les lois a la fin ideale de 1'univers
II etait bon que cette experience fut faite, et en un sens elle
a ete faite pour tous. L'echec de Renan n'est pas un accident,
il est le terme logique d'une philosophic qui se reduit a 1'his-
toire, demande aux faits eux-memes Tintelligence des faits, et
devant leurs dementis ne pent que renoncer a elle-meme et
desesperer. ... La vie intellectuelle de RJenan est une
experience faite pour tous, elle nous apprend ou la logique
conduit un esprit sincere qui, resolu a suivre la verite jusqu'au
bout, Fattend du seul temoignage des faits." E. R., VIII, 341.
My own opinion is that M. Seailles is trying too hard to
refer to a single cause what in truth was due to the coopera-
tion of a great many; and that, moreover, he has approached
his author too exclusively from the intellectual side. It was
not so much Renan's rejection, of metaphysics, — indeed, he did
not reject it in the sweeping manner assumed by M. Seailles —
but rathecr his heterogeneous temperament; not his adherence
to the experimental method, but rather his frequent and capri-
cious departure from that method, that furnished the principal
source of the puzzling contradictions in his philosophical writ-
ings. But further discussion of this point must be reserved for
a later chapter.
An explanation seems called for in regard to the form of
the exposition here attempted. After bringing together and
comparing with one another all Renan's utterances on the va-
rious topics discussed, his contradictions were found to be so
bold and so unceasing, that it seemed impossible to avoid mis-
representation, or to convey anything like a true idea of the
218 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
nature of his mind, except by exhibiting his own statements
side by side, and making discussion and criticism incidental.
This mode of exposition will of course not lend itself well
to continuous narrative, and is certain for that reason to prove
less attractive to the reader; but it seemed the only way to
avoid arbitrary exclusions. Moreover, this method has the
advantage of presenting Kenan's views mainly in his own words,
and thus provides at least, in convenient groupings, materials
for a more detailed study of the subject at somie future time.
The topics are accordingly grouped under three heads : Nature,
Man, Society. Under the first will be found Kenan's ideas on
such questions as evolution vs. special creation, law and miracle ;
materialism and spiritualism; theism:, pantheism, agnosticism
and positivism. In the other two divisions are presented his
views on certain questions in ethics and politics respectively.
The concluding chapter suggests the direction in which we must
turn for a knowledge of the psychological factors involved in
the production of his heterogeneous personality.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 219
CHAPTER II.
I NATURE.
Of Kenan's nature-philosophy, in the sense just described,
the most characteristic feature is its thorough-going evolution-
ism!. As early as 1845, fourteen years before the publication
of the Origin of Species, he had quite abandoned the special-
creation hypothesis, and adopted instead, at least within the
limits of his own specialty, the principle of gradual evolution
in accordance with natural law. Souv., 251.
At least as early as 1848 also, he had developed a formula
for evolution in general, recalling that which has since become
f amous in the wording of Herbert Spencer. It may help the
comparison to place the two side by side. Mr. Spencer's well-
known formula runs thus :
"Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dis-
sipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent het-
erogeneity ; and during which the retained motion undergoes a
parallel transformation." First Principles, §145.
Kenan's conception is not expressed in such definite terms;
it is less abstract, but also less concise and less comprehensive,
being restricted to living forms. He writes in 1848 :
"Evolution d'un germie primitif et syncretique par I'analyse
de ses membres, et nouvelle unite resultant de cette analyse,
telle est la loi de tout ce qui vit. Un germe est pose, renfer-
mant en puissance, sans distinction, tout ce que 1'etre sera un
jour; le germe se developpe, les formes se constituent dans
leurs proportions regnlieres1 . . . Mais rien ne se cree,
rien ne s'ajoute. Je me suis sou vent servi avec succes de la
comparaison suivante pour faire comprendre cette vue. Soit
220 BULLETIN OF THE UNTVEBSITY OF WISCONSIN.
nne masse de clianvre homogene, que Ton tire en cordelles dis-
tinctes ; la masse representera le syncretisme, oii coexistent con-
fusement tous les instincts; les cordelles representeront 1'ana-
lyse. Si Ton suppose que les cordelles, tout en rest-ant distinctes,
soient ensuite entrelacees pour former une corde, on aura la
synthese, qui differe du syncretisme primitif, en ce que les
individuality bien que nouees en unite y restent distinctes."
A. S., 313.
This conception is applied by Benan to the evolution of the
htiman mind, as represented in languages, literatures and re-
ligions; and, in a more hypothetical way, to cosmic evolution
at large. See A. S., 301-318. Herder, Michelet, and Cousin
are frequently mentioned by him in connection with these views.
So extreme was Kenan's enthusiasm for evolutionary science
in this early period of his life that, had he been free to de-
vote himself to biology instead of theology, as he often declared
in later days, he would probably have anticipated some of the
demonstrations of Darwin. Souv., 262-3. He was forced
into other fields, however; and so, instead of an Origines des
Especes, it was Les Origines du Christianisme which established
his famle in the world.
Writing nearly half a century later of his views in the
forties :
"J'avais un sentiment juste de ce que j'appellais les origines
de la vie. Je voyais bien que tout se fait dans I'humaiiite et
dans la nature, que la creation n'a pas de place dans la serie
des effets et des causes. Trop peu naturaliste pour suivre les
voies de la vie dans le labyrinthe que nous voyons sans le voir,
j'etais evolutionniste decide en tout ce qui concerne les produits
de rimmanite, langues, ecritures, litteratures, legislations,
formes sociales. J'entrevoyais que le daniier morphologique
des especes vegetales et animales est bien 1'indice d'une geiiese,
que tout est ne selon un dessein dont nous voyons 1'obscur cane-
vas." A. S., XII-XIII. Of. ibid., 170-2.
But the truth is that Benan and Darwin approached the prob-
lem! from entirely different points of view. Consistently with
his clerical antecedents^\Benan approached the question of evo-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 221
^
lution from the side of its theological and religious significance.
To his mind, at least in the earlier period, the assertion of evo-
lution was primarily a denial of the biblical account of creation,
and of all the theological dogmas thence derived.
^In a world governed by natural law, — this is the very key-
stone of his nature-philosophy — supernatural agencies have no
place. In the endless chain of cause and effect which formed
his conception of nature, each event is bound to its neighbor
by a tie of internal necessity which is never broken through by
interpositions of a supernatural or extra-natural power. Dial.,
162; Or. Lang., 241.
"Une chose absolument hors; de doute, c'est quo, dans 1'uni-
vers accessible a notre experience, on n' observe et on 11 a jamais
observe aucun fait passager provenant d'une volonte ni de
volontes superieures a celle de Phomme." F. Det., 402 ; also
406.
This conviction dates back as far as 1846, and was apparently
formed under the influence of, or at least in co-operation with,
his friend M. Berthelot. In all his life Kenan never again
changed from this position. Souv., 337-8 ; also, 371-2.
Neither is there any such thing as intentional action to be
discovered in the operations of Nature. Whatever may be true
of the government of the universe as a whole, in the details of
this planet, if we except the actions of finite beings, there is
no such thing as intelligently directed action ; nor ever has been,
so far as man can ascertain. The unerring precision and ab-
solute constancy of natural la,w, making it possible to predict
results from a given combination of known materials and forces,
is alone sufficient ground, he affirms, for discarding the idea of
intelligent or intentional action, in the workings of Nature.
"Le ca,ractere de precsion absolue du monde que nous ap-
pelons materiel suifirait a eloigner 1'idee d'intention; Pinten-
tionnel se trahissant presque ton jours par le manque de geo-
metrie et Fa-peii-pres." ~F. Dei, 404. Cf. Or. Lang., 241.
In the present state of the universe, intelligence is restricted
to a middle region: both above and below finite minds, all is
night. There is no evidence that our planet has ever been in-
222 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
fluenced by any rational being higher than man. A God, in
the ordinary sense of the word, a living, acting God, a Provi-
dence, is nowhere discernible. F. Dei, 406-7. And this ab-
sence of purposive action may be affirmed without hesitation,
he declares, of the entire solar system, and even of the whole
universe, so far as planetary motions are concerned. There is
no reasonable doubt that the other celestial bodies likewise fol-
low laws of development inherent in their own constitution.
At any rate, the onus probandi rests upon those who deny this.1
F. Det., 405.
Ren an does not mean to assert that a conscious ruler of the
world does not exist ; but merely that no such influence is dis-
cernible in the details of the world's government over that por-
tion of space and time which man can investigate. Dial., 20.
In other worlds or other ages, interventions by outside powers
may possibly occur. It may well be that, compared with the
totality of things, the portion of the universe accessible to the
observations of man is a mere point; and what is true of this
point, need not, of course, be true of the whole. At all events,
with respect to the totality of things, it would be as rash to
deny as to affirm intervention by superior powers. Dial., 22 ;
F. Det., 417.
The same course of reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to
infinite time. Between our phenomenal universe, which we
know is not eternal, and the primordial universe, of which we
know nothing at all, there may be infinitudes of intervals. But
if we admit, as Renan thinks we must, that our phenomenal
world is but a finite part, of an infinite whole, everything is
possible, even God. F. Det., 416. The day may come, for
^ught we know or can do to the contrary, .when some outside in-
fluence will break through the causal nexus of our world and
destroy its autonomy, without more regard for our theories than
we show for the microbes in a clod that we crush. F. Det., 416.
Imagine an atom, unconscious as a whole but inhabited by con-
scious individuals asserting the complete autonomy of their
little world. Suppose that chemistry should some clay succeed
in disintegrating these atoms. And is it quite impossible that
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 223
our universe should have similar proof some day of the possi-
bility of interventions from outside powers? F. Det., 414.
But plainly, all this speculation about the constitution of a
supposed primordial universe turns on mere possibilities, and
between posse and esse the gulf is too wide to be bridged by
the fragile fabrics of mere fancy. So far as our positive knowl-
edge of nature extends, Reman maintains, inviolate natural law,
unbroken by any trace of supernatural intervention, reigns su-
preme in the universe. Cf . A. S., 170-1 ; 174.
This intense constitutional aversion, as it must be called,
for anything that savored of miracle, is best understood from
a study, of his childhood environment.
As Mr. Balfour among others has pointed out, one of the most
important causes of belief, because the most irresistible, is the
psychological climate, as he calls it, in which a person is born.
And indeed, a little reflection will show that none of o>ur earli-
est beliefs, whether in religion, philosophy or science, can be
properly called the product of our own reasoning at all. A
man cannot choose the first beginnings of his intellectual life
any more than he can choose his parents or his native land.
His first beliefs are matters of ethnical geography, and are de-
termined by what may be called the moral zone or psychological
climate of his early surroundings. In the words of Mr.
Balfour :
"Considered from the side of their origin, a man's early
beliefs are mere products of natural conditions, psychological
growths, comparable to the flora and fauna of continents and
oceans." Found. Bel., 196; Cf. James, Will to Bel.; Bain's
Ment and Mor. Sci., especially the Appendix, p. 80; also
Philos. Rev., V, p. Iff.
This truth is well exemplified in the life of Ernest Renan.
His native town, T'reguier, had grown out of an ancient mon-
astery, and was shrouded in an atmosphere of mythology, as
dense as Benares or Jagatnata. Souv., I. He calls it a nest
of priests and nuns, cut off from all trade and industry. Secu-
lar pursuits were looked upon as vanity and vexation of spirit,
while all about the town, in the high places and the country holy-
424 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
wells, Mab and Merlin, the fairies and the witches, had their
devotees. Cf . Mme. Darmsteter, Life of Renan, pp. 4-5 ;
Seailles, K R, p. 4.
A large pla,ce in the lives of the people was given to the wor-
ship of saints, most of them; unkown to the rest of Christendom,
and whose solitary little chapels stood here and there among
the moors or barren rocks.
These local deities have left indelible marks on the mind of
Renan. More than half a century later he writes :
"La physionomie etrange, terrible, de ces saints, plus druides
que chretiens, sauvages, vindicatifs, me poursuivait comme un
cauchemar." Souv., 82.
Among other virtues, these saints were reputed to possess
the power of working miracles. A good example of these is the
miracle by which, as Kenan was taught to believe, his father
was cured of fever whan a child. Before day-break, the child
was taken to the chapel of the saint who exercised the healing
power. A blacksmith arrived at the sarnie time with his forge,
nails and tongs. He lighted his fire, made his tongs red-hot,
and held them before the face of the saint, threatening to shoe
him like a horse unless he cured the child of his fever. The
threat took immediate effect, and the child was cured. Souv.,
p. 86.
A still better test of credulity was the miracle performed
once a year by Saint Yves de Id Verite, the patron-saint of Brit-
tany, on the occasion of an annual festival held in his honor :
;<La veille de la fete, le peuple se reunissait le soir dans
Teglise et, a minuit, le saint etendait le bras pour benir 1'as-
sistance prosternee. Mais s'il y avait dans la foule un seul
incredule qui levat les yeux pour voir si le miracle etait reel,
le saint, justement blesse de ce soupcon, ne bougeait pas, et,
par la faute clu mecreant, personne n'etait beni." Souv., 11.
Renan was not slow to discover a common trait in all these
miracles: the credulity of the witnesses. "Das Wunder 1st,
Jes Glaubens liebstes Kind."
BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 225
With this environment of his childhood and the circum-
stances of his early life in view, we are no longer surprised to
find that his interest as a theological student in, Paris should
have centered in the subject of miracles, and that throughout
his long life the question of naturalism vs. supernaturalism
should have been in the fore-ground of all his philosophical
speculations. It is impossible to read his later discussions of
miracles without being reminded of the wonder-working saints
of his early surroundings.
"II y a des miracles quand on y croit ; ils disparaissent quand
on n'y croit plus." Mor. Or., 194. Cf. V. J., L-LII, 268;
Dial, 14-22 ; Q. C., 221.
"Aucun miracle ne s'est produit dans des conditions vrai-
ment scientifiques, en presence de juges competents." Or.
Lang., 241; Apost,, 37-42; Fragm., 318-19.
Renan insists that his rejection of miracles is not a violation
of scientific method, nor an a priori procedure. Rather is it
the inevitable result of an impartial study of nature and his-
tory. There is no evidence at the present day of any violation
or suspension of natural law, he, maintains ; and as for the mir-
acles alleged to have occurred in the distant past, they are in
the same class with sirens and centaurs. What reason have we
for disbelieving either the one or the other except that they have
never been seen? Dial., 246. Hence the burden of proof, he
insists, lies not with those who reject miracles, but with those
who affirm them. Science is not called upon to disprove
groundless assertions gratuitously made. Quod gratis asseri-
tur gratis negatur. F. Det, 405.
"Chercher a expliquer les recits surnaturels ou les reduire a
des legendes, ce n'est pas mutiler les faits au nom1 de la theo-
rie; c'est partir de robservation meme des faits. . . Une
observation qui n'a pas ete une seule fois dementie nous ap-
prend qu'il n'arrive de miracles que dans les tem'ps. et les pays
ou Ton y croit, devant des personnes disposees a y croire. . .
Ce n'est don<5 pas au nom^ de telle ou telle philosophiei, c'est au
nom d?une constante experience, que nous banissons le miracle
2
226 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
de riiistoire." V. J., L-LI; Apost, 37ff; Dial, 318-19.
"C'est par les sciences historiques qu'oni pent etablir (et,
selon moi, d'une maniere peremptoire) . . . qu'il n'y a
jamais eu de fait surnaturel. Ce n'est point par un raisonne-
inent a priori que nous repoussons le miracle; c'est par un rai-
sonnement critique ou historique." Souv., 328. Cf. ibid.,
282.
It is a noteworthy fact that Kenan seldom approaches the
question of miracles without citing either MaJebranche or Lit-
tre. The influence of the former on Renan was probably
greater in this matter than that of any other writer.
The conception of miracle, according to Renan, is a legacy
from an unscientific age, and entirely without rational mean-
ing today. At a time when everybody believed, as a matter of
course, in spirits and their intervention in human affairs, any-
thing that baffled the understanding was considered sufficiently
explained by calling it a miracle, that is to say the work of su-
pernatural powers. A. S., 262. But to a modern mind such
an explanation is without meaning. To call an event- miracu-
lous to-day is not. to explain it, but rather to' class it as unex-
plained.
"La condition mema de la science est de croire que tout est
explicable naturellement, meme 1'inexplique. Pour la science,
une explication surnaturelle n'est ni vraie ni fausse; ce n'est
pas une explication." Q. C., 223.
In Rman's sense of the word miracle', indeed, it would be a
contradiction in terms to speak of miracles in the remote past.
The miraculous, as he conceives it, is not merely the inexpli-
cable; it is a formal derogation from recognized laws in the
name of a particular desire. A thing is not miraculous merely
because it is unique,, or not understood. Apost., 37-42 ; Or.
Lang., 239.
As thus denned, a miracle is a comparatively modern con-
ception, a kind of^ by-product of natural science. Obviously,
there must be a conception of natural law before we can think
of an infraction or suspension of natural law ; or rather the two
BBATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 227
conceptions, law and miracle, undifferentiated in primitive
minds, develop together, pari passu, as the idea of natural law
becomes definite.2 Miracle implies law, as supernaturalism
implies naturalism. They are correlative terms, and only have
a meaning with reference to each other.
The opposition of law and miracle, of naturalism: and super-
naturalism, thus represent different stages in the evolution of
man's ideas about nature. Time was when the word miracle
explained things, in the sense of satisfying curiosity, just as
phlogiston, chemism, heredity, electricity, microbe, even evolu-
tion itself, have: served in turn to> explain almost anything, to
unscientific minds of a later day. In the mythological ages
of primitive man, spirits were as real as bacteria are to-day,
and their action as universal. The exact nature of their ac-
tivity, its limits and conditions, nobody stopped to examine in
detail. Of. A. S., 45-6 ; also V. J., 41.
But in his polemics against the miraculous Reman seems not
to have realized sufficiently, at least in his earlier days, the ne-
cessity of compromise in passing from the one regime to the
other.
"Tout on rien," he exclaims1, "supernaturalisme absolu 001
rationalisme sans reserve." A. S.? 49.
But who could expect that the humian race should pass from
mythology to logic at a single bound? Should we not call it
the greatest miracle of all if humanity had leaped suddenly
from undoubting belief to> unbelieving doubt?
JSTor has Renan, in his crusade against supernaturalism, al-
ways kept to the straight and narrow path, of sound logic.
When, for example, miracles are declared impossible because
natural law is absolute and universal (A. S., 48, 169), he is
plainly assuming the very point at issue. Such a statement
amounts to saying that miracles cannot happen because they do
not ; a position which he has himself refuted elsewhere :
"Dans le milieu que nous experimentons, il ne se passe pas
de miracles; mais, au point de vue de Tinfini, rien n'est imh
possible." F. Det, 418.
Occasionally also, in reply to a certain class of theologians,
228 BULLETIN OF TILE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
and presumably on the biblical principle of answering the fool
according to his folly, he has repeated the well-worn argument
that miracles are inconsistent with the idea of an all-knowing
and all-powerful creator, as subsequent interventions would im-
ply that the original plan of the world was defective and needed
occasional correction. Or. Lang., 239.
But in such quibbling he rarely indulges. Already in
L'Avemr de la science he takes the ground that belief in super-
naturalism, like belief in fetichism, will never be dispelled by
metaphysical argumentation.
"Le seul moyen de guerir de cette etrange maladie qui, a la
honte de la civilisation, n'a pas encore disparue de rhumanite,
c'est la culture moderne. Mettez 1'esprit au niveau de la sci-
ence, nourissez-le dans la methode rationnelle, et, sans lutte, sans
argumentation, tomberont ces superstitions surannees. . . .
La science positive et experimentale, en donnant a Thomme le
sentiment de la vie reelle, pent seule detruire le supernatural-
isme," A. S., 48-9.
It is interesting to note that Itenan, while repudiating mir-
acles in the past and the present, admits their possibility in the
future. Supernatural interventions do not occur at the pres-
ent time, because there is no supernatural being capable of in-
tervening. Some day, however, such a being may exist. In
the remote future, when evolution has run its course and the
universe attained to complete self -consciousness, personal acts
of divine will may take the place of natural law, even to the
extent of becoming the normal modus operandi of nature.
"Mais le miracle, c'est-a-dire ^intervention d'un etre su-
perieur, qui maintenant n'a pas lieu, pourra un jour, quand
Dieu sera conscient, etre le regime normal de Tunivers." F.
Det, 441. Also in his article on Amid, F. Det., 392-3.
Is Renan, then, to be classed as a materialist, in view of his
disbelief in the existence of a conscious ruler of the universe?
That wo>uld be a great mistake. Of. Dial., 143-4, 253, 141.
The truth is that materialism in every form, whether ra-
tional or temperamental, was repulsive to him. As for onto-
logical materialism;, the doctrine that matter is the one eternal*
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 229
self-existent reality, the ultimate Weltstoff,, so to speak, he ex-
plicitly rejects it as a palpable absurdity. A. S., 478. Mat-
ter, he declares, has no real independent existence. It is
merely the form in which the true substance of the universe,
whatever that may be, becomes manifest to our senses ; a bridge
of communication, as it were, between spirit and spirit in the
finite world.
"Je ne puis trop le repeter," he writes in 1862, "c'est Tideal
qui est, et la realite passagere qui parait etre." Frag., 250.
"S'il est une induction qui resulte naturellemient de 1'aspect
general des f aits, c'est que la conscience de 1'individu nait et se
forme, qu'elle est une resultante, mais une resultante plus re-
elle que la cause qui la produit et sans commune mesure avec
elle. . . . Le materialisme est done un non-sens plutot
qu'une erreur. II est le fait d'esprits etroits qui se noient dans
leurs propres mots et s'arretent au petit cote des choses." Mor.
Cr., 65.
"L'amfi! est la premiere desi realites et la seule pleine realite.
C'est Tame qui est, et le corps qui parait etre." Ibid., 63. Of.
Dial., 56, 141; A. S., 261; Or. Lang., 99; V. J., 29; Dr. Phv
22-3.
Is spirit, then, the ultimate reality, the true substance of the
world 2 There are numerous passages in Kenan's books which
would make it appear that he thought, so, as for example, the
statement last quoted. That is not his meaning, however. In
reality he takes a, middle ground, declaring the one assertion as
unwarranted as the other. Neither matter nor mind are abso-
lute, independent, self-existent realities. Rather, our ideas of
matter and spirit are both of them negative conceptions.
"What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind."
All that we know about either is that it is not the other; mat-
ter is not-mind, mind is not-matter. "Tout ce qui n'est point
prose est vers, et tout ce qui n'est point vers est prose." H&-
nan's only advance upon this tautology consists in the state-
ment, little more than a guess, that matter and spirit are dis-
tinct and irreducible modes of existence in which the real real-
ity, whatever that may be, becomes manifest to our senses.
BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
This view, already distinctly expressed in the Avenir de la sci-
ence, he maintained to the end.
"Les mots de corps et d'ame restent parfaitement distincts,
en taut que representant des ordres de phenomenes irredue-
tibles; mais faire cette diversite toiite phenomenale synonyme
d'une distinction ontologique, c'est toimber dans un pesant re-
alisme, et imiter les anciennes hypotheses des sciences phy-
siques, qui supposaient autant de causes que, de faits.
Le vrai est qu'il y a un© substance unique, qui n'est ni corps
ni esprit^ mais qui se manifeste par deux ordres de phenomenes,
qui sont le corps et Tesprit, que ces deux mots n'ont de sens
que par leur opposition, et que cette opposition n'est que dans
les faits." A. S., 4T8.
In his reply to the Discours de reception of M. Pasteur be-
fore the Academie Francaise, 1882, he says:
"Le but du monde, c'est 1'idee; mjais je ne connais pas un
cas ou Fidee so soit produite sans matiere; je ne connais pas
d'esprit pur ni d'oeoivre d'esprit pur. . . . Je ne sais pas
si je fruis spiritualiste ou materialiste." Disc., 78. Cf. Dial.,
55-6; Frag., 253.
It i* only very occasionally, however, that Renan adverts to
questions of this order. Ke was not much addicted to specula-
tions about the essence of Being. Metaphysical speculations
seemed to him1, in his normjal moods, an unprofitable waste of
time, an intellectual legerdemain unworthy of a serious mind,
and completely barren of results so far as the advancement of
positive knowledge is concerned.3
"Si la philosophic ne veut pas rester une toile de Penelope,
sans cesse et toujours vainement recommencee, il faut qu'elle
devienne savante." Mor. Crit, 81.
"La tentative de construire la theorie des choses par le jeu
dcs formules vides de 1'esprit est une prevention aussi vaine que
celle du tisserand que voudrait produire de la toile en faisant
aller sa navette sans y mettre du fil." Mor. Crit, 82. Cf.
Souv., 250; Averr. IV, 323; Lang. Eem,, 505; D;sc., 39.
But although the ultimate nature of reality is thus unknown,
and presumably unknowable, Renan is very positive in his
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST BEN AN. 231
numerous assertions regarding its aims. An essential feature
of his nature-philosophy is its teleology. The universe is cer-
tainly not an assemblage of undirected, blindly acting forces,
it is a mechanism moving towards a predetermined goal.
"L'univers a un but ideal et sort, a une fin divine; il n'est
pas seulement tine vaine agitation, dont la balance finale est
zero," Dial., XIV.
This is inferred from the fact of evolution throughout na-
ture, the universal tendency in virtue of which the possible de-
velops into the actual, the actual into the conscious, and the con-
scious intoi progressively higher forms of self-consciousness.
As the germ of an animal or plant tends to evolve conformably
to its ancestral pattern, so does the evolution of the world as a
whole follow a predetermined course. Dial., 23—4 ; Frag., 177.
This belief in the purposive character of world evolution is
not by any m;eans the expression merely of a passing mood, or
the casual flight of an erratic fancy. It is repeated again and
again, in a great variety of forms — essays, speeches, dialogues,
histories, plays, — and in widely different associations. It is,
in fact, one of the few constant items in his eminently incon-
stant creed. Renan thoroughly believed, in his more serious
moments at least, in some "far-off divine event, toward which
the whole creation moves." As if to make sure of being taken
in earnest, he declares his belief in teleology to be one of the
only two propositions in philosophy of which he is certain be-
yond a, doubt, the other being his belief in the absoluteness and
universality of natural law.
"Autant je tiens pour indubitable qu'aucun caprice, aucune
volonte particuliere n'intervient dans le tissu des f aits de 1'uni-
vers, autant je regarde comme evident que le monde a un but
et travaille a une oeuvre mrysterieuse. II y a. quelque chose
qui se developpe par une necessite interieure, par un instinct
inconseient, analogue au mouvement des planter vers 1'eau ou
la lumiere. . . Le monde est en travail de quelque chose;
omnis creatura\ ingemiscit et parturit" Dial., 22. Cf. Frag.,
177, 179.
232 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
If we ask what can be this ulterior goal of world-develop-
ment, his answer is ready: It is the production of Reason.
"Le but du monde est de produire de la raison. Tout lui
est bon pour cela. Chaque planete fabrique de la pensee, du
sentiment esthetique et moral; la petite recolte de vertu et de
raison que produit chaque monde est la fin de ce monde, comme
la secretion de la granine est le dernier but du gommier.7'
Dial., 58-9.
Again in his letter to M. Berthelot, Frag., 177 :
"Deux elements, le temps et la tendance au progres, ex-
pliquent Punivers. Mens agitat molem. . . Spiritus Mus
alii. . . . II v a une conscience obscure de Punivers qui
tend a se faire, un secret ressort qui pousse le possible a ex-
ister." Frag., 177-8. Cf. Dial., 144; Dr. Ph., 189.
It is needless to observe that the Reason which, according
to Kenan, the universe is destined to evolve, is not human rea-
son, but intelligence or mind in its widest sense, including all
conscious beings of whatever sort, past, present and to come.
Human reason, it is true, mjarks the highest point yet reached,
so far as the process is represented on this planet.
"Pour moi je pense qu'il n'est pas dans Punivers d'intelli-
gence superieure a celle de Phomme, en sorte que le plus vaste
genie . de notre planete est vraiment le pretre du monde,
puisqu'il en est la plus haute reflection." Frag., 283. Cf.
Dial., 20-1 ; A. SI, note 14.
Au moyen age, le plus haut resultat du monde, au moins de
la planete Terre, etait un choeur de religieux chantant des
psaumes. La science de notre temps, repondant au desir qu'a
le monde de se connaitre, atteint des effets bien superieurs."
Frag., 430-1.
But, of course, evolution does not stop with man. Human-
ity is merely a transitional link, human reason only a phase
in the evolutionary movement whose ultimate goal is the pro-
duction of a universal reason or world-consciousness. A. S.,
XX ; Dial, 118-23 ; Frag., 182-3 ; A. S., note 14. In a single
word, evolution is a deific process. The development of con-
BRAUEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 233
sciousness is the development of God, that is to say of a being
who will one day permeate and govern the universe as the soul
its body. F. Det, 430. Of. A. S., 37 ; and especially, note
42 ; also Dial., 143 ; Souv., XXI-II. God is immanent in na-
ture, and in all its products; the laws of nature are the habits
of God. Dial., 25-6; 125; Frag., 248.
"De qui est done cette phrase. . . "Dieu est immanent
dans I'ensemble de Funivers, et dans chacun des etres qui le
composent. Seulement il ne se connait pas egalement dans
tous. II se connait plus dans la plante que dans le rocher, dans
Tanimal que dans la plante, dans I'homnue que dans 1'ani-
inal, dans 1'hoiinme intelligent que dans 1'homme borne, dans
Thomme de genie que dans 1'homme intelligent, dans Socrate
que dans 1'homme! de genie, dans Bouddha que dans Socrate,
dans le Christ que dans B'ouddha," Voila la these fonda-
mentale de toute notre theologie. Si c'est bien la ce qu'a voulu
dire Hegel, soyons hegeliens," Dial, 187 ; 310 ; Dr. Ph. 22-3 ;
A. S., 188-9 ; 200-1 ; Or. Lang., 99.
Reman insists, that his teleology is not open to the objections
properly raised against the Aristotelian finalism of the schol-
astics. His own conception, he claimis, does not imply the ex-
istence of a conscious, deliberating, omnipotent power. The re-
alization of nature's aim is not a conscious execution of a pre-
conceived plan. Evolution attains its purpose without special
aimi, by a succession of lucky hits, so to speak.
"Les objections des savants qui se mettent en garde centre
ce qivil tiennent pour une resurrection du finalismei portent a
fond centre le systeme d'un createur reflechi et tout-puissant.
Elles ne portent en rien centre notre hypothese d'un. nisus pro-
fond, s'exercant d'unei mianiere aveugle dans lea abimes de
I'etre, poussant tout a 1'existence a chaque point de 1'espace.
Ce nisus n'est ni, conscient, ni tout-puissant; il tire le meilleur
parti possible de la, matiere dont il dispose." F. Det.,429-30.
Cf. A. S., 258; Souv., 373.
The evolutional impulse is an unconscious tendency or drift,
ein, 'blinder Drang, groping its way in the dark, and reaching
its goal in the end. in spite of endless blundering and countless
234- BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
failures, because of its eternal persistence and indefatigable en-
deavor. Imagine, says Renan, an insect fluttering about in a
room f roan which the only escape is through a hole in the ceil-
ing just large enough for the creature to pass through if it
happens to strike the exact centre of the opening. Allow this
insect infinite time and infinite patience and perseverance, and
it will ultimately succeed. Such is the universe; always young,
always enterprising, never discouraged, and with a supply of
material for experimentation so inexhaustible that waste is no
loss,4
But how can these positive statements, so often repeated in
Renan's books, be made to accord with his explicit rejection of
metaphysics ?
"II n'y a pas de verite," he has told us, "qui n'ait son point
de depart dans I'experience scientifique, qui no sorte directe-
ment ou indirectement d'un laboratoire oil d'une bibliotheque,
etc." Frag., 283-4; ibid., 263, 265.
"Comment, " asks M. Seailles, "Inexperience scientifique
Tauter ise-t-elle a conclure que Dieu se fait, qn'un jour il sera?"
E. R, 212.
Kenan's own reply is that it does not. In spite of his fre-
quent reiterations of the deific doctrine, he has really forestalled
criticism by explicit declarations on the other side of the
question. How, for example, can the following words be recon-
ciled with his doctrine of deific evolution, when taken together
with his rejection of metaphysics ?
"La theodicee n'a aucun fondement experimental.
Deonander la Divinite a Inexperience, c'est done s'abuser."
Frag., 318-20.
And again in his preface to the Dramas Philosophiques,
written in 1888 :
"La philosophic, an point de rafftnement on elle est arrivee,
s'aceomode a merveille d'un rnbde d'exposition ou rien ne
s'afiirme, o-u tout s'induit, se fond, s'oppose, se nuance. On
n'en est plus a perfectionner les regies du syllogisme, ni a
fortifier les preuves de 1'existence de Dieu ou de Fimmortalite
de Tame. L'homme voit bien, a Fheure qu'il est, qu'il ne saura
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 235
jamais rien de la. cause supreme de 1'univers ni de sa propre
•destinee." Dr. Ph., III.
Two years later, in another preface, — all his prefaces are
written with special care — we have the two opposite views ex-
pressed in almost the same breath :
"Rien ne noois indique quelle est la volonte de la nature,
ni le but de Punivers. Pour nons autres>, idealistes, une seule
doctrine est vraie, la doctrine transcendante selon laquelle le
but de riiumanite est la constitution d'une conscience superi-
eure, ou, commie on disait autrefois, la plus grande gloire de
Dieu." A. S., XVI.
Here we learn that our author distinguished between scien-
tific truth and transcendental truth, the one for all mien and the
other reserved for idealists; but how, again, is this "doctrine
transcendante' ' to be reconciled with his rejection of metaphys-
ics? Is not his theory one thing, and his practice quite
another ?
With regard to his theory, one is curious to know what stage
this God-evolving process may have reached in our own day.
May we say that God is, as well as that he will le? In a letter
dated August, 1862, written in answer to this very question,
Reiian says:
"En dehors de la nature et de Phomnie, y a-tril done quelque
•chose ? me demandez-vous.
"II y a tout, repondrai-je. La nature n'est qu'une appa-
rence, 1'homme n'est qu'un phenomene. II y a le fond eternel,
il y a Finfini, la substance, Tabsolu, 1'idea.l ; il y a, selon la belle
expression miusulmane, celui qui dure ; il y a, selon Fexpression
juive, plus belle encore, celui qui est. Voila le pere du sein
duquel tout sort, au sein duquel tout rentre." Dial., 252.
This is not merely ironical jargon employ ed. to put off in>
pertinent questions. The statement is repeated in many dif-
ferent connections. In the lecture Rome et le Christianisme,
for example, we read :
"La vie nous parait un court passage entre deux longues
nuite. . . . line seule chose est certaine, c'est le sourire
paterael, qui, a certaines heures, traverse la nature, attestant
236 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
qu' nn oeil nous regard e et qu'un coeur nous suit," C. d'Angl.r
200-1. Cf. Souv., 376.
And again in his article: la Metaphysique et son avenir:
"Dans la nature et Phistoire je vois bien mieux le divin que
dans des formules abstraites d'une theodicee artificielle et d'une
ontologie sans rapports avec les faits L'infini
n'existe que quand il revet e une forme finie. Dieu ne se voit
que dans ses incarnations." Frag., 310; ibid.., 250.
These are explicit statements. Unfortunately, however, for
logical consistency, he is equally explicit on the other side of
the question. Contrast, for example, the passage last quoted
with the following, taken from the same article:
"La theodicee n'a aucun fondement experimental. Loin de
reveler Dieu, la nature est immorale ; le bien et le mal lui sont
indifferents. . . . L'histoire de meme est un scandale
permanent au point de vue de la morale." Frag., 319. Cf.
Disc., pp. 75, 134.
And again:
"La conscience est peut-etre une forme secondaire de 1'exist-
ence. Un tel mot n'a. plus de sens quand on veut 1'appliquer
au tout, a Tunivers, a Dieu. Conscience suppose une limitation,
une opposition du moi et du non-moi, qui est la negation meme
de rinfini. Ce qui est eternel, c'est Pidee." Dial., 140-1.
In his article on Amiel he speaks of the "conscience generale
obscure" as being "tout a fait insoucieuse des individus"
(F. Det, 391) ; and repeatedly he declares that the process
of deific evolution is still very far from its goal, which per-
haps it may never attain. Compared with the omnipotence and
omniscience which the world-soul is probably destined some
day to attain, its present condition is comparable to the semi-
consciousness of an oyster.
"La conscience du tout parait jusqu-ici bien obscure. Elle
ne seonble pas depasser beaucoup celle de Phuitre et du polypier,
mais elle exist© ; le monde va vers ses fins avec un instinct sur."
Dial., 23-4; cf. F. Pet., 442-3.
It would be interesting to know how Henan would have us
reconcile the ff*ovrire paternel . . . attestant qu'un oeil
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 237
nous regarde et qu'un coeur nous suit" with this oyster-con-
sciousness of the over-soul in its present stage.
A third statement of his, it is true, supplies a connecting
link; but this statement appears under the heading Reves:
"Croyez-mjoi, Diem est une necessite absolue. Dieu sera, et
Dieu est. En tant que realite, il sera; en tan,t qu'ideal, il
est. Deus est sitrwl in esse et in fieri. Cela seul pent se deve-
lopper qui est deja. Comment d'ailleurs imaginer un deve-
loppemen-t ayant pour point de depart le neant." Dial., 145-6.
Of. F. Det, XV— XVII.
Without entering here on a discussion of the grounds upon
which even the ideal existence of God is affirmed in this inter-
mediate statement, it is clear that it does not remove the con-
tradiction between the other two. Even here the existence of
God as an actual and completed present reality is distinctly
denied.5
A very provoking mannerism of Kenan, whenever he touches
these questions, is the substitution of vague, grandiloquent
phrases for coherent ideas. What, precisely, does he mean by
ffle fond eternel, t'infini, la substance, V Ideal, I'abime de I'eire,"
and so forth?
"Kenan abuse de la mythologie," suggests M. Seailles, "il fait
des etres avec des mots.'7 E. R, 282, note 2 : Cf. ibid., 192-3.
Much of Kenan's religious philosophy is in fact mere rheto-
ric, His language reminds one of Napoleon's famous har-
angue to his soldiers in Egypt : "Soldats, du haut de ces monu-
ments quarante siecles vous contemplent !" The emptiest rhet-
oric will serve when minds are made up in advance. It is so
in philosophy and religion, Glittering sophistries, from the
lips of a good or great man, real or supposed, are often more
powerful than truth itself as inducements to noble and heroic
living.
Stripped of its rhetoric, Kenan's belief in a God amounts
to little more than a consciousness that our phenomenal world
is probably not the whole of existence. Some deeper reality,
beginning and end of all things, most probably exists ; but con-
238 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
ceirning its ultimate nature and attributes nothing whatever is
known.
"La tentative d'expliquer Pineffable par des mots est aussi
desesperee que celle de Fexpliquer par des recite ou des images :
la langue, condamnee a cette torture, proteste, hurle, detonne.
Toute proposition appliquee a Dieu est imperti^
nente, une seule exeeptee: II est." Frag., 323-5.
Renan expressly repudiates the assumption that any conclu-
sions can be drawn, as to the attributes of Grod, from the bare
assertion of his existence, or even from the pro-position that
he is a spirit Remembering that the word spirit bears a, purely
negative meaning in, his ontology, we are prepared for the fol-
lowing reductio ad absurdum of scholastic argumentation:
"On dit, par example, Dieu est un esprit, il a tons les attributs
des esprits. Esprit signifiant seulement tout ce qui n'est pas
corps, ce raisonnement equivaut a celui-ci : II y a deux classes
d'aniiniaux, les chevaux et les non-chevaux. L'oiseau est un
non-cheval. Le poisson est aussi un non-cheval. Done 1'oiseau
et le poisson sont de la meme espece, et ce qui se dit de I'oiseau
peut se dire du poisson." A. S., note 192.
On questions concerning the nature and attributes of what
is known as the Absolute, Renan was an agnostic.
"Des voiles impenetrables," he writes in 1859, "nous de-
robent le secret de ce monde etrange dont la realite a la fois
s'impose a nous et nous accable; la philo'sophie et la science
poursuivront a jamais, sans jamais Tatteindre, la formule de
ce Protee qu'aucune raison ne limite, qu'aucun langage n'ex-
prime." Mor. Or., I— II; Disc., 216; also Preface to the
Dial. ; Hist, rel., 418.
Again, in his reply to the Discours de reception of M. Pas-
teur, 1882:
"Le resultat final, c'est encore que le plus grand des sages a
ete TEcclesiaste, quand il represente le monde livre a,ux disputes
des hoonmies, pour qu'ils n?y comprennent rien depuis un bout
jusqu'a 1'autre." Disc., 81.
Already in his first book he takes up the position that the
human mind, developed by contact with the phenomenal world
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 239
and therefore adapted to it alone, is unable to apprehend
"things-in-tbeonselves." As the humlan ear is adapted to the
perception of sound only within a certain, middle region of
wave-lengths, and is deaf to everything above or below its range,
so with reason : both the infinitely small and the infinitely great
arei beyond its reach. Man is unable to1 conceive either an ab-
solute beginning or an absolute end ; a first cause is as unthink-
able as a last effect. Carry ontological speculation beyond a
certain limit, and you are brought to the merest tautology.
Every act of mind, he declares, like every equation, is reduci-
ble at last to A = A. See A. S., p. 477.
"II faut renoncer a 1'etroit concept de la scolastique,
prenant Pesprit humain commie une machine parfaitement
exacto et adequate a I'absolu. Des vues, des apergusi, des jours,
des ouvertures, des sensations, des couleurs, des physionomies,
des aspects, voila les formes sous lesquelles Pesprit pergoit les
choses. La geometrie seule se forme en axiomes et en
theoremes. Ailleurs le vague est le vrai." A. S., 58. Cf.
ibid., 56; 152-153; 477; and note 26. Also Dial., VI, 147.
"l^ous ne savons pas! voila tout ce qu'on peut dire de clair
sur ce qui est au-dela du fini. ~Ne nions rien, n'amrmons rien,
esperons. Gardons une place, dans les funerailles, pour la
musique et Pencens." F. Det, XVII. Cf. C. d'Angl., 6-7.
TJie question whether the human mind, inadequate and un-
satis factory though it be as a, measure of objective reality, is
reliable within the limits of perception adapted to its own con-
stitution, is raised by Ren an at the bginning of his Dialogues
philosophiques :
Phtialetke:
"Force nous est bien, cependant, d^essayer de construire
d'apres ce que nous voyons la theorie de ce que nous ne voyons
pas, sons peine de rassembler a P animal qui, courbe vers la
terre, ne s'occupe que de Pobjet le plus prochain de ses sens et
de ses appetits.
240 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Eutliypliron:
"Soit, .... Mais un doute superieur plane sur
toutes ces speculations. Le doute tient a une question insolu-
ble. Notre constitution psychologique, qui est 1'oeil par lequel
nous voyons la realite, n'est-elle pas elle-meme trompeuse ? ISTe
sommes-nous pas les jouets d'une erreur inevitable £ Impossi-
ble de repondre a une pareille interrogation sans tomber dans
un eercle vicieux.
Philalethe:
"Je me suis habitue a ne plus m'arreter a ce doute, qui a
jete tant de philosophes dans une voie sans issue. Comme 1' in-
strument de la raison, manie scientifiquement et applique a la
facon d'un etalon inflexible de la realite, n?a jamiais conduit a
une erreur, il faut en conclure qu'il est bon &t qu'on pent s'y
fier. Une balance se verifie par elle-meme, quand, en variant
les pesees, elle donne des resultats constants." Dial., 6-7.
The further question, whether man's present "faculties" of
perception are final, whether new ones may not in time be de-
veloped or unknown ones discovered, Kenan seems nowhere to
have considered explicitly, though an affirmative answer would
seem to be implied in his belief that the evolving God is devel-
oping through humanity.
Concerning the future of religion, Renan is in complete agree-
ment with Herbert Spencer. Positive knowledge, he main-
tains, can never fill out the whole region of possible thought.
Beyond the circle of the known lies the region of the unknown.
The very nature of intelligence and constitution of the mind
imply that around this circle of knowledge must always ex-
tend a margin of ignorance. The greater one's knowledge, in-
deed, or the larger one's circle, the broader the outlook upon
the surrounding area of the .unknown, the region of igno-
rance and wonder, of mystery and miracle. Kenan concludes
from this that man will always be religious, for he will always
be impelled, by the very nature of his mind, to reach over into
this border-land of mystery, and seek to establish communion
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REOSAN. 241
with what he regards as a super-sensuous world. And what is
this, Renan asks, if not religion?
"L'homime en face des choses est fatalement porte a en, cher-
cher le secret. Le probleine se pose de lui-mieme, et en vertu
de cette faculte qu'a rhotmme d7allor au dela du phenomene
qu7il percoit : tou jours, en face de Pmconnu,
Thonime ressent un douhle sentiment, respect pour le mystere,
noble temerite qui le porte a dechirer le voile pour connaitre ce
,Uii est au dela." A. S., 17-18.
And again before the Academie Fran^aise:
"II est des sujets ou Ton aime mieux deraisonner que de se
taire. Verite ou chimere, le reve de Tinfini, nous attirera tou-
jours En pareille matiere, la puerilite meme
des efforts est touchante. II ne f aut pas demander de logique
aux solutions que rhomone imagine pour se rendre quelque
raison du sort etrange qui lui est echu." Disc., 40-1. Cf. Dial.,
VI, VII; XIII.
"La religion est necessaire. Le jour ou elle disparai trait,
ce serait le coeur meme de Thumanite qui se dessecherait
La religion est aussi eternelle que la poesie, aussi eternelle que
1' amour ; elle survivra a la destruction de toutes las illusionsu
Jamtais Thomme ne se contentera d?une destinee
finie." Q. C., 235; ibid., 414; also C. d'Ang., 6-7; Ant,
XLIX— LI.
This propensity of human nature to "other-worldliness" led
Renan to the position of Kant. Cf. Mor. Grit., IV. Besides
the pure reaison which iserves in the phenomenal world, there
is in man, he believed, a mysterious transcendental faculty or
capacity, in virtue of which he is enabled to hold communion
with a. super-sensuous wo>rld. This capacity he variously de-
nominates r'Moral Sense,77 "Categorical Imperative,77 "Practi-
cal Reason,77 "Conscience,77 "'Divine Instinct,77 and so forth;
but called by whatever name, it is always opposed to the Pure
Rieason. It is the pure heart that sees God; pure reason is
atheistic. Dr. Ph., 279-80.
"II est une base indubitable que nul scepticisme n7ebranlera
3
4 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
et 011 I'homme trouvera jusqn'a la fin des jours le point fixe de
ses incertitudes : le bien, c'est le bien ; le mal, c'est le mal. Pour
hair Tun et pour aimer 1'autre, aucun systeme n'est necessaire,
et c'est en ce sens que la foi et 1'amour, en apparence sans lien
avec I'inteliigence, sont le vrai fondement de la certitude morale
et 1'unique moyen qu'a I'homme de comprendre quelque chose
au probleme do son origine et de sa destinee."Mor. Cr, II. Of.
Job, XG— XCI.
"Ce qui revele le vrai Dieu, c'st le sentiment moral. Si
1'humanite n'etait qu'intelligente, elle serait athee;
Le devoir, le devouement, le sacrifice, toutes chooses dont 1'his-
toire est pleine, sont inexplicables sans Dieu." Frag., 321-3.
Cf. Dial., 30-1, 38.
Nor is the testimony of this moral sense less reliable than
the deliverances of pure reason, or the verdict of sense-percep-
tion. Kenan would admjit that moral and religious intuitions
cannot b© expressed in rational speech, nor formulated in defi-
nite logical propositions ; but he would insist, at the same time,
that such an admission in no wise affects their veracity, and that
ideas are not necessarily false because they are vagua Once
admit that there is or can be such a thing as non-rational truth,
and it seems impossible to avoid acknowledging symbolistic
suggestion as legitimate language by the side of syllogistic
assertion; the one for religion and the other for science.6
"La spiritualite de Tame et 1'existence de Dieu . . .
sont des choses si claires qu'elles n'ont pas besoin d'etre demon-
trees, 011, quand on les prend pa,r 1'analyse, des choses si obscures
qu'elles ne sont pas demontrables." Frag., 2Y2. Cf. ibid.,
323.
To what extent, if at all, Renan was influenced by contem-
porary thinkers of the agnostic and positive schools, with whom
he agrees in the main in miuch of his religious philosophy, it
is impossible to make out with sufficient clearness to warrant
positive statements. Cf. Faguet, Hist. lit. fr., 410-11.
As for positivism, there is abundant evidence that he early
became familiar with the doctrines of Comte and his disciple
BEAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAX. 243
Littre, though neither of these appears to have been sympa-
thetically read by him,
Com,tei receives frequent mention in his earlier writings,, but
always in a disparaging tone. In ISAvenir de Id science, for
example, Kanan's criticism is summed up in these words :
"En un mot, M. Comfe n'entend rien aux sciences de 1'hu-
manite, parce qu'il n'est pas philologue." A. S., 151 ; also note
117.
And again in the Souvenirs:
"J'eprouvai une sorte d'agacenuent a voir la reputation ex-
ageree d' Augusta Comte, erige en grand homme de premier
ordre pour avoir dit, en mauvais francais, ce que tous les esprits
scientifiques, depuis deux cents ans, ont vu aussi clairement que
lui." Souv., 250.
But in spite of his unlaudatory estimates of the founder of
positivism), there can be no question that Renan was deeply imf
bued with its spirit, and this appears to be due to> the influence
of Comte. Cf. Brunetiere, Manl. hist lit fr., 482. Mr. Bab-
bitt briefly and correctly defines Renan asi a scientist and posi"
tivist with a Catholic imagination. Souv., Introd., IX.
Far more important than the influence of Comte, or of any
of his own countrymen, except, perha.ps, Malebranche, was the
influence of the Germans, notably Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Herder,
Goethe, and later Schopenhauer and v. Hartmann. With
Kant> Herder and Hegel, however, Kenan appears to have had
only a secondhand acquaintance, apparently through Cousin,
and Quinert* His scientific work, too, in history and biblical
criticism, was mainly built up on the results of German schol-
arship, as he often himself very gratefully acknowledged.
Souv., 58, 246, 291, 311, 385 ; Bef. Int, V— VI; Cf. Hist lit
fr., 456-7; Platehoff, E. R., 71; Seailles, E. R, 244. For
Kenan's criticisms upon Hegel, see A. S., note 14; also p. 258;
and Lang. Sem., 505.
We have comtpared Kenan with agnostics. But here again
he very much lacked consistency. Many of his utterances, es-
pecially in the earlier period, are as far as possible removed
244 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
from the agnostic creed. Imagine Huxley or Spencer writing
these words:
"Oui, il viendra uii jour ou Mmmanite ne croira plus, mais
ou elle saura ; un jour ou elle saura le monde metaphysique et
moral, comtme elle sait deja le monde physique." A. S., 91.
And yet an agnostic Renan crtainly was, at least in the sense
of distinguishing sharply between knowledge and opinion, fact
and fable, and declaring the riddle of existence unsolvable by
the human mind. Cf. Monod: Renan, etc., XIV.
"On ne fait pas de dialogues sur la geometric; car la geome-
trie est vraie d'une facon impersonnelle. Mait tout ce qui im-
plique une nuance de foi, d'adhesion voulue, de choix, d'anti-
pathie, de sympathie, de haine et d'amour, se trouve bien
d'une forme disposition oil chaque opinion s'incarne en une
personne et se comporte comme un etre vivant." Dr. Ph., II.
Cf. Dial., XIII— XIV; Disc., 75; Mor. Grit., I— II; A. S.,
53-4.
"Refuser de determiner Dieu n'est pas le nier; cette reserve
est bien plutot I'effet d'une prof onde piete, qui tremble de blas-
phemier en disant ce qu^il n'est pas." Frag., 317.
There are two kinds of agnosticism, as everybody knows:
that of flippant indifference, and that of baffled endeavor; and
between the two there is a contrast in spirit and aim as great
as that between tavern and temple. Renan belongs very em-
phatically in the latter class. There is no evidence, however,
of any direct influence on Renan from contemporary agnosti-
cism. As for the English school, there is nothing in his writ-
ings to suggest that he was even acquainted with their works.
Neither Huxley, nor Spencer, nor Tyndall is once mentioned
in any of his books.
This chapter must not close without at least a passing refer-
ence to Renan's latest phase, in which his philosophy of life
fades out more and more into epicurean indifferentism. After
a long life laboriously spent in the quest of what he conceived
to be the truth, he falls more and more, like his model the
Preacher, into a habit of discoursing discouragingly upon the
vanity of all things.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 245
"La. verite est sourde et froide; nos ardeurs ne la, tou client
pas. Die neue Philosophic, die neuere Philosophic, die neueste
Philosophic. Mon Dieu ! que ces surencheres1 sont naives- !
Pourquoi se disputer ainsi la priorite do Perre<ur ? Sachons at-
tendre; il n'y a peut-etre rien an bout; on bien, qui salt si la
verite n'est pas triste? Ne soyons pas si presses de la con-
naitre Mais, chers enfants, c'est inutile de se
donner tant de mal a la tete, pour n'arriver qu'a diangea*
d'erreur. Aimusez-vons, puisque vous avez vingt; ans ; travaillez
aussi.77 F. Det, X. Cf. Dr. Ph., 263.
aJe ne peux m'oter de Fidee que o'est peut-etre apres tout le
libertin qui a raison et qui pratique la vraie philosophie de la
vie." Souv., 149-50.
"Par la bouche de Eeiian jeune," comments M Seailles on
this philosophy., ala jeunesse repond an vieux Renan: 'Malheur
a la generation pui a congu la vie comme un repos et Tart comtme
une jouissance!' " E. K,, 318. Cf. Q. C., 301.
The only redeeming feature in this indifference, if that is
the word, is the intellectual hospitality it implies. A more tol-
erant mjan than Renan never was; and in the present instance
his theory seemis inspired by his practice. He repeatedly de-
clares that the most cordial and most genuine toleration is that
which rests on the broad and firm foundations of universal dis-
illusionment:
"La plus solide bonte est celle qui se fonde sur le parfait
ennui, sur la vue claire de ce fait que tout en ce monde est
frivole et sans fond reel. Dans cette mine absolue de toute
chose1, que reste-t^il ? La mechancete ? Oh ! Cela n'en vaut
pas la; peine. La mechancete suppose une eertaine foi au
serieux de la vie, la foi du moins au plaisir, la foi a la ven-
geance, la foi a 1'ambition. Neron croyait a 1'art; Commode
croyait au cirque, et cela les rendait cruels. Mais le desabuse
qui sait que tout objet de desir est frivole, pourquoi se donne-
raitril la peine d'un sentiment desagreable-" Marc-Aur., 483.
"La bonte du sceptique est la plus solide de toutes ; elle repose
Cf. Disc., 75.
246 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
sur un sentiment profond de la verite supreme : Nil expedit."
Eoci. 89; repeated P. Isr., V: 159-60.
If these statements are true, it seems safe to predict that
"la bonte la plus solide du sceptique," this universal tolerance
based on universal indifference, is not what humanity wants,
or will permanently accept. Considerations of practical useful-
ness, rather than of speculative truthfulness, will doubtless con-
tinue to preside over the moral evolution of the race. The in-
corrigible prejudices of virtuous men will continue to count
for more than the sceptic's "verite supreme: Nil expedit."
It must be admitted, however, that most people are least tol-
erant precisely in the sphere in which positive knowledge is
most difficult, not to say impossible, the sphere of religion.
Of. James, Var. Rel. Exp., 338, 342-3 ; also P. Is., II, 102,
141. Renan was the very reverse. To the end of his life he
was always willing to accord to his fellowmen the same free-
dom of belief, whether positive or negative, which he claimed
for himself. His last word on this subject is contained in a
little after-dinner speech :
"Nous autres liberaux, nous ne demandons qu'une seule chose,
<c'est que chacun ait la liberte de batir a sa maniere son roman
de 1'infLni. Tout ce qu'on balbutie en pareille matiere revient
a peu pres au meme et se resume a dire que, sur ce qui depasse
notre pauvre monde, on ne sait pas grand chose." F. Det,
124-5.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 247
CHAPTER III.
MAN.
In passing from Kenan's philosophy of nature to his moral
philosophy, we are not progressing to something m|ore definite
or more coherent. On the contrary, the vagueness which char-
acterizes all his philosophical thought becomes increasingly
prominent in his utterances concerning the moral life. It
seems to have been one of his favorite convictions that a com-
prehensive description of the moral life, or statement of moral
principles, cannot be given in a series of definite propositions
logically consistent with each other.
"Telle est la veritable forme des verites morales: c'est les
f ausser que leur appliquer ces monies inflexibles des sciences
mathcmatiques, nui ne conviennent qu'a des verites d'un autre
ordre, acquises par d'autres precedes Quand
done cesserons-nous d'etre de lourds scolastiques et d'exiger
sur Dieu, sur Tame, sur le morale, des petits bouts de phrases
a la faeon de la geometric? Je suppose ces phrases aussi ex-
actes que possible; elles seraient fausses, radicalement fausses,
par leur absurde tentative de definir, de limiter 1'infini : Ah !
lisez-moi un dialogue de Platon, une meditation de Lamartine,
une page de Herder, une scene de Faust. Voila une philoso-
phie, c'est-a-dire une f agon de prendre la vie et les choses."
A. S., 54-55. Cf. ibid, 152-3.
In Averro'es et I'averro'isme, we find the same doctrine in a
more elaborate and reasoned form, affirmed in opposition to the
Averroasts of Padua :
"Lii verite en toute chose etant extrememeoit delicate et fugi-
tive, ce n'est pas a la dialectique qu'il est donne de Tatteindre.
Dans les sciences morales et politiques, .
ou les principes, par leur expression insuffisante et toujours
248 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
partielle, posent a moitie sur le vrai, a moitie stir le faux, les
result ats du raisonnement ne sont legitimes qu'a condition d'etre
controles a chaque pas par I'experience et le boni sens. Le syl
logisme excluant toute nuance et la verite residant tout entiere
dans les nuances, le syllogisme est un instrument inutile poui
trouver le vrai dans les sciences morales. La penetration, la
souplesse, la culture multiple de 1'esprit, voila la vraie logique.
La forme est, en philosophic, au moins aussi importante que le
fond." Averr., 323 ; 170, X. Of. Hist. Eel., 339-40.
"Autant vaudrait essayer d'atteindre un insecte aile avec une
massue que de pretendre, avec les serres pesantes du syllogisme,
trouver le vrai en des matieres aussi delicates. La logique ne
saisit pas les nuances ; or les verites de 1'ordre moral resident
tout entieres dans la nuance. Elles s'echappent par les mailles
du filet de la scolastique." Mor. Crit,, 189. Cf. ibid, 312-13.
13.
Perhaps the simplest and most direct way of exhibiting Re-
nan's speculations in moral philosophy is to plunge at once m
medias res and begin with its central feature, the problem of
immortality. It is impossible^ in fact, to discuss his view of
morality without coming around again and again to this ques^
tion. In his writings morality is practically identified with
religion, and religion with immortality. With the m)ost untir-
ing emphasis he insists that the best foundation of morality
after all, its only effective foundation indeed, is the belief in a
future life.
"La poesie et la. morale sont en effet deux choses differentes ;
mais elles supposent 1'une et 1'autre que I'hoinme n'est pas un
etre d'un jour sans lien avec Tinfini qui le precede, sans respon-
sabilite envers Tinfini qui le suit." Mor. Crit, 112.
His point of view is very clearly described by M. Scherer,
who makes it his own :
"Ayons le courage de le reconnaitrei : la morale ne peut
se passer de transcendance, et par consequent de metaphysique.
S'achons voir les choses comme elles sont: la mo-
rale, la bonne, la vraie, Fancienne, Timperative, a besoin de Tab-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 24G
solu; . . . elle ne trouve son point d'appui qu'en Dieu.
La religion, c'est le surnaturel. Etj'ajoute: la mo-
rale de meme; car la morale n'est rien si elle n'est pas reli-
gieuse." Scherer, Litt. Cbnt, vol. 8, pp. 171, 182-3. Cf. also
Prof. James: "Religion, in fact, for the great majority of
our own race, means immortality, and nothing else." Var.
Eel. Exp., 524.
The problemi of immortality early engaged Kenan's atten-
tion, owing to his belief in universal evolution. He tells us
that ever since he was capable of thinking for himself, it was
to questions concerning the origin and destiny of man that his
thoughts most frequently turned. A. S., 160-1.
In 1848 he declares that the question relating to the origin
of man must be solved, if at all, by the observational or his-
torical method ; and he indicates, in a manner that shows a
clear grasp of the situation, the numerous preliminary ques-
tions to be answered before the solution of the general problem
is possible. A. S., 161-3. For some years previous he had
been, convinced that man is not a "special creation," but the
cumulative product of evolutionary forces still at work. A. S.,
161. Cf. ibid., note 75.
To what extent did the new theory of man's origin affect his
conception of man's destiny ? If humanity is the outcome of
a long development reaching back to the first beginnings of
life; if it is really true that m!an has grown, spiritually and in-
tellectually as well as physically, from the brute animal, which
in turn was evolved in the same gradual way from still lower
forms, the question naturally arises: is it possible to continue
affirming the immortality of man, without extending it also to
the beasts of the field, and even to fishes and worms ? At what
point in the passage from protozoon to man does the immortal
soul begin ?
He clearly shows that the difficulty arises fromi the unbroken
continuity of the evolutionary process. If evolution is indeed
continuous, leading without a break from! the lowest forms of
life to the highest, it must be impossible to draw any definite
250 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN.
line of separation between mortal and immortal creatures. It
would be quite arbitrary where such a line should be drawn.
A similar objection against the traditional creed arose from
what may be called his psycho-physical conception of man.
The very idea of body and soul as two distinct and separate en-
tities, united in some mysterious way during life and by their
separation marking what is called death, is an idea which
he believed to be incompatible with evolutional psychology.
Where is the evidence that body and soul are separate exist-
ences at all? Might they not be different aspects merely of
one and the same phenomenon ? And if they are only differ-
ent sides of one and the same thing, what sense can there be in
the statement that the soul may continue to exist though the
body have perished ? 7
These were some of the thorns which evolutionary science
had sown in the once fruitful fields of theology, in which lie-
nan was so earnestly at work. With these and kindred difficul-
ties he grappled and struggled, for a time by day and by night.
Tlhe result is well known. Unable to reconcile what he be-
lieved to be the teachings of science with those of the creed, he
abandoned the priesthood and left the church. He was then a
young man of two and twenty, and he lived to be almost seventy.
Did his subsequent labors lead him to any deeper insight into
this momentous question of human destiny ?
In later years his position on the question of human immor-
tality was, like most of his philosophical beliefs, a double one.
A rationally conceived and scientifically established fact, he in-
sists on the one hand, immortality most certainly is not. In-
deed, he strongly inclines to the belief that, so far as scientific
enquiry and demonstration can go, individual human immor-
tality is very probably an illusion.
But while immortality cannot be asserted as a, fact, neither
can it, on the other hand, be convincingly shown to be a mere
fiction. Absolute denial would be as misplaced as positive as-
sertion. F. Det, XV-XVIL
In Kenan's philosophy the universe is divided into two
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 251
spheres, so to speak, the finite and the infinite, the relative and
the absolute; and the criteria of truth which serve in the one
are not, lie believed, of necessity valid in the other. The
idea of immortality therefore, though an entirely gratuitous as-
sumption when addressed to the finite reason, may yet corre-
spond to reality in the realm of the absolute.
"Les deux grands postulate de la vie humaine, Dieu et Timr
mortalite le Tame, gratuits au point de vue du fini ou nous vi-
vons, sont peut-etre vrais a la limite de Tinfini." F. Det., 419.
He often insists that belief in immortality is at bottom a
corollary from faith in divine justice. A just God, he argues,
cannot allow that the virtuous should wholly die. F. Det.,
XV-XIX. If there is no hereafter, a virtuous life is an im-
position without compensation, and not worth while. The idea
that virtue mjust meet with its reward, he declares, is the most
logical of all ideas in the human breast. P. Isr., IV, 277.
Cf. Dial., 137.
"S'il etait vrai que la vie humaine ne fut qu'une vaine suc-
cession de faits vulgaires, sans valeur suprasensible, des la pre-
miere reflection serieuse, il faudrait se donner la mort; il n?y
aurait pas de milieu entre Tivresse, une occupation tyrannique
de tous les instants, et le suicide." A. S., 8 ; 411.
And again in his lecture before the Royal Institution, 1880 :
"Dire que si ce monde n'a pas sa contrepartie, Phomme qui
s'est sacrifie pour le bien ou le vrai doit le quitter content et
absoudre les dieux, cela est trop naif. Non, il a le droit de les
blasphemter. . . Je veux que 1'avenir soit une enigme ; mais
s?il n'y a pas d'avenir, ce monde est un affreux guetrapens."
C. d'Angl, 242.
"S'il n'y a pas un,e autre vie pour reparer les iniquites de
celle-ci, soutenir que Dieu est juste et ami du bien est le plus
pueril des paradoxes ou la plus niaise des contre-verites."
Eccl., 33.
Again in his Discours de reception before the Academie
Francaise :
"L'homime . . . invinciblement porte a croire a la jus-
tice et jete dans un monde qui est et sera toujours Tinjustice
252 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
meme . . ., que voulez-vous qu'il f asse ? II se revolte con-
tre le cereiieil, il rend la chair a Pos decharne, la vie au cerveau
plein de pourriture, la lumiere a Poeil eteint; il imagine des
sophisinies dont il rirait chez un enfant, pour ne pas avouer que
la nature a pu pousser Pironie jusqu'a lui imposer le fardeau
du devoir sans compensation." Disc., 41.
Observe, however, that these statements admit of two very
different conclusions : either there is no hereafter, or there is
no just God. With the utmost emphasis he affirms that in this
present world justice is not done.
"Loin de reveler Dieu, la nature est immorale ; le bien et le
mal lui sont indifferents. Jamais avalanche ne s'est arretee
pour ne pas ecraser un honnete homme; le soleil n'a pali de-
vant aucun crime ; la, terre boit le sang du juste commie le sang
du pecheur. L'histoire de meme est un scandale permanent
au point de vue de la morale." Frag., 319. Cf. ibid., 250;
also Disc., 41 ; Ecd., 33 ; Souv. 119, 316.
The assertion that virtue is rewarded here below, he declares,
is at once encountered by unanswerable objections. "The asser-
tion is not truei. In fact, in whatever age of the world, and in
whatever society we place ourselves, compensatory justice
is constantly violated. More versed in social science than the
ancients, we can go further, and assert that it is not possible it
should be otherwise. Injustice is to be found in Nature itself.
. . . A man dies in the devoted attempt to save another ;
no one can argue that absolute justice in this present world has
been displayed in the fate of that man." P. Isr., IV : 278.
And again:
"In history, as a rule, man is punished for the good he does,
and recompensed for the evil. . . . History is quite the
contrary of virtue rewarded."8 P. Isr., I: 331. Of. Kef.,
Int., XII: "The laws of history are the justice of God;" also
Dr. Ph., 262.
But why mniltiply citations ? Statements like these have be-
come platitudes. And yet, if they are really true, it would
seem indispensible, if the world is to b© grounded in justice,
that there should be opportunity for retribution and compen-
.
'
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 253
sation in another life. But where is Kenan's proof for the ex-
istence of such a life? To prove that justice will reign in
heaven, something more is required, surely, than the assertion
of its notorious absence on earth ! If there is no trace of di-
vine justice in the past and the present, as Kenan declares there
is not, what ground can this be for affirming its existence in
the future ?
His answer is supplied by his theory of deific evolution.
The destiny of man, he argues, is inseparably bound up with
the destiny of God. Whether or not immortality shall some
day be an established fact depends upon whether or not the uni-
verse succeeds in evolving a just God. At present paradise is
a dream ; billions of years hence it may be a reality. F. Det.,
419. Immortality as an essential and natural property of the
human soul is a myth, to be sure; we shall most certainly die,
soul and body, and nothing short of a miracle can bring us
back into existence. This prodigious miracle may take place,
however. The evolving Over-soul, having attained complete
self-consciousness, will doubtless be just, and will recall to ex-
istence all who have labored in behalf of its own evolution.
And then will immortality be established.
"Qui salt si le dernier terme du progres, dans des millions
de siecles, n'amenera pas la conscience absolue de Tunivers, et
dans cette conscience le reveil de tout ce qui a vecu?" V. J.,
288.
"Quand Dieu sera en meme temps parfait et tout-puissant,
e?est-a-dire quand romnipotence scientifique sera concentree
entre les mains d'un etre bon et droit, cet etre voudra ressusci-
ter le passe, pour eii reparer les innombrables iniquites. Dieu
existera de plus en plus; plus il existera, plus il sera juste."
Dial., 135-6.
"L'oeuvre de Phumanite est le bien; ceux qui auront con-
tribue au triomphe du bien fulgebunt sicut siellae." Dial.,
138.
The clearest statement of this doctrine which he has any-
where given occurs in his article on Amiel:
"IN'ous eprouvons un invincible besoin de supposer dans le
254: BULLETIN OF THE UN1VEKSITY OF WISCONSIN.
gouvernement du monde la justice dont nous trouvons la dictee
dans nos coeurs; et, comme il est de toute evidence que cette
justice n'existe pas dans la realite de 1'univers, nous arrivons
a exiger absolument, comme condition de la morale, la survi-
vance de ehaque conscience humaine au dela de la tombe. Ici
eclate Tantinomie supreme de la nature et de la. raison. Un tel
postulat, en effet, est la chose la plus necessaire a priori et la
plus impossible a posteriori. ... La resurrection serait
un miracle. . . . Elle serait Facte final du monde, le fait
d'un Dieu tout-puissant et tout-sachant, capable d'etre juste
et voulant Tetre. . . . Ce serait un don reserve par Petrer
devenu absolu, parfait, omniscient, tout-puissant, a ceux qui
auraient contribue a son developpement." F. Det., 390-2. Cf.
ibid., 418; P. Isr., IV: 286-7, 284; A. S., 220-1; Dial., 129-
30; 142-3. Dr. Ph., 262-3. Souv., XXI-II.
Renan declares he can see no force in the objection that an
immortality to be inaugurated ages hence is too remote a con-
tingency to afford consolation in present suffering. Time is a
purely subjective matter. Succession, which is a category of
the finite mdnd, has no place in the realm of pure spirit. In
the timeless eternity of the spirit-world, therefore, a sleep of a
billion years is no longer than the sleep of a moment; and to
shrink from the long interval of unconsciousness between death
and the resurrection is like dreading the length of a night which
is certain to be passed in sound and dreamless sleep. F. Det.,.
419-20. To those who have died in a righteous cause, the
reign of justice in heaven will seem like the immediate contin-
uation and triumph of the very cause which they served on
earth. P. Isr., IV, 287.
"Ceux qu'une tardive justice y replacera croiront etre morts-
de la veille, Comme dans la legende du moyen age, en pal-
pant leur lit d'agonie, ils le trouveront encore chaud." F.
Det, 419.
The truth is, on this as on most other questions of the same-
order, Renan has taken both sides alternately. At one time we
are told, if virtue and vice are the same after death, if saint
and sinner alike both end in the same putrefaction of the tombr
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 255
then God is not just. And then again we find him refuting
his own argument.
"Je n'admets pas comme rigoureuse la preuve de rimmor-
talite tiree do la necessite ou serait la justice divine de reparer,
dans une vie ulterieure, les injustices que 1'ordre general de
Funivers entraine ici-bas. Cette preuve est conc/ue au point de
vue de 1'individu. Nos peres ont souffert, et nous heritons du
fruit de leurs souffrances. Nous souffrons, Tavenir en profi-
tera. Qui sait si un jour on ne dira pas: 'En ce temps-la, on
devait croire ainsi, car rhumajiite fondait alors par ses souf-
frances 1'etat meilleur dont nous jouissons. Sans cela nos
peres n'eussent point eu le courage de supporter la chaleur du
jour. Mais maintenant nous avons la clef de Tenigmie, et Dien
est justifie par le plus grand bien de Tespece.' Pendant que
la croyance a rimimortalite aura ete necessaire pour rendre la
vie supportable, on y aura cru." A. S., note 162.
The only kind of immortality that he unconditionally affirms
as rooted in the nature of things is what may be called the sur-
vival of influence. Man's work will endure as long as the
world. A. S., 226, 223. No action ever dies. The immortals
are those who have contributed to an immortal work. F. Det,
441. Cf. Dial., 131-2. In this sense the very worms have
a place in the eternal chain of causation. A. S., 223 ; also note
42. Truth especially is imperishable; he that adds to the tem-
ple of truth even a single stone may justly boast: Exegi mo-
numentum aere perennius. A,, S., 226.
"L'immortalite consiste a travailler a une oeuvre immortelle,
telles que sont Tart, la science, la religion, la vertu, la tradi-
tion du beau et du bien sous toutes leurs formes." Mbr. Grit.,
140. Cf. ibid., 63-4.
This doctrine likewise goes back to his earliest days. In tho
Avenir de la science, 1848-9, we read:
"II f aut done admettre que tout ce qui aura ete sacrifie pour
le progres se retrouvera au bout de Tinfini, par une facon
d'immortalite que la science decouvrira un jour, et qui sera
a Pimmortalite fantastique du passe ce que le palais de Ver-
256 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
sallies est an chateau de cartes cPun enfant." A. S., 99. Cf.
ibid., note 42.
In a famons open letter to his friend M. Berthelot, his point
of view is presented more fully and more clearly:
"Nous serons cendres depuis des milliards d'annees, les
quelques molecules qui font la matiere de notre etre seront des-
agregees et passees a d'incalculables transformations ; mais nous
ressusciterons dans le monde que nous aurons contribue a f aire.
Notre oeuvre triomphera L'ame, la personne,
doivent etre congues comme choses distinctes de la conscience.
L'aine est ou elle agit, on elle aime. Dieu
etant Pideal, objet de tout amour, Dieu est done essentielle-
ment le lieu des ames. La place de Thomme en Dieu, Topinion
que la justice absolue a de lui, le rang qu'il tient dans le seul
vrai mtonde, qui est le monde selon Dieu, sa part en un mot
de la conscience generale, voila son etre veritable
C'est en Dieu que Fhomme est immortel. Les categories
de temps et d'espace etant effacees dans Pabsolu, ce qui existe
pour 1'absolu est aussi bien ce qui a ete que ce qui sera. En
Dieu vivent de la sorte toutes les ames qui out vecu. Pour-
quoi le regne de Pesprit, fin de Punivers, ne serait-il pas ainsi
la resurrection de toutes les consciences ?" Frag., 185-90. Cf.
Dial., 139-43; Job, XCI ; also Seailles, E. E., 208, note,
But what has this kind of immortality in common, one can-
not help asking, except the name, with the continued existence
of individual personality after death ? "C'est en Dieu que
Phomme est immortel. En Dieu vivent toutes les ames qui
ont vecu." Very good* but do not these words, froon Kenan's
point of view, convey more sound than sense? For God, ac-
cording to our author, is still in process of evolution, and
he often declares it is by no means certain that our planet
may not fail after all to contribute abiding results to that end.
Hence to say that man is immortal because his work is incor-
porated as a link in the endless chain of cause and effect, seems
only another way of saying, though a less disagreeable way,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 257
that his personal destiny after death is that of the worm or the
waterfall.9
In short, the belief in immortality represents, according to
Kenan, not a, fact, but a hope: and fortunately for its own, sur-
vival, is independent of logical proof. Man is not all reason,
nor entirely governed by reason. On this truth he often in-
sists. For ages mien have believed in their own immortality
without intellectual proof, and for ages to come they will con-
tinue so to believe, even in face of positive disproof.
"On ne fera jamais taire les objections du materialisme.
II n'y a pas d'exemple qu'une pensee, un sentimient, se soient
produits sans cerveau, on avec un cerveau en decomposition.
D'un a.utre cote, Phomme n'arrivera point a se persuader que sa
destinee soit semblable a celle de 1'animal. Meme quand oela
sera demontre, on ne le croira pas," Eccl., 87-8.
Immortality, in a word, is an inevitable postulate of human
life. Whatever man's theories may be, in practice he cannot
assume that his earthly life is the be-all and end-all of his per-
sonal existence^
"I own that I have grave doubts," he writes of himself, "as
to individual immortality, and yet I almost constantly act as
if I held in view things beyond my life." P. Isr., IV: 285.
On this point he is very emphatic.
"L'histoire demontre cette verite qu'il y a dans la nature
humaine un instinct transcendant qui la pousse vers un but
superieur. Le developpement de Fhumanite n'est pas explica-
ble dans Thypothese ou I'homme ne serait qu'un etre a destinee
finie, la ve:rtu qu'un raffinement d'egoi'sme, la religion qu'une
chimera" Peup. Sem,., 42 ; Cf. F. Det., 420.
"L?humanite est ainsi acculee a cette singuliere impasse que,
plus elle reflechit, mieux elle voit la necessite morale de Dieu
ot de rimmortalite, et mieux aussi elle voit les difficultes qui
s'elevent contre les dogm,es dont elle affirme la necessite."
F. Det., 434.
"Une voix est en nous, que seules les bonnes et grandes amfes
savent entendre, et cette voix nous crie sans cesse: ^La verite
et le bien sont la fin de ta vie ; sacrifie tout le reste a ce but ;
4
258 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
et quand, suivant 1'appel de cette sirene interieure, qui dit
avoir les promesses de vie, nous sommes arrives an terme on
devrait etre la recompense, ah ! la trompeuse consolatrice !
elle nous manque." Disc., 91.
The note of scepticism in this last passage is one that is fre-
quently sounded by Renan, especially in his later works (Dial.,
26-29),, though it is already suggested in passing even in the
earliest. In the Eau de jouvence, Prospero, his favorite sage,
suggests that this f< sirene interieure" is probably a device by
which Nature dupes her children into furtherance of her own
ulterior aims. That Prospero is in reality presenting the au-
thor's own views is clear from Kenan's repetition of the same
doctrine in the article on Amiel. And indeed, if the only
evidence for a life to come is entirely non-rational, as Kenan
maintains, how can we ever be sure that our belief in that life
is anything more that the survival in us of emotions re-
fleeting the erroneous beliefs of primitive man ?
"II se peut que cee voix interieures proviennent d'illusions
honnetes, entretenues gar 1'habitude, et que le monde ne soit
qu'une amusante feerie dont aucun dieu. ne se soucie. II f aut
done nous arranger de mianiere que, dans les deux hypotheses,
nous ri'ayons pas eu completement tort. II faut ecouter les
voix superieures, mais de f aeon que, dans le cas ou la seconde
hypothese serait la vraie, nous n'ayons pas ete trap dupes. Si
le monde;, en effet, n'est pas chose serieuse, ce sont les gens
dogmatiques qui auront ete fri voles, et les gens du monde, ceux
ques les theologiens traitent d'etourdis, qui auront ete les vrais
sages." F. Det, 394-5. Cf. Disc., 245 ; P. Isr., IV: 287.
Oddly enough, this uncertainty does not in the least interfere
with positive statements on the same question elsewhere. There
are passages in Kenan that would do credit to any church-
father. One is tempted to urge in excuse that his contra-
dictions represent his belief at different periods of life. Such
is not the fact, however; they appear in the sarnie chapter,
and even on the same page. His beliefs seem to vary not
merely with his moods, but even with the requirements of
euphony and rhythm in literary composition. Cf. Souv., 363.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 259
To one point, however, in regard to religion, he has con-
sistently held from first to last, and that is its social utility.
However uncertain its doctrines may be, there can he no ques-
tion^ he reminds us, of the beneficent influence of religion over
men's lives. V. J., 184. He goes so far as to affirm that
a belief in immortality is an indispensable support of the mioral
life. No greater calamity could befall mankind, he declares,
than the universal abandonment of this belief. Fact or fiction,
what matter, if it affords inspiration to more virtuous liv-
ing ? In such matters, practical utility is more important than
scientific accuracy,
"Let us not deceive ourselves," he writes, "man is governed
by nothing but his conception of the future. A nation which
en masse gives up all faith in what lies beyond the grave will
become utterly degraded. An individual may do great things
and yet not believe in immortality ; but those around him must
believe in it, for him and for themselves' Faith
in glory and all our pursuings of the ideal are but another form
of faith in immortality; . . . every noble life is built^
in great part, on foundations laid in the life beyond." P. Isr.,.
IV: 285.
"Eien de grand ne se fait sans chimeres. L'homme a besoin,.
pour deployer toute son activite, de placer en avant de lui un
but capable de 1? exciter. . . . Les premiers musulmans,,
auraienthils marche jusqu'au bout du monde, si Aboubekr ne
leur eut dit: Allez, le paradis est avant. Les conquistadores,
ffussent-ils entreipris leurs aventureuses expeditions s'ils n'eus-
sent espere trouver 1'Eldorado, la Fontaine de Jouvence, Oi-
pango aux toits d'or ? Alexandre poursuivait le$ Griffons et les
Arimaspes. Colomb, en revant les iles de Saint-Brandon et
le paradis terrestre, trouva TAmerique. Avec 1'idee que le
paradis est par dela, on marche ton jours et on touve mieux que
le paradis." A. S., 409-10.
This vimv is maintained in all his writings. A disinterested
moral life is impossible without illusions, and the most impor-
tant of these is the belief in a life ,to come.
"II vaut mieux que Thumanite ait espere le Messie que bien
260 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
entendu telie endroit d'Isaie ou elle a cru le voir annonce;
il vaut mieux qu'elle ait cm a la resurrection que bien lu et bien
oompris tel passage obscur du Livre de Job sur la foi duquel
elle a affirme sa delivrance future. Ou en serions-nous si les
oontemporains du Christ et les fondateurs du christianisme eus-
sent ete d'aussi bons philologues que Gesenius ?" Cant., XII —
xm.
One of his last utterances on the subject is found in his
preface to the Avenir de la science, composed nearly half a cen-
tury later than the work itself:
"Ce qu'il y a de grave, c'est que nous n'entrevoyons pour
1'avenir, a moins d'un retour a la credulite, le moyen de donner
a I'humanite un catechisme desormais acceptable. II est done
possible que la mine des croyances idealistes soit destinee a
suivre la ruine des croyances surnaturelles, et qu'un abaisse-
ment reel du moral de I'humanite date du jour ou elle a vu
la realite des choses. A force de chimeres, on avait reussi a
obtenir du bon gorille un efl?ort moral surprenant ; otees les chi-
mjeres, une partie de Tenergie factice qu'elles. eveillaient dis-
paraitra, Meme la gloire, comme force de traction, suppose
.i quelques egards rimmortalite, le fruit n'en devant d?ordinaire
«tre touche qu'apres la mort. Supprimez Talcool au travail-
leur dont il fait la force, mais ne lui deanandez plus la meme
somme de travail.
"Je le dis franchement, je ne me figure pas comment on
rebatira, sans les anciens reves, les assises d'une vie noble et
heureuse/' A. S., XVIII. Cf. V. J., 184; Dr. Ph., 356-7,
360.
This brings us to Kenan's remarkable doctrine Hiat reason,
inevitably selfish as he believed it to be, is hostile to the moral
life. Morality has nothing to gain from' a clear insight into
Nature's ways, and it has everything to lose. Philosophical
Aufldaruvig is the arch-enemy of virtue, that is to say, of un-
selfishness.
"L'homme est si mediocre, qu'il n'est bon que quand il reve.
II lui faut des illusions pour qu'il fasse ce qu'il devrait faire
par amour du bien. Cet esclave a besoin de crainte et de
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 261
mensonges pour accomplir son devoir. On n'obtient des sacri-
fices de la masse qu'en lui promettant qu'elle sera payee de
retonr. Uabnegation du chretieni n'est, apres tout, qu'un cal-
cul habile, un placement en vue du royaume de Dieu." M.-
Aur., 567. Cf. V. J., 457.
This doctrine is repeated in many places throughout his books.
"Prejuge, vanite, voila la base de la vie. La philosophic,
qui detruit les prejuges, detruit la base de la vie." Dr. PL,
28.
"L'homme est lie par certaines ruses de la nature, telles que
la religion, 1' amour, le gout du bien et du vrai, tous instincts
qui, si Ton s'en tient a la consideration de Finteret egoiste, le
trompent et le menent a des fins voulues hors de lui. L'honune,
par le progres de la reflection, reconnait de plus en plus les
roueries de la nature, demolit par la critique religion, amour,
bien, vrai. Ira-t-il jusqu'au bout, ou la nature Pempor-
tera-t-elle? Dial., 43. Cf. P. Isr., IV: 312.
In the philosophy of Eenan unselfishness is miade the very
touch-stone of morality. His antipathy towards ethical hedon-
ism, so marked in his earlier period, springs from this point
of view. Whatever is done for pleasure, he contends, is with-
out moral value, for pleasure-seeking is always and inevitably
self-seeking.
"Le plaisir, essentiellement egoiste, est par consequent la
negation du divin, Tinverse de la religion." Q. C., 470.
And again:
"Ce qui fait que le plaisir est pour nous une chose tout a
fait profane, c'est que nous le prenons comma une jouissance
personmlle; or, la jouissance personnelle n'a absolument aucune
valeur suprasensible." A. S., 405.
Even the belief in a future existence, the very foundation
of morality, according to Eenan, becomes morally worthless,
he declares, if embraced in consequence of rational persuasion.
If heaven and hell were undoubted realities, the coriduct resultr
ing from hope of the one or fear of the other would be noth-
ing more than pursuit; of self-interest. And to be sure, it is
obviously the same thing in principle whether the pleasure pur-
262 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
sued is happiness on earth or blessedness in heaven, the only
difference being that the latter policy is less short-sighted. A
Simeon Stylites, enduring pain in this present life in order to
escape the endless tortures or secure the endless joys of a life
to come, is just as much pursuing his own greatest ultimate
good as the veriest libertine. If these future pains and pleas-
ures are regarded as actual facts, it is not the hermit but the
libertine who fails to secure for himself the greatest balance
of pleasures over pains in the end.
"Si les verites morales etaient des resultats mathematique-
ment demontres, elles perdraient tout leur prix ; elles cesseraient
ineme d'etres morales, puisqu/il n'y aurait pas plus de merite
a les croire qu'a croire la geometric et a s'arreter devant le code
penal." Dial., 331. Of. F. Det., XV; also Dr. Ph., 260.
"Supposons, en effet, une preuve directe, positive, evidente
pour tous, des peines et des recompenses futures; ou sera le
merite de faire le bien? II n'y aurait que des fous qui, de
gaiete de coeur, courraient a leur damnation, Une foule d'ames
basses feraient leur salut cartes sur table. . . . Qui ne
voit que, dans un tel systeme, il n'y a plus morale ni religion ?
Dans Fordre moral et religieux, il est indispensable de croire
sans demonstration; il ne s'agit pas de certitude, il s'agit de
foi." M.-Aur., 264-5. Of. O. d'Angl., p. 260.
These statements, taken together with those previously
quoted, would seem at first glance to place Renan in a very
paradoxical position: immortality as a hope is indispensable
to an unselfish life, immortality as a certitude is incompatible
wth such a life. In this case the contradiction is only appar-
ent, however. For even admitting that believers and unbe-
lievers alike are governed, in the last resort, by considerations
of their own greatest ultimate welfare, it is plain that their
respective policies would lead to very different kinds of con-
duct in this present world. The one would bend his efforts
to secure his own greatest happiness here and now, regardless
of society at large, or showing a regard for the good of others
only so far as this was necessary to secure his own ; while the
believer, postponing his own enjoyments to a future world, is
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 263
free to promote his neighbor's welfare, or the glory of God,
quite regardless of pain or pleasure to himself. And this is
all that Renan really means : A virtue that is made a. matter
of policy is no longer meritorious, because it no longer proceeds
from, unselfish motives. He does not really mean, to deny that
a selfish life would be very differently ordered in fact, accord-
ing as it takes account or not of a life after death.
No doctrine in the realm of moral philosophy is more em-
phatically or miore persistently affirmed by Renan than the
proposition that morality, or in other words altruism, is a be-
quest from pre-rational or even pre-human times. Unselfish-
ness, he believes, is always a non-rational impulse. Ascribe
it to instinct, to family- or race inheritance, to social tradition,
to religious belief, to what you will; but it is never the out-
come of rational reflection. So far as true altruism is still
to be found among men, it represents a survival from pro-
rational or even pre-human times.10 Of. James, Var. Rel.
Exp., 431ff.
"Aucune mere n'a besom d'un sy sterna de philosophie morale
pour aimer son enfant. Aucune jeune fille de bonne race n'est
chaste en vertu d'une theorie. De meme aucun homme coura-
geux ne court a la mort mu par un raisonnement. Nous f aisons
le bien sans etre surs qu'en le faisant nous ne sommes pas
dupes ; et saurions-nous de science certaine que nous le sommes,
nous ferions le bien tout de meme." Dr. Ph., 260-1. Of.
Dial., XVIII— IX; ibid., 32-3, 37, 39-40; EccL, 88; F. Det,
35, 426-7; Mar. Grit, 13 ; Q. C., 128; Souv., 12, 342-3, 359.
This doctrine that morality is largely a result of past ha.b-
its was exemplified, as Renan believed, in his own life. Ever
since leaving the church, he often declares, he subsisted on the
fund of morality which he had accumulated in early youth
under the influence of beliefs which he later considered illu-
sory. Souv., 12, 342-3, 346, 359 ; Dial., XVIII— IX.
In discussing this question Renan follows Kant in drawing
a sharp distinction between man's rational and his moral na-
ture, and he adopts the terminology of his German original.
The Pure Reason is contrasted with the Practical Reason,
264 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Pure Reason, he maintains, is incapable of initiating, or even
approving, an unselfish act. Altruism, Religion, Morality, —
often interchangeable terms in Kenan — have a transcendental
source, which is called by many names : Practical Reason, Cat-
egorical Imperative, God, Universe, Mature, la Categorie de
PIdeal, Abime de PEtre, etc.
"The reasoning of Kant remains as true as it ever was ; moral
affirmation creates its object. . . . Without the hope of
any recompense, man devotes himself to his duty even to death.
Justice, truth and goodness are willed by a
higher power." P. Isr., I: XXVII— VIII. Cf. Dr. Ph.,
413.
"Les croyanees de la religion naturelle, derivant toutes- de
Pimperatif categorique, ont Pair d'un filet qui nous enlace, d'un
philtre qui nous seduit La religion est dans
Phumanite Panalogue de Pinstinct maternel chez les oiseaux,
le sacrifice aveugle de soi a une fin inconnue, vooilue par la na-
ture; . . . ." Dial., 32. Cf. ibid., 38, 30, 142 ; also
Kef. Int., 338.
"Le devoir et les instincts de nidification et de couvee chez
Poiseau ont la meme origine providentielle. . . Ces voix,
tan-tot donees, tantot austeres, d'ou viennent-elles ? Elles vien-
nent de Punivers, ou, si Pon veut^ de Dieu. L'univers, avec qui
nous sommesi en rapport comme par tin conduit ombilical, veut
le devouement, le devoir, la vertu; il emiploie, pour arriver a
ses fins, la religion, la poesie, P amour, le plaisir, toutes les
deceptions. ... La religion, resume des besoins moraux
de Phomme, la vertu, la pudeur, le desinteressement, le sacri-
fice, sont la voix de Punivers. Tout se resume en un acte de
foi a des instincts qui nous obsedent, sans nous convaincre, en
Pobeissance a un langage venant de Pinfini, langage parfaite-
ment clair ien ce qu'il nous commande, obscur en ce qu'il
promet" F. Det, 425-7.
As already observed in another connection, these inner voices
of morality and religion, when examined from the point of
view of man's relation to Nature's ulterior aims, are seen to
be a device by which individuals are compelled to work for
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 265
the good of the whole; leading eventually, according to our
author, to the evolution of God. The kind of life which these
voices approve, considered apart from, the satisfaction derived
from this very approval, is not that which leads to a maximum
of enjoyment for the individual in this present world. Obey-
ing this oracle man is exploited in behalf of a cause entirely
foreign to his own personal welfare. Dial. 29 ; also ibid. 35-6.
"La nature agit a notre egard commue envers une troupe de
gladiateurs destines a se faire tuer pour une cause qui n'est
pas la leur." Dial., 40 ; also cf. 129-30.
"Nous travaillons pour un Dieu, de meme que Pabeille, sans
le savoir, fait son miel pour rhommje." Dial., 45 ; 30-1.
"L'homme est comme Touvrier des Gobelins qui tisse a 1'en-
vers une tapisserie dont il ne voit pas le dessein." Dial., 28.
This idea of antagonism between Nature and man seems to
have been taken from Schopenhauer. At any rate, both Scho-
penhauer and Fichte are repeatedly mentioned in connection
with the doctrine. Cf. Dial., 42; also* Seailles, E. R, 282,
note 1. But while accepting the premises of the German pes-
simist, Renan applies them in a very different way. He fully
admits that man is exploited by Nature for certain ulterior aims,
and he also concedes that rebellion against this arrangement
is useless. But he differs from Schopenhauer in concluding that
precisely this conflict between Nature and man is the source
from which morality springs; for morality is essentially a
cheerful co-operation with the deific tendencies of the universe.
"La moralite se reduit ainsi a la soumission. L'immoralite,
c'est la revolte contre un etat de choses dont on voit la duperie.
II faut a la fois la voir et s'y soumettre." Dial., 43.
"'Le mal, c'est de se revolter contre la nature, quand on a
vu qu'elle nous trompe. . . . Son but est bon ; veuillons
ce qu'elle vemt. La vertu est un amen obstine, dit aux fins ob-
scures que poursuit la Providence par nous." Dial., 46 ; but
cf. A. S,, 9.
"Pourquoi dire que la nature nous trompe," asks M. Seailles,
usi son but est bon ? Que 1'utilitaire s'indigne, soit, il est ex-
ploite ! mais 1'idealiste, le soldat du combat de Dieu ?
266 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Est-il besoin de faire remarquer 1'incoherence
mythologique du langage de Renan : numina, nomina.
La vertu est line illusion divine, providentielle, parce qu'il n'y
a ni Dieu, ni Providence; car, dans Fhypothese ou la vertu
serait divine, providentielle, elle ne serait plus illusion." E. R.
283 ; 318, note.
It is interesting to note that in this view of morality as being
essentially obedience to a higher power, Renan is virtually re-
turning to the teachings of the Church; to the very position,
that is, which in L'Avenir de Id science he repudiates as a hu-
miliating subjection incompatible with the dignity of man.
Speaking of the Christian ascetic, he wrote :
"Non seulement il negligea totalement le vrai et le beau (la
philosophic, la science, la poesie etaient des vanites) ; mais, en
s'attachant exclusivement au bien, il le concut sous sa forme
la plus mesquine: le bien fut pour lui la realisation de la volonte
d'un ctre super ieur, une sorte de sujetion humiliante pour la
dignite humiaine : car la realisation du bien moral n'est pas plus
une obeissance a des lois imposees que la realisation du beau
dans une oeuvre d'art n'est Texecution de certaines regies."
A. S., 9.
Coiitrasting this earlier position with his latest creed, the
principal difference appears to be this: while in both phases
morality is conceived as obedience to a transcendental author-
ity, in his later position this authority is no longer determinate ;
the moral imperative has been emptied of its definite content
"Morality is no longer obedience to a God whose will is defined
in a bible and summarized in the decalogue; it is obedience
to a Mature who commands nothing in particular yet requires
unconditional surrender to her commands; a Nature of whom
nothing is known save that, tyrant-like, she exploits her own
children for her selfish ends by duping them into unselfish
lives.11
But is this "obedience" to Nature, o<r to its Author, any-,
thing more, after all, than making a virtue of necessity?
Renan repeatedly asserts that against Nature's dupery man is
powerless. Obedience to Nature is regarded as a species of
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 267
slavery, in which the slave is made to hug the very chains by
which he is held to his task. These chains are his instincts,
his desires, his aspirations, especially the "other-profiting" in-
stincts by means of which individuals are duped into sacrificing
their own present pleasures to Nature's ulterior aims.
"L'homme depend de l'ensein>ble de 1'univers, lequel a un
but et fait tout converger a ce but, L'homme est un etre sub-
ordonne; quoi qu'il fasse, il adore, il sert," ISP. Hist. Bel., XV;
Dial., 45.
". • .La nature triomphera toujours; elle a trop bien
arrange les choses, elle a, trop bien pipe les des ; elle atteindra,
quoi que nous fassions, son but, qui est de nous- tromper a son
profit." Dial., 42 ; also 28.
In view of such statements, and remembering that, accord-
ing to his own theory, mleritorious acts alone can properly
be called virtuous, how is it possible to affirm that virtue con-
sists in obedience to Nature, and then affirm in the same breath
that man cannot possibly refuse the obedience? Is he not,
as some one has said of Hegel, devising a logic for his own pri-
vate use? Is he not, in the strictest sense of the terms, mak-
ing a virtue of necessity ?
It is true that Kenan distinguishes between cheerful and
grudging obedience, graceful and ungraceful service, and de-
clares the former alone to be moral, as in the following passage
(among many other's) :
"La vertu, c'est de contribuer avec joie et empressement au
bien supreme. Le mal, c'est de servir sans grace, de ressemjbler
au sold at mediocre qui murmure contre son chef, tout en allant
au feu comme les autres." N. Hist. Eel., XV.
But even so, what more does morality become than a cheer-
ful submission to the inevitable? And what else do we mean
by miaking a. virtue of necessity ?lla
Man's obedience to Nature, again, viewed from another side,
becomes altruismt, which in Kenan's terminology is the whole
of morality.
"Chose singuliere," he writes in his review of Sainte-Beuve's
Port-Royal, 1860; " le principe qui fait les bons ecrivains est
268 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
le meme que celui qui fait les saints. L' amour-propre, 1'envie
de briller sont le defaut capital, qu'il s'agisse de morale re-
ligieuse ou qu'il s'agisse d'eloeution ; 1'oubli de soi, le mepris
du succes sont la regie du bien dans tous les genres." N. Hist.
Rel.; 492-3.
There is no contradiction, of course, between his conception
of morality as obedience to* Mature, and his conception of it
as altruism; it is both, only from different points of view.
Morality is obedience, — with reference to the source of the
impulses and instincts by which unselfish action is prompted;
it is altruism', — with, reference to the end which the impulse
seeks to attain. The element of altruism, in fact, has to be
made very prominent in order to guard this conception of
morality against obvious misunderstandings. For if virtue is
obedience to Nature, what then, it might be asked, is vice?
Are murder, theft and adultery less "natural" than faith, hope
and charity ? It is therefore important to lay stress on the
motive, and not on the motive merely as such, but on a conscious
and deliberate recognition of the motive as altruistic.
But in thus attempting to guard our author's coneerption
against absurd misconstructions, we are landed, in fact, in an-
other contradiction. For how can deliberate altruism be recon-
ciled with his doctrine that Reason is always and inevitably
self -centered ? But this point we shall Jiave occasion to dis-
cuss more fully as we proceed.
A threefold distinction seems necessary in order to bring out
Kenan's full meaning. Altruism may be viewed from three
sides, according as we contemplate the result of an act, or its
cause, or a consciousness of the cause on the part of the actor.
It is this last phase alone which Kenan has in mind when he
speaks of altruism] as virtue, and of virtue as obedience to Na-
ture. Throughout his moral philosophy, his attention seems
directed, not to the goodness or badness of acts as determined
by their consequences, but to the character or disposition from
which they proceed. For an act to be altruistic, and therefore
virtuous, in Kenan's sense of the terms, an act must reveal not
only de facto obedience to unselfish impulses, but a conscious-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 269
ness of the impulse as being unselfish. A man is not yet virtu-
ous because his conduct is in fact unselfish, whether in motive
or result, but only when the unselfish motive is knowingly and
deliberately followed as such. Through the instrumentality of
"other-profiting" instincts, — to adopt a bad word, — man is ex-
ploited, according to this view, whether he will or not, in the
interests of universal evolution, or the good of the universe.
Even when individuals imagine themselves pursuing their own
interests they are all the time unconsciously furthering Nature's
ulterior aims. But this is not yet virtue, or merit. It is only
when we come to be clearly aware of this dupery, and yet co-
operate, knowingly and deliberately, with Nature's plans, that
our obedience is entitled to the lofty appellation of virtue.
It is needless to say that Kenan made no effort to apply this
exacting conception of virtue to work-a-day life. In the task
of allotting the prizes for virtue known as the Prix Montyon,
awarded each year by the Academic Franchise, and on which
Renan was himself several times commissioned to report, he
appears to have made no attempt to ascertain as a preliminary
qualification to compete for this prize, whether the candidates
were clearly aware of their being exploited in behalf of deific
evolution.
It is interesting to note that in his conception of morality as
altruism likewise, Renan is making a virtue of necessity; for
he holds that a certain amount of unselfishness is unavoidable
in every human life. An utterly selfish life is an impossibi-
lity.
"Pretendre enlever de ce mjonde le sentiment de la piete et
reduire tout au pur egoi'sme est aussi impossible qu'enlever a la
femme ses organes de mere. L'egoiste lui-meme, qui pretend
dresser la theorie de 1'interet bien entendu, est dupe de la na-
ture. L'egoi'ste donne a chaque heure mille demjentis a son sys-
teme; la vie d'un egoiste est un tissu d'inconsequences, d'ac-
tions qui, a son point de yue, sont absurdes et folles." Dial.,
37; 39-40.
A similar paradox appears in his statements regarding the
relation of morality to reason. On the one hand he insists, as
270 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
we have seen, that reason is hostile to altruism, in other words
to morality and religion. He deplores the fact, that humanity,
in these days of rationalism, should be living upon its moral
capital, the laborious savings of past generations.
"Les vieilles croyances an moyen desquelles on aidait
rhomme a pratiquer la vertu sont ebranlees, et elles* n'ont pas
ete remplacees. Pour nous autres, esprits cultives, les equiva-
lents de ces croyances que fournit ridealisme suffisent tout a
fait; car nous agissons sous Pempire d'anciennes habitudes;
nous soimmes comme ces animaux a qui les physiologistes* en-
levent le cerveau, et qui n'en continuent pas moins certaines
f onctions de la vie par 1'effet du pli contracte. Mais ces mouve-
ments instinctifs s'aiTaibliront avec le temps. . . . Les
personnes religieuses vivent d'une ombre. ]STous vivons de
Tombre d?une ombre. De quoi vivra-t-on apres nous ?" Dial,
XVIII-IX. F. Det, XVIII.
But on the other hand he just as frequently declares that
morality and religion are beyond the reach of rational argu-
mentation. Compared with the deep-rooted non-rational imh
pulses of man's moral nature, reason is but a superficial ven-
eering, powerless to suppress the altruistic instincts which de-
termine our practice in spite of our theories. There will
always be1 those, he declares, who practice virtue without stop^
ping to make sure that they are not fools for their pains.
"Precher a rhomme de ne pas se devouer est comme precher
a Toiseau de ne pas f aire son nid, et de ne pas nourrir ses petits.
Cela est tres-peu dangereux; rhomme et Toiseau continueront
toujours leur eternel manege, car la nature en a besoin. Une
ingenieuse providence prend ses precautions pour assurer la
somme de vertu necessaire a la sustentation de 1'univers."
Dial., 32-3.
"Ce que vent Tunivers, il rimposera toujours; car il a pour
appuyer ses volontes des ruses monies. Les raisonnements les
plus evidents des critiques ne feront rien pour demolir ces
saintes illustions." ~F. Det, 426-7.
"Les croyances necessaires sont au-dessus de toute atteinte.
L'hum,anite ne nous ecoutera que dans la mesure ou no®
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 271
temes conviendront a ses devoir et a se& instincts. Disons ce
que nous pensons; la femme n'en continuera pas moins sa
joyeuse cantilene, 1'enfant n'en deviendra pas plus soucieux,
ni la jeunesse moins enivree; rhomme vertueux restera ver-
ttuex; la carmelite continuera a macerer sa chair, la mere a
remplir ses devoirs, 1'oiseau a chanter, 1'abeille a faire son
miel." EccL, 88; repeated in P. Isr., V: 159.
There is no real contradiction, however, between these state-
ments and the assertion that reason is hostile to virtue. Ra-
tionalism injures altruism,, vet altruism! survives rationalism.
Both statements would seem to be true. A society which for
many generations has been accustomed, like modern Europe,
to associate virtuous living with religious beliefs, is certain to
have its morality injuriously affected by a philosophy which
tends to subvert those beliefs, It is a matter of daily observa-
tion that what is known as " Aufklarung" has no tendency to
improve morals. But on the other hand, it is also true that
no amount of rationalization can permanently destroy the moral
life of the race. Kenan's meaning appears to be that altruistic
impulses, being matters of instinct, will always exist; but that
it is only in virtue of certain illusions that these impulses, and
the conduct they prompt, can secure the sanction of reason.
By reason, indeed, Renan simply means the capacity for cool,
dispassionate judgment of values. Rational judgments, ex vi
termini, are dispassionate judgments. But dispassionate delib-
eration in morals, he believed, is essentially and inevitably self-
centered; self-interest being the pivot,, so to speak, on which
the deliberation must turn. Hence reason becomes, in morals,
a capacity for the calculation of self-interest, and therefore a
thorough-going and consistent rationalism must of course be
strictly incompatible with an unselfish life. From this position
Renan never swerves. A conscious and deliberate renunciation
of self-interest, he insists, is never obtained through rational
persuasion ; but he was very confident that humanity will never
fail to supply all the illusions and sophistries necessary for the
subsistence of moral ideals and virtuous habits.
"Une seule chose est sure, c'est que rhumanite tirera de son
272 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
sein tout c© qui est necessaire en fait d'illusions pour qu'elle
remplisse ses devoir et accomplisse sa destinee." Dial., XIX.
We must remember, however, that all these illusions are ef-
fective only because they are taken, or rather mistaken, for
truths. However important they may be in sustaining the
moral life, the time must come when they are seen to be fic-
tions, at least by a disillusioned few. What then shall be the
attitude of these philosophers towards, the rest of mankind?
In* the event of a real conflict between the claims of truth and
the requirements of morality, which shall prevail ? Can it ever
be right to suppress the truth in the interests of morality, real
or supposed ?
As an example we may take once more the belief in a future
judgment. Suppose it to be1 known by the initiated (among
whom we must reckon Kenan), beyond the possibility of a
doubt, that belief in a judgment after death is based on illu-
sion. Shall the fact be openly professed, even though it is
certain to lead to a lowering of the standard of morals ?
Here again it is possible to quote Kenan on both sides
of the question. In one of his last utterances on the subject,
his preface to the Avenir de la science, he insists that even truth
itself is a secondary consideration when it comes into conflict
with the demands of m'orality.
"Je veux certes la liberte de la pensee; car le vrai a ses droits
comme le Men, et on ne gagne rien a ces timides mensonges
qui ne trompent personne et n'aboutissent qu?a Thypocrisie.
Mais, je 1'avoue, la science mem© et la cri-
tique sont a me& yeux des choses secondaire® aupres de la neces-
site de conserves la tradition du bien." Mor. Grit., Ill — IV ;
also, XVII.
More frequently, however, he insists that truth must come
first, regardless of consequences to religion and morals; for the
advancement of truth is an end to which morality is merely a
means. F. Det, 436-7.
"L'ordre social, comme 1'ordre theologique, provoque la
question: Qui sait si la verite n'est pas triste? L'edifice de
la societe humaine porte sur un grand vide. !Nous avons ose lo
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 273
dire. Kien do plus dangereux quo de patiner sur une couche
de glace sans songer combien cette couche est mince. Je n'ai
jamais pii croire que, dans aucun ordre de choses, il fut mau-
vais d'y voir trop clair. Toute verite est bonne a savoir. Oar
toute verite elaireinent sue rend fort, ou prudent." Avant-
propos to the Pretre de Nemi, Dr. Ph., 263.
In his Exaimen de conscience philosopJiique he seems to up^
hold the extremie position that man exists for truth, not truth
for man. A planet on which the postulates of morality are
incompatible with the facts of science were better wiped away :
"Si Perreur etait la, condition de la, moralite humaine, il n'y
aurait aucune raison pour s'interesser a un globe, voue a rigno-
rance. Nona aimons I'humanite, parce qu'elle produit la
science ; nous tenons a la moralite, parce que des races honnetes
peuvent seules etre des races scientifiquea Si on posait Fig-
norarice co'mme borne necessaire de Thumanite, nousi ne voyons
plus aucun motif de tenir a son existence. . . . Le retour
de Thumanite a ses vieilles erreurs, censees indispensable^ a
sa moralite, serait pire que son entiere demoralisation."12 F.
Det, 436-7. Cf. ibid., XXIV, 402; A. S., 93.
Of all the contradictions in Kenan's writings the most as-
tounding is contained in the following passage, when con-
trasted with the doctrine which prevails in his later years:
"Que les personnes qui ne croient pas a la realite du devoir,
qui regardent la morale comme une illusion, prechent la these
desolante de rabrutissement necessaire d'une partie de respece
humaine, rien de mieux; mais pour nous qui crayons que la
moralite est vraie d'une mianiere absolue, une telle doctrine nous
est interdite. A tout prix, et quoi qu'il arrive, que plus de
lumiere se fasse. Voila notre devise ; nous ne Fabandonnerons
jamais." Eef. Int., 308. Cf. Disc., 232-3; 258-9; 39.
"Nous ne I' abandonnerons jamais/' But alas for human
resolutions ! I/ho>mme propose mais Dieu dispose. Only a few
months later, the very doctrines so indignantly repudiated here:
"la miorale comme une illusion," "la these desolante de rabru-
tissement necessaire d'une partie de Tespec© humaine," are de-
veloped in extenso by Kenan himself in the Dialogues pliiloso-
5
274 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
pliiques, and thenceforward become dominant thoughts in all
his political philosophy.
The above passage is taken from a public address on the place
of the State in the education of children, delivered in April,
1869, shoTtly before the outbreak of the war, and during his
candidacy for the electoral district of Seine-et-Marne. Can it
be that his liberal attitude towards popular education in. this
address was determined by his candidacy for the Chamber of
Deputies ?
But it seems more likely, in view of his independent charac-
ter, that his statement truly represented his dominant belief at
the time; and. that his espousal of the opposite view immedi-
ately after the war is to be ascribed to the change of political
organization which followed that disastrous event. Idealist
that he was, he seems always to have been opposed to the pre-
vailing regime ; a democrat under the empire, an aristocrat un-
der democracy.
Not that his earlier beliefs were ever abandoned, however.
The old and the new, regardless of consistency, are affirmed al-
ternately, as mood or necessity prompt. Audiatur et altera
pars! Even in his latest writings, his faith in rational prog-
ress, and his earlier enthusiasm for popular education, are fre-
quently and emphatically affirmed, though the latter on differ-
ent grounds.
"Mieux vaut un peuple immoral qu'un peuple f anatique ; car
les masses immorales ne sont pas genantes, tandis que les
masses fanatiques abetissent le monde, et un monde condamne
a la betise n'a plus de raison pour que je m'y interesse; j'aime
autant le voir mourir. Supposons les orangers atteints d'une
maladie dont on ne puisse les guerir qu'en les empechant de
produire des oranges. Cela ne vaudrait pas la peine, puisque
Toranger qui ne produit pas d'oranges n'est plus bon a rien."
A. S., X.
An intermediate position is taken in the Avenir de la sci-
ence, which represents the climax of the age of reason in his
own life. In the long run, he there maintains, truth and util-
ity, the interests of science and those of morality, must coin-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 275
cide. It is only during periods of transition, like that from.
Bupernaturalism to naturalism, that the truth ma,y seem: hostile
to morals. The only morality that is ever injured by truth is
a morality based on error. Reason, however inadequate and
disappointing in many ways, is still the best guide we have.
(Souv., 408: letter of Sep. 11, 1846, to his friend M. Cog-
nat. ) Rationalism has never yet been the cause of social degen-
eration. In fact, he insists, the experiment has never been tried,
for the age of reason is even now only in its dawn. A. S., 74.
Cf. ibid., 68; 93; 96; 101; XIX. N. Hist EeL, 505. Mor.
Grit, III, VII.
Turning now to the question of moral criteria: it is very
obvious that Kenan's definition of morality as unselfishness can-
not furnish a standard of right action, for the simple reason,
that "selfish" and "unselfish" may mean as miany different
things as there are different characters or selves. Selfish con-
duct is presumably that which secures, or is expected to secure,
the agent's own welfare, real or supposed, regardless of the wel-
fare of others. But obviously, different kinds of conduct will
bring satisfaction to different characters. The practice of vir-
tue is pleasurable to the virtuous as vice is to the vicious.
If therefore, an act becomes selfish whenever it aims at the
satisfaction or pleasure of the agent, it follows that the practice
of virtue by the virtuous is selfish ; and if all selfish' action is
wrong, it must be wrong for the virtuous to practice virtue,
which, as Euclid would say, is absurd.
And besides, if all action which' aims at the agent's own1 wel-
fare is wrong, it is not certain that any opportunity for right
action remains. It would be easy to show, indeed, from Renan's
own words, that morality is at bottom nothing more than a; ficv
tion. For if it is true that reason is utterly and unavoidably
selfish, as he insists, and that hence there can be no such thing
as a deliberately unselfish act ; and if, as he further maintains,
deliberate unselfishness alone can be called meritorious, then1
does it not follow that the very idea of merit, or of morality,
rests on illusion ?
But this is as far as possible from the position expressly main-
276 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
tained by him elsewhere. For not only is faith in morality
declared to be the most certain! of all human beliefs, it is the
only absolute certitude in the entire realm of philosophy.
Speaking of the articles which make up his Essais de morale
et de critique, he says:
"Tous se resument en une pensee que je mets fort au-dessus
des opinions et des hypotheses, c'est que le morale est la chose
serieuse et vraie par excellence, et qu'elle suffit pour donner a
la vie un sens et uiu but" Mar. Grit,, I. Cf . Frag., 311 ; also,
Seailles, E. R., 218.
M. Seailles comments on these passages :
"A regarder les choses du point de vue de Tespace et du
temps, il y a quelque chose de monstrueux dans la primaute
que Renan accorde aux sciences morales, c'est revenir a Fan-
thropomorphismje sans prendre la peine de le justifies. " E. R.,
340.
The truth is that we are confronted again with the capi-
tal defect of Roman's moral philosophy, as of all his philosoph-
ical speculations,: it is either so incurably vague as to afford
no definite information, or so hopelessly self-contradictory as
to baffle all .attempts at reconciliation, and even at clear and
consistent exposition. His language is loose and elastic, sup-
ple and evasive to the last degree. Moreover, he seems never
to have examined the problems of moral philosophy from a
psychological point of view. There is nothing in his writings
to indicate that he ever went to the trouble of analyzing men's
moral judgments with reference to the ultimate reasons wky
acts are currently judged to be good or bad, or motives right
or wrong. The only statement in his books which might sug-
gest a familiarity with the subject occurs in one of his speeches
before the Academie Frangaise, in which all existing theories
concerning the origin of morality and the ultimate grounds
of obligation are declared to be untenable. Cf. Disc., 196-7.
It is true that in all his utterances; on the subject he de-
clares or implies that morality consists in unselfishness; but
it is too absurd to suppose that so clear-headed a man as Renan
would expressly maintain that all selfish action is wrong, and
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 277
all unselfish action right The truth is that he approaches the
problem from a different point of view. Morality, in his con-
ception of it, is not so much a question of right and wrong,
or of reasons for right and wrong, as a question of merit or
absence of merit Unselfish conduct, he would say with Kant,
to whom his impressions in moral philosophy all appear to go
back, is meritorious conduct; and that is his reason for calling
it virtuous.
But even so he gets himself hopelessly involved in tauto-
logy, or entangled in contradictions, the moment he is pressed
to define his terms. What, for example, does he miean by mer-
itorious conduct?
In all the accepted meanings of the term, merit is rested
upon virtue, and not the other way round. An action is meri-
torious beca,use it is virtuous, or virtuous to an unusual de-
gree. Merit is simply the value set upon virtue. The weaker
the flesh the greater the merit if we do right. The harder it
is to rise early in the mlorning, the greater the merit in doing
so. Cf . Leslie Stephen, Sci. Eth., Lond., 1882, p. 311 ; Alex-
ander, Mor. Order and Prog., Lond., 1891, p. 194; Kant, Met
d. Sit, 1797, p. 29.
To make mierit the basis of virtue, therefore, involves a
logical circle. For if we ask for the ground of the mierit, the
only answer can be that it is virtue, or an unusual degree of
virtue. The tautology is obvious: unselfish conduct is vir-
tuous because it is meritorious, and it is meritorious because
it is unselfish and therefore virtuous; in other words, it is.
good because it is good.
And this really seems to be Kenan's position. He expressly
declares, ove-r and over again, that no reason can be given why
a man should be virtuous. Whenever an individual is truly
unselfish, it! is in consequence of some mysterious, transcenden-
tal compulsion. A moral hero can give no rational grounds
for his heroism.
"La signification transcendante de Tacte vertueux est pre-
cisement qu'en le faisant, on ne poturra pas bien dire pour-
quoi on le fait II n'y a pas d'acte vertueux qui puisse raison-
278 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
nablemtent se deduire. Le heros, quand il se mot a reflechir,
trouve qu'il a agi commie un etre absurde, et c'est justement
pour cela qu'il a ete un heros. II a obei a un ordre superieur,
a un oracle infaillible, a une voix qui comniande de la facon
la plus claire, sans donner ses raisons." Disc., 196-7; Cf.
Mor. Grit., II.
But again we must ask: Where is the merit of unselfish-
ness, if it springs, not from the (human will, but from some
unknown, irresistible source? What merit can there be in
doing what we cannot avoid ?
The attempt to bring logical coherence into Kenan's ethical
teachings leads, in fact, as already suggested, to the strange
result that there is no such thing as a truly meritorious or
moral act, in his own sense of the terms ; for the only con-
duct to which merit attaches is not in reality the work of man.
This seems another instance of the persistence in him of
theological influences. If in the place of his transcendental
compulsion we put the Christian idea of divine grace, we have
the theological doctrine that whatever is good or meritorious
in human conduct proceeds from the grace of God. In the
•eyes of Reman as in those of Saint Augustine, man is inca-
pable of even resolving a truly virtuous act of his own free,
unaided choice.
. ''Quid habes quad non accepisti? Le dogme de la grace est
le plus vrai des dogmes chretiens. L'effort inconscient vers le
bien et le vrai qui est dans 1'univers joue son coup de de par
chacun de nous. Tout arrive, les quaternes comme le reste.
Nous pouvons deranger le dessein providentiel do<nt notua
aomines Tobjet; nous ne sommes pour presque rien dans sa
reussite." Souv., 373.
Tihus we are brought around at last, unawares, to the ever-
lastingly debatable question of the free will, and perhaps this
is the most convenient place to state Kenan's position in regard
to this time-honored problemi
He has nowhere discussied the question ex cathedra, for-
tunately for this chapter, and even his passing references are
few and brief.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 279
The term free-will, as Hoffding and others have shown, is
played fast and loose with in philosophical discussion, being
currently used in half a dozen or more quite different mean-
ings. Of. Holding's Ethik, Germ, trans!., Leipz., 1888.
Kenan's utterances on this topic are altogether too vague to place
him on either the determinist or the indeterminist side in this
controversy.
He insists that man is a free moral agent (whatever that
may moan). Disc., III. An essential condition of right ac-
tion, he declares, is the possibility of wrong action. Q. C.,
65. It is man's mission in the world to substitute reason for
blind physical necessity. A. S., 31.
This view is more fully and more clearly set forth in the
following anecdote, which incidentally illustrates Kenan's habit
of reflecting upon his own actions, and perpetually revising his
own conclusions.
aJe vis tin jour dans un bois un essaim de vilains petite
insectes, qui avaient entoure de leurs filets un© jeune plante et
suQaient ses pousses vertes avec un si laid caractere de para-
sitisme, que cela faisait repugnance. J'eus un instant 1'idee
de les detruire. Puis je me dis: Ce n'est pas leur faute s'il
sont laids; c'est une facon de vivre. II est d'un petit ©sprit,
me disais-je, de moraliser la nature et d© lui imposer nos
jugera/ents. Mais maintenant je vois que j'eus tort; j'aurais
du les tuer; car la mission de 1'homme dans la nature c'est de
reformer le laid et 1'immioraL" A. S., note 182.
The most definite of his utterances on the question of the free
will occurs in the Averroes et I'Averro'isme, where the views of
the Arabian philosopher are endorsed in the following words :
"Ibn-Kioschd a ... soutenu .... les vraies
theories de la philosophi© sur la liberte. L'homme n'est ni ab-
solument libre ni absolument predestine. La liberte envisagee
dans 1'ame, est entiere et sans restriction ; mais ©lie est limiit©©
par la fatalite des circonstances exterieures. La caus© ©fii-
cient© de nos actes est en nous ; mais la caus© occasionnell© est
hors de nous." Averr., 159-60.
From a not© to the Avenir de la science it appears that the
280 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
reality of roan's freedom was so unquestioningly assumed by
Renan as an indisputable fact, that it served him as a criterion
of philosophical truth.
"Qu'il me suffi.se de dire que je crois a une raison vivante
de toute chose, et que j'admets la liberte et la personnalite hu-
maine comme des f aits evi dents ; que par consequent toute doe-
trine qui serait amenee logiquement a les nier serait f ausse a
mies yeux." A. S., note 14.
It should be noticed, however, that all these passages belong
to his earliest period, immediately following his separation
from the church. In his later works there does not appear to
be even a passing reference to this classical product of schola-s-
tical lore.
Returning to our question of moral criteria:
The only standard of ethical judgments to which Renan has
anywhere expressly declared his personal allegiance is the es-
thetic standard, which in his earlier days he believed to be des-
tined to supplant all other standards of right, in proportion as
humanity progresses in culture.
"Je reconnais que le sens moral ou ses equivalents sont de
Fessence de Fhumanite; . . . II y a dans Fhumanite
une faculte ou un besoin, une capacite, en un mot, qui est
combiee de nos jours par la morale, Je concois
de mem|e pour Favenir que le mot morale devienne impropre
et soit remplace par un autre. Pour mon usage particulier,
j'y sub&titue de preference le nom esthetique. En face d'une
action, je me demJande plutot si elle est belle ou laide, que
bonne ou mauvaise, et je crois avoir la un bon criterium; car
avec la simple morale qui fait Fhonnete homnie, on peut encore
mener une assez mesquine vie." A. S., 177.
aSois beau, et alors fais a chaque instant ce que t'inspirera
ton coeur,'7 voila toute la morale. T'outes les autres regies
sont fautives et mensongeres dans leur forme absolue. Les
regies generales ne sont que des expedients mesquins pour sup-
pleer a Fabsence du grand sens moral, qui suffit a lui seul pour
reveler en toute occasion a Fhommie ce qui est le plus beau/'
A. S., 179-80 ; 475 ; F. Det., 333.
BEAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 281
"Moi qui suis cultive, je ne trouve pas de mlal en moi, et
spontanement en toute chose je me port© a ce qui me semble
le plus beau. Si tous etaient aussi cultives qu© moi, tous s©rai-
eiit comime moi dans Theureuse impossibility de mial faire.
La morale a ete congu© jusqu'ici d'une maniere
fort etroite, comm© un© obei'ssance a une loi, comme une lutte
interieur© entr© des lois opposees. Pour moi, je declare que
quand je fais bien, je n'obeis a personne, je ne livre aucune
bataille et n© remporte aucune victoire. . . . L^homnie
eleve n'a qu'a suivre la delicieuse pent© de son impulsion in-
tin^e; il pourrait adopter la devise de St. Augustin.
'Fais c© que tu voudras" ; car il ne peut vouloir que de belles
choses. L'homme vertueux est un artiste qui realise 1© beau
dans une vie humaine comme le statuaire 1© realise sur 1©
marbre, comme le musicien par des sons. Y a-t>il obei'ssance
et lutte dans Fact© du statuaire et du musicien ?" A. S., 354—
5. Of. James, Var. Eel. Exp., 80.
The religion of the future, he prophesies, will be a pure
humanism, "c'est a dire le cult© de tout ce qui est de rhomme,
la vie entiere sanctifiee et elevee a un© valeur miorale. Soigner
sa belle humamte (Schiller) s©ra alors la Loi ©t l©s Prophetes."
A. S., 101.
"Tout c© qui s'atta-ch© a la vie superieure de Thomme, a
cet,t© vie par laquelle il se distingue d© Tanimal, tout c©la ©st
sacre, tout cela est digne de la passion des belles ames.
L'homme parfait serait celui qui s©rait a la fois poete, philo-
sophe, savant, homm© vertueux." A. S., 11. Cf. ibid., 355 ;
M.-Aur., 554; Mor. Grit, 36T.
In the following passage we have an interesting example of
Kenan's application of this criterion of right to a concrete in-
stance: the institution of suttee among the natives of India.
The English are severely condemned for attempting to repress
this beautiful effusion of idealism, that is to say the burning
of womjen alive.
"Les Anglais ont cru faire pour la saine moral© en inter-
disant dans Tlnde les processions ensanglante©s par des sacri-
fices volontaires, 1© suicid© de la femme sur le tombeau
282 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
dii mari. Etrange meprise! Croyez-vous que ce fanatique
qui va poser avec joie sa tete sous les roues du char de Jagat/-
nata n'est pas plus heureux et plus beau que vous, insipides
marchands? Croyez-vous qu'il ne fait pas plus d'honneur a
la nature humaine en temioignant, d'une facon irrationnelle
sans doute mais puissante, qu'il y a dans rhomme des instincts
superieurs a tous les desirs du fini et a 1' amour de soi-memo?
II faut voir dans ces actes la fascination que Tinfini exerce sur
rhomme, Penthousiasme impersonnel, le culte du suprasensible.
Et c'est a ces superbes debordements des grands instincts de
la nature humaine que vous venez de tracer des limites, avec
votre petite morale et votre etroit bon sens." A. S., 87.
Is any further proof needed of the insufficiency and unre-
liableness of the beauty standard as a criterion of right and
wrong ?
In another passage from the same book, monasticismi is pro-
nounced more beautiful than industrialism}; are we to con-
clude that it is therefore morally more right ? Cf . Mor. Grit.,
356; ]XToaiv. fit Eel., 337-8.
I cannot resist quoting two more passages on this topic,
showing what opposite judgments he himself passed on the
same characters in the samje book.
"Pairqe mieux un iogui, j'aime mieux un mouni de Tlnde,
j'aime mieux Simeon Stylite mange des vers sur son etrange
piedestal qu'un prosaique industriel, capable de suivre pen-
dant vingt ans une meme pensee de fortune. Heros de la vie
desinteressee, saints, apotres, mounis, solitaires, cenobites, as-
cetes de tous les siecles ... que vous avez mieux comh
pris la vie que ceux qui la prennent coimne un etroit calcul
d'interet, comme une lutte insignifiante d'ambition ou de
vanite."13 A. S., 84-5.
With this passage in mind, turn to the following, written
the samje year:
"L'abstinence et la mortification sont des vertus de barbares
et d'hommes materiels, qui, sujets a de grossiers appetits, ne
congoivent rien de plus heroique que d'y resister. . . Aux
yeux d'homone'S grossiers, un hommie qui jeune, qui se flagelle,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPFIY OF ERNEST REN AN. 283
qui est chaste, qui passe sa vie sur une colonne, est 1'ideal de la
vertu. . . L' abstinence affectee prouve qu'on fait beau-
coup de cas de® choses dont on se prive." A. S., 403-4.
Taking the two statements together, it would be easy to show
from his own words that Renan was ffun homme materiel,"
"un homme grassier" when he penned his rhapsodic admiration
of the vermin-eaten hermit on his column. That would be un-
true, however, as well as unkind. It is simiply another in-
stance of the countless conflicting opinions expressed in his
books, according as he gives expression to the idealistic values
of his poetic temperament or to the subtle speculations of an
analytic mind.
His preference for the esthetic standard in morals, it may be
noted in passing, is entirely in keeping with his pronounced
aversion for logic. Esthetic impressionism in ethics fits ad-
mirably with the perpetual tergiversation and mercurial fickle-
ness of his general philosophy; both alike affording release
from the odious fetters of logical consistency. It is another
evidence of the wonderful versatility of his mind, perpetually
oscillating between; different points of view, and delighting in
the sense of its own ubiquity. Renan could not make up his
mind to exclude from his appreciation anything that miight
possibly enrich his collection of intellectual and spiritual curi-
osities. Logical consistency seemed to him] too great a price
to pay for this self-impoverishment. The good, the beautiful
and the true, in all their various manifestations, found eager
and ardent recognition from his pen, quite regardless whether
or not his esthetic appreciations were consistent with his intel-
lectual ones. An institution might be good but not beautiful,
or beautiful but not good ; a doctrine might be true but injuri-
ous, or useful but false, oar beautiful without being either true
or good; but this he considered no ground for withholding his
recognition of their own peculiar merits. His exclusive aim
at all times was sincerity, and the reconciliation of his sepa-
rate sincerities he has left to his readers, or rather expositors.
Renan's emphasis on the esthetic side of life in the period
imimediately following his separation from the church appears
284 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
to have been a reaction against Christian asceticism. He re-
proaches the church for its one-sided emphasis upon goodness,
to the neglect or even exclusion of truth and beauty. Human
perfection, he insists, implies intellectual and esthetic culture
as well as moral; and this remained a favorite topic with him
to the end of his life.
"On s'imagine trop sou vent/' he writes "que la mora-
lite seule fait la perfection, que la poursuite du vrai et du beau
ne constitue qu'une jouissance, que rhomtme parfait, c'est
1'honnete homime, le f rere morave par example. Le modele de
la perfection nous est donne par Phumanite elle-meme; la vie
la plus parf aite est celle qui represente le mieux toute Phu-
manite. Or Phumanite cultivee n'est pas seulement morale;
elle est encore savante, curieuse, poetique, passionnee." A. S.,
12. Of. ibid., 355; Mor. Crit., 367.
In his juvenile enthusiasm he even goes so far as to hope
that somje day a more completely human moral ideal may be
evolved, " — un Christ qui ne representerait plus seulement le
cote moral a sa plus haute puissance, mais encore le cote es-
thetique et scientifique de Phumanite." A. S., 13.
This alleged one-sidedness of the Christian ideal of human
perfection is reaffirmed, more than thirty years later, in his
Marc-Aurele, and indeed to the end of his days:
"Le defaut du christianisme appiarait bien ici. II est trop
uniquement moral ; la beaute, chez lui, est tout a fait sacrifice.
Or, aux yeux d'une philosophie complete, la beaute, loin
d'etre un avantage superficiel, un danger, un inconvenient, est
un don de Dieu, commje la vertu. Elle vaut la vertu; la
femme bello exprime aussi bien une face du but divin, une des
fins de Dieu, que Fhomme de genie, ou la femmie vertueuse.
Elle le sent, et de la sa fierte. . . . Elle sait bien qu'elle
compte entre les premieres manifestations de Dieu.
La fem^ne, en se parant, accomplit un devoir; . . la plus
belle oeuvre de Dieu, c'est la beaute de la femme. M.-Aur.,
554-5. Cf. Souv., YIII-IX, 14-15, 33-4, 114.
But in later years he applied this principle of all-sided de-
velopment, more broadly, to humanity as a whole, rather than
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 285
to separate institutions, or to individual men. He seems to
Lave held in his latest phase that the ideal life for a given in-
dividual at any time depends on a great many things: his age,
history, rank, social function, his talents, opportunities, and so
forth:
"Ghaque classe de la societe est un rouage, un bras de le-
vier dans cette immense machine. Voila pourquoi chacune a
.-ses vertus. Nous sommes tons des fonctions de Tunivers; le
devoir consiste a ce que chacun remiplisse bien sa fonetion."
Dial., 132-3.
"II importe pen que St Vincent de Paul n'ait pas ete un
grand esprit. Raphael n'aurait rien gagne a etre bien regie
dans ses moeurs. L'effort divin qui est en tout se produit par
les justes, les savants, les artistes. Chacun a sa part. Le de-
voir de Goethe fut d'etre egoi'ste pour son oeuvre. L'immo-
ralite transcendante de Fartiste est a sa facon moralite su-
premo, si elle sert a I'accomplissement de la particuliere mis-
sion divine dont chacun est charge ici-bas." Dial., 133. Cf.
F. Det., 382-3. Ref. Int., 2; A. S., VIII-X; Of. F. Det.,
110 ; also Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 3rd ed., p. 339.
"La fete de 1'univers manquerait de quelque chose, si
]e monde n'etait peuple que de fanatiques iconoclastes et de
lourdauds vertueux."13a
But do not these later statements furnish a complete an-
swer to his earlier criticisms on the one-sidedness of the Chris-
tian ideal of goodness ? The special emphasis laid by the
Christian religion on moral excellence is simply, "from a cos-
mical standpoint," a case of what the economists call division
of labor. And is it so certain that the interests of the race,
even on secular grounds, may not require a special emphasis
on some one side of human capabilities, either as being of
miore fundamental importance in character, or less likely to
receive sufficient attention from individuals in the absence of
a constant social or institutional pressure?
It was said somb pages back that the only moral criterion
explicitly acknowledged by Henan as guiding his personal val-
uations of right and wrong, in judgment and action, was the
286 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN".
standard of beauty. It would be misrepresenting his mean-
ing, however, to suppose that he intended this criterion to serve
universally, regardless of the characters and the ideals of the
persons judging. For refined, impeccable natures of high
moral culture, like himself, he indeed believed that the right
would always coincide with the beautiful; but it is only when,
all have attained, as he believed all could attain, this same de-
gree of moral perfection, that the beauty of an act can be a
reliable criterion of its. rightness. We saw into what opposite
judgments he himself was led, notwithstanding his impeccabil-
ity, by this standard. The truth is that the criterion of
beauty is not one, but many; varying with the character, the
ideals, the knowledge, the propensities and even the moods of
the persons judging. Different acts seemi beautiful to differ-
ent persons, and to the sam)e person at different times.
Nor did Renan see that the esthetic standard is at bottom
only a sublimation of the hedonistic standard, just as truly as
appreciation of beauty affords pleasure. If by pleasure is
meant an agreeable state of consciousness, — and what else can
it mean? — •, then beauty is a species of pleasure, and ugliness
a species of pain, in however refined a form. But this
fact seems never to have occurred to Renan; for ethical
hedonism is as violently antagonized in his earlier period as
moral estheticism is enthusiastically chamtpioned. He ex-
pressly repudiates the idea that pleasure is the ultimate item
of worth in life. If happiness were the highest aim,! of life,
or even the only rational aim, there would be no difference, lie
argues, in respect of their destinies, between man and beast.
Mor. Grit, IV; A. S., 324-5.
He frequently insists on what Jias been called the paradox
of hedonism, the fact that a conscious and exclusive pursuit
of pleasure defeats its own aim. Pleasure-seeking, he assures
the unsophisticated populace of Treguier, is impolitic as well
as immoral. The surest way of finding happiness is to stop
looking for it. Disc., 219. Cf. C. D'Angl., 222; Souv.y
127-8.
In later years his attitude towards hedonistic conceptions
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 287
of life were very radically changed, however, and much for
the worse. But this decadent phase will call for further dis-
cussion in the next chapter.
It remains to observe in this place that another criterion of
moral judgments, besides that of beauty, was in fact presup-
posed and implied in all his utterances on the subject: the
standard of social utility, or social efficiency. In the Abbesse
de Jouarre, for example, the most objectionable of his Dromes
philosophiques, he implies all along that acts are good or bad
according as their consequences are socially advantageous or
the reverse. The only reason why "free love" is judged to be
wrong is because it is incompatible with the requirements of
civilized life. This doctrine is clearly formulated in his
Avant-propos to the play:
"Je m/ imagine souvent que, si Phumianite acquerait la certi-
tude que le monde dut finir dans deux ou trois jours, P amour
eclaterait de toutes parts avec une sorte de frenesie; car ce
qui retient P amour, ce sont les conditions absolument neces-
saires que la conservation morale de la societe humaine a im-
posees. Quand on se verrait en face d'une mprt subite et cer-
taine, la nature seule parlerait; le plus puissant de ses
instincts, sans cesse bride et contrarie, reprendrait ses droits;
un cri s'echapperait de toutes les poitrines, quand on saurait
qu'on peut approcher avec une entiere legitimite de Tarbre em-
toure de taut d'anathemes." Dr. Ph. 411 Le
monde boirait a pleine coupe et sans arriere-pensee un aphro-
disiaque puissant qui le ferait mourir de plaisir
On mouiTait dans le sentiment de la plus haute adoration et
dans Pacte de priere le plus parfait." Dr. Ph., 411-12. Cf.
Dial., 133 ; F. Det., 382-3.
For once, then, morality is dissociated completely from all
metaphysical speculations or transcendental moral impera-
tives.
"J'espere que m'on Abbesse plaira aux idealistes," he says
of this play "qui n'ont pas besoin de crodre a Texistence d'es-
prits purs pour croire au devoir, et qui savent bien que la
288 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
noblesse morale ne depend pas des opinions metaphysiques."
Dr. Ph., 413.
And again:
"Le vrai, le beau, le bien ont par eux-memes assez d'attrait
pour n'avoir pas besoin d'une autorite qui les coonniande, ni
d'une recompense qui y soit attachee." Dr. Ph., 413.
Yet in the Avenir de la science, in his impassioned plea for
the extension of science and its application to all departments
of human life, he expressly repudiates a merely utilitarian ba-
sis for his plea, and incidentally declares that morality has a
value in itself, independently of any advantage to society:
"(Test comnie si, pour etablir la morale, on se bornait a
presenter les avantages qu'elle procure a la societe. La science,
aussi bien que la morale, a sa valeur en elle-mieme et indepen-
detriment de tout resultat avantageux." A. S., 22.
All the reasons for morality dispersed throughout his writ-
ings, or nearly all, are run in together in the following prayer,
with which he concludes his article la, Melaphysique el son
avendr.
"O Pere celeste, j 'ignore ce que Tu nous reserves. Cette foi,
que Tu ne nous permets pas d'effacer de nos coeurb, est-elle une
consolation que Tu as menagee pour nous rendre supportable
notre destine© fragile ? Est-ce la une bienf aisante illusion que
ta pitie a savamment combinee, ou bien un instinct profond,
une revelation qui suffit a ceux qui en sont dignes ? Est-ce
le desespoir qui a raison, et la verite serait-elle triste? Tu
n'as pas voulu que ces doutes re^ussent une claire reponse,
aim que la foi au bien ne restat pas sans mlerite, et que la
vertu ne fut pas un calcul. Une claire revelation eut assimile
Tame noble a Tame vulgaire; Fevidence en pareille matiere
eut ete une atteinte a notre liberte. C'est de nos dispositions
interieures que Tu as voulu faire dependre notre foi. Dans
tout ce qui est objet de science et de discussion rationnelle,
Tu as livre la verite aux plus ingenieux; dans Tordre moral
et religieux, Tu as juge qu'elle devait appartenir aux meilleurs.
II edit ete inique que le genie et 1'esprit constituassent ici un
privilege1, et que les croyances qui doivent etre le bien commun
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 289
de tons fussent le fruit d'un raisonnement plus ou moins bieii
conduit, de recherches plus ou moins favorisees." Frag.,
333-4. '
Before concluding this chapter, a word must be said about
Roman's position on the much-mooted question of optimism
versus pessimism:
It would seem that there is no> place in his philosophy
for a theodicy, inasmuch as in his speculations about thje cos-
mos the relations of creator and creation are inverted. In-
stead of God in the beginning creating heaven and earth, the
heavens and the earth are engaged through all time in, the task
of evolving a God. Nevertheless, Renan has attempted some-
thing like a justification of the ways of God to man.
In the semi-conscious groping of the deific process, he as-
sures us, a certain amount of evil is the necessary price of
a greater good. F. Det, 377-8. Of., Mor. Grit., 179.
Renan took every opportunity to testify that life is good,
and decidedly worth living. Replying to the Discours de re-
ception of M. Pasteur, before the Academie Frangaise. 1882, he
declares :
"Le coin imperceptible de la realite que nous entrevoyons
est plein de ravissantes harmonies^ et la vie, telle qu'elle nous
a ete octroyee, est un don excellent et pour chacun de nous
la revelation d'une bonte infinie. Disc., 81. Of. ibid., 207-
8; 219.
"Grace a la vertu, la Providence se justifie; le pessimisme
lie peut citer que quelciues cas bien rares d'etres pour lesquels
Texistence n'ait pas ete un bien. Un dessein d7 amour edate
dans 1'univers; malgre ses immenses defauts, ce monde rest©
apres tout une oeuvre de bonte infinie." Disc., 199-200.
In his own experience of life, he often declares, the good
was unquestionably far in excess of the evil ; and he confidently
assumes that the same must be true of the lives of the vast
mlajority of men.
"Je n'ai jamais beaucoup sounert," he writes in concluding
his Souvenirs, " A mioins que mies dernierea
annees ne rne^ reservent des peines bien cruelles, je nyaurai?
6
290 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
en disant adieu a la vie, qu'a remercier la cause de tout bien
de la ehannante promenade qu'il m'a ete donne d'accomplir a
travers la realite." Souv., 373-8.
Ten more years were reserved for Renan after writing these
words, years full of toil and much physical pain; yet we find
him reaffirming this same faith in the fundamental goodness
of life, to the end of his days. His charming little speech
before the Felibres, in June, 1891, the year before his death,
and again at the Fete de Brehat, in September of the same
year, are among his latest direct confessions on the subject:
"Je garderai jusqu'a la fin la foi, la certitude, 1'illusion,
si Ton veut, que la vie est un fruit savoureux." F. Det., 124 ;
ibid., 109, 168.
The complete sincerity of these public professions is attested
by the general tone and spirit of all his writings.
Slide by side, with his belief in the essential goodness of life,
and proceeding from the same spirit, went his faith in the
essential goodness of man. In his daily intercourse with people,
ihe habitually assumed that he was dealing with honest men
until he had proof of the contrary. It was impossible for him,
he declares, to be unkind to anybody a priori.
"Un des principes fondamentaux de ma vie, principe auquel
je m* attache obstinement, bien que plusieurs de mes amis me
disent que c'est une enorme duperie, est de considerer comme
un honnete homme toute creature humaine pour laquelle le
contraire ne infest pas demontre Je persiste
a pemser que si Ton tient compte de® difficultes sans nombre
de la condition humaine, la bienveillance generale est la vraie
justice." F. Det., 194-5. Of. Souv., 374.
Bcimeanbering Kenan's habit of espousing alternately both
sides of any debatable question, in order to be sure not to exclude
any part of the truth, it seems surprising that he should nob
occasionally have defended the pessimistic attitude also. But
the fact seems to be that he never did. Is this because, he was
incapable by temperament of being impressed with the evil
in life, the Weltschmerz, or is it because he deliberately re-
solved to ignore it? There is such a thing as temperamental
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 291
optimism, rendering its happy possessor impervious to the
manifestations of cosmic evil.14
There are several passages in Kenan's books, it is truei, in
which he seems at first glance to make open avowal of pessi-
mism ; and. it would seemi that on the strength of these state-
ments some eminent critics, M. Faguet among themi, have given
him credit for a first-hand acquaintance with pessimism in
his own person:. <
"Bien que parfois je sois tente d'envier le don de ces natures
heureuses, tou jours et facilement satisfaites, j'avoue qu'a la
reflexion, je me trouve fier de mon pessimisme, ©t que, si je
le sentais s'amollir, le siecle restant le meme, je rechercherais
avidement quelle fibre s'est relach.ee en mon coeur." Mor.
Grit, XII.
And again in his article on M. de Sacy:
"M. de Sacy est pessimiste, et il a bien raison. II est dee
temps ou Poptimisme fait involontairement soupconner ehez
celui qui le professe quelque petitesse d'esprit ou quelque
bassesse de coeur." Mor. Grit, 20. Of. ibid., 21, 23; also
Seailles, El K,., 51.
But in thesei and similar passages, as a glance at the context
will show, he is really using the word pessimism; in a sense
very different from, that in which it would contradict his habit-
ual professions of optimism. Adverse criticisms of a distaste-
ful political and social regime, or gloomy forecasts of their
probable future, if we call this pessimismj atl all, is yet a very
different thing from the assertion that creation is a failure^
or that life is essentially and inherently not worth living.
How profound and unshakable was Kenan's faith in the
fundamental goodness of life and of men, is unmistakably ex-
pressed even in his first book, and from the faith there pro-
claimed he never appreciably swerved:
"Peut-etre nos affirmations a cet egard oiHrelles un peu du
m-erite de la foi, qui croit sans avoir1 vu, et a vrai dire, quand
on envisage les faits isoles, roptimisme semble une generositc
faite a Dieu en toute gratuite. Pour moi, je verrais 1'hu-
manite crouler sur ses fondements, je verrais les homlmes s'egor-
292 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
ger dans une nuit fatale, que je proclamerais encore quo la
nature humaine est droite et faite pour le parfait, que les mal-
entendus se leveront, et qu'un jour viendra le regne de la raison
et du parfait." A. S., 69.
In his article on Amiel, however, in 1884, he reluctantly
admits the deplorable fact that for some few unfortunates, not
to be were better than to be. But he holds that these unfortu-
nate exceptions are very few, and arise not so much from! the
nature of things as from certain "coincidences funestes/'
which he hopes may some day be eliminated entirely. F. Det.,
388.
Onei way of eliminating these few outstanding exceptions, he
•suggests, — and there seemis no reason to suppose that he is not
in earnest — is to provide for all men the means of a painless,
•decent and voluntary exit from life, in the form of public
euthanasial parlors, maintained by the State, and apparently
placed at the disposal of all comers.
"J'ai toujours eu pour principe," says Prospero'-RBnani, who
himself dies in this way, "qu'une vie disposee selon les regies
d'une belle eurythmie ne doit pas laisser au hasard une piece
aussi importante que le denouement. Tout est bonheur dans
la vie, quand on peut a son gre disposer de la mort.
La vie n'est chose digne que quand on peut la finir a volonte."
Dr. PK, 228-9, 231.
"Que dites-vous!" exclaims his attendant, Jiorrified. "Le
suicide implique des idees repoussantes, une mare de sang, des
souillures. La proprete rinterdit."
"IsTon, soyez tranquille, chere Brunissende," replies. Pros-
pero. "Je n^aurai que des sensations douces, et mes traits con,-
servoTont leur beaute. Mourir n'est rien. L'essentiel est de
mourir avant le premier affaiblissement et d'eviter Fennui
d'etre plaint," Ibid., 229.
"Viens done, mon eau de mort, c'est ton heure ! Oher tissu
impregne d'ether, qui possedes dans tes plis le tresor de Fanes-
thesie, donne-moi le repos. Ah ! je crois que tu seras en defini-
tive mon invention la plus bienfaisante," Ibid., 234.
Then, gradually expiring under his euthanasial veil:
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 293
"Grace a ce linceul, je meurs entier, et sans perdre aucune
des sensations delicieuses qui sont d'ordinaire obliterees chez
le mourant par la douleur et raffaiblissemient. La coupe de
la vie est delicieuse. Quelle sottise de s'indigner parce qu'on.
en voit le fond ! C'est Pessence d'une coupe d'etre epuisabla"
And taking leave of his attendants :
"Dites qu'on joue les airs d'Amalfi et du golfe de Naples.
Ayez soin que je ne voie pas un visage triste et que je n'entende
pas un soupir.
"fitre eternel et bon, merci pour Fexistenca J'ai collabore
a toutes tes oeuvres, j'ai servi a toutes tes fins, Je te benis!
(II s'endort en souriant. On lit sur sa figure les signes de
jouissances infinies.)" Dr. Ph., 246-7. Of. James, Var. Kel.
Does Kenan refuse to be held responsible for this revolting
doctrine? Tihen here are the same ideas direct, from his own
pen:
"C'est coinome si Ton repoussait une coupe de vin exquia
parce qu'elle sera vite epuisee, un plaisir parce qu'il ne dure
pas longtemps. . . . Keste la douleur, qui surement est
chose odieuse, humiliante, nuisible aux fonctions nobles de la
vie. L'homme peut la combattre, presque la supprimer, tou-
jours s?y soustraire. Les cas ou l?hompne est rive a la vie sont
tres rares. La seulo destinee absolum^ent condamnee est celle
de Panimfcl esclave, du cheval par example, qui ne peut se
suicider, ou bien celle des condamnes a mort, gardes a vue,
ou de Taliene: mais ce sont la des situations bien exception-
nelles. L'imnaense majorite des individus n'a pas a se plaindre
de son passage par 1'etre, puisque la balance de la vie se solde
en joie et que la mort pourra sans doute un jour etre rendue
sans douleur."15 F. Det, 384-5.
If life is a good, Kenan argues, the world as a whole must
be good; for the continuance of life alone is evidence that,
for each species of creatures taken as a whole, the good must be
in excess of the evil, else this species would cease to exist.
And if there is a balance of good for each, there must be a
balance of good for all.
294- BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
"L'etre, ou du moms la conscience, n'a commence et ne con-
tinue dans le monde que parce qu'il y a dans 1'etre une plua-
value de bien pour 1'ensemble des individus conscieoits.
Un monde ou le mal Pemporterait sur le bien serait un monde
qui n'existerait pas, ou qui disparaitrait." F. Dek, 387.
And again, in his Exam en de conscience phUosophique:
"De cette resultants supreme de Punivers total, nous ne pou-
yons dire qu'une seule chose, c'est qu'elle est bonne. Car si
elle n'etait pas bonne, Punivers total, qui existe depuis Peter-
nite; se serait detruit. Supposons une miaison de banque
existant depuis Peternite. Si cette1 maison avait le moindre
defaut dans ses bases, elle eut mille fois fait faillite."16
F. Det. 427.
Renan had no patience with pessimists. The fundamental
error of pessimism, he declares, consists in applying to the
world as a whole an anthropocentric measure of worth, as if
the totality of things had been planned for the exclusive con-
venience of m'an. F. Det., 388-389.
But surely this again is a slip of the pen. It is impossible
to suppose that Renan would seriously maintain that pessimists
are specially prone to exaggerate the importance of man in the
universe !
And besides, does not his reasoning hit the optimists quite
as hard as the pessimists ? If it is a mistake to call the world
bad because it is not the best possible for man, by what right
do we call it good in the opposite case ? Yet this is precisely
what he is himself continually doing.
The truth seems to lie somewhere betweien the two positions,
or rather alternately with each of the disputants. Optimists
and pessimists are both partly right and partly wrong. Asser-
tions about the goodness or badness of the world, or of life in
the world, are without meaning until the statements are reduced
to concrete terms. The question must be whether life is good or
bad for some particular individual, or group of individuals. For
the world is both good and bad ; good for some creatures and
bad for others, good in some respects and bad in* others. When-
ever a given species of beings is in a prosperous and progressive
BEATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 295
condition,, we infer that, for this particular group, the good
must predominate over the evil ("good" being taken in the
se<nse of life-sustaining) ; and the reverse is true whenever a
given species is on the way to extinction. The same reason-
ing applies to individuals. For them also, the world, in other
words life in the world, is at once good and bad, to different
individuals, at different times, and in different respects.
If this is true, it seems clear that anthropocentricism, or
somje otheir "centricism," is unavoidable in our judgments of
good and bad, if o>ur language is to be more than empty sound.
Plain statements of fact, however encouraging or discouraging
these mjay be, should never be termed either optimism or pes-
simism. These terms should be reserved, in the interests of
clear thinking, for exaggerations of existing good and evil re-
spectively.
Renan maintains, in conclusion, that the world, good as it
is already, is growing better every day, thanks to the labors
of man. On this point he never changed from) the position af-
firniied in his youth :
"I/optimisme serait une erreur, si Phomime n'etait point per-
fectible, s'il ne lui etait donne d'ameliorer par la science 1'ordre
etabli. La formule: 'Tout est pour le mieux/ ne serait sans
cela qu'une amere derision. Oui, tout est pour le mieux, grace
a la raisonj humaine, capable de reformer les> imlperfections
necessaires du premier etablissement des choses. Disons plu-
tot: tout sera pour le mieux, quand rhommei, ay ant accomtpli
son oeuvre legitime, aura retabli rharmlonie dans le monde
moral et se sera assujetti le monde physique." A. S., 31. Cf.
ibid., 69.
296 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
CHAPTER IV.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.
The political and social philosophy of Renan is thoroughly
permeated by his metaphysics, and suffers from the same capri-
ciousness and unseizable vagueness. From transcendentalism
in ethics, we paiss to idealism in politics, not to say utopianism,
as in the Avenir de la science.
He has somewhere declared himself unable to take seriously
the philosopher who has never worked, as a specialist over some
problem in science. The philosopher might retort that Renan
himself would have profited no less by a little of the disci-
pline which philosophical system-building affords. The jux-
taposition of his own divergent ideas on related subjects, had
he himself undertaken the task, would probably have eliminated
from his beautiful pages many a sophism which now, concealed
by the charm of his magical phrase, glides by unnotit?ed ; and
perhaps nothing short of such a labor could have brought this
poetic writer of classical prose to a proper regard for that sacred
jewel of philosophical tradition, consistency. Cf. Seailles,
Ei. R>, 213-14.
In his latest phase, thoroughly disillusioned in respect of
all things human and divine, an all-indulging scepticism! so
far predominates in his writings as to be almost his normal point
of view.
A few items, however, are constant in his ever-changing
creed, and among these must be mentioned his unlimited faith
in the possibilities of humlan reason in the field of positive sci-
ence. \ The day will come, he insists, when reason, in spite
of all that can be done to impede its progress, will truly govern
the world, even the political world.
BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 297
At the present day, to be sure, science and politics have little
in common. Corr., p. 29. ; But an age of reason is coming,
he prophesies in the Avenir de Id science,, evem for politics.
The last word of science1, he insists, must be the scientific organ-
ization of humanity.
"Pour la politique, dit Herder, I'hommle est un moyen; pour
la morale, il est une fin. La revolution de I'avenir sera le tri-
omphe de la morale sur la politique. Organiser scientifique-
ment rhumanite, tel est 1© lernier mot de la science moderne,
telle est son audacieuse, m'ais legitime pretention." A. S., 37 ;
repeated in Q. C., 334. Cf. preface to L'Eau de jouvence,
Dr. Pk, 111.
In respect of his method] in social philo'sophy, Ren an belongs
to the synthetic or historical school. He contends that the so-
cial sciences must be based on a. study of the laws which have
guided the development of society thus far. Q. C., 76.
In a lecture first delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882, and
which has since become famous, Renan has given an elaborate
definition of his idea of a nation. He begins by recalling the
manifold forms which human association has taken in the past.
There are those vague agglomerations of men after the manner
of ancient Babylonia, China and Egypt; tribes like those of
the Hebrews and Arabs ; city states, like Athens and Sparta ;
unions of different countries, as in the Romjan and Carlo-
vingian empires ; communities without a country, held together
by religious ties, like the Israelites and the Parsees. Then
we have the different types of nations and confederations of the
modern world : France, England. Germany, Switzerland and
the United States ; and finally there is that feeling of brother-
hood and kinship established by community of race or lan-
guage, uniting men into still larger groups, as when we speak
of the Slavic or Grermanic peoples. All these diverse forms of
human association have actually existed, or still exist ; are they
all nations?
In regard to the ancient world, his answer is: obviously not.
A nation, in the modern sense of the term, was unknown to an-
tiquity. Egypt, China and ancient Chaldea were not nations ;
298 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
they were mjasses or hordes, led by a supposed descendant of
the sky. Egypt had no citizens, any more than has China
today.
What, then,, is it that constitutes a nation ? Is it comjmu-
irity of race? But in which of our modern nations is this to
be found ? The truth is that ethnographic considerations have
had little or nothing to do with the formation of modern na-
tions. France1, for exam-pie, is Celtic, Iberian and Germanic;
Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slavic. In other nations,
as in Italy, the ethnographic elements are still more compli-
cated. It is impossible, in fact, to determine the race-element
of a modern nation in the physiological sense of the termi, for
the zoological beginnings of humianity long antedate the ori-
gin of civilization and language.
And what is true of community of race applies equally,
mutatis mutandis, to community of language and religion;
neither of these is sufficient for the founding of a nation.
Is it community of comjrnercial and industrial interests, then,
that constitutes1 a nation'? This also Kenan denies; a Zoll-
verein is not a patrie.
~Nor is it the "natural frontiers," such as mountains or riv-
ers, that determine the limits of a. nation. In a word, neither
race, nor language, nor community of interests, noi* religious
affinity, nor geographical conditions, — none of these is suffi-
cient to found a nation.
A nation is a soul or spiritual principle, resulting from
efforts and sacrifices made in the past. A heroic past:
great men, great achievements, — this is the social capital upon
which a national idea may be established. To have done
great things together and be willing to do more ; comjmon souve-
nirs of a glorious past and a united will in the present; com-
mon sufferings, common joys, a common hopei: these are bonds
of union stronger than race, language or religion; these are
the foundations of national existence. Cf. Disc., 2Y7ff.
"Lai patrie est un compose de corps et d'amies. L^ame, ce
sont les souvenirs, les usages, les legendes, les malheiirs, les
esperances, le® regrets communs ; le corps, c'est le sol, la race,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 299
la langue, les montagnes, les fleuves, les productions caracte-
ristiques." 0. d'Angl., 34.
"Dante, Petrarque, les grands artistes de la renaissance ont
ete les vrais fondateurs de I'unite italienne. Goethe, Schiller,
Kant, Herder, ont cree la patrie allemande." Ref. Int., 138.
The idea that a nation is something more than the sum of
its members appears already in the Avenir de la science, and
is repeated in all his later works.
"La societe n'est pas la reunion atomiistique de® individus,
formee par la repetition de 1'unite; elle est une unite consti-
tuee; elle est primitive." A. S., 252.
"Aux yeux d'une philosophic eclairee, la societe est un grand
fait providentiel ; elle est etablie, non par Phommie, mais par
la nature elle-meme, afin qu'a la surface de notre planete se
pro-dulse la vie intellectuelle et morale. L'homme isole n'a
jamais existe. La societe humaine, miere de tO'Ut ideal, est
le produit direct de la volonte supreme qui veut que le bien,
le vrai, le beau, aient dans 1'univers des contemplateurs," Ref.
Int., 241-2. Of. ibid., 302-3.
There is naturally not mtuch in the writings of Renan with,
reference to the earlier forms of human association, or the mian-
ner in which the clan, the tribe or the nation develops. His
only utterance on this point is1 that the family, and more par-
ticularly the monogamic family, is necessary to the formation
of great races. Dial., 35. This statement he often repeats.
The conjugal fidelity of women which monogamy implies is the
result, he declares, of long-continued cruelty to her sax in the
remote past. Like all great things1 the family was founded by
the most atrocious means; millions of women stoned to death
paved the way to conjugal fidelity. P. Isr., 1:5.
From the fact that society is an evolutionary and therefore
non-rational product, and not the creation of some contmt
social, combined with the fact that reason is acquiring an ever
growing influence in political and social affairs, he appears
to conclude that political progress is destined to do away with
patriotism,. Social progress, from his point of view, may be
defined as a substitution of reason for tradition. With the
300 BULLETIN OF THE rXIVEESITY OF WISCONSIN.
progress of reason, considerations of humanity will more and
more prevail over those of country. Patriotism, therefore,
being essentially a non-rational form of social cohesion, u
tain to grow weaker as men grow more rational, and will ulti-
mately disappear altogether; — a catastrophe, it may be added,
which Renan would be the last to regret.
Renan has said many hard things against patriotism :
The fact is, he writes, that nation and philosophy have little to
do with each other. Patriotism, among other meannesses, has the
p-retention of having a God of its own. Jahreh elohetm, said
the Israelite: unser Gott, says the German. A nation is al-
ways egotistical It desires that the God of heaven and earth
should think of no other interests than its own. Under one
name or another it creates for itself tutelary divinities. P.
Isr.. I:'2'20.
Again in the Hibbert Lecture for 1880:
"Grande est la patrie, et saints sont les heros de Marathon
et des Thermopyles. La patrie, cependant, n'est pas tout
iei-bas. On est homme et fils de Dieu, avant d'etre frangais
ou allemand. Le royaume de Dieu, reve eternel qu'on n'arra-
chera pas du eoeur de Fhomme, est la protestation contre ce que
le patriotisme a de trop exclusif." C. d'Angl., 3T-S; also
V. J.. 123.
"Ma philosophic est I'ldealisme; ou je vois le bien, le beau,
le vrai, la est ma patrie," Ref. Int., 177--. Cf. Coir., Je.
14, 1853.
Similar declarations abound in his letters, especially those
of the earlier period. Writing in 1849 to his friend Berthelot,
he refers to an observation he has made among the French
peasants: after only a single century of civilization, they are
showing signs of decadence; and he consoles himself with the
hope that the Slavic peoples, invading western Europe, may
perhaps adopt its ideas and carry them forward with a new
energy. Cf. Ref. Int, 192. It is only when the vanquished
are superior in capacity and culture to their conquerc:
adds, that an appeal to nationality is justifiabla Corr., 37-9.
. -fimporte par qui le bien se fait? Xous sornnies main-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 301
tenant pour les barbares contre les Romiains. II n'y a pas de
decadence au point de vue de 1'humanite."17 Corr., 39.
But though it is true that Renan made little of patriotism,
especially in the ultra-rationalistic period of his earlier years ;
and though he treats it as a logical fallacy kept alive by preju-
dice, yet he felt it to be of the utmost importance, in the in-
terests of national strength, that the fallacy should continue
widely to prevail. For a long time to comje, he declares, the
existence of separate* nationalities is necessary to the preserva-
tion of liberty, which would be lost if the world had but one
law and one master. A confederation of the world involving
the abolition of independent nationalities, even if possible,
would not be desirable.
"La division est la condition de la liberte. II dependrait
de quelqu'un de fond re les nations en une seule nation, les
figlises en une seule figlise, les sectes, les ecoles, en une seule
secte, en une seule ecole, qu'il faudrait s'y opposer. Le vieux
monde romain a peri par 1'unite, le salut du monde moderne
sera sa diversite." Q. C., 352.
The same is affirmed of religions:
"Des trois grandes formes que le christianisme a prises dans
nos societes, catholicisme, protestantisme, orthodoxie, en est-il
une qui doive supprimer les deux autres ? La puissance de la
Russie fait Favenir de 1'orthodoxie, la race anglo-saxonne porte
avec elle Tesprit du protestantisme sur tous les points du globe,
le Catholicism e a pour resister sa centralisation puissante et sa
forte discipline. Rejouissons-nous de ces divisions irreduo
tibles qui sont la garantie de la liberte." Nouv. Hist, ReL,
463.
Renan has been much criticised for his attitude towards dem-
ocratic institutions.
JM. Berthelot, who had a closer acquaintance with him than
probably any one else, describes Kenan's attitude towards de>
mocracy by comparing it with his own:
"Nos conceptions fondamentales etaient assez differentes.
Si nous etions tous deux egalement devoues a la science et a la
libre pensee, Renan, en raison de ses origines bretonnes et de
302 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
son education ecclesiastique et contemplative, tournee vers le
passe, avait moins de gout pour la democratie, pour la Revo-
lution franchise, et surtout pour cette transformation a la fois
rationnelle, industrielle et socialiste, dans laquelle est engagee
la civilisation mjoderne. Les anciennes manieres d'envisager
la protection des sciences, des lettres et des arts, par un pou-
voir super ieur et autocratique, I'attiraient davantage: il n'en
a jainais fait mystere." Corr., 2. Cf. Souv., XI, 335.
It would be a mistake to suppose that Renan was anti-demo-
cratic from the beginning, however. The contrary is the fact.
The political and social ideas of his first book are democratic
to the last degree. The revolution of 1848, coming soon after
his withdrawal from the church, found him! a young man of
extremely radical tendencies, fired with a zeal for social
as well as religious reform.18 Corr., 26-7; 35-6; Ref. Int.,
14-15.
In his later writings, his attitude towards democracy is an-
tagonistic enough, it is true. His Reforme intellectuelle et
morale, written in 1870, is one long tirade against democratic
institutions. The very source of democracy is condemned.
Popular government, he declares, springs from1 a false and ig-
noble view of life, being based on envy and selfishness.
Another charge is that democracy is a cause of national
weakness; a transgression, that is, of the first and greatest of
Nature's commandments: be strong! Ref. Int., 49; 18; 29-
30.
"La democratie est le plus fort dissolvant de rorganisation
militaire. L'organisation militaire est fondee sur la disci-
pline; la democratie est la negation de la discipline." Ref.
Int.2 54.
Moreover, democracy rests on a fallacious assumption of hu-
mjan equality. It is not true that all men are by nature free
and equal; rather the proposition is absurd. Everyone
knows that men are eminently unequal, in, body, mind
and f character, and no human institution, can change this
fundamental fact. Nor is it possible for men to treat each
other as though they were equal, to -say nothing of the viola
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 303
tion of justice in doing so. Personal beauty, intellectual and
physical vigor, a noble character, are intrinsically respectable,
ns their opposites are inherently despicable. No amount of
revolutionary legislation can sweep away the distinctions be-
tween vice and virtue, beauty and ugliness, strength and weak-
ness, honesty and dishonesty . Title© and privileges may be
abolished, but those who really deserved them will be looked up
to and bowed down to as much as before. A gentleman does not
become the equal of gavroche by calling them; both citoyen.
He calls attention to the superiority of Germany to France
in this respect.
"Tandis que parmi nous un meme type d'honneur est Fide-al
de tons, en Allemagne, le noble, le bourgeois, lei professeur, le
paysan, Fouvrier, ont leur form'ule particuliere du devoir; les
devoirs de Fhomtme, les droits de rhomme sont peu compris;
et c'est la une grande force, car 1'egalite est la plus grande
cause d'affaiblissenient politique et militaire qu'il y ait." Ref.
Intv 52-3 ; also p. 176.
"On supprime Phumanite, si Ton n'admet pas que dee
classes entieres doivent vivre de la gloire et de la jouissance
des autres." Ref. Int., 246; 296.
But of all the absurdities of democracy, he declares, the most
idiotic is the institution of universal suffrage. He could
never forgive what he calls the us/parallelled recklessness of the
French statesmen of 1848 for conferring universal suffrage
upon the country when it was not even called for. Ref. Int.,
14-15.
His objections to the ballot-box have become platitudes. It
affords no criterion of right policy, of true theory, or of wise
and efficient administration. On the contrary, the appeal to
the ballot-box is an appeal from knowledge to ignorance, and
from civilization to barbarism. Furthermore, the masses are
always exposed, by their love of flattery, to the evil designs and
malpractices of the "peripatetic political practitioner." Dr.
Ph., 383. F. Det, 171.
"La masse n'a droit de gouverner que si Ton suppose qu'elle
sait mieux que personne ce qui est le meilleur. Le gouveme-
304 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
ment represente la raison, Diem, si 1'on veut, I'humanite dans
le sens eleve (c'est a dire les hautes tendances de la nature hu-
maine) mais non> un chiffre. . . Le suffrage universe! n'est
legitime que s'il pent hater 1' amelioration sociale. Un despote
qui realiserait cette amelioration contre la volonte du plus
grand nombre serait parfaitement dans son droit." A. S.,
349-50 ; Ref. Int., 47, 67-8 ; O. C., 302.
Nor is the ballot-box a test of strength even:
aEb se proclamant ultima ratio, le suffrage universe! part
de cette idee que le plus grand nombre est un indice de force;
il suppose que, si la minorite ne pliait pas devant l'o>pinion de
la majorite, elle aurait toute chance d'etre vaincue. Mais ce
raisonnement n'est pas exact, car la minorite peut etre plus
energique et plus versee dans le maniement des armes que la
majorite." Kef. Int., 303.
Already in the Avenir de la science he suggests that the
m)ore direct method of actual battle is preferable to the count-
ing of heads, since the truth is likely to be with those who> art)
impelled by conviction to risk their own heads in defense of
their claims. A. S., 344-5.
Besides, he asks, by what right can a majority, merely as
such, claim the privilege of deciding a nation's destiny? The
only justification of government is the good of humanity; but
to realize this good is not necessarily the same thing as to obey
the will of the greatest number. If therefore in a given in-
stance the majority, whether from ignorance, prejudice or any
other cause, are found to oppose the best interests of humanity,
including their own, is it not right that they should be carried
along by a wiser minority, even against their will? A. S.,
429-30; of. 340.
"Le bien de 1'hunianite etant la, fin supreme, la mdnorite
ne doit nullemlent se faire scrupule de mener contre son gre,
s'il le faut, la majorite sotte ou egoiste. Mais pour cela il
faut qu'elle ait raison. Sans cela, c'est une abominable tyran-
nie." A. S,, 429.
A further charge against democracy is its unfitness to attain
what he considers the principal raison d'etre of national exist-
BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 305
ence, — the production of great men. Nothing without great
men, he exclaims ; it is through great men that humanity will
work out its salvation. Dial., 103. But democracy, he insists,
Is doomed to mediocrity in all things. Mor. Crit., 371-3.
With reference to methods of selecting national executives,
he writes :
"II est incontestable que, s'il fallait s'en tenir a un moyen de
selection unique, la naissance vaudrait mdeux gue Felection. Le
hasard de la naissance est moindre que le hasard du scrutin."
Kef. Int., 45.
Last not least, democracy stands condemned by its own inher-
ent instability. France committed suicide the day it beheaded
its king. Eef. Int., 8, 250-2.
It would be mistaking Kenan's meaning, however, to conclude
that he intends by these charges to condemn constitutional gov-
ernment. Indeed, a truly constitutional government is just
what democracy is incapable of producing, according to himi.
Considered historically, he says, constitutional government is
not a creation of democracy. England, which instead of the
absolute doctrine of popular sovereignty admits only the more
moderate principle that there must be no government without
the people, nor against the people, has been far better governed
than France.
"L'Angleterre . . . s'est trouvee malle fois plus libre que
la France, qui avait si fierement plante le drapeau philosophique
des droits de 1'homme. (Test que la souverainete du peuple ne
fonde pas le gouvernement constitutionnel." Kef. Int., 240. Cf.
ibid., 43-5; Dr. Ph., 85, 99.
In 1871 he writes in a letter to his friend Berthelot:
aLa France s'est trompee sur la forme que peut prendre la
conscience d'un peuple. Un tas de sable n'est pas une nation ;
or, le suffrage universel n'admet que le tas de sable. . . La
civilisation a ete de tout temps une oeuvre aristocratique, main-
tenue par un petit nombre ; Tame d'une nation est chose aristo-
cratique aussi : cette ame doit etre guidee par un certain nombre
de pasteurs officiels, formant la continuite de la nation." Corr.,
395-6. Ref. Int., 67, 147.
7
306 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
He explains that this "pasteur officiel" is not necessarily a
dynasty. Leadership may be exercised by a senate, like that of
ancient Rome, or of Venice; or better still by religious, social,
educational or gymnastic institutions, like those of the Greek
cities. But a thing that has never been seen, he insists, is a
society without traditional institutions, a, national education,
or an accepted religion. Corr., p. 68.
The most sympathetic attitude which he has anywhere
taken towards democracy occurs in his preface to the Souvenirs,
pp. X-XX, where different forms of political organization are
compared with, regard to the influence they are likely to exert
on the progress of reason, of which the first condition is declared
to bo freedom] of thought and speech.
"Le but du monde est le developpement de resprit^ et la
premiere condition du developpement de 1' esprit, c'est la li-
berte." Souv., XIIL Cf. Ref. Int., 99-100.
"Le monde marche vers line sorte d'americanisme, qui blesse
nos idees raffinees, mais qui, une fois les crises de I'heure
actuelle passees, pourra bien n'etre pas plus mauvais que
1'ancien regime pour la seule chose qui importe, c?est-a-dire
raffranchissement et le progres de Tesprit humiain." Souv.,
X-XI.
With reference to the ancien regime, he continues: Les con-
cessions qu'il f allait faire a la cour, a la societe, au clerge
etaient pires que les petite desagrements que peut nous infliger
la democratie.?> Souv., XII.
But even these attenuations of his habitual bias are made re-
luctantly, and not without reserve. For a few pages forward
in the same preface, contrasting democracy in France with its
better organization in England and America, he says of the
former :
"Je crois bien que, si les idees democratiques venaient a tri-
onrpher definitivement, la science et Tenseignemient scientifique
perdraient assez vite leurs modestes dotations. II en faudrait
faire son deuil." p. XVI-XVII. "Noli me t&ngere est tout
ce qu'il faut demander a la democratie."19 Ibid. XX. Of.
Dial., Y7 ; Ref. Int., 218.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 307
On the other hand, the praises which aristocracy gets from his
pen are many and generous. All civilization is of aristocratic
origin. Dr. Ph., 85. An aristocracy of the wise was the law
of primitive man. Or. Lang., 25. It is by aristocracy that
the inferior races have been disciplined, grammatical language
created, that laws have been framed, and morality and reason
developed. Dr. PL, 99 ; Oorr., 395. Even to-day its service^
to the State are incalculabla C. d'Angl., 122 ; also Kef. Ink
67, 244; Dial., 64-65. Seailles, 269-70.
"La vertu diminue ou augmente dans Phumanite selon quo
Pimlperceptible aristocratie en qui reside le depot de la noblesse
humaine trouve ou non une atmosphere pour vivre et se pror-
pager." Mor. Grit, 23. Of. A. SI 319 ff.
This one-sided antagonism is all the more remarkable as it
was characteristic of his method to advocate both sides of a
question in turn, whenever it seemed fairly debatable!. Can it
be that he really had nothing to say in favor of democracy ?
It is plain that his preference for aristocratic institutions ig
based on something more than an impartial examination of thei*
comparative merits. An obvious criticismi which his treatment
of democracy provokes is that he condemns it in general terms,
without considering the conditions' in which it is placed (his-
torical, geographical, ethnographical, political). If demjocracy
is a failure in one country, that can prove nothing against its
being a permanent success in another. The same nation, inr
deed, not only may but does need different forms, of social and
political organization at different stages in its development. It
is of course impossible to decide questions as to the relative
worth of political institutions one way or another in the form of
general propositions, regardless of the special conditions under
which these institutions are tested.
In the Dialogues philosophiquzs, half in jest and half m
earnest, Renan describes an. ideal social order, in which reasoni at
last is the undisputed sovereign of the world. The progress of
science, he suggests, may conceivably lead to the discovery of
new forms of force, so hard to wield and so dangerous to maniph
ulate that only a few superior minds would be capable of turn-
308 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
ing the same to practical use. In the hands of these intellectual
giants, veritable gods as compared with even the choicest intel-
lects of the present day, these hidden forces would be instru-
ments of truly super-human power. The mass of mankind,
lacking capacity for such knowledge, would be forced to submit.
Dial., 82. The power which popular fancy ascribed to magicians
of old would then become a reality. A select few would
rule the many in virtue of mysterious influences which they
alone understood. Such a government would be despotic, to be
sure, but not therefore unjust; for he supposes these magicians
to be as high above the average in virtue as in knowledge. It-
would be the beneficent tyranny of justice and truth. As soon
as it was discovered that the power of these demi-gods was al-
ways in the service of the right, there would be no objection to
its exercise ; and very soon these heaven-born rulers would come
to be loved, and their commands be accepted like irresistible
natural laws. Dial., 112. In course of time, having discov-
ered the secrets of matter and of life, they would rule over phys-
ical creation likewise, and eventually come to be worshipped
as gods. "Primos in orbe deos fecit limor." Dial., 113, Cf.
Frag., 153 ff.
This is mere dreaming, of course ; but it points in the direc-
tion of Kenan's ideal of social organization. An enlightened
despotisms, not supposedly merely but truly enlightened, and
despotic only in the sense of being all-powerful, was his beau
ideal of political order. Cf. A. S., 350-2 ; Souv., 335.
But notwithstanding his strictures upon democracy, Renan
was at all times an ardent advocate of personal liberty.
"Le regime liberal est une necessite absolue," he writes,
"pour toutes les nations modernes. Qui ne pourra s'y aceom-
moder perira. . . . Une nation qui ne sera capable ni de
la liberte de la presse, ni de la liberte de reunion, ni de la li-
berte politique, sera certainement depassee et vaincue par les
nations qui peuvent supporter de telles libertes. Ces dernieres
seront tou jours mieux infonnees, plus instruites, plus seri-
euses, mieux gouvernees." Ref. Int., 273.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 309
"Le but supreme de rhumanite est la liberte des individus."
M.-Aur., 588.
Many other passages of like tenor might be quoted from) his
books.
Conservatism, to be sure, is also indispensable. Radicalism
and conservatism are the two weights, so to speak, by which
society maintains its balance over the tight-ropes of destiny.
"La vie est le resultat d'un conilit entre deux forces con-
traires. On meurt aussi bien par 1? absence de tout souffle re-
volutionnaire que par 1'exces de la revolution." C. d'Angl.,
100.
It is liberalismi, however, that needs most encouragement,
for of conservatism there is always an abundant supply. Lil>
eralism itself becomes eonservatismi through mere lapse of
time. The liberals of to-day are the conservatives of to-mor-
row. Dr. Ph., 269.
In a letter of 1847 to his friend Berthelot the relation of
these opposite forces to social progress is clearly set forth:
"La loi, en politique, e'est de m|archer toujours. L'opinion
ne peut rester un instant stationnaire. . . Mais 1'opinion
marchant toujours et le gouve>rnement etant necessairement
stationnaire et conservateur, le lendemain de la revolution 1' ac-
cord est rompu, et une nouvelle revolution est necessaire*
Elle ne se fera pas, et cela fort heureusemient, parce que Fop-
position n'a pas encore la force; cela arrivera plus ta,rd, quand'
le desaccord sera trop criant; alors une nouvelle revolution^
puis a recommencer. Eoi un mot, j 'imagine Topinion conune
avan^ant d'un mouvement continu et les gouvernements avan-
gant par soubresaiits, en sorte qu'ils ne peuvent que par in-
stants se trouver de front" Corr., 26.
Kenan was thoroughly modern in the distrust he showed for
abstract "natural rights." A liberty which exists in fact as
well as name is not the result of mere constitutional enactment.
Civil liberty is not assured, he says, until it is rooted in insti-
tutions which have long endured. It might be shown that the
only ground upon which a certain amount of independence
still finds refuge in our time is a remnant of what
310 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
in France is known as the ancien regime. Mor. Grit., 335.
The French revolution made the mistake of all revolu-
tions which are founded on abstract ideas, instead of antece-
dent rights. Ibid., 98 ; also 37-8.
"La liberte achetee ou arrachee pied a pied a ete plus du-
rable que la liberte par nature. En croyant fonder le droit ab-
strait, on fondait la servitude, tandis que les hauts barons
d'Angleterre, ... en defendant leurs privileges, ont
fonde la vraie liberte." Mor. Grit., 39.
"L'Angleterre, sans rompre avec sa royaute, avec sa no-
blesse, avec see oomtes, avec ses communes, avec son figlise,
aveo sea universites, a trouve moyen d'etre Ffitat le plus libre,
le plus prospere et le plus patriote qu'il j ait."20 Ref. Int., 5.
Of. ibid., 239.
Foremost among civil liberties, in his estimation, are free
thought and free speech. Without this personal freedom po-
litical liberty is 1iie merest sham. Q. G., 411.
This seemjs to have been his normal point of view, though
he did not hold to it consistently. In the Avenir de la science ,
for example, he defends the opposite view, insisting that free
speech, like universal suffrage, cannot be reasonable until all
men have acquired, the capacity to distinguish between truth
and error. The right freely to express one's thoughts presup-
poses a capacity to think aright, for there can be no such thing
as a right to disseminate falsehood. A. S., 357. Gf. Mor.
Grit, 161.
A far more urgent duty of society than the guarantee of uni-
versal free speech, he declares, is to improve the minds and
characters of its members. So long as the mtasses are kept
in ignorance, it is simply absurd to claim in their behalf the
right to free assembly and free speech.
"Le vrai trouve tou jours assez de liberte pour se faire jour,
et la liberte ne pent etre que prejudiciable, quand ce sont des
insenses qui la reclament. . . . Nous usons la force pour
conserves a tous le droit de radoter a leur aise; ne vaudrait-il
pas mienix chercher a parler raison et enseigner a tous a parler
et a comprendre ce langage? Fermer les clubs, ouvrez les
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 311
ecoles, et vous servirez vraiment la cause populaire." A. S.,
356. Also Q. O., 477. C. d'Angl., 26-7.
Legal guarantees of free speech he considered of little im-
portance. A mian who is really in the right is always suffi-
ciently free to disseminate his convictions. In some respects,
indeed, opposition to innovating ideas is a good thing. When
would-be reformers are obliged to risk their own life in the
advocacy of their cause, the peace will be disturbed only by
those who are sure of their mjessage. A. S., 362.
"La persecution a le grand avantage d'ecarter la petite ori-
ginalite qui cherche son profit dans une mesquine opposition.
. . . Autrefois, sur dix novateurs, neuf etaient violem-
ment etouffes, aussi le dixieme etait bien vraiment et franche-
ment original. La serpe qui emonde les rameaux faibles ne
fait que donner aux autres plus de force. Aujourd'hui plus
de serpe; mais aussi plus de seve. En somme, tout cela est
assez indifferent, et I'humanite fera son chemin sans les li-
beraux et malgre les retrogrades." A. S., 362.
"L'idee vraie ne demande pas de permission; elle so soucie
peu que son droit soit ou non reconnu. Le christianismje n'a
pas eu besoin de la liberte d© la presse ni de la liberte de re-
union pour conquerir le monde. . . . Occupons^nous done
un peu plus de penser, et un peu mmns d' avoir le droit d'ex-
primer notre pensee. L'homme qui a raison est toujours assez
libre." Q. C., 303-4
Moreover, the suppression of free-thought is, strictly speak-
ing, impossible. A heretic placed on the rack may alter his lan-
guage, but his private conviction is beyond the reach of external
coercion. Even.! in the days when free-thinking meant reasoning
that was not consistent with statements in the Bible, or the
Goran, and people were burnt alive for professing their real
beliefs, free-thinking was not in reality suppressed. All that
philosophers needed to do was to twist their own language into
harmony with the scriptures, or vice versa; in which case ex-
ternal coercion resulted merely in the mlultiplication of glos-
saries and commentaries. A. S., 58. What else are the in-
tricate commiefnts on knotty points in the scriptures but the pro-
312 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
test of reason against the enslaving letter of the text? And
what is the cause of all the hermeneutical dodges and subter-
fuges of theological apologetics, both Christian and pagan, save
the rebellion of present knowledge against past ignorance?
"La liberrte de penser est imprescriptible. . . Sous le re-
gime d'Aristote, comme sous celui de la Bibkj on a pu penser
presque aussi librement que de nos jours, mais a la condition
de prouver que telle pensee etait reellement dans Aristote ou
dans la Bible, ce qui ne faisait jamais grande difficulte. . .
Tous les comjmjentaires des livres sacres se ressemblent, depuis
ceux de Manou, jusqu'a ceux de la Bible, jusqu'a ceux du
Goran. Tous sont la protestation de 1'esprit humain centre
la lettre asservissante. . . C'est la regie etroite que fait
naitre Fequivoque." A. S., 58-9. Cf. ibid., 290.
So little did Kenan mjake of the right to free speech at the
most rationalistic period of his own life that even the inquisi-
tion itself, with all its cruelty, is condemned solely on
the ground of not being in the service of truth. If the doc-
trine of the church had been true, he says, the inquisi-
tion would have been a beneficient institution. The moment
a doctrine acquires universal acceptance and is made the foun-
dation of social and national existence, society is right in pun-
ishing those who attempt to subvert it. A. S., 345-7.
"Du moment qu'une societe entiere accepte un dogme et pro-
clame que ce dogme est la verite absolue, et cela sans opposi-
tion^ on est charitable en persecutant. C'est defendre la soci-
ete." A. S., 345. Cf. Mor. Grit., 161.
"Je concois Tfitat reconnaissant un seul culte; je le concois
ne reconnaissant aucun culte; nxais je ne le concois pas recon-
naissant tous les cultes. II faut de la doctrine a Thumauite.
Si le catholicisme est le vrai, les pretentious les plus extremes
des ultramjontains sont legitimes, I'lnquisition est une institu-
tion bienfaisante. . . De ce point de vue, . . le sou-
verain fait acte de pere en separant le bon grain de Tivraie et
brulant celleHci. Rien ne tient devant la seule chose neces-
saire, sauver les ames.?> A. S., 348-9. Cf. Souv., 112-13.
The needs of society^ he repeatedly affirms, must in all cases
BEAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 313
take precedence of individual rights. Whenever personal lib-
erty comes in conflict with social welfare, it is the latter which
otight to prevail. It is so, he believed, throughout nature.
He goes so far as to declare that any curtailment of individual
liberties is right, even to slavery itself, if the welfare of soci-
ety demands it.20a
The first and most imperative duty of any society, as of any
individual, is the duty of self -preservation. Fighting-ability,
lie insists, is of the utmost importance to a nation's welfare.
A society which is too kindly in disposition is weak. The
world is not made up of perfect people; certain abuses, there-
fore, are necessary and unavoidable. It is dangerous for a
nation to be more civilized than its neighbors. P. Isr., Ill,
230; Dr. Ph., 346.
A sound philosophy of life should fit men for killing as well
as for dying. Dr. Ph., 349. The surest guarantee of peace
is preparation for war.
Speaking of the regime under which the happiness of the
individual, guaranteed by the social group to which he belongs,
is the sole object of the law: "Who will maintain this fine
ideal ?" he asks ; "who will protect this little paradise of broth-
ers against the attacks of external force?" P. Isr., Ill: 354.
"(Test une verite bien constatee que le progres philoso-
phique des lois ne repond pas toujours a un progres dans la
force de Pfitat. La guerre est chose brtitale ; elle veut des bru-
taux; souvent il arrive ainsi que les ameliorations morales et
sociales entrainent un affaiblissement militaire." M.-Aur.,
253-4.
He reminds his readers that war is a legacy from uncivil-
ized times, a relic of primitive barbarism. M.-Aur., 253.
Militarism therefore, appealing as it does to instincts deep-
rooted in human nature, cannot be suddenly abolished by mere
resolutions; nor the cannon be safely discarded by any sin-
gle nation alone. He believed that peoples, far more than in-
dividuals even, are compelled to be selfish by the very condi-
tions of existence. P. Isr., I: 210. The way to certain na-
tional death is persistence in a policy of unselfish humanitar-
314 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
ianism. A nation that labors for humanity is always a victim
of the universal work which it accomplishes. P. Isr., HI:
224 ; XII. A nation which devotes itself to social and religious
problems, courts its own ruin. C. d'Angl., 106.
This is one of his oft-repeated inductions from history. In
the Hibbert lecture for 1880, he writes:
"Presque toujours les nations creees pour jouer un role de
civilisation universelle, comme la Judee, la Grece, PItalie de
la renaissance, n'exercent leur pleine action sur le monde
qu'apres avoir ete victimes de leur propre grandeur. . .
Lea peuples doivent choisir, en effet, entre les destinees lon-
gues, tranquilles et obscures, de celui qui vit pour soi, et la
carriere troublee, orageuse, de celui qui vit pour rhumanite.
La nation qui agite daus son sein des problemes sociaux et re-
ligieux est presque toujours faible politiquement. Tout pays
qui reve un royaume de Dieu, qui vit pour les idees generales,
qui poursuit une oeuvre d'interet universel, sacrifie par la
meme sa destinee particuliere, affaiblit et detruit son role
comme patrie teirestre. On ne porte jamais impunement le
feu en soi." C. d'Angl., 103-4. Kef. Int., 236; Q. C,,
XXVIII.
Renan had little sympathy, on the whole, with socialism, as
a project for the re-organization of society on a basis of equal
rights for all men. ^ot that he was blind to the manifold in-
justice of the present social regime, or felt no sympathy with
the undeserved sufferings of the less fortunate classes. The
reverse is the truth. Nor would he deny that socialism is a
well-grounded protest against the present regime. His want
of sympathy with the movement appears rather to have sprung
from a conviction that, at bottom, the wrongs for which social-
ists are seeking a remedy are beyond the power of man to re>
move, being inherent in the nature of things.
He was much impressed with the analogy of socialism to
early Christianity. The two movements appeared to him to
spring from] a common source: the evils and sufferings and
general unsatisfactoriness of average humlan life in this world.
The great consolation of man, he says with reference to the
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 315
!N"ew Jerusalem, in the presence of the incurable evils of soci-
ety, is to imagine an ideal city, from which he excludes every
sorrow and which he endows with every perfection. P. Isr.,
Ill: 400.
He notes a fundamental difference., however, amounting to
contrast, in their respective conceptions of the possibilities of
human nature. In the Christian eceonomy the reign of jus-
tice, impossible on earth because the "prince of this world" is
the "prince of darkness," is deferred to another life and con-
stitutes the reward of those who are worthy to enter the heav-
enly city. Socialism, on the other hand, with its different con-
ception of nature and of man's place in nature, also less cer-
tain of man's future and with, more faith in his present, hopes
to establish its New Jerusalem on this planet. In a word, so-
cialism is Christianity modernized and secularized. Christi-
anity is socialism minus its faith in man; socialism is Chris-
tianity minus its faith in God.
The parallelism of the two extends to details. Like Christi-
anity, socialism is international in its sympathies and aspira-
tions, which is a serious matter, considering that socialism is
a live issue in politics.
Socialism again, with its phalansteries, communities, unions,
orders, and brotherhoods, tends, like Christianity, to create
separate allegiances within the state, in rivalry with patriot-
ism.
All religious orders, he writes, are in the same position. If
socialism could attain any organization, its phalansteries,
groups, syndicates, would exist in the state, like small egoisms
caring very little for public interests. . . . Ideal Jerusa,-
lems bring misfortune. P. Isr., Ill: 355. Of. Y. J., 172.
Above nationalities there is, in fact, an eternal ideal. So-
cialism, according to the Israelite and Christian dream, will
probably one day kill the patriots, and make a reality of the
words read in the service for the dead : Judicare secidum per
ignem. P. Isr., Ill: 386.
Socialism, moreover, is unmilitary in spirit and policy,-
further trait of resemblance with early Christianity.
316 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
"II est clair que le socialisme des ouvriers est 1'antipode de
Pesprit militaire; c'est presque la negation de la patrie; les
doctrines de I'lnternationale sont la pour le prouver." Ref.
Int., 23.
But if socialism and Christianity are so nearly related, it
may be asked, how comes it that the church is commonly re-
garded by socialists as one of their very worst enemies?
Should we not expect that so far as they are pursuing common
aims, such as the extension of human brotherhood, Christian-
ity and socialism would reinforce each other?
Renan admits that in some respects Christianity is a formid-
able barrier to socialism. It is, in, fact., at once an obstacle
and a reinforcement; a reinforcement through its doctrine of
universal brotherhood, and an, obstacle through its doctrine of
the future life. The Christian who really tries to love his
neighbor as himself and to do unto others as he would that they
should do unto him, is so far a socialist. But on the other
hand, so far as the disciple of Jesus loves, not the- world nor
the things that are in the world, and considers life on earth
as a; pilgrimage to his heavenly home ; so far as, concerned only
to lay up treasures in heaven, he despises earthly riches and,
embracing poverty, welcomes suffering and sorrow as a disci-
pline to fit him for the kingdom; of God : in so far his relig-
ion is the very opposite of socialism. Imagine Simeon Styl-
ites heading a procession for a fairer distribution of the com-
forts and pleasures of life!
Already in his first book Kenan calls attention to the fact
that an excessive regard for the life to come is an obstacle to
social reform!.
"Quand on pense que toute chose se trouvera la-haut retablie,
ce n'est plus tant la peine de poursuivre Pordre et Tequite
ici-bas. Notre principe, a nous, c'est qu'il faut regler la vie
presente comme si la vie future n'existait pas, qu'il n'est ja-
mais permis pour justifier un etat ou un acte social de s'en
referer a Tau-dela. En appeler incessamment a la vie fu-
ture, c'est endormir P esprit de reforme, c'est ralentir le zele
pour Forganisation rationnelle de rhum'anite." A. S., 331-2.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 317
Cf. P. Isr., Ill: 208. He is especially indignant against
those who feign a belief in the hereafter because they imagine
this to be in the interests of social order:
"Quand un sceptique preche au pauvre le dogme consolateur
de I'immortalite, afin de le f aire tenir tranquille, cela doit s'ap-
peler une escroqnerie ; c'est payer en billets qu'on sait faux,
<s'est detO'iirner le simple par une chimere de la poursuit© du
reel/' A. S., 331.
That this side of religion is unfavorable to social reform, is
further shown, according to Renan, by the fact that contempo-
rary socialism finds its very tap-root in the wide-spread dis-
belief in a future life. The reason the masses are insisting
so energetically on a fairer distribution of the good things of
life is because they have ceased to believe that one can merit
heaven by miaking earth a hell.
"C'est fatalement que 1'humanite cultivee a brise le joug des
anciennes croyances ; . . . est-ce sa f aute ? Peut-on
croire ce que Ton veut ? II n'y a rien de plus fatal que la rai-
son. Of. Souv., 383. C'est fatalement . . . que le peu-
ple est devenu a son tour incredule. . . C'est fatalemient
enfin que le peuple incredule s'est eleve contre ses maitres eoi
incredulite et leur a dit : Donnez-moi une part ici-bas, puis-
que vous m'enlevez la part du ciel. . . Maintenir une por-
tion de 1'humianite dans la brutalite, est immjoral et dangereux ;
lui rendre la chaine des anciennes croyances religieuses, qui
la moralisaient suffisamment, est impossible. II reste done un
seul parti, c'est d'elargir la grande famille, de donner place
A tons au banquet de la lumiere." A. S., 333-4.
This view of the question is repeated in all his later works.
"II faut aiigmenter la sommle de bonheur de la vie hu-
m,aine," he says in his article on Amiel. "Ce n'est pas de
peche, d'expiation, de redemption qu'il faut desorniiais parler
a rhomme; c'est de bonte, de gaiete, d'indulgence, de bonne
humeur, de resignation. A mesure que les esperances d'outre-
tombe disparaissent, il faut habituer les etres passagers a re-
garder la vie cO'mlme supportable; sans cela ils se revolteront
On ne maintiendra plus 1'hommie en repos que par le bonheur.
318 BULLETIN OE THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
. . Le pessimism© et le nihilisme ont pour cause 1'ennui
d'une vie qui, par suite d'une organisation sociale defectueuse,
ne vaut pas la peine d'etre vecue. La vie ne vaut que par ses-
fruits; si Ton desire que rhomm,e y tienne, il faut la rendre
savoureuse et delectable a mener." F. Det., 381-2.
Kenan is sometimes accused of an absence of sympathy
with the lower classes, and it must be admitted that his habit-
ual attitude towards certain questions of social policy, his ap-
parent indifference to social reforms, his dislike of the ballot-
box and general distrust of democracy, lend countenance to the
charge. But the accusation is false, nevertheless. Nobody fa-
miliar with his writings, especially those of the earlier period,,
can doubt for a moment that his sympathy with the poor was
genuine and deep.
"S'il etait vrai que rhumanite fiit constitute de telle sorte
qu'il n'y edit rien a faire pour le bien general, s'il etait vrai
que la politique consistat a etouffer le cri des mialheureux et a
se croiser les bras sur des maux irremediables, rien ne pour-
rait decider les belles ames a supporter la vie. Si le monde
etait fait comonje cela, il f audrait maudire Dieu et puis se sui-
cider." A. S., 325. Of. ibid., 319-329; also Souv., 148;
349-50 ; Dr. Ph., 173-6.
And again in a later work:
"Quand on a charge d'anues, il faut done s'exprimer avec as-
sez de reserve pour que, dans Thypothese de la grande ban-
queroute, ceux qu'on y a compromis se trouvent n' avoir pas
ete trop victimies." F. Det, 395-6.
Kenan's apparent hostility to political and social reforms in
reality reflects his indifference to material interests and pre-
occupations as such; and from a passage in the Souvenirs it
appears that his attitude was due to impressions received in
early youth. That spirit of unworldly idealism which he
caught from his earliest teachers, the priests of Treguier Col-
lege, while it heightened his sympathy for the poor, inspired dis-
taste for the vulgar methods and selfish motives of secular
affairs. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that he alone in his
century has rightly understood Jesus and St. Francis, — a slip
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 319
of the pen for which, he has often been censured by his numer-
ous critics. Cf. Souv., 148 ; also 11, 135, 140.
It is interesting to compare the epicureanism of his old age,
with, the stoicism of his youth. In his earlier books he is always
insisting that nobody has a right to enjoyment; for the end of
society is not the happiness of its members, but the greatest
attainable moral and intellectual perfection of all. A. S. 378,
421, 386; Hist. KeL, 393.
"Le but de Thumanite n'est pas le repos; c'est la perfection
intellectuelle et morale. II s'agit bien de se reposer, grand
Dieu ! quand on a Finfini a parcourir et le parf ait a atteindre !
L'humanite ne se reposera que dans le parfait." Q. C., 306 Cf.
ibid., 49. For Kenan's conception of human perfection, see
A. S., 12, 355, 376, 387.
"La devise des saintrsimoniens: "Sanctifiez-vous par le
plaisir," est abominable; c'est le pur gnosticisme. Celle du
christianisme : "Sanctifiez-vous en vous abstenant du plaisir,"
est encore imparf aite. Nous disons, nous autres spiritualistes :
"Sanctifiez-vous et le plaisir deviendra pour vous insignifiant,
et vous ne songerez pas an plaisir." La, saintete, e'est de vivre
de 1' esprit, non du corps." A. S., 404.
As pleasure-seeking is destructive of all that is best in the
individual, so is it the bane of nations. A people that gives
itself up to frivolity and ease is doomed to certain decadence.
Socialism is expressly condemned on the ground that it springs
from a false, hedonistic conception of life.
If socialism ever becomes an established fact, he declares, it
must sooner or later lead to national decay. The pinch of
necessity is the mother of all effort. All progress comes from
the hope of doing better or avoiding worse. A. S., 373 ; also
note 158.
"Si Tideal du bien-etre materialiste que revent quelques re-
formateurs venait a se realiser, le mionde, prive de Faiguillon de
la soufFrance, perdrait un des moyens qui ont le plus contribue
a faire de 1'hommie un etre intelligent et moral." Mor. Grit,
18. Of. A. S., 421-2,429 ; Kef Int., 111.
"L'erreur commune des socialistes et. de leurs adversaires est
320 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
de supposer que la question de I'humJanite est une question de
bien-etre et de jouissance. Si cela etait, Fourier et Cabet aurai-
ent parfaitement raison . . . S'il ne s'agissait que de jouir,
mieux vaudrait pour tons le brouet noir que pour les unes les
delices, pour les autres la f aim." A. S., 377-8 ; also 431-2.
"Malheur a la generation . . . qui a concu la vie
oomme un repos et Tart comme une jouissance! Les grandes
ehoses n'apparaissent jamais dans ces tiedes milieux." A. S.,
421.
Even war itself acquires a redeeming feature from its con-
ducing to a strenuous life:
"Le jour ou I'humanite deviendrait un grand empire remain
pacifie et n'ayant plus d'ennemis exterieurs, serait le jour ou la
moral ite et Tintelligence courraient les plus grands dangers."
Ref. Int., 111. Of. ibid., 40; also A. S., IX; Dial., 23.
"II f aut done s'y resigner : les belles choses naissent dans les
larmies ; ce n'est pas acheter trop chere la beaute que de Tacheter
au prix de la douleur." A. S., 426. Of., Q. C., 466-7.
Now turn to the gospel which prevails in his writings half a
century later:
"La plus dangereuse erreur, en fait de morale sociale, est la
suppression svstematique du plaisir." F. Det., 383.
"Moraliser les masses!" exclaims Prospero-Renan. A notre
age, peut-on dire de pareils enf antillages ? Si nous ne sommes
pas des abuses, quand le serons-nous, mon cher ? ... La
moralite doit etre reservee pour ceux qui ont une mission comme
nous . . . Mais les pauvres gens, les gens ordinaires,
allez done! Us sont pauvres, et vous voulez que, par-dessus le
marche, ils soient vertueux! C'est trop exiger. ... Si
Fhomrne n'existait pas, les formes les plus elevees de Tadoration
sur notre planete eussent ete les jeux des dauphins, le tourbil-
lonnement folatre des papillons, le chant des oiseaux." Dr.
Ph., 170-2.
"Le peuple doit s'amuser; c'est la sa grande compensation.
Un peuple gai est le meilleur des peuples. Ce qu'un peuple
donne a la gaiete, il le prend presque tou jours sur la median-
oete."
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 321
As for expecting the masses to be temperate in drink :
"Mais c'est la une veritable indignite. Priver lea simjples
gens de la seule joie qu'ils ont, en leur promettant un paradis
qu'ils n'auront pas ! . . . Aliens done ! Pauvres vies de-
florees ! Pourquoi voulez-vous empecher ces malheu-
reux de se plonger un moment dans P ideal ? Ce sont peut-etre
les heures on ils valent quelque chose."21 Dr. Ph., 172-3.
It mjust be admitted that Kenan's later writings have con-
tributed not a little to render public opinion in France as in-
dulgent as possible in matters of sexual immorality. He seems
to have grown more and more lax in his speech as he grew
older; though not, of course, in his personal life.22 He appa-
rently had lost all faith in the very possibility of effecting any
considerable permanent improvement in the economic condition
of the mass of mankind. Equality, even the more modest
claim to equality of opportunity, he had come to consider an
unrealizable dream. In his earlier period he enthusiastically
hoped that all men might be lifted to a level of culture where
the coarser pleasures1 would be too repulsive to bring satisfaction
to a human soul. But in these ideals he now believed no longer.
In his later position he reasoned like this: If life is a good
only in proportion to its surplus of pleasures over pains, why
should not the masses, these "pauvres vies deflorees," be allowed
to indulge those forms of amusement by which alone they are
reconciled to the hardships of their brutal existence?
But this is plainly a gospel of decadence, individual and
national. It overlooks the all-important fact that pleasure-
seeking, like any other degrading habit, must grow by what it
feeds on. The more this conception of life is allowed to gain
prevalence, the more animalistic and bestial must men become.
Remove the restraints and supports of a healthy public opinion,
and who shall predict ati what point in the decalogue the down-
ward drift will come to a stop?
But perhaps we should judge his later effusions in the light
of the following warning, with which he concludes his Sou-
venirs:
"Je proteste d'avance contre les faiblesses qu'un cerveau
8
322 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
ramolli pourrait me faire dire on signer. C'est Renan sain
d'esprit et de coeur, comme je le snis aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas
Renan a moitie detruit par la mjort et n'etant plus lui-meme,
comjme je le serai si je me decompose lentement, que je veux
qu'on croie et qu'on ecoute. Je renie les blasphemes que les
defaillances de la derniere heure pourraient me faire prononcer
contre P fi'ternel." Souv., 377.
His habitual attitude in later years towards social and politi-
cal questions is well expressed in a 'New Year's message to his
friend M. Berthelot, then prime minister of his country. It re-
veals again the capital defect of all his later philosophy: the
inveterate habit of contemplating all things, even morality itself,
sub specie aeterndtatis.
"Los accidents les plus graves des choses humaines, quand
on se place au point de vue de la terre entiere, n'ont pas plus
d'importance que le mouvement d'un guepier ou le va-et-vient
d'une fourmiliere, Quand on se place an. point de vue du sys-
teme- solaire, nos revolutions ont a peine T amplitude de mouve-
ments d'atomes. Du point de vue de Sirius, c'est moins encore.
Du point de vue de Pinfini, ce n'est rien. Oe point de vue est
le seul d'ou Pon juge bien les choses dans leurs verite."22a F.
D^t, 156-7. Of. A. S., 330.
Renan has somewhere argued that belief in a future life tends
to make people indifferent to the bettering of the conditions of
life in this1 world, and this may perhaps be true in some cases.
But if any lesson is taught by the example of his own life, it is
this that the most universal disillusionment may lead to at least
an equal indifference; and indeed he himself has affirmed this
in so many words:
"To have recognized that human aifairs are an approximation
without earnestness and without precision is a great result in
philosophy, but involves the abdication of every active role.
The future lies in the hands of those who are not undeceived.
Woe to those of whom Saint Paul speaks: qui spem non habent!
P. Isr., Ill, 404. Of. James, Yar. Rel. Exp., 265.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 323
CHAPTER V.
CRITICAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS.
The reader who has followed the exposition in the preceding
pages, especially the numerous quotations from Renani himself,
can hardly help feeling that his philosophical speculations, when
stripped of the charm, they derive from the beautiful language
in which they invariably are clothed, are too often characterized
either by unprofitable vagueness or fundamental incoherence;
that his conclusions are either so indefinite as to accord with
almost any view of the question under discussion, or so hope-
lessly inconsistent as to lead to no positive results.
And this is the truth. Andrew Lang was quite right when
he wrote :
"Renan has no fixed theory of philosophy. . . . ; the is
Jeckyl and he is also Hyde ; he is Pulvis and he is Umbra ; he
is Indra and he is the sacrifice on the altar of Indra ; he is Jean,'
qui pleure and he is Jean qui rit ; he is Democritus and he is
Heraclitus." Fort, Rev., vol., 47. Of. Seailles, E. R, 293.
Renan's characterization of the philisophy of Plato, in fact,
applies equally well to his own :
"Platon n'a pas de symbole, pas de propositions arretees>
. . dans le sens scolastique que nous attachons a ce mot;,
c'est fausser sa peonsee que de vouloir en extraire une theorie
dogmatique. Et pourtant, Platon represente un esprit; Platon,
est une religion." A. S., 54. Of. ibid., 446-7.
These words are true of himself. Renan, like Plato, repre-
sents an esprit, a philosophy, a religion if you will.
He sometimes writes, as if this esprit, this personal note, this
religion, were the whole of philosophy, or at least its chief char-
acteristic. He expressly defines philosophy as a species of
poetry:
324 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN".
"De la poesie a la critique, il n'y a pas si loin qu'on le sup-
pose ; les races poetiques sont les races philosophiques, et la phi-
losophie n'est au fond qu'une maniere le poesie comme une
autre." Mor. Or., 4-55.
"Tin systeme, c'est une epopee sur les choses. II serait aussi
absurde qu'un systeme renfermat le dernier mot de la realite
qu'il le serait qu/une epopee epuisat le cercle entier de la
beaute. A. 8., 57 Of. P. Sem,, 40.
And again in his article I'Avenir de la metaphysique:
La philosophic est moins une science qu'un cote de toutes les
sciences ... La plus humble commie la plus sublime in-
telligence a eu sa f agon de concevoir le monde ; chaque tete pen-
sante a ete a sa guise le miroir de Tunivers ; chaque etre vivant
a eu son reve qui Fa charme, eleve, console : grandiose ou mes-
quin, plat ou sublime, ce reve a ete sa philosophie." Frag.,
286-T.
There would thus be as many different philosophies as dif-
ferent personalities; and indeed, he says this in so many words:
"La philosophie, c'est rhomme meme; chacun nait aveo sa
philosophie comme avec son style." Frag., 288.
Only a few pages earlier, however, in the same article, philos-
ophy is described in a manner quite incompatible with this view,
Joeing practically identified with ^positive science :
"Les vrais philosophes se sont faits philologues, chimistes,
physiologistes . . . Aux vieilles tentatives d'explication
universelle se sont substitut^es des series de patientes investigar
tions sur la nature et Fhistoire. La philosophie semble ainsi
aspirer a redevenir co qu'elle etait a Torigine, la. science uni-
verselle." Frag., 265. The same idea, A. S., 301.
But two-sided statements from Renan, or even many-sided
ones, no longer surprise us. We have learned to regard them
as an essential part of his philosophical miethod, not to say its
leading characteristic. He seems to have really believed and
practiced, what in his later period he so often preached, that
in philosophy and religion, the only way to mjake sure of being
right sometimies, is to affirm in turn all the alternatives. Dr.
Ph. 256. Of. James, Hum. Im., 12, 16.
BEAUEB THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST BEN AN. 325
A complete explanation of Kenan's heterogeneous personal-
ity, and the numerous contradictions in his writings to which it
led, is of course not attempted ini this chapter. All that can be
accomplished here is to indicate the direction in which, as the
writer believes, a more exhaustive study of the subject must
turn.23
Perhaps we may best begin by examining first the explana-
tions he jhimself has offered.
In his Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse, he tries to account
for what he is pleased to call his apparent contradictions, by
tracing them back to a certain dualism in his character, which
in turn is variously ascribed, now to an atavistic influence of
his complex descent,, and again to a later disillusionment.
"Par m|a race," he says, "j'etais part-age, et comme ecartele,
entre des forces contraires . . . Cette complexite d'origine
est en grande partie, je crois, la cause de mes1 apparentes con-
tradictions. Je suis double; quelquefois une partie de moi
rit quand Tautre pleure." S'ouv., 141-5 ; 73, 90.
But a few pages earlier in the same book we find this dualism
attributed to a later disenchantment, due to a wider knowledge
of men and a deeper insight into the ways and the needs of the
world. His native idealism, he tells us, seemed to him out of
place in a world such as ours, and this discovery led hint to apply
8 double standard of worth in his judgments of men and things;
. . . "de prendre pour me® jugements pratiques le con-
trepied exact de mfes jugements theoriques, de ne regarder
commc possible que ce qui contredisait mies- aspirations."
Souv., 123.
"Alors s'etablit en moi une lutte ou plutot une dualite qui a
ete le secret de toutes mes opinions . . . Je vis que
Pideal et la realite n'ont rien a faire ensemble; que le monde,
jusqu'a nouvel ordre, est voue sans appel a la platitude, a la
mediocrite ; que la cause qui plait aux ames bien njees est sure
d'etre vaincue ; que ce Ojui est vrai en litterature, en poesie, aux
yeux des gens raffines, est tou jours faux dans le monde grossier
des faits accomplis." Souv., 122 ; 123-4.
Still another explanation is suggested in his preface to the
326 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
samje book, whore opposite tendencies and temperaments within
the same personality are explained as a case of opposite poles
attracting each other.
"Presque tons nous sommes doubles. Plus I'homme se deve-
loppe par la tete, plus il reve le pole contraire, c'est a dire Fir-
ratioimel, le repos dans la complete ignorance, la femme qui
n'est que femme, 1'etre instinctif qui n'agit que par 1'impulsion
d'une conscience obscure." Souv., VII-VIII ; Of., F. Det., 39.
Comparing these explanations with one another, it seems at
first glance that Kenan has fallen merely into new contradictions
in attempting to explain the old ones. But it is quite probable
that his explanations are all of them true as far as they go;
heredity, experience, the attraction of opposites, have doubtless
all co-operated in the total result.
It is easy to present these contradictions in such a way as to
insinuate that Ren an was incapable of close reasoning, or a
stranger to sound scientific methods ; and to assume that his con-
tradictions are merely the result of flippant levity or self-satis-
fied superficiality. But such a procedure is too absurd, and
reveals a total misapprehension of the nature of his contradic-
tions, as well as of his true character.
Two prime factors seem to lie at the root of all his contra-
dictions : sincerity and progressiveness. A more unfeigned sin-
cerity there never was, either in seeking the truth or ini stating
it.. In Kenan's own explanations, ascribing these contradic-
tions to a kind of double personality, this ultimate trait, sin-
cerity, is taken for granted ; but it has to be made explicit if the
explanation is to be complete.
It is quite possible, of course, for contradictory impulses and
opposite points of view to exist together within the same per-
sonality, without appearing in speech and conduct ; and it is
only because in Kenan's case these opposite promptings were all
expressed with an equal freedom and frequency that his double
personality gave rise to that systematic two-sidedness which
uninitiated readers of Kenan find so bewildering. Whatever
Beeoued to himj to be true, in different moods and from, different
points of view, he frankly and fully expressed, quite regard-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RESTAN. 327
less of consistency with other moods or other points of view.
His own testimony on this question will not be disputed by
any one familiar with his works.
"Dans mes ecrits, j'ai ete d'une sincerite absolue. Non seulo-
ment je n'ai rien dit que ce que je pense; chose bien plus rare
et plus difficile, j'ai dit tout ce que je pense." Souv., 151.
"Le public m'a eu autant que mes amis. ... II m'est
arrive frequemment, en ecrivant une lettre, de m'arreter pour
tourner en propos general les idees qui me venaient. Je n'ai
existe pleinement que pour le public. II a eu tout de moi; il
n'aura apres ma mort aucune surprise ; je n'ai rien reserve pour
person ne." Souv., 365.
And few indeed are those who have had a wider range of
thoughts and feelings, of facts and fancies to express. His life
has been compared to a voyage through the realm] of ideas and
sentiments.
"II avait connu 1'etat d?ame religieux, Fetat d'ame scien-
tifique, un etat d'ame oil science et religion co-existaient sans
s'exclure; il connut Tetat d'ame optimiste, Fetat d'ame pessi-
miste, la hautaine ironie et rindulgence indefinie, la resignation
et le sarcasm©, Felevation religieuse et le persiflage Voltairien,
tous les modes en quelque sorte, de penseo et meme de croyance,
donjiant a chacune une expression si vive qu'on eut pu croire a
chaque fois, que c?etait le seul qu'il entendit et pratiquat."
M. Faguet, Hev. Par., Vol. 4, p. 119.
"By his mastery of Eastern and Oriental languages and liter-
atures," says Mr. Oonway, "he had familiarly dwelt among
primitive tribes, with them; set up their dolmens, knelt at their
altars, travelled with their migrations in India, Persia, Egypt,
Syria, shared their pilgrimages from lower to higher beliefs,
had listened to their prophets, visited the home of Mary and
Joseph, walked with the disciples." Monist, vol. 3, pp. 201 ff.
Cf. Monod, Kenan, etc., p. 40, 48.
"Pour moi," says Theoctiste-Benan, "je goute tout Funivers
par cette sorte de sentiment general qu fait que nous sommes
tristes en une ville triste, gais en une ville gaie. Je jouis ainsi
des voluptes du voluptueux, des debauches du debauche, de la
328 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
mondanite du mondain, de la saintete de rhomme vertueux, des
meditations du savant, de Fausterite de Tascete. Par une sorte
de syrnpathie douce, je me figure que je suis leur conscience.
Les decouvertes du savant sont mon bien; les triomtphes de
rambitieux me sont une fete. Je serais f ache que quelque
chose manquat au monde; car j'ai conscience de tout ce qu'il en-
ferme." Dial., 133-4. Of., ibid., XIII; Dr. Ph., 233; F.
Det., 382-3 ; A. S., 1C, 123 ; Ant., 140.
It was this universal recognition and comprehensive apprecia-
tion of all codes and customs and philosophies, this ubiquity of
interest and unprejudiced intellectual hospitality, mjore than
any other single trait that could be named, which made Kenan
the spokesman of all sorts and conditions of men. lie was con-
tinually making new acquisitions, and at the same timje was
unable to give up the old ones. His thirst for knowledge and
experience was insatiable. His wish was to lead a multitude of
lives all abreast of each other.
"Je voudrais, dans un antre monde, parler au feminin, d'une
voix de femme, penser en femme, aimer en femjme, prier en
femime, voir comment les femmes ont raison." F. Det., 39.
Cf. Benjamin' Constant, Journal, Paris, 1895, p. 56.
Speaking in 1890 of the faults of his early manner of writing,
he sumis them all up in the sentence: Je tenais trop a ne rien
perdre, A. Si, VI ; and this remained to the end the condition of
his mind, though not of his style. He had learned the capital
art of omitting, indeed ; but only to embrace the next occasion
for expressing the opposite side.
Three orders of reality in particular are sharply distin-
guished and made very prominent in all Kenan's writings; so
prominent, in fact, that one of his best and most appreciative
critics, M. Gabriel Monod, declares this three-fold grouping
of experience, and the assertion of mutual equivalence among
the groups thus obtained, to be the chief characteristic and the
central feature in Kenan's philosophical thought. These
groups are: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.
The following passage, from his earliest book, is typical of
scores of others throughout his writings:
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 329
"Tin beau sentiment vaut une belle pensee ; une belle pensee
vaut une -belle action. Un systeine de philosophic vaut un
poeme, un poeme vaut une decouverte scientifique, une vie de
science vaut une vie de vertu. L'homnie parfait serait celui
qui serait a la fois poete, philosophe, savant, homme vertueux."
A. S., 11 ; also 101 ; Mor. Grit., 358-9.
Truth, goodness and beauty, according to Kenan, represent
different modes in which the ultimate cosmic reality, whatever
that may be, is reflected in human consciousness.
The question arises whether this is not, after all, simply an
interpretation of reality in terms of human nature, a projection
of his own self into external facts; in other words, a return to
that very anthropocentricism which he so often condemned in
other people?
The truth is that a man so many-sided as Renan, who has
run the entire gamut, one1 may fairly say, of feelings and tem-
peraments, and who lived so many lives in one, is too complex
and abnormal a character to be fairly judged by ordinary-
standards. Is it any wonder that a personality so heteroge-
neous, who in thought was a m'an, in feeling a woman and in
action a child; whose writings reflect now the reminiscent
poetry of an outworn faith and again the subtle criticism of
an aridly erudite intellect; a "tissue of contradictions," as he
calls himself: is it any wonder that such a man should find it
impossible to represent on paper all the disparate medley of
his conflicting judgments upon experience, even to their finest
shades and transitions, within the inflexible limits of syllogistic
logic?
But perhaps a more im*portant cause still of logical contradic-
tion than the freedom he at all times practiced in expressing his
judgments is the freedom with which he allowed these judg-
ments to form in his mind. Imbued with the Cartesian ration-
alism of the seventeenth century, especially as represented in
Malebranche, he had early embraced the doctrine that reason,
and reason alone, unhampered by will or desire, is the judge
of all truth. Reason .was conceived as a kind of balance for
weighing ideas, producing belief or disbelief, according as the
330 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
scales dip this way or that. All reasoning, therefore, to be
trustworthy, must be an objective process, unbiased as the mar-
iner's compass.
"Les gens du monde qui croient qu'on se decide dans le choix
de sea opinions par des raisons de sympathie ou d'antipathie
s'etonneront certainemjent du genre de raisonnements qui
m'ecarta de la foi chretienne, a laquelle j 'avals tant de motifs
de coeur et d' interet de raster attache. Les personnes qui n'ont
pas Fesprit scientifique ne comprennent guere qu'on laisse ses
opinions se fornuer hors de soi par une sorte de concretion. in>
personnelle, dont on n'est en quelque sorte que le spectateur. En
me livrant ainsi a la force des choses, je croyais me oonformer
aux regies de la grande ecole du XVIIe siecle, surtout de Male-
branche, dont le premier principe est que la raison doit etre con-
templee, et qu'on n'est pour rien dans sa procreation ; en sorte
que le devoir de Phomme est de se mettre devant la verite, denue
de toute personnalite, pret a se laisser trainer ou voudra la
demonstration preponderante. Loin de viser d' avance certains
resultats, ces illustres penseurs voulaient que, dans la recherche
de la verite, on s'interdit d'avoir un desir, une tendance, un
attachment personnel."24 Souv., 296-7.
But so far is this conception of reason from corresponding in
fact to the psychical processes of humanity at large, that the
opposite appears to be implied in nearly all the mental opera-
tions of the vast majority of mankind.
The position of Prof. James, for example, is the very oppo-
site of that maintained by Renan in the passages above quoted.
This writer insists that not only do men, as a matter of fact,
allow their beliefs to be influenced by their emotions, such as
hope, fear, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship,
but that it is right we should be so influenced in certain cases.
"Oar passional nature," he writes, "not only lawfully may,
but must, decide an option, whenever it is a genuine option that
cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; fo>r to
say, under such circumstances, "do not decide, but leave the
question open," is itself a passional decision, — just like deciding
BRAUEB THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 331
yes or no, — and is attended with the same risk of losing the
truth." The Will to Believe, 1897, p. II.
"Is it wiser or better," he asks, "to yield to the fear that re-
ligion may be an error than to yield to the hope that it inlay be
be true I p. 27.
"Where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be.
an insane; logic which should say that faith running ahead of
scientific evidence is the lowest kind of immortality into which
a thinking being can fall." p., 25.
"A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from
acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth
were really there, would be an irrational rule." p. 28.
So far is reason from being the sole and ultimate arbiter of
all truth, or an infallible and sufficient guide for attaining it,
according to Prof. James, that
"Our reason is quite satisfied, in 999 cases out of every thou-
sand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite
in case our credulity is criticised by some one else. Our faith
is faith in some one else's faith, and in the greatest matters this
is most the case." P., 9.
But why quote this writer against Renan ? The truth is
that, notwithstanding the statements of Rienan above quoted,
and many others in the same key, he has himself affirmed the
Tery position for which Prof. James contends. It is interest-
ing to contrast the following passages with those last cited :
"L' attitude la plus logique du penseur devant la religion est
de faire comme si elle etait vraie. II faut agir commie si Dieu
et Fame existaient. La religion entre ainsi dans le cas de ces
nombreuses hypotheses telles que Tether, les fluides electriques,
lumineux, caloriques, nerveux, Patome lui-meme, que nous sa-
vons bien n'etre que des sym boles, des moyens commjodes pour
•expliquer les phenomenes, et que noiis maintenons tout de
mfeme." F. Det., 432 ; cf. ibid., XVII.
And again:
"La Nature est imniorale. . . Mais dans la conscience
s'eleve une voix sainte qui parle a 1'homme d'un tout autre
monde, le mpnde de Tideal, le inonde de la verite, de la bonte,
332 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN.
de la justice. S'il n'y avait que la nature, on pourrait se de-
mander si Dieu est necessaire. Mais, depuis qu'il a existe un
honnete homime, Dieu a ete prouve." Frag., 250. Cf. Job,
XC; Frag., 321-323; A. S., 17-18, 56, 58, 152-3, 477; note
26; C. d'Angl., 6-7; Dial., VI, 30-1, 38, 147; Mor. Or., II;
Q. C., 235, 414.
But while in his writings, where it was a question merely of
theorizing on the subject, we find both sides of his tempera-
ment affirmed in turn; it was tlte rationalistic side that seems
to have prevailed in his conduct throughout. It was this pre-
dominance of the intellect over the emotions and the will which
in early life had led him out of the church ; and this event, in a
psychological view of his development, was by far the most im-
portant of his life.
His separation from the church, in fact, marks the epoch of
his mental growth when the torturing strain of his opposite
tendencies had become unbearable, and it is impossible to sepa-
rate a study of the causes of his contradictions from an exam-
ination of the factors which produced this central crisis in his
life. The same causes operate in both cases. It was the sharp
distinction Between the rational and the emotional nature which
his studies had led him to observe, combined with the unfinality
of his unusually progressive mind, that made it impossible for
him to continue in the career of a priest; and these same ulti-
mate factors, intellectual duality and progressive unfinality, are
responsible for many of the contradictions in his work.
Indeed, the more closely one examines the psychological fac-
tors of his apostacy, the more does this crisis appear as an ex-
periment, under exceptionally favorable conditions, with the
Cartesian principle of objective reason, rigorously and consist-
ently applied in the sphere of theology and religion. It wa&
Descartes and Malebranche, far more than Strauss or Gesenius,
that led him away from1 the faith of his childhood.25
His intense rationalism at the time of his apostacy is in strik-
ing contrast with the poetic idealism of his early surroundings ;
and these opposite temperaments no doubt underlie that system-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 333
atic two-sidedness so obtrusively characteristic of all his philo-
sophic speculations.
For the idealistic side, his "moral romanticism" as he calls
it, no explanation seeins necessary, or rather none is possible,
beyond the general recognition of environmental pressure, the
passive contagion of example and precept, working upon he-
reditary predispositions in the same direction. The general
character of these influences has been sufficiently indicated in
an earlier chapter.
For the rational side, however, which represents a later de-
velopment, it is possible to assign more specific causes, and
these must now be briefly set forth.
The more closely one looks at Kenan's early development,
the more does the course he actually followed appear to have
been inevitable. Everything, after liis removal to Paris,
seems to- have combined to undo the work of his childhood sur-
roundings, by which he had been moulded for sixteen, years.
The mere geographical change, from the quiet seclusion of
T'reguier to cosmopolitan, glittering Paris, marks an epoch in
his mental development. It was not merely a transfer from
country to city, but a change to a different civilization ; a sud-
den leap from medievalism into the modern age.
At Treguier he had been in actual contact, he tells us, with the
primitive woirld. The most remote past was still in existence
in Brittany up to 1830. The life of the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries was daily before the eyes of those who lived
in the towns. In the country, the epoch of the Welsh emdgra'-
tion? the fifth and sixth centuries, was plainly visible to the
practiced eye.
"Le paganisme se degageait derriere la couche chretienne,
souvent fort transparente. A cela se melaient des traits d'un
monde plus vieux encore, quo j'ai retrouve chez les Lapons.
En visitant, en 1870, avec le prince Napoleon, les huttes d'un
eamipement de Lapons, pres de Trom&oe, je cms plus d'une
fois, dans des types de femmes et d'enfants, dans certains
traits, dans certaines habitudes, voir ressusciter devant moi
mes plus anciens souvenirs." Souv., 87-8.
334 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEBSITY OF WISCONSIN.
For the possibility of going to Paris he was indebted, next
to his own industry and talents, to his sister Henriette. In
the summer of 1838 he had won all the prizes of his class at
Tregiiier college, an achievement which enabled his sister, then
a school-teacher in Paris, to procure him! admission without
cost to the famous little boarding-school, Saint-Nicolas du
Ohardonnet. Lett. Sem., 1-2. He was in his sixteenth year.
After a two days' journey — there were no railroads of course
— , he was set down among scenes as novel to him; as if he had
comle direct from Tahiti or Timibuctoo.
"Un lama bouddhiste on un faquir mrusulman, transporte en
un clin d'oeil d'Asie en plein boulevard, serait moins surpris
que je ne le fus en tombant subitement dans un milieu aussi
different de celui de mes vieux pretres de Bretagne." Souv.,
172.
Nor was it his immjediate surroundings alone, — mother,
teachers, companions and playmates — of which he was de-
prived by this change of abode; all his habits of life were
broken through. Even the church itself, Parisian Catholi-
cism, was so widely different from the Catholicism of Tre-
guier in which he had grown up, as to be in effect a different
religion.
"Ma venue a Paris fut le passage d'une religion a une autre.
. . . Ce fut la crise la plus grave de ma vie." Souv.,
172-3.
This sharp contrast between the old and the new could
hardly fail to> invite comparison and provoke criticism. The
Treguier in his memory and the Paris around him, the naive
sincerity of the vie spontanee and the polish and tact of the
vie reflechie, were too incongruous to exist side by side in the
same mind without starting the machinery of reflection, com-
parison and criticism,. Up to this time his ideas and ideals
had been shaped by authority, example and habit; they were
now to be placed on a rational basis of his own construction.
In later life Kenan saw very clearly the imtmense signifi-
cance of this change. He indeed declares it to have been the
primary cause not only of his leaving the church, but of all the
BKAUEB, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 335
subsequent phases of development to which, this separation in
turn was to lead.
"II est bien probable que, si un incident exterieur n'etait
venu me tirer brusquement du milieu honnete, m,ais borne, o<u
s'etait passee mon en-f ance, j'aurais conserve toute ma vie la foi
qui m'etait apparue d'abord comme I'expression absolue de la
verite." Souv., 130-1; 158.
"An fond, quand je m'etudie, j'ai en effet tres peu change;
le sort m'avait en quelque sorte rive des Tenfance a la fonction
que jo devais accomplir. J'etais fait en arrivant a Paris;
avant de quitter la Bretagne, ma vie etait ecrite d'avance.v
Souv., 73.
The effects of his transplantation were still further inten-
sified by his going home for the sumjmer vacations. In this-
way the contrast was kept fresh in his mind. We may imag-
ine the reflections of the young student, modernized and
rationalized more and more as the years went by, and with the
same exemption he had always enjoyed from manual toil, as
he contemplated the customs and studied the minds of the un-
sophisticated, naively religious, sincere, conservative, virtuous
rustics around him.
At school, too, during his three years at Saint Nicolas, the in-
tellectual atmosphere was as different as possible from that at
Treguier College. He had come to Paris, he says, with a com-
plete moral training, but ignorant to the last degree. With the
exception of mathematics and ancient languages, in which he
had laid a good foundation, he had everything to learn. Of sci-
ence, history and modern literatures he knew nothing. It
was a great surprise to him, he tells us, when he found that
there was such a thing as a learned, lay-man. He discovered
that antiquity and the church are not everything, and ceased
to look upon the death of Louis XIV as marking the end of
the world.
"Le monde s'ouvrit pour moi. . . Saint-Nicolas etait a
cette epoque la maison la plus brillante et la plus mondaine.
. . Mes vieux pretres de Bretagne savaient bien mieux les
mathemlatiques et le latin que mes nouveaux maitres; mais ils
336 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSCTY OF WISCONSIN.
vivaient dans des catacombes sans lumiere et sans air. Ici,
Tatmosphere du siecle circulait librement. Hugo et La-
martine me remplissaient la tete. Je compris la gloire, que
j 'avals cherchee si vaguement a la voute de la chapelle de Tre-
guier. . . Les mots talent, eclat, reputation eurent un sens
pour moi. J'etais perdu pour Tideal modeste que mes anciens
maitres mfavaient inculque." Souv., 185-6.
His early ideals, though not in reality discarded, were laid
aside for a time, and a new direction given to his ambition.
His three years at Saint Nicolas had completely transformed
him). From a poor little country lad struggling vainly to
emerge from! his shell, he had grown to be a young man of re-
markable alertness and quick perceptions. Souv., 195.
When from this school he passed, in 1841, to the theological
seminary at Issy, he was obliged once mtore to adjust himself
to a different medium, in respect both of teachers and studies.
His new instructors recalled to his mind the venerable priests
of Treguier College, who had always seemed to him:, with their
heavy, old-fashioned copes, like the magi, from whose lips
came the eternal truths. Souv., 11. His readings, too, again
became mjore austere. The superficial rhetoric of Saint Nicr
olas2 as he retrospectively calls it, — somewhat unfairly, it
would seem. Of. Lett. Sem., 38, 131 — was replaced by nat-
ural philosophy, logic, mjathemtatics and history. Hugo and
Lamartine were exchanged for Pascal and Malebranche, and
he applied himself, besides, to Eiuler and Leibnitz, Descartes,
Locke, Eeid, and Dugald Stewart.
Among the texts which served as a basis for instruction at
Issy; during two years, one was destined to be of special sig-
nificance in .his mental evolution. This was the so-called
Philosophic d-e Lyon, a kind of Cartesian scholasticism com-
piled in the eighteenth century by the Jansenist arch-bishop
of Lyons, and which bears the ominous title: Institutiones
Philosophicae, Auctoritate D. D. Archiepiscopi Lugdunensis
Ad Usum Scholarum Suae Dioecesis Editae.
This treatise is divided into three parts, dealing respectively
with logic, metaphysics and physics. The following sample,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 337
laken almost at random, may serve to indicate the general char-
acter and method of this work:
"Part III, Physica Specialis, sen de Terra et Corporibus
Terrestribus. Sectio Prima, Capitis Primi: De Igne.
Propositio: Ignis est fluidum, ubique diffusum, cujus partes
sunt tenuissimae, elasticae, rigidae, motuque pernicissimo agi-
tatae."
Various questions are then discussed concerning the proper-
ties of fire and the mode of its action upon bodies, and finally
directions given for experiments with fire. Whenever it seems
to the author that the propositions affirmed in the text are
likely to be called in question, a number of possible objections
are disposed of, by hook or by crook, under the separate head-
ing: Solvuntur Objecia.
In this separate heading Renan very soon, took a special in-
terest, and more often than not the objections discussed were
his own, i
"Ces objections sont ensuite resolues, souvent d'une maniere
qui laisse tout© leur force aux idees heterodoxes qu'on pretend
reduire a neant Ainsi, sous le couvert de refutations faibles,
tout Fensemble des indees modernes ve.na.it a no^us.'7 Souv.,
248.
Thus was his critical faculty provoked and his rationalism
encouraged more and more, and his Catholic faith undermined,
even, by the very studies which were intended to establish that
faith on firnii and stable foundations.
"Dans un tel systcme," he writes nearly half a century la-
ter, "la raison est avant toute chose, la raisoii prouve la reve-
lation, la divinite de I'ficriture et Tautorite de 1'figlise. Cela
fait, la porte est ouverte a toutes les deductions. . . . Ce
n'est pas ma faute si mes maitres m'avaient enseigne la lo-
gique, et, par leurs argumentations impitoyables, avaient fait
de mon esprit un tranchant d'acier." Souv., 281, 303. Also
cf. 246, 296-7, 341, 318-19, 389.
The first result of this course in theological dialectics, which
at least afforded an excellent drill in deductive logic, was to
destroy completely "Renan's confidence in scholastic methods of
9
338 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
testing and establishing truth. Souv., 250. Yet it was by
mjeans of these very methods that his growing doubts were to
be dispelled and his tottering faith renewed. The result
might have been predicted.
Still further were his rationalistic tendencies encouraged by
the extreme solitude to which his manner of living condemned
him in the seminaries. During his two years at Issy, he tells
us, he never once sought permission to see Paris. It is true
that he indulged in occasional outings with the rest of
the school (Lett. Sera., 58, 70, 107, 113, 114, 119, 144, 149-
50, 163, 174, 223, 288) ; but at home he appears to have lived,
to himself, like the veriest hermit.
His books were his world. Even in recreation hours, instead
of joining in the games, he would pass the time on a seat in the
grounds, reading philosophic disquisitions about the existence
of God, (how significant!) and trying to keep warm in the win-
ter by wearing several overcoats.
Such a life of reflection and study, of introspective seclu-
sion and turning-away from matters of present and practical
moment, combined with physical inaction, was certain to leave
permanent traces in his mind no less than his body.
"Ma croissance etait a peine achevee; ma taille se voutait.
Mais ma passion Pemporta. Je m'y livrai avec d'autant plus
de securite que je la croyais bonne. C' etait une sorte de fu-
reur; mais pouvais-je croire que Tardeur de penser, que
je voyais louer . . . f fit blamable et dut me mener a un
resultat que j'eusse repousse de toutes mes forces si j'avais pu
1'entrevoir ?" Souv., 244-5.
'His reason for being so exclusively devoted to books at this
timte becomes clear on reading his letters, especially those to
his sister. He was busy transferring the faith of his child-
hood from the rock of tradition to the arid sands of Cartesian
psychology; and his sister was the only person in the world to
whomi he could turn for effective sympathy in this struggle to
get rid of his doubts through a process of rational conviction.
But she was now far away. Since January, 1841, she had
left Paris to accept a position as governess in Poland, which in
BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF EKNEST KENAN. 339
those days was several weeks distant, and where she remained in
bitter exile for ten long years. It is to this separation that we
owe the beautiful volume, Letires Iniimes, every reader of
which has learned to pronounce the name of Henriette Kenan
with profound respect.
There can be no doubt that her letters did more than any
other single influence to determine the course of Renan's life.
Cf. Lett. Sem, 1-2, 26, 33, 102, 104, 136, 161, 173, 259, 327.
It is true that she never attempted to influence her brother's
beliefs directly, but her indirect influence was all the greater.
Again and again she exhorts him, implores himi, to be honest
with the truth; to make no concessions to fear, nor compro-
mise with expediency. Truth and duty alone, his own rea-
son and his own conscience, the mjost absolute intellectual and
moral integrity, she never wearies of insisting, must decide so
weighty a question. Cf. Lett Sem., 326.
When his studies were drawing to a close and the time ap-
proached for him to decide irrevocably whether w not he
would continue in his priestly career, she sent him, through a
friend, out of her own hard-earned savings, the sum] of 1,500
francs for immediate needs, in order that he might feel
entirely free, so far as irrelevant considerations of livelihood
were concerned, to decide either for or against remaining in
the church.
But with all her womanly sympathy and inexhaustible sis-
terly love it is certain that the net result of her influence was
only to exalt still further the office of reason in the process of
forming and sifting religious beliefs. By always insisting
that he must fight out the battle for himself and think his own
way out of his difficulties, guided by reason and conscience
alone, she still further confirmed his own conception of reason
as the sole and ultimate arbiter of all truth. It is an interest
ing fact that this same sister, the guardian angel of his early
life, as Madame Darmsteter very propeorly calls her, who in
his childhood had taken himi by the hand on winter evenings
to prayers in the village cathedral, sheltered from snow and
rain under the ample folds of her cloak; this same sister in
34:0 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
later years, his cloud by day and pillar of fire by night, as he
himself describes her, was to lead him away from that self-
same faith in which she had cradled his earliest youth.
And if it is true that hers was the leading influence in her
brother's apostacy, must we not say that his very decision to
repress or ignore all the promptings' of emotion or passion, and
to follow pure reason alone, was itself the result of a passional
impulse : the omnipotent love of a sister ? It was not merely
his own faith in reason ; it was still more his faith in his sister's
faith, that led to this crisis in his life.
This chapter has failed of its purpose if it has not brought
into clear relief the powerful contrast between the environmen-
tal influences at work on Renan during his studies in Paris, and
those which had moulded his character in Brittany up to his
sixteenth year.
His removal to Paris, seven years of diligent study and ex-
tensive reading, and much reflection; an intellectual and spir-
itual solitude broken only by the frequent letters of his distant
sister, who essentially reinforced the ultra-rationalistic ten-
dencies of his favorite authors: all these influences from
within and without combined to superimpose on his ear-
lier character a second self, and make him a man of opposite
temperaments and correspondingly opposite ideals. The
saintly and the worldly ideals, for ever at feud in literature as
in life, are reflected in his writings alternately, according as
the Treguier or the Parisian self is holding the pen.
Before concluding this chapter with an estimiate of Kenan's
life and work as a whole, it may be of interest to note with
what feelings he himself looked back upon his career. We
shall find that his judgment is different according as he con-
templates his past life from the point of view of greatest enr
joyment for himself, or of making the most of his opportun-
ities in behalf of humanity at large.
Few great writers have been more deeply convinced that life
is a good, — the mere living. His Souvenirs concludes with the
words :
"Mon experience de la vie a done ete fort douce, et je ne
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 341
crois pas qu'il y ait eu beaucoup d'etres plus heu-
reux que moi. . . . J'ai tant joui dans cette vie, que je
n'ai vraiment pas le droit de reclaimer une compensation
d'outre-tombe. L'infinie bonte que j'ai rencontree en ce monde
m'inspire la conviction que Peternite est remplie par une bonte
non moindre, en qui j'ai une confiance absolue. L'existence
qui m'a ete donnee sans que je 1'eusse demandee a ete pour
moi un bienfait. Si elle m'etait offerte, je Paccepterais de
nouveau avec reconnaissance." Sonv., 373-8.
Similar statements abound in his books. From a hedon-
istic point of view no one ever surveyed his own life with more
genuine self-satisfaction.
"Tout pese, si j'avais a recommencer ma vie, avec le droit
d'y faire des ratures, je n'y changerais rien," Souv., 362.
aSon ideal ne depasse pas la realite," complains M. Seailles,
<CI1 ne congoit pas mieux que la vie d'un homme commen§ant
comane il a commence pour finir comnie il finit." E, R., 324.
But Renan has himself forestalled this criticism. For a
very different tone is adopted in speaking of his own past when-
ever he considers what might have been done, with his talents
and opportunities, for civilization at large through the ad-
vancement of science.
There can be no doubt that rational progress was, after all,
his highest ideal, and the advancement of science his real re-
ligion. No one familiar with his work as a whole will dispute
his own confession on this point:
"Les mathematiques et Tinduction physique ont toujours
ete les elements fondamentaux de mon esprit, les seules pier-
res de ma batisse qui n'aient jamais change d'assise et qui ser-
vent toujours." Souv., 251. Cf. Dr. Ph., 111. Cf. Lett
Sem., 5, 15, 16, 41, 164, 344.
It is said that after his death there was found in his desk
a piece of paper on which he had written the words:
"De tout ce que j'ai fait, c'est le Corpus que j'aime
le mieux." This was the Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum.
Rerian's predilection for positive science and exact scholar-
ship explains his frequent regrets at having devoted his life
342 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
to history and literature, instead of to natural science.26 When-
ever in later life he recalled the extreme interest he had early
felt in biological science, and compared his own achievements
with the undying fame of a Darwin, he seems to have looked
with envy upon the work of his English contemporary, whose
epoch-making demonstrations he might, as he later believed,
have partly anticipated.
"Je serais sorti du seminaire sans avoir fait d'hebreu ni de
theologie? La physiologic et les sciences naturelles m'aurai-
ent entraine ; or, je peux bien le dire, Pardeur extreme que ces
sciences vitales excitaient dans mon esprit me fait croire que,
si je les avais cultivees d'une fagon suivie, je fusse arrive a
plusieurs des resultats de Darwin, que j'entrevoyais." Souv.,
262-3.
"C'est a en donner le frisson/7 exclaims M. Scherer, "et nous
Favons echappe belle. M. Renan, je n'en doute pas, avait
tout ce qu'il faut pour etre un Darwin, mais Darwin, lui, ne
nous aurait pas rendu notre Renan." fit. litt. con,, VIII, p.
98.
But Renan's readers doubtless have no occasion to regret his
alienation from natural science; nor, most probably, have the
readers of Darwin. Renan could hardly have improved upon
the Origin of Species, to say the least; and who would have
written the Vie de Jesus?
The simple truth is that Renan's regret over what -might
have been was, as usual, a quarrelling with the inevitable ; for
it is safe to say, in view of his dominant interests at the time,
that he never was really free to exchange the library for the
laboratory. At every step in his progress, from his schooldays
at Treguier to his apostacy in 1845, and thence forward, his
work in the future seems predetermined, in general outline at
least, by the intellectual and spiritual momentum acquired
through his work in the past. Not indeed in the sense that
no other course was possible, but in the sense that no other
could have seemed reasonable. It is not meant that the im-
pelling necessity was a species of fatalism independent of his
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 343
own personality ; it was simply his own endeavor to make the
most of past acquisitions.
His entrance upon a theological career, to begin with, was
not in any sense a matter of free choice. Almost fromi in-
fancy he had, been destined for the priesthood.
"Petals ne pretre a priori, comme tant d'autres naissent
miilitaires, miagistrats." Souv., 153. Of. ibid., 309.
"Mes maitres me rendirent tellement impropre a toute be-
sogne temfporelle, que je fus frappe d'une marque irrevocable
pour la vie spirituelle." Souv., 135 ; also 140. Cf. Lett.
Sem., 196-7, 202, 238, 279.
Fatherless at the age of five, his early education was left
entirely to women and priests. In the little Treguier seminr
ary, everything, example no less than precept, impelled him in
the direction of theology. All his fellow students, unless they
failed in their studies, became priests as a matter of course.
Souv., 137, 153-4. Studious and gifted as he was, therefore,
the possibility of a lay career never for a moment entered
his mind. His teachers were his living ideals ; and his highest
ambition was to be like unto them, — a priest. Souv., II ; 140.
How indeed can a child be properly said to choose a calling,
having no comparative knowledge whatever, either of the pro-
fessions among which he is expected to choose, nor of his own
capacities or aptitudes for such professions?
In his later period Kenan took every opportunity to say pleas-
ant things about his early teachers, and about the education they
imparted. Souv., 134—5. It was to those stern-visaged, aus-
tereKmannered monks, he very truthfully says, that he owed the
best that was in him. Souv., 11. But, of course, these men
were as far as possible from! creating in their pupils an interest
for natural science, as he further explains, Souv., 130-5, and
his admiration for their persons merely shows how strong was
the bond by which he was bound to the church. Even after his
transfer to Paris, in the autumn of 1838, there was no provo-
cation, during his four years at St. Nicolas, and in fact no op-
portunity for a change of career. Souv., 169, 180, 195. It is
quite certain, indeed, according to numerous passing allusions
344 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
in his letters of the time, that his interest in science was not
aroused till 1841, when he entered the seminary at Issy. It
was there that he first developed that aversion for metaphysics
and admiration of positive science which he retained to the end.
Souv., 250, 297-8.
Here, then, for the first time, was there a parting of
the ways, and an opportunity to change his course; and
the question arises why, despite his recently acquired en-
thusiasm for science and distrust of metaphysics, he still
went on with his theological course. There were several
reasons. Apart from the influence of his directors and con-
fessors, the power of mental inertia and of daily routine,
and what may be called the contagion of personal and material
surroundings, his letters of the time make it plain that, between
Issy and St. Sulpice, in reality only different branches of the
same institution, there was no halting-place. There was no
inducement to change, and there was every inducement to go on.
It is 1rue that, at this critical period of his life, he was contin-
ually agitated by religious doubts, provoked by his readings in
philosophy and encouraged by the letters of his sister (Cf. Lett.
Int., 39 . But he had not gone far enough yet in his studies to
be entirely certain that, in this conflict between doubt and
dogma, doubt was right and dogma wrong. Souv., 319. It
was not till several years later, when suspicion had ripened into
conviction, that he had the courage to break with his past; a.nd
even then the immediate occasion was an external pressure.
Souv., 392-3. Indeed, when we consider his sister's constant
warnings against hasty and final committal to a career he mio-ht
one day regret, the fact that he did not change alone affords a
strong presumption that he could not. His professors, more-
over, who had the advantage of being also his confessors, urged
him onward in his clerical course, Souv., 260-1, 271-2, 405;
and their reasons, all the miore persuasive for his own indecision
and lack of financial means, finally prevailed over the gentler,,
and it must be admitted the wiser, counsels of his sister.
The only other period of his life when he mjight reasonably
have turned to natural science was immediately after his seces-
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 345
sion from the church, in 1845. The opportunity was all the
more favorable as his new position brought him, into intimate
relations with M. Berthelot, then, like himself, laying the foun-
dations of his future greatness. But here again his letters show
that the course he actually pursued was inevitable. He was
now 22 years old, well versed in Hebrew and biblical studies
generally, and with a power over the pen which gave promise of
success as a writer. On the other hand, there was nothing in
his prospects to tempt him to abandon the way on which he had
now gone so far. A change to biological science would appear
to have been the least possible of all, for he lacked at this junc-
ture, as he himself declares, the most essential quality of the
scientist: the capacity for specialization, Souv., 397-9; 402.
Cf. A. S., 11-12; Seailles, E. K,., 31.
In truth, the struggles involved in his recent apostacy ha,d
made too deep a groove in h.is mind ; he was too much preoccu-
pied in thought and feeling with the creeds he had just dis-
carded, to be able to settle down calmly to the patient plodding-
of laboratory experimentation. The inner momentum of his
whole being, naturally enough, impelled him in the direction of
religious reform, and there was no external influence to deflect
him from- this path. Like St. Paul — the comparison is his
own — his purpose in life was summed up in the wish: ffcupio
ommes fieri quails et ego sum/' Souv., 404. In his then con-
dition of mind, secular science seemed to him unworthy a mo-
ment's serious thought, save in so far as it might take the place
of religion in human life. A. S., 38-9. Cf. So<uv., 398.
"J'etais terriblement depayse," he writes of this period
nearly half a century later. "lAmivers me faisa.it Peffet d'un
desert sec et f raid. Du moment que le christianisme n'etait nas
la verite, le reste me parut indifferent, frivole, a peine digne
d'interet. I/ecroulement de ma vie sur elle-meme mje laissait
un sentiment de vide comnie celui qui suit un acces de fievre on
un amour brise." Souv., 330.
"Si la science devait rester ce qu'elle est, il faudrait la subir
en la maudissant ; car elle a detruit, et elle n'a pas rebati ; elle
a tire Fhomme d'un doux sommeil, sans lui adoucir la realite.""
A. S., 93.
-346 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
We must not forget that when Renan left the church, he was
not merely discarding a creed, but renouncing a livelihood as
well, and a career for which all his past life had aimed to pre-
pare him. Lett Sem., 279. Such a step is not taken without
;a prolonged intellectual and spiritual struggle. It was the
battle of conscience against self-interest, of spirit against the
claims of matter, if we may so express it, subverting the very
foundations of his spiritual self. Such a crisis must perforce
leave its mlark in the mind and temperament of the victim. So
with Renan. It was impossible for him to begin work, as it
were de novo, in a field unrelated to these recent struggles. The
most pressing need of the mordent, he seems to have felt, was to
rebuild, in mjore stately form if possible, the shattered mansions
•of his faith. Destruction called for reconstruction, very nat-
urally; and this led to an independent, historical study of the
Christian religion, eventually resulting in the well-known vol-
umes : Les Origines du Christiamsme and Uhistoire du Peuple
d' 'Israel, together with numerous articles and essays on related
subjects. *
"Une seule occupation me parut digne de remplir ma vie:
c'etait de poursuivre mes recherches critiques sur le christia-
nisme par les moyens beaucoup plus larges que m'offrait la
science lai'que." Souv., 343.
"Le livre le plus important du dix-neuvieme siecle," he
•writes in 1848, "devrait avoir pour titre: Histoire critique
des Origines du Christianisme. Oeuvre admirable que j'envie
a celui qui la realisera, et qui sera celle de mon age mur, si la
inort et tant de f atalites exterieures . . . ne viennent m'en
empecher." A. S., 279. Cf. ibid. 185 : "Cette merveilleuse
histoire qui, executee d'une maniere scientifique et definitive,
revolutionnerait la pensee."
At the time of his apostacy, therefore, in 1845, the plan of
his life was already determined. Indeed, he says this himself :
"L'idee qu'en abandonnant Tfiglise, je resterais fidele a Jesus,
s'empara de moi, et, si j'avais ete capable de croire aux appari-
tions, j'aurais certainement vu Jesus mie disant: "Abandonne-
jnoi pour etre mpn disciple." Cette pensee me soutenait,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST BENAN. 347
hardissait. Je peux dire que, des lors, la Vie de Jesus etait
ecrite dans mon esprit. La croyance a Teminente personnalite
de Jesus, qui est Tame de ce livre, avait ete ma force dans ma
lutte contre la theologie. Jesus a bien reellement toujours ete
mon maitre."27 Souv., B., 214. Of. A. S., 278-9.
Tlie fact is that, notwithstanding all his contradictions of de-
tail, Kenan's life and s^^^ as a whole is remarkable for its
logical development, ^BBy in the sense of being an almost
passive product of antecedent conditions, or environmental
pressure ; but in the higher sense of adhering to the principles
and maturing the plans of his early youth. Cf . Seailles, E. R.,
41.
There are few great men in whose lives the formative
power of circumstances is more evident, or less interfered
with by their own wills; and one of his most characteristic
traits, without doubt, is the predominance of intellect and feel-
ing over the will. As Mr. Babbitt says, the masculine religion
of the will was sacrificed to the feminine religion of the heart.
• Cf. Hahrenholtz, E. K, 93.
But when we contemplate the circumstances of his life, this
is not in the least surprising. We have already noted in pass-
ing that everything in his life, from earliest childhood on,
favored a subordination of the will to feeling and intellect.
We recall that he was brought up by women and priests. Of.
F. Det., XXX; Souv., 153 ; YIII-IX, 14-15, 33-4, 114. His
delicate health as a child debarred him from participating in
the self-asserting, will-developing, rough-and-tumble sports of
the boys, who laughed at his delicacy and called him "made-
moiselle." In his home there was no father, and his mother and
sister, as well as the girl playmates of whom he was so fond,
did much to encourage this "feminine religion of the heart."
The very poverty and simplicity of his life at home, with no
opportunity for manual labor, decided the nature of his tasks.
For reflectioni and study he had an abundance of time, as well
as abundant encouragement and good opportunities. His bril-
liant miental endowments were apparent at once, and the dis-
tinction gained in the class-room amply consoled him for the
348 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
taunts of the boys in the play-grounds, thus encouraging still
further the development of reason at the expense of the will,
and of mind at the expense of his body.
We should remember, too, his years of brooding solitude in
Paris, where the feminine influences of mother, sister and play-
mates were replaced by the rationalistic influences of Cartesian
philosophy. A religion of reason replaced the religion of feel-
ing ; but there was nothing during his student years to encour-
age- the development of an active will, and much to discourage
it. And the same is true of his later life.
His very respect for the truth, and especially his theory that in
the quest for truth all personal bias should be suppressed, would
tend, so far as this theory was carried out in his own practice,
still further to develop his intellect at the cost of his will. Such
an attitude must favor compromise, and never can lead to
blustering self-assertion. Kenan was at once too sincere and
too clear-headed a man to be tempted to dogmatize on any one
side of a debatable question.
"Un esprit eclaire se dit a lui-meme: Si, depuis que la
raison existe, taut de milliers de symboles ont eu la pretention
de presenter la verite complete, et si cette pretention s'est tou-
jours trouvee vaine, est-il bien probable que je sois plus heureux
que taut d'autres et que la verite ait attendu ma venue ici-bas
pour faire sa definitive revelation ?" C. d'Angl., 198-9.
"Si une societe, si une philosophic, si une religion eut pos-
sede la verite absolute, cette societe, cette philosophic, cette re-
ligion aurait vaincu les autres et vivrait seule a I'heur'e qu'il est.
Tons ceux qui, jusqu'ici, ont cru avoir raison se sont trompes,.
nous le voyons clairement. Pouvons-nous, sans folle outrecui-
dance, croire que Pavenir ne nous jugera pas coinme nous
jugeons le passe ? Souv., 71. Cf. A. S., 446-7.
This conviction, joined with a sincerity which in him was
second nature, led him to show an unusual regard for opponents.
NX) one ever saw more clearly, or recognized more candidly, the-
soul of truth in things erroneous, or of good in things evil.
"Ici, je plaide un peu contre moi-meme; mais je ne suis pas
un pretre ; je suis un penseur ; comme tel je dois tout voir. Un
BKAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF EllNEST KENAN". 349
ouvrage bien eompkt ne doit pas avoir besoin qu'on le refute.
L'envers de chaque pensee doit y etre indique, de maniere que
le leeteur saisisse d'un soul coup d'oeil les deux faces opposees
dont se compose toute verite." Dr. Ph., 256.
One of the central features of all his philosophy was the belief
'that truth and error, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, wisdom
and folly, and other such opposites, shade off into one another by
gradations as imperceptible as the colors in a dove's neck.
Souv., 70-1.
"Ne rien aimer, ne rien hair absolument, devient alors une
sagesse." Souv., 71.
"L'i impression des choses humaines n'est complete que si on
fait une place a 1'ironie a cote des larmes, a la pitie a cote de la
colere, an sourire a cote du respect," Dr. Ph., V. Alsa, cf.
I-II.
Such convictions, when not only preached but lived, as in
Kenan's case they were, have of course no tendency to develop
a strong, active will. One of his latest critics, Mr. Babbitt, is
quite right when he says :
"Everything tends to assume in the intelligence of Renan
the form of an acute antimony — reason and sentiment, the
classic and the romantic, the rual and the ideal, science and
morality. He is unable to fuse together and reconcile these
contradicto<ry terms in the light of a higher insight. Instead of
choosing between opposite and equally plausible conclusions, he
sets athe different lobes of hisi brain" to dialoguing about them.
Such a state, if prolonged, would lead to a paralysis of the will."
Souv., B., Introd., XXVII.
The judgment of another critic, still more unfavorable, is also
true:
"After all is said one cannot but feel that there is a touch of
something unwholesome in Kenan's writings, though, doubtless,
nothing whatever of it in his life, which was as blamieless as it
was kindly and gracious. There was too little of fierceness and
indignation against what was false and foul, too mtuch tolerance
for the partially untrue and the partially unclean. To put the
matter shortly, no one who loves the manliness and sincerity of
350 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
the puritan spirit can fail to feel a certain disgust at, and con-
tempt for, Kenan's standpoint in regard to both morality and
religion." Spectator, 79 : 897 fT.
Bnt surely no less true are the words with which his bio-
grapher concludes the story of his life:
"Veracity, like charity, covers a multitude of sins . . .
Do we not crave above all things from a gifted man, working in
Kenan's intellectual sphere, that he shall tell us what he really
and truly thinks and feels, whether the world likes it or not?'y
Espinasse, E. R, 235.
And sincere he certainly was, throughout life. Whatever
may be said of the truth of his teachings, his sincerity is beyond
question. If he failed to see human relations and eternal real-
ities in the right perspective, this was the fault of his instru-
ment, not of his purpose. On this point there is no disputing
his own testimony:
"Ce que j'ai toujours en, c'est 1'amour de la verite. Je veux
qu'on mette sur ma tombe (ah ! si elle pouvait etre au milieu du
cloitre! mais le cloitre, c'est 1'eglise, et 1'eglise, bien a tort, ne
veut pas de moi), je veux, dis-je qu'on mette sur ma tombe:
Veritatem dilexi. Oui, j'ai aime la verite . . . J'ai de-
chire les liens les plus chers pour lui obeir. Je suis sur d' avoir
biem fait . . . Cei temoignage, je le porterai haut et ferine
sur nia tete au jugement dernier." Disc., 215-16. Of. E.
Det, XXXIV; Souv., 305-6; Seailles, E. R, 22, 24, 315.
Also the letter to his friend Cbgnat, Sep. 11, 1846.
But perhaps this paper has been too unappreciative and, on
the whole, too unsympathetic; and lest his truth-loving spirit
should have cause to reproach his expositor with neglecting his
greatest miessage to the world, sincerity and truthfulness, it
seems only fair at this point, in bidding our author a, long fare-
well, to allow him a final word in defence of his own position on
the subjects discussed in this paper.
"Dans cette grande crise que 1'avenement de 1'esprit positif
fait subir de nos jours aux croyances morales, j'ai defendu
plutot qu'amioindri la. part de 1'ideal. Je n'ai pas ete de ces
esprits timides qui croient que la verite a besoin de penombre et
B BAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 351
que Tinfini craint le grand air. Pai tout critique, et, quoi
ciu'on dise, j'ai tout maintenu. J'ai rendu plus de services au
bieii en ne dissimulant rien de la realite qu'en enveloppant ma
pensee de ces voiles hypocrites qui ne trompent personne^
Notre critique a plus fait pour la conservation de la religion
que toutes les> apologies. Nous avons trouve a Dieu un riche
ecrin de synonymes. Si nos raisons de croire aux reparations
d'outre-tombe peuvent semibler freles, celles d' autrefois, etaient
elles beaucoup plus fortes ? Tesie David cum Sibylla! . . .
L'odre social, eomme Tordre theologique, provoque la question:
Qui sait si la verite n'est pas triste? L'edifice de la societe
Jiumaine porte sur un grand vide. Nous avons ose le dire.
Rien de plus dangereux que de patiner sur une couche de glace
sans songtr combien oette couche est mince. Je n'ai jaanais pu
croire que, dans aucun ordre de choses, il fut mauvais d'y voir
trop clair. Toute verite est bonne a savoir. Car toute verite
clairement sue rend fort ou prudent, deux chose® egalement
necessaires a ceux que leur devoir, une ambition imprudente ou
leur mauvais sort appellent a se meler des affaires de cette
pauvre humanite." Dr. Ph., 262-4. Cf. Monod, Renan^
36-4G.
352 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
APPENDIX A: NOTES.
Note 1. — It is interesting to compare the view of a professional
modern psychologist. Prof. James, distinguishing between "refined"
or "universal" supernaturalism, and "piecemeal" supernaturalism, in-
clines to affirm the latter on the identical ground on which it is
rejected by Renan.
"For refined supernaturalism," he writes, "the world of the ideal
has no efficient causality, and never bursts into the world of phe-
nomena at particular points. . . . Universalistic supernatural-
ism surrenders, it seems to me, too easily to naturalism. ... In
this universalistic way of taking the world, the essence of practical
religion seems to me to evaporate. ... In spite of its being so
shocking to the reigning intellectual taste, I believe that a candid con-
sideration of piece-meal supernaturalism and a complete discussion of
all its metaphysical bearings will show it to be the hypothesis by
which the largest number of legitimate requirements are met." Var.
Kel. Exp., 521-3.
Note 2. "La notion du surnaturel, avec ses impossibilites, n'ap-
parait que le jour 6u nait la science experimental de la nature.
L'homme etranger a toute idee de physique, qui croit qu'en priant il
change la marche des nuages, arrete la maladie et la mort meme, ne
trouve dans le miracle rien d'extraordinaire." V. J., 41.
"La croyance au miracle est, en effet, la consequence d'un etat
intellectual oii le monde est considers comme gouverne" par la fan-
taisie et non par des lois immuables. Sans doute, ce n'est pas ainsi
que 1'envisagent les supernaturalistes modernes, lesquels, force's par
la science, qu'ils n'osent froisser assez hardiment, d'admettre un ordre
stable dans la nature, supposent seulement que 1'action libre de Dieu
peut parfois le changer, et congoivent ainsi le miracle comme une
derogation a des lois etablies. Mais ce concept, je le repete, n'etait
nullement celui des hommes primitifs. Le miracle n'etait pas congu
alors comme surnaturel. L'idee de surnaturel n'apparait que quand
1'idee des lois de la nature s'est nettement formulae et s'impose meme
a ceux qui veulent timidement concilier le merveilleux et I'expgrience.
. Pour les hommes primitifs, au contraire, le miracle etait par-
faitement naturel et surgissait a chaque pas, ou plutot il n'y avait ni
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERTSTEST RE^AN. 353
lois ni nature pour ces ames nai'ves, voyant partout action immediate
d'agents libres. . . Ce n'est pas d'un raisonnement, mais de tout
1'ensemble des sciences modernes que sort cet immense resultat: il n'y
a pas de surnaturel." A. S., 45-6.
Note 3. Renan's position on this question is more fully set forth
in his article la Metaphysique et son avenir, 1860, and again, three
years later, in a letter to Mr. Berthelot:
"Si Ton entend par metaphysique le droit et le pouvoir qu'a I'homme
de s'elever audessus des faits, d'en voir les lois, la raison, 1'harmonie,
la poesie, la beaute . . . il y a une metaphysique. . . Mais
si Ton veut dire qu'il existe une science premiere contenant les prin-
cipes de toutes les autres, une science qui peut a elle seule, et par des
combinaisons abstraites, nous amener & la verity sur Dieu, le monde,
rhomme, je n3 vois pas la necessite d'une telle categoric du savoir
humain. . . II n'y a pas de veritS qui n'ait son point de depart
dans 1'experience scientifique, qui ne sorte directement ou indirecte-
ment d'un laboratoire ou d'une bibliotheque, car tout ce que nous
savons, nous le savons par 1'etude de la nature ou de 1'histoire." Frag.,
282-4. Cf. ibid., 263, 265. C. d'Agl., 206.
"J'ai nie autrefois 1'existence de la metaphysique comme science
a part et progressive; je ne la nie pas comme ensemble de notions
immuables a la fagon de la logique. Ces sciences n'apprennent rien,
mais elles font bien analyser ce que Ton savait. En tout cas, elles
sont totalement hors des faits. Les regies du syllogisme, les axiomes
fondamentaux de la raison pure, seraient vrais comme les mathema-
tiques, quand meme il n'y aurait personne pour les percevoir.
Mathematiques pures, logique, metaphysique, autant de sciences de
1'eternel, de rimmuabie, nullement historiques, nullement exp^ri-
mentales, n'ayant aucun rapport avec 1'existence et les faits." Frag.,
174-5.
Note 4. "II n'est pas stir que la Terre ne manque pas sa
destinee, comme cela est probafrlement arrivS a des mondes innom-
brables; il est meme possible que notre temps soit un jour considers
comme le point culminant apres lequel 1'humanite n'aura fait que
dechoir; mais 1'univers ne connait pas le decouragement; il com-
mencera sans fin 1'oeuvre avortee; chaque echec le laisse jeune, alerte,
plein d'illusions. . . Courage, courage, nature! . . Obstine-toi;
repare pour la millionieme fois la maille de filet qui se casse. . .
Vise, vise encore le but que tu manques depuis I'eternitS. . . Tu
as 1'infini de 1'espace et 1'infini du temps pour ton experience. Quand
10
354 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
on a le droit de se tromper impunement, on est toujours sur de reus-
sir." Souv., XX-XXI.
"The universe . . obtains its object by an infinite variety of
germs. What Javeh desires always happens. Let us not be trou-
bled; if we are among those who are going astray, who are running
counter to the supreme will, that is of little consequence. Humanity
is one of the countless ant-hills among which the experiment of
reason is being carried on in the midst of space; if we miss our goal,
others will reach it." P. Isr., 11:454-5; ibid. vol. V, 361.
Note 5. The same view is taken in his Etudes d'histoire religieuse,
p. 419.:
"Dieu, Providence, immortalite, autant de bons vieux mots, un peu
lourds peut-etre, que la philosophic interpretera dans des sens de
plus en plus raffines, mais qu'elle ne remplacera jamais avec avantage.
Sous une forme ou sous une autre, Dieu sera toujours le resume" de
nos besoms suprasensibles, la categorie de 1'ideal (c'est & dire la
forme sous laquelle nous concevons 1'ideal." Cf. Frag., 250; A. S.,
479.
Note 6. "Our normal waking consciousness, rational conscious-
ness, as we call it," writes Prof. James in his latest book, "is
but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from
it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness
entirely different. . . No account of the universe in its totality
can be final, which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite
disregarded. . . They may determine attitudes, though they can-
not furnish formulas, and open a region, though they fail to give a
map. At any rate they forbid a premature closing of our accounts
with reality. .
. . If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level
of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits.
. . The truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere, ar-
ticulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings
of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclu-
sions." Var. Rel. Exp., 388, 73, 74. Prof. James explains that he is
dealing for the moment with the is, not with' the ought. All he con-
tends for is that the sub-conscious and non-rational does, as a matter
of fact, hold primacy over reason in the religious realm. Cf. ibid., pp.
422-4, 427, 456.
Note 7. "How do we know," asks Prof. James, "that conscious-
ness is generated de novo in each particular brain? May not
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 355
consciousness exist anterior to the brain, behind the scenes, co-eval
with the world?
The production of such a thing as consciousness in the brain is the
absolute world-enigma, — something so paradoxical and abnormal as to
be a stumbling block to Nature, and almost a self-contradiction. Hum.
Im., 21.
Even though our soul's life (as here below ft is revealed to us) may
be in literal strictness the function of a brain that perishes, yet it is
not at all impossible, but on the contrary quite possible, that the life
may still continue when the brain itself is dead." Ibid., 11-12.
Note 8. Compare the famous declaration of Huxley:
"If there is one thing plainer than another, it is that neither the
pleasures nor the pains, of life in the merely animal world are distrib-
uted according to desert; for it is admittedly impossible for the lower
orders of sentient beings to deserve either tfie one or the other. If
there is a generalization from the facts of human life, which has the
assent of thoughtful men in every age and country, it is that the vio-
lator of ethical rules constantly escapes the punishment which he de-
serves; that the wicked flourishes like the green bay-tree, while the
righteous begs his bread; that the sins of the fathers are visited upon
the, children; that, in the realm of nature, ignorance is punished just
as severely as wilful wrong; and that thousands upon thousands of in-
nocent beings suffer for the crime, or the unintentional trespass, of
one." Evolution and Ethics, Lond., 1893, p. 12.
So likewise felt Goethe:
"Denn unfiihlend
1st die Natur:
Es leuchtet die Sonne
Uber bose und gute,
Und dem Verbrecher
Glanzen wie dem Besten
Der Mond und die Sterne.
Wind und Strome,
Donner und Hagel
Rauschen ihren Weg
Und ergreifen,
Voriibereilend,
Einen und den andern.
Auch so das Gliick
Tappt unter die Menge,
Fasst bald des Knaben
356 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Lockige Unschuld,
Bald auch den kahlen
Schuldigen Scheitel.
Nach ewigen, ehrnen,
Grossen Gesetzen
Miissen wir alle
Unseres Daseins
Kreise vollenden. . . "
Note 9. "I have said nothing," writes Prof James of his Gifford
Lectures, "about immortality or the belief therein, for to me it seems
a secondary point. If our ideals are only cared for in 'eternity/ I do
not see why we might not be willing to resign their care to other
hands than ours. Yet I sympathize with the urgent impulse to be
present ourselves, and in the conflict of impulses, both of them so
vague yet both of them noble, I know not how to decide. It seems to
me it is eminently a case for facts to testify." Var. Rel. Exp., 524.
But in the case of many people, if not most, it is the death of a
loved one, child, parent, or friend, that reinforces this "urgent im-
pulse to be present ours'elves," and it is very hard to see how such
people can be willing to leave the hoped-for reunion "to other hands
than their own."
In complete contrast with these statements is the belief of Emer-
son:
"If you love and serve men, you cannot by any hiding or stratagem
escape the remuneration. Secret retributions are always restoring
the level, when disturbed, of the divine justice. It is impossible to
tilt the beam. All the tyrants and proprietors and monopolists of the
world in vain set their shoulders to heave tfie bar. Settles forever-
more the ponderous equator to its line, and man and mote, and star
and sun, must range to it, or be pulverized by the recoil." Lectures
and Biogr. Sket., 1868, p. 186.
Note 10. Compare the statement of Sidgwick, Methods, 438:
"And, therefore, I should judge, from a strictly utilitarian point of
view, that any attempt, such as Bentham made, to dispense with the
morality of instinct and tradition, would be premature and ill-advised." •
Note 11. From a passage in the Souvenirs it appears that, as man
is duped by Nature, so Nature in turn may be duped by man. The
following story is put in the mouth of Kenan's mother, but she is
plainly expressing his own views:
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAI*. 357
"Tout n'est au fond qu'une grande illusion, et ce qui le prouve,
c'est que, dans beaucoup de cas, rien n'est plus facile que de duper la
nature par des singeries qu'elle ne sait pas distinguer de la r6alite\
Je n'oublierai jamais la fille de Marzin. . . qui, folle par sup-
pression du sentiment maternel, prenait une buche, remmaillottait de
chiffons, lui mettait un semblant de bonnet d'enfant, puis passait les
jours & dorloter dans ses bras ce poupon fictif, £ le bercer, & le serrer
centre son sein, §L le couvrir de baisers. . . II y a des instincts pour
qui 1'apparence suffit et qu'on endort par des fictions. . . Que
veux-tu! Ces pauvres folles prouvent par leurs ggarements les saintes
lois de la nature et leur inevitable fataliteV' Souv., 41-2.
Note lla. An interesting comparison at this point is again fur-
nished by Prof. James. Commenting on the favorite utterance of
Margaret Puller: "I accept the universe," and Carlyle's sardonic re-
ply. "Gad! she'd better!" he writes:
"At bottom the whole concern of both morality and religion is with
the manner of our acceptance of the universe. Do we accept it only
in part and grudgingly, or heartily and altogether? . . . Morality
pure and simple acce'pts the law of the whole which it finds reigning,
so far as to acknowledge and obey it, but it may obey it with the
heaviest and coldest heart, and never cease to feel it as a yoke. But
for religion, in its strong and well-developed manifestations, the serv-
ice of the higher never is felt as a yoke. Dull submission is left far
behind, and a mood of welcome, which may fill any place on the scale
between cheerful serenity and enthusiastic gladness, has taken its
place. . • . It makes a tremendous emotional and practical differ-
ence to one whether one accept the universe ra, the drab discolored
way of stoic resignation to necessity, or with the passionate happi-
ness of Christian saints." Var. Rel. Exp., 41.
Note 12. "The assertion that mortality is in any way depend-
ent on certain philosophical problems," says Prof. Huxley, "produces
the same effect on my mind as if one should say that a man's vision
depends on his theory of sight, or that he has no business to be sure
that ginger is hot in his mouth, unless he has formed definite views
as to the nature of ginger."
"If it is demonstrated that without this or that theological dogma
the human race will lapse into bipedal cattle, more brutal than the
beasts by reason of their greater cleverness, my next question is to
ask for the proof of the dogma. If this proof is forthcoming, it is my
conviction that no drowning sailor ever clutched a hencoop more
tenaciously than mankind will hold by such dogma, whatever it may
358 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
be. But if not, then I verily VeltSve that the human race will go on
its evil way; and my only consolation lies in the reflection that, how-
ever bad our posterity may become, so long as they hold by the plain
rule of not pretending to believe what they have no reason to believe,
because it may be to their advantage so to pretend, they will not have
reached the lowest depths of immorality."
In behalf of the same view may be cited one of the greatest names
in modern ethics, Prof. Sidgwick:
"I am so far from feeling bound to believe for purposes of practice
what I see no ground for holding as a speculative truth, that I can-
not even conceive the state of mind which these words seem to de-
scribe, except as a momentary, half-wilful irrationality, committed in
a violent access of philosophic despair." Methods, 5th ed., 507.
Note 13. This remained Renan's attitude, more or less con-
sistently, throughout life. Nature and nurture had combined to in-
oculate his childhood with a temperamental idealism which not even
the rudest reverses of life were able entirely to efface.
Nearly half a century later he writes of himself:
"En fait, je n'ai d'amour que pour les caracteres d'un ide"alisme
absolu, martyrs, he"ros, utopistes, amis de fimpossible. De ceux-la
seuls je m'occupe; ils sont, si j'ose le dire, ma spe"cialiteV' Souv., 123.
"Je n'abandonnai nullement mon gout pour 1'deal; je 1'ai plus vif
que jamais, je 1'aurai toujours. Le moindre acte de vertu, le moindre
grain de talent, me paraissent infiniment supe"rieurs a toutes les rich-
j, a tous les succes du monde." Souv., 122.
Note 13a. "What right have we," asks Dr. Maudsley, "to be-
lieve nature under any obligation to do her work by means of com-
plete minds only? She may find an incomplete mind a more suitable
instrument for a particular purpose. It is the work that is done, and
the quality in the worker by which it was done, that is alone of mo-
ment; and it may be no great matter from a cosmical standpoint, if in
other qualities of character he was singularly defective, — if indeed
he were hypocrite, adulterer, eccentric, or lunatic." Quoted, with ap-
proval, by Prof. James, Var. Rel. Exp., 19.
Note 14. "Happiness," says Prof. James, "like every other emo-
tional state, has blindness and insensibility to opposing facts given
it as its instinctive weapon for self-protection against disturb-
ance. When happiness is actually in possession, the thought of evil
can no more acquire the feeling of reality, than the thought of good
can gain reality when melancholy rules. To the man actively happy,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERXEST RENAI*. 359
from whatever cause, evil simply cannot then and there be believed
in. Var. Rel. Exp., 88; also cf., 90.
But this exactly is the problem, why happiness rather than melan-
choly should continue in possession.
Renan has attempted himself to explain his constant cheerfulness,
but as usual his explanations do not agree very well with each other.
He is specially fond of attributing his temperamental cheerfulness to
his descent from a Celtic ancestry. Disc., 217.
"Je suis double," he writes in the Souvenirs, "quelque fois une
partie de moi rit quand 1'autre pleure. C'est la 1'explication de ma
gaite. Comme il y a deux hommes en moi, il y en a toujours un qui
a lieu d'etre content." p., 145.
The explanation offered in the Souvenirs is more serious, and on
the whole, correct:
"Ma paix d 'esprit est parfaite. D'un autre cote, j'ai trouve1 une
bonte extreme dans la nature et dans la sociSte. . . Je n'ai ren-
contre" sur mon chemin que des hommes excellents. . . Une bonne
humeur, difficilement alterable, rgsultat d'une bonne sant§ morale,
rgsultat elle-meme d'une ame bien e'quilibre'e et d'un corps suppor-
table malgr6 ses dSfauts, m'a jusqu'ici maintenu dans une philosophic
tranquille, soit qu'elle se traduise en optimisme reconnaissant, soit
qu'elle aboutisse a une ironie gaie. Je n'ai jamais beaucoup souf-
fert " p. 374.
Note 15. It would not be hard to find in Kenan's books many
other passages in which the same doctrine is expressed or implied.
Here, e. g., is another from the Souvenirs:
"Et maintenant je ne demande plus au bon genie qui m'a tant de
fois guide, conseillee, console, qu'une mort douce et subite, pour 1'heure
qui m'est fix§e, proche ou lointaine. Les stoiciens soutenaient qu'on
a pu mener la vie bienheureuse dans le ventre du taureau de Phalaris.
C'est trop dire. La douleur abaisse, humilie, porte a blasphemer.
La seule mort acceptable est la mort noble, qui est non un accident
pathologique, mais une fin voulue et prScieuse devant 1'Eternel. La
mort sur le champ de bataille est la plus belle de toutes, etc. Souv.,
376.
Note 16. It is from this point of view that we must interpret
Kenan's frequent suspicions that morality and religion may be nothing
more, after all, than cosmic illusions. In the course of evolution only
such traits of mind and character have come down to our own times
as were not incompatible with the requirements of successful life
360 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
under set cosmic conditions. This is concisely and clearly expressed
in the following passage:
"Une humanite plus intelligente, ou tous verraient clair, ne serait
pas viable; elle periraic dans son germe meme, et par consequent elle
n'existe pas." Dial., 30.
Note 17. The same attitude appears to have been taken by Renan
during the siege of Paris, in 1870. The Journal of the Goncourts
records the following scene:
"Berthelot continue ses revelations desolantes, au bout desquelles
je m'e'crie: 'Alors tout est fini, il ne nous reste plus qu'zi el ever une
generation pour la vengeance' " — "Non, non, crie Renan, qui s'est
leve, la figure toute rouge, pas la vengeance, perisse la France, perisse
la patrie, il y a au-dessus le Royaume du Devoir, de la Raison." — "Non,
non, hurle toute la table, il n'y a rien au-dessus de la patrie . . ."
Renan s'est leve et se promene autour de la table, la marche mal
e"quilibree, ses petits bras battant 1'air, citant a haute voix des frag-
ments de 1'Ecriture sainte, en disant que tout est la." E. de Goncourt,
Journal, 2 serie, I vol., p. 28. But cf. Renan's letters to M. Strauss,
written at this time; aiso Seailles, E. R., 265, note 1.
Note 18. Renan's progress from radicalism to conservatism can
be broadly traced in his attitude towards the French Revolution
at different periods of his life. In the Avenir de la science he is still
a fervent admirer of that great event, as appears from the following
foot-note:
"L'ann§e 1789 sera dans 1'histoire de 1'humanite une ann£e sainte.
. Le lieu ou 1'humanite s'est proclamee, le Jeu de Paume, sera
un jour un temple; on y viendra comme a Jerusalem, quand 1'eloigne-
ment aura sanctifie et caracterise' les faits particuliers en symboles
des faits g6neraux. Le Golgotha ne devint sacre que deux ou trois
siecles apres Je"sus." A. S., note 6.
The same attitude is taken in his letters during the period between
his apostacy from the church in 1845 and the coup d'etat of 1851: In
a letter from St. Malo, for example, Sept., 1847, to his friend Berthe-
lot, he gravely argues: If the sublimities of the Christian religion
have prevailed over its narrowness and its primitive superstitions,
why should the sublimity of the Revolution be unable to efface its
horrors? The critic will see both sides, to be sure, as he sees them
both in Christianity; but the religionist will see only the sublime, just
as in Christianity. Corr., 32.
With this youthful enthusiasm we may contrast what he has to say
on the same subject in 1858, in his article on M. Cousin:
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 361
"Ail fond, la Revolution frangaise, qu'on prend toujours comme un
fait general de 1'histoire du monde (Hegel lui-meme a commis cette
erreur), est un fait tres particulier a la France, un fait gaulois, si
j'ose le dire, la consequence de cette vanite" qui fait que le gaulois
supporte tout, excepte" 1' inSgalite des rangs sociaux, et de cette
logique absolue qui le porte a reformer la societe" sur un type ab-
strait, — again like himself in the A. S., — sans tenir compte de 1'histoire
et des droits consacres." Mor. Grit., 98-9. CT. Q. C., III-IV, 86, 380;
also R6f. int., 248.
From a passage in the Souvenirs it appears that his early enthus-
iasm for the Revolution was caught from his mother, and that he was
well aware of the inconsistency of his statements in regard to it:
"J'ai pris d'elle un gout invincible de la Revolution, qui me 1'a fait
aimer malgrg ma raison et malgre tout le mal que j'ai dit d'elle. Je
n'efface rien de ce que j'ai dit; mais, depuis que je vois 1'espece de
rage avec laquelle des ecrivains Strangers cherchent a prouver que la
Revolution frangaise n'a etc" que honte, folie, et qu'elle constitue un
fait sans importance dans 1'histoire du monde, je commence a croire
que c'est peut-etre ce que nous avons fait de mieux, puisqu'on en est
si jaloux." Souv., 105.
We may note, too, in passing, that Renan's early radicalism in mat-
ters of social policy was simply the application to secular institutions
of that same intellectual temper of ultra-rationalism which had re-
cently forced him out of the church. Indeed, we should hardly expect
a young man who had just set aside the supposedly sacred authorities
and traditions of the church, to show much respect for authority and
tradition in secular matters.
He was certainly influenced, too, in these matters, during the
years immediately following his withdrawal from the church, by his
intimate relations with the young Berthelol. It was in the autumn of
1845 that they first made each other's acquaintance. Renan was 22
years old, and Berthelot 18, and so completely did they stand at the
same point of view, t~at friendship at once became a kind of intel-
lectual partnership.
"Notre ardeur d'apprendre e"tait egale; nos cultures avaient Ste"
tres di verses. Nous mimes en commun tout ce que nous savions;
. Berthelot m'apprit ce qu'on n'enseignait pas au se"minaire; de mott
c6t6, je me mis en devoir de lui apprendre la th6ologie et I'h6breu. . .
Notre honnetete et notre droiture s'embrasserent. . . Nos discus-
sions 6taient sans fin. . . Nous passions une partie des nuits a
chercher, a travailler ensemble. . . La crise de 1848 nous 6mut
profondement. . . Notre amiti6 consista en ce que nous nous ap~
prenions inutuellement, en une sorte de commune fermentation qu'une
362 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
remarquable conformite d'organisation intellectuelle produisait en
nous devant les mSmes objets. Ce que nous avions vu a deux nous
paraissait certain. . . II faut que les questions sociales et philoso-
phiques soient bien difficiles, pour que nous ne les ayons pas resolues
dans notre effort de"sespere." Souv., 334-7.
The results of this co-operative intellectual fermentation are pre-
served in Kenan's Avenir de la science, that great Pourana, as he him-
self calls it, from which most of his later inspirations were drawn.
A. S., XI. Cf. Seailles, &. R., 40-1.
Kenan's radicalism was destined to be short-lived, however. The
events of 1848 had already shaken rudely his confidence in democracy,
and the coup d'etat of 1851 destroyed it completely. A. S., IV.
His mission to Italy, moreover, during 1849-50, besides developing
new interests and awakening his artistic instinct, had taught him the
valuable lesson that different peoples need different institutions, and
that a government which is good for one country may be very bad for
another. Within a year after writing the Avenir de la science he had
so far changed his ground, he himself tells us, especially with refer-
ence to socialism, that he wondered how he ever embraced the views
so enthusiastically espoused in that work. It was for this reason
among others that the book was not published till more than forty
years later. A. S., IX.
Note 19. This attitude seems at first glance to be contradicted
by his unlimited admiration of all the forms of culture achieved
by ancient Athens. Souv., 57-72. But Athenian democracy, as he ex-
pressly admits in that famous rhapsody, was virtually an aristocracy,
based on slavery.
"II y a eu un peuple d'aristocrates, un public tout entier compose"
de connaisseurs, une democratic qui a saisi des nuances d'art telle-
ment fines que nos raffines les apergoivent a peine. II y a eu un pub-
lic pour comprendre ce qui fait la beaute des Propylees et la
superiority des sculptures du Parthenon." Souv., 61.
Note 20. Kenan's conception of civil liberty coincides exactly with
that of Herbert Spencer:
"La liberte", c'est le droit qu'a tout homme de croire et de faire ce
que bon lui semble dans les limites ou le droit semblable des autres
n'est point atteint." Mor. Grit., 159.
Note 20a. "L'me"galite est legitime toutes les fois que 1'inegalite
est nScessaire au bien de I'humanite. Une societe a droit a ce
-qui est necessaire a son existence, quelque apparente injustice qui en
BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 363
re"sulte pour 1'individu. . . La possibility et les besoins de la so-
ciete, les inte'rets de la civilisation priment tout le reste. . . Je
vais jusqu'a dire que, si jamais 1'esclavage a pu €tre n6cessaire a
1'existence de la societe, 1'esclavage a ete Iggitime; car alors les
esclaves ont et6 esclaves de 1'humanite, esclaves de 1'oeuvre divine,
ce qui ne rgpugne pas plus que 1'existence de tant d'etres attaches
fatalement au jong d'une idee qui leur est superieure et qu'ils ne com-
prennent pas. A. S., 378-9. Cf. ibid., notes 156 and 157:
"On est parfois tenter de se demander si 1'humanite n'a pas e"te" trop
tot emancipee. . . Comment fera rhumanitS, avec une liberte in-
dividuelle aussi developpee que la nStre, pour conquerir les deserts?
. Les grandes choses ne se font pa sans sacrifice, et la religion,
conseilldre des sacrifices, n'est plus! Je me berce parfois de 1'espoir
que les machines et les progres de la science appliquee compenseront
un jour ce que I'humanitS aura perdu d'aptitude au sacrifice par le
progres de la reflection."
This doctrine was often reaffirmed by Renan in his later period, and
is developed at length in his Dialogues and his Drames.
The practice of vivisection, and the killing of animals for food, is
justified by Renan on the same general ground as slavery:
"Les animaux qui servent a la nourriture de l'homme de g§nie ou
de I'homme de bien devraient etre contents, s'il savaient S, quoi ils
servent. Tout depend du but, et si un jour la vivisection sur une
grande Schelle etait necessaire pour decouvrir les grands secrets de
la nature vivante, j'imagine les etres, dans 1'extase du martyre volon-
taire, venant s'y offrir couronnes de fleurs. Le meurtre inutile d'une
mouche est un acte blamable; celui qui est sacrifi£ aux fins ideales n'a
pas droit de se plaindre, et son sort, au regard de rinfini (r<y S«o> ),
est digne d'envie." Dial., 129-30. Cf. A. S... IX, 387.
But Renan himself has repeatedly asserted, both before and after
writing this passage, that these transcendental ends are not known, and
very probably cannot be known:
"Rien ne nous indique quelle est la volonte de la nature, ni le but
de 1'univers." A. S., XVI. Cf. Frag., 318-9.
Taking the two statements together, it would seem that he is him-
self refuting the very proposition which his arguments are intended
to establish. For if the sacrifice of individual lives and liberties is
legitimate only when made for certain supposedly transcendental ends
of Nature, it would seem that these ends must be known before the
sacrifice can be legitimate. It must be admitted that Renan's ideal-
ism, in the present instance again, is more beautiful than true.
364 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Note 21. That this is not merely the doctrine of one of Kenan's-
characters but truly his own, is shown by the following passages from,
his article on Amiel:
"Les societes de temperance reposent sur d'excellentes intentions,
mais sur un malentendu. Je ne connais qu'un argument en leur
faveur. M. T. . . me disaft un jour que les maris de certains pays,,
quands ils n'ont pas ete temperants, battent leurs femmes. Voila qui
est horrible, assurement; il faudrait tacher de corriger cela. Mais, au
lieu de supprimer 1'ivresse pour ceux qui en ont besoin, ne vaudrait-il
pas mieux essayer de la rendre douce, aimable, accompagnee de sen-
timents moraux? II y a tant d'hommes pour lesquels 1'heure de
1'ivresse est, apres 1'heure de 1'amour, le moment ou ils sont les meil-
leurs." F. Det., 383-4.
In the following passage he attempts to defend this attitude on phil-
osophic grounds:
"Eh bien! 1'etat d'ame que M. Amiel appelle dedaigneusement.
'Te'picure'isrne de 1'imaglnation" n'est peut-etre pas, pour cela, un
mauvais parti. La gaiete a cela de tres philosophique qu'elle semble
dire a la nature que nous ne la prenons pas plus au serieux qu'elle ne
nous prend nous-memes.; si le monde est une mauvaise farce, par
la gaiete" nous la rendons bonne. D'un autre cote", si une pens6e
indulgente et bienveillante preside a Funivers, nous entrons bien mieux
par la resignation joyeuse dans les intentions de cette pensee supreme,.
que par la morne raideur du sectaire et I'^ternelle j6re"miade du croy-
ant." F. D6t, 396-7.
And again:
"Amiel se demande avec inquietude: Qu'est-ce qui sauve? Eh!
mon Dieu! c'est ce qui donne a chacun son motif de vivre. Le moyen
de salut n'est pas le meme pour tous. Pour Tun, c'est la vertu; pour
1'autre, 1'ardeur du vrai; pour un autre, 1'amour de 1'art; pour d'autres,
la curiosite, 1'ambition, les voyages, le luxe, les femmes, la richesse;
au plus bas degre, la morphine et 1'alcool. Les hommes vertueux
trouvent leur recompense dans la vertu meme; ceux qui ne le sont pas
ont le plaisir." F. De"t, 382-3.
In spite of the offensively frivolous tone of these passages, — and
they might easily be multiplied, — there is a grain of truth in Kenan's
contention. This is more clearly and less objectionably put by Prof.
James :
"The sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its
power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually
crushed to earth by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour.
Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands,
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 365
unites, and says yes. It is in fact the great exciter of the Yes
function in man. It brings its votary from the chill periphery of things
to the radiant core. It makes him for the moment one with truth.
Not through mere perversity do men run after it. To the poor and
the unlettered it stands in the place of symphony concerts and of liter-
ature; and it is part of the deeper mystery and tragedy of life that
whiffs and gleams of something that we immediately recognize as
excellent should be vouchsafed to so many of us only in the fleeting
earlier phases of what in its totality is so degrading and poisoning.
The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness,
and our total opinion of it must find its place in our opinion of that
larger whole." Var. Rel. Exp., 387.
Note 22. "I/impossibillte" ou il se voyait de plus en plus de faire
des sottises 1'autorisait a dire toute celles qui lui passaient par
la tete; il se rendait cette justice qu'il n'avaft fait aucun mal; il ne
songeait pas qu'ecrire, c'est agir, et qu'on a sa part des fautes de tous
ceux dont on affaiblit la conscience et la volonte"." E. R. XII. Also 292.
In reply one might quote from Renan:
"Tout ce qui eleve I'homme et le ramene au soin de son ame I'am6-
liore et 1'epure; la qualite des doctrines importe assez peu. Les lec-
teurs capables de trouver du gout a un e"crit, sont capables aussi d'en
decouvrir le venin, s'il y en a." Mor. Grit, VII. Cf., Dial., 32-40; Eccl.,
88; F. Det., 426-7. Souv. 149-50.
But such statements, even if they were quite true, would not remove
the objection; and for once there can be no doubt that Renan is wrong
and his critic right.
Note 22a. Compare the statement of Amiel:
"Juger notre 6poque au point de vue de 1'histoire universelle,
1'histoire au point de vue de periodes geologiques, la geologie
au point de vue de rastronomie, c'est un affranchissement pour
la pensee. Quand la dure"e d'une vie d'homme ou de peuple nous ap-
parait aussi microscopique que celle d'un moucheron, et, inversement,
la vie d'un ephemere aussi infinie que celle d'un corps celeste avec
toute sa poussiere de nations, nous nous sentons bien petits et bien
grands, et nous pouvons dominer de toute la hauteur des spheres notre
propre existence et les petits tourbillons qui agitent notre petite Eu-
rope." Journ., Jl. 20, 1848.
Note 23. For the general question of heterogeneous personalities,
the reader is referred to James, Var. Rel. Exp., 166-'88. The divided
366 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
self and the process of Us unification, and to the numerous references
there given to other treatments of the same subject.
Note 24. This same doctrine of objective reason as being "not
merely the only legitimate source of belief, which perhaps it may be,
but the only source of legitimate beliefs, which it assuredly is not,"
is clearly expressed also in his article UExamen de conscience phi-
losophique, 1888:
"Le premier devoir de 1'homme sincere est de ne pas influer sur ses
propres opinions, de laisser la rSalite" se refle'ter en lui comme en la
chambre noire du photographe. . . Devant les modifications internes
de notre re"tine intellectuelle, nous devons rester passifs. . . Nous
n'avons pas le droit d'avoir un de"sir, quand la raison parle; nous
devons ecouter, rien de plus; prets a nous laisser trainer pieds et
poings lies ou les meilleurs arguments nous entrainent. La production,
de la verite est un phe"nomene objectif, etranger au moi, qui se passe
en nous sans nous, une sorte de precipite" chimique que nous devons
nous contenter de regarder avec curiosite"." F. De"t., 401-2.
In accordance with this theory Renan believed that the progress of
reason is inevitable and irresistible. No man can choose what he will
or will not believe.
"S'il y a quelque chose de fatal au monde, c'est la raison et la sci-
ence. Les orthodoxes sont vraiment plaisants dans leurs coleres
contre les libres penseurs, comme s'il avait de"pendu d'eux de se de-
velopper autrement, comme si Ton e"tait maitre de croire ce que Ton
veut." A. S., 93. Cf. F. Det, 402. In recent years this question as to
the proper attitude of mind in the pursuit of truth, has been much dis-
cussed, especially with reference to the role which the will and the
intellect respectively play in what may be called the psychology of re-
ligious belief. Hermann Lotze seems to have done more than any
one else in the last century to inaugurate this reaction against the
agnostic doctrine (see his Microcosmos, Eng. tr., 4th ed., 1890, vol. 2,
pp. 571-8, 659, 678; also the introductory pages of his Outlines of
Philosophy of Religion. A powerful impetus was given to the move-
ment by Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belie?; but perhaps the most
lucid discussion in brief compass is that of Prof. James, in his well-
known essay The Will to Believe.
Note 25. This view of his apostacy conflicts, it is true, with his
own account in the Souvenirs; but his own version, written some
thirty years after the event, seems distorted by historical perspective,
or imperfect remembrance:
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 367
He is certainly mistaken when he says, for example:
"Ma foi a ete detruite par la critique historique, non par la scolas-
tique, ni par la philosophie. L'histoire de la philosophic et 1'espSce de
scepticisme dont j'etais atteint me retenaient dans le christianisme
plutot qu'elles ne m'en chassaient Je me repStais souvent ces vers.
que j'avais lus dans le vieux Brucker:
Discussii fateor, sectas attentius omnes,
Plurima quaesivi, per singula quaeque cucurri,
Nee quidquarn inveni melius quam credere Christo." Souv., 258.
"Dans cette grande lutte engagee entre ma raison et mes croyances,
j'evitai soigneusement de faire un seul raisonnement de philosophie
abstraite. . . Mes raisons furent toutes de 1'ordre philologique et
critique; elles ne furent nullement de 1'ordre m6taphysique, de 1'ordre
politique, de 1'ordre moral" Souv. 297-8. Cf. ibid., 286; also Mor. Cr.^
174.
These statements must be taken to represent the process as it ap-
peared to his memory in the retrospect, rather than its actual char-
acter. A truer account is found in his letters of the time, which
are contemporary records, and addressed, not like the Souvenirs ta
a promiscuous public as an Apologia pro vita sua, but to the only per-
son in the world to whom he dared reveal the most intimate secrets of
his heart, his sister Henriette. It is to this correspondence, where-
his plans and prospects, his disappointments and his difficulties are
frankly discussed, that we must turn for the real causes of his sepa-
ration from the church.
And from these letters it is very clear that his apostasy was not
by any means due, as he insists, exclusively to historical and textual
criticism, but quite as much to his readings in philosophy and natural
science. For long before he was capable of wielding the weapons of
textual criticism, ana before he had even begun his studies in biblical
philology, he was being incessantly torn by religious doubts of the
very gravest nature. Cf. A. S,. 49.
As early as March, 1842, before he had begun either Hebrew or
German (Lett. Sem,., 165, 229), he was already inoculated with the
germs of an all-questioning scepticism.
On March 23, 1842, he writes to his sister:
"D'ailleurs, le propre de la philosophie est moins de donner des
notions bien assurees, que de lever une foule de prejuges. On est tout
etonne", quand on commence a s'y adonner, de voir que jusque-la, on
a etc" le jouet de mille erreurs, enracinees par 1'opinion, la coutume,.
1'education." Lett. 87; also 122. Cf. Lett. Sem., 164, 175.
368 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Again on Sept. 15 of the same year, he writes:
"On voit les choses d'une maniere si differente; on reconnait tant
-de prejuges et d'erreurs, la ou Ton ne croyait voir que verite, qu'on
serait tenter d'embrasser un scepticisme universel. C'est la la pre-
miere impression de 1'etude de la philosophic" Lett., 96; also 100.
And that it was not merely his secular beliefs that had grown un-
certain, but his religious creed as well, appears clearly from another
passage in the same letter, where he discusses the choice of a vocation.
Declaring that he was not intended for a secular calling, he continues:
"Je ne dis pas ceci par le zele d'une devotion spirituelle: oh! non;
ce n'est plus la mon defaut; la philosophie est merveilleusement propre
a en corriger les exces, et une reaction trop violente est seule a
craindre." Lett., 100.
Even in the Souvenirs itself there are passages in which the influ-
ence of philosophy is explicitly recognized as an important factor in
the destruction of his faith; as for example the following:
"La contradiction des travaux philosophiques ainsi entendu avec la
foi chrStienne ne m'apparaissait point encore avec le degre de clarte"
qui bientot ne devait laisser a mon esprit aucun choix entre 1'abandon
du christianisme et 1'inconsequence la plus inavouable." Souv., 247;
also 251; Cf. St. Beuve, Nouv. Lund., Je. 2, 18S2; N. Am. Rev., 48-63ff.
But the most glaring discrepancy appears in his attempt to account
for the persistent orthodoxy of one of his teachers, the erudite M.
Lehir. The question could scarcely fail to present itself to his mind:
If the study of biblical criticism proved so disastrous to the faith of the
student, why was the teaching of it compatible with the faith of the
professor?
"La verite de 1'orthodoxie," he writes of M. Lehir, "ne fut jamais
pour lui 1'objet d'un doute. . . Tout a fait Stranger a la philosophie
naturelle et a 1'esprit scientifique, dont la premiere condition est de
n'avoir aucune foi prealable et de rejeter ce qui n'arrive pas, il resta
.dans cette equilibre ou une conviction moins ardente eut tre'buche'.
Le surnaturelle ne lui causait aucune repugnance intellectuelle." Souv.,
274; Cf. A. S., 49.
The explanation is probably correct; but does it not involve the
open admission that foremost among the causes of his own defection
were "la philosophie naturelle et 1'esprit scientifique," and a "repug-
nance intellectuelle" against supernaturalism? Cf. Lett. S6m., 5, 15,
16, 41.
The truth is, when Renan entered upon his theological studies at
St Sulpice, in Sep. 1843, he was virtually a disbeliever already. From
the very first the onus probandi was thrown on Christianity. That
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 369
was important. There is all the difference in the world between be-
lieving a creed until disproven, and disbelieving it until proven; and
there can be no doubt whatever that the latter was Renan's attitude
towards the Christian creed at the beginning of his theological studies.
It cannot be true then, that his faith was destroyed by textual criti-
cism of the bible, for the excellent reason that none remained to be
destroyed. All that was left for philology to do was to ripen the seed
that philosophy and science had sown. And that it promptly did.
By destroying the prestige of a supposedly infallible scripture, phil-
ology dethroned the last authority which still subdued his reason
and restrained his will. But even here there were powerful allies.
Renan ceased to acknowledge the authority of the scriptures not
merely because of errors and contradictions in the text, but also, as
he very significantly observes in one of his letters of the time, be-
cause an inspired book would be a miracle. Souv, 293-5; Cf. Dial. 14-22.
That was decisive. To imply a miracle was to assail his most
cherished conviction, the reign of law, and to assert an impossible ab-
surdity. Dial., 14-22. In his mind, the impossibility of miracle had
come to be more than a mere doctrine; it had acquired all the
fixity of a mental category. Nothing could have prevailed at this
period against his worship of reason. Had he witnessed a genuine
miracle with his own eyes he would certainly have declared it hallu-
cination or imposture rather than admit that the causal nexus of na-
ture had been broken through.
Indeed, were any specific belief to be named as the cause of his
leaving the church, it would be this belief in the universality of irre-
fragable natural law. In point of fact, however, no one such specific
belief can be named. He is much nearer the truth when he says:
"Mes doutes ne vinrent pas d'un raisonnement, ils vinrent de dix
mille raisonnements." Souv., 284-5; Mor. Cr., 174.
His entire disposition and method had led to this crisis. It was
not so much his disbelief in any particular dogma that made it impos-
sible for him to abide by the creed; it was the rationalism and the
unfinality of his whole intellectual temper. Cf. James, Var. Rel. Exp.,
pp. 73-74.
Half a century later, looking back upon this intellectual hypertrophy
of his earlier period, he refers to himself humorously as
"Un jeune homme, atteint d'une forte encephalite, vivant unique-
ment dans sa t§te et croyant fre"netiquement & la ve"rite." A. S., VI.
Note 26. Renan has made repeated confession of his own disap-
pointment with his labors in history:
11
370 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Je crains fort que nos ecrits de precision de 1' Academic des inscrip-
tions et belles-lettres, destinees a donner quelque exactitude a 1'his-
toire, ne pourissent avant d'avoir ete lus. C*est par la chimie a un
bout, par 1'astronomie a un autre, c'est surtout par la physiologie
genSrale que nous tenons vraiment le secret de 1'etre, du monde, de
Dieu, comme on voudra Fappeler. Le regret de ma vie est d'avoir
choisi pour mes etudes un genre de recherches qui ne s'imposera
jamais et restera toujours a 1'etat d'interessantes considerations sur
une realite a jamais disparue." Souv., 263. See also his letter to M.
Berthelot, Aug., 1863, in the Frag., 153-4; also Disc., 134-5; A. S., XIV.
One of his latest expressions of opinion as to the probable future
of historical science occurs in his preface to the Avenir de la science
1890:
"Les sciences historiques et leurs auxiliaires, les sciences philo-
logiques, ont fait d'immenses conquetes depuis que je les embrassai
avec tant d'amour il y a quarante ans. Mais on en voit le bout.
Dans un siecle, I'humanite saura a peu pres ce qu'elle peut savoir sur
son passe. . . Le processus de la civilisation est reconnu dans ses
lois generales. L'inegalite" des races est constatee. Les titres de
chaque famille humaine a des mentions plus ou moins honorables dans
1'histoire du progres sont & peu pres determines." A. S., XIV.
For a critical estimate of Renan as an historian, see the discussion
of M. Ch. Seignobos, Hist. lang. litt. fr., t. VIII, 259-267. Also the esti-
mate of M. Faguet in the same volume.
Note 27. This is a very interesting confession; but does it really
conform to his own canon of objective reason? Des lors la Vie de
J6sus etait Scrite dans mon esprit." That is to say, fifteen years before
it was written the Vie de Jesus was complete in his mind. The state-
ment is doubtless true, and accounts for the fact, patent to all readers,
that the character of Kenan's Jesus so much resembles Renan. But
how are we to reconcile this confession with his doctrine that truth
must be a product of objective reason, as impartial and impersonal as
a chemical precipitate Cf. F. Det. 401-2; also Souv., 274: "L^esprit
scientifique, dont la premiere condition est de n'avoir aucune foi
prealable."
Is it not palpably plain that in this matter again Renan's theory is
one thing and his practice quite another? Or rather his theory itself
is many things; for a doctrine fundamentally opposed to the "chemical
precipitate" theory is affirmed no less often.
"La foi et I'amour, en apparence sans lien avec 1'mtelligence, sont
le vrai fondement de la certitude morale et 1'unique moyen qu'a
BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST BEN AN. 371
I'homme de comprendre quelque chose au probleme de son origine et
de sa destinSe." Mor. Crit. II.
Is not this the most subjective conceivable conception of truth?
But why dwell longer on these perpetual contradictions? Is Renan
alone, after all, in falling thus short of his own ideals? Let the con-
sistent man, if he knows himself, throw the first stone! In the present
instance, Renan is the more pardonable as the ideal to be attained is
probably a mere fiction. For the truth seems to be, as Mr. Balfour and
others have tried to show, that the doctrine of an objective reason,
universally applied, is itself an unrealized — and perhaps unrealizable —
subjective ideal.
372 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
APPEsNDIX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY.
The number of books, pamphlets and magazine articles written
about Renan is of course much too large to be catalogued here. Most
of them, especially those provoked by the Vie de Jesus, are of a con-
troversial nature, and give little or no help towards a comprehension
of Renan and his work. Among the best are the following:
I. BIOGRAPHICAL.
Boissier, G: Fun6railles de M. E. Renan, 1895.
Cognat, J.: Renan, hier et aujourdhui, 1883.
Dannesteter, Mary J.: La Vie d'Ernest Renan, 1898.
Denais, J: Du S6minaire au Pantheon, Paris, 1893.
Duff, Sir M. E. Grant: Ernest Renan. In Memoriam, 1893.
Espinasse, F.: Life of Renan, 1895.
Frenzel, K: Renan und Henriette. Cosmopolis, Dec., 1896.
Loth, J.: Renan au College de Treguier. In Annales de Bretagne, vol-
VIII (1892), pp. 124-9 (the Palmares of Trgguier College for the
years 1836-7).
Mahrenholtz, R.: Ernest Renan. In Zeitschrift f. fr. Sprache u. Lit.,
Bd. XVI, 50-93.
Paris, G.: Penseurs et Poetes, 1896.
Platzhoff, Eduard: Ein Lebensbild von Ernest Renan, Dresd, 1900.
Perraud, Mgr.: Souvenirs et impressions, 1893.
Sch6rer, Melanges d'histoire religieuse, 2nd ed., 1865.
Renan, Ernest: Lettres du Se"minaire (1838-1846), Paris, 1902. Let-
tres Intimes de Ernest et de Henriette Kenan, 1896. Correspon-
dance, E. Renan et M. Berthelot, 1898. Souvenirs d'enfance et de
jeunesse, dixieme ed., 1884. Ma Soeur Henriette.
II. CRITICAL WORKS.
Allier, R.: La philosophic d'Ernest Renan, 1894.
Bodner, S.: Mikrokosmos, vol. 2, pp. 88-190, Berlin, 1898.
Bourget, P.: Essais de psych, contemp., 1883.
Brandes, G.: Eminent Authors of the 19th Cent., 1887.
Brunetiere, F.: Nouveaux essais litt. cont, 1895.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 373
Darmesteter, James: Notice sur la vie et les oeuvres de M. Renan,
1893.
Denis, Ch.: La Critique irreligieuse de Renan, 1898.
Desportes, H. et Bourmand, F.: E. Renan, sa vie et son oeuvre, 1893.
Faguet, E.: Politiques et moralistes, 3e se"rie, 1900.
France, A. : La Vie littgraire, vols. 1 and 2.
Hutton, R. H.: Criticism on contemporory thought, vol. 2, 1894.
Labanca, B.: La "Vita di Gesu" di Ernesto Renan in Italia, 1900.
Ledrain, A.: Renan, sa vie et ses oeuvres, 1892.
Lemaitre, Jules: Les Contemporains, vols. 1 and 4.
Impressions de theatre, vol. 1.
Monod, G.: Renan, Taine et Michelet, 1894.
Paris, G.: Penseurs et Poetes, 1896.
Pellissier, G.: Le Mouvement Iitt6raire au XIXe siecle, 1894.
Platzhoff, Ed.: E. Renan, seine Entwickelung und Weltanschauung,
1900.
Rod, E.: Les IdSes morales du temps present, 1891.
Sainte-Beuve, Nouveaux Lundis, vols. II (1&62~), and VI (1863).
Samtsbury, G.: Miscellaneous Essays, 1892.
ScheYer, Edm.: Etudes sur la litt. contemp., vols. IV, VII, VIII, IX,
X.
Seailles, G.: Ernest Renan, 1895.
Verne, M.: Revue de Belgique, 1898.
Vogii6, E. M. de: Heures d'histoire, 1893.
Wyzewa: Nos Maftres, 1895.
III. MAGAZINE ARTICLES.
The very numerous magazine articles about Renan can be readily
found from the following works :
Poole's Index to Periodical Literature, 1802, to date. There is now a
very convenient abridgment of this work covering the period from
1815-1899 in a single volume.
Cumulative Index to a Selected list of Periodicals (for current num-
bers).
Bibliographie der Deutschen Zeitschriften-Lffleratur, mit Einschluss
von Sammelwerken und Zeitungen, Leipz. 1897. This work begins
with the year 1896.
Repertoire Bibliographique des Principales Revues Frangaises, Paris,
1898. This begins with 1897.
374 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Catalogo Metodico degli Scritti Contenuti nelle Pubblicazioni Perio-
diche italiane e straniere. The first volume of this work was pub-
lished at Rome in 1885, but the indexing begins, for the more im-
portant periodicals, with their first volume.
IV. GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
The best general bibliography of Renan in existence is that of Mr.
John P. Anderson, of the British Museum, which was published as
an Appendix to The Life of Ernest Renan, by Fr. Espinasse, Lond.,
1895.
In this work are listed, in chronological order, the various editions
of Renan's writings, down to 1895; and a very extensive catalogue is
given of books on Renan, in the various languages of Europe, besides
a large number of articles from English and French magazines.
This bibliography is reprinted, with less detail and a few unimpor-
tant omissions, by Hugo Paul Thieme, in his b'rochure: La Litterature
Frangaise du dix-neuvieme Siecle, Paris and Leipzig, 1897; and the
following books, besides a number of magazine articles, are added
to Mr. Anderson's list:
Brunetiere, Nouveaux Essais, 1895.
Darmesteter, J.: Selected Essays, 1895.
Deschamps, G.: La Vie et les Livres, 1896.
Felix, C. J.: M. Renan et sa Vie de Jesus, 18~63.
Guettee, F. R.: Du Discours d'ouverture de M. Renan, 1862.
Hello, Era.: M. Renan et la Vie de Jesus, 1863.
Lanson, G.: Hist. d. 1. Litterature Franc., 1S95.
Naudet, F.: Notes sur la Litterature Moderne, I-II, 1885-8.
Rod, Ed.: Les Idees Morales du Temps Present, 1891.
Wyzewa: Nos Maitres, 1895.
The following works should be added to the bibliographies of MM.
Anderson and Thieme:
1. Renan's own works:
Les antiquites egyptiennes et les fouilles de M. Mariette, souvenirs de
mon voyage en Egypte, Rev. d. d. Mond., 1865.
Documents epigraphiques recueillis dans le nord de 1'Arabie par M. C.
Doughty, publics et expliques par E. Renan, 1884.
Introduction to Book III of the "Hundred Greatest Men," by F. Max
Mueller and E. Renan, Lond., 1885.
Melanges d'histoire et de voyages, 1890.
Lettres Intimes de Ernest Renan et Henriette Renan, 1842-5, second
ed., 1896.
BEAUER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 375
Same translated into English by Lady Mary Loyd, N. Y., 1896.
Oeuvres choisies (In Colin's series of Pages Unoisies), 1897.
Ernest Renan et Marcelin Berthelot, Correspondance, 1847-'92. Pub-
lished by M. Berthelot in 1898.
Etudes sur la politique religieuse du regne de Philippe le Bel, 1899.
(A reprint from the Hist. Litt. d. 1. Fr., vols. 26, 27 and 28.)
Pri£re sur 1'Acropole. Compositions de H. Bellery-Desfontaines,
gravees par Eugene Froment, 1899. For an estimate of this beau-
tiful edition d'art of a chapter from Kenan's Souvenirs d'Enfance,
see the article by:
Janin, Cl.: Le livre, a propos d'une edition d'art de la Priere sur
1'acropole, in the Gazette des Beaux Arts, third series, vol. 24, pp.
253-264, Paris, 1900.
Another portion of the Souvenirs, with very fine illustrations, was
published in Paris in 1901, under the title:
Le broyeur de lin. Avec preface des Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeu-
nesse. Vingt-sept eaux-fortes originales de Ed. Rudaux.
Lettres du Seminaire (1838-1848), Paris, 1902.
An annotated edition of the Souvenirs, with an introductory article
which is the best brief treatment in print of Renan and his work,
by Irving Babbit, published by Heath and Company, 1902.
A catalogue of Renan's library was published in Paris in 1895, mak-
ing a book of 495 pages.
2. Biographical and critical works:
Aurevilly, J. Barbey de: Les Oeuvres et les Hommes au dixneuvi£me
siecle, vol. 8, 1887. A very adverse criticism.
Bersot, Era.: M. Ernest Renan. In his Essais, 1864, vol. 2, pp.
264-80; 509-24. Reviews of R's Mor. Grit, and of his V. J.
Bodner, Sigm.: Mikrokosmos, vol. 2, 88-190, Berl., 1898.
Boissier Gaston: Funerailles de M. E. Renan, Paris, 1895.
Bonghi, Ruggiero: La "Tempesta" di W. Shakspeare e il "Calibano"
di E. Renan. Reale Accademia di scienze morale e politiche,
Atti, 1879, XV: 9.
Bussy, Ch. de (i. e., Marchal, Chas.): Renan en famille, Paris, 1866.
Cassel, Paul S.: Preussen und Deutschland. Eine Antwort an Ernest
Renan. Berl., 1870.
Church, R. W.: Occasional papers selected from the Guardian, the
Times and the Sat. Rev., 1846-90, 2 vols., Lond., 1897. (Reviews
of R's Les Apotres, Hibbert lecture, and the Souv.)
Crelier, H. J.: M. Ernest Renan trahissant le Christ par un roman,
etc., second ed. Paris, 1864.
Cuoq, J. A.: Jugement errone" de M. E. Renan sur les langues sau-
vages. Montreal, 1864.
376 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
Denais, J.: Du SSminaire au Pantheon, Paris, 1893.
Denis, Ch.: La Critique irreligieuse de Renan, Paris, 189s.
Desportes H. et Bourmand F.: Ernest Renan. Preface par J. de
Biez, Paris, 1893.
Deutsch, Em.: Literary Remains, Lond., 1874.
Eminent Persons. Biographies reprinted from the Times, Lond.,
1892-7 (vol. 5).
Espinasse, Fr.: The life of Ernest Renan, 1895.
Faguet, Em.: Politiques et Moralistes du 19e siecle, 3e serie, 1900.
FSlix, N. : M. Renan et sa Vie de J6sus, Paris, 1863.
Frenzel, Karl: Renan und Henri ette, Cosmopolis, Dec., 1896.
Furness, W. H.: Remarks on Renan's Life of Jesus. Phil., 1865.
Gratry, A. J. A.: Les Sophistes et la Critique, Paris, 1864.
Griswold, Hattie: Personal Sketches of Recent Authors, Chicago,
1898.
Harrisse, Henry: M. Ernest Renan.
Hutchison, Wm. G.: Introd. to Renan's Poetry of the Celtic Races.
Hutton, R. H.: Criticism on Contemporary Thought, Lond., 1894,
vol. 2.
Janet, P.: La philosophie et M. Renan, Paris, 1858.
Labanca, B.: La "Vita di Gesu" 9i Ernesto Renan in Italia; studio
storico-critico, Roma, 1900.
Littre", M. P. Emile: La Science au point de vue philosophique, Paris,
1873. (Review of R's Hist. Semitic Languages.)
Loth, J.: Renan au College de TrSguier. In Annales de Bretagne,
vol. VIII, pp. 121, 124-9 (1892).
Mahrenholtz, R.: A carefully written article on Renan's life and
work, in Zeitschrift f. franz. Sprache u. Lit., XVI: pp. 50-93.
Negri, G.: Segni dei tempi; profili e bozzetti letterari. (Ernesto
Renan e rincredulita moderna.) Milano, 1893.
Paris, Gaston: Penseurs et Poetes, 2e ed., Paris, 1896. (Discours
prononces au nom du College de France, aux funerailles d'Ernest
Renan.)
Pearson, C. H.: Reviews and Critical Essays, Lond., 1896.
Pellissier, G.: Literary Remains in France in 19th Cent., N. Y., 1897.
Perraud, Mgr.: A propos de la mort et des funerailles de M. Ernest
Renan, Souvenirs et Impressions, Paris, 1393.
Platzhoff, Eduard: E. Renan, seine Entwickelung und Weltanschauung.
Inaugural-Dissertation der philosophischen Fakultat der Univer-
sitat Bern zur Erlangung der Doktorwiirae, Dresden und Leipzig,
1900.
Ernest Renan; ein Lebensbild, Dresden, etc., 1900. (Vol. 9
in "Manner der Zeit.")
BRAUEB, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ElRNEST KENAN. 377
Poitou, M. Eug.: Les philosophes frangais contemporains et leurs
systemes religieux, Paris, 1864. M. Renan et 1'Allemagne. Let-
tre ouverte d'un Allemand, Wiesbaden, IB79.
Ritter, Dr. H.: E. Renan iiber Naturwiss. u. Geschichte, 1865.
Robinson, A. M. P. (Mde. Darmesteter) : La Vie de Ernest Renan,
Paris, 1898.
Secre"tan, Ch.: Essais de philos. et de litt, pp. 368-71, 1896.
Simon, J.: Quatre Portraits, Paris, 1896.
Smalley, Geo.: London Letters and Some Authors, vol. I, N. Y., 1891.
Strong, Aug. H.: Christ in Creation, and Ethical Monism, Phil., 1899.
(pp. 332-363.)
Stuart, H.: Paris Days.
Tollemache, L. A.: Essays, Mock-Essays and Character Sketches,
1898.
Vattier, G.: Gale"rie des Acad6miciens, 3e sSrie, Paris,
Verne, Maurice: E. Renan. In Revue de Belgique, 1898.
Vogue, E. M. de: Heures d'Histoire, Paris, 1893.
378 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
APPENDIX C: ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED, AND
EDITIONS; QUOTED.
(Unless otherwise stated, the author is Renan.)
Amiel, Journ. — Fragments d'un Journal Intime, 7th ed., Geneve, 1897.
/Ant— L'Ante-christ.
— Apostles, N. Y., 1866.
Averr. — Averroes et 1'Averroisme, 4th ed., 1882.
^A. S — L'Avenir de la Science, 8th ed., 1894.
Cant. — Le Cantique des Cantiques, 7th ed., 1891.
C. d'Angl, — Conferences d'Angleterre, 1880.
Darmesteter, Agn. M. F. — The Life of Ernest Renan, 1898.
v/Dial. — Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques, 4th ed., 1895.
Disc. — Discours et Conferences, 3rd ed., 1887.
v^Dr. Ph. — Drames philosophiques, 1888.
Eccl. — L'Ecclesiaste, 3rd ed., 1890.
E. R. — Ernest Renan.
Espinasse, Fr. — Life of Ernest Renan, Lond., 1895.
Frag., see Dial.
F. Det— Feuilles Detachees, 9th ed., 1892.
Fort. Rev. — Fortnightly Review.
Found. Bel. — Foundations of Belief.
-4list. Rel.— Etudes d'histoire religieuse, 7th ed., 1864.
James, Var. Rel. Exp. — Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902.
Job— Le Livre de Job, 5th ed., 1894.
/•"*/ Lang. Se"m. — Histoire generate des langues semitiques, 1863.
Lett. Sem.— Lettres du Seminaire (1838-46), 1902.
(1842-5), 4th ed., 1896.
Lett. Sem. — Lettres du Seminaire (1838-46-, 1902.
v M.-Aur. — Marc-Aurele^et la fin du monde antique, 1882.
Monod, Renan, Taine et Michelet, 1894.
v^Alor. Crit. — Essais de morale et de critique, 4th ed., 1889.
Nouv. Hist. Rel. — Nouvelles etudes d'histoire religieuse, 1884.
Or. Lang. — De 1'Origine du Langage, 3rd ed., 1859.
>j> P. Isj. — History of the People of Israel, Boston, 1894-5.
BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RE3STAJ5T. 379
v/Peup. Se"m. — De la part des peuples se"mitiques dans 1'histoire de la
civilisation, 7th ed., 1875.
M3. C. — Questions Contemporaries, 3rd ed., 1870.
Re"f. Int. — La Re"forme intellectuelle et morale, 4th ed., 1884.
Se"ailles — Ernest Renan, 2nd ed., 1895.
Sidgwick, Henry— Methods of Ethics, 5th ed.
v/Souv. — Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse.
J.— La Vie de J6sus, 9th ed., 1863.
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