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THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 
Volume  VI 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF 
ERNST    CASSIRER 


THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 
PAUL  ARTHUR  SCHILPP,  Editor 


Already  Published: 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  JOHN  DEWEY  (1939) 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GEORGE  SANTAYANA  (1940) 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ALFRED  NORTH  WHITEHEAD  (1941) 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  G.  E.  MOORE  (1942) 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BERTRAND  RUSSELL  (1944) 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  (1949) 


In  Preparation: 

ALBERT   EINSTEIN:   P  H  IL  O  S  O  P  H  E  R-  S  C  I  E  N  TI  ST 

THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   BENEDETTO   CROCE 

THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  SARVEPALLI    R  AD  H  AKRI  S  H  N  AN 

THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   KARL   JASPERS 

Other  volumes  to  be  announced  later 


THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 
Volume  VI 


THE   PHILOSOPHY 

OF 

ERNST  CASSIRER 

EDITED  BY 
PAUL  ARTHUR  SCHILPP 


1949 
THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS,  INC. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ERNST  CASSIRER 

Copyright,  1949,  by  The  Library  of  Living  Philosophers,  Inc. 
Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


FIRST  EDITION 
A-F 


GEORGE  BANTA  PUBLISHING  COMPANY,  MENASHA,  WISCONSIN 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTrt>& 

TO 

"THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS" 

A  CCORDING  to  the  late  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  the  greatest  ob- 
JTj\.  stacle  to  fruitful  discussion  in  philosophy  is  "the  curious 
etiquette  which  apparently  taboos  the  asking  of  questions  about 
a  philosopher's  meaning  while  he  is  alive."  The  "interminable 
controversies  which  fill  the  histories  of  philosophy,"  he  goes  on 
to  say,  "could  have  been  ended  at  once  by  asking  the  living  phi- 
losophers a  few  searching  questions." 

The  confident  optimism  of  this  last  remark  undoubtedly  goes 
too  far.  Living  thinkers  have  often  been  asked  "a  few  searching 
questions,"  but  their  answers  have  not  stopped  "interminable 
controversies"  about  their  real  meaning.  It  is  none  the  less 
true  that  there  would  be  far  greater  clarity  of  understanding 
than  is  now  often  the  case,  if  more  such  searching  questions  had 
been  directed  to  great  thinkers  while  they  were  still  alive. 

This,  at  any  rate,  is  the  basic  thought  behind  the  present  un- 
dertaking. The  volumes  of  The  Library  of  Living  Philosophers 
can  in  no  sense  take  the  place  of  the  major  writings  of  great 
and  original  thinkers.  Students  who  would  know  the  philoso- 
phies of  such  men  as  John  Dewey,  George  Santayana,  Alfred 
North  Whitehead,  Benedetto  Croce,  G.  E.  Moore,  Bertrand 
Russell,  Ernst  Cassirer,  Etienne  Gilson,  Karl  Jaspers,  et  al., 
will  still  need  to  read  the  writings  of  these  men.  There 
is  no  substitute  for  first-hand  contact  with  the  original  thought 
of  the  philosopher  himself.  Least  of  all  does  this  Library  pre- 
tend to  be  such  a  substitute.  The  Library  in  fact  will  spare 
neither  effort  nor  expense  in  offering  to  the  student  the  best 

*  This  General  Introduction,  setting  forth  the  underlying  conception  of  this 
Library,  is  purposely  reprinted  in  each  volume  (with  only  very  minor  changes). 

vii 


viii        THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 

possible  guide  to  the  published  writings  of  a  given  thinker.  We 
shall  attempt  to  meet  this  aim  by  providing  at  the  end  of  each 
volume  in  our  series  a  complete  bibliography  of  the  published 
work  of  the  philosopher  in  question.  Nor  should  one  overlook 
the  fact  that  the  essays  in  each  volume  cannot  but  finally  lead 
to  this  same  goal.  The  interpretative  and  critical  discussions  of 
the  various  phases  of  a  great  thinker's  work  and,  most  of  all, 
the  reply  of  the  thinker  himself,  are  bound  to  lead  the  reader 
to  the  works  of  the  philosopher  himself. 

At  the  same  time,  there  is  no  blinking  the  fact  that  different 
experts  find  different  ideas  in  the  writings  of  the  same  philoso- 
pher. This  is  as  true  of  the  appreciative  interpreter  and  grateful 
disciple  as  it  is  of  the  critical  opponent.  Nor  can  it  be  denied 
that  such  differences  of  reading  and  of  interpretation  on  the 
part  of  other  experts  often  leave  the  neophyte  aghast  before 
the  whole  maze  of  widely  varying  and  even  opposing  interpreta- 
tions. Who  is  right  and  whose  interpretation  shall  he  accept? 
When  the  doctors  disagree  among  themselves,  what  is  the  poor 
student  to  do?  If,  finally,  in  desperation,  he  decides  that  all  of 
the  interpreters  are  probably  wrong  and  that  the  only  thing  for 
him  to  do  is  to  go  back  to  the  original  writings  of  the  philoso- 
pher himself  and  then  make  his  own  decision — uninfluenced  (as 
if  this  were  possible!)  by  the  interpretation  of  any  one  else — 
the  result  is  not  that  he  has  actually  come  to  the  meaning  of  the 
original  philosopher  himself,  but  rather  that  he  has  set  up  one 
more  interpretation,  which  may  differ  to  a  greater  or  lesser  de- 
gree from  the  interpretations  already  existing.  It  is  clear  that  in 
this  direction  lies  chaos,  just  the  kind  of  chaos  which  Schiller 
has  so  graphically  and  inimitably  described.1 

It  is  strange  that  until  now  no  way  of  escaping  this  difficulty 
has  been  seriously  considered.  It  has  not  occurred  to  students  of 
philosophy  that  one  effective  way  of  meeting  the  problem  at 
least  partially  is  to  put  these  varying  interpretations  and  critiques 
before  the  philosopher  while  he  is  still  alive  and  to  ask  him  to 
act  at  one  and  the  same  time  as  both  defendant  and  judge.  If 
the  world's  great  living  philosophers  can  be  induced  to  coSper- 

*In  his  essay  on  "Must  Philosophers  Disagree?"  in  the  volume  by  the  same 
title  (Macmillan,  London,  1934),  from  which  the  above  quotations  were  taken. 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  ix 

ate  in  an  enterprise  whereby  their  own  work  can,  at  least  to  some 
extent,  be  saved  from  becoming  merely  "desiccated  lecture- 
fodder,"  which  on  the  one  hand  "provides  innocuous  sustenance 
for  ruminant  professors,"  and,  on  the  other  hand,  gives  an  op- 
portunity to  such  ruminants  and  their  understudies  to  "specu- 
late safely,  endlessly,  and  fruitlessly,  about  what  a  philosopher 
must  have  meant"  (Schiller),  they  will  have  taken  a  long  step 
toward  making  their  intentions  clearly  comprehensible. 

With  this  in  mind  The  Library  of  Living  Philosophers  ex- 
pects to  publish  at  more  or  less  regular  intervals  a  volume  on 
each  of  the  greater  among  the  world's  living  philosophers.  In 
each  case  it  will  be  the  purpose  of  the  editor  of  The  Library 
to  bring  together  in  the  volume  the  interpretations  and  criti- 
cisms of  a  wide  range  of  that  particular  thinker's  scholarly  con- 
temporaries, each  of  whom  will  be  given  a  free  hand  to  discuss 
the  specific  phase  of  the  thinker's  work  which  has  been  assigned 
to  him.  All  contributed  essays  will  finally  be  submitted  to  the 
philosopher  with  whose  work  and  thought  they  are  concerned, 
for  his  careful  perusal  and  reply.  And,  although  it  would  be  ex- 
pecting too  much  to  imagine  that  the  philosopher's  reply  will  be 
able  to  stop  all  differences  of  interpretation  and  of  critique,  this 
should  at  least  serve  the  purpose  of  stopping  certain  of  the 
grosser  and  more  general  kinds  of  misinterpretations.  If  no  fur- 
ther gain  than  this  were  to  come  from  the  present  and  projected 
volumes  of  this  Library,  it  would  seem  to  be  fully  justified. 

In  carrying  out  this  principal  purpose  of  the  Library,  the 
editor  announces  that  (in  so  far  as  humanly  possible)  each  vol- 
ume will  conform  to  the  following  pattern: 

First,  a  series  of  expository  and  critical  articles  written  by  the 
leading  exponents  and  opponents  of  the  philosopher's 
thought; 

Second,  the  reply  to  the  critics  and  commentators  by  the  phi- 
losopher himself; 

Third,  an  intellectual  autobiography  of  the  thinker  whenever 
this  can  be  secured;  in  any  case  an  authoritative  and  author- 
ized biography;  and 

Fourth,  a  bibliography  of  the  writings  of  the  philosopher  to  pro- 


x          THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 

vide  a  ready  instrument  to  give  access  to  his  writings  and 
thought. 

The  editor  has  deemed  it  desirable  to  secure  the  services  of 
an  Advisory  Board  of  philosophers  to  aid  him  in  the  selection 
of  the  subjects  of  future  volumes.  The  names  of  the  six  promi- 
nent American  philosophers  who  have  consented  to  serve  appear 
below.  To  each  of  them  the  editor  expresses  his  deep-felt  thanks. 
The  first  fruit  of  their  consultation  is  the  selection  of  Karl  Jaspers 
as  the  subject  of  a  subsequent  study  in  this  Library. 

Future  volumes  in  this  series  will  appear  in  as  rapid  succes- 
sion as  is  feasible  in  view  of  the  scholarly  nature  of  this  Library. 
The  next  volume  in  this  series  will  be  that  on  Albert  Einstein: 
Philosopher-Scientist,  which  is  scheduled  to  come  off  the  press 
during  1949,  the  year  which  will  mark  Professor  Einstein's 
seventieth  birthday. 

PAUL  ARTHUR  SCHILPP 

Editor 

1 01 -i 02  FAYERWEATHER  HALL 
NORTHWESTERN  UNIVERSITY 
EVANSTON,  ILLINOIS 

ADVISORY  BOARD 

GEORGE  P.  ADAMS  RICHARD  P.  McKEON 

University  of  California  University  of  Chicago 

FRITZ  KAUFMANN  ARTHUR  E.  MURPHY 

University  of  Buffalo  Cornell  University 

CORNELIUS  KRUSE  HERBERT  W.  SCHNEIDER 

American  Council  of  Learned  Columbia  University 

Societies 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

I.  BIOGRAPHICAL  MATERIAL 

A.  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY:  "Ernst  Cassirer:  His  Life  and 

His  Work." i 

B.  Four  Addresses,  delivered  at  Memorial  Services,  held 
under  the  Auspices  of  the  Department  of  Philosophy  of 
Columbia  University  in  the  Brander  Matthews  Theater 
of  Columbia  University,  New  York  City,  on  June  I, 

1945 39 

1.  EDWARD   CASE:   "In   Memoriam:  Ernst  Cassirer" 

— A  poem 40 

2.  HAJO  HOLBORN:  "Ernst  Cassirer" 41 

3.  F.  SAXL:  "Ernst  Cassirer" 47 

4.  EDWARD  CASE:  "A  Student's  Nachruf"  .      .      .      .  52 

5.  CHARLES  W.  HENDEL:  "Ernst  Cassirer"  ...  55 

C.  HENDRIK  J.  Pos:  "Recollections  of  Ernst  Cassirer"     .  61 

II.  DESCRIPTIVE  AND  CRITICAL  ESSAYS  ON  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

1.  HAMBURG,  CARL  H.:  "Cassirer's  Conception  of  Phi- 

losophy"    73 

2.  SWABEY,    WILLIAM    CURTIS:    "Cassirer   and   Meta- 

physics"     121 

3.  STEPHENS,  I.  K.:  "Cassirer's  Doctrine  of  the  A  Prior?'     149 

4.  KAUFMANN,  FELIX:  "Cassirer's  Theory  of  Scientific 

Knowledge" 183 

5.  GAWRONSKY,  DIMITRY:  "Cassirer's  Contribution  to  the 

Epistemology  of  Physics" 215 

6.  SMART,  HAROLD  R.:  "Cassirer's  Theory  of  Mathe- 

matical Concepts" 239 

7.)  LEWIN,  KURT:  "Cassirer's  Philosophy  of  Science  and 

the  Social  Sciences" 269 

8.  HARTMAN,  ROBERT  S.:  "Cassirer's  Philosophy  of  Sym- 
bolic Forms"  289 

xi 


xH  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

9.  LEANDER,  FOLKE:  "Further  Problems  Suggested  by  the 

Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms" 335 

10.  MONTAGU,  M.  F.  ASHLEY:  "Cassirer  on  Mythological 

Thinking" 359 

11.  LANCER,  SUSANNE  K.:  "On  Cassirer's  Theory  of  Lan- 

guage and  Myth" 379 

12.  URBAN,  WILBUR  M.:  "Cassirer's  Philosophy  of  Lan- 

guage"      401 

13.  GUTMANN,  JAMES:  "Cassirer's  Humanism"  .      .      .     443 

14.  SIDNEY,  DAVID:  "The  Philosophical  Anthropology  of 

Ernst  Cassirer  and  Its  Significance  in  Relation  to 
the  History  of  Anthropological  Thought"     .      .      465 

15.  KUHN,   HELMUT:   "Ernst   Cassirer's  Philosophy   of 

Culture" 545 

1 6.  BAUMGARDT,  DAVID:  "Cassirer  and  the  Chaos  in  Mod- 

ern Ethics" 575 

17.  GILBERT,  KATHARINE:  "Cassirer's  Placement  of  Art"     605 

1 8.  SLOCHOWER,  HARRY:  "Ernst  Cassirer's  Functional  Ap- 

proach to  Art  and  Literature" 631 

1 9.  REICHARDT,  KONSTANTIN  :  "Ernst  Cassirer's  Contribu- 

tion to  Literary  Criticism" 66 1 

20.  RANDALL,  JOHN  HERMAN,  JR.:  "Cassirer's  Theory  of 

History  as  Illustrated  in  His  Treatment  of  Renais- 
sance Thought" 689 

21.  SOLMITZ,   WALTER  M.:  "Cassirer  on  Galileo:  An 

Example  of  Cassirer's  Way  of  Thought"  .      .      .      729 

22.  WERKMEISTER,  WILLIAM  H.:  "Cassirer's  Advance 

Beyond  Neo-Kantianism" 757 

23.  KAUFMANN,  FRITZ:  "Cassirer,  Neo-Kantianism,  and 

Phenomenology" 799 

III.  THE  PHILOSOPHER  SPEAKS  FOR  HIMSELF 
ERNST  CASSIRER:  "  'Spirit'  and  'Life'  in  Contemporary  Phi- 
losophy"     855 

IV.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  THE  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST 

CASSIRER    (to    1946):   Compiled   by   CARL   H. 
HAMBURG  and  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ)  .      .      .      .881 

Chronological  List  of  Principal  Works 910 

Index  (Arranged  by  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN) 911 


PREFACE 

AS  SOON  as  it  had  become  clear  that  there  was  a  real  place 
JTJIJL  in  philosophic  literature  for  the  type  of  book  which  it  is 
the  aim  of  this  Library  to  present,  it  was  also  quite  evident  that 
such  a  series  would  not  be  complete  without  a  volume  on  The 
Philosophy  of  Ernst  Cassirer.  If  there  could  ever  have  been  any 
doubt,  on  this  point,  it  existed  merely  among  such  provincial 
philosophical  scholars  as  had  not  become  personally  acquainted, 
let  alone  familiar,  with  the  writings  and  work  of  this  prodigious 
and  acute  contemporary  thinker.  Anyone  at  all  aware  of  Cas- 
sirer's  philosophical  contributions,  and  of  the  ever  growing  in- 
fluence of  his  thought  upon  younger  thinkers,  knew  quite  well 
that  Cassirer's  philosophy  would  have  to  be  treated  in  this 
Library.  It  was  not  at  all  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  editor 
found  a  ready  response  among  scholars  everywhere  to  his  invita- 
tion to  contribute  to  a  projected  Cassirer  volume.  The  present 
co-operative  effort,  accordingly,  had  been  largely  planned  long 
before  Professor  Cassirer  left  the  hospitable  shores  of  Sweden 
to  come  to  the  United  States  in  1942. 

At  the  time,  therefore,  that  the  tragic  news  of  Professor 
Cassirer's  unexpected  death,  on  April  13,  1945,  reached  the 
editor,  many  of  the  essays  now  appearing  in  this  volume  were 
already  in  the  editor's  hands  and  many  others  had  been  in  the 
process  of  being  written  by  their  authors  for  some  time  past. 

Nevertheless,  this  tragic  blow — among  its  manifold  unhappy 
consequences — seemed  to  place  a  volume  on  the  philosophy  of 
Ernst  Cassirer  in  the  Library  of  Living  Philosophers  forever 
beyond  the  pale  of  possibility.  For,  with  Cassirer  dead,  how 
could  a  volume  on  his  philosophy  appear  in  such  a  series?  This, 
at  any  rate,  was  the  first  reaction  of  the  editor  to  the  unbe- 
lievable news  of  Cassirer's  passing.  And  it  was  in  this  spirit, 
therefore,  that  letters  went  out  almost  immediately,  notifying 


anil 


xiv        THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 

all  contributors  to  the  present  book  that,  with  the  death  of  Cas- 
sirer,  the  original  project  of  a  volume  on  his  philosophy — if 
not  actually  completely  abandoned — would  at  least  have  to  be 
changed  so  radically  as  no  longer  to  fit  into  the  framework  of 
the  Library. 

The  storm  of  protest  and  the  almost  unanimity  of  objection 
which  greeted  this  announcement  forced,  in  the  first  place,  a 
careful  reconsideration  of  the  hasty  decision,  and  very  quickly 
indeed,  a  complete  reversal.  Many  of  the  contributors  com- 
plained that  the  editor  was  conceiving  of  the  word  "living"  in 
the  title  of  the  series  far  too  literally  or  at  least  too  narrowly. 
That,  despite  the  fact  that  we  would  now  never  be  able  to  pre- 
sent to  the  philosophical  world  either  Cassirer's  own  auto- 
biography or  his  formal  "Reply"  to  his  critics,  it  was  perhaps 
all  the  more  necessary  that  the  philosophical  world  should  have 
an  opportunity  to  see  and  view  this  great  contemporary  thinker's 
ideas  from  the  varied  points  of  view  made  possible  precisely  in 
the  kind  of  book  which  the  volumes  in  this  series  have  been. 

Although  it  is  true  that  the  editor  yielded  to  this  almost  uni- 
versal pressure  and  even  more  to  the  force  and  decisiveness  of 
this  argument,  the  yielding  certainly  did  not  take  place  in  the 
least  reluctantly.  Of  course  it  is  true  that  he  greatly  regrets 
the  anomaly  of  having  a  volume  appear  in  a  series  dealing 
with  "living"  philosophers,  when  the  philosopher  with  whose 
thought  the  volume  is  concerned  is  no  longer  among  the — physi- 
cally— living.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  he  would  not  be  truthful, 
where  he  to  claim  that  he  feels  that  the  present  volume  has — 
for  these  reasons — no  legitimate  place  within  the  bounds  of 
this  particular  series.  After  all,  the  volume  on  The  Philosophy 
of  Alfred  North  Whitehead  (Vol.  Ill  of  this  Library}  also  had 
no  formal  "Reply"  to  the  expository  and  critical  articles  in  the 
book  from  the  pen  of  Whitehead — and  yet  seemed  to  fill  a 
real  philosophical  need  just  the  same.  And,  in  the  case  of  the 
Whitehead  volume,  this  problem  was — in  a  sense  at  least — even 
more  serious  than  it  would  appear  to  be  in  the  present  instance. 
For,  when  the  Whitehead  volume  appeared  in  print,  Professor 
Whitehead  himself  was  still  very  much  alive — even  though  he 
had  just  gone  through  a  terrible  siege  of  double  pneumonia  at 


PREFACE  xv 

the  age  of  eighty.  If,  in  Whitehead's  case,  we  were  prevented 
from  carrying  out  the  fundamental  idea  of  this  series  by  the 
commanding  imperative  of  very  serious  illness,  in  the  case  of 
Cassirer  we  found  ourselves  stopped — at  the  point  of  "The 
Philosopher's  Reply" — by  the  finality  of  death  itself.  But, 
though  death  might  prevent  us  from  giving  our  readers  the 
very  careful  and  minute  formal  "Reply,"  which  the  editor 
knows  Cassirer  had  planned  to  write  for  the  present  volume, 
even  that  tragic  fatality  was  not  able  to  stop  the  continued 
strong  influence  which  Cassirer's  thought  is  having  upon  serious 
reflection  in  the  contemporary  world.  Nor  should  it  be  allowed 
to  stop  the  present  volume.  For  better  or  for  worse,  therefore, 
the  volume  now  is  done — or,  more  accurately  speaking,  is  done 
as  much  as  it  could  be  done  once  Cassirer  himself  was  no  longer 
with  us.  And,  frankly,  though  the  reviewers  almost  inevitably 
will  pick  on  the  anomaly  of  the  appearance  of  this  book  under 
the  title  of  this  series,  after  reading  the  material  which  has  gone 
into  the  making  of  this  book,  the  editor  himself  does  not  at  all 
feel  apologetic  for  its  publication.  For  this  volume  will  best 
fulfill  its  real  function  in  philosophical  literature  if — like  its 
predecessors  in  this  series — it  will  send  the  reader  of  The  Phi- 
losophy of  Ernst  Cassirer  to  the  books  and  other  writings  of 
Cassirer  himself,  where  he  may  learn  by  experience  why  he 
would  have  been  the  loser,  if  he  had  never  made  the  detailed 
acquaintance  of  this  acute  philosophical  mind  and  of  the  great 
and  profound  contributions  which  that  mind  has  made  to  the 
thinking  and  knowing  of  man. 

There  is  one  temptation — in  the  writing  of  this  Preface — to 
which  the  editor  dare  not  yield.  It  is  all  too  tempting  to  discuss 
Cassirer  the  philosopher;  but  this  is  done  by  twenty-three  con- 
temporary philosophers  who  have  contributed  to  this  volume 
and  most  of  whom  are  far  better  qualified  for  this  task  than  is 
the  editor.  It  is  even  more  tempting  to  trespass  upon  the  good 
taste  of  editorial  prerogatives  by  discussing  here  Cassirer  the 
man,  the  gentleman,  the  personal  friend.  But  to  this  temptation 
also  the  editor  must  turn  a  deaf  ear,  since  others,  who  have 
known  him  much  longer  and  far  more  intimately,  have  dis- 
cussed this  aspect  within  the  covers  of  this  book.  I  shall  merely 


xvi        THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 

say  that  I  consider  the  personal  acquaintance  and  contacts  with 
Ernst  Cassirer  to  be  among  the  greatest  experiences  and  privi- 
leges of  my  life.  In  the  judgment  of  this  writer,  it  is  not  too 
much  to  say  of  Cassirer:  Ecce  Homo!  It  is  profoundly  sad  to 
contemplate  his  leaving  us  in  the  midst  of  his  great  creative  and 
productive  career,  with  dozens  of  tasks  which  he  had  set  him- 
self unfinished  and  others  barely  begun. 

The  editor's  debt  of  gratitude  to  each  of  the  contributors  to 
this  volume  is  so  self-evident  that  a  mere  mention  of  this  fact 
should  suffice.  But,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  many  of  them  have 
had  to  wait  four  years,  or  even  longer,  to  see  the  arduous  work 
of  their  mind  finally  in  print,  the  editor's  debt,  in  this  instance, 
is  even  greater  than  usual.  The  reasons  which  have  delayed  the 
appearance  of  this  volume  time  and  again  are,  however,  far 
too  numerous  to  bear  repetition  here.  Suffice  it  to  record  the 
editor's  sincere  regrets  and  abject  apologies  for  a  situation  which 
has  caused  him  much  agony  and  ever  increasing  embarrassment, 
but  over  much  of  which  he  had  little  (if  any)  control. 

Special  words  of  gratitude  and  appreciation  need,  however, 
to  be  penned  for  the  never  failing  helpfulness  and  encourage- 
ment— through  all  these  three  and  one-half  years  since  her  illus- 
trious husband's  death — given  by  the  widow  of  Ernst  Cassirer, 
Mrs.  Toni  Cassirer.  When  at  times  the  obstacles  seemed  almost 
insurmountable,  it  was  Mrs.  Cassirer's  everlasting  faith  which 
kept  the  project  going.  Here  truly  is  a  woman  who  knew — 
and  still  knows — her  husband's  greatness  and  who  never  failed 
to  understand  the  significance  of  what  he  was  trying  to  do  with 
his  life  and  thought. 

Death  did  not  spare  the  contributors  to  this  volume  either. 
Two  of  these  are  no  longer  with  us.  First,  Kurt  Lewin,  whose 
essay  for  the  present  volume  had  been  mailed  to  the  editor 
on  January  3rd,  1947,  passed  away  very  suddenly  only  five 
weeks  later,  namely  on  February  nth,  1947.  Thirteen  months 
later,  in  March  1948,  the  news  of  F.  Saxl's  death  reached  us. 
The  latter's  contribution  to  this  volume  were  remarks  he  de- 
livered on  the  occasion  of  the  Memorial  Services  held  for  Cas- 
sirer at  Columbia  University.  Little  did  he  realize  that,  by  the 
time  his  remarks  would  appear  in  print,  he  himself  would  have 


PREFACE  xvii 

joined  those  for  whom  it  is  altogether  fitting  to  hold  memorial 
services.  Of  Kurt  Lewin,  Alexander  M.  Dashkin,  writing  in 
Jewish  Education  (for  Feb.-March  issue,  1947),  had  the  fol- 
lowing to  say:  "Kurt  Lewin  was  one  of  the  very  few  men  in  our 
midst  who  had  the  right  to  be  called  a  genius.  He  was  an  inven- 
tive, comprehensive  mind,  a  warm  large  personality,  with  an 
indefatigable  capacity  for  resourceful  work."  The  editor  is  proud 
to  be  able  to  present,  in  this  volume,  what  was  undoubtedly  one 
of  the  last  pieces  of  such  creative  work  from  the  pen  of  Kurt 
Lewin. 

These  lines  are  being  written  on  the  very  eve  of  the  editor's 
departure  for  five  months'  sojourn  in  Europe,  including  a  se- 
mester's lecturing  in  one  of  Germany's  newly  re-opened  univer- 
sities. This  means  that  the  burden  of  proofreading  and  seeing 
this  volume  through  the  press  will  largely  have  to  fall  upon 
other  shoulders.  In  the  editor's  absence  he  counts  himself  ex- 
ceedingly fortunate  in  having  been  able  to  secure  the  able  as- 
sistance of  his  present  colleague,  old  friend  and  former  student, 
Professor  Robert  W.  Browning,  of  the  department  of  philoso- 
phy at  Northwestern  University.  Upon  Dr.  Browning  and  such 
additional  aids  as  he  is  able  to  marshal, — such,  for  example,  as 
that  of  Dr.  David  Bidney  of  the  Viking  Fund,  New  York  City, 
who  has  already  kindly  offered  his  good  services  because  of  his 
deep  interest  in  this  project  and  his  knowledge  of  the  editor's 
temporary  absence — ,  the  detailed  technical  work  of  seeing  this 
volume  to  final  fruition  will  largely  devolve.  To  them  the  edi- 
tor, as  well  as  the  contributors  and  readers,  owe  a  deep  and  great 
debt  of  gratitude,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  all  such 
service  on  a  project  like  this — unsupported  as  it  is  by  endow- 
ments or  by  any  university  press — can  only  be  a  labor  of  love. 
The  same  goes  for  Professor  Robert  S.  Hartman,  of  the  De- 
partment of  Philosophy  of  Ohio  State  University,  another  one 
of  the  editor's  former  students,  who  again  was  kind  enough  to 
undertake  the  laborious  task  of  preparing  the  index  and  of  see- 
ing it  through  the  press.  A  brief  look  at  the  index  will  convince 
even  the  casual  observer  of  the  immensity  of  this  task  and  of 
the  consequent  obligation  under  which  the  editor  feels  himself 
to  Dr.  Hartman. 


xviii       THE  LIBRARY  OF  LIVING  PHILOSOPHERS 

In  conclusion  the  reader's  attention  must  be  called  to  the 
deplorable  fact  that  the  main  works  by  Cassirer  have  been  out 
of  print  for  some  time  and  are  simply  not  to  be  had  anywhere. 
This  situation  should  certainly  be  remedied  as  soon  as  at  all 
possible.  New  German  editions  of  Cassirer's  works  are  sorely 
needed.  But,  if  Cassirer  is  ever  truly  to  come  into  his  own  in 
the  English  speaking  world,  it  is  high  time  that  some  enterpris- 
ing university  press  in  this  country  should  soon  supply  the  phil- 
osophical reading  public  with  authorized  translations  into  Eng- 
lish of  at  least  most  of  Cassirer 's  major  works.  Certainly  some 
well-to-do  reader  of  the  present  volume  could  do  far  worse 
than  offer  his  financial  aid  to  such  an  enterprising  university 
press  for  the  purpose  of  at  least  partial  subsidies  for  such  pub- 
lication. 

P.  A.  S. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
NORTHWESTERN  UNIVERSITY 
EVANSTON,  ILLINOIS 

August  3,  1948 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Grateful  acknowledgement  is  made  to  the  Yale  University  Press,  to 
the  Open  Court  Publishing  Company,  to  Harper  and  Brothers,  and 
to  the  Princeton  University  Press,  for  their  kind  permission  to  quote 
at  length  from  the  works  of  Ernst  Cassirer,  without  requiring  a  de- 
tailed enumeration.  Exact  title,  name  of  publisher,  and  place  and  date 
of  publication  of  each  of  Cassirer's  works  are  enumerated  in  the  Bibli- 
ography to  this  volume,  found  on  pages  885  to  909. 

We  also  wish  to  express  our  appreciation  to  the  editors  and  publishers 
of  the  numerous  philosophical  and  literary  journals  quoted,  and  to  the 
publishers  of  all  other  books  used  by  our  contributors,  for  the  privilege 
of  utilizing  source  materials  therein  found  relevant  to  the  discussion  of 
The  Philosophy  of  Ernst  Cassirer. 


A 

Dimitry  Gawronsky 
ERNST  CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK 

A  Biography 


ERNST  CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK 

ERNST  CASSIRER  was  born  in  Breslau  on  July  28,  1874. 
He  was  the  fourth  child  of  a  rich  Jewish  tradesman  j  a 
brother  and  two  sisters  preceded  Ernst.  His  brother  died  in 
infancy,  before  Ernst  was  born,  and  his  mother  therefore  be- 
stowed upon  the  second  boy,  the  impassioned  love  she  had  felt 
for  her  lost  son  and  in  memory  of  this  tragic  loss  and  the  ordeal 
she  underwent  she  called  her  second  son  Ernst.  To  the  last  days 
of  her  life,  Ernst  was  her  most  cherished  child,  although  two 
other  sons  and  three  daughters  came  after  him. 

As  a  boy,  Ernst  was  exceptionally  cheerful  and  buoyant,  yet 
easy  to  handle.  In  his  games  he  displayed  an  inexhaustible 
imagination  j  he  was  full  of  new  tricks  and  pranks,  and  nothing 
in  his  nature  seemed  to  reveal  that  his  life  would  be  devoted  to 
quiet  and  concentrated  contemplation.  He  was  endowed  with  a 
great  courage  and,  as  a  boy  of  ten,  it  was  nothing  to  him  to  swim 
the  broad  Oder  River  across  and  back.  The  most  outstanding 
feature  of  the  boy  was  his  keen  sense  of  fair  play  and  justice. 
Althought  the  most  beloved  child  of  the  family,  he  never  toler- 
ated the  slightest  discrimination  against  his  brothers  and  sisters, 
never  accepted  any  favors,  refused  anything  which  was  not  also 
given  to  the  others. 

Ernst  was  an  impassioned  music  lover  and  never  missed  an 
opportunity  to  attend  a  concert  or  an  opera.  In  his  early  classes 
at  the  "Gymnasium"  he  was  just  an  average  pupil,  much  more 
likely  to  be  at  the  bottom  than  at  the  head  of  his  class.  He  kept 
so  busy  playing  with  his  brothers  and  friends  that  there  was 
little  time  left  for  study. 

But  a  change  was  not  far  off.  Ernst's  maternal  grandfather, 
although  a  self-taught  person,  was  an  exceptionally  cultured 
man  of  wide  intellectual  scope  and  truly  philosophical  mind. 
He  lived  not  far  from  Breslau,  and  every  summer  Ernst  paid  a 


4  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

visit  to  his  grandfather.  There,  in  conversations  with  his  grand- 
father, whom  he  dearly  loved,  and  in  the  latter's  vast  library, 
awoke  and  grew  Ernst's  interest  in  the  problems  of  the  intel- 
lectual life.  All  his  life  Cassirer  was  convinced  that  he  inherited 
his  philosophical  vein  of  thought  from  his  grandfather.  At  the 
age  of  twelve  he  had  already  thoroughly  read  many  literary 
and  historical  works.  Shakespeare,  whose  work  he  found  in  his 
father's  library,  especially  appealed  to  him  and  Ernst  read  and 
reread  all  of  Shakespeare's  plays  several  times;  only  Hamlet 
was  missing  from  his  father's  library,  and  Ernst  was  quite  un- 
aware of  the  existence  of  this  play.  Then,  on  his  thirteenth  birth- 
day, he  received  a  book  containing  Shakespeare's  complete 
works  and  he  was  most  amazed  and  thrilled  to  "discover"  Ham- 
let. 

At  this  early  age — and  for  the  remainder  of  his  life — 
Cassirer  acquired  the  capacity  for  concentrated  and  persistent 
work.  His  entire  behavior  began  to  change  slowly.  Now  there 
was  only  little  time  left  for  play,  and  in  his  class  he  became 
admittedly  the  best  pupil.  In  higher  classes  Cassirer's  teachers 
were  often  amazed  at  the  depth  of  his  knowledge  and  maturity 
of  his  judgment,  and  when  he  completed  his  studies  at  the 
"Gymnasium"  his  graduation  certificate  contained  the  highest 
marks. 

Without  losing  any  time,  Cassirer  entered  the  University  of 
Berlin.  He  was  then  eighteen  years  of  age  and  the  major  sub- 
ject he  had  selected  for  a  study  was  jurisprudence.  He  made 
this  choice  more  upon  the  insistence  of  his  father,  who  was 
largely  interested  in  the  field  of  law,  than  of  his  own  free  will. 
Soon  he  gave  up  this  line  of  study  and  began  to  concentrate 
upon  German  philosophy  and  literature.  In  addition  he  listened 
eagerly  to  lectures  on  history  and  art.  And  yet  all  these  studies 
somehow  did  not  give  Cassirer  complete  satisfaction;  something 
was  lacking  in  them;  he  missed  in  them  a  certain  degree  of 
depth  in  understanding  and  failed  to  find  any  solution  of  funda- 
mental problems.  It  was  undoubtedly  this  sense  of  dissatisfac- 
tion which  caused  Cassirer  to  change  universities  several  times; 
he  went  from  Berlin  to  Leipzig,  from  there  to  Heidelberg,  and 
then  back  to  Berlin.  In  the  meantime  he  further  enlarged  the 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  5 

scope  of  his  studies  and  found  himself  becoming  more  and  more 
interested  in  philosophy.  Thus  it  happened  that  in  the  summer 
of  1894  he  decided  to  take  a  course  on  Kant's  philosophy  given 
by  Georg  Simmel,  then  a  young  and  brilliant  Privatdozent  at 
the  University  of  Berlin. 

This  was  a  time  when  strong  idealistic  tendencies  seemed  to 
win  a  decisive  victory  over  mysticism,  which  for  many  centuries 
had  dominated  German  spiritual  culture.  Already  in  the  first 
half  of  the  thirteenth  century  Meister  Eckhart,  one  of  the 
greatest  of  the  German  mystics,  had  impressively  revealed  the 
very  core  of  his  creed  in  the  following  words:  "Man,  yes,  I 
stood  with  God  before  time  and  the  world  were  created;  yes, 
I  was  included  in  the  eternal  Godhead  even  before  it  became 
God.  Together  with  me  God  has  created  and  is  still  and  always 
creating.  Only  through  me  He  became  God."  This  conception, 
born  out  of  titanic  pride,  infinite  egotistic  power,  and  ecstasy  of 
passion,  for  five  long  centuries  and  virtually  unopposed  had 
dominated  German  spiritual  culture;  it  never  remained  a  move- 
ment of  intellectuals  only,  or  of  any  other  small  group  of  peo- 
ple; in  fact,  all  the  great  folk  movements  in  Germany  during 
those  five  centuries  were  movements  of  outspoken  mysticism. 

In  the  eighteenth  century,  however,  tendencies  of  a  very 
different  nature  came  to  the  fore  within  German  culture.  Leib- 
niz and  Wolf,  Lessing  and  Goethe,  Schiller  and  Kant  created 
in  Germany  a  bright  atmosphere  of  genuine  humanism;  ideal- 
istic tendencies,  intermingled  with  radical  rationalism,  became 
most  potent  in  Germany's  intellectual  life.  Yet,  this  triumph  of 
reason  and  of  humanism  was  only  shortlived;  with  the  begin- 
ning of  the  nineteenth  century  a  huge  wave  of  mysticism  again 
arose  in  Germany,  breaking  through  all  ramparts  of  measure 
and  reason  and  overflowing  the  spiritual  culture  of  Germany. 
Then  again,  in  the  last  third  of  the  nineteenth  century  Otto 
Liebmann  and  Hermann  Cohen  initiated  a  philosophical  move- 
ment which  harked  back  to  Kant  and  to  the  idealistic  tendencies 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  Several  philosophical  "schools"  soon 
arose  in  Germany,  all  quite  similar  in  this  basic  tendency  and 
diverging  from  each  other  in  only  more  or  less  important 
details.  When  Ernst  Cassirer  began  his  academic  studies,  this 


6  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

neo-Kantianism  dominated  many  of  the  German  universities 
to  an  almost  exclusive  degree.  Hans  Vaihinger  for  a  score  of 
years  kept  in  his  desk  the  completed  volume  of  his  Philosophy 
of  As  ljy  a  fictional  and  pragmatistic  conception  of  knowledge, 
and  wrote  his  commentary  on  Kant  in  which  he  embarked  upon 
an  orthodox  interpretation  of  Kant's  texts,  word  by  word  and 
sentence  by  sentence.  And  Simmel,  the  future  leading  "philoso- 
pher of  life,"  wrote  and  lectured  on  Kant's  philosophy. 

For  some  weeks  Cassirer  regularly  attended  Simmel's  lec- 
tures. Once,  when  lecturing  on  Kant,  Simmel  dropped  the  fol- 
lowing remark:  "Undoubtedly  the  best  books  on  Kant  are 
written  by  Hermann  Cohen;  but  I  must  confess  that  I  do  not 
understand  them." 

Immediately  after  the  lecture,  Cassirer  went  to  his  bookshop 
and  ordered  Cohen's  books;  and  no  sooner  had  he  begun  study- 
ing them  than  his  decision  was  made — to  go  to  Marburg  and 
there  to  study  philosophy  under  Cohen's  guidance.  However, 
Cassirer  did  not  want  to  go  to  Cohen  at  once.  The  young  stu- 
dent studied  Kant's  and  Cohen's  works  thoroughly,  as  well  as 
those  of  several  other  philosophers  essential  for  the  understand- 
ing of  Kant,  such  as  Plato,  Descartes,  and  Leibniz.  In  addition 
he  devoted  a  large  part  of  his  time  to  the  study  of  mathematics, 
mechanics,  and  biology — sciences  which  were  indispensable  for 
an  understanding  of  Cohen's  interpretation  of  Kant. 

When,  in  the  spring  of  1896,  Cassirer  finally  arrived  in 
Marburg  to  hear  Cohen  for  the  first  time,  he  knew  a  great  deal 
about  Kant's  and  Cohen's  philosophies.  There  was  something 
very  peculiar  about  Cohen's  appearance:  he  was  stout  and  short, 
with  an  incredibly  huge  head  towering  over  his  broad  shoulders. 
He  had  an  almost  abnormally  high  forehead.  His  eyes  flashed, 
fascinated,  and  penetrated,  despite  the  dark  glasses  which  he 
always  wore.  In  his  lectures  and  seminars,  and  even  in  his  pri- 
vate conversations,  one  could  not  help  experiencing  the  presence 
of  a  great  mind  and  the  heart  of  a  prophet,  filled  to  overflowing 
with  an  ecstatic  belief  in  the  value  of  truth  and  the  power  of 
goodness.  No  matter  what  problem  Cohen  discussed — a  mathe- 
matical, epistemological  or  ethical  one — he  always  spoke  with 
a  deep,  intense  passion,  which  was  usually  controlled  perfectly 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  7 

by  the  measured  flow  of  his  slow  and  powerful  language — until 
the  passion  broke  through  in  a  few  words  or  short  sentences. 
Then  Cohen  would  shout  with  mighty  voice  at  his  listeners, 
emphasizing  the  importance  of  his  words  with  an  energetic 
movement  of  his  hands. 

However  interesting  Cohen's  lectures  were,  his  seminars 
were  even  more  stimulating.  He  was  truly  a  spiritual  "mid- 
wife" in  the  Socratic  sense.  Always  using  the  method  of  the 
Socratic  dialogue,  he  had  a  great  pedagogical  ability  to  let  the 
students  themselves  find  the  answers  to  questions  discussed.  His 
patience  and  his  personal  interest  in  the  intellectual  develop- 
ment of  every  single  one  of  the  students  was  inexhaustible.  At 
the  same  time  he  was  keenly  concerned  with  their  general  wel- 
fare, and  whenever  his  help  was  needed,  he  always  gave  it  to 
his  utmost. 

In  the  first  seminar  hour  which  Cassirer  attended  he  volun- 
teered to  answer  a  rather  difficult  philosophical  question  asked 
by  Cohen.  A  conversation  arose  between  them,  and  within  a  few 
minutes  Cohen  was  quite  aware  of  the  type  of  student  that  sat 
before  him.  Later  on  this  first  meeting  with  Cassirer  belonged 
to  Cohen's  most  pleasant  reminiscences,  and  he  enjoyed  telling 
it  frequently  and  in  great  detail}  how  a  new  student,  whom  he 
had  never  seen  before,  very  youthful  in  appearance,  a  little  shy 
but  determined,  raised  his  hand  and  in  a  firm  voice  gave  a  quite 
correct  and  complete  answer  to  his  question.  "I  felt  at  once," 
said  Cohen,  "that  this  man  had  nothing  to  learn  from  me."  At 
that  time  Cohen  was  surrounded  by  quite  a  few  disciples,  and 
some  of  them  already  had  studied  philosophy  with  him  for 
years;  but  from  the  first  moment  Cassirer  towered  above  them 
all.  He  was  quite  at  home  in  all  the  most  intricate  problems  of 
Kantian  and  Cohenian  ways  of  thinking. 

It  was  a  firmly  established  custom  in  Marburg  that  after 
every  seminar  Cohen's  disciples,  often  five  or  six  at  a  time, 
accompanied  him  to  the  threshold  of  his  house.  But  Cassirer, 
who  in  every  seminar  distinguished  himself  by  the  scope  of  his 
knowledge  and  by  the  brilliancy  of  his  philosophical  mind,  at 
first  did  not  approach  Cohen  or  his  students.  For  years  already 
Cassirer  had  been  entirely'absorbed  in  his  studies  and  had  little 


8  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

time  to  spare  for  social  intercourse;  he  did  not  enjoy  any  type 
of  discussion  with  his  friends,  probably  because  his  own  inten- 
sive thinking  furthered  his  intellectual  progress  even  more.  He 
became  almost  unsociable.  In  this  mood  he  came  to  Marburg; 
he  was  always  most  polite  and  friendly  to  everybody,  but  kept 
so  obviously  aloof  that  Cohen's  disciples  nicknamed  him  "the 
Olympian."  Most  amazed  of  all  was  Cohen  himself;  he  took  a 
great  liking  to  Cassirer  and  keenly  felt  the  latter's  outstanding 
philosophical  talent;  but  he  wondered  at  his  strange  behavior. 
Finally  Cohen  developed  a  peculiar  suspicion.  There  was  one 
group  of  people  whom  Cohen  could  not  tolerate:  the  converted 
Jews;  he  never  even  shook  hands  with  them.  Cohen  evidently 
thought  that  Cassirer  was  also  converted  and  was  avoiding  any 
personal  contact  with  his  teacher  because  he  was  aware  of 
Cohen's  attitude  towards  such  people.  When  Cassirer  finally 
heard  of  this  surmise,  he  at  once  called  on  Cohen,  and  this  was 
the  beginning  of  an  intimate  friendship  between  them  which 
lasted  to  the  end  of  Cohen's  days. 

Now  Cassirer  became  the  acknowledged  leader  in  the  circle 
of  Cohen's  disciples.  He  lived  in  a  house  which  for  decades 
was  a  sort  of  headquarters  for  Cohen's  students,  and  with 
several  of  these  students  Cassirer  came  into  close  personal  con- 
tact. It  was,  however,  still  quite  impossible  to  entice  Cassirer  to 
go  to  a  party  or  to  spend  an  evening  in  a  cafe,  which  was  the 
almost  obligatory  pastime  of  the  German  students;  but  he  took 
a  fancy  to  studying  with  some  of  his  new  friends.  Thus  he  read 
Dante  and  Galileo  with  an  Italian  disciple  of  Cohen;  he  studied 
intricate  Greek  texts  with  a  classical  philologist,  and  for  hours 
he  discussed  difficult  mathematical  problems  with  a  mathema- 
tician. And  the  most  interesting  part  of  it  was  that  all  these 
people,  although  they  were  experts  in  their  respective  fields, 
willingly  acknowledged  Cassirer's  superiority  and  received 
from  him  a  great  deal  more  than  they  were  able  to  give  him  in 
return.  Soon  all  students  of  Cohen  knew  that,  whenever  they 
needed  a  helping  hand,  they  could  turn  to  Cassirer,  and  this 
very  busy  man  who  treasured  every  minute  of  his  time  was 
always  ready  to  spend  hours  explaining  difficult  problems  to 
anybody  who  approached  him. 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  9 

By  the  end  of  Cassirer's  first  semester  in  Marburg  not  only 
all  the  University,  but  all  the  town  as  well,  knew  of  the  prodigy. 
Cassirer  became  quite  popular,  but  he  did  not  enjoy  popularity 
at  all}  he  sincerely  hated  any  kind  of  notoriety  in  connection 
with  his  person. 

Undoubtedly  the  credit  for  Cassirer's  stupendous  knowledge 
must  be  attributed  to  a  large  degree  to  his  exceptional  memory. 
Cohen  told  us  several  times  that  as  a  young  student  Cassirer  was 
able  to  quote  by  heart  whole  pages  of  almost  all  the  classical 
poets  and  philosophers.  And,  in  a  sorrowful  voice,  Cohen  never 
forgot  to  add:  "Even  all  modern  poets,  like  Nietzsche  and 
Stefan  George,  he  could  quote  you  by  heart  for  hours!"  This 
prodigious  memory  served  Cassirer  faithfully  to  the  end  of  his 
days  and  made  him  capable  of  finding  with  the  greatest  of  ease 
any  quotations  he  needed  in  all  those  countless  books  he  had 
read  during  his  life  time.  Yet  Cassirer's  memory  was  not  just  a 
passive  capacity,  a  sort  of  storage  for  acquired  knowledge — it 
was  rather  an  er-mnern  in  Goethe's  sense,  a  process  of  repeated 
and  creative  mental  absorption,  combined  with  a  keen  ability 
to  see  all  essential  elements  of  a  problem  and  its  organic  relation 
to  other  problems.  Cassirer's  sharp  and  most  active  intellect 
constantly  used  the  rich  material  of  his  memory,  incessantly 
reviewing  and  reshaping  it  under  different  aspects,  thus  keeping 
it  vividly  present  in  his  mind. 

When  Cassirer  came  to  Cohen,  the  latter's  philosophy  was  in 
a  state  of  transition.  Cohen  worked  at  that  time  on  his  own 
system  of  philosophy,  which  he  began  publishing  a  few  years 
later.  Cohen's  chief  goal  at  that  time  was  to  free  Kant's  philoso- 
phy from  inner  contradiction  and  to  emphasize  more  strongly 
its  fundamental  methods  and  ideas.  In  his  "critique  of  reason" 
Kant  tried  to  measure  the  real  power  of  the  human  intellect 
and  the  part  it  played  in  the  cognition  of  the  external  world. 
The  result  Kant  reached  was  the  following:  the  human  intellect 
not  only  classifies  and  combines  our  sensations  and  perceptions, 
but  does  much  more  besides  j  it  forms  them  from  the  outset  and 
makes  them  possible,  so  that  even  the  simplest  sensation  exists 
in  the  human  mind  owing  to  the  analytical  and  synthetical 
power  of  the  human  intellect  which  carries  in  itself  visible  marks 


io  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

of  this  power.  We  are  very  much  mistaken  when  we  think  that, 
for  instance,  a  "white  ceiling' '  or  a  "brown  floor"  are  just  simple 
sensations}  quite  the  contrary  is  true:  "white,"  "ceiling," 
"brown,"  "floor"  presuppose  already  whole  systems  of  concepts, 
continuous  application  of  analytical  and  synthetical  functions  of 
our  intellect.  Any  sensory  intuition,  Kant  taught  in  the  central 
chapter  of  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  in  the  "Transcendental 
Deduction  of  the  Pure  Concept  of  Reason,"  is  only  possible  as  a 
product  of  the  creative  activity  of  the  fundamental  functions  of 
our  intellect;  yet  in  the  chapters  preceding  and  following  this 
one  Kant  insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  accepting  the  sensory 
intuition  as  the  very  source  of  the  creative  synthetic  power  of 
our  intellect.  Furthermore,  having  showed  the  indispensability 
of  reason  for  the  true  understanding  of  nature,  for  the  creation 
of  natural  science  as  a  thoroughly  consistent  system  of  knowl- 
edge, Kant  still  did  not  part  with  his  conception  of  the  "thing- 
in-itself,"  according  to  which  all  our  knowledge  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  world  of  ultimate  reality,  but  can  only  deal  with 
the  sphere  of  humanly  (i-e.y  sensorily)  conditioned  appearances. 

Thus  Kant  decisively  broke  with  the  naive  and  shallow  belief 
of  the  German  Enlightenment  in  the  miraculous  power  of  the 
intellect,  with  its  tendency  to  solve  with  the  help  of  trite  and 
schematic  reasonings  all  mysteries  of  the  cosmos;  he  put  the 
greatest  stress  upon  the  necessity  of  clear  insight  into  the  basic 
limitations  which  characterize  the  creative  work  of  human 
reason.  Yet  all  these  limitations  Kant  accepted  only  for  the 
realm  of  theoretical  knowledge,  not  for  the  field  of  ethical 
activity;  in  this  latter  sphere  Kant  was  convinced  that  the 
knowledge  of  good  as  well  as  its  materialization  depend  ex- 
clusively on  the  human  intellect,  that  all  emotions  and  feelings 
— such  as  friendship,  sympathy,  love — insofar  as  they  are  in- 
strumental in  the  realization  of  good,  only  obscure  and  debase 
the  purity  of  moral  principles. 

Cohen  tried  to  rectify  these  inconsistencies.  To  him  "sensa- 
tion" was  only  a  problem  which  could  be  consciously  put  and 
solved  by  the  methods  of  the  human  intellect:  this  bright 
yellow  stain  in  the  skies  is  in  reality  the  centre  of  a  whole 
planetary  system  which  reveals  in  its  substance  and  movements 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  11 

a  miraculous  chain  of  natural  laws.  This  knowledge  is  genuine 
and  is  directed  towards  the  true  object,  behind  which  no  "thing- 
in-itself"  is  hidden.  Yet,  our  knowledge  is  deficient  and  is  able 
to  progress  slowly  and  painfully  5  only  as  a  result  of  the  infinite 
progress  of  science  can  a  true  knowledge  of  the  object  be  won. 
And  only  the  completely  exploded  object,  reached  at  the 
infinitely  remote  limit  of  our  knowledge,  is  the  real  "thing-in- 
itself." 

Thus,  Cohen's  philosophy  decisively  preached  the  predomi- 
nant role  of  the  intellect  in  the  realm  of  knowledge  and  did 
away  with  some  of  the  basic  limitations  of  intellectual  power 
which  were  accepted  by  Kant.  Yet,  it  was  quite  different  in  the 
realm  of  volition;  there  Cohen  was  much  less  rationalistic  than 
Kant  and  was  convinced  that  it  was  the  intensity  of  our  emotions 
and  feelings  on  which  depended  the  energy  of  our  volition; 
they  supplied  the  "motor  power"  for  our  actions. 

Hence  came  Cohen's  preference  for  mathematics  and  natural 
science;  there  the  work  of  our  intellect  could  be  observed  and 
studied  in  its  unadulterated  form.  And,  since  the  intellect  was  to 
Cohen  the  backbone  of  the  human  mind,  he  strongly  insisted 
upon  the  necessity  of  starting  philosophical  studies  with  epis- 
temology.  Cassirer  knew  this  already  from  Cohen's  books  and 
eagerly  studied  mathematics  and  natural  science  before  he  went 
to  Marburg.  Now  he  devoted  almost  all  of  his  time  to  these 
disciplines  and  to  the  problems  of  knowledge. 

During  the  first  semester  Cohen   already  began  asking 
Cassirer  which  subject  he  would  like  to  choose  for  his  doctor's 
thesis.  After  some  hesitation  Cassirer  decided  to  write  on  Leib- 
niz. Many  reasons  determined  this  choice.  First  of  all  there  was 
the  great  versatility  of  Leibniz's  prolific  genius  and  his  funda- 
mental achievement  in  the  fields  of  logic,  mathematics,  and 
natural  science,  in  which  at  that  time  Cassirer  was  primarily 
interested.  Next,  the  exceptional  difficulty  of  the  task  also  chal- 
lenged Cassirer  j  Leibniz  had  set  forth  his  philosophy  not  in 
book  form  mainly,  but  piecemeal,  in  his  vast  correspondence; 
and  the  system  of  his  philosophy  consequently  had  to  be  recon- 
structed out  of  these  dispersed  elements.  In  addition,  the  slowly 
developing  recognition  of  Leibniz's  great  importance  for  the 


12  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

development  of  modern  philosophy  caused  the  Berlin  Academy 
to  make  Leibniz  the  subject  for  a  prize  competition,  and 
Cassirer  decided  to  participate  in  this  competition. 

In  less  than  two  years  Cassirer  had  completed  his  sizable 
work  on  Leibniz.  The  first  part  of  it,  dealing  with  Descartes' 
theory  of  knowledge,  was  accepted  by  the  Marburg  philosophi- 
cal faculty  as  a  doctor's  dissertation  and  obtained  the  highest 
possible  mark  in  form  of  the  very  seldom  conferred  "opus 
eximum."  Cassirer  was  at  once  admitted  to  the  oral  examination, 
during  which  he  once  more  kept  his  teachers  breathless  by  the 
immensity  of  his  knowledge  and  brilliancy  of  his  understand- 
ing, and  was  awarded  the  doctor's  degree  "summa  cum  laude." 
The  entire  book  on  Leibniz  Cassirer  presented  to  the  Berlin 
Academy.  There  he  was  not  quite  so  fortunate:  the  Academy 
decided  not  to  give  the  first  prize  to  anyone  j  Cassirer's  book 
obtained  the  second  prize,  followed  by  a  long  and  most  flatter- 
ing commendation,  where  his  great  erudition,  philosophical 
talent  and  brilliancy  of  presentation  were  highly  praised,  but 
the  prevalence  of  rational  and  systematic  tendencies,  along  with 
the  primary  concentration  upon  the  epistemological  problems 
were  given  as  reasons  for  the  withholding  of  the  first  prize  from 
him.  Some  130  years  before  the  Berlin  Academy  had  made  a 
similar  grave  mistake,  which  world  opinion  had  to  correct  in 
subsequent  years,  by  withholding  the  first  prize  from  Immanuel 
Kant.  Did  not  that  famous  Academy  commit  a  similar  error  in 
Cassirer's  case? 

Upon  receiving  his  Doctorate  from  Marburg  University, 
Cassirer  went  back  to  the  home  of  his  parents,  who  meanwhile 
had  moved  to  Berlin.  There  he  at  once  began  working  on  a  new 
problem,  which  grew  out  of  his  research  on  Leibniz — he  de- 
cided to  give  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  development  of 
epistemology  in  the  philosophy  and  science  of  modern  times. 
He  continued  to  live  in  seclusion,  devoting  all  his  time  to  his 
studies.  Yet,  his  aloofness  never  was  a  matter  of  unsociability: 
it  was  his  vivid  awareness  of  the  greatness  of  the  task  he  had 
embarked  upon,  combined  with  the  all-devouring  interest  in  his 
work,  which  forced  him  to  spare  to  the  limit  his  time  and 
energy. 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  13 

It  was  on  the  occasion  of  a  close  relative's  wedding  in  Berlin, 
in  1901,  that  Cassirer  met  his  first  cousin  from  Vienna.  He  had 
previously  seen  her  only  once,  eight  years  earlier,  when  she  was 
a  child  of  nine.  All  artistic  traits  of  Cassirer's  nature,  his  love 
and  deep  understanding  of  music,  his  fine  feeling  for  genuine 
beauty  had  in  no  way  suffered  from  his  assiduous  scientific  re- 
searches and  philosophical  meditations;  they  always  added  a 
great  deal  to  the  irresistible  charm  of  his  personality  and  were 
immediately  and  deeply  felt  by  the  young  girl.  This  first  meet- 
ing determined  their  whole  future.  They  fell  in  love  with  each 
other  and  married  a  year  later  in  Vienna. 

This  was  indeed  an  exceptionally  happy  and  harmonious 
union.  Their  mutual  understanding  was  perfect,  and  Cassirer's 
wife  always  succeeded,  thanks  to  her  remarkable  understanding 
and  insight,  in  creating  for  her  husband,  even  during  the  most 
stormy  periods  of  their  life,  appropriate  conditions  for  his  con- 
tinuous work. 

Immediately  after  the  wedding  the  young  couple  went  to 
Munich,  where  they  lived  for  more  than  a  year.  It  was  during 
this  year  that  their  first  son,  Heinz,  was  born  (he  is  now  mem- 
ber of  the  philosophical  faculty  at  the  University  of  Glasgow, 
Scotland).  In  1903  Cassirer  returned  with  his  family  to  Berlin, 
where  he  began  writing  his  history  of  epistemology.  Cohen 
constantly  pressed  upon  him  and  urged  him  to  embark  upon 
an  academic  career,  yet  Cassirer  showed  little  desire  to  go  to 
some  small  university  town  and  live  there  for  years  in  its  at- 
mosphere of  gossip  and  latent  anti-Semitism.  He  much  pre- 
ferred to  stay  in  Berlin,  where  most  of  his  and  his  wife's 
relatives  lived  and  where  the  treasure  of  the  State  and  Uni- 
versity libraries  were  at  his  disposal.  His  work  developed 
rapidly,  and  as  early  as  1904  the  two  volumes  of  his 
Erkenntnisfroblem  ("Problem  of  Knowledge")  were  finished. 
It  was  one  of  Cohen's  most  cherished  stories  how  once,  while 
visiting  Cassirer  in  Berlin  in  1904,  he  had  asked  Cassirer  how 
his  work  was  progressing.  "Without  saying  a  word,"  Cohen 
would  relate,  "Cassirer  led  me  into  his  study,  opened  a  drawer 
of  his  desk,  and  there  it  was,  a  voluminous,  completely  finished 
manuscript  of  his  new  work." 


14  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

In  1906  the  first  volume  of  the  Erkenntnis-problem  ("Prob- 
lem of  Knowledge")  was  published,  followed  by  the  second 
one  in  1908.  The  outstanding  qualities  of  this  work  were 
rapidly  recognized  by  students  of  philosophy  all  over  the 
world}  it  appeared  in  several  editions  and  slowly  became  one  of 
the  standard  works  on  the  history  of  human  thought.  Cassirer's 
original  intention  had  been  to  give  a  broad  picture  of  modern 
European  thought  as  it  led  to,  and  culminated  in,  the  philoso- 
phy of  Kant.  This  he  did  in  the  first  two  volumes  of  his 
Erkenntnis'problem.  Fifteen  years  later  he  added  one  more 
volume,  in  which  he  set  forth  the  development  of  epistemology 
in  post-Kantian  philosophy;  and  shortly  before  he  came  to 
America  (in  the  summer  of  1941)  he  finished  the — as  yet  un- 
published— fourth  volume,  where  he  has  given  a  broad  picture 
of  the  evolution  of  epistemology  up  to  our  own  days.* 

The  more  one  studies  this  work  of  Cassirer,  the  more  one 
admires  the  intellectual  scope  of  the  man  who  was  able  to  write 
it.  Immense  was  the  number  of  books  Cassirer  had  to  study  and 
familiarize  himself  with  in  the  interest  of  this  work.  And  yet, 
this  is  the  least  spectacular  part  of  it.  Really  amazing  is 
Cassirer's  ability  to  penetrate  scores  of  individual  systems  of 
thought,  reconstruct  them  in  all  their  peculiarities,  accentuate 
all  that  is  original  and  fruitful  in  them,  and  reveal  all  their 
weaknesses  and  inconsistencies.  Cassirer  had  an  incredibly  fine 
mind  for  the  slightest  nuances  of  thought,  for  the  minutest 
differences  and  similarities,  for  all  that  was  of  fundamental  or 
of  secondary  importance;  with  steady  grasp  he  picked  up  the 
development  through  all  its  stages  and  ramifications;  and,  in 
showing  how  the  same  concept  acquired  a  different  meaning, 
according  to  the  diverse  philosophical  systems  in  which  it  was 
applied  as  a  constructive  element,  Cassirer  laid  the  first  founda- 
tion for  the  ideas  which  he  later  developed  as  his  theory  of 
"symbolic  forms."  Scores  of  Italian  and  German,  French  and 
English  philosophers,  almost  or  completely  fallen  into  oblivion, 
came  back  in  Cassirer's  book  to  new  life  and  historical  impor- 

*  EDITOR'S  NOTE:  This  (fourth)  volume  of  Cassirer's  Erkennlnis'problem  is 
now  being  translated  into  English  under  the  direction  of  Professor  Charles  W. 
Hendel  and  will  in  due  time  be  published  by  the  Yale  University  Press. 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  15 

tance  as  organic  links  in  the  development  of  ideas  or  as  con- 
nections between  well  known  philosophical  systems}  thus  mak- 
ing the  continuity  of  philosophical  thought  more  consistent  and 
true.  He  was  the  first  to  introduce  into  the  history  of  philosophy 
such  names  as  Kepler,  Galileo,  Huygens,  Newton,  and  Euler, 
by  giving  a  detailed  analysis  of  their  philosophical  conceptions, 
scientific  methods  and  achievements,  and  by  proving  their 
fundamental  importance  for  the  theory  of  knowledge.  Kant's 
own  assertion  that  he  tried  to  introduce  Newton's  method  into 
philosophy  now  became  quite  clear  in  Cassirer's  representation 
of  Newton's  and  Kant's  systems  of  thought.  Yet  Cassirer's 
greatest  achievement  in  this  work  consisted  in  the  creation  of  a 
broad  general  background  by  connecting  the  evolution  of 
knowledge  with  the  totality  of  spiritual  culture:  mythos  and 
religion,  psychology  and  metaphysics,  ethics  and  aesthetics — 
Cassirer  drew  all  these  problems  into  his  deliberations  as  soon  as 
he  found  some  links  missing  in  the  development  of  their 
epistemology. 

Most  noteworthy  is  also  the  style  and  the  whole  manner  of 
presentation  in  this  work.  The  most  intricate  philosophical  prob- 
lems are  treated  in  a  quite  clear  and  simple  way;  one  gets  the 
impression  that  the  author  deeply  felt  his  responsibility  to  truth 
and  to  the  reader;  in  every  sentence  he  sincerely  tried  to  help 
the  reader  to  advance  on  the  thorny  path  of  truth.  Cassirer's 
style  makes  any  subject  he  discusses  almost  transparent,  and 
his  argumentation  glides  along  like  a  broad  and  mighty  stream, 
with  great  convincing  power. 

The  great  success  of  his  Erkenntnisproblem,  which  became 
obvious  immediately  after  the  appearance  of  the  first  volume, 
caused  Cassirer  to  yield  to  Cohen's  ardent  desire  and  to  embark 
finally  upon  an  academic  career.  Yet,  there  was  one  condition 
attached  to  it — he  was  ready  to  become  Privatdozent  only  in  the 
University  of  Berlin,  since  he  still  did  not  want  to  leave  the 
city.  He  knew  how  difficult  this  undertaking  was,  first,  because 
he  was  a  Jew,  and  secondly,  because  he  was  Cohen's  disciple  and 
considered  himself  a  member  of  the  Marburg  school,  which 
at  that  time  was  one  of  the  most  renowned — and  hated — 
"schools"  in  Germany.  In  his  quiet  manner  Cassirer  said  to 


1 6  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

Cohen:  "In  this  way  I  do  not  risk  anything.  I  need  not  go  any- 
where and  waste  my  time.  And  if  they  do  not  want  me — it  is  all 
right  with  me." 

At  that  time  philosophy  was  by  no  means  brilliantly  repre- 
sented at  the  University  of  Berlin.  The  famous  Dilthey  was 
already  retired  and  only  occasionally  gave  a  few  lectures  for  a 
selected  group  of  students.  Simmel  was  still  there,  but  owing 
to  his  Jewish  lineage  and  notwithstanding  the  importance  of 
his  books  (especially  his  voluminous  Soziologie,  which  became 
a  standard  work  of  pre-Hitlerite  German  science)  and  the 
brilliant  success  of  his  lectures,  he  was  an  assistant  professor  and 
virtually  without  any  influence.  The  leading  roles  were  played 
by  Stumpf  and  Riehl,  both  quite  serious  scholars,  but  without 
any  real  importance  (the  following  untranslatable  pun  was  then 
very  popular  with  the  students  at  the  University  of  Berlin: 
"Philosophic  wird  in  Berlin  mit  Stumpf  und  Riehl  aus- 
gerottet").  Stumpf  was  bitterly  opposed  to  any  form  of  idealis- 
tic philosophy ;  Riehl  tried  to  interpret  Kant  in  a  realistic  sense 
and  was  an  outspoken  antagonist  of  the  Marburg  "school."  Yet 
it  was  precisely  these  two  men  that  Cassirer  had  to  deal  with 
when  he  decided  to  become  Privatdozent  of  the  University  of 
Berlin. 

According  to  the  regulations  valid  at  that  time  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Berlin  a  candidate  for  "Privatdozentur"  had  to  pre- 
sent a  scientific  study — in  the  form  of  a  book  or  manuscript — 
and  then,  if  his  study  had  been  accepted,  he  was  invited  to  a  so- 
called  colloquium,  where  he  had  to  give  a  trial  lecture  and  to 
answer  questions  or  critical  comments  on  views  expressed  by 
him.  Cassirer  sent  in  his  Erkenntnisproblem,  which  was  at  once 
accepted.  A  few  weeks  later  he  was  invited  to  the  colloquium, 
and  as  subject  for  his  trial  lecture  he  had  chosen  the  "Ding  an 
sichy"  one  of  the  most  intricate  concepts  of  Kant's  philosophy.  In 
his  Erkenntmsfwoblem  Cassirer  had  given  a  very  interesting 
interpretation  of  this  notion:  he  showed  that  the  "Ding  an 
sichy"  being  within  Kant's  philosophy  always  a  limit  of  a 
maximum  or  minimum  value,  radically  changed  its  meaning 
according  to  the  particular  group  or  system  of  concepts  with 
reference  to  which  in  any  given  case  it  played  the  role  of  the 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  17 

limit.  Thus,  the  "Ding  an  s\ch"  has  one  meaning  in  the 
"Transcendentale  Aesthetik"  (Part  I  of  Kritik  der  reinen 
Vernunft^y  and  an  essentially  different  meaning  in  the  "Deduc- 
tion der  reinen  Verstandesbegriffe"  (Part  II  of  the  same  work), 
and  it  is,  therefore,  fruitless  to  define  this  notion  without  taking 
into  consideration  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  specific  ideas  with 
which  it  is  connected  in  any  special  case. 

Here  again  we  can  vividly  feel  the  future  originator  of  the 
theory  of  "symbolic  forms."  Yet,  Stumpf  and  Riehl  were,  of 
course,  not  satisfied  at  all,  and  they  both,  especially  the  latter, 
violently  attacked  Cassirer's  theory.  "You  deny  the  existence  of 
real  things  surrounding  us,"  said  Riehl.  "Look  at  that  oven 
there  in  the  corner:  to  me  it  is  a  real  thing,  which  gives  us  heat 
and  can  burn  our  skin;  but  to  you  it  is  just  a  mental  image,  a 
fiction!"  Time  and  again  Cassirer  tried  to  explain  the  true 
meaning  of  the  Kantian  criticism,  that  human  reason  creates  our 
knowledge  of  things,  but  not  the  things  themselves;  yet  with- 
out avail.  When  the  colloquium  was  over,  both  Stumpf  and 
Riehl  pleaded  against  admitting  Cassirer  as  Privatdozent.  But 
Dilthey,  who  was  also  present  at  the  colloquium,  decisively 
took  Cassirer Js  side  and  finished  his  plea  with  these  words:  "I 
would  not  like  to  be  a  man  of  whom  posterity  will  say  that  he 
rejected  Cassirer."  This  was  sufficient  to  turn  the  tide:  without 
further  discussion  the  faculty  gave  Cassirer  the  venia  legendi. 

In  subsequent  years  the  writer  of  this  biography  came  to 
Berlin  many  times  and  frequently  had  the  opportunity  of  at- 
tending Cassirer's  lectures.  Thus  he  was  able  to  observe 
Cassirer's  rapidly  growing  popularity;  he  saw  how  the  original 
attendance  of  a  few  students  grew  to  several  dozens,  then  to 
many  scores.  This  was  an  outstanding  success;  for  at  that  time 
Cassirer's  lectures  were  not  obligatory  for  anyone,  and  his  class- 
room was,  therefore,  crowded  only  because  the  students  felt 
that  what  they  got  from  him  was  true  and  substantial  knowl- 
edge. Besides,  his  delivery  was  most  attractive,  his  speech  was 
very  vivid  and  fluent,  exact  and  eloquent  at  the  same  time. 
Especially  popular  were  Cassirer Js  seminars;  there,  in  close 
personal  contact  with  his  students,  he  displayed  all  the  charm 
and  benevolence  of  his  nature,  he  analyzed  with  endless  patience 


1 8  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

and  sympathetic  understanding  any  expressed  opinion  and,  if 
necessary,  cautiously  corrected  it  or  interpreted  it  in  the  most 
fruitful  possible  way.  He  was  a  true  paidagogos  in  the  Platonic 
sense,  deeply  convinced  that  the  teacher  is  largely  to  blame  for 
the  insufficiencies  of  his  pupil. 

However,  when  circumstances  demanded  it,  Cassirer  could 
show  that  he  was  a  real  master  of  fencing.  Once — it  was  in 
Berlin,  in  1910 — our  common  friend  persuaded  us  to  attend  a 
lecture  of  a  disciple  of  Avenarius.  The  lecture  was  quite  con- 
fused and  Cassirer  was  quite  irritated  by  the  lack  of  knowledge 
and  understanding  shown  by  the  speaker.  During  the  discussion, 
Cassirer  took  the  floor  and  in  the  short  space  of  less  than  half  an 
hour  he  not  merely  revealed  his  amazingly  deep  and  exact 
knowledge  of  Avenarius,  but  he  uncovered  so  brilliantly  all  the 
inconsistencies  of  the  main  speaker  that  the  entire  lecture 
seemed  literally  to  dissolve  into  thin  air  before  our  very  eyes. 
When  he  finished,  the  audience  cheered  and  laughed  and  went 
home  without  even  listening  to  the  lecturer's  attempted  stam- 
mering rejoinder.  Much  more  important,  however,  was  another 
occasion  where  Cassirer  displayed  his  qualifications  as  a  brilliant 
polemicist.  It  was  when  Leonard  Nelson,  the  founder  of  the 
so-called  New-Friesian  "school,"  violently  attacked  Hermann 
Cohen.  Here  again  it  was  the  unfairness  of  the  criticism,  the 
lack  of  understanding  or  any  desire  for  true  understanding 
which  induced  Cassirer  to  answer  Nelson.  A  polemic  developed 
which  could  have  become  very  interesting,  if  the  opponents  had 
been  equal  in  intellectual  stature.  As  things  were,  Cassirer 
towered  above  his  antagonist  to  such  a  degree  that  all  the  time 
they  fought  on  different  levels:  Nelson  tried  to  ridicule  single 
sentences,  taken  out  of  Cohen's  books,  especially  of  his  Logik 
der  reinen  Erkenntnis,  which  is  a  profound  and  creative  work 
but  a  hard  nut  to  crack}  whereas  Cassirer  was  mainly  interested 
in  the  very  roots  of  the  dissension  and  tried  to  show,  by  analyz- 
ing the  original  Kant-Fries  relationship,  the  dangers  of  an  ex- 
aggerated psychologism  for  epistemology. 

The  first  great  systematic  work  of  Cassirer  appeared  in  1910, 
his  Stibstanzbegrif  und  Funktionsbegrif.  Despite  the  origi- 
nality of  the  basic  conception  and  whole  structure  of  this  work — 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  19 

or,  maybe  just  because  of  this — ,  it  was  several  years  before 
the  importance  of  this  work  was  duly  recognized  by  the  scien- 
tific world  and  by  the  philosophically  interested  public.  Then, 
however,  it  became  the  first  work  of  Cassirer  to  be  translated 
into  several  foreign  languages,  including  English  and  Russian, 
As  the  title  of  the  book  indicates,  it  is  devoted  to  the  problem 
of  concepts.  (Although  in  the  title  of  the  authorized  English 
translation,  viz.,  Substance  and  Function,  this  fact  is  almost  lost 
sight  of.)  For  more  than  two  thousand  years  the  science  of  logic 
was  based  upon  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  concepts,  which  says 
that  generalization  is  always  the  result  of  abstraction:  from  a 
group  of  similar  things, — for  instance,  round,  oval,  square, 
rectangular  tables — the  attributes  common  to  them  all  are  ab- 
stracted and  summarized  in  a  general  concept,  "table."  This 
theory,  Cassirer  argues,  has  one  decisive  weakness:  whence  and 
how  do  we  get  those  groups  of  similar  things  that  we  allegedly 
use  as  the  basis  for  our  abstractions?  How  does  it  happen  that 
from  one  perception,  say  that  of  a  round  table,  we  proceed  to 
other  perceptions  which  are  similar  to  the  first  one  and  not  to 
the  perceptions  of,  for  instance,  "auto,"  "star,"  "water,"  in 
which  case  we  would  not  obtain  a  group  of  similar  things?  Is  it 
not  obvious  that  we  use  the  first  perception  as  a  kind  of  criterion 
with  the  help  of  which  we  are  able  to  decide  what  belongs  to 
our  group  of  similar  things  and  what  not?  Thus  Aristotle's 
abstraction  becomes  only  possible  as  the  result  of  a  selec- 
tion, of  the  coordinated  activity  of  the  human  reason,  which  is 
the  first  and  fundamental  step  toward  general  notions.  "What 
lends  the  theory  of  abstraction  support  is  merely  the  circum- 
stance that  it  does  not  presuppose  the  contents,  out  of  which 
the  concept  is  to  develop,  as  disconnected  particularities,  but  that 
it  tacitly  thinks  them  in  the  form  of  an  ordered  manifold  from 
the  first.  The  concept,  however,  is  not  deduced  thereby,  but 
presupposed;  for,  when  we  ascribe  to  a  manifold  an  order  and 
connection  of  elements,  we  have  already  presupposed  the  con- 
cept, if  not  in  its  complete  form,  yet  in  its  fundamental  func- 
tion."1 

Thus  Aristotle's  theory  of  concept,  based  upon  the  abstraction 

1  Ernst  Cassirer,  Substance  and  Function.  Chicago — London,  1923,  p.  17. 


20  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

of  common  elements  from  a  group  of  similar  things,  is  nothing 
else  than  an  obvious  circulus  viciosus.  Yet  this  is  not  all.  The 
theory  of  abstraction  shows  also  another  decisive  weakness:  in 
order  to  form  a  concept  only  such  attributes  are  retained  which 
are  common  to  all  elements  of  a  given  group,  whereas  all 
particularities  are  not  included  in  a  general  concept — they  are 
just  thrown  aside  and  fade  away.  And  the  more  general  a  con- 
cept is,  the  less  attributes  it  contains,  the  more  particularities 
disappear  in  the  process  of  abstraction.  Yet,  "the  genuine  con- 
cept does  not  disregard  the  peculiarities  and  particularities  which 
it  holds  under  it,  but  seeks  to  show  the  necessity  of  the  occurrence 
and  connection  of  just  these  particularities.  .  .  .  Here  the  more 
universal  concept  shows  itself  also  the  more  rich  in  content."2 
Scientific  concepts  are  all  of  this  kind}  they  are  general  ideas, 
but  their  true  function  consists  of  expressing  the  rule  from  which 
a  number  of  concrete  particular  forms  can  be  derived. 

In  his  Substance  and  Function  Cassirer  also  undertook  the 
difficult  task  of  showing  what  particular  kinds  of  concepts 
underly  the  different  realms  of  the  exact  and  natural  sciences, 
what  is  the  logical  essence  of  such  categories  as  number,  space, 
time,  energy,  and  so  forth.  Cassirer  was  particularly  interested 
in  the  problem  of  how  the  structure  of  concepts  changes  its 
character  when  we  pass  from  one  field  of  science  to  another  j 
for  instance,  from  mathematics  to  physics,  or  from  physics  to 
biology,  etc.  In  carrying  out  this  plan,  he  made,  for  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  human  thought,  the  very  important  and 
successful  attempt  to  give  a  systematic  analysis  of  concepts 
which  underly  the  science  of  chemistry.  The  last  part  of  the 
book  is  devoted  to  the  theory  of  knowledge  proper,  to  the  con- 
cepts and  methods  by  which  human  reason  transforms  sensory 
impressions  into  the  systems  of  objective  science. 

The  members  of  the  Marburg  school  were  very  proud  of  this 
new  performance  of  Cassirer.  Yet,  the  opposition  came  this  time 
from  a  quarter  from  which  it  had  been  least  expected — from 
Hermann  Cohen  himself.  Already  while  reading  the  proofs, 
Cohen  obtained  the  impression,  that — as  he  expressed  it  later 
in  a  letter  to  Cassirer — "our  unity  was  jeopardized."  Especially 

pp.  19-20. 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  21 

one  long  paragraph  in  Cassirer's  book  seemed  to  Cohen  to  be 
quite  inconsistent  with  the  teachings  of  the  Marburg  school, 
and,  although  all  of  Cohen's  closest  disciples  were  convinced 
that  Cohen  was  mistaken,  Cassirer,  who  invariably  held  Cohen 
in  deepest  respect,  at  once  decided  to  reshape  the  whole  page, 
despite  the  fact  that  he  did  not  agree  with  Cohen  and  that  his 
book  was  already  in  the  final  stages  of  printing.  Upon  reading 
the  finished  book,  Cohen  wrote  to  Cassirer:  "I  congratulate  you 
and  all  members  of  our  philosophical  community  on  your  new 
and  great  achievement.  If  I  shall  not  be  able  to  write  the  second 
part  of  my  Logic,  no  harm  will  be  done  to  our  common  cause, 
since  my  project  is  to  a  large  degree  fulfilled  in  your  book."3 
But  the  criticism  comes  after  that:  "Yet,  after  my  first  reading 
of  your  book  I  still  cannot  discard  as  wrong  what  I  told  you  in 
Marburg:  you  put  the  center  of  gravity  upon  the  concept  of 
relation  and  you  believe  that  you  have  accomplished  with  the 
help  of  this  concept  the  idealization  of  all  materiality.  The  ex- 
pression even  escaped  you,  that  the  concept  of  relation  is  a 
category;  yet  it  is  a  category  only  insofar  as  it  is  function,  and 
function  unavoidably  demands  the  infinitesimal  element  in 
which  alone  the  root  of  the  ideal  reality  can  be  found." 

The  controversy  goes  back  to  Cohen's  daring  attempt  to 
establish  the  infinitesimal  numbers  as  an  absolute  element,  to 
put  this  absolute  element  before  the  whole  number  and  to  de- 
rive the  latter  from  the  former.  There  can  be  little  doubt, 
logically  as  well  as  mathematically,  that  this  is  an  impossible 
undertaking;  the  value  of  a  number  depends  always  on  its 
relation  to  other  numbers  in  which  it  may  be  contemplated: 
five  is  only  fiye  in  relation  to  one,  yet  it  is  an  infinite  number  in 
relation  to  an  infinitesimal  one,  and  an  infinitesimal  number  in 
relation  to  an  infinite  one.  Cassirer's  "function,"  as  contrasted 
with  "substance,"  meant  just  that:  it  is  impossible  to  ascribe  an 
absolute  value  to  a  mathematical  element,  since  this  value  is 
determined  by  different  relations  to  which  it  may  belong. 

Cassirer's  theory  of  concept  proved  its  great  fruitfulness  for 
the  whole  field  of  theoretical  knowledge;  it  freed  the  principles 
and  methods  of  human  reason  from  the  shadow  of  absoluteness 

3  From  Cohen's  letter  to  Cassirer  of  August  24,  1910. 


22  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

and  disclosed  their  functional  nature  as  flexible  instruments  of 
human  knowledge.  And  just  as  the  functional  concept  contains 
a  direction,  a  certain  point  of  view  which  serves  as  a  basis  of 
measurement  for  the  similarity  of  single  elements  and  arranges 
them  in  groups  and  series  according  to  their  affinity,  so  "the 
ideal  connections  spoken  of  by  logic  and  mathematics  are  the 
permanent  lines  of  direction,  by  which  experience  is  orientated 
in  its  scientific  shaping.  The  function  of  these  connections  is  their 
permanent  and  indestructible  value,  and  is  verified  as  identical 
through  all  changes  in  the  accidental  material  of  experience."4 

The  publication  of  this  important  work  brought  about  no 
change  in  Cassirer's  academic  career  j  he  was  still  Privatdozent 
in  Berlin,  and  not  one  single  German  university  invited  him, 
even  as  an  assistant  professor.  Every  time  a  chair  in  philosophy 
became  free,  Cassirer  was  invariably  listed  by  the  respective 
faculty  as  a  candidate,  but,  oddly  enough,  his  name  was  always 
put  in  the  second  place.  Cassirer  himself  was  quite  content  with 
his  limited  academic  activities  in  the  University  of  Berlin ;  he 
not  only  never  complained,  but  he  did  not  even  seem  to  feel  the 
unfairness  of  the  situation.  He  enjoyed  his  life  and  work  in 
Berlin,  his  great  success  as  teacher  and  scholar,  even  though 
officially  it  remained  unrecognized. 

Harvard  University  was  the  first  to  invite  him,  in  1914,  for 
two  years  as  visiting  professor.  However,  personal  reasons  pre- 
vented Cassirer  at  that  time  from  accepting  this  invitation.  The 
same  year  he  was  awarded  the  Kuno  Fischer  Gold  Medal  by  the 
Heidelberg  Academy.  Upon  Cassirer's  special  request  he  was 
given  a  bronze  medal  instead,  and  the  difference  in  monetary 
value — 3,000  R.M. — was  sent  to  the  Red  Cross. 

Although  Cassirer  was  highly  absorbed  by  his  research  work 
and  academic  activities,  he  still  found  time  to  organize  and 
direct  a  new  edition  of  Kant's  works.  For  this  edition  he  wrote 
an  extensive  biographical  and  philosophical  introduction  to 
Kant's  system.  In  this  introduction  he  gives  a  very  clear — both 
popular  and  truly  scientific — picture  of  the  evolution  of  Kant's 
central  ideas  and  makes  several  important  contributions  to  the 
understanding  of  Kant's  philosophy.  Perhaps  the  most  important 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  323. 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  23 

of  these  contributions  is  Cassirer's  analysis  of  the  fundamental 
ideas  of  Kant's  Kritik  der  Urteilskrajt  and  his  explanation  of 
why  Kant  based  his  theory  of  judgment  upon  two  seemingly 
so  different  roots  as  the  philosophy  of  art,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
biology,  on  the  other. 

Thus  far  all  of  Cassirer's  publications  had  been  devoted  to 
the  problem  of  knowledge.  Although  he  was  vitally  interested 
in  all  the  problems  of  art,  ethics,  and  religion,  and  assiduously 
worked  on  them,  he  somehow  did  not  feel  ready  to  write  down 
the  results  of  his  research;  and  meanwhile  he  was  busy  with  the 
preparations  for  the  third  volume  of  his  Erkewntws'problem. 
The  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War  changed  his  plans.  He 
was  drafted  for  Civil  Service,  and  his  work  consisted  of  the 
reading  of  foreign  newspapers.  Thus  he  was  able  to  contemplate 
the  war  from  different  points  of  view  and  to  obtain  a  truer 
picture  of  events  j  he  knew  already  in  the  early  stages  of  the 
war  that  Germany  was  doomed.  Besides,  his  whole  nature  was 
absolutely  contrary  to  the  imperialistic  megalomania  of  Prus- 
sian militarism.  Yet  he  was  a  philosopher,  not  a  politician,  and 
he  found  his  own  way  of  expressing  his  attitude  toward  the 
ultimate  spiritual  values  around  which  the  struggle  raged:  he 
published  his  book  Freiheit  und  Form. 

All  truly  humanitarian  and  idealistic  tendencies  of  German 
culture,  everything  which  proclaimed  the  dignity  and  freedom 
of  individuals  and  of  nations — Leasing  and  Schiller,  Kant  and 
Goethe — was  convincingly  and  eloquently  expounded  by  Cas- 
sirer  in  this  book,  providing  a  magnificent  picture  of  man's 
struggle  for  his  spiritual  liberation,  showing  Lessing's  cosmo- 
politanism and  sublime  tolerance,  Schiller's  keen  sensitiveness 
and  passion  for  freedom,  Kant's  radical,  conception  of  natural 
right,  and  Goethe's  redemption  of  the  individual  as  milestones 
of  this  eternal  process. 

Cassirer  showed  in  this  book  that  his  feeling  for  all  forms  of 
poetry  was  just  as  deep  and  incisive  as  his  understanding  of 
science.  His  interpretation  of  Goethe's  lyrics,  his  analysis  of 
Goethe's  poetical  work  in  the  different  stages  of  its  develop- 
ment belong  to  the  best  that  has  ever  been  written  on  this  sub- 
ject. Cassirer's  strong  artistic  vein  enabled  him  to  grasp  the 


24  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

inner  core  of  Goethe's  symbols,  to  provide  those  symbols  with 
profound  and  most  surprising  interpretation.  "Mahomed," 
"Pandora" — to  mention  only  two  examples — in  Cassirer's 
masterly  exposition  appeared  suddenly  in  a  new  light  and  their 
unfathomable  wisdom  and  beauty  became  visible  to  anyone.  No 
less  penetrating  was  his  analysis  of  Goethe's  achievements  in  the 
fields  of  aesthetics,  morals,  and  religion.  Cassirer  always  felt 
keenly  that  great  poets  and  belletrists  were,  in  their  innermost, 
endeavoring  to  find  a  solution  to  the  eternal  problems  of  being 
and  life,  akin  to  the  search  of  the  great  philosophers}  they  only 
expressed  their  thoughts  and  beliefs  in  the  form  of  concrete 
symbols  and  images,  and  not  in  the  form  of  abstract  reasoning. 
Goethe's  titanic  personality,  the  originality,  depth  and  versa- 
tility of  his  creative  power  irresistibly  attracted  Cassirer  all  his 
life,  and  in  a  long  series  of  special  articles  he  followed  up  his 
study  of  Goethe.  Brilliant  was  the  way  in  which  he  revealed  the 
deepest  ideological  roots  of  Goethe's  polemic  attitude  towards 
Newton,  or  described  Goethe's  conception  of  history,  or  com- 
pared the  spiritual  worlds  of  Goethe  and  Plato.  All  who  knew 
Cassirer  personally  admitted  that  his  face  reminded  them  of 
Goethe^  yet  their  mental  similarity  was  even  more  striking — it 
was  the  same  wide  scope  of  spiritual  interests,  the  same  tend- 
ency to  regard  every  event  in  the  light  of  endless  historical 
perspectives,  to  transform  every  single  fact  into  an  element  of 
an  infinite  system.  It  was  undoubtedly  this  affinity  of  mental 
tendencies  which  accounted  for  Cassirer's  unique  understanding 
of  Goethe — 

War  nicht  das  Auge  sonnenhaft, 

Die  Sonne  Konnt'  es  nie  erblicken.  .  .  . 

World  War  I  brought  a  deep  spiritual  crisis  in  Europe.  One 
belief  especially  had  been  shattered  to  its  very  foundation:  the 
idea  that  human  reason  was  a  decisive  power  in  the  social  life 
of  man.  When,  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century, 
Georges  Sorel  advanced  his  theory  that  not  reason  but  social 
myth  was  the  driving  power  of  human  history,  that  the  actions 
of  human  societies  were  determined  not  by  objective  truth  and 
cool  deliberation  but  by  peculiar  images,  mostly  born  out  of 
hatred,  revulsion,  contempt,  and  filled  with  strong  impulses  and 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  25 

emotions,  images,  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  truth  and 
often  represent  the  greatest  possible  falsehood — the  scholars 
only  laughed  at  him  and  paid  no  attention  at  all  to  his  "queer" 
ideas.  Yet,  the  progress  of  the  war  and  the  subsequent  years 
which  saw  the  birth  of  several  totalitarian  ideologies  and  their 
victorious  march  to  power  in  the  largest  countries  of  Europe, 
ruined  and  disarrayed  by  the  war,  clearly  showed  the  extent 
of  truth  contained  in  Sorel's  social  theories.  The  stormy  pace  of 
historical  events  demanded  a  new  approach  to  the  problems  of 
reality,  different  ways  and  means  for  its  understanding.  This 
was  the  background  for  Cassirer's  theory  of  symbolic  forms — 
his  great  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  most  vital 
problems  of  our  time  and  of  history. 

When  the  author  of  this  article  again  met  Cassirer,  shortly 
after  the  termination  of  World  War  I,  Cassirer  was  already 
quite  absorbed  in  his  new  work.  Cassirer  once  told  how  in  1917, 
just  as  he  entered  a  street  car  to  ride  home,  the  conception  of  the 
symbolic  forms  flashed  upon  him  5  a  few  minutes  later,  when  he 
reached  his  home,  the  whole  plan  of  his  new  voluminous  work 
was  ready  in  his  mind,  in  essentially  the  form  in  which  it  was 
carried  out  in  the  course  of  the  subsequent  ten  years.  Suddenly 
the  onesidedness  of  the  Kant-Cohen  theory  of  knowledge  be- 
came quite  clear  to  Cassirer.  It  is  not  true  that  only  the  human 
reason  opens  the  door  which  leads  to  the  understanding  of 
reality,  it  is  rather  the  whole  of  the  human  mind,  with  all  its 
functions  and  impulses,  all  its  potencies  of  imagination,  feeling, 
volition,  and  logical  thinking  which  builds  the  bridge  between 
man's  soul  and  reality,  which  determines  and  moulds  our  con- 
ception of  reality.  "The  true  concept  of  reality  cannot  be  pressed 
into  a  plain  and  abstract  form  of  being,  it  rather  contains  the 
whole  manifold  and  wealth  of  spiritual  life.  ...  In  this  sense 
any  new  'symbolic  form' — not  only  the  concept  and  system  of 
knowledge,  but  also  the  intuitive  world  of  art  or  myth  or  langu- 
age, represents — according  to  a  saying  of  Goethe's — a  revela- 
tion directed  from  the  inside  toward  the  outside,  a  'synthesis  of 
world  and  mind,'  which  alone  makes  certain  for  us  the  genuine 
unity  of  both."5  The  whole  world  of  reality  can  be  grasped 

5  Ernst  Cassirer,  Phttosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Vol.  I,  p.  46. 


26  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

only  with  the  help  of  certain  mental  images,  symbolic  forms, 
and  the  task  of  philosophy  consists  in  the  understanding  of  those 
mental  and  psychical  functions  which  determine  the  structure 
of  these  symbolic  forms.  A  queer  image  of  primitive  totemism 
may  be  vastly  different  from  the  modern  conception  of  four- 
dimentional  space,  yet  they  both  show  a  definite  regularity  of 
inward  structure,  they  both  can  be  reduced  to  some  fundamental 
functions  of  the  human  mind.  Even  the  spiritual  world  of 
lunatics  reveals  to  an  attentive  analysis  some  definite  regularities 
which  find  their  expression  in  queer  but  still  understandable 
symbolic  forms  and  their  study  proved  to  be  helpful  for  the 
diagnosis  and  treatment  of  certain  mental  diseases. 

The  whole  of  human  culture  is  reflected  in  our  mind  in  an 
endless  row  of  symbolic  forms,  and  Cassirer  now  embarked 
upon  the  titanic  task  of  first  trying  to  analyze  the  structure  of 
these  forms  in  general,  and,  secondly,  to  show  what  special  kind 
of  symbolic  forms  underlie  the  different  realms  of  human  life 
— religion,  art,  science,  social  activities.  For  many  years  the 
external  conditions  of  his  life  were  greatly  favorable  to  this 
immense  task:  during  World  War  I  two  new  universities  were 
founded  in  Germany,  one  in  Hamburg  and  the  other  in  Frank- 
furt, both  quite  progressive  and  democratic,  and  the  first  thing 
they  both  did  was  to  offer  Cassirer  a  full  professorship  in 
philosophy.  Cassirer  decided  to  accept  the  offer  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Hamburg  because  it  showed  an  exceptionally  great 
eagerness  for  securing  his  services.  He  never  regretted  his 
choice — in  Hamburg  he  found  everything  he  could  desire:  a 
large  and  most  interested  audience  for  his  lectures,  and  the 
famous  private  "Warburg  Library"  with  a  rich  collection  of 
materials  which  Cassirer  needed  for  his  researches  into  symbolic 
forms.  Many  times  Cassirer  expressed  his  positive  amazement 
at  the  fact  that  the  selection  of  the  materials  and  the  whole  in- 
ward structure  of  this  library  suggested  the  idea  that  its 
founder  must  have  more  or  less  anticipated  his  theory  of 
symbolic  forms  as  a  system  of  fundamental  functions  of  the 
human  mind  underlying  all  basic  tendencies  of  human  culture 
and  explaining  the  particular  nature  of  any  one  of  them. 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  27 

In  the  years  1923-1929  the  three  volumes  of  his  Philosophie 
der  symbolischen  Formen  were  composed  and  published.  Based 
upon  vast  historical  and  systematical  material,  the  work  gives 
a  penetrating  analysis  of  Cassirer's  general  theory  of  symbolic 
forms  and  of  its  application  to  the  problems  of  language,  of 
myths,  and  of  knowledge.  Almost  incredible  is  the  wealth  of 
concrete  facts  and  original  ideas  by  means  of  which  Cassirer  shows 
the  fruitfulness  of  his  theory.  Almost  the  entire  world's  litera- 
ture on  language  and  myths,  almost  all  the  realms  of  human 
science  had  been  closely  explored  by  him  and  the  particular 
kinds  of  symbolic  forms  in  those  different  realms  shown  in  bold 
and  broad  relief.  Yet,  even  this  immense  job  did  not  take  all  of 
Cassirer's  time  and  energy.  During  the  same  years,  while  work- 
ing out  and  writing  down  his  Philoso'phie  der  symbolischen 
Formeny  he  finished  the  third  volume  of  his  Erkenntnityrob- 
lemy  he  wrote  a  book  on  Einstein's  theory  of  relativity  and  pub- 
lished literally  scores  of  philosophical  and  literary  articles.  Be- 
sides, he  eagerly  performed  his  duties  as  academic  teacher,  gave 
weekly  several  lectures  and  seminars,  and  was  most  accessible 
to  any  student  who  desired  his  help  on  philosophical  problems. 

Despite  this  immense  amount  of  intellectual  work  which 
Cassirer  performed  day  after  day,  there  was  nothing  of  the 
ivory  tower  pedant  in  him;  he  spent  almost  every  evening  in  the 
circle  of  his  family  and  of  his  friends,  and  he  showed  a  lively 
interest  in  all  world-events.  It  was  amazing  to  what  a  degree  he 
was  able  to  keep  abreast  of  so  many  things  which  had  no  relation 
whatsoever  to  his  scientific  work — he  was  a  thorough  connois- 
seur of  classical  music,  and  in  the  classical  operas  he  knew  not 
only  every  single  melody,  but  also  every  word  of  the  text,  often 
even  in  several  different  languages.  He  knew  a  great  deal  about 
many  fields  of  sport  and  was  able  to  discuss  some  intricate  prob- 
lems of  passiance  or  skat.  He  was  even  interested — in  the  most 
impersonal  manner — in  stock  exchange  prices  and  tried  to 
understand  what  was  hidden  behind  their  seemingly  grotesque 
and  unpredictable  movements.  Yet,  there  was  only  one  game 
which  he  really  cherished:  chess.  Only  on  rare  occasions  did  he 
have  the  time  and  opportunity  to  play  a  game  of  chess  or  to 


28  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

analyze  the  game  of  an  outstanding  master;  but  when  he  did 
take  the  time  for  such  it  absorbed  him  to  such  a  degree  that  as 
long  as  he  busied  himself  with  chess  he  did  not  hear  or  see  any- 
thing that  was  going  on  around  him. 

This  great  versatility  proved  to  be  a  real  blessing  to  Cassirer 
when,  in  1930,  he  was  elected  rector  of  the  University  of  Ham- 
burg. Now  he  had  to  represent  the  University  at  the  various 
academic  functions  and  to  make  speeches  on  literally  every  type 
of  subject — one  day  he  spoke  on  the  development  of  modern 
traffic,  another  day  on  the  breeding  of  hogs,  then  again  on  the 
importance  of  athletic  sports.  And  the  most  amazing  part  of  it 
was  that  the  scope  of  his  understanding  and  the  wealth  of  his 
knowledge  were  so  vast  that  whatever  subject  he  touched  upon 
he  was  able  to  illuminate  its  different  aspects  and  to  show  its 
true  place  in  the  whole  of  cultural  life. 

Fourteen  most  prolific  years  of  his  life  Cassirer  spent  in 
Hamburg;  into  this  period  fell  also  two  large  research  works 
on  the  history  of  philosophy,  one  concerning  the  time  of  the 
Reformation,  the  other  dealing  with  the  development  of  Plato- 
nism  in  England.  This  latter  work,  published  in  1932,  was  the 
last  one  he  ever  published  in  Germany.  Meanwhile  heavy 
storm  clouds  darkened  the  skies  over  Germany,  the  Hitler 
movement  was  on  the  verge  of  its  first  decisive  victory,  ready 
to  take  over  the  Reich  government.  Already  years  before  Cas- 
sirer had  recognized  the  great  danger  of  this  movement;  he 
never  listened  to  the  speeches  of  Hitler  or  his  henchmen,  he 
never  read  their  books  and  pamphlets;  yet  he  seemed  to  know 
with  uncanny  foresight  what  Nazism  was  about  to  do  to 
Germany  and  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  When  their  notorious 
slogan:  "Right  is  what  serves  our  Fuehrer"  first  came  up,  and 
Cassirer  heard  of  it,  he  said:  "This  is  the  end  of  Germany." 
Cassirer,  therefore,  did  not  wait  to  be  dismissed  by  the  Nazis — 
he  tendered  his  resignation  immediately  after  Hitler  became 
Chancellor  of  the  German  Reich.  He  knew  that  there  would  be 
nothing  for  him  to  do  in  the  "new"  Germany,  and  he  decided 
to  emigrate.  Within  a  very  few  weeks  he  was  offered  three  pro- 
fessorships in  three  different  countries — one  in  Sweden  (Upsala 
University),  one  in  England  (Oxford  University),  and  one  in 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  29 

the  U.S. A.  (New  School  for  Social  Research  in  New  York).  Cas- 
sirer  went  first  to  Oxford,  where  he  lectured  for  two  years 
(1933-35).  When  he  arrived  in  England,  he  was  only  able  to 
read  English,  but  he  could  not  speak  a  word  of  it.  Yet,  three 
months  later  he  was  already  lecturing  in  English.  Meanwhile 
he  had  received  another  offer,  this  time  from  the  University  of 
Goeteborg  (Sweden).  He  decided  to  accept  it,  but  only  on  one 
condition:  that  he  would  be  given  a  personal  chair,  in  order  that 
no  Swedish  professor  would  have  to  lose  his  job.  This  condition 
was  readily  accepted,  and,  in  September,  1935,  Cassirer  went  to 
Goeteborg. 

He  stayed  in  Sweden  for  almost  six  years  5  and  those  years 
again  were  very  fruitful  years  for  him.  In  1937  he  published 
his  book  on  Determinismus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der  mod- 
ernen  Physik.  Cassirer  himself  regarded  this  book  as  one  of  his 
most  important  achievements.  His  capacity  to  penetrate  into  all 
the  details  of  the  most  intricate  problems  of  modern  physics, 
as  shown  by  this  book,  is  truly  amazing.  Cassirer  had  been 
prompted  to  embark  upon  this  difficult  task  by  a  prolonged  and 
somewhat  confused  discussion  which  had  arisen  among  several 
leading  physicists  and  which  had  touched  upon  the  funda- 
mental problems  of  epistemology,  especially  upon  the  principle 
of  causality.  The  structure  of  the  atom,  the  peculiar  manner  in 
which  an  electric  particle  jumps,  as  it  were,  from  one  pre- 
destined trajectory  to  another,  the  difficulties  in  recognizing 
and  characterizing  individual  elements,  and  the  necessity  of 
applying  statistical  methods  to  the  solution  of  quantum-theo- 
retical problems  convinced  many  physicists  not  only  of  the  im- 
possibility of  going  on  exclusively  with  the  methods  of  the 
so-called  classical  mechanics  but  even  induced  some  of  them  to 
discard  the  principle  of  causality  altogether  and  to  introduce 
the  concept  of  purpose  into  the  interpretation  of  purely  material 
phenomena.  In  order  to  analyze  this  problem,  Cassirer  gave 
a  vast  and  detailed  picture  of  the  development  of  the  basic 
concepts  of  mechanics  and  physics  in  modern  times;  he  showed 
the  historical  continuity  of  thought,  which  led  to  the  conception 
of  the  quantum  theory,  and  convincingly  demonstrated  that  it 
was  not  the  principle  of  causality  which  was  to  blame  for  the 


30  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

difficulties  with  which  this  theory  had  to  struggle,  but  the  fact 
that  the  system  of  symbols  used  in  it  was  too  narrow:  modern 
physics  "is  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  applying  different 
types  of  symbols,  of  schematic  'explanation/  to  one  and  the 
same  occurrence."6 

This  idea,  in  which  Cassirer  saw  a  consistent  method  of 
interpretation  of  the  fundamental  results  of  atomic  physics,  is 
one  of  the  basic  principles  of  his  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms. 
He  once  expressed  it  in  a  simple,  yet  truly  classical,  manner 
with  the  aid  of  the  following  concrete  example:  "We  begin  with 
a  certain  perceptual  experience:  with  a  drawing  which  we  see 
before  us.  We  may  turn  our  attention,  first  of  all,  to  the  purely 
sensory  'impression'  which  we  comprehend  as  a  simple  combina- 
tion of  lines."  Now  we  change  our  approach  to  this  geometrical 
figure,  we  apply  to  it  another  set  of  symbolic  forms,  and  "the 
spatial  image  becomes  an  aesthetic  one:  I  comprehend  in  it  the 
character  of  a  certain  ornament,  with  which  there  is  connected 
in  my  mind  a  certain  artistic  sense  and  significance. . . .  And  once 
again  the  form  of  my  contemplation  may  change,  insofar  as  that 
which  at  first  appeared  to  me  as  a  pure  ornament  now  reveals 
itself  as  the  bearer  of  a  mystic-religious  significance."7  Thus  the 
same  thing,  in  this  particular  case  a  geometrical  figure,  appears, 
when  treated  from  different  points  of  view,  as  the  bearer  of  a 
very  different  significance,  as  a  concept  with  different  meanings. 

No  sooner  had  Cassirer  finished  his  epistemological  interpre- 
tation of  the  quantum  theory  than  he  began  working  on  the 
fourth  volume  of  the  Erkenntnisfroblem.  In  this  volume, 
which  is  now  awaiting  publication,  Cassirer  is  giving  us  an 
integral  analysis  of  the  development  of  epistemological  and 
logical  problems  for  the  period  of  the  last  hundred  years — 
from  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  practically  our 
own  day.  This  volume  also  contains  a  critical  analysis  of  all 
important  movements  in  the  realm  of  contemporary  philosophy. 

*  Determinismus ,  p.  265. 

f  From  "Das  Symbolproblem  und  seine  Stellung  im  System  der  Philosophic"  in 
the  Zeitschrtft  fur  Aesthetik  und  Allgemeine  KunstwitsenscJiaft,  Vol.  21,  pp.  194- 
195.  Both  of  the  above  quotations  come  from  this  article  j  the  translation  is  by 
the  present  writer. 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  31 

There  were  two  more  books  Cassirer  published  during  the 
six  years  he  lived  in  Sweden,  both  of  them  very  typical  of  his 
almost  incredible  versatility  and  mental  adaptability.  For,  de- 
spite his  advanced  age,  he  mastered  the  Swedish  language 
perfectly  and  so  thoroughly  imbued  himself  with  Swedish  art, 
philosophy,  literature,  and  history  that  he  was  able  to  make  a 
very  important  contribution  to  the  development  of  Swedish 
philosophy  with  his  book  on  Hagerstrom.  Cassirer's  second 
book  is  devoted  to  Descartes  and  his  relation  to  the  Swedish 
queen  Christine}  here  he  discusses  one  of  the  most  difficult 
problems  of  Swedish  history:  why  did  Queen  Christine  resign 
her  throne?  Cassirer  attempts  his  solution  of  this  problem  by 
spreading  new  light  upon  Descartes,  on  his  influence  upon 
Christine,  and  by  giving  a  broad  picture  of  the  spiritual  life  of 
Europe  in  the  seventeenth  century. 

When  Cassirer  left  Germany  he  arranged  everything  for  the 
emigration  of  his  daughter  and  two  sons.  One  son  and  the 
daughter  joined  him  almost  immediately  in  England.  But  it 
took  all  of  five  years  before  his  second  son  could  join  him  in 
Goeteborg.  This  was  a  great  sorrow  of  the  emigration  years — 
he  was  never  able  to  live  together  with  all  his  children  and 
grandchildren,  whom  he  loved  so  dearly  j  there  was  always  a 
separation  from  one  or  the  other. 

In  the  summer  of  1941  Cassirer  accepted  the  invitation  of 
Yale  University  and  came  to  the  United  States  as  a  visiting 
professor.  His  original  intention  was  to  remain  here  two  years 
only  and  then  to  return  to  Sweden,  where  he  had,  in  the  mean- 
time, become  a  citizen.  However,  the  outbreak  of  World  War 
II  upset  his  plans.  At  the  end  of  two  years  he  was  unable  to 
return  to  Sweden  and  willingly  agreed,  therefore,  to  prolong 
his  contract  with  Yale  University  for  another  year.  During  this 
period  Cassirer  received  an  invitation  to  teach  at  Columbia 
University  and  in  the  summer  of  1944,  he  left  New  Haven  and 
went  to  New  York. 

His  arrival  in  America  opened  a  new  page  in  Cassirer's  life. 
Here  again  one  has  to  admire  his  great  adaptability.  This  time 
it  was  not  the  English  language,  which  he  knew  quite  well  by 
now,  nor  was  it  American  philosophy  the  development  of  which 


32  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

he  had  studied  closely  for  decades.  In  Substance  and  Function 
one  already  finds  numerous  references  to  American  scholars 
and  philosophers.  But  the  methods  of  academic  teaching  in 
America  are  quite  different  from  those  of  Europe.  The  co- 
operation between  students  and  professors  is  much  closer  and 
more  informal  here  than  in  Europe.  Cassirer  not  only  adapted 
himself  willingly  and  easily  to  these  different  ways  of  teaching 
— he  sincerely  liked  and  greatly  appreciated  them.  He  often 
said  that  to  work  together  with  a  group  of  eager  students  who 
recognized  no  other  authority  than  truth  itself  and  kept  ques- 
tioning their  teachers  until  they  were  entirely  and  thoroughly 
satisfied  was  to  him  a  new  and  most  fruitful  experience. 

During  the  last  twelve  years  of  his  life  Cassirer  devoted  in- 
creasingly more  time  to  research  in  the  fields  of  the  social 
sciences.  He  felt  that  now  the  time  had  come  for  him  to  apply 
his  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  to  this  realm  of  human  culture 
which  had  always  strongly  attracted  him,  but  which  he  had  never 
yet  discussed  systematically  in  his  books.  There  had  been  good 
reasons  for  this  delay.  The  social  sciences  cannot  easily  free 
themselves  from  the  influence  of  deeply  rooted  subjective 
tendencies  in  the  form  of  national  and  class  ideologies,  religious 
and  racial  prejudices,  economic  interests,  etc.  Cassirer  undertook 
to  explore  in  the  first  instance  those  aspects  of  human  culture 
where  the  attitude  of  (at  least  relative)  objectivity  could  more 
easily  prevail.  But  the  victorious  advance  of  the  totalitarian 
ideology  in  some  of  the  largest  countries  of  Europe  finally 
urged  him  on  to  take  a  stand  against  these  destructive  forces 
which — as  was  so  obvious  to  him — threatened  to  engulf  the 
whole  world.  In  1941  he  wrote,  therefore,  his  first  more 
comprehensive  study  in  the  field  of  the  social  sciences.  Even 
this,  however,  dealt,  in  the  main,  with  the  epistemological  side 
of  the  problem,  with  the  characteristics  of  the  particular 
methods  and  principles  upon  which  this  branch  of  human 
knowledge  is  based. 

His  Essay  on  Man,  published  in  1944,  and  written  by  him 
in  English,  contains  a  comprehensive  and  integral  exposition 
of  his  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  and  their  application  to 
different  realms  of  human  culture.  In  this  book  Cassirer  not 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  33 

only  summarizes  his  more  than  half-a-century  long  researches 
on  languages  and  science,  myth  and  religion,  but  he  also  shows, 
for  the  first  time,  at  some  length  the  decisive  role  the  symbolic 
forms  play  in  the  realms  of  art  and  historical  science.  At  the 
same  time  Cassirer  also  published  several  important  articles  on 
various  subjects.  In  one  of  them  he  gave  a  quite  original  analysis 
of  the  Bible  and  showed  why  the  Nazis  had  chosen  the  Jews 
as  their  ideological  enemy  Number  One — while  the  Nazis 
based  their  power  upon  historical  and  social  myths,  the  Jews 
have  always  shown  little  inclination  for  mythical  thought. 

Meanwhile  he  also  persistently  worked  on  what  he  now  con- 
sidered to  be  his  main  task,  namely,  an  undertaking  of  the 
driving  forces  of  human  history,  especially  those  forces  which 
made  possible  the  appalling  growth  of  totalitarianism  in  our 
time.  In  1944  he  finally  put  into  finished  form  a  voluminous 
manuscript  which  offers  his  solution  to  this  problem.  This  book 
— which  was  to  be  Cassirer's  last — is  entitled  The  Myth  of  the 
Statey  and  was  written  in  English.  Even  if  this  were  the  only 
book  ever  written  by  him,  it  would  still  secure  a  considerable 
name  for  him  as  a  scientist  and  philosopher  for  many  genera- 
tions to  come.  This  book  begins  with  an  exhaustive  analysis  of 
mythical  thought,  uncovering  the  intellectual,  emotional,  and 
volitional  roots  upon  which  the  myth  thrives  in  the  social  life  of 
man.  Then  it  gives  a  broad  and  general  delineation,  quite 
original  in  nature,  of  the  development  of  political  theory  from 
the  days  of  the  early  Greek  philosophy  to  the  very  threshold  of 
our  own  time,  and  uncovers,  step  by  step,  the  technique — not 
always  clever,  but  always  treacherous  and  persistent — of  the 
modern  political  myth  which  led  human  culture  to  the  brink  of 
complete  destruction.  The  result  of  this  penetrating  and  il- 
luminating investigation  into  the  myth  of  the  state  is  found, 
in  concentrated  form,  in  Cassirer's  following  words: 

"In  the  Babylonian  mythology  we  find  a  legend  that  de- 
scribed the  creation  of  the  world.  We  are  told  that  Marduk,  the 
highest  God,  before  he  could  begin  his  work,  had  to  fight  a 
dreadful  combat.  He  had  to  vanquish  and  subjugate  the  serpent 
Tiamat  and  the  other  dragons  of  darkness.  He  slew  Tiamat  and 
bound  the  dragons.  Out  of  the  limbs  of  the  monster  Tiamat  he 


34  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

formed  the  world  and  gave  to  it  its  shape  and  its  order. . . .  The 
world  of  human  culture  may  be  described  in  the  words  of  this 
Babylonian  legend.  It  could  not  arise  before  the  darkness  of 
myth  was  fought  and  overcome.  But  the  mythical  monsters 
were  not  entirely  destroyed.  They  were  used  for  the  creation 
of  a  new  universe — and  they  still  survive  in  this  universe.  The 
powers  of  myth  were  thus  checked  and  subdued  by  superior 
forces.  As  long  as  these  forces — intellectual,  ethical,  artistic 
forces — are  in  full  strength,  myth  is  tamed  and  subdued.  But 
once  they  begin  to  lose  their  strength  chaos  arises  again.  Myth- 
ical thought  then  begins  to  rise  anew  and  to  pervade  the  whole 
of  man's  cultural  and  social  life."* 

Despite  his  advancing  age,  Cassirer  kept  on  working  continu- 
ously, persistently,  almost  as  much  as  he  had  worked  in  his 
youth,  and,  in  fact,  throughout  his  life.  How  often  did  he  sit, 
writing  at  his  desk,  till  late  into  the  night,  and  the  next  morning 
the  first  rays  of  the  rising  sun  found  him  again  busy  with  his 
work.  On  April  13  (1945),  the  day  of  his  death,  Cassirer  got 
up  very  early  and  spent  the  whole  morning  at  his  desk  writing; 
then  he  went  to  Columbia  University,  never  to  return  to  his 
home. 

Ernst  Cassirer  belongs  to  the  great  tradition  of  classical  phi- 
losophy. Goethe,  trying  to  define  the  essence  of  classicism,  once 
said:  "Classicism  is  sanity,  romanticism  is  illness,"  and  Novalis, 
one  of  the  greatest  among  the  romanticists,  unwittingly  pro- 
vided the  key  to  this  judgment  by  his  assertion  that  the  essence 
of  romanticism  consists  in  the  transformation  of  a  single  event 
or  individual  fact  into  an  absolute  and  general  principle  of  the 
whole.  To  Novalis  and  Schlegel  everything  was  the  emotion  of 
love,  even  mathematics  or  a  death  sentence;  to  Fichte  and 
Schopenhauer  everything  was  volition,  just  as  to  Hegel  every- 
thing was  Objective  Mind  or  to  Schelling  intellectual  intuition: 
in  each  case  one  principle,  one  function,  one  special  power 
dominates  and  determines  the  whole.  Classicism,  on  the  con- 
trary, always  recognizes  several  principles  as  quite  independent 

*  EDITOR'S  NOTE:  Apparently  Mr.  Gawronsky,  in  making  this  quotation,  had 
access  to  a  manuscript  version  of  the  book}  cf.  pp.  297-98  of  the  published  work, 
New  Haven  (1946). 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  35 

of  each  other,  although  closely  connected  and  organically 
related  and  capable  only  in  their  organic  interrelatedness  of 
creating  and  forming  the  spiritual  world  of  man.  This  was  the 
very  core  of  Cassirer's  philosophical  conviction.  Throughout 
the  multifarious  realms  of  human  culture  he  demonstrated  the 
originality  and  independence  of  their  respective  symbolic  forms 
and  at  the  same  time  showed  the  closest  connection  to  exist 
among  all  these  forms,  thus  uniting  them  into  one  organic  and 
harmonic  whole.  So  great,  moreover,  was  the  scope  of  Cas- 
sirer's  mental  gifts,  so  inexhaustible  his  energy,  so  faithful  his 
memory,  so  deep,  swift,  and  versatile  his  power  of  comprehen- 
sion, his  mind  so  original  and  imaginative,  that  he  was  able 
to  undertake  a  unique  voyage  around  the  entire  spiritual  world 
of  man  and  to  discover,  on  his  journey,  innumerable  treasures 
of  human  thought. 

Cassirer  liked  to  tell  the  following  story:  once  he  met  the 
great  mathematician  Hilbert,  the  "Euclid  of  our  time,"  and 
asked  him  about  one  of  the  latter's  disciples.  Hilbert  answered: 
"He  is  all  right.  You  know,  for  a  mathematician  he  did  not  have 
enough  imagination.  But  he  has  become  a  poet  and  now  he  is 
doing  fine."  Cassirer  always  heartily  laughed,  when  he  told 
this  story,  and  he  had  good  reason  for  doing  so,  but  a  reason,  of 
which  he  was  never  aware: — he  had  enough  imagination  to  be- 
come a  true  scholar  and  philosopher.  His  mental  associations 
were  amazingly  rich,  colorful,  and  always  quite  exact.  He 
possessed  in  high  degree  the  gift  which  Goethe  called  "im- 
agination for  the  truth  of  reality"  or  "exact  sensory  imagina- 
tion." However  keen  and  daring  his  thinking  was — it  always 
remained  measured,  objective,  realistic. 

Truly  original  and  prolific  thinkers  are  usually  very  modest. 
Goethe  wrote  in  the  introduction  to  his  absolutely  new  and 
revolutionary  conception  of  botany  that,  in  this  work,  he  had  not 
said  anything  which  any  man  of  common  sense  could  not  easily 
discover  for  himself.  Kant  frankly  expressed  his  regret  that  he 
was  not  as  gifted  as  Mendelssohn.  And  we  all  know  how  ab- 
solutely modest  is  Einstein.  Thus,  modesty  was  also  one  of 
Cassirer's  most  outstanding  traits.  He  never  claimed  that  this  or 
that  idea  or  conception  had  first  been  discovered  or  formulated 


36  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

by  him.  On  the  contrary,  he  was  always  in  the  habit  of  quoting 
numerous  authorities  both  of  the  past  and  in  the  present  who 
expressed  similar  ideas}  and  he  always  pointed  out  that  really 
important  ideas  usually  appear  as  the  result  of  the  close  co- 
operation of  many  human  minds.  Goethe's  assertion  that  only 
mankind  as  a  whole  is  able  to  find  the  truth  was  part  of  Cas- 
sirer's  very  nature  and  made  him  largely  oblivious  to  the 
uniqueness  of  many  of  his  own  deepest  insights  and  significant 
contributions. 

It  was  this  trait  of  Cassirer's  mental  attitude  which  made  him 
so  tolerant  in  all  spiritual  things  and  so  appreciative  of  all  earnest 
and  sincere  striving.  His  deep  conviction  that  truth  is  im- 
mensely beyond  the  insight  of  any  one  individual  mind  never 
permitted  him  to  discard  any  opinion  without  thorough  investi- 
gation. And,  just  because  he  found  so  much  truth  in  other 
thinkers,  he  never  attempted  to  found  a  philosophical  school  of 
his  own.  And  it  was  precisely  his  great  love  of  truth  which  made 
deliberate  falsehood  and  evil  all  the  more  loathsome  to  him. 
Throughout  his  life,  therefore,  he  did  not  stop  fighting  against 
falsehood  and  evil  in  his  own  quiet  but  determined  manner. 

Cassirer  was  a  deeply  religious  man.  He  cared  little  for 
differing  rites,  rituals,  confessions,  or  denominations}  these 
only  split  mankind  into  so  many  groups  and  often  turn  them 
against  each  other.  Yet  the  very  core  of  any  true  religion,  the 
cosmic  feeling,  a  love  as  wide  as  the  universe  and  as  intense  as 
the  light  of  the  sun,  was  always  vivid  in  his  heart.  It  was  this 
feeling  which  urged  Cassirer  incessantly  to  explore  all  material 
and  spiritual  things,  which  filled  his  heart  with  deep  sympathy 
for  everything  good'in  the  world,  which  strengthened  his  will 
to  fight  for  this  good.  And  it  was  this  feeling  which  was  the 
source  of  his  charming  humour — the  Infinite  All  was  always 
present  in  his  mind,  it  never  permitted  him  to  take  either  him- 
self or  his  surroundings  too  seriously,  and  he  was,  therefore, 
able  to  joke  for  hours  in  the  most  spirited  and  sympathetic 
manner. 

To  the  very  end  of  his  life  Cassirer  retained  his  youthful 
spirit,  his  vivid  interest  in  all  the  aspects  of  life  around  him  and 
his  readiness  to  be  helpful  to  other  people.  It  is  difficult  to 


CASSIRER:  HIS  LIFE  AND  HIS  WORK  37 

imagine  a  kinder  and  more  sympathetic  person,  a  man  with  such 
an  absolute  devotion  to  the  good.  Symbolic  of  his  whole  nature, 
therefore,  was  the  way  of  his  passing:  on  the  street  he  was  met 
by  one  of  his  students,  who  addressed  a  question  to  him.  Cas- 
sirer  turned  to  answer,  smiled  kindly  at  the  young  man,  and 
suddenly  fell  dead  into  his  arms. 

DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 
NEW  YORK  CITY 


B 

FOUR  ADDRESSES 

Delivered  at  Memorial  Services,  held  under  the  Auspices 

of  the 
Department  of  Philosophy 

of 

Columbia  University 

Brander  Matthews  Theater,  Columbia  University 
June  i,  1945 


IN  MEMORIAM:  ERNST  CASSIRER 

This  is  the  locust  season  of  our  days 

When  the  ripe  meadows  of  the  mind  are  bare, 

This  is  the  month  of  the  never-born  maize 

Upon  whose  golden  meats  we  shall  not  fare. 

This  is  the  week  of  the  stunted  stalk 

And  fruit  that  is  dust  on  the  bones  of  rock, 

This  is  the  day  of  the  hungry  hawk 

And  the  songbirds  dead  by  the  fallen  flock. 

This  is  the  noon  of  our  derelict  plain, 

The  sun-parched  hour  of  most  desolate  pain. 

Yet  there  is  a  valley  where  sweet  grain  grows 
In  strong-rooted  stands,  in  tall  splendid  rows. 
Here  toiled  in  the  meadows  a  man  wise  and  serene, 
And  the  meadows  bore  fruit  and  the  meadows  are  green. 

EDWARD  MURRAY  CASE 


ERNST  CASSIRER 

WITH  the  passing  of  Ernst  Cassirer  one  of  the  great 
philosophical  interpreters  of  human  civilization  has  been 
taken  from  us.  The  last  true  scion  of  the  classic  tradition  of 
German  idealism  has  been  laid  to  rest.  While  we  are  wondering 
whether  the  Germans  will  ever  be  able  to  produce  a  new  moral 
and  intellectual  order  by  returning  to  the  liberal  humanism  of 
their  own  past,  which  they  renounced  so  violently  in  recent 
decades,  this  meeting  is  a  demonstration  of  our  confident  faith 
in  these  ideas  as  a  precious  part  of  our  own  culture. 

Soon  after  the  classic  school  of  German  philosophy  had  been 
deprived  of  its  great  creative  leaders  with  the  deaths  of  Hegel 
and  Schelling,  German  philosophy  lost  its  dominant  position  to 
the  new  natural  and  historical  sciences.  Simultaneously  Ger- 
man philosophy  began  to  retreat  from  an  active  participation  in 
the  discussion  of  the  fundamental  political  issues  of  the  age.  The 
programs  of  the  political  parties  were  little  affected  by  the 
humane  philosophy  of  the  early  part  of  the  century. 

In  the  last  third  of  the  century,  however,  a  renascence  of 
philosophical  thought  took  place,  which  is  usually  called  the 
rise  of  neo-Kantianism.  But  though  a  great  deal  of  the  new 
philosophical  discussion  centered  around  a  fresh  study  and 
appreciation  of  Kant,  the  new  philosophical  movement  did  not 
aim  at  the  enthronement  of  the  Konigsberg  philosopher  as  the 
patron  saint  of  a  new  scholasticism  but  had  much  broader  and 
deeper  objectives.  It  sprang  from  the  moral  and  intellectual 
dissatisfaction  with  the  then  fashionable  ideas  which  seemed 
incapable  of  overcoming  the  growing  materialism  and  natural- 
ism. Many  went  even  so  far  as  to  consider  these  philosophies 
the  logical  outcome  of  modern  scientific  research.  In  contrast, 

.41 


42  HAJO  HOLBORN 

the  new  generation  of  German  philosophers  asserted  that  the 
progress  of  the  individual  natural  and  historical  sciences 
stemmed  very  largely  from  the  discoveries  of  classic  philosophy 
and  that  research  would  lose  its  direction  and  meaning  without 
a  critical  awareness  of  its  basic  methods.  However,  philosophy 
was  not  only  to  act  as  a  guide  to  the  various  academic  depart- 
ments but  was  to  gain  fresh  vigor  from  them. 

Ernst  Cassirer  began  his  studies  when  the  new  philosophical 
movement  had  already  gained  influence  in  German  universities. 
Lotze  was  probably  the  chief  bridge-builder  between  the  classic 
idealism  and  the  neo-idealism  which  then  found  its  leaders 
in  Dilthey  and  in  the  neo-Kantian  schools  of  Marburg  and 
the  South- West,  represented  by  Cohen  and  Natorp  and  by 
Windelband  and  Rickert.  But  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  sciences  and  arts  took  an  active  part  in  producing  the  new 
philosophy.  German  mathematics  and  physics  from  Helmholtz 
to  Planck  and  Einstein  were  deeply  conscious  of  their  philo- 
sophical roots  and  not  all  the  historians  got  lost  in  contemporary 
national  politics.  Harnack  and  his  school  of  ecclesiastical  his- 
tory, the  school  of  the  history  of  religion  from  which  Troeltsch 
made  his  way  into  philosophy,  and  Meinecke's  work  in  the 
history  of  ideas  are  only  a  few  examples  of  the  manner  in 
which  historians  helped  to  buttress  the  new  philosophical  move- 
ment. 

Ernst  Cassirer  took  his  place  among  the  best  scholars  of  this 
group,  and  while  he  remained  always  grateful  for  being  the 
member  of  a  group  of  common  spirit  and  purpose,  he  soon 
began  to  chart  a  course  of  his  own  in  accordance  with  his 
personal  gifts.  In  his  early  studies  Cassirer  concentrated  on 
achieving  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  much-praised  and  little- 
known  Leibniz,  the  real  founder  of  the  German  philosophical 
tradition.  Leibniz  was  the  father  of  the  theory  of  knowledge 
which,  in  contrast  to  almost  the  whole  philosophy  of  the  i8th 
century,  Kant  included,  saw  in  the  study  of  nature  and  of  history 
two  manifestations  of  the  one  human  quest  for  knowledge.  He 
did  not  consider  the  humanities  a  lower,  or  less  mature,  form  of 
academic  achievement.  Both  were  branches  of  Wissenschaft, 
science,  i.e.,  both  were  producing  scientific  truth  though  by  dif- 


ERNST  CASSIRER  43 

ferent  methods.  Throughout  his  life  Cassirer  remained  a  stu- 
dent of  Leibniz  by  keeping  abreast  both  of  the  progress  of 
the  natural  sciences  and  of  the  liberal  arts. 

However,  Cassirer  believed  that  his  basic  approach  to  phi- 
losophy was  Kantian  in  origin,  Kant  had  maintained  that  the 
way  to  a  transcendental  order  could  be  gained  only  through 
an  analysis  of  the  forms  and  methods  of  human  thought,  and 
he  had  demonstrated  the  power  of  his  new  critical  idealism  in 
the  philosophical  study  of  the  natural  sciences,  ethics,  and 
finally  aesthetics.  The  neo-Kantians  and  particularly  Cassirer 
went  farther.  Their  epistemology  included  the  methodology 
of  history  and  moreover  of  all  forms  of  creative  civilization, 
finally  encompassing  even  the  expressions  of  pre-scientific  hu- 
man thought  and  imagination  as  revealed  in  language  and 
mythology. 

This  is  the  key  to  the  truly  universal  scope  of  Cassirer's 
studies.  In  addition  to  Leibniz  and  Kant,  it  was  the  spirit  of 
Goethe  which  gave  life  to  Cassirer's  thought, 

Wer  nicht  von  3000  Jahren 
Sich  weiss  Rechenschaft  zu  geben 
Bleibt  im  Grunde  unerfahren 
Muss  von  Tag  zu  Tage  leben.1 

In  Cassirer's  personality  and  work  Goethe's  program  of  edu- 
cation became  a  living  reality  again.  The  totality  of  Western 
civilization  was  to  be  reconstructed  and  made  a  part  of  the 
consciousness  of  the  modern  individual  and  of  present-day 
civilization.  The  study  of  the  processes  and  creations  of  civiliza- 
tion would  lift  the  individual  to  a  position  from  which  he  could 
see  farther  than  "from  day  to  day"  and  could  begin  to  grasp 
the  ideal  forms  and  categories  of  the  human  mind. 

In  this  version  of  idealistic  philosophy  philosophical  studies 
became  in  large  sections  identical  with  historical  research.  In 
general,  Cassirer  confined  his  historical  interest  to  the  history 
of  human  thinking  and  avoided  the  discussion  of  the  social  and 
political  forces.  However,  he  was  not  satisfied  with  the  old- 

lTr.:  He  who  cannot  account  for  3000  years  is  basically  inexperienced  and 
therefore  can  only  exist  from  day  to  day. 


44  HAJO  HOLBORN 

fashioned  type  of  history  of  philosophy  which  dealt  chiefly 
with  the  doctrines  of  the  leading  philosophers,  and  linked  them 
together  by  a  loose  chain  of  abstract  speculation.  Thus,  between 
a  social  and  political  interpretation  of  historical  civilization  on 
one  side  and  a  history  of  mere  ideas  on  the  other  his  history  of 
human  thought  held  its  own  place.  His  work  ranged  from  the 
tedious  editing  of  small  texts  and  discoveries  to  his  monu- 
mental edition  of  Kant.  Beyond  the  editing  it  proceeded  to  the 
analytical  and  interpretative  monographs  and  articles  covering 
ancient  science  and  the  philosophy  of  practically  all  ages  of 
Western  civilization.  Even  those  historians  who  care  little  about 
philosophy  cannot  by-pass  the  new  historical  vistas  which  he 
opened  particularly  on  the  Renaissance  and  the  European 
Enlightenment. 

But  as  closely  as  his  historical  and  philosophical  studies  were 
intertwined,  the  unity  of  his  many  interests  is  to  be  found  in 
the  philosophical  conviction  that  man  can  participate  in  a 
higher  order  of  life  only  through  the  realization  of  the  peren- 
nial forms  of  human  thought.  He  drew  these  philosophical  con- 
clusions most  clearly  in  his  great  Erkenntnistheorie  and  in  his 
Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Cassirer's  writings  mir- 
ror far  more  than  do  those  of  most  of  his  German  colleagues 
his  unusual  gift  as  a  teacher.  He  had  a  unique  facility  for  clear 
and  logical  exposition,  and  all  the  products  of  his  pen  display 
his  extraordinary  sense  of  balance  and  aesthetic  form.  His  ca- 
pacity to  project  himself  into  the  psychological  and  mental 
environment  of  a  past  age  or  of  an  individual  thinker  of  the 
past  did  not  make  him  forget  the  individual  needs  of  a  present- 
day  audience  or  student.  His  understanding  of  human  nature 
made  him  take  his  listeners  or  pupils  as  seriously  as  the 
philosophical  and  historical  subjects  he  tried  to  expound  to 
them.  These  qualities  explain  his  success  as  a  teacher  in  Ger- 
many, in  Sweden,  and  in  America. 

Cassirer  gave  up  his  professorship  in  Hamburg  when  the 
Hitlerites  came  to  power  in  Germany.  This  was  natural,  con- 
sidering that  he  was  one  of  the  chief  exponents  of  that  liberal 
tradition  of  German  thought  which  the  Nazis  tried  to  destroy 
by  all  means.  But,  being  at  the  same  time  a  Jew,  he  had  to 


ERNST  CASSIRER  45 

take  refuge  in  foreign  countries.  No  German  was  as  deeply 
steeped  in  the  German  cultural  tradition  and  very  few  had 
contributed  so  much  to  its  growth  within  his  generation  as 
Ernst  Cassirer.  Many  other  German  scholars  who  found  them- 
selves in  a  similar  situation  preferred  to  cut  all  their  ties  with 
their  Jewish  origin.  Prior  to  Hitler  not  very  many  Germans 
would  have  criticized  anyone  for  doing  just  that;  on  the  con- 
trary, many  would  have  applauded  such  an  attitude.  Actually, 
Cassirer's  unwillingness  to  abandon  his  Jewish  faith  proved  a 
handicap  in  his  earlier  academic  career,  but  he  was  too  honest 
to  dissimulate  his  heritage.  He  was  also  conscious  that  a  great 
deal  of  his  moral  integrity  and  intellectual  strength  had  come 
to  him  through  his  Jewish  culture.  Nor  did  this  make  him  feel 
suspicious  or  bitter.  There  was  little  of  Heinrich  Heine  in  him, 
but  much  more  of  Felix  Mendelssohn,  to  whom  he  can  be 
compared  in  many  respects.  As  Mendelssohn  helped  to  dis- 
cover for  the  Germans  some  of  the  greatest  treasures  of  their 
cultural  past,  and  at  the  same  time  contributed  by  his  own 
creative  work  to  the  continuation  of  their  classic  tradition,  so 
did  Cassirer  in  the  philosophic  field. 

Yet  Cassirer's  life  and  work  do  not  belong  to  Germany 
alone.  The  philosophical  revival  of  the  last  third  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  was  not  merely  a  German  event.  It  had  its 
parallels  and  found  its  students  in  many  lands,  e.g.,  in  the 
Italy  of  Benedetto  Croce  and  to  a  lesser,  though  considerable, 
degree  in  modern  French  philosophy  or  in  the  Spain  of  Ortega 
y  Gassett,  from  where  it  recently  has  spread  far  over  Latin 
America.  Among  his  German  contemporaries,  Cassirer  was 
probably  the  one  most  conscious  of  the  international  significance 
of  philosophy.  Certainly  he  was  the  one  German  philosopher 
of  distinction  who  had  least  indulged  in  construing  the  Kantian 
and  post-Kantian  German  philosophy  as  a  complete  refutation 
of  the  philosophy  of  Western  European  Enlightenment.  While 
German  philosophers  and  historians  were  prone  to  describe 
the  Kantian  philosophy  as  a  separation  of  the  superior  German 
from  Western-European  civilization,  Cassirer  was  always  mind- 
ful of  the  fact  that  Kant  had  his  roots  in  the  Western  European 
Enlightenment,  or  for  that  matter,  that  it  was  impossible  to 


4S  HAJO  HOLBORN 

think  of  Goethe  without  Shaftesbury  and  Spinoza.  These  were 
some  of  the  reasons  which  made  him  approach  Western- 
European  thought  with  the  same  warmth  of  understanding 
which  he  showed  in  his  German  studies.  He  deserved  the  re- 
spect and  affection  of  the  philosophers  of  other  countries  which 
they  showed  him  so  often.  Never  did  scholars  of  so  many  lands 
cooperate  in  expressing  their  admiration  for  a  colleague  of  theirs 
as  happened  in  the  symposium  on  History  and  Philosophy, 
which  the  Oxford  Press  presented  to  him  at  his  6oth  birthday. 

His  knowledge  of  other  civilizations,  his  truly  cosmopolitan 
outlook,  and  the  friendships  which  he  acquired  among  his 
American  colleagues  and  students,  made  the  years  of  his  exile 
not  only  bearable,  but  fruitful.  Others  of  his  age  never  again 
came  into  their  own  after  being  separated  from  the  world  in 
which  they  had  spent  the  major  part  of  their  life.  No  doubt 
the  events  cast  a  tragic  shadow  over  the  last  years  of  his  career, 
but  they  did  not  change  his  fundamental  beliefs,  nor  even  his 
joy  in  research  and  teaching.  The  core  of  his  personality  was 
unaffected.  He  was  unassuming  and  undemanding.  His  greatest 
satisfaction  lay  in  giving  others  knowledge  and  wisdom. 

HAJO  HOLBORN 

YALE  UNIVERSITY 


3 
ERNST  CASSIRER 

IT  MUST  have  been  in  1920  that  I  first  met  Ernst  Cassirer. 
Although  the  war  had  been  lost  by  Germany,  the  air  was 
full  of  hope.  The  collapse  of  material  power  had  produced  a 
strong  and  favourable  reaction  in  the  intellectual  field,  and 
one  of  the  symptoms  of  this  was  the  foundation,  in  Hamburg — 
now  more  anti-militaristic  than  ever — of  a  new  university.  High 
hopes  were  entertained  for  the  new  institution,  which  was  to 
be  of  good  standing  and  to  form  an  intellectual  centre  for  the 
Hansa  city.  Of  particular  importance  was  the  chair  of  philoso- 
phy, for  which  Cassirer  had  been  chosen.  The  new  university 
elected  a  man  whose  international  reputation  at  that  time  was 
far  greater  than  the  recognition  which  the  older  seats  of  learn- 
ing had  bestowed  on  him.  He  lent  a  peculiar  dignity  to  the 
young  arts  faculty,  and  an  ever-growing  number  of  students 
came  to  his  courses,  eager  for  the  truth  and  for  learning,  after 
the  many  deceptions  of  the  war  years. 

On  a  day  memorable  in  the  annals  of  the  Warburg  Institute, 
Cassirer  came  to  see  the  library  collected  by  Professor  Warburg 
over  a  period  of  about  thirty  years.  Warburg's  nerves  had 
broken  down  in  1920  under  the  strain  of  the  post-war  events, 
and  he  had  been  sent  to  Switzerland  for  recovery.  Being  in 
charge  of  the  library,  I  showed  Cassirer  around.  He  was  a 
gracious  visitor,  who  listened  attentively  as  I  explained  to  him 
Warburg's  intentions  in  placing  books  on  philosophy  next  to 
books  on  astrology,  magic,  and  folklore,  and  in  linking  the  sec- 
tions on  art  with  those  on  literature,  religion,  and  philosophy. 
The  study  of  philosophy  was  for  Warburg  inseparable  from 
that  of  the  so-called  primitive  mind:  neither  could  be  isolated 
from  the  study  of  imagery  in  religion,  literature,  and  art.  These 

47 


48  F.  SAXL 

ideas  had  found  expression  in  the  unorthodox  arrangement  of 
the  books  on  the  shelves. 

Cassirer  understood  at  once.  Yet,  when  he  was  ready  to 
leave,  he  said,  in  the  kind  and  clear  manner  so  typical  of  him: 
"This  library  is  dangerous.  I  shall  either  have  to  avoid  it  alto- 
gether or  imprison  myself  here  for  years.  The  philosophical 
problems  involved  are  close  to  my  own,  but  the  concrete  his- 
torical material  which  Warburg  has  collected  is  overwhelming." 
Thus  he  left  me  bewildered.  In  one  hour  this  man  had  under- 
stood more  of  the  essential  ideas  embodied  in  that  library  than 
anybody  I  had  met  before.  Why,  then,  did  he  seem  to  hesitate? 
I  expected  that,  if  anyone,  he  would  help  me  with  the  difficult 
task  of  continuing  the  library  without  its  founder.  But  it  seems 
that  the  workings  of  his  mind  would  not  allow  him — or,  at 
least,  not  yet  allow  him — to  be  drawn  into  the  dangerous  chan- 
nels of  Warburg's  creation.  Only  much  later  did  I  understand 
that  the  reason  was  not  narrowness,  but  self-restraint.  Those 
who  knew  Cassirer  will  realize  that  the  decision  to  keep  aloof 
from  certain  problems  at  a  certain  moment  was  dictated  by 
the  austere  logic  of  his  own  method. 

But,  after  an  interval  of  waiting,  the  situation  changed 
radically;  and,  from  that  moment  on,  for  ten  years,  I  never 
appealed  in  vain  to  Cassirer  for  collaboration.  He  had  begun 
writing  the  first  volume  of  his  Philoso^hie  der  symbollschen 
Formen  and,  in  developing  his  systematic  ideas,  he  studied  the 
voluminous  concrete  material  prepared  by  ethnologists  and 
historians.  Warburg  had  collected  the  very  material  which 
Cassirer  needed.  More  than  that:  looking  back  now  it  seems 
miraculous  that  Warburg  had  collected  it  for  thirty  years  with 
a  view  to  the  very  problems  which  Cassirer  was  then  beginning 
to  investigate.  In  the  1890*8  (inspired  by  Friedrich  Theodor 
Vischer),  Warburg  had  set  out  to  study  symbolic  expression 
in  art.  His  experience  in  studying  the  rites  and  arts  of  the 
New  Mexico  Zunis  had  taught  him  that  the  study  of  symbolic 
expression  in  art  could  not  be  isolated  from  that  of  religion, 
magic,  language,  and  science.  (In  a  number  of  still  unpublished 
writings,  Warburg  had,  on  the  one  hand,  tried  to  formulate 
a  practical  theory  of  the  symbol  in  the  history  of  civilization; 


ERNST  CASSIRER  49 

while,  on  the  other  hand,  he  had  built  up  a  library  containing  the 
concrete  materials  for  these  studies,  beginning  with  books  and 
articles  on  the  general  problem  of  symbolic  expression  and 
arranging  all  the  historical  sections  with  a  view  to  this  problem.) 
At  the  time  of  Cassirer's  first  visit,  Die  Philosofhie  der  sym- 
bolischen  Formen  was  just  taking  shape  in  Cassirer  Js  mind.  It 
came  as  a  shock  to  him,  therefore,  to  see  that  a  man  whom  he 
hardly  knew  had  covered  the  same  ground,  not  in  writings,  but 
in  a  complicated  library  system,  which  an  attentive  and  specula- 
tive visitor  could  spontaneously  grasp.  That  was  the  reason  why, 
at  our  first  meeting,  Cassirer  immediately  felt  that  the  alterna- 
tive confronting  him  was  either  to  ignore  the  Institute  or  else 
to  submit  to  its  spell. 

When  the  time  was  ripe  for  him,  Cassirer  became  our  most 
assiduous  reader.  And  the  first  book  ever  published  by  the  Insti- 
tute was  from  Cassirer's  pen.  It  dealt  with  the  problem  on  which 
Warburg  had  started,  namely  to  establish  the  categories  of 
primitive  thought  in  the  primitive  cultures  proper,  as  well  as  in 
modern  primitivism,  as  for  example  in  astrology. 

Warburg  was  a  man  of  a  very  imaginative  and  emotional 
type,  in  whom  historical  imagination,  nourished  by  concrete 
historical  experience,  always  struggled  against  an  ardent  de- 
sire for  philosophical  simplification.  Yet  he  had  created  a  tool 
which  a  master,  whose  greatest  gifts  were  in  the  line  of  systema- 
tization,  could  use,  and  who,  just  at  this  moment,  was  eager 
to  find  the  concrete  material  on  which  to  build  his  system. 
Cassirer  found  it  laid  out  in  the  library  of  a  man  who  was  still 
alive,  but  who  was  living  in  darkness  behind  doors  which 
seemed  never  again  to  open  for  him. 

Years  went  by.  The  first  volume  of  Cassirer's  magnum  opts 
appeared,  while  we  published  some  corollaries  to  it  and  some 
lectures.  One  day  Cassirer  went  to  Switzerland  to  pay  a  visit 
to  Warburg.  It  was  a  meeting  of  which  both  Cassirer  and 
Warburg  often  spoke  in  later  years.  The  patient  had  prepared 
himself  for  this  day  for  weeks  and  months  previously.  Cassirer 
came,  full  of  sympathy  and  with  the  apprehension  and  awe  that 
mental  illness  inspires.  In  the  years  of  anguish  and  isolation 
Warburg's  thought,  which  had  never  been  arrested  by  the  ill- 


50  F.  SAXL 

ness,  had  centred  around  Kepler.  Warburg  had  come  to  the 
conclusion,  although  separated  from  all  books,  that  modern 
thought  was  born  when  Kepler  broke  the  traditional  supremacy 
of  the  circle,  as  the  ideal  form  in  cosmological  thought,  and 
replaced  it  by  the  ellipse.  Cassirer,  who  never  took  notes  but 
possessed  a  memory  of  almost  unlimited  capacity,  at  once  came 
to  Warburg's  aid,  giving  chapter  and  verse  for  this  idea  by 
quoting  from  Kepler.  It  was,  probably,  Warburg's  first  ray 
of  light  in  those  dark  years.  He  learnt  through  Cassirer  that 
he  had  not  wandered  in  a  pathless  wilderness,  but  that  his 
scientific  thought  at  least  was  sane.  Cassirer's  memory  was 
always  miraculous}  but  it  had  never  worked  as  miraculous  a 
cure  as  it  did  on  that  day. 

In  later  years,  when  Warburg  was  back  in  Hamburg,  a  warm 
friendship  sprang  up  between  the  two  men.  Warburg  admired 
the  clarity  of  thought  and  form  in  the  philosopher;  and  Cassirer 
was  impressed  by  the  man  who  grasped  life  and  history  with 
such  passion  and  who  had  gone  through  mental  experiences 
which  gave  every  utterance  of  his  about  art  or  religion,  about 
philosophy  and  literature,  a  deep  and  wise  ring. 

The  character  of  Cassirer's  scholarship,  however,  was  such 
that,  though  enriched  and  extended,  its  intrinsic  direction  was 
never  changed  by  his  co-operation  with  Warburg.  A  reader 
familiar  with  Cassirer's  work,  but  unfamiliar  with  these  per- 
sonal details,  would  never  divine  the  intimate  relationship 
which  existed  between  the  two  men,  so  much  did  all  the  writings 
of  those  years  appear  as  the  necessary  continuation  of  Cassirer's 
earlier  work.  When  Warburg  died  in  1929,  it  was  Cassirer 
who  spoke  at  his  grave:  a  commemoration  of  the  strange  and 
fruitful  meeting  of  two  thinkers  of  almost  diametrically  op- 
posed character  and  tendency.  Yet  they  had  one  great  goal  in 
common:  to  understand  the  nature  and  history  of  the  symbolic 
expression  of  the  human  mind. 

If  the  Warburg  Institute  has  grown  into  a  stable  institution, 
we  owe  much  of  its  success  to  Cassirer's  advice  and  help.  If 
Warburg  were  alive,  he  would  testify  how  greatly  he  admired 
Cassirer.  But  above  all,  he  would  express  his  deep  gratitude  to 
the  man  who,  better  than  any  psychiatrist,  had  helped  him  to 


ERNST  CASSIRER  51 

find  the  way  back  into  the  world.  Even  those  of  you  who  knew 
Cassirer  could  hardly  imagine  the  immense  impression  that  his 
clear  and  calm  personality  made  on  a  mind  cut  off  from  the 
world  and  striving  hard  to  reach  the  port  of  health  by  exerting 
his  powers  of  reason.  Cassirer,  Olympian  and  aloof,  was  yet 
the  most  humane  and  learned  doctor  of  the  soul.  Higher  praise 
could  hardly  be  given  to  any  man. 

F.  SAXL 

THE  WARBURG  INSTITUTE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON 

LONDON,  ENGLAND 


4 
A  STUDENT'S  NACHRUF 

FRIENDS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER: 

I  SHOULD  like  you  to  know  something  of  what  the  stu- 
dents in  the  Department  of  Philosophy  at  Columbia  felt  for 
Ernst  Cassirer.  By  recounting  to  you  the  substance  of  my  own 
experience  and  my  own  feelings  I  shall  be  summing  up  the 
experience  and  the  feelings  of  all  of  us  here  who  were  the 
students  of  Ernst  Cassirer.  For,  my  relations  with  Ernst  Cas- 
sirer were  surely  typical  and  most  representative. 

As  a  mere  apprentice  to  that  trade  in  which  Ernst  Cassirer 
was  a  revered  guild-master,  I  am  aware  that  language  is  a 
fragile  bridge  to  understanding,  and  one  that  is  too  easily  col- 
lapsible. Thus,  if  someone  were  to  ask  me:  "How  well  did 
you  know  Ernst  Cassirer?,"  I  should  feel  the  need  of  beginning 
my  answer  by  making  a  certain  verbal  distinction.  In  terms 
reminiscent  of  one  of  the  great  problems  with  which  Professor 
Cassirer  came  boldly  to  grips,  I  should  have  to  reply:  "Just 
what  do  you  mean  by  the  word  'know'?" 

If  by  your  question  you  mean  to  inquire  whether  I  enjoyed 
a  personal  friendship  with  my  teacher,  whether  our  acquaint- 
ance was  an  intimate  one,  then  regretfully  I  should  have  to 
answer  that  in  this  sense  I  did  not  "know"  Ernst  Cassirer.  The 
time  was  too  short,  the  days  were  too  few  for  this. 

But  if  your  meaning  is:  "Did  I  have  an  understanding  of 
the  kind  of  man  that  Ernst  Cassirer  was?,"  then  I  should 
answer,  and  every  one  of  his  students  would  answer  with  me: 
"I  did,  and  I  do." 

Ernst  Cassirer  was  an  exile,  a  Jew,  who  wrote:  "In  our  life, 
in  the  life  of  a  modern  Jew,  there  is  no  room  left  for  any  joy 
or  complacency.  All  this  has  gone  forever.  No  Jew  whatsoever 

52 


A  STUDENT'S  NACHRUF  53 

can  and  will  ever  overcome  the  terrible  ordeal  of  these  last 
years."  And  yet  Ernst  Cassirer  was  a  man  whose  presence  be- 
spoke serenity  as  surely  as  do  the  green  leaves  bespeak  the 
springtime.  This  sereneness  of  countenance  and  mind  was  noted 
by  all.  But  it  was  not  the  serenity  which  is  unconscious  of  the 
storm  j  it  was,  rather,  a  kind  of  winged  serenity  which  surveyed, 
which  comprehended,  and  yet  which  nobly  overrode  the  storm. 
And  so,  having  seen  this,  we  knew  that  Ernst  Cassirer  was  a 
good  man.  For  only  the  good  are  serene. 

We  were  impressed  by  the  depth  and  variety  of  his  knowl- 
edge. The  depth  we  were  prepared  for,  but  the  variety  amazed 
us.  I  recall  that,  after  I  had  seen  An  Essay  On  Man,  I  asked  two 
members  of  the  department  whether  Professor  Cassirer  were 
really  at  home  in  all  the  varied  fields  surveyed  by  this  book. 
They  assured  me  that,  in  truth,  he  was.  And  I  am  ashamed  to 
confess  that  I  was  dismayed  at  this  confirmation}  for  it  seemed 
to  me  that  I,  a  beginner  in  philosophy,  could  never  hope  my- 
self to  be  the  master  of  such  a  manifold  of  learning.  But  this 
dismay  was  supplanted  soon  by  a  spirit  of  emulation;  and  the 
kind  of  scholarship  which  was  Ernst  Cassirer's  became  for  me 
something  to  strive  for,  a  goal  which  I  might  not  attain,  but  a 
goal  which  was  truly  clear,  for  I  had  seen  it  defined  in  the 
being  of  a  living  man. 

In  the  lecture  hall  we  were  particularly  impressed  by  the 
profound  and  appropriate  allusions  made  to  every  field  of 
knowledge.  In  the  seminar  room  we  learned  to  wait  for  the 
brilliant  interjection,  the  almost  casual  sentence  which  put  a 
philosopher  or  a  problem  in  a  new  and  more  illuminating  light. 
In  short,  we  came  to  realize,  all  of  us,  in  time,  that  as  a  man 
of  learning  and  wisdom,  as  a  scholar,  Ernst  Cassirer  was 
unique. 

He  was  an  ardent  man.  I  understood  this  on  the  day  of  the 
last  class  he  taught.  I  was  on  my  way  to  class  that  day,  when 
in  the  distance  I  was  glad  to  see  Professor  Cassirer  walking  in 
the  same  direction.  I  quickened  my  pace  in  order  to  catch  up 
with  him.  When  I  came  closer  I  saw  that,  as  he  walked,  he 
was  reading  a  book,  which  absorption  accounted  for  the  slow- 
ness of  his  step.  As  I  watched  him,  he  paused  to  concentrate  on 


54  EDWARD  MURRAY  CASE 

what  he  was  reading,  and,  in  that  moment,  I  perceived  that 
Ernst  Cassirer,  at  the  age  of  seventy,  was  more  ardently  in- 
terested in  the  contents  of  that  book  than  most  young  men 
have  ever  been  interested  in  the  contents  of  any  book.  And  so 
I  did  not  disturb  Professor  Cassirer,  and  I  am  glad  now  that  I 
did  not,  for  the  discreet  man  does  not  intrude  upon  a  lover. 

Thus,  being  serene  and  good,  being  learned  and  wise  and 
ardent,  being  all  these  things,  Ernst  Cassirer  was  a  great  man. 

And  so  we,  the  students  of  philosophy  at  Columbia  esteem 
it  to  have  been  a  great  privilege  and  a  great  honor  in  our  lives 
that,  in  this  great  university  of  the  New  World,  we  were  the  last 
students  of  the  lineal  descendant  of  Immanuel  Kant,  that  we 
were  the  last  students  of  the  last  flowering  of  German  philoso- 
phy. And  I  do  not  speak  from  paper  or  from  notes  or  in 
words  formulated  coldly  and  with  deliberation,  but  I  speak 
from  the  heart  when  I  say:  We  loved  Ernst  Cassirer. 

EDWARD  MURRAY  CASE 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


5 
ERNST  CASSIRER 

WE  ARE  gathered  together  in  a  memorial  to  Ernst  Cas- 
sirer.  We  meet  here  to  convey  to  each  other,  in  some 
poor  words,  what  he  meant  to  us  as  man  and  philosopher.  It 
will  take  more,  of  course,  than  we  have  to  give  in  this  meeting 
to  reveal  what  significance  his  work  has  and  will  continue  to 
have  for  many  others  besides  ourselves}  and,  fortunately,  there 
is  to  be  a  volume  of  studies  of  his  philosophy,  where  this 
further  and  more  adequate  appraisal  may  have  place.  But  we 
can,  at  this  moment,  do  something  good  for  ourselves  and  for 
the  memory  of  our  friend,  if  we  simply  speak  of  the  things 
that  promptly  stand  out  in  our  consciousness  now  rather  than 
strain  at  the  impossible  task  of  offering  a  comprehensive  pic- 
ture of  the  whole  man  and  his  work.  These  first  thoughts  that 
come  in  the  dawning  realization  of  our  loss  have  a  very  personal 
character.  Each  one  of  us  has  his  own  individual  feelings  and 
appreciations.  We  are  sharing  these  together  in  this  hour  and 
making  the  man  we  have  known  even  more  real  for  each  other 
as  we  here  tell  how  we  best  remember  him. 

Four  years  ago,  almost  to  the  day,  Ernst  Cassirer  came  to 
this  country,  accompanied  by  his  wife,  without  whom  we  who 
have  but  known  him  these  few  years  cannot  think  of  him. 
They  came  here  direct  from  Sweden,  on  the  last  ship  permitted 
to  go  out,  in  May,  1941.  They  made  themselves  at  home  in 
America,  where  they  already  had  some  dear  ones  waiting  for 
their  arrival.  I  believe  that  we  can  say  that  Ernst  Cassirer  was 
happy  here,  both  in  New  Haven,  where  he  first  came  to  live, 
and  then  in  New  York. 

Let  me  speak  to  you  after  his  own  fashion.  It  was  always 
his  way,  when  telling  of  some  other  thinker  or  philosopher, 

55 


56  CHARLES  W.  HENDEL 

first  to  quote  something  that  was  completely  characteristic  of 
the  man.  He  often  quoted  at  greater  length,  some  people  felt, 
than  he  needed  to  do.  I  recall  a  publisher  saying  this  in  criticism 
of  one  of  his  manuscripts.  "We  want  more  Cassirer,"  he  com- 
plained, "and  less  of  what  other  people  have  thought."  But 
what  other  people  had  learned  and  thought  was  too  important 
to  Ernst  Cassirer  to  be  made  so  little  of.  He  always  knew  that 
many  artists  of  the  mind  had  searched  for  and  shaped  the 
truths  or  the  problems  for  inquiry  with  which  he  himself  was 
concerned  and  he  believed  it  a  duty  to  give  their  "authority," 
in  this  fine  and  original  sense  of  the  term,  before  he  ventured 
to  present  his  own  contribution  to  the  matter.  This  was  his 
style  of  life  and  thought.  It  expressed  both  his  generous  regard 
for  other  thinkers  and  his  modest  estimate  of  his  own  place 
alongside  them  in  the  halls  of  philosophy. 

I  have  in  my  hands  a  precious  document  and  memento  writ- 
ten in  his  own  hand.  Last  year  at  this  time  he  was  saying  fare- 
well to  his  friends  at  Yale.  He  spoke  at  the  Philosophical  Club 
meeting  where  all  of  us  assembled  to  express  to  him  our  appre- 
ciation of  the  three  good  years  we  had  been  privileged  to  have 
together  in  our  study  of  philosophy.  This  is  what  he  said  to 
us  on  that  occasion: 

Looking  back  on  my  long  academic  life  I  must  regard  it  as  a  long 
Odyssey.  It  was  a  sort  of  pilgrimage  that  led  me  from  one  university  to 
the  other,  from  one  country  to  the  other,  and,  at  the  end,  from  one 
hemisphere  to  the  other.  This  Odyssey  was  rich  in  experiences — in  human 
and  intellectual  adventures.  What  was  most  delightful  and  gratifying  in 
this  long  academic  journey  was  the  fact  that  it  became  also,  more  and 
more,  a  sentimental  journey.  For  at  any  new  place  I  was  lucky  enough 
to  find  new  friends.  I  found  colleagues  who  were  ready  to  help  me  in 
my  work,  and  I  found  students  who  were  interested  in  my  philosophical 
views. 

When  I  came  to  this  country  I  cherished  the  hope  that  the  same  would 
happen  here.  And  this  hope  was  not  disappointed.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
I  found  something  more  and  something  better — something  that  passed 
all  my  expectations.  I  was  not  only  supposed  to  give  my  own  lectures 
and  hold  my  own  courses.  I  was  invited  to  have  a  share  in  the  work  of  my 
colleagues.  During  my  first  year  I  had  the  pleasure  and  the  great  privilege 
to  be  invited  to  a  seminar  on  the  philosophy  of  history  .  .  . ;  in  my  second 


ERNST  CASSIRER  57 

year  I  could  participate  in  a  seminar  on  the  philosophy  of  science  .  .  .; 
in  my  third  year  we  had  a  conjoint  seminar  on  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
.  .  .  That  was,  indeed,  a  new  experience  to  me — and  a  very  suggestive 
and  stimulating  one.  I  look  back  on  these  conjoint  seminars  with  real 
pleasure  and  gratitude.  I  am  sure  I  have  learned  very  much  from  them. 

Of  course,  it  was  in  a  sense  a  rather  bold  enterprise,  the  bringing 
together  of  so  many  philosophers.  As  a  rule  philosophers  seem  not  to  be 
very  fond  of  such  a  close  cooperation.  They  are  apt  to  disagree  in  their 
views,  in  their  interests,  in  their  very  definition  of  what  philosophy  is  and 
means.  And  the  task  that  had  to  be  solved  here  was  so  much  the  more 
doubtful  and  risky  since  three  different  generations  were  expected  to 
have  a  share  in  a  common  work.  To  the  struggle  between  philosophers 
there  was  added  the  struggle  between  the  generations.  In  many  of  our 
modern  systems  of  education  we  are  told  that  it  is  hopeless  to  reconcile  the 
views  of  men  belonging  to  different  generations.  We  are  told  that,  there 
is  a  deep  and  insurmountable  gap  between  the  generations;  that  every 
new  generation  must  feel  in  its  own  way,  think  its  own  thoughts  and 
speak  its  own  language.  I  regard  this  as  a  misleading  and  dangerous 
dogma — and  as  a  dogma  that  throughout  my  life  I  found  constantly 
contradicted  by  my  own  personal  experience.  The  older  I  grow,  so  much 
the  more  I  become  interested  in  the  work  and  the  thoughts  of  the 
younger  men.  And  I  always  found  that  they  readily  answered  to  my 
interest.  To  my  great  satisfaction  I  had  the  same  experience  here.  .  .  . 

Of  course  the  younger  people  criticized  me  sometimes  rather  severely. 
They  could  not  always  agree  with  me;  they  thought  perhaps  that  they 
had  outgrown,  a  long  time  ago,  some  of  the  philosophic  ideas  and  ideals 
that  were  still  very  dear  to  me.  But,  after  all,  they  listened  to  me  and 
they  tolerated  my  very  old-fashioned  philosophy.  They  could  see  my 
point — as  well  as  I  could  see  theirs. 

This  ended  his  "brief  report,"  as  he  then  called  it,  on  his 
life  amongst  us,  though  he  had  even  other  things  to  express, 
more  personal,  on  that  occasion.  But  what  he  said  in  these 
words  just  quoted  belongs  to  no  particular  group  of  colleagues 
and  students  or  university.  It  was  as  much  his  message  to  Co- 
lumbia this  year  as  it  was  to  Yale  then.  It  was  his  report  on  his 
American  sojourn.  And  while  it  reports  our  academic  life  as 
he  really  saw  it,  it  has  greater  truth  still  as  a  revelation  of  him- 
self. 

That  friendship  of  which  he  told,  the  eager  interest  in  ideas, 
the  tolerance  of  mind  .  .  .  "they  could  see  my  point  as  well  as 


58  CHARLES  W.  HENDEL 

I  could  see  theirs."  All  this  happened  because  of  him.  It  was 
his  doing.  "I  was  lucky  enough  to  find  new  friends."  Lucky? 
Oh  no,  he  was  himself  the  architect  of  these  rewarding  per- 
sonal and  academic  relations  which  we  all  so  much  enjoyed.  He 
was  the  philosopher  who  brings  to  birth  the  philosophic  spirit 
and  way  of  life  in  those  who  lived  and  worked  with  him. 

"The  older  I  grow,"  he  had  said,  "the  more  I  become  in- 
terested in  the  thoughts  of  the  younger  men."  Very  few  men 
of  seventy  will  even  think  of  saying  that,  and  there  are  fewer 
still  who,  if  they  were  to  say  it,  would  ever  be  believed.  We 
know  that  he  said  this,  however,  in  all  sincerity  and  without  the 
shadow  of  a  boast.  He  spoke  with  transparent  honesty  when  he 
acknowledged  such  an  intellectual  benefit  for  himself  in  his 
association  with  youth  and  with  the  younger  scholars.  It  was  a 
confession  made  in  fine  simplicity  by  one  who  was  a  genuine 
teacher  of  men. 

He  rejoiced,  as  you  saw,  at  the  idea  especially  of  keeping 
three  generations  in  touch  with  each  other  in  common  work,  the 
young,  the  middle-aged  and  the  old.  He  was  well  aware  of  the 
risk  involved  in  such  an  enterprise  in  education.  We  realize 
from  his  own  words,  too,  that  he  felt  the  severity  of  the  youth- 
ful criticism  directed  at  his  particular  philosophic  beliefs  and 
ideasj  but  we  saw  him,  too,  meeting  the  criticism  with  reason 
and  patience  and  generosity,  and  it  was,  in  fact,  by  so  doing  that 
he  brought  several  generations  so  happily  together  in  adven- 
tures of  learning.  Here  is  another  classic  trait  of  the  philosopher. 
We  all  remember  Socrates  at  the  same  age  and  doing  the  same 
things. 

No  man  of  his  high  caliber  could  live  through  these  last 
twenty-five  years  without  giving  profound  thought  to  the 
whole  plight  of  humanity  in  all  the  nations  of  the  world.  He 
knew  what  adversity  meant  close  at  home.  His  knowledge  of 
vast  periods  of  history  brought  multitudes  of  other  instances 
that  could  weigh  down  the  spirit  with  a  heavy  burden.  He  was 
sensitive  to  the  pain  and  the  hopelessness  that  many  have  to 
suffer  and  must  continue  to  suffer.  Yet  his  vision  kept  in  view 
the  dignity  and  continuity  of  man's  long  struggle  forward  to  a 
life  that  befits  humanity.  Thus  he  succeeded  in  attaining  sere- 


ERNST  CASSIRER  59 

nity  himself.  Yet  he  was  never  aloof  and  abstracted,  for  he 
gave  thought  and  individual  sympathy  for  the  small  personal 
trials  of  everyone  whom  he  knew.  It  was  good  for  one's  soul 
to  be  with  him.  And  no  one  who  knew  him  at  all  could  miss 
that  cheerfulness  which  was  a  sort  of  spiritual  radiance  that 
warmed  and  brightened  our  fellowship.  This  is  the  thing,  I 
believe,  we  should  bear  in  mind  now,  as  we  go  on  to  recall  all 
the  other  things  that  Ernst  Cassirer  has  meant  to  us. 

CHARLES  W.  HENDEL 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

YALE  UNIVERSITY 


c 

Hendrik  J.  Pos 
RECOLLECTIONS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER* 

HONORED  by  the  invitation  to  contribute  to  the  Cassirer 
volume,  I  should  like  to  carry  out  this  assignment  by 
saying  something  about  Cassirer,  the  man,  as  well  as  about  his 
philosophical  significance.  I  had  the  privilege  of  studying  Cas- 
sirer's  works  even  before  I  first  heard  his  lectures  in  Hamburg 
during  the  summer  semester  of  1928.  I  then  met  him  in  the 
Spring  of  1929  at  the  Second  University  Congress  in  Davos; 
and  since  1934  I  have  been  in  closer  personal  relationship  with 
him,  which  led  to  my  spending  a  month  with  him  in  Goteberg 
in  the  summer  of  1936,  for  the  purpose  of  co-operating  on  a  task 
which,  due  to  unforeseen  circumstances,  was  never  brought  to 
completion.  The  last  word  I  ever  had  from  him  was  a  postcard, 
dated  May  1940,  expressing  his  concern  over  how  I  had  fared 
since  the  invasion.  Shortly  thereafter  I  was  interned,  and  when 
the  war  was  over  the  news  of  his  death  reached  me. 

When  I  was  a  young  student,  Ernest  Cassirer's  works  on  the 
history  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  Substance  and  Function,  as 
well  as  on  Einstein's  theory,  opened  up  to  me  the  whole  world 
of  scientific  thought,  which  was  far  removed  from  a  student  of 
classical  philology.  This  study  became  determinative  for  my 
philosophical  development,  insofar  as  I  learned  from  it  the 
nature  of  natural  science  in  contrast  to  cultural  (social)  science, 
and  how  the  former  has  gradually  created  its  own  correct  path 
for  itself,  a  path  which  leads  form  Galileo  through  Newton  to 
Einstein  and  the  moderns.  If,  as  a  young  admirer  of  the  Greeks, 
one  is  inclined  to  take  all  of  Plato's  and  Aristotle's  speculative 
thought  for  immutable  truth,  then  nothing  is  more  instructive 
than  to  take  cognizance  of  the  inexorable  course  pursued  by 

*  Translated  by  Dr.  Robert  W.  Bretall. 

63 


64  HENDRIK  J.  POS 

science  since  the  Renaissance.  To  this  end  Cassirer's  Erkenntnis- 
problem  is  an  excellent  guide.  Endowed  with  a  wonderfully 
flexible  style,  he  knows  how  to  transpose  himself  into  every 
point  of  view,  to  present  it  con  amorey  and  at  the  same  time  to 
trace  the  great  lineage  which  leads  from  speculative  ontology 
and  abstract  verbalism  to  the  rational  empiricism  of  modern 
natural  science.  It  is  most  gratifying  that  the  three  volumes 
which  carry  the  treatment  up  to  Hegel,  are  very  soon,  through 
the  interest  of  Professor  Hendel  of  Yale,  to  be  completed  with 
the  fourth  volume,  which  Cassirer  had  left  in  manuscript.  In 
this  major  work  of  its  kind  Cassirer  exhibited  an  unexcelled 
mastery,  command,  and  disposition  of  his  material,  and  in 
addition,  a  luminous  facility  of  presentation,  which  remains 
unique  in  German  philosophy.  It  is  a  history  of  recent  philoso- 
phy from  the  standpoint  of  the  progress  of  the  natural  sciences. 
It  may  be  that  here  and  there  in  the  quotations  there  is  some 
room  for  improvement:  the  whole  [work]  is  the  expression  of 
an  idea,  which  emerges  clearly  from  the  development  of  the 
natural  sciences  in  modern  times,  the  idea,  namely,  of  the  transi- 
tion from  metaphysical  speculation  to  rational  understanding. 
Here  it  is  shown  how,  by  a  gradual  process  of  trial  and  error,  and 
under  the  decisive  influence  of  scientific  savants,  the  intellectual 
and  technical  mastery  over  nature  has  come  about;  and  how,  in 
this  process,  the  basic  viewpoints  have  altered.  One  cannot  claim 
that  any  old  philosophical  position  fits  into  this  development 
equally  well:  ontologism  sees  itself  compelled  to  separate  the 
empirical  development  of  science  from  the  philosophical  deter- 
mination of  fundamental  principles,  in  order  thus  to  keep  the 
changes  of  empirical  science  far  away  from  the  philosophical 
enterprise.  Cassirer  demonstrated  at  what  cost  the  a  prioristic 
and  established  results  of  philosophy  are  purchased  by  this 
method.  He  also  showed  how  the  historical  development  has 
shoved  aside  this  dualism,  which  amounts  to  a  doctrine  of  the 
twofold  nature  of  truth,  and  how  Kant's  method  of  the  analysis 
of  basic  principles — an  analysis  which  proceeds  from  the  very 
fact  of  existing  science — does  justice  to  the  progress  of  science 
without  robbing  philosophy  of  her  own  task.  Further,  he  showed 
how  the  application  of  Kant's  analysis  to  natural  science  today 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  65 

makes  it  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  content  of  Kant's  doctrine. 
Of  this  the  Relativity  theory  is  the  classical  demonstration,  inso- 
far as  it  modifies  the  intuition  of  space  and  time,  which  Kant 
still  was  able  to  lay  down  as  the  foundation  of  physics.  This 
[theory]  makes  it  clear  that  the  advance  of  knowledge  consists 
not  only  in  the  material  of  new  experience  being  incorporated 
into  the  fixed  categories,  but  also  in  the  fact  that  the  basic  as- 
sumptions themselves  must  be  revised  from  time  to  time,  in 
order  to  bring  new  facts  into  non-contradictory  connection  with 
old.  Philosophically  considered,  Cassirer  taught  how  to  extend 
the  idea  of  the  process  under  which  the  Marburg  school  sub- 
sumed "knowledge,"  to  include  the  basic  categories  themselves 
and  their  determination — thereby  going  beyond  Kant  and  his 
orthodox  adherents.  This  was  the  only  way  of  safeguarding 
Kantianism  against  the  reproach  of  dogmatism,  and  of  prevent- 
ing it  from  being  left  behind  by  the  advance  of  science,  as  had 
happened  in  the  case  of  ontological  speculation.  Through  his 
"scientism"  Cassirer's  philosophy  has  achieved  an  international 
reputation  which  puts  him  close  beside  the  kindred  figure  of 
Leon  Brunschvicg.  At -Davos  I  was  present  at  conversations 
during  which  the  two  thinkers  made  the  discovery  of  their 
spiritual  affinity. 

Cassirer  was  so  many-sided,  that  his  total  work  was  far  from 
exhausted  by  his  writings  in  the  field  of  epistemology.  To  others 
it  may  be  left  to  come  to  closer  terms  with  the  abiding  merit  of 
his  studies  in  the  history  of  epistemology,  in  theory  of  relativity, 
and  in  the  problem  of  causality  in  recent  physics.  I  turn  now  to 
his  philosophy  of  culture,  set  down  in  the  first  two  volumes  of 
the  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen.  In  1923  appeared 
the  volume  on  language,  and  in  1925  that  on  mythical  thought. 
The  first  is  a  phenomenology  of  the  formation  of  our  world- 
view  in  terms  of  a  philosophy  of  language;  whereas  the  second 
volume  lays  bare  the  driving  force  which  conditioned  the  crea- 
tion of  a  religion.  Cassirer  was  the  first  to  apply  the  basic  ideas 
of  neo-Kantianism  concerning  spirit  and  its  creative  energy  to 
the  pre-scientific  world-view.  Here,  too,  he  was  guided  by  that 
historical  sense  which  distinguishes  his  treatment  of  the  problem 
of  knowledge.  With  the  aid  of  an  intensive  study  of  the  struc- 


66  HENDRIK  J.  POS 

tures  of  primitive  languages — for  which  the  Warburg  Institute 
in  Hamburg  provided  him  with  the  jviferials — he  sought  to 
construct  a  line  of  development  leadihg  from  the  most  ele- 
mentary categories  of  the  world  to  the  more  objective  ones,  and 
finally  to  the  cognitive  results  of  the  sciences.  The  primitive 
languages,  taken  as  witnesses  to  a  very  remote  stage  of  the  hu- 
man grasp  of  the  universe,  offered  him  valuable  supporting 
evidence  for  his  notion  of  the  gradually  advancing  "symbolical" 
formation  of  the  world-picture,  which  in  the  interest  of  ob- 
jectivity and  of  comprehensive  unification,  gets  farther  and 
farther  away  from  the  original,  primitive  intuitions.  He  showed 
in  a  convincing  manner  how  an  originally  strong,  vital,  and 
qualitatively  conditioned  world-view  gives  way  gradually  to  an 
objective  and  more  universal  one,  this  transition  attesting  itself 
in  the  transformations  of  language  as  it  proceeds  from  a  sensory, 
qualitative  stage  to  a  symbolical-abstract  mode  of  expression. 
Thus  it  becomes  clear  how  the  requirements  of  science  make  it 
necessary  to  introduce  symbols  which  in  precision  and  fruitful- 
ness  surpass  those  of  language. 

One  may  perhaps  harbor  some  doubt  as  to  whether  the  cur- 
rent linguistic  structure  of  a  society  is,  indeed,  always  so  faithful 
an  expression  of  its  manner  of  thought  and  feeling — whether 
now  and  then,  let  us  say,  the  external  structure  may  not  be  in- 
adequate to  the  thought-content.  No  damage  is  thereby  done 
to  the  methodological  principle  of  Cassirer 's  theory  of  language, 
and  it  is  to  be  gratefully  acknowledged  that  through  him  the 
researches  instigated  by  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  and  by  Wundt 
have  been  fruitfully  continued  and  have  received  their  philo- 
sophical foundation.  The  basic  idea  which  sustains  both  the 
theory  of  language  and  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  the  fact 
that,  by  introducing  symbols,  the  human  consciousness  succeeds 
in  ordering  and  governing  the  welter  of  sensations.  The  cate- 
gories expressed  in  languages  pave  the  way  for  that  logical 
order  for  which  the  sciences  are  striving. 

Cassirer's  philosophy  of  culture  is  a  philosophy  of  the  logos, 
not  in  the  narrow  sense  of  "ratio"  or  of  the  intellect  in  the  purely 
theoretical  sense,  but  rather  in  the  sense  of  that  spiritual,  form- 
indudng  energy  which  appears  in  science,  society,  and  art.  As  a 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  67 

critic  Cassirer  was  as  ill  disposed  to  metaphysics  as  toward  that 
irration?1'  *n  which  stirred  mightily  in  Germany  between  the 
two  world  wars.  His  Kantian  rationalism  was  bound  to  come 
into  conflict  with  the  intuitionism  of  the  waxing  phenome- 
nology, and  especially  with  the  ontological  and  "philosophy  of 
life"  stamp  which  Heidegger  imparted  to  it.  The  Kant  inter- 
pretations presented  by  Cassirer  and  Heidegger,  together  with 
the  ensuing  discussions,  constituted  the  focal  point  of  the  Inter- 
national Davos  University  course  in  1929. 

The  two  standpoints  could  be  mutually  clarified,  but  they 
could  not  be  brought  any  closer  together.  Cassirer  [on  his  part] 
emphasized  the  spiritual  law,  the  form,  by  means  of  which  man 
liberates  himselfs  from  his  immediacy  and  his  anxiety.  This  is 
the  way  in  which  the  finite  mind  participates  in  the  infinite. 
Whereas  Heidegger  expounded  his  book  on  Kant  and  the  Prob- 
lem of  Metaphysics,  which  had  just  been  published.  He  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  Kant's  central  problem  was  not  at  all 
that  of  scientific  knowledge,  but  rather  the  problem  of  the 
metaphysical  comprehension  of  being.  Kant's  philosophy  he  de- 
clared to  be  a  philosophy  of  finite  man,  whose  access  to  the  In- 
finite is  denied,  but  whose  orientation  toward  the  transcendent 
confirms  his  very  finitude.  The  difference  was  clear.  Heidegger 
persisted  in  the  terminus  a  quo,  in  the  situation  at  the  point  of 
departure,  which  for  him  is  the  dominating  factor  in  all  phi- 
losophizing, Cassirer  [on  the  other  hand]  aimed  at  the 
terminus  ad  quern,  at  liberation  through  the  spiritual  form,  in 
science,  practical  activity,  and  art.  The  contrast  was  not  theoreti- 
cal, but  human.  Here  stood,  on  the  one  side,  the  representative 
of  the  best  in  the  universalistic  traditions  of  German  culture,  a 
man  for  whom  Idealism  was  the  victorious  power  which  is  called 
to  mold  and  spiritualize  human  life.  This  man,  the  heir  of  Kant, 
stood  there  tall,  powerful,  and  serene.  His  effect  upon  his 
audience  lay  in  his  mastery  of  exposition,  in  the  Apollonian  ele- 
ment. From  the  beginning  he  had  within  him  the  liberal  culture 
of  Central  Europe,  the  product  of  a  long  tradition.  In  both 
spiritual  lineaments  and  external  appearance,  this  man  belonged 
to  the  epoch  of  Kant,  of  Goethe,  and  of  Kleist,  to  each  of  whom 
he  had  dedicated  some  of  his  literary  efforts.  And  over  against 


68  HENDRIK  J.  POS 

him  stood  an  altogether  different  type  of  man,  who  struggled 
with  Cassirer  over  the  deepest  intentions  of  Kant's  writings.  This 
man  too  had  a  gigantic  intellect.  As  a  man,  however,  he  was 
completely  different.  Of  $etit  bourgeois  descent  from  southwest 
Germany,  he  had  never  lost  his  accent.  In  him  this  was  readily 
forgiven,  being  taken  as  a  mark  of  firm-rootedness  and  peasant 
genuineness.  There  was,  however,  much  more  that  was  of  inter- 
est in  this  man.  In  his  youth  he  was  destined  for  the  priesthood, 
and  was  to  receive  his  seminary  education  at  Constance.  He  ran 
away,  however,  and  became  a  renegade.  At  home  as  almost  no 
one  else  in  Aristotle  and  the  scholastics,  in  Kant  and  Hegel,  he 
constructed  for  himself  a  philosophy  which,  on  the  side  of 
method,  came  close  to  the  phenomenology  of  his  teacher,  Hus- 
serl.  In  point  of  content,  however,  this  philosophy  was  of  course 
entirely  his  own:  there  lay  feelings  at  the  base  of  it  which 
were  concealed  by  the  gigantic  intellectual  superstructure.  But 
when  one  listened  to  his  lectures,  listened  to  this  gloomy,  some- 
what whining  and  apprehensive  tone  of  voice,  then  there  flowed 
forth  the  feelings  which  this  man  harbored  or  at  least  which  he 
knew  how  to  awaken.  These  were  feelings  of  loneliness,  of  op- 
pression, and  of  frustration,  such  as  one  has  in  anxious  dreams, 
but  now  present  in  a  clear  and  wakeful  state  of  mind. 

The  bearer  of  this  mood-philosophy  had  the  ear  of  Germany's 
academic  youth,  not  on  account  of  his  prodigious  knowledge  of 
the  history  of  philosophy,  but  rather  because  he  translated  feel- 
ings which  in  that  youth  found  a  soil  already  prepared.  This 
man  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  great  hope.  His  searching  book 
on  Kant  had  succeeded  in  showing  those  dark,  melancholy  feel- 
ings as  determinative  even  for  the  philosophy  of  the  famous 
sage  of  Konigsberg.  Man  is  a  finite  being  and  cannot  escape  his 
finitude — this,  the  book  taught,  was  to  have  been  the  deepest 
meanings  of  Kant's  thought.  This  carried  conviction,  from  the 
very  first,  for  the  youth  of  a  land  where  the  feeling  of  frustra- 
tion had  for  ten  years  now  been  alive  in  a  sense  other  than  the 
merely  metaphysical  one.  The  little  man  with  the  sinister  wilful 
speech,  who  was  at  home  with  these  morose  feelings,  who  loved 
to  say  that  philosophy  is  no  fun,  the  despiser  of  Goethe — [this 
man]  over  against  the  representative  of  Enlightenment,  basking 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  69 

in  spiritual  fortune,  for  whom  the  philosopher's  life  was  joy  and 
inspiration,  and  who  in  Goethe  paid  homage  to  the  universal 
man. 

The  whole  discussion  was  the  intuitive  representation  of  this 
profound  cleavage  between  the  two  men.  The  one  abrupt,  nega- 
tive, his  attitude  one  of  protest}  the  other  kindly,  gracious,  ac- 
commodating, always  concerned  to  give  his  partner  more  honor 
than  he  deserved.  The  two  men  reached  an  agreement  on  the 
meaning  of  Kant's  Schematism,  which  represents  the  original 
intermingling  of  sense  and  understanding.  This,  however,  left 
the  main  questions  undecided:  each  one  viewed  Kant  from  the 
standpoint  of  his  own  humanity,  with  the  difference,  however, 
that  the  one  admitted  that  metaphysical  expressions  are  not 
lacking  in  the  text,  whereas  the  other  would  in  no  wise  grant 
that  the  main  concern  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  was  aimed 
at  grounding  the  scientific  knowledge  of  nature  philosophically. 
Long  went  the  discussions  back  and  forth,  until  finally  they 
terminated.  The  conclusion  was  not  without  human  symbolism; 
the  magnanimous  man  offered  his  hand  to  his  opponent:  but  it 
was  not  accepted. 

The  Davos  conversations  were  symbolical  of  the  tragic  decline 
toward  which  German  philosophy  was  hastening.  Whoever 
at  that  time  still  did  not  grasp  what  was  going  on,  could  get  a 
glimpse  of  it  four  years  later,  when  fate  divided  the  two  Kant 
interpreters  as  irreconcilably  as  had  their  manners  of  thought: 
for  Ernst  Cassirer  there  no  longer  was  any  room  in  Germany. 
He  emigrated  to  Oxford.  In  the  same  year  his  opponent  in  the 
Davos  discussions  was  appointed  rector  of  the  University  of 
Freiburg,  and  in  his  inaugural  address  professed  himself  un- 
reservedly for  National  Socialism.  Germany's  spiritual  collapse 
had  taken  place,  and  Heidegger  placed  his  philosophy  at  the 
service  of  the  self-destruction  of  the  German  intelligentsia. 

When  Ernst  Cassirer  was  forced  to  leave  the  University  of 
Hamburg  in  1933,  he  stood  at  the  peak  of  his  international 
reputation.  It  was  primarily  because  of  him  and  Husserl  that 
German  philosophy,  at  that  time,  flourished  before  the  world. 
For  the  regime,  quite  naturally,  this  was  no  reason  whatsoever 
for  making  an  exception  in  his  case.  On  the  contrary,  interna- 


70  HENDRIK  J.  POS 

tional  recognition  was  then  taken  as  a  proof  of  unreliability, 
especially  if  on  top  of  this  one  was  a  non-Aryan.  Cassirer  loved 
the  free-thinking  Hamburg,  whose  newly  founded  university  he 
had  co-operatively  helped  to  build  ever  since  1919.  The  leave- 
taking  must  have  been  painful,  perhaps  even  more  so  than  the 
cutting  injustice  perpetrated  by  his  dismissal.  So  magnificent 
a  person  was  he,  however,  that  no  word  of  bitterness  was  ever 
heard  from  him  about  the  injustice  done.  With  Olympian 
serenity  he  departed.  A  man  who  for  many  years  had  lived  in 
Cassirer's  shadow  became  his  successor,  and  expressed  his  pleas- 
ure at  the  course  of  events.  Cassirer  rapidly  made  friends  in 
Oxford.  He  learned  English  and  delivered  lectures.  It  was  not 
easy  to  gain  a  genuine  understanding  for  neo-Kantianism.  It 
was  during  his  stay  in  England  that  Cassirer  celebrated  his 
sixtieth  birthday.  The  co-operative  volume,  Philosophy  and 
History,  which  was  presented  to  him  on  this  occasion  (Oxford, 
Clarendon  Press,  1936)  is  a  living  testimonial  to  the  diversity 
of  influence  and  of  inspiration  which  radiated  from  him  upon 
philosophers  and  historians  of  culture  in  all  countries.  The 
twenty-two  essays  had  been  edited  by  Cassirer's  student  Kli- 
bansky  and  the  Oxford  Kantian  scholar  and  historian  of  phi- 
losophy, H.  J.  Paton.  The  contributions  came  from  England, 
France,  Holland,  Germany,  Switzerland,  Italy,  Spain,  and 
America.  In  the  preface  the  editors  wrote:  "It  is  our  hope  that 
this  book  may  bear  witness  to  that  enduring  spiritual  bond  which 
unites  scholars  of  different  countries  and  different  traditions." 
The  name  of  Cassirer  actually  symbolized  a  universalism  and 
internationalism  which  recognizes  every  member  of  mankind  for 
its  spiritual  contribution  to  the  whole  culture  pattern,  on  the 
presupposition  that  through  such  mutual  recognition,  the  unity 
of  mankind  will  be  honored  and  promoted. 

The  further  course  of  Cassirer's  life  was  to  bear  still  further 
testimony  to  this  universalism.  In  1935  he  emigrated  to  Sweden, 
where  his  former  student  Jacobson  vacated  for  him  the  chair 
in  philosophy  at  the  University,  while  he  himself  accepted  the 
appointment  as  Governor  of  the  Province  of  Bohnslau.  Here 
too  Cassirer  made  devoted  friends  and  enthusiastic  students. 
And  here  in  the  summer  of  1936  I  had  the  privilege  of  being 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  71 

allowed  to  carry  on  a  series  of  conversations  with  him  in  a  sub- 
ject for  which  we  had  conceived  the  plan  of  a  co-operative 
volume  during  his  stay  in  Amsterdam:  the  influence  of  the 
Greek  language  on  philosophy.  Was  Greek  from  the  very  first 
a  language  well  adapted  to  philosophical  thought?  Or  did  the 
thinkers  rather  take  the  instrument  at  hand  in  its  natural  state 
and  adapt  it  to  their  particular  needs  of  expression?  How  far 
does  the  unconscious  influence  of  the  inner  linguistic  form  of 
Greek  extend  to  the  construction  of  metaphysical  concepts? 
These  and  similar  questions  we  discussed  intensively}  during 
which  process  Cassirer  unfolded  his  masterly  gift  of  intellectual 
sympathy  and  dialectical  skill.  After  these  preparatory  conversa- 
tions we  promised  each  other  to  work  them  out  during  the  next 
summer.  It  never  got  that  far.  Since  1936  I  have  remained  in 
correspondence  with  Cassirer,  but  have  never  seen  him  again. 
A  very  promising  participation  in  a  Hegel  conference  at  Amers- 
foort  had  to  be  declined  by  him  for  reasons  of  health.  In  Sweden 
too  Cassirer  did  fruitful  work.  His  stay  in  the  North  furnished 
him  the  occasion  for  taking  up  his  Cartesian  studies  once  more 
and  for  engaging  in  documentary  research  on  Descartes'  life  in 
Stockholm.  The  fruits  of  these  years  were  many  an  article  in  the 
philosophical  journal  Theoria,  edited  by  Ake  Petzall,  a  book 
on  the  development  of  the  concept  of  causality,  and  the  book  on 
Descartes. 

In  May,  1941,  Cassirer  came  to  America  with  the  last  ship 
which  was  permitted  to  make  the  crossing.  Of  his  work  at  Yale, 
until  1944,  and  at  Columbia  until  his  death  on  April  13,  1945, 
Professor  Charles  Hendel  has  given  a  beautiful  account  in  the 
Journal  of  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research  (Sept., 
1945,  156-159).  The  quotation  there  reproduced  really  consti- 
tutes the  autobiography  of  Ernst  Cassirer.  A  great  man  looks 
back  upon  the  Odyssey  of  his  life,  in  the  course  of  which  he  has 
had  to  wander  from  land  to  land  and  from  continent  to  conti- 
nent. He  did  it  modestly,  cheerfully,  and  magnificently.  Sub- 
jectively considered,  this  man's  gratitude  to  others  is  perfectly 
sincere;  whereas  taken  objectively,  it  is  not  without  irony,  since 
it  was  not  he  but  the  others  who  had  cause  to  be  grateful.  But 
that  is  the  way  Ernst  Cassirer  was;  he  sought  no  glory,  and  yet 


72  HENDRIK  J.  POS 

he  gained  it;  he  esteemed  others  higher  than  himself,  but 
actually  was  their  superior.  This  was  the  secret  of  the  inspiring 
and  uplifting  effect  which  emanated  from  his  presence.  There 
was  nothing  in  him  of  professorial  vainglory,  and  yet  he  was  a 
teacher  beyond  compare.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  cite  the  writings 
of  a  man  who  had  lived  for  many  years  in  his  shadow  and  who 
was  openly  jealous  of  him.  And  I  can  still  hear  him  speaking, 
in  Davos,  to  a  very  young  instructor:  "You  and  I  have  the  same 
philosophical  interests,  and  I  am  very  glad  of  this."  This  was  his 
self-giving  virtue,  the  generosite  of  the  Descartes  he  so  greatly 
admired.  One  scarcely  knows  what  to  marvel  at  most,  this  man's 
gigantic  intellect,  his  consummate  form  of  expression,  or  his 
chivalrous  humanity. 

His  philosophy  reveals  his  character  through  its  capacity  for 
transposing  itself  sympathetically  into  various  and  sundry  phil- 
osophical viewpoints,  without  thereby  losing  the  distinctive 
lines  of  his  own  thinking.  To  the  editor  of  this  book  I  have  to 
express  my  gratitude  for  the  opportunity  of  bearing  witness,  by 
a  short  and  fleeting  sketch,  to  my  grateful  admiration  for  a  man 
to  whom  German  philosophy  owes  more  than  to  any  other  of 
its  current  representatives — (viz.,)  that  in  the  time  of  its  shame 
and  its  decline,  it  has  been  able  to  maintain  its  age-old  renown 
in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

HENDRIK  J.  Pos 

PHILOSOPHICAL  FACULTY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  AMSTERDAM 


I 

Carl  H.  Hamburg 
CASSIRER'S  CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


CASSIRER'S  CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

IF  IT  IS  the  mark  of  a  great  thinker  that  death  cannot 
interrupt  the  continuity  of  his  intellectual  influence,  and 
if,  furthermore,  an  ever  growing  demand  for  his  published 
thought  may  be  taken  as  one  way  of  measuring  his  greatness, 
the  late  Ernst  Cassirer  must  well  be  accorded  this  rare  title. 
Within  three  years  after  an  untimely  death  cut  short  his  teach- 
ing career  at  Columbia  University,  there  have  rolled  off  the 
presses  several  printings  of  his  Essay  on  Man  (first  published 
in  1944),  Language  and  Myth  (translated  in  1946  and  already 
out  of  print)  and  Myth  of  the  State  (fourth  printing  since 
1946),  all  of  which  have  simultaneously  been  translated  into 
Spanish  and  some  of  which  will  soon  appear  in  French,  Ger- 
man, and  Dutch.  In  addition,  we  may  expect  in  the  not  too 
distant  future  English  editions  of  Determinism  and  Indeter- 
minism  in  Modern  Physics?  the  fourth  volume  of  his  famous 
Erkenntnisproblem?  the  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment? 
and  possibly,  the  Logic  of  the  Humanities?  Spanish  transla- 
tions of  Kant's  Life  and  Work?  and  the  Philosophy  of  Sym- 
bolic Forms6  as  well  as  posthumous  publication  in  German  of 

1  Dcterminlsmus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der  modernen  Physik}  Historische  und 
systematische  Studien  zum  Kausalproblem.  (Goeteborgs  Hoegskolas  Arsskrift.  Vol. 
XLIIj  1936)  5  ix,  265  pp. 

*To  be  published  sometime  in  1948,  this  volume  will  deal  with  physical, 
biological  and  historical  methods.  (Approx.  500  pp.) 

1  Die  Philosophic  der  Aufklaerung.  (Tuebingen,  Mohr,  1932)$  491  pp. 

*  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaftenj  Fuenf  Studien.   (Der  Gegenstand  der 
Kulturwissenschaftj  Ding-  und  Ausdruckswahrnehmung  j  Naturbegriffe  und  Kul- 
turbegriffej   Formproblem  und  Kausalproblem  j   Die  "Tragoedie  der  Kultur".) 
(Goeteborgs    Hoegskolas   Arsskrift  $    Vol.    XL VII  $    1942)$    139    pp. 

*  Kant's  Leben  und  Lehre.  Vol.  XI  of  £.  Cassirer's  edition  of  Kant's  ScMften 
(Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1918) j  viii,  448  pp. 

*  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  (see  Bibliography  in  this  Vol.) 

75 


76  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

his  Kleinere  Schriften7  and  the  collection  of  essays  into  a 
Goethe-book. 

Now,  if  these  publishing  announcements  may  be  taken  to 
reflect  a  considerable  preoccupation  with  the  work  of  Cassirer, 
such  interest  is  certainly  not  properly  taken  cognizance  of  in  our 
teaching  curricula.  It  is  doubtful  whether  in  any  of  the  many 
courses,  offered  on  the  subject  of  "Contemporary  Philosophy" 
in  American  colleges  and  universities,  more  than  summary — 
if  any — mention  is  made  of  the  philosophy  of  Cassirer.  In  the 
case  of  this  thinker,  we  seem  to  be  facing  the  rather  familiar 
paradox  that  a  lively  'interest'  in  his  philosophy  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  just  as  lively  an  ignorance  concerning  what  his 
philosophy  is  about.  Although  there  is  undoubtedly  more  than 
one  reason  for  this  circumstance,  a  decisive  one,  I  believe,  must 
be  seen  in  the  fact  that,  whereas  Cassirer  achieved  early  fame 
with  his  historical  works,  his  philosophy  proper  was  not  de- 
veloped before  the  publication  of  his  Philosophie  der  sym- 
bolischen  Foremen,  the  latest  volume  of  which  appeared  in  1929, 
at  a  time  when  in  Germany  phenomenology  and  the  "lebens- 
philosophischen"  precursors  of  existentialist  philosophies  had 
all  but  eclipsed  the  classicism  of  Cassirer's  theme  and  style. 

Cassirer's  philosophy  proper  has,  accordingly,  neither  re- 
ceived the  attention  that  a  German  intelligentsia  gave  to  lesser 
intellectual  events  in  the  anxious  pre-Hitler  years  nor  has  an 
English-speaking  audience  had  the  opportunity  to  satisfy — by  a 
closer  study  of  a  translated  version  of  the  Philosophie  der 
symbolischen  Formen — the  interest  in  his  thought  which  such 
books  as  An  Essay  on  Man  and  Language  and  Myth  have  al- 
ready provoked.  Although  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  arrangements 
for  an  English  translation  of  Cassirer's  magnum  of  us  will  soon 
be  made,  in  the  meantime  there  may  be  some  value  in  sketching 
somewhat  broadly  what  may  be  termed  his  'conception  of  phi- 
losophy.' To  this  purpose  we  shall  examine  Cassirer's  symbolic- 
form  concept,  upon  the  proper  understanding  of  which  hinges 
both  his  conception  of  what  philosophy  has  been  and  what  it 
must  be,  if  it  is  to  give  full  and  impartial  attention  to  the 

T  Containing  a  number  of  previously  published  essays,  most  of  which  are  out 
of  print  by  now. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  77 

phenomena  of  the  "natural"  as  well  as  of  the  "cultural" 
sciences,  to  both  the  Natur-  und  Kulturwissenschaften. 

THE  SYMBOLIC — FORM  CONCEPT 
a.  Terminological  distinctions 

The  term  "symbolic  form"  is  employed  by  Cassirer  in  at 
least  three  distinct,  though  related,  senses: 

(1)  It  covers  what  is  more  frequently  referred  to  as  the 
"symbolic  relation,"  the  "symbol-concept,"  the  "symbolic  func- 
tion," or,  simply,  the  "symbolic"  (das  Symbolische) . 

(2)  It  denotes  the  variety  of  cultural  forms  which — as  myth, 
art,  religion,  language,  and  science — exemplify  the  realms  of 
application  for  the  symbol-concept. 

(3)  It  is  applied  to  space,  time,  cause,  number,  etc.  which — 
as  the  most  pervasive  symbol-relations — are  said  to  constitute, 
with  characteristic  modifications,  such  domains  of  objectivity  as 
listed  under  (2). 

In  correspondence  with  this  division,  we  shall  in  the  sequel 
deal  first  with  the  "symbol-concept."  Indication  will  be  given 
of  both  the  "cultural"  import  attributed  to  it  by  Cassirer  and 
the  essentially  Kantian  epistemological  provisions  within  which 
it  is  developed.  We  shall  attempt  an  adequate  definition  of  this 
concept  and  consider  both  objections  and  a  possible  defense  for 
its  maintenance.  We  shall  examine,  secondly,  how  a  philosophy 
thus  oriented  may  be  conceived  as  a  transition  from  a  critique  of 
reason  to  a  critique  of  culture.  As  such,  it  would  suggest  a 
widening  of  the  scope  of  philosophic  concern  by  putting  the 
"transcendental  question"  beyond  science  to  other  types  of 
institutionalized  activities  which,  such  as  art,  language,  science, 
etc.,  actually  define  the  meaning  of  the  term  "culture."  And, 
thirdly,  we  shall  view  Cassirer's  inquiry  into  symbolic  forms  as 
a  study  of  the  basic  (intuitional  and  categorial)  forms  of  syn- 
thesis (space,  time,  cause,  number,  etc.)  and  their  characteristi- 
cally different  functioning  in  a  greater  variety  of  contexts  than 
was  considered  by  Kant.  If  presented  thus,  one  could  clarify  just 
what  type  of  metaphysics  would  be  both  possible  and  profitable 
within  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms. 


78  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

b.  The  Symbol-Concept.  Efistemological  considerations 

As  the  most  universal  concept  to  be  formulated  within  Cas- 
sirer's  philosophy,  the  symbol-concept  is  to  cover  "the  totality 
of  all  phenomena  which — in  whatever  form — exhibit  'sense  in 
the  senses'  (Sinnerjuellung  im  Sinnlichen)  and  in  which  some- 
thing 'sensuous'  (ein  Sinnliches)  is  represented  as  a  particular 
embodiment  of  a  'sense'  (Bedeutungy  meaning)."8  Here  a 
definition  of  the  symbol-concept  is  given  by  way  of  the  two 
terms  of  the  "sensuous"  on  one  hand  and  the  "sense"  (mean- 
ing) on  the  other,  and  a  relation  between  the  two,  which  is  most 
frequently  referred  to  as  "one  representing  the  other."  The 
extremely  general  character  of  this  pronouncement  must  be 
noted.  Cassirer's  claim  exceeds  by  far  what  has  ordinarily  been 
admitted  about  the  "symbolical  character"  of  knowledge.  Al- 
though not  all  philosophers  would  subscribe  to  the  idea  that 
all  knowledge  is  of  a  mediate  type,  it  could  perhaps  be  said  that 
to  the  extent  that  knowledge  is  taken  to  be  mediate,  it  may  also 
be  said  to  be  "symbolical"  by  virtue  of  its  dependence  upon 
(sets  or  systems  of)  signs  which  determine  the  discursive 
(linguistic  or  mathematical)  medium  within  which  it  is  attained. 
Whereas  the  history  of  ideas  discloses  a  varying  emphasis  put 
by  different  thinkers  upon  sometimes  one,  sometimes  another 
of  the  (symbolic)  media  to  be  trusted  for  the  grand  tour  to  the 
"really  real,"  it  also  appears  to  substantiate  Cassirer's  general 
formula,  according  to  which  all  knowledge — as  mediate — is 
defined  as  implying  (besides  an  interpretant,  mind,  Geisi) 
both:  the  given-ness  of  perceptual  signs  (sensuous  vehicles,  ein 
Sinnliches)  and  something  signified  (meaning,  Sinn).  But,  al- 
though Cassirer's  above  quoted  symbol-definition  would  indeed 
be  wide  enough  to  cover  such  area  of  considerable  agreement 
with  respect  to  the  symbolically  mediate  character  of  knowl- 
edge, note  that  it  formulates  no  restrictions  with  respect  to 
cognitive  discourse.  The  "representative"  relation  which  is 
asserted  to  hold  between  the  senses  and  the  sense  (mean- 
ing) is,  in  other  words,  not  taken  to  be  exhaustively  defined  by 

*PMlosopMe  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Vol.  Ill,  109.  To  be  abbreviated 
henceforth  as:  PSF. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  79 

grammatical,  logical,  or  mathematical  syntax-types,  which  de- 
termine the  conventional  forms  of  discourse  within  which 
knowledge  is  held  to  be  mediated.  Instead,  it  is  to  cover  "the 
whole  range  of  all  phenomena  within  which  there  is  sense  in 
the  senses,"  i.e.,  in  all  contexts  in  which  (e.g.,  on  the  expressive 
and  intuitional  levels)  experience  is  had  as  of  "characters" 
(persons)  and  "things"  in  space  and  time.  The  issue,  therefore, 
of  a  confrontation  by  "signs"  of  "facts,"  which  would  be 
germane  to  all  those  views  which  consider  essentially  the  dis- 
cursive dimension  of  symbol-situations,  cannot  even  come  up 
for  a  philosophy  according  to  which  "facts"  cannot  be  evidence 
for  (or  against)  "symbols,"  simply  because  their  very  "factu- 
ality"  is  not  considered  meaningful  outside  of  some  determinate 
symbolic  context.  The  objection,  therefore,  raised  by  many 
philosophers  against  scholasticism,  to  the  effect  that  the  latter 
replaced  the  consideration  of  facts  by  that  of  symbols  (names), 
need  not  invalidate  Cassirer's  position  for  which 

there  is  no  f actuality  ...  as  an  absolute  .  .  .  immutable  datum;  but 
what  we  call  a  fact  is  always  theoretically  oriented  in  some  way,  seen 
in  regard  to  some  .  .  .  context  and  implicitly  determined  thereby.  Theo- 
retical elements  do  not  somehow  become  added  to  a  'merely  factual,'  but 
they  enter  into  the  definition  of  the  factual  itself.9 

Once  the  "facts,"  the  state  of  affairs,  the  objects,  which  are 
designated  by  conventional  signs,  are  realized  as  themselves 
partaking  of  expressive  (qualitative)  and  perceptive  (intui- 
tional) "symbolisms"  of  their  own,  the  question  of  the  appli- 
cation of  symbols  to  facts  is  replaced  by  the  question  concerning 
the  "checking"of  one  symbol-context  by  another,  considered 
more  reliable  or  more  easily  institutable. 

In  this  connection,  a  brief  consideration  of  the  issue  of  con- 
firmation may  be  to  the  point.  In  Carnap's  version 

the  scientist  describes  his  own  observations  concerning  a  certain  planet 
in  a  report  Oi.  Further,  he  takes  into  consideration  a  theory  T,  con- 
cerning the  movements  of  planets  (also  laws  assumed  for  the  justifiable 
application  of  his  instruments.  C.H.).  From  Oi  and  T  the  astronomer 

9  PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  475.  See  also:  Substance  and  Function,  143. 


80  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

deduces  a  prediction;  he  calculates  the  apparent  position  of  the  planet  for 
the  next  night.  At  that  time,  he  will  make  a  new  observation  and  formu- 
late it  in  a  report  Oz.  Then  he  will  compare  the  prediction  P  with  Oa 
and  thereby  find  it  either  confirmed  or  not.10 

A  theoretical  symbolism,  in  other  words,  is  confirmed  when 
the  phenomena,  which  the  symbolism  predicts,  are  observed. 
Concededly,  however,  there  is  a  hypothetical  reference  to  con- 
text not  only  in  the  theory  to  be  confirmed  but  also  in  the  ob- 
servations which  do  the  confirming.  "All  observation  involves 
more  or  less  explicitly  the  element  of  hypothesis."11  On  the 
view  proposed  by  Cassirer,  to  say  that  a  theory  (in  combination 
with  statements  regarding  initial  conditions)  is  confirmed  by 
"observation"  would  not  require  recognition  of  and  recourse  to 
any  non-symbolic  factuality,  disclosed  to  the  senses  free  from 
all  elements  of  interpretation}  but  it  would,  instead,  be  equiva- 
lent to  saying  that  hypothetically  constructed  contexts  (theories 
regarding  the  orbit  of  a  planet)  would  be  confirmable  if  from 
it  certain  data  can  be  deduced  (its  position  at  a  certain  time) 
such  that,  by  appropriate  co-ordination  of  a  perceptual  context, 
what  are  defined  as  light-rays  in  one  context,  will  be  interpreted 
as  the  determinate  color  and  shape  of  a  "thing"  (planet)  in 
another.  Furthermore:  we  have  an  "interpretant"  with  his 
attendant  "perspectives,"  a  sign-signified  relation  on  both  the 
theoretical  and  the  observational  levels.  To  hold  that  the 
former  stands  in  need  of  confirmation  by  the  latter — and  not 
vice  versa — ,to  maintain  that  "the  scientific  criterion  of  objec- 
tivity rests  upon  the  possibility  of  occurrence  of  predicted  per- 
ceptions to  a  society  of  observers"  (ibid.,  5),  is  fully  intelligible 
within  the  provisions  of  Cassirer's  view  which  cannot  except  ob- 
servation from  a  symbolic  interpretation.  Whether  as  observa- 
tion of  pointer-readings  or  of  "things,"  the  "confirmatory" 
character  of  observation  does  not  depend  upon  its  confrontation 
by  non-symbolic  facts  of  symbolic  theories,  but  rather  upon  the 
easily  (almost  immediately)  institutable  and  shareable  nature 
of  the  perceptual  context  in  which  we  have  "facts"  and  to 

10  Rudolf  Carnap,  Foundations  of  Logic  and  Mathematics,  i. 

11  Victor  Lenzen :  Procedures  of  Empirical  Science,  4. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  81 

which  all  other  contexts  can  be  co-ordinated  in  varying  degrees 
of  explicitness. 

We  suggest,  therefore,  that  whereas  the  import  of  symbolic 
media  for  the  intelligibility  of  reality  is  certainly  not  a  new 
discovery  and  has  been  realized  by  philosophers  from  Plato  to 
Dewey,  the  thesis  that  a  symbolic  relation  obtains  for  any 
possible  (culturally  encounterable)  context  in  which  we  per- 
ceive or  observe  a  "world,"  expresses  what  is  most  distinctive  in 
Cassirer's  conception  of  philosophy. 

A  comparable  extension  of  the  philosophical  concern  beyond 
the  cognitive  to  other  types  of  signifying  and  modes  of  sign- 
usages  has  been  advocated  more  recently  by  positivistic  thinkers, 
who  are  intent  upon  establishing  a  more  secure  foundation  for 
the  discipline  of  semiotics.  Unfortunately,  Cassirer  himself 
nowhere  explicitly  differentiates  his  own  type  of  inquiry  from 
the  kind  of  sign-analyses  carried  on  by,  e.g.,  Carnap  and 
Morris.12  We  shall,  therefore,  briefly  consider  both  areas  of 
agreement  and  points  of  divergence  characteristic  of  the  two 
schools  of  thought  before  proceeding  to  examine  the  epistemo- 
logical  orientation  within  which  Cassirer's  own  philosophy  of 
symbolic  forms  is  developed. 

Note  that  Cassirer  could  well  agree  with  a  view  according 
to  which  "the  most  effective  characterization  of  a  sign  is  the 
following:  S  is  a  sign  of  D  for  I  to  the  degree  that  I  takes 
account  of  D  by  virtue  of  the  presence  of  S,"18  where  I  stands 
for  the  interpretant  of  a  sign,  D  for  what  is  designated,  and 
S  for  the  vehicle  (mark,  sound,  or  gesture)  by  means  of  which 
D  is  designated  to  I.  Yet,  although  the  proposal  to  understand 
sign-processes  as  "mediated-taking-accounts  of"  is  also  implied 
in  Cassirer's  conception  of  the  matter,  there  would  be  a  charac- 
teristic shift  of  terms.  Where  Morris,  e.g.,  has  his  "interpre- 
tant," Cassirer  would  speak  in  terms  of  "Bewusstsein"  or 
"Geist:"  "the  meaning  of  spirit  (Geist)  can  be  disclosed  only 
in  its  expression;  the  ideal  form  (what  is  designated)  comes  to 

"Rudolf  Carnap j  Foundations  of  Logic  and  Mathematics^  1939.  Charles  W. 
Morris,  Foundations  of  the  Theory  of  Signs,  1938$  and  Language ,  Signs  and 
Behavior,  1946. 

M  Charles  W.  Morris,  foundations  of  the  Theory  of  Signs,  4. 


82  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

be  known  only  in  and  with  the  system  of  sensible  signs  by 
means  of  which  it  is  expressed."14  Likewise,  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  sign-vehicle  (S)  and  the  designation  of  the  sign  (D) 
by  Cassirer  is  put  in  terms  of  a  correlation  alternatively  called 
"the  sign  and  the  signified,"  "the  particular  and  the  general," 
"the  sensuous  and  its  sense"  (das  Sinnliche  imd  sein  Sinn). 
There  is  agreement,  then,  on  this  basic  point:  for  anything  to  be 
a  sign  does  not  denote  a  property  characterizing  a  special  class 
of  objects,  but — speaking  in  the  material  mode — it  indicates 
that  it  participates  in  the  sign-process  as  a  whole  within  which 
it  "stands"  to  somebody  for  something,  or — in  the  formal  mode 
— that  it  can  be  defined  only  in  terms  of  a  three-term  relation 
of  the  form  "I-S-D,"  where  "I"  designates  the  "taking- 
account-of,"  "S"  the  mediators  of  the  "taking-account-of,"  and 
"D"  what  is  taken  account  of.  In  Cassirer  Js  language:  "The  act 
of  the  conceptual  determination  of  what  is  designated  (ernes 
Inhalts)  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  act  of  its  fixation  by  some 
characteristic  sign.  Thus,  all  truly  concise  and  exacting  thought 
is  secured  in  the  'SymboUk*  and  'Semiotik*  which  support  it."15 
For  a  correct  understanding  of  Cassirer's  position  all  depends 
here  upon  the  interpretation  we  put  upon  this  metaphor  of  "the 
sign  and  the  signified  going  hand  in  hand."  For  Morris,  mani- 
festly, the  relationship  suggested  is  one  interchangeably  alluded 
to  as  one  of  signs  "indicating,"  "announcing,"  or  "suggesting" 
the  presence  of  whatever  they  denote,  designate,  or  signify. 
For  Cassirer,  on  the  other  hand,  HusserPs  dictum  in  the  matter 
holds:  "Das  Bedeuten  ist  nicht  eine  Art  des  Zeichen-Seins  im 
Sinne  der  Anzeige"  (To  signify  is  not  a  way  of  being  a  sign  in 
the  sense  of  being  an  indication.)18  The  indicative  function  of 
signs,  upon  the  broad  basis  of  which  Morris  attempts  to  sketch 
the  foundations  of  a  semiotic,  is  accordingly  of  just  the  kind 
that  Cassirer  would  have  to  consider  as  inadequate  for  an  under- 
standing of  the  symbolic  function  properly  speaking.  In  the 
formulation  of  this  distinction  by  Susanne  Langer:  "The  funda- 
mental difference  between  signs  and  symbols  is  this  difference 

"PSF,  Vol.  I,  1 8. 
MP£F,Vol.  I,  1 8. 
16  Edmund  Husserl,  Logische  Untersuchungen,  Vol.  II,  23. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  83 

of  association,  and  consequently  of  their  use  by  the  third  party  to 
the  meaning  function,  the  subject:  signs  announce  their  objects 
to  him,  whereas  symbols  lead  him  to  conceive  their  objects."17 
Against  this  establishment  of  a  "fundamental"  difference, 
Morris  has  advanced  the  objection  that  too  much  is  made  of 
what  essentially  seems  to  amount  to  a  mere  difference  of  degree. 

A  symbol  is  on  the  whole  a  less  reliable  sign  than  is  a  sign  (that  is  a 
signal)  .  .  .  (the  latter)  being  more  closely  connected  with  external 
relations  in  the  environment  is  more  quickly  subject  to  correction  by  the 
environment.  .  ,  .  But,  since  signals  too  have  varying  degrees  of  re- 
liability, the  difference  remains  one  of  degree.18 

Now,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  one  agrees  with  Morris 
that  environmental  correction  in  the  case  of  signals  is  in  all 
contexts  more  reliable  than  purely  symbolic  procedures  such  as 
provided,  e.g.,  by  derivations  or  calculations,  one  need  not  argue 
that,  once  the  behavioristic  approach  is  taken  with  regard  to  both 
signs  and  symbols,  they  may  indeed  be  considered  as  compara- 
ble— and  not  fundamentally  distinct — means  through  which 
behavior  may  be  informed  in  different  degrees  of  reliability.  To 
take  signs  as  related  to  dispositions  of  behavior  is  to  be  primarily 
interested  in  the  modes  in  which  they  come  to  inform,  incite, 
appraise,  or  direct  action.  To  emphasize  signs  in  their  symbolic 
use  is  to  inquire  not  so  much  into  what  they  "announce,"  "ap- 
praise," etc.,  but  into  their  "meaning,"  the  "domain  of  objec- 
tivity" they  appear  to  condition.  An  inquiry  into  the  symbolic 
function  of  signs,  as  Cassirer  puts  it, 

is  not  concerned  with  what  we  see  in  a  certain  perspective,  but  (with) 
the  perspective  itself  ...  [so  that]  the  special  symbolic  forms  are  not 
imitations,  but  organs  of  reality,  since  it  is  solely  by  their  agency  that 
anything  real  becomes  an  object  for  intellectual  apprehension  and  as 
such  is  made  visible  to  us.  The  question  as  to  what  reality  is  apart  from 
these  forms,  and  what  are  its  independent  attributes,  becomes  irrelevant 
here.19 

Cassirer  insists,  in  other  words,  that  the  truly  symbolic  (the 

17  Susanne  K.  Langer,  Philosophy  in  a  New  Key,  61. 

18  Charles  W.  Morris,  Signs,  Language  and  Behavior >  50. 

19  Language  and  Myth,  translated  by  S.  Langer,  8. 


84  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

properly  "significative")  meaning  of  sign- functions  cannot  be 
looked  for  in  the  indicative  office  performed  by  them,  but  refers 
to  their  role  as  "organs  of  reality"  as  which  they  are  said  to 
"bring  about"  (condition)  what  is  meant  by  an  "object"  in  the 
various  universes  of  discourse,  intuition,  and  expression. 

In  accordance  with  three  senses  in  which  the  symbolic-form 
concept  is  used  (see  above),  to  say  that  "the  symbolic  forms 
are  . . .  organs  of  reality"  would  be  equivalent  to  the  following 
three  expressions  of  the  thesis: 

1 i )  No  meaning  can  be  assigned  to  any  object  outside  the  cul- 
tural (mythical,  artistic,  common-sensical,  scientific)  contexts 
in  which  it  is  apprehended,  understood,  or  known. 

(2)  No  meaning  can  be  assigned  to  any  object  except  in  refer- 
ence to  the  pervasive  symbolic-relation  types  of  space,  time, 
cause  and  number  which  "constitute"  objectivity  in  all  domains, 
with  the  modifications  characteristic  of  the  media  listed  under 

<'>• 

(3)  No  meaning  can  be  assigned  to  any  object  without,  in 
whatever  form,  assuming  a  representative  relationship — ex- 
pressed in  the  symbol-concept — which,  abstractable  from  any 
context,  would  be  said  to  hold  between  given  "sensuous" 
moments,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  (in  principle)  non-senuous 
"sense"  moment,  on  the  other. 

How,  we  must  ask  now,  is  both  the  pervasiveness  and  the 
objectifying  office  of  the  symbolic- form  concept  to  be  demon- 
strated? Keeping  Cassirer's  Kantian  orientation  in  mind,  it  will 
follow  that  his  inquiry  into  the  objectifying  pervasiveness  of 
symbols  cannot  properly  be  expected  to  point  to  or  to  discover 
facts  or  activities  hitherto  unknown  or  inaccessible  to  either  the 
sciences  or  such  other  culturally  extant  types  of  experience- 
accounting  as  religion,  myths,  the  arts.  Kant,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, set  out  to  clarify  his  "misunderstood"  Kritik  by 
demonstrating  in  the  Prolegomena  that  neither  mathematics 
nor  the  physical  sciences  would  be  "possible"  unless  the  pure 
forms  of  intuition  and  certain  categorial  determinations  were 
presupposed  as  valid  for  all  experience.  Analogously,  Cassirer 
maintains  that  the  symbol-concept  must  be  taken  as  just  as 
pervasive  as  are,  in  fact,  the  sciences,  arts,  myths,  and  languages 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  85 

of  common  sense,  all  of  which  may  be  conceived  as  employing 
symbols  in  their  respective  experience-accountings.  To  say, 
furthermore,  that  symbols  "objectify"  would,  on  this  interpre- 
tation, mean  nothing  else  than  that  these  various  domains 
themselves,  in  their  symbolic  evaluation  of  the  perceptive  data 
to  which  they  apply,  furnish  the  only  contexts  within  which 
one  can  meaningfully  speak  of  any  kind  of  "objectivity."  There 
is,  in  other  words,  no  point  in  producing  examples  to  illustrate 
what  exactly  Cassirer  means  when  he  credits  symbols  with 
"bringing  about"  rather  than  merely  "indicating"  objects, 
simply  because  all  sciences,  arts,  myths,  etc.  would  have  to  be 
taken  as  illustrating  this  general  contention.  We  must  distin- 
guish here  two  aspects  of  this  contention:  (i)  That  all  the 
above-listed  "domains  of  objectivity"  do  indeed  presuppose 
the  employment  of  symbols,  and  (2)  That  there  is  no  objec- 
tivity outside  the  contexts  established  by  these  various  domains. 
As  regards  the  latter  aspect,  its  acceptance  follows  from 
Cassirer's  endorsement  of  what  he  took  to  be  Kant's  trans- 
cendental method.  Could  Kant  prove  the  adequacy  of  this 
method  by  the  use  he  made  of  it  with  respect  to  "experience  as 
science?"  The  answer  may  be  in  the  affirmative,  if  one  keeps  in 
mind  the  state  of  the  mathematical  and  physical  disciplines  with 
which  he  was  familiar.  As  a  contemporary  writer  has  put  it:  "In 
relation  to  his  information  Kant's  intuition  of  Euclid's  axioms 
is  unobjectionable.  .  .  .  Without  the  aid  of  Einstein's  conception 
of  a  curved  physical  space,  we  should  not  conclude  that  Kant 
is  altogether  wrong."20  The  answer  may  be  in  the  negative,  if 
one  considers  that  Kant  presented  his  "forms"  of  intuition  and 
understanding  as  immutable  human  faculties,  and  took  them  to 
be  as  final  as  Aristotelian  logic,  Euclidean  geometry,  and  New- 
tonian physics  were  thought  to  be  necessary.  But,  whatever  be 
one's  evaluation  of  Kant's  position,  this  much  of  it  is  never 
questioned  by  Cassirer,  namely  that  the  determinateness  with 
which  we  experience  the  "objective"  world  is  never  passively 
received  ab  extra,  but  that  it  is,  in  principle,  analyzable  as 
"conditioned"  by  acts  of  synthesizing  the  manifold  given  in  per- 

20  Andrew  P.  Ushenko,  Power  and  Events,  xv. 


86  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

ception.  What  Kant  had  maintained  was  that  there  can  be  no 
objectivity  in  the  physical  sense  without  assumption  of  the 
synthesizing  forms  laid  down  by  the  Transcendental  Analytic. 
This  point  is  generalized  by  Cassirer  to  include  other  than 
physical  domains,  to  be  accounted  for  by  types  of  synthesis 
other  than  those  listed  in  the  first  Kritik.  That  aspect  of  Cas- 
sirer's  general  contention,  then,  according  to  which  there  can 
be  no  objectivity  outside  the  contexts  established  by  the  sciences, 
arts,  myths,  etc.,  instead  of  being  explicitly  demonstrated, 
constitutes  his  basic  philosophical  commitment  to  Kant's  view- 
point. 

Regarding  the  other  aspect  of  his  thesis,  viz.,  that  all  the 
contexts  within  which  such  objectivity  is  encountered,  are  to 
be  taken  as  sign-systems,  in  so  far  as  all  of  them  imply  specific 
evaluations  of  the  "same"  sensory  data,  on  what  evidence  are 
we  to  accept  it?  Or  better:  what  sort  of  evidence  is  possible  for 
this  contention  within  the  commitment  to  Kant's  position  as 
indicated?  With  respect  to  Kant's  inquiry  it  is  maintained  by 
Cassirer  that  he  aimed  to  develop  the  epistemological  conse- 
quences from  the  facts  of  the  sciences  with  which  he  was  fa- 
miliar. It  was  their  actual  employment  of  "judgments"  both 
related  to  experience  (synthetic)  and  yet  necessary  (a  priori) 
which  seemed  to  Kant  to  demand  a  revision  of  both  the 
empiricist  and  the  rationalist  pronouncements  with  respect  to 
the  character  of  human  knowledge.  In  the  stage  at  which  he 
analyzed  it,  it  could  be  said  that  his  analysis  was  adequate  for 
science  as  he  knew  it.  Kant,  in  other  words,  was  not  concerned 
with  adducing  evidence  that  there  are  synthetic  judgments  a 
priori — the  evidence  for  their  actual  employment  being  taken 
to  issue  from  an  impartial  examination  of  the  sciences  them- 
selves. It  was  but  their  "possibility"  that  Kant  felt  had  to  be 
accounted  for  by  making  those  necessary  presuppositions  about 
human  cognition  through  mediation  of  which  science — as  a  re- 
sult of  the  activation  of  that  cognition — would  become  intelligi- 
ble. Consequently,  these  presuppositions,  the  forms  of  intuition 
and  understanding,  are  not  the  evidence  from  which  the  syn- 
thetic a  priori  judgments  of  the  scientist  are  thought  to  be 
derivable,  but  the  sciences  themselves  are  taken  as  the  evidence 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  87 

that  justifies  and  postulates  the  epistemological  characterization 
of  the  "mind"  with  which  the  first  Kritik  is  concerned. 

This  brief  reminder  serves  to  explain  Cassirer's  analogous 
conviction  that  his  theory  of  the  symbolically-mediate  character 
of  reality,  far  from  standing  in  need  of  ingenious  philosophical 
demonstrations,  merely  formulates,  on  a  level  of  highest  gen- 
erality, a  semiotic  function  which,  in  various  modifications,  is 
assumed  as  a  matter  of  fact  by  all  who,  within  the  legitimate 
contexts  of  their  respective  branches  of  investigation,  inquire 
into  the  nature  of  physical,  artistic,  religious,  and  perceptual 
"objects."  A  re-examination  of  this  evidence  in  the  light  of 
more  recent  developments  in  the  mathematical,  physical,  psy- 
chological, linguistic,  religious  and  anthropological  researches 
considered  by  Cassirer,  would  be  both  surpassing  the  compe- 
tency of  one  inquirer  and  not  be  to  the  immediate  purpose. 

For  the  remainder  of  this  section,  it  will  be  our  chief  concern 
to  elucidate  how  the  symbol-concept  must  be  understood  in 
order  to  warrant  the  universal  use  and  significance  which 
Cassirer  attributes  to  it.  Before  proceeding  to  this  task,  however, 
note  that — rightfully  or  not — Cassirer  did  take  for  granted  its 
actual  employment,  not  just  in  the  analysis  of  the  various 
disciplines,  but  in  the  very  construction  of  the  domains  to  which 
these  analyses  refer.  In  support  of  this  contention,  we  point  to 
the  following: 

(i)  Early  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Philosofhie  der  sym- 
bolischen  Formeny  where  Cassirer  prepares  for  the  introduction 
of  the  symbolic-form  concept,  he  raises  the  question  ".  .  . 
whether  there  is  indeed  for  the  manifold  directions  of  the 
spirit ...  a  mediating  function,  and  whether,  if  so,  this  function 
has  any  typical  characteristics  by  means  of  which  it  can  be 
known  and  described."21  Yet,  although  it  is  a  foregone  con- 
clusion that  such  a  "mediating  function"  must  be  ascribed  to 
the  symbol-concept,  Cassirer,  instead  of  presenting  specific 
arguments  for  this  core  idea,  immediately  goes  on  to  say:  "We 
go  back  for  an  answer  to  this  question  to  the  symbol-concept  as 
Heinrich  Herz  has  postulated  and  characterized  it  from  the 
point  of  view  of  physical  knowledge."  (ibid.)  As  soon  as  the 

11  PSF,  Vol.  1, 1 6. 


88  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

question  is  raised,  in  other  words,  whether  there  is  a  function 
both  more  general  and  flexible  than,  e.g.,  the  concepts  of 
"spirit"  and  "reason,"  elaborated  by  traditional  philosophy,  the 
answer,  in  the  form  of  the  proposed  symbol-concept,  is  not 
argued  for  at  all  but  is  presented  as  being  actually  effective  and 
recognized  as  such  by  Herz  with  respect  to  physical  science, 
and  such  other  thinkers  as  Hilbert  (mathematical  logic),  Hum- 
boldt  (comparative  linguistics),  Helmholtz  (physiological 
optics),  and  Herder  (religion  and  poetry). 

(2)  In  1936,  the  Swedish  philosopher  Konrad  Marc-Wogau 
had  commented  upon  certain  difficulties  he  found  inherent  in 
Cassirer's  various  versions  of  the  symbol-concept.  In  a  re- 
joinder to  these  objections,  Cassirer  makes  this  very  character- 
istic statement:  "In  his  criticism,  Marc-Wogau  seems  to  have 
overlooked  this  one  point,  namely  that  the  reflections  to  which 
he  objects,  are  in  no  way  founded  upon  purely  speculative  con- 
siderations but  that  they  are  actually  related  to  specific,  concrete 
problems  and  to  concrete  matters  of  fact."22  It  is  significant  that, 
here  again,  where  the  "logic  of  the  symbol-concept"  has  been 
challenged,  Cassirer  makes  no  attempt  to  take  up  his  critic's 
suggestions  on  the  same  analytical  level  on  which  they  were 
made,  but,  instead,  goes  on  to  cite  a  variety  of  instances  (drawn 
from  psychology,  linguistics,  mathematics,  and  physics)  for 
which  outstanding  representatives  have  emphasized  the  sym- 
bolical character  of  their  respective  subject-matters. 

Strange  as  this  attitude  may  appear  to  those  who  would  ex- 
pect an  original  philosophy  to  develop  and  reason  from  its  own 
axioms,  it  is  only  consistent  in  the  light  of  the  above-mentioned 
transcendental  orientation  in  which  Cassirer  read  and  accepted 
Kant.  The  thesis,  accordingly,  that  the  mind  (Bewusstsein, 
Geist)  is  symbolically  active  in  the  construction  of  all  its  uni- 
verses of  perception  and  discourse  is  not  suggested  as  a  dis- 
covery to  be  made  by  or  to  be  grounded  upon  specifically  philo- 
sophical arguments.  Instead  of  presupposing  insights  different 
from  and  requiring  cognitive  powers  or  techniques  superior  to 
those  accessible  to  empirical  science,  the  thesis  is  developed  as 

iat   (Tidskrift  for  Filosofi  och  Psykologi.)  II,  158. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  89 

issuing  from  an  impartial  reading  of  the  scientific  evidence  in  all 
branches  of  investigation. 

Certain  difficulties  about  such  a  position  could  perhaps  be 
felt  from  the  outset.  It  may  be  questioned,  for  instance,  whether 
scientific  situations  could  be  encountered  at  any  time  which 
would  give  univocal  testimony  to  the  symbolically-mediate 
character  of  both  their  methods  and  their  subject-matters.  One 
may  also  wonder  whether  the  scientific  crown-witnesses  (on 
whom  Cassirer  relies  so  heavily),  when  reflecting  upon  the 
symbolic  nature  of  their  domains,  do  so  qua  scientists,  or 
whether,  when  so  reflecting,  they  must  be  considered  philo- 
sophical rather  than  scientific  spokesmen  for  their  disciplines. 
Finally,  a  philosophy  resting  its  case  squarely  on  the  evidence  of 
not  just  one  (especially  reliable)  science,  but  of  all  the  sciences 
— including  all  religious  and  imaginative  sense-making  as 
within  the  province  of  what  Cassirer  calls  "Kulturwissen- 
schajten" — seems  dangerously  committed  to  generalize  upon 
enterprises  notorious  for  their  proneness  to  scrap  both  their  own 
theories  and  attendant  philosophical  explanations  of  their 
theories. 

Considerations  of  this  type  need  not  be  fatal,  however,  to 
a  philosophy  thus  far  considered.  A  philosophical  reading  of 
the  evidence  of  the  sciences  will  indeed  not  face  "univocal  situa- 
tions." Nor  will  such  situations  be  encountered  within  any 
other  inquiry.  The  cognitive  enterprise,  whether  in  the  form 
of  large  philosophical  generalizations,  or  of  the  more  readily 
controlled  scientific  generalizations,  is  admittedly  guided  by 
hypotheses  and  thus  does  imply  decisions  with  respect  to  the  data 
that  are  considered  relevant  for  their  respective  generalizations. 
The  further  contention  that  the  methodological  testimony  of 
the  scientists  cannot  be  credited  with  the  same  respectability  as 
his  methodological  effectiveness  also  need  not  be  damaging  to  a 
philosophy  whose  center  of  gravity  is  determined  by  the  scien- 
tist's findings.  Any  philosophy,  one  could  say,  which  is  pro- 
posed as  a  critique  and  mediation  of  symbolisms,  must  obviously 
do  justice  to  the  most  reliably  constructed  symbol-systems  of 
the  sciences  and,  in  doing  that,  it  can  hardly  afford  to  disregard 
the  statements  on  method  merely  because  they  come  from  some- 


90  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

body  who  employs  them  successfully.  At  any  rate,  an  adequate 
interpretation  of  the  scientific  symbolisms  always  requires  atten- 
tion to  both  the  factual  and  the  (methodo-)  logical  subject- 
matters,  and  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  Qrima  -facie  evidence 
why  the  method-conscious  scientist  is  to  be  trusted  less  in  this 
connection  than  the  science-versed  philosopher.  The  objection, 
finally,  that  any  philosophy  whose  ambition  it  is  to  bring  into 
conformity  its  account  of  "reality"  with  the  latest  results  of 
the  sciences  is  doomed  to  "eternalize"  highly  contingent 
validity-claims,  need  likewise  not  endanger  the  position  taken 
by  Cassirer.  It  would  be  the  alternative  to  the  self-corrective 
character  of  the  evidence  trusted  by  him  that  would  be  fatal  to 
any  philosophy.  The  ambition  to  make  final  pronouncements, 
to  issue  once-and-for-all  "truths/'  is  certainly  not  germane  to  a 
thought-system  which,  by  Kantian  orientation,  is  not  straining 
to  lay  hold  upon  a  final  reality-structure,  but  which  is  advanced 
frankly  as  an  attempt  to  discharge  the  "culture-mission"  of 
mediating  the  reality-accounts  offered  by  the  various  cultural 
disciplines. 

We  must  conclude  therefore:  the  thesis  that  all  contexts  (in 
which  we — objectively — have  a  world,  structure,  domain  of 
reality)  may  be  analyzed  as  differently  oriented  symbolic  evalu- 
ations of  the  perceptive  data,  is  offered  as  evidenced  by  all  the 
inquiries  made  of  these  contexts.  As  such,  the  thesis  is  sug- 
gested as  a  generalization  upon  the  pervasive  features  of  the 
artistic,  religious,  and  scientific  domains,  guided  by  Kant's 
transcendental  hypothesis  that  the  pervasive  features  of  all 
experience  cannot  be  prior  to  and  independent  of  the  synthesiz- 
ing activities  of  a  symbol-minded  consciousness  which  has  and 
reflects  upon  them. 

What  Cassirer  never  tires  of  attributing  to  Kant  is  the  latter's 
"Revolution  der  Denkarty"  by  which  philosophers  were  freed 
from  having  to  attain  a  reality  more  profound  (or  more  im- 
mediate) than  the  only  one  given  in  experience,  either  as  en- 
countered or  as  reflected  upon  by  the  only  valid  methods  of 
scientific  synthesizing.  Instead  of  undertaking — in  the  fashion 
of  ontological  metaphysics — to  determine  fixed  traits  of  being, 
the  transcendental  method  would  bid  us  to  examine  the  types 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  91 

of  judgments  which  logically  condition  whatever  may  validly 
be  asserted  as  "objective."  The  "objectivity,"  however,  with 
which  the  first  Kritik  furnishes  us,  actually  turns  out  to  be  an 
exclusively  "physical"  one.  The  transcendental  method,  as  used 
in  the  Kritik,  has  not  provided  us — Cassirer  thinks — with  the 
clue  for  "Objektivitat  uberhauyt"  but  specifically  with  just 
one  type  of  objectivity,  viz.,  the  one  that  may  be  formulated 
within  the  system  of  principles  constitutive  of  Newtonian 
physics.23 

In  brief:  what  Cassirer  accepts  of  Kant  is  the  transcendental 
method  which,  instead  of  revealing  immutable  structures  of 
Being,  inquires  into  the  culturally  given  "fact"  of  science  and, 
"being  concerned  not  with  objects  but  with  our  mode  of  know- 
ing objects,"24  makes  for  a  more  flexible  analysis  of  experience 
by  allowing  for  different  types  of  "objectivity,"  comprehended 
as  corresponding  to  different  "modes  of  knowing."  In  Cassirer's 
version:  "The  decisive  question  is  always  whether  we  attempt  to 
understand  function  in  terms  of  structure  or  vice  versa. . , .  The 
basic  principle  of  all  critical  thinking — the  principle  of  the  pri- 
macy of  the  function  before  the  object — assumes  a  new  form  in 
each  discipline  and  requires  a  new  foundation."28  Cassirer's 
position  implies  both  an  acceptance  of  Kant's  methodological 
strictures  and  a  demand  for  a  wider  application  of  the  "critical 
method."  More  specifically:  Kant's  method  was  to  limit  the 
philosopher's  concern  to  an  elucidation  of  the  mode  of  knowing 
governing  "reality"  as  scientifically  accessible.  It  was,  in  conse- 
quence, to  deny  him  the  right  of  engaging  in  ontological  pur- 
suits, i.e.,  to  discover  or  construct  "realities,"  offered  as  "meta- 
physical," apprehension  of  which  would  involve  an  employment 
of  cognitive  powers  superior  to  those  certified  by  the  first 
Kritik  as  "constitutive"  of  (or  regulative  for)  experience,  i.e., 
of  science  as  the  only  legitimate  inquiry  through  which  the 
permanent  structure  of  this  experience  may  be  known. 

23  We  are  concerned  here  merely  with  Kant's  attempt  to  formulate  his  "Grund- 
satze"  in  conformity  with  Newtonian  physics,  not  with  the  success  of  this  attempt. 
On  this  point,  see  A.  Pap:  The  Afriori  in  Physical  Theory,  Pt.  II.  King's  Crown 
Press,  1946. 

a<  Immanuel  Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  "Einleitung,"  Par.  VII. 


92  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

If  then  the  philosopher — qua  cognitor,  not  qua  moralizer — 
was  to  be  restricted  to  an  examination  of  the  source,  scope  and 
validity  of  the  "mode  of  knowing"  that  makes  possible  experi- 
ence as  science,  or  if,  in  Cassirer's  extended  version,  he  is  to  be 
restricted  to  an  examination  of  all  the  various  modes  of  knowing 
and  comprehending  that  make  possible  experience,  however 
structured  (as  science,  or  myth,  art,  religion,  or  common  sense), 
the  issue  of  highest  philosophical  universality  will  logically  arise 
as  one  of  attempting  to  reduce  the  variety  of  such  distinguish- 
able modes  to  so  many  comparable  instances  of  one  fundamental 
function.  And  such  a  function  would  at  once  have  to  be  general 
enough  to  characterize  all  modes  of  knowing  and  comprehend- 
ing through  which  experience  is  realized  as  structured,  and  yet 
permit  of  all  the  differentiations  that  specifically  modify  the 
various  cultural  media  for  which  it  must  account.  Now,  it  is 
Cassirer's  contention  that,  historically,  philosophy  both  aimed 
and  fell  short  of  elaborating  principles  of  such  high  generality 
that  would,  on  the  one  hand,  be  valid  for  all  domains  and,  on 
the  other,  be  susceptible  of  modifications  characteristic  of  the 
specific  differences  distinguishing  these  domains.  Before  turning 
to  a  closer  examination  of  the  symbol-concept  which,  Cassirer 
believes,  satisfies  the  requirements  of  such  a  universal  yet 
modifiable  function,  it  is  significant  to  note  here  that  Cassirer 
conceives  of  his  own  efforts  as  within  the  general  direction  of 
what  philosophers,  with  varying  degrees  of  awareness  and  suc- 
cess, have  always  striven  for.  In  this  connection,  Cassirer  has 
spoken  of  both  the  "culture-mission"  of  philosophy  and  the 
"antinomies  of  the  culture-concept."  By  the  latter,  reference  is 
made  to  the  characteristic  conflicts  that  arise  as  the  various 
cultural  media  of  religion,,  art,  language,  and  science  tend  to  set 
off  their  special  domains  by  claiming  superiority  of  insight  for 
their  respective  perspectives.  Thus,  although  the  first  cosmo- 
logical  and  physical  scientists  everywhere  started  out  from  the 
distinctions  and  discriminations  made  by  common  sense  and 
reflected  by  language,  they  soon  opposed  to  this  basic  fund  of 
accumulated  knowledge  specifically  new  principles  of  division, 
a  new  "logos33  from  the  vantage-point  of  which  all  non-scientific 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  93 

knowledge  appeared  as  a  mere  distortion  of  "the  truth. "  Simil- 
arly, while  both  art  and  religion  in  their  early  stages  developed 
closely  together,  if  not  at  times  in  actual  interpenetration, 
further  development  of  these  two  cultural  media  resulted  in 
either  of  them  claiming  superior  vision  and  closer  approxima- 
tion to  the  "really  real"  as  over  against  the  other.  Instead  of 
contenting  themselves  with  the  specific  insights  which  they 
afford,  the  various  cultural  disciplines  tend — Cassirer  points  out 
— to  impose  the  characteristic  form  of  their  interpretation  upon 
the  totality  of  being,  and  it  is  from  this  tendency  towards  the 
"absolute,"  inherent  in  each  one  of  them,  that  there  issue  the  con- 
flicts that  Cassirer  considers  "antinominal"  within  the  culture- 
concept.  Yet,  although  it  is  in  intellectual  conflicts  of  this  type 
that  one  would  expect  philosophy,  as  a  reflection  on  the  highest 
level  of  universality,  to  mediate  among  the  various  claims,  the 
different  "dogmatic  systems  of  metaphysics  satisfy  this  expecta- 
tion and  demand  only  imperfectly}  they  themselves  are  im- 
mersed in  this  struggle  and  do  not  stand  above  it."26  Upon 
analysis,  it  is  suggested,  most  philosophical  systems  turn  out 
to  be  merely  so  many  hypostatizations  of  a  particular  logical, 
ethical,  esthetical,  or  religious  orientation. 

We  have  briefly  adduced  these  considerations  because  it  is 
against  their  background  that  one  can  understand  the  impor- 
tance Cassirer  attributes  to  his  own  "philosophy  of  symbolic 
forms,"  which  is  presented  as  having  a  chance  of  succeeding 
where  all  former  "systems"  could  only  failj  not  in  the  sense, 
to  be  sure,  that  it  holds  the  key  to  all  the  problems  that  have  or 
will  come  up,  but  in  the  sense,  nevertheless,  that  with  the 
symbol-concept  it  puts  at  the  philosopher's  disposal  an  intel- 
lectual instrument  of  greatest  universality  and  modifiability.  As 
such,  it  is  commended  as  impartially  comprehending  all  "do- 
mains of  reality"  as  of  a  determinable,  symbolically-mediate 
type  for  which  philosophical  analysis  may  indicate  their  specific 
modalities  of  sign-functioning,  instead  of  super-imposing  one 
privileged  modality  of  meaning  (logical,  esthetic,  ethical,  etc.) 
with  respect  to  which  all  other  "visions"  are  reduced  to  mere 

*PSF,VoL  I,  13. 


94  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

approximations  and  appearances   (at  best),  or  illusions   (at 
worst). 

c.  Exposition  of  the  Symbol-Concept 

We  have  considered  so  far  the  epistemological  setting  within 
which  Cassirer's  thesis  is  developed.  We  have  listed  what,  we 
believe,  represent  three  essentially  distinct  senses  in  which  the 
symbolic-form  concept  is  employed,  and  we  have  contrasted  it 
from  both  the  usually  agreed  upon  view,  according  to  which 
knowledge-as-mediate  is  indeed  taken  as  "symbolical,"  and 
from  the  more  current  behavioristic  position,  according  to  which 
the  pervasive  character  of  sign-situations  is  interpretable  as  in- 
volving objects  which — as  signs — indicate  the  presence  (or  the 
conditions  for  the  realization  of  the  presence)  of  other  objects- 
as-signified.  We  have  then  attempted  to  render  meaningful 
Cassirer's  contradistinction  from  this  position  by  stressing  that 
his  concern  is  with  symbols,  taken  not  as  "indications"  but  as 
"organs  of  reality."  Interpreting  "organs  of  reality"  in  a  sense 
termed  "transcendental"  by  Kant,  we  could  say  that  Cassirer's 
type  of  inquiry  constitutes  a  most  erudite  attempt  to  provide 
evidence  for  the  thesis  that  no  empirical  "reality"  (objectivity, 
structure)  can  be  meaningfully  referred  to  except  under  the 
implicit  presupposition  of  the  symbolic  (constitutive)  "forms" 
of  space,  time,  cause,  number,  etc.  and  the  symbolic  (cultural) 
"forms"  of  myth,  common  sense  (language),  art,  and  science, 
which  furnish  the  contexts  (Sinnzusammenhange)  within  which 
alone  "reality"  is  both  encounterable  and  accountable. 

We  must  now  examine  more  closely  exactly  what  is  asserted 
when  it  is  said  of  the  constitutive  and  cultural  "forms"  which 
condition  "reality,"  however  accounted,  that  they  are  "sym- 
bolical." For  this  purpose,  let  us  go  back  to  the  already  stated 
definition  of  the  symbol-concept,  according  to  which  "it  is  to 
cover  the  totality  of  all  those  phenomena  which  exhibit  in  what- 
ever form  'sense  in  the  senses'  (Sinnerfiillung  im  Sinnlicheri) 
and  all  contexts  in  which  something  'sensuous* — by  being  what 
it  is  (in  der  Art  seines  Da-Seins  und  So-Seins} — is  represented 
as  a  particular  embodiment  as  a  manifestation  and  incarnation 
of  a  meaning."27  According  to  this  passage,  the  symbol-concept 

"PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  109. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  95 

would  apply  to  all  contexts  in  which  a  "sensuous"  moment  may 
be  distinguished  from  a  "sense"  moment,  with  the  proviso 
that  a  relation  holds  with  respect  to  these  two  terms  which  is 
most  frequently  referred  to  as  "one  representing  the  other." 
For  Cassirer  (as  for  most  other  philosophers)  the  term  "senses" 
covers  all  perceptual  cues  which — such  as  colors,  sounds,  etc. — 
suffice  to  act  as  vehicles  for  any  and  all  meaning,  where  "mean- 
ing" covers  all  the  embodiments  to  which  the  senses  are  amen- 
able as  related  to  an  interpreter  of  these  cues,  i.e.,  to  the  full 
complexity  of  perspectives  which  the  term  "interpreter"  (Gei$ty 
Bewusstsein)  suggests.  To  realize  yet  more  distinctly  what  both 
the  "senses"  and  the  "sense"  (meaning)  connote  in  this  defini- 
tion, we  must  attempt  further  to  clarify  the  relation  that  is  sup- 
posed to  hold  between  the  two  terms,  if  they  are  to  function 
symbolically.  This  relation,  we  suggest,  is  taken  by  Cassirer 
both  in  a  polar  and  a  correlative  sense. 

( i )  The  polarity  of  "sense"  and  "senses." 

Stressing  the  polarity  of  this  relation,  Cassirer  states  suc- 
cinctly that  "the  symbolic  function  is  composed  of  moments 
which  are  different  in  principle.  No  genuine  meaning  (Sinn)  as 
such  is  simple,  but  it  is  one  and  double — and  this  polarity,  which 
is  intrinsic  to  it,  does  not  tear  it  asunder  and  destroy  it,  but 
instead  represents  its  proper  function."28 

This  function,  we  may  say,  establishes  a  relation  between  the 
"senses" — as  signs — and  the  "sense" — as  signified  by  them — in 
such  a  way  that  these  two  terms  must  be  conceived  as  polar, 
opposite  and  (potentially,  if  not  actually)  distinguishable  from 
each  other.  This  polar  distinction  of  the  two  symbol-moments, 
as  maintained  by  Cassirer,  can  be  read  from  a  variety  of  pro- 
nouncements made  by  him  apropos  the  three  modal  forms, 
termed  respectively:  the  expression-function  (Ausdrucksfank- 
tiori)\  the  intuition-function  (Anschauungsjunktion)  and  the 
and  the  conceptual-function  (reine  Bedeutungsjunktion).  Space 
forbids  even  a  selective  reproduction  of  the  illustrative  material 
offered  by  Cassirer.  The  gist  of  the  matter  will  be  intelligible, 
however,  if  the  following  points  are  kept  in  mind. 

*PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  1 10. 


96  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

a.  If  the  representative  relation  between  the  senses  and  their 
sense  is  of  an  expressive  type  (of  which  myth,  art,  and  the  reali- 
zation of  "persons"  are  taken  as  instances),  "reality"  is  had  as 
a  universe  of  "characters,"  with  all  events  in  it  having  physiog- 
nomic traits  and  all  manifestation  of  sense  through  the  senses 
being  restricted  to  what  is  expressible  in  terms  of  man's  emotive, 
affective  (evaluational)  system.  Where  the  "world,"  in  other 
words,  is  taken  in  its  primary  expression-values,  all  of  its  phe- 
nomena manifest  a  specific  character  which  belongs  to  them  in  an 
immediate  and  spontaneous  fashion.  Cassirer's  description  of 
these  "expression-phenomena"  as  "being  inherently  sombre  or 
cheerful,  exciting  or  appeasing,  frightening  or  reassuring"29 
parallels  Dewey's  account,  e.g.,  according  to  which  "empiri- 
cally, things  are  poignant,  tragic,  settled,  disturbed  .  . .  are  such 
immediately  and  in  their  own  right  and  behalf  .  .  .  any  quality 
is  at  once  initial  and  terminal."30  It  would  therefore  be  a  mis- 
reading of  what  Cassirer  terms  the  "reine  Ausdrucksphaenom- 
ene"  if  they  were  taken  to  issue  from  secondary  acts  of  inter- 
pretation, as  products  of  an  act  of  "empathy."  The  basic  error 
of  such  an  "explanation"  would  consist  in  the  fact  that  it  re- 
verses the  order  of  what  is  phenomenally  given.  This  interpre- 
tation "must  kill  the  character  of  perception,  it  must  reduce  it 
to  a  mere  complex  of  sensory  data  of  impression  in  order  to  then 
revive  the  dead  matter  of  impression  by  an  act  of  empathy."31 
What  is  overlooked  in  the  empathy-theories  is  that,  in  order  to 
get  at  the  sensory  data  (the  hot  and  cold,  the  hard  and  soft,  the 
colors,  sounds,  etc.),  we  must  already  disregard  and  abstract 
from  the  expressive  "Urfhaenomene?*  in  which  a  "world"  is 
had  prior  to  the  working  out  of  the  various  representative 
schemes  and  conceptual  frameworks  to  which  it  subsequently 
submits.  What  typifies  an  expression-phenomenon,  we  conclude, 
is  that,  whereas  it  possesses  specific  (immediate,  non-derivative) 
meanings  not  realized — on  the  perceptual  level — as  distinct 
from  the  sensuous  vehicles  with  which  they  go  "hand  in  hand," 
it  must  still  be  recognized  as  an  instance  of  a  symbolic  function, 


,  Vol.  Ill,  85. 
30  Experience  and  Nature,  96. 
nPSF,  Vol.  Ill,  85. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  97 

in  so  far  as  subsequent  analysis,  on  the  level  of  reflection,  will 
make  what  Cassirer  considers  a  "polar  distinction"  between  its 
two  constitutive  moments  which,  as  the  sign  (senses)  and  the 
signified  (sense)  define  that  function. 

b.  The  polarity  between  these  two  moments  is  encountered 
in  a  more  developed  form  in  the  intuitive  mode  of  the  symbolic 
function,  for  which  a  perception  is  not  merely  taken  as  a  qualita- 
tive presence  (Praesenz)  but  as  a  cue  for  the  representation  of 
something  else. 

The  construction  of  our  perceptive  world  begins  with  such  acts  of  divid- 
ing up  the  ever-flowing  series  of  sensuous  phenomena.  In  the  midst  of 
this  steady  flux  of  phenomena  there  are  retained  certain  determinate 
(perceptive)  units  which,  from  now  on,  serve  as  fixed  centers  of  orien- 
tation. The  particular  phenomenon  could  not  have  any  characteristic 
meaning  except  if  thus  referred  to  those  centers.  All  further  progress  of 
objective  knowledge,  all  clarification  and  determination  of  our  percep- 
tive world  depends  upon  this  ever  progressing  development.32 

The  passage  from  the  expression-mode  to  the  intuition-mode 
of  "making  sense  in  the  senses"  is  described  by  Cassirer  as  a  de- 
velopment in  which  progressively  an  organization  of  the  sensory 
flux  is  brought  about  by  singling  out  certain  data,  realized  as 
comparatively  constant,  significant  or  relevant  for  action,  by 
operating,  in  brief,  a  division  of  the  perceptually  given  into 
"presentative"  and  "representative"  moments.83  Now,  the 
selective  and  organizing  office  of  sensory  perception  has  been 
noted  by  both  scientists  and  philosophers  for  some  time.  If  a 
symbolic  interpretation  is  put  upon  whatever  evidence  exists  for 
this  fact,  it  is  because  such  "selectivity"  entails  a  distinction  of 
the  constant  from  the  variable,  of  the  necessary  from  the  con- 
tingent, of  the  general  from  the  particular,  distinctions,  in 
brief,  which,  for  Cassirer,  "imply  the  very  source  of  all  objecti- 
fication."34  And  it  is  to  language  that  we  are  referred  as  both 
the  outstanding  agency  which  establishes  the  basic  objectifying 
distinctions  and  the  medium  which  reflects  the  "foci  of  atten- 

"PSF,Vol.  Ill,  165. 

88  This,  of  course,  is  a  metaphorical,  not  a  genetic  account.  A  "flux"  prior  to 
any  and  all  "organization"  is  a  contrary-to-fact  abstraction, 
"PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  1 80. 


98  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

tion,"  the  "perspectives"  which  condition  whatever  discrimina- 
tion is  exercised  when  some  (rather  than  other)  perceptions  are 
taken  to  "represent"  the  quasi-permanent  units  as  which,  on  the 
intuition-mode,  we  have  the  world  as  organized  in  spatio- 
temporal  "things-with-properties."  Skipping  at  this  point 
further  consideration  of  the  evidence  adduced  by  Cassirer  for 
this  view,85  what  matters  for  the  present  purpose  is  that  the 
intuition-mode  of  symbolic  representation  is  conceived  as  in- 
volving, besides  the  sensory  data,  an  "original  mode  of  sight" 
(eine  eigene  Weise  der  Sicht)  and  that  both  these  moments  are 
said  to  stand  in  a  polar  relationship  to  each  other  in  so  far  as  the 
"sight,"  the  "perspective,"  as  something  posited  (em  Seteungs- 
modus),  is  not  reducible  to  or  constructible  from  the  sensory 
data  which  it  "sees."  Cassirer  argues  in  this  connection  against 
both  rationalist  and  empiricist  epistemologies  which,  regardless 
how  differently  they  provide  answers  to  the  question  of  the 
"relation  of  our  perceptions  to  an  object,"  take  the  same  basic 
course  in  explaining  this  relation  either  in  terms  of  "associa- 
tions" and  "reproductions"  or  in  terms  of  judgments  and  "un- 
conscious inferences."  "What  is  overlooked  in  either  approach 
is  the  circumstance  that  all  psychological  or  logical  processes  to 
which  one  has  recourse  come  rather  too  late.  .  .  .  No  associative 
connection  of  them  can  explain  that  original  Setzungsmodus, 
according  to  which  an  impression  (taken  representatively) 
stands  for  something  'objective'."36  The  intuition-mode  of  the 
symbol  function  is  proposed  therefore  as  both  an  original  and 
ultimate  mode  of  sight  which,  although  inseparable  from  the 
sensory  impressions  which  it  seesy  must  be  distinguished  from 
them  as  sharply  as  the  dimensions  of  "meaning"  (sense)  from 
the  dimension  of  "signs"  (senses). 

c.  The  polar  relation  between  the  sensuous-  and  the  sense- 
moments  is  even  more  readily  realized  in  Cassirer's  discussion 
of  the  theoretical  mode  of  the  symbol  function.  Within  this 

88  In  his  Die  Sprache  und  der  Aufbau  der  Gegenstandswelt,  Jena,  1932  (sec 
Bibliography  for  translations) .  Also  in  the  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen, 
Language  and  Myth>  and  "The  Concept  of  Group  and  the  Theory  of  Perception," 
(Journal  of  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research,  Vol.  V,  1944,  1-35.) 

86  PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  148. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  99 

dimension,  also  referred  to  as  the  "level  of  cognition,"  there 
obtains,  as  within  the  expression-  and  the  intuition-modes,  an 
organization  and  determination  of  sensory  data,  with  this  dif- 
ference, however,  that  now  "the  moments  which  condition  the 
order  and  structure  of  the  perceptual  world  are  grasped  as  such 
and  recognized  in  their  specific  significance.  The  relations  which, 
on  the  former  levels,  were  established  implicitly  (in  der  Form 
blosser  Mitgegebenheit)  are  now  explicated."37 

This  "explication,"  proceeding  by  way  of  an  abstractive  iso- 
lation of  the  relations  which,  while  applicable  to  perception, 
are,  in  principle,  of  a  non-perceptual  character,  is  evidenced, 
"writ  large"  so  to  speak,  in  the  constructive  schemata,  the  con- 
ventional systems  of  conventional  signs  by  mediation  of  which 
scientific  knowledge  is  attained.  A  considerably  detailed  demon- 
stration of  this  thesis  was  given  by  Cassirer  long  before  the 
development  of  his  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms.  His  con- 
tention that  all  scientific  concept-formation  is  definable  as  an 
ever  more  precise  application  of  relational  thinking  was  first 
presented  in  his  influential  Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbe- 
griff  (1910)  and  reasserted  in  the  concluding  sections  of  his 
"Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis"  (PSF,  Vol.  III.)  where 
recent  developments  (until  1929)  of  the  mathematical  and 
physical  sciences  are  considered  in  confirmation  of  this  thesis. 
What  is  established  by  the  scientific  concept  is  referred  to  vari- 
ously as  a  "function,"  a  "principle,"  a  "law  of  a  series,"  a  "rule" 
or  "form,"  where  all  these  terms  are  employed  with  the  same 
connotation  which  his  early  work  had  given  them,  i.e.,  as  ex- 
pressing relations  between  (terms  designating)  phenomena. 
"To  'comprehend  conceptually'  and  to  'establish  relations'  turn 
out — upon  closer  logical  and  epistemological  analysis — to  be 
always  correlative  notions."38  Instead  of  defining  the  concept 
as  extensively  determining  a  class,  having  members,  it  is  main- 
tained that  theoretical  concepts 

always  contain  reference  to  an  exact  serial  principle  that  enables  us  to 
connect  the  manifold  of  intuition  in  a  definite  way,  and  to  run  through  it 

"PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  3  30. 
"PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  346. 


ioo  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

according  to  a  prescribed  law.  .  .  .  (Thus)  no  insuperable  gap  can  arise 
between  the  'universal'  and  the  'particular,'  because  the  universal  itself 
has  no  other  meaning  and  purpose  than  to  represent  and  to  render 
possible  the  connection  and  order  of  the  particular.  If  we  regard  the 
particular  as  a  serial  member  and  the  universal  as  a  serial  principle, 
it  is  at  once  clear  that  the  two  moments,  without  going  over  into  each 
other  and  in  any  way  being  confused,  still  refer  throughout  in  their 
function  to  each  other.39 

The  symbolic  function,  implied  in  the  theoretical  mode,  becomes 
comparable  to  both  the  expression-  and  intuition-modes  in  that 
here  too  we  are  bidden  to  distinguish  between  the  "principle  of 
the  series"  and  the  "manifold"  ordered  into  the  members  of  the 
series. 

Let  us  put  this  polarity  into  the  language  of  symbolic  logic. 
If  we  are  to  define  the  meaning  of  a  concept  not  extensionally 
(by  specification  of  the  members  that  are  subsumed)  but  in 
terms  of  a  prepositional  function  p(x),  we  are  clearly  desig- 
nating two  distinguishable  moments. 

The  general  form  of  the  functions  designated  by  the  letter  C0'  is  to  be 
sharply  contrasted  with  the  values  of  the  variable  V  which  may  enter 
this  function  as  ctrue'  values.  The  function  determines  the  relation  of 
these  values,  but  it  is  not  itself  one  of  them:  the  C0'  of  C0(x)'  is  not 
homogenous  to  the  xi,  X2,  Xs,  etc.  [Both  the  function  and  the  values  of 
the  variables  belong  to  an  entirely  different  conceptual  type  (Denk- 


And  this  formulation  only  throws  into  relief  the  distinctness  of 
the  two  moments  which,  as  the  principle  (form)  of  the  series 
and  its  members  (material)  are  held  to  define  all  theoretical 
(conceptual)  symbolisms.  The  distinctive  trait  of  theoretical 
concept-formation  must,  accordingly,  be  sought  in  the  elabora- 
tion of  distinctive  "points  of  view"  which,  as  "principles"  or 
"forms"  determine  the  selection  of  the  perceptually  given  mani- 
fold into  specifically  ordered  series.  In  this  connection,  Cassirer 
argues  against  certain  empiricist  doctrines  which  regard  the 
"similarity"  of  the  intuitively  apprehended  phenomena  as  a 

39  Substance  and  Function  (Swabey  tr.),  223^ 
*PSF9VoL  III,  349-350. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  101 

self-evident  psychological  fact,  fit  to  account  for  the  serial  re- 
lations established  by  concepts.  But,  as  he  points  out, 

the  similarity  of  certain  elements  can  only  be  spoken  of  significantly  when 
a  certain  point  of  view  has  been  established  from  which  the  elements  can 
be  designated  as  like  or  unlike.  The  difference  between  these  contents, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  conceptual  species  by  which  we  unify  them, 
on  the  other,  is  an  irreducible  ]act$  it  is  categorial  and  belongs  to  the 
form  of  consciousness.41 

It  designates,  as  we  have  seen,  the  polar  contrast  between  the 
members  of  a  series  and  the  form  of  the  series. 

(2)  The  correlativity  of  "sense"  and  "senses." 

Above,  we  have  considered  a  number  of  passages  indicative 
of  Cassirer's  conviction  that  on  all  levels  on  which  we,  symboli- 
cally, have  a  world, — be  it  as  organized  in  qualitative  expres- 
sion-characters, be  it  as  "broken"  into  spatio-temporally  ordered 
"things-with-properties,"  be  it  in  the  relational  order-systems 
of  the  sciences, — we  are  always  in  a  position  to  make  a  €€dis- 
tinctio  rationis"  between  the  "sight"  (die  Sicht;  the  form  of  a 
manifold)  and  the  sensory  data  that  are  variously  determinable 
within  these  different  sights.  We  have  treated  of  this  conviction 
as  implying  an  interpretation  of  polarity  between  the  two  mo- 
ments of  the  symbol  function.  We  must  now  qualify  this  char- 
acterization by  pointing  out  that,  in  another  sense  (to  be 
specified),  both  moments  are  taken  as  correlative  to  a  degree 
that  makes  it  inconceivable  to  refer  to  or  define  either  moment 
except  under  implicit  presupposition  of  the  other.  If,  in  agree- 
ment with  Cassirer's  actual  usage,  we  call  the  perceptive  mani- 
fold the  "matter"  of  the  symbolic  function  and  the  sense- 
perspective  (Sinn-Persfektive)  its  "form,"  we  are  bidden  to 
think  of  these  terms  as  correlative  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  not 
only  impossible — in  any  actual  context — to  separate  one  from 
the  other,  but  also  to  assign  any  meaning  to  either  term  without 
implication  of  the  meaning  of  the  other. 

Our  problem  here  makes  contact  with  the  metaphysical  con- 
troversy about  universals.  From  what  has  been  said  so  far  about 

41  Substance  and  Function,  25. 


CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

the  relation  between  the  "form"  and  "matter"  of  a  series,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  Cassirer  could  not,  without  qualifications, 
have  subscribed  to  either  the  realist  or  the  nominalist  position. 
Partial  agreement  is  indicated  with  St.  Thomas,42  whom  he 
credits  with  having  maintained  a  "strict  correlation,  a  mutual 
relationship  between  the  general  and  the  particular."43  What 
attracts  him  in  this  version  is  the  fact  that  it  is  free  from  the 
various  space-  and  time-metaphorical  separations  that  have 
traditionally  been  assumed  to  characterize  the  universal  as  be- 
ing before  or  after,  within  or  outside  the  particular.  Cassirer's 
insistence  that  no  meaning  can  be  given  to  the  universal  "form" 
independently  of  a  "matter"  for  which  it  is  valid,  is  reasserted  in 
a  number  of  ways,  such  as,  e.g.,  the  "sight"  determining  the 
"how"-character  of  "what"  is  seen,  or  the  "principle  of  a  series" 
exhausting  its  meaning  in  the  order  it  establishes  among  the  mem- 
bers of  the  series,  or  the  "p"  of  a  prepositional  function  not  be- 
ing definable  independently  of  the  variables  for  which  it  holds.44 
Now,  it  has  been  suggested  that  Cassirer's  thought  here  is  not 
free  from  contradiction  on  the  grounds  that  the  two  moments 
by  which  he  aims  to  define  the  symbol-concept  cannot  both: 
(a)  belong  to  two  entirely  different  dimensions  and  (b)  yet  be 
tied  together  in  such  close  correlation  that  the  definition  of  one 
could  not  be  given  except  in  terms  of  the  other.  These  objections 
were  voiced  by  the  Swedish  philosopher  Marc-Wogau.45  It  is 
to  these  objections  that  we  must  now  give  some  attention,  before 
considering  Cassirer's  defense  in  the  sequel. 

d.  The  Symbol-Concept.  Objections  and  Defense 
Marc-Wogau  writes: 

A  closer  examination  seems  to  me  to  lead  to  the  result  that  the  positive 
meaning  of  Cassirer's  "symbolic  relation"  is  of  a  dialectical  character; 
the  symbolic  relation,  as  conceived  by  Cassirer,  covers  both  the  idea  of 
an  opposition  between  the  sensuously  given  (the  sign)  on  the  one  hand, 

48  "Universalia  non  sunt  res  subsistentes,  sed  habent  esse  solum  in  singularibus." 
Contra  Gentiles ,  Lib.  I,  165. 
48 /W,  Vol.  Ill,  351. 

44  On  this  point,  see  also  B.  Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  85. 
48  In:   Theoria  (Tidskrift  for  Filosofi  och  Psykologi,  1936),  279-332, 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  103 

and  the  " Sinner juettunff*  (the  signified)  on  the  other,  and  also  the  idea 
of  an  identity  between  the  two.  The  first  idea  is  clearly  asserted  by 
Cassirer,  the  second  issues  as  a  consequence  from  certain  of  his  definitions 
and  assertions.46 

Now,  the  second  idea  concerns  the  correlativity  of  the  two 
symbol-moments  which,  according  to  Marc-Wogau,  entails 
their  identity  as  a  consequence.  Let  us  follow  his  reasoning: 

'Sign'  and  'Signified'  ...  are  to  be  mutually  conditioned  by  each  other 
in  their  determinate  character.  One  moment  has  meaning  only  in  re- 
lation to  the  other.  But  that  implies  that  the  thought  about  the  one  term 
involves  the  thought  about  the  other.  If  the  one  term  is  being  thought 
of,  the  other  is  thereby  being  thought  of  too.  The  two  moments  of  the 
relation  would,  in  consequence,  coincide.  If  A  and  B  are  to  be  connected 
in  such  a  way  that  A  can  be  determined  only  with  reference  to  B  and 
B  can  be  determined  only  in  reference  to  A,  it  becomes  impossible  to 
distinguish  A  and  B :  they  coincide  (zusammen] alien)  .4T 

With  respect  to  another  characterizatioin  of  the  symbol  by  Cas- 
sirer, according  to  which  it  is  said  to  be  "immanence"  and 
"transcendence"  in  one:  in  so  far  as  it  expresses  a  meaning — 
non-intuitive  in  principle — in  an  intuitive  form,"48  Marc-Wogau 
remarks: 

In  this  definition,  two  moments  are  distinguished  which  are  related  in 
a  specific  way.  When  Cassirer  characterizes  this  relation  by  saying  that 
"the  symbol  is  not  'the  one  or  the  other,'  but  that  it  represents  the  'one 
in  the  other'  and  'the  other  in  the  one,'  "  the  question  seems  to  crop  up 
how,  under  such  circumstances,  a  possible  distinction  between  the  'one' 
and  the  'other'  could  even  be  made.  By  this  definition  is  there  not 
posited  an  identity  between  the  two  moments  of  the  symbolic  relation 
which  would  conflict  with  the  insistence  upon  their  polarity?49 

In  Cassirer's  rejoinder  to  these  objections,50  at  least  two 
different  lines  of  argumentation  may  be  distinguished.  For  one, 
considerations  are  adduced,  designed  to  render  questionable 

441  Theoria,  (1936),  291. 

47  Theoria,  (1936),  292. 

48  PSF,  Vol.  Ill,  447- 


*  w'*«*>  v*yjw/,  33 1. 
60 In  Theoria,  (1938)1  '45-'75. 


104  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

Marc-Wogau's  belief  that  there  are  logical  grounds  on  which 
the  maintained  correlativity  of  the  two  symbol-moments  could 
be  refuted.  Furthermore,  illustrations  from  empirical  sciences 
are  reproduced  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  his  contention  that 
the  two  symbol-moments  (although  correlative)  cannot  only 
still  be  distinguished,  but  purporting  to  show  that  and  how  such 
isolation  of  the  two  moments  has  been  accomplished.  In  this 
connection,  Cassirer  quotes  extensively  from  contemporary  re- 
search into  color  and  acoustical  phenomena  which  are  presented 
by  him  as  documenting  as  a  fact  what  Marc-Wogau  had  denied 
as  a  possibility. 

( i )  The  logical  issue. 

Marc-Wogau's  objection  that,  if  two  terms  of  a  relation  are 
thought  of  as  "mutually  determined,"  they  will,  of  necessity, 
also  be  identical,  is  countered  by  Cassirer's  reference  to  the 
actual  employment  of  "implicit  definitions"  in  modern  mathe- 
matical logic.  Now,  implicit  definitions  may  be  defined  as  "de- 
noting anything  whatsoever  provided  that  what  they  denote 
conforms  to  the  stated  relations  between  themselves,"51  where 
the  stating  of  the  relations  is  presumably  to  be  given  within  the 
axiom-system  selected.  With  the  discovery  of  non-Euclidean 
geometries,  Cassirer  remarks,  it  became  increasingly  clear  to 
those  concerned  with  their  logical  foundation,  that  their  ele- 
ments— the  points,  lines,  angles,  etc. — could  not  be  defined 
anymore  in  the  explicit  way  in  which  Euclid  could  take  them  as 
intuitively  evident.  "Neither  the  basic  elements,  nor  the  basic 
relations  could  have  been  defined,  if  by  a  definition  one  under- 
stands the  indication  of  the  'genus  *proximmn?  and  of  the  'dif- 
ferentia specified."*2  A  way  out,  Cassirer  suggests,  was  opened 
by  Pasch's  investigations53  which  were  continued  and  brought  to 
a  systematic  conclusion  with  Hilbert's  Grundlagen  der  Geomet- 
rie.**  Hilbert's  analyses,  of  considerable  influence  upon  the 
development  of  mathematical  logic,  may  be  summarized  by 
saying  that,  for  him,  the  geometrical  elements  and  relations  are 

51  Cohen  and  Nagel,  An  Introduction  to  Logic  and  Scientific  Method,  135. 

K  Theoria,  169. 

88  See  Substance  and  Function,  101. 

"ibid.,  93. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  105 

not  to  be  taken  as  independent  entities,  intuitively  grasped,  for 
which  ^xplicit  definitions  could  be  given,  but  as  terms  whose 
meaning  is  specified  by  the  relations  which  are  axiomatically 
prescribed  for  them.  "The  axioms  which  they  satisfy  determine 
and  exhaust  their  essence."55  Basic  geometrical  concepts  are, 
accordingly,  held  to  be  only  implicitly  definable,  i.e.,  within 
a  logical  system;  and  it  is  gratuitous  to  ask  for  a  determination 
of  their  meaning  independently  of  this  system.  It  follows, 
of  course,  that,  if  in  Hilbert's  geometry  the  signification  of 
points,  lines,  the  relations  of  "between-ness,"  "outside,"  etc., 
cannot  be  formulated  except  in  relation  to  a  selected  axiom- 
group,  a  variety  of  other  elements  and  relations,  if  they  satisfy 
the  formal  conditions  of  the  same  axioms,  must  be  considered 
as  equivalent  to  it.  Against  the  very  possibility  of  structural 
isomorphisms,  of  different  (though  logically  justifiable)  inter- 
pretations of  the  same  basic  calculus,  the  objection  could  perhaps 
be  raised  that  they  merely  prove  the  impossibility  of  arriving 
at  completely  determined  elements  by  means  of  implicit  def- 
initions. This  apparent  limitation,  however,  also  marks  the 
very  strength  of  mathematical,  deductive  thought,  as  was  stated 
by  Cassirer  distinctly  in  his  Substance  and  Function: 

Two  different  types  of  assertions,  of  which  the  one  deals  with  straight 
lines  and  planes,  the  other  with  cycles  and  spheres  .  .  .  are  regarded  as 
equivalent  to  each  other  in  so  far  as  they  provide  for  the  same  con- 
ceptual dependencies.  .  .  .  The  points  with  which  Euclidean  geometry 
deals  can  be  changed  into  spheres  and  circles,  into  inverse  point-pairs 
of  a  hyperbolic  or  elliptical  group  of  spheres  .  .  .  without  any  change 
being  produced  in  the  deductive  relations  of  the  individual  propositions 
.  .  .  evolved  for  these  points.  .  .  .  Mathematics  recognizes  (in  these 
points)  no  other  'being'  than  that  belonging  to  them  by  participation  in 
this  form.  For  it  is  only  this  'being'  that  enters  into  proof  and  into  the 
processes  of  inference  and  is  thus  accessible  to  the  full  certainty  that 
mathematics  gives  to  its  subject-matter.56 

The  relevance  of  these  considerations  for  the  problem  at 
hand  may  perhaps  be  put  thus:  Marc-Wogau's  contention  that, 
if  the  terms  of  a  relation  are  mutually  determined,  they  there- 

w  Theoria,  1 69. 

M  Substance  ana  Function  (Swabey  tr.),  93. 


io6  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

by  must  also  be  identical,  is  refutable,  if  we  maintain  the  justi- 
fiability of  implicit  definitions,  respectively  of  the  different 
mathematical  (logical)  calculi  which  they  make  possible.  And 
vice  versa:  Marc-Wogau's  charge,  if  taken  seriously,  would 
not  only  refute  the  "logic"  of  the  symbol-concept  (with  its 
two  distinct,  yet  correlative  moments,  its  "sensuous"  represen- 
tation of  the  "non-sensuous"),  but  it  would  also  have  to  refute 
the  "logic"  of  all  those  disciplines  that  could  not  constitute  their 
respective  syntax-forms  except  by  employment  of  implicit  defi- 
nitions. In  consequence,  Cassirer  is  convinced  that,  if  the  scien- 
tist can  proceed  effectively  with  elements  the  meaning  of  which 
is  indefinable  outside  the  axiom-system  within  which  they  occur, 
the  philosopher  neither  may  (nor  need)  hope  for  more  secure 
foundations  regarding  the  symbol-concept.  Marc-Wogau's 
charge  of  a  contradiction  inherent  in  this  concept  is  thus 
countered  by  Cassirer's  reference  to  scientific  syntax  whose 
elements  are  not  considered  identical  merely  because  their 
definition  implies  mutual  determination. 

(2)  The  empirical  issue. 

Regardless,  however,  whether  correlativity  of  the  relational 
terms  implies  their  "identity"  or  not,  is  there  any  other  than 
just  formal  evidence  for  the  "fact"  that,  notwithstanding  such 
correlativity,  a  distinction  between  the  symbol-moments  is  not 
only  logically  permissible  but  also  actually  achievable?  Before 
examining  the  empirical  evidence  adduced  in  answer  to  this 
question,  it  will  be  worth  while  to  consider  the  issue  here  raised 
in  its  full  generality. 

The  symbol-concept,  we  suggested  above,  was  to  result  from 
Kant's  epistemology,  in  so  far  as  it  was  to  cover  all  the  "syn- 
thesizing acts"  which  variously  condition  the  many  expressive, 
perceptual,  and  conceptual  forms  in  which  we  have  the  respec- 
tive worlds  of  myth,  art,  common  sense,  and  science.  Instead 
of  departing  from  a  taken-for-granted  opposition  between  a 
statically  conceived  "self"  and  a  just  as  statically  conceived 
"world,"  the  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  was  proposed 

to  examine  the  presuppositions  upon  which  that  opposition  depends  and 
to  state  the  conditions  that  are  to  be  satisfied  if  it  is  to  come  about.  It 
finds  that  these  conditions  are  not  uniform,  that  there  are  rather  different 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  107 

dimensions  of  apprehending,  comprehending  and  knowing  the  phenom- 
ena and  that,  relative  to  this  difference,  the  relationship  between  'self 
and  'world'  is  capable  of  characteristically  different  interpretations.  .  .  . 
True,  all  these  forms  aim  at  objectification  on  the  level  of  perception 
(zielen  auj  gegenstandliche  Anschauung  hin)^  but  the  perceived  objects 
change  with  the  type  and  direction  of  such  objectification.  The  phi- 
losophy of  symbolic  forms,  accordingly,  does  not  intend  to  establish  a 
special  dogmatic  theory  regarding  the  essence  and  properties  of  these 
'objects,'  but  it  aims,  instead,  to  comprehend  these  types  of  objectifica- 
tion which  characterize  art  as  well  as  religion  and  science.87 

It  follows  that,  if  no  objectivity  is  held  to  be  encounterable 
except  within  the  symbolic  forms  of  myth  and  religion,  of  art, 
common  sense,  and  science,  there  also  can  be  no  chance  to  break 
out  of  the  "charmed  circle"  of  these  forms.  If  it  is  only  under 
the  pervasive  presupposition  of  these  forms  that  we  can  appre- 
hend, comprehend  and  know  all  the  objects,  however  struc- 
tured, how  then  will  it  be  possible  even  to  conceive  of  a  polar 
concept  which,  such  as  the  "sensuous  manifold,"  is  claimed  to 
be  distinguishable  from  the  formal  moment  of  the  symbol- 
relation?  What  answer,  in  other  words,  can  be  given  to  Marc- 
Wogau's  charge  that,  to  be  consistent,  Cassirer  cannot  hope  even 
to  make  a  "distinctio  rationis**  between  the  perceptual  "matter" 
and  the  significant  "form"  of  the  symbol-concept?  As  mentioned 
earlier,  it  is  typical  of  Cassirer's  procedure  that  the  resolution 
of  this  problem  is  not  left  to  logical  or  specifically  "philo- 
sophical" considerations  as  have  conventionally  been  devoted 
to  the  "form-matter"  issue.  The  latter  is  to  be  evaluated,  in- 
stead, in  the  light  of  empirical  evidence.  Let  us  be  clear  once 
more  for  just  exactly  what  this  empirical  reference  is  to  provide 
evidence.  What  is  under  discussion  concerns  the  question 
whether  the  "material"  moment  of  the  symbol-concept  (to 
which  we  have  variously  referred  as  the  "sensuous  manifold," 
the  "sensory-  or  perceptual  data") — although  indeterminable 
outside  any  given  context  ("perspective,"  "sight,"  "principle" 
or  "form  of  a  series") — can  nevertheless  be  distinguished,  i.e., 
conceived  as  different  in  principle  from  the  sense-perspectives 
within  which  it  becomes  manifest. 

For  evidence  of  the  fact  that  this  problem  has  been  realized 

87  Theoria  (1938),  151. 


io8  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

by  scientists,  Cassirer  quotes  these  remarks  from  Karl  Buehler: 

No  theory  of  perception  should  forget  that  already  the  most  simple 
qualities,  such  as  'red'  and  'warm'  usually  do  not  function  for  them- 
selves but  as  signs  for  something  else,  i.e.,  as  signs  of  properties  of 
perceived  things  and  events.  The  matter  looks  different  only  in  the 
comparatively  problematic  borderline-case  where  one  seeks  to  determine 
the  'Ansich*  of  these  qualities  in  fercepion™ 

But  it  is,  of  course,  exactly  this  "borderline-case,"  i.e.,  whether 
conditions  for  the  isolation  of  the  "Ansich"  of  perceptual  data 
can  be  instituted  or  not  (and  how  such  isolation  is  to  be  inter- 
preted), that  is  at  issue.  The  question,  in  other  words,  is  whether 
perceptual  data  can  be  stripped  of  their  various  representative 
functions,  and  the  relevance  of  having  recourse  to  empirical 
investigations  would  concern  the  technical  possibility  of  operat- 
ing such  a  reductive  stripping  of  these  data.  For  evidence  of  the 
empirical  feasibility  of  that  reduction,  Cassirer  mentions  the 
German  physiologists  Helmholtz,  Hering  and  Katz.  Katz, 
e.g.,59  had  initiated  a  procedure  involving,  a.o.,  the  observation 
of  colors  through  a  punctured  screen  (ILochschirm) .  "It  turned 
out  that  hereby  (the  colors)  change  their  phenomenal  character 
and  that  there  takes  place  a  reduction  of  the  color-impression 
to  ...  the  dimension  of  plane-  (Flaechen-)  colors."60  Hering 
performs  similar  reductions  by  means  of  a  vision-tube  (eine 
irgendwie  fixierte  Roehre)^  whereas  Helmholtz,  more  ingeni- 
ously, gets  along  without  any  instruments  and  achieves  com- 
parable effects  by  "looking  from  upside  down,  from  under  one's 
legs  or  under  one's  arms."  Thus,  Hering: 

Place  yourself  near  the  window,  holding  in  your  hands  a  piece  of 
white  and  a  piece  of  grey  paper  closely  together.  Now,  turn  the  grey 
paper  towards  the  window,  the  white  one  away  from  it,  so  that  the 
retinal  image  of  the  grey  paper  will  be  more  strongly  illuminated  than 
the  white  one  5  but  even  though  one  will  notice  the  change  in  light- 
intensity,  the  now  "lighter"  but  really  grey  paper  will  still  appear  as 
grey,  while  the  now  "darker"  but  really  white  paper  will  be  seen  as 
white.  If  now  both  papers  are  looked  at  through  a  tube,  one  will  soon 

M  Die  Krise  der  Psychologic  (1927),  97. 

59  In  his  Der  Aufbau  der  Farbwelt,  (ind  edition  1930). 

90  Grundziige  elner  Lehre  <vom  Lichtsinn.  Paragraph  4. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  109 

see  both  papers  (if  held  so  that  one  will  not  shade  the  other)  on  one 
and  the  same  level,  and  now  the  grey  paper  will  be  seen  as  the  lighter 
one,  the  white  one  as  the  darker  one,  corresponding  to  the  difference  in 
the  two  light-intensities.60 

And  Helmholtz: 

We  know  that  green  plains  appear — at  a  certain  distance — in  somewhat 
different  color-tones;  we  get  used  to  abstract  from  this  change  and  we 
learn  to  identify  the  different  'green'  of  distant  lawns  and  trees  with 
the  corresponding  'green'  of  these  objects,  seen  at  close  range.  .  .  .  But 
as  soon  as  we  put  ourselves  into  unusual  circumstances,  when  we  look, 
e.g.,  from  under  our  legs  or  arms,  the  landscape  appears  to  us  as  a  flat 
picture.  .  .  .  Colors  thereby  lose  their  connection  to  close  or  distant 
objects  and  now  face  us  purely  in  their  qualitative  differences.61 

Similar  reductions  with  respect  to  other  than  color-phenomena 
are  also  referred  to  by  Cassirer  in  this  connection.182 

Now  it  seems  that,  if  examples  of  the  above-mentioned  type 
are  taken  as  evidence  for  the  fact  that  the  severing  of  sensory 
data  from  representative  contexts  is  not  only  possible  but  actu- 
ally (technically)  achievable,  Cassirer  would  both  be  proving 
too  much  (with  respect  to  what  can  be  maintained  within  his 
own  strictures)  and  not  enough  (with  respect  to  what  he  pre- 
sumes to  prove).  For  one,  to  suggest  that  Helmholtz's,  Her- 
ing's,  and  Katz's  investigations  succeeded  in  "de  facto"  isolating 
the  "pure  color-phenomena"  from  their  representative  office, 
would  be  to  maintain  more  than  Cassirer  could  allow  for,  after 
taking  pains  to  point  out  that  the  sensuous  moment  can  never 
actually  be  encountered  independently  of  the  sense  (context-) 
moment.  To  maintain  such  "isolation"  would  certainly  not  be 
compatible  with  his  contention  that  "there  is  nothing  in  con- 
sciousness without  thereby  also  positing  . .  .  something  other  and 
a  series  of  such  'others.*  For  each  singular  content  of  conscious- 
ness obtains  its  very  determination  from  consciousness  as  a  whole 
which,  in  some  form,  is  always  simultaneously  represented  and 
co-posited  by  it."83  Nor  could,  or  need,  the  alluded  empirical 

61  Hcmdbuch  der  Physiologischen  Oftik,  (1896),  607. 

62 For  haftical  phenomena:  Katz,  Der  Aufbau  der  Tastwelt  (1925),  255.  For 
odor  phenomena:  Henning,  Der  Geruch  (1924.),  275,  278. 
mPSF,  Vol.  I,  32. 


no  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

illustration  prove  that  this  is  not  the  case.  What  they  may  be 
taken  to  support  is  not  the  view  that  color- values  can  be  stripped 
of  their  representative  function,  but  only  that — by  an  appropri- 
ate shift  from  a  normal  perception  perspective  to  a  controlled 
two-dimensional  perspective — different  interpretations  hold 
with  respect  to  color-phenomena.  The  latter  have,  in  effect,  not 
"really"  been  stripped  of  their  representative  office,  but  they 
now  "represent"  plane  instead  of  surface  colors. 

That  the  above  is  a  preferable  way  of  stating  the  matter  is 
suggested  by  an  earlier  pronouncement: 

(After)  the  complete  reduction  of  the  color-impressions,  they  do  not 
represent  ...  a  particular  thing  .  .  .  (but)  appear  as  members  of  a 
series  of  light-experiences  (Ltchterlebnisse) .  But  even  these  'Lichter- 
lebnisse*  betray  a  certain  structure  in  so  far  as  they  are  sharply  con- 
trasted with  each  other,  and  in  that  they  are  organized  in  that  contrast. 
Not  only  do  they  have  different  degrees  of  coherence  so  that  one  color 
appears  separated  from  the  other  by  a  larger  or  smaller  distance  (where- 
from  issues  a  determinate  principle  of  their  serialization),  but  there 
are  assumed  in  this  series  certain  privileged  points  around  which  the 
various  elements  can  be  organized.  Even  when  reduced  to  a  mere 
light-impression,  the  individual  color-nuance  is  not  just  'present'  as 
such  but  it  also  is  representative.  The  individual  'red,'  given  here  and 
now,  is  given  as  V  red,  as  a  member  of  a  species  which  it  represents.  . .  . 
Without  this  (co-ordination  to  a  series),  the  impression  would  not  even 
be  determinable  as  'this  one,1  as  TO$S  te  in  the  Aristotelian  sense.64 

We  must  conclude,  therefore,  that  it  becomes  impossible  on 
Cassirer's  own  view  to  conceive  of  the  sensory  moment  of  the 
symbol-concept  as  isolable  from  any  serial  context.  Thus, 
whereas,  under  specifically  controlled  conditions,  color-,  sound-, 
and  other  sensory  data  may  cease  to  function  representatively 
for  esthetic  qualities,  thing-surfaces  and  shapes,  or  for  con- 
ventional language-signs,  their  reduction  will  still  not  go  be- 
yond the  physical  and  physiological  contexts  within  which  they 
are  identifiable  as  of  a  determinate  wave-length,  intensity,  pitch, 
etc.  Marc-Wogau's  charge  that  the  "material"  moment  of  the 
symbol-concept  is  not  distinguishable  from  its  sense-moment 
would,  accordingly,  hold  if  and  only  if  the  symbol-concept 

,  Vol.  Ill,  157. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  in 

allowed  of  application  in  one  and  not  more  than  one  sense- 
context.  To  be  sure,  within  any  one  perspective,  the  "whatness" 
of  a  phenomenon  is  never  determinable  in  separation  from  its 
"how-ness,"  from  the  respective  "sight"  in  which  it  is  seen.  With 
a  variety  of  symbolic  contexts,  however,  there  is  also  given  the 
possibility  of  their  contrast  and  of  distinguishing  them  as  dif- 
ferently oriented  "modes  of  sight,"  of  which  it  can  be  said  that 
they  are  "of"  sensory  data  in  the  sense  that  a  reduction  to  the 
physico-descriptive  dimension  can  be  performed  for  all  of 
them.  When  Cassirer  insists,  therefore,  that  "there  is  always  a 
world  of  optical,  acoustical  and  haptical  phenomena  in  which 
and  by  means  of  which  all  'sense/  all  apprehending,  compre- 
hending, intuiting  and  conceiving  alone  is  manifest,"65  then  the 
conceivability  of  these  sensory  phenomena,  as  distinct  from  the 
"sense"  they  manifest,  must  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  a  phys- 
ical context  (acoustics,  optics,  etc.)  can  be  co-ordinated  to  all 
other  contexts  in  which  the  senses  represent  different  types  of 
(expressive,  intuitional,  theoretical)  sense. 

The  "material"  moment  of  the  symbol-concept,  we  could 
say,  as  reference  of  and  relevance  for  the  sense-endowing 
"formal"  moment,  may  not  be  separately  encountered  or  isol- 
able  within  one  context,  but  it  is  nevertheless  distinguishable 
as  one  context.  To  speak  of  it  as  "material,"  would  seem  to  be 
justified,  if  one  considers  the  term  to  stand — in  the  Aristotelian 
sense — for  what  is  taken  as  that  of  which  manifold  determina- 
tions are  possible.  What  the  term  also  suggests  is  that  we  are 
dealing  here  with  what — as  matter — in  space  and  time,  is  ac- 
cessible to  physical  determination.  In  this  sense,  the  material 
moment  refers  not  just  to  one  among  other  contexts,  but  to  the 
most  reliably  controlled  and  pervasive  one  to  which  all  other 
contexts  may  indeed  be  "reduced." 

In  support  of  our  belief  that  this  interpretation  of  the  "in- 
dependent variability"  of  the  two  symbol-moments  is  adequate 
with  respect  to  what  Cassirer  aims  to  maintain,  let  us  turn,  in 
conclusion,  to  an  illustration  adduced  by  him  on  various  oc- 
casions:186 Cassirer  bids  us  to  think  of  a  black  line-drawing,  a 

"Theoria  (1939))  *S3- 

"E.g  in:  Zeitschrift  fur  Aesthetik,  1927,  (Vol.  XXI),  195.  PSF,  Vol.  Ill, 
331.  Theoria  (1938),  154. 


ii2  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

"Linienzug"  distinguished  as  a  simple  "perception  experience." 

Yet,  while  I  still  follow  the  various  lines  of  the  drawing  in  their  visual 
relations,  their  light  and  dark,  their  contrast  from  the  background, 
their  up-and-down  movements,  the  lines  become,  so  to  speak,  alive. 
The  spatial  form  (das  GebUde)  becomes  an  aesthetic  form:  I  grasp  in 
it  the  character  of  a  certain  ornament  ...  I  can  remain  absorbed  in  the 
pure  contemplation  of  this  ornament,  but  I  can  also  apprehend  in  and 
through  it  something  else:  it  represents  to  me  an  expressive  segment  of 
an  artistic  language,  in  which  I  recognize  the  language  of  a  certain 
time,  the  style  of  an  historical  period.  Again  the  'mode  of  sight'  may 
change,  in  so  far  as,  what  was  manifest  as  an  ornament,  is  now  dis- 
closed to  me  as  a  vehicle  of  a  mythico-religious  significance,  as  a  magical 
.  .  .  sign.  By  a  further  shift  in  perspective,  the  lines  function  as  a 
sensuous  vehicle  for  a  purely  conceptual  structure-context.  .  .  .  To  the 
mathematician,  they  become  the  intuitive  representation  of  a  specific 
functional  connection.  .  .  .  Where,  in  the  aesthetic  sight,  one  may  see 
them  perhaps  as  Hogarth  beauty-lines,  they  picture  to  the  mathematician 
a  certain  trigonometric  junction,  viz.,  the  picture  of  a  sin-curve, 
whereas  the  mathematical  physicist  may  perhaps  see  in  this  curve  the 
law  of  some  natural  process,  such  as,  e.g.,  the  law  for  a  periodic  oscilla- 
tion. 

All  depends  here  upon  what  is  taken  to  remain  "identical"  in 
all  these  modes  of  sight.  When  we  say  that  it  is  the  "Linien- 
zug"  which  figures  as  the  material  moment  in  all  contexts,  in 
what  sense  can  we  say  that  it  is  the  "same"  one,  since  we  know 
that  it  is  seen  as  so  many  different  things  from  context  to  con- 
text? Cassirer's  rather  metaphorical  pronouncements  in  this 
connection  can  be  clarified  in  the  light  of  our  interpretation.  In 
the  passage  quoted  above,  he  speaks  of  the  simple  (schlichte) 
"perception  experience"  in  which  the  line-drawing  is  phenomen- 
ally given  before  it  "comes  to  life,"  i.e.,  enters  into  the  various 
perspectives  mentioned.  But  clearly,  if  experienceable  at  all, 
this  "simple  perception  experience"  must  itself  be  taken  as  a 
mode  of  sight  and  not  as  a  moment  prior  and  common  to  all 
other  sights.  This  formulation  is  particularly  unhappy  in  the 
light  of  other  passages  where  Cassirer  generalizes  upon  the  il- 
lustration given  above  by  remarking  that 

the  material  moment  is  no  psychological  datum ,  but  rather  a  liminal 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  113 

notion  (Grenzbe griff).  .  .  .  What  we  call  the  'matter'  of  perception 
is  not  a  certain  sum-total  of  impressions,  a  concrete  substratum  at  the 
basis  of  artistic,  mythical  or  theoretical  representation.  It  is  rather  a 
line  towards  which  the  various  formal  modes  converge.  (Erne  Linie 
.  .  .  in  der  sich  die  verschiedenen  Weisen  der  Formung  schneiden.)*7 

This  space-metaphorical  version  of  the  issue  would  be  amen- 
able to  the  interpretation  suggested  in  so  far  as  the  "matter  of 
perception"  qua  "convergence  of  the  various  formal  modes" 
could  well  be  taken  as  the  "reductibility"  of  all  contexts  to  the 
physico-physiological  one  from  which  Cassirer's  actual  evidence 
is  concededly  derived.  (Helmholtz,  Hering,  Katz,  Buehler, 
etc.) 

SYMBOL-CONCEPT  AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS 

We  conclude  from  the  preceding  discussion  that  a  consistent 
meaning  may  be  assigned  to  Cassirer's  theory  of  the  symbol- 
concept.  The  extreme  generality  of  this  concept  is  manifest  when 
expressed  as  a  propositional  function.  We  could  say  that  the 
property  (of  a  "sensuous"  representing  "sense")  limits  in  no 
way  whatsoever  the  scope  of  the  particulars  which  may  enter  the 
argument  as  true  values.  A  symbolic  relation,  in  other  words, 
must  hold  for  all  facts,  because,  as  indicated  above,  no  facts  are 
•held  to  be  statable  without  reference  to  some  context;  and  no 
context  can  fall  outside  the  symbol  formula,  because,  as  a  con- 
text (Sinnzusammenhang),  it  must  establish  some  exemplifica- 
tion of  a  representative  relationship.  Now,  this  "representation 
of  sense  through  the  senses"  can  take  three  distinct  modal  forms: 

1 i )  If  the  referent  of  the  senses  is  the  affective-emotive  system 
of  man,  the  senses  are  said  to  make  "expressive  sense." 

(2)  If  the  referent  of  the  senses  is  the  volitional-teleological 
system  of  man,  the  senses  make  "common"-(thing-perceptual) 
sense. 

(3  )  If  the  referent  of  the  senses  is  a  system  of  theoretical  order- 
signs,  the  senses  make  conceptual,  i.e.,  scientific  sense. 

It  is  to  each  of  these  "modi"  of  the  symbolic  relation  that 
there  correspond  the  various  cultural  media.  Thus: 

67  Theoria  (1938),  155-156.  ED.  NOTE:  Cf.  infra  330  f. 


ii4  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

(  i  )  The  expression-modus  is  taken  to  be  exemplified  in  the 
domains  of  myth,  art,  and  (the  substrata  of)  language,  in  all  of 
which  media  we  deal  with  what  Cassirer  terms  "Ausdrucks- 
Charaktere"  and  what  are  variously  referred  to  by  other 
contemporary  philosophers,  in  related  connotations,  as  "terti- 
ary qualities,"  "essences,"  "prehensions,"  "significant  forms," 
etc. 

(2)  The  common  sense  or  empirical-intuitional-  (empirische 
Anschaulichkeit)-modus  is  taken  to  be  exemplified  in  the  "nat- 
ural  world-view"   which   is   both   constituted  and   reflected, 
Cassirer  holds,  by  the  "world  of  language." 

(3)  The  conceptual  (theoretical)  modus  is  taken  to  be  exem- 
plified by  the  order-systems  in  which  we  have  the  "world  of 
science." 

The  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  is,  accordingly,  a  philos- 
ophy of  the  cultural  forms  from  which  alone  we  can  read  the 
various  modalities  within  which  symbolic  functioning  occurs  and 
of  which  the  symbol-concept  furnishes  the  most  general  formu- 
lation. 

From  these  cultural  exemplifications  of  the  "modi"  of  the 
symbol-concept  we  must  distinguish  the  "qualities"  of  the 
most  pervasive  symbol-relations  which,  such  as  space,  time, 
cause,  number,  etc.,  are  "constitutive"  (in  the  Kantian  sense)  of 
any  and  all  objectivity.  "The  form  of  the  simultaneous  consti- 
tutes a  quality  distinct  from  the  form  of  succession."68  But  since 
each  "quality"  is  never  manifest  but  in  one  of  the  three  specified 
modal  forms, 

we  may  conceive  certain  spatial  forms  (e.g.  certain  lines)  as  an  artistic 
ornament  in  one  case,  as  a  geometrical  draft  in  another  ...  so  that,  in 
consequence,  the  quality  of  a  relation  can  never  adequately  be  given 
except  in  reference  to  the  total  system  from  which  it  is  abstracted.  If, 
e.g.,  we  designate  the  temporal,  spatial,  casual,  etc.,  relations  as  Ri,  R2, 
Rs  .  .  .,  there  belongs  to  each  of  these  a  special  'index  of  modality' 
|*i,  1*2,  [*s  .  .  .  which  indicates  the  context  within  which  they  are  to 
be  taken.69 

It  follows  that  Cassirer  could  not  consider  as  adequate  any 


,  Vol.  I,  29. 

*  PSF,  Vol.  1,  3  1. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  115 

philosophical  analysis  of  space,  time,  cause,  number,  etc.,  unless, 
besides  mathematical  and  physical  spaces,  it  also  attempted  to 
account  for  the  expressive  and  intuitional  spaces  of  common 
sense,  art,  myth,  and  religion. 

In  the  light  of  the  above,  it  will  now  be  clear  in  which  sense 
Cassirer's  theory  of  symbolic  forms  could  be  presented  both  as 
a  "philosophy  of  culture"  and  a  "metaphysics  of  experience." 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Cassirer  himself  preferred  to 
think  of  his  work  as  providing  "Prolegomena"  for  a  philosophy 
of  culture.  In  this  form,  the  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  For- 
men  is  actually  developed,  starting,  as  it  does,  from  a  philos- 
ophy of  language  (Volume  I,  1923)  and  moving  on  to  a 
philosophy  of  myth  (Volume  II,  1925)  and  to  a  philosophy  of 
(perceptual  and  conceptual)  knowledge  (Volume  III,  1929).™ 

All  that  would  seem  to  be  required,  however,  in  order  to 
formulate  Cassirer's  various  analyses  of  language,  myth,  and 
the  sciences  as  a  "metaphysics  of  experience,"  would  be  to  bring 
together  the  many  penetrating  examinations  of  "expressive 
space"  (in  the  volumes  on  Language  and  Myth),  of  the  "em- 
pirical space"  of  common  sense  (in  the  volumes  on  Language 
and  Phenomenology  of  Knowledge),  of  mathematical  and 
physical  spaces  (in  the  volumes  on  Phenomenology  of  Knowl- 
edge and  Substance  and  Function),  and  to  arrange  them  within 
a  single  scheme  of  exposition,  doing  the  same  for  the  other 
"categories."  The  result  would  be  at  least  as  universal  a  treat- 
ment of  the  pervasive  (symbolic)  traits  of  "Being"  as  is  ex- 
pected of  a  metaphysical  treatise. 

To  develop  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  as  a 
"metaphysics  of  experience"  may  appear  bold,  if  not  outright 
paradoxical,  in  view  of  both  Cassirer's  frequent  polemics  against 
"metaphysical  speculations"  in  his  early  writings  and  in  con- 
sideration of  the  pronounced  anti-metaphysical  tenor  of  the 
entire  neo-Kantian  movement  of  which  Cassirer  was  one  of 
the  most  brilliant  exponents.  A  closer  examination  of  some  of  the 
relevant  passages,  however,  will  back  our  contention  that  the 
issue  is  essentially  a  terminological  one.  It  concerns  not  so  much 

10  In  accordance  with  the  then  ongoing  Hegel-Renaissance,  Cassirer  preferred 
the  title :  "Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis." 


n6  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

the  possibility  (or  legitimacy)  of  metaphysics  as  a  significant 
philosophical  enterprise  as  rather  the  questionability  of  what 
the  term  "metaphysics"  has  connoted  so  far.  Take,  e.g.,  this 
passage  from  Substance  and  Function: 

When  empirical  science  examines  its  own  procedure,  it  has  to  recog- 
nize that  there  is  in  the  (metaphysical)  struggles  a  false  and  technical 
separation  of  ways  of  knowing  that  are  both  alike  indispensable  to  its  very 
existence.  The  motive  peculiar  to  all  metaphysics  of  knowledge  is  here 
revealed.  What  appears  and  acts  in  the  process  of  knowledge  as  an 
inseparable  unity  of  conditions  is  hypostatized  on  the  metaphysical  view 
into  a  conflict  of  things.71 

Now  compare  this  passage  with  another  one,  written  almost 
thirty  years  later: 

The  history  of  metaphysics  is  by  no  means  a  history  of  meaningless 
concepts  or  empty  words  ...  it  establishes  a  new  basis  of  vision  and  from 
it  gains  a  new  perspective  for  knowing  the  real.72 

What  appears  on  the  surface  as  a  complete  shift  from  a  rejection 
to  an  acceptance  of  metaphysical  thinking  must  be  recognized, 
however,  as  a  mere  shift  in  emphasis  with  respect  to  an  essen- 
tially identical  point  of  view.  To  be  sure,  Cassirer's  statements 
in  Substance  and  Function  are  not  as  positive  with  regard  to 
metaphysics  as  the  point  he  makes  in  the  study  on  Hagerstromy 
where  he  asserts  that  "the  genuine,  the  truly  metaphysical 
thoughts  have  never  been  empty  thoughts,  have  never  been 
thoughts  without  concepts"  (ibid.).  Yet,  in  this  same  context 
he  goes  on  to  warn  us — exactly  as  he  did  in  his  earlier  work — 
that 

the  difficulties,  dangers  and  antinomies  of  metaphysics  arise  from  the 
fact  that  its  'intuitions'  themselves  are  not  expressed  in  terms  of  their 
true  methodological  character.  None  (of  the  great  metaphysical  in- 
sights) is  considered  as  giving  insight  into  only  a  portion,  but  all  are 
claimed  to  generally  span  the  whole  of  reality.  .  .  .  The  subsequent 
contest,  resulting  from  such  (partial)  claims  becomes  at  once  a  dialectical 
conflict.  (Ibid.) 

M  Substance  and  Function  (Swabey  tr.),  237. 

"  Axel  Hagerstromi  Eine  Studie  zur  Scfawedischen  Philosofhie  der  Gegewwart, 
Ch.I. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  117 

Cassirer's  position  is  thus  a  consistent  one.  He  does  not  side 
with  the  positivistic  contention  that  metaphysics  is  not  only 
"false,"  but  also  "meaningless."  Instead,  he  distinguishes  the 
genuine  character  of  the  problems  with  which  the  great  meta- 
physicians have  dealt,  from  the  still  imperfect  modes  in  which 
their  findings  have  been  presented.  The  metaphysical  objective 
is  taken  to  be  legitimate,  whereas  the  metaphysical  results  can- 
not be  accepted  without  qualification,  simply  because  meta- 
physicians have  offered  "partial  truths"  as  "universal"  ones  and 
because,  in  focussing  upon  one  aspect  of  symbolization  (viz. 
the  mathematical,  religious,  aesthetic,  or  moral  one),  they  have 
lost  sight  of  the  equal  validity  of  such  other  aspects  as  also  must 
be  accounted  for  as  legitimate  paths  to  what — in  any  perspective 
— may  be  referred  to  as  the  "real." 

Now,  since  this  denial  of  a  privileged  status  for  any  one  form 
of  representation  is  exactly  what  Cassirer  has  claimed  for  his 
philosophy  of  symbolic  forms,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any 
reason  why — within  his  own  pronouncements — his  work  may 
not  indeed  be  considered  as  a  kind  of  metaphysics,  oriented 
around  the  central  notion  of  the  symbol-concept,  which  charac- 
terizes all  aspects  (contexts;  Sinnzusammenhange)  of  the 
"real,"  pervading  as  a  common  theme,  the  polyphony  of  all 
cultural  forms  in  which  reality  is  perceived,  understood,  and 
known.  Now,  if  emphasis  is  put  upon  the  mjost  universal  rela- 
tional forms  (space,  time,  cause,  number,  etc.)  which  reappear 
in  characteristic  modifications  in  all  of  these  forms,  we  would 
be  offered  a  metaphysics  of  (cultural)  experience.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  our  exposition  proceeds  by  way  of  separate  analyses 
of  language,  myth,  religion,  the  mathematical  and  physical 
sciences,  the  character  of  Cassirer's  work  would  be  more  obvi- 
ously one  of  a  philosophy  of  culture.  Regardless,  however, 
which  form  of  presentation  is  chosen,  each  will  center  around 
the  idea  of  the  symbol-concept. 

Cassirer  himself,  when  offered  an  opportunity  to  present 
(in  abbreviated  form)  his  thoughts  to  an  English-speaking 
audience,  subtitled  his  Essay  on  Man  "An  Introduction  to  a 
Philosophy  of  Human  Culture"  Here,  the  emphasis  is  on  the 
cultural  realities,  the  languages  and  rituals,  the  art-masterpieces 


n8  CARL  H.  HAMBURG 

and  scientific  procedures.  To  comprehend  them  philosophically 
requires  to  realize  them  as  so  many  symbolic  manifestations 
of  different  types  of  synthesizing  activities. 

The  content  of  the  culture-concept  cannot  be  separated  from  the  basic 
forms  and  directions  of  significant  (g^istigen)  production;  their  'being* 
is  understandable  only  as  a  'doing.*  It  is  only  because  there  is  a  specific 
direction  of  our  aesthetic  imagination  and  intuition  that  we  have  a 
realm  of  aesthetic  objects  —  and  the  same  goes  for  all  our  other  energies 
by  virtue  of  which  there  is  built  up  for  us  the  structure  of  a  specific 
domain  of  objectivity.73 

An  analysis  of  culture  could,  correspondingly,  proceed  along 
both  "material"  and  "formal"  lines.  It  could  either  undertake  a 
descriptive  classification  of  the  products  of  the  various  cultural 
activities,  or  it  could  seek  "behind"  this  great  diversity  of  mani- 
festations the  characteristic  types  of  intuiting,  imagining,  and 
conceiving,  i.e.,  the  "doings,"  in  terms  of  which  the  "works" 
become  intelligible.  It  is  only  in  focussing  on  the  "doings"  that, 
according  to  Cassirer,  we  may  hope  to  find  a  common  de- 
nominator. "We  seek  not  a  unity  of  effects,  but  a  unity  of 
action;  not  a  unity  of  products,  but  a  unity  of  the  creative 
process."74  But  this  "unity  of  the  creative  process"  —  as  is  ob- 
vious by  now  —  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  unity  and  univer- 
sality of  the  symbolic  function,  expressed  in  the  symbol- 
concept. 

The  "culture-concept"  must,  accordingly,  eclipse  the  "nature- 
concept"  which,  in  Substance  and  Function,  still  stands  for  the 
regulative  idea  of  "lawfulness"  'per  se.  It  does  so  by  reason  of 
the  circumstance  that,  whatever  the  "nature-concept"  connotes 
at  various  historical  periods,  it  is  intelligible  only  as  a  function 
of  what  the  cultural  media  of  art,  religion,  and  science  take  it 
to  mean.  Whereas  "culture"  creates,  in  an  uninterrupted  flow, 
ever  new  linguistic,  artistic,  religious,  and  scientific  symbols, 
both  "philosophy  and  science  must  break  up  these  symbolic 
languages  into  their  elements.  .  .  .  (We  must  learn)  to  inter- 
pret symbols  in  order  to  decipher  the  meaning-content  they 


,  Vol.  1,  1  1. 

74  Essay  on  Man,  70. 


CONCEPTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  119 

enclose,  to  make  visible  again  the  life  from  which  they  orig- 
inally came  forth."75 

Measured  against  this  considerable  task,  what  we  have  in 
the  three  volumes  of  the  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen 
can  hardly  be  expected  to  provide  a  full  answer.  Doubtless,  a 
more  detailed  examination  of  the  various  cultural  phenomena 
than  offered  so  far  would  be  required  to  make  good  the  implied 
promise.  Cassirer  himself  was  aware  of  the  tentative  char- 
acter of  his  attempts  in  what  he  thought  was  the  right  direc- 
tion. 

The  'Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms'  cannot  and  does  not  try  to  be  a 
philosophical  system  in  the  traditional  sense  of  this  word.  All  it  attempted 
to  furnish  were  the  'Prolegomena'  to  a  future  philosophy  of  culture. 
.  .  .  Only  from  a  continued  collaboration  between  philosophy  and  the 
special  disciplines  of  the  'Humanities'  (Geisteswissenschafteri)  may  one 
hope  for  a  solution  of  this  task.76 

CARL  H.  HAMBURG 
TULANE  UNIVERSITY 

78  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften,  94.$ . 


2 

William  Curtis  Swabey 
CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS 


E 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS 

1 RNST  CASSIRER  is  known  to  students  of  epistemology 
1  and  metaphysics  as  a  learned,  lucid,  and  skillful  repre- 
sentative of  the  neo-Kantian  or  "critical  idealistic"  point  of 
viewj  no  one  can  deny  the  competence  with  which  he  reviews 
"the  problem  of  knowledge  in  the  science  and  philosophy  of  the 
modern  age,"  expounding,  quoting,  and  criticizing  innumer- 
able authors,  himself  always  firmly  anchored  in  the  critical 
idealism  of  the  Marburg  School.  In  what  follows  I  undertake, 
with  all  becoming  diffidence,  to  make  explicit  certain  difficulties 
which  I  find,  not  so  much  in  Cassirer's  writings  as  such,  but  in 
the  point  of  view  of  idealism  itself.  The  learned  material 
which  Cassirer  presents,  the  information  concerning  mathe- 
matics and  physics  from  Galileo  and  Cusanus  down  to  Einstein 
and  the  quantum  theory,  is  after  all  susceptible  of  more  than  one 
interpretation  5  just  as  scripture  supports  various  systems  of 
theology,  so  science  does  not  oblige  a  philosopher  to  embrace 
either  idealism  or  realism.  Cassirer's  assemblage  of  historical 
material,  which  he  so  eloquently  and  persuasively  interprets 
in  the  light  of  Kantianism,  could  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of 
realism,  were  there  a  sufficiently  learned  and  skillful  realistic 
philosopher  who  was  willing  to  undertake  the  task.  Naturally, 
in  such  a  wide-spread  application  of  the  historico-critical 
method,  Cassirer  has  had  to  leave  behind  most  of  the  scholastic 
architectonic,  which  Kant  offered  to  the  world  as  never  to  be 
changed  5  the  modern  disciple  merely  retains  a  "point  of  view," 
which  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  extremely  difficult  to  reduce  to  a 
few  definite  assertions.  The  Kantian  "thing-in-itself"  has  dis- 
appeared and  with  it  that  vestige  of  realism,  which  was  always 

123 


124  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

in  the  back  of  Kant's  mind:  the  a  priori  has  become  fluid  and 
indefinite.  The  old  opposition  to  metaphysics,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  to  empiricism,  on  the  other,  remains.  Emphasis  is 
placed  on  relations,  especially  upon  those  involved  in  serial 
order. 

The  comments  which  follow  will  be  made  in  the  name  of 
metaphysics.  By  metaphysics  I  understand  a  theory  of  being 
in  general,  a  science  which  would  deal  with  the  fundamental 
types  of  being  and  reality.  It  would  take  its  stand  on  the  in- 
escapable ontological  claims  of  all  our  thought  and  speech. 
I  do  not,  however,  understand  by  metaphysics  a  discipline 
which  would  deal  primarily  with  those  problems  which  Kant 
dealt  with  under  the  caption  Transcendental  Dialectic;  it  may 
be  true  that  a  degree  of  agnosticism  is  indeed  the  proper  attitude 
with  regard  to  the  dogmas  of  the  metaphysics  of  religion; 
metaphysics,  as  I  understand  it,  is  not  to  be  understood  as 
primarily  the  science  of  the  meta-empirical  (and  consequently 
the  un verifiable),  but  rather  as  that  science  which  clarifies  the 
fundamental  ontological  claims  of  our  thought.  It  is  my  opinion 
that  metaphysics,  in  this  sense,  is  led  to  a  standpoint  of  dualistic 
realism,  a  standpoint  which  is  perhaps  not  final,  but  which  is 
at  any  rate  the  only  natural  way  of  thinking.  The  dualism  of 
Descartes  and  Locke,  although  encumbered  with  many  dubious 
assertions  in  each  case,  still  seems  to  me  the  philosophy  which 
is  most  clearly  suggested  by  our  common  ways  of  talking;  it  is 
perhaps  in  the  end  the  only  intelligible  system,  or,  if  it  too 
conceals  some  insoluble  problems,  it  is  the  least  unintelligible 
system.  By  dualistic  realism  I  mean  a  system  which  posits  a 
world  of  bodies  and  minds  in  continual  interaction.  Bodies  are 
self-existent  entities  with  spatial  attributes;  minds  are  non- 
spatial  beings  which  continually  interact  with  bodies  and  fur- 
thermore know  them  both  by  perception  and  in  other  more 
elaborate  and  indirect  ways.  Dualistic  realism  seems  to  the 
idealist  utterly  unworthy  of  philosophy;  for  him,  it  is  common- 
place, if  not  downright  vulgar;  he  would  prefer  to  leave 
behind  mere  things  and  delve  into  the  mysteries  of  symbolism 
and  the  super-sensuous  regions.  The  realist,  although  sharing 
to  some  extent  the  aspirations  of  the  idealist,  nevertheless  puts 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  125 

common  sense  clarity  and  intelligibility  first,  in  his  list  of  philo- 
sophic values,  and  views  mathematics  as  a  dubious  guide  with 
regard  to  problems  of  being  and  real  existence.  The  idealist  of 
the  type  of  Cassirer  does  not  regard  natural  science  as  con- 
cerned with  a  self-existent  nature.  On  the  contrary,  nature  is 
the  product  of  a  synthesis  of  sensations  and  the  history  of 
science  is  a  process  in  which  thought  perpetually  re-creates  its 
object. 

The  attitude  of  the  criticist  is  one  of  reflection  }  he  deals  not 
with  things,  but  with  thought  about  things  j  he  lives  in  a  world 
of  second  intentions.  Thus,  such  a  philosopher  as  Cassirer  does 
not  offer  us  a  theory  of  bodies  and  minds,  or  of  universals, 
essences,  relations  and  individuals  in  general  j  he  speaks  rather 
as  a  scholar  writing  in  a  well-stocked  library  }  nature  is  for 
him  something  known  only  indirectly,  primarily  through  the 
books  of  scientists}  it  is  an  object  postulated  and  described 
by  a  series  of  authorities.  Ultimately  it  exists  only  in  their 
minds  j  it  undergoes,  in  the  advance  of  science,  modifications 
making  for  greater  extensiveness  and  unity.  Cassirer,  it  is  true, 
has  come  to  recognize  points  of  view  other  than  that  of 
science}  namely,  the  standpoints  of  language  and  myth.  Never- 
theless the  world  exists,  for  the  critical  idealist,  primarily  as 
an  object  of  consciousness.  In  the  end,  I  presume,  it  will  be 
found  to  exist  only  in  the  minds  of  historians}  they,  in  turn, 
will  exist  only  in  each  other's  minds.  Being  is  everlastingly 
dependent  upon  being  known.  My  thesis  is  that  the  attitude 
of  critical  idealism  cannot  consistently  be  maintained}  thought 
always  claims  to  know  an  independent  reality  (or  at  least  be- 
ing)} and  a  consistent  philosophy  can  only  be  reached  by 
following  out  the  ontological  claims  of  our  unsophisticated 
thinking. 

The  sub-title  of  Cassirer's  Substanzbegriff  und  Funktions- 
be griff  is:  Untersuchungen  iiber  die  Grundfragen  der  Erkennt- 
niskritik.  The  phrase  Erkenntniskritik,  or  "critique  of  knowl- 
edge," is  worthy  of  our  attention.  How  can  knowledge  be 
criticized?  If  knowledge  is  knowledge  it  knows  its  objects  as 
they  sre.  The  knowledge  which  can  be  destroyed  by  criticism 
is  not  true  knowledge}  it  is  mere  seeming  knowledge  and 


126  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

nothing  can  replace  such  false  knowledge  save  true  knowledge. 
Critique  of  knowledge  must  mean  a  criticism  of  certain  sciences 
as  they  actually  exist,  in  which  it  is  shown  that  they  use  con- 
venient fictions  and  are  thus  not  literally  true.  Still  this  is  a 
criticism  of  historically  existing  sciences  and  not  of  knowledge 
as  such.  How  can  one  criticize  the  sciences  without  in  some  way 
knowing?  One  would,  otherwise,  have  no  way  of  being  aware 
of  the  shortcomings  of  the  disciplines  he  was  attempting  to 
criticize. 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  critical  standpoint  which  Cassirer 
consistently  occupies  that  metaphysics  is  regarded  as  obsolete. 
As  Cassirer  uses  the  word,  metaphysics  is  merely  a  name  for 
certain  bad  habits  of  thought  inherited  from  a  crude  and  unen- 
lightened past.  In  this  Cassirer  is  in  agreement  with  the  prag- 
matists  and  positivists.  But  philosophers  are  not  to  be  left 
without  any  employment  at  all;  they  may  study  "critique  of 
knowledge."  They  may  pore  over  the  treatises  of  mathema- 
ticians and  physicists  and  note  the  methods  used  and  the  funda- 
mental trends.  Yet  it  cannot  be  said  that  Cassirer,  in  the 
chapters  he  has  devoted  to  mathematics,  physics,  and  chemistry, 
writes  merely  as  an  historian  of  science.  An  account  of  these 
sciences,  taken  merely  as  offered  in  the  works  of  scientists, 
would  generally  be  in  realistic  terms;  such  an  account,  made 
into  philosophy,  would  be  what  is  called  materialism  or  mech- 
anism. But  Cassirer  is  an  idealist;  he  thinks  of  the  sciences  as 
dealing  with  "experience."  What  a  strange  object  is  experience! 
It  is  neither  a  body  nor  a  set  of  bodies,  neither  a  mind  nor  a  set 
of  minds.  From  the  standpoint  of  dualism  experience  is  the 
result  of  the  interaction  of  mind  and  body;  our  bodies  are 
affected  by  external  things  in  various  ways  and  our  brains, 
parts  of  our  bodies,  affect,  according  to  certain  laws  of  psycho- 
physical  correspondence,  our  minds;  the  result  is  what  we 
call  experience.  Experience  is  not  as  such  the  object  of  knowl- 
edge; it  is  better  to  say  that  we  know  material  things  and 
minds  (including  our  own)  by  means  of  experience.  To  make 
"experience"  the  all-inclusive  object  is  itself  a  form  of  meta- 
physics; it  inescapably  commits  us  to  idealism.  Or,  if  we  sup- 
pose that  the  intention  is  merely  to  deny  the  ontological  validity 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  127 

which  science  naturally  claims  for  its  assertions,  still  such 
denial  implies  that  philosophy  possesses,  at  least  in  general 
terms,  a  knowledge  of  what  is,  of  being.  The  traditional  name 
of  the  branch  of  philosophy  which  deals  with  the  fundamental 
types  of  being  is  metaphysics.  My  contention  is  that  every  phi- 
losophy, even  that  sort  which  makes  a  point  of  repudiating  meta- 
physics, involves  some  theory,  however  obscure,  of  the  nature 
of  being  as  such.  The  criticist  himself  deals  with  metaphysical 
problems,  but  in  an  indirect  and  inconsistent  fashion. 

If  we  start  from  the  world  as  given  to  us  in  daily  life  and 
common  language,  we  easily  distinguish  between  bodies  and 
minds.  We  find  a  world  of  bodies  characterized  by  size,  shape, 
and  state  of  motion  or  rest,  having  a  continuous  existence  in 
contrast  to  the  coming  and  going  of  our  perception,  and  dis- 
playing regularity  of  behavior.  But  there  are  also  minds  which 
have  sensations,  thoughts,  and  feelings ;  by  means  of  these 
sensations  and  thoughts  we  somehow  know  bodies  and  are  in 
continual  interaction  with  them;  now  it  is  true  that,  if  we 
regard  knowledge  as  a  matter  of  being  affected  from  without, 
we  are  likely  to  conclude  that  we  know  only  our  own  sensa- 
tions. But  the  causal  theory  of  sensation  itself  presupposes 
.knowledge  of  an  external  world.  This  world,  by  acting  upon 
our  organisms,  engenders  an  awareness  of  sense-qualities.  The 
idealist  abandons  the  external  material  world  on  the  basis  of 
facts  drawn  from  that  world  itself;  the  realist  feels  that  the 
path  of  true  philosophy  consists  in  following  the  fundamental 
ontological  assumptions.  As  an  historian,  Cassirer  postulates 
a  common  sense  world  in  which  such  persons  as  Leibniz,  New- 
ton and  Kant  really  existed  as  psycho-physical  beings.  And  yet, 
like  Kant,  Cassirer  is  an  idealist.  Locke  had  laid  the  foundations 
of  a  dualistic  outlook;  but,  by  thinking  of  the  immediate  object 
or  idea  as  "in  the  mind,"  he  prepared  the  way  for  Berkeley, 
Hume,  and  Kant.  The  world  of  bodies  lost  its  absoluteness 
and  substantiality.  Physical  nature  came  to  be  replaced  by 
experience  taken  substantively.  But  what  definite  conception 
can  we  form  of  experience?  We  know  that  neither  Kant  nor  his 
modern  disciple  would  plead  guilty  to  any  simple  form  of 
Berkeleyanism  (such  as  that  recently  outlined  by  Professor 


128  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

Stace),1  which  would  reduce  the  world  to  spirits  and  their  sense- 
data,  following  one  another  according  to  inexplicable  laws. 

Cassirer's  discussions  of  -logic,  mathematics,  physics,  and 
chemistry,  emphasize  the  importance  of  judgment  in  discover- 
ing relations.  In  general  he  is  antagonistic  to  any  purely  em- 
pirical account  of  mathematical  or  scientific  conceptions.  The 
great  object  of  science  is  relations,  especially  those  giving  rise 
to  serial  orders.  Relations,  he  holds,  are  not  given  to  the  senses, 
but  are  evidence  of  the  comparative  and  postulational  activity 
of  the  mind.  But  it  is  precisely  here  that  difficulties  appear. 
Kant  sharply  distinguishes  between  what  "comes  in  from 
without"  and  the  mind's  own  contribution.  From  the  stand- 
point of  realism,  however,  it  is  obvious  that  the  mind  cannot 
produce  relations  between  things  which  are  not  already  related  } 
thus,  if  two  things  are  correctly  judged  to  be  similar  or  differ- 
ent, it  must  be  because  they  are  already  similar  or  different, 
etc.  Kant  thought  of  the  mind  as  "receiving"  the  "raw  material 
of  sense"  from  "outside}"  but  this  is  all  built  upon  a  dubious 
metaphor.  Let  me  indicate  how,  as  I  suppose,  the  matter  would 
stand  from  the  standpoint  of  psycho-physical  dualism.  We 
postulate  a  brain  as  well  as  a  mind}  the  latter  is  really  merely  a 
series  of  thoughts.  When  the  brain  is  stimulated  in  certain  ways 
sensa  appear  or  occur}  they  occur,  however,  in  relation  to  other 
sensa  which  are  either  actually  present  or  belong  to  the  recent 
or  remote  past}  we  experience  sensa  as  simultaneous  or  succes- 
sive, similar  or  different.  When  the  brain  is  stimulated  probably 
a  considerable  area  is  affected}  old  "traces"  and  habits  are  re- 
activated and  the  mind  finds  itself  perceiving  a  real  thing  in 
a  world  of  material  things.  In  all  this  there  is  no  more  occa- 
sion to  think  of  relations  as  creatures  of  pure  consciousness  or 
of  a  transcendental  mind  than  there  is  to  think  of  the  sensa 
themselves  in  such  a  way.  What  we  know  is  merely  that  per- 
ception of  things  occurs;  the  categorial  interpretation  as  well 
as  the  data  are  the  psychic  accompaniments  of  brain-processes. 
Thus  the  brain  or  the  laws  of  psycho-physical  correspondence 
may  take  the  place  of  the  transcendental  ego  and  its  super- 
natural spontaneity.  But,  at  the  same  time,  we  must  maintain 

1  Stace,  W.  T.,  The  'Nature  of  the  World  (Princeton  University  Press,  1940). 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  129 

also  our  essential  doctrine  that  such  perception,  even  though 
occurring  under  such  psycho-physical  laws,  is  still  perception, 
a  revelation  of  what  is.2  A  psychological  theory,  whether  it 
comes  under  such  transcendental  psychology  as  Kant  gives  us 
or  such  physiological  psychology  as  has  just  been  suggested, 
nevertheless  merely  tells  us  under  what  conditions  we  come 
to  know  a  part  of  the  real  world.  But  the  idealist  thinks  of 
"synthetic  activity"  as  creating  a  second  world  within  the  mind, 
which  in  turn  soon  becomes  the  one  real  world. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  Substance  and  Function  Cassirer  re- 
views the  theories  of  ancient  and  modern  logicians  concerning 
the  concept;  the  general  trend  of  his  discussion  may  be  de- 
scribed by  saying  that  he  finds  the  traditional  class-concept  to 
be  in  process  of  being  supplanted  by  a  new  form  of  concept, 
which  is  that  of  serial  order.  Modern  mathematical  science  no 
longer  views  nature  as  made  up  of  things  or  substances;  it  is 
primarily  concerned  with  relations,  and  these  relations  give  rise 
to  series  of  points,  numbers,  instants,  etc.  Hence  Cassirer  holds 
that  the  form  of  the  concept  which  is  fruitful  for  modern 
mathematical  science  is  no  longer  the  generic  concept  which 
merely  expresses  what  a  number  of  pre-existent  entities  have 
in  common,  but  rather  the  "principle  of  serial  order,"  which, 
once  assumed,  "generates"  the  individuals  which  conform  to  it. 
Against  this  view,  I  would  suggest  the  following  objections. 
Cassirer  is  mistaken  if  he  imagines  that  such  "principles"  can 
ever  take  the  place  of  class-concepts.  For  a  serial  order  pre- 
supposes a  group  of  entities  which  are  ordered,  whether  real  or 
unreal,  such  as  points,  numbers,  colors,  temperatures,  etc.  We 
can  only  refer  to  these  elements  by  means  of  concepts  in  the 
traditional  sense.  Furthermore,  a  principle  of  serial  order  is 
not  a  concept  at  all;  it  is  a  proposition.  Thus,  of  a  row  of 
soldiers,  I  may  be  able  to  say  that  each  man  is  taller  than  the 
one  before  him.  This  is  a  mere  description  of  given  individuals, 
but  it  is  expressed  in  a  proposition.  In  mathematics  I  may 
grandly  postulate  a  series  of  unreal  entities,  such  that  each  one 
is  related  to  the  preceding  one  in  a  certain  way;  still  here  too 

2  Cf.  Sellars,  R.  W.,  The  Philosophy  of  Physical  Realism  (New  York,  Mac- 
inillan,  1932),  70. 


130  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

the  principle  of  serial  order  is  not  what  is  commonly  called  a 
concept.  Or,  consider  such  relations  as  similarity,  equality, 
greater  than,  etc.  How  are  relations  in  any  sense  rivals  of 
class-concepts?  Relations  are  relations,  concepts  are  concepts, 
but  of  course  there  are  concepts  of  relations  and  relations  of 
concepts.  Here  I  shall  venture  a  definition.  Concepts  are  uni- 
versals  connected  with  words  as  their  meanings}  universals  are 
potentially  recurrent  features  of  either  real  or  unreal  entities. 
They  are  capable  of  appearing  more  than  once  (cf.  blue,  square, 
etc.})  while  individuals  are  unique  beings  which  occur  once  and 
once  only.  Individual  things  may  be  unreal,  e.g.,  points,  in- 
stants, geometrically  perfect  bodies,  etc.}  but  all  such  things 
have,  with  reference  to  concepts,  what  is  called  their  essence, 
which  consists  of  those  properties  which  entitle  them  to  belong  to 
a  given  class.  Thus  an  individual  man  may  be  considered  merely 
as  a  man  and  must  have  those  properties  which  warrant  us  in  so 
considering  him.  These  properties  are  said  to  constitute  the 
essence  of  man.  The  concept  of  man  has  these  properties  as  its 
connotation.  When  we  take  these  points  into  account,  it  becomes 
highly  doubtful  whether  there  is  any  justification  for  replacing 
the  class-concept  by  a  "principle  of  serial  order." 

Everything  to  which  we  can  refer  has  its  concept,  points, 
instants,  numbers,  relations,  as  well  as  the  types  of  plant  and 
animal.  Thus,  if  we  speak  of  circles  or  triangles  or  of  numbers, 
of  variables,  or  of  series,  we  do  so  by  means  of  words,  which 
have  the  traditional  type  of  class-concept  as  their  meanings.  It  is 
true  that  all  members  of  a  class  are  similar  to  each  other  in 
certain  respects;  nevertheless  similarity  alone  does  not  define  a 
class  (since  the  members  of  all  classes  are  similar  to  other  mem- 
bers of  their  respective  classes)  unless  we  tell  wherein  the 
members  are  similar,  and  this  can  be  done  only  by  mentioning 
the  feature  that  all  the  members  of  the  class  have  in  common. 
This  common  element  may  be  either  determinate  or  determi- 
nable.  Thus  color  is  a  determinable  feature  and  can  occur  in 
actuality  only  when  rendered  perfectly  specific,  namely,  as 
this  nuance  of  this  particular  color.  When  the  common  element 
is  determinable  it  demands  supplementation;  nevertheless,  we 
cannot  deny  that  all  the  things  named  by  a  generic  term  have 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  131 

something  in  common}  this  is  a  universal  and  may  belong  to 
the  essence  of  those  individuals.  This  doctrine,  however,  im- 
plies nothing  which  would  minimize  the  importance  of  rela- 
tions. Still,  it  is  true  that  the  relations  of  a  thing  do  not  make 
it  what  it  is,  that  is,  do  not  belong  to  its  essence.  Thus  a  lamp 
or  a  shoe  is  what  it  is  by  virtue  of  its  definitive  properties, 
without  regard  to  when  or  where  it  is,  by  whom  manufactured 
or  to  what  use  it  is  put.  It  should  be  remarked,  however,  that 
nothing  has  an  essence  save  with  reference  to  some  defining 
concept.  Thus,  if  a  lamp  is  no  longer  regarded  as  a  lamp  but 
as  a  piece  of  metal  it  is  said  to  have  a  different  essence. 
Furthermore,  nothing  can  lose  its  essence  without  being  annihi- 
lated; if  the  lamp  is  thrown  into  a  furnace  and  melted,  it  ceases 
to  exist  as  a  lamp.  The  properties  of  water  as  water  do  not 
change  when  water  is  frozen  or  vaporized  or  made  to  stand 
upright  in  a  glass  tumbler;  its  nature  includes  the  facts  that 
it  will  evaporate  when  heated,  solidify  when  chilled,  stand  up- 
right when  enclosed  in  a  glass,  etc.  Thus  the  essence  of  a  sub- 
stance is  not  affected  by  its  relations  to  other  things;  if  we  con- 
sider water  solely  as  a  liquid,  then  we  know  from  experience 
that  it  continues  to  exist  as  a  liquid  only  as  long  as  a  certain 
range  of  temperatures  persists;  if  these  temperatures  pass  be- 
yond certain  limits,  liquid  water  is  annihilated.  Thus,  whether 
a  thing  exists  or  not  depends  on  its  relations,  but  its  essence 
is  not  so  dependent.  There  is,  therefore,  a  good  meaning  in 
the  old  doctrine  that  relations  are  all  extra-essential,  the  only 
exceptions  being  found  in  those  cases  in  which  things  are  named 
by  the  relations  in  which  they  stand;  husband,  captain,  servant, 
etc.  The  chief  point  which  I  wish  to  make  is  that  the  logic  of 
the  concept  and  essence  applies  to  all  things,  including  points, 
instants,  numbers,  propositions,  and  relations;  it  can  by  no 
means  be  replaced  by  "functional  relations"  or  "principles  of 
serial  order."  Thus,  beings  may  stand  in  serial  relations,  but 
they  must  have  their  essence  prior  to  and  apart  from  their 
relations;  this  is  because  we  are  dealing,  in  our  statements 
about  essence,  merely  with  entities  as  such.  Numbers,  points, 
instants  and  the  rest  must  be  entities  before  they  can  stand  in 
relations  to  each  other. 


132  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

Cassirer  is  in  general  an  advocate  of  a  "logical"  theory  of 
number;  but  he  rejects  the  emphasis  upon  the  correspondence 
of  classes  characteristic  of  Frege  and  Russell.  His  fundamental 
aim  is  to  vindicate  the  priority  of  serial  order  as  a  basis  for 
mathematical  science.  His  theory  is  therefore  the  opposite  of 
that  which  defines  number  in  terms  of  equivalent  classes.  Two 
groups  are  said,  according  to  Russell,  "to  belong  to  the  same 
number"  when  there  is  a  relation  of  possible  co-ordination  be- 
tween the  members  of  the  two  groups.  Cassirer's  opinion  that 
the  definition  of  number  as  a  class  of  classes  by  no  means 
corresponds  to  the  meanings  of  the  names  of  numbers  in  daily 
life  seems  to  be  sound.  "The  'how  many'  of  the  elements,  in 
the  ordinary  sense,  can  be  changed  by  no  logical  transformation 
into  a  bare  assertion  concerning  'just  as  many'."3  Cassirer  him- 
self advocates  an  ordinal  theory  of  numbers  according  to  which 
"the  individual  number  never  means  anything  by  itself  alone" 
and  "a  fixed  value  is  only  ascribed  to  it  by  its  position  in  a  total 
system."4  According  to  the  "cardinal"  theory,  to  which  Cassirer 
is  opposed,  "the  members  (of  the  number  series)  are  deter- 
mined as  the  common  properties  of  certain  classes  before  any- 
thing whatever  has  been  established  as  to  their  relation  of 
sequence.  Yet  in  truth  it  is  precisely  in  the  element  here  at 
first  excluded  that  the  peculiar  numerical  character  is  rooted."5 
This  is  Cassirer's  statement  of  his  view.  The  philosophy  of 
number  is  a  matter  concerning  which  a  non-mathematician 
may  well  be  cautious.  Perhaps  I  shall  not  be  wrong,  if  I  call 
attention  to  a  principle  which  is  rather  generally  accepted, 
namely,  that  we  gain  insight  into  the  meaning  of  even  the  most 
general  propositions  only  by  analysis  of  particular  illustrative 
cases.  In  application  to  the  problem  of  number  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  mathematicians  or  anyone  else  can  understand  any- 
thing whatever  save  with  reference  to  relations  which  are 
actually  given  in  sensuous  experience.  I  can  well  believe  that 

1  Cassirer,  Ernst,  Substance  and  Function,  (Swabey  tr.,  Open  Court  Publishing- 
Company,  Chicago,  1923),  48.  Since  most  of  my  quotations  from  Cassirer's  writ- 
ings will  be  from  this  particular  volume,  I  shall  hereafter  abbreviate  it :  SF. 

4 1  bid. 

*lbid. 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  133 

in  the  case  of  ordinary  calculation  blind  symbol-manipulation 
takes  the  place  of  "intuitive"  understanding,  and  there  is  no 
reason  why  it  should  not;  mathematics  is,  on  the  whole,  a 
technique  for  dealing  with  relations  far  too  complex  for  us 
to  understand.  Nevertheless,  the  basis  of  mathematics  must  be 
in  the  relation  of  small  numbers  which  can  easily  be  grasped. 
The  relations  of  small  numbers  may  be  illustrated  by  sense- 
data  and  those  of  the  larger  numbers  understood  by  analogy 
with  the  smaller  ones.  Taking  its  start  from  simple  sensuous 
experiences  the  mind  conceives  and  postulates  an  infinite  system 
of  numbers  5  number  is  given  to  sensuous  experience  as  the 
form-quality  of  a  group  of  entities.  Three-ness  is  a  quality  of 
each  and  every  group  of  three,  etc.  Now  it  is  true  that  numbers 
form  a  series,  a  series  stretching  to  infinity.  My  point,  with 
regard  to  Cassirer's  theory  of  number,  is  that  the  "principle" 
or  "form"  of  the  series  cannot  be  understood  save  by  reference 
to  its  individual  members,  which  must  be  given  before  "the 
principle  of  the  series"  can  be  understood.  If  we  say  that  a  given 
number  can  only  be  understood  in  its  relations  to  all  other 
numbers,  it  follows  that  no  number  can  be  understood;  for  the 
series  of  numbers  can  never  be  given  as  a  whole.  If,  therefore, 
to  understand  "3"  it  were  necessary  to  understand  all  the  num- 
bers, the  task  would  be  an  impossible  one.  But  knowing  what 
i,  2,  and  3,  etc.,  are,  as  patterns  or  form-qualities,  with  refer- 
ence to  small  groups,  we  see  that  they  are  capable  of  being 
arranged  in  a  series  such  that  each  number  is  equal  to  the 
preceding  number  plus  one.  But,  if  I  did  not  know  what  num- 
bers were  and  had  no  notions  of  addition,  equality,  etc.,  I  could 
form  no  idea  of  such  a  series  or  its  principles.  The  elementary 
number-equations  seem  to  be  related  to  a  fact  of  experience, 
namely,  that  the  same  group  can  always  be  taken  in  different 
ways.  Thus  six  apples  can  be  taken  by  the  mind  as  one  group, 
or,  in  various  ways,  as  two  or  three  groups:  the  fact  that  these 
transformations  are  always  possible  is  so  easily  verified  that 
it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  the  laws  of  arithmetic  are  a  priori. 
They  may,  however,  be  regarded  as  well-established  generali- 
zations based  on  easy  and  oft-repeated  mental  experiments. 


134  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

It  is  quite  true  that  such  numbers  as  zero,  fractions,  and 
those  which  are  labelled  negative,  irrational,  and  imaginary 
are  not  "funded  qualities"  of  given  groups;  they  require  a 
more  involved  derivation.  Fundamentally,  however,  the  point 
must  be  insisted  upon  that  these  are  not  numbers  in  the  original 
sense  of  the  word;  they  are  rather  fictions  or  quasi-numbers, 
which  could  never  be  understood  did  we  not  have  definite  con- 
cepts of  the  small  integers,  y*  represents  a  division  which  can- 
not be  carried  out;  the  symbol  is  meaningful  only  because  we 
are  ready  to  substitute  for  the  abstract  concept  of  pure  unity 
the  concept  of  distance  or  area  or  material  object.  In  the  same 
way,  to  understand  -2  we  go  beyond  the  notion  of  number  to 
that  of  a  series  having  direction.  According  to  Dedekind,  irra- 
tional numbers  are  "cuts,"  or  divisions  in  the  number-series. 
"The  'cuts'  may  be  said  to  be  numbers,"  says  Cassirer,  "since 
they  form  among  themselves  a  strictly  ordered  manifold  in 
which  the  relative  position  of  the  elements  is  determined  accord- 
ing to  a  conceptual  rule."6  But  there  is  here  a  point  which 
calls  for  comment.  Words  may  change  their  meanings,  but 
meanings  themselves  do  not  change.  A  new  concept  of  number 
is  only  a  new  meaning  attached  to  an  old  word.  The  point  I 
would  make  is  that,  whereas  irrational  numbers  may  be  in  some 
sense  as  good  as  other  numbers,  i.e.,  they  may  conform  to 
certain  laws,  still  they  are  not  numbers  in  the  original  sense 
of  the  word.  Unless  we  start  with  what  Frege  scornfully  re- 
ferred to  as  "pebbles  and  gingerbread  nuts,"  i.e.,  with  that  con- 
ception of  number,  of  "how  many,"  which  the  child  applies  to 
his  fingers  and  toes,  we  cannotjunderstand  the  new  extended 
sense  of  the  word  in  which  V2  may  be  said  to  be  a  number. 
The  technical  kinds  of  number  are  not  numbers  in  the  primary 
sense  of  the  word,  and  they  can  only  be  defined  in  terms  of 
experience  in  roundabout  ways,  as,  for  example,  imaginary 
completions  of  processes,  which  cannot  in  fact  be  completed. 
A  number  is  a  quality  of  a  finite  group;  an  infinite  number  is, 
on  the  face  of  it,  something  inconceivable,  or  even  self-contra- 
dictory. Cassirer  would  say  that  we  grasp  an  infinite  series 
when  we  know  the  law  by  which  it  is  generated.  I  would  say, 

9SF,  61. 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  135 

however,  that  we  know  that  law  only  in  terms  of  the  relations 
of  small  whole  numbers;  these  relations  seem  to  me  to  be 
simply  given  in  the  same  elementary  way  in  which  the  sense- 
qualities  are  given;  there  seems  no  point  in  speaking,  as  Kant 
did,  of  a  dual  origination  of  sense-qualities  "coming  in  from 
the  outside"  and  relations  having  the  more  noble  characteristic 
of  having  been  generated  in  the  mind.  From  the  standpoint  of 
physiological  psychology,  both  qualities  and  relations  originate 
within  the  mind  on  the  occasion  of  the  activation  of  the  brain; 
from  the  standpoint  of  realistic  epistemology,  relations  hold 
between  material  things,  whether  or  not  these  relations  are 
known  by  any  mind. 

A  question  of  prime  importance  for  the  understanding  of 
Cassirer's  position  is  concerned  with  the  meaning  to  be  attached 
to  the  phrase  a  priori.  I  presume  that  the  meaning  which  most 
philosophers  would  give  to  the  term  would  be  simply  the 
intuitively  certain.  Thus  the  multiplication  table  and  the  axioms 
of  Euclid  are  commonly  regarded  as  at  least  legitimate  examples 
of  what  was  formerly  regarded  as  a  priori.  The  a  priori  in  this 
sense  cannot  change;  it  is  capable  of  becoming  intuitively  cer- 
tain to  all  who  understand  the  meaning  of  the  propositions. 
Man  may  be  mistaken  as  to  what  is  self-evident;  but  the  rule 
holds  that  "once  self-evident,  always  self-evident."  If  a  prin- 
ciple is  at  a  later  time  discovered  not  to  be  self-evident,  this 
implies  that  the  earlier  thinkers  were  mistaken  in  regarding  the 
principle  as  self-evident.  Thus,  if  the  "axioms"  of  geometry 
are  not,  in  the  light  of  modern  thought,  self-evident,  they  were 
not  so  in  the  days  of  Kant,  either,  although  he  falsely  thought 
that  they  were.  The  a  priori  then  admits  of  no  variation.  Kant 
claimed  this  sort  of  truth  not  only  for  the  axioms  of  Euclidean 
geometry  but  for  his  whole  transcendental  system  as  well.  Mod- 
ern mathematical  science,  however,  no  longer  recognizes  the 
unique  authority  of  Euclidean  geometry;  it  recognizes  other 
systems  which  it  offers  impartially  to  physics;  this  science 
chooses,  for  certain  purposes,  a  non-Euclidean  system;  indeed, 
no  one  has  given  a  more  lucid  account  of  this  whole  develop- 
ment than  Cassirer  himself  in  his  essay,  Einstein's  Theory  of 
Relativity.  How,  then,  can  one  still  defend  the  a  priori?  The 


136  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

answer  is,  only  by  changing  the  meaning  of  the  term  and 
ascribing  this  new  meaning  to  Kant  as  his  "deeper  meaning." 
And  if  this  is  done  it  becomes  a  real  question  whether  rational- 
ism differs  significantly  from  empiricism.  Cassirer  emphasizes 
the  "active,"  "synthetic,"  and  "relating"  functions  of  the  mind 
as  opposed  to  the  passive  receptivity  of  sense-perception.  The 
mind  exercises  its  intellectual  functions  and  in  this  consists  its 
a  priori  character.  Yet  it  may  be  questioned  whether  this  doc- 
trine has  a  clear  meaning.  The  mind  can  only  distinguish  that 
which  is  already  different }  it  can  rightly  regard  as  similar  only 
that  which  is  already  similar,  etc.  If  we  assume,  as  dualistic 
realism  does,  a  world  of  independently  existent  things,  these 
things  must  have  numerical,  spatial,  and  causal  relations.  The 
mind  cannot  create  these  relations.  Or,  if  we  retreat  to  a 
Berkeleyan  world  of  bodiless  spirits,  there  will  still  be  relations 
of  one  sort  or  another  between  these  spirits.  Our  minds  are 
active  in  shifting  their  attention  from  one  object  to  another  and, 
furthermore,  in  speaking  and  in  writing}  using  words,  we 
"create  worlds,"  "weave  relations,"  "split  asunder,"  and  "re- 
combine  what  we  have  separated,"  etc.  In  the  use  of  words, 
therefore,  we  are  no  doubt  creative}  but  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  our  "judgmental  activity"  can  actually  either  affect  or 
create  things  or  relations. 

However,  let  us  return  to  the  subject  of  space.  Cassirer,  in 
Substance  and  Functlony  quotes  with  approval  the  view  of  Well- 
stein  that  Kant's  intuitive  theory  of  mathematics  was  a  "resid- 
uum of  sensualism  still  attached  to  the  Kantian  idealism."7 
The  new  mathematics,  Cassirer  believes,  brings  out  the  logical 
rather  than  the  empirical  character  of  pure  mathematics.  Now 
this  opinion  seems  to  be  widespread  if  not  universal  among 
students  of  modern  mathematics.  We  may  sum  up  the  matter 
by  saying  that,  in  so  far  as  mathematics  is  a  logically  necessary 
system  of  deductions,  it  is  certain  but  not  true}  in  so  far  as  it  is 
true,  it  is  not  certain  a  priori.  It  was  only  Kant's  extraordinary 
invention  of  an  a  priori  sensibility  which  was  compatible  with  the 
supposed  character  of  Euclidean  geometry,  namely,  that  it  was 
both  a  priori  and  true  of  real  things.  It  is  interesting  to  recall 

1  SF,  1 06. 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  137 

here  the  view  of  geometry  which  Hume  propounds  in  his 
Treatise  of  Human  Nature.  He  tells  us  that  in  geometry  "we 
ought  not  to  look  for  the  utmost  precision  and  exactness.  None 
of  its  proofs  extend  so  far.  It  takes  the  dimensions  and  propor- 
tions of  figures  justly;  but  roughly,  and  with  some  liberty."8 
For  Hume  the  only  possible  criteria  of  existential  truth  were 
sense-data,  and  sense-data  are  often  compatible  with  several 
geometrical  propositions.  Modern  geometry  may  well  be,  as 
Cassirer  says,  a  purely  logical  system  dealing  with  postulated 
relations  in  an  abstract  manifold;  this,  however,  is  not  the  ele- 
mentary geometry  of  the  older  thinkers;  with  regard  to  that 
(elementary)  system  events  seem  to  have  shown  that  Hume, 
who  was  no  great  admirer  of  mathematics,  was  more  nearly 
correct  than  Kant,  who  earnestly  sought  to  eternalize  the 
mathematical  science  of  his  time  by  giving  it  a  transcendental 
foundation. 

Metaphysics  deals  with  problems  of  an  entirely  different 
order.  It  deals  with  the  nature  of  being  and  of  real  existence, 
if  the  two  are  to  be  distinguished,  with  the  difference  between 
mind  and  matter,  universal  and  individual,  etc.,  but  without 
taking  anything  from  the  special  sciences.  But  for  Cassirer 
metaphysics  is  merely  a  name  for  certain  unfortunate  intel- 
lectual tendencies,  which  disappear  in  the  light  of  critical  phi- 
losophy. Let  us  see  what  he  has  to  say  in  the  chapter  entitled 
"The  Problem  of  Reality"  in  Substance  and  Function.  The 
fundamental  vice  of  metaphysics  is,  in  general,  that  it  sets  up, 
as  an  opposition  of  things  (Widerstreit  der  Dinge)  what  in  the 
process  of  knowledge  is  an  inseparable  unity  of  conditions.  Thus 
persistence  and  change,  unity  and  plurality,  thought  and  being 
are  falsely  opposed  to  each  other  in  the  metaphysical  approach.9 
"If  once  things  and  the  mind  become  conceptually  separated 
they  fall  into  separate  spatial  spheres,  into  an  inner  and  an  outer 
world,  between  which  there  is  no  intelligible  causal  connection." 
(271)  But  this  is  a  very  cavalier  way  of  speaking.  It  refers  to 
metaphysics  in  a  broad  condemnatory  way  without  distinguish- 

8  Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Book  I,  Part  2,  Section  4.  (Selby-Bigge 
ed.,  p.  45)- 
•^,237. 


138  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

ing  the  actual  doctrines  held  by  metaphysicians.  It  is  not  clear 
that  metaphysicians  must  fall  into  the  fallacies  named.  Mind 
and  body  may  be  entirely  distinct  from  each  other  in  essence  and 
yet  in  constant  interaction.  If  mind  is  essentially  non-spatial,  it 
cannot  be  spatially  separated  from  bodies,  since  only  what  is  in 
space  can  be  spatially  remote  from  anything  else.  Furthermore, 
the  essential  distinction  of  mind  and  body  does  not  imply  that 
mind  cannot  know  body. 

If  we  consult  immediate  experience,  wHich  is  free  from  re- 
flection, says  Cassirer,  we  find  that  it  is  wholly  without  the 
distinction  between  the  objective  and  the  subjective.  (272) 
For  such  experience  there  is  only  one  level  of  being  which  con- 
tains all  content  within  itself.  The  intellectual  experiment 
which  Cassirer  proposes  is  a  difficult  one;  just  what  are  we  to 
subtract  to  reach  "immediate  experience?"  Still,  without  chal- 
lenging the  proposition  laid  down,  we  may  point  out  that  most 
of  us  are  familiar  with  two  distinctions,  namely,  that  between 
the  objective  and  the  subjective  and  that  between  the  mental 
and  the  physical.  Thus,  another  person's  mind  is  objective,  in 
the  sense  of  really  existent,  although  wholly  mental  in  charac- 
ter. The  same  is  true  of  our  own  minds.  On  the  other  hand,  an 
hallucinatory  dragon  may  be  physical  in  nature  and  yet  unreal, 
which  is,  I  suppose,  what  Cassirer  means  by  subjective.  Even 
if  we  grant  that  the  supposed  "immediate  experience"  does  not 
contain  the  opposition  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective, 
it  might  contain  the  opposition  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical.  If  we  were  conscious  of  any  distinctions  at  all  (and 
otherwise  how  could  we  be  conscious  or  how  could  there  be 
experience?)  we  might  note  the  difference  between  sense-data 
and  the  thought  which  plays  over  them  and  calls,  as  Cassirer 
says,  some  of  them  subjective  and  others  objective.  In  fact,  if 
our  words  referring  to  the  mind  have  a  bona  fide  meaning, 
there  must  be  an  immediate  experience  by  the  mind  of  the  mind 
itself,  an  original  form  of  self-knowledge,  an  awareness  of 
awareness.  At  a  later  stage,  our  primitive  awareness  of  sense- 
data  becomes  a  perception  of  things  and  our  awareness  of  the 
activity  of  thought  becomes  an  explicit  knowledge  of  the  mind 
by  itself. 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  139 

But  let  us  return  to  the  contemplation  of  the  one  plane  of 
immediate  experience}  at  this  stage  all  seems  objective,  and 
hence  there  is  no  occasion  for  the  "false  metaphysical  problem" 
as  to  how  we  pass  from  the  subjective  to  the  objective.  But,  says 
Cassirer,  at  the  first  appearance  of  reflection  a  division  sets  in, 
according  to  which,  data  are  not  simply  accepted  but  are  dis- 
tinguished in  their  value.  Unique  and  fleeting  observations,  he 
says,  are  forced  into  the  background  while  typical  experiences 
which  recur  under  similar  conditions  are  emphasized.  Cassirer 
is  here  attempting  a  hypothetical  reconstruction  of  the  process 
by  which  our  belief  in  an  external  world  arises.  The  mind  sorts 
out  its  impressions  and  there  emerges  a  consciousness  of  ob- 
jective things. 

Along  with  the  loose  associative  connections  of  perceptions  united  only 
under  particular  circumstances  (as,  for  example,  under  definite  physio- 
logical conditions)  there  are  found  fixed  connections,  which  are  valid  for 
a  whole  field  of  objects  and  belong  to  this  field  independently  of  the 
differences  given  in  the  particular  place  and  time  of  observation.  We  find 
connections  which  hold  their  ground  through  all  further  experimental 
testing  and  through  apparently  contrary  instances  and  remain  steadfast 
in  the  flux  of  experience  while  others  dissolve  and  perish.  It  is  the  former 
that  we  call  "objective"  in  a  pregnant  sense,  while  we  designate  the  latter 
by  the  term  "subjective."10 

Now  none  can  doubt  that  in  the  pursuit  of  empirical  knowl- 
edge, it  is  important  to  separate  trivial  and  accidental  connec- 
tions from  those  which  are  universal  and  are  said  to  be  "essen- 
tial" and  "necessary."  But  how  is  this  connected  with  the 
distinction  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective?  It  is  a  fact, 
let  us  say,  that  on  Friday  the  I3th  I  lost  my  purse,  and  it  is  also 
a  fact  that  water  is  essential  to  life.  The  first  is  no  more  sub- 
jective than  the  second.  If,  however,  I  permitted  myself  to 
generalize  from  the  former  occurrence,  I  would  propound  a 
false  superstitious  law  of  bad  luck.  Such  a  generalization  would 
indeed  be  false  and  would  be  founded  on  inadequate  observa- 
tion. A  law  of  this  type  might  be  called  "subject! vej"  but  the 
occurrences  which  cause  some  men  to  accept  it  as  true  are  as 


HO  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

objective  as  any  other  occurrences.  It  seems  that  Cassirer  is  seek- 
ing to  reduce  the  distinction  between  the  subjective  and  the  ob- 
jective to  that  between  particular  events  and  universal  laws. 
But  the  former  are  as  objective  as  the  latter.  He  says: 

We  finally  call  objective,  those  elements  of  experience  which  persist 
through  all  change  in  the  here  and  now  and  on  which  rests  the  un- 
changeable character  of  experience,  while  we  ascribe  to  the  sphere  of 
subjectivity  all  that  belongs  to  this  change  itself  and  that  only  expresses 
a  determination  of  the  particular  unique  here  and  now.11 

But  this  sentence  is  obscure,  particularly  with  reference  to  the 
phrase  "elements  of  experience;"  it  might  mean  that  colors, 
sounds,  tactile  qualities,  and  the  like  are  objective,  for  they  are 
recurrent  elements  in  all  experience;  we  gather  from  the  con- 
text, however,  that  this  would  be  far  from  what  he  means.  He 
has  in  mind  laws  or  connections,  but  laws  or  connections  are 
merely  propositions  supposed  to  be  true  descriptions  of  the  way 
in  which  events  occur;  and  what  occurs  universally  is  no  more 
objective  (really  existent)  than  what  occurs  once  and  once  only. 
However,  perhaps  we  can  make  clear  what  Cassirer  means 
if  we  refer  to  the  classic  instance  of  the  wine  which  was  sweet  to 
Socrates  when  well,  but  bitter  to  Socrates  when  ill.  Should  we 
say  that  the  wine  is  objectively  sweet  because  it  is  normally 
tasted  as  sweet  by  Socrates  and  others;  while  it  is  tasted  as 
bitter  only  by  Socrates  when  he  is  ill?  This  would  be  a  way  of 
permitting  the  feelings  of  the  majority  to  function  as  the 
criterion  of  objectivity;  although  this  is  an  attractive  and  popu- 
lar answer  to  the  question,  it  seems  scarcely  well  founded;  un- 
less, perchance,  we  choose  to  define  objectivity  with  reference 
to  the  majority.  There  is  another  way  of  dealing  with  this  prob- 
lem which  commences  by  asking  us  to  define  our  terms.  Let 
us  say  that  those  features  of  bodies  are  objective  which  belong 
to  them  without  reference  to  observers.  Sweetness  is  merely  an 
effect  produced  by  bodies  acting  on  our  psycho-physical  organ- 
isms and  belongs  to  the  wine  no  more  than  does  the  bitterness, 
save  in  the  sense  that  the  wine  has  the  power  to  produce  a 
certain  sensation  in  the  minds  of  most  people.  It  is  merely  con- 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  141 

venient  to  name  the  wine  according  to  the  more  common  re- 
sponse. But  this  convenience  does  not  constitute  objectivity  in 
the  sense  of  real  existence,  apart  from  all  onlookers. 

Cassirer  himself  goes  on  to  mention  the  Democritean  distinc- 
tion between  the  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of  bodies.  For 
him  it  is  an  illustration  of  the  "transformation  of  objectivity 
into  subjectivity."  "The  seen  color,  the  heard  tone,  remains 
something  *realjj  only  this  reality  does  not  subsist  in  isolation 
and  for  itself,  but  results  from  the  interaction  of  the  physical 
stimulus  and  the  appropriate  organ  of  sensation."12  Similar  con- 
siderations apply  to  the  illusions  of  the  senses.  The  distinction 
between  the  subjective  and  the  objective  is  thus,  for  Cassirer, 
not  a  fixed  line  of  demarcation  but  a  moving  and  relative 
barrier,  such  that  the  same  content  of  experience  can  be  called 
subjective  and  objective,  according  as  it  is  conceived  relative 
to  different  logical  frames  of  reference. 

Sensuous  perception,  as  opposed  to  the  hallucination  and  the  dream, 
signifies  the  real  type  of  the  objective;  while  measured  by  the  schema 
of  exact  physics,  sense  perception  can  become  a  phenomenon  that  no 
longer  expresses  an  independent  property  of  things  but  only  a  subjective 
condition  of  the  observer.13 

Such  a  view  commits  us  to  a  boundless  relativism  in  which  no 
definite  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical.  The  mental  is  identified  with  the  subjective  and  un- 
real. Erkenntniskritik  thus  seems  to  involve  an  attitude  of 
intellectual  nihilism,  in  which  both  mind  and  nature  disappear 
in  a  bottomless  abyss  of  relativity. 

The  standpoint  of  dualistic  realism,  on  the  other  hand,  even 
if  not  capable  of  proof,  is  not  self-refuting.  At  an  early  stage 
men,  and  probably  animals  too,  become  conscious  of  the  thing- 
world  of  which  they  themselves  are  parts ;  they  find  themselves 
continually  interacting  with  these  things.  When  we  consider  the 
way  in  which  sensations  originate  it  becomes  probable  that  colors 
and  tones  belong  to  external  things  only  in  the  sense  that  they 
are  produced  by  them.  The  seen  color  may  be  considered  either 

"W,274. 

"^,275. 


142  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

as  a  predicate  of  external  things  or  in  its  own  right  5  when  taken 
in  its  own  right,  it  becomes  what  some  call  a  sense-datum  and 
others  as  essence.  In  any  case,  the  seen  color  is  not  mental  in 
the  sense  of  belonging  to  the  inner  essence  of  mind  as  con- 
sciousness or  knower;  on  the  other  hand,  it  does  not  belong  to 
nature  as  an  interacting  system  of  bodies.  Taken  merely  as  ob- 
jects by  themselves  colors,  sounds,  odors,  and  the  like  belong  to 
the  non-existent,  to  the  realm  of  being,  which  is  so  much  broader 
than  the  realm  of  existence.  Thus  the  change  which  took  place 
with  regard  to  the  secondary  qualities  need  not  be  described  as 
one  in  which  what  was  previously  thought  to  be  physical  comes 
to  be  thought  of  as  mental  5  it  may  be  described  as  a  change  in 
which  what  was  previously  thought  to  be  an  intrinsic  property 
comes  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  relative  predicate. 

Cassirer's  approach  to  the  problem  of  knowledge  is  that  of 
a  reflective  historian  of  philosophy  and  science;  he  thus  seems 
to  avoid  any  definite  metaphysical  position  of  his  own;  never- 
theless, it  seems  fair  to  say  that  a  definite  ontological  platform 
is  involved  in  so  far  as  we  may  speak  of  Cassirer  as  an  idealist. 
This  position  is  one  of  phenomenalism.  The  things  which  we 
postulate  in  daily  life  are  posited  to  explain,  as  Hume  put  it, 
the  constancy  and  coherence  of  our  perceptions.  The  senses 
alone  do  not  show  us  a  world  of  nature,  but  our  minds  have  a 
natural  tendency  to  postulate  as  much  uniformity  as  they  can; 
sense-perception  gives  us  a  fragmentary,  incomplete  order 
which  we  make  perfect  by  the  assumption  that  things  exist  be- 
fore and  after  our  actual  perceptions.  Science  carries  the  process 
further.  The  "things"  which  it  posits  are  "metaphorical  expres- 
sions of  permanent  connections  of  phenomena  according  to  law 
and  thus  expressions  of  the  constancy  and  continuity  of  experi- 
ence itself."14  In  comment  upon  this  position,  which  Cassirer 
maintains  in  agreement  with  the  views  of  Hume  and  Kant,  it 
may  be  remarked  that  an  account  of  how  we  come  by  a  belief 
need  not  involve  the  notion  that  that  belief  is  itself  false.  To 
explain,  as  John  Stuart  Mill  did,  the  origin  of  our  belief  in  an 
external  world  does  not  imply  that  no  external  world  exists. 
In  fact,  we  may  say  that  such  an  explanation  starts  with  an 
assumption  of  the  validity  of  that  belief  in  so  far  as  there  is  talk 

14 SF,  276. 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  143 

of  "sensations"  or  "perceptions"  which  are  intermittent,  a 
notion  which  is  significant  only  in  contrast  to  continuously 
existent  things.  Does  the  mind  "construct"  things?  Why  should 
we  not  say  that,  on  the  occasion  of  the  occurrence  of  sensations, 
the  mind  comes  to  know  of  things  as  continuously  existent 
entities  which  interact  with  each  other  and  with  the  mind  it- 
self? 

But  let  us  seek  to  discover  the  proper  formulation  of 
Cassirer's  idealism.  Metaphysical  realism,  he  says,  postulates  an 
absolute  gap  between  the  immanent  and  the  transcendent,  and 
declares  that  there  is  no  logical  inference  by  which  we  can  pass 
from  the  former  to  the  latter.  The  realist,  he  says,  finds  it 
necessary  to  leap  the  gap  by  insisting  on  the  transcendent  refer- 
ence of  knowledge,  Cassirer  denies,  however,  that  such  con- 
siderations invalidate  his  own  form  of  critical  idealism. 

Critical  idealism,  [he  writes,]  is  distinguished  from  the  realism  here 
advocated,  not  by  denying  the  intellectual  postulate  at  the  basis  of  these 
deductions  of  the  concept  of  objective  being,  but,  conversely,  by  the  fact 
that  it  grasps  this  intellectual  postulate  more  sharply  and  demands  it  for 
every  phase  of  knowledge,  even  the  most  primitive.  Without  logical 
principles  which  go  beyond  the  content  of  given  impressions  there  is  as 
little  a  consciousness  of  the  ego  as  there  is  a  consciousness  of  the  object. 
.  .  .  No  content  can  be  known  and  experienced  as  "subjective"  without 
being  contrasted  with  another  content  which  appears  as  objective.15 

The  essential  thought  here  is  that  the  subjective  and  the  ob- 
jective are  correlative  and  that  consciousness  is  not  immediately 
given  to  itself  as  such.  This  doctrine  is  no  doubt  derived  from 
the  position  taken  by  Kant  in  his  "Refutation  of  Idealism"  in 
the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  namely,  that  knowledge  of  the 
subject  is  secondary  and  is  dependent  upon  knowledge  of  the 
object  "with  regard  to  its  determinations  in  time."  But  why 
cannot  the  realist  welcome  considerations  of  this  sort?  There  is 
a  directness  of  reference  in  the  mind's  knowledge  of  external 
things  as  well  as  in  its  knowledge  of  itself  j  no  doubt  the  two 
forms  of  knowledge  develop  $ari  passu  and  cannot  exist  apart 
from  each  other.  Still,  if  there  is  knowledge  of  things,  those 
things  must  exist  apart  from  knowledge  and  prior  to  it.  In  a 

15  W,  295. 


144  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

word,  being  must  antedate  being  known;  we  cannot  suppose 
that  things  known  exist  only  in  our  knowledge  of  them;  for, 
"creative  knowledge"  is  not  knowledge  at  all  in  the  human 
sense  of  the  word.  The  thought  that  being  depends  on  being 
known  brings  us  to  most  surprising  results.  For  then  the  knower 
would  also  derive  his  being  from  being  known  either  to  himself 
or  to  another.  It  is  impossible,  however,  for  a  thing  to  depend 
on  itself,  and  not  plausible  to  suppose  that  one  knower  derives 
his  being  from  being  known  by  another  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 
Surely  in  the  end  we  must  reach  a  type  of  being  which  is  self- 
existent. 

We  have  just  seen  that  Cassirer  holds  that  there  is  no  con- 
sciousness of  the  ego  nor  of  material  things  without  "logical 
principles"  which  "go  beyond  the  content  of  given  impressions." 
However,  this  position  seems  open  to  question.  A  man  may 
think  of  whatever  he  likes,  gods,  devils,  angels,  or  atoms.  There 
is,  in  such  thinking,  a  certain  directness;  we  contemplate  our 
object,  whatever  it  may  be,  without,  however,  necessarily  af- 
firming its  existence.  A  man  may,  therefore,  consider  his  own 
mind,  which  he  does  whenever  he  speaks  of  it.  Where  are  the 
"logical  principles"  said  to  be  involved?  No  doubt  it  is  true  that 
the  self,  however  it  may  be  defined,  is  not  among  given  im- 
pressions or  sense-data.  Still,  I  can  mean  myself  just  as  I  can 
mean  the  table.  All  objects  of  thought  are  given  as  objects; 
although  we  are  not  thereby  entitled  to  regard  them  as  real. 
The  real  existence  of  the  self  is  postulated  to  explain  certain 
facts  just  as  that  of  the  table  is  postulated  to  explain  certain 
others;  no  doubt  this  "explanation"  does  presuppose  certain 
logical  principles.  Nevertheless,  has  Cassirer  shown  that  the 
assertions  of  the  "metaphysical  realist,"  namely,  that  there  are 
minds  and  that  these  minds  know  things  external  to  themselves, 
are  false? 

"If  we  determine  the  object,  not  as  an  absolute  substance 
beyond  all  knowledge,  but  as  the  object  shaped  in  progressing 
experience,  we  find  that  there  is  no  epistemological  gap  to  be 
laboriously  spanned  by  some  authoritative  decree  of  thought, 
by  a  'trans-subjective  command'."16  Naturally  the  object  is  not 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  145 

"beyond  all  knowledge,"  since  by  definition  it  is  the  object  of 
knowledge.  How  can  an  object  be  "shaped  in  progressing  ex- 
perience?" Do  scientists  re-make  the  world?  Does  Cassirer 
mean  to  deny  that  the  thing  known  is  distinct  from  the  knowing 
mind  and  existentially  independent  of  that  mind?  Cassirer  him- 
self goes  on  to  say: 

This  object  may  be  called  transcendent  from  the  standpoint  of  a  psycho- 
logical individual;  from  the  standpoint  of  logic  and  its  supreme  principles, 
nevertheless,  it  is  to  be  characterized  as  purely  "immanent."  It  remains 
strictly  within  the  sphere  which  those  principles  determine  and  limit, 
especially  the  universal  principles  of  mathematical  and  scientific  knowl- 
edge. This  simple  thought  alone  constitutes  the  kernel  of  "critical 
idealism."17 

Here  then  we  have  a  statement  offered  as  the  essence  of  critical 
idealism  and  well  worthy  of  our  attention.  Cassirer  grants  that 
the  object  is  transcendent  from  the  standpoint  of  the  psycho- 
logical individual.  Does  he  mean  that  the  object  is  not  trans- 
cendent with  reference  to  the  "mind"  taken  in  some  other 
sense?  Apparently  he  does,  for  he  goes  on  to  say  that  the  object 
is  immanent  "from  the  standpoint  of  logic  and  its  supreme 
principles."  However,  we  may  well  ask  whether  there  is  any- 
thing to  which  logic  does  not  apply.  In  asserting  that  the  object 
is  immanent  in  this  sense,  have  we  not  a  meaningless  statement, 
since  there  is  no  transcendent  realm  with  regard  to  which  the 
immanent  is  a  limited  sphere?  In  a  word,  in  so  far  as  Cassirer's 
idealism  merely  asserts  (if  we  may  cite  such  laws  as  non- 
contradiction and  excluded  middle  as  "supreme  principles  of 
logic")  that  "what  is"  is  self-consistent  and  determinate,  we 
can  hardly  deny  that  the  doctrine  is  not  in  conflict  with  dualistic 
realism.  Such  idealism  would  be  merely  a  re-affirmation  of  logic 
and  mathematics  and  not  a  recognizable  epistemological  asser- 
tion. If  Cassirer's  idealism  contradicts  realism  at  any  point  it 
must  be  because  he  regards  the  principles  of  logic  and  mathe- 
matics as  inherent  in  the  mind,  just  as  Kant  did.  Cassirer  goes 
on  to  assert  "the  objective  validity  of  certain  axioms  and  norms 
of  scientific  knowledge."  "Die  Wahrheit  des  Gegenstands — dies 

17  Cf.  SF,  297. 


146  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

allein  ist  die  Meintmg — hangt  an  der  Wahrheit  dieser  Axiome 
tmd  besifat  keinen  anderen  und  fester  en  Grund."16  But  how  can 
an  object  be  true?  An  object  is  real  or  unreal;  only  a  proposition 
is  capable  of  truth.  The  fact  that  certain  logical  laws  are  uni- 
versally presupposed  in  other  propositions  does  not  imply  that 
being  is  dependent  upon  being  known  and  is  therefore  not 
incompatible  with  dualistic  realism.  The  assertion  of  the  in- 
volvement of  logical  principles  in  more  particular  judgments 
implies  a  conflict  with  realism  only  if  logical  truths  are  supposed 
to  represent  the  necessary  thoughts  of  a  universal  consciousness; 
all  things  may  then  be  said  to  be  within  this  universal  mind.  But 
this  universal  mind  seems  to  be  merely  a  postulated  correlative 
of  universal  truths.  Cassirer  says  nothing  about  a  universal 
mind,  and  thus  seems  to  leave  the  conception  of  idealism  indefi- 
nite. He  does,  however,  conceive  of  the  mind  as  perpetually  en- 
gaged in  a  constructive  activity.  We  are  left  with  a  protean 
"thought"  which  postulates,  on  the  one  hand,  bodies,  and  on  the 
other,  selves.  The  thesis  which  we  seek  to  defend  in  this  criticism 
is  that  such  "construction"  is  merely  metaphorical.  The  mind 
may  range  through  the  realm  of  being,  the  world  of  thinkables, 
in  an  exploratory  fashion,  merely  considering  hypotheses;  but, 
in  all  this  it  creates  nothing;  it  merely  discovers  pre-existent 
possibilities.  When  it  posits  some  one  of  these  thinkable  objects 
as  really  existent  it  likewise  produces  nothing;  it  merely  makes 
an  assertion  which  may  be  either  true  or  false.  But  such  idealism 
as  that  of  Kant  and  Cassirer  would  lose  much  of  its  attractive- 
ness were  it  deprived  of  the  picturesque  and  poetic  notion  of 
mind,  the  supreme  magician,  endlessly  producing  and  destroy- 
ing worlds. 

The  concept  of  thing,  according  to  Cassirer,  is  merely  a  su- 
preme ordering  concept  of  experience.  At  first  we  believe  that 
we  know  things  directly;  but  reflection  destroys  this  naive  con- 
fidence. The  impression  of  the  object  comes  to  be  separated 
from  the  object  itself,  which  becomes  an  unknowable  and 
elusive  thing-5n-itself .  But  from  the  standpoint  of  critical  ideal- 
ism, Cassirer  says,  the  concept  of  an  object  or  thing  is  merely 

18 Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbegriff  (original  German  edition,  1910),  395. 


CASSIRER  AND  METAPHYSICS  147 

an  instrument  of  knowledge;  this  amounts  to  saying  that  objects 
are  merely  fictions,  useful  in  stating  propositions  regarded  as 
true.  Helmholtz  took  the  position  that  "Each  property  or 
quality  of  a  thing  is  in  reality  nothing  but  its  capacity  to  produce 
certain  effects  on  other  things."  On  this  Cassirer  makes  the 
following  comment: 

We  do  not  grasp  the  relations  of  absolute  things  from  their  interaction, 
but  we  concentrate  our  knowledge  of  empirical  connections  into  judg- 
ments, to  which  we  ascribe  objective  validity.  Therefore  the  relative 
properties  do  not  signify  in  a  negative  sense  that  residuum  of  things  that 
we  are  able  to  grasp,  but  they  are  the  first  and  positive  ground  of  the 
concept  of  reality.19 

We  see  then  that,  for  Cassirer,  the  great  objects  of  knowledge 
are  relations.  Thing-concepts  are  merely  means  for  stating  rela- 
tions. Now,  undoubtedly  this  view  is  an  attractive  one;  yet  it 
contains  certain  difficulties.  How  can  there  be  relations  without 
relata?  The  weight  of  a  body  can  perhaps  be  defined  in  terms 
of  its  power  of  influencing  other  bodies,  and  the  sense-qualities 
are  explained  as  mere  powers,  possessed  by  bodies,  of  producing 
sensations.  Nevertheless,  size,  shape,  and  relative  position 
cannot  be  taken  from  bodies  without  annihilating  them.  Rela- 
tivism of  this  extreme  sort  constitutes  a  species  of  nihilism  which 
forces  us  to  admit  that  we  can  form  no  conception  of  the  real 
whatsoever.  Or,  if  we  are  left  with  truths,  what  are  these  truths 
about?  If  realism  is  to  be  defended,  it  must  be  because  not  all 
the  properties  of  bodies  are  relative.  Thus  the  numerical  expres- 
sion of  size  varies  with  the  unit  of  measurement,  but  size  is  what 
is  measured;  it  is  not  the  result  of  measurement.  So,  too, 
although  a  body  appears  differently  when  viewed  from  differ- 
ent angles,  we  need  not  deny  that  bodies  possess  determinate 
shapes.  The  difficulty  which  I  feel  here  is  concerned  with  the 
question  whether  such  a  complete  relativism  can  really  be  in- 
telligibly stated.  At  any  rate,  Cassirer  and  other  idealists  must 
continue  to  use  language  which  implies  the  existence  of  the 
world  of  material  things.  Who  are  the  knowers  who  "use  the 
thing-concept  to  organize  their  experiences?"  Are  they  men? 

19  SF,  306. 


148  WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

And  what  is  experience?  From  the  standpoint  of  dualism,  ex- 
perience involves  the  interaction  of  minds  and  things;  it  is  pri- 
marily a  matter  of  minds  being  affected  by  things.  Experience  is 
itself  not  a  thing  made  up  of  parts,  and  it  is  not  the  primary 
object  of  knowledge;  "we"  do  not  "deal  with"  experience,  but 
rather  we  have  experience  of  things  and  thus  learn  their  ways. 
The  making  of  an  object  out  of  experience  is,  of  course,  the 
irremovable  mark  of  Kantian  idealism. 

The  realist  believes  that  physical  things  are  more  than  mere 
ordering  concepts.  It  is  true  that  physical  things,  whether  those 
dealt  with  by  common  sense  or  those  postulated  by  physical 
science,  are  not  "given  to  sense,"  if  we  are  to  understand  thereby 
a  wholly  passive  process.  We  must  distinguish  between  sensing 
and  perceiving;  the  latter  involves  the  use  of  "thing-concepts." 
In  postulating  public  and  continuously  existent  things  we  neces- 
sarily go  beyond  the  sensations  of  the  moment.  The  very  con- 
cept of  really  existent  things,  in  contrast  to  things  which  are 
merely  thinkable,  implies  at  least  some  degree  of  lawfulness  of 
behavior,  in  other  words,  some  sort  of  interaction  and  causality. 
Cassirer  seems  to  say  the  same  thing  but  with  a  different  em- 
phasis; he  seems  to  think  that  what  we  must  postulate  is  a 
creation  of  our  own  minds,  enjoying  no  absolute  being.  We 
may,  however,  appeal  to  the  parallel  case  of  the  religious  man 
who  feels  that  he  must  postulate  a  God;  he  nevertheless  postu- 
lates this  God  as  an  eternal  and  indestructible  being.  Must  we 
not  postulate  nature  as  (very  likely)  an  everlasting  system  of 
things  in  perpetual  interaction:  some  of  their  interactions  con- 
stitute the  occasions  for  the  occurrence  of  minds  who  know  them 
and  interact  with  them  in  various  ways?  But  for  Cassirer  there  is 
no  self-existent  nature  of  which  we  have  real  but  imperfect 
knowledge;  hypothesis  replaces  hypothesis,  and  "reality"  is 
defined  by  the  law  of  sequence,  by  which  world-system  over- 
comes world-system;  for  him,  there  is  progress  towards  com- 
prehensiveness and  consistency,  but  no  progressive  revelation 
of  a  reality  which  is  there,  whether  known  or  not. 

WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

NEW  YORK  UNIVERSITY 


3 

I.  K.  Stephens 
CASSIRER'S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI 


3 
CASSIRER'S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI 


WHEN  Locke  cleared  the  philosophical  stage  of  its 
"props"  in  the  form  of  innate  ideas,  he  offered,  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  this  particular  traditional  basis  of  certainty,  our  im- 
mediate perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  our 
ideas.  Whatever  ground  this  theory  might  have  supplied  as  a 
basis  for  empirical  certainty,  however,  was  shattered  by  Hume 
when  he  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  "relations  of  ideas"  dif- 
fer in  principle  from  "relations  of  matters  of  fact."  He  admitted 
that  there  are  necessary  relations  between  our  ideas,  but  denied 
that  there  are  any  such  relations  between  "matters  of  fact."  Since, 
for  Hume,  knowledge  must  be  based  upon  ideas,  and  certainty 
must  be  based  upon  necessary  connections,  the  only  field  in 
which  the  mind  can  possibly  attain  certainty  is  in  the  field  of  the 
"relations  of  ideas."  Since  relations  of  matters  of  fact  lack  this 
character  of  necessity,  our  knowledge  pertaining  to  this  field  of 
experience  is  deprived  of  all  logical  grounds  for  a  claim  to 
certainty. 

The  problem  which  Hume  raises  here  is  simply  that  concern- 
ing the  objective  validity  of  the  conceptual  order  of  'the  mind.  If 
one  desires  to  defend  a  claim  to  certainty  in  knowledge  pertain- 
ing to  "matters  of  fact,"  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to  show  how 
the  mind  can  impose  its  concepts  upon  "matters  of  fact,"  upon 
the  "given  in  experience,"  in  such  a  manner  as  to  guarantee 
that  conceptual  necessity  will  govern  the  given.  He  must  show 
how  the  relation  between  the  ideas  of  the  mind  and  matters 
of  fact  can  be  so  interpreted  as  to  furnish  a  solid  ground  on  the 
basis  of  which  the  necessity  which  admittedly  holds  for  rela- 
tions of  ideas  can  be  guaranteed  to  hold  in  the  mind's  conceptual 


152  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

dealings  with  matters  of  fact.  This  is  essentially  the  problem  of 
the  a  priori;  and  every  significant  doctrine  of  the  a  priori  which 
has  been  formulated  in  philosophy  since  Hume  raised  the  prob- 
lem has  been  designed  as  a  basis  for  its  solution. 

Now  this  bit  of  skeptical  infection,  which  Hume  injected 
into  the  thought  stream  of  modern  science  and  philosophy,  first 
took  effective  hold  in  the  mind  of  Kant.  After  a  long  period  of 
intellectual  insomnia  and  after  many  mental  contortions  and 
gyrations,  Kant  finally  came  out  of  the  attack  with  a  new 
Copernican  Revolution  in  philosophy  and  with  a  brand-new 
conception  of  the  a  priori,  which  he  regarded  as  a  sound  basis  for 
the  defense  of  the  citadel  of  empirical  certainty  against  Hume's 
skepticism.  Subsequent  developments  in  the  fields  of  science, 
mathematics,  and  logic  have,  however,  shaken  the  Kantian 
foundation  and  torn  gaping  holes  in  his  defenses.  As  these 
defenses  have  disintegrated,  under  the  bombardment  of  the 
guns  of  recent  developments  in  science,  mathematics,  and  logic, 
however,  a  long  line  of  "successors  to  Kant"  have  appeared  on 
the  scene  to  render  valiant  service  in  attempts  to  secure  the 
foundations  and  to  repair  the  breaches,  through  some  sort  of 
modification,  or  reformulation,  or  regrounding  of  the  Kantian 
a  priori.  It  should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  in  spite  of  all 
these  gallant  efforts,  Hume's  denial  of  certainty  in  the  realm  of 
empirical  knowledge  still  stands. 

II 

In  that  long  line  of  "critical  philosophers"  who  claim  a  philo- 
sophical lineage  from  Kant,  possibly  no  one  is  more  worthy 
of  the  distinction  than  is  Cassirer.  His  penetrating  and  thorough 
analysis  of  Kant's  system  of  philosophy,  his  precise  understand- 
ing of  just  what  Kant  was  attempting  to  do,  and  his  profound 
and  extensive  knowledge  of  the  recent  developments  in  science, 
mathematics  and  logic,  revealed  to  him  many  of  the  funda- 
mental weaknesses  in  Kant's  position;  but,  despite  these  facts, 
he  still  seems  to  me  to  find  more  of  permanent  value  in  Kant's 
system  of  philosophy  than  do  most  of  those  who  claim  to  "stem 
from  Kant."  His  doctrine  of  the  a  priori,  however,  is  not  simply 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  153 

Kant's  doctrine  reformulated  with  its  elaborate  architectonic 
omitted;  nor  is  it  Kant's  doctrine  revised  and  brought  up-to- 
date  in  the  light  of  recent  developments  in  science,  mathematics, 
and  logic.  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  a  priori  and  the  ingenuity  with 
which  Kant  applied  it  in  his  attempt  to  solve  Hume's  problem 
seem  to  be  to  Cassirer — as  they  have  been  to  many  other 
Kantians — a  source  of  inspiration  and  a  useful  guide  in  the 
formulation  of  his  own  doctrine  of  the  a  priori.  As  he  himself 
puts  it,  he  sees  in  Kant  "not  an  end,  but  an  ever  new  and  fruit- 
ful beginning  for  the  criticism  of  knowledge."1 

With  Kant,  and  with  most  Kantians,  Cassirer  is  in  funda- 
mental agreement  on  at  least  two  points  with  respect  to  the 
a  priori;  (i)  that  the  a  priori  is  of  the  mind,  and  (ii)  that  all 
certainty  is  based  on  logical  necessity  and  that  logical  necessity 
is  grounded  in  the  a  priori.  Also  like  Kant  and  most  Kantians, 
Cassirer  conceives  the  major  task  of  philosophy  to  be  the  critical 
analysis  of  knowledge  and  the  explication  of  the  a  priori;  to  the 
accomplishment  of  this  task  he  devotes  his  entire  ponderous  sys- 
tem of  philosophy.  Nowhere  in  his  voluminous  writings,  so 
far  as  I  have  been  able  to  determine,  has  Cassirer  set  forth,  in 
any  sort  of  definite  and  summary  statement,  his  doctrine  of  the 
a  priori.  It  pervades  every  phase  of  his  philosophy  and  appears 
on  almost  every  page  of  his  philosophical  writings;  but  it  is  a 
difficult  and  hazardous  task  to  analyze  it  out  of  his  system  and 
to  pin  it  down  in  a  definite  statement  which  will  do  justice  to 
its  total  meaning  and  value.  This  difficulty  is  further  increased 
by  two  other  factors,  (i)  His  doctrine  of  the  a  priori  seems  to 
have  gone  through  at  least  two  phases  of  development,  and  the 
detailed  results  of  these  two  different  phases  of  its  formulation 
are  significantly  different,  (ii)  In  each  of  these  two  formula- 
tions his  doctrine  of  the  a  priori  is  so  inextricably  bound  up  with 
some  other  special  aspect  of  his  philosophical  theory  that  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  isolate  it  and  evaluate  it,  without  going 
thoroughly  into  these  intimately  associated  theories. 

The  first  phase  of  its  development,  set  forth  in  his  Sub- 
stanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbegriff  (1910),  is  formulated  on  the 

1  Das  Erkenntnisfroblem,  Vol.  I  (1922),  14. 


154  I-  K.  STEPHENS 

basis  of  a  very  thorough  critical  analysis  of  the  physical  sciences 
and  of  mathematics,  and  is  thoroughly  dominated  by  what 
seems  to  me  to  be  a  tremendously  exaggerated  regard  for  the 
position  and  the  value  of  mathematics  and  the  mathematical 
concept  in  the  theory  of  knowledge.  Throughout  this  whole 
work,  as  Gerard  Heymans  remarks,  "Cassirer  looks  steadfastly 
towards  mathematics  and  insists  that  what  is  valid  for  this  is 
valid  also  for  all  the  other  sciences."2  Here  his  doctrine  of  the 
a  priori  is  intricately  bound  up  with  his  "mathematical  theory  of 
the  concept"  and  reflects  a  powerful  influence  from  the  mathe- 
matical interest.  Since  another  essay  in  this  volume  deals  with 
Cassirer's  "theory  of  the  mathematical  concept,"*  I  shall  omit 
its  discussion  here  and  shall  confine  my  discussion  to  those  more 
basic  aspects  of  this  earlier  formulation  which  seem  to  carry  over 
into  the  later  formulation. 

This  second  formulation,  which  is  contained  primarily  in 
Cassirer's  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formeny  is  based  on  a 
critical  analysis  of  the  whole  of  culture  and  is,  in  a  definite 
sense,  a  modification  and  extension  of  the  earlier  formulation 
to  constitute  a  basis  for  a  "general  theory  of  meaning."  Here 
Cassirer  has  relinquished,  to  some  extent,  his  former  emphasis 
upon  the  place  and  value  of  mathematics  and  the  mathematical 
concept.  And,  though  he  still  insists  that  "for  such  a  theory  of 
meaning,  mathematics  and  mathematical  natural  science  will 
always  constitute  a  weighty  and  indispensable  paradigm,"  he 
admits  that  "it  in  no  wise  exhausts  its  content."3  In  this  second 
formulation,  however,  his  doctrine  of  the  a  priori  has  found  a 
new  "love"  in  the  form  of  his  elaborate  doctrine  of  "signs." 
Since  any  attempt  to  extricate  it  from  its  many  "entangling 
alliances"  with  this  theory  would  lead  far  beyond  the  intended 
scope  of  this  paper,  I  shall  feel  justified  here  in  avoiding  also 
any  discussion  of  this  aspect  of  his  doctrine,  except  in  so  far  as 
it  seems  necessary  in  order  to  do  justice  to  his  doctrine  of  the 
a  priori. 

Cassirer  agrees  with  Kant  that  the  correct  approach  to  the 

8  "Zur  Cassirerschen  Reform  der  Begriffslehre,"  Kant-Studien,  Vol.  33  (1928), 
109-128. 

*  EDITOR'S  NOTE  :  Cf.  Professor  Harold  R.  Smart's  essay  infra  on  this  subject. 
3  "Zur  Theorie  des  Begriffs,"  Kant-Studien.  Vol.  33  (1928),  130. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  155 

discovery  of  the  a  priori  is  through  the  method  of  a  critical 
analysis  of  knowledge.  He  emphasizes,  over  and  over,  the 
futility  of  the  attempts  on  the  part  of  previous  "metaphysical 
philosophers"  to  deduce  the  "fundamental  forms  of  the  mind" 
from  some  "original  fundamental  principle."  The  original  diffi- 
culty in  such  an  attempt  always  consists  in  the  fact  that  such 
philosophers  can  determine  neither  the  correct  "beginning 
point"  nor  the  correct  "end  point."  If  they  were  granted  these 
two  points,  "they  might  succeed  in  connecting  them  through 
the  constant  application  of  one  and  the  same  methodological 
principle  in  a  synthetic-deductive  process."  But  since  they  have 
neither  "point,"  they  are  much  in  the  same  position  as  Kant's 
speculative  "dove,"  which  succeeded  in  generating  a  tre- 
mendous amount  of  action,  but  was  unable  to  produce  any  for- 
ward motion.  As  Cassirer  correctly  asserts,  such  philosophers 
have  always  started  out  from  "some  definite  metaphysically 
hypostatized  logical,  or  aesthetic,  or  religious  principle,"  and 
the  results  obtained  from  the  process  have  never  been  worth 
the  efforts  spent. 

Granted,  however,  that  the  critical  analysis  of  knowledge  is 
the  only  method  that  will  lead  to  the  discovery  of  the  genu- 
inely a  priori  elements  of  knowledge,  the  question  naturally 
arises,  How  is  one  to  recognize  it,  when  he  comes  upon  it  in 
the  analysis?  Unless  one  has  some  distinguishing  criterion  in 
terms  of  which  to  recognize  the  a  priori  when  he  finds  it,  he 
would  still  be  in  the  same  position  as  the  "metaphysical  philoso- 
pher" who  had  no  "end  point."  Cassirer's  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion, in  the  first  formulation  of  his  doctrine  of  the  a  priori, 
would  seem  to  run  as  follows:  Since  the  a  priori  is  an  "element 
of  form,"  which  is  necessarily  involved  in  every  creative  act  of 
mind,  and  since  all  knowledge  is  the  product  of  such  creative 
activity,  a  critical  analysis  of  knowledge  will  reveal  the  a  priori 
as  that  "element  of  form"  which  is  always  present  in  every 
creative  act  of  mind  and  which  remains  invariant  through  all  the 
changing  and  shifting  contents  of  experience.  It  is  to  the  end  of 
discovering  just  such  a  set  of  "invariant  elements  of  form"  that 
he  devotes  that  searching  and  exhaustive  critical  analysis  of 
science  and  mathematics  set  forth  in  his  Substanzbegriff  und 
Funktionsbegriff. 


156  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

One  of  the  most  obvious  aspects  of  science,  says  Cassirer,  is 
that  it  is  a  going  concern,  "a  historically  self-developing  fact." 
Kant's  failure  to  recognize  this  fact  becomes,  according  to 
Cassirer,  one  of  the  chief  sources  of  weakness  in  Kant's  system. 
Kant  developed  and  formulated  his  doctrine  of  the  a  priori 
under  an  undue  predilection  for  Newtonian  Mechanics,  which 
he  seemed  to  regard  as  an  example  far  exellence  of  pure 
Reason,  and  as  definitely  finished.  Scientific  knowledge,  how- 
ever, is  never  static;  it  is  in  constant  process  of  development; 
and  the  one  definite  end  toward  which  it  seems  ever  to  be 
directed  is  the  discovery  of  certain  permanent  elements  in  the 
flux  of  experience,  "that  can  be  used  as  constants  of  theoretical 
construction."  Of  such  nature  are  the  concepts  of  science:  hy- 
potheses, laws  of  nature,  scientific  principles,  and  the  like.  In 
the  history  of  this  process,  however,  we  are  met  with  a  constant 
changing  and  shifting  of  just  such  seemingly  constant  elements. 
What  seems  to  be  secure  on  one  level  of  development  is  found 
inadequate  on  the  next  level.  One  particular  system  of  concepts 
follows  another  in  constant  succession;  hypotheses  formulated 
on  one  level  yield  their  place  to  other  hypotheses  on  the  higher 
level;  scientific  principles,  which  seem  to  be  secure  and  firmly 
established  on  one  level  of  development,  are  supplanted  by 
other  principles  on  the  next  level  of  development;  and  even 
"the  categories  under  which  we  consider  the  historical  process 
must  themselves  be  regarded  as  mutable  and  susceptible  to 
change."  But  no  system  of  concepts,  no  single  hypothesis  or 
system  of  hypotheses,  no  scientific  principle,  and  no  category 
which  gives  way  to  a  successor  is  ever  entirely  annihilated.  In 
each  case  of  substitution  the  earlier  form  is  taken  up  into  the 
new  form  which  must  contain  the  answers  to  all  the  questions 
raised  under  the  previous  form.  This  one  feature,  Cassirer 
claims,  guarantees  the  logical  continuity  from  stage  to  stage; 
establishes  a  logical  connection  between  the  earlier  and  the 
latter;  and  "points  to  a  common  forum  of  judgment  to  which 
both  are  subjected."4 

This  "common  forum  of  judgment,"  at  the  bar  of  which 

4  Substance  and.  Function^  268. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  157 

every  concept,  hypothesis,  principle,  and  category  must  justify 
its  relative  claim  to  truth,  consists  in  a  set  of  logically  prior 
"supreme  principles  of  experience  in  general,"  which  must 
always  be  present  and  effective  as  an  "ultimate  constant  standard 
of  measurement"  in  terms  of  which  these  relative  claims  may  be 
measured  and  established. 

Since  we  never  compare  the  system  of  hypotheses  in  itself  with  the  naked 
facts  in  themselves,  but  always  can  only  oppose  one  hypothetical  system  of 
principles  to  another  more  inclusive,  more  radical  system,  we  need  for 
this  progressive  comparison  an  ultimate  constant  standard  of  measure- 
ment of  supreme  principles  of  experience  in  general.  Thought  demands 
the  identity  of  this  logical  standard  of  measurement  amid  all  the  changes 
of  what  is  measured.5 

Now,  according  to  Cassirer,  the  critical  analysis  of  knowledge 
ends  in  just  such  a  set  of  ultimate  logical  principles,  a  set  of 
"fundamental  relations,  upon  which  the  content  of  all  experi- 
ence rests,"  and  beyond  which  thought  can  not  go,  for  "only  in 
them  is  thought  itself  and  an  object  of  thought  possible."6 

They  are  the  "universally  valid  formal  functions  (Fiwctions- 
form)  of  rational  and  empirical  knowledge"  and  constitute 

a  fixed  system  of  conditions,  and  only  relative  to  this  system  do  all  as- 
sertions concerning  the  object  as  well  as  those  concerning  the  ego,  con- 
cerning object  and  subject,  gain  an  intelligible  meaning.  There  is  no 
objectivity  outside  the  frame  of  number  and  magnitude,  permanence 
and  change,  causality  and  reciprocal  action ;  all  these  determinations  are 
only  the  ultimate  invariants  of  experience  itself  and  therefore  of  all 
reality  which  can  be  established  in  it  and  by  it.7 

These  forms,  then,  constitute  the  genuine  a  priori  elements 
of  knowledge,  for  they  are  "those  ultimate  logical  invariants 
which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  every  determination  of  a  con- 
nection in  general  according  to  natural  law"  and  "only  such 
ultimate  logical  invariants  can  be  called  a  priori."*  To  this  list 
of  ultimate  invariants,  Cassirer  adds  "the  categories  of  space 
and  time,  magnitude,  and  the  functional  dependency  of  magni- 

8  ibid. 

8  Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbegriff.  (1910),  410. 
4ii. 
357. 


158  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

tudes,  etc.,"  since  they,  too,  are  "established  as  such  elements 
of  form,  which  cannot  be  lacking  in  any  empirical  judgment  or 
system  of  judgments."9  This  group  of  "logical  invariants"  con- 
stitutes that  system  of  "unchanging  elements  demanded  by  all 
scientific  thought"  and  "fulfill  a  requirement  clearly  urged  by 
inductive  procedure  itself."10  They  also  seem  to  constitute  the 
basic  structural  form  of  the  mind,  and  the  basic  principles  of 
that  "transcendental  logic"  upon  which  alone  a  truly  universal 
logic  can  be  developed.  For  Cassirer  insists  that  "a  truly  uni- 
versal logic  can  be  constructed  only  upon  a  'transcendental* 
logic,  i.e.,  a  logic  of  thought-objects."  Such  a  logic,  he  insists,  is 
in  diametrical  opposition  to  the  formal  logic,  which,  as  Kant 
defined  it,  has  as  its  chief  excellence  the  fact  that  it  "abstracts 
from  all  experience  of  objects  and  their  differences."11  In  this 
traditional  formal  logic,  the  concept  is  a  mere  "form  emptied 
of  all  its  objective  content  and  meaning}"  whereas,  in  his  "truly 
universal  logic,"  concepts  are  "concrete  universals"  which  not 
only  "embrace"  but  "comprehend"  the  particular  subordinated 
to  them. 

Now  when  Cassirer  defines  the  a  priori  as  "those  ultimate 
logical  invariants  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  every  determi- 
nation of  a  connection  in  general  according  to  natural  law,"  he 
designates  this  as  "a  strictly  limited  meaning  of  the  a  friori" 
It  seems  that  a  more  comprehensive  meaning  of  the  term  would 
include  all  those  concepts,  categories,  and  interpretive  principles 
which  are  implicitly  contained  in  this  set  of  "ultimate  forms," 
all  arranged  in  a  logical  structure  of  superordination  and  sub- 
ordination. The  task  of  science  is  to  discover  these  concepts, 
categories,  etc.;  and  the  procedure  by  which  it  accomplishes 
this  task  is  the  constant  comparison  of  these  various  concepts, 
hypotheses,  etc.,  with  this  "constant  standard  of  measurement 
of  supreme  principles  of  experience  in  general."  And  the 
method  followed  here,  says  Cassirer,  "shows  the  same  'rational7 
structure  as  was  found  in  mathematics."12  Induction  and  deduc- 

1  Substance  and  F unction >  269. 

"Ibid.,  268. 

M"Zur  Theorie  des  Begriffs,"  Kant-Studien.  Vol.  33  (1928),  131. 

"Substance  and  Functiony  269. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  159 

tion  do  not  differ  in  their  goal,  but  only  in  the  means  of  reaching 
their  goal. 

"The  tendency  to   something  unchanging,   to   something 
permanent  in  the  coming  and  going  of  sensuous  phenomena,  is 
thus  characteristic  of  inductive  thought  no  less  than  of  mathe- 
matical thought."13  Genuine  theoretically  guided  induction  is 
never  satisfied,  says  Cassirer,  short  of  the  establishment  of  a 
connection  in  the  given  "which  can  be  ...  clearly  surveyed  ac- 
cording to  the  principle  of  its  construction."14  All  thought  is  a 
process  of  objectifying.  Its  function  and  purpose,  both  in  induc- 
tion and  in  deduction,  is  to  establish  unity  in  the  flux  of  sensory 
experience.  This  can  be  done  only  on  the  basis  of  those  trans- 
cendental forms  which  constitute  the  structural  unity  of  the 
mind.  In  so  far,  then,  as  induction,  through  its  method  of  con- 
tinually testing  its  conceptual  devices  by  constant  reference  to 
that  body  of  "ultimate  invariants"  is  able  to  develop  concepts, 
hypotheses,  etc.,  which  stem  logically  from  this  system  of  in- 
variant principles,  and  to  apply  them  in  its  conceptual  dealings 
with  "matters  of  fact,"  it  can  gain  knowledge  of  empirical 
objects  which  possesses  the  same  degree  of  necessity  and  cer- 
tainty as  does  knowledge  of  the  objects  of  mathematics.  For 
"we  do  not  know  'objects'  as  if  they  were  already  independently 
determined  and  given  as  objects, — but  we  know  objectively,  by 
producing  certain  limitations  and  by  fixating  certain  permanent 
elements  and  connections  within  the  uniform  flow  of  experi- 
ence."15 The  superiority  of  the  mathematical  concept  over  the 
ordinary  generic  concept,  its  "greater  value  for  knowledge,"  its 
"superior  objective  meaning  and  validity,"  seems  to  be  due  to 
its  closer  logical  affinity  for  this  set  of  "supreme  principles." 

In  the  first  formulation  of  his  doctrine  of  the  a  priori, 
Cassirer's  attempt  to  solve  Hume's  problem  seems  to  have 
turned  out  to  be  much  the  same  as  the  attempt  made  by  Kant, 
namely,  to  show  how,  at  least  in  the  realm  of  mathematics  and 
the  exact  sciences,  synthetic  propositions  a  priori  are  possible. 
He  seems  to  have  become  conscious  later,  however,  that  he  had 

18  Ibid.,  249. 

14  ibid.,  253. 
303. 


160  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

committed  the  same  fallacy  of  which  he  accused  Kant,  i.e.,  he 
had  confined  his  critical  analysis  within  too  narrow  limits.  For, 
if  the  a  priori  is  the  "necessary  condition  for  all  meaningful 
experience/'  and  its  function  is  to  guarantee  the  unity  of  all 
knowledge,  then  it  must  be  present  and  effective  wherever 
there  is  meaningful  experience  and  a  claim  to  knowledge.  The 
world  of  mathematics  and  the  exact  sciences  is  not  the  beginning, 
but  the  end  of  this  "objectifying  process,"  and  its  roots  reach 
down  into  earlier  levels  of  "fashioning."  Thus  these  a  priori 
forms,  which  come  to  clearest  expression  on  the  level  of  scien- 
tific knowledge,  must  apply  no  less,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  all  the 
fundamental  functions  of  mind  on  all  the  lower  levels  of  cul- 
ture and  in  all  its  special  "phases."  Thus,  for  Cassirer,  in  the 
second  attempt  to  formulate  his  doctrine  of  the  a  priori, 

The  Critique  of  Reason  becomes,  therefore,  the  Critique  of  Culture. 
It  seeks  to  show  how  all  the  content  of  culture,  in  so  far  as  it  is  more 
than  a  mere  single  content,  in  so  far  as  it  is  grounded  in  a  formal  prin- 
ciple, presupposes  an  original  act  of  the  mind.  Herein  the  fundamental 
thesis  of  Idealism  finds  its  essential  and  complete  verification.  So  long 
as  philosophical  consideration  has  reference  simply  to  the  analysis  of 
purely  formal  knowledge  and  is  limited  to  that  task,  just  so  long  the  force 
of  the  naive  realistic  world  view  cannot  be  broken.1* 

An  initial  clue  to  Cassirer's  position  here  is  revealed  in  his 
statement  of  the  demand  made  upon  critical  philosophy.  The 
demand  is 

...  to  include  the  various  methodological  tendencies  of  knowledge,  in 
all  their  recognized  originality  and  independence,  in  a  system  in  which 
the  individual  members,  in  exactly  their  necessary  variety,  are  reciprocally 
conditioned  and  required.  The  postulate  of  a  kind  of  pure  functional 
unity  now  enters  in  the  place  of  the  postulate  of  the  unity  of  the  sub- 
strate and  the  unity  of  origin,  by  which  the  ancient  concept  of  being 
was  essentially  governed.  From  this  there  arises  a  new  task  for  the  phil- 
osophical criticism  of  knowledge.  It  must  follow  as  a  whole  and  survey 
as  a  whole  the  course  which  the  special  sciences  have  traveled  individually. 
It  must  put  the  question,  whether  the  intellectual  symbols  under  which 
the  special  disciplines  consider  and  describe  reality  are  to  be  thought  as 

18 Philosofhie  der  symbotischen  Former*.  Vol.  I  (1923),  n. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  161 

a  simple  juxtaposition  or  whether  they  can  be  understood  as  different 
expressions  of  one  and  the  same  basic  mental  junction.  And  if  this  latter 
presupposition  should  be  verified,  then  there  arises  the  further  task  of 
setting  up  the  universal  conditions  of  this  function  and  of  clarifying  the 
principle  by  which  it  is  governed.17 

In  the  light  of  this  statement,  it  would  seem  that  Cassirer's 
first  fundamental  assumption  is  that  knowledge,  which  philoso- 
phy is  to  subject  to  critical  analysis,  is  necessarily  a  unity;  and, 
furthermore,  that  this  unity  must  be  assured  and  explained  in 
terms  of  certain  "basic  mental  functions"  and  a  "rule"  which 
"governs  the  concrete  multiplicity  and  variety  of  these  knowl- 
edge functions,"  integrating  the  totality  of  their  products  into 
an  organic  whole.  These  "basic  mental  functions"  for  which  all 
the  varieties  of  intellectual  symbols  are  to  be  regarded  as  differ- 
ent expressions,  together  with  the  "rule"  which  governs  these 
functions,  seem  now  to  constitute,  for  Cassirer,  the  fundamental 
a  priori  elements  of  knowledge.  The  categories,  which  Kant 
considered  as  the  "original  concepts  of  the  understanding,"  as 
its  basic  a  priori  forms  and  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  possi- 
bility of  experience,  are  here  relegated  to  a  subordinate  level 
in  the  structure  of  the  a  priori.  Kant's  error,  both  as  to  the 
number  and  nature  of  these  categories,  says  Cassirer,  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  he  did  not  know  at  that  time  what  the  subsequent 
developments  in  "critical  and  idealistic  logic"  have  made  com- 
pletely clear  on  that  point,  namely,  that 

the  forms  of  judgment  mean  only  unified  and  living  motives  of  thought, 
which  pervade  all  the  diversity  of  its  special  forms  and  are  constantly  en- 
gaged in  the  creation  and  formulation  of  ever  new  categories.  The  richer 
and  more  plastic  these  variations  prove  to  be,  the  more  do  they  testify 
to  the  individuality  and  to  the  originality  of  the  logical  function  out  of 
which  they  arise.18 

In  the  light  of  these  considerations,  critical  analysis  must, 
according  to  Cassirer,  be  extended  to  the  whole  of  culture,  to  all 
its  different  "phases"  or  "provinces,"  Art,  Language,  Myth, 

17  Ibid.,  8-9.  Italics  are  mine. 

18 Das  Erkenntnisfroblem.  Vol.  I  (1922),  18. 


162  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

Religion,  and  Science,  and  to  all  the  different  levels  of  its  de- 
velopment. For, 

It  is  proper  not  only  for  Science,  but  for  Language,  for  Art,  and  for 
Religion,  that  they  supply  the  building  materials,  from  which  is  con- 
structed for  us  not  only  the  world  of  the  "real,"  but  also  the  world  of 
the  "mental,"  the  world  of  the  "ego."  We  cannot  insert  them  in  the 
given  world  as  simple  creations,  but  must  concewe  them  as  functions,  by 
means  of  which  every  specific  fashioning  of  Being  and  every  special 
division  and  differentiation  of  the  same  is  carried  out.19 

Each  of  these  special  "provinces"  is  determined  by  a  special 
"point  of  view"  which  the  mind  "freely  takes"  with  respect 
to  the  given  in  experience.  This  special  point  of  view  determines 
a  special  function  which  governs  the  mind's  dealings  with  the 
given,  in  that  special  province.  It  determines  the  formulation 
of  the  categories  and  the  concepts  by  means  of  which  the  mind 
interprets  and  expresses  the  real  from  that  specific  "point  of 
view."  In  each  of  these  special  provinces,  therefore,  we  get  a 
manifestation  of  "one  side  of  the  real."  And  in  all  these  prov- 
inces, taken  together  as  a  unity,  we  get  a  complete  picture  of 
the  totality  of  the  real.  True,  the  pictures  of  the  real  presented 
from  these  different  "points  of  view"  are  very  dissimilar.  But 
this  is  just  what  we  should  expect.  For, 

Since  the  means  utilized  by  these  functions  in  the  performance  of  these 
acts  are  different,  and  since  the  standards  and  the  criteria  which  each 
separate  one  presupposes  and  applies  are  different,  the  result  is  different. 
The  scientific  conception  of  truth  and  of  reality  is  different  from  that 
of  Religion  or  of  Art — thus  it  is  indeed  a  special  and  incomparable 
fundamental  relation  which  is,  not  so  much  indicated,  as  rather  estab- 
lished in  them  between  the  "inner"  and  the  "outer,"  between  the  Being 
of  the  ego  and  of  the  world.20 

The  results  obtained  in  each  of  these  provinces  must,  there- 
fore, be  measured  and  evaluated  in  terms  of  its  own  standards 
and  not  in  terms  of  the  standards  and  demands  of  any  other. 
And  only  in  such  manner  of  dealing  with  them  can  the  question 

10 Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Vol.  I  (1923),  24. 
*lbit. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  163 

be  raised  "whether  and  how  all  these  different  forms  of  world- 
comprehension  and  I-comprehension  can  be  unified — if  they  do 
not  indeed  portray  one  and  the  same  self-existing  'thing',  they 
at  least  perfect  (ergdnzen)  a  totality,  a  unified  system  of  mental 
performance  (Tuns)"21 

Now  if,  under  these  conditions,  the  unity  of  knowledge, 
which  it  is  the  specific  function  of  the  a  priori  to  guarantee, 
seems  to  fall  apart  into  several  separate  provinces  of  knowledge, 
each  with  its  own  a  priori  forms,  its  special  categories,  standards 
and  criteria,  which  apply  only  within  its  own  special  field  of 
"construction,"  Cassirer  informs  us  that  it  is  just  as  much  the 
function  of  the  a  priori  to  preserve  this  diversity  as  it  is  to 
guarantee  the  unity  of  knowledge.  This  "unity  in  diversity'"  he 
says,  is  an  essential  demand  of  consciousness.  In  spite  of  this 
essential  diversity,  there  is  still  a  "unity  of  meaning"  which 
binds  all  these  provinces  together  into  a  "unity  of  systems" 
without  destroying  the  separate  and  distinctive  meaning  and 
value  of  any  system.  This,  he  insists,  is  just  what  an  analysis  of 
culture  reveals. 

For  every  one  of  these  "connections  of  meaning"  (Bedeutungszusam- 
menhange),  Language  as  well  as  scientific  knowledge,  Art  as  well  as 
Myth,  possesses  its  own  constitutive  principle  which  impresses  all  the 
special  fashionings  in  it  as  if  with  its  seal.  ...  It  belongs  to  the  essence 
of  consciousness  itself,  that  no  content  can  be  posited  in  it  without,  posit- 
ing, at  the  same  time,  through  this  simple  act  of  positing,  a  complex  of 
other  contents  with  it.22 

Myth,  Art,  Language,  and  Science  are,  in  this  sense,  impressions  to 
Being  (Pragungen  zum  Sein):  They  are  not  simple  portrayals  of  a 
present  reality,  but  they  exhibit  the  great  lines  of  direction  of  mental 
movement,  of  the  ideal  process,  in  which  the  real  as  one  and  many  is 
constituted  for  us — as  a  multiplicity  of  configurations,  which  are  still, 
ultimately,  held  together  through  a  unity  of  meaning.23 

One  ground  on  which  Cassirer  rejects  the  single  system  of 
the  structure  of  the  mind,  which  speculative  philosophers  of 

21  Ibid. 

22 ibid.,  3i. 

23  Ibid.,  43.  Italics  mine. 


164  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

the  past  have  attempted  to  deduce  from  a  "single  original 
principle"  and  to  arrange  in  a  unique  progressive  series,  is  the 
fact  that  such  a  system  is  inadequate  for  the  explanation  of  this 
diversity.  Explained  in  terms  of  such  a  system,  the  diversity 
gets  swallowed  up  in  the  unity  of  the  system.  Instead  of  such  a 
system,  says  Cassirer,  critical  philosophy  demands,  and  the 
analysis  of  culture  reveals,  a  complex  system  in  which 

Every  form  is,  so  to  speak,  assigned  a  special  plane  within  which  it 
operates  and  in  which  it  unfolds,  with  complete  independence,  its  own 
specific  individuality — but  just  in  the  totality  of  these  ideal  modes  of 
operation  appear,  at  the  same  time,  definite  analogies,  definite  typical 
modes  of  relating,  which  can  be  singled  out  and  described.24 

Now  as  a  means  of  explaining  how  all  these  various  levels 
and  phases  of  culture  are  integrated  into  a  logically  unified 
system  of  systems,  Cassirer  appeals  to  that  set  of  "fundamental 
relations  upon  which  the  content  of  all  experience  rests."  These 
logical  invariants,  he  claims,  permeate  all  the  forms  which 
determine  all  the  fashionings  of  experience  on  all  the  different 
levels  and  in  all  the  different  phases  of  culture.  From  the 
lowest  level  of  "Expression"  in  terms  of  mythical  concepts, 
through  the  level  of  "Representation"  in  terms  of  the  concepts 
of  language,  to  the  highest  level  of  "pure  Meaning"  compre- 
hended in  terms  of  the  "concepts  of  natural  law,"  he  traces  the 
development  of  culture.  In  doing  so,  he  offers  an  incredible 
array  of  evidence  in  support  of  his  claim  that  the  same  "motive 
of  construction"  and  the  same  basic  "structural  form  of  the 
mind"  persist  through  all  these  different  levels  of  develop- 
ment. Although  he  admits  that,  in  the  advancement  from  stage 
to  stage  in  the  process  of  development,  certain  changes  and 
"transformations,"  certain  "characteristic  metamorphoses" 
occur,  he  still  insists  that  these  "supreme  principles"  remain 
fundamentally  the  same,  though  appearing,  on  each  successive 
level,  under  a  "new  form  and  covering."  With  every  transition 
from  a  lower  to  a  higher  level  of  culture,  there  occurs  a  "trans- 
formation" in  the  "point  of  view"  which  the  mind  takes.  This 

29. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  165 

transformation  gives  rise  to  new  demands  and  requires  new 
"norms"  in  terms  of  which  to  meet  them.  As  the  development 
proceeds,  there  is  a  constant  "shifting  of  mental  meaning"  and 
"out  of  every  one  of  these  shiftings  there  arises  a  new  'total 
meaning'  of  reality."25 

Even  on  the  mythical  level  of  culture,  says  Cassirer,  we  find 
exhibited,  in  all  its  various  "fashionings,"  a  certain  definite 
"mental  tendency,"  a  "fixed  direction  of  thought,"  which  the 
mind  follows  in  all  its  expressions  of  experience  on  this  level. 
This  fixed  direction  of  thought  he  attributes  to  the  "form  of 
the  mythical  consciousness,"  which  is  "nothing  more  than  the 
unity  of  the  mental  principles  by  which  all  its  constructions,  in 
all  their  variety  and  in  all  their  vast  empirical  richness,  are 
ultimately  governed."26  Also  on  this  level  of  "Expression," 
there  is  a  "unity  of  point  of  view"  under  the  dominance  of 
which  man's  "mytho-religious  intuition"  shapes  all  the  con- 
ceptual devices  by  means  of  which  he  carries  out  the  organiza- 
tion of  society  as  well  as  the  organization  of  the  world.  And 
although  this  "point  of  view"  may  be  more  definitely  deter- 
mined in  each  particular  society  by  the  living  conditions  under 
which  that  society  exists  and  develops,  we  can  clearly  detect, 
as  a  common  element  in  all  of  them,  certain  "general  and  per- 
vading motives  of  construction."27 

The  mental  principles  which  the  mind  employs  in  carrying 
out  these  constructions  are,  Cassirer  claims,  the  general  cate- 
gories which  constitute  the  fundamental  forms  of  the  social 
consciousness  on  this  level  of  cultural  development.  They  re- 
veal, he  says,  "the  lawfulness  of  consciousness,"  the  unity  of  a 
"structural  form  of  the  mind,"  and  are  just  as  genuinely  a  priori 
as  are  the  fundamental  forms  of  "knowledge"  exhibited  on  the 
various  successive  higher  levels  of  cultural  development.  They 
are,  in  fact,  the  logical  ancestors  of  those  forms  5  for  all  those 
forms  of  culture,  Art,  Law,  Science,  and  all  the  rest,  had  their 
genesis  in  this  mythical  consciousness.  Not  one  of  them  had,  in 

85  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Vol.  Ill  (1929),  523. 
96  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Vol.  II  (1925),  16. 
*lbid.,  220. 


1  66  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

the  beginning,  anything  like  a  distinct  and  clearly  defined  form. 
They  can  all  be  traced  back  to  a  primitive  stage  in  which  they 
all  existed  together  in  the  immediate  and  undifferentiated  unity 
of  mythical  consciousness.  And  out  of  this  undifferentiated 
state,  all  those  fundamental  forms  of  knowledge,  space,  time, 
number,  continuity,  property,  and  the  rest,  have  been  de- 
veloped. 

They  are  the  most  general  forms  of  perception,  which  constitute  the 
unity  of  consciousness  as  such,  and,  therefore,  just  as  well  that  of  mythi- 
cal consciousness  as  that  of  pure  knowledge.  In  this  respect  it  can  be 
said  that  each  of  these  forms  must  have  run  through  a  previous  mythical 
stage  before  receiving  its  definite  logical  form  and  impress.28 

It  is  obvious  that  the  world  picture  presented  on  the  level 
of  Myth  is  quite  different  from  that  presented  on  the  scientific 
level.  This  difference,  Cassirer  claims,  is  not  to  be  explained  on 
the  assumption  that  these  world-pictures  are  constructed  on  the 
basis  of  a  difference  in  the  "nature"  or  the  "quality"  of  the 
categories  used,  but  on  the  basis  of  a  difference  in  the 
"modality"  of  the  categories.  Space,  time,  number,  causality, 
and  all  the  rest  of  the  basic  forms  of  consciousness  are  present 
and  effective  on  the  mythical  level  just  as  they  are  on  all  the 
higher  levels  of  culture,  but  with  a  difference  in  "modality." 
By  the  "quality"  of  a  relation  he  means  "the  special  manner  of 
connecting,  by  means  of  which  it  creates  a  series  in  the  whole  of 
consciousness,"  such  as  is  exemplified  in  the  form  of  "together" 
as  compared  with  "successive,"  the  "simultaneous"  as  con- 
trasted with  "successive  connection."  By  the  "modality"  of  a 
relation,  however,  he  means  its  "meaning  for  the  whole" 
(Sinnganzen)  .  This  character  of  a  relation  "possesses  its  own 
nature,  its  own  self-contained  formal  law.  Thus,  for  example, 
that  universal  relation  which  we  call  time  represents  equally  an 
element  of  theoretical  scientific  knowledge,  and  also  an  essential 
moment  for  definite  structures  of  aesthetic  consciousness."29  Al- 
though it  may  seem  that  these  two  senses  in  which  the  concept 


d.,  78. 
P  kilo  sof  hie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Vol.  I  (19*3),  39. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  167 

time  is  used,  namely,  as  the  uniform  measure  of  all  change  and 
as  the  rhythmical  measure  of  music,  have  nothing  in  common 
except  the  name}  nevertheless,  says  Cassirer, 

This  unity  of  naming  contains  in  itself  a  unity  of  meaning,  at  least 
in  so  far  as  there  is  posited  in  both  that  universal  and  abstract  quality 
which  we  designate  by  the  expression  "succession."  But  it  is  obviously 
a  special  "manner,"  indeed  a  unique  "mode"  of  succession  which  rules 
in  the  consciousness  of  natural  law,  as  the  law  of  the  temporal  form 
of  events,  and  that  which  rules  in  the  comprehension  of  the  rhythmical 
measure  of  a  tone  structure.80 

Now  the  transition  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  level  in  the  de- 
velopment of  culture  is  always  the  result  of  a  "transformation" 
or  a  "permutation"  in  the  "modality"  of  those  various  funda- 
mental forms  "within  which  alone  thought  and  its  world  are 
possible."  This  "permutation"  in  the  "meaning  for  the  whole" 
seems  to  arise  out  of  a  new  "point  of  view"  with  respect  to  ex- 
perience. And  experience  interpreted  from  this  new  point  of 
view  gives  a  new  world-picture.  In  order  to  express  the  new 
relations  and  meanings  which  emerge  with  this  transformation 
in  the  modality  of  those  fundamental  relational  forms,  the 
mind  is  under  necessity  of  creating  a  new  set  of  concepts.  Even 
the  old  concepts  that  are  retained  on  the  new  level  take  on  an 
entirely  different  meaning  from  that  which  they  express  with 
respect  to  the  lower  level.  For  instance,  the  concept  of  "truth" 
and  the  concept  of  "reality"  have  a  meaning  for  science  which 
is  entirely  different  from  that  which  they  express  on  the  level 
of  myth.  It  is  the  function  of  the  concepts  utilized  on  each  level 
of  culture,  however,  to  express  with  objective  validity  the 
relations  and  meanings  which  are  characteristic  of  that  particular 
level,  i.e.,  those  relations  and  meanings  logically  determined 
by  the  specific  formal  modalities  operative  on  that  particular 
level.  The  function  of  thought  on  all  the  different  levels  of 
culture  is  to  "objectify}"  and  this  is  done  in  each  case  by 
"producing  certain  limitations  and  fixating  certain  permanent 
elements  and  connections  within  the  uniform  flow  of  experi- 

90  ibid. 


168  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

ence."  This  task  is  performed  by  means  of  the  concepts  used. 
Thus  the  concepts  used  on  any  particular  level  of  culture  ex- 
press the  meanings  and  fixate  the  relations  peculiar  to  that 
particular  level  with  a  sufficient  degree  of  logical  necessity  to 
guarantee  their  objective  validity.  But  since  the  concepts  uti- 
lized by  the  mind  on  the  different  levels  are  different,  and 
express  different  meanings  and  relations,  the  world-picture 
presented  on  the  different  levels  will  be  different.  All  these  dif- 
ferent world-pictures,  however,  present  different  views  of  the 
one  total  reality.  And  all  these  different  processes  of  objectifying 
contribute  to  one  and  the  same  ultimate  end,  namely,  the  re- 
duction of  the  world  of  mere  impressions  to  a  logically  in- 
tegrated objective  world. 

The  different  creations  of  mental  culture,  Language,  Scientific 
Knowledge,  Myth,  Art,  and  Religion,  in  all  their  inner  variety,  become, 
therefore,  members  of  one  great  problem  of  connection — manifold  tend- 
encies, all  of  which  are  related  to  the  one  goal  of  transforming  the 
passive  world  of  mere  impressions  .  .  .  into  a  world  of  pure  mental 


expression.81 


The  problem  posed  by  Hume,  however,  was  not  the  problem 
of  developing  in  the  mind  a  system  of  ideas  with  their  necessary 
connections,  but  the  problem  of  finding  a  logical  basis  on  which 
to  guarantee  that  these  necessary  connections  of  ideas  must  hold 
in  the  mind's  dealings  with  matters  of  fact.  In  his  first  formula- 
tion of  his  doctrine  of  the  a  priori,  Cassirer  seems  to  attempt 
to  solve  this  problem,  at  least  in  part,  by  an  implicit  denial  that 
any  such  problem  exists.  He  seems  to  think  that  the  problem 
arose  for  Hume  because  he,  like  Kant  in  the  first  part  of  his 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  was  assuming  an  untenable  dualism 
between  a  "mundus  sensibilis'*  and  a  "mundus  intelligibilis" 
In  the  second  formulation,  however,  he  seems  to  realize  more 
fully  that  there  is  some  necessity  of  explaining  how  and  why 
there  must  be  a  necessary  harmony  between  the  conceptual  order 
of  the  mind  and  the  "uniform  flow  of  experience."  Here  the 
"symbol"  becomes  the  mediating  device  which  seems  to  turn 
the  trick.  Symbols,  he  seems  to  think,  are  created  by  "a  pure 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  169 

activity  of  the  mind"  and  are  specifically  and  peculiarly  de- 
signed by  the  mind  to  perform  this  feat.  "All  those  symbols 
appear  from  the  beginning  with  a  definite  claim  to  objective 
value.  They  all  transcend  the  circle  of  the  mere  phenomena  of 
consciousness  and  claim,  in  opposition  to  them,  to  represent  a 
universal  validity."32  In  fact,  their  "structure"  represents  the 
"essential  kernel  of  the  objective,  of  the  real."  Every  symbolic 
structure,  furthermore,  possesses  a  characteristic  "double 
nature."  On  the  one  side,  it  is  essentially  bound  to  the  sensuous; 
but  "its  subjection  to  the  sensuous  contains  in  itself  at  the  same 
time  a  freedom  from  the  sensuous,"  an  essential  connection  with 
the  mental,  with  the  conceptual  order  of  the  mind. 

"In  every  linguistic  'sign',  in  every  mythical  or  artistic 
'image'  appears  a  mental  content  which,  in  and  for  itself,  tran- 
scends the  sensuous,  permuted  Into  the  form  of  the  sensuous, 
the  visible,  the  audible,  the  tastable."33 

Cassirer  attributes  to  Pierre  Duhem  the  credit  for  being  the 
first  to  show  that  only  within  the  structure  of  a  definite  symbolic 
world  is  it  possible  to  approach  the  world  of  physical  reality. 
It  was  his  claim  that  what  first  appears  to  us  as  a  purely  factual 
manifold,  as  a  factual  variety  of  sense  impressions,  gains  phys- 
ical meaning  and  value  only  when  it  is  portrayed  in  the 
province  of  numbers.  This  portrayal,  however,  is  wrongly 
interpreted,  says  Cassirer,  if  we  think  it  simply  consists  in  "sub- 
stituting for  the  individual  contents  given  in  experience  contents 
of  another  kind  and  coinage.  To  every  special  class  of  experi- 
ence, is  co-ordinated  a  special  substrate  which  is  the  complete 
expression  of  its  genuine,  its  essential  'reality'."34 

Now  it  is  Cassirer's  claim  that  the  function  of  mind  in  all  its 
objectifying  processes  is  to  establish  harmony  between  opposites. 
This  harmony,  however,  is  essentially  different  from  the  mere 
matter  of  agreement,  and  requires  a  genuine  synthetic  act  of  the 
mind.  It  seems  to  be  the  function  of  the  symbol  to  mediate  this 
synthesis  and  the  function  of  the  concept  to  "fix"  the  connec- 
tions established  in  the  synthesis.  For  the  first  work  of  the  con- 


88  ibid.,  4i. 

34  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Vol.  Ill   (1929),  478. 


ijo  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

cept,  he  asserts,  is  "to  grasp,  as  such,  the  moments  upon  which 
rests  the  organization  and  order  of  perceptual  reality  and  to 
recognize  them  in  their  specific  meaning.  The  connections  which 
are  posited  implicitly  in  perceptual  existence  in  the  form  of  mere 
'given-withness'  (Mitgegebenheii)  are  developed  from  it.  .  .  ,"35 
Furthermore,  "The  logical  concept  does  nothing  more  than  fix 
the  lawful  order  which  already  lies  in  the  phenomena  them- 
selves y  it  follows  consciously  the  rule  set  up,  which  experience 
follows  unconsciously."36  It  is  the  mind  itself,  guided  by  the 
logical  demands  of  its  "supreme  logical  functions"  which  "sets 
up"  the  rule  which  the  concept  follows  consciously  and  experi- 
ence follows  unconsciously.  Thus  those  functions  seem  to  de- 
termine both  the  conceptual  order  of  the  mind  and  also  the 
"uniform  flow  of  experience,"  and  do  it  in  such  a  fashion  that 
there  must  be  complete  harmony  between  these  two  "op- 
posites."  The  mind's  task  is  to  make  a  synthesis  of  the  two  and 
it  accomplishes  this  feat  by  means  of  the  concept.  For, 

Such  a  "synthesis  of  opposites"  lies  concealed  in  every  genuine  physical 
concept  and  in  every  physical  judgment.  For  we  are  always  concerned 
with  referring  two  different  forms  of  the  manifold  to  one  another  and, 
in  a  certain  measure,  penetrating  them  with  one  another.  We  always 
proceed  from  a  mere  empirical,  a  "given"  plurality;  but  the  goal  of  the 
theoretical  construction  of  the  concept  is  directed  at  changing  it  into  a 
rationally  surveyable,  into  a  "constructive"  plurality.87 

On  the  lower  levels  of  culture,  these  concepts  and  symbols 
are  so  completely  immersed  in  the  sensuous  that  it  is  difficult 
to  detect  in  them  any  connection  with  those  "fundamental  func- 
tions" of  the  mind  which  they  express.  As  the  process  of  objecti- 
fying advances  from  the  lower  to  the  higher  levels,  however, 
the  mind  gradually  succeeds  in  extricating  them  from  their 
subjection  to  and  their  contamination  with  the  sensuous  and  in 
creating  concepts  and  symbols  which  reveal  more  and  more  the 
genuine  nature  of  those  functions.  On  the  lower  levels,  we  see 
those  forms  only  "as  if  through  a  glass  darkly,"  only  in 
their  distorted  "modalities;"  but  when  the  highest  level  is 


85  Ibid.y  330. 

M  I***.,  333- 
87  Ibid.,  480. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  171 

reached,  the  level  of  pure  mathematics  and  the  pure  math- 
ematical natural  sciences,  where  they  have  "put  off  the  cor- 
ruptible and  put  on  incorruption,"  we  shall  "see  them  face  to 
face"  and  recognize  them  for  what  they  genuinely  are,  "pure 
meanings."  This  is  the  ultimate  end  towards  which  the  whole 
creative  process  is  directed,  the  "one  far-off  divine  event  to 
which  the  whole  creation  moves."  For  this  is  the  realm  in  which 

the  bond  between  "concept"  and  "reality"  is  severed  with  complete 
consciousness.  Above  "reality,"  as  the  reality  of  phenomena,  is  raised 
a  new  realm:  The  realm  of  pure  meaning;  and  in  it  henceforth  is 
grounded  all  certainty  and  all  constancy,  all  final  truth  of  knowledge. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  world  of  "ideas,"  of  "meanings,"  although  it 
renounces  all  "similarity"  with  the  empirical  sensuous  world,  it  cannot 
dispense  with  its  relation  to  it.88 

Ill 

This  is,  admittedly,  an  inadequate  and  in  some  respects,  no 
doubt,  an  erroneous  exposition  of  Cassirer's  doctrine  of  the 
a  priori.  It  has  omitted  many  aspects  of  his  doctrine  which,  if 
taken  into  consideration,  might  effect  a  "transformation"  in 
the  "modality"  of  those  aspects  that  are  considered  here.  My 
first  reaction  to  the  whole  delineation  of  his  doctrine  of  the 
a  priori  is  simply  to  regard  it  as  an  extremely  thorough,  meticu- 
lously painstaking  attempt  on  the  part  of  another  brilliant 
philosopher  to  elaborate  and  defend  a  theory  of  the  0  priori 
which  is,  from  the  beginning,  palpably  indefensible.  A  careful 
analysis  of  his  doctrine,  however,  reveals  many  points  which, 
if  taken  in  isolation  from  the  rest  of  his  system  or  if  given  a 
slightly  different  interpretation  from  that  which  his  whole 
system  demands,  would  appear  perfectly  sound  and  thoroughly 
defensible.  This  slight  difference  in  interpretation  is,  however, 
to  use  Whitehead's  expression,  "just  that  slight  difference 
which  makes  all  the  difference  in  the  world." 

To  his  claim  that  the  a  priori  is  of  the  mind  and  is  the  basis 
of  all  necessity  and  of  all  certainty  in  knowledge,  I  readily 
agree.  But  I  contend  that  his  conception  of  the  essential  nature 
of  the  a  priori  is  untenable,  both  in  the  light  of  logic  and  from 

18  ibid.,  527. 


172  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

the  standpoint  of  what  is  revealed  in  a  critical  analysis  of 
knowledge.  Furthermore,  such  a  conception  of  the  a  priori 
is  inadequate  as  a  basis  for  explaining  and  guaranteeing  that 
type  of  necessity  which  grounds  the  only  type  of  certainty  which 
the  mind  can  have  with  respect  to  matters  of  fact.  An  analysis 
of  knowledge  does  not  reveal  any  set  of  invariant  principles 
which  are  necessarily  common  to  all  thinking  minds  and  which, 
by  some  inherent  logical  power  which  they  possess,  are  opera- 
tive in  any  of  the  mind's  categories  and  concepts  in  such  a 
fashion  as  to  force  their  character  of  logical  necessity  upon  the 
given  in  experience.  The  a  priori  character  of  any  concept  or 
category  of  the  mind  is  not  derived  from  any  logical  connection 
which  it  may  have  with  any  fundamental  set  of  "basic  func- 
tions ;"  but  from  the  definitive  attitude  of  the  mind  which  gives 
rise  to  this  conceptual  order  and  determines  the  characteristics 
which  the  given  must  exhibit,  if  it  is  to  be  classified  under  the 
category  or  the  concept  determined  by  that  definitive  attitude. 
The  only  certainty  the  mind  can  have  with  respect  to  any  sensory 
datum  yet  to  be  given  rests  upon  the  mind's  certainty  with 
respect  to  the  meaning  of  its  own  concepts  and  categories.  This 
meaning  is  established  and  determined  by  the  mind  itself,  by 
virtue  of  the  definitive  attitudes  which  it  takes,  and  can  be 
strictly  and  consistently  adhered  to  regardless  of  what  may  be 
given  in  experience.  This  definitive  attitude  determines  the 
criteria  which  any  given  datum  must  satisfy  if  it  is  to  be  in- 
terpreted under  the  concept  or  under  the  category  which 
embodies  and  expresses  these  criteria.  Failing  to  satisfy  these 
criteria,  the  given  datum  is  excluded  from  such  classification 
and  interpretation.  For  every  classification  which  the  mind 
makes  is  an  implicit  interpretation.  But  every  interpretation  is 
an  implicit  prediction  with  respect  to  some  subsequent  datum  of 
experience.  The  interpretation  of  any  set  of  sensory  data  under 
any  definite  concept  or  category  implicitly  asserts  that  such  a 
set  of  data  will  be  followed  by  certain  other  definitely  specifiable 
data,  namely,  those  which  are  implicitly  demanded  by  the 
definitive  criteria  which  constitute  the  essential  meaning  of  the 
concept  or  the  category  under  which  the  original  data  were 
classified.  The  only  necessity  which  the  mind  can  impose  on  the 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  173 

given,  therefore,  is  the  necessity  which  the  given  is  under  of 
conforming  to  certain  definitive  criteria  of  the  mind  or  else 
being  excluded  from  classification  and  interpretation  under  the 
specific  concept  or  category  which  those  definitive  criteria  es- 
tablish. The  mind  can  know,  then,  prior  to  the  experiencing  of 
any  particular  datum  of  experience,  the  character  which  that 
particular  datum  must  exhibit  if  it  is  to  be  classified  under  any 
definite  concept  or  category.  The  mind  knows  this  because  the 
mind  itself,  by  its  own  definitive  attitudes,  determines  those 
criteria  to  which  the  datum  must  conform,  or  elsey  and  can  make 
them  hold  regardless  of  what  the  given  datum  may  or  may  not 
do.  Thus  all  the  necessity  which  the  mind  is  capable  of  imposing 
on  the  given,  through  the  use  of  its  "conceptual  order,"  is 
derived  (i)  from  the  character  of  its  own  legislative  acts  which 
determine  the  essential  meaning  of  its  conceptual  devices  and, 
(ii)  from  the  alternative  which  the  mind  has  of  excluding  from 
classification  under  any  concept  or  category  any  given  element 
of  experience  which  does  not  conform  to  the  criteria  which  are 
established  by  those  legislative  acts  for  the  concept  or  the  cate- 
gory in  question.  Such  necessity,  therefore,  does  not  rest  upon 
some  logical  connection  which  these  concepts  and  categories 
have  with  some  "fixed  system  of  conditions,"  relative  to  which 
alone  any  assertion  concerning  anything  whatsoever  can  have 
any  meaning.  This  contention  of  Cassirer  reflects  the  powerful 
influence  of  his  undue  predilection  for  mathematics,  and  also  his 
misconception  of  the  genuine  nature  of  mathematics  itself. 

There  is  a  definite  sense  in  which  the  a  'priori  principles  of 
knowledge  may  be  considered  as  the  "formal  structure  of  the 
mind,"  but  not  the  sense  in  which  Cassirer  uses  the  expression. 
Those  initial  principles  and  criteria  of  interpretation  which 
formulate  the  mind's  definitive  attitudes  constitute  the  formal 
conceptual  structure  with  which  the  mind  meets  and  interprets 
the  given  in  experience.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the  mind  organizes 
and  systematizes  the  chaotic  flux  of  the  given  into  a  predictable 
and  intelligible  world.  This  conceptual  "structure  of  the  mind," 
however,  is  neither  an  inherent  structure  of  all  thinking  minds } 
nor  is  it  by  any  means  invariant.  Even  those  most  fundamental 
categories  of  the  mind,  those  which  formulate  the  mind's  de- 


174  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

finitive  attitudes  that  determine  the  different  types  of  the  real, 
are  not  invariant,  at  least  not  in  the  sense  that  they  must  remain 
the  same  regardless  of  any  change  in  the  complexity  of  the 
given  which  the  mind  must  encounter}  or  regardless  of  any 
possible  change  in  the  dominant  interests  and  purposes  of 
society.  In  fact,  it  seems  to  be  carrying  the  defense  of  a  claim 
to  the  point  of  absurdity  to  insist  that  those  "rational  functions" 
which  Cassirer  designates  as  "the  ultimate  invariants  of  ex- 
perience itself"  have  remained  invariant  throughout  the  history 
of  culture.  Furthermore,  if  the  character  of  invariance  be  desig- 
nated as  the  criterion  of  the  a  priori,  I  doubt  that  any  single 
"element  of  form,"  not  even  excepting  such  forms  as  Space, 
Time,  Number  and  Magnitude,  Permanence  and  Change, 
Causality  and  Reciprocal  Interaction  would  qualify  as  a  priori; 
for  these  fundamental  forms  have  certainly  undergone  rather 
remarkable  change  in  the  process  of  man's  cultural  develop- 
ment from  the  primitive  level  to  its  present  state.  Cassirer  does, 
of  course,  allow  for  certain  "shiftings  of  intellectual  accent" 
and  certain  "modal  transformations"  in  the  process  j  but  I  doubt 
whether  the  difference  between  the  primitive  man's  vague  sense 
of  time  and  of  space  and  the  modern  scientist's  conception  of  a 
fused  space-time  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  such  "shiftings" 
and  "transformations  ;"  or  whether  man's  hazy  anthropo- 
morphic conception  of  a  mythical  causal  agent  could  be  recon- 
ciled in  this  way  with  the  purely  formal  definition  of  cause  as  it 
is  used  today  by  the  theoretical  scientist.  If  the  change  be  ex- 
plained in  terms  of  a  refinement  in  definition,  it  can  be  said  in 
reply  that  a  relation  is  what  it  is  by  definition,  and  any  refine- 
ment in  definition  means  a  change  in  the  nature  of  the  relation. 
Even  those  forms  are  creations  of  the  mind;  and  what  the  mind 
has  created  it  can  change  when  the  demand  arises.  And  the  de- 
mand for  such  a  change  is,  usually,  not  merely  a  logical  demand, 
but  a  practical  one,  a  demand  created  by  the  appearance  of  some 
new  type  of  the  "given"  for  the  proper  interpretation  of  which 
the  previous  forms  have  proven  inadequate. 

The  relative  permanence  of  these  forms  and  also  their  a 
priori  character  I  would  readily  grant;  but  I  would  deny  that 
they  are  invariant  and  also  that  invariance  is  the  criterion  for 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  175 

the  determination  of  the  a  priori  character  of  any  form.  It  may 
be  that,  to  paraphrase  Wordsworth,  "Each  hath  had  elsewhere 
its  origin  and  commeth  from  far"  and  that  each  does  come 
"trailing  clouds  of  glory."  Such  clouds  of  glory  may  be  marks 
of  their  ancient  origin  j  but  neither  the  clouds  of  glory  nor  its 
ancient  origin  is  a  mark  of  its  a  priori  character.  In, the  case  of 
these  forms,  as  in  the  case  of  all  other  forms  and  "functional  re- 
lations of  rational  and  empirical  knowledge,"  whatever  char- 
acter of  the  a  priori  they  may  possess  is  due  to  a  definitive 
and  legislative  act  of  the  mind  itself.  Whatever  degree  of 
permanence  or  invariance  they  may  show  is  explicable,  I  think, 
on  the  grounds  of  their  practical  value  as  instruments  for  han- 
dling the  given,  and  not  on  the  grounds  that  they  satisfy  some 
"ideal  logical  demand."  Furthermore,  if  invariance  and  an- 
tiquity of  origin  be  sure  marks  of  the  a  priori,  then  I  see  no 
grounds  on  which  to  exclude  the  category  of  substance,  against 
which  Cassirer  so  vigorously  inveighs  throughout  his  entire 
system  j  for  certainly  this  category  has  as  ancient  and  as  honor- 
able a  history  as  can  be  claimed  for  any  of  those  "functional 
relations"  to  which  he  attributes  the  a  priori  character. 

It  is  true,  as  Cassirer  claims,  that  Culture,  in  all  its  different 
forms  and  on  all  its  different  levels,  is  a  creation  of  the  mind. 
It  includes  all  those  devices,  both  mental  and  physical,  which 
the  mind  has  created  for  the  purpose  of  handling  the  given  in 
experience  and  of  reducing  that  given  to  an  ordered  and  in- 
telligible world.  It  seems  to  be  the  characteristic  function  of  the 
mind  to  create  just  such  conceptual  tools  and  to  use  them  to 
this  definite  end.  The  "original  motive"  which  lies  behind  this 
"constructive  activity,"  however,  is  not  a  "will  to  logic,"  but 
a  "will  to  live,"  a  will  to  satisfy  certain  vital  and  emotional 
interests  of  the  organism.  And  it  is  the  "will  to  live"  rather 
than  a  "will  to  logic"  which  tends  to  determine  those  definitive 
attitudes  of  the  mind  and,  thus,  the  nature  and  meaning  of  its 
categories  and  concepts.  Cassirer,  it  seems,  would  insist  that 

There's  a  Logic  that  shapes  our  concepts, 
Rough-hew  them  how  we  will. 

I  would  insist  on  substituting  for  "logic"  certain  vital  and  emo- 


176  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

tional  interests  of  the  organism.  For  the  thinking  organism, 
confronted  with  the  chaotic  welter  of  experience,  is  confronted 
likewise  with  a  practical  necessity  of  doing  something  about  it. 
Otherwise  I  doubt  that  any  tendency  to  think  would  ever  have 
arisen.  The  ability  to  think  is,  I  take  it,  an  evolutionary  product, 
and  has  developed  in  the  human  species  as  a  result  of  its  sur- 
vival value.  The  tendency  to  regard  man  as  primarily  a  "think- 
ing being"  rather  than  as  an  "acting  being"  has  led  to  many 
misinterpretations  of  the  function  of  mind.  Mind's  function 
is  not  that  of  "harmonizing  thought  and  Being,"  but  rather  that 
of  adjusting  the  organism  to  the  chaotic  flux  of  experience  in 
ways  that  will  preserve  and  promote  certain  vital  and  emotional 
interests  which  the  organism  has.  This  function  it  performs  by 
taking  certain  definitive  attitudes  towards  the  given  in  experi- 
ence and  in  formulating  these  attitudes  into  definite  categories 
and  concepts  which  will  serve  as  efficient  guides  to  the  organism 
in  its  processes  of  adjustment.  Thinking  is  only  one  means 
of  solving  these  problems  of  adjustment  -y  and  most  beings,  who 
have  the  ability  to  think,  generally  use  it  only  when  more 
primitive  means  prove  inadequate.  The  human  mind  itself  is 
only  man's  ability  to  create  and  to  use  conceptual  devices  as  a 
means  to  that  end.  Such  conceptual  devices  are  created  by  the 
mind,  usually,  just  to  serve  that  end.  They  may  be  changed  or 
even  discarded  when  they  prove  inadequate  to  serve  this 
purpose  or  when  the  mind  hits  upon  other  devices  which  serve 
the  purpose  better.  The  standard  against  which  the  mind  is 
constantly  checking  its  categories,  concepts,  hypotheses,  etc.,  is 
not  a  set  of  invariant  logical  functions,  but  usually  the  practical 
results  derived  from  their  application  to  the  flux  of  experience 
and  the  consonance  of  those  results  with  experience  itself. 

Cassirer  admits  that  "No  number  . .  .  'is'  anything  other  than 
it  is  made  in  certain  conceptual  definitions."  This  is  true,  of 
course  j  but  the  same  can  be  truly  said  of  all  the  concepts  and 
categories  which  the  mind  uses.  The  superior  value  which 
number  and  all  other  mathematical  concepts  have  for  deductive 
purposes  rests  upon  the  exactness  and  precision  with  which  they 
may  be  defined.  Again,  the  relations  in  terms  of  which  math- 
ematical concepts  are  defined  are  quantitative  relations  and, 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  177 

therefore,  susceptible  to  more  definite  and  precise  expression 
and  analysis  than  are  those  with  which  ordinary  classificatory 
concepts  are  defined.  The  very  essence  of  number  is  simply  a 
definite  position  in  a  purely  logical  series.  Number  is  not  a 
"concrete  universal,"  but  a  purely  abstract  universal,  a  purely 
logical  entity,  the  quintessence  of  abstraction.  The  relata  them- 
selves are  creations  of  the  mind  and,  for  that  reason,  the  mind 
is  able  to  force  them  to  conform  to  relations  established  by  its 
concepts.  The  given  sensory  data  of  experience,  however,  are 
not  created  by  the  mind  and  cannot  be  forced  to  conform  to 
those  relations.  They  either  do,  or  they  do  not.  If  they  do  not, 
the  mind  has  the  alternative  of  excluding  them  from  classifica- 
tion under  the  concept  which  established  those  relations.  Upon 
this  ability  of  the  mind  to  formulate  concepts  by  definition,  and 
to  reject  from  classification  and  interpretation  under  those  con- 
cepts any  datum  which  does  not  conform  to  the  criteria  which 
their  definitions  establish  rests  the  a  priori  character  of  all  con- 
cepts, mathematical  as  well  as  the  ordinary  generic  concepts. 

Mathematics  is,  in  its  entirety,  a  creation  of  the  mind  and  is 
the  most  efficient  tool  for  handling  certain  types  of  the  given — 
those  types  in  which  the  quantitative  aspects  are  more  important 
than  are  the  qualitative  aspects — that  the  mind  has  ever  created. 
Mathematics,  however,  demands  nothing  more  than  that,  if  a 
certain  relation  holds  among  a  certain  set  of  entities,  be  they 
abstract  or  be  they  concrete  entities,  then  certain  other  sets  of 
relations  must  also  hold  among  those  same  entities.  But  those 
certain  other  sets  of  relations  which  must  hold  are  implications 
of  the  definition  which  established  the  meaning  of  the  original 
relation.  If  three  points  in  a  plane  are  arranged  in  the  form 
of  a  right  triangle — these  are  all  pure  abstractions — ,  then  the 
square  on  the  hypotenuse  must  be  equal  to  the  sum  of  the 
squares  on  the  other  two  sides.  The  certainty  of  the  statement 
contained  in  the  "then"  clause  of  this  theorem  is  assured  by  the 
implications  of  the  definition  of  a  right  triangle.  The  relations 
stated  in  the  "then"  clause  can  be  known  to  hold  a  priori,  neces- 
sarily, only  on  the  ground  that  the  mind  is  in  position  to  exclude 
from  the  class  of  right  triangles  all  triangles  which  do  not 
conform  to  the  criteria  specifically  stated  or  implied  in  the 


178  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

definition  of  a  right  triangle.  If  we  substitute  for  these  abstract 
entities  certain  concrete  entities,  a  triangular  plot  of  ground  for 
the  plane  and  fence  posts  for  the  abstract  points,  we  know  that 
the  same  relations  must  hold  among  these  entities  also.  If  we 
measure  accurately  the  distances  between  the  posts  along  the 
shorter  sides  of  the  triangle  and,  upon  these  measurements, 
calculate  accurately  the  length  of  the  supposed  hypotenuse  and, 
then,  upon  these  calculations,  buy  the  wire  to  fence  the  piece 
of  ground,  we  may  come  out  several  rods  short.  Such  a  disap- 
pointing and  inconvenient  result  does  not  constitute  an  empirical 
demonstration  of  the  falsity  of  the  Euclidean  theorem,  but 
demonstrates  the  falsity  of  the  original  assumption  that  the 
posts  were  related  in  the  form  of  a  right  triangle.  It  is  just  this 
character  of  mathematical  concepts  which  makes  them  so  useful 
as  means  of  discovering  relations  among  concrete  entities  which 
would  likely  never  be  discovered  otherwise.  But  the  certainty 
obtained  in  this  way  is  of  the  same  type,  and  rests  upon  the 
same  basis,  as  that  gained  through  the  mind's  application  of  any 
of  its  concepts  to  the  concrete  data  of  experience.  For  all  cer- 
tainty in  empirical  knowledge  rests  upon  the  mind's  ability  to 
formulate  definitions  of  concepts  and  to  make  those  definitions 
hold  with  respect  to  the  given  by  rejecting  all  cases  which  do 
not  conform  to  the  demands  established  in  those  definitions. 
The  application  of  mathematical  concepts  in  the  interpretation 
of  the  given  can,  therefore,  like  the  application  of  any  other 
type  of  concepts,  never  be  more  than  hypothetical.  And  the 
certainty  derived  from  their  application  is  of  the  same  type  as 
that  derived  from  the  application  of  other  types  of  concepts. 
Also  the  a  priori  character  of  mathematical  concepts  is  of  the 
same  nature  as  that  of  any  other  type  of  concepts.  Whatever 
superiority  they  may  have  over  the  ordinary  classifi.catory  con- 
cept is  due  to  properties  which  they  possess  other  than  their  a 
priori  character. 

The  a  priori  is  not  some  inherent  character  of  logical  necessity 
or  "logical  priority  to  the  possibility  of  experience"  possessed  by 
any  relation  or  group  of  relations.  Those  initial  principles  and 
definitive  criteria  which  have  the  character  of  a  priori  necessity 
and  certainty  possess  it  by  virtue  of  the  definitive  attitude  which 
the  mind  takes  toward  them  and  the  alternative  which  the  mind 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  179 

has  of  excluding  from  classification  under  them  any  given  case 
which  fails  to  conform  to  the  definitive  attitude  formulated  in 
them.  The  chemist,  for  instance,  may  know  with  absolute 
certainty  the  truth  of  the  chemical  formula  HC1  +  NaOH  -> 
NaCl  +  H2Oj  but  only  on  the  grounds  that  in  the  case  of  any 
experiment  in  which  these  results  fail  to  follow,  the  chemicals 
used  were  either  not  HC1  or  not  NaOH  or  were  neither  HC1 
nor  NaOH.  In  such  a  case  he  may  demand  either  a  re-labeling 
or  a  re-filling  of  the  containers  from  which  the  chemicals  were 
obtained.  On  this  same  basis,  one  may  assert  with  absolute 
certainty  that  all  crows  are  black.  This  statement  may  be  ac- 
cepted as  a  mere  hypothetical  principle,  susceptible  to  verifica- 
tion or  refutation  by  future  experience,  or  it  may  be  taken  as  a 
definitive  principle  and,  in  that  case,  it  would  not  be  susceptible 
to  refutation  at  all.  It  would  be  an  a  priori  principle.  The  dif- 
ference between  the  two  cases  is  simply  a  difference  in  the 
attitude  which  the  mind  takes  with  respect  to  the  principle.  It 
is  just  such  a  definitive  attitude  of  the  mind  that  establishes  the 
a  priori  character  of  any  principle,  not  excepting  space,  time, 
number,  magnitude,  permanence,  change,  causality,  reciprocal 
interaction,  or  any  other  relation. 

The  assertion  that  this  particular  set  of  "universal  functions," 
or  any  other  particular  set  of  relations  or  presuppositions  "form 
a  fixed  system  5  and  only  relative  to  this  system  do  assertions 
concerning  the  object,  as  well  as  concerning  the  subject,  gain 
any  intelligible  meaning"  is  an  assertion  which  is  not  only  un- 
warranted but  definitely  untenable  in  the  light  of  recent  de- 
velopments in  logic  and  mathematics.  These  developments  have 
definitely  shown  that  various  sets  of  postulates  may  serve  as  a 
logical  basis  from  which  the  same  deductive  system  may  be  de- 
rived. They  have  also  definitely  shown  that  deductive  systems 
are  purely  analytical  and  tautological  and  that  there  are  no 
synthetic  propositions  a  priori.  As  Reichenbach  has  correctly 
said,  "The  evolution  of  science  in  the  last  century  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  continuous  process  of  distintegration  of  the  Kantian 
synthetic  a  priori"™  In  the  light  of  the  combined  results  of  the 
developments  in  science,  mathematics,  and  logic  during  the  last 

*  Hans  Reichenbach,  "Logistic  Empiricism  in  Germany,"  Journal  of  Philosophy ', 
vol.  33  (1936)1  H5- 


i8o  I.  K.  STEPHENS 

century,  it  would  be  difficult,  at  least,  to  justify  the  claim  that 
any  one  set  of  postulates  is  the  only  one  relative  to  which  ex- 
perience would  be  possible}  or  that  any  one  set  of  presupposi- 
tions is  the  only  one  in  terms  of  which  valid  judgments  con- 
cerning the  object  or  the  subject  of  knowledge  can  have  any 
meaning.  It  must  be  admitted  that  some  set  of  logically  prior 
principles  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  any  knowledge  of 
anything  at  all.  But  this  logical  priority  is  not  the  inherent 
birthright  of  any  particular  set  of  principles.  If  there  has  ever 
been  any  justification  for  the  Rationalist's  claim  that  any  certain 
set  of  "first  principles"  is  logically  indispensable  for  the  ex- 
planation of  the  experienced  world  of  particulars,  and  that  such 
logical  priority  is  a  guarantee  for  the  truth  of  those  principles, 
the  grounds  for  that  justification  have  been  definitely  elimi- 
nated by  the  revelations  of  modern  logic  and  mathematics  rela- 
tive to  the  nature  of  deductive  systems. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  all  knowledge  is  purely  relational 
and  that  man's  whole  categorial  and  conceptual  scheme  is  a 
purely  relational  scheme.  It  is  also  true  that  such  a  relational 
scheme  has  meaning  only  within  a  more  or  less  definitely  fixed 
set  of  "reference  objects"  which  constitute  a  general  "frame  of 
reference"  somewhat  analogous  to  a  set  of  co-ordinate  axes, 
the  points  of  the  compass,  meridians  of  longitudes  and  parallels 
of  latitude,  etc.  Those  relations  which  Cassirer  designates  as  the 
"fixed  system"  of  "supreme  principles"  may  be  regarded,  in  the 
main,  as  just  such  a  system  of  reference  objects,  and  as  consti- 
tuting such  a  "frame  of  reference."  But  such  reference  objects 
are  neither  true  nor  false,  neither  right  nor  wrong.  They  are 
only  methodological  devices  which  render  possible  the  achieve- 
ment of  some  desired  end.  They  may  be  convenient  or  incon- 
venient, adequate  or  inadequate,  for  the  accomplishment  of  this 
end.  And  although  some  such  set  of  "reference  objects"  is  neces- 
sary for  the  accomplishment  of  this  end,  no  particular  set  is 
necessarily  invariant.  Nor  is  any  particular  set  of  such  relations 
indispensable. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  no  given  datum  of  experience  ever 
comes  with  its  meaning  attached,  so  that  it  may  be  read  off  by 
the  mind  in  some  sort  of  mtellectuelle  Anschauung  or  some 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  A  PRIORI  181 

Wordsworthian  state  of  "wise  passiveness."  Each  given  datum 
receives  meaning  only  through  some  interpretive  construction 
being  put  upon  it.  And  interpretation  always  involves  the  ap- 
plication of  some  set  of  distinguishing  and  definitive  criteria  and 
interpretive  principles,  some  set  of  "reference  objects,"  in  terms 
of  which  interpretation  gives  meaning  to  the  given  datum  of 
experience.  Some  such  set  of  "elements  of  form"  must,  there- 
fore, be  logically  prior  to  any  knowledge  at  all.  Such  elements 
are  creations  of  the  mind  and  are  a  priori.  Even  the  most  primi- 
tive judgment  involves  the  implicit  application  of  such  elements 
to  the  object  of  the  judgment.  This  certainly  does  not  imply, 
however,  that  any  particular  set  of  such  a  'priori  elements  can  be 
legitimately  singled  out  and  designated  as  the  only  set  in  terms 
of  which  even  a  meaningful  experience  is  possible. 

If  one  desires,  therefore,  to  seek  for  the  a  priori  either  in  the 
intellectual  creations  of  the  childhood  of  the  individual  or  in 
those  of  the  childhood  of  the  race,  he  will  likely  find  it  there. 
For  the  a  priori  always  serves  as  a  means  for  the  conceptual 
handling  of  "matters  of  fact,"  and  wherever  man  is  engaged  in 
this  sort  of  enterprise  he  will  be  using  it.  It  is  also  true  that  any 
adequate  conception  of  the  a  priori  must  be  one  that  is  applicable 
anywhere,  on  any  level  and  in  any  phase  of  human  experience 
where  the  work  of  an  interpretive  mind  is  recognizable.  On  this 
ground,  there  is  certainly  justification  for  Cassirer's  insistence 
that  certain  a  priori  "elements  of  f orm"  may  be  found  on  every 
level  and  in  every  phase  of  human  experience.  But  I  see  no 
justification  for  his  extension  of  the  Critique  of  Reason  into  a 
Critique  of  Culture  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  the  nature  of 
the  a  priori.  If  his  purpose  was  to  show  that  the  a  priori  consists 
of  a  set  of  invariant  principles,  then  it  seems  to  me  that  his  mon- 
umental efforts  have  turned  out  to  be  a  case  of  "Love's  Labor's 
Lost." 

I.  K.  STEPHENS 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
SOUTHERN  METHODIST  UNIVERSITY 


4 
Felix  Kaufmann 

CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 


CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 

I 

FUTURE  writers  of  textbooks  on  the  history  of  philosophy 
will  have  little  difficulty  in  assigning  Ernst  Cassirer  a  place 
within  their  neat  schemes  of  philosophical  doctrines.  He  will  be 
classified  as  a  neo-Kantian,  and,  more  specifically,  as  an  out- 
standing member  of  the  Marburg  school  of  neo-Kantians, 
alongside  of  Hermann  Cohen  and  Paul  Natorp.  Cassirer  him- 
self frequently  professed  his  close  affiliation  with  this  group  of 
thinkers1  and  was  profoundly  influenced  by  Cohen's  interpreta- 
tion of  Kant's  philosophy. 

It  is  one  of  Cohen's  lasting  accomplishments  to  have  shown 
that  Kant's  intuitionistic  theory  of  mathematics,  as  exhibited  in 
some  of  the  arguments  in  his  Transcendental  Aesthetics,  repre- 
sents only  a  transitory,  pre-critical,  stage  in  his  philosophical 
development,  which  led  to  the  transcendental  method  in  the 
strict  sense.  This  can  be  seen  from  Kant's  diary,  as  well  as  from 
a  comparison  of  the  first  edition  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason, 
with  the  Prolegomena  and  with  the  second  edition  of  the  Crit- 
ique. Cohen  submits  that  this  trend  in  Kant's  thought  represents 
genuine  philosophical  progress,  the  full  implications  of  which 
were  grasped  neither  by  Kant  himself  nor  by  the  idealistic 
schools  which  emerged  after  him.  Accordingly,  he  assigns  the 
task  to  his  own  generation  of  philosophers  of  understanding 
Kant  better  than  he  understood  himself,2  just  as  Kant  had  de- 
manded that  we  understand  Plato  better  than  he  understood 

*See  e.g.,  Cassirer's  Preface  to  Determinismus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der 
modemen  Physikt  viii. 

2  See  Preface  to  the  ist  ed.  of  Hermann  Cohen's  Logik  der  Reinen  Erkenntnis, 
xi,  xii. 

185 


1 86  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

himself.  A  substantial  part  of  Cassirer's  life-work  is  an  execution 
of  this  program.  It  will,  therefore,  be  appropriate  to  start  our 
analysis  of  his  theory  of  knowledge  with  a  brief  outline  of  his 
interpretation  of  Kant's  epistemological  doctrine. 

II 

In  a  famous  passage  of  the  preface  to  the  second  edition  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  Kant  has  drawn  an  analogy  between 
his  work  and  the  work  of  Copernicus. 

The  experiment  .  .  .  ought  to  be  made,  whether  we  should  not  succeed 
better  with  the  problems  of  metaphysic,  by  assuming  that  the  objects 
must  conform  to  our  mode  of  cognition,  for  this  would  better  agree  with 
the  demanded  possibility  of  a  priori  knowledge  of  them,  which  is  to 
settle  something  about  objects,  before  they  are  given  us.  We  have  here 
the  same  case  as  with  the  first  thought  of  Copernicus  who,  not  being 
able  to  get  on  in  the  explanation  of  the  movements  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  as  long  as  he  assumed  that  all  the  stars  turned  round  the  spectator, 
tried,  whether  he  could  not  succeed  better,  by  assuming  the  spectator 
to  be  turning  round,  and  the  stars  to  be  at  rest.  (F.  Max  Miiller  trans- 
lation [1896:1922],  693.) 

This  analogy  suggested  the  facile  interpretation  of  Kant's 
philosophy,  of  his  "Copernican  Revolution,"  as  a  subjectivistic, 
anthropocentric  doctrine.  But  more  penetrating  students  of 
Kant — as  were  the  members  of  the  Marburg  school — realized 
that  this  interpretation  is  apt  to  conceal  the  core  of  Kant's  trans- 
cendental method.  They  realized  that  his  approach  was  far  more 
"revolutionary."  He  did  not  try  to  offer  a  new  solution  to  the 
time-honored  problem  of  the  origin  of  knowledge  by  proposing 
a  transformation  which  makes  the  subject  the  initial  system,  the 
"center  of  the  universe."  Kant  rather  disposed  of  the  whole 
problem  in  its  traditional  formulation  by  refuting  all  attempts 
toward  explaining  pre-scientific  and  scientific  experience  in 
terms  of  the  dogmatic  assumption  of  things-in-themselves.  This 
point  is  emphasized  by  Cassirer  time  and  again,  perhaps  most 
forcefully  in  his  analysis  of  Kant's  philosophy  in  the  eighth 
book  of  the  Erkenntnisproblem. 

Kantian  philosophy  is  not  primarily  concerned  with  the  ego,  nor  with 
its  relations  to  external  objects,  but  with  the  principles  and  the  logical 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         187 

structure  of  experience.  Neither  "internal"  nor  "external"  objects  exist 
in-  and  for-  themselves  j  they  are  given  under  the  conditions  of  experi- 
ence. Accordingly,  we  have  to  develop  the  norms  and  rules  of  experi- 
ence before  we  make  statements  about  the  nature  of  things.  Hitherto 
things  and  the  ego  had  to  be  projected  on  a  metaphysical  background, 
to  be  derived  from  a  common  substantial  origin  in  order  to  be  grasped 
in  their  context;  but  now  the  question  takes  a  new  turn.  What  is  now 
sought  is  the  fundamental  logical  form  of  experience  as  such,  which 
must  apply  to  "internal"  as  well  as  "external"  experience.  Knowledge 
with  respect  to  objects  cannot  be  entirely  different  from  knowledge 
with  respect  to  our  ego;  both  kinds  of  knowledge  should  be  united  by 
an  all-embracing  principle.  In  this  principle  we  have  the  genuine,  true 
unity  of  "origin,"  and  we  need  only  go  back  to  this  unity  to  dispose  of 
the  "absolute  contrasts"  presupposed  by  traditional  ontology.  These 
observations  amount  to  a  clear  delineation  of  Kant's  method;  judgments 
about  things  rather  than  things  are  its  theme.  A  problem  of  logic  is 
posed,  but  this  logical  problem  is  exclusively  related  to  and  aimed  at 
that  peculiar  and  specific  form  of  judgment  by  which  we  claim  to  know 
empirical  objects.8 

Kant's  transcendental  method  starts  from  the  fact  of  (scien- 
tific) experience  and  seeks  to  determine  how  this  fact  is  possible. 
In  other  words,  he  clarifies  the  meaning  of  "objective  experi- 
ence." In  making  explicit  the  elements  of  experience  and  the 
different  types  and  levels  of  synthesis  involved,  we  arrive  at 
synthetic  propositions  a  priori.  These  propositions  are  a  priori 
for  experience  inasmuch  as  they  contain  constitutive  principles 
of  experience,  but  they  are  not  independent  of  experience  in  the 
sense  of  being  valid  beyond  the  realm  of  (possible)  experience. 
The  time-honored  ontological  principles  are  found  to  be 
pseudo-principles  and  the  related  ontological  problems  to  be 
pseudo-problems,  as  soon  as  it  is  recognized  that  the  "transcend- 
ent use"  of  the  categories  implied  in  their  formulations  is  ille- 
gitimate. Yet  this  "extermination"  of  ontological  principles  does 
not  amount  to  their  complete  annihilation}  they  are  re- 
interpreted as  regulative  principles  of  scientific  inquiry. 

The  unity  of  empirical  knowledge  is  not  "given"  (gegeberi) 
but  "set  as  a  task"  (auj 'gegeberi) ;  in  other  words,  it  is  not  pre- 
established  by  things-in-themselves,  but  conceived  as  an  ideal, 

*  Erkenntnisfroblem,  Vol.  II,  662  f.  Cf.  also  Vol.  Ill,  3  ff. 


1 88  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

a  guiding  principle,  for  scientific  inquiry.  Critical  philosophy 
seeks  to  grasp  the  nature  of  this  unity  by  analyzing  it  into  its 
elements  and  determining  the  place  of  each  element  within  the 
whole,  in  teleological  terms,  by  determining  its  function  in  the 
constitution  of  the  whole. 

Ill 

In  referring  to  Ms  meaning  of  the  term  "function"  in  Cas- 
sirer's  philosophy,  we  are  led  to  another  strong  influence  in 
shaping  his  thought,  the  influence  of  Hegel.  Broadly  speaking 
— and  making  allowance  for  the  unavoidable  inaccuracy  of  such 
a  formula — we  may  say  that  Cassirer  used  a  somewhat  modified 
Kantian  method  in  promoting  a  goal  set  by  HegeL  Although  he 
is  well  aware  of  the  basic  defects  of  HegePs  metaphysical 
system,4  he  accepts  as  leitmotif  of  his  own  analysis  HegePs 
principle  that  truth  as  the  "whole"  is  not  given  all  at  once  but 
must  be  progressively  unfolded  by  thought  in  its  movement. 
The  unity  of  knowledge  must  be  discovered  in  the  progress  of 
knowledge  from  its  primary  and  primitive  stages  to  "pure" 
knowledge;  it  reveals  itself  in  the  form  of  this  process.  None 
of  the  phases  of  this  process  must  be  disregarded  if  we  are  to 
grasp  the  form  of  the  process.5 

Accordingly,  Cassirer  sets  himself  the  task  of  determining 
what  particular  type  of  unity  is  sought  and  (temporarily)  found 
in  the  different  domains  and  at  the  different  stages  of  human 
thought,  and  he  seeks  to  disclose  how  the  transition  from  one 
stage  to  another  is  necessitated  by  the  inner  dialetic  of  the  move- 
ment of  thought. 

In  his  first  systematic  work,  Substanzbegriff  und  Funktions- 
begn-jfy  Cassirer  was  guided  by  the  idea  that  the  structure  and 
basic  principles  of  knowledge  could  be  most  clearly  discerned  in 
mathematics  and  mathematical  physics,  where  knowledge  had 
reached  its  highest  level.  His  chief  aim  was  to  corroborate  his 
thesis  that  the  progressive  emancipation  of  thought  from  the 
so-called  data  of  immediate  experience  manifests  itself  in  the 
development  of  these  sciences.  This  process  of  emancipation, 

4  See  Erkenntnis'problem,  Vol.  Ill,  362-377. 

9  See  e.g.,  Preface  to  Vol.  Ill  of  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen,  vi  fl. 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         189 

which  can  never  be  completed,  is  most  conspicuous  in  the  re- 
placement of  the  thing-concept  by  the  concept  of  law.  Even  the 
thing-concept  is  an  intellectual  construct  of  a  highly  complex 
structure,  yet  it  shows  a  close  affinity  to  the  (allegedly)  pure 
data  of  immediate  perceptual  experience.  As  long  as  it  is  made 
not  only  the  starting-point  but  also  the  pivot  of  philosophical 
analysis,  a  certain  kind  of  interpretation  of  mental  activity  in 
general  and  of  the  formation  of  scientific  concepts  in  particular 
is  suggested,  an  interpretation  which  has,  indeed,  prevailed  in 
philosophical  thought  from  the  very  outset.  According  to  this 
view  the  activity  of  the  mind  consists  exclusively  in  determining 
and  isolating  common  qualitative  elements  within  the  vast 
variety  of  existing  things,  uniting  them  into  classes,  and  repeat- 
ing this  procedure  as  long  as  possible.  By  comparing  and  dis- 
tinguishing actually  present  objects  of  thought — mathematical 
objects  as  well  as  empirical  objects — we  arrive  at  an  ever  more 
embracing  hierarchy  of  beings.  The  proposed  interpretation 
seems  to  be  in  harmony  with  common  sense  and  to  save  us  from 
a  dualism  between  percept  and  concept.  The  universals  are 
taken  to  be  "in re"  to  be  part  of  the  perceptible  world. 

However,  this  traditional  view  does  not  bear  closer  exami- 
nation. In  the  first  place,  it  fails  to  account  for  the  fact  that 
scientific  (and  even  pre-scientific)  concepts  are  not  random  ag- 
gregates of  qualities,  but  are  established  with  a  purpose.  We  do 
not — as  Lotze  remarked — form  a  class  of  reddish,  juicy,  edible 
things,  under  which  cherries  and  meat  might  be  subsumed  5  and 
the  reason  why  we  don't  do  it  is  that  we  consider  such  a  notion 
quite  irrelevant  for  theoretical  as  well  as  practical  ends.  Ref- 
erence to  it  is  not  supposed  to  be  productive  of  any  new  results. 
Thus  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  qualitative  similarity  is 
not  the  only  basis  in  all  instances  for  the  formation  of  concepts. 
Realizing  that  this  process  involves  judgments  concerning  the 
relevance  of  a  concept  for  the  promotion  of  given  ends,  we  can 
no  longer  maintain  that  the  mental  activity  involved  is  confined 
to  the  recognition  of  qualitative  similarities  or  differences  and  to 
selections  on  this  basis. 

But  this  is  only  half  the  story.  It  might  still  be  suggested  that 
such  a  similarity  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the  formation  of 


190  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

concepts.  But  even  this  view  is  untenable.  What  is  required  is 
rather  a  relation  in  terms  of  which  the  variety  of  (actually  or 
potentially)  given  objects  may  be  ordered.  Such  a  relation  does 
not  dispose  of  the  qualities  of  the  individual  objects  con- 
cerned— if  it  did,  it  would  not  be  of  any  aid  in  investigating 
specific  objects — ;  but  it  replaces  fixed  qualities  by  general  rules 
which  enable  us  to  grasp  uno  actu  a  total  series  of  possible, 
qualitative  determinations.  This  is  of  decisive  theoretical  and 
practical  import.  As  inquiry  proceeds,  thing-concepts  are  gradu- 
ally replaced  by  relation-concepts,  and  a  hierarchy  of  laws, 
stating  invariant  relations  in  terms  of  mathematical  functions, 
occupies  the  place  formerly  held  by  a  hierarchy  of  intrinsic 
qualities.  The  transition  from  Aristotle's  physics  to  Galileo's 
and  Newton's  physics  is  marked  by  this  change  in  the  conceptual 
framework  of  science. 

Cassirer  insists  that  there  are  guiding  principles  in  arranging 
perceptual  material,  even  on  the  pre-scientific  level,  principles 
which  cannot  be  considered  as  inherent  in  the  material  j  but  this 
autonomy  of  form,  this  spontaneity  of  the  mind,  becomes  ever 
more  conspicuous  and  extensive  as  science  advances.  The  totality 
of  experience  as  it  represents  itself  on  any  given  stage  of 
knowledge  is  not  a  mere  aggregate  of  data  of  perception}  it  has 
a  complex  and  intricate  structure  which  constitutes  its  unity. 

But  this  coherence  of  the  body  of  knowledge  established  at  a 
given  time  does  not  exhaust  what  we  mean  by  "unity  of  science." 
There  is,  moreover,  a  "dynamic  unity"  of  scientific  procedure. 
The  dynamic  unity  becomes  manifest  in  the  very  process  of  the 
reconstruction  of  scientific  systems.  Even  if  we  change  most 
general  principles — like  those  of  Newton's  mechanics — ,  which 
we  avoid  as  long  as  less  incisive  changes  in  the  theory  can 
restore  its  agreement  with  the  results  of  observation,  we  do  not 
alter  the  fundamental  form  of  experience,  nor  break  the  con- 
tinuity of  inquiry.  This  is  seen  when  we  consider  that  the  new 
system  is  supposed  to  yield  solutions  of  problems  that  emerged 
within  the  frame  of  the  old  system,  but  could  not  be  solved 
there.  It  would  indeed  be  impossible  to  demonstrate  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  new  system,  unless  there  were  invariant  stand- 
ards of  comparability.  These  standards  are  the  fundamental 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         191 

invariants  of  experience;  to  make  them  explicit  is  the  main  ob- 
jective of  critical  (transcendental)  philosophy,  which,  accord- 
ingly, may  be  regarded  as  the  general  theory  of  the  invariants  of 
experience. 

If  we  say  that  knowledge  of  these  "logical  invariants"  is 
knowledge  a  prioriy  this  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  it  is 
prior  (in  time)  to  experience.  It  only  means  that  these  "logical 
invariants"  are  implicitly  presupposed  in  any  valid  statement 
about  facts.  That  is  why  the  notion  of  space,  but  not  that  of 
color,  is  considered  a  priori  in  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge; 
space  is  indeed  an  invariant  for  every  physical  construction; 
color  is  not. 

IV 

When  Cassirer  laid  down  these  views  in  Substance  and 
Function  and  supported  them  by  a  thorough  analysis  of  mathe- 
matical and  physical  terms,  as  they  emerged  in  the  historical 
development  of  these  sciences,  Einstein's  Special  Theory  of 
Relativity  had  only  recently  been  developed  and  the  General 
Theory  had  not  yet  been  formulated.  Cassirer's  analysis  of 
physical  concepts  in  this  work  is  therefore  confined  to  classical 
physics  in  the  strict  sense.  But  soon  after  the  General  Theory  of 
Relativity  had  been  well  established,  Cassirer  extended  his 
analysis  to  both  the  Special  and  the  General  Theory.6 

The  geometry  underlying  Einstein's  General  Theory  of 
Relativity  is  Riemannian  geometry,  which  is  a  "Non-Euclid- 
ean" geometry.  The  Euclidean  parallel  postulate  is  replaced  in 
it  by  the  postulate  that  no  "straight  line"  (geodesic)  can  be 
drawn  through  a  given  "point"  which  is  "parallel"  to  a  given 
"straight  line."  Still  Euclidean  geometry  remains  applicable 
in  the  "limiting  case"  of  weak  gravitational  fields,  like  that  of 
the  earth,  where  the  "curvature  of  space,"  determined  by  the 
strength  of  the  gravitational  field,  comes  close  to  zero.  (Eu- 
clidean space  is  then  interpreted  as  the  space  of  zero-curvature.) 
The  establishment  of  Einstein's  theory  had  been  considered 
by  empiricist  philosophers  as  a  death-blow  to  Kant's  doctrine. 

*  Cf.  Einstein's  Theory  of  Relativity.  (The  authorized  English  translation  of 
this  work  from  the  pen  of  Cassirer  is  printed  as  a  "Supplement" — pp.  347-45 6 — 
in  the  Swabeys'  English  rendition  of  Substance  and  Function;  Open  Court,  1923.) 


192  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

They  claimed  that  his  whole  system  breaks  down  with  the  col- 
lapse of  one  of  its  chief  pillars,  the  aprioricity  of  Euclidean 
geometry.  Is  this  claim  well  founded? 

Even  when  Gauss,  Lobachevski,  Bolyai,  and  Riemann  first 
constructed  systems  of  non-Euclidean  geometries  without,  how- 
ever, applying  them  to  physical  science,  it  had  been  maintained 
that  such  systems  are  in  conflict  with  Kant's  philosophy.  Yet 
this  view  was  certainly  wrong.  What  had  been  demonstrated  by 
the  non-Euclidean  geometries — provided  it  could  be  shown 
that  they  were  free  from  contradictions — was  only  that  the 
Euclidean  postulate  is  not  an  analytical  consequence  of  the 
other  postulates;  but  Kant  had  never  maintained  that  a  system 
of  geometry  different  from  Euclidean  geometry  is  self-contra- 
dictory. Rather  he  had,  in  distinguishing  the  synthetic  a  priori 
from  the  analytical  a  priori,  precluded  such  a  view. 

Kant  did  maintain  that  Euclidean  geometry  is  a  priori  for 
physics;  and  this  statement  cannot  be  squared  with  Einstein's 
General  Theory  of  Relativity.  But  it  is  another  question 
whether  this  fact — and  the  fact  that  space  and  time  cannot  be 
isolated  in  Einstein's  theory  so  that  they  apparently  lose  their 
physical  objectivity — undermines  the  roots  of  Kant's  doctrine. 
Cassirer  submits  that  either  of  these  facts  leaves  the  funda- 
mentals of  critical  philosophy  untouched.  In  support  of  this 
view  he  offers  a  penetrating  analysis  of  the  meaning  of  "physi- 
cal objectivity,"  which  he  prefaces  by  a  declaration  of  the  partial 
independence  of  the  epistemologist  from  the  scientist.  The 
epistemologist  is  bound  to  accept  scientifically  established  facts 
and  laws,  and  these  delimit  indeed  his  universe  of  discourse; 
but  he  is  not  bound  to  accept  the  scientist's  interpretation  of 
these  facts  and  laws  in  general  philosophical  terms,  such  as 
the  term  "objectivity."  The  main  reason  why  the  epistemologist 
is  not  bound  to  accept  the  scientist's  interpretation  is  that  analy- 
sis made  by  the  former  reaches  beyond  that  of  the  scientist. 

Each  answer,  which  physics  imparts  concerning  the  character  and 
the  peculiar  nature  of  its  fundamental  concepts,  assumes  inevitably  for 
epistemology  the  form  of  a  question.  When,  for  example,  Einstein  gives 
as  the  essential  result  of  his  theory  that  by  it  "the  last  remainder  of 
physical  objectivity"  is  taken  from  space  and  time  .  .  .,  this  answer  of  the 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         193 

physicist  contains  for  the  epistemologist  the  precise  formulation  of  his 
real  problem.  What  are  we  to  understand  by  the  physical  objectivity, 
which  is  here  denied  to  the  concepts  of  space  and  time?  To  the  physicist 
physical  objectivity  may  appear  as  a  fixed  and  sure  starting-point  and  as 
an  entirely  definite  standard  of  comparison;  epistemology  must  ask  that 
its  meaning  ...  be  exactly  defined/ 

We  arrive  at  such  a  definition  by  clarifying  the  function  of  the 
notion  of  objectivity  in  physical  inquiry.  Similar  considerations 
apply  to  Kant's  doctrine  that  Euclidean  geometry  is  the  one 
a  priori  true  geometry. 

We  are  no  longer  concerned  with  what  space  "is"  and  with  whether 
any  definite  character,  whether  Euclidean,  Lobatschefskian  or  Rieman- 
nian,  is  to  be  ascribed  to  it,  but  rather  with  what  use  is  to  be  made  of 
the  different  systems  of  geometrical  presuppositions  in  the  interpretation 
of  the  phenomena  of  nature  and  their  dependencies  according  to  law.8 

We  could  say  that  Euclidean  space  was  indeed  a  priori  for 
Newtonian  physics,  since  Euclidean  geometry  is  presupposed 
in  it,  whereas,  by  this  very  token,  Riemannian  space  is  a  priori 
for  the  General  Theory  of  Relativity.  This  interpretation  seems 
to  be  in  harmony  with  Einstein's  view,  lucidly  expressed  in  his 
lecture  on  Geometrie  umd  Erfahrung? 

Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  held  undoubtedly  that  Euclidean 
geometry  would  have  to  underly  physical  science  at  any  stage 
of  its  development,  and  this  view  was  mistaken.  But  to  concede 
this  is  not  to  admit  that  Einstein's  General  Theory  has  refuted 
the  fundamentals  of  Kant's  transcendental  method.  This  method 
can  be  upheld  after  it  has  been  freed  from  some  time-bound 
limitations. 

Commenting  upon  Cassirer's  argument  I  would  suggest  that 
aprioricity  in  a  more  incisive  sense  could  be  claimed  for  some 
topological  properties  of  space.  Hermann  Weyl  has  made  the 
point  (in  his  remarkable  Philosophie  der  Mathematik  und 
Naturwissenschajt  [Munchen,  1927],  97)  that  the  number 
four  of  the  dimensions  of  the  space-time  continuum  is  a  priori 

7  Einstein* 's  Theory  of  Relativity,  (Swabey  tr.)  356. 

8/^.,439. 
'Berlin,  (1921.) 


194  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

in  Kant's  sense.  This  would  imply,  it  seems  to  me,  that  the 
four-dimensionality  of  space-time  is  implicitly  presupposed  in 
perceptual  experience — perceptual  experiences  being  located  in 
four-dimensional  space-time — so  that  it  could  never  be  refuted 
by  perceptual  experience.  This  interpretation  is  in  harmony 
with  Kant's  general  conception  of  synthetic  a  priori  as  per- 
taining to  the  form  of  experience;  and  it  is,  moreover,  sup- 
ported by  modern  psychological  analysis  of  the  structure  of 
perception. 


When  Einstein's  Special  and  General  Theories  had  been 
firmly  established,  they  were  first  regarded  as  a  revolution  in 
physics,  rendering  the  fundamental  notions  and  principles  of 
classical  physics  obsolete.  But  Einstein  himself  has  always 
stressed  the  continuity  of  the  process  of  inquiry  leading  to  this 
theory;  and  nowadays  his  theory  is  considered  the  perfection 
of  classical  physics  rather  than  its  destruction.  But  the  second 
great  event  in  twentieth  century  physics,  the  emergence  of 
quantum  physics,  is  taken  to  be  more  truly  revolutionary,  and 
to  impose  on  us  a  revision  not  only  of  fundamental  physical 
notions,  but  also  of  philosophical  categories,  particularly  of  the 
category  of  causality.  Here,  then,  seems  to  exist  an  even  deeper 
cleavage  between  the  Kantian  theory  for  which  Newton's 
magnum  of  us  represented  the  "fact  of  science"  and  a  theory 
of  knowledge  which  is  in  conformity  with  modern  physics. 

But  even  in  this  case  we  are  cautioned  by  Cassirer  against 
assuming  that  the  transcendental  method  has  been  rendered 
obsolete  by  recent  developments  in  physics.  He  discusses  quan- 
tum physics  in  his  Determinisnws  und  Indeterminismus  in  der 
modernen  Physik™  a  work  which  offers  perhaps  the  most 
accomplished  elaboration  of  his  theory  of  science.  It  is  essential 
for  the  transcendental  method,  Cassirer  points  out,  that  it  deals 
not  directly  with  things  but  rather  with  our  empirical  knowl- 
edge of  things,  more  precisely  with  the  form  of  experience. 
Kant  agrees  with  Hume's  critique  of  the  notion  of  causality 

10 Determinismus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der  modernen  Physik.  (Sub-title: 
Historische  und  systematische  Studien  zum  Kausalproblem.)  Goteburg  (1936). 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE          195 

inasmuch  as  it  established  that  there  is  no  innate,  self-evident 
idea  of  causality,  no  subjective  necessity  rooted  in  our  mental 
organization  which  compels  us  to  acknowledge  a  rigid  causal 
nexus  among  phenomena.  But  Kant's  epistemological  analysis 
does  not  stop  at  this  point,  as  did  Hume's.  Whereas  he  admits 
that  the  principle  of  causality  does  not  enable  us  to  state  any 
specific  physical  law,  he  vindicates  this  principle  as  a  "postulate," 
as  a  "regulative  principle"  of  science.  It  is  a  statement  of  the 
resolution  not  to  give  up  the  search  for  causes  and  to  strive  to- 
ward an  ever  more  comprehensive  system  of  knowledge,  a 
resolution  which  is  basic  for  scientific  inquiry. 

Cassirer  is,  of  course,  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  Kant  had 
not  been  quite  consistent  in  the  development  of  this  idea,  that 
he  had,  in  the  "Analogies  of  Experience,"  offered  a  "deduc- 
tion" of  the  principle  of  causality.  But  this,  Cassirer  declares,  is 
one  more  point  where  we  have  to  understand  Kant  better  than 
he  understood  himself,  if  we  are  to  be  true  Kantians.  We  have 
to  follow  him  only  so  long  as  he  does  not  part  with  his  own 
professed  principles,  the  principles  of  the  transcendental 
method. 

The  preceding  remarks  should  not  create  the  impression 
that  Determinism  and  Indeterminism  in  Modern  Physics  is  pri- 
marily concerned  with  a  defense  of  Kant's  transcendental 
method.  This  is  by  no  means  the  case.  The  object  of  this  book 
is  rather  a  reconsideration  of  the  structure  of  physical  science 
in  the  light  of  the  development  of  quantum  physics.  One  of 
Cassirer's  most  important  points  is  the  distinction  between 
three  types  of  statements  in  physics,  viz.,  a)  statements  of  the 
results  of  measurements  (Massaussagen),  b)  laws,  c)  prin- 
ciples. This  distinction  was  suggested  by  Russell's  theory  of 
types  which  had  been  established  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
cluding the  emergence  of  antinomies  in  logic  and  Cantorian  set 
theory.  The  theory  of  types  is  governed  by  the  so-called  Vicious 
Circle  Principle:  "Whatever  includes  all  of  a  collection  must 
not  be  one  of  the  collection,"  which  "enables  us  to  avoid  the 
vicious  circles  involved  in  the  assumption  of  illegitimate  totali- 
ties."11 Cassirer's  hierarchy  of  types  of  physical  statements  is 

u  Whitehead-Russell,    Prmcipia   Mathematka,    Vol.    I,    40. 


196  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

meant  to  preclude  similar  predicaments  in  the  analysis  of  em- 
pirical science. 

Concerning  (a):  Statements  of  the  results  of  measurement 
are  attained  by  transposing  reports  of  sensory  experiences  into 
determinations  in  terms  of  numerical  relations.  These  "state- 
ments of  the  first  order"  are  singular  propositions.  They  relate 
to  definite  space-time  points. 

Concerning  (b) :  Realization  that  physical  laws  are  a  distinct 
type  of  physical  statements  implies  rejection  of  the  sensation- 
alists' view — most  vigorously  defended  by  J.  S.  Mill — that  a 
physical  law  is  but  an  aggregate  of  particular  truths,  and  that 
"all  inference  is  from  particulars  to  particulars."  This  view  has 
always  been  one  of  the  chief  targets  of  Cassirer's  criticism.  Time 
and  again  he  has  pointed  out  that  it  is  not  in  accordance  with 
actual  scientific  procedure  and  that  the  great  scientists  of  the 
modern  age,  from  Galileo  on,  were  fully  aware  of  the  hetero- 
geneity of  fact-statements  and  laws.  A  law  is  a  hypothetical 
judgment  of  the  form:  "If  x  then  y;"  it  does  not  connect  single 
magnitudes  with  definite  space-time  points;  rather  it  refers 
to  classes  of  magnitudes,  classes  which  have  an  infinite  number 
of  elements  and  are  thus  inexhaustible  by  simple  enumera- 
tion.12 

Concerning  (c) :  The  distinction  between  fact-statements  and 
laws  had  been  widely  recognized  before;  but  the  difference  be- 
tween laws  and  principles  had  remained  almost  unnoticed. 
Whereas  facts  are  brought  into  a  definite  order  by  laws,  the 
laws  themselves  are  integrated  into  a  higher  unity  by  principles, 
such  as  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy  or  the  prin- 
ciple of  least  action  (which  is  the  most  general  of  all  physical 
principles). 

The  three  types  of  statements  may  be  differentiated  in  a 
formal  way  by  calling  them,  respectively,  "individual,"  "gen- 
eral," and  "universal." 

In  defending  the  tripartition  against  the  tendencies  (repre- 
sented by  Mill)  toward  levelling  down  these  distinctions,  Cas- 
sirer  makes  an  interesting  remark  which  indicates  his  attitude 

M  Determinismus . . .,  5 iff. 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         197 

toward  "dogmatic  empiricism."  "The  defect  of  dogmatic  em- 
piricism," he  points  out, 

does  not  consist  in  its  attempt  to  link  all  knowledge  to  experience  and 
to  recognize  nothing  but  experience  as  a  criterion  of  truth,  but  rather  in 
its  failure  to  go  far  enough  in  the  analysis  of  experience,  in  its  stopping 
short  of  a  clarified  notion  of  it.  It  is  not  infrequently  a  vague  assumption 
of  continuity  that  leads  to  this  attitude;  empiricism  refrains  from  strictly 
separating  the  various  stages  of  knowledge  in  order  to  be  able  to  develop 
them  from  each  other.  But  this  development  is  deceptive,  if  one  seeks  to 
understand  it  as  a  mere  reproduction  of  similarity.  Somewhere  in  the 
process  of  knowledge  we  must  acknowledge  a  genuine  "mutation" 
which  leads  to  something  new  and  independent.13 

The  failure  of  dogmatic  empiricism  to  give  a  proper  account 
of  the  practice  of  physical  inquiry  becomes  most  obvious  in  an 
analysis  of  statistical  laws  which  latter  have  gained  an  ever 
higher  significance  since  Gibbs'  and  Boltzmann's  foundation 
of  statistical  mechanics.  Boltzmann's  kinetical  theory  of  gases 
interprets  the  physical  properties  of  a  gas,  such  as  its  density,  its 
pressure,  its  specific  heat,  as  resultants  of  the  movements  of  its 
molecules}  but  it  does  not  attempt  to  determine  the  move- 
ments of  each  single  molecule.  Some  hypothetical  assumptions 
concerning  statistical  averages,  for  instance  average  velocity,  are 
made,  and  the  behavior  of  the  gas  is  explained  in  terms  of 
these  hypotheses.  It  is  clear  that  such  a  procedure  cannot  be 
interpreted  as  an  inference  from  particulars  to  particulars,  as 
Mill  and  his  disciples  would  have  it. 

There  is  one  more  methodological  conclusion  which  we  may 
draw  from  Boltzmann's  theory,  a  conclusion  which  provides  a 
cue  to  the  philosophical  interpretation  of  quantum  physics, 
namely  that  physics  does  not  attempt  to  answer  every  "Why- 
question"14  which  may  possibly  be  asked,  and  that  its  success  is 
largely  due  to  this  self-restraint,  and  to  a  selection  of  problems 
in  accordance  with  certain  regulative  principles  of  inquiry. 

Having  realized  this,  we  shall  no  longer  maintain  that  Hei- 
senberg's  principle  of  indeterminacy,  which  occupies  a  central 


"Ibid.,  132. 


198  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

place  in  quantum  physics,  means  a  complete  break  with  the 
fundamental  ideas  of  classical  physics.  Heisenberg's  principle 
states  that  the  precision  in  determining  simultaneously  two 
"conjugate  magnitudes,"  such  as  the  position  and  the  velocity  of 
an  electron,  is  limited  by  Planck's  constant  h.  In  the  older  (un- 
critical) view,  which  interpreted  electrons  as  "material  points," 
pre-established  thing-like  entities,  this  principle  seemed  to  in- 
volve sceptical  resignation,  the  acknowledgment  that  the  finite 
human  mind  cannot  trespass  certain  boundaries.  Critical  analysis, 
however,  reveals  that  the  traditional  formulation  of  these 
"insoluble  problems"  is  inadequate,  and  that  the  pertinent 
arguments  of  the  sceptics  lose  their  point  as  soon  as  we  formu- 
late the  problems  adequately.  We  have  to  dispose  of  the  idea 
that  a  material  point  is  a  pre-established  entity,  existing  inde- 
pendently of  the  relations  into  which  it  may  enter,  and  to 
realize  that  "material  point"  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  system 
of  these  relations.  Cassirer  points  out  that  there  is  no  basic 
difference  in  this  respect  between  the  notion  of  a  "material" 
physical  point  and  the  notion  of  an  "ideal"  mathematical  point. 
In  the  so-called  axioms  of  geometry,  a  mathematical  point  is 
"implicitly  defined"  in  terms  of  a  system  of  formal  relations. 
"Material  point,"  on  the  other  hand,  is  implicitly  defined  in 
terms  of  a  system  of  relations  which  we  call  a  physical  theory. 
Hence  "material"  points  are  intellectual  constructs,  as  are 
"ideal"  geometrical  points  j  and  the  demand  that  "absolute" 
locations  should  be  assigned  to  them  is  as  illegitimate  as  would 
be  the  corresponding  demand  for  geometrical  points. 

VI 

We  have  already  mentioned  that  Cassirer's  analysis  of  physi- 
cal theories  is  performed  with  the  purpose  of  corroborating  his 
thesis  that  the  decisive  stages  in  the  advancement  of  science  are 
marked  by  a  progressive  emancipation  from  "naive"  realism, 
which  starts  from  a  conception  of  things-in-themselves  and 
interprets  knowledge  as  a  conformity  of  our  thoughts  with  those 
pre-established  "objects."  Each  new  stage  in  scientific  progress 
is  characterized  by  a  specific  type  of  "objectification,"  by  the 
creation  of  new  scientific  objects,  represented  in  the  symbols 
of  the  language  of  science.  All  of  Cassirer's  elaborate  and  en- 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         199 

lightening  interpretations  of  scientific  theories  are  but  so  many 
variations  of  this  central  theme.  The  same  is  true  of  his  analysis 
of  mathematical  concepts. 

A  substantial  part  of  Substance  and  Function  is  devoted  to  this 
analysis.  Russell's  Principles  of  Mathematics  had,  at  the  time, 
been  published  only  a  few  years  before,  and  Whitehead- 
RusselPs  Principa  Mathematica  had  not  yet  appeared.  The 
number  of  mathematicians  and  philosophers  engaged  in  work- 
ing on  problems  of  the  "foundations  of  mathematics"  was  still 
small.  This  situation  changed  rapidly  during  the  following  two 
decades.  Principa  Mathematica  demonstrated  what  can  be 
achieved  in  the  way  of  a  unification  of  logic  and  mathematics  j 
Hilbert  took  the  final  step  in  the  "formalization"  of  mathe- 
matics, and  Brouwer  advanced  his  criticism  of  the  application 
of  the  principle  of  excluded  middle,  a  criticism  which  seemed  to 
affect  not  only  Cantor's  set  theory,  but  large  sections  of  classical 
mathematics.  Spirited  controversies  between  logicists  (Russell), 
formalists  (Hilbert),  and  intuitionists  (Brouwer)  ensued  and 
attracted  wide  attention  j  and  it  was  generally  assumed  that  basic 
philosophical  issues  were  at  stake.  However,  there  were  only  a 
small  number  of  philosophers  who  were  prepared  to  face  the 
difficulties  in  studying  the  rather  "technical"  books  and  papers 
in  the  field. 

Cassirer  was  one  of  those  few.  In  chapter  IV  of  Part  III  of 
the  third  volume  of  his  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen 
(1929)  he  offers  a  well-considered  interpretation  of  some  of 
the  major  pertinent  problems,  an  accomplishment  which  de- 
served more  attention  than  it  has  actually  received.  Philosophers 
should  be  grateful  to  him  for  his  placing  these  problems  in 
their  proper  historical  setting.  And  they  should,  moreover,  find 
some  of  his  critical  remarks  apt  and  incisive.  I,  for  one,  have 
no  doubt  that  he  is  right  in  rejecting  i)  Russell's  reduction  of 
the  number  concept  to  the  class  concept,  2)  Brouwer's  (and 
Becker's)  interpretation  of  the  role  of  time  in  mathematics, 
and  3)  Hilbert's  philosophical  interpretation  of  his  formaliza- 
tion of  mathematics,  according  to  which  the  visible  marks  as 
such  would  be  the  object  of  mathematics.15  Each  of  these  points 

18  The  present  writer  came  to  similar  conclusions,  in  a  book,  Das  Unendliche  in 


200  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

is  of  major  philosophical  significance.  Russell's  way  of  relating 
the  class  concept  to  the  number  concept  is  closely  linked  with 
his  sensationalist  and  nominalist  view  concerning  universals. 
Brouwer's  emphasis  on  the  time  factor  in  mathematics  (and  his 
demand  for  actual  construction  in  mathematics)  raises  the  basic 
issue  of  the  meaning  of  possibility  (which  is  indeed  the  prob- 
lem of  universals  seen  from  another  angle).  And  Hilbert's 
interpretation  of  his  formalization  involves  the  same  problem. 
Cassirer  never  tires  of  stressing  that  we  have  to  interpret 
"reality"  and  "experience"  in  terms  of  "possibility",  though 
there  is  no  "realm  of  possibilities"  beyond  experience.  He 
analyzes  mathematical  systems,  for  instance  those  of  different 
types  of  geometry,  in  order  to  make  it  clear  that  they  do  not 
contain  any  assertions  about  "real"  things  or  facts,  but  deal  with 
pure  possibilities.  These  possibilities  cannot  be  derived  from 
sense  perception.  "Experience  as  such  does  not  contain  in  itself 
a  principle  for  the  production  of  such  possibilities,  its  role  is 
confined  to  a  selection  among  them  in  the  application  to  given 
concrete  cases.  Its  real  accomplishment  consists  in  determina- 
tion rather  than  in  constitution."16  "One  could  say,  using  a 
metaphor  taken  from  the  language  of  chemistry,  that  sense 
experience  has  essentially  a  'catalytic'  function  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  theories  of  the  natural  sciences."17  Sense  experience 
is  indispensable  for  the  process  of  forming  exact  concepts,  but  it 
is  no  longer  contained  as  an  independent  ingredient  in  the 
product  emerging  from  this  process,  in  the  scientific  concept. 
And  the  process  of  establishing  scientific  concepts,  which  is  a 
process  of  objectification,  has  its  own  immanent  principle  of 
development.  Each  subsequent  (higher)  stage  of  development 
terminates  the  earlier  stage,  but  it  assimilates  rather  than  ex- 
terminates that  earlier  stage.18  A  striking  example  is  the  prog- 
ress from  Newton's  system  to  Einstein's  Special  Theory  and 
General  Theory  of  Relativity. 

der  Mathematik  und  seine  Ausschaltung,  which  appeared  shortly  after  the  publica- 
tion of  Cassirer's  work. 

*  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Vol.  Ill,  487. 

"Ibid.,  485. 

18  Hegel  expresses  this  view  by  using  the  word  "aufgehoben,"  which  may  mean 
cancelled  (abrogated)  or  "preserved." 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE          201 
VII 

Each  stage  of  obj  edification  is  represented  by  a  specific  sys- 
tem of  linguistic  symbols.  But  this  fact  must  not  be  interpreted 
as  a  creation  of  concepts  (meanings)  by  words,  as  radical  nom- 
inalists would  have  it.  The  meaning  is  the  nuclear  point,  the 
true  wpd-rcpov  <pucret.  However  we  should  not  regard  the  word 
as  a  mere  appendix  to  the  concept,  it  is  rather  one  of  the  most 
important  means  for  the  actualization  of  the  concept,  for  its 
separation  from  the  "immediately  given."  Hence  linguistic 
signs  are  indispensable  in  the  process  of  objectification,'and 
it  is  proper  to  approach  the  theory  of  knowledge  from  the  angle 
of  an  analysis  of  scientific  language.  But  in  doing  this  we  should 
bear  in  mind  that  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  not  the  whole  of 
philosophy,  and  that  the  activity  of  the  scientist  is  not  the 
only  nor  the  first  attempt  of  man  to  transform  a  chaos 
of  immediate  experiences  into  a  cosmos.  The  symbolism  of  scien- 
tific language  is  therefore  not  the  only  symbolism  a  study  of 
which  is  required  for  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  man, 
who  should  be  defined  as  an  animal  symboUcum  rather  than  as 
an  animal  rationale™ 

It  is  the  task  of  systematic  philosophy  ...  to  grasp  the  whole  system  of 
symbolic  forms,  the  application  of  which  produces  for  us  the  concept  of 
an  ordered  reality,  and  by  virtue  of  which  subject  and  object,  ego  and 
world  are  separated  and  opposed  to  each  other  in  definite  form,  and  it 
must  refer  each  individual  in  this  totality  to  its  fixed  place.  If  we  assume 
this  problem  solved,  then  the  rights  would  be  assured,  and  the  limits 
fixed,  of  each  of  the  particular  forms  of  the  concept  and  of  knowledge 
as  well  as  of  the  general  forms  of  the  theoretical,  ethical,  aesthetic  and 
religious  understanding  of  the  world.  Each  particular  form  would  be 
"relativized"  with  regard  to  the  others,  but  since  this  "relativization" 
is  throughout  reciprocal  and  since  no  single  form  but  only  the  systematic 
totality  can  serve  as  the  expression  of  "truth"  and  "reality,"  the  limit 
that  results  appears  as  a  thoroughly  immanent  limit,  as  one  that  is  re- 
moved as  soon  as  we  again  relate  the  individual  to  the  system  of  the 
whole.20 

The  three  volumes  of  Cassirer's  Philosophic  der  symbolischen 

19  An  Essay  on  Man  (1944),  26. 

w Einstein's  Theory  of  Relativity,  (Swabey  translation),  447. 


202  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

Formen  (summarized  in  his  Essay  on  Man)  represent  a  re- 
markable contribution  towards  this  goal.  The  chief  critical 
outcome  of  this  approach  is  a  refutation  of  sensationalism  as 
well  as  of  dogmatic  realism.  Cassirer  realized  that  such  a  refuta- 
tion, in  order  to  be  fully  convincing,  must  start  at  the  level  of 
sense-perception. 

We  shall  conclude  our  brief  outline  of  Cassirer's  epistemology 
by  referring  to  his  important  study  "The  Concept  of  Group  and 
the  Theory  of  Perception,"21  which  suggests  a  mathematical 
interpretation  of  some  of  the  results  of  Gestalt  psychology,  and 
contains  a  devastating  criticism  of  the  traditional  sensationalist 
theory  of  perception,  according  to  which  perception  is  merely 
a  bundle  of  sense-impressions. 

This  doctrine,  Cassirer  points  out,  has  been  definitely  shat- 
tered by  physiological  and  psychological  research  initiated  by 
Helmholtz's  and  Hering's  investigations.  There  is  first  of  all 
the  established  fact  of  perceptual  constancy  involving  both 
color  constancy  and  constancy  of  spatial  shape  and  size.  A  sheet 
of  paper  which  appears  white  in  ordinary  daylight  is  recognized 
as  white  in  very  dim  light  as  well  ;  a  piece  of  velvet  which  looks 
black  to  us  under  a  cloudy  sky  looks  also  black  to  us  in  full 
sunshine}  a  piece  of  paper  which  looks  blue  to  us  in  daylight 
looks  blue  also  in  the  reddish-yellow  light  of  a  gasflame.  Con- 
sidering that  every  change  of  illumination  is  accompanied  by 
a  modification  in  the  stimulation  of  the  retina,  we  realize  that 
these  facts  cannot  be  squared  with  the  sensationalist's  theory  of 
perception,  which  claims  that  the  stimuli  are  simply  "copied" 
in  perception.  We  have  to  admit,  on  the  basis  of  this  evidence, 
that  the  stimuli  are  transformed  in  a  certain  direction. 

Experiments  concerning  perceptions  of  shape  and  size  lead 
to  similar  conclusions. 

When  an  object  is  moved  away  from  our  eyes,  the  images  on  the  retinae 
become  smaller  and  smaller.  Nonetheless,  within  certain  distances,  the 
perceptual  size  of  the  object  is  constant.  Variations  of  shape,  which  result 
from  the  fact  that  a  figure  is  turned  out  of  the  frontal-parallel  position, 

21  This  article  appeared  first  in  French  in  the  Journal  de  Psychologle  (1938), 
368-414.  It  was  recently  translated  into  English  by  Dr.  A.  Gurwitch  and 
published  in  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research,  Vol.  V  (1944-45),  1-35. 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         203 

are  also  "counterbalanced"  by  the  eye  to  a  high  degree,  so  that  we 
perceive  the  figure  in  its  "true"  shape.  What  is  meant  by  this  "truth" — 
a  kind  of  truth  which  seems  to  contradict  the  objective  facts,  the  real 
conditions  of  physical  stimulation?  In  raising  this  question,  psychological 
inquiry  comes  close  to  the  fundamental  epistemological  problems  of  the 
theory  of  perception,  even  though  it  may  try  to  confine  itself  strictly  to 
empirical  observation.22 

The  theory  of  knowledge  has  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that 
"we  do  not  merely  €re-ac?  to  the  stimulus,  but  in  a  certain 
sense  act  'against'  it,"  and  thereby  accomplish  a  "transforma- 
tion." This  fact  gives  rise  to  the  question  whether  the  group 
concept,  the  nuclear  concept  in  the  mathematical  theory  of 
transformations,  can  offer  a  clue  for  an  interpretation  of  the 
phenomena  of  perception. 

Group  theory,  which  has  developed  in  the  last  hundred  years 
into  one  of  the  most  important  mathematical  disciplines,  has 
also  substantially  contributed  to  a  deeper  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  mathematics,  and  particularly  of  geometry.  A  group 
(as  defined  by  Lie  and  Klein)  is  a  system  of  unique  operations 
A,  B,  C, .  . .  so  that  from  the  combination  of  any  two  operations 
A  and  B  there  results  an  operation  C  which  also  belongs  to  the 
totality:  A  •  B  =  C.  The  system  must  contain  the  Identity 
Element  which,  when  combined  with  any  other  element,  leaves 
this  other  element  unchanged.  Furthermore,  there  must  be  an 
inverse  operation  S"1  established  for  any  given  operation  S, 
such  that  S"1  cancels  out  (reverses)  Sj  and  finally,  the  associa- 
tive law  A  (BC)  =  (AB)  C  must  hold.  Now  it  has  been  defi- 
nitely established  in  F.  Klein's  famous  "Erlanger  Program  of 
1872"  that  the  geometrical  properties  of  any  figures  are  com- 
pletely describable  in  terms  of  group  theory.  Our  familiar 
metrical  Euclidean  geometry  is  a  member  of  a  family  of  geom- 
etries, each  of  which  investigates  the  invariant  properties 
of  a  particular  group.  The  groups  may  be  classified  in  an  order 
of  increasing  generality.  We  arrive  from  metrical  geometry 
successively  at  affinitive  geometry,  projective  geometry,  and 
topology  (analysis  situs}  by  considering  movements  with  re- 


204  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

spect  to  ever  wider  "principal  groups  of  transformations."  With 
every  extension  of  the  "principal  group"  some  distinctions 
which  could  be  made  in  a  geometry  corresponding  to  the  nar- 
rower principal  group  disappear.  Thus  the  distinction  between 
circles  and  ellipses  disappears  in  affinitive  geometry}  all  kinds 
of  conic  sections  (circles,  ellipses,  hyperbolae,  parabolae)  be- 
come indistinguishable  in  projective  geometry,  and  as  we  come 
to  topology  we  can  no  longer  differentiate  between  any  figures 
that  may  be  derived  from  each  other  by  continuous  reversibly 
unique  distortions. 

Helmholtz  was  the  first  to  attempt  an  application  of  group 
theory  to  an  investigation  of  the  phenomena  of  perception. 
But  this  approach  could  not  stand  up  under  experimental  tests. 
Since  that  time  the  psychology  of  perception  has  made  great 
strides,  particularly  through  the  work  of  the  Gestalt  psycholo- 
gists (Wertheimer,  Kohler,  Koffka,  Katz,  and  many  others) 
who  followed  a  trend  of  thought  suggested  by  Ehrenfels. 
Gestalt  psychologists  have  performed  systematic  studies  of  in- 
variances  of  perceptual  experiences  with  respect  to  certain  kinds 
of  variations  in  the  stimuli.  It  is  characteristic  of  phenomenal 
forms  ($haenomenale  Gestalten)  that  their  specific  properties 
remain  unchanged  when  the  absolute  data  upon  which  they 
rest  undergo  certain  modifications.  Thus  a  melody  is  not  sub- 
stantially altered  when  all  of  its  notes  are  subjected  to  the 
same  relative  displacement  j  an  optical  spatial  figure  remains 
approximately  the  same  when  it  is  presented  in  a  different  place 
or  on  a  different  scale,  but  in  the  same  proportions.23 

These  phenomena,  Cassirer  submits,  are  closely  related  to 
group  theory. 

What  we  find  in  both  cases  are  invariances  with  respect  to  variations 
undergone  by  the  primitive  elements  out  of  which  a  form  is  constructed. 
The  peculiar  kind  of  "identity"  that  is  attributed  to  apparently  altogether 
heterogeneous  figures  in  virtue  of  their  being  transformable  into  one 
another  by  means  of  certain  operations  defining  a  group,  is  thus  seen 
to  exist  also  in  the  domain  of  perception.  This  identity  permits  us  not  only 
to  single  out  elements,  but  also  to  grasp  "structures"  in  perception.  To 

28  W.  Kohler,  Die  fhysischen  Gestalten  in  Ruhe  ttnd  im  stationary  Zustand, 
(1920),  37,  quoted  by  Cassirer  in  Ibid.,  25. 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         205 

the  mathematical  concept  of  "transformability"  there  corresponds,  in  the 
domain  of  perception,  the  concept  of  "transposability."24 

However,  we  must  not  interpret  this  correspondence  as  an 
identity.  There  is  no  complete  invariance  of  phenomena  of 
perception  with  respect  to  such  variations  as  mentioned  above. 
Gestalt  psychologists  have  fully  recognized  that  we  should 
speak  of  more  or  less  effective  tendencies  toward  invariance,  the 
degree  of  effectiveness  depending  on  various  factors  of  which 
we  have  to  take  account  in  describing  a  perceptual  field.  Wert- 
heimer  has,  accordingly,  introduced  the  concept  of  "Gestalt 
dispositions,"  by  which  he  understands  tendencies  toward  "laws 
of  organization"  of  the  perceptual  material. 

It  could  not  escape  Cassirer's  attention  that  these  results  of 
modern  psychology  square  well  with  Plato's  conception  of  the 
relation  between  perception  and  thought.  Moreover,  he  em- 
phasized that  they  vindicate  some  basic  ideas  of  Kant's  concern- 
ing the  function  of  imagination  which  Kant  had  laid  down  in 
the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (chapter  on  Schematism)  and  in 
the  Critique  of  Judgment.  But  the  most  obvious  philosophical 
conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  these  psychological  results  is 
the  untenability  of  the  sensationalist's  interpretation  of  percep- 
tion as  a  process  of  mere  reproduction.  Considering  that  this 
interpretation  is  at  the  very  heart  of  the  sensationalist  doctrine, 
it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  this  doctrine  should  be  able 
to  continue  to  have  any  influence  after  its  lifeline  has  been  cut. 

VIII 

Brief  and  fragmentary  as  our  presentation  of  Cassirer's  con- 
tributions to  the  theory  of  knowledge  had  to  be,  it  has,  I  hope, 
brought  into  sharp  focus  the  guiding  principles  of  his  analysis 
of  cognition.  This  should  enable  us  to  determine  in  a  broad  way 
the  relation  of  his  teachings  to  other  contemporary  philosophi- 
cal doctrines. 

Although  he  is  inclined  to  stress  points  of  agreement  rather 
than  points  of  disagreement,  and  generously  acknowledges 
merits  even  where  he  disapproves,  Cassirer  makes  it  unmistak- 
ably clear  that  he  is  strongly  opposed  to  uncritical  realism  and 


25. 


206  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

sensationalism.  Moreover,  he  rejects  all  varieties  of  transem- 
pirical  metaphysics  j  philosophy  is,  to  him,  as  it  was  to  Kant, 
analysis  of  experience.  He  combats  "atomism"  wherever  he 
finds  it  and  endorses  a  coherence  theory  of  truth  which  bears 
some  resemblance  to  HegePs  pertinent  views ;  but  he  would 
not  accept  the  chief  tenets  of  the  doctrines  of  Bradley  and 
other  neo-Hegelians,  who  claim  that  the  real  subject  of  a 
judgment  is  the  Absolute,  and  that  our  particular  judgments 
are  inconsistent. 

Can  it  then  be  said  that  Cassirer  is  a  "positivist"  who  dis- 
poses of  metaphysical  sentences  as  meaningless  pseudo-state- 
ments? We  should  hardly  expect  a  historian  of  philosophy,  who 
has  taken  so  much  pains  in  interpreting  the  teachings  of  the 
great  "metaphysicians"  of  the  past,  to  endorse  this  view  without 
qualifications.  Although  he  concedes  that  metaphysical  sentences 
are  not  meaningful  at  face  value,  he  insists  that  they  can  be 
transformed  into  meaningful  sentences  by  interpreting  onto- 
logical  principles  as  regulative  principles  of  cognition.  "What 
metaphysics  ascribes  as  a  'property  to  things  in  themselves  now 
proves  to  be  a  necessary  element  in  the  process  of  obj  edifica- 
tion."25 This  way  of  dealing  with  metaphysical  doctrines  had 
been  established  in  Kant's  "Transcendental  Dialectics,"  and  the 
philosophers  of  the  Marburg  school  have  consistently  followed 
this  clue.  It  would  be  a  good  thing  for  the  more  uncompromis- 
ing anti-metaphysicians  to  give  this  Kantian  and  neo-Kantian 
approach  a  second  thought.  Desirable  as  it  is  to  get  rid  of 
pseudo-problems,  we  should,  in  disposing  of  them,  be  careful 
lest  we  pour  out  the  baby  with  the  bath. 

Cassirer  took  issue  with  this  cavalier  way  of  treating  meta- 
physical doctrines  in  one  of  his  later  works.26  There  he  quotes 
with  approval  a  statement  made  half  a  century  ago  by  the 
great  physicist  Heinrich  Hertz,  which  was  aimed  at  the  anti- 
metaphysicians  among  his  fellow-scientists.  "No  consideration 
which  makes  any  impression  on  our  mind  can  be  disposed  of  by 
labeling  it  as  'metaphysical  j'  every  thinking  mind  has  needs 

88  Substance  and  Function.  303^ 

26  Axel  Hagerstrom:  Eine  Studie  zur  schwedischen  Philosofhie  der  Gegenwart 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         207 

which  the  natural  scientist  is  wont  to  call  'metaphysical'." 

Heinrich  Hertz  was  anything  but  a  metaphysician  j  his  great 
work,  Die  Prinzfyien  der  Mechanik,  from  which  the  sentence 
quoted  above  is  taken,  has  indeed  more  definitely  disposed  of 
the  "metaphysical"  concept  of  force  than  any  preceding  treatise 
on  physics.  But  he  realized  that  the  attempts  of  scientists  to- 
wards making  their  fundamental  notions  clear  frequently  stop 
short  of  the  level  of  clarity  that  can  be  reached  if  clarification 
of  meaning  is  made  the  primary  objective  of  inquiry.  That's 
where  the  philosopher  steps  in,  but  in  doing  this  he  has  to  be 
constantly  on  his  guard  against  hasty  interpretations  of  scien- 
tific findings  which  seem  to  lend  support  to  his  specific  doctrine. 
It  is  shown  by  the  record  that  scientists  who  become  philoso- 
phers in  their  leisure  hours  are  hardly  less  exposed  to  this 
danger  than  professional  philosophers,  though  in  a  slightly 
different  form.  Whereas  their  accounts  of  the  work  accomp- 
lished in  their  own  field  are  usually  accurate,  they  are  prone 
to  exaggerate  the  range  of  applicability  of  their  methods  to 
other  domains  of  inquiry  and,  consequently,  to  underrate  the 
significance  of  other  methods.  But  we  should  gratefully  ac- 
knowledge the  fact  that  a  number  of  prominent  scientists — like 
Helmholtz,  Mach,  and  Poincare — who  discussed  the  "founda- 
tions" of  their  sciences,  have  offered  most  valuable  aid  to  phi- 
losophers in  their  attempts  to  grasp  thoroughly  the  methods  of 
science.  Ernst  Cassirer  used  this  help  to  the  best  advantage. 

There  is  one  more  point  to  be  made  in  this  context.  The  fact 
that  the  process  of  clarification  is  carried  farther  by  philosophers 
than  by  scientists,  qua  scientists,  may  be  stressed  by  saying  that 
philosophical  analysis  penetrates  deeper  than  scientific  analysis. 
Understood  in  this  sense,  the  statement  is  legitimate.  But  it 
should  not  be  taken  to  imply  that  the  "realm"  of  scientific 
knowledge  is  strictly  separated  from  the  "deeper  realm"  of 
philosophical  knowledge,  and  that  the  scientist  qua  scientist  and 
the  philosopher  qua  philosopher  have  to  refrain  from  crossing 
the  borderlines.  This  view,  which  may  be  historically  linked  to 
the  medieval  doctrine  of  the  twofold  truth,  has  been  defended 
— more  or  less  explicitly — by  prominent  contemporary  philoso- 
phers and  scientists,  such  as  Whitehead,  Eddington,  and  Jeans, 


208  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

but  it  is  certainly  not  endorsed  by  Cassirer.  He  holds  that  the 
scientist  can — in  principle — never  go  too  far  in  the  process  of 
clarification  of  his  terms  and  methods,  and  that  the  philosophers 
can  never  come  too  close  to  the  scientist's  work. 

Cassirer's  "scientific  attitude"  and  his  familiarity  with  mod- 
ern mathematics  and  physics  represents  no  minor  link  between 
his  teaching  and  the  doctrine  of  logical  positivism,  which  has 
so  emphatically  stressed  this  attitude  and  so  thoroughly  ana- 
lyzed the  principles  of  mathematics  and  natural  science.27  This 
affinity  became  even  greater  as  logical  positivism  gradually 
freed  itself  from  vestiges  of  sensationalism,  which  were  largely 
due  to  the  influence  of  Mach  and  Russell.  But  there  are  im- 
portant doctrinal  differences  which  should  not  be  overlooked. 
The  logical  positivists  are  radical  anti-metaphysicians  in  the 
sense  described  above.  They  regard  ontological  statements  as 
altogether  meaningless  and  seek  to  eliminate  them  by  a  logical 
analysis  of  language}  whereas  Cassirer  transforms  them  into 
regulative  principles  of  inquiry.  Another  point  of  difference  is 
Cassirer's  rejection  of  "physicalism,"  (radical  behaviorism), 
which  has  for  some  time  prevailed  among  logical  positivists. 
But  it  should  be  noted  that  the  leading  philosopher  of  the 
group,  Rudolf  Carnap,  has,  in  the  last  decade,  modified  his 
physicalistn  to  an  extent  which  comes  close  to  its  complete 
abandonment.28 

There  is,  moreover,  the  issue  of  the  universals  which  divides 
the  two  doctrines.  Cassirer  is  clearly  opposed  to  nominalism, 
whereas  the  logical  positivists  are  among  the  staunchest  nomi- 
nalists in  contemporary  philosophy.  Cassirer's  "conceptualistic" 
view  is  well  expressed  in  the  following  sentence:29 

That  the  general  birch-tree  "exists"  can  only  mean  that  what  is  to  be 

27Philipp  Frank,  one  of  the  leading  members  of  this  group,  is  basically  in 
agreement  with  Cassirer's  interpretation  of  quantum  physics  and  considers  his 
philosophical  work  as  a  whole  as  a  (highly  welcome)  symptom  of  a  "disintegrating 
process  inside  of  school  philosophy."  See  his  discussion  of  Cassirer's  Determinismus 
und  Indeterminismtts  in  der  modernen  Physik  in  his  volume,  Between  Physics  and 
Philosophy  (Cambridge,  194.1),  191-210. 

88 1  have  discussed  this  change  in  Carnap's  view  in  Ch.  XI  of  my  Methodology 
of  the  Social  Sciences,  New  York,  (i  944) . 

*  Axel  Hagerstrb'm,  5 1 . 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         209 

stated  by  it  is  not  a  mere  name,  not  simply  a  flatus  vocis;  the  statement 
is  meant  to  refer  to  relations  of  the  real.  We  express  by  the  notion 
"general  birch-tree"  merely  the  fact  that  there  are  judgments  which  do 
not  refer  to  this  or  that — here  and  now  given — birch-tree,  but  claim  to 
apply  to  "all"  birch-trees.  I  can  uphold  this  logical  participation,  this 
[X€Te£t£  of  the  particular  in  the  general,  without  transforming  it  into  an 
ontological  statement  in  which  two  fundamental  forms  of  reality  are 
posited. 

In  the  paper  mentioned  above,  Philipp  Frank  quotes  Jacques 
Maritain  as  saying  "that  the  aim  of  the  Vienna  circle  and  of  the 
whole  movement  of  logical  empiricism  was  to  'disontologize 
science'."30  We  might  say  with  equal  right  that  one  of  the  aims 
of  Cassirer's  theory  of  knowledge  is  to  disontologize  philosophy 
without  destroying  it. 

IX 

The  relation  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  to  pragmatism  in  gen- 
eral, and  to  Dewey's  instrumentalism  in  particular,  might,  at 
first  glance,  seem  to  be  more  remote  than  its  relation  to  logical 
positivism,  and  to  imply  a  larger  number  of  conflicting  tenets. 
But  this  cannot  be  unreservedly  maintained.  The  neo-Kantian- 
ism  of  the  Marburg  school  is,  indeed,  in  some  important  re- 
spects closer  to  pragmatism  than  to  logical  positivism.  We 
shall  confine  ourselves  to  a  brief  comparison  between  Cassirer's 
and  Dewey's  theories  of  knowledge  and  make  the  point  that 
some  striking  differences  between  their  doctrines  are  less  funda- 
mental than  one  might  suppose  them  to  be.  Dewey's  philosophy, 
it  might  be  suggested,  is  through  and  through  naturalistic; 
Cassirer's  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  through  and  through 
idealistic.  We  are  thus  confronted  with  two  diametrically  op- 
posed philosophical  approaches. 

But  such  an  interpretation  is  all  too  facile,  and  cannot  bear 
closer  examination.  We  should  be  aided  in  a  more  thorough 
appraisal  of  the  relation  between  the  two  philosophies  by  con- 
sidering their  historical  settings.  Dewey,  as  well  as  Cassirer,  was 
profoundly  influenced  (though  in  a  different  way)  by  Kantian 
and  Hegelian  teachings}  and  both  were  also  under  the  impact 

90  Between  Physics  and  Philosophy,  195. 


210  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

of  the  naturalist-empiricist  reaction  to  these  teachings.  Each 
of  the  two  men  was  too  penetrating  a  thinker  to  ignore  the 
strong  points  in  either  of  the  conflicting  philosophical  trends. 
It  is,  of  course,  undeniable  that  Dewey  broke  determinedly 
away  from  the  Hegelian  tradition  and  rejected  in  unambiguous 
terms  Kant's  apriorism  and  dualism  (as  he  saw  them)  j  whereas 
Cassirer  considers  himself  as  a  faithful,  though  not  orthodox, 
follower  of  Kant,  and  to  some  extent,  even  of  Hegel.  Quite 
a  number  of  doctrinal  differences,  which  should  by  no  means 
be  minimized,  can  be  historically  interpreted  in  terms  of  this 
split.  But  we  have  to  ask  whether  the  split  goes  to  the  roots, 
whether  it  leads  to  opposite  theoretical  or  practical  conclusions. 

We  might  look  for  a  clue  to  an  answer  to  this  question  by 
considering  the  manner  in  which  our  two  philosophers  deal 
with  the  notions  of  "development"  and  "progress."  When  Cas- 
sirer uses  these  terms,  we  are  reminded  of  Aristotle's  entelechy 
and  self-perfection,  of  Leibniz'  monads,  and  of  Hegel's  dia- 
lectical movement  of  the  objective  mind.  When  Dewey  uses 
these  terms,  one  is  under  the  spell  of  Darwin's  Origin  of 
Species.  We  know  that  the  effect  of  this  shift  in  meaning  from 
spiritual  development  to  biological  evolution  can  be  tremen- 
dous. It  is  apt  to  lend  support  to  a  transvaluation  of  traditional 
values  and  to  the  irrationalism  of  a  Nietzsche,  Pareto,  Sorel. 
But  we  know  as  well  that  Dewey  is  most  vigorously  opposed  to 
these  irrationalist  tendencies,  and  shall  therefore  not  conclude 
that  an  irreconcilable  conflict  between  the  two  doctrines  is 
proved  by  a  pragmatic  test.  Since  we  cannot  thoroughly  under- 
stand diversities  unless  we  are  able  to  grasp  the  underlying 
identities,  we  shall  start  by  referring  to  the  common  features 
of  the  two  doctrines. 

First  of  all,  they  are  close  to  each  other  in  the  professed  aim 
of  their  theories  of  knowledge,  which  is  to  clarify  the  basic 
principles  of  scientific  inquiry.  Consequently,  they  are  opposed 
to  any  interpretation  of  philosophy,  according  to  which  philoso- 
phy could  and  should  "legislate"  to  science.  Moreover,  they 
agree  that  one  should  rather  define  "(factual)  truth"  in  terms 
of  knowledge,  as  outcome  of  inquiry,  than  knowledge  in  terms 
of  "truth."  Both  philosophers  reject  the  correspondence  theories 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE         211 

of  truth  as  proposed  by  realists  and  by  sensationalists,  e.g., 
Bertrand  Russell.  They  endorse  a  coherence  theory  of  truth, 
where  "coherence"  is  not  understood  as  mere  consistency  of  the 
body  of  established  knowledge,  but  interpreted  in  terms  of  the 
principles  of  empirical  procedure.  Linked  with  this  point  is 
the  conception  of  inquiry  as  a  process  which  is  guided  by  a  set 
of  "postulates."  Kant's  regulative  principles  as  interpreted  by 
the  Marburg  school,  are  not  very  different  in  function  from 
Peirce's  and  Dewey's  leading  principles — though  the  latter  are 
more  flexible — and  the  resemblance  between  Cassirer's  and 
Dewey's  reinterpretations  of  traditional  epistemological  contro- 
versies in  terms  of  such  methodological  principles  is  sometimes 
striking. 

These  considerations  should  suffice  for  a  rejection  of  the 
view  that  Cassirer's  decidedly  idealistic  approach  is  diametric- 
ally opposed  to  Dewey's  decidedly  naturalistic  approach.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  we  need  not  go  very  far  in  the  study  of  Dewey's 
work  to  discover  that  his  naturalism  is  heavens  apart  from  those 
crude  types  of  naturalism  which  would  "reduce"  human  ac- 
tivity to  behavior  of  inanimate  bodies.  I  do  not  see  why 
Cassirer  should  have  had  to  take  issue  with  a  naturalism  which 
is  characterized  as  follows: 

The  term  "naturalistic"  has  many  meanings.  As  it  is  here  employed 
it  means,  on  one  side,  that  there  is  no  breach  of  continuity  between 
operations  of  inquiry  and  biological  operations  and  physical  operations. 
"Continuity,"  on  the  other  side,  means  that  rational  operations  grow 
out  of  organic  activities,  without  being  identical  with  that  from  which 
they  emerge.81 

Nor  was  he  bound  to  have  any  substantial  objections  to  Dewey's 
outline  of  the  "cultural  matrix  of  inquiry"  in  the  third  chapter 
of  the  Logic  (and  in  earlier  works),  which  might  well  have  led 
to  the  definition  of  man  as  a  symbol-making  animal,  as  sug- 
gested by  Cassirer. 

Yet  there  are  indeed  incisive  differences  between  the  two 
doctrines  which  have  direct  bearing  upon  methodological  is- 
sues. We  shall  briefly  examine  two  of  them.  The  first  relates 

"Dewey,  Logic:  The  Theory  of  Inquiry^  i8f. 


212  FELIX  KAUFMANN 

to  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  meanings.  While  Dewey  is  not 
an  extreme  nominalist,  he  is  much  closer  to  nominalism  than 
Cassirer,  even  though  Cassirer  is  as  little  a  conceptual  realist 
as  was  Kant.32  Dewey  treats  comprehension  of  meaning  and 
sensation  on  an  almost  equal  footing.  Immediate  experience 
of  both  types  is  taken  to  be  preliminary}  it  indicates  a  problem, 
but  it  cannot  by  itself  establish  knowledge.  Only  in  its  proper 
setting  within  the  context  of  empirical  inquiry  is  such  experi- 
ence conducive  to  knowledge.  Cassirer  would  endorse  this  view 
as  far  as  sensation  is  concerned.  This  tenet  is  indeed  as  essential 
in  his  philosophy  as  it  is  in  Dewey's.  But  he  would  not  accept 
the  view  that  comprehension  of  meaning  is  in  a  similar  sense 
controlled  by  empirical  inquiry  as  is  sensation.  He  would, 
moreover,  insist  upon  a  sharp  differentiation  between  verifies  de 
raison  and  verites  de  fait,  and,  accordingly,  upon  the  autonomy 
of  pure  logic  and  pure  mathematics. 

Although  I  am  in  agreement  with  Cassirer  on  this  issue,  I 
think  that  in  another  respect  Dewey's  theory  of  inquiry  is  su- 
perior to  Cassirer'sj  namely,  in  its  analysis  of  scientific  testing. 
One  might  be  tempted  to  emphasize  this  point  by  declaring 
that  Cassirer's  interpretation  of  science  is  static,  whereas  Dew- 
ey's approach  is  dynamic.  These  terms  are  indeed  suggestive  of 
an  important  difference  between  the  two  approaches,  but  they 
should  not  mislead  us  into  conceiving  of  Cassirer  as  an  orthodox 
disciple  of  Parmenides.  He  realizes  as  well  as  any  pragmatist 
that  scientific  inquiry  is  a  potentially  endless  self-correcting 
process 5  but  (like  the  classical  economist)  he  focuses  his  atten- 
tion upon  states  of  equilibrium,  where  the  material  of  avail- 
able perceptual  experience  is  "absorbed"  by  theoretical  systems. 
Dewey,  on  the  other  hand,  concentrates  upon  the  processes  that 
emerge  from  (particular)  states  of  disequilibrium — indeter- 
minate situations — and  lead  to  the  attainment  of  new  equilib- 
ria (determinate  situations).  And  he  deals  more  thoroughly 
with  the  conditions  of  "warranted  assertability,"  with  the  criteria 
for  the  distinction  between  warranted  and  unwarranted  asser- 
tions. 

The  analysis  of  warranted  assertability  is  intimately  con- 

18  See  $ufra,  i89f,  208  f. 


THEORY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE          213 

nected  with  the  problem  of  determining  the  relation  between 
propositional  meaning  and  the  criteria  of  verification  of  propo- 
sitions (the  so-called  truth-conditions).  Cassirer's  discussion, 
in  his  Erkenntnisproblem,  of  Kant's  criticism  of  the  ontological 
argument  gives  some  hints  as  to  where  he  stands  on  this  issue; 
but  I  do  not  think  that  it  suffices  for  a  full  understanding  of 
his  position.  This  problem  is  as  actual  in  contemporary  theory 
of  knowledge  as  was  the  problem  of  the  relation  between  essence 
and  existence  in  Greek  and  medieval  philosophy  j  and  I  would 
even  submit  that  it  is  a  "modern"  version  of  this  time-honored 
metaphysical  issue.  As  such  it  is  closely  linked  with  the  peren- 
nial problems  of  matter  and  form,  which  are  a  leitmotif 
throughout  Cassirer's  work. 

It  would  be  a  rewarding  task  to  compare  Cassirer's  general 
treatment  of  these  problems  with  their  treatment  in  HusserPs 
phenomenology.  But  in  making  such  an  attempt  I  should  have 
to  overstep  the  boundaries  of  space  allotted  to  me  and  the 
limits  of  my  assignment,  and  I  am  too  well  aware  of  Heraclitus' 
warning  to  venture  this.  I  shall  therefore  confine  myself  to  the 
remark  that  HusserPs  approach  to  the  problems  of  matter  and 
form33  is  rather  different  from  Cassirer's  approach,  which  is 
more  in  line  with  the  classical  interpretation  of  matter  as  both 
a  challenge  and  an  obstacle  to  the  'forming'  activity  of  the 
mind. 

In  the  General  Introduction  to  The  Library  of  Living  Phi- 
losophers y  the  editor  resumes  F.  C.  S.  Schiller's  question:  "Must 
philosophers  disagree?"  When  one  studies  Ernst  Cassirer's 
work,  which  sheds  a  flood  of  light  on  different  philosophical 
aspects  with  a  view  towards  synthesizing  them,  one  feels  that 
disagreement  among  philosophers  need  not  persist  unabated. 

FELIX  KAUFMANN 

GRADUATE  FACULTY 

NEW  SCHOOL  FOR  SOCIAL  RESEARCH 

88  In  the  sth  and  6th  of  his  Logische  Untersuchungen,  in  the  Ideen,  in  Formale 
und  transcendental*  Logik,  and  in  Erfahrung  und  Urteil. 


5 
Dmitry  Gawronsky 

CASSIRER'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS 


CASSIRER'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS 

MO  OTHER  epistemological  problem  has  caused  philoso- 
phers and  scientists  as  great  a  headache  as  the  application 
of  mathematics  to  the  cognition  of  real  things.  Mathematics 
and  material  things  seem  to  belong  to  two  quite  different  worlds 
— mathematical  concepts,  relations,  and  laws  reveal  such  an 
absolute  precision  and  necessity,  two  qualities,  these  latter, 
which  do  not  exist  in  the  same  form  in  the  world  of  reality.  The 
geometrical  straight  line,  for  instance,  is  physically  a  quite  im- 
possible concept:  first,  because  this  line  consists  exclusively  of 
one  dimension  and,  not  having  any  thickness,  could  not  be 
represented  by  any  really  existing  thing;  and,  secondly,  it  is 
conceived  as  a  form  which  has  absolutely  no  curbs  or  bends, 
and  this,  again,  is  a  physical  impossibility.  One  could  argue 
that  the  concept  of  straight  line  is  given  us — even  if  not  in  a 
perfect,  then  at  least  in  an  approximative  form — by  real  things, 
for  instance  by  a  straight  slender  stick.  Yet,  this  argument  is 
hardly  sound;  first  of  all,  this  slender  stick  is  not  just  a  gift 
of  nature,  but  had  been  manufactured  by  man  who  was  guided 
in  this  job  by  his  idea  of  a  straight  line;  and,  secondly,  even  if 
by  some  miracle  such  a  rod  could  be  found  in  nature,  even  then 
it  could  be  transformed  into  an  exact  mathematical  concept  only 
through  an  infinite  process  of  attenuation  and  straightening, 
whereby  the  straight  line  itself,  as  the  limit  of  this  infinite  proc- 
ess, would  always  be  present  in  our  mind  as  a  directing  and 
controlling  prototype. 

The  more  obvious  it  becomes  that  mathematical  concepts 
and  real  things  belong  to  two  different  spheres,  the  more  diffi- 
cult grows  the  question:  how  is  it  possible  that  even  the  subtlest 
and  most  complicated  mathematical  relations  and  laws  find 

217 


218  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

their  successful  application  to  the  world  of  reality?  Only  two 
directly  opposite  philosophical  tendencies — naive  empiricism 
and  absolute  idealism — avoid  with  ease  this  epistemological 
difficulty;  but  they  both  do  it  at  the  cost  of  even  greater  diffi- 
culties. Empiricism  locates  the  source  of  mathematical  notions 
and  conceptions  in  the  sphere  of  real  things,  without  being  able 
to  explain  satisfactorily  their  absolute  validity  and  necessity, 
the  infinite  character  of  their  methods  of  construction  and  cal- 
culation. And  absolute  idealism  does  exactly  the  opposite:  in 
its  mystical  belief  in  the  infinite  power  of  human  reason,  it 
regards  all  real  things  as  derived  in  all  their  qualities  and  func- 
tions from  this  reason;  it  disregards  the  simple  fact  that  reason 
may  be  largely  instrumental  in  the  understanding  of  the  uni- 
verse. At  the  same  time,  the  conception  that  reason  "creates" 
the  universe  is  overbearing  and  ridiculously  false. 

Plato's  idealism  reveals  its  close  connection  with  Orphism  in 
its  conception  of  the  Idea  as  a  prototype  of  which  real  things 
endeavor  to  partake;  and  it  discloses  the  same  exaggerated  be- 
lief in  the  power  of  the  human  mind  in  its  ethical  teaching  of 
virtue  as  the  knowledge  of  good.  Yet  the  revival  of  Platonism 
in  modern  times  struck  deep  roots  in  the  realm  of  exact  knowl- 
edge and  influenced  decisively  the  founders  of  exact  science: 
Copernicus,  Kepler,  and  Galileo.  The  problem  of  knowledge 
ceased  to  be  the  concern  of  pure  philosophy  only — the  great 
men  of  science  felt  keenly  the  desire  to  elucidate  this  problem 
and  to  understand  the  very  nature — the  principles,  the  methods, 
the  attainable  goals — of  the  creative  work  they  were  doing. 

Exact  science,  this  rewriting  of  nature  in  mathematical  letters, 
became  now  a  crucial  test  of  man's  successful  mental  conquest  of 
nature,  and  this  fact  induced  Ernst  Cassirer  to  devote  a  large 
part  of  his  research  to  this  field  of  human  knowledge:  "only 
in  exact  science — in  its  progress  which,  despite  all  vacillation, 
is  continuous — does  the  harmonious  concept  of  knowledge  ob- 
tain its  true  accomplishment  and  verification;  everywhere  else 
this  concept  still  remains  only  a  demand."1 

To  this  problem — the  contribution  of  exact  science  to  epis- 

1  Ernst  Cassirer,  Das  Erkenntnisproblem  in  der  Philosofhie  und  Wissenschaft 
der  neueren  Zeit.  Vol.  I.,  p.  1 1 . 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  219 

temology — Cassirer  devoted  constant  and  assiduous  study 
throughout  his  entire  life.  He  first  approached  the  problem 
from  the  historical  point  of  view — he  showed  how  slowly  and 
painfully  the  scientific  notion  of  nature  detached  itself  from 
purely  mystical  and  metaphysical  conceptions.  Even  Coperni- 
cus, who  methodically  controlled  and  reversed  immediate  sen- 
sory impressions  by  mathematical  reasoning  and  proceeded  upon 
the  principle  "Mathemata  mathematicis  scribuntur?  introduced 
aesthetic  motives  into  his  demonstrations  and  regarded,  for  in- 
stance, our  sun  as  the  center  of  the  entire  universe,  since  no 
other  place  would  be  more  suitable  to  its  dignity  and  majestic 
brilliancy. 

It  was  Leonardo  da  Vinci  who  freed  exact  science  from  all 
arbitrary  elements  and  waged  a  systematic  battle  against  all 
attempts  to  introduce  spiritual  causes  into  the  explanation  of 
physical  phenomena.  (Only  mathematics,  every  concept  and 
law  of  which  is  permeated  by  the  spirit  of  absolute  necessity,  is 
able  to  provide  us  with  an  adequate  basis  upon  which  to  build 
our  knowledge  of  nature.)  Kepler  already  had  gone  so  far  as 
not  only  to  recognize  clearly  both  sense  impressions  and  intel- 
lectual concepts  as  fundamental  sources  of  our  knowledge  of 
nature,  but  also  to  emphasize  their  thorough  and  organic  in- 
terrelation. According  to  him,  perception  incites  and  controls 
our  reasoning  and  is  a  genuine  and  reliable  beginning  of  our 
knowledge;  but  all  this  only  because  it  contains — though  in  a 
hidden  and  obscure  form — elements  of  intellectual  concepts  and 
mathematical  relations. 

All  these  basic  tendencies  were  decisively  deepened  and  en- 
larged by  Galileo.  He,  too,  recognized  sense  impressions  as  a 
fundamental  source  of  our  knowledge;  yet  for  him  these  im- 
pressions did  not  remain  in  the  realm  of  individual  perceptions 
— rather  they  acquired  the  form  of  organically  unified  experi- 
ence, founded  upon  and  formed  by  mathematical  concepts  and 
laws  of  absolute  necessity.  Truth  is  what  is  organically  con- 
nected with  the  whole  of  experience,  what  belongs  to  this  whole 
as  a  consistent  part  of  it;  and  the  knowledge  of  any  single  fact 
is  only  possible  by  way  of  studying  its  relations  to  the  totality 
of  known  and  established  facts. 


220  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

The  second  generation  of  great  scientists — Huyghens,  Boyle, 
and  Newton — showed  much  less  interest  in  general  episte- 
mological  problems  and  tried  primarily  to  purify  and  clarify 
their  experimental  methods.  They  tried  to  avoid  all  general 
concepts  and  theories  and  they  went  so  far  in  this  direction  that 
— as  Goethe  put  it — "they  expressed  the  clear  intention  to 
observe  natural  phenomena  as  well  as  their  own  experiments 
separately,  placing  them  side  by  side  and  without  making  any 
attempt  to  connect  them  somehow  artificially  with  one  another." 
Yet,  continued  Goethe,  they  put  a  firm  trust  in  mathematics  and 
stood  in  awe  before  the  usefulness  of  its  application  to  physics 
and  thus,  "while  they  tried  to  be  on  their  guard  with  ideality, 
they  admitted  and  kept  the  highest  ideality."  Those  great 
scientists — and  especially  the  greatest  of  them,  Newton — de- 
veloped their  mathematical  methods  to  an  amazing  degree, 
methods  which  enabled  them  meticulously  to  control  their 
experiments  and  to  deduce  from  them  exact  and  fundamental 
knowledge.  Newton's  purely  mathematical  and  seemingly  quite 
abstract  concepts  of  "absolute"  space  and  time,  of  force  and 
movement,  soon  became  the  very  foundation  of  all  physical 
science.  The  basic  epistemological  problem — the  application  of 
ideal  concepts  to  reality — attained,  through  Newton's  pro- 
cedure, such  a  degree  of  precision  that  it  soon  became  the  focal 
point  of  an  impassioned  and  prolonged  controversy  in  which 
Clarke,  Leibniz,  and  Euler  played  the  leading  part,  and  which 
so  decisively  influenced  the  young  Kant  that  not  only  did  New- 
ton's system  become  the  very  object  of  his  theoretical  philoso- 
phy, but  Kant  even  tried  to  introduce  Newton's  methods  into 
philosophy. 

In  the  first  two  volumes  of  his  Erkenntnisproblem  in  der 
Philosophie  und  Wissenschaft  der  neueren  Zeit  Cassirer  de- 
scribed and  analyzed,  step  by  step,  the  historical  development 
of  the  struggle  of  human  thought  with  this  basic  epistemologi- 
cal question}  the  same  question  lies  at  the  core  of  his  extended 
work,  Substanzbegrif  und  Funktionsbegriff.  In  this  book,  how- 
ever, Cassirer's  approach  to  the  problem  is  different — here  he 
seeks  the  solution  by  a  subtle  analysis  and  systematic  recon- 
struction of  the  whole  complex  of  epistemological  principles 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  221 

and  methods.  His  first  step  is  to  show  that  a  logical  concept  is 
never  a  simple  summing  up  of  qualities  common  to  a  certain 
group  of  similar  things}  before  this  summing  up  can  take  place 
the  human  mind  must  have  the  ability  to  establish  in  its  con- 
sciousness such  a  grouping  of  similar  things.  This  is  done  by  a 
special  mental  process  of  identification  which  establishes  a 
criterion.  This  process  of  identification,  using  any  one  particular 
as  an  instance  which  satisfi.es  the  conditions  set  forth  by  the 
criterion,  collects  a  group  of  similar  particulars,  related  to  one 
another,  and  bound  together  by  the  criterion  common  to  them 
all.  The  material  of  our  perceptions  can  be  formed  and  ordered 
in  many  different  ways  according  to  the  criterion  which  is  used 
in  any  single  case;  every  given  criterion  forms  a  special  series  of 
perceptions  in  which  a  certain  relation  among  the  single  ele- 
ments of  this  series  prevails.  This  relation  can  be  determined 
by  the  degree  of  similarity  or  difference  among  the  successive 
terms  of  the  given  series,  but  it  also  can  be  determined  by  num- 
ber or  size,  by  dimensions  of  space  or  time. 

This  structure  of  concept  as  a  succession  of  terms  connected 
with  one  another  by  a  certain  criterion  Cassirer  named  "func- 
tional" concept.  Mathematical  concepts  are  all  of  this  kind — 
what  an  integral  number  is  can  be  understood  only  if  this  num- 
ber is  regarded  as  a  term  within  an  infinite  series  where  the 
relation  of  any  two  contiguous  terms  is  that  of  n  to  n  +1} 
negative,  fractional,  irrational  and  even  transcendent  numbers 
can  be  defined  only  as  terms  of  infinite  series  whose  structure  is 
determined  by  certain  rules,  according  to  which  all  terms  of 
these  series  are  connected  with  one  another  and  derived  from 
one  another.  This  holds  true  of  all  fields  of  mathematical  science 
— geometry  and  algebra,  the  infinitesimal  calculus,  quantum 
theory,  and  so  forth.  As  Georg  Cantor  once  said,  mathematics  is 
a  free  science,  free  in  the  sense  that  its  concepts  are  neither  de- 
rived from  nor  limited  by  the  world  of  real  things.  Infinity 
is  the  very  soul  of  mathematical  concepts}  and  the  law  which 
determines  the  relation  between  single  terms  spreads  endlessly 
in  all  directions  and  forms  a  perfectly  harmonious  system  whose 
every  term  is  bound  by  infinite  relations  to  all  other  terms  of  the 
same  system. 


222  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

The  concepts  of  mechanics  reveal  the  same  nature,  the  same 
inward  structure  as  the  mathematical  concepts.  Take  as  ex- 
amples the  concepts  of  velocity  as  uniform  and  rectilinear 
motion,  of  uniform  acceleration,  of  continuous  space  and  of 
mass  reduced  to  a  point — they  all  represent  ideal  constructions 
and  criteria  determining  an  infinite  succession  of  forms,  which 
can  be  derived  from  one  another  according  to  a  constant  rule. 
Yet,  all  these  sharply  and  exactly  formed  ideal  concepts  not 
only  help  and  further  our  knowledge  of  real  things,  but  they 
actually  constitute  the  very  foundation  of  this  knowledge.  In 
order  to  understand  this  paradox  one  must  ask  himself  the 
following  question:  what  exactly  is  it  to  which  we  apply  these 
ideal  notions?  Is  it  sensations,  perceptions,  or  objects  of  the 
external  world?  The  philosophy  of  critical  idealism,  whose  basic 
tendencies  Cassirer  faithfully  espoused  and  strongly  developed 
throughout  his  life,  gives  the  following  answer:  the  primary 
stuff  of  our  consciousness  consists  of  disconnected,  fluctuating, 
chaotic  sensations,  into  which  the  human  mind  slowly  and 
steadily  brings  regularity  and  order  by  connecting  (and  bind- 
ing) dispersed  sensations  and  forming  them  into  objects.  It 
would  be  quite  wrong  to  think  that  there  exist  two  sharply 
separated  realms — the  realm  of  sensations  and  the  realm  of 
objects — and  that  the  true  goal  of  our  knowledge  consists  in 
an  unequivocal  connection  of  sensations  with  the  corresponding 
objects.  The  truth  is  that  in  the  given  form  these  two  separated 
realms  do  not  exist  at  all  and  that  the  actual  process  of  our 
knowledge  consists  in  something  quite  different.  Take  the 
simplest  sensation,  and  you  will  find  present  in  it  already  a 
considerable  amount  of  objective  elements.  Modern  psychology 
teaches  us  that  an  infant  of  six  months,  not  yet  able  to  distin- 
guish separate  sensations  from  one  another,  is,  none  the  less, 
already  able  to  comprehend  the  expressions  of  his  mother's  face 
correctly,  and  consequently  feels  whether  his  mother  is  pleased 
with  him  or  not.  On  the  other  hand,  take  any  object,  even  a 
highly  complex  and  well  known  one,  and  you  will  always  find 
that  some  subjective  impressions  doggedly  stick  to  it.  What 
really  and  truly  is  going  on  in  our  consciousness  is  not  a  grasp- 
ing at  objects  but  a  continuous  process  of  objectification — the 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  223 

raw  material  of  our  sensations  is  gradually  and  systematically 
being  worked  over  by  the  concepts  and  methods  of  our  mind, 
is  being  formed  and  objectified;  what  we  name  "objects"  are 
in  reality  nothing  else  but  more  or  less  advanced  stages  of  this 
infinite  process  of  obj edification.  A  completely  finished  object, 
one  freed  of  all  elements  of  uncertainty  and  subjectivity,  can 
be  given  only  as  the  ultimate  result  of  the  development  of 
science,  it  is  the  infinite  and  final  goal  of  human  knowledge. 
And,  conversely,  our  sensations  are  always,  to  a  greater  or 
smaller  degree,  imbued  with  elements  of  objectivity — an  abso- 
lutely pure  sensation  is  only  thinkable  as  the  ultimate  result  of 
an  endless  process  of  subjectification. 

These  considerations  open  the  way  toward  the  solution  of  our 
epistemological  problem:  the  profuse  and  fruitful  application  of 
the  ideal  concepts  of  mathematics  and  mechanics  to  the  world 
of  real  things.  Now  we  can  see  just  what  made  this  problem  so 
difficult:  the  primary  separation  into  two  different  and  inde- 
pendent worlds — the  world  of  ideal  concepts  and  the  world 
of  real  things — is  nothing  more  than  a  wrong  presumption. 
Take,  for  instance,  sudh  a  "real  thing"  as  matter  which  sur- 
rounds us  everywhere  in  such  impressive  quantities.  Greek 
science  first  thought  that  matter  was  continuous  substance;  then 
it  surmised  that  matter  was  of  atomic  structure.  And  now  we 
know  that  matter  is  nothing  but  condensed  energy  and  that  this 
energy  has — miraculously  enough — an  atomic  structure!  Our 
knowledge  of  the  atomic  bomb — no  matter  how  real  and  potent 
its  destructive  power  may  be — is  still  only  one,  and  by  no  means 
the  final,  stage  within  the  infinite  process  of  objectification;  and 
our  ideal  concepts  of  mathematics  and  mechanics  are  the  driving 
forces,  which  mold  and  regulate  this  process,  which  transform 
our  sensations  into  more  and  more  advanced  stages  of  objectifi- 
cation. The  intellect  and  its  ideal  concepts  from  the  outset 
perform  an  organic  and  absolutely  necessary  function  within 
this  process — no  knowledge  of  real  things  would  be  possible 
without  them. 

Guided  by  this  conviction,  Cassirer,  in  his  book,  Substanz- 
begrif  und  Funktionsbegrifi,  unfolded  step  by  step  the  syste- 
matic work  of  objectification  performed  by  natural  science  and 


224  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

showed  the  basic  importance  of  some  very  complicated  branches 
of  mathematics,  including  the  quantum  theory.  However, 
strangely  enough,  not  once  in  this  book  did  he  mention  the 
theory  of  relativity,  although  Einstein's  first  fundamental 
publication  concerning  this  subject  had  appeared  five  years 
earlier  and  had  aroused  a  truly  sensational  interest.  In  1921, 
two  years  after  Einstein's  concept  of  the  curvature  of  light 
(when  it  passes  through  a  field  of  gravitation)  was  brilliantly 
proved  by  astronomical  observations,  Cassirer  published  a  book- 
let on  the  theory  of  relativity.  Yet  even  in  1910  Einstein's 
theory  was  already  very  much  talked  of,  and  that  not  merely 
in  scientific  circles,  but  everywhere  and  by  everyone.  Thus, 
there  must  have  been  some  reasons  for  Cassirer's  silence  on 
relativity  at  that  time,  which  should  prove  to  be  of  great  inter- 
est, if  it  could  be  discovered  what  "precisely"  the  reasons  were. 
In  his  first  publication  on  the  theory  of  relativity,  the  famous 
"Elektrodynamik  bewegter  Systeme,"  (1905),  Einstein,  for  the 
first  time  in  the  history  of  human  thought,  put  the  following 
question  in  so  many  words:  We  all  know  Newton's  definition  of 
"absolute,  true,  and  mathematical  time;"  but  in  what  way  can 
this  concept  be  applied  to  the  world  of  real  occurrences?  Sup- 
pose, for  some  special  purpose,  we  have  to  synchronize  three 
watches — one  in  New  York,  another  in  San  Francisco,  and  the 
third  halfway  between  them,  say  in  Norfolk,  Nebraska.  The 
only  correct  way  to  do  that  would  be  to  send,  let  us  say  at  12:00 
P.M.  sharp,  a  light  signal  from  Norfolk  to  the  two  other  cities, 
and  when  this  signal  would  arrive  in  each  of  the  two  cities,  the 
time  on  their  watches  should  be  put  at  12:00  P.M.  plus  one 
hundredth  of  a  second,  since  it  would  take  the  light  signal  that 
much  time  to  reach  those  cities.  This  procedure  seems  to  be 
quite  correct  and  even  matter-of-course;  yet  Einstein  proved 
that  it  was  incorrect,  since  it  did  not  allow  for  the  rotation  of 
the  earth.  In  our  example  the  light  signal  would  reach  New 
York  earlier  than  San  Francisco,  since  New  York  would,  so 
to  speak,  move  to  meet  this  signal,  whereas  San  Francisco 
would,  as  it  were,  run  away  from  it.  Thus,  concluded  Einstein, 
time,  within  a  given  system,  depends  on  whether  this  system 
is  moving  or  not  and — if  it  is — on  the  velocity  of  its  movement. 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  225 

In  a  second  example  Einstein  showed  that  there  is  only  one 
way  to  measure  the  length  of  a  moving  object,  namely,  to  use 
light  signals  and  synchronized  watches;  but,  inasmuch  as  syn- 
chronization of  watches  depends  upon  the  movement  of  a  given 
system,  the  length  of  an  object  must  also  depend  on  this  move- 
ment. 

These  two  examples  given  by  Einstein  were  so  surprisingly 
novel,  so  impressive,  so  convincingly  true  that  the  attention  of 
the  scientific  world  was  immediately  focused  on  him.  However, 
this  was  only  the  beginning  $  he  also  discovered  other  most  in- 
genious and  important  physical  laws,  as,  for  instance,  the  exact 
correlation  between  electric  and  magnetic  fields,  and,  in  particu- 
lar, the  relation  between  mass  and  energy:  E  =  mc2;  this 
formula  was  made  so  popular  by  the  atomic  bomb  that  one  can 
now  find  it  even  in  newspaper  advertisements.  The  great 
authority  of  Einstein  as  a  true  genius  of  natural  science  was, 
thus,  firmly  and  indisputably  established. 

And  yet:  an  objective  study  of  the  whole  complex  of  Ein- 
stein's theories  shows  clearly  that  there  is  also  another  side  to 
them  and  that  Einstein's  case  at  certain  points  repeats  a  phe- 
nomenon which  is  sometimes  met  in  the  history  of  natural 
science,  namely,  that  a  well  recognized  authority  advances  a 
theory  which  is  obviously  inconsistent  and  later  may  even  be 
proved  wrong.  Yet  such  a  theory  may  nevertheless  be  immedi- 
ately accepted  and,  supported  as  it  is  by  the  weighty  name  of 
its  famous  originator,  it  is  likely  to  become  a  part  of  accepted 
science.  The  most  striking  example  of  this  kind  is  provided  by 
the  physics  of  Aristotle:  as  late  as  in  the  seventeenth  century 
the  official  doctrine  in  physics  accepted  Aristotle's  thesis  that 
the  velocity  of  a  falling  object  is  proportional  to  its  weight; 
viz.,  ten  bricks  tied  together  fall  ten  times  faster  to  the  earth 
than  a  single  brick;  or  that  a  stone  dropped  on  a  moving  ship 
from  the  top  of  a  mast  falls  not  to  the  base  of  this  mast  but 
into  the  water,  an  experiment  Aristotle  allegedly  performed 
many  times.  So  great  was  Aristotle's  authority  that  the  physi- 
cians among  his  followers  implicitly  believed  his  assertion  that 
the  heart  is  the  center  of  the  nervous  system.  Galileo  tells  us 
that  ^t  one  time  a  human  body  was  dissected  in  the  presence 


226  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

of  a  large  group  of  Aristotelians  and  the  dissection  incontro- 
vertibly  proved  that  it  is  the  brain  which  is  the  center  of  the 
nervous  system.  Thereupon  the  spokesman  of  the  Aristotelians 
declared:  "You  gave  us  such  clear  and  evident  proof,  that,  were 
it  not  asserted  by  Aristotle  that  the  nerve-center  lies  in  the 
heart,  we  would  be  forced  to  the  admission  that  you  are  right." 
Yet,  Aristotle  is  not  the  only  great  authority  of  whom  this 
sort  of  thing  is  true.  Other  instances  could  easily  be  cited.  But 
this  is  not  the  place  for  such — however  interesting — stories. 

Something  akin  to  it  we  find  in  some  elements  of  Einstein's 
theory  of  relativity.  Having  proved  that  the  necessity  of  using 
light  signals  for  the  measurement  of  time  and  space  in  moving 
systems  is  bound  to  influence  the  results  of  this  measurement, 
Einstein,  without  reason  or  explanation,  stops  following  up 
this  absolutely  correct  and  revolutionary  idea  and  supersedes 
it  by  another  explanation  which  is  quite  wrong:  in  a  moving 
system  the  time  and  the  length  of  objects  change  because  the 
movement  of  a  system  influences  the  motion  of  watch  mecha- 
nisms by  slowing  them  down  and  influences  the  length  of  ma- 
terial objects  by  physically  contracting  them.  This  sounds  so 
incredible  that  we  must  quote  Einstein  himself.  "A  balanced 
watch  placed  on  the  equator  moves  by  a  very  small  amount 
slower  than  an  exactly  identical  watch  would  move  under  other- 
wise quite  identical  conditions  except  that  it  is  placed  at  the 
pole."2  In  this  quotation  Einstein  does  not  speak  of  the  watch 
in  general,  but  rather  he  stresses  that  it  has  to  be  a  balanced 
watch.  Why?  Because,  according  to  Einstein  and  his  most 
famous  followers,  like,  for  instance,  Max  von  Laue,  only  the 
balance  wheel  (this  regulating  gear  of  a  watch),  is  slowed 
down  by  the  velocity  of  the  moving  system  to  which  this 
watch  belongs.  At  once  the  question  arises:  And  how  about  other 
kinds  of  timepieces  which  work  without  coiling  spring  and 
balance  wheel,  for  instance,  clepsydra  or  hourglass?  Einstein 
did  not  think  of  them;  yet  he  did  think  of  the  pendulum-clock, 
and  therefore  added  the  following  words:  a  balance-watch  "in 

*  Einstein's  "Elektrodynamik  bewegter  Systeme,"  reprinted  in  the  Fortschritte  der 
mathematmhen  Wissenschaften,  No.  2,  p.  38.  (Translation  by  the  present  writer.) 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  227 

opposition  to  a  balance-clock  which  represents — from  the  point 
of  view  of  physics — the  same  system  as  the  terrestrial  globe; 
this  case  has  to  be  excluded,"  If  what  Einstein  says  here  is  true, 
then  there  is  nothing  easier  than  to  avoid  all  complications  by 
simply  using  pendulum-clocks  exclusively,  never  the  balance- 
watches  j  then  the  theory  of  relativity  would  not  be  a  novel  and 
revolutionary  conception  of  time  and  space,  but  merely  a  ques- 
tion of  using  incorrect  or  correct  technical  instruments.  Yet 
Einstein's  attempt  to  make  his  theory  dependent  on  the  kind 
of  timepieces  used  is  just  as  strange  and  contains  just  as  much 
truth  as,  for  instance,  the  assertion  that  the  validity  of  non- 
Euclidean  geometry  depends  on  the  type  of  glasses  a  mathema- 
tician wears. 

Einstein's  so-called  special  theory  of  relativity,  the  only  one 
to  which  we  are  here  referring,  did  not  introduce  any  new 
mathematical  formula;  it  was  rather  an  attempt  to  give  a  new 
interpretation  to  the  Lorentz-transformation,  and  the  fallacy 
of  Einstein's  interpretation  could  not  in  any  way  invalidate 
the  importance  and  fruitfulness  of  the  Lorentz-transformation. 
Yet  this  fallacy  of  interpretation  is  the  source  of  all  the  para- 
doxes and  inconsistencies  of  Einstein's  theory.  Take,  for 
instance,  the  so-called — and  very  famous  at  that — "paradox 
of  the  watch"  which  Einstein  later  expressed  in  the  following 
drastic  form: 

If  we  could  put  a  living  organism  into  a  box  and  compel  it  to  perform 
the  same  regular  movements  as  a  balance-watch  does,  then  it  would  be 
possible  to  achieve  that  this  organism  would  return  to  its  starting  place 
after  as  long  a  flight  as  you  like  and  would  not  show  any  changes  what- 
soever, whereas  quite  similar  organisms  which  all  this  time  stayed  quietly 
in  their  place  would  be  superseded  by  several  consecutive  generations. 
The  long  time  which  this  journey  lasted  was  for  the  moving  organism 
not  more  than  one  single  moment,  provided  only  that  it  moved  approxi- 
mately with  the  velocity  of  light.  This  is  an  inevitable  consequence  of 
our  fundamental  principles  imposed  upon  us  by  experimental  knowledge.8 

In  reading  these  words  one  involuntarily  thinks  of  what 

'Einstein,  "Die  Relativitatstheorie."  Vierteljahnschrift  der  naturforsckenden 
Gesellschaft,  Zurich,  Vol.  56,  p.  12.  (Translation  by  the  present  writer.) 


228  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

Aristotle  said  after  asserting  that  a  stone,  dropped  on  a  moving 
ship  from  the  top  of  the  mast,  falls  into  the  water:  "This  experi- 
ment I  performed  several  times."  First  of  all,  Einstein's  allega- 
tion completely  contradicts  Einstein's  own  "fundamental  princi- 
ple" of  relativity.  According  to  this  principle,  movement  is 
always  relative  to  some  other  system,  and  there  is  no  way  of 
ascertaining  which  of  these  two  systems  really  moves  and  which 
is  in  the  state  of  immobility,  or  which  part  of  this  relative  move- 
ment is  performed  by  either  of  these  systems.  Yet  Einstein's 
example  of  a  moving  organism  brings  back  the  idea  of  absolute 
movement:  the  surviving  organism  was  really  in  a  state  of 
motion,  whereas  the  extinct  generations  were  in  a  state  of  im- 
mobility. Furthermore,  the  assertion  that  time  slows  down 
under  the  influence  of  movement  is  quite  wrong.  If  one  follows 
up  Einstein's  brilliant  example  of  the  synchronization  of  three 
watches  in  three  different  cities,  one  finds  the  following  phe- 
nomenon: so  long  as  a  watch  recedes  from  the  observer,  the  time 
on  this  watch  appears  to  him  as  retarded;  but  the  moment  this 
watch  begins  approaching  the  observer,  the  time  on  it  appears 
as  accelerated  in  the  same  degree,  and  as  an  ultimate  result  there 
is  absolutely  no  loss  or  gain  of  time.4 

Truth  is  always  simple,  understandable,  impressive.  This  is 
the  case  with  all  elements  of  Einstein's  theory  which  are  veri- 
fiably  correct.  Only  those  elements  of  Einstein's  theory  are 
difficult  which  are  basically  wrong.  The  famous  originator  of 
the  quantum  theory,  Max  Planck,  once  said  of  the  theory  of 
relativity:  "It  is  hardly  necessary  to  emphasize  that  this  novel 
conception  of  time  puts  the  highest  demands  upon  the  power 
of  imagination  of  a  physicist  and  upon  his  ability  of  abstraction. 
Its  boldness  surpasses  everything  which  previously  had  been 
accomplished  in  the  speculative  philosophy  of  nature  and  even 
in  philosophical  epistemologyj  compared  to  it,  non-Euclidean 
geometry  is  mere  child's  play."5  It  certainly  was  not  Einstein's 
intention  to  enrich  the  "speculative  philosophy  of  nature"  with 

4  See  my  booklet,  "Der  fkysikalische  Gehalt  der  speziellen  Relattvitatstheorie," 
Stuttgart,  Engelhorns. 

8  Max  Planck,  Acht  Vorlesungen  iiber  theoretische  Phy$ikt  1910,  p.  117. 
(Translation  by  the  present  writer.) 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  229 

his  theory  ;  he  is  a  great  physicist,  and  some  parts  of  his  theory 
will  probably  live  forever  in  the  science  of  men;  but  the  in- 
correct parts  of  his  theory  belong  nowhere,  not  even  to  specula- 
tive philosophy. 

It  is  most  interesting  to  observe  in  what  manner  Cassirer,  in 
his  booklet,  7,wr  Einstein*  schen  Relativitatstheorie,  deals  with 
the  theory  of  relativity,  this  amazing  combination  of  profound 
truths  and  striking  inconsistencies.  Cassirer  knew  Einstein  per- 
sonally and,  as  he  tells  in  the  preface  to  his  booklet,  showed  the 
manuscript  to  Einstein  before  having  it  printed.  In  the  whole 
booklet  one  does  not  find  one  single  word  of  criticism  or  doubt; 
at  the  same  time,  only  those  elements  of  Einstein's  theory  are 
discussed  which  are  undoubtedly  fruitful  and  true.  Cassirer 
regards  the  theory  of  relativity  as  one  link  in  the  long  chain  of 
scientific  and  philosophical  development,  as  an  important  con- 
stituent in  the  whole  structure  of  epistemology.  He  starts  with 
the  general  problem  of  measuring  and  shows  that  it  is  the  first 
step  to  the  objectification  of  our  sensations,  their  transformation 
into  elements  of  scientific  experience.  Our  methods  of  measuring 
are  always  based  upon  some  principles  and  axioms.  One  of  these 
axioms  always  was  that  units  of  time,  length,  mass,  are  quite 
independent  of  whether  they  are  applied  in  a  moving  or  a 
motionless  system.  Einstein  showed  the  incorrectness  of  this 
axiom  by  proving  that  these  units  themselves  depend  on  the 
velocity  of  a  given  system.  Cassirer  does  not  at  all  discuss  the 
question:  What  is  the  cause  of  this  change?  He  does  not  even 
mention  Einstein's  explanation  according  to  which  even  uniform 
and  rectilinear  motion  physically  affects  the  mechanism  of  a 
watch,  an  explanation  which,  by  the  way,  directly  contradicts 
Galileo's  and  Newton's  principle  of  inertia. 

In  order  to  explain  the  crisis  into  which  science  was  thrown 
by  the  negative  result  of  Michelson's  experiment,  let  me  use 
the  following  imaginary  example:  an  observer  on  a  highway 
sees  an  automobile  moving  with  the  velocity  of  a  hundred  miles 
per  hour;  at  the  same  time  he  sees  a  plane  flying  in  the  same 
direction  with  the  velocity  of  three  hundred  miles  per  hour; 
the  observer  does  not  doubt  for  a  moment  that — if  the  passen- 
gers of  the  car  compared  their  velocity  with  the  velocity  of  the 


230  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

plane — they  would  find  a  difference  of  two  hundred  miles. 
How  greatly  amazed  one  would  be,  if  he  were  told  that  in 
relation  to  him  the  plane  still  flies  at  the  velocity  of  three 
hundred  miles!  Einstein's  method  of  solving  this  difficulty  was 
the  following:  he  showed  on  the  examples  of  synchronization 
of  watches  and  measuring  of  length  within  a  moving  system 
that  both  operations  could  be  performed  only  with  the  help 
of  light  signals;  and  then  he  said  (not  literally,  to  be  sure): 
You  see,  our  units  of  time  and  length  are  not  at  all  as  matter- 
of-course  as  we  used  to  think  of  them;  they  are  rather  uncertain, 
they  change  along  with  the  velocity  of  a  given  system,  and, 
since  this  is  the  case,  why  should  we  not  presuppose  that  the 
changes  these  units  undergo  are  just  big  enough  to  explain  the 
fact  that  our  plane  flies  relatively  both  to  the  highway  and  to 
the  speeding  car  with  the  same  velocity  of  three  hundred  miles? 

One  can  hardly  regard  this  as  a  solution  to  our  problem,  in- 
asmuch as  the  problem  itself  is  simply  transformed  into  a  sup- 
position. At  the  same  time  Einstein's  analysis  of  the  problem  of 
synchronization  contains  all  the  elements  of  the  correct  solu- 
tion. Yet,  amazingly  enough,  he  did  not  follow  up  the  novel 
and  most  promising  road  he  had  himself  discovered.  But  this 
method — to  transform  the  problem  into  a  supposition — Ein- 
stein used  once  more,  when  he  replaced  Newton's  law  of  gravi- 
tation with  a  slightly  different  law  of  a  very  complicated  mathe- 
matical structure.  Newton  derived  his  law  of  gravitation  from 
Kepler's  third  law  of  planetary  motion;  this  was  a  simple  and 
most  convincing  demonstration  of  Newton's  law.  Einstein's 
procedure  was  different;  he  tried  to  construct  a  mathematical 
formula  which  had  to  satisfy  the  following  conditions:  to  con- 
tain Newton's  formula  as  first  approximation  and  to  produce  the 
amount  of  the  perihelion  movement  of  the  planet  Mercury;  it 
was  an  ad  hoc  formula,  a  transformation  of  a  problem  into  a 
supposition. 

Cassirer  does  not  criticize  or  reject  this  procedure;  he  gives 
a  quite  adequate  description  of  it  and  introduces  his  own  analysis 
with  the  following  spirited  words  of  Goethe:  "The  highest  art 
in  science  and  life  consists  in  transforming  a  problem  into  a 
postulate;  one  gets  through  this  way."  But  Cassirer  does  not 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  231 

dwell  on  this  subject}  whereas  Einstein's  conception  of  matter 
as  condensed  energy,  this  daring  and  practically  most  important 
of  his  theories,  is  discussed  at  great  length.  Cassirer  shows  that 
the  entire  history  of  physics  had  been  dominated  by  a  peculiar 
dualism  in  the  apprehension  of  nature.  Democritus  introduced 
the  concepts  of  the  atom  and  of  empty  space  as  the  only  sources 
of  physical  reality.  In  the  subsequent  centuries  this  dualism 
transformed  itself  into  the  acceptance  of  pure  form  concepts 
(like  space  and  time),  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  substance  con- 
cepts (like  matter),  on  the  other.  Descartes  was  the  first  to 
attempt  a  unification  of  these  two  concept  groups}  by  levelling 
any  distinction  between  them  he  dissolved,  as  it  were,  the  sub- 
stance of  a  physical  object  into  a  system  of  purely  geometrical 
relations.  Yet  Cartesian  physics  proved  to  be  ineffectual,  and 
Newton  refuted  Descartes1  physical  theories  and  went  back  to 
the  old  dualism  of  space  as  a  kind  of  a  vessel  and  of  matter  as 
substance  contained  in  it.  Faraday  was  the  first  to  bring  about 
a  new  conception  of  matter,  by  advancing  the  theory  that  matter 
consists  of  lines  of  force,  that  it  is  nothing  but  a  spot  within  a 
field  of  force.  This  theory  stirred  up  a  strong  development  of 
the  so-called  "field-physics,"  which  did  not  accept  the  existence 
of  matter  and  space  as  two  separate  factors,  but  regarded  matter 
as  an  "offspring  of  field."  Einstein's  theory  of  relativity  repre- 
sents the  last  link  within  this  development}  it  does  not  accept 
space,  time,  matter,  and  force  as  independent  factors,  but  re- 
gards the  physical  world  as  a  four-dimensional  multiplicity. 
Along  with  this  new  conception  of  the  world  another  historical 
development  has  been  brought  to  its  conclusion.  Leibniz  already 
had  completely  dissolved  matter  into  force,  yet  he  retained  a 
distinction  between  two  kinds  of  forces,  "active"  and  "passive" 
forces.  Einstein's  theory  brings  about  the  ultimate  fusion  be- 
tween the  two  fundamental  principles  of  modern  physics — 
the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  mass  and  the  principle  of  the 
conservation  of  energy.  The  qualitative  difference  between 
matter  and  energy  disappears  entirely. 

This  method  is  typical  of  Cassirer's  treatment  of  Einstein's 
theory — the  historical  continuity  of  scientific  thought  appears 
clearly  and  convincingly  in  Cassirer's  argumentation.  The  prin- 


232  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

ciples  of  physics  introduced  by  Galileo  and  further  developed 
by  Newton  are  only  confirmed  and  enlarged  in  the  theory  of 
relativity.  And  since  Cassirer,  with  his  keen  sense  of  con- 
sistency and  exactness  of  scientific  truth,  concentrated  his  atten- 
tion only  on  those  elements  of  Einstein's  theory  which  are 
correct  and  fruitful,  Cassirer  acquitted  himself  of  this  task  most 
brilliantly.  He  does  not  mention  with  even  one  single  word 
Einstein's  assertion  that  uniform  and  rectilinear  movement 
influences  a  watch  mechanism  and  slows  it  down,  or  that  this 
movement  keeps  a  living  organism  indefinitely  alive,  or  that 
there  is  a  basic  difference  between  a  balance-watch  and  pendu- 
lum-clock. Only  one  of  Einstein's  assertions  is  casually  men- 
tioned by  Cassirer,  despite  the  fact  that  it  definitely  belongs 
to  the  group  of  erroneous  elements  within  Einstein's  theory. 
I  am  referring  to  Einstein's  assertion  (repeated  several  times 
by  himself,  and  many  thousands  of  times  by  his  followers)  that 
Euclidean  geometry  loses  its  validity  within  a  system  which  is 
in  a  state  of  motion,  even  of  uniform  and  rectilinear  motion. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  ratio  of  the  circumference  of  a  circle  to 
its  diameter  (pi);  it  changes  its  value  within  such  a  moving 
system,  it  becomes  smaller,  according  to  Einstein.  Why?  The 
reason,  says  Einstein,  is  quite  simple.  If  you  have  a  rotating 
disk,  then,  since  all  moving  objects  become  shorter  in  the  di- 
rection of  their  movement,  the  circumference  of  this  disk  will 
be  smaller  than  the  circumference  of  the  same  disk  in  the  state 
of  immobility,  and  the  corresponding  ratio  will  drop  below  pi. 
This  whole  argument  is  entirely  wrong  $  and  the  fact  that  so 
many  earnest  scientists  willingly  accepted  it  is  very  strange 
indeed.  This  is  such  a  striking  example  of  mass-suggestion  (not 
to  say  gullibility)  in  the  field  of  "exact"  ( ! )  science  that  it  is 
worth  while  to  dwell  a  bit  more  upon  this  subject. 

In  order  to  prove  that  moving  objects  become  shorter  in  the 
direction  of  their  movement,  Einstein  invented  a  very  ingenious 
example  which,  when  adapted  to  American  geography,  might 
take  the  following  form:  suppose  that  an  immensely  long  air- 
ship of  approximately  3000  miles  in  length  is  flying  in  west- 
east  direction  over  American  territory,  with  one  end  over  San 
Francisco  and  the  other  end  over  New  York,  just  at  the  moment 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  233 

when  we  are  trying  to  find  out  the  precise  length  of  this  air- 
ship. There  is  only  one  way  to  do  that,  namely,  to  notice,  at 
precisely  the  same  moment,  both  ends  of  the  airship,  one  in 
San  Francisco  and  the  other  in  New  York,  and  then  figure  out 
the  distance  between  these  markings.  For  this  purpose  we  must 
have  perfectly  synchronized  watches  placed  in  both  cities.  Yet 
this  is  impossible,  as  we  have  already  seen — the  watch  in  San 
Francisco  will  be  slower  than  the  watch  in  New  York;  there- 
fore we  shall  be  marking  the  rear  end  of  the  airship  later  than 
the  front  end,  and  the  airship  will  consequently  appear  to  us 
to  be  shortened.  Very  well.  But  now  suppose  that  two  airships 
move  simultaneously,  but  in  opposite  directions — is  it  not  abso- 
lutely clear  that  in  this  case  the  second  ship  will  appear  longer 
in  exact  proportion  as  the  first  ship  will  appear  shorter?  Thus, 
if  you  take  a  rotating  disk,  you  will  have  to  admit  by  the  same 
reasoning  that,  since  the  two  halves  of  its  circumference  always 
move  in  opposite  direction,  one  half  shortens  in  exactly  the  same 
proportion  in  which  the  other  half  lengthens  5  the  effect  of 
rotation  is  neutralized,  pi  remains  absolutely  unchanged,  and 
there  is  no  reason  whatsoever  to  dethrone  Euclidean  geometry 
on  this  illusory  ground. 

During  the  last  years  of  his  stay  in  Germany  Cassirer  devoted 
increasingly  more  time  to  the  study  of  the  quantum  theory,  and 
when,  in  the  spring  of  1933,  he  decided  to  leave  Germany,  he 
went  to  Switzerland  and  there  he  wrote  the  first  draft  of  his 
Determinismus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der  modernen  Phystk. 
This  book  was  his  last  major  contribution  to  epistemology  and 
to  the  philosophy  of  natural  science.  The  subsequent  years  of 
his  life,  with  their  frequent  peregrinations  and  changes  of  place 
of  activity,  deprived  him  to  some  degree  of  the  steady  tran- 
quillity which  was  so  favorable  to  his  assiduous  work.  Besides, 
the  new  social  phenomenon  which  suddenly  appeared  on  the 
stage  of  history  and  at  once  began  threatening  the  future  of 
mankind — totalitarianism  based  upon  and  supported  by  the 
fanaticism  of  deceived  masses — moved  Cassirer  to  transfer  the 
center  of  gravity  of  his  studies  to  the  problems  of  social  science. 

Quantum  theory  and  the  theory  of  relativity  are  the  two 
outstanding:  achievements  of  theoretical  phvsics  in  the  last  half- 


234  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

century.  Yet,  how  different  was  their  ultimate  fate!  Max  Planck 
was  compelled  to  advance  his  incredible  and  almost  incompre- 
hensible conception  that  energy  has  a  discontinuous  structure 
and  consists  of  elementary  quanta,  of  which  all  other  amounts  of 
energy  are  multiples,  since  otherwise  it  was  impossible  to  ex- 
plain the  peculiar  and  quite  "unclassical"  manner  in  which 
energy  is  radiated  by  a  black  body.  From  the  outset  it  was 
obvious  that  here  a  perfectly  new  and  truly  revolutionary 
principle  was  being  introduced  into  physics.  Yet  Planck  tried 
by  every  means  to  retain  the  continuity  of  scientific  thought  and 
was  only  willing  to  admit  the  quite  "inevitable  deviation  from 
the  laws  of  electrodynamics  in  the  smallest  possible  degree. 
Therefore,  as  far  as  it  concerns  the  influence  of  a  radiation  field 
upon  an  oscillator,  we  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  classical 
theory."6  Which  means  that  Planck,  although  accepting  energy 
quanta  for  the  radiation,  still  retained  the  point  of  view  of 
classical  physics  upon  the  absorption  of  energy  by  an  oscillator. 
From  the  very  beginning  Planck  based  his  theory  strictly  upon 
experience  and  experiment,  and  his  hypothesis,  despite  its 
breath-taking  character,  advanced  therefore  from  one  great 
triumph  to  another,  never  meeting  with  any  serious  opposition. 
The  road  of  the  theory  of  relativity  was  quite  different.  Ein- 
stein made  a  great  discovery  by  recognizing  the  decisive  role 
the  light  signals  play  in  the  measuring  of  time  and  space ;  this 
discovery  was  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  Galileo-Newtonian 
mechanics}  it  was  a  correct  and  most  important  materialization 
of  their  general  concepts  of  time  and  space.  Yet,  instead  of  con- 
tinuing this  line  of  development,  he  made  a  quite  inconsistent 
and  "anti-classical"  supposition  to  the  effect  that  uniform  and 
rectilinear  motion  influence  the  mechanism  of  a  balance-watch. 
This  was  a  violent  and  quite  unwarranted  break  with  classical 
mechanics.  And  the  paradoxes  involved  in  the  suppositions  of 
a  living  organism  surviving  in  a  fraction  of  a  second  several 
consecutive  generations  of  its  kind,  or  of  a  rotating  disk  invali- 
dating Euclidean  geometry,  helped  to  create  such  an  unsound 

9  Max  Planck,  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Theorie  der  W armestrahlungy  3rd  Ed.  p. 
148.  Quotation  taken  from  Cassirer's  book,  p.  136  (Translation  by  the  present 
writer) . 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  235 

sensation  around  this  theory  that  it  slowly  became  even  a 
political  issue — the  reactionaries  were  against  it  because  of  Ein- 
stein's Jewish  lineage,  and  the  communists  were  for  it  because 
of  the  "revolutionary  spirit"  of  this  theory.  A  line  of  cleavage 
in  the  field  of  science  which  is  nothing  short  of  scandalous.  But 
now  back  to  Cassirer's  book,  Determinismus  und  Indeter- 
minismus. 

Cassirer's  first  step  consists  in  the  analyzing  of  the  factual 
procedure  of  physics,  of  the  concrete  way  in  which  it  achieves 
its  knowledge  of  nature.  He  distinguishes  three  different  forms 
of  assertion  within  the  physical  sciences,  three  basically  differ- 
ent stages  on  the  way  towards  the  obj  edification  of  our  "world 
of  sense"  into  the  "world  of  physics."  The  first  form  of  physi- 
cal assertions  Cassirer  calls  "judgments  concerning  measure- 
ment"— the  data  of  our  perceptions  are  gradually  transformed, 
with  the  aid  of  concepts  of  measurement  and  of  number,  into 
more  and  more  objectified  assertions.  The  sensibility  of  our 
organs  of  perception  is  superseded  by  the  sensibility  of  our 
physical  instruments.  In  this  way  the  material  of  our  knowl- 
edge has  increased  tremendously  and  the  horizon  of  reality  has 
been  widened  in  all  directions.  This  enriched  material  of  our 
experience  becomes  the  basis  for  the  next  step,  for  its  unifica- 
tion and  systematization  with  the  help  of  natural  laws;  Cassirer 
called  this  stage  of  objectification  "assertions  about  laws."  These 
laws  combine  smaller  or  larger  groups  of  facts  into  one  single 
formula.  Yet  our  science  does  not  stop  here}  it  is  not  satisfied 
with  unification  of  innumerable  facts  through  a  limited  system 
of  lawsj  it  constantly  explores  the  possibility  of  unifying  these 
laws,  of  connecting  them  with  one  another  and  sometimes  de- 
riving them  from  one  another.  This  endeavor  characterizes  the 
third  stage  of  objectification  which  Cassirer  calls  "assertions  of 
principles."  Thus,  D'Alembert's  "principle  of  virtual  displace- 
ment" made  possible  the  unification  of  statics  and  dynamics 
under  one  and  the  same  system  of  mechanical  laws;  and  the 
principle  of  conservation  of  energy  builds  bridges  connecting  all 
branches  of  physics. 

Yet  human  thought  does  not  confine  itself  to  these  three 
stages  of  physical  knowledge — it  belongs  to  the  very  essence  of 


236  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

the  human  mind  to  continue  the  search  for  ever  more  and  more 
general  laws  and  principles,  and  it  finds  such  in  the  systems  of 
mathematical,  logical,  and  epistemological  concepts.  The  law  of 
causation  belongs  to  the  system  of  epistemological  concepts;  it 
does  not  contain  any  assertion  about  this  or  that  special  occur- 
rence in  nature;  it  only  asserts  the  thorough  and  consistent  uni- 
formity of  all  natural  events  and  of  nature  as  a  whole.  Every 
single  law  of  nature  may  some  day  turn  out  to  be  incorrect,  even 
the  sunrise  in  the  morning;  yet,  even  if  this  event  should  occur, 
one  thing  will  be  absolutely  certain:  there  will  be  some  cause 
for  that  event.  Without  this  law  of  causation  no  natural  laws, 
and,  therefore,  no  human  knowledge  is  possible. 

The  law  of  causation  was  always  regarded  as  the  main  pillar 
of  the  classical  physics.  But  when  the  development  of  the 
quantum  theory  convincingly  revealed  its  fundamental  differ- 
ence from  the  classical  physics,  there  appeared  a  tendency  within 
this  theory  to  break  even  with  causality  and  to  replace  the  classi- 
cal determinism  with  a  modernized  form  of  indeterminism. 
This  attack  upon  the  law  of  causation  has  been  launched  by 
some  physicists  mainly  from  the  following  point  of  view:  the 
first  point  of  view  is  based  upon  a  statistical  interpretation  of 
quantum  theory — it  operates  only  with  immense  numbers  of 
elementary  particles  of  electricity  and  denies  the  possibility  of  a 
precise  description  of  the  conditions  of  single  elements  within 
a  given  system;  only  laws  of  probability  can  be  applied  to  such 
systems,  only  statistical  results  can  be  obtained  by  these  laws — 
there  remains,  therefore,  no  place  for  causation  within  these 
systems.  It  is  with  ease  that  Cassirer  uncovers  the  fallacy  of  this 
point  of  view.  Statistical  results,  he  points  out,  very  often  have 
the  character  of  strict  necessity;  the  only  condition  being  that 
they  must  not  be  arbitrary  or  incoherent,  but  based  upon  laws. 
The  kinetic  theory  of  gases  is  the  best  example  of  how  statistical 
methods  and  laws  of  probability  lead  to  strict  uniformity  and, 
therefore,  to  a  complete  vindication  of  the  law  of  causation. 

The  second  point  of  view  which  has  led  to  the  denial  of 
causality  is  more  radical,  even  if  not  so  well  founded.  This 
attack  is  led  by  the  well-known  physicist  and  Nobel  prize- 
winner Heisenberg  and  is  based  upon  his  principle  of  "uncer- 


EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  PHYSICS  237 

tainty"  or  "indeterminacy."  All  elements  of  physical  observa- 
tion and  experiment  are  given  to  us,  says  Heisenberg,  not  in  the 
form  of  absolutely  exact  knowledge,  not  as  Kantian  trans- 
cendent "things-in-themselves" — rather  they  are  the  results  of 
our  instruments  of  measurement  and  depend  strictly  on  the 
delicacy  of  these  instruments.  But  this  quite  matter-of-course 
fact  leads  us  within  the  quantum  theory  to  the  following  'pe- 
culiar paradox:  suppose  that  an  observer  has  the  task  of  deter- 
mining exactly  the  position  and  the  velocity  of  an  electron;  in 
order  to  do  that  he  must  irradiate  this  electron  and  put  it  under 
a  microscope  5  the  experiment  shows  that  the  shorter  the  waves 
of  light  are  which  we  use  for  this  irradiation  the  more  exactly 
can  the  position  of  this  electron  be  determined  ;  but  at  the  same 
time  the  electron,  as  a  result  of  the  "Compton-effect,"  changes 
its  velocity,  and  this  change  is  the  greater  the  shorter  are  the 
waves  of  the  irradiating  light.  Thus,  concludes  Heisenberg,  it 
is  quite  impossible  simultaneously  to  perform  an  exact  measure- 
ment of  both  the  position  and  the  velocity  of  an  electron,  since 
the  more  exact  one  measurement  is  the  more  uncertain  the  other 
one  becomes.  Heisenberg's  conclusion  is:  "Thus  quantum  me- 
chanics has  definitely  established  the  worthlessness  of  the  law  of 
causation." 

It  is  almost  incredible  how  many  serious  scientists  have  been 
influenced  by  this  conception  of  Heisenberg's.  A  new  wave  of 
mass-suggestion  was  on  the  verge  of  submerging  a  large  num- 
ber of  physicists — people  who  by  the  very  virtue  of  their  pro- 
fession should  be  fairly  rational.  Cassirer's  attempt  to  combat 
this  contemporary  aberration  in  science  was  quite  timely,  there- 
fore. His  method  of  demonstrating  the  erroneousness  of  Hei- 
senberg's  deduction  was  as  simple  as  it  was  convincing.  He 
showed  that  Heisenberg,  in  order  to  demonstrate  his  "principle 
of  indeterminacy,"  at  every  step  applied  the  very  same  law  of 
causation  which  he  tried  to  disprove  with  the  help  of  these 
"uncertainty  relations."  Take,  for  example,  the  "Compton- 
effect,"  upon  which  Heisenberg's  demonstration  rests;  the  im- 
pact between  light  quanta  and  electrons  makes  an  application 
of  the  law  of  causation  and  yields  experimental  results  strictly 
in  accordance  with  this  law. 


238  DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

Cassirer  died  less  than  four  months  before  the  first  explosion 
of  the  atomic  bomb  proved  to  the  entire  civilized  world  the 
great  danger  which  lies  in  the  mere  development  of  exact 
science:  it  releases  forces  too  powerful  to  be  controlled  j  it  makes 
man  so  powerful  that  the  very  existence  of  mankind  appears  to 
be  endangered.  This  dark  prospect  reminds  us  of  the  philo- 
sophical thesis  Cassirer  defended  and  developed  all  his  life — 
that  scientific  progress  is  only  beneficial  for  man  in  so  far  as  it  is 
supported  and  guided  by  equally  as  vigorous  progress  of  man's 
ethical,  spiritual,  cultural,  and  social  life. 

DIMITRY  GAWRONSKY 

NEW  YORK  CITY 


6 

Harold  R.  Smart 

CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL 
CONCEPTS 


CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL 
CONCEPTS 

IN  AN  important  article  in  Kantstudien  (XII,  1907),  en- 
titled "Kant  und  die  moderne  Mathematik,"  Cassirer 
makes  an  assertion  which  throws  much  light  on  his  theory  of 
mathematical  concepts.  He  declares  that  "it  cannot  be  denied 
that  cLogistik'  [i.e.,  symbolic  or  mathematical  logic]  has  revivi- 
fied formal  logic,  and  .  .  .  nourished  it  anew  with  the  life  blood 
of  science."  And  this  development,  he  continues,  is  of  great  sig- 
nificance with  respect  to  Kantian  doctrines.  Although  it  is  cer- 
tainly true  that  symbolic  logic  "can  never  supplant  or  replace 
'transcendental'  logic,"  it  is  equally  certain  that  formal  logic 
as  thus  rejuvenated  "offers  more  pregnant  suggestions  and 
affords  more  trustworthy  'guiding  threads'  than  Kant  possessed 
in  the  traditional  logic  of  his  time." 

This  statement  clearly  foreshadows  one  of  the  principal 
tasks  Cassirer  set  himself  early  in  his  career,  which  he  has 
attempted  to  carry  through  by  means  of  his  profound  and  criti- 
cal study  of  the  history  of  mathematics  in  its  relations  both  with 
philosophy  and  with  the  other  sciences,  from  the  earliest  times 
down  to  the  immediate  present.  That  it  is  a  truly  formidable 
undertaking  thus  to  seek  to  preserve  and  reinterpret  the  tran- 
scendental logic  of  Kant  in  such  a  way  as  finally  to  bring  it  into 
good  and  fruitful  accord  with  recent  tendencies  in  formal  sym- 
bolic logic  and  mathematics,  will  readily  be  admitted.  Indeed, 
it  is  not  going  too  far  to  say  that  most  authorities  would  at  the 
very  outset  declare  that  purpose  to  be  one  which  could  not 
possibly  be  realized  5  so  far  apart  are  Kantian  doctrines — at 
least  as  usually  presented — and  those  of  most  contemporary 
logicians  and  mathematicians,  that,  like  oil  and  water,  they 
simply  cannot  be  made  to  mix. 

241 


242  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

Did  not  Kant  firmly  declare  that  concepts  without  percepts 
are  empty ;  was  it  not  his  settled  doctrine  that  mathematical 
judgments  are  synthetic  a  priori;  did  he  not  maintain,  at  least 
in  the  "transcendental  aesthetic,"  that  mathematics  is  possible 
as  a  science  only  because  space  and  time  are  pure  forms  of  intui- 
tion or  pure  intuitions}  was  it  not  in  particular  his  thesis  that 
mathematical  inference  proceeds  by  means  of  Constructions' 
which  must  be  either  directly  intuitable  in  actual  space,  or 
clearly  imaginable?  Taking  these  and  kindred  doctrines  into 
account,  is  it  not  the  consensus  of  authoritative  commentators 
that  Kant  deceived  himself  both  in  underestimating  the  revo- 
lutionary character  of  his  contributions  to  logic,  and  in  cherish- 
ing the  belief  that  the  validity  of  the  main  tenets  of  formal 
logic  was  unimpaired  thereby?  And  finally,  do  not  contempo- 
rary symbolic  logicians  and  mathematicians,  with  one  unani- 
mous voice,  sharply  oppose  every  one  of  those  typical  Kantian 
doctrines  and  assertions? 

Initially  improbable  though  success  in  such  a  venture  might 
seem,  however,  Cassirer  does  not  shrink  from  facing  coura- 
geously all  of  the  tremendous  difficulties  it  involves;  and  what- 
ever may  be  one's  final  judgment  in  the  matter,  all  hands  will 
readily  agree  that,  quite  apart  from  his  success  or  failure  in  this 
particular  regard,  his  own  positive  doctrines  stand  forth  as  of 
intrinsic  worth  on  their  own  account.  It  soon  becomes  clear, 
indeed,  to  Cassirer's  readers,  that  one  has  to  do  with  no  slavish 
disciple  of  any  of  the  traditional  lines  of  thought.  The  historical 
and  critical  studies  so  assiduously  pursued  are  by  no  means 
ends  in  themselves,  but  serve  rather  as  most  carefully  selected 
source  material  for  constructive  philosophical  undertakings  of 
the  most  significant  and  original  sort.  Such  being  the  case,  it  is 
to  be  expected  that  the  materials  supplied  in  this  way  will  be 
handled  with  the  greatest  freedom  and  boldness,  and  that,  as 
finally  presented,  Cassirer's  doctrines  will  frequently  diverge 
more  or  less  widely  from  their  anterior  sources  of  inspiration. 

Take,  for  example,  the  concept  of  number — the  concept 
which  Cassirer  significantly  declares  to  be  not  merely  basic  to 
the  special  science  of  mathematics  but  "the  first  and  truest 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      243 

expression  of  rational  method  in  general."1  Although  critics 
frequently  charge  Kant  with  basing  this  concept  upon  the  pure 
intuition  of  time,  this  is  true,  so  Cassirer  avers,  only  in  so  far  as 
time  appears  as  "the  type  of  ordered  sequence"  as  such.  In 
Kant's  own  words, 

the  pure  image  ...  of  all  objects  of  the  senses  in  general  is  time.  But  the 
pure  schema  of  quantity,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  concept  of  the  understanding, 
is  number,  a  representation  which  combines  the  successive  addition  of  one 
to  one  (homogeneous).  Thus  number  is  nothing  but  the  unity  of  the 
synthesis  of  the  manifold  of  a  homogeneous  intuition  in  general — a 
unity  due  to  the  fact  that  I  generate  time  itself  in  the  apprehension  of 
the  intuition.2 

As  Cassirer  sees  it,  however,  further  development  of  this 
doctrine  has  followed  two  very  different  directions,  the  one 
emphasizing  the  active  'understanding'  and  the  process  of 
creative  synthesis,  the  other  stressing  the  passive  'sensibility' 
and  irrational  intuition. 

The  latter  alternative  is  that  adopted,  for  example,  by  most 
varieties  of  empiricism,  and  by  intuitionism,  and  it  naturally 
conforms  best  to  the  traditional  formal  logic  of  the  generic 
concept — i.e.,  the  logic  which  regards  the  concept  as  a  common 
element  abstracted  from  a  class  of  particulars.8  Against  all  three 
of  these  lines  of  thought — empiricism,  intuitionism,  and  the 
subject-predicate  logic — Cassirer  brings  to  bear  a  devastating 
criticism,  supported  by  profuse  historical  evidence.  These  his- 
torical and  epistemological  studies  demonstrate  convincingly 
that  in  terms  of  no  one,  nor  of  any  combination  of  the  three, 
can  Kant's  question  as  to  the  'possibility'  of  the  science  of  pure 
mathematics  be  answered  at  all  satisfactorily. 

There  remains,  then,  for  further  consideration,  what  Cassirer 
regards  as  the  only  other  genuine  alternative,  namely  the 
postulation  of  the  creative  synthesis  of  the  pure  understanding 

1  Substance  and  Function,  Eng.  transl.,  26. 

8  Translation  quoted  from  N.  Kemp  Smith's  Commentary  to  Kant's  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason^  2nd  ed.,  129.  Cassirer  makes  a  similar  gloss  on  Kant's  notion  of  space 
with  reference  to  geometry. 

3  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Ch.  Ill,  402!. 


244  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

as  the  absolutely  essential  epistemological  and  logical  prius, 
upon  which  the  possibility  of  number  in  particular  and  of 
mathematics  in  general  must  depend.  In  Kantian  language,  the 
synthetic  activity  of  knowing  is  a  process  of  generating  relations 
— i.e.,  to  know  is  to  relate}  and  to  relate,  so  Cassirer  continues, 
is  to  introduce  order  into  a  'manifold'  or  series;  and  serial  order, 
in  this  precise  sense  of  the  word,  finds  its  first  and  fundamental 
expression  in  the  series  of  ordinal  numbers.  Logical  or  critical 
idealism  maintains,  in  short,  that  there  is  nothing  more  ultimate 
for  thought  than  thinking  itself,  and  thinking  consists  essen- 
tially in  the  positing  of  relations  (das  Beziehungssetzen). 

From  this  point  of  view,  Cassirer  declares,  "number  appears 
not  merely  as  a  production  of  pure  thought,  but  actually  as  its 
prototype  and  origin  ...  as  the  primary  and  original  act  of 
thought, "  which  all  further  scientific  and  logical  thinking 
presupposes.4  In  this  pregnant  sense  of  the  word,  number  is, 
indeed,  the  "schema"  of  serial  order  in  general,  the  "ideal 
axis,"  so  to  speak,  about  which  thought  organizes  its  world. 
Pythagoreanism  erred  only  in  its  too  enthusiastic  identification 
of  number  with  the  whole  truth,  with  the  entire  system  of  ideal 
relations  constitutive  of  reality.  Only  "after  we  have  conceived 
the  plan  of  this  system  in  a  general  logical  theory  of  rela- 
tions," whereby  the  members  of  a  series  may  be  variously 
ordered — for  example,  "according  to  equality  and  inequality, 
number  and  magnitude,  spatial  and  temporal  relations,  .  .  . 
causal  dependence,"  and  the  like — can  we  ascribe  to  the  several 
sciences  their  true  epistemological  import  as  so  many  progres- 
sively successful  applications  of  this  logical  theory  to  the  data 
of  experience.5 

In  further  elucidation  and  development  of  this  thesis — 
which  is  perhaps  more  accurately  and  directly  anticipated  by 
the  Cartesian-Leibnizian  theory  of  a  mathesls  universalis  than 
it  is  by  the  Kantian  transcendental  logic — Cassirer  refers,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  the  so-called  calculus  of  relations  as  recently 
worked  out  by  the  symbolic  logicians,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  the  relevant  stages  in  the  origination  and  subsequent  history 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      245 

of  such  basic  mathematical  concepts  as  those  of  number  and 
space. 

The  main  purpose  of  the  critical  study  of  the  history  of 
mathematics  is  to  illustrate  and  confirm  the  special  thesis  that 
ordinal  number  is  logically  prior  to  cardinal  number,  and,  more 
generally,  that  mathematics  may  be  defined,  in  Leibnizian 
fashion,  as  the  science  of  order,  Cassirer's  readers  do  not  need 
to  be  told  how  impressive  in  both  amount  and  quality  is  the 
historical  evidence  he  adduces  in  support  of  these  tenets,  nor 
how  great  is  the  skill  with  which  he  marshalls  his  interpretative 
expositions  to  the  same  end. 

As  Cassirer  is  no  doubt  well  aware,  however,  other  authori- 
ties, among  them  some  as  critical  of  mere  empiricism  as  he  him- 
self is,  differ  sharply  with  this  interpretation  of  the  same 
historical  data,  and  at  least  two  other  plausible  alternatives  have 
been  ably  presented,  namely  the  exactly  opposite  thesis  that 
cardinal  number  is  logically  prior  to  ordinals,  and  the  perhaps 
even  more  inviting  thesis  that  cardinal  and  ordinal  are  strictly 
complementary  aspects  of  number,  neither  of  which  can  claim 
priority  over  the  other.  Thus  it  seems  rather  unwise  to  place 
too  much  confidence  in  any  one  interpretation,  unless  indeed 
weighty  evidence  of  another  sort  can  be  marshalled  in  support 
of  one  of  the  three,  which  cannot  be  matched  in  favor  of  either 
or  both  of  the  others. 

And  of  what  sort  can  such  evidence  be?  Not  of  any  epistemo- 
logical  variety,  it  would  seemj  for  to  ground  an  historical 
interpretation  on  an  epistemological  theory,  and  then  to  claim 
that  the  interpretation  confirms  the  theory,  is  hardly  justifiable 
at  the  bar  of  logic.  As  for  the  logical  evidence,  Cassirer  himself 
concedes  that  order  "does  not  exhaust  the  whole  content  of  the 
concept  of  number.)>tt  A  "new  aspect,"  he  declares,  "appears  as 
soon  as  number,  which  has  hitherto  been  deduced  as  a  purely 
logical  sequence  of  intellectual  constructs,  is  understood  and 
applied  as  an  expression  of  flwratity" 

But  when — the  question  almost  asks  itself — is  it  not  so 
understood  and  applied?  Certainly  many  unbiassed  witnesses 
are  prepared  to  answer,  in  no  uncertain  voice,  that  it  functions 

6  Substance  and  Function,  41. 


246  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

in  this  sense  from  the  very  beginning.  Nay,  testimony  on  this 
point  is  well-nigh  universal  to  the  effect  that  'in  the  beginning' 
was  simple  counting,  a  process  resting  directly  on  the  concept 
of  cardinal  number.  And,  as  far  as  contemporary  logic  is  con- 
cerned, an  able  expositor  of  the  doctrines  of  Principa  Mathe- 
matica  explains,  in  terms  exactly  matching  those  used  by 
Cassirer,  but  having  a  precisely  opposite  import,  that  "two 
important  concepts"  essential  to  the  formation  of  the  series  of 
ordinal  numbers,  namely  'o5  and  'successor,'  "introduce  a  new 
idea  not  used  in  the  definition  of  cardinal  number,  namely  the 
idea  that  the  cardinal  numbers  form  a  discrete  series  of  next 
successors  beginning  with  o."7 

These  comments  are  not  offered,  however,  as  by  any  means 
indicating  a  complete  refutation  of  Cassirer's  doctrines,  but 
rather  merely  to  reveal  the  diversity  of  views  prevailing  on 
this  matter.  Epistemological  theories  apart,  it  is  tacitly  admitted 
by  all  hands  that  cardinal  and  ordinal  actually  function,  mathe- 
matically, as  complementary  to  each  other.  In  any  event, 
Cassirer  relies  more  heavily  upon  the  aforementioned  calculus 
of  relations,  than  he  does  upon  the  historical  evidence,  in  direct 
and  positive  support  of  his  theory  of  the  formation  of  mathe- 
matical concepts.  For  it  is  by  means  of  this  calculus,  so  he  avers, 
that  number  can  indeed  be  "deduced  as  a  purely  logical  se- 
quence of  intellectual  constructs."  More  specifically,  in  the 
classification  of  relations  into  transitive,  intransitive,  symmetri- 
cal, asymmetrical,  and  so  on,  Cassirer  sees,  ready  to  hand  as  it 
were,  the  perfect  instrumentality  whereby  "the  more  exact 
definition  of  what  we  are  to  understand  as  the  order  of  a  given 
whole"  is  to  be  attained.  Prior  to  this  development  the  basic 
thesis  of  critical  idealism,  namely  that  thinking  consists  in  the 
positing  or  generating  of  relations,  appeared  as  a  bare  epistemo- 
logical  postulate,  illustrated,  and  even,  if  you  please,  in  a  sense 
confirmed  by  the  history  of  scientific  thought,  but  all  the  while 
lacking  its  fundamental  logical  articulation,  its  systematic  expo- 
sition and  confirmation.  In  particular,  to  Bertrand  Russell  and 
his  colleagues  Cassirer  gratefully  attributes  the  epochal  dis- 

T  Eaton,  General  Logic,  468. 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      247 

covery  "that  it  is  always  some  transitive  and  asymmetrical  rela- 
tion that  is  necessary  to  imprint  on  the  members  of  a  whole  a 
determinate  order."8 

From  this  point  of  view,  numbers — ordinal  numbers,  that  is 
— stand  forth  as  "a  system  of  ideal  objects  whose  whole  content 
is  exhausted  in  their  mutual  relations."  In  such  a  system, 
Cassirer  maintains,  the  'what'  of  the  elements  is  disregarded, 
and  merely  the  'how'  of  a  certain  progressive  connection  is 
taken  into  account.  Here,  in  short,  is 

a  general  procedure  which  is  of  decisive  significance  for  the  whole  for- 
mation of  mathematical  concepts.  For  whenever  a  system  of  conditions 
is  given  that  can  be  realized  in  different  contents,  then  we  can  hold  to 
the  form  of  the  system  itself  as  invariant,  undisturbed  by  the  difference 
of  contents,  and  develop  its  laws  deductively.9 

This  state  of  affairs  is  as  clearly  evident  in  geometry  as  it 
is  in  the  science  of  number.  Mathematical  space  may  be  defined, 
in  Leibnizian  terminology,  as  an  "order  of  coexistence."  Geo- 
metricians may  still  talk  of  points,  straight  lines,  and  planes  5 
but  in  the  course  of  time  these  familiar  objects  have  become 
divested  of  all  intuitive  content,  and  all  connection  between 
these  elements  is  developed  deductively  from  purely  con- 
ceptual definitions.  The  relation  expressed  by  the  word  'be- 
tween,' for  example,  though  seemingly  possessing  an  irreducible 
sensuous  connotation,  has  nevertheless  been  freed  from  this 
narrow  restriction,  and  is  now  determined,  mathematically, 
solely  by  means  of  definite  logical  prescriptions,  which  alone 
endow  it  with  the  meaning  it  possesses  in  the  deductive  pro- 
cedure of  mathematics.  In  other  words,  according  to  Cassirer, 
it  is  always  and  everywhere  "the  relational  structure  as  such," 
rather  than  any  absolute  properties  of  the  elements  entering 
into  the  structure,  which  constitutes  the  real  'object'  of  mathe- 
matical investigation.  The  particular  elements  entering  into 
any  deductive  complex  of  relations, 

are  not  viewed  according  to  what  they  are  in  and  for  themselves,  but 

*  Substance  and  Function,  38. 
9 


248  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

simply  as  examples  of  a  certain  universal  form  of  order  and  connection; 
mathematics  . .  .  recognizes  in  them  no  other  'being'  than  that  belonging 
to  them  by  participation  in  this  form.  For  it  is  only  this  being  that  enters 
into  proof,  into  the  process  of  inference,  and  is  thus  accessible  to  the  full 
certainty,  that  mathematics  gives  its  objects.10 

Thus  the  fundamental  work  of  the  science  does  not  con- 
sist, for  example,  in  comparing,  dividing,  and  compounding 
specific  given  magnitudes,  but  rather  "in  isolating  the  generat- 
ing relations  themselves,  upon  which  all  possible  determination 
of  magnitude  rests,  and  in  determining  the  mutual  connection 
of  these  relations."  Although  it  may  be  true,  psychologically 
speaking,  that  the  meaning  of  a  relation  can  only  be  grasped 
by  means  of  some  given  terms  which  thus  serve  as  its  material 
basis,  still  (Cassirer  insists)  the  logical  import  of  the  relation 
is  wholly  independent  of  any  such  origin,  and  is  the  resultant 
of  a  purely  rational  and  deductive  procedure.  To  put  the  point 
in  terminology  long  since  familiar  to  British  and  American 
philosophers,  Cassirer  apparently  concurs  in  the  doctrine  that 
relations  are  prior  to,  and  independent  of,  or  'external*  to 
their  terms. 

On  the  logical  plane,  therefore,  it  seems  that  Cassirer  simply 
appropriates  for  his  own  purposes  and  construes  in  his  own 
fashion  that  special  portion  of  formal  symbolic  logic  having  to 
do  with  relations,  in  abstraction  from  other  branches  of  the 
subject, — towards  which,  indeed,  he  manifests,  on  occasion, 
considerable  opposition.  With  respect  to  this  state  of  affairs  the 
following  points  naturally  suggest  themselves  for  discussion. 

The  first  of  these  points,  put  in  the  form  of  a  question,  is: 
What  becomes  of  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  categories,  in  the  light 
of  the  significance  Cassirer  attaches  to  the  calculus  of  relations? 
Partly  by  explicit  statement,  partly  by  plain  implication,  the 
answer  is  that  that  doctrine  is  completely  nullified.  For,  as  a 
little  reflection  will  suffice  to  show,  it  is  quite  impossible  to 
reconcile  the  basic  thesis  of  Kant's  transcendental  logic  that  the 
categories  are  functional  forms  of  relationship  immanent  in 
scientific  knowledge  as  embodied  in  synthetic  judgments,  with 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      249 

the  thesis  advanced  by  Cassirer  that  the  "generating  relations" 
productive  of  "serial  order"  are  logically  prior  to,  and  inde- 
pendent of  their  terms,  and  purely  ideal  in  nature.  This  is,  in 
short,  entirely  to  abandon  the  Kantian  conception  of  the  a  priori, 
and  to  revert,  instead,  to  that  of  Leibniz. 

Now  it  would  be  a  natural  though  a  serious  error  to  assume 
that  this  point  concerns  only  students  of  Kant  and  Leibniz,  and 
that  it  is  without  intrinsic  importance  for  anyone  who  is  simply 
trying  to  understand  contemporary  mathematics.  For  to  follow 
Cassirer  in  this  respect  is  definitely  to  play  into  the  hands  of 
those  formalists  who  see  in  mathematics  not  a  genuine  science 
among  others,  but  a  mere  extension  and  elaboration  of  formal 
logic — is  to  rededicate  oneself  to  that  very  abstract  rationalism 
which  Kant  did  so  much  to  overthrow.  In  fact,  it  almost  seems 
as  if  preoccupation  with  the  sins  and  omissions  of  a  one-sided 
empiricism  had  induced  Cassirer,  against  his  own  better  judg- 
ment, to  adopt  the  opposite  extreme,  even  in  the  face  of  Kant's 
convincing  demonstration  that  such  a  one-sided  rationalism  is 
just  as  untenable. 

This  interpretation  of  Cassirer's  position  gains  further  con- 
firmation by  a  closer  examination  of  his  attitude  of  acceptance 
towards  the  calculus  of  relations.  In  view  of  his  just  and  pene- 
trating criticism  of  other  parts  and  aspects  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
symbolic  logicians  (to  be  touched  upon  later  in  this  essay),  his 
exemption  of  this  particular  calculus  from  the  force  of  those 
criticisms  can  only  be  explained  as  due  to  certain  inherently 
formalistic  tendencies  in  his  own  thought.  That  is  to  say,  it  is 
not,  in  the  last  analysis,  with  abstract  formalism  in  logic  and 
mathematics  as  such,  but  rather  merely  with  certain  specific 
features  and  portions  of  that  formalism,  that  Cassirer  finds  him- 
self in  disagreement.  Otherwise  he  would  readily  perceive,  for 
example,  that,  since  the  calculus  of  relations  is  in  many  essential 
respects  strictly  analogous  to  the  calculus  of  classes — a  fact  to 
which  attention  is  explicitly  called  by  the  highest  authorities — 
the  charge  of  circularity  which  he  so  acutely  brings  against  this 
latter  calculus  also  applies,  mutatis  mutandis^  to  the  former.  If 
the  derivation  of  cardinal  numbers  from  classes  be  condemned 
as  circular  reasoning,  then,  for  strictly  analogous  reasons,  the 


250  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

derivation  of  ordinal  numbers  from  relations  must  be  circular 
also;  and  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  latter  can  be  successfully  de- 
fended against  such  a  charge,  then,  again  for  strictly  analogous 
reasons,  so  can  the  former.11  Since,  however,  Cassirer  simply 
contents  himself  with  laying  down  the  general  thesis,  and  no- 
where undertakes  such  an  explicit  derivation  on  his  own  account, 
it  is  impossible  to  justify  this  contention  further  by  a  critical 
study  of  details. 

What  still  further  complicates  matters  here,  and  beclouds 
the  specific  issue  in  question,  is  the  fact  that  Cassirer  envisages 
the  issue  as  one  ultimately  involving  a  conflict  between  "the 
logic  of  the  generic  (or  class)  concept"  and  "the  logic  of  the 
relational  concept."  As  he  sees  it,  "if  the  attempt  to  derive  the 
concept  of  number  from  that  of  a  class  were  successful,  the 
traditional  form  of  logic  would  gain  a  new  source  of  confirma- 
tion. The  ordering  of  individuals  into  the  hierarchy  of  species 
would  be,  now  as  before,  the  true  goal  of  all  knowledge.  .  .  ,"12 

But  surely  this  antithesis  between  the  two  species  of  concepts 
is  not  as  definitive  as  the  preceding  statement  implies.  As  good 
a  historian  of  science  as  Cassirer  does  not  need  to  be  told  of  the 
inherently  important,  if  largely  subsidiary,  role  which  classifi- 
cation as  a  matter  of  fact  does  play,  even  in  such  an  abstract 
science  as  mathematics.  Granting  that  "the  ordering  of  indi- 
viduals into  the  hierarchy  of  species"  is  not  the  "true  goal"  of 
any  science,  still  it  is  quite  impossible  to  deny  that  classification 
does  represent  a  most  useful  and  perfectly  legitimate  scientific 
procedure,  or  that  it  is  explicitly  recognized  as  such  by  scientists 
and  logicians.  If  'to  relate/  in  the  widest  possible  sense  of  the 
word,  be  taken  to  mean  what  Kant  meant  by  it,  namely,  not 
merely  to  establish  order  in  a  series,  but,  more  generally,  'to 
organize  into  a  system,'  then  may  not  a  class  be  construed  as  a 
rudimentary  kind  of  a  system,  and  may  not  classification  itself 
be  looked  upon  as  a  kind  of  relating?  For  that  matter,  no  small 
part  of  the  business  of  the  very  calculus  of  relations  itself  con- 
sists in  classifying  relations  into  a  hierarchy,  and  determining 

11  See,  on  this  whole  question,  the  illuminating  discussion,  in  Ch.  V,  of  Lewis 
and  Langford's  Symbolic  Logic. 

12  Substance  and  Function^  53. 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      251 

the  differentiae  of  the  various  species  and  sub-species  of  re- 
lations. Thus  little  indeed  would  be  left  of  the  calculus,  if  the 
'logic  of  the  generic  concept'  were  to  be  rejected  as  entirely 
unsound. 

In  view  of  such  considerations,  Cassirer  will  find  many  sup- 
porters for  his  strictures  on  the  logic  of  the  generic  concept  who 
will  yet  not  feel  inclined  to  follow  him  all  the  way  in  denying 
to  it  any  epistemological  value  whatsoever  and  thus  leaving  the 
logic  of  the  relational  concept  in  sole  possession  of  the  field. 
But  for  students  of  Kant  there  is  a  still  more  fundamental  con- 
sideration which  may  appropriately  be  emphasized  here. 

From  a  strictly  Kantian  point  of  view,  as  Norman  Kemp 
Smith  well  points  out,18  generic  and  relational  concepts,  as  here 
defined,  both  refer  to  a  distinction,  not  in  the  form,  but  in  the 
specific  content  of  knowledge.  Just  as  a  generic  concept  (or 
universal)  expresses  a  common  quality  or  qualities  to  be  ascribed 
to  each  distinguishable  element  of  a  nexus  of  complex  contents, 
so  a  relational  concept  (or  universal)  expresses  relationships 
specified  as  holding  amongst  the  elements  severally.  A  category, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  not  a  content  of  any  sort,  or  any  aspect  of 
a  content,  but  a  general  form  of  organization,  a  "function  of 
unity,"  whereby  contents  are  related  in  the  judgment.  No 
superficial  verbal  similarity  turning  upon  the  common  use  of  the 
term  'relation'  should  be  allowed  to  conceal  the  fact  that  Kant 
and  the  symbolic  logicians  are  concerned  with  two  vastly  dif- 
ferent matters,  nor  that  their  basic  logical  doctrines  are  ftinda- 
mentally  opposed  in  principle.  The  problems  Kant  wrestled 
with  in  his  transcendental  logic  are  in  large  part  simply  ignored 
by  the  symbolic  logicians,  or  handed  over  to  epistemology} 
whereas  what  the  symbolic  logicians  regard  as  basic  logical 
problems  could  scarcely  have  appeared  in  that  light  to  Kant. 

Precisely  in  this  connection,  however,  a  fundamental  episte- 
mological antithesis  or  antinomy  appears  between  the  doctrines 
of  orthodox  symbolic  logicians  and  Cassirer's  critical  idealism. 
For  precisely  at  this  point  certain  other  Kantian  influences  make 
themselves  most  strongly  felt  and  give  rise  both  to  a  criticism  of 
epistemological  theories  of  the  Russellian  type,  as  well  as  to  the 

**  Commentary  to  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  38,  178. 


252  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

application  and  development  of  an  epistemology  on  Leibnizian 
and  Kantian  lines.  Not  only  does  Cassirer  call  attention  to  the 
circularity  inevitably  involved  in  the  attempt  to  derive  cardinal 
number  from  the  concept  of  a  class,14  but  he  also  stoutly  insists 
— quite  in  the  spirit  of  Kant,  and  in  complete  opposition  to  more 
fashionable  contemporary  tenets — on  the  synthetic  character  of 
mathematical  propositions  or  judgments.  In  the  article  already 
drawn  upon,  "Kant  und  die  moderne  Mathematik,"  Cassirer 
explains  that  by  synthetic  he  means,  (a)  not  reducible  to  that 
species  of  subject-predicate  propositions,  in  which  the  predicate 
merely  explicates  the  meaning  of  the  subject  term;  (b)  not 
deducible  from  the  mere  formal  laws  of  thought;  and  (c)  the 
functional  relationship  in  which  mathematical  propositions 
stand  to  empirical  phenomena,  and,  lacking  which,  mathematical 
concepts  would  be  nothing  better  than  hollow  fictions. 

Since  points  (a)  and  (b)  are  now  conceded  by  everyone,  their 
mere  mention  seems  sufficient  here;  but  point  (c)  is  a  different 
matter.  After  the  most  elaborate  epistemological  tour  de  force 
by  which  Russell  and  his  collaborators  seek  to  convince  them- 
selves and  others  that,  although  their  absolutely  basic  "atomic 
propositions"  admittedly  stem  directly  from  sense  experience, 
nevertheless  the  world  of  logic  and  mathematics,  as  such,  in  its 
unsullied  purity,  is  a  transcendent  realm,  they  can  only  account 
it  a  "lucky  accident,"  which  might  just  as  well  have  been  other- 
wise, that  the  propositions  of  logic  and  mathematics  apply  to  the 
realm  of  physical  phenomena.  In  other  words,  the  two  realms 
having  been  severed  so  completely  by  those  thinkers,  Cassirer 
points  out  that  it  is  actually  an  epistemological  and  logical  im- 
possibility to  establish  any  real  connection  between  them.  As 
Cassirer  sees  it,  on  the  other  hand,  the  objectivity  of  scientific 
knowledge  of  phenomena  is  guaranteed  precisely  by  virtue  of 
the  "synthetic  unity  of  the  concept" — to  use  an  appropriate 
Kantian  phrase — whose  sole  function  is  to  introduce  order 
into  the  ideal  'manifolds'  of  mathematics,  and,  through  them, 
in  turn,  into  the  experiential  manifolds  of  the  spatio-temporal 
world  of  physics. 

*  Substance  and  Function,  Ch.  II,  sec.  iiij  see  also  Smart,  The  Philosophical 
Presuppositions  of  Mathematical  Logic,  Ch.  VI. 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      253 

Thus,  to  take  a  simple  example,  Cassirer  maintains  that 
thought  follows  a  straight,  undeviating  path,  in  proceeding 
from  the  logical  calculus  of  relations,  to  such  a  special  type  of 
generating  relation  as  is  compactly  symbolized  by  the  general 
algebraic  equation  of  the  second  degree,  from  which,  in  turn, 
every  species  of  conic  section — circle,  ellipse,  parabola,  etc. — 
may  be  deductively  derived.  And  this  same  mathematical  con- 
cept of  the  conic  section  it  is  which  alone  enables  the  natural 
scientist  to  introduce  order  or  synthetic  unity  into  the  manifold 
of  astronomical  phenomena,  thus  making  possible  knowledge 
of  those  phenomena  which  is  at  once  objective  and  systematic. 
Only  in  this  wise,  so  Cassirer  declares  in  a  pregnant  passage, 

only  when  we  clearly  understand  that  the  same  basic  syntheses  upon 
which  logic  and  mathematics  depend,  also  control  the  formation  of  ex- 
periential knowledge,  thereby  for  the  first  time  making  it  possible  to 
speak  of  the  ordering  of  phenomena  according  to  scientific  laws  and 
thus  to  ascribe  objective  meaning  to  these  phenomena,  is  the  true  justifica- 
tion of  those  principles  attained.15 

Nor  is  this  by  any  means  the  end  of  the  matter.  Not  only  are 
single  concepts  and  judgments  thus  synthetic,  but  the  whole 
process  of  deduction,  characteristic  of  mathematical  inference, 
is  itself  progressive,  productive  of  new  knowledge.  In  this  re- 
spect also  Cassirer  opposes  the  essentially  static  ideal  of  logic 
and  mathematics  fostered  by  the  symbolic  logicians,  in  their 
thesis  that  the  propositions  of  these  sciences  are  analytic  or 
tautological,  and  also  in  their  complementary  doctrine  that 
deduction  is  a  mere  re-arranging  of  the  elements  of  discourse  in 
accordance  with  fixed  rules  of  procedure.  Epistemologically 
speaking,  this  doctrine  becomes  the  thesis  that  thought  merely 
'discovers'  relationships  eternally  'there,'  subsisting  in  that 
transcendent  realm  which  reveals  itself  to  a  critical  inspection 
to  be  nothing  but  the  naive  hypostatization  of  certain  logical  and 
mathematical  concepts,  and  their  consequent  deprivation  of  any 
objective  meaning  or  truth. 

Now  according  to  Cassirer  this  ideal  of  mathematical  knowl- 
edge is  not  only  self -contradictory  j  it  directly  conflicts  with  the 

15  "Kant  und  die  moderne  Mathematik,"  Kantstudien,  vol.  XII,  45  (1907). 


254  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

plainest  possible  evidence,  namely,  the  progressive  character 
which  the  long  history  of  that  science  reveals  as  its  most  out- 
standing feature.  Every  important  advance  in  mathematics, 
from  the  earliest  times  down  to  the  immediate  present,  involves 
both  an  extension  and  a  deepening  or  enrichment  of  funda- 
mental concepts,  and  their  progressive  liberation  from  what 
have  conclusively  shown  themselves  to  be  extraneous  sensuous 
connotations.  "Just  as  the  field  of  rational  numbers  is  broadened 
by  gradual  steps  of  thought  into  the  continuous  totality  of  real 
numbers,  so,  by  a  series  of  intellectual  transformations,  does  the 
space  of  sense  pass  into  the  infinite,  continuous,  homogeneous 
and  conceptual  space  of  geometry  . .  ,"16 — illustrative  examples 
which  could  be  repeated  ad  nauseam  in  confirmation  of  this 
view  of  the  continuing  'creative  advance'  of  mathematical 
thought. 

Hence  arises  for  Cassirer  a  question  which  the  symbolic  logi- 
cians, in  their  blindness,  blandly  ignore,  namely  how  is  this 
creative  advance  possible  j  how,  in  epistemological  terms,  can 
it  be  justified  to  reason,  and  how,  more  precisely,  is  it  to  be 
described? 

In  the  case  of  the  physical  sciences  answers  to  such  questions 
are  comparatively  easy  to  come  by,  the  only  difficult  logical 
problem  being  that  of  the  closer  determination  of  the  nature  of 
induction.  But  in  common  with  many,  perhaps  most  contempo- 
rary logicians,  Cassirer  denies  a  role  to  induction  in  the  mathe- 
matical sciences.  True,  he  apparently  does  not  share  the  vulgar 
prejudice  or  presupposition  dominating  the  thinking  of  so  many 
authorities  on  this  matter,  namely,  that  there  is  some  necessary 
connection  between  induction  and  specific  experimental  tech- 
niques confined  to  certain  natural  sciences,  so  that  it  is  dog- 
matically and  arbitrarily  settled  beforehand  that  where  there  is 
no  experimentation  of  the  sort  in  question,  neither  can  there  be 
any  induction.  Rather  Cassirer  excludes  induction  (and  an- 
alogy!) from  mathematical  inference,  on  the  ground  that, 
whereas  the  former  "proceeds  from  the  particular  to  the  uni- 
versal .  . .  [and]  attempts  to  unite  hypothetically  into  a  whole 
a  plurality  of  individual  facts  observed  as  particulars  without 

"  Substance  and  Function,  p.  106. 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      255 

necessary  connection,"  the  latter  proceeds  always  from  "the 
law  of  connection,"  which  serves  as  "the  original  basis  by  virtue 
of  which  the  individual  case  can  be  determined  in  its  meaning." 
In  other  words,  "the  conditions  of  the  whole  system  are  pre- 
determined, and  all  specialization  can  only  be  reached  by  adding 
a  new  factor  as  a  limiting  determination  while  maintaining  these 
conditions."17  In  sum,  mathematical  inference  always  "proceeds 
from  the  properties  of  the  connection  to  those  of  the  objects 
connected,  from  the  serial  principle  to  the  members  of  the 
series,"  and  never  in  the  reverse  order. 

One  minor  but  nevertheless  interesting  point  included  in  the 
preceding  general  statement  may  appropriately  be  mentioned 
here  before  proceeding  to  a  more  detailed  study  of  this  concep- 
tion of  mathematical  inference.  The  symbolic  logicians  never 
tire  of  proclaiming  it  as  an  ideal  of  their  procedure  that  "all  of 
pure  mathematics"  can  (or  should)  be  shown  to  follow  de- 
ductively from  a  certain  set  of  primitives — primitive  or  un- 
defined ideas,  primitive  propositions  or  postulates,  and  the  like. 
Nothing  not  explicitly  included  or  provided  for  in  this  founda- 
tional  nexus  is  to  be  permitted  entry  into  the  subsequent  un- 
foldment  or  'development'  of  the  series  of  logico-mathematical 
propositions.  Otherwise  the  purely  analytical  or  tautological 
nature  of  those  propositions  might  easily  become  infected  with 
a  'synthetic'  impurity!  Cassirer,  on  the  other  hand,  realistically 
points  to  the  actual  practice  of  mathematicians,  and  shows  con- 
clusively that  their  practice  never  conforms  to  any  such  extrane- 
ously  imposed  ideal.  In  fact,  quite  the  contrary  is  the  case.  Only 
by  and  in  so  far  as  modifications  and  specifications  not  explicitly 
provided  for  or  foreseen  in  the  formulation  of  the  foundational 
nexus,  but  deliberately  introduced  at  certain  stages  as  new  facts 
or  limiting  determinations,  as  the  deduction  proceeds,  can  the 
special  cases  or  conclusions,  in  which  the  procedure  character- 
istically issues,  be  derived.  To  employ  the  same  simple  example 
utilized  earlier  in  this  exposition:  from  the  general  equation  of 
the  second  degree,  the  equations  of  such  conies  as  the  ellipse, 
the  parabola,  etc.,  could  never  be  derived  simply  by  the  ana- 
lytical 'development'  of  that  equation.  On  the  contrary,  such 

*lbid.  81,  82. 


256  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

special  cases  can  be  derived  from  the  general  equation  only  by 
introducing  limitations  not  explicitly  contemplated  in  the  for- 
mulation of  that  equation,  and  not  formally  connected  with  it  in 
any  way.  In  this  sense  they  are  added  from  without,  somewhat 
as  the  minor  premise  is  added  to  the  major  premise  in  the  tra- 
ditional syllogism;  the  only  restrictions  on  this  typical  deductive 
procedure  being  such  as  are  prescribed  by  the  basic  laws  of 
thought  themselves. 

This  is  not,  however,  the  major  factor  in  mathematical  de- 
duction. It  will  be  recalled  that  one  main  epistemological  thesis 
of  Cassirer's  critical  idealism  is  that  the  creative,  synthetic  ac- 
tivity of  thought  displays  itself  in  the  positing  or  generating 
of  relations;  and,  as  was  indicated  above,  it  is  in  terms  of  this 
thesis  that  he  construes  all  scientific  reasoning.  Thus  the  prob- 
lem of  the  'possibility'  of  mathematics,  as  one  progressive 
science  among  others,  may  be  more  definitely  characterized  as 
the  problem  of  determining  the  rationale,  the  logical  'go,'  so  to 
speak,  of  that  process  in  the  special  field  in  question. 

At  this  point  the  Kantian  doctrine  that  mathematical  reason- 
ing proceeds  by  means  of  the  'construction'  of  its  objects,  either 
in  intuition  or  imagination,  reveals  its  positive  significance  for 
Cassirer.  Not  that  he  views  the  reference  to  intuition  or  imagi- 
nation as  the  important  factor  in  that  conception;  for  what 
mathematician  does  not  realize  that  such  limitations  on  his 
creative  activity  have  long  since  been  transcended;  and  does 
not  Cassirer  himself,  on  every  appropriate  occasion,  proclaim 
the  liberation  of  mathematics  from  reliance  on  sensuous  or  per- 
ceptual guides  as  one  of  the  greatest  intellectual  triumphs  of 
recent  times?  Rather  what  on  this  view  is  of  permanent  worth  in 
the  Kantian  doctrine  is  the  emphasis  upon  construction  as  a  typi- 
cal mode  of  procedure;  only  the  construction  must  be  under- 
stood in  a  purely  ideal  sense,  and  as  carried  out  by  pure  thought, 
independently  of  experience.  And  here  again,  as  so  frequently 
happens,  Cassirer  turns  to  Leibniz,  rather  than  to  Kant,  for 
further  insight,  for  more  positive  guidance,  in  developing  his 
own  ideas.  To  put  it  very  briefly,  it  is  by  means  of  what  Leibniz 
called  real,  causal,  or  genetic  definitions,  that,  according  to  Cas- 
sirer, the  ideal  constructions  characteristic  of  mathematical  de- 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      257 

duction  are  carried  through.  Such  definitions,  which  Cassirer 
regards  as  perhaps  the  most  striking  exemplification  of  the  pro- 
ductivity of  thought,  serve  in  effect  as  rules  or  laws  for  the 
construction  of  specific  mathematical  objects,  or  complexes  of 
such  objects.  For  the  traditional  definition  of  a  circle,  for  ex- 
ample, in  terms  of  genus,  species,  and  differentia,  Leibniz  would 
substitute  a  definition  revealing  its  "mode  of  generation,"  and 
similarly  for  the  definition  of  parallel  lines  and  of  all  such 
mathematical  constructs. 

No  doubt  these  and  the  other  specimens  Leibniz  offers  of 
this  type  of  definition  are  rather  too  elementary,  too  empirical, 
to  be  wholly  convincing  as  samples  of  purely  ideal  construc- 
tions ;  but  Cassirer  maintains  that  the  principle  involved  can 
easily  be  generalized  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  out  its  full  sig- 
nificance.18 At  all  events,  in  presenting  his  proposed  new  type  of 
definition,  Cassirer  points  out  that  Leibniz  envisaged  it  as  an 
instrumentality  for  combatting  two  erroneous  tendencies  preva- 
lent in  the  logical  theories  of  his  time,  tendencies,  which,  as 
Cassirer  maintains,  still  confuse  fundamental  issues  in  con- 
temporary logic. 

The  first  of  these  tendencies  is  nominalism — the  Hobbesian 
doctrine  that  all  definitions  are  merely  nominal.  It  needs  no 
citing  of  names  to  confirm  the  fact  that  this  doctrine  is  enthu- 
siastically fostered  by  many  logicians  of  the  present  time.  And 
nominalism  in  this  respect  inevitably  leads  on  to  the  sweeping 
conclusion  that  mathematics  in  its  entirety  is  nothing  but  a  sym- 
bolic technique,  a  manipulation  of  conventional  symbols,  which 
as  such  is  devoid  of  objective  import,  and  in  respect  to  which  it  is 
nonsense  to  talk  of  truth.  The  "freedom"  of  mathematics  is 
hereby  purchased  at  the  heavy  expense  of  its  renunciation  of  all 
claims  to  yielding  knowledge  of  the  real  world.  Consistency  in 
the  formulation  and  application  of  conventional  rules  of  an 
empty  symbolism  is  all  that  remains. 

The  second  erroneous  tendency  is  in  a  sense  antithetical  to  the 
preceding,  in  that  it  hypostatizes  ideas,  endows  them  with  a 

lf  See  the  article,  "Kant  und  die  moderne  Mathematik,"  and  also  Leibniz*  System 
in  semen  wissenschaftlichen  Grundlageny  108  ff.,  and  Pkilosofhie  der  symbolischen 
Formen,  Pt.  HI,  Ch.  IV. 


258  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

quasi-ontological  status,  and  attributes  to  them  'being'  in  a 
transcendent  realm  quite  apart  from  human  experience.  On  this 
view,  the  sole  test  of  the  reality  of  an  idea  is  its  abstract  possi- 
bility of  being  thought  in  complete  abstraction  from  any  ques- 
tion as  to  its  actual  realization  in  experience,  its  epistemological 
functioning.  Adoption  of  this  doctrine  commits  one  to  the  'copy' 
theory  of  truth,  reduces  thought  to  the  role  of  a  passive  spec- 
tator, and  sets  up  an  impassable  barrier,  a  dualism,  between  the 
world  of  ideas  and  the  factual  world — between  truths  of  reason 
and  truths  of  matter  of  fact.  Finally  it  should  be  emphasized 
that  neither  of  these  tendencies  has  anything  to  do  with  the 
actual  science  of  mathematics  as  such,  but  is  instead  the  product, 
pure  and  simple,  of  abstract,  gratuitously  a  priori  theorizing. 

Thus,  according  to  Leibniz's  distinguished  commentator  and 
disciple,  these  two  equally  untenable  lines  of  thought,  far  from 
providing  a  satisfactory  foundation  for  the  formation  of  mathe- 
matical concepts,  succeed  only  in  setting  up  an  empty  scaffolding 
of  formal  consistency  and  abstract  possibility.  Through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  causal  or  genetic  definition,  on  the  other 
hand,  thought  can  produce  out  of  its  own  creative,  synthetic 
resources,  all  that  is  so  conspicuously  lacking  in  the  rejected 
doctrines — such  at  least  is  Cassirer's  profound  conviction.  To 
define  the  circle — to  revert  to  this  simple  example — as  a  plain 
curve,  so  constituted  that  it  encloses  a  maximum  area  within  a 
given  perimeter,  is  merely  a  matter  of  words,  which  leaves  it 
doubtful  whether  there  actually  be  such  a  curve;  and,  even  in 
case  this  question  can  be  answered  affirmatively,  it  still  remains 
open  to  doubt  whether  the  prescribed  condition  be  fulfilled  by 
just  the  one  sort  of  curve.  Such  doubts  can  be  stilled  if  and  only 
if  a  fully  determinate  "mode  of  generation"  can  be  specified, 
and  if  the  desired  characteristics  can  be  shown  to  be  actually 
produced  by  this  mode  of  generation  by  a  rigorous  deductive 
proof.  In  this  wise,  according  to  Cassirer,  the  definition  may 
truly  be  said  to  generate  the  object  in  question  out  of  its  con- 
stituent elements.  And  what  is  true  in  this  simple  case  holds 
true  (so  Cassirer  maintains)  of  mathematics  generally.  Always 
and  everywhere  the  necessary  and  sufficient  prerequisite  to  the 
formation  of  mathematical  concepts,  and  to  the  ascription  to 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      259 

them  of  definite  contents,  shows  itself  to  be  the  same.  What 
Cassirer  calls  a  genetic  definition  may  on  occasion  (he  points 
out)  find  more  detailed  embodiment  in  a  set  of  axioms  or 
postulates,  especially  where  not  a  specific  object  but  a  whole 
branch  of  mathematics — multi-dimensional  geometry,  the 
theory  of  groups — is  in  question.  But  in  any  case,  the  creative 
synthesis,  involving  one  or  more  elementary  structural  ele- 
ments, and  producing  out  of  these  elements,  by  means  of  the 
generating  relations  embodied  in  the  definitional  nexus,  the 
whole  contextual  content  of  the  field  in  question,  is  what  char- 
acterizes the  differentia  of  mathematical  inference  as  such. 

Now  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  Cassirer's  criticisms  of 
fashionable  tendencies  in  contemporary  logic — such  as  the  nom- 
inalistic  theory  of  definitions,  the  thesis  that  mathematical  pro- 
positions are  analytical  or  tautological,  and  the  static  concepion 
of  deduction — are  well-founded  and  that  his  own  contrasting 
views  on  these  matters  are  much  nearer  the  truth.  His  basic 
contention,  moreover,  that  mathematics  is  a  progressive  science, 
sharing  with  the  other  sciences  the  common  search  for,  and  at- 
tainment of  objective  knowledge,  is  one  of  those  truisms  which 
too  many  contemporaries,  in  their  over-zealous  preoccupation 
with  symbolic  techniques  as  such,  have  seemingly  lost  from 
view.  The  question  remains,  however,  whether,  on  the  basis  of 
Cassirer's  own  theory  of  the  formation  of  mathematical  con- 
cepts, the  'possibility'  of  mathematics,  in  the  sense  just  de- 
scribed, can  be  fully  accounted  for.  As  already  pointed  out,  in 
spite  of  his  opposition  to  abstract  formalism  in  certain  important 
respects,  Cassirer  nevertheless  concurs  with  such  a  line  of 
thought  in  other  equally  decisive  respects.  He  concurs,  for  ex- 
ample, in  holding  that  mathematics  is  nothing  but  a  prolonga- 
tion of  formal  logic,  differing  only  in  the  somewhat  more 
restricted  range  of  its  assertions  $  and  also  in  the  widely  preva- 
lent view  that  mathematical  inference,  unlike  inference  in  other 
fields,  is  purely  deductive  in  character.  And  these  two  doctrines 
imply  the  strictly  a  priori  character  of  the  propositions  in  both 
logic  and  mathematics,  in  the  anti-Kantian,  rationalistic  sense  of 
that  word. 

Nevertheless  a  close  study  of  such  a  work  as  Substance  and 


260  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

Function  will  reveal  highly  significant  evidence  pointing  in  an- 
other direction.  So  sincere  is  the  author's  desire  to  let  the 
historical  record  speak  for  itself,  uncolored  by  his  personal  pre- 
dilections, that  he  actually  succeeds,  to  a  remarkable  degree,  in 
allowing  that  record  to  bear  witness  directly  opposed  to  all  of 
those  formalistic  tenets.  Both  arithmetic  and  geometry,  he  is  at 
pains  to  emphasize,  developed  from  humble  beginnings  in  com- 
mon sense  experience,  and  both  numerical  and  spatial  concepts 
were  for  long  encumbered  with  all  sorts  of  sensuous  connota- 
tions. In  mathematics,  quite  as  in  the  other  sciences,  more 
general  principles  had  to  wait  upon  the  acquisition  and  analysis 
of  particular  facts;  and  the  more  general  principles,  in  turn, 
led  to  the  discovery  of  other  particular  facts,  which,  again  in 
turn,  led  to  the  formation  of  still  more  general  principles — such 
is  the  plain  historical  record,  as  faithfully  presented  by  Cassirer 
himself,  there  for  all  who  have  eyes  to  read.  Yet  in  every  other 
science  this  doubly  reciprocal  relationship  between  particulars 
and  universals  is  held  to  exemplify  and  to  depend  upon  the  co- 
operative procedures  of  induction  and  deduction;  and  no  one 
more  persuasively  than  Cassirer  himself  insists  upon  the  in- 
separability of  these  two  aspects  of  scientific  inference — in  every 
other  science  except  mathematics! 

Why  the  exception?  Why  refuse  to  designate  by  the  same 
name  a  procedure  so  obviously  the  same  in  every  significant 
respect;  why  refuse  the  name  of  induction  to  a  procedure  in 
mathematics  which  would  undoubtedly  be  called  by  that  name, 
if  pursued  in  any  other  department  of  human  knowledge?  Or 
why,  save  for  some  extraordinarily  compelling  reason,  adhere 
to  or  postulate  a  theory  of  mathematical  inference  which  not 
only  runs  counter  to  the  whole  history  of  that  special  science, 
but  renders  impossible  a  consistent  logical  theory  of  scientific 
inference  in  general?  This  is  surely  a  question  definitely  de- 
manding an  answer;  a  question  that  only  stares  one  the  more 
fully  in  the  face  the  more  persistently  it  is  ignored  by  the  vast 
majority  of  logicians.  Every  logician  construes  reasoning  by 
analogy  as  an  essential  and  characteristic  instrument  of  inductive 
generalization;  histories  of  mathematics  are  full  of  examples 
of  reasoning  by  analogy;  yet  the  obvious  conclusion  is  not 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      261 

drawn.  New  mathematical  theories  are  evolved  to  embrace  and 
systematize  under  a  set  of  common  principles  various  particular 
theorems  and  topics  hitherto  regarded  as  unrelated  or  inde- 
pendent— so  Cassirer,  like  every  other  historian,  repeatedly 
points  out.  Precisely  the  same  result  attained  in  any  other  science 
would  be  held  up  as  a  typical  product  of  inductive  reasoning} 
yet  in  the  special  case  of  mathematics  no  one  seems  to  be  willing 
to  conceive  that  it  could  possibly  call  for  a  modification  of  the 
hallowed  doctrine  that  mathematical  inference  is  purely  deduc- 
tive. Could  any  more  conspicuous  example  of  Bacon's  "Idols 
of  the  Tribe"  easily  be  found?  And — observe  well! — it  is,  in  the 
last  analysis,  precisely  and  solely  because  of  the  uncritical  ac- 
ceptance of  this  doctrine  that  certain  puzzling  (not  to  say  in- 
soluble) epistemological  problems  with  regard  to  the  nature 
and  import  of  mathematical  knowledge  rise  up  to  plague  so 
many  contemporary  logicians. 

It  would  be  grossly  unfair,  of  course,  to  criticize  Cassirer 
alone  in  this  connection;  the  point  is,  rather,  that  by  his  clear 
presentation  of  the  historical  evidence  he  supplies  all  the  requi- 
site material  to  overthrow  that  prevalent  but  one-sided  theory 
of  mathematical  inference,  which  is  actually  merely  the  conse- 
quence of  unjustified  epistemological  presuppositions,  and 
which  so  blindly  ignores  such  abundant  and  conclusive  evidence 
to  the  contrary. 

What  these  presuppositions  are,  and  that  they  are  indeed  un- 
justifiedj  it  will  not,  perhaps,  be  too  difficult  to  discover,  once 
attention  is  turned  in  their  direction.  At  bottom,  it  will  be  found, 
there  is  little  save  verbal  terminology,  and  sometimes  scarcely 
even  that,  to  distinguish  Cassirer's  critical  idealism  from  lines 
of  thought  he  vigorously  opposes,  so  far  as  this  important  matter 
is  concerned. 

Who,  for  example,  is  the  author  of  the  assertion  that  "the 
mathematician  need  not  concern  himself  with  the  particular 
being  or  intrinsic  nature  of  his  points,  lines,  and  planes,  ...  ;" 
on  the  contrary,  a  'point'  merely  "has  to  be  something  that  satis- 
fies our  axioms?"  Not  Cassirer,  though  (as  noted  above)  he  says 
the  same  thing  in  other  words,  but  Bertrand  Russell.19  And  who 

19  Introduction  to  Mathematical  Philosophy -,  59. 


262  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

declares  that  in  mathematics  "a  field  of  free  and  universal 
activity  is  disclosed,  in  which  thought  transcends  all  limits  of 
the  'given',"  in  that  "the  objects  which  we  consider  .  .  .  have 
only  an  ideal  being?"  Not  Bertrand  Russell,  but  Cassirer.20 
True,  according  to  Russell  thought  merely  discovers  the  sub- 
sisting essences  of  this  ideal,  trans-empirical  realm  $  whereas 
according  to  Cassirer  thought  actively  creates  those  universals, 
thus  generating  its  own  world  out  of  its  own  internal  resources. 
Nevertheless  both  thinkers  emphasize  equally  the  complete 
"liberation"  of  thought  from  all  experientially  imposed  limita- 
tions.21 

The  fact  that  Cassirer  presents  such  a  telling  criticism  of 
Russellian  epistemology,  in  this  regard,  cannot  be  allowed  to 
obscure  the  complementary  fact  that  precisely  analogous  ob- 
jections may  be  urged  against  his  own  epistemology.  Surely 
'discovery'  is  no  more  a  pure  metaphor,  as  applied  to  the  role 
of  thought  in  knowledge,  than  is  'creation.'22  In  plain  language, 
the  relation  of  mathematics  to  logic  is  equally  close,  and  the 
separation  of  mathematical  concepts  from  experience  is  equally 
complete,  whichever  metaphor  may  be  used  to  characterize  the 
actual  functioning  of  thought.  On  no  other  grounds  can  it  be 
explained  why  Cassirer  explicitly  recognizes  that  he  as  well  as 
Russell  has  to  show  how  mathematical  concepts,  originally  con- 
strued as  non-experiential  and  purely  logical  in  origin,  can  yet 
be  'applied'  so  directly  and  effectively  to  the  solution  of  em- 
pirical problems.  To  insist  upon  the  inseparability  of  mathemat- 
ics and  formal  logic  is  ipso  facto  to  cut  mathematics  off  from 
all  essential  connection  with  experience}  and  to  insist,  with 
Cassirer,  that  nevertheless  mathematical  knowledge  is  as  ob- 
jective as  all  other  scientific  knowledge,  because,  forsooth,  all 
truth  is  literally  created  by  thinking,  is  if  so  jacto  to  reduce 
scientific  truth  as  such  to  formal  consistency  within  a  closed 

80  Substance  and  Function,  112. 

81  The  hostile  critic  would  be  tempted  to  express  the  same  idea  in  rather  different 
terms,  to  the  effect  that  the  "liberation"  in  question  actually  amounts  to  a  confine- 
ment of  thought  within  the  four  walls  of  an  a  priori  formalism. 

MCf.  the  present  writer's  The  Philosophical  Presuppositions  of  Mathematical 
Logic  Chs.  Ill — VI,  on  this  point,  and  also  for  a  remarkable  similarity  between 
the  views  of  Josiah  Royce  and  Cassirer  on  such  matters. 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      263 

circle  of  ideas — the  whole  world,  in  Schopenhauerian  language, 
is  my  idea — and  objectivity  (as  Russell  has  somewhere  justly 
observed)  must  be  construed,  in  the  last  analysis,  as  merely  a 
species  of  subjectivity. 

There  is,  however,  here  as  in  other  contexts,  another  tend- 
ency, or  another  phase  of  Cassirer's  thought,  which  sharply 
conflicts  with  such  abstract  rationalism.  For  above  everything 
else  he  insists  on  the  essential  continuity  of  scientific  thought 
in  general,  and  of  mathematical  thought  in  particular.  And, 
although  carrying  on  a  persistent  warfare  against  all  species  of 
empiricism  and  positivism,  he  at  the  same  time  emphatically 
maintains  that  it  is  the  prime  function  of  scientific  laws  and 
general  mathematical  formulas  alike  to  render  the  'particulars' 
— particular  scientific  facts,  or  specific  mathematical  truths — 
intelligible,  by  incorporating  them  in  a  concrete  systematic 
nexus.  Apart  from  such  a  nexus,  he  insists,  neither  particulars 
nor  universals  have  any  meaning.  Even  in  the  case  of  mathe- 
matics, he  seems  to  argue,  the  construction  of  concepts  does  not 
take  place  in  complete  abstraction  from  perceptually  given  and 
intuitively  apprehended  data,  though  it  does  of  course  involve, 
from  the  very  beginning,  an  attempt  to  free  those  concepts  more 
and  more,  not  from  their  roots  in  experience  as  such,  but  rather 
simply  from  irrelevant,  transitory,  and  merely  sensuous  con- 
notations.23 The  historical  accuracy  of  this  contention  cannot  be 
denied,  and  neither  can  its  epistemological  significance  be  over- 
emphasized. 

The  point  is  that  in  mathematics,  just  as  in  all  other  sciences, 
new  concepts  and  new  theories  are  evolved  in  the  process  of 
seeking  a  solution  to  some  hitherto  recalcitrant  problem  in- 
herited from  an  earlier  stage  in  the  development  of  the  science. 
These  new  concepts  and  theories  usually  represent  the  end 
product  of  a  long  and  arduous  labor  of  preparation,  of  trial 
and  error;  and  their  significance  is  measured,  not  merely  by 
reference  to  the  particular  problem  or  problems  they  solve,  but 
also  in  terms  of  the  enrichment  of  meaning  they  bestow  upon 
previously  accepted  concepts  and  theories.  As  Cassirer  so  well 
says, 

"  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formeny  III,  45 iff.,  esp.  468f. 


264  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

the  unity  and  self-sufficiency  of  the  mathematical  method  depends  upon 
the  fact  that  the  creative,  generative  procedure  to  which  the  science 
owes  its  origin,  never  comes  to  an  end  at  any  given  point,  but  displays 
itself  in  ever  new  forms,  and  in  this  wise  maintains  itself  forever  as  one 
and  the  same,  as  an  indestructible  totality.24 

What  is  of  decisive  significance  here  is  that  within  the  science 
of  mathematics  itself  (quite  as  in  every  other  science)  there  is, 
on  such  a  view,  what  may  be  called  an  immanent  logic,  which 
carries  the  science  forward  on  its  own  momentum.  The  history 
of  mathematics  in  its  entirety  is  nothing  less  than  a  standing 
repudiation  of  any  and  all  attempts  to  'deduce'  its  fundamental 
concepts  and  theories  from  any  fixed  and  arbitrary  set  of  formal 
postulates  and  definitions.  For  that  matter  logical  principles, 
as  such,  differ  absolutely,  both  in  nature  and  function,  from  the 
premises  or  other  foundations  of  any  given  science — such  at 
least  is  one  lesson  plainly  taught  by  the  transcendental  logic  of 
Kant.  And  on  the  other  hand,  the  only  logic  mathematics  (or 
any  other  science)  needs  or  uses,  in  the  course  of  its  own  pro- 
gressive development,  resides  in  those  logical  principles  accord- 
ing to  which,  but  not  from  which,  mathematical  reasoning  pro- 
ceeds. In  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  the  foundations  of  no 
science  are  properly  to  be  described  as  logical}  for  the  good  and 
sufficient  reason  that  it  is  their  proper  function  to  define  or 
determine  (and  this  means  progressively  to  redefine),  not  the 
method,  but  the  general  nature  of  the  content,  the  subject- 
matter,  of  the  science  in  question.  If  it  be  true,  as  everyone 
acknowledges  it  to  be,  that  the  elementary  content  of  mathe- 
matics was  supplied  by,  or  taken  from  crude  experience,  then  it 
is  equally  true  and  undeniable  that  the  whole  history  of  the 
science  must  logically  be  regarded  as  an  account  of  the  precise 
way  in  which  that  first  crude  material  has  been  (as  Cassirer  is 
fond  of  repeating)  elaborated,  refined,  enriched  in  meaning, 
and  increased  in  extent.  It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized 
that  an  enormous  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  shoulders  of 
anyone  trying  to  maintain  any  other  thesis — proof  which  would 
not  only  have  to  disregard  all  the  historical  evidence,  but  run 
directly  counter  to  it. 

*  Of.  cit.,  469. 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS      265 

Thus  it  is  only  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  quixotic 
endeavor  to  base  mathematics  on  formal  logic,  that  the  self- 
stultifying  thesis  that  the  science  has  absolutely  no  content  can 
be  understood,  and  that  the  insoluble  problem  of  the  'applica- 
tion' of  mathematical  concepts  rises  up  to  plague  both  scientists 
and  philosophers.  On  the  view  clearly  implicit  in  Cassirer's 
emphasis  on  the  continuity  and  progressive  character  of  mathe- 
matical knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  no  such  artificial  prob- 
lems can  arise,  for  the  good  and  sufficient  reason  that  on  that 
view  mathematics  has  never  entirely  lost  contact  with  experi- 
ence. 

What,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  true  import  of  the  dictum 
proclaimed  by  Cassirer  himself,  along  with  so  many  other 
authorities,  that  no  other  meaning  is  to  be  ascribed  to  any 
mathematical  concept  (even  to  such  as  seem  most  empirical, 
such  as  the  solids  of  geometry),  than  that  contained  in  and  pre- 
scribed by  the  basic  postulates  and  definitions?  Does  not  this 
fundamental  methodological  principle  render  any  reference 
to  experience  logically  inoperative  and  purely  incidental?  No 
matter  what  the  whole  previous  history  of  mathematics  says  or 
implies,  who  can  deny  that  such  is  the  state  of  affairs  at  the 
present  time? 

But  surely  the  answers  to  these  questions  are  not  far  to  seek. 
The  phrase  'no  other  meaning  than  that  prescribed  by  the  basic 
postulates'  means  just  what  it  says;  and  it  does  not  say  that  no 
meaning  whatsoever  is  to  be  ascribed  to  such  basic  concepts  and 
propositions.  For  that  matter,  precisely  the  same  assertion,  mu- 
tatis mutandis,  may  be  made  concerning  the  basic  concepts  and 
definitions  of  any  science — biology,  for  example — 5  for  pre- 
cisely herein  lies  the  only  justification  for  calling  them  'basic.' 
That  such  an  assertion  lends  itself  to  misinterpretation  to  the 
effect  that  'no  other  meaning'  means  'no  meaning  at  all'  has, 
however,  unfortunately  revealed  itself  to  be  the  case.  It  is  true, 
of  course,  that  the  only  experience  immediately  and  directly 
relevant  to  mathematics  at  any  given  stage  is  the  highly  ab- 
stract experience  represented,  in  the  main,  by  what  the  next 
preceding  stage  of  the  science  has  made  of  space,  number,  and 
the  like;  just  as,  in  physics,  the  only  directly  relevant  experience 


266  HAROLD  R.  SMART 

is  what  the  next  preceding  stage  of  that  science  has  made  of 
space-time,  the  constitution  of  the  atom,  and  the  like.  No  de- 
veloped science  ever  falls  back  upon  the  crude  experience  of  the 
cplain  man/  for  the  purpose  of  verifying  or  testing  its  concepts 
and  theories}  comparatively  rarely  does  it  do  so,  indeed,  even 
in  the  most  elementary  laboratory  work  of  the  undergraduate. 
In  all  cases  the  experience  really  in  question  is  that  which  both 
insures  the  continuity  of  scientific  knowledge  and  provides  the 
material  essential  for  further  progress.  It  goes  without  saying 
that  experience,  in  such  contexts,  is  restricted  to  what  is  relevant 
to  the  science  in  question j  and,  just  as  the  mathematician  ab- 
stracts from  all  or  most  of  the  physical  properties,  attributes, 
and  relations  of  things,  so  the  physicist  abstracts  from  all  of  the 
properties,  attributes,  and  relations  of  things,  other  than  such  as 
logically  come  within  his  purview  as  a  physicist.25  But  just  as 
physics  yields  genuine  knowledge  of  the  real  world  only  because 
it  does  not  abstract  from  all  properties,  attributes,  and  relations, 
precisely  the  same  is  true,  mutatis  mutandis,  of  mathematics — 
a  fact  which  disposes  of  all  those  problems  concerning  the  appli- 
cation of  mathematics  to  experience,  as  neither  the  theories  of 
Russell  nor  even  those  of  Cassirer  himself  are  able  to  do.  More- 
over, it  is  only  because,  and  to  the  extent  that  this  is  so,  as  Kant 
plainly  intimated,  that  its  'possibility'  as  a  science  can  be  under- 
stood. What  Cassirer  says  so  well  of  mathematical  symbols, 
namely  that  they  are  neither  meaningless  signs,  as  some  would 
argue,  no  mundane  instrumentalities  for  communication  with  a 
transcendent  realm  of  hypostatized  ideas,  as  others  suggest,  but 
are  rather  explicative  of  meanings  immanent  in  mathematical 
thought,  is  directly  to  the  point  in  this  connection.  And  for  this 
very  reason,  if  for  no  others,  a  calculus  of  relations,  conceived 
as  a  branch  of  formal  symbolic  logic,  is  just  as  impotent,  and  for 
strictly  analogous  reasons,  as  the  so-called  subject-predicate 
logic,  with  respect  to  the  generation  of  the  synthetic  concepts 
and  judgments  of  mathematics. 

In  the  light  of  the  preceding  discussion  it  would  seem  that 
much  the  same  observation  applies  to  Cassirer's  theory  of  math- 

*  See  the  present  writer's  article  entitled  "Cassirer  versus  Russell,"  in  Philosophy 
of  Science,  Vol.  X.,  no.  3  (July,  1943),  174. 


THEORY  OF  MATHEMATICAL  CONCEPTS       267 

ematical  concepts,  with  respect  to  its  relation  to  contemporary 
symbolic  logic,  that  commentators  apply  to  Kant's  transcen- 
dental logic,  with  respect  to  its  relation  to  traditional  formal 
logic.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  rather  in  spite  of  misleading  associa- 
tions and  entanglements  with  abstract  formalism  than  because 
of  any  positive  guidance  accruing  from  such  a  source,  that  Cas- 
sirer,  like  Kant  before  him,  has  accomplished  so  much  of  solid 
and  enduring  worth. 

HAROLD  R.  SMART 

SAGE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY 


7 
Kurt  Lemn 

CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE  AND 
THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE  AND 
THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES 


following  remarks1  on  the  relation  between  Cassirer's 
JJL  views  on  the  development  of  science  and  the  recent  history 
of  psychology  are  the  expression  of  a  person  who  has  always 
felt  the  deep  gratitude  of  a  student  to  his  teacher. 

During  the  period  from  1910,  when,  as  a  graduate  student, 
I  listened  to  the  lectures  of  the  then  "Privatdocent"  Cassirer, 
to  1946,  psychology  has  undergone  a  series  of  major  changes 
related  to  basic  issues  of  Behaviorism,  Gestalt  psychology,  Psy- 
choanalysis, Field  Theory  and  the  present  problem  of  an  in- 
tegrated social  science.  The  experiment  has  reached  out  from 
"psycho-physics"  into  any  number  of  areas  including  motiva- 
tion, personality  >  and  social  psychology.  The  mathematical 
problems  of  representing  psychological  fields  and  treating  data 
statistically  have  proceeded  step  by  step  to  new  levels.  Tech- 
niques of  interviewing,  observation,  and  other  forms  of  fact- 
finding  have  grown  into  a  rich  and  well-established  method- 
ology. The  scientific  infant  of  1910,  which  had  hardly  cut  his 
cord  to  mother  philosophy  and  was  looking  with  astonished  eyes 
and  an  uneasy  heart  to  the  grown-up  sciences,  not  knowing 
whether  he  should  try  to  copy  them  or  whether  he  ought  to 
follow  his  own  line  —  this  scientific  infant  has  perhaps  not  yet 
fully  developed  into  maturity,  but  has  certainly  reached  a  stage 
of  strength  and  progress  which  makes  the  psychologies  of  1910 
and  1946  rather  different  entities.  Still,  throughout  this  period, 
scarcely  a  year  passed  when  I  did  not  have  specific  reason  to 

1  Some  sections  of  this  paper  are  also  published  in  Lewin,  Kurt,  "Problems  of 
Group  Dynamics  and  the  Integration  of  the  Social  Sciences:  I.  Social  Equilibria." 
Human  Relations  (1947)  Vol.  I. 

271 


272  KURT  LEWIN 

acknowledge  the  help  which  Cassirer's  views  on  the  nature  of 
science  and  research  offered. 

The  value  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  for  psychology  lies,  I  feel, 
less  in  his  treatment  of  specific  problems  of  psychology — al- 
though his  contribution  in  this  field  and  particularly  his  recent 
contributions  are  of  great  interest — than  in  his  analysis  of  the 
methodology  and  concept-formation  of  the  natural  sciences. 

To  me  these  decades  of  rapid  scientific  growth  of  psychology 
and  of  the  social  sciences  in  general  have  provided  test  after 
test  for  the  correctness  of  most  of  the  ideas  on  science  and  scien- 
tific development  expressed  in  his  Substanzbegrif  und  Funk- 
tionsbegriff.  Since  the  primitive  discussions  of  the  psychologists 
of  1910  about  whether  or  not  psychology  ought  to  try  to  include 
not  only  qualitative  but  also  quantitative  data,  and  Cassirer's 
general  discussions  of  the  problem  of  quality  and  quantity — up 
to  the  present  problems  of  research  in  personality,  such  as  the 
treatment  of  biographical  data,  and  Cassirer's  discussion  of  the 
interdependence  of  "historical"  and  "systematic"  problems — , 
I  have  felt  with  increasing  strength  the  power  and  productivity 
of  his  basic  approach  to  science. 

It  is  not  easy  to  point  in  Cassirer's  work  to  a  specific  concept 
or  any  specific  statement  which  provides  a  striking  new  insight 
and  solves  a  previously  insoluble  problem.  Still,  as  "participant 
observer"  of  the  recent  history  of  psychology,  I  may  be  per- 
mitted to  state  that  Cassirer's  approach  seems  to  me  a  most 
illuminating  and  constructive  help  for  making  those  decisions 
about  methods  and  about  the  direction  of  the  next  step,  upon 
which  it  depends  whether  a  concrete  piece  of  research  will  be  a 
substantial  contribution  to  a  living  science  or  a  well  polished 
container  of  nothing. 

i.  THEORY  OF  SCIENCE  AND  EMPIRICAL  RESEARCH 

The  relation  between  logic  and  theory  of  science  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  progress  of  empirical  science  on  the  other  is  not 
a  simple  one  and  is  not  easily  transformed  into  a  mutually  pro- 
ductive state  of  affairs. 

Since  Kant  philosophers  have  tried  more  or  less  successfully 
to  avoid  telling  the  empirical  scientist  what  he  "ought"  to  do  or 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  273 

not  to  do.  They  have  learned,  with  a  few  exceptions,  to  regard 
science  as  an  object  they  should  study  rather  than  rule.  This 
laudable  and  necessary  removal  of  philosophy  from  the  authori- 
tarian place  of  the  boss  or  the  judge  over  science  has  led  to  a 
tendency  of  eliminating  all  "practical"  relations  between  phi- 
losophy and  the  empirical  sciences,  including  the  perhaps  pos- 
sible and  fruitful  position  of  philosophy  as  a  consultant  to 
science.  As  the  scientist  tries  to  progress  into  the  eternal  frontier 
of  the  unknown,  he  faces  highly  complex  and  intricate  problems 
of  methods,  concepts,  and  theory  formation.  It  would  seem 
natural  that  he  should  turn  to  the  philosophical  study  of  the 
nature  of  science  for  information  and  help  on  the  method- 
ological and  conceptual  aspects  of  the  pressing  problems  he  is 
trying  to  solve. 

There  are  certain  lines  along  which  such  help  might  be  forth- 
coming and  certain  dangers  involved  in  the  all  around  co- 
operation of  scientists  and  philosophers  on  the  theory  and  prac- 
tice of  such  an  "applied  theory  of  science."  To  start  with  the 
latter:  as  a  rule,  the  philosopher  can  hardly  be  expected  to  have 
the  detailed  knowledge  of  an  active  research  worker  in  a  specific 
branch  of  an  empirical  science.  As  a  rule,  therefore,  he  should 
not  be  expected  to  make  direct  contributions  to  empirical 
theories.  The  tragi-comic  happening  of  half  a  decade  ago,  when 
a  certain  group  of  philosophers  tried  to  revive  good  old  classical 
behaviorism  just  after  it  had  fulfilled  its  usefulness  for  psy- 
chology and  was  happily  dying,  should  be  a  warning  against 
such  inappropriate  overstepping  of  boundaries.  On  the  other 
hand,  such  danger  should  not  minimize  the  essential  advantages 
which  a  closer  cooperation  between  the  philosopher  and  the 
scientist  should  offer  to  both. 

As  far  as  I  can  see,  there  are  two  main  lines  along  which 
valuable  and  more  than  accidental  help  for  the  empirical  and 
particularly  the  social  sciences  may  emerge  from  a  closer  rela- 
tion to  philosophy.  One  has  to  do  with  mathematical  logic,  the 
other  with  comparative  theory  of  science. 

The  development  of  mathematical  logic  has  proceeded  con- 
siderably beyond  what  Cassirer  had  to  offer.  Mathematical  logic 
seems  to  provide  a  fruitful  possibility  of  assistance  for  specific 


274  KURT  LEWIN 

problems  of  measurement  for  basic  mathematical  questions  re- 
garding qualitative  and  quantitative  data,  for  general  mathema- 
tical problems  of  representing  social  and  psychological  fields, 
and  so  on.  The  insight  provided  by  mathematical  logic  could 
probably  have  avoided  some  of  the  past  headaches  and  should 
be  of  considerable  potential  assistance  to  the  social  scientist  in  the 
coming  period  of  the  quantitative  measurement  of  social  forces. 

Mathematical  logic  has,  however,  not  been  of  much  avail 
and,  in  my  judgment,  is  not  likely  to  be  of  much  avail  for 
guiding  the  psychologist  or  social  scientist  through  certain  other 
major  methodological  perplexities. 

The  logician  is  accustomed  to  deal  with  problems  of  correct 
conclusions  or  other  aspects  of  science  and  concepts  which  are 
"timeless,"  which  hold  as  much  for  the  physics  of  Copernicus  as 
for  modern  physics.  These  problems  are  doubtless  of  great 
interest  to  the  research-worker.  They  make  up,  however,  only 
a  small  section  of  the  problems  of  scientific  strategy  which  are 
the  concern  of  the  daily  struggle  of  progressing  into  the  un- 
known. The  main  problems,  which  the  scientist  has  to  face  and 
for  which  he  has  to  find  a  solution,  are  inevitably  bound  to  the 
particular  state  of  development  of  his  science,  even  if  they  are 
problems  of  method  rather  than  content. 

It  is  unrealistic  and  unproductive  for  an  empirical  scientist  to 
approach  problems  of  scientific  method  and  procedure  in  a  way 
which  does  not  take  cognizance  of  the  basic  fact  that,  to  be 
effective,  scientific  methods  have  to  be  adjusted  to  the  specific 
state  of  affairs  at  a  given  time.  This  holds  for  the  techniques 
of  fact-finding,  for  the  process  of  conceptualization  and  theoriz- 
ing, in  short,  for  more  or  less  all  aspects  of  research.  Research 
is  the  art  of  taking  the  next  step.  Methods  and  concepts,  which 
may  represent  a  revolutionary  progress  today,  may  be  outmoded 
tomorrow.  Can  the  philosopher  gain  insight  into  the  develop- 
ment of  science  in  a  way  useful  for  these  vital  time-bound 
aspects  of  scientific  labor? 

The  logician  may  be  inclined  to  place  these  problems  outside 
the  realm  of  a  theory  of  science.  He  may  be  inclined  to  view 
them  not  as  philosophical  problems  but  as  questions  which 
should  be  dealt  with  by  historians.  Doubtless  the  researcher  is 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  275 

deeply  influenced  by  the  culture  in  which  he  lives  and  by  its 
technical  and  economic  facilities.  Not  these  problems  of  cultural 
history,  however,  are  in  question  when  the  social  psychologist 
has  to  make  up  his  mind  whether  or  not  "experiments  with 
groups"  are  scientifically  meaningful,  or  what  procedure  he  may 
follow  for  developing  better  concepts  of  personality,  of  leader- 
ship, or  of  other  aspects  of  group  life.  Not  historical,  but  con- 
ceptual and  methodological  problems  are  to  be  answered,  ques- 
tions about  what  is  scientifically  right  or  wrong,  adequate  or 
inadequate  5  although  this  correctness  may  be  specific  to  a  special 
developmental  stage  of  a  science  and  may  not  hold  for  a  pre- 
vious or  a  later  stage.  In  other  words,  the  term  "scientific  de- 
velopment" refers  to  levels  of  scientific  maturity,  to  levels  of 
concepts  and  theories  in  the  sense  of  philosophy  rather  than  of 
human  history  or  psychology. 

It  is  this  approach  to  science  as  emerging  systems  of  theorems 
and  concepts  to  which  Cassirer  has  contributed  so  much.  When- 
ever Cassirer  discusses  science,  he  seems  to  perceive  both  the 
permanent  characteristics  of  scientific  systems  and  procedures 
and  the  specific  conceptual  form. 

Philosophy  of  science  can  come  to  an  insight  into  the  nature 
of  science  only  by  studying  science.  It  is,  therefore,  in  permanent 
danger  of  making  the  science  of  the  past  a  prototype  for  all 
science  and  of  making  past  methodology  the  standard  by  which 
to  measure  what  scientific  methods  "ought"  to  be  used  or  not 
to  be  used.  Cassirer  has  in  most  cases  successfully  avoided  this 
danger  by  looking  at  the  scientific  mehods  of  the  past  in  the  way 
in  which  the  research-worker  at  that  time  would  perceive  them. 
He  discloses  the  basic  character  of  science  as  the  eternal  attempt 
to  go  beyond  what  is  regarded  scientifically  accessible  at  any 
specific  time.  To  proceed  beyond  the  limitations  of  a  given  level 
of  knowledge  the  researcher,  as  a  rule,  has  to  break  down 
methodological  taboos  which  condemn  as  "unscientific"  or  "il- 
logical" the  very  methods  or  concepts  which  later  on  prove  to 
be  basic  for  the  next  major  progress.  Cassirer  has  shown  how 
this  step  by  step  revolution  of  what  is  "scientifically  permis- 
sible" dominates  the  development  of  mathematics,  physics,  and 
chemistry  throughout  their  history. 


276  KURT  LEWIN 

A  second  reason  why  I  feel  Cassirer's  approach  is  so  valuable 
to  the  social  scientist  is  his  comparative  procedure.  Although 
Cassirer  has  not  fully  developed  what  might  be  called  a  system- 
atic comparative  theory  of  the  sciences,  he  took  important  steps 
in  this  direction.  His  treatment  of  mathematics,  physics,  and 
chemistry,  of  historical  and  systematic  disciplines  is  essentially 
of  a  comparative  nature.  Cassirer  shows  an  unusual  ability  to 
blend  the  analysis  of  general  characteristics  of  scientific  method- 
ology with  the  analysis  of  a  specific  branch  of  science.  It  is  this 
ability  to  reveal  the  general  rule  in  an  example,  without  de- 
stroying the  specific  characteristics  of  a  particular  discipline  at  a 
given  stage  of  development,  which  makes  the  comparative  treat- 
ment of  some  branches  of  mathematics  and  of  the  natural 
sciences  so  illuminating  for  research  in  the  social  sciences.  This 
comparative  approach  opens  the  way  to  a  perception  of  similari- 
ties between  different  sciences  and  between  apparently  un- 
related questions  within  the  same  science. 

We  shall  discuss  here  only  one  type  of  problem  as  an  example 
of  the  structural  similarities  between  the  conceptual  problems 
of  the  present  social  sciences  and  problems  of  mathematics  and 
the  physical  sciences  at  certain  stages  of  development,  namely 
that  of  "existence." 

2.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  "EXISTENCE"  IN  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

Arguments  about  "existence"  may  seem  metaphysical  in 
nature  and  may  therefore  not  be  expected  to  be  raised  in 
empirical  sciences.  Actually,  however,  opinions  about  existence 
or  non-existence  are  quite  common  in  the  empirical  sciences  and 
have  greatly  influenced  scientific  development  in  both  a  positive 
and  a  negative  way.  Labelling  something  as  "non-existing"  is 
equivalent  to  declaring  it  "out  of  bounds"  for  the  scientist. 
Attributing  "existence"  to  an  item  automatically  makes  it  a  duty 
of  the  scientist  to  consider  this  item  as  an  object  of  research;  it 
includes  the  necessity  of  considering  its  properties  as  "facts," 
which  cannot  be  neglected  in  the  total  system  of  theories  j 
finally,  it  implies  that  the  terms  by  which  one  refers  to  the  item 
are  accepted  as  scientific  "concepts"  (rather  than  regarded  as 
"mere  words"). 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  277 

The  problem  of  "existence"  is,  therefore,  one  of  the  most 
illuminating  examples  for  the  way  in  which  facts,  concepts,  and 
methods  are  closely  interdependent  aspects  of  an  empirical 
science.  To  demonstrate  the  way  in  which  this  interdependence 
is  functioning  in  every  phase  of  science  is  the  central  theme  of 
this  aspect  of  Cassirer's  philosophy. 

Cassirer  follows  the  steps  by  which  mathematics  is  gradually 
transformed.  Geometry  and  the  theory  of  numbers,  for  instance, 
changes  from  a  study  of  separate  forms  or  entities,  which  are  to 
be  described  and  analysed  one  by  one — with  the  objective  of 
finding  "permanent  properties" — into  a  discipline  which  deals 
with  problems  of  interrelations  and  transformations.2 

Geometry,  as  the  theory  of  invariants,  treats  certain  unchangeable  rela- 
tions; but  this  unchangeableness  cannot  be  defined  unless  we  understand, 
as  its  conceptual  background,  certain  fundamental  changes  relative  to 
which  they  hold.  The  unchanging  geometrical  properties  are  not  such 
in  and  for  themselves,  but  only  in  relation  to  a  system  of  possible  trans- 
formations that  we  implicitly  assume.  Constancy  and  change  thus  appear 
as  thoroughly  correlative  moments,  definable  only  through  each  other.3 

In  physics  an  equivalent  change  occurs  on  the  basis  of  an 
increasingly  close  interdependence  of  fact  finding  and  theory. 

It  has  been  shown,  in  opposition  to  the  traditional  logical  doctrine,  that 
the  course  of  the  mathematical  construction  of  concepts  is  defined  by  the 
procedures  of  the  construction  of  series.  We  have  not  been  concerned 
with  separating  out  the  common  element  from  a  plurality  of  similar  im- 
pressions but  with  establishing  a  principle  by  which  their  diversity  should 
appear.  The  unity  of  the  concept  has  not  been  found  in  a  fixed  group  of 
properties,  but  in  the  rule,  which  represents  the  mere  diversity  as  a 
sequence  of  elements  according  to  law.4 

In  truth,  no  physicist  experiments  and  measures  with  the  particular 
instrument  that  he  has  sensibly  before  his  eyes;  but  he  substitutes  for  it 
an  ideal  instrument  in  thought,  from  which  all  accidental  defects,  such 
as  necessarily  belong  to  the  particular  instrument,  are  excluded.  For 
example,  if  we  measure  the  intensity  of  an  electric  current  by  a  tangent- 
compass,  then  the  observations,  which  we  make  first  with  a  concrete 

a  Substance  and  Function  (Swabcy  tr.) ,  68. 

*  Ibid.,  90$  wording  changed  by  K.  Lewin,  in  line  with  German  original. 

4 Ibid.,  148. 


278  KURT  LEWIN 

apparatus,  must  be  related  and  carried  over  to  a-  general  geometrical 
model,  before  they  are  physically  applicable.  We  substitute  for  a  coppei 
wire  of  a  definite  strength  a  strictly  geometrical  circle  without  breadth ; 
in  place  of  the  steel  of  the  magnetic  needle,  which  has  a  certain  magni- 
tude and  form,  we  substitute  an  infinitely  small,  horizontal  magnetic 
axis,  which  can  be  moved  without  friction  around  a  vertical  axis;  and 
it  is  the  totality  of  these  transformations,  which  permits  us  to  carry  the 
observed  deflection  of  the  magnetic  needle  into  the  general  theoretical 
formula  of  the  strength  of  the  current,  and  thus  to  determine  the  value 
of  the  latter.  The  corrections,  which  we  make  and  must  necessarily  make 
with  the  use  of  every  physical  instrument,  are  themselves  a  work  of 
mathematical  theory;  to  exclude  these  latter,  is  to  deprive  the  observation 
itself  of  its  meaning  and  value.5 

Until  relatively  recently  psychology,  sociology,  and  anthro- 
pology were  dominated  by  a  methodology  which  regarded 
science  as  a  process  of  "collecting  facts."  This  methodology 
showed  all  the  earmarks  of  early  Greek  mathematics  and  pre- 
Galilean  physics.  During  the  last  ten  years  the  hostility  to 
theorizing  has  greatly  diminished.  It  has  been  replaced  by  a 
relatively  wide-spread  recognition  of  the  necessity  for  develop- 
ing better  concepts  and  higher  levels  of  theory. 

This  change  has  its  corollary  in  certain  changes  regarding 
what  is  considered  "existing."  Beliefs  regarding  "existence"  in 
social  science  have  changed  in  regard  to  the  degree  to  which 
"full  reality"  is  attributed  to  psychological  and  social  phenom- 
ena, and  in  regard  to  the  reality  of  their  "deeper,"  dynamic 
properties. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  century,  for  instance,  the  experi- 
mental psychology  of  "will  and  emotion"  had  to  fight  for  rec- 
ognition against  a  prevalent  attitude  which  placed  volition, 
emotion,  and  sentiments  in  the  "poetic  realm"  of  beautiful 
words,  a  realm  to  which  nothing  corresponds  which  could  be 
regarded  as  "existing"  in  the  sense  in  which  the  scientist  uses 
the  term.  Although  every  psychologist  had  to  deal  with  these 
facts  realistically  in  his  private  life,  they  were  banned  from  the 
realm  of  "facts"  in  the  scientific  sense.  Emotions  were  declared 

'/«*.,  144. 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES          279 

to  be  something  too  "fluid"  and  "intangible"  to  be  pinned  down 
by  scientific  analysis  or  by  experimental  procedures.  Such  a 
methodological  argument  does  not  deny  existence  to  the  phe- 
nomenon, but  it  has  the  effect  of  keeping  the  topic  outside  the 
realm  of  empirical  science. 

Like  social  taboos,  a  scientific  taboo  is  kept  up  not  so  much  by 
a  rational  argument  as  by  a  common  attitude  among  scientists: 
any  member  of  the  scientific  guild  who  does  not  strictly  adhere 
to  the  taboo  is  looked  upon  as  queer  j  he  is  suspected  of  not 
adhering  to  the  scientific  standards  of  critical  thinking. 

3.  THE  REALITY  OF  SOCIAL  PHENOMENA 

Before  the  invention  of  the  atom  bomb  the  average  physical 
scientist  was  hardly  ready  to  concede  to  social  phenomena  the 
same  degree  of  "reality"  as  to  a  physical  object.  Hiroshima  and 
Nagasaki  seem  to  have  caused  many  physical  scientists  to  change 
their  minds.  This  change  was  hardly  based  on  philosophical  con- 
siderations. The  bomb  has  driven  home  with  dramatic  intensity 
the  degree  to  which  social  happenings  are  both  the  result  of 
and  the  conditions  for  the  occurrence  of  physical  events.  The 
period  during  which  the  natural  scientist  thought  of  the  social 
scientist  as  someone  interested  in  dreams  and  words  (rather 
than  as  an  investigator  of  facts  which  are  not  less  real  than 
physical  facts  and  which  can  be  studied  no  less  objectively)  has 
gradually  been  coming  to  an  end. 

The  social  scientists  themselves,  of  course,  have  had  a 
stronger  belief  in  the  "reality"  of  the  entities  they  were  study- 
ing. Still  this  belief  was  frequently  limited  to  the  specific  narrow 
section  with  which  they  happened  to  be  familiar.  The  economist, 
for  instance,  finds  it  a  bit  difficult  to  concede  to  psychological, 
to  anthropological,  or  to  legal  data  that  degree  of  reality  which 
he  gives  to  prices  and  other  economic  data.  Some  psychologists 
still  view  with  suspicion  the  reality  of  those  cultural  facts  with 
which  the  anthropologist  is  concerned.  They  tend  to  regard  only 
individuals  as  real  and  they  are  not  inclined  to  consider  a 
"group  atmosphere"  as  something  which  is  as  real  and  measur- 
able as,  let  us  say,  a  physical  field  of  gravity.  Concepts  like  that 


a8o  KURT  LEWIN 

of  "leadership"  retained  a  halo  of  mysticism  even  after  it  had 
been  demonstrated  that  it  is  quite  possible  to  measure  and  not 
only  to  "judge"  leadership  performance. 

The  denial  of  existence  of  a  group  or  of  certain  aspects  of 
group  life  is  based  on  arguments  which  grant  existence  only  to 
units  of  certain  size,  or  which  concern  methodologic-technical 
problems,  or  conceptual  problems. 

4.  REALITY  AND  SIZE 

Cassirer6  discusses  how,  periodically  throughout  the  history 
of  physics,  vivid  discussions  have  occurred  about  the  reality  of 
the  atom,  the  electron,  or  whatever  else  was  considered  at  that 
time  to  be  the  smallest  particle  of  physical  material.  In  the  social 
sciences  it  has  usually  been  not  the  part  but  the  whole  whose 
existence  has  been  doubted. 

Logically,  there  is  no  reason  for  distinguishing  between  the 
reality  of  a  molecule,  an  atom,  or  an  ion,  or  more  generally 
between  the  reality  of  a  whole  or  its  parts.  There  is  no  more 
magic  behind  the  fact  that  groups  have  properties  of  their  own, 
which  are  different  from  the  properties  of  their  subgroups  or 
their  individuals  members,  than  behind  the  fact  that  molecules 
have  properties,  which  are  different  from  the  properties  of  the 
atoms  or  ions  of  which  they  are  composed. 

In  the  social  as  in  the  physical  field  the  structural  properties 
of  a  dynamic  whole  are  different  from  the  structural  properties 
of  their  subparts.  Both  sets  of  properties  have  to  be  investigated. 
When  one  and  when  the  other  is  most  important,  depends  upon 
the  question  to  be  answered.  But  there  is  no  difference  of  reality 
between  them. 

If  this  basic  statement  is  accepted,  the  problem  of  existence 
of  a  group  loses  its  metaphysical  flavor.  Instead  we  face  a  series 
of  empirical  problems.  They  are  equivalent  to  the  chemical 
question  of  whether  a  given  aggregate  is  a  mixture  of  different 
types  of  atoms,  or  whether  these  atoms  have  formed  molecules 
of  a  certain  type.  The  answer  to  such  a  question  has  to  be 
given  in  chemistry,  as  in  the  social  sciences,  on  the  basis  of  an 

f  Ibid.,  151-170. 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  281 

empirical  probing  into  certain  testable  properties  of  the  case  in 
hand. 

For  instance,  it  may  be  wrong  to  state  that  the  blond  women 
living  in  a  town  "exist  as  a  group"  in  the  sense  of  being  a  dy- 
namic whole  that  is  characterized  by  a  close  interdependence  of 
their  members.  They  are  merely  a  number  of  individuals  who 
are  "classified  under  one  concept"  according  to  the  similarity  of 
one  of  their  properties.  If,  however,  the  blond  members  of  a 
workshop  are  made  an  "artificial  minority"  and  are  discrim- 
inated against  by  their  colleagues,  they  may  well  become  a 
group  with  specific  structural  properties. 

Structural  properties  are  characterized  by  relations  between 
parts  rather  than  by  the  parts  or  elements  themselves.  Cassirer 
emphasizes  that,  throughout  the  history  of  mathematics  and 
physics,  from  Anaxagoras  and  Aristotle  to  Bacon,  Boscovich, 
Boltzman  and  the  present  day,  problems  of  constancy  of  rela- 
tions rather  than  of  constancy  of  elements  have  gained  im- 
portance and  have  gradually  changed  the  picture  of  what  is 
considered  essential. 

The  meaning  of  the  mathematical  concept  cannot  be  comprehended, 
as  long  as  we  seek  any  sort  of  presentational  correlate  for  it  in  the  given ; 
the  meaning  only  appears  when  we  recognize  the  concept  as  the  expres- 
sion of  a  $ure  relation,  upon  which  rests  the  unity  and  continuous  con- 
nection of  the  members  of  a  manifold.  The  function  of  the  physical 
concept  also  is  first  evident  in  this  interpretation.  The  more  it  disclaims 
every  independent  perceptible  content  and  everything  pictorial,  the 
more  clearly  its  logical  and  systematic  function  is  shown.  .  .  .  All  that  the 
"thing"  of  the  popular  view  of  the  world  loses  in  properties,  it  gains 
in  relations;  for  it  no  longer  remains  isolated  and  dependent  on  itself 
alone,  but  is  connected  inseparably  by  logical  threads  with  the  totality 
of  experience.  Each  particular  concept  is,  as  it  were,  one  of  these  threads, 
on  which  we  string  real  experiences  and  connect  them  with  future  possi- 
ble experiences.  The  objects  of  physics:  matter  and  force,  atom  and 
ether,  can  no  longer  be  misunderstood  as  so  many  new  realities  for  in- 
vestigation, and  realities  whose  inner  essence  is  to  be  penetrated — when 
once  they  are  recognized  as  instruments  produced  by  thought  for  the 
purpose  of  comprehending  the  confusion  of  phenomena  as  an  ordered 
and  measurable  whole/ 

'Ibid.,  1 66. 


282  KURT  LEWIN 

5.  REALITY,  METHODS,  AND  EXPERIENCE 

If  recognition  o£  the  existence  of  an  entity  depends  upon 
this  entity's  showing  properties  or  constancies  of  its  own,  the 
judgment  about  what  is  real  or  unreal  should  be  affected  by 
changes  in  the  possibility  of  demonstrating  social  properties. 

The  social  sciences  have  considerably  improved  their  tech- 
niques for  reliably  recording  the  structure  of  small  or  large 
groups  and  of  registering  the  various  aspects  of  group  life. 
Sociometric  techniques,  group  observation,  interview  techniques, 
and  others  are  enabling  the  social  scientist  more  and  more  to 
gather  reliable  data  on  the  structural  properties  of  groups,  on 
the  relations  between  groups  or  subgroups,  and  on  the  relation 
between  a  group  and  the  life  of  its  individual  members. 

The  taboo  against  believing  in  the  existence  of  a  social  entity 
is  probably  most  effectively  broken  by  handling  this  entity 
experimentally.  As  long  as  the  scientist  merely  describes  a  lead- 
ership form,  he  is  open  to  the  criticism  that  the  categories  used 
reflect  merely  his  "subjective  views"  and  do  not  correspond  to 
the  "real"  properties  of  the  phenomena  under  consideration.  If 
the  scientist  experiments  with  leadership  and  varies  its  form, 
he  relies  on  an  "operational  definition"  which  links  the  concept 
of  a  leadership  form  to  concrete  procedures  of  creating  such  a 
leadership  form  or  to  the  procedures  for  testing  its  existence. 
The  "reality"  of  that  to  which  the  concept  refers  is  established 
by  "doing  with"  rather  than  "looking  at,"  and  this  reality  is 
independent  of  certain  "subjective"  elements  of  classification. 
The  progress  of  physics  from  Archimedes  to  Einstein  shows 
consecutive  steps,  by  v^hich  the  "practical"  aspect  of  the  ex- 
perimental procedure  has  modified  and  sometimes  revolution- 
ized the  scientific  concepts  regarding  the  physical  world  by 
changing  the  beliefs  of  the  scientists  about  what  is  and  what  is 
not  real. 

To  vary  a  social  phenomenon  experimentally  the  experi- 
menter has  to  take  hold  of  all  essential  factors,  even  if  he  is 
not  yet  able  to  analyze  them  satisfactorily.  A  major  omission 
or  misjudgment  on  this  point  makes  the  experiment  fail.  In 
social  research  the  experimenter  has  to  take  into  consideration 
such  factors  as  the  personality  of  individual  members,  the  group 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  283 

structure,  ideology  and  cultural  values,  and  economic  factors. 
Group  experimentation  is  a  form  of  social  management.  To  be 
successful  it,  like  social  management,  has  to  take  into  account 
all  of  the  various  factors  that  happen  to  be  important  for  the 
case  in  hand.  Experimentation  with  groups  will  therefore  lead 
to  a  natural  integration  of  the  social  sciences,  and  it  will  force 
the  social  scientist  to  recognize  as  reality  the  totality  of  factors 
which  determine  group  life. 

6.  SOCIAL  REALITY  AND  CONCEPTS 

It  seems  that  the  social  scientist  has  a  better  chance  of  accom- 
plishing such  a  realistic  integration  than  the  social  practitioner. 
For  thousands  of  years  kings,  priests,  politicians,  educators,  pro- 
ducers, fathers  and  mothers — in  fact,  all  individuals — have 
been  trying  day  by  day  to  influence  smaller  or  larger  groups. 
One  might  assume  that  this  would  have  led  to  accumulated 
wisdom  of  a  well  integrated  nature.  Unfortunately  nothing  is 
farther  from  the  truth.  We  know  that  our  average  diplomat 
thinks  in  very  one-sided  terms,  perhaps  those  of  law,  or  eco- 
nomics, or  military  strategy.  We  know  that  the  average  manu- 
facturer holds  highly  distorted  views  about  what  makes  a 
work-team  tick.  We  know  that  no  one  can  answer  today  even 
such  relatively  simple  questions  as  what  determines  the  pro- 
ductivity of  a  committee  meeting. 

Several  factors  have  come  together  to  prevent  practical  ex- 
perience from  leading  to  clear  insight.  Certainly,  the  man  of 
affairs  is  convinced  of  the  reality  of  group  life,  but  he  is  usually 
opposed  to  a  conceptual  analysis.  He  prefers  to  think  in  terms 
of  "intuition"  and  "intangibles."  The  able  practitioner  fre- 
quently insists  that  it  is  impossible  to  formulate  simple,  clear 
rules  about  how  to  reach  a  social  objective.  He  insists  that 
different  actions  have  to  be  taken  according  to  the  various  situa- 
tions, that  plans  have  to  be  highly  flexible  and  sensitive  to  the 
changing  scene. 

If  one  tries  to  transform  these  sentiments  into  scientific  lan- 
guage, they  amount  to  the  following  statements,  a)  Social 
events  depend  on  the  social  field  as  a  whole,  rather  than  on  a 
few  selected  items.  This  is  the  basic  insight  behind  the  field 


284  KURT  LEWIN 

theoretical  method  which  has  been  successful  in  physics,  which 
has  steadily  grown  in  psychology  and,  in  my  opinion,  is  bound 
to  be  equally  fundamental  for  the  study  of  social  fields,  simply 
because  it  expresses  certain  basic  general  characteristics  of  inter- 
dependence, b)  The  denial  of  "simple  rules"  is  partly  identical 
with  the  following  important  principle  of  scientific  analysis. 
Science  tries  to  link  certain  observable  (phenotypical)  data  with 
other  observable  data.  It  is  crucial  for  all  problems  of  inter- 
dependence, however,  that — for  reasons  which  we  do  not  need 
to  discuss  here — it  is,  as  a  rule,  impracticable  to  link  one  set  of 
phenotypical  data  directly  to  other  phenotypical  data.  Instead, 
it  is  necessary  to  insert  "intervening  variables."8  To  use  a  more 
common  language:  the  practitioner  as  well  as  the  scientist  views 
the  observable  data  as  mere  "symptoms."  They  are  "surface" 
indications  of  some  "deeper-lying"  facts.  He  has  learned  to 
"read"  the  symptoms,  like  a  physicist  reads  his  instruments. 
The  equations  which  express  physical  laws  refer  to  such  deeper- 
lying  dynamic  entities  as  pressure,  energy,  or  temperature 
rather  than  to  the  directly  observable  symptoms  such  as  the 
movements  of  the  pointer  of  an  instrument. 

The  underlying  methodological  principle  is  but  one  expres- 
sion of  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  concepts,  scientific 
facts  and  scientific  fact  finding.  In  the  words  of  Cassirer, 

Strictly  speaking,  the  experiment  never  concerns  the  real  case,  as  it  lies 
before  us  here  and  now  in  all  the  wealth  of  its  particular  determinations, 
but  the  experiment  rather  concerns  an  ideal  case,  which  we  substitute 
for  it.  The  real  beginnings  of  scientific  induction  furnish  the  classical 
example  of  this.  Galileo  did  not  discover  the  law  of  falling  bodies  by 
collecting  arbitrary  observations  of  sensuously  real  bodies,  but  by  de- 
fining hypothetically  the  concept  of  uniform  acceleration  and  taking  it  as 
a  conceptual  measure  of  the  facts.  This  concept  provides  for  the  given 
time-values  a  series  of  space-values,  such  as  proceed  according  to  a 
fixed  rule,  that  can  be  grasped  once  for  all.  Henceforth  we  must  at- 
tempt to  advance  to  the  actual  process  of  reality  by  a  progressive  con- 
sideration of  the  complex  determinations,  that  were  originally  excluded: 
as,  for  example,  the  variation  of  acceleration  according  to  the  distance 
from  the  centre  of  the  earth,  retardation  by  the  resistance  of  the  air,  etc.9 

'Tolman,  E.  C,  "The  Determiners  of  Behavior  at  a  Choice  Point,"  Psycho- 
logical Review,  (1938),  Vol.  45,  1-41. 
*  Substance  and  Function  fEnp-1.  tr.V  *  CA 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  285 

If  we  consider  the  factors  involved  in  the  measurement  of  motion,  .  .  . 
it  is  evident  that  the  physical  definition  of  motion  cannot  be  established 
without  substituting  the  geometrical  body  for  the  sensuous  body,  without 
substituting  the  "intelligible"  continuous  extension  of  the  mathematician 
for  sensuous  extension.  Before  we  can  speak  of  motion  and  its  exact 
measurement  in  the  strict  sense,  we  must  go  from  the  contents  of  per- 
ception to  their  conceptual  limits.  ...  It  is  no  less  a  pure  conceptual  con- 
struction, when  we  ascribe  a  determinate  velocity  to  a  non-uniformly 
moving  body  at  each  point  of  its  path;  such  a  construction  presupposes 
for  its  explanation  nothing  less  than  the  whole  logical  theory  of  in- 
finitesimal analysis.  But  even  where  we  seem  to  stand  closer  to  direct 
sensation,  where  we  seem  guided  by  no  other  interest  than  to  arrange  its 
differences  as  presented  us,  into  a  fixed  scale,  even  here  theoretical 
elements  are  requisite  and  clearly  appear.  It  is  a  long  way  from  the 
immediate  sensation  of  heat  to  the  exact  concept  of  temperature.10 

The  dynamics  of  social  events  provides  no  exception  to  this 
general  characteristic  of  dynamics.  If  it  were  possible  to  link  a 
directly  observable  group  behavior,  B,  with  another  behavior, 
B1,  —  B  =  F  (B1)  where  F  means  a  simple  function  —  then 
simple  rules  of  procedure  for  the  social  practitioner  would  be 
possible.  When  the  practitioner  denies  that  such  rules  can  be 
more  than  poor  approximations  he  seems  to  imply  that  the 
function,  F,  is  complicated.  I  am  inclined  to  interpret  his 
statement  actually  to  mean  that  in  group  life,  too,  "appearance" 
should  be  distinguished  from  the  "underlying  facts,"  that  simi- 
larity of  appearance  may  go  together  with  dissimilarity  of  the 
essential  properties  and  vice  versa,  and  that  laws  can  be  formu- 
lated only  in  regard  to  these  underlying  dynamic  entities  — 
k  =  F  (n,m)  where  k,n,m  refer  not  to  behavioral  symptoms 
but  to  intervening  variables.11 

For  the  social  scientist  this  means  that  he  should  give  up 
thinking  about  such  items  as  group  structure,  group  tension,  or 
social  forces  as  nothing  more  than  a  popular  metaphor  or 
analogy,  which  should  be  eliminated  from  science  as  much  as 
possible.  Although  there  is  no  need  for  social  science  to  copy 
the  specific  concepts  of  the  physical  sciences,  the  social  scientist 
should  be  clear  that  he,  too,  needs  intervening  variables  and 


142., 

11  Cf  .  Lewin,  Kurt,  A  Dynamic  Theory  of  Personality  (tr.  by  D.  Adams  and 
K.  Zener),  New  York:  McGraw-Hill  (1935). 


286  KURT  LEWIN 

that  these  dynamic  facts  rather  than  the  symptoms  and  appear- 
ances are  the  important  points  of  reference  for  him  and  the 
social  practitioner  alike. 

7.  MATHEMATIZATION  AND  INTEGRATION  OF  THE 
SOCIAL  SCIENCES 

The  relation  between  theory  formation,  fact  finding  and 
mathematization,  which  Cassirer  has  described  in  regard  to 
the  physical  sciences,  has  come  much  to  the  fore  in  the  psy- 
chology of  the  last  decade.  Different  psychological  trends  have 
led  from  different  sides  and  with  partly  different  objectives 
to  a  strong  emphasis  on  mathematization.  This  need  springs 
partly  from  a  desire  of  a  more  exact  scientific  representation 
of  the  results  of  tests  or  other  fact  findings  and  has  led  to  an 
elaborate  development  of  statistical  procedures.  In  part  the 
emphasis  on  mathematization  springs  from  the  desire  of  a 
deeper  theoretical  insight.12  Both  geometrical  and  algebraic 
concepts  are  employed  to  this  end. 

Mathematical  economics  since  Pareto  (1909)  is  another  ex- 
ample of  the  development  of  a  social  science  which  shows  many 
of  the  characteristics  discussed  by  Cassirer. 

One  of  the  most  striking  illustrations  of  the  function  of 
theorems,  concepts,  and  methods  in  the  development  of  science 
is  their  role  in  the  integration  of  the  social  sciences  which  is 
just  beginning  to  take  place.  It  may  be  appropriate  to  mention 
this  problem  and  to  refer  briefly  to  considerations  I  have  pre- 
sented elsewhere.13 

Many  aspects  of  social  life  can  be  viewed  as  quasi-stationary 
processes.  They  can  be  regarded  as  states  of  quasi-stationary 
equilibrium  in  the  precise  meaning  of  a  constellation  of  forces 
the  structure  of  which  can  be  well  defined.  The  scientific  treat- 

18  Hull,  C.  L.,  Principles  of  Bettavior,  New  York:  Appleton  Century  (1943)$ 
Kohler,  W.,  The  Place  of  Value  in  a  World  of  Facts.  New  York:  Liveright  (1938)  j 
Lewin,  Kurt,  "The  Conceptual  Representation  and  the  Measurement  of  Psycho- 
logical Forces,"  Contributions  to  Psychological  Theory,  Vol.  I,  No.  4,  Duke  Uni- 
versity Press  (1938)5  Lewin,  Kurt,  "Constructs  in  Psychology  and  Psychological 
Ecology,"  Studies  in  Tofological  and  Vector  Psychology,  III,  University  of  Iowa. 

11  Lewin,  Kurt,  "Problems  of  Group  Dynamics  and  the  Integration  of  the  Social 
Sciences:  I.  Social  Equilibria,"  Human  Relations  (1947),  Vol.  I. 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  287 

ment  of  social  forces  presupposes  analytic  devices  which  are 
adequate  to  the  nature  of  social  processes  and  which  are  tech- 
nically fitted  to  serve  as  a  bridge  to  a  mathematical  treatment. 
The  basic  means  to  this  end  is  the  representation  of  social 
situations  as  "social  fields." 

This  technical  analysis  makes  it  possible  to  formulate  in  a 
more  exact  way  problems  of  planned  social  changes  and  of  re- 
sistance to  change.  It  permits  general  statements  concerning 
some  aspects  of  the  problem  of  selecting  specific  objectives  in 
bringing  about  change,  concerning  different  methods  of  bring- 
ing about  the  same  amount  of  change,  and  concerning  differences 
in  the  secondary  effects  of  these  methods.  The  analytic  tools 
used  are  equally  applicable  to  cultural,  economic,  sociological, 
and  psychological  aspects  of  group  life.  They  fit  a  great  variety 
of  processes,  such  as  production  levels  of  a  factory,  a  work- 
team  and  an  individual  worker;  changes  of  abilities  of  an  indi- 
vidual and  of  capacities  of  a  country;  group  standards  with  and 
without  cultural  value;  activities  of  one  group  and  the  interac- 
tion between  groups,  between  individuals,  and  between  indi- 
viduals and  groups.  The  analysis  concedes  equal  reality  to  all 
aspects  of  group  life  and  to  social  units  of  all  sizes.  The  applica- 
tion depends  upon  the  structural  properties  of  the  process  and  of 
the  total  situation  in  which  it  takes  place. 

How  is  it  possible,  one  may  ask,  to  bring  together  under  one 
heading  and  procedure  such  diversified  data?  Does  that  not 
necessarily  mean  losing  in  concreteness  what  one  might  gain 
in  scientific  generality? 

In  the  same  way  as  the  natural  sciences,  the  social  sciences 
have  to  face  the  problem  of  how  to  get  hold  conceptually  of 
the  disturbing  qualitative  richness  of  psychological  and  cul- 
tural events,  how  to  find  "general"  laws  without  giving  up 
reaching  the  individual  case.  Cassirer  describes  how  the  mathe- 
matical constructive  procedure  solves  this  problem  by  changing, 
as  it  were,  the  very  meaning  of  equality  and  scientific  abstrac- 
tion. Speaking  of  equalities  of  mathematical  sets  he  says,  "This 
similarity,  however,  means  nothing  more  than  that  they  are 
connected  by  a  definite  rule,  such  as  permits  us  to  proceed  from 
one  manifold  to  another  by  continued  identical  application  of 


a88  KURT  LEWIN 

the  same  fundamental  relation}"14  "The  genuine  concept  does 
not  disregard  the  peculiarities  and  particularities  which  it  holds 
under  it,  but  seeks  to  show  the  necessity  of  the  occurrence  and 
connection  of  just  these  particularities."15 

The  individual  case  is  not  excluded  from  consideration,  but  is  fixed  and 
retained  as  a  perfectly  determinate  step  in  a  general  process  of  change. 
It  is  evident  anew  that  the  characteristic  feature  of  the  concept  is  not 
the  "universality"  of  a  presentation,  but  the  universal  validity  of  a 
principle  of  serial  order.  We  do  not  isolate  any  abstract  part  whatever 
from  the  manifold  before  us,  but  we  create  for  its  members  a  definite 
relation  by  thinking  of  them  as  bound  together  by  an  inclusive  law.  And 
the  further  we  proceed  in  this  and  the  more  firmly  this  connection  ac- 
cording to  laws  is  established,  so  much  the  clearer  does  the  unambiguous 
determination  of  the  particular  stand  forth.16 

The  consideration  of  quasi-stationary  equilibria  is  based  on 
analytic  concepts  which,  within  the  realm  of  the  social  sciences, 
have  emerged  first  in  psychology.  The  concepts  of  a  psycho- 
logical force,  of  tension,  of  conflicts  as  equilibria  of  forces,  of 
force  fields  and  of  inducing  fields,  have  slowly  widened  their 
range  of  application  from  the  realm  of  individual  psychology 
into  the  realm  of  processes  and  events  which  had  been  the 
domain  of  sociology  and  cultural  anthropology.  It  seems  that 
the  treatment  of  economic  equilibria  by  mathematical  economics, 
although  having  a  different  origin,  is  fully  compatible  with  this 
development. 

The  fusion  of  the  social  sciences  will  make  accessible  to 
economics  the  vast  advantages  which  the  experimental  pro- 
cedure offers  for  testing  theories  and  for  developing  new  in- 
sight. The  combination  of  experimental  and  mathematical  pro- 
cedures which  Cassirer  describes  has  been  the  main  vehicle  for 
the  integration  of  the  study  of  light,  of  electricity,  and  of  the 
other  branches  of  physical  science.  The  same  combination  seems 
to  be  destined  to  make  the  integration  of  the  social  sciences  a 
reality. 

KURT  LEWIN 

MASSACHUSETTS  INSTITUTE  OF  TECHNOLOGY 

14  Substance  and  Function  (Engl.  tr.),  31. 
"/Ml.,  19. 
"Ibid.,  20. 


8 

Robert  S.  Hartman 
CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS 

I  DWELT  on  the  birth  of  the  ego  out  of  the  mythical 
collective.  .  .  .  [The]  ego  detaches  itself  from  the  collec- 
tive in  the  same  way  that  certain  figures  of  Rodin  wrest  them- 
selves out  of  the  stone  and  awaken  from  it."  Thus,  in  a  speech 
at  the  Library  of  Congress,1  Thomas  Mann  described  his 
creation  of  the  Joseph  figures.  In  a  similar  way  Cassirer  could 
have  described — and  did  describe2 — the  birth  of  modern  self- 
consciousness  from  the  matrix  of  pre-historic  myth  and  medi- 
eval metaphysics,  the  creation  of  its  symbolic  forms  out  of  the 
raw  material  of  rites  and  gestures,  the  emergence  of  logical 
functions  from  natural  material,  their  gradual  liberation — and 
therewith  the  self-liberation  of  consciousness — from  sensuous 
encumbrances. 

Symbolic  forms  are  progressive  states  of  the  self-emergence 
of  consciousness.  That  emergence  may  be  followed  in  the  grad- 
ual unfolding  of  metaphysical  thought  into  modern  science — as 
Cassirer  has  shown  in  the  first  three  volumes  of  the  Erkenntnis- 
problem — or  it  may  be  demonstrated  in  the  gradual  unfolding 
of  the  raw  material  and  mirroring  produce  of  the  self -evolving 
consciousness — as  Cassirer  has  done  in  his  Philosofhie  der 
symbolischen  Formen? 

Both  forms  of  presentation  demonstrate  one  and  the  same 
process  of  creative  thought:  in  the  first  case  with  the  emphasis 
on  the  creating  mind,  in  the  second  with  the  emphasis  on  the 
created  form.  As  the  form,  in  its  successive  elaboration,  mirrors 

1  The  Atlantic  Monthly,  February  1943,  97  ff. 
*  Cf.  Erkenntnisfroblem  I,  1 1  f. 

1  All  references  in  this  essay  are  to  that  work,  and  will  be  referred  to  by  PSF, 
unless  otherwise  stated.  The  translations  are  my  own. 

291 


292  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

the  laboring  mind,  so  the  mind,  in  its  successive  effort,  reflects 
the  form  wrought.  In  the  Erkenntnisfroblem  Cassirer  has 
shown  the  work  of  the  objective  spirit  in  its  course;  in  the 
Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  he  has  shown,  in  the 
evolution  of  its  work,  the  course  of  the  objective  spirit.  In  both 
cases  he  stands  at  the  end  of  the  development,  surveying  it  and 
focusing  it  within  his  own  mind,  thus  re-creating  the  energy  of 
cultural  development  and  sculpturing  its  forms  before  our  own 
eyes,  a  philosophical  seer,  whose  visual,  "synoptic"4  view  of 
philosophy — both  in  its  historical  and  conceptual  dimension — 
has  rendered  to  us  in  ontogeny  what  the  objective  spirit  has 
wrought  throughout  generations  in  phylogenic  labor.  Thus 
he  has  created  a  new  symbolic  form,  which  points  beyond  itself 
toward  still  higher  formations.  His  work  for  us,  represents 
what  he  calls  "a  new  Composition*  of  the  world,  which  proceeds 
according  to  specific  standards,  valid  only  for  itself."5  Such  a 
form  "must  be  measured  with  its  own  measure.  The  points  of 
view,  according  to  which  it  is  to  be  judged  .  .  .  must  not  be 
brought  to  it  from  outside,  but  must  be  deduced  from  the 
fundamental  principle  of  its  own  formation."8  No  rigid  meta- 
physical category  must  interfere  with  such  "a  purely  immanent 
beginning." 

Let  us  then  measure  Cassirer  with  his  own  measure.  We 
shall  be  unable,  within  the  limits  of  this  essay,  to  extend  our 
measurements  into  all  the  ramifications  of  the  philosophy  of 
symbolic  forms.  But  we  shall  be  able  to  follow  its  formative 
principle.  From  it  we  shall  deduce,  and  by  it  justify,  our  own 
procedure.  Thus  we  may  hope  to  catch  the  spirit  of  that  great 
work — the  spirit  of  creation  itself. 

The  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  is  a  philosophy  of  creation. 
The  category  of  creativity  is  the  one  we  shall  apply  to  and 
deduce  from  his  system.  In  order  to  do  so  we  must  first  clear 
the  way  and  determine  his  philosophy  negatively  against  its 
two  poles,  the  raw-material  of  creation  and  the  source  of  the 
creating  act.  The  symbolic  form  is  neither  the  one  nor  the 

4  PSF,  III,  viii. 
•/W,I,iaa. 
'I  but. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  293 

other,  but  represents  the  process  of  creation  itself.  Confinement 
to  the  raw-material  would  lead  to  metaphysics,  confinement  to 
the  source  of  the  creative  act  to  psychology.  Cassirer's  philoso- 
phy is  neither  metaphysics  nor  psychology}  it  is  neither  con- 
cerned with  pure  Being  nor  with  pure  Consciousness,  but  with 
the  context  and  interaction  of  both. 

The  characteristic  and  peculiar  achievement  of  each  symbolic  form — 
the  form  of  language  as  well  as  that  of  myth  or  of  theoretical  cognition — 
is  not  simply  to  receive7  a  given  material  of  impressions  possessing  already 
a  certain  determination,  quality  and  structure,  in  order  to  graft  on  it, 
from  the  outside,  so  to  speak,  another  form  out  of  the  energy  of  con- 
sciousness itself.  The  characteristic  action  of  the  spirit  begins  much 
earlier.  Also,  the  apparently  "given"  is  seen,  on  closer  analysis,  to  be 
already  processed  by  certain  acts  of  either  the  linguistic,  the  mythical, 
or  the  logico-theoretical  "apperception."  It  "is"  only  that  which  it  has 
been  made  into  by  those  acts.  Already  in  its  apparently  simple  and  im- 
mediate states  it  shows  itself  conditioned  and  determined  by  some 
primary  function  which  gives  it  significance.  In  this  primary  formation, 
and  not  in  the  secondary  one,  lies  the  peculiar  secret  of  each  symbolic 
form.8 

Thus  there  is  no  "primary  datum"  underlying  the  creative 
activity  of  consciousness.  Every  primary  datum  is  already 
spiritually9  imbued,  even  the  simplest  spatial  perceptions,  like 
left  and  right,  high  and  low.10  The  same  is  true  of  the  original 
sensuous  perceptions  of  time,  number,  and  causality.  If  these 
categories  were  substantial  elements,  they  could  point  to  an 
absolute  Being}  but  such  a  Being,  presupposed  by  dogmatic 
metaphysics,  does  not  exist.  Our  consciousness  cannot  posit  any 
content  without,  by  that  very  act  of  positing,  setting  a  whole 
complex  of  other  contents.  This  fact  cannot  be  explained  by 
dogmatic  metaphysics  from  the  presupposition  of  an  absolute 
Being  j  on  the  contrary,  the  existence  of  such  a  being  is  contra- 
dicted by  that  very  activity  of  consciousness.11  An  "immediate 

T  In  the  sense  of  the  Platonic  "receptacle." 
*PSF,ll9  120. 

0  The  adjective  "spiritual"  is  used  in  the  sense  of  the  German  "geistig." 
10  PSF,  II,  120. 

"  PSF9  I,  31  f.,  with  reference  to  Kant's  Versuch  die  negatwen  Grossen  in  die 
Weltweisheit  rimuf&hren. 


294  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

datum"  is  already  a  material-spiritual  context,  it  is  a  creatum: 
the  germ  of  a  symbolic  form. 

It  is  obvious,  on  the  other  hand,  that  we  cannot  understand 
the  form  through  insight  into  the  natural  causes  of  its  origina- 
tion, by  the  method  of  psychology  rather  than  that  of  meta- 
physics. What  consciousness  contributes  to  the  form  is  as  im- 
portant as  are  the  contributions  of  the  schemata  of  space,  time, 
and  number;  but  it  is  as  little  real  by  itself  as  are  the  latter. 
There  is  a  third  "formative  determination,"  which  explains  the 
world  of  symbolic  forms  neither  from  the  nature  of  the  abso- 
lute nor  from  the  play  of  empirico-psychological  forces.  Al- 
though that  determination  may  agree  with  the  method  of  psy- 
chology in  acknowledging  the  fact  that  the  subjectum  agens  of 
the  symbolic  forms  is  to  be  found  nowhere  else  than  in  the 
human  consciousness,  it  does  not  necessarily  have  to  take 
consciousness  in  either  its  metaphysical  or  in  its  psychological 
determination — but  in  a  critical  analysis  which  goes  beyond 
both.  "The  modern  critique  of  cognition,  the  analysis  of  the 
laws  and  principles  of  knowledge,  has  freed  itself  more  and 
more  determinedly  from  the  presuppositions  both  of  meta- 
physics and  of  psychologism."12 

Neither  from  the  side  of  an  absolute  being  nor  from  that  of 
consciousness  alone  can  reality  be  comprehended.  Only  in  the 
combination  of  both,  in  the  symbolic  form  as  constituted  by  the 
creative  activity  of  the  spirit,  in  the  produce,  the  autonomous 
creation  of  the  spirit  do  we  have  reality — and  therewith  truth ; 

for  the  highest  truth  which  opens  itself  to  the  spirit  is  finally  the  form  of 
its  own  activity.  In  the  totality  of  its  own  accomplishments  and  the 
cognition  of  the  specific  rules  by  which  each  of  them  is  being  determined, 
as  well  as  in  the  consciousness  of  the  connection  which  combines  all  these 
rules  into  the  unity  of  one  task  and  one  solution:  in  all  this  the  spirit 
possesses  the  knowledge  of  itself  and  of  reality.13 

And  that  knowable  reality  alone  is  real. 

To  the  question  what  absolute  reality  should  be  outside  of  that  totality 
of  spiritual  functions,  what  the  "thing  in  itself"  might  be  in  this  sense — 
to  this  question  there  is  no  further  answer.  It  must  be  understood  more 

"PSF,  II,  I5. 
11 WF, 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  295 

and  more  as  a  falsely  put  problem,  a  phantom  of  thought.  The  true 
concept  of  reality  cannot  be  pressed  into  the  abstract  form  of  Being,  but 
becomes  merged  in  the  variety  and  abundance  of  the  forms  of  spiritual 
life  —  a  life  on  which  is  imprinted  the  stamp  of  inner  necessity,  and  there- 
with the  stamp  of  objectivity.  In  this  sense  each  new  "symbolic  form," 
not  only  the  conceptual  world  of  cognition  but  also  the  plastic  world  of 
art,  as  well  as  that  of  myth  and  of  language,  signifies,  in  the  words  of 
Goethe,  a  revelation  from  the  inner  to  the  outer,  a  "synthesis  of  world 
and  spirit,"  which  alone  truly  assures  us  of  the  original  unity  of  both.14 

The  world  of  symbolic  forms  is  the  world  of  life  itself. 
Neither  in  the  primitive  intuition  of  the  spirit15  nor  in  the 
primitive  perception  of  natural  being  can  life  be  comprehended. 
Life  has  left  both  these  states  behind,  it  has  transformed  itself 
into  the  form  of  the  spirit.16  "The  negation  of  the  symbolic 
forms  would  therefore,  instead  of  apprehending  the  fullness  of 
life,  on  the  contrary  destroy  the  spiritual  form,  to  which  that 
fullness  necessarily  is  bound."17 

We  must  not  passively  contemplate  these  spiritual  realities, 
but  put  ourselves  right  into  the  midst  of  their  restless  activity; 
only  thus  shall  we  comprehend  these  realities  not  as  static  con- 
templations of  a  metaphysical  Being  but  as  formative  functions 
and  energies.  In  doing  so  we  shall  discover  in  them,  however 
different  the  "Gestalten"  they  produce,  certain  universal  and 
typical  principles,18  the  principles  of  creation  itself.  Recognizing 
creation  we  become  creative  ourselves:  not  as  dogmatic  meta- 
physicians but  as  artists  vitalized  by  and  vitalizing  our  ma- 
terial. 

Thus,  in  our  interpretation,  Cassirer's  philosophy  is  meta- 
physics as  little  as  Rodin's  figures  are  stone:  if  no  creative  hand 
had  ever  touched  the  stone  it  might  have  remained  stone.  The 
creative  touch  proved  that  mere  "stone"  it  never  was.  If  no 
creative  philosophy  had  ever  liberated  the  spirit  from  the 
mould  of  the  scholastic  system  into  which  it  had  been  "melted 
down,"19  then  metaphyiscs  might  have  remained  metaphysics. 


"  PSF,  1,  48  f. 

M/W,I,5i. 

17  Ibid. 

"«F,I,5i. 

a*  Erkenntnisfroblem,  I,  1  1  . 


296  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

"Only  slowly  the  individual  moments  of  thought,  which  in 
that  system  were  held  together  as  if  by  a  dogmatic  force,  step 
forth  in  freer  movement."20  From  the  intellectual  struggles  of 
the  Renaissance,  to  the  liberating  strike  of  Kant's  Critique  of 
Reason,  to  Cassirer's  "Critique  of  Culture,"21  the  life-giving 
touch  works  on  and  transforms  metaphysics,  until  it  culminates 
in  the  Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms.  But  being  capable  of  such 
transformation  it  shows  itself  never  to  have  been  mere  "meta- 
physics." Critical  philosophers,  and  Cassirer  in  particular,  could 
vitalize  metaphysics  as  Rodin  could  the  stone.  It  may  be  instruc- 
tive to  compare  the  nature  of  Cassirer's  material  with  that  of 
Rodin's. 

Rodin's  "stone"  never  was  just  stone.  Rodin  only  knew 
living  surfaces.  These  surfaces  consisted  of  infinitely  many 
movements. 

The  play  of  light  upon  them  made  manifest  that  each  of  these  move- 
ments was  different  and  significant.  At  this  point  they  seemed  to  flow 
into  one  another;  at  that  to  greet  each  other  hesitatingly;  at  a  third  to 
pass  by  each  other  without  recognition,  like  strangers.  There  were 
undulations  without  end.  There  was  no  point  at  which  there  was  not 
life  and  movement.  ...  He  saw  only  innumerable  living  surfaces,  only 
life.22 

Cassirer's  philosophy  never  was  just  metaphysics.23  Meta- 
physics, as  ontology,  is  the  discipline  of  pure  Being,  but  there 
never  was  pure  Being.  In  the  interaction  of  the  thinker's  mind 
with  the  raw  material  of  his  thought  arises  a  new  reality: 
Reality  proper.  That  reality  appears  in  "symbolic  forms"  — 
forms  which  rise  under  the  dynamic  movement  of  thought  like 
Rodin's  figures  under  the  magic  of  his  hands.  Like  on  Rodin's 
surfaces,  the  light  of  reality  plays  on  these  forms,  which  refract 
it  in  a  thousand  manifestations. 

When  one  characterizes  language,  myth,  art,  as  "symbolic  forms," 


MRilke,  Rainer  Maria,  Rodin,  New  York:  The  Fine  Editions  Press,  1945,  n  f. 

9  Somewhat  doubtful  in  this  respect  is  W.  C.  Swabey  in  his  book-report  on 
the  PMlosophie  der  symbolise/ten  Formen,  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  XXXIII, 
No.  2,  1924,  195. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  297 

then  there  seems  to  lie  in  that  expression  the  presupposition  that  all  of 
them,  as  definite  formative  modes  of  the  spirit,  point  back  to  a  last 
primary  layer  of  reality,24  which  is  seen  through  them  only,  like  through 
a  strange  medium.  Reality  seems  to  become  comprehensible  for  us  only 
in  the  particular  state  of  those  forms;  in  them  it  both  conceals  and  re- 
veals itself.  The  same  fundamental  functions  which  give  the  world 
of  the  spirit  its  determination,  its  imprint  and  character,  appear  on  the 
other  hand  as  just  so  many  refractions  which  Reality,  uniform  and 
unique  in  itself,  experiences  as  soon  as  it  is  being  apperceived  and  ap- 
propriated by  the  "subject."  The  philosophy  of  symbolic  'forms  is, 
seen  under  this  point  of  view,  nothing  but  the  attempt  to  indicate  for 
each  of  them,  as  it  were,  the  definite  index  of  refraction.  It  wants  to 
recognize  the  particular  nature  of  the  different  refracting  media.25 

Those  indices  determine  the  activity  of  the  spirit,  defining 
it  in  terms  of  the  "modalities"26  which  the  spirit  assumes  in 
each  particular  medium.  The  life  of  the  spirit  thus  is  "multi- 
dimensional j"27  there  are  undulations  without  end,  movements, 
dynamic  processes.  Like  Rodin's  statues  they  grow  out  of  the 
undifferentiated  sensuous  matrix  into  the  determinacy  of  ob- 
jective thought  —  indeed,  like  Rodin's  own  "Thought,"  a  head 
growing  out  of  the  stone,  or  his  "Thinker,"  shaped  from  him- 
self, pondering  the  abundance  of  forms  crowding  "The  Gate 
of  Hell,"  in  deep  symbolism. 

The  process  of  differentiation  is  a  process  of  objectivation.  As 
Rodin  followed  religiously  the  laws  of  nature,  the  way  he  him- 
self successively  discovered  them,28  so  Cassirer  follows  the  laws 
of  the  spirit  as  he  uncovers  them.  There  are  two  main  laws,  The 
Law  of  Continuity  —  each  phase  is  the  fulfilment  of  the  preced- 
ing one  —  and  The  Law  of  New  Emphasis  —  each  phase  de- 
velops the  preceding  one.29  These,  of  course,  are  nothing  but  the 
laws  of  growth  itself.  As  the  forms  grow  their  "moments" 
change,  their  "accents"  shift.  The  three  stages  or  "dimensions" 

"  Cf.  II,  50. 
*  PSF,  III,  3. 

II,  i6il,9ff,29ff. 


38  Story,  Sommerville,  "Auguste  Rodin  and  His  Work,"  in  Rodin,  New  York: 
Phaidon  Edition,  Oxford  University  Press,  1939,  n. 


298  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

of  shift  are  Expression,  Presentation,  Meaning  (Ausdruck, 
Darstellung,  Bedeutung).  These  stages  are  not  isolated  from 
one  another  but  contain  "points"  at  which  the  forms  flow  into 
one  another,  greet  each  other  hesitatingly  or  pass  each  other 
without  recognition,  like  strangers.  In  the  first  stage,  Expres- 
sion, the  subject  "possesses"  the  environment  as  a  variety  of 
physiognomic  experiences.30  Long  before  there  are  "things" 
there  is  such  structurization  of  experience.  "Existence,"  "re- 
ality," are  at  that  stage  physiognomically  manifest.  The  ab- 
straction of  "pure"  perception,  which  is  the  starting  point  of 
dogmatic  sensualism,  is  here  already  transcended.  The  datum 
which  the  subject  experiences  as  being  "opposite"  to  him  is  here 
transparent  with  inner  life,  not  exterior  or  dumb.  This  is  the 
stage  at  which  myth  and  art  originate,  and  where,  with  hesitat- 
ing greeting,  they  meet  language,  which,  in  the  Sentence,  takes 
up31  and  transcends  that  stage,  setting  the  new  dimension, 
Presentation.  The  sentence,  however,  only  very  gradually 
swings  itself  upward  into  the  new  dimension.  It  remains  bound 
to  the  physiognomic  realm,  substituting  logical  determination 
for  spatial  demonstration.  Only  gradually  it  expands  from  per- 
ceptual and  emotional  perspectives  to  full  objectivation,  in  three 
steps  again:  the  mimic,  where  it  remains  in  the  plastic  world, 
in  the  spatial  meanings  of  the  copula,  the  demonstrative  pro- 
nouns, the  definite  article,  onomatopoetic  formations,  and  the 
rendering  of  the  physiognomic  characters  through  voiced  or 
voiceless  consonants,  higher  or  lower  vowels  j  the  analogic, 
where  in  the  relation  of  sounds  the  relations  of  the  objects  are 
expressed ,  and,  finally,  the  symbolic,  where  all  similarity  be- 
tween the  world  of  language  and  that  of  objects  has  dis- 
appeared. Only  in  this  last  form,  in  the  distance  from  the  lower 
stages,  language  comes  entirely  into  its  own.32  The  three  stages 
of  language  are  thus,  as  it  were,  steps  by  which  the  spirit  passes 
from  the  physiognomic  to  the  presentative  dimension,  and 
beyond  it  into  that  of  meaning. 

Whereas  language  and  mythos  partly  flow  into,  partly  greet 

" PSF,  III,  5245  71. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  299 

each  other,  mythos  and  logos  pass  by  each  other  without  recog- 
nition, like  strangers.  The  scientific  concept  is  past  the  physio- 
gnomic level.83  "Cognition"  implies  distance  from  the  world, 
a  "cut"  between  "nature"  and  the  world  of  feeling.  The  concept 
starts  its  career  on  the  level  of  perception,  where  it  meets 
language,  to  ascend  in  harmony  with  it,  in  order,  finally,  to 
transcend  it  through  three  stages  again,  corresponding  to  the 
three  stages  of  language}  the  mimic,  in  the  platonic  *«pwww« 
from  things  to  ideas,34  with  its  correspondence  between  both; 
the  analogic,  in  Kepler-Galileo-Newtonian  science,  where  the 
correspondence  between  the  world  of  objects  and  that  of  con- 
cepts has  disappeared  in  detail  but  still  persists  in  the  corre- 
spondence of  structures,  especially  in  the  model  of  a 
given  space  j  and  the  symbolic,  in  the  modern  scientific  concept 
with  its  purely  symbolic  "space"  without  any  correspondence  to 
the  perceptual  world.  In  this  last  stage  the  process  of  objectiva- 
tion  is  completed,  the  symbols  stand  freely  and  in  full  self- 
consistent  significance  above  the  raw  material  of  the  world. 
Yet,  they  point  to  it  and  give  it  its  final  and  culminating  mean- 
ing, fulfilling  in  their  lofty  sweep  the  grunt,  the  first  gesture 
of  the  man  of  primal  times. 

Rodin's  "Man  of  Primal  Times"35  shows  precisely  this:  the 
unlimited  promise  of  that  first  gesture,  the  unfolding  of  thought 
from  hand. 

It  indicates  in  the  work  of  Rodin  the  birth  of  gesture.  That  gesture 
which  grew  and  developed  to  such  greatness  and  power,  here  bursts 
forth  like  a  spring  that  softly  ripples  over  this  body.  It  awakens  in  the 
darkness  of  primal  times  and  in  its  growth  seems  to  flow  through  the 
breadth  of  this  work  as  though  reaching  out  from  bygone  centuries  to 
those  that  are  to  come.  Hesitatingly  it  unfolds  itself  in  the  lifted  arms. 
These  arms  are  still  so  heavy  that  the  hand  of  one  rests  upon  the  top  of 
the  head.  But  this  hand  is  roused  from  its  sleep,  it  concentrates  itself 
quite  high  on  the  top  of  the  brain  where  it  lies  solitary.  It  prepares  for 
the  work  of  centuries,  a  work  that  has  no  measure  and  no  end.8e 

"PSF,!!!,  526. 


M  Alsowcalled  "The  Age  of  Bronze." 
*  Rilke,  op.  cittj  24. 


300  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

Gesture  is  the  first  awkward  manifestation  of  the  spontaneity 
of  spirit  which  flowers  forth  in  the  full  bloom  of  the  symbolic 
forms.  In  its  beginning  even  the  primal  forms  of  the  synthetiz- 
ing  function  of  consciousness,87  space,  time,  and  number,  are 
nothing  but  corporeal  motions  "that  softly  ripple  over  the 
body."  Space  arises  from  the  demonstrative  gestures  of  Here 
and  There,  I  and  Thou,  and  expands  in  concentric  circles  around 
the  speaker,  whose  body  is  the  first  system  of  spatial  coordina- 
tion.88 Thomas  Mann's  Joseph  is  still  a  mythical  but  also  already 
an  individual  figure,  as  he  describes  his  own  and  his  Ishmaelite 
fellow  travelers'  universes: 

The  world  hath  many  centres,  one  for  each  created  being,  and  about 
each  one  it  lieth  in  its  own  circle.  Thou  standest  but  half  an  ell  from 
me,  yet  about  thee  lieth  a  universe  whose  centre  I  am  not  but  thou  art. 
.  .  .  And  I,  on  the  other  hand,  stand  in  the  centre  of  mine.  For  our 
universes  are  not  far  from  each  other  so  that  they  do  not  touch;  rather 
hath  God  pushed  them  and  interwoven  them  deep  into  each  other.89 

That  body-space  finally  becomes  the  pure-brain-space  of  mod- 
ern relativity  theory.  Time,  originally  woven  into  the  spatial 
determination  of  Here  and  There  as  Now  and  Then,40  becomes 
the  purely  mental  symbol  of  our  physical  science.  And  number 
itself,  "originally  a  hand  concept,  not  a  thought  concept,"41 
develops  out  of  its  bodily  encumbrance  into  the  lofty  realm  it 
has  so  elaborately  carved  out  today;  now  not  only  a  content 
of  thought  but  even  a  way  of  thinking,42  a  means  of  sharper  and 
sharper  determination  of  the  indeterminate.43 

Thus,  like  filigree  work  chiseled  out  from  heavy  walls,  the 
final  Gestalten  of  the  symbolic  forms  stand  out  in  relief  against 
the  background  of  metaphysics.  The  vertical  "schemata"  of  the 
structure,  reaching  throughout  the  whole  dis-cursus  of  con- 
sciousness,44 are  the  formative  principles:  space,  time,  and 

"PSF,!!!,  1  6. 

MPSF,I,  156. 

89  Mann,  Thomas,  Joseph  in  Egyft,  New  York:  Alfred  A.  Knopf,  1  939,  Vol.  1,  4. 

*P£F,I,  i67ff. 

41  /W,  III,  397- 


*PSF,  III,  468. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  301 

number.  The  horizontal  "dimensions"  are  the  forms  of  expres- 
sion, presentation,  and  meaning.  These  latter  are  principles  of 
differentiation,  carrying  forward  the  relief  into  ever  finer 
ramifications.  Thus  the  creative  activity  of  the  spirit  resembles 
that  of  sculpture  even  in  the  method,  "the  process  of  removal,"45 
to  use  the  words  of  Michelangelo.  The  combination  of  both  the 
horizontal  and  the  vertical  principles  of  formation  are  the  sym- 
bolic forms,  myth,  language,  art,  religion,  theoretical  cognition: 
peculiar  energies  of  the  spirit,46  with  their  own  "modalities" 
and  their  own  particular  "planes  of  reality"  (Seinsebenen)*1  — 
their  own  position  and  Gestalt  on  the  metaphysical  background. 
Their  ultimate  refinement  has  lost  all  semblance  to  its  meta- 
physical matrix,  just  as  filigree  on  a  wall,  or  a  sculptured  hand 
by  Rodin,  have  lost  all  semblance  to  their  own  concrete  ma- 
terial. It  has  lost  almost  even  the  texture  of  the  background. 
It  is  pure  symbol  —  either  script,  as  the  filigree  on  the  walls  of 
the  Alhambra  of  Granada,  or  something  sui  generis,  as  a  mem- 
ber sculptured  by  Rodin.  "A  hand  laid  on  another's  shoulder 
or  thigh  does  not  any  more  belong  to  the  body  from  which  it 
came  —  from  this  body  and  from  the  object  which  it  touches 
or  seizes  something  new  originates,  a  new  thing  that  has  no 
name  and  belongs  to  no  one."48  It  is  a  symbol. 

The  symbol,  though  of  sensuous  material,  yet  transcends 
that  materiality  and  points  toward  a  content  in  the  higher 
forms  of  Meaning.  Its  materiality  is  completely  absorbed,  in 
that  function  of  meaning,49  its  "symbolic  pragnanz."™  It  is 
subjected  under  the  sensuous;  yet  that  subjection  is  at  the  same 
time  freedom  from  the  sensuous.51  The  capacity  of  the  sen- 
suous material  to  point  toward  a  world  of  meanings,  to 
symbolize  it  without  co-inciding  with  it  —  this  clothing  of  the 
sensuous  with  ideal  meaning  is  indeed  "das  Mysterium  des 

45  Cf.  II,  2  89*  Erkenntnisfroblem  I,  5  f. 


,, 

*PSF,l,  28  f. 
48  Rilke,  op.  «/.,  30. 


"PSF,  III,  234.  The  similarity  of  Cassirer's  terminology  with  that  of  Gestalt 
psychology  is  a  conscious  one.  Symbolic  forms  are  "Gestaltcn." 
,  41. 


302  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

Wirkens  schlechthin"**  the  mystery  of  creative  activity  far 
excellence.  It  cannot  suddenly  accrete  to  the  sensitive  faculty 
out  of  nothing,  but  must  be  part  of  the  very  nature  of  that 
faculty  from  its  first  beginnings.  There  is,  in  the  sensuous 
itself, 

to  use  an  expression  of  Goethe,  an'  "exact  sensuous  imagination,"  which 
appears  active  in  the  most  diverse  realms  of  spiritual  and  mental  creativity. 
Each  of  these  realms  gives  rise,  as  the  true  vehicle  of  its  own  immanent 
process,  beside  and  above  the  world  of  perception,  to  a  free  world  of 
images,  a  world  which  in  its  immediate  quality  still  bears  the  hue  of 
the  sensuous,  but  that  sensuousness  is  formed  and  therewith  spiritually 
dominated.  We  do  not  encounter  the  sensuous  as  a  simple  datum,  but  as 
a  system  of  sensuous  varieties,  which  are  being  produced  in  all  kinds  of 
free  creation.53 

In  other  words,  not  only  is  there  no  absolute  metaphysical  Be- 
ing, there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  not  even  an  absolutely  given 
sensuous  perception.  The  network  of  meanings  is  present  in 
germ,  in  f>otentiay  in  the  first  ripples  of  expression.  Already  then 
there  is  not  only  the  substance  of  the  material,  but  also  the 
function  of  meaning  in  it.  "The  fundamental  function  of  mean- 
ing is  there  before  the  positing  of  the  individual  sign,  so  that 
in  that  positing  that  function  is  not  created  but  only  fixated, 
only  applied  to  an  individual  case."54  Substance  and  function, 
material  and  meaning,  the  sensuous  and  the  "intelligible"  are 
originally  fused  in  the  unity  of  primary  symbols.  As  the 
process  of  objectivation,  of  spiritualization  continues,  the  sub- 
stantial is  gradually  chiseled  off,  "in  a  process  of  removal," 
and  the  functional  appears  in  greater  and  greater  purity.  But 
substance  and  function  never  lose  their  mutual  interdependence 
— the  filigree  of  the  Alhambra  is  still  on  the  wall,  and  Rodin's 
sculptured  hand  is  still  of  bronze.  That  primary  fusion  in  the 
symbolic,  this  primacy  of  the  symbolic  junction,  is  the  secret 
of  all  symbolic  forms  and  all  spiritual  activity.  There  is  no  Out- 
side or  Inside  here,  no  Before  or  After,  nothing  Active  or  Pas- 
sive. Here  we  have  a  union  of  elements,  which  did  not  have 


11  POT,  m,  119. 

"POT, I,  19  f. 
"  POT,  I,  41. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  303 

to  be  constructed,  but  was  a  primary  meaningful  whole  which 
belongs  only  to  itself  and  interprets  itself  alone.  In  the  fusion 
of  body  and  soul  we  have  the  paradigm  and  prototype  of  such 
a  relation.55 

The  moments  of  succession,  as  we  find  them  in  space  and 
time,  the  connections  of  conditions  such  that  the  one  appears  as 
"thing,"  the  other  as  "quality,"  the  connection  of  successive 
events  such  that  the  one  appears  as  cause,  the  other  as  effect: 
all  these  are  examples  of  how  the  original  fusion  is  gradually 
loosened  and  ramified.  At  the  end  of  the  development  stands 
modern  man,  his  intellect  almost  disengaged  from  his  sensuous 
and  social86  background.  Not  without  reason  Cassirer's  last 
published  work  had  to  be  An  Essay  on  Man. 

The  principles  of  formation,  present  in  the  gestures  of  the 
man  of  primal  times,  brought  about  the  intellect  of  the  man 
of  modern  times.  The  hand  resting  on  the  brain  of  Rodin's 
figure  symbolizes  the  entire  power  of  that  primal  gesture. 
That  hand  does  not  rest  there  any  more — it  has  emancipated 
itself  in  the  actions  of  that  brain,87  from  which  proceeded  both 
modern  science  and  technology,  more  like  Ares  than  Athene. 
In  the  Critical  philosophy  the  threads  had  been  laid  bare  by 
which  intellect  is  knitted  to  perception.  For  Kant  "the  intellect 
is  the  simple  transcendental  expression  for  the  fundamental 
phenomenon  that  all  perception,  as  conscious,  always  and  neces- 
sarily must  be  jormed  perception."58  In  Cassirer's  philosophy 
the  threads  are  traced  back  to  their  very  origin  in  the  original 
skein  of  cultural  life:  the  critique  of  reason  is  expanded  and 
empirically  substantiated  in  Cassirer's  critique  of  culture.  But, 
after  showing  the  entire  many-branched  labyrinth  of  man's 
development  to  modernity,  Cassirer  focuses  on  the  hero  him- 
self, a  modern  Theseus,  who  has  left  the  guiding  hand  of 
nature  and,  at  the  end  of  his  course,  encounters  a  monster,  the 
master  of  the  maze,  the  Minotaur  of  Machinery,  ready  to  de- 
vour him.  Will  man  slay  it  or  will  he  be  slain? 

55  PSF,  in,  117. 

M  Originally  spatial. 

OT  PSF,  II,  266:  Technology  as  "organ  projection." 

"  PSF,  III,  2124. 


304  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

It  all  depends  on  whether  the  original  power  of  symboliza- 
tion  is  still  living  in  him.  For  symbolization  is  power.  Rodin's 
sculptured  limbs  are  creations  of  a  powerful  energy  which  has 
appropriated  the  material  and  bent  it  to  its  will.  The  power  of 
symbolization  is  a  power  of  concentration  and  condensation,  a 
Kraft  der  Verdichtung™  active  in  all  symbolic  forms.  "It  is  as  if 
through  the  creation  of  the  new  symbol,  a  tremendous  energy 
of  thought  is  being  transformed  from  a  relatively  diffuse  into 
more  concentrated  form."80  That  energy  is  the  spontaneity,  the 
creative  freedom  of  the  spirit,  a  freedom  not  arbitrary,  but 
producing  within  the  modalities  of  the  symbolic  forms.161  It  is  a 
power  which  contains  within  itself  the  entire  force  of  cultural 
evolution — the  symbol  concentrates  in  one  intense  moment  the 
entire  cultural  energy,  diffuse  in  its  manifold  forms  from  past 
to  future:  a  "revelation  in  the  material."62  Man  will  slay  the 
monster,  if  he  has  the  power  of  the  symbol:  to  find  his  way 
back  to  nature  and  at  the  same  time  to  look  forward  into  the 
future,  if  he  is  able  to  concentrate  and  symbolically  to  divine 
past  and  future  in  the  present.  He  must  become  a  prophet: 
a  symbol  himself  of  his  own  origin  and  destination.63 

For  us  Cassirer  was  such  a  "symbolic  man,"  and  so  was 
Rodin.  Both  knew  the  nature  and  power  of  the  symbol.  Rodin 
saw  man  himself  as  a  symbol.  "When  I  have  a  beautiful  wom- 
an's body  as  a  model,  the  drawings  I  make  of  it  also  give  me 
pictures  of  insects,  birds,  and  fishes.  That  seems  incredible  and 
I  did  not  know  it  myself  until  I  found  out."84  Cassirer  found 
a  similarly  incredible  content  in  the  "symbolic  forms"  of  the 
spirit.  Each  of  them  symbolizes  the  totality  of  cultural  evolu- 
tion. Consciousness  cannot  posit  anything  without  positing 
every  thing  j  in  the  Goethean  words,  often  quoted  by  Cassirer, 

Truly  the  mental  fleece 
Resembles  a  weaver's  masterpiece, 

**PSF,  III,  466. 

60  Ibid. 

"PSF,e.g.  I,  20. 

"PSF,  I,  46. 

M  Cf.  Essay  on  Many  55,  61. 

**  Story,  op.  tit.,  14  f. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  305 

Where  a  thousand  threads  one  treadle  throws, 
Where  fly  the  shuttles  hither  and  thither 
Unseen  the  threads  are  knit  together, 
And  an  infinite  combination  grows. 

The  symbol,  the  material  content  clothed  with  the  ideal  mean- 
ing of  the  whole  infinite  composition,  is  therefore  the  "natural" 
product  of  consciousness,  the  symbolic  function  its  natural  func- 
tion. A  healthy  consciousness  must  in  every  act,  to  the  degree 
and  extent  of  that  act,  shuttle  back  and  forth  throughout  the 
aeons  of  cultural  development  and  knit  all  of  them  into  the 
act.  To  the  degree  that  it  achieves  this  it  is  free  from  its  sensuous 
origins:  it  is  human.  The  essence  of  humanity  is  a  free  con- 
sciousness, roaming  widely  over  cultural  space  and  time.  "Hu- 
man culture  taken  as  a  whole  may  be  described  as  the  process 
of  man's  progressive  self-liberation.'*65  The  more  symbolic  an 
act,  therefore,  the  more  it  is  a  truly  human  act.  The  more  it 
presents  a  cultural  content,  the  more  it  must  represent  all 
culture.  Ethically  as  well  as  epistemologically,  the  develop- 
ment of  presentation  is  progressive  representation.  Man's  self- 
liberation  proceeds  proportionately  to  his  capacity  for  symbolic 
representation.  Representation  is  the  act  of  manifesting  spiritual 
energy  in  sensuous  material.  It  is  the  fundamental  function  of 
consciousness,  exhibited  in  the  primal  gesture  of  the  savage  as 
well  as  in  the  mathematical  analysis  of  the  man  of  advanced 
studies.  Between  both  activities  is  a  difference  of  degree,  but 
not  of  kind.  In  all  intellectual  activity  this  function  is  being 
applied,  or  rather,  all  intellectual  activity  is  this  function.  Only 
in  human  behavior  it  is  not  yet  manifest}  only  man  himself 
has  not  yet  become  a  symbol  unto  himself.  In  the  social  sphere 
the  relationship  between  symbol  and  reality  has  not  yet  been 
found.  It  must  be  found}  social  reality  must  be  filled  with 
symbolic  meaning.  Thus  the  tension  between  symbol  and 
reality66  would  be  consummated.  The  other  alternative  of  con- 
summation would  be  the  effacement  of  man,  the  flattening  out 
of  the  spirited  ripple  that  rose  as  form  over  the  faceless  deep. 
The  differentiation  of  the  formless,  similar  to  the  structuriza- 

85  Essay  on  Man,  228. 


306  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

tion  of  the  Awpov  by  the  ™9<*S  or  the  articulation  of  5Xi)  by  \MW 
—  this  is  the  function  of  Form  in  Cassirer's  philosophy  (even 
though  limited  to  the  field  of  human  culture  and  on  the  level 
of  transcendental  correlation  rather  than  that  of  metaphysical 
opposition,  as  it  was  in  the  philosophies  of  Plato  and  Aristotle 
and  later  in  that  of  Hegel).67  Form  is  not  a  static  thing,  a  shape, 
but  a  dynamic  principle,  the  totality  of  characters  that  transform 
sensuous  impressions  into  intellectual  and  spiritual  expressions." 
In  its  totality  alone  the  form  finds  truth}  truth  is  the  whole  — 
herein  Cassirer  agrees  with  Hegel,  calling  part  of  his  own 
philosophy  a  "Phenomenology  of  Cognition."09 

The  end,  the  "telos"  of  the  spirit  cannot  be  comprehended  or  pro- 
nounced, if  one  takes  it  by  itself,  severed  from  its  beginning  and  middle. 
Philosophical  reflection  does  not  in  this  way  set  off  the  end  against 
middle  and  beginning,  but  takes  all  three  as  integral  moments  of  one 
unique  total  movement.70 

In  this  total  context,  then,  every  element  of  the  form,  every 
one  of  its  "differentials"71  is  representative  of  the  whole.  As  for 
Rodin  the  beauty  of  the  woman  is  representative  of  all  creation, 
so  for  Cassirer  the  characteristic  of  one  cultural  unit,  whether 
a  vowel  in  language,  a  ritual  in  religion  or  an  algorithm  in 
mathematics,  mirrors  monadlike72  the  whole  universe  of  forms. 
As  Rodin's  model  is  an  end  product  of  evolution,  but  as  such 
again  a  middle  term  between  the  universal  premise  of  evolution 
and  the  conclusion  drawn  by  Rodin's  pencil,  so  the  symbolic 
unit  is  an  end  of  the  formative  development  preceding  it,  but 
also  a  mediator  between  that  development  and  Cassirer's  con- 
ception of  it.  At  the  same  time  these  units  are  mediators  be- 
tween the  preceding  and  successive  stages,  and  focal  points  of 
the  entire  development. 

The  form  of  sensuous  reality  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  individual 
moments  of  which  it  is  built  up  do  not  stand  by  themselves,  but  that 

OTCf.  PSF,  III,  13,  230,  and  infra  312  ff.,  322. 
,  12. 


,  I,  40}  III,  235- 
,  102. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  307 

between  them  takes  place  a  peculiar  relation  of  "corn-positing"  (Mit- 
setzung).  Nowhere  is  here  anything  isolated  and  detached.  Even  that 
which  seems  to  belong  to  a  certain  single  spatial  point  or  temporal 
moment,  does  not  remain  immersed  in  the  mere  Here  and  There.  It 
reaches  beyond  itself  into  the  totality  of  all  empirical  contents.73 

The  higher  reality  unfolds  itself,  the  richer  its  pattern  be- 
comes and  the  fuller  of  symbolic  functions  will  be  the  contents 
that  offer  themselves  to  consciousness. 

The  farther  that  process  continues,  the  wider  a  circle  consciousness  is 
able  to  span  in  a  single  moment.  Each  of  its  elements  is  now  saturated, 
as  it  were,  with  such  functions.  It  stands  in  varied  meaningful  contexts, 
which  again  are  connected  and  which,  by  virtue  of  that  connection, 
constitute  a  whole,  which  we  denote  as  the  world  of  our  "experience." 
Whatever  contexts  one  may  isolate  from  this  totality  of  "experience" 
.  .  .  always  their  orders  will  show  a  definite  structure  and  a  common 
fundamental  character.  They  are  of  such  a  nature,  that  from  everyone 
of  their  moments  a  transition  is  possible  to  the  whole,  just  as  the  con- 
stitution of  the  whole  is  presentable  and  presented  in  every  moment.74 

Every  phenomenon  is  now  only  a  letter  within  the  script  of 
total  reality.75 

Thus  it  is  possible  to  span  the  whole  world  in  a  moment. 
Physical  science  is  doing  that,  comprehending  the  totality  of 
events  by  representing  each  event  through  its  four  space-time 
coordinates  and  reducing  the  variation  of  these  coordinates  to 
(more  or  less)  final  invariant  laws/8  It  thus  obtains  what  science 
calls  the  "truth"  of  the  phenomena,  which  is  nothing  else  but 
their  totality,  "taken  not  in  their  concrete  state  but  in  the  form 
of  an  ideal  coordination"™  That  coordination  is  based  both 
on  logical  connections  and  logical  distinctions,  on  synthesis 
as  well  as  analysis.  The  higher  a  symbol,  that  is  to  say  the  more 
numerous  and  the  more  complex  the  phenomena  it  refers  to, 
the  more  different  will  be  its  own  form,  its  shape,  from  that 
of  the  phenomena  themselves,  and  the  greater  the  "distance" 


l,  80. 
"Ibid. 


308  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

between  the  sensuous  and  the  symbolic  content  of  consciousness 
—  but  the  greater  that  "distance"  the  greater,  because  the  more 
comprehensive,  the  more  "universal,"  will  be  the  "truth."  Fi- 
nally the  symbol  contains  nothing  but  the  'principle  of  the  forms 
it  represents,  the  constitutive  law  of  their  structure,  the  genetic 
essence  of  their  formation.  It  thus  refers  not  to  the  similarity  of 
the  forms,  but  to  their  inner  connective  law,  which  may  or  may 
not  express  itself  in  similarities  of  form.78  Thus  the  common 
constructive  principle  of  the  conic  sections  is  not  betrayed  in 
any  similarity  of  shape.  Again  we  are  reminded  of  Rodin,  who 
in  all  his  work  looked  for  the  latent  principles  of  natural  move- 
ment. "Such  was  the  basis  of  what  is  called  my  Symbolism. 
I  do  not  mind  being  called  a  Symbolist,  if  that  will  define  the 
essential  principle  of  sculpture."79  It  was  not  enough  for  Rodin 
to  study  nature  and  follow  it  so  closely  that  "The  Man  of 
Primal  Times"  was  suspected  to  be  cast  from  the  living  model. 
He  tried  to  find  the  principle  of  movement  —  by  what  he  called 
a  method  of  "logical  exaggeration."  "My  aim  was  then,  after 
the  'Burghers  of  Calais,'  to  find  ways  of  exaggerating  logi- 
cally."80 Indeed,  what  could  be  sensuously  as  well  as  significantly 
more  expressive  than  calling  ellipse,  parabola  and  hyperbola 
"logical  exaggerations"  of  the  circle! 

Logical  exaggeration  consists,  among  other  things,  in  the 
"constant  reduction  of  the  face  to  a  geometrical  figure,  and  the 
resolve  to  sacrifice  every  part  of  the  face  to  the  synthesis  of  its 
aspect,"81  that  is  to  say,  the  totality  of  its  features.  That  totality 
is  sometimes  enhanced  by  subtraction. 

Take  the  Cathedral  of  Chartres  as  an  example:  one  of  its  towers  is 
massive  and  without  ornamentation,  having  been  neglected  in  order 
that  the  exquisite  delicacy  of  the  other  could  be  better  seen.  In  sculpture 
the  projection  of  the  sheaths  of  muscles  must  be  accentuated,  the  shorten- 
ings heightened,  the  holes  made  deeper.  Scultpure  is  the  art  of  the  hole 
and  the  lump.82 


I,  88. 

70  Story,  op.  cit.,  14. 
* 


J  bid. 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  309 

The  "process  of  removal"  thus  is  a  succession  of  dialectic  steps 
in  the  totality  of  the  form's  movement. 

Not  in  continuous  quantitative  accretion,  but  in  the  sharpest  dialectic 
contradiction  the  various  fundamental  ideas  oppose  each  other  in  the 
truly  critical  epochs  of  cognition.  .  .  ,88  The  myth  [e.g.,]  would  not  be 
a  truly  spiritual  form,  if  its  unity  were  nothing  but  oppositionless  sim- 
plicity. .  .  ,  The  individual  stages  of  its  development  do  not  simply 
join  themselves  one  to  the  other,  but  often  oppose  each  other  in  sharp 
contrast.  The  process  consists  in  the  fact  that  certain  fundamental  traits, 
certain  spiritual  determinations  of  the  preceding  stages  are  not  only 
elaborated  and  supplemented,  but  are  also  being  negated,  indeed  an- 
nihilated.84 

Whatever  obstructs  the  law  of  process  of  the  total  form  is  being 
eliminated.  The  symbol  itself  cannot  contain  anything  that  is  not 
part  of  the  totality:  it  shows  "hole  and  lump."  It  is  not  similar 
to  the  symbolized  content,  but  somehow  in  its  shape  is  found  the 
principle  of  the  totality  of  the  represented  forms,  visible  to  the 
eye  of  the  synoptic  seer,  whether  he  be  of  plastic  imagination 
like  Rodin  or  of  philosophical  imagination  like  Cassirer.  Some 
day,  perhaps,  a  logic  of  symbolic  forms  will  be  written,  based 
on  the  combined  insight  of  both  philosopher  and  artist. 

That  logic  would  have  to  be  symbolic  of  the  entire  fullness  of 
life,  its  symbolism  saturated  with  live  meanings  and  not  "sick- 
lied o'er  with  the  pale  cast"  of  positivism.  Cassirer's  philosophy 
of  symbolic  forms  is  such  a  truly  symbolic  logic,  culminating, 
as  it  does,  in  the  symbols  of  mathematics,  the  "logic  of  inven- 
tion," as  it  was  called  both  by  Galileo  and  Leibniz.  But  Cas- 
sirer's  "Ansatz"  the  method  and  tendency  of  his  work,  points 
further:  to  an  expansion  of  his  method  into  the  very  field  of  the 
arts,  into  a  logical  symbolism  or  symbolic  logic  of  painting  and 
sculpture  as  well  as  of  music,  thus,  in  due  time,  to  a  method 
which  will  make  these  forms  of  consciousness  as  definitely  and 
determinedly  symbolic  of  life's  fullness — maybe  even  in  the 
form  of  communication85 — as  now  are  the  "rational"  signs  of 

88  Erkenntnisproblem,  I,  5. 
MP£F,  II,  289.  Cf.  infra  879  f. 

85  Cf .  Langer,  Susanne  K.,  Philosophy  in  a  New  Key,  Cambridge,  Mass. :  Har- 
vard University  Press,  1942,  2i8fL,  and  passim. 


3io  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

language  and  mathematics.  Seen  under  this  view,  not  of  eternity 
but  of  long  term  development,  Cassirer's  "phenomenology  of 
cognition"  is  as  much  a  precursor  of  a  new  logic  as  was  HegePs 
phenomenology  —  only  in  a  much  wider  sense,  comparable,  per- 
haps, to  Leibniz'  divined  rather  than  elaborated  scientia  gener- 
alis  as  a  precursor  of  modern  mathematical  science. 

Indeed,  in  its  emphasis  on  the  totality  of  the  formative 
process  Cassirer's  philosophy  agrees  with  HegePs  phenome- 
nology; in  its  emphasis  on  the  fullness  of  life  it  draws  inspiration 
from  Leibniz'  scientia  generalis.  With  Hegel  he  has  only  the 
"Ansatz"9*  in  common;  HegePs  phenomenology  "finally,  so  to 
speak,  sharpens  itself  into  a  highest  logical  point.  .  .  .  How  rich 
and  varied  ever  its  content,  its  structure  is  subject  to  a  single 
and  in  a  way  uniform  law."87  The  logic  to  which  Cassirer  points 
is  a  logic  of  creation,  a  logic  of  invention  in  a  sense  much  wider 
even  than  that  divined  by  Galileo  and  Leibniz  —  as  wide  and 
varied,  in  fact,  as  life  itself.  The  structure  of  his  work  does 
not  suffer  from  HegePs  shortcomings,  from  compression  into 
a  too  narrow  scheme.  On  the  contrary,  if  criticism  is  in  order, 
Cassirer's  work  seems  almost  too  little  inhibited,  too  artfully 
rambling  at  times  in  the  fascinating  regions  it  discloses,  the 
style  too  ornamental  sometimes  to  be  fully  effectful.88  It  is  a 
work  of  art,  full  of  life,  showing,  as  does  Rodin's  work,  "life  in 
movement."89  For  Rodin  it  is  the  life  of  natural  forms,  for 
Cassirer  the  life  of  cultural  forms.  Rodin  had  nude  models 
moving  about  in  his  studio, 

to  supply  him  constantly  with  the  picture  of  nudity  in  various  attitudes 
and  with  all  the  liberty  of  ordinary  life.  He  was  constantly  looking  at 
them,  and  thus  was  always  familiar  with  the  spectacle  of  muscles  in 


88  In  contrast,  for  example,  to  the  condensed  imagery  of  Bergson.  HegePs  often 
atrocious  German  cannot  be  compared  to  the  elegance  of  Cassirer's  style.  Although 
Cassirer  was  not  as  electrifying  a  personality  as  was  Bergson,  he  was  an  absorbingly 
interesting  lecturer.  His  classrooms,  as  one  of  his  students  expressed  it,  "seemed 
to  be  the  halls  where  there  was  no  life  but  the  life  of  thought.  In  his  lectures  the 
spirit  itself  seemed  to  speak  to  the  brains  of  men."  This  is  a  far  cry  from  the  utter 
dryness  of  HegePs  presentation,  the  effect  of  which  seems  to  have  been  one  of  the 
riddles  of  his  time  (not  only  to  Schopenhauer). 

w  Story,  of  cit.t  9. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  311 

movement.  Thus  the  nude,  which  today  people  rarely  see,  and  which 
even  sculptors  only  see  during  the  short  period  of  the  pose,  was  for 
Rodin  an  ordinary  spectacle.  .  .  .  The  face  is  usually  regarded  as  the 
only  mirror  of  the  soul,  and  mobility  of  features  is  supposed  to  be  the 
only  exteriorization  of  spiritual  life.  But  in  reality  there  is  not  a  muscle 
of  the  body  which  does  not  reveal  thoughts  and  feelings.90 

Only  the  highest  functions  of  the  human  mind  seem  to  express 
the  creativity  of  the  spirit}  Kant,  and  in  a  way  even  Hegel,  as 
well  as  most  of  the  post-Kantian  philosophers  before  Cassirer, 
were  interested  in  them  mainly.  Even  Cassirer  demonstrated 
the  creativeness  of  thought  first  in  its  highest  functions,  in  the 
field  of  abstract  science.91  Only  gradually  he  worked  down  from 
the  brain  to  the  lower  and  lowlier  parts  of  the  body,  finally  to 
the  gestures  of  the  members,  the  movement  of  the  muscles, 
until  the  entire  body  of  man  stood  before  his  eyes  vibrating 
with  spiritual  life.  All  the  forms  of  that  life  were  then  con- 
stantly before  his  view;  for  over  thirty  years  he  constantly 
looked  at  them.  He  seemed,  like  Rodin,  "obsessed  by  a  sort  of 
divine  intoxication  for  form."92  "The  living  motion  of  the  spirit 
must  be  apprehended  in  its  actuality,  in  the  very  energy  of  its 
movement."93  "Procedere"  is  only  apprehensible  through  proc- 
ess, in  its  Fortgang.  Only  by  constantly  following  the  forms  of 
the  spirit  and  sculpturing  them  in  their  process  can  one  appre- 
hend them. 

The  true,  the  concrete  totality  of  the  spirit  must  not  be  denoted  in  a 
simple  formula  at  the  beginning  and  so  to  speak  presented  ready  made, 
but  it  develops,  it  finds  itself  only  in  the  constantly  advancing  process94 
of  critical  analysis  itself.95 

Just  as  the  eyes  of  the  sculptor  must  follow  his  models'  mo- 
tions constantly  and  apprehend  them  in  motor  empathy,  so  the 
spirit  itself,  as  analysis,  must  follow  the  "stetig  weiterschrei- 

90  Story,  op.  cit.y  13. 

91  In  Substance  and  Function. 
"Story,  of.  cit.t  26. 


""Im  stetig  weiterschreitenden  Fortgang."  The  translation  cannot  render  the 
plastic  expressiveness  of  Cassirer's  style. 

"PSFJy    10. 


312  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

tenden  Fortgang?  "the  steadily  further  striding  onwalking," 
of  the  symbolic  forms  —  parading  before  the  philosopher's  eyes 
like  models  before  the  artist.  "The  perimeter  of  spiritual  reality 
can  be  designated,  defined  and  determined  only  by  pacing  it 
.off  in  the  process."96  The  whole  of  the  objective  spirit  thus 
reveals  itself  gradually  as  an  organic  unity,  steadily  growing 
and  developing  in  a  "definite  systematic  scale,  an  ideal  progress, 
as  the  end  of  which  may  be  stated  that  the  spirit  in  its  own 
formations  and  self-created  symbols  not  only  is  and  lives,  but 
that  it  comprehends  them  as  they  are."07  In  this  respect  again 
the  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  connects  with  HegePs  phe- 
nomenology: "the  end  of  development  consists  in  the  com- 
prehension and  expression  of  spiritual  reality  not  only  as  sub- 
stance, but  'just  as  much  as  subject'."98  But  there  is  an  important 
difference  between  HegePs  and  Cassirer's  phenomenology, 
which  can  be  illustrated  by  Cassirer's  attitude  toward  HegePs 
historical  theory. 

The  concept  of  a  history  of  science  contains  the  idea  of  the  conservation 
of  a  universal  logical  structure  in  the  succession  of  particular  conceptual 
systems.  Indeed:  if  the  earlier  content  of  thought  would  not  be  con- 
nected with  the  succeeding  one  by  some  identity,  there  would  be  nothing 
to  justify  our  comprising  the  scattered  logical  fragments  then  at  hand, 
in  a  series  of  becoming  events.  Each  historical  series  of  evolution  needs 
a  "subject"  as  a  substratum  in  which  to  present  and  exteriorize  itself. 
The  mistake  of  the  metaphysical  theory  of  history  lies  not  in  the  fact 
that  it  demands  such  a  subject,  but  in  the  fact  that  it  reifies  it,  by  speak- 
ing of  the  self-development  of  an  "Idea,"  a  progress  of  the  "World 
Spirit,"  and  so  on.  We  must  renounce  such  reified  carrier  standing 
behind  the  historical  movement;  the  metaphysical  formula  must  be 
changed  into  a  methodological  formula.  Instead  of  a  common  sub- 
stratum we  only  demand  an  intellectual  continuity  in  the  individual 
phases  of  development." 

That  is  to  say,  just  as  the  sculptor  is  not  interested  in  the  per- 
sonality of  his  models  as  such,  but  in  their  symbolic  significance 
for  the  laws  of  nature,  so  the  philosopher  of  symbolic  forms 
"ibid. 


"Ibid. 

*  Erkenntnisfroblem,  I,  16.  Italics  mine. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  313 

is  not  interested  in  the  subject  matter  of  the  forms  as  such, 
but  only  their  significance  for  the  whole  context  in  which  they 
appear.  "It  is  the  task  of  philosophy  .  .  .  again  and  again,  from 
a  concrete  historical  aggregate  of  certain  scientific  concepts  and 
principles  to  set  forth  the  universal  logical  functions  of  cogni- 
tion in  general."100  In  this  respect  the  histories  of  science  and  of 
philosophy  are  two  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  intellectual 
process,  for  which  Galileo  and  Kepler,  Newton  and  Euler  are 
just  as  valid  witnesses  as  Descartes  or  Leibniz.101  The  process 
is  an  empirical  logical,  not  a  metaphysical  logical  process.  It  is 
the  historical  process  by  which  the  cultural  realities  have 
evolved. 

From  the  sphere  of  sensation  to  that  of  perception,  from  perception  to 
conceptual  thinking,  and  from  that  again  to  logical  judgment  there 
leads,  for  critical  epistemology,  one  steady  road.  Each  later  moment 
comprises  the  earlier,  each  earlier  prepares  the  later.  All  the  elements 
constituting  cognition  refer  both  to  themselves  and  the  "object."  Sen- 
sation, perception,  are  in  germ  already  comprehension,  judgment,  con- 
clusion.102 

Neither  in  the  treatment  of  the  philosophical  systems  nor 
in  that  of  the  cultural  forms  is  Cassirer  concerned  with  estab- 
lishing a  metaphysical  subjective  idealism.  He  is  not  dogmatic 
in  any  way  5  the  dogmatic  systems  of  metaphysics  are  in  most 
cases  nothing  but 

hypostases  of  certain  logical,  aesthetical,  or  religious  principles.  The  more 
they  seclude  themselves  into  the  abstract  generality  of  principle,  the 
more  they  preclude  themselves  from  other  sides  of  spiritual  culture  and 
the  concrete  totality  of  its  forms.103 

With  that  totality  Cassirer  is  concerned,  in  it  he  finds  intellec- 
tual creativity  active.  The  existence  of  such  creativeness  thus 
becomes  for  him  not  a  matter  of  principle  —  even  though  orig- 
inally it  was  a  postulate104  —  but  a  question  of  fact.  In  the  rich- 
ness of  that  concrete  totality  he  finds,  through  the  ingenious 

100  ibid. 

101  Erkenntnisproblem,  I,  i  o. 


*  Erkenntnisfroblem,  1,  1  8. 


314  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

interpretation  of  the  symbolic  function,  a  whole  systematic  of 
the  spirit,  where  each  particular  form  receives  its  meaning  pure- 
ly by  the  position  it  has  within  the  system,  a  kind  of  periodic 
system  of  cultural  forms.  Only  that  system  is  never  closed,  but 
ever  active,  ever  in  process,105  reality  thus  never  being  but 
ever  becoming,  the  ideal  goal  of  the  process  rather  than  the 
process  itself. 

Being  concerned  with  the  universal  meaning  in  concrete  re- 
ality rather  than  in  an  abstract  principle,  which  would  only 
detract  from  that  meaning,  and  in  the  sifting  of  that  meaning 
from  all  the  forms  of  reality  itself,  Cassirer  is  not  interested  only 
in  completed  philosophical  systems,  nor  in  fully  grown  cultural 
forms.  Similar  or  even  identical  concepts  might  conceal  differ- 
ent, even  contrasting  meanings,106  and  most  significant  features 
might  be  found  in  byroads  hitherto  overlooked.  The  manifold 
attempts  and  beginnings  of  research  in  all  cultural  forms  are 
the  trickles  from  which  the  formula  of  universal  cultural  prog- 
ress must  be  distilled.107  In  the  frozen  shapes  of  these  forms  the 
original  dynamics  of  their  movement  must  be  detected.  Cassirer 
inquired  into  all  these  forms,  torsos,  trunks  of  forms,  with 
never  resting  zeal,  presenting  not  only  full  grown  treatises 
like  the  three  great  master  works,  but  a  host  of  monographs  on 
particular  questions.  In  all  this  his  reasoning  was  profound; 
he  aimed  to  crystallize  the  leading  idea  of  cultural  movement, 
its  dynamic  soul.  Similarly  Rodin  in  an  unheard  of  procedure 
for  a  sculptor,  exhibited 

human  figures  deprived  of  a  head,  legs  or  arms,  which  at  first  shock 
the  beholder,  but  on  examination  are  found  to  be  so  well  balanced  and 
so  perfectly  harmonized  that  one  can  only  find  beauty  in  them.  His 
reason  for  this  is  artistically  profound.  ...  In  the  development  of  a 
leading  idea — of  thought,  of  meditation,  of  the  action  of  walking, — his 
desire  was  to  eliminate  all  that  might  counteract  or  draw  attention  from 
this  central  thought.  "As  to  polishing  nails  or  ringlets  of  hair,  that  has 
no  interest  for  me,"  he  said;  "it  detracts  attention  from  the  leading 
line  and  the  soul  which  I  wish  to  interpret."108 

1M  Perhaps,  in  the  light  of  the  newest  atomic  achievements,  this  is  also  true  for 
the  periodic  system  of  elements. 
108  Cf.  Erkenntnlsfroblem^  I,  10. 
10T  Cf.  Erkenntnis'problem,  I,  9. 
108  Story,  op.cit.,  13. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  315 

Just  as  little  did  Cassirer  have  time  for  the  trimmings  of  the 
cultural  process.  His  painstaking  search  for  phenomena  was  the 
search  for  the  essential,  the  symbolic  in  them.  But,  since  the 
symbolic  is  never  found  in  purity109  but  only  fulfilled  in  the 
totality  of  the  process,  and  the  process  is  never  finished  but  al- 
ways proceeding,  the  search  for  the  symbol  itself  is  never  ending 
but  always  asymptotic.  Just  as  for  Rodin — and  for  every  great 
master — it  was  never  Cassirer's  habit  "to  undertake  a  work, 
complete  it  and  have  done  with  it.  He  always  had  by  him  a 
number  of  ideas  and  thoughts  on  which  he  meditated  patiently 
for  years  as  they  ripened  in  his  mind."110  By  the  time  he  wrote 
the  Essay  on  Man  Cassirer  saw  the  problems  of  the  Philosophy 
of  the  Symbolic  Forms  from  a  different  angle  and  in  a  new 
light.111 

Now  it  was  no  longer  so  much  the  totality  of  the  process  that 
interested  him,  but  one  moment  of  its  concrete  fullness:  the 
reference  to  man.  The  asymptotic  openness  of  the  process,  the 
lofty  culmination  in  merely  intellectual  symbols  now  has  given 
place  to  a  fuller  harmony:  a  human  universe.  Now  the  sym- 
bolic forms  were  to  help  man  to  slay  the  monster  and  continue 
the  process  of  life  itself.  Now  it  is  no  longer  science  which  is 
the  great  culmination,  but  art — Cassirer  has  moved  toward  the 
new  logic  towards  which  we  see  his  work  tending.  On  the  last 
page  of  the  Essay  we  read  the  famous  words  of  Kant,  that  we 
can  learn  all  about  Newton's  principles  of  natural  philosophy, 
however  great  a  mind  may  have  been  required  to  discover  them; 
but  we  cannot  learn  to  write  spirited  poetry,  however  explicit 
may  be  the  precepts  of  the  art  and  however  excellent  its  models. 
We  learn  that  the  highest  of  forms  is  not  an  abstract  "logical 
function,"  but  that  it  is  genius  himself,  homo  creator.  Now  the 
whole  of  science  is  a  flat  dimension  as  compared  with  the  di- 
mension of  man  himself.  Not  only  "ex  analogia  universi"  but, 
even  more,  "ex  analogia  hominis"  we  must  understand  the 
world.  And  it  is  on  a  note  of  musical  harmony  that  this  last 
great  work  of  Cassirer  ends: 

All  these  functions  complete  and  complement  one  another.  Each  one 

"•  PSF,  III,  142. 
110  Story,  op.  cit.,  13. 
**  Essay  on  Man,  vii. 


316  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

opens  a  new  horizon  and  shows  us  a  new  aspect  of  humanity.  The  dis- 
sonant is  in  harmony  with  itself;  the  contraries  are  not  mutually  exclu- 
sive, but  interdependent:  "harmony  in  contrariety,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
bow  and  the  lyre."112 

The  spirit  of  Leibniz,  in  the  new  form  of  warm  human  concern, 
has  conquered  the  Hegelian  aloofness  in  Cassirer's  mind.  Now 
spontaneity  and  productivity  are  no  more  prerogatives  of  "the 
objective  spirit"  or  "the  symbolic  function,"  but  are  "the  very 
center  of  all  human  activities."113  The  philosophy  of  symbolic 
forms  has  become  the  philosophy  of  man.  Man  himself  now  is 
the  central  symbolic  form.  The  symbolic  process  is  now  no 
longer  so  much  one  of  "dematerialization,"114  "a  process  of 
removal,"  but  of  spiritualization,  a  process  of  strengthening 
the  differentiation  of  matter  by  a  new  energy:  the  spiritual 
energy  of  harmonization.  That  energy  combines  the  human 
world  into  a  symphony  of  meanings.  It  strengthens  itself 
through  its  wedlock  with  matter.  Has  it  been  an  original  partner 
of  matter  from  the  beginning?  Has  the  harmony  between  it  and 
matter  been  pre-established  from  the  beginning  and  is  the  whole 
development  of  the  forms  nothing  but  the  elaboration  of  that 
pre-established  harmony?  And  is  the  appearance  of  that  har- 
mony in  the  logic  of  symbols  nothing  but  that  harmony's 
revelation  in  matter?  Cassirer  never  answers  these  Leibnizian 
questions}  although,  with  unconcerned  assurance,  he  makes 
positive  statements  in  all  these  respects — covering  up  meta- 
physical concern  with  reference  to  "miracles"  and  "ultimate 
mysteria."  But  he  seems  to  be  in  profound  agreement  with 
Leibniz.  "Leibniz  was  the  first  great  modern  thinker  to  have 
a  clear  insight  into  the  true  character  of  mathematical  sym- 
bolism,"115 and  into  the  nature  of  symbolism  in  general. 

For  him  [Leibniz]  the  problem  of  the  "logic  of  things"  is  insolubly 
connected  with  the  problem  of  the  "logic  of  signs."  The  "Sctentia  gen- 
erdu"  needs  the  "Characteristica  general**"  as  its  tool  and  vehicle.  The 

112  Essay  on  Man,  228. 

118  Essay  on  Man,  220. 

114  PSF,  III,  387. 

118  Essay  on  Man,  217  j  cf.  Erkenntnisfroblem,  II,  1425. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  317 

latter  does  not  refer  to  the  things,  but  their  representations:  it  does  not 
deal  with  the  res  but  the  "notae rerum"  But  this  does  not  prejudice  their 
objective  content.  For  that  "pre-established  harmony"  which,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  fundamental  thought  of  Leibniz'  philosophy,  rules 
between  the  world  of  the  ideal  and  the  real:  it  also  connects  the  world 
of  signs  with  that  of  objective  "meanings."  The  real  is  subject,  without 
any  limitation,  to  the  ideal.116 

There  is  no  such  division  between  ideal  and  real  world  in  the 
philosophy  of  Cassirer.  Critical  philosophy  welds  the  two 
worlds  into  transcendental  unity.  But  the  seam  appears  in  the 
notion  of  the  symbol.  Cassirer  cannot  help  using  Leibnizian 
language.  In  that  way  he  slides  over  the  metaphysical  problem 
which  has  been  put  and  answered  by  Leibniz.  With  Leibniz 

the  analysis  of  the  real  leads  to  the  analysis  of  the  ideas,  the  analysis  of 
the  ideas  to  that  of  the  signs.  With  one  stroke  therewith  the  concept 
of  the  symbol  has  become  the  spiritual  focus,  the  true  center  of  the 
intellectual  world.  In  it  the  principles  of  metaphysics  and  cognition  run 
together.117 

This  very  same  characteristic  can  be  given  of  Cassirer's  philoso- 
phy of  symbolic  forms;  only  that  the  form's  metaphysical  in- 
gredients, by  definition,  are — as  metaphysical — unknowable. 
His  philosophy  is  thus  in  a  way  frustrating;  one  would  like  to 
say,  it  is  so  by  definition.  The  quest  for  a  metaphysics  "behind" 
the  symbolic  form  is  invalid.  But  the  question  concerning  the 
nature  of  that  energy,  which  welds  phenomena  into  structural 
totality  and  thus  brings  about  symbols,  is  still  valid.  Its  answer 
would  lead  into  metaphysics — a  metaphysics  of  Leibnizian  har- 
mony with  humanistic  emphasis:  "the  highest,  indeed  the  only 
task  of  all  these  forms  is  to  unite  men!"11* 

What  a  new  key  is  sounded  here!  How  much  has  totality 
become  harmony  and  harmony  humanism!  Human  harmony 
all  over  the  world  presupposes  universal  symbols.  Leibniz  was 
right:  without  a  Characteristica  generalis  we  shall  never  find  a 
Scientia  generalis.  Modern  symbolic  logic  follows  the  same 


'"/«£ 

118  Essay  on  Man,  129.  Italics  mine.  Whether  these  forms  actually  do  unite  men 


is  another  question.  See  below  notes  132, 133. 


3i 8  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

tendency.119  But  therewith  the  problem  of  human  harmony  is 
not  solved.  "In  an  analysis  of  human  culture  we  must  accept 
the  facts  in  their  concrete  shape,  in  all  their  diversity  and 
divergence."120  The  diversity  of  produced  languages  divide 
menj  the  unity  of  linguistic  functions  may  unite  them.  Even 
more,  however,  may  they  become  united  by  a  universal  logic 
of  artistic  imagination,  an  aesthetic  logic,  which  is  not  inferior 
to  intellectual  logic,  as  was  the  one  constructed  by  Baum- 
garten,121  but  superior  to  it,  extending  not  only  over  the  whole 
surface  of  things  but  also  sounding  the  depths  of  the  under- 
standing consciousness.  Only  then  will  it  truly  be  possible  to 
"comprehend  the  world  in  a  moment,"  to  make  actual  the 
brotherhood  of  man.  Science,  following  the  Leibnizian 
"Ansatz"  has  conquered  the  totality  of  things.  Exact  science  is 
completely  under  Leibniz's  spell.122  But  science  has  diluted  the 
metaphysical  richness  of  his  method.  "For  Leibniz  the  concept 
of  symbol  was  so  to  speak  the  'vinculum  substantiate?  between 
his  metaphysics  and  his  logic.  For  modern  science  it  is  the 
'vmculum  substantiate*  between  logic  and  mathematics  and  be- 
tween logic  and  exact  natural  science."123  For  the  author  of  the 
Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms  this  fact  implied  a  distinct  prog- 
ress and  advantage.  It  was  a  fascinating  discovery  to  find  the 
intermediate  function  between  the  logical  universal  and  the 
concrete  individual,124  the  common  denominator  between  ex- 
tension and  intension,  to  discover  the  world  of  things  as  a  world 
of  symbols,  as  representations  rather  than  as  objects,125  and  to 
rise,  in  the  process  of  dematerialization,  to  the  pure  "conceptual 
sign"  without  any  Nebensinn™  that  is  to  say  without  any 
material  appendage,  in  spite  of  the  necessity  of  meaning  to  find 
a  sensuous  substratum  for  its  actualization.127  But  for  the  author 


"•  1  ML 
™lbid. 

181  Essay  on  Man,  136. 


,  III,  55. 
'"PSF,  I,  tfif. 
mPSF,  111,373- 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  319 

of  An  Essay  on  Man  it  is  different.  The  fascination  of  intellec- 
tual discovery  now  seems  to  have  given  way  to  an  endeavor  of 
moral  persuasion — a  development  similar  to  Kant's,  although, 
in  my  opinion,  less  consciously  planned  for.  In  the  Philosophy 
of  Symbolic  Forms  it  is  the  fascinating  function  of  the  concept 
to  refer  from  the  very  beginning  to  the  totality  of  thought,  to 
the  whole  of  all  possible  thought  formations.128  Precisely  that 
which  has  not  happened  here  or  anywhere  else  is  posited  as 
norm129  by  the  concept  and  is  pre-formed  in  anticipation  by  the 
symbol.130  The  fascination  of  the  Essay  on  Man  is  no  more  the 
all  comprehensive  potentiality  of  thought  but  that  of  man  him- 
self. The  kingdom  of  the  possible  must  now  be  actualized  by 
man.  He  must  make  true  what  has  never  been  true  before,  his 
own  total  harmonic  life.  Now  a  new  miracle  has  to  happen:  not 
the  miracle  of  the  concept,  "that  the  simple  sensuous  material, 
by  the  way  in  which  it  is  considered,  gains  a  new  and  manifold 
spiritual  life}"131  but  a  miracle  of  social  life:  that  the  human 
material,  by  the  way  in  which  it  is  considered,  gains  a  new  and 
manifold  spiritual  life.  Now  the  question  arises,  how  man's 
spiritual  creations  can  reactively  ennoble  their  creator  himself. 

This  is  only  possible,  obviously,  if  they  do  not  remain  merely 
intellectual  achievements,  but  take  hold  of  the  whole  of  man's 
nature}  if  culture  is  integrated  by  the  symbol  not  only,  so  to 
speak,  horizontally,  in  the  totality  of  its  forms,  but  also  in  the 
person  of  its  creator,  vertically,  so  to  speak,  to  the  very  founda- 
tions of  his  soul — in  a  word,  if  man  himself  is  integrated  into  his 
culture.  For  such  an  achievement  the  intellectual  logic  is  not 
sufficient.  The  author  of  the  Essay  on  Man  does  no  longer 
seem  to  find  it  so  important  that  the  symbolic  function  is  the 
vinculum  substantiate  between  logic  and  mathematics  and  be- 
tween logic  and  exact  natural  science.  For  him  it  seems  now  to 
be  all  important  that  it  be  the  vinculum  substantiate  between 
logic  and  morality. 

It  is  one  of  the  peculiarities  of  creation  that  the  works  created 

128 PSF,  m,  39i. 
,  111,370. 


™PSF,  III,  i97f.,  21  if,  234- 

mPSF,  1, 27. 


320  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

appear  as  strangers  to  the  creator.  Since  the  essential  act  of 
creation  is  a  subconscious  one,  the  miracle  of  encompassing  the 
spiritual  in  the  material  takes  place  in  the  very  depths  of  the 
creating  soulj  the  memory  of  it  is  faint,  indeed,  non-existing, 
and  the  re-cognition  of  the  created  as  created  almost  impossible. 
Herein  lies  the  fascination  of  the  work  for  the  creator  5  but 
herein  also  the  danger  of  abstracting  himself  from  his  creations, 
of  disintegration  between  man  and  culture  instead  of  integra- 
tion. The  very  variety  and  differentiation  of  cultural  forms,  in 
which  lies  the  progress  of  the  spirit  and  in  the  totality  of  which 
lies  its  harmony,  also  makes  for  differences  and  separations. 
"Thus  what  was  intended  to  secure  the  harmony  of  culture  be- 
comes the  source  of  the  deepest  discords  and  dissensions."182 
This  is  the  great  antinomy,  the  dialectic,  not  only  of  the  religious 
life133  but  of  all  cultural  life.  The  "process  of  removal"  some- 
times "iiberschlagt  sich"  gets  out  of  hand,  and  degenerates  into 
an  urge  of  destruction.  The  great  problem  then  is  how  to  main- 
tain the  continuity  between  the  soul  of  man  and  his  creations, 
how  to  weave  him  and  the  symbolic  forms  into  one  cultural 
pattern,  a  pattern  of  morality.  When  man  is  identified  with  his 
works,  he  is  moral;  for  then  he  is  identified  with  the  works  of 
all  mankind.  How  can  that  integration  be  achieved?  Again  let 
us  glance  at  the  artist. 

Rodin  and  his  works  were  one. 

It  was  impossible  to  separate  him  from  his  work.  His  statues  were  the 
states  of  his  soul.  Just  as  Rodin  seemed  to  break  the  fragments  around 
the  statue  away  from  the  block  in  which  it  had  been  concealed,  so  he 
himself  seemed  to  be  a  sort  of  rock  hiding  various  forms  and  crystallized 
growths.184 

The  symbolic  forms  are  the  states  of  man's  soul.  "The  contents 
of  culture  cannot  be  separated  from  the  fundamental  forms  and 
directions  of  spiritual  creation:  their  'being'  cannot  be  appre- 
hended otherwise  but  as  'doing'."135  As  the  sculpture  is  "con- 
cealed" in  the  block,  "pre-existent"  in  its  shape,  grain,  texture, 


***  Essay  on  Man,  130. 
138  Ibid,  and  Chap.  VII. 
**  Story,  op.  cit.f  n. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  321 

"like  the  chicken  in  the  egg,"136  and  the  sculptor  must  "col- 
laborate" with  the  stone  to  free  the  figure  concealed  in  it,  so 
man  must  "collaborate"  with  himself  to  free  the  symbolic  forms 
within  him  and  create  culture  out  of  himself.  Culture  is  indeed 
the  process  of  man's  progressive  self-liberation.  "Language,  art, 
religion,  science,  are  various  phases  in  this  process."137  Man  is 
his  own  "matter"  and  his  own  "form."  Cassirer's  philosophy 
here  completes  and  substantiates  empirically  Kant's  "Coperni- 
can  revolution."  Matter  and  form 

are  now  no  more  absolute  powers  of  Eemgy  but  they  serve  the  designa- 
tion of  certain  differences  and  structures  of  meaning.  The  "matter"  of 
perception,  as  it  was  understood  by  Kant  originally,  could  still  appear 
as  a  kind  of  epistemological  counterpart  to  Aristotle's  WP<OTYJ  uXiq.  Like 
it,  it  is  taken  as  the  merely  indeterminate  before  all  determination, 
which  must  expect  all  determination  from  the  form  which  accrues  to 
it  and  imprints  itself  on  it.  The  situation  changes  after  Kant's  own  de- 
velopment of  the  "transcendental  topic"  and  his  designation,  within  that 
topic,  of  a  definite  position  to  the  opposition  of  "matter"  and  "form." 
Now  they  are  no  more  primal  determinations  of  Being,  ontic  entities, 
but  pure  concepts  of  reflection,  which  in  the  section  on  the  "Amphiboly 
of  the  Concepts  of  Reflection"  are  being  treated  on  the  same  line  with 
Agreement  and  Opposition,  and  Identity  and  Difference.  They  are 
no  more  two  poles  of  Being  in  insoluble  "real"  opposition,138 

but  concepts  of  transcendental  comparisons  referring  to  states 
of  consciousness.  They  are  "states  of  man's  soul."  "From  the 
point  of  view  of  phenomenology  there  is  as  little  a  'matter  in 
itselP  as  a  'form  in  itself — there  are  only  total  experiences, 
which  can  be  compared  under  the  point  of  view  of  matter  and 
form,  and  determined  and  articulated  accordingly."139 

In  the  Essay  on  Man  the  transcendental  "relativization"140 
of  the  contrast  between  matter  and  form  has  been  applied  to 
man  5  man  is  the  sculptor  of  the  symbolic  forms — forms  of  his 
own  consciousness.  But  the  relationship  already  appears  clearly 
in  the  Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms.  Indeed,  it  is  the  differ- 

136  In  words  of  the  Spanish  sculptor  Jose*  de  Creeft. 
187  Essay  on  Man,  228. 
138  m1,  III,  13. 
189  PSF,  III,  230. 


322  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

entiation  of  man's  "space"  by  which  man  actually  carves  out 
the  symbolic  forms,  pre-existent  in  it.  Space  is  the  universal 
matrix  of  these  forms — and  it  is  a  state  of  man's  own  con- 
sciousness. Plato's  rcp&Tov  SeKTixdVj  space  as  common  matrix  of 
all  determinations,  is  actually  being  confirmed  by  the  philoso- 
phy of  symbolic  forms,141  even  though  its  "space,"  like  Kant's, 
is  very  different  from  Plato's  metaphysical  "receptacle."  It  is  a 
formative,  dynamic  principle,  indeed,  the  formative  principle 
of  consciousness  itself  in  its  relation  to  the  world — the  form 
of  our  "outer  experience."  It  is  a  living  "material,"  living  in 
and  through  the  life  of  its  shaper,  just  as  is  the  "stone"  of 
Rodin.  All  the  symbolic  forms  have  their  particular  "spati- 
ality,"142  their  particular  form  of  correlation148  according  to  their 
particular  modality.  From  empirical  perceptual  space  develops 
conceptual  space.144  Perceptual  space  is  already  filled  with  sym- 
bolic forms  and  interpenetrated  by  them.  Language  forms  the 
first  space-words.  In  abstract  geometry  space  is  a  system  of 
topological  determinations:  proximity  of  points,  distance,  inter- 
section of  lines,  incidence  of  planes  and  spaces.  From  topologi- 
cal develops  metric  and  projective  space.  The  development  of 
space  is  at  the  same  time  the  development  of  relational  thought, 
the  gradual  awakening  of  consciousness  and  its  world-aware- 


ness.145 


There  is  no  power  of  the  spirit  which  has  not  co-operated  in  this  gigantic 
process  of  formation.  Sensation,  intuition,  feeling,  phantasy,  creative 
imagination,146  constructive  [!]  conceptual  thought  —  and  the  manner 
of  their  interpenetration  create  each  time  a  new  spatial  Gestalt.™ 

At  the  same  time  there  is  a  definitive  direction  of  the  process: 
"the  '  Auseinanderseteung*  between  world  and  £^o"148  —  the 


1  PSF,  m,  49i. 


148  ibid. 

144  PSF,  m,  49*. 

148  Cassirer  refers  in  this  connection  to  Carnap,  Rudolf,  Der  Raum,  tin  Beitrag 
zur  Wissenschaftslehre,  Berlin,  1922. 

14*The  German  word  "Einbildungskraft"  '-"power  of  in-forming,"  gives  the 
spatial  implication. 

"PSF,  III,  493. 

148      £  Italics  mine. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  323 

progressive  "ex-position"  and  "ex-secution"  of  the  separateness 
of  man  and  world,  their  gradual  differentiation.  Gradually  man 
releases  space  and  its  forms  from  and  out  of  himself,  until 
finally  it  seems  to  be  an  independent  Gestalty  standing  opposed 
to  and  as  counter-pole  of  him.  The  mythical  consciousness  of 
space  is  still  entirely  woven  within  the  sphere  of  subjective  feel- 
ing, but  already  there  appears  an  opposition  of  cosmic  powers, 
as  in  the  Platonic  Timaeus,  the  Chinese  Yin  and  Yang,  and  the 
innumerable  forms  of  "cosmic  bisexuality."149  Language  con- 
tinues the  separation  and  deepens  it:  the  mythical  physiog- 
nomic space  becomes  presentative  space.  Conceptual  —  mathe- 
matical, geometrical,  and  physical  —  thought  complete  the  proc- 
ess: the  anthropomorphic  conditions  are  being  pushed  back  in 
favor  of  "objective"  determinations  which  result  from  the  meth- 
ods of  counting  and  measuring.  Now  we  have  the  space  of  pure 
meaning  or  signification.150  A  similar  process  of  differentiation 
takes  place  within  the  elemental  units  of  the  symbolic  forms. 
The  flux  of  perceptual  impressions  is  being  subdivided  into 
centers  around  which  the  undifferentiated  variety  clusters,  like 
the  diffuse  matter  in  space,  which  gradually  clustered  into  nebu- 
lae, and  continues  to  concentrate  its  diffuse  matter  into  condensed 
energy  "through  millions  and  mountains  of  millions  of  cen- 
turies."151 Similarly  the  process  of  symbolic  formation  continues 
to  concentrate  diffuse  energies  as  long  as  there  is  man.  The 
diffuse  matter  in  space  is  being  organized  by  being  referred  to  a 
natural  center.  Ever  new  worlds  are  in  formation  and  "gain  a 
general  relation  to  the  center,  the  first  formative  point  of  crea- 
tion."152 Similarly  in  the  world  of  symbolic  forms  centers  are 
formed  as  points  of  reference.  Thus  the  name  becomes  name 
only  through  reference  to  such  centers.  The  names  "red"  or 
"blue,"  for  instance,153  do  not  mean  certain  blue  or  red  nuances, 
but  express  the  specific  manner,  in  which  an  undetermined 
variety  of  such  nuances  is  seen  as  one  and  conceptually  set  as 

**  Treated  symbolically  in  Mann's  Joseph  novels.  Cf.  Slochower,  Harry,  No 
Voice  is  Wholly  Lost,  New  York  1945,  350  n. 
™PSF,  III,  493  f. 
"*  Kant,  Natural  History  and  Theory  of  the  Heavens,  2.  Teil,  7tes  Hauptstuck. 


PSF,  111,497- 


324  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

one.154  In  physical-geometrical  thought  the  given  is  not  only 
being  divided  and  assembled  around  fixed  centers,  but  "cast 
into  form,"155  the  harmonious  form  of  mathematical  symbols, 
which  is  as  opposed  to  the  original  diffusion  of  formative  ener- 
gies as  the  well  ordered  system  of  planets  is  to  the  primal 
diffusion  of  matter.  For  Laplace  Kant's  theory  of  the  heavens 
was  the  inspiration  for  a  mathematical  theory  of  the  creation 
of  the  world.156  For  Cassirer  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  was 
the  inspiration  for  a  theory  of  the  creation  of  the  cultural  world, 
one  of  whose  culminations  is  mathematics.  In  both  cases  the 
world  is  modelled  in  space — a  work  of  plastic  imagination.157 
If  all  activity  of  thought  expresses  itself  in  spatial  forms,  then 
its  creative  activity  must  needs  be  a  kind  of  plastic  sculpturing. 
Cassirer  himself  has  never,  to  my  knowledge,  drawn  this  con- 
clusion, but  it  deduces  itself  logically  from  his  philosophy. 

In  sculpturing  the  world  of  symbolic  forms,  man  sculptures 
and  forms  his  own  soul.  What  he  looks  at  in  the  variety  of 
forms  is  his  own  inner  life.  Rodin  "used  to  contemplate  his 
creations  lovingly,  and  sometimes  even  seemed  to  be  astonished 
and  contemplative  at  the  idea  of  having  created  them,  speaking 
as  if  they  existed  apart  from  himself."158  Thus  man  stands 
wonderingly  before  his  creations,  astounded  at  the  world,  which 
he  has  created — created  so  unconsciously  that  it  took  several 
thousand  years  of  contemplative  thought  until,  in  the  mind  of 
Kant,  he  recognized  in  it  himself.  This  same  difficulty  veiled 
the  world  of  symbolic  forms  before  man's  mind  in  a  world  of 
metaphysics.  Again  and  again  man  tried  to  lift  the  veil,  but  the 
attempt  was  doomed  to  pathetic  failure.  As  for  Schiller's 
"Young  Man  of  Sai's,"  curiosity  could  only  yield  horror:  the 
look  into  the  abyss  of  nothing — or  the  abyss  of  his  own  self.  In 

184  "In-eins-gesefon  und  in-eins-gesetzt."  "Einsicht"  becomes  "Eins-sicW — "In- 
sight" becomes  "One-sight." 

**  PSF,  III,  498. 

lw  Or  might  have  been,  if  he  knew  Kant's  treatise.  Whether  or  not  he  actually 
did  is  unknown. 

m  Cf .  Rodin :  "If  we  can  imagine  the  thought  of  God  in  creating  the  world, 
we  shall  find  that  He  first  thought  of  the  modelling,  which  is  the  unique  principle 
in  Nature — and  perhaps  of  the  *  planets."  Story,  of.  cit.>  14. 

w  Story,  of,  c*t.t  n. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  325 

a  very  real  sense  we  are  all  thinkers  pondering  "The  Gate  of 
Hell."  Thinking  is  fraught  with  shocking  surprises,  shocks 
which  are  dialectic  hiatuses  in  the  process  of  the  souPs  self- 
discovery.  That  process  leads  to  successive  "crises"  "separa- 
tions" of  existence,  in  which  the  unconscious  and  uncontem- 
plated process  of  spiritual  development  becomes  a  problem  to 
itself,  in  which  "Ausserung*  becomes  "Ausserliches"  self-ex- 
pression becomes  the  exterior  world.159  This  estrangement  of 
the  symbolic  forms  from  their  creator  arises  from  the  very 
fundamental  principle  of  their  creation. 

The  acts  of  expression,  presentation,  and  meaning  are  not  immediately 
present  to  themselves,  but  become  apparent  only  in  the  totality  of  their 
accomplishment.  They  are  only  by  confirming  themselves,  and  giving 
notice  of  themselves  through  their  action.  They  do  not  originally  reflect 
on  themselves,  but  they  look  at  the  work  which  they  are  to  execute,  to 
the  reality  the  valid  form  of  which  they  are  to  build  up.160 

Hence  these  forms  can  only  be  described  within  their  works 
and  in  the  language  of  these  works.  Language,  myth,  art: 

each  of  these  exteriorizes  its  own  individual  world  of  creations,  which 
latter  cannot  be  understood  otherwise  than  as  expressions  of  the  self- 
activity,  the  "spontaneity"  of  the  spirit.  But  this  self-activity  does  not 
proceed  in  the  form  of  free  reflection,  and  therefore  remains  hidden 
to  itself.  The  spirit  creates  the  series  of  linguistic,  mythical  and  artistic 
Gestalten,  without  in  them  recognizing  itself  as  creative  principle.  Thus 
each  of  these  series  becomes  for  it  an  "exterior"  world.161 

The  free  creations  of  the  spirit  are  then  regarded  as  "things" 
and  the  power  and  independence  of  the  spirit  compelled  into 
systems  of  dogmatic  concepts.182  Only  the  Critical  philosophy 
succeeds  in  prying  open  this  dogmatism.  The  thing,  far  from 
being  a  self-sufficient  being,  is  for  it  only  "an  intellectual  partial 
condition  of  being,  a  single  conceptual  moment,  which  only  in 
the  complete  system  of  our  knowledge  comes  to  full  effect."168 
It  is  now  nothing  but  the  general  principle  of  the  series,  so  to 


160  PSFy  III,  1  1  8. 

m  PSF,  II,  267.  Cf.  Erkenntnisfroblem  I,  7. 

1W  Erkenntnisfroblem  I,  vf. 

"•/*«. 


326  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

speak,  its  general  term.184  The  whole  of  reality  is  process,  and 
the  things  are  condensations  of  that  process,  much  as  matter  is 
in  physical  field  theory.165  There  is  now  no  more  metaphysical 
absolute,  but  only  becoming.  "By  regarding  the  conditions  of 
science  as  'become,'  we  recognize  them  precisely  thereby  as 
creations  of  thought."166  In  doing  so  we  recognize  the  opposition 
of  subject  and  object  as  a  metaphysical  artifice,  "the  charac- 
teristic procedure  of  metaphysics."167  Thus  metaphysics  es- 
tranges man  from  his  creations}  it  must  be  overcome  if  man 
is  to  become  responsible  for  his  culture.  It  is  no  wonder,  there- 
fore, that  the  most  metaphysical  people  has  also  fallen  victim 
to  the  most  tremendous  "crisis,"  the  most  barbaric  separation 
of  man  and  culture:  what  the  German  scientists  of  extermina- 
tion strove  to  annihilate  was  the  man-of-culture,168  termed  by 
them  "the  beast  of  intelligence"  —  "die  Intelligenzbestie"  In 
their  scientific  one-sidedness  they  were  both  "metaphysical" 
and  barbaric.169 

To  overcome  this  metaphysical  crisis  man  must  "collaborate" 
with  himself  as  the  sculptor  does  with  his  material.  He  must 
fuse  his  own  form  with  his  own  matter.  The  metaphysical  crisis 
must  be  transformed,  through  cultural  critique,  into  harmonic 
responsibility  of  man  for  his  world.  This  is  only  possible  by 
man's  recognizing  in  the  cultural  forms  his  own  consciousness, 
by  comprehending  these  forms  as  symbolic  for  the  unity  of 


•,  ill,  3  73. 

165  That  theory  should,  theoretically,  be  deducible  from  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason. 

ie*  Erkenntnis'problem  I,  vi. 

™  Substance  and  Function,  271$  Cf.  PSF,  I,  24. 

""Cf.  Kerenyi,  Karl,  Romandlchtung  und  Mythologle,  Bin  Briefwechsel  mit 
Thomas  Mann,  Zurich:  Rhein  Verlag,  1945*  42» 

169  Cf.  Bluhm,  Heinz,  "Ernst  Cassirer  und  die  deutsche  Philologie,"  Monats- 
hefte  filr  Dcutsdten  Unterrlcht,  Vol.  XXXVII,  No.  7,  November  1945,  471. 
Ilya  Ehrenburg,  The  Tempering  of  Russia,  New  York:  Alfred  A.  Knopf,  i944> 
276,  on  examining  the  diary  of  a  dead  German  who  at  the  front  continued  read- 
ing philosophy  and  whose  notebook  related  the  philosophy  and  practice  of  exter- 
mination interspersed  with  quotations  from  Plato,  Schopenhauer,  and  Nietzsche, 
wrote:  "In  perusing  the  brown  notebook  one  is  amazed  at  the  mental  poverty 
of  these  scholarly  cannibals.  To  torture  people  they  need  philosophical  quotations. 
.  .  .  One  feels  like  killing  Fritz-the-philosopher  twice:  one  bullet  because  he  tor- 
tured Russian  children  5  another  because  after  murdering  a  baby,  he  read  Plato." 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  327 

man  <md  his  world.  Symbolism  is  to  be  the  vehicle  of  man's 
morality. 

How  else  should  man  be  able  to  sound  the  depths  of  his  own 
consciousness  and  at  the  same  time  roam  over  the  width  of  the 
world?  The  variety  of  forms  would  be  too  manifold  for  com- 
prehension, if  there  were  not  the  principle  of  the  symbolic 
function  to  organize  them.  The  consciousness  would  be  too 
fleetingly  incomprehensible,  if  there  were  not  the  material  em- 
bodiments of  its  energies.  How  else  should  we  be  able  to 

penetrate  to  this  purely  inner  world  of  consciousness  as  last  concen- 
tration of  the  spiritual,  if  for  its  demonstration  and  description  we  have 
to  renounce  all  the  concepts  and  points  of  view,  which  have  been  created 
for  the  presentation  of  the  concrete  reality  of  things.  Where  would 
there  be  a  means  to  comprehend  the  incomprehensible,  to  express  in 
any  way  that  which  itself  has  not  yet  assumed  any  concrete  form — 
either  of  the  perceptual  space  and  time  order,  or  of  an  intellectual, 
ethical  or  aesthetic  order?  If  the  consciousness  is  nothing  but  the  pure 
potentiality  of  all  the  "objective"  forms,  so  to  speak  the  pure  receptivity 
and  preparedness  for  them,  then  it  cannot  be  seen  how  precisely  this 
potentiality  itself  can  be  treated  as  a  fact,  indeed,  as  the  primary  fact 
of  all  spirituality  itself.  ...  It  is  obvious  that  this  paradoxical  demand 
can  only  be  satisfied,  if  at  all,  mediately.  We  can  never  uncover  the 
immediate  being  and  life  of  consciousness  purely  as  such,170 — but  it  is  a 
meaningful  task  to  understand  the  process  of  objectivation171 

by  treating  it  from  a  double  perspective,  shuttling  back  and 
forth  between  the  terminus  a  quo  and  the  terminus  ad  quemy 
thus  truly  following  the  method  of  that  weaver's  masterpiece 
or,  even  better,  instead  of  treating  the  objectivity  of  the  law 
rather  find  the  Gestalt172  of  cognition,  thus  transforming  the 
method  of  psychology  into  that  of  the  symbolic  forms. 

We  start  from  the  problems  of  the  "objective  spirit,"  the  Gestalten  of 
which  it  consists  and  in  which  it  exists;  but  we  do  not  rest  there  as  a 
mere  fact,  but  try,  through  a  reconstructive  analysis,  to  penetrate  to  their 
elementary  conditions,  the  "conditions  of  their  possibility."173 

170  In  this  connection  Cassirer's  criticism  of  Berg-son's  method  is  of  importance, 
PSF,  III,  42ff. 
mPSF,  III,  6zf. 
mPSF,  III,  66. 
111 /W,  III,  67. 


328  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

In  other  words,  we  look  for  the  "various  forms  and  crystal- 
lized growths"  within  the  rock  that  is  man,  and  then  proceed 
to  carve  them  out,  helped  by  our  knowledge  of  the  grain  and 
texture,  the  geology  and  palaeontology  of  those  forms.  Thus 
we  would  find  the  correspondence  between  the  manifold  of 
objective  formations  and  subjective  states  of  consciousness,  a 
"truly  concrete  view  of  the  cfull  objectivity'  of  the  spirit  on  the 
one  hand  and  its  'full  subjectivity'  on  the  other."174  To  do  so 
we  must  delve  down  deeply  into  the  roots  of  consciousness: 

We  must  consider  not  only  the  three  dimensions  of  the  logical,  the 
ethical  and  the  aesthetic,  but  in  particular  the  "form''  of  language  and 
the  "form"  of  mythos,  if  we  want  to  penetrate  down  to  the  primary  be- 
havioral and  formative  conditions  of  consciousness.175 

In  this  way,  then,  the  vertical  integration  of  man  will  be 
joined  to  the  horizontal  integration  of  his  culture.  Man  must 
live  on  all  the  levels  of  his  consciousness,  on  the  deepest  of 
myth  as  well  as  on  the  highest  of  mathematics,  music,178  and 
mysticism.  This  vertical  task  has  only  just  begun,  but  the  great 
minds  of  our  age  are  preparing  the  synthesis.  Bergson  joins 
"mechanics  and  mysticism,"177  Thomas  Mann  joins  mythos  and 
language,178  and  asks  for  a  chair  in  "mythology"  to  join  mythos 
and  logos.179  Cassirer  joins  all  spiritual  forms  in  the  synthesis 
of  cultural  symbolism. 

174  Ibid. 
17' 1 bid. 

178  See  above  note  85. 

177  The  Two  Sources  of  Morality  and  Religion,  New  York:  Henry  Holt  and 
Company,  1935,  chapter  IV.  Bergson's  philosophy  is  based  on  the  form  of  our 
inner  experience,  time;  Cassirer's  is  based  on  that  of  our  outer  experience,  space. 
Therefore  the  latter  is  led  to  the  central  notion  of  the  symbol,  which  the  former 
rejects,  the  former  to  that  of  metaphysical  intuition  which  the  latter  rejects.  Cas- 
sirer's philosophy  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  plastic  arts,  Bergson's  in  terms 
of  music.  A  synthesis  of  both  philosophies  would  be  the  true  philosophy  of  sym- 
bolism. 

""Kerenyi,  of.  «'/.,  50.  According  to  Cassirer,  PSF,  I,  268,  language  as  a  form 
is  between  mythos  and  logos. 

179  Kerenyi,  op.  cit.t   84,   82.  The  separation  of  the  myth  from  logos  is  the 
immediate  cause  of  the  latest  world  catastrophe.  The  combination  of  both,  in 
particular  of  mythos  with  the  science  of  psychology,  is  one  of  the  guarantees  of 
the  future.  "I  have  long  been  a  passionate  friend  of  this  combination  j  for  indeed, 
psychology  is  the  means  to  take  the  myth  out  of  the  hands  of  the  fascist  obscurants 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  329 

In  this  way  he  has  given  us  a  tool,  a  "grammar  of  the  sym- 
bolic function,"180  a  key  with  which  to  open  the  treasure  house 
of  our  own  culture.  But  simply  to  open  it  and  wander  around 
in  it  as  in  a  museum  will  not  solve  the  crisis.  We  must  appropri- 
ate all  the  symbolic  forms  as  our  own  creations.  The  symbols 
must  not  remain  mute  and  dumb  signs  for  us,  but  be  charged 
with  all  the  meaning  of  life.  We  must  enter  into  their  own 
lives  and  live  on  their  level.  Our  survival  depends  on  our  ca- 
pacity to  handle  symbols  in  communication,  discussion,  and 
agreement — in  settling  conflicts  by  handling  symbols  rather 
than  the  powers  they  stand  for.  We  must  "do  away  with  pres- 
ence in  order  to  penetrate  to  representation.  .  .  .  The  regress 
into  the  world  of  signs  is  the  preparation  for  that  decisive  break- 
through in  which  the  spirit  will  conquer  its  own  world,  the 
world  of  idea."1*1 

We  are  standing  before  that  decisive  event.  We  must  either 
live  through  symbols  or  die  in  the  flesh.  The  symbols  will  be 
filled  with  life  if  they  reach  through  our  entire  self,  far  above 
and  below  the  merely  intellectual  level.  We  must  recognize  the 
states  of  our  soul  in  them,  as  did  Rodin  in  his  creations  j  "he  was 
the  companion  of  these  white  mute  creatures  of  his,  he  loved 
them  and  entered  into  their  abstract  lives."182  So  we  must  enter 
the  life  of  human  culture  and  lovingly  develop  it  and  us  in  it. 
In  this  sense  the  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  may  be  said  to 
be  a  comprehensive  aesthetics,  the  work  of  an  artist  for  artists: 
the  vision  of  man  as  creator  of  all  his  works,  the  vision  of  culture 
as  human  creation.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  Cassirer  himself  has 
had  that  vision  very  consciously  5  the  volume  on  Aesthetics  was 
to  be  the  crowning  volume  of  the  Philosophy  of  Symbolic 
Forms™  It  is  the  crisis  itself  that  has  separated  Cassirer  from 


and  to  'transfunction*  it  into  the  humane.  That  combination  actually  represents 
to  me  the  world  of  the  future,  a  humanity,  that  is  blessed  from  on  high,  through 
the  spirit,  and  *f  rom  the  depths  that  lie  below'."  Thomas  Mann,  Kerenyi  j  op.  cit., 
82.  Cf.  Buxton,  Charles  Roden,  Prophets  of  Heaven  and  Hell,  Virgil,  Dante,  Mil- 
ton, Goethe,  Cambridge:  At  the  University  Press,  1945,  2$L  + 

**»  pg  p    T     _  a 

181  PSF,  III,  3*561  54- Cf.  Ill,  330. 

182  Story,  op.  cit.,  n. 

183Bluhm,  op.  cit.,  468.  PSF,  I,  120. 


330  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

the  symbolic  forms  of  the  arts  5  his  book  could  not  be  written 
"due  to  the  unfavorable  political  conditions."  Otherwise  he 
himself  might  have  performed  that  vertical  synthesis  of  man 
and  cast  man's  inner  life  into  the  forms  of  the  new  logic.  Maybe 
he  would  have  called  that  new  form  the  form  of  man's  "sym- 
bolic Pr'dgnanz" — man's  existence  as  symbol  of  his  own  uni- 
versal thought:  transcending  his  material  confinement  in  uni- 
versal meaning. 

How  Cassirer  would  have  integrated  man  himself  into  his 
culture  we  can  only  guess.  He  has  given  us  one  lowly  example 
for  symbolic  Pragnanz:  he  integrates  the  life  of  a  wavy  line  in 
all  fields  of  meaning.  Let  us  quote  that  passage,  not  only  as  a 
symbolic  review  of  the  whole  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms,  its 
artistic  empathy  and  the  sweep  of  its  meaning,  but  also  as  a  pre- 
view into  realms  to  which  Cassirer's  philosophy  points. 

In  the  purely  spatial  determination  there  is  a  peculiar  "mood,"  the  up 
and  down  of  lines  in  space  contains  an  inner  motion,  a  dynamic  rise 
and  fall,  a  psychic  being  and  life.  It  is  not  we  who  feel  our  own  inner 
states  in  a  subjective  way  in  the  spatial  form:  but  that  form  presents 
itself  to  us  as  a  spirited  whole,  an  independent  manifestation  of  life. 
Its  steady  and  calm  flow  or  its  sudden  break,  its  roundness  and  whole- 
ness or  its  brokenness,  its  hardness  or  softness :  all  this  appears  as  character 
of  its  own  being,  its  objective  "nature."  But  all  this  recedes  and  seems 
as  if  it  were  annihilated  and  extinguished  as  soon  as  the  line  is  taken  in 
another  meaning — as  a  mathematical  design,  a  geometrical  figure.  Now 
it  becomes  a  mere  scheme,  the  means  of  presenting  a  universal  geometric 
law.  Where  before  we  had  the  up  and  down  of  a  wavy  line  and  in  it 
the  harmony  of  an  inner  mood — there  now  we  find  the  graphic  pres- 
entation of  a  trigonometric  function,  a  curve  the  whole  content  of  which 
is  absorbed  in  its  analytic  formula.  The  spatial  Gestalt  is  nothing  else 
now  than  the  paradigm  of  that  formula;  it  is  only  the  hull  into  which 
a  mathematical  thought,  imperceptible  in  itself,  is  clothed.  And  the  latter 
does  not  stand  by  itself,  but  in  it  a  universal  law  presents  itself,  the 
order  of  space  in  general.  Every  single  geometric  form  is  by  virtue  of 
that  order  connected  with  the  totality  of  all  other  spatial  forms.  It 
belongs  to  a  certain  system — an  aggregate  of  "truths"  and  "theorems," 
of  "reasons"  and  "consequences" — and  that  system  denotes  the  universal 
form  by  which  each  individual  geometric  figure  is  alone  possible,  that  is 
to  say,  constructable  and  "understandable."  And  again  the  situation  is 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  331 

different,  when  we  consider  the  line  as  mythical  sign  or  as  aesthetic 
ornament.  The  mythical  sign  expresses  the  fundamental  mythical  con- 
trast between  the  "holy"  and  the  "profane."  It  is  established  in  order 
to  separate  these  two  realms  from  each  other,  to  warn  and  to  terrify  and 
to  bar  the  uninitiated  from  approaching  or  entering  the  holy.  And 
thereby  it  does  not  function  only  as  a  mere  sign,  as  a  mark  by  which  the 
holy  is  being  recognized;  but  it  possesses  a  magically  compelling  and  re- 
pelling power,  which  resides  in  it  objectively.  Of  such  a  compulsion  the 
aesthetic  world  knows  nothing.  Contemplated  as  an  ornament  the  line 
is  removed  both  from  the  sphere  of  "meaning"  in  the  logico-conceptual 
sense  as  that  of  magico-mythical  significance  and  warning.  It  now 
possesses  its  import  in  itself,  which  uncovers  itself  only  in  the  purely 
artistic  contemplation,  the  aesthetic  intuition  as  such.  Here  again  the 
experience  of  the  spatial  form  completes  itself  only  through  belonging  to 
a  total  horizon  and  opening  that  horizon  up  for  us,  ...  by  standing  in  a 
certain  atmosphere,  in  which  it  not  only  simply  "is,"  but  in  which  it 
so  to  speak  lives  and  breathes.184 

Imagine  the  hero  of  this  tale  to  be  man  rather  than  a  wavy 
line!  How  he  would  be  seen  in  all  realms  of  meaning,  all  forms 
of  culture — a  symbol  himself  of  his  own  striving  and  achieve- 
ment, the  central  system  of  co-ordination  of  all  life  activities. 
"The  symbolic  process  is  like  a  unique  life  and  thought  current 
which  flows  through  consciousness  and  which  in  its  flowing 
motion  alone  brings  about  the  variety  and  continuity  of  con- 
sciousness in  all  its  fullness."185  In  the  unity  of  that  flow  man 
would  become  integrated,  from  the  mythical  depth  of  con- 
sciousness— the  well  of  the  past  from  which  Thomas  Mann 
brought  forth  his  Joseph  figures186 — to  the  highest  height  of 
mathematics,  music,  and  mysticism.187 

181 PSF,  III,  231  j  Cf.  Cassirer  "Das  Symbolproblem  und  seine  Stellung  im  Sys- 
tem der  Philosophic,"  Zeitschrift  fur  Asthettk  und,  allgemeine  Kumtwissenschajt, 
Bd.  XXI,  191  ff.  Cf.  supra  112  f. 

185  PSF,  III,  234- 

188  Cf .  Thomas  Mann  on  the  combination  of  psychology  and  myth  in  Kerenyi, 
op.  cit.,  82$  also  "Freud  and  the  Future,"  in  Freud,  Goethe,  Wagner,  New  York: 
Alfred  A.  Knopf,  1942,  298. 

**  For  then  the  process  of  objectivation  would  not  be  completed  in  the  mathe- 
matical symbols — symbols  for  nature  rather  than  for  human  nature.  It  may  be 
that  those  symbols  will  also  aid  in  the  objectivation  of  man  toward  himself,  the 
objectivation  of  his  own  psyche:  his  emotions  and  desires.  Perhaps  Spinoza  was 


332  ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

So  far  the  highest  realms  of  the  vertical  synthesis  have  not 
been  reached.  Cassirer's  work  is  unfinished  and  waits  for  com- 
pletion. The  mysticism  of  the  artist,  the  musicality  of  the  mathe- 
matician, all  these  are  symbolic  forms  and  elaborations  of  lower 
forms  as  truly  as  mathematics  is  the  elaboration  of  the  lower 
symbolic  forms  of  myth  and  language.  Perhaps  Cassirer  had 
intended  to  show  us  these  connections  in  his  projected  volume 
on  the  symbolic  forms  of  Aesthetics.  As  it  is,  the  work  must 
be  completed  by  us,  the  epigones.  But  we  too  shall  only  be 
precursors,  preparers  of  the  day  "when  the  human  intelligence, 
elevated  to  its  perfect  type,  shall  shine  forth  glorified  in  some 
future  Mozart-Dirichlet  or  Beethoven-Gauss."188  Cassirer's 
work  points  toward  a  future  of  symbolic  forms  so  rich  that 
man's  present  culture  appears  very  primitive  indeed. 

In  1910,  at  about  the  time  when  Cassirer's  first  great  work 
appeared,  another  great  mind  was  concerned  with  the  future. 
Leo  Tolstoy,  shortly  before  his  death,  dictated  to  his  daughter 
Anastasia  a  strange  prophecy.  He  predicted  the  coming  of 
world  wars,  the  sway  of  a  strange  figure  from  the  North,  "a 
new  Napoleon,"  and  finally,  a  "federation  of  the  United  States 
of  nations."  After  that 

I  see  a  change  in  religious  sentiment.  .  .  .  The  ethical  idea  has  almost 
vanished.  Humanity  is  without  the  moral  feeling.  But  then  a  great  re- 
former arises.  ...  I  see  the  peaceful  beginning  of  an  ethical  era.  .  .  . 
In  the  middle  of  this  century  I  see  a  hero  of  literature  and  art  rising  .  .  . 
and  purging  the  world  of  the  tedious  stuff  of  the  obvious.  It  is  the  light 
of  symbolism  that  shall  outshine  the  torch  of  commercialism™* 

Cassirer's  life  was  dedicated  to  the  self-liberation  of  man 
through  symbolism.  Everything  for  him,  like  for  Rodin,190 

on  the  right  road  with  his  geometric  ethics.  But  the  "grammar  of  emotions"  may 
have  to  be  written,  ultimately  in  a  more  fitting  script:  that  of  musical  and  mysti- 
cal symbolism.  To  the  latter  point  see  Essay  on  Man,  102.  Concerning  the  in- 
sufficiency of  mathematical  symbolism  even  for  the  comprehension  of  nature  cf. 
Cassirer,  "Goethe  and  Kantian  Philosophy"  in  Rousseau,  Kant,  Goethe,  64.8.,  8 if. 

388  James  Joseph  Sylvester  in  a  paper  on  Newton's  rule  for  the  discovery  of 
imaginery  roots  of  algebraic  equations,  quoted  from  £.  T.  Bell,  Men  of  Mathe- 
matics, New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1937,  4O4f. 

1S9Forman,  Henry  James,  The  Story  of  Prophecy,  New  York:  Tudor  Publish- 
ing Company:  1939,  25 3 f. 

190  Story,  of.  cit.,  17. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS  333 

was  "idea  and  symbol  j"  like  Rodin  "he  sought  in  the  energy 
of  the  human  body  and  its  symbolism  for  the  origins  of  all  re- 
ligions, all  philosophy  and  poetry."191  The  ethical  era  to  come 
must  be  built  to  a  large  extent  on  his  work.  His  morality  was, 
like  Rodin's,192  the  comprehensive  love  of  life  and  of  all  its 
forms.  Rodin  "opened  a  vast  window  in  the  pale  house  of 
modern  statuary,  and  made  of  sculpture,  which  had  been  a 
timid,  compromised  art,  one  that  was  audacious  and  full  of 
life."193  So  Cassirer  opened  a  large  window  in  the  pale  house 
of  modern  critical  philosophy  and  made  of  epistemology,  which 
had  been  a  timid,  compromised  discipline,  one  that  was  auda- 
cious and  full  of  life.  He  prepared  the  horizontal-vertical 
integration  of  man's  soul  and  culture  —  a  symbolic  cross,  to 
which  man  will  not  be  fixed  in  agony,  but  in  which  he  will  live. 

ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
OHIO  STATE  UNIVERSITY 


2  Story,  op.  cit.,  n. 


9 

Folke  Leander 

FURTHER  PROBLEMS  SUGGESTED  BY  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  SUGGESTED  BY  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS 

ONE  should  take  everything  for  what  it  is,  not  criticize  it 
for  not  being  what  it  is  not" — such  was  the  critical  maxim 
of  the  Swedish  poet-philosopher  Thomas  Thorild  (1759-1806), 
on  whom,  incidentally,  Cassirer  has  written  an  excellent  book. 
It  is,  however,  exceedingly  difficult  to  criticize  Cassirer  for 
what  he  does  say,  and  much  easier  to  point  to  the  unsolved 
problems  which  he  never  set  out  to  solve.  Cassirer's  method  in 
The  Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms  is  that  of  concentrating  his 
attention  on  a  very  limited  number  of  major  problems,  treating 
them  exhaustively,  adducing  a  great  wealth  of  linguistic,  mytho- 
logical, and  psychological  material  to  prove  his  point.  The 
numerous  and  widespread  errors  he  refutes  are  disproved  very 
thoroughly.  He  rarely  "sticks  his  neck  out,"  as  the  Americans 
say.  There  is  a  certain  finality  about  all  this  and  little  tempta- 
tion for  the  student  to  quote  a  passage  and  disagree  with  it.  In 
fact,  if  you  accept  the  view  that  all  thought,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
really  thought,  must  necessarily  be  true,  all  criticism  must  con- 
sist in  drawing  attention  to  omissions.  Only,  in  Cassirer's  case 
you  rarely  find  the  omissions  mixed  up  with  and  vitiating  what 
he  does  say,  which  latter  will  generally  be  found  to  be  unim- 
peachable, as  far  as  it  goes.  These  introductory  remarks  may 
serve  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  following  pages,  which  are 
intended  primarily  to  point  to  further  problems  suggested  by 
Cassirer's  philosophy.  The  problems  suggested  are:  i)  the  uni- 
fication of  the  pre-scientific  symbolic  forms;  2)  a  more  careful 
distinction  between  form  and  material  j  3)  an  analysis  of  the 
logic  of  history  and  the  logic  of  philosophy.  I  will  try  to  show 
how  these  desiderata  grew  out  of  Cassirer's  own  philosophy. 

337 


338  FOLKE  LEANDER 

I 

The  Unification  of  the  Pre-Scientific  Symbolic  Forms 

As  Theodor  Litt1  has  remarked,  the  whole  of  Cassirer's 
philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  may  be  regarded  as  a  synthesis 
of  Kant  and  Herder,  or  as  an  adoption  into  the  former's  phi- 
losophy of  the  wider  sphere  of  interest  represented  by  the  latter. 
Kant's  epistemology,  devised  to  explain  the  possibility  of  New- 
tonian physics,  must  be  broadened  so  as  to  include  aesthetics, 
the  theory  of  language,  and  the  philosophy  of  mythology.  It 
is  high  time  for  epistemologists  to  rid  themselves  of  the  superior 
attitude  often  taken  towards  language,  myth,  and  especially  art, 
as  if  these  things  did  not  concern  them.  As  Cassirer  shows  they 
are  the  basis  of  our  knowing  life,  the  basis  upon  which  even 
science  rests.  Cassirer  has  admirably  instructive  studies  of  two  of 
the  pre-scientific  symbolic  forms,  language  and  myth.  There  is, 
however,  no  volume  on  art,  and  this  fact  is  seldom  mentioned. 

So  far  so  good.  We  have  every  reason  to  be  grateful  for 
these  excellent  books.  Yet  one  should  like  to  know  more  about 
the  way  these  pre-scientific  symbolic  forms  are  related  to  one 
another.  How  does  Cassirer  know  there  are  three  of  them? 
How  does  he  arrive  at  them?  He  simply  takes  over  the  popu- 
lar delimitations  without  caring  about  the  objections  that 
myth  may  be  a  mixture  of  artistic  imagination  and  practical  emo- 
tion of  a  certain  kind,  and  language  a  crudely  delimited  type  of 
art  or,  alternatively,  art  a  crudely  delimited  type  of  language. 
He  projects  the  idea  that  aesthetics  is  the  general  science  of 
pre-scientific  symbolism ;  but  he  rejected  it  without  anything  re- 
sembling real  disproof.2 

In  Sfrache  und  Mythos  (Leipzig  1925),  pp.  65!?.,  he  dis- 
cusses at  length  the  relations  of  language,  myth  and  art.  He 
begins  by  pointing  out  that  language  and  myth  have  "a  com- 
mon root"  and  are  the  products  of  an  ultimately  identical 
mental  function  (eine  lefote  Gemeinsamkeit  in  der  Fwnktion 
des  Gestaltens).  They  are  both  the  products  of  "metaphorical 
thinking."  He  quotes  from  Max  Muller:  "Whether  he  wanted 

1  Kant  und  Herder  als  Deuter  der  geistigen  Welt,  Leipzig  (1930),  285 f. 
*  Die  Sfrache,  Berlin  (1923),  12 of. 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    339 

to  or  not,  man  had  to  speak  in  metaphors,  not  because  he  could 
not  restrain  his  poetic  imagination,  but  rather  because  he  had 
to  use  it  to  the  utmost  in  order  to  find  expressions  for  the  ever- 
growing needs  of  his  mind."  The  growth  of  intuition,  accord- 
ingly, is  correlative  to  the  growth  of  poetic  symbolism.  The 
common  root  of  language  and  myth  turns  out  also  to  be  the 
root  of  poetryj  in  fact,  we  are  told,  they  are  originally  one, 
and  the  distinctions  between  them  were  gradually  introduced. 
"Myth,  language  and  art  begin  as  a  concrete,  undivided  unity, 
which  is  only  gradually  resolved  into  a  triad  of  independent 
modes  of  spiritual  creativity."3 

The  critic  will  remark  that  there  are  distinctions  and  dis- 
tinctions— they  need  not  all  be  of  the  same  kind.  Some  may  be 
fundamental  and  "real,"  whereas  others  are  "merely  empirical," 
more  or  less  arbitrary  cuts  in  a  flowing  continuum.  Cassirer's 
Kantianism  will  scarcely  allow  him  to  put  the  distinctions  be- 
tween abstract  and  concrete,  or  theoretical  and  practical,  moral 
good  and  sensuous  satisfaction  on  a  level  with  the  arbitrary  dis- 
tinction between,  say,  a  chair  and  a  sofa,  where  all  sorts  of 
intermediary  forms  are  conceivable.  It  is  a  question  of  logic 
whether  you  accept  "real"  distinctions  as  ultimately  different 
from  "merely  empirical"  or  "pragmatic"  ones.  But  whatever 
your  ultimate  decision  on  this  point  of  logic  will  be,  you  will 
certainly  have  to  admit  a  difference  of  status.  Now  the  critic 
may  maintain  that  the  distinctions  gradually  emerging  between 
language,  myth,  and  art  are  of  the  "merely  empirical"  variety 
and  that  pre-scientifi.c  symbolism  is  "really"  the  same  activity 
everywhere. 

Cassirer  describes  the  creation  of  myth  and  language  in  the 
very  terms  in  which  others  describe  the  process  of  artistic  crea- 
tion. Myth  arises  from  an  emotional  tension  between  man  and 
his  environment: 

then  the  spark  jumps  somehow  across,  the  tension  finds  release,  as  the 
subjective  excitement  becomes  objectified,  and  confronts  the  mind  as  a 
god  or  a  daemon.  .  .  .4  As  soon  as  the  spark  has  jumped  across,  as  soon 
as  the  tension  and  emotion  of  the  moment  has  found  its  discharge  in 

9  Language  and  Myth  (S.  Langer  translation,  1945),  98. 
33- 


340  FOLKE  LEANDER 

the  word  as  the  mythical  image,  a  sort  of  turning  point  has  occurred  in 
human  mentality:  the  inner  excitement  which  was  a  mere  subjective 
state  has  vanished,  and  has  been  resolved  into  the  objective  form  of 
myth  or  of  speech.5 

If  anything  can  be  objected  to  in  this  statement,  it  is  that  the 
additional  practical  emotion  characteristic  of  myth  is  here  over- 
looked in  favour  of  a  complete  identification  with  art.  The 
subjective  practical  emotion  is  never  completely  expressed  in 
the  mythical  image,  as  is  the  case  in  pure  art,  but  remains  as 
terror  and  awe;  and  to  this  is  added  the  practical  act  of  "belief." 
There  is  a  profound  difference  between  scientific  symbolism 
on  the  one  hand,  and  pre-scientific  symbolism  on  the  other. 
The  function  of  the  latter,  according  to  Cassirer,  is  intuitive 
elaboration  of  experience  (Intensivierung  is  his  own  term), 
whereas  the  former  aims  at  discursive  mastery,  by  means  of 
rules  and  procedures,  of  a  world  already  intuitively  appre- 
hended. Science  moves  on  the  discursive  level,  the  level  of  gen- 
eral concepts  (Allgemeinbegriffe}  and  laws.  But  this  level  of 
rationality  could  not  exist  by  itself  and  must  everywhere  attach 
itself  to  something  more  basic.  The  intuitive  level  of  experience 
is  experience  elaborated  by  means  of  linguistic,  mythical,  and 
artistic  symbolism.6 


£*.,  3  6. 

8  In  myth,  says  Cassirer,  "thought  does  not  dispose  freely  over  the  data  of 
intuition,  in  order  to  relate  and  compare  them  to  each  other,  but  is  captivated  and 
enthralled  by  the  intuition  which  suddenly  confronts  it.  It  comes  to  rest  in  the 
immediate  experience  j  the  sensible  present  is  so  great  that  everything  else  dwindles 
before  it."  (Ibid.y  32.)  ".  .  .  the  immediate  content,  whatever  it  be,  that  commands 
his  religious  interest  so  completely  fills  his  consciousness  that  nothing  else  can  exist 
beside  and  apart  from  it.  The  ego  is  spending  all  its  energy  on  this  single  object, 
lives  in  it,  loses  itself  in  it."  (Ibid.,  33.)  This  would  also  be  an  excellent  description 
of  the  aesthetic  attitude,  the  common  element  being  intuitive  elaboration,  or 
"Intensivierung,"  of  experience. 

"Language  and  myth  stand  in  an  original  and  indissoluble  correlation  with  one 
another,  from  which  they  both  emerge  but  gradually  as  independent  elements.  They 
are  two  diverse  shoots  from  the  same  parent  stem,  the  same  impulse  of  symbolic 
formulation,  springing  from  the  same  basic  mental  activity,  a  concentration  and 
heightening  of  simple  sensory  experience.  In  the  vocables  of  speech  and  in  primitive 
mythic  figurations,  the  same  inner  process  finds  its  consummation:  they  are  both 
resolutions  of  an  inner  tension,  the  representation  of  subjective  impulses  and 
excitations  in  definite  objective  forms  and  figures."  (Ibid.,  88.)  Can  anyone  fail 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    341 

The  sharp  distinction  between  the  two  levels  of  experience — 
discursive  and  intuitive — does  not  imply,  of  course,  that  mean- 
ings belong  merely  to  the  discursive  level.  There  are  also  mean- 
ings on  the  intuitive  level,  though  of  a  different  kind.  They 
may  be  termed  "felt  identities/'  "affinities,"  "qualia,"  "char- 
acters}" as  caught  and  held  in  symbols,  Cassirer  terms  them 
"Sfrachbegriffe,"  "mythische  Begriffe,"  etc. 

It  appears,  then,  that  language,  myth,  and  art  have  a  common 
task  in  the  theoretical  life  of  man,  namely,  the  intuitive  mastery 
of  experience.  This  would  seem  to  make  it  imperative  to  dis- 
criminate between  the  theoretical  and  the  practical-emotional 
aspects  of  myth,  in  which  case  the  former  could  hardly  fail  to 
be  identified  with  art.  A  similar  failure  to  distinguish  between 
the  theoretical  and  the  practical  vitiates  Cassirer's  use  of  the 
term  "expressional  phenomenon,"  by  which  he  means  the  emo- 
tional qualities  of  phenomena.  In  so  far  as  emotion  is  subservient 
to  intuition,  it  is  aesthetic}  but  it  may  also  obstruct  the  intuitive 
elaboration  of  experience  and  may  then  be  called  practical. 
Practical  emotional  qualities  are  stimuli  to  immediate  practical 
reaction:  we  give  up  the  attitude  of  contemplation,  of  intuitive 
elaboration.  Thus  sudden  fear,  if  detrimental  to  intuition,  is 
practical,  whereas  the  grandiose,  the  sublime  and  even  the  ter- 
rible may  be  aesthetic  qualities.  The  distinction  is  blurred  by  the 
use  of  the  term  "expressional  qualities"  no  less  than  in  the 
phrases  current  among  English-speaking  philosophers:  "terti- 
ary qualities"  and  the  like. 

One  should  also  note  that  the  function  Cassirer  ascribes  to 
language  is  intuitive  mastery  of  experience.  For  one  of  the 
things  that  have  evidently  puzzled  him  most,  is  the  "logical" 
element  of  language.  But,  when  raising  this  problem,  he  in- 
variably makes  a  metabasis  eis  allo  genos  and  passes  from  pre- 

to  see  that  this  is  a  perfect  description  of  the  process  of  artistic  creation?   Could 
there  be  a  better  proof  that  myth  and  language  are  aesthetic  products? 

If  discursive  thinking  "tends  toward  expansion,  implication,  and  systematic 
connection,  the  verbal  and  mythical  conception  tends  toward  concentration,  tele- 
scoping, separate  characterization."  (Ibid.,  56.)  "Here  thought  does  not  confront 
its  data  in  an  attitude  of  free  contemplation,  seeking  to  understand  their  structure 
and  their  systematic  connections,  and  analyzing  them  according  to  their  parts  and 
functions,  but  is  simply  captivated  by  a  total  impression."  (Ibid.,  57.) 


342  FOLKE  LEANDER 

scientific  to  scientific  symbolism,  asserting  that  the  same 
"Logos"  that  is  operative  in  scientific  symbolism,  is  also  at  work 
in  pre-scientific  symbolism.  If  we  ask  what  is  here  meant  by 
Logos,  we  find  that  several  different  meanings  are  crowded 
together  into  one  term.  "Logos"  may  mean  spiritual  synthesis 
in  general:  and  in  this  case  it  is,  of  course,  true  that  Logos  is 
operative  in  pre-scientific  symbolism.  But  Logos  may  also  mean 
the  thinking  of  scientific  and  general  concepts:  and  in  this  case 
it  can  be  shown,  I  think,  that  Logos  is  altogether  outside  of  in- 
tuition and  of  pre-scientific  symbolism,  although  it  may  leave 
results  that  may  be  absorbed  in  the  latter.  (I  shall  explain  pres- 
ently what  is  meant  by  the  last  clause.) 

As  we  have  seen,  meanings,  according  to  Cassirer,  are  found 
also  on  the  intuitive  level;  as  caught  and  held  in  linguistic 
symbols  they  are  "Sfrachbegriffe"  not  to  be  confused  with 
general  or  scientific  concepts.  When  he  asserts  that  the  same 
Logos  is  operative  in  the  creation  of  "S-prachbe griff eP  which 
on  a  higher  level  is  operative  in  the  creation  of  scientific  con- 
cepts, this  assertion  is  only  acceptable  if  Logos  means  Geist  in 
general.  But  Cassirer  also  means  that  "Sprachbegriffe"  are  a 
confused  and  preliminary  creation  of  Logos  in  the  sense  of 
scientific  intellect.  This  latter  assertion  seems  to  me  untenable. 

The  confusion  is  made  possible  by  the  fact  that  general  and 
scientific  concepts  may  be  "absorbed"  into  intuition.  An  electric 
charge  is  one  thing  for  the  engineer  in  his  capacity  of  scientific 
specialist  5  it  is  a  different  thing  for  the  layman  and  even  for 
the  engineer  himself  qua  non-specialist.  What  was  originally 
a  mere  formula,  a  rule  of  procedure,  may  through  practice  and 
experience  of  its  effects  be  transformed  into  an  intuitive  affinity, 
a  quale,  a  Gestalt,  a  characteristic  physiognomy.  As  John  Dewey 
puts  it: 

In  the  situation  which  follows  upon  reflection,  meanings  are  intrinsic; 
they  have  no  instrumental  or  subservient  office,  because  they  have  no 
office  at  all.  They  are  as  much  qualities  of  the  objects  in  the  situation  as 
are  red  and  black,  hard  and  soft,  square  and  round.  And  every  re- 
flective experience  adds  new  shades  of  such  intrinsic  qualifications.7 

1  Essays  in  Experimental  Logic,  (1916)  17.  Cf.  also  How  We  Think,  (1933), 
135  ff.  ("Things  and  Meanings")*  and  Logic,  (1938)  ch.  VIII  ("Immediate 
Knowledge"). 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    343 

Perhaps  Dewey's  term  "intrinsic  qualifications"  is  better  than 
any  of  those  I  have  so  far  used  (affinity,  physiognomy,  quale, 
etc.).  Discursive  procedures,  then,  may  grow  intuitive,  ideas 
may  lose  their  intellectual  quality  by  habitual  use.  And,  as  a 
parallel  process,  general  and  scientific  concepts  may  be  trans- 
formed into  "Sfrachbegriffe"  Dewey  distinguishes  between 
two  types  of  grasp  of  meaning:  the  strictly  logical  type  and  the 
"aesthetic"  perception  of  intrinsic  qualifications,  which  is  some- 
times called  acquaintance-knowledge.  We  apprehend  chairs, 
tables,  books,  trees,  horses,  stars,  rain,  etc.,  promptly  and  di- 
rectly $  we  need  not  think  about  these  things  in  order  to  identify 
them;  we  cannot  help  seeing  them  as  chairs,  tables,  etc. 

Certainly  logical  thought-processes  leave  results  in  intuition  j 
the  starry  heavens,  for  instance,  look  different  to  us  from  what 
they  did  to  a  contemporary  of  Dante.  But  there  is  also  a  move- 
ment in  the  opposite  direction.  "Red"  meant  originally  an  in- 
tuitively felt  affinity  j  but  when  definite  procedures  have  been 
developed, — e.g.y  the  colour-pyramid, — it  may  mean  a  loom 
within  the  system. 

In  spite  of  all  this  give  and  take,  however,  the  intuitive  and 
the  discursive  levels  remain  different.  Since  the  aim  and  func- 
tion of  "Sfrachbegriffe?*  is  altogether  different  from  that  of 
general  and  scientific  concepts,  the  former  cannot  be  viewed  as 
an  inferior  and  undeveloped  variety  of  the  latter.  Yet  the  inter- 
play between  the  levels  is  certainly  misleading.  On  the  intuitive 
level,  Cassirer  says,  meanings  are  "fused"  (eingeschmolzen) 
with  the  concrete.8  And  he  paints  a  picture  of  the  poor  Logos 
like  a  butterfly  grovelling  in  the  dust,  until  in  science  it  dis- 
engages itself  from  the  many-coloured  intuition,  rises  into  the 
air,  and  starts  out  on  a  proud  flight  in  its  own  proper  element.9 

1  Phanomenologie der  Erkenntiris,  (1929),  327. 

9  Phanomenologie  der  Erkenntms,  395!.  "It  is  true  that  an  abyss  appears  to  yawn 
between  the  scientific  concept  and  the  verbal  concept — however,  looked  at  more 
closely  this  abyss  is  exactly  the  same  gulf  which  thinking  had  to  bridge  earlier 
before  it  could  become  verbal  thought.  .  .  .  Now  thought  has  to  tear  loose  not 
merely  from  the  here  and  now,  from  the  respective  location  and  moment,  but  it 
has  to  reach  beyond  the  totality  of  space  and  time,  beyond  the  limits  of  perceptual 
description,  and  of  description  and  describability  in  general.  .  .  .  The  Vehicle*  of 
word-language  which  served  for  so  long  a  time,  will  now  bear  him  no  farther- 
but  he  feels  himself  strong  and  powerful  enough  to  risk  the  flight  which  is  to 
carry  him  to  a  new  goal." 


344  FOLKE  LEANDER 

But  this  metaphor  is  objectionable.  The  Logos  flying  discur- 
sively in  the  air  is  different  from  that  working  intuitively  within 
experience.  Both  are  needed  $  but  the  intuitive  Logos  is  no 
preliminary  variety  of  the  scientific  Logos. 

This  panlogistic  tendency  is  incompatible  with  the  main 
body  of  Cassirer's  thought.  For  he  teaches  that  language  is  in 
essence  intuitive  elaboration  (Intensvolerung)  of  experience. 
And  he  also  teaches  that  the  "logical"  element  of  language,  in 
so  far  as  "Sprachbegriffe"  are  concerned,  should  not  be  called 
logical  at  all,  if  we  distinguish  between  an  intuitive  and  a  dis- 
cursive, logical  level  of  experience.  Language  is  correlative  to 
intrinsic  qualifications,  characters,  physiognomies,  qualia,  affini- 
ties, or  whatever  term  may  be  used  for  the  meanings  belonging 
to  the  intuitive  level. 

All  this,  the  critic  will  add,  proves  that  language  is  essentially 
an  aesthetic  activity.  Of  course,  in  reasoning  language  is  the 
bearer  of  logical  meanings;  yet  even  pure  mathematics  has 
an  aesthetic  side,  since  it  is  an  existential  thought-process.  The 
mathematical  concepts  are  embodied  in  aesthetically  meaningful 
concrete  processes.  Words,  says  Cassirer,  are  mere  "signs"  or 
"vehicles"  of  logical  meanings.10  The  relation  between  intuitive 
meanings  and  language  is  that  of  vital  incarnation.  Words  ex- 
press intuitive  meanings  but  statey  or  are  mere  signs  of,  logical 
meanings.  On  the  intuitive  level,  says  Cassirer,  "the  word  which 
denotes  that  thought  content  is  not  a  mere  conventional  symbol, 
but  is  merged  with  its  object  in  an  indissoluble  unity."11  If  the 
lightning  is  seen  as  a  snake,  it  will  also  be  called  "the  snake  of 

"For  it  is  precisely  the  'Logos/  which  was  at  work  from  the  beginning  in  the 
creation  of  language,  which,  in  the  progress  to  scientific  knowledge,  frees  itself 
from  the  limiting  conditions  which  originally  clung  to  it — which  proceeds  from 
its  implicit  form  into  its  explicit  form."  (Ibid.y  388) 

10  "For  theoretical  thinking,  a  word  is  essentially  a  vehicle  serving  the  funda- 
mental aim  of  such  ideation:  the  establishment  of  relationships  between  the  given 
phenomenon  and  others  which  are  "like"  it  or  otherwise  connected  with  it  according 
to  some  co-ordinating  law.  .  .  .  The  word  stands,  so  to  speak,  between  actual 
particular  impressions,  as  a  phenomenon  of  a  different  order,  a  new  intellectual 
dimension)    and  to  this  mediating  position,  this  remoteness  from  the  sphere  of 
immediate  data,  it  owes  the  freedom  and  ease  with  which  it  moves  among  specific 
objects  and  connects  one  with  another."  Language  and  Myth,  (Langer  tr.)  56f. 

11  Language  and  Myth,  58. 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    345 

the  sky:"  intuitive  elaboration  and  linguistic  naming  is  here  one 
and  the  same  activity.  "The  spiritual  excitement  caused  by  some 
object  which  presents  itself  in  the  outer  world  furnishes  both 
the  occasion  and  the  means  of  its  denomination.  Sense  impres- 
sions .  .  .  naturally  strive  for  vocal  expression."12  Language  and 
intuition  are  correlative  and  develop  together.  Intuitive  mean- 
ings are  vitally  fused  with  intuition,  and  so  they  are  fused  with 
language.  Scientific  and  general  concepts,  on  the  other  hand, 
are  externally  related  to  intuition  and  have  a  corresponding 
status  in  its  correlative,  language.  Since  this  is  Cassirer's  own 
view,  why  does  he  reject  the  aesthetic  theory  of  language?  He 
not  only  rejects  it  but  misrepresents  it  as  wanting  to  reduce 
language  to  mere  animal  expression,  to  mere  "naturliche  Sym- 
bolik"  mere  "Laut  der  Emfindung."™  But  surely  nothing  of 
the  sort  has  been  meant  by  those  who  have  held  the  theory  in 
question. 

A  significant  omission  is  Cassirer's  failure  to  mention  Baum- 
garten  in  his  survey  of  the  history  of  the  philosophy  of  lan- 
guage. Certainly  his  view  of  oratio  sensitive  as  correlative  to 
cognitio  sensitivat  or  intuition,  is  worthy  of  close  attention.  The 
"distinct"  concepts,  Leibniz  had  said,  are  exemplified  in  our 
conceptual  methods  of  recognizing  objects  as  belonging  to  a 
class;  but  there  is  also  an  intuitive  way  of  recognizing  them. 
We  immediately  see  chairs  as  chairs  and  feel  no  need  of  pro- 
ceeding by  rule.  This  is  the  level  of  "clear  but  confused"  cate- 
gories, i.e.y  of  everyday  intuition  and,  as  Baumgarten  pointed 
out,  in  its  most  intense  form  the  level  of  art.  For  art  is  perfectio 
cognition/is  semitivaey  qua  talis.  In  the  same  way,  ordinary 
speech  is  inherently  aesthetic,  oratio  sensitiva,  although  the 
word  poetry  is  reserved  for  its  more  intense  form,  oratio  sensi- 
tiva  ferfecta.  What  Baumgarten  means  by  "sensitive"  speech 
might  be  freely  expressed  as  follows.  The  nature  of  speech  is 
that  of  "painting  a  picture"  of  something,  e.g.,  of  something 
I  want  you  to  do,  or  of  the  field  where  the  point  is  localized 
on  which  I  want  you  to  give  me  information.  Of  course,  the 
analogy  with  painting  must  not  be  pressed:  it  only  lays  hold  of 

18  Ibid.)  89.  H.  Usener,  as  quoted  by  Cassirer. 

18  Ibid.,  3  of.  Cf.  also  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwtsstnscfaften,  37^  ' 


346  FOLKE  LEANDER 

the  fact  that  the  function  of  speech  is  that  of  conjuring  up  some- 
thing concrete,  however  "thin,"  schematic,  and  bare  of  details 
it  may  be.  Even  a  newspaper  headline  is  oratio  sensitiva,  al- 
though ordinarily  very  far  from  ferfecta. 

It  is  strange  that  Cassirer,  the  distinguished  Leibnizian 
scholar,  should  have  made  no  use  of  the  philosophy  of  lan- 
guage proposed  by  Baumgarten,  the  founder  of  aesthetics.  Here 
is  a  perfect  distinction  between  the  conceptual  and  the  intuitive 
levels  of  experience.  The  "affinities"  or  general  "characters" 
belonging  to  the  latter  level  are  accounted  for  as  "confused 
concepts."  And  language  is  seen  to  be  the  correlative  of  intui- 
tion. All  this  returns  in  Cassirer's  own  philosophy,  even  the 
doubtful  part  of  Leibniz-Baumgarten,  namely,  the  view  of 
intuitive  reason  as  an  imperfect  and  preliminary  form  of  scien- 
tific reason.  Only  Baumgarten's  insight  into  the  fundamentally 
aesthetic  nature  of  intuition  and  language  has  fallen  out  of  the 
picture.  I  believe  it  will  have  to  be  re-introduced. 

II 

A  More  Careful  Distinction  between  Form  and  Material 

One  may  note  in  Cassirer  a  certain  attachment  to  what  Dewey 
has  termed  "the  museum  conception  of  art."  Dewey  holds  the 
view  that  any  experience  to  the  extent  to  which  it  is  an  experi- 
ence, is  aesthetic14 — an  idea  that  goes  back  to  Baumgarten, 
Herder,  and  the  romantics.  From  this  point  of  view  a  "tran- 
scendental aesthetics"  would  not  be  the  doctrine  of  mathemati- 
cal time  and  space  but  simply  aesthetics.  The  subjects  dealt  with 
by  Kant  at  the  end  of  his  system,  in  the  Critique  of  Judgment, 
would  be  placed  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  system.  Or  rather, 
since  all  rationality  is  "absorbed"  and  all  practical  emotion  is 
expressed  in  intuition,  the  doctrine  of  intuition  would  be  at 
once  at  the  end  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  system,  which  would 
accordingly  be  as  circular  as  experience  itself:  Theodor  Litt 
says  that  if  Kant  had  ever  discovered  real  intuition  as  some- 
thing very  different  from  mathematical  tiipe  and  space,  he 
would  hardly  have  failed  to  place  art  on  this  level ;  and  further, 

14  Art  at  Experience,  (x  934) . 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    347 

"he  could  not  have  been  able  to  escape  the  insight  which 
dominated  a  Herder,  namely  that  aesthetic  experiences  stand 
by  no  means  alone  in  this  regard,  but  rather  constitute  the 
highest  intensification  of  the  spiritual  situation  which  runs 
through  all  and  every  sensory  world  view."16  In  short,  the  true 
"transcendental  aesthetics"  is  simply  aesthetics;  intuition  and  its 
correlative,  the  pre-scientific  symbolism,  may  be  divided  and 
subdivided  in  many  ways  by  means  of  "merely  empirical"  dis- 
tinctions, but  "really"  it  is  one  identical  activity  everywhere — 
an  activity,  which  in  its  more  intense  form  is  recognized  as 
aesthetic.  A  division  of  our  intuitive  acts  into  "more  intense" 
and  "less  intense"  would  itself  be  merely  empirical.  "We  all 
take  some  pleasure,"  says  Dr.  Barnes,  "in  seeing  how  things 
look,  in  observing  their  colour,  their  contour,  their  movement, 
whether  they  are  moving  in  our  direction  or  not.  In  so  far  as 
we  are  successful  in  finding  what  is  characteristic,  appealing, 
or  significant  in  the  world  about  us,  we  are,  in  a  small  im- 
promptu way,  ourselves  artists."16  He  adds  that  "the  artist 
differs  from  the  ordinary  person  partly  by  his  ability  to  make 
what  he  sees  a  public  object,  but  chiefly  in  the  range  and  depth 
of  his  vision  itself."17  A  novelist  spending  weeks  and  months  on 
working  out  a  "great"  intuition,  merely  intensifies  an  activity 
in  which  we  are  all  engaged.  We  all  want  clarity  of  vision  and 
imaginative  interpretation  of  experience.  As  Cassirer  points  out, 
the  poet  does  not  "know"  what  he  wants  to  say,  until  he  has 
said  it;  he  obscurely  feels  something  working  within  him,  but 
he  does  not  know  what,  until  he  has  defined  it  in  a  work  of 
art.18  Similarly,  it  might  be  added,  workmen  had  no  "class- 
consciousness"  until  Marx  and  others  created  their  "myths"  (as 
Sorel  would  say) ;  surely  there  were  all  sorts  of  obscure  feelings 
among  the  workmen,  but  they  were  not  articulated.  In  the 
same  way,  we  are  all  dependent  upon  poets,  prophets  and 
artists  for  our  imaginative  interpretation  of  experience.  There 
is  no  difference  of  kind  between  our  everyday  intuitive  activities 

v  Kant  und  Herder,  61 . 

M  Albert  C.  Barnes:  The  Art  in  Painting,  3rd  ed.  (1937)  12. 

"Ibid.,  13. 

*  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften,  1 30. 


348  FOLKE  LEANDER 

and  those  of  the  great  "seers,"  merely  a  difference  of  intensity 
and  degree.  Just  as  the  science  of  biology  deals  with  cells  as 
well  as  elephants,  so  the  science  of  intuition  deals  with  everyday 
intuitive  awareness,  however  insignificant,  as  well  as  with  those 
greater  intuitions  recognized  as  aesthetic. 

Anyone  who  takes  such  a  broad  view  of  aesthetics  will  almost 
inevitably  be  led  to  look  upon  the  division  of  Art  into  various 
arts  and  genres  as  "merely  empirical"  distinctions.  Surely  the 
distinction  between  art  and  science  is  "real"  in  a  sense  in  which 
the  distinctions  between  various  arts  are  superficial  and  "prag- 
matic." Cassirer  on  the  other  hand,  not  having  freed  himself 
entirely  from  the  "museum"  idea  of  art,  believes  that  the  main 
arts  and  genres  are  a  priori,  inherent  in  the  very  idea,  the  "cate- 
gory" of  art.  I  do  not  know  whether  or  not  Cassirer  would 
nowadays  accept  the  "panaesthetic"  conception  of  experience. 
But,  even  if  he  does,  he  will  certainly  cling  to  his  view  of  cer- 
tain major  arts  as  a  priori,  categorically  (not  merely  em- 
pirically) distinct. 

The  objections  to  such  a  view  seem  to  me  very  strong.  After 
all,  a  human  race  may  be  conceived  having  neither  eyes  nor  ears 
and  yet  endowed  with  a  type  of  experience  resembling  our  own 
in  certain  general  traits.  Their  art  would  be  very  different  from 
ours.  Further,  new  arts  constantly  arise  in  the  course  of  his- 
tory. Painting  grew  out  of  Byzantine  mosaics  j  sculpture  was 
originally  an  integral  part  of  architecture — both  may  be  an 
integral  part  of  town-planning;  music  had  no  existence  apart 
from  song,  etc.  Recent  arts  are  the  movies  and  the  radio  drama. 
Art  is  the  activity  of  organizing  a  material  so  as  to  be  pleasing 
in  perception — so  as  to  give  the  perceiver  an  integral,  rounded 
"experience."  Since  any  material  or  combination  of  materials 
may  be  shaped  into  beauty,  the  number  of  artistic  media  is  in 
principle  unlimited.  To  what  art  belong  good  manners,  a  per- 
sonal style  of  dressing  and  talking,  pleasant  conversation — the 
sort  of  aesthetic  shaping  that  we  all  practice  daily?  Are  they 
one  art  or  several  arts?  It  might  seem  as  if  all  the  means  used 
to  give  a  total  unified  impression  ought  to  be  considered  one 
art.  Song  is  not  a  combination  of  two  arts,  poetry  plus  music, 
like  one  cake  put  upon  another.  In  dancing  to  music,  the  move- 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    349 

ments  and  the  music  are  fused  into  one  organic  whole  $  the 
division  into  two  arts  is  "merely  empirical,"  whereas  the 
aesthetic  reality  is  an  integral  whole.  When  the  Greeks  painted 
their  statues,  this  was  not  a  simple  addition  of  two  arts.  A 
church  service,  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  aesthetic  experience,  is  a 
whole,  although  numerous  media  may  be  empirically  distin- 
guished. Man,  says  Schiller,  "soil  alles  Inner  veraussern  und 
alles  Aussere  formen"  The  emphasis  should  be  put  upon 
"alles  Aussere" — all  materials  can  be  shaped  into  beauty,  the 
possible  media  are  infinite  in  number.  Historical  traditions  arise, 
certain  media  become  traditional  like  colours  on  canvas  or  theat- 
rical representation.  But  there  are  always  numerous  media 
which  do  not  fit  into  the  classifications  based  upon  the  more 
important  traditions.  Dewey  asks: 

What  can  such  classifications  make  out  of  sculpture  in  relief,  high  and 
low,  of  marble  figures  on  tombs,  carved  on  wooden  doors  and  cast  in 
bronze  doors?  What  about  carvings  on  capitals,  friezes,  cornices,  cano- 
pies, brackets?  How  do  the  minor  arts  fit  in,  workings  in  ivory,  alabaster, 
plaster-paris,  terra-cotta,  silver  and  gold,  ornamental  iron  work  in  brack, 
ets,  signs,  hinges,  screens  and  grills?19 

All  classifications  can  here  be  made,  since  the  materials  are  a 
continuum  with  all  sorts  of  intermediary  forms  and  endless 
overlappings  and  combinations.  If  we  distinguish  between  aes- 
thetic "form"  and  the  "material"  formed,  it  seems  evident 
that  the  differences  between  the  various  arts  and  genres  belong 
altogether  to  the  material  side  and  leave  aesthetic  form  un- 
affected. 

If  one  were  to  accept  such  a  theory,  Cassirer  objects, 

one  would,  by  so  doing,  be  led  to  the  strange  conclusion  that,  by 
calling  Beethoven  a  great  musician,  Rembrandt  a  great  painter,  Homer 
a  great  epic  poet,  Shakespeare  a  great  dramatist,  only  inconsequential 
empirical  marginal  conditions  were  expressed  by  such  assertions,  con- 
ditions aesthetically  quite  unimportant  and  for  their  characteristics  as 
artists  entirely  superfluous.20 

In  the  same  way,  one  might  argue,  it  is  no  indifferent  matter 

w  Art  as  Experience,  p.  223. 

20  Zw  Logik  der  Kulturwissensckaften,  p.  130. 


350  FOLKE  LEANDER 

that  Ariosto  wrote  a  romance  and  Virgil  an  epic,  or  that 
D.  G.  Rossetti  wrote  sonnets  and  Wordsworth  long  poems  as 
well  as  short.  No  such  things  are  indifferent — or  rather,  the 
one  important  thing,  to  which  everything  adds  up,  is  that 
Wordsworth  was  Wordsworth  and  Rossetti  was  Rossetti.  Of 
course,  it  is  no  matter  of  indifference  that  Shakespeare  wrote 
for  the  stage,  or,  in  brief,  all  such  circumstances  added  together, 
that  Shakespeare  was  Shakespeare.  Yet  aesthetically  the  essen- 
tial point  is  that  the  stage  as  a  traditional  medium  belonged  to 
the  "material"  side  of  his  works  of  art,  not  to  their  "formal" 
side.  And  on  the  material  side  there  are  no  barriers  between 
media — they  may  merge  by  insensible  gradations. 

Cassirer  is  quite  right  in  saying:  "Beethoven's  intuition  is  in 
the  realm  of  music.  Phidias'  intuition  is  in  that  of  sculpture, 
Milton's  in  epic  poetry,  and  Goethe's  in  lyric  poetry.  All  of  this 
concerns  not  merely  the  external  husk,  but  the  core  of  their 
creative  work."21  But  this  only  means  that  the  imagination  of 
an  artist  works  within  some  medium.  Perhaps  it  was  a  mere 
coincidence  that  originally  presented  this  medium  to  his  imagi- 
nation. Perhaps  he  has  to  change  and  develop  the  medium  in 
order  to  make  it  a  vehicle  for  what  he  wants  to  say.  Perhaps, 
having  had  an  initial  experience  of  various  media,  he  chooses 
the  one  which  for  some  reason  or  other  suits  him  best — a  deaf 
man,  for  instance,  is  not  likely  to  choose  music,  nor  a  colour- 
blind man  painting.  One  puts  a  false  interpretation  upon  these 
facts,  if  one  infers  that  the  types  of  intuition  enumerated  by 
Cassirer  are  categorial  and  a  priori  divisions. 

One  may  very  well,  it  may  be  added,  recognize  the  non- 
categorial  and  merely  empirical  status  of  the  arts  and  at  the 
same  time  dislike  the  romantic  confusions,  rooted  in  a  love  of 
suggestion  for  its  own  sake.  Irving  Babbitt  was  thoroughly 
right  in  The  New  Laokoon,  An  Essay  on  the  Confusion  of  the 
Arts  (1910).  These  romantics  want  to  put  us  in  a  state  of 
sensuous,  even  voluptuous  dreaming,  they  want  to  thrill  us 
with  strange  and  surprising  effects.  There  is  no  contradiction 
between  clear  insight  in  the  non-aesthetic  character  of  such 
endeavours  and  recognition  of  the  merely  empirical  status  of 
the  arts  and  genres. 

"ibid.,  131. 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    351 

A  similar  tendency  to  apriorize  merely  empirical  distinctions 
can  be  noticed  in  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  language.  When  he 
speaks  of  "the  form  of  a  language,"  it  is  clear  that  the  word 
"form"  does  not  merely  denote  the  nature  of  essence  of  lan- 
guage in  general  but  also  the  fundamental  and  enduring  lin- 
guistic habits  of  a  particular  people.  Cassirer  here  uses  the 
word  "form"  in  the  same  way  as  Humboldt  did  when  speaking 
of  the  innere  Sprachform  of  a  particular  language.  There  is  no 
objection  to  such  a  terminology,  unless  it  leads  to  confusion 
between  enduring  linguistic  habits  (or  even  among  these  only 
the  habits  denominated  grammatical)  and  linguistic  form  per 
se.  For  such  a  confusion  would  mean  that  "empirically"  distin- 
guished, historically  conditioned  habit-systems  are  apriorized 
into  eternal  subdivisions  of  speech  as  a  universal  form  of  ac- 
tivity. 

Suppose  we  distinguish  carefully  between  linguistic  and  ar- 
tistic "form,"  on  the  one  hand,  and  habits  and  traditions  on  the 
other.  Suppose  further  that  we  call  the  "merely  empirical" 
distinctions  made  among  the  latter:  Stilbegriffe.  Then  we  would 
have  adopted  a  term  introduced  by  Cassirer  in  Zur  Logik  der 
Kulturwissenschajteny  using  it  in  approximately  the  same  sense 
as  he  does.  In  order  to  write  the  history  of  language  and  of  art 
— thus  Cassirer  begins  his  exposition  of  what  he  means  by 
Stilbegriffe — we  need  a  great  variety  of  terms  describing  the 
structure  of  artistic  and  linguistic  phenomena.  Open  any  gram- 
mar or  any  history  of  art  or  literature,  and  you  will  be  able 
to  grab  them  with  both  hands.  Thus  Wolfflin  distinguishes  be- 
tween a  "picturesque"  and  a  "linear"  style,  and  Humboldt  in- 
troduces the  notion  of  "polysynthetic"  languages.  These  types 
of  concepts,  Cassirer  goes  on  to  say,  differ  both  from  those  of 
natural  science  and  from  the  concepts  of  value  (Wertbegriffe). 

So  far  no  objection  can  be  raised.  Certainly  history  and  the 
enquiry  into  general  terms  must  keep  pacej  a  theory  of  language 
and  a  theory  of  art  are  indispensable  in  writing  the  history 
of  these  activities.22  But  are  the  basic  concepts  in  these  theories — 

M  "On  the  one  hand  it  is  clear  that  the  creation  of  a  theory  of  language  is  not 
possible  without  constant  reference  to  the  results  achieved  in  the  history  of  language 
and  in  psychology  of  language.  Such  a  theory  can  not  be  erected  in  the  empty  space 
of  [mere]  abstraction  or  speculation.  But  it  is  equally  clear  that  empirical  research 
in  the  realm  of  linguistics  as  in  that  of  the  psychology  of  language  must  constantly 


352  FOLKE  LEANDER 

the  concepts  of  "language"  and  "art" — also  Stilbegriffe?  Cas- 
sirer  says  nothing  about  "art"  in  this  context;  but  "language" 
evidently  is  included  among  the  "concepts  of  style."23  He  says 
nothing  about  the  relation  of  "concepts  of  style"  to  "concepts 
of  value"  and  seems  to  have  altogether  forgotten  that  the  latter 
have  also  a  function  in  the  theories  of  art  and  language.  "Art" 
is  obviously  a  value  term,  since  a  work  of  art  is  the  better,  the 
more  it  is  art;  on  the  other  hand,  no  "picturesque"  or  "linear" 
work  of  art  is  the  better,  the  more  picturesque  or  linear  it  is. 
Similarly,  "polysynthetic"  is  no  value  term,  but  "speech"  is: 
only  in  so  far  as  a  person  manages  to  express  what  he  wants  to 
express — and  this  is  a  question  of  degrees — has  he  achieved 
articulate  speech. 

Thus  Wertbegriffe  are  seen  to  denote  the  "form"  or  eternal 
nature  of  art  and  language,  whereas  Stilbegriffe  denote  em- 
pirically demarcated  tendencies  and  habits.  But  no  such  sharp 
distinction  is  to  be  found  in  Cassirer's  book.  The  student  of  his 
thought  is  left  with  the  task  of  working  it  out  for  himself. 

Ill 

An  Analysis  of  the  Logic  of  History  and  the 
Logic  of  Philosophy 

As  we  have  seen,  "Logos"  in  its  highest,  purest  and  most 
intense  form  is  supposed  to  be  identical  with  mathematical 
science.  In  The  Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms  Cassirer  always 
means  mathematical  science,  when  speaking  of  Wissenschaft. 

presuppose  concepts  which  can  only  be  taken  from  the  linguistic  'theory  of  forms.' 
If  investigations  are  to  be  initiated  to  ascertain  in  which  order  the  various  classes 
of  words  occur  in  the  linguistic  development  of  the  child,  or  to  ascertain  in  which 
phase  the  child  moves  from  the  use  of  the  'single  word  sentence*  to  the  'paratacticaP 
sentence,  and  from  this  latter  to  the  'hypotacticaP  sentence,  it  must  be  clear  that  in 
such  procedure  [of  investigation]  the  meaning  of  quite  definite  basic  categories 
of  the  'theory  of  forms,'  of  grammar  and  of  syntax,  are  laid  down  as  basic.  Else- 
where also  it  is  shown  again  and  again  that  empirical  research  loses  itself  in 
'Schemfrobleme'  and  gets  entangled  in  insoluble  antinomies,  if  careful  conceptual 
reflection  concerning  what  precisely  language  'is*  does  not  come  to  the  aid  of  such 
research  and  accompanies  it  constantly  in  the  putting  of  its  questions."  Zur  Logik 
der  Kulturwissenschajten,  75. 
*Ibid.,  75f. 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    353 

History  and  philosophy  are  silently  allowed  to  drop  out  of  the 
picture. 

Modern  philosophers  since  Descartes  have  been  chiefly  in- 
terested in  the  thought-processes  of  mathematicians  and  scien- 
tists. They  have  until  recently  evinced  little  interest  in  those 
of  the  historians.  And  very  few  have  even  today  discovered 
that  their  own  philosophical  activities  might  be  as  interesting 
logically  as  those  of  scientists  and  mathematicians.  The  logic 
of  philosophical  thought  is  a  field  which  has  not  been  discovered 
at  all  by  the  majority  of  philosophers.  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  see 
why  general  statements  should  not  be  made  about  the  activity 
of  philosophizing. 

When  exalting  mathematical  science  to  the  highest  place  in 
our  knowledge-getting  life,  Cassirer  seems  to  have  forgotten 
the  claims  of  his  own  subject,  philosophy.  He  has  said  excellent 
things  on  the  activities  of  mathematicians  and  scientists,  and 
also  some  good  things  on  history.  On  the  activity  of  philosophiz- 
ing there  is  little  more  than  a  chapter  on  "Subjective  and 
Objective  Analysis"  in  The  Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms. 
And  this  chapter  does  not  take  us  very  far. 

A  brief  criticism  of  other  thinkers  may  be  helpful.  Dewey 
touches  upon  the  logic  of  philosophy,  or  more  specifically  the 
logic  of  logical  enquiry,  in  the  Introduction  to  his  Logic.2*  He 
believes  that  the  philosopher's  thought-processes  can  be  ac- 
counted for  by  a  pragmatic  logic  5  they  present  no  special  diffi- 
culties. Similarly,  logical  positivists,  when  occasionally  con- 
fronted with  the  problem,  affirm  that  their  own  philosophy  is 
a  hypothesis  of  the  same  sort  as  any  other  scientific  hypothesis. 
Their  own  philosophy,  in  other  words,  is  only  probable  and 
must  be  verified  by  experience.  But  anyone  who  says:  "Our 
philosophy  is  only  a  hypothesis,"  is  surely  talking  nonsense;  for 
in  this  statement  is  implicitly  contained  another  one:  "The 
criterion  of  verification  is  the  ultimate  court  of  appeal  deciding 
the  fate  of  each  and  every  philosophy."  An  absolute,  unhypo- 
thetical  statement  has  been  made.  To  put  it  in  other  words: 
anyone  who  asserts  that  "'philosophies  are  hypotheses"  thereby 
affirms  hypothesis-verification  as  the  ultimate  truth  about  our 

*  Logic:  The  Theory  of  Inquiry,  by  John  Dewey  (New  York,  1938). 


354  FOLKE  LEANDER 

knowledge-getting  life.  To  put  it  in  a  third  manner:  when  we 
are  supposed  to  be  choosing  between  various  systems  of  philo- 
sophical axioms  by  testing  their  applicability  to  experience,  we 
are  also  supposed  already  to  have  a  philosophical  system,  of 
which  the  idea  of  "applicability  to  experience"  forms  a  part. 
This  shows  that  the  logic  of  philosophy  does  present  special 
difficulties  and  does  not  fit  into  pragmatic  logic. 

What,  then,  is  the  logic  of  philosophical  thinking?  If  phi- 
losophy is  self-knowledge,  the  logic  of  philosophy  is  an  account 
of  what  happens  in  self-knowledge.  That  self-knowledge  does 
not  fit  into  pragmatic  logic  can  easily  be  shown.  It  is  often 
affirmed  that  all  a  priori  truth  is  analytic  and  all  empirical  state- 
ments merely  probable.  But  if  one  can  be  sure  of  an  analytic 
truth,  one  can  certainly  also  be  sure  of  the  existence  of  the 
thought-process  in  which  the  analytic  truth  is  being  sought;  and 
one  can  also  affirm  with  certainty  that  the  existential  thought- 
process  in  question  belongs  to  a  certain  kind  of  thought-processes, 
those  which  the  theory  calls  analytic.  Here  is  an  element  of 
self-knowledge  which  is  at  once  a  priori  and  empirical.  Further, 
no  verification  of  a  hypothesis  can  take  place,  unless  we  can 
know  with  certainty  that  we  are  verifying  a  hypothesis;  an 
infinite  regress  of  verifying  that  we  are  verifying  provides  no 
escape  from  nihilism — it  is  like  lifting  oneself  by  one's  boot- 
straps. Without  an  assertion  somewhere  there  can  be  no  proba- 
bility, only  a  mass  of  hypothetical  sentences;  even  an  infinite 
amount  of  "if-then"-sentences  does  not  provide  us  with  a 
single  probability.  Self-knowledge  that  we  are  verifying  is 
accordingly  indispensable.  Similarly,  the  philosophical  method 
of  analyzing  linguistic  statements  presupposes  the  absolute 
knowledge  (at  once  empirical  and  a  priori)  that  "this  is  a  lin- 
guistic statement" — and  this  is  a  piece  of  self-knowledge, 
knowledge  of  our  own  activity  of  speaking  and  of  reconstruct- 
ing other  people's  expressions. 

In  short,  knowledge  of  our  own  activities  and  attitudes — 
verifying  analytic  thinking,  expressing  oneself  (speaking),  re- 
constructing expressions  (listening,  reading),  imagining,  ob- 
serving, philosophizing,  etc., — must  in  a  sense  be  immediate 
and  direct,  for  otherwise  the  whole  structure  of  knowledge 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    355 

would  break  down.  Self-knowledge  is  the  basis  of  all  other 
knowledge.  Now  self-knowledge  is  in  one  respect  historical 
(knowledge  of  individual  processes)  and  in  another  respect 
philosophical  (knowledge  of  the  general  categories  of  activity, 
like  those  just  mentioned).  The  history  of  philosophy  is  the 
history  of  a  growing  insight  into  the  nature  of  our  own  ac- 
tivities. And  the  method  of  philosophy  has  been  a  sort  of 
direct  inspection  of  our  activities,  often  called  "reflection" 
upon  them. 

Now  what  has  just  been  advanced  as  a  criticism  of  prag- 
matism and  logical  positivism  indicates  the  way  I  believe  mod- 
ern philosophy  will  develop.25  And  it  also  indicates  a  realm 
which  Cassirer  has  left  unexplored.  The  logical  analysis  of  what 
philosophers  are  doing  and  how  they  do  it — the  logic  of  think- 
ing the  Idea,  as  Hegel  would  say — has  become  a  problem  to 
modern  neo-Hegelians  like  Emil  Lask,  Theodor  Litt,  Richard 
Kroner  and  Benedetto  Croce.26  But  Cassirer  remains  a  neo- 
Kantian  and  refuses  to  venture  into  these  problems.  Abstract 
mathematics  and  unreal  scientific  constructions  are  to  him  the 
true  nature  of  Logos.  We  go  beyond  him  by  identifying  Logos 
with  the  Idea  and  interpreting  philosophy  as  the  self-conscious- 
ness of  Logos. 

The  subject  may  also  be  approached  from  another  angle,  by 
a  detour  over  the  subject  of  "freedom  and  form."  This  was 
the  theme  of  a  volume  of  essays  which  Cassirer  published  dur- 
ing the  first  world  war:  Freiheit  und  Form  (Berlin,  1916). 
The  basic  idea  is  that  freely  developing  life  finds  its  own  law 
within  itself,  that  "form"  is  no  restriction  on  freedom,  unless 
it  be  merely  external,  pseudo-classical,  conventional,  based  upon 

*  Those  interested  in  a  fuller  development  of  this  criticism  may  read  my  article, 
"Analyse  des  Wirklichkeitsbegriffs,"  in  Theoria,  vol.  IX,  (1943). 

*E.  Lask:  Die  Logik  der  Philosofhie  und  die  Kategorienlefare,  Ges.  Schr.  II, 
Tubingen,  1923. 

Th.Litt:  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  1933,  p.  1-33$  Kant  und  Herder ,  1930, 
ch.  3  j  Das  Allgemeine  im  Aufbau  der  geisteswissenschaftlichen  Erkenntnis,  Leipzig* 
1941  (a  brief  summary). 

R.  Kroner:  Von  Kant  bis  Hegel,  MI,  Tubingen,  1921-1924,  esp.  vol.  I,  pp. 
103$,  2895.  Croce  anticipated  the  Germans  by  several  years.  See  his  Logica  come 
scienza  del  concetto  furo,  Bar.  1908. 


356  FOLKE  LEANDER 

outer  pressure.  In  the  volume  mentioned  Cassirer  applied  this 
idea  to  the  fields  of  aesthetics,  ethics,  and  politics. 

As  Cassirer  himself  points  out,  the  problem  of  The  Philoso- 
phy of  Symbolic  Forms  is  also  at  bottom  a  question  of  freedom 
and  form.  It  might  seem  as  if  myth  and  language  cut  us  off  from 
reality,  covering  it  with  a  many-coloured  veil  of  "subjective"  il- 
lusions. The  free  expansion  of  individuality  might  seem  detri- 
mental to  our  knowledge  of  reality.  But  Cassirer  shows  that  this 
is  not  really  the  case.  Pre-scientific  symbolism  is  really  a  method 
of  exploring  reality,  having  its  own  type  of  objectivity,  its  own 
"form,"  in  which  the  expansion  of  individuality  issues. 

What,  according  to  Cassirer,  is  the  "objectivity"  or  truth 
of  myth?  His  answer  is  that  the  truth  of  myth  is  what  myth  does 
in  the  intuitive  elaboration  of  experience.  This  view  may  be 
elucidated  by  a  quotation  from  an  American  writer  on  art: 

Science  may  seem  dry  and  trivial  or  mechanical  to  those  who  have  no 
desire  to  understand  the  world  intellectually;  and  poetry  seem  tedious, 
futile,  or  trifling  to  those  who  care  nothing  for  imaginative  under- 
standing. Each  is  right  in  his  own  sphere,  and  wrong  only  in  supposing 
that  his  sphere  leaves  room  for  no  other.27 

The  artist,  he  adds,  is  primarily  the  discoverer,  just  as  the 
scientist  is;  the  scientist  invents  abstract  laws  which  may  be 
used  for  the  purposes  of  calculation  and  prediction;  the  artist 
explores  reality  in  a  different  way.  We  see  only  by  utilizing  the 
vision  of  others,  and  this  vision  is  embodied  in  the  traditions 
of  art.  Pre-scientific  symbolism,  according  to  Cassirer,  serves 
the  purpose  of  imaginative,  intuitive  understanding.  The  pas- 
sage just  quoted  corresponds  to  Cassirer's  thought  (and  to  the 
general  trend  of  contemporary  philosophy)  also  in  another 
respect:  in  its  tendency  to  leave  out  history  and  philosophy 
altogether.  Failure  to  analyze  the  last-mentioned  activities  is 
indeed  the  weakness  of  contemporary  thought.  When  this 
analysis  has  been  performed,  it  will  be  clear,  I  believe,  that 
individuality  plays  no  less  a  role  in  history  and  philosophy 
than  in  art,  myth,  and  language,  and  that  here  too  the  expansion 
of  individuality  is  compatible  with  "form"  and  objectivity. 

*  A.  Barnes:  The  Art  in  Painting,  37. 


FURTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  SYMBOLIC  FORMS    357 

Only  science  is  in  substance  impersonal.  Of  course,  it  takes  indi- 
viduals to  create  it,  but  individuality  is  no  part  of  the  results, 
which  are  strictly  impersonal.  "Freedom  and  form"  as  the 
Leitmotiv  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  cannot  come  into  its  own 
as  long  as  mathematical  science  is  taken  to  be  the  apex  of  our 
knowing  life.  As  a  system  of  practical  procedures  science  is  our 
way  of  controlling  the  forces  of  nature.  Yet,  if  nature  be  some- 
thing of  the  kind  pictured  by  Alfred  N.  Whitehead,  practical 
control  is  surely  something  very  different  from  real  understand- 
ing in  the  sense  of  Verstehen.  Maybe  natural  history  can  only 
be  dead  history  to  us,  a  mere  chronicle;  at  all  events  real  under- 
standing, where  it  is  possible,  i.  e.,  in  the  human  world,  touches 
the  rock-bottom  of  reality  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  rivalled  by 
the  merely  external  approach  of  science.  The  apex  of  knowledge 
cannot  therefore  be  sought  in  the  latter;  it  is  the  self-knowledge 
of  the  mind. 

If  there  is  any  truth  in  what  has  just  been  said,  the  problem 
of  "freedom  and  form"  is  the  fundamental  problem  of  logic 
and  epistemology.  The  compatibility  of  individuality  of  vision 
with  objective  truth  must  be  established  not  only  on  the  level 
of  artistic,  mythical,  and  linguistic  symbolism  but  also  on  the 
level  of  historical  and  philosophical  knowledge.  Every  philoso- 
pher has  his  own  truths  to  reveal,  and  these  truths  are  not 
mutually  incompatible;  only  by  being  intensely  himself,  by 
working  out  his  own  deepest  inspiration,  will  he  bring  a  unique 
contribution  to  the  progress  of  thought.  Even  if  Cassirer  has 
not  worked  out  the  theory  of  freedom  and  form  in  philosophi- 
cal progress,  he  has,  by  his  whole  work,  given  us  a  brilliant 
illustration  of  it. 

FOLKE  LEANDER 

HOGS  KOLA 
GOTEBORC,  SWEDEN 


10 

M.  F.  Ashley  Montagu 
CASSIRER  ON  MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING 


IO 

CASSIRER  ON  MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING 

IN  SUBSTANZBEGRIFF  UND  FUNKTIONSBE- 
GRIFF  (1910)  we  learn  that  the  study  arose  out  of 
the  attempt  to  comprehend  the  fundamental  conceptions  of 
mathematics  from  the  point  of  view  of  logic.  Cassirer  found 
that  it  became  necessary  to  analyze  and  trace  back  the  funda- 
mental presuppositions  of  the  nature  of  a  concept  itself.  This  led 
to  a  renewed  analysis  of  the  principles  of  concepts  in  general. 

In  the  course  of  his  analysis  of  the  special  sciences  it  became 
evident  that  the  systematic  structure  of  the  exact  sciences 
assumes  different  forms  according  to  the  different  logical  per- 
spectives in  which  they  are  regarded.  Hence  the  necessity  of 
the  analysis  of  the  forms  of  conceptual  construction  and  of  the 
general  function  of  concepts  5  for  it  is  obvious  that  the  con- 
ception which  is  formed  of  the  fundamental  nature  of  the 
concept  is  directly  significant  in  judging  the  questions  of  fact  in 
any  criticism  of  knowledge  or  metaphysics. 

From  such  considerations  with  respect  to  the  processes  of 
knowing,  and  the  conceptual  formalization  of  that  knowing 
as  related  to  the  pure  sciences,  Cassirer  was  led  to  a  consideration 
of  the  more  fundamental  problem  of  the  primitive  origins  of 
these  processes  and  their  development.  The  first  fruits  of  his 
studies  in  this  field  he  published  in  1923,  as  the  first  instalment 
of  a  large  work  entitled  Philosofhie  der  symboUschen  Formen 
(Bruno  Cassirer  Verlag,  Berlin)  j  this  first  volume  was  devoted 
to  "Die  Syrache"  in  which  the  nature  and  function  of  language 
was  considered.  A  second  volume  devoted  to  "Das  mythische 
Denizen" — which  is  discussed  in  the  present  chapter — was  pub- 
lished in  19255  and  the  third  and  last  volume,  entitled  "Pha- 
nomenologie  der  Erkenntnis"  made  its  appearance  in  1929. 


362  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

Of  these  volumes  I  think  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  they 
constitute  perhaps  the  most  important  and  certainly  the  most 
brilliant  work  in  this  field  which  has  yet  been  published. 

Before  entering  upon  a  presentation  of  Cassirer's  treatment 
of  the  nature  of  mythological  thinking  it  is  necessary  to  present 
something  of  his  views  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  language  as 
propaedeutic  to  the  former. 

Cassirer  insists  on  the  fact  that  in  consciousness,  whether 
theoretical,  artistic,  or  linguistic,  we  see  a  kind  of  mirror,  the 
image  falling  upon  which  reflects  not  only  the  nature  of  the 
object  existing  externally  but  also  the  nature  of  consciousness  it- 
self. All  forms  brought  into  being  by  the  mind  are  due  to  a 
creative  force,  to  a  spontaneous  act  in  the  Kantian  sense,  thanks 
to  which  that  which  is  realized  is  something  quite  other  than  a 
simple  reception  or  registration  of  facts  exterior  or  foreign  to 
the  mind.  We  are  now  dealing  not  only  with  an  entering  into 
the  possession  of  facts,  but  with  the  lending  to  them  of  a 
certain  character,  with  an  integration  of  them  in  a  determinate 
physical  order.  Thus,  the  act  of  consciousness  which  gives  birth 
to  one  or  the  other  of  these  forms,  to  science,  to  art,  and  to 
language,  does  not  simply  discover  and  reproduce  an  ensemble 
of  pre-existent  objects.  This  act,  the  processes  which  give  birth  to 
it,  lead  rather  to  this  objective  universe,  and  contribute  towards 
constituting  its  being  and  structure.  The  essential  function  of 
language  is  not  arbitrarily  to  assign  designations  to  objects  al- 
ready formed  and  achieved  j  language  is  rather  a  means  indis- 
pensable to  that  formation,  even  of  objects.  Similarly,  in  the 
plastic  arts,  the  creative  act  consists  in  the  construction  of  space, 
in  conquering  it,  in  opening  a  path  of  access  to  it,  which  each 
of  these  arts  makes  according  to  the  manner  that  is  specific 
to  it.  Similarly,  in  respect  of  language  it  is  necessary  to  return 
to  the  theory  of  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  according  to  which 
the  diversity  of  languages  expresses  the  diversity  of  aspects  from 
which  the  world  is  seen  and  conceived  by  the  different  linguistic 
groups,  and  which  consequently  contribute  to  the  formation  of 
the  different  representations  of  the  world.  But  one  cannot  ob- 
serve the  intimate  operations  of  the  mind  which  are  at  work  in 
the  formation  of  language.  Psychology,  even  after  having 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  363 

abandoned  the  concepts  of  apperception  and  of  association — con- 
cepts which  during  the  nineteenth  century  stood  in  the  way  of 
the  realization  of  Humboldt's  ideas — -does  not  provide  a 
method  which  permits  direct  access  to  the  specific  process  of 
the  mind  which  ends  by  leading  to  the  production  of  the  ver- 
bal. What  experimentation  and  introspection  renders  percepti- 
ble are  the  facts  impregnated  by  language  and  by  them,  not  the 
manner  of  formation,  but  the  achieved  state. 

If  one  wishes  to  go  back  to  the  origin  of  language  and,  in- 
stead of  being  content  with  the  linguistic  facts  and  findings,  one 
seeks  to  discover  the  creative  principle,  one  can  be  satisfied  only 
with  those  regions  in  which  the  formation  of  the  language  is 
known,  in  all  its  particulars,  and  to  attempt  by  an  analysis  of 
the  structure  of  the  languages  of  these  regions,  by  a  regressive 
method,  to  arrive  at  the  genetic  factors  of  language. 

Cassirer's  study  deals  with  the  languages  of  a  number  of 
regions  of  this  kind,  inquiring  into  their  mode  of  arriving  at 
an  objective  representation  of  the  world.  According  to  Cassirer 
the  lower  animals  are  incapable  of  such  objective  representa- 
tions; they  find  themselves  enclosed  in  an  environment,  in 
which  they  live,  move,  and  have  their  being,  but  which  they  are 
unable  to  oppose,  and  which  they  are  incapable  of  viewing 
objectively,  since  they  cannot  transcend  it,  consider  or  conceive 
it.  The  impressions  they  receive  do  not  pass  beyond  the  level  of 
urges  to  action,  and  between  these  they  fail  to  develop  those 
specific  relations  which  result  in  a  true  notion  of  that  objectivity 
which  is  essentially  defined  by  the  constancy  and  identity  of  the 
object.  This  transition  from  a  world  of  action  and  effectiveness 
to  the  world  of  objective  representation  only  begins  to  manifest 
itself,  in  mankind,  at  a  stage  which  coincides  with  a  certain 
phase  in  the  development  of  language;  viz.,  at  that  stage  which 
the  child  exhibits  when  it  grows  to  understand  that  a  whole 
thing  corresponds  to  a  particular  value  or  denomination,  and 
at  which  it  is  constantly  demanding  of  those  about  it  the  names 
of  things.  But  it  does  not  occur  to  the  child  to  attach  these 
designations  to  the  representation  of  things  already  stabilized 
and  consolidated.  The  child's  questions  bear  rather  more  on  the 
things  themselves.  For  in  the  eyes  of  the  child,  as  in  the  eyes 


364  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

of  primitive  peoples,  the  name  is  not  an  extrinsic  denomination 
of  the  thing  which  one  arbitrarily  attaches  to  it,  but  it  is  rather 
an  essential  quality  of  the  object  of  which  it  forms  an  integral 
part.  The  principal  value  of  this  denominative  phase  is  that  it 
tends  to  stabilize  and  to  consolidate  the  objective  representation 
of  things  and  permits  the  child  to  conquer  the  objective  world 
in  which  it  is  henceforth  to  live.  For  this  task  he  needs  some 
name.  If,  for  a  multiplicity  of  impressions  one  sets  apart  the 
same  name,  these  different  impressions  will  no  longer  remain 
strange  to  one  another  5  in  this  way  they  will  come  to  represent 
simply  aspects  of  the  modes  of  appearance  of  the  same  thing. 
The  loss  of  this  conceptual  and  symbolic  function  of  the  word 
leads  to  such  effects  as  one  may  observe  in  those  suffering  from 
aphasia.  That  which  language  renders  possible  on  the  plane  of 
objects,  viz.,  a  separation  or  distinction  between  subjects  and 
thingSy  it  permits  equally  in  the  domain  of  sentiment  and  voli- 
tion. In  this  domain  also  language  is  more  than  a  simple  means 
of  expression  and  of  communication}  this  it  is  only  at  the  begin- 
ning of  human  life,  when  the  infant  gives  expression  without 
any  reserve  to  the  states  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  which  it  experi- 
ences y  and  it  is  language  which  provides  the  infant  with  a 
means  of  getting  into  contact  with  the  outside  world.  Language 
prolongs  these  affective  states,  but  it  does  not  in  any  way  alter 
them.  Things,  however,  present  another  aspect  as  soon  as  the 
child  acquires  representational  language.  Henceforth,  his  vocal 
expressions  will  no  longer  be  simple  exclamations,  nor  of  pure 
expansiveness  apart  from  these  emotional  states.  That  which  the 
child  expresses  is  now  informed  by  the  fact  that  his  expressions 
have  taken  the  form  of  intelligible  words,  the  child  hears  and 
understands  what  he  himself  says.  He  thus  becomes  capable  of 
knowing  his  own  states  in  a  representative  and  objective  man- 
ner, of  apperceiving  and  looking  at  them  as  he  does  at  external 
things.  He  thus  becomes  capable  of  reflecting  upon  his  own 
affective  life,  and  of  adopting  in  relation  to  that  life  an  attitude 
of  contemplation.  In  this  way  his  affective  energies  gradually 
lose  that  power  of  brutal  constraint  which  it  exercises,  during 
early  infancy,  upon  the  "self."  The  fact  that  emotion  attains 
to  a  consciousness  of  itself,  renders  man  to  some  extent  free  of 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  365 

it.  To  the  pure  emotion  are  henceforth  opposed  those  intellec- 
tual forces  which  support  representational  language.  Emotion 
will  now  be  held  in  constraint  by  these  forces,  it  will  no  longer 
obtain  an  immediate  and  direct  expression,  but  will  have  to 
justify  itself  before  language,  which  now  assumes  the  position 
of  an  instrument  of  the  mind.  In  this  connection  we  may  recall 
the  Greek  idea  that  man  must  not  abandon  his  passions,  that 
these  rather  must  be  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  Logos, 
to  that  reason  which  is  incorporated  in  language. 

Thanks  to  its  regulative  powers,  language  transforms  senti- 
ments .and  volitions,  and  organizes  them  into  a  conscious  will, 
and  thus  contributes  to  the  constitution  of  the  moral  self.  There 
is  still  another  domain  into  which  one  can  gain  entry  only 
through  the  medium  of  language,  it  is  the  social  world.  Up  to  a 
certain  point  in  the  moral  evolution  of  humanity,  all  moral  and 
intellectual  community  is  bound  to  the  linguistic  community, 
in  much  the  same  way  as  men  speaking  a  foreign  language  are 
excluded  from  the  protection  and  advantages  which  are  alone 
enjoyed  by  members  of  the  community  considered  as  equals. 
And  in  the  development  of  the  individual,  language  constitutes 
for  the  child,  who  is  beginning  to  learn,  a  more  important  and 
a  more  direct  experience  than  that  of  the  social  and  normative 
bond.  But  when  for  his  characteristic  infantile  state  he  com- 
mences to  substitute  representational  language,  and  experiences 
the  need  of  being  understood  by  his  environment,  he  discovers 
the  necessity  of  adapting  his  own  efforts  without  reservation  to 
the  customs  characteristic  of  the  community  to  which  he  belongs. 
Without  losing  anything  of  his  own  individuality,  he  must 
adapt  himself  to  those  among  whom  he  is  destined  to  live.  It 
is  thus  through  the  medium  of  a  particular  language  that  the 
child  becomes  aware  of  the  bond  which  ties  it  to  a  particular 
community.  This  social  bond  becomes  closer  and  more  spiritual- 
ized during  the  course  of  its  development.  When  the  child 
commences  to  pose  the  questions — What  is  it?  and  Why? — not 
only  is  he  going  to  penetrate  into  the  world  of  knowledge,  but 
also  into  a  conquest  of  that  world  and  a  collective  possession 
of  it.  Not  only  does  the  tendency  to  possess  a  thing  begin  to 
give  way  before  the  desire  to  acquire  knowledge,  but  what  is 


366  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

still  more  important,  the  relations  which  hold  him  to  his  en- 
vironment are  going  to  be  reorganized.  The  desire  for  physical 
assistance  begins  to  transform  itself  into  a  desire  for  intellectual 
assistance}  the  contact  of  the  child  with  the  members  of  its 
environment  is  going  to  become  a  spiritual  contact.  Little  by 
little,  the  constraint,  the  commands  and  prohibitions,  the 
obediences  and  resistances,  which  up  to  now  have  characterized 
the  relations  between  the  child  and  the  adult  gives  way  to  that 
reciprocity  which  exists  between  the  one  who  asks  and  waits  for 
a  reply,  and  the  one  who  takes  an  interest  in  the  question 
asked  and  replies.  Thus  arise  the  bases  of  spiritual  liberty  and 
of  that  free  collaboration  which  is  the  characteristic  mark  of 
society  in  so  far  as  it  is  human. 

Finally,  Cassirer  assigns  a  capital  importance  to  language 
in  the  construction  of  the  world  of  pure  imagination,  above  all 
to  that  state  of  conscious  development  wherein  the  decisive 
distinction  between  the  real  and  the  imagined  is  not  made.  The 
question  that  has  so  much  occupied  psychologists,  whether  the 
play  of  the  child  represents  for  it  a  veritable  reality  or  merely 
a  conscious  occupation  with  fictions,  this  question,  asserts  Cas- 
sirer, is  malposed,  since  the  play  of  the  child,  like  the  Myth, 
belongs  to  a  phase  of  consciousness  which  does  not  yet  under- 
stand the  distinction  between  that  which  is  real  and  that  which 
merely  is  simply  imagined.  In  the  eyes  of  the  child  the  world 
is  not  composed  of  pure  objects,  of  real  forms,  it  is,  on  the 
contrary,  peopled  by  beings  who  are  his  equals;  and  the  charac- 
ter of  the  living  and  the  animate  is  not  limited  for  him,  to  that 
which  is  specifically  human.  The  world,  for  him,  has  the  form 
of  Thou  and  not  of  That.  This  anthropomorphism  of  the  child 
arises  out  of  the  fact  that  the  child  speaks  to  the  things  which 
surround  him,  and  the  things  speak  to  him.  It  is  no  accident 
that  there  is  no  substitute  for  dumb  playj  when  playing  the 
child  does  not  cease  to  speak  of  and  to  the  things  with  which 
he  is  playing.  It  is  not  that  this  activity  is  an  accessory  com- 
mentary of  play,  but  rather  it  is  an  indispensable  element  of  it. 
The  child  views  every  object,  all  beings,  as  an  interlocutor  of 
whom  he  asks  questions  and  who  reply  to  him.  His  relation  to 
the  world  is  above  all  else  a  verbal  relation,  and  Cassirer  asserts 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  367 

that  the  child  does  not  speak  to  things  because  he  regards  them 
as  animate y  but  on  the  contrary  y  he  regards  them  as  animate  be- 
cause he  speaks  with  them.  It  is  much  later  that  the  distinction  is 
made  between  that  which  is  pure  thing  and  that  which  is  ani- 
mate and  living.  The  most  developed  of  languages  still  retain 
traces  of  this  original  state.  The  lack  of  such  distinctions  is 
strikingly  evident  when  we  study  the  languages,  the  mental 
instruments,  of  the  simpler  peoples,  a  study  which  is  obviously 
necessary  for  any  true  understanding  of  mythological  thinking. 

Cassirer's  approach  to  mythology  is  that  of  the  neo-Kantian 
phenomenologist;  he  is  not  interested  in  mythology  as  such, 
but  in  the  processes  of  consciousness  which  lead  to  the  creation 
of  myths.  It  will  be  recalled  that  he  was  originally  concerned 
with  inquiring  into  the  bases  of  empirical  knowledge,  but  since 
a  knowledge  of  a  world  of  empirical  things  or  properties  was 
preceded  by  a  world  characterized  by  mythical  powers  and 
forces,  and  since  early  philosophy  drew  its  spiritual  powers 
from  and  created  its  perspective  upon  the  bases  of  these  mythical 
factors,  a  consideration  of  them  is  clearly  of  importance.  The 
relation  between  myth  and  philosophy  is  a  close  one;  for  if  the 
myth  is  taken  to  be  an  indirect  expression  of  reality,  it  can  be 
understood  only  as  an  attempt  to  point  the  way,  it  is  a  prepara- 
tion for  philosophy.  The  form  and  content  of  myth  impede  the 
realization  of  a  rational  content  of  knowledge,  which  reflection 
alone  reveals,  and  of  which  it  discovers  the  kernel.  An  illustra- 
tion of  this  effect  of  myth  upon  knowledge  may  be  seen  in  the 
attempts  of  the  sophists  of  the  Fifth  Century  to  work  from 
myth  to  empirical  knowledge,  in  their  newly  founded  scientific 
wisdom.  Myth  was  by  them  understood  and  explained,  and 
translated  into  the  language  of  popular  philosophy,  as  an  all 
embracing  speculative  science  of  nature  or  of  ethical  truth. 

It  is  no  accident,  remarks  Cassirer,  that  just  that  Greek 
thinker  in  whom  the  characteristic  power  of  creating  the  mythi- 
cal was  so  outstanding  should  reject  the  whole  world  of  mythi- 
cal images,  namely,  Plato.  For  it  was  Plato  who  was  opposed  to 
the  attempts  at  myth-analysis  in  the  manner  of  the  Sophists 
and  rhetoricians;  for  him  these  attempts  represented  a  play 
of  wit  in  a  difficult,  though  not  very  refined,  subject  (Phaedrus* 


368  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

229).  Plato  failed  to  see  the  significance  of  the  mythical  world, 
seeing  it  only  as  something  opposed  to  pure  knowledge.  The 
myth  must  be  separated  from  science,  and  appearance  be  dis- 
tinguished from  reality.  The  myth  however  transcends  all  ma- 
terial meaning}  and  here  it  occupies  a  definite  place  and  plays 
a  necessary  part  for  our  understanding  of  the  world,  and  accord- 
ing to  the  philosophy  of  the  Platonic  school  it  can  work  as  a  true 
creative  and  formative  motive.  The  profounder  view  which 
has  conquered  here  has,  in  the  continuity  of  Greek  thought,  not 
always  been  carried  through  nor  had  quite  the  same  meaning. 
The  Stoics  as  well  as  the  neo-Platonists  returned  to  the  Platonic 
view — as  did  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  Renaissance. 

In  the  newer  philosophy  the  myth  becomes  the  problem  of 
philosophy  when  it  is  recognized  that  there  exists  a  primordial 
directive  of  the  spirit,  an  intrinsic  way  of  forming  knowledge. 
The  spirit  (Geist)  forges  the  conditions  necessary  to  itself.  In 
this  connection  Giambattista  Vico  may  be  regarded  as  the 
founder  of  the  new  philosophy  of  language  and  of  mythology. 
The  real  and  true  knowledge  of  the  unitary  idea  of  the  spirit  is 
shown  in  the  triad  of  Language,  Art,  and  Myth. 

The  critical  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  aesthetic  and  ethical 
judgment,  which  Kant  inquired  into,  was  transferred  by  Schel- 
ling  to  the  field  of  myth.  For  Kant  the  problem  does  not  ask  for 
psychological  origins  or  beginnings — but  for  pure  existence  and 
content.  Myth  does  not  make  its  appearance,  like  morality  or 
art,  as  a  self-contained  world  in  itself,  which  may  be  measured 
by  objective  values  and  reality  measurements,  but  it  must  be 
understood  through  its  own  immanent  laws  of  structure  and  of 
being.  Every  attempt  to  make  this  world  understandable  by 
simple  direct  means  only  reveals  the  reflection  of  something 
else. 

In  the  empirical  comparisons  of  myths  a  distinct  trend  was 
noticeable  to  measure  not  only  the  range  of  mythical  thinking 
but  also  to  describe  the  unitary  forms  of  consciousness  and  its 
characteristics.  Just  as  in  physics  the  concept  of  the  unit  of  the 
physical  world  led  to  a  deepening  of  its  principles,  so  in  folklore 
the  problem  of  a  general  mythology  instead  of  special  research 
gained  for  it  a  new  lease  on  life.  Out  of  the  conflicting  schools 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  369 

there  appeared  no  other  way  than  to  think  in  terms  of  a 
single  source  of  myth  and  of  a  distinct  form  of  orientation. 
From  this  way  of  treating  myth  arose  the  conception  of  a  funda- 
mental mythical  view  of  the  world.  Fundamental  and  character- 
istic motives  were  found  for  the  whole  world,  even  where  space 
and  time  relations  could  not  be  demonstrated.  As  soon  as  the 
attempt  was  made  to  separate  these  motives,  to  distinguish  be- 
tween them,  and  to  discover  which  were  the  truly  primitive 
ones,  conflicting  views  were  again  brought  to  the  fore  more 
sharply  than  ever.  It  was  the  task  of  folklore  in  association  with 
folk  psychology  to  determine  the  order  of  the  appearances  and 
to  uncover  the  general  laws  and  principles  with  respect  to  the 
formation  of  myths.  But  the  unity  of  these  principles  disap- 
peared even  before  one  had  assured  oneself  of  the  existence  of 
the  necessary  fullness  and  variety  of  myths. 

Besides  the  mythology  of  nature,  there  is  the  mythology 
of  the  soul.  In  the  first  there  are  involved  a  large  variety  of 
myths  which  have  a  definite  object  of  nature  for  their  kernel. 
One  always  asked  of  each  single  myth  whether  it  bore  a  distinct 
relation  to  some  natural  thing  or  event.  One  had  to  approach 
the  matter  in  this  way  because  only  in  this  way  could  phantasy 
be  distinguished,  and  a  strictly  objective  position  arrived  at. 
But  the  arbitrary  power  of  building  hypotheses,  seen  in  a  strictly 
objective  way,  showed  that  it  was  nearly  as  great  as  the  creation 
of  phantasy.  The  older  form  of  the  storm  and  thunder  my- 
thology was  the  opposite  of  the  astral  mythology  which  itelf, 
again,  took  different  forms,  sun  mythology,  lunar  mythology, 
and  stellar  mythology. 

Another  approach  to  the  ultimate  unity  of  myth  creation 
attempted  to  see  it  not  as  a  natural  but  more  as  a  spiritual  unity, 
expressing  this  unity  not  in  the  field  of  the  object  but  as  in  the 
historical  field  of  culture.  Were  it  possible  to  find  such  a  field 
of  culture  for  the  general  origin  of  the  great  fundamental 
mythical  motives  and  themes,  as  a  center  from  which  they 
eventually  spread  over  the  whole  world,  it  would  be  a  simple 
matter  to  explain  the  inner  relation  and  systematic  consequences 
of  these  themes  and  motives.  If  any  such  relation  in  a  known 
form  is  obscure,  it  must  appear  at  once,  if  one  but  refers  to  the 


370  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

best  historical  source  for  it.  When  the  older  theorists,  e.g., 
Benfey,  looked  to  India  for  the  most  important  motives,  there 
seemed  to  be  certain  striking  evidences  for  the  historical  unity 
and  association  of  myth  forming;  this  became  even  more  so 
when  Babylonian  culture  became  better  known.  With  the  find- 
ing of  this  homeland  of  culture  the  answer  was  also  found  to  the 
question  as  to  the  home  of  myth  and  its  unitary  structure. 
The  answer  to  Pan-Babylonianism  is  that  myth  could  never 
have  developed  a  consistent  world  viewpoint  if  it  had  been 
constituted  out  of  a  primitive  magic,  idea,  dream,  emotion  or 
superstition.  The  path  to  such  a  Weltanschauung  was  much 
more  likely  to  be  there  where  there  was  in  existence  a  distinct 
proof  of  a  conception  of  the  world  as  an  ordered  whole — a  con- 
dition which  was  fulfilled  in  the  beginning  of  Babylonian 
astronomy  and  cosmogony.  From  this  spiritual  and  historical 
viewpoint  the  possibility  is  opened  up  that  myth  is  not  only  a 
form  of  pure  phantasy  but  is  in  itself  a  finished  and  compre- 
hensive system.  What,  remarks  Cassirer,  is  so  interesting  about 
this  theory  in  the  methodological  sense  is  that  not  only  does 
it  attempt  the  empirical  proof  of  the  real  historical  origin  of 
myth,  but  it  also  attempts  to  give  a  sort  of  a  priori  substantia- 
tion to  the  proper  direction  and  goal  of  mythological  research. 
That  all  myths  have  an  astral  origin  and  should  in  the  end 
prove  to  be  calendric,  is  stated  by  the  students  of  the  Pan- 
Babylonian  school  to  be  the  basic  principle  of  the  method.  It  is 
a  sort  of  Ariadne's  thread,  which  is  alone  able  to  lead  through 
the  labyrinth  of  mythology.  By  this  means  it  was  not  very 
difficult  to  fill  in  the  various  lacunae  which  the  empiric  tradi- 
tion had  somehow  failed  to  make  good, — but  this  very  means 
showed  ever  more  clearly  that  the  fundamental  problem  of  the 
unit  of  the  mythological  consciousness  could  not  really  be 
explained  in  the  manner  of  the  historical  objective  empirical 
school. 

It  becomes  more  and  more  certain  that  the  simple  statement 
of  unity  of  the  fundamental  mythical  ideas  cannot  really  give 
any  insight  into  the  structure  of  the  forms  of  mythical  phantasy 
and  of  mythical  thinking.  To  define  the  structure  of  this  form, 
when  one  does  not  desert  the  basis  of  pure  descriptive  con- 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  371 

siderations,  requires  no  more  elaborate  conception  than  Bastian's 
concept  of  "Volkergedanken"  Bastian  maintained  that  the  varie- 
ties of  the  objective  approach  do  not  simply  consider  the  con- 
tent and  objects  of  mythology,  but  start  off  from  the  question 
as  to  the  function  of  myth.  The  fundamental  principle  of  this 
function  should  remain  to  be  proved;  in  this  way  various 
resemblances  are  discovered  and  relations  demonstrated.  From 
the  beginning  the  sought-for  unity  is  both  from  the  inside 
and  the  outside  transferred  from  the  phenomena  of  reality  to 
those  of  the  spirit.  But  this  idealism,  as  long  as  it  is  received 
psychologically  and  determined  through  the  categories  of  psy- 
chology, is  not  characterized  by  a  single  meaning.  When  we 
speak  of  mythology  as  the  collective  expression  of  mankind, 
this  unity  must  finally  be  explained  out  of  the  unity  of  the 
human  soul  and  out  of  the  homogeneity  of  its  behaviour.  But 
the  unity  of  the  soul  expresses  itself  in  a  great  variety  of 
potencies  and  forms.  As  soon  as  the  question  is  asked  which 
of  these  potencies  play  the  respective  roles  in  the  building  up 
of  the  mythical  world,  there  immediately  arise  conflicting  and 
contradictory  controversial  explanations.  Is  the  myth  ulti- 
mately derived  from  the  play  of  subjective  phantasy,  or  does 
it  in  some  cases  rest  upon  a  real  view  of  things,  upon  which 
it  is  based?  Is  it  a  primitive  form  of  knowledge  (Erkenntnls} 
and  in  this  connection  is  it  a  form  of  intellection,  or  does  it  be- 
long rather  to  the  sphere  of  affection  and  conation?  To  this 
question  scientific  myth-analysis  has  returned  different  an- 
swers. Just  as  formerly  the  theories  differed  with  respect  to 
the  objects  which  were  considered  necessary  to  the  creation 
of  myths,  in  the  same  way  they  now  differed  in  respect  of  the 
fundamental  psychic  processes  to  which  these  are  considered  to 
lead  back.  The  conception  of  a  pure  intellectual  mythology 
made  its  reappearance,  the  idea  that  the  essence  of  the  myth 
was  to  be  sought  in  the  intellectual  analysis  of  experience. 

In  opposition  to  Schelling's  demand  for  a  tautegorical  (ex- 
pressing the  same  thing  in  different  words,  opposed  to  allegori- 
cal) analysis  of  myth  an  allegorical  explanation  was  sought  for 
(See  Fritz  Langer,  Intellektualmythologle^  Leipzig,  1916). 

In  all  this  is  evident  the  danger  to  which  the  myth  is  ex- 


372  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

posed,  the  danger  of  becoming  lost  in  the  depths  of  a  particular 
theory.  In  all  these  theories  the  sought-for  unity  is  transferred 
in  error  to  the  particular  elements  instead  of  being  looked  for 
in  that  spiritual  whole,  the  symbolic  world  of  meaning,  out 
of  which  these  elements  are  created.  We  must,  on  the  other 
hand,  says  Cassirer,  look  for  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
spirit  to  which  the  myth  goes  back.  Just  as  in  the  process  of 
arriving  at  knowledge  The  Rhapsody  of  Perceptions  (Rha-p- 
sodie  der  W ahrnehmwngeri)  is,  by  means  of  certain  laws  and 
forms  of  thinking,  transmuted  into  knowledge,  so  we  can  and 
must  ask  for  the  creation  of  that  form  unity,  the  unending  and 
manifold  world  of  the  myth,  which  is  not  a  conglomerate  of 
arbitrary  ideas  and  meaningless  notions,  a  characteristic  spiritual 
genitor.  We  must  look  at  the  myth  from  a  genetic-causal,  teleo- 
logical  standpoint  j  in  this  way  we  shall  find  that  what  is  pre- 
sented to  us  is  something  which  as  a  complete  form  possesses  a 
self-sufficient  being  and  an  autochthonous  sense. 

The  myth  represents  in  itself  the  first  attempts  at  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  world,  and  since  it  furthermore  possibly  represents 
the  earliest  form  of  aesthetic  phantasy,  we  see  in  it  that  particu- 
lar unity  of  the  spirit  of  which  all  separate  forms  are  but  a 
single  manifestation.  We  see  too,  here,  that  instead  of  an 
original  unity  in  which  the  opposites  lose  themselves,  and  seem 
to  combine  with  one  another,  that  the  critical-transcendental 
idea-unit  seeks  the  clear  definition  and  delimitation  of  the 
separate  forms  in  order  to  preserve  them.  The  principle  of  this 
separation  becomes  clear  when  one  compares  here  the  problem 
of  meaning  with  that  of  characterization — that  is,  when  one 
reflects  upon  the  way  in  which  the  various  spiritual  forms  of 
expression,  such  as  "Object71  with  "Idea  or  Image,"  and  "Con- 
tent" with  "Sign,"  are  related  to  one  another. 

In  this  we  see  the  fundamental  element  of  the  parallelism, 
namely,  the  creative  power  of  the  "sign"  in  myth  as  in  lan- 
guage, and  in  art,  as  well  as  in  the  process  of  forming  a 
theoretical  idea  in  a  word,  and  in  relation  to  the  world.  What 
Humboldt  said  of  language,  that  man  places  it  between  him- 
self and. the  internal  and  external  world  that  is  acting  upon 
him,  that  he  surrounds  himself  with  a  world  of  sounds  with 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  373 

which  to  take  up  and  to  work  up  the  world  of  objects,  holds 
true  also  for  the  myth  and  for  the  aesthetic  fancy.  They  are 
not  so  much  reactions  to  impressions,  which  are  exercised  from 
the  outside  upon  the  spirit,  but  they  are  much  more  real 
spiritual  activities.  At  the  outset,  in  the  definite  sense  of  the 
primitive  expression  of  the  myth  it  is  clear  that  we  do  not 
have  to  deal  with  a  mere  reflection  or  mirage  of  Reality  (Seiri), 
but  with  a  characteristic  treatment  and  presentation  of  it.  Also 
here  one  can  observe  how  in  the  beginning  the  tension  between 
"Subject"  and  "Object,"  "Internal"  and  "External,"  grad- 
ually diminishes,  a  richer  and  multiform  new  middle  state 
stepping  in  between  both  worlds.  To  the  material  world  which 
it  embraces  and  governs  the  spirit  opposes  its  own  independent 
world  of  images — the  power  of  Impression  gradually  becomes 
more  distinct  and  more  conscious  than  the  active  power  of  Ex- 
pression. But  this  creation  does  not  yet  in  itself  possess  the 
character  of  an  act  of  free  will,  but  still  bears  the  character 
of  a  natural  necessity,  the  character  of  a  certain  psychic  "mecha- 
nism." Since  at  this  level  there  does  not  yet  exist  an  inde- 
pendent and  self-conscious  free  living  "I,"  but  because  we  here 
stand  upon  the  threshold  of  the  spiritual  processes  which  are 
bound  to  react  against  each  other,  the  "I"  and  the  "World," 
the  new  world  of  the  "Sign"  must  appear  to  the  conciousness 
as  a  thoroughly  objective  reality.  Every  beginning  of  the 
myth,  especially  every  magical  conception  of  the  world,  is 
permeated  by  this  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  objective  power 
of  the  sign.  Word  magic,  picture-magic,  and  script-magic  pro- 
vide the  fundaments  of  magical  practices  and  the  magical  view 
of  the  world.  When  one  examines  the  complete  structure  of  the 
mythical  consciousness  one  can  detect  in  this  a  characteristic 
paradox.  For  if  the  generally  prevailing  conception,  that  the 
fundamental  urge  of  the  myth  is  to  vivify,  is  true,  that  is  that  it 
tends  to  take  a  concrete  view  in  the  statement  and  representa- 
tion of  all  the  elements  of  existence,  how  does  it  happen,  then, 
that  these  urges  point  most  intensely  to  the  most  unreal  and 
non- vital;  how  is  it  that  the  shadow-empire  of  words,  of 
images,  and  signs  gains  such  a  substantial  ascendancy  and  power 
over  the  mythical  consciousness?  How  is  it  that  it  possesses  this 


374  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

belief  in  the  abstract,  in  this  cult  of  symbols  in  a  world  in  which 
the  general  idea  is  nothing,  the  sensation  (Empfindung),  the 
direct  urge,  the  (sensible)  psychic  perception  and  outlook  seem 
to  be  everything?  The  answer  to  this  question,  says  Cassirer, 
can  be  found  only  when  one  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  it  is 
improperly  stated.  The  mythical  world  is  not  so  concrete  that  it 
deals  only  with  psychically  'objective'  contents,  or  simply 
'abstract'  considerations,  but  both  the  thing  and  its  meaning 
form  one  distinct  and  direct  concrete  unity,  they  are  not  differ- 
entiated from  one  another.  The  myth  raises  itself  spiritually 
above  the  world  of  things,  but  it  exchanges  for  the  forms  and 
images  which  it  puts  in  their  place  only  another  form  of  restric- 
tive existence.  What  the  spirit  appears  to  rescue  from  the 
shackles  now  becomes  but  a  new  shackle,  which  is  so  much 
more  unyielding  because  it  is  not  only  a  psychical  power  but  a 
spiritual  one.  Nevertheless,  such  a  state  already  contains  in  it- 
self the  immanent  condition  of  its  future  release.  It  already 
contains  the  incipient  possibility  of  a  spiritual  liberation  which 
in  the  progress  of  the  magical-mythical  world-idea  will  even- 
tually arrive  at  a  characteristic  religious  world-idea.  During  this 
transition  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  spirit  to  place  itself  in 
a  new  and  free  relation  to  the  world  of  images  and  signs,  but, 
at  the  same  time,  in  a  different  way  than  formerly,  sees  through 
this  relationship,  and  in  this  way  raises  itself  above  it,  though 
living  it  still  and  needing  it. 

And  in  still  further  measure  and  in  greater  distinctness 
stands  for  us  the  dialectic  of  these  fundamental  relations,  their 
analysis  and  synthesis,  which  the  spirit  through  its  own  self- 
made  world  of  images  experiences,  when  we  here  compare  the 
myth  with  all  other  forms  of  symbolic  expression.  In  the  case 
of  language  also  there  is  at  first  no  sharp  line  of  separation  by 
means  of  which  the  word  and  its  meaning,  the  thing  content 
of  "idea"  and  the  simple  content  are  distinguished  from  one 
another.  The  nominalist  viewpoint,  for  which  words  are  con- 
ventional signs,  simply  flatus  vocis,  is  the  result  of  later  reflec- 
tion but  not  the  direct  expression  of  the  direct  natural  language 
consciousness.  For  this  the  existence  of  things  in  words  is  not 
only  indicated  as  indirect,  but  is  contained  and  present  in  it  any- 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  375 

way.  In  the  language  consciousness  of  the  primitive  and  in  that 
of  the  child  one  can  demonstrate  this  concrescence  of  names  and 
things  in  very  pregnant  examples — one  has  only  to  think  of 
the  different  varieties  of  the  taboo  names.  But  in  the  progression 
of  the  spiritual  development  of  language  there  is  also  here 
achieved  a  sharper  and  ever  more  conscious  separation  between 
the  Word  and  Being  or  Existence,  between  the  Meaning  and 
the  Meant.  Opposed  to  all  other  physical  being  and  all  physical 
activity  the  word  appears  as  autonomous  and  characteristic,  in 
its  purely  ideal  and  significative  function. 

A  new  stage  of  the  separation  is  next  witnessed  in  art.  Here, 
too,  there  is  in  the  beginning  no  clear  distinction  between  the 
"Ideal"  and  the  "Real."  The  beginning  of  the  formation  and 
of  the  cultivation  of  art  reaches  back  to  a  sphere  in  which  the 
act  of  cultivation  itself  is  strongly  rooted  in  the  magical  idea, 
and  is  directed  to  a  definite  magical  end,  of  which  the  picture 
(Bild)  is  yet  in  no  way  independent,  and  has  no  pure  aesthetic 
meaning.  Nevertheless  already  in  the  first  impulse  of  char- 
acteristic artistic  configurations,  in  the  stages  of  spiritual  forms  of 
expression,  quite  a  new  principle  is  attained.  The  view  of  the 
world  which  the  spirit  opposes  to  the  simple  world  of  matter 
and  of  things  subsequently  attains  here  to  a  pure  immanent 
value  and  truth.  It  does  not  attach  itself  or  refer  to  another; 
but  it  simply  /V,  and  consists  in  itself.  Out  of  the  sphere  of 
activity  (Wirksamkeit),  in  which  the  mythical  consciousness, 
and  out  of  the  sphere  of  meaning,  in  which  the  marks  of  lan- 
guage remain,  we  are  now  transferred  to  a  sphere,  in  which  so  to 
say,  only  the  pure  essence  (Sein),  only  its  own  innermost  nature 
(Wesenheii)  of  the  image  (Bildes)  is  seized  as  such.  Thus,  the 
world  of  images  forms  in  itself  a  Kosmos  which  is  complete  in 
itself,  and  which  rests  within  its  own  centre  of  gravity.  And  to 
it  the  spirit  is  now  first  able  to  find  a  free  relation.  The  aesthetic 
world  is  measured  according  to  the  measure  of  things,  the 
realistic  outlook  according  to  a  world  of  appearance: — but  since 
in  just  this  appearance  the  relation  to  direct  reality,  to  the 
world  of  being  and  action  (Wirken),  in  which  also  the  magical- 
mythical  outlook  has  its  being,  is  now  left  behind,  there  is  thus 
made  a  completely  new  step  towards  truth.  Thus  there  present 


376  M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

themselves  in  relation  to  Myth,  Language,  and  to  Art,  con- 
figurations which  are  linked  directly  together  in  a  certain  histori- 
cal series,  by  means  of  a  certain  systematic  progression  (Stujen- 
gang),  and  ideal  progress  (Fortschritt),  as  the  object  of  which 
it  can  be  said  the  spirit  in  its  own  creations,  in  its  self-made 
symbols,  not  only  exists  and  lives,  but  gains  its  significance. 
There  is  a  certain  pertinence,  in  this  connection,  in  that  dominant 
theme  of  HegePs  Phenomenology  of  the  Spirit,  namely,  that 
the  object  of  development  lies  in  the  comprehension  and  ex- 
pression of  the  fact  that  the  spiritual  being  is  not  only  "Sub- 
stance" but  just  as  much  "Subject."  In  this  respect  the  problems 
which  grow  out  of  a  "Philosophy  of  Mythology"  resolve 
themselves  once  more  to  such  as  arise  from  the  philosophy  of 
pure  logic.  Then  also  science  separates  itself  from  the  other 
stages  of  spiritual  life,  not  because  it  stands  in  need  of  any 
kind  of  mediation  or  intervention  through  signs  and  symbols, 
seeking  naked  truth,  the  truth  of  "things-in-themselves,"  but 
because  it  uses  the  symbols  differently  and  more  profoundly 
than  the  former  is  able  to  do,  and  recognizes  and  understands 
them  as  such,  i.e.,  as  symbols.  Furthermore,  this  is  not  accom- 
plished at  one  stroke  5  rather  there  is  here  also  repeated,  at 
a  new  stage,  the  typical  fundamental  relation  of  the  spirit  to 
its  own  creation.  Here  also  must  the  freedom  of  this  creation 
be  gained  and  secured  in  continuous  critical  work.  The  utiliza- 
tion of  hypotheses,  and  its  characteristic  function  to  advance  the 
foundations  of  knowledge,  determines  that,  so  long  as  this 
knowledge  is  not  secured,  the  principles  of  science  are  unable 
to  express  themselves  in  other  than  dinglicher,  i.e.,  material, 
or  in  half  mythical  form. 

Every  student  of  primitive  peoples  and  of  mythology  would 
recognize  in  Cassirer's  views  on  mythological  thinking,  which 
have  here  been  presented  only  partially,  a  valuable  contribution 
towards  the  clarification  of  a  difficult  problem.  In  a  brilliant 
chapter  in  which  Cassirer  discusses  "the  dialectic  of  the  mythical 
consciousness,"  he  shows  how  interrelated  and  interdependent 
the  mythical  and  religious  consciousness  are,  and  that  there  can 
really  be  no  distinction  between  themj  there  is  a  difference  in 
form,  but  not  in  substance.  An  admirable  discussion  of  the  rela- 


MYTHOLOGICAL  THINKING  377 

tion  of  "speech"  to  "language"  and  of  "sound"  to  "meaning" 
(already  dealt  with  at  length  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Sym- 
bolischen  Formen)  leads  to  a  brief  discussion  of  writing. 

Cassirer  points  out  that  all  writing  begins  as  picture-signs 
which  do  not  in  themselves  embrace  any  meaning  or  communi- 
cative characters.  The  picture-sign  takes  the  place  rather  of  the 
object  itself,  replaces  it,  and  stands  for  it. 

This  statement  is  perfectly  true  of  all  forms  of  primitive 
writing.  One  of  the  most  primitive  forms  of  writing,  for  ex- 
ample, with  which  we  are  acquainted  is  that  invented  and 
practiced  by  certain  Australian  tribes.  On  the  message  sticks 
which  they  send  from  one  tribe  to  another  the  signs  which  they 
make  fulfill  all  the  specifications  stated  by  Cassirer. 

Cassirer  also  states  that  at  first  writing  forms  a  part  of  the 
sphere  of  magic.  The  sign  which  is  stamped  on  the  object  draws 
it  into  the  circle  of  its  own  effect  and  keeps  away  strange  in- 
fluences. 

The  anthropological  data  lend  full  support  to  this  idea.  It 
may  even  be  that  the  magicians  were  the  first  to  invent  writing, 
though  it  would  at  present  be  impossible  to  prove  such  a  sug- 
gestion or  even  to  prove  that  the  magicians  were  among  the 
first  to  use  picture  signs.  The  evidence  does,  however,  suggest 
that  this  is  highly  probable. 

I  can  only  have  succeeded  in  giving  a  faint  indication  of  the 
value  and  quality  of  Cassirer's  contribution  to  our  understanding 
of  mythological  thinking  in  general  and  that  of  pre-literate 
peoples  in  particular.  To  appreciate  Cassirer's  great  work  at 
its  full  value  the  reader  is  recommended  to  go  to  the  original 
work.  This  essay  must  be  regarded  as  but  a  footnote  to  it. 

M.  F.  ASHLEY  MONTAGU 

PHILADELPHIA,  PENNA. 


II 
Susanne  K.  Langer 

ON  CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE 
AND  MYTH 


II 

ON  CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE 
AND  MYTH 

EVERY  philosopher  has  his  tradition.  His  thought  has  de- 
veloped amid  certain  problems,  certain  basic  alternatives  of 
opinion,  that  embody  the  key  concepts  which  dominate  his  time 
and  his  environment  and  which  will  always  be  reflected,  posi- 
tively or  by  negation,  in  his  own  work.  They  are  the  forms  of 
thought  he  has  inherited,  wherein  he  naturally  thinks,  or  from 
which  his  maturer  conceptions  depart. 

The  continuity  of  culture  lies  in  this  handing  down  of  usable 
forms.  Any  campaign  to  discard  tradition  for  the  sake  of  novelty 
as  such,  without  specific  reason  in  each  case  to  break  through  a 
certain  convention  of  thought,  leads  to  dilettantism,  whether  it 
be  in  philosophy,  in  art,  or  in  social  and  moral  institutions.  As 
every  person  has  his  mother  tongue  in  terms  of  which  he  can- 
not help  thinking  his  earliest  thoughts,  so  every  scholar  has  a 
philosophical  mother  tongue,  which  colors  his  natural  Weltan- 
schauung. He  may  have  been  nurtured  in  a  particular  school 
of  thought,  or  his  heritage  may  be  the  less  conscious  one  of 
"common  sense,"  the  popular  metaphysic  of  his  generation  5  but 
he  speaks  some  intellectual  language  that  has  been  bestowed 
on  him,  with  its  whole  cargo  of  preconceptions,  distinctions, 
and  evaluations,  by  his  official  and  unofficial  teachers. 

A  great  philosopher,  however,  has  something  new  and  vital 
to  present  in  whatever  philosophical  mold  he  may  have  been 
given.  The  tenor  of  his  thought  stems  from  the  pastj  but  his 
specific  problems  take  shape  in  the  face  of  a  living  present,  and 
his  dealing  with  them  reflects  the  entire,  ever-nascent  activity 
of  his  own  day.  In  all  the  great  periods  of  philosophy,  the  lead- 
ing minds  of  the  time  have  carried  their  traditional  learning 


382  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

lightly,  and  felt  most  deeply  the  challenge  of  things  which  were 
new  in  their  age.  It  is  the  new  that  calls  urgently  for  interpre- 
tation} and  a  true  philosopher  is  a  person  to  whom  something  in 
the  weary  old  world  always  appears  new  and  uncomprehended. 

There  are  certain  "dead  periods"  in  the  history  of  philosophy, 
when  the  whole  subject  seems  to  shrink  into  a  hard,  small  shell, 
treasured  only  by  scholars  in  large  universities.  The  common 
man  knows  little  about  it  and  cares  less.  What  marks  such  a 
purely  academic  phase  of  philosophical  thought  is  that  its  sub- 
stance as  well  as  its  form  is  furnished  by  a  scholastic  tradition; 
not  only  the  categories,  but  the  problems  of  debate  are  familiar. 
Precisely  in  the  most  eventful  epochs,  when  intellectual  activity 
in  other  fields  is  brilliant  and  exciting,  there  is  quite  apt  to  be 
a  lapse  in  philosophy;  the  greatest  minds  are  engaged  else- 
where; reflection  and  interpretation  are  in  abeyance  when  the 
tempo  of  life  is  at  its  highest.  New  ideas  are  too  kaleidoscopic 
to  be  systematically  construed  or  to  suggest  general  proposi- 
tions. Professional  philosophers,  therefore,  continue  to  argue 
matters  which  their  predecessors  have  brought  to  no  conclusion, 
and  to  argue  them  from  the  same  standpoints  that  yielded  no 
insight  before. 

We  have  only  recently  passed  through  an  "academic"  phase 
of  philosophy,  a  phase  of  stale  problems  and  deadlocked  "isms." 
But  today  we  are  on  the  threshold  of  a  new  creative  period. 
The  most  telling  sign  of  this  is  the  tendency  of  great  minds 
to  see  philosophical  implications  in  facts  and  problems  belong- 
ing to  other  fields  of  learning — mathematics,  anthropology, 
psychology,  physics,  history,  and  the  arts.  Familiar  things  like 
language  or  dream,  or  the  mensurability  of  time,  appear  in  new 
universal  connections  which  involve  highly  interesting  abstract 
issues.  Even  the  layman  lends  his  ear  to  "semantics"  or  to  new 
excitements  about  "relativity." 

Cassirer  had  all  the  marks  of  a  great  thinker  in  a  new  philo- 
sophical period.  His  standpoint  was  a  tradition  which  he  in- 
herited— the  Kantian  "critical"  philosophy  seen  in  the  light  of 
its  later  developments,  which  raised  the  doctrine  of  transcen- 
dental forms  to  the  level  of  a  transcendental  theory  of  Being. 
His  writings  bear  witness  that  he  often  reviewed  and  pondered 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH     383 

the  foundations  of  this  position.  There  was  nothing  accidental 
or  sentimental  in  his  adherence  to  it;  he  maintained  it  through- 
out his  life,  because  he  found  it  fruitful,  suggestive  of  new 
interpretations.  In  his  greatest  works  this  basic  idealism  is 
implicit  rather  than  under  direct  discussion;  and  the  turn  it 
gives  to  his  treatment  of  the  most  baffling  questions  removes  it 
utterly  from  that  treadmill  of  purely  partisan  reiteration  and 
defense  which  is  the  fate  of  decadent  metaphysical  convictions. 
There  is  little  of  polemic  or  apologetic  in  Cassirer's  writings; 
he  was  too  enthusiastic  about  solving  definite  problems  to  spend 
his  time  vindicating  his  method  or  discussing  what  to  him  was 
only  a  starting-point. 

One  of  the  venerable  puzzles  which  he  treated  with  entirely 
new  insight  from  his  peculiarly  free  and  yet  scholarly  point 
of  view  is  the  relation  of  language  and  myth.  Here  we  find 
at  the  outset  the  surprising,  unorthodox  working  of  his  mind: 
for  what  originally  led  him  to  this  problem  was  not  the  con- 
templation of  poetry,  but  of  science.  For  generations  the  advo- 
cates of  scientific  thinking  bemoaned  the  difficulties  which  nature 
seems  to  plant  in  its  path — the  misconceptions  bred  by  "igno- 
rance" and  even  by  language  itself.  It  took  Cassirer  to  see 
that  those  difficulties  themselves  were  worth  investigating. 
Ignorance  is  a  negative  condition;  why  should  the  mere  absence 
of  correct  conceptions  lead  to  w/Vconceptions?  And  why  should 
language,  supposedly  a  practical  instrument  for  conveying 
thought,  serve  to  resist  and  distort  scientific  thought?  The 
misconceptions  interested  him. 

•  If  the  logical  and  factual  type  of  thought  which  science  de- 
i  mands  is  hard  to  maintain,  there  must  be  some  other  mode  of 
thinking  which  constantly  interferes  with  it.  Language,  the 
expression  of  thought,  could  not  possibly  be  a  hindrance  to 
thought  as  such;  if  it  distorts  scientific  conception,  it  must  do 
so  merely  by  giving  preference  and  support  to  such  another 
mode. 

Now,  all  thinking  is  "realistic"  in  the  sense  that  it  deals 
with  phenomena  as  they  present  themselves  in  immediate 
experience.  There  cannot  be  a  way  of  thinking  that  is  not  true 
to  the  reports  of  sense.  If  there  are  two  modes  of  thinking, 


384  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

there  must  be  two  different  modes  of  perceiving  things,  of 
apprehending  the  very  data  of  thought.  To  observe  the  wind, 
for  instance,  as  a  purely  physical  atmospheric  disturbance,  and 
Mnk  of  it  as  a  divine  power  or  an  angry  creature  would  be 
purely  capricious,  playful,  irresponsible.  But  thinking  is  serious 
business,  and  probably  always  has  been  5  and  it  is  not  likely  that 
language,  the  physical  image  of  thought,  portrays  a  pattern  of 
mere  fancies  and  vagaries.  In  so  far  as  language  is  incompatible 
with  scientific  reasoning,  it  must  reflect  a  system  of  thought  that 
is  soberly  true  to  a  mode  of  experiencing^  of  seeing  and  feeling, 
different  from  our  accepted  mode  of  experiencing  "facts."1 

This  idea,  first  suggested  by  the  difficulties  of  scientific 
conception,  opened  up  a  new  realm  of  epistemological  research 
to  its  authorj  for  it  made  the  forms  of  misunderstanding  take 
on  a  positive  rather  than  a  negative  importance  as  archaic  forms 
of  understanding.  The  hypostatic  and  poetic  tinge  of  language 
which  makes  it  so  often  recalcitrant  to  scientific  purposes  is  a 
record  not  only  of  a  different  way  of  thinking,  but  of  seeing, 
feeling,  conceiving  experience — a  way  that  was  probably  para- 
mount in  the  ages  when  language  itself  came  into  being. 
The  whole  problem  of  mind  and  its  relation  to  "reality"  took 
a  new  turn  with  the  hypothesis  that  former  civilizations  may 
actually  have  dealt  with  a  "real  world"  differently  constituted 
from  our  own  world  of  things  with  their  universal  qualities 
and  causal  relationships.  But  how  can  that  older  "reality"  be 
recaptured  and  demonstrated?  And  how  can  the  change  from 
one  way  of  apprehending  nature  to  another  be  accounted  for? 

The  answer  to  this  methodological  question  came  to  him 
as  a  suggestion  from  metaphysics.  "Es  ist  der  Geist  der  sich 
den  Korper  bauty"  said  Goethe.  And  the  post-Kantian  idealists, 
from  Fichte  to  Hermann  Cohen,  had  gone  even  beyond  that 
tenet;  so  they  might  well  have  said,  "Es  ist  der  Geist  der  sich 
das  Weltall  baut"  To  a  romanticist  that  would  have  been  little 
more  than  a  figure  of  speech,  expressing  the  relative  importance 
of  mind  and  matter.  But  in  Cassirer's  bold  and  uncomplacent 
mind  such  a  belief — which  he  held  as  a  basic  intellectual  postu- 
late, not  as  a  value- judgment — immediately  raised  the  ques- 

1  Cf .  Language  and  Myth>  i  of. 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH     385 

tion:  How?  By  what  process  and  what  means  does  the  human 
spirit  construct  its  physical  world? 

Kant  had  already  proposed  the  answer:  By  supplying  the 
transcendental  constituent  of  form.  Kant  regarded  this  form 
as  a  fixed  pattern,  the  same  in  all  human  experience;  the  cate- 
gories of  thought  which  find  their  clearest  expression  in  science, 
seemed  to  him  to  govern  all  empirical  experience,  and  to  be 
reflected  in  the  structure  of  language.  But  the  structure  of 
language  is  just  what  modern  scientific  thought  finds  uncon- 
genial. It  embodies  a  metaphysic  of  substance  and  attribute; 
whereas  science  operates  more  and  more  with  the  concept  of 
junction,  which  is  articulated  in  mathematics.2  There  is  good 
reason  why  mathematicians  have  abandoned  verbal  propositions 
almost  entirely  and  resorted  to  a  symbolism  which  expresses 
different  metaphysical  assumptions,  different  categories  of 
thought  altogether. 

At  this  point  Cassirer,  reflecting  on  the  shift  from  substantive 
to  functional  thinking,  found  the  key  to  the  methodological 
problem:  two  different  symbolisms  revealed  two  radically  dif- 
ferent forms  of  thought;  does  not  every  form  of  Anschauung 
have  its  symbolic  mode?  Might  not  an  exhaustive  study  of 
symbolic  forms  reveal  just  how  the  human  mind,  in  its  various 
stages,  has  variously  construed  the  "reality"  with  which  it  dealt? 
To  construe  the  equivocally  "given"  is  to  construct  the  phe- 
nomenon for  experience.  And  so  the  Kantian  principle,  fructified 
by  a  wholly  new  problem  of  science,  led  beyond  the  Kantian 
doctrine  to  the  Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms. 

The  very  plan  of  this  work  departs  from  all  previous  ap- 
proaches to  epistemology  by  not  assuming  either  that  the 
mind  is  concerned  essentially  with  facts,  or  that  its  prime  talent 
is  discursive  reason.  A  careful  study  of  the  scientific  miscon- 
ceptions which  language  begets  revealed  the  fact  that  its  subject- 
predicate  structure,  which  reflects  a  "natural"  ontology  of 
substance  and  attribute,  is  not  its  only  metaphysical  trait.  Lan- 
guage is  born  of  the  need  for  emotional  expression.  Yet  it  is 
not  exclamatory.  It  is  essentially  hypostatic,  seeking  to  distin- 
guish, emphasize,  and  hold  the  object  of  feeling  rather  than 

*  See  Substance  and  Function,  Ch.  I. 


386  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

to  communicate  the  feeling  itself.  To  fix  the  object  as  a  per- 
manent focus  point  in  experience  is  the  function  of  the  name. 
Whatever  evokes  emotion  may  therefore  receive  a  name;  and, 
if  this  object  is  not  a  thing — if  it  is  an  act,  or  a  phenomenon 
like  lightning,  or  a  sound,  or  some  other  intangible  item — , 
the  name  nevertheless  gives  it  the  unity,  permanence,  and 
apparent  substantiality  of  a  "thing." 

This  hypostasis,  entailed  by  the  primitive  office  of  language, 
really  lies  deeper  even  than  nomenclature,  which  merely  reflects 
it:  for  it  is  a  fundamental  trait  of  all  imagination.  The  very  word 
"imagination"  denotes  a  process  of  image-making.  An  image 
is  only  an  aspect  of  the  actual  thing  it  represents.  It  may  be 
not  even  a  completely  or  carefully  abstracted  aspect.  Its  im- 
portance lies  in  the  fact  that  it  symbolizes  the  whole — the  thing, 
person,  occasion,  or  what-not — from  which  it  is  an  abstract. 
A  thing  has  a  history,  an  event  passes  irrevocably  away,  actual 
experience  is  transient  and  would  exhaust  itself  in  a  series  of 
unique  occasions,  were  it  not  for  the  permanence  of  the  symbol 
whereby  it  may  be  recalled  and  possessed.  Imagination  is  a 
free  and  continual  production  of  images  to  "mean"  experience — 
past  or  present  or  even  merely  possible  experience. 

Imagination  is  the  primary  talent  of  the  human  mind,  the 
activity  in  whose  service  language  was  evolved.  The  imagina- 
tive mode  of  ideation  is  not  "logical"  after  the  manner  of 
discursive  reason.  It  has  a  logic  of  its  own,  a  definite  pattern  of 
identifications  and  concentrations  which  bring  a  very  deluge  of 
ideas,  all  charged  with  intense  and  often  widely  diverse  feelings, 
together  in  one  symbol. 

Symbols  are  the  indispensable  instruments  of  conception.  To 
undergo  an  experience,  to  react  to  immediate  or  conditional 
stimuli  (as  animals  react  to  warning  or  guiding  signs),  is  not  to 
"have"  experience  in  the  characteristically  human  sense,  which 
is  to  conceive  it,  hold  it  in  the  mind  as  a  so-called  "content  of 
consciousness,"  and  consequently  be  able  to  think  about  it.3  To 
a  human  mind,  every  experience — a  sensation  of  light  or  color, 
a  fright,  a  fall,  a  continuous  noise  like  the  roar  of  breakers 

§  Cf.  Language  and  Myth,  38. 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH    387 

on  the  beach — exhibits,  in  retrospect,  a  unity  and  self-identity 
that  make  it  almost  as  static  and  tangible  as  a  solid  object.  By 
virtue  of  this  hypostatization  it  may  be  referred  to>  much  as  an 
object  may  be  fainted  at;  and  therefore  the  mind  can  think 
about  it  without  its  actual  recurrence.  In  its  symbolic  image  the 
experience  is  conceived,  instead  of  just  physiologically  remem- 
bered.4 

Cassirer's  greatest  epistemological  contribution  is  his  approach 
to  the  problem  of  mind  through  a  study  of  the  primitive  forms 
of  conception.  His  reflections  on  science  had  taught  him  that 
all  conception  is  intimately  bound  to  expression;  and  the  forms 
of  expression,  which  determine  those  of  conception,  are  symbolic 
forms.  So  he  was  led  to  his  central  problem,  the  diversity  of 
symbolic  forms  and  their  interrelation  in  the  edifice  of  human 
culture. 

He  distinguished,  as  so  many  autonomous  forms,  language, 
myth,  art,  and  science.5  In  examining  their  respective  patterns  he 
made  his  first  startling  discovery:  myth  and  language  appeared 
as  genuine  twin  creatures,  born  of  the  same  phase  of  human 
mentality,  exhibiting  analogous  formal  traits,  despite  their  ob- 
vious diversities  of  content.  Language,  on  the  one  hand,  seems 
to  have  articulated  and  established  mythological  concepts, 
whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  its  own  meanings  are  essentially 
images  functioning  mythically.  The  two  modes  of  thought 
have  grown  up  together,  as  conception  and  expression,  respec- 
tively, of  the  primitive  human  world. 

The  earliest  products  of  mythic  thinking  are  not  permanent, 
self-identical,  and  clearly  distinguished  "gods;"  neither  are 
they  immaterial  spirits.  They  are  like  dream  elements — objects 
endowed  with  daemonic  import,  haunted  places,  accidental 
shapes  in  nature  resembling  something  ominous — all  manner  of 
shifting,  fantastic  images  which  speak  of  Good  and  Evil,  of 
Life  and  Death,  to  the  impressionable  and  creative  mind  of 
man.  Their  common  trait  is  a  quality  that  characterizes  every- 
thing in  the  sphere  of  myth,  magic,  and  religion,  and  also  the 

4  See  An  Essay  on  Man,  chapters  2  and  3,  fassim. 
9  Language  and'  Myth^  8, 


388  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

earliest  ethical  conceptions — the  quality  of  holiness*  Holiness 
may  appertain  to  almost  anything;  it  is  the  mystery  that  appears 
as  magic,  as  taboo,  as  daemonic  power,  as  miracle,  and  as 
divinity.  The  first  dichotomy  in  the  emotive  or  mythic  phase 
of  mentality  is  not,  as  for  discursive  reason,  the  opposition  of 
"yes"  and  "no,"  of  "a"  and  "non-a,"  or  truth  and  falsity;  the 
basic  dichotomy  here  is  between  the  sacred  and  the  profane. 
Human  beings  actually  apprehend  values  and  expressions  of 
values  be-fore  they  formulate  and  entertain  jacts. 

All  mythic  constructions  are  symbols  of  value — of  life  and 
power,  or  of  violence,  evil,  and  death.  They  are  charged  with 
feeling,  and  have  a  way  of  absorbing  into  themselves  more 
and  more  intensive  meanings,  sometimes  even  logically  conflict- 
ing imports.  Therefore  mythic  symbols  do  not  give  rise  to  dis- 
cursive understanding;  they  do  beget  a  kind  of  understanding, 
but  not  by  sorting  out  concepts  and  relating  them  in  a  distinct 
pattern;  they  tend,  on  the  contrary,  merely  to  bring  together 
great  complexes  of  cognate  ideas,  in  which  all  distinctive  fea- 
tures are  merged  and  swallowed.  "Here  we  find  in  operation  a 
law  which  might  actually  be  called  the  law  of  the  levelling  and 
extinction  of  specific  differences,"  says  Cassirer,  in  Language  and, 
Myth.  "Every  part  of  a  whole  is  the  whole  itself,  every  speci- 
men is  equivalent  to  the  entire  species."7  The  significance  of 
mythic  structures  is  not  formally  and  arbitrarily  assigned  to 
them,  as  convention  assigns  one  exact  meaning  to  a  recognized 
symbol;  rather,  their  meaning  seems  to  dwell  in  them  as  life 
dwells  in  a  body;  they  are  animated  by  it,  it  is  of  their  essence, 
and  the  naive,  awe-struck  mind  finds  it,  as  the  quality  of  "holi- 
ness." Therefore  mythic  symbols  do  not  even  appear  to  be 
symbols;  they  appear  as  holy  objects  or  places  or  beings,  and 
their  import  is  felt  as  an  inherent  power. 

This  really  amounts  to  another  "law"  of  imaginative  con- 
ception. Just  as  specific  differences  of  meaning  are  obliterated 
in  nondiscursive  symbolization,  the  very  distinction  between 
form  and  content,  between  the  entity  (thing,  image,  gesture,  or 

6  See  Die  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  II, 
fPp.  91-92. 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH     389 

natural  event)  which  is  the  symbol,  and  the  idea  or  feeling 
which  is  its  meaning,  is  lost,  or  rather:  is  not  yet  found.  This 
is  a  momentous  fact,  for  it  is  the  basis  of  all  superstition  and 
strange  cosmogony,  as  well  as  of  religious  belief.  To  believe  in 
the  existence  of  improbable  or  quite  fantastic  things  and  beings 
would  be  inexplicable  folly  if  beliefs  were  dictated  essentially 
by  practical  experience.  But  the  mythic  interpretation  of  reality 
rests  on  the  principle  that  the  veneration  appropriate  to  the 
meaning  of  a  symbol  is  focussed  on  the  symbol  itself,  which 
is  simply  identified  with  its  import.  This  creates  a  world  punctu- 
ated by  pre-eminent  objects,  mystic  centers  of  power  and  holi- 
ness, to  which  more  and  more  emotive  meanings  accrue  as 
"properties."  An  intuitive  recognition  of  their  import  takes  the 
form  of  ardent,  apparently  irrational  belief  in  the  physical 
reality  and  power  of  the  significant  forms.  This  is  the  hypostatic 
mechanism  of  the  mind  by  which  the  world  is  filled  with 
magical  things — fetishes  and  talismans,  sacred  trees,  rocks, 
caves,  and  the  vague,  protean  ghosts  that  inhabit  them — and 
finally  the  world  is  peopled  with  a  pantheon  of  permanent, 
more  or  less  anthropomorphic  gods.  In  these  presences  "reality" 
is  concentrated  for  the  mythic  imagination}  this  is  not  "make- 
believe,"  not  a  willful  or  playful  distortion  of  a  radically  differ- 
ent "given  fact,"  but  is  the  way  phenomena  are  given  to  naive 
apprehension. 

Certainly  the  pattern  of  that  world  is  altogether  different 
from  the  pattern  of  the  "material"  world  which  confronts  our 
sober  common  sense,  follows  the  laws  of  causality,  and  exhibits 
a  logical  order  of  classes  and  subclasses,  with  their  defining 
properties  and  relations,  wherfeby  each  individual  object  either 
does  or  does  not  belong  to  any  given  class.  Cassirer  has  summed 
up  the  logical  contrast  between  the  mode  of  mythic  intuition  and 
that  of  "factual"  or  "scientific"  apprehension  in  very  telling 
phrase: 

In  the  realm  of  discursive  conception  there  reigns  a  sort  of  diffuse 
light — and  the  further  logical  analysis  proceeds,  the  further  does  this 
even  clarity  and  luminosity  extend.  But  in  the  ideational  realm  of  myth 
and  language  there  are  always,  besides  those  locations  from  which  the 


390  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

strongest  light  proceeds,  others  that  appear  wrapped  in  profoundest 
darkness.  While  certain  contents  of  perception  become  verbal-mythical 
centers  of  force,  centers  of  significance,  there  are  others  which  remain, 
one  might  say,  beneath  the  threshold  of  meaning.8 

His  coupling  of  myth  and  language  in  this  passage  brings  us 
back  to  the  intimate  connection  between  these  two  great  sym- 
bolic forms  which  he  traces  to  a  common  origin.  The  dawn  of 
language  was  the  dawn  of  the  truly  human  mind,  which  meets 
us  first  of  all  as  a  rather  highly  developed  organ  of  practical 
response  and  of  imagination,  or  symbolic  rendering  of  impres- 
sions. The  first  "holy  objects"  seem  to  be  born  of  momentary 
emotional  experiences — fright  centering  on  a  place  or  a  thing, 
concentrated  desire  that  manifests  itself  in  a  dreamlike  image  or 
a  repeated  gesture,  triumph  that  issues  naturally  in  festive  dance 
and  song,  directed  toward  a  symbol  of  power.  Somewhere  in 
the  course  of  this  high  emotional  life  primitive  man  took  to 
using  his  instinctive  vocal  talent  as  a  source  of  such  "holy  ob- 
jects," sounds  with  imaginative  import:  such  vocal  symbols  are 
names. 

In  savage  societies,  names  are  treated  not  as  conventional  ap- 
pellations, but  as  though  they  were  physical  proxies  for  their 
bearers.  To  call  an  object  by  an  inappropriate  name  is  to  con- 
found its  very  nature.  In  some  cultures  practically  all  language 
serves  mystic  purposes  and  is  subject  to  the  most  impractical 
taboos  and  regulations.  It  is  clearly  of  a  piece  with  magic, 
religion  and  the  whole  pattern  of  intensive  emotional  symbolism 
which  governs  the  pre-scientific  mind.  Names  are  the  very  es- 
sence of  mythic  symbols;  nothing  on  earth  is  a  more  concen- 
trated point  of  sheer  meaning  than  the  little,  transient,  invisible 
breath  that  constitutes  a  spoken  word.  Physically  it  is  almost 
nothing.  Yet  it  carries  more  definite  and  momentous  import 
than  any  permanent  holy  object.9  It  can  be  invoked  at  will, 
anywhere  and  at  any  time,  by  a  mere  act  of  speech;  merely 
knowing  a  word  gives  a  person  the  power  of  using  it;  thus  it 
is  invisibly  "had,"  carried  about  by  its  possessors. 

8  Language  and  Myth,  9 1 . 

*  "Often  it  is  the  name  of  the  deity,  rather  than  the  god  himself,  that  seems 
to  be  the  real  source  of  efficacy."  (Language  and  Myth,  48) 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH     391 

It  is  characteristic  of  mythic  "powers"  that  they  are  com- 
pletely contained  in  every  fragment  of  matter,  every  sound,  and 
every  gesture  which  partakes  of  them.10  This  fact  betrays  their 
real  nature,  which  is  not  that  of  physical  forces,  but  of  meanings; 
a  meaning  is  indeed  completely  given  by  every  symbol  to  which 
it  attaches.  The  greater  the  "power"  in  proportion  to  its  bearer, 
the  more  awe-inspiring  will  the  latter  be.  So,  as  long  as  mean- 
ing is  felt  as  an  indwelling  potency  of  certain  physical  objects, 
words  must  certainly  rank  high  in  the  order  of  holy  things. 

But  language  has  more  than  a  purely  denotative  function. 
Its  symbols  are  so  manifold,  so  manageable,  and  so  economical 
that  a  considerable  number  of  them  may  be  held  in  one  "spe- 
cious present,"  though  each  one  physically  passes  away  before 
the  next  is  given;  each  has  left  its  meaning  'to  be  apprehended 
in  the  same  span  of  attention  that  takes  in  the  whole  series.  Of 
course,  the  length  of  the  span  varies  greatly  with  different  men- 
talities. But  as  soon  as  two  or  more  words  are  thus  taken  together 
in  the  mind  of  an  interpretant,  language  has  acquired  its 
second  function:  it  has  engendered  discursive  thought,  fb" 

The  discursive  mode  of  thinking  is  what  we  usually  call 
"reason."  It  is  not  as  primitive  as  the  imaginative  mode,  because 
it  arises  from  the  syntactical  nature  of  language;  mythic  en- 
visagement  and  verbal  expression  are  its  forerunners.  Yet  it  is 
a  natural  development  from  the  earlier  symbolic  mode,  which 
is  pre-discursive,  and  thus  in  a  strict  and  narrow  sense  "pre- 
rational." 

Henceforth,  the  history  of  thought  consists  chiefly  in  the 
gradual  achievement  of  factual,  literal,  and  logical  conception 
and  expression.  Obviously  the  only  means  to  this  end  is  lan- 
guage. But  this  instrument,  it  must  be  remembered,  has  a  double 
nature.  Its  syntactical  tendencies  bestow  the  laws  of  logic  on 
us;  yet  the  primacy  of  names  in  its  make-up  holds  it  to  the 
hypostatic  way  of  thinking  which  belongs  to  its  twin-phe- 
nomenon, myth.  Consequently  it  leads  us  beyond  the  sphere  of 
mythic  and  emotive  thought,  yet  always  pulls  us  back  into  it 
again;  it  is  both  the  diffuse  and  tempered  light  that  shows  us 
the  external  world  of  "fact,"  and  the  array  of  spiritual  lamps, 

**  Cf.  Language  and  Myth,  92. 


392  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

light-centers  of  intensive  meaning,  that  throw  the  gleams  and 
shadows  of  the  dream  world  wherein  our  earliest  experiences  lay. 

We  have  come  so  far  along  the  difficult  road  of  discursive 
thinking  that  the  laws  of  logic  seem  to  be  the  very  frame  of 
the  mind,  and  rationality  its  essence.  Kant  regarded  the  cate- 
gories of  pure  understanding  as  universal  transcendental  forms, 
imposed  by  the  most  naive  untutored  mind  on  all  its  perceptions, 
so  that  self-identity,  the  dichotomy  of  "a"  and  "non-0/'  the  rela- 
tion of  part  and  whole,  and  other  axiomatic  general  concepts 
inhered  in  phenomena  as  their  necessary  conditions.  Yet,  from 
primitive  apprehension  to  even  the  simplest  rational  construc- 
tion is  probably  a  far  cry.  It  is  interesting  to  see  how  Cassirer, 
who  followed  Kant  in  his  "Copernican  revolution,"  i.e.,  in  the 
transcendental  analysis  of  phenomena  which  traces  their  form 
to  a  non-phenomenal,  subjective  element,  broadened  the  Kan- 
tian concept  of  form  to  make  it  a  variable  and  anthropologi- 
cally valid  principle,  without  compromising  the  "critical" 
standpoint  at  all.  Instead  of  accepting  one  categorial  scheme — 
that  of  discursive  thought — as  the  absolute  way  of  experiencing 
reality,  he  finds  it  relative  to  a  form  of  symbolic  presentation; 
and  as  there  are  alternative  symbolic  forms,  there  are  also  al- 
ternative phenomenal  "worlds."  Mythic  conception  is  categori- 
ally  different  from  scientific  conception;  therefore  it  meets  a  dif- 
ferent world  of  perceptions.  Its  objects  are  not  self-identical, 
consistent,  universally  related;  they  condense  many  characters  in 
one,  have  conflicting  attributes  and  intermittent  existence,  the 
whole  is  contained  in  its  parts,  and  the  parts  in  each  other.  The 
world  they  constitute  is  a  world  of  values,  things  "holy"  against  a 
vague  background  of  commonplaces,  or  "profane"  events,  in- 
stead of  a  world  of  neutral  physical  facts.  By  this  departure,  the 
Kantian  doctrine  that  identified  all  conception  with  discursive 
reason,  making  reason  appear  as  an  aboriginal  human  gift,  is 
saved  from  its  most  serious  fallacy,  an  unhistorical  view  of  mind. 

Cassirer  called  his  Essay  on  Man,  which  briefly  summarizes 
the  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formeny  "An  Introduction 
to  a  Philosophy  of  Human  Culture."  The  subtitle  is  appropriate 
indeed;  for  the  most  striking  thing  about  this  philosophy  viewed 
as  a  whole  is  the  way  the  actual  evolution  of  human  customs, 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH  393 

arts,  ideas,  and  languages  is  not  merely  fitted  into  an  idealistic 
interpretation  of  the  world  (as  it  may  be  fitted  into  almost  any 
metaphysical  picture),  but  is  illumined  and  made  accessible  to 
serious  study  by  working  principles  taken  from  Kantian  episte- 
mology.  His  emphasis  on  the  constitutive  character  of  symbolic 
renderings  in  the  making  of  "experience"  is  the  masterstroke 
that  turns  the  purely  speculative  "critical"  theory  into  an 
anthropological  hypothesis,  a  key  to  several  linguistic  problems, 
a  source  of  psychological  understanding,  and  a  guidepost  in  the 
maze  of  Geistesgeschichte. 

It  is,  as  I  pointed  out  before,  characteristic  of  Cassirer's 
thought  that,  although  its  basic  principles  stem  from  a  philo- 
sophical tradition,  its  living  material  and  immediate  inspiration 
come  from  contemporary  sources,  from  fields  of  research  beyond 
his  own.  For  many  years  the  metaphysic  of  mind  has  been 
entirely  divorced  from  the  scientific  study  of  mental  phe- 
nomena} whether  mind  be  an  eternal  essence  or  a  transient 
epiphenomenon,  a  world  substance  or  a  biological  instrument, 
makes  little  difference  to  our  understanding  of  observed  human 
or  animal  behavior.  But  Cassirer  breaks  this  isolation  of  specula- 
tive thought}  he  uses  the  Kantian  doctrine,  that  mind  is  con- 
stitutive of  the  "external  world,"  to  explain  the  way  this  world 
is  experienced  as  well  as  the  mere  fact  that  it  is  experienced;  and 
in  so  doing,  of  course,  he  makes  his  metaphysic  meet  the  test 
of  factual  findings  at  every  turn.  His  most  interesting  exhibits 
are  psychological  phenomena  revealed  in  the  psychiatric  clinic 
and  in  ethnologists'  reports.  The  baffling  incapacities  of  im- 
paired brains,  the  language  of  childhood,  the  savage's  peculiar 
practices,  the  prevalence  of  myth  in  early  cultures  and  its  per- 
sistence in  religious  thought — these  and  other  widely  scattered 
facts  receive  new  significance  in  the  light  of  his  philosophy.  And 
that  is  the  pragmatic  measure  of  any  speculative  approach.  A 
really  cogent  doctrine  of  mind  cannot  be  irrelevant  to  psy- 
chology, any  more  than  a  good  cosmological  system  can  be 
meaningless  for  physics,  or  a  theory  of  ethics  inapplicable  to 
jurisprudence  and  law. 

The  psychiatric  phenomena  which  illustrate  the  existence  of  a 
mythic  mode  of  thought,  and  point  to  its  ancient  and  primitive 


394  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

nature,  are  striking  and  persuasive,11  Among  these  is  the  fact 
that  in  certain  pathological  conditions  of  the  brain  the  power  of 
abstraction  is  lost,  and  the  patient  falls  back  on  picturesque 
metaphorical  language.  In  more  aggravated  cases  the  imagina- 
tion, too,  is  impaired}  and  here  we  have  a  reversion  almost  to 
animal  mentality.  One  symptom  of  this  state  which  is  significant 
for  the  philosophy  of  symbolism  is  that  the  sufferer  is  unable  to 
tell  a  lie,  feign  any  action,  or  do  anything  his  actual  situation 
does  not  dictate,  though  he  may  still  find  his  way  with  immedi- 
ate realities.  If  he  is  thirtsy,  he  can  recognize  and  take  a  glass 
of  water,  and  drink  j  but  he  cannot  pick  up  an  empty  glass  and 
demonstrate  the  act  of  drinking  as  though  there  were  water  in 
it,  or  even  lift  a  full  glass  to  his  lips,  if  he  is  not  thirsty.  Such 
incapacities  have  been  classified  as  "apractic"  disorders}  but 
Cassirer  pointed  out  that  they  are  not  so  much  practical  failures, 
as  loss  of  the  basic  symbolic  function,  engagement  of  things 
not  given.  This  is  borne  out  by  a  still  more  serious  disturbance 
which  occurs  with  the  destruction  of  certain  brain  areas,  inability 
to  recognize  "things,"  such  as  chairs  and  brooms  and  pieces  of 
clothing,  directly  and  instantly  as  objects  denoted  by  their 
names.  At  this  point,  pathology  furnishes  a  striking  testimony 
of  the  real  nature  of  language:  for  here,  names  lose  their 
hypostatic  office,  the  creation  of  permanent  and  particular  items 
out  of  the  flux  of  impressions.  To  a  person  thus  afflicted,  words 
have  connotation,  but  experience  does  not  readily  correspond  to 
the  conceptual  scheme  of  language,  which  makes  names  the  pre- 
eminent points  of  rest,  and  requires  things  as  the  fundamental 
relata  in  reality.  The  connoted  concepts  are  apt  to  be  adjectival 
rather  than  substantive.  Consequently  the  world  confronting  the 
patient  is  not  composed  of  objects  immediately  "given"  in  ex- 
perience; it  is  composed  of  sense  data,  which  he  must  "associate" 
to  form  "things,"  much  as  Hume  supposed  the  normal  mind  to 
do. 

Most  of  the  psychological  phenomena  that  caught  Cassirer's 
interest  arose  from  the  psychiatric  work  of  Kurt  Goldstein,  who 

11  For  a  full  treatment  of  this  material  see  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  For  men  ^ 
III,  part  3,  fassim. 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH  395 

has  dealt  chiefly  with  cases  of  cerebral  damage  caused  by  physi- 
cal accident.  But  the  range  of  psychological  researches  which  bear 
out  Cassirer's  theory  of  mind  is  much  wider;  it  includes  the 
whole  field  of  so-called  "dynamic  psychology,"  the  somewhat 
chaotic  store  of  new  ideas  and  disconcerting  facts  with  which 
Sigmund  Freud  alarmed  his  generation.  Cassirer  himself  never 
explored  this  fund  of  corroborative  evidence;  he  found  himself 
in  such  fundamental  disagreement  with  Freud  on  the  nature  of 
the  dynamic  motive — which  the  psychologist  regarded  as  not 
only  derived  from  the  sex  impulse,  but  forever  bound  to  it,  and 
which  the  philosopher  saw  liberated  in  science,  art,  religion, 
and  everything  that  constitutes  the  "self-realization  of  the 
spirit" — that  there  seemed  to  be  simply  no  point  of  contact  be- 
tween their  respective  doctrines.  Cassirer  felt  that  to  Freud  all 
those  cultural  achievements  were  mere  by-products  of  the  un- 
changing animalian  "libido,"  symptoms  of  its  blind  activity  and 
continual  frustration;  whereas  to  him  they  were  the  consumma- 
tion of  a  spiritual  process  which  merely  took  its  rise  from  the 
blind  excitement  of  the  animal  "libido,"  but  received  its  im- 
portance and  meanings  from  the  phenomena  of  awareness  and 
creativity,  the  envisagement,  reason,  and  cognition  it  produced. 
This  basic  difference  of  evaluations  of  the  life  process  made 
Cassirer  hesitate  to  make  any  part  of  Freud's  doctrine  his  own; 
at  the  end  of  his  life  he  had,  apparently,  just  begun  to  study  the 
important  relationship  between  "dynamic  psychology"  and  the 
philosophy  of  symbolic  forms. 

It  is,  indeed,  only  in  regard  to  the  forms  of  thought  that  a 
parallel  obtains  between  these  systems;  but  that  parallel  is 
close  and  vital,  none  the  less.  For,  the  "dream  work"  of 
Freud's  "unconscious"  mental  mechanism  is  almost  exactly 
the  "mythic  mode"  which  Cassirer  describes  as  the  primitive 
form  of  ideation,  wherein  an  intense  feeling  is  spontane- 
ously expressed  in  a  symbol,  an  image  seen  in  something  or 
formed  for  the  mind's  eye  by  the  excited  imagination.  Such  ex- 
pression is  effortless  and  therefore  unexhausting;  its  products 
are  images  charged  with  meanings,  but  the  meanings  remain 
implicit,  so  that  the  emotions  they  command  seem  to  be  centered 


396  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

on  the  image  rather  than  on  anything  it  merely  conveys;  in  the 
image,  which  may  be  a  vision,  a  gesture,  a  sound- form  (musical 
image)  or  a  word  as  readily  as  an  external  object,  many  mean- 
ings may  be  concentrated,  many  ideas  telescoped  and  interfused, 
and  incompatible  emotions  simultaneously  expressed. 

The  mythic  mind  never  perceives  passively,  never  merely  contemplates 
things;  all  its  observations  spring  from  some  act  of  participation,  some 
act  of  emotion  and  will.  Even  as  mythic  imagination  materializes  in 
permanent  forms,  and  presents  us  with  definite  outlines  of  an  'objective' 
world  of  beings,  the  significance  of  this  world  becomes  clear  to  us  only 
if  we  can  still  detect,  underneath  it  all,  that  dynamic  sense  of  life  from 
which  it  originally  arose.  Only  where  this  vital  feeling  is  stirred  from 
within,  where  it  expresses  itself  as  love  or  hate,  fear  or  hope,  joy  or 
sorrow,  mythic  imagination  is  roused  to  the  pitch  of  excitement  at  which 
it  begets  a  definite  world  of  representations.  (Philosofhie  der  symboli- 
schen  Formeny  II,  90.) 

For  a  person  whose  apprehension  is  under  the  spell  of  this  mythico- 
religious  attitude,  it  is  as  though  the  whole  world  were  simply  annihilated; 
the  immediate  content,  whatever  it  be,  that  commands  his  religious  in- 
terest so  completely  fills  his  consciousness  that  nothing  else  can  exist 
beside  and  apart  from  it.  The  ego  is  spending  all  its  energy  on  this  single 
object,  lives  in  it,  loses  itself  in  it.  Instead  of  a  widening  of  intuitive 
experience,  we  find  here  its  extreme  limitation;  instead  of  expansion 
.  .  .  we  have  here  an  impulse  toward  concentration;  instead  of  extensive 
distribution,  intensive  compression.  This  focussing  of  all  forces  on  a 
single  point  is  the  prerequisite  for  all  mythical  thinking  and  mythical 
formulation.  When,  on  the  one  hand,  the  entire  self  is  given  up  to  a 
single  impression,  is  'possessed'  by  it  and,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  the 
utmost  tension  between  the  subject  and  its  object,  the  outer  world;  when 
external  reality  is  not  merely  viewed  and  contemplated,  but  overcomes 
a  man  in  sheer  immediacy,  with  emotions  of  fear  or  hope,  terror  or 
wish  fulfillment:  then  the  spark  jumps  somehow  across,  the  tension  finds 
release,  as  the  subjective  excitement  becomes  objectified  and  confronts 
the  mind  as  a  god  or  a  daemon.  (Language  and  Myth,  32-33.) 

.  .  .  this  peculiar  genesis  determines  the  type  of  intellectual  content 
that  is  common  to  language  and  myth  .  .  .  present  reality,  as  mythic  or 
linguistic  conception  stresses  and  shapes  it,  fills  the  entire  subjective 
realm.  ...  At  this  point,  the  word  which  denotes  that  thought  content 
is  not  a  mere  conventional  symbol,  but  is  merged  with  its  object  in  an 
indissoluble  unity.  .  .  .  The  potential  between  'symbol'  and  'meaning*  is 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH     397 

resolved;  in  place  of  a  more  or  less  adequate  'expression,'  we  find  a 
relation  of  identity,  of  complete  congruence  between  'image1  and  'object/ 
between  the  name  and  the  thing. 

.  .  .  the  same  sort  of  hypostatization  or  transubstantiation  occurs  in 
other  realms  of  mental  creativity;  indeed,  it  seems  to  be  the  typical  process 
in  all  unconscious  ideation.  (Ibid.,  57-58.) 

Mythology  presents  us  with  a  world  which  is  not,  indeed,  devoid  of 
structure  and  internal  organization,  but  which,  none  the  less,  is  not 
divided  according  to  the  categories  of  reality,  into  'things'  and  'properties.' 
Here  all  forms  of  Being  exhibit,  as  yet,  a  peculiar  'fluidity;'  they  are 
distinct  without  being  really  separate.  Every  form  is  capable  of  changing, 
on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  even  into  its  very  opposite.  .  .  .  One  and 
the  same  entity  may  not  only  undergo  constant  change  into  sucessive 
guises,  but  it  combines  within  itself,  at  one  and  the  same  instant  of  its 
existence,  a  wealth  of  different  and  even  incompatible  natures.  (Philoso- 
phic der  symbolischen  Formeny  III,  71-72.) 

Above  all,  there  is  a  complete  lack  of  any  clear  division  between 
mere  'imagining'  and  'real'  perception,  between  wish  and  fulfilment, 
between  image  and  object.  This  is  most  clearly  revealed  by  the  decisive 
role  which  dream  experiences  play  in  the  development  of  mythic  con- 
sciousness. ...  It  is  beyond  doubt  that  certain  mythic  concepts  can  be 
understood,  in  all  their  peculiar  complexity,  only  in  so  far  as  one  realizes 
that  for  mythic  thought  and  'experience'  there  is  but  a  continuous  and 
fluid  transition  from  the  world  of  dream  to  objective  'reality.'  (Ibid.,  II, 

48-49-) 

The  world  of  myth  is  a  dramatic  world — a  world  of  actions,  of 
forces,  of  conflicting  powers.  In  every  phenomenon  of  nature  it  [mythic 
consciousness]  sees  the  collision  of  these  powers.  Mythical  perception 
is  always  impregnated  with  these  emotional  qualities.  Whatever  is  seen 
or  felt  is  surrounded  by  a  special  atmosphere — an  atmosphere  of  joy 
or  grief,  of  anguish,  of  excitement,  of  exultation  or  depression.  .  .  .  All 
objects  are  benignant  or  malignant,  friendly  or  inimical,  familiar  or 
uncanny,  alluring  and  fascinating  or  repellent  and  threatening. — (An 
Essay  on  Many  76-77.) 

The  real  substratum  of  myth  is  not  a  substratum  of  thought  but  of 
feeling.  ...  Its  view  of  life  is  a  synthetic,  not  an  analytical  one.  .  .  . 
There  is  no  specific  difference  between  the  various  realms  of  life.  .  .  . 
To  mythical  and  religious  feeling  nature  becomes  one  great  society, 
the  society  of  life.  Man  is  not  endowed  with  outstanding  rank  in  this 
society.  .  .  .  Men  and  animals,  animals  and  plants  are  all  on  the  same 
level.  (Ibid.,  81-83.) 


398  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

To  all  these  passages  Freud  could  subscribe  wholeheartedly  j 
the  morphology  of  the  "mythic  mode"  is  essentially  that  of 
dream,  phantasy,  infantile  thinking,  and  "unconscious"  ideation 
which  he  himself  discovered  and  described.  And  it  is  the  recog- 
nition of  this  non-discursive  mode  of  thought,  rather  than  his 
clinical  hypothesis  of  an  all-pervading  disguised  sexuality,  that 
makes  Freud's  psychology  important  for  philosophy.  Not  the 
theory  of  "libido,"  which  is  another  theory  of  "animal  drives," 
but  the  conception  of  the  unconscious  mechanism  through  which 
the  "libido"  operates,  the  dream  work,  the  myth-making  process 
— that  is  the  new  generative  idea  which  psychoanalysis  con- 
tributed to  psychological  thinking,  the  notion  that  has  put 
modern  psychology  so  completely  out  of  gear  with  traditional 
epistemology  that  the  science  of  mind  and  the  philosophy  of 
mind  threatened  to  lose  contact  altogether.  So  it  is  of  the  utmost 
significance  for  the  unity  of  our  advancing  thought  that  pure 
speculative  philosophy  should  recognize  and  understand  the 
primary  forms  of  conception  which  underlie  the  achievement  of 
discursive  reason. 

Cassirer's  profound  antipathy  to  Freud's  teaching  rests  on 
another  aspect  of  that  psychological  system,  which  springs  from 
the  fact  that  Freud's  doctrine  was  determined  by  practical  inter- 
ests: that  is  the  tendency  of  the  psychoanalyst  to  range  all 
human  aims,  all  ideals  on  the  same  ethical  level.  Since  he  deals 
entirely  with  the  evils  of  social  maladjustment,  his  measure  of 
good  is  simply  adjustment}  religion  and  learning  and  social 
reform,  art  and  discovery  and  philosophical  reflection,  to  him 
are  just  so  many  avenues  of  personal  gratification — sublimation 
of  passions,  emotional  self-expression.  From  his  standpoint  they 
cannot  be  viewed  as  objective  values.  Just  as  good  poetry  and 
bad  poetry  are  of  equal  interest  and  importance  to  the  psycho- 
analyst, so  the  various  social  systems  are  all  equally  good,  all 
religions  equally  true  (or  rather,  equally  false,  but  salutary), 
and  all  abstract  systems  of  thought,  scientific  or  philosophical  or 
mathematical,  just  self-dramatizations  in  disguise.  To  a  phi- 
losopher who  was  also  a  historian  of  culture,  such  a  point  of  view 
seemed  simply  devastating.  It  colored  his  vision  of  Freud's  work 
so  deeply  that  it  really  obscured  for  him  the  constructive  aspect, 


THEORY  OF  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH     399 

the  analysis  of  non-discursive  ideation,  which  this  essentially 
clinical  psychology  contains.  Yet  the  relationship  between  the 
new  psychiatry  and  his  own  new  epistemology  is  deep  and  close; 
"der  Mythos  als  Denkform"™  is  the  theme  that  rounds  out  the 
modern  philosophical  picture  of  human  mentality  to  embrace 
psychology  and  anthropology  and  linguistics,13  which  had 
broken  the  narrow  limits  of  rationalist  theory,  in  a  more  ade- 
quate conceptual  frame. 

The  broadening  of  the  philosophical  outlook  achieved  by 
Cassirer's  theory  of  language  and  myth  affects  not  only  the 
philosophical  sciences,  the  Geisteswissenschaften,  but  also  the 
most  crucial  present  difficulty  in  philosophy  itself — the  ever  in- 
creasing pendulum  arc  between  theories  of  reason  and  theories 
of  irrational  motivation.  The  discovery  that  emotive,  intuitive, 
"blind"  forces  govern  human  behavior  more  effectively  than 
motives  of  pure  reason  naturally  gave  rise  to  an  anti-rationalist 
movement  in  epistemology  and  ethics,  typified  by  Nietzsche, 
William  James,  and  Bergson,  which  finally  made  the  truth- 
seeking  attitude  of  science  a  pure  phantasmagoria,  a  quixotic 
manifestation  of  the  will.  Ultimately  the  role  of  reason  came  to 
appear  (as  it  does  in  Bergson's  writings)  as  something  entirely 
secondary  and  essentially  unnatural.  But  at  this  point  the  exist- 
ence of  reason  becomes  an  enigma:  for  how  could  instinctive  life 
ever  give  rise  to  such  a  product?  How  can  sheer  imagination  and 
volition  and  passion  beget  the  "artificial"  picture  of  the  world 
which  seems  natural  to  scientists? 

Cassirer  found  the  answer  in  the  structure  of  language;  for 
language  stems  from  the  intuitive  "drive"  to  symbolic  expres- 
sion that  also  produces  dream  and  myth  and  ritual,  but  it  is  a 
pre-eminent  form  in  that  it  embodies  not  only  self-contained, 
complex  meanings,  but  a  principle  of  concatenation  whereby  the 
complexes  are  unravelled  and  articulated.  It  is  the  discursive 
character  of  language,  its  inner  tendency  to  grammatical  de- 

"  This  is  the  title  of  the  first  section  in  Vol.  II  of  Philosophic  der  symbolischen 
Formen. 

"The  knowledge  of  linguistics  on  which  he  bases  vol.  I  of  his  Philosophic 
der  symbolischen  Formen  is  almost  staggering.  His  use  of  anthropological  data 
may  be  found  especially  throughout  vol.  II  of  that  work. 


400  SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 

velopment,  which  gives  rise  to  logic  in  the  strict  sense,  i.e.,  to  the 
procedure  we  call  "reasoning."  Language  is  "of  imagination  all 
compact,"  yet  it  is  the  cradle  of  abstract  thought;  and  the 
achievement  of  Vernunft,  as  Cassirer  traces  it  from  the  dawn  of 
human  mentality  through  the  evolution  of  speech  forms,  is  just 
as  natural  as  the  complicated  patterns  of  instinctive  behavior  and 
emotional  abreaction. 

Here  the  most  serious  antinomy  in  the  philosophical  thought 
of  our  time  is  resolved.  This  is  a  sort  of  touchstone  for 
the  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms,  whereby  we  may  judge  its 
capacity  to  fulfill  the  great  demand  its  author  did  not  hesitate 
to  make  on  it,  when  he  wrote  in  his  Essay  on  Man: 

In  the  boundless  multiplicity  and  variety  of  mythical  images,  of  reli- 
gious dogmas,  of  linguistic  forms,  of  works  of  art,  philosophic  thought 
reveals  the  unity  of  a  general  function  by  which  all  these  creations  are 
held  together.  Myth,  religion,  art,  language,  even  science,  are  now 
looked  upon  as  so  many  variations  on  a  common  theme — and  it  is  the 
task  of  philosophy  to  make  this  theme  audible  and  understandable. 

SUSANNE  K.  LANGER 
DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


12 

Witt*  M.  Urban 
CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE 


12 

CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE 


C^RNST  CASSIRER  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  first  of  modern 
1— d  philosophers  to  see  the  full  significance  of  the  relations 


of  problems  of  language  to  problems  of  philosophy  and,  there- 
fore, the  first  also  to  develop  a  philosophy  of  language  in  the 
full  sense  of  the  word.  Others,  it  is  true,  had  made  important 
contributions  without  which  the  more  systematic  treatment  of 
Cassirer  would  have  been  impossible.  In  the  field  of  linguistics 
itself  contributions  of  a  philosophical  nature  had  become  more 
and  more  frequent,  and  of  these  Cassirer  has  made  full  use,  his 
erudition  in  this  field  being  such  as  to  command  our  admiration. 
In  the  field  of  the  special  sciences  scientists  had  become  increas- 
ingly aware  of  the  problems  of  methodology  which  their  lan- 
guages and  symbolisms  present,  and  with  these  Cassirer  is 
equally  familiar.  For  these  reasons,  no  less  than  because  of  his 
own  philosophical  acumen,  he  has  been  enabled,  not  only  to 
formulate  the  problems  of  a  philosophy  of  language  in  a  sys- 
tematic fashion  but  also,  as  I  believe,  in  general  to  find  the  right 
solutions. 

It  is  because  of  the  outstanding  character  of  his  work  that 
his  philosophy  of  language  becomes  of  great  importance,  not 
only  for  the  understanding  of  his  own  philosophy,  but  for  the 
equally  significant  purpose  of  understanding  the  role  which 
philosophies  of  language  play  in  the  life  of  modern  philosophy 
as  a  whole.  It  is  because  of  this  outstanding  character  that  the 
present  writer  has  learned  so  much  from  this  philosophy  of 
language  and  is  glad,  therefore,  to  undertake  the  task  of  pre- 
senting it  for  this  volume.  Cassirer's  treatment  of  language  is  so 

403 


404  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

fundamental  for  his  philosophy  as  a  whole  that  it  is  impossible 
to  present  it  without  trenching,  to  some  extent  at  least,  upon 
topics  assigned  to  other  contributors.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  where 
this  is  inevitable,  it  will  serve  to  clarify  rather  than  to  confuse 
the  important  issues  in  modern  science  and  philosophy,  to  the 
solution  of  which  this  study  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  should  con- 
stitute an  important  contribution. 

B 

The  chief  source  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  language  is  his 
monumental  work,  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen?  the 
first  volume  of  which  is  devoted  exclusively  to  the  philosophical 
study  of  language,  the  second  to  the  language  of  myth,  and  the 
third  to  the  language  of  science.  All  three  are,  in  Cassirer's 
terminology,  "symbolic  forms,"  and  it  is  the  interrelations  of 
these  three  forms  which  constitute  the  central  problem  of  the 
work  as  a  whole. 

The  relation  of  this  work  to  his  earlier  investigations  will 
perhaps  best  serve  to  indicate  its  standpoint.  The  investigations 
of  Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbegriff,  so  he  tells  us,  pro- 
ceeded from  the  assumption  that  the  basal  conception  of  knowl- 
edge (and  its  essential  law)  shows  itself  most  clearly  in  the  field 
of  mathematics  and  mathematical  natural  science,  where  the 
highest  stage  of  universality  and  necessity  is  achieved.  The 
Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen>  however,  goes  beyond 
this  earlier  standpoint  in  both  content  and  method.  It  seeks  to 
show  that  "theoretical  and  form  elements"  are  not  confined  to 
scientific  construction,  but  are  found  also  in  the  "natural  world 
picture"  and  in  the  constructions  of  the  imagination,  mythical, 
aesthetic,  etc.2  This  statement  of  the  problem,  formulated  as  it 
is  in  terms  of  the  Kantian  idiom,  serves  also  to  indicate  the 
relation  of  the  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  to  the  critical 
idealism  of  Kant.  Cassirer  accepts,  he  tells  us,  the  critical  prin- 
ciples of  Kant,  but  extends  them  to  other  spheres  than  the 
theoretical,  widening  the  Kantian  conception  of  "form"  to  the 

1  Die  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  (Berlin,  1929)  j  hereafter  abbreviated : 
PSF. 

*PSF.,  Ill,  v. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  405 

more  general  notion  of  symbolic  form.8  Otherwise  expressed, 
the  Kritik  der  Vernunft,  in  its  various  forms,  becomes  a  Kritik 
der  Sfrache,  in  its  various  forms  and  symbolic  expressions.  Such 
a  critique  was,  indeed,  like  many  other  developments  in  philoso- 
phy since  Kant,  already  implicit  in  the  Kantian  philosophy;  it 
has  been  Cassirer's  task,  as  well  as  his  good  fortune,  to  have 
made  this  explicit. 

II 

The  Theme  of  a  Philosophy  of  Language,  according 
to  Cassirer 

A 

The  chief  reason  why  Cassirer  is  able  to  develop  a  philosophy 
of  language  of  such  significance  is,  I  believe,  because  he  formu- 
lates the  theme  of  such  a  philosophy  in  the  main  with  truth  and 
adequacy.4 

This  theme,  stated  in  Hegelian  terms, — which,  as  we  shall 
see,  are  not  foreign  to  Cassirer's  way  of  thinking, — may  be  said 
to  be  "language  as  the  actuality  of  culture."  "Language,"  he 
tells  us,  "stands  in  a  focal  point  of  spiritual  being,  in  which  rays 
of  entirely  differing  origin  unite  and  from  which  lines  run  into 
all  the  realms  of  the  spirit."  Of  these  various  realms,  these 
ways  in  which  culture  actualizes  itself,  the  theoretical  or  sci- 
entific form  is  that  in  which  knowledge  chiefly  manifests  itself, 
and  it  is  with  this  language  that  philosophy  is,  if  not  solely,  yet 
chiefly  concerned;  but  there  are  other  ways  and  other  languages, 
and  the  knowledge  value  of  these  becomes  also  part  of  the 
problem  of  a  philosophy  of  language.  Thus  the  critique  of  lan- 
guage becomes,  so  he  holds,  the  basis  of  the  critique  of  knowl- 
edge, the  basal  theme  of  a  philosophy  of  language  being  the 
"Erkenntniswert  der  Sprache."* 

B 

The  theme  of  these  three  volumes  is  not  an  arbitrary  pro- 

9 1  but.,  I,  9ff}  also  III,  7ff. 

4  Ibid.,  I,  Preface. 

5  Ibid.,  I,  Einleitung  und  Problemstellung,  1-4.1. 


406  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

nouncement,  as  is  the  case  of  so  many  current  dicta  on  language, 
but  is  shown  to  have  developed  out  of  the  history  of  philosophic 
thought  itself.  Chapter  I  of  Vol.  I  is  entitled  "Das  Sprachpro- 
blem  in  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic." 

Histories  of  philosophy  have,  in  the  main,  either  ignored  or 
been  unaware  of  the  philosophies  of  language  presupposed  by 
the  great  philosophers.  With  his  more  than  ordinary  historical 
erudition,  Cassirer  has  been  enabled  to  rewrite  the  history  of 
European  philosophy  from  this  standpoint.  In  making  explicit 
the  assumptions  or  presuppositions  regarding  language  on  the 
part  of  the  philosophers,  and  in  showing  how  they  predeter- 
mined in  various  ways  the  results  of  their  thinking,  Cassirer  has 
enabled  us  to  see  the  central  place  of  problems  of  language  in 
the  entire  history  of  philosophy. 

From  Plato  on  (he  speaks  of  the  famous  Seventh  Epistle  as 
the  first  attempt  made  to  determine  the  Erkenntniswert  der 
Sprache  in  a  purely  methodological  manner)  the  "value  of  the 
word"  becomes,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly,  an  essential  part 
of  the  problem  of  knowledge.  The  outstanding  phenomenon 
from  this  point  of  view,  is,  of  course,  the  opposition  of  nominal- 
ism and  realism,  each  representing,  so  to  speak,  a  fundamental 
evaluation  of  the  word. 

The  opposition  of  rationalism  and  empiricism  in  modern  phi- 
losophy is,  in  a  sense,  the  continuation  of  the  same  problem.  The 
ideal  of  a  lingua  universalisy  held  by  Descartes  and  Leibnitz,  to 
say  nothing  of  lesser  rationalists,  was  an  expression  of  the  ideal 
of  universal  reason;  logos,  in  the  sense  of  language,  and  in  the 
sense  of  reason,  being,  for  all  of  this  way  of  thinking,  in  prin- 
ciple inseparable.  Empiricism,  on  the  other  hand,  proceeds,  as 
Cassirer  tells  us,  from  a  completely  opposite  standpoint  and 
reaches  contrary  results.  Although  recognizing,  as  did  Locke, 
that  problems  of  knowledge  cannot  be  separated  from  language, 
it  starts  with  the  assumption  that  the  primary  form  of  knowl- 
edge is  simple  awarness  of  sense  data,  to  which  language  is  a 
mere  addendum.  The  empirical  philosophy  of  language  be- 
comes the  basis  for  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  seeks  to 
eliminate  the  universal}  Berkeley  even  proposing  "to  confine 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  407 

his  thought  to  his  own  ideas  divested  from  words,"  believing 
that  thus  he  "cannot  then  be  mistaken." 

As  the  Kantian  "critical"  philosophy  represents  the  media- 
tion between  rationalism  and  empiricism  in  epistemology,  so 
philosophies  of  language,  influenced  by  the  Kantian  criticism, 
represent  a  crucial  point  in  connection  with  the  speech  problem 
in  the  history  of  philosophy.  In  this  respect  von  Humboldt 
played  an  outstanding  part  and  has  consequently  had  a  deter- 
mining influence  upon  Cassirer  himself;  an  entire  section  being 
given  to  the  discussion  of  his  main  principles.  For  von  Hum- 
boldt language  is  not  a  product  (ergon)  but  an  activity, 
(energeia).  The  Kantian  principle  of  knowledge  as  synthesis  is 
carried  over  into  the  sphere  of  language,  "Sfrache  als  Schof- 
fung  und  Entwicklung"  the  title  of  a  work  of  Karl  Vossler  to 
which  Cassirer  refers  with  approval,  representing  this  "idealis- 
tic" tendency  in  the  modern  philosophy  of  language. 

Of  the  relation  of  this  general  problem  to  current  tendencies 
in  philosophy  Cassirer  is  fully  aware,  and  his  own  position  is 
mainly  determined  by  his  reaction  to  these  tendencies.  Modern 
empiricism,  in  its  positivistic  form,  and  the  Bergsonian  philoso- 
phy of  organism,  both  proceed  from  a  purely  naturalistic  and 
nominalistic  theory  of  language,  and  to  the  premises  and  con- 
clusions of  both  Cassirer  is  in  complete  opposition.  There  are, 
he  tells  us,  in  general  only  two  ways  of  solving  the  problem  of 
language  and  reality.  The  first  of  these  assumes  a  reality  known 
independently  of  language  and  its  categories,  a  hypothetical 
pure  experience  to  be  discovered  by  stripping  off  language. 
The  second  way  proposes  an  exactly  opposite  method  and  pro- 
ceeds upon  opposite  presuppositions.  Instead  of  attempting  to 
get  back  of  the  forms  of  thought  and  language  to  a  hypothetical 
pure  experience,  it  assumes  that  experience  is  never  pure  in  this 
sense  and  that  intuition  and  expression  are  inseparable.  It  there- 
fore proposes,  not  to  deny,  but  to  complete  and  perfect  the 
principles  of  expression  and  symbolism.  It  proceeds  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  more  richly  and  energetically  the  human 
spirit  builds  its  languages  and  symbolisms  the  nearer  it  comes,  if 
not  to  some  hypothetical  original  source  of  its  being,  certainly  to 


408  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

its  ultimate  meaning  and  reality.  This  is  the  idealistic  minimum 
in  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  language,  as  indeed  it  must  be,  in 
the  view  of  the  present  writer,  in  any  adequate  philosophy  of 
language. 

Ill 

Cassirerys  "Idealistic"  Theory  of  Language:  Criticism  of 
Naturalism  in  Linguistic  Science 

A 

One  thing  which  distinguishes  Cassirer's  philosophy  of 
language  from  most  contributions  to  this  subject  is  his  extensive 
use  of  the  results  of  linguistic  science,  an  advantage  conspicu- 
ously absent  in  most  discussions  of  the  subject.  Not  only  does  he 
appeal  to  these  studies  in  detail  for  the  substantiation  of  his  main 
theses,  but  he  examines  the  postulates  and  method  of  modern 
linguistics. 

The  assumption  underlying  the  linguistic  science  of  the  nine- 
teenth century — and  most  philosophies  of  language  had  ac- 
cepted this  assumption — is  that  language  is  but  a  part  of  nature. 
As  such,  it  was  made  by  nature  for  certain  natural  ends — for 
the  manipulation  of  physical  objects  or  for  adjustment  to  the 
physical  environment.  In  other  words,  linguistic  science  has 
tended  to  study  language,  so  to  speak,  within  the  bounds  of 
naturalistic  assumptions  alone.  Cassirer  challenges  this  stand- 
point, not  only  from  the  point  of  view  of  "critical"  philosophy, 
but  from  the  standpoint  of  linguistic  science  itself.  An  important 
part  of  his  entire  approach  to  problems  of  language  is  his 
account  of  the  stages  in  the  development  of  modern  linguistics, 
which  not  only  constitutes  one  of  the  most  complete  pictures  of 
that  science,  but  also  enables  him  to  disprove  many  of  the  as- 
sumptions, regarding  matter  of  fact,  all  too  common  in  modern 
positivistic  philosophy. 

Linguistics,  so  Cassirer  tells  us,  hoping  to  attain  the  same 
certainty  and  exactness  as  the  natural  sciences,  moulded  itself, 
in  the  first  instance,  on  their  methods  and  conceptions.  But 
gradually  the  notion  of  "laws,"  physical,  physiological,  and 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  409 

even  psychological,  showed  itself  untenable.  The  entire  con- 
ception of  nature  and  natural  law  upon  which  it  was  sought  to 
build,  turned  out  to  be  an  illusion,  a  wholly  fictitious  unity 
including  the  most  disparate  elements.  Thus,  as  the  naturalistic 
and  positivistic  scheme  of  linguistic  science  has  tended  to  break 
up,  there  has  been  also  a  marked  tendency  towards  the  return 
to  earlier  conceptions  of  the  autonomy  of  language.  The  move- 
ment within  linguistics  as  a  whole,  so  it  seems  to  Cassirer,  has 
been,  methodologically  speaking,  a  movement  in  a  circle.  A 
revision  of  the  naturalistic  assumptions  of  the  science  has  taken 
place  to  such  an  extent  that  it  is  again  approaching  the  stand- 
point from  which  it  started.  As  under  the  aegis  of  the  physical 
and  biological  sciences,  it  took  the  step  from  Geist  to  Natury 
so  now  in  a  very  real  sense  it  is  turning  again  from  nature  to 
spirit.  This  is  the  significance  of  the  opposition  of  idealism  and 
positivism  in  modern  linguistics.6 

B 

With  the  return  from  nature  to  mind,  the  problem  of  mean- 
ing becomes  central,  and  a  corollary  of  the  return  movement  is 
the  methodological  principle  of  the  primacy  of  meaning — d,er 
Primat  des  Sinnes,  as  Cassirer  calls  it.  It  may  be  stated  in  the 
following  way.  The  sole  entrance  to  the  understanding  of  lan- 
guage is  through  meaning,  for  meaning  is  the  sine  qua  non  of 
linguistic  fact.  Language  for  modern  linguistics  is  not  sound, 
nor  again  the  motor  and  tactual  sensations  which  make  up  the 
word  psychologically,  nor  yet  the  associations  called  up;  it  is 
the  meaning  itself  which,  although  conditioned  by  these,  is  not 
identical  with  any  of  them.  This  being  the  fact,  the  methodology 
of  linguistic  study  is  not  that  of  the  natural  sciences  but  rather, 
for  language,  as  for  all  symbolic  forms,  the  phenomenological. 
The  nature  of  this  method,  as  conceived  by  Cassirer,  will  be 
stated  more  definitely  presently;  the  significant  point  here  is 
that  it  is  interpretation  from  within,  not  merely  explanation 
from  without. 

The  significance  of  this  principle  of  the  primacy  of  meaning 

'PSF.,  I.  118  flF. 


410  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

is  far  reaching.  It  means  negatively,  as  we  have  seen,  the  denial 
of  the  adequacy  of  external  approaches  to  language,  whether 
physical,  physiological,  or  even  psychological;  but  it  involves 
also,  positively,  significant  changes  in  methodology.  Earlier 
methods  proceeded  from  the  elements  to  the  whole — from  the 
sounds  to  the  words,  from  words  to  sentences,  and  finally  to 
the  meaning  of  discourse  as  a  whole.  The  present  tendency  is 
the  exact  opposite.  It  proceeds  from  the  whole  of  meaning,  as 
Gestalty  to  the  sentences  and  words  as  elements — the  parts  be- 
ing understood  through  the  whole.  The  spirit  which  lives  in 
human  discourse  works  as  a  totality  constituting  the  sentence 
or  proposition,  the  copula,  the  word,  and  the  sound.7 

Of  the  many  important  consequences  of  this  methodological 
principle — a  discussion  of  the  details  of  which  would  be  neces- 
sary for  an  adequate  account  of  Cassirer's  linguistic  studies — 
we  shall  single  out  one  which  is  important  for  all  that  follows, 
namely  the  nature  and  modes  of  linguistic  meaning. 

Meaning,  as  understood  by  positivistic  theories,  is  reference 
to  sensuously  observable  entities.  "Indication"  is,  therefore, 
the  essence  of  meaning,  "in  the  strict  sense."  All  other  mean- 
ings are  emotive  in  character,  and  the  words  in  this  case  refer 
to  nothing  and  stand  for  nothing.  For  Cassirer  indication  is 
indeed  a  primary  mode,  but  equally  primary  is  representation 
or  Darstellung.*  Without  this  element  there  is  no  linguistic 
meaning.  This  element  or  function  is  an  Urfhanomen,  present 
in  language  from  its  simplest  to  its  highest  forms,  and  it  is,  as 
we  shall  see,  the  development  of  this  mode  of  meaning — from 
copy  through  analogy,  to  symbolic  representation — which  con- 
stitutes the  thread  of  Cassirer's  treatment,  not  only  of  language 
but  of  the  entire  range  of  symbolic  forms. 

Closely  bound  up  with  this  question  as  to  what  language  is  are 
the  genetic  problems  of  language,  more  specifically  the  prob- 
lem of  "animal  language."  Holding,  as  he  does,  that  the 
Darstellungsfanktion  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  linguistic  meaning, 
he  denies  this  function  to  the  phonetic  expressions  of  animals, 

11  ibid.,  i,  n9. 

9  Ibid.,  I,  i26ff}  III,  n6ff. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  411 

even  those  of  the  higher  apes.  His  discussion  of  the  results  of 
Kohler's  investigations  are  most  enlightening,  and  he  concludes 
that  recent  observations  of  animal  psychology  seem  to  widen 
rather  than  narrow  the  gulf  between  human  and  animal  com- 
munication, and  that  what  is  called  animal  speech  "seems  to  be 
permanently  held  fast  in  the  pre-linguistic  stage."9  In  any 
case,  it  is  the  growing  conviction  of  linguistics  that  the  hiatus 
between  animal  expressions  and  human  speech  is  widening 
rather  than  narrowing  as  investigation  proceeds — all  of  which 
leads  to  the  modern  speech  notion  as  "a  human,  non-instinctive 
function."  The  step  to  human  language  is  made  first  when  the 
pure  meaningful  sound  achieves  supremacy  over  the  affective 
stimulus-born  sounds  and  this  achievement  has  in  it  the  charac- 
ter of  a  unique  level  of  being.  The  notion  of  speech  as  an 
Urphanomen,  in  short  the  autonomy  of  the  speech  notion, 
seems  to  be  more  and  more  confirmed  by  the  study  of  animal 
psychology. 

Cassirer's  philosophy  of  language  has  been  called  "idealistic," 
and  in  the  sense  that  it  is  opposed  to  naturalism  and  positivism 
it  is.  Language  is,  indeed,  to  use  an  expression  of  Karl  Vossler, 
"embedded  in  nature,"  and  it  is  out  of  this  fact  that  "the  illusion 
of  its  being  a  piece  of  nature  constantly  arises."  But  Cassirer 
would  agree  with  Vossler  that  this  illusion  must  be  just  as 
constantly  dispelled  if  an  adequate  philosophy  of  language  is 
to  be  possible.  Language  is  indeed  a  part  of  nature  and  as  such 
it  was  "made"  for  certain  natural  ends.  But  in  its  development 
it  subserves  quite  other  ends.  Granted  that  it  was  made  by 
nature  for  a  natural  object,  language  like  our  intelligence,  and 
all  the  forms  of  culture  with  which  it  is  connected,  has  de- 
veloped along  lines  which  are  independent  of  natural  ends, 
perhaps  in  opposition  to  them.  Language  is  not  limited  to  the 
"practical"  functions  for  which  it  was  primarily  made,  but  in 
its  development  has  achieved  a  freedom  which  makes  it,  in  the 
words  of  von  Humboldt,  "a  vehicle  for  traversing  the  manifold 
and  the  highest  and  deepest  of  the  entire  world." 

9 Ibtd.y  I,  136  note}  III,  127, 


412  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

IV 

Language  and  Cognition:  The  Relation  of  Intuition 
to  Expression 

A 

As  opposed  to  purely  naturalistic  and  positivistic  theories  of 
language  Cassirer's  theory  is  idealistic.  But  it  may  be  said  to 
be  idealistic  in  another  sense,  in  the  Kantian  sense  of  "critical 
idealism."  This  general  "critical"  position  is  determinative 
throughout  j  it  underlies  his  conception  of  language  in  Vol.  I, 
his  conception  of  language  and  myth  in  Vol.  II,  and  his  inter- 
pretation of  science  in  Vol.  III.  It  is,  however,  with  the  first, 
the  general  question  of  the  relation  of  language  to  cognition, 
that  we  are  now  concerned. 

The  problem  of  knowledge  presents  itself  to  Cassirer,  as  to 
all  "critical"  philosophers,  under  a  double  aspect,  the  psycho- 
logical and  the  epistemological.  In  the  psychological  or  natural- 
istic treatment,  as  in  the  application  of  the  "scientific"  method 
everywhere,  the  only  possible  standpoint  is  to  start  with  the 
"things"  or  objects,  as  already  constructed,  and  then  ask  how 
they  acquire  meaning  and  are  known.  The  petitio  principii  in 
this  method  is,  for  Cassirer,  obvious.  It  assumes  that  the  things 
or  objects  are  given  and  are  then  known,  when  actually  there 
is  an  element  of  construction,  perhaps  incalculable,  in  the  things 
as  given.  The  epistemological  treatment  of  the  subject  starts 
from  an  entirely  different,  perhaps  opposite,  standpoint.  It 
involves  a  radical  shift  from  the  realm  of  things  to  that  of 
meaning  and  value.  It  must  study  perception  and  perceptual 
meaning,  not  causally,  as  determined  from  without,  but  from 
within,  as  a  constitutive  element  in  cognition.10  If  it  is  really 
"meaning  that  transforms  sense  data  into  things,"  it  then  be- 
comes a  problem  whether  language  and  linguistic  meaning  are 
not  present  in  the  first  processes  of  such  transformation.  Cassirer 
holds  that  language  is  thus  present  from  the  beginning,  and 
that  in  this  sense  language  first  created  the  realm  of  meaning. 
Otherwise  expressed,  intuition  and  expression  are,  if  not  identi- 
cal, as  according  to  Croce,  at  least  inseparable. 

1,  in,  68ff. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  413 

In  this  connection  we  may  note  a  term  constantly  used  by 
Cassirer,  the  full  significance  of  which  will  later  become  ap- 
parent, namely,  the  expression  Ausdruckserlebnisse.  The  pri- 
mary experiences  (Erlebnisse)  are  at  the  same  time  primary 
forms  of  expression  and  constitute  the  "natural"  world  picture, 
as  well  as  the  picture  constructed  by  myth.  These  are  the  origi- 
nal forms  of  knowledge  and  in  these,  according  to  Cassirer's 
"critical"  principles,  there  are  already  "theoretical  and  form 
elements"  which  contribute  their  elements  to  knowledge. 
Science,  it  is  true,  tends  to  transcend,  and  in  a  sense  "break 
through,"  these  forms  of  expression}  but  that  very  fact  creates 
one  of  the  fundamental  problems  of  a  philosophy  of  language 
and  of  symbolic  forms,  namely,  the  Erkenntniswert  of  these 
A  usdruckserlebnisse. 

B 

Intuition  is  inseparable  from  expression,  but  in  expression 
there  is  always  an  element  of  re-presentation  j  die  Darstellungs- 
junktion  is  equally  original — das  symbolische  Grundverhaltnis> 
as  he  calls  it.  This  is  described  as  the  bi-polar  character  of  all 
knowledge  and  is,  in  Cassirer's  terms,  an  Urphanomen. 
Empiricism,  with  its  doctrine  of  presentational  immediacy,  pro- 
ceeds on  the  assumption  that  the  primary  and  original  form  of 
knowledge  is  one  in  which  we  merely  h<wey  or  possess,  the  sense 
data.  Such  an  hypothetical  form  of  knowledge  is,  for  Cassirer, 
pure  myth.  Without  the  element  of  polarity,  and  therefore  of 
the  reference  of  the  presentation  to  that  which  is  presented,  that 
is  without  some  element  of  representation,  the  entire  notion  of 
knowledge  collapses.  It  follows  from  this  that  problems  of 
knowledge  and  problems  of  language  are  inseparable.11 

In  connection  with  this  fundamental  principle  two  specific 
points  in  the  development  of  Cassirer's  thesis  require  special 
attention.  They  are  treated  by  him  under  the  two  captions,  Z#r 
Pathologie  des  Symbolbewusstseins  and  the  notion  of  Symbol- 
ischer  Pragnanz^  both  of  which  serve  to  illuminate  the  general 
principle. 

11  This  thesis  is  the  underlying"  theme  of  the  entire  Philosophic  der  symbolischen 
Formeny  but  is  especially  developed  in  Vol.  Ill,  Part  i.  A  statement  of  it  is  found 
on  pp.  1436*. 


414  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

Under  the  former,  the  pathology  of  the  symbol-conscious- 
ness, he  makes  use  of  the  phenomena  of  mental  blindness,  in  its 
verbal  form,  as  studied  by  both  psychologists  and  linguists. 
When  in  certain  forms  of  aphasia  the  word  is  not  recognized  or 
cannot  be  formed,  the  perceptual  meaning  of  the  object  itself 
is  absent  also — facts  which  go  far  towards  confirming  the  princi- 
ple that  language  is  part  of  the  perceptual  process  itself.12  The 
significance  of  speech  for  the  construction  (Aujbau)  of  the  per- 
ceptual world,  to  employ  Cassirer's  terms,  is  obvious. 

The  notion  of  Symbolischer  Pragnanz  is  equally  important 
for  his  general  thesis,  important  not  only  for  his  philosophy  of 
language,  but  for  his  theory  of  symbolism.  By  this  term  is  to  be 
understood,  he  tells  us,  the  way  in  which  perception,  as  sensu- 
ous experience,  becomes  at  the  same  time  the  means  of  appre- 
hension (symbolically)  of  a  non-intuitive  meaning  and  brings 
this  meaning  to  immediate  and  concrete  expression.13  Thus  a 
color  phenomenon  is,  as  sense  datum,  a  sensuous  experience,  but 
it  is  also  a  symbol  which  stands  for  references  and  meanings 
which  themselves  are  not  objects  of  sensuous  experience.  This 
symbolic  character  is,  as  we  shall  see,  present,  in  Cassirer's  view, 
on  the  lowest  levels  of  experience  as  well  as  on  the  highest  j  it 
extends,  in  his  words,  through  every  level  of  the  world  picture. 
In  sum,  this  symbolic  function,  like  the  DarsteHungsfanktiony 
of  which  it  is  an  aspect,  is  an  Urfhanomen. 


The  function  of  language  in  the  Aujbau  of  the  perceptual 
world  is  further  shown  by  the  presence  of  the  universal  in  the 
perceptual  process  itself.  Everything  denoted  by  language  is 
already  universalized.  Apart  from  purely  formless  interjec- 
tions and  emotive  sounds,  all  linguistic  expressions  contain 
implicitly  this  "form  of  thought."  The  universal  is  not,  as  com- 
monly held,  the  product  of  abstraction  and  then  embodied  in 
language  5  it  is  present  in  this  "first  precipitate  of  language." 

°PSF,  III,  chapter  VI. 

11  Of.  cit.y  Vol.  Ill,  p.  234.  In  Cassirer's  own  words,  "Unter  'symbolischer 
Pragnanz'  soil  also  die  Art  verstanden  werden,  in  der  ein  Wahrnehmungserlebniss, 
als  'sinnliches*  Erlebniss,  zugleich  einen  bestimmten  nicht-anschaulichen  'Sinn*  in 
sich  fasst  imd  ihn  zur  unmittlebaren  konkreten  Darstellung  bringt." 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  415 

The  later  processes  of  abstraction  take  place  upon  contents  al- 
ready thus  universalized. 

In  developing  this  point  Cassirer  makes  use  of  Lotze's  term, 
"first"  or  primary  universal,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  secondary 
or  abstract  universal.  Nouns,  verbs,  adjectives  are  all  in  a 
sense  names,  and  when  anything  is  named  this  first  universal  is 
implicit.  This  first  universal  is  intuitive,  of  a  very  different 
nature  from  the  ordinary  class  concepts  of  logic,  and  is,  indeed, 
presupposed  by  them.  Perception  contains  this  universal.  It  is 
true,  of  course,  that  it  is  always  a  particular  color  or  tone  that  is 
perceived,  always  a  particular  quote  and  intensity.  But  this  per- 
ception is  always  accompanied  by  the  fact  that  every  other  color 
or  tone  has  an  equal  right  to  function  as  an  example  of  the  uni- 
versal. This  class  concept  is,  as  he  further  insists,  not  constructed 
by  repressing  or  eliminating  the  individual  color  or  tone,  but 
rather  by  the  recognition  of  a  common  element  (in  the  indi- 
vidual phenomena  themselves)  already  intuited.14 

This  doctrine  of  the  "double  universal,"  as  Cassirer  calls  it, 
is  important  for  his  entire  philosophy  of  language.  It  also  fur- 
nishes the  basis  for  his  theory  of  language  and  logic.  His  logical 
theory  will  doubtless  receive  fuller  treatment  by  other  con- 
tributors to  this  volume,  but  some  comment  should  be  made 
upon  it  in  this  connection. 

The  point  at  which  logic  and  the  philosophy  of  language,  so 
he  tells  us,  first  touch  each  other  is  the  problem  of  the  forma- 
tion of  concepts;  the  point,  indeed,  "at  which  they  disclose 
their  inseparable  character."  "All  logical  analysis  of  concepts," 
he  adds,  "seems  to  lead  in  the  end  to  a  point  at  which  the 
examination  of  concepts  passes  into  that  of  words  and  names. 
From  this  point  of  view  logic  might  be  defined  as  the  science 
or  doctrine  of  the  concept  and  its  meaning."15  Predication  is  a 
problem  at  once  linguistic  and  logical  and  the  real  secret  of 
predication  is  found  in  the  doctrine  of  the  double  universal. 
Predication,  in  the  logical  sense,  is  but  the  conceptual  expres- 
sions of  relations  already  intuited.  These  form  the  basis  for  the 
more  complex  syntheses  of  logical  thought,  logical  concepts 

14  PSF,  I,  249*F.  Also  III,  i35ff. 
"Ibid.,  I,  244ff. 


416  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

having  the  function  merely  of  fixing  the  relations  already 
present  in  experience.  The  logical  concept,  so  he  tells  us,  does 
nothing  else  than  fix  the  "gesetzliche  Ordnung*  already  present 
in  the  phenomena  themselves;  it  states  consciously  the  rule 
which  the  perception  follows  unconsciously.16 

Cassirer  seems  to  maintain  a  relational,  as  opposed  to  a 
subject-predicate  logic,  and  his  general  thesis  of  the  develop- 
ment from  substance  to  function  in  the  sphere  of  scientific 
knowledge  would  seem  to  indicate  this  position.  It  would  seem 
also,  that  with  regard  to  the  issue  raised  by  the  expression 
"logical  analysis  of  language,"  he  also  maintains  the  right  of 
such  a  relational  logic  to  exercise  its  critique  upon  the  subject- 
predicate  logic,  which  is  the  constitutive  element  in  the  natural 
world  picture  as  given  us  by  perception.  And  yet  I  am  not  so 
sure.  Certainly  one  of  his  main  positions  is  that  the  mathemati- 
cal-logical world  picture  given  us  by  science  is  not  the  only 
symbolic  form  which  has  knowledge  value,  but  that  such  value 
must  be  accorded  also  to  the  natural  and  mythical  pictures  of 
the  world.  In  any  case,  I  cannot  go  into  this  issue  here.  It  was 
one  of  my  hopes  that  this  ambiguity  regarding  logic  would 
be  cleared  up  in  Cassirer's  answers  to  the  questions  raised  by  the 
essays  in  this  volume,  before  the  suddenness  and  untimeliness 
of  his  death  made  this  expectation  futile. 

D 

As  the  Darstellungsfunktion  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  linguistic 
meaning,  so  the  nature  of  that  function,  of  the  relation  of  the 
"word"  to  the  "thing"  —  and  the  nature  of  the  truth  relation  in 
general  —  becomes  a  fundamental  problem  of  a  philosophy  of 
language.  "The  function  of  language,"  according  to  Cassirer, 
"is  not  to  copy  reality  but  to  symbolize  it."17 

In  this  connection  his  "law"  of  the  development  of  language 
becomes  of  first  importance.  The  development  of  language 
proceeds  through  three  stages.  They  are  (a)  the  mimetic  or  copy 
stage,  (b)  the  analogical  and  (c)  the  symbolic.  The  characteris- 


T  Ibid.,  I,  i32ff»  233ff. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  417 

tic  of  the  first  stage  is  that  between  the  word,  or  verbal  sign, 
and  the  thing  to  which  it  refers  no  real  difference  is  made.  The 
word  is  the  thing.  This  initial  stage  is,  however,  broken  up  as 
soon  as  transfer  of  signs  takes  place.  Here  the  relation  is  ana- 
logical. This  relation  in  turn  gives  way  to  the  symbolic.  The 
characteristic  of  this  last  stage  is  that,  whereas  the  element  of 
representation  (Darstellung),  which  is  the  sine  qua  non  of 
linguistic  meaning,  still  remains,  the  relation  of  similarity 
which  conditions  this  representation  becomes  more  and  more 
partial  and  indefinite. 

As  thus  briefly  stated,  this  "law"  of  development  is,  to  be 
sure,  a  mere  schematism;  but  when  it  is  filled  in  with  the  rich 
content  at  Cassirer's  disposal,  it  becomes  one  of  the  most  illumi- 
nating conceptions  of  his  entire  work.  It  becomes  not  only  an 
important  principle  for  the  understanding  of  the  Aufbw  der 
Sprache,  but  one  which  also  enables  him  to  connect  the  develop- 
ment of  language  with  other  "symbolic  forms,"  such  as  art, 
science,  and  religion.  ' 

As  concerns  language  itself,  Cassirer  is  enabled,  as  the  result 
of  extensive  comparative  studies,  to  show  the  presence  of  this 
tendency  or  "law"  throughout  linguistic  phenomena.  From  this 
wealth  of  material  I  choose  but  one  illustration  to  indicate  the 
significance  of  the  principle,  namely,  the  phenomenon  of  re- 
duplication common  in  primitive  languages.  The  reduplication 
of  sound  or  syllable  appears,  at  first  view,  to  involve  merely 
the  copying  of  the  object  or  happening.  Actually,  however,  it 
marks  the  beginning  of  an  analogical  representation  which  is  a 
step  on  the  way  to  the  symbolic.  The  representation  is,  in  the 
first  instance,  imitative  and  serves  to  conjure  up  the  thing  itself. 
Gradually,  however,  the  Gestalt  is  detached  from  the  primary 
material  and  becomes  the  means  of  representation  of  plurality, 
repetition,  and  finally,  in  many  cases,  becomes  the  form  of 
representation  or  expression  of  the  fundamental  intuitions, 
space,  time,  force,  etc.  Cassirer  develops  this  theme  with  many 
illustrations  which  cannot,  of  course,  be  given  here.  The  im- 
portant point  is  the  presence  of  the  representative,  as  well  as 
the  indicative  function,  from  the  beginning,  and  also  the  manner 


4i8  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

in  which  this  representative  function  develops  from  representa- 
tion in  the  sense  of  imitation  to  symbolic  representation  as  its 
ultimate  form.18 

It  is  impossible  even  to  indicate  here  the  manifold  applica- 
tions of  this  principle  to  the  development  of  the  various  speech 
forms.  More  important  for  his  philosophy  as  a  whole  is  the 
way  in  which,  as  he  points  out,  the  development  of  language 
through  the  three  stages  makes  it  possible  for  speech  to  become 
the  medium  for  the  expression  of  conceptual  thought  and  of 
pure  relations.  It  is  indeed  the  very  Vieldeutigkeit  of  the  verbal 
signs,  which  appears  on  the  analogical  stage  of  development, 
that  constitutes  the  real  virtue  of  that  stage  of  development. 
It  is  precisely  this  that  compels  the  mind  to  take  the  decisive  step 
from  the  concrete  function  of  indication  (Eezeichnung)^  which 
characterizes  the  early  stage  of  language,  to  the  general  and 
more  significant  function  of  "meaning"  (Bedeutung).  It  is  at 
this  point  that  language  at  the  same  time  emerges  from  the 
sensuous  husk  in  which  it  first  embodied  itself.  The  imitative 
and  analogical  expressions  give  place  to  the  purely  symbolic,  and 
language  thus  becomes  the  bearer  of  a  newer  and  deeper 
spiritual  content.19 

Of  special  importance  in  this  connection  is  the  application 
of  this  principle  to  space-time  language,  not  only  for  the  entire 
philosophy  of  symbolic  forms,  but  more  especially  for  Cassirer's 
treatment  of  symbolism  in  science.  All  language  goes  through 
these  three  stages  of  development,  and  space-time  words  are 
no  exception  to  the  rule.  Into  the  details  of  his  exhaustive  study 
we  cannot,  of  course,  enter.  It  must  suffice  to  give  the  results 
as  summed  up  in  his  own  words:  "Again  it  is  clear,"  he  tells  us, 

that  the  concepts  of  space,  time  and  number  furnish  the  actual  structural 
elements  of  objective  experience  as  they  build  themselves  up  in  language. 
But  they  can  fulfil  this  task  only  because,  according  to  their  total  struc- 
ture, they  keep  it  an  ideal  medium,  precisely  because,  while  they  keep 
to  the  form  of  sensuous  experience,  they  progressively  fill  the  sensuous 
with  ideal  content  and  make  it  the  symbol  of  the  spiritual.20 

,  Ifi43. 


,  145. 
"7M&.L  *oft. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  419 

Thus  the  space  and  time  of  the  immediate  Ausdruckserlebnisse 
become  the  ideal  space-time  of  modern  physical  science  which, 
as  we  shall  see,  although  keeping  the  forms  of  sensuous  experi- 
ence, become  more  and  more  the  symbol  for  non-intuitable 
relations.21 


The  theme  of  a  philosophy  of  language  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  Erkenntniswert  der  Sprache.  To  the  question  thus  raised 
Cassirer's  critical  idealistic  philosophy  of  language  seems  to  me 
to  be  in  the  main,  the  right  answer.  As  opposed  to  naively 
naturalistic  and  "realistic"  views  of  language,  this  conception  of 
language  seems  to  me  to  be  alone  tenable.  Nevertheless  there 
also  appear  to  me  to  be  certain  difficulties  in  Cassirer's  formula- 
tion of  this  theory — a  fundamental  ambiguity  in  his  evaluation 
of  language  which  becomes  increasingly  puzzling  as  he  passes 
from  the  philosophy  of  language  eo  nomme  to  other  aspects  of 
the  more  general  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms. 

There  seems  to  be  little  question  of  the  inseparability  of 
intuition  and  expression  embodied  in  the  notion  of  Ausdrucks- 
erlebnisse,  that  language  is  present  from  the  beginning  in  the 
Aufbau  of  the  perceptual  world.  There  seems  to  be  just  as 
little  question  that  language  develops  from  copy  to  analogy 
and  from  analogy  to  symbol;  that  the  function  of  language  is 
not  to  copy  reality  but  to  symbolize  it;  and  that,  more  and  more, 
the  symbolization  of  things  gives  place  to  the  symbolization  of 
relations.  The  problem  then  becomes  whether,  in  this  dialecti- 
cal movement,  as  Cassirer  calls  it,  inherent  in  language,  the 
goal  of  the  movement  is  the  abandonment  of  language  with  its 
natural  "parts  of  speech"  and  its  subject-predicate  logic  for  a 
symbolism  of  pure  relations  and  a  purely  relational  logic.  Is 
there  within  language  itself  an  immanental  dialectic  which 
drives  it  ever  onward  beyond  itself?  Otherwise  expressed,  are 
the  natural  categories  of  language,  although  useful  for  practice, 
wholly  erroneous  when  applied  to  the  sphere  of  theory? 

On  this  fundamental  issue  Cassirer's  answer  seems  to  me  to 
be  ambiguous.  In  many  places  he  appears  to  suggest  that  the 

*  Ibid.,  'Ill,  Part  III,  Chap.  V. 


420  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

function  of  thought  is  to  break  through  the  husk  of  language, 
with  its  natural  categories  (of  subject  and  predicate,  of  substance 
and  attribute)  to  a  "purer  notation"  and  to  a  symbolism  of  pure 
relations,  notably  in  science.  In  other  places  he  seems  to  suggest 
that,  although  this  is  the  ideal  goal  of  knowledge,  natural 
language  can  never  be  broken  through  completely  and  the  cate- 
gories of  this  language  can  never  be  completely  transcended. 
Doubtless  Cassirer  is  clear  on  this  point,  and  my  own  uncer- 
tainty arises  from  defects  of  understanding.  In  any  case,  the 
problem  here  presented  is  one  which  faces  all  modern  philoso- 
phies of  language,  a  problem  to  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
present  writer,  few  have  given  really  satisfactory  answers. 


The  Philosophy  of  Language  and  The  Philosophy  of  Symbolic 
Forms.  Principles  of  Symbolism 

A 

For  Cassirer,  then,  the  philosophy  of  language  leads  directly 
to  a  philosophy  of  symbolism.  If,  as  he  maintains,  the  function 
of  language  is  not  to  copy  reality  but  to  symbolize  it,  it  becomes 
necessary,  in  order  to  understand  that  function,  to  understand 
also  the  nature  and  principles  of  symbolism.  More  than  this, 
language  is  for  him  not  the  only  symbolic  form.  In  art,  religion, 
and  preeminently  in  "science"  itself,  non-linguistic  symbols  are 
employed  and  the  relation  of  these  symbols  to  language  becomes 
one  of  the  central  problems  of  the  philosophy  of  language,  as 
viewed  in  its  more  general  aspects. 

Cassirer's  problem,  as  we  have  seen,  insofar  as  it  is  concerned 
with  language,  is  the  study  of  the  Aufbau  der  Sprache  in  connec- 
tion with  the  development  of  the  varied  forms  of  culture,  more 
particularly  science,  art,  and  religion.  The  essence  of  culture  is 
precisely  this  objectification  of  the  "spirit"  in  various  forms  and 
structures.  In  all  these,  no  less  than  in  science  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word,  theoretical  and  form  elements  are  to  be  found. 

The  methodology  of  such  a  study,  even  in  the  case  of 
language  itself,  obviously  can  not  be  the  scientific  method  in  the 
sense  of  natural  science,  as  we  have  already  seen  in  his  critique 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  421 

of  the  assumptions  and  methods  of  linguistics.  It  is,  for  Cassirer, 
the  phenomenological  method  conceived  in  the  broadest  sense. 
The  place  in  his  studies  where  the  character  of  this  method  is 
most  clearly  formulated  is  in  the  Preface  to  Vol.  III.  "When," 
he  writes,  "I  speak  of  the  phenomenology  of  knowledge,  I  refer 
not  to  the  modern  usage,  but  go  back  to  the  fundamental  mean- 
ing of  phenomenology  as  finally  fixed  and  systematically  de- 
veloped and  justified  by  Hegel."  For  Hegel,  he  reminds  us, 
phenomenology  is  "the  fundamental  presupposition  of  philo- 
sophical knowledge."  In  contrast  to  the  scientific  method,  it 
seeks  to  understand  the  various  "spiritual  forms"  from  within, 
not  from  without.  It  seeks  moreover  "to  embrace  the  totality 
of  spiritual  forms  and  to  understand  and  evaluate  them  in  their 
mutual  relations,"  for  "the  fundamental  presupposition  of  the 
phenomenological  method  is  that  the  truth  is  the  whole."  With 
this  conception  of  phenomenology,  Cassirer  tells  us,  the  philoso- 
phy of  symbolic  forms  is  in  accord,  although  in  the  application 
of  these  principles  his  procedure  naturally  varies  significantly 
from  that  of  Hegel.22 

B 

The  first  requisite  of  a  general  theory  of  symbolism  is  an 
adequate  notion  of  the  symbol  and  the  symbolizing  function. 
This  notion  must,  as  Cassirer  rightly  points  out,  be  a  broad  one, 
if  it  is  to  be  adequate.  "The  philosophy  of  symbols  and  of  sym- 
bolic forms  is  not,  as  some  suppose,  concerned  primarily  and 
exclusively  with  scientific  and  exact  concepts,  but  with  all  direc- 
tions of  the  symbolizing  function,"  in  its  attempt  to  grasp  and 
understand  the  world.  It  is  necessary  to  study  this  function,  not 

M  PSF.,  Ill,  vi.  Cassirer  does  not,  to  be  sure,  deny  the  valuable  services  rendered 
by  Phenomenology  in  the  narrower  sense  of  Husserl.  It  has,  he  tells  us,  sharpened 
our  sense  anew  for  the  variety  of  spiritual  "Strukturformen"  and  shown  us  the 
way  in  which  the  method  of  their  understanding-  must  differ  from  the  psychological. 
As  Husserl's  studies  have  developed  it  becomes  ever  clearer  that  this  method  is  not 
exhausted  in  the  analysis  of  knowledge,  but  that  its  task  includes  the  investigation 
of  the  different  realms  of  objects,  according  to  what  they  mean  without  reference 
to  their  psychical  conditions  or  the  existence  of  their  objects.  The  extension  of  this 
general  point  of  view  and  method  from  the  sphere  of  logic  to  ethics  and  art  has, 
he  holds,  been  one  of  the  most  fruitful  movements  of  modern  thought.  (PSF.,  II, 
1 6  note.) 


422  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

only  in  the  realm  of  scientific  concepts  but  in  the  non-scientific 
realms  of  poetry,  art,  religion,  etc.,  not  only  on  the  level  of  the 
conceptual  but  on  the  cognitive  levels  below  the  conceptual.23 

We  lose  our  grasp  of  the  whole,  if  we  confine  the  symbolizing  function 
at  the  outset  to  the  level  of  conceptual  'abstract'  knowledge.  Rather  we 
shall  have  to  recognize  that  this  function  belongs  not  only  to  a  single  level 
of  the  theoretical  world  picture,  but  that  it  conditions  and  carries  this 
picture  in  its  totality.2* 

How  much  this  warning  is  needed  is  apparent  when  we  realize 
that  precisely  the  tendency  to  narrow  the  concept  of  the  symbol 
to  the  logical  and  mathematical  has  been  a  conspicuous  tendency 
of  recent  philosophic  thought. 

The  symbolic  function  belongs,  then,  not  to  a  single  level  of 
the  world  picture  but  holds  throughout.  It  is  present  on  the 
level  below  conceptual  knowledge,  in  perception  itself — that  is 
the  significance  of  the  principle  of  symbolischer  Pragnanz — 
but  it  holds  also  for  the  realms  of  poetry,  art,  religion,  and 
preeminently  that  of  science.  The  philosophy  of  symbolic 
forms  includes  the  study  of  the  symbolizing  function  in  all  forms 
of  the  objectification  of  the  human  spirit. 

One  level  of  the  world  picture  on  which  the  symbolic  func- 
tion is  most  in  evidence  is  that  of  myth.  The  second  volume  of 
the  Philoso'phie  der  symbolischen  Formen  is  entitled  "Das 
mythische  Denken,"  which  is  in  reality  a  discussion  of  the  prob- 
lem of  Sprache  und  Mythos.  In  this  without  question  the  most 
significant  modern  study  of  the  myth,  the  entire  problem  of  the 
nature  of  myth,  of  its  Erkenntmswert  and  of  its  relation  to  re- 
ligion as  symbolic  form,  is  involved.  This  problem  is  the  subject 
of  other  papers  in  this  volume,  and  we  shall  accordingly  confine 
ourselves  wholly  to  its  significance  in  the  context  of  the  philoso- 
phy of  language. 

The  essence  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  myth  is  that  the 
language  of  the  myth  represents  an  original  form  of  the  intui- 
tion of  reality.  In  consequence,  the  individual  categories  of 
mythical  thinking  have  their  own  form  and  structure.  Space, 
time,  number,  classes,  all  have  different  meanings  in  mythical 

*PSF,  III,  1 6. 
Vtd.,  Ill,  57. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  423 

thought  from  those  of  science  and  constitute,  in  their  totality 
and  interrelations,  a  "symbolic  form"  with  its  own  immanent 
form  and  significance.  Into  the  details  of  this  analysis  we  can- 
not, of  course,  go — they  are  among  the  most  admirable  of 
Cassirer's  comparative  studies.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  this 
fundamental  way  of  intuiting  the  world  expresses  an  "organic" 
aspect  of  reality  which  escapes  the  physico-mathematical  cate- 
gories of  science.  Part  of  this  "critical"  philosophy,  therefore, 
is  also  the  thesis  that  the  myth  is  to  be  evaluated,  not  by  norms 
taken  from  alien  spheres,  but  in  terms  of  its  own  form 
and  structure  as  an  original  and  primary  way  of  intuiting  re- 
ality. 

The  development  of  myth  exhibits  stages  parallel  to  the 
stages  of  language — from  copy,  through  analogy,  to  symbol. 
Here,  too,  an  immanent  dialectic  drives  thought  on  from  copy 
to  symbol.25  It  is  here  that  the  question  of  the  relation  of  myth 
to  religion  is  raised  by  Cassirer  and,  in  the  last  section,  entitled 
"Die  Dialectik  des  mythischen  Bewusstseins,"  is  given  an 
answer  which  I  believe,  is,  in  principle  at  least,  in  the  right 
direction.  According  to  this  view,  originally  myth  and  religion 
(and  mythical  and  religious  symbolism)  were  identical,  or  at 
least  inseparable  and  interfused.  It  is  clearly  impossible,  he  tells 
us,  to  make  any  study  of  religious  symbols  without  a  study  of 
their  relation  to  myth.  There  is  no  positive  religion  without 
these  elements.  The  further  we  follow  the  content  of  the  re- 
ligious consciousness  to  its  beginnings,  the  more  it  is  found 
impossible  to  separate  the  belief  content  from  mythical  lan- 
guage y  one  has  then  no  longer  religion  in  its  actual  historical  and 
cultural  nature  but  merely  a  shadow  picture  and  an  empty 
abstraction.  Nevertheless — and  this  is  the  important  point  for 
the  philosophy  of  religion — despite  this  inseparable  interweav- 
ing of  the  content  of  myth  and  religion,  they  are  far  from  being 
identical.  Neither  the  form  nor  the  spirit  of  the  two  are  the 
same.  The  peculiar  character  of  the  religious  form  of  con- 
sciousness shows  itself  precisely  in  a  changed  attitude  towards 
the  mythical  picture  of  the  world.  It  cannot  do  without  this 
world,  for  it  is  in  the  mythical  consciousness  that  the  immediate 

"PSF,  II,  29*ff. 


424  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

intuition  of  the  meaningfulness  of  the  world  is  given.  Yet  in 
the  religious  consciousness  the  myth  acquires  a  new  meaning  5  it 
becomes  symbolic.  Religion  completes  the  process  of  develop- 
ment which  myth  as  such  can  not.  It  makes  use  of  the  sensuous 
pictures  and  signs,  but  at  the  same  time  knows  them  to  be  such. 
It  always  draws  the  distinction  between  mere  existence  and 
meaning.26 

C 

This  critical  theory  of  myth  and  of  its  relation  to  religion 
seems  to  me  the  only  tenable  one,  when  all  the  relevant  facts 
are  taken  into  consideration.  In  contrast  to  positivistic  theories 
which  identify  religion  with  myth,  Cassirer's  emphasis  upon  the 
fundamental  difference  between  the  two  seems  to  me  to  be  of 
great  importance.  Nor  does  it  suffice,  as  in  certain  theories  very 
common  at  the  present  time,  to  distinguish  between  pre-scientific 
myth,  which  is  transitory,  and  permanent  myth,  which  is  the 
language  of  religion.  There  is  all  the  difference  in  the  world 
between  saying  that  religion  is  myth,  however  permanent,  and 
saying  that  the  language  of  myth  constitutes  the  indispensable 
source  of  religious  symbolism  5  and  Cassirer  has  grasped  this 
fundamental  difference. 

On  the  other  hand,  true  as  this  conception  in  principle  is,  it 
seems  to  me  that,  as  formulated  by  Cassirer,  it  presents  essen- 
tially the  same  difficulties  which  are  encountered  in  his  philoso- 
phy of  language.  Indeed  the  same  ambiguity  which  there 
appeared  is  present  in  another  form  in  his  philosophy  of  re- 
ligious symbolism.  It  concerns  what  he  calls  the  dialectic  of 
the  mythical  consciousness.  Religion  does  indeed  complete  the 
process  of  development  which  myth  as  such  can  not.  But  what 
is  this  completion?  He  does  tell  us,  to  be  sure,  that  religion 
makes  use  of  the  sensuous  pictures  and  signs,  but  at  the  same 
time  he  seems  also  to  tell  us  that  the  ideal  completion  of  the 
process  would  be  the  mystical  consciousness — that  negative 
mysticism  in  which  the  pictures  and  symbols  are  transcended 
and  ultimately  abandoned.  Undoubtedly,  as  the  illustrations  he 
gives  us  of  the  dialectic,  taken  from  the  Hebrew,  Persian,  and 
Hindu  religions,  indicate,  every  positive  religion  reaches  a  crisis 

*ibid.,  n,  294. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  425 

in  which  it  breaks  with  the  mythical  and  on  its  higher  levels 
seeks  a  direct  approach  to  the  absolute.  Christianity  also,  as  he 
tells  us,  reached  this  crisis  and  "has  fought  this  fight."  It  too 
draws  the  distinction  between  existence  and  meaning.  This  is 
doubtless  true,  but  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  any  form  of 
religion — certainly  not  the  Christian  religion  and  theology — 
ever  abandons  existence  for  meaning.  It  is  true,  again,  that  the 
negative  theology  of  the  philosophical  mystics,  such  as  Eckhart 
and  Tauler,  might  be  said  to  have  completed  the  dialectical  proc- 
ess in  this  fashion,  and  Cassirer  seems  to  quote  them  as  repre- 
senting the  essence  of  the  dialectic  of  religion.27  But  it  is  in  the 
positive  rather  than  in  the  negative  mystics  that  the  essence  of 
Christian  mysticism  is  to  be  found  5  and  this  form  of  mysticism, 
as  Von  Hiigel  has  shown,  includes  both  acceptance  and  tran- 
scendence of  the  symbol.  In  any  case — and  this  is  really  the 
only  point  I  wish  to  raise  here — Cassirer's  conception  of  the 
relation  of  myth  to  religion,  however  valuable  it  may  be  on  the 
main  issue,  nevertheless  is  not  wholly  unambiguous,  any  more 
than  is  his  philosophy  of  language  as  a  whole.  Is  it,  or  is  it  not, 
the  fate  of  religion  to  be  dissolved  into  something  else — into  a 
philosophy  which  is  no  longer  religious  or  into  a  mysticism 
which  is  no  longer  theological? 

D 

Of  this  critical  idealistic  theory  of  the  religious  symbol  Paul 
Tillich  has  said  that  it  stands  in  the  forefront  of  symbol-theory 
today,28  and  in  this  he  is  probably  right.  But  this  is  but  one  phase 
of  Cassirer's  more  general  theory  of  symbolism.  The  symbolic 
function  belongs,  as  we  have  seen,  not  to  any  single  level  of  the 
world  picture,  but  holds  throughout.  By  thus  identifying  the 
symbolic  with  the  entire  range  of  knowledge,  including  the 
scientific,  the  concept  of  the  syrilbol  and  of  symbolic  truth  has 
been  given  a  tremendous  expansion  and  a  new  significance.  It  is, 
indeed,  on  his  view,  only  in  the  mathematical-physical  sciences 
that  the  full  significance  of  the  .philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  is 
seen;  for,  as  he  tells  us,  "no  matter  how  high  myth  and  art  may 

"  PSF,  II,  3o6ff. 

28  For  a  critical  discussion  of  this  problem  sec  a  discussion  between  Paul  Tillich 
and  myself  in  The  Journal  of  Liberal  Religion,  Vol.  II,  No.  i,  (1940). 


426  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

carry  their  constructions,  they  yet  remain  permanently  rooted 
in  the  primitive  world  of  Ausdruckserlebnisse."29  It  is  only  in 
the  sphere  of  physical  mathematical  science  that  thought,  so  to 
speak,  breaks  through  the  husk  of  language,  with  its  natural 
forms,  and  creates  a  world  of  concepts  which,  because  of  the 
conscious  recognition  of  their  nature  as  symbols,  and  of  science 
itself  as  symbolic  form,  makes  it  possible  to  realize  the  ideal 
immanent  in  knowledge  from  the  start,  namely  the  correlation 
of  phenomena  in  a  systematic  whole.  It  is  here  that  the  step  from 
substance  to  function  is  finally  taken. 

VI 

The  Language  of  Science:  Symbolism  as  a  Scientific  Principle 

A 

The  third  volume  of  the  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen 
Formen  is  entitled  Phanomenologie  der  Erkenntnis  and  the 
third  part  of  this  volume  bears  the  title,  "Die  Bedeutungsfunk- 
tion  und  der  Aufbau  der  wissenschaftlichen  Erkenntnis."  One 
chapter  is  entitled  "Sprache  und  Wissenschaft,  Dingzeichen 
und  Ordnungszeichen"  and  the  theme  herein  expressed  is  the 
main  theme  of  this  part  of  our  study. 

"Language  and  science"  has,  indeed,  become  one  of  the  cen- 
tral problems  of  modern  philosophy  of  science,  as  the  problem 
of  symbolism  has  become  a  burning  issue  in  scientific  method- 
ology. All  that  the  scientist  contributes  to  the  fact  is,  according 
to  Poincare,  the  language  in  which  it  is  enunciated.  But,  if  the 
relation  of  perception  to  language  is  such  as  Cassirer  conceives 
it,  that  "all"  is  a  very  great  deal  indeed;  for  there  is  no  "fact," 
in  the  sense  of  "critical"  philosophy,  until  it  is  expressed,  and 
the  primary,  if  not  the  only,  form  of  expression  is  language. 
Science,  so  Cassirer  maintains  in  the  introduction  to  Das 
mythische  Denken,  differs  from  the  other  stages  of  spiritual 
life  not  in  the  fact  that  it  gives  us  the  truth  itself  without  any 
mediation  through  signs  and  symbols,  but  rather  that  science 
recognizes  that  the  symbols  which  it  uses  are  symbols  and 
realizes  this  fact  in  a  way  in  which  the  others  do  not.80  This 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  427 

"realization"  constitutes  the  recognition  of  symbolism  as  a 
scientific  principle  and  the  statement  of  this  principle — involv- 
ing both  the  nature  of  the  symbol  and  its  relation  to  reality — 
becomes  the  central  problem  of  "science  as  symbolic  form." 

It  is  in  contrast  with  the  copy  or  model  theory  of  scientific 
concepts  which  characterized  nineteenth  century  physics,  that 
the  symbolic  character  of  these  concepts  is  developed.  If  the 
function  of  language  in  general  is  not  to  copy  but  to  symbolize 
reality,  this  is  a  fortiori  true  of  scientific  language.  Cassirer  cites 
a  wealth  of  illustrations  from  modern  physical  science  to  sub- 
stantiate this  thesis,  but  it  is  in  connection  with  the  theory  of 
light  that  this  fundamental  change  from  copy  to  symbol  is  per- 
haps clearest,  and  Cassirer  gives  an  excellent  picture  of  this 
development. 

The  corpuscular  theory  of  Newton,  according  to  which  light 
consists  in  very  small  particles,  proved  untenable  and  gave  way 
to  the  undulatory  theory  of  Huygens,  based  upon  an  analogy 
taken  from  perceptible  phenomena  and  giving  rise  to  the  con- 
struct of  the  ether  as  the  substance  which  has  these  waves. 
Contradictions  arose,  however,  in  the  predicates  of  this  hypo- 
thetical ether  which  could  not  be  eliminated.  Physics  was  led 
even  more  deeply  into  paradoxes,  and  all  ad  hoc  hypotheses 
invented  to  solve  the  difficulties  served  only  to  lead  more  deeply 
into  the  morass.  Finally  there  came  the  electrodynamic  theory 
of  the  field.  The  characteristic  here  is  that  the  reality  which  is 
designated  as  the  "field"  is  no  longer  a  complex  of  physical 
"things"  but  an  expression  for  a  system  of  relations.  But  the 
important  thing  for  us  is  that  the  notion  of  the  intuitible  is  com- 
pletely abandoned  and  therefore  the  entire  notion  of  the  scien- 
tific concept  is  changed.81  This  change,  which  we  may  take  as 
an  outstanding  illustration  of  the  movement  from  "schematism" 
to  symbol  in  physics,  illustrates  also  a  fundamental  change  in 
the  modern  symbolic  consciousness  of  science.  The  symbol  sym- 
bolizes not  things  (substances)  but  relations  (functions). 

B 

This  symbolic  theory  of  scientific  concepts  is,  according  to 
Cassirer,  "the  accepted  theory  in  physical  science  today"  and 

*  Ibid..  IIL 


428  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

he  is,  doubtless,  on  the  whole  justified  in  calling  it  such.  He  is 
doubtless  right  also  in  saying  that  science  recognizes  the  fact  that 
the  concepts  which  it  uses  are  symbols  in  a  way  in  which  other 
symbolic  forms  do  not.  Certainly  it  represents  in  principle  the 
standpoint  of  such  physicists  as  Jeans  and  Eddington,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  continental  physicists  he  cites.  For  Jeans  the  pic- 
tures are  the  fables  with  which  we  deck  our  mathematical  equa- 
tions j  for  Eddington  they  are  dummies  in  our  mathematical 
equations.  Symbolism  as  a  scientific  principle  means,  then,  in 
the  words  of  Cassirer,  that 

physics  has  finally  abandoned  the  reality  of  description  and  representa- 
tion in  order  to  enter  upon  a  realm  of  greater  abstraction.  The  schema- 
tism of  pictures  has  given  place  to  a  symbolism  of  principles.  Physics 
is  concerned  no  longer  with  the  actual  itself,  but  with  its  structure  and 
formal  principles.  The  tendency  to  unification  has  conquered  the  tend- 
ency to  intuitive  representation.  The  synthesis  which  is  possible  through 
pure  concepts  of  law  and  relation  has  shown  itself  more  valuable  than 
the  apprehension  in  terms  of  objects  or  things.  Order  and  relation  have, 
then,  become  the  basal  concepts  of  physics.32 

To  say  that  physical  science,  in  the  later  stages  of  its  develop- 
ment, is  no  longer  concerned  with  the  actual,  but  solely  with 
formal  principles  and  structure,  is  seemingly  to  enunciate  a 
paradox  of  the  most  astounding  sort.  This  view,  however, 
Cassirer  is  careful  to  point  out,  does  not  in  the  least  signify 
that  science  has  abandoned  sense  experience.  Science,  he  tells  us, 
"starts  with  observable  objects  and  is  not  content  until  it  de- 
duces from  its  concepts  or  theories  objects  and  events  which 
can  also  be  observed.  Without  this  connection  with  sense,  how- 
ever indirect  and  remote,  there  is  no  verification. 

The  meaning  of  the  principle  must  be  ultimately  empirically  and  intui- 
tively fulfilled,  but  this  fulfilment  (Erjullung)  is  never  possible  directly, 
but  only  insofar  as  from  the  supposition  of  its  validity  other  propositions 
are  derived  by  means  of  an  hypothetical  deduction.  None  of  these 
propositions,  none  of  the  individual  stages  in  this  logical  process,  need 
be  capable  of  a  direct  sensory  interpretation.  Only  as  a  logical  totality 

*,  Ill,  545. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  429 

can  the  series  of  deductions  be  referred  to  observation  and  be  proved 
and  justified  by  it.33 

"Only  as  logical  totality"  —  this  is  the  significant  point.  Since 
none  of  the  individual  propositions  requires  reference  to  sensu- 
ous intuition,  there  is  a  gradual  shift  of  the  locus  of  verification 
from  the  intuitible  to  the  meaningful.  "Objectivity"  in  modern 
physics  is  not  a  problem  of  representation  (Darstellung)  but 
it  is  a  problem  of  meaning  alone  ("ein  reines  Bedeutungsprob- 


In  this  last  statement  we  have  not  only  the  heart  of  Cassirer's 
philosophy  of  science,  but  of  the  entire  philosophy  of  symbolic 
forms,  of  which  the  scientific  form  is  but  a  part.  For  the  study 
of  modern  science  shows  us,  what  the  philosophy  of  symbolic 
forms  has  continually  emphasized,  that  all  spiritual  life  and  all 
spiritual  development  consist  in  nothing  else  than  in  such  in- 
tellectual metamorphoses  —  and  in  this  passage  from  repre- 
sentation to  the  .  creation  of  meaningful  structures.  Scientific 
knowledge  repeats,  in  a  different  dimension  to  be  sure,  the 
same  process  which  characterizes  language  and  myth,  a  fact 
which,  as  we  shall  see,  raises  again,  in  an  acute  form,  the  funda- 
mental problem  of  the  knowledge  value  of  all  the  symbolic 
forms. 


In  that  in  physical  science  the  concept  of  substance  has  given 
place  to  that  of  function  and  the  concepts  of  physics  are  found 
to  symbolize  not  things  but  relations,  mathematics,  as  the 
science  of  relations  far  excellence,  becomes  for  Cassirer  central 
in  his  entire  treatment  of  science  as  symbolic  form.  His  philoso- 
phy of  mathematics,  like  his  theory  of  logic,  is  a  topic  which 
belongs  to  other  contributors,  but  some  comment  seems  neces- 
sary in  the  present  context.  Here  only  one  problem  can  be 
raised.  It  concerns  the  question  of  what  we  may  call  the  "lan- 
guage of  mathematics"  and  mathematics  as  symbolic  form. 

The  main  problem,  of  course,  is  that  of  the  function  of  mathe- 
matical symbols  in  modern  physical  science;  but  this  involves 


"Ibid.,  Ill,  538. 

84  /Ml.,  in,  552. 


430  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

also  the  problem  of  the  philosophical  basis  of  pure  mathematics. 
Starting  with  the  definition  of  mathematics  as  the  science  of 
numbers,  and  with  the  definition  of  numbers  as  symbols  con- 
structed for  the  ordering  activities  of  the  understanding,  there 
is  created  the  problem  of  the  truth  value  of  these  symbols 
themselves. 

Are  they  mere  signs  to  which  no  objective  meaning  is  to  be  assigned  or 
have  they  a  fandamentum  in  re?  And  if  the  latter  is  the  case — where 
are  we  to  seek  this  basis?  Is  it  given,  ready-made,  in  the  "intuition;"  or 
must  it,  apart  from  and  independently  of  the  intuitively  given,  gain  and 
secure  its  validity  in  the  independent  activities  of  the  understanding,  in 
pure  spontaneity  of  thought?  With  these  questions  we  find  ourselves  in 
the  very  center  of  the  methodological  struggle  which  is  presently  raging 
about  the  meaning  and  content  of  the  fundamental  mathematical  con- 
cepts. ,  .  .  What  does  this  question  mean  for  our  own  fundamental  prob- 
lem of  symbolical  thinking?35 

The  solution  of  this  problem  involves  the  entire  dispute 
between  the  intuitive  and  the  formal  or  symbolic  theories  in 
modern  mathematics,  and  Cassirer's  analysis  of  modern  mathe- 
matical theory  is  one  of  the  most  important,  as  it  is  one  of  the 
most  enlightening,  phases  of  his  work.  So  far  as  the  basal  prob- 
lem is  concerned,  his  answer  is  that  the  above  disjunction  is 
neither  unequivocal  nor  complete.  Mathematics,  he  holds,  has 
objective  significance,  but  that  significance  does  not  lie  in  any 
immediate  correlation  with  the  intuited  world  of  "nature,"  but 
rather  in  the  fact  that,  by  constructing  this  world  according  to 
its  own  formal  principles,  it  is  enabled  thereby  to  understand  its 
laws.  I  have  neither  the  space  nor  the  competence  to  develop  his 
solution  of  this  problem  in  detail — it  is  but  an  application  of  the 
principle  that  the  function  of  "language,"  in  any  form,  is  not  to 
copy  reality  but  to  symbolize  it — rather  shall  I  note  his  com- 
ment on  the  opposition  of  realistic  and  idealistic  theory  in 
mathematics.  A  true  and  valid  conception  of  the  symbolic  in  the 
mathematical  field,  as  in  other  fields,  does  not,  he  tells  us, 
consort  well  with  the  traditional  dualism  of  idealism  and 
realism,  subject  and  object,  but  rather  transcends  them.  "The 
symbolic  belongs  neither  ...  to  the  sphere  of  the  immanent  nor 

*lbid.,  ill,  414. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  431 

to  that  of  the  transcendent;  its  value  consists  precisely  in  the 
fact  that  it  enables  us  to  transcend  these  oppositions.  It  is  not 
the  one  nor  the  other,  but  'the  one  in  the  other'  and  cthe  other 
in  the  one'."36 

It  is,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  transition  from  the 
schematism  of  pictures  to  the  symbolism  of  principles  that  the 
role  of  mathematics  has  become  increasingly  significant  in 
modern  science.  Order  has  thereby  become  the  "absoluter 
Grundbegrif"  of  modern  physics.  For  modern  physical  science 
the  world  presents  itself  no  longer  as  a  collection  of  entities, 
but  as  an  order  of  happenings  or  events.  Cassirer  quotes  with 
apparent  approval  a  statement  of  Weyl  in  this  connection. 

Neither  intuitive  space  nor  intuitive  time,  but  only  a  four-dimensional 
continuum  in  the  abstract  mathematical  sense,  may  serve  as  the  medium 
in  which  physics  constructs  the  external  world.  If  color  consisted 
"actually"  of  ether- vibrations  as  for  Huyghens,  it  appears  now  only  as 
mathematical  functional  processes  of  a  periodic  character,  whereby  four 
independent  variables  occur  in  the  functions  as  representatives  of  the 
spatio-temporal  medium  referring  to  co-ordinates.  What  remains,  then, 
finally  is  a  symbolic  construction  in  precisely  the  sense  in  which  Hilbert 
carried  such  construction  through  in  the  field  of  mathematics.87 

Thus  do  the  intuited  space  and  time  of  the  immediate  Ausdrucks- 
erlebnisse  become  the  ideal  space-time  which,  as  Cassirer  said, 
while  keeping  the  form  of  sensuous  experience,  progressively 
fills  that  form  with  non-sensuous  ideal  content  and  makes  the 
sensuous  form  a  symbol  of  the  ideal. 

D 

In  such  fashion,  then,  does  science,  as  symbolic  form,  find  its 
place  in  Cassirer's.  more  general  idealistic  philosophy  of  lan- 
guage and  of  symbolic  forms.  This  symbolic  theory  of  scientific 
concepts  is,  I  suppose,  not  only  the  "accepted  theory  today"  but 
one  to  which,  as  I  believe,  we  are  forced  by  the  developments  of 
modern  scientific  methodology.  Nevertheless,  as  formulated  by 

98  ibid.,  m,  444f. 

$T?£F,  III,  546.  The  quotation  from  Weyl  is  taken  from  his  Philosophic  der 
Mathematik  und  Naturwissenschaft,  found  in  Handbuch  der  Philosophic,  80. 


432  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

Cassirer,  it  presents  certain  difficulties  not  wholly  unrelated  to 
those  found  in  other  parts  of  his  general  philosophy. 

The  primary  difficulty  arises  out  of  an  ambiguity  in  Cassirer's 
conception  of  science.  The  basal  science,  on  his  view,  is  the 
mathematical-physical,  for  here  the  essential  law  of  all  knowl- 
edge manifests  itself  completely  j  and  it  is  for  this  type  of  science 
that  his  theory  of  scientific  symbolism  is  developed.  But  there 
are  other  sciences  ("so-called,"  at  least),  biology,  psychology, 
etc.,  to  say  nothing  of  the  Geisteswissenschaften,  which,  so  to 
speak,  employ  other  languages  and  exhibit  very  different  sym- 
bolic form.  Are  they  science  or  are  they  not?  It  is  possible  to 
hold,  with  many  scientists,  that  they  are  really  not  science — 
that  the  universe  is  exhaustively  analyzable  into  terms  of  pure 
mathematics,  and  only  insofar  as  this  analysis  is  carried  out  do 
we  have  science,  properly  speaking.  This  is  a  possible  view,  but 
it  is  very  questionable  whether  the  concepts  of  the  mathematical 
sciences  are  most  suitable  for  the  biologist  and  psychologist,  to 
say  nothing  of  history  and  the  other  Geisteswissenschaften. 
Living  organisms  and  conscious  minds  are,  to  be  sure,  a  part  of 
nature,  but  the  concepts  of  nature  developed  in  mathematical 
physics  are  scarcely  such  as  to  express  adequately  their  nature 
as  living  and  conscious.  On  the  other  hand,  we  may  say  that 
these  are  really  science  j  and  if  that  is  the  case  the  essential 
law  of  all  knowledge  does  not  manifest  itself  completely  in  the 
mathematical-physical  sphere  j  nor  is  the  concept  of  symbol 
developed  in  this  sphere  adequate  to  all  forms  of  scientific  sym- 
bolism. We  are  forced  to  a  concept  of  "double  symbolism"  in 
science,  such  as  I  have  developed  in  Language  and  Reality™ 

It  may  be  said,  of  course,  that  the  issue  here  is  largely  verbal 
and  concerns  merely  the  question  of  the  "definition"  of  science. 
But  I  do  not  believe  that  this  is  all  there  is  to  this  problem.  It 
concerns  the  much  more  fundamental  question  of  whether  the 
ideal  of  knowledge  is  really  realized  in  the  mathematical-physi- 
cal form,  whether,  in  short,  there  are  not  other  aspects  of  reality 
the  adequate  expression  of  which  requires  a  different  kind  of 
symbolism.  Of  the  fact  itself,  of  this  "double  symbolism,"  there 
is  no  doubt  j  the  only  question  is  whether  we  call  this  symbolic 

38  Language  and  Reality,  5235. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  433 

form,  other  than  that  in  the  mathematical  sciences,  science  or  not. 
It  is  not,  of  course,  my  intention  to  argue  these  points  here — I 
have  done  so  in  another  context — but  merely  to  suggest  an  im- 
portant point  at  which  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  science  leaves 
important  questions  unanswered. 

Closely  connected  with  this  problem  is  one  no  less  funda- 
mental, and  one  which  involves  an  ambiguity  no  less  disturbing 
than  the  preceding.  It  concerns  the  relation  of  the  scientific, 
more  specifically  the  mathematical  symbol,  to  ordinary  lan- 
guage. 

The  ideal  of  science  seems  to  be  to  pass  from  a  language  of 
things  to  a  language  of  pure  relations,  a  language  which  by  an 
immanental  necessity  tends  to  become  the  language  of  mathe- 
matics. Science  breaks  through  the  husk  of  ordinary  language, 
with  its  connotations,  into  a  world  of  "pure  notation."  It  be- 
comes wholly  ^pronomlnaly  to  use  Karl  Vossler's  expression.  The 
question,  then,  arises  as  to  the  relation  of  this  mathematical 
symbolism  to  natural  language.  I  am  not  sure  as  to  Cassirer's 
position  at  this  point  5  here  also  he  seems  to  be  ambiguous. 
According  to  him,  the  relation  of  mathematical  symbols  to 
"natural"  language  seems  to  parallel  the  relation  of  religion  to 
myth.  As  the  religious  consciousness  cannot  abandon  completely 
the  mythical  picture  of  the  world,  although  it  surpasses  and 
transcends  it,  so  the  scientific  and  mathematical  language  never 
quite  abandons  the  speech  forms  from  which  it  developed. 
All  "rigorous  science,"  Cassirer  tells  us,  demands  that  thought 
shall  "free  itself  from  the  compulsion  of  the  word;"39  but  this 
is  never  completely  possible.  The  issue,  as  I  see  it,  is  not 
whether  it  is  possible,  but  whether  it  is  desirable.  A  mathe- 
matical equation,  until  it  is  interpreted,  "says  nothing,"  and  I 
cannot  see  how  it  can  be  interpreted  except  in  terms  of  "natural" 
language  which  involves  inevitably  those  "pre-scientific"  cate- 
gories, of  substance  and  attribute,  which,  according  to  this 
theory  of  science,  it  is  the  ideal  of  science  to  transcend. 

I  find,  then,  in  Cassirer  an  ambiguity  which  I  also  find 
present  in  many  modern  physicists.  On  the  one  hand,  we  find 
them  speaking  of  electrons,  etc.,  as  the  symbols  "with  which 

*PSF,  III,  382. 


434  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

we  deck  our  mathematical  equations }"  the  assumption  being 
that  the  equations,  the  mathematical  relations,  express  the  non- 
symbolic  aspects  of  reality.  On  the  other  hand,  these  same 
mathematical  signs,  which  make  up  the  equations,  are  them- 
selves characterized  as  symbols — with  the  result  that  we  are 
left  uncertain  as  to  what  is  symbol  and  what  reality.  My  own 
view — which  I  do  not,  of  course,  wish  to  argue  here — is  that 
mathematical  symbols  are  merely  "pronominal,"  they  merely 
manipulate,  and,  until  they  are  translated  into  non-mathemati- 
cal terms,  "say  nothing."  I  should  be  disposed  to  say  with 
Brouwer  that  mathematics  is  "weit  mehr  ein  Thun  denn  tine 
Lehre"  Yet,  whatever  pure  mathematics  may  be,  mathematical 
physics  is  not  a  mere  Thun>  (activity  or  manipulation),  but 
also  a  Lehre  or  theory — a  theory  of  the  nature  of  reality,  a 
theory  which,  as  I  believe,  can  be  stated  only  in  terms  of  natural 
language  and  of  the  categories  which  naturally  belong  to  such 
language.  In  other  words,  physical  theory  must  ultimately  pre- 
suppose a  metaphysics  which  cannot  be  merely  a  symbolism  of 
relations  but  must  be  a  symbolism  of  things. 

The  questions  here  raised,  important  as  they  are,  do  not, 
however,  affect,  I  think,  the  general  critical-idealistic  philoso- 
phy of  science.  The  essence  of  that  interpretation  of  science, 
as  it  is  for  all  those  who  thus  conceive  it,  is  that  science  is  one 
symbolic  form  among  other  symbolic  forms.  Science,  Cassirer 
would  say  with  Weyl,  I  think,  concedes  to  idealism  that  its 
objective  world  is  not  given,  but  only  propounded  like  a  prob- 
lem to  be  solved,  and  that  it  can  only  be  constructed  by  symbols. 
He  would  also  say  with  Eddington,  I  think,  that  the  explora- 
tion of  the  external  world  by  science  leads  not  to  concrete 
reality,  but  to  a  world  of  symbols  beneath  which  these  methods 
are  not  adapted  to  penetrating.  In  saying  these  things,  if  he 
says  them,  he  would  also  say,  by  implication,  that  there  are  other 
symbolic  forms  which  are  more  adapted — if  not  to  penetrate 
into  concrete  reality  (Cassirer  would  probably  not  wish  to  use 
this  expression),  certainly  more  adapted  to  expressing  concrete 
reality.  But  there  is  a  further  implication  of  this  theory  of 
science  which  he  could  scarcely  avoid,  namely,  that  science,  so 
understood,  presupposes  a  metaphysics.  Not  only  is  art  as 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  435 

symbolic  form  une  metaphysique  figuree,  to  use  Bergson's 
terms,  but  science  is  also.  The  ideal  of  modern  science,  as  con- 
ceived by  Cassirer,  is  expressed  in  the  postulate  that  nothing 
shall  be  admitted  to  science  which  is  not  resolvable  into  the 
sensible  and  the  measurable.  But  this  postulate  presupposes 
that  there  is  a  metaphysical  sphere  not  thus  resolvable.  If  so, 
the  question  arises  whether,  corresponding  to  this  sphere,  there 
is  not  a  language  of  metaphysics  and  a  metaphysical  symbolism. 

VII 

The  Language  of  Metaphysics  and  The  Nature  of 
Philosophical  Discourse 


One  of  the  chief  problems  which  face  any  one  who  realizes 
the  issues  raised  by  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  language  to 
thought  and  knowledge  is  that  of  the  language  of  philosophy. 
The  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  is  philosophy  and  not 
science}  although,  of  course,  the  results  of  scientific  investiga- 
tion find  their  place  in  the  phenomenology  of  these  forms. 
What,  then,  is  the  character  of  philosophical  language? 

That  there  is  such  a  thing  as  philosophical  discourse,  as  con- 
trasted with  scientific,  is  recognized  by  Cassirer  in  his  acceptance 
of  the  Hegelian  principle  that  the  phenomenological  method 
is  the  presupposition  of  philosophy  and  in  the  application  of 
this  method  to  the  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms.  It  is  recog- 
nized also  that  philosophical  discourse  involves  a  radical  shift 
from  the  sphere  of  things  (that  of  science)  to  the  sphere  of 
meanings  (and  values).  The  traditional  view,  of  course,  is  that 
this  discourse  is  identical  with  that  of  metaphysics — that  the 
language  of  philosophy  and  that  of  metaphysics  are  one.  This 
view  has,  however,  been  challenged  in  the  modern  world,  not 
only  by  positivism  but  by  certain  interpretations  of  the  Kantian 
"critical"  philosophy.  Cassirer's  position  is  one  continuous 
critique  of  positivism  in  all  spheres  of  the  human  spirit}  it  is 
not  so  clear  what  his  position  is  regarding  Kant  and  meta- 
physics. In  any  case,  it  seems  obvious  that  a  philosophy  of 


436  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

symbolic  forms,  to  be  in  any  sense  complete,  must  include  a 
study  of  the  language  and  the  form  which  we  call  metaphysical. 

B 

In  the  entire  three  volumes  there  is  only  one  point  at  which 
the  problem  of  metaphysics  is  presented  at  all — the  section  in 
Vol.  Ill,  entitled  "Intuitive  and  Symbolic  Knowledge  in  Mod- 
ern Metaphysic."  It  is  a  critique  of  Bergson's  position  in  which 
metaphysics  is  defined  as  the  science  which  seeks  to  dispense 
with  symbols — "the  most  radical  denial,"  as  Cassirer  rightly 
says,  "of  the  right  of  all  symbol  formation  which  has  ever 
appeared  in  the  history  of  metaphysics."40 

Cassirer's  criticism  of  Bergson  at  this  point  is,  I  believe,  fully 
justified.  Quite  rightly  he  points  out  that  this  sharp  contrast, 
between  the  way  of  metaphysical  intuition  and  the  way  of 
science  and  knowledge,  shows  Bergson  to  be  the  son  of  a 
naturalistic  epoch  in  which  all  activity  of  the  intellect  is  re- 
duced to  the  purely  vital  or  biological.  Quite  rightly  also  he 
points  out  the  impossibility  of  a  purely  intuitive  metaphysics  5 
for  it  would  not  be  any  kind  of  knowledge,  even  metaphysical, 
unless  it  gave  us  some  description  of  the  "vital  force,"  and 
this  too  requires  theoretical  or  form  elements  5  in  other  words, 
metaphysical  knowledge  must  be  symbolic  form  also. 

This  criticism  of  a  purely  intuitive  metaphysics  seems  to 
imply  both  the  right  to  a  metaphysical  language  and  also  to  sym- 
bolic construction  in  metaphysics.  We  look,  therefore,  for  a 
further  development  of  the  language  of  metaphysics  and  of 
symbolism  as  a  metaphysical  principle;  but  little  light  is  thrown 
upon  either  the  nature  of  metaphysics  or  the  character  of  its 
language  and  symbolism.  Just  as  we  feel  that  we  are  about  to 
put  our  hands  on  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the  problem,  Cas- 
sirer remarks,  "Aber  wir  brechen  an  diesem  Punkte  ab."  (Ill, 
4.8)  All  that  can  be  asked,  he  continues,  is  a  journey  round  the 
world,  the  globus  intellectualis.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  the 
philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  is  intended  to  be  just  such  a 
journey — neither  penetration  into  the  essence  of  "reality"  nor 
an  ultimate  interpretation  of  its  meaning.  It  is  apparently 

40  PSF,  III,  42ff,  esp.  43  and  44. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  437 

merely  a  phenomenology,  not  a  metaphysics  that  is  offered  us. 

Nevertheless,  it  seems  doubtful  whether  a  philosophy  of  lan- 
guage and  of  symbolic  forms  can  stop  at  this  point.  Even  in  a 
journey  around  the  globus  intellectualis  the  traveller  will  in- 
evitably come  upon  a  region  in  which  men  talk  a  language  which 
is  neither  that  of  science,  as  understood  by  Cassirer,  nor  of  myth 
and  poetry — a  language  and  symbolic  form  which  can  only  be 
called  metaphysical.  That  there  is  such  a  language  can,  I  think, 
scarcely  be  denied.  If  the  various  symbolic  forms,  art,  religion, 
science,  all,  in  their  several  ways,  constitute  une  metcrphysique 
figuree,  then  there  must  be,  it  would  seem,  a  language  of  meta- 
physics in  which  these  symbolic  forms  are  expanded  and  inter- 
preted. As  metaphysical  "postulation"  is  necessary  to  round 
out  our  world  of  experience,  so  metaphysical  language  is  neces- 
sary to  make  these  other  languages  intelligible.  Elsewhere  I 
have  myself  attempted  a  study  of  this  unique  language  and  of 
the  nature  of  the  symbolic  structure  called  metaphysics.41  I 
have,  of  course,  no  intention  of  going  into  that  here,  but  desire 
merely  to  suggest  that  this  is  one  of  the  gaps  in  Cassirer's 
thought  which  I  am  unable  to  fill,  and  that  precisely  here  the 
fundamental  ambiguity  in  his  evaluation  of  language  is  in  evi- 
dence. 

It  would  doubtless  be  an  impertinence  should  I  venture  to 
indicate  what,  had  Cassirer  carried  out  this  task,  his  conception 
of  the  language  of  metaphysics  and  of  metaphysics  as  symbolic 
form  would  have  been.  It  may  be  permitted,  however,  to  sug- 
gest the  point  at  which,  in  attempting  to  understand  Cassirer, 
I  have  found  myself  thrown  into  confusion  and  uncertainty.  If 
the  ideal  form  and  immanental  law  of  all  knowledge  is,  indeed, 
to  be  found  in  the  mathematical-physical  sciences,  then  it  would 
seem  that  the  symbolism  of  metaphysics  must  also  be  a  sym- 
bolism of  relations  and  that  a  philosophy  of  events,  such  as 
that  of  Whitehead  for  instance,  would  necessarily  be  the  re- 
sultant metaphysics.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  true,  as  we  are 
told  by  Cassirer,  that  science  as  symbolic  form  has  no  exclusive 
value,  but  is  only  one  way  of  constructing  reality,  and  has  value 
only  from  the  standpoint  of  science,  then  it  would  appear  that 

41  Language  and  Reality,  Chap.  XIII. 


438  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

a  metaphysics,  to  be  adequate,  must  be  a  metaphysics  of  art 
and  religion  also  and  must  have  a  language  and  symbolic  form 
which  includes  these  forms  also — in  which  case  it  could  no 
longer  be  a  symbolism  of  relations  merely,  but  must  be  a 
symbolism  of  things  also. 

But  all  this  may  be  beside  the  point.  It  may  be,  after  all, 
that  it  is  merely  a  phenomenology  and  not  a  metaphysics  with 
which  Cassirer  presents  us.  The  question  always  remains,  I 
suppose,  whether,  as  in  the  case  of  Kant,  the  critical  transcen- 
dental method  is  the  denial  of  metaphysics  or  itself  a  meta- 
physics. This  is,  I  believe,  an  ambiguity  inherent  in  the  Kantian 
position  and  one  shared  by  the  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms 
itself.  If  so,  this  ambiguity  must  take  its  place  beside  the 
other  forms  of  ambiguity  which  have  presented  themselves  at 
various  stages  of  the  development  of  this  philosophy.  The  key 
to  the  understanding  of  knowledge,  Cassirer  tells  us,  is  the 
Kantian  principle  that  we  must  have  our  eyes,  not  on  the 
results,  but  on  the  processes  of  knowledge.42  That  may  be  an 
important  key  to  understanding,  but  it  is  scarcely  sufficient 
for  evaluation;  it  may  reveal  to  us  the  meaning  of  the  process, 
but  can  scarcely  determine  the  truth  of  its  result.  This  brings 
us  to  the  problem  of  meaning  and  truth  in  Cassirer's  philosophy. 

VIII 

Language  and  Reality.  The  Problem  of  Meaning  and  Truth 

A 

How  much  the  present  writer  has  learned  from  his  journey 
in  Cassirer's  company  around  the  globus  intellectualis,  is,  I 
hope,  fully  clear  from  the  sympathetic  presentation  of  the  main 
points  of  his  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms.  But  that  I  have 
still  much  to  learn  is  clear  also  from  the  fact  that  I  have  been 
forced  to  confess  my  perplexity  at  certain  crucial  points.  What 
has  puzzled  me  has  already  been  suggested  by  the  indication 
of  certain  ambiguities  present  in  his  philosophy  of  language  eo 
nomine,  and  which  have  grown  in  significance  as  we  have  passed 
on  to  the  wider  implications  of  his  philosophy. 

4*PSF,  III,  7ff,  esp.  8. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE 

The  critical  position  which  Cassirer  maintains  throughoir 
plicitly  denies  exclusive  value  to  any  one  of  the  fundair 
symbolic  forms.  Modern  science  has  come  to  recognize,  he 
that  its  concepts  or  symbols  are  constructions  for  a  spe 
pose,  namely,  "to  deduce,  as  from  models,  what  will 
in  the  external  world."  As  such  "they  correspond  to  tl 
point  of  science  and  have  no  ultimate  meaning  out 
standpoint."  Art   and  religion   are   equally   symbc 
equally  ways  of  representing  the  world.  "None  of  th 
Cassirer  tells  us,  is  a  "direct  reproduction  of  realist 
facts."  All  share  in  the  common  character  of  beit 
of  expression  of  one  spiritual  principle.  All  have 
they  all  also  have  truth? 

To  none  of  these  forms,  therefore,  does  Cass" 
ing  or  significance.  The  question  is  whether 
includes  the  truth- value  of  knowledge.  I  may 
this  point  also  Cassirer  seems  to  me  to  give  ar 
It  is  true  that  he  seems  to  conceive  them  aL 
edge  and  truth.  Even  to  the  mythical  for 
value.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  proble 
maintains  "relative  truth"  can  be  no  lor 
significantly  enough,  he  puts  the  wor 
marks.43  As  for  all  "critical"  philosopi 
theory,  the  myth  expresses  aspects  of 
matical-physical  language  cannot  expr 
art  and  religion,  which  make  use  o* 
bolically,  are  a  fortiori  forms  of  trut 
aspect  of  his  thought.  It  is  in  science 
law  of  knowledge  finds  its  supra" 
higher  symbolic  form  with  a  tr 
quotation  marks.  We  cannot  esc 
as  symbolic  form,  is  not  only  t 
that  shall  supersede  all  other 
further  suspicion  that,  when  " 
the  other  forms,  it  is  with  a 
the  present  writer  at  least,  s* 

"ibid.,  n,  19. 


WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

splendid  structure  which  Cassirer  has  erected  in  these  three 
nes. 

">  tendencies  strive  for  supremacy  in  Cassirer's  thought, 

d  they  do  in  all  forms  of  philosophy  which  draw  their 

spiration  from  the  ideals  of  knowledge  of  a  scientific 

;deals  upon  which  Kant  himself  seemed  at  least  to  set 

<natur.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  narrow  conception 

'hich  it  seems  difficult  to  avoid  in  this  age  of  science. 

xssages  in  Cassirer's  works  this  seems  to  be  the  truth 

wcellencey  as  it  was  for  Kant  in  one  of  his  philo- 

-.  On  the  assumption  that  the  basal  conception  and 

knowledge  are  completely  shown  in  the  methods 

'  seems  inevitable.  On  the  other  hand,  another 

strives  for  recognition  in  Cassirer's  thought,  as 

n  the  thought  of  any  one  who  is  as  conversant 

readth  and  depth  of  human  culture — a  concep- 

words  of  John  Dewey,  is  "broader  and  more 

;n  which  Kant  also  put  his  imprimatur  in 

>sophical  moods.  It  is  the  dilemma  under- 

Ulemmas  into  which  the  modern  mind  has 

that  Cassirer  had  a  solution  for  this 

>nly  my  own  failure  to  bring  the  many 

•gument  into  a  significant  whole  which 

it.  None  the  less,  I  fail  to  see  it,  and 

ask  for  more  light.  There  is,  indeed, 

at  which,  if  I  understand  it  aright, 

-er  tells  us,  contains  in  itself  an 

'drives  it  on  unmercifully  further 

any  boundary  hitherto  reached." 

notion,  adaequatio  intellectus  et 

merely  with  calling  in  question 

world  picture,  but  seizes  upon 

f ."  The  outcome  of  this  inner 

e  notion  of  truth  to  that  of 

to  a  realm  of  pure  meaning 

d  new  difficulties,  it  never- 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  LANGUAGE  441 

theless  results  in  the  subordination  of  the  notion  of  truth  to  that 
of  meaning"44 — a  subordination  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  as 
much  a  feature  of  the  development  of  modern  physical  science 
as  of  any  other  symbolic  form 5  for  objectivity  in  modern  physics 
is  not  a  problem  of  representation  (f>arstellung)^  but  of  mean- 
ing alone  (ein  reines  Bedeutwngsproblem). 

This  subordination  of  truth  to  meaning  is  obviously  suscep- 
tible of  two  interpretations.  On  the  one  hand,  it  may  be  so 
interpreted  as  to  express  a  widespread  tendency  in  modern 
philosophy — one  shared  by  positivism  and  instrumentalism 
alike — namely,  to  insist  upon  the  existence  of  realms  of  mean- 
ing or  significance  (such  as  those  of  art  and  metaphysics)  in 
which  notions  of  truth  and  falsity  are  irrelevant  and  into  which, 
as  it  has  been  said,  "truth  has  no  right  to  enter."  On  the  other 
hand,  it  may  be  so  interpreted  as  to  express  the  notion  that, 
in  the  development  of  thought  which  has  resulted  in  the  sub- 
ordination of  truth  to  meaning,  truth  has  a  right  to  enter  because 
the  meaningful  is  already  true,  for  truth  and  meaning  ulti- 
mately coincide.  The  sum  total  of  meaningful  discourse  is  the 
truth. 

This  is  my  own  solution  of  the  problem,  as  developed  in 
Language  and  Reality.  I  hope  it  is  Cassirer's  also,  for  then  it 
would  not  only  be  true  that  I  have  learned  immensely  from  his 
philosophy  of  symbolic  forms,  but  also  that  from  this  learning 
I  have  not  drawn  consequences  which  would  be  disavowed  by 
Cassirer  himself.  I  hope  it  is  his  solution  also,  for  the  reason 
that  from  this  solution  of  the  problem  would  follow,  I  think, 
the  answers  to  the  other  problems  which  I  have  felt  constrained 
to  raise  in  the  course  of  these  discussions. 

WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

YALE  UNIVERSITY 

NEW  HAVEN,  CONNECTICUT 

44  PSF,  III,  6ff.j  also  3*8ff. 


'3 
James  Gutmann 

CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM 


13 
CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM 

ASSIRER'S  Humanism  is  not  a  segment  or  portion  o£ 
his  philosophy  j  it  is  an  aspect  of  all  his  writing  and  teach- 
ing. It  permeates  his  thought  in  his  historical  studies  and  also 
in  his  theoretical  and  systematic  works.  As  a  student  of  the 
history  of  ideas,  Cassirer  concentrated  his  interest  and  attention 
on  those  great  figures  and  ages  of  intellectual  history  in  which 
the  humanistic  interest  was  especially  prominent.  His  studies 
of  Plato  and  Platonism  in  ancient  thought  and  in  later  times, 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  Renaissance  in  its  ethical  and  cosmo- 
logical  speculations,  and  of  the  age  of  the  Enlightenment  are 
some  of  the  evidences  of  his  interest  in  the  traditions  of  human- 
ism. His  work  as  an  editor  of  Leibniz  and  Kant,  his  biography 
of  Kant  and  his  studies  of  Descartes,  Kepler,  Leibniz,  and 
others,  reflect  a  prevailing  sense  of  philosophy's  relation  to  other 
cultural  interests.  Even  his  most  technical  contributions  to 
linguistics  and  to  epistemological  and  mathematical  theory  re- 
veal his  pervasive  humanistic  concern.  The  relation  of  these 
specialized  studies  to  his  great  systematic  work  is  signally  illus- 
trated in  his  essay  on  Language  and  Myth,  which  was  written 
at  the  very  time  when  he  was  formulating  the  Philosofhie  der 
symbolischen  Formen.  And  the  significance  of  Cassirer's  human- 
ism in  his  conception  of  symbolic  forms  is  definitively  expressed 
in  the  synoptic  version  of  his  system,  his  Essay  on  Man. 

The  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  starts  from  the  presupposition  that, 
if  there  is  any  definition  of  the  nature  or  "essence"  of  man,  this  defini- 
tion can  only  be  understood  as  a  functional  one,  not  a  substantial  one. 
We  cannot  define  man  by  any  inherent  principle  which  constitutes  his 
metaphysical  essence — nor  can  we  define  him  by  any  inborn  faculty  or 
instinct  that  may  be  ascertained  by  empirical  observation.  Man's  out- 

445 


446  JAMES  GUTMANN 

standing  characteristic,  his  distinguishing  mark,  is  not  his  metaphysical 
or  physical  nature — but  his  work.  It  is  this  work,  it  is  the  system  of 
human  activities,  which  defines  and  determines  the  circle  of  "humanity." 
Language,  myth,  religion,  art,  science,  history  are  the  constituents,  the 
various  sectors  of  this  circle.1 

The  present  paper  will  not,  of  course,  attempt  to  review 
Cassirer's  achievements  as  a  humanist  in  all  the  ranges  of  his 
work.  However,  while  stressing  his  contribution  to  the  humani- 
ties, it  will  consider  his  literary  and  artistic  interests  in  relation 
to  that  "philosophical  anthropology"  which  is,  after  all,  the 
equivalent — in  Greek  dress — of  wisdom-loving  humanism.  The 
designation  of  "philosophical  anthropology"  was  chosen  by 
Cassirer  himself,  following  in  Kant's  footsteps,  to  describe  the 
content  of  the  seminar  in  which  he  was  engaged  at  the  time  of 
his  death.  Cassirer's  use  of  Kant's  terms  in  this  seminar  as  in 
his  Essay  on  Man  showed  at  one  and  the  same  time  his  reverence 
for  Kant  and  the  independence  with  which  he — unlike  some  of 
the  neo-Kantians — employed  the  Kantian  legacy. 

Though  Cassirer's  modification  of  Kant  raised  difficulties 
both  in  his  historical  work  and  in  his  systematic  writing,  this 
paper,  while  considering  some  of  them  below,  is  particularly 
designed  to  show  how  other  elements,  borrowed  and  original, 
contributed  to  Cassirer's  humanism.  After  considering  some  of 
these  elements,  notably  the  influence  of  German  Romanticism, 
a  brief  review  of  Cassirer's  own  summary  of  the  history  of 
Western  humanism  will  lead  back  naturally  to  certain  aspects 
of  his  Kantianism,  not  only  in  its  relevance  to  his  position  as 
a  humanist  historian,  but  also  to  the  relation  of  his  views  on  his- 
tory to  his  other  humanistic  interests.  That  his  humanism  is  one 
of  the  constant  factors  in  the  wide  range  of  his  interests  and  in  all 
his  contributions  to  philosophy  is  the  thesis  of  this  paper.  Cas- 
sirer is  a  follower  of  Kant,  but  is  surely  not  to  be  interpreted  as 
a  neo-Kantian  in  any  limited  sense.  He  stands  in  many  tradi- 
tions, among  them,  neither  last  nor  least,  in  the  great  tradition 
of  philosophic  humanism. 

1  Essay  on  Many  67-68. 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  447 

I 

It  is  significant  that  Cassirer  came  to  philosophy  as  a  student 
of  literature  and  linguistics.  Though  his  publications  include 
numerous  technical  studies  not  only  of  mathematics  but  of 
physics  and  psychology,  his  initial  interest  in  languages  and 
literature  remained  a  major  preoccupation.  His  studies  of 
German  culture,  Freiheit  und  Form>  as  well  as  some  of  the 
essays  which  compose  his  subsequent  Idee  und  Gestalt  anticipate 
in  nuce  doctrines  concerning  myth  and  language  which  he  de- 
veloped in  his  later  writings.  Goethe  and  Schiller,  Herder, 
Kleist  and  Holderlin,  Lessing  and  Rousseau  are  figures  to 
whom  he  returned  again  and  again,  not  only  to  use  them  to 
illuminate  the  work  of  other  more  technical  philosophers,  but 
for  their  own  sake.  He  wrote  on  Goethe  and  Plato  or  on  Goethe 
and  Kanty  but  he  is  as  much  interested  in  Goethe's  Pandora 
and  Faust  as  in  Goethe's  views  on  natural  science  or  in  Goethe 
and  mathematical  physics.  He  discussed  Lessing  and  Mendels- 
sohn or  Schiller  and  Shaftesbury  with  as  much  emphasis  on 
the  more  literary  as  on  the  more  technically  philosophical 
writer.  His  study  of  Holderlin  foreshadowed  the  exhaustive 
analysis  of  mythopoeic  imagination  in  which  he  later  developed 
the  insights  of  modern  romanticism  and  particularly  of  Schel- 
ling's  philosophy  of  mythology  and  revelation. 

Though  following  Helmholtz,  Otto  Liebmann,  and  Cas- 
sirer's  own  teacher,  Hermann  Cohen,  "back  to  Kant,"  and 
though  adhering  to  Kantian  principles,  Cassirer  repeatedly 
proved  his  indebtedness  to  some  of  the  insights  of  certain  post- 
Kantian  writers,  notably  Humboldt  and  Schelling.  Rejecting 
the  metaphysical  absolutism  which  prevailed  in  Fichte,  in 
Schelling's  emphasis  on  the  Infinite,  and  especially  in  Hegel, 
and  though  critical  of  the  psychological  approach  made  by 
Schopenhauer  and  Nietzsche,  he  found  in  Romanticism's  aware- 
ness of  the  significance  of  myth,  of  poetic  imagery  and  cultural 
continuity,  elements  worthy  of  being  added  to  the  stern  and 
rigorous  discipline  of  Kantianism.  Never  forgetting  Kant's  in- 
sistence that  all  philosophy  must  regard  the  dualism  between 


448  JAMES  GUTMANN 

being  and  becoming  as  a  logical  rather  than  a  metaphysical 
dualism  and  that  it  must  accept  the  findings  of  science  as  its 
data,  he  nevertheless  concerned  himself  with  the  processes  of 
change,  of  becoming,  which  Romanticism  emphasizes.  Differing 
from  Kant  and  agreeing  with  Humboldt  that  speculation  re- 
garding the  genesis  and  essence  of  language  is  not  the  business 
of  the  philosopher,  he  carried  forward  the  study  of  linguistics 
for  which  Jacob  Grimm  had  laid  the  foundations.  Conceiving 
man  not  as  homo  sapiens  nor  as  homo  jaber  but  as  animal 
symbolicum,  he  concerned  himself  with  symbolic  forms  in  all 
aspects  of  man's  experience. 

To  what  extent  this  fusion  of  neo-Kantianism  with  interests 
and  problems  largely  foreign  to  Kant's  thought  generated  diffi- 
culties for  Cassirer  need  not  be  questioned  now.  But  any  under- 
standing of  man  as  animal  symbolicum  requires  at  least  a  brief 
consideration  of  Cassirer's  use  of  mythopoeic  data.  Cassirer 
traced  the  relation  of  myth  to  speculative  thought  from  Plato 
and  neo-Platonism  to  such  modern  writers  as  Giambattista  Vico, 
Holderlin  and  Schelling.  Though  the  attitudes  of  these  and 
other  related  thinkers  differ  with  regard  to  the  precise  signifi- 
cance of  mythical  elements  in  human  nature  and  culture,  they 
agree  in  conceiving  mythic  apprehension  as  more  than  meta- 
phorical or  allegorical.  None  of  them  sees  the  symbolic  func- 
tion of  myth  precisely  as  Cassirer  himself  came  to  view  it;  but 
Schelling  approaches  this  view  more  closely  than  the  others. 
Moreover,  Cassirer  construed  Schelling's  Philosophic  der 
Mythologie  as  being,  in  part,  an  elaboration  and  development 
of  an  early  intuition  of  Holderlin's.  "Mythopoeic  imagery," 
he  wrote,  "is  no  mere  ornament  which  we  incidentally  add  to 
our  portrait  of  reality,  but  it  is  one  of  the  necessary  organs 
for  the  apprehension  of  reality  itself.  In  it  we  find  the  world 
and  life  first  truly  revealed  and  made  significant."2 

As  this  statement,  quoted  from  Cassirer's  essay  on  "Holderlin 
and  German  Idealism,"  suggests,  he  acknowledged  this  early 
anticipation  of  his  conception  of  mythopoeic  imagination  as  a 
necessary  organ  of  apprehension  which  he  developed  especially 
in  the  second  volume  of  the  Philosophie  der  symbolischen 

*  Idee  und  Gestalt,  121. 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  449 

Formen.  In  spite  of  Cassirer's  diagnosis  of  Holderlin's  intel- 
lectual limitations,  his  appreciation  of  Holderlin's  artistic  in- 
sights reveals  a  fundamental  sympathy.  If  he  denies  Holderlin 
a  position  of  great  importance  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  he 
credits  him  with  a  high  degree  of  poetic  inspiration.  It  is  sig- 
nificant, moreover,  that,  though  he  bases  his  own  estimate  of 
Holderlin's  artistic  greatness  on  the  poet's  concern  with  mythic 
imagery,  he  also  finds  this  the  source  of  his  chief  philosophic 
deficiency.  He  seems  to  be  convinced  that  Holderlin's  absorption 
in  mythology  actually  interfered  with  his  attaining  an  adequate 
total  conception  of  human  nature  and  human  history.  Holder- 
lin happily  reacted  against  those  eighteenth  century  thinkers 
who  treated  myth  only  in  a  derogatory  sense  j  but  Cassirer 
finds  his  attainments  in  philosophy  negligible  despite  Holder- 
lin's  "lifelong  earnest  wrestling  with  philosophic  problems, 
since  he  was  never  a  systematic  thinker."  It  remained  for  Schel- 
ling,  who  recognized  myth  as  a  product  of  man's  collective 
imagination,  not  only  to  see  myth  as  a  great  and  indestructible 
force  basic  to  all  culture,  but  also  to  formulate  the  first  sys- 
tematic philosophy  of  mythology. 

Whether  or  not  this  estimate  of  Holderlin  be  accepted  is  less 
important,  at  least  in  the  present  context,  than  the  circumstance 
that  Cassirer's  judgment  is  based  on  his  insistence  concerning 
the  lack  of  system  in  Holderlin's  thought.  It  is  not  entirely  clear 
whether  he  believes  such  a  lack  of  system  to  be  due  to  tempera- 
mental limitations  or  to  the  inadequacy  of  a  humanism  which 
fails  to  recognize  the  importance  of  non-literary  and  non- 
artistic  elements  as  expressions  of  human  nature.  Be  that  as  it 
may,  it  is  evidence  of  the  primary  importance  which  Cassirer 
attached  to  systematic  construction  in  philosophy. 

II 

However  much  Cassirer  differed  from  Alexander  Pope,  the 
title  of  whose  poem  he  used  for  his  Essay  on  Many  he  agreed 
with  him  that  "the  proper  study  of  mankind  is  man."  To  be 
sure,  Cassirer  included  in  such  a  study  many  elements  which 
would  have  seemed  irrelevant  not  only  to  Pope  but  to  the 
philosophers  of  his  day  who  discussed  human  nature.  Indeed, 


450  JAMES  GUTMANN 

the  history  of  the  interpretation  of  human  nature  from  the  time 
when  the  Greeks  inscribed  "Know  Thyself"  on  the  Temple 
of  Apollo  would  show  striking  contrasts  not  only  with  regard 
to  the  content  and  scope  of  such  knowledge  but  also  with 
respect  to  the  methods  of  pursuing  it.  The  anthropological  phi- 
losophy which  Kant  fathered  seems  often  to  have  been  neglected 
by  philosophers  who  claimed  to  be  Kantians.  It  itself  has  under- 
gone significant  changes.  Yet  every  example  of  it  which  is 
worthy  of  its  founder  combines  the  ethical  imperative  char- 
acteristic of  Kant  with  the  scepticism  that  underlies  his  Critiques 
but  which  is,  like  all  genuine  scepticism,  the  "counterpart  of 
resolute  humanism.'* 

"The  starting  point  of  all  anthropological  philosophy,"  writes 
Bernard  Groethuysen  in  his  essay  "Towards  an  Anthropological 
Philosophy," 

or  all  philosophy  of  man,  is  the  ancient  maxim,  cKnow  Thyself.'  But 
what  is  it  that  man  wishes  to  know  about  himself?  What  are  the 
questions  which  he  puts  to  himself?  'Know  Thyself*  is  the  command. 
.  .  .  [But  this]  means  not  simply  try  to  define  yourself  by  concepts,  .  .  . 
but  become  conscious  of  yourself,  live  in  the  consciousness  of  yourself, 
understand  yourself,  come  to  experience  yourself,  be  present  to  yourself, 
live  in  the  awareness  of  your  present,  come  to  yourself.4 

As  Socrates  interpreted  the  Delphic  injunction,  it  meant  not 
merely  that  the  unexamined  life  was  no  life  for  man,  but  that 
self-knowledge  by  its  very  nature  could  not  be  achieved  in 
isolation,  that  it  involved  a  co-operative  venture  and  that  the 
individual,  to  be  truly  known,  must  be  known  not  only  in  all 
his  social  relations  but,  indeed,  required  the  assistance  of  others 
to  achieve  this  very  knowledge.  In  Socrates,  "philosophy, 
which  had  hitherto  been  conceived  as  an  intellectual  monologue, 
is  transformed  into  a  dialogue.  Only  by  way  of  dialogical  or 
dialectic  thought  can  we  approach  the  knowledge  of  human 
nature."5  Socrates  finds  his  teachers  among  those  who  dwell  in 
the  city  and  is  content  to  interrogate  an  unschooled  slave  boy, 
if  only  the  latter  can  add  to  his  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 

8  Essay  on  Man,  i . 

4  Philosophy  and  History  ^  ed.  by  Klibansky  and  Paton,  77, 
5  Essay  on  Man,  5. 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  451 

man.  It  is  surely  in  this  sense  that  "his  philosophy,  if  he  pos- 
sesses a  philosophy,"  is  strictly  anthropological. 

Doubtless  one  of  the  aspects  of  Renaissance  culture  which 
has  drawn  scholars  like  Cassirer  again  and  again  to  study  its  art 
and  thought  is  the  reaffirmation,  involved  in  its  cultural  rebirth, 
of  the  validity  of  natural  human  aspiration.  Contrasted  with 
the  other-worldliness  of  mediaevalism,  the  recognition  that 
human  nature  is  indeed  natural  led  to  the  conviction  that  human 
appetites  and  aspirations  can  yield  all  manner  of  excellence. 
The  plasticity  of  man's  endowments  not  only  suggested  the 
ideal  of  the  uomo  universale  but  an  increased  interest  in  variety 
and  differentiation  as  such.  Though  this  central  awareness  of  the 
Renaissance  has  been  remarked  by  many  students,  and  though 
Cassirer  himself  gave  attention  to  its  manifestation  by  many 
contrasting  types,  his  study  of  Giovanni  Pico  della  Mirandola 
expressed  this  aspect  of  Renaissance  humanism  with  singular 
persuasiveness:  What  Pico 

sets  up  as  the  distinctive  privilege  of  man  is  the  almost  unlimited 
fower  of  self -trans formation  at  his  disposal.  Man  is  that  being  to  whom 
no  particular  form  has  been  prescribed  and  assigned.  He  possesses  the 
power  of  entering  into  any  form  whatever.  What  is  novel  in  this  idea 
lies  not  in  its  content,  but  rather  in  the  value  Pico  places  on  this  content. 
.  .  .  With  Pico  this  inner  unrest  of  man,  impelling  him  on  from  one 
goal  to  another,  and  forcing  him  to  pass  from  one  form  to  another,  no 
longer  appears  as  a  mere  stigma  upon  human  nature,  as  a  mere  blot 
and  weakness.  Pico  admires  this  multiplicity  and  multiformity,  and 
he  sees  in  it  a  mark  of  human  greatness.6 

Clearly,  for  man  to  know  himself,  in  this  sense,  is  to  recognize 
the  rich  and  varied  potentialities  of  his  nature. 

That  there  were  limitations  upon  even  the  inclusive  ideal 
of  Renaissance  humanism  is  evident  in  the  comparatively  small 
place  which  was  allowed  to  natural  science  by  humanists  such 
as  Erasmus  and  Vives.  But  in  this  respect,  as  in  many  others, 
Cassirer  views  the  Renaissance  as  an  age  in  which  distinctive  and 
original  developments  in  the  relation  of  science  to  other  learning 
took  place. 

*In  the  Jwrnal  of  th*  History  of  WMS,  III,  no.  3,  331, 


45*  JAMES  GUTMANN 

III 

In  his  monograph,  "Naturalistische  und  humanistische  Be- 
griindung  der  Kulturphilosophie"  (published  in  1939)  as  well 
as  in  his  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften  (1942),  Cassirer 
traces  in  detail  the  complicated  relationship  of  the  naturalistic 
and  humanistic  factors  in  philosophy  from  the  Renaissance  to 
the  twentieth  century.  In  both  of  these  essays  Cassirer  uses  his 
humanism  to  clarify  problems  of  the  philosophy  of  culture.  This 
field  of  study,  he  repeatedly  points  out,  is  perhaps  the  most 
problematic  and  disputed  realm  in  the  whole  domain  of  phi- 
losophy. Not  only  are  clear  and  recognized  solutions  lacking 
in  this  novel  philosophic  discipline,  but  there  is  even  a  lack 
of  agreement  as  to  the  questions  which  may  reasonably  be 
asked.  Unlike  logic,  physics,  and  ethics,  which  remained  the 
three  main  branches  of  philosophy  from  antiquity  down  to  the 
time  of  Kant,  these  newer  questions  lack  a  secure  tradition  and 
development.  According  to  Cassirer's  interpretation,  Kant  is 
here,  as  in  so  many  other  domains,  the  dividing  line  between 
fundamentally  different  views  of  the  relation  of  nature  and 
human  nature,  or,  to  change  the  metaphor,  the  bridge  from 
classical  humanism  to  distinctively  modern  conceptions  of  man 
and  culture. 

During  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  Cassirer 
notes,  a  new  preoccupation  became  increasingly  evident  among 
philosophers,  though  it  could  find  no  definite  place  in  the 
traditional  systems.  Cultivated  by  philosophical  humanists,  the 
discipline  which  was  later  to  be  called  by  Dilthey  the  "nattir- 
liche  System  der  Geisteswissenschajten"  could  not  be  assimilated 
to  traditional  philosophy,  because  it  appeared  to  conflict  with 
the  natural  and  mathematical  sciences,  to  which  the  mightiest 
and  most  productive  forces,  over  which  the  modern  spirit 
reigned,  were  applied.  To  the  new  scientific  philosophers  there 
seemed  to  be  no  place  for  a  genuinely  respectable  philosophy 
apart  from  mathematics  and  the  mathematical  sciences,  which 
constituted  the  ideal  of  knowledge.  If  the  realities  of  humanism 
were  to  become  accessible  to  philosophic  reason,  this  would 
have  to  be  accomplished  by  making  them  accessible  to  the 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  453 

same  mathematical  apprehension  which  had  grasped  the  physi- 
cal universe.  The  alternative  was  to  leave  the  humanistic  enter- 
prise in  mystic  darkness,  subject  to  theological  traditions. 
Spinoza's  attempt  to  establish  a  systematic  unity  between  ethics 
and  geometry  was  based  upon  the  conviction  that  human  nature 
could  no  longer  be  regarded  as  an  enclave  in  an  all-inclusive 
natural  order.  Man  and  human  achievements  must  henceforth 
be  viewed  and  described  as  though  they  were  a  matter  of  lines, 
surfaces,  or  corporeal  bodies.  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  a  unified 
nature  reached  its  climax  in  his  demand  for  a  monistic  view  not 
merely  as  a  metaphysic  but  as  a  strict  method  of  interpreting 
nature.  A  sound  philosophy  will  dispense  with  teleology  and 
banish  the  notion  of  purpose  from  nature}  for,  if  we  seek  the 
genesis  of  this  notion,  it  is  evident  that  it  is  merely  an  anthropo- 
morphic misunderstanding  and  falsification,  whereas  only  an 
application  of  mathematical  law  can  yield  the  truth. 

Spinoza's  monistic  methodology  conditioned  subsequent 
thought,  and  precisely  this  demand  for  unity  became  the  de- 
cisively important  motive  in  the  revival  of  Spinozism  at  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Schelling  linked  his  thought  to 
Spinoza's  at  this  point  and  expressly  declared  that  his  "Phi- 
losophy of  Identity"  was  designed  to  complete  what  Spinoza 
had  posited  in  his  first,  daring  outline.  But  in  spite  of  this 
assurance  of  complete  agreement  and  consonance  with  Spinoza, 
Schelling  could  not  take  up  the  problem  at  the  same  point 
where  Spinoza  had  left  it.  For  even  if  he  teaches  that  there  is 
an  absolute  identity  between  nature  and  spirit,  the  concept  of 
nature,  one  of  the  supposedly  identical  factors  in  the  equation, 
has  changed  fundamentally  for  him.  When  Schelling  speaks  of 
nature,  he  reiterates  that  he  is  not  thinking  of  a  being  which 
merely  has  extension  and  motion.  He  does  not  apprehend  it 
as  a  concept  of  geometric  relationships  and  mechanical  laws  but 
as  a  Whole  having  living  forms  and  powers.  The  system  of 
nature  of  mathematical  physics  is  for  him  a  mere  abstraction, 
a  shadow  world.  From  this  initial  stage  of  being,  philosophic 
thought  ascends  to  the  actual  world  of  spirit — to  the  world  of 
history  and  human  culture.  From  theoretic  knowledge  of  the 
laws  of  space  and  time,  matter  and  force,  the  path  of  philosophy 


454  JAMES  GUTMANN 

ascends  through  the  realm  of  moral  consciousness  to  the  highest 
stage,  the  stage  of  aesthetic  awareness. 

That  which  we  call  nature  is  a  poem  which  lies  concealed  in  a  secret, 
wondrous  form.  Yet,  if  the  riddle  could  be  revealed,  we  would  recog- 
nize in  it  the  Odyssey  of  the  spirit,  which,  wondrously  deceived,  seeks 
itself  while  fleeing  from  itself,  for  through  the  sensuous  world  meaning 
can  be  discerned  only  as  if  through  words,  just  as  the  land  of  imagina- 
tion towards  which  we  aim  may  be  discerned  as  if  through  half-trans- 
parent mists.7 

Cassirer  quotes  these  lines  of  Schelling's  in  his  "Naturalis- 
tische  und  humanistische  Begrundung  der  Kulturphilosophie"  in 
an  historic  summary  which  we  are  following  in  synoptic  form. 
He  goes  on  to  point  out  how  Romanticism  developed  this  view 
of  Schelling's.  In  so  doing  he  also  indicated  his  own  relation- 
ship to  the  Romantic  movement.  For  Cassirer  holds  that  the 
strength  as  well  as  the  weakness  of  Romanticism  are  to  be  found 
in  its  attempt  to  explain  by  a  single  principle  and  to  view  in  a 
single  focus  all  conscious  phenomena  from  the  first  dreamlike 
dawn  of  mythical  consciousness,  through  fable  and  poesy  up  to 
the  loftiest  pronouncements  of  thought  in  language,  science, 
and  philosophy.  The  land  of  imagination,  of  which  Schelling 
speaks,  and  the  realm  of  strict  logical  knowledge  constantly 
interpenetrate  in  romantic  theory  j  they  are  never  separated, 
but  interlock  with  one  another.  Romanticism's  greatest  achieve- 
ments, according  to  Cassirer,  were  derived  from  this  imagina- 
tive power  and  intuition.  Not  only  was  nature  seen  in  a  new 
light,  but,  so  viewed,  it  included  all  forms  of  the  spirit.  Here 
for  the  first  time  seemed  to  be  revealed  the  most  genuine  and 
profoundest  sources  of  myth  and  religion,  of  language  and 
literature,  of  morality  and  law.  For  Romanticism  the  origin 
of  all  things  of  the  spirit,  which  is  clear  and  mysterious  at  one 
and  the  same  time,  is  to  be  found  in  the  Volksgeist.  This  is  a 
kind  of  humanistic  naturalism,  even  though  it  speaks  the  lan- 
guage of  a  spiritual  metaphysics. 

The  weakness  and  danger  of  this  position  for  a  humanistic 
philosophy  become  clearly  apparent  when  the  veil  is  lifted 

f  Schelling,  System  des  transzendentalen  Idealismus  (Sdmmtliche  Werke,  III, 
628). 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  455 

which  Romanticism  had  thrown  over  nature  and  history.  This 
takes  place  whenever  philosophy  is  no  longer  satisfied  with 
delving  by  intuition  into  the  ultimate  depths  of  life  but  instead 
seeks  to  examine  its  view  of  life  scientifically.  This  change  of 
attitude,  which  occurred,  for  instance,  in  the  second  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  is,  at  least  in  part,  responsible  for  the 
crisis  in  man's  knowledge  of  himself  which  Cassirer  pointed  out 
in  the  first  chapter  of  the  Essay  on  Man.  It  was  most  clearly 
apparent  in  the  circle  of  French  thinkers  who  based  their 
teaching  on  Comte's  Cours  de  Philosophic  positive.  Comte's 
positivism  not  only  gave  them  a  method  but  also  formulated 
the  questions  which  they  attempted  to  answer.  But  they  were 
affected  by  the  status  of  the  science  which  they  confronted 
even  more  than  by  the  general  philosophic  presuppositions  of 
positivism.  For  the  teachings  of  classical  physics  provided  them 
with  their  view  of  the  world  and,  for  them,  seemed  to  possess 
finality.  The  principle  of  causality  was  axiomatic.  Even  criti- 
cally-minded thinkers  trained  in  Kantian  philosophy  did  not  dare 
to  disturb  the  form  in  which  the  principle  of  causality  was 
accepted.  For  example,  Otto  Liebmann,  in  his  essay  on  Die 
Klimax  der  Theorien,  proceeds  on  the  basis  of  a  strict  deter- 
minism, which  is  presumed  to  apply  in  the  same  way  to  the 
several  realms  of  thought,  investigation  and  knowledge,  with- 
out distinction  or  the  slightest  difference  between  the  moral  and 
the  physical  worlds. 

As  Cassirer  points  out,  no  cultural  philosopher  of  science 
would  dare,  today,  to  introduce  the  principle  of  universal  de- 
terminism in  the  form  in  which  Liebmann  used  it.  For  if  he 
did,  he  would  be  confronted  at  once  by  all  the  weighty  ques- 
tions and  doubts  involved  in  the  development  of  modern 
theoretical  physics,  even  though — as  Cassirer  adds — he  does 
not  believe  that  these  doubts  imply  that  the  concept  of  causal- 
ity, as  such,  is  endangered.  The  French  positivists,  who  first 
faced  the  problems  which  the  assumption  of  an  axiom  of  uni- 
versal determinism  posed  for  the  Kulturwissenschaften  and  for 
the  foundation  of  the  Geisteswissenschaften,  were  neither 
mathematicians  nor  physicists,  even  if  they  took  physics  as  their 
model.  It  was  not  the  world  view  of  Newton  and  Laplace 


456  JAMES  GUTMANN 

but  of  Darwin  and  Spencer  which  characterized  their  outlook. 
Here  too,  as  for  Schelling  and  the  romanticist  philosophy  of 
nature,  culture  and  nature  are  united,  insofar  as  both  are 
subject  to  a  common  law,  the  basic  law  of  evolution.  But  the 
direction  of  this  unification  has  altered;  for  the  difference  which 
seems  to  divide  human  culture  and  physical  nature  is,  according 
to  positivism,  no  longer  to  be  bridged  by  a  spiritualization  of 
nature,  as  in  the  way  of  Romanticism,  but  by  interpreting  cul- 
ture materialistically.  Not  metaphysics  nor  theology,  but  physics 
and  chemistry,  zoology  and  botany,  anatomy  and  physiology 
must,  it  is  argued,  take  the  lead,  if  a  true  science  of  culture  is  to 
be  achieved. 

Sainte-Beuve  and  Taine,  too,  interpreted  cultural  phenomena 
in  terms  of  forces 

not  like  the  supra-personal  unities  and  totalities  of  romantic  theories, 
which  belonged  to  a  supersensuous  world,  but  as  the  same  ones  which 
build  and  rule  the  material  world.  .  .  .  Thus  viewed,  science  is  neither 
to  justify  nor  to  condemn  but  to  investigate  and  explain.  Cultural  science 
must  proceed  like  botany  which  studies  the  orange  tree  and  the  laurel, 
the  pine  and  the  birch  with  equal  interest.8 

If  we  designate  one  group  of  facts  as  physical  and  another  as 
spiritual  or  moral,  some  sort  of  difference  of  content  may  then 
be  exposed.  But  this  circumstance  is  utterly  irrelevant  to  our 
knowing  them.  For  knowledge  is  never  concerned  with  indi- 
vidual facts  as  such  but  with  their  inter-connections. 

Cassirer  considers  three  divergent  attempts  to  establish  a 
principle  for  interpreting  these  inter-connections  based  upon 
three  distinct  systems  of  postulates.  In  addition  to  French  pos- 
itivism he  reviews  the  theories  of  Oswald  Spengler  and  also 
the  Hegelian  philosophy  of  history.  Spengler  regarded  his  own 
views  as  a  great  advance  on  positivism,  which  he  held  to  be 
narrowly  naturalistic.  According  to  him  a  culture  is  brought  to 
birth  in  a  way  which  natural  science  cannot  comprehend,  but 
which  the  philosopher  should  grasp  by  dramatizing  (dichteri) 
history.  Thus  Spengler  conceived  the  epic-drama  of  The  De- 

8  "Naturalistische  und  humanistische  Begriindung  der  Kulturphilosophie,"  1 1  j 
cf.  Bibliography  of  Cassirer's  Writings:  1939:3;  also  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissen- 
schaften,  8;ff. 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  457 

dine  of  the  Westy  in  which  individual  man,  in  his  being  and  his 
activity,  is  mystically  linked  to  the  fate  of  civilizations  whose  rise 
and  decline  he  can  in  no  way  control.  This  view  Cassirer  con- 
trasts with  Hegel's  claim  that  his  philosophy  of  history  is  a 
philosophy  of  freedom.  But  he  rejects  these  as  well  as  posi- 
tivism. All  three,  he  declares,  are  unsatisfactory  as  attempts  to 
clarify  history  and  culture,  because  they  hold  inadequate  con- 
ceptions of  human  nature  and  man's  activities. 

IV 

The  preceding  summary  describes  contrasting  attitudes  to- 
ward traditions  of  humanism  before  and  after  Kant.  It  indi- 
cates the  extent  to  which  his  philosophical  anthropology  was  the 
dividing  line,  in  Cassirer's  judgment,  between  the  classical  and 
Renaissance  conceptions  which  retained  their  authority  down 
to  the  eighteenth  century,  and  more  modern  ones  which  have 
been  associated  especially  with  changes  in  natural  science.  Cas- 
sirer's historical  account,  which  we  have  followed,  serves  also 
to  define  his  own  position,  or,  at  least,  to  place  him  in  the 
great  tradition.  In  his  humanism  he  has  been  a  follower  not 
only  of  Kant  but  of  Herder  and  Holderlin,  of  Goethe  and 
Humboldt.  Diverging  from  the  positions  of  other  post-Kantians, 
he  has  found  sustenance  in  Schelling's  philosophy  of  mythology, 
although  rejecting  his  transcendental  idealism. 

By  his  distinctive  interpretation  of  Kant,  Cassirer  long  ago 
established  the  basis  for  his  own  doctrine  of  man.  In  so  doing 
he  illustrated  not  only  Kant's  but  his  own  humanism.  The  post- 
humously published  essay  on  "Kant  and  Rousseau"  once  again 
made  clear  how  fundamentally  Cassirer's  humanism  is  based 
on  Kant's  view  of  human  nature  developed  in  his  philosophical 
anthropology.  The  emphasis  on  this  aspect  of  Kant's  work  was 
already  evident  in  his  Kants  Leben  und  Lehre.  "The  man  who 
introduced  anthropology  as  a  branch  of  study  in  German  uni- 
versities and  who  lectured  on  it  regularly  for  decades"9  was 
himself,  according  to  Cassirer,  much  more  of  a  humanist  than 
scholars  have  generally  recognized. 

Herder,  who  during  the  'sixties  was  Kant's  pupil  in  Konigsberg,  has 
*  Kants  Leben  und  Lehre,  25. 


458  JAMES  GUTMANN 

drawn  for  us  a  living  and  characteristic  picture  of  his  philosophical  teach- 
ing at  that  time.  From  it  we  see  that  this  teaching  was  by  no  means 
restricted  to  abstract  problems,  to  questions  of  logic  and  metaphysics. 
It  extended  just  as  much  to  the  fundamental  questions  of  natural  science, 
to  psychology  and  anthropology,  and  it  made  full  use  of  contemporary 
literature.10  To  be  sure,  this  interest  was  essentially  restricted  to  Kant's 
pre-critical  period.11 

In  just  that  period  of  his  life  in  which  he  was  most  under 
the  influence  of  Rousseau  from  whom  he  "learned  to  respect 
human  nature"12  Cassirer  notes  that  Kant  was  "a  stylist  and  a 
psychological  essayist,  and  in  this  respect  he  established  a  new 
standard  for  the  German  philosophical  literature  of  the 
eighteenth  century."13  And  he  remarks  "that  Rousseau  not 
only  influenced  the  content  and  systematic  development  of 
Kant's  foundation  of  ethics,  but  that  he  also  formed  its  lan- 
guage and  style."14  It  may  not  be  irrelevant  in  this  connection 
to  suggest  that  Cassirer's  own  "language  and  style"  reflected 
his  study  of  the  great  figures  of  German  literature  in  somewhat 
the  way  that  Kant  was  influenced  by  Rousseau.  In  any  case 
there  need  be  no  question  that  Cassirer  can  claim  a  place 
among  the  relatively  small  group  of  philosophers  who  were 
also  men  of  letters — and  the  very  small  group  of  German 
philosophers  who  attained  such  distinction. 

Some  passages  from  Kant's  writings  which  Cassirer  quotes 
in  his  essay  on  "Kant  and  Rousseau"  suggest  not  only  the 
centrality  of  the  humanistic  and  anthropological  interest  in 
Kant's  ethical  doctrine  but  throw  further  light  on  Cassirer's 
own  thought.  Even  the  conviction  that  the  proper  study  for 
mankind  is  man,  is  reenforced  by  the  argument  which  Kant  uses 
for  placing  Rousseau's  work  alongside  Newton's: 

Newton  was  the  first  to  discern  order  and  regularity  in  combination 
with  great  simplicity,  where  before  him  men  had  encountered  disorder 

10  See  Herder's  Brief e  zur  Beforderung  der  Humanitat,  79th  letter. 

11  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe ,  86. 

12  Kant's  Fragment*,  ed.  Hartensteiny  vol.  VIII,  624.  Quoted  in  Rousseau  Kant 
Goethe ',  i  j  cf.  also  Kants  Leben  und  Lehre,  238$,  and  Zur  Loglk  der  Kulturwis- 
senschafteny  1135. 

11  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  6. 
"Ibid.,  32. 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  459 

and  unrelated  diversity.  .  .  .  Rousseau  was  the  first  to  discover,  beneath 
the  varying  forms  human  nature  assumes,  the  deeply  concealed  essence 
of  man.  .  .  .  After  Newton  and  Rousseau,  the  ways  of  God  are  justified 
— and  Pope's  thesis  is  henceforth  true.1* 

Kant  indicated  the  relation  of  his  philosophical  anthropology  to 
ethics  in  announcing  his  lectures  for  1765-1766: 

I  shall  set  forth  the  method  by  which  we  must  study  man — man  not 
only  in  the  varying  forms  in  which  his  accidental  circumstances  have 
molded  him,  in  the  distorted  form  in  which  even  philosophers  have 
almost  always  misconstrued  him,  but  what  is  enduring  in  human 
nature,  and  the  proper  place  of  man  in  creation.18 

Or,  again: 

If  there  is  any  science  man  really  needs  it  is  the  one  I  teach,  of  how 
to  occupy  properly  that  place  in  creation  that  is  assigned  to  man,  and 
how  to  learn  from  it  what  one  must  be  in  order  to  be  a  man.  .  .  .  This 
teaching  will  lead  him  back  again  to  the  human  level,  and  however 
small  or  deficient  he  may  regard  himself,  he  will  suit  his  assigned  sta- 
tion, because  he  will  be  just  what  he  should  be.17 

If  these  quotations  from  Kant  suggest  the  extent  to  which 
the  influence  of  Rousseau  led  him  to  accept  the  thesis  of  Pope's 
Essay  on  Many  they  also  indicate  how  greatly  Cassirer  Js  con- 
ception of  man  and  his  Essay  derive  from  this  Kantian  back- 
ground. Cassirer  writes: 

For  Kant  man's  'assigned  station'  is  not  located  in  nature  alone;  for 
he  must  raise  himself  above  it,  above  all  merely  vegetative  or  animal 
life.  But  it  is  just  as  far  from  lying  somewhere  outside  nature,  in  some- 
thing absolutely  other-wordly  or  transcendent.  Man  should  seek  the  real 
law  of  his  being  and  his  conduct  neither  below  nor  above  himself;  he 
should  derive  it  from  himself,  and  should  fashion  himself  in  accordance 
with  the  determination  of  his  own  free  will.  For  this  he  requires  life 
in  society  as  well  as  an  inner  freedom  from  social  standards  and  an 
independent  judgment  of  conventional  social  values.18 

*  Kant's  Fragwente,  ed.  Hartenstein,  vol.  VIII,  630,  Quoted  in  Rousseau  Kant 
Goethe ,  18. 

™hnmanuel  Kants  Werke,  ed.  Cassirer  a.o.,  vol.  II,  326.  Quoted  in  Rousseau 
Kant  Goethe,  21. 

"  Kant's  Fragment*,  ed.  Hartenstein,  vol.  VIII,  624.  Quoted  in  Rousseau  Kant 
Goethe,  23. 

M  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  23. 


460  JAMES  GUTMANN 

Kant's  doctrine  is,  of  course,  based  on  a  dualism  between  the 
world  of  nature  and  the  realm  of  freedom,  between  the  world 
of  the  senses  and  an  intelligible  order.  Among  those  who  learned 
much  from  Kant  there  were  many  who  did  not  follow  him 
along  this  path  in  the  development  of  a  more  adequate  concep- 
tion of  human  nature  and  of  humanism.  Herder  and  Goethe 
discerned  what  they  considered  essential  in  human  culture 
not  in  a  mode  of  being  but  rather  in  humanistic  achievement. 
Only  man  among  all  the  creatures  of  nature  is  capable  of  such 
achievement.  What  man  accomplishes  according  to  this  view  is 

objectification,  self-recognition  based  upon  the  development  of  theoretical, 
aesthetic  and  ethical  forms.  .  .  .  But  all  form  requires  a  definite  measure 
and  is  bound  to  it  in  its  pure  embodiments.  Life  in  itself,  as  mere 
experience  flowing  freely  along,  cannot  bring  forth  significant  forms;  it 
must  apprehend  and,  in  a  sense,  comprehend  itself  in  order  to  participate 
in  such  forms.19 

The  philosophical  development  of  Herder's  and  Goethe's 
perceptions  was  not  advanced  by  the  metaphysical  systems  of 
the  post-Kantians,  though  Fichte,  Schelling  and  Hegel  re- 
peatedly returned  to  these  problems  and  sought  to  deal  with 
them  in  their  works.  But  it  was,  according  to  Cassirer,  Wilhelm 
von  Humboldt  who  made  particularly  significant  contributions 
to  a  humanistic  philosophy. 

Humboldt's  work  at  first  appears  much  less  systematic  than  Fichte's, 
Schelling's  and  Hegel's.  As  he  proceeds  on  his  way  he  seems  more  and 
more  to  lose  himself  ...  in  questions  of  detail  regarding  his  researches. 
But  a  genuinely  philosophic  spirit  pervades  all  this,  and  he  never  loses 
sight  of  the  inclusive  purpose  which  his  investigation  is  to  serve.20 

It  has  been  conventional  to  treat  the  humanistic  ideal  set 
forth  by  Kant  in  terms  of  his  ethics  as  though  this  constituted  its 
entire  importance.  But  Cassirer  insists  that  this  is  a  misreading 
of  the  history  of  ideas.  According  to  his  view  the  humanism  of 
the  eighteenth  century  which  molded  Kant's  thought  and  con- 
tinued its  influence  in  Herder  and  Goethe,  in  Schiller  and 
Humboldt,  has  other  significance  too  often  neglected.  To  be 
sure,  they  are  convinced  that  humanistic  ideals  yield  a  distinc- 

19  "Naturalistische  und  humanistische  Begrundungr  der  Kulturphilosophie,"  17. 
£.  18-10. 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  461 

tive  morality  and  a  distinctive  order  of  socio-political  life.  But 
their  vision  is  not  directed  exclusively  to  this  goal}  it  extends 
to  all  creative  effort,  no  matter  in  what  realm  of  life. 

It  appears  to  be  the  fundamental  fact  about  all  truly  human  existence 
that  man  is  not  merely  a  creature  that  absorbs  the  plenitude  of  external 
impressions,  but  that  he  controls  this  plenitude  by  imposing  definite 
forms  upon  it  which,  in  the  last  analysis,  derive  from  the  thinking,  feel- 
ing, willing  subject  himself.21 

Cassirer's  own  theory  of  symbolic  forms  may  well  be  viewed 
as  a  development  of  these  insights  and  of  the  humanism  on 
which  they  were  based.  This  is  particularly  evident  in  his  Essay 
on  Man.  For  though  the  Essay,  as  he  points  out,  is  "more  an 
explanation  and  illustration  than  a  demonstration"  of  the 
theory  of  symbolic  forms  and  though  students  will  always  turn 
to  the  Philoso'phie  der  symbolischen  Formen  for  the  systematic 
formulation  of  Cassirer's  doctrine,  the  briefer  work  sets  forth 
most  clearly  his  thesis  that  myth  and  religion,  language  and  art, 
science  and  history  "are,  after  all,  only  one  subject .  .  .  different 
roads  leading  to  a  common  center."22  By  concentrating  upon 
Man  as  this  common  center  and  thus  emphasizing  philosophical 
anthropology  as  the  keystone  of  his  philosophy  of  symbolic 
forms,  Cassirer  brings  religion,  art,  and  history  into  even  clearer 
perspective  than  in  the  Philoso'phie  der  symbolischen  Formen, 
where  language,  myth,  and  science  were  the  foci  of  the  suc- 
cessive volumes. 

Viewing  man  as  animal  symbolicum,  Cassirer  seeks  to  under- 
stand human  nature  by  exploring  culture  in  terms  of  the  specific 
character  and  structure  of  the  various  symbolic  forms.  Having 
denied  that  man  can  be  defined  by  reference  to  an  hypostatized 
metaphysical  essence,  he  seeks  to  understand  man  in  terms  of 
his  culture.  But  this  understanding,  in  turn,  is  rooted  in  the 
rich  soil  of  humanism: 

A  philosophy  of  culture  begins  with  the  assumption  that  the  world 
of  human  culture  is  not  a  mere  aggregate  of  loose  and  detached  facts. 
It  seeks  to  understand  these  facts  as  a  system,  as  an  organic  whole.  For 
an  empirical  or  historical  view  it  would  seem  to  be  enough  to  collect 
the  data  of  human  culture.  Here  we  are  interested  in  the  breadth  of 

81  Ibid.,  1 6. 

*  Ibid.)  Essay  on  Man,  viii. 


462  JAMES  GUTMANN 

human  life.  We  are  engrossed  in  a  study  of  the  particular  phenomena  in 
their  richness  and  variety;  we  enjoy  the  polychromy  and  the  polyphony 
of  man's  nature.  But  a  philosophical  analysis  sets  itself  a  different  task. 
Its  starting  point  and  its  working  hypothesis  are  embodied  in  the 
conviction  that  the  varied  and  seemingly  dispersed  rays  may  be  gathered 
together  and  brought  into  a  common  focus.  The  facts  here  are  reduced 
to  forms,  and  these  forms  themselves  are  supposed  to  possess  an  inner 
unity.  .  .  .  Here  we  are  under  no  obligation  to  prove  the  substantial 
unity  of  man.  Man  is  no  longer  considered  as  a  simple  substance  which 
exists  in  itself  and  is  to  be  known  by  itself.  His  unity  is  conceived  as  a 
functional  unity.23 

The  common  focus  of  all  cultural  forms  is  man — and  man, 
in  turn,  must  be  conceived  in  terms  of  his  functional  unity  in 
the  development  of  these  forms. 


It  may  at  times  appear  that  when  Cassirer  uses  the  concept 
of  symbolic  forms  to  explain  man's  nature  in  functional  terms 
the  forms  lack  content.  Contrariwise  the  specific  illustrations 
which  he  employs  are  often  familiar  and,  indeed,  conventional, 
though  he  presents  them  with  great  originality  and  artistry. 
The  interconnections  between  human  nature  and  culture  are 
constantly  stressed;  but  Cassirer  time  and  again  appears  to 
assume  a  unity  and  to  argue  for  a  systematic  formulation  which 
does  not  accord  with  his  own  practice.  Indeed,  the  Essay  on  Man 
lacks  systematic  unity  and  is  notable,  rather,  for  the  rich  variety 
of  the  content,  for  the  revealing  insights  into  the  researches  of 
contemporary  psychology  and  empirical  anthropology  and  es- 
pecially for  the  fruitful  harvest  of  Cassirer's  lifelong  interest 
in  literature  and  the  arts. 

If  Cassirer's  Kantianism  seems  at  times  to  obtrude,  as  we 
have  indeed  seen  above,  this  is  perhaps  the  inevitable  outcome 
of  the  neo-Kantian  method  of  combining  systematic  and  histori- 
cal investigation  which  Dr.  Edgar  Wind  pointed  out  in  an 
admirable  essay  on  Cassirer's  thought,  which  he  published  in 
1925.  "No  matter  how  successful  the  interbreeding  of  historical 
and  systematic  methods  may  prove  as  a  means  of  explaining 
the  development  of  science,"  wrote  Dr.  Wind, 

*  Ibtd.,  222. 


CASSIRER'S  HUMANISM  463 

...  by  defending  this  union  in  general,  the  philosopher,  who  is  supposed 
to  face  all  problems,  would  seem  deliberately  to  disregard  one  of  them — 
the  conflict  between  systematic  and  historical  thinking  as  such.  He 
must  be  prepared  to  hear  the  usual  objections:  If  all  standpoints  are 
merely  stages  in  an  infinite  development,  how  about  your  own  stand- 
point? If  you  treat  thinking  as  an  historical  matter,  how  about  the 
historical  limitations  of  your  own  thinking?24 

It  may  well  be  that  Cassirer  had  questions  such  as  these  in 
mind  when  he  wrote  certain  passages  concerning  history  in  the 
Essay  on  Man.  He  continued  to  affirm  the  necessity  of  the 
historian  writing  in  terms  of  his  personal  experience;  indeed  he 
finally  made  it  the  sine  qua  non  of  genuine  historical  writing. 

If  the  historian  succeeded  in  effacing  his  personal  life  he  would  not 
thereby  achieve  a  higher  objectivity.  He  would  on  the  contrary  de- 
prive himself  of  the  very  instrument  of  all  historical  thought.  If  I 
put  out  the  light  of  my  own  personal  experience  I  cannot  see  and 
I  cannot  judge  of  the  experience  of  others.25 

It  was  indeed  by  emphasizing  the  humanistic  significance  of 
history  and  the  anthropological  elements  in  historical  knowledge 
that  Cassirer  solved,  to  his  own  satisfaction,  the  problem  of 
historical  objectivity  and  answered  the  question  of  the  relation- 
ship of  his  work  as  an  historian  to  his  work  as  a  systematic 
philosopher. 

If  we  bear  in  mind  this  character  of  historical  knowledge,  it  is 
easy  to  distinguish  historical  objectivity  from  that  form  of  objectivity 
which  is  the  aim  of  natural  science.  A  great  scientist,  Max  Planck, 
described  the  whole  process  of  scientific  thought  as  a  constant  effort 
to  eliminate  all  "anthropological"  elements.  We  must  forget  man  in 
order  to  study  nature  and  to  discover  and  formulate  the  laws  of  nature. 
In  the  development  of  scientific  thought  the  anthropomorphic  element 
is  progressively  forced  into  the  background  until  it  entirely  disappears 
in  the  ideal  structure  of  physics.  History  proceeds  in  a  quite  different 
way.  It  can  live  and  breathe  only  in  the  human  world.  Like  language 
or  art,  history  is  fundamentally  anthropomorphic.  To  efface  its  human 
aspects  would  be  to  destroy  its  specific  character  and  nature.  But  the 
anthropomorphism  of  historical  thought  is  no  limitation  of  or  impedi- 
ment to  its  objective  truth.  History  is  not  knowledge  of  external  facts 

"Journal  of  Philosophy,  vol.  XXII,  no.  18,  4.7 yfi. 
*  Essay  on  Man,  187. 


464  JAMES  GUTMANN 

or  events;  it  is  a  form  of  self-knowledge.  In  order  to  know  myself  I 
cannot  endeavor  to  go  beyond  myself,  to  leap,  as  it  were,  over  my  own 
shadow.  I  must  choose  the  opposite  approach.  In  history  man  con- 
stantly returns  to  himself;  he  attempts  to  recollect  and  actualize  the 
whole  of  his  past  experience.28 

And  yet  the  ideality  of  history  is  not  the  same  as  the  ideality  of 
art.  Art  gives  us  an  ideal  description  of  human  life  by  a  sort  of 
alchemistic  process;  it  turns  our  empirical  life  into  the  dynamic  of  pure 
forms.  History  does  not  proceed  in  this  way.  It  does  not  go  beyond 
the  empirical  reality  of  things  and  events  but  molds  this  reality  into  a 
new  shape,  giving  it  the  ideality  of  recollection.  Life  in  the  light  of 
history  remains  a  great  realistic  drama,  with  all  its  tensions  and  con- 
flicts, its  greatness  and  misery,  its  hopes  and  illusions,  its  display  of 
energies  and  passions.  This  drama,  however,  is  not  only  felt;  it  is  intuited. 
Seeing  this  spectacle  in  the  mirror  of  history  while  we  are  still  living 
in  our  empirical  world  of  emotions  and  passions,  we  become  aware 
of  an  inner  sense  of  clarity  and  calmness — of  the  lucidity  and  serenity 
of  pure  contemplation.27 

Thus  as  an  historian  and  as  a  humanist  Cassirer  once  again 
raised  the  standard  of  self-knowledge,  reaffirmed  the  doctrine 
that  the  unexamined  life  is  no  life  for  man,  that  the  proper  study 
of  mankind  is  man,  and  asserted  that  man  is  best  known  and 
studied  in  his  creative  life.  That  Ernst  Cassirer  himself  thus 
achieved  calmness  and  serenity,  even  during  the  crises  of  the 
last  decade,  is  evidence  that  his  philosophy  was,  in  the  most 
significant  sense,  a  philosophy  of  life.  We  may  well  salute 
Cassirer,  the  humanist,  by  utilizing  a  tribute  which  he  himself 
offered  to  the  humanism  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists:  It  stands 
to  his  undisputed  credit  that  he  did  not  allow  the  torch  which 
he  held  in  his  hand  to  be  extinguished,  that  in  spite  of  every 
obstacle  and  in  opposition  to  all  dogmatism  he  preserved  the 
flame  of  a  genuinely  perennial  philosophical  tradition  and 
passed  it  on  in  its  purity  to  future  ages.28 

JAMES  GUTMANN 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


28  Ibid.,  191. 
27  Ibid.,  205-206. 


1  Cf.  Die  Platonische  Renaissance  in  England  und  die  Schule  von  Cambridge, 
141. 


H 
David  Sidney 

ON  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  ANTHROPOLOGY  OF 

ERNST  CASSIRER  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  THE 

HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT 


SYNOPSIS 

1.  The  Crisis  in  Modern  Philosophical  Anthropology: 

The  Metaphysical  versus  the  Historical  and  Posi- 
tivistic  Approaches 467 

2.  Plato's  Metaphysical  Theory  of  Man  and  Culture.  .     470 

3.  Stoicism  on  the  Rationality  of  Man  and  the  Concept 

of  Humanitas 478 

4.  Kant  and  the  Anthropocentric  Critique  of  Human 

Culture  484 

5.  Wilhelm  Dilthey's  Neo-Kantian  Critique  of  His- 

torical Reason 488 

6.  Jose  Ortega  y  Gasset  and  Historical  Vitalism 490 

7.  Cassirer's  Cultural  Definition  of  Man:  Man  as  Ani- 

mal Symbolicum 492 

8.  Ernst  Cassirer  and  the  Concept  of  Cultural  Reality  496 

9.  Cassirer's  Critique  of  Kant 498 

10.  Cassirer   on    Symbolism,   Language   and   Cultural 

Thought   502 

u.  Cassirer  on  the  Evolution  of  Cultural  Symbolism.  .     506 

12.  Cassirer  on  the  Unitary  Psychological  Functions  of 

Symbolic  Forms 512 

13.  Cassirer  and  the  Problem  of  the  Unitary  Function 

of  Myth  515 

14.  Cassirer,  Levy-Bruhl  and  Malinowski  on  the  Con- 

cept of  Myth 517 

15.  Cassirer  on  the  Role  of  Myth  in  the  History  of 

Human  Culture 527 

1 6.  The  Humanism  and  Rationalism  of  Cassirer 535 

17.  Cassirer  on  the  Problem  of  Cultural  Unity 541 


14 

ON  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  ANTHROPOLOGY  OF 

ERNST  CASSIRER  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  THE 

HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT1 


The  Crisis  in  Modern  Philosophical  Anthropology:  The  Meta- 
physical Versus  the  Historical  and  Positives  tic  Approaches 

T  N  HIS  study  of  Wilhelm  Dilthey,  H.  A.  Hodges  makes  the 
**  following  statement: 

Modern  philosophy  is  philosophy  in  crisis.  Its  history  is  one  long  tale 
of  challenges,  emergencies,  and  attempted  fresh  starts.  As  time  goes  on, 
it  becomes  increasingly  evident  that  the  crisis  affects  not  this  or  that 
philosophical  doctrine  or  principle,  but  philosophy  itself,  which  is  now 
challenged  to  show  reason  why  it  should  continue  to  exist.  Dilthey 
is  one  of  those  who  have  helped  to  bring  the  issue  to  a  head,  and  of 
this  he  himself  is  fully  aware.  He  speaks  of  himself  as  in  search  of  a 
new  way  of  philosophizing,  and  calls  for  a  radical  reassessment  of 
the  tradition.  He  draws  his  inspiration,  as  usual,  from  two  sources:  from 
Kant  and  from  the  Anglo-French  empiricists,  and  his  starting-point 
lies  in  what  these  have  in  common.  They  are  united  in  an  attack 
upon  what  had  been  the  very  heart  of  the  philosophical  tradition,  upon 
metaphysics,  the  science  of  being  and  of  first  principles.2 

Ernst  Cassirer,  whose  philosophical  position  is  essentially 
similar  to  that  of  Dilthey,  is  acutely  aware  of  the  critical  position 
of  modern  philosophical  thought  and  significantly  begins  his 
Essay  on  Man  with  a  chapter  entitled:  "The  Crisis  in  Man's 
Knowledge  of  Himself."  There  he  writes: 

1  The  research  involved  in  the  writing-  of  this  paper  is  part  of  a  larger 
project  on  theoretical  anthropology,  which  is  being  conducted  by  the  writer 
under  the  liberal  auspices  of  the  Viking  Fund  Inc.  of  New  York  City. 

*H.  A.  Hodges,  Wilkelm  Dilthey:  An  Introduction  (New  York,  i944)>  88. 

467 


468  DAVID  BIDNEY 

Owing  to  this  development  our  modern  theory  of  man  lost  its  intellectual 
center.  We  acquired  instead  a  complete  anarchy  of  thought.  Even  in 
the  former  times  to  be  sure  there  was  a  great  discrepancy  of  opinions 
and  theories  relating  to  this  problem.  But  there  remained  at  least  a 
general  orientation,  a  frame  of  reference,  to  which  all  individual 
differences  might  be  referred.  Metaphysics,  theology,  mathematics,  and 
biology  successively  assumed  the  guidance  for  thought  on  the  problem 
of  man  and  determined  the  line  of  investigation.  The  real  crisis  of 
this  problem  manifested  itself  when  such  a  central  power  capable  of 
directing  all  individual  efforts  ceased  to  exist.  The  paramount  im- 
portance of  the  problem  was  still  felt  in  all  the  different  branches  of 
knowledge  and  inquiry.  But  an  established  authority  to  which  one 
might  appeal  no  longer  existed.  Theologians,  scientists,  politicians,  so- 
ciologists, biologists,  psychologists,  ethnologists,  economists  all  approached 
the  problem  from  their  own  viewpoints.  To  combine  or  unify  all  these 
particular  aspects  and  perspectives  was  impossible.  And  even  within 
the  special  fields  there  was  no  generally  accepted  scientific  principle.  The 
personal  factor  became  more  and  more  prevalent,  and  the  temperament 
of  the  individual  writer  tended  to  play  a  decisive  role.  .  .  .  That  this 
antagonism  of  ideas  is  not  merely  a  grave  theoretical  problem  but  an 
imminent  threat  to  the  whole  extent  of  our  ethical  and  cultural  life 
admits  of  no  doubt.2* 

According  to  Cassirer,  it  would  appear,  the  intellectual  crisis 
of  our  times  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  fact  that  we  have  no 
"central  power"  or  "established  authority"  capable  of  integrat- 
ing all  the  sciences  and  the  humanities  in  a  single,  unified, 
cultural  perspective.  He  does  not  stop  to  consider  the  special 
characteristics  of  classical  thought  which  rendered  it  a  coherent  or 
integrated  whole.  He  indiscriminately  lumps  together  "meta- 
physics, theology,  mathematics  and  biology"  as  having  at  one 
time  or  another  "assumed  the  guidance  for  thought  on  the 
problem  of  man."  But  what  was  it  that  made  it  possible  for 
these  disciplines  to  assume  the  guidance  for  thought,  and  why  is 
this  no  longer  possible  in  the  present  crisis? 

The  answer,  it  seems,  is  the  one  that  Hodges  suggests, 
namely,  that  classical  thought,  whatever  its  divergencies,  agreed 
upon  metaphysics  or  ontology  as  the  foundation  for  its  episte- 
mology,  morality,  politics,  and  religion.  By  postulating  a  general 

*tt  An  Essay  on  Man,  2 if.  Hereafter  to  be  referred  to  as  EM. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  469 

plan  of  reality  they  found  it  possible  to  conceive  all  natural 
and  cultural  phenomena  in  relation  to  this  master  plan.  The 
various  sciences,  and  especially  the  human  studies,  were  referred 
back  to  this  center  of  orientation  which  served  both  as  a 
logical  starting  point  and  as  a  criterion  of  validity.  Thus,  al- 
though the  theologian,  the  biologist,  or  the  mathematician 
might  conceive  this  basic  reality  in  different  forms,  once  a  given 
pattern  of  thought  was  accepted,  it  could  serve  as  a  norm  and 
principle  of  integration  for  the  culture  as  a  whole.  Modern 
thought,  on  the  other  hand,  following  Locke,  Hume,  Kant,  and 
Comte,  has  denied  the  possibility  of  universal,  ontological 
knowledge  and  consequently  provided  a  favorable  environment 
for  the  growth  of  the  chaotic  pluralism  and  mutual  unintelligi- 
bility  of  the  natural  and  social  sciences  which  all  the  responsible 
thinkers  of  our  time  deplore  so  greatly.  Not  the  least  significant 
factor  in  the  breakdown  of  the  classical,  metaphysical  tradition 
has  been  the  historicism  and  relativism  of  the  neo-Kantian  ap- 
proach which  swept  away  the  last  metaphysical  presuppositions 
of  the  Kantian  system  by  substituting  the  free  or  undetermined, 
creative,  symbolic  expressions  of  the  life-process  for  the  fixed 
structure  of  a  comparatively  abiding  nature. 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  basic  conflict  in  modern 
thought  is  one  between  diverse  metaphysical  approaches  on  the 
one  hand,  and  anti-metaphysical  tendencies  on  the  other.  Classi- 
cal ontological  thought  attempted  to  view  the  phenomena  of 
nature  and  life  sub  specie  aeternitatis,  whereas  modern  ontologi- 
cal thought  tends  to  view  cosmic  reality  sub  specie  temforis.  It 
should  not  be  an  impossible  task  to  reconcile  these  opposite 
points  of  view,  provided  there  is  agreement  on  the  possibility 
and  necessity  of  a  comprehensive,  ontological  theory  based  on 
verifiable  scientific  knowledge,  which  takes  account  of  the  ele- 
ment of  structure  as  well  as  of  process  in  the  explanation  of 
natural  and  cultural  phenomena.3  But  between  the  classical 
tradition  of  the  possibility  of  "substantial"  knowledge  of  reality 
and  the  "critical"  idealistic  position  that  ontological  knowledge 

8  See  W.  H.  Sheldon's  Process  and  Polarity  (New  York,  1 944)  and  America's 
Progressive  Philosophy  (New  Haven,  1942)  for  significant  analyses  of  this 
problem. 


470  DAVID  SIDNEY 

is  impossible,  there  can  be  no  logical  reconciliation.  We  must 
choose  decisively  between  these  two  contrary  positions,  if  we 
are  to  resolve  the  philosophical  crisis  of  our  times.  To  deplore 
the  intellectual  crisis  on  the  one  hand,  and  yet  to  hold  on  to  the 
very  same  anti-metaphysical  approach  which  helped  bring  it 
about,  as  the  neo-Kantians  and  positivists  tend  to  do,  is  an  ir- 
rational and  hopeless  procedure  which  only  serves  to  make  the 
confusion  worse. 

By  way  of  indicating  more  precisely  the  nature  of  the  conflict 
between  classical,  ontological  thought  and  modern  positivism 
and  neo-Kantian  idealism,  an  attempt  will  be  made  in  the  fol- 
lowing analysis  to  present  a  brief  survey  of  some  aspects  of  the 
history  of  anthropological  thought  from  the  Greeks  to  modern 
times,  referring  in  the  process  to  Cassirer's  interpretation  of  the 
history  of  the  ideas  involved.  In  relation  to  this  background  we 
shall  be  able  to  appreciate  critically  the  significance  of  Cassirer's 
contribution  towards  a  systematic  philosophy  of  culture.  Special 
consideration  will  be  given  to  the  problem  of  the  relation  of 
Cassirer's  philosophical  anthropology  to  that  of  modern  and 
contemporary  ethnology. 


Plato's  Metaphysical  Theory  of  Man  and  Culture 

Modern  ethnology  has  shown  that  all  historical  societies  have 
had  cultures4  or  traditional  ways  of  behavior  and  thought  in 
conformity  with  which  they  have  patterned  their  lives.  And  so 
valuable  have  these  diverse  ways  of  living  appeared  to  the 
members  of  early  human  society  that  they  have  tended  to  ascribe 
a  divine  origin  to  their  accepted  traditions  and  have  encouraged 
their  children  to  conform  to  their  folkways  and  mores  as  matters 
of  faith  which  were  above  question.  With  the  growth  of  ex- 
perience and  the  development  of  critical  thought,  first  indi- 
viduals and  then  groups  began  to  question  some  elements  of 
the  traditional  thoughtways  and  practices  and  thereby  provided 
a  stimulus  for  cultural  change  and  development. 

4  For  a  critical  analysis  of  the  ethnological  literature  dealing  with  the  concept 
of  culture,  see  D.  Bidney,  "On  the  Concept  of  Culture  and  Some  Cultural  Fallacies" 
in  American  Anthropologist  46:30-44,  (1944). 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  471 

The  critical  approach  to  traditional  cultural  expressions  has 
varied  in  different  societies  and  so  has  the  tempo  of  cultural 
change.  Frequently  the  reformers  have  claimed  the  authority 
of  some  new  divine  revelation  and  have  then  proceeded  to 
institute  reforms  and  establish  new  institutions  to  supplant  the 
old. 

What  is  significant  in  the  case  of  historical  Greek  society  is 
that  the  appeal  against  tradition  was  made  in  the  name  of  human 
reason  and  logic  rather  than  in  the  name  of  the  gods.  It  was, 
therefore,  a  revolutionary  event  in  the  history  of  human  culture 
when  men  like  the  Sophists,  Socrates,  and  Plato  began  to  ques- 
tion the  accepted  traditions  and  to  assert  boldly  that  "an  un- 
examined  life  is  not  worth  living."  From  the  point  of  view  of 
the  conventional  good  citizens  of  the  Athenian  state,  Socrates 
was  indeed  an  "atheistic"  radical,  who  well  merited  the  cup  of 
hemlock  which  the  civilized  Greeks  invited  him  to  drink  for 
their  benefit.  But  the  amazing  thing  in  the  case  of  Greek  society 
was  that  this  critical,  questioning  attitude  of  mind,  which 
Socrates  shared  with  the  Sophists  of  his  day,  was  not  entirely 
suppressed  and  was  even  encouraged.  Self-knowledge  was 
recognized  by  the  Greek  oracles  as  the  highest  form  of  wisdom. 

However,  self-knowledge,  as  Socrates  and  later  Plato  demon- 
strated, was  not  easy  of  attainment.  It  was  not  something  to  be 
acquired  by  mental  introspection,  since  the  kind  of  self-knowl- 
edge they  were  seeking  was  a  reflective,  rational  analysis  of  the 
universal  nature  of  man.  To  know  onself  in  this  objective  sense, 
Plato  showed,  meant  to  have  a  rational  knowledge  of  the  rela- 
tion of  man  to  the  whole  of  nature.  Plato's  Republic  is  based 
upon  the  thesis  that  the  prerequisite  for  a  scientific  knowledge 
of  man  is  a  knowledge  of  mathematics  and  of  the  unchanging 
mathematical  forms  manifested  in  nature  as  a  whole.  The  Idea 
of  the  Good,  he  held,  was  the  principle  of  integration  in  the 
cosmos  as  a  whole  and  could  therefore  be  known  and  intuited 
only  through  a  prior  knowledge  of  physics  and  astronomy.5 
Only  metaphysical,  theoretical,  or  dialectical  knowledge  of  this 

B  See  F.  S.  C.  Northrop's  essay,  "The  Mathematical  Background  and  Content 
of  Greek  Philosophy"  in  Philosophical  Essays  for  Alfred  North  Whitehead  (New 
York,  1936),  1-40. 


472  DAVID  SIDNEY 

kind  could  provide  a  solid  foundation  upon  which  to  build  the 
organization  of  man's  social  and  cultural  life.  In  short,  genuine 
self-knowledge  involved  an  ontological  and  theoretical  analysis 
of  nature  as  a  whole. 

The  basic  presupposition  of  Platonic  (as  well  as  of  Aris- 
totelian) philosophical  anthropology  is  that  culture,  understood 
both  as  a  system  of  education  (paedeia)  and  socio-political  or- 
ganization (politeia),  is  to  be  based  upon  a  scientific  knowledge 
of  nature.  The  Sophists  had  contrasted  the  uniformities  of  nature 
with  the  diversities  of  social  culture  and  were  inclined  to  re- 
gard the  latter  as  a  more  or  less  arbitrary  convention  (nomos) 
superimposed  by  the  rulers  upon  their  people.  Plato,  by  con- 
trast, attempted  to  harmonize  nature  and  culture,  and  held  that 
man  attained  his  true  good  and  proper  measure  of  perfection 
through  insight  into  the  abiding  forms  of  being  revealed 
through  a  study  of  mathematical  science  and  dialectical  synthe- 
sis. 

Cassirer  claims  that  "To  the  Sophists  'man'  meant  the  indi- 
vidual man.  The  so-called  'universal'  man — the  man  of  the 
philosophers — was  to  them  a  mere  fiction."6 

Whether  or  not  the  sophists  intended  to  apply  the  Protag- 
orean  maxim  that  "man  is  the  measure  of  all  things"  to  indi- 
vidual men  only  and  not  to  universal  man,  the  fact  remains 
that,  as  Plato  interpreted  it?  the  maxim  led  logically  to  indi- 
vidualistic relativism.  The  notion,  he  argued,  that  man  is  a 
measure  of  all  things  begs  the  very  question  it  is  supposed  to 
answer,  for  the  problem  is  whether  it  is  possible  to  have  a 
universal  measure  of  human  values.  To  say  that  man  is  the 
universal  measure  still  leaves  open  the  question  how  one  is  to 
determine  the  universal  nature  of  man.  This  question  according 
to  Plato,  could  not  be  answered  without  a  mathematical  and 
dialectical  knowledge  of  nature  as  a  whole.  The  Platonic 
Socrates,  in  agreement  with  the  Sophists,  was  certainly 
interested  in  "humanizing"  philosophy  in  the  sense  of  being 
concerned  with  a  critical  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  civilized 
life.  But  he  insisted,  as  against  the  sophists,  that  a  genuine  hu- 

*  In  The  Myth  of  tJie  State,  57.  Hereafter  to  be  referred  to  as  MS. 
T  See  Plato's  Theaetetus)  cf.  Brand  Blanshard's  "Current  Strictures  of  Reason" 
in  the  Philosophical  Review  Iv '.67 0-7 3,  (1946). 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  473 

manistic  education  must  be  one  based  upon  a  rational  or  scien- 
tific philosophy  of  nature.  I  find  it  difficult,  therefore,  to  accept 
Cassirer's  statement  to  the  effect  that 

From  then  on  man  was  no  longer  regarded  as  a  mere  part  of  the 
universe;  he  became  its  center.  Man,  said  Protagoras,  is  the  measure  of 
all  things.  This  tenet  holds,  in  a  sense,  both  for  the  sophists  and 
for  Socrates.  To  "humanize"  philosophy,  to  turn  cosmogony  and  ontol- 
ogy into  anthropology,  was  their  common  goal.  .  .  .  He  [Socrates]  is 
not  primarily  interested  in  the  unity  of  Being  nor  in  the  systematic  unity 
of  thought.  What  he  is  asking  for  is  the  unity  of  the  will.8 

Although  it  is  true  that  Socrates  was  primarily  interested  in 
the  study  of  man,  I  find  no  basis  for  the  statement  that  he  meant 
to  turn  cosmogony  and  ontology  into  anthropology.  Cassirer,  it 
would  seem,  is  reading  a  bit  of  Kant  into  the  Platonic  Socrates 
at  this  point. 

Plato's  perspective  was  "Copernican"  and  "heliocentric"  in 
the  sense  that  he  derived  his  knowledge  of  the  good  for  man 
from  an  objective  knowledge  of  nature  as  a  whole.  It  is  signifi- 
cant that  in  the  Republic  Plato  conceived  the  relation  of  the 
Idea  of  the  Good  to  the  intelligible  world  of  ideas  as  similar 
to  that  of  the  sun  in  the  physical  world.9  Cassirer  himself  notes 
that  Plato's  "categorical  imperative"  was  a  "demand  for  order 
and  measure"  and  that  "the  triad  of  Logos,  Nomos,  Taxis — 
Reason,  Lawfulness,  Order — is  the  first  principle  both  of  the 
physical  and  the  ethical  world."10 

Plato  would  acquire  a  knowledge  of  man  not  only  through  a 
subjective  analysis  of  the  individual,  but  also  and  primarily 
through  an  objective  investigation  of  the  natural  cosmos  and 
the  political  cosmos.  From  the  study  of  nature  and  of  mathe- 
matical science,  he  held,  one  derived  an  objective,  impersonal 
criterion  of  the  true  good  and  the  just  social  order  for  man,  so 
that  man  the  microcosm  might  order  his  life  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  of  justice  and  proportion  which  prevail  in  the 
macrocosm.11  Furthermore,  from  the  study  of  the  prevailing  or 

'MS,  56,  57. 

9  Republic ,  vi  1508-1  o. 

10  MS.,  65. 

11  See  A.  N.  Whitehead's  paper,  "Mathematics  and  the  Good"  in  The  Philosophy 
«/  Alfred  North  Whitehead,  edited  by  P.  A.  Schilpp   (The  Library  of  Living 


474  DAVID  SIDNEY 

historical  political  orders  (Plato  did  not  distinguish  the  state 
from  society)  one  may  infer  the  psychological  forces  which 
these  institutions  embody  and  the  type  of  personality  and  char- 
acter which  is  objectively  exemplified  in  any  given  society  or 
state.  Such  a  survey  alone,  however,  will  not  tell  us  what  is  the 
true  or  ideal  type  of  human  nature  or  what  type  of  personality 
ought  to  be  realized. 

The  significance  of  Plato's  analysis  in  the  Republic  for 
modern  anthropological  thought  lies  in  the  fact  that  here  we 
have  presented  for  the  first  time  the  thesis  that  the  social  cul- 
ure  of  a  given  society  is  integrated  about  a  given  personality 
type,  so  that  the  individual  who  participates  in  a  given  cultural 
configuration  and  set  of  institutions  takes  on  the  social  character 
which  is  exemplified  in  that  society  taken  as  a  whole.  Culturally, 
therefore,  the  individual  is  to  be  understood  through  the  state 
or  society  of  which  he  is  a  member,  since  the  political  order 
reflects  the  educational  ideals.  This,  however,  does  not  mean 
that  the  individual  has  no  universal  nature  apart  from  the  state. 
Man's  ontological  nature  is  not  a  socio-cultural  product  but 
rather  provides  the  basis  for  any  form  of  social  order  one 
chooses  to  institute.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  the  culturally  acquired 
personality  of  the  individual  is  to  be  understood  through  the 
social  conditioning  which  he  has  undergone  from  childhood  on- 
wards, it  must  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  ontological  nature 
of  the  individual  is  logically  prior  to  any  given  social  order. 

Cassirer's  interpretation  of  Plato  on  this  point  is  rather  am- 
biguous and  gives  one  the  impression  that  he  is  reading  a  little  of 
Comtean  sociology  into  Plato's  thought.  Thus  he  writes: 

We  cannot  find  an  adequate  definition  of  man  so  long  as  we  con- 
fine ourselves  within  the  limits  of  man's  individual  life.  Human  nature 
does  not  reveal  itself  in  this  narrow  compass.  What  is  written  in 
"small  characters"  in  the  individual  soul,  and  is  therefore  almost 
illegible,  becomes  clear  and  understandable  only  if  we  read  it  in  the 
larger  letters  of  man's  political  and  social  life.  This  principle  is  the 
starting  point  of  Plato's  Republic.  From  now  on  the  whole  problem 

Philosophers,  Evanston  and  Chicago,  1941)5  also  F.  H.  Anderson's  The  Argu- 
ment of  Plato  (London,  1934),  especially  ch.  6  on  "Microcosm  and  Social 
Macrocosm." 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  475 

of  man  was  changed:  politics  was  declared  to  be  the  clue  to  psychology.12 
Again  in  the  Essay  on  Man  he  writes: 

Man  is  to  be  studied  not  in  his  individual  life  but  in  his  political  and 
social  life.  Human  nature,  according  to  Plato,  is  like  a  difficult  text, 
the  meaning  of  which  has  to  be  deciphered  by  philosophy.  But  in  our 
personal  experiences  this  text  is  written  in  such  small  characters  that 
it  becomes  illegible.  The  first  labor  of  philosophy  must  be  to  enlarge 
these  characters.  Philosophy  cannot  give  us  a  satisfactory  theory  of  man 
until  it  has  developed  a  theory  of  the  state.  The  nature  of  man  is 
written  in  capital  letters  in  the  nature  of  the  state.  Here  the  hidden 
meaning  of  the  text  suddenly  emerges,  and  what  seemed  obscure  and 
confused  becomes  clear  and  legible.  .  .  . 

In  modern  philosophy  Comte  was  one  of  the  first  to  approach  this 
problem  and  to  formulate  it  in  a  clear  and  systematic  way.  It  is  some- 
thing of  a  paradox  that  in  this  respect  we  must  regard  the  positivism  of 
Comte  as  a  modern  parallel  to  the  Platonic  theory  of  man.  Comte  was  of 
course  never  a  Platonist.  He  could  not  accept  the  logical  and  metaphysical 
presuppositions  upon  which  Plato's  theory  of  ideas  is  based.  Yet,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  was  strongly  opposed  to  the  views  of  the  French 
ideologists.  In  his  hierarchy  of  human  knowledge  two  new  sciences,  the 
science  of  social  ethics  and  that  of  social  dynamics,  occupy  the  highest 
rank.  From  this  sociological  viewpoint  Comte  attacks  the  psychologism  of 
his  age.  One  of  the  fundamental  maxims  of  his  philosophy  is  that  our 
method  of  studying  man  must,  indeed,  be  subjective,  but  that  it  can- 
not be  individual.  For  the  subject  we  wish  to  know  is  not  the  individual 
consciousness  but  the  universal  subject.  If  we  refer  to  this  subject  by 
the  term  "humanity"  then  we  must  affirm  that  humanity  is  not  to  be 
explained  by  man,  but  man  by  humanity.13 

Cassirer  has  here  interpreted  "the  hidden  meaning  of  the 
text"  of  Plato's  Republic,  as  if  the  latter  would  define  the  nature 
of  man  through  society  and  its  culture.  But  Plato  explicitly 
distinguishes  the  ontological  nature  of  man  and  the  psychologi- 
cal functions  through  which  it  is  expressed  from  the  temporal 
character  of  the  political  state  through  which  it  is  exemplified 
and  molded.  The  social  order  is  the  analogue  of  the  individual 
soulj  and  there  can  be  no  justice  in  the  state  unless  it  is  or- 

"MS.  6if. 

13  An  Essay  on  Man,  6$l. 


476  DAVID  SIDNEY 

ganized  on  principles  of  justice  similar  to  those  which  obtain  in 
the  soul  of  the  individual.  As  Cassirer  has  put  it: 

Justice  is  not  on  the  same  level  with  other  virtues  of  man.  It  is 
not,  like  courage  and  temperance,  a  special  quality  or  property.  It  is 
a  general  principle  of  order,  regularity,  unity,  and  lawfulness.  Within 
the  individual  life  this  lawfulness  appears  in  the  harmony  of  all  the 
different  powers  of  the  human  soul;  within  the  state  it  appears  in  the 
"geometrical  proportion"  between  the  different  classes,  according  to 
which  each  part  of  the  social  body  receives  its  due  and  cooperates 
in  maintaining  the  general  order.  With  this  conception  Plato  becomes 
the  founder  and  the  first  defender  of  the  Idea  of  the  Legal  State.14 

And  again  Cassirer  states: 

The  Platonic  state  gives  to  everyone  and  to  all  the  social  classes  their 
allotted  work  in  the  common  work;  but  their  rights  and  duties  are 
widely  different.  That  follows  not  only  from  the  character  of  Plato's 
ethics,  but,  first  and  foremost,  from  the  character  of  his  psychology. 
Plato's  metaphysical  psychology  is  based  upon  his  division  of  the  human 
soul.  The  character  of  man  is  determined  by  the  proportion  between 
these  three  elements.  .  .  . 

The  different  classes  into  which  the  Platonic  state  is  divided  have  as 
many  different  souls — they  represent  different  types  of  human  charac- 
ters. These  types  are  fixed  and  unchangeable.  Every  attempt  to  change 
them,  i.e.,  to  efface  or  diminish  the  difference  between  the  rulers,  the 
guardians,  and  the  ordinary  men,  would  be  disastrous.  It  would  mean  a 
revolt  against  the  unchangeable  laws  of  human  nature  to  which 
the  social  order  has  to  conform.15 

Here  we  see  that  Cassirer  explicitly  admits  that  the  social 
order  of  the  Platonic  state  follows  from  the  character  of  "Plato's 
metaphysical  psychology"  and  from  "  the  unchangeable  laws 
of  human  nature."  If  this  be  the  case,  it  is  most  difficult  to  ac- 
cept Cassirer's  interpretation  that  for  Plato  "politics  was  de- 
clared to  be  the  clue  to  psychology"  and  that  "philosophy  can- 
not give  us  a  satisfactory  theory  of  man  until  it  has  developed  a 
theory  of  the  state."  On  the  contrary,  Plato's  theory  of  the 
state  with  its  rigid  class  differences  depends  on  his  meta-psycho- 
logical  theory  of  the  natural  divisions  or  functions  of  the  soul. 

14  MS.  69. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  477 

Cassirer,  it  would  seem,  is  confusing,  as  Plato  himself  never  did, 
the  cultural  priority  of  the  state  or  society  to  the  individual  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  ontological  priority  of  the  individual  to 
his  society  on  the  other. 

According  to  Plato,  an  empirical,  comparative  survey  of 
actual  states  or  societies  would  not  tell  us  anything  of  the  nature 
of  the  ideal  state.  For  the  latter  one  would  require  a  knowledge 
of  "first  principles"  which  are  not  derived  from  empirical  ob- 
servation. For  Plato,  the  ideal  and  the  actual  remained  for- 
ever distinct  and  unidentical.  That  is  why  Plato,  the  Utopian 
idealist,  was  also  theoretically  a  revolutionary  reformer  and 
never  accepted  the  civitas  terrena  or  status  quo  of  his  times.  Cas- 
sirer has  recognized  the  significance  of  this  aspect  of  Plato's 
thought  and  points  out:  "It  is  one  of  the  first  principles  of 
Plato's  theory  of  knowledge  to  insist  upon  the  radical  distinction 
between  empirical  and  ideal  truth.  .  .  .  The  difference  between 
these  two  types,  between  doxa  and  episteme  is  ineffaceable.  Facts 
are  variable  and  accidental}  truth  is  necessary  and  immutable."16 

This  Platonic  distinction  between  the  logical  ideal  and  the  fac- 
tual or  positive  social  situation  is  the  direct  antithesis  of  the  Com- 
tean  approach  which  postulated  that  an  empirical  study  of  "social 
facts"  would  automatically  reveal  the  nature  of  a  scientific  social 
order  and  the  inevitable  laws  of  social  evolution.  To  say,  there- 
fore, that  "we  must  regard  the  positivism  of  Comte  as  a  modern 
parallel  to  the  Platonic  theory  of  man,"  is  essentially  mislead- 
ing. 

Plato's  metaphysical  approach  implies  that  it  is  possible  to  en- 
visage a  universal  and  eternal  order  of  nature  as  well  as  a  ra- 
tional, social  and  cultural  order  which  is  to  conform  to  it.  Plato 
views  culture  sub  specie  aeternitatis  as  an  ideal,  rational  order 
capable  of  transcending  the  temporal  and  local  limitations  of 
given  historical  institutions.  In  practice,  however,  this  meta- 
physical and  rational  ideal  is  extraordinarily  difficult  to  conceive 
— let  alone  realize —  and  the  cultural  historian  has  little  diffi- 
culty in  demonstrating  the  limitations  of  his  theory  and  general 
mental  perspective.  His  conception  of  science,  which  divorced 
the  theoretical  from  the  practical  approach,  as  well  as  his  rigid 

16  MS.  69. 


478  DAVID  BIDNEY 

class  differences  reflect  much  of  the  socio-cultural  conditions 
of  his  time  and  place.  Similarly  Aristotle's  acceptance  of  slavery 
as  something  rooted  in  the  nature  of  things,17  and  the  general 
tendency  of  Greek  intellectuals  to  divide  the  human  race  into 
Greeks  and  barbarians18  demonstrate  the  all-too-human  cultural 
limitations  of  even  the  most  sincere  philosophical  idealists.  This, 
however,  does  not  invalidate  the  intellectual  vision  of  a  uni- 
versally valid  cultural  norm  which  may  be  progressively  con- 
ceived and  achieved  in  time.  The  cultural  limitations  of  a  great 
thinker  may  be  detected  by  others  of  a  later  generation  coming 
from  diverse  cultural  backgrounds  and  to  that  extent  eliminated 
from  their  own  thinking.  If  there  is  danger  in  not  taking  time 
seriously  enough,  there  is  even  more  danger  in  taking  it  too 
seriously. 


Stoicism  on  the  Rationality  of  Man  and  the  Concept 
of  Humanitas 

The  Stoics,  while  building  upon  the  general  metaphysical 
views  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  added  two  new  concepts  which 
were  destined  to  have  great  influence  on  the  subsequent  history 
of  anthropological  thought  and  political  action,  namely,  the  con- 
cept of  the  intrinsic,  universal  rationality  of  man  and  the  concept 
of  humanity  (humanitas). 

In  their  psychology,  the  Stoics,  unlike  Plato,  denied  any 
irrational  functions  of  the  soul  and  regarded  reason  as  the  es- 
sential function  of  mind  —  a  position  which  was  later  to  find  ex- 
pression in  the  Cartesian  notion  of  mind  as  res  cogitans.™  They 
regarded  the  emotions  or  passions  as  diseases  which  disturbed 


17  Cf.  Aristotle's  Politics, 

18  Cf.  Plato's  Statesman,  262,  Jowett  translation.  As  Plato  puts  it:  "The  error 
was  just  as  if  some  one  who  wanted  to  divide  the  human  races,  were  to  divide  them, 
after  the  fashion  which  prevails  in  this  part  of  the  world}  here  they  cut  off  the 
Hellenes  as  one  species,  and  all  the  other  species  of  mankind,  which  are  innumer- 
able, and  have  no  ties  of  common  language  they  include  under  the  single  name 
of  "barbarians"  and  because  they  have  the  one  name  they  are  supposed  to  be  of 
one  species  also." 

19  For  a  comparative  analysis  of  Stoic  psychology  see  D.  Bidney,  The  Psychology 
and  Ethics  of  Spinoza  (New  Haven,  1940),  especially  ch.  i. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  479 

the  apathy  or  calm  of  the  rational  activity  of  the  soul.  Hence 
they  counselled  that  a  man  should  limit  and  restrain  his  desires 
to  those  things  within  his  power  and  should  give  the  consent 
of  his  will  to  the  dictates  of  reason  only. 

The  significant  feature  of  Stoic  psychology  in  this  connection 
is  its  adherence  to  the  Platonic  view  of  the  essential  dualism  of 
body  and  soul.  In  social  practice  this  meant  that  the  freedom  and 
autonomy  of  the  rational  soul  could  be  maintained  even  while 
the  body  was  in  slavery  to  the  state.  The  Stoics  were  concerned 
with  the  spiritual  or  moral  freedom  of  the  individual,  his 
freedom  from  passions,  but  not  especially  with  political  free- 
dom. Like  the  early  Christians,  they  were  content  to  render 
unto  Caesar  the  things  that  were  Caesar's  as  a  matter  of  social 
tradition  as  well  as  expediency;  in  fact,  Caesar  himself,  in  the 
person  of  the  Emperor  Marcus  Aurelius,  was  one  of  the  chief 
apostles  of  this  ethical  creed.  The  spirit  of  Stoic  political  phi- 
losophy was  one  of  acceptance  of  prevailing  social  conditions, 
since  it  was  held  that  the  wise  man  could  maintain  his  intellec- 
tual freedom  and  moral  integrity  under  any  political  conditions. 
If  necessary,  he  could,  like  Seneca,  commit  suicide,  in  case  he 
did  not  wish  to  compromise  himself.  Thus,  although  denying 
the  Greek,  aristocratic  notion  that  some  peoples  were  slaves 
by  nature  and  insisting  upon  the  intellectual  and  moral  equality 
of  all  men,  the  Stoics  did  nevertheless  tolerate  physical  slavery 
and  political  despotism.  According  to  Seneca, 

It  is  a  mistake  to  imagine  that  slavery  pervades  a  man's  whole  being; 
the  better  part  of  him  is  exempt  from  it:  the  body  indeed  is  subjected 
and  in  the  power  of  a  master,  but  the  mind  is  independent,  and  indeed 
is  so  free  and  wild,  that  it  cannot  be  restrained  even  by  this  prison  of 
the  body,  wherein  it  is  confined.20 

In  view  of  the  alleged  moral  and  political  disparity  of  body 
and  mind,  I  find  it  difficult  to  understand  the  ground  for  Cas- 
sirer's  emphasis  upon  the  "coalescence  of  political  and  phil- 
osophic thought"21  as  characteristic  of  the  Stoics.  Stoicism,  like 
Christianity,  was  originally  and  essentially  a  spiritual  and  moral 

20  As  quoted  by  Cassirer,  MS.t  103.  The  reference  is  to  Seneca's  De 
in,  20,  tr.  A.  Stewart  (London,  1900)  p.  69. 
"M.5.,  102. 


480  DAVID  SIDNEY 

doctrine  and  as  such  was  historically  compatible  with  any  politi- 
cal form  of  organization  whatsover.  To  say  that  men  like  Cicero, 
Seneca,  or  Marcus  Aurelius  "admitted  no  cleft  between  the 
individual  and  political  sphere"22  simply  is  not  in  agreement 
with  the  historical  facts.  It  is  true,  as  later  history  shows,  that 
the  concept  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  equality  of  all  men 
was  a  principle  which  could  be  utilized  for  social  and  political 
reform  -y  but  the  fact  remains  that  the  Stoics  themselves,  in  com- 
mon with  other  philosophical  schools,  suffered  from  the  cultural 
limitations  of  the  Roman  Empire  and  did  not  so  envisage  their 
teaching  at  this  time.  The  Stoic  doctrine  of  living  in  harmony 
with  nature,  far  from  being  a  revolutionary  summons  or  an  in- 
centive to  the  formulation  of  Utopian  theories  of  the  state, 
merely  served  at  the  time  as  a  rationalization  for  accepting  the 
status  quo. 

The  concept  of  humanity  (humanitai)  in  particular  was 
original  with  the  Stoics  and  represented  an  ideal  alien  to  Greek 
philosophical  thought  which  had  not  gone  beyond  the  ideal 
of  Greek  unity.  As  Wilhelm  Wundt  has  pointed  out,  the  con- 
cept of  humanity  has  a  dual  significance  and  refers  to  a  purely 
logical  concept  as  well  as  to  a  moral  ideal.23  Logically,  hu- 
manitas refers  to  the  unity  of  mankind  as  a  whole.  As  a  moral 
ideal,  it  is  a  value-attribute  and  refers  "to  the  complete  develop- 
ment of  the  ethical  characteristics  which  differentiate  man  from 
the  animal  and  to  their  expression  in  the  intercourse  of  indi- 
viduals and  of  peoples."24  The  concept  of  humanity  in  this  lat- 
ter, moral  sense  is  not  to  be  found  among  the  virtues  discussed 
in  the  writings  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  According  to  Cassirer, 

The  ideal  of  humanitas  was  first  formed  in  Rome;  and  it  was 
especially  the  aristocratic  circle  of  the  younger  Scipio  that  gave  it  its 
firm  place  in  Roman  culture.  Humanitas  was  no  vague  concept.  It  had 
a  definite  meaning  and  it  became  a  formative  power  in  private  and 
public  life  in  Rome.  It  meant  not  only  a  moral  but  also  an  esthetic  ideal; 
it  was  the  demand  for  a  certain  type  of  life  that  had  to  prove  its 
influence  in  the  whole  of  man's  life,  in  his  moral  conduct  as  well  as  in 

"Ibid. 

28  Wilhelm  Wundt,  Elements  of  Folk  Psychology   (London  and  New  York, 
1916),  ch.  iv  on  "The  Development  of  Humanity,"  470-523. 
"Ibid.,  47*. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  481 

his  language,  his  literary  style,  and  his  taste.  Through  later  writers  such 
as  Cicero  and  Seneca  this  ideal  of  humanitas  became  firmly  established 
in  Roman  philosophy  and  Latin  literature.25 

Humanitasy  as  a  moral-aesthetic  ideal  or  way  of  life,  passed 
over  into  medieval  and  modern  European  culture  and  became 
firmly  established  in  the  educational  system  as  the  study  of 
"the  humanities." 

The  concept  of  the  moral  and  metaphysical  equality  of  all 
men  is  logically  connected  with  the  Stoic  notion  of  humanitas, 
since  the  idea  of  the  community  of  reason  in  all  men  implies 
the  notion  of  a  community  of  mankind.  The  intellect  is  regarded 
as  the  universal  bond  of  agreement  between  men  which  makes 
it  possible  for  all  men  as  rational  beings  to  live  in  harmony 
with  one  another  as  well  as  with  nature.  Thus  Marcus  Aurelius 
writes  in  his  Meditations: 

If  our  intellectual  part  is  common,  the  reason  also,  in  respect  of 
which  we  are  rational  beings,  is  common;  if  this  is  so,  common  also  is 
the  reason  which  commands  us  what  to  do  and  what  not  to  do;  if  this 
is  so,  there  is  a  common  law  also;  if  this  is  so,  we  are  fellow-citizens; 
if  this  is  so,  we  are  members  of  some  political  community;  if  this  is  so, 
the  world  is  in  a  manner  a  state.  For  of  what  other  common  political 
community  will  any  one  say  that  the  whole  human  race  are  members?26 

It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say,  therefore,  that  the  ideal  of 
humanitas,  in  combining  individualism  and  universalism,  pre- 
pared the  way  for  the  concept  of  a  world  culture,  world  history, 
and  a  world  state.27  As  an  ethical  ideal  it  made  the  individual 
conscious  of  the  personal  as  well  as  of  the  universal  character  of 
his  rights  and  duties.  In  modern  philosophical  thought  the  ideal 
of  humanitas  has  received  its  classic  expression  in  Kant's  categori- 
cal imperative  as  the  injunction  "So  to  act  as  to  treat  humanity, 
whether  in  thine  own  person  or  in  that  of  any  other,  in  every 
case  as  an  end  withal,  never  as  means  only."28 

w  MS.,  102. 

28  In  The  Stoic  and  Epicurean  Philosophers,  ed.  by  W.  J.  Gates  (New  York, 
1940),  p.  509,  bk.  4,  section  4. 

*  See  Wundt,  loc.  cit. 

*  Kant,  Fundamental  Principles  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Ethics,  tr.  T.  K.  Abbott 
(London,  1923),  56. 


482  DAVID  SIDNEY 

In  terms  of  political  theory,  the  concept  of  humanitas  may  be 
combined  either  with  an  organic  notion  of  society  and  the  state 
or  with  an  atomistic,  individualistic  theory.  In  Marcus  Aurelius 
we  find  the  Aristotelian  notion  that  man  is  by  nature  a  social  or 
political  animal  and  that  the  individual  cannot  exercise  his 
proper  function  apart  from  society.29  On  the  other  hand,  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  political  thinkers,  such  as 
Spinoza,  Locke,  Kant,  Jefferson,  and  Thomas  Paine,  utilized 
the  Stoic  ideal  of  humanitas  in  conjunction  with  an  individual- 
istic theory,  which  regarded  the  state  as  an  institution  organized 
to  serve  the  common  interests  of  its  component  citizens.  As 
Spinoza  puts  it: 

Nothing,  therefore,  can  agree  better  with  the  nature  of  any  individual 
than  other  individuals  of  the  same  kind,  and  so  there  is  nothing  more 
profitable  to  man  for  the  preservation  of  his  being  and  the  enjoyment  of 
a  rational  life  than  a  man  who  is  guided  by  reason.  .  .  .  Above  all 
things  it  is  profitable  to  men  to  unite  in  communities  and  to  unite  them- 
selves to  one  another  by  bonds  which  make  all  of  them  as  one  man 
(de  omnibus  unum  efficiani)  and  absolutely  it  is  profitable  for  them  to 
do  whatever  may  tend  to  strengthen  their  friendships.80 

Thus  in  answer  to  the  question  raised  by  Cassirer  as  to  "What 
gave  to  the  old  Stoic  ideas  their  freshness  and  novelty,  their 
unprecedented  strength,  their  importance  for  the  formation  of 
the  modern  mind  and  the  modern  world?"31  it  may  be  said: 
The  Stoic  concept  of  humanitas  was  combined  with  the  atomic 
individualism  of  Renaissance  science,  Platonic  idealism  and 
Protestant  theology  to  produce  a  revolutionary  social  mentality 
capable  of  questioning  established  authorities  and  institutions. 
Cassirer  seems  to  assume  that  Stoicism  alone  was  the  primary 
political  influence  in  the  rise  of  the  modern  world  and  therefore 
replies  somewhat  enigmatically  that 

What  matters  here  is  not  so  much  the  content  of  the  Stoic  theory 

29  Meditations,  bk.  8,  section  34. 

80  Spinoza,  Ethics,  part  iv,  Appendix,  sections  ix,  xii.  The  phrase  "de  omnibus 
unum"  is  reminiscent  of  the  American  motto  "e  pluribus  unum."  It  is  significant 
that  we  find  humanitas  listed  among-  the  intellectual  affects  in  Spinoza's  Ethics 
(part  3,  def.  43),  where  it  is  defined  as  "the  desire  of  doing-  those  things  which 
please  men  and  omitting  those  which  displease  them." 

81  MS.,  j  68. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  483 

as  the  function  that  this  theory  had  to  fulfil  in  the  ethical  and  political 
conflicts  of  the  modern  world.  In  order  to  understand  this  function  we 
must  go  back  to  the  new  conditions  created  by  the  Renaissance  and  the 
Reformation.  All  the  great  and  undeniable  progress  made  by  the 
Renaissance 'and  the  Reformation  were  counterbalanced  by  a  severe  and 
irreparable  loss.  The  unity  and  the  inner  harmony  of  medieval  culture 
had  been  dissolved.  ...  If  there  was  to  be  a  really  universal  system  of 
ethics  or  religion,  it  had  to  be  based  upon  such  principles  as  could  be 
admitted  by  every  nation,  every  creed,  and  every  sect.  And  Stoicism 
alone  seemed  to  be  equal  to  this  task.  It  became  the  foundation  of  a 
"natural"  religion  and  a  system  of  natural  laws.  Stoic  philosophy  could 
not  help  man  to  solve  the  metaphysical  riddles  of  the  universe.  But  it 
contained  a  greater  and  more  important  promise:  the  promise  to  restore 
man  to  his  ethical  dignity.  This  dignity,  it  asserted,  cannot  be  lost;  for 
it  does  not  depend  on  a  dogmatic  creed  or  on  any  outward  revelation. 
1^  rests  exclusively  on  the  moral  will — on  the  worth  that  man  attributes 
to  himself.32 

Cassirer,  it  appears,  separates  the  transcendental  "function" 
which  Stoicism  "had  to  fulfil"  from  its  actual,  scientific  content. 
He  points  out  that  the  Stoic  principle  of  the  "autarky"  or 
autonomy  of  human  reason  was  the  source  of  modern  rational- 
ism and  "became  the  cornerstone  of  all  systems  of  natural 
right."33  Cassirer  also  attributes  to  the  Stoics  the  Kantian  thesis 
that  man  asserts  his  moral  dignity  by  an  act  of  moral  will  and 
that  this  dignity  cannot  be  lost  irrespective  of  the  nature  of  one's 
beliefs.  He  omits  entirely  in  his  Myth  of  the  State  any  reference 
to  Galilean  and  Newtonian  science  or  to  the  Utopian  idealism 
which  had  its  source  in  Plato.84  The  concept  of  natural  rights  is 
indeed  related  in  part  to  the  notion  of  natural  law  postulated  by 
the  Stoics,  but  it  seems  an  exaggeration  to  base  the  modern 
theory  of  natural  rights  upon  Stoic  rationalism  exclusively.  A 
close  analysis  of  the  available  literature  of  the  period  will 
demonstrate  how  the  concept  of  natural  rights  was  re-inter- 

*MS.  i69f. 

88  MS.  172. 

84  See  F.  S.  C.  Northrop's  The  Meeting  of  East  and  West  (New  York,  1946), 
especially  ch.  3.  Northrop  provides  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  natural  science 
background  of  eighteenth  century  American  thought,  but  goes  to  the  opposite 
extreme  of  Cassirer  in  neglecting  Stoic  influence. 


484  DAVID  BIDNEY 

preted  in  terms  of  the  individualism  and  mechanistic  science  de- 
rived from  distinctively  Renaissance  sources.35 


Kant  and  the  Anthrofocentric  Critique  of  Human  Culture 

Cassirer,  in  a  passage  quoted  earlier,  has  pointed  out  that,  in 
regarding  man  as  the  measure  of  all  things,  the  Sophists  turned 
cosmogony  and  ontology  into  anthropology.  This,  it  would  ap- 
pear, is  especially  true  of  Kant.  For  Kant,  above  all,  made  man's 
transcendental  ego  the  measure  of  all  things.  This  reversal  of 
the  classic,  objective  metaphysical  approach  he  himself  regarded 
as  parallel  to  the  Copernican  revolution  in  astronomy;  in  fact, 
however,  he  accomplished  the  exact  contrary  by  his  anthropo- 
centric  approach.86 

It  is  most  significant,  as  Cassirer  observes,  that  Kant  was 
"the  man  who  introduced  anthropology  as  a  branch  of  study  in 
German  universities  and  who  lectured  on  it  regularly  for 
decades."37  In  the  introduction  to  his  Anthrofologie  in  prag- 
matischer  Hinsicht  Kant  informs  us: 

In  my  occupation  with  pure  philosophy,  which  originally  I  had 
voluntarily  taken  upon  myself,  but  which  was  later  on  officially  en- 
trusted to  me  as  an  academic  lectureship,  I  have,  throughout  some  thirty 
years,  given  two  lecture  courses  whose  purpose  it  was  to  transmit  a 
knowledge  of  this  world,  namely,  (in  the  winter  semesters)  anthropology 
and  (in  the  summer  semesters)  physical  geography.38 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  by  anthropology  Kant 
meant  something  different  from  the  study  of  human  culture  or 
comparative  anatomy  of  peoples.  For  him,  the  term  comprised 

35  See  D.  Bidney,  The  Psychology  and  Ethics  of  Spinoza  for  an  example  of  this 
fusing  of  ideas. 

86  See  E.  Gilson,  The  Spirit  of  Medieval  Philosophy  (New  York,  1940),  245. 
According  to  Gilson,  "The  sun  that  Kant  set  at  the  centre  of  the  world  was  man 
himself,  so  that  his  revolution  was  the  reverse  of  the  Copernican  and  led  to  an 
anthropoccntrism  a  good  deal  more  radical,  though  radical  in  another  fashion, 
than  any  of  which  the  Middle  Age  is  accused." 

87  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe ',  25. 

88Immanuel  Kant,  Anthropologie  in  pragmatischer  Hinsicht  (Zweyte  verbes- 
serte  Auflage,  Konigsberg,  1800),  Vorrede,  xiii-xiv. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  485 

empirical  ethics  (folkways),  introspective  psychology  and 
"physiology."  Empirical  ethics,  as  distinct  from  rational  ethics, 
was  called  "practical  anthropology."39  As  Kant  puts  it: 

Eine  Lehre  von  der  Kenntnis  des  Menschen  systematisch  abgefasst 
(Anthropologie)  kann  es  entweder  in  physiologischer  oder  in  tyragma- 
tischer  Hinsicht  seyn.  Die  physiologische  Menschenkenntnis  geht  auf  die 
Erforschung  dessen,  was  die  Natur  aus  dem  Menschen  macht,  die 
pragmatische  auf  das,  was  er,  als  freyhandelndes  Wesen,  aus  sich  selber 
macht,  oder  machen  kann  und  soil.40 

From  this  it  appears  that,  for  Kant,  anthropology,  as  a  Men- 
schenkenntnis or  study  of  man,  comprised  two  major  ap- 
proaches, namely,  the  physiological  and  the  pragmatic.  Under 
physiology  he  included  all  those  human  phenomena  which  may 
be  attributed  directly  to  nature,  such  as  anatomy,  psychology, 
and  the  relation  of  man  to  his  geographical  environment 
(ecology).  Under  the  pragmatic  approach  he  included  all  hu- 
man phenomena  which  may  be  attributed  to  human  culture, 
namely,  those  of  empirical  social  ethics  (the  folkways  and 
mores  of  Sumner),  which  he  termed  pratical  anthropology, 
and  rational,  normative  ethics,  which  prescribed  the  conditions 
of  rational,  civilized  life.  Kant's  Critiques  were  in  effect  critical, 
anthropological  treatises  which  investigated  the  a  priori  con- 
ditions of  natural  science  and  ethics  as  given  cultural  disciplines, 
although  Kant  himself  did  not  clearly  recognize  this  point  as 
regards  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

Kant,  as  is  well  known,  accepted  the  validity  of  Newtonian 
science  and  sought  for  the  conditions  in  the  human  understand- 
ing which  made  mathematics  and  natural  science  in  general  pos- 
sible and  intelligible.  His  "answer"  to  Hume  was  that  theo- 
retical or  pure  reason  was  limited  by  its  a  priori  categorial 
structure  to  the  cognition  and  organization  of  phenomena.  Thus 
Kant,  in  fundamental  agreement  with  Hume,  denied  the  possi- 
bility of  an  ontological  knowledge  of  nature  and  more  than 
any  one  else  was  responsible  for  the  antithesis  of  science  and 
metaphysics.  He  did  not,  however,  entirely  exclude  the  notion 

99  Immanuel  Kant,  Fundamental  Principles  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Ethics,  ed. 
by  T.  K.  Abbott  (London,  1923),  2. 
*  Anthropologie y  iv. 


486  DAVID  SIDNEY 

of  a  metaphysical  or  noumenal  reality,  but  maintained  that 
"things-in-themselves"  were  not  the  object  of  scientific  knowl- 
edge. In  effect  this  meant  that  the  classic  assumption  of  Greek, 
medieval,  and  Renaissance  philosophy  of  an  empirically  vali- 
dated ontology  was  denied.  Instead  Kant  affirmed  that  "The 
understanding  does  not  derive  its  laws  (a  priori}  from,  but 
prescribes  them  to,  nature."41  This  meant,  in  sum,  that  Kant 
reduced  natural  philosophy  or  theoretical  science  to  anthro- 
pology. 

Just  as  Kant  began  his  critique  of  scientific  knowledge  by 
accepting  the  fact  of  mathematical  science,  so  he  began  his  ethics 
and  his  Anthropologie  by  accepting  the  fact  of  civilization.  Un- 
like Rousseau,  Kant  did  not  begin  with  "the  natural  man"  in 
order  to  arrive  at  an  evaluation  of  human  culture,  but,  beginning 
with  "civilized  man"  and  accepting  the  reality  and  validity  of 
historical  cultural  achievements,42  he  proceeded  to  outline  the 
necessary  postulates  which  would  enable  man  to  attain  ideal 
moral  perfection  and  a  rational  state  of  society.  According  to 
Cassirer, 

This  beginning  is  indicated  because  in  the  concept  of  man  civilization 
constitutes  no  secondary  or  accidental  characteristic  but  marks  man's 
essential  nature,  his  specific  character.  He  who  would  study  animals 
must  start  with  them  in  their  wild  state;  but  he  who  would  know  man 
must  observe  him  in  his  creative  power  and  his  creative  achievement, 
that  is,  in  his  civilization,48 

Rousseau's  type  of  approach  involves  a  dualism  or  antithesis 
of  nature  and  culture,  and  implies  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge 
of  man  which  is  pre-cultural  logically,  if  not  historically.  Kant, 
on  the  other  hand,  does  not  oppose  nature  to  culture,  but  begin- 
ning with  the  phenomena  of  culture  or  civilization  as  historically 
given,  investigates  analytically  the  formal,  logical  conditions 

41  Prolegomena  To  Any  Future  Metaphysics,  tr.  and  ed.  by  Paul  Cams 
(Chicago,  1929),  #36,  p.  82.  Metaphysics,  in  Kant's  use  of  the  term,  refers 
to  the  a  priori  logical  and  epistemological  conditions  of  experience,  and  hence 
to  a  priori  synthetic  propositions.  This  use  of  the  term  is  to  be  differentiated 
from  the  ontological  or  substantial  meaning  as  used  originally  by  Aristotle. 

ttKant,  as  quoted  by  Cassirer  in  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  22. 

48  Ibid.,  22. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  487 

which  would  render  human  cultural  experience  intelligible  as 
well  as  rational.  This  explains  why,  in  the  last  analysis,  Rous- 
seau was  essentially  a  cultural  revolutionary  or  reformer, 
whereas  Kant  remained  a  thinker  who  did  not  set  out  to  change 
the  human  world  but  to  understand  it. 

There  is,  for  Kant,  a  fundamental  difference  between  the 
object  or  sphere  of  theoretical  understanding  and  practical 
reason.  Nature  is  the  sphere  of  mathematical,  scientific  law. 
There  is  an  isomorphic  relation  between  the  phenomena  of  na- 
ture and  the  human  understanding,  such  that  the  universal  laws 
of  nature  are  identical  with  the  synthetic  a  priori  rules  or  laws 
of  the  understanding.  Human  practical  reason,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  not  limited  by  any  a  priori  categories  which  necessarily 
would  determine  the  conditions  of  its  experience  and  operation  j 
it  is  completely  free  and  undetermined.  Hence  practical  reason 
can  issue  a  categorical  imperative  on  how  man  as  a  rational, 
moral  being  ought  to  act,  and  can  postulate  what  man  ought  to 
believe  concerning  such  noumenal  entities  as  God  and  the  human 
soul.  So  far  as  moral  culture  is  concerned,  the  maxim  "Thou 
canst  because  thou  oughtest"  holds  good;  whereas  in  the  sphere 
of  natural  science  man  is  confronted  with  a  necessary  order  of 
phenomena  which  is  not  determined  by  human  will. 

This  explains  why  Kant  did  not  postulate  any  a  priori  cate- 
gories of  practical  reason,  since  to  have  done  so  would  have 
meant  a  denial  of  man's  moral  freedom  and  autonomy.  Nature, 
for  him,  was  the  sphere  of  necessity  and  required  the  postulation 
of  equally  predetermined  categories  of  the  understanding,  but 
moral  and  religious  culture  was  the  product  of  human  freedom 
and  creativity,  and  did  not,  therefore,  require  or  necessitate 
any  fixed  categories.  Man  does  not  create  the  order  of  nature  of 
which  he  is  a  part,  although  the  human  understanding  through 
its  categories  does  predetermine  the  general  modes  or  per- 
spectives through  which  it  is  perceived.  Man  does,  however, 
create  his  own  moral  laws  and  freely  sets  up  universal  moral 
standards  for  all  mankind.  In  short,  natural  phenomena  are 
given  in  experience;  moral  phenomena  are  not  so  given,  but 
have  to  be  willed  into  existence  in  accordance  with  the  dictates 
of  practical  reason  and  the  human  conscience.  This  important 


488  DAVID  BIDNEY 

point  seems  to  have  been  overlooked  by  the  neo-Kantian  axiolo- 
gists  who  criticize  Kant  for  having  failed  to  provide  categories  of 
practical  reason  and  who  presume  to  rectify  Kant's  failure  by 
providing  such  axiological  categories.44  These  neo-Kantian  axi- 
ologists,  like  the  historical  idealists,  seem  to  confuse,  as  Kant 
himself  never  did,  the  sphere  of  logical  and  scientific  necessity 
which  is  nature,  and  the  sphere  of  moral  freedom  which  is  cul- 
ture. 

5 

Wilhelm  Dilthey's  Neo-Kantian  Critique  of  Historical  Reason 

In  contrast  to  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  meta- 
physical rationalism,  the  keynote  of  nineteenth  century  philo- 
sophical thought  is  history.  Even  those  who  accepted  the  "crit- 
ical," anthropological  idealism  of  Kant  felt  that  the  Kantian 
approach  had  to  be  expanded  so  as  to  provide  a  logical  and 
epistemological  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  historical,  cultural 
thought.  Wilhelm  Dilthey  gave  classic  expression  to  this  point 
of  view  and  attempted  to  synthesize  the  thought  of  Kant  and 
Comte  together  with  the  historicism  of  the  Romanticists  and 
Evolutionists.  He  proposed  a  "Critique  of  Historical  Reason" 
to  take  the  place  of  Kant's  Critiqu.es  of  Pure  and  Practical 
Reason  in  order  to  get  to  know  the  laws  which  govern  social, 
intellectual,  and  moral  phenomena  while  following  "Kant's 
critical  path." 

Dilthey  differentiated  sharply  between  the  sphere  of  natural 
science  and  that  of  the  Geisteswissenschaften  or  human  studies. 
Thus  he  writes: 

Mankind,  if  apprehended  only  by  perception  and  perceptual  knowl- 
edge, would  be  for  us  a  physical  fact,  and  as  such  it  would  be  accessible 
only  to  natural-scientific  knowledge.  It  becomes  an  object  for  the 
human  studies  only  in  so  far  as  human  states  are  consciously  lived, 
insofar  as  they  find  expression  in  living  utterances,  and  insofar  as 
these  expressions  are  understood.  ...  In  short,  it  is  through  the  process 
of  understanding  (verstehen)  that  life  in  its  depths  is  made  clear  to 
itself,  and  on  the  other  hand  we  understand  ourselves  and  others  only 

"See,  for  example,  W.  M.  Urban's  The  Intelligible  World  (London,  1929), 
344*. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  489 

when  we  transfer  our  own  lived  experience  into  every  kind  of  expres- 
sion of  our  own  and  other  people's  life.  Thus  everywhere  the  relation- 
ship between  lived  experience,  expression,  and  understanding  is  the 
proper  procedure  by  which  mankind  as  an  object  in  the  human  studies 
exists  for  us.  The  human  studies  are  thus  founded  on  this  relation  be- 
tween lived  experience,  expression  and  understanding.45 

In  brief,  according  to  Dilthey,  the  human  studies  have  for 
their  object  life-forms  which  are  to  be  adequately  understood 
in  their  dynamic  relationships  through  an  inner,  lived  experi- 
ence of  the  concrete  expressions  and  symbolic  meanings  which 
constitute  these  forms.  By  contrast,  natural  science  is  said  to 
deal  with  abstract  or  value- free  objects  which  are  known  directly 
through  observation  and  explained  causally.  Natural  science  is 
said  to  be  "nomothetic"  whereas  cultural  studies  are  "idio- 
graphic."46 

The  practical  significance  of  this  dichotomy  betweeen  the 
natural  sciences  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  human  studies  on  the 
other,  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  divorced  cultural  values  or  ends  as 
the  expression  of  historical  reason  from  the  value-free  facts  and 
laws  provided  by  the  natural  sciences.47  This  divorce,  as  in- 
dicated earlier,  had  its  source  in  the  Kantian  distinction  between 
the  inherent  freedom  of  the  practical  reason  and  the  formally- 
determined  pure  reason.  All  Dilthey  had  really  done  was  to 
convert  Kant's  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  into  a  critique  of 
historical  reason  and  of  human  cultural  expression. 

Since  cultural  values,  as  the  free  expression  and  creation  of 
historical  reason  were  relative  to  one's  time  and  society,  there 
was  on  this  basis  no  universal  criterion  by  which  they  could  be 
measured  or  evaluated  in  relation  to  one  another.  Dilthey  him- 
self was  aware  of  this  implication  of  his  thought  and  accepted 
it.  He  writes: 

The  knife  of  historical  relativism  which  has  cut  to  pieces  all  meta- 

45  Quoted  by  Hodges,  Dilthey,  142. 

49  Ibid.,  69.  In  his  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturvnssenschaften  Cassirer  rejects  this. 

41  See  Howard  Lee  Nostrand's  Introduction  to  Jose  Ortega  y  Gasset's  Mission 
of  the  University  (Princeton,  1944)  for  an  interesting  analysis  of  the  implica- 
tions of  this  separation}  also  D.  Bidney's  "Culture  Theory  and  the  Problem  of 
Cultural  Crises"  in  A  Broaches  to  Group  Understanding,  Sixth  Symposium  of  the 
Conference  on  Science,  Philosophy  and  Religion,  (New  York,  1947). 


490  DAVID  BIDNEY 

physics  and  religion,  must  also  bring  healing.  We  only  need  to  be 
thorough.  We  must  make  philosophy  itself  an  object  of  philosophical 
study.  There  is  need  of  a  science  which  shall  apply  evolutionary  con- 
ceptions and  comparative  methods  to  the  study  of  the  systems  them- 
selves. .  .  .  Every  solution  of  the  philosophical  problem  belongs  from  a 
historical  point  of  view  to  a  particular  date  and  a  particular  situation  at 
that  date;  man,  the  creature  of  time,  so  long  as  he  works  in  time, 
finds  the  security  of  his  existence  in  the  fact  that  he  lifts  his  creations 
out  of  the  stream  of  time  as  something  lasting:  this  illusion  gives  to  his 
creative  work  a  greater  joy  and  power.  .  .  .  Philosophy  cannot  compre- 
hend the  world  in  its  essence  by  means  of  a  metaphysical  system,  and 
set  forth  this  knowledge  in  a  way  that  is  universally  valid.  .  .  .  Thus 
from  all  the  enormous  labour  of  the  metaphysical  mind  there  remains 
the  historical  consciousness,  which  repeats  that  labour  in  itself  and  so 
experiences  in  it  the  inscrutable  depths  of  the  world.  The  last  word 
of  the  mind  which  has  run  through  all  the  outlooks  is  not  the  relativity 
of  them  all,  but  the  sovereignty  of  the  mind  in  face  of  each  one  of 
them,  and  at  the  same  time  the  positive  consciousness  of  the  way  in 
which,  in  the  various  attitudes  of  the  mind,  the  one  reality  of  the  world 
exists  for  us.48 

Dilthey,  although  accepting  the  historical  relativity  of  phil- 
osophical systems  and  denying  the  validity  of  metaphysics, 
found  solace  in  the  fact  of  the  mind's  sovereignty  and  freedom 
in  creating  its  own  cultural  perspectives.  Thus,  contrary  to  the 
naturalistic  approach,  historical  relativity  was  linked,  not  with 
determinism,  but  with  human  freedom  of  self-expression.  The 
idea  that  man  is  free  to  envisage  his  own  world  of  values  and  to 
reconstruct  his  human  world  in  terms  of  his  lived  experiences, 
is  ground  for  optimism  and  faith  in  human  progress,  notwith- 
standing the  temporal  character  and  historical  relativity  of 
human  achievements.  This  thesis  is  one  which,  it  will  appear, 
Cassirer  also  shares  with  Dilthey. 

6 
Jose  Ortega  y  Gasset  and  Historical  Vitalism 

In  his  essay  on  "Wilhelm  Dilthey  and  the  Idea  of  Life,"49 
Ortega  y  Gasset  has  clarified  and  systematized  the  basic  pre- 

48  Quoted  by  Hodges  in  his  Dilthey ',  1546*. 

**  Jose  Ortega  y  Gasset,  in  Concord  and  Liberty  (New  York,  1946). 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  491 

suppositions  of  Dilthey's  theory  while  re-interpreting  it  in  his 
own  ontological  terms.  If  one  accepts  the  standpoint  of  his- 
toricism,  he  points  out,  man  may  not  be  said  to  possess  a  nature 
in  the  sense  of  a  fixed  mode  of  being.  "Man  has  no  'nature  j'  he 
has  history.  His  being  is  not  one  but  many  and  manifold,  dif- 
rent  in  each  time  and  each  place."50  Summarizing  and  comple- 
menting Dilthey's  thought  Ortega  y  Gasset  writes: 

Man  is  historical  in  the  sense  that  he  has  no  actual  and  immutable 
constitution  but  assumes  most  varied  and  diverse  forms.  History,  in  the 
first  instance,  signifies  the  simple  fact  that  the  human  being  is  variable. 
Man  is  historical  in  the  sense  that  what  he  is  at  each  moment  includes 
a  past.  Remembrance  of  what  happened  to  him  and  what  he  was  before 
bears  upon  what  he  is  now.  History  here  means  persistence  of  the  past, 
to  have  a  past,  and  to  come  out  of  it  ...  history  is  the  more  or  less  ade- 
quate reconstruction  which  human  life  produces  of  itself  .  .  .  history  is 
the  attempt  to  bring  to  its  possible  perfection  the  interpretation  of  human 
life  by  conceiving  it  from  the  viewpoint  of  all  mankind  in  so  far  as 
mankind  forms  an  actual  and  real  unity,  not  an  abstract  ideal — in 
short,  history  in  the  formal  sense  of  universal  history.51 

Although  appreciating  Dilthey's  contribution  towards  a  gen- 
uine, historical  perspective,  Ortega  y  Gasset  is  critical  of  the  the 
former's  "spiritual  anthropology."  Since  "consciousness  cannot 
go  behind  itself,"  Dilthey's  anthroplogy  becomes  a  phenomen- 
ological  analysis  of  the  cognitive  efforts  of  mankind.  Although 
rejecting  a  metaphysics  of  fixed  forms  of  being,  he  conceives  of 
the  life-process  as  a  kind  of  Heraclitean  flux  similar  to  Berg- 
son's  elan  vital.  Man  in  particular  is  conceived  as  a  sort  of  finite 
causa  smy  as  "a  being  creating  its  own  entity."  In  his  essay  on 
"History  as  a  System"  Ortega  y  Gasset  states: 

Man  in  a  word  has  no  nature;  what  he  has  is  ...  history.  Expressed 
differently:  what  nature  is  to  things,  history,  res  gestae>  is  to  man.  Once 
again  we  become  aware  of  the  possible  application  of  theological  con- 
cepts to  human  reality.  Deus,  cut  hoc  nature  quod  Decent  .  .  .  says 
Augustine.  Man  likewise  finds  that  he  has  no  nature  other  than  what 
he  himself  has  done.52 

80 1  bid.,  148. 
KIHd.,  i66f. 

"in  Philosophy  and-  History,  Essays  presented  to  Ernst  Cassirer,  ed.  by  Kli- 
bansky  and  Paton  (Oxford,  1936),  313. 


492  DAVID  BIDNEY 

Thus  Ortega  y  Gasset  finds  an  ontological  justification  for 
Dilthey's  phenomenological  historicism.  By  regarding  man  in 
the  perspective  of  history  as  literally  making  himself,  un- 
hampered by  any  restraints  other  than  those  man  himself  has 
historically  created  for  himself,  Ortega  y  Gasset  is  able  to  com- 
bine ontological  freedom  with  historical  determinism  and  to  at- 
tribute to  man  the  attribute  of  self-creation  which  the  classical 
philosophers  reserved  for  God  alone. 

It  is  of  especial  interest  in  this  connection  to  compare  Ortega 
y  Gasset's  historical  vitalism,  as  it  may  be  called,  with  the  ex- 
istentialism of  Jean-Paul  Sartre.53  Both  writers  are  committed 
to  a  radical  humanism  which  postulates  the  self-creativity  of 
human  life  and  its  constantly  changing  modes  of  expression.  It 
would  appear,  therefore,  that  Sartre's  existentialism  and  Ortega 
y  Gasset's  historical  vitalism  share  a  common  ontological  thesis 
in  maintaining  that  life  or  existence  determines  its  own  essence. 
Contemporary  existentialism,  considered  as  an  interpretation  of 
man  and  his  culture,  is  not  quite  as  novel  as  it  has  been  made  to 
appear. 

7 

C 'assurer's  Cultural  Definition  of  Man:  Man  as 
Animal  Symbolicum 

Cassirer  also  provides  a  historical  interpretation  of  the  con- 
cept of  human  nature  and  in  this  respect  his  view  is  close  to  the 
radical  historicism  of  Dilthey  and  Ortega  y  Gasset.  The  latter, 
we  have  noted,  maintains  that  "Man  has  no  nature;  he  has 
history."  To  have  a  nature  would  imply  having  a  fixed  form  of 
being,  and  as  Ortega  y  Gasset,  like  Bergson,  regards  life  as 
essentially  a  Heraclitean  process  of  becoming,  he  denies  that 
man  has  any  fixed  nature.  Man  is  said  to  be  always  in  the  mak- 
ing, and  without  any  fixed  constitution.  Cassirer,  in  agreement 
with  Dilthey's  phenomenological  anthropology,  arrives  at  a 
similar  conclusion  by  the  subjective  route  of  symbolical  or  cul- 
tural idealism.  As  against  Ortega  y  Gasset's  ontological  position, 
Cassirer  argues  that 

Since  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  we  conceive  the  dualism  of 
ra  Jean-Paul  Sartre,  UExirtentiaUsme  est  une  Humanisme  (Paris,  1 946) . 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  493 

being  and  becoming  as  a  logical  rather  than  a  metaphysical  dualism.  .  .  . 
We  do  not  regard  substance  and  change  as  different  realms  of  being  but 
as  categories  —  as  conditions  and  presuppositions  of  our  empirical  knowl- 
edge. These  categories  are  universal  principles;  they  are  not  confined 
to  special  objects  of  knowledge.54 

Thus,  according  to  Cassirer,  an  ontological  or  "substantial" 
knowledge  of  man  is  impossible,  since  the  latter  would  imply 
that  man  can  have  an  immediate  knowledge  of  himself  as  an 
entity  or  thing-in-itself  apart  from  his  symbolical  representa- 
tions. Man,  he  argues,  cannot  know  himself  except  through  an 
analysis  of  his  symbolic  cultural  expressions  or  objectifications, 
since  all  human  knowledge,  including  self-knowledge,  is  or- 
ganized by  the  a  priori,  symbolic  categories  of  historical  culture. 
Man  is,  therefore,  said  to  be  an  "animal  symbolicum"**  rather 
than  an  "animal  rationale?'  as  he  has  been  defined  since  the 
time  of  Aristotle.  As  Cassirer  goes  out  of  his  way  to  explain: 

The  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  starts  from  the  presupposition 
that,  if  there  is  any  definition  of  the  nature  or  "essence"  of  man,  this 
definition  can  only  be  understood  as  a  functional  one,  not  a  substantial 
one.  We  cannot  define  man  by  any  inherent  principle  which  constitutes 
his  metaphysical  essence  —  nor  can  we  define  him  by  any  inborn  faculty 
or  instinct  that  may  be  ascertained  by  empirical  observation.  Man's 
outstanding  characteristic,  his  distinguishing  mark,  is  not  his  meta- 
physical or  physical  nature  —  but  his  work.  It  is  this  work,  it  is  the 
system  of  human  activities,  which  defines  and  determines  the  circle 
of  "humanity."  Language,  myth,  religion,  art,  science,  history  are  the 
constituents,  the  various  sectors  of  this  circle.  A  "philosophy  of  man" 
would  therefore  be  a  philosophy  which  would  give  us  insight  into  the 
fundamental  structure  of  each  of  these  human  activities,  and  which 
at  the  same  time  would  enable  us  to  understand  them  as  an  organic 
whole.  Language,  art,  myth,  religion  are  no  isolated,  random  crea- 
tions. They  are  held  together  by  a  common  bond.  But  this  bond  is 
not  a  vinculum  substantiale,  as  it  was  conceived  and  described  in 
scholastic  thought;  it  is  rather  a  vinculum  functionate.  It  is  the  basic 
function  of  speech,  of  myth,  of  art,  of  religion,  that  we  must  seek  far 
behind  their  innumerable  shapes  and  utterances,  and  that  in  the  last 
analysis  we  must  attempt  to  trace  back  to  a  common  origin.56 

84  EM.y  172. 


Ibid.,  67f. 


494  DAVID  SIDNEY 

Thus  Cassirer,  in  agreement  with  Comte,  maintains  that  to 
"know  thyself"  individually  requires  that  one  know  humanity  in 
terms  of  its  historical,  cultural  achievements,  and  hence  he  ac- 
cepts Comte's  proposition  that  "humanity  is  not  to  be  explained 
through  man  but  man  by  humanity."57 

Cassirer,  like  Dilthey,  would  disagree  with  Comte's  positiv- 
ism only  insofar  as  Comte  applies  the  objective  methods  of 
natural  science  to  human  studies,  on  the  assumption  that  the 
latter  were  a  kind  of  "social  physics,"  subject  to  empirical  ob- 
servation and  explanation  in  terms  of  universal,  natural  laws. 
In  opposition  to  this  naturalistic  approach,  the  neo-Kantians 
would  maintain  that  the  human  studies  or  cultural  sciences  re- 
quire a  subjective  approach  which  would  yield  understanding 
and  concrete,  idiographic  insight  into  the  human  processes  and 
symbols  involved — a  type  of  knowledge  which  no  amount  of 
external  observation,  causal  explanation,  or  statistical  correlation 
can  possibly  furnish. 

This  point  is  significant  in  that  it  demonstrates  how  closely 
historical  idealism  and  sociological  positivism  approximate  one 
another,  and  how  much  essential  agreement  there  is  in  their  con- 
clusions, notwithstanding  their  professed  differences  in  method- 
ology. The  basic  reason  for  this  agreement  between  historical 
idealism  and  sociological  positivism  lies  in  their  common  anti- 
metaphysical  perspective.  In  denying  any  ontological  or  sub- 
stantial knowledge  of  man  or  of  human  nature,  the  adherents  of 
both  these  positions  are  led  to  affirm  that  only  a  knowledge  of 
"social  facts"  and  historical,  social  achievements  can  provide  a 
scientific  knowledge  of  man.  Thus  both  the  positivists  and  the 
neo-Kantian  idealists  tend  to  reduce  the  category  of  nature  to 
that  of  culture,  thereby  turning  ontology  and  epistemology  into 
"culturology"  or  cultural  anthropology. 

A  careful  analysis  of  contemporary  ethnology  would  suggest, 
that  both  sociological  positivism  and  cultural  idealism  represent 
extreme  positions.58  If  one  were  to  adopt  a  polaristic  conception 
of  culture  and  recognize  that  the  idea  of  culture  is  unintelligible 

BT  ibid.,  64. 

58  See  D.  Sidney,  "Human  Nature  and  the  Cultural  Process"  (American 
Anthropologist,  49,  no.  3,  1947,  375'99-) 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  495 

apart  from  its  reference  to  nature,  then  it  would  follow  that 
human  nature  is  logically  and  genetically  prior  to  culture,  since 
we  must  postulate  human  agents  with  determinate  psycho- 
biological  powers  and  impulses  capable  of  initiating  the  cultural 
process.  In  other  words,  the  determinate  nature  of  man  is  mani- 
fested functionally  through  culture  but  is  not  reducible  to  cul- 
ture. There  is  no  necessity  in  fact  or  in  logic  for  choosing  between 
nature  and  history.  Man  does  have  a  substantial  nature  which 
may  be  investigated  by  the  methods  of  natural  science  as  well  as 
a  cultural  history  which  may  be  studied  by  the  methods  of  the 
social  sciences  and  humanities.  By  assuming  uncritically  that  all 
human  phenomena  pertain  to  the  domain  of  cultural  history,  one 
sets  up  a  false  dichotomy  or  division  between  human  studies  on 
the  one  hand,  and  natural  science  on  the  other — a  division  which 
tends  to  widen  the  gulf  between  them  and  thus  renders  any 
effective  cultural  integration  impossible  of  achievement.  As 
Eduardo  Nicol  has  recently  put  it, 

Our  epoch  reproduces,  in  the  anthropological  field,  the  situation  of 
thought  represented  by  Heraclitus  and  Parmenides  in  the  cosmological 
field;  we  have  to  investigate  what  the  being  who  changes  is.  It  is  not 
enough  to  say  that  man  changes,  that  man  is  historical ;  it  is  not  sufficient 
to  say  that  man  is.  We  must  explain  how  he  is  in  change;  we  must 
explain  what  constitutes  the  internal  law  of  his  change  and  how  the 
organic  structure  of  his  being  operates  in  history.59 

If  there  were  nothing  relatively  permanent  or  fixed,  if  there 
were  no  human  nature  or  essence,  there  could  be  no  science  of 
man  but  only  a  sequence  of  descriptions  for  each  period  of 
history.  On  the  other  hand,  if  human  nature  were  completely 
unmodifiable,  if  man  were  incapable  of  determining  for  himself 
the  direction  or  particular  form  of  his  development  in  time, 
there  could  be  no  culture  or  history.  The  cultural  process  re- 
quires as  its  indispensable  condition  a  determinate  human  nature 
and  environment  which  is  subject  to  transformation  in  time  by 
man  himself. 

w  See  Eduardo  Nicol,  "The  Idea  of  Man,"  in  The  Social  Sciences  in  Mexico^ 
vol.  i,  no.  i,  (May  1947)  62-69. 


496  DAVID  BIDNEY 

8 
Ernst  Cassirer  and  the  Concept  of  Cultural  Reality 

In  agreement  with  the  Kantian  position,  Cassirer  also  holds 
that  human  thought  is  no  passive  mirror  of  reality  but  rather  a 
dynamic  agent  which  creates  a  symbolical  or  intelligible  world 
of  its  own.  In  his  early  work  on  Language  and  Myth  Cassirer 
has  formulated  very  clearly  his  basic  indebtedness  to  the 
Kantian  approach.  He  writes: 

Against  this  self-dissolution  of  the  spirit  there  is  only  one  remedy: 
to  accept  in  all  seriousness  what  Kant  calls  his  "Copernican  revolution." 
Instead  of  measuring  the  content,  meaning,  and  truth  of  intellectual 
forms  by  something  extraneous  which  is  supposed  to  be  reproduced 
in  them,  we  must  find  in  these  forms  themselves  the  measure  and 
criterion  for  their  truth  and  intrinsic  meaning.  Instead  of  taking  them 
as  mere  copies  of  something  else,  we  must  see  in  each  of  these  spiritual 
forms  a  spontaneous  law  of  generation;  an  original  way  and  tendency 
of  expression  which  is  more  than  a  mere  record  of  something  initially 
given  in  fixed  categories  of  real  existence.  From  this  point  of  view, 
myth,  art,  language  and  science  appear  as  symbols;  not  in  the  sense 
of  mere  figures  which  refer  to  some  given  reality  by  means  of  suggestion 
and  allegorical  renderings,  but  in  the  sense  of  forces  each  of  which 
produces  and  posits  a  world  of  its  own.  In  these  realms  the  spirit 
exhibits  itself  in  that  inwardly  determined  dialectic  by  virtue  of  which 
alone  there  is  any  reality,  any  organized  and  definite  Being  at  all. 
Thus  the  special  symbolic  forms  are  not  imitations,  but  organs  of 
reality,  since  it  is  solely  by  their  agency  that  anything  real  becomes  an 
object  for  intellectual  apprehension,  and  as  such  is  made  visible  to  us. 
The  question  as  to  what  reality  is  apart  from  these  forms,  and  what 
are  its  independent  attributes,  becomes  irrelevant  here.  For  the  mind, 
only  that  can  be  visible  which  has  some  definite  form;  but  every  form 
of  existence  has  its  source  in  some  peculiar  way  of  seeing,  some  intel- 
lectual formulation  and  intuition  of  meaning.  Once  language,  myth, 
art  and  science  are  recognized  as  such  ideational  forms,  the  basic 
philosophical  question  is  no  longer  that  of  their  relation  to  an  absolute 
reality  which  forms,  so  to  speak,  their  solid  and  substantial  substratum;  the 
central  problem  now  is  that  of  their  mutual  limitation  and  supplementa- 
tion. Though  they  all  function  organically  together  in  the  construction 
of  spiritual  reality,  yet  each  of  these  organs  has  its  individual  assignment.60 

"Language  and  Myth,  tr.  by  S.  K.  Langer  (New  York  and  London,  1946)  8f. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  497 

Thus  Cassirer's  Kantian  thesis  is  that  symbolic  forms  are  not 
mere  imitations  but  organs  of  reality  and  that  there  are  a 
limited  number  of  "archetypal"  cultural  phenomena  which  con- 
stitute the  main  categories  of  cultural  reality.  For  man,  all 
reality  is  ultimately  cultural  reality  or  symbolical  reality  which 
the  human  mind  itself  has  created  in  the  course  of  historical 
development,  since  that  is  the  only  kind  of  reality  which  it  is 
possible  for  the  human  mind  to  apprehend  and  evaluate. 

This  symbolical  world  of  objective  meanings  constitutes,  as  it 
were,  "a  new  dimension  of  reality"61  available  only  to  man.  Man 
literally  lives  in  a  "symbolical  universe"  of  his  own  creation 
and  imagination.  As  Cassirer  puts  it  in  his  Essay  on  Man: 

Man  cannot  escape  from  his  own  achievement.  He  cannot  but  adopt 
the  conditions  of  his  own  life.  No  longer  in  a  merely  physical  universe, 
man  lives  in  a  symbolic  universe.  Language,  myth,  art  and  religion 
are  parts  of  this  universe.  They  are  the  varied  threads  which  weave  the 
symbolic  net,  the  tangled  web  of  human  experience.  All  human  progress 
in  thought  and  experience  refines  upon  and  strengthens  this  net.  No 
longer  can  man  confront  reality  immediately  j  he  cannot  see,  as  it 
were,  face  to  face.  Physical  reality  seems  to  recede  in  proportion  as 
man's  symbolic  activity  advances.  Instead  of  dealing  with  the  things 
themselves  man  is  in  a  sense  constantly  conversing  with  himself.  He 
has  so  enveloped  himself  in  linguistic  forms,  in  artistic  images,  in 
mythical  symbols  or  religious  rites  that  he  cannot  see  or  know  anything 
except  by  the  interposition  of  this  artificial  medium.  His  situation  is  the 
same  in  the  theoretical  as  in  the  practical  sphere.  Even  here  man  does 
not  live  in  a  world  of  hard  facts,  or  according  to  his  immediate  needs 
and  desires.  He  lives  rather  in  the  midst  of  imaginary  emotions,  in  hopes 
and  fears,  in  illusions  and  disillusions,  in  his  fantasies  and  dreams.62 

Thus,  according  to  Cassirer,  the  various  cultural  disciplines 
are,  as  it  were,  the  language  of  the  spirit,  the  diverse  modes  of 
symbolical  expression  created  by  man  in  the  process  of  inter- 
preting his  life-experiences.  One  cannot  go  behind  these  sym- 
bolical expressions  to  intuit  nature  or  things-in-themselves  di- 
rectly, since  experience  is  formally  constituted  by  symbols  which 
determine  all  our  human  perspectives.  For  Cassirer,  it  would 


498  DAVID  SIDNEY 

appear,  the  symbol  takes  the  place  of  Kant's  forms  of  intuition 
and  categories  of  the  understanding.  The  symbol  is  thought  to 
constitute  the  ultimate  element  of  all  human  culture. 

Again  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  sociological  positivists 
have  come  to  a  similar  conclusion  by  a  different  route.  In  his 
Cultural  Reality  Florian  Znaniecki  argues  that 

For  a  general  view  of  the  world  the  fundamental  points  are  that  the 
concrete  empirical  world  is  a  world  in  evolution  in  which  nothing 
absolutely  permanent  can  be  found,  and  that  as  a  world  in  evolution 
it  is  first  of  all  a  world  of  culture,  not  of  nature,  a  historical,  not  a 
physical  reality.  Idealism  and  naturalism  both  deal,  not  with  the  concrete 
empirical  world,  but  with  abstractly  isolated  aspects  of  it.63 

From  this  it  appears  that  Znaniecki's  positivistic,  historical 
cultural  reality  is  identical  with  that  of  the  neo-Kantian  ideal- 
ists, although  he  himself  thought  that  he  was  steering  a  middle 
course  between  naturalism  and  idealism  (of  the  Hegelian 
variety).  Once  more  it  may  be  seen  how  sociological  positivism 
and  historical  idealism  come  to  the  same  conclusion  and  posit  a 
cultural  reality  as  over  against  a  metaphysical  or  ontological 
reality  which  is  pre-cultural. 


Cassirer*s  Critique  of  Kant 

As  pointed  out  in  our  discussion  of  Dilthey  (Section  5  above), 
the  neo-Kantians  of  the  nineteenth  century  felt  that  the  Kantian 
approach  had  to  be  modified  so  as  to  take  into  consideration  the 
facts  of  cultural  evolution.  Cassirer  likewise  shares  this  view, 
and,  in  common  with  Dilthey,  takes  objection  to  Kant's  exces- 
sive intellectualism  and  lack  of  historical  perspective.  In  agree- 
ment with  Comte,  Durkheim  and  Levy-Bruhl  he  maintains  that 
primitive  thought  is  pre-scientific  and  does  not  conform  to  our 
logical  standards,  but  that  it  is  nonetheless  intelligible  and 
orderly.  Kant  tended  to  assume  that  only  the  categories  of 
modern  science  provided  the  necessary  logical  ground  for  order 

w  Florian  Znaniecki,  Cultural  Reality  (Chicago,  1919),  21.  ZnanieckPs  formu- 
lation of  the  epistemological  theory  of  cultural  reality  actually  antedates  that  of 
Cassirer,  and  so  there  can  be  no  question  of  his  indebtedness  to  the  latter. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  499 

and  objectivity,  whereas  the  facts  of  ethnology  demonstrate 
the  possibility  of  types  of  order  and  logic  which  are  pre-scientific 
or  non-scientific.  Thus  Cassirer  comments: 

In  our  modern  epistemology,  both  in  the  empiristic  and  rationalistic 
schools,  we  often  meet  with  the  conception  that  the  first  data  of  human 
experience  are  in  an  entirely  chaotic  state.  Even  Kant  seems,  in  the 
first  chapters  of  the  Critique  o]  Pure  Reason,  to  start  from  this  pre- 
supposition. Experience,  he  says,  is  no  doubt  the  first  product  of  our 
understanding.  But  it  is  not  a  simple  fact;  it  is  a  compound  of  two 
opposite  factors,  of  matter  and  form.  The  material  factor  is  given  in  our 
sense  perceptions;  the  formal  factor  is  represented  by  our  scientific 
concepts.  These  concepts,  the  concepts  of  pure  understanding,  give  to 
the  phenomena  their  synthetic  unity.  What  we  call  the  unity  of  an 
object  cannot  be  anything  but  the  formal  unity  of  our  consciousness  in 
the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  in  our  representations.  Then  and  then  only 
we  say  that  we  know  an  object  if  we  have  produced  synthetic  unity 
in  the  manifold  of  intuition.  For  Kant,  therefore,  the  whole  question 
of  the  objectivity  of  human  knowledge  is  indissolubly  connected  with 
the  fact  of  science.  His  Transcendental  Aesthetics  is  concerned  with  the 
problem  of  pure  mathematics;  his  Transcendental  Analytic  attempts 
to  explain  the  fact  of  a  mathematical  science  of  nature. 

But  a  philosophy  of  human  culture  has  to  track  down  the  problem 
to  a  more  remote  source.  Man  lived  in  an  objective  world  long  before 
he  lived  in  a  scientific  world.  Even  before  he  had  found  his  approach 
to  science,  his  experience  was  not  a  mere  amorphous  mass  of  sense  expres- 
sions. It  was  an  organized  and  articulated  experience.  It  possessed  a  defi- 
nite structure.  But  the  concepts  that  give  to  this  world  its  synthetic  unity 
are  not  of  the  same  type  nor  are  they  on  the  same  level  as  our  scientific 
concepts.  They  are  mythical  or  linguistic  concepts.64 

In  brief,  logical  or  scientific  thought,  which  Kant  assumed 
to  be  a  native  endowment  of  the  human  understanding  is  rather 
an  historical  achievement  of  man. 

Thus  Cassirer  would  transform  the  Kantian  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  into  a  "Critique  of  Culture."  His  monumental  Phi- 
losofhie  der  symboUschen  Formen  is  an  attempt  to  demonstrate 
that  the  whole  of  human  culture  may  be  understood  as  an  his- 
torical expression  of  the  human  spirit  and  that  the  diverse  cul- 

2o7f. 


500  DAVID  SIDNEY 

tural  disciplines  are  functionally  integrated  and  are  all  alike  to 
be  interpreted  as  symbolic  creations  of  humanity.  In  the  intro- 
duction to  the  aforementioned  work,  Cassirer  states  his  thesis 
and  main  objective  clearly: 

With  this  the  critique  of  reason  becomes  the  critique  of  culture.  It 
tries  to  understand  and  to  demonstrate  how  all  the  content  of  culture — 
in  so  far  as  it  is  more  than  merely  singular  content,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
grounded  in  a  universal  formal  principle — presumes  an  original  act 
of  spirit  (Geist).  It  is  in  this  that  the  basic  tenet  of  idealism  finds  its 
specific  and  complete  validation.65 

In  sum,  Cassirer  Js  critique  of  culture  has  for  its  main  objec- 
tive "a  phenomenology  of  human  culture,"66  and  provides  a 
logical  analysis  of  basic  cultural  disciplines  in  their  historical  and 
systematic  development.  He  takes  cultural  reality  as  given  in 
human  experience  and  seeks  to  analyze  its  basic  forms  and  the 
functional  interrelations  of  these  forms  with  one  another.  Cas- 
sirer's  anthropological  study,  like  that  projected  by  Dilthey,  is 
a  "spiritual  anthropology"  and  is  concerned  with  the  phe- 
nomenological  analysis  of  cultural  symbols  taken  as  free  expres- 
sions or  obj  edifications  of  the  human  spirit.  Whereas  in  Kant 
we  have  an  epistemological  dualism  of  form  versus  content,  Cas- 
sirer's  cultural  symbols  are  said  to  be  concrete  forms  utilizing 
sense  material  in  diverse  ways.87  The  symbol  is  thought  of  as  an 
"organ  of  thought"  which  permits  of  no  separation  of  the  sym- 
bol and  its  object.  Symbols  are  regarded  not  merely  as  mental 
constructs  but  as  dynamic  functions  or  energies  for  the  forming 
of  reality  and  for  the  "synthesis  of  the  ego  and  its  world."  In 
sum,  Cassirer  stresses  the  autonomous  creativity  of  the  spirit 
(Schopfung  des  Getstes)  and  envisages  life  or  spirit  as  a  "func- 
tion and  energy  of  construction"  which  manifests  a  "unity  of 
being  amidst  diversity  of  expression." 

It  may  be  questioned,  however,  whether  Cassirer  has  really 
overcome  Kant's  epistemological  dualism.  So  far  as  one  can 
gather,  he  has  replaced  the  Kantian  dualism  of  form  and  con- 

*  Pkiloso'phie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  vol.  I. 

WJ?M.,  52.  Cassirer's  phenomenology  of  culture  may  be  contrasted  with  the 
ontology  of  culture  of  the  pre-Kantian  philosophical  tradition. 
w  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  vol.  i,  Introduction. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  501 

tent  by  the  duality  of  function  and  content,  but  function  as  he 
conceives  it  appears  to  be  equally  formal.  Thus,  as  we  have 
noted,  he  speaks  of  the  "function"  which  Stoicism  had  to  fulfil 
in  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  thought,  as  if  the  func- 
tion of  an  idea  were  something  distinct  from  its  content.  Simi- 
larly he  speaks  of  the  "functional  bond"  which  binds  together 
the  various  cultural  disciplines  irrespective  of  their  "substance" 
or  content.  In  like  manner,  he  refers  to  "the  true  unity  of  Ian- 
gauge"  as  being  a  "functional  one"  rather  than  a  "substantial 
one."68  In  all  these  instances,  function  and  substance,  end  and 
means,  are  divorced  as  if  one  were  quite  intelligible  apart  from 
the  other.  In  effect,  function  as  so  interpreted  becomes  com- 
pletely formalized,  since  one  and  the  same  function  may  be 
performed  by  the  most  diverse  cultural  means  or  expressions. 
Thus,  although  Cassirer  wishes  to  assure  us  that  there  is  no 
separation  of  the  symbol  and  its  object,  his  actual  procedure  in 
separating  function  from  substance  or  content  demonstrates  the 
exact  contrary. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  Cassirer,  like  the  neo-Kantian 
axiologists  referred  to  earlier  (in  conclusion  of  Section  4  above), 
reduces  the  sphere  of  nature  to  that  of  culture,  but  for  a  differ- 
ent reason.  Whereas  the  neo-Kantian  axiologists  attempted  to 
subordinate  theoretical  reason  to  practical  reason  and  proceeded 
to  endow  practical  reason  with  special  value  categories,  the  neo- 
Kantian  culturologists,  as  they  may  be  called,  regarded  both 
theoretical  and  practical  reason  as  different  modes  of  a  common 
historical,  cultural  reason.68*  In  seeking  to  overcome  the  duality 
of  Kant's  Critiques  by  positing  a  unity  either  of  the  practical, 
axiological  reason,  or  of  historical  cultural  reason,  the  neo- 
Kantians  tended  to  reduce,  as  Kant  himself  would  never  permit, 
the  sphere  of  nature  and  natural  science  to  that  of  culture  and 
free,  historical  expression. 


130. 

681  In  his  monograph  Zur  Logik  Der  Kulturvrissenschaiten  (Goteborg,  1942) 
Cassirer  explicitly  differentiates  between  his  theory  of  symbolic  forms  or  Kultur- 
be  griff  e  and  the  Wertbegriffe  of  Rickert.  Culture  concepts  are  said  to  have  a 
logical  structure  which  differentiates  them  from  historical  as  well  as  from  value 
concepts  (72). 


502  DAVID  BIDNEY 

IO 
Cassirer  on  Symbolism,  Language,  and  Cultural  Thought 

Since  the  symbol,  according  to  Cassirer,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  ultimate  element  or  source  of  human  culture,  we  must 
consider  carefully  his  concept  of  symbolism  and  its  relation  to 
language  in  particular  and  to  cultural  thought  in  general. 

First  of  all,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  Cassirer  distinguishes  be- 
tween signs  or  signals  and  symbols.  A  sign  or  signal  is  a  sense- 
reference  to  some  physical  object  or  event.  A  symbol  is  an  ex- 
pression which  refers  to  an  intuited,  universal  meaning.  That 
is  to  say,  the  meaning  of  a  symbol  is  intrinsic  to  it  and  is  not  to 
be  understood  by  reference  to  some  object  other  than  itself.  Signs 
or  signals  have  a  practical  value  for  behavior  and  may  be  per- 
ceived by  all  animals;  but  symbols  have  a  theoretical  function 
which  only  humans  are  capable  of  experiencing.  Thus  Cassirer 
writes: 

Symbols  —  in  the  proper  sense  of  this  term  —  cannot  be  reduced  to 
mere  signals.  Signals  and  symbols  belong  to  different  universes  of  dis- 
course: a  signal  is  a  part  of  the  physical  world  of  being;  a  symbol  is  a 
part  of  the  human  world  of  meaning.  Signals  are  "operators,"  symbols 
are  "designators."  Signals,  even  when  understood  and  used  as  such, 
have  nevertheless  a  sort  of  physical  or  substantial  being;  symbols  have 
only  a  functional  value.  ...  In  short,  we  may  say  that  the  animal 
possesses  a  practical  imagination  and  intelligence  whereas  man  alone 
has  developed  a  new  form:  a  symbolic  imagination  and  intelligence?* 

Cassirer's  idealistic  theory  of  symbolism  may  be  contrasted 
with  the  behavioristic,  naturalistic  theory  of  symbolic  meaning 
held  by  contemporary  linguists  and  anthropologists,  such  as, 
Leonard  Bloomfield,70  Edward  Sapir,71  and  Charles  Morris/2 
Thus  Morris,  whom  Cassirer  apparently  had  in  mind,  states 
that 

A  symbol  is  a  sign  produced  by  its  interpreter  which  acts  as  a  substitute 
for  some  other  sign  with  which  it  is  synonymous;  all  signs  not  symbols 


32f. 

70  Leonard  Bloomfield,  Language  ,  (New  York,  1933). 

"Edward  Sapir,  Language  y  (New  York,  1939)5  also  article  "Language"  in 
Encyclopedia  of  Social  Sciences,  vol.  9. 

78  Charles  Morris,  Signs,  Language  and  Behavior,  (New  York,  1  94.6)  . 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  503 

are  signals.  .  .  .  Signals  and  symbols  are  alike  signs  in  that  they  are 
preparatory  stimuli  controlling  behavior  with  respect  to  other  behavior; 
the  symbol  is  a  sign  producible  by  the  organism  itself  and  a  substitute 
for  some  other  sign,  but  this  difference,  while  distinguishing  sign  and 
symbol,  is  not  regarded  as  a  fundamental  difference  in  their  nature  as 
signs.78 

Morris  explicitly  contrasts  his  behavioristic  position  with  that 
of  the  "mentalists"  for  whom  symbols  refer  to  concepts  and  not 
to  objects  or  behavior. 

As  against  this  type  of  behavioristic,  naturalistic  theory,  Cas- 
sirer  argues  that  the  symbolic  function  marks  a  new  stage  of 
mental  development,  which  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of 
"emotionally  denuded"  animal  cries  or  as  a  by-product  of  be- 
havior. The  difference,  he  claims, 

between  'prepositional  language  and  emotional  language  is  the  real 
landmark  between  the  human  and  animal  world.  All  the  theories  and 
observations  concerning  animal  behavior  are  wide  of  the  mark  if  they 
fail  to  recognize  this  fundamental  difference.  In  all  the  literature  of  the 
subject  there  does  not  seem  to  be  a  single  conclusive  proof  of  the  fact 
that  an  animal  ever  made  the  decisive  step  from  subjective  to  objective, 
from  affective  to  prepositional  language.74 

According  to  Cassirer,  therefore,  man  may  be  defined  as  the 
symbolizing  or  symbol-making  animal.  It  is  this  symbolic  func- 
tion which  has  enabled  man  to  create  language  and  culture  and 
has  opened  up  for  him  "a  new  dimension  of  reality"  not  access- 
ible to  the  animal  species.  The  symbolic  function  of  language  is 
said  to  be  an  "Urfhanomen"  which  is  not  to  be  explained 
causally  or  genetically  through  some  antecedent  order  of  psycho- 
biological  phenomena.  This  in  turn  presupposes  a  theory  of 
evolution  by  "mutation"  or  emergence  of  new  kinds,  which 
may  be  contrasted  with  the  Darwinian  theory  of  gradual  evolu- 
tion through  chance  variations.75 

Cassirer  illustrates  his  point  by  reference  to  the  development 
of  the  child: 

"  Loc.  cit.,  25,  49. 
74  £M.,  30. 

w  Cf .  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschajten,  especially  part  4  on  "Formproblem 
und  Kausalproblem,"  108-112. 


504  DAVID  SIDNEY 

With  the  first  understanding  of  the  symbolism  of  speech  a  real  revo- 
lution takes  place  in  the  life  of  the  child.  From  this  point  on  his  whole 
personal  and  intellectual  life  assumes  an  entirely  new  shape.  Roughly 
speaking,  this  change  may  be  described  by  saying  that  the  child  passes 
from  a  more  subjective  to  an  objective  state,  from  a  merely  emotional 
attitude  to  a  theoretical  attitude.  .  .  .  The  child  himself  has  a  clear 
sense  of  the  significance  of  the  new  instrument  for  his  mental  develop- 
ment. He  is  not  satisfied  with  being  taught  in  a  purely  receptive  manner 
but  takes  an  active  share  in  the  process  of  speech  which  is  at  the  same 
time  a  process  of  progressive  objectifi cation. — By  learning  to  name  things 
a  child  does  not  simply  add  a  list  of  artificial  signs  to  his  previous  knowl- 
edge of  ready-made  empirical  objects.  He  learns  rather  to  form  the 
concepts  of  these  objects,  to  come  to  terms  with  the  objective  world.  .  .  . 
To  the  adult  the  objective  world  already  has  a  definite  shape  as  a  result 
of  speech  activity,  which  has  in  a  sense  molded  all  our  other  activities. 
Our  perceptions,  intuitions,  and  concepts  have  coalesced  with  the  terms 
and  speech  forms  of  our  mother  tongue.  Great  efforts  are  required  to 
release  the  bond  between  words  and  things.76 

The  understanding  and  utilization  of  genuine,  human  speech 
are  achieved  when  the  child  first  acquires  insight  into  the  fact 
that  words  symbolize  universal  concepts  or  meanings.  This  is  a 
revolutionary,  momentous  step  which  enables  him  for  the  first 
time  to  join  the  human  speech  community  and  to  form  a  clear 
understanding  of  the  objective,  common  cultural  world  in  which 
he  lives.  In  this  sense,  language  is  basic  to  all  other  forms  of 
cultural  activity,  since  the  words  of  language  mold  the  way  in 
which  one  experiences  and  reacts  to  the  objective  world.  In  the 
last  analysis,  it  is  the  theoretical  function  of  linguistic  symbols, 
the  fact  that  they  are  instruments  which  refer  to  universal  con- 
cepts, which  makes  possible  their  practical  utilization  in  social 
communication  as  well  as  in  individual  thought. 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  although  linguistic  symbols 
underlie  all  other  cultural  activities,  they  are  in  turn  affected  by 
the  particular,  cultural  configuration  in  which  they  are  utilized. 
As  Franz  Boas  has  put  it: 

We  should  rather  say  that  language  is  a  reflection  of  the  state  of 
culture  and  follows  in  its  development  the  demands  of  culture.  In  an- 
other way,  however,  language  exerts  an  influence  upon  culture.  Words 

"EM.,  i3Iff. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  505 

and  phrases  are  symbols  of  cultural  attitudes  and  have  the  same  kind 
of  emotional  appeal  that  is  characteristic  of  other  symbols.  The  name  of 
a  rite,  of  a  deity,  an  honorific  title,  a  term  giving  a  succinct  expression 
to  political  or  church  organization,  may  have  the  power  to  raise  the 
passions  of  a  people  without  much  reference  to  the  changing  contents  of 
the  term.77 

Cassirer  was  keenly  aware  of  the  "social  task"  of  language 
and  its  relativity  to  specific  cultural  conditions.78  All  languages, 
whether  of  primitive  societies  or  of  civilized  ones,  are  said  to  be 
in  congruity  with  the  conditions  of  their  cultures. 

Finally,  it  should  be  noted,  that  the  category  of  symbol  as 
employed  by  Cassirer  has  a  subjective  as  well  as  objective  refer- 
ence. Thus  words  are  said  to  be  symbols  in  the  sense  that  they 
refer  to  universal,  objective  meanings  which  the  intellect  and 
imagination  intuit  immediately.  This  "semantic  function"  of 
words  makes  phenomenological  analysis  possible,  since  the  ideas 
or  meanings  referred  to  have  a  subsistence  which  is  independent 
of  the  mind  which  conceives  them.  It  is  because  of  this  capacity 
for  symbolic  intuition  that  man  may  be  said  to  be  a  symbol- 
making  or  symbolizing  animal.  On  the  other  hand,  symbols 
have  a  subjective  function  in  the  sense  that  they  are  expressions 
of  human  life  or  spirit,  and  of  basic  psychological  motivations. 
Every  cultural  form  is  said  to  be  a  symbolic  form  in  virtue  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  an  "organ  of  thought"  or  an  obj  edification  of  the 
spirit.  Cultural  symbols  as  objective  manifestations  of  thought 
constitute  a  "symbolic  universe"  and  man  is  described  as  "con- 
stantly conversing  with  himself. "  In  this  sense  man  is  said  to  be 
an  "animal  symboUcum"  or  a  symbolized  animal,  since  man 
does  not  know  himself  directly  but  only  through  the  cultural 
symbols  which  humanity  has  created  historically. 

Theoretically,  however,  it  is  quite  possible  to  maintain  the 
semantic  thesis  that  man  is  a  symbol-making  or  symbolizing 
animal  without  adhering  also  to  the  idealistic  view  that  man  is 
essentially  a  symbolized  or  symbolical  animal.  The  former 
semantic  point  is  quite  compatible  also  with  a  realistic  episte- 
mology  and  a  dualistic  metaphysics  which  allows  for  the  reality 

"Franz  Boas,  in  General  Anthropology ',  edited  by  himself  (New  York,  1938), 
ch.  iv,  142. 


506  DAVID  SIDNEY 

of  minds  as  well  as  physical  substances,  whereas  the  latter  thesis 
presupposes  an  idealistic  epistemology  which  denies  ontological 
knowledge.  Cassirer  himself  utilizes  both  conceptions  of  the 
symbol,  passing  from  the  idealistic  to  the  realistic  view  without 
explicitly  recognizing  the  change  in  philosophical  perspective. 
The  disparity  between  the  subjective  and  objective  functions 
of  symbolic  forms  may  be  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  diverse 
conceptions  of  man  to  which  they  lead.  If  the  symbol  is  defined 
objectively,  then  man  may  be  said  to  have  a  nature  as  well  as  a 
culture,  since  symbols  refer  to  a  reality  other  than  themselves. 
If,  however,  the  symbol  is  defined  subjectively,  then  all  reality 
is  culturally  defined  and  man  has  no  nature  but  only  cultural 
functions. 

ii 
Cassirer  on  the  Evolution  of  Cultural  Symbolism 

One  of  the  basic  tasks  which  Cassirer  set  himself  in  his  Phi- 
losophy of  Symbolic  Forms  was  to  trace  the  evolution  of  cul- 
tural symbolism  from  primitive  to  modern  times,  with  a  view  to 
indicating  the  critical  stages  of  development.  He  was,  moreover, 
concerned  to  demonstrate  the  "unity  of  function"  of  each 
archetypal  form  of  symbolism  by  showing  how  it  originated  in, 
or  was  motivated  by,  some  psychological  impulse  which  sought 
creative  expression  through  a  given  mode  of  symbolism. 

The  act  of  symbolization  is  the  initial  presupposition  of  his 
philosophy  of  culture.  In  the  beginning  was  the  symbol.  But 
originally  the  basic  archetypal  forms  of  symbolism  were  not 
clearly  differentiated.  From  the  start  there  were  the  elements 
of  language,  myth,  and  art  which  arose  as  expressions  of  sensa- 
tion, thought,  feeling,  and  intuition;  but  primitive  man  was 
not  conscious  of  his  symbolic  acts  as  having  discrete  functions 
and  objects.  As  Cassirer  puts  it  in  his  Language  and  Myth: 

Myth,  language  and  art  begin  as  a  concrete,  undivided  unity,  which 
is  only  gradually  resolved  into  a  triad  of  independent  modes  of  spiritual 
creativity.  Consequently,  the  same  mythic  animation  and  hypostatization 
which  is  bestowed  upon  the  words  of  human  speech  is  orginally  accorded 
to  images,  to  every  kind  of  artistic  representation.  Especially  in  the 
magical  realm,  word  magic  is  everywhere  accompanied  by  picture  magic. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  507 

The  image,  too,  achieves  its  purely  representative,  specifically  "aesthetic" 
function  only  as  the  magic  circle  with  which  mythical  consciousness 
surrounds  it  is  broken,  and  it  is  recognized  not  as  a  mythico-magic  form, 
but  as  a  particular  sort  of  formulation.  .  .  .  Language  and  myth  stand 
in  an  original  and  indissoluble  correlation  with  one  another,  from  which 
they  both  emerge  but  gradually  as  independent  elements.  They  are 
two  diverse  shoots  from  the  same  parent  stem,  the  same  impulse  of 
symbolic  formulation,  springing  from  the  same  basic  mental  activity, 
a  concentration  and  heightening  of  simple  sensory  experience.  In  the 
vocables  of  speech  and  in  primitive  mythic  figurations,  the  same  inner 
process  finds  its  consummation;  they  are  both  resolutions  of  an  inner 
tension,  the  representation  of  subjective  impulses  and  excitations  in 
definite  objects,  forms  and  figures.79 

As  Cassirer  interprets  it,  language  and  myth  are  originally 
so  closely  interconnected  because  genetically  "Both  are  based  on 
a  very  general  and  very  early  experience  of  mankind,  an  experi- 
ence of  a  social  rather  than  of  a  physical  nature."80  Just  as  the 
child  soon  learns  that  words  have  "magic"  powers  in  securing 
attention  from  its  mother  or  nurse,  so  primitive  man  is  said  to 
transfer  this  first  elementary  experience  to  the  totality  of  nature, 
since  for  the  latter  "Nature  itself  is  nothing  but  a  great  society 
— the  society  of  life."81  Thus  for  the  primitive  mind  "the  social 
power  of  the  word,  experienced  in  innumerable  cases,  becomes 
a  natural  and  even  supernatural  force."  In  brief,  myth  arises 
originally  as  a  magical  interpretation  of  the  power  of  words. 
Similarly  image  or  picture  magic  gives  rise  to  mythical  belief. 
As  against  Max  Muller's  theory  that  myth  arises  as  a  disease  of 
language  and  owing  to  the  metaphorical  use  of  words,  Cassirer's 
point  is  that  myth  arises  as  a  result  of  the  normal  functioning  of 
language  in  early  childhood  and  in  the  early  experience  of 
mankind?2 

A  crisis  in  the  intellectual  and  moral  life  of  mankind  arose 
when  primitive  man  first  discovered  that  nature  did  not  under- 
stand his  language.  From  then  on,  "The  magic  function  of  the 
word  was  eclipsed  and  replaced  by  its  semantic  function."88  Man 

79  LM.,  98,  88. 
"EM.,  1 10. 
81  Ibid. 

.y  io9f. 
in. 


5o8  DAVID  SIDNEY 

discovered  that  words  have  a  purely  logical,  symbolic  function  in 
the  communication  of  meanings  and  ideas. 

According  to  Cassirer,  therefore,  there  is  an  evolutionary 
process  of  development  from  the  mythical  to  the  logical  func- 
tion of  linguistic  symbols.  This  development  is  produced  in 
human  experience  by  the  functioning  or  exercise  of  language 
alone.  Linguistic  symbols  must  not  be  regarded  merely  as  repre- 
senting or  referring  to  objective  reality  other  than  themselves  j 
linguistic  symbols  create  or  determine  the  order  of  reality 
which  the  human  mind  recognizes  and  to  which  it  adjusts  itself 
accordingly.  Myth,  logic,  metaphysics,  and  science  are  the  result 
or  product  of  linguistic  symbolization  at  different  stages  of  its 
development.  As  Cassirer  puts  it  in  his  Language  and  Myth: 

Here  one  can  trace  directly  how  humanity  really  attains  its  insight 
into  objective  reality  only  through  the  medium  of  its  own  activity  and 
the  progressive  differentiation  of  that  activity;  before  man  thinks  in 
terms  of  logical  concepts,  he  holds  his  experiences  by  means  of  clear, 
separate,  mythical  images.  And  here  too,  the  development  of  language 
appears  to  be  the  counterpart  of  the  development  which  mythical  intuition 
and  thought  undergo;  for  one  cannot  grasp  the  true  nature  and  function 
of  linguistic  concepts  if  one  regards  them  as  copies,  as  representations 
of  a  definite  world  of  facts,  whose  components  are  given  to  the  mind 
ab  initio  in  stark  and  separate  outlines.  Again,  the  limits  of  things  must 
first  be  posited,  the  outlines  drawn,  by  the  agency  of  language;  and 
this  is  accomplished  as  man's  activity  becomes  internally  organized,  and 
his  conception  of  Being  acquires  a  correspondingly  clear  and  definite 
pattern.84 

For  Cassirer,  it  would  appear,  linguistic  symbolism  is  primary 
to  all  other  forms  of  cultural  expression.  In  this  sense  his  phi- 
losophy of  culture  may  be  said  to  depend  upon  his  philosophy  of 
language — a  fact  which  explains  the  tremendous  importance 
attached  to  the  philosophy  of  language  by  other  neo-Kantian 
philosophers,  such  as  W.  M.  Urban,85  who  have  been  influenced 
by  Cassirer's  work. 

In  the  last  analysis,  it  would  appear,  Cassirer  reduces 
ontology  and  epistemology  to  psychology  and  linguistics.  We 

84  IM.,  37. 

85  W.  M.  Urban,  Language  and  Reality,  (New  York*  1939). 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  509 

have  seen  how  myth  is  said  to  have  originated  from  the  normal 
functioning  of  language  in  the  psychological  history  of  the 
childhood  of  humanity  and  how  gradually  man  discovered  the 
logical  or  semantic  function  of  words  as  a  result  of  his  frustrat- 
ing experience  with  unintelligent,  dumb  nature.  From  this  it 
follows  that  the  very  notion  of  an  objective  reality  was  a  logical 
inference  from  man's  practical,  psychological  experience — an 
argument  which  is  reminiscent  of  the  psychoanalytical  treat- 
ment of  metaphysics. 

It  may  be  questioned,  however,  whether  Cassirer's  psycho- 
logical interpretation  of  myth  and  magic  is  not  itself  mythical. 
In  the  first  place,  Cassirer,  in  common  with  nineteenth  century 
evolutionary  psychologists,  assumes  a  parallelism  between  the 
experiences  of  the  child  and  the  mental  evolution  of  mankind — 
a  position  which  modern  psychologists  and  ethnologists  have 
rejected.  Secondly,  modern  psychology  provides  no  evidence 
that  the  child  originally  attaches  a  mythical  or  magical  signifi- 
cance to  words.  It  is  true  that  the  child  does  assume  naively  at 
first  that  all  things  are  equally  animate  and  that  he  can  com- 
municate with  them  as  with  human  beings.  This,  however, 
implies  a  naive  type  of  animism,  a  kind  of  "natural,"  mythical 
metaphysics  which  children  everywhere  tend  implicitly  to 
adopt.  It  may  be  argued,  therefore,  that  the  ontological  belief 
of  the  child  determines  his  use  of  language  on  a  scale  which 
the  rational  adult  finds  amusing.  It  is  not  his  social  experience 
with  words  which  determines  his  mythical  perspective  upon  his 
environment,  but  rather,  it  is  his  animistic  perspective  which 
determines  his  attempt  to  communicate  with  all  things.  Gradu- 
ally, as  his  efforts  at  communication  prove  unsuccessful,  the 
child  learns  to  distinguish  between  animate  and  inanimate 
objects  and  to  restrict  his  verbal  communications  to  the  former. 
Even  then,  the  process  is  a  slow  one,  since  he  has  also  to  learn 
that  not  all  animals  speak  his  type  of  language  and  that  even 
among  humans  not  all  speak  his  vocabulary.  The  notion  that 
words  themselves  have  magical  supernatural  powers  is  a  rather 
complex  and  relatively  sophisticated  belief,  which  the  child  may 
acquire  from  folklore,  but  is  one  which  he  does  not  arrive  at 
simply  as  a  result  of  his  own  common  experience.  In  other 


5io  DAVID  BIDNEY 

terms,  the  mythology  and  magic  of  words  are  special  instances 
of  cosmic  mythology  and  magic,  and  the  former  cannot  there- 
fore serve  as  a  general  explanation  of  the  latter.  In  the  last 
analysis,  Cassirer  assumes  that  the  will  to  power  through  words 
of  the  child  as  well  as  of  early  man  leads  them  both  to  believe 
in  a  methaphysics  of  the  solidarity  of  life — an  idealistic,  volun- 
taristic,  anthropocentric  assumption  which  does  not  take  into 
consideration  the  empirical  data  of  experience  and  the  impact  of 
man's  cosmic  environment  upon  human  intelligence. 

It  seems  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  Cassirer's  approach  to 
the  problem  of  the  evolution  of  cultural  symbolism  is  essen- 
tially anthropocentric.  Symbols  are  formed  in  response  to 
psychological  tensions  and  motivations,  and  hence  symbolic 
meanings  are  said  to  have  a  practical  bearing  upon  the  satisfac- 
tion of  human  psychobiological  interests.  As  Cassirer  puts  it  in 
Language  and  Myth: 

Whatever  appears  important  for  our  wishing  and  willing,  our  hope 
and  anxiety,  for  acting  and  doing:  that  and  that  only  receives  the 
stamp  of  verbal  "meaning."  .  .  .  For  only  what  is  related  somehow 
to  the  focus  point  of  willing  and  doing,  only  what  proves  to  be  essential 
to  the  whole  scheme  of  life  and  activity,  is  selected  from  the  uniform 
flux  of  sense  impressions,  and  is  "noticed"  in  the  midst  of  them — that 
is  to  say,  receives  a  special  linguistic  accent,  a  name.  .  .  .  Only  symbolic 
expression  can  yield  the  possibility  of  prospect  and  retrospect,  because 
it  is  only  by  symbols  that  distinctions  are  not  merely  made,  but  fixed 
in  consciousness.  What  the  mind  has  once  created,  what  has  been  culled 
from  the  total  sphere  of  consciousness,  does  not  fade  away  again  when 
the  spoken  word  has  set  its  seal  upon  it  and  given  it  definite  form.  .  .  . 
Here,  too,  the  recognition  of  function  precedes  that  of  Being.  The 
aspects  of  Being  are  distinguished  and  co-ordinated  according  to  a 
measure  supplied  by  action — hence  they  are  guided,  not  by  any  "objec- 
tive" similarity  among  things,  but  by  their  appearance  through  the 
medium  of  practice,  which  relates  them  with  a  purposive  nexus.  This 
teleological  character  of  verbal  concepts  may  be  readily  supported  and 
clarified  by  means  of  examples  from  the  history  of  language.86 

Cassirer's  anthropocentric,  pragmatic  interpretation  of  the 
origin  of  symbolic,  verbal  meanings  is  reminiscent  of  Bergson's 
evolutionary  approach  to  intellectual  concepts.  But  in  his 

37ff. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  511 

emphasis  upon  the  primacy  of  symbolic  function  over  form  of 
being,  Cassirer,  it  would  appear,  deserves  the  creMt  for  having 
first  formulated  systematically  a  functionalistic  theory  of  culture 
which  also  comprises  the  data  of  ethnology.  In  the  history  of 
modern  ethnology,  Bronislaw  Malinowski  is  usually  credited 
with  having  first  formulated  such  an  approach,  and  the  latter 
has  written  as  if  the  functionalistic  theory  of  culture  were  his 
special  achievement.87  Of  course,  Malinowski,  as  a  field  anthro- 
pologist, gathered  his  own  data,  especially  among  the  Trobriand 
Islanders,  and  has  undoubtedly  provided  the  stimulus  in 
modern  ethnology  for  a  holistic,  dynamic  approach  to  cultural 
phenomena.88  Furthermore,  the  functionalism  of  Cassirer  is 
historical  and  symbolic,  whereas  that  of  Malinowski  is  biological 
and  sociological.  It  is  all  the  more  significant,  therefore,  that 
the  philosophical  anthropologist  and  the  empirical  ethnologist 
whose  methods  appear  to  differ  so  widely  should  converge 
upon  a  similar  functionalistic  conclusion.  Cassirer  himself,  dur- 
ing his  appointment  at  Yale  University,  had  ample  opportunity 
to  make  the  personal  acquaintance  of  Malinowski,  and  he  soon 
recognized  the  affinity  between  their  cultural  approaches,  as 
the  many  references  and  quotations  in  his  Essay  on  Man  and 
Myth  of  the  State  demonstrate.  One  may  even  affirm  that 
Cassirer  tended  to  underestimate  their  respective  differences, 
especially  as  regards  the  problem  of  myth  and  the  evolution 
of  cultural  mentality,  thereby  undermining  the  consistency  of 
his  own  position.  (See  Section  14  infra.} 

This  brings  us  back  once  more  to  the  distinction  between  the 
subjective  and  objective  functions  of  symbols  which  we  discussed 
earlier.  We  have  noted  that  for  Cassirer  a  symbol  is  an  expres- 
sion which  refers  to  an  intuited,  universal  meaning.  Signs  or 
signals  may  be  discerned  by  all  animals,  but  symbols  have  a 

87  Bronislaw  Malinowski,  A  Scientific  Tfoory  of  Culture  and  Other  Essays, 
(Chapel  Hill,  N.C.,  1944).  Cf.  R.  H.  Lowie,  The  History  of  Ethnological  Theory, 
(New  York,  1937),  ch.  xiii,  "Functionalism,  Pure  and  Tempered."  See  also  "The 
Problem  of  Meaning  in  Primitive  Languages"  in  Ogden  and  Richards,  The  Mean- 
ing  of  Meaning  (first  edition,  London,  1923)  where  Malinowski  interprets  the 
significance  of  meaning  in  primitive  thought  and  language  in  terms  almost 
identical  with  those  of  Cassirer. 

68  Malinowski,  Argonauts  of  the  Western  Pacific,  (London,  1922))  Coral 
Gardens  and  their  Magic,  (New  York,  1935). 


512  DAVID  SIDNEY 

theoretical  function  which  only  human  beings  are  capable  of 
experiencing.  In  virtue  of  his  intuition  of  the  objective  reference 
of  linguistic  symbols,  man  forms  the  notion  of  a  common,  ob- 
jective world  and  is  able  to  communicate  with  others  who  share 
a  common  cultural  perspective.  It  is  the  theoretical  function  of 
symbols  which  makes  possible  their  practical  utilization  in 
human  society.  On  the  other  hand,  linguistic  symbols  are  said 
to  have  an  essentially  subjective,  teleological  reference  and 
to  reflect,  not  the  objective  character  of  things,  but  our  sub- 
jective, practical  interests  and  impulses.  Reality  as  constituted 
by  human  symbols  is  a  human  creation  or  invention  and  serves 
the  interests  of  human  action  or  practice.  Human  symbols  are 
not  primarily  a  guide  to  an  understanding  of  nature,  but  a  re- 
flection of  human  psycho-biological  impulses  and  interests.  As 
stated  in  these  extreme  forms,  the  two  concepts  of  the  nature  of 
symbolic  forms  and  meanings  appear  antithetical.  Logically,  it 
is  quite  possible  to  maintain  a  mentalistic  theory  of  symbolism 
which  would  take  into  consideration  the  diversity  of  cultural 
interests  and  classifications.  But  Cassirer  uses  the  evidence  of 
the  relativity  of  cultural  conceptualization  as  an  argument  for 
his  subjective,  idealistic  theory  of  cultural  symbolism.  That  is  to 
say,  he  employs  a  mentalistic  theory  of  symbolism  to  demon- 
strate the  concept  of  objective  reality,  and  a  behavioristic,  prag- 
matic, anthropocentric  theory  of  symbolism  to  demonstrate  the 
idealistic,  subjective  reference  of  symbols. 

12 

Cassirer  on  the  Unitary  Psychological  Functions  of 
Symbolic  Forms 

In  commenting  adversely  upon  nineteenth  century  linguistics 
Cassirer  writes:  "The  nineteenth  century  was  not  only  a  his- 
torical but  also  a  psychological  century.  It  was,  therefore,  quite 
natural  to  assume,  it  even  appeared  self-evident,  that  the  princi- 
ples of  linguistic  theory  were  to  be  sought  in  the  field  of  psy- 
chology. These  were  the  two  cornerstones  of  linguistic  stud- 


ies."80 


119. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  513 

Cassirer's  own  philosophy  of  language  and  culture  provides 
ample  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  he  himself  participated  in 
this  historical-psychological  approach,  notwithstanding  his  pro- 
fessed criticism  of  it  and  his  attempt  to  distinguish  genetic 
from  systematic,  functional  problems.90  We  have  seen  that  his 
interpretation  of  the  relation  of  language  and  myth  depended 
upon  uncritical,  psychological  assumptions  as  to  the  mythical 
function  of  words.  We  have  found,  furthermore,  that  he  pre- 
supposes a  functionalistic,  voluntaristic  psychology  in  interpret- 
ing the  origin  of  linguistic  symbols  and  classifications. 

In  general,  it  appears,  Cassirer  maintained  that  each  arche- 
typal form  of  symbolism  manifested  a  unity  of  function  in  the 
subjective  sense,  that  it  was  an  expression  of  a  particular  psy- 
chological faculty  or  activity.  Thus  in  his  Myth  of  the  State  he 
remarks: 

The  subjects  of  myth  and  the  ritual  acts  are  of  an  infinite  variety, 
they  are  incalculable  and  unfathomable.  But  the  motives  of  mythical 
thought  and  mythical  imagination  are  in  a  sense  always  the  same.  In 
all  human  activities  and  in  all  forms  of  human  culture  we  find  a  "unity 
in  the  manifold."  Art  gives  us  a  unity  of  intuition;  science  gives  us  a 
unity  of  thought;  religion  and  myth  give  us  a  unity  of  feeling.  Art  opens 
up  to  us  the  universe  of  "living  forms;"  science  shows  us  a  universe 
of  laws  and  principles;  religion  and  myth  begin  with  the  awareness  of 
the  universality  and  fundamental  identity  of  life.91 

Here  we  are  presented  with  a  tripartite  division  of  psycho- 
logical functions  or  motivations  which  neatly  correlates  intui- 
tion, thought,  and  feeling  with  art,  science,  and  religion  re- 
spectively. Each  psychological  function  expresses  itself  through 
different  symbolic  forms  j  but  the  underlying  principle  of  unity 
amidst  the  diversity  of  objects  symbolized  in  any  one  cultural 
discipline  is  its  psychological  motivation  in  the  human  ego. 
In  this  manner,  Cassirer  correlates  the  subjective  functions  of 
the  ego  with  the  given  objective,  cultural  categories  or  types  of 
symbols,  thereby  linking  together  man  and  his  symbolic  world. 

Parallel  to  the  cultural  evolution  of  mankind  there  is  a  corre- 
sponding psychological  evolution.  Primitive  man,  we  have  seen, 

90  ibid.,  1 1 8. 

nMS.,  37. 


514  DAVID  SIDNEY 

is  said  to  be  motivated  primarily  by  feelings,  by  emotion  and 
desire,  and  his  psychological  motivation  is  reflected  in  myth 
and  ritual.  Only  gradually,  as  the  linguistic  process  develops 
in  the  course  of  experience,  man  acquires  the  faculty  of  thinking 
logically  and  rationally  by  distinguishing  between  the  semantic 
function  of  words  and  the  objective  reality  of  objects.  Similarly, 
art  develops  as  an  independent  expression  of  intuition  and 
imagination  and  severs  its  original  connection  with  magic  and 
myth.  In  each  of  the  several  cultural  disciplines  there  is  a 
gradual  process  of  development  from  irrational  and  subjective 
to  rational  and  objective  modes  of  expression.  In  this  sense  the 
history  of  human  culture  is  the  record  of  man's  progressive 
efforts  at  self-expression  and  self-liberation,  since  all  culture  is 
a  manifestation  of  human  freedom  and  creativity. 

Cassirer's  psychological  approach  to  cultural  symbolism  in 
general  is  especially  significant  in  view  of  his  assertion  that  man 
is  to  be  defined  through  humanity  and  not  through  a  given 
psychological  or  metaphysical  nature.92  Again,  in  practice,  it 
would  appear,  Cassirer  does  not  follow  his  professed  historical 
and  phenomenological  procedure  exclusively  but  proceeds 
rather  to  explain  the  cultural  achievements  of  humanity  through 
man's  psychological  nature.  Instead  of  choosing  between  hu- 
manity and  man,  he  finds  it  more  practicable  to  utilize  both 
concepts,  thereby  implying  that  culture  has  a  unity  of  function 
because  man  has  a  nature  as  well  as  history. 

In  terms  of  contemporary  ethnological  theory,  the  issue  in- 
volved is  whether  culture  is  to  be  understood  as  essentially  a 
"superorganic"  phenomenon  or  whether  it  is  to  be  conceived 
organically  as  a  vital  expression  of  the  human  organism  whose 
individual  and  social  needs  it  satisfies.98  As  a  superorganic 
dimension  of  reality  all  cultural  symbols  are  conceived  through 
one  another  and  require  no  further  reference  to  the  psychologi- 
cal nature  of  man.  As  an  organic  phenomenon  culture  cannot  be 
understood  apart  from  the  psycho-biological  nature  of  man.  The 

02  Cf .  Section  7  above. 

WC£.  D.  Sidney,  "The  Concept  of  Culture  and  Some  Cultural  Fallacies}"  and 
"Human  Nature  and  the  Cultural  Process." 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  515 

superorganic  theory  of  culture  requires  that  man  be  conceived 
through  humanity  j  the  organic  theory  requires  that  humanity 
be  conceived  through  man.  Cassirer,  it  seems,  professes  the 
superorganic  theory  of  Comte  but  in  practice  also  leans  heavily 
on  the  organic,  functionalistic  theory,  especially  in  dealing  with 
the  origin  and  function  of  myth. 

13 
Cassirer  and  the  Problem  of  the  Unitary  Function  of  Myth 

Cassirer  objects  to  the  procedure  of  those  folklorists,  phi- 
lologists, and  psychoanalysts  who  attempt  to  ascribe  a  unity  of 
object  to  myth,  and  posits  instead  a  unity  of  psychological 
function.  He  assumes  that  the  motive  of  myth-making  is  always 
the  same  and  that  feeling  or  emotion  is  the  common  functional 
bond,  the  unity  in  the  manifold.  "Biologically  speaking,"  he 
claims,  "feeling  is  a  much  more  general  fact  and  belongs  to  an 
earlier  and  more  elementary  stratum  than  all  the  cognitive 
states  of  mind."94  He  is  opposed,  therefore,  to  those  who,  like 
Tylor  and  Frazer,  attempted  to  intellectualize  myths  and  to 
interpret  them  as  modes  of  logical  thought  and  belief.  Myths, 
he  maintains,  are  primarily  emotional  in  origin  and  their  practi- 
cal social  function  is  to  promote  a  unity  or  harmony  of  feeling 
between  individuals  as  well  as  a  sense  of  harmony  with  the 
whole  of  nature  and  life.  In  agreement  with  Malinowski,95  he 
holds  that  the  function  of  myth  is  not  the  theoretical  or  intel- 
lectual one  of  explanation,  but  rather  the  practical  one  of  pro- 
moting a  consciousness  of  the  solidarity  of  all  life,  especially 
in  times  of  crisis,  through  a  rationalization  of  the  social  rites 
which  preceded  them. 

This  basic  assumption  of  Cassirer  as  to  the  unity  of  psycho- 
logical motivation  and  sociological  function  (the  subjective  and 
objective  aspects  of  function)  is  one  that  leading  contemporary 
ethnologists  do  not  accept,  since  they  are  more  inclined  towards 
a  pluralistic  theory  of  explanation  of  the  function  as  well  as  of 

MMS.,  27. 

96  Bronislaw  Malinowski,  Myth  in  Primitive  Psychology ,  Psyche  Monographs, 
no.  6,  (London,  1916)  j  cf.  also  MS.,  28. 


516  DAVID  SIDNEY 

the  object  of  myth.  Franz  Boas,  for  example,  writes: 

The  fact  that  we  designate  certain  tales  as  myths,  that  we  group 
certain  activities  together  as  rituals,  or  that  we  consider  certain  forms 
of  industrial  products  from  an  esthetic  point  of  view,  does  not  prove 
that  these  phenomena,  wherever  they  occur,  have  the  same  history  or 
spring  from  the  same  mental  activities.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  quite 
obvious  that  the  selection  of  the  material  assembled  for  the  purpose 
of  comparison  is  wholly  determined  by  the  subjective  point  of  view 
according  to  which  we  arrange  diverse  mental  phenomena.  .  .  .  The 
phenomena  themselves  contain  no  indication  whatever  that  would 
compel  us  to  assume  a  common  origin.  On  the  contrary,  wherever  an 
analysis  has  been  attempted  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  we  are 
dealing  with  heterogeneous  material.  Thus  myths  may  be  in  part 
interpretations  of  nature  that  have  originated  as  results  of  naively  con- 
sidered impressions  (Naturanschauung)  ;  they  may  be  artistic  productions 
in  which  the  mythic  element  is  rather  a  poetic  than  a  religious  concept; 
they  may  be  the  result  of  philosophic  interpretation  or  they  may  have 
grown  out  of  linguistic  forms  that  have  risen  into  consciousness.  To 
explain  all  these  forms  as  members  of  one  series  would  be  entirely 
unjustified.96 

Here  we  see  that  Boas  denies  that  any  one  psychological  mo- 
tive is  sufficient  to  explain  the  origin  of  myth.  The  error  of  the 
nineteenth  century  anthropologists,  folklorists,  and  philologists 
is  said  to  lie,  not  in  their  limited  empirical  evidence,  but  rather 
in  their  uncritical  assumption  that  all  myth  is  of  the  same  type, 
and  that  we  are  dealing  here  with  homogeneous  material  which 
originates  in  some  one  psychological  motive.  Myths,  according 
to  Boas,  may  be  either  theoretical  and  explanatory,  or  poetic  and 
religious  j  they  may  have  a  practical  function  and  serve  to 
rationalize  a  given  custom,  as  in  the  case  of  totemism,  or  they 
may  be  in  part  philological  in  origin  as  Max  Muller  suggested. 
No  one  psychological  function  and  no  one  type  of  object  is 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  various  forms  of  myth. 

Similarly  Ruth  Benedict,  although  agreeing  with  Boas'  point 
that  myths  are  not  based  on  any  one  object  of  "fixed  symbol- 
ism" and  that  they  are  not  primarily  explanatory,  is  inclined  to 
stress  the  intimate  connection  between  the  play  of  imagination 

M  Franz  Boas,  "The  Origin  of  Totemism,"  in  American  Anthropologist,  18: 
319-26  (1916). 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  517 

and  wish  fulfilment  in  a  given  culture.97  Thus  she  writes: 

Myth  like  secular  folklore  is  an  articulate  vehicle  of  a  people's  wishful 
thinking.  Secular  heroes  portray  the  ideal  man  of  the  culture  and  myth 
remodels  the  universe  to  its  dominant  desire.  .  .  .  The  striking  contrasts 
in  different  collections  of  myth  are  in  a  large  measure  due  to  the  dif- 
ference in  the  types  of  wish  fulfilment  that  are  characteristic  of  the 
different  cultures.98 

According  to  Benedict,  then,  the  play  of  imagination  and 
wishful  thinking  are  the  primary  psychological  factors  under- 
lying myth.  The  cultural  function  of  myth  is  regarded  as  being 
poetic  and  artistic. 

Thus,  it  appears,  that  Cassirer's  assumption  as  to  the  unity  of 
function  at  the  basis  of  myth  is  one  which  modern  ethnologists, 
with  the  exception  of  functionalists  such  as  Malinowski  or 
Radcliffe-Brown,  would  be  inclined  to  question.  Although  they 
would  agree  with  Cassirer  that  myths  have  no  unity  of  object, 
they  would  disagree  with  his  uncritical  assumption  that  myths 
have  a  unity  of  psychological  motivation  or  social  function. 

H 
Cassirer y  Levy-Bruhl,  and  Malinowski  on  the  Concept  of  Myth 

The  full  significance  of  Cassirer's  theory  of  myth  and  the 
mythical  mentality  may  be  critically  evaluated  in  relation  to 
modern  ethnology  which  he  investigated  and  by  which  he  was 
influenced  considerably.  Among  the  various  logical  possibilities 
as  to  the  nature  of  mythical  thought  there  are  three  which  are 
significant  in  this  connection. 

First,  there  is  the  rationalistic  or  intellectualistic  theory,  as- 
sociated with  the  names  of  E.  B.  Tylor  and  Sir  James  Frazer, 
that  myths  are  essentially  rational  constructions  based  on  errone- 
ous major  premises.  The  native  mind  is  said  to  be  essentially 
logical  and  myths  are  regarded  as  the  products  of  intellectual 
wonder,  and  logical  inference.  Thus  animism,  according  to  Tylor, 
is  a  logical  theory  which  offers  a  plausible  explanation  of  death 
on  the  analogy  of  sleep;  it  is  a  rational  primitive  philosophy. 

97  Ruth   Benedict,   article   "Folklore"   in  Encyclopedia  of  the  Social  Sciences 
6:288-93)  also  article  "Myth"  in  same  work,  n  1178-80. 
"In  her  article  "Myth." 


5i8  DAVID  SIDNEY 

Second,  there  is  the  evolutionary,  sociological  theory  of 
Levy-Bruhl  that  the  native  mind  is  essentially  "prelogical,"  in 
the  sense  that  it  is  indifferent  to  the  rules  of  our  logic  but  not 
necessarily  contrary  to  it.  The  native  mind,  as  may  be  gathered 
from  a  study  of  the  "collective  representations"  manifested  in 
typical,  native  social  culture,  has  not  reached  the  stage  where  it 
differentiates  clearly  between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
between  natural  and  magical  powers}  and  hence  the  native 
mental  perspective  or  mode  of  thinking  differs  radically  from 
the  logical,  scientific  mentality  of  civilized  man.  This  does  not 
mean  that  the  native,  taken  as  an  individual,  does  not  have  a 
psycho-biological  nature  similar  to  that  of  civilized  man  or  that 
he  would  not  react  and  think  in  a  given  situation  much  the  same 
as  we  do,  provided  he  was  similarly  conditioned.  Levy-BruhPs 
thesis  is  that,  culturally  speaking,  the  typical  native,  insofar  as 
he  is  a  product  of  primitive,  native  culture,  does  not  think  logi- 
cally, that  is,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  contradiction,  and 
that  his  mind  obeys  instead  the  organic  law  of  mutual  "partici- 
pation," whereby  all  things  are  thought  to  participate  in  one 
another  in  a  kind  of  "mystic  symbiosis." 

As  Levy-BruhPs  theory  of  the  prelogical  character  of  the 
native  mentality  has  been  the  target  of  much  criticism  on  the 
part  of  modern  anthropologists,  and  as  Cassirer  also  takes  issue 
with  him,  it  will  help  this  discussion,  if  we  refer  directly  to 
Levy-BruhPs  statements  of  his  position.  In  his  work,  How 
Natives  Think  (Les  Fonctions  Mentales  Dans  Les  Societes 
Injerieures)  he  writes: 

By  prelogical  we  do  not  mean  to  assert  that  such  a  mentality  con- 
stitutes a  kind  of  antecedent  state  in  point  of  time  to  the  birth  of 
logical  thought.  ...  It  is  not  antilogical;  it  is  not  alogical  either.  By 
designating  it  "prelogical"  I  merely  wish  to  state  that  it  does  not  bind 
itself  down,  as  our  thought  does,  to  avoid  contradiction.  It  obeys  the 
law  of  participation  first  and  foremost. 

Essentially  mystic  as  it  is,  it  finds  no  difficulty  in  imagining  as  well 
as  feeling  the  identity  of  the  one  and  the  many,  the  individual  and  the 
species,  of  entities  however  unlike  they  be,  by  means  of  participation. 
In  this  lies  its  guiding  principle;  this  it  is  which  accounts  for  the  kind 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  519 

of  abstraction  and  generalization  peculiar  to  such  a  mentality  and  to 
this  again  we  must  mainly  refer  the  characteristic  forms  of  activity  we 
find  in  primitive  peoples. 

As  has  been  said,  these  characteristics  apply  only  to  the  collective 
representations  and  their  connections.  Considered  as  an  individual,  the 
primitive  in  so  far  as  he  thinks  and  acts  independently  of  these  collective 
representations  where  possible,  will  usually  feel,  argue  and  act  as  we 
should  expect  him  to  do.  The  inferences  he  draws  will  be  just  those 
which  would  seem  reasonable  to  us  in  like  circumstances.  .  .  .  But 
though  on  occasions  of  this  sort  primitives  may  reason  as  we  do,  though 
they  follow  a  course  similar  to  the  one  we  should  take  (which  in  the 
more  simple  cases,  the  most  intelligent  among  the  animals  would  also 
do)  it  does  not  follow  that  their  mental  activity  is  always  subject  to  the 
same  laws  as  ours.  In  fact,  as  far  as  it  is  collective,  it  has  laws  which 
are  peculiar  to  itself,  and  the  first  and  most  universal  of  these  is  the 
law  of  participation." 

Thus,  according  to  Levy-Bruhl,  the  mentality  of  native  peo- 
ples is  prelogical  in  the  sense  that  its  collective  representations, 
the  mode  of  thought  which  is  culturally  conditioned  by  a  given 
society,  is  indifferent  to  the  law  of  contradiction  and  is  said  to 
be  regulated  instead  by  the  law  of  participation.  This  renders 
the  native  mentality  essentially  mystical  to  our  usual  way  of 
thinking.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  mind  of  civil- 
ized man  is  entirely  logical  by  comparison.  On  the  contrary, 
for  Levy-Bruhl  "the  rational  unity  of  the  thinking  being  .  .  . 
is  a  desideratum,  not  a  fact."100  Our  mentality  is  said  to  be  both 
rational  and  irrational:  "The  prelogical  and  the  mystic  are 
co-existent  with  the  logical."  In  civilized  society  the  logical, 
scientific  aspect  of  thought  may  be  dominant,  but  there  always 
remain  elements  of  prelogical  mentality — a  fact  which  accounts 
for  the  antinomies  of  thought  and  the  struggle  of  reason  with 
itself. 

•  The  prelogical,  mystical  character  of  native  collective  repre- 
sentations also  renders  intelligible  the  socio-cultural  function 
of  their  myths.  Myths  are  interpreted  as  "an  expression  of  the 

M  Lucien  Le'vy-Bruhl,  How  Natives  Think  (Let  Fonctions  Mentales  Dans  Les 
Societts  Inftrieures,  Paris,  1910),  London  &  New  York,  1926$  ySf,  135^ 
386. 


520  DAVID  SIDNEY 

solidarity  of  the  social  group  with  itself  in  its  own  epoch  and  in 
the  past,  and  with  the  groups  of  being  surrounding  it,  and  a 
means  of  maintaining  and  reviving  this  feeling  of  solidarity."101 
In  opposition  to  Levy-BruhPs  evolutionary  conception  of  the 
prelogical,  cultural  mentality  of  the  native,  Bronislaw  Mali- 
nowski  has  maintained  that  the  native  distinguishes  clearly 
between  the  sphere  of  the  natural  and  secular  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  sphere  of  the  supernatural  and  holy  on  the  other.  As 
opposed  to  the  intellectualism  and  individualism  of  Tylor  and 
Frazer,  and  in  agreement  with  Levy-Bruhl,  he  maintains  that 
myths  originate  in  social,  practical  and  emotional  needs  and 
serve  to  strengthen  the  feeling  of  solidarity  between  the  indi- 
vidual and  his  community  as  well  as  between  the  community 
and  the  forces  of  the  natural,  cosmic  environment.  The  socio- 
logical, functional  significance  of  myths  has  been  emphasized 
by  Malinowski,  especially  in  his  monograph  on  Myth  in  Primi- 
tive Psychology.  He  writes: 

Studied  alive,  myth  is  not  symbolic,  but  a  direct  expression  of  its 
subject-matter;  it  is  not  an  explanation  in  satisfaction  of  a  scientific 
interest,  but  a  narrative  resurrection  of  a  primeval  reality,  told  in 
satisfaction  of  deep  religious  wants,  moral  cravings,  social  submissions, 
assertions,  even  practical  requirements.  Myth  fulfils  in  primitive  culture 
an  indispensable  function;  it  expresses,  enhances,  and  codifies  belief;  it 
safeguards  and  enforces  morality;  it  vouches  for  the  efficiency  of  ritual 
and  contains  practical  rules  for  the  guidance  of  man.  Myth  is  thus  a 
vital  ingredient  of  human  civilization ;  it  is  not  an  idle  tale  but  a  hard- 
worked  active  force;  it  is  not  an  intellectual  explanation  or  an  artistic 
imagery,  but  a  pragmatic  charter  of  primitive  faith  and  moral  wisdom.102 

According  to  Malinowski,  the  native  resorts  to  myth  and 
magic,  not  because  he  fails  to  distinguish  the  natural  from  the 
supernatural,  or  the  scientific  from  the  magical,  but  precisely 
because  he  does  in  fact  make  this  distinction.  Myths  and  magic 
are  resorted  to  only  when  all  common,  rational  techniques  and 
processes  fail,  as  in  time  of  crisis  or  extreme  danger.  As  Mali- 
nowski puts  it: 


101  Ibid.,  371. 

MMyth  in  Primitive  Psychology,  23. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  521 

Primitive  man  has  his  science  as  well  as  his  religion;  a  myth  does 
not  serve  to  explain  phenomena  but  rather  to  regulate  human  actions. . . . 
It  is  rather  the  recognition  of  his  practical  and  intellectual  limitations 
and  not  the  illusion  of  the  omnipotence  of  thought  which  leads  man 
into  ritualism,  which  makes  him  re-enact  miracles,  the  feasibility  of 
which  he  has  accepted  from  his  mythology.  ...  In  short,  myth  is  not  a 
pseudo-science  of  nature,  it  is  a  history  of  the  supernatural.  It  invariably 
refers  to  a  unique  break  in  the  history  of  the  world  and  mankind.103 

There  is  no  need,  therefore,  for  Malinowski  to  assume  a 
mythical  mentality  which  gradually  evolved  into  the  logical 
mentality  of  civilized  man.  Myths  are  expressions  of  acts  of 
faith  and  as  such  are  characteristic  of  man  at  practically  all 
stages  of  human  culture.  Myths  as  beliefs  in  the  supernatural 
thus  complement  scientific  theory  and  practice;  they  are  neither 
a  substitute  for  science  nor  the  antithesis  of  scientific  thought.  In 
Malinowski's  words: 

Mythology,  then,  is  definitely  the  complement  of  what  might  be 
called  the  ordinary  knowledge  or  science  of  primitive  man,  but  not 
its  substitute.  .  .  .  The  so-called  primitives  do  distinguish  between  natural 
and  supernatural.  They  explain,  not  by  telling  a  fairy-tale,  but  by  refer- 
ence to  experience,  logical  and  common  sense,  even  as  we  do.  Since 
they  have  their  own  science,  mythology  cannot  be  their  system  of 
explanation  in  the  scientific  sense  of  the  word.  Myth  serves  as  a 
foundation  for  belief  and  establishes  a  precedent  for  the  miracles  of 
ritual  and  magic.104 

Thus,  it  appears,  myth  is  regarded  as  an  essential  element  in 
the  life  of  primitive  as  well  as  in  that  of  civilized  man.  Myth 
begins  where  scientific  knowledge  ends  and  yet,  it  is  pragmati- 
cally significant  in  providing  assurance  of,  and  faith  in,  the 
harmony  of  man  and  nature.  In  brief,  for  Malinowski,  mythical 
thought  is  not  prelogical  but  rather  post-logical  and  post- 
scientific,  in  the  sense  that  it  involves  an  act  of  faith  in  the 

108  The  Foundations  of  Faith  and  Morals:  An  anthropological  analysis  of 
primitive  beliefs  and  conduct  with  special  reference  to  the  fundamental  problems 
of  religion  and  ethics.  Delivered  as  Riddell  Memorial  Lectures,  Seventh  Series, 
1934-5  (London,  1936). 

104  Ibid.  Cf,  also  his  "Magic,  Science  and  Religion,"  in  Science,  Religion  and 
Reality,  ed.  by  J.  Needham,  (New  York,  1928). 


522  DAVID  SIDNEY 

supernatural  and  miraculous  which  goes  beyond  logic  and  scien- 
tific evidence.  It  is  of  interest  to  note  in  this  connection,  that 
William  James'  Will  to  Believe  provides  a  philosophical  justi- 
fication for  a  similar  faith  on  the  part  of  civilized  man. 

When  we  turn  to  Cassirer's  own  theory  of  mythical  thought 
we  find  a  rather  curious  state  of  affairs.  To  begin  with,  his 
description  of  mythical  mentality  is  similar  in  all  essentials  to 
the  evolutionary  theory  of  Levy-Bruhl,  and  even  goes  beyond 
the  latter  in  positing  a  radical  disparity  between  the  mythical 
and  logical  stages  of  development.  It  is  significant  to  note  that 
Susanne  K.  Langer,  in  her  preface  to  the  translation  of  Cas- 
sirer's  Language  and  Myth,  actually  refers  to  his  "theory  of 
prelogical  conception  and  expression."105  When,  however,  we 
turn  to  Cassirer's  Essay  on  Man,  we  find  he  takes  issue  with 
Levy-Bruhl  over  the  latter's  concept  of  the  prelogical.  Thus  he 
states: 

The  thesis  of  Durkheim  has  come  to  its  full  development  in  the 
work  of  Levy-Bruhl.  But  here  we  meet  with  a  more  general  character- 
istic. Mystical  thought  is  described  as  "prelogical  thought"  If  it  asks 
for  causes,  these  are  neither  logical  nor  empirical;  they  are  <cmystic 
causes."  .  .  .  According  to  Levy-Bruhl  this  mystic  character  of  primitive 
religion  follows  from  the  very  fact  that  its  representations  are  "collective 
representations."  To  these  we  cannot  apply  the  rules  of  our  own  logic 
that  are  intended  for  quite  different  purposes.  If  we  approach  this  field, 
even  the  law  of  contradiction  and  all  the  other  laws  of  rational  thought, 
become  invalid.  To  my  mind  the  French  sociological  school  has  given 
full  and  conclusive  proof  of  the  first  part  of  its  thesis  but  not  of  the 
second  part.  The  fundamental  social  character  of  myth  is  uncontroverted. 
But  that  all  primitive  mentality  necessarily  is  prelogical  or  mystical  seems 
to  be  in  contradiction  with  our  anthropological  and  ethnological  evidence. 
We  find  many  spheres  of  primitive  life  and  culture  that  show  the  well- 
known  features  of  our  own  cultural  life.  As  long  as  we  assume  an 
absolute  heterogeneity  between  our  own  logic  and  that  of  the  primitive 
mind,  as  long  as  we  think  them  specifically  different  from  and  radically 
opposed  to  each  other,  we  can  scarcely  account  for  this  fact.  Even  in 
primitive  life  we  always  find  a  secular  or  profane  sphere  outside  the 
holy  sphere.106 

103  LM.,  x. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  523 

Similarly,  in  his  Myth  of  the  State  Cassirer  resumes  his 
criticism: 

We  find  the  very  reverse  of  this  conception  in  Levy-Bruhl's  well- 
known  description  of  "primitive  mentality."  According  to  Levy-Bruhl 
the  task  that  former  theories  had  set  themselves  was  impossible  —  a 
contradiction  in  terms.  It  is  vain  to  seek  for  a  common  measure  between 
primitive  mentality  and  our  own.  They  do  not  belong  to  the  same 
genus;  they  are  radically  opposed  the  one  to  the  other.  The  rules  which  to 
the  civilized  man  seem  to  be  unquestionable  and  inviolable  are  entirely 
unknown  and  constantly  thwarted  in  primitive  thought.  The  savage's 
mind  is  not  capable  of  all  those  processes  of  arguing  and  reasoning  that 
were  ascribed  to  it  in  Frazer's  and  Tylor's  theories.  It  is  not  a  logical, 
but  a  "prelogical"  or  a  mystic  mind.  Even  the  most  elementary  principles 
of  our  logic  are  openly  defied  by  this  mystic  mind.  The  savage  lives 
in  a  world  of  his  own  —  in  a  world  which  is  impermeable  to  experience 
and  unaccessible  to  our  forms  of  thought.107 

In  view  of  the  statements  quoted  from  Levy-BruhPs  work, 
one  cannot  regard  Cassirer's  criticism  as  valid.  The  latter,  it 
would  appear,  has  read  Levy-Bruhl  too  much  through  Mali- 
nowski's  eyes.  Levy-Bruhl,  we  have  seen,  does  not  deny  that  the 
native  is  capable  individually  of  psychological  functions  similar 
to  those  of  civilized  man.  He  affirms  most  explicitly  that  there 
is  a  common  measure  between  primitive  mentality  and  our  own 
and  that  the  difference  between  them  is  one  of  degree,  not 
of  kind.  All  that  he  claims  is  that  a  comparative  analysis  of  the 
ethnological  literature  dealing  with  native  thought  and  practice 
reveals  a  typical,  collective,  cultural  mentality  which  is  pre- 
dominantly prelogical  in  character.  This  does  not  mean  to  say 
that  all  of  native  culture  reveals  this  prelogical  character  and 
that  it  does  not  manifest  logical,  rational  traits  as  well,  but  only 
that  prelogical  thought  is  typical  of  native  culture  and  serves  as 
a  means  of  differentiating  it  from  the  typical  scientific  thought 
of  civilized  man.  The  collective  representations  of  the  native 
are  said  to  reveal  a  cultural  mentality  which  is  indifferent  to 
the  law  of  contradiction  as  exemplified  in  our  contemporary 
cultural  mentality;  but  this  does  not  imply  that  the  former  may 


J.,  ii. 


524  DAVID  BIDNEY 

not  reveal,  within  limited  areas,  logical  and  empirical  traits 
as  well. 

Furthermore,  it  should  be  noted,  native  collective  representa- 
tions are  said  to  presuppose  an  organic  metaphysics  which  postu- 
lates the  intrinsic  unity  of  all  forms  of  life  and  the  "affective 
category  of  the  supernatural."108  The  collective  or  social  charac- 
ter of  these  metaphysical  representations  does  not,  however, 
explain  or  account  for  their  prelogical  or  mystical,  epistemic 
character  as  Cassirer  suggests  it  does.  There  is  no  evidence  that 
Levy-Bruhl  regarded  the  social  function  of  native  representa- 
tions as  determining  their  prelogical  or  mystical  form  of  ex- 
pression, and  it  would  appear,  therefore,  as  if  Cassirer  were 
reading  his  own  functionalistic  thesis  into  the  former's  thought 
at  this  point.  Our  civilized  collective  representations  are  logi- 
cal or  scientific  and  the  individual  who  participates  in  our  form 
of  civilization  reflects  the  social  character  of  our  civilization, 
just  as  the  native  reflects  the  social  or  collective  representations 
of  pre-scientific  native  culture.  One  may  indeed  question,  as 
modern  ethnologists  have  done,  the  extent  of  the  influence  of 
social  culture  upon  the  individual  in  native  society  and  whether 
the  individual  does  not  deviate,  far  more  than  the  Durkheim 
school  presupposed,  from  the  social  norms  which  are  professed 
collectively.  But  Cassirer  does  not  take  into  consideration  this 
commonly  accepted  criticism  j  on  the  contrary,  he  accepts  un- 
critically "the  social  character  of  myth,"  while  taking  objection 
to  the  theory  of  the  prelogical. 

It  should  be  noted,  furthermore,  that  the  prelogical  mentality 
is  not,  according  to  Levy-Bruhl,  meant  to  be  either  illogical  or 
irrational  5  it  simply  involves  a  different  type  of  logic  which  the 
scientific  mind  can  reconstruct  and  infer.  The  issue,  therefore, 
of  the  logical  versus  prelogical  nature  of  native  thought  is 
largely  verbal  and  originates  from  the  tendency  to  identify  our 
own  Western,  syllogistic  logic  with  logic  in  general,  and  to 
regard  any  other  form  of  thought  with  different  ontological 
presuppositions  as  non-logical  or  prelogical.  It  may  be  granted, 
accordingly,  that  Levy-BruhPs  use  of  the  term  prelogical  was 
most  unfortunate,  since  the  real  antithesis  is  between  the  pre- 

108  L6vy-Bruhl,  Primitives  and  the  Supernatural^  (London,  1936),  36. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  525 

scientific  and  scientific  mentality  and  not  at  all  between  the 
logical  and  prelogical  mentality.  The  issue,  in  other  words,  is 
ultimately  ontological  and  cultural,  and  not  psychological  or 
logical.  If  we  accept  the  basic  ontological  premise  of  native 
metaphysical  thought,  namely,  the  organic  unity  of  all  forms  of 
life  ajjgl  the  internality  of  all  relations,  then  their  mode  of 
thought  appears  quite  intelligible  and  logical,  even  though  it  is, 
in  its  extant  forms,  hardly  scientific,  since  it  may  not  be  verified 
by  objective,  empirical  tests.109 

Levy-Bruhl  would,  therefore,  be  in  complete  agreement  with 
Cassirer's  statement  that 

What  we,  from  our  own  point  of  view,  may  call  irrational,  prelogical, 
mystical  are  the  premises  from  which  mythical  or  religious  interpretation 
starts,  but  not  the  mode  of  interpretation.  If  we  accept  these  premises 
and  if  we  understand  them  aright — if  we  see  them  in  the  same  light 
that  primitive  man  does — the  inferences  drawn  from  them  cease  to 
appear  illogical  or  antilogical.  .  .  .  Primitive  man  by  no  means  lacks 
the  ability  to  grasp  the  empirical  differences  of  things.  But  in  his  concep- 
tion of  nature  and  life  all  these  differences  are  obliterated  by  a  stronger 
feeling:  the  deep  conviction  of  a  fundamental  and  indelible  solidarity 
of  life  that  bridges  over  the  multiplicity  and  variety  of  its  single  forms.110 

This  is  precisely  Levy-BruhPs  thesis  as  any  reading  of  the 
latter's  works  makes  evident.  The  very  argument  that  native 
thought  is  neither  illogical  nor  antilogical,  and  that  it  pre- 
supposes "the  solidarity  of  life"  occur  explicitly  in  Levy-BruhPs 
writings.  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  for  the  most  part 
Cassirer  was  really  fighting  a  straw-man,  a  figment  of  his  own 
imagination  and  of  that  of  Malinowski,  since  he  criticized  Levy- 
Bruhl  for  views  which  the  latter  never  held  and  then  proceeded 
to  submit  as  his  own  the  very  thesis  which  the  subject  of  his 
criticism  had  maintained.  In  fact,  it  may  be  shown,  that  Cas- 
sirer's  conception  of  mythical  thought  involved,  as  Susanne  K. 
Langer  has  said,  a  prelogical  interpretation  according  to  which 
native,  mythical  thought  is  regarded  as  antecedent  in  point  of 

109  It  is  significant  to  point  out  in  this  connection  that  modern  philosophical 
and  scientific  thought  is  also  tending  towards  an  organic  type  of  metaphysics — a 
fact  which  explains,  as  in  the  work  of  A.  N.  Whitehead,  the  necessity  for  a  radical 
change  in  our  terminology  and  mode  of  thinking. 

110  EM.,  8of. 


526  DAVID  SIDNEY 

time  to  logical  thought  and  hence  as  non-logical.  Levy-Bruhl, 
on  the  other  hand,  claims  that  native  thought  is  prelogical  only 
in  the  sense  that  it  is  indifferent  to  a  strict  adherence  to  the  law 
of  contradiction,  but  not  in  the  sense  that  the  native  is  incapable 
of  logical  thought.  In  other  words,  the  disparity  between  mythi- 
cal and  logical  thought  is  much  greater  in  Cassirer*  s  own  theory 
of  mental  and  cultural  development  than  it  is  in  Levy-Bruhlys 
work.  Cassirer  has,  in  effect,  taken  over  Levy-BruhPs  interpre- 
tation of  the  ontological  presuppositions  of  native  thought, 
while  criticizing  the  latter's  use  of  the  term  prelogical  to  de- 
scribe the  native  mode  of  thinking.  But,  in  doing  so,  Cassirer 
has  undermined  his  own  theory  of  the  development  of  human 
thought  from  a  mythical  or  prelogical  to  a  logical  stage. 

Cassirer,  it  seems,  gives  his  whole  case  against  Levy-Bruhl 
away  when  he  admits  in  his  Myth  of  the  State: 

Of  course  we  must  not  understand  the  term  "logic"  in  too  narrow 
a  sense.  We  cannot  expect  the  Aristotelian  categories  of  thought  or  the 
elements  of  our  parts-of-speech  system,  the  rules  of  Greek  and  Latin 
syntax,  in  languages  of  aboriginal  American  tribes.  These  expectations 
are  bound  to  fail;  but  this  does  not  prove  that  these  languages  are  in 
any  sense  "illogical"  or  even  less  logical  than  ours.111 

Once  it  is  admitted  that  the  term  logic  is  not  to  be  used  in 
"too  narrow  a  sense,"  then  Levy-BruhPs  use  of  the  term  pre- 
logical may  be  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  define  the  type  of 
logic  which  is  characteristic  of  native  language  and  thought. 
Cassirer  himself  has  employed  the  term  "mythical  thought"  in- 
stead of  the  term  "prelogical  mentality}"  but  the  meaning  of 
the  two  terms  is  practically  identical,  as  may  be  seen  from  the 
fact  that  the  mythical  mentality  is  said  to  have  all  the  attributes 
ascribed  by  Levy-Bruhl  to  the  prelogical  mentality.  Thus, 
according  to  Cassirer,  mythical  thought  does  not  clearly  dis- 
tinguish between  reality  and  the  symbol,  accepts  the  principle  of 
pars  pro  toto  in  magical  practices,  does  not  recognize  the  limits 
of  individuality,  and  accepts  totemistic  beliefs.112  All  these 
modes  of  thought  are  to  be  found  duplicated  and  attributed  to 


111  MS.,  i3f. 

112  Cf.  LM. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  527 

the  prelogical  mentality  in  Levy-BruhPs  writings.113  Both 
writers  also  presuppose  that  the  native  mentality,  whether 
mythical  or  prelogical,  differs  radically  from  the  logical  or 
scientific  mentality  of  modern  man,  and  that  rationality  in  the 
scientific  sense  is  a  state  of  mind  which  is  achieved  only  gradu- 
ally in  the  process  of  cultural  evolution. 

The  real  difficulty  in  Cassirer's  conception  of  myth  lies  in  the 
fact  that  he  has  attempted  to  combine  the  antithetical  ethnologi- 
cal views  of  Levy-Bruhl  and  Malinowski.  On  the  one  hand,  as 
said,  he  agrees  substantially  with  the  former's  evolutionary  con- 
ception of  native  mentality.  On  the  other  hand,  he  also  professes 
agreement  with  Malinowski's  thesis  that  the  native  mind  clearly 
differentiates  the  category  of  the  natural  from  the  supernatural, 
the  sphere  of  science  from  that  of  magic.  According  to  this 
functionalistic  theory  of  myth,  myth  and  magic  are  not  ante- 
cedent to  logic  and  science,  but  rather  post-logical  and  post- 
scientific  mental  inventions  utilized  in  times  of  crisis,  when 
scientific  thought  fails  to  achieve  the  desired  ends  of  action  and 
fails  to  satisfy  the  human  longing  for  security.  Thus  whereas 
Levy-Bruhl  maintains  that  prelogical  thought  is  something  to 
be  struggled  against,  something  to  be  superseded  in  the  de- 
velopment of  a  logical,  scientific  mentality,  Malinowski  accepts 
mythical  thought  as  a  means  universally  employed  to  tide 
societies  over  difficult  periods  of  transition.  Cassirer,  it  would 
appear,  would  have  it  both  ways  at  once,  maintaining  that 
mythical  thought  is  antecedent  to  logical  thought,  and  holding 
with  Malinowski  that  the  native  mind  differentiates  clearly 
between  the  sphere  of  science  and  that  of  myth. 

15 
Cassirer  on  the  Role  of  Myth  in  the  History  of  Human  Culture 

The  practical  import  of  Cassirer's  utilization  of  these  anti- 
thetical conceptions  of  mythical  thought  may  be  seen  in  his 
diagnosis  of  the  crisis  of  our  times  as  well  as  in  his  interpretation 
of  the  history  of  philosophical  anthropology. 

In  the  final  chapter  of  the  Myth  of  the  State,  entitled  "The 

118  Cf.  Levy-BruhPs  Primitive  Mentality  (New  York,  1923)5  The  Soul  of  the 
Primitive,  (London,  1928). 


528  DAVID  SIDNEY 

Technique  of  the  Modern  Political  Myths,"  we  find  he  again 
takes  up  Malinowski's  thesis  that  myth-making  and  magic  are 
elemental  functions  of  the  human  mind,  which  make  their 
appearance  in  times  of  crisis.  Thus  he  writes: 

In  all  those  tasks  that  need  no  particular  and  exceptional  efforts,  no 
special  courage  or  endurance,  we  find  no  magic  and  no  mythology. 
But  a  highly  developed  magic  and  connected  with  it  a  mythology  always 
occurs  if  a  pursuit  is  dangerous  and  its  issues  uncertain.  This  description 
of  the  role  of  magic  and  mythology  in  primitive  society  applies  equally 
well  to  highly  advanced  stages  of  man's  political  life.  In  desperate 
situations  man  will  always  have  recourse  to  desperate  means — and  our 
present-day  political  myths  have  been  such  desperate  means.  If  reason 
has  failed  us,  there  remains  always  the  ultima  ratio,  the  power  of  the 
miraculous  and  mysterious.114 

Cassirer,  it  appears  from  this,  regards  myth  as  irrational  and 
illogical  (in  agreement  with,  but  going  beyond  Levy-BruhPs 
thesis),  but  at  the  same  time  agrees  with  Malinowski  that  myth 
fulfils  a  positive  social  function  in  times  of  social  crisis.  Never- 
theless, myth  is  something  to  be  opposed  and  struggled  against 
— and  not  something  to  be  welcomed  as  a  complement  to  reason, 
as  Malinowski's  premises  imply.  The  social  function  of  myth 
in  producing  a  feeling  of  solidarity  with  one's  society  and  with 
nature  in  general  is  said  to  be  evil,  since  it  comes  as  a  victory 
for  the  forces  of  irrationalism.  In  Cassirer Js  words: 

In  all  critical  moments  of  man's  social  life  the  rational  forces  that 
resist  the  rise  of  the  old  mythical  conceptions  are  no  longer  sure  of 
themselves.  In  these  moments  the  time  for  myth  has  come  again.  For 
myth  has  not  been  really  vanquished  and  subjugated.  It  is  always  there, 
lurking  in  the  dark  and  waiting  for  its  hour  and  opportunity.  This  hour 
comes  as  soon  as  the  other  binding  forces  of  man's  social  life,  for  one 
reason  or  another,  lose  their  strength  and  are  no  longer  able  to  combat 
the  demonic  mythical  powers.115 

This  statement  implies  that  in  time  of  crisis,  at  least,  even 
modern  man  is  no  longer  sure  of  himself  and  fails  to  differ- 
entiate clearly  between  reason  and  myth.  It  is  not  that  myth 
complements  reason  but  rather  overcomes  it  and  subjugates  or 

114  MS.,  279. 

™  MS.,  280. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  52$ 

represses  it.  Hence,  according  to  this  psychoanalytic  interpre- 
tation, myth  arises  in  modern  times  as  a  reversion  to  the  primi- 
tive state  of  mind  from  which  mankind  slowly  emerged.  In 
other  words,  although  Cassirer  professes  agreement  with  the 
functionalistic  thesis  that  the  native  mind  does  differentiate 
clearly  between  scientific  reason  and  emotional,  mystical  feeling, 
he  justifies  and  explains  the  reversion  from  the  rational  to  the 
mythical  mentality  as  a  failure  to  keep  this  radical  disparity 
in  mind — thereby  utilizing  the  presupposition  of  Levy-Bruhl. 
At  the  same  time,  following  the  psychoanalytical  approach,  he 
also  recognizes  the  ideal  motive  in  modern  social  myth — a  point 
Ruth  Benedict  had  made — by  suggesting  that  social  myths  serve 
as  expressions  or  objectifications  of  "collective  wishes"  which 
are  personified  in  the  political  leader  who  is  endowed  for  this 
purpose  with  powers  of  "social  magic"  to  fulfil  the  collective 
wish.116 

On  the  whole,  it  would  appear,  Cassirer's  attitude  toward 
magic  and  myth  is  ambivalent  and  reflects  the  conflict  between 
romantic  and  rationalistic  traditions  which  he  sought  to  rec- 
oncile. From  an  ethnological  standpoint,  he  shares  the  view  of 
the  romanticists  that  myth  constitutes  an  essential  element  in 
the  evolution  of  human  culture  and  thought.  As  a  critical  ideal- 
ist, on  the  other  hand,  he  is  fundamentally  a  rationalist  who 
participates  in  the  struggle  against  the  power  of  myth  as  an 
irrational,  demonic  force.  In  his  Myth  of  the  State  Cassirer 
has  himself  well  stated  the  antithesis  between  the  rationalist  and 
romantic  approaches: 

That  is  the  real  difference,  the  deep  gulf,  between  the  period  of  the 
Enlightenment  and  German  romanticism.  .  .  .  According  to  this 
metaphysical  conception  the  value  of  myth  is  completely  changed.  To 
all  the  thinkers  of  the  Enlightenment  myth  had  been  a  barbarous  thing, 
a  strange  and  uncouth  mass  of  confused  ideas  and  gross  superstitions, 
a  mere  monstrosity.  Between  myth  and  philosophy  there  could  be  no 
point  of  contact.  Myth  ends  where  philosophy  begins — as  darkness  gives 
way  to  the  rising  sun.  This  view  undergoes  a  radical  change  as  soon 
as  we  pass  to  the  romantic  philosophers.  In  the  system  of  these  philosophers 
myth  becomes  not  only  a  subject  of  the  highest  intellectual  interest  but 
also  a  subject  of  awe  and  veneration.  It  is  regarded  as  the  mainspring 

.,  i8of. 


530  DAVID  SIDNEY 

of  human  culture.  Art,  history,  and  poetry  originate  in  myth.  A  phi- 
losophy which  overlooks  or  neglects  this  origin  is  declared  to  be  shallow 
and  inadequate.  It  was  one  of  the  principal  aims  of  Schelling's  system 
to  give  myth  its  right  and  legitimate  place  in  human  civilization.  In  his 
works  we  find  for  the  first  time  a  philosophy  of  mythology  side  by  side 
with  his  philosophy  of  nature,  history,  and  art.  Eventually  all  his  interest 
seems  to  be  concentrated  upon  this  problem.  Instead  of  being  the  opposite 
of  philosophic  thought  myth  has  become  its  ally;  and,  in  a  sense,  its 
consummation.  ...  In  philosophy  the  influence  of  Schelling  was  counter- 
balanced and  soon  eclipsed  by  the  appearance  of  the  Hegelian  system. 
His  conception  of  the  role  of  mythology  remained  only  an  episode. 
Nevertheless  the  way  was  paved  that  could  lead  later  to  the  rehabilitation 
and  glorification  of  myth  that  we  find  in  modern  politics.117 

One  may  understand  Cassirer's  own  philosophy  of  mythology 
as  an  attempt  to  reconcile  the  extremes  of  rationalism  and 
romanticism.  With  the  latter  he  shares  the  conviction  that 
myths  have  a  significant  cultural  value  in  revealing  the  origin 
and  basic  motivations  of  human  language  and  historical  thought. 
But  Cassirer  does  not  share  the  unqualified  enthusiasm  of  the 
romanticists  for  mythology,  since,  as  a  philosopher  and  intel- 
lectual, he  is  conscious  of  the  excesses  to  which  mythology  is  in- 
clined, once  its  adherents  leave  the  realm  of  poetry  and  extend 
their  influence  into  the  realm  of  politics.  In  the  sphere  of 
politics,  therefore,  he  shares  the  rationalistic  approach  and 
accepts  the  rule  of  reason  as  over  against  the  "reason"  of  rule, 
which  is  the  myth  of  the  state. 

It  is  of  interest  in  this  connection  to  examine  Cassirer's  inter- 
pretation of  Plato's  theory  of  myth.  In  the  Republic  (Bk.  10), 
Plato  would  expel  the  poets  from  his  ideal,  regimented  state 
because,  as  mere  "imitators,"  they  were  "thrice-removed  from 
reality."  According  to  Cassirer,  Plato  was  justified  in  his  expul- 
sion of  the  poets  from  the  ideal  republic  on  the  ground  that  in 
politics  myth  is  the  most  dangerous  enemy.  The  fact  that  Plato 
himself  invented  some  myths  of  his  own  is  explained  away  on 
the  ground  that  Plato  did  not  mind  a  few  suggestive  myths  in 
metaphysics,  but  considered  myth  much  too  dangerous  in  politi- 
cal theory.  As  Cassirer  puts  it: 

How  is  it  to  be  accounted  for  that  the  same  thinker  who  admitted 
117  Ibid.,  i8if. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  531 

mythical  concepts  and  mythical  language  so  readily  into  his  metaphysics 
and  his  natural  philosophy  spoke  in  an  entirely  different  vein  when 
developing  his  political  theories?  For  in  this  field  Plato  became  the 
professed  enemy  of  myth.  If  we  tolerate  myth  in  our  political  systems, 
he  declared,  all  our  hopes  for  a  reconstruction  and  reformation  of  our 
political  and  social  life  are  lost.  There  is  only  one  alternative:  we  have 
to  make  our  choice  between  an  ethical  and  a  mythical  conception  of 
the  state.  In  the  Legal  State,  the  state  of  justice,  there  is  no  room  left 
for  the  conceptions  of  mythology,  for  the  gods  of  Homer  and  Hesiod.118 

Cassirer  then  proceeds  to  quote  from  Plato's  Re-public  (37yf ) 
a  passage  which  demonstrates  that  Plato  wished  to  "supervise 
the  making  of  fables  and  legends,  rejecting  all  which  are  un- 
satisfactory." But  this  merely  shows  that  Plato  had  no  senti- 
mental attachment  for  tradition  as  such  and  was  prepared  to 
adopt  a  critical  attitude  towards  it,  even  as  Socrates  had  done, 
accepting  what  appeared  to  him  to  be  rational  and  rejecting 
what  he  thought  was  irrational.  The  passage  does  not  prove  that 
Plato  decided  to  expel  the  poets  from  his  ideal  republic  for 
political  reasons  or  that  he  considered  the  poets  especially  a 
great  political  menace.  As  a  philosopher  Plato  sought  to  estab- 
lish a  true  theory  of  the  state  and  in  this  sense  he  was  opposed 
to  mere  myth  or  fiction  in  political  theory.  One  must  make  a 
choice  between  a  rational  and  a  mythical  conception  of  the  state 
but  not  between  philosophers  and  poets. 

According  to  Cassirer, 

What  is  combated  and  rejected  by  Plato  is  not  poetry  itself,  but  the 
myth-making  function.  To  him  and  to  every  other  Greek  both  things 
were  inseparable.  From  time  immemorial  the  poets  had  been  the  real  myth 
makers.  As  Herodotus  said,  Homer  and  Hesiod  had  made  the  generations 
of  the  gods;  they  had  portrayed  their  shapes  and  distinguished  their 
offices  and  powers.  Here  was  the  real  danger  for  the  Platonic  Republic. 
To  admit  poetry  meant  to  admit  myth,  but  myth  could  not  be  admitted 
without  frustrating  all  philosophic  efforts  and  undermining  the  very 
foundations  of  Plato's  state.  Only  by  expelling  the  poets  from  the  ideal 
state  could  the  philosopher's  state  be  protected  against  the  intrusion 
of  subversive  hostile  forces.  Plato  did  not  entirely  forbid  mythical  tales; 
he  even  admitted  that,  in  the  education  of  a  young  child,  they  are 
indispensable.  But  they  must  be  brought  under  a  strict  discipline.119 

118  Ibid.,  72. 
*.,  67. 


532  DAVID  BIDNEY 

Here,  almost  in  the  same  breath,  Cassirer  maintains  that 
Plato  felt  compelled  to  expel  the  poets  from  his  Republic  be- 
cause they  were  myth-makers,  and  yet  admits  that  mythical 
tales,  when  properly  censored,  were  considered  indispensable 
in  the  education  of  the  young.  There  is  a  decided  difference 
between  censoring  the  myth-makers  and  expelling  them  al- 
together. 

In  sum,  it  would  appear,  that  Cassirer  is  reading  into  Plato 
a  political  motive  which  was  alien  to  his  thought.  Plato,  as  a 
scientist  and  philosopher,  was  indeed  opposed  to  mythology, 
insofar  as  it  tended  to  be  accepted  literally  as  religious  truth. 
Yet,  as  educator,  he  reluctantly  admitted  that  myths  were  in- 
dispensable in  educating  young  people  and  in  exemplifying  a 
metaphysical,  religious  truth.  Myths  in  other  words,  if  properly 
constructed  and  selected,  were  compatible  with  a  rationalistic 
philosophy.  Nowhere  in  the  Republic  does  Plato  suggest  that 
the  poets  as  well  as  artists  whom  he  criticized  were  a  political 
threat  to  his  ideal  state.  When,  towards  the  end  of  his  Republic, 
he  finally  does  suggest  that  poets  and  painters  are  not  to  be  ad- 
mitted into  a  well-ordered  state,  it  is  for  epistemological  and 
scientific  reasons,  and  not  at  all  for  political  reasons.  It  is  be- 
cause the  poets  and  artists  are  dealing  with  "imitations  of  imi- 
tations" and  are  thrice-removed  from  the  ideal  forms  which 
may  be  intuited  by  reason  that  they  are  not  to  be  allowed  in 
his  scientific  society.120  In  an  ideal  philosophical  state,  where  the 
pursuit  of  truth  and  reality  was  the  most  important  task,  the 
poets  and  artists  as  such  would  have  no  place.  In  the  actual 
historical  state,  however,  they  were  indispensable.  The  non- 
admission  of  the  poets  and  artists  was,  therefore,  for  Plato  an 
ideal,  intellectual  requirement  motivated  by  theoretical  con- 
siderations. It  was  not  motivated  by  practical,  political  con- 
siderations in  the  sense  that  the  poets  and  artists  were  con- 
sidered a  political  threat  to  the  existence  of  the  Republic. 

Perhaps  the  issue  involved  regarding  Plato's  attitude  towards 
the  poets  may  be  pointed  up  by  reference  to  the  difference  of 
opinion  between  Cassirer  and  Jaeger  regarding  the  ultimate 

™  Republic,  X,  601-607. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  533 

status  of  Plato's  Republic.™  According  to  Jaeger,  Plato  re- 
garded the  Republic  as  the  "true  home  of  the  philosopher." 
To  this  Cassirer  counters,  that  the  home  of  the  philosopher  was 
the  civitas  divina,  not  the  civitas  terrena.  Yet,  according  to 
Cassirer,  "Plato  did  not  allow  this  religious  tendency  to  in- 
fluence his  political  judgment.  He  became  a  political  thinker  and 
a  statesman  not  by  inclination  but  from  duty."  The  two  points 
of  view  of  Jaeger  and  Cassirer  may  be  reconciled,  if  one  holds 
that  Plato's  Republic  was  indeed  an  ideal  state,  a  heaven  on 
earth,  for  the  philosopher  to  live  in}  and  that  it  was  also  an 
attempt  at  a  practical  resolution  of  the  social  and  political  crises 
which  afflicted  the  Greek  city  states  of  his  day.  The  Republic 
may  therefore  be  considered  Plato's  first  attempt  at  formulating 
a  theory  of  the  ideal  as  well  as  of  the  best  state.122  As  an  ideal, 
the  Republic  was  a  scientific  political  theory  which  dealt  with 
fundamental  principles  of  social  organization  and  culture.  As 
the  best  state,  the  Republic  was  a  practical  social  invention  which 
took  into  consideration  the  current  Greek  culture  and  attempted 
to  eliminate  some  of  its  objectionable  features.  It  may  be  said, 
perhaps,  that  the  idealistic  philosopher  and  practical  statesman 
in  Plato  were  never  quite  reconciled  and  that  the  Republic 
reveals  both  tendencies.  In  this  way,  it  would  seem,  one  could 
account  for  the  fact  that  Plato  at  first  speaks  of  censoring  the 
myth-makers  and  later,  in  the  same  dialogue,  urges  their  non- 
admission.  Cassirer,  in  attributing  to  Plato  a  political  motive 
for  the  non-admission  of  the  poets  and  artists,  is  not  taking 
sufficiently  into  consideration  the  idealistic  motive  in  Plato, 
which  he  himself  has  recognized  in  evaluating  the  Republic  as  a 
whole. 

In  sum,  we  must  distinguish  between  a  mythical  conception 
of  the  state  and  myth-making  as  a  poetic  function.  As  a  ration- 
alistic philosopher,  Plato  rejected  the  former  but  accepted  the 
latter.  This,  I  take  it,  would  be  Cassirer's  position  as  well. 

The  full  significance  of  Cassirer's  antipathy  to  political  myths 
becomes  apparent  in  his  treatment  of  modern  and  contemporary 
theories  of  man  and  the  state. 

121  M.S.,  635  cf.  earlier  discussion  in  Section  2  above. 
69. 


534  DAVID  SIDNEY 

In  discussing  "The  Myth  of  the  Twentieth  Century,"  Cas- 
sirer  contrasts  myth  as  "an  unconscious  activity  and  as  a  free 
product  of  imagination"123  with  the  new  political  myths  which 
are  the  product  of  a  conscious,  deliberate  technique.  As  Cassirer 
puts  it: 

It  has  been  reserved  for  the  twentieth  century,  our  own  great  technical 
age,  to  develop  a  new  technique  of  myth.  Henceforth  myths  can  be 
manufactured  in  the  same  sense  and  according  to  the  same  methods 
as  any  other  modern  weapon  —  as  machine  guns  or  airplanes.  That  is 
a  new  thing  —  and  a  thing  of  crucial  importance.  It  has  changed  the 
whole  form  of  our  social  life.  .  .  .  The  real  rearmament  [of  Germany] 
began  with  the  origin  and  rise  of  the  political  myths.  The  later  military 
rearmament  was  only  an  accessory  after  the  fact.124 

The  new  political  myths  are  fabricated  through  a  deliberate 
change  in  the  function  of  language  from  the  semantic  to  the 
magical  use  of  words,125  from  a  logical  to  a  cynically  pragmatic 
use  of  words  "destined  to  produce  certain  effects  and  to  stir  up 
certain  emotions."  As  in  primitive  societies,  the  modern  totali- 
tarian societies  supplement  magic  words  with  appropriate  social 
rites,  the  neglect  of  which  is  regarded  as  a  crime  against  the 
state.  As  a  result,  Cassirer  notes, 

We  have  learned  that  modern  man,  in  spite  of  his  restlessness,  and 
perhaps  because  of  his  restlessness,  has  not  really  surmounted  the  con- 
dition of  savage  life.  When  exposed  to  the  same  forces,  he  can  easily 
be  thrown  back  to  a  state  of  complete  acquiescence.  He  no  longer 
questions  his  environment;  he  accepts  it  as  a  matter  of  course.126 

Cassirer,  it  appears,  does  not  share  the  naive  faith  of  some  of 
the  nineteenth  century  evolutionists  in  linear  progress  and  in  a 
steady,  continuous  growth  in  rational  institutions.  As  in  the 
sphere  of  biology,  he  recognizes  that  there  may  be  reversions,  in 
part,  to  a  more  primitive  state,  with  the  difference  that  the  new 
primitives  are  far  more  deadly  than  the  old,  having  added  the 
techniques  of  modern  science  to  the  irrationalism  of  primitive 
mentality. 

188  Ibid.,  282. 
184  Ibid.,  282. 


286. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  535 

Since  Cassirer  must  have  had  in  mind  Alfred  Rosenberg's 
Myth  of  the  Twentieth  Century121  in  entitling  the  last  section 
of  his  Myth  of  the  State,  it  will  prove  illuminating  to  consider 
for  a  moment  what  this  Nazi  "philosopher,"  the  influence  of 
whose  work  was  second  only  to  Hitler's  Mem  Kampf,  meant  by 
the  term  my  thus.  Myth,  as  conceived  by  Rosenberg,  became 
transformed  from  a  term  of  disparagement  in  the  sense  of  being 
the  antithesis  of  science,  to  one  of  positive  appreciation  as  some- 
thing which  refers  to  a  truth  which  transcends  science.  Myth 
became  a  racial  or  Volk  ifltuition  of  nature  and*  life,  which  re- 
veals the  special  character  and  destiny  of  a  given  Volk.  On  this 
assumption,  "truth"  is  relative  to  the  needs  and  aspirations  of 
the  folk-soul}  that  which  enhances  the  form  and  inner  values 
of  this  organic  life  is  true.  Of  course,  only  Nordic  man,  and  in 
particular  the  late  Fuehrer,  was  held  to  be  qualified  to  deter- 
mine infallibly  what  is  true  for  the  Volky  since  the  notion  of 
an  objective,  universal  criterion  of  truth  was  rejected  as  a 
perversion  of  Jews,  Catholics,  and  democrats.  In  brief,  myth 
was  understood  as  an  ethnocentric,  mystical  truth  which  was 
validated  pragmatically  by  its  social  consequences  for  a  given, 
chosen  community. 

Rosenberg's  "philosophy"  of  mythology  is  a  political  myth 
in  the  sense  that  it  provides  a  rationalization  for  a  given  pattern 
of  political  action  on  the  part  of  the  state  and  its  leaders.  It  is 
a  conscious  attempt  to  undermine  the  presuppositions  of  an 
objective,  universally  normative  truth  in  the  supposed  interests 
of  a  given  state,  thereby  precluding  any  appeal  to  a  common 
reason  or  to  common  civilized  standards  of  value  in  inter- 
national relations.  It  is  this  new  myth  of  the  state  of  which 
Cassirer  voices  his  disapproval  so  whole-heartedly. 

16 
The  Humanism  and  Rationalism  of  Cassirer 

The  outstanding  characteristics  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  oi 
culture  are  its  humanism  and  rationalism,  both  of  which  derive 
from  his  neo-Kantian  orientation. 

1IT  Alfred  Rosenberg,  The  Myth  of  the  Twentieth  Century,  (Munich,  1930), 
Cf.  Rosenberg's  Na&i  Myth,  by  Albert  R.  Chandler,  (Ithaca,  N.Y.,  1945). 


536  DAVID  SIDNEY 

Cassirer's  standpoint  is  essentially  anthropocentric  or  homo- 
centric.  In  accepting  the  so-called  Copernican  revolution  of 
Kant  he  committed  himself  to  the  view  that  the  human  mind  is 
the  creative  source  of  symbolic  forces  which  serve  as  organs  or 
instruments  for  the  understanding  of  man  and  nature.  Man  is 
said  to  be  an  animal  symbolicum,  living  in  a  symbolical  universe 
of  his  own  creation.  Historically,  man  is  said  to  be  known 
through  the  cultural  achievements  of  humanity.  But,  unlike  the 
positivistic  sociologists,  Cassirer  does  not  regard  culture  as  a 
reality  sui  generis,  as  if  culture  were  to  be  explained  as  a  phe- 
nomenon which  is  conceived  through  itself  alone  and  is  de- 
termined entirely  by  itself.  He  always  reminds  us  that  culture 
consists  of  cultural  symbols  and  that  the  function  of  the  latter 
is  objectification  of  the  experiences  of  the  human  ego.  Thus 
language  is  said  to  symbolize  sense  perception  5  myth  and  re- 
ligion are  symbolic  expressions  of  emotion,  art  of  intuition, 
science  of  understanding.  In  all  instances  of  cultural  symboliza- 
tion  we  are  reminded  of  the  creative  role  of  the  human  ego  in 
the  conception  and  formation  of  its  cultural  symbols.  Thus, 
unlike  some  modern  "culturologists"128  who  stress  man's  pas- 
sivity and  the  predominant  influence  of  cultural  determinism, 
Cassirer  stresses  the  role  of  human  freedom  in  the  development 
of  culture.  As  Cassirer  puts  it: 

Human  culture  taken  as  a  whole  may  be  described  as  the  process 
of  man's  progressive  self-liberation.  Language,  art,  religion,  science  are 
various  phases  in  this  process.  In  all  of  them  man  discovers  and  proves 
a  new  power — the  power  to  build  up  a  world  of  his  own,  an  "ideal" 
world.129 

Cassirer,  like  Ortega  y  Gasset  and  Jean-Paul  Sartre  (see 
earlier,  Section  6),  emphasizes  man's  subjective  freedom  and 
power  of  creativity  in  literally  making  himself  through  the 
process  of  symbolic  objectification.  The  so-called  objective 
world  of  nature  provides  the  stimulus  or  occasion  for  man's 
creative  powers,  but  does  not  affect  the  nature  and  general 
development  of  this  mental-cultural  activity. 

128  Vide  L.  A.  White,  "Man's  control  over  Civilization:  An  Anthropocentric 
Illusion,"  in  The  Scientific  Monthly,  Ixvi,  March  194.8,  235-47. 

*"  EM.,  22  8  j  cf.  Cassirer's  "Naturalistische  und  humanistische  Begrundung 
der  Kulturphilosophie,"  Goteborg-,  1939. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  537 

By  contrast,  those  contemporary  ethnologists  or  "culturolo- 
gists"  who  hold  to  the  "superorganic"  view  of  culture,  draw 
attention  to  the  fact  that  culture  molds  or  determines  human 
personality  and  its  modes  of  expression,  and  claim  that  man  is 
not  at  all  the  free  agent  which  he  erroneously  believes  himself 
to  be.  As  one  culturologist  has  recently  stated:  "From  the 
cultural  determinisms  point  of  view,  human  beings  are  merely 
the  instruments  through  which  cultures  express  themselves. 
.  .  .  Neither  as  groups  nor  as  individuals  do  we  have  a  choice 
of  roles  or  of  fates."130 

Cassirer's  thesis  that  human  culture  as  a  whole  may  be 
described  as  the  process  of  man's  self-liberation  is  thus  seen 
to  be  the  antithesis  of  the  culturological  view  that  culture  is  an 
autonomous  process,  subject  to  its  own  determinate  laws  of 
development,  and  that  man  is  largely  the  instrument  or  vehicle 
of  a  cultural  process  whose  direction  and  modes  he  neither  con- 
trols nor  determines. 

According  to  the  position  proposed  in  this  analysis,  both  the 
above  views  represent  extreme  positions.  Cultural  man  is  neither 
quite  so  free  nor  quite  so  determined  as  the  proponents  of  these 
extremes  tend  to  assume  he  is.  If  one  accepts  the  polaristic  con- 
ception of  culture  suggested  earlier  (Section  7),  then  it  may  be 
said  that  there  is  a  determinate  human  nature  which  is  mani- 
fested functionally  through  culture  but  is  not  reducible  to  cul- 
ture. Hence  man  may  be  conceived  as  being  in  part  determined 
by  himself — by  his  own  nature  and  powers — and  in  part  by  the 
natural  forces  to  which  he  must  adjust  himself  while  utilizing 
them  to  further  his  own  ends.  Man's  essence  may  be  said  to 
determine  his  functions  and  modes  of  existence  in  the  sense  of 
setting  limits  to  human  powers  of  effort  and  endurance  in  any 
given  environment.  On  the  other  hand,  human  life  or  existence 
is  free  in  the  sense  that  man  creates  his  own  forms  of  cultural 
expression  and  symbolization,  while  adjusting  himself  to  the 
conditions  of  his  natural,  cosmic  environment. 

The  notion  of  unpredictable  cultural  freedom  of  expression 
emphasized  by  the  neo-Kantian  idealists  and  the  humanistic 
existentialists  is  based  upon  a  common  ontological  presupposition 

110  L.  A.  White,  "Man's  Control  over  Civilization,"  244,  246.  (See  fn.  128.) 


538  DAVID  BIDNEY 

that  life  or  existence  is  prior  to  its  own  essence,  and  that  life 
creates  itself  progressively  through  its  own  expressions  or  ob- 
jectifications.  On  the  other  hand,  the  cultural  determinists  pre- 
suppose that  cultural  essences  or  forms  determine  human 
existence  and  its  dynamic  modes  of  expression;  that  the  what 
or  essence  of  culture  determines  the  function  or  active  nature 
of  man.  This  explains  why  the  cultural  positivists  and  cultural 
idealists  differ  on  the  issue  of  human  freedom,  although  agree- 
ing in  positing  a  cultural  reality  as  over  against  the  notion  of 
a  meta-cultural  or  pre-cultural  reality.  Thus  cultural  existen- 
tialists and  functionalists  as  well  as  cultural  "essentialists"  or 
culturologists  end  up  by  eliminating  the  category  of  nature  and 
reducing  nature  to  culture,  the  former  in  the  name  of  human 
freedom,  and  the  latter  in  the  name  of  scientific  determinism. 

When  we  turn  to  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  history  we  find 
him  similarly  opposed  to  the  view  of  the  historical  determinists, 
that  human  cultural  and  social  development  may  be  described  in 
terms  of  a  general  formula  of  fixed  stages,  and  to  the  prophetic 
notion  that  there  is  a  "destiny"  in  human  culture  history.  Thus 
he  writes: 

But  the  reality  of  history  is  not  a  uniform  sequence  of  events  but 
the  inner  life  of  man.  This  life  can  be  described  and  interpreted  after 
it  has  been  lived;  it  cannot  be  anticipated  in  an  abstract  general  formula, 
and  it  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  rigid  scheme  of  three  or  five  acts.131 

The  notion  of  fate  or  destiny  in  human  cultural  history 
seems  to  him  to  be  a  mythological  idea  incompatible  with  the 
rationality  of  man  as  a  conscious,  self-determining  agent.  Ac- 
cording to  Cassirer, 

In  almost  all  mythologies  of  the  world  we  meet  with  the  idea  of  an 
inevitable,  inexorable,  irrevocable  destiny.  Fatalism  seems  to  be  in- 
separable from  mythical  thought.  .  .  .  But  in  some  of  our  modern  phi- 
losophers this  distinction  [between  mythical  and  philosophical  thought] 
seems  to  be  completely  effaced.  They  give  us  a  metaphysics  of  history 
that  shows  all  the  characteristic  features  of  myth.132 

On  the  other  hand,  Cassirer  does  not  mean  to  say  that  man  is 

m£M.,  201. 
m  MS.9  zgoL 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  539 

absolutely  free  under  all  circumstances.  It  is  possible  for  man 
to  surrender  his  freedom  of  self-determination  under  the 
paralyzing  influence  of  some  myth  of  the  state,  so  that  he  be- 
comes a  willing  victim  of  his  self-enslavement.  Man's  freedom, 
in  other  words,  is  manifested  in  his  ability  to  surrender  his  free- 
dom as  well  as  in  his  efforts  to  retain  it.  As  Ortega  y  Gasset  has 
remarked,  our  present  actions  determine  the  extent  of  our  future 
freedom. 

Thus  Cassirer  reminds  us  that  ethical  freedom  is  not  a  natural 
fact  that  is  given  or  inherited,  but  rather  a  potentiality  which 
man  himself  must  strive  to  realize  and  bring  into  practical 
operation.  Acknowledging  his  indebtedness  to  Kant  on  this 
point,  Cassirer  observes  that 

In  the  exposition  of  his  own  theory  Kant  always  warns  us  against 
a  fundamental  misunderstanding.  Ethical  freedom,  he  declares,  is  not 
a  fact  but  a  postulate.  It  is  not  gegeben  but  aufgegeben;  it  is  not  a  gift 
with  which  human  nature  is  endowed;  it  is  rather  a  task,  and  the 
most  arduous  task  that  man  can  set  himself.  It  is  no  datum,  but  a 
demand ;  an  ethical  imperative.  To  fulfil  this  demand  becomes  especially 
hard  in  times  of  a  severe  and  dangerous  social  crisis  when  the  breakdown 
of  the  whole  public  life  seems  to  be  imminent.  At  these  times  the  indi- 
vidual begins  to  feel  a  deep  mistrust  in  his  own  powers.  Freedom  is  not 
a  natural  inheritance  of  man.  In  order  to  possess  it  we  have  to  create 
it.133 

But  in  order  to  create  freedom  one  must  first  have  the  ca- 
pacity for  free  action  by  nature — a  basic  presupposition  to  which 
Rousseau  and  the  rationalists  who  followed  him  have  repeatedly 
drawn  attention.  Here  again  Cassirer  confronts  us  with  a  choice 
between  natural  and  cultural  freedom,  as  if  the  two  notions 
were  not  logically  compatible.  Unless  freedom  were  a  fact  of 
nature,  in  the  sense  of  being  an  intrinsic  capacity  or  power  of 
self-determination,  there  would  be  no  point  in  postulating  it  as 
an  ethical  imperative. 

As  Cassirer  conceives  it,  the  task  of  the  modern  rationalistic 
philosopher  is  to  combat  the  surrender  of  human  reason  and 
freedom  to  the  forces  of  irrationalism  and  fatalism,  by  develop- 
ing afresh  the  humanistic  insight  of  Plato  and  Kant  that  man, 

188  MS.,  287f. 


540  DAVID  SIDNEY 

historically  speaking,  is  master  of  his  fate  and  can  choose  his 
demon  in  order  to  achieve  eudaimonia  or  happiness.134  In  this 
sense  the  task  of  philosophy  may  be  said  to  begin  with  itself, 
with  the  overcoming  of  the  myth-provoking  irrationalism  of 
those  philosophies  (such  as  theological  existentialism)  in  which 
reason  is  employed  in  order  to  accomplish  its  unconditional 
surrender  in  all  the  critical  situations  of  human  life.135 

In  the  last  analysis,  Cassirer  holds  fast  to  his  evolutionary, 
rationalistic  faith  in  cultural  progress  and  in  the  power  of 
reason  to  keep  in  check  the  irrational  powers  of  myth.  As  he 
expresses  it: 

Yet  when  small  groups  do  try  to  enforce  their  wishes  and  their 
fantastic  ideas  upon  great  nations  and  the  whole  body  politic,  they  may 
succeed  for  a  short  time,  and  they  may  even  achieve  great  triumphs, 
but  these  must  remain  ephemeral.  For  there  is,  after  all,  a  logic  of  the 
social  world  just  as  there  is  a  logic  of  the  physical  world.  There  are 
certain  laws  that  cannot  be  violated  with  impunity.  Even  in  this  sphere 
we  have  to  follow  Bacon's  advice.  We  must  learn  how  to  obey  the 
laws  of  the  social  world  before  we  can  undertake  to  rule  it.136 

Here,  obviously,  the  man  of  liberal  faith  and  the  prophet 
of  rationalism  is  speaking  and  expressing  his  faith  in  the  ulti- 
mate triumph  of  social  logic  in  human  affairs.  He  refers 
enigmatically  to  certain  "laws"  of  the  social  world  which  "must" 
be  obeyed  but,  like  the  destiny-philosophers  whom  he  criti- 
cizes, fails  to  specify  what  these  laws  are  or  how  they  can 
be  empirically  established.  If  irrational  social  forces  do  come 
to  the  fore  and  do  manage  to  gain  the  ascendancy,  why  "must" 
their  triumph  remain  any  more  ephemeral  than  that  of  the 
opposing  forces?  There  is  more  to  be  said  for  the  "logic  of 
power"  than  the  idealistic  advocates  of  the  power  of  logic  have 
yet  been  prepared  to  acknowledge.  Cassirer,  it  would  appear, 
was  so  much  concerned  with  the  power  of  cultural  symbols  that 
he  failed  to  reckon  realistically  with  the  power  of  the  objects 
to  which  the  symbols  referred.  Furthermore,  in  view  of  Cas- 
sirer's  admission  that  the  irrational  forces  of  myth  tend  to 

184  ibid.,  76. 

™Ibid.,    292f. 

"  Ibid.,  295. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  541 

predominate  in  times  of  crisis  and  that  "it  is  beyond  the  power  of 
philosophy  to  destroy  the  political  myths,"137  one  cannot  help 
wondering  how  substantial  is  the  foundation  for  his  faith  in  the 
ultimate  victory  of  the  rational  functions  of  mind  and  of  social 
logic. 


Cassirer  on  the  Problem  of  Cultural  Unity 

We  return  finally  to  the  problem  with  which  we  began  this 
analysis  and  ask  again  whether  Cassirer  has  made  any  sig- 
nificant contribution  towards  the  resolution  of  the  intellectual, 
cultural  crisis  of  our  times.  We  have  seen  that,  according  to 
Cassirer,  the  crisis  which  confronts  us  is  owing  to  the  fact  that 
modern  culture  lacks  an  intellectual  center  of  integration.  He 
has  suggested,  therefore,  that  what  is  vitally  needed  is  a  philo- 
sophical anthropology  capable  of  comprehending  man  as  a 
whole  and  providing  a  meaning  and  direction  to  all  our  human 
activities.  His  Essay  on  Man  and  The  Myth  of  the  State  com- 
prise his  final  "testament  of  wisdom"  and  may  therefore  fairly 
be  evaluated  with  reference  to  this  ideal  objective. 

In  sum,  it  may  be  said,  Cassirer  has  offered  us  a  spiritual 
anthropology  which  reduces  the  category  of  nature  to  that  of 
culture,  thereby  "humanizing  philosophy  and  turning  cos- 
mogony and  ontology  into  anthropology."  The  key  concept 
to  this  spiritual  anthropology  is  the  symbol,  which  is  the 
source  of  reality  as  well  as  of  intelligibility  in  human  experi- 
ence. The  whole  of  human  culture  is  understood  or  interpreted 
as  comprising  the  diverse  modes  of  symbolism  historically  cre- 
ated and  evolved  by  mankind  in  its  efforts  at  self-expression 
and  "progressive  self-liberation."  In  the  last  analysis,  the  evo- 
lution of  cultural  thought  is  said  to  be  dependent  upon  the 
evolution  of  language  or  linguistic  symbolism,  and  culture  as 
a  whole  is  interpreted  as  the  language  of  the  human  spirit. 

Within  each  category  or  mode  of  culture  there  is  a  "unity 
in  the  manifold,"  in  the  sense  that  each  cultural  perspective 
may  ultimately  be  conceived  through  some  one  psychological 

MTMS.,  2965  cf.  the  writer's  review  of  Cassirer's  Myth  of  the  State  in  Ameri- 
can Anthropologist,  49,  (July-September  1947),  481-83. 


542  DAVID  SIDNEY 

motive  or  function.  Thus  all  forms  of  art  may  be  understood  as 
diverse  symbolic  expressions  of  intuition;  myth  and  religion 
symbolize  emotions  and  provide  a  rationalization  for  the 
identity  of  all  forms  of  lifej  and  science  gives  us  a  unity  of 
thought  by  providing  a  symbolic  universe  of  laws  and  principles 
(see  Section  12  above).  Cassirer  thus  correlates  the  subjective 
functions  of  the  ego  with  the  historically-evolved  cultural  cate- 
gories, thereby  binding  together  man  and  the  symbolic  world  of 
his  creation.  , 

Similarly  one  may  discern  a  common  function  for  the  whole 
of  human  culture.  Cassirer's  ultimate  presupposition  appears  to 
be  that  the  whole  of  human  culture  has  a  common,  evolutionary 
origin  in  human  experience  as  well  as  a  common  end  or  function 
in  making  for  progressive  objectification  of  the  human  spirit 
and  for  self-liberation.  Notwithstanding  the  diversity  of  cul- 
tural expressions  there  is  said  to  be  a  "dynamic  equilibrium" 
and  a  "hidden  harmony"  which  reconciles  apparently  opposing 
forces.138  As  Cassirer  concludes  in  his  Essay  on  Man, 

But  this  multiplicity  and  disparateness  does  not  denote  discord  or 
disharmony.  All  these  functions  complete  and  complement  one  another. 
Each  one  opens  a  new  horizon  and  shows  us  a  new  aspect  of  humanity. 
The  dissonant  is  in  harmony  with  itself;  the  contraries  are  not  mutually 
exclusive,  but  interdependent;  "harmony  in  contrariety,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  bow  and  the  lyre."139 

There  are  then,  for  Cassirer,  two  sources  of  unity  of  function 
in  human  culture,  namely,  psychological  or  genetic  unity  of 
motive  for  each  type  of  cultural  discipline,  and  teleological 
unity  of  function  in  achieving  a  common  harmony  for  any  given 
historical  culture  as  well  as  for  the  culture  of  humanity  as  a 
whole. 

As  regards  the  genetic,  psychological  unity  of  function  at- 
tributed to  a  mode  of  culture,  we  have  seen,  in  the  case  of 
myth,  that  this  is  open  to  question.  Cassirer  has  not  demon- 
strated that  each  cultural  discipline  may  be  correlated  with 
only  one  psychological  function.  Objectively,  we  find  that 

188  EM.,  223. 

189  'L'J      22*. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  543 

leading  contemporary  ethnologists,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Functionalistic  School,  would  not  subscribe  to  the  thesis  that 
myth,  for  example,  has  one  primary  social  function  and  would 
hold  instead  that  it  may  have  a  plurality  of  functions — a  criti- 
cism which  may  be  applied  to  any  other  cultural  discipline. 

Furthermore,  with  reference  to  the  teleological  unity  of 
function  which  is  said  to  characterize  a  given  culture  and  the 
culture  of  humanity  as  a  whole,  the  reply  may  be  made  that 
this  a  priori  harmony  is  not  substantiated  by  the  empirical  evi- 
dence. Political  myth,  for  example,  has,  on  Cassirer's  own  in- 
sistence, no  place  in  a  genuinely  rational  culture.  Obviously, 
then,  from  a  historical  point  of  view,  there  can  be  no  "pre- 
established  harmony"  between  myth  and  the  rational  elements 
of  culture. 

The  most  serious  criticism,  however,  of  the  so-called  func- 
tionalistic  harmony  of  culture  is  that  it  is  purely  formal  and 
provides  no  criterion  for  the  evaluation  of  the  content  or  "sub- 
stance" of  any  given  cultural  configuration.  Any  one  historical 
culture  is,  on  this  assumption,  in  harmony  with  itself,  no 
matter  what  its  empirical  content  may  be.  This  problem  be- 
comes acute  especially  in  the  sphere  of  intercultural  relations 
where  we  are  confronted  with  international  conflicts  which  may 
lead  to  world  war.  Obviously  the  assurance  under  such  circum- 
stances that  there  is  an  ultimate  "hidden  harmony"  between 
the  East  and  the  West  is  of  little  comfort  or  practical  signifi- 
cance y  since  what  is  required  is  a  MANIFEST  harmony,  which 
may  enable  the  nations  of  the  world  to  dwell  together  in 
peace.  But  since  there  is  for  Cassirer  no  reality  other  than 
cultural  or  symbolical  reality,  there  can  be  no  meta-cultural 
or  pre-cultural,  ontological  reality  by  which  to  evaluate  con- 
flicting standards  of  value.  In  the  end,  we  are  left  with  a 
plurality  of  empirical  ethnocentric,  symbolical  worlds,  each  of 
which  is  formally  in  harmony  with  the  idea  of  humanity  but 
functionally  and  actually  in  conflict  with  the  others. 

As  the  writer  has  noted  elsewhere,140  the  neo-Kantians  are 
tolerant  in  theory  to  the  extreme  point  of  accepting  the  validity 
of  any  empirical  socio-cultural  system  whatsoever.  Any  actual 

140  Bidney,  "Culture  Theory  and  the  Problem  of  Cultural  Crises." 


544  DAVID  SIDNEY 

perversion  or  "transvaluation"  of  concrete  human  values  may 
be  justified  on  earth,  provided  one  acknowledges  his  faith  in 
the  purity  and  harmony  of  the  categorial  structure  whose  abode 
is  Heaven. 

Thus,  Cassirer  was  led  by  his  faith  in  the  higher  rationality 
of  humanity  to  overlook  the  serious  practical  problems  of  cul- 
tural conflict  and  disunity.  In  other  words,  the  very  rationality 
of  his  neo-Kantian  outlook  led  him  logically  and  paradoxically 
to  a  toleration  in  theory  of  the  irrational  and  mythological 
mentality  which  he  strove  in  practice  to  obliterate  from  the 
social  and  political  life  of  man.  As  a  moral  philosopher  he  did 
not  believe  in  "speculative  idleness"  and  urged  his  fellow 
philosophers  to  emulate  the  great  thinkers  of  the  past  who  made 
it  their  task  "to  think  beyond  and  against  their  times."141  But 
he  derived  his  intellectual  and  moral  courage  to  do  so,  not  from 
his  neo-Kantian  theory  and  his  egocentric,  spiritual  anthro- 
pology, but  from  the  classical  metaphysical  traditions,  from 
Greek  culture  and  the  philosophia  ferennis  of  the  Hebrew- 
Christian  tradition  as  well  as  from  the  humanism  of  the  Renais- 
sance and  the  rationalism  of  the  Enlightenment  which  he  knew 
so  intimately  and  loved  so  well. 

DAVID  SIDNEY 

THE  VIKING  FUND 

NEW  YORK  CITY 

141  MS.,  296. 


15 

Helmut  Kuhn 
ERNST  CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE 


15 
ERNST  CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE 


title  "Philosophy  of  Culture"  seems  to  denote  a 
JL  branch  or  field  of  philosophy:  philosophy  applying  itself 
to  the  exploration  of  that  particular  fact  or  set  of  facts  which 
we  describe  as  "culture."  This  special  field  would  have  to  be 
mapped  out  in  terms  of  the  total  area  of  which  it  is  a  part,  and 
in  terms  of  its  relation  to  the  adjacent  fields  of  philosophical 
study,  such  as  ethics  or  philosophy  of  history. 

In  fact,  culture  is  one  of  the  themes  of  Cassirer's  philosophy, 
and  culture  does  constitute  a  field  of  study  within  the  wider 
compass  of  his  thought.  But  it  does  so  only  incidentally.  This 
may  seem  a  paradoxical  assertion,  flying  in  the  face  of  Cassirer's 
own  explicit  statements.  Does  he  not,  in  unambiguous  words, 
distinguish  between  philosophy  of  culture  and  philosophy  of 
nature  as  two  separate,  though  related,  domains? 

Nevertheless,  we  rejoin,  by  regarding  culture  as  a  special 
field  or  theme  of  Cassirer's  thought  we  choose  an  unpromising 
approach  and  are  almost  certain  to  miss  the  intent  of  his  phi- 
losophy. Although  analyzing  in  great  detail  certain  forms  of 
culture,  such  as  language  or  myth,  Cassirer  neglects  others 
almost  completely;  and  this  uneven  treatment,  far  from  being 
fortuitous,  betrays  the  guiding  and  selecting  interest  in  the 
philosopher's  mind.  This  interest  is  not  in  the  exploration  of 
culture  for  its  own  sake. 

Wondering  what  culture  is  and  trying  to  describe  its  nature 
in  terms  as  simple  and  straightforward  as  possible,  the  observer's 
mind  may  fasten  upon  certain  salient  features  and  cardinal  ques- 
tions. Culture,  as  cultura  animiy  seems  to  indicate  a  deliberate 
cultivation,  a  tending  or  fashioning  of  the  mind,  some  kind  of 
education.  What  is  the  nature  and  goal  of  this  education? 
Furthermore,  culture  or  civilization  is  distinguished  from  both 

547 


548  HELMUT  KUHN 

primitivism  and  barbarism,  compared  with  which  it  claims  to 
be  a  richer,  more  dignified,  and  more  truly  human  mode  of  life. 
Wherein  does  its  superiority  consist  and  how  was  it  achieved? 
Why  is  it  as  precarious  a  possession  as  the  annals  of  mankind 
show?  May  we  look  forward  to  an  as  yet  unattained  perfection 
of  culture  in  some  near  or  distant  future? 

If  a  reader  approaches  Cassirer's  work  with  these  observa- 
tions and  questions  in  mind,  he  finds  it  unresponsive.  The 
center  of  Cassirer's  interest  is  elsewhere,  and  the  student's 
query,  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  questioner,  is  central,  is 
relegated  to  the  periphery  of  the  intellectual  universe.  We  even 
begin  to  doubt  whether  the  imaginary  questioner  correctly 
understands  the  meaning  of  the  term  "culture"  as  used  by 
Cassirer.  Where,  then,  is  the  center  of  gravity  in  Cassirer's 
world? 

"Primary  philosophy"  (TCP<OTY)  ^tXodo^ia)^  according  to  Aris- 
totle, is  a  science  which  investigates  being  as  being,  or,  in  a 
more  familiar  terminology,  Reality  as  such.1  Cassirer's  re- 
search, however  radically  it  departs  in  some  respects  from  the 
great  current  of  philosophia  perennis,  is  still  animated  through- 
out by  the  quest  of  "primary  philosophy"  as  enunciated  by 
Aristotle.  Philosophy  of  culture  is  for  him,  first  of  all,  phi- 
losophy, i.e.,  an  investigation  into  the  nature  of  Reality.  But 
this  investigation  tends  towards  the  study  of  culture  as  of  a 
particularly  revealing  domain  of  reality.  Culture  appears  the 
privileged  document  testifying  with  unparalleled  eloquence  to 
the  adequacy  of  the  underlying  concept  of  "being  as  being." 

The  affirmation  of  the  ontological  primacy  of  culture  in 
Cassirer's  thought  is  borne  out  by  a  glance  at  his  literary  career. 
The  progressive  articulation  of  his  philosophy  went  hand  in 
hand  with  a  movement  towards  a  greater  emphasis  on  prob- 
lems of  culture — a  development  which  culminated  in  the 
Philosophy  of  Symbolic  Forms  (now  conveniently  summarized 
in  the  recent  Essay  on  Man).  This  magnum  opus,  a  boldly 
conceived  and  masterly  executed  philosophical  interpretation  of 
culture,  completed  the  conquest  of  a  domain  which,  though 
coveted  before  by  other  members  of  the  Marburg  School,  had 

1  Metaphysics,  1003  a  21. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         549 

proved  inaccessible  to  Cassirer's  predecessors.  It  is  true,  Cas- 
sirer  was  encouraged  and  aided  in  his  undertaking  by  a  pre- 
vailing current  of  thought.  At  the  turn  from  the  nineteenth 
to  the  twentieth  century,  German  philosophy  sought  to  put  a 
check  on  the  hegemony  of  the  natural  sciences  by  working  out 
a  system  of  Geisteswissenschajt.  But,  if  we  view  Cassirer's 
achievement  against  the  background  of  the  co-operative  effort 
with  which  he  found  himself  in  harmony,  the  originality  of  the 
solution  he  propounded  becomes  only  the  more  impressive. 

Following  Hermann  Cohen,  the  founder  of  the  Marburg 
School,  Cassirer  derived  his  interpretation  of  Reality  from 
Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  The  Critique  so  powerfully 
influenced  Cassirer's  thinking  that  it  determined  his  interpreta- 
tion of  culture  throughout,  from  its  principles  down  to  the 
order  of  procedure,  as  shown  by  the  tables  of  contents  in  the 
volumes  of  Die  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Mod- 
estly the  author  takes  credit  only  for  essaying  a  work  that  was 
rendered  both  possible  and  indispensable  by  Kant,  but  left 
undone,  for  some  reason  or  other,  by  the  master.  Like  Wilhelm 
Dilthey  and  Heinrich  Rickert,  he  claims  to  complete  the 
Kantian  architecture  by  giving  the  philosophical  foundation  of 
the  science  of  nature  as  furnished  by  Kant  a  companion-piece 
in  the  philosophical  foundation  of  the  science  of  culture.  His- 
torically, the  claim  is  void.  The  alleged  supplementation  re- 
quires a  fresh  ground-plan  and,  in  fact,  a  different  building.  Yet 
the  intended  adherence  to  Kant's  letter  and  spirit  is  nonetheless 
the  salient  trait  of  the  new  structure. 

"For  it  is  the  same  thing  that  can  be  thought  and  that  can 
be."2  With  this  succinct  assertion  Parmenides  put  an  end  to 
naive  reflection  on  the  totality  of  real  things,  and  philosophy 
as  a  disquisition  on  reality  as  such  emerged  into  sight.  It  is  made 
clear  that  "being"  is  related  to  "being  thought"  not  as  the 
florin  is  related  to  the  purse,  the  cargo  to  the  vessel,  or  in  any 
other  extrinsic  fashion.  The  two  terms  are  conjoined  rather  as 
"sight"  is  to  "being  seen"  or  "creature"  to  "being  created." 
Despite  their  distinctness  they  form  an  integral  unity. 

Kant  found  a  fresh  formula  for  the  Eleatic  insight.  In  pur- 

2  Hermann,  Diels,  Fragment*  der  Vorsokratiker,  (5th  ed.),  I,  231,  fr.  3. 


550  HELMUT  KUHN 

suing  knowledge  we  put  ideas  together:  Knowledge,  the  result 
of  this  process,  is  a  synthesis.  But  may  we,  by  so  uniting  ideas 
into  a  composite  whole,  expect  to  reveal  something  which,  by 
definition,  lies  outside  the  sphere  of  mental  operations,  viz., 
reality?  We  may,  Kant  answers,  provided  the  principles  which 
direct  our  constructing  a  synthesis  are  identical  with  the  prin- 
ciples determining  the  structure  of  reality.  It  will  be  permitted 
to  call  the  totality  of  knowledge  as  based  upon  sense  perception 
"experience ;"  to  substitute  for  principles:  "conditions  of  pos- 
sibility," and  to  dub  statements  relating  to  these  fundamental 
conditions  "a  priori  judgments."  With  these  terminological  ad- 
justments, Kant's  "highest  principle  of  all  synthetic  judg- 
ments" is  arrived  at:  "We  then  assert  that  the  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  experience  in  general  are  likewise  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  the  objects  of  experience,  and  that  for  this  reason 
they  have  objective  validity  in  a  synthetic  a  priori  judgment."3 
Cassirer  poses  the  problem  in  Parmenidean  terms  and  then, 
for  an  answer,  reaffirms  Kant's  solution. 

The  first  point  of  departure  for  speculation  is  denoted  by  the  concept 
of  Being.  The  instant  this  concept  articulates  itself  and  a  consciousness 
awakes  of  the  unity  of  Being,  as  set  over  against  the  multiplicity  and 
variety  of  being  things,  the  specifically  philosophical  mode  of  regarding 
the  world  arises.4 

With  this  ontological  conception  of  philosophy  in  mind,  Cas- 
sirer proceeds  to  express  the  Parmenidean  identification  in 
terms  of  a  Kantian  "transcendental"  logic:  "The  concept  relates 
to  the  object  because  and  as  much  as  it  [the  concept]  is  the 
necessary  and  indispensable  presupposition  of  objectivation; 
because  it  is  the  function  for  which  alone  there  can  be  objects, 
i.e.,  permanent  basic  units,  amidst  the  flux  of  experience."5 
Shorter  and  simpler:  "The  logical  concept  is  the  necessary  and 
sufficient  condition  for  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things."6 
"Being,"  according  to  this  transcendental  logic,  means  "being 

3  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (Norman  K.  Smith  tr.,  London,  1929),  194. 

4  Die  Philoso'phie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  I,  3. 
-     *lbid.,  Ill,  368. 

'  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenfchajten,  typescript  p.  37. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         551 

determined,"  and  thinking  is  the  process  of  determination.  So 
there  is  no  essence  outside  the  sphere  of  thinking,  and  meta- 
physics as  the  supposed  knowledge  of  essences  is  non-existent. 
Transcendental  idealism  has  no  room  for  a  transcendent,  i.e., 
super-sensible,  reality,  and  discountenances  Natural  Theology 
and  similar  speculative  flights.  Along  with  metaphysics  it  dis- 
penses with  the  "copy  theory  of  knowledge"  (Abbildtheorie) . 
This  theory  naively  interprets  ideas  "inside  the  mind"  as  copies 
of  "things  without,"  thus  dissociating  what  belongs  indelibly 
together  and  then  reassembling  the  broken  parts  by  resorting 
to  a  dubious  analogy.7 

Examining  this  "critical"  or  "transcendental"  logic,  we  do 
well  to  remember  that  "naive,"  i.e.,  pre-Kantian,  metaphysics 
was  not  so  nai've  as  to  subscribe  to  the  unphilosophical  notion 
of  knowledge  as  a  passive  image  mirroring  a  given  reality. 
Naivete,  of  course,  is  undying.  But  it  has  been  obsolescent  in 
philosophy  ever  since  Parmenides  put  forward  his  monumental 
identification  5  and  traditional  metaphysics  as  called  into  ex- 
istence by  Plato  and  Aristotle  did  not  entirely  fail  to  heed 
"Father  Parmenides' "  teaching.  However,  his  stupendous  in- 
sistence on  a  seemingly  absurd  truth,  expressed  in  words  as 
rigidly  erect  and  quaintly  ornate  as  an  archaic  statue,  underwent 
at  the  hands  of  his  followers  a  differentiation  which  made  it 
supple  and  alive.  The  chief  purpose  of  this  differentiation  was 
to  find  a  place  for  the  finite  human  knower  as  an  integral 
part  of  reality — a  part  ignored  by  the  disdainful  Eleatic  save, 
by  way  of  compromise,  in  the  second,  pragmatic  portion  of  his 
poem. 

In  Aristotle,  the  identity  of  "thinking"  and  "being"  is  main- 
tained at  the  pinnacle  of  the  pyramid  of  reality.  The  unmoved 
mover,  form  disengaged  from  matter,  act  free  of  potentiality, 
is  described  as  v6i)i$  voqw<&« — thinking  returning  upon  itself, 
reality  as  self-comprehending  intellection,  a  thing  that  is  by 
virtue  of  thinking  itself.  But  in  the  sublunar  world  inhabited 
by  man  this  primordial  unity  bifurcates.  Man  the  knower  is 
confronted  by  things  to  be  known — things  which  arey  regard- 
less as  to  whether  or  not  he  takes  cognizance  of  their  existence. 

7  Cf .  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  (hereafter  abbreviated:  PSF),  I,  5. 


552  HELMUT  KUHN 

Yet  their  "becoming  known"  is  by  no  means  incidental  to  their 
existence  in  the  sense  in  which  "being  portrayed"  is  incidental 
to  a  person.  First,  the  kind  of  existence  which  a  thing  has  in- 
volves a  degree  of  knowability,  depending  upon  the  share  which 
form  has  in  its  constitution.  So  a  star  is  more  knowable  than  a 
lump  of  clay,  or  the  soul  than  the  body.  For  cognition  detaches  a 
thing's  form  from  its  matter:  the  intelligent  mind  is  the  locus 
of  forms.  Second,  the  identity  which  is  complete  at  the  summit, 
in  the  form  of  forms,  is  present  also  in  the  human  act  of  cogni- 
tion, though  only  in  a  qualified  way.  "In  the  case  of  objects 
which  involve  no  matter,  what  thinks  and  what  is  thought  are 
identical"  (*6  a^6  eate  TO  vooov  *ai  T&  vooujxevov).8  The  very  word- 
ing is  reminiscent  of  Parmenides. 

Man  may  rise  to  intuiting  forms  not  contaminated  with 
matter.  But  he  is  environed  by  a  compound  reality — forms 
wedded  to  matter.  Consequently  the  cognitive  process  in  the 
human  mind  is,  for  Aristotle,  an  interplay  and  co-operation  of 
activity  and  passivity.  This  duality  corresponds  to  the  duality 
of  the  human  situation.  Man,  as  finite,  is  one  thing  among  the 
many  things  of  the  world,  acted  upon  and  reacting.  At  the  same 
time,  man,  through  reason,  is  somehow  all  things. 

Turning  now  to  Kant,  the  source  of  Cassirer's  epistemology, 
we  find  the  interplay  of  activity  and  passivity  supplanted  with 
a  novel  emphasis  on  the  constructive  activity  of  the  mind. 
The  Eleatic  identification  is  reborn  in  the  spirit  of  the  modern, 
post-Cartesian  subject.  However,  the  scope  of  this  idealistic 
motif  which  reverses  the  natural  order  by  making  objects  con- 
form to  concepts9  is  strictly  limited  to  the  sensible  world:  to 
the  world  of  phenomena  as  interpreted  by  "experience;"  and 
this  phenomenal  world  is  not  coextensive  with  reality.  The 
Critique  teaches  that  "the  object  is  to  be  taken  in  a  twofold 
sense,  namely  as  appearance  and  thing  in  itself."10  Beyond  the 
pales  of  appearance  all  the  essential  features  of  the  metaphysical 
world  picture,  though  denied  to  speculative  knowledge,  are 
restored  to  enlightened  faith.  This  restoration,  far  from  being 

8  De  Anima^  43oa  3-4. 

9  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (N.  K.  Smith  tr.)>  22. 

28. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         553 

a  mere  compromise,  springs  from  the  ethos  of  Kant's  under- 
taking. Rescinding  the  principle  of  happiness  and  dislodging 
contemplation  from  its  sovereign  place,  he  wrests  man  from 
his  anchorage  in  nature  while  blocking  his  visionary  ascent  to 
God.  But  he  believes  he  only  takes  away  what  man  never  right- 
fully possessed. 

It  is  true,  Kant  disabuses  man  and  purges  his  mind  from 
speculative  conceit.  Yet  in  so  humbling  him  he  does  not  deliver 
him  into  the  despair  of  metaphysical  homelessness.  Instead  he 
returns  the  paraphernalia  of  the  transmundane  homestead, 
God  and  the  intelUgibilia,  freedom  and  beatitude — not  to  man's 
cognitive  faculty,  but  to  his  "practical  belief."  Man,  in  a 
chastened  mood  now,  since  he  has  put  away  his  intellectual  pride, 
is  expected  reverently  to  submit  to  a  law  that  defines  his  place 
in  the  order  of  things  and  to  which  the  voice  of  duty  in  his 
own  mind  bears  unequivocal  testimony.  By  the  same  token, 
the  interplay  of  spontaneity  and  passivity  in  the  cognitive 
process  is  restored.  Again,  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  but- 
tressed to  the  idea  of  the  finitude  of  man.  The  very  act  of 
resignation  by  which  we  disown  metaphysical  vision  is  supposed 
to  establish  the  right  rapport  between  ourselves  and  the  objects 
of  the  metaphysical  world.  By  a  tour  de  force  we  thus  arrive  at 
the  notion  of  unintelligible  intelligibilia  (vooujxeva) — unintel- 
ligible, we  must  add,  to  us,  to  man. 

Following  the  general  line  of  neo-Kantian  thought,  Cassirer 
adopts  Kant's  "highest  principle  of  all  synthetic  judgments" — 
the  identification  of  "the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  experi- 
ence" with  "the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  the  objects  of 
experience."  At  the  same  time,  again  conforming  to  the  Mar- 
burg pattern,  he  goes  beyond  Kant.  Kant's  "objects  of  experi- 
ence" are  not  objects  as  such,  but  "appearances"  as  set  over 
against  the  "thing  in  itself."  Hence,  Kant's  identification  is 
a  limited  one.  The  neo-Kantian,  discarding  the  "thing  in  itself," 
makes  the  identification  total.  He  robs  the  object  of  all  its  sub- 
stantiality. To  him  the  object  is  the  result  or  the  "function" 
of  the  logical  process  of  objectivationj  and  the  residuum  which 
resists  this  "functionalization"  becomes  an  "objective"  (Auf- 
gabe] — the  infinitely  distant  goal  for  further  acts  of  logical 


554  HELMUT  KUHN 

determination.  Kant's  transcendental  logic  is  made  to  outgrow 
the  limited  domain  assigned  to  it  by  the  master. 

If  God  held  in  one  hand  truth,  in  the  other  the  search  for  it, 
inviting  us  to  choose,  we  should,  Lessing  held,  beg  the  heavenly 
Father  to  keep  the  truth  for  Himself  and  let  us  have  the 
search.  To  this  Hermann  Cohen  objects.  What  truth  means 
to  God  is  of  no  concern  to  us ;  and  as  far  as  we  are  con- 
cerned the  gifts  of  the  two  hands  are  actually  one:  truth  is  the 
quest  for  truth.11  In  the  same  vein,  Cassirer  quotes  Faust's 
translation  of  the  opening  words  of  the  Gospel  according  to 
St.  John:  "In  the  beginning  was  the  deed."12  Logos  is  creation, 
positing  reality.  All  this  goes  beyond  Kant  in  the  sense  that  the 
transcendental  synthesis  is  viewed  as  constituting  not  only  "ob- 
jects of  experience"  but  objects  tout  court. 

However,  in  so  radicalizing  the  thesis  of  Kant's  transcen- 
dental logic,  Cassirer  goes  also  back  behind  Kant — not  to 
pre-Kantian  metaphysics,  but  to  pre-metaphysical,  i.e.,  pre- 
Platonic,  ontology:  to  Parmenides.  A  modern  dynamic  com- 
panion-piece to  the  immobile,  self-contained  Eleatic  Being  is 
achieved.  This,  of  course,  is  not  the  avowed  intent  of  the  neo- 
Kantian  thinker  who  is  innocent  of  any  archaizing  inclinations. 
But,  constrained  by  the  logic  of  his  transcendental  identifica- 
tion, he  comes  to  embrace  an  archaically  simplified  concept  of 
Being.  Incidentally,  this  simplification  was  encouraged  by  the 
scientific  ideal  prevalent  in  an  industrialized  civilization.  Or- 
ganized co-operation  of  vast  groups,  made  effective  by  a  division 
of  labor  into  multiple  functions, — the  master-device  of  modern 
industry — was  inapplicable  to  the  intricate  wholeness  of  meta- 
physics. Its  "huge  helplessness"  (G.  K.  Chesterton)  did  not 
fit  into  the  contemporary  pattern.  On  the  other  hand,  the  neo- 
Kantian  idea  of  knowledge  as  an  infinite  process  of  determina- 
tion, suggestive  as  it  was  of  the  cumulative  collaboration  of 
individuals  and  groups,  seemed  more  agreeable  to  the  Zeitgeist. 

Be  that  as  it  may  (and  admitting  that  this  explanation  of  the 
pre-Socratic  features  so  strikingly  characteristic  of  various  cur- 
rents of  recent  philosophy  is  far  from  exhaustive),  the  logic 

"Hermann  Cohen,  Ethik  des  reinen  Willens  (1904),  93. 
12  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften,  61. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         555 

of  the  neo-Kantian  return  to  Parmenidian  simplicity  is  both 
clear  and  cogent.  As  the  transcendental  synthesis,  the  act  of 
objectification,  wins  unlimited  scope,  the  receptivity  (or  pas- 
sivity) in  the  knower  is  cancelled  out.  Along  with  his  receptivity 
the  knower  as  a  finite  subject  is  likewise  lost  to  view;  and 
the  anthropological  undergirding  of  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
reinterpreted  but  preserved  by  Kant,  is  gone.  The  "bifurcation" 
of  the  ontological  identity,  which,  in  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
showed  man  as  being  "of  the  world,"  and  the  world  as  existing 
for  man — this  bifurcation  is  blotted  out.  We  move  in  the  self- 
contained  sphere  of  a  thinking  that  constitutes  objects;  and  this 
sphere  leaves  as  little  room  for  man,  the  knower,  as  the  Eleatic 
sphere  of  Being.  The  knower  looks  upon  this  sphere  as  it  were 
"from  outside."  Never  and  under  no  circumstances  is  he  en- 
compassed by  it. 

We  ask  Parmenides  about  man  and  those  obtrusive  facts 
which  loom  large  in  man's  life:  the  choice  between  good  and 
evil,  the  cycle  of  birth  and  death,  and  the  alternation  of  the 
seasons.  In  reply  he  puts  us  off  with  information  on  "the  beliefs 
of  mortals"  and  on  the  names  they  have  decided  to  affix  to 
things.13  We  ask  the  neo-Kantian  about  man,  and  he  sends  us 
to  empirical  psychology  and  empirical  anthropology.  But  this, 
of  course,  is  not  his  whole  reply  to  our  query.  Man  figures  in 
his  philosophy  as  a  subject  related  to  objects.  The  subject- 
object  correlation  is  all-pervasive,  omnipresent.  However,  Cas- 
sirer  affirms,  no  hard  and  fast  dividing  line  separates  the  two 
correlate  spheres.  Wherever  a  meaning  is  grasped,  it  carries 
with  it  both  subject  and  object  as  polar  "moments"  involved 
in  its  structure;  in  other  words,  it  is  the  result  of  a  mediation 
between  the  two  poles.  "To  be,"  in  this  view,  means  "to  be  a 
synthesis"  of  subject  and  object,  or  of  the  ego  and  the  world. 
But  with  this  definition  the  status  of  "being"  or  "reality"  is 
denied  to  the  world  as  well  as  to  the  ego. 

Using  a  simile  dear  to  Plato  we  may  liken  the  synthesis  to 
a  tissue.  Let  us  suppose  a  student  of  the  weaving  process,  though 
sharp-sighted  in  observing  the  expanding  pattern  of  warp  and 
woof,  be  completely  blind  to  loom,  shuttle,  and  raw-material. 

"Hermann  Diels,  of.  «'/.,  I,  239,  fr.  8,  50-61. 


556  HELMUT  KUHN 

So  he  is  well  equipped  closely  to  follow  the  progress  of  the 
work,  but  unable  to  see  the  tools  and  the  thread  which  between 
them  carry  on  this  work.  The  puzzled  student  will  try  to  make 
up  for  the  lacuna  in  his  vision  by  imagining  hypothetical  agen- 
cies which  would  explain  the  mysterious  growth  of  the  texture. 
Ingenious  as  he  is  he  might  succeed  in  imagining  the  devices 
invisible  to  him.  But,  instead  of  letting  him  have  his  way,  we 
deepen  his  perplexity  by  adding  to  the  defect  of  eyesight  a 
mental  handicap.  We  incapacitate  him  for  thinking  or  imagin- 
ing anything  except  in  terms  of  a  texture,  and  accordingly  we 
endow  him  with  a  purely  "textile"  language. 

The  doubly  disabled  student  of  textile  manufacture  in  our 
parable  is  man  trying  to  study  "subject"  and  "reality"  on  the 
line  of  the  neo-Kantian  approach.  These  two  polar  concepts 
are  of  crucial  importance  to  him:  they  denote  the  terminal  points 
of  the  axis  upon  which  his  interpretation  revolves.  At  the  same 
time,  he  finds  himself  debarred  from  ever  bringing  them  into 
the  purview  of  his  analysis.  By  definition,  one  of  the  two, 
the  object  pole,  while  directing  the  advance  of  cognitive  syn- 
theses, never  rises  above  the  knower's  horizon.  Similarly,  the 
ego,  manifest  though  it  is  through  its  works,  remains  eternally 
in  his  back.  This  "evanescent  nature"  of  both  "ego"  and 
"world,"  as  it  appears  in  neo-Kantian  epistemology,  points 
truly  to  the  structure  of  the  situation  of  the  knower  confronted 
with  potential  objects  of  knowledge.  But  the  question  is  as  to 
whether  an  analysis  of  the  cognitive  subject-object  relation  can 
provide  the  foundations  upon  which  to  erect  a  philosophical 
edifice.  In  other  words,  is  a  situation  in  which  the  world  is  "for 
man,"  the  spectator,  (while  man's  participation  in  the  world  as 
an  agent  is  lost  sight  of)  as  prototypical  for  an  interpretation 
of  reality  as  neo-Kantianism  assumes?  To  be  sure,  an  under- 
standing of  culture  can  be  won  only  on  the  basis  of  an  adequate 
conception  of  the  human  agent.  Hence  the  attempt  to  develop 
the  transcendental  logic  of  neo-Kantianism  into  a  philosophy 
of  culture  appears  a  singularly  unpropitious  enterprise.  Nature 
without  man  is  imaginable,  fragmentary  though  she  may  seem. 
But  culture  is  clearly  a  man-made  thing,  a  datum  for  rtian's  in- 
spection, too,  but  first  of  all  existing  through  man  and  in  man. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         557 

To  find  strength  in  weakness  is  the  mark  of  a  creative  mind. 
In  Cassirer's  hands,  transcendental  logic  becomes  an  effective 
tool  for  coping  with  problems  of  the  human  world.  Within  its 
limited  reach,  this  clean-cutting  tool  harvests  fruits  which  a 
more  deeply  searching  instrument,  or  one  of  more  sweeping 
grasp,  would  have  been  likely  to  have  left  ungleaned. 

An  analysis  of  the  transcendental  synthesis  may  move  in 
either  of  two  directions,  according  to  the  prevailing  interest. 
The  interest  may  be  directed  either  towards  uncovering  "founda- 
tions," i.e.,  ultimate  positing  acts  which  afford  a  basis  for  subse- 
quent syntheses  and  endow  the  whole  process  with  the  character 
of  self-supporting  "science"  (wwrtfaiQ) ;  or  it  may  focus  on  the 
resulting  structures.  It  was  Hermann  Cohen,  the  founder  of  the 
Marburg  school,  who  took  the  "adventurous  road"  towards  the 
discovery  of  origins.  In  his  Logic  we  find  him  at  pains  to  wrest 
Being  as  "aught"  from  a  primordial  "naught" — a  "logogony" 
which  forces  the  thinking  mind  through  the  narrow  strait  of  an 
"extreme  perplexity"  into  progressive  self-determination.14  With 
Cassirer,  temper  and  direction  of  the  transcendental  enterprise 
have  changed.  Gone  is  the  heroic  passion  for  moving  the  globus 
intellectualis  by  the  "lever  of  the  origin  j "  gone  also  the  founder's 
provincialism  which  oddly  clogged  his  vision.  Instead,  we  find  an 
analyst  applying  himself  with  an  open  mind  and  heightened  sen- 
sitiveness to  a  study  of  those  structural  features  which  the  cogni- 
tive synthesis  in  its  manifold  forms  reveals — forms  abundantly 
exhibited  by  the  numerous  branches  of  actual  science.  This  new 
tendency,  akin  in  spirit  to  HusserPs  phenomenology,  bore 
its  early  fruits  in  the  field  of  the  logic  of  natural  science.  But 
gradually  it  gave  rise  to  a  broadening  of  perspective  which 
rendered  a  philosophy  of  culture  possible. 

Once  we  have  accepted  the  basic  principle  of  a  "critical 
philosophy,"  the  primacy  of  the  creative  mind  over  a  given 
reality,  of  "function"  over  "object,"  we  need  not,  Cassirer 
argues,  confine  ourselves  to  examining  the  cognitive  function 
and  its  objective  correlate,  the  thing  as  knowable.  There  are 
other  types  of  meaningful  structures  through  which  the  mind 
manifests  its  creativity,  distinct  from  knowledge,  but  no  less 

"Hermann  Cohen,  Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnis  (3rd  ed.,  1922),  83 f. 


558  HELMUT  KUHN 

coherent,  each  forming  a  realm  of  meaning  of  its  own,  each 
ordered  and  articulated  in  accordance  with  its  own  laws,  its  own 
"style."  Mythic  thought,  language,  art — these  are  the  chief 
instances  of  autonomous  "structures  of  meaning"  which  Cas- 
sirer  has  in  mind.  Only  by  comprising  these  non-cognitive 
structures  within  its  field  of  vision  does  transcendental  idealism 
come  into  its  own.  "Thus  the  critique  of  reason  becomes  critique 
of  culture.  It  seeks  to  understand  and  to  show  how  all  content 
of  culture,  inasmuch  as  it  is  not  a  merely  particular  content  but 
one  based  upon  a  universal  principle  of  form,  presupposes  a 
creative  act  of  the  mind  (eine  ursfrilngliche  Tat  des  Geistes)"™ 

The  defeat  of  the  naive-realistic  view  of  the  world  is  in- 
complete as  long  as  the  idealistic  analysis  is  confined  to  knowl- 
edge. While  admitting  that  certain  structural  traits  of  the 
object  of  knowledge  result  from  a  formative  activity  of  the 
mind,  the  realist  may  still  maintain  that  there  must  be  an 
independent  "something,"  a  datum,  subsisting  outside  the 
subject-object  relation.  His  contention,  Cassirer  holds,  becomes 
untenable  as  soon  as  we  substitute  "culture"  for  "world." 
Confronted  with  the  array  of  cultural  forms,  he  must  see  that 
clinging  to  the  idea  of  a  self-contained  non-mental  substratum,  a 
"thing  in  itself,"  henceforth  will  serve  no  purpose.  Here,  at 
last,  the  mind  stands  revealed  in  works  unmistakably  its  own. 
There  is  distinctness,  structure,  articulate  meaning,  but  no  sus- 
picion of  an  extra-mental  givenness.  Envisaging  these  structures 
and  meaningful  contexts  is  tantamount  to  discerning  a  variety  of 
basic  "directions"  or  "tendencies"  of  the  mind,  each  of  which 
issues  in  an  object  or  a  set  of  objects.  And  these  objects  are 
plainly  products,  shaped  through  and  through  by  that  creative 
"direction"  from  which  they  spring.  "Being"  is  swallowed  up 
in  "doing."  A  work  of  art  is.  But  the  being  we  ascribe  to  it  is 
derivative.  It  actually  is  nothing  save  what  it  is  in  relation  to, 
and  as  a  product  of,  artistic  imagination.  The  world  of  aesthetic 
objects  is  a  continuous  and  orderly  manifestation  of  one  of  the 
mind's  cosmogonic  urges.  And  the  same  is  true  of  the  world  of 
mythic  thought  and  of  language. 

With  its  recent  development  modern  physics  has  lost  its  grip 

,  ii. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         559 

on  material  reality.  Models  explanatory  of  sub-atomic  struc- 
tures can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  faithful  large  scale  replicas 
of  microcosmic  nature.  Their  value  is  to  be  assessed  in  terms  of 
their  usefulness  in  rendering  prediction  of  future  events  pos- 
sible. These  new  physical  concepts,  instead  of  "picturing"  facts, 
permit  the  physicist  to  orient  himself  in  his  dealings  with  nature 
by  providing  what  Heinrich  Hertz  called  "symbols."  This 
term,  signaling,  so  it  seemed,  the  bankruptcy  of  naive  realism 
in  physics,  was  seized  upon  and  given  a  new  and  ambitious 
career  by  Cassirer.  He  decided  to  call  those  structures  which 
he  set  out  to  analyze  in  his  philosophy  of  culture,  "symbolic 
forms." 

The  title  seems  appropriate.  In  ancient  Greece  old  bonds  of 
friendship  and  hospitality  were  acknowledged  and  renewed 
when  the  two  fragments  of  a  ring,  tokens  of  recognition,  fitted 
exactly  together.  The  ring,  or  whatever  object  took  its  place, 
was  called  a  symbol.  Symbol,  in  the  original  Greek  sense  of 
the  word,  is  a  token.  The  cultural  forms  also  betoken  some- 
thing. They  express  a  meaning.  In  the  symbol  literally  so-called 
the  sign  is  clearly  distinct  from  that  which  it  signifies.  The 
sign  is:  two  physical  objects  fitting  together ;  the  thing  signified: 
two  minds  fitting  together.  In  Cassirer's  "symbolic  form"  this 
distinction  holds  too.  There  is  a  perceived  or  imagined  form: 
a  sequel  of  articulate  sounds,  an  arrangement  of  lines  and  colors, 
a  "world  picture;"  and  these  sensible  forms  are  designed  to 
point  to  something  non-sensible.  They  are  utterances.  Each  one 
of  the  various  "realms  of  forms"  externalizes  an  inner  world. 
Each  is  a  language  of  its  own. 

At  this  juncture  the  metaphor  of  the  symbol  breaks  down 
and,  at  the  same  time,  gains  a  fresh  significance.  The  ring 
is  one  thing,  the  ancient  alliance  of  two  families  or  clans  an- 
other thing;  and  we  find  no  difficulty  in  not  only  distinguishing 
but  also  separating  these  two  types  of  reality.  Both  may  exist 
independently  of  each  other.  This  separableness  is  not  found  in 
Cassirer's  "symbolic  forms."  Distinct  though  sign  and  meaning 
are,  they  belong  inextricably  together.  They  fit  as  neatly  to 
each  other  as  the  broken  halves  of  a  ring  fit.  Like  these  they 
form  an  integral  whole.  This  intimacy  of  the  relation  between 


560  HELMUT  KUHN 

"form"  and  "meaning"  distinguishes  the  genuine  symbolic  form 
from  conventional  semantic  systems  such  as  the  Morse  Code  or 
the  signs  used  by  symbolic  logic.  The  latter  provide  vehicles  for 
conveying  a  ready-made  meaning  j  and  they  may,  at  any  time, 
be  supplanted  with  alternative,  more  convenient  vehicles.  Not 
so  the  "symbolic  form."  It  is  not  exchangeable,  not  detachable, 
not  arbitrarily  constructed.  It  is  not  content  in  a  form  but  con- 
tent as  formj  a  medium  informed  and  animated  by  meaning, 
meaning  articulating  itself  into  form. 

The  mind  weaves  a  seamless  robe.  A  linguistic  expression  may 
be  translated  from  one  language  into  another,  though  even 
here  the  translation  will  never  be  a  perfect  equivalent  of  the 
original.  But  a  content  expressed  in  one  type  of  symbolic  form, 
say  in  language,  cannot  be  ripped  from  its  "connatural"  mani- 
festation and  sewn  to  a  different  symbolic  vesture.  The  meaning 
of  languages  is  not  expressible  in  painting,  nor  the  meaning  of 
music  in  terms  of  mythic  thinking.  Every  realm  of  symbolic 
forms,  language,  art,  and  mythic  Weltanschauung,  must  be 
accepted  on  its  own  terms  and  deciphered  in  consonance  with 
the  creative  direction  or  intent  which  determines  the  structure 
of  that  particular  realm.  To  lay  bare  this  unique  structure, 
neither  adding  nor  leaving  out  but  faithfully  following  in  the 
footprints  of  mens  creatrix — such  is  the  business  of  a  transcen- 
dental analysis  of  language,  of  mythology,  of  art.  Philosophy 
appears  in  the  role  of  a  universal  interpreter  of  the  multiple 
"languages"  through  which  the  mind  puts  forth  its  inner  wealth. 
It  functions,  in  Cassirer's  own  terms,  as  "the  conscience  of 
culture."1* 

Transcendental  analysis  as  employed  by  Cassirer  has  a  special 
aptitude  for  performing  precisely  this  task.  It  operates  with  a 
dynamic  and  highly  flexible  concept  of  "form"  which  is  equally 
applicable  in  all  spheres  of  symbolic  expression.  Kant,  in  the 
"transcendental  logic,"  views  the  cognitive  act  as  the  synthesis 
of  a  diversity  of  sensory  data.  This  idea  of  synoptic  construction, 
stripped  of  the  realistic  ingredient  which  accrued  to  it  from 
Kant's  notion  of  "givenness,"  proves  a  perfect  tool  for  an  inter- 
pretation which  is  to  range  far  beyond  epistemology  over  the 

"Logik  .  .  .,  33. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         561 

whole  field  of  cultural  achievements.  Myths  and  language,  re- 
ligious symbols  and  works  of  art — all  and  each  show  the  dom- 
inance of  one  point  of  view — different  in  each  particular  field 
yet  analogous  in  mode  of  operation  to  all  the  others  j  and  this 
point  of  view  unifies  and  organizes  an  indefinite  multiplicity 
into  an  orderly  Kingdom  of  Forms.  To  understand  any  one  cul- 
tural phenomenon,  be  it  a  religious  belief,  an  artistic  motif, 
or  a  linguistic  expression,  means  to  locate  it  within  the  sphere 
of  symbolic  expression  to  which  it  belongs  and  from  which 
it  derives  its  significance.  In  other  words,  the  phenomenon 
under  analysis  must  be  subjected  to  the  dominant  angle  of 
vision  as  the  principle  of  synthesis. 

Whence  do  the  material  elements  hail  which  are  put  together 
by  transcendental  synthesis  in  the  several  provinces  of  its 
operation?  "From  nowhere,"  seems  the  correct  reply.  These 
material  elements,  although  affording  a  particular  content, 
have  no  existence  apart  from,  or  previous  to,  the  framework  of 
forms  in  which  they  are  ensconced.  They  owe  their  particularity, 
and,  in  fact,  their  existence,  to  their  relation  to  universal  form; 
and  this  assertion  is  reversible.  Form  and  matter,  in  this  view, 
are  strictly  correlate,  and  synthesis  is  diversification  as  well  as 
unification.  We  see  here  Cassirer  taking  the  path  along  which 
Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  had  once  moved  beyond  Kant 
and  away  from  Kant:  away  from  the  "thing  in  itself"  in  rela- 
tion to  which  the  subject  was  supposed  to  be  the  suffering  or 
receptive  rather  than  the  spontaneously  active  partner. 

Logic,  which  demands  the  dialectical  interdependence  of  "the 
one"  and  "the  many,"  seems  to  be  with  Cassirer  and  his  prede- 
cessors in  radical  idealism.  But  his  resolute  departure  from 
Kant's  residual  realism  saves  the  idealist  from  an  inconsistency 
only  to  entangle  him  in  another  no  less  grave  difficulty.  If 
the  particular  content  does  not  stem  from  a  material  datum  out- 
side the  mind,  it  must  be  the  mind  that  gives  rise  to  it.  How,  then, 
is  this  infra-mental  duality  to  be  accounted  for?  How  explain 
the  concentration  of  analysis  upon  "form,"  if  "form"  and 
"matter"  are  of  the  same  origin  and,  consequently,  of  the  same 
ontological  rank?  Cassirer  throughout  uses  a  language  which 
presupposes  the  common-sense  notion  of  the  mind  exercising 


562  HELMUT  KUHN 

itself  in  a  world  of  "given"  objects.  This  is  the  view  which 
descriptive  expressions  such  as  articulation  of  meaning,  unifica- 
tion, synoptic  organization,  etc.,  imply.  But  the  rigorous  dia- 
lectics of  transcendental  idealism  gives  the  lie  to  these  and 
similar  terms  and  reduces  them  to  the  status  of  metaphors.  No 
language  is  available  directly  to  express  what  the  idealist  en- 
deavors to  think. 

The  linguistic  difficulty  indicates  a  deep-seated  quandary.  We 
are  brought  face  to  face  with  an  ancient  cosmogonic  puzzle. 
The  original  One,  so  it  seems,  needs  a  counter-force  to  chal- 
lenge it  into  productivity.  A  metaphysical  antagonist  is  re- 
quired, 

Der  reizt  und  wirkt  und  muss  als  Teufel  schaffen*7 

In  Cassirer's  philosophy,  cultural  productivity  is  partheno- 
genesis, parturition  of  the  spirit  that  dwells  in  solitude.  Sub- 
stance, he  insists,  must  be  transfigured  into  function,  "being" 
into  "doing."  But  function  is  discernible  only  if  seen  against 
the  foil  of  substance,  just  as  doing  requires  something  "unto 
which"  doing  is  done.  The  attempt  to  translate  everything  into 
doing  obliterates  doing.  Exactly  this  occurs  in  Cassirer's  phi- 
losophy of  culture.  Total  dynamism  is  proclaimed,  the  bound- 
less liberty  of  the  creative  mind  5  yet  the  result  obtained  is 
meaning  congealed  into  structures  rigidly  static,  like  Parmen- 
ides' Being  "immovable  in  the  bonds  of  mighty  chains  without 
beginning  and  without  end."18 

Parmenides  was  at  great  pains  to  ward  off  intrusions  of  the 
non-being  about  which,  he  stoutly  maintained,  no  assertion 
can  be  made  except  that  "it  is  not."  Melissus  and  Zeno,  armed 
with  the  two-edged  sword  of  Parmenidean  dialectic,  continued 
to  fight  the  losing  battle  j  until  in  Gorgias,  the  prodigal  son 
of  the  Eleatic  house,  non-being  carried  the  day.  Plato  discovered 
the  moral  of  this  story.  With  apologies  to  Parmenides  he  laid 
unfilial  hands  on  his  thesis  and  re-admitted  non-being  to  some 
sort  of  existence — the  existence  of  "images"  (eidold).™  Thus  he 
limited  the  scope  of  Parmenides'  "ontological  identification"  (of 

17  Goethe,  Faust,  "Prolog  im  Himmel." 
"Hermann  Diels,  loc.  cit.,  237,  fr.  8,  26f. 
" Sophist,  2+1  d. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         563 

knowledge  and  being)  and  rendered  a  philosophy  of  the  finite 
world  and  the  finite  knower  possible.  Similarly,  the  Atomists 
used  the  void  (successor  to  Parmenides'  non-being)  as  an  auxil- 
iary cosmogonic  principle.  In  our  own  time,  while  metaphysics 
tottered  with  decrepitude,  neo-Kantianism  reverted  to  the 
Eleatic  identification  j  and  again,  at  the  periphery  of  the  re- 
stored sphere  of  Being,  the  teasing  presence  of  the  unsuccess- 
fully exorcized  non-being  made  itself  felt.  Its  name,  in  Cassirer, 
is  "the  flux  of  experience,"  out  of  which  the  symbolic  forms  are 
said  to  crystallize.  This  matrix  of  Being,  itself  non-being,  how- 
ever indispensable  it  seems,  is  inassimiliably  alien  within  the  tran- 
scendental scheme.  It  is  supposed  to  be  objectifiable.  But  it  is 
not  objectified.  Hence  it  is  not. 

As  the  "flux  of  experience"  looms  as  that  which,  a  passive 
substratum,  is  as  yet  to  be  objectified,  so,  at  the  opposite  pole  of 
the  transcendental  axis,  the  active  partner  becomes  just  dis- 
cernible: that  which  objectifies  but  has  not  yet  passed  into 
objectivity.  And  again,  according  to  the  rigid  laws  of  tran- 
scendental logic,  this  still,  so  to  speak,  "fluid"  creativity  is  kept 
lingering  at  the  outer  confines  of  the  universe  of  philosophical 
discourse.  To  mingle  with  transcendentally  respectable  concepts 
it  lacks  the  stamp  of  objectivity  which  can  be  imprinted  upon 
it  only  by  a  synthesis.  This  but  dimly  perceived  creativity  re- 
sembles the  Christian  God  rather  than  the  Platonic  demiurge 
who,  with  the  Eternal  Model  before  him,  persuades  the 
"errant  cause"  into  submission  to  his  formative  will.  There  is, 
according  to  the  "critical"  view,  no  malleable  stuff  to  be  fash- 
ioned. Creation  is  creatio  ex  nihilo.  But,  of  course,  the  creative 
mind  which  reveals  itself  in  symbolic  forms  has  vacated  its 
transmundane  heaven  to  take  up  quarters  in  the  human  sphere. 
It  is  alternately  called  "life,"  a  name  which  denotes  its  present 
abode,  and  "spirit"  which  is  reminiscent  of  its  exalted  origin. 
Life  or  spirit  in  Cassirer's  philosophy  is  akin  to  HegePs  Welt- 
geist.  But,  whereas  the  latter  unfolds  itself  in  history,  baring 
the  rhythm  of  its  movements  for  our  inspection,  Cassirer's 
"life"  is  known  by  its  fruits  alone.  At  the  same  time,  the  ele- 
ment of  transcendence,  maintained  in  Hegel,  is  discarded. 
Cassirer's  philosophy  is  plainly  "immanentist."  Its  principle  of 


564  HELMUT  KUHN 

creativity  is  conceived  in  the  spirit  of  an  era  whose  implicit 
faith  found  a  classic  expression  in  Auguste  Comte's  "worship 
of  humanity." 

We  remember  here  that  student  of  textile  manufacture  to 
whom  we  likened  the  follower  of  "critical"  or  "transcendental" 
idealism.  This  student,  we  agreed,  was  to  be  blind  both  to  his 
tools  and  to  his  raw  material.  He  has  an  eye  only  for  the  web 
itself.  Loom  and  shuttle,  in  our  simile,  stand  for  "life"  (or 
"spirit"),  the  thread  as  raw  material  for  the  "flux  of  experi- 
ence." We  could  not  prevent  our  student  from  casting  about  un- 
easily for  surmises  concerning  these  to  him  invisible  agents. 
In  the  same  way,  the  ideas  of  "creative  life"  and  the  "flux 
of  experience"  intrude  upon  the  attention  of  the  critical  analyst. 
But  a  further  stipulation  we  agreed  upon  cannot,  as  we  now  see, 
be  upheld.  We  tried  to  cast  upon  the  victim  of  our  experiment 
a  spell  which  would  force  him  to  think  everything  (including 
tools  and  material)  in  terms  of  texture.  This  proves  more  than 
human  blood  and  flesh  can  bear.  In  non-metaphorical  language: 
metaphysics  is  not  to  be  expelled  by  a  vow  of  abstinence.  Drive 
it  out  with  the  critical  pitchfork:  tamen  usque  recurret.  Definite 
metaphysical  tenets  underlie  Cassirer's  philosophy  of  culture. 
His  determination  to  refrain  from  metaphysics  is  itself  dictated 
by  his  immanentist  metaphysics — a  self-denying  metaphysics, 
condemned  to  suffering  atrophy. 

The  common  denominator  of  the  divers  symbolic  forms  is 
their  character  as  principles  of  objectivation.  They  are  non- 
cognitive  variants  of  the  Kantian  "synthesis  of  transcendental 
apperception."  But  this  is  not  the  only  bond  between  them. 
They  bear,  as  it  were,  a  family  likeness  to  each  other.  Although 
they  form  different  "languages,"  they  show  analogies  of  "syn- 
tax" and  treat  identical  themes.  This  analogous  structure  of 
the  various  "realms"  is  reflected  in  the  parallel  order  followed 
by  the  argument  in  the  three  volumes  of  the  Philoso'phie  der 
symbolischen  Formen.  The  analysis  of  language  (in  volume  I), 
the  analysis  of  myth  (in  volume  II),  and  the  analysis  of  the 
cognitive  process  (in  volume  III)  begin  with  a  treatment  of 
space  and  time.  This,  of  course,  is  done  in  adherence  to  the 
pattern  set  by  Kant's  "transcendental  aesthetics,"  the  opening 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         565 

part  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  But  Cassirer  adds  a  dis- 
cussion of  number  which  has  no  pendant  in  the  Critique. 

For  Kant  self-consciousness  and  time  are  intimately  related 
to  each  other.  Time  is  "the  form  of  the  inner  sense,"  So,  in 
letting  an  examination  of  the  ego  follow  on  the  heels  of  his 
"transcendental  aesthetics,"  Cassirer  still  is  guided  by  the 
spirit  though  not  by  the  table  of  contents  of  Kant's  work.  The 
latter  part,  in  all  three  volumes,  corresponds  roughly  to  the 
master's  "transcendental  logic,"  insofar  as  it  rises  above  the 
outlines  of  the  sensible  world  to  more  abstract  relationships. 

The  significance  of  these  analogies  is  obvious.  Language, 
myth,  knowledge  are  different  media,  all  three  of  them  refract- 
ing rays  emitted  by  one  and  the  same  luminary;  or  to  use  an- 
other more  closely  "transcendental"  figure  of  speech:  they 
are  different  idioms  which  express  an  identical  conception.  This 
pervasive  conception  or  pattern  is  of  triadic  structure:  the 
sensible  world,  the  ego,  the  ego  orienting  itself  in  the  world. 
The  world,  a  temporal  sequence  of  events,  extended  in  space, 
exhibiting  a  prodigious  wealth  of  qualities — this  world  is  re- 
flected in  linguistic  signs,  intuited  by  mythic  consciousness, 
interpreted  by  religion  and  art,  known  by  science.  In  its  passage 
from  one  medium  to  another,  it  is,  and  is  not,  the  same,  com- 
parable to  a  tune  played  on  different  instruments.  And  what 
is  true  of  the  first  unit  of  the  triad,  the  sensible  world,  holds 
likewise  of  the  ego,  and  of  the  relations  between  self  and 
world. 

Space,  for  instance,  as  a  feature  of  mundane  existence,  is 
found  in  mythic  thought  as  well  as  in  a  scientific  interpretation 
of  reality.  There  are  not  two  different  spaces:  a  mythic  and  a 
scientific  space.  Wherever  space  is  apprehended,  it  shows  cer- 
tain persistent  traits:  it  has  dimensions,  and  it  is  the  locus  in 
which  things  are  placed  as  "here,"  or  "there,"  as  inside  one 
thing,  distant  from  another  thing,  etc.  In  another  sense,  how- 
ever, there  are  indeed  different  spaces  or  rather  types  of  space. 
In  mythic  thought  no  clear  distinction  is  made  between  the 
place  and  the  thing  that  fills  the  place.  The  "here"  and 
"there"  are  conceived  of  as  properties  of  objects.  Things  have 
their  "natural"  place  and  displacement  may  destroy  them. 


566  HELMUT  KUHN 

Likewise  spatial  directions  coalesce  with  features  of  reality: 
north  is  air,  and  it  is  also  war  and  hunting;  south  is  fire,  and 
also  medicine  and  agriculture,  and  so  forth.  The  nature  of  this 
"mythic"  space  does  not  greatly  differ  from  space  as  we  all 
perceive  it  in  everyday  life.  But  only  remotely  does  it  resemble 
the  strictly  homogenous  space  of  Euclidean  geometry  which  is 
"the  locus  of  loci,"  totally  detached  from  localized  objects. 
Time,  number,  relation,  ego — they  all  show  a  similar  plas- 
ticity. Although  retaining  their  nature,  they  suffer  modifications 
in  conformity  with  the  realm  of  meaning  in  which  they  appear. 
They  are  "polyglot"  in  the  sense  that  they  express  themselves  in 
different  "languages,"  such  as  religion,  art,  or  science. 

The  tripartite  pattern  which  recurs  in  each  of  the  symbolic 
forms  mirrors  a  more  basic  triad.  The  triptych:  world — ego — 
categorial  relations,  forms  within  the  sphere  of  constituted 
structures  the  counterpart  to  a  triune  constituent  structure 
"higher  up,"  in  the  sphere  of  transcendental  origins.  "World" 
corresponds  to  "flux  of  experience,"  "ego"  to  "life,"  and  the 
"categorical  relations,"  which  straddle  over  this  dichotomy,  to 
"transcendental  synthesis."  The  former  are  to  the  latter  as  the 
non-lingual  conditions  which  render  language  possible  (voice, 
communicable  meaning)  to  a  universal  grammar. 

The  "universal  grammar,"  which  shows  the  uniformity  of  all 
types  of  symbolic  expression,  is  diversified  into  a  number  of 
"languages"  by  principles  of  specifications;  and  the  specific 
structure  combines,  in  every  particular  field,  with  the  all-perva- 
sive structure  into  a  complex  pattern.  So  there  is  one  differentia 
specifics  which  modifies  the  "universal  grammar"  into  what  is 
literally  called  language,  another  specifying  principle  consti- 
tutes the  type  of  expression  called  "religion,"  a  third  one  con- 
stitutes art,  and  so  forth.  The  principles  of  specification  are  not 
arrived  at  by  deduction.  Cassirer  even  refrains  from  enunciating 
them  in  abstracto.  The  analyst  of  culture,  he  holds,  should  not 
rival  with  natural  science  in  the  attempt  to  formulate  universal 
laws  which  determine  causally  connected  events.  Instead  he 
must  seek  to  "make  visible"  a  "totality  of  forms,"  held  together 
by  unity  of  "style."  The  concepts  through  which  a  style  is  com- 
prehended do  not  "determine" — they  "characterize."  From  the 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         567 

point  of  view  of  Cassirer's  own  methodology,  the  "structural 
analysis"  which  he  brings  to  bear  on  culture  holds  a  middle- 
ground  between  natural  science,  which  aims  at  the  discovery  of 
universal  laws,  and  historiography,  which  emphasizes  the  indi- 
viduality of  facts.20  With  this  logical  topology  Cassirer  puts  on 
record  his  own  contribution  to  that  prolonged  and  dust-raising 
battle  of  books  for  which  Wilhelm  Windelband,  as  long  ago  as  in 
1894,  sounded  the  opening  flourish  with  a  timely  and  successful 
platitude,  the  distinction  between  generalizing  knowledge  (Erk- 
Ureri)  and  individualizing  knowledge  (Verstehen)^  and  whose 
prize  was  Geisteswissenschaft,  philosophically  justified. 

In  order  to  make  visible  that  unity  of  style  which  character- 
izes one  type  of  expression  as  myth,  another  as  art,  a  third  as 
religion,  and  so  on,  the  conceptual  instruments  traditionally 
used  by  neo-Kantian  thinkers  were  of  no  avail.  Neither  Her- 
mann Cohen's  rhapsodic  construction  nor  Heinrich  Rickert's 
painstaking  diaeresis  could  have  helped  Cassirer  solve  the  prob- 
lem at  hand.  Long  enough  Windelband's  terms  "idiographic" 
and  "nomothetic"  had  been  bandied  about  by  argumentative 
methodologists.  Cassirer  came,  through  his  affiliation  with  Mar- 
burg stamped  as  a  man  of  vastest  generalities,  and  possessed 
himself  of  that  subtly  individualizing  art  of  understanding 
which  had  been  evolved  in  the  camp  of  his  intellectual  anti- 
podes: in  the  Historical  School  and  by  Wilhelm  Dilthey.  With 
Cassirer,  neo-Kantianism,  originally  given  to  rigidly  construc- 
tive methods,  became  sensitive  to  the  finest  shades  of  style  and 
structure — to  a  type  of  order  which  reveals  its  secret  to  the 
observant  physiognomist  rather  than  to  the  classifying  logician. 
In  Cassirer's  work,  transcendental  construction  and  empirical 
interpretation  come  to  a  fruitful  understanding. 

Mythic  thought  is  dominated  by  what  Cassirer  describes  as 
"the  concrescence  of  related  terms."21  The  wound  suffered  in 
combat  is  considered  not  merely  an  effect  related  to  the  foe  as 
to  its  cause:  somehow  it  is  the  foe,  the  presence  of  his  malignant 
power  in  the  stricken  man's  body.  Similarly,  the  parts  are  seen 
not  only  as  composing  the  whole,  but  each  part  stands  for,  and 

*  Logik  .  .  .,  89-93. 
nPSF,  II,  83. 


568  HELMUT  KUHN 

to  some  extent  is,  the  whole.  A  man's  footprints,  or  his  nails, 
are  in  a  way  the  man  himself,  carriers  of  the  "real  power"  which 
centers  in  a  person.  This  coalescence  of  related  but  distinct  ele- 
ments runs  through  all  strata  of  the  mythic  world  picture.  To- 
gether with  other  features  it  forms  the  "specific  difference" — 
that  which  defines  myth  as  myth  and  sets  it  off  against  other 
types  of  symbolic  expression  such  as  religion  or  art.  However, 
Cassirer  does  not  deduce  the  nature  of  myth  from  "participa- 
tion" or  "concrescence"  as  from  a  principle,  but  proceeds  in  a 
manner  which  might  be  described  as  "constructive  empiricism." 
He  first  surveys  his  assemblage  of  data,  an  astonishingly  rich 
harvest  gleaned  from  a  thorough  study  of  anthropological  lit- 
erature, then  fastens  upon  some  salient  features  which  bring  out 
the  structure  of  the  field  under  investigation.  These  features  he 
follows  into  their  finer  ramifications  until  he  finally  succeeds  in 
hammering  out  the  rich  relief  of  a  coherent  and  balanced 
"totality  of  forms." 

Naturally  this  structural  interpretation,  with  all  its  scrupulous 
attention  to  facts,  is  ultimately  guided  by  the  principles  of  tran- 
scendental philosophy.  But  to  a  large  extent,  this  philosophical 
orientation,  far  from  imposing  ready-made  concepts  upon  a  re- 
calcitrant material,  serves  as  a  critical  catalytic.  We  are  prone  to 
cast  our  experiences  in  a  number  of  streotyped  forms  which  are 
most  handy  to  us  because  of  their  usefulness  in  practical  life} 
and  in  so  doing  we  readily  overlook  the  unique  character  of 
these  experiences.  To  this  "pragmatic  fallacy"  the  analysis  of 
symbolic  forms  offers  an  effective  antidote. 

In  ancient  Greece,  language,  as  a  system  of  phonetic  signs,  was 
made  the  object  of  a  famous  controversy.  Those  who  regarded 
these  signs  as  existing  "by  nature"  (fww)  joined  issue  with 
others  who  considered  them  conventional  (>W>);  and  even 
today,  as  the  emergence  of  Semantics  in  our  midst  shows,  the 
hoary  "conventionalism"  is  not  yet  extinct.  Here  is  a  test  case  for 
Cassirer's  method  of  arbitration.  The  study  of  linguistic  form, 
conducted  under  the  auspices  of  transcendental  philosophy, 
establishes  language  as  a  unique  type  of  expression.  This  "sym- 
bolic form"  of  language  qua  language  is  adequately  described 
neither  by  linguistic  naturalism  with  its  emphasis  on  onomato- 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         569 

poetic  links  between  sign  and  signified  objects,  nor  by  conven- 
tionalism with  its  insistence  on  the  arbitrary  character  of  signs. 
Another  illustration  is  furnished  by  the  debate  between  imita- 
tion theory  and  expression  theory  in  aesthetics.  Again  a  unique 
creative  direction,  incarnate  in  works  of  art,  is  unduly  assimilated 
to  that  type  of  objective  existence  with  which  we  are  most 
familiar  in  our  workaday  world.  And  again,  the  analyst  of 
symbolic  forms,  with  his  eye  upon  the  differentia  sfecifica  of 
the  aesthetic  form  qua  aesthetic,  may  arbitrate  between  the  dis- 
putants by  discarding  their  false  disjunction. 

Up  to  this  point,  the  symbolic  forms  have  been  treated 
by  us  as  autonomous  domains,  of  analogous  structure,  but  other- 
wise insular,  unrelated  among  themselves.  Yet  there  are,  over 
and  above  their  generic  features  as  "forms,"  certain  specific 
ties  and  interrelations  between  them.  As  we  now  focus  on  the 
links  connecting  form  with  form  we  come  across  another  factor, 
neglected  hitherto.  Eleatic  immobility  has  seemed  to  character- 
ize the  symbolic  structures.  Studying  their  interrelations  we 
catch  a  glimpse  of  their  subdued  dynamism. 

Some  of  the  symbolic  forms  as  distinguished  by  Cassirer  can, 
others  can  not,  coexist  in  the  same  mind  or  in  the  same  cultural 
environment.  Language,  e.g.,  lives  together  with  religion  peace- 
ably and  in  fruitful  co-operation  j  whereas  scientific  knowledge 
is  intolerant  of  myth.  This  observation  furnishes  a  clue  for 
uncovering  the  configuration  of  Forms  in  a  field  of  mutual  re- 
latedness. 

Significantly  the  philosophy  of  the  symbolic  forms  opens 
with  language.  Language,  in  effect,  occupies  a  unique  place 
within  the  scheme  of  cultural  structures.  It  is  the  one  form  that 
associates  with  all  other  forms.  Be  he  a  primitive,  his  mind  be- 
clouded by  magic  and  superstition,  or  a  specimen  of  homo 
sapens,  consumer  and  fabricator  of  books  on  philosophy,  as 
human,  man  is,  according  to  Aristotle's  definition,  "an  animal 
endowed  with  speech."22 

Cassirer  distinguishes  three  linguistic  phases,  characterized 
severally  by  the  prevalence  of  mimetic,  analogical,  and  sym- 
bolic expression.  At  the  stage  of  mimetic  expression,  the  word  is 

M  Politics,  i25$a  10. 


570  HELMUT  KUHN 

an  imitative  gesture  clinging  closely  to  what  it  denotes.  The 
primitive  Ewe  language,  for  example,  has  no  less  than  33 
"phonetic  images"  for  various  modes  of  "walking}"  and  we  may 
believe  that,  beside  the  mimetic  power  and  evocative  vividness 
of  each  of  them,  even  so  picturesque  English  verbs  as  "stagger," 
"lumber,"  "strut,"  and  the  like,  appear  sicklied  over  with  the 
pale  cast  of  thought.  In  modern  languages  this  primitive  type  of 
expression  survives  in  those  linguistic  fossils  which  we  call  ono- 
matopoetic.23  The  analogical  stage  is  reached,  where  the  ar- 
rangement of  phonetic  signs  corresponds  to  the  arrangement  of 
denoted  events.  The  resemblance  between  event  and  phonetic 
signal  is  here  superseded  with  the  analogy  between  the  order  of 
things  and  the  order  of  sounds.  So  a  difference  in  pitch  of  voice 
may  be  used  to  signal  a  difference  of  distance}  or  reduplication 
(as  in  doy  dedf)  serves  to  express  the  past  tense.  With  the  attain- 
ment, finally,  of  the  symbolic  stage,  the  heterogeneity  of  sign  and 
fact  is  understood  and  fully  exploited.  The  phonetic  symbol  is 
made  to  "signify"  (bedeuten)  instead  of  merely  to  "denote" 
(bezeichnen),  and  the  mind  now  moves  with  supreme  freedom 
in  the  fully  mastered  medium  of  linguistic  expression. 

The  trend  of  the  movement  from  stage  to  stage  is,  it  appears, 
towards  greater  "spiritualization"  or  "etherialization"  (Ver- 
geistigung).  At  the  same  time,  it  becomes  clear  why  one,  and 
only  one,  of  the  symbolic  forms,  language,  "mingles"  with  all 
its  peers.  In  its  development  from  mimetic  to  symbolic  expres- 
sion it  covers  the  entire  rising  scale  on  which  each  of  the  other 
forms  occupies  a  fixed  point.  Language  evolves  through  all 
phases  of  the  mind's  progress  towards  freedom,  whereas  the 
other  forms  are  located  each  within  one  phase;  and  this  is 
why,  to  some  extent,  they  are  mutually  exclusive.  In  addition  to 
being  autonomous  provinces  of  expression,  they  mark  "stages  on 
life's  road." 

With  the  mythic  world  picture,  we  find  ourselves  at  the  start- 
ing point  of  the  road.  Owing  to  the  operation  of  the  principle 
of  "concrescence,"  meaning  exists  here  only  as  materialized, 
fettered  to  a  sensuous  substratum.  At  a  point  farthest  removed 
from  myth,  knowledge  is  located,  the  road's  terminus.  Here 

*PSF,  I,  «37f. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         571 

spiritualization  has  reached  its  consummation  j  and  the  philoso- 
phy of  symbolic  forms,  itself  a  type  of  knowledge,  endeavors 
to  give  adequate  expression  to  this  crowning  achievement.  With 
its  emphasis  on  the  creative  deed  of  the  intellect  in  "positing"  its 
objects,  and  with  its  fight  against  the  "copy  theory"  of  knowl- 
edge, it  claims  for  the  spirit  its  finally  accomplished  freedom. 
Recognizing  itself  in  its  works,  the  mind  has  won  the  prize  of 
its  longest  journey. 

Two  intermediate  stages  link  beginning  and  end.  They  have 
not  been  given  a  full  treatment  by  Cassirer.  But  the  intima- 
tions of  volume  two,  in  the  concluding  section,  entitled  "The 
Dialectic  of  the  Mythic  Consciousness,"  are  sufficiently  reveal- 
ing to  help  us  round  off  our  "dynamic  chart"  of  the  forms  of  cul- 
ture. The  life  which  animates  the  mythic  consciousness  tends  to 
burst  into  a  freedom  beyond  the  world  of  myth.  In  religion  this 
new  freedom  is  attained.  But,  although  shedding  the  material- 
ity which  the  principle  of  concrescence  imposes  upon  mythic 
consciousness,  religion  still  cleaves  to  a  sensuous  substratum.  Its 
spirituality,  insisted  upon  by  a  trend  towards  mysticism,  is 
counterbalanced  by  an  equally  vital  attachment  to  the  world  of 
sacred  imagery.  This  tension  between  disembodied  spirituality 
and  imaginative  concreteness  is  set  at  rest,  though  not  fully 
resolved,  in  another  type  of  symbolic  expression,  in  art. 
Through  the  work  of  art,  meaning  builds  itself  an  appearance, 
filling  it  with  expression  to  the  brim  without  overflow  and  mak- 
ing it  wholly  alive.  But  at  the  same  time,  this  appearance  offers 
itself  as  nothing  but  an  image,  as  "semblance."  It  renounces  the 
claim  to  objective  reality  in  the  context  of  practical  life. 

Myth  appears  as  a  prelude  followed  by  a  triadic  sequel:  re- 
ligion, art,  knowledge.  Unmistakably  -  this  is  the  rhythm  of  the 
"Absolute  Spirit"  according  to  Hegel.24  At  the  same  time,  it 
becomes  plain  why  the  evolutionary  impetus  which  sweeps 
through  Hegel's  philosophical  vision  must  remain  a  subordi- 
nate and  undeveloped  feature  with  Cassirer — a  "subdued 
dynamism,"  as  we  have  called  it.  Given  full  scope,  this  dynamic 
element,  a  corrosive  power,  would  wash  away  the  foundations 
from  under  the  Symbolic  Forms. 

*Cf.  Hegel's  Encydopadie,  §§553-577- 


572  HELMUT  KUHN 

Cassirer's  symbolic  forms  are  primarily  independent  struc- 
tures, viewed  in  juxtaposition,  each  animated  by  an  immanent, 
unique  "direction  of  creativity."  Once  we  stress  the  dynamic 
feature,  envisaging  a  succession  of  forms,  this  immanence, 
autonomy,  and  static  self-sufficiency  of  the  Form  singly  taken 
is  called  in  question.  Cassirer  is  well  aware  of  this  danger  and 
warns  us  not  to  confuse  his  "three  phases"  with  Auguste  Comte's 
law  of  the  trois  Stats™  The  latter  schema,  he  writes,  does  not 
permit  a  purely  immanent  evaluation  of  the  achievements  of  the 
mythic-religious  consciousness.  In  fact,  it  is  a  perilous  undertak- 
ing for  Cassirer  even  to  moot  the  problem  of  a  dynamic  self- 
transcendence  of  the  Symbolic  Forms.  By  doing  so  he  himself 
encourages  us  to  relinquish  his  principle  of  a  "purely  immanent 
evaluation"  and  thus  brings  down  upon  himself  a  host  of  dis- 
concerting questions.  How  can  the  co-ordination  of  Form  as 
equals  be  upheld  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  one  of  them, 
knowledge,  encompasses  all  the  others?  What  of  the  truth 
which  religion,  or  rather  every  particular  religion,  claims  for 
itself?  Does  not  transcendental  analysis,  although  attributing  to 
religion  a  certain  meaningful  structure,  tacitly  nullify  this 
claim?  Furthermore,  is  not  the  passage  from  myth  to  religion, 
and  perhaps  also  from  religion  to  science,  or  from  a  primitive  to 
a  pure  religion,  a  progress  from  the  misery  of  error  and  super- 
stition to  wisdom  and  to  the  felicity,  precarious  and  yet  real, 
of  a  civilized  life?  And  would  not  progress,  so  understood,  be 
a  greater  thing  than  what  it  appears  in  Cassirer?  Not  a  tenuous 
dialectic  which  wafts  the  spirit  from  one  insular  Form  to  an- 
other, but  man's  Promethean  deed  which  made  him  human — 
culture  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word? 

In  these  questions  we  readily  recognize  the  voice  of  the 
importune  questioner  who,  at  the  beginning  of  our  analysis, 
came  out  with  his  naive  query  concerning  culture  only  to  find 
Cassirer's  philosophy  unresponsive.  An  explanation  of  this  un- 
responsiveness  is  now  at  hand. 

The  field  within  which  the  dynamic  interrelatedness  of  the 
Symbolic  Forms  unfolds,  the  dimension,  we  might  say,  of  their 
orderly  combination  into  a  comprehensive  pattern  of  co-opera- 

II,  291. 


CASSIRER'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CULTURE         573 

tion — this  field  is  the  mind  of  the  concrete  individual,  living  his 
own  life  and  participating,  at  the  same  time,  in  the  life  of  a 
civilization.  On  him,  poor  wretch,  is  incumbent  the  choice  be- 
tween good  and  evil.  For  him,  happy  man,  for  his  enjoy- 
ment, the  works  of  civilization  are  produced.  He  will  not  be 
content  with  learning  that  the  story  of  Faust,  as  a  myth,  exhibits 
certain  features  typical  of  "mythic  thought."  He  is  interested  in 
knowing  whether,  perchance,  it  prefigures  a  truth.  That  religion 
wavers  between  mystic  spirituality  and  imaginative  concreteness 
will  be,  for  him,  only  a  preliminary  statement  leading  up  to 
more  relevant  problems  such  as:  Is  the  idea  of  "original  sin"  as 
taught  by  one  particular  religion,  Christianity,  in  conformity 
with  what  we  know  about  human  life?  It  is  he,  the  concrete 
living  individual,  who  asks  all  the  importune  questions.  It  is  he, 
also,  for  whose  enlightenment  and  betterment  Socrates,  Plato, 
and  Aristotle  labored,  and  following  them,  the  philosophers  of 
the  Middle  Ages  and  the  Modern  Era,  including,  of  course, 
Kant.  But  never  and  under  no  circumstances  is  he  admitted  to 
the  precincts  of  neo-Kantian  thought.  Where  is,  we  wonder,  a 
place  for  ethics  and  political  philosophy  in  the  frame-work  of 
the  Symbolic  Forms?  For  Cassirer,  life  comes  into  view  only 
as  vita  acta,  "life  that  was  lived,"  never  as  vita  agenda,  "life 
as  it  is  to  be  lived."  This  accounts  for  the  calm  perfection  of  his 
thought,  and  also  for  its  ineluctable  limitations.  He  is  not  in 
the  melee,  forever  breathing  the  cool  air  of  contemplative  de- 
tachment. But  how  such  serenity  is  achieved  his  philosophy  does 
not  tell. 

For  once,  Cassirer  sounds  a  sombre  note.  At  the  conclusion 
of  his  analysis  of  the  logic  of  Geisteswissenschaft  a  thoughtful 
chapter  is  devoted  to  the  "Tragedy  of  Culture."  We  are  in- 
vited to  survey  the  vast  panorama  as  disclosed  by  "critical  phi- 
losophy." With  one  glance  we  embrace  the  Symbolic  Forms,  a 
solemn  array  of  structures  which  outline  the  timeless  possibilities 
of  the  creative  mind.  Their  rigid  architecture  rises  above  an  ele- 
ment of  infinite  mobility,  a  whirl  of  incessant  change:  the 
temporal  flux  of  life.  At  brief  creative  moments  this  flux  is 
arrested.  It  crystallizes  into  shapes  that  temporarily  fill  the  ves- 
sels of  timeless  possibility  with  the  actuality  of  life:  languages 


574  HELMUT  KUHN 

become  articulate,  religions  seek  and  find  credence,  works  of  art 
spread  delight,  philosophies  express  truth.  But  life  is  alternation 
of  building  up  and  breaking  down.  Man's  creations,  the  works 
of  culture,  bask  for  awhile  in  the  broad  daylight  of  history  only 
to  return  whence  they  came.  Such  is  "the  tragedy  of  culture," 
according  to  Cassirer. 

Is  this  transience  truly  tragic,  the  reader  asks.  Surely,  it  lies  in 
the  nature  of  things,  and  it  leaves  intact  the  grandiose  perdur- 
ance  of  the  Symbolic  Forms.  The  philosophical  complaint  on 
mortality  recalls  a  well-known  earlier  treatment  of  the  theme: 

"Mark  ye  the  leaves,  for  men  are  like  thereto. 
When  leaves  by  winds  into  the  dust  are  whirled 
Soon  the  green  forest  buddeth  millions  new, 
And  lo,  the  beauty  of  Spring  is  on  the  World. 
So  come,  so  pass,  all  that  are  born  of  Man." 

\Iliady  vi,  146-149  tr.  Gilbert  Murray) 

Again  we  ask  why  the  transitoriness  of  man  should  be  a  sub- 
ject for  mourning.  The  forest  endures,  and  so  does  mankind, 
and  both  forest  and  mankind  can  live  only  through  suffering 
numberless  deaths. 

The  answer  to  our  query  will  be  the  same,  or  nearly  the  same, 
in  both  cases.  For  the  Ionian  poet,  singing  at  the  dawn  of  Hel- 
lenic culture,  the  passing  of  generations  is  tragic,  because  in  him 
the  self-conscious  individual  with  his  thirst  for  eternity  just 
awakens.  For  the  twentieth  century  scholar,  the  timeless  validity 
of  symbolic  structures  is  not  enough  to  forestall  tragedy,  be- 
cause the  old  imperious  desire  for  "world  without  end"  is  not 
entirely  put  to  sleep.  The  individual  is  not  wholly  banished.  His 
ghostlike  presence  suffuses  the  great  unconcern  of  the  philoso- 
phy of  Symbolic  Forms  with  an  elegiac  mood. 

HELMUT  KUHN 
DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
EMORY  UNIVERSITY 


i6 

David  Bautngardt 
CASSIRER  AND  THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS 


i6 
CASSIRER  AND  THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS 


is,  in  Ernst  Cassirer's  vast  work,  one  example 
JJL  above  all  of  penetrating  analysis,  dealing  with  the  chaos 
of  contemporary  ethical  thought  and  indicating  a  way  out  of 
its  Babel  of  confusion.  It  is  a  pregnant  chapter  in  Cassirer's 
Axel  Hagerstrom,  1939.  This  work,  analyzing  the  philosophy 
of  a  Swedish  thinker,  seems  hardly  the  place  in  which  to  find  a 
masterpiece  of  contemporary  ethical  research.  But  the  fact  that 
Professor  Cassirer  chose  just  this  inconspicuous  place  for  his 
main  contribution  to  ethics  shows,  I  think,  the  degree  of  his 
affection  for  that  nation  which  offered  him  a  real  home  at  the 
time  of  a  gigantic  homelessness  of  the  spirit.  In  Axel  Hager- 
strom,  and  in  widely  scattered  reflections  in  his  other  writings, 
Cassirer's  own  ethical  views  evolve  out  of  brief  examinations 
of  a  considerable  number  of  contemporary  theories:  ethical 
neo-intuitionism  and  the  ethics  of  absolute  values,  as  well  as 
ethical  relativism  and  utilitarianism. 

I.  THE  PLURALISTIC  ETHICS  OF  ENGLISH  NEO-DEONTOLOGISM 

Although  Sir  W.  D.  Ross  is  fond  of  appealing  to  the  authority 
of  Kant's  concept  of  moral  duty,  Cassirer,  who  set  out  from 
Kant,  has  in  his  ethics  very  little,  almost  nothing  in  common 
with  Sir  David's  neo-deontologism.  Professor  Prichard,  Profes- 
sors Broad  and  Ross  obviously  think  that  their  ethical  teachings 
on  $rima  facie  duties,  on  "imperatives  .  .  .  which  are  here  and 
now  categorical,"1  and  on  particular  self-evident  moral  "obliga- 
tions"2 are  still  somehow  in  line  with  the  Kantian  ethics  of  duty. 
All  these  moralists  believe  that  they  remain  in  far-reaching 
agreement  with  Kant  despite  their  "pluralistic"  tendencies,  i.e., 

*C.  D.  Broad:  Five  Types  of  Ethical  Theory  y  (1930),  123. 
2  See  H.  A.  Prichard,  "Does  Moral  Philosophy  Rest  on  a  Mistake?,"  Mind, 
January  (1912),  New  Series,  vol.  XXI,  361". 

577 


DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

despite  their  supposition  of  a  multitude  of  genuine  a  priori 
duties.  Professor  Broad,  in  his  defense  of  a  definite  pluralism 
of  ethical  principles,  even  went  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  Kant 
himself  presupposed  "imperatives  which  are  here  and  now 
categorical  for  certain  persons;"  and  that,  with  this  Kantian 
thesis,  justice  is  done  to  "an  important  psychological  fact  which 
moralists  like  Spinoza  and  Hume  tend  to  ignore."  In  contrast  to 
this  pseudo-Kantian  pluralism,  Professor  Cassirer  is  doubtless 
correct  when  he  emphasizes  that,  in  Kant  at  least,  "categorical" 
has  the  meaning  of  universal  validity,  and  that  for  Kant  the 
uniqueness  and  universal  validity  of  his  ethical  axiom  are  at 
least  as  essential  as,  if  not  more  essential  than,  its  imperative 
character.3 

Kant  frequently  expressed  the  meaning  of  his  categorical  im- 
perative in  non-imperative  terms,  and  without  explicit  reference 
to  the  concept  of  duty,  but  he  never  agreed  to  a  plurality  of  cate- 
gorical imperatives.  All  the  duties  of  which  he  speaks  in  his 
Metaphysik  der  Sitten  are  applications  of  one  categorical  im- 
perative. Any  supposition  of  a  multiplicity  of  ethical  axioms 
would  destroy  the  whole  epistemological  basis  of  Kant's  ethics. 
Such  a  supposition  is  incompatible,  not  only  with  the  letter  of 
what  Kant  wrote,  but  also  with  the  spirit  of  all  that  Kant's 
"Typik  der  pracktischen  Vernunft"  and  his  numerous  discus- 
sions of  moral  casuistry  stand  for.  Henry  Sidgwick,  Alexander 
Bain,  and  other  English  or  German  Kant  interpreters  of  the 
1 9th  century  were  certainly  right  when  they  denied  that  there 
is  any  pluralism  in  Kant's  doctrine  of  duties.  Kant's  aim  was  "to 
show  that  they  (the  duties)  may  be  all  deduced  from  the  single 
imperative."4  His  intention  was  "to  deduce  a  complete  code  of 
duty  from  a  purely  formal  principle."5 

8  See  e.g.  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hdgerstrom  (Goteborgs  Hogskolas  Arsskrift  XLV), 

(I939>>  79- 

4  Alexander  Bain,  Mental  and  Moral  Science  (1868),  731. 

5  See   H.   Sidgwick,    The  Methods  of  Ethics   (1884),   207.   Note   discussion 
in   Thomas   K.    Abbott's   Critique   of   Practical   Reason   and   other   Works   on 
the  Theory  of  Ethics,  Memoir  of  Kant  p.  li.  Cf.  H.  Sidgwick,  The  Methods 
of  Ethicsy  (1901),  209.  I  have  dealt  with  these  questions  in  detail  in  my  book, 
Der  Kampf  um  den  Lebenssinn  unter  den  Vorlaufern  der  modemen  Ethiky  (1933), 
and  shall,  therefore,  not  repeat  myself  here. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  579 

But  no  matter  whether  contemporary  English  moralists  do 
or  do  not  have  truly  Kantian  tendencies,  the  main  question  is: 
do  their  pluralistic  theses  deserve  any  preference  to  a  "one-prin- 
ciple ethics," — the  Kantian  or  any  other?  Out  of  the  extreme 
complexities  involved  in  this  question,  I  should  like  to  take  up 
only  a  few  points  for  summary  discussion. 

Cassirer  agrees  with  Kant  that,  in  the  theory  of  nature  as  well 
as  in  ethics,  the  "demand  for  greatest  unity"  must  be  placed 
constantly  in  the  center  of  philosophical  reflection.8  Contempo- 
rary ethics,  however,  is  generally  pluralistic,  and  this  for  a  num- 
ber of  complex  reasons.  But  there  seems  little  doubt  that  one  of 
the  main  reasons  is  the  fear  of  oversimplification  so  frequently 
expressed  by  modern  moralists  and  their  disdain  for  the  "sweet 
simplicity"  of  utilitarians  who  perhaps  represent  the  most 
marked  type  of  a  one-principle  ethics.  In  the  eyes  of  the  best 
known  contemporary  English  ethicists,  it  obviously  would  be  an 
oversimplification  to  presuppose  the  universal  validity  of  a 
single  ethical  principle.  To  believe  in  the  validity  of  several 
moral  axioms  or  $rima  -facie  duties  seems  to  be  much  more 
"gegenstandsnah*"  it  seems  to  do  far  more  justice  to  concrete 
ethical  situations.  Is  this  implicit  methodological  consideration 
justifiable? 

I  think  not,  for  at  least  three  reasons.  First,  it  is  by  no  means 
self-evident  that  in  ethical  reasoning,  as  in  simple  induction,  the 
way  leads  from  evident  particularia  to  less  evident  generalia. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  as  Professors  Prichard  and  Ross  assure  us, 
we  have  immediate  insight  into  the  validity  of  concrete  moral 
obligations  comparable  with  the  insight  into  mathematical  truth, 
then  we  have  every  reason  to  assume  that,  as  in  mathematics,  the 
general  axiom  is  less  complex  and  more  immediately  given  than 
any  concrete,  particular  mathematical  relation.  If  ethical  insight 
is,  in  fact,  of  the  same  structure  as  mathematical,  then  here  too 
the  principle  applies  that  totum  est  ante  Cartes. 

Secondly,  even  if  the  methodological  procedure  in  ethics  were 
not  merely  deductive,  a  mere  analogy  to  mathematical  reason- 
ing, even  if  it  were,  as  in  natural  science,  a  complicated  combina- 

8E,  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrom,  (1939),  79- 


58o  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

tion  of  deduction  and  induction,  even  then — as  in  meteorology 
— the  general  principles  may  be  well  established  and  ascertained, 
although  their  application  to  concrete  cases  may  be  extremely 
complex  and,  in  many  circumstances,  actually  impossible.  If  this 
be  the  case,  then  again,  as  under  the  first  mentioned  supposition, 
it  would  be  a  gross  oversimplification  to  begin  with  seemingly 
evident  particulars  instead  of  general  principles  or  hypotheses. 
Although  this  may  appear  paradoxical  to  common  sense,  in  a 
science  of  ethics,  as  well  as  in  mathematics  or  physics,  the  valid- 
ity of  general  principles  may  be  much  more  elementary  and  more 
easily  ascertainable  than  the  validity  of  particular  concrete  rules. 

Thirdly,  the  concrete  duties  which  Sir  David  considers  a 
priori  obligatory,  such  as  keeping  a  promise,  telling  the  truth 
and  giving  aid  to  victims  of  accidents,  are  by  no  means  obligatory 
as  such,  as  concrete  duties.  Contrary  to  his  presuppositions,  the 
moral  validity  and  obligatory  character  of  these  duties  are 
highly  controversial.  In  a  consistent  morality  of  power,  the  very 
same  duties  are  not  binding  either  as  prima  facie  duties  or  in 
any  other  way.  The  moral  validity  of  these  particular  obligations 
can  be  assured  only  after  the  general  validity  of  a  morality  of 
altruism,  a  Jewish,  Christian,  Buddhist  ethics,  or  something 
similar,  has  already  been  accepted;  and  this  is  by  no  means  a 
matter  of  course  in  any  critical  ethics. 

Sir  David  thinks  it  essential  to  deal  with  the  questions  of  the 
"good"  and  the  "right"  separately,  and  to  avoid  in  this  way  a 
great  amount  of  entanglement  in  ethics.  For  the  same  reason 
Professor  Broad  breaks  up  his  analysis  into  even  more  elements 
when  he  discusses  the  intuitively  given  essence  of  the  "useful" 
and  the  "fitting"  of  every  phase  of  any  act.  Only  in  this  way, 
he  states,  can  decision  about  the  morally  right  act  be  composed, 
namely,  through  moral  decisions  on  many  more  elementary 
points.  "The  rightness  or  wrongness  of  an  action  in  a  given  .  .  . 
situation  is  a  function  of  its  fittingness  in  that  situation  and  its 
utility  in  that  situation;"  we  have  to  estimate  "total  rightness 
from  total  fittingness  and  total  utility."7  It  probably  did  not 
occur  to  either  of  these  subtle  thinkers  that,  although  abhorring 

7C.  D.  Broad,  op.  cit.,  22 if. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  581 

oversimplification  at  the  end  of  the  inquiry,  one  may  neverthe- 
less fall  into  it  at  the  very  start.  As  I  have  tried  to  hint,  I  think 
that  such  seemingly  simple  questions  as  "is  keeping  a  promise  a 
p'ima  jade  duty?"  or  even  "is  this  phase  of  this  action  morally 
fit?"  contain  highly  complex  ethical  problems  and  by  no  means 
the  most  elementary  ones. 

Only  in  an  early  stage  of  the  development  of  physics  could  it 
have  been  considered  self-evident  that  the  fall  of  a  particular 
body  in  a  definite  time  was  a  less  complex  phenomenon  than  the 
general  laws  of  equally  accelerated  movement  and  of  friction,  or 
than  the  most  general  law  of  the  verification  of  scientific  state- 
ments by  sense  data.  Why  epistemological  conditions  in  ethics 
should  be  the  opposite  of  those  in  science  has  never  been  ex- 
plained or  justified  by  contemporary  English  ethics  and  I  do 
not  think  that  it  can  ever  be  justified. 

Of  course,  it  must  be  admitted  that,  psychologically  speaking, 
the  genius  of  Galileo  was  able  to  decipher  the  meaning  of  one 
particular  observation  in  such  a  way  that  he  intuitively  read  out 
of  it  the  general  law  of  the  free  fall  of  bodies,  and  even  the 
univeral  law  of  the  necessity  of  verifying  all  hypothetical  laws 
in  physics  by  minute  observation.  Any  modern  physicist  is  now 
able  to  interpret  any  particular  phenomenon  of  a  free  fall,  so 
to  speak,  intuitively  by  immediate  insight.  In  the  same  way  the 
moral  genius  and,  after  a  long  period  of  conscious  or  unconscious 
training,  the  plain  man  may  be  able  to  make  decisions  on  highly 
complex  and  particular  moral  rules  instantly,  by  immediate 
ethical  insight,  without  even  being  aware  of  underlying  general 
principles. 

Epistemologically  speaking,  however,  an  insight  into  the  es- 
sence of  the  universal  law  of  verification,  or  even  an  insight  into 
the  law  of  free  fall,  can  never  be  won  by  a  merely  inductive 
piling  up  of  particular  observations  or  particular  rules.  On  the 
contrary,  from  the  epistemological  standpoint  any  adequate  in- 
terpretation of  particular  cases  of  free  fall  must  be  preceded  by 
the  adoption  of  the  universal  law  of  verification  of  scientific 
statements,  and  by  the  hypothesis  that  the  free  fall  of  bodies  is  a 
case  of  equally  accelerated  movement.  If  the  validity  of  such 


582  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

general  laws  is  not  acknowledged  first,  there  would  be  no  reason 
to  prefer  the  Galilean  analysis  of  free  fall  to  Franz  Baader's 
mythological  interpretation,  or  to  HegePs  metaphysical,  dialec- 
tical explanation. 

Seen  from  the  psychological  point  of  view,  particular  frima 
facie  duties  may  appear  to  represent  elementary  moral  issues, 
whereas  general  moral  laws,  or  one  universal  law,  may  seem  to 
involve  far  more  complex  and  perhaps  insoluble  or  unnecessary 
complex  difficulties.  But,  if  the  problem  is  viewed  epistemologi- 
cally,  certain  general  laws  or  one  universal  principle  must  form 
the  indispensable  precondition  of  the  validity  of  any  particular 
moral  rules  or  duties.  To  replace  the  epistemological  point  of 
view  by  the  psychological  would  be  what  I  should  like  to  call 
a  "psychologistic  fallacy."  It  does  not  seem  to  me  entirely  im- 
possible that  this  kind  of  confusion  or  fallacy  may  have  played 
some  part  in  the  foundations  of  Sir  David's  and  Professor 
Broad's  ethical  reasoning,  despite  the  admirable  acuteness  of 
the  superstructure  of  their  work.  In  any  case,  Cassirer's  ethics 
has  kept  itself  free  from  the  psychologistic  fallacy  and  free, 
also,  from  the  other  uncritical  presuppositions  just  mentioned. 

II.  THE  ETHICS  OF  NON-NATURAL  INTRINSIC  GOODNESS  AND 
OF  ABSOLUTE  VALUES 

Professor  G.  E.  Moore's  ethical  analyses  concentrate  mainly 
on  the  concept  of  "good,"  though  he  grants,  in  his  "Reply  to 
my  Critics"  in  1942,  that  the  following  not  very  lucid  relation 
exists  between  the  concept  of  good  and  that  of  duty: 

To  say  of  anything,  A,  that  it  is  "intrinsically"  good  is  equivalent  to 
saying  that,  if  any  agent  were  a  Creator  before  the  existence  of  any 
world,  whose  power  was  so  limited  that  the  only  alternatives  in  his 
power  were  those  of  ( i )  creating  a  world  which  consisted  solely  of  A  or 
(2)  causing  it  to  be  the  case  that  there  should  never  be  any  world  at  all, 
then,  if  he  knew  for  certain  that  this  was  the  only  choice  open  to  him 
and  knew  exactly  what  A  would  be  like,  it  would  be  his  duty  to  choose 
alternative  (i),  provided  only  he  was  not  convinced  that  it  would  be 
wrong  for  him  to  choose  that  alternative.8 

'"The  Library  of  Living  Philosophers,"  vol.  IV:  The  Philosophy  of  G.  E. 
Moore,  ed.  by  P.  A.  Schilpp  (1942),  600. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  583 

From  this  statement  one  might  infer  first  that  it  seems  hardly 
possible  to  break  through  all  the  reservations  enumerated  in  this 
one  sentence.  On  second  thought,  however,  from  this  and  other 
statements  of  Professor  Moore's  one  might  draw  at  least  the 
inference  that  his  ethics  more  than  that  of  English  neo-deon- 
tologists  is  on  the  whole  in  favor  of  one  unifying  principle — the 
principle  of  the  good  which  does  not  seem  to  be  in  need  of  sup- 
plementary principles  of  the  morally  right  or  morally  fit,  of 
prima  facie  duties  and  of  utility.  In  truth,  however,  he  is  in 
other  respects  probably  no  less  of  an  ethical  "pluralist"  than 
the  Provost  of  Oriel  and  Professor  Broad. 

If  I  understand  Professor  Moore  aright,  his  opinion  is  that 
there  are  a  multitude  of  ethical  goods,  as  there  are  a  multitude 
of  yellows  or  reds.  But  there  is  no  universal  principle  which 
determines  what  is  morally  good;  "good"  is  indefinable  and 
ultimately  independent  of  anything  else  existing  or  given  by 
experience.  The  main  thesis  of  this  ethics  is,  obviously,  that  a 
large  plurality  of  morally  good  things  or  motives  or  acts 
do  exist,  each  case  being  isolated  and  independent  of  the  others, 
good  by  itself.  If  this  thesis  were  correct,  then,  as  Professor 
Moore  and  the  neo-deontologists  imply,  it  would  of  course 
be  superfluous  to  carry  on  the  age-old  attempts  to  determine 
what  may  be  good  by  some  general  elementary  criterion.  More- 
over, these  attempts  would  be  not  only  useless  but  misleading 
and  futile,  as  misleading  and  futile  as  are  all  efforts  to  deter- 
mine or  to  define  the  nature  of  a  concrete  sense-datum.  One  may 
be  able  to  speak  of  relations  existing  between  different  data  of 
the  senses;  and  one  is  able,  according  to  Professor  Moore,  to 
speak  of  a  very  complicated  relation  existing  between  "good" 
and  duty.  But  in  neither  case  can  a  general  principle  determine 
the  nature  of  good  or  of  a  sense  datum;  and  no  critical  justifica- 
tion of  the  validity  of  our  propositions  on  "good"  is  thought  to 
be  possible  or  needed.  For  what  "good"  is,  no  less  than  what  is  a 
sense  datum,  is  believed  to  be  known  already  by  an  unfailing 
insight  of  common  sense;  and  therefore,  to  Professor  Moore, 
ethics  does  not  seem  to  demand  any  general  principle  for  a  criti- 
cal distinction  between  morality  and  immorality. 

I  wish  to  hint  at  least  at  a  few  reasons  why,  in  my  view, 


584  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

Professor  Moore's  analyses  lead  to  such  embarrassing  problems 
that  perhaps,  as  he  says  himself,  he  has  "not  gone  about  the 
business  of  trying  to  solve  them  in  the  right  way."  Moore  him- 
self admits  that  "it  is  a  just  charge  against  me  that  I  have  been 
able  to  solve  so  few  of  the  problems  I  wished  to  solve  j"  and 
I  see  no  reason  why  one  should  take  this  statement  as  a  mere 
flourish  of  modesty  or  irony  in  a  thinker  who  often  shows  most 
definite  self-assuredness.  But,  if  Professor  Moore's  self-criticism 
is  not  without  foundation,  his  failure  to  answer  fundamental 
questions  in  ethics  satisfactorily  is  certainly  not  due,  as  he  adds, 
"partly  [to  a]  sheer  lack  of  ability. "9  There  is  no  doubt  of  the 
subtlety  of  Professor  Moore's  ethical  analyses,  i.e.,  of  all  the 
superstructures  which  he  built  up  on  his  common-sense  ethical 
beliefs;  but  the  basis  of  these  superstructures,  which  seems  to 
him  so  undoubtedly  firm,  "realistic,"  and  unassailable  in  its 
common-sense  quality,  seems  to  me  amazingly  weak. 

(a)  Intrinsic  Goodness  and  Values  in  Themselves 

In  Professor  Moore's  ethics,  and  similarly  in  modern  ethics 
of  values  in  general,  the  following  concepts  are  basic:  intrinsic, 
non-natural  goodness;  intrinsic  value;  things  good  by  them- 
selves and  existing  by  themselves  "in  absolute  isolation."10  In 
about  the  same  sense  moral  values  are  self-evident  in  Max 
Scheler's,  Nicolai  Hartmann's,11  or  Wilbur  M,  Urban's  ethics 
of  values.  Everywhere  in  these  ethical  systems  the  morally  good 
and  all  values  are  values,  not  in  consequence  of  any  "external" 
relations  to  other  things  or  experiences  or  principles,  but  only 
on  the  ground  of  their  "intrinsic  nature." 

Professor  H.  J.  Paton  protested,  in  "The  Library  of  Living 

9  The  Philosophy  of  G.  E.  Moore,  ed.  by  Paul  A.  Schilpp  (1942),  677. 

10 See  G.  E.  Moore,  Principia  Ethica  (1903),  37,  6ff,  21,  nofj  Philosophical 
Studies  (1922),  chapters  VIII,  Xj  Principia  Ethica,  187,  184,  27ff,  955  chapter 
VI 5  Ethics  (1912)  chap.  VII 5  cf.  William  K.  Frankena  in  The  Philosophy  of 
G.  E.  Moore  (1942),  931". 

11  For  a  more  detailed  criticism  of  Max  Scheler's  and  Nicolai  Hartmann's  ethics 
of  values  see  my  essay  on  "Some  Merits  and  Defects  of  Contemporary  German 
Ethics"  in  Philosophy  (The  Journal  of  the  British  Institute  of  Philosophy), 
(1938), 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  585 

Philosophers/'  against  this  alleged  independence  of  goodness. 
He  pointed  out  that,  to  say  the  least,  "the  goodness  of  a  thing 
. .  .  must  stand  in  some  necessary  relation  to  a  rational  will .  .  . 
and  .  .  .  may  vary  in  different  circumstances."12  In  his  reply  to 
this,  Professor  Moore  admitted  only  "that  the  existence  of  some 
experience  is  a  proposition  which  does  follow  from  the  hy- 
pothesis that  there  exists  a  state  of  affairs  which  is  good;"  but, 
as  he  adds,  "I  cannot  see"  that  logically  the  hypothesis  of  the 
existence  of  a  good  state  of  affairs  "entails  any  proposition  to  the 
effect  that  a  mental  disposition"  such  as  rational  will  exists.1* 
Certainly  this  is  absolutely  correct  according  to  the  principles  of 
formal  logic.  Unless  it  is  granted  first  by  explicit  definition  or 
implicitly  by  experience  that  scarlet  is  a  particular  shade  of  red, 
I  cannot  conclude  from  the  concept  of  scarlet  that  it  includes 
the  concept  of  red. 

But  the  question  at  issue,  the  particular  question  which  Pro- 
fessor Paton  obviously  has  in  mind,  is  not  this  problem  of 
drawing  a  merely  logical  inference.  It  is  the  epistemological 
question  of  whether,  in  the  world  of  reality,  it  is  possible  to 
think  of  goodness  without  any  relation  to  rational  will.  This 
question  has  not  been  answered  by  Professor  Moore. 

The  question  is  not  how  to  define  moral  goodness.  The 
question  is  whether  the  meaning  of  moral  goodness  in  reality 
can  be  clarified  without  taking  into  account  the  concept  of 
rational  will — &  concept  which,  it  is  true,  from  the  merely 
logical  point  of  view  or  from  the  standpoint  of  linguistics  is  not 
connected  with  the  concept  of  goodness.  That  is,  to  approach  this 
controversial  point  from  a  slightly  different  angle,  can  the 
meaning  of  moral  goodness  be  clarified  without  taking  into 
account  more  than  particular,  isolated  states  of  affairs  of  good- 
ness? Are  not  some  general  principles,  or  is  not  one  universal, 
unifying  rational  principle  needed  for  determining  rationally 
whether  certain  states  of  affairs  can  rightly  be  called  good,  or 
whether  certain  concepts,  such  as  honor  or  love,  really  deserve  to 
be  called  values?  Has  any  isolated  particular  state  of  affairs 

14  The  Philosophy  of  G.  E.  Moore,  113. 
13  Ibid.,  6 1 8. 


586  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

"by  itself"  the  "intrinsic  nature"  to  be  good  without  being  re- 
lated to  anything  "outside"  itself? 

Cassirer  answers  this  question  in  the  following  way:  It  "is 
and  remains  ...  in  any  case  a  questionable  metaphor  ...  to 
speak  of  cvalues-in- themselves'}"  every  ethical  "evaluation" 
includes  "a  form  of  retrospect,  of  preview,  and  of  survey,  which 
is  lacking  in  feelings  j  since  these  [latter  are]  merely  given  phe- 
nomena."14 As  we  may  add,  in  the  spirit  of  Cassirer's  whole 
neo-Kantian  outlook,  this  kind  of  preview,  retrospect  and  survey 
is  a  necessary  precondition  of  true  statements  in  all  knowledge 
of  nature  as  well  as  in  morals.  That  there  is  any  truth  or  moral 
validity  built  up  dogmatically  on  the  perception  or  the  analysis 
of  a  particular  state  of  affairs,  isolated  from  all  others — may  be 
a  seemingly  plausible  common-sense  view;  but  it  is  by  no  means 
self-evident  and  is  scientifically  untenable. 

To  Professor  Moore  this  "method  ...  of  isolation"  is  "the 
only  safe"  one.15  Even  his  "organic  unities"  are  unities  separate 
from  each  other  j  and  no  conclusion  has  for  him  "any  weight 
whatever  failing  a  careful  examination  of  the  (separate)  in- 
stances which  have  led"  him  "to  form  it."16  But  this  method  of 
generalization — a  generalization  by  mere  induction  of  separate 
instances  is  certainly  not  the  method  of  exact  science,  and,  above 
all,  it  seems  to  me  by  no  means  "the  only  safe"  method  in 
ethics. 

Professor  Moore  is  absolutely  right  in  saying  that  "to  search 
for  'unity'  and  'system,'  at  the  expense  of  truth,  is  not,  I  take  it, 
the  proper  business  of  philosophy,  however  universally  it  may 
have  been  the  practice  of  philosophers."17  Certainly  it  is  en- 
tirely unphilosophical,  if  unity  and  system  are  sought  at  the 
expense  of  truth.  But  does  this  statement  exclude  in  any  way 
the  possibility  that  the  concept  of  truth  itself  is  closely  tied 
up  with  the  "right  kind"  of  unity  and  system?  Contrary  to  Pro- 
fessor Moore's  and  Ross'  presuppositions,  might  it  not  be  im- 

14 E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrom  (1939),  65. 

MG.  E.  Moore,  Principia  Ethica.  (1903),  94$  cf.  91. 

"/«*,  223. 

17  Ibid.,  222. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  587 

possible  to  arrive  at  any  worth-while  truth  by  analyzing  only 
isolated  phenomena,  even  if  they  are  analyzed  with  the  greatest 
acumen? 

A  similar  question  has  been  raised  by  Professor  Paton  in  the 
following  piece  of  analysis:  "When  Sir  Philip  Sidney  in  dying 
resigned  to  a  wounded  soldier  the  cup  of  water  which  had  been 
off ered  him,  I  take  it  that  his  action  was  a  good  action  and  that 
its  goodness  depended  partly  on  the  circumstances}"  if,  how- 
ever, one  would  "evaluate  in  isolation,  not  the  action  in  itself, 
but  the  action  in  the  relevant  circumstances  together  with  its 
motive  and  intention,"  then  "the  main  contention  would  .  .  . 
be  reduced  to  the  view  that  the  goodness  of  an  action  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  circumstances  irrelevant  to  its  goodness — which 
is  a  mere  tautology."18  To  this  argument  Professor  Moore 
simply  replies  that  "these  cwhen-clausesj  "  in  Professor  Paton's 
example  do  not  express  external  "circumstances  under  which  the 
choice  we  admire  was  made:  they  form  part  of  the  description 
of  the  intrinsic  nature  of  that  choice,"  which  is  morally  good} 
these  so-called  circumstances  are  "an  essential  part"19  of  Sid- 
ney's good  action;  they  belong  to  its  intrinsic  nature. 

Again,  this  method  of  "solving"  problems  is  certainly  correct 
from  the  point  of  view  of  formal  logic.  But  how  similar  is  this 
manner  of  overcoming  philosophical  difficulties  to  that  of 
Moliere's  "Le  malade  imaginaire"!  In  Moliere,  too,  certain 
"external"  relations  are  "explained"  by  elevating  them  to  the 
rank  of  "intrinsic"  ones.  Here,  too,  the  external  causal  con- 
nection between  poppy  and  its  making  people  sleep  is  explained 
by  taking  this  causal  relation  as  an  "intrinsic"  attribute,  as  a  part 
of  the  "essence"  of  poppy,  by  bringing  that  causal  relation  into 
the  "intrinsic  nature"  of  poppy  and  calling  it  the  "essential" 
dormitive  power  of  the  plant. 

Apart  from  this  reminder,  I  should  say  that,  even  if  all  these 
circumstances  mentioned  by  Professors  Paton  and  Moore  are 
interpreted  as  forming  the  intrinsic  nature  of  Sidney's  good 
action,  I  fail  to  see  why  a  choice  of  exactly  this  intrinsic  nature 

18  The  Philosophy  of  G.  E.  Moore,  126. 

19  Ibid.,  619. 


588  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

is  morally  good  on  the  ground  of  self-evidence,  as  is  evidently 
implied  in  Professor  Moore's  argument. 

My  trouble — and  obviously  the  trouble  of  only  too  many 
contemporaries — is  that  questions  of  just  this  type,  questions 
of  why  Sidney's  action  is  good,  occupy  my  mind  even  more 
than  the  logical  subtleties  of  Moore's  ethics.  And  while  I  try 
to  follow  his  minute,  logical,  step-by-step  procedure,  which 
often  admittedly  leads  to  nothing,  I  am  afraid  that  I  cannot 
follow  him  when  he  suddenly  indulges  in  sweeping  assertions 
which  concern  not  merely  logical  problems  but  questions  of 
obvious  psychological  and  ethical  importance,  e.g.,  whether 
Sidney's  choice  is  intrinsically  good,  and  as  such  needs  no  further 
qualification  or  justification;  or  when  Professor  Moore  states 
that  "Americans  are  more  generally  and  markedly  friendly" 
than  the  English,20  it  seems  to  me  that  not  only  Lord  Baldwin, 
who  called  the  English  the  most  friendly  people  on  earth,  but 
also  many  Americans  may  feel  some  hesitancy  on  this  point; 
nor  can  one,  I  think,  accept  the  similarly  bold  statement  of 
Professor  L.  S.  Stebbing,  that  "anyone  who  has  been  able  to 
learn  something  of  Moore's  way  of  thinking  .  .  .  could  not  .  .  . 
succumb  to  the  muddle-headed  creed  of  Fascism  or  National- 
Socialism."21  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  should  be  one  of  the 
primary  aims  of  any  ethical  teaching  to  protect  us  from  succumb- 
ing to  any  kind  of  Machiavellianism.  But  I  fear  that  hardly  any 
ethical  doctrine  developed  so  far  has  succeeded  in  reaching  this 
high  aim. 

To  return  to  Sidney's  action:  in  order  to  show  why  his 
choosing  is  morally  good  it  seems  to  me  indispensable  to  show, 
first,  why  the  general  principle  of  altruism  or  any  kind  of  al- 
truism is  moral,  and  to  clear  up  numerous  other  preliminary 
questions  which  present  the  most  fundamental  ethical  difficul- 
ties. If  for  the  sake  of  argument  one  granted  all  the  presup- 
positions of  Professor  Moore,  the  "when-clauses"  which  he 
thinks  essential  for  the  intrinsic  goodness  of  Philip  Sidney's 
choice  would  by  no  means  be  sufficient.  Contrary  to  Professor 

"/«*.,  39- 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  589 

Moore's  assumption,  far  more  would  be  needed  as  an  essential 
part  of  the  good  choice  than  that  "the  cup  should  be  given  to 
another  man,  when  he  (Sidney)  himself  was  in  pain  and  thirsty 
and  knew  that  the  other  man  was  in  pain  and  thirsty."22  It 
would  be  essential,  also,  that  the  dying  man  who  refused  the 
cup  of  water  was  not,  for  example,  an  ancient  Egyptian.  For  if 
he  were,  his  refusal  of  the  cup  would  have  implied  a  lack  of 
faith  in  the  doctrine  of  immortality.  He  would  have  been  guilty 
of  an  act  of  impiety.  He  would  have  shown  by  his  choice  that, 
contrary  to  the  rules  of  Egyptian  piety,  he  obviously  thought  he 
would  be  able  to  go  on  after  death  without  food  and  drink.  Or, 
if  the  wounded  soldier  to  whom  the  cup  of  water  was  later 
offered  had  shared  the  not-uncommon  superstition  that  to  take 
away  food  and  drink  from  a  dying  man  brings  misfortune  upon 
you,  or  if  the  dying  man  himself  had  shared  the  same  super- 
stition, would  the  choice  of  the  dying  man  still  have  been  mor- 
ally good,  even  if  one  grants  additionally  that  altruism  is  always 
good?  It  seems  to  me  that,  if  one  adopts  Professor  Moore's 
teaching  about  assimilating  "when-clauses"  to  the  intrinsic 
nature  of  a  moral  choice,  the  "when-clauses"  would  have  to  be 
extended  so  far  that  the  "isolation"  of  the  intrinsic  nature  of  any 
moral  choice  would  grow  utterly  hopeless. 

(b)  Is  Moral  Goodness  a  Non-Natural  Property  or  Has  It 
Only  an  Emotive  Meaning? 

The  most  outstanding  and  most  influential  contribution  which 
Professor  Moore  has  made  to  the  development  of  modern 
ethics  is  in  all  probability  this:  he  insisted,  in  his  Principa 
Ethica,  on  denying  that  "morally  good"  is  a  natural  intrinsic 
property  or  characteristic.  To  speak  of  good  as  if  it  were  a 
natural  property  of  things  or  acts  or  motives  would  be  what 
Professor  Moore  termed,  in  1903,  a  "naturalistic  fallacy}"  and 
it  was  certainly  most  illuminating  when  he  unearthed  this 
naturalistic  fallacy  in  some  well-known  ethical  theories.  This 
was  a  vigorous,  lucid  application  of  an  old  truth  in  a  new  and 
striking  formulation. 
619. 


590  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

The  "idealistic"  moralist,  who  does  not  share  uncritically 
every  "realistic"  common-sense  opinion,  should  not  find  it  too 
difficult  to  adhere  to  a  clear-cut  distinction  between  natural  and 
non-natural  characteristics.  Such  moralists  (including  a  really 
consistent  utilitarian)  can  explain  the  difference  in  question  in 
about  the  following  way:  natural  properties  are  those  which  are 
given  us  immediately  in  our  various  experiences  such  as  sweet- 
ness, hardness,  redness,  and  even  pleasantness.  Non-natural 
properties  such  as  "true"  or  "good"  concern  properties  of 
judgments  built  up  on  the  comparing  and  ordering  of  immedi- 
ately given  data  of  experience.  Professor  Moore  has  never 
accepted  any  definition  along  these  lines,  probably  because  it 
would  not  conform  to  the  principle  of  his  "common-sense" 
reasoning. 

In  his  essay  of  1932  "Is  Goodness  a  Quality?"  he  states  that 
ethical  good  means  "an  experience  which  is  worth  having  for 
its  own  sake."23  This  is  a  view  which  obviously  fits  the  "isola- 
tionist," "pluralistic,"  "common-sense"  tendencies  which  he 
has  always  maintained,  despite  his  principle  of  "organic  wholes." 
It  fits  these  trends  far  better  than  does  any  such  "idealistic" 
explanation  as  that  morally  good  is  not  an  immediately  given 
quality  at  all,  but  a  quality  bound  up  with  judgments  which,  at 
least,  try  to  "unify"  experiences  universally. 

In  his  "Reply  to  My  Critics,"  however,  in  1942,  even  his 
own  view  of  1932  is  evidently  no  longer  "realistic"  enough  for 
Professor  Moore.  He  now  explicitly  rejects  the  explanation  of 
good  he  had  given  in  1932  and  suggests,  instead  of  this,  the 
following  explanation  of  non-natural  properties,  such  as  good,  in 
general: 

Properties  which  are  intrinsic  properties,  but  not  natural  ones,  are 
distinguished  from  natural  intrinsic  properties,  by  the  fact  that,  in 
ascribing  a  property  of  the  former  kind  to  a  thing,  you  are  not  describing 
it  at  dly  whereas,  in  ascribing  a  property  of  the  latter  kind  to  a  thing, 
you  are  always  describing  it  to  some  extent?* 

*  Proceeding*  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  Supplementary  Volume  XI,  (1932), 

. 
*lbid.,  591.  See  also  555. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  591 

Concerning  this  account  of  the  cardinal  distinction  between 
natural  and  non-natural  properties  Professor  Moore  himself 
says  that  it  is  "certainly"  a  "vague  and  not  clear  . . .  account."25 
This  is,  as  Professor  Moore  states  himself  with  regard  to  a 
similar  thesis  of  his,  "at  least  an  honest  statement."28 

Yet  it  is  certainly  most  discouraging  to  see  that  an  ethics 
which  set  out  only  to  "clarify"  problems  leads  finally  to  expla- 
nations which  are  admittedly  "vague  and  not  clear."  One  may 
readily  grant  Professor  Moore's  main  contention,  that  what 
we  need  first  (and  obviously,  in  his  view,  what  is  often  our 
only  need)  is  not  to  solve  problems  but  to  clarify  their  meaning. 
If,  however,  these  strenuous  efforts  at  clarification  end  in  a 
definite  lack  of  clearness  even  on  a  most  fundamental  point, 
one  may  perhaps  be  allowed  to  make  use  of  Professor  Moore's 
most  radical  prescript  in  philosophy.  I.e.,  one  may  ask  whether 
the  question  itself  which  he  seeks  to  clarify  is  not  a  confused 
question,  which  stands  in  need  neither  of  clarification  nor  of 
solution,  but  of  dissolution. 

In  other  words,  to  ask  how  to  distinguish  natural  from  non- 
natural  properties  on  the  ground  of  a  realistic  common-sense 
philosophy  is  to  ask  a  question  which  can  be  asked  only  on  the 
ground  of  an  illusion — Moore's  fundamental  illusion — that, 
despite  all  differences  between  non-natural  and  natural  proper- 
ties, the  non-natural  properties  "exist"  on  the  same  level  and 
show  the  same  character  of  "givenness"  as  the  natural  ones  given 
by  sense  data.  Without  going  into  any  critical  analysis  of  Pro- 
fessor Moore's  ethics,  or  of  any  other  ethics  of  values,  Pro- 
fessor Cassirer  has  briefly,  and  I  think  rightly,  stated  that  non- 
natural  ethical  characteristics  are  not  to  be  found  on  the  same 
plane  of  "existence"  or  "givenness"  as  natural  properties,  and 
are,  therefore,  not  comparable  to  each  other  on  the  same  plane. 
"The  question  concerning  the  possibility  of  an  'objective'  mor- 
ality can,  consequently,  not  be  whether  in  this  field,  qualities  in 
themselves  correspond  to  our  judgments — qualities  which  are 
comparable  to  physical  qualities  theoretically  statable."27  "The 

25  ibid.,  591. 
*/**.,  545- 

27  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrom,  74. 


592  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

question ...  is ...  not . . . ,  whether  there  are  any  empirical  things 
or  thing-qualities,  which  correspond  to  our  value- judgments."28 
There  is,  however,  one  way  left  open  by  Professor  Moore  to 
avoid  the  fatal  conclusions  which  can  be  drawn  from  his  "vague 
and  not  clear"  accounts  of  non-natural  properties  such  as  the 
morally  good.  It  is,  of  course,  possible  to  doubt  that  there  are 
such  properties  at  all.  In  another  statement,  which  Professor 
Moore  characterizes  explicitly  as  "at  least  honest,"  he  makes 
a  definite  concession  to  this  effect.  He  asserts: 

I  must  say  again  that  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  "right"  in  all  ethical 
uses,  and,  of  course,  "wrong,"  "ought,"  "duty"  also,  are,  in  this  more 
radical  sense,  not  the  names  of  characteristics  at  all,  that  they  have 
merely  "emotive  meaning"  and  no  "cognitive  meaning"  at  all:  and, 
if  this  is  true  of  them,  it  must  also  be  true  of  "good,"  in  the  sense  I  have 
been  most  concerned  with.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  this  is  so,  but 
I  am  also  inclined  to  think  that  it  is  not  so;  and  I^do  not  know  which 
way  I  am  inclined  most  strongly.  If  these  words,  in  their  ethical  uses, 
have  only  emotive  meaning,  .  .  .  then  it  would  seem  that  all  else  I 
am  going  to  say  about  them  must  be  either  nonsense  or  false  (I  don't 
know  which).29 

As  we  have  seen,  if  right  and  good  have  cognitive  and  no 
merely  emotive  meaning,  then  they  are,  according  to  Pro- 
fessor Moore,  of  necessity  non-natural  properties.  However, 
the  best  account  which  Professor  Moore  can  give  of  these  non- 
natural  characteristics  must,  in  his  own  words,  remain  vague 
and  not  clear.  Therefore,  it  may  seem  preferable  to  consider 
morally  good  and  morally  right  as  being  without  cognitive 
meaning  and  as  not  being  "the  names  of  characteristics  at 
all." 

But  if  we  follow  this  second  suggestion  left  open  by  Pro- 
fessor Moore,  the  consequences  are  in  my  view  no  less  unattrac- 
tive. First,  if  this  suggestion  is  accepted — if  morally  good, 
morally  right,  morally  wrong,  and  moral  duties  have  no  cogni- 
tive but  merely  emotive,  meaning — then  again,  in  Professor 
Moore's  own  words,  "all  else  I  am  going  to  say  about  them 


72. 
29  The  Philosophy  of  G.  E.  Moore,  554,  545. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  593 

must  be  either  nonsense  or  false  (I  don't  know  which)."  In 
truth,  then,  the  whole  basis  on  which  Professor  Moore's  past 
and  present  ethical  reasoning  rests  is  cut  away  from  under  his 
feet.  Second,  if  one  should  nevertheless  say  in  favor  of  Pro- 
fessor Moore's  whole  argument  that  it  is,  after  all,  instructive, 
close  reasoning,  though  proceeding  under  the  mistaken  supposi- 
tion that  good  has  a  cognitive  meaning,  then  in  any  case  the 
titles  of  his  main  works  are  completely  misleading.  His  first 
book  Princi^pia  Ethica,  his  Ethics  and  his  essay  on  "Ethics"  in 
1942  are,  then,  by  no  means  treatises  on  ethics.  They  are  not 
even  preliminary  remarks  to  prolegomena  toward  an  introduc- 
tion to  Principa  EMca.  They  are  complicated  scholastic  exer- 
cises in  logic,  built  up  on  an  untenable  basis,  and  fail  to  repre- 
sent themselves  clearly  as  such. 

As  Moore  reports  in  his  autobiography,  Henry  Sidgwick  once 
called  McTaggart's  dissertation,  and  probably  also  that  of 
Professor  Moore  himself  "nonsense  of  the  right  kind."30  I  am 
afraid  that  what  Professor  Moore  wrote  on  ethics  after  his 
dissertation  may  perhaps  be  termed,  not  quite  inaptly,  "best 
common-sense  of  the  wrong  kind."  To  use  once  more  one  of 
Professor  Moore's  own  witty  remarks  about  a  fellow  moralist, 
throughout  his  ethical  work  he  hits  the  nail  on  the  head,  but 
unfortunately  not  "the  right  nail."31  We  witness  in  his  ethics 
the  grandiose  spectacle  of  a  mighty  air  armada  of  arguments 
successfully  destroying  a  few  mosquitoes  by  blockbusters,  but 
leaving  untouched  the  real  targets  of  the  enemy. 

III.  ETHICAL  RELATIVISM  AND  ETHICAL  RELATIVITY 

That  morally  good  and  right  have  merely  emotive  meaning 
is  a  thesis  generally  advanced  by  ethical  relativism,  by  the 
anthropological  school  in  ethics,  or  in  our  days  by  logical  posi- 
tivism in  so  far  as  logical  positivism  takes  any  interest  in  morals. 
As  do  most  of  the  representatives  of  the  modern  ethics  of  values, 
Professor  Moore  denied  in  his  two  main  works,  Principa  EMca 

M  The  Philosophy  of  G.  E.  Moore,  21. 
546. 


594  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

and  Ethics,  that  morally  good  has  a  merely  emotive  meaning. 
He  insisted  that  "this  choosing  is  morally  good"  does  not  mean 
that  I  or  someone  else  emotionally  approve  of  it.  It  means  that 
this  choosing  is  good,  independent  of  anyone's  emotive  ap- 
proval. Later,  in  his  "Reply  to  my  Critics"  in  1942,  Professor 
Moore  admitted  that  morally  good  may  have  merely  emotive 
meaning;  and  I  should  prefer  this  later  attitude  to  the  almost 
complete  ignoring  by  modern  neo-deontologism  of  the  mighty 
problems  of  ethical  relativity. 

In  1939,  on  the  eve  of  world  war  II,  just  after  the  spokes- 
man of  the  most  powerful  state  of  that  time  had  declared  the 
morality  of  Berlin  and  of  London  to  have  nothing  in  common, 
neo-deontologism  comforted  itself  with  the  "time-honoured" 
belief  that  there  is,  in  morals,  a  consensus  omnium  or  at  least 
an  agreement  between  all  those  men  whom  neo-deontologism 
would  call  "wise."  The  "common  knowledge,"  the  "common 
opinions,"  about  morality  and  the  ethical  judgment  of  wise 
men  were  believed  to  be  in  perfect  harmony,  and  all  the  clash- 
ing differences  in  the  moral  outlook  of  hostile  economic  classes 
and  political  ideologies  were  calmly  said  to  be  only  the  result 
of  "different  perspectives"  in  facing  the  same  truth.32  Even  in 
the  eighteenth  century  it  was  somewhat  out  of  date,  among  the 
leading  moralists,  to  use  that  "time-honoured"  belief  as  the 
basis  of  ethical  inquiry.  Even  Kant,  who  shared  that  belief,  did 
not  regard  its  dogmatism  as  the  proper  basis  of  a  critical  ethics.33 
But  in  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century  it  seems  to  me  the 
height  of — wishful  thinking  to  disregard  the  arguments  of 
Nietzsche,  Marx,  Freud,  Durkheim  and  Levy-Bruhl  as  irrele- 
vant on  the  very  first  pages  of  a  work"  entitled  Foundations  of 
Ethics. 

Strangely  enough,  even  the  examples  which  these  most  skill- 
ful and  experienced  thinkers  use  to  apply  their  teachings  to  life 
smack  more  of  the  atmosphere  of  the  European  and  American 
classroom  than  of  real  life.  They  are,  unfortunately,  the  mani- 

wSee  W.  D.  Ross,  Foundations  of  Ethics  (1939),  iff. 

wSee  D.  Baumgardt,  Der  Kamff  urn  den  Lebenssinn  unter  den  Vorlaufern 
der  modernen  Ethik  (1933),  I.  Tell. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  595 

festation  of  a  rather  dubious  and  certainly  unjustifiable  pride  in 
the  "narrow"  range  of  experience  of  a  "don,"84  In  contrast  to 
the  neo-deontologists,  Professor  G.  E,  Moore  in  some  of  his 
publications  and  Nicolai  Hartmann  in  his  ethics  of  1935  tried 
to  take  into  account  the  far-reaching  relativity  of  moral  valua- 
tions. But  they  do  so  only  with  much  hesitation  and  reserve. 

Professor  Cassirer,  despite  his  neo-Kantian  extraction,  takes 
fully  into  consideration  the  "widely  called  upon  relativity  of 
moral  ideas."35  He  takes  even  the  radical  moral  scepticism 
of  Axel  Hagerstrom  most  seriously  and  admits  that  it  is  criti- 
cally superior  to  the  naive  dogmatic  belief  in  an  ethical  agree- 
ment between  all  plain  men  or  all  wise  men.  In  agreement  with 
modern  comparative  ethnology,  Cassirer  holds  that  there  is  a 
lively  and  far-reaching  contrast  between  the  moral  ideas,  the 
particular  ethical  rules  and  customs  of  different  groups  of  men. 
Following  Hagerstrom,  he  cites  Herodotus'  story  about  the 
moral  horror  with  which  the  ancient  Greeks  regarded  an  Indian 
tribe  which  considered  it  their  duty  to  eat  the  corpses  of  their 
fathers  and  the  moral  horror  with  which  those  Indians  regarded 
the  Greeks,  who  burnt  such  corpses.86  Unlike  most  of  the 
ethicists  of  the  last  three  decades,  Cassirer  invokes  Kant's  partial 
praise  of  scepticism,  and  applies  it  not  only  to  the  field  of 
theoretical,  but  also  to  that  of  "practical,"  philosophy.  He 
quotes  from  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  the  following  daring 
passage:  "All  sceptical  polemic  should  properly  be  directed  only 
against  the  dogmatist,  who,  without  any  misgivings  as  to  his 
fundamental  objective  principles,  that  is,  without  criticism, 
proceeds  complacently  upon  his  adopted  path;  it  should  be 
designed  simply  to  put  him  out  of  countenance  and  thus  to 
bring  him  to  self-knowledge."37  In  the  greatest  possible  contrast 

84  See  C.  D.  Broad's  self-characterization  in  his  Five  Types  of  Ethical  Theory, 
xxiv. 

M  See  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrdm,  e.g.  69. 

"/*&.,  67f. 

87  Ibid.,  63  $  the  above  given  quotation  is  the  Norman  Kemp  Smith  translation 
of  the  passage,  which,  in  the  Original  German  of  Kant's  Kritik  der  reinen 
Vernunft,  reads  as  follows:  "Alles  sceptische  Polemisiren  ist  eigentlich  nur  wider 
den  Dogmatiker  gekehrt,  der,  ohne  ein  Misstrauen  auf  seine  ursprunglichen  objec- 


596  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

to  contemporary  neo-intuitionism,  Cassirer  emphasizes  that  the 
days  have  definitely  gone  when  the  evidence  of  moral  insight 
could  be  compared  with  mathematical  evidence  in  the  way  that, 
up  to  the  nineteenth  century,  scientists  believed  in  simple,  un- 
problematic,  and  immediate  mathematical  intuition.  In  the 
seventeenth  century  the  rationalist  Leibniz,  and  even  the  em- 
piricist Locke,  drew  this  parallel  between  ethical  and  mathe- 
matical science.88  But,  at  least  since  the  age  of  Hume  and  Kant, 
a  critical  ethics  should  not  longer  rely  on  such  over-optimistic 
presuppositions. 

There  is  hardly  anywhere  a  more  flagrant  dissension  than  in 
the  case  of  the  so-called  *prima  facie  duties  of  men  or  of  seem- 
ingly intrinsic  values.  This  has  led  ethical  relativism  to  the  con- 
clusion that,  as  Axel  H'agerstrom  puts  it,  "the  word  Value'  .  .  . 
is  ...  only  an  expression  for  a  feeling  or  a  desire,  not  an 
expression  of  a  thought."39  Logical  positivism,  in  one  of  the 
statements  of  Rudolf  Carnap,  has  arrived  at  a  similar  conclu- 
sion, asserting  that  it  is  meaningless  to  speak  of  any  possible 
philosophical  ethics.  At  best  there  can  be,  according  to  Carnap, 
the  possibility  of  a  "psychological  ethics."40  Yet  such  a  psycho- 
logical ethics,  of  course,  is  no  ethics  at  all.  It  would  be  nothing 
but  psychology.  For  it  would  deal  only  with  the  psychological 
analysis  of  certain  feelings  which  are  wrongly  thought  to  impart 
an  alleged  ethical  insight.  Of  the  logical  positivists,  it  is  probably 
Mr.  Ayer  who  has  formulated  the  ethical  attitude  of  the  group 
most  bluntly:  ethical  concepts  are,  in  his  opinion,  "mere  pseudo- 
concepts."41  "Sentences  which  simply  express  moral  judgments 


tiven  Principien  zu  setzen,  d.i.,  ohne  Kritik  gravitatisch  seinen  Gang  fortsetzt,  bloss 
urn  ihm  das  Concept  zu  verrucken  und  zur  Selbsterkenntniss  zu  br ing-en."  Kant, 
Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunjt,  2nd  ed.,  (1787),  7915  Kants  Gesammelte  Schriften, 
herausg.  v.d.  Koniglich  Preussischen  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften,  I.  Abtheilung, 
Bd.  Ill  (1904),  498$  N.  Kemp  Smith  tr.  (1919),  6o8f. 

88  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrom,  63,  100. 

n  Die  Philosophie  der  Gegenwart  in  Selbstdarstellungen,  ed.  by  Raymund 
Schmidt,  Band  VII  (1929),  44. 

40  R.  Carnap,  Philosophy  and  Logical  Syntax  (1935),  25. 

41  A.  J.  Ayer,  Language,  Truth  and  Logic  (1936),   158$  cf.   168,   170.  Cf. 
Bertrand  Russell,  Religion  and  Science  (1935),  24:  "Since  no  way  can  be  even 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  597 

do  not  say  anything  .  .  .  they  are  unverifiable  for  the  same 
reason  as  a  cry  of  pain  or  a  word  of  command  is  unverifiable — 
because  they  do  not  express  genuine  propositions."42  According 
to  Mr.  Ayer  we  may  evince  certain  subjective  feelings  by  mak- 
ing value  judgments}  but  in  doing  so  we  do  not  say  anything 
which  can  be  subject  to  the  criterion  of  objective  truth. 

Cassirer  describes  H'agerstrom's  moral  scepticism  thus:  The 
object  of  ethics  has 

no  real  but  only  a  nominal  existence.  "Values,"  understood  in  an  objec- 
tive sense,  are  nothing  else  and  can  be  nothing  more  than  words.  With 
this  assertion  there  seems  to  be  denied  to  all  objective  value- judgments 
not  merely  their  strict  validation  and  demonstrability,  but  also  every 
graspable  sense  [and  meaning] .  If  we  continue  to  prefer  any  practical 
conduct  to  some  other  and  to  characterize  it  as  "better,"  such  judgments, 
according  to  Hagerstrom,  lack  every  foundation.43 

However,  although  Professor  Cassirer  wishes  to  do  full  justice 
to  this  and  other  types  of  ethical  scepticism,  he  does  not  agree 
with  them. 

In  his  In  Quest  of  Morals  (1941),  Henry  Lanz  has  tried  to 
show  with  special  emphasis,  why  a  moralist  who  fully  acknowl- 
edges the  relativity  of  factual  moral  valuations  is  by  no  means 
obliged  to  end  in  moral  relativism  or  nihilism.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  even  the  sense  data  experienced  by  different  individuals 
may  differ  widely;  but  this  fact  in  no  way  undermines  the  possi- 
bility of  true  judgments  concerning  the  world  "represented  to 
us  by  our  senses."  Subjectivity  and  relativity  of  value  experi- 
ences in  no  wise  render  impossible  the  objective  validity  of 
certain  judgments  concerning  morality  and  immorality.  On  the 
contrary,  "it  is  precisely  relativity,  defined  as  invariance  in  trans- 
formation, which  renders  moral  standards  objective."44  Simi- 
larly, Cassirer  stresses  the  point  that  "an  ever  so  great  difference 
of  moral  'percepts,  with  which  experience  confronts  us, ...  does 

imagined  for  deciding  a  difference  as  to  values,  the  conclusion  is  forced  upon  us 
that  the  difference  is  one  of  tastes,  not  one  as  to  any  objective  truth." 

48  A.  J.  Ayer,  Language,  Truth  and  Logic,  161. 

48  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrom,  64. 

44  H.   Lanz,  In  Quest  of  Morals   (1941),   159. 


598  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

not  necessarily  lead  to  a  divergence  of  the  underlying  con- 
cepts."45 "The  liberation  from  metaphysics  in  ethics  need  by  no 
means  sacrifice  ...  the  concept  of  'objective  mind'  with  that  of 
'absolute  mind'."46 

Modern  science  insists  that  there  can  be  no  truth  about  nature, 
no  objective  judgment  on  nature,  which  is  not  in  one  way  or 
another  ultimately  verifiable  by  data  of  the  senses.  Neverthe- 
less, science  does  not  deny  that  "isolated"  sense  data  are  by  no 
means  "in  themselves"  of  objective  validity.  They  may  differ 
radically  and  contradict  each  other  with  different  individuals 
or  with  the  same  individual  at  different  times ;  and  many  of 
these  data  of  the  senses  are  stripped  of  all  immediate  objective 
value,  although  they  remain  related  to  the  same  object.  But 
there  remains,  unshaken  by  contradictory  sense  data  related  to 
the  same  object,  an  objective  criterion  of  truth  as  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  nature.  This  criterion  enables  us  to  determine  which 
data  of  the  senses  fit  a  coherent,  i.e.,  true,  interpretation  of 
nature  and  which  are  unfit  for  this  purpose,  although  all  com- 
mon-sense evidence  may  speak  in  favor  of  the  data  unfit  for 
immediate  scientific  use.  In  a  similar  way,  the  radical  relativity 
of  human  valuations  in  no  wise  excludes  the  possibility  of  an 
objective  criterion  of  morality.  This  criterion  would  enable  us 
to  determine  what  truly  valuable,  i.e.,  moral,  conduct  is,  and 
would  allow  us  to  distinguish  objectively  between  morally 
valueless  and  valuable  behavior. 

IV.  UTILITARIANISM 

Professor  Cassirer  has  not  so  far  outlined  a  positive  theory  of 
morals.  He  has  limited  his  task  to  showing  why  it  should  not  be 
impossible  to  build  up  an  objective  theory  of  ethics,  even  if  the 
isolated  moral  ideas  of  different  men  seem  to  have  only  emotive 
meaning  and  are  widely  at  variance. 

Obviously  he  does  not  approve  of  utilitarianism;  but  he 
grants  that  utilitarianism  does  not  teach  ethical  relativism  and 
scepticism.  Utilitarianism  aspired,  at  least,  to  erect  an  objective 

45  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerttrom,  67. 
*  See  ibid.,  62. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  599 

theory  of  morals  which  is  meant  to  overcome  the  mere  rela- 
tivism of  moral  judgment  and  the  uncritical  belief  in  the  moral 
validity  of  particular  values  or  duties.  Consistent  utilitarianism, 
such  as  that  of  Bentham,  denies  that  we  have  any  evidence  of 
the  intrinsic  goodness  of  any  particular  isolated  choice  and  any 
evidence  of  the  obligatory  character  of  particular  duties.  Never- 
theless, utilitarianism  suggests  at  least  the  "hypothetical" 
validity  of  a  universal  and  objective  moral  principle  which 
would  enable  us  to  make  particular  judgments  of  objective 
validity. 

Utilitarianism  affirms  throughout  the  objectivity  of  moral  ideas  and 
judgments.  It  sets  up  a  supreme  goal:  "the  greatest  possible  happiness 
of  the  greatest  possible  number,"  and  it  utters  its  "yes"  or  "no"  to  the 
actions  which  advance  or  retard  this  goal.  There  reigns  here,  then, 
throughout  a  social  teleology ,  which  declares  a  certain  condition  of 
human  society  as  valuable,  whereas  it  rejects  another.  In  a  very  acute 
fashion  Hagerstrom  proved,  in  his  own  research,  that  Marxism  too, 
irrespective  of  its  economic  materialism  and  despite  its  loathing  of  all 
"ideology,"  contains  such  a  teleology  within  itself  and  that,  in  this 
sense,  Marxism  contains  a  "morality"  for  which  it  claims  objective 
validity.47 

Professor  Cassirer  shares,  with  utilitarianism,  the  view  that  we 
are  confronted  with  contradictory  claims  of  particular  moral 
views  and  can,  nevertheless,  maintain  that  universal  objective 
validity  of  moral  judgment  is  possible. 

Both  sides  of  this  fundamental  issue  are  stressed  by  critical 
utilitarianism  and  by  Cassirer  with  equal  emphasis.48  In  agree- 
ment with  Bentham's  utilitarianism  Professor  Cassirer  does  not 
even  reject  fanaticism  offhand. 

Fanaticism  has  not  only  at  all  times  proved  its  power  in  the  life  of 
mankind,  but  it  also  has  ever  and  again  been  represented  and  proclaimed 
as  an  ideal;  and  today  it  is  actually  being  praised  in  many  quarters  as 
precisely  "the"  moral  ideal  as  such.  .  .  .  For  a  purely  descriptive 

47  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrom,  73^ 

48  As  to  consistent  utilitarianism,  see  especially  Vol.  II  of  my  Jeremy  Bentham 
and  the  Ethics  of  Today,  which  Princeton  University  Press  will  publish  early 
in  1949. 


600  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

ethics  .  .  .,  which  wants  to  be  nothing  else  and  nothing  more  than 
a  science  of  the  factual  moral  evaluations  in  their  historical  status  and 
growth  .  .  .  there  would  obviously  exist  no  reason 

for  the  rejection  of  fanaticism.49  "If  the . . .  humanities  and  social 
sciences  had  to  do  only  with  feelings,"  with  moral  value  feel- 
ings, with  feelings  of  justice,  with  feelings  of  beauty,  then  "a 
logic  of  the  humanities"  would  be  ...  "nonsense."50  "Anthro- 
pocentricity  is  even  much  more  difficult  to  overcome  in  ethics 
than  in  the  knowledge  of  nature."51  But,  like  utilitarianism, 
Professor  Cassirer  proclaims  the  possibility  of  securing  objective 
truth  in  morals  as  well  as  in  natural  science,  despite  the  rela- 
tivity of  particular  sense  data  and  particular  moral  observations. 
Again  and  again  he  points  out  that  "in  morals  and  in  juris- 
prudence as  in  language  there  .  .  .  reigns  ...  a  strange  func- 
tion of  obj edification."52  "The  copy-theory  of  concepts  must 
be  surrendered  in  favor  of  a  purely  functional  theory."53  "The 
direction  towards  something  not  given  .  .  .  cannot  be  described 
as  a  mere  deception,  as  an  empty  fiction,"54  which  is  as  impor- 
tant to  note  in  morals  as  in  science.  "The  principal  emphasis  of 
the  concept  of  objectivity  lies  ...  not  on  the  ...  given  as  such, 
but  on  its  coherence  and  consistent  order."55  "Conceiving  the 
idea  of  systematic  jurisprudence,  the  Romans  carried  through  a 
great  new  synthesis,  which  in  a  certain  sense  is  of  value  and  sig- 
nificance equal  to  the  Greek  view  of  'natural  law,'  as  this  latter  de- 
veloped from  the  time  of  Leucippus  and  Democritus  on."56  The 
task  of  "the  psychology  and  sociology  of  law,"  of  the  psychology 
and  sociology  of  morals,  "could  appear  completed"  when  the 
factors  are  described  which  are  operative  in  the  formation 
of  law  and  morals:  "religious  intuitions,  the  so-called 
'judicial  consciousness,'  class-interests,  the  general  tendency  to 

*  E.  Cassirer,  Axel  Hagerstrom,  8 1 . 

80  Ibid.,  114. 

81  Ibid.,  78. 
"/to*.,  io5f. 

M/W.,  97*. 
84  Ibid.,  108. 
"Ibid.,  72. 
*Ibid.9  102. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  601 

yield  to  existing  circumstances,  the  fear  of  anarchy, .  .  .  but  for 
a  real  'philosophy'  of  culture  the  question  ...  is  not  thus 
settled. "6r  In  morals  and  "in  the  philosophy  of  culture  .  .  . 
metaphysics  . . .  must ...  in  turn  be  succeeded  by  criticism  . . .; 
but  criticism  need  no  more  turn  into  scepticism,  into  doubt  con- 
cerning the  possibility  of  an  objective  foundation,  in  this  area 
then  it  does  in  that  of  theoretical  knowledge."58  How  this 
"objective  foundation  of  ethics"  is  to  be  secured,  Professor  Cas- 
sirer  has  not  as  yet  developed  in  detail. 

Moreover,  he  seems  not  at  all  satisfied  with  the  result  of 
any  attempt  yet  made  in  this  direction.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  say: 

It  is  no  secret  that  no  other  philosophical  discipline  is  so  far  removed 
from  the  ideal  of  an  honest-to-goodness  scientific  foundation  as  is  [true 
of]  ethics,  and  that  superstition  has  as  yet  been  no  more  extirpated 
from  the  philosophy  of  morals  than  from  everyday  morality.  Com- 
ing centuries,  when  looking  back  upon  many  a  moral  doctrine  which 
even  today  is  being  widely  proclaimed  as  "wisdom's  ultimate  con- 
clusion," may  perhaps  pass  the  judgment  that  such  doctrines  have 
exactly  the  same  relation  to  genuine  ethical  knowledge  which  alchemy 
has  to  chemistry  or  astrology  to  scientific  astronomy.59 

I  cannot  conceal  a  cordial  agreement  even  with  this  far-reaching 
criticism  of  highly  reputed  contemporary  ethics  and  have  tried 
to  give  some  reasons  for  my  agreement.  Strange  to  say,  quite 
independently  of  this  remark  by  Professor  Cassirer,  I  drew  the 
same  analogy  between  contemporary  "time-honoured"  methods 
of  ethics  and  alchemy  in  a  book  not  yet  published,  and  I  further 
compared  the  ethics  of  the  "plain  man,"  developed  in  con- 
temporary neo-deontologism,  not  with  astrology  but  with 
Ptolemaic  astronomy  as  regards  their  methods. 

On  this  point,  however,  I  should  add  a  few  remarks  con- 
cerning which  I  am  not  at  all  sure  that  Professor  Cassirer  will 
agree.  I  should  compare  the  status  of  modern  ethics  with  that 
of  alchemy  and  Ptolemaic  astronomy  in  another  respect  as  well. 
As,  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  alchemy  and 

87  Ibid.,  95  f. 
mlbid.,  83. 
63. 


602  DAVID  BAUMGARDT 

even  Ptolemaic  astronomy  did  not  die  out  with  the  develop- 
ment of  scientific  chemistry  and  Copernican  astronomy,  so  old 
scholastic  "time-honoured"  methods  of  ethics  still  survive  the 
beginning  of  a  science  of  ethics  which  I  see  developed  in  hun- 
dreds of  painstaking  and  almost  unknown  arguments  in  Jeremy 
Bentham's  writings  and  unpublished  papers. 

There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  we  must  reject  the  bulk 
of  Bentham's  psychological  teaching,  and  any  naive  hope  of  a 
concurrence  between  self-interest  and  the  maximization  of 
happiness — a  hope  which  was  J.  S.  Mill's  far  more  than  it  was 
Bentham's.  Bentham  held  extremely  narrow  views  on  meta- 
physics, religion,  the  arts,  poetry,  and  the  philosophy  of  history. 
All  such  narrow-mindedness  definitely  impairs,  in  my  opinion, 
the  importance  of  any  ethicist.  But,  because  of  the  critical  sub- 
tlety of  his  ethical  method,  I  think  Bentham  for  many  reasons 
superior  to  any  modern  moralist. 

Of  course,  it  must  be  granted  that  Bentham  changes  inten- 
tionally (and  not  by  a  naturalistic  fallacy)  the  common-sense 
meaning  of  "morally  good"  as  much  as  the  common-sense  mean- 
ing of  "truly  existent"  has  been  changed  in  science.  Therefore, 
in  so  far  as  contemporary  ethics  wishes  to  maintain,  at  all  costs, 
the  common-sense  meaning  of  the  moral  ought  and  of  the 
morally  good,  Bentham 's  concept  of  morals  has  to  be  rejected 
with  as  much  reason  as  Copernican  astronomy  had  to  be  rejected 
by  astronomers  who  were  not  willing  to  sacrifice  the  common- 
sense  meaning  of  sunrise  and  sunset. 

The  price  which  Ptolemaic  astronomers  as  well  as  contem- 
porary moralists  must  pay  for  the  maintenance  of  their  common- 
sense  views  is  a  more  and  more  complicated  and  embarrassing 
arrangement  in  the  superstructure  of  their  theories.  But,  paying 
this  price,  they  may  go  on  for  a  long  time,  and  neither  con- 
temporary ethics  nor  Ptolemaic  cosmology  can  as  such  be 
"refuted"  by  its  opponents.  In  due  time  mankind  knew  how  to 
grow  out  of  the  views  of  "time-honoured"  astronomy  and  will, 
in  all  probability,  learn  to  outgrow  time-honoured  ethics  with- 
out endlessly  deploring  the  loss  of  the  common-sense  meaning 
of  fundamental  astronomical  or  ethical  concepts. 


THE  CHAOS  IN  MODERN  ETHICS  603 

Kant  once  said  that  the  senses  are  to  be  acquitted  from  the 
charge  of  betrayal.60  Kant  himself  carried  out  this  acquittal  in 
his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  by  an  equally  reasoned  opposition 
to  uncritical  rational  metaphysics  and  uncritical  sensationism 
and  relativism.  Bentham  did  the  same  in  the  field  of  ethics. 

Bentham  acquitted  all  subjective,  relative  "feelings  of  posi- 
tive and  negative  tones"  from  the  charge  of  betrayal;  and, 
nevertheless,  by  reference  to  merely  subjective  emotions,  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  he  tried  to  establish  an  objective  theory  of 
morals  in  a  great  number  of  most  acute  discussions  of  ethical 
method  in  general.  I  believe  that  no  one  should  write  on  ethics 
without  having  become  familiar  with  these  discussions. 

I  am  well  aware  that  even  the  most  guarded  defense  of 
consistent  hedonistic  ethics  sounds  outrageously  shallow  to  prac- 
tically all  contemporary  schools  of  ethics  and  to  critics  of  the 
possibility  of  any  scientific  ethics.  Therefore  I  do  not  wish  to 
burden  Cassirer  with  even  these  hints  at  my  defense  of 
Bentham's  ethical  method.*  I  wish  to  build  up  my  type  of  "con- 
sistent hedonism"  entirely  at  my  own  risk  5  it  is,  however,  espe- 
cially gratifying  to  me  that,  in  one  of  his  letters,  Cassirer  ex- 
pressed his  heartfelt  approval  of  my  principal  ethical  ideas.61 

DAVID  BAUMGARDT 
LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS 
WASHINGTON,  B.C. 

*See  Kant,  Anthropology  in  fragmatischer  Hinsicht,  §  gffj  Werke>  ed.  by 
E.  Cassirer,  Band  VIII  (1922),  28ff. 

*  Editor's  Note:  As  the  reader  will  see  from  footnote  61,  this  essay  was  not 
merely  written  before  Professor  Cassirer's  death,  but  had  been  submitted  by  its 
author  to  Cassirer  in  time  to  elicit  a  reply  from  the  latter. 

61  In  his  letter  of  March  i5th,  1944,  Cassirer  wrote  me:  "Fur  Ihren  Aufsatz 
fuhle  ich  mich  Ihnen  zu  herzlichem  Dank  verpflichtet.  Er  hat  mich  besonders 
erfreut,  weil  ich  aus  ihm  ersehen  habe,  wie  nahe  wir  uns  in  unseren  ethischen 
Grundanschauungen  stehen.  t)ber  Ihre  Kritik  an  G.  E.  Moore  und  anderen 
englischen  Ethikern  karm  ich  wenig  sagen, — da  Sic  diese  Dinge  sehr  vie!  genauer 
kennen  als  ich," 


I? 

Katharine  Gilbert 
CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART 

A  RT  is  not  one  of  the  subjects  to  which  Professor  Cassirer 
JLjjL  devoted  an  independent  volume,  as  he  did  to  language, 
myth,  and  to  the  scientific  and  philosophic  categories  of  sub- 
stance and  function.  But  this  fact  by  no  means  proves  a  lack 
of  important  views  on  art  present  in  the  body  of  his  writings. 
The  precedent  of  many  great  names  reminds  us  at  once  of 
the  congruity  of  philosophical  reflection  on  art,  and  its  rela- 
tively incidental  placement.  Cassirer's  latest  book,  An  Essay  on 
Man,  contains  a  chapter  on  "Art;"  the  volumes  on  language 
and  myth  as  symbolic  forms  carry  a  pervading  consciousness  of 
art  as  a  parallel  symbolic  form}  and  the  genius  and  work  of 
certain  great  artists,  especially  Goethe,  have  undergone  exten- 
sive analysis  at  his  hands.  Having  edited  Kant  and  Leibniz,  he 
remains  conscious,  in  all  references  to  their  philosophy,  of  the 
service  they  performed  for  aesthetic  theory.  In  his  Individuum 
imd  Kosmos  in  der  Philosophic  der  Renaissance  implications 
concerning  art  stand  in  relief.  Pregnant  phrases  and  notions 
meet  the  reader  again  and  again  as  he  follows  an  historical  argu- 
ment— phrases  and  notions  that  contain  in  germ  the  lacking 
independent  volume.  For  instance,  Cassirer  connects  the  origin 
of  plastic  art  with  a  mutation  in  the  idea  of  immortality.  He 
relates  how  among  the  Egyptians  the  soul  was  first  cherished 
toward  its  immortal  destiny  by  preserving  its  mortal  house,  the 
bodyj  how,  then,  a  second  way  of  ensuring  human  survival  was 
discovered.  Beside  the  mummy  a  statue  was  placed.  Thus  art 
was  born.1  Again  he  notes  how  hostile  to  art  is  a  certain  tendency 
in  religion — the  tendency  to  introverted  pietism.  The  food  gone 

1  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  For  men:  Zweiter  Tetl,  205. 

607 


608  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

on  which  art  lives — contact  with  the  outside  world — art  can 
beget  only  monotonous  songs  of  soul-ecstasy.  It  takes  the  gift  of 
a  Bach,  he  says,  to  restore  art's  vitality.  Bach  elaborated  a  new 
language  of  musical  forms,  and  thus  made  the  new  intensity  of 
feeling  articulate.2  Such  compact  insights  on  the  relation  of  art 
to  other  elements  of  culture  are  scattered  throughout  Cassirer's 
volumes. 

Cassirer's  method  in  respect  to  art  is  the  philosopher's.  He  is 
neither  critic,  psychologist,  nor  an  artist  celebrating  his  own 
way  of  life.  As  a  philosopher,  Cassirer  accepts  the  task  of  placing 
art  among  the  realms  of  spirit  (language,  myth,  religion,  and 
science  particularly)  and  of  tracing  within  the  history  of  culture 
the  growth  of  appreciation  of  art's  autonomy.  He  always  keeps 
awareness  of  the  wider  cultural  and  cosmic  context,  though 
there  is  abundant  reference  to  the  concrete,  particularly  to 
Goethe,  who  is  the  star  example.  Learned  historians  of  art 
could  hardly  have  fitted,  as  they  have  done,  their  detailed  re- 
searches to  his  intellectual  frame,  if  he  had  not  commanded 
wide  expanses  of  fact.  Nevertheless,  his  purpose  remains  philo- 
sophical, i.e.,  he  defines  the  sphere  of  art  among  the  forms  of 
the  spiritual  life,  and  does  not  to  any  great  extent  sharpen  and 
validate  images — the  general  function  of  the  art-critic.  As  a 
philosopher,  he  emphasizes  the  truth  that  a  language  of  relevant 
sensuous  forms  is  indispensable  for  the  larger  part  that  art  wills 
to  play  in  social  life.. But  he  is  not  an  original  investigator  of 
these  forms  and  their  ultimate  elements. 

Art  is  placed  by  Cassirer  among  the  "symbolic  forms."  In  a 
contribution  to  a  symposium  on  the  nature  of  symbol  in  1927,* 
he  developed  the  emphasis  laid  in  1887  on  the  idea  of  symbol 
by  Friedrich  Theodor  Vischer.  Vischer  had  asserted  its  cen- 
trality  for  all  the  philosophical  disciplines,  its  protean  character, 
and  its  tendency  to  assume  new  meanings  at  its  core  when  ap- 
plied to  a  new  field.  Symbols  are  made  when  man  learns  to 
separate  himself  from  nature  and  to  use  independent  carriers 

*  Freiheit  und  Form,  274. 

8  "Das  Symbolproblem  und  seine  Stellung  im  System  der  Philosophic,"  Zeit- 
schrift  fur  Jtsthctik  und  Allgemcine  Kunstwissenschaft,  XXI,  295-319. 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  609 

to  hold  his  meanings.  A  symbolic  form  in  general  is  an  active 
interpreter,  binding  an  intellectual  content  to  a  sensuous  show. 
Its  mediating  power  is  the  heart  of  it.  Wherever  a  symbol  is 
present,  there  is  polarity  operative  and  yet  somehow  overcome. 
The  opposites  that  are  reconciled  by  the  offices  of  symbol  are 
many:  meaning  and  sensuous  embodiment}  the  intelligible 
world  and  the  world  of  time  and  change;  contemplation  and 
action;  freedom  and  form;  spirit  and  nature;  divine  essence 
and  human  need.  In  speculative  aesthetics  in  particular,  says 
Cassirer,  from  Plotinus  to  Hegel,  the  problem  of  symbol  has 
always  come  up  in  connection  with  such  reconciliation.  The 
relation  of  painted  shows  to  the  intelligible  world,  of  the 
semblance  on  the  stage  and  in  the  singer's  lay  to  the  values  of 
truth  and  goodness — such  problems  are  continually  provoking 
inquiry. 

The  beautiful  is  essentially  and  necessarily  symbol  because  and  in  so 
far  as  it  is  split  within  itself,  because  it  is  always  and  everywhere  both 
one  and  double.  In  this  split,  in  this  attachment  to  the  sensuous,  and 
in  this  rising  above  the  sensuous,  it  not  only  expresses  the  tension  which 
runs  through  the  world  of  our  consciousness, — but  it  reveals  by  this 
means  the  original  and  basic  polarity  of  Being  itself;  the  dialectic  which 
obtains  between  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  between  the  absolute  idea 
and  its  representation  and  incorporation  inside  the  world  of  the  indi- 
vidual, of  the  empirically  existent.4 

The  aesthetic  symbol  is,  then,  for  Cassirer;  symbol  at  its  height. 
It  is  bordered  below  by  religious  symbolism  where  the  com- 
munication is  still  opaque,  and  above  by  the  scientific  sign  where 
the  sensuous  sign  is  often  arbitrary. 

We  may  briefly  outline  Cassirer's  ideas  concerning  the  sym- 
bolism of  art.  Art  as  symbol  requires  for  the  unfolding  of  its 
meaning  a  two-fold  movement  of  thought:  a  purification  of  its 
conception  from  confusing  adhesions  and  then  a  restoration  of 
it  to  the  family  of  human  functions.  ( i )  Art  begins  to  be  con- 
scious of  itself  in  the  process  of  its  disentanglement  from  a  pre- 
aesthetic  existence  where  its  mode  is  bodily  and  its  charm  magi- 
cal. Even  after  art  begins  to  emerge  from  its  religious,  mythical, 
*.,  296. 


6 io  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

and  biological  matrix,  it  still  leads  for  centuries  a  servile  life} 
first,  as  a  servant  of  things,  when  it  is  interpreted  as  imitation} 
second,  as  a  servant  of  reason,  when  interpreted  as  analogue.  It 
is  also  less  than  its  free  self  when  it  is  still  largely  governed  by 
instinct  or  emotion.  Art  only  becomes  a  characteristic  symbolic 
form  when  it  stands  forth  as  a  free  entity,  declaring  itself. 

(2)  The  second  part  of  the  defining  movement  reinstates 
liberated  art  once  again  within  the  circle  of  the  activities  of 
spirit,  and  sees  it  as  part  of  man's  total  functioning  in  his  world. 
Art,  freed  from  patronage  and  models,  from  alien  patterns  of 
order  and  from  dark  urges  of  instinct,  tends  to  become  undisci- 
plined genius  expressing  itself  lyrically  out  of  and  into  a  void. 
This  tendency  is  a  false  excess.  Though  loosed  from  irrelevant 
adhesions  and  dominions,  art  has  a  work  and  place  committed 
to  it.  As  imaginative  penetration  into  the  nature  of  things, 
Cassirer  teaches,  art  swings  rhythmically  between  the  realm  of 
objects  and  of  subjects,  and  bears  witness  to  the  ultimate 
solidarity  of  the  two.  Hence  the  "polarity"  or  "tension"  in  all 
art-symbols  and  the  favorite  definition  of  beauty  as  harmony. 

Besides  being  witness  to  the  harmony  of  man  and  his  world 
in  polarity,  art  as  symbol  is  a  peculiar  microcosm  of  the  age.  In 
it  are  reflected  as  in  a  mirror  the  concerns  of  time,  place,  and 
social  habit.  This  is  the  essential  historicity  of  the  symbol.  In  its 
historical  setting  art  is  a  free  collaborator  with  science,  phi- 
losophy, religion,  the  formulations  of  social  and  political  values, 
and  other  cultural  functions. 

We  may  now  expand  the  accompanying  outline  which  we 
have  constructed  to  suggest  the  form  of  Cassirer's  thought.  Art 
begins  its  fight  for  self-subsistence  by  struggling  free  from 
substantial  nature.5  Although  the  student  of  culture  sometimes 
thinks  himself  able  to  point  to  a  moment  when  detachment 
occurred,  on  the  whole  art  loosened  its  bonds  gradually.  Before 
man  deposited  his  intention  in  a  free-standing  form,  he  mixed 
it  obscurely  with  things,  and  myths  and  magic  grew  up  hybrids. 
In  these  earlier  forms  of  symbolism  there  was  no  sharp  line 

"The  paragraphs  sketching  pre-artistic  symbols  in  space,  time,  and  language 
are  based  on  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen:  Enter  Teil:  Die  Sprache^ 
Teil:  Das  Mythische  Denken. 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  611 

separating  man's  intentional  act  from  the  natural  world  which 
he  molded  to  convey  his  will.  Before  the  architect  or  sculptor 
submitted  matter — the  element  spread  out  in  space — to  his 
euplastic  engine,  the  hand,  in  order  to  make  a  god  after  his  own 
image  or  build  a  god's  house,  he  accepted  as  his  medium  the 
heavy  earth  as  it  stretched  out  beneath  him,  and  made  it  bear 
in  its  raw  state  the  distinctions  that  his  feelings  and  desires 
sought  to  place.  Right  and  left,  high  and  low,  near  and  far 
achieved  moral  sense  as  well  as  plain,  physical  sense.  They  all 
reflected  the  body's  station,  and  the  direction  toward  which  he 
faced  or  reached  or  looked,  or  the  forefeeling  or  memory  in  his 
limbs  of  an  effort  of  movement.  Man  committed  to  the  surface 
of  the  earth  his  pride  or  awe  in  the  sacred  field  marked  off  from 
the  indefinite  stretch  of  common  ground.  Gradually  he  pro- 
jected into  the  given  earth  and  heavens  his  main  qualitative 


PLACEMENT  OF  ART 

Object  Subject 

Substantial  things  Myth  Soul's  magical  fusion 

with  things 

Expression  Instinct}  Affects 

A  Imitation  Perception;  feeling 

Appearance  r       '  ** 

Analogue  Obscure  processes 


Symbolic  Synthesis 


Religion  Social 

Values      Art       Philosophy       Science 


612  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

genera:  colors,  animals,  organs  of  the  body,  seasons  of  the  year, 
totemic  classes  for  marriage  and  inheritance  purposes,  his  re- 
ligious attitude.  The  divisions  of  space  were  drafted  as  they 
lay  to  carry  the  order  man  had  achieved  for  the  conduct  of  his 
life.  But  man  was  not  an  original  artificer  of  spatial  form  in  all 
this.  His  feelings  and  sensuous  perceptions  accepted  the  shape 
and  color  of  nature's  regions  and  toned  these  givens  into  har- 
mony with  affective  attitudes.  Spatial  determinations  at  this 
level  are  the  carriers  of  human  propensities.  Here  we  have  the 
thing-like  opaque  symbol  of  mythology  and  religion. 

As  space  still  inheres  in  things  on  the  mythical  level  and 
has  not  become  an  inspired  form  or  a  constructed  relation,  so 
also  with  time.  Time  was  not  in  primitive  experience  a  relation 
of  periods  measured  in  terms  of  a  system  of  referents,  nor  even 
the  rhythm  of  poetry  or  music,  but  the  very  process  of  the 
torches  of  time:  sun,  moon,  and  stars.  It  was  real  passage  in- 
carnate in  the  agents  of  passage.  The  same  incompleteness  of 
the  human  shaping  act  was  present  when  speech  symbols  first 
appeared.  A  word  is  not  in  the  first  instance  a  coin  minted  by  a 
creative  spirit  out  of  the  indefinite  flux  of  sound  to  express  an 
intent.  A  word,  though  symbol,  is  also  for  primitive  thought  a 
thing — the  thing  that  is  named  with  cryptic  potency.  The  Word 
of  God  was  a  phase  of  the  God-head  and  not  his  title  merely. 
Or,  in  its  half-brutish  beginnings,  language  was  interjection, 
cry  of  pain  or  joy,  gesture  of  welcome  or  defiance,  echo  of  some 
natural  marvel.  When  language  jets  without  pause  for  reflec- 
tion, then  it  is  an  aspect  of  primitive  organic  behavior  as  well 
as  the  forerunner  of  intelligible  speech.  Though  it  is  the  in- 
distinct mythical  habit  that  thus  confuses  name  with  the  named 
and  the  statement  of  meaning  with  organic  response,  even  the 
art  of  poetry  has  to  work  its  way  free  from  the  immediate  lyrical 
impulse  of  nature.  It  is,  for  Cassirer,  a  proof  of  Goethe's  con- 
stant mastery  of  his  art  that  even  in  his  youthful  storm  and 
stress  period,  when  he  liked  to  lie  on  the  earth  and  court  the  sun 
and  small  creatures  crawling  through  the  grass,  when  the 
rhythms  in  his  lyrics  were  the  rhythms  of  waves  and  winds,  he 
was  not  absorbed.  He  never  confused  his  mind's  ways  with 
nature's  ways.  In  just  this  assurance  about  the  indispensable 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  613 

formative  function  of  art  does  he  stand  apart  from  the  poets 
who  discharge  natural  impulses  with  primitive  directness  or 
make  themselves  sensitive  plates  of  nature. 

In  his  most  recent  statement  of  the  nature  of  art,  Chapter  IX 
in  his  Essay  on  Man,  Cassirer  has  once  more  illustrated  the 
distinction  between  the  symbolic  function  in  art,  where  a  ma- 
terial is  transformed  by  the  spirit  of  man,  and  that  pre-artistic 
relation  of  man  to  his  world  where  the  content  is  imposed 
largely  from  outside.  This  time  he  has  the  naive  contemporary 
spectator  of  art  in  mind.  He  chooses  the  example  of  the  enjoy- 
ment of  landscape.  For  the  simple  awareness  of  the  natural  man, 
agreeable  physical  qualities  operate  on  the  passive  organism: 
bright  colors,  fragrant,  mild  airs.  The  "meeting  soul"  takes  in 
the  pleasant  scene  as  a  whole  and  half  suffuses  it  with  a  life 
and  tone  of  its  own;  but  what  is  present  is  things  not  forms. 
"But  I  may  then,"  writes  Cassirer, 

experience  a  sudden  change  in  my  frame  of  mind.  Thereupon  I  see 
the  landscape  with  an  artist's  eye — I  begin  to  form  a  picture  of  it. 
I  have  now  entered  a  new  realm — the  realm  not  of  living  things  but  of 
"living  forms."  No  longer  in  the  immediate  reality  of  things,  I  live 
now  in  the  rhythm  of  spatial  forms,  in  the  harmony  and  contrast  of 
colors,  in  the  balance  of  light  and  shadow.  In  such  absorption  in  the 
dynamic  aspect  of  form  consists  the  aesthetic  experience.* 

Art  to  be  art  must  not  only  extricate  man's  concern  from  in- 
gredience  in  things,  magical  or  sentimental;  it  must  stop  repro- 
ducing the  shows  of  things.  The  conception  of  art  as  imitation 
has  been  historically  so  persistent  that  Cassirer  was  bound  to 
take  account  of  it,  little  as  he  agrees  with  it.  The  neo-Kantian 
idealist  who  denies  any  element  of  pure  datum  even  in  the 
perception  of  a  patch  of  color  could  never  admit  an  art  that 
repeats  a  given.  The  simplest  item  of  common  sense  experience 
points  beyond  itself  for  him,  and  thus  involves  an  act  of  spirit, 
if  and  in  so  far  as  it  has  meaning.  But  the  symbolizing  acts  of 
artists  (and  of  all  builders  of  culture)  imply  a  higher  and  more 
complex  human  entrance.  In  art  man  builds  a  disentangling 
frame  to  hold  and  relieve  the  item.7 

*  Essay  on  Man,  chapter  IX  on  "Art,"  1 5 1  f . 
der  symbolischen  Formen,  I,  41. 


6 14  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

Cassirer  notes  here  and  there  in  his  historical  surveys  and 
analyses  variants  of  the  mimesis  doctrine.  Each  of  these  altered 
without  redeeming  it.  The  concept  of  imitation  is  still  dominant 
in  that  view  of  art  which  identifies  it  with  the  extraction  for 
preservation  of  the  beautiful  elements  of  things.  In  noting  the 
contribution  of  the  Swiss  literary  critics,  Bodmer  and  Breitinger, 
to  the  progress  of  aesthetic  theory,  Cassirer  remarks  that  they 
could  not  draw  out  the  implications  of  the  notion  of  a  heightened 
energy  in  individual  vision,  prepared  by  Leibniz's  metaphysics. 
Rather  they  marked  off  a  region  of  the  actual  as  good  poetical 
material.  "How,"  they  asked,  "can  a  painting  of  a  peasant  and 
his  beasts  of  burden  charm  us,  if  the  original  scene  does  not 
draw  our  gaze?"8  The  assumption  here  is  the  familiar  one  that 
art  is  imitation,  though  selective.  It  derives,  as  is  always  told, 
from  the  famous  story  of  the  painting  of  the  maidens  of 
Crotona  by  Zeuxis,  and  is  but  a  feeble  change  in  the  ape  doc- 
trine. It  leaves  the  two  factors  in  the  situation  standing  over 
against  each  other.  However,  the  selection  is  up  to  a  point  evi- 
dence of  human  valuation. 

The  next  refinement — one  developed  by  Shaftesbury  and 
Lessing — is  simply  an  intensification  of  the  first.  Artists  select 
for  perpetuation  the  pregnant  moment  in  a  scene.  The  artist  lets 
his  spatial  fancy  grow  in  responding  to  the  center  of  movement 
in  the  piece  of  nature  he  is  contemplating.  He  and  his  object 
are  both  alive }  they  are  both  in  labor  with  something  new  and 
important  that  is  to  be  brought  forth.  Cassirer  reminds  us  that 
this  marks  a  progress  in  the  artist's  view  from  the  content  of  the 
given  to  its  form  and  relations.  The  pregnant  moment  reaches 
before  and  after  itself  and  by  a  half-revealed  energy  extends  its 
sphere  of  existence  into  what  the  spirit  alone  sees  and  knows.9 

A  third  variant  of  the  imitation  doctrine  Cassirer  finds  in  the 
values  of  omission,  and  binds  it  with  the  second.  "The  artistic 
sketch  becomes  such,  and  distinguished  from  mechanical  repro- 
duction, by  virtue  of  what  is  dropped  out  of  the  immediately 
given  impression."10  In  this  imitation  through  negation  there 

8  Freiheit  und  Form,  116-117. 

9  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen^  I,  44. 
*  Loc.  cit. 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  615 

is  restriction  of  the  dominance  of  the  particular  model,  but  in- 
crease in  its  symbolic  potency. 

A  fourth  variant  is  the  recognition  of  the  importance  of  indi- 
vidual style  in  imitation.  Certain  thinkers,  e.g.,  Diderot,  may 
conceive  art  as  imitative,  and  yet  have  a  most  lively  feeling  for 
the  special  individualities  of  different  languages.  Diderot  is 
endowed  with  a  feeling  for  the  finest  nuances  of  words,  for 
their  tone  and  clang,  for  their  untranslatable  moments.11  This 
marks  the  passage  of  any  art,  whether  an  art  of  words  or  an  art 
of  images,  from  the  stage  of  social  utility  and  rational  gen- 
erality to  an  unquestioned  aesthetic  level.  There  was  in  the 
eighteenth  century  a  whole  strain,  starting  with  Leibniz,  which 
clarified  more  and  more  the  importance  for  art  and  culture  of 
individuality  and  eccentricity,  sensuous  detail,  passionate  aber- 
ration. Cassirer  attaches  this  enrichment  of  theory  to  Hamann 
and  Herder  after  Leibniz  and  sets  it  for  purposes  of  contrast 
over  against  the  new  assertion  of  orderly  classicism  in  Winckel- 
mann.12  Indeed,  Cassirer  is  always  watching  for  the  moment  of 
individual  variation  in  the  essence  of  art.  Emphasis  on  indi- 
viduality is,  however,  sometimes  combined  with  the  unaccepta- 
ble imitation  doctrine. 

Besides  being  taken  as  a  servant  of  things  in  its  mode  of 
imitation,  art  is  servilely  treated  (though  less  so)  as  a  de- 
pendent of  reason  in  its  phase  as  analogue.  We  owe  the  begin- 
nings of  this  interpretation  to  Leibniz.  It  came  about  in  this 
way.18  Leibniz  entertained  the  logical  ideal  of  submitting  all 
the  work  of  mind  to  the  standard  of  clear  and  compelling  order. 
The  reduction  worked  without  much  difficulty  so  long  as  ra- 
tional truths  and  abstract  categories,  such  as  substance  and  cause, 
were  in  question.  To  all  the  ideas  that  fell  within  this  circle 
Leibniz  applied  the  strict  law  of  consistency:  of  identity  and 
difference.  But  both  for  completeness  and  system,  and  in  con- 
formity with  the  law  of  continuity  in  which  he  believed,  he  was 
obliged  to  make  the  effort  to  handle  in  the  light  of  the  same 
goal  the  less  clear  notions  furnished  by  perception,  memory,  and 


I,  82. 

12  Fretheh  und  Form,  170-221. 
19  Ibid.,  99-218. 


616  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

the  aesthetic  activities.  He  had  to  try  to  satisfy  the  demand  for 
reason,  law,  and  order  in  the  inferior  faculties  and  obscure 
regions  of  the  soul.  He  accomplished  this  by  postulating  a 
progressive  scale  of  clarity.  In  the  scale  the  earlier  confused 
stages  implied  but  did  not  reveal  the  coming  distinctness.  Out 
of  the  I  itself,  from  which  he  made  all  mental  facts  flow,  he 
drew  an  anticipating  and  accumulating  sequence,  dim  at  first, 
but  exhibiting  even  in  the  semi-darkness  intimations  of  form 
and  rule.  Leibniz  placed  music  and  painting  then  among  the 
analogues  of  reason.  He  interpreted  them  as  big  with  their 
own  rational  explanation,  though  conceived  on  the  sensuous 
plane  of  feeling  and  taste.  One  might  perhaps  say  that  they 
prophesy  their  own  clarification  and  that  they  instinctively 
correspond  with  their  own  ratios  and  proportions.  Art,  then, 
for  Leibniz  no  longer  imitates,  but  presses  toward,  without 
attaining,  its  own  logical  fulfilment. 

In  spite  of  the  advance  of  the  concept  of  analogue  over  the 
concept  of  imitation,  there  is  still  unfitness  in  the  new  notion. 
As  in  the  phase  of  imitation  art  defers  to  a  model,  so  in  the 
role  of  analogue  art  is  measured  by  the  superior  excellence  of 
reason.  Therefore  art  is  not  yet  autonomous  nor  handled  in 
terms  of  wholly  relevant  categories. 

In  the  building  up  of  the  artistic  function  of  man,  Cassirer 
says  there  is  a  general  law  of  three  stages:  the  mimetic,  the 
analogical,  and  finally,  the  symbolic.14  We  have  been  noting 
in  what  way  art  falls  short  of  self-determination  in  so  far  as  it 
is  copy  or  analogue.  Cassirer  also  ties  in  the  imperfection  of  these 
early  stages  with  the  fragmentary  conative  views.  Language 
was  interpreted  by  Vico  as  half  rooted  in  interjection,15  and  art 
recurrently  offers  itself  as  the  immediate  utterance  of  nature. 
Cassirer  passes  in  review  the  variants  of  this  definition  of  art 
as  expression  of  genius.  For  him  they  seem  all  to  be  either 
romantic  theories  which  overemphasize  feeling,  emotion,  or 
god-like  creativity,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  play-theories  which 
overemphasize  primitivism  and  release.16  As  an  idealist,  Cas- 

14  Phtlosofhie  der  symbotischen  Formcn,  I,  136,  137. 

"Ibid.,  I,  91. 

16  Essay  on  Man,  140$, 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  617 

sirer  never  loses  awareness  of  the  spirit's  being  there.  No  field 
of  reality  nor  region  of  culture  exists  for  him  which  is  not 
stamped  by  the  energy  of  mind.  However,  the  phrases  em- 
ployed by  the  Schlegels  and  Schelling  implying  the  unrestricted 
rights  of  genius  Cassirer  would  temper  and  balance.  Cassirer 
believes  that  the  "genius"  theory  of  art  or  the  emphasis  on 
soul-discharge  does  justice  to  only  one  pole  of  the  artistic  situa- 
tion. It  is  a  pole  that  will  always  be  highly  charged  when  art 
has  been  subjected  to  rules  or  models,  as  by  Boileau  and  the 
neo-classicists  generally.  The  neglected  jet  of  the  human  imagi- 
nation will  spring  up  when  it  is  suppressed.  It  was  Kant — the 
Kant  who  for  Cassirer  marked  the  culmination  of  the  cultural 
passage  from  Leibniz  in  the  eighteenth  century — who  gave  once 
for  all  the  proportions  to  Genius  and  Nature  in  Art.  "Art  can 
be  called  beautiful  only  if  we  are  conscious  that  it  is  Art  although 
it  looks  like  Nature."  "Genius  is  the  talent  through  which 
Nature  gives  the  rule  to  Art."  "Nature  by  the  medium  of 
Genius  .  .  .  prescribes  rules  to  Art."17  Therefore  where  a 
Rousseauist  urges  the  rights  of  feeling,  Cassirer  counters  with 
the  claims  of  form  and  repose.  And  the  various  biological 
theories  of  the  nineteenth  century,  which  featured  the  play 
instinct,  needed,  according  to  Cassirer,  to  humanize  the  concept 
for  art,  so  that  play  is  seen  as  productive  and  structural.18  Even 
the  play  theory  of  Schiller,  though  far  closer  to  the  balanced 
view  of  art  as  living-form,  gives  too  much  to  the  unordered 
sport  of  innocent  childhood. 

In  the  group  of  theories  which  make  art  less  than  free  and 
less  than  complete  because  of  over-emphasis  on  the  emotional 
thrust,  Cassirer  places  those  of  Croce  and  Collingwood.19  He 
complains  that  those  thinkers  limit  the  whole  of  art  to  the  lyri- 
cal impulse  and  leave  out  the  contribution  made  by  medium  and 
structure.  Undoubtedly  there  are  many  passages  in  the  writings 
of  these  two  philosophers  which  support  the  adverse  view  of 
Cassirer.  But  with  respect  to  medium  one  must  remember  the 
famous  passage  in  Croce's  Essence  of  Aesthetic,  in  which  he  cer- 

17  KanPs  Kritique  of  Judgment,  trans.  J.  H.  Bernard,  188-190. 

18  Essay  on  Man, 
"Ibid., 


618  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

tainly  demands  the  realization  of  intuitions:  "A  thought  is  not 
thought  for  us,  unless  it  be  possible  to  formulate  it  in  words; 
a  musical  image  exists  for  us,  only  when  it  becomes  concrete  in 
sounds;  a  pictorial  image,  only  when  it  is  coloured."20  The 
apparent  failure  to  provide  a  place  in  his  system  for  sensuous 
medium  is  the  result  of  a  prohibiting  metaphysic.  As  one  might 
say  that  a  modern  physicist  who  denies  the  old  concept  of  solid 
matter,  substituting  the  current  one  of  fields  of  force,  left  no 
room  for  cans  and  kidneys!  As  for  form,  one  remembers  the 
statement  in  Croce's  most  recent  general  article:  "The  problem 
for  aesthetics  today  is  the  reassertion  and  defense  of  the  classical 
as  against  romanticism:  the  synthetic,  formal  theoretical  ele- 
ment which  is  the  firofrmm  of  art,  as  against  the  affective  ele- 
ment which  it  is  the  business  of  art  to  resolve  into  itself."21  It 
seems  definitely  inappropriate  to  regard  a  theory  which  involves 
such  a  statement  as  instinctive.  Both  in  the  case  of  Croce  and  of 
Collingwood  the  importance  of  structure  and  medium  is  recog- 
nized in  the  long  and  intricate  treatment  of  language.  Colling- 
wood says  that  the  experience  of  art  involves  the  change  from 
affect  in  the  lower  level  of  the  psyche  to  the  activity  of  con- 
scious awareness,  from  impression  to  imagination,  from  brute 
giveness  to  domination  by  thought.22  These  marks  of  art  are 
hardly  consistent  with  the  sentimentalism  and  exhibitionism  im- 
plicitly charged  by  Cassirer.23 

Although  Cassirer  rejects  the  notions  of  art  as  imitation, 
lyricism,  or  analogue,  he  carries  over  elements  from  these  into 
the  one  he  accepts.  Art  for  him  is  a  symbolic  form:  a  living 
shape  worked  out  in  a  sensuous  medium,  expressing  tension 
and  release.  The  tension  holds  man  over  against  the  world; 
the  release  means  reconciliation  with  it.  In  Cassirer's  latest 
statement  of  what  art  is  various  expressions  are  used  rather 
than  "symbolic  form"  to  convey  both  the  autonomy  and  the 
richness  of  the  idea  as  he  holds  it:  "constructive  eye,"24  "con- 

*°  Benedetto  Croce,  The  Essence  of  Aesthetic,  42-43. 

21  Croce,  article  on  "Aesthetics,"  Encyclopaedia  Britannica ;  i4th  edition  (1946). 

MR.   G.   Collingwood,  Principles  of  Art,  234-235. 

28  Essay  on  Man,  142. 

*rLSj    151. 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  619 

templative  creation,"25  "intuitive  form,"28  "sympathetic  vi- 
sion."27 In  each  of  these  phrases  it  is  obvious  that  the  opposition 
between  the  subjective  and  objective  contributions  to  the  act 
and  fact  of  art  is  meant  to  be  resolved.  Something  is  saved,  to 
be  sure,  from  the  imitation  doctrine,  as  the  words  "contempla- 
tive," "intuitive,"  and  "vision"  suggest.  Cassirer  points  out 
that  when  Leonardo  da  Vinci  said  that  the  function  of  art  was 
to  teach  men  how  to  see  (safer  vedere)  he  uttered  an  inex- 
pugnable truth.28  Art  does  not  imitate  the  world  of  men  and 
things,  but  it  penetrates  it  with  the  faculty  of  imagination  and 
restates  its  essential  character  in  revealing  and  beautiful  forms. 
A  painter  interprets  the  spectacle  which  it  is  contrary  to  his 
genius  to  retrace  dumbly  line  for  line.  He  discriminates  and 
communicates  delicate  aspects  of  the  nature  whose  gross  ap- 
pearance bores  him.  Intensive  and  concentrated  vision  is  a  main 
attribute  of  an  artist  and  this  is  what  is  left  of  the  discarded 
doctrine  of  ars  Simla  naturae. 

There  is  value  to  be  conserved  also  in  the  variants  of  expres- 
sionism. The  force  of  genius,  the  lyrical  thrust  is  the  inception 
of  art.  But  the  value  in  emotional  theories  has  to  be  balanced 
by  values  taken  from  the  rationalistic  school,  the  values  of 
measure  and  order.  In  all  contexts  the  Kantian  Cassirer  asserts 
the  primacy  of  the  spontaneity  of  consciousness.  In  the  context 
of  art  this  general  idea  becomes  the  interpretation  of  art  as 
man's  deed.  Art,  in  fact  any  cultural  symbol,  he  is  never  tired 
of  saying,  is  energeia  and  not  ergon.29  Every  symbolic  form, 
art,  myth,  or  speech  is  a  revelation  proceeding  from  within  out- 
wards. One  of  the  insights  of  Leibniz,  important  for  aesthetic 
theory,  was  just  this  revaluation  of  reality  in  terms  of  force. 
In  interpreting  the  aesthetic  significance  of  Hogarth's  line  of 
beauty  Cassirer  traverses  the  lower  levels  on  which  it  is  a  mere 
sensuous  impression,  and  then  an  optical  structure.  As  one 
looks  at  it,  Cassirer  writes,  the  thin  perceptual  experience  be- 

**ibid.,  162. 

99  Ibid.,  167,  170. 

"Ibid.,  150,  1 7 on. 

"Ibid.,  144. 

M  Phtlosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  I,  104. 


620  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

gins  to  move  and  become  a  self-shaping  energy.  It  has  then 
arrived  at  the  stage  of  aesthetic  form  5  it  becomes  definite 
ornament,  with  artistic  intent  and  place.  For,  although  as  beauti- 
ful ornament  it  is  timeless,  even  so  it  belongs  to  the  history 
of  style  and  can  be  placed  in  an  epoch.  "In  the  concrete  experi- 
ence of  the  simple  linear  track,  there  comes  now  into  being  at 
a  single  blow,  just  a  particular  style,  just  the  comprehensive 
characteristic  'art  will'  of  the  time  pregnant  and  living  be- 
fore me."30 

But,  though  art  begins  as  spontaneity,  act  of  will,  or  expres- 
sion of  emotion,  it  is  great  in  proportion  as  it  is  the  expression 
not  of  a  feeling  but  of  the  gamut  of  human  feelings,  thereby 
attaining  universality  and  subtlety.  If  various  emotions  in  their 
responsiveness  to  multiplied  occasions,  and  fortune's  turns,  are 
represented,  the  work  of  art  rises  to  wholeness  and  sloughs  vio- 
lence. Emotion  converts  to  motion,  i.e.,  to  rhythm,  measure, 
and  design.  Tension  deepens  to  the  center's  stillness.  Cassirer 
makes  use  of  the  idea  of  catharsis  to  prove  how  inadequate 
unshaped  passion  is  for  the  purposes  of  art.  Art  must  operate 
to  convert  the  passive  burden  of  pity  and  fear  into  an  active 
state  of  soul.  Cassirer  answers  the  question:  Of  what  is  man 
freed  by  art?  thus:  So  long  as  fear  is  a  real  dread  of  a  real 
state  of  affairs  man  feels  his  dependence.  But,  if  he  remolds 
this  fear  into  the  art  of  tragedy — whether  he  writes  it  or 
relives  it  as  a  fit  spectator — he  is  emancipated  by  the  form  of 
art  from  the  material  load  of  existing  danger,  be  it  a  tyrant's 
menace  or  the  approach  of  death,  poverty,  or  disease.81  In  such 
ways  Cassirer  limits  the  idea  of  the  absoluteness  of  genius. 

Having  brought  to  a  point  the  positive  and  negative  elements 
in  Cassirer's  theory  of  art  as  symbol  or  intuitive  awareness  of 
living  form,  we  turn  to  Goethe  for  concrete  demonstration. 
"The  life  and  the  poetry  of  Goethe  gives  us  the  best  and  most 
typical  example  of  the  mutual  penetration  of  all  those  elements 
that  constitute  a  work  of  art."32  Particularly  we  find  there  on  a 

90  Zeitschrtft,  XXI,  op.  cit.,  299. 
"  Essay  on  Many  1481". 

12  Ibid.,  10.  The  page-reference  here  is  to  Cassirer's  original  typescript  pages  $ 
I  have  been  unable  to  locate  the  above  sentence  in  the  printed  chapter  on  "Art" 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  621 

grand  scale  and  in  clear  outlines  the  swing  from  originative 
lyrical  thrust  to  compensating  objective  vision  of  beauty,  both 
in  nature  and  in  the  human  form.  We  find  this  tension  over- 
ruled by  the  mastery  of  Goethe's  poetical  power  which  holds 
all  in  seamless  unity.  We  will  avail  ourselves  of  typical  observa- 
tions made  by  Cassirer  on  this  master  illustration. 

The  early  lyrics  and  dramatic  sketches  of  Goethe  convey 
the  Prometheus  motive,  the  youthful  accent  of  energy,  gener- 
osity, and  love  of  nature  and  thus  express  the  first  subjective 
stage  of  symbol  clearly.  They  were  written  in  the  Sturm  und 
Drang  period  of  Goethe's  life,  when  he  felt  the  liberation 
wrought  by  Rousseau,  when  he  was  overwhelmed  by  the  gi- 
gantic strength  of  a  Gothic  cathedral,  and  when  his  own  mount- 
ing genius  found  dramatic  counterparts  in  Gotz  von  Berlich- 
ingen,  Mohammed,  and  Caesar.  Like  the  early  lyrics  the 
Urfaust  is  an  expression  of  the  first  thrust  of  a  great  spirit's 
power  and  dream.  In  the  first  scenes  of  the  Faust  poem,  which 
conserve  the  early  force,  one  remembers  how  the  young  world 
of  the  on-coming  Renaissance,  its  experimentation  and  ferment, 
and  the  unbounded  eagerness  and  ambition  of  a  scientific  ex- 
plorer show  themselves  in  epithets,  figures  and  scenes.  Faust's 
ecstatic  wonder  in  the  awareness  of  his  god-like  powers,  his 
thirst  for  contact  with  the  very  springs  and  breast  of  nature, 
his  intoxicated  yearning  after  the  fire  and  loom  and  ocean 
of  Being  all  reflect  the  onset  of  symbol  as  such.  However 
important  the  swaying  middle  position  of  symbol  and  its  re- 
conciling function,  a  work  of  art  as  symbol  is  born  on  the  side 
of  spiritual  freedom  and  power  5  it  is  autonomous  creation. 

In  Faust  the  objective  pole  is  represented  by  Helena,  her 
beauty  and  implications.  To  the  extent  that  subject  and  object 
can  be  perfectly  balanced  in  a  work  of  art  the  union  of  Faust 
and  Helena  stands  for  that  total  compensation.  But  this  would 
be  too  static  a  name  for  the  living,  dynamic  conception  of 
symbol  that  Goethe  employed  and  Cassirer  expounds.  Helena 
herself,  though  she  represents  the  beauty  of  the  ancient  world 
and  of  nature,  and  most  of  all,  of  the  fair  human  shape,  is  a 

in  An  Essay  on  Man.  However,  the  main  source  for  Cassirer*s  use  of  Goethe  is 
Freihett  und  Form,  271-421. 


622  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

shifting,  shimmering,  many-visaged,  and  finally  poignantly 
fading  form.  She  shows  in  a  mirror,  she  incarnates  in  Gretchen, 
she  leaps  ages  and  mountains.  The  too  humbly  Teutonic 
Gretchen  gives  place  under  the  growing  aesthetic  ideal  to  the 
nobler  form  of  Menelaus'  wife.  But  in  total  conception  the 
classic  heroine  answers  to  that  firm  objective  beauty  which 
Goethe  found  and  celebrated  on  his  Italian  journey.  He  wrote 
from  there  that  his  early  Titanic  ideas  were  only  airy  shapes  and 
that  before  the  serene  beauty  of  the  human  form  in  antique  art 
he  had  first  learned  to  see.33 

The  peace  of  the  aesthetic  sense,  resting  in  its  formed  counter- 
part, is  for  this  view,  as  we  have  said,  only  the  limit  and  cross- 
section  of  a  process.  The  admiration  of  Helena  becomes  a  func- 
tion. For  Faust  it  acts  as  a  fluid  standard  in  terms  of  which  his 
many  admirations  may  be  measured.  German  shapelessness, 
though  dear  through  kinship,  becomes  relatively  unsympathetic. 
He  returns  to  it  indeed:  Gretchen  is  envisioned  again.  But  pain 
mixes  with  the  pleasure  of  the  experience  of  Helena  throughout. 
In  her  phantom-quality  she  symbolizes  the  instability  of  all 
embodied  loveliness.  Hers  and  Faust's  child,  Euphorion,  who 
shared  with  his  father  vaulting  ambition,  dies  like  Icarus.  Thus 
the  subjective  moment,  Faust's  ambition,  and  the  objective  mo- 
ment, Helena's  beautiful  form,  interweave  and  change.  In  their 
interaction  and  growth  they  compose  the  poetized  image  of 
Goethe's  own  life  in  the  sense  of  the  law  of  the  form  of  his 
life,  and  beyond  this,  of  the  history  and  tragedy  of  humanity. 

While  analyzing  the  symbolism  of  Faust  Cassirer  makes  a 
cross-reference  to  the  Pandora  in  which,  he  says,  Goethe's 
symbolic  meaning  has  received  its  purest  poetical  stamp.34  He 
also  devoted  a  separate  study  to  the  Pandora  fragment.85 
Though  unfinished  and  more  difficult  to  analyze,  it  is  almost 
a  symbol  of  the  symbolic  function  itself.  As  it  is  the  business 
of  symbol  to  harmonize  tensions,  so  with  Pandora  here.  For 
Cassirer  explains  that  the  Pandora  Goethe  has  in  mind  is  the 

M  Freiheit  vnd  Form,  409^ 
14  Ibid.,  412. 

w  "Goethe's  Pandora,"  Zefackrijt  fur  Xsthetik  und  Allgemeine  Kunstwissen- 
$cha}t,  XIII,  (1919),  116. 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  623 

"all-gifted  and  all-giving  one,"  the  loving  dispenser  of  goods 
to  man,  the  kind  and  beautiful  force  that  draws  men  into  com- 
munion and  fellowship.  Like  Love,  the  great  ascending  and 
descending  Daimon  of  Plato's  Symposium,  Pandora  is  the  arch- 
mediator,  "destined  to  connect  together  poverty  and  plenty, 
finite  and  infinite,  mortality  and  immortality,  and  by  so  doing 
to  cement  the  universe  into  a  whole."36 

Cassirer  watches  the  Pandora  symbol  grow,  and  by  following 
the  illustration  we  may  get  fresh  light  on  this  basic  interpre- 
tation of  art.  The  tensions  that  are  stated  and  harmonized 
mount  in  intensity  and  depth  of  meaning.  In  most  general 
terms  the  opposition  running  through  the  whole  is  that  between 
deed  and  reflection,  subjective  force  and  objective  seeing,  the 
active  and  contemplative  forces  in  life  and  being.  At  one  point, 
where  Cassirer  himself  almost  turns  poet,  he  suggests  that 
we  hear  in  our  mind's  ear  the  individual  dramatic  parts  as 
voices  brought  together  contrapuntally  in  a  magnificent  fugue. 
Early  in  the  poem  where  the  tension  is  at  its  most  uncompro- 
mised  stage  the  active  pole,  Prometheus,  represents  man's  primi- 
tive self-reliant  effort  to  work  nature  for  his  basic  needs.  Measur- 
ing all  values  in  terms  of  tangible  utilities,  Prometheus  has  no 
sympathy  for  sabbath  rest  or  aesthetic  contemplation.  The 
early  reflective  pole,  Epimetheus,  receives  from  Pandora  a 
floating  vision  of  beautiful  natural  forms,  on  water  and  land, 
in  youth  and  woman.  But  because  form,  Gestalt,  is  at  this  point 
sheer  gift  and  not  achievement,  the  lovely  shapes  disintegrate 
and  pass  away  with  the  passing  of  natural  light.  As  the  contra- 
puntal music  thickens,  the  active  moment  becomes  purposive 
and  enlightened  cultivation  of  the  arts  and  sciences}  the  re- 
flective moment  brings  justice  and  the  loving  co-operation  of 
communal  life.  Then  another  character,  Elf  ore  thraseia, 
strengthens  the  reality  of  the  good  gifts  of  Pandora,  by  bringing 
confident  hope.  This  optimism,  however,  Cassirer  finds  balanced 
near  the  end  by  the  expression  of  an  old  man's  serene  renuncia- 
tion, renunciation  of  the  belief  in  the  possibility  of  steady 
maintenance  of  classic  peace  and  harmony.  But  there  is  mastery 
by  form  even  though  classic  harmony  passes.  Goethe  realizes 

"Ibid.,  1 1 6. 


624  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

and  expresses  the  realization  that  the  forces  that  generate  the 
changes  in  being  spring  within  man  as  well.  He  accepts  the  fact 
of  his  own  decline  as  linked  with  the  larger  rhythms  in 
things  and  yields  more  place  to  the  idea  of  passage  and  indi- 
viduality. 

The  application  to  Goethe  illuminates  Cassirer's  conception 
of  true  art  as  symbolic  form.  We  understand  more  vividly  after 
the  projection  on  to  the  Goethean  plane  how  a  great  poem 
figures  forth  the  conciliating  office  of  living  form;  how  the 
impetus  of  Faustian,  Promethean  spirit  needs  for  completeness 
the  quieting  influence  of  Helena's  and  Hellenic  beauty  and 
the  scope  and  objectivity  of  Nature's  inner  rhythm;  how  the 
self-assertive  tendency  needs  to  be  controlled  by  the  contem- 
plation of  beauty;  how  social  bonds  are  insufficient  without  en- 
lightenment, confidence  without  resignation;  how  even  beauti- 
ful irenic  love  and  classic  ideals  are  subject  to  time — how 
beauty  is  one  aspect  of  the  total  life  of  form. 

Cassirer's  application  of  his  concept  of  art  remains  on  the 
whole  within  the  field  of  the  art  of  words.  For  the  other  arts  he 
furnishes  us  only  a  general  program  and  occasional  allusions. 
We  are  not,  however,  without  indication  of  the  direction  his 
applications  might  easily  have  taken  in  the  field  of  the  visual 
arts.  In  several  places  the  art-historian,  Dr.  Erwin  Panofsky, 
borrows  Cassirer's  usage  of  the  term  "symbolism,"  praising  its 
aptness;  and  one  may,  I  think,  make  so  bold  as  to  assume  that 
this  art-historian's  rich  iconographical  studies  in  the  main  illus- 
strate  what  Cassirer  would  like  to  have  understood  as  the  appli- 
cation of  his  theory  of  art  to  painting  and  sculpture.  The  best 
locus  for  our  desired  application  to  the  spatial  arts  is  Die  Per- 
spektive  als  "Symbolische  Form"*7  where  the  very  wording  of 
the  title  shows  Cassirer's  influence.  In  this  learned  study  Panof- 
sky traces  the  handling  of  perspective  in  painting  and  drawing 
from  classical  times  to  the  present  and  ties  the  spatial  treatment 
throughout  with  the  general  Weltanschauung.  He  demon- 
strates how  man's  pictorial  and  plastic  portrayals  reflect  through 
the  ages  his  primary  orientation  to  his  environment — his  place 
in  the  world — his  set  toward  things — his  middle  position  be- 

91  Vortrage  der  Eibliothek  Warburg,  (1924-1925),  258-330. 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  625 

tween  the  heavens  above  and  the  pit  at  the  center — his  physical 
consorting  with  nature — what  he  fundamentally  means  by  here 
and  there,  between,  outside  of,  near,  far — all  under  the  in- 
fluence of  a  changing  ultimate  sense  of  values. 

Examples  from  Panofsky's  study  should  make  this  clear.  For 
period  after  period  he  matches  the  artistic  handling  of  spatial 
relations,  the  particular  variant  of  perspective  worked  out  by  a 
period's  artists,  with  wider  tendencies  in  philosophy  and  science. 
Thus,  while  he  is  converting  spatial  symbols  into  historic  monu- 
ments, he  is  at  the  same  time  relating  these  monuments  to  the 
other  major  contemporary  activities.  This  is  that  reinstatement 
of  autonomous  art  to  its  position  among  its  human  kindred 
which  Cassirer  believes  in  and  which  is  illustrated  in  the  ex- 
panding movement  of  our  initial  schematic  outline. 

Panofsky  begins  with  classical  antiquity.  The  artists  of  this 
time  saw  their  material  world  loosely  held  together.  The  ob- 
jective scene  was  made  up  of  a  plurality  of  bodies  with  shapes 
determined  by  function,  and  with  'tactile  values.'  Empty  space 
was  in  this  style  a  nothing — simply  a  remainder.  The  whole 
field  of  vision  was  thus  a  sum  of  separate  spaces.  Now  the 
world  of  the  philosopher  Democritus  was  just  such  an  aggre- 
gate: atoms  plus  a  void  within  which  the  atoms  could  move. 
If  Democritus  be  thought  not  central  enough  in  Greek  philoso- 
phy to  be  taken  as  the  significant  background  of  Greek  artistic 
symbolism,  then  Plato  and  Aristotle  can  be  drafted.  Plato  with 
his  triangles  and  receptacle,  Aristotle  with  his  nest  of  forms 
made  the  space  of  nature  a  sum  of  the  places  of  bodies  and 
forms.  Neither  for  classical  Greek  thought  nor  for  art  was  there 
an  envisioned  space  that  could  master  and  fuse  the  contents 
of  space. 

The  quasi-impressionism  of  Hellenistic  landscape  and  archi- 
tectural interiors  cracked  the  atomistic  independence  of  class- 
ical forms,  but,  being  inconsistent  and  inconclusive,  achieved 
no  federating,  spatial  continuum.  In  the  realm  of  art  this  was 
like  the  Pyrrhonic  scepticism  which  shook  the  simple  positive- 
ness  of  earlier  philosophy,  but  achieved  no  system  of  its  own. 
Passing  on  to  the  Middle  Ages,  we  find  there  the  gradual 
conquest  of  spatial  unity  in  art  corresponding  to  the  many- 


626  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

sided  movement  of  Christian  philosophy.  In  the  manuscript 
illuminations  and  mosaics  there  was  the  rhythmic  interplay  of 
pure  gold  and  colors  correspondent  to  the  metaphysics  of  light 
— a  metaphysics  at  first  pagan,  but  then  central  in  Christian 
theology.  When  St.  Thomas  made  Christian  thought  Aris- 
totelian in  outline,  he  added  a  divine  outer  body,  spiritual  in 
essence  and  infinite  in  power,  to  Aristotle's  set  of  starry  orbits. 
This  may  be  claimed  as  the  analogue  of  the  rising  dominance 
in  architecture  of  arched  roofings  and  canopies  over  lesser 
sculptured  forms — still  a  great  body  ruling  lesser  bodies,  and 
to  this  degree  pluralistic — but  a  kind  of  unity  for  all  that. 

With  the  great  painters  and  architects  of  the  Renaissance 
conscious  unity  arrived.  A  mathematical  theory  of  perspective 
was  constructed  in  terms  of  sectioned  visual  pyramids,  and  ex- 
pressed itself  through  chess-board  tiled-floors,  ground  plans, 
etc.  Thus  a  whole  of  space  definitely  replaced  a  space-aggregate. 
The  philosophical  rationalism  of  the  seventeenth  century,  with 
all  its  subsidiary  mathematical  disciplines,  stands  in  the  wide 
world  of  theory  for  the  perfected  system  of  perspective  in  art. 
A  natural  continuum,  dispensing  with  a  supernatural  over-lord, 
a  homogeneous  infinite  extension  of  which  all  particular  bodies 
are  determinate  modes,  is  contemplated  and  analyzed.  Space 
at  last  signifies  an  unbroken  web,  not  a  sum  of  entities. 

Why  was  this  apparent  conclusion  of  the  problem  of  space, 
for  art  and  for  philosophy,  not  a  final  resting-place?  One  knows 
that  the  naturalistic  perspective  style  of  the  High  Renaissance 
yielded  to  others}  and  that  the  Substantial  Extension  of  Des- 
cartes was  no  last  word  in  Nature-philosophy.  We  remember 
that  symbols  are  polar,  and  always  retain  at  their  heart  an  am- 
biguity. The  symbolism  of  naturalistic  perspective  painting  car- 
ries within  it  the  typical  tension.  The  reason  that  Diirer's  "St. 
Jerome"  or  De  Hooch's  interiors  look  like  a  slice  of  reality  set 
on  the  canvas  is  because,  paradoxically,  the  subjective  point  of 
sight  has  been  so  perfectly  reckoned  with.  Where  the  phe- 
nomenon of  art  seems  most  real,  there  the  subjective  factor 
enters  in  most  penetratingly.  The  perspective  system  of  Albert! 
and  Piero  della  Francesca  is  both  a  triumph  for  the  reporter 
of  fact  and  for  the  egotist  whose  will  to  power  subdues  the  fact 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  627 

to  the  individual  point  of  view.  Once  the  process  of  perspective 
representation  was  mastered,  artists  began  to  adapt  the  cross-cut 
of  nature  freely  to  their  fancy.  The  Italian  baroque  painters 
played  freely  with  the  possibilities  of  an  emphasized  high-space} 
Altdorfer  with  oblique  space;  Rembrandt  with  near  space.  This 
variety  of  space-emphasis  in  art  corresponds  once  more  to 
modern  subjectivism  in  thought.  Coming  still  nearer  to  our 
own  day,  everyone  knows  how  in  the  last  few  decades  the  model 
of  naturalistic  space  has  been  fundamentally  defied  by  Abstrac- 
tionists, Futurists,  Surrealists,  Dadaists,  Suprematists.  Such  con- 
trol of  the  organization  of  the  artist's  space  by  an  arbitrarily 
accented  motive  is  in  harmony  with  new  psychological  tenden- 
cies, and  a  late  pervasive  irrationalism.  There  have  also  been 
sympathetic  symptoms  from  non-Euclidean  pangeometry. 

The  purpose  of  this  brief  summary  has  been  not  only  to 
exemplify  Cassirer's  notion  of  the  art-symbol  in  its  characteristic 
form,  but  to  indicate  the  way  art  can  be  both  recognized  as  an 
autonomous  activity  of  spirit  and  yet  restored  to  the  family  of 
human  functions.  There  is  a  typical  organization  of  space  in 
painting  in  the  Renaissance  j  but  this  treatment  of  space  has 
an  underlying  kinship  with  the  naturalistic  philosophy  and 
mathematical  sciences  of  the  same  centuries.  Even  so  in  ex- 
pounding Goethe's  Pandora,  Cassirer  keeps  the  poem  Goethe's 
own,  yet  points  out  the  kinship  with  Schelling's  metaphysics. 
What  came  out  of  genius  in  that  day  could  hardly  miss  the 
flood-tide  of  romantic  influence.  There  is  in  any  case  in  any 
age  a  world-outlook  characteristically  coloring  both  art  and 
philosophy.  The  most  sensitive  and  profound  spectator  of  a 
picture  will,  Panofsky  thinks,  penetrate  to  what  he  defines 
as  its  philosophical  layer,  where  the  total  habits  of  the  time 
bear  subtle  witness  to  themselves.  His  analysis  of  the  layers  of 
meaning  in  a  work  of  art  provides,  first,  for  a  superficial  layer  of 
recognizable  and  expressive  objects  and  events;  a  secondary 
layer  of  literary  types;  and  an  ultimate  basis  of  philosophical 
meaning.  In  his  exposition  of  this  last  layer  Panofsky  cites 
Cassirer:  ".  .  .  the  intrinsic  meaning  .  .  .  may  be  defined  as  a 
unifying  principle  which  underlies  and  explains  both  the  visible 
event  and  its  intelligible  significance,  and  which  determines 


628  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

even  the  form  in  which  the  visible  event  takes  shape."38  "In 
this  conceiving  of  pure  forms,  motifs,  images,  stories,  and 
allegories  as  manifestations  of  underlying  principles,  we  inter- 
pret all  these  elements  as  what  Ernst  Cassirer  has  called  'sym- 
bolical values'."89 

The  spectator  of  symbolical  values,  the  third  philosophical 
layer,  being  in  his  own  person  aware  of  the  "essential  tendencies 
of  the  human  mind,"40  intuits  their  presence  in  what  is  before 
him.  He  senses  the  artist's  half-conscious  communication  of  a 
habit  of  spirit,  a  dominant  attitude  toward  men  and  things,  and 
responds  to  it,  is  articulate  about  it.  This  fine  awareness  of 
philosophical  habit  and  spiritual  sense,  Panofsky,  in  agreement 
with  Cassirer,  makes  complex.  He  who  intuits  it,  intuits  a  many- 
in-one,  and  an  atmosphere  surrounding  the  one.  Within  the 
"symbolic  form"  are  condensed  "symptoms"  of  the  political, 
scientific,  religious,  and  economic  tendencies  of  the  age  that 
produced  the  work.  The  philosophical  interpreter  reads  the 
many  symptoms  compact  in  a  single  frame  and  knows  their 
echoes  and  analogues.  It  is  the  whole  life  and  tone  of  an  age 
that  pulses  in  the  image. 

The  art-historian  will  have  to  check  what  he  thinks  is  the  intrinsic 
meaning  of  the  work  .  .  .  against  what  he  thinks  is  the  intrinsic  meaning 
of  as  many  other  documents  of  civilizations  historically  related  to  that 
work  ...  as  he  can  master;  of  documents  bearing  witness  to  the 
political,  poetical,  religious,  philosophical,  and  social  tendencies  of  the 
personality,  period,  or  country  under  investigation.  ...  It  is  in  the  search 
for  intrinsic  meanings  or  content  that  the  various  humanistic  disciplines 
meet  on  a  common  plane  instead  of  serving  as  hand-maidens  to  each 
other.41 

The  work  of  art  as  symbolic  form  is  in  the  middle  position  of 
a  spiritual  circuit  which  runs  from  personal  creator  to  the 
whole  cultural  scope  of  the  age,  back  and  forth,  and  round 
and  round.  It  is  the  chief  home  of  the  busy  messenger  Eros — 
Eros  here  himself  a  symbol. 

88  Erwin  Panofsky,  Studies  in  Iconology,  5. 
"Ibid.,  8. 
*/«£,  15. 
41  Ibid.,  1 6. 


CASSIRER'S  PLACEMENT  OF  ART  629 

We  have  now  completed  the  account  of  that  two-fold  move- 
ment of  thought  in  the  course  of  which  Cassirer  frees  art  from 
alien  domination,  defines  it  as  an  autonomous  symbol,  and  then 
recharges  its  connection  with  the  principal  human  activities. 

Such  a  theory  of  art  as  Cassirer's,  instructed  as  it  is  by  the 
movement  of  culture,  the  history  of  aesthetic  theory,  and  the 
phenomena  of  art,  is  bound  to  be  largely  satisfactory.  It  pro- 
vides for  the  two  main  classical  factors  of  clear  control  and 
sensuous  richness.  It  stands  by  art's  autonomy.  In  adding  to 
the  notions  struck  out  by  the  thought  of  the  great  German 
classical  period  later  ideas  of  historical  style  and  tragic  tran- 
sience, Cassirer  leaves  in  the  main  little  to  be  desired  by  the 
traditional  lovers  and  students  of  art.  But  the  question  does 
arise  whether  the  philosophy  of  overcome  polarity,  of  subject 
and  object,  their  tensions  and  syntheses,  furnishes — not  a  pos- 
sible frame  of  art-critical  reference  for  recent  developments  in 
art,  for  this  it  obviously  does — but  at  present  the  most  appro- 
priate and  illuminating  one.  I  am  not  clear  whether  Cassirer 
would  say:  "My  view  is  elastic  enough  to  receive  recent  experi- 
ments," or  would  say:  "My  view  cannot  and  ought  not  so  to  do. 
For  the  recent  achievement  is  wandering  rather  than  a  genuine 
advance."  At  any  rate  the  polar  pattern  of  Cassirer's  symbol 
seems  a  little  too  balanced  and  full  of  grace  when  approached 
from  immersion  in  Eliot,  Auden,  Picasso  and  Stravinsky.  The 
very  meaning  of  polarity  derives  from  common-sense  percep- 
tion and  the  ordinary  interplay  of  organism  and  environment. 
Sapient  seeing  itself  and  reconstructed  interplay  leave  normal 
vision  and  normal  practice  as  axes  of  reference.  However,  one 
guesses  that  Cassirer's  own  thought  feels  the  impact  of  the  less 
contemplative  and  more  electrically  and  experimentally  gen- 
erated symbolism  of  recent  years,  as  he  writes  his  latest  chapter 
on  the  subject  of  art.  He  speaks  of  the  "new  force"  as  well  as 
of  the  "new  form"  of  artj42  he  quotes  Leibniz's  definition  of 
perfection  as  "enhancement  of  being"  and  is  at  pains  to  note  the 
contribution  of  Leibniz's  functionalism  to  the  newer  aesthetics. 
"It  is,"  he  says,  "the  intensification  of  our  dynamic  energies  that 
we  seek  and  find  in  art."  This  last  phrase  certainly  marks  the 

49  Essay  on  Man,  154. 


630  KATHARINE  GILBERT 

direction  in  which  recent  art  has  moved.  The  art  of  the  genera- 
tion between  the  wars  yielded  more  intensity  and  force  than 
harmony  and  centralized  form.  Its  experiments  in  denser  pack- 
ing of  tones  and  metaphors  and  its  series  of  cubistic  experi- 
ments, have  excited  interest,  but  the  results  have  oftener  main- 
tained suspense  and  deepened  art's  resources  than  resolved 
tensions.  A  deeply  boring  curiosity  and  demonic  wit  have  finely 
fractioned  and  strangely  fused  the  old  vocabulary  and  grammar. 
One  feels  that  Cassirer  increasingly  savors  the  qualities  of  the 
new  aesthetic  ways  and  would  recognize  the  place  of  today's 
art  beside  the  new  physics  and  psychology  in  the  social  picture 
and  humanistic  circle.  Would  he  find  wanting  the  completion  of 
its  own  peculiar  task:  the  achievement  or  promise  of  a  symbol, 
after  war  and  exploration,  of  peace  and  a  valid  humanism? 

KATHARINE  GILBERT 

DEPARTMENT  OF  AESTHETICS,  ART  AND  Music 

DUKE  UNIVERSITY 


i8 
Harry  Slochower 

ERNST  CASSIRER'S  FUNCTIONAL  APPROACH  TO 
ART  AND  LITERATURE 


i8 

ERNST  CASSIRER'S  FUNCTIONAL  APPROACH  TO 
ART  AND  LITERATURE 

A  RT  and  literature  occupy  a  more  pervasive  location  in  the 
JTJJL  writings  of  Ernst  Cassirer  than  they  do  in  any  other 
modern  philosopher  since  Nietzsche.  Four  of  his  books  are 
largely  devoted  to  theories  of  aesthetics  and  to  studies  of 
Holderlin,  Lessing,  Schiller,  Kleist  and  Goethe.  Furthermore, 
questions  involving  the  nature  and  process  of  art-forms  are 
also  raised  in  his  other  more  general  works. 

A  study  of  Cassirer's  view  on  art  and  literature  requires 
an  examination  of  its  context  in  his  system  as  a  whole.  Even 
as  Cassirer  writes  that  the  various  cultural  functions  "cannot 
be  reduced  to  a  common  denominator,"  he  insists  that  they 
"complete  and  complement  one  another."1  Indeed,  a  striking 
feature  of  Cassirer's  philosophy,  as  developed  in  Philosophie 
der  symboUschen  Formen  and  in  An  Essay  on  M.any  is  its 
strategy  of  showing  that  science,  language,  myth,  religion,  his- 
tory and  art  form  an  organic  unity  located  in  a  common  struc- 
tural framework.  Although,  following  Kant,  Cassirer  ascribes 
to  art  a  degree  of  autonomy,  he  views  it  as  a  phase  in  the 
process  of  human  culture  and  bound  up  with  its  basic  directives. 
Thus,  he  would  show  the  principle  connecting  Greek  drama 
with  Greek  philosophy,  classical  and  romantic  literature  and 
aesthetics  with  the  systems  of  Leibniz,  Newton,  Shaftesbury, 
Kant,  Fichte,  Rousseau,  and  Hegel.2 

However,  art-problems  are  not  simply  an  integral  part  of 

1  An  Essay  on  Man,  (New  Haven,  1944),  228. 

*  Logos  Dike  Kosmos  in  der  Entwicklung  der  griechischen  Philosofhie, 
Goteborgs  Hogskolas  Arsskrift  XL VII,  (Goteborg,  194.1),  4,  i5ff.  Die  Philosophie 
der  Aufklarung,  (Tubingen,  1932).  Freiheit  und  Form.  Studien  zur  deutschen 
Geistesgeschichte,  (Berlin,  1922).  Idee  und  Gestalt.  Goethe,  Schiller,  Holderlin, 
Kleist  (Berlin,  1924).  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  (Princeton,  1945). 

633 


634  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

Cassirer's  philosophy,  but  offer  the  most  characteristic  amplifica- 
tion of  his  method  and  system.  This  essay  will  attempt  to  dem- 
onstrate that  an  understanding  of  Cassirer's  view  on  art  and 
literature  is  indispensable  for  gaining  the  full  import  of  his 
basic  category,  "function,"  in  which  a  dialectic  method  is  ap- 
plied to  and  verified  by  concrete,  material  forms  leading  to  a 
free  social  act.  The  point  will  be  developed  by  an  analysis  of 

1.  Cassirer's  strategy  and  leading  principles. 

2.  Their  objectification  in  his  approach  to 

a.  Art  and  aesthetic  theory 

b.  Literary  personalities,  particularly  Goethe. 

Finally,  we  shall  indicate  the  limitation  and  the  fruitfulness  of 
Cassirer's  approach  with  reference  to  contemporary  problems 
of  art  and  literary  criticism. 

METHOD 

The  initial  impression  gained  from  some  of  Cassirer's  works 
is  that  they  are  learned  treatises  on  the  history  of  philosophy, 
science,  culture,  and  art.  Indeed,  Cassirer  has  been  criticized 
for  showing  greater  interest  in  citing  other  men's  theories  than 
in  stating  a  position  of  his  own.  It  is  true  that  his  writings 
contain  extensive  quotations  from  a  great  number  of  sources, 
and  that  his  studies  on  aesthetic  theory,  on  Goethe,  etc.,  trace 
their  historical  development.  However,  this  documentation  is 
not  merely  a  matter  of  scholarly  learning.  Cassirer's  specific 
employment  of  the  historical  method,  as  we  shall  see,  is  a  char- 
acteristic function  of  his  philosophic  method. 

Cassirer's  primary  concern  in  all  of  his  investigations  is 
method.  "All  unity  of  the  intellectual  form  which  comprises 
a  system,"  he  writes,  "is  finally  grounded  in  (method)." 
Method  is  "the  most  objective  and  the  most  personal  element 
in  every  philosophy."  Cassirer  is  persuaded  that  a  difference  in 
method  makes  a  difference  in  the  direction  taken  by  content. 
This  is  the  point  he  would  establish  in  discussing  Lamprecht's 
philosophy  of  history,  Schiller's  and  Kleist's  manipulation  of 
Kantian  concepts,  etc.  In  these  analyses,  Cassirer  is  less  con- 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE        635 

cerned  with  content  and  conclusion  than  with  the  method 
through  which  they  are  reached  and  in  which  they  are 
grounded.8 

Stated  generally,  Cassirer's  method  consists  in  examining  the 
interplay  of  the  particular  and  the  universal  in  a  dialectic  dy- 
namic process.  He  investigates  the  individual  perspective  in 
its  interaction  with  the  over-all  view  reached,  and  its  merging 
with  a  philosophic  tradition.  The  essay  on  Holderlin,  for 
example,  would  demonstrate  that  the  poet  shares  many  of  the 
tenets  held  by  German  idealism,  but  that  they  take  on  a  differ- 
ent significance  and  color  for  him,  because  in  his  case  they  are 
rooted  in  other  intellectual  presuppositions.  For  the  same 
reason,  Holderlin's  own  contributions  vary  from  the  tenets 
which  he  took  over  from  the  founders  of  idealism.  Throughout, 
it  is  this  "dual  process  of  taking  and  giving"  which  Cassirer 
traces,  as  in  discussing  the  relations  of  Goethe  to  Plato,  Spinoza, 
Newton,  of  Rousseau  and  Kleist  to  Kant,  etc.4  Everywhere,  he 
moves  in  a  dialectic  rhythm  to  establish  what  separates  and 
what  unites  different  personalities  and  movements. 

This  centering  on  method  is,  however,  not  in  the  interests 
of  denying  basic  assumptions  and  principles.  To  be  sure,  Cas- 
sirer keeps  himself  aloof  from  the  traditional  metaphysical 
substance.  In  the  manner  of  the  Marburg  School,  to  which  he 
belongs,  he  converts  Kant's  thing-in-itself  into  a  dynamic  un- 
ending process.  Yet,  Cassirer  also  rejects  the  traditional  brands 
of  positivism,  empiricism,  and  rationalism.  Enumeration  of  em- 
pirical data,  he  notes,  can  establish  no  law,  and  the  rationalistic 
law  gained  by  abstracting  from  particular  manifestations  is  to 
him  an  "impoverishment  of  reality."  Nor  may  Cassirer's  focus 
on  method  be  linked  to  Dewey's  instrumentalism;  for  he  is 
opposed  to  the  pragmatic  denial  of  substance  and  certainty.  In 
so  far  as  pragmatism  identifies  truth  and  utility,  it  is  but  "a 
philosophic  catch-word."  Progress  in  knowledge  is  not  deter- 
mined by  variations  in  need,  "but  by  the  universal  intellectual 

9  Idee  und  Gestalt,  83,  97^.,  xySff.  Essay  on  Man,  201  f. 
*ldee  and  Gestalt,  118,  338.,  1788.,  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  loc.  cit.,  Goethe 
und  die  geschichtlkhe  Welt,  (Berlin,  1932). 


636  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

postulate  of  unity  and  continuity."  All  forms  of  human  activity 
must  be  traced  back  "to  a  common  origin,"  must  be  imbedded 
in  their  "general  structural  principles."  A  philosophy  of  cul- 
ture involves  viewing  facts  "as  a  system,  as  an  organic  whole." 
Philosophy  must  hold  to  the  idea  of  invariance.5 

The  idea  of  a  leading  principle  requires  that,  in  some  sense, 
the  part  represents  the  whole.  The  specific  nature  of  Cassirer's 
problem,  however,  is  to  find  a  methodology  through  which  the 
part  would  represent  the  whole  and  by  which  it  would  in  turn 
be  represented  in  the  whole.  Stated  summarily,  his  method 
aims  at  discovering  principles  manifested  in  their  function  and 
form. 

SERIAL  ORDER  AS  FUNCTIONAL  STRUCTURE 

Cassirer's  term  for  this  principle  is  "serial  order"  ("Reihen- 
ordnung").  The  question  posed  is  not  what  characteristics  are 
common  to  various  elements,  but  what  are  the  conditions 
according  to  which  one  element  is  arranged  and  connected  with 
another  and  follows  from  it.  As  formulated  in  Die  Philoso^hie 
der  symbolischen  Formen: 

A  series  of  terms  a,  b,  c,  d,  .  .  .  are  to  be  perceived  as  "belonging" 
together,  are  to  be  connected  by  a  rule  on  the  basis  of  which  the 
"issuance"  of  the  one  from  the  other  can  be  determined  and  pre- 
dicted. .  .  .  The  elements  a,  b,  c,  d,  .  .  .  are  arranged  in  a  manner 
that  they  can  be  ...  regarded  as  terms  in  a  series  xi,  X2,  xs,  X4  .  .  . 
which  is  characterized  by  a  definite  "general  member."6 

The  most  elementary  sensory  plane  presents  structural  ele- 
ments, such  as  congruence  or  opposition,  similarity  or  dis- 
similarity. The  point  is  also  illustrated  by  the  phenomenon 
of  memory.  More  is  required  for  memory  than  mere  repetition 
of  former  events  and  impressions.  These  must  be  ordered  and 

8 Substance  and  Function,  (Chicago-London,  1923),  317,  3195  Essay  on  Man, 
68,  69,  172,  222.  Article  on  "Substance,"  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  i4th  ed., 
(1928),  vol.  XXVI. 

*The  principle  "stellt  ein  Neben-  und  Nach-Einander  auf,  das  fortschreitend 
in  ein  In-Einander  umgesetzt  werden  soil."  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen, 
Dritter  Teil,  (Berlin,  1929),  482. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE        637 

located  in  time.  "Such  a  location  is  not  possible  without  con- 
ceiving time  as  a  general  scheme — as  a  serial  order  which  com- 
prises all  the  individual  events."  What  is  sought  are  analogous 
correspondences  within  empirical  variations.  Both  Substance  and 
Function  and  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  emphasize 
that  the  whole  must  not  be  conceived  as  an  absolute  outside  of 
all  possible  experience.  "It  is  nothing  else  than  the  ordered 
totality  of  these  possible  experiences  themselves."7  Serial  order 
makes  for  a  philosophic  system  "in  which  each  separate  form 
gains  its  meaning  purely  by  the  position  which  it  occupies, 
where  its  content  and  import  are  marked  by  the  wealth  and  the 
individuality  of  relations  and  implications  through  which  it  is 
connected  with  other  human  forces,  and  finally  with  their 
totality."  The  analogous  "inner  form"  of  culture  lies  in  "the 
conditioning  principle  of  its  structure,"  in  which  the  individual 
relation  does  not  lose  its  uniqueness  by  its  interrelation  with 
other  human  energies.  This  produces  an  abiding  unity  of  basic 
patterns  (Grundgestalteri) .  The  very  relational  network  in 
which  separate  contents  of  consciousness  are  interwoven  contains 
a  reference  to  other  contents.  These  references  mean  that  there 
are  certain  forms  (Gebilde)  of  consciousness.  The  form- 
principle  which  finally  emerges  lies  above — but  not  beyond — 
the  material  forms  from  which  they  originally  stem. 

The  unity  thus  achieved  is  "a  functional  unity."  It  involves 
change  which  is  "directed  toward  constancy,  while  constancy 
reaches  consciousness  in  change"  Objectivity  is  determined 
functionally,  that  is  in  "the  manner  and  form  of  its  objectifica- 
tion."  The  "thing  in  itself"  apart  from  its  function  is  a  false 
problem.  The  life  of  Reality  is  constituted  by  the  manifold 
fullness  of  human  forms  which  has  the  stamp  of  functional  ob- 
jectivity. The  problem  of  Reality  issues  into  a  phenomenology 
of  human  culture.8 

Cassirer's  functional  unity  is  not  one  of  specific  materials  >  of 
products  or  effects.  It  involves  a  concept  of  causality  which,  in 

T  Ibid.9  494  >  Essay  on  Man,  51  j  Substance  and  Function,  292. 
*  Philosofhie  der  syntbolischen  Formen,  Erster  Teil,  (Berlin,  1923),  14,  12, 
4 iff.,  47-8.  Dritter  Teil,   19.  Essay  on  Man,  52 


638  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

contrast  to  the  mechanistic  and  teleologic,  probes  "the  creative 
process"  itself.  From  this  approach,  the  "distinguishing  mark" 
of  man  "is  not  his  metaphysical  or  physical  nature — but  his 
work. ...  It  is  the  system  of  human  activities  which  defines  and 
determines  the  circle  of  'humanity'."  Cassirer's  philosophy 
transforms  substance  into  function  and  essence  into  relation. 
The  creative  value  in  the  method  of  functional  structure 
lies  in  that  it  permits  us  not  only  to  maintain  order  in  the  rela- 
tionship of  the  "real"  with  the  "real,"  but  to  pass  from  the 
"real"  to  the  "possible."  It  enables  us,  for  example,  to  foresee 
what  color-nuance  belongs  to  a  given  series  of  colors,  even  if 
we  never  experienced  it  before.  Cassirer  cites  the  scheme  of 
Heinrich  Wolfflin  as  a  structural  view  in  the  history  of  art. 
From  his  study  of  different  art-modes,  Wolfflin  derived  the 
categories  of  "Classic"  and  "Baroque."  These  terms  do  not 
simply  describe,  nor  are  they  exhausted  by  particular  historical 
periods,  but  designate  general  structural  patterns.  Wolfflin 
naturally  refers  to  the  works  of  Raphael,  Titian,  Rembrandt 
and  Velasquez  j  yet,  what  he  analyzes  is  "the  schema"  which 
their  works  embody.  It  follows  from  Cassirer's  stress  on  the 
creative  process  of  man's  work  that  reality  can  never  be  ex- 
hausted. In  the  spirit  of  Hermann  Cohen's  notion  of  an 
"unendliche  Aujgabe?  it  is  a  question  of  "an  ever  progressive 
process  of  determination."9  It  is  here  that  the  historical  method 
emerges  as  an  integral  aspect  of  Cassirer's  functional  approach. 

HISTORICAL  PROCESS  AND  FREEDOM 

Cassirer's  historical  procedure  is  based  on  an  idealistic  orienta- 
tion translated  into  the  constructive  act.  Basing  himself  on  neo- 
Kantian  epistemology,  Cassirer  holds  that  forms  of  culture, 
from  language  to  art,  do  not  refer  to  physical  objects,  but  are 
expressions  of  human  feelings  and  concepts.  The  latter  have  a 

*  Essay  on  Man,  71,  70,  68,  69.  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Dritter 
Tell,  496.  Here,  Cassirer  opposes  Hume  on  the  basis  of  a  relational  and  Gestalt- 
psychology.  In  a  similar  way,  he  analyzes  the  Theory  of  Relativity  as  functional 
objectivity.  Ibid,  55 iff.  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen,,  Erster  Teil,  22. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE        639 

productive  and  constructive  function,  and  must  be  studied,  not 
simply  in  their  final  products,  but  in  their  process.  Instead  of 
viewing  concepts  in  their  static  completed  form,  "we  want  to, 
so  to  speak,  grasp  them  in  statu  nascendi."  Historical  process  is 
the  vehicle  through  which  the  creative-dynamic  and  functional- 
dialectic  nature  of  man's  world  becomes  concretized  in  time.  It  is 
not  simply  a  review,  but  a  construction  or  a  "prophecy  of  the 
past."  Symbolic  reality  itself  requires  "symbolic  reconstruc- 
tion." Because  its  subject  matter  is  human  life  and  culture, 
history  is  not  an  exact  science,  and  its  "last  and  decisive  act  is 
always  an  act  of  the  imagination."10  Genuine  historical  time  is 
not  biological,  as  Bergson  thought,  but  involves  an  act  of  will 
as  well  as  a  contemplative  moment.  Cassirer  also  opposes 
Nietzsche's  argument  that  the  study  of  history  enfeebles  our 
activistic  powers.  Rightly  employed,  history  "strengthens!  our 
responsibility  with  regard  to  the  future."  We  study  the  past, 
not  in  order  to  escape  into  a  lost  paradise.  On  the  contrary,  "only 
to  the  extent  the  human  mind  .  .  .  develops  in  a  futuristic 
direction  can  it  find  itself  in  the  framework  of  the  past."  As 
Goethe  puts  it,  genuine  longing  must  here  too  be  'productive:' 
It  should  seek  out  the  past  "in  order  to  grasp  and  view  it  as 
a  symbol  of  the  lasting  and  enduring."11  The.  study  of  history 
is  determined  by  our  futuristic  perspective.  Cassirer's  own 
analysis  of  the  historical  connection  between  Logos,  Dike  and 
Kosmos  in  Greek  philosophy  is  motivated  by  "anxiety  over  our 
human  freedom.  We  know  that  (our)  future  is  most  heavily 
endangered  unless  we  succeed  to  link  truth  and  justice,  Logos 
and  Dike  in  the  same  way  as  the  Greeks  linked  them  in  the 
history  of  man."  Historical  form  involves  the  element  of 
freedom. 

This  element  prevents  history  from  being  an  exact  science. 
Yet,  it  is  not  therefore  subjective  idiosyncrasy.  It  is  not  ego- 

10  Essay  on  Man,  131,  178,  177,  191,  69,  204.  Logos  Dike  Kosmos,  4. 

11  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Dritter  Teil,   21  of.,   218.  Freiheit 
und  Form,  5755  Essay  on  Man,  179.  See  also  Wissenschaft,  Bildung,  Weltans- 
chauung,  (1928),   30,  quoted  in  Philosophy  and  History,  Essays  presented  to 
Ernst  Cassirer,  (Oxford,  1936),  141-42. 


640  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

centric,  but  anthropomorphic.  The  rules  which  bind  the  scien- 
tist hold  for  the  historian  as  well.  History  too  has  "a  general 
structural  scheme"  by  means  of  which  it  can  classify,  order,  and 
organize  disconnected  facts.  What  history  aims  at  is  an  "objec- 
tive anthropomorphism." 

The  historical  method  which  Cassirer  uses  in  his  analysis  of 
art  and  other  cultural  activities  follows  from  his  general  func- 
tional approach.  History  is  the  form  in  which  the  laws  of 
human  behaviour  are  enacted  by  way  of  symbolic  construction 
and  reinterpretation.  To  know  the  whole,  we  must  present  it  in 
its  functional  acts.  Conversely,  the  parts  represent  the  whole. 
This  is  the  character  assumed  by  the  "natural"  symbolism  of 


consciousness.12 


THE  DIALECTIC  OF  FUNCTIONAL  STRUCTURE 

Cassirer's  historical  procedure  contains  the  dialectic  notion 
that  all  creative  effort  contributes  towards  the  dynamic  process 
of  reality  by  its  very  dramatic  location  in  that  process.  Cassirer 
agrees  with  Whitehead  in  opposing  the  method  of  "simple  loca- 
tion." Older  methods  are  not  to  be  eliminated,  but  referred 
to  "a  new  intellectual  center."  He  sees  no  either-or  between 
the  descriptive  and  the  exact  procedures,  but  would  relate  both 
to  two  different  aspects  of  a  general  problem.  Nor  would  he 
choose  among  the  psychological,  sociologic  and  historic  meth- 
ods, between  the  proponents  of  Van  pour  I* art  and  the  opposing 
method  of  I.  A.  Richards.  Likewise,  he  rejects  the  theory  of 
Windelband  and  Rickert  that  history  is  a  logic  of  individuals, 
whereas  natural  science  is  a  logic  of  universals.  Cassirer  points 
out  that  "thought  is  always  universal,"  and  that  a  judgment 
also  contains  an  element  of  particularity.  Where  others  see 
irresolvable  antinomies,  Cassirer  seeks  the  plane  from  which 
they  may  be  viewed  as  partial  aspects  of  a  more  inclusive  whole. 
"It  is  characteristic  of  the  nature  of  man  that  he  is  not  limited  to 
one  specific  and  single  approach  to  reality  but  can  choose  his 
point  of  view  and  so  pass  from  one  aspect  to  another."  Thereby, 

**  Logos  Dike  Kosmos,  235  Essay  on  Man,  69,  191.  PMlosophie  der  $ym- 
bolischen  Formen,  Erster  Tcil,  43. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE        641 

the  general  and  the  particular,  content  and  form,  element  and 
relation  become  reciprocal  correlates.  Such  union  of  the  typical 
with  the  specific  provides  "a  kind  of  grammar  of  the  symbolic 
function  as  such."13  The  point  is  bound  up  with  Cassirer's 
concept  of  "theory." 

In  Substance  and  Function,  the  form  of  knowledge  was  seen 
as  identical  with  that  of  the  exact  sciences.  Philoso'phie  der 
symbolischen  Formen  enlarges  the  concept  of  "theory"  to 
show  that  genuine  theoretical  forms  and  motivations  also  ob- 
tain for  the  world  of  perception.  Yet,  even  the  earlier  work 
draws  a  distinction  between  the  universality  obtained  in  mathe- 
matics and  mathematical  physics  and  that  gained  in  fields 
where  perception  enters.  The  former  uses  an  abstractive  pro- 
cedure, "selecting  from  a  plurality  of  objects  only  the  similar 
properties  and  neglecting  the  rest."  Herein  lies  its  limitation. 
"Through  this  sort  of  reduction,  what  is  merely  a  $art  has 
taken  the  place  of  the  original  sensuous  whole.  This  part, 
however,  claims  to  characterize  and  explain  the  whole."  Selec- 
tion, on  the  basis  of  the  similarity-principle,  is  one-sided,  for 
it  disregards  "things  and  their  properties."  Thus,  in  passing 
from  the  particular  to  the  universal,  we  reach  "the  paradoxical 
result  .  .  .  that  all  the  logical  labor  which  we  apply  to  a  given 
sensuous  intuition  serves  only  to  separate  us  more  and  more 
from  it."  For  this  reason,  modern  logic  opposes  abstract  uni- 
versality by  concrete  universality  as  in  the  logic  of  the  mathe- 
matical concept  of  function.  And,  even  though  this  form  of 
logic  is  not  confined  to  mathematics,  but  is  applicable  to  other 
fields,  a  distinction  remains  between  the  space  of  sense-percep- 
tion and  the  space  of  geometry.  In  the  former,  space-differentia- 
tion is  connected  with  the  content  of  sensation.  This  is  not  the 
case  in  geometrical  space.  Here,  "the  principle  of  absolute 
homogeneity  of  spatial  points  denies  all  differences,  like  the 
difference  of  above  and  below,  which  concern  only  the  relation 
of  outer  things  to  bodies,  and  thus  belong  to  a  particular  em- 
pirically given  object."  The  logic  of  mathematics  and  of 
mathematical  physics  "forbids  any  .  .  .  identification  of  the 

18  Essay   on  Man,   50,    68,    50,    i66f.,    i86f.,    170.   Substance   and  Function, 
314.  Phttosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Erster  Teil,  18-19,  32. 


642  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

exact  and  the  descriptive  methods."  Here  lies  the  contrast  be- 
tween science  and  art.  Even  as  the  work  of  the  great  natural 
scientists  has  an  element  of  "spontaneity  and  productivity," 
their  particular  type  of  abstraction  impoverishes  reality.  Science 
is  concerned  with  the  uniformity  of  laws,  rather  than  with  the 
diversity  of  intuition,  with  conceptual  depth,  tracing  phenomena 
back  to  their  first  causes,  rather  than  with  visual,  audible,  and 
tactile  forms.14 

ART  AS  THE  DIALECTIC  OF  CONCRETE  TOTALITY 
Cassirer  regards  the  Platonic  dialogue  as  the  basic  intellectual 
form  of  all  dialectics.  And  he  pays  tribute  to  Hegel  as  the 
organizer  of  this  method.  But  he  sees  HegePs  limitation  in  that 
the  resolution  in  his  dialectic  issues  from  the  pure  movement  of 
thought,  and  in  that  it  pretends  to  be  final.  Hegel,  to  be  sure, 
did  speak  of  the  "concrete  universal,"  and  in  the  second  part 
of  his  Phenomenology,  his  Philosophy  of  History,  and  else-t 
where,  attempted  to  show  the  location  of  physical  and  individual 
existence  in  the  dialectic  scheme.  Yet,  Cassirer  regards  HegePs 
dialectic  as  moving  mainly  in  the  realm  of  the  speculative  idea. 
Furthermore,  in  its  pretense  at  exhaustive  "syntheses,"  it  vio- 
lates the  process  of  human  acts  and  feelings. 

Cassirer's  insistence  is  on  the  concreteness  and  materiality  of 
cultural  forms.  Traditional  metaphysical  dualisms  are  bridged 
insofar  as  it  can  be  shown  that  "the  pure  function  of  the  spiritual 
must  seek  its  concrete  fulfillment  in  the  physical,"  And,  it  is 
because  art  is  in  the  most  favorable  position  to  fulfill  this  task 
that  Cassirer  finds  in  it  the  richest  function  of  reality.  Cassirer's 
philosophy  itself  reaches  its  own  most  eloquent  expression  in 
his  discussion  of  art  and  literature.  Here  his  writing  is  at  its 
most  engaging  and  animated,  metaphor,  style,  and  imagery 
moving  in  rhythm  with  the  subject  discussed. 

Art  gives  us  "a  richer,  more  vivid  and  more  colorful  image 
of  reality"  than  science.15  This  is  so  because  artists  and  writers 

14  Philosofhle  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Dritter  Teil,  V.  Substance  and  Func- 
tion, 6,  1 6,  i8f.,  21,  105.  Essay  on  Man,  220,  169. 

15  Idee  und  Gestalt,  io8f.,  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  Erster  Teil, 
19.  Essay  on  Man,  170,  207. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE        643 

replace  an  abstract-conceptual  dialectic  by  the  material-content- 
ual  dialectic.  Furthermore,  they  are  nearer  to  reality  in  that  they 
do  not  pretend  to  offer  a  final  resolution  of  conflict,  but  present 
this  conflict  practically  in  its  entire  depth.  On  this  account, 
Cassirer  pays  tribute  to  Holderlin's  "dialectic  of  feeling," 
Kleist's  "dramatic  dialectic"  which  issues  from  forms  and  char- 
acters, rather  than  from  tendencies  and  ideas.  Whereas  other 
forms  of  symbolic  activity  combine  the  universal  with  the  par- 
ticular, art  comes  nearest  to  this  goal  because  it  communicates 
through  an  immanent  symbolism.  Its  immanence  appears  two- 
fold: every  work  of  art  has  specific  individuality,  and  it  has 
sensuous  form.  This  holds  not  alone  for  the  arts  which  manipu- 
late materials  (architecture,  sculpture,  painting,  etc.),  but  also 
for  poetry  and  music  which  work  in  a  sensuous  medium,  in 
images,  sounds,  rhythms.  For  Cassirer,  the  mode  and  design 
are  "necessary  moments  of  the  productive  process  itself."  An 
artist  does  not  merely  "feel"j  he  must  externalize  what  he 
feels  and  imagines  in  visible,  audible,  or  tangible  embodiment. 
He  works  not  simply  "in  a  particular  medium — in  clay,  bronze, 
or  marble — but  in  sensuous  forms,  in  rhythms,  in  color  pat- 
terns, in  lines  and  design,  in  plastic  shapes.  .  .  .  Free  from  all 
mystery,  they  are  patent  and  unconcealed."  Shakespeare  illus- 
trated this  aspect  of  poetic  imagination  in  Midsummer  Night's 
Dream: 

And,  as  imagination  bodies  forth 
The  forms  of  things  unknown,  the  poet's  pen 
Turns  them  to  shapes,  and  gives  to  airy  nothing 
A  local  habitation  and  a  name. 

In  that  the  realists  of  the  nineteenth  century  concentrated  on 
"the  material  aspect  of  things,"  they  had  a  "keener  insight  into 
the  art  process  than  their  romantic  adversaries."  Likewise, 
Croce  errs  in  minimizing  the  material  factor  as  having  only 
technical,  not  aesthetic  importance.16 

The  concept  of  "form"  is  central  to  Cassirer's  scheme.  And, 
in  character  with  the  nature  of  his  philosophy,  the  term  itself 

und  Gestalt,  155,  aot.  Essay  on  Man,  207,  170,  141!.,  154,  157,  153. 


644  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

appears  in  varying  functional  imports.  We  can  distinguish  four 
different  and  overlapping  meanings: 

1.  Form  as  material  embodiment. 

2.  Form  as  organized  construction. 

3.  Form  as  imaginative  reconstruction  and  transcendence. 

4.  Form  as  Law,  or  as  the  unifying  functional  principle 
among  different  phenomena. 

Cassirer's  high  evaluation  of  art  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it 
combines  these  various  aspects  of  form.  We  have  already  spoken 
of  the  art-form  as  material  embodiment.  But  art  is  more  than 
material  form:  it  organizes  and  shapes  this  material.  It  is  not 
simply  an  "imitation"  of  reality,  as  the  naturalists  claim,  and 
it  is  more  than  emotional  "expression,"  as  Croce  and  Romantic 
theorists  argue.  It  expresses  emotion  in  a  disciplined  way  and 
through  an  act  of  construction.  Yet,  this  act  of  construction 
does  not  render  art  subjective.  Great  works  of  art  "reveal  a 
deep  unity  and  continuity"  which  reside  in  their  structural  unity 
by  which  they  organize  and  reconstruct  experience.  The  process 
of  selection  is  also  a  process  of  objectification. 

Law  in  art-form  does  not  preclude  but  contains  the  element 
of  transcendence  or  freedom.  As  the  most  anthropomorphic  of 
cultural  pursuits,  art  possesses  a  teleologic  structure,  and  ex- 
presses "an  activity  of  the  mind."  This  activity  does  not  re- 
ceive sense  impressions  passively,  but  gives  them  a  dynamic 
life  of  forms.  The  symbolic  nature  of  art  moves  it  beyond 
mere  expression  and  mere  representation  towards  "an  intensifi- 
cation of  reality."  Whereas  art  conforms  to  the  same  funda- 
mental task  as  other  forms  of  culture,  unlike  science,  it  does  not 
eliminate  but  intensifies  the  personal  and  the  individual  ele- 
ment. Art-forms  are  specific,  but  not  static.  Their  concretion  is 
a  continuous  process  revealing  a  mobile  order  which  is  the 
dynamic  process  of  life  itself.  "Pregnant  with  infinite  possi- 
bilities which  remain  unrealized  in  ordinary  sense  experience," 
they  transform  our  passions  into  "a  free  and  active  state." 
Freedom  is  once  more  Cassirer's  final  value,  freedom  to  shape 
and  construct  human  life  in  accordance  with  the  limits  im- 
posed by  the  structural  forms  of  our  world.17 

*  Essay  on  Man,   151,    143,   i44f.,   149.  A  stimulating  view  of  art  along 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE         645 

The  functional  and  dialectic  aspect  of  art  also  appears  in 
genuine  aesthetic  experience.  Here  too  a  dialectic  relationship 
must  obtain  where  we  would  understand  a  work  of  art,  involv- 
ing an  element  of  empathy  and  a  ready  attitude  to  enter  into 
the  artist's  perspective.  It  is  not  simply  a  question  of  extracting 
"pleasure"  from  art,  as  the  hedonistic  theory  claims,  but  to 
gain  a  sense  of  freedom  through  absorption  in  dynamic  forms, 
and  in  turn  by  reconstructing  them  towards  new  emerging  func- 
tions. 

AESTHETIC  THEORY 

Cassirer's  category  of  function  appears  in  his  own  analysis 
and  demonstration  of  particular  materials.  That  is,  it  becomes 
more  completely  meaningful  in  its  own  concrete  functioning.  In 
the  field  of  art  and  literature,  his  studies  comprise  analyses  of 
aesthetic  theories,  examination  of  individual  critics  and  artists, 
and  consideration  of  specific  art-works.  Throughout,  Cassirer's 
principle  of  functional  objectivity  makes  itself  felt  through  the 
manner  in  which  the  general  thesis  appears  in  its  particular  form, 
and  the  central  argument  is  ever  felt  amidst  the  rich  multi- 
plicity of  detailed  historical  data. 

The  problem  set  in  Cassirer's  historical  account  of  aesthetic 
(as  well  as  philosophic  and  moral)  theories  is  to  show  their 
gradual  development  to  the  point  where  the  ideas  of  freedom 
and  form  appear  as  reciprocal  functions.18  Before  Kant,  Cassirer 
points  out,  German  aesthetics  (Gottsched,  Bodmer,  Breitinger) 
was  dominated  by  rationalistic  categories.  Alexander  Baum- 
garten's  Aesthetka  does  distinguish  between  the  logic  of  the 
imagination  and  the  logic  of  reason,  but  relegates  the  former  to 
a  lower  plane.  The  aesthetic  is  conceived  as  the  lowest  logical, 
not  as  an  extra-logical  function.  The  notion  of  form  dominant 
here  and  in  the  Italian  and  French  neo-classicists  is  a  form  of 

similar  lines  is  offered  by  G.  Kepes  in  Language  of  Vision,  (Chicago,  1944),  iaff. 
"The  experience  of  an  image  is  ...  a  creative  act  of  integration.  .  .  .  Here  is 
a  basic  discipline  of  forming,  that 'is,  thinking  in  terms  of  structure.  .  .  .  This 
new  language  can  and  will  enable  the  human  sensibility  to  perceive  space-time 
relationships  never  recognized  before.  .  .  .  Visual  language  .  .  .  must  absorb  the 
dynamic  idioms  of  the  visual  imagery,  to  mobilize  the  creative  imagination  for 
positive  social  action,  and  direct  it  toward  positive  social  goals." 
"Particularly  in  Freihgit  und  Form,  loc.  cit. 


646  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

reason,  not  of  sensuous  matter.  Art  is  but  to  reproduce  the 
beautiful  in  nature,  leaving  no  room  for  freedom  or  for  the 
power  of  the  imagination.  The  romantic  theory,  on  the  other 
hand,  stressed  almost  exclusively  the  free  poetic  imagination 
as  the  clue  to  reality.  And  by  dissolving  the  distinction  between 
poetry  and  philosophy,  art  became  a  universal  product,  rather 
than  the  work  of  an  individual  artist.  By  this  emphasis  on  art 
as  a  symbolic  representation  of  the  infinite,  the  Romanticists 
left  no  place  for  the  finite  world  of  sense  experience.  Their 
universal  freedom  was  beyond  the  world  of  finite  and  deter- 
mined form. 

The  discussion  of  historical  aesthetic  movements  is  supple- 
mented by  analysis  of  specific  writers  on  aesthetics.  It  extends 
frohi  the  general  philosophic  and  aesthetic  examinations  of 
Shaftesbury,  Leibniz,  Kant,  Fichte,  Schelling,  Rousseau, 
Herder,  Hamann  and  Wincklemann  to  concrete  exemplifica- 
tion of  art-theory  in  the  drama  and  poetry  of  Lessing,  Holder- 
lin,  Schiller,  and,  above  all,  Goethe.  Everywhere,  Cassirer 
would  show  what  connects  and  what  distinguishes  the  various 
writers.  And  faithful  to  his  strategy,  he  employs  a  different 
method  in  each  case. 

In  Lessing,  Schiller  and  Goethe,  Cassirer  finds  the  nearest 
dialectic  fusion  of  freedom  and  form  in  German  classical  litera- 
ture, with  Kant  as  the  most  potent  stimulant.19  Lessing  held 
that  drama  must  be  examined  not  only  for  its  climax  and  con- 
clusion, but  for  the  law  of  its  construction.  Foreshadowing 
Kant,  Lessing  saw  in  the  freedom  of  creative  genius  the  source 
of  artistic  necessity.  The  genius  does  "freely"  what  objective 
formal  rules  demand.  And,  in  his  stress  that  action  is  the 
primal  ingredient  of  poetry,  Lessing  stated  the  objective  of 
art  itself  to  be  that  of  producing  inner  movement. 

19  Through  his  rejection  of  English  empiricism  with  its  doctrine  of  "receptivity,'* 
Shaftesbury  is  credited  with  providing  the  seeds  for  a  philosophic  aesthetic  which 
helped  shape  German  intellectual  history.  Following  English  Platonism  instead, 
Shaftesbury  sought  the  beautiful  not  in  the  rtalm  of  the  formed,  but  in  activity, 
in  the  creative  principle  of  forming.  ("The  Beautifying  not  the  BeautifyM  is 
the  really  Beautiful." — Shaftesbury).  Cf.  Cassirer's  Die  Platonische  Renaissance 
und  die  Schule  von  Cambridge,  (Leipzig,  Berlin,  1932),  niff.,  1381". 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE     .  647 

In  the  case  of  Schiller,  Cassirer  traces  his  development  from 
a  eudaemonistic  and  rationalistic  ideal  of  truth  to  the  point  where 
art  appears  as  autonomous,  not  as  a  means  to  truth  or  ethics. 
Through  Kant,  Schiller  came  to  realize  that  art  finds  its  form 
and  purpose  in  itself,  and  that  the  aesthetic  acts  as  a  mediator 
between  the  theoretic  and  practical  realms.  But,  whereas  Kant 
demands  or  postulates  this  mediation,  Schiller,  as  artist,  knows 
it  as  such.  Kant's  principles  become  "Triebe?*  for  Schiller.  He 
sees  the  tension  and  resolution  not  as  a  static  relation  of  concepts, 
but  as  a  dynamic  process.  It  is  precisely  here  that  Kant's  tran- 
scendental methd  begins  to  go  over  into  the  dialectic  method 
of  his  followers.  "In  setting  up  the  basic  opposition  between) 
stuff  and  form,  receptivity  and  spontaneity,  Kant  proceeds  as  a 
transcendental  analyst,  .  .  .  Schiller  as  dramatist."  Schiller's 
"Spieltrieb"  synthesizes  "Formtrieb"  and  "Stofftrieb"  which 
belong  to  the  realm  of  Ideas  without  however  leaving  the 
sensuous  world.  Beauty  for  him  is  "freedom  incarnate"  (Frei- 
heit  in  der  Erscheimmg).  The  analogy  between  the  genuine 
work  of  art  and  the  living  organic  form  lies  in  that  both  are 
determined  by  a  self-given  rule.  Herein  Schiller  reveals  the 
highest  degree  of  sensuous  dialectic  thought.20 

GOETHE 

Cassirer's  treatment  of  historical  personalities  and  theories 
is  such  that  at  times  one  feels  that  he  is  identifying  himself 
with  them.  This  flows  from  his  notion  that  the  past  is  to  be 
treated  as  a  living  force,  not  merely  effective  in  the  present, 
but  closely  interlocked  with  it.  Still,  Cassirer  does  distinguish 
between  greater  or  lesser  historic  truth  and  error,  validity  and 
limitation,  and  we  can  thereby  distinguish  Cassirer's  own  posi- 
tion from  those  he  presents.  In  one  instance,  however,  this 
distinction  almost  disappears.  It  is  in  Cassirer's  discussion  of 
Goethe  that  one  senses  something  like  complete  identification 
between  author  and  subject.  Indeed,  some  of  Cassirer's  very 
formulations  on  the  role  of  form  in  art  are  identical  with  those 

*  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  875  Freiheit  und  Form,  156,  4*i£F.j  Idee  und 
Gcstalt,  8 iff.,  90,  102. 


648  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

ascribed  by  him  to  Goethe.  Likewise,  Cassirer's  principle  of 
"serial  order"  appears  completely  illustrated  in  his  presenta- 
tion of  Goethe's  own  method  in  the  natural  sciences.  The  same 
holds  for  other  problems,  such  as  causation,  the  role  of 
hypotheses,  etc.21  Cassirer  is  here  at  one  with  the  German  tradi- 
tion, particularly  from  Nietzsche  to  Thomas  Mann,  which 
looks  to  Goethe  as  the  inspiring  prototype. 

Goethe  appears,  in  Cassirer's  studies,  as  the  highest  develop- 
ment in  the  historical  relation  between  form  and  freedom.22 
For  Schiller,  natural  law  is  in  conflict  with  the  idea  of  freedom 5 
for  Goethe,  it  is  in  harmony  with  nature.  Hence,  Schiller  regards 
the  ethical  imperative  of  freedom  as  the  most  inclusive  cate- 
gory. For  Goethe,  objective  existence  itself  provides  the  ma- 
terial for  freedom. 

Cassirer's  method  avoids  the  traditional  approach  to  Goethe 
in  terms  of  "phases"  and  "periods,"  which  gives  parts  instead 
of  a  whole.  The  problem  is  to  show  the  inner  unity  and  basic 
forms  of  Goethe's  life,  poetry,  drama,  science,  etc.,  "to  show 
how  the  same  law  operates  in  all  ...  that  they  are  various 
symbols  for  one  and  the  same  living  connection."  This  is 
the  method  Goethe  himself  employed  in  striving  to  find  a  cen- 
tral "pregnant  point."  Moreover,  appreciation  of  Goethe's 
work  requires  more  than  seizing  on  his  conclusions.  The  ap- 
proach must  be  functional:  the  results  are  to  be  shown  as  they 
were  arrived  at  through  the  concrete  process  of  his  life  and  art. 

It  was  Hellenic  art  which  helped  shape  the  substance  of 
Goethe's  thought.  It  taught  him  that  the  content  and  essence  of 
art  and  nature  are  analogous. 

Wie  Natur  im  Vielgebilde 
Einen  Gott  nur  offenbart, 
So  im  weiten  Kunstgebilde 
Webt  ein  Sinn  der  ew'gen  Art. 

From  then  on,  Goethe's  view  on  art  struggles  towards  the 
typical,  or  the  "Urbild"  This  type  is  not  a  fixed  schema,  but 
"a  norm  which  cannot  be  known  and  grasped  except  through 

*  Essay  on  Man,  140$  Freiheit  und  Form,  32iff.j  Idee  und  Gestalt,  48fL,  57!. 
**  Cassirer  sees  Greek  philosophy  and  tragedy  as  the  first  to  have  expressed  the 
connection  between  freedom  and  law.  Logos  Dike  Kosmos,  22. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE     ,  649 

the  regulated  changes  from  one  individual  structure  to  the 
next."  This  does  not  exclude  the  method  of  abstraction — a 
method  Goethe  did  not  reject,  but  use.  Yet,  Goethe's  abstractive 
method  does  not  detach  itself  from  individual  phenomena,  but 
presents  the  totality  in  all  of  its  combinations.  It  is  not  a  prag- 
matic norm,  for  it  seeks  the  structural  processes  in  which  various 
distinct  moments  interpenetrate.  Cassirer  gives  something  like 
a  restatement  of  his  own  logical  method  when  he  writes  that 
Goethe  leaned  towards  that  method  in  logic  in  which  a  law  is 
based  on  the  continuity  of  individual  parts — rather  than  of 
classes — ,  which  gives  a  series  bound  together  by  firm  princi- 
ples. He  calls  attention  to  Goethe's  term  "ultimate  phenom- 
enon" (Urfhanomen),  as  combining  the  Platonic  concept  of 
eternal  Ideas  with  the  notion  of  sensuous  "phenomena."  The 
Urphanomen  appears  in  a  dialectic  play  of  antitheses  (Polaritat 
and  Steigemng),  ultimately  reducible  to  the  basic  antithesis  of 
rest  and  motion.  Every  complete  poem  of  Goethe's  shows  this 
blending  of  motion  and  structure,  of  individuality  and  totality, 
of  freedom  and  form.  All  Being  finds  its  fulfillment  in  Becom- 
ing, and  there  is  no  Becoming  in  which  Being  is  not  present. 
In  that  we  think  of  the  two  (the  "simultaneous"  and  the  "suc- 
cessive") as  united,  we  reach  the  plane  of  the  "Idea." 

However,  only  the  direction  of  this  process,  not  its  goal,  is 
knowable.  The  essence  of  all  true  symbolism  lies  precisely  in 
that  here  the  particular  represents  the  general — not  as  a  dream 
and  shadow,  but  in  Goethe's  formulation  "as  a  living  and  im- 
mediate revelation  of  the  unfathomable."23  Here,  Goethe  is  at 
one  with  the  greatest  artists,  such  as  Leonardo  da  Vinci.  His  no- 
tion that  "the  beautiful  is  a  manifestation  of  secret  natural  laws 
which  would  be  eternally  hidden  from  us,  if  they  did  not  come 
into  concrete  appearance,"  is  altogether  in  Leonardo's  sense. 

This  reveals  Goethe's  relation  to  traditional  metaphysics.  In 
his  essay  "Goethe  und  Platon,"  Cassirer  points  out  that,  whereas 
in  Plato  becoming  was  the  limit  of  knowledge,  in  Goethe  it  is 
transformed  into  a  presupposition  and  a  form  of  knowledge.  As 

43 Idee  und  Gestalt,  137.  Freiheit  und  Form,  277-79,  3°7>  3IX>  327>  37^1 
412.  Cf.  the  essay,  "Goethe  and  the  Philosophic  Quest,"  by  Slochower,  H.,  in  the 
Germanic  Review,  vol.  VIII,  No.  3,  (July,  1933). 


650  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

an  artist,  he  saw  no  antinomy  between  idea  and  experience.  A 
work  of  art  demands  sensuous  concretion  of  the  Idea.  With 
Plato,  Goethe  also  saw  the  beautiful  as  an  expression  of  truth 
and  law.  But  for  him,  this  truth  cannot  be  measured  or  replaced 
by  another.  Its  truth  is  that  of  the  image,  the  highest  moment 
of  appearance.  Plato  rejected  art,  since  it  does  not  drive  from 
nature  to  the  Idea,  but  stays  at  the  reproduction  of  the  image. 
But  to  Goethe  art  was  the  realm  where  man  both  stays  aloof 
from  and  also  binds  himself  most  firmly  to  the  world.  In  it,  we 
are  no  longer  in  the  sphere  of  the  sensuous,  yet  still  stand 
within  the  periphery  of  the  perceptual.  It  is  the  real  mediator 
between  idea  and  appearance.24 

Goethe's  "corporeal"  {gegenstandlhhei)  thinking  is  again 
shown  in  Cassirer's  discussion  of  specific  works,  such  as  Pandora 
and  Faust.  His  analysis  of  Pandora  would  demonstrate  "how 
the  artistic  image  gradually  takes  on  the  stamp  of  the  idea  and 
the  idea  takes  on  the  stamp  of  the  image  and  the  sensation."  In 
contrast  to  Platonic  thinking  (to  which  this  poetic  drama  bears 
an  inner  relation),  the  idea  has  sensuous  form.  And  "form"  does 
not  pertain  to  a  transcendental  plane,  but  emerges  in  the  midst 
of  the  dynamics  of  life.  Yet,  the  final  truth  is  that  man  can 
never  grasp  the  realm  of  form.  His  real  formative  power  is  not 
in  the  contemplation  but  in  the  creation  of  form  which  gains  life 
and  reality  in  the  realm  of  action.  In  this  way,  Goethe  reconciles 
the  formless  world  of  action  (Prometheus)  and  the  inactive 
visionary  world  (Epimetheus).  The  same  point  appears  in 
Faust.  Helen's  veil  dissolves  in  Faust's  hands.  His  final  wisdom 
is  that  the  meaning  of  life  lies  in  human  co-operative  work.  His 
liberation  takes  place  not  in  the  world  of  beauty  but  in  that  of 
action.  The  highest  goal  lies  in  the  liberation  of  mankind.  "The 
world  of  freedom,"  Cassirer  concludes,  "arises  from  the  world 
of  form  ...  a  freedom  which  exists  only  in  that  it  continually 
becomes."  As  against  the  individualistic  idealism  of  German 
humanism,  we  have  here  a  new  social  ideal.25 

M  Individuum  und  Kosmos  in  der  Philosophic  der  Renaissance,  (Leipzig,  1927), 
1 68.  Goethe  und  die  geschichtliche  Welty  ii4f. 

w Idee  und  Gestalt,  n,  27.  Freiheit  und  Form,  415. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE     d  651 

One  of  Cassirer's  more  notable  contributions  are  his  essays 
on  Goethe's  scientific  studies.  He  does  not  agree  with  those  who 
dismiss  these  studies  as  poetic  fancies.  Following  Geoffroy  de 
St.  Hilaire,  Helmholtz  and  others,  Cassirer  regards  them  as 
containing  a  vital  contribution  to  methodology.  He  is  concerned 
with  showing  that  Goethe's  conflict  with  the  method  of  mathe- 
matical physics  is  not  merely  a  historical  phenomenon,  but  is 
permanently  relevant. 

To  begin  with,  Cassirer  would  establish  that  both  Goethe's 
method  and  that  of  the  mathematical  physicist  aim  at  finding 
"an  analogy  of  form."  In  his  studies  on  optics  and  morphology, 
Goethe  too  employs  the  idea  of  continuity  and  the  method  of 
genetic  construction.  He  also  recognizes  the  value  of  general 
formulation,  and  his  morphological  cognition  is  never  identified 
with  sensuous  particularity.  However,  beyond  this,  there  is  a 
differentiation  in  their  methods,  as  becomes  apparent  in  Goethe's 
controversy  with  Newton.  Newton's  theory  of  color  reduces 
differences  of  color  to  numerical  differences.  It  is  concerned 
with  the  general,  not  the  real  form  of  color.  Goethe  directs  his 
problem  to  the  world  of  vision,  rather  than  to  color.  He  too 
would  introduce  a  definite  principle}  yet,  he  would  not  reduce 
it  to  numbers  which  represent  things  merely  conceptually,  but  to 
a  principle  which  would  signify  and  be  this  order.  The  mathe- 
matical formula  aims  to  make  phenomena  calculable^  Goethe's 
principle  to  make  them  visible.  Actually  therefore,  the  two 
views  are  not  in  conflict.  Goethe  was  concerned  with  the  physi- 
ological, Newton  with  the  physical  aspect  of  color. 

Goethe's  scientific  studies  are  an  organic  mode  of  his  poetic 
productions  as  well.  Likewise,  there  is  an  analogy  between 
Goethe's  critique  of  eighteenth  century  science  and  of  eighteenth 
century  poetics.  He  condemns  Boileau's  philosophy  of  art  and 
Linne's  philosophy  of  botany  from  the  same  angle:  both 
slighted  particular  phenomena  in  their  quest  of  the  general. 

Goethe  was  persuaded  that  phenomena  themselves  were  the 
final  formula,  insofar  as  they  are  regarded  in  their  genetic 
connection  which  preserves  their  perceptual  quality.  The 
Urphanomen  is  Goethe's  "final"  principle  beyond  which  he  does 


652  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

not  try  to  penetrate  to  ask  for  its  "why."  The  nearest  equivalent 
for  the  Urphanomen  is  "life."  It  follows  that  this  principle  is 
not  a  final  solution  and  resolution,  but  only  a  final  and  highest 
problem.  Goethe  knew  only  one  way  in  which  this  problem  could 
be  "resolved":  practically,  in  the  realm  of  action.  He  avoids  the 
either-or  of  a  mystic-pantheistic  method  and  that  of  scientific 
abstraction.  Nor  does  he  urge  an  eclectic  reconciliation  of  the 
"middle  way"  between  the  two.  Instead,  Goethe  transforms  the 
problem  into  a  postulate  to  be  resolved  through  the  act.  Cassirer 
quotes  Goethe's  maxim:  "Theory  and  experience  stand  in  per- 
petual conflict.  All  unity  arrived  at  through  reflection  is  illusion , 
only  through  activity  can  they  be  united." 

The  value  of  Goethe  resides  in  his  significance  for  us.  "The 
problems  which  he  posed  live  among  us  and  await  decision:  we 
feel  them  to  be  our  problems."  Our  norm  in  approaching  Goethe 
should  not  be  in  terms  of  praise  and  celebration.  In  Goethe's 
words:  "The  true  celebration  of  the  genuine  man  is  the  act."26 

CRITIQUE 

Evaluation  of  Cassirer's  work  might  well  apply  the  func- 
tional method  to  "locate"  his  own  system.  Cassirer's  neo- 
Kantian  orientation  places  him  in  the  idealistic  "serial  order." 
His  notion  that  man  is  a  "symbolical  animal"  with  powers  of 
reconstruction  postulates  that  reality  is  basically  constituted  by 
thought.  This  confronts  us  with  a  number  of  problems  and 
ambiguities  in  Cassirer's  work. 

I.  The  stumbling  block  of  idealistic  systems  arises  from  their 
difficulty  in  being  able  (or,  more  precisely  unable)  to  account 
for  evil  and  error.  Despite  Cassirer's  modifications  of  tradi- 
tional idealism  through  his  concept  of  concrete  functional  ob- 
jectivity, his  analysis  is  heavily  weighted  towards  regarding 
all  historical  creativeness  as  retaining  validity  through  its  loca- 
tion and  order,  by  which  it  finally  contributes  to  the  whole. 
That  is,  Cassirer  tends  to  identify  history  with  value,  what  is 

M  Idee  and  Gestalt,  37,  44.  Goethe  und  die  geschichtliche  Welt,  121,  ggL 
Freihett  und  Form,  326.  Similarly,  Cassirer  writes  that  his  study  of  the  En- 
lightenment is  for  the  purpose  of  finding  "the  courage  to  compare  ourselves 
with  it  and  to  come  to  terms  with  it  inwardly  ...  to  free  the  original  forces 
which  produced  and  shaped  this  form."  Die  Philosofhie  der  Aufkldrungy 
(Tubingen,  1932),  xvi. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE         653 

with  what  is  good.  To  be  sure,  in  his  actual  analysis,  Cassirer's 
sensitive  discrimination  leads  him  to  occasional  criticism  and  re- 
jection.27 But  such  critique  is  infrequent  and  generally  tempered 
with  the  suggestion  that  even  a  narrow  perspective  contributed 
towards  an  evolving  truth.  Thus  there  arises  an  ambiguity  be- 
tween what  does  develop  and  what  should  develop.  Cassirer 
rarely  views  any  pattern  or  doctrine  as  in  basic  opposition  with 
another.  Cassirer's  dialectic  is,  in  the  main,  one  of  reconcilia- 
tion. Although  he  criticizes  the  logical  approach  to  art,  Cassirer 
credits  the  rationalistic  aesthetics  of  Leibniz  with  containing  ele- 
ments which  were  later  developed  in  the  notion  of  the  manifold 
in  art.  In  reviewing  the  relation  of  Heraclitus  to  Parmenides, 
Cassirer  focuses  on  the  fact  that  they  meet  in  centering  on 
Logos  and  Dike.  The  discussion  of  Goethe  and  Plato  begins 
by  contrasting  Goethe's  conception  of  truth  in  terms  of  the 
image  and  Plato's  notion  of  truth  as  a  pure  Idea.  Yet,  Cassirer 
notes  that  Plato  also  had  recourse  to  the  images  of  the  sun  and 
the  cave  to  represent  the  Idea  of  the  Good  and  the  State,  and 
that,  in  his  later  dialogues,  Plato  taught  that  motion  and  be- 
coming penetrated  the  sphere  of  pure  Being.  A  similar  approach 
is  used  by  Cassirer  in  his  historical  analyses  of  science,  language, 
mythical  thought,  religion,  and  culture.  "Only  in  such  relations 
and  in  such  contrasts,"  Cassirer  concludes,  "does  truth  have  its 
concrete  historical  being. . .  .  Whoever  grasps  history  intellectu- 
ally and  the  intellectual  historically  hears  everywhere  this 
solemn-friendly  sound  of  the  bell — and  it  becomes  a  consoling 
bass-sound  which  assures  the  inner  harmony  of  ...  world  history 
in  all  its  chaotic  entanglement  of  outer  happenings."28 

2.  Cassirer's  dynamic  concept  of  the  dialectic  clearly  tran- 
scends his  Kantian  heritage.  It  also  does  greater  justice  to  the 
material  aspect  than  does  Hegel's  dialectic.  Cassirer's  functional 
methodology  provides  a  general  lever  for  examining  the  social 
along  with  the  intellectual  conditions  for  the  conception  and  the 

2T  Some  of  these  have  been  noted  earlier.  Cassirer  also  speaks  of  Hellenic 
influence  as  having  endangered  the  development  of  the  dynamic  form-concept. 
He  criticizes  Tolstoy's  suppression  of  form  in  art,  and  rejects  deterministic  theories 
as  "full  of  metaphysical  fallacies."  Essay  on  Man,  i4if.,  147,  192$, 

28  Logos  Dike  Kosmos,  n.  Goethe  und  die  Geschichtliche  Welt,  124.1"., 
148. 


654  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

reception  of  culture.  Yet,  the  material  aspect  which  Cassirer 
stresses  is  generally  restricted  to  material  form  which  art  and 
other  cultural  expressions  manipulate.  He  does  view  art  as  part 
of  life  and  sees  in  "work"  man's  outstanding  characteristic.  But, 
in  his  specific  analyses,  "life"  and  "work"  are  considered  mainly 
apart  from  social  "life"  and  "work."29  Similarly,  Cassirer's  gen- 
eral formulations  recognize  the  reciprocal  relationship  between 
the  subjective  and  objective  factors.  What  becomes  of  the 
beams  which  philosophic  ideas  send  out,  he  writes,  "depends  not 
only  on  the  character  of  the  source  of  light,  but  also  on  the 
mirror  they  encounter  and  in  which  they  are  reflected."  Yet, 
Cassirer  examines  this  source  and  mirror  primarily  in  their 
intellectual  and  formal  nature.  His  study  of  the  Enlighten- 
ment aims  to  show  the  connection  between  its  philosophy  and 
its  science,  history,  law,  and  politics.  But,  to  Cassirer,  it  is  phi- 
losophy which  provides  the  "living  breath,  the  atmosphere  in 
which  alone  they  can  exist  and  function."  Throughout  his 
analyses,  the  conditions  for  "influence"  are  considered  in  terms 
of  the  "geistigeP  situation.  Questions  such  as  why  Goethe,  Schil- 
ler, and  others  were  ignored  in  certain  periods,  despite  their 
stature,  are  not  raised.  Cassirer  does  not  analyze  the  social  ref- 
erence to  revolutionary  innovations  in  art  and  literature  which 
condition  their  acceptance  or  nonacceptance,  the  specific  accents 
in  their  development  and  related  features.  His  discussion  of 
Lessing,  Schiller,  Goethe,  and  others  focuses  on  their  formal  or 
humanistic  dialectic.  He  is  less  concerned  with  their  rebellious 
social  roles.  Perhaps  this  predilection  explains  why  Cassirer 
steers  clear  of  the  great  literary  rebels  of  the  igth  century.80 

*  However,  some  passing  references  should  be  noted.  Cassirer  speaks  of  the 
"narrowness  of  German  life"  which  determined  the  rationalistic  view  of  art. 
Language  is  said  to  have  also  "a  social  task  which  depends  on  the  specific  social 
conditions  of  the  speaking  community."  Likewise,  the  classification  of  its  idioms 
is  dictated  by  needs  which  "vary  according  to  the  different  conditions  of  man's 
social  and  cultural  life."  In  discussing  Diderot,  Cassirer  writes  that  his  thought 
"moves  within  and  is  bound  up  with  a  specific  social  order  ...  the  atmosphere 
of  the  Paris  salons."  See  Freihett  und  Form,  1031".,  aiyf.  Essay  on  Man,  128, 
136,  178.  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  8. 

80  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  98.  PMlosophie  der  Aufklarung,  x.  Yet,  Cassirer's 
orientation  must  be  distinguished  from  that  of  Wilhelm  Dilthey,  to  whom  some 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE     ,  655 

3.  If  Cassirer  slights  the  role  of  social  materials,  he  all  but 
ignores  the  weight  of  personal  psychic  elements.  This  is  par- 
ticularly striking  in  his  study  of  Kleist,  whose  personality  and 
work  are  a  clear  expression  of  unconscious  motivation  and  psy- 
chological estrangement.  Cassirer  would  prove  that  Kleist's  so- 
called  "Kant-upheaval"  was  due,  not  to  Kant,  but  to  Fichte's 
Vocation  of  Man  and  to  its  doctrine  of  the  subjectivity  of  per- 
ception. He  demonstrates  that  Kleist's  plaint  over  the  relativity 
of  knowledge  could  not  have  its  source  in  Kant's  transcendental 
idealism,  which  proved  the  validity  of  experience  as  against 
Berkeley's  psychological  idealism.  Cassirer  argues  further  that, 
through  Kant,  Kleist  was  induced  to  abandon  his  monistic  tele- 
ology. Yet,  whereas  this  shift  produced  an  intellectual  up- 
heaval in  Kleist,  it  also  made  for  a  profounder  objectivity  in 
his  art.  Finally,  the  disciplinary  impact  of  Kant's  ethics  appears 
in  Kleist's  last  years  in  his  drama  "The  Prince  of  Homburg." 
Now,  shortly  afterwards,  Kleist  committed  suicide.  Yet,  Cas- 
sirer's  study  does  not  contain  a  single  reference  to  this  act,  nor 
to  the  inner  motives  which  were  driving  Kleist  towards  his 
tragic  end  at  the  very  stage  when  he  appeared  to  have  found  an 
intellectual  center  in  Kant's  ethics.  Cassirer  merely  writes  of  the 
"immediate  living  force"  which  Kant  exerted  on  Kleist,  and 
notes  that  Kleist's  nature  was  averse  to  compromise.  There  is  no 
examination  of  Kleist's  social  context,  involving  factors  such  as 
his  equivocal  societal  location  as  a  member  of  a  pauperized 
nobility  in  the  era  of  the  Stein-Hardenberg  reforms,  nor  of  his 
psychological  dilemmas,  the  great  attraction  for  his  sister  Ulrike 

have  linked  him.  Dilthey  saw  the  greatest  task  of  the  historian  and  artist  in 
"understanding"  and  "reliving"  experience.  Although  requiring  passionate 
immersion  into  inner  experiences,  his  "Verstehen"  and  "Erlebnis"  were  essen- 
tially a  pious  non-reactive  homage  to  historical  "lived  experience."  Hence 
Dilthey's  prototypes  were  the  German  Romanticists,  such  as  Novalis  and 
Schleiermacher.  Cassirer's  concept  of  the  historian  and  artist  has  a  much  more 
active  and  reactive  tenor.  His  approach  to  the  Romanticists  is  more  critical,  and  he 
identifies  himself  most  readily  with  writers  preceding  and  following  the  Ro- 
manticists, with  Shakespeare,  Lessing,  Schiller,  and  Goethe,  who  viewed  art 
and  the  genius  in  terms  of  their  recreative,  not  merely  relived,  capacities.  See 
Wilhelm  Dilthey's  Das  Erlebnis  und  die  Dichtung,  loth  ed.  (Leipzig  and  Berlin, 
1924),  Cf.  H.  A.  Hodges'  Wilkelm  Dilthey.  An  Introduction,  (N.Y.,  1944). 


656  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

and  for  men-friends,  evidence  of  sublimation  and  compulsion  in 
the  relation  to  his  bride, — all  of  these  factors  which  enter  into 
the  pattern  comprising  Kleist's  complex  emotional  reaction  to 
Kant,  Rousseau  and  Fichte,  and  his  final  suicide. 

In  his  study  of  Rousseau  and  Kant,  Cassirer  similarly  confines 
himself  to  speaking  of  Rousseau's  "fundamental  trait,"  of  the 
turmoil  in  the  man  who  was  "always  fleeing  from  himself." 
Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  is  termed  "the  man  of  the  clock," 
whose  "being"  was  guided  by  order  and  law.  Cassirer's  whole 
point  in  drawing  the  contrast  in  their  personalities  is  to  indicate 
that  Kant's  attraction  for  Rousseau's  ideas  can  not  be  accounted 
for  on  the  basis  of  their  individual  structures,  but  that  the  in- 
fluence was  of  an  intellectual  and  moral  nature.  It  was  in  these 
spheres  that  they  met  "at  some  profound  stratum  of  their 
beings."31 

Although  Cassirer  places  the  "symbol"  into  the  center  of 
human  activity,  the  term  is  used  solely  in  an  honorific  sense. 
Its  imaginative  transcendence  is  seen  only  as  good  transcend- 
ence. It  stands  in  overlapping  harmony  with,  never  in  opposi- 
tion to  other  elements.  Metaphorical  expression  is  analyzed  to 
the  extent  that  it  is  more  than  the  object  referred  to,  but  not  in 
terms  of  its  conflicting  variations.  The  dissociative  and  opposi- 
tional  disparity  in  the  relation  between  art  and  society  is  ignored, 
as  is  the  complex  interplay  between  public  demands  and  private 
desires  within  the  individual.  In  short,  the  whole  problem  of 
psycho-social  alienation  falls  outside  the  framework  of  Cassirer's 
investigations.32  This  introduces  a  troubling  problem  for  Cas- 
sirer's  category  of  freedom.  Freedom  in  Cassirer's  work  lies  in 
creative  reconstruction  and  in  the  preservation  of  the  individual- 
concrete  form  within  the  presentation  of  the  universal.  Hence 
his  high  elevation  of  art,  which  can  fulfill  this  task  most  ade- 
quately. He  does  not  press  towards  the  question  of  the  realistic 
conditions  which  can  offer  the  widest  possibilities  for  art  to  exer- 
cise this  ideal  function.  Cassirer  blurs  the  adverse  situation  (in 

81  Idee  und  Gestalt,  164-188.  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe,  3,  56,  4,  57. 
"Compare  the  chapter  on  Marx  and  Freud  in  Harry  Slochower's  No  Voice 
Is  Wholly  Lost.  Writers  and  Thinkers  in  War  and  Peace,  (N.Y.,  1945). 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE     j  £57 

its  personal  and  public  forms)  from  which  man  migbt  free  him- 
self. By  slighting  the  factor  of  conflict,  Cassirer's  concept  of 
freedom  loses  much  of  its  own  functional  import.88 

However,  Cassirer's  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  per- 
spectives not  only  mark  the  limits  of  his  approach.  They  also 
make  possible  his  distinctive  contributions.  The  pyscho-social 
function  which  Cassirer  neglects  is  today  provided,  and  some- 
times over-provided.  On  the  other  hand,  such  analyses  often 
lose  sight  of  the  broader  intellectual  and  aesthetic  forms.  Here, 
Cassirer's  work  offers  a  much-needed  corrective.  His  very  classi- 
cal standards  separate  him  from  the  secessionist  vogue  of  our 
time.  The  era  of  "division  of  labor"  has  developed  split  and  com- 
partmentalized motivations  in  which  man  appears  separated 
from  tradition,  divided  within  himself,  and  lacking  the  basis  for 
integrating  the  new  complexities.  Cassirer  is  not  altogether  un- 
aware of  such  disturbances,  as  shown  in  his  analysis  of  psychical 
disturbances  in  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Yet,  he 
is  persuaded  that  men  live  in  a  common  world  and  respond  simi- 
larly to  similar  conditions.  Cassirer's  thinking  in  terms  of  or- 
ganic centers  is  a  wholesome  antidote  to  the  divisionism  in  the 
critical  fashion  which  would  analyze  art  simply  in  terms  of 
"form,"  where  form  is  divorced  from  content  and  historical 
motivation.  Here  technical  factors,  such  as  plasticity,  line,  color, 
relief,  are  viewed  as  things  in  themselves,  detached  from  subject 
matter  and  the  artist's  creative  imagination.  This  has  resulted  in 
the  phenomenon  which  Toynbee  has  called  "etherealization." 
A  similar  emphasis  violates  denotation  in  art  in  the  interests  of 
maximum  connotation.  To  be  sure,  all  art  is  connotative  insofar 
as  it  has  general  import.  But  art  differs  from  philosophy  and 
science  in  that  it  aims  at  maximum  denotation,  which  it  is  in  a 
position  to  approximate  because  of  the  particularity  and  sensu- 
ousness  of  its  material.  Cassirer Js  functional  objectivity  offers  a 
welcome  alternative  to  such  unreal  dilemmas. 

Another  signal  value  is  the  crucial  weight  Cassirer  places  on 
process  and  form.  One  of  the  melancholy  aspects  of  much  art- 

88  Relevant  to  this  point  is  Helmut  Kuhn's  criticism  of  Cassirer  in  The  Journal 
of  Philosophy r,  vol.  XLII,  no.  18,  (August  30,  1945). 


658  HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

criticism  is  its  focus  on  the  "what,"  "the  point  of  view,"  or  "pur- 
pose" of  the  artist.  It  seeks  out  a  writer's  "conclusion"  and 
praises  or  condemns  him  on  that  score.  This  method  blurs  the 
distinction  between  an  essay  and  a  painting,  between  a  logical 
exposition  and  a  musical  motif  to  the  extent  that  it  singles  out 
what  they  "stand"  for.  This  procedure  obviously  violates  the 
specific  character  of  the  material.  Moreover,  it  contains  a  fal- 
lacious assumption  as  to  what  constitutes  "conclusions"  in  art. 
The  "message"  is  identified  with  the  moral  exhortations  of  the 
"good"  characters  and  the  fate  which  overcomes  the  "sinners." 
This  type  of  analysis  leaves  out  almost  everything  that  is  pe- 
culiarly relevant  to  a  work  of  art,  which  makes  its  "point"  by 
way  of  imagery,  metaphor,  irony  and,  above  all,  the  dramatic 
process.  Cassirer's  functional  approach  shows  that  to  get  at  the 
artist's  "what"  we  must  enter  into  his  "how,"  that  its  whole 
meaning  lies  precisely  in  the  manifold  of  its  form.  Examining 
art  from  this  angle,  we  may  find  that  a  writer's  ostensible  "con- 
clusion" is  at  least  modified  by  the  "sympathy"  in  the  artist's 
form.  Such  sympathy  appears  in  the  relative  enthusiasm  re- 
vealed by  the  power  and  richness  of  depiction,  by  ironic  reserva- 
tions introduced  in  motivating  the  context  of  "bad"  acts,  and 
similar  structural  and  formal  devices.  The  same  principle  holds 
for  an  evaluation  of  literary  criticism  itself,  insofar  as  the  latter 
is  not  mere  documentation,  but  attempts  reconstruction  of  lit- 
erary material.  Cassirer  makes  an  analogous  point  when  he  re- 
fers to  the  discrepancy  between  Taine's  explicit  formulation  of 
naturalism  in  his  Philosophie  de  Part  and  his  actual  investigation 
and  description  which  corrects  this  formulation.  It  follows  that 
appreciation  of  creative  works  requires  entering  into  the  process 
through  which  the  conclusion  is  reached,  requires  attention  to 
the  formal  elements  involved,  which  are  "part  and  parcel  of  the 
artistic  intuition  itself,"  — in  short,  calls  for  something  of  the 
same  temper  and  equipment  which  is  exhibited  by  the  art-work 
which  is  being  evaluated.  In  Cassirer's  formulation,  "we  cannot 
understand  a  work  of  art  without,  to  a  certain  degree,  repeating 
and  reconstructing  the  creative  process  by  which  it  has  come  into 
being."84 

"Essay  on  Man,  i94f.,  155,  149. 


APPROACH  TO  ART  AND  LITERATURE     ,  659 

In  conclusion: 

Cassirer's  functional  analysis  sees  man  as  a  dialectical  complex 
of  a  triadical  unity:  Man  as  history,  Man  as  permanence,  and 
Man  as  animal  symbolicum.  In  the  latter  capacity,  man  recreates 
his  world  by  means  of  his  symbolical  tools  of  which  art  is  the 
most  enriching.  Cassirer's  dialectic  is  not  content  with  establish- 
ing "ambivalence," — a  favorite  resting  ground  for  contempo- 
rary truncated  criticism — ,  but  penetrates  towards  the  underly- 
ing valence. 

The  stimulation  and  fertility  of  Cassirer's  work  stems  from 
the  dynamic  concatenation  of  these  elements.  In  his  mastery  of 
detailed  knowledge,  his  catholic  learning,  his  calm  reasoning 
approach,  and  in  some  of  his  underlying  logical  framework, 
Cassirer  reminds  one  of  Morris  R.  Cohen.85  To  it  all,  Cassirer 
brings  high  imaginative  sensitiveness  and  a  synthesizing  vision. 
The  whole  makes  for  living  history,  for  life  as  art  and  art  as  life. 
The  lines  of  the  Earth-Spirit  in  Faust  which  Cassirer  quotes  for 
Goethe's  method  apply  to  his  own: 

Wie  alles  sich  zum  Ganzen  webt, 

Eins  in  dem  andern  wirkt  und  lebt  .  .  . 

Harmonisch  all1  das  All  durchklingen ! 

The  final  contribution  of  Cassirer's  functional  method  lies  in 
its  own  functional  value  for  us:  the  extent  to  which  it  sets  up, 
suggests  and  stimulates  analogous  waves  of  ideas  and  images, 
and  helps  us  to  reshape  the  world  in  accordance  with  new  emerg- 
ing materials.  This  is  in  spirit  with  Cassirer's  own  supreme 
value — the  liberating  social  act. 

HARRY  SLOCHOWER 

DEPARTMENT  OF  GERMAN 

BROOKLYN  COLLEGE 

*See,  in  particular,  chapter*  II,  III,  IV  of  Cohen's  A  Preface  To  Logic, 
(New  York,  1944). 


19 

Konstantin  Reichardt 

ERNST  CASSIRER'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO 
LITERARY  CRITICISM 


19 

ERNST  CASSIRER'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO 
LITERARY  CRITICISM 

IN  HIS  Essay  on  Man,  Cassirer — in  the  form  of  a  paradox — 
defines  the  historian's  aspiration  as  "objective  anthropo- 
morphism."1 Whereas  the  process  of  scientific  thought  shows  a 
constant  effort  to  eliminate  "anthropological"  elements,  history 
appears  not  as  a  knowledge  of  external  facts  or  events,  but  as  a 
form  of  self-knowledge:  man  constantly  returns  to  himself  at- 
tempting to  recollect  and  actualize  the  whole  of  his  past  experi- 
ence. The  historical  self,  however,  aspires  to  objectivity  and  is  not 
satisfied  with  egocentricity.  In  his  discussion  of  the  various 
methods  of  historical  research  Cassirer  expresses  greatest  warmth 
when  speaking  of  the  work  of  Ranke,  who  once  voiced  the  desire 
to  extinguish  his  own  self  and  to  make  himself  the  pure  mirror  of 
things.  This  wish,  clearly  recognized  both  by  Ranke  and  Cas- 
sirer as  the  deepest  problem  of  the  historian,  remains  at  the 
same  time  the  historian's  highest  ideal.  His  feeling  of  responsi- 
bility and  his  ethical  standing  will  determine  the  value  of  his 
results  according  to  the  definition  of  "objective  anthropomorph- 
ism." Cassirer  reveals  Ranke's  ethical  conception  and  his  uni- 
versal sympathy  for  all  ages  and  all  nations  as  his  principal 
merits  and  he  contrasts  Ranke's  basic  attitude  with  that  of 
Treitschke's  Prussian  school.2 

According  to  Cassirer,  history  belongs  not  to  the  field  of 
natural  science,  but  to  that  of  hermeneutics.  Our  historical 
knowledge  is  a  branch  of  semantics,  not  of  physics.8  Cassirer 
stands  closer  to  Dilthey  than  to  Taine.  Submitting  the  "scien- 

1  Essay  on  Man,  191. 
i87fF. 
1 95. 

663 


664  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

tific,"  statistical  and  psychological  methods  of  Taine,  Buckle, 
and  Lamprecht  to  criticism  he  maintains  that  history,  not  being 
an  exact  science,  will  always  keep  its  place  and  its  inherent  na- 
ture in  the  organization  of  human  knowledge,  and  the  speeches 
in  Thucydides'  work  will  retain  their  historical  value,  because 
they  are  objective  and  possess  ideal,  if  not  empirical  truth.4 
Cassirer  asks  for  greater  susceptibility  in  exactly  this  sense:  "In 
modern  times  we  have  become  much  more  susceptible  to  the 
demands  of  empirical  truth,  but  we  are  perhaps  frequently  in 
danger  of  losing  sight  of  the  ideal  truth  of  things  and  personali- 
ties. The  just  balance  between  these  two  moments  depends 
upon  the  individual  tact  of  the  historian.  .  .  ,"5  In  order  to 
achieve  the  high  task,  the  last  and  decisive  act  is  "always  an 
act  of  the  productive  imagination."  "It  is  the  keen  sense  for  the 
empirical  reality  of  things  combined  with  the  free  gift  of  imagi- 
nation upon  which  the  true  historical  synthesis  or  synopsis  de- 
pends.3^ 

In  other  words,  the  just  balance  in  historical  research  postu- 
lated by  Cassirer  will  depend  upon  two  basic  elements:  on  the 
historian's  ethical  conception  of  his  duties  and  on  the  disciplined 
greatness  of  his  productive  imagination, — the  full  knowledge  of 
the  material  being  self-understood.  Thus  conceived,  history  be- 
comes a  sister  of  art.  Art  turns  our  empirical  life  into  the  dynamic 
of  pure  form;  history  molds  the  empirical  reality  of  things  and 
events  into  a  new  shape  and  gives  it  the  ideality  of  recollection.7 

We  could  make  psychological  experiments  or  collect  statistical  facts. 
But  in  spite  of  this  our  picture  of  man  would  remain  inert  and  colorless. 
We  should  only  find  the  "average"  man — the  man  of  our  daily  practical 
and  social  intercourse.  In  the  great  works  of  history  and  art  we  begin 
to  see,  behind  the  mask  of  the  conventional  man,  the  features  of  the 
real,  individual  man.8 

In  August  1943  I  had  the  opportunity  to  read  a — then  un- 
published— manuscript  by  Cassirer  on  Thomas  Mann's  Goethe 

4  Ibid.,  205. 

6  Ibid.,  205. 

*  Ibid.,  204f. 

7  Ibid.,  205. 

*  Ibid.,  206. 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     665 

novel  Lotte  in  Weimar.  I  began  to  read  the  manuscript  with  a 
special  kind  of  expectation.  Knowing  Cassirer's  stern  demand  for 
the  highest  degree  of  objectivity  in  historical  research,  includ- 
ing literary  criticism,  and  the  complete  absence  of  humor,  irony, 
or  any  lighter  tone  in  general  in  his  writings,  I  was  eager  to  see 
if  Cassirer  would  make  an  exception  in  this  case,  which — as  I 
thought — would  tempt  even  the  most  serious  and  objective 
critic  to  some  application  of  Thomas  Mann's  own  and  possibly 
most  characteristic  style  element,  his  "loving  irony."  However, 
Cassirer  had  written  his  critical  essay  in  the  Cassirer  mood: 
sympathetically  and  without  one  deviation  from  full  seriousness. 
This  consistency  throughout  all  his  publications  shows  how 
deeply  his  general  demand  for  ethics  and  tact  in  historical  re- 
search are  rooted  in  his  personality,  and  it  also  explains  the 
almost  complete  absence  of  polemics  in  his  contributions  to  the 
field  of  literature.  Compared  with  many  of  his  German  contem- 
poraries Cassirer  distinguishes  himself  by  the  objective  spirit 
of  his  work.  He  seems  to  be  urged  to  write  whenever  he  feels 
able  to  improve  or  to  elucidate,  and  not  because  he  would  like  to 
correct  or  to  attack.  Thus,  his  own  discussions  appear  usually  as 
an  investigation  of  a  point  without  an  edge.  "Man  cannot  live  his 
life  without  constant  efforts  to  express  it,"9  this  would  be  Cas- 
sirer's  general  answer  to  a  question  about  the  value  of  literary  doc- 
uments in  the  past  or  present.  Every  document  requires,  from  a 
historian,  a  sympathetic  and  expert  reading,  and  the  true  his- 
torian will  remain  sympathetic,  since  every  document  will  be  a 
contribution  to  his  "self-knowledge"  and  the  knowledge  of  man. 
How  he  himself  will  express  his  own  attitude  and  beliefs  will 
be  a  matter  of  ethics  and  tact.  It  is  highly  revealing  how  gently 
and  without  a  trace  of  irony  or  impatience  Cassirer  treats  far- 
fetched theories  in  aesthetics  or  the  immature  statements  on  art 
by  the  young  Schiller.10  They  receive  his  serious  attention  as  his- 
torically logical  efforts  of  man  to  express  the  fact  that  he  is 
living.  And  without  sympathy  significant  interpretation  is  im- 
possible. 

f  Ibid.,  1 84. 

10  Die  Philosophic  der  Aufklarung,  368-482.  Die  Methodik  des  Idealismus  in 
S chillers  philosophischen  Schrijten,  86ff. 


666  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

Cassirer  considered  himself  a  philosopher,  not  a  literary  critic. 
With  the  exception  of  one  article,  all  his  publications  in  the  field 
of  literature  appeared  either  in  independent  form  or  in  strictly 
philosophical  periodicals.  The  scope  of  his  contributions  is  wide: 
the  German  enlightenment  period  and  German  classicism  and 
romanticism  stand  in  the  foreground  j  however,  there  are  many 
valuable  chapters,  passages,  or  remarks  on  Classical,  French, 
English,  Swedish,  etc.,  literature  in  his  work.  They  all  deal  with 
literary-philosophical  questions  and  they  are  all  directed  toward 
an  understanding  of  the  relation  between  certain  literary  per- 
sonalities and  certain  philosophers  or  systems  of  philosophy} 
however,  Cassirer's  ideal  problem  seems  never  to  be  merely 
that.  His  investigations  always  exceed  the  concrete  question 
of  influences  or  individual  works  of  art,  and  his  deepest  inter- 
est seems  to  lie  elsewhere.  Although  Cassirer,  as  far  as  I  can  see, 
nowhere  makes  a  statement  to  this  end,  his  publications  con- 
cerned with  literature  are  of  greater  interest  for  the  aesthetician 
than  for  either  the  philosopher  or  for  the  literary  critic  in  gen- 
eral. Whenever  Cassirer  writes  about  a  writer  X  in  relation  to  a 
philosopher  Y,  he  seems  to  be — in  spite  of  all  his  attention  to 
X  and  Y — more  interested  in  Z,  and  Z  is  the  individual  essential 
poetic  element  (dichterisches  Wesenselement)  of  X. 

In  the  introductory  part  to  his  essay  on  Holderlin11  Cassirer 
expresses  the  aim  of  his  investigation  most  significantly.  I  trans- 
late the  passage: 

It  [the  investigation]  will  have  to  try  to  draw  from  Holderlin's  poetic 
essence,  as  it  belongs  to  him  originally  and  as  it  precedes  all  abstract 
reflection,  the  interpretative  conclusion  in  regard  also  to  those  trends 
which  manifest  themselves  more  and  more  distinctly  in  the  totality  of 
his  theoretical  attitude  toward  the  world  and  life.12 

This  means  clearly  that  Cassirer  considers  it  the  first  duty  of 
his  investigation  to  clarify  the  character  of  Holderlin's  "poetic 
essence"  which  he  regards  as  Holderlin's  "original  property," 
before  any  possible  statement  about  the  development  of  his 
theoretical  attitude  can  be  made.  Cassirer's  wording  looks  like  a 

"Holdcrlin  und  der  deutsche  Idealismut. 
"Idee  und  Gestolt,  118. 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     667 

sanctification  of  deductive  method;  however,  the  essay  itself 
gives  clear  proof  of  the  opposite  and  his  other  publications  on 
literature  support  it.  An  inductive  analysis  is  always  made — as 
far  as  such  an  analysis  can  go.  The  final  evaluation  of  the 
material,  however,  is  no  longer  a  matter  of  scientific  method. 

Thus,  Cassirer's  task  here  and  elsewhere  is  a  two-sided  one. 
He  does  not  limit  himself  to  the  never  quite  satisfactory  in- 
vestigation of  certain  philosophical  influences  on  certain  ele- 
ments or  periods  of  an  artist's  work,  but  tries  to  find  a  concrete 
picture  of  the  artist's  essence  qua  artist  before  the  question  of  the 
artist's  reflective  world  is  raised.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Cassirer — 
without  mentioning  it — has  the  tendency  to  protect  the  artist 
both  from  literature  and  from  philosophy  as  these  fields  are 
usually  represented  in  criticism.  Cassirer,  the  philosopher,  shows 
his  greatest  sympathy  for  the  world  of  creative  art  and  its  indi- 
vidual rights. 

The  essay  on  Holderlin  may  serve  as  an  example  for  Cas- 
sirer's  general  attitude  and  method  in  the  realm  of  literary- 
philosophical  problems.  The  ideal  subject  for  this  purpose 
would  be  Cassirer's  intensive  occupation  with  his  master, 
Goethe.  However,  this  latter  would  greatly  exceed  the  scope  of 
our  contribution. 

Before  Cassirer  wrote  his  Holderlin  essay,  three  modern  and 
important  works  on  Holderlin  had  appeared, — Dilthey's  fa- 
mous essay,  Zinkernagel's  book,  and  Gundolf's  deep  analysis 
of  Holderlin's  Archfyelagus.  The  result  of  Cassirer's  essay 
shows,  besides  important  additions,  intensification  of  Dilthey's 
views,  agreement  with  Gundolf,  and  a  sharp  contrast  to  Zinker- 
nagel's method. 

One  of  the  foremost  questions  in  regard  to  Holderlin  had 
been  the  exact  determination  of  his  position  within  the  philoso- 
phy of  German  idealism.  That  Holderlin  had  been  greatly 
and  constructively  influenced  by  Platonic  reflections,  Kantian 
criticism,  and  Spinoza's  system  was  known.  However,  Holder- 
lin's relation  to  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  particularly  to  Hegel  had 
not  been  clarified.  In  this  respect,  Professor  Zinkernagel  had 
tried  to  reach  results  by  an  analysis  of  Holderlin's  foremost 
work  Hyperion  and  had  offered  a  very  thorough  appearing  list 


668  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

of  "influences"  which  seemed  to  make  Holderlin  a  receptive 
organon  of  all  kinds  of  stimulations.  A  reader  of  Zinkernagel's 
book,  in  spite  of  all  possible  admiration  for  the  author's  knowl- 
edge and  minute  scholarship,  would  ask  in  vain  why  Holderlin, 
as  both  poet  and  philosopher,  shows  such  remarkable  and  gen- 
erally acknowledged  unity,  and  proved  at  the  same  time  to  be 
able  to  survive  all  these  "influences"  as  an  individual  and  to 
maintain  his  artistic  personality  to  such  an  extent  that  today  he 
is  considered  one  of  the  most  consistent  and  full  grown  lyric 
poets  in  world  literature.  It  is  in  connection  with  ZinkernagePs 
book  that  Cassirer  made  his  statement  that  Holderlin's  artistic 
personality  was  to  be  the  res  'prior  of  his  investigation  and  all 
other  questions  were  to  be  regarded  as  res  $osteriores.  The 
reciprocity  between  Holderlin's  imaginative  and  rational  world 
was  to  be  investigated. 

Since  Holderlin's  poetry  as  a  whole  is  an  expression  of  his 
personal  conception — or  philosophy — of  nature,  Cassirer 
chooses  at  first  to  characterize  Holderlin's  peculiarity  in  contrast 
to  Fichte  and  Schelling.  Holderlin,  seeing  in  Kant's  Criti- 
cal philosophy  a  propaedeutic  step  towards  a  "system"  and 
finding  the  ideal  form  of  a  system  represented  in  Spinoza,  tried 
— as  did  Fichte  and  Schelling — to  establish  an  idealistic  counter- 
part of  Spinoza's  construction.  However  he  distinguished  him- 
self from  Fichte  and  Schelling  by  regarding  the  One  not  as  the 
supreme  principle  of  deduction  but  as  a  «v  8ea<pep6[j,£vov  eauTcj>  con- 
ceived in  direct  relation  to  his  conception  of  nature.  The 
study  of  Plato  contributed  greatly  to  Holderlin's  peculiar 
mythical  imagination}  however,  myth  never  was  and  to 
Holderlin  never  became  a  mere  symbol  or  a  poetic  ornament; 
but  it  was  a  necessary  organon  to  apprehend  reality.  Myth  and 
mythical  phenomena  appear  in  all  of  Holderlin's  works,  includ- 
ing his  letters  and  philosophical  fragments,  as  sensuous-spiritual 
realities  in  which  he  believed  without  any  noticeable  sense  of 
dualism.  Holderlin's  conception  of  nature  manifests  an  inter- 
twinement  of  the  reflective  and  perceptive  elements  without 
any  break  or  inconsistency,  and  what  Schiller  tried  to  evoke 
sentimentally  (sentimentalise^)  in  his  poem  "Die  Gotter 
Griechenlands,"  Holderlin  achieved  naively  and  faithfully:  to 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     669 

him  the  gods  of  Greece  were  not  welcome  poetical  elements,  but 
realities  and  therefore  means  towards  the  cognition  of  truth.  The 
contact  with  Fichte's  writings  stimulated  the  depth  of  Holder- 
lin's  reflective  thinking,  however — again — he  reached  his  in- 
dependent conclusion:  nature,  for  him,  was  not  matter  but  form. 

ZinkernagePs  belief  that  Schelling's  influence  was  telling  for 
Holderlin's  repudiation  of  Fichte's  doctrine  is  denied  by  Cas- 
sirer. Moreover,  Cassirer  is  able  to  provide  almost  irrefutable 
proof  for  the  opposite.  Disregarding  the  fact  that  Schelling  had 
been  Fichte's  follower  until  1796, — the  year  in  which  the  "in- 
fluence" was  supposed  to  have  taken  place, — we  have  (with 
Cassirer)  to  take  into  consideration  that  Schelling's  later  phi- 
losophy of  nature  reminds  one  of  Holderlin's  earlier  general 
attitude.  A  document  made  available  in  1 9 1 3  seems  to  correct  all 
former  interpretations  of  the  Schelling-Holderlin  relation.  In 
1913,  the  Royal  Library  at  Berlin  acquired  a  folio-sheet  which 
shows  HegePs  hand  and  contains  a  brief  outline  of  a  philo- 
sophical system.  The  editor  called  it  "the  oldest  systematic  pro- 
gram of  German  idealism"  and  was  able  to  prove  that  the  manu- 
script is  a  Hegelian  copy  of  a  Schelling  text.13  The  text  ex- 
presses a  demand  for  a  system  of  philosophy  that  would  combine 
"the  monotheism  of  reason"  with  "the  polytheism  of  imagina- 
tion," in  order  to  develop  a  "mythology  of  reason."  This  is 
exactly  what  Holderlin  in  his  more  imaginative  rather  than  ra- 
tional way  of  thinking  had  felt  and  fought  for.  Cassirer's  con- 
clusion seems  good  enough:  the  widely  discussed  meeting  be- 
tween Holderlin  and  Schelling  in  1795  had  not  brought  about 
a  Schelling  influence  on  Holderlin,  but  had  given  Schelling  an 
opportunity  to  find  stimulation  from  the  side  of  Holderlin  and 
to  formulate  rationally  what  had  already  been  in  Holderlin's 
mind. 

The  result  is  the  historically  significant  fact  that  Holderlin 
had  been  the  responsible  agent  implanting  the  thoughts  into 
the  man  who  was  to  become  the  most  Romantic  representative 
of  German  idealism.  Cassirer  was  able  to  supply  the  proof  for 
this  contention  because  of  his  correct  basic  presumption  that 

"  F.  Rosenzweig,  Das  dlteste  Systemprogramm  des  deutschen  Idealismus  (1917). 


670  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

Holderlin's  imaginative  world  was  clearly  outlined  before 
any  outside  influences  came  upon  his  reflective  world.  What  fol- 
lows in  the  last  part  of  Cassirer's  essay  is  an  intensively  com- 
pressed description  of  Holderlin's  pantheism.  After  giving  one 
of  his  masterly  surveys  of  the  dialectic  method  in  Kantian  and 
Romantic  philosophy,  Cassirer  shows  that  Holderlin,  who  used 
the  categories  and  terms  of  philosophical  idealism,  transformed 
them  gradually  but  consistently  into  a  dialectic  of  feeling — the 
simultaneously  consistent  and  antithetic  essence  of  every  lyric 
poet.  Holderlin  did  not  try  to  solve  the  dialectical  problem  con- 
cerning the  relation  of  the  general  and  the  particular  j  he  only 
expressed  the  depth  of  the  problem  as  an  artist. 

I  do  not  find  sufficient  reason  for  divergence  from  Cassirer's 
interpretation  and,  in  particular,  from  his  discussion  of  Holder- 
lin's  "artistic  essence."  Newer  and  fuller  investigations,  carried 
through  with  greater  ambition  in  regard  to  completeness,  have 
enlarged  on  the  material;  however,  they  have  not  improved  our 
understanding  in  general.14  Yet,  I  should  like  to  take  up  one 
specific  statement  in  Cassirer's  essay,  a  statement  which  makes 
me  uneasy. 

In  the  introduction  to  his  brilliant  last  section  Cassirer  ex- 
presses himself  rather  apodictically  about  the  general  character 
of  a  lyric  poet.15  According  to  him  the  peculiarity  of  a  lyric 
poet  is  to  be  found  in  two  elements:  his  individual  conception 
of  nature  (Naturgejiihl)^  and  his  individual  feeling  for  form 
and  development  (Ablauf)  of  spiritual  occurrences  (seelisches 
Gescheheri).  When  these  two  elements  meet  and  determine 
each  other  reciprocally,  the  peculiar  lyric  form  of  expression 
arises.  In  other  words,  the  individual  conception  of  nature  and  of 
the  human  soul  is  the  basic  condition  for  a  meeting  which — in 
the  world  of  an  artist — makes  lyric  art.  The  important  attribute 
here  seems  to  be  "individual,"  since  all  art  shows  the  inter- 
relationship of  nature  (all  manifestations  of  nature,  from  a 
flower  to  a  slum  dwelling)  and  man  (the  life  of  soul  in  all 

14  See    W.    Bohm,   Holderlin   I-II    (1928-30),    K.    Hildebrandt,    HSlderlin; 
Philosofhi*  und  Dichtung  (1939). 
11 'Idee  und  Gestdt,  136. 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     671 

possible  aspects).  Therefore,  what  does  "individual"  mean?  In 
the  following  passages  Cassirer  speaks  lucidly  of  Holderlin's 
tragic  efforts  to  find  objectivity,  and  he  manages,  very  methodi- 
cally, to  leave  the  impression  that  Holderlin  as  an  individual  was 
one  of  the  unusual  artistic  phenomena  who  were  both  influencing 
and  being  influenced  in  regard  to  their  philosophical  or  cognitive 
achievements.  However,  this  did  not  make  Holderlin  a  lyric 
poet,  and  his  individuality  as  such — if  we  accept  Cassirer's  two 
conditions — does  not  differ  in  principle  from  other  artists  who 
were  not  lyric  poets,  but,  for  instance,  dramatists. 

I  do  not  believe  that  Cassirer,  in  his  statement  about  the  lyric 
poet,  and  speaking  of  his  "individual"  conceptions,  was  en- 
tangled in  the  still  rather  common  belief  that  subjectivity  is  one 
of  the  foremost  elements  of  lyrics.  Many  years  after  he  wrote 
his  Holderlin  essay  Cassirer  expressed  himself  clearly  in  this 
respect.  After  a  discussion  of  Croce's  aesthetic  theories,16  he  says: 

It  is  of  course  true  that  the  great  lyrical  poets  are  capable  of  the  deepest 
emotions  and  that  an  artist  who  is  not  endowed  with  powerful  feelings 
will  never  produce  anything  except  shallow  and  frivolous  art.  But  from 
this  fact  we  cannot  conclude  that  the  function  of  lyrical  poetry  and  of 
art  in  general  can  be  adequately  described  as  the  artist's  ability  "to 
make  a  clean  breast  of  his  feelings."  .  .  .  The  lyric  poet  is  not  just 
a  man  who  indulges  in  displays  of  feeling.  .  . .  An  artist  who  is  absorbed 
not  in  the  contemplation  and  creation  of  forms  but  rather  in  his  own 
pleasure  or  in  his  enjoyment  of  "the  joy  of  grief"  becomes  a  senti- 
mentalist. Hence  we  can  hardly  ascribe  to  lyric  art  a  more  subjective 
character  than  to  all  the  other  forms  of  art.  For  it  contains  the  same 
sort  of  embodiment,  and  the  same  process  of  objectification.  ...  It  is 
written  with  images,  sounds,  and  rhythms  which,  just  as  in  the  case 
of  dramatic  poetry  and  dramatic  representation,  coalesce  into  an  indi- 
visible whole.  In  every  great  lyrical  poem  we  find  this  concrete  and 
indivisible  unity.17 

There  is  an  interval  of  twenty-six  years  between  the  Holder- 
lin essay  and  the  Essay  on  Man.  Yet  I  cannot  find  any  basic  in- 
consistency between  the  quoted  passages  from  the  latter  and 

lf  Essay  on  Man, 
I4»f. 


672  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

Cassirer's  general  attitude  in  the  former.  However,  the  state- 
ment about  the  principal  elements  of  a  lyric  poet  still  remains 
unexplained.  Perhaps,  Cassirer  used  a  cliche — an  unusual  proc- 
ess in  his  writings — in  order  better  to  express  the  content  of  the 
directly  following  statement  about  the  peculiarity  of  the  German 
lyric  poets  in  the  period  of  Idealism,  their  desire  to  become  con- 
scious of  their  actions  as  creative  artists,  and  their  further  desire  to 
verify  these  actions  philosophically.  This  is,  to  be  sure,  not  a  sin- 
gular incident  in  the  history  of  lyrics — the  French  symbolists  and 
their  successors  show  a  more  than  general  parallel — ,  but  it  is  true. 

There  are  many  relations  between  philosophy  and  literature 
which  have  been  noticed  surprisingly  late18  or  have  not  as  yet 
found  a  satisfactory  explanation.  Those  cases  appear  most  puz- 
zling in  which  there  exists  a  deep  similarity  between  a  philo- 
sophical system  and  the  expression  of  a  poet  without  permitting 
the  assumption  of  a  "physical"  influence.  In  the  case  of  Holder- 
lin  the  existing  material  is  such  that  his  development  simply 
could  not  be  understood  after  eliminating  the  surrounding  phil- 
osophical situation.  In  the  case  of  Corneille,  however,  and  his 
position  in  relation  to  the  Cartesian  system,  the  problem  is  much 
more  involved.  In  consideration  of  the  methodically  different 
approach,  Cassirer's  attitude  seems  to  be  significant. 

G.  Lanson19  expressed  the  situation  very  well  in  a  few  words: 
€€Il  y  a  non  settlement  analogie,  mais  identite  dy  esprit  dans  le 
Traite  des  passions  et  dans  la  tragedie  cornelienne"  The  curious 
facts  are  that  Descartes  and  Corneille  were  contemporaries — 
Descartes'  Discours  de  la  Methode  appeared  in  1637,  immedi- 
ately after  the  first  performance  of  the  Cid  at  the  Theatre  du 
Marais  in  Paris — ,  that  they  represented  a  school  of  thought 
which  was  new  and  individual,  and  that  yet  a  direct  relation  be- 
tween them  cannot  be  established.  Q.  Krantz  tried  to  show  Des- 
cartes' constructive  influence  on  the  aesthetic  theories  of  French 
classicism,  and  Faguet20  made  the  attempt  to  establish  reasons 

18 1  am  thinking-  especially  of  Plotinus*  influence.  See  Franz  Koch,  Goethe 
und  Plotin  (1925). 

19  G.  Lanson,  Etudes  d'Histoire  Litter  air e  (1930),  58  ff, 

20  G.  Krantz,  Essai  sur  UEsthetique  du  Descartes  (1882).  Faguet,  Dix-septttm* 
siecle,  175. 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     673 

for  a  possible  influence  on  Descartes  by  Corneille, — both  in  vain. 
Lanson,  who  is  certainly  right  in  not  trusting  either  theory,  ex- 
plains the  similarity  between  Descartes'  and  Corneille's  psy- 
chological and  ethical  aspects  from  their  physical  environment 
and  tries  to  ascertain  that  the  spiritual-moral  reality  in  French 
seventeenth  century  life  was  reason  enough  to  stimulate  both 
the  philosopher  and  the  poet  toward  the  same  end;  that  the 
active-intellectual  type  of  man,  then  representative  in  France, 
gave  both  of  them  an  object  of  experience  which  contributed  to 
the  results  in  their  respective  attitudes. 

In  his  book  on  Descartes,  Cassirer  devotes  a  chapter  to  the 
discussion  of  Descartes  and  Corneille.21 

Cassirer  does  not  assume  any  direct  influence.  A  Cartesian  in- 
fluence on  Corneille  is  impossible  chronologically,  and  a  Cor- 
neillean  influence  on  Descartes  highly  improbable  because  of 
Descartes'  well-known  attitude  toward  literature  in  general  and 
modern  literature  in  particular.  Since  Lanson's  explanation  does 
not  appeal  to  Cassirer,  he  directs  his  efforts  towards  finding 
reasons  which  may  have  brought  about  something  like  a  pre- 
established  harmony  between  Descartes  and  Corneille.  His 
method  is  geisteswissenschajtUch, — the  essence  in  Descartes'  re- 
flective and  in  Corneille's  poetic  psychology  and  ethics  is  to  be 
defined  and  explained  in  their  connection  with  the  historically 
preceding  or  simultaneous  philosophical  development. 

According  to  Cassirer,  both  Descartes  and  Corneille  were 
dealing  with  an  object  of  thought  which  had  been  one  of  the 
foremost  topics  since  the  early  Renaissance:  the  relation  between 
Ego  and  World.  They  both  express  the  "pathos  of  subjectivity," 
theoretically-ethically  or  poetically,  and — %  striking  parallel 
— they  have  the  same  theory  of  freedom  in  contrast  to  their 
contemporaries. 

Essential  for  both  Descartes  and  Corneille  was  their  occupa- 
tion with  the  world  of  passions.  Descartes  tried  to  investigate  his 
object  as  a  physicist  (en  Physicien);  only  through  cognition  of 
the  passions  can  we  master  them  and  use  them  to  our  ethical 
advantage.  In  Descartes'  scale  of  values  the  highest  ideal  is 

81  Descartes,  71-117, 


674  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

represented  by  the  combination  of  full  energy  of  will  and  per- 
fect judgment,  although  Descartes  does  not  deny  the  existence 
of  a  relative  ideal  besides  the  absolute  one,  which  ideal  would 
consist  of  a  combination  of  full  energy  of  will  and  not  perfect 
judgment.  Corneille,  in  his  plays,  shows  an  exactly  equivalent 
attitude  and  was  attacked  by  his  contemporary  critics  as  immoral 
because  of  his  opinion  that  the  application  of  great  will  power, 
no  matter  whether  the  aim  is  good  or  not,  has  its  own  value. 

Furthermore,  Cassirer  shows  clearly  that  the  Stoicism,  as  it 
appears  both  in  Descartes'  and  in  Corneille's  work,  experienced 
a  significant  transformation,  losing  its  passive  attitude  (sustine 
et  abstine!)  and  its  moral  characteristic  as  a  doctrine  for  "bodi- 
less beings."  Descartes'  psycho-physical  interpretation  of  the 
passions  and  Corneille's  similar  attitude  distinguish  them 
both  from  the  classical  and  the  Christian  conception. 

Cassirer  succeeds  very  well  in  pointing  out  sharply  the  gen- 
eral parallels  which,  without  any  doubt,  are  essential.  In  addi- 
tion to  it,  his  literary  discussion  of  Corneille's  tragedies  is  of 
high  value  because  of  its  historical  objectivity.  Corneille's 
dramatis  fersonae  will  seem  unreal  or  psychologically  improb- 
able to  anyone  who  has  not  been  initiated  into  the  essence  and 
the  laws  of  the  poet's  individual  world;  yet  they  regain  their 
ideal  truth  as  soon  as  the  doors  to  this  world  have  been  opened. 
Then,  and  then  only,  is  it  not  a  question  of  liking  or  immediate 
appreciation  any  more,  but  a  case  of  following  a  creative  poet  on 
his  excursions  through  his  imaginative  world. 

All  this  granted,  we  are  still  waiting  for  an  answer  to  the 
original  question.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  certain  lines  of 
development  can  be  traced  down  to  Descartes  and  Corneille 
which  will  make  them  appear  as  historically  "logical"  personali- 
ties; yet  their  peculiar  conformity  in  reaching  the  same  conclu- 
sions in  regard  to  such  specific  objects  as  human  passions  and 
the  scale  of  values  has  not  been  explained  by  Cassirer.  In  his 
interpretation,  Descartes  and  Corneille  still  remain  lonesome 
giants,  having  many  clear  connections  with  the  past  and,  at  the 
same  time,  with  modern  views,  yet  lacking  any  significant  con- 
nection with  their  own  time.  The  clarification  of  their  philosoph^ 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     675 

ical  or  poetic  systems  is  helpful  for  our  understanding  of 
them;  however  not  sufficient  for  the  understanding  of  their 
positions  in  their  time. 

Lanson's  idea  that  Descartes  and  Corneille  were  basically  in- 
fluenced by  the  peculiarity  of  their  time  is  enticing  in  its  me- 
thodical aspect.  Cassirer  finds  the  connection  between  them  in 
the  past}  Lanson  stresses  their  immediate  relations  as  not  result- 
ing from  any  direct  physical  influence  but  from  the  source  of 
life  surrounding  them.  And  Cassirer  himself,  in  a  different 
chapter  of  his  Descartes  book,  offers  new  material  which  seems 
to  give  Lanson  substantial  support. 

In  the  chapter  about  Descartes  and  Queen  Christina  of 
Sweden,  Cassirer  discusses  the  question  whether  Christina 
might  have  been  acquainted  with  Corneille's  writings.22  There  is 
no  conclusive  answer}  yet  Christina's  interest  in  contemporary 
thought  and  art  is  established  so  well  that  her  ignorance  of  the 
first  great  French  dramatist  would  seem  unbelievable.  Cassirer 
goes  farther}  he  not  only  shows  that  Christina  in  her  reactions 
and  actions  resembles  greatly  the  heroines  in  Corneille's  plays, 
but  also  gives  a  highly  interesting,  concrete  example  which  mani- 
fests a  deep  affinity  between  one  historical  reaction  of  the  Queen 
of  Sweden  and  a  poetic  one  in  Corneille's  Pulcherie:  Christina's 
decision  to  dissolve  her  engagement  to  Karl  Gustaf  and  the 
parallel  Pulcherie — Leon.  Corneille  wrote  his  play  twenty-five 
years  after  Christina  had  made  her  famous  decision.  Therefore, 
no  fantastic  hypothesis  about  the  influence  of  poetry  on  life  can 
be  offered  in  this  case. 

Queen  Christina,  after  Cassirer's  very  valuable  interpretation, 
appears  as  an  addition  to  the  list  of  seventeenth  century  per- 
sonalities who,  according  to  Lanson,  showed  Corneillean  char- 
acter in  concrete.  It  is  surprising  that  Cassirer,  in  spite  of  this, 
reacts  so  indifferently  to  Lanson's  theory  in  his  Descartes- 
Corneille  chapter.  Descartes  and  Corneille  would  become  fully 
comprehensible,  if  not  only  their  common  roots  in  the  past  but 
also  in  their  own  time  could  be  shown.  Great  philosophers  and 
artists,  I  think,  never  stand  apart  from  their  own  time,  no  matter 

251-278. 


676  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

whether  they  act  as  friends,  enemies,  or  prophets.  The  sociologi- 
cal aspect  of  both  philosophy  and  literature  should  never  be 
forgotten,  and  in  the  case  of  Descartes'  and  Corneille's 
"strange"  affinity  it  should  be  applied  in  full.  Therefore,  Lan- 
son's  treatment  of  the  question,  although  deplorably  incom- 
plete, shows  the  way  to  future  research.  I  am  not  at  all  in  favor 
of  giving  the  sociological  method  a  prominent  position  in 
literary  research  5  however,  I  think  that  the  physician  should 
know  which  medicine  to  use  in  each  specific  case.23 

A  completely  different  problem  appears  in  connection  with 
the  most  controversial  German  romanticist,  Heinrich  von  Kleist. 

Kleist's  relatively  small  artistic  output  stands  in  no  quantita- 
tive relation  to  the  amount  of  work  dedicated  to  him  in  literary 
criticism.  The  Kleist-specialization  in  Germany  has  resulted  in 
research  conditions  which  have  made  every  element  in  Kleist's 
life  and  work  an  object  of  passionate  discussion.24  The  phe- 
nomenon Kleist  represents  an  in  many  respects  interesting  rid- 
dle which,  in  order  to  be  solved,  seems  to  require  a  co-operative 
effort  on  the  part  of  rather  broadminded  literary  critics,  histori- 
ans, and  psychiatrists.  The  limitations  of  critics  manifest  them- 
selves almost  necessarily  in  regard  to  Kleist.  To  make  things 
worse,  Kleist  has  some  national  importance  for  his  country,  and 
we  need  hardly  enlarge  upon  the  almost  inevitable  results  in 
criticism.  The  most  significant  example  of  misunderstandings  in 
regard  to  Kleist,  however,  is  in  my  eyes  the  Katchen  von  Heil- 
bronn  interpretation  in  F.  GundolPs  book  on  Kleist,25  in  which 
this  truly  exceptional  and  far-sighted  critic  manifests  a  complete 
lack  of  hermeneutic  ability  in  this  particular  respect.  All  the  dif- 
ficulties of  interpretation  in  re  Kleist  arise  from  Kleist's  own 
super-nervous  and  chaotic  personality  more  than  from  his 
artistic  work.  He  is  one  of  the  best  examples  both  of  the  in- 
ability of  the  soul  of  man  to  master  absolute  ideal  demands  and 
also  of  a  psychopathic  condition  together  with  a  capacity  for  ex- 
ceptionally creative  and  lucid  artistry. 

"The  sociological   method   has  been  applied   with   good  results  in  modern 
Russian  criticism  j  see  especially  P.  N.  Sakulin,  Die  russische  Liter atur  (1927). 
84  See  Jahrbuch  der  Kleist-Gesellschaft,  192 iff. 
*F.  Gundolf,  Heinrich  von  Kleist  (1922). 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     677 

Kantian  philosophy,  as  generally  acknowledged,  had  a  great 
influence  on  Kleist  as  a  man  and  as  a  writer.  Obvious  records, 
among  them  his  letters,  give  a  solid  basis  for  this  contention} 
and  his  artistic  works  show  Kleist's  symbolical  transformations 
of  philosophical  (and  other)  problems.  However,  the  exact  sig- 
nificance of  Kant's  philosophy  for  Kleist  as  an  artist  has  not  been 
clarified  as  yet,  and  certain  gaps  of  understanding  prevailed 
when  Cassirer  enlivened  the  Kleist  research  by  his  daring  essay 
on  Kleist  and  the  Kantian  philosophy.26  Among  other  contribu- 
tions to  the  point,  Cassirer  advanced  a  new  hypothesis  which — 
if  accepted — would,  even  though  it  would  not  change  our  gen- 
eral attitude  toward  Kleist,  compel  us  to  take  new  data  into 
consideration. 

In  his  letters  to  his  sister  Ulrike  and  his  fiancee  Wilhelmine 
von  Zenge,  young  Kleist  gave  an  intimate  account  of  his  state 
of  mind  and  his  general  views.  The  letters  are  sometimes  so 
expressive  and  self-interpreting  that  many  a  statement  in  them 
has  been  taken  for  granted  without  due  regard  to  Kleist's  gen- 
eral characteristic  of  being  very  inconsistent  and  versatile  in  his 
moods,  predilections,  and  self-expression.  In  his  plays  and  short 
stories  Kleist  offers  a  magnificent  example  of  his  creative  ability 
to  transform  a  moment  into  a  life.  However,  his  letters  suffer 
from  the  dualism  between  his  creative,  and  therefore  prac- 
tically not  always  reliable  imagination,  and  the  attempt  of  giv- 
ing an  empirically  realistic  account  of  his  life.  This  is  likely  to  be 
a  rather  general  situation  in  an  artist's  letters.  Yet  in  this  case 
it  is  more  prominent  than  in  others,  perhaps  because  of  the 
constant  efforts  in  the  Kleist  research  to  establish  the  empirical 
truth  instead  of  pursuing  the  wiser  way  towards  the  ideal  truth. 

In  a  much  discussed  letter  of  March  22,  1801,  Kleist,  in 
utter  despair,  describes  to  his  fiancee  the  annihilating  effect  of 
his  occupation  with  the  Kantian  philosophy  and  gives  a  vivid 
picture  of  his  total  apathy  after  learning  that  "We  cannot  de- 
cide, whether  what  we  call  truth  is  really  the  truth  or  only  ap- 
pears to  us  as  such."  Kleist's  world  of  ideals,  for  which  he  had 
lived  and  from  which  he  had  received  his  strength,  seemed  to 

*"Heinrich  von  Kleist  und  die  Kantische  Philosophic,"  in  Idee  und  Gestalt, 
159-302. 


678  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

be  destroyed.  This  letter  is  a  masterpiece  of  writing  and  could, 
without  a  change,  fill  the  place  of  a  monologue  in  any  suitable 
tragedy. 

At  least  three  specific  questions  arise  directly  from  this  letter. 
First,  Kleist  gives  the  impression  that  he  had  begun  his  occupa- 
tion with  Kant's  philosophy  "a  short  time  ago"  ("vor 
kurzem"})  although  we  know  that  he  had  already  studied  Kant 
in  1800.  Secondly,  speaking  of  Kant,  Kleist  uses  the  strange 
expression  "the  more  recent  so-called  Kantian  philosophy" 
(neuere  sogenannte  Kantische  Philosophie).  Thirdly,  Kant's 
Critical  method  and  philosophy  seem  to  have  been  misunder- 
stood by  Kleist. 

The  discussion  of  these  three  points  is  the  backbone  of  Cas- 
sirer's  hypothesis  in  the  first  part  of  his  essay:  that  Kleist  in  this 
letter  had  in  his  mind  not  Kant's  transcendental  idealism  but 
Fichte's  Bestimmung  des  Menschen. 

The  question  is  not  of  great  importance  outside  the  circle  of 
the  professional  Kleist  experts.  However  it  has  methodical  sig- 
nificance. We  know  that  in  1800  Kleist  had  occupied  himself 
with  Kant  without  experiencing  any  disastrous  results.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  easy  for  Cassirer  to  show  that  Kant's  Critical 
method  did  not  imply  the  denial  of  the  objectivity  of  man's 
cognitive  efforts.  These  two  facts,  in  connection  with  the  strange 
formula  "so-called  Kantian  philosophy,"  leads  Cassirer  to  the 
possibility  that  Kleist,  in  1801,  had  read  Fichte's  Bestimmung 
des  Menschen  y  which  had  been  published  in  1800  in  Berlin — 
where  Kleist  lived — under  circumstances  which  made  this  book 
immediately  one  of  the  most  widely  discussed  in  Prussia's  capi- 
tal. Kleist  must  have  known  the  book;  and  it  contained  ideas 
which  would  make  his  reaction  very  plausible. 

Cassirer's  hypothesis  may  be  correct.  However,  I  think  that  it 
represents  one  of  the  very  few  instances  in  his  writings  on  litera- 
ture where  he  presses  a  point  less  from  necessity  than  from  his 
own  status  as  a  Kant  expert.  It  is  certainly  strange  to  observe 
that  Kleist,  who  in  November  1 800  had  written  his  sister  that 
he  would  like  to  go  to  France  in  order  to  spread  there  the  new 
(i.e.,  Kantian)  philosophy,  would  have  had  such  a  shocking 
experience  on  account  of  this  same  philosophy  less  than  half  a 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     679 

year  later.  The  explanation  that  Kleist  was  shocked  after  read- 
ing the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  is  not  sufficient,  since  this  work 
does  not  express  an  attitude  that  would  have  been  basically 
different  from  Kant's  earlier  works.  On  the  other  hand,  Fichte 
had  become  such  a  well-known  personality  in  Germany,  after 
his  "atheism  controversy"  and  his  leaving  Jena  for  Berlin,  that 
it  is  hardly  comprehensible  that  Kleist  should  have  hidden 
Fichte's  name  in  his  letter,  if  it  was  Fichte  and  not  Kant  whom 
he  had  in  mind.  Cassirer  sees  that  the  acquaintance  with  Fichte's 
Bestimmung  des  Menschen  would  have  been — without  any 
misunderstanding — a  sufficient  cause  for  Kleist's  despair;  how- 
ever, he  does  not  sufficiently  take  into  consideration  a  possible 
misunderstanding  by  Kleist  as  to  the  meaning  of  Kant's  philoso- 
phy. Strong  inconsistencies  and  quick  impulsive  reactions  were 
characteristic  of  the  violently  emotional  Kleist,  and  these  two 
letters  of  1800  and  1801  may  be  just  other  examples  of  this 
sort  of  conduct.  If  Fichte,  a  "Kantian"  philosopher,  misunder- 
stood Kant,  why  should  not  Kleist,  certainly  not  a  professional 
philosopher,  have  made  a  similar  mistake?  And  his  desire  to 
spread  Kantian  philosophy  in  France  is  no  proof  by  itself  that 
Kleist,  in  1800,  had  an  intimate  knowledge  of  Kant's  tran- 
scendental idealism. 

To  prove  either  opinion  is,  of  course,  impossible;  and  it  was  to 
be  expected  that  critics  of  Cassirer's  hypothesis  were  split  into 
two  camps.  Oskar  Walzel,  one  of  the  foremost  experts  in  the 
field  of  German  romanticism,  remarked:  "Among  the  numer- 
ous discussions  of  Kleist's  'Kant  experience,'  only . . .  [Cassirer's 
essay]  needs  to  be  emphasized."27  Eugen  Kuhnemann,  in  his 
lecture  on  "Kleist  und  Kant,"  took  the  stand  against  Cassirer.28 

The  discussion  of  Kleist's  confusing  letter  is  only  a  part  of 
Cassirer's  essay.  Its  second  half  deals  with  the  significance  of 
transcendental  idealism  for  Kleist  as  a  creative  artist,  and  shows 
in  an  exemplary  manner  how  Kleist's  artistic  work  received  a 
constructive  impetus  from  Kantian  thoughts.  Kleist's  personal 
tragedy,  experienced  by  him  consciously  in  continuous  philo- 

87  O.  Walzel,  German  Romanticism,  translated  by  A.  £.  Lussky  (1932),  302. 
9  E.   Kuhnemann,   "Kleist   und   Kant,"   in  Jahrbuch  der  Kleist-Gesellschaft 
(1922),   1-30. 


680  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

sophic  reflections,  expressed  itself  in  his  art.  Cassirer  may  be 
right  in  stating  that  Kleist  is  perhaps  the  only  example  of  a 
great  poet  whose  creative  power  had  been  awakened  by  a  re- 
flective experience  (gedankliches  Erlebmi) ,  at  least  I  do  not 
find  any  striking  parallels.  In  this  connection  Cassirer,  after 
his  adventure  into  the  realm  of  empirical  truth,  is  again  search- 
ing for  the  ideal  truth  and  is,  consequently,  at  his  best. 

I  do  not  want  to  leave  the  Kleist  essay  without  calling  atten- 
tion to  a  brief  passage  in  it29  which  is  very  characteristic  of 
Cassirer  as  a  historian.  In  the  history  of  German  literature  there 
is  one  of  those  rather  common  little  events  which,  sub  specie 
aeternitatis  would  appear  as  mere  trifles  but  which  come  up 
again  and  again  and  are  discussed  with  much  satisfaction:  I  am 
speaking  of  those  numerous  examples  of  apparent  pettiness  in 
great  men.  Our  example  concerns  Goethe  and  his  relation  to 
Kleist  and  refers  to  the  simple  fact  that  Goethe  had  no  under- 
standing for  the  tragic  genius  of  his  younger  colleague.  We 
know  some  examples  of  Goethe's  not  exactly  admirable  reac- 
tions in  similar  cases;  but  we  do  not  think  their  discussion 
particularly  valuable.  However,  if  a  discussion  were  necessary, 
the  only  possibly  fruitful  method  is  that  used  by  Cassirer  in  his 
essay.  His  brief  analysis  appears  to  me  to  be  a  perfect  example 
of  the  ideal  method  of  procedure.  Showing  Goethe's  individual 
views  and  his  certainly  broad,  but  naturally  limited,  i.e.,  defined, 
personal  requirements  for  what  he  would  have  considered  great 
art,  Cassirer  puts  Goethe's  lack  of  understanding  for  Kleist 
in  the  light  in  which  it  needs  to  be  seen.  There  are  worlds  of 
thought  and  of  art  where  friendship  is  not  possible,  and  that  is 
all.  Another  sober  interpretation  of  one  of  Goethe's  peculiar 
reactions  was  given  by  Cassirer  in  his  essay,  "Goethe  and  the 
1 8th  Century."30  Goethe  astonished  Mr.  Soret,  Prince  Karl 
Alexander's  educator  at  Weimar,  in  August  1830,  by  his-total 
indifference  to  the  fact  of  the  July  revolution  in  Paris  and  at 
the  same  time  by  his  very  strong  interest  in  the  fact  that  his, 
Goethe's,  synthetic  method  in  scientific  research  had  just  been 

29  Idee  und  Gestalt,  1 8  6ff . 

80  Zeitschrift  fur  Aesthetik  XXVI  (1932),  also  in  Goethe  und  die  geschichtliche 
Welt  (1932),  86ff. 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     68 1 

accepted  by  Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire.  In  this  context  Cassirer  is 
able  to  give  an  objective  and,  to  me,  doubtlessly  correct  interpre- 
tation. Goethe  believed  in  "representative  moments"  in  history. 
To  him  the  July  revolution  was  less  representative  than  the 
victory  of  his  synthetic  method.  As  we  know  today,  Goethe 
was  right. 

In  the  history  of  literary  criticism  Cassirer  is  one  of  the 
representatives  of  the  field  and  methods  of  Geisteswissenschajt 
— the  study  of  the  development  of  ideas.  Usually  the  work  of 
the  individual  in  this  line  of  endeavor  shows  individual  con- 
centration, since  what  is  investigated  is  not  ideas  far  excellence 
but  ideas  in  their  relation  to  something  else.  Our  survey  of  a 
few  of  Cassirer's  contributions  shows  that  his  main  concern  is 
to  be  found  in  the  investigation  of  the  relation  between  the 
reflective  and  the  imaginative  world  of  the  artist.  Cassirer  is 
most  explicit  and  most  eloquent  when  recreating  the  life  of  the 
artist's  imaginative  conceptions  which  manifest  themselves  as 
transformations  of  his  reflective  life.  His  most  significant  con- 
tribution seems  to  me  to  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  this  particu- 
lar point.  I  find  it  in  the  gap  which  Cassirer  leaves  unexplained, 
because  he  does  not  want  to  make  a  pretentious  statement  with- 
out offering  the  scale  of  processes  which  would  solidify  it.  In 
spite  of  everything,  Cassirer's  apparent  interest  in  the  clarifica- 
tion of  historical  items — Kleist  and  Fichte  or  Kant — ,  or  in 
the  truer  understanding  of  a  poet's  philosophical  contribution — 
Holderlin  and  Schelling — ,  or  a  better  psychological  interpre- 
tation of  a  great  individual's  momentous  reactions — Goethe  and 
Soret — ,  he  dedicates  his  greatest  effort  to  re-telling  the  story 
of  artistic  imagination  in  those  individual  lives  which  caught 
his  fancy.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Goethe  is  for  Cassirer  the  most 
significant  phenomenon  since  he  is  the  broadest}  a  phenomenon 
which,  in  the  rare  combination  of  pure  artistry,  profound  under- 
standing of  the  sciences,  and  peculiarly  unacademic  philosophiz- 
ing, represents  an  object  of  investigation  beyond  the  usual 
scope.  In  his  writings  on  Goethe31  Cassirer  has  the  opportunity 
to  apply  his  own  wholly  constructive,  positive,  and  synthetic 

"See  especially  Freikeit  und  Form   (1916),  Goethe  and  die  geschichtliche 


682  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

mind  better  than  anywhere  else.  But  here  also  a  lacuna  remains. 
Cassirer  expresses  with  great  penetration  his  conception  of 
Goethe's  artistic  essence  as  he  sees  it,  and  the  discipline  of  his 
knowledge  and  thought  restrains  him  from  overstepping  the 
limits  of  the  material  at  his  disposal.  However,  here  also  a  point 
appears  again  and  again  where  I  would  ask  for  further  ob- 
jective penetration}  Cassirer  would  probably  reply  that  the 
remaining  part  is  a  matter  of  experience,  tact,  and  taste.  The 
demand  for  more  becomes  consequently  so  urgent  that, — if  the 
demand  is  followed  by  a  new  investigation, — Cassirer  surely 
would  have  stimulated  it.  The  investigation  ought  to  be  directed 
toward  a  more  objective  foundation  of  our  conception  of  the 
artist's  creative  world. 

To  be  sure,  Cassirer  has  never  published  a  statement  referring 
to  what  I  shall  try  to  express.  He  knew,  however,  that  such  a 
demand  is  a  logical  consequence  of  his  writings  on  literature; 
and  in  conversations  he  liked  to  dwell  on  this  point.  Fortunately, 
Cassirer  has  published  a  comprehensive  chapter  on  "Art"  and 
there  has  given  a  clear  picture  of  his  aesthetic  views.82  There  is  no 
inconsistency  between  his  general  theoretical  discussion  and  the 
method  used  in  his  more  practical  contributions. 

We  must  mention  a  few  of  Cassirer's  statements,  in  order  to 
clear  the  ground. 

Cassirer  conceives  art  in  general  as  a  reality  of  the  same  value 
as,  for  example,  science.83  "Rerum  videre  formas  is  a  no  less 
important  and  indispensable  task  than  rerum  cognoscere 
causas"**  Art  has  its  own  rationality,  the  rationality  of  form. 

Art  is  not  fettered  to  the  rationality  of  things  or  events.  It  may  infringe 
all  those  laws  of  probability  which  classical  aestheticians  declared 
to  be  the  constitutional  laws  of  art.  It  may  give  us  the  most  bizarre 
and  grotesque  vision,  and  yet  retain  a  rationality  of  its  own — the 
rationality  of  form.85 

Welt  (1932),  "Goethes  Pandora?9  (in  Idee  und  Gestalt,  7-32),  "Goethe  und  die 
mathematische  Physik"  (in  Idee  und  Gestalt,  33-80),  Rousseau  Kant  Goethe. 

*  Essay  on  Man,  137-170. 

88  Ibid.,  fassim. 

"Ibid.,  170. 

"Ibid.,  167. 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM    683 

The  artist  who  discovers  the  form  of  nature  is  philosophically 
equal  to  the  scientist  who  discovers  nature's  laws.  Moreover, 
"language  and  science  are  abbreviations  of  reality  5  art  is  intensi- 
fication of  reality.  Language  and  science  depend  upon  one  and 
the  same  process  of  abstraction}  art  may  be  described  as  a  con- 
tinuous process  of  concretion."36  "Science  gives  us  order  in 
thoughts;  morality  gives  us  order  in  actions,  and  art  gives  us 
order  in  the  apprehension  of  visible,  tangible,  and  audible  ap- 
pearances."87 And  —  "We  cannot  speak  of  art  as  'extrahuman' 
or  'superhuman'  without  overlooking  one  of  its  fundamental 
features,  its  constructive  power  in  the  framing  of  the  human 
universe."38 

These  incomplete  quotations  help  us  to  summarize  Cassirer's 
attitude.  Cassirer  believes  in  a  creative  world  of  art  as  a  funda- 
mentally independent  world  of  human  behavior,  with  its  own 
conditions  and  laws.  The  essence  of  the  artist's  mind  is  different 
from  the  reflective  mind  of  the  scientist  or  philosopher.  The 
scientist  deals  with  phenomena  and  makes  the  intellectual  at- 
tempt to  bring  order  into  them,  renouncing  to  the  highest  possi- 
ble extent  an  interference  of  anthropomorphic  elements.  The 
artist  offers  the  principal  human  example  of  free  creative  action. 
The  scientist's  work  comprises  a  reciprocity  of  the  phenomenal 
and  his  intellectual  world;  his  reflective  activity  has  the  form  of 
conquest:  he  becomes  master  of  the  phenomena  by  fully  con- 
scious induction,  trying  (never  quite  successfully)  to  reduce  the 
exciting  but  dangerous  combination  by  means  of  an  always 
threatening  semi-conscious  deduction.  The  artist,  on  the  con- 
trary, uses  his  intellect  rather  as  a  function  than  as  a  condition, 
in  order  to  express  the  results  of  his  creative  imagination. 

The  transformation  of  the  "real"  world  which  takes  place  in 
every  great  work  of  art  shows  something  else  which  may  be 
called  intensification  or  concretion,  a  something  which  other- 
wise does  not  make  an  unhindered  appearance  in  the  regions  of 
human  behavior.  In  art,  and  only  in  art,  a  decade  can  be  made 
an  hour,  and  a  life  made  a  mere  moment. 


143. 

*  Ibid.,  1  68. 
88  IbU.,  167. 


684  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

The  intellect's  interference  manifests  itself  most  clearly  in 
literature,  because  literature  is  a  linguistic  art.  However,  the 
total  work  of  literary  art  does  not  always  have  any,  and  some- 
times has  very  little,  direct  relation  to  the  world  of  reflection. 
The  main  characteristic  of  art,  in  contrast  to  philosophy  and  sci- 
ence, is  its  inherent  particularity  not  to  be  basically  dependent 
upon  the  laws  of  scientific  reflection.  Since  form  is  the  only  com- 
mon rational  factor  of  every  art,  and  the  form  of  each  art  mani- 
fests a  specific  order,  the  order  and  form  of  the  arts  are  to  be 
investigated,  if  we  want  to  examine  the  artist's  imagination  at 
work  and  the  architecture  of  the  world  of  art. 

This  has  certainly  been  done  again  and  again;  however  from 
a  different  methodical  point  of  view.  Since,  in  this  context,  we 
are  not  interested  in  the  biographical,  psychological,  or  general 
historical  implications  of  an  artist,  nor  in  a  more  or  less  casual 
or  accidental  investigation  of  certain  elements  in  the  work  pe- 
culiar to  a  certain  artist,  our  task  should  be  a  complete  investiga- 
tion of  the  artist's  formative  tendencies  which  result  in  the  total 
of  his  artistic  creation.  Art's  main  element  is  not  the  content  j 
it  is  the  creation  of  a  form  which — in  all  its  dimensions — offers 
us  the  cognition  of  a  content.  The  formative  tendencies  may 
vary  in  one  or  in  all  artists. 

When  Cassirer  speaks  of  poetic  essence  (dichterisches 
Wesenselemeni))  he  does  not  use  simply  a  general  term  for 
an  unclear  conception,  but  thinks  of  the  full  essence  of  the 
artist's  creative  and  created  world.  The  method  of  finding  it 
remains  undiscussed.  Aesthetic  judgment,  experience,  taste,  and 
tact  combined  in  a  mind  of  methodical  strength  and  constructive 
imagination  reach, — as  we  know  and  as  Cassirer  himself  shows, 
— remarkable  results.  However,  the  stimulation  to  a  "more" 
is  given  at  the  same  time,  since  the  road  toward  subjectivity  is 
wide  open  and  the  question  arises  whether  among  the  aesthetic 
opinions  of  several  experts  some  may  not  approach  the  "ideal 
truth"  more  closely  than  others.  As  long  as  the  object  of  investi- 
gation is  not  the  function  of  pleasure  but  the  formative  condi- 
tions of  a  work  of  art,  an  objective  method  should,  at  least,  be 
visualized.  That  such  a  method  can  never  consist  of  the  tradi- 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     685 

tional  formidable  computations  of,  for  instance,  rhymes,  influ- 
ences, or  new  words,  is  obvious. 

In  literary  research  we  find  some  of  the  finest  examples  of 
hermeneutic  ability.  The  changes  and  the  continuous  develop- 
ment of  evaluation  do  not  necessarily  make  the  quality  of  the 
preceding  or  following  critical  opinions  appear  weak,  because 
the  liking  of  individuals,  groups,  and  generations  may  differ. 
This  will  remain  so  forever.  However,  we  are  not  dealing  with 
a  sociology  of  art  or  with  a  history  of  taste.  We  may  not  "like" 
a  certain  artistic  creation.  However  we  ought  to  find  a  method 
of  discovering  whether  our  dislike  is  simply  a  dislike  or  whether 
it  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  work  in  question  is  not  a  work  of 
art.  We  ought  to  have  the  methodical  means  of  finding  the 
characteristics  of  the  numerous  "essences"  or  "worlds"  of  art 
as  objectively  as  possible.  Acknowledging  that  form  and  order  in 
art  are  a  conditio  sine  qua  nony  we  certainly  should  be  able  to 
reach  a  better  understanding  of  all  the  forms  and  orders  appear- 
ing in  the  history  of  art.  This  has  been  achieved  quite  admirably 
in  one  of  the  non-linguistic  arts — painting. 

An  ideal  work  of  art  may  be  compared  with  a  sphere,  every 
external  and  internal  point  of  which  stands  in  a  meaningful 
connection  with  every  other  point.  To  determine  the  connec- 
tions and  the  necessity  of  their  full  reciprocity  is  the  aim  of  an 
investigation  in  regard  to  the  form  of  art.  Obviously,  such  an 
ideal  example  may  be  found  best  in  an  artistic  genre  which 
by  necessity  lends  itself  to  a  relatively  easy  analytical  approach, 
for  example  in  music  and  also  in  painting.  Linguistic  art  is  far 
more  complex.  A  lyric  poem  or  a  drama  can  be  approached  much 
more  easily  than  for  instance  a  novel,  a  widely  changing  and 
only  superficially  definable  object  which,  because  of  the  lack 
of  formal  limitation,  appears  as  the  most  difficult  possible  prob- 
lem in  this  respect. 

The  enervating  element  in  literary  research,  as  in  all  arts, 
is  the  difficulty  of  determining  why  an  apparently  good  work 
of  art  is  good.  Here  Cassirer  says:  "It  is  the  task  of  the  aesthetic 
judgment  or  of  artistic  taste  to  distinguish  between  a  genuine 
work  of  art  and  those  other  spurious  products  which  are  indeed 


686  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

playthings,  or  at  most  cthe  response  to  the  demand  of  enter- 
tainment'."89 I  believe  that  more  concrete  results  can  be  reached. 
A  novel  may  be  good,  because  it  manifests  profound  psycho- 
logical insight  in  spite  of  bad  style;  and  another  novel  may  be 
bad,  because  it  shows  superficiality  of  content  in  spite  of  a  very 
good  style.  But  it  is  not  psychology  or  style  or  content  which 
make  a  novel  good  or  bad;  it  is  something  else.  We  should 
try  to  find  this  "something  else."  We  should  find  the  conditions 
under  which  art  manifests  itself  in  literature.  We  should,  in 
every  work  of  real  or  presumed  art,  investigate  and  define  those 
elements  which  make  it  art. 

Experience  shows  that  certain  results  can  be  achieved  very 
quickly,  for  instance  in  the  field  of  the  novel.  An  initial  two- 
sided  attempt  usually  clarifies  the  ground.  A  novel  combines, 
under  normal  circumstances,  the  description  of  man  with  the 
description  of  man's  environment — nature  in  any  kind  of  varia- 
tion. A  minute  investigation  of  the  formative  elements  pertain- 
ing to  the  representation  of  man  is  the  foremost  aim.  What 
literary  research  has  done  so  far  is  only  a  part  of  the  whole 
task.  In  discussions  of  paintings  we  are  accustomed  to  point  out 
every  detail  of  a  depicted  being's  characteristics;  in  literary  re- 
search we  are  usually  satisfied  with  less.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
physical  colors, — an  artist's  language  transforms  ideas  and 
feelings  into  its  own  colors;  "it  is  written  with  images,  sounds, 
and  rhythms  . . .  which  coalesce  into  an  indivisible  whole."  The 
character  of  a  person  in  a  novel  as  concerns  his  actions,  feelings, 
and  thoughts  is  the  most  obvious,  although  not  the  artistically 
most  important  part  of  it.  A  look  at  the  formative  tendencies  of 
a  novelist  shows  numerous,  but  not  innumerable,  pecularities  in 
making  a  person  come,  go,  think,  speak,  impress,  yawn,  weep, 
live,  and  die.  A  thorough  examination  of  these  peculiarities 
will  tell  us  something  rather  important  about,  not  the  mere 
technique,  but  the  creative  activity  of  the  artist.  A  com- 
plete analysis  of  a  novel  will  give  us  a  fairly  objective  compre- 
hension of  his  formative  action.  The  literary  critic  should  be- 
come a  neighbor  of  the  fine  arts,  since  literature,  in  its  greatest 
performances,  manifests  the  same  purity  of  form  and  order  as 
does  great  painting.  The  reason  why  a  complete  analytical 

.,  164, 


CONTRIBUTION  TO  LITERARY  CRITICISM     687 

investigation  of  a  novel  or  even  of  a  short  story  has  never  yet 
been  made  lies  in  the  apparent  enormity  of  the  task.  The  task  is 
great.  However,  considering  the  immense  amount  of  time 
spent  on  other — and  sometimes  hardly  worthwhile — types  of 
literary  research,  one  may  be  permitted  to  think  this  and  similar 
objects  worthwhile. 

Remaining  with  our  subject,  the  novel,  we  may  say  that  an 
investigation  of  nature  as  a  formative  element  is  much  easier 
than  is  that  of  man.  In  literary  criticism  we  are  accustomed  to 
find  statements  about  the  particular  tendency  or  ability  of  certain 
artists  to  describe  nature.  Very  little  has  been  said  of  the  various 
types  of  nature  descriptions  in  prose  works  and  still  less  about 
the  part  which  descriptions  of  nature  play  as  a  constructive 
power,  necessary  for  the  understanding  of  the  total  essence  of 
the  work,  or  as  a  mere  embellishment  with  no  other  reason 
than  that  of  serving  the  pleasure  of  the  reader.  In  the  first, 
artistically  significant,  case  there  are  various  patterns  or  types 
of  form,  and  in  each  individual  example  an  objective  picture 
of  the  artist's  aim  and  creative  ability  can  be  found.  The  results 
may  sometimes  be  surprising  j  here  I  am  able  to  offer  a  small  but 
concrete  example,  since  a  concrete  analysis  has  been  published.40 

In  the  history  of  the  German  novel,  Theodor  Fontane  holds 
an  eminent  place.  Fontane's  descriptions  of  North  German 
landscape,  an  inherent  and  distinct  element  in  his  best  novels, 
were  praised  by  critics  as  creative  achievements  of  high  quality. 
An  analysis  of  these  descriptions,  however,  showed  that  Fontane 
used  a  superficial  pattern,  introducing  the  descriptions  without 
necessary  inner  connection,  phrasing  them  rather  monoton- 
ously, and  using  them  as  a  kind  of  background  music.  Fontane 
was  clever,  but  not  a  creative  artist  in  his  descriptions  of  nature. 
His  quality  in  other  respects  has  thus  far  not  been  investigated. 
In  his  technical  dealing  with  nature  he  shows  a  tendency  toward 
ornament  or  embellishment.  In  the  history  of  human  taste,  in 
regard  to  literature,  fine  arts,  and  music — technical  ornamenta- 
tion has  been  one  of  the  safest  steps  to  popularity  and  has  often 
been  mistaken  for  true  art.  • 

"So  long  as  we  live  in  the  world  of  sense  impressions  alone  we 

40  Max  Tau,  Der  assoziative  Faktor  in  der  Landschajtt-  und  Ortsdarstellung 
Theodor  Fontanes  I  (1928). 


688  KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

merely  touch  the  surface  of  reality.  Awareness  of  the  depth  of 
things  always  requires  an  effort  on  the  part  of  our  active  and 
constructive  energies."41  The  active  and  constructive  energies 
have  not  yet  been  used  sufficiently  for  our  better  understanding 
of  the  means  which  make  it  possible  for  a  creative  artist  to  show, 
in  a  symbol,  a  concretion  of  his  poetic  world.  Better  understand- 
ing does  not  mean  destructive  analysis  or  hair-splitting.  I  be- 
lieve with  Cassirer  that  creative  art  is  the  noblest  activity  of 
man.  The  investigation  of  the  formative  elements  of  poetic 
creation  is  a  noble  task. 

KONSTANTIN  REICHARDT 

DEPARTMENT  OF  GERMANIC  LANGUAGES 

YALE  UNIVERSITY 

41  Essay  on  Mant  169. 


2O 
John  Herman  Randall,  Jr. 

CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  HISTORY  AS  ILLUS- 
TRATED IN  HIS  TREATMENT  OF 
RENAISSANCE  THOUGHT 


20 

CASSIRER'S  THEORY  OF  HISTORY  AS  ILLUS- 
TRATED IN  HIS  TREATMENT  OF 
RENAISSANCE  THOUGHT 

Die  Aufgabe  der  Geschichte  besteht  nicht  lediglich 
darin,  dass  sie  uns  vergangenes  Sein  und  Leben  kennen 
lehrt,  sondern  dass  sie  es  uns  deuten  lehrt.  .  .  .  Was  uns 
tatsachlich  von  der  Vergangenheit  aufbewahrt  ist,  sind 
bestimmte  historische  Denkmaler:  "Monumente"  in 
Wort  und  Schrift,  in  Bild  und  Erz.  Zur  Geschichte  wird 
dies  fur  uns  erst,  indem  wir  in  diesen  Monumenten 
Symbole  sehen,  an  denen  wir  bestimmte  Lebensformen 
nicht  nur  zu  erkennen,  sondern  kraft  deren  wir  sie 
fur  uns  wiederherzustellen  vermogen. 

— Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften,  85,  86. 

IN  THE  work  of  Ernst  Cassirer,  historical  and  systematic 
studies  were  not  only  carried  on  side  by  side,  they  were 
woven  together  and  used  to  illuminate  each  other.  From  the 
outset  he  brought  his  great  gifts  for  historical  interpretation 
to  bear  on  strengthening  and  extending  the  philosophy  of 
humanism  he  found  in  Kant.  The  autonomy  of  reason,  the 
creativity  of  the  human  spirit,  der  Wille  zur  Gestaltung — this 
was  Cassirer's  central  vision.  It  gave  him  a  consuming  interest 
in  all  the  products  of  the  human  mind  and  in  the  processes  by 
which  they  have  been  created — in  what  he  came  to  call  "the 
universe  of  symbols."  "History  as  well  as  poetry  is  an  organon 
of  our  self-knowledge,  an  indispensable  instrument  for  build- 
ing up  our  human  universe."1  The  autonomy  of  thought  was  the 
lesson  he  learned  from  history  5  it  was  also  the  principle  of 
interpretation  he  brought  to  the  past  to  make  it  speak  to  us. 
Hence  his  special  interest  and  love  went  out  to  those  periods 

*  An  Essay  on  Man,  (1944),  206. 

691 


692  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

in  the  past  when  men  were  most  keenly  aware  of  their  own 
productive  powers  and  responsibility — to  those  periods  in  which 
a  creative  humanism  was  most  alive,  and  was  forging  its 
weapons.  Closest  to  his  heart  was  the  great  humanistic  move- 
ment in  the  classic  literature  and  philosophy  of  eighteenth- 
century  Germany.  In  Goethe  and  in  Kant  he  found  the  culmina- 
tion at  once  of  an  emancipated  imagination  and  an  autonomous 
reason}  here  poetry,  science  and  philosophy  had  at  last  reached 
maturity  and  began  to  realize  their  "unendliche  Aujgabe." 
Dear  also  was  the  Greek  humanism  of  antiquity,  above  all  of 
Plato,  which  classic  German  humanism  had  used  as  an  instru- 
ment to  build  its  own  human  universe.  And  dear  was  the 
emancipating  thought  of  that  Renaissance  which  had  earlier 
turned  to  antiquity  to  win  its  liberation  from  the  theocentric 
world  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  to  create  its  own  "jreies  welt- 
Uches  Bildungsideal."2 

All  three  of  these  creative  humanistic  movements  of  the  past, 
Cassirer  held,  can  furnish  inspiration  and  sources  of  power  for 
creating  further  forms  of  culture  in  the  future.  When  by  care- 
ful historical  study  we  have  learned  to  understand  their  lan- 
guage, they  can  free  us  both  from  the  optimism  of  a  Hegel  and 
from  the  fatalistic  pessimism  of  a  Spengler.  Once  we  have 
achieved  "a  humanistic  foundation  for  culture,"  we  shall  find 
that  "action  once  more  has  free  scope  to  decide  by  its  own 
power  and  on  its  own  responsibility,  and  it  knows  that  the  direc- 
tion and  future  of  culture  will  depend  on  the  way  it  decides."3 

"A  humanistic  foundation  for  culture" — thus  Cassirer  had 
come  to  see  his  task.  How  then  can  we  explain  the  central  role 
he  always  gave  to  natural  science  in  human  thought  and  in  his 
historical  studies?  How  can  we  reconcile  his  humanism  with  his 
major  contribution  to  the  history  of  philosophy,  his  making  the 
history  of  scientific  thought  an  integral  part  of  it?  How  was  it 
that  Cassirer  the  humanist  became  one  of  the  outstanding  his- 
torians of  science  of  our  times? 

*  Freiheit  und  Form  (1916),  3. 

8  "Naturalistische  und  humanistische  Begrundung  der  Kulturphilosophie," 
Goteborgs  Kung.  Vetenskafs-  och  Vitterhets—Samhalles  Handlingar,  Femte 
Foljden,  Ser.  A,  Band  7,  No.  3  (1939),  p.  28. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  693 

This  seems  a  paradox  only  so  long  as  we  remain  with  the 
conventional  opposition  between  the  humanist  and  the  scientist. 
As  William  James  pointed  out,  "You  can  give  humanistic  value 
to  almost  anything  by  teaching  it  historically.  Geology,  eco- 
nomics, mechanics  are  humanities  when  taught  with  reference  to 
the  successive  achievements  of  the  geniuses  to  which  these 
sciences  owe  their  being."  Natural  science  Cassirer  always 
looked  upon  as  the  highest  and  most  characteristic  expression 
of  the  powers  of  the  human  mind.  Even  when,  as  a  young 
student,  he  was  most  under  the  spell  of  Kant's  scientific  inter- 
ests, with  his  teacher  Hermann  Cohen  he  emphasized  this 
humanistic  import  of  the  exact  sciences.  Mathematics  and 
mathematical  physics  were  always  for  him  great  creative  enter- 
prises of  the  human  spirit,  forms  of  Socratic  self-knowledge. 
In  analyzing  precisely  the  concepts  and  methods  by  which  men 
have  constructed  their  natural  science,  we  are  really  analyzing 
the  nature  of  man  himself.  Hence  from  his  earliest  work  on 
Leibniz  down  to  the  penetrating  studies  he  wrote  in  Sweden 
and  in  this  country,  the  history  of  natural  science,  the  meaning 
and  interpretation  of  its  epoch-making  creative  achievements, 
formed  the  core  of  his  investigation  into  the  nature  of  man. 

We  have  only  to  consider  his  interpretation  of  the  humanistic 
movement  of  the  Renaissance.  Of  his  favorite  historical  periods, 
this  is  the  one  in  which  science  is  conventionally  held  to  have 
played  the  most  minor  role.  From  Burckhardt  down,  the  control- 
ling interests  of  the  Renaissance  have  been  thought  to  be  irrele- 
vant to,  if  not  actually  opposed  to  the  development  of  natural 
science.  Historians  of  science,  like  Lynn  Thorndike,  have  in  turn 
even  questioned  the  existence  of  any  significant  "Renaissance."4 
But  for  Cassirer,  the  "discovery  of  the  individual,"  that  humanis- 
tic task  of  Renaissance  thought,  "as  the  Renaissance  pursued  it  in 
poetry,  in  the  plastic  arts,  in  religious  and  political  life,  found 
its  philosophical  conclusion  and  its  philosophical  justification" 
in  the  scientific  achievements  of  Galileo  and  Descartes.5 

But   highly   as    Cassirer   esteemed   man's   self-expression 

4  "Renaissance  or  Prenaissance?"  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  IV  (1943), 

65-74. 

8  "Descartes'  Wahrheitsbegriff,"  Tkeoria,  III  (Gothenburg,  1937),  176. 


694  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

through  natural  science,  the  Kantian  limitation  of  truth  to 
mathematical  physics  was  from  the  beginning  far  too  narrow  for 
him.  As  early  as  the  Substanzbegriff  in  1910,  he  attempted  a 
further  analysis  of  the  concepts  and  methods  of  chemistry.  More 
recently  he  did  the  same  for  biology.6  But  his  outstanding  theo- 
retical achievement  was  to  carry  through  a  similar  methodo- 
logical analysis  of  all  those  other  "symbolic  forms"  which  man 
makes  and  which  make  man  known  to  himself.  An  analysis  of 
the  "logic  of  the  cultural  sciences" — of  the  categories  and  con- 
cepts, the  methods  and  notions  of  truth  and  of  objectivity  by 
which  men  interpret  these  symbolic  expressions  of  their  life — 
came  more  and  more  to  occupy  the  center  of  his  attention.  Only 
by  sharpening  these  tools  of  interpretation  can  we  make  a 
knowledge  of  what  man  has  created  in  his  culture  in  the  past 
into  a  genuine  "humanistic  foundation  for  the  culture"  of  the 
future.7 

Cassirer  saw  the  "cultural  sciences"  as  embracing  primarily 
linguistics,  the  sciences  of  art,  and  the  sciences  of  religion.  And 
with  them  belongs  history,  so  fundamental  a  part  of  them  all. 
Cassirer  did  not  attempt  to  formulate  with  precision  the  distinc- 
tive concepts  and  methods  of  historical  investigation  and  inter- 
pretation until  the  latter  part  of  his  life.  He  then  developed 
his  analysis  in  critical  opposition  to  most  of  the  theories  of 
history  of  the  last  generation  in  Germany,  and  against  the  back- 
ground of  his  general  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms.  But  his 
thought  is  also  obviously  his  own  aims  and  procedures  come  to 
critical  self-awareness }  he  tested  other  views  by  what  he  had 
already  learned  during  his  own  practice  as  an  intellectual  his- 
torian. With  a  thinker  so  conscious  of  method  as  Cassirer,  it  is 
doubly  important  to  start  any  examination  of  his  actual  histori- 
cal work  from  his  own  statement  of  his  theoretical  views  as  to 
the  nature  and  procedure  of  the  historian's  enterprise.  "No- 
body," he  says,  "could  ever  attempt  to  write  a  history  of  mathe- 
matics or  philosophy  without  having  a  clear  insight  into  the 
systematic  problems  of  the  two  sciences.  The  facts  of  the  philo- 

*Z«r  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften  (Gothenburg,  1942),  100-1045  see  also 
the  forthcoming  fourth  volume  of  the  Erkenntnisproblem. 
7  See  Zur  Logtk  der  Kulturwissenschaften. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  695 

sophical  past,  the  doctrines  and  systems  of  the  great  thinkers, 
are  meaningless  without  an  interpretation."8  Likewise,  no  one 
can  hope  to  understand  Cassirer's  historical  practice  without  a 
knowledge  of  what  he  conceives  to  be  the  questions  and  prob- 
lems the  historian  is  trying  to  answer. 

Consequently,  the  best  way  to  understand  what  Cassirer  has 
done  as  an  historian  is  in  terms  of  his  own  analysis  of  the  his- 
torian's aim.  This  makes  clear  not  only  why  he  has  proceeded 
as  he  has;  it  answers  the  questions  as  to  why  he  has  not  done 
other  things,  why  he  has  left  out  what  many  other  intellectual 
historians  would  want  to  include,  and  minimized  what  they 
would  make  central.  We  shall  start,  therefore,  with  a  statement 
of  Cassirer's  analysis  of  history. 

I 

Cassirer  belongs  with  those  who  find  a  sharp  difference  be- 
tween natural  science  and  history.  Physical  facts  are  not  like 
historical  facts,  though  neither  are  brute,  "hard"  data — both 
depend  on  theoretical  construction,  and  their  objectivity  is 
established  only  by  a  complicated  process  of  judgment.  Physical 
facts  are  determined  by  observation  and  experiment;  they  be- 
come part  of  the  physical  order  only  if  we  can  describe  them 
in  mathematical  language.  "A  phenomenon  which  cannot  be  so 
described,  which  is  not  reducible  to  a  process  of  measurement, 
is  not  a  part  of  our  physical  world."9  But  historical  facts  are  not 
established  by  observation  and  experiment,  nor  are  they  meas- 
ured and  expressed  in  mathematical  terms.  They  have  to  be 
given  "a  new  ideal  existence."  "Ideal  reconstruction,  not 
empirical  observation,  is  the  first  step  in  historical  knowledge."10 
A  scientific  fact  is  always  the  answer  to  a  question;  the  object 
is  always  there  to  be  questioned.  But  the  historian's  questions 
cannot  be  directed  immediately  toward  the  past  he  is  trying  to 
understand;  they  must  be  addressed  rather  to  documents  or 
monuments.  His  data,  indeed,  are  not  things  or  events,  but 
symbols  with  a  meaning;  he  confronts  a  world  of  symbols  to  be 

8  Essay  on  Man,  179. 
9 1  bid.,  174. 
10  Ibid. 


696  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

interpreted.  The  task  of  the  historian  is  thus  not  the  mathemati- 
cal expression  of  observed  events,  but  the  interpretation  of 
symbols. 

Cassirer  rejects,  however,  those  distinctions  between  natural 
science  and  historical  knowledge  which  have  been  most  popular 
in  recent  discussion  of  historical  knowledge  and  historical  truth, 
especially  in  Germany.  History  has  no  distinctive  "logic"  of  its 
own.  Logic 

is  one  because  truth  is  one.  In  his  quest  of  truth  the  historian  is  bound 
to  the  same  formal  rules  as  the  scientist.  In  his  modes  of  reasoning 
and  arguing,  in  his  inductive  inferences,  in  his  investigation  of  causes, 
he  obeys  the  same  general  laws  of  thought  as  a  physicist  or  a  biologist. 
So  far  as  these  fundamental  theoretical  activities  of  the  human  mind 
are  concerned,  we  can  make  no  discrimination  between  the  different 
fields  of  knowledge.  .  .  .  Historical  and  scientific  thought  are  distinguish- 
able not  by  their  logical  form  but  by  their  objectives  and  subject  matter.11 

But  again,  the  difference  does  not  lie  in  the  fact  that  the 
objects  of  historical  knowledge  are  past.  Science  too  is  concerned 
with  the  past:  the  astronomer,  the  geologist,  the  paleontologist, 
all  succeed  in  disclosing  a  former  state  of  the  physical  world. 
Nor  does  the  difference  consist  in  the  historian's  concern  with 
individuals  —  the  view  of  Windelband  and  Rickert,  who  held 
that  science  aims  at  general  laws  and  universals,  history  at 
unique  events  and  particulars. 

It  is  not  possible  to  separate  the  two  moments  of  universality  and 
particularity  in  this  abstract  and  artificial  way.  A  judgment  is  always 
the  synthetic  unity  of  both  moments;  it  contains  an  element  of  uni- 
versality and  particularity.  These  elements  are  not  mutually  opposed; 
they  imply  and  interpenetrate  one  another.  "Universality"  is  not  a  term 
which  designates  a  certain  field  of  thought;  it  is  an  expression  of  the 
very  character,  of  the  function  of  thought.  Thought  is  always  universal.12 

On  the  other  hand,  many  natural  sciences,  like  geology,  de- 
termine concrete  and  unique  events.  Thus,  in  distinguishing 
history  from  natural  science,  Cassirer  avoids  many  of  the  theo- 
retical difficulties  of  those  who  have  sharply  divided  the  two 
realms.  Above  all,  he  does  not  rule  scientific  procedures  out  of 


Ibid.,  1  8  6. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  697 

the  historian's  method,  but  makes  them  necessary  if  not  sufficient 
conditions. 

The  real  difference,  Cassirer  concludes,  is  that  the  historian's 
object  is  human  life  and  human  culture. 

History  can  make  use  of  scientific  methods,  but  it  cannot  restrict  itself 
only  to  the  data  available  by  these  methods.  No  object  whatever  is 
exempt  from  the  laws  of  nature.  Historical  objects  have  no  separate 
and  self-contained  reality;  they  are  embodied  in  physical  objects.  But 
in  spite  of  this  embodiment  they  belong,  so  to  speak,  to  a  higher 
dimension.13 

The  historian  must  use  the  concepts  of  science  in  reconstructing 
the  past  from  its  present  traces,  just  like  the  geologist.  But  "to 
this  actual,  empirical  reconstruction  history  adds  a  symbolic 
reconstruction."14  Its  documents  are  not  dead  remnants  of  the 
past  but  living  messages  from  it  to  us.  The  historian  must  make 
us  understand  their  language.  Not  the  logical  structure  of 
historical  thought,  but  this  special  task  of  "interpretation,"  is 
his  distinguishing  mark. 

What  the  historian  is  in  search  of  is  the  materialization  of  the  spirit 
of  a  former  age.  He  detects  the  same  spirit  in  laws  and  statutes,  in 
charters  and  bills  of  right,  in  social  institutions  and  political  constitutions, 
in  religious  rites  and  ceremonies.  To  the  true  historian  such  material 
is  not  petrified  fact  but  living  form.  History  is  the  attempt  to  fuse 
together  all  these  disjecta  membra,  the  scattered  limbs  of  the  past  and 
to  synthesize  them  and  mold  them  into  new  shape.15 

The  historian  thus  aims  at  a  "palingenesis,"  a  rebirth  of  the 
past. 

...  an  understanding  of  human  life  is  the  general  theme  and  ultimate 
aim  of  historical  knowledge.  In  history  we  regard  all  the  works  of  man, 
and  all  his  deeds,  as  precipitates  of  his  life;  and  we  wish  to  reconstitute 
them  into  this  original  state,  we  wish  to  understand  and  feel  the  life 
from  which  they  are  derived.16 

All  human  works  are  forever  in  danger  of  losing  their  meaning. 
Their  reality  is  symbolic,  not  physical;  and  such  reality  never  ceases 

"Ibid.,  176. 
14  Ibid.,  177. 
"  Ibid. 
MIbid.t  178,  184. 


698  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

to  require  interpretation  and  reinterpretation.  ...  In  order  to  possess 
the  world  of  culture  we  must  incessantly  reconquer  it  by  historical 
recollection.  But  recollection  does  not  mean  merely  the  act  of  reproduc- 
tion. It  is  a  new  intellectual  synthesis — a  constructive  act.17 

The  historian,  consequently,  is  a  kind  of  "retrospective  proph- 
et." He  interprets  the  meaning  of  the  past  5  and  the  category 
of  meaning  is  not  to  be  reduced  to  the  category  of  being.  It  is, 
in  fact,  an  Ur$hanomeny  in  Goethe's  sense;  its  "origin"  is  an 
insoluble  question.  It  is  a  kind  of  "mutation"  in  evolutionary 
development  that  must  be  accepted  with  natural  piety.18 

If  we  seek  a  general  heading  under  which  we  are  to  subsume  historical 
knowledge  we  may  describe  it  not  as  a  branch  of  physics  but  as  a 
branch  of  semantics.  The  rules  of  semantics,  not  the  laws  of  nature, 
are  the  general  principles  of  historical  thought.  History  is  included  in 
the  field  of  hermeneutics,  not  in  that  of  natural  science.19 

In  this  work  of  historical  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of 
the  past,  the  historian  must  take  his  point  of  departure  from 
his  own  times. 

He  cannot  go  beyond  the  conditions  of  his  present  experience.  Historical 
knowledge  is  the  answer  to  definite  questions,  an  answer  which  must 
be  given  by  the  past;  but  the  questions  themselves  are  put  and  dictated 
by  the  present — by  our  present  intellectual  interests  and  our  present 
moral  and  social  needs.20 

The  questions  we  put  to  past  thinkers  are  determined  by  our 
understanding  of  our  own  problems.  Hence  the  need  for  con- 
tinual reinterpretation. 

As  soon  as  we  have  reached  a  new  center  and  a  new  line  of  vision  in 
our  own  thought  we  must  revise  our  judgments  ...  we  have  a  Stoic,  a 
sceptic,  a  mystic,  a  rationalistic,  and  a  romantic  Socrates.  They  are 
entirely  dissimilar.  Nevertheless  they  are  not  untrue;  each  of  them  gives 
us  a  new  aspect,  a  characteristic  perspective  of  the  historical  Socrates 
and  his  intellectual  and  moral  physiognomy.  .  .  .  We  have  a  mystic 
Plato,  the  Plato  of  neo-Platonism;  a  Christian  Plato,  the  Plato  of 

"Ibid.,  185. 

*  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften,  109-112. 

19  Essay  on  Man,  195. 

*lbid.,  178. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  699 

Augustine  and  Marsilio  Ficino;  a  rationalistic  Plato,  the  Plato  of  Moses 
Mendelssohn;  and  a  few  decades  ago  we  were  offered  a  Kantian  Plato. 
We  may  smile  at  all  these  different  interpretations.  .  .  .  They  have  all 
in  their  measure  contributed  to  an  understanding  and  to  a  systematic 
valuation  of  Plato's  work.  Each  has  insisted  on  a  certain  aspect  which 
is  contained  in  this  work.  .  .  .21 

When  we  turn  from  the  history  of  ideas  to  "real"  history 
—  to  the  history  of  man  and  human  actions,  the  same  holds 
true.  In  political  history  we  wish  to  understand  not  only  the 
actions  but  the  actors.  "Our  judgment  of  the  course  of  political 
events  depends  upon  our  conception  of  the  men  who  were 
engaged  in  them.  As  soon  as  we  see  these  individual  men  in 
a  new  light  we  have  to  alter  our  ideas  of  these  events."22  Hence 
what  Cassirer  is  emphasizing  is  a  personal  interpretation  of  his- 
tory, in  which  the  key  is  in  the  last  analysis  the  personality  and 
character  of  outstanding  men.  And  history  is  for  him  "per- 
sonal" in  a  double  sense.  Not  only  does  the  historian  look  for 
"a  human  and  cultural  life  —  a  life  of  actions  and  passions,  of 
questions  and  answers,  of  tensions  and  solutions."  He  must 
also  give  a  "personal"  interpretation  of  these  other  personalities, 
a  "personal  truth." 

He  infuses  into  his  concepts  and  words  his  own  inner  feelings  and  thus 
gives  them  a  new  sound  and  a  new  color  —  the  color  of  personal 
life.  ...  If  I  put  out  the  light  of  my  own  personal  experience  I  cannot 
see  and  I  cannot  judge  of  the  experience  of  others.  Without  a  rich 
personal  experience  in  the  field  of  art  no  one  can  write  a  history  of  artj 
no  one  but  a  systematic  thinker  can  give  us  a  history  of  philosophy.23 

Cassirer  cites  Ranke  as  his  model  —  not  the  Ranke  of  the  fa- 
miliar precept  of  impersonality,  but  the  Ranke  who  actually 
wrote  history  with  a  universal  "personal"  sympathy  —  a  sympa- 
thy which  was  intellectual  and  imaginative,  not  emotional. 

The  procedure  of  the  historian,  therefore,  is  that  of  the  inter- 
preter of  another  human  personality.  Thus,  to  understand 
Cicero's  role  in  the  events  in  which  he  took  part,  and  to  under- 


.,  i  so. 

"Ibid.,  1  8  1. 

"/«*,,  187. 


700       JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

stand  those  events  themselves,  we  must  first  of  all  understand 
his  personality  and  character. 

To  this  end  some  symbolic  interpretation  is  required.  I  must  not  only 
study  his  orations  or  his  philosophical  writings;  I  must  read  his  letters 
to  his  daughter  Tullia  and  his  intimate  friends;  I  must  have  a  feeling 
for  the  charms  and  defects  of  his  personal  style.  Only  by  taking  all  this 
circumstantial  evidence  together  can  I  arrive  at  a  true  picture  of  Cicero 
and  his  role  in  the  political  life  of  Rome.  Unless  the  historian  remains 
a  mere  annalist,  unless  he  contents  himself  with  a  chronological  narration 
of  events,  he  must  always  perform  this  very  difficult  task;  he  must 
detect  the  unity  behind  innumerable  and  often  contradictory  utterances 
of  a  historical  character.24 

In  this  delicate  task  he  must  be  selective}  but  not  necessarily 
of  those  events  which  have  had  important  practical  conse- 
quences, as  Eduard  Meyer  held}  he  will  single  out  those  acts  or 
remarks  which  are  "characteristic,"  whose  importance  lies  not 
in  their  consequences  but  in  their  semantic  meaning,  as  "sym- 
bols" of  characters  and  events. 

The  true  historian  must  thus  be  not  only  a  trained  scientific 
investigator,  he  must  be  an  artist  as  well. 

But  even  though  we  cannot  deny  that  every  great  historical  work 
contains  and  implies  an  artistic  element,  it  does  not  thereby  become 
a  work  of  fiction.  In  his  quest  for  truth  the  historian  is  bound  by  the 
same  strict  rules  as  the  scientist.  He  has  to  utilize  all  the  methods  of 
empirical  investigation.  He  has  to  collect  all  the  available  evidence  and 
to  compare  and  criticize  all  his  sources.  He  is  not  permitted  to  forget 
or  neglect  any  important  fact.  Nevertheless,  the  last  and  decisive  act  is 
always  an  act  of  the  productive  imagination.25 

I  well  remember  a  conversation  with  Cassirer,  in  which  I  was 
trying  to  establish  some  continuity  between  the  procedures  of 
the  scientist — whom  I  do  not  take  in  strictly  Kantian  terms  as 
the  mathematical  physicist  alone — and  of  the  historian.  He 
admitted  that  the  closest  parallel  in  natural  science  to  what  the 
historian  has  to  do  is  the  physician's  diagnosis  of  the  ailment  of 
his  patient,  in  which  all  his  scientific  knowledge  is  brought  to 


182. 
85  Ibid.,  204. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  701 

bear  upon  a  particular  case.  But  he  went  on  to  insist  that  the 
historian  must  proceed  always  like  the  biographer  of  a  man.  He 
must  gather  together  all  his  evidence — evidence  which  is  "sym- 
bolic" of  the  character  of  the  man  he  is  considering — and  then 
try  to  find  that  unifying  focus  or  "center"  from  which  all  the 
manifestations  of  that  character  can  be  understood — what  he  is 
at  bottom  trying  to  do.  This  is,  of  course,  to  try  to  interpret  a 
thinker  in  terms  of  his  central  problem — in  terms,  as  Ebbing- 
haus  put  it,  of  "was  er  eigentlich  will"  This  seems,  indeed,  the 
height  of  wisdom  in  interpreting  the  thought  of  any  individual. 
But  it  is  significant  that  Cassirer  used  this  example  as  the  way 
to  interpret  all  history.  It  illustrates  what  I  have  called  his 
"personal"  view  of  the  historian's  enterprise;  and  it  throws  a 
flood  of  light  on  what  he  does  not  do  in  his  historical  studies — 
on  his  complete  indifference  to  any  economic  interpretation  of 
intellectual  history,  for  example. 

Cassirer's  analysis  of  the  aim  and  function  of  the  historian  is 
well  summed  up  in  the  following  passage  from  Zur  Logik  der 
Kulturwissenschaften : 

The  task  of  history  does  not  consist  merely  in  making  us  acquainted 
with  past  existence  and  life,  but  in  showing  us  how  to  interpret  its 
meaning.  All  mere  knowledge  of  the  past  would  remain  for  us  a  "dead 
picture  on  a  board"  if  no  other  powers  than  those  of  the  reproductive 
memory  were  involved.  What  memory  preserves  of  facts  and  events 
becomes  historical  recollection  only  when  we  can  relate  it  to  our  inner 
experience  and  transform  it  into  such  experience.  Ranke  said  that  the 
real  task  of  the  historian  consists  in  describing  "wie  es  eigentlich 
gewesen."  But  even  if  we  accept  this  statement,  it  is  still  true  that 
what  has  been,  when  it  comes  into  the  perspective  of  history,  finds  there 
a  new  meaning.  History  is  not  simply  chronology,  and  historical  time 
is  not  objective  physical  time.  The  past  is  not  over  for  the  historian  in 
the  same  sense  as  for  the  investigator  of  nature ;  it  possesses  and  retains 
a  present  of  its  own.  The  geologist  may  report  about  a  past  form  of 
the  earth;  the  paleontologist  may  tell  us  of  extinct  organic  forms.  All 
this  "existed"  at  one  time,  and  cannot  be  renewed  in  its  existence  and 
actual  character.  History,  however,  never  tries  to  set  before  us  mere 
past  existence ;  it  tries  to  show  us  how  to  grasp  a  past  life.  The  content 
of  this  life  it  cannot  renew;  but  it  tries  to  preserve  its  pure  form.  The 
wealth  of  different  concepts  of  form  and  of  style  which  the  cultural 


702  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

sciences  have  worked  out  serves  in  the  last  analysis  a  single  end:  only 
through  them  all  is  the  rebirth,  the  "palingenesis"  of  culture  possible. 
What  is  actually  preserved  for  us  from  the  past  are  particular  historical 
monuments:  "monuments"  in  word  and  writing,  in  picture  and  in 
bronze.  This  does  not  become  history  for  us  until  in  these  monuments 
we  see  symbols,  through  which  we  can  not  only  recognize  definite 
forms  of  life,  but  by  virtue  of  which  we  can  restore  them  for  ourselves.26 

II 

This  is  Cassirer's  statement  of  the  fundamentally  humanistic 
task  of  the  historian.  By  entering  into  the  spirit  of  former  ages, 
he  can  reveal  man  to  himself,  and  in  so  doing  enlarge  man's 
imaginative  sympathies  beyond  the  narrow  limits  of  the  present 
cultural  expressions  of  what  man  is. 

Like  language  or  art,  history  is  fundamentally  anthropomorphic.  .  .  . 
History  is  not  knowledge  of  external  facts  or  events;  it  is  a  form  of 
self-knowledge.  ...  In  history  man  constantly  returns  to  himself;  he 
attempts  to  recollect  and  actualize  the  whole  of  his  past  experience. 
But  the  historical  self  is  not  a  mere  individual  self.  It  is  anthropomorphic, 
but  it  is  not  egocentric.  Stated  in  the  form  of  a  paradox,  we  may  say 
that  history  strives  after  an  "objective  anthropomorphism."  By  making 
us  cognizant  of  the  polymorphism  of  human  existence,  it  frees  us 
from  the  freaks  and  prejudices  of  a  special  and  single  moment.  It  is 
this  enrichment  and  enlargement,  not  the  effacement,  of  the  self,  of 
our  knowing  and  feeling  ego,  which  is  the  aim  of  historical  knowl- 
edge." 

With  this  statement  of  a  humanistic  historical  enterprise,  of  its 
emancipating  function  in  liberating  us  from  the  provincialism 
of  the  present,  and  of  the  imaginative  enrichment  and  enhance- 
ment it  can  bring,  no  sensitive  man  could  quarrel.  Nor  could 
the  methodologist  seriously  doubt  that  Cassirer's  procedure  is 
appropriate  to  this  goal  of  his.  Not  even  the  embattled  pro- 
ponent of  the  unity  of  intellectual  method  could  take  real  issue 
with  that  added  "dimension"  which  Cassirer  finds  in  history,  or 
with  the  "artistic  element,"  the  final  work  of  the  "productive 

M  Zitr  Log'rk  der  Kulturwissenschaften,  85. 
*;  Essay  on  Man,  191. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  703 

imagination,"  which  he  sees  it  demanding.  Cassirer  has  no 
scorn  for  "mere"  science.  He  is  only  too  anxious  to  make  use 
of  all  the  help  which  "scientific  methods"  can  furnish. 

Philosophic  reflection  upon  the  fact  of  history  and  upon  the 
ways  in  which  it  can  be  construed  and  understood  might,  indeed, 
point  out  that  these  ways  are  many  and  diverse.  Cassirer's 
humanistic  enterprise  is  but  one  of  many  types  of  historical  in- 
vestigation, each  of  which  has  its  own  function  and  validity.  Like 
most  of  those  who  have  given  thoughtful  consideration  to 
historical  goals  and  methods,  especially  if  they  have  been  men 
who  have  themselves  long  and  fruitfully  pursued  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  meaning  of  the  past,  Cassirer  is  too  ready  to  set  up 
his  own  distinctive  conceptions  and  working  principles  as  the 
sufficient  model  for  every  approach  to  the  past.  But  it  is  not 
only  human  existence  that  exhibits  a  "polymorphism"}  so  like- 
wise does  men's  concern  with  their  living  past.  It  is  doubtless 
a  "prejudice  of  the  moment"  to  identify  one's  own  historical 
enterprise  with  the  task  of  "history"  in  general.  In  the  his- 
torian's house  are  many  mansions;  and  a  comprehensive  analysis 
of  the  ways  in  which  history  may  be  understood,  and  in  which 
that  understanding  may  illuminate  human  life  today,  would 
have  to  examine  the  specific  functions  and  contributions  of  each. 
That  task  Cassirer  has  not  attempted. 

What  the  historian,  even  the  intellectual  historian,  is  likely  to 
find  most  questionable  in  Cassirer's  "symbolic  reconstruction" 
of  the  spirit  of  past  ages  in  terms  of  the  achievement  of  great 
men,  is  his  almost  total  lack  of  concern  with  any  questions  of 
historical  causation.  Men  and  ages  in  the  past  thought  differ- 
ently from  each  other,  and  from  ourselves;  to  realize  this 
elementary  fact  is  an  enhancement  of  our  knowledge  of  man. 
But  no  mention  is  made  that  it  might  be  a  valid  problem  for 
historical  investigation  to  ask  why;  there  is  not  even  a  reasoned 
defense  of  a  negative  position  on  causation  in  history,  as  in 
theories  like  those  of  Croce  or  Collingwood.  So  far  as  Cassirer's 
analysis  goes,  thought  might  well  be  operating  in  a  vacuum. 
The  Hegelian  cast  of  the  passage  quoted  above  about  the  non- 
individual  self  actualizing  the  whole  of  its  past  experience  is 
obvious.  But  there  is  not  even  the  Hegelian  concern  with  the 


704       JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

"immanent"  development  of  thought.28  All  those  questions 
which  are  certainly  central  in  the  "spirit"  of  our  own  age,  as 
to  the  "dynamics"  in  history,  are  simply  omitted.  There  is,  in 
fact,.no  place  in  Cassirer's  discussion  where  it  would  be  fitting 
even  to  raise  the  problem  of  a  possible  influence  of  technological 
or  economic  factors  in  determining  the  issues  which  confront 
thinkers.  It  is  significant  that  in  criticizing  historical  determin- 
ism, Cassirer  examines  three  forms:  the  physicalistic  determin- 
ism of  the  French  positivists,  the  psychologistic  determinism  of 
Spengler,  and  the  metaphysical  determinism  of  Hegel.29  Eco- 
nomic determinism  is  not  so  much  as  mentioned.  Indeed,  it  is 
hard  to  ascertain  whether  the  social  sciences  and  their  subject 
matters  enter  into  Cassirer's  thought  at  all.  Certainly  neither 
as  symbolic  forms  nor  as  heuristic  principles  do  they  figure  in  his 
historical  enterprise,  nor  are  they  ever  mentioned  as  "Kulturwis- 
senschajten" 

Cassirer,  however,  is  surely  right  in  pointing  out  that  the 
questions  the  historian  puts  to  the  past  are  the  questions  that  are 
central  in  his  own  philosophic  understanding  of  the  world.  As 
he  maintains,  only  a  philosopher  can  write  a  significant  history 
of  philosophy;  and  what  he  finds  significant  in  past  philosophies 
will  depend  on  his  own.  Hence  Cassirer's  statement  of  his  con- 
ception of  the  task  of  the  historian  is  so  intimately  bound  up 
with  his  systematic  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms  that  a  search- 
ing examination  would  have  to  come  to  grips  with  that  philoso- 
phy. This  is  not  the  place  for  such  an  undertaking.  We  can  only 
be  grateful  that  any  set  of  leading  principles,  when  applied  by 
a  mind  with  a  scholar's  equipment  and  scrupulous  conscience 
before  facts,  is  bound  to  shed  a  great  light  and  reveal  new  rela- 

88  Cf.,  however,  Essay  on  Man,  180:  "The  history  of  philosophy  shows  us 
very  clearly  that  the  full  determination  of  a  concept  is  very  rarely  the  work  of 
that  thinker  who  first  introduced  that  concept.  For  a  philosophical  concept  is, 
generally  speaking,  rather  a  problem  than  the  solution  of  a  problem — and  the 
full  significance  of  this  problem  cannot  be  understood  so  long  as  it  is  still 
in  its  first  implicit  state.  It  must  become  explicit  in  order  to  be  comprehended 
in  its  true  meaning,  and  this  transition  from  an  implicit  to  an  explicit  state  is 
the  work  of  the  future." 

*  "Naturalistische  und  humanistische  Begrundung  der  Kulturphilosophie," 
of.  cit.,  12-14. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  705 

tions  and  meanings.  It  is  not  necessary  to  share  Cassirer's  exten- 
sion of  the  Kantian  approach  in  order  to  appreciate  his  actual 
historical  achievement. 

Ill 

But  it  is  necessary  to  understand  Cassirer's  approach  and  his 
theory  of  history  in  order  to  understand  why  that  achievement  is 
what  it  is.  Whatever  our  judgment  of  the  importance  of  his 
humanistic  conception  of  history,  or  of  the  validity  of  the  phi- 
losophy on  which  it  ultimately  depends,  it  remains  true  that  that 
conception  does  state  the  aim  and  method  he  himself  pursued. 
It  makes  clear  why  he  devoted  himself  with  such  success  to  the 
particular  historical  task  he  undertook,  and  why  he  set  about 
that  task  in  the  particular  way  he  did.  It  also  makes  clear  the 
reasons  for  the  self-imposed  limitations  of  his  historical  work 
— why  he  disregarded  the  problems  he  did,  and  why  he  gives 
no  answer  to  many  questions  that  have  interested  other  intel- 
lectual historians.  If  his  theory  of  history  grew  out  of  his  own 
practice,  that  practice  in  turn  can  be  taken  to  illustrate  the 
theory}  and  the  theory  will  furnish  his  own  apologia,  his  own 
answer  to  the  criticisms  that  have  been  directed  against  the  prac- 
tice. I  wish,  therefore,  to  turn  now  to  an  examination  of 
Cassirer's  treatment  of  the  Renaissance,  to  show  how  that  treat- 
ment illuminates  his  theory  and  how  it  can  be  understood  in 
terms  of  his  systematic  views. 

As  an  historical  interpreter,  a  "retrospective  prophet,"  Cas- 
sirer  aimed  to  recreate  the  past,  to  recapture  the  spirit  of  a 
former  age  and  to  understand  and  feel  it  from  within.  In  the 
Renaissance  as  a  whole,  or  in  any  of  the  figures  who  represented 
its  different  facets,  he  was  consequently  concerned  to  grasp  what 
was  most  distinctive  and  original,  not  what  was  merely  tra- 
ditional and  received  as  a  legacy.  His  studies  abound  in  phrases 
like  "a  wholly  new  feeling,"  "a  completely  different  concep- 
tion." The  Middle  Ages  serve  as  the  foil,  the  contrast;  they 
have  for  him  little  existence  in  their  own  right  as  themselves 
expressions  of  the  human  spirit  and  its  achievements.80 

80  For  Cassirer,  the  fundamental  trait  of  medieval  thought,  which  sets  it  off 


706  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

Cassirer  was  not  a  medievalist,  and  when  he  first  embarked 
on  his  pioneer  studies  of  Renaissance  thought  the  later  Middle 
Ages  were,  as  he  has  pointed  out,  largely  a  terra  incognita.™ 
That  a  closer  first-hand  acquaintance  with  the  complex  currents 
of  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  century  thought — an  acquaintance 
won  only  during  the  past  generation,  and  still  in  great  need  of 
enlargement — would  have  led  to  some  modification  of  his  inter- 
pretation of  Renaissance  figures,  especially  of  the  scientists,  is 
certainly  true.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  that  knowledge  would 
have  altered  fundamentally  his  judgments.  For  the  tracing  of 
continuities  and  antecedents  played  a  very  minor  part  in  his 
own  historical  enterprise.  What  interested  him  was  rather  the 
other  side  of  history's  shield,  its  novelties  and  new  achieve- 
sharply  from  that  of  the  Renaissance,  is  its  subjection  of  reason  to  an  external 
standard  and  authority.  "In  order  to  find  an  unchangeable,  an  absolute  truth, 
man  has  to  go  beyond  the  limit  of  his  own  consciousness  and  his  own  ex- 
istence. He  has  to  surpass  himself.  ...  By  this  transcendence  the  whole  method 
of  dialectic,  the  Socratic  and  Platonic  method,  is  completely  changed.  Reason 
gives  up  its  independence  and  autonomy.  It  has  no  longer  a  light  of  its  own; 
it  shines  only  in  a  borrowed  and  reflected  light.  If  this  light  fails,  human  reason 
becomes  ineffective  and  impotent.  ...  No  scholastic  thinker  ever  seriously  doubted 
the  absolute  superiority  of  the  revealed  truth.  .  .  .  The  Autonomy'  of  reason  was 
a  principle  quite  alien  to  medieval  thought."  The  Myth  of  the  State  (1946), 
83^5  95-  "The  discovery  of  truth  and  the  foundation  of  truth  [in  Thomas 
Aquinas]  is  withdrawn  from  individual  thinking  and  instead  handed  over  to 
the  Church  as  a  universal  institution."  "Descartes'  Wahrheitsbegriff,"  Theoria 
III  (1937),  174.  Speaking  of  Galileo,  he  says:  "Just  this  character  of  the 
completeness,  the  self-sufficiency,  the  autonomy  of  natural  knowledge  the  medieval 
system  of  doctrines  and  beliefs  could  not  recognize.  Here  there  could  be  no 
possible  compromise:  had  the  Church  accepted  Galileo's  new  conception  of  truth 
and  his  new  conception  of  nature,  it  would  have  been  giving  up  its  own  founda- 
tion. For  what  Galileo  is  demanding,  not  indeed  explicitly  but  implicitly,  is 
the  abandonment  of  the  dogma  of  original  sin.  For  him  there  is  no  corruption 
of  human  nature  through  which  it  has  been  led  astray  from  its  goal  of  the 
knowledge  of  truth  and  of  God."  "Wahrheitsbegriff  und  Wahrheitsproblem  bei 
Galilei,"  Scientia,  LXII  (1937),  130$  cf.  191-3. 

That  this  formulation  of  the  "medieval  conception  of  truth,"  in  the  light  of 
the  many  different  and  shifting  views  from  the  i3th  century  on,  is  hardly  adequate 
to  the  complexity  or  even  the  "autonomy"  achieved  by  reason  in  medieval 
philosophical  discussion,  no  impartial  student  of  medieval  intellectual  life  would 
be  likely  to  deny. 

M<<Some  Remarks  on  the  Question  of  the  Originality  of  the  Renaissance," 
Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  IV  (1943),  50. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  707 

ments;  this  concern  is  implicit  in  his  whole  enterprise  of 
"palingenesis."  He  had  a  genius  for  seizing  on  what  was 
geninely  original  in  a  thinker,  and  lifting  it  out  of  its  context 
in  what  was  merely  traditional.  The  traditional  he  freely  recog- 
nized} but  that  was  not  what  he  was  looking  for.  And,  having 
no  interest  in  causal  questions,  he  was  not  concerned  to  show 
how  a  man,  working  with  traditional  materials  upon  new  prob- 
lems, had  managed  to  strike  off  original  ideas.  He  loved  sharp 
contrasts,  the  setting  off  of  a  "wholly  new"  idea  against  its 
background.  Thus  his  symbolic  reconstruction  aimed  ultimately 
at  a  description,  an  intellectual  portrait  of  a  man's  ideas,  not  a 
genetic  analysis. 

He  stated  the  general  problem: 

Even  if  it  were  possible  to  answer  all  these  psychological,  sociological, 
and  historical  questions,  we  should  still  be  in  the  precincts  of  the  properly 
"human"  world;  we  should  not  have  passed  its  threshold.  All  human 
works  arise  under  particular  historical  and  sociological  conditions.  But 
we  could  never  understand  these  special  conditions  unless  we  were  able 
to  grasp  the  general  structural  principles  underlying  these  works.  In 
our  study  of  language,  art,  and  myth  the  problem  of  meaning  takes 
precedence  over  the  problem  of  historical  development.  .  .  .  The  neces- 
sity of  independent  methods  of  descriptive  analysis  is  generally  recog- 
nized. We  cannot  hope  to  measure  the  depth  of  a  special  branch  of 
human  culture  unless  such  measurement  is  preceded  by  a  descriptive 
analysis.  This  structural  view  of  culture  must  precede  the  merely  his- 
torical view.  History  itself  would  be  lost  in  the  boundless  mass  of  dis- 
connected facts  if  it  did  not  have  a  general  structural  scheme  by  means  of 
which  it  can  classify,  order,  and  organize  these  facts.  ...  As  Wolfflin. 
insists,  the  historian  of  art  would  be  unable  to  characterize  the  art  of 
different  epochs  or  of  different  individual  artists  if  he  were  not  in 
possession  of  some  fundamental  categories  of  artistic  description.52 

For  Cassirer,  it  is  clear,  the  "spirit  of  a  former  age"  is  caught  in 
a  descriptive  analysis,  not  in  a  causal  or  genetic  explanation. 

Cassirer  kept  in  touch  with  all  the  major  secondary  interpre- 
tations of  the  medieval  background  of  Renaissance  thought.  He 
did  not  dream  of  questioning  these  discovered  antecedents.  But 

M  Essay  on  Man,  6Si 


708  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

he  brushed  them  aside  with  some  impatience}  they  did  not  affect 
the  fundamental  question,  as  he  saw  it.  Typical  is  a  statement 
about  Galileo: 

The  antecedents  of  Galileo's  science  are  now  much  more  precisely 
known  than  they  were  a  few  decades  back.  When  I  began  my  studies 
in  Galileo  forty  years  ago,  this  field  was  largely  a  terra  incognita.  A 
turning-point  here  came  with  the  investigations  of  Duhem.  .  .  .  The 
antecedents  of  Galileo's  theory  of  method  have  also  been  thoroughly  and 
intensively  examined.  .  .  .  But  can  all  this  historical  evidence  seriously 
shake  our  conviction  of  the  incomparable  scientific  originality  of  Galileo? 
I  believe  that  it  can  only  serve  to  strengthen  this  conviction  and  to  sup- 
port it  with  new  arguments.  ...  A  work  like  the  dynamics  of  Galileo 
could  not  come  to  birth  all  at  once,  like  Athene  from  the  head  of  Zeus. 
It  needed  a  slow  preparation,  empirically  as  well  as  logically  and  meth- 
odologically. But  to  all  these  given  elements  Galileo  added  something 
completely  new.  .  .  .  All  this  is  wholly  new  and  unique — and  unique 
not  only  as  a  particular  discovery,  but  as  the  expression  of  a  scientific 
attitude  and  temper.33 

Or  take  his  judgment  of  Descartes: 

That  between  Descartes'  philosophy  and  the  scholastic  systems  there 
are  close  relations,  that  the  break  between  the  two  is  by  no  means  so 
sharp  as  it  often  appears  in  the  traditional  conception  and  presentation 
of  his  ideas:  this  cannot  be  contested  after  the  fundamental  investigation 
of  Gilson.  But  no  matter  how  many  points  of  contact  we  may  find 
between  medieval  and  Cartesian  thought,  the  whole  accent  of  knowledge 
still  changes  when  we  pass  from  one  to  the  other.  The  scholastics  and 
Descartes  can  agree  completely  in  assuming  and  establishing  definite 
particular  "truths" — as  in  the  ontological  proof  of  God — but  in  the 
conception  of  truth  itself,  in  the  explanation  of  its  "nature"  and  its  real 
meaning,  there  is  an  ineradicable,  a  radical  difference.  .  .  .  The  new  in 
Descartes  is  not  that  he  used  doubt  as  the  means  by  which  alone  we 
can  arrive  at  truth.  In  this  respect  Augustine  had  preceded  him.  But 

88  "Some  Remarks  on  the  Question  of  the  Originality  of  the  Renaissance," 
Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  IV  (1943),  50,  51.  Cf.  his  comparison  of  Galileo 
with  Machiavelli:  "Recent  research  has  taught  us  that  both  Machiavelli  and 
Galileo  had  their  precursors.  .  .  .  They  needed  a  long  and  careful  preparation. 
But  all  this  does  not  detract  from  their  originality.  What  Galileo  gave  in  his 
Dialogues  and  what  Machiavelli  gave  in  his  Prince  were  really  'new  sciences.' 
.  . .  Just  as  Galileo's  Dynamics  became  the  foundation  of  our  modern  science  of  na- 
ture, so  Machiavelli  paved  a  new  way  to  political  science."  Myth  of  the  State>  1 30. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  709 

Augustine's  maxim:  "Noli  foras  ire,  in  te  ipsum  redi,  in  interiore  homine 
habitat  veritas"  had  another  significance  from  Descartes'  return  to  the 
"Cogito."  The  inner  experience  that  is  here  denoted  is  not  that  of  pure 
knowledge,  but  that  of  the  will  and  of  religious  certainty.  .  .  .  The  prin- 
ciple of  doubt  becomes  for  Descartes  the  real  synthetic  constructive 
principle  of  knowledge.34 

Or,  in  another  field,  take  Cassirer's  illuminating  distinction 
between  Luther  and  medieval  mysticism: 

Here  there  is  the  closest  connection  between  Luther  and  the  reli- 
gious individualism  of  the  Middle  Ages,  as  it  is  expressed  in  mysticism  in 
particular.  But  on  the  other  hand  it  is  clear  that  the  conception  in  which 
this  connection  is  above  all  presented  contains  also  the  decisive  differ- 
ence. .  .  .  Together  with  the  dependence  on  objective  things,  mysticism 
destroys  at  the  same  time  every  principle  of  objective  imposition  of  form: 
the  "self"  that  it  seeks  is  wholly  without  form,  it  is  a  "self"  that  has 
divested  itself  of  all  finite  measure  and  limitation.  ...  In  contrast, 
Luther's  conception  of  freedom  and  of  individuality  contains  not  the 
mere  principle  of  the  denial  of  the  world,  but  in  that  principle  and 
because  of  it  the  principle  of  world  transformation.  The  value  of 
"working"  itself  is  not  destroyed  along  with  the  intrinsic  value  of 
particular  works.35 

And  finally: 

The  Platonism  of  the  new  age,  as  it  appears  in  the  Florentine 
Academy,  remains  in  its  beginnings  still  completely  bound  up  with 
Augustinianism  and,  as  it  were,  merged  in  it.  Relying  on  the  authority 
of  Augustine,  Ficino  himself  acknowledges,  he  first  dared  to  combine 
Christianity  with  Platonism.  Hence  it  is  not  the  discovery  of  the  "self" 
that  is  distinctive  for  the  Renaissance,  but  rather  the  circumstance  that 
a  fact  and  content  which  the  Middle  Ages  acknowledged  only  in  its 
religious  psychology  the  Renaissance  removed  from  this  connection  and 
exhibited  in  independence.86 

IV 

These  instances  make  clear  just  what  Cassirer  meant  by  "re- 
creating the  spirit  of  a  former  age."  They  also  illustrate  the 

*  "Descartes'    Wahrheitsbegriff,"    Thcoria    III    (1937),    173-5,    178-9.    Cf. 
Indvoiduum  und  Kosmos  (1927),  135. 
85  Freiheit  und  Form  (1916),  19-21. 
16  Das  Erkenntnisfroblem,  I  (1922;  third  ed.),  78. 


710  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

way  in  which  another  of  his  historical  principles  entered  in  to 
modify  and  give  direction  to  his  aim  of  symbolic  reconstruction. 
This  re-creation  is  to  be  no  mere  passive  act  of  reproduction,  we 
recall.87  It  is  rather  a  new  intellectual  synthesis,  a  new  Gestalt- 
ungy  a  new  creative,  constructive  act.  For,  though  the  answers 
to  the  historian's  questions  must  come  from  the  past,  the  ques- 
tions themselves  depend  on  his  own  interests  and  systematic 
problems.38  Cassirer's  central  concern  with  the  autonomy  of 
thought,  the  creativity  of  the  human  spirit,  not  only  directed 
his  attention  to  the  Renaissance  in  the  first  place,  but  made  him 
devote  to  its  thinkers  a  detailed  study  which  he  gave  only  in  a 
derived  sense  to  the  medieval  philosophers.  It  also  determined 
the  creative  achievements  and  ideas  he  would  single  out. 

This  is  most  apparent  in  his  great  Erkenntnis'problem.  The 
first  volume  includes  a  careful  and  penetrating  analysis  of  al- 
most all  the  major  Renaissance  thinkers,  beginning  with 
Cusanus.  Its  successive  editions  (1906,  1910)  brought  to  light 
a  great  wealth  of  material  then  nearly  unknown.  The  problem 
of  knowledge  is  very  broadly  construed,  and  upon  it  is  hung  an 
analysis  of  most  of  the  major  themes  of  Renaissance  thought.39 
The  store  of  otherwise  inaccessible  quotation  from  the  sources 
has  made  it  for  a  generation  one  of  the  most  useful  books  for 
the  student  of  the  period. 

But  the  volume  is  unmistakably  the  work  of  a  neo-Kantian 
philosopher.  The  reader  gets  at  times  the  impression  that  the 
Renaissance  was  populated  largely  with  Vorkantianer.  It  is  not 
that  Cassirer  actually  distorts  the  thought  of  the  men  he  is 
dealing  with ;  for  that  he  is  too  honest  and  scrupulous  a  scholar, 
and  too  largely  endowed  with  a  vivid  historical  sense.  His 
interpretations  have  stood  up  remarkably  well.  It  is  rather  that 
the  problems  he  singles  out  for  analysis  are  those  which  interest 
the  Kantian. 

*  Essay  on  Man,  185. 

88  Essay  on  Man,  178. 

89  Cf.  Erkenntnisproblem,  I,   13:  "In  general,  the  history  of  the  problem  of 
knowledge  will  mean  for  us  not  so  much  a  fart  of  the  history  of  philosophy — 
for   with   the   way   in   which   all   the   elements   in   a  philosophical   system   are 
internally   and    mutually    determined,    any   such    separation    would    remain    an 
arbitrary  limitation — as  rather  the  total  field  from  a  definite  point  of  view  and 
a  definite  approach." 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  711 

For  the  Erkenntnis^roblem^  of  course,  was  undertaken  to 
furnish  historical  confirmation  of  "the  power  and  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  mind."  It  was  designed  to  exhibit  all  scientific 
concepts  "as  the  meaqs  by  which  thought  wins  and  makes  secure 
its  dominance  over  appearances."  It  belongs  with  the  learned 
and  penetrating  historical  studies  of  that  other  "critical  idealist," 
Leon  Brunschvicg,  as  an  historical  proof  that  science  is  a  con- 
struction and  creation  of  "reason" — the  reason  embodied  in  the 
concrete  social  enterprise  of  science.  By  an  analysis  of  the  de- 
velopment of  scientific  thought  it  establishes  the  same  position 
which  the  Substanzbegriff  reaches  by  its  systematic  analysis.  "In 
regarding  the  presuppositions  of  science  as  having  come  about, 
we  are  at  the  same  time  recognizing  them  as  creations  of 
thought  j  in  discovering  its  historical  relativity  and  conditions, 
we  are  opening  up  the  prospect  of  its  never-ending  progress  and 
its  ever-renewed  productivity."40 

History  becomes  the  completion  and  the  touchstone  of  the  results  which 
the  analysis  and  reduction  of  the  content  of  the  sciences  gives  us.  ... 
The  analytic  task  imposed  on  modern  thought  finds  its  logical  conclusion 
in  the  system  of  Kant.  Here  is  taken  the  final  and  conclusive  step; 
knowledge  is  based  completely  on  itself,  and  nothing  further  in  the 
realm  of  being  or  of  consciousness  is  prior  to  its  own  legislative  activity.41 

As  Cassirer  moved  beyond  the  limits  of  a  narrow  Kantianism 
— he  came  to  be  provoked  that  the  label  was  still  attached  to 
him — this  apologetic  aim  and  direction  of  his  historical  studies 
became  less  intrusive.  He  had  reached  "a  new  center  and  a  new 
line  of  vision."  But  his  fundamental  humanism  remained,  and 
continued  to  dominate  his  interpretation  of  the  Renaissance, 
and  of  what  in  it  was  of  significance  and  importance.  The 
Individuum  tmd  Kosmos  is  not  a  neo-Kantian  book,  in  the  same 
sense  as  the  Erkenntnisfroblem.  If  anything,  as  its  very  title 
suggests,  it  is  Burckhardtian.42  But  it  is  uncompromisingly 
"humanistic"  in  Cassirer's  sense. 

*  Erkenntnisfroblem  (3rd  ed.,  1922),  I,  vi. 

41  Ibid.,  6,  13. 

"This  is  also  especially  true  of  the  brief  sketch  of  the  Italian  Renaissance 
in  the  Introduction  to  Freiheit  und  Form,  with  its  emphasis  on  the  "new  relation 
to  politics,"  and  "the  state  as  a  work  of  art." 


712  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

That  Cassirer  should  have  interpreted  Renaissance  thought 
from  the  standpoint  of  his  own  philosophic  vision  was  inevitable. 
What  is  more  important,  it  is  also  completely  consistent  with  his 
considered  conception  of  the  very  nature  of  historical  interpre- 
tation. If  it  be  a  shortcoming,  it  was  an  intentional  one.  Like  all 
perspectives,  to  be  sure,  it  is  a  limitation:  it  excluded  other 
aspects  of  the  Renaissance  from  the  center  of  his  attention. 
From  a  less  partial  point  of  view — perhaps  merely  from  a 
different  perspective,  one  that  I  happen  to  find  more  illumi- 
nating— Cassirer  was  prevented  by  his  Kantian  humanism  from 
realizing  the  full  significance  of  at  least  one  of  the  major  cur- 
rents of  Renaissance  thought.  He  appreciated  its  Humanism, 
and  he  analyzed  brilliantly  its  Platonism.  But  he  failed  to  see 
the  role  of  its  Aristotelianism.  He  did  not,  like  other  great 
students  of  Renaissance  thought — like  Gentile,  for  instance — 
dismiss  that  Aristotelianism  as  a  mere  survival  of  "scholasti- 
cism." His  analyses  of  Pomponazzi43  are  suggestive;  and  he  was 
the  first  to  call  attention  to  the  great  importance  of  Zabarella.44 
But  he  naturally  saw  in  Renaissance  Aristotelianism  primarily 
its  new  humanistic  element — which  was  great — and  not  its  still 
greater  naturalism.  And  since  he  did  not  adequately  bring  out 
the  significance  of  that  Aristotelianism,  he  did  not  contrast  it 
effectively  with  the  Platonistic  movement,  and  thus  failed  to 
reveal  the  full  significance  of  the  latter. 

The  contrast  between  the  Platonism  and  the  Aristotelianism 
of  the  Renaissance  is  at  bottom  one  between  a  modernistic  and 
a  naturalistic  humanism.  Both  focused  attention  on  man  and 
his  destiny 5  both  emphasized  individual  and  personal  values.45 

41  Erkenntnityrobleni)    I,    105-175    Individuum   und   Kosmos,    85-7,    108-12, 

143-49- 

44  Erkenntnisfroblem,  I,   117-20,   136-44. 

48  Cf.  Individuum  und  Kosmos,  148:  "Both  men,  Pomponazzi  as  well  as 
Ficino,  are  wrestling  with  the  problem  of  individuality}  both  are  trying  to  make 
the  phenomenon  of  the  Self*  the  center  of  psychology.  But  they  pursue  this  goal 
in  ways  that  are  completely  separate.  For  Ficino  it  is  the  purely  intellectual 
nature  of  man  which  can  alone  form  him  into  a  'self*  in  the  strict  sense,  and 
elevate  him  above  the  realm  of  all  that  is  merely  corporeal.  .  .  .  For  Pomponazzi, 
on  the  contrary,  individuality  is  not  to  be  asserted  against  Nature,  but  is  to  be 
derived  and  proved  from  Nature.  .  .  .  Just  as  Ficino  in  his  fight  for  the  rights 
and  the  uniqueness  of  the  individual  self  calls  for  help  upon  supernaturalism 
and  transcendence,  so  Pomponazzi  in  the  same  fight  calls  upon  naturalism  and 
immanence." 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  713 

In  this  sense  both  were  humanistic.  But  where  Ficino  and  the 
Platonists,  to  support  their  religious  modernism  and  "liberal- 
ism," went  back  to  the  Hellenistic  world,  to  Plutarch  and 
Alexandria,  Pomponazzi  and  the  greater  Zabarella  went  to 
ancient  Athens  to  find  inspiration  in  its  naturalistic  and  scientific 
thought.  Their  scientific  humanism  is  much  more  original  than 
the  religious  humanism  of  the  Florentines.  Where  the  Platon- 
ists vindicated  the  dignity  of  the  individual  soul  by  elevating  it 
in  freedom  above  nature,  the  Aristotelians  made  the  soul  a 
natural  inhabitant  of  an  orderly  universe.  Not  until  Spinoza 
and  the  eighteenth-century  Newtonians  is  there  another  figure 
who  effects  so  "modern"  a  blend  between  humanism  and  scien- 
tific naturalism  as  Pomponazzi  and  Zabarella.  They  are,  in 
fact,  the  spiritual  fathers  of  Spinoza's  religious  naturalism.  The 
historical  influence  of  the  Platonists  was  great.  But  the  Renais- 
sance Aristotelians  have  a  more  original  as  well  as  a  much 
sounder  philosophy,  and  one  which  much  more  closely  fore- 
shadows later  modern  thought. 

This  is  hardly  the  place  to  substantiate  this  interpretation, 
made  from  another  perspective  than  Cassirer's,  or  to  maintain 
— as  I  think  can  be  done — that  it  is  closer  to  the  problems  of 
Renaissance  thought  itself.  It  is  easier  to  show  that  Cassirer 
overemphasized  the  influence  of  Platonism  and  underempha- 
sized  that  of  the  Aristotelian  tradition  on  points  of  detail,  espe- 
cially in  the  development  of  science.  Galileo,  for  instance,  was 
much  closer  to  the  scientific  Aristotelianism  of  the  Italian 
schools,  and  much  farther  from  Plato,  than  Cassirer  realized.*8 

**  For  Cassirer's  view  of  Galileo's  "Platonism,"  see  Individuum  und  Kosmos, 
1785  "Galileo:  a  New  Science  and  a  New  Spirit,"  American  Scholar,  12  (1943)1 
10  j  "Descartes'  Wahrheitsbegriff,"  Theoria,  III  (1937),  168.  Cassirer  has  been 
very  cautious  in  asserting  the  Platonism  of  Galileo's  thought.  It  is  mentioned 
only  once  in  the  Erkenntnisfroblem  (I,  389),  and  does  not  appear  in  "Wahrheits- 
begriff  und  Wahrheitsproblem  bei  Galilei"  (Scientia,  LXII  [1937])  at  all.  In 
contrast  to  A.  Koyrc,  e.g.,  who  speaks  of  Galileo's  work  as  "an  experimental 
proof  of  Platonism,"  and  identifies  any  mathematical  science  of  nature  with 
"Platonism,"  ("Galileo  and  Plato,"  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  IV  [1943]) 
4285  cf.  also  his  Studes  Galileennes  [Paris,  1940]),  Cassirer  emphasizes  instead 
the  differences  between  Galileo's  and  Plato's  views.  "Galileo  had  still  another 
dualism  to  overcome  before  he  could  found  a  science  of  nature.  Plato  had  based 
his  philosophy  upon  the  presupposition  that  we  cannot  speak  of  a  science  of 
nature  in  the  same  sense  as  we  can  of  a  science  of  mathematics.  ...  It  was  most 
difficult  for  Galileo  to  combat  the  authority  of  Plato.  .  .  .  But  he  was  convinced 


714  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

And  Cassirer  likewise  fails  to  give  due  importance  to  the 
Aristotelian  background  of  the  Nature  philosophies  of  the 
Italian  Renaissance.  On  the  development  of  both  science  and 
Nature  philosophy  he  underestimates  the  influence  of  the  tra-* 
dition  of  Ockhamism.  And  he  undoubtedly  overestimated  that 
of  his  favorite  Cusanus,  as  he  came  reluctantly  to  admit/7 

that  in  his  own  work,  in  the  new  science  of  dynamics,  he  had  removed  the  barrier 
Plato  had  erected  between  mathematical  and  natural  science  5  for  this  new  science 
proved  nature  itself  a  realm  of  necessity  rather  than  of  chance."  "Galileo:  a 
New  Science  and  a  New  Spirit,"  American  Scholar,  12  (1943),  10.  Cf.  also 
"Descartes'  Wahrheitsbegriff,"  Theoria,  III  (1937),  168:  "So  long  as  the 
philosophical  orientation  was  directed  toward  Plato  alone,  and  to  a  certain 
extent  committed  to  him,  there  was  a  weighty  obstacle  opposed  to  the  carrying 
through  of  the  ideal  of  an  exact  science  of  nature."  And  Cassirer  distinguished 
sharply  between  the  "mathematical  mysticism"  of  much  of  the  Pythagoreanizing 
Platonism  of  the  Renaissance,  and  the  "mathematical  science  of  nature."  Cf. 
"Mathematische  Mystik  und  mathematische  Naturwissenschaft,"  Lychnos  (Upsala, 
1940).  In  his  final  judicious  analysis  ("Galileo's  Platonism,"  Studies  and  Essays 
in  the  History  of  Science  and  Learning  offered  in  homage  to  George  Sarton  (1947)  ) , 
Cassirer  identifies  Galileo's  very  novel  "physical  Platonism"  primarily  with  the 
hypothetical  method  of  "problematical  analysis"  he  found  in  the  Meno  as  well 
as  in  Euclid  and  Archimedes,  and  best  described  in  his  letter  to  Carcaville. 

But  if,  as  Cassirer  emphasizes,  Galileo  insists  that  the  subject-matter  of 
knowledge  is  not  an  intelligible,  "ideal"  world  dubiously  related  to  the  world 
of  natural  events,  but  is  rather  the  intelligible  structure  of  that  world  j  and  if  he 
also  insists  that  it  is  arrived  at  by  the  intellect  through  the  careful  analysis  of 
instances  of  it  encountered  in  sense  experience,  as  Aristotle  had  suggested  and 
the  Italian  methodolo gists  more  precisely  formulated — how  can  this  be  called 
a  "Platonism"  rather  than  an  "Aristotelianism"?  There  is  no  evidence  that 
Galileo  was  in  any  sense  touched  by  Platonic  metaphysics,  or  that  he  is  any  more 
of  a  Platonist  than  Aristotle  himself.  On  the  fundamental  issue  in  any  philosophy  of 
science,  the  relation  of  discourse  to  knowledge  and  to  the  subject-matter  of 
knowledge,  Galileo  was  one  with  the  Italian  tradition  of  realistic  Aristotelianism. 
Galileo's  distinction  was  his  startling  illustration  that  the  best  human  knowledge 
is  mathematics,  and  that  the  intelligible  structure  of  things  which  that  knowledge, 
when  clearly  formulated,  is  able  to  grasp,  is  mathematical  in  character.  Cf.  my 
"Development  of  Scientific  Method  in  the  School  of  Padua,"  Journal  of  the 
History  of  Ideas,  I  (1940),  204-6. 

*T"I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  revise  a  former  statement  made  in 
my  Individuum  und  Kosmos.  In  the  second  chapter  I  tried  to  show  that  Nicholas 
of  Cusa's  philosophy  exerted  a  strong  influence  on  the  general  development  of 
Italian  thought  in  the  Quattrocento.  I  still  think  this  to  be  highly  probable,  but 
I  should  perhaps  have  spoken  with  more  caution.  I  quite  agree  that,  on  the 
strength  of  new  historical  evidence,  we  can  not  give  a  direct  and  definite  proof 
of  this  thesis.  It  is  possible  that  Ficino  conceived  his  general  theory  independently 
of  Nicholas  of  Cusa.  In  this  case  the  close  relationship  between  the  two  thinkers 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  715 

But  when  all  this  has  been  pointed  out,  it  remains  true  that, 
in  importing  the  issues  of  a  later  day  into  his  study  of  the 
Renaissance,  Cassirer  had  instruments  with  which  to  ask  ques- 
tions. Even  should  we  end  by  drastically  modifying  his  interpre- 
tation of  Renaissance  thought,  his  questions  have  taught  us  an 
immense  amount.  What  he  learned  forms  the  basis  on  which  we 
have  asked  our  own  questions.  And  in  the  course  of  putting  his 
questions  to  the  Renaissance,  Cassirer  was  led  much  nearer  to 
the  problems  of  the  Renaissance  itself.  There  is  a  vast  difference 
between  the  Erkenntnisfroblem  and  late  studies  like  those  of 
Pico,  Ficino,  Galileo  and  Descartes.48  The  closer  we  can  get  to 
the  problems  of  the  Renaissance  itself,  and  the  farther  we  can 
get  away  from  viewing  them  in  terms  of  problems  of  a  later 
incidence,  the  more  likely  we  are  to  arrive  at  a  genuine  his- 
torical understanding.  May  our  perspectives  give  us  an  equal 
chance  to  learn! 

V 

The  illustrations  already  given  show  also  how  Cassirer  him- 
self followed  his  third  major  principle,  that  historical  interpre- 
tation must  always  center  on  individual  persons,  and  under- 
stand events  in  terms  of  such  personalities.  His  analyses  are 
always  carried  out  as  the  intellectual  portraits  of  men,  even 
when  those  men  have  been  selected  as  "symbols"  of  an  age,  or 
of  characteristic  answers  to  a  problem.49  His  interest  in  intel- 

would  be  all  the  more  important  and  interesting  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
general  history  of  ideas.  For  it  would  show  us  the  common  background  of  the 
philosophy  of  the  fifteenth  century — the  general  intellectual  and  religious  atmo- 
sphere of  the  Renaissance."  "Ficino's  Place  in  Intellectual  History,"  Journal  of  the 
History  of  Ideas,  VI  (1945),  492n. 

48  "Giovanni  Pico  della  Mirandola,"  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  III 
(194.*),  123-44,  3 1 9-46  j  "Ficino's  Place  in  Intellectual  History,"  Journal  of  the 
History  of  Ideas,  VI  (1945),  483-501$  "Wahrheitsbegriff  und  Wahrheitsproblem 
bei    Galilei,"    Scientia,    LXII    (1937),    121-30,    185-935    "Galileo,"   American 
Scholar,  12  (1943))  5-195  "Descartes'  Wahrheitsbegriff,"  Theoria,  III  (1937), 
161-87. 

49  This  is  true  of  the  one  book  Cassirer  wrote  specifically  about  the  Renaissance, 
Individuum  und  Kosmos   (1927).  After  quoting  the  major  criticisms  of  the 
"concept  of  the  Renaissance,"  Cassirer  goes  on:  "What  is  needed  is  the  universality 
of  a  systematic  point  of  view  and  a  systematic  orientation,  which  by  no  means 
coincides  with  the  universality  of  merely  empirical  generic  concepts,  commonly 


716  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

lectual  personalities  is  so  great  that  it  quite  bursts  the  frame  of 
the  context  for  which  an  idea  has  been  introduced.  It  is  the 
history  of  "thinking,"  of  Denken,  that  he  definitely  gives  us, 
not  of  ideas  divorced  from  the  minds  that  have  entertained 
them.  His  analyses  of  ideas  are  beautifully  lucid,  but  they  aim 
to  convey  the  feel  of  those  ideas  to  the  men  expressing  them — 
he  is  true  to  his  "personal"  interpretation.  He  is  at  his  best  in 
such  a  "contextual"  analysis,  in  pointing  out  how  an  idea  in 
one  man's  thinking  differs  from  what  seems  to  be  the  "same" 
idea  in  another's.  All  this,  of  course,  lends  added  value  to 
Cassirer's  work,  and  makes  the  reader  quite  forget  the  limita- 
tions originally  suggested  by  his  own  intellectual  framework. 
Thus  whatever  his  shortcomings  in  appraising  the  significance 
of  the  Aristotelian  movement  as  a  whole,  Cassirer  cannot  help 
but  do  a  great  measure  of  justice  when  he  comes  to  individual 
Aristotelians  like  Pomponazzi  or  Zabarella.  This  is  reinforced 
by  the  wealth  of  judiciously  selected  quotations — quotations 
which  are  always  "symbolic"  of  far  more  than  the  point  for 
which  they  are  introduced. 

In  this  art  of  portraiture,  Cassirer's  method  is  clear.  He 
seeks  above  all  for  that  "central  focus"  in  terms  of  which  every- 
thing the  man  says  will  form  an  "organic  whole."  His  comment 
on  the  work  of  another  historian,  P.  O.  Kristeller,  states  this 
well.  In  the  last  article  Cassirer  wrote,  he  quotes  Kristeller: 
"If  we  are  to  understand  Ficino's  metaphysics,"  he  declares, 

we  must  start  from  the  phenomenon  of  "internal  experience."  Here 
we  find  the  real  clue  to  Ficino's  philosophy — the  fundamental  fact  and 

used  to  divide  history  into  periods  and  to  delimit  conveniently  its  individual 
epochs.  Toward  this  goal  the  following  considerations  are  directed.  .  .  .  They 
remain  within  the  history  of  philosophical  problems,  and  seek  to  find  an  answer 
there  to  the  question  whether  and  in  how  far  the  intellectual  movement  of  the 
1 5th  and  i6th  centuries,  in  all  the  multiplicity  of  its  ways  of  putting  problems 
and  all  the  divergence  of  its  solutions,  forms  a  self-contained  unity."  Individuum 
und  KosmoSy  5,  6. 

But  the  book  itself  is  far  from  a  unity.  It  is  a  collection  of  studies  of  the 
views  of  different  men  grouped  around  a  few  central  problems — ultimately,  as 
the  title  suggests,  those  raised  by  Burckhardt.  Its  organization  is  far  from  clear, 
it  is  full  of  digressions,  and  its  enduring  value  is  undoubtedly  its  presentation 
of  the  "intellectual  portraits"  of  men  looking  at  these  problems. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  717 

principle  on  which  all  his  special  doctrines  depend.  ...  If  we  accept 
this  starting-point  of  Kristeller's  interpretation — and  to  my  mind  he 
has  proved  his  point  by  conclusive  arguments — we  have  won  a  new 
perspective,  a  vantage-point  from  which  we  may  see  the  whole  of 
Ficino's  system  in  a  clearer  light.  Many  questions  that  were  highly 
controversial  can  now  be  answered  in  a  better  and  more  satisfactory 
way.  ...  He  gives  us  a  much  more  "organic"  view  of  Ficino's  philosophy 
than  we  find  in  other  writers.  Kristeller  makes  no  attempt  to  conceal 
the  contradictions  inherent  in  Ficino's  doctrine.  But  he  shows  convinc- 
ingly that  in  spite  of  all  its  discrepancies  Ficino's  work  preserves  its 
systematic  unity.  It  is  centered  around  a  few  fundamental  problems 
which  complete  and  elucidate  each  other.50 

What  Cassirer  thus  praises  in  the  method  of  Kristeller  he 
himself  tried  to  do  in  his  own.  Thus,  facing  the  apparent  con- 
tradictions in  the  thought  of  Pico  della  Mirandola,  he  says: 

Pico  .  .  .  was  trying  to  assert  the  validity  of  his  own  principle  of 
knowledge.  .  .  .  The  distinctive  category  under  which  he  subsumed  his 
doctrine  of  God,  of  the  world  and  of  man,  his  theology  and  his  psy- 
chology, is  the  category  of  symbolic  thought.  Once  we  ascertain  this 
central  point  of  his  thinking,  the  different  parts  of  his  doctrine  immedi- 
ately coalesce  into  a  whole.  .  .  .  Pico  is  no  longer  trying  to  exhibit  the 
Many  as  the  effect  of  the  One,  or  to  deduce  them  as  such  from  their 
cause,  with  the  aid  of  rational  concepts.  He  sees  the  Many  rather  as 
expressions)  as  images,  as  symbols  of  the  One.51 

Cassirer's  method  appears  in  a  little  different  form  in  con- 
nection with  Galileo: 

If  we  wish  to  comprehend  Galileo's  nature  and  activity,  we  confront 
the  same  problem  we  encounter  in  almost  every  portrayal  of  one  of  the 
great  geniuses  of  the  Renaissance.  We  cannot  remain  within  a  single 
area  of  his  activity,  however  significant  and  consequential  it  may  appear, 
and  we  cannot  take  our  standards  from  this  area  alone.  We  must  rather 
proceed,  as  in  concentric  circles,  from  the  center  of  his  intellectual 
activity  to  its  ever  wider  and  more  comprehensive  expressions.  Here 
is  revealed  a  definite  scale:  the  extent  of  the  problem  becomes  greater 
and  greater,  and  embraces  a  richer  and  richer  area,  while  the  typical 

""Ficino's  Place  in  Intellectual  History,"  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas, 

VI  (1945),  485-7. 

""Giovanni  Pico   della   Mirandola,"   Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  III 

(1942),  137-8. 


;i 8  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

form  in  which  the  question  is  put  as  such  remains  the  same.  The  follow- 
ing consideration  has  to  do  with  no  special  content  of  Galileo's  science, 
but  rather  with  this  universal  type  of  his  investigation  and  questioning,52 

This  procedure  is  clearly  applicable  to  the  thought  of  a  single 
intellectual  personality,  where  something  like  an  "organic 
unity"  with  a  discoverable  "center"  may  reasonably  be  expected. 
Even  here,  one  sometimes  suspects,  there  may  be  more  of  con- 
flict and  tension,  even  in  a  great  thinker,  than  Cassirer  allows 
forj  his  heroes  emerge  uniformly  as  intellectually  integrated. 
For  many  philosophers,  especially  those  facing  problems  of 
reconciliation,  one  could  find  equal  illumination  in  an  interpre- 
tation that  took  the  strife  of  incompatibles  as  central. 

But  the  difficulties  are  greater  when  the  method  is  extended 
to  a  group  of  men,  and  greatest  of  all  in  attempting  to  charac- 
terize an  entire  "age."  Cassirer  applies  it  to  the  Cambridge 
Platonists: 

With  all  this  we  have  won  only  partial  aspects;  we  have  illuminated 
the  work  of  the  Cambridge  School  from  different  sides,  but  we  have  not 
grasped  the  real  intellectual  principle  it  represents,  in  setting  forth  and 
carrying  through  which  it  alone  deserves  a  place  in  the  history  of  the 
modern  mind.  To  lay  bare  this  principle  and  in  it  the  real  ideal  center 
of  the  intellectual  work  of  the  Cambridge  School  is  the  task  of  the  fol- 
lowing investigation.  ...  It  is  a  unified  and  total  view  that  is  represented 
by  the  Cambridge  circle:  a  view  which  is  maintained  and  carried 
through  as  a  constant  basic  theme  amidst  all  the  individual  differences 
of  the  particular  thinkers  and  all  its  extension  to  the  manifold  and 
disparate  areas  of  problems.  .  .  ,  What  is  embodied  in  it  is  a  definite 
type  of  thinking  of  independent  power  and  significance.53 

The  applicability  of  this  search  for  a  unifying  "type  of  think- 
ing" grows  more  doubtful  when  we  begin  to  seek  for  the 
"center"  from  which  to  interpret  an  entire  age.  In  the 
Erkenntnisfroblem  Cassirer  is  aware  of  the  difficulties: 

In  Jacob  Burckhardt's  portrayal,  which  first  made  the  total  picture 

w  Wahrheitsbegriff  und  Wahrheitoproblem  bei  Galilei,"  Scientia,  LXII  (1937), 

I25' 

51  Die  Platonische  Renaissance  in  England  und  die  Schule  von  Cambridge 

(1932),  4. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  719 

of  the  Renaissance  live  once  more  in  its  individual  traits,  philosophical 
efforts  and  achievements  recede  completely  into  the  background.  While 
everywhere  else  they  represent  the  structure  and  the  real  measure  of  the 
intellectual  progress  of  a  period,  they  here  stand  as  it  were  outside  the 
common  pattern.  Nowhere  does  there  appear  at  first  glance  a  recog- 
nizable unity,  nowhere  a  fixed  center  about  which  the  different  move- 
ments are  ordered.  The  conventional  traits  and  formulae  with  which 
we  are  accustomed  to  indicate  the  character  of  the  Renaissance  fail  us 
when  we  honestly  consider  the  individual  philosophical  currents  and 
their  multiplicity.54 

This  raises  the  question  whether  we  can  hope  to  find  any 
unifying  formula  in  structural  or  morphological  terms  for  the 
thought  of  the  Renaissance  as  a  whole  —  the  entire  problem  of 
"styles"  of  thought,  a  conception  German  Kultwgeschichte  has 
taken  over  from  the  historians  of  art.  As  a  conscientious  scholar, 
Cassirer's  attitude  is  very  cautious  and  reserved. 

That  in  a  mere  chronological  sense  we  cannot  separate  the  Renaissance 
from  the  Middle  Ages  is  obvious.  By  innumerable  visible  and  invisible 
threads  the  Quattrocento  is  connected  with  scholastic  thought  and 
medieval  culture.  In  the  history  of  European  civilization  there  never 
was  a  break  of  continuity.  To  seek  for  a  point  in  this  history  in  which 
the  Middle  Ages  "end"  and  the  modern  world  "begins"  is  a  sheer  absurd- 
ity. But  that  does  not  do  away  with  the  necessity  of  looking  for  an  in- 
tellectual line  of  demarcation  between  the  two  ages.55 

At  times  Cassirer  was  willing  to  use  this  notion  of  "style"  in 
a  definite  non-temporal  sense. 

Our  controversy  as  to  the  originality  of  the  Renaissance  and  as  to 
the  dividing-line  between  the  "Renaissance"  and  the  "Middle  Ages" 
seems  to  me  in  many  ways  rather  a  "logical"  dispute  than  one  about  the 
historical  facts.  Ideas  like  "Gothic,"  "Renaissance,"  or  "Baroque"  are 
ideas  of  historical  "style."  As  to  the  meaning  of  these  ideas  of  "style" 
there  still  prevails  a  great  lack  of  clarity  in  many  respects.  They  can  be 
used  to  characterize  and  interpret  intellectual  movements,  but  they 
express  no  actual  historical  facts  that  ever  existed  at  any  time.  "Renais- 
sance" and  "Middle  Ages"  are,  strictly  speaking,  not  names  for  historical 


84  Erkenntnisfroblem^  I,  74. 
KMyth  of  the  State,  130. 


720  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

periods  at  all,  but  they  are  concepts  of  "ideal  types,"  in  Max  Weber's 
sense.  We  cannot  therefore  use  them  as  instruments  for  any  strict  divi- 
sion of  periods;  we  cannot  inquire  at  what  temporal  point  the  Middle 
Ages  "stopped"  or  the  Renaissance  "began."  The  actual  historical  facts 
cut  across  and  extend  over  each  other  in  the  most  complicated  manner.58 

The  meaning  of  these  ideas  of  "style"  Cassirer  tried  to  clarify 
and  analyse  in  his  Zwr  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschajten: 

Jacob  Burckhardt  gave  in  his  Kultur  der  Renaissance  a  classic  por- 
trait of  "the  man  of  the  Renaissance."  It  contains  features  that  are 
familiar  to  us  all.  The  man  of  the  Renaissance  possesses  definite  charac- 
teristic properties  which  clearly  distinguish  him  from  "the  man  of  the 
Middle  Ages."  He  is  characterized  by  his  joy  in  the  senses,  his  turning 
to  nature,  his  roots  in  this  world,  his  self-containedness  for  the  world 
of  form,  his  individualism,  his  paganism,  his  amoralism.  Empirical  re- 
search has  set  out  to  discover  this  Burckhardtian  "man  of  the  Renais- 
sance"— but  it  has  not  found  him.  No  single  historical  individual  can 
be  cited  who  actually  unites  in  himself  all  the  traits  that  Burckhardt 
considers  the  constitutive  elements  of  his  picture.  "If  we  try,"  says 
Ernst  Walser  in  his  Studien  zur  Weltanschauung  der  Renaissance™ 
"to  consider  the  life  and  thought  of  the  leading  personalities  of  the 
Quattrocento  purely  inductively,  of  a  Coluccio  Salutati,  Poggio  Brac- 
ciolini,  Leonardo  Bruni,  Lorenzo  Valla,  Lorenzo  Magnifico  or  Luigi 
Pulci,  it  is  regularly  found  that  for  the  particular  person  being  studied 
the  traits  set  up  absolutely  do  not  fit.  ...  And  if  we  bring  together  the 
results  of  inductive  research,  there  gradually  emerges  a  new  picture  of 
the  Renaissance,  no  less  a  mixture  of  piety  and  impiety,  good  and  evil, 
longing  for  heaven  and  joy  in  earth,  but  infinitely  more  complicated. 
The  life  and  endeavor  of  the  whole  Renaissance  cannot  be  derived  from 
a  single  principle,  from  individualism  and  sensualism, — no  more  than  can 
the  reputed  unified  culture  of  the  Middle  Ages." 

I  agree  completely  with  these  words  of  Walser's.  Every  man  who  has 
ever  been  concerned  with  the  concrete  investigation  of  the  history, 
literature,  art,  or  philosophy  of  the  Renaissance  will  be  able  to  confirm 
them  from  his  own  experience  and  add  many  further  instances.  But 
does  this  refute  Burckhardt's  notion?  Shall  we  regard  it,  in  the  logical 

86  "Some  Remarks  on  the  Question  of  the  Originality  of  the  Renaissance," 
Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  IV  (194.3),  54-5. 

57  Ernst  Walser,  Studien  zur  Weltanschauung  der  Renaissance,  now  in  Gesam- 
melte  Studien  zur  Geistesgeschichte  der  Renaissance  (19205  Basel,  1932),  102. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  721 

sense,  as  a  null  class — as  a  class  into  which  no  single  object  falls?  That 
would  be  necessary  only  if  we  were  here  concerned  with  one  of  those 
generic  concepts  which  are  arrived  at  through  the  empirical  comparison 
of  particular  cases,  through  what  we  commonly  call  "induction." 
Measured  by  this  standard,  Burckhardt's  notion  could  indeed  not  stand 
the  test. 

But  it  is  just  this  presupposition  that  needs  logical  correction.  Certainly 
Burckhardt  could  not  have  given  his  portrait  of  the  man  of  the  Renais- 
sance without  relying  for  it  on  an  immense  amount  6f  factual  material. 
The  wealth  of  this  material  and  its  reliability  astonishes  us  again  and 
again  when  we  study  his  work.  But  the  kind  of  "conspectus''  he  draws 
up,  the  historical  synthesis  he  gives,  is  of  a  wholly  different  kind  in 
principle  from  empirically  acquired  natural  concepts.  If  we  want  to 
speak  here  of  "abstraction,"  it  is  that  process  which  Husserl  has  char- 
acterized as  "ideirende  Abstraction"  That  the  result  of  such  an 
"ideirende  Abstraction"  could  ever  be  brought  to  cover  any  concrete 
particular  case:  this  can  neither  be  expected  nor  demanded.  And  "sub- 
sumption"  also  can  never  be  taken  here  in  the  same  way  as  we  subsume 
a  body  given  here  and  now,  a  piece  of  metal,  under  the  concept  of  gold, 
because  we  find  that  it  fulfills  all  the  conditions  of  gold  known  to  us. 
When  we  indicate  that  Leonardo  da  Vinci  and  Aretino,  Marsiglio 
Ficino  and  Machiavelli,  Michelangelo  and  Cesare  Borgia  are  "men  of 
the  Renaissance,"  we  do  not  mean  that  there  is  to  be  found  in  them  all 
a  definite  particular  trait  with  a  fixed  content  in  which  they  all  agree. 
We  shall  perceive  them  to  be  not  only  completely  different,  but  even 
opposed.  What  we  are  asserting  of  them  is  only  that  regardless  of  this 
opposition,  perhaps  just  because  of  it,  they  stand  to  each  other  in  a 
definite  ideal  connection;  that  each  of  them  in  his  own  way  is  co-operat- 
ing to  construct  what  we  call  the  "spirit"  of  the  Renaissance  or  the 
culture  of  the  Renaissance. 

It  is  a  unity  of  direction,  not  a  unity  of  existence,  that  we  are  thus 
trying  to  express.  The  particular  individuals  belong  together,  not  be- 
cause they  are  alike  or  resemble  each  other,  but  because  they  are  co- 
operating in  a  common  task,  which  in  contrast  to  the  Middle  Ages  we 
perceive  to  be  new,  and  to  be  the  distinctive  "meaning"  of  the  Renais- 
sance. All  genuine  notions  of  "style"  in  the  cultural  sciences  reduce, 
when  analyzed  more  precisely,  to  such  notions  of  "meaning."  The 
artistic  style  of  an  epoch  cannot  be  determined  if  we  do  not  bring  to  a 
unity  all  its  different  and  often  apparently  disparate  artistic  expressions 
by  understanding  them,  to  use  Riegl's  term,  as  expressions  of  a  definite 


722       JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

"artistic  will."58  Such  notions  indeed  characterize,  but  they  do  not 
determine;  the  particular  that  falls  under  them  cannot  be  derived  from 
them. 

But  it  is  equally  incorrect  to  infer  from  this  that  we  have  here  only 
intuitive  description,  not  conceptual  characterization;  it  is  rather  a  mat- 
ter of  a  distinctive  manner  and  direction  of  this  characterization,  of 
a  logico-intellectual  work  that  is  sui  generis.59 

This  passage  hardly  possesses  the  clarity  we  are  accustomed 
to  expect  from  Cassirer.  Is  it  only  an  elaborate  way  of  saying 
that  we  "perceive"  certain  common  "tendencies"  running 
through  Renaissance  thought,  though  fidelity  to  facts  demands 
that  we  recognize  its  wide  diversity?  Or  is  Cassirer  trying  to 
indicate  something  deeper  by  his  "ideal  types,"  his  "unities 
of  direction,"  his  "common  task"  and  "will"?  In  saying  that 
such  "unities"  are  not  historical  facts  discoverable  in  the  web  of 
history,  that  they  can  be  used  to  "characterize"  and  "interpret" 
the  facts,  but  do  not  "determine"  them,  Cassirer  is  of  course, 
being  faithful  to  his  general  Kantian  epistemology.  "Unities" 
in  that  theory  of  knowledge  are  applied  to  the  materials  of 
knowledge,  they  are  not  discovered  in  those  materials.  In 
Kantian  terms,  Cassirer  is  saying  that  these  "unities,"  these 
concepts  or  historical  "style,"  are  not  constitutive  but  regulative 
principles.  They  are  closest,  perhaps,  to  the  idea  of  teleology 
as  it  appears  in  the  Critique  of  Judgment.  In  any  event,  we 
should  remember  that  for  Cassirer  the  act  of  "interpreting" 
any  symbolic  forms  is  creative,  productive  of  a  new  synthesis} 
the  historical  "meaning"  that  results  from  it  is  as  much  a  crea- 
tion of  the  historian  as  a  deliverance  of  the  past.  It  is  a  gen- 
uinely new  "Gestaltung."  In  less  Kantian  phraseology,  all 
such  unities  are  working  hypotheses  employed  to  explore  the 
facts. 

Cassirer's  labored  distinctions  are  thus  involved  in  all  the 
dubieties  of  his  philosophy  of  symbolic  forms.  That  there  are 
discoverable  unities  in  history,  and  in  the  thought  of  the  Renais- 
sance in  particular,  I  should  myself  maintain.  That  thought,  I 
should  suggest,  is  unified  in  the  light  of  the  problems  men  were 

"Alois  Ricgl,  Stilfragen  (1893),  and  Sfatromische  Kvnstindustrie  (1901). 
"  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissensckajten  (Goteborg,  194.2),  79-81. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  723 

then  facing.  And  there  is  much  in  Cassirer  which  points  to  such 
a  unification  in  terms  of  problems,  rather  than  in  terms  of  the 
vague  and  indeterminate  notion  of  "meaning."  To  be  sure, 
his  further  notion  of  a  common  "task"  is  rather  blind.  In  the 
Erkenntni$'[>roblem)  however,  he  puts  the  matter  much  more 
precisely.  "It  is  the  fight  against  'substantial  form'  that  is  above 
all  characteristic  of  the  Renaissance."60  This  suggests  that  the 
problems  of  the  Renaissance  were  primarily  negative:  intel- 
lectually, men  were  seeking  to  escape  from  earlier  views,  just 
as  in  their  social  life  they  were  seeking  to  escape  from  the  forms 
of  medieval  society  which  had  outlasted  their  usefulness  and 
were  now  felt  to  be  constricting  rather  than  directing.  The 
vexed  question  of  Renaissance  "individualism"  also,  I  think,  is 
soluble  if  that  "individualism"  is  construed  in  terms  of  the 
specific  social  organizations  from  which  men  were  seeking  to 
escape,  rather  than  in  terms  of  any  positive  content.  Like  the 
Romantic  movement,  the  Renaissance  is  to  be  understood  in 
the  light  of  what  it  was  revolting  against.  Being,  like  Romanti- 
cism, a  reaction  and  a  revolt,  it  naturally  expressed  itself  in  a 
wide  variety  of  alternatives. 

Such  a  "functional"  interpretation,  I  submit,  is  really  closer 
to  Cassirer's  own  fundamental  position  than  the  "structuralism" 
— the  attempt  to  find  some  common  structural  or  morphological 
"meaning" — into  which  he  was  occasionally  seduced.  Cassirer 
is  at  his  best  when  he  insists  that  the  originality  and  novelty  of 
a  period,  or  a  thinker,  lies  not  in  the  statement  of  "erne  neue 
Thematik"  but  in  the  serious  confrontation  of  "erne  neue  Prob- 
lematik."** 

Whatever  weight  Cassirer  was  inclined  to  give  to  "styles" 
or  unities  as  he  reinterpreted  them  as  regulative  principles,  in 
his  last  statement  on  this  problem  he  returned  to  his  funda- 
mentally "personal"  conception  of  history.  "What  we  learn 
from  this  discussion,"  he  says  in  his  final  paper  on  Ficino, 
referring  to  the  symposium  on  the  originality  of  the  Renais- 
sance,82 

80  Erkenntnisfroblem,  I,  76. 

01  Die  Platonische  Renaissance  in  England,  etc.,  5. 

68  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  IV  (1943). 


724  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

is  only  the  fact  that  the  period  of  the  Quattrocento  and  Cinquecento  is 
too  subtle  and  too  complicated  a  phenomenon  to  be  described  by  any 
simple  term  or  abstract  formula.  All  such  formulae  are  bound  to  fail. 
When  we  come  to  the  real  question,  when  we  begin  to  deal  with  any 
special  problem  or  any  individual  thinker,  we  must  forget  them.  They 
turn  out  to  be  inadequate  and  misleading.  In  every  particular  investiga- 
tion the  question  must  be  raised  anew  and  answered  independently.63 

The  question  of  novelty  and  originality,  so  important  in  all 
of  Cassirer's  studies  of  the  Renaissance,  remains.  What  is  it 
which  in  that  period  can  be  called  really  "new"?  Surprisingly 
enough,  in  view  of  his  sharp  distinction  between  the  concepts  of 
the  natural  and  the  cultural  or  symbolic  sciences,  in  good 
Kantian  fashion  Cassirer  often  uses  metaphors  drawn  from 
the  science  of  mechanics — "forces,"  "center  of  gravity,"  new 
"equilibrium."  Thus  in  speaking  of  Machiavelli  he  says:  "When 
Machiavelli  conceived  the  plan  of  his  book  the  center  of 
gravity  of  the  political  world  had  already  been  shifted.  New 
forces  had  come  to  the  fore  and  they  had  to  be  accounted  for — 
forces  that  were  entirely  unknown  to  the  medieval  system."64 

The  fullest  and  most  illuminating  use  of  such  a  mechanical 
figure  occurs  in  his  discussion  of  the  originality  of  the  Renais- 
sance: 

Nevertheless  the  distinction  [between  Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance] 
has  a  real  meaning.  What  we  can  express  by  it,  and  what  alone  we 
intend  to  express,  is  that  from  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century 
onward  the  balance  between  the  particular  forces — society,  state,  religion, 
church,  art,  science — begins  to  shift  slowly.  New  forces  press  up  out  of 
the  depths  and  alter  the  previous  equilibrium.  And  the  character  of  every 
culture  rests  on  the  equilibrium  between  the  forces  that  give  it  form. 
Whenever  therefore  we  make  any  comparison  between  the  Middle  Ages 
and  the  Renaissance,  it  is  never  enough  to  single  out  particular  ideas  or 
concepts.  What  we  want  to  know  is  not  the  particular  idea  as  such,  but 
the  importance  it  possesses,  and  the  strength  with  which  it  is  acting  in 
the  whole  structure.  "Middle  Ages"  and  "Renaissance"  are  two  great 
and  mighty  streams  of  ideas.  When  we  single  out  from  them  a  particular 
idea,  we  are  doing  what  a  chemist  does  in  analyzing  the  water  of  a 

68  "Ficino's  Place  in  Intellectual  History,"  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas, 

VI  (i945)>  483-4. 

"  Myth  of  the  State  >  133. 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  725 

stream  or  what  a  geographer  does  in  trying  to  trace  it  to  its  source. 
No  one  denies  that  these  are  interesting  and  important  questions.  But 
they  are  neither  the  only  nor  the  most  important  concern  of  the  historian 
of  ideas. 

The  historian  of  ideas  knows  that  the  water  which  the  river  carries 
with  it  changes  only  very  slowly.  The  same  ideas  are  always  appearing 
again  and  again,  and  are  maintained  for  centuries.  The  force  and  the 
tenacity  of  tradition  can  hardly  be  over-estimated.  From  this  point  of 
view  we  must  acknowledge  that  there  is  nothing  new  under  the  sun. 
But  the  historian  of  ideas  is  not  asking  primarily  what  the  substance  is 
of  particular  ideas.  He  is  asking  what  their  junction  is.  What  he  is 
studying — or  should  be  studying — is  less  the  content  of  ideas  than  their 
dynamics.  To  continue  the  figure,  we  could  say  that  he  is  not  trying 
to  analyze  the  drops  of  water  in  the  river,  but  that  he  is  seeking  to 
measure  its  width  and  depth  and  to  ascertain  the  force  and  velocity  of 
the  current.  It  is  all  these  factors  that  are  fundamentally  altered  in  the 
Renaissance;  the  dynamics  of  ideas  has  changed.65 

More  often,  however,  Cassirer  employs  not  a  metaphor 
drawn  from  the  natural  science  of  dynamics,  but  the  more 
appropriate  conception  that  a  new  problem  has  been  insistently 
posed.  This  conception  of  a  new  "Problematik"  dominates  his 
major  treatments.  In  the  Erkenntnisfroblem  he  says: 

The  philosophical  character  of  an  epoch  cannot  be  judged  merely  by  its 
achievement  in  fixed  doctrines;  it  announces  itself  no  less  in  the  energy 
with  which  it  conceives  and  maintains  a  new  intellectual  goal.  The  unity 
of  the  different  directions  which  stand  opposed  to  each  other  in  the 
thinking  of  the  Renaissance  lies  in  the  new  attitude  which  they  gradually 
come  to  take  toward  the  problem  of  knowledge.66 

In  Freiheit  und,  Form  he  says:  "In  destroying  the  whole  medi- 
eval system  of  religious  beliefs,  the  system  of  religious  media- 
tion through  fixed,  objectively  communicable  means  of  sal- 
vation, Luther  imposed  upon  the  individual  an  immense  new 
task.  Union  with  the  Infinite  must  now  be  accomplished  in 
himself  without  the  aid  of  any  assistance  in  material  means."67 

*  "Some  Remarks  on  the  Question  of  the  Originality  of  the  Renaissance," 
Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  IV  (1943),  55. 

*  Erkenntnisf roblem,  I,  75-6. 
w  Freiheit  und  Form,  1 8. 


726  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

The  Individiwm  und  Kosmos 

remains  within  the  history  of  philosophical  problems  and  seeks  to  find 
there  an  answer  to  the  question  whether  and  in  how  far  the  movement 
of  thought  in  the  I5th  and  i6th  centuries,  in  all  the  multiplicity  of  its 
ways  of  putting  problems  and  in  all  the  divergence  of  its  solutions,  forms 
a  self-contained  unity.68 

And  again: 

What  characterizes  and  distinguishes  the  Renaissance  is  the  new  relation 
in  which  individuals  place  themselves  toward  the  world  and  the  form 
of  community  which  they  establish  between  themselves  and  the  world. 
They  see  themselves  facing  an  altered  conception  of  the  physical  and 
the  intellectual  universe,  and  it  is  this  conception  that  imposes  upon  them 
a  new  intellectual  and  moral  demand,  which  requires  of  them  an  inner 
transformation,  a  rejormatio  and  regeneration 

VI 

When  Cassirer  goes  beyond  the  attempt  to  analyze  the  in- 
tellectual personality  of  an  individual  thinker  to  essay  the  por- 
trait of  an  age,  to  try  to  reconstruct  its  spirit  as  a  whole,  he 
wavers  between  two  rather  different  conceptions.  On  the  one 
hand,  he  tries  to  introduce  a  unity  into  a  mass  of  divergent 
currents  of  thought  by  constructing  a  synthesis  in  terms  of  a 
characteristic  "style"  or  "ideal  type"  of  thinking.  On  the  other, 
he  finds  unification  in  terms  of  the  new  problems  forced  on 
men — forced  primarily,  in  his  interpretation,  by  the  advance 
of  scientific  knowledge  and  the  new  conceptions  of  truth  to 
which  that  advance  leads.  Combining  something  of  both  con- 
ceptions is  the  notion  he  most  commonly  employs,  that  the 
unification  can  be  constructed  in  terms  of  a  new  "task,"  a  new 
"Aufgabe"  The  first  idea  is  morphological,  a  descriptive  analy- 
sis, though  of  a  sort  Cassirer  claims  to  be  not  "merely  em- 
pirical," but  sw  generis,  appropriate  to  the  human  universe  of 
symbolic  forms.  The  second  idea  is  equally  appropriate  to  a 
human  world:  it  finds  understanding  in  terms  of  ends,  goals, 

**  Individuum  und  Kosmos,  6. 

*  "Wahrheitsbegriff  und  Wahrheitsproblem  bei  Gaillei,"  Scientia,  LXII  (1937), 


THEORY  OF  HISTORY  727 

and  purposes,  it  is  teleological  and  functional.  Is  it  too  much 
to  say  that  the  first  was  impressed  on  Cassirer  by  Burckhardt 
and  Dilthey,  whereas  the  second  came  from  his  own  more 
original  thought?  The  first  can  be  called,  in  his  own  terms,  a 
"substantial"  or  "structural"  conception;  the  second  is  "func- 
tional." 

The  structural  unification  has  the  disadvantage  that  when 
worked  out  with  complete  honesty  in  the  face  of  facts,  as 
Cassirer  had  to  work  it  out,  it  leads  to  a  conception  that  is 
unique  and  without  parallel — a  conception,  furthermore,  that 
Cassirer  has  great  difficulty  in  trying  to  formulate.  It  is  a  con- 
ception which  by  definition  eludes  public  confirmation;  it  de- 
pends on  the  "productive  imagination"  of  the  historical  inter- 
preter not  only  for  its  discovery,  as  do  all  hypotheses,  but  also 
for  its  validity.  And  it  opens  the  way  to  no  further  inquiry 
as  to  its  causes  and  conditions.  The  functional  unification  in 
terms  of  new  problems  forced  on  men  by  their  changing  social 
experience,  on  the  other  hand,  introduces  nothing  that  is  not 
already  familiar  in  human  life.  It  is  clear  and  precise,  and  it 
can  be  confirmed  by  public  evidence.  It  suggests  the  further 
investigation  of  the  many  and  complex  causes,  intellectual  and 
social,  which  have  led  men's  social  experience  to  change. 

Cassirer  quotes  from  Kant,  in  speaking  of  Plato: 

It  is  by  no  means  unusual,  upon  comparing  the  thoughts  which  an 
author  has  expressed  in  regard  to  his  subject,  ...  to  find  that  we  under- 
stand him  better  than  he  has  understood  himself.  As  he  has  not  sufficiently 
determined  his  concept,  he  has  sometimes  spoken,  or  even  thought,  in 
opposition  to  his  own  intention.70 

Cassirer  himself  adds: 

The  history  of  philosophy  shows  us  very  clearly  that  the  full  determina- 
tion of  a  concept  is  very  rarely  the  work  of  that  thinker  who  first  intro- 
duced that  concept.  For  a  philosophical  concept  is,  generally  speaking, 
rather  a  problem  than  the  solution  of  a  problem — and  the  full  significance 
of  this  problem  cannot  be  understood  so  long  as  it  is  still  in  its  first 
implicit  state.  It  must  become  explicit  in  order  to  become  comprehended 

w  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (and  ed.),  370.  Tr.  N.  K.  Smith,  310. 


728  JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

in  its  true  meaning,  and  this  transition  from  an  implicit  to  an  explicit 
state  is  the  work  of  the  future.71 

Is  it  not  possible  that  we  may  be  able  to  understand  the  idea 
of  a  truly  functional  interpretation  of  history  better  than  Cas- 
sirer  understood  it,  and  that  we  may  hope  to  make  the  problem 
which  he  introduced  more  explicit  than  he  was  able  to  do  him- 
self? 

JOHN  HERMAN  RANDALL,  JR. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 

71  Essay  on  Man,  180. 


21 

Walter  M.  Solmitz 

CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO:  AN  EXAMPLE  OF 
CASSIRER'S  WAY  OF  THOUGHT 


21 

CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO:  AN  EXAMPLE  OF 
CASSIRER'S  WAY  OF  THOUGHT 

"Als  wie  der  Tag  die  Menschen  hell  umscheinet 
Und  mit  dem  Lichte,  das  den  Hohn  entspringet, 
Die  dammernden  Erscheinungen  vereinet, 
1st  Wissen,  welches  tief  der  Geistigkeit  gelinget." 

— Holderlin.* 


THE  following  passage  may  be  regarded  as  a  typical  "Cas- 
sirer"  text.  It  can  call  to  mind  a  few  characteristics  of  Cas- 
sirer's  philosophical  style. 

Galileo  emphasized  unceasingly  that  the  law  which  rules  the  phe- 
nomena, and  their  underlying  reasons  (ragioni),  cannot  immediately 
be  read  off  of  the  phenomena  by  sensory  perception.  What  is  required 
for  the  discovery  of  those  laws  is  rather  the  spontaneity  of  mathematical 
reasoning.  For  we  learn  to  know  the  eternal  and  necessary  in  things 
not  by  means  of  mere  piling  up  and  comparison  of  sense  experiences; 
rather  the  mind  must  have  grasped  it  "from  within  itself"  in  order  to 
be  able  to  find  it  again  in  the  phenomena.  Each  intellect  knows  from 
itself  (da  $er  $e)  the  true  and  necessary  things,  i.e.,  those  which  could 
not  possibly  be  [or  act]  otherwise;  —  or  else  it  is  impossible  for  the  mind 
ever  to  know  them.1 

There  is  nothing  very  extraordinary  about  this  passage.  It  is 
an  historical  passage  from  an  historical  book,  written  in  a  rather 


*  "Bright  is  broad  day  that  beams  around  the 

Uniting  with  the  light  that  comes  forth  from  the  heights 

The  various  things  appearing  in  the  dusk. 

Thus  too  beams  knowledge  that  has  blessed  the  spirit's  depth." 

*  Individuum  und  Kosmos  in  der  Philosofhie  der  Renaissance.  Studien  der 
Bibliothek  Warburg,  vol.  X,  (Leipzig,  1927),  173. 

731 


732  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

conventional  manner.  The  reader  is  carried  along  easily  and 
pleasantly}  his  intellectual  imagination  is  helped  by  a  rhetorical 
antithesis  in  the  form  of  "not  thisj  but  that."  Moreover,  when 
read  in  the  (original)  German  it  recalls  the  pleasant  rhythm  of 
Cassirer's  prose.  You  read  through  it  almost  without  realizing 
that  you  have  read  some  statement  which  might  set  you  think- 
ing. As  it  stands,  it  looks  rather  trite,  more  or  less  a  matter 
of  course  j  but,  if  you  read  it  in  the  context  of  the  book,  you 
are  sustained  by  the  very  rhythm  of  the  prose,  expecting  some- 
how that  the  real  thing  is  yet  to  come,  and  is,  so  to  speak,  just 
around  the  corner. 

Now  let  us  read  the  few  sentences  over  again.  And  let  us 
keep  in  mind  that  this  is  an  historical  statement,  a  fairly  close 
paraphrasing  of  Galileo's  text  (as  is  quite  common  in  Cassirer's 
historical  books).  Cassirer's  writings  can  often  be  read  as  an 
anthology  from  an  author  or  various  authors — an  anthology, 
to  be  sure,  with  a  very  definite  purpose  in  mind.  (Cassirer  was 
once  asked  what  it  was  that  made  his  books  so  readable}  his 
reply  was  that  this  was  due  to  the  simple  fact  that  he  had  read 
the  authors  themselves  about  whom  he  wrote.) 

In  the  present  instance  also  we  have  an  historical  report.  The 
strange  thing,  however,  is  that  one  is  inclined  to  read  historical 
reports  by  Cassirer,  such  as  this,  as  if  they  were  "systematic" 
statements}  i.e.,  as  if  they  were  reports  not  about  a  thinker  who 
lived  several  centuries  ago,  but  as  if  they  were  reports  about  pres- 
ently stated  and  perceived  truth. 

If  read  with  these  facts  in  mind,  the  passage  here  under  con- 
sideration— even  when  thus  isolated  from  its  context — makes 
a  significant,  if  not  actually  bold  assertion.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
those  few  sentences  state  a  fairly  radical  form  of  rationalism. 

For  what  is  it  that  the  sentences  say?  First  of  all,  they  say 
something  about  the  methodology  of  science.  In  this  respect 
they  express  and  demand  resignation  as  well  as  encouragement. 
They  teach  resignation  by  saying:  we  cannot  know  the  world 
immediately,  by  unreservedly  giving  ourselves  up  to  it,  by 
just  looking  at  it  and  faithfully  observing  it.  We  might  be 
inclined  to  do  so;  we  may  desire  to  have  the  phenomena  speak 
for  themselves  and  by  themselves — so  that  we  may  listen  to 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  733 

them  faithfully,  passively,  and  without  prejudice.  That  can- 
not be  done.  In  order  to  understand  them  and  to  arrive  at 
some  knowledge  about  them,  our  mind  must  work  actively. 
But  there  is  also  the  encouraging  assurance  that  our  mind  can 
proceed  in  this  fashion  and  still  arrive  at  (some)  objective 
knowledge.  In  fact,  it  cannot  proceed  otherwise — else  it  will 
not  be  able  to  know  anything  at  all. 

These  methodological  maxims  depend  on  the  theory  of 
knowledge.  Scientific  knowledge  consists  of  mathematical  equa- 
tions, not  of  sense  perceptions.  Mathematical  equations  can- 
not simply  be  read  from  the  stars  or  from  whatever  moves 
around  on  our  own  planet  j  the  phenomena  do  not  carry  mathe- 
matical equations  as  labels  pasted  on  their  backs.  One  has  to 
search  for  mathematical  equations;  they  are  found  not  by  con- 
tinuously looking  outside,  but  only  by  turning  "inside,"  by 
questioning  ourselves,  and  by  drawing  from  the  well  of  our 
own  mind. 

Does  this  reliance  on  our  own  mind  not  compel  us  to 
recognize  that  science  is  something  completely  subjective  and 
therefore  merely  a  product  of  some  arbitrary  constructions?  On 
the  contrary,  without  mathematics  there  would  not  be  such  a 
thing  as  objectivity  in  this  respect  at  all;  we  would  not  even 
be  able  to  distinguish  the  subjective  from  the  objective. 

This,  then,  is  a  definite  statement  of  Galileo's  view;  but  it 
is  definitely  misleading,  if  taken  in  isolation.  In  the  context 
in  which  the  statement  occurs  the  passage  is  preceded  by  one 
which  emphasizes  Galileo's  "empiricism"  and  the  fact  that 
Galileo  was  always  fighting  against  a  scholastic  method  which 
concentrated  on  the  exposition  of  books  instead  of  concerning 
itself  with  a  description  and  interpretation  of  the  phenomena 
themselves. 

Which  statement,  then,  is  true?  In  Cassirer's  opinion,  is 
Galileo  an  empiricist  or  is  he  a  rationalist?  The  point  is  that 
both  interpretations  are  true — or,  rather,  that  each  of  them  is 
wrong,  when  taken  by  itself.  It  is  only  against  the  background 
of  the  passage  on  Galileo's  empiricism  that  the  antithetical  asser- 
tion about  his  rationalism  appears  in  its  intended  meaning; — 
and  the  passage  on  Galileo's  empiricism  is  meant  to  lead  up 


734  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

to  the  surprising  statement  of  its  opposite.  In  other  words,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  Cassirer,  Galileo's  empiricism  is  the  em- 
piricism of  a  rationalist. 

Each  of  the  apparently  contradictory  statements,  then,  is 
true.  They  are  true,  however,  only  in  that  both  of  them,  thesis 
and  antithesis,  are  but  preparing  the  way  for  the  synthesis. 
One  arrives  at  definite  knowledge  only  by  means  of  empirical, 
experimental  proof.  But  what  is  an  experiment?  An  experiment 
is  a  method  by  which  Nature  is  made  to  answer  with  "yes"  or 
"no"  to  a  question  put  to  it.  Without  such  a  question  there  is 
no  experiment.  This  question  is  an  intellectual  act.  It  is  with 
my  mind  that  I  conceive  (^mente  concipo"}  an  "hypothesis." 
This  hypothesis  is  an  anticipation  of  what  is  the  objective  law  of 
Nature.  Such  an  hypothesis  needs  confirmation  by  experiment; 
but  it  is  only  such  an  hypothesis  that  can  be  either  confirmed 
or  refuted  by  the  experiment. 


The  historical  statement  quoted  does  not  read  as  if  it  were 
a  statement  concerning  the  opinions  of  a  scientist  of  several 
centuries  ago;  rather  it  reads  "as  if  it  were  a  present  true 
statement."  In  reading  a  novel  or  in  seeing  a  play  and  listening 
to  it,  you  are  tempted  to  forget  that  you  are  witnessing  only  a 
"story;"  moreover,  this  is  quite  as  it  should  be.  A  novel  or  play 
is  supposed  to  exert  this  kind  of  temptation,  and  you  are  ex- 
pected to  yield  to  it.  But,  if  the  same  kind  of  experience  is 
encountered  in  a  scholarly  book  on  the  history  of  philosophy, 
you  are  apt  to  feel  a  little  uneasy  afterwards.  You  were  fas- 
cinated and  caught  by  the  thought  itself:  you  were  following 
the  several  steps,  and  led  to  ask  yourself:  Is  Galileo  right?  And, 
in  asking  this  question,  you  look  around  for  Cassirer's  assistance: 
What  does  he  think?  Was  Galileo  right  or  not?  But  you  look 
in  vain  for  the  author's  assistance.  You  suddenly  realize  that  it 
was  not  a  present  truth-assertion  you  were  reading,  but  only  a 
"story" — the  history  of  a  philosophical  opinion.  The  more  you 
were  fascinated  and  caught  by  the  thought  itself,  the  more 
quickly  you  are  likely  to  lose  interest.  From  the  enthusiasm 
which  your  excursion — or  escape — into  history  may  have  pro- 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  735 

duced,  there  is  almost  bound  to  result  a  kind  of  intellectual 
hangover.  You  ask  yourself:  But  where  is  truth?  And  what 
is  truth? 

Indeed,  the  context  from  which  the  above  passage  is  taken 
makes  it  clear  that  we  are  faced  with  an  historical  statement.  The 
passage  serves  as  an  illustration  of  some  characteristics  which 
were  common  to  the  period  of  the  Renaissance,  to  its  scientists 
as  well  as  to  its  artists.  This  particular  passage  is  included  in  a 
discussion  of  Leonardo  da  Vinci's  theory  of  the  arts;  and 
Galileo's  empiricism  and  rationalism  are  introduced  only  to 
show  that  Leonardo's  views  were  of  something  more  than  in- 
dividual significance;  that  they  were  indeed  a  characteristic 
of  the  period.  Accordingly,  this  short  discussion  of  Galileo's 
theory  leads  to  the  statement  that  Galileo's  theory  about  the 
relationship  between  thought  and  experience  is  in  strict  analogy 
to  that  relation  which,  according  to  Renaissance  aesthetic  the- 
ory, exists  between  the  imagination  (Phantasie)  of  a  painter 
and  the  "objective"  reality  of  things.  The  power  of  the  mind, 
of  artistic  as  well  as  scientific  ingenuity,  consists  not  in  un- 
restrained or  arbitrary  procedure,  but  in  the  fact  that  only  the 
mind  can  teach  us  to  see  and  to  recognize  the  "object"  in  those 
factors  which  are  its  highest  determinants.  The  genius  both 
in  the  artist  and  in  the  scientist  discovers  the  necessity  of  Nature. 

There  is  considerable  intellectual  pleasure  in  being  led  from 
strict  empiricism  to  rationalism,  and  from  there  to  a  compre- 
hensive synthesis  of  both,  and  again  further  to  an  interpretation 
of  scientific  method  as  something  "artistic."  In  spite  of  the 
enjoyment  of  this  intellectual  process,  however,  we  stop  at  this 
point,  and  ask:  Does  Cassirer  really  mean  to  say  that  science 
is  founded  on  no  firmer  ground  than  the  imagination  of  a 
painter?  To  be  sure,  one  realizes  that  this  is  a  statement  which 
is  meant  to  apply  only  to  the  period  of  the  Renaissance.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  the  passage  on  Galileo  recalls  some  of 
Cassirer's  own  views.  Consequently,  the  reader's  uncertainty 
is  only  increased:  Is  this  statement  of  the  historian  supposed 
to  be  "true,"  i.e.,  is  it  at  the  same  time  an  assertion  by  the 
present  philosopher  himself?  The  best  way  of  getting  an  answer 
to  this  question  is  to  look  at  some  of  the  passages  in  which 


736  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

Cassirer  discusses  Galileo  in  his  systematic  philosophical 
treatises. 

3 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  above  passage  from  Galileo  is 
a  very  "Cassirerian"  passage.  The  keen  paradox  that  the  indi- 
vidual mind,  out  of  itself,  (da  "per  se)  knows  the  objective 
laws  of  nature — or  rather  the  fact  that  this  is  not  regarded  as 
a  paradox — reflects  the  ideas  one  is  accustomed  to  in  Ernst  Cas- 
sirer to  such  an  extent  that  one  almost  expects  to  hear  the  ring 
of  his  voice,  and  to  see  the  statement  emphasized  by  his  own 
personality. 

Indeed,  the  passage  expresses  Cassirer's  basic  epistemological 
position — and  at  the  same  time  it  does  not  do  so.  The  famous 
words  come  to  mind  in  which,  in  the  Preface  to  the  second  edi- 
tion of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  "Kant  tried  to  appraise  the 
consequences  of  empiricism  and  rationalism."  These  words  de- 
note in  general  terms  the  starting  point  of  Cassirer's  own  theory 
of  knowledge}  and  the  way  in  which  he  quoted  them  in  one  of 
his  latest  remarks  on  Galileo2  suggests  that  they  were  also  the 
starting  point  of  Cassirer's  own  historical  work,  and  especially 
of  his  history  of  the  Erkenntnisproblem.  "When  Kant .  .  .  tried 
to  appraise  the  consequences  of  empiricism  and  rationalism,  he 
was  obliged  to  go  back  to  the  source  of  this  development."  One 
is  greatly  tempted  to  substitute  here  Cassirer's  name  for  Kant's. 

When  Galilei  let  balls  of  a  particular  weight,  which  he  had  determined 
himself,  roll  down  an  inclined  plane  ...  a  new  light  flashed  on  all  stu- 
dents of  nature.  They  comprehended  that  reason  has  insight  into  that 
only  which  she  herself  produces  on  her  own  plan,  and  that  she  must 
move  forward  with  the  principles  of  her  judgments,  according  to  fixed 
law,  and  compel  nature  to  answer  her  questions.  .  .  .  Reason  holding 
in  one  hand  its  principles  .  .  .  and  in  the  other  hand  the  experiment, 
which  it  has  devised  according  to  those  principles,  must  approach  nature 
in  order  to  be  taught  by  it:  but  not  in  the  character  of  a  pupil  who 
agrees  to  everything  the  master  likes  but  as  an  appointed  judge  who 
compels  the  witnesses  to  answer  the  questions  which  he  himself  proposes. 
.  .  .  Thus  only  has  the  study  of  nature  entered  on  the  secure  method  of  a 

2  "Galileo:  a  New  Science  and  a  New  Spirit,"  The  American  Scholar ,  (Vol.  12) 
1943)  6. 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  737 

science,  after  having  for  many  centuries  done  nothing  but  grope  in  the 
dark.8 

These  lines  show  where  Kant  and  Cassirer  (in  so  far  as  the 
latter  was  a  Kantian)  agree  with  Galileo.  At  the  same  time, 
these  same  lines,  and  the  context  from  which  they  are  taken, 
point  out  those  principles  in  regard  to  which  their  thought 
moves  in  a  direction  diametrically  opposed  to  that  of  Galileo. 
There  is  nothing  in  Galileo  which  suggests  that  Reason  acts 
as  the  "legislator  to  Nature"  and  "prescribes  its  laws  to  Nature." 
On  the  contrary,  Cassirer  frequently  quotes  Galileo's  statement, 
which  says  that  the  word  of  God  is  written  in  Nature,  in  mathe- 
matical language  j  Reason  is  capable  of  sharing  the  divine 
knowledge  in  kind,  though  not  in  extent.  This  claim  of  possess- 
ing divine  knowledge,  the  claim  of  having  an  absolutely  certain 
knowledge  of  Being-in-itself — these  ontological  claims  are  ir- 
reconcilable with  those  'Critical*  views  which  Cassirer  never 
ceased  to  share  with  Kant. 

The  same  vacillation  between  taking  sides  both  "with"  and 
"against"  Galileo  can  be  found  in  Cassirer's  systematic  writings 
on  the  philosophy  of  science. 

In  order  to  testify  for  Cassirer's  own  views,  Galileo  is  called 
in,  e.g.,  when  Cassirer  discusses  the  problem  of  induction* 
Among  the  many  theories  of  induction  there  are  essentially  two 
types;  one  of  them  is  represented  by  Bacon  and  John  Stuart 
Mill, — the  other  one  by  Galileo,  both  in  his  capacity  of  a 
scientist  and  as  a  theoretician  of  science.  In  Galileo's  'classical' 
and  €a-prioristic*  view  the  experiment  answers  a  question;  i.e., 
it  answers  only  a  question,  and  this  question  qua  question  is 
limited;  it  is  defined  by  the  "mental  conception"  which  makes 
us  raise  the  question.  But,  although  it  is  only  to  a  question  that 
the  experiment  gives  an  answer,  it  does  give  an  answer,  and  it 

8  Immanuel  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Preface  to  and  Edition.  Translated 
by  F.  Max  Muller,  London,  Macmillan  and  Co.,  (1881)  Vol.  I,  p.  368.  Quoted 
by  Ernst  Cassirer  in  his  article  "Galileo:  a  New  Science  and  a  New  Spirit," 
published  in  The  American  Scholar,  (Vol.  12)  1943,  6. 

4  E.g.,  Substance  and  Function,  Engl.  Translation  (1923)  pp.  237-270,  esp. 
252-270.  Determinismus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der  modernen  Physik  (hereafter 
abbreviated:  Determinismus)  pp.  103,  118,  "Goethe  und  die  mathematische 
Physik,"  in;  Ifae  und  Gestalt,  j$t  ed.,  42, 


73»  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

answers  the  question  once  and  for  all.  Every  experiment  can  be 
made  only  under  particular  circumstances,  and  these  circum- 
stances change  from  hour  to  hour,  or  even  from  one  split  second 
to  another,  and  from  place  to  place.  The  particular  event  which 
is  observed  can  serve  in  the  rank  of  an  experiment  only  to  the 
extent  to  which  one  abstracts  from  the  particular  circumstances} 
one  can  abstract  from  them  only  by  taking  them  into  considera- 
tion} in  order  to  take  the  accidental  circumstances  into  considera- 
tion, however,  the  decision  must  have  been  made  beforehand 
as  to  what  in  the  particular  case  is  accidental  and  what  is  essential 
and  necessary.  That  is  to  say,  the  criterion  for  the  abstraction 
is  €a  priori?  and  it  is  this  a  priori  criterion  which  makes  the 
universal  validity  of  the  experiment  possible}  i.e.,  makes  the  ex- 
periment an  experiment. 

This  universal  validity  of  the  experiment  is  contested  by  the 
doctrine  of  induction  which  Bacon  and  Mill  represent;  and 
with  its  universal  validity  they  also  question  its  a  priori  char- 
acter. The  "induction  from  particular  to  particular,"  from 
which  Mill  stated  his  canons,  gives  up  the  a  priori  claim  of 
universal  validity,  since,  according  to  this  conception,  one  experi- 
ment is  always  a  set  of  experiments,  the  function  of  which  is 
to  discover  the  constant  factor.  Instead  of  stating  a  priori  some- 
thing about  the  phenomena  with  preconceived  notions,  it  is 
necessary  to  come  to  and  to  remain  in  constant  touch  with  them ; 
if,  through  a  great  number  of  variations  in  various  ways,  two 
factors  remain  uniformly  connected,  then  a  constancy  and  uni- 
formity is  shown  in  the  connection  between  those  two  factors. 
This  uniformity  is  proved  strictly  only  for  the  number  of  cases 
for  which  it  was  shown  to  exist;  there  is  no  reason  why  this 
uniformity  should  last  beyond  the  number  of  tested  cases; 
the  uniformity  of  nature,  which  we  rely  on,  is  itself  supposed  to 
be  based  only  on  an  "induction"  of  this  type.  The  disclaimer 
that  such  a  theory  of  induction  lacks  a  logical  justification  can 
not  well  be  raised  against  it;  for  it  is  precisely  one  of  the  pur- 
poses of  the  theory  to  bring  into  sharp  relief  the  fact  that 
human  knowledge  does  not  have  any  such  independent  founda- 
tion, but  remains  ultimately  exposed  to  the  uncertainties  of  the 
unknown.  It  gives  up  the  claim  to  universal  laws.  If  physics,  on 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  739 

the  other  hand,  has  shown  that  phenomena  can  not  only  be  stated 
and  measured,  but  that  they  can  be  subsumed  under  laws,  then 
such  a  theory  of  induction  is  not  sufficient  for  physics. 

Against  Mill's  notion  that  a  natural  law  can  always  be  only  an  "aggre- 
gate of  specific  truths"  a  decisive  objection  was  raised  by  Galileo  at  the 
very  beginning  of  modern  science.  Galileo  declared:  If  this  were  so, 
then  any  general  judgments  concerning  reality  would  be  either  impossi- 
ble or  useless.  They  would  be  impossible,  if  the  series  of  the  individual 
cases  which  are  observed  is  infinite ;  for  such  a  series  cannot  be  exhausted 
by  means  of  enumeration  (per  enumerarionem  simflicem) ;  and  they 
would  be  superflous,  if  the  series  were  finite ;  for  in  this  case  we  could  be 
satisfied  with  ascertaining  the  fact  specifically  in  the  case  of  each  of  the 
members  of  the  series.  Mill's  declaration  "All  inference  is  from  particu- 
lars to  particulars"  is  therewith  declared  void,  at  least  for  the  field  of  exact 
physics.5 

In  other  words,  what  Bacon's  and  Mill's  type  of  induction 
can  establish  are  statements  of  information  which  in  the  ideal 
(and  unattainable)  case  of  perfection,  would  have  the  form  of: 
"Whenever  X,  then  Y."  The  form  of  physical  laws,  as  estab- 
lished by  Galileo,  has  the  form:  "If  X,  then  Y" — whereby  it  is 
completely  irrelevant  whether  X  ever  "happens."  On  the  other 
hand,  "if  X  ever  happens,  then  Y  must  necessarily  be  the  case 
too." 

Cassirer,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  never  in  the  least  questioned  the 
usefulness  of  the  methods  of  induction  as  a  means  of  finding 
"correlations"  between  two  sets  of  phenomena  between  which 
so  far  no  relation  had  been  discovered.  If  I  do  not  have  any 
idea  with  what  factors  a  certain  phenomenon  P  might  be  con- 
nected, then,  in  my  desperate  need  for  a  good  idea,  I  look 
around  and  may  try  by  the  methods  of  trial  and  error,  as  im- 
proved by  Mill's  canons,  to  "get  an  idea,"  or  any  "suggestion" 
as  to  where  to  look  for  any  relevant  factors.  Also,  the  other 
way  around}  suppose  I  have  an  idea,  a  "suspicion"  that  two 
phenomena,  which  have  never  before  been  related,  may  have 
something  to  do  with  each  other  j  then  again,  by  means  of 
"induction,"  such  as  stated  by  Mill's  canons,  I  can  find  out 

*  Deter minismus,  51.  (Cf.  Galileo,  Opere,  ed.  Alberi.  XLI,  513). 


740  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

whether  there  is  any  basis  for  my  suspicion  and  whether  there 
is  any  possibility  (and  in  this  sense,  any  likelihood  or  proba- 
bility) of  its  being  true.  But  such  a  suspicion  is  not  an  "hypoth- 
esis," and  its  "try-out"  is  not  an  experiment  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word.  To  be  sure,  it  is  merely  a  verbal  question  whether 
such  a  "try-out"  is  called  an  experiment.  What  is  important 
is  this:  that  the  small,  but  immensely  significant  difference  is 
recognized  which  exists  between  the  "testing  a  suspicion"  and 
an  experiment  in  the  strict  sense,  i.e.,  an  experiment  which 
serves  to  confirm  an  hypothesis. 

A  "suspicion"  in  the  sense  in  which  the  word  was  used  here 
refers  to  a  matter  of  some  factual  information,  something  that 
may  happen  to  be  the  case,  it  can  be  proved  completely,  or 
rather  replaced,  by  an  observation  j  in  fact,  it  makes  sense  only 
in  the  absence  of  an  observation,  as  its  substitute.  An  hypothesis 
represents  an  insight,  and  may  be  true  even  though  there  might 
never  again  occur  a  case  to  demonstrate  the  insight.  As  an 
insight  it  is  not  "derived"  from  experience,  but  is  only  provoked 
by  an  experience.  (Plato's  term  is  rcapa*aXef<j6ai).  In  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  hypothesis,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word, 
"experience"  plays,  so  to  speak,  only  the  role  of  a  trigger 
action.  As  one  illustration  out  of  many  others  in  the  history  of 
science,  Cassirer  discusses  in  detail  the  very  accidental  "experi- 
ence" which  led  Robert  Mayer  to  the  first  statement  of  the 
principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy.  Similarly,  the  study 
of  the  case  of  one  single  patient  may  give  a  physician  the  insight 
into  the  intrinsic  and  universal  connection  between  some  "mys- 
terious" symptoms,  which  so  far  had  remained  unexplained, 
and  some  relevant  condition.8  Cassirer  quotes  Goethe's  criticism 
of  Bacon's  inductive  method,  and  his  comparison  with  that  of 
Galileo. 

He  who  is  not  capable  of  becoming  aware  of  the  fact  that  often  one 
case  is  worth  thousands  of  them  and  includes  them  all,  will  never  be 
able  to  promote  anything  for  his  own  enjoyment  and  benefit,  and  that 
of  others.  .  .  .  "Through  Bacon's  method  of  dispersion  natural  science 
seemed  to  be  scattered  forever.  But  through  Galileo  it  became  at  once 
united  and  concentrated.  Galileo  proved  in  his  early  youth  that  for  a 
6Cf.  Determinism™ >  59. 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  741 

true  genius,  one  case  may  stand  for  a  thousand  cases,  inasmuch  as  he 
developed  the  theory  of  the  pendulum  and  of  the  fall  of  bodies  from  the 
observation  of  a  swinging  lamp  in  a  cathedral."  ...  In  the  sciences 
everything  depends  on  what  is  called  an  apergu,  and  on  becoming  aware 
of  what  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  phenomena.  Such  an  awareness  goes  on 
to  be  productive  ad  infinitum.7 

It  is  seen  from  these  instances  that  in  Cassirer's  systematic 
writings  Galileo  appears  in  an  extremely  un-historical  fashion. 
Galileo  is  pictured  in  discussion  with  John  Stuart  Mill,  and 
Goethe  is  called  in  to  aid  himj  no  attempt  is  made  to  excuse 
the  chronological  anachronisms  (as  was  done  even  by  Plato, 
when  he  had  old  Parmenides  meet  young  Socrates).  Galileo  has 
to  dispute  with  the  theoreticians  of  modern  statistical  physics, 
and  even  then  is  made  to  carry  the  day.  He  comes  in  to  defend 
himself  (and  Cassirer)  against  Exner's  questioning  of  the  ulti- 
mate validity  of  the  laws  of  dynamic  physics.  From  the  "classi- 
cal" point  of  view,  any  statistical  arguments  are  regarded  simply 
as  preliminary,  temporary  statements  which  are  supposed  to 
be  replaced  eventually  by  "dynamic"  statements.  In  the  case  of 
all  "irreversible"  processes,  however,  statistical  statements  must 
be  regarded  as  final.  If  both  the  dynamic  and  the  statistical 
forms  of  laws  are  required,  then  it  seems  necessary  to  consider 
the  statistical  laws  of  the  general  concept,  and  to  subsume  the 
classical  form  of  dynamic  laws  under  it  as  a  special  case.  The 
laws  of  the  kinetic  theory  of  gases  do  not  have  any  "exact," 
but  only  statistical  validity,  and  offer  average  values  gathered 
from  a  great  number  of  observations. 

Is  it  different  with  the  rest  of  the  laws,  with  the  laws  of  classical  physics? 
Does  the  formula  which  Galileo  has  established  for  the  free  fall  of  bodies 
really  apply  always  and  everywhere?  How  can  we  decide  about  the 
universal  validity  of  a  law,  since  our  experience  can  always  cover  only 
the  "average"  of  a  phenomenon  during  a  long,  but  limited  stretch  of 
time?8 

1 1bid.)  cf.  also  "Galileo:  A  New  Science  and  A  New  Spirit,"  16.  The  internal 
quotation  is  taken  from  Goethe's  Zur  Farbenlehre,  Historischer  Teil,  Weimar 
edition,  Part  II }  Vol.  3,  236,  246ff. 

8  Determmismus,  102  (the  quotation  stems  from  Exner,  Vorlesungen  uber  die 
fhysikalischen  Grundlagen  der  Natttrwissenschajten,  Wien,  1919$  86th  &  8;th 
Vorlesung,  647 fT.). 


742  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

Could  it  not  be  that  the  average  laws  would  not  apply  within 
very  small  stretches  of  space  and  time?  To  this  question  Galileo 
answers  with  an  extensive  quotation  from  one  of  his  letters,0 
to  this  effect:  his  arguments  would  not  lose  the  least  of  their 
force  and  collusiveness,  even  if  the  bodies  of  Nature  did  not 
happen  to  fall  with  a  strictly  uniform  acceleration}  for  these 
arguments  claim  only  a  hypothetical  and  not  an  assertive  va- 
lidity. 

This  shows,  according  to  Cassirer,  that  Galileo's  equations  are 
not  supposed  to  give  a  collective  description  of  "all"  individual 
cases.  "One  could  express  this,  somewhat  paradoxically,  by  say- 
ing that  Galileo's  equations  do  not  claim  to  be  true  because  they 
apply  always  and  everywhere,  and  because  this  'always'  and 
'everywhere'  had  been  experimentally  proved — but  because, 
strictly  speaking,  they  never  apply  anywhere."10 

4 

And  now  something  very  strange  happens,  and  something 
very  unhistorical  and  antihistorical  indeed — although  what  Cas- 
sirer did  here  to  Galileo  is,  from  the  historical  point  of  view, 
probably  not  any  worse  than  what  Plato  did  occasionally  to 
the  historical  Socrates.  After  having  brought  the  argument  to 
this  point  with  the  aid  of  Galileo,  Cassirer  takes  it  up  again 
himself,  and  leads  it  to  a  point  which  represents  the  very 
opposite  of  what  Galileo  could  ever  have  thought.  There  is, 
however,  not  the  slightest  historical  misrepresentation.  Galileo, 
so  to  speak,  has  left  the  room  without  his  departure  being 
noticedj  and  the  stream  of  thought,  within  which  he  had 
emerged  for  a  few  "interviews,"  has  gone  on  so  rapidly  and 
so  smoothly  that  if  and  when  you  come  to  stop  for  a  moment, 
and  ask  yourself:  "Yes,  but  what  about  Galileo?",  you  notice 
that  he  has  been  left  behind  long  ago. 

What  Cassirer  does  is  to  take  up  Exner's  argument,  and  in 
general  the  argument  of  "induction  from  particular  to  particu- 
lar," in  a  more  radical  form — only  in  order  to  outdo  it  in  its 
radicalism.  It  should  be  said  at  once  that,  in  a  later  chapter  on 

9  Ibid.,  103  (Galileo  to  Carcaville,  Ofere,  ed.  Alberi,  VII,  i56f). 
"/*#.,  103. 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  743 

the  logical  analysis  of  probability,  Cassirer  stresses  the  fact  that 
judgments  of  probability  are  just  as  "true"  (or  false),  and  just 
as  "objective"  as  any  judgments  of  the  classical  form.  But  here 
he  considers  Exner's  objection  to  Planck's  position  of  maintain- 
ing dynamic  laws  as  an  ideal  of  knowledge.  Exner  expresses 
very  strongly  that  mood  of  the  philosophy  of  empirical  induc- 
tion in  which  man  is  regarded  as  a  stranger  in  this  world,  in- 
significant as  compared  with  the  universe,  and  out  of  touch 
with  it.  Can  we  ever  be  quite  sure  whether  what  happens  in 
Nature  "really"  corresponds  to  what  we  assume  and  establish 
in  our  general  laws? 

Nature  does  not  care  whether  man  understands  it  or  not;  also,  it  is  not 
appropriate  for  us  to  construct  a  Nature  which  is  adequate  to  our  under- 
standing; the  only  thing  for  us  to  do  is  to  become  resigned  to  accepting 
it  as  it  is  given  to  us.  ...  The  actual  empirical  confirmation  of  the 
results  of  the  calculus  of  probability  demonstrates  that  "chance"  must 
be  something  that  is  completely  independent,  something  that  is  given  in 
Nature.  Otherwise,  it  would  not  be  possible  that  physical  laws  could  be 
derived  on  the  assumption  of  chance.11 

The  argument  of  Exner  does  not  concern  Cassirer;  he 
considers  the  question  dealt  with  therein  as  a  pseudo-problem. 
He  replies  with  the  counter-question:  on  what  grounds  may  we 
assume  that  there  does  not  prevail  a  complete  chaos,  but  a 
certain  regularity  which  is  expressed  in  objective — statistical — 
laws? 

Cassirer,  as  has  already  been  intimated,  is  more  radical  than 
Exner.  Not  only  does  Nature  not  care,  but  there  is  not  any 
Nature  which  could  either  care  or  not  care.  For  any  scientific 
experience  there  is  no  Nature  which  "exists,"  as  an  absolute 
being,  outside  of  a  system  of  experience}  the  system  of  ex- 
periences by  which  we  know  phenomena  may  be  called  Nature. 
After  having  realized  that  we  know  by  (the  conception  of) 
Nature  rather  than  know  Nature,  it  no  longer  makes  sense  to 
ask  for  laws  "in"  Nature.  The  boldness  and  efficiency  of  Kant's 
"Copernican  Revolution"  on  which  Cassirer  insists  is  apparent 
in  a  context  like  this. 

11  Ib$d.t  1 08  (the  quotations  are  taken  from  Exner,  loc.  cit.,  697,  667). 


744  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

Thus,  there  does  not  "exist**  any  Nature,  but  there  is  objectivity.  Not 
Nature  "cares"  and  "asks,"  but  "knowledge"  asks  whether  and  to 
what  extent  it  may  be  possible  to  find  an  objective  order  and  determina- 
tion within  the  phenomena:  and  all  its  individual  concepts  are  but 
partial  expressions  for  this  one  basic  problem.  If  physical  research, 
starting  from  some  general  hypothetical  presuppositions,  is  able  to  link 
them  together  in  such  a  manner  that  a  more  and  more  perfect  knowl- 
edge of  the  particular  phenomena  will  result,  then  we  have  all  that 
can  be  meant  by  and  expected  from  strict  dynamic  lawfulness  (Gesetz- 
lichkeit.)1* 

The  very  analysis  of  the  problem  is  offered  as  its  complete 
solution. 

But  would  Galileo  accept  this  solution?  He  is  not  mentioned, 
and  a  little  reflection  shows  that,  if  Galileo  were  confronted 
with  Exner's  problem,  he  would  not  have  considered  it  as  a 
pseudo-problem  as  Cassirer  did.  For,  whereas  for  Galileo  the 
book  of  Nature  is  written  in  mathematical  language,  it  is  the 
book  of  an  independent  Nature  that  is  written  in  this  language; 
Galileo's  doctrine  is  just  as  "ontological"  as  is  Exner's;  and 
Exner's  "ontological"  view  is  not  more  so  than  that  of  Galileo 
— whom  Cassirer  had  quoted  against  Exner. 


Let  us  consider  this  case  of  "Galileo  versus  Galileo;"  a  brief 
consideration  of  this  somewhat  disturbing  phenomenon  may 
give  us  some  insight  into  the  structure  of  Cassirer's  thought. 

The  case  is  disturbing,  for  several  reasons.  First  of  all,  it  is 
disconcerting,  to  say  the  least,  to  find  that,  whereas  the  witness 
is  called  in  order  to  testify  when  he  is  needed  to  speak  in  favor 
of  the  cause,  he  is  not  called  in  at  any  other  occasions.  Perhaps 
it  was  assumed  that  he  did  not  have  anything  relevant  to  say. 
But  it  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  what  he  has  to  say  is 
relevant  to  the  matter,  and  that  he  would  be  opposed  to  Cas- 
sirer's  views  here.  And  thirdly,  it  can  easily  be  shown  that 
Cassirer  knew  that  what  Galileo  would  have  to  say  here  would 
be  contrary  to  his  (Cassirer's)  own  views. 

.,  io8f. 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  745 

If  this  is  so,  then  the  counter-argument  could  have  been 
omitted  only  for  didactic  or  stylistic  reasons  of  simplification. 
A  psychological  after-effect,  however,  may  remain  as  the  result 
of  such  procedure:  namely,  one  might  begin  to  distrust  Cassirer's 
quotations,  of  which  there  are  many.  (As  to  this,  however,  there 
is  no  reason  for  concern,  either  in  this  particular  instance,  or, 
for  that  matter,  in  general.)  In  the  p-esent  case,  one  can  easily 
convince  himself  that  neither  the  historical  truth  nor  the  argu- 
ment suffers  from  the  fact  that  on  occasion  the  evidence  to  the 
contrary  has  been  withheld,  whereas  that  "in  favor"  has  been 
given. 

Although  the  psychological  after-effect  may,  then,  be  dis- 
missed, the  "objective"  question  remains  all  the  more  disturbing. 
How  is  it  possible  that  Cassirer  agrees  and  disagrees  with  the 
same  author  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  respect? 

If  one  is  familiar  with  Cassirer's  thought,  one  is  so  used  to 
the  fact  that  Cassirer  can  agree  and  disagree  at  the  same  time 
that  he  no  longer  wonders  about  it. 

In  his  investigations  into  "Einstein's  Theory  of  Relativity" 
Cassirer's  problem  is  in  part  this:  Kant's  transcendental  deduc- 
tions refer  to  the  classical  physics  of  Newton  and  Galileo.  If 
classical  physics  is  superseded  by  modern  physics,  are  Kant's 
transcendental  deductions  also  out  of  date?13 

Since,  in  some  respects,  Cassirer  is  a  Kantian,  one  might  (if 
one  did  not  know  him  well)  expect  him  to  tend  to  minimize  the 
difference  between  modern  and  classical  physics.  However,  the 
very  opposite  is  the  case.  The  reason  for  the  insufficiency  of 
classical  physics  lies  in  its  very  concept  of  "mechanism,"  and  in 
the  metaphysical  and  oncological  basis  on  which  Galileo's,  New- 
ton's, and  Leibniz'  discoveries  were  based.  As  for  Galileo,  it  is 
recognized  that  his  foundation  of  dynamics  is  due  to  his  con- 
ception of  mathematical  hypothesis  (which  we  mentioned), 
which  enabled  him  to  "abstract"  from  the  happenings  in  phe- 
nomenal or  empirical  space  to  which  absolute  being,  ontological 
reality,  is  ascribed.  At  the  same  time,  his  own  new  concepts 

11  Cf.  Einstein's  Theory  of  Relativity,  in:  Substance  and  Function  (Engl. 
transl.),  355. 


746  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

do  not  abandon  the  idea  of  such  an  "absolute  reality"  alto- 
gether; this  is  the  reason,  as  Cassirer  sees  it,  why  Galileo's 
idea  of  mechanism  is  faulty  and  insufficient. 

.  .  .  The  way  is  open  to  Galileo's  foundation  of  dynamics:  for  since 
place  has  ceased  to  be  something  real,  the  question  as  to  the  ground  of 
the  place  of  a  body  and  the  ground  of  its  persistence  in  one  and  the  same 
place  disappears.  Objective  physical  reality  passes  from  place  to  change 
of  place,  to  motion  and  the  factors  by  which  it  is  determined  as  a  magni- 
tude. If  such  a  determination  is  to  be  possible  in  a  definite  way,  the 
identity  and  permanence,  which  were  hitherto  ascribed  to  mere  place, 
must  go  over  to  motion;  motion  must  possess  "being,"  that  is,  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  physicist,  numerical  constancy.  This  demand  for  the 
numerical  constancy  of  motion  itself  finds  its  expression  and  its  realization 
in  the  law  of  inertia.  We  recognize  here  again  how  closely,  in  Galileo, 
the  mathematical  motive  of  his  thought  was  connected  with  an  ontologi- 
cal  motive,  how  his  conception  of  being  interacted  with  his  conception 
of  measure.  The  new  measure,  which  is  found  in  inertia  and  in  the 
concept  of  uniform  acceleration,  involves  also  a  new  determination  of 
reality.  In  contrast  with  mere  place,  which  is  infinitely  ambiguous  and 
differs  according  to  the  choice  of  the  system  of  reference,  the  inertial 
movement  appears  to  be  a  truly  intrinsic  property  of  bodies,  which  be- 
longs to  them  "in  themselves"  and  without  reference  to  a  definite  system 
of  comparison  and  measurement.  The  velocity  of  a  material  system  is 
more  than  a  mere  factor  for  calculation;  it  not  only  really  belongs 
to  the  system  but  defines  its  reality,  since  it  determines  its  vis  viva,  i.e.} 
the  measure  of  its  dynamic  effectiveness.  In  its  measure  of  motion,  in  the 
differential  quotient  of  the  space  by  the  time,  Galileo's  physics  claims 
to  have  reached  the  kernel  of  all  physical  being,  to  have  defined  the 
intensive  reality  of  motion.  By  this  reality,  the  dynamic  consideration 
is  distinguished  from  the  merely  phoronomic.  The  concept  of  the  "state 
of  motion,"  not  as  a  mere  comparative  magnitude,  but  as  an  essential 
element  belonging  to  the  moving  system  intrinsically,  now  becomes  the 
real  mark  and  characteristic  of  physical  reality. ...  In  all  these  examples, 
it  is  evident  how  sharply,  on  the  one  hand,  the  physical  thought  of 
modern  times  has  grasped  the  thought  of  the  relativity  of  place  and 
of  motion,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  how  it  has  shrunk  back  from  follow- 
ing it  to  its  ultimate  consequences.14 

So  much  then  is  clear:  the  fact  that  Galileo  does  not  always 

14  Substance  and  Function,  3 6 if. 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  747 

agree  with  Cassirer's  views  is  clearly  understood  and  fully 
recognized  by  Cassirer.  Cassirer  finds  that  he  cannot  agree 
with  Galileo  because  Galileo  bases  his  theories  on  ontology  and 
metaphysics. 

This  is  clear  and  simple.  What  remains  puzzling  is  the  fact 
that  Cassirer  can  agree  with  Galileo  after  all.  The  simplest 
solution  of  this  would,  of  course,  be  to  say  that  he  just  happens 
to  agree  with  some  of  Galileo's  views  and  to  disagree  with  some 
others.  But  Cassirer  does  not  give  such  a  superficial  answer; 
and  he  cannot  give  it  because  he  sees  much  too  clearly  how 
intimately  Galileo's  achievements,  which  Cassirer  admires,  are 
connected  with  Galileo's  metaphysical  doctrine,  which  Cassirer 
rejects. 

Galileo's  (as  well  as  Newton's  and  Leibniz')  "error"  con- 
sists in  their  mathematical  metaphysics,  i.e.,  in  the  fact  that  they 
were  convinced  of  the  identity  of  Mathematics  and  Nature. 
Their  views  in  this  respect  are  summarized  in  this  manner: 

He  who  thinks  and  makes  inferences  mathematically,  does  not  play 
around  with  empty  thoughts;  he  does  not  move  in  a  narrow  world  of 
self-made  concepts,  but  he  is  in  contact  with  the  fundamentals  of  reality 
themselves.  Here  we  are  at  the  point  in  which  thinking  and  being  are 
in  immediate  touch  with  one  another,  and  where,  accordingly,  there  is 
not  noticeable  any  difference  between  "finite"  and  "infinite"  understand- 
ing any  more.  For  the  divine  intellect  has  this  privilege:  it  knows  the 
objects  not  because  it  looks  at  them  and  observes  them  from  the  outside; 
it  knows  them  because  it  itself  is  the  very  reason  of  their  being.  Its 
thought  grasps  Being  because  and  in  so  far  as  it  creates  Being;  and  this 
original  of  creation  is  determined  by  magnitude,  number,  and  measure. 
Far  from  being  mere  copies  of  reality,  these  concepts  are  the  very 
originals,  the  everlasting  and  unchangeable  "archetypes"  of  Being.  On 
this  assumption  there  rests  Kepler's  doctrine  of  "cosmic  harmony,"  .  .  . 
and  the  same  idea  permeates  Galileo's  representation  and  justification 
of  the  Copernican  system.  In  his  Dialogues  .  .  .  Galileo  emphasizes  that 
with  regard  to  mathematical  knowledge  there  is  no  basic  qualitative  dif- 
ference between  the  human  and  the  divine  intellect.15 

This  is,  as  Cassirer  remarks,  a  point  which  gave  offense  to  the 
church  and  which,  for  dissimilar  but  related  reasons,  offends 

M  Determinismusy  19. 


748  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

Cassirer's  critical-philosophical  mind.  Nonetheless,  as  this  pas- 
sage shows,  Cassirer  always  has  "the  fullest  understanding" 
for  the  ideas  of  other  thinkers — a  human  understanding  and  a 
historical  understanding  j  sometimes  it  looks,  therefore,  as  if 
this  "understanding"  enabled  him  to  "agree  and  disagree  at 
the  same  time;"  i.e.,  as  if  he  could  forget  his  disagreement  be- 
cause he  was  always  making  allowance  for  "extenuating  cir- 
cumstances." In  the  views  of  these  mathematical  metaphysicians 
and  metaphysical  mathematicians,  and  in  their  identification 
of  mathematics  and  Nature, 

there  is  expressed  the  characteristic  subjective  "pathos"  which  inspires 
the  first  founders  and  champions  of  the  classical  rationalism.  ...  It  is  the 
first  exuberant  enthusiasm  and,  as  it  were,  the  intoxication  with  the 
newly  founded  and  established  mathematical  knowledge  which  coined 
this  language,16 

It  is  true,  the  word  "language"  in  this  connection,  in  a  book 
by  Cassirer,  has  a  special  connotation:  he  wrote  a  philosophy  of 
language,  and  this  philosophy  of  language  is  part  of  what 
could  be  called  a  philosophy  of  languages,  or  of  "Language" — 
in  the  sense  and  the  effect  that  every  form  of  world  view  can 
be  regarded  as  one  complete  and  consistent  "Language"  in  the 
"words"  or  symbols  of  which  every  content  can  be  expressed. 
Whereas  "Language"  becomes  something  very  important 
( — there  is  no  world- view  without  such  a  "Language" — ),  the 
importance  of  the  "vocabulary"  of  every  world-view  declines 
somewhat:  in  short,  what  Galileo  and  the  "rationalists"  had 
to  say  in  metaphysical  terms  is  no  longer  very  important.  But 
( — and,  in  describing  Cassirer's  thought,  the  word  "but"  must 
be  used  again  and  again — ),  having  made  this  statement,  we 
notice  at  once  that  this  is  only  half  the  truth,  and  that  the  very 
limitations  of  this  metaphysical  "Language"  caused  the  insuffi- 
ciency and  faultiness  of  the  great  systems  of  mathematical  ra- 
tionalism. 

Hence  a  passage  like  this,  which  reveals  Cassirer's  willing- 
ness and  ability  to  achieve  "full  understanding"  of  historical  and 
human  limitations,  must  not  be  taken  too  seriously  in  a  strictly 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  749 

philosophical  sense.  It  serves  as  a  kind  of  protection,  so  to 
speak}  it  is  as  a  sheath  which  is  used  for  both  purposes:  for 
protecting  the  "human  interest"  from  being  hurt  by  the  crystal- 
hard  edge  of  the  core  of  the  argument — and  also  for  protecting 
the  most  sharply  cut  edges  of  the  argument  from  being  blunted 
by  some  inappropriate  use.  The  core  of  the  intellectual  argu- 
ment in  the  case  "against  Galileo"  remains  unaffected,  even 
though  the  sentence  passed  on  the  "human"  factor  has  been 
mellowed  by  granting  "extenuating  historical  circumstances." 

In  his  mechanistic  metaphysics  Galileo  did  not  know  what 
he  was  talking  about.  In  drastic  words,  this  is  what  Cassirer  says 
in  more  urbane  terminology,  when  he  says  that  only  the  sub- 
sequent periods  of  science  recognized  what  Galileo  had  meant. 

In  the  progress  of  mechanics  the  principle  of  inertia  is  recognized  with 
increasing  distinctness  as  what  it  meant  fundamentally  to  Galileo.17 


In  a  very  agreeable  manner,  then,  Cassirer  disagrees  with 
Galileo  the  metaphysician;  but  the  agreeable  manner  does  not 
change  the  fact  of  extreme  disagreement;  it  is  a  fight  which  is 
going  on — or  is  it  only  a  tournament? 

As  has  been  shown,  the  reconciliation  between  Galileo,  the 
defender  of  the  principle  of  "hypothesis,"  and  Galileo,  the 
metaphysician,  is  made  possible  only  on  the  assumption  that 
one  can  understand  Galileo  better  than  he  understood  him- 
self. An  adequate  interpretation  of  this  assumption  and  what 
it  meant  to  Cassirer  could  be  given  only  in  a  discussion  of  his 
theory  of  history.  It  sometimes  looks  as  if  Cassirer  were  inclined 
to  give  an  answer,  in  terms  of  an  optimistic  rationalistic  theory 
of  history,  to  the  effect  that  the  "dim"  ideas  of  former  genera- 
tions are  freed  from  their  metaphysical  make-up  by  the  fol- 
lowing generations.  Sometimes  Cassirer  does  seem  to  come  close 
to  the  "organic"  interpretations  of  a  mathematical  metaphysics 
as  advanced  by  Whitehead.  All  this,  however,  and  all  that  has 
to  do  with  the  convictions  and  motives  of  Cassirer's  philosophy 
must  be  disregarded  in  the  present  discussion  which  attempts 

"Einstein's  Theory  of  Relativity  in  Substance  and  Function,  364. 


750  WALTER  M.  SOLMIT2 

only  to  sketch  briefly  the  formal  schematism  by  which  Cassirer's 
thought  proceeds. 

Galileo,  the  defender  of  "hypothesis,"  and  Galileo,  the  de- 
fender of  metaphysics,  can  be  "reconciled"  only  because  they 
are  not  treated  impartially.  What  the  defender  of  "hypothesis" 
has  to  say  is  accepted  and  believed;  what  the  defender  of  meta- 
physics has  to  say,  however,  does  not  receive  such  acceptance. 
The  judge  knows  better  than  the  witness  himself  what  the 
witness  "means"  to  say;  his  statement  is  discarded  as  unessen- 
tial and  accidental.  As  far  as  the  form  of  the  argument  goes,  this 
is  the  basic  factor:  the  metaphysical  statement  is  regarded  as 
accidental. 

Hypothesis  is  an  expression  of  Necessity.  Metaphysics  is 
accidental. 

If  we  give  Cassirer's  judgment  this  form  then  we  recognize 
its  formal  connection  with  another  pair  of  basic  concepts  of 
reflection  in  Cassirer's  philosophy:  "Function"  is  an  expression 
of  Necessity,  "Substance"  is  accidental. 

On  the  other  hand,  and  when  more  closely  studied,  we  also 
see  the  formal  connection  with  a  paradox  around  which  Cassirer 
centers  his  discussion  on  this  point,  a  paradox  which  he  found 
in  Kant:  the  paradoxical  conception  of  the  contingency  of  neces- 
sity." 

What  does  this  paradox  mean,  and  how  does  Cassirer  arrive 
at  it?  Stated  in  simplest  terms  it  is  this:  if  we  are  to  have  the 
concept  of  necessity,  we  need  the  concept  of  contingency.  We  do 
have  and  use  the  concept  of  necessity;  therefore,  we  need  the 
concept  of  contingency.  Contingency  is  a  requirement  for  neces- 
sity. The  two  concepts  are  correlates.  This  correlation  can  be 
expressed  in  different  and  more  significant  ways:  The  question, 
"Why?"  can  be  answered  and  makes  sense  only  within  a  certain 
system.  If  we  ask  for  the  "why?"  of  the  system  itself,  it  no 
longer  makes  any  sense.  The  system  itself  remains  contingent; 
without  such  a  contingent  system  we  could  not  ask  or  answer 
the  question:  "why?"  Thus  Kant  says  that  there  is  no  apodicti- 
cal  proof  for  the  principle  of  causation.  It  can  be  "deduced" 

18  Cf.  Determinismus ,  iz8f. 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  751 

only  through  its  relationship  to  something  contingent,  namely, 
"possible  experience."  Cassirer  puts  its  as  follows: 

The  general  principle  of  causation  can  be  called  both  necessary  and 
contingent  with  equal  justification — depending  on  the  point  of  view 
which  we  happen  to  choose.  The  principle  is  necessary,  since  every 
empirical  statement  is  based  on  it,  and  since,  as  a  "synthetic  judgment 
a  priori"  it  precedes  all  empirical  judgments.  On  the  other  hand,  how- 
ever, it  is  "accidental"  since  the  totality  of  experience,  to  which  it  refers 
and  on  which  it  depends  for  its  justification,  is  itself  given  as  purely 
factual.19 

This  interpretation  of  Kant  appears  to  be  very  characteristic 
of  Cassirer  indeed.  I  am  not  sure  whether  it  is  possible  to  inter- 
pret and  exhaust  its  real  significance;  quite  apart  from  the 
question  whether  it  is  "defensible."  A  little  metaphorical  cir- 
cumlocution may  lend  some  help  to  the  imagination,  if  not 
to  thought.  Experience  is  intrinsically  "necessary,"  and  it  is 
something  which  in  itself  is  "moving."  But  it  is  moving  only 
within  itself — self-contained,  and  well-rounded — suspended,  as 
it  were,  in  a  vacuum,  without  support,  kept  in  balance  and  kept 
in  motion  only  by  itself.  Although  such  a  metaphorical  circum- 
locution certainly  does  not  help  with  the  technical  explanation, 
and  although  in  its  vagueness  it  would  not  be  acceptable  to 
Cassirer  himself,  it  may  help  the  imagination  to  realize,  if 
not  the  logical  ground,  then  at  least  the  ideal  of  knowledge 
which  Cassirer  seems  to  have  in  mind. 

What  needs  to  be  stressed  within  this  context  is  the  following: 
if  we  fully  realize  the  significance  of  the  idea  that  experience  as 
a  fact  is  accidental,  then  Kant's  transcendental  deductions  ap- 
pear in  a  light  which  is  different  from  their  customary  and 
historically  well-founded  interpretation.  The  transcendental 
deductions  lose  some  of  the  pragmatic  "weight"  which  they 
usually  have.  More  simply  expressed,  we  may  describe  the 
principle  of  the  transcendental  deduction  in  a  somewhat  "prag- 
matic" fashion  as  follows:  "there  is  the  fact  of  experience;  and 
the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  are  the  necessary  condi- 
tions or  instruments  of  this  fact."  By  emphasizing  the  contin- 

19  Determinismus ,  128. 


752  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

gency  of  this  "fact,"  Cassirer  takes  away  from  the  solid  "factual- 
ness"  and  what  I  have  called  the  "pragmatic  weight"  of  such 
a  formulation}  he  has  made  experience  a  "structure j"  or,  in 
a  metaphor  he  used  to  employ  occasionally  during  the  last  two 
decades,  he  has  made  the  "fact"  of  experience  "transparent." 
In  proceeding  thus,  Cassirer  conceived  of  experience  as  of  a 
Platonic  Idea. 

Only  if  we  keep  in  mind  this  "transparence"  and  ideality 
of  experience  can  Cassirer's  following  argument  appear  in  its 
proper  light  and  function.  As  soon  as  pragmatic  or  teleological 
expressions  appear  in  Cassirer's  arguments,  one  has  to  inter- 
pret them  as  metaphors  which  are  supposed  to  express  "ideal" 
relationships  which  cannot  be  expressed  "directly."  This  is  a 
feature  Cassirer's  thought  has  in  common  with  Plato's  thought. 

In  such  half-metaphorical  language  Cassirer  can  now  say 
that  both  concepts,  necessity  and  contingency,  are  "required  for" 
and  "justified  by"  the  fact  of  experience. 

On  the  whole  the  isolation  of  formal  structures  which  has 
been  attempted  in  these  remarks  is  not  at  all  in  line  with  the 
tendency  of  Cassirer's  work.  Cassirer  not  only  holds  the  theory 
that  there  is  no  form  without  content,  and  vice  versa,  but  he 
never  actually  deals  with  a  form  without  its  corresponding 
content.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  very  reason,  however,  that  a  para- 
doxical formulation  like  that  of  the  contingency  of  necessity 
can  be  used  in  interpreting  various  levels  of  Cassirer's  thought, 
and  in  this  respect  presents  a  key  to  many  of  his  doctrines. 

Out  of  the  many  variations  of  this  theme  in  Cassirer's  philos- 
ophy, only  a  few  examples  from  our  context  may  be  cited. 

1.  The  necessary  and  the  contingent  are  not  two  different 
"powers"  or  "things,"  but  correlates. 

2.  There  is  no  "system  of  experience"  (mythical  thought, 
theoretical  thought,  or  systems  of  individual  philosophers) 
without  these  concepts. 

3.  In  this  respect  they  represent  something  which  is  common 
to  all  systems  of  thought — and  a  principle  of  unity, — 

4.  — and  diversity,  since  the  accentuation  of  what  is  neces- 
sary and  what  is  contingent  varies  in  every  system. 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  753 

5.  Therefore  this  paradox  is  applicable  to  itself:  for  just 
what  is  necessary  in  every  system  is  contingent. 

6.  Thus  there  is  a  dialectic,  according  to  which  every  "suc- 
ceeding" system  regards  as  contingent  (and  rightly  so)  what  was 
regarded  as  necessary  in  the  "preceding"  system. 

7.  This  applies  to  Cassirer's  own  system  too;  so  that  its 
most  fundamental  concept  (the  concept  of  "understanding," 
"verstehen"}  is  also  regarded  as  contingent — as  an  expression  of 
an  ultimate  problem  rather  than  as  a  definite  "being." 

Applications  to  Galileo  are  easily  made: 

1.  Within  Galileo's  system  the  necessary  is  represented  by 
the  equations  of  motion;  the  contingent  is  represented  by  the 
subjective  sense  qualities. 

2.  The  concept  of  determination  in  Galileo  has  the  form 
y  =  f  (x).  That  is  to  say,  y  is  precisely  determined  by  x,  and 
in  that  sense  the  relationship  is  "necessary."  An  equation  of 
this  form  answers  the  question  "how  does  y  change?"  but  it 
does  not  answer  the  question  "why  does  y  change?"  (in  the 
sense  of  one  of  the  four  Aristotelian  causes).  Because  the  kind 
of  determination  is  not  expressed,  there  is  an  element  of  in- 
determination  and  contingency. 

3.  There  is  no  answer  to  the  question  why  the  equations  of 
motion  are  as  they  are.  They  are  to  Galileo  ultimate  metaphysi- 
cal realities;  but  as  such  they  are  contingent. 

From  these  schematic  remarks,  it  may  be  seen  why  "Galileo 
the  metaphysician"  could  be  "rejected,"  and  yet  be  "reconciled" 
with  "Galileo  the  defender  of  hypothesis."  In  this  sense  the 
"case"  of  Galileo  is  an  exemplification  of  the  principle  of  the 
contingency  of  necessity. 

Upon  reflection,  the  more  one  considers  the  formulation  of 
the  "contingency  of  necessity"  with  respect  to  all  fields  and 
aspects  of  Cassirer's  philosophy,  (as  well  as  in  itself),  the  more 
one  realizes  the  intellectual  impetus  which  such  a  "symbolic" 
concept  provides  and  the  more  one  experiences  the  suggestive 
power  and  fascination  which  comes  from  it.  Yet,  perhaps,  a 
more  serious  and  sober  reflection  would  now  seem  to  be  called 
for.  The  question  arises:  Have  we  not  fallen  victim  to  a 


754  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

splendid  performance  of  subtle  sophistry?  If  a  theory,  such 
as  mathematical  metaphysics,  is  first  rejected  and  then  accepted 
on  a  different  level,  is  this  not  exactly  "making  the  weaker 
cause  the  stronger?"  Furthermore:  is  a  concept  like  that  of 
"the  contingency  of  necessity"  not  simply  a  device  of  sophistic 
jugglery?  What  does  it  really  mean  to  say  that  "contingent" 
and  "necessary"  are  correlative  concepts,  and  that  in  order  to 
have  a  necessary  system  of  experience  the  idea  of  contingency 
is  required?  Is  this  different  at  all  from  saying  that  for  the 
preservation  of  health  some  sickness  is  required?  This  may  be 
true  in  some  special  sense,  but  the  suspicion  of  a  sophistic 
trickery  cannot  be  repressed.  Brought  to  more  abstract  formu- 
lation: would  such  a  thesis  not  correspond  to  the  postulate  that 
the  concept  of  Non-Being  is  required  in  order  to  have  a  concept 
of  Being?20 

As  soon  as  we  arrive  at  this  more  general  formulation,  how- 
ever, we  become  aware  that  it  might  be  advisable  to  become 
suspicious  of  our  suspicion.  At  any  rate,  the  central  problem 
is  indicated:  Is  there  a  possibility  that  "in  looking  for  the 
Sophist  we  have  encountered  the  Philosopher  unaware?"21 

This  is  possible}  and  the  contrary  is  also  possible:  in  looking 
for  and  believing  ourselves  to  be  following  a  philosopher,  we 
may  have  caught  (or  may  have  been  caught  by)  a  sophist.  This 
question  does  not  yet  admit  of  a  ready  answer;  but  it  certainly 
needs  at  least  to  be  raised  whenever  one  undertakes  to  under- 
stand and  examine  the  philosophy  of  Ernst  Cassirer. 

In  this  region  [of  dialectic]  we  shall  discover  the  philosopher  now 
or  later  or  whenever  we  shall  look  for  him ;  like  the  sophist,  he  is  hard 
to  recognize  precisely,  although  the  difficulty  with  him  is  different  from 
the  difficulty  one  has  with  the  sophist. — The  sophist  runs  away  into  the 
darkness  of  not-being  where  he  is  used  to  feel  his  way  by  routine;  and 
because  of  the  darkness  of  the  place  he  is  hard  to  recognize. — The 
philosopher  who  has  his  mind  and  thought  fixed  to  the  idea  of  Being  is 
also  hard  to  recognize,  because  of  the  shining  brightness  of  the  place.22 

80  Cf.  "Zur  Logik  des  SymbolbegrifFs,"  Theoria,  IV,  145-175,  Gcschichte  der 
griechischcn  Philosophic  (in:  Lehrbuch  der  Philosophic,  cd.  M.  Dessoir),  129 
and  frequently. 

21  Plato,  Sophist,  2535. 

24  Plato,  Sophist, 


CASSIRER  ON  GALILEO  755 

Just  as  the  student  is  blinded  by  a  philosopher  no  less  than 
by  a  sophist,  there  is  a  deceptive  resemblance  between  the  two. 
A  sophist  appears  like  a  philosopher,  and  a  philosopher  appears 
like  a  sophist,  as  a  dog  resembles  a  wolf,  and,  as  we  may  add, 
a  liar  may  resemble  a  poet,  or  the  tyrant  may  resemble  the 
philosopher-king.  There  is  an  infinitely  fine  and  yet  immensely 
decisive  difference  between  the  two.  Both  the  philosopher  and 
the  sophist  employ  the  same  means  and  tricks,  both  use  the 
playful  joke.23  In  fact,  the  philosopher  is  the  "good"  sophist. 
Diotima  speaks  fiurcep  oi  TeXeoe  ao^ecnrae^  like  one  of  the  accom- 
plished sophists. 

The  criterion  lies  in  their  concepts  of  Being.  Until  these  are 
analyzed,  the  issue  between  Sophist  and  Philosopher  remains 
in  suspense.  Yet,  in  the  case  of  Ernst  Cassirer,  whoever  thinks 
of  his  person  and  his  style  may  be  confident  about  the  outcome, 
"because  of  the  shining  brightness  of  the  place." 

7 

The  present  illustrations,  loosely  knit  as  they  are,  may  have 
at  least  suggested  that  the  very  rhythm  of  Cassirer's  prose  re- 
flects his  philosophical  dialectics.  A  statement  by  Cassirer,  valid 
in  itself,  must  yet  be  seen  within  its  dialectical  context.  Further- 
more, in  addition  to  the  horizontal  dialectics,  there  is  a  kind  of 
vertical  dialectics:  a  historical  statement  by  Cassirer  has  a  sys- 
tematic significance  at  the  same  time.  The  fact  that  Cassirer 
could  "revive"  and  "re-present"  Galileo  on  the  contemporary 
intellectual  scene  is  obviously  due  to  the  special  form  of  Cas- 
sirer's  systematic  interest  in  Galileo. 

Cassirer  does  not  simply  write  a  detached  historical  report 
about  Galileo  nor  does  he  really  enter  into  an  intimate  discussion 
with  him.  His  relationship  to  Galileo  is  much  more  and  much 
less  close  than  is  that  of  two  persons  talking  to  one  another: 
either  Cassirer  agrees  with  Galileo  and  then  speaks  "through" 
Galileo,  somewhat  like  a  dramatist  speaks  through  a  historical 
character  $  or  else  he  disagrees  with  him  and  then  he  makes 
Galileo  the  object  of  his  comprehensive  and  extremely  liberal 
understanding  in  such  a  manner  that  even  where  Galileo  seems 

**  Phaedrus,  2770$  S  of  hist  y 


756  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

to  "disagree"  he  is  also  made  to  "express"  the  truth — in  a  dif- 
ferent language.  (Cassirer  had  started  from  the  ahistorical  neo- 
Kantian  approach  j  but  he  combined  HegePs  method  and  that 
of  a  historical  relativism  in  order  to  arrive  at  what  may  be  called 
a  new  timelessness  in  history.) 

In  fact,  the  ways  in  which  Galileo  is  made  to  reflect  Cassirer's 
thought  are  far  more  manifold  than  could  be  indicated  in  this 
sketch.  Cassirer  tried  to  find  a  theoretical  synthesis  of  scientific 
and  aesthetic  understanding24  just  as  he  tried  to  find  a  synthesis 
of  historical  and  systematical  understanding}  and  his  own  actual 
understanding  has  definitely  an  artistic  note  in  addition  to,  and 
in  combination  with,  its  scientific  and  historical  character.  These 
manifold  relationships  are  apt  to  be  implicitly  present  in  what 
he  says,  and  a  statement  by  Cassirer  can  often  be  read  on  various 
levels,  just  as  symbols  can  be  in  a  work  of  art.  What  may  appear 
as  an  ambiguity  is  in  fact  a  multiplicity  of  meanings  which, 
however,  do  not  necessarily  impair  one  another  at  all.  The  spell 
which  emanates  from  Cassirer's  style  (as  it  did  from  his  person) 
fascinates  his  reader  and  student}  its  recognition  must  make  one 
wonder  whether  what  Cassirer  taught  should  and  could  be 
separated  from  how  he  taught  it. 

Cassirer's  art  is  that  of  the  Platonic  philosopher,  playful  and 
used  with  that  irony  and  sovereignty  which  is  owed  to  the  Idea 
of  the  Good.  With  the  cunning  of  this  idea,  in  HegePs  term, 
its  light  "unites  the  various  things  appearing  in  the  dusk." 
Cassirer's  synthesis,  unifying  through  that  understanding  and 
reconciliation  of  opposites  which  made  him  an  extremist  of  uni- 
versal liberalism,  is  basically  Platonic.  If  Plato  found  it  difficult 
to  distinguish  between  a  sophist  and  a  philosopher  when  he  met 
one,  we  need  perhaps  not  be  ashamed  if  we  require  a  little  more 
time  and  space  to  arrive  at  a  full  view  of,  and  a  clear  distinction 
between,  the  scientific,  historical,  and  aesthetic  elements  in  the 
structure  of  Ernst,  Cassirer's  philosophical  thought. 

WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

DEPARTMENT  OF  GERMAN 

BOWDOIN  COLLEGE 

M  Cf.  "Goethe  und  die  mathematische  Physik"  in  Idee  und  Gestalt  (Berlin,  19*1), 
27-76. 


22 
William  H.  Werkmeister 

CASSIRER'S  ADVANCE  BEYOND 
NEO-KANTIANISM 


22 

CASSIRER'S  ADVANCE  BEYOND 
NEO-KANTIANISM 

WHEN  critics  of  the  Marburg  School  of  neo-Kantianism 
argued  that  the  theories  of  Cohen  and  Natorp  had  little 
in  common  with  the  original  views  of  Kant,  Paul  Natorp  re- 
plied1 that  it  had  never  been  the  intention  of  the  Marburg 
School  to  revive  orthodox  Kantianism;  that,  on  the  contrary, 
the  step  back  to  Kant  had  been  taken  only  in  order  to  gain  a 
more  profound  understanding  of  the  genuine  insights  of  the 
Sage  of  Konigsberg,  and  to  advance  from  his  position  in  a 
direction  more  in  conformity  with  the  developments  of  modern 
science  j  that,  finally,  the  spirit  of  Kant,  rather  than  any  one 
of  his  propositions,  was  to  be  preserved.  A  poor  student  of 
Kant  is  he,  Natorp  stated,  who  understands  the  meaning  of 
"critical  philosophy"  in  any  other  way. 

In  the  same  spirit  in  which  Cohen  and  Natorp  advanced 
beyond  Kant,  Ernst  Cassirer  seems  to  have  advanced  beyond 
the  neo-Kantians. 

When  Cassirer  published  his  monograph,  Zur  Einsteinschen 
Relativitatstheorie,  several  critics,  although  agreeing  with  his 
conclusions,  doubted  that  he  was  justified  in  drawing  them, 
unless  he  relinquished  at  the  same  time  his  neo-Kantianism. 
Readers  of  Cassirer's  later  works — in  particular,  readers  of  his 
Philoso^hie  der  symboUschen  Formeny  and  of  his  Determinis- 
mus  and  Indeterminismus  in  der  modernen  Physik — may  ex- 
perience similar  doubts.  Cassirer  himself,  however,  feels  that 
the  ties  which  connect  him  with  the  founders  of  the  Marburg 
School  have  not  been  loosened,  and  that  the  "debt  of  gratitude" 
he  owes  them  has  not  been  diminished  j  although  he  may  now 

'"Kant  und  die  Marburger  Schule,"  Kant-Studien>  Vol.  XVIII   (1910). 

759 


760  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

interpret  the  foundations  of  modern  science  in  a  way  which 
differs  in  some  essentials  from  the  interpretations  given  by 
Hermann  Cohen  and  Paul  Natorp.2 

It  will  be  our  task  to  examine  briefly  the  extent  to  which 
Cassirer's  views  still  fall  within  the  general  framework  of  neo- 
Kantianism,  and  to  describe  those  points  of  doctrine  which 
constitute  a  definite  and  decisive  modification  of  the  original 
position  of  the  Marburg  School. 

This  task  is  formidable  and  can  be  fully  accomplished  only 
in  a  detailed  study  which  far  exceeds  the  space  available  in 
this  volume}  for  Cassirer  has  been  a  prolific  writer.  His  in- 
terests are  truly  catholic  and  his  books  deal  with  a  great  variety 
of  problems.  Even  if  we  restrict  our  considerations  to  ques- 
tions of  epistemology,  Cassirer's  discussions  range  from  the 
foundations  of  mathematics  and  modern  physics  to  an  approach 
to  art,  religion,  and  a  general  philosophy  of  culture. 

Our  task  is  somewhat  simplified,  however,  by  Cassirer's 
own  recent  statement3  that  the  essentials  of  his  philosophy  of 
science  have  undergone  no  significant  change  since  the  publica- 
tion in  1910  of  his  book,  Substanzbegriff  wnd  Funktionsbegriff, 
and  that  today  he  still  adheres  to  the  point  of  view  of  that 
work.  In  view  of  the  developments  of  modern  physics  he  has 
been  able  to  formulate  more  clearly  and  demonstrate  more 
effectively  the  basic  ideas  expressed  more  than  thirty  years  ago  5 
but  his  philosophical  position  remains  substantially  unaltered 
and,  in  the  opinion  of  Cassirer  himself,  has  been  confirmed  by 
what  has  happened  in  the  sciences.  It  is  therefore  possible  for  us 
to  disregard  the  problem  of  a  gradual  evolvement  of  Cassirer's 
philosophy,  and  to  concentrate  on  its  most  adequate  and  most 
recent  formulations,  leaving  to  the  historian  of  philosophy  the 
additional  task  of  determining  to  what  extent,  if  any,  these 
formulations  modify  Cassirer's  earlier  position. 

Our  discussions  will  be  concerned  primarily  with  Cassirer's 
views  as  expressed  in  his  monograph,  Determinisms  und  In- 
determvmsmus  in  der  modernen  Physik,  and  in  his  three- volume 
work,  Die  Philoso'phie  der  symbolischen  Formen.  These  views 

2  Cassirer,  Determinismus,  viii. 
*  Ibid.,  vii-viii. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          761 

we  shall  compare  with  Natorp's  position  as  formulated  in  Die 
logischen  Grundlagen  der  exakten  Wissenschaften  (1910)  and, 
for  the  sake  of  completeness,  with  certain  sections  of  Cohen's 
Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnis  (1902).  Such  a  comparison  should 
reveal  the  extent  to  which  Cassirer  has  advanced  beyond  neo- 
Kantianism  and  should  disclose  also  the  affinities  he  still  has 
with  the  founders  of  the  Marburg  School. 

In  order  to  facilitate  our  task  further,  we  shall  restrict  our 
comparison  to  a  consideration  of  a  few  basic  concepts;  all  minor 
issues  can  have  only  a  secondary  bearing  upon  our  problem. 
We  have  chosen  for  our  analysis  the  concepts  "object,"  "space- 
time,"  and  "causality,"  and  the  general  problem  of  an  epistemo- 
logical  basis  of  the  cultural  sciences  or  Geisteswissenschaften. 

We  begin  our  discussion  with  a  consideration  of  the  concept 
"object." 

I.  "OBJECT" 

We  must  understand  from  the  start  that  the  founders  of  the 
Marburg  School  were  interested  primarily  in  scientific  knowl- 
edge, and  that  they  saw  in  scientific  cognition  the  prototype  of 
all  cognition  worthy  of  the  name.  Scientific  cognition,  moreover, 
they  identified  in  all  essentials  with  mathematics  and  mathe- 
matical physics.  Epistemology,  therefore,  became  for  them  an 
analysis  of  "the  logical  foundations  of  the  exact  sciences;"  and 
this  limitation  of  the  scope  of  their  analyses  became  decisive 
for  their  whole  point  of  view.  We  shall  return  to  this  in  Part  IV 
of  our  essay. 

If,  for  the  time  being,  we  accept  the  restrictive  definition  of 
knowledge  as  given  by  Cohen  and  Natorp,  the  question  arises: 
What  is  the  "factum"  of  science?  What  is  the  ultimate  basis  of 
validation  of  scientific  cognition,  and  what  are  the  "objects" 
concerning  which  science  gives  us  "knowledge"? 

The  "factum"  of  science,  Natorp  maintains,  is  neither 
"given,"  ready-made  and  complete  in  itself;  nor  is  it  some 
"completed  or  definitive  knowledge;"  for  every  cognition 
which  provides  the  answer  to  a  given  problem  leads  to,  or 
implies,  new  and  even  greater  problems.  Plato,  therefore,  was 
right  in  the  opinion  of  the  neo-Kantians  when  he  saw  the  task 


762  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

of  science  in  an  infinite  process  of  determining  the  indeter- 
minate. And  since  the  infinite  process  of  determination  may 
move  ifi  two  directions — toward  the  determination  of  particu- 
lars as  well  as  toward  the  determination  of  an  all-inclusive 
universal — there  can  be  no  absolute  or  definitive  starting-point 
of  the  process  of  cognition  any  more  than  there  is  an  absolute 
or  definitive  terminal  point.  The  process  is  unending  in  either 
direction. 

In  order  to  get  the  process  going  at  all,  that  is  to  say,  in  order 
to  have  some  anchorage,  some  vantage-point  from  which  to 
begin  the  determination  of  the  indeterminate,  it  is  necessary  to 
"posit"  or  "fixate"  something  in  experience  as  our  point  of 
departure  and  then  to  advance  from  it  as  far  as  possible  on 
logically  justifiable  grounds.  We  must  remember  at  all  times, 
however,  that  our  starting-point  was  "posited"  or  assumed 
and  that  it  is  subject  to  revision  as  soon  as  such  revision  seems 
possible  or  necessary  in  the  light  of  subsequent  experiences. 
The  individual  "factum,"  therefore,  originally  posited  as  our 
starting-point  or  "discovered"  in  the  process  of  advancing  cogni- 
tion, is  never  an  isolated  datum,  but  must  needs  be  an  element 
within  a  context — within  the  context  of  cognition  itself. 

Mathematics  provides  the  most  clear-cut  example  of  what 
is  meant;  for  the  basic  concepts  of  mathematics  are  "posited" 
concepts  which  find  their  justification  and  validation  only  within 
the  orderly  process  of  mathematical  thinking.  This  reference 
to  mathematics,  incidentally,  also  makes  it  clear  that  the  "prog- 
ress" here  meant  is  essentially  not  a  progress  in  time,  not  a 
merely  psychological  or  historical  progress,  but  a  logical  pro- 
gression, a  system  of  implications.  Time  itself  is  but  one  aspect — 
and  by  no  means  the  most  fundamental  one — of  the  systemic 
progress  with  which  epistemology  is  concerned. 

If  it  is  true  that  the  "factum"  of  science  finds  justification 
and  determination  only  within  the  systemic  context  of  which  it 
is  an  element,  then  we  can  no  longer  speak  of  "objects"  as 
"given,"  ready-made  and  complete,  or  of  cognition  as  an  "analy- 
sis of  the  given."  On  the  contrary,  the  "object"  itself  is  now 
a  "problem,"  something  which  we  may  attain  at  the  end  of  the 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          763 

cognitive  process  but  which  we  certainly  do  not  possess  at  its 
beginning.  And  cognition,  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned  with 
"objects"  is  necessarily  "synthetic"  in  Kant's  meaning  of  the 
term,  i.e.,  it  is  the  enlargement  of,  or  the  continuous  progress 
in,  our  context  of  experience. 

From  the  above  it  follows  also  that  there  is  not  and  cannot 
be  a  "favored"  starting-point  of  cognition.  The  integration  of 
experience  according  to  law  may  be  started,  ideally,  wherever 
one  wishes.  The  context  of  experience  can  be  established  no 
matter  what  we  posit  at  the  beginning  so  long  as  we  remember 
that  this  starting-point,  being  only  assumed  to  begin  with,  is 
subject  to  constant  revision  as  we  progress.  Only  one  condition 
is  indispensable.  The  context  of  cognition  must  be  grounded 
in  a  unitary  origin  of  thought. 

This  unitary  origin  (Ursfrungseinheit),  however,  is  not  an 
undifferentiated  logical  One.  Such  a  One  could  never  provide  an 
adequate  basis  for  a  variegated  context.  The  unitary  origin, 
furthermore,  is  neither  a  psychological  nor  a  metaphysical 
entity  whose  "existence"  would  have  to  be  assumed.  It  is  rather 
the  logical  ideal  of  the  all-comprehensive  context  of  experience 
in  and  through  which  each  "posited"  element  leads  to  all  other 
elements  of  that  context.  It  is  the  ideal  of  "systemic"  thinking, 
the  idea  that  all  thinking  ultimately  strives  toward  systemic 
unity. 

But  this  context,  as  unitary  origin,  is  also  not  "given"  in 
actual  concreteness.  It  is  an  implied  but  as  yet  unrealized  goal. 
All  cognition  begins  with  the  implicit  assumption  that  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  systemic  context  is  the  logical  task  ahead  of  us.  The 
unitary  origin,  in  other  words,  is  neither  a  system  in  nuce 
nor  a  first  element  within  a  system.  It  is  in  itself  not  even 
"systemic"  but  is  only  the  demand  for  a  system. 

Hermann  Cohen,  in  particular,  attempted  to  clarify  the 
demand  for  a  starting-point  of  cognition.  He  argued  that,  strict- 
ly speaking,  all  cognition  would  have  to  start  from  "nothing." 
From  "nothing,"  however,  nothing  can  be  derived,  and  if  the 
starting-point  of  cognition  were  strictly  interpreted  as  "noth- 
ing," cognition  itself  would  be  impossible.  The  "nothing" 


764  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

Cohen  speaks  of  must  therefore  be  only  a  "relative  nothing." 
In  Cohen's  own  argumentation  it  turns  out  to  be  the  "possibility 
of  transition,  of  logical  progression  (or  regression)"  which,  in 
Natorp's  terminology,  is  identical  with  the  ideal  of  an  all- 
inclusive  cognitive  context,  the  ideal  of  the  context  of  logical 
proof,  logical  interdependence. 

As  has  been  mentioned  before,  this  context  may  be  "traced" 
in  two  directions:  toward  the  unification  of  differentiated  ele- 
ments, or  toward  the  differentiation  of  what  is  unified.  This 
double-faced  context  of  logical  interdependence  is,  for  the 
neo-Kantians,  the  basis  of  all  cognition. 

Context,  as  here  understood,  must  mean  and  imply  the 
preservation  of  the  logical  significance  of  each  individual  ele- 
ment and,  at  the  same  time,  the  unification  of  elements  in  a 
higher  logical  unity;  and,  vice  versa,  it  must  mean  the  preser- 
vation of  the  logical  unity  of  the  context  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  diversification  and  preservation  of  the  individual  elements. 
The  particulars  must  be  preserved  within  the  context,  and  the 
context  must  be  maintained  despite  all  differentiations.  Logical 
context,  as  exemplified  in  mathematics  and  mathematical  phys- 
ics, fulfills  both  requirements. 

This  context  is  encountered  in  its  most  elementary  form  in  the 
relationship  of  a  question  and  its  answer.  The  question  antici- 
pates its  answer;  the  answer  fulfills  or  satisfies  the  question. 
Both  belong  indissolubly  together. 

The  relationship  of  question  and  answer,  however,  also 
defines  the  problem  of  the  "object;"  for  the  "object"  is  an 
answer  to  a  question.  Its  primary  meaning  is  that  of  an  answer, 
that  of  an  element  within  a  context  determined  by  a  question. 
The  fact  that  the  "object"  seems  to  lie  "outside"  cognition  and 
that  it  is  "appropriated"  by  cognition  is  fully  explained,  accord- 
ing to  Natorp,  by  the  idea  of  anticipation  which  we  encounter  in 
the  question.  It  is  the  context  defined  by  a  question  which,  in 
and  through  its  anticipation,  defines  or  determines  the  "ob- 
ject." As  in  the  case  of  mathematical  equations  the  unknown 
variables  x,  y,  z  have  meaning  for  the  equation  and  within  the 
equation  only  by  virtue  of  the  meaning  of  the  equation  itself, 
i.e.,  in  relation  to  the  "invariables,"  the  assumed  "variables," 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          765 

and  the  "roots"  of  the  equation,  just  so,  and  only  so,  is  the 
great  X  of  cognition,  the  "object,"  meaningful  and  understand- 
able only  as  an  element  within  the  context  of  cognition. 

So  interpreted,  the  "object"  of  cognition  becomes  an  antici- 
pation, a  "projection,"  and  ceases  to  be  an  unapproachable 
"thing-in-itself,"  a  something  which  literally  and  in  the  abso- 
lute sense  transcends  all  cognition.  There  is  no  longer  any  need 
for  the  assumption  that  "objects"  exist  in  and  by  themselves. 
All  we  need  to  accept  now  is  the  possibility  of  an  orderly 
progress  of  cognition,  the  possibility  of  establishing  an  all- 
comprehensive  context  according  to  law,  the  method  of  securing 
scientific  cognition.  The  "object"  becomes  the  ultimate  goal  of 
that  process,  the  ultimate  determination  of  the  X  in  our  initial 
question. 

The  unity  of  context  is  unity  of  thought.  To  think,  so  Natorp 
maintains,  is  to  unify.  That  which  is  to  be  unified,  however,  is  not 
something  beyond  or  outside  of  thinking.  It  is,  rather,  some- 
thing "posited"  as  a  terminal  of  synthetic  relations  and  there- 
fore is  a  product  of  thought  itself.  The  psychologist  may  still 
speak  of  "sense  impressions,"  "images,"  and  the  likej  but  so 
far  as  logic  is  concerned,  we  can  speak  only  of  "contents"  and 
"content  relations"  which  are  determined  and  defined  in  and 
through  thinking.  From  a  strictly  "critical"  point  of  view  it  is 
meaningless  to  speak  of  a  "manifold  of  the  senses"  which  exists 
prior  to,  and  independent  of,  thinking  and  which  is  "unified" 
in  cognition  through  a  secondary  thought  process.  For  the  neo- 
Kantians,  to  think  means  to  posit  that  something  "is."  What 
this  something  may  be  prior,  or  in  addition  to,  our  thinking,  is 
a  question  which  cannot  be  asked  legitimately  within  the  frame- 
work of  thought  itself,  for  the  demand  for  a  meaning,  the  de- 
mand that  the  "something"  mean  something  within  the  con- 
text of  thought,  is  already  a  demand  for  a  justification  of  it  in 
and  through  thought,  a  demand  for  its  validation  as  a  content 
of  thought.  For  thought,  all  "being"  exists  only  in  and  through 
thought  itself.  Logically  there  is  nothing  prior  to  thinking. 
The  X  of  cognition  may  be  determined  as  an  A  or  a  B  or  a  C} 
but  as  X  it  is  only  the  "pure  expression  of  a  question"  and  not 
an  entity,  psychological,  metaphysical,  or  otherwise. 


766  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

If  thinking,  and  thinking  alone,  creates  the  comprehensive 
context  which,  through  its  unity  or  interrelations,  determines  or 
defines  the  X  of  cognition  as  an  A  or  a  B  or  a  C,  then  the  epis- 
temological  problem  reduces  to  a  problem  of  the  ultimate  logical 
functions  of  thinking.  The  problem  of  cognition,  in  other  words, 
will  have  been  solved  as  soon  as  we  solve  the  problems  of  the 
"categories"  which  govern  and  determine  the  basic  functions  of 
thought. 

Natorp  finds  that,  to  begin  with,  the  categories  "quantity" 
and  "quality"  are  indispensable.  Wherever  an  X  is  to  be  trans- 
formed by  thought  into  a  determinate  A  or  B  or  C,  we  must 
think  that  X  in  terms  of  quantity  and  quality  at  least.  Neither 
one  of  these  categories  by  itself  is  sufficient  as  a  determination  of 
X,  for  the  "quantum"  is  only  the  quantum  of  a  quale,  and  the 
"quale"  is  but  the  quale  of  a  quantum.  Both  together,  and  in 
their  interpenetration  only,  constitute  magnitude — the  first 
product  of  thought,  the  first  synthetic  or  integrational  unity  of 
experience.  They  determine  X  as  an  "object,"  but  only  in  a 
general  way.  They  certainly  do  not  yet  determine  the  interde- 
pendence of  "objects"  within  a  determinate  context  of  experi- 
ence. 

The  next  step  in  cognition  is  to  advance  from  such  simple 
and  primary  syntheses  to  a  new  level  of  unification,  to  a 
synthesis  of  the  elementary  syntheses,  i.e.,  to  the  construction  of 
a  system  of  interrelations.  The  interrelations  to  be  established 
are  the  "relations"  of  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason;  that  is 
to  say,  they  are  "relations  of  dependence  according  to  law;" 
they  are  "functional  relations." 

The  goal  of  cognition,  so  we  have  seen,  is  the  universal  and 
complete  determination  of  the  "object"  of  cognition  which 
leaves  nothing  undetermined  in  the  original  X.  The  method 
by  means  of  which  alone  this  can  be  achieved  is,  according  to 
Natorp,  the  method  of  establishing  functional  relations  which 
are  integrated  into  a  contextual  system  of  experience.  Upon 
such  integration  depends  the  very  meaning  of  our  term  "nature" 
— the  possibility  of  conceiving  "nature"  as  a  system  of  laws  or 
dynamic  interrelations. 

The  complete  integration  is,  of  course,  not  attainable  at  once 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          767 

and  at  one  stroke.  Only  little  by  little  does  our  thinking  move 
toward  the  all-comprehensive  context  of  the  whole  of  experi- 
ence. At  every  step,  however,  "nature"  or  "reality"  is  encoun- 
tered and  understood  to  exactly  the  same  degree  as  univocal  in- 
terrelations of  the  diverse  elements  have  been  established,  or 
to  which,  for  any  given  field  of  investigation,  the  choice  be- 
tween possible  kinds  of  functional  interrelations  has  been  re- 
stricted. Admittedly,  every  fixation  of  interrelations  thus 
achieved  raises  new  problems  and  does  not  constitute  a  defini- 
tive terminal  of  integration}  but  we  are  not  interested  in  defini- 
tive terminals  anyway.  Our  concern  is  with  the  discovery  of  a 
method  of  progressive  determination  which  will  lead  toward  the 
ultimate  goal  of  cognition,  the  one  univocal  context. 

This  progressive  determination  must  be  defined  by  the  basic 
law  of  synthetic  unity,  i.  e.,  by  the  generic  law  of  the  synthetic 
process  itself.  This  law  involves  or  presupposes,  first,  a  "start- 
ing-point" or  an  "anchorage"  as  the  foundation  or  reference 
point  of  the  integration.  It  presupposes,  secondly,  the  possibility 
of  unrestricted  progression  from  one  element  to  another.  And 
it  implies,  lastly,  a  relative  termination  of  the  process  for  each 
level  of  integration  reached.  Natorp  identifies  these  three 
"indispensables"  of  the  generic  law  with  the  "basic  series,"  with 
the  "space-time"  schema,  and  with  "causality,"  respectively. 

The  possibility  of  arranging  experience  in  series  presupposes 
a  secure  basic  series  as  reference  point  and  foundation  of  the 
whole  schema  of  order — a  fundamentum  relationis  or  basic 
scheme  which  provides  a  univocal  and  unchanging  standard  for 
all  subsequent  series,  a  sequence  of  positions  or  a  "scale"  in 
terms  of  which  the  progression  of  all  other  sequences  can  be 
determined.  This  requirement  of  the  generic  law  gives  rise  to 
the  age-old  demand  for  something  constant  or  permanent  as  the 
basis  of  all  change,  for  a  subjectum  (in  the  Aristotelian  sense). 

Since  the  required  "invariable"  subjects  are  not  provided  by 
sensuous  things,  we  must  construct  them — as  science  has  always 
done.  The  unchangeable  basic  constants  of  science  are  the  per- 
manent relations  which,  in  our  various  equations,  take  the  place 
of  "things."  Science,  in  other  words,  deals  with  "mass," 
"energy,"  "gravitation,"  or  whatever  it  may  be,  but  these  con- 


768  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

cepts  represent,  not  "things,"  but  ultimate  relations  which  have 
been  posited  hypothetically  for  the  sake  of  the  laws  based  upon 
them.  In  especially  favorable  cases  these  "posits"  serve  well, 
for  a  time  at  least,  the  purpose  of  integration.  But  as  soon  as  the 
field  of  experience  is  broadened  it  may  be  necessary  to  revise 
our  original  hypotheses  and  to  employ  different  "constants." 
In  any  case,  however,  it  remains  necessary  to  posit  something  as 
ultimate,  for  without  any  "positing"  of  some  constants  it  would 
be  impossible  to  deal  with  "nature"  scientifically  or  to  deter- 
mine events  in  accordance  with  lawsj  and  only  such  determina- 
tion can  lead  to  the  conception  of  one  all-comprehensive  "nat- 
ure." Only  through  the  assumption  of  some  basic  constants 
will  it  be  possible  to  determine  "nature"  univocally  and  as 
a  whole. 

The  one  sequence  of  order  which  is  basic  and  common  to  all 
experience  is  time.  Time  is  the  clearest  form  of  the  type  of  scale 
requisite  to  a  progressive  synthesis.  But  it  must  at  once  be  sup- 
plemented by  space,  as  the  basis  for  an  interrelation  of  parallel 
series.  Together,  space  and  time  provide  the  relational  founda- 
tion for  every  possible  progression  from  one  element  of  experi- 
ence to  another. 

Since  we  shall  deal  with  Natorp's  interpretation  of  space  and 
time  more  fully  in  Part  II,  we  refrain  here  from  giving  further 
details.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  through  the  relations  involved  in 
the  space-time  schema  we  can  now  define  "change"  as  well  as 
"permanence."  Every  change  which  occurs  in  a  definite  time 
and  at  a  definite  point  in  space  must  be  representable  as  the 
univocal  result  of  the  continuously  changing  spatial  distribu- 
tion of  a  "substance."  "Substance,"  therefore,  is  nothing 
"given"  as  independent  or  as  existing  in  and  by  itself;  it  is 
"posited"  as  required  by  the  "relations  according  to  law"  which 
describe  observable  changes. 

Space  and  time,  being  infinite,  cannot  by  themselves  deter- 
mine any  particular  "object."  They  provide  only  the  "possi- 
bility of  progression"  from  one  element  to  another.  The  actual 
synthesis  is  achieved  through  the  "law  of  causality"  which 
defines  the  order  of  relation  as  an  order  of  "antecedent"  and 
"consequent":  If  x,  then  y;  "y"  is  now  regarded  as  in  some 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          769 

manner  dependent  upon,  or  conditioned  by,  "x."  And  this  rela- 
tion of  dependence  is  posited  as  a  permanent  relation.  What- 
ever determinateness  an  object  possesses  must  be  derivable  from 
this  general  law  through  the  means  of  cognition;  it  must  be 
"constructable"  on  the  basis  of  the  law  of  causality. 

According  to  Natorp,  the  first  and  primary  means  of  the 
"construction"  is  the  positing  of  "rectilinear  uniform  motion" 
as  the  one  unchangeable  factor  in  all  our  calculations  which  are 
meant  to  describe  events  in  nature.  Upon  this  "posit"  the 
validity  of  Newtonian  mechanics  depends,  and  upon  it  also 
depends  the  integrative  success  of  classical  laws. 

Newton's  three  laws  of  motion  do  not  describe  directly  and 
as  such  the  events  in  nature;  they  only  formulate  the  broadest 
and  most  fundamental  presuppositions  in  accordance  with  which 
an  interpretation  of  motion  is  at  all  possible  in  systemic  integra- 
tion. Together  they  provide  the  framework  within  which  an 
"object"  may  be  specifically  determined  in  accordance  with  the 
law  of  causality,  the  schema  in  and  through  which  the  X  of 
experience  may  be  described  as  an  A  or  a  B  or  a  C. 

Newton's  first  law  of  motion,  the  "principle  of  inertia,"  ful- 
fills only  the  demand  for  substantiality;  for  mass,  strictly 
speaking,  is  nothing  but  the  measure  of  inertia.  As  yet  no 
reference  is  made  to  "forces"  which  might  determine  change. 

Newton's  second  law  provides  the  rule  in  accordance  with 
which  all  "forces"  must  be  posited — the  rule,  namely,  that 
"forces"  must  be  posited  in  proportion  to  determinate  accelera- 
tions. 

To  state  this  matter  differently,  the  first  law  formulates  the 
general  presupposition  of  an  underlying  "substance"  of  all 
motion.  The  second  law  corresponds  to  the  law  of  causality 
which,  according  to  Natorp,  makes  it  at  all  possible  to  fulfill 
the  demand  for  substantiality. 

Newton's  third  law,  stipulating  that  for  every  action  there 
exists  an  equal  and  opposite  reaction,  expresses  a  more  pro- 
found conception  of  causality.  The  mere  "chain"  of  events  has 
been  transformed  into  a  "system"  of  interactions. 

But  this  third  law,  too,  is  only  another  version  of  the  first. 
Both  express  the  same  factual  situation  from  different  points 


770  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

of  view.  We  attribute  the  n-fold  mass  to  a  body  which  gives 
to  another  body  (chosen  as  unit)  an  acceleration  n-fold  of  that 
which  it  itself  would  receive  from  the  latter.  The  proportion- 
ality of  the  masses  can  thus  be  defined  through  the  negative  and 
inverse  proportion  of  the  counter-acceleration.  Mass,  in  other 
words,  is  not  "given"  prior  to  the  dynamic  or  functional  rela- 
tions of  causation  but  in  and  through  those  relations,  for  mass 
is  the  proportion  of  force  to  acceleration. 

Mass,  however,  is  an  indispensable  factor  in  all  calculations 
through  which  the  principles  of  pure  mechanics  are  specifically 
applied  to  concrete  physical  situations.  Mass  ties  the  equations 
to  physical  "reality."  Mass  itself  and  "mass-points,"  neverthe- 
less, have  no  "physical  existence."  It  is  not  permissible  to  say 
that  bodies  "consist"  of  masses  or  of  mass-points.  Masses  and 
mass-points  are  only  the  conceptual  integrals  of  "bodies  5"  they 
are  what  scientists  mean  by  "objects." 

It  is  clear  from  the  above  statements  that,  according  to 
Natorp,  laws  are  not  derived  from  "objects"  by  a  process  of 
abstraction,  but  that  "objects"  are  posited  in  requirement  of  cer- 
tain functional  or  dynamic  relations  according  to  law.  They  are 
the  product  of  progressive  integration. 

Hamilton's  principle  of  energy  extends  this  procedure  of  in- 
tegration to  the  whole  field  of  physics.  In  the  realm  of  electricity 
the  "ponderable  masses"  of  classical  mechanics  are  dissolved 
into  "forms  of  energy,"  but  the  epistemological  procedure  is 
unaltered.  Such  at  any  rate  is  the  theory  of  Natorp  and  of  the 
neo-Kantians  in  general. 

We  shall  now  try  to  understand  Cassirer's  view  with  respect 
to  this  problem. 

To  begin  with,  Cassirer,  like  all  neo-Kantians,  asserts  "the 
epistemological  primacy  of  the  concept  of  law  over  the  concept 
of  things."4  "Understanding"  the  world  is  not  a  purely  passive 
process,  a  mere  copying  of  some  "given"  structure  of  reality, 
but  is  a  free  and  constructive  activity  of  mind.  "Objects"  as 
such  are  not  "given,"  ready-made  and  rigidly  fixed  in  them- 
selves; they  do  not  exist  prior  and  external  to  the  synthetic 
unity  of  comprehension,  but  are  "constituted"  through  that 

*  Philosophie  der  symboUschen  Formtn,  III,  vii. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          771 

unity,  are  the  result  of  an  integration  in  and  through  con- 
sciousness. Every  picture  or  conception  of  the  world  which  we 
have  has  been  achieved  through  some  kind  of  "objectification," 
some  kind  of  synthetic  transformation,  which  changes  mere 
"impressions"  into  determinate  and  integrated  "representa- 
tions."5 Even  the  most  elementary  sensuous  content  of  experi- 
ence is  already  permeated  with  a  "tension"  between  "content" 
and  "representative  function,"  is  not  "mere"  content  but  content 
pointing  beyond  itself.  It  is  not  simply  "given"  in  isolated  inde- 
pendence but  is  already  viewed  sub  specie  and  in  a  certain  "re- 
spect j"  and  this  "respect"  alone  gives  meaning  to  the  impres- 
sion. Just  as  any  word  of  a  language  can  be  understood  only 
within  the  totality  of  a  sentence,  so  each  individual  impression 
has  meaning  and  significance  only  in  and  through  the  context 
within  which  we  view  it.8 

The  cognitive  process  begins  when  in  the  flux  of  sensuous 
impressions  certain  "units"  are  "fixed"  and  retained  as  centers 
of  integration.  Individual  phenomena  receive  their  characteristic 
meaning  only  through  their  relation  to  such  fixed  centers  or 
points  of  reference.7  The  "incisions"  which  determine  the 
"fixed  units"  are  the  product  of  thought,  the  first  determina- 
tions of  the  X  of  experience,  and  obviously  correspond  to  the 
"posits"  of  Natorp's  terminology.  They  provide  the  anchorage 
for  the  progressive  determination  of  the  "objects"  of  experi- 
ence. 

Every  individual  content  is  determined  "objectively"  and 
as  an  "existant"  when  it  is  brought  into  a  space-time  order,  a 
causal  order,  and  a  thing-attribute  order.  Participation  in  the 
contextual  interrelations  of  these  "orders"  assures  each  particu- 
lar phenomenon  of  "objective  reality"  and  "objective  deter- 
minateness"8  or,  as  Natorp  said,  it  changes  the  X  into  a  specific 
A  or  B  or  C.  For  Cassirer,  as  for  Natorp,  any  object  as  deter- 
minate existant  "is"  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  integral  element 
of  a  relational  context  established  by  cognitive  thought.9  It  is 


.,  II,  39- 

6  Ibid.,  Ill,  149-*  55  »  H,  40. 
'Ibid.,  Ill,  165. 
8  Ibid.,  235-236. 
•/«*.,  II,  40. 


772  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

Cassirer's  contention  that  this  fact  becomes  perfectly  clear  when 
we  consider  sensuous  impressions  in  various  space  configura- 
tions. 

The  relation  of  externality  and  spatial  separateness,  i.e.,  the 
relations  of  co-existence,  Cassirer  argues,  are  not  "given"  along 
with  sensuous  impressions;  they  are  highly  complex  and  medi- 
ated results  of  constructive  thinking.  When  we  attribute  to 
things  in  space  a  specific  magnitude,  a  specific  position,  or  a 
specific  distance  from  one  another,  we  refer  to  no  simple  data 
of  sense  impressions  but  place  the  sensuous  elements  into  a 
context  of  relations,  into  a  system,  which,  in  the  end,  is  a 
context  of  judgments,  a  product  of  pure  thought.10 

Throughout  our  discussion  of  Cassirer's  point  of  view  we 
have  repeatedly  spoken  of  "sense  impressions"  and  "sensuous 
element,"  as  Cassirer  himself  does;  and  it  seems  that,  with  re- 
spect to  this  reference  to  "sense  data,"  Cassirer  has  already 
forsaken  the  position  of  the  orthodox  neo-Kantians,  for  it  was 
Natorp's  contention  that  as  far  as  epistemology  is  concerned 
there  is  nothing  prior  to  thinking.  To  think  is  to  posit  that 
something  "is."  Upon  analysis  we  find,  however,  that  the  dif- 
ference between  Cassirer  and  Natorp  on  this  point  is  verbal 
rather  than  real.  Natorp  admitted  that  the  psychologist  might 
speak  of  "impressions,"  "perceptions,"  "images,"  etc.,  but 
maintained  that  neither  "impressions"  nor  "perceptions"  could 
be  thought  without  being  taken  up  into  thought,  without  being 
permeated  with  thought;  that  their  very  meaning  depended 
upon  their  being  elements  within  the  context  of  thought.  What 
he  repudiated  was  the  idea  of  "impressions,"  "perceptions," 
and  the  like,  existing  by  themselves  in  complete  separation 
from  thought  and  having  meaning  or  epistemological  signifi- 
cance in  and  by  themselves.  Cassirer,  if  I  understand  him  cor- 
rectly, is  saying  the  very  same  thing  because,  as  he  puts  it,  even 
the  simplest  sensuous  impressions  are  already  permeated  with  an 
"internal  tension"  involving  elements  of  thought.  He  would 
join  Natorp  in  repudiating  the  idea  that  sensuous  elements  are 
significant  or  meaningful  for  cognition  prior  to  and  independent 
of  systemic  thought. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          773 

But  let  us  return  to  our  main  theme. 

The  transition  from  the  level  of  sense  impressions  to  the 
mediated  world  of  spatial  representations  is  made  possible  by 
the  fact  that  within  the  sequence  of  fluctuating  impressions  cer- 
tain constant  relations  can  be  fixed  and  defined  and  can  be 
asserted  as  something  permanent  and  independent  of  the  flux 
itself.11  Each  impression  must  then  prove  its  objective  sig- 
nificance by  becoming  an  integral  element  of  these  relations  or, 
rather,  of  the  totality  or  the  system  of  these  relations.  Its  fusion 
into  the  systemic  context,  and  this  alone,  gives  objective  meaning 
to  the  individual  impression.  From  the  very  first,  every  forma- 
tion of  concepts,  irrespective  of  the  field  in  which  it  is  carried 
through,  points  toward  one  ultimate  goal,  the  one  goal  of  all 
cognition,  namely,  the  fusion  of  all  specific  "positings,"  of  all 
particular  conceptual  structures,  into  one  unique  and  univocal 
all-comprehensive  context  of  thought.12  This  complete  syn- 
thesis, this  absolute  systemic  unity,  is  the  goal  and  driving  force 
impelling  the  process  of  cognition  —  and  it  is  this  for  Cassirer 
no  less  than  for  Natorp  and  Cohen.  Only  at  the  end  of  the 
process  of  integration  is  the  object  of  experience  fully  deter- 
mined, and  only  then  has  truth,  absolute  and  unchanging  truth, 
been  attained. 

However,  before  the  contents  of  experience  can  be  inte- 
grated as  here  demanded  they  must  be  transformed.  The  "sense 
data"  or  "immediate  impressions"  must  be  "resolved"  into 
elements  of  theoretical  thinking.  They  must  be  "posited"  as 
such  elements.13  Without  this  transformation,  carried  through 
most  effectively  in  the  physical  sciences,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  formulate  the  laws  which  describe  and  determine  the  context 
of  experience.  And  without  attaining  at  least  in  some  measure 
the  systemic  unity  according  to  law  we  could  not  even  speak 
about  "nature."  "Nature"  —  for  Cassirer  as  well  as  for  Natorp 
—  is  the  unity  according  to  law,  the  systemic  context  of  all 
particulars  in  experience,  the  totality  of  progressive  integra- 


"I  bid.,  Ill,  331. 

»/«*.,  II,  43. 


774  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

tion  and  objective  determination  of  the  "objects"  of  experi- 


ence.14 


In  the  field  of  physics  the  "transformation"  referred  to  in- 
volves a  change  from  the  quale  of  immediate  impressions  to 
concepts  of  measure  and  number.  The  laws  of  physics  are  state- 
able only  with  respect  to  such  transformed  "objects."  And,  vice 
versa,  the  significance  of  an  "object"  as  object  now  depends 
exclusively  upon  the  clarity  and  univocality  with  which  it  re- 
flects or  represents  the  law  or  the  determinateness  of  the  con- 
text, upon  its  inclusion  within  a  system  of  law.  Cassirer  and 
Natorp  would  agree  on  this  point.  They  differ,  however,  in  their 
reference  to  the  specific  laws  determining  the  content.  Natorp 
based  his  interpretation  exclusively  upon  Newtonian  mechanics; 
Cassirer,  on  the  other  hand,  took  into  consideration  more  recent 
developments  in  the  field  of  physics.  For  Natorp,  "existence" 
means  the  complete  and  absolute  determination  of  an  "object" 
with  respect  to  space  and  time.15  Cassirer,  contemplating  the 
conclusions  reached  by  quantum  mechanics,  knows  that  such 
complete  determination  is  impossible  even  in  theory,  and  that 
we  must  rest  satisfied  with  a  less  rigid  demand.1*  Let  us  follow 
Cassirer's  argument  in  greater  detail. 

Cassirer  finds  that  quantum  mechanics  has  confirmed  rather 
than  disproved  the  general  position  of  the  neo-Kantians.  At 
least  it  has  cut  the  ground  from  under  all  realistic  interpretations 
of  reality.  "Things"  no  longer  provide  the  starting-point  of 
cognition  but  are  the  ultimate  goal  of  our  interpretations.  Laws 
can  no  longer  be  derived  from  "things"  through  a  process  of 
abstraction}  they  constitute  the  basis  upon  which  alone  we  can 
assert  the  existence  of  "things."  The  concept  of  law  is  logically 
prior  to  the  concept  of  thing.17  Our  knowledge  of  "nature" 
extends  only  so  far  as  does  our  concept  of  law.  Objective 
"reality"  can  be  asserted  only  in  so  far  as  there  is  order  in  ac- 
cordance with  law.  "Things"  are  the  "limit,"  the  ultimate  goal 
toward  which  the  process  of  cognition  moves  but  which  it  never 


</.,  n,  65  $  in,  367. 

15  Logische  Grundlagen,  34  iff. 
M  DeterminismuSy  236. 
11  Ibid.,  163. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          775 

actually  reaches.  The  "object"  of  experience  is  not  something 
completely  determined  in  itself  but  something  determinable 
without  end  in  the  process  of  cognition.18  Except  through  the 
medium  of  laws,  no  "object"  is  "given"  or  known.19 

So  far  Cassirer  is  in  complete  agreement  with  Paul  Natorp. 
But,  whereas  Natorp  believed  that  Newtonian  mechanics  pro- 
vided the  means,  in  principle,  for  a  complete  determination 
of  an  object  in  space-time,  Cassirer  points  out  that  this  thesis 
involves  an  over-simplification  of  the  facts.  "Field"  theories, 
the  phenomena  of  "entropy,"  and  the  "uncertainty  relations"  of 
quantum  mechanics  involve  problems  which  cannot  be  solved 
within  the  framework  of  classical  mechanics. 

"Fields  of  forces,"  for  example,  are  not  "entities"  in  the 
classical  sense  of  "material  bodies."  As  far  as  such  "fields" 
are  concerned,  "mass"  can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  "ponder- 
able reality"  but  must  be  resolved  into  electric  "charges." 
The  whole  conception  of  a  "physical  body"  must  therefore  be 
redefined.20  The  "field"  is  not  a  "thing,"  but  a  "system  of 
effects." 

Similarly,  the  "atom"  can  no  longer  be  conceived  as  a 
"thing."  It  has  turned  out  to  be  an  intricate  "system"  of 
dynamic  relations  and  can  be  described  only  through  the  laws 
which  express  its  effects.21  To  assert  that  "electrons"  exist  within 
the  atom  and  that  they  move  in  definite  orbits  actually  means 
only  that  certain  laws,  formulated  to  describe  observable  phe- 
nomena of  cathode  rays  and  line  spectra,  are  valid;  that  they 
are  descriptive  of  the  phenomena.22  Neither  the  "electrons"  nor 
their  "orbits"  are  "things-in-themselves,"  mere  "stuff," 
"given"  to  us  prior  to  cognition.  They  are,  rather,  terminals 
within  the  integrative  process  of  cognition.23  The  electron 
"exists"  only  relative  to  a  "field,"  relative,  that  is,  to  a  "system 
of  effects,"  and  as  a  particular  "place"  of  that  field.24 

18  Ibid.,  164. 

19  Ibid.,  178. 
90  Ibid.,  163. 
n  Ibid.,  165. 
"Ibid.,  1 68. 
*Ibid.,  171. 
24  Ibid.,  222. 


776  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

The  laws  of  classical  mechanics  are  so  formulated  that  they 
are  valid  only  under  two  assumptions.  First,  all  physical  objects 
must  be  reducible  to  mass-points;  and,  second,  these  mass-points 
must  be  definitely  localizable  in  space  at  any  given  time  and 
with  any  given  momentum.  Quantum  mechanics  shows,  how- 
ever, that  it  is  impossible  to  determine  the  exact  location  of  an 
electron  if  we  determine  its  momentum  at  the  same  time  with  an 
accuracy  required  by  the  classical  laws.  The  impossibility  here  in- 
volved is  not  merely  of  a  practical  nature  but  is  one  in  principle. 
We  must  therefore  conclude  that  the  individuality  of  an  electron 
can  no  longer  be  defined  or  determined  as  that  of  a  "thing" 
in  space  and  time.25  If  we  continue  to  speak  about  individual 
electrons  we  can  do  so  only  indirectly.  That  is,  we  can  speak 
of  their  "individuality,"  not  as  something  "given,"  but  only  as 
constituting  specific  focal  points  of  relations,  "intersections" 
within  a  system  of  effects.28  All  formulations  of  quantum 
mechanics  are  systemic  formulations  concerning  functional  de- 
pendencies, not  statements  concerning  individual  "things"  called 
"electrons."27 

The  situation,  in  brief,  is  something  like  this:  Classical 
mechanics  assumed  that  the  "state"  of  a  "thing"  in  space  can  be 
completely  determined  at  any  given  moment  and  in  every 
respect.  The  possibility  of  such  determination  was  regarded 
as  so  certain  that  it  became  the  basis  for  the  definition  of  the 
"reality"  of  a  thing.  Only  an  object  that  could  be  determined 
completely  in  space-time  was  said  to  be  "real."28  Now  this 
definition  of  "reality"  must  be  relinquished,  for  we  now  know 
that  the  "picture"  of  an  object  which  we  obtain  is  inescapably 
conditioned  by  the  process  of  observation.  If  we  carry  out  one 
type  of  experiments,  we  can  locate  the  electron  in  space-time 
and  can  regard  it  as  a  "particle;"  but  its  momentum  cannot  be 
determined  with  accuracy.  If  we  resort  to  a  different  type  of 
experiments,  we  can  determine  the  momentum  of  the  electron 
with  complete  accuracy,  but  we  cannot  locate  it  in  space;  we 


224. 
"ibid.,  225. 

*  Ibid.,  228. 
"Ibid.,  235. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          777 

must  then  consider  it  as  a  "wave."  What  an  electron  "is,"  in  the 
absolute  sense  and  independent  of  specifically  defined  condi- 
tions of  observation,  we  cannot  say.29 

If  we  insist  upon  an  absolute  determination  of  the  "object," 
we  retain  nothing  but  a  shadowy  abstraction.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  relinquish  the  demand  for  an  absolute  determination 
and  are  satisfied  with  a  relative  one,  then  we  find  that  this  rela- 
tive determination  can  be  achieved  with  great  accuracy.30  This 
means,  however,  that  we  must  abandon  the  cognitive  ideal 
which,  for  Natorp,  was  the  goal  of  all  science.  Cassirer  is  willing 
to  take  this  stepj  and  there  is  no  question  in  my  mind  that 
Natorp  himself  would  have  taken  it  had  he  lived  long  enough 
to  come  in  contact  with  modern  quantum  mechanics.  The  spirit 
of  Natorp  and  the  whole  conception  of  his  theory  of  knowl- 
edge warrant  such  a  conclusion ;  for  there  is  nothing  involved 
in  this  step  which  in  the  least  challenges  the  idea  of  the 
primacy  of  law  over  things.  On  the  contrary,  Cassirer  is  per- 
fectly right  when  he  sees  in  the  development  of  quantum 
mechanics  a  confirmation  of  the  neo-Kantian  thesis.  Just  as 
in  mathematics  "point"  and  "straight  line"  are  implicitly  de- 
fined by  the  relations  which  govern  them,  so,  in  quantum 
mechanics,  "atoms"  and  "electrons"  are  defined  by  the  laws 
and  relations  of  the  system  as  a  whole.31  The  only  difference 
between  physics  and  mathematics  is  that  the  axiomatic  asser- 
tions of  mathematics  are  replaced  in  physics  by  hypothetical 
"posits"  of  such  a  type  that  their  interrelations  constitute  the 
most  complete  system,  the  most  comprehensive  context,  of  the 
phenomena  of  experience.  In  neither  case  are  the  laws  derived 
from  existing  "objects"  by  a  process  of  abstraction,  but  the 
"objects"  are  constituted  and  determined  through  the  laws  of 
integration.  Cassirer  and  Natorp  are  equally  emphatic  on  this 
point. 

II.  "SPACE"  AND  "TIME" 

Our  second  point  of  comparison  involves  the  interpretation  of 
space  and  time  as  given  by  Natorp  and  Cassirer,  respectively. 


id.t  238. 

10  ibid.,  239. 

"Ibid.,  2*3- 


778  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

For  Natorp,  "time"  is  a  "mode  of  order,"  just  as  "space" 
is  such  a  "mode."  "Time,"  however,  is  the  one  "mode"  com- 
mon and  basic  to  all  happenings,  whereas  "space"  is  the  "order" 
of  coexistence.  The  definite  co-ordination  of  specific  points  in 
space  with  successive  points  in  time  enables  us  to  define  all 
change  as  "motion,"  i.e.,  as  "change  of  position  in  time." 

But  if  "time"  is  only  an  "order  of  position,"  it  is  essentially 
a  "parameter"  in  the  purely  mathematical  sense — in  the  sense, 
that  is,  in  which  all  space  co-ordinates  also  are  such  "parame- 
ters." As  "modes"  of  arranging  the  manifold  phenomena  of 
experience  in  specific  ways,  space  and  time  are  of  exactly  the 
same  logical  significance  for  cognition.32  They  represent  the 
"form,"  i.e.,  the  kind  of  order  according  to  law,  in  accordance 
with  which  alone  the  manifold  of  experience  can  be  viewed 
concretely  and  in  relations  of  succession  and  coexistence;  they 
represent  a  certain  "mode"  in  which  the  integration  of  the 
phenomena  can  be  accomplished,  a  "condition"  which  restricts 
the  activity  of  synthetic  thinking  in  its  dealings  with  sense 
impressions  by  imposing  upon  it  certain  laws  of  relations.33 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  section,  the  cognition  of  an 
"object"  means,  for  Natorp,  the  progressive  determination  of 
an  undetermined  X;  and  univocality  of  cognition  means  com- 
plete determination.  Such  determination,  Natorp  believes,  can 
be  achieved  with  respect  to  space  and  time,  giving  rise  to  the 
concept  "existence."  We  must,  however,  examine  more  closely 
the  meaning  and  nature  of  space  and  time. 

To  begin  with,  space  and  time  may  be  considered  from  two 
points  of  view,  namely,  as  mathematical  structures  and  as  in- 
dispensable conditions  of  the  existential  determination  of  all 
possible  experience.  Viewed  from  the  point* of  view  of  pure 
mathematics,  space,  like  time,  is  but  an  order  of  position  and 
is  without  content.  Time  and  space,  as  mathematical  structures, 
are  "empty."  They  are,  however,  subject  to  one  and  the  same 
type  of  law — the  law  of  any  order  of  position,  the  law  of 
"number" — and,  in  this  sense,  are  inseparably  interrelated.34 


"Natorp,  op.  cit.,  72-78. 
"Ibid.,  268-269. 


280. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          779 

As  mathematical  structures,  space  and  time  are  subject  only 
to  the  laws  of  integrative  thought  and  their  qualities  depend 
exclusively  upon  that  thought.  The  "directions"  and  "dimen- 
sions" of  space,  for  example,  may  be  arranged  in  complete 
freedom.  All  types  of  non-Euclidean  geometry  are  acceptable 
so  long  as  they  fulfill  the  logical  requirements  of  coherent 
systems.35  Natorp,  in  other  words,  fully  accepts  the  modern 
developments  in  geometry36  and  he  approves  of  Cantor's  "trans- 
finite"  numbers.  Indeed,  he  sees  in  both  developments  a  verifi- 
cation .of  his  neo-Kantian  position. 

However,  when  we  leave  the  realm  of  pure  mathematics  and 
attempt  to  determine  the  X  of  experience  through  the  "forms" 
of  space  and  time,  a  specific  restriction  in  the  development  of 
space-time  relations  must  be  accepted.  This  restriction  may  be 
formulated  as  the  demand  that  the  directions  and  dimensions 
admitted  must  constitute  a  univocal  and  closed  system  of  rela- 
tions, and  that  no  greater  number  of  dimensions  be  introduced 
than  is  necessary  and  sufficient  to  establish  a  complete,  univocal, 
homogeneous,  and  continuous  context  of  spatial  determinations 
for  the  contents  of  experience.37 

This  demand  for  a  limitation  of  the  free  creativeness  of 
mathematical  thought  does  not  arise  from  any  need  or  implica- 
tion of  mathematics,  but  solely  from  the  nature  of  our  judg- 
ments of  existence.  In  their  epistemological  significance,  "di- 
mensions" are  means  of  determination  j  but  an  infinite  number 
of  dimensions  would  determine  nothing. 

If  the  limitation  of  the  dimensions  of  space  be  carried 
through  in  conformity  with  the  stipulation  that  only  such  a 
number  of  dimensions  is  to  be  admitted  as  is  necessary  and 
sufficient  for  the  univocal  determination  of  "objects,"  then, 
Natorp  argues,  we  are  at  once  restricted  to  three  dimensions 
of  Euclidean  constitution.  The  space  within  which  our  mani- 
fold experience  can  be  arranged  in  univocal  and  complete 
order  is  a  continuous,  homogeneous,  and  three-dimensional 
space  j  it  is  the  Euclidean  space.38  . 


304. 

308. 

305. 
98  Ibid.,  306-308. 


780  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

Natorp  points  out,  however,  that  the  Euclidicity  of  physical 
space  is  neither  an  absolute  necessity  for  pure  thought  nor  a  fact 
of  pure  experience.  It  is  only  a  "necessary  presupposition"  for 
the  integration  of  experience  in  the  sense  that  it  is  required  as 
the  basis  for  a  univocal  determination  of  the  "objects"  of  experi- 
ence. It  is  a  requisite  for  thought  only  when  thinking  is  con- 
cerned with  the  actual  integration  of  "objects,"  with  their  uni- 
vocal determination  as  coexisting  entities  within  the  context  of 
experience.39 

Consequently,  if  relations  of  objects  are  discovered  which 
deviate  from  the  assumptions  implicit  in  Euclidean  space,  it 
may  be  necessary  to  modify  our  geometrical  presuppositions. 
If  non-Euclidean  geometries  offer  technical  advantages  in  the 
integration  and  determination  of  experience,  so  Natorp  main- 
tains, it  would  be  foolish  not  to  employ  them.40  Every  empirical 
datum  can  be  reconciled  mathematically  with  every  type  of 
geometry  if  proper  assumptions  are  made,41  and  only  the 
demand  for  univocality  of  description  and  the  stipulation  that 
no  unnecessary  assumptions  should  be  made  can  guide  us  in  our 
choice  of  the  geometrical  system  which  we  regard  as  constitu- 
tive for  the  world  of  experience. 

For  Natorp,  the  univocal  determination  of  the  "objects" 
of  experience  can  be  achieved  only  through  the  establishment  of 
"causal"  relations  in  space  and  time — of  relations,  that  is,  as 
exemplified  in  the  laws  of  classical  mechanics;  and  these  laws 
presuppose  and  imply  the  Euclidicity  of  space.42  Physics,  how- 
ever, as  actual  cognition,  can  never  fully  attain  the  ideal  of 
absolute  determinateness,  for  we  can  measure  only  with  em- 
pirical means.  The  degree  of  determinateness  achieved  de- 
pends in  every  case  upon  the  accuracy  of  our  measurements. 
This  being  the  case,  we  must  employ,  as  the  basis  for  measure- 
ment, that  empirical  value  which  most  closely  approaches  the 
ideal  limit.  For  contemporary  physics  this  value  is  the  constant 

"Ibid.,  312. 
40 ««.,  3 1 5- 

316. 

339-347- 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM  781 

velocity  of  light  in  empty  space43  as  disclosed  in  the  Michelson- 
Morley  ether-drift  experiment  and  as  "posited"  in  the  Einstein- 
Minkowski  theory  of  relativity. 

Natorp,  who  published  his  Logische  Grundlagen  in  1910, 
i.e.,  five  years  prior  to  the  publication  of  Einstein's  generalized 
theory,  sees  in  the  Einstein-Minkowski  theory  the  reconcilia- 
ton  between  pure,  absolute,  and  mathematical  space  and  time 
on  the  one  hand,  and  empirical,  relative,  and  physical  space 
and  time  determinations  on  the  other.44  That  is  to  say,  he  sees 
in  the  "special"  theory  of  relativity  the  completion  of  Newton 
and  Kant,  the  reconciliation  of  the  ultimate  ideal  of  absolute 
determination  with  the  restriction  of  all  knowledge  to  relative 
determinateness.  Instead  of  achieving  absolute  determinateness, 
science  must  now  rest  satisfied  with  a  determinateness  in  space 
and  time  which  depends  upon  the  value  c  as  upon  the  last  uni- 
vocal  measure  empirically  attainable.45  The  laws  of  motion  and 
the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy  must  be  restated  in 
somewhat  different  form,  but  they  appear  again  in  classical 
form  if,  instead  of  cy  we  posit  °o  as  the  ideal  constant. 

It  is  obvious  from  this  line  of  reasoning  that  Natorp  accepts 
the  special  theory  of  relativity  and  maintains  that,  far  from  im- 
pairing the  basic  position  of  the  neo-Kantians,  this  theory  actu- 
ally confirms  the  epistemological  views  of  the  Marburg  School.46 
The  ideal  of  absolute  and  univocal  determination  of  the  "ob- 
jects" loses  nothing  of  its  attractiveness  or  of  its  logical  validity  5 
only  the  possibility  of  its  empirical  fulfillment  has  been  re- 
stricted in  a  very  specific  way.  The  theory  of  relativity  stipulates 
a  freedom  of  choice  so  far  as  space  and  time  co-ordinates  are 
concerned  which  was  not  found  in  classical  mechanics  j  but  this 
freedom  does  not  endanger  the  integrated  unity  of  our  cogni- 
tion of  nature  because  it  does  not  impair  the  univocality  of  the 
laws  of  nature.  On  the  contrary,  the  recognition  of  the  "in- 
variance"  of  the  laws  of  nature  despite  the  relativity  of  the 


id.,  398. 
4  Ibid.,  399- 


8  Ibid.,  401. 


782  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

space-time  factors  (as  expressed  in  the  Lorentz  "transformation 
equations")  is,  according  to  Natorp,  the  most  important  result  of 
the  relativity  theory/7 

What  is  Cassirer  Js  view  with  respect  to  this  point? 

Natorp,  we  repeat,  published  his  book,  Die  logischen  Grund- 
lagen  der  exakten  Wissenschaften,  five  years  before  Einstein's 
general  theory  of  relativity  became  known.  Cassirer,  on  the 
other  hand,  published  his  monograph,  Zur  Einsteinschen  Rela- 
tivitatstheoriey  six  years  after  the  general  theory  first  appeared 
in  print.  This  circumstance  alone,  I  believe,  is  sufficient  to 
account  for  whatever  difference  concerning  the  interpretation 
of  space  and  time  there  may  be  in  the  writings  of  these  two 
men. 

In  accord  with  Natorp's  view,  Cassirer  maintains  that  "the 
doctrine  of  space  and  time  developed  by  the  theory  of  relativity 
is  a  doctrine  of  empirical  space  and  empirical  time,  not  of  pure 
space  and  pure  time,"48  and  that  to  this  extent  the  relativity 
theory  constitutes  "the  most  definite  application  and  carrying 
through  of  the  standpoint  of  critical  idealism  within  empirical 
science  itself."49 

Space  and  time,  by  themselves,  "signify  only  a  fixed  law  of 
the  mind,  a  schema  of  connection  by  which  what  is  sensuously 
perceived  is  set  in  certain  relations  of  coexistence  and  se- 
quence."50 That  is  to  say,  time  is,  like  space,  a  schema  in  which 
we  must  arrange  events,  if  the  flux  of  our  subjective  impressions 
is  to  have  objective  order  and  significance.  The  actual  arrange- 
ment of  impressions,  however,  can  be  accomplished  only  upon 
the  basis  of  measured  relationships.  And,  as  the  theory  of  rela- 
tivity shows,  two  observers  in  relative  motion  to  each  other 
will  make  the  arrangement  in  different  ways.  Each  will  regard 
his  own  system  of  reference  as  the  starting-point  in  relation  to 
which  the  space-time  order  of  events  is  to  be  established,  but 
each  order  will  be  different. 

Nevertheless,  both  arrangements,  if  carried  through  con- 
sistently, will  have  objective  significance,  since  it  is  possible  to 

"  ibid.,  403. 

48  Cassirer,   E.,  Substance  and  Function,  and  Einstein's   Theory  of  Relativity 
(W.  C.  and  M.  C.  Swabey,  trans.),  409. 
"Ibid.,  412. 
60  Ibid.,  412. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          783 

deduce  from  each  the  particular  arrangement  valid  for  the  other 
observer.  The  old  idea  of  a  unitary  time  and  a  unitary  space  has 
been  abandoned,  but  its  place  has  been  taken  by  a  one-to-one 
correlation  of  space-time  values  in  empirically  different  systems. 
The  dynamic  unity  of  temporal  and  spatial  determinations  has 
been  retained,  but  only  as  a  postulate  of  relations  which  are 
validated  in  and  through  a  system  of  laws  other  than  that  of 
Newtonian  mechanics. 

Following  Newton,  Kant  assumed  that  the  three  laws  of  mo- 
tion of  classical  mechanics  provided  the  sole  and  sufficient  basis 
for  an  integration  of  experience;  and  these  laws  presuppose 
absolute  space  and  absolute  time.  In  the  special  theory  of  rela- 
tivity, the  principle  of  the  constancy  of  the  velocity  of  light 
was  accepted  as  the  basic  presupposition  of  our  integration  of  ex- 
perience. Natorp  and  Cassirer  agree  on  this,  and  both  modify  the 
Kantian  position  accordingly. 

In  the  general  theory  of  relativity  even  this  principle  is  re- 
placed by  a  still  different  one  —  by  the  principle  of  the  equiva- 
lence of  gravitational  and  inertial  fields;  and  it  follows  from 
this  principle  that  "all  Gaussian  co-ordinate  systems  are  of 
equal  value  for  the  formulation  of  the  universal  natural  laws."51 
We  must  still  conceive  an  absolute  space  and  an  absolute  time, 
i.  e.,  an  absolute  unity  of  all  space-time  determinations;  but 
this  unity  is  not  the  unity  of  some  "real"  object.  It  is,  rather,  an 
Idea  (in  the  Kantian  sense)  which  serves  as  "a  rule  for  con- 
sidering all  motions  in  it  as  merely  relative."  "The  logical  uni- 
versality of  such  an  idea,"  Cassirer  argues  in  complete  agree- 
ment with  Natorp,  "does  not  conflict  with  the  theory  of  rela- 
tivity."52 On  the  contrary,  it  alone  assures  the  validity  of  the 
empirical  laws.  All  motions  in  space  must  be  regarded  as  merely 
relative  because  only  in  this  way  is  it  possible  to  combine  them 
into  a  definite  concept  of  experience  which  unifies  all  phe- 
nomena. "The  one  valid  norm  is  merely  the  idea  of  the  unity  of 
nature,  of  exact  determination  itself;"53  and  this  the  theory  of 
relativity  safeguards  by  guaranteeing  the  "invariance"  of  the 
laws  of  nature  despite  the  relativity  of  all  space-time  co-ordi- 


,  416. 
"Ibid.,  41*. 


784  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

nates.  Cassirer  and  Natorp  are  in  complete  agreement  on  this 
point;  although  Natorp  did  not  know  the  generalized  theory  of 
relativity  when  he  wrote  his  Logische  Grundlagen. 

When  Natorp's  book  was  republished  without  revision  in 
1923,  Cassirer's  interpretation  of  relativity  was  well  known,  and 
Natorp,  in  the  new  preface  to  his  book,  referred  his  readers  to 
Cassirer's  monograph,  saying  that  this  monograph  provided  a 
substitute  for  Natorp's  own  interpretation,  since  it  "contains 
much  of  what  I  myself  might  have  said  concerning  this  mat- 


ter."54 


III.  CAUSALITY 


Our  third  point  of  comparison  involves  the  interpretations  of 
causality  as  given  by  Natorp  and  Cassirer,  respectively. 

According  to  Natorp,  experience  is  integrated  and  the  "order" 
of  experience  is  established  in  conformity  with  the  ideas  of  suc- 
cession and  simultaneity.  Through  the  idea  of  succession,  im- 
pressions are  related  in  series,  and  these  series,  in  turn,  are 
related  in  sequence  until  the  whole  of  experience  has  been  in- 
corporated into  one  unitary  system  of  series.  Through  the  idea 
of  simultaneity,  parallel  series  are  interrelated  in  accordance 
with  a  law  of  progression  which  establishes  a  mutual  dependence 
or  interdependence  of  coexisting  series.  The  arrangement  in- 
volving succession  is  carried  through  on  the  basis  of  "causality;" 
the  arrangement  involving  interdependence  presupposes  "inter- 
action." 

The  "law  of  causality,"  according  to  Natorp,  asserts  that  a  re- 
sult attained  under  certain  conditions  at  a  time  /  will  be  at- 
tained again  under  the  same  conditions  at  a  time  /  but  it  does 
not  stipulate  what  the  specific  conditions  are  in  any  given  case.55 
In  other  words,  the  "law  of  causality"  affirms  merely  the  de- 
pendence of  a  consequent  in  general  upon  an  antecedent  in  gen- 
eral. It  affirms  an  "orderliness  according  to  law"  which  involves 
immediately  and  directly  only  an  order  of  succession. 

In  so  far,  however,  as  we  deal  not  only  with  a  single  series 
in  time  but  with  the  interrelation  of  parallel  series,  the  general 

B*  Natorp,  op.  cit.y  vii. 
,  80. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          785 

relationship  of  antecedent  and  consequent  does  not  adequately 
represent  the  idea  of  causality.56  A  comparison  of  various 
parallel  or  "co-ordinated"  series  of  changes  shows  that  the  law 
which  determines  the  specific  sequence  of  each  series  is  deter- 
minable  only  through  a  law  which  defines  the  relation  of  co- 
ordination— a  law,  that  is,  which  defines  a  "totality  of  order," 
a  system  of  interrelations,  within  which  each  individual  series  is 
determined  by  all  other  series,  and  in  which  each  series  contrib- 
utes to  the  determination  of  all  others.  Such  a  law,  however, 
is  nothing  but  Kant's  "principle  of  interaction,"  the  culmination 
of  our  conception  of  "nature"  as  a  dynamic  system,  i.e.,  as  a 
singular  and  all-comprehensive  functional  context  of  events.57 

The  demand  for  a  general  law  of  causality  has  been  fulfilled, 
according  to  Natorp,  through  Newton's  formulation  of  the 
three  basic  laws  of  motion.  The  second  of  these  laws,  in  particu- 
lar, is  an  expression  of  the  most  general  demand  for  a  depend- 
ence of  a  consequent  upon  some  antecedent.  The  third  law  pro- 
vides the  more  profound  interpretation  of  causality  as  "inter- 
action."58 

Through  the  application  of  the  law  of  causality  in  its  most 
profound  sense,  a  totality  of  order,  a  system  of  order,  is  estab- 
lished— the  totality  or  system  which  we  call  "nature."  The 
nature  of  the  law  itself  is  such  that  the  mathematical  term 
"function"  describes  it  most  adequately.  We  may  say,  therefore, 
that  only  through  the  idea  of  "function"  can  the  demand  for  an 
all-inclusive  and  orderly  context  of  experience  be  fulfilled. 
"Nature"  or  "reality"  is  known  or  "understood"  only  to  the 
extent  to  which  such  a  "functional"  or  "dynamic"  context  has 
been  established.59 

Cassirer,  I  am  sure,  would  agree  with  Natorp  that  only  the 
"functional"  or  "dynamic"  context  according  to  law  discloses 
to  us  the  reality  and  the  essence  of  "nature."  His  earlier  book, 
Substance  and  Function,  is  sufficient  proof  for  this.  But,  whereas 
Natorp  argues  that  the  functional  equations  of  classical  me- 

mlbid.,  8 1. 
"Ibid.,  81. 
88 Ibid.,  371. 
d.9  67. 


786  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

chanics,  as  based  upon  Newton's  three  laws  of  motion,  are  the 
sole  means  through  which  that  context  can  be  established  uni- 
versally, Cassirer  maintains  that  these  classical  equations  must 
be  supplemented  and  that  even  new  types  of  laws  may  be  re- 
quired for  the  establishment  of  an  all-comprehensive  context. 

According  to  Cassirer,  the  "law  of  causality"  must  be  clearly 
distinguished  from  the  specific  equations  of  the  empirical  sci- 
ences. It  is  logically  on  a  different  level.  The  equations  ex- 
press particular  interrelations  of  various  magnitudes,  but  the 
"law  of  causality"  is  the  general  demand  that  the  cognitive 
process  of  transforming  the  data  of  observation  into  concise 
expressions  of  measure,  the  process  of  synthesizing  the  results 
of  measurements  in  functional  equations,  and  of  unifying  these 
equations  in  conformity  with  certain  uniform  principles,  shall  be 
possible  without  end.  The  "law  of  causality,"  in  other  words,  is 
the  axiomatic  demand  that  the  progressive  functional  interpreta- 
tion of  experience  can  and  must  be  carried  through.60 

The  "law  of  causality"  is  in  so  far  sui  generis  as  it  is  not  a 
statement  about  "things"  or  "events,"  but  a  statement  concern- 
ing laws  and  principles.  It  is  the  axiomatic  assertion  that  the 
results  of  our  measurements,  the  laws  governing  these  results, 
and  the  principles  of  interrelating  those  laws  can  be  integrated 
in  such  a  manner  that  they  constitute  one  coherent  system  of 
cognition,  one  unitary  and  univocal  integration  of  "nature." 

If  I  understand  Natorp's  arguments  correctly,  they  imply  this 
very  same  conception  of  the  "law  of  causality;"  for  does  not 
Natorp  maintain  that  the  law  of  causality  in  its  profoundest 
sense  is  the  demand  for  the  homogeneous  functional  system,  and 
not  some  specific  equation  describing  "events"?  But  so  far  as 
Natorp  is  concerned,  this  demand  for  a  system  is  completely 
realizable  through  the  equations  of  classical  mechanics.  These 
equations,  for  Natorp,  express  the  prototype  of  relations  which 
fulfill  the  demand  for  causal  interdependence. 

Cassirer  admits  that  the  "law  of  causality"  has  been  decisive 
for  the  development  of  classical  physics,  that  it  has  given  im- 
petus and  direction  to  this  development.61  But  Cassirer  shows 

*°  Cassirer,  Determinismus,  76. 
82. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          787 

that  the  statistical  treatment  of  entropy,  as  given  by  Boltzmann, 
has  introduced  into  physics  a  new  type  of  "law,"  a  new  type  of 
equations  of  interdependence,  which  must  be  given  equal  status 
with  the  dynamic  laws  of  Newtonian  mechanics.  A  dualism  has 
thus  been  introduced  into  the  conception  of  "physical  laws."62 

Natorp,  in  agreement  with  most  of  his  contemporaries,  seems 
to  have  regarded  the  "statistical  laws"  as  approximations  which 
did  not  affect  the  ideal  of  a  rigid  functional  interpretation.  Ac- 
cording to  this  view,  the  "fate"  of  individual  particles  is  strictly 
determinable  through  classical  laws,  but  it  is  not  always  conven- 
ient or  possible  for  practical  reasons  to  ascertain  all  the  "condi- 
tions" requisite  for  a  complete  functional  interpretation.  In 
principle,  however,  the  demand  for  a  complete  determination 
remains  unchallenged. 

Cassirer  argues  in  a  somewhat  different  manner.  He  points 
out  that  even  Galileo  claimed  unconditional  or  complete  exact- 
ness for  his  laws  only  in  so  far  as  these  laws  are  hypothetically 
exact  formulations,  not  in  the  sense  that  they  describe  actual 
events  with  absolute  exactness.  They  are  expressions  of  an  "if- 
then"  relation  rather  than  descriptions  of  the  "here-and-now" 
of  events.  They  apply,  strictly  speaking,  to  "ideal"  cases,  not  to 
empirically  given  situations. 

What  is  true  of  Galileo's  laws,  Cassirer  points  out,  is  true 
also  of  all  laws  formulated  in  conformity  with  the  Galilean 
model.  It  is  true,  in  particular,  of  the  equations  of  Newtonian 
mechanics.68 

The  laws  of  classical  mechanics,  however,  involve  only  "re- 
versible" processes.  The  principle  of  entropy,  on  the  other  hand, 
deals  with  processes  which  are  not  reversible;  and  such  proc- 
esses, Cassirer  argues,  require  a  new  type  of  "law,"  statistical 
laws,  and  laws  involving  the  calculation  of  "probabilities."64 

The  "probabilities"  involved  in  these  laws  are  not  of  a  sub- 
jective nature  but  are  objective  in  their  significance  and  mean- 
ing. Once  the  factors  present  in  a  cognitive  situation  have  been 
analyzed,  our  probability  calculations  determine  rigidly  what 


.,  96. 
68  Ibid.,  103. 
"IbiL,  in. 


;88  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

is  a  probable  (or  improbable)  result  under  those  conditions,  and 
they  determine  this  probability  or  improbability  of  the  event 
in  complete  independence  of  our  subjective  opinion  in  the  mat- 
ter.65 

Probability  calculation  is  a  branch  of  pure  mathematics  and 
leads  to  definite  conclusions  in  accordance  with  strict  rules  once 
we  apply  it  to  certain  assumed  or  stipulated  empirical  conditions. 
And,  Cassirer  argues,  in  so  far  as  this  is  true,  statistical  expres- 
sions have  the  same  epistemological  significance  as  the  laws  of 
classical  mechanics.  They  can  and  must  therefore  be  co-ordinated 
with  those  laws.66 

This  co-ordination  is  easily  accomplished  if  we  remember  that 
the  classical  laws  expressing  specific  causal  relations  pertain  to 
the  course  of  an  event,  whereas  probability  concerns  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  initial  conditions  which  give  rise  to  that  event.  The 
idea  of  causality  in  conjunction  with  the  conception  of  probabili- 
ties results  in  the  special  laws  of  "statistical  mechanics"  which 
strictly  determine  an  event  as  a  consequent  of  the  assumed  or 
stipulated  conditions  but  which,  when  applied  to  actual  events, 
constitute  the  prototype  of  a  physical  hypothesis.67  Only  through 
the  interpenetration  of  causality  and  probability  is  the  general 
form  of  "order  in  conformity  with  law"  at  all  conceivable.  New- 
ton's law  of  gravitation,  for  example,  tells  us  exactly  what  will 
happen  under  condition  of  some  specific  distribution  of  matter 
in  space,  but  the  actual  state  of  that  distribution  is  not  deter- 
mined by  the  law  of  gravitation  and  can  be  ascertained  only 
through  measurements  and  calculations  involving  probabilities. 

So  far,  therefore,  no  radical  change  of  the  epistemological 
position  of  neo-Kantianism  is  required  to  accommodate  the  statis- 
tical laws.  So  far  Cassirer  was  not  compelled  to  modify  Natorp's 
view  in  any  radical  manner.  The  question  arises,  however,  to 
what  extent  and  in  what  sense  the  significance  and  meaning  of 
the  "law  of  causality"  have  been  affected  by  the  transition  from 
classical  mechanics  to  quantum  theories.  Natorp,  so  we  have 
seen,  died  before  quantum  mechanics  came  into  its  own.  Hence, 

"  Ibid.,  113. 
*lbid.9  1 1 8. 
Ibid.,  130. 


87 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          789 

if  Cassirer's  views  differ  essentially  from  those  of  orthodox 
neo-Kantians,  this  difference  should  become  noticeable  at  this 
point. 

It  is  Cassirer's  thesis,  as  it  was  Natorp's,  that  the  principle  of 
causality  is  not  a  proposition  dealing  directly  with  things  or 
events  but  is,  rather,  a  stipulation  concerning  the  means  through 
which  things  and  events  are  constituted  in  experience.  This  gen- 
eral meaning  of  causality,  according  to  Cassirer,  remains  un- 
affected by  quantum  mechanics.  It  is  true  that  Heisenberg  has 
shown  that  specific  "uncertainties"  are  unavoidable  whenever 
we  deal  with  individual  electrons  or  similar  particles,  and  that 
therefore  "probability  equations"  alone  adequately  describe  the 
observed  processes.  But,  as  Heisenberg  himself  has  pointed  out, 
these  "probabilities"  are  by  no  means  indeterminate.  They  are 
derivable  from  the  principles  of  quantum  mechanics  and  are 
strictly  and  univocally  determined  by  them.68  The  "uncertainty 
relations,"  therefore,  do  not  imply  a  lack  of  precision  in 
quantum  mechanical  laws.69 

To  put  it  differently,  quantum  mechanics,  like  every  other 
branch  of  science,  makes  certain  stipulations  from  which  it  pro- 
ceeds and  upon  which  the  validity  of  its  formulations  depends.  It 
no  longer  accepts  all  the  stipulations  of  classical  mechanics  and 
has  abandoned  the  hope  that  all  propositions  of  physics  can 
ultimately  be  reduced  to  one  type  of  functional  laws;  but,  within 
the  framework  of  its  own  stipulations,  the  equations  of  quantum 
mechanics  reveal  objective  interrelations  of  events  with  exacti- 
tude and  precision. 

When  Heisenberg  rejected  the  "law  of  causality,"  his  argu- 
ments were  directed  only  against  a  narrowly  conceived  version 
of  that  law,  not  against  the  general  idea  of  "orderliness  in  accord- 
ance with  law."70  But  "causality"  in  the  narrow  sense,  Cassirer 
maintains,  had  been  invalidated  even  before  the  advent  of 
quantum  mechanics.  It  had  lost  status  in  classical  physics,  because 
the  equations  of  classical  mechanics  could  be  applied  to  actual 
situations  only  on  the  basis  of  probability  considerations. 

m  Ibid.,  144. 
*  Ibid.,  146. 
70  Ibid.,  i43i  153. 


790  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

If  we  discard  this  narrow  conception  of  causality  and  adhere 
only  to  the  general  demand  for  "orderliness  according  to  law" 
(Gesetzlichkeit),  Cassirer  argues,  then  the  "uncertainty  rela- 
tions" of  Heisenberg  "do  not  constitute  a  contrary  instance."71 
The  very  demonstration  of  the  validity  of  the  "uncertainty  rela- 
tions" presupposes  the  validity  of  the  generalized  law  of  caus- 
ality. Moreover,  the  basic  postulates  of  quantum  mechanics  are 
inseparably  tied  up  with  the  principles  of  conservation  of  energy 
and  conservation  of  momentum,  with  principles,  that  is,  which 
are  "pure  and  typical  statements  of  causality."72 

The  general  principle  of  causality  demands  in  general  the  de- 
pendence of  a  consequent  y  upon  an  antecedent  x:  If  x,  then 
y.  Even  traditional  logic  reveals  ( i )  that  the  falsity  of  x  does 
not  necessarily  imply  the  falsity  of  y>  and  (2)  that  the  universal 
validity  of  the  conditional  proposition  is  unaffected  by  the  fal- 
sity of  the  antecedent,  or  by  any  restriction  of  its  truth.  Hence,  if 
the  "uncertainty  relations"  imply  that  in  the  field  of  physics 
some  judgements  of  causality  rest  upon  false  premises  or  upon 
premises  of  restricted  truth,  nothing  is  said  thereby  concern- 
ing the  pure  form  of  the  hypothetical  syllogism  or  concerning 
its  formal  validity.  The  schema,  //  x,  then  y,  as  purely  formal 
schema,  loses  nothing  of  its  force  or  of  its  validity.  If,  however, 
the  schema  is  to  be  applied  to  some  concrete  situation,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  values  to  be  inserted  for  x 
can  be  determined  by  measurement  with  complete  and  absolute 
accuracy.  The  problem,  in  other  words,  pertains  not  to  the  causal 
relation  as  such  but  to  the  "empty  places,"  the  measured  vari- 
ables, which  make  the  general  principle  applicable  in  concrete 
cases.  The  values  of  x  must  be  "admissible"  if  the  principle  of 
causality  is  to  have  specific  and  univocal  meaning  in  some  par- 
ticular situation. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  physics,  only  such  values  are  "ad- 
missible" which  can  be  definitely  ascertained  through  determi- 
nate and  definable  methods  of  measuring.  This  restrictive  inter- 
pretation of  the  conditions  under  which  the  law  of  causality 
becomes  applicable  alone  assures  the  physical  significance  of 


153. 
,  154. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          791 

that  principle.  Natorp,  I  am  sure,  would  agree  with  Cassirer  on 
this  point,  for  the  idea  as  such  is  not  new.  Newton  already  in- 
cluded it  in  his  regulae  fhiloso'phandi.  The  new  aspect  is  that 
quantum  mechanics  reveals,  through  its  "uncertainty  relations," 
that  it  is  forever  impossible  to  obtain  experimentally  certain 
pairs  of  magnitudes — such  as  the  place  and  momentum  of  an 
electron — with  complete  accuracy.  Through  this  discovery  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  causality  is  subjected  to  a  condi- 
tion of  which  classical  physics  knew  nothing  j  but  the  restriction 
in  applicability  does  not  entail  the  suspension  of  the  principle 
itself.73 

So  far  as  quantum  mechanics  is  concerned,  the  law  of  causality 
stipulates  that,  if  at  any  time  certain  physical  magnitudes  have 
been  measured  with  the  greatest  accuracy  possible  in  conformity 
with  the  "uncertainty  relations,"  then  there  exist  at  some  other 
time  certain  other  magnitudes  the  measurable  qualities  of  which 
can  be  predicted  with  accuracy.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to 
describe  completely  in  space  and  time  the  actual  connections 
expressed  by  the  functional  law,  just  as  it  is  impossible  to  con- 
struct a  mechanism  on  the  basis  of  classical  laws  which  reveals 
the  quantum  theoretical  connection  between  waves  and  particles. 
Such  a  representation  and  description  in  space  and  time  is,  how- 
ever, not  needed  for  the  application  of  the  principle  of  causality. 
The  formalism  of  quantum  mechanics  itself  provides  all  neces- 
sary "functional"  connections.  So  long  as  empirical  events  can 
be  measured  and,  on  the  basis  of  these  measurements,  can  be 
described  in  mathematical  terms  and  by  means  of  mathematical 
equations,  the  postulate  of  the  "comprehensibility  of  nature" 
is  fulfilled.  Moreover,  inasmuch  as  this  "comprehensibility" 
rests  upon  the  principle  of  causality  in  its  broad  sense,  this  prin- 
ciple, too,  has  lost  nothing  of  its  epistemological  significance.74 

Natorp,  I  feel  certain,  would  endorse  wholeheartedly  this 
conclusion  of  Cassirer's  argument.  Had  he  lived  to  see  the  ad- 
vent of  modern  quantum  mechanics  he  would  have  moved  on 
beyond  the  position  of  orthodox  neo-Kantianism  in  the  same 
direction  in  which  Cassirer  has  actually  moved.  The  initial  posi- 

"  Ibid.,  i57. 
74  Ibid.,  234. 


792  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

tion  taken  by  Natorp  with  respect  to  the  presuppositions  of  scien- 
tific cognition  implies  this.  In  developing  his  interpretation  of 
quantum  mechanics,  Cassirer  has  not  broken  with  neo-Kantian- 
ism  but  has  adapted  its  established  principles  to  the  latest  results 
of  scientific  research.  He  has  carried  out  a  program  first  enunci- 
ated by  Natorp,  and  he  has  carried  it  out  in  the  very  spirit  of 
Natorp.  In  one  essential  respect,  however,  Cassirer  has  gone 
far  beyond  the  orthodox  neo-Kantians.  We  shall  consider  this 
point  in  our  next  section. 

IV.  FOUNDATIONS  OF  THE  "GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN" 

Up  to  now  we  have  considered  Cassirer's  views  only  in  so 
far  as  they  pertain  to  the  epistemological  basis  of  the  exact 
natural  sciences.  We  have  found  that  in  all  these  matters  Cas- 
sirer has  advanced  beyond  orthodox  neo-Kantianism  only  in  a 
very  restricted  sense.  However,  in  the  course  of  his  many-sided 
investigations,  Cassirer  became  convinced  that  the  traditional 
epistemology  in  its  usual  limitation  to  "scientific  cognition"  does 
not  provide  a  basis  for  the  Geisteswissenschaften  or  cultural 
sciences. 

If  all  types  of  knowledge  are  to  find  epistemological  justi- 
fication, then  the  basic  principles  of  epistemology  itself  must  be 
radically  expanded  or  generalized75  and  must  be  conceived  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  admit  knowledge  differing  in  kind,  not  only 
in  degree,  from  that  obtained  in  the  natural  sciences.  And  with 
this  demand  for  a  generalized  epistemological  basis  of  all  knowl- 
edge Cassirer  departs  radically  from  the  position  of  orthodox 
neo-Kantianism  5  for  Natorp  is  committed  to  the  idea  that  the 
prototype  of  all  knowledge  is  found  in  the  mathematical  sciences. 
The  cultural  sciences  find  no  consideration  in  the  Logische 
Grundlagen  or  in  Natorp's  other  epistemological  writings.  The 
epistemological  problems  of  these  sciences  are  not  recognized  as 
such — unless  we  are  to  accept  Natorp's  explicit  restriction  of 
analysis  to  the  foundations  of  the  so-called  exact  sciences  as  an 
implied  admission  that  other  sciences  may  require  a  different 
treatment. 

Despite  this  break  with  the  orthodoxy  of  the  Marburg  School, 

"  Cassirer,  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  I,  v. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          793 

Cassirer  has  by  no  means  abandoned  the  essence  of  Kantianism. 
On  the  contrary,  he  finds  ample  room  for  the  new  generalization 
within  the  framework  of  that  position. 

Starting  once  more  from  the  premise  that  the  basic  concepts 
of  science  are  obtained,  not  through  a  process  of  abstraction,  but 
through  an  integrative  or  synthetic  act  of  mind,  Cassirer  argues 
that  this  integrative  activity  of  mind  permeates  all  types  of 
knowledge.  Our  concepts,  whatever  they  may  be  in  any  given 
field  of  investigation,  are  man-created  intellectual  symbols  by 
means  of  which  experiential  contexts  are  established;  they  are 
integral  parts  of  logical  systems  and  are  defined  and  determined 
in  and  through  the  logical  structure  of  their  respective  systems. 

But  if  this  is  true,  then  our  basic  concepts  participate  in,  or 
"share,"  the  logical  structure  of  the  system  to  which  they  be- 
long. And  if  an  "object"  of  experience  is  constituted  only 
through  these  concepts,  then  "we  cannot  reject"  the  idea  that 
the  variety  of  such  constitutive  logical  means  produces  a  variety 
of  "objective"  contexts,  a  variety  of  differently  integrated  "ob- 
jects."76 Even  within  the  realm  of  "nature"  the  "physical"  ob- 
ject is  not  strictly  identical  with  the  "chemical"  object,  or  the 
"chemical"  object  with  the  "biological"  object,  for  "physical," 
"chemical,"  and  "biological"  cognition,  respectively,  involve  spe- 
cifically different  points  of  view  from  which  the  questions  are 
raised  which  guide  our  inquiries,  and  from  which  the  phenomena 
of  observation  are  subjected  to  interpretation  and  integration.77 

The  One  Being,  presupposed  in  all  realistic  epistemologies, 
the  thing-in-itself  as  it  exists  in  and  by  itself,  recedes  more  and 
more  from  the  field  of  investigation  and  becomes  the  unknow- 
able X.  It  is  not  encountered  at  the  beginning  of  cognition  as 
something  "given,"  but  only  at  the  end,  as  the  fulfillment  of 
completed  cognition,  the  culmination  of  all  integration.  Our 
basic  concepts  of  cognition  cannot  be  obtained  from  this  X 
through  a  process  of  abstraction.  All  Kantians  agree  on  this. 
But  is  it  possible  to  take  the  opposite  view  and  to  interpret  all 
intellectual  symbols,  irrespective  of  the  field  of  their  applica- 
tion, as  expressions  of  one  and  the  same  basic  function  of  mind? 

.,  6. 

7. 


794  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

Natorp  maintains  that  all  cognition,  no  matter  how  different 
its  ways  and  modes  may  be,  aims  ultimately  at  an  integration  of 
experience  in  terms  of  causality,  at  the  complete  subsumption  of 
all  objects  of  experience  under  the  law  of  causality.  The  partic- 
ular is  not  to  remain  an  isolated  particular  but  is  to  be  merged 
into  a  context  determined  and  defined  by  causal  interrelations. 
Cassirer,  on  the  other  hand,  finds  that  the  causal  mode  of 
integration  is  only  one  of  many  which  are  equally  possible  and 
equally  actual.  "Ob  j  edification"  is  carried  on,  and  the  particular 
is  fused  into  context,  by  means  quite  different  from  that  em- 
ploying logical  concepts  and  laws  of  logical  relations.  Art,  my- 
thology, and  religion  exemplify  these  other  types  of  integration. 

No  work  of  art,  no  mythology,  no  religion  merely  reflects 
an  empirically  "given."  All  of  them  constitute  their  "objects," 
their  "world,"  in  conformity  with  some  independent  principle 
of  integration.  Each  creates  its  own  symbolic  forms,  forms  which 
are  not  of  the  same  type  as  the  "intellectual"  symbols  of  science 
but  which,  nevertheless,  considering  their  origin,  are  episte- 
mologically  equivalent  to  them.  Not  one  of  these  different  types 
of  symbols  can  be  fully  represented  by  any  other,  or  can  be  trans- 
lated into,  or  derived  from,  any  other.  Each  type  represents 
a  distinct  approach  to,  and  a  distinct  mode  of  interpretation  of, 
experience  and  thus  constitutes  in  and  through  itself  a  specific 
aspect  of  the  "real."  These  types  of  symbols  are  not  different 
ways  in  which  one  and  the  same  "thing-in-itself"  reveals  itself 
to  us,  but  they  are  modes  through  which  mind  accomplishes  its 
"objectification"  of  experience.78  Kant's  "Copernican  revolu- 
tion" must  therefore  be  extended  to  all  of  them.79 

The  question  in  all  cases  of  "objectification"  is  this:  Is  the 
function  of  the  "symbol"  derivable  from  the  "object,"  or 
does  the  "object"  presuppose  the  functional  significance  of  the 
"symbol"?  Does  the  "symbol"  find  its  validation  through  the 
"object,"  or  is  the  "object"  constituted  through  (or  by  means  of) 
the  "symbol"?  Since  this  question  arises  in  every  field  in  which 
symbols  are  employed,  it  represents  the  intellectual  bond,  the 
methodological  unity,  which  holds  these  fields  together. 


9. 

19  Ibid.,  10. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          795 

Answering  this  question  in  the  basically  Kantian  sense  of  the 
primacy  of  "functions"  or  "laws"  over  "objects,"  Cassirer  finds 
that  it  is  possible  to  transcend  the  narrowly  conceived  position 
of  the  neo-Kantians  without  discarding  the  essence  of  Kantian- 
ism itself.  As  he  now  sees  it,  the  integrative  activity  of  mind  is 
not  restricted  to  a  purely  cognitive  function.  In  addition  to  the 
logical  integration  of  experience  we  can  discern  a  "function  of 
linguistic  thinking,"  a  "function  of  mythico-religious  thinking," 
and  a  "function  of  artistic  intuition."  Each  one  of  these  integrat- 
ing functions  leads  to  a  particular  type  of  integration  and  is 
therefore  constitutive  to  its  own  specific  context  of  experience, 
to  its  own  "objective  totality."80 

Interpreted  in  this  way,  the  critique  of  reason  becomes  a 
generalized  critique  of  culture,  showing  how  all  content  of 
culture  presupposes  and  involves  a  primordial  act  of  mind,  an 
act  of  creative  integration.  And  in  this  generalized  critique  the 
basic  thesis  of  idealism  finds  its  proper  and  complete  validation.81 
The  varied  products  of  culture — language,  scientific  cognition, 
myths,  art,  and  religion — despite  their  diversified  character  and 
despite  the  difference  in  method  and  aim  of  integration,  now  are 
conceived  as  being  one  in  ultimate  purpose — in  the  purpose, 
namely,  of  transforming  the  passive  world  of  mere  impressions 
(in  which  mind  seems  at  first  imprisoned)  into  a  "world  of 
pure  spiritual  expression."82 

If  we  insist  upon  the  complete  logical  unity  of  all  integrations, 
the  universality  and  exclusiveness  of  the  logical  form  tend  to 
destroy  the  specifically  and  uniqueness  of  the  obj  edifications 
in  non-logical  spheres  of  integration.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
acknowledge  the  specifically  of  these  integrations  without  ad- 
vancing at  the  same  time  beyond  it  to  an  all-inclusive  principle 
of  integration,  we  are  in  danger  of  losing  ourselves  in  particu- 
lars.83 But,  if  we  accept  the  expansion  of  Kant's  "Copernican 
revolution,"  then,  according  to  Cassirer,  both  of  these  fatal 
alternatives  can  be  avoided.  We  can  then  admit  the  greatest 

80 1  bid.,  ii. 
81  Ibid.,  ii. 
"Ibid.,  12. 
"/«<*.,  1 6. 


796  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

diversity  of  forms  without  being  forced  to  relinquish  the  de- 
mand for  ultimate  unity  in  the  creative  function  of  mind.  For 
example,  the  synthesis  in  which  the  succession  of  tones  is  trans- 
formed into  the  unity  of  a  "melody"  is  quite  different  from 
the  synthesis  through  which  the  manifoldness  of  linguistic 
sounds  is  integrated  into  the  unity  of  a  "sentence}"  but  common 
to  both  is  the  fact  that  the  sensuous  elements  no  longer  remain 
isolated  particulars  but  are  fused  into  a  context  in  and  through 
which  each  element  receives  its  real  meaning  and  significance.84 
Each  field  of  integration  is  characterized  by  its  own  approach 
and  procedure;  each  involves  its  own  specific  integrative  princi- 
ple. But  all  of  them  are,  nevertheless,  only  functions  of  the  same 
integrating  mind,85  and  in  and  through  its  diversified  products 
this  mind  reveals  itself  and  reveals  the  world  of  experience  as  an 
expression  or  manifestation  of  mind.86 

Such  is  the  essence  of  Cassirer's  thesis.  That  it  involves  a  step 
beyond  orthodox  neo-Kantianism  is  obvious.  It  is  true,  further- 
more, that  in  all  cultural  achievements — in  language,  art,  re- 
ligion, and  science — creative  and  integrating  minds  reveal  them- 
selves. Whenever  we  deal  with  "symbols,"  a  creative  mind 
which  integrates  and  interprets  them  may  be  assumed  to  be  at 
work.  The  use  of  "symbols"  is  an  act  of  synthesis,  of  con- 
struction, not  of  abstraction  or  passive  reception.  To  this  extent 
at  least  Cassirer's  thesis  may  be  regarded  as  validated. 

However,  Cassirer's  three- volume  work,  Die  Philosofhie  der 
symbollschen  Formen,  still  leaves  many  questions  unanswered. 

The  epistemological  problem  of  the  exact  sciences  (mathe- 
matics, mathematical  physics,  and  chemistry)  may  be  regarded 
as  solved,  for  the  principle  of  integration  is  evident  in  each 
case.  It  may  be  granted  likewise  that  the  epistemological  prob- 
lem of  "mystical"  thinking  (mythology  and  religion)  has  found 
its  solution.  Its  integrating  principle  seems  to  be  identical  with 
what  Levy-Bruhl  has  called  the  principle  of  "participation." 
Both  mathematical  science  and  mythology  (religion)  have, 
however,  in  common  that  they  aim  at  an  integrated  totality  of 

*•/«<*.,  27. 
31. 


ADVANCE  BEYOND  NEO-KANTIANISM          797 

experience.  Language  and  art,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  share 
this  aim. 

No  "object  of  art"  claims  to  be  an  all-inclusive  totality  of 
experience,  nor  do  all  "objects  of  art"  together  constitute  such 
a  totality.  The  creative  synthesis  in  a  work  of  art  is  undeniable, 
but  in  intent  and  method  it  is  not  on  the  same  level  with  a  law 
or  theory  of  science  or  with  an  "explanatory"  myth. 

Language  also  is  the  product  of  creative  synthesis}  but  it, 
too,  is,  epistemologically  speaking,  not  on  the  same  plane  with 
science  or  mythology  (religion).  Both  science  and  mythology 
represent  distinct  world-views,  intellectual  positions  from  which 
the  manifold  of  experience  is  to  be  integrated  into  comprehen- 
sive contexts.  Language,  on  the  other  hand,  despite  its  sym- 
bolic character,  is  but  a  means  to  be  employed  in  such  integra- 
tion. It  may  reflect  in  its  forms  and  vocabulary  predominantly 
the  point  of  view  of  mythology  or  that  of  science  (and  usually 
is  a  fair  mixture  of  both),  but  in  itself  it  provides  no  "point  of 
view"  from  which  experience  is  to  be  integrated.  This  is  not 
to  say  that  the  development  of  language  remains  unaffected  by 
the  purpose  for  which  linguistic  symbols  are  employed.  My 
contention  is  merely  that  language  as  an  instrument  useful  in 
integrating  experience  cannot  be  set  in  strict  parallel  with 
science  or  mythology  as  "point  of  view"  and  as  mode  of  inte- 
gration. Cassirer's  "philosophy  of  symbolic  forms"  needs  clarifi- 
cation at  this  point. 

Cassirer,  as  will  be  recalled,  generalized  the  position  of  the 
neo-Kantians  in  order  to  provide  an  epistemological  basis  for 
the  cultural  sciences.  But  neither  in  his  Philoso$hie  der  symbo- 
lischen  Formen  nor  in  his  other  books  does  this  problem  find 
further  consideration. 

It  may  be  granted  that  the  general  thesis  of  the  primacy  of  the 
integrative  functions  of  mind  over  all  "objects"  of  experience 
implies  a  suggestion  of  the  direction  in  which  an  answer  to  this 
problem  must  be  sought.  But  the  task  of  carrying  through  the 
required  analysis  of  categories  and  principles  of  integration  still 
remains  to  be  done.  What,  for  example,  is  the  principle  (corre- 
sponding to  the  law  of  causality  in  the  exact  sciences)  which 
determines  obj  edification  and  integration  of  historical  knowl- 


798  WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

edge?  Upon  what  basis  is  the  historical  context  of  experience 
to  be  established?  If  in  the  field  of  history,  too,  the  basic  princi- 
ple of  integration  is  to  be  a  law  of  causality,  then,  it  seems,  this 
law  must  be  even  more  generalized  than  it  was  in  the  field  of 
quantum  mechanics — and  generalized  in  a  different  manner. 
It  may  have  to  be  transformed  into  a  "principle  of  relevancy" — 
a  principle,  that  is,  the  application  of  which  involves  value 
judgments.  If  so,  new  questions  arise,  questions  which  tran- 
scend the  field  of  history  proper.  We  must  then  ask:  What  are 
values?  What  is  the  epistemological  basis  of  value  judgments? 
What  is  the  principle  of  integration  in  the  general  field  of 
axiology?  All  these  questions  must  be  answered  before  the 
epistemology  of  Geisteswissenschaften  is  complete}  but  none  of 
them  are  answered  by  Cassirer.  His  radical  step  beyond  the 
neo-Kantians  of  the  Marburg  School  is  also  a  step  away  from 
specifically  epistemological  problems  and  from  the  type  of 
analyses  which  such  problems  demand. 

WILLIAM  H.  WERKMEISTER 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  NEBRASKA 


Fritz  Kauf matin 

CASSIRER,  NEO-KANTIANISM,  AND 
PHENOMENOLOGY 


SYNOPSIS 

I.  The  Historical  Conjunction 801 

II.  Variety  of  Experience  vs.  Autonomy  of  Cultural 

Realms 805 

III.  The  Nature  of  the  Subjective 806 

IV.  The  Form  (in  Construction  and  Intuition) 812 

V.  The  Rapprochement  between  neo-Kantianism  and 

Phenomenology     823 

VI.  The  Symbolical  Forms  (neo-Kantian  and  Phenom- 

enological  Philosophies  of  Man) 831 

VII.  Philosophy  and  Religion 845 


CASSIRER,  NEO-KANTIANISM,  AND 
PHENOMENOLOGY 


The  Historical  Conjunction 

IT  IS  NOT  the  purport  of  the  present  paper  to  pin  down 
to  any  'Ism*  so  rich  and  distinguished  an  individuality  as 
Ernst  Cassirer's.  I  am  convinced,  however,  that  the  encyclopedic 
nature  of  his  thought,  of  his  learning  and  empathy  and  the 
peculiar  lucidity  of  his  style  are  partly  due  to  the  sound  philo- 
sophical tradition  and  scholarly  discipline  of  "Marburg  neo- 
Kantianism"  (just  as,  for  instance,  the  followers  of  Hegel  were 
privileged  to  harvest  the  fruit  of  their  master's  systematic 
achievements  and  historical  wisdom). 

Yet,  although  Cassirer,  skillfully  and  conscientiously  at  once, 
cultivated  and  transformed  his  teachers'  heritage,  he  remained 
closer  to  the  original  Idealism  than  even  Cohen  and  Natorp 
themselves  in  their  last  writings.  Their  turn  toward  religious 
metaphysics  took  place  at  a  time  when  Cassirer's  ideas  had 
already  crystallized  in  a  form  which  he  continuously  developed 
without  ever  reaching  a  breaking-point  such  as  Cohen  did  in  the 
religious  personalism  of  his  Religion  der  Vernunft  (1919)  or 
Natorp  in  the  religious  mysticism  of  Praktische  Philosophie 


Cassirer's  Kantianism  has  to  be  seen  against  the  background 
of  Hermann  Cohen's  Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnis  (1902)  and 
Paul  Natorp's  Einleitung  in  die  Psychologie  nach  Kritischer 
Methode  (1888),  the  original  version  of  the  Allgemeine  Psy- 
chologie of  1912.  Hence  we  shall  have  to  make  particular  refer- 
ence to  these  classical  writings  of  the  school.  This  will  be  espe- 

801 


8oa  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

cially  fitting  in  our  context,  since  HusserPs  Phenomenology 
also  profited  very  much  from  his  ponderings  over  Natorp's 
Psychologic  and  the  preceding  article  "Ueber  objective  und 
subjective  Begriindung  der  Erkenntnis"  (Philoso'phische 
Monatshefte,  iSSy).1  These  are  the  main  sources  for  any  at- 
tempt at  defining  and  evaluating  anew  the  relationship  between 
neo-Kantianism  and  phenomenology  proper.  Cohen's  breaking 
away  from  an  orthodox  neo-Kantianism  had  its  effect  primarily 
on  the  Jewish  philosophy  of  religion  (Franz  Rosenzweig),  and 
Natorp's  thoughtful  Praktische  Philosofhie  has  not  yet  at- 
tained the  productive  recognition  which  it  deserves,  i.e.,  the 
status  and  dynamics  of  a  historic  philosophical  motive.  As 
regards  phenomenology,  only  the  grandiose  syncretism  of 
Heidegger's  Sein  und  Zeit  seems  to  show  traces  of  the 
metaphysical  philosophy  of  language  in  Natorp's  posthumous 
work.2 

In  German  philosophy,  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury was  marked  by  the  appearance  of  three  classic  works: 
Edmund  HusserPs  Logische  Untersuchungen  (1900/01), 
Hermann  Cohen's  (already  mentioned)  Logik  der  reinen  Er- 
kenntnis (1902)  and  Heinrich  Rickert's  Die  Grenzen  der 
naturwissenschaftlichen  Begriffsbildtmg  (1902) — the  third  of 
which,  the  foremost  exponent  of  the  so-called  Southwestern 
neo-Kantian  School,  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  study.3 
Whereas  Cohen's  Logik  climaxed  a  movement  which  lost  more 
and  more  ground  in  the  following  decades,  HusserPs  Unter- 
suchungen  was  the  beginning  of  a  philosophical  enterprise 
which  was  to  make  proselytes  from  all  schools  of  German 
philosophy.  This  success  it  owed  not  only  to  its  inner  strength 
and  radical  method:  it  was  also  favored  by  the  tendencies  of 

1  Cf.  Husserl,  Logische  Untersuchungen  (and  edition)  II,  I,  35 3! 5  Ideen  zu  einer 
reinen  Phaenomenologie,  io9fj  Natorp,  Allgemeine  Psychologie,  335$  28off. 
HusserPs  relation  to  Natorp's  early  writings  is  carefully  studied  in  Marvin  Farber's 
The  Foundation  of  Phenomenology  (1943). 

aCp.  Natorp's  Praktische  Philosofhie,  2495,  261  with  Heidegger,  Sein  und 
Zeit,  i6of. 

8  Besides,  a  phenomenological  criticism  of  Rickert's  position  was  set  forth  both 
by  the  present  writer  in  GescMchtsfhilosofhie  der  Gegenwart  (1931)  and  Eugen 
Fink  in  Die  Phaenomenologische  Philosofhie  Edmund  Husserls  m  der  gegen- 
wartigen  Kritik  (1934). 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     803 

the  age/  Husserl  put  to  philosophical  use  the  descriptive  method 
introduced  in  psychology  by  Brentano,  James,  Dilthey  and 
Lipps.  He  contributed  also  to  the  rise  of  the  new  morpho- 
logical trends  which — heralded  by  the  disciples  of  Burckhardt, 
Nietzsche  and  Stefan  George — came  to  prevail,  first,  in  the 
analysis  of  the  forms  and  products  of  culture.  But  from  the 
interpretation  of  poetry,  art,  religion,  etc.,  these  trends  began 
to  expand  and  invade  all  realms  of  being  and  experience,  psycho- 
logical as  well  as  biological  and  physical:  they  all  were  to  unfold 
the  variety  and  articulation  of  their  forms  and  show  their  spe- 
cific, irreducible  natures.  Phenomenology  served  the  self- 
understanding  of  all  these  movements  by  providing  them  with 
a  methodical  foundation  and  bestowing  upon  them  a  systematic 
unity. 

When  we  analyze  the  implications  of  this  phenomenological 
approach  to  the  facts  and  problems  of  world  and  life,  the  points 
of  contact  with  neo-Kantian  thought  as  well  as  those  of  con- 
trast to  it  (and,  hence,  the  mixture  of  alliance  and  tension  be- 
tween the  two  movements)  will  immediately  come  to  the  sur- 
face. It  should  be  stated,  however,  from  the  outset  that  this 
relation  was  not  static,  but  seemed  to  lead  toward  a  qualified 
rapprochement  to  which  the  later  writings  of  Natorp,  Husserl 
and  Cassirer  bear  witness.5  The  present  article,  too,  was  intended 
to  advance  a  closer  co-operation  between  the  thinkers  of  both 
schools:  a  purpose  which  is  now  largely  frustrated  by  the 
untimely  death  of  my  eminent  partner  in  the  originally  con- 
templated dialogue. 

Husserl  found  himself  in  a  common  front  with  the  Marburg 
scholars  in  his  victorious  struggle  against  the  psychologism  of 
1900.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  anti-psychologism  which  domi- 

4  It  is  symptomatic  that,  in  the  late  twenties,  most  of  the  teachers  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  Philosophy  at  the  University  of  Marburg  itself  (Heidegger,  Mahnke, 
Loewith,  (Gadamer),  Krueger)  claimed  to  be  adherents  of  phenomenology. 

8  Historically  the  germs  for  such  an  understanding  were  present  from  the 
beginning  in  the  profound  admiration  for  Leibniz  which  the  author  of  the  Unter- 
suchungen  has  in  common  with  Cassirer  (whose  book,  Leibniz*  System,  appeared 
in  1902)  as  well  as  in  Husserl's  grateful  interest  in  Natorp's  Psyckologie — an 
interest  which  shows  not  only  in  HusserPs  writings,  but  also  in  the  fact  that  Natorp's 
book  was  repeatedly  the  subject  of  discussion  in  HusserPs  (and  later,  Heidegger's) 
seminars. 


804  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

nates  the  first  volume  of  the  Logische  Untersuchungen  proved 
so  successful  that  only  few  readers,  like  Dilthey,  realized  the 
methodological  importance  of  what  the  second  volume  offered 
under  the  somewhat  misleading  title  "descriptive  psychology:" 
this  'psychology'  was  as  little  a  piece  of  merely  empirical  re- 
search as  was  the  psychology  that  played  its  part  in  the  philo- 
sophical systems  of  Cohen  and  Natorp.  At  the  same  time,  the 
systematic  function  of  HusserPs  'psychology'  was  not  that  of 
studying  the  unity  of  human  culture  or  reconstructing  the 
original  unity  of  consciousness — the  tasks  set  for  "psychology 
according  to  the  critical  method"  by  Cohen  and  Natorp  re- 
spectively. In  the  terms  of  Natorp's  philosophy,  the  comple- 
mentary methods  of  direct  construction  and  psychological  re- 
construction express  the  correspondence  between  two  procedures 
— that  of  objectification  and  subj  edification  (a  difference  said 
to  be  logically  prior  to  the  determination  of  object  and  subject 
proper).  According  to  Cohen  and  Natorp  the  unity  of  the 
subject,  i.e.,  of  the  concrete  living  consciousness,  this  unity  di~ 
rectly  enjoyed,  but  not  directly  grasped,  has  to  be  regained 
through  a  reversal  of  the  processes  of  objectification — through 
fusing  what,  under  the  theoretical,  ethical  and  aesthetic  aspects, 
had  been  separated  in  the  pure  forms  and  normative  products 
of  science,  art,  and  the  moral  "kingdom  of  ends."  The  unity 
of  the  mind  is  said  to  consist  in  the  unity  of  these  aspects,  i.e., 
of  these  types  of  objective  synthesis  and  legislation  which  make 
up  the  worlds  of  pure  science,  pure  morals,  and  pure  art. 

In  neo-Kantianism  the  search  for  this  unity  of  conscious  life 
and  its  world — the  life  and  world  wherein  these  different  atti- 
tudes (Einstellungen)  pervade  one  another — is  not  the  first 
step  to  be  taken.  It  is  preceded  by  the  investigation  into  the 
constitutive  principles  (the  "inner  forms")  through  which  ob- 
jectivity in  one  sense  or  the  other  can  be  achieved.  The  critical 
distinction  between  the  different  ways  of  objectification  and 
between  the  corresponding  realms  of  culture  is  intended  to 
secure  the  autonomy  of  these  realms,  ascertain  the  both  irreduc- 
ible and  limited  variety  of  the  'styles'  of  human  experience  and 
overcome  the  dangers  of  one-sided  naturalism  (including  psy- 
chologism),  moralism,  and  aestheticism. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     805 

What  distinguishes  this  neo-Kantian  philosophy  from  the 
phenomenological  approach  are  (i)  the  different  roles  assigned 
to  the  element  of  jormy  (2)  the  different  concept  of  subjectivity 
and  (3)  the  greater  variety  of  experiences  accounted  for  by 
phenomenology. 

II 

Variety  of  Experience  vs.  Autonomy  of  Cultural  Realms 

It  is  advisable,  perhaps,  to  begin  with  the  discussion  of  this 
third  factor.  Neo-Kantianism  is  a  "philosophy  of  human  cul- 
ture:" even  the  latest  important  document  of  the  school — 
Cassirer's  Essay  on  Man — has  "philosophy  of  culture"  in  its 
subtitle.  The  philosophical  interest  is  centered  in  the  founda- 
tion, forms,  and  products  of  human  civilization.  The  traditional 
tripartition  of  the  realms  of  culture  tended,  at  first,  to  determine, 
i.e.,  both  to  fix  and  to  limit  the  various  types  of  human  ex- 
perience. The  religious  experience,  e.g.,  does  not  fit  into  this 
schema:  the  very  possibility  of  a  philosophy  of  religion  is  denied 
by  Natorp — at  least  in  his  capacity  as  a  transcendental  criticist  j6 
in  Cohen's  last  works  its  recognition  comes  close  to  destroying 
the  framework  of  critical  idealism;  and  in  Cassirer's  thought 
religion  occupies  a  somewhat  precarious  position  between  myth 
and  morals:  in  his  Essay  on  Man  it  seems  almost  restricted  to 
the  moral,  positive  revaluation  of  the  ancient  taboo  system.7 

To  be  sure,  following  Natorp's  own  suggestion,  Cassirer  en- 
riched the  neo-Kantian  system  by  a  variety  of  symbolic  forms 
and,  with  their  help,  by  the  systematic  interpretation  of  an 
enormous  wealth  of  relevant  phenomena.  We  shall  turn  later 
on  to  this  new  phase  of  a  more  versatile  transcendental  method. 
For  the  moment,  it  may  be  stated,  first,  that  the  very  rise 
and  attraction  of  phenomenology  was  greatly  due  to  its  insist- 

6Cf.  Natorp,  Praktische  Philosophie  (1925),  534!  (in  partial  revision  of 
Allgemeine  Psychologic,  94) . 

TCf.  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Man,  1056*. — In  his  Philosofhie  der  symboliscken 
Formen  (II,  i6>  n.  x)  he  lists,  however,  with  chivalrous  praise  "amongst  the 
epochal  merits  of  Husserlian  phenomenology  that  it  has  sharpened  our  eyes  for 
the  differences  between  the  'structural  forms'  of  the  mind  and,  in  a  departure  from 
the  method  of  psychological  inquiry,  has  shown  us  a  new  way  of  viewing  them," 
viz.,  through  analysis  of  their  essential  meanings. 


8o6  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

ence  on,  and  exhibition  of,  a  manifoldness  of  experiences  and 
types  of  being — an  open-mindedness  which  was  not  narrowed 
down  by  the  preconception  of  three  spheres  of  objective  experi- 
ence. To  survey  and  divide  the  otherwise  boundless 'field  of 
investigations,  Husserl  used  tentatively  the  different  formal 
and  material  ontologies  (of  nature,  soul,  spirit,  etc.,)  as  "guid- 
ing clues"  for  the  analysis  of  the  different  types  of  phenomena. 
But  these  ontologies  functioned  as  mere  "indicators,"  and  their 
establishment  was  in  itself  a  philosophical  task.  To  the  phe- 
nomenologist  there  are  no  pre-established  "transcendental 
facts"  like  the  fact  or  even  fieri  of  science — data  which  have 
only  to  be  resolved  into  their  constitutive  factors. 

Phenomenology  is  not  a  philosophy  of  culture  in  the  sense 
that  it  takes  orders  from  any  canonic  standard.  It  is  free  not  only 
to  criticize  the  actual  state  of  our  culture,  but  to  delimit  even 
the  idea  and  claims  of  culture  as  such.8  It  does  not  accept 
Cohen's  identification  of  the  subject,  i.e.,  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness, with  the  unity  of  the  human  culture — an  identifica- 
tion through  which  the  objective  mind  comes  to  account  for  the 
whole  sphere  of  the  human  spirit. 

Ill 

The  Nature  of  the  Subjective 

In  the  neo-Kantian  interpretation  subjectivity  is  cnothing  but' 
the  system  of  objectifying  functions  read  from  the  cultural 
documents  in  which  they  have  manifested  themselves  and  in 
which  alone  they  are  said  to  have  their  true  life  and  being.9 
Ou  Y«P  &*u  TOU  eovcoSj  $v  fit  rce^aTKJixGVov  eaftv^  eupqareis  TO  voeiv: 

"You  will  not  find  thought  apart  from  the  objective  content 
wherein  it  found  its  expression"  (Parmenides). 

My  purpose  cannot  be  to  discredit  the  great  Parmenidean 
tradition  which  is  still  alive  in  Kant  and  his  followers.  The 

8  Cf.,  e.g.,  Husserl,  Formate  und  Transzendentale  Logik  (Jahrbuch  fur  Philo- 
sophic) X,  161$  Die  Krisis  der  Europdischen  Wissenschaften  und  die  Transzen- 
dentale  Phaenomenologie  (Philosophiay  I)  79$.  But  even  Natorp  eventually  comes 
to  criticize  Cohen's  reliance  on  the  transcendental  facts  of  physics,  jurisprudence, 
etc.:  Cf.  Praktische  PMlosopfa,  2o8ff. 

'  Cf.  e.g.,  Cassirer,  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  ///,  59. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     807 

primacy  of  the  positive — Leibniz's  conviction  that  people  are 
right  in  what  they  see  and  aver,  although  they  may  be  wrong 
in  what  they  deny  only  because  they  do  not  see  it — is  a  leading 
principle  of  phenomenological  interpretation.  The  quasi  in- 
direct, hermeneutic  approach  to  human  being — the  discovery 
of  this  being  in  its  most  characteristic  expressions — is  the  right- 
ful method  of  moral  sciences  (Geisteswissenschafteri).  It  has 
been  analyzed  and  practiced  as  such  in  an  admirable  way  by 
a  thinker  like  Wilhelm  Dilthey.  All  we  know  and  all  we  need 
to  know,  e.g.,  of  Shakespeare,  lives,  indeed,  in  his  works  and  has 
not  passed  with  the  passing  of  his  private  life  nor  been  buried 
in  the  archives  of  London  and  Stratford-on-Avon.  Still,  the 
historical  and  geisteswissenschaftliche  approach  is  not  the  only 
way  of  human  self-concern  and  self-knowledge.  Cassirer's  main 
methodical  principle — that  "only  by  expressing  itself  the  spirit 
reaches  its  true  and  perfect  inwardness  (Innerlichkeity10  has 
its  historical  foundation  in  idealistic  thought,  but  represents  an 
indisputable  truth  only  if  it  is  properly  qualified  and  under- 
stood: it  cannot  be  simply  presupposed;  the  roots  it  has  in  the 
structure  of  our  being  must  be  bared.  That  introspection  would 
yield  only  "a  very  meager  and  fragmentary  picture  of  human 
being"11  is  not  borne  out  by  the  Confessions  of  Augustine,  the 
Thoughts  of  Pascal  or  the  Journals  of  Kierkegaard. 

Yet,  man's  true  and  direct  self-knowledge  is  not  even  con- 
fined to  these  religious  confessions  or  to  the  existential  re-flec- 
tions of  men  who  are  thrown  back  upon  themselves — that  type 
of  'immanent  perception'  in  which  consciousness  and  conscience 
may  become  one.  In  addition  there  may  well  be  a  scientific 
research  for  the  essence  of  subjectivity  and  for  the  different 
types  of  what  Brentano  and  Husserl  called  the  intentionality 
of  consciousness.  By  the  nature  of  its  subject  such  analysis  will 
grow  in  intensity  so  as  to  uncover  the  innermost  springs  of  con- 
scious life — including  those  of  philosophy  itself  as  a  way  of 
life  leading  toward  the  appropriation  of  our  very  own  essence. 
In  this  regard  Heidegger's  existentialism  (biased  and  one-sided 

10Cassirer,  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen,  II,  242$  cf.,  e.g.,  193,  229, 
246,  267. 

u  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Man,  ^. 


8o8  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

as  its  execution  proved  to  be)  is  no  mere  deviation  from  Hus- 
serl's  thought,  but  its  rather  unorthodox  pursuance  into  a  sphere 
of  problems  which  Husserl  considered  a  cwra  posterior  of  the 
phenomenologist. 

Husserl  has  shown  how  the  'noetic'  processes  of  the  mind 
(e.g.,  the  synthetic  actions  of  judging)  are  to  be  studied 
parallel  (i)  to  its  'noematic'  contents  (e.g.,  the  meaning  of 
judgments — the  subject-matter  of  apophantic  logic)  and  (2) 
to  real  or  ideal  facts  judged  of  (and  studied,  first  of  all,  in  the 
system  of  formal  and  material  ontologies).  The  neglect  of  the 
noetic  studies  (which  are  prefigured  in  Kant's  "Subjective  De- 
duction," i.e.,  in  an  approach  that  was  long  somewhat  dis- 
credited in  the  Marburg  school)  deprived  neo-Kantianism  of 
such  fundamental  insights  as  are  worked  out  in  HusserPs 
analysis  of  time-consciousness  ("Vorlesungen  zur  Phaenome- 
nologie  des inneren Zeitbewusstseins"  Jahrbuch  IX,  367-496). 

This  neglect  may  have  been  caused  partly  by  the  fear  of 
falling  prey  to  psychologism,  partly  by  the  adherence  to  the 
Cartesian  dogma  that  the  mode  of  consciousness  (Bewusstheii) 
is  always  the  same,  and  that  consciousness  differs  only  in  its 
contents,  objects,  and  their  respective  orders.12  Following 
Husserl,13  Adolf  Reinach14  had  already  protested  against  level- 
ing all  functions  of  consciousness,  and  asked  how,  without  the 
awareness  of  functional  differences,  the  indistinct  hearing  of  a 
loud  tone  could  be  distinguished  from  the  clear  and  distinct 
hearing  of  a  low  one.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  differences  of 
attention  and  the  distinction  between  intentional  experiences 
in  general — like  just  seeing  and  hearing  things — and  inten- 
tional acts  in  particular — like  the  explicit  looking  at,  listening 
to  something — have  played  an  important  part  in  phenomeno- 
logical  analysis.  Yet  they  are  far  from  being  the  only  themes 
of  noetic  investigations:  the  centrifugal  or  centripetal  ways  of 
experience;  the  looking  upward,  downward,  or  straight  forward 
at  things  or  persons  j  the  variations  in  pace,  temper,  genuineness, 

"Cf.  Cohen,  Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnisy  363^.,  Natorp,  Allgemeine  Psy- 
chologie,  lyff.,  40^. 

11  Log ische  Untersuchungen  (and  edition)   II,  I,   362. 
14  Gesammelte  Sckrtften} 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     809 

etc.,  represent  additional  ways  of  dealing  with  things,  i.e.,  par- 
ticular modifications  of  "intentionality."  They  can  be  over- 
looked only  by  one  who  identifies  without  reservation  the  "being 
conscious  of"  with  the  appearance  of  a  thing,  with  the  T«IVW£«I 
itself — this  "most  wonderful  phenomenon  of  all"  (Hobbes), 
behind  which  allegedly  no  question  can  reach,  which  is  no  prob- 
lem itself,  but  gives  to  all  questions  an  unquestionable  founda- 
tion.15 And,  indeed,  consciousness  cannot  be  deduced  and  ex- 
plained j  but  why  should  it  not  be  explored  in  its  modes  as  well 
as  in  its  contents?18 

Failing  the  recognition  of  this  possibility,  the  life  and  nature 
of  the  subject  appear  only  by  way  of  interweaving  the  diverse 
principles  to  which  all  types  of  objects  owe  their  existence  and 
re-constructing  thus,  at  the  bottom  of  all  specific  experiences, 
the  original,  formative  unity  of  consciousness  as  such  (Kant's 
unity  of  the  transcendental  synthesis  of  apperception).  The 
construction  of  the  object  is  temporally  and  logically  prior  to  its 
reversal,  the  reconstruction  of  the  subject. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  even  according  to  Husserl,  the  method  of 
reflection  which  gives  us  access  to  pure  consciousness  is  but  the 
reverse  of  the  primary,  natural  attitude  (natiirliche  Einstel- 
lung)  and  its  orientation.  Still,  reflection  is  to  him  a  way  of 
immanent  intuition  5  it  is  no  bare  reconstruction  of  the  sub- 
jective, does  not  presuppose  the  whole  work  of  objectification 
and  is  not  restricted  to  the  Penelope-labor  of  undoing  the  care- 
ful syntheses  of  the  mind.  It  starts  from  distinctive  unities  of 
experience  (phenomena  in  this  sense)  and  is  free  to  go  back 
all  the  way  through  the  synthetic  processes  and  actions  which 
lead  upward  to  these  appearances  or  else  to  go  on  to  objective 
unities  of  a  higher  level.  The  given  experience  appears  thus 

15  Cf.  Cohen,  Logtk,  365$  Natorp,  Allgemeine  Psychology  29,  35  j  Cassirer, 
Das  Erkenntnisproblem,  II,  67  f. 

16  To  be  sure,  it  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  in  as  early  a  writing-  as  Substanz- 
btgriff  und  Funktionsbegriff  (32!)  Cassirer  refers  to  Husserl  in  acknowledging  a 
variety  of  the  most  different  acts  of  thought.  Each  of  them  is  a  mode  of  conscious- 
ness which  represents  "a  specific  way  of  interpreting  its  content,  a  peculiar  inten- 
tional relation  to  the  object."  Still,  he  continues  to  study  the  life  of  consciousness 
only  in  the  dialectics  of  its  formations,  in  the  objective  meaning  which  the  sensory 
material  acquires  and  in  the  transformation  of  meaning  which  it  undergoes}  in 
Husserlian  terms  the  analyses  remain  within  the  'noematic*  realm. 


8io  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

as  the  product  of  a  phenomenological  genesis  which  can  be 
verified  by  retracing  the  whole  process — springing  back  from  a 
given  point  to  a  more  primitive  state  and  following  from  there 
the  stream  of  consciousness — just  as  in  the  case  of  living  remi- 
niscence we  are  drawn  back  into  the  past  to  embark  once  more  on 
the  path  toward  the  present.  The  phenomenological  research 
never  loses  the  color  of  life,  the  dynamics  of  consciousness  which 
it  is  in  search  of — the  concrete  experience  from  which  mere 
objectification  and  subjectification,  mere  construction  and  re- 
construction are  alienated.  (So  much  so  that  in  his  Practical 
Philosophy  Natorp  would  like  to  describe  the  process  of  tran- 
scendental synthesis  entirely  without  any  reference  to  the 
Kantian  Ego,  to  subject  and  consciousness.17) 

Even  so,  Natorp  considers  himself  faithful  to  the  spirit  of 
Kant's  basic  intentions.  And  Cassirer  is  at  one  with  him  in 
emphasizing  that  the  process  of  experience  as  such — not  only  of 
theoretical  experience  as  described  in  the  first  Critique — ante- 
dates the  distinction  between  the  objective  and  the  subjective, 
between  being  and  consciousness.  Self  and  object  are  not  pre- 
supposed from  the  first,  nor  is  one  the  foundation  of  the  other 
and  its  knowledge,  "but  in  one  and  the  same  process  of  objecti- 
fication  and  determination  the  whole  of  experience  comes  to  be 
divided  for  us  into  the  'spheres  within  and  without,'  into  'Self 
and  'World'."18 

This  may  be  compared  with  Husserl's  conception  of  pure 
consciousness  as  the  sphere  of  origin  within  which  alone  the  real 
person  and  his  real  world  are  to  find  their  "phenomenological 
constitution."  The  absoluteness  of  the  latter  constitutive  process, 
however,  is  not  so  remote  as  to  make  it  a  mere  dialectical  con- 
struction. Even  where  intentional  experience  (intentionales 
Erlebnis)  is  not  a  matter  of  personal  activity,  it  is  still  borne  and 
animated  by  living  consciousness.  And,  whereas  Natorp  speaks 
of  a  quasi-automatic  and  Utopian  "movement  of  the  categories" 
as  such,  taken  to  enjoy  a  sort  of  mythical  super-being,  Husserl 

"Natorp,  Praktische  Philosophic,  241.  Cf.  also  Cohen,  e.g.,  Logik  der  reinen 
Erkenntnis,  415,  Ethik  des  reinen  Willens,  130. 

38  Cassirer,  Kants  Leben  und  Lchre,  209.  Cf.  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  For- 
men  ///,  59. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     811 


deals  not  only  with  the  categories,  but  with  the  aai^Yopetv  itself, 
the  very  acts  of  determining  things.  Here  the  procedures  of 
objectification  as  such  are  followed  out  and  not  merely  fixed  as 
to  their  results  at  the  different  stages  of  their  evolution. 

The  function  of  objectification  certainly  plays  an  important 
part  in  Husserl's  transcendental  phenomenology  —  the  very 
title  'transcendental"  refers  to  the  self-transcendence  of  the 
subject  towards  the  object.  But  it  does  not  cover  the  whole  of 
conscious  life  and  is  not  the  only  concern  of  the  phenomenolo- 
gist.  This  fact  would  have  come  out  even  more  clearly,  if  the 
second  and  third  parts  of  HusserPs  Ideas  had  ever  been  pub- 
lished. While  speaking  of  the  subjective  side  of  a  phenomenon 
as  well  as  of  the  objective  one,  i.e.,  "that  experiential  content 
which  points  away  from  the  Ego,"  Husserl  gives  in  the  first  part 
of  the  Ideas  preference  to  the  latter  —  to  the  "objectively 
oriented  aspect,  since  it  is  this  aspect  which  is  most  familiar  to 
us  from  our  natural  attitude."19  Yet  even  in  the  description  of 
the  synthesis  in  which  an  identical  object  comes  to  be  realized, 
Husserl  does  not  confine  himself  to  the  spontaneity  of  the 
intellect  and  the  process  of  "categorial  constitution."20  He 
studies  also  the  more  primitive  fusion  of  appearances,  the  work 
of  what  he  calls  primary  passive  syntheses,  i.e.,  syntheses  in 
which  the  Ego  is  still  latent,  just  as  there  is  a  secondary  pas- 
sivity into  which  each  previous  activity  is  likely  to  fall  back:  a 
judgment,  for  example,  after  having  been  actively  built  up, 
lives  on  in  a  sedimentary  state  in  which  it  enters  new  connec- 
tions, new  passive  syntheses.21  In  this  way  the  formative  power 
of  pure  consciousness  can  be  exhibited  and  analyzed,  whether  or 
not  the  subject  qua  agent  is  openly  on  the  stage  and  personally 
engaged  in  performing  any  synthetic  activities. 

19  Husserl,  Ideen  I,  1605  cf.  also  192,  21  9,  232. 

"Natorp,  Praktische  Philosophic,  2i2ff,  222.  Cf.  Cassirer,  "Paul  Natorp," 
Kantstudien,  XXX  (1925)  280. 

**  Cf.  Husserl,  Meditations  Carte  siennes:  §38,  "Genese  active  et  passive"  (658)  $ 
Erjakrung  und  Urteil,  pass.  (e.g.  §  1  6,  74^  )  .  These  problems  are  intimately  con- 
nected with  Dilthey's  attempt  to  lay  a  foundation  for  formal  logic  and  its  categories 
through  a  logic  and  categories  of  life:  cf.,  especially,  Dilthey,  Schriften  VII,  228ffj 
Georg  Misch,  Lebemfhilosofhie  und  Phaenomenologie  (1930),  fast. 


812  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

IV 
The  Form  (in  Construction  and  Intuition) 

The  confrontation  of  HusserPs  "passive  syntheses"  with  the 
ideals  of  "construction  and  re-construction"  in  neo-Kantianism 
can  serve  very  well  to  characterize  the  difference  in  the  tenor  of 
these  two  types  of  philosophy.  Neo-Kantianism,  attributing  to 
construction  a  foremost  place  in  the  growth  of  all  experience, 
pursued  a  constructive  method  in  its  own  procedure.  Cassirer 
always  insisted  on  the  paradigmatic  importance  of  Kant's 
"Copernican  revolution"  in  philosophy: 

In  each  and  every  sphere  of  objects — the  viewpoint  of  "ectypal  reflection" 
(nachbrldendey  copeyliche  Betrachtung)  has  to  be  abandoned  for  that  of 
'architectonic  ordering/  .  .  .  Even  outside  of  the  realm  of  pure  theory  we 
ought  to  see  that  the  object  of  a  certain  synopsis  is  constituted  rather  than 
copied  by  this  form  of  unification,  the  synopsis.22 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  unqualified  emphasis  on  the  arche- 
typal function  of  the  forms  of  our  experience  makes  neo- 
Kantianism  border  on  anti-Kantianism.  It  is  not  balanced  by 
the  recognition  of  the  finiteness  of  our  knowledge  in  contra- 
distinction to  an  intuitus  originarms  which  brings  the  Ding  an 
sich  into  being.  In  this  neo-Kantian  interpretation  the  Ding  an 
sich  is  not  determined  in  itself;  it  is  not  qualitatively  different 
from  the  objects  and  products  of  experience;  it  is  reduced  to  a 
methodological  idea — the  sum  total  of  experience — and  has 
become  relative  to  the  process  of  objective  determination;  as  an 
ideal  limit  it  marks  only  the  point  of  complete  determination 
of  things  in  every  possible  way — a  point  never  reached,  but 
always  striven  for.  Leibniz's  principle  of  a  continuous  scale  of 
representation  has  gained  the  upper  hand  over  the  transcen- 
dental contrast  between  the  two  forms  of  representation  (sen- 
sory and  intellectual)  in  Kant. 

This  is  why  the  procedure  in  the  different  ways  of  cultural 

**  Cassirer,  "Das  Symbolproblem  und  seine  Stellung  im  System  der  Philosophic" 
(Zeitschrift  fuer  Aesthetik  XXI  (1927)9  311).  For  thought  qua  determination  cf. 
Natorp,  Die  logischen  Grundlagen  der  exacten  Wissenschaften  (1910),  38f:  "To 
think  does  not  mean  anything  else  but  to  determine.  . . .  Thought  does  not  recognize 
any  determination  prior  to  that  which  is  of  thought's  own  making."  Cf.  Kant, 
Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  B,  375. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     813 

life,  as  described  by  Cassirer,  resembles  so  much  the  building 
of  the  Tower  of  Babel:  it  seems  to  reach  into  the  void,  governed 
as  it  is  exclusively  by  internal  principles,  without  being  oriented 
toward  anything  or  controlled  by  anything  independent  of 
this  whole  process  and  without  being  animated  by  the  messianic 
spirit  of  Cohen.  The  constructive  schemata  designed  by  thought 
"do  not  borrow  their  hold  and  support  from  the  empirical 
world  of  things,  but  create  this  support  themselves"  by  way  of  a 
context  of  signs  contrived  to  represent  a  system  of  universal 
relations.28 

The  full  meaning  of  this  contention  comes  to  light  by  the 
help  of  its  negative  counterpart:  the  rejection  of  sense-percep- 
tion as  a  mediating  link  in  a  causal  chain  between  subject  and 
object.  The  relation  between  object  and  consciousness  being  that 
of  "intentionality"  (Husserl),  no  causal  relation  can  prevail 
between  them,  since  causality,  according  to  Cassirer,  has  its 
place  exclusively  within  the  realm  of  things.  This  statement 
neglects,  however,  the  variety  of  causal  experience  and  narrows 
causality  down  to  a  phenomenologically  derivative  type,  the 
relation  between  physical  events.  Even  the  Kantian  category 
had  been  much  more  comprehensive.  Cassirer  insists  that  sensa- 
tion can  be  only  the  sign,  the  representative  of  its  'intentional* 
object,  never  the  effect  of  a  transcendent  Ding  an  sich  which 
affects  our  mind.24 

28  Cassirer,  Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnisy  33 if. 

M  Ibid.,  365*1,  above  all  376ff.  In  his  Essay  on  Man,  however,  Cassirer  actually 
did  employ  such  biological  terms  as  'stimulus*  and  'response*  to  characterize  the 
dynamic,  i.e.,  causal  relations  between  man  and  world.  At  the  same  time,  thought 
appeared  as  a  refined  means  to  regulate  this  rapport  as  well  as  conquer  a  new 
dimension  of  reality.  In  this  way  Cassirer  seems  to  have  accommodated  himself  to 
the  American  scene.  But  this  adaptation  to  Dewey's  thought  ought  not  to  be  over- 
rated :  there  has  always  been  a  bridge  between  panmethodologism  and  instrumental- 
ism.  Moreover,  Cassirer  does  not  take  these  biological  and  instrumental  aspects  to 
be  distinctive  of  man.  In  the  formation  of  his  symbolic  worlds  man  still  enjoys 
perfect  autonomy  and  is  left  to  what  we  may  call  his  inner  genius.  As  regards, 
finally,  the  organic  correlation  between  stimulus  and  response,  we  must  consider, 
first,  that  affection  by  way  of  stimulus  is  not  simply  identical  with  sensation,  and 
then  that  things  must  not  needs  be  treated  alike  in  philosophical  anthropology,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  a  logic  of  pure  knowledge  and  other  transcendental  disciplines, 
on  the  other.  Unfortunately,  the  systematic  locus  of  An  Essay  on  Man  is  nowhere 
sufficiently  clarified  from  the  viewpoint  of  transcendental  idealism. 


814  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

Hence  sensation  is  not  backed  by  reality:  its  own  ontological 
status  is  not  defined  with  respect  to  a  reality  which  is  more  than 
the  final  product  of  objectification.  Only  because  in  his  philoso- 
phy sensation  had  such  support  by  the  Ding  an  sich,  could  Kant 
make  the  "being  bound  up  with  sensation"  the  criterion  of 
actual  existence.25  That  an  idea  is  right  when  its  consequences 
agree  with  the  data  of  our  senses — this  explanation  may  be 
satisfactory  within  the  peculiar  framework  of  Leibniz's  meta- 
physics;26 it  may  accurately  describe  the  way  of  scientific  veri- 
fication— hence  it  appears  in  Heinrich  Hertz's  famous  Prin- 
zifien  der  Mechanik  (a  passage  which  Cassirer  quotes  repeat- 
edly27) :  but,  on  new-Kantian  ground,  it  is  hardly  sufficient  to 
bear  out  the  full  meaning  of  real  truth. 

The  neo-Kantian  thinker  cannot  want  to  have  a  theoretical 
assertion  verified  by  mere  reference  to  immediate  sensation — 
for  the  simple  reason  that  to  him  pure,  formless  sensation  may 
be  the  methodical  presupposition  of  all  objective  determination 
as  well  as  (mutatis  mutandis}  the  ultimate  result  of  psychologi- 
cal reconstruction,  but  never  an  immediate  and  self-evident 
datum  of  consciousness.  Referring  to  the  findings  of  modern 
psycho-pathology,  Cassirer  takes  great  and  well  rewarded  pains 
in  showing  the  conceptual  ingredient  in  all  sense  perception. 
Sensation  itself  remains  a  mere  hypothesis;  its  possibility  is 
never  accounted  for.  In  phenomenology,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Kantian  affection  has  found  its  revaluation  in  HusserPs 
analysis  of  the  field  of  passive  pre-acquaintance,  affective 
tendencies,  and  the  receptivity  of  the  Ego — studies  to  which,  in 
the  present  essay,  I  can  only  refer.28 

If  the  objective  validity  of  a  theoretical,  moral,  or  aesthetic 
idea  is  to  mean  more  than  its  consistency  with  other  ideas  and 
its  quasi-stylistic  purity  according  to  the  inner  rules  of  pro- 
cedure, Cassirer  does  not  seem  to  have  set  forth  the  solution 
to  this  problem.  The  concluding  thoughts  of  his  Phaenomeno- 

28  Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunfa  B  2$6fL 

*  Leibniz,  "Quid  sit  Idea"  Philosophised  Schriften  (ed.  Gerhardt)  VII,  iSaf. 

aT  Cf.,  e.g.,  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  I,  5!. 

38  Cf.  Husserl,  Erjahrung  und,  Urteil,  §§  i6f  with  Cohen's  declaration  (Logik 
der  reinen  Erkenntnis,  402 :)  "We  have  nothing*  to  do  with  .  .  .  sensation.  This  is 
our  logical  direction." 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     815 

logic  der  Erkenntnis  (552ff)  can  hardly  be  taken  as  the  proper 
fulfillment  of  a  promise  to  this  effect  given  previously,29  yet 
finally  postponed — perhaps  for  an  additional  volume  which  has 
never  been  published.  Meanwhile,  in  the  Philosophic  der  sym- 
bolischen  Formen  as  well  as  in  Substanzbegrijf  tmd  Funktions- 
begrijf  and  in  some  later  articles,  Cassirer  understands  "ob- 
jectivity" to  abide  in  the  invariability  of  universal  relations. 
This  is  a  problem  to  which  we  shall  return  later  on. 

Whereas  to  Kant  knowledge  is  essentially  intuition,80  the 
strict  imperceptibility  (Unanschaulichkeii)  of  the  object  of 
knowledge  is  proclaimed  (from  Cohen  to  Cassirer)  as  the  true 
corner-stone  of  the  "critical"  theory  of  knowledge.31  In  Cas- 
sirer's  youth  this  problem  had  been  the  very  point  of  dispute 
between  the  neo-Kantianism  of  the  Fries-school  and  that  of 
Marburg.  The  same  question  arises  again  in  relation  to  phe- 
nomenology and  its  revised  and  enlarged  concept  of  intuition 
(the  paramount  importance  of  which  does  not  prevent  us  from 
recognizing  the  impossibility  of  giving  a  perceptual  illustration 
to  the  key  concepts  of  modern  physics.) 

The  idea  of  construction  as  the  general  character  of  mental 
life  on  the  whole  is  so  strong  in  neo-Kantianism  that  it  makes 
knowledge  also  exclusively  a  matter  of  constructive  or  recon- 
structive determination.  Since  the  form-matter  relation  and 
correlation — witness  its  original  meaning  in  Aristotle — is  most 
congenial  to  this  idea  of  'poietic'  activity,  it  dominates  the  neo- 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  to  such  a  degree  as  to  make  its 
repeated  application  somewhat  dull  and  monotonous  in  the  long 
run — even  more  so  in  the  form-matter  hierarchy  characteristic 
of  the  school  of  Rickert  and  Lask  than  in  that  of  Marburg. 
This  accounts  for  the  fact  that  in  the  early  stages  of  phenome- 
nology the  uniformity  and  recklessness  of  this  constructive  pro- 
cedure ("matter  does  not  deserve  any  forbearance")  was  most 
suspicious  to  us  young  phenomenologists  who  felt  committed 
to  do  justice  to  the  variety  of  phenomena:  the  opposition  to 

*  Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis,  2711,  having  reference  to  a  (non-existent) 
Book  III,  ch.  6. 

10  Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vemunft,  B  33. 

11  Cassirer,  Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis >  367. 


816  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

neo-Kantian  criticism  thus  became  focussed  in  the  polemics 
against  "construction" — a  term  which  came  close  to  being  an 
invective. 

The  form-matter  relationship  is  too  useful  a  pattern  not  to 
play  an  important  role  even  in  HusserPs  philosophy — e.g., 
under  the  title  of  syntactic  forms  and  syntactic  materials.82  But 
it  did  so  only  within  the  frame  of  a  much  more  comprehensive 
and  flexible  pattern  of  interpretation — that  of  intention  and 
fulfilment.  A  first  'empty'  intention  of  the  mind  was  to  be 
given  an  original  fulfilment  in  direct  intuition.  I  take  it  that 
this  conception  of  knowledge,  of  which  Cassirer  also  availed 
himself  occasionally,83  was  much  more  both  in  the  letter  and  in 
the  spirit  of  Kant  (who  spoke  of  thought  as  a  mere  means  for 
direct  intuition34)  than  was  this  type  of  neo-Kantianism  itself. 
It  is  partly  true  that  in  Husserl  also  "the  content  of  perception 
depends  on  thought,  'fulfilment'  on  intention,'  presentation  on 
representation  and  that  the  perceptual  aspect  is  fundamentally 
determined"  by  the  conceptual  outlook.35  Yet  a  given  intention 
is  no  ultimate  with  Husserl,  but  an  intellectual  habitude  which, 
in  genetic  phenomenology y  can  be  accounted  for  as  an  outgrowth 
of  (i)  processes  of  "associative  synthesis"  and  (2)  the  still  more 
primitive  syntheses  of  the  "immanent  time-consciousness."36 

In  the  eyes  of  the  phenomenologist,  the  fulfilment  given  to 
our  intentions  by  way  of  intuition  makes  the  process  of  knowl- 
edge as  much  a  process  of  discovery  and  explication  as  of  de- 
termination. To  apprehend  is  not  identical  (as  it  is  in  Cassirer37) 
with  the  establishment  of  relations — even  the  recognition  of 

32  Cf.  Husserl,  e.g.,  formate  und  Transzendentale  Logik,  2598. 

83  E.g.,  in  the  necrology  on  Natorp  (Kanstudien,  XXX,  287). 

84  Kant,  loc.  cit. 

"Natorp,  Allgemeine  Psychologie>  287.  But  cf.  Praktische  Philosofhie,  21  off 
for  the  final  recognition  of  the  primacy  of  content. 

MAt  this  point  I  must  content  myself  with  these  terms  indicating  problems 
with  which  Husserl  dealt,  e.g.,  in  Ideen,  73^  Meditations  Cartesiennes,  656*,  in 
the  "Vorlesungen  zur  Phaenomenologie  des  inneren  Zeitbewusstseins"  (JaArbuch, 
IX,  2521!)  $  Erjahrung  und  Urteil,  746:,  4601!. 

"Cf.  Cassirer,  Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis,  346.  In  Zur  Logik  der 
Kulturwissenschaften  (8of),  Cassirer  comes  closer  to  adopting  the  descriptive  aims 
of  phenomenology,  namely  with  regard  to  the  concepts  of  style,  which  (he  says) 
are  reached  by  way  of  ideation  and  characterize  rather  than  determine  their  objects. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     817 

relations  is  only  a  part  of  it.  To  equate  knowing  with  relating 
is  a  dangerous  oversimplification,  which  cannot  but  have  detri- 
mental consequences  in  epistemology  and  is  implicitly  refuted 
by  the  careful  way  in  which  Husserl  distinguishes,  within  the 
course  of  knowledge,  phases  of  simple  apprehension,  explicative 
study,  perception  of  relations,  determinative  and  relational 
judgment  (bestimmendes  und  beziehendes  Urteileri),  etc.88 
Altogether,  'intentional  experience,'  as  it  appears  in  Husserl, 
is  not  restricted  to  noesis  in  the  sense  of  actively  constituting  a 
certain  meaning  (Sinngebung):  it  is  always  acknowledgment 
of  meaning  (Sinnfindung)  at  the  same  timej  and  it  is  only  in 
one  specific  stratum  of  transcendental  phenomenology  that  the 
former  character  appears  all-dominating.89 

88  Cf.  Husserl,  Erjahrung  und  Urteil,  §§  23fT,  §  54. 

89  It  is  worth  mentioning-  that  the  language  of  Cassirer's  last  work — Essay 
on  Man — is  far  less  rigorous  in  maintaining  the  panmethodology  of  the  Marburg 
school.  The   diction   of  critical   idealism  is  often  abandoned   in   favor  of  terms 
which  have   their  proper  place   in  epistemological  realism.   He  stresses  the   fact 
that   material   objects  exist   independent  of  the   scientist    (185)5    speaks  of  the 
symbolic  systems  as  links  between  man  and  reality  (24^)  5  characterizes  knowledge 
as  interpretation  (138,  146,  170)  and  even  as  discovery  and  abbreviation  (143, 
156)   of  reality,  art  as  an  intensification  of  it   (143)  j  and,  in  a  phrase  which 
reminds  one  of  objective  idealism  (in  Dilthey's  sense)  rather  than  of  neo-Kantian 
criticism,  he  sees  in  art  the  apprehension  of  "the  dynamic  life  of  forms"  by  "a 
corresponding  dynamic  process  in  ourselves"  (151) — a  formula  which  may  reveal 
the  growing  influence   Kant's  Critique   of  Judgment  in   its  more  metaphysical 
prefigurements  had  on  Cassirer's  mind.  (Cf.  Kants  Leben  und  Lehre,  354).  Point- 
ing in  the  same  direction  is  his  emphasis  on  the  Stoic  maxim  of  the  "sympathy 
of  the  whole"  as  "one  of  the  firmest  foundations  of  religion."  (Essay  on  Man, 

95). 

The  trend  away  from   the  earlier  logical  idealism   of  the  Marburg  school 

toward  objective  idealism  is  strongly  accentuated  in  Natorp's  Praktische  Philosofhie. 
But  it  is  also  noticeable  (though  less  pronounced)  in  Cassirer's  discussion  of 
Scheler's  philosophical  anthropology:  first  at  Davos  in  1929,  in  the  following 
year  in  an  article  of  Die  Neue  Rundschau:  "  *Leben'  und  'Geist'  in  der  Philosophic 
der  Gegenwart."*  Here  Cassirer  tries  to  resolve  the  alleged  opposition  of  Life  and 
Spirit  into  two  complementary  forms  of  movement  within  life  as  a  whole — spirit 
representing-  a  later  phase  of  life  itself.  This  idea  of  immanent  transcendence  is 
closely  akin  to  the  role  which  I  myself  have  assigned  to  'absolute  consciousness* 


*  EDITOR'S  NOTE:  The  interested  reader  will  find  this  essay  from  Cassirer's 
pen  reprinted — in  English  translation — as  Part  III  of  the  present  volume,  under 
the  title:  "'Spirit'  and  'Life'  in  Contemporary  Philosophy,"  (855-880  infra). 


8i8  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

The  objectivistic  ingredient  in  the  phenomenological  concept 
of  knowledge  is  expressed  by  the  mistakable  and  often  mistaken 
watchword  of  the  movement:  "back  to  the  things  themselves j"40 
and  it  is  also  evidenced  by  the  term  "eidos"  (essence)  as  the 
object  of  this  discovery,  i.e.,  as  the  correlate  of  4-M)Beia  (truth 
in  the  predominantly  objectivistic  view  of  the  Greek  mind). 
It  is  symptomatic  that  the  tribute  which  the  thinkers  of  Mar- 
burg paid  to  Plato's  idealism  was  more  in  the  enthusiastic  recog- 
nition of  the  idea  than  in  that  of  the  eidos.  Natorp's  Platons 
Ideenlehre  begins  with  the  distinction  of  these  terms:  the  latter 
is  said  to  stand  for  the  sight  a  thing  offers,  whereas  the  former 
is  said  to  mean  the  aspect,  the  point  of  view  from  which  this 
thing  comes  to  be  seen,41  The  emphasis  on  the  eidos  in  Husserl's 
phenomenology  thus  betrays  a  genuine  interest  in  the  nature 
of  things — as  much  as  the  praise  of  the  idea  shows  Cohen's, 
Natorp's,  and  Cassirer's  primary  concern  with  the  nature  of 
thought^  i.e.,  "with  the  immanent  laws  according  to  which 
thought  does  not  accept  its  object  as  simply  given,  but  con- 
structs it  in  conformity  with  thought's  own  way  of  looking  at 
things."42 

In  the  sharpest  contrast  to  this  declaration  is  what  Husserl 
announces  as  "the  principle  of  all  principles,"  i.e.,  that  "what- 
ever presents  itself  in  'intuition'  directly  and  as  it  were  in  bodily 
reality  has  to  be  accepted  just  as  it  shows  itself,  though  only 
within  the  limits  of  such  self-presentation."43  Whereas  the 
panmethodology  of  neo-Kantian  philosophy  cannot  but  abolish 

within  the  sphere  of  the  'Absolute' — an  attempt  at  broadening  HusserPs  concept 
of  the  absolute  sphere  as  being  identical  with  the  sphere  of  immanent  consciousness. 
(Cf.  "Art  and  Phenomenology"  in  Philosophical  Essays  in  Memory  of  Edmund 
Husserl).  But  the  self-transcendence  of  life,  which  is  here  in  question,  underlies 
and  is  by  no  means  one  with,  the  inner  dialectics  of  the  categories  or  that  of  the 
pure  forms  of  culture,  which  is  in  the  foreground  of  Natorp's  and  Cassirer's 
interest  (cf.,  e.g.,  Praktische  Pkilosofhie,  209$  Essay  on  Many  pass.).  Logical 
idealism  and  phenomenology  may  converge,  but  they  never  coincide. 

40  In  its  true  and  original  meaning  this  word  occurs  in  the  Introduction  to 
the  second  volume  of  Logische  Untersuchungen  (second  edition),  6. 

uNatorp,  Platons  Ideenlehre  (second  edition,  1921)  p.  i. 

0  Loc.  cit.y  cf.  Cassirer,  e.g.,  Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis,  3475. 

43  Husserl,  Ideen  zu  einer  reinen  Phaenomenologie,  §  24  (Jahrbuch,  I)  43^ 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY 

the  definition  of  truth  as  adaequatio  (ret  et  intellectus),  this 
definition  was  to  be  restored  in  a  new  sense  through  the 
Logische  Untersuchungen:  by  conveying  an  ultimate  intuitive 
fulfilment  of  a  certain  intention  a  thing  may  present  itself  as  it 
is — at  least  as  regards  its  general  nature.  At  this  point  the 
essentia  jormalis  and  the  essentia  objective*  of  the  thing  will 
coincide.  Complete  evidence,  i.e.,  the  experience  of  adequate 
fulfilment,  and  true  being  thus  become  correlative  terms. 
Actually  such  consummate  evidence  cannot  be  obtained  for  each 
and  every  type  of  being.  The  adequate  knowledge  of  outer 
reality,  above  all,  exists  only  (but  actually)  as  an  ideal  in  the 
Kantian  sense.  This  fact,  however,  does  not  detract  from  the 
meaning  of  truth:  truth  is  experienced  wherever  that  which  is 
meant  is  fully  'covered'  by  that  which  is  given — given  in  the 
mode  of  perfect  self-presentation.44 

To  be  sure,  the  adequacy  of  knowledge  which  phenome- 
nology is  seeking  is  not  that  of  faithfully  copying  mere  facts — 
phenomenology  deals  with  the  essence  of  things — but  neither 
is  it  mere  faithfulness  to  the  purity  of  its  methodical  principles. 
It  consists  in  the  adequate  fulfilment  of  original  intentions.  As 
mentioned  above,  there  is  a  mutual  dependence  between  inten- 
tion and  fulfilment  (cf.  supra,  p.  816).  On  the  one  hand,  the  in- 
tentions are  charged  with  expectations  marking  out  the  ways  and 
types  of  intuitive  experience  in  which  a  proper  fulfilment  may 
be  sought  and  found.  Intuition  thus  responds  and  corresponds 
to  intention  and  varies  with  it.  This  relation  accounts  for  that 
broadening  of  the  concept  of  intuition  in  phenomenology  of 
which  we  spoke  before — j<?w<?-perception  exhibiting  only  one 
peculiar  (though  peculiarly  important)  mode  of  intuitive  ful- 
filment. On  the  other  hand,  an  intention  is  to  be  verified  (or 
disproved)  by  subsequent  perception.  In  its  objective  orienta- 
tion it  represents  an  aspect  which,  as  experience  goes  on,  is 
continuously  adjusted  to  the  things  that  are  to  be  disclosed 
from  this  point  of  view.  It  needs  must  be  congenial  to  the  inner 
essence  (sachhaltiges  Wesen)  of  the  phenomenon  in  question. 

"Husserl,  Logische  Untersuchungen  (second  edition,  19*1)  II,  2,  nsffj  Ideen 
zu  einer  reinen  Phaenomenologie  (Jahrbuch,  I)  125^.,  2 8 iff. 


8ao  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

Thus  it  is  under  the  dictate  of  the  experiental  content  just  as 
much  as  this  content  appears  in  the  forms  in  which  it  is  appre- 
hended 'as'  such  and  such  a  thing,  as  a  chair  or  a  table,  as  H^O 
or  a  drink,  i.e.,  according  to  the  meaning  that  is  carried  by  a 
certain  intention. 

Consisting  in  this  adequacy  of  intention  to  its  stuff,  truth  has 
a  dimension  of  depth:  it  does  more  or  less  justice  to  the  inner 
nature  of  the  material  in  question.  Philosophical  truth,  at  least, 
is  not  exhausted  by  the  alternative  'right  or  wrong.'  The  higher 
or  lower  degree  of  adequacy  of  interpretation  becomes  particu- 
larly relevant  in  phenomenological  philosophy,  devoted  as  it  is 
to  the  disclosure  of  the  essential  structures  within  the  world  of 
conscious  life.  For  it  is  the  nature  and  experience  of  life  which 
give  rise  to  the  use  of  the  term  'depth'  in  connection  with  the 
truth  of  being.  Phenomenology  as  the  analysis  of  the  original 
constitution  of  consciousness  tries  to  penetrate  into  the  very 
depths  from  which  the  various  formations  of  consciousness 
originate. 

The  search  for  these  original  springs,  modes  and  structures 
of  life  presupposes  and  sharpens  a  sense  of  the  original,  a  ca- 
pacity of  retracing  familiar  appearances  to  their  sources,  of 
renewing  and  intensifying  insights  of  the  past  and  piercing 
through  conventional  interpretations  so  as  to  understand  where 
and  why  they  veil  rather  than  unveil  the  essential  truths  of 
life.  In  this  way  a  phenomenological  description  will  pass 
through  different  strata  and  become  more  and  more  profound 
as  it  reaches  more  and  more  original  depths.  This  procedure 
has  been  inaugurated  in  HusserPs  Ideen  starting  as  he  does 
from  the  naive,  worldly  attitude  of  life  to  discover  then  its  true 
origin  in  the  stream  of  pure,  transcendental  consciousness. 
Yet  this  "  'Absolute'  again  is  not  truly  ultimate  but  constitutes 
itself  in  a  certain  hidden  and  most  peculiar  sense,  having  its 
original  source  in  an  ultimate  true  Absolute."45  This  latter 
dimension  is  only  hinted  at  in  the  Ideen:  it  is  that  of  inner  time- 
consciousness  which  has  been  analyzed  by  Husserl  in  courses, 
parts  of  which  were  published  by  Heidegger  in  the  Jahrbuchy 
IX  (1928). 

45  Husserl,  Ideen  zu  einer  reinen  Phaenomenologie,  163. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     821 

Heidegger's  own  Sein  und  Zeit  betrays  both  in  its  title  and  its 
composition  his  dependence  on  Husserl's  approach  and  results: 
he  too  tries  to  identify  'absolute  being'  with  the  being  or  rather 
welling  up  (Zeitigeri)  of  time}  he  too  advances  from  the  worka- 
day world,  the  world  of  tools,  and  from  Everyman's  attitude  to 
the  original  mode  of  true  temporality.  In  the  academic  courses 
of  both,  Husserl  and  Heidegger,  the  term  "Abbau"  (destruc- 
tion) marked  this  regress  from  the  established  positions  of  con- 
scious life  to  its  sources,  although  it  had  a  much  less  aggressive 
note  with  Husserl. 

The  inner  historicity  of  consciousness  can  be  sounded  by  what 
Husserl  called  'genetic  phenomenology' — a  splitting  up,  as  it 
were,  of  given  experiences  and  formations  into  the  different 
layers  and  sediments  of  meaning  which  they  imply  and  the 
processes  through  which  this  meaning  came  to  be  constituted  and 
settled.  Each  phenomenon  has  a  coming  into  being  (a  Y«ve<n<; 
et<;  otaiov)  the  style  of  which  is  prescribed  by  its  very  nature. 
Thus  the  discovery  and  descriptive  analysis  of  these  implications 
is,  on  the  whole,  independent  of  empirical  studies  of  the  primi- 
tive mind  or  of  psycho-pathology  such  as  .are  accumulated  in 
Cassirer's  Das  mythische  Denken  and  Phaenomenologie  der 
Erkenntnis.  In  saying  this,  I  do  not  deny  that  findings  of  this 
kind  can  be  used  to  good  advantage  by  the  phenomenologist.  In 
fact,  they  have  been  employed  this  way,  e.g.,  by  Max  Scheler. 
They  help  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  variations  which  are  indis- 
pensable for  the  control  of  phenomenological  intuition  (cf. 
infra,  pp.  827-830) ;  and  mental  deficiencies — as  in  aphasia — or 
deviations  from  the  norm  may  be  referred  to  in  order  to  place 
the  very  norm  into  bolder  relief.  On  the  other  hand,  a  pre- 
knowledge  of  the  norm  is  obviously  the  condition  without  which 
the  abnormal  cannot  be  characterized  as  such. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  phenomenological  re-search  after 
the  sphere  of  origin,  although  bearing  some  analogy  with 
Natorp's  'psychological  reconstruction'  of  the  original  unity  of 
consciousness,  cannot  be  identified  with  it  either.  The  leaping 
back  from  objective  units  to  the  underlying  manifoldness  of  the 
contents  of  consciousness  remains  a  mere  inference  with  Natorp: 
how  can  this  manifoldness  be  regained  from  the  synthetic  unity 


822  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

of  the  objects  by  which  it  seems  absorbed  (whereas  an  infinity 
of  perspectives  is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  phenomena  which 
are  the  primary  concern  in  HusserPs  analyses)?  Above  all, 
however,  the  true  meaning  of  'original  life'  does  not  lie  in  the 
dimension  and  hierarchy  of  contents  and  objects  at  all:  it 
denotes  a  distinctive  mode  of  experience  which  Natorp  cannot 
account  for  because  he  denies  all  distinctions  of  modes  in  con- 
sciousness (Bewusstheit),  trying  to  reduce  them  to  mere  differ- 
ences in  the  order  of  contents  (cf.  supra,  p.  808).  In  the  same 
vein  Cassirer  also  neglected  somewhat  the  problems  of  the  How 
of  Experience  (Vollzugssinn)  in  favor  of  its  What  (Gehalts- 
sinn — to  use  two  terms  of  Husserl  and,  especially,  of  Heideg- 
ger): he  showed  the  'subject'  only  in  the  ways  in  which  it  rises 
above  impressions,  not  in  those  in  which  it  is  subjected  to  them. 
Finally  (and  this,  perhaps,  marks  the  disparity  in  the  outlook 
of  the  two  schools  most  clearly)  the  phenomenological  research 
into  origins  is  not  the  laying  of  a  foundation  in  the  sense  of  a 
rational  principle  as  in  Herman  Cohen,  where  the  "principle" 
and  the  "judgment  of  origin"  give  rise  to  the  physical  object 
(in  Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnis)  and  to  the  human  individual 
(in  Ethik  des  reinen  Willens).  This  difference  must  be  stated, 
not  to  disparage  the  sagacity  in  which  the  Logik  shows  how  the 
something  originates  in  the  relative  nothing  (the  W  °v)  of  the 
"infinitesimal  number"  (the  "differential"),  nor  to  discredit  the 
moral  wisdom  which  seeks  the  origin  of  the  Self  in  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  Alter  Ego,  but  to  prove  the  different  atmospheres 
in  which  phenomenological  and  neo-Kantian  thought,  including 
that  of  Cassirer,  came  to  grow.  The  feeling  of  this  dissimilarity 
could  be  even  intensified  by  comparing  the  way  (just  men- 
tioned) in  which  Cohen  reaches  Being  "through  the  detour 
of  the  Nothing"*6  with  that  of  Heidegger,  who  finds  the 
original  revelation  of  Being  in  the  "clear  night  of  Nothing- 
ness"47 (the  nothingness  of  dread) — an  extreme,  but  also,  for 
this  very  reason,  exaggerated  contrast.  (It  would  appear  much 
milder,  even  as  far  as  Cohen  and  Heidegger  are  concerned, 
if  we  took  account  of  the  concepts  of  origin,  Being,  and  Non- 

*  Cohen,  Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnis ,  69. 

*  Heidegger,  Was  i$t  Meta-physikf^  19. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     823 

Being  in  the  religious  function  they  obtain  in  Cohen's  posthu- 
mous work  Religion  der  Vernunft.**) 

In  short,  the  paramount  difference  between  the  two  move- 
ments which  we  are  trying  to  present  consists  in  their  different 
philosophical  ethos:  in  the  self-reliance  of  reason  as  a  sys- 
tematizing power,  the  passionate  interest  in  the  purity  of 
method  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  faithful  devotion  to  Being  in 
all  of  its  manifestations  on  the  other.  It  must  be  admitted, 
however,  that  this  latter  amor  intellectualis  has  sometimes  been 
lacking  in  humility  and  trustworthiness  even  in  the  case  of  some 
of  the  most  gifted  phenomenologists — men  who  proclaimed  this 
love  most  fervently  (as,  e.g.,  Max  Scheler) — whereas  the 
school  of  Marburg  was  always  distinguished  by  a  spirit  of 
admirable  scholarly  discipline. 


The  Rapprochement  between  neo-Kantianism  and 
Phenomenology 

The  discussion  between  Marburg  neo-Kantianism  and  phe- 
nomenology has  always  been  carried  on  in  an  exemplarily  fair 
way.  The  gap  between  them  did  not  and  could  not  be  bridged, 
but  it  was  narrowed  in  the  second  and  third  decades  of  the 
present  century.  Whereas  in  Logische  Untersuchungen  the 
ultimate  philosophical  decisions  were  still  in  a  state  of  suspen- 
sion, HusserPs  Ideen  made  the  transition  to  transcendental 
idealism  and  accepted  Natorp's  concept  of  the  Pure  Ego — al- 
though in  a  sense  vastly  different  from  that  of  the  neo-Kantians: 
HusserPs  Pure  Ego  is  individual  in  character  and  not  identical 
with  the  pure  unity  of  objective  thought  represented  by  "pure 
apperception,  i.e.,  the  pure  'Ego',"  "the  ideal  subject  as  such 
(Subjekt  iiberhauft)  ,"49  The  famous  debate  between  Cassirer 
and  Heidegger  at  Davos  (Switzerland)  in  April  1929  was  pre- 
ceded by  a  series  of  lectures  which  showed  a  curious  crossing  in 

48  Cohen,  Religion  der  Vernunft,  48,  51,  76ff. 

^Natorp,  Allgemeine  Psychologie,  244^  The  contrast  to  phenomenology  is 
much  milder  in  Cohen's  ethics  and,  especially  in  his  philosophy  of  religion  j  also 
in  Cassirer's  account  of  the  aesthetic  experience  j  cf.,  e.g.,  Essay  on  Man,  228. 


824  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

themes — Cassirer  speaking  on  Philosophical  Anthropology, 
Heidegger  on  Kant. 

But,  again,  Cassirer's  conception  of  man  was  far  from  being 
Heidegger's  (it  was  actually  in  striking  contrast  to  it);  and 
Heidegger's  interpretation  of  Kant  stressed  the  importance  of 
the  first  Critique  for  the  foundation  of  metaphysics  and  not, 
as  the  neo-Kantians  did,  for  the  theory  of  scientific  knowledge. 

It  may  be  profitable  to  study  the  rapprochement  in  question 
with  specific  regard  to  the  problems  discussed  in  the  preceding 
sections  of  this  essay.  In  his  old  age,  when  death  intervened  with 
his  purpose,  Natorp  was  about  to  supplement  the  formalism  of 
his  earlier  thought  with  an  increased  emphasis  on  the  content 
of  experience50  taken  as  an  "actuated  individual  factor."51  Strug- 
gling beyond  the  limits  of  his  original  neo-Kantian  position, 
he  began  to  realize  that  the  actuality  and  the  meaning  of  a  thing 
(its  Dasssinn  and  Wassinri)  were  to  be  acknowledged  rather 
than  posited.  Knowledge  qua  determination  no  longer  meant 
to  him  imposing  a  unifying  form  on  a  variety  of  materials:  it 
was  now  supposed  to  ascertain  and  fix  the  intrinsic  meaning  of 
given  phenomena.52  He  came  to  disclaim  the  creativity  of 
knowledge  by  what  amounts  almost  to  a  play  on  words — by 
re-interpreting  the  ambiguous  German  word  "Schoepfen:"  in- 
stead of  meaning  "to  create"  it  was  now  taken  to  mean  "to  draw 
from  the  source  of  being."53  (It  is  to  be  regretted  that  all  this 
did  not  lead  to  any  serious  revision  of  Cassirer's  own  theory  of 
being  and  knowledge). 

On  the  other  hand,  Husserl's  own  writings  and  particularly 
those  of  the  following  generation  bore  witness  to  the  legitimate 
role  construction  can  play  as  an  element  of  phenomenological 
interpretation.  With  so  widely  varying  representatives  of  phe- 
nomenological thought  as  Heidegger  or  Felix  Kaufmann,  'con- 
struction' (Heidegger's  'Entwurf'}  has  ceased  to  be  a  sort  of 
phenomenological  bogy.  "There  is  no  meaning" — says  Felix 

"°  Natorp,  Praktische  PMlosofhie,  21  if 5  cf.  Cassirer,  "Paul  Natorp,"  Kant- 
studien,  XXX,  291. 

"Natorp,  Praktische  Philosofhie, 
52  Cf.  op.  cit.,  240,  261. 
**  Op.  cit.,  212. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     825 

Kaufmann — "either  in  scientific  thinking  or  in  pre-scientific 
thinking,  that  does  not  imply  a  mental  construction  (syn- 
thesis)."54 

Cassirer's  own  attitude  toward  phenomenology  cannot  be 
read  simply  from  the  growing  use  he  made  of  the  term  'phe- 
nomenology' itself:  this  use  is  greatly  influenced  by  HegePs 
description  of  the  spirit's  way  from  naive  consciousness  toward 
knowledge  proper.55  Such  a  dialectical  movement,  from  mythi- 
cal to  scientific  thought,  is  the  theme  of  Cassirer's  Phenome- 
nology of  Knowledge,  the  third  volume  of  the  Philoso'phie  der 
symbolischen  Formen.  In  the  same  sense  he  describes  his  Essay 
on  Man  not  only  (in  the  subtitle)  as  an  "Introduction  to  a 
Philosophy  of  Human  Culture,"  but  equally  as  a  "phenome- 
nology of  human  culture."56 

This  dialectic  proceeds  in  articulated  steps  and  passes  through 
well  distinguished  stations.  In  other  words,  each  of  these  steps 
represents  a  specific  form  of  consciousness  and  cultural  expres- 
sion. Thus  genetic  interest  and  genetic  description  are  supple- 
mented by  the  morphological  ones  in  a  phenomenology  of  the 
"main  forms  of  the  objective  mind."57  This  procedure  is  some- 
what analogous  to  the  way  in  which  the  problems  of  static  and 
genetic  constitution  combine  in  HusserPs  later  works.58  And 
'phenomenology'  stands  here  not  only  for  HegePs  conception 
of  this  term,  but  also  for  HusserPs  eidetic  description  of  the 
phenomena. 

Hence  there  are  not  only  occasional  points  of  contact  between 
phenomenology  and  Cassirer's  theory  of  symbolic  representa- 
tion— such  as  when  he  refers  to  the  analysis  of  "expression  and 
signification"  in  the  second  volume  of  HusserPs  Logische 
Untersuchungen™  or  even  relates  his  own  concept  of  representa- 

54  Felix  Kaufmann,  Methodology  of  the  Social  Sciences  (1944),  34- 

85  Cf .  Cassirer,  "  'Geist*  und  'Leben*  in  der  Philosophic  der  Gegenwart,"  Neue 
Rundschau  (1930),  260  (cf.  translation  of  this  article  in  the  present  volume, 
p.  875)  $  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  I,  155  II,  xf$  III,  vi, 

"Essay  on  Man,  52. 

57  Philoso'phie  der  symbolischen  Formeny  III,  58. 

88  Cf.,  e.g.,  Husserl,  Meditations  Cartesiennes,  115. 

M  Cf.  Phihsofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen  III,  375, 


826  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

tion  to  HusserPs  idea  of  intentionality.60  It  is  also  methodically 
important,  but  not  yet  decisive  that  his  theory  of  perception 
and  expression  has  much  in  common  with  Max  Scheler's  phe- 
nomenology of  inner  and  outer  perception,61  etc.  But  over  and 
above  all  this,  the  common  morphological  interest  creates  a 
general  affinity  between  the  two  ways  of  philosophizing. 
Through  his  whole  description  of  the  forms  of  human  culture, 
his  analysis  of  the  structures  of  linguistic,  mythical,  and  religious 
thought,  Cassirer  draws  close  to  phenomenology  and  its  descrip- 
tive analysis  of  the  essential  forms.  In  this  spirit  Cassirer  empha- 
sizes, e.g.,  the  fundamental  difference  between  "the  genetic 
question"  and  "the  analytical  and  phenomenological"  one  as 
regards  the  nature  of  language.62 

This  affinity  is  given  another  expression  in  Cassirer's  philo- 
sophical group-theory — dealing  with  the  universal  relations 
which  remain  invariant  throughout  the  transformation  of  struc- 
tures in  both  the  perceptual  and  conceptual  realms.  The  unity 
of  the  manifold,  which  in  this  way  comes  to  the  fore,  gives  to  the 
particulars  a  community  of  being  (Wesen)  which  must  not  lie 
in  external  resemblances,  but  consists  in  an  analogy  of  function 
within  a  context  of  relations.63 

This  theory  is,  in  a  certain  way,  an  application  of  Poncelet's 
"principle  of  the  permanence  of  mathematical  relations." 
Within  its  original  realm  it  enjoys,  therefore,  the  privilege  of 
mathematical  exactness.  In  recent  publications,  however,  Cas- 
sirer was  anxious  to  show  that  essentially  the  same  procedure 
can  take  place  even  where  this  privilege  has  to  be  renounced, 
i.e.,  in  non-mathematical  realms  such  as  perception64  and  lan- 
guage.65 

60  Cf.  e.g.,  Cassirer's  article  on  Paul  Natorp,  Kantstudien,  XXX,  2875 
Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  III,  2276. 

81  Cf .  Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis,  \  ooff . 

82  Essay  on  Man,  30. 

"  Cf.  Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbe griff,  igffj  Pkilosophie  der  symbolischen 
Formeny  III,  3418,  particularly  352$  4635. 

64  Cassirer,  "Group  Concept  and  Perception  Theory,"  Philosophy  and  Phenom- 
enological  Research,  V  (1944),  1-35. 

"Cassirer,  "The  Influence  of  Language  upon  the  Development  of  Scientific 
Thought,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XXXIX  (1942),  309-327. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     827 

Thus  he  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  ideal  'schema' 
(in  the  Kantian  sense)  for  the  establishment  of  perception  and 
the  constitution  of  our  world.  With  reference  to  Ehrenfels' 
concept  of  Gestaltqualitaten  (the  'Einheitsmomente?  of  Hus- 
serPs  Philosophic  der  Arithmetik}  he  points  out  that  the 
identity  of  a  perceptual  form — e.g.,  a  melody — throughout  the 
change  of  all  its  elements  is  but  what,  "in  a  much  higher  degree 
of  perfection/'  prevails  in  the  domain  of  geometrical  concepts. 
"What  we  find  in  both  cases  are  invariances  with  respect  to  vari- 
ations undergone  by  the  primitive  elements  out  of  which  a  form 
is  constructed."66  The  reason  for  such  a  perceptual  invariance  is 
the  'goodness'  of  a  certain  exemplary  'form.'  "The  'true'  color, 
the  'true'  shape,  the  'true'  size  of  an  object  are  by  no  means  that 
which  is  given  in  any  particular  impression,  nor  need  they  be  the 
csum'  of  these  impressions."  "The  constitutive  factor  .  .  .  mani- 
fests itself  in  the  possibility  of  forming  invariants."67  The  'true' 
impression  is  that  which  is  transformed  into  a  fixed  value  able  to 
build  up  a  knowledge  of  constant  reality. 

These  ideas  are  not  only  in  agreement  with  Husserl's  analysis 
of  perception  and,  e.g.,  with  his  emphasis  on  the  role  of  per- 
ceptual optima,  they  go  far  in  the  direction  of  Husserl's  We- 
sensschau  (intuition  of  essences).  Cassirer's  statement  that  "the 
intentional  reference  to  an  object  is  not,  to  the  extent  to  which  it 
is  realizable  at  all  in  perception,  fulfilled  all  at  once,  but  gradu- 
ally only"68  is  couched  in  the  terms  of  both  Husserl's  phenome- 
nology of  perception  and  of  his  phenomenology  of  intuition. 
Nothing  is  ready  made  and  given  uno  intuitu^  the  intuition  of 
essences  is  as  much  in  need  of  verification  and  elucidation  as  any 
individual  perception.  Far  from  being  an  uncontrolled  mystical 
or  a  dogmatic  rationalistic  concept,  Husserl's  idea  of  intuition 
and  eidos  is  bound  up  with  a  process  of  methodical  discovery 
(ideation).  And  the  pith  and  marrow  of  this  ideation  is  nothing 
else  but  variation  in  a  sense  not  altogether  different  from  that  in 
Cassirer's  writings. 

*  "Group  Concept  and  Perception  Theory,"  25. — For  the  whole  problem  of 
this  paragraph  cf.  Husserl,  Ideen,  §§  71-75. 

"Cassirer,  "Group  Concept  and  Perception  Theory,"  34. 
68  Cassirer,  ibid.,  30.  Cf.  Husserl,  Ideen,  §  67. 


828  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

In  what  amounts  to  a  mental  experiment,  Husserl  shows  how 
to  vary  a  certain  given  phenomenon  by  way  of  free  imagination 
while  preserving  the  unity  of  the  original  intention.  Without 
being  restricted  by  the  limits  of  real  experience  (or  even  of 
experience  possible  within  the  frame  of  our  real  world),  he 
moves  through  all  possible  dimensions  of  change  implied  within 
the  horizon  of  the  same  phenomenon.  Thus  he  manages  to  grasp 
the  identical  content — the  general  essence — at  the  bottom  of  an 
infinitude  of  possible  varieties.  This  'ideational  abstraction'  can 
do  with  one  (preferably  one  pregnant)  example  and  thus  differs 
radically  from  inductive  abstraction,  which  is  dependent  on  the 
accumulated  evidence  of  many  instances.69 

HusserPs  method  of  ideation  was  to  be  applied  to  all  types 
of  experiences  and  attitudes — perceptual,  social,  historical, 
moral,  aesthetic,  religious,  etc.  A  large  stock  of  a  priori  knowl- 
edge of  this  morphological  type  has  thus  been  gathered  by  Hus- 
serl himself,  by  his  friends  and  disciples,  but  also  by  scholars  like 
Litt,  Riezler,  and  many  others  who  never  belonged  to  the 
inner  circle  of  the  phenomenological  movement.  I  restrict  my- 
self to  the  quotation  of  one  recent  statement: 

We  cannot  hope  to  deal  scientifically  with  any  problem  of  social  or 
cultural  change  if  we  tie  our  concepts  to  particular  and  changing  con- 
ditions. As  our  variables  must  at  least  aim  at  universality,  they  cannot 
be  defined  in  terms  of  mutable  institutions.  If  we  do  not  eventually 
succeed  in  finding  universal  variables  that  constitute  a  pattern  of  all 
patterns,  containing  in  itself  the  principles  of  its  variations,  social  change 
will  continue  to  engulf  the  meaning  of  the  concepts  in  which  we  pretend 
to  formulate  its  laws.70 

Thus  the  concept  and  method  of  variation  figure  as  a  link 
between  Cassirer  and  phenomenological  thought.  The  value  of 
this  rapport  at  first  seems  to  be  limited,  however,  by  his  specific 
way  of  approach.  Motivated  as  he  is  by  mathematical  prece- 

**A  much  more  thoroughgoing-  description  of  this  method  is  given  in  HusserPs 
Erfahrung  und  Urteil,  III.  Abschnitt,  II.  Kapitel  (402-442).  Cf.  also  my  article 
"In  Memoriam  Edmund  Husserl,"  Social  Research,  February  1940,  especially 
74-76. 

70 Kurt  Riezler,  "What  is  Public  Opinion?"  Social  Research,  November  1944, 

397*. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     829 

dents,  he  insists  that  the  "form  of  logical  systematfaation  which 
is  both  possible  and  necessary  in  the  domain  of  geometrical 
thought  is  once  and  for  all  inaccessible  to  perception."71  This  is 
contrary  to  the  convictions  and  practice  of  phenomenologists  like 
Husserl,  Scheler,  Schapp,  Leyendecker,  the  two  Conrads  and 
others.  They  concentrated  on  studying  the  a  priori  structure  of 
the  perceptual  sphere — as,  for  instance,  the  essential  relations 
between  impression,  retention  and  protention  in  every  percep- 
tion (Husserl).  They  could  expand  the  span  of  the  a  priori 
without  falling  prey  to  intellectual  hybris  because  in  phenome- 
nology the  a  priori  forms  are  not  imposed  on  the  phenomena, 
but  (by  way  of  ideational  abstraction)  abstracted  from  them. 
Cassirer,  on  the  other  hand,  leaves  the  constancies  in  the  per- 
ceptual realm  to  the  empirical  observation  of  the  psychologist: 
"here  no  a  priori  judgment  is  possible."72 

This  attitude  may  account  for  the  abundant  use  he  makes 
of  psychological,  psycho-pathological  and  anthropological  ma- 
terial both  in  the  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  and  in 
his  Essay  on  Man.  Even  so,  his  philosophical  practice  is  some- 
what different  from  his  methodological  theory.  Just  as  his 
Geschichte  des  Erkenntnisproblems  is  not  only  an  inestimable 
source  of  authentic  historical  knowledge,  but  interprets  modern 
science  and  philosophy  on  the  basis  of  a  principle  which  is  truly 
congenial  with  them  (the  concept  of  function  over  against  that 
of  substance),  so — besides  being  a  mine  of  information — his 
Philosophy  of  Symbolical  Forms  bears  out  general  philosophical 
convictions  and  is  interspersed  with  analyses  which  are  of  an  a 
priori  character  and  phenomenological  in  a  broad  sense,  even 
though  they  remain  fragmentary  and  are  not  ruled  by  so  strict 
and  clear  a  method  as  that  of  HusserPs  eidetic  and  phenomeno- 
logical reductions.  There  are,  e.g.,  in  the  Essay  on  Man,  the 
sections  on  experienced  space  and  time}  in  the  Phaenomenologie 
der  Erkenntnisy  the  investigation  into  the  inner  unity  of  percep- 
tion and  conception;  in  an  (unpublished)  essay  on  Thomas 
Mann's  Lotte  in  Weimar — one  of  the  masterpieces  of  Cassirer 

"Cassirer,  "Group  Concept  and  Perception  Theory,"  26. 
"  Ibid. 


830  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

as  a  literary  critic — an  appreciation  of  the  formative  power  of 
(symbolic)  memory.78  In  "The  Influence  of  Language  upon  the 
Development  of  Scientific  Thought"  (Journal  of  Philosophy, 
XXXIX,  309-327)  and  elsewhere,  he  investigates  the  nature  of 
speech — those  characters  which  are  independent  of  a  specific 
situation  or  the  medium  of  a  particular  language;  and  with 
reference  to  Buehler's  "Organmodell"  (cf.  Karl  Buehler, 
Sprachtheorie,  1934),  he  points  out  how,  in  all  speech  as  such, 
speaker,  hearer,  subject  matter,  etc.,  combine  to  form  an  in- 
trinsic unity. 

Moreover,  though  established  on  the  basis  of  innumerable 
scientific  findings,  his  'symbolical  forms'  have  an  inner  con- 
sistency and  almost  self-containedness  which  give  even  to  pre- 
rational  structures  a  quasi-rational  cogency.  Their  components 
are  related  to  one  another  in  a  way  which  is  empirically  dis- 
covered, but  intuitively  evident  j  and  this  super-factual  evidence 
resembles  that  which  illumines  the  relations  between  essences 
(general  qualities),  like  color  and  extension,  or  red,  orange  and 
yellow  (to  give  some  primitive  examples  of  the  'relation  of 
ideas'  which  are  a  main  subject  of  phenomenological  inquiry). 

The  essential  forms  of  language,  myth,  etc.,  come  thus  to 
complement  the  general  laws  in  which  the  earlier  neo-Kantian- 
ism  had  been  too  exclusively  interested.  Science  is  not  the  only 
transcendental  fact  which  can  be  analyzed  by  way  of  transcen- 
dental philosophy.  Even  if  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  philosophy  of 
religion  were  concerned  with  nothing  but  universal  and  neces- 
sary laws,  "does  the  same  hold  true  of  their  spiritual  content, 
that  is  to  say  of  morals,  art,  religion  themselves} " — this  is  the 
question  in  terms  of  which  Cassirer  objects  to  the  pan-nomism  of 
Cohen  and  Natorp.74  He  did  not  try — as  Natorp  did — to  iden- 
tify "phenomenology  of  consciousness"  with  the  psychological 
"description  of  ethical,  aesthetic,  religious  knowledge"'1*  He 
realized  the  heterogeneous  natures  of  these  different  ways  of 

11  For  this  latter  point  cf.  also  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  I,  2 if 5 
Essay  on  Man,  52!. 

T4  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  III,  66.  It  must  be  said,  however,  that 
Natorp  himself  rectified  his  earlier  attitude  in  Praktische  Philosophic:  cf.  especially 
209. 

w  Natorp,  Allgemetne  Psychologic,  241  j  cf.  72,  94. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     831 

objectification  and  gave  'structuralism'78 — the  investigation  into 
the  'inner  forms'  of  language,  myth,  religion,  etc., — its  place 
alongside  the  'legalism'  of  knowledge,  i.e.,  the  search  for 
general  laws.  By  this  way  of  aiming  at  a  philosophical  mor- 
phology he  countenanced  the  phenomenological  attempt  to  bare 
the  inner  nature,  the  typical  structure  of  the  acts,  objects,  and 
contents  of  consciousness. 

To  be  sure,  this  convergence  with  phenomenology  was  more  or 
less  incidental  in  Cassirer's  development.  It  was  not  only,  and 
not  even  so  much,  phenomenology  which  stood  behind  his  new 
version  of  neo-Kantian  philosophy — Cassirer's  emphasis  on  the 
'inner  form'  derives,  first  of  all,  from  the  artistic  ingredient  of 
his  own  nature,  the  Goethian  element  of  his  being,  and  tallies 
with  the  Goethe  revival  in  his  generation.  (Whereas  Natorp, 
and  above  all,  Cohen  represented  much  more  the  moral  ideal- 
ism of  Kant,  Schiller  and  Fichte,  ethics  plays  a  very  minor  role 
in  Cassirer's  systematic  writings).  It  is  connected  with  the 
"wholism"  of  the  later  nineteenth  and  the  twentieth  centuries, 
which  expressed  itself  in  the  mathematical  group-theories  as  well 
as  in  the  field-theories  of  physics  and  psychology,  in  Wolfflin's 
analysis  of  fine  arts77  as  well  as  in  the  biology  of  thinkers  like 
Kurt  Goldstein,  on  whom  Cassirer  drew  heavily  for  his  Phaeno- 
menologie  der  Erkenntnis.  (In  his  theory  of  the  organism 
Goldstein  makes  use  of  the  concept  of  essence  in  a  combination 
of  Goethian  and  phenomenological  thought  which  could  not  fail 
to  strike  a  sympathetic  vein  in  Cassirer.) 

VI 

The  Symbolical  Forms 
Neo-Kantian  and  Phenomenological  Philosophies  of  Man 

The  'symbolical  forms'  figuring  in  a  scale  of  representations 
— Cassirer  distinguishes  between  the  expressional,  the  strictly 
representative,  and  the  significatory  dimensions  of  the  symbol78 

w  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Man,  121. 
n  Cf.  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Man,  69. 

TO  Cf.,  e.g.,  "Das  Symbolproblem  und  seine  Stellung  im  System  der  Philosophic," 
Zeitschrift  juer  Aesthetik  und  Allgemeine  Kunstwissensckaft,  XXI,  303**. 


832  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

— remind  us  of  the  gamut  of  representations  in  Leibniz.  Since 
the  beginning  of  his  philosophical  career  Cassirer  was  deeply 
familiar  with  Leibniz's  philosophy ;  and  this  fact  was  doubtless 
instrumental  in  Cassirer's  peculiar  relation  to  Goethe,  in  so 
many  regards  an  heir  to  Leibniz's  mode  of  thinking. 

In  Freiheit  und  Form  Cassirer  had  shown  how  the  founder 
of  modern  philosophical  aesthetics,  Alexander  Baumgarten, 
employed  and  transformed  the  Leibnizian  schema  of  representa- 
tion. Baumgarten  inserted  between  the  lower  pole  of  obscure 
and  confused  perception  and  the  highest  point  of  clear  and  dis- 
tinct conception  a  stage  of  singular  perfection  in  clarity,  yet 
without  distinctness:  the  perfectio  phaenomenon,  the  cognitio 
perfecte  sensitiva  of  aesthetic  experience.  This  is  analogous  to 
the  role  the  non-scientific  symbols  of  language  and  the  myth 
have  in  Cassirer Js  philosophy:  while  showing  a  perfection  of 
their  own,  they  are,  at  the  same  time,  preconditions  of  scientific 
and  philosophical  knowledge.  "Each  genuine  and  fundamental 
function  of  the  spirit  has  one  decisive  feature  in  common  with 
knowledge:  in  every  one  of  them  resides  an  archetypal  power, 
not  only  an  ectypal  one."79 

To  vary  a  famous  verse  of  Schiller's:  we  enter  the  land  of 
knowledge  only  through  the  morning-gate  of  the  myth.  In  a 
similar  way  language  is  said  to  figure  in  a  dialectical  movement 
in  which  it  heals  its  own  (logical)  defects  by  setting  itself  "dif- 
ferent and  higher  tasks."  "Man  can  proceed  from  ordinary 
language  to  scientific  language,  to  the  language  of  logic,  of 
mathematics,  of  physics."80  And  as  regards  religion — its  ulti- 
mate truth  seems  ascertained  only  in  a  philosophy  of  religion 
like  that  of  Schleiermacher  (we  shall  see  presently  that  its 
ultimate  aim — the  perfect  balance  between  meaning  (Sinn)  and 
image  (Bild) — is  reached  only  in  art).81  In  all  this  there  are 
tokens  and  remnants  of  that  scientism  which  is  of  the  original 
dowry  of  neo-Kantian  thought.  The  questions,  how  far  theo- 
retical knowledge  can  accept  the  honors  assigned  to  it,  how 

ro  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  I,  8. 

80  Cassirer,  "The  Influence  of  Language  upon  the  Development  of  Scientific 
Thought"  (op.  cit.)y  327. 

"Cf.  Philosofhie  der  tymbolischen  Formen,  II,  3i8ff.  Cf.  infra,  85off. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     833 

congenial  it  is  to  the  original  impulses  that  live  in  language  and 
religion,  how  much  of  these  primitive  motives  will  be  lost  on 
the  way  of  their  intellectual  transformation — such  questions  are 
either  not  asked  at  all  or  answered  in  an  unduly  optimistic  vein. 
To  be  sure,  the  critic  of  each  dialectical  movement — and, 
therefore,  of  each  dialectical  treatment — is  on  difficult  ground. 
His  subject  will  always  offer  an  aspect  complementary  to  that 
under  which  he  tries  to  attack  it.  In  our  case,  the  preliminary 
character  of  certain  symbolical  forms  is  made  up  for  by  their 
indispensable  function:  they  are  autonomous  constituents  in  the 
system  of  culture.  They  have  structural  laws  of  their  own  which 
we  ought  to  recognize,  even  if  they  do  not  fully  participate  in 
the  canonic  authority  which  Cohen's  classicism  attributed  to  the 
topmost  formations  of  the  objective  mind.The  phenomenologist 
will  be  inclined  to  challenge  this  whole  dialectical  construction 
of  a  self-contained  cultural  process.  He  will  question  the  strange 
synthesis  between  the  autonomous  perfection  of  the  forms  of 
culture  on  the  one  hand  and,  on  the  other,  the  reduction  of  most 
of  them  to  mere  prefigurations  of  final  truth — the  truth  of 
knowledge.  This  is,  indeed,  the  tenor  of  Heidegger's  review82 
of  Das  mythische  Denken>  the  second  volume  of  the  Philoso- 
phic der  symbolischen  Formen.  He  argues  that  the  systematic 
unity  of  the  symbolic  forms  ought  to  be  sought  for,  more  radi- 
cally than  Cassirer  does,  in  the  original  make-up  of  human  exist- 
ence (Lebensform)  j  and  intimates,  for  instance,  that  mythical 
thought  is  not  fully  elucidated  by  making  it  an  expression  of  hu- 
man creativeness.  A  fundamental  concept  like  that  of  cmana'  be- 
trays as  its  ultimate  motive  man's  perplexity  in  the  face  of  his 
tasks  and  his  feelings  of  being  overwhelmed  by  the  world  around 
him.  Man  does  not  extricate  himself  from  such  a  predicament  by 
acknowledging  it  in  this  fashion.  The  myth  may  thus  testify 
to  his  resigning  himself  to  the  domination  of  uncontrollable 
powers  as  well  as  exhibit  his  constructive  capacities.  The  world 
of  the  myth,  though  being  in  one  sense  the  work  of  his  creative 
imagination,  may  still  fail  to  be  man's  proper  world — the  world 
in  which  he  feels  at  home.  The  needy  man,  the  man  dependent 

81  Cf.  Deutsche  Literaturzeitung  (1928),  xooo-ioiz. 


834  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

on  mercy  and  subject  to  renunciation,  disappears  (here  as  well  as 
elsewhere  in  Cassirer's  writings)  behind  the  screen  of  his  spe- 
cious cultural  achievements. 

With  all  its  wealth  of  new  materials,  the  Philosofhie  der 
symbolischen  Formen  is  still  neo-Kantian  in  its  method.  This 
can  best  be  shown  by  tracing  its  plan  back  to  suggestions  con- 
tained in  the  tenth  chapter  of  Natorp's  Allgemeine  Psychologie. 
Natorp  recognizes  as  one  "mighty  and  central  province"  of 
general  psychology  a 

description  of  the  formations  of  consciousness  .  .  .  which  must  not  be 
restricted  to  the  pure  forms  of  knowledge,  volition,  and  art,  and,  further- 
more, to  the  pure  foundations  of  religious  consciousness,  but  may  be 
extended  to  the  ...  imperfect  objectifications  of  opinion,  belief,  and 
imagination — regardless  of,  and  unlimited  by,  their  inner  relation  to 
truth  and  the  realm  of  laws.  .  .  .  Even  the  most  irresponsible  opinion, 
the  darkest  superstition,  the  most  boundless  imagination  make  use  of  the 
categories  of  objective  knowledge;  they  are  still  ways  of  objectification, 
however  poor  the  means  and  impure  the  performance  of  this  process 
may  prove  to  be.83 

And  as  regards  "the  almost  inexhaustible  fund  of  primitive 
knowledge"  stored  in  the  words  and  syntax  of  higher  lan- 
guages— there  we  have  even  "objectifications  which,  within  the 
limits  of  their  specific:  purpose,  do  not  fall  very  short  of  the 
exactness  and  precision  of  scientific  knowledge."84  Almost  the 
same  applies  to  other  subject-matters  of  "differential  psychol- 
ogy"— the  special  social  classes  and  orders  and  the  ways  in 
which  the  sexes  and  ages  of  man  assert  themselves.85  In  the 
terms  of  Natorp,  it  is  largely  to  these  "lower  stages  of  objec- 
tification" that  Cassirer's  phenomenologies  of  language,  the 
myth,  etc.,  are  devoted  although  he  tried  to  distinguish  them 
and  their  genuine  value  more  clearly  from  the  particular  form 
of  intellectual  synthesis  than  Natorp  may  have  done  in  his  ear- 
lier writings.86 

81  Natorp,  Allgemeine  Psychologie,  241  f. 
84  Ibid.,  99. 

88  Ibid.,   221. 

**Cf.  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen  I,  8;  III,  6^fL.  Cp.,  however, 
Natorp  himself,  Praktische  Philosophic,  209. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     835 

The  interpretation  of  life  as  a  contest  of  objectifying  func- 
tions tends  to  bear  out  the  hermeneutic  nature  of  neo-Kantian 
idealism.  The  way  to  man  leads  through  the  analysis  of  human 
expressions.  Although  testifying  once  more,  to  its  great  value, 
I  have  to  hint  at  the  limits  of  this  procedure  which  cannot  serve 
as  a  philosophical  'passe-partout. 

Our  discussion  will  be  under  the  restriction  set  by  the  title 
of  the  present  article.  It  cannot  deal  with  the  cardinal  problem 
whether  nature  and  function,  locus  and  scope  of  the  symbolic 
are  defined  by  Cassirer  in  a  way  radical  and  consistent  enough 
to  make  this  idea  of  the  symbol  the  firm  corner-stone  of  a  phil- 
osophical system.87  Instead  of  probing  these  depths,  I  confine 
myself  to  such  methodological  remarks  as  are  invited  by  our 
previous  considerations. 

Cassirer  emphasizes  that  he  deals  with  the  world  of  man 
above  all  in  order  to  pass  through  it  to  the  being  of  man  which 
is  expressed  in  such  a  "world  of  his  own — an  'ideal'  world."88 
Perhaps,  he  is  not  quite  consistent  in  speaking  of  cideaP  worlds 
as  links  between  man  and  "physical  reality" — **  terms  which 
presuppose  a  concept  of  the  real  which  neo-Kantianism  fails  to 
provide.  Cassirer  is  always  inclined  to  think  of  physical  reality 
as  reality  proper.  This  attitude,  however,  is  by  no  means  an 
essential  part  of  transcendental  idealism:  Cohen's  conception  of 
reality,  e.g.,  is  much  more  plastic  and  corresponds  to  the  dif- 
ferent ways  of  the  human  outlook.  Take,  e.g.,  the  following 
passage  from  Cohen's  Judische  Schriften  (III,  142):"  Real, 
eminently  real  is  what  is  not  yet  actual,  but  anticipated  by  way 
of  hope  so  that  its  actuality  is  postulated  in  the  vision  of  hope. 
Hope,  the  future,  humanity  belong  together:  they  are  the  pro- 
test against  taking  reality  only  as  what  is  actual  in  nature  and 
history." 

However  this  may  be,  it  is  quite  in  the  neo-Kantian  style  of 
thought  to  see  and  define  man  according  to  the  ways  in  which 

87 1  have  discussed  this  question  in  my  review  of  An  Essay  on  Man,  see  Phi- 
losophy and  Phenomenological  Research,  VIII,  2  (1947),  283-287. 

*  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Many  228.  Cf.  Philosofhie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  III, 
104. 

*Cf.  Essay  on  Man,  241". 


836  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

he  realizes  himself  in  worlds  of  his  own  making.  He  is  not  seen 
in  the  ways  he  faces  a  reality  and  moves  in  a  world  in  which  he 
is  never  quite  at  home.  "No  longer,"  says  Cassirer,  "can  man  con- 
front reality  immediately,  he  cannot  see  it,  as  it  were,  face  to 
face.  Instead  of  dealing  with  the  things  themselves,  man  is  in  a 
sense  constantly  conversing  with  himself."90  If  that  were  really 
the  case,  we  would  know  only  objectifications,  projections  of  our 
own  being,  and  no  objects  at  all — no  things  which  may  'object' 
to  us  and  to  our  existence.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  come  to  deal 
with  objects  even  through  these  objectifications.  Just  as  it  seems 
of  the  very  nature  of  things  in  space  to  manifest  themselves  in 
certain  spatial  perspectives,  thus  in  our  intercourse  with  things 
they  may  present  themselves  in  mythical,  historical,  linguistic, 
and  other  perspectives.  Although  qualifying  our  views,  neither 
the  spatial  nor  these  personal  aspects  are  separated  from,  and 
block  the  sight  of,  the  things  themselves.  This  is  almost  admit- 
ted by  Cassirer  in  one  of  the  following  sentences:  man  "cannot 
see  or  know  anything  except  by  the  interposition  of  this  arti- 
ficial medium,"  sc.  the  symbolic  forms — 5  but  even  here  we 
must  take  exception  to  the  figurative  use  of  the  term  "medium" 
which  is  as  likely  to  be  misunderstood  as  is  the  epithet  "artifi- 
cial" used  in  connection  with  it.91 

That  things  present  themselves  in  more  or  less  adequate 
forms  of  appearance  and  modes  of  interpretation  does  not  do 
away  with  the  fact  that  they  present  themselves.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  fact  of  this  self-presentation  is  not  incompatible  with 
the  recognition  of  something  beyond  cognition — beyond  it,  be- 
cause it  is  MW*«V«  TYJS  ouaia^  beyond  any  definite  form  of  being: 
the  Alpha  as  well  as  the  Omega  of  our  life,  i.e.,  not  only  the 
final  point  of  all  ways  of  determination,  but  also  the  dark  yet 
everpresent  ground  from  which  all  beings  seem  to  rise,  against 

90  Essay  on  Man,  25. 

91  Ibid.  The  same  incongruity  appears,  e.g.,  in  "  'Geist*  und  'Leben'  in  der 
Philosophic  der  Gegenwart,"  Neue  Rundschau^  1930,  254-259.  Cf.  pp.  870-874, 
infra.  According  to  this  passage  reality  can  be  reached  only  after  passing  through 
the   sphere   of  the   ideal.   But,   although   this  contention   may  be  borne  out  by 
reference  to  mathematics,  some  fields  of  art,  etc.,  it  is  far  from  being  universally 
valid.  The  ideal  factors  are  not  always  so  separable  from  the  real  ones  as  to 
allow  such  a  dialectical  movement  to  take  place  between  them. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     837 

which  they  stand  out  for  some  time  and  into  the  embrace  of 
which  they  seem  to  return  after  their  time  is  over  (*orca  TYJV 
TOO  Xpovou  T«giv).  This  principle  of  origin  is  of  a  metaphysical 
order,  not  a  logical  one.  It  lays  a  foundation  which  cannot  be 
laid  by  such  a  principle  of  thought  as  Cohen  tried  to  establish.92 
The  pathos  of  this  metaphysical  experience — the  fountain-head 
of  all  religious  feeling — is  conspicuously  absent  in  Cassirer's 
work. 

The  neo-Kantian  pan-methodology98  is  the  complement  of 
the  "critical"  attitude  which  separates  reality  proper  from  the 
forms  of  appearance  and  leads  many  of  its  representatives  to 
an  anti-metaphysical  position,  an  unconcern  with  reality  far 
excellence.  It  is  partly  for  these  reasons  that  the  chapter  on  "His- 
tory" in  An  Essay  on  Man  fails  to  deal  either  with  histori- 
cal reality  as  such  or  with  the  historical  nature  (the  'histor- 
icity*) of  man — problems  which  have  played  a  more  and  more 
prominent  role  in  the  phenomenology  of  the  last  twenty  years. 
Cassirer  takes  here  a  somewhat  belated  part  in  the  methodo- 
logical discussion,  which  took  place,  around  1900,  between  his- 
torians and  neo-Kantian  philosophers  such  as  Karl  Lamprecht, 
Eduard  Meyer,  and  Heinrich  Rickert.  In  contrast  to  Natorp 
(Praktische  Philosophie,  §§  66ff),  he  treats  history  almost  ex- 
clusively as  historical  science,  not  so  much  historical  science  as  a 
variety  of  historical  consciousness  and  as  continuous  with  his- 
torical life  and  historical  tradition.94 

History  as  found  in  classical  writers  like  Ranke  stands  with 
science  among  the  refined,  perfected  forms  of  civilization,  "an 
indispensable  instrument  for  building  up  our  human  uni- 
verse."95 These  regions  are  the  birth-place  of  logical  idealism. 
We  have  seen,  however,  that  Cassirer  tried  to  deal  not  only  with 
the  super-structure  of  highest  objectifications,  but  also  with  the 
primary  phenomena  of  human  life.The  intermediate  forms  of 
the  myth,  language,  etc.,  are  closer  to  naive  life  and  cannot 

MCf.  Cohen,  Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnisy  32. 

M  "There  is  not  any  difference  more  radical  than  that  of  method,"  says  Cohen 
(J&disck*  Schriften,  III,  143). 
**  Cf.  Essay  on  Man,  206. 


838  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

claim  the  universal  validity  of  the  exact  sciences.96  But  whatever 
may  be  the  character  of  the  forms  he  takes  as  his  starting  point, 
they  represent  eo  ipso,  i.e.,  by  their  very  nature  as  forms  and 
objectifications,  certain  human  achievements.  Thus,  they  put 
man  from  the  very  beginning  into  a,  perhaps,  too  favorable 
light.  The  image  of  man  is  not  independent  of  the  setting  in 
which  it  appears.  To  be  sure,  there  is  a  distinction  to  be  made 
between  a  form  itself  and  its  content.  Through  scientific  his- 
tory, e.g.,  we  become  more  thoroughly  acquainted  with  man — 
man's  joys  and  sorrows,  possibilities  and  dangers,  his  passions 
and  sufferings,  his  greatness  and  defects.  Still,  the  objectivity 
of  this  representation  has  an  effect  similar  to  the  mastery  of  the 
artist:  the  wonderful  polish  of  the  mirror  reconciles  us  with  the 
sadness  of  the  image;  the  perfect  representation  succeeds  in 
outbalancing  the  imperfections  of  what  is  represented  in  such  a 
way.87 

Cassirer's  own  philosophy  of  man,  moreover,  shows  a  quasi 
superhuman  aloofness  by  which  he  seems  to  outdo  even  the 
composure  of  the  historian  and  the  artist.  At  first  glance,  neither 
the  tenor  nor  the  themes  of  the  Essay  on  Man  betray  any  effect 
of  the  crisis  of  man  in  our  eschatological  age — not  to  speak  of 
the  experiences  of  the  author  himself  who  was  driven  from  land 
to  land  as  a  victim  of  racial  persecution  and  global  war.  Only  on 
second  thought  does  the  reader  come  to  realize  that  Cassirer's 
interest  in  myth  is  partly  prompted  by  a  present  day  revival  of 
mythical  thought,  and  that  his  studies  in  mythology  may  well 
serve  to  understand  the  effectiveness  of  mythical  symbolism 
and  check  its  misuse.  On  the  other  hand,  the  economic  problems 
of  human  existence  are  scarcely  mentioned  at  all;  and  even  the 
forms  of  political  life  are  passed  over  as  being  "a  late  product 
of  the  civilizing  process."98  The  process  of  civilization,  the 
movement  of  self-propelling  pure  forms  (so  to  speak),  seems 
to  be  something  like  a  metaphysical  absolute;  it  goes  on 

HCf.,  e.g.,  PhilosofMe  der  symbolischen  Formerly  III,  14,  3571". 
wCf.  Essay  on  Man,   149.  Cf.,  however,  in  qualification  of  what  follows, 
Cassirer's  posthumous  writing1,  The  Myth  of  the  State  (1946). 
18  Ibid.,  63. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     839 

smoothly  and  essentially  undisturbed  by  the  regrettable  acci- 
dents of  our  own  life. 

Whereas  as  early  as  in  1902  a  William  James  dared  to  re- 
mind his  audiences  that  "our  civilization  is  founded  on  the 
shambles,  and  every  individual  existence  goes  out  in  a  lonely 
spasm  of  helpless  agony,"99  Cassirer's  happy  eyes  saw  man  even 
as  late  as  1944  only  in  the  light  of  his  cultural  products,  not  in 
the  darkness  of  his  earthly  struggle,  nor  in  the  hours  of  his 
despair  and  in  the  loneliness  of  his  death.  In  difference  from 
Aristotle,  Cassirer  defines  man  somewhat  loosely  as  the  animal 
symbolicum — in  the  sense  of  the  animal  symbola  formans  or, 
as  we  would  have  preferred  to  say,  the  animal  imaginativum. 
This  latter  formula  would  imply  an  allusion  to  imagination  as 
the  central  root  of  human  nature,  "our  destiny,  our  being's 
heart  and  homej"  but,  although  being  in  accordance  with  ideas 
of  Hume  and  Kant,100  of  Coleridge  and  Wordsworth,  to  give  to 
'imagination'  so  dominant  a  place  would  meet  with  Cassirer's 
aversion  to  any  'image'  theory  of  knowledge.101  Although  he 
stressed  its  importance  repeatedly,102  imagination  did  not  be- 
come a  patent  factor  in  his  definition  of  man. 

The  noble  Aristotelian  tradition  of  defining  man  by  his  high- 
est capacity — reason — is  slightly  modified  by  Ernst  Cassirer. 
The  latter's  definition  of  man  gives  a  specific  difference — the 
symbolizing  power — which  is  said  to  extend  further  down  than 
does  reason.108  His  statement  fails,  however,  to  grasp  the  true 
significance  of  Aristotle's  approach  to  the  problem.  Aristotle  does 
not  offer  a  pars  pro  toto  definition.10*  In  his  psychology  Aris- 
totle tries  to  show  how  reason  functions  as  the  formal  cause  of 
our  whole  being,  and  how  man's  development  is  to  be  under- 
stood as  the  growing  self-assertion  of  reason. 

*W.  James,  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience  (Modern  Library),  160. 

100  Cf.  Cassirer  himself,  e.g.,  in  "  'Geist'  und  'Leben'  in  der  Philosophic  der 
Gegenwart,"  Neue  Rundschau  (1930),  257  (cf.  871  infra). 

m  Cf.  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Man,  57. 

101  Cf.    Cassirer's    "Kant    und    das   Problem    der    Metaphysik,"    Kantstudien, 
XXXVI  (1931),  8f.,  1 8 \  "The  Concept  of  Group  and  the  Theory  of  Perception," 
Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research,  V  (1944),  3*f. 

***  Essay  on  Man,  25. 


840  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

Moreover,  Cassirer  loses  the  great  advantage  of  the  Aristo- 
telian definition — its  dynamic  possibilities.  Whereas  'animal 
symbolicum*  adds  only  a  specific  difference  to  the  generic  one, 
'animal  rationale?  by  showing  man  between  the  heights  to  which 
he  can  attain  and  the  depths  to  which  he  can  sink,  may  indicate 
the  permanent  tension  and  strife  between  man's  animal  and 
rational  natures,  the  promise  as  well  as  the  danger  of  human 
freedom.  To  be  sure,  Aristotle  himself  did  not  exhaust  the  dra- 
matic potentialities  implied  in  his  definition.  The  instability  of 
the  human  condition  in  the  realm  between  the  two  poles — pure 
rationality  and  mere  animality — is  seen  in  contrast  to  the 
blessedness  of  the  divine  being,  but  this  contrast  is  not  fully 
developed  in  its  tragic  implications.  He  is  more  interested  in 
normal  mentality,  in  the  organic  health  of  human  life  than  in 
its  extremities  and  conflicts.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Cassirer. 
He  was  not  a  tortured  soul.  Both  in  his  writings  and  in  his  ap- 
pearance he  made  the  impression  of  an  Apollonian  nature.  He 
was  a  neo-Kantian  in  the  sense  that  his  intellectual  temper  was 
congenial  to  the  Kant  whom  he  loved  and  admired.  What  he 
said  of  Kant,  applies  to  himself  and  explains  the  high  pleasure 
we  experience  in  reading  his  works:  He  "is  and  remains  a 
thinker  of  the  Enlightenment — in  the  most  radiant  and  sublime 
sense  of  this  word:  he  aspires  toward  light  and  clarity  even 
when  reflecting  on  the  darkest  depths  and  'radices5  of  being."105 
Yet,  we  cannot  help  feeling  that  the  darkness  of  these  depths  is 
not  sufficiently  represented  in  Cassirer's  own  philosophical  out- 
look. Thus  he  extolled  the  positive  aspect  of  existence:  the 
self-transcendence  of  life  into  spirit,  of  rcpo&s  into  wofrqori^  of 
organic  formation  into  the  formation  of  ideas  and  symbols: 
he  remonstrates  on  the  metaphysical  hypostatizing  of  Life  and 
the  Spirit,  on  their  being  taken  for  two  hostile  entities  (as  in 
Klages)  or  for  two  heterogeneous  powers  which  are  on  pre- 
carious terms  with  one  another  (as  in  Scheler).106  Yet,  like 
Aristotle,  he  sees  human  freedom  too  exclusively  in  the  growing 

108  Cassirer,  "Kant  und  das  Problem  der  Metaphysik,"  Kantstudien,  XXXVI, 
(1931),  24. 

100  Cf.  "'Geist'  und  'Leben'  .  .  .",  o/».  cit.,  244-264;  also  Part  III  of  the 
present  volume,  862-880. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     841 

independence  from  the  senses — manifested  as  it  seems  by  the 
processes  of  symbolization.  He  does  not  really  plunge  into  the 
abyss  of  freedom  in  the  human  soul — that  freedom  which 
is,  at  once,  man's  distinction  and  his  temptation,  man's  pride 
and  his  torment — and  he  does  not  ask  how  human  freedom  can 
coexist  with  human  finiteness.  He  is  so  engrossed  by  the  dialec- 
tics of  the  spirit  as  "a  new  turn  and  conversion  of  life  itself"  that 
he  all  but  forgets  about  the  labor-pains  of  such  a  dialectical 
turn — this  perennial  turn  and,  therefore  perennial  crisis  of 
human  existence. 

It  is  of  the  very  nature  of  human  freedom  that  the  outcome 
of  this  crisis  and,  therefore,  the  continuation  of  the  objectifying 
process  can  never  be  foreseen.  We  know  it  again:  just  as  the  in- 
dividual person,  so  is  the  whole  of  cultural  life  threatened  by 
death.  But  in  the  radiance  of  his  own  being  and  in  his  admira- 
tion for  the  triumphal  procession  of  culture,  Cassirer  was  in- 
clined to  neglect  its  sad,  tragic,  even  suicidal  traits.  Yet  life 
creates  idols  as  well  as  true  symbols;  the  work  of  the  spirit 
drains  man's  vital  energies;  there  are  all  the  frustrations  of  hu- 
man endeavor;  and  man  chokes  to  death  in  the  very  shelters 
(Jaspers'  Gehause)  and  is  slain  by  the  very  arms  he  built  him- 
self. Cassirer's  philosophy  suffers  from  too  much  light;  still  it 
is  a  noble  and  finished  account  of  come  I'uom  s'eterna.  "The 
various  modes  of  [his] expression  ....  have  a  life  of  their  own, 
a  sort  of  eternity  by  which  they  survive  man's  individual  and 
ephemeral  existence."107 

A  corollary  to  their  assertion  of  the  autonomous  course  of  the 
objectifying  process  is  Natorp's  and  Cassirer's  insistence  that, 
both  genetically  and  systematically,  individual  self-knowledge 
is  a  very  late  product  of  consciousness.  Cassirer  agrees  with  Max 
Scheler's  theory  in  the  contention  that  experience  is  at  first  quasi 
anonymous  and  only  subsequently  attributed  either  to  myself  or 
to  other  Egos.108  This  phenomenological  description  may  be 
correct  as  to  the  origin  and  qualification  of  the  contents  of  hu- 
man consciousness}  but  it  applies  neither  to  the  noetic  side  of  ex- 

1W  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Man,  224. 

108  Max  Scheler,  Wesen  und  Formen  der  SymfaMe,  284*!.  Cf.  Cassirer, 
Philosofhie  der  symboUschen  Formen,  III,  100-107, 


842  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

periences,  i.e.,  to  the  actualization  (Vollzugsmodus)  of  these 
contents,  nor  to  the  pure  Ego  of  phenomenological  reflection, 
which  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  inner  perception,  the  Na- 
tural' self-knowledge  of  man.109 

In  Cassirer  the  two  levels  of  analysis — that  of  empirical  or 
even  eidetic  psychology  of  human  life  and  that  of  transcendental 
philosophy  of  pure  consciousness — are  not  always  as  clearly  sep- 
arated as  these  subtle  problems  require.  But,  although  in  the 
case  of  empathy  psychological  findings  are  played  off  against  the 
data  of  original  constitution  (as  these  appear  in  the  light  of 
transcendental  reflection),  usually  the  transcendental  process  of 
objectification  is  given  the  upper  hand  over  anthropological 
facts.110 

We  have  seen  that  Cassirer's  pre-occupation  with  the  bound- 
less objectifying  process  almost  blinds  him  to  the  essential  lim- 
itations of  human  life.  This  applies,  above  all,  to  the  life  of  the 
individual.111  Cassirer's  main  concern  is,  like  Kant's,  with  the 

**€£.  the  dissertation  of  HusserPs  assistant  Edith  Stein,  Zum  Problem  der 
EinfueMung,  1917,  30-39.  Edith  Stein  reproduces  fairly  well  HusserPs  own 
teaching  on  empathy.  I  regret  that  in  the  present  article  references  to  HusserPs  work 
must  be  brief  and  may  appear,  therefore,  in  spots  somewhat  cryptical  or  dogmatic. 
But  it  is  obviously  impossible  within  the  framework  of  this  essay  even  to  attempt 
to  render  HusserPs  subtle  analyses  with  any  degree  of  adequacy. 

110  With  the  neo-Kantians  Cassirer  used  to  distinguish  very  carefully  between 
the  transcendental  and  the  psychological  or  anthropological  methods.  (He  did  it  as 
late  as  in  1931 — in  his  discussion  of  Heidegger's  "Kant  und  das  Problem  der 
Metaphysik:"  Kantstudien  XXXVI,  i5f.  But  whereas  the  Pktlosofhie  der  sym- 
bolischen  Formen  was  thought  to  conquer  new  territory  for  transcendental 
idealism,  An  Essay  on  Man — for  the  most  part  an  abstract  of  the  former  work — 
is  obviously  an  experiment  in  philosophical  anthropology.  Is  the  purity  of  the 
transcendental  method  impaired  by  the  anthropological  material  of  the  Philosofhie 
der  symboUschen  Formen9  or  is  the  anthropological  turn  in  the  Essay  impeded 
by  the  demands  of  neo-Kantian  transcendentalism? 

m  HusserPs  position  differs  from  that  of  Cassirer  in  so  far  as  HusserPs  tran- 
scendental Ego,  although  not  being  essentially  finite  either,  is  from  the  outset 
a  single  Ego,  not  a  universal  subject  as  such:  this  Ego  apperceives  itself  only 
afterwards  as  a  member  of  a  monadic  universe,  i.e.,  of  an  intersubjective  sphere 
of  transcendental  Egos,  and  ends  with  identifying  itself  in  a  certain  way  with  a 
particular  and  finite  human  being*— part  of  the  transcendentally  constituted 
human  world  (cf.  the  fifth  of  HusserPs  Meditations  Cartesiennes).  The  analysis 
of  intersubjectivity  was  complemented  in  HusserPs  courses  (e.g.  on  Ethics)  by 
that  of  interpersonal  relationships  which  have  their  ultimate  end  in  constituting 
the  real  world  of  true  humanity.  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  neither 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     843 

'intelligible  substrate  of  humanity,'  not  with  human  existence.112 
The  problems  of  individual  birth  and  death — personal  prob- 
lems rather  than  merely  creatural  ones — are  scarcely  handled  at 
all  (death  only  in  a  negative  way).  While — under  the  influence 
of  Kierkegaard,  Jaspers,  and  Heidegger — the  second  generation 
of  phenomenologists  was  almost  obsessed  by  this  latter  prob- 
lem, inclined  as  they  were  to  see  life  only  in  the  light  (and  the 
shadow)  of  death,  Cassirer  adhered  to  a  tradition  that  prevails 
from  Descartes  to  Eucken  and  Caird:  he  recognized  in  man's 
knowledge  of  his  finiteness  the  very  dawn  of  the  infinite. 

This  was  in  fact  not  only  the  general  tenor  of  his  discussion 
with  Heidegger  at  Davos ,  it  was  also  his  main  objection  to  the 
sort  of  existentialism  which  Oskar  Becker  tried  to  build  into  the 
very  foundation  of  mathematics.  Whatever  the  truth-value  of 
either  position  may  be,  it  is  symptomatic  that  in  the  well-known 
definition  of  the  mathematical  procedure — 'the  mastery  of  the 
infinite  through  finite  means' — Becker  stressed  the  element  of 
the  finite,  Cassirer  that  of  the  infinite.113 

To  introduce  a  philosophical  anthropology  under  the  sub- 
title of  a  "philosophy  of  human  culture"  implies  (as  indicated 
above)  a  foregone  conclusion:  it  anticipates  the  answer  to  the 
first  question  of  the  Essay  on  Man:  "What  is  man?"  It  elimi- 
nates in  one  stroke  from  the  field  of  research  such  profound  ex- 
periences as  love  and  hatred,  fear  and  trembling,  shame  and  re- 
pentance, guilt  and  sin,  and  such  revealing  traits  as  concentration 
and  distraction  and  innumerable  others — so  far  at  least  as  their 
existential  meaning  is  not  exhausted  by  their  contribution  to  the 
forms  of  cultural  life.  It  neglects  man's  inability  to  express  cer- 
tain experiences  in  an  adequate  way  as  well  as  his  unique  capacity 

Husserl  nor  Cassirer  fully  developed  all  three  dimensions  implied  in  the  idea  of 
self-realization — which  are  (i)  the  awareness  of  the  individual  Self  as  determined 
and  limited  by  the  Other  (Thou)  j  (2)  the  fulfilment  of  one's  own  being  in  this 
very  relationship 5  and  (3)  finding  one's  place  in  the  real  world  by  way  of  inter- 
personal communication. 

1MCf.  Cassirer,  "Kant  und  das  Problem  der  Metaphysik,"  op.  «/.,  i8j  H. 
Cohen,  EMk  des  reinen  Willens,  3. 

""Cf.  Oskar  Becker,  Mathematische  Existen  (19:17)  j  Cassirer,  Philosophic  der 
symbolischen  for  men  >  III,  4696*.  It  ought  to  be  acknowledged,  however,  that  at 
this  point  the  difference  is  one  of  two  generations  rather  than  of  two  schools. 


844  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

for  going  into  hiding  by  the  very  means  of  communication. 

Cassirer  did  not  and  could  not  proceed  the  way  Kierkegaard, 
Jaspers  and,  within  their  sphere,  the  great  tragedians  and  also 
such  novelists  as  Joseph  Conrad  and  Franz  Kafka  did:  he  could 
not  'define'  man  with  a  view  to  the  extreme  situations  (Grenz- 
situationen)  in  which  man's  true  being,  his  greatness  and  weak- 
ness come  out — most  eloquently  in  the  very  moments  of  his 
growing  silent  and  succumbing  to  destiny.  (Personal  'destiny'  is 
not  a  category  that  fits  into  a  dialectical  schema  of  the  objective 
mind.) 

Why  should  philosophy  rely  entirely  on  previous  obj  edifica- 
tions without  doing  some  objectifying  of  its  own?  Why  should  it 
be  confined  to  the  conceptualization  of  previous  expressions?  It 
may  well  discover  and  even  prefigure  new  human  possibilities  or 
reveal  moods  and  modes  of  life  which — von  Menschen  nicht  ge- 
wusst  oder  nicht  bedacht — waited  for  the  penetration  and  the 
candidness  of  a  great  thinker  to  be  unearthed.  The  claim  to  make 
such  a  new,  original  beginning,  to  lay  a  new,  absolute  foundation 
not  only  of  thought,  but  (through  thought  and  even  a  very  ab- 
stract thought)  of  life  itself,  was  the  secret  behind  HusserPs  in- 
creasingly priestly  and  almost  prophetic  attitude.  His  phenom- 
enology was  designed  to  overcome  "the  radical  crisis  in  the  life 
of  the  European  man."114  And  due  to  the  specific  phenomeno- 
logical  impulse  and  approach  to  things,  a  similar  absolute  claim 
lives  (mutatis  mutandis)  in  the  phenomenological  philosophies 
of  Scheler,  Heidegger,  and  Nicolai  Hartmann.  Cassirer,  on  the 
other  hand,  remained  in  accordance  with  the  hermeneutic  prin- 
ciples of  critical  idealism  when  he  restricted  himself  to  the  noble 
task  of  a  sovereign  interpreter  of  given  expressions.  He  felt  far 
too  modest  for  the  role  of  a  path-finder  of  life — and  was  far  too 
honest  for  that  of  a  false  prophet. 

Cassirer's  definition  of  man  as  the  animal  symbolicum  is  in- 
tended to  absorb  both  of  the  Aristotelian  definitions — man  as 
the  rational  and  man  as  the  social  animal.  He  considers  the  first 
definition  too  narrow,  the  second  too  broad:  the  social  character 
of  human  life  needs  to  be  specified  by  reference  to  language, 

1X4  Cf.  Husserl,  "Die  Krisis  dcr  curopaischen  Wissenschaften  und  die  Phae- 
nomenologie,"  Philosofhia,  I  (1936),  77 ff. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     845 

myth,  art,  religion,  science  as  "the  elements  and  the  constitutive 
conditions  of  this  higher  form  of  society."115  But  since  this  re- 
mark appears  only  in  the  'Summary  and  Conclusion'  of  the  Essay 
on  Man,  its  implications  are  not  sufficiently  elaborated.  The  dif- 
ferent symbolical  forms  which  are  meant  to  establish  the  specific 
difference  of  human  social  life  are  not  really  evinced  as  means  of 
personal  intercourse.  The  communicative  function  of  language, 
e.g.,  is  much  less  prominent  in  Cassirer's  writings  than  its  repre- 
sentative nature,  i.e.,  its  relation  to  things,  its  inner  form,  its  pre- 
figuring of  scientific  concepts.116 

Besides,  it  is  questionable  whether  the  cultural  media  in 
which  human  relationships  develop  are  the  only  distinctive 
marks  of  intersubjective  and,  above  all,  interpersonal  life.  There 
are  many  modes  and  dimensions  of  these  relationships  which 
are,  of  course,  reflected  and  evolved  in  myth  and  language,  reli- 
gion and  art,  but  have  a  structure  and  dynamics  of  their  own  in 
the  very  actuality  and,  as  it  were,  welling  up  of  human  inter- 
course. These  original  relations  between  I,  Thou,  and  We,  the 
essential  attitudes  prevailing  between  the  first,  the  second  and 
the  third  person,  the  specific  characteristics  of  social,  socially  con- 
ditioned, socially  addressed  acts,  etc.,  are  studied  in  the  often 
masterly  descriptive  analyses  of  Husserl,  Reinach  and  Scheler, 
Pfaender  and  Geiger,  Edith  Stein  and  Dietrich  von  Hildebrand, 
Theodor  Litt  and  Karl  Loewith.  The  approach  of  these  scholars 
is  more  direct,  their  patience  and  subtlety  of  description  greater 
than  Cassirer's,  even  though  he  may  be  superior  to  them  in  the 
careful  evaluation  of  the  most  modern  scientific  results. 

VII 

Philosophy  and  Religion 

Since,  according  to  Cassirer,  to  know  means  to  relate,  the 
whole  of  being  is  defined  as  a  net  of  relations.  Man,  however,  is 
not  (or  not  primarily)  defined  by  his  peculiar  relationships — by 

115  Cassirer,  Essay  on  Man,  251".,  223. 

"'This  impression  is  slightly  modified  but  not  overthrown  by  the  discussion 
of  the  I-Thou  relation  in  Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissensch&ften  (particularly  44), 
a  book  published  in  Sweden  in  1942  and  not  available  when  the  present  article 
was  written. 


846  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

the  ways  he  relates  himself  and  finds  himself  related  to  things, 
to  his  fellows — perhaps  to  God.  He  is  not  defined  in  these  ways, 
i.e.,  his  limits  are  not  delineated,  his  concrete  determination  is 
not  given  through  the  correlations  which  prevail  between  re- 
sponsive and  responsible  beings. 

Since  the  dialectical,  more  or  less  anonymous  and  almost 
mythical  process  of  objectification  and  transformation  is  always 
considered  first117  (even  in  aesthetics118),  personalism — also 
personalism  in  religion — has  little  chance  to  be  embraced  in 
this  form  of  anthropology.  To  be  sure,  Cassirer  recognized  re- 
ligion as  giving  scope  to  the  feeling  for  individuality}119  and, 
following  Cohen's  example,  he  saw  as  the  meaning  and  merit  of 
Jewish  prophetism  the  insistence  on  a  moral  and  spiritual  rela- 
tionship between  God  and  man — the  most  intimate  correlation 
of  two  persons — I  and  Thou.  But,  just  as  in  Cassirer  the  pro- 
phetic spirit  is  a  theme  and  not  an  element  of  thought  (as  it 
was  in  H.  Cohen),  the  I-Thou  relationship — either  between 
God  and  man  or  within  the  human  sphere  proper — never  be- 
came a  pivot  of  Cassirer's  philosophy  (in  contradistinction  to 
Cohen  in  his  old  age,  Ferdinand  Ebner,  Franz  Rosenzweig, 
Martin  Buber,  and  the  theologians  around  Karl  Barth120). 
The  nature  of  this  relationship  was  not  expounded  by  him  in 
the  thoroughgoing  way  we  find,  e.g.  (on  the  basis  of  sugges- 
tions by  Pfaender,  Scheler  and  Reinach),  in  Kurt  Stavenhagen's 
Absolute  Stellwngnahmen  (1925).  Cassirer  does  not  see  nor,  as 
it  were,  locate  man  in  this  paradoxical  and  precarious  relation 

UT  Cf.  e.g.,  Philosophie  der  symbolischen  Formen,  II,  289^ 

111  Essay  on  Man,  141$,  154,  1645  but  cf.  226fL 

139  Essay  on  Man,  96. 

x*  The  relation  between  Kant  and  Cohen  on  the  one  hand,  the  school  of  Karl 
Barth  on  the  other,  is  mediated  through  Kant's  distinction  between  the  noumenal 
and  the  phenomenal  worlds,  corresponding  to  that  between  the  infinite  intellect 
of  God  and  the  finite  intellect  of  man,  and  through  Cohen's  principle  of  origin 
(Prinzip  des  Ursprungs)  which  is  no  longer  the  central  problem  in  Cassirer's 
philosophy.  For  this  relation  cf.  Heinrich  Barth,  Das  Problem  des  Ursprungs  in  der 
platonischen  Philosophie  (1921),  Emil  Brunner,  Erlebnis,  Erkenntnis  und  Glaube 
(1923)  and  Religionsphilosophie  evangelischer  Theologie  (1927),  Max  Strauch, 
Die  Theologie  Karl  Earths  (1926),  H.  W.  van  der  Vaart  Smith,  "Die  Schule  Karl 
Barths  und  die  Marburger  Philosophic,"  Kantstudien,  XXXIV  (1929),  333-350. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     847 

between  the  finite  and  the  Infinite,  Without  annihilating  alto- 
gether the  duality  involved  in  any  relation  as  such,  he  pushes  it 
into  the  direction  of  a  mystic  union,  where  nothing  happens  to 
the  soul  that  did  not  happen  in  it  eternally,  and  where  the  I  and 
the  Thou  are  poles  of  a  movement  in  which  neither  of  them 
has  the  status  of  an  independent  value.121 

This  account  of  religious  experience,  however,  neglects  the 
essential  inequality  between  the  terms  of  a  relation  which  man 
does  not  feel  able  to  determine  himself,  whereas  he  himself 
feels  determined  by  it}  a  relation,  moreover,  in  which  God  is 
grasped  by  man  only  when  man  is  'grasped'  by  God,  and  as 
far  as  God  deigns  to  reveal  himself  to  man.  (That  is  the  reason 
why  in  the  Bible  man  is  entitled  to  give  names  to  all  living 
creatures,  whereas  only  God  Himself  can  disclose  His  own 
name,  i.e.,  His  very  essence.) 

According  to  Cassirer  man  learns  to  recognize  his  own 
capacities  as  a  free  agent  by  projecting  them  into  the  figure  of 
his  God.122  In  this  way  it  is  man  who  is  understood  in  the  symbol 
of  his  God,  instead  of  God's  being  approached,  however  inade- 
quately, through  the  human  symbols.  The  God-man  relation- 
ship in  which  man  is  confronted  by  another,  infinitely  superior 
(if  not  altogether  different)  being  is  re-absorbed  by  one  of  the 
forms  of  the  cultural  process,  one  of  the  modes  of  objectification. 
Offerings  and  prayers,  e.g., 

are  typical  forms  of  religious  expression  which  do  not  lead  from  a  pre- 
viously determined  and  well  described  sphere  of  the  Ego  to  an  equally 
fixed  sphere  of  the  divine,  but  serve  to  determine  either  sphere  and  draw 
the  limits  between  them  in  always  different  ways.  What  the  religious 
process  takes  to  be  the  spheres  of  the  divine  and  the  human  are  not 
two  strictly  exclusive  realms  of  being  rigidly  separated  from  one  another 
at  the  outset  by  spatial  and  qualitative  boundaries:  rather  we  are  dealing 
here  with  an  original  form  of  the  religious  spirit's  movement  the  opposite 
poles  of  which  do  not  cease  to  flee  from  and  seek  one  another.123 

But  what  is  this  spirit,  if  it  is  not  the  spirit  of  man?  And 

181  Cf.  P^losofMe  der  symbolischen  Formen,  II,  28jff,  307. 
1M /***.,  252,  261. 
'"/«.,  283. 


848  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

what  is  this  movement,  if  it  is  not  the  "performance  of  the 
mythical-religious  consciousness"  bent  on  building  up  its  own 
symbolism  without  recognizing  anything  beyond  itself?124 
These  ideas  are  contrary  to  the  development  neo-Kantianism 
has  taken,  for  instance,  in  the  later  Natorp.  He  protested  against 
"drawing  the  divine  into  the  human  realm,  the  realm  of  human 
culture."  And  he  revised  his  own  former  Religion  within  the 
Limits  of  Humanity  by  "seeking  religion  not  any  longer 
within,  though  just  as  little  without  the  limits  of  humanity,  but 
precisely  in  its  very  limit" — the  one  ultimate  limit  which  marks 
man's  difference  from  the  absolute  One.125 

To  proclaim  the  religious  experience  a  form  of  cultural 
achievement  runs  counter  to  two  of  its  mainsprings.  First,  to  the 
neediness  of  the  individual  to  whom  the  presence  of  God  is 
proved  by — yea,  consists  in — His  gracious  assistance  (this  is 
implied  in  the  Eheje  Asher  Eheje  of  the  God  of  the  Bible). 
This  dependence  on  God  finds  a  more  specific  expression  in 
the  second  motive:  man's  reliance  on  divine  mercy  because  he 
realizes  his  incapacity  to  perform  satisfactorily  the  moral  task 
of  'objectification'  which  is  assigned  to  him  as  a  moral  agent — 
the  establishment  of  the  "kingdom  of  ends."  Although  man  is 
honored  by  his  moral  responsibility — as  a  moral  agent  he  bows 
only  to  the  moral  law  within  himself — ,he  is  humbled  by  the 
facts  of  his  religious  consciousness — and  rehabilitated  only  from 
above  (a  statement  which  needs  to  be  qualified  differently  in 
different  religions). 

These  facts  have  been  in  the  forefront  of  Cohen's  philosophy 
of  religion.  They  recede  into  the  background  in  Cassirer's 
analysis  of  religious  thought.  He  took  religion  for  the  new 
moral  form  of  ancient  mythical  contents — the  spiritualization, 
e.g.,  of  the  external  purity  prescriptions  and  prohibitions  of  the 
taboo  system.128  They  are  not  abolished  j  but  what  counts  in 
religion  is  only  the  purity  of  the  heart  and  the  inner  obligation. 
Yet  this  dialectical  description  will  not  do.  Religion  is  not  only 
the  moral  transformation — Aujhebung — of  the  naive  mythical 


124  Cf.  Ibid.,  291!. 

125  Natorp,  Platos  Ideetilehre,  2nd  edition,  511$  cf.  468. 

136 


Cf.  PMlosofhie  der  symbolise  hen  Formtn,  II,  294)  Essay  on  Man,  103*?. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     849 

consciousness  and  a  declaration  of  man's  moral  freedom;  it  is 
also  man's  abdication  of  moral  autarchy,  his  declaration  of  abso- 
lute dependence. 

But  even  the  purely  ethical  correlation  between  I  and  Thou, 
between  man  and  the  Highest  in  person  (the  pure  and  eternal 
form  of  religious  consciousness  which  Cassirer  seemed  to  recog- 
nize with  H.  Cohen,  presenting  as  it  does  the  highest  trans- 
figuration of  formerly  mythical  motives127) — this  concrete  per- 
sonal relation  comes  to  be  weakened  and  quasi-cneutralized' 
at  the  end:  Cassirer  makes  it  a  relation  between  man  and  the 
Whole — or,  rather,  between  man  and  the  principle  (s)  of  the 
Whole,  the  laws  of  the  Universe.  Thus  he  shifts  the  consumma- 
tion of  religion  to  a  realm  beyond  the  limits  of  religious  con- 
sciousness itself — to  the  realm  of  systematic  thought:  he  finds 
it  in  Leibniz's  monadism  and  in  his  characteristica  univer salts, 
and  in  Schleiermacher's  philosophy  of  religion.  Now 

an  event  derives  its  religious  significance  not  any  longer  from  its  con- 
tent, but  merely  from  its  form ;  its  character  as  a  symbol  does  not  depend 
on  what  it  is  and  whence  it  directly  comes,  but  from  the  spiritual  aspect 
under  which  it  is  placed,  from  the  "reference"  to  the  universe  which 
it  bears  thanks  to  the  religious  feeling  and  religious  thought.128 

The  neo-Kantian  primacy  of  the  method  reasserts  itself  once 
more  over  against  the  "inner  form"  of  the  original  contents  of 
experience,  and  against  the  very  insight  which  he,  like  Natorp, 
gained  in  the  nineteen  twenties:  that  the  character  of  any 
synthesis  depends  on  the  peculiar  nature  of  its  material  contents, 
and  that  "the  specific  *f  orm'  of  the  mythical  'meaning'  as  well  as 
of  the  theoretical  one  is  expressed,  more  profoundly  and  more 
clearly  than  in  any  complex  formation,  in  the  relatively  simple, 
the  truly  'primitive'  structures."129 

In  a  similar  way  the  existential  tension  which  the  finite  in- 
dividual feels  in  view  of  the  infinite  God  is,  as  it  were,  shifted 
to  the  objective  sphere:  we  are  told  that  the  religious  attitude 
differs  from  the  mythical  one  by  clearly  recognizing  the  in- 

187  Cf.  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  II,  lySff. 

»  Ibid.,  II,  319. 

1W  Cassirer,  "Zur  Theorie  dcs  Begriffs,"  Kantstudien,  XXXIII  (19*8),  136. 


850  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

commensurability  between  religious  image  and  religious  mean- 
ing.180 The  inadequacy  of  the  religious  symbol  is  emphasized  by 
Cassirer  almost  to  the  point  of  neglecting  the  insufficiency  of 
the  human  being.  The  gap  between  the  human  and  the  divine 
is  said  to  be  "created,"  by  consciousness  itself  in  order  to  be 
closed  again  by  the  same  consciousness.181 

As  mentioned  above,  the  shortcomings  (not  of  man  but)  of 
religion  are  to  be  made  up  for  by  another  form  of  cultural 
creativity — by  philosophy  and  art.  The  tension  between  image 
and  meaning,  the  fact  that  the  symbol  (Sinnbild)  cannot  wholly 
surpass  the  limits  of  sensory  appearance  (SinnenbilcT)  is  of  the 
very  nature  of  religious  experience.  In  art,  however,  a  perfect 
equilibrium  is  reached  between  the  spheres  of  the  sensory  and 
the  spiritual.  Here  "the  image  does  not  appear  as  a  thing  by 
itself  which,  in  turn,  affects  the  mind,  but  has  become  a  pure 
expression  of  one's  own  creative  power  for  the  mind."132 

As  represented  by  the  Philosophy  of  the  Symbolical  Forms> 
the  dialectics  of  consciousness  seems  to  proceed  beyond  the  re- 
ligious level  to  issue  in  philosophy  of  religion  on  the  one  hand, 
and  in  art  on  the  other.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  either 
art  or  philosophy  is  fully  equipped  to  play  the  superior  part 
assigned  to  it.  A  phenomenology  of  art  and  religion,  e.g.,  will 
have  to  ask  whether  the  alleged  dialectical  movement  from 
religion  to  art  is  not,  at  least,  counterbalanced  by  a  correspond- 
ing movement  leading  from  art  to  religion.  In  an  article  on 
"Art  and  Religion"  I  have  tried  to  indicate  such  an  aspect, 
from  which  art  can  be  considered  a  prefigurement  of  religion, 
and  the  fruit  of  religious  experience  appears  the  ultimate  ful- 
filment of  the  specious  promise  which  is  embodied  in  the  flower 
of  art.188 

180  Phllosofhie  der  $ymbolischen  Formen,  II,  2  9 off. 

m /***.,  2  84. 

1W  Ibid.y  320.  I  refer,  however,  to  note  39  as  regards  the  slightly  different 
attitude  in  a  passage  of  the  Essay  on  Man  (151):  there  "the  sense  of  beauty"  is 
taken  to  be  "the  susceptibility  to  the  dynamic  life  of  forms." 

**  Fritz  Kaufmann,  "Art  and  Religion,"  Philosophy  and  Phenomenologkal 
Research^  I  (1941),  463-469.  A  somewhat  similar  position  can  be  found  in  Paul 
Haeberlin,  Allgemeine  Aesthetik  (1929). 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     851 

It  is  quite  true  (as  Cassirer  stresses  repeatedly134)  that  a  work 
of  art  is  the  more  universal  in  character,  the  more  deeply  indi- 
vidual it  proves  to  be.  Yet  this  universality  is  not  only  flavored, 
but  also  qualified  by  the  individual  point  of  view.  Ttye  work  of 
art  incarnates  the  spirit  of  the  artist's  world — the  world  which 
is  the  common  denominator  of  his  impressions  and  the  objective 
correlate  of  his  productive  reaction.  This  universal  representa- 
tion gives  to  his  work  an  inner  infinitude  which  is,  neverthless, 
(to  speak  with  Spinoza)  an  infinitum  in  suo  genere,  rather  than 
the  absolute  infinitum.  While  his  point  of  view  serves  to 
integrate  the  phenomena  into  a  whole,  the  artist  cannot  but  sift 
them,  accenting  what  is  essential  under  his  aspect,  while  neglect- 
ing what  does  not  add  to  his  image  of  the  world.  The  artist 
conjures  up  what  may  be  called  the  genius  of  the  universe;  but 
this  genius  speaks  the  language  and  voices  the  experience  of  the 
author.  Man  succeeds  in  mastering  his  impressions  as  far  as  he 
can  extend  the  mastery  of  his  expression. 

The  religious  prophet,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  the  author 
of  his  speech  nor  does  he  find  'composure*  in  the  'composition' 
of  his  masterwork.  He  feels  himself  to  be  the  mouth-piece  of  a 
voice  which  is  no  more  his  own  and  speaks  in  terms  which  may 
be  beyond  his  grasp.  Through  the  voice  of  man  sounds  here  that 
of  his  God.  This  is  a  difference  of  type,  of  meaning  and  of  claim 
which  is  to  be  acknowledged  whether  or  not  the  disparity  be- 
tween the  aesthetic  experience  and  the  religious  one  derives 
from  two  really  different  existences — God  and  man.  This  dif- 
ference between  the  Absolute  and  the  finite  is  more  radical  than 
that  between  two  poles  within  a  movement  whose  dynamics  is 
the  true  Absolute  in  Cassirer's  philosophy. 

The  two  types  of  experience  in  question  have  to  be  recog- 
nized as  heterogeneous,  even  though  they  may  be  found  in  a 
personal  union.  There  is  the  element  of  poetic  fascination  in  all 
religious  expression,  since  in  God  himself  the  mysterium 
fascinosum  is  one  with  the  mysterium  tremendum.  And  re- 
ligious art  may  bear  witness  not  only  to  some  congeniality  be- 

**  Cf.  Preiheit  und  Form,  312^,  363!?}  Kants  Leben  und  Lehre,  3545  Essay  on 
Man,  143. 


852  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

tween  the  artist  and  the  Creator  Sprites  wundi,  but  also  to 
man's  personal  response  to  this  spirit  and  its  claims  and  to  his 
trustful  invocation  of  it.  In  ecstatic  experiences,  such  as  Rilke's  at 
the  time  of  the  Sonnets  to  Orpheus  and  the  Elegies  of  Duino 
(experiences  which  almost  destroy  the  framework  of  human 
nature),  the  artist's  state  of  mind  comes  close  to  that  of  the 
prophet — though  even  here  the  measure  of  man  comes  finally 
to  prevail.  "Denn  das  Schone  ist  Nichts  als  des  Schrecklkhen 
Anjangy  den  wir  noch  grade  ertragen"™  The  poet  as  such  is 
always  victorious  in  his  work,  whereas  the  religious  person  con- 
quers only  in  his  absolute  surrender. 

Although  the  essential  differences  are  clear,  the  actual 
boundaries  between  both  states  are  often  hidden — so  as  to  leave 
a  man  like  Kierkegaard  tragically  uncertain  whether  he  has  only 
the  talents  of  a  religious  poet  or  the  call  of  a  religious  witness. 
But  the  thirst  of  the  religious  person  is  not  satisfied  by  the 
draughts  of  poetical  imagination.  The  distinctive  gift  of  man, 
the  gift  of  thinking  in  terms  of  open  possibilities,136  needs  to  be 
complemented  by  the  recognition  of  an  ultimate  reality  which 
is  not  a  product  of  objective  determination,  but  the  very  origin, 
the  fiat  behind  both  facts  and  fieri  of  experience. 

The  reliance  on  the  autonomy  of  culture  with  all  its  symbolic 
forms  is  challenged  by  the  religious  experience  in  which  man 
ceases  to  exploit  his  own  possibilities.  In  this  experience  man 
sees  himself  determined  not  only  by  what  amounts  to  a  process 
of  self-realization  (and  self-liberation)137  or  by  that  anonymous 
process  of  the  "categorial  constitution"  whose  secret  author  and 
hero  he  actually  is  himself,  but  fundamentally  by  a  power  which 
is  not  only  beyond  the  empirical  self  but  also  beyond  the  multi- 
form unity  of  transcendental  synthesis. 

All  this  had  to  be  said — not  in  order  to  substitute  for  Cas- 
sirer's  never  fully  developed  philosophy  of  religion  a  sketch 
of  our  own  making,  but  to  show  how  the  implications  of  this 
cultural  immanentism  compare  to  the  claims  of  religious  experi- 

138  R.  M.  Rilke,  from  the  first  of  the  Duineser  Elegien. 
186  Cf.  Essay  on  Man,  56-62. 
228. 


NEO-KANTIANISM  AND  PHENOMENOLOGY     853 

ence.  We  do  not  shut  our  eyes  to  the  possibility  that  these 
claims  cannot  be  ultimately  verified;  but  their  eventual  ful- 
filment has  to  be  true  to  the  very  nature  of  the  religious  inten- 
tions. This  is  not  only  a  necessary  postulate  of  the  phenome- 
nological  method — a  principle  which  Cassirer  would  have  been 
the  last  to  repudiate;  it  is  an  ideal  to  which  HusserPs  phenome- 
nology has  actually  tried  to  live  up  even  on  this  point,  i.e.,  in 
spite  of  his  own  emphasis  on  the  absoluteness  of  the  process  of 
pure  consciousness.  I  am  referring  to  the  modest  hypothetical 
reflections  on  the  theological  problem  in  the  Ideen™  They 
have  been  acclaimed  even  by  so  strictly  Christian  thinkers  as 
Theodor  Haecker189  and  proved  instrumental  in  the  beginnings 
of  a  genuine  phenomenology  of  religion. 

Husserl  speaks  of  God's  transcendence  in  contradistinction  to 
that  of  the  Ego  and  that  of  the  world.  None  of  the  three  is  an 
immanent  part  of  consciousness  as  such.  But,  whereas  the  pure 
Ego  and  pure  consciousness  cannot  be  disconnected,  it  is  differ- 
ent with  God  and  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  confronted  by 
God  just  as  it  is  confronted  by  the  world;  yet  these  two  forms 
of  transcendence  belong  to  opposite  dimensions:  God's  trans- 
cendence is  "as  it  were  the  polar  opposite  to  the  transcendence 
of  the  world."  But  whereas,  according  to  Husserl,  the  real 
world  is  relative  to  pure  consciousness,  God  as  the  ordering 
principle  of  absolute  consciousness  would  be  absolute  himself140 
— though  again  in  a  different  sense  both  from  the  absoluteness  of 
myself  qua  Ego  of  the  phenomenological  reduction  and  from 
that  of  the  Alter  Ego,  or  rather,  all  the  other  "transcendental 
Egos"  who  are  "constituted"  within  my  consciousness  by  way 
of  empathy,  yet  recognized  as  being  essentially  my  equals.141 
The  divine  being  "would  be  an  'Absolute'  in  a  sense  entirely 
different  from  the  absoluteness  of  consciousness — while,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  a  transcendent  being  in  an  entirely  different 

188  Husserl,  Idten  zu  einer  reinen  Phaenomenologie  und  fhaenomenologischen 
Philosofhie,  961",  nof. 

180  Cf.  e.g.,  Haecker*s  Nachwort  to  Kierkegaard's  Der  Begriff  des 

344*- 

140  Husserl,  Ideen,  96. 

141  Husserl,  Meditations  Cartetitnnts,  Meditation  V. 


854  FRITZ  KAUFMANN 

sense  from  that  in  which  the  world  is  understood  to  be  trans- 
cendent."142 

What  holds  for  "absolute  consciousness"  in  Husserl's  sense, 
applies  a  fortiori  to  finite  human  consciousness.  The  recognition 
of  such  an  absolute  transcendence  would  doom  the  enterprise  of 
a  predominantly  'humanistic'  anthropology  like  Cassirer's.  It 
would  make  it  impossible  to  write  an  Essay  on  Man  with  ex- 
clusive regard  to  a  'Philosophy  of  Human  Culture'  and  would, 
thus,  prevent  an  idolization  of  the  cultural  process — the  danger 
which  threatens  this  neo-Kantian  idealism.  Man's  true  nature 
would  not  be  seen  in  his  cultural  achievements  alone,  but  in  his 
failures  and  limitations  as  well.  And — but  this  assertion  has  to 
be  made  true,  in  order  to  be  true — man  would  be  at  his  best 
where  culture  becomes  cult  again:  a  praise  of  the  Highest  and  an 
offering  to  Him: 

".  .  .  .  die  Erde  grunt 
Und  stille  vor  den  Sternen  tiegt,  den 
Betenden  gleich  in  den  Staub  geworjen, 

Frehuillig  uberwunden  die  lange  Kunst 

Vor  jenen  U nnachahmbaren  da;  er  selbst 

Der  Mensch  mit  eigner  Hand  zerbrachy  die 
Hohen  zu  ehren,  sein  Werk  der  Kiinstler."1*3 

FRITZ  KAUFMANN 
DEPARTMENT  OP  PHILOSOPHY 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  BUFFALO 

142Husscrl,  Ueen,  m. 

**  Holderlin,  "Stimme  des  Volks." 


Ernst  Cassirer 

"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  IN  CONTEMPORARY 
PHILOSOPHY 


HOCSKOLA 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  IN  CONTEMPORARY 
PHILOSOPHY* 


A  MONG  the  minor  works  of  Heinrich  von  Kleist  may  be 
JL^L  found  a  brief  essay  in  which  the  author  has  succeeded  in 
setting  forth  one  of  the  philosophical  problems  of  his  era  with 
all  the  brevity  and  succinctness,  all  the  cogency  and  penetration 
which  mark  his  incomparable  prose  style.  Kleist  attains  this 
pregnancy  of  thought  by  capturing  content  of  it  in  the  form  of 
a  tale  by  the  telling  and  creation  of  which  the  whole  art  of  the 
epic  poet  is  revealed.  He  starts  out  from  the  recollection  of  an 
occurrence  which  he  depicts  as  one  experienced  by  himself.  A 
youth,  excelling  not  only  in  physical  beauty  but  also  in  the 
naturalness  of  his  whole  bearing  and  demeanor,  comes  to  lose 
this  attractiveness  the  moment  he  accidentally  becomes  aware 
of  it  5  and  once  lost,  it  proves  to  be  irrecoverable  by  will-power 
or  by  any  conscious  effort.  The  consequence  which  Kleist  draws 
from  this  is  that  nature  and  consciousness,  beauty  and  reflective 
thought  belong  to  different  realms  and  stand  in  a  relation  of 
polar  tension  and  opposition  to  each  other.  Insofar  as  the  one 
comes  to  the  fore,  the  other  must  give  way.  Confronted  by  the 
bright  daylight  of  consciousness,  by  reflection's  piercing  ray 
which  strikes  it  to  the  heart,  beauty  must  needs  pale  and  vanish. 
"We  can  see  that  just  insofar  as  reflection  grows  weaker  and 
more  obscure,  in  the  organic  world,  beauty  emerges  all  the 
brighter  and  more  overpowering.  Nevertheless,  just  as  two 
lines  diverging  from  a  point,  extended  to  infinity,  will  suddenly 
come  together  again  on  the  other  sidej  or,  just  as  the  image  in 

*  From  the  original  German  essay,  "  'Geist*  und  'Leben'  in  der  Philosophic 
der  Gegenwart,"  which  appeared  in  Die  Nfue  Rundschau  (Berlin  und  Leipzig, 
1930 — I,  pp.  244-264),  translated  specifically  for  this  volume  by  Robert  Walter 
Bretall  and  Paul  Arthur  Schilpp. 

857 


858  ERNST  CASSIRER 

a  concave  mirror,  when  extended  to  the  infinite,  suddenly 
emerges  again  directly  before  us:  even  so,  when  knowledge 
has,  so  to  speak,  traversed  the  infinite,  beauty  once  again  will 
disclose  itself,  so  that  simultaneously  it  will  appear  in  its  purest 
form  in  that  human  organism  which  either  is  without  con- 
sciousness at  all  or  has  an  infinite  consciousness — i.e.,  in  the 
marionette  or  in  God."  For  man,  once  driven  from  the  paradise 
of  immediacy — man  who  has  once  partaken  of  the  tree  of 
knowledge  and  therewith  has  forever  left  behind  the  limits  of 
merely  natural  existence,  of  life  which  is  unconscious  of  itself 
— for  man  it  follows  that  he  must  traverse  his  appointed  orbit, 
in  order  at  the  end  of  his  road  to  find  his  way  back  again  to  its 
beginning.  That  is  the  fate  imposed  by  our  "circular  world." 
"Paradise  is  bolted  fast,  and  the  cherub  far  behind  us;  we  must 
travel  around  the  world  and  see  whether  perchance  an  entrance 
can  be  found  somewhere  from  the  rear." 

Kleist's  essay,  "The  Marionette  Theatre,"  appeared  in  the 
Berliner  Abendblatter  in  1810  and  is  thus  well  over  100  years 
old.  But  if  some  one  came  upon  it  today  who  did  not  know  its 
original  author,  he  might  well  imagine  that  the  writer  belongs 
to  our  own  time — so  clearly  does  he  mirror  the  problematic 
character  of  our  anthropology  today,  of  our  philosophical  doc- 
trine of  man.  At  once  all  the  well-known  names  and  works  of 
present-day  philosophy  press  for  comparison:  in  this  trend  we 
see  once  again  how  deep  the  roots  of  our  "modern"  and  most 
up-to-date  philosophical  thinking  go  down  into  the  soil  of 
Romanticism,  and  how,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  they  all 
depend  upon  Romantic  prototypes.  Today  anew  the  great 
antithesis  of  "Nature"  and  "Spirit,"  the  polarity  of  "Life"  and 
"Knowledge,"  looms  as  the  very  centre  of  philosophical  specu- 
lation— and  it  is  still  in  terms  of  Romantic  concepts  and  Ro- 
mantic categories  that  the  problems  are  posed  and  their  solu- 
tion is  sought.  But  really  the  conflict  seems  to  have  been 
sharpened,  and  the  contradiction  stands  before  us  even  more 
definitive  and  inexorable  than  in  the  days  of  Romanticism.  For 
in  order  to  meet  this  contradiction,  however  sharply  it  might 
be  set  forth,  Romantic  philosophy  has  always  held  ready  a 
definite  metaphysical  solution  and  reconciliation:  in  the  last 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  859 

analysis,  by  way  of  various  mediations,  the  contradiction  runs 
squarely  into  the  underlying  concept  of  the  "Identity  philoso- 
phy." "What  we  call  Nature/1  as  Schelling  puts  it  in  his 
System  of  Transcendental  Idealism,  "is  a  poem  which  lies  locked 
up  in  a  wonderful,  secret  script.  Yet  the  riddle  could  be  solved, 
if  we  would  but  learn  to  recognize  the  spirit's  Odyssey  as, 
wondrously  deceptive,  it  seeks  itself  in  continual  flight  from  it- 
self." From  any  such  solution  of  the  riddle,  from  any  such 
aesthetic  harmonizing  of  the  contradiction  between  Nature  and 
Spirit,  modern  philosophy  is  far  removed.  It  recognizes  and 
permits,  on  this  point,  no  purely  aesthetic  compromise,  but 
rather  seeks  to  apprehend  and  to  tear  open  for  us  the  chasm 
between  the  two  worlds  in  all  its  yawning  depth.  Thus  espe- 
cially in  the  writing  of  Ludwig  Klages,  where  the  problem  has 
been  given  its  most  pointed  expression,  Spirit  appears  as  a 
power  which  in  the  very  depths  of  its  being  is  anti-divine  and 
hostile  to  Life.  "Consciousness"  and  "Life,"  "cogitare"  and 
"esse"  remain  sundered  from  each  other  at  the  very  root  of 
their  being.  Having  given  himself  to  the  domination  of  Spirit, 
man  sets  himself  at  variance  with  Life  and  entrusts  himself  to 
vampiric  forces  which  enter  into  the  music  of  the  spheres  as  a 
piercing  dissonance. 

One  feels  it  almost  as  a  redemption  from  this  magic-mythical 
web  in  which  Klages5  theory  of  consciousness  threatens  to  en- 
tangle us,  when  we  shift  our  attention  from  this  to  the  basic 
doctrines  of  Max  Scheler's  "Anthropology,"  as  developed  in 
his  latest  philosophical  writings,  particularly  in  his  book,  Die 
Stellung  des  Menschen  im  Kosmos.1  A  presentation,  and  inter- 
pretation and  critical  examination  of  these  basic  doctrines  re- 
mains indeed  an  audacious  undertaking.  For  Scheler's  Anthro- 
pology remained  fragmentary;  we  still  do  not  know  whether 
we  shall  ever  possess  it  in  all  the  breadth  and  fulness  in  which 
he  himself  had  originally  planned  and  conclusively  envisaged 
it.  Only  a  few  brief  sketches  of  the  project  as  a  whole  were 
published  by  Scheler  himself;  only  a  few  of  the  major  lines 

1  First  appearing  under  the  title,  "Die  Sonderstellung  des  Menschen,"  in  the 
collection  of  essays,  Mensch  und  Erde;  now  published  separately  (Otto  Reichl 
Verlag,  Darmstadt). 


860  ERNST  CASSIRER 

of  demarcation  were  drawn  and  firmly  laid  down.  We  must  try 
to  hold  to  these  lines  of  demarcation  in  order  to  use  them  as 
guide-posts  to  the  new  world  of  ideas  which  opened  up  to 
Scheler  during  the  last  few  years  of  his  life.  What  makes 
Scheler's  solution  so  distinctive,  and  also,  at  first  glance,  so 
paradoxical  and  foreign  to  our  customary  thought-patterns,  is 
this:  in  no  wise  does  he  seek  to  reconcile  "Life"  and  "Spirit" — 
or  to  overcome  the  dualism  between  the  two}  but  he  succeeds 
nonetheless  in  drawing  a  totally  different  picture  of  the  real 
meaning  and  significance  of  this  dualism,  of  this  original  cleav- 
age of  Being  within  itself,  from  that  presented  by  traditional 
Western  metaphysics.  From  this  tradition  he  parts  company 
in  two  respects.  On  the  one  hand  he  absolutely  forswears  any 
and  all  attempts  at  a  monistic  "identity-philosophy,"  whether 
of  the  speculative  or  of  the  empirical-scientific  variety.  Accord- 
ing to  Scheler  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  evolution  leading 
from  bare  Life  to  Spirit,  no  such  thing  as  a  gradual  emergence 
of  the  latter  out  of  the  former.  "The  new  principle,"  he  empha- 
sizes, "which  makes  man  truly  man,  is  something  that  stands 
entirely  outside  the  realm  of  what  can  be  called  'Life'  ...  in 
even  its  most  inclusive  sense.  That  which  makes  mankind  truly 
human  is  a  principle  standing  in  direct  opposition  to  all  Life  qua 
Life,  and  which,  as  such,  cannot  in  any  way  be  traced  back  to 
'the  natural  evolution  of  life'."  That  this  is  so,  that  in  all  those 
activities  which  are  usually  embraced  under  the  term  "Spirit," 
what  we  have  is  not  any  simple  extension  of  the  functions  of  Life 
as  such,  nor  so  to  speak  any  tranquil  emergence  therefrom,  but 
on  the  contrary  a  resolute  reversal  of  Life's  basic  direction: 
according  to  Scheler  this  much  is  shown,  above  all,  in  that  just 
the  aforementioned  activities,  measured  in  terms  of  bare  Life, 
are  not  positive  but  negative  in  kind.  What  makes  itself  felt  in 
them  is  no  intensification  of  Life's  natural  forces,  but  rather 
their  obstruction,  a  giving  pause  and  a  turning  aside  from  every- 
thing toward  which  Life  is  oriented,  when  Life  is  conceived 
purely  as  impulse,  purely  in  its  own  sphere  and  according  to 
the  principle  of  its  own  dynamic  motion.  Man  is  not  wholly 
man  until  he  executes  this  turning  aside — until  he  is  no  longer 
tied  and  bound  fast  to  the  wheels  and  engines  of  purely  vital 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  86 1 

events,  but  is  able  to  view  them  from  a  vantage-point  outside 
and  above. 

The  basic  determination  of  a  spiritual  being,  according  to 
Scheler,  is  consequently  his  existential  disengagement,  his  free- 
dom, his  release  from  confinement,  from  compulsion,  from 
dependence  upon  the  organic.  "Such  a  Spiritual'  being  is  not 
longer  bound  to  impulse  or  to  his  environing  world,  but  free 
from  it  and,  as  we  should  like  to  call  it,  open  to  the  world.  Such 
a  being  may  be  said  to  have  a  'world;'  he  is  able  to  raise  to  the 
status  of  'objects'  those  centres  of  resistance  and  reaction  origi- 
nally presented  to  him  by  his  environment  (in  which  environ- 
ment the  animal  ecstatically  loses  itself),  and  even  to  grasp 
the  very  quintessence  of  these  'objects'  in  their  essential  being, 
without  the  limitations  of  experiencing  this  world  of  objects 
or  its  'givenness'  via  the  apparatus  of  vital  impulses  and  via  its 
sense  functions  and  organs.  Hence  Spirit  is  objectification,  the 
capacity  of  determination  through  the  essence  of  things  as  such. 
And  such  a  being  is  a  'carrier'  of  Spirit,  whose  principal  inter- 
course with  reality  outside  itself  has  dynamically  reversed  itself 
completely  in  its  relation  to  the  animal."  By  means  of  highly 
original  and  epistemologically  weighty  and  fruitful  trains  of 
thought  Scheler  seeks  to  show  how  precisely  the  fundamental 
cognitive  functions — those  functions  to  which  we  are  indebted 
for  the  construction  of  an  "objective"  world  in  any  proper 
sense — measured  purely  by  reference  to  Life's  relational 
system,  exhibit  a  negative  prefix.  "Pure"  space  and  "pure"  time, 
for  example,  are  nothing  but  schemata — i.e.,  empty  forms  of 
cognition.  Manifestly  neither  one  has  any  positive  content; 
neither  are  they  "objects"  in  the  sense  that  effects  flow  from 
them  or  can  be  wrought  upon  them.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
are  clearly  not  a  mere  nothing:  rather  it  is  in  this  their  very 
negativity, — in  this  basic  opposition  of  theirs  to  anything  real, — 
that  they  possess  an  entirely  definite  meaning,  which  is  a  neces- 
sary function  for  the  theoretical  formation  and  for  the  theoreti- 
cal cognition  of  reality.  This  function  depends  upon  the  fact  that 
empty  space  and  empty  time  are  pure  forms  of  order — forms 
which  apply  not  only  to  the  actual,  but  extend  beyond  that  to 
the  possible.  Space — as  Leibniz  already  defined  it — is  the  order 


862  ERNST  CASSIRER 

of  all  possible  togetherness,  just  as  time  is  the  order  of  all 
possible  successiveness.  This  concept  of  the  possible — which 
Leibniz  first  used  to  open  up  the  realm  of  the  Ideal,  the  region 
of  "eternal  truths" — from  the  standpoint  of  philosophical 
anthropology  now  reveals  itself  as  a  quite  peculiar,  a  specifically 
human  concept.  What  perhaps  differentiates  man  most  sharply 
from  the  beast,  according  to  Scheler,  is  just  this,  that  he  is  not 
fast  bound  to  the  actuality  of  the  moment  which  surrounds  him, 
and  that  he  is  not  held  by  it,  but  is  capable  of  the  free  contem- 
plation of  the  Possible.  "The  animal  is  as  little  able  to  separate 
the  empty  form  of  space  and  time  from  the  specific  content  of 
things  in  its  environment,  as  it  is  to  abstract  'number'  from  the 
greater  or  lesser  'quantity'  of  things  themselves.  It  lives  entirely 
in  the  concrete  actuality  of  its  specious  present.  Only  when  the 
instinctive  expectations,  transforming  themselves  into  motivat- 
ing impulses,  gain  the  ascendancy  over  everything  which  is 
[merely]  factual  instinctive  fulfilment  in  perception  or  sensa- 
tion, does  there  take  place  in  man  the  exceedingly  unique  phe- 
nomenon that  spatial  and  also  temporal  emptiness  appear  to 
precede  and  to  be  the  foundation  of  all  possible  contents  of  per- 
ception and  of  the  whole  world  of  material  objects." 

Thus  again  we  see  the  antithesis  between  "Life"  and  "Spirit" 
stressed  as  sharply  as  possible  and  rigorously  carried  out — 
nevertheless,  in  the  definition  of  the  basic  relationships  of  the 
two  to  each  other,  the  prefix,  so  to  speak,  has  now  been  changed. 
For  Scheler  has  not  the  slightest  doubt  concerning  the  superi- 
ority and  sovereignty  of  the  spirit  in  the  metaphysical  hierarchy 
and  order  of  values.  One  thing  only  he  emphasizes — that  this 
superiority  in  point  of  value  be  in  no  way  equated  with  superi- 
ority in  point  of  existence  or  efficacy.  Rather  we  encounter  here 
another  peculiar  antithesis,  and  one  which  seems  at  last  destined 
to  trace  the  dualism  of  Life  and  Spirit  down  to  its  very  deepest 
roots.  Scheler  most  resolutely  opposes  the  doctrine  that  the 
higher  value,  in  the  totality  of  being  and  becoming,  must  also 
be  endowed  with  the  greater  strength.  Over  against  this  opti- 
mistic viewpoint  he  sets  the  sharply  contradictory  thesis:  the 
Spirit,  or  the  Idea,  in  which  a  supreme  value  seems  collected  and 
concentrated,  is,  precisely  because  of  this  fact,  by  no  means 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  863 

commensurable  in  terms  of  power,  of  immediate  actuality  and 
efficacy,  with  Life  and  with  the  merely  vital  forces.  As  we  have 
seen,  man  was  defined  by  Scheler  as  the  living  being  who  is 
capable  of  assuming  a  primarily  ascetic  attitude  toward  his  own 
life.  Compared  to  animals,  who  always  say  "Yes"  to  whatever 
happens  to  be,  even  when  they  are  repelled  and  are  running 
away,  man  is  "the  being  who  is  able  to  say  <No',"  "the  ascetic 
toward  Life,"  the  everlasting  protestant  against  sheer  actuality. 
"Here,  however,  arises  the  decisive  question:  does  the  Spirit 
arise  out  of  ascesisy  repression,  and  sublimation — or  does  it 
merely  derive  its  energy  from  these?  In  the  answer  to  this 
question  lies  a  radical  parting  of  the  ways.  It  is  my  own  con- 
viction that  the  being  of  the  Spirit  in  no  way  hinges  on  this 
negative  activity,  this  'No'  to  actuality,  but  only,  as  it  were,  its 
supply  of  energy  and  therewith  its  ability  to  manifest  itself." 
Hence  the  Spirit,  as  Scheler  understands  it,  is  at  the  outset  abso- 
lutely powerless.  All  the  power  of  which  it  can  avail  itself  in  its 
struggle  with  Life  stems  not  from  itself;  it  must  rather,  in  a 
unique  roundabout  way,  wrest  it  from  the  realm  of  Life  itself, 
step  by  step,  through  just  that  act  of  asceticism  and  impulse- 
sublimation.  Erroneous,  according  to  Scheler,  is  that  theory 
which  originates  in  the  Greek  conception  of  Spirit  and  of  the 
Idea — the  doctrine  of  the  "inherent  power  of  the  Idea,"  its 
inner  strength  and  activity,  its  independent  efficacy.  True,  the 
Spirit  may  gradually  attain  power  to  the  degree  that  Life's  im- 
pulses enter  into  its  lawfulness:  "but  to  begin  with  and  in  its 
original  form,  the  Spirit  has  not  energy  of  its  own."  Hence  the 
Spirit  must  be  content  with  pointing  Life's  forces  toward  a 
definite  goal,  in  terms  of  its  own  ideational  structures  and  mean- 
ings; but  it  is  not  the  Spirit's  own  task  to  produce  this  goal.  The 
promised  land  to  which  it  points  is  and  remains  a  land  of  mere 
promise.  At  no  other  point,  perhaps,  does  Scheler's  theory 
diverge  so  clearly  from  that  of  Hegel,  which  comes  to  a  focus 
precisely  in  this  one  thought,  the  conviction  that  the  Idea  is  not 
merely  a  task,  but  a  "substantial  power."  "Human  spirit  and 
human  volition" — Scheler  emphasizes,  over  against  Hegel — 
"can  never  mean  more  than  guidance  and  direction."  And  this 
means  simply  that  the  Spirit,  as  such,  presents  Ideas  to  the 


864  ERNST  CASSIRER 

impulsive  forces}  but  not  that  it  introduces  any  original  potency 
of  its  own  for  the  realization  of  these  Ideas.  Consequently,  this 
is  how  the  goal  and  the  true  meaning  of  human  evolution  now 
appear:  "the  mutual  penetration  of  the  originally  impotent 
Spirit  and  the  originally  demonic  Impulses  (i.e.,  one  which,  as 
over  against  all  spiritual  Ideas  and  values,  is  blind)  .  .  .  and 
the  simultaneous  empowering,  i.e.,  enlivening,  of  the  Spirit  is 
the  final  End  and  Goal  of  all  finite  being  and  becoming — which 
Theism  mistakenly  posits  as  the  point  of  departure." 

II 

Here,  however,  two  questions  arise  to  which,  as  far  as  I  can 
see,  this  firmly  joined  and  internally  coherent  system  of 
Scheler's  anthropology  no  longer  affords  any  answer.  First  of 
all:  if  Life  and  Spirit  belong  to  entirely  disparate  worlds — if 
they  are  completely  foreign  to  each  other  in  their  nature  as  well 
as  in  their  origin — how  is  it  possible  that  they  nevertheless  can 
accomplish  a  perfectly  homogeneous  piece  of  work,  that  they 
co-operate  and  interpenetrate  in  constructing  the  specifically 
human  world,  the  world  of  "meaning"?  Is  this  interpenetration 
— to  use  a  word  which  Lotze  once  coined  in  another  epistemo- 
logical  connection — nothing  more  or  less  than  a  "happy  acci- 
dent"? How  can  it  be  explained  that  the  forces  of  Life — the 
purely  vital,  impulsive  urges  in  Scheler's  sense — permit  them- 
selves to  be  diverted  from  their  own  paths  and  to  take  that 
other,  precisely  opposite  direction,  which  the  law  of  the  Spirit 
demands?  True,  Scheler  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  Spirit  by 
no  means  directly  breaks  in  or  infringes  upon  the  world  of  Life 
— that  it  has  no  force  of  its  own  to  set  over  against  the  force  of 
Life's  impulses,  but  that  it  is  content  to  function  in  a  purely 
symbolic  manner,  by  pointing  and  showing  the  way.  The  Ideas 
are  not  efficacious;  they  merely  lead  and  direct;  they  illumine 
the  course  of  Life,  but  they  do  not  compel  it  to  take  a  certain 
direction.  But  in  spite  of  all  this:  how  is  Life  capable  of  even 
seeing  the  Ideas  which  the  Spirit  holds  up  to  it  and  of  directing 
its  way  by  them,  as  by  starry  constellations,  if  its  pristine  nature 
be  defined  as  mere  impulse,  i.e.,  as  spiritually  blind?  If  we  are 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  865 

to  gain  an  answer  to  this  question,  within  the  framework  of 
Scheler's  anthropology,  we  must,  it  seems,  risk  a  leap  into  the 
darkj  we  must  refer  back  to  the  unity  of  the  metaphysical 
world-ground — the  ground  which  nevertheless  unites  what  to 
us  is  and  remains  manifestly  heterogeneous  and  knits  it  into 
a  single  whole.  Scheler  himself,  at  one  point  in  his  essay  on 
"Die  Stellung  des  Menschen,"  has  pointed  the  way  toward  some 
such  solution.  He  stresses  the  idea  that  the  Spirit  absolutely 
never  can  be  derived  from  Life  or  explained  in  terms  of  Life, 
since  it  is  rather  a  principle  standing  in  opposition  to  all  Life 
as  such,  so  that  it  must  fall  back,  if  on  anything  at  all,  upon  the 
supreme  Ground  of  things  themselves.  However  widely  Spirit 
and  Life  may  diverge,  for  us,  in  all  their  phenomenal  forms 
and  appearances,  there  always  remains  nonetheless  the  possi- 
bility that  the  two  may  meet  at  some  infinitely  distant  point — 
that  they  may,  in  some  manner  unknown  to  us,  be  held  together 
in  that  X  which  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  the  universe.  But 
with  such  an  answer  the  Gordian  knot  is  really  not  so  much 
untied  as  cut.  It  is  remarkable  that  Scheler,  with  all  the  evident 
originality  and  excellence  of  his  last  philosophical  works,  is  here 
thrown  back  upon  problems  which  belong  to  the  very  oldest 
stratum  of  the  metaphysical  thinking  and  self-reflection  of  man- 
kind. Already  his  conception  of  "Spirit"  as  such,  in  its  very 
wording  and  original  definition,  is  unmistakably  reminiscent 
of  Aristotle's,  and  Scheler  confronts  us  with  the  same  internal 
difficulties  in  which  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  Spirit  finally 
ensnares  us.  Aristotle's  Spirit,  or  vou^  is  related  to  the  lower 
mental  faculties,  to  the  forces  of  the  purely  vital  sphere — to 
sense-perception,  memory  and  ideation — not  as  an  additional 
member  of  the  same  evolutionary  series,  but  rather  as  super- 
ordinate  to  them  all:  it  enters  into  the  world  of  Life  and  of 
psychical  being  "from  without."  Here,  however,  burst  upon  us 
all  those  questions  with  which  the  entire  metaphysics  and  the 
whole  psychology  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  thereafter  the  psy- 
chology of  the  Renaissance,  wrestled  on  and  on,  and  which  even 
today,  as  the  structure  of  Scheler's  anthropology  shows,  seem 
not  yet  to  have  been  definitively  silenced.  How  is  the  Spirit  able 


866  ERNST  CASSIRER 

to  exert  any  effect  on  a  world  to  which  it  does  not  itself  belong  j 
— how  can  the  transcendence  of  the  Idea  be  reconciled  with  the 
immanence  of  Life? 

For  Aristotle  himself  the  answer  to  this  question  is  supplied 
by  his  system  of  teleology.  The  Aristotelian  God — who  is  con- 
ceived as  pure  Spirit  without  admixture  of  anything  material, 
as  actus  purus,  as  "thought  thinking  thought" — nevertheless 
moves  the  world:  but  he  does  so  not  in  a  mechanical  way,  not 
through  any  external  impetus,  but  rather  because,  as  the  Su- 
preme Form,  he  also  constitutes  the  purpose  towards  which  the 
universe  itself  is  striving  as  the  goal  of  its  own  self-realization. 
Thus  God  moves  the  world  not  through  physical  force,  but  "as 
the  beloved  object  moves  the  lover."  This  interpretation  (so 
profound  and  beautiful  in  itself)  of  the  relation  between  God 
and  the  world,  between  Idea  and  Life,  is,  however,  no  longer 
useful  to  Scheler  in  the  last  phase  of  his  philosophy;  it  is, 
for  him,  antiquated  and  superseded.  He  charges  the  "classical 
theory"  of  the  Spirit,  as  developed  in  ancient  Greece,  with 
precisely  this,  that  in  its  consequences  it  has  led  "to  the  untena- 
ble nonsense  of  a  so-called  teleological  Weltanschauung"  as  it 
has  dominated  the  whole  theistic  philosophy  of  the  Occident. 
But  failing  this  classical,  theistic-teleological  solution  of  the 
problem — what  other  solution  remains?  How  is  it  to  be  ex- 
plained that  Life  follows  the  pattern  set  before  it  by  the  Idea — 
if  there  is  not  contained  in  Life  itself  an  immanent  "trend 
toward  the  Idea" — if  (to  speak  in  Platonic  terms)  a  yearning 
for  the  Idea  and  striving  toward  it  were  not  already  prevalent  in 
the  phenomenal  world?  May  not  Life,  after  all,  be  something 
other  and  something  more  than  mere  impulse,  more  than  a  drive 
into  the  indeterminate  and  the  aimless?  Does  there  not  exist 
originally  within  Life  itself  the  Will  to  attain  its  own  self- 
portrayal,  its  own  self-objectification,  its  own  "visibility"?  And 
on  the  other  hand:  must  not  the  Spirit — even  if  one  ascribes  to  it 
no  original  energy  of  its  own  and  confines  its  activity  merely  to 
the  inhibiting  of  the  natural,  purely  vital  forces — must  not  the 
Spirit,  even  in  this  inhibiting,  still  be  something  positively 
determinate  and  something  positively  effective?  How  could 
even  this  stoppage,  this  unique  damming  up  of  Life's  forces 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  867 

and  impulses  ever  succeed,  if,  from  the  very  beginning,  the 
Spirit  were  entirely  impotent?  The  problem  of  the  opposition 
between  Life  and  Spirit,  as  posed  in  modern  metaphysics,  is 
strikingly  reminiscent  in  more  ways  than  one  of  that  set  of 
problems  in  the  older  metaphysics  which  centered  around  the 
mind-body  problem.  As  greatly  different  as  is  the  mere  content 
of  the  questions  in  these  two  cases,  the  essential,  purely  methodi- 
cal motives  repeat  themselves  in  both  instances  in  a  peculiar 
way.  Thus  immediately  alongside  Scheler's  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion concerning  the  unification  of  Life  and  Spirit  we  may  place 
Descartes'  answer  to  the  question  of  the  unification,  the  "union" 
of  body  and  soul.  Descartes  begins  with  the  proposition  that  the 
soul  can  neither  beget  any  new  force  in  the  field  of  bodily  events, 
nor  destroy  any  force  already  extant:  for  the  realm  of  bodily 
events  constitutes  a  homogeneous,  tightly  closed  causal  system, 
which  is  determined  by  a  strict  law  of  conservation,  by  the  law 
of  constancy  of  momentum  in  the  universe.  Thus  the  soul,  of 
itself,  can  neither  create  any  physical  energy  nor  can  it  destroy 
any  already  in  existence.  Only  one  possibility  remains  to  the 
soul,  according  to  Descartes,  and  this  is  that  it  may  determine 
and  under  certain  conditions  alter  the  direction  of  these  move- 
ments operating  in  the  physical  realm}  and  it  is  supposed  to  be 
precisely  this  change  of  direction,  which  marks  the  souPs  in- 
fluence upon  the  body,  and  to  which  this  effect  is  confined.  The 
objection  which  remained  standing  against  this  solution  of  the 
mind-body  problem,  and  which  was  at  once  raised  by  Leibniz, 
lay  just  in  the  fact  that  even  this  mere  change  of  direction 
necessarily  demands  a  certain  definite  expenditure  of  energy, 
without  which  it  is  inconceivable.  Quite  analogously,  even  that 
process  of  mere  inhibition — which,  with  Freud,  Scheler  calls  the 
sublimation  of  life — would  be  incomprehensible  and  impossible, 
were  the  Spirit,  which  is  to  effect  this  result,  in  its  essence  to  be 
thought  of  as  totally  impotent.  Even  this  inhibition  must  ulti- 
mately go  back  to  some  sort  of  positive  factor  and  to  some  posi- 
tive impulse.  If  one  takes  the  "Spirit"  exclusively  in  the  sense 
of  Scheler's  original  definition,  it  will  never  be  able  in  any  way 
to  effect  anything  beyond  itself.  Of  it,  Faust's  saying  would  hold 
strictly  true: 


868  ERNST  CASSIRER 

The  god  that  dwells  within  my  soul 
Can  stir  to  life  my  inmost  deeps. 
Full  sway  o'er  all  my  powers  he  keeps, 
But  naught  external  can  he  e'er  control.2 

When  Life  is  once  defined  as  the  "wholly  other,"  as  the  contra- 
dictory opposite  of  Spirit,  it  becomes  impossible  to  see  how  this 
contradiction  can  ever  be  resolved — how  the  Spirit's  summons 
is  not  to  die  away  in  emptiness,  but  is  still  to  be  heard  in  the 
sphere  of  Life  and  to  be  understood  there. 

Ill 

Herewith  we  at  once  arrive  at  a  very  general  question  which 
must  be  put  to  Scheler's  projected  philosophical  anthropology. 
Does  there  really  obtain  this  relationship  of  strict  opposition, 
i.e.,  a  genuine  logical  disjunction  between  the  "classical"  doc- 
trine, which  Scheler  combats,  and  his  own  basic  point  of  view 
— between  the  view  which  grants  the  Spirit  absolute  substantial 
power  over  all  actuality  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  which  sees 
it  as  a  principle  "powerless"  from  the  very  beginning?  Such 
would  only  be  the  case,  if  the  concept  of  "power"  itself  were  a 
completely  definite,  logically  entirely  unambiguous  concept,  so 
that  we  could  be  quite  certain  it  was  being  taken  in  exactly  the 
same  strictly  circumscribed  sense  in  both  theses  of  the  disjunc- 
tion. But  it  is  precisely  this  presupposition  which  seems  not  to 
be  fulfilled  in  this  case.  A  keener  analysis  of  HegePs,  as  well  as 
of  Scheler's,  concept  of  "power"  seems  to  me  to  indicate  that 
there  exists  here  an  equivocation  which  must  first  be  cleared  up, 
if  we  wish  to  lay  bare  the  distinctive,  the  fundamental  problem 
which  is  in  question  at  this  point.  Scheler  himself  does  not? 
distinguish  between  efficient  energy  and  that  kind  which  might 
be  called  jormatvue  energy  or  energy  of  pure  formation.  Yet 
between  the  two  there  is  an  essential  and  very  specific  difference. 
Efficient  energy  aims  immediately  at  man's  environment, 
whether  it  be  in  order  to  apprehend  it  as  it  actually  is  and  take 
possession  of  it,  or  in  order  to  alter  its  course  in  some  definite 
direction.  Formative  energy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  aimed 

"Lines  1566  to  1569  (incl.)  of  Goethe's  Faust,  First  Part,  as  translated  by 
George  Madison  Priest  (Alfred  Knopf,  New  York,  1941),  46. 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  869 

directly  at  this  outer  environment,  but  rather  remains  self- 
contained:  it  moves  within  the  dimension  of  the  pure  "image," 
and  not  in  that  of  "actuality."  Here  the  human  spirit  does  not 
directly  turn  against  objects,  but  rather  weaves  itself  into  a 
world  of  its  own,  a  world  of  signs,  of  symbols  and  of  meanings. 
And  herewith  it  really  forfeits  that  immediate  oneness  which, 
in  the  lower  animals,  unites  "observing"  and  "effecting."  This 
is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  characteristic  traits  of  the  animal 
world,  of  its  organic  firmness  and  its  inner  organic  health, 
that  in  it  this  unity  is  most  strictly  preserved.  The  world  of  the 
Spirit,  on  the  contrary,  does  not  come  into  existence  until  the 
stream  of  Life  no  longer  merely  flows  freely,  but  is  held  back 
at  certain  points — until  Life,  instead  of  unceasingly  giving  birth 
to  new  Life  and  consuming  itself  in  these  very  births,  gathers 
itself  together  into  enduring  forms  and  projects  these  forms 
out  of  and  in  front  of  itself.  Herein  seems  to  me  to  lie  the  truth 
of  Scheler's  fundamental  position:  that  by  no  mer£  quantita- 
tive increase,  enhancement  or  intensification  of  Life  can  we  ever 
attain  the  realm  of  the  Spirit,  but  that  in  order  to  gain  entrance 
into  this  sphere  a  turnabout  and  return,  a  change  of  "mind" 
and  of  direction  are  necessary.  But  from  this  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  in  its  peculiar,  constitutive  principle  the  Spirit 
would  have  to  be  understood  as  completely  powerless,  as  utterly 
static  and  as  "the  ascetic  of  Life."  Indeed  the  Spirit  would  not 
be  capable  of  bringing  Life  to  this  relative  stand-still,  which  in  a 
certain  sense  marks  the  beginning  of  all  "understanding,"  if  it 
did  not  have  some  power  of  its  own  to  set  over  against  Life, 
power  which  is  not  borrowed  from  Life,  but  which  it  draws  from 
the  depths  of  its  own  being.  The  mediate  activity  of  form- 
creation,  to  be  sure,  differs  from  the  immediate  activity  of  work 
and  deed  in  the  direction  which  it  takes  and  in  the  goal  at  which 
it  aims;  but  it  is,  no  less  than  the  other,  pure  activity,  actus  purus. 
The  genuine  "ideas" — according  to  Spinoza,  and  this  is  true 
not  only  of  the  ideas  involved  in  pure  cognition,  but  also  of  the 
creations  of  language  and  the  arts,  of  myth  and  religion — stand 
there  not  like  silent  pictures  on  a  blackboard}  they  bring  them- 
selves into  being,  and  in  this  their  act  of  self-generation  they 
afford  at  the  same  time  a  new  intuition  into  "objective"  reality. 


870  ERNST  CASSIRER 

From  this  functional  character  of  pure  Form — i.e.y  from  the 
circumstance  that  it  ever  exists  only  insofar  as  it  continually  re- 
creates itself — it  first  becomes  wholly  clear  how  and  why  each 
form  is  antithetical  in  itself — why  a  necessary  polarity  must 
reside  therein.  It  is  always  a  double  movement  that  works  itself 
out  here:  a  continuous  alternation  of  the  forces  of  attraction  and 
repulsion.  "There  is  no  surer  way  of  evading  the  world  than 
through  art," — so  says  Goethe, — "and  there  is  no  surer  way  of 
binding  oneself  to  it  than  through  art."  This  double  determina- 
tion applies  to  every  kind  of  creative  activity  and  of  "symbolic 
formation."  This  formative  activity  always  begins  by  holding 
off  the  world,  as  it  were,  at  a  distance  and  by  erecting  a  barrier 
between  the  I  and  the  world.  In  the  purely  vital  sphere  no  such 
division  has  yet  taken  place.  Here  action  immediately  follows 
action  j  effect  is  followed  by  counter-effect,  from  which  again  a 
new  effect  arises.  Even  relatively  very  complicated  instinctive 
actions  of  animals  appear  to  be  nothing  other  than  such  "reflex 
chains."  But  with  the  first  dawning  of  spirituality  in  man  this 
kind  of  immediacy  is  a  thing  of  the  past.  Henceforth,  the  ten- 
sion between  the  I  and  its  environment  is  not  resolved  with  a 
single  stroke,  the  spark  between  the  two  no  longer  leaps  over 
directly;  rather  it  is  mediated  in  a  way  which,  instead  of  leading 
through  the  world  of  event  and  action,  proceeds  by  way  of 
creative  formation.  Only  at  the  end  of  this  long  and  difficult 
way  of  inner  formation  does  actuality  again  come  into  the 
purview  of  man.  In  his  research  into  anthropoid  intelligence 
Kohler  has  shown  that  the  highest  achievement  which  can 
possibly  be  expected  of  an  animal  is  the  art  of  the  "detour" — 
and  that  even  the  highest  animals  learn  this  art  only  with 
great  difficulty  and  to  a  very  limited  degree.  Compared  to  this, 
the  world  of  the  human  Spirit,  as  built  up  in  language  and  in 
the  use  of  tools,  in  artistic  representation  and  conceptual  knowl- 
edge, is  nothing  other  than  the  persistent,  continuously  expand- 
ing and  refined  "art  of  the  detour."  More  and  more  man  learns 
to  set  the  world  aside,  in  order  to  draw  it  to  himself — and  more 
and  more  these  two  basic  antithetical  directions  of  efficient  action 
come  to  melt,  for  him,  into  one  homogeneous  activity,  both  sides 
of  which,  like  inhaling  and  exhaling,  reciprocally  condition  one 
another.  Man  must  retreat  into  the  world  of  "unreality,"  into 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  871 

the  world  of  appearance  and  of  play,  in  order  therein  and  there- 
by to  conquer  the  world  of  reality.  For  aesthetic  theory,  this 
basic  insight  was  set  forth  above  all  by  Schiller,  and  developed 
by  him  in  all  its  ramifications.  From  this  point  of  view  Schiller's 
"Letters  on  the  Aesthetic  Education  of  Mankind"  looms  up  as 
one  of  the  fundamental  writings  on  which  modern  philosophical 
anthropology  is  also  based.  Here  is  the  root  of  that  famous  idea 
(Begriffserklarung)  in  which  Schiller  seeks  to  express  man's 
essential  nature:  "Man  only  plays  when  he  is  man  in  the  fullest 
sense  of  the  word,  and  he  is  only  fully  man  when  he  plays." 
This  pregnant  explanation  of  man's  being  is,  however,  expressly 
limited  by  Schiller  to  the  aesthetic  sphere:  according  to  him 
man  should  only  play  with  beauty,  but  also  he  should  play  only 
with  beauty.  But  if  we  take  the  concept  of  play  as  broadly  as 
possible,  this  limitation  [to  aesthetics]  turns  out  to  be  unsound 
and  unnecessary.  Rather  one  may  venture  the  paradox  that  not 
only  the  sphere  of  beauty  but  also  that  of  truth  is  first  wholly 
disclosed  to  man  by  the  play-function.  In  one  of  the  deepest  and 
most  fruitful  sections  of  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  it  is 
shown  that  the  function  of  pure  reason,  if  it  is  not  to  remain 
empty,  has  need  of  another  function  as  its  completion  and  neces- 
sary correlative — a  function  which  Kant  designates  by  the  name 
of  "productive  imagination."  And  he  went  on  to  infer  that 
everything  we  are  accustomed  to  call  simple  sensory  "percep- 
tion" is  most  closely  bound  up  with  this  function — that  the  pro- 
ductive imagination  also  forms  an  "ingredient  of  every  possible 
perception."  If  this  is  so,  then  what  we  call  the  intuition  of  "the 
actual"  does  not  occur  without  the  outlook  and  prospective 
glance  into  "the  possible"— then  furthermore,  the  construction 
of  the  "objective"  world  of  experience  is  dependent  upon  the 
original  formative  powers  of  the  Spirit  and  upon  the  funda- 
mental laws  according  to  which  they  act. 

IV 

It  is  impossible  to  enter  into  the  weighty  and  decisive  conse- 
quences for  epistemology  which  follow  from  this  basic  view- 
point.8 If  we  return,  instead,  to  our  starting-point  once  more, 

1 1  have  tried  to  draw  these  consequences  in  another  place,  the  third  volume 
of  my  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen  (published  by  Bruno  Cassirer). 


872  ERNST  CASSIRER 

to  the  way  in  which  the  problem  is  posited  in  Scheler's  philo- 
sophical anthropology,  we  shall  then  be  able  to  define  more 
sharply  the  basic  thesis  of  this  anthropology,  both  positively 
and  negatively.  What  Scheler  saw  and  what — even  in  the  brief 
sketch  of  his  anthropology  which  is  all  we  have  had  until  now 
— with  his  extraordinary  dialectical  power  and  mastery,  he  has 
succeeded  in  working  out,  is  precisely  that  tension,  that  ir- 
reconcilable difference,  that  antithesis  which  holds  between  the 
region  of  "Spirit"  and  that  of  "Life."  Here  he  successfully  dis- 
misses every  attempt  at  a  comfortable  "monistic"  solution. 
Scheler,  however,  does  not  stop  with  the  primary  and  methodi- 
cal contradiction  herein  demonstrated:  he  goes  on  immediately 
to  another,  metaphysical  contradiction  which  for  him  arises  out 
of  the  former — an  antithesis  not  between  functions  but  between 
real  powers  of  Being.  The  metaphysical  concept  of  "being,"  how- 
ever, is  marked  by  this  peculiarity,  that  it  possesses  a  strongly 
absolutistic  character.  Within  it  there  is  basically  no  room  for 
"being"  of  a  different  stamp  and  different  type  of  meaning. 
Rather  we  are  led  sooner  or  later  to  a  simple  "either-or" — to 
that  "crisis"  between  being  and  non-being  by  which  the  first 
great  thinker  of  Western  metaphysics,  Parmenides,  already 
found  himself  confronted.  In  Scheler's  philosophical  anthro- 
pology, too,  this  fate  of  metaphysics  is  borne  out  anew  in  a 
rather  singular  and  remarkable  way.  What  Scheler  gives  to  the 
Spirit  he  must  take  away  from  Life;  what  he  allots  the  latter 
he  must  deny  the  former.  Thus  for  him  originally  a  Spirit 
hostile  to  Life  and  a  Life  blind  to  Ideas  stand  confronting  one 
another — only  in  order  then  to  be  drawn  to  each  other  after  all, 
and,  as  if  by  a  miracle,  to  "find  their  way  back  to  each  other." 
The  Spirit,  powerless  in  itself,  and  without  drawing  upon  its 
own  resources,  but  sheerly  through  its  presence  (Daseiri)  and 
nature  (So-Seiri),  at  last  steers  Life  into  its  own  orbit;  and  Life 
yields  itself  to  the  Spirit,  it  follows  the  Ideas  which  are  held 
before  it,  even  though  these  Ideas,  seen  purely  from  the  stand- 
point of  Life,  mean  nothing  more  than  a  diversion  from  its  own 
goal  and  consequently  a  definite  weakening  and  obstruction. 
The  supreme,  yes  indeed  the  only  power  which  man  can  bring 
to  bear,  in  order  to  outgrow  the  realm  of  mere  vitality  and 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  873 

attain  his  distinctive  being  and  his  specific  worth,  is  accordingly 
the  power  of  asceticism.  That  Scheler  should  impute  to  ascetic- 
ism this  moral-spiritual  power  is  perhaps  the  only,  yet  at  the 
same  time  a  most  significant  symptom  of  the  fact  that  even  the 
final  "atheistic"  phase  of  his  philosophy  is  still  bound  as  by 
invisible  threads  to  the  earlier  period  of  his  thinking.  But  just 
here  it  seems  to  me  that  the  actual  inner  logic  of  Scheler's 
fundamental  position  clearly  points  even  beyond  the  stage  to 
which  he  himself  had  pursued  it  in  his  last  works  on  anthro- 
pology. For  it  would  indeed  be  comprehensible  that  asceticism 
might,  so  to  speak,  break  the  path  for  energies  already  at  hand 
and  standing  on  their  own;  but  not  that  it  could  call  these 
energies  forth,  as  it  were,  out  of  nothing,  or  that  it  should  be 
able  to  endow  with  real  strength,  in  the  first  place,  an  in- 
herently impotent  principle.  For  in  truth  that  asceticism  which 
is  viewed  by  Scheler  at  the  pre-condition  and  the  point  of  de- 
parture for  all  basic  phenomena  of  the  Spirit,  more  closely 
scrutinized,  bears  not  so  much  an  absolute  as  a  definitely  relative 
character.  Plainly  it  is  no  turning  away  from  Life  as  such,  but 
rather  an  inner  transformation  and  about-face  experienced  by 
Life  itself.  This  about-face — this  pathway  from  "Life"  to  "the 
Idea" — is  not  marked  by  rest  as  opposed  to  motion;  it  is  no 
quietistic,  inherently  inactive  principle  as  contrasted  with  rest- 
less becoming.  Rather  it  is  energies  of  a  different  order  and,  as 
it  were,  of  a  different  dimension  which  here  stand  confronting 
one  another.  The  most  comprehensive  definition  of  "Spirit" 
set  down  by  Scheler  is  to  the  effect  that  for  him  Spirit  means 
objectivity,  "determinability  through  the  essence  (So-Sein)  of 
things  as  such."  In  his  activity  man  is  presumed  to  be  deter- 
mined not,  like  the  animals,  by  the  mere  reaction  to  opposing 
forces,  but  by  the  intuition  of  objects — and  this  elevation  above 
the  circumstantial  to  the  realm  of  the  objective,  this  pure  object- 
existence  is  supposed  to  be  the  most  formal  category  of  the  logi- 
cal aspect  of  the  Spirit.  But  as  soon  as  this  definition  has  been 
agreed  to,  the  further  question  must  at  once  be  raised,  how  pre- 
cisely this  fundamental  act  of  objectification  is  itself  possible, 
and  by  what  it  is  conditioned.  The  totality  of  its  conditions,  it 
seems  to  me,  can  be  surveyed  and  exhibited  only  by  entering 


874  ERNST  CASSIRER 

into  the  "in-between"  realm  of  the  "symbolic  forms,"  by  view- 
ing the  many-sided  image-worlds  which  man  interposes  between 
himself  and  reality,  not  in  order  to  remove  and  thrust  the  latter 
from  him,  but  in  order,  by  thus  gaining  distance,  to  bring  it 
properly  within  the  purview  of  his  vision — in  order  to  elevate  it 
from  the  merely  tangible  sphere,  which  demands  immediate 
proximity,  to  that  of  the  visible.  Language  and  the  arts,  myth 
and  theoretical  knowledge,  all  work  together,  each  according  to 
its  own  inner  law,  at  this  process  of  spiritual  "setting  at  a 
distance:"  they  are  the  great  stages  on  the  way  which  leads 
from  the  Space  of  grasping  and  doing,  wherein  the  animal  lives 
and  remains,  as  it  were,  imprisoned,  to  the  Space  of  intuition 
and  thought,  to  that  of  the  spiritual  "horizon." 

Viewed  in  this  perspective,  the  polarity  of  Spirit  and  Life, 
which  constitutes  the  basic  idea  of  Scheler's  anthropology,  is  by 
no  means  cancelled  j  but,  systematically  considered,  it  now  ap- 
pears in  a  different  light.  Even  in  his  last  works,  however 
radical  a  transformation  of  his  views  they  may  contain,  Scheler 
still  speaks  the  language  of  a  definitely  realistic  metaphysics.  He 
sets  Spirit  and  Life  over  against  each  other  as  primeval  powers 
of  being — as  real  forces  which,  in  a  certain  way,  contend  with 
one  another  for  dominion  over  the  whole  of  reality.  In  doing 
this,  however,  a  purely  functional  antithesis  is  transformed  into 
a  substantial  one — from  a  distinction  exhibitable  in  phenomena 
we  are  suddenly  led  to  an  assertion  about  the  transcendental, 
initial  cause.  To  be  sure,  Scheler  even  here  remains  far  removed 
from  Klages'  mythicizing  and  demonizing  of  the  Spirit.  For 
Scheler  the  Spirit  is  demarcated  and  distinguished  precisely  by 
the  fact  that  it  can  never  be  exhibited  as  a  substantial  entity,  but 
only  in  its  pure  act  of  functioning,  in  its  living  actuality.  Just 
because  it  represents  the  principle  of  objectification  it  can  never 
itself  become  objective,  it  cannot  be  defined  and  comprehended 
in  the  manner  of  any  objective  entity.  But  in  spite  of  this  dis- 
claimer and  this  critical  delimitation,  the  Spirit,  even  for 
Scheler,  still  remains,  as  it  were,  a  kind  of  substantive.  In  him 
too  the  metaphysical  interest  in  the  end  takes  precedence  over 
the  purely  phenomenological:  the  Spirit  becomes  a  Being  sui 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  875 

standing  over  and  above  the  being  of  mere  Life.  If, 
instead,  one  understands  Life  and  Spirit  not  as  substantial 
essences  set  over  against  one  another,  but  takes  both  of  them 
in  the  sense  of  their  pure  functional  activity,  the  antithesis  be- 
tween the  two  immediately  acquires  a  different  meaning.  No 
longer  need  the  Spirit  be  viewed  as  a  principle  foreign  or  hostile 
to  all  Life,  but  it  may  be  understood  as  a  turning  and  about- 
face  of  Life  itself — ,  a  transformation  which  it  experiences 
within  itself,  insofar  as  it  passes  from  the  circle  of  merely  organic 
creativity  and  formation  into  the  circle  of  "form,"  the  circle  of 
ideal  formative  activity. 

At  this  point  the  fundamental  thesis  of  "Objective  Idealism" 
completely  maintains  its  ground,  in  the  face  of  all  the  criticism 
which  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries',  "philosophy  of 
life"  has  urged  against  it.  Especially  as  concerns  Hegel,  it 
would  be  a  complete  misunderstanding  of  his  system  to  bring 
against  it  the  reproach  that  by  reason  of  its  panlogistic  tendency 
it  denies  the  rights  of  Life — that  it  has  sacrificed  the  vital 
sphere  to  that  of  logic.  Even  a  mere  glance  at  the  historical  de- 
velopment of  the  Hegelian  doctrine  is  sufficient  to  invalidate 
this  objection:  for  it  is  precisely  in  the  writings  of  HegePs  early 
period  that,  in  connection  with  his  investigations  in  philosophy 
of  history  and  philosophy  of  religion,  a  new,  systematically  most 
fruitful  concept  of  Life  is  coined.  In  the  introduction  to  his 
Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  however,  Hegel  then,  in  propositions 
of  truly  classical  formulation,  proceeded  to  carry  out  the  ad- 
vance and  to  make  the  definitive  break.  He  now  demands  that 
the  self-contained  and  closed  substantiality  of  life  open  up,  that 
it  spread  out  and  reveal  itself:  for  only  in  this  process  and  by 
virtue  of  it  can  mere  substance  achieve  its  "Being-for-itself" 
and  become  a  "subject."  "The  strength  of  the  Spirit  is  only  as 
great  as  its  expression;  its  depth  only  as  deep  as  in  its  revelation 
it  dares  to  expand  and  lose  itself."  The  realization  of  this  princi- 
ple demands  not  only  that  Spirit  and  Life  come  to  know  them- 
selves as  opposites}  but  that,  at  the  same  time,  on  account  of 
this  very  opposition,  they  seek  and  demand  each  other.  The 
polarity  between  the  two  remains,  but  it  loses  its  appearance  of 


876  ERNST  CASSIRER 

absolute  estrangement.  Indeed,  if  we  pass  in  review  the  whole 
series  of  accusations  which  the  modern  "philosophy  of  life"  has 
raised  against  the  usurped  supremacy  of  the  Spirit,  one  objec- 
tion immediately  obtrudes  itself.  Who  exactly — it  must  be  in- 
quired— is  the  plaintiff,  and  who  the  defendant  in  the  trial  here 
getting  under  way?  It  seems  as  if  Life  were  here  brought  to 
the  bar  against  the  Spirit,  in  order  to  defend  itself  against  the 
latter's  enroachment,  against  its  violence  and  its  conceit.  And 
yet  this  impression  is  deceptive — for  Life  as  such  is  self-im- 
prisoned, and  in  this  self-imprisonment  is  speechless.  It  has  no 
language  other  than  that  which  the  Spirit  lends  it.  Hence, 
wherever  it  is  summoned  against  the  Spirit,  the  latter  in  truth 
is  always  both  assailant  and  defendant,  plaintiff  and  judge  in 
one.  The  real  drama  takes  place  not  between  Spirit  and  Life, 
but  in  the  midst  of  the  Spirit's  own  realm,  indeed  at  its  very 
focus.  For  every  accusation  is  a  form  of  predication;  every  con- 
demnation is  a  form  of  judgment;  predication  and  judgment, 
however,  are  the  basic  and  time-honored  functions  of  the  Logos 
itself.  In  connection  with  this  we  may  recall  that  in  Greek  it  is 
one  and  the  same  word,  one  and  the  same  term — the  term 
xcmQYopeiv  and  xaTYftopt'a — which  expresses  accusation  as  well  as 
predication  in  general.  All  of  the  passionate  speeches  of  accusa- 
tion against  the  Spirit,  in  which  modern  philosophical  literature 
is  so  rich,  cannot  make  us  forget,  therefore,  that  here  in  truth 
it  is  not  Life  striving  against  the  Spirit,  but  the  latter  striving 
against  itself.  And  this  internal  conflict  is  really  its  appointed 
fate,  its  everlasting,  inescapable  pathos.  The  Spirit  is  only,  inso- 
far as  it  turns  against  itself  in  this  manner;  its  own  unity  is 
thinkable  only  in  such  contrariety.  Hence  the  Spirit  is  not  only 
— as  Scheler  defines  it — the  ascetic  of  Life,  not  only  that  which 
is  able  to  say  "No"  to  all  organic  reality;  it  is  the  principle 
which  within  itself  may  negate  itself.  And  the  paradox  of  its 
nature  consists  precisely  in  the  fact  that  this  negation  does  not 
destroy  it,  but  first  makes  it  truly  what  it  is.  Only  in  the  "No" 
with  which  it  confronts  itself  does  the  Spirit  break  through  to 
its  own  self-affirmation  and  self-assertion:  only  in  the  question 
which  it  presents  to  itself  does  it  become  truly  itself.  Montaigne 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  877 

said  once  that  man  is  the  enigmatic  animal  who  is  capable  of 
hating  himself:  an  anomaly  and  a  contradiction  for  which  no 
precedent  exists  anywhere  else  in  the  realm  of  nature.  Nature 
knows  suffering  and  death,  destruction  and  annihilation ;  but  it 
knows  nothing  of  that  self-disintegration  whereby  man  turns 
against  himself.  As  the  being  who  alone  is  capable  of  question- 
ing, man  is  also  the  being  who  is  and  remains  to  himself 
thoroughly  problematical,  the  being  eternally  worthy  of  ques- 
tioning. In  this  sense  all  those  who,  in  the  name  of  Life,  bring 
the  Idea  into  court,  remain, — to  use  HegePs  expression — the 
"agents  of  the  Idea,"  for  just  this  passing  of  judgment  upon 
itself  is  nothing  but  a  primeval  phenomenon  and  an  imperative, 
a  categorical  demand  of  Spirit ;  and  from  this  setting  of  the 
problem  it  necessarily  follows  that  precisely  the  Spirit's  own 
accusers  must  in  the  end  become  its  custodians  and  its  witnesses. 


This  fundamental  situation  emerges  most  clearly  and  most 
definitely  perhaps,  if  we  endeavor  to  grasp  it  by  way  of  Lan- 
guage and  to  throw  light  upon  it  from  the  basic  and  peculiar 
spiritual  structure  of  the  latter.  It  can  be  said  that  as  long  as 
there  has  been  philosophy  of  language,  so  long  has  there  also 
been  critique  of  language — that  the  insight  into  the  positive 
strength  and  the  positive  meaning  of  language  has  always  been 
followed  by  scepticism,  as  by  a  shadow.  And  this  doubt  about 
language,  indeed  this  despair  regarding  it,  remains  by  no  means 
limited  to  philosophy;  it  is  not  even  foreign  to  the  great  poets 
and  to  the  greatest  coiners  of  language  in  the  realm  of  poetry. 
In  a  well-known  Venetian  epigram  Goethe  complained  of  the 
fact  that,  bound  as  he  was  to  the  medium  of  the  German  lan- 
guage, he  unfortunately  had  to  corrupt  both  life  and  art  by 
having  to  use  this  "worst  of  material."  But  among  his  works 
there  is  also  to  be  found  another  poem,  entitled  "Language," 
which,  compared  with  this  epigram  figures  as  its  polar  opposite 
and  palinode: 

What's  "rich,"  what's  "poor"!  What's  "strong"  and  "weak"! 
Is  rich  the  treasure  in  the  buried  urn? 


878  ERNST  CASSIRER 

Is  strong  the  sword  within  the  arsenal  ? 
Grasp  gently,  then,  and  benign  fortune 
Flows,  Godhead,  out  from  Thee; 
T'ward  victory,  might,  reach  for  the  sword 
And  glory  o'er  thy  neighbors.4 

Here  again  the  feeling  of  the  true  language-coiner  breaks 
through:  the  feeling  that,  essentially,  language  is  only  what  the 
momentary  impulse,  the  animating  and  life-giving  moment, 
makes  out  of  it.  Its  meaning  and  value  depend  not  on  what  it 
may  be  "in  itself,"  in  its  metaphysical  nature,  but  on  the 
manner  of  its  use,  its  spiritual  employment.  For  it  is  not  the 
rigid  substance  of  language,  but  its  living,  dynamic  function, 
which  determines  this  meaning  and  value.  Language  is  mis- 
judged if  it  is  taken  in  some  way  or  other  as  a  thinglike  being, 
as  a  substantial  medium  which  interposes  itself  between  man 
and  the  reality  surrounding  him.  However  one  were  then  to 
define  this  medium  more  precisely,  it  always  appears  neverthe- 
less— while  wanting  to  be  the  connecting  link  between  two 
worlds — as  the  barrier  which  separates  the  one  from  the  other. 
However  clear  and  however  pure  a  medium  we  may  then  see 
in  language,  it  always  remains  true  that  this  crystal-clear 
medium  is  also  crystal-hard — that  however  transparent  it  may 
be  for  the  expression  of  ideas,  it  still  is  never  wholly  penetrable. 
Its  transparency  does  not  remove  its  impenetrability.  But  this 
misgiving  vanishes  the  moment  we  remember  that  basically  we 
are  dealing  here  with  a  self-created  difficulty — that  the 
antinomy  is  grounded  not  so  much  in  the  nature  of  language 
itself  as  in  an  inadequate  metaphorical  description  of  its  essen- 
tial nature.  If,  instead  of  likening  Language  to  an  existing  thing, 
we  understand  it  rather  in  the  sense  of  what  it  really  does, — if 

*The  German  original  reads  as  follows: 

Was  reich,  was  arm!  Was  stark  und  schwach! 

1st  reich  vergrabener  Urne  Bauch? 

1st  stark  das  Schwert  im  Arsenal? 

Greif  milde  drein  und  freundlich  Gliick 

Fliesst,  Gottheit,  von  Dir  aus, 

Pass  an  zum  Siege,  Macht,  das  Schwert 

Und  iiber  Nachbarn  Ruhm. 


"SPIRIT"  AND  "LIFE"  879 

we  take  it,  in  accordance  with  Humboldt's  injunction,  not  as  an 
erg  [quantity  of  work]  but  as  energy — then  the  problem  im- 
mediately assumes  a  different  form.  Language  then  is  no  longer 
a  given,  rigid  structure}  rather  it  becomes  a  form-creating 
power,  which  at  the  same  time  has  to  be  really  a  form-breaking, 
form-destroying  one.  Even  the  world  of  grammatical  and  syn- 
tactical forms  is  not  merely  a  kind  of  firm  dike  and  dam,  against 
which  the  formative,  the  truly  creative  forces  of  language  con- 
tinually break.  Rather  is  it  the  original,  creative  power  of  lan- 
guage which  floods  through  this  world  as  well,  and  which 
supplies  it  with  ever  new  momentum.  In  this  process  the 
hardened  forms  are  also  ever  and  again  melted  down,  so  that 
they  cannot  "clothe  themselves  in  rigid  armor  5"  but  on  the 
other  hand,  only  in  this  process  do  even  the  momentary  im- 
pulse, the  creation  of  the  moment,  receive  their  continuity  and 
stability.  This  creation  would,  like  a  bubble,  have  to  dissolve 
before  every  breath  of  air  if  it  did  not,  in  the  midst  of  its 
originating  and  becoming,  encounter  earlier  structures — forms 
already  originated  and  in  existence — to  which  it  may  cling  and 
hold  fast.  Thus  even  this  which  has  already  come  into  being 
is  for  language  not  merely  material,  against  which  foreign  and 
ever  stranger  material  is  ever  pressing;  but  it  is  the  product 
and  attestation  of  the  same  formative  powers  to  which  even 
language  itself  owes  its  existence.  Every  single  act  of  speech 
flows  again  back  into  the  great  river-bed  of  language  itself, 
yet  without  being  entirely  lost  and  perishing  therein.  Instead, 
the  stronger  was  its  own  individuality,  borrowed  from  the 
originality  of  its  creator,  the  more  it  maintains  itself  and  the 
more  strongly  it  transmits  itself — in  such  a  way  that,  by  means 
of  the  new  momentary  impulse,  the  current  as  a  whole  may 
be  altered  in  its  direction  and  intensity,  in  its  dynamics  and 
rhythm.  To  be  sure,  it  is  evident  that  all  these  turns  of  expres- 
sion can  be  nothing  other  and  nothing  more  than  metaphors; 
but,  if  at  all,  it  is  only  in  dynamic  metaphors  like  these,  and  not 
in  any  figures  whatsoever  borrowed  from  the  static  world,  the 
world  of  things  and  thing-relationships,  that  the  connection 
between  the  "particular"  and  the  "general"  in  language,  the 


88o  ERNST  CASSIRER 

relation  between  "Life"  and  "Spirit"  therein,  can  properly  be 
described.  And  the  same  fundamental  relationship  exhibited 
here  in  the  realm  of  language  holds  true  of  every  other  genuine 
"symbolic  form."  The  inner  contradictoriness,  the  polarity 
which  necessarily  dwells  within  every  such  form,  does  not  rend 
or  demolish  it$  rather  it  constitutes  the  condition  whereby  its 
unity  may  again  be  established  out  of  that  contradiction  and  may 
thus  again  present  itself  to  the  outside  world. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  THE  WRITINGS  OF 
ERNST  CASSIRER 

To  1946 

Compiled,  by 

CARL  H.  HAMBURG  AND  WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 


PREFACE  TO  THE  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

THIS  list  of  the  published  writings  by  Ernst  Cassirer  and 
of  their  translations  contains,  as  far  as  we  know,  all  of  his 
publications  which  have  come  out,  either  during  his  lifetime  or 
posthumously.  It  also  includes  a  number  of  books  now  in  prep- 
aration. 

The  material  for  the  publications  from  1899  to  1936  could 
mostly  be  taken  from  the  Bibliography  of  Ernst  Cassirer*s 
Writings  by  Raymond  Klibansky  and  Walter  Solmitz  which  ap- 
peared in  the  volume  Philosophy  and  History  (Essays  pre- 
sented to  Ernst  Cassirer  5  edited  by  Raymond  Klibansky  and 
H.  J.  Paton.  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  1936).  For  the  period 
after  1936  we  had  at  our  disposal  Professor  Cassirer Js  own 
continuation  of  this  bibliography  as  well  as  Mrs.  Cassirer's  list- 
ing of  the  posthumous  publications.  To  her  we  are  greatly  in- 
debted for  providing  us  generously  with  all  the  material  at  her 
hand;  and  to  the  editors  and  publishers  of  Philosophy  and  His- 
tory our  thanks  are  due  for  allowing  us  very  kindly  to  use  the 
material  from  their  book.  We  had  the  privilege  of  using  the 
facilities  of  the  Libraries  of  Bowdoin  College  and  Columbia 
University,  and  of  the  Harvard  College  Library,  and  of  draw- 
ing freely  on  the  collection  of  Ernst  Cassirer's  writings  which 
Professor  Koelln  of  Bowdoin  College  owns,  who  also  kindly 
helped  us  with  his  advice.  We  also  should  like  to  thank  Messrs. 
Max  Hamburg  from  Fordham  University,  and  John  E.  Smith, 
Instructor  at  Barnard  College,  for  their  help.  We  are  particu- 
larly grateful  to  Professor  Raymond  Klibansky  of  McGill 
University  for  reading  the  proofs  and  making  some  valuable 
suggestions. 

As  in  all  the  Bibliographies  of  the  Library  of  Living  Philoso- 
phers, the  writings  have  been  arranged  in  the  chronological 
order  of  the  dates  of  publication.  The  Bibliography  of  1936 

883 


884  PREFACE  TO  THE  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

had  grouped  the  items  according  to  subject  matter,  from  a 
^systematic"  point  of  view.  In  this  respect  the  earlier  list  should 
still  prove  useful  as  an  initial  guide  to  Ernst  Cassirer's  philoso- 
phy. It  represents  graphically  the  universal  scope  of  his  work, 
marking,  as  it  were,  on  the  globus  mtellectuaUs  its  widely  spread 
topics,  and  suggesting  their  multiple  systematic  and  historical 
interrelation. — A  story  of  the  development  of  Ernst  Cassirer's 
thought  may  be  read,  on  the  other  hand,  from  the  chronological 
list  that  follows  here.  In  Cassirer's  work  as  a  whole,  as  is  the 
case  in  each  of  his  individual  writings,  this  development  was  as 
full  of  surprises  as  it  was  methodical.  Step  by  step  was  taken 
until,  on  a  higher  level  each  time,  a  new  and  wider  vista  opened 
up.  The  basic  points  of  orientation  remained  the  same  through- 
out his  life's  work.  But  the  same  themes,  taken  up  again  and 
again,  were  carried  on  by  means  of  ever  new  variations  to  ever 
new  phases  of  interpretation.  One  of  Cassirer's  favorite  quota- 
tions was  Goethe's,  "Die  Quelle  muss  fliessend  gedacht  warden" 
The  present  chronological  record  of  his  writings  may  perhaps 
be  used,  in  this  manner,  as  a  source  for  the  study  and  the 
realization  of  Ernst  Cassirer's  thought. 

CARL  H.  HAMBURG 
WALTER  M.  SOLMITZ 

Summer  1948 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 
NEW  YORK,  N.Y. 

BOWDOIN  COLLEGE 
BRUNSWICK,  MAINE 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 
To  August  1946 

1899 

i.  DESCARTES'  KRITIK  DER  MATHEMATISCHEN  UND  NATURWISSEN- 
SCHAFTLICHEN  ERKENNTNis.   Inaugural  Dissertation,   Marburg, 
1899. 
Reprinted:  as  Einleitung  in  Leibniz*  System,  1902,  pp.  3-102. 

1902 

/.  LEIBNIZ'    SYSTEM    IN    SEINEN    WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN    GRUND- 
LAGEN.  Marburg,  N.  G.  Elwert,  1902.  xiv,  548  pp. 

Contents:  Vorrede — EINLEITUNG:  DESCARTES'  KRITIK  DER  MATHEMATISCHEN 
UND  NATURWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN  ERKENNTNIS. — I.  Die  erkenntniskritische 
Begriindung-  der  Mathematik — II.  Die  erkenntniskritische  Begriindung-  der 
Naturwissenschaft — III.  Der  Begriff  der  Substanz  und  die  Substanzialisierung 
des  Raumes — IV.  Substanz  and  Veranderung — V.  Der  Begriff  der  Erfahrung 
— VI.  Das  Problem  des  Unendlichen — VII.  Der  Begriff  der  Zeit. — LEIBNIZ* 
SYSTEM  IN  SEINEN  WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN  GRUNDLAGEN — PART  ONE:  DIE 
GRUNDBEGRIFFE  DER  MATHEMATIK. — Ch.  I.  Verhaltnis  von  Mathe- 
matik und  Logik — Ch.  II.  Die  Grundbegriffe  der  Mathematik — Ch.  III.  Das 
geometrische  Raumproblem  und  die  Analysis  der  Lage — Ch.  IV.  Das  Pro- 
blem der  Kontinuitat— PART  TWO:  DIE  GRUNDBEGRIFFE  DER  ME- 
CHANIK—Ch.  V.  Raum  und  Zeit— -Ch.  VI.  Der  Begriff  der  Kraft— PART 
THREE:  DIE  METAPHYSIK—Ch.  VII.  Das  Problem  des  Bewusstseins— 
Ch.  VIII.  Das  Problem  des  Individuums — Ch.  IX.  Das  Problem  des  Indi- 
viduums  im  System  der  Geisteswissenschaften — PART  FOUR:  DIE  ENT- 
STEHUNG  DES  LEIBNIZISCHEN  SYSTEMS— I.  Die  Jugendwerke  bis  zur 
Zeit  des  Pariser  Aufenthaltes.  (1633-1673) — II.  Der  Pariser  Aufenthalt. 
(1673-1676) — III.  Von  der  Riickkehr  nach  Deutschland  bis  zur  Abfassung 
des  metaphysischen  Diskurses.  (1676-86)—  KRITISCHER  NACHTRAG — 
(I.  Bertrand  Russell,  A  critical  exposition  of  the  philosophy  of  Leibniz. 
Cambridge,  1900. — II.  Louis  Couturat,  La  logique  de  Leibniz  d'apres  des 
documents  inedits.  Paris,  1901) 

1904 

/.  G.  W.  LEIBNIZ.  PHILOSOPHISCHE  WERKE. 
HAUPTSCHRIFTEN  ZUR  GRUNDLECUNG  DER  PHILOSOPHIE. 

885 


886  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

(Jbersetzt  v.  A.  Buchenau.  Durchgesehen  und  mit  Einlcitungen 
und  Erlauterungen  hrsg.  von  E.  Cassirer.  Vol.  I.  (Phflosophische 
Bibliothek.  Vol.  107).  Leipzig,  Durrsche  Buchhandlung,  1904.  vi, 
374  PP- 
Second  edition :  Leipzig,  F.  Meiner,  1 924. 

Cassirer*s  Introductions:  Vorrede  (pp.  iii-vi) — Zur  Logik  und  Mathematik: 
Einleitung  (pp.  1-12) — Schriften  zur  Phoronomie  und  Dynamik:  Einleitung 
(pp.  107-119) 

1906 

/.  G.  W.  LEIBNIZ.  PHILOSOPHISCHE  WERKE. 
HAUPTSCHRIFTEN  ZUR  GRUNDLEGUNG  DER  PHILOSOPHIE. 

Obersetzt  von  A.  Buchenau.  Durchgesehen  und  mit  Einleitungen 
und  Erlauterungen  hrsg.  von  E.  Cassirer.  Vol.  II,  (Phflosophische 
Bibliothek.  Vol.  108).  Leipzig,  Durrsche  Buchhandlung,  1906. 
Second  edition:  Leipzig,  F.  Meiner,  1924.  582  pp. 

Cassirer3 s  Introductions:  Zur  Biologic  und  Entwicklungslehre:  Einleitung 
(pp.  3-34). — Zur  Monadenlehre:  Einleitung  (pp.  81-122). — Sach-  und  Na- 
menregister  (pp.  561-579). 

2.  DER  KRITISCHE  IDEALISMUS  UND  DIE  PHILOSOPHIE  DBS  GESUN- 
DEN  MENSCHENVERSTANDES.  (Philosofhische  Arbeiten,  hrsg.  von 
Cohen  und  Natorp.  Vol.  I,  No.  i.)  Giessen,  A.  Topelmann,  1906. 

35  PP- 

A  criticism  of  Leonhard  Nelson's  Die  kritische  Methode  und  das  Verhaltnis 

der   Psychology   zur  Philosophic  and   Friedrich  Fries  und  seine  jungsten 

Kritiker. 

3.  DAS  ERKENNTNISPROBLEM  IN  DER  PHILOSOPHIE  UND  WISSEN- 
SCHAFT  DER  NEUEREN  ZEIT.  Vol.  I.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1906. 
xv,  608  pp. 

Second,  revised  Edition  (with  some  corrections  and  additions,  but  omitting 
an  introduction  about  Greek  philosophy,  contained  in  the  First  Edition), 
1911.  xviii,  601  pp.  Third  Edition,  1922. 

Contents:  Vorreden — EINLEITUNG:  DAS  ERKENNEN  UND  SEIN  GEGENSTAND— 
Bk.  i.  DIE  RENAISSANCE  DES  ERKENNTNISPROBLEMS — CH.  /.  NIKOLAUS 
CUSANUS—Carolus  Bovillus—CH.  II.  DER  HVMAN1SMUS  UND  DER 
KAMPF  DER  PLATONISCHEN  UND  AR1STOTELISCHEN  PHILOSO- 
PHIE— Einleitung1 — I.  Die  Erneuerung-  der  Platonischen  Philosophie — Geor- 
gius  Gemistos  Plethon — Marsilius  Ficinus — II.  Die  Reform  der  Aristotelischen 
Psychologic — Einleitung — Pietro  Pomponazzt—Giacomo  Zarbarclla—Fran- 
cesco  Pico  delta  Mirandola — Marius  Nizolius — IV.  Die  Erneuerung  der 
Natur-  und  Geschichtsansicht— CH.  III.  DER  SKEPTlZlSMUS—Montaign$ 
— Charron — Sanchez  und  La  Mothe  le  Vayer — BK.  II.  DIE  ENTDECKUNG 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  887 

DES  NATURBECRIFFS— CH.  /.  DIE  NATURPHILOSOPHIE—A.  Der  Be- 
griff des  Weltorganismus — Agrippa  von  Nettesheim — Paracelsus — B.  Die 
Psychologic  des  Erkennens — I.  Girolamo  Fracastoro — II.  Telesio—lll.  Cam- 
panella—C.  Die  Begriffe  des  Raumes  und  der  Zeit — Die  Mathematik — 
Cardano,  Scaliger  und  Telesio — Patrizzi — D.  Das  Copernikanische  Welt- 
system  und  die  Metaphysik — Giordano  Bruno— CH.  II.  DIE  ENTSTEHUNG 
DER  EX  A  K  TEN  WISSENSCHAFT-Begrift  und  Erfahrung— i.  Leonardo 
da  Vinci — 2.  Kepler — a)  Der  Begriff  der  Harmonic — b)  Der  Begriff  der 
Kraft — c)  Der  Begriff  des  Gesetzes — 3.  Galilei — 4.  Die  Mathematik — 
BK.  in.  DIE  GRUNDLEGUNG  DES  IDEALISMUS — CH.  /.  DESCARTES — I.  Die 
Einheit  der  Erkenntnis— II.  Die  Metaphysik— CH.  //.  DIE  FORTBILDUNG 
DER  CARTESISCHEN  PHILOSOPHIE— A.  Pascal— B.  Logik  und  Kate- 
gorienlehre — Claubergs  Logica  vetus  et  nova  und  die  Logik  von  Port  Royal — 
Pierre  Silvain  Regis — Geulincx — Richard  Burthogge-—C.  Die  Ideenlehre. — 
Malebranche — D.  Der  Ausgang  der  Cartesischen  Philosophic — Bayle. 

1907 

/.  DAS  ERKENNTNISPROBLEM  IN  DER  PHILOSOPHIE  UND  WISSEN- 
SCHAFT  DER  NEUEREN  ZEIT.  Vol.  II.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1907. 
xiv,  732  pp. 

Second  Edition,  1911.  xv,  832  pp.  Third  Edition,  1912. 

Contents:  BK.  iv.  DIE  ANFANGE  DES  EMPIRISMUS — CH.  /.  BACON — I.  Die 
Kritik  des  Verstandes— II.  Die  Formenlehre— CH.  //.  GASSENDI—CH.  III. 
HOBBES — BK.  v.  FORTBILDUNG  UND  VOLLENDUNG  DES  RATIONALISMUS — 
CH.  /.  SPINOZA— I.  Die  Erkenntnislehre  des  "Kurzen  Traktats"— II.  Der 
"Tractatus  de  Intellects  Emendatione" — III.  Der  Begriff  der  Substanz — CH. 
//.  LEIBNIZ— CH.  III.  TSCHIRNHAUS—CH.  IV.  DER  RATIONAL- 
ISMUS IN  DER  ENGLISCHEN  PHILOSOPHIE— I.  Herbert  von  Cherbury 
— Kenelm  Digby — II.  Die  Schule  von  Cambridge — Cudworth — John  Norris 
— BK.  vi.  DAS  ERKENNTNISPROBLEM  IM  SYSTEM  DES  EMPIRISMUS— CH.  /. 
LOCKE — Die  Grenzbestimmung  des  Verstandes.  Der  Kampf  gegen  das 
"Angeborene" — I.  Sensation  und  Reflexion — II.  Der  Begriff  der  Wahrheit — 
III.  Der  Begriff  des  Seins— CH.  //.  BERKELEY— 1.  Die  Theorie  der  Wahr- 
nehmung — II.  Die  Begrundung  des  Idealismus — III.  Kritik  der  Berkeleyschen 
Begriffstheorie — IV.  Der  Begriff  der  Substanz — V.  Die  Umgestaltung  der 
Berkeleyschen  Erkenntnislehre — CH.  ///.  HUME — Die  "Gleichformigkeit  der 
Natur" — Die  Kritik  der  abstrakten  Begriffe — I.  Die  Kritik  der  mathema- 
tischen  Erkenntnis — II.  Die  Kritik  des  Kausalbegriffs — III.  Der  Begriff  der 
Existenz — BK.  vn.  VON  NEWTON  zu  KANT:  Wissenchaft  und  Philosophic  im 
achtzehnten  Jahrhundert— CH.  /.  DAS  PROBLEM  DER  METHODS— 
I.  Die  Aufgabe  der  Induktion — Joseph  Glanvill — Newtons  Grundlegung  der 
Induktion — Die  Schule  Newtons:  Keill  und  Freind — d'Alembert — II.  Ver- 
nunft  und  Sprzche—Condillac — Lambert,  Ploucquet,  Sulzer — III.  Der  Begriff 
der  Kraft — Maupertuis — IV.  Das  Problem  der  Materie — Die  Chemie — CH. 
//.  RAUM  UND  ZEIT. — i.  Das  Raum-  und  Zeitproblem  in  der  Metaphysik 
und  spekulativen  Theologie — I.  Raumbegriff  und  Gottesbcgriff — Henry 
Moore — Newton  und  seine  Schule — Samuel  Clarke — Joseph  RapJuon~—Il. 


888  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

Isaac  Watts9  Enquiry  concerning  Space — Edmund  Law — 2.  Das  Raum-  und 
Zeitproblem  in  der  Naturwissenschaft — a)  Newton  und  seine  Kritiker — b)  Die 
Fortbildung  der  Newtonischen  Lehre — Leonhard  Euler — Euler  und  Maclaurin 
3.  Die  Idealitat  des  Raumes  und  der  Zeit — Die  Antinomieen  des  Unendlichen 
— Maufertuis — Maufertuis  und  Kant}  Schofenhauers  Urteil — Die  Entwick- 
lung  des  Leibnizischen  Phaenomenalismus:  Joh.  Aug.  Eberhard  und  Kasimir 
von  Creuz — Maufertuis9  Theorie  der  Existentialurteile — Gottfried  Ploucquet 
— Ploucquet  und  Malebranche — Grandi  und  Sturm — Das  Unendlichkleine  bei 
Leibniz  und  Maclaurin — Fontenelles  "Elements  de  la  Geometric  de  Plnfini" 
— Eulers  Kritik  des  UnendlichkeitsbegrifTs — 4.  Das  Raum-  und  Zeitproblem 
in  der  Naturphilosophie—- Boscowich — CH.  III.  DIE  ONTOLOGIE—DER 
SATZ  DES  WIDERSPRUCHS  UND  DER  SATZ  VOM  ZURE1CHENDEN 
GRUNDE—l.  Der  WahrheitsbegrifT  bei  Leibniz  und  Wolff— Die  Kritik  der 
Wolffschen  Lehre:  Andreas  Rudiger — Die  neue  "Methode"  von  Crusius9 
Philosophic  und  ihre  geschichtliche  Wirkung:  Lambert  und  Mendelssohn — 
Joh.  Heinr.  Lambert — II.  Der  Satz  des  Widerspruchs  und  der  Satz  vom  zu- 
reichenden  Grunde — Wolff  und  seine  Schule,  der  syllogistische  Beweis  des 
Satzes  vom  Grunde  (Darjes,  Carpow,  Meier) — Crusius9  Kritik  des  Satzes 
vom  Grunde — Crusius  und  Schopcnhatter — Die  Kritik  des  CausalbegrifTs: 
Nik.  Beguelin — Beguelin  und  Hum e — Thummig  und  Crusius — CH.  IV. 
DAS  PROBLEM  DES  BEWUSSTSEINS.  —SUBJEKTIVE  UND  OBJEK- 
TIVE  BEGRONDUNG  DER  ERKENNTNIS—I.  Fortbildung  und  Kritik 
von  Lockes  Psychologic — Peter  Browne — Hartley  und  Priestley — Condillac 
— Psychologic  und  Aesthetik  im  18.  Jahrhundert — Tetens — II.  Das  psy- 
chologische  und  das  logische  Wahrheitskriterium.  Die  physiologische  Be- 
dingtheit  der  Erkenntnis — Diderots  Lettre  sur  les  aveugles — Lossitts9  "Phy- 
sische  Ursachen  des  Wahren" — Tetens9  Kritik  der  Common-Sense-Philosophie 
— Psychologische  und  logische  Deutung  der  Grundprinzipien — BK.  vin.  DIE 
KRITISCHE  PHILOSOPHIE— -CH.  I.  DIE  ENTSTEHUNG  DER  KRIT1SCHEN 
PHILOSOPHIE — I.  Die  Schriften  des  Jahres  1763 — II.  Die  "Traume  eines 
Geistersehers"  (1765) — Verhaltnis  zu  Rousseau — Kant  und  Hume — III.  Von 
den  "Traumen  eines  Geistersehers"  bis  zur  "Dissertation"  (1765-69) — IV. 
Vorbereitung  und  Abschluss  der  Dissertation  (1769-70) — Kant  und  Euler — 
V.  Der  Fortschritt  zur  Vernunftkritik  (1772-1781)— -CH.  II.  DIE  VER- 
NUNFTKRITIK — I.  Der  metaphysische  Gegensatz  von  Subjekt  und  Objekt 
und  seine  geschichtliche  Entwicklung — II.  Das  Problem  der  Objektivitat. 
— Analytisch  und  synthetisch. — III.  Raum  und  Zeit — IV.  Der  Begriff  des 
Selbstbewusstseins — V.  Das  "Ding  an  sich" — NAMEN-  UND  SACHREGISTER. 

2.  KANT  UND  DIE  MODERNE  MATHEMATIK. 

MIT  BEZIEHUNC  AUF  BERTRAND  RUSSELLS  UND  Louis  COUTURATS  WERKE 

UBER  DIE  PRINCIPIEN  DER  MATHEMATIK. 

Kant"Studteny  Vol.  XII,  1907,  pp.  1-40. 

j.  ZUR  FRAGE  DER  METHODE  DER  ERKENNTNISKRITIK. 
EINE  ENTGEGNUNG. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  889 

Vierteljahrsschrift  jiir  wissenschaftliche  Philosofhie  und  Soziologie. 
Vol.  XXXI,  No.  4.  1907. 

1909 

/.  REVIEW  OF:  RICHARD  HONIGSWALD,  BElTRrfGE  ZUR  ER- 
KENNTNISTHEORIE  UND  METHODENLEHRE.  Kant- 
Studien,  Vol.  XIV,  1909.  No.  i,  pp.  91-98. 

1910 

7.    SUBSTANZBEGRIFF  UND  FUNKTIONSBEGRIFF. 

UNTERSUCHUNGEN  UBER  DIE  GRUNDFRAGEN  DER  ERKENNTNISKRITIK. 
Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1910.  vii,  459  pp. 

Second  Edition:  1923. 

Russian  Translation :  1912. 

English  Translation  in:  SUBSTANCE  AND  FUNCTION,  AND  EINSTEIN'S  THEORY 

OF  RELATIVITY.  Translated  by  William  Curtis  Swabey  and  Mary  Collins 

Swabey.  Chicago  and  London,  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Company,  1923. 

pp.  i-xi,  1-346. 

Contents:  Preface — PART  ONE.  THE  CONCEPT  OF  THING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 
OF  RELATION — Ch.  I.  On  the  Theory  of  the  Formation  of  Concepts — Ch.  II. 
The  Concept  of  Number — Ch.  III.  The  Concept  of  Space  and  Geometry — 
Ch.  IV.  The  Concepts  of  Natural  Science — PART  Two.  THE  SYSTEM  OF 
RELATIONAL  CONCEPTS  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  REALITY — Ch.  V.  On  the 
Problem  of  Induction — Ch.  VI.  The  Concept  of  Reality — Ch.  VII.  Sub- 
jectivity and  Objectivity  of  the  Relational  Concepts — Ch.  VIII.  On  the 
Psychology  of  Relations. 

2.  REVIEW  OF:  JONAS  COHN,  VORAUSSETZUNGEN  UND 
ZIELE  DES  ERKENNENS.  Deutsche  Liter aturzeitung,  Vol. 
XXXI,  1 910,  No.  39. 

1911 

/.  LEIBNIZ.  Article  in  the  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Social  Sciences,  New 
York,  1911. 

2.  ARISTOTELES  UND  KANT. 

Zu  GORLANDS  BUCK:  ARISTOTELES  UND  KANT. 

Kant-Studteny  Vol.  XVI,  1911,  pp.  431-447. 

1912 
/.  IMMANUEL    KANTS   WERKE. 

GESAMTAUSGABE  IN  10  BANDEN  UND  EINEM  ERGANZUNGSBAND. 


890  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

In  Gemeinschaft  mit  Hermann  Cohen,  Arthur  Buchenau,  Otto 
Buck,  Albert  Gorland,  B.  Kellermann,  Otto  Schondorfer,  hrsg. 
von  Ernst  Cassirer.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1912. 

Volumes  edited  by  Ernst  Cassirer:  Vol.  IV.  Schriften  von  1783-1788. 
Hrsg-.  von  A.  Buchenau  und  Ernst  Cassirer. — Vol.  VI.  Schriften  von  1790- 
1796.  Hrsg.  von  Ernst  Cassirer  und  Artur  Buchenau. — Vols.  IX  and  X. 
Briefe  von  und  an  Kant.  Hrsg.  von  Ernst  Cassirer. — Erlauterungsbande : 
i.  KANTS  LEBEN  UND  LEHRE.  Von  Ernst  Cassirer  (see  1918,  i). 

2.  HERMANN  COHEN  UND  DIE  ERNEUERUNG  DER  KANTISCHEN 
PHILOSOPHIE.  Kant-Studien,  Vol.  XVII,  1912.  No.  3,  pp.  252- 

273- 

3.  DAS  PROBLEM  DES  UNENDLICHEN  UND  RENOUVIERS  "GESETZ 
DER  ZAHL."  In:  Philosofhische  Abhandlungeny  Hermann  Cohen 
zum  jo.  Geburtstag  dargebracht.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,   1912, 
pp.  85-98- 

1913 

i.  ERKENNTNISTHEORIE  NEBST  DEN  GRENZFRAGEN  DER  LOGIK. 
Jahrbucher  der  Philosophic,  Vol.  I.  Berlin,  E.  S.  Mittler,  1913,  pp. 
1-59. 

1914 

/.  DIE  GRUNDPROBLEME  DER  KANTISCHEN  METHODIK  UND  IHR 
VERHALTNIS  ZUR  NACHKANTISCHEN  SPEKULATION.  Die  Geistes- 
wissenschajten^  Vol.  I.  Leipzig,  Veit,  1914.  Pp.  784-787  and  812- 
815. 

1915 

/.  G.   W.   LEIBNIZ.   PHILOSOPHISCHE  WERKE.   VOL.  ni.   NEUE 
ABHANDLUNGEN  UBER  DEN  MENSCHLICHEN  VERSTAND.  In  3. 
Auflage  mit  Benutzung  der  Schaarschmidtschen  t)bertragung  neu 
iibersetzt,  eingeleitet  und  erlautert  von  E.  Cassirer.  Philosofhische 
Eibliotheky  Vol.  69.  Leipzig,  F.  Meiner,  1915. 
New  Edition,  with  an  author  and  subject  index,  1926. 
Einleitung,  by  Ernst  Cassirer:  pp.  i-xxv. 

1916 
/.  FREIHEIT  UND  FORM. 

STUDIEN  ZUR  DEUTSCHEN  GEISTESGESCHICHTE. 
Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer.  1916.  xix,  575  pp. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  891 

Second  Edition:  1918.  Third  Edition:  1922. 

Contents:  Vorwort — EiNLEiTUNO — i.  Die  Entwicklung  des  Personlichkeits- 
begriffs  bei  den  modernen  Kulturvolkern — 2.  Das  System  der  mittelalterlichen 
Weltanschauung  und  Lebensordnung — Luthers  Glaubens-  und  Freiheitsbegriff 
— Die  Grundformen  des  religiosen  Individualism  us:  Luther  und  Zwingli — 
CH.  i.  LEIBNIZ — i.  Die  Anfange  der  deutschen  Wissenschaft — 2.  Das  Pro- 
blem des  Bewusstseins  und  des  Individuums — 3.  Die  Monade  als  Einheit  von 
Formbegriff  und  Kraftbegriff — CH.  n.  DIE  ENTDECKUNG  DER  ASTHETISCHEN 
FORMWELT — i.  Das  asthetische  Problem  in  Leibniz*  Metaphysik — 2.  Die 
Anfange  der  deutschen  Poetik — Gottsched  und  die  Schweizer — Der  Begriff 
der  poetischen  Wahrheit  bei  Bodmer  und  Breitinger — 3.  Die  Begriindung  der 
philosophischen  Asthetik  durch  Baumgarten  und  Meier — 4.  Das  Problem  der 
Sinnlichkeit  in  der  Leibnizschen  Metaphysik — Leibniz  und  Shaftesbury — 5. 
Lessing — 6.  Hamann  und  Herder — Leibniz  und  Herder — 7.  Winckelmann — 
CH.  in.  DIE  FREIHEITSIDEE  IM  SYSTEM  DES  KRITISCHEN  IDEALISMUS — 

1.  Die  Stellung  des  Kantischen  Systems  in  der  deutschen  Geistesgeschichte — 

2.  Die  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft — CH.  iv.  GOETHE — i.  Die  neue  Stellung 
der  Subjektivitat  in  Goethes  Welt-  und  Lebensansicht — Goethe  und  Rousseau 
— 2.    Weltanschauung   und   Lebensform   des  jungen   Goethe — 3.   "Freiheit" 
und   "Notwendigkeit" — 4.   Die  italienische  Reise  und  die  Entwicklung  des 
"klassischen"  Formbegriffs — Die  lyrische  Symbolik  in  Goethes  Jugend-  und 
Altersdichtung — 5.   Naturanschauung  und  Naturtheorie — Die  t)berwindung 
des  naturwissenschaftlichen  Klassenbegriffs — Das  Problem  der  "Gestalt"  und 
die  Idee  der  Metamorphose — Die  Urpflanze  als  Wirklichkeit  und  als  Symbol — 
6.  Der  Begriff  der  Metamorphose  und  der  Aufbau  der  geistigen  Welt — 7.  Die 
Methodik  der  Goetheschen  Naturbetrachtung  und  sein  Wahrheitsbegriff — 8. 
Das  Faustdramaj  Faust  und  Helena. — CH.  v.  SCHILLER — FREIHEITSPROBLEM 

UND    FORMPROBLEM    IN    DER    KLASSISCHEN    ASTHETIK 1.    Die    FreiheitSldec 

in  der  Dramatik  des  jungen  Schiller — Die  Entwicklungsphasen  der  Schil- 
lerschen  Asthetik — 2.  Die  "Theosophie  des  Julius"  j  Schiller  und  Leibniz—* 
Der  Briefwechsel  mit  Kornerj  die  aAutonomie  des  Organischen" — Der  Frei- 
heitsgedanke  als  aesthetisches  Prinzip — Verhaltnis  zu  Kant  und  Goethe— $. 
Schiller  und  Fichte — Klassischer  und  romantischer  Formbegriff — CH.  VI. 
FREIHEITSIDEE  UND  STAATSIDEE — i.  Der  Begriff  des  Deutschtums  bei  Schiller 
und  Fichte — 2.  Die  Staatstheorie  des  deutschen  Idealismus — Leibniz  und 
Wolff — Der  Begriff  des  Staates  und  der  Staatspersonlichkeit  bei  Friedrich 
dem  Grossen — 3.  Kants  Stellung  in  der  Entwicklung  des  Staatsproblems — 4. 
Wilhelm  von  Humboldt — 5.  Fichte — 6.  Die  Staatslehre  Schellings — Die  ro- 
mantische  Staatslehre — Adam  Mullers  "Elemente  der  Staatskunst" — 7.  Hegel. 

1917 
J.    HOLDERLIN  UND  DER  DEUTSCHE  IDEALISMUS.  LogOS,  1917-1918. 

Vol.  VII,  pp.  262-282.  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  30-49. 

Reprinted  in:  Idee  und  Gestalt  (see  1921,  2). 

1918 
j.  KANTS  LEBEN  UND  LEHRE.  Immanuel  Kants  Werke.  In  Gemein- 


892  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

chaft  mit  Hermann  Cohen  u.  a.  herausgegeben  von  Ernst  Cassirer, 
Vol.  XI  (Erganzungsband),  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1918.  xi, 
448pp.  (See  1912,  i.) 

Second  Edition:  1921.  VIII,  448  pp. 

Contents:  Vbrrede — Einleitung — Ch.  I.  Jugend-  und  Lehrjahre — Ch.  II.  Die 
Magisterjahre  und  die  Anfange  der  Kantischen  Lehre — i.  Das  naturwissen- 
schaftliche  Weltbild — Kosmologie  und  Kosmophysik — 2.  Das  Problem  der 
metaphysischen  Methode — 3.  Die  Kritik  der  dogmatischen  Metaphysik — 
Die  "Traume  eines  Geistersehers" — 4.  Die  Scheidung  der  sinnlichen  und 
intelligiblen  Welt — 5.  Die  Entdeckung  des  kritischen  Grundproblems — Ch. 
III.  Der  Aufbau  und  die  Grundprobleme  der  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft — 
Ch.  IV.  Erste  Wirkungen  der  kritischen  Philosophic — Die  "Prolegomena" — 
Herders  "Ideen"  und  die  Grundlegung  der  Geschichtsphilosophie — Ch.  V. 
Der  Aufbau  der  kritischen  Ethik — Ch.  VI.  Die  Kritik  der  Urteilskraft — 
Ch.  VII.  Letzte  Schriften  und  Kampfe — Die  "Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen 
der  blossen  Vernunft"  und  der  Konflikt  mit  der  preussischen  Regierung. 

Spanish  Translation:  Mexico,  Fondo  de  Cultura  Economica  (In  prepara- 
tion). 

2.  GOETHES    PANDORA.    Zeltschrijt    fur    Asthetik    und    allgememe 
Kunstwissenschajt.  1918.  Vol.  XIII,  pp.  113-134. 

Reprinted  in:  Idee  und  Gestalt  (see  1921,  2). 

j.  HERMANN  COHEN.  Worte  gesprochen  an  seinem  Grabe.  Neue 
Judische  Monatshefte.  1918.  No.  15-16. 

1919 

/.  HEINRICH    VON    KLEIST   UND   DIE    KANTISCHE   PHILOSOPHIE. 
Philosophische    Vortrage  der  Kant-Gesellschaft.   No.    22    Berlin, 
Reuther  und  Reichard,  1919.  56  pp. 
Reprinted  in:  Idee  und  Gestalt  (see  1921,  2). 

1920 

/.  DAS  ERKENNTNISPROBLEM  IN  DER  PHILOSOPHIE  UND  WISSEN- 
SCHAFT  DER  NEUEREN  ZEIT. 

DIE  NACH KANTISCHEN  SYSTEME. 

Vol.  III.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer.  1920.  xiv,  483  pp. 
Second  Edition:  1923. 

Contents:  Vorwort — EINLEITUNG— CH.  i.  DER  "GECENSTAND  DER  ER- 
FAHRUNG"  UND  DAS  "DiNC  AN  SIGH" — i.  Friedrtch  Heinrich  Jacob*— 2. 
Reinhold — I.  Die  Methode  der  Elemental-philosophic  und  der  "Satz  des 
Bewu$8t$eins" — II.  Begriff  und  Problem  des  "Dinges  an  sich" — 3.  Aentsidem 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  893 

— 4.  Jakob  Sigismund  Beck — Salomon  Maimon — Maimons  Denkform  und 
Stil — I.Dcr  Begriff  des  "Gegebenen"  und  das  Humesche  Problem — II.  Die 
Idee  des  "unendlichen  Verstandes"  und  die  Theorie  der  Differentiale — III. 
Der  Satz  der  Bestimmbarkeit — CH.  11.  FICHTE — I.  Die  Begrundung  der 
Wissenschaftslehre — II.  Der  Atheismusstreit  und  die  Grundlegung  von  Fichtcs 
Religionsphilosophie — III.  Das  Absolute  und  das  Wissen — IV.  Problem  und 
Methode  der  Fichteschen  Philosophic — CH.  m.  SCHELLING — I.  Die  Grund- 
legung der  Naturphilosophie  und  das  System  des  transcendentalen  Idealismus 
— II.  Das  Erkenntnisprinzip  der  Schellingschen  Philosophic — III.  Der  Aus- 
gang  der  Schellingschen  Philosophic — CH.  iv.  HEGEL — I.  Der  Begriff  der 
Synthesis  bei  Kant  und  Hegel — II.  Die  Kritik  der  Reflexionsphilosophie — 
III.  Die  geschichtliche  und  systematische  Stellung  der  dialektischen  Methode 
— IV.  Die  Phaenomenologie  des  Geistes — V.  Der  Aufbau  der  Hegelschen 
Logik — VI.  Kritischer  und  absoluter  Idealismus — CH.  V.  HERBART — I.  Die 
Methode  der  Beziehungen — II.  Die  Lehre  von  den  'Realen' — CH.  vi.  SCHOPEN- 
HAUER— Die  Physiologic  als  Grundlage  der  Erkenntnistheorie — I.  Die  physio- 
logische  Erkenntnistheorie  und  die  Welt  als  Vorstellung — II.  Die  meta- 
physische  Erkenntnistheorie  und  die  Welt  als  Wille — III.  Die  Begrundung 
der  Aprioritatslehre  in  Schopenhauers  System — IV.  Erkenntnisproblem  und 
Wertproblem — CH.  vn.  FRIES — I.  Die  Lehre  von  der  unmittelbaren  Erkennt- 
nis — II.  Die  Methode  der  Friesschen  Philosophic. 

2.  HERMANN  COHEN.  Vortrag.  Korresfondenzblatt  des  Vereins  zur 
.  Grundung  und  Erhaltung  emer  Akademie  des  Judentums.  Frank- 
furt, Kauffmann,  1920.  Vol.  I,  p.  I  ff. 

5.  PHILOSOPHISCHE   PROBLEMS  DER  RELATIVITATSTHEORIE.  Die 
Neue  Rundschau.  Berlin,  S.  Fischer,  1920.  Vol.  XXXI.  No.  12. 

PP-  I337-I357- 

1921 

/.    ZUR  ElNSTEINSCHEN  RELATIVITATSTHEORIE. 

ERKENNTNISTHEORETISCHE  BETRACHTUNGEN. 
Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1921.  134  pp. 
Second  Edition:  1925 
Russian  Translation:  1922 
Japanese  Translation:  1923 

English  Translation  in:  Substance  and  Function  and  Einstein9 s  Theory  of 
Relativity.  Translated  by  W.  C.  Swabey  and  M.  C.  Swabey,  1923  (see 
1910,  i) 

Contents:  I.  Concepts  of  measure  and  concepts  of  thing's — II.  The  empirical 
and  conceptual  foundations  of  the  theory  of  relativity — III.  The  philosophical 
concept  of  truth  and  the  theory  of  relativity — IV.  Matter,  ether  and  space — 
V.  The  concepts  of  space  and  time  of  critical  idealism  and  the  theory  of 
relativity — VI.  Euclidean  and  non-Euclidean  geometry — VII.  The  theory  of 
relativity  and  the  problem  of  reality — Bibliography. 


894  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

2.  IDEE  UND  GESTALT.  Fiinf  Aufsatze.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassircr,  1921. 
II,  200  pp. 

Second  Edition:  1924. 

"Die  folgenden  Studien  wollen  eine  Erganzung  zu  den  Studien  zur  deutschen 
Geistesgeschichte  bilden,  die  ich  unter  dem  Titel  "Freiheit  und  Form"  (Ber- 
lin, 1917,  2.  Aufl.  1918)  verSflfentlicht  habe"  (see  1916,  i) 

Contents:  I.  GOETHES  PANDORA  (see  1918,  2) — II.  GOETHE  UND  DIE  MATHE- 
MATISCHE  PHYSIK.  Eine  erkenntnistheoretische  Betrachtung — III.  DIE 
METHODIK  DBS  IDEALISMUS  IN  SCHILLERS  PHILOSOPHISCHEN  SCHRIFTEN — 

IV.     HOLDERLIN     UND     DER     DEUTSCHE     IDEALISMUS     (see     1917,     l) — V. 

HEINRICHVON  KLEIST  UND  DIE  KANTISCHE  PHILOSOPHIE  (see  1919,  i) 

1922 

/.  GOETHE  UND  PLATON.  Vortrag  in  der  Goethe-Gesellschaft  Berlin. 
Sokrates.  48th  year  of  issue.  No.  i.  Berlin,  Weidmann.,  1922. 
Reprinted  in:  Goethe  und  die  geschtchtliche  Welt  (see  1932,  3). 

2.  DIE  BEGRIFFSFORM  IM  MYTHISCHEN  DENKEN.  Studien  der  Biblio- 
thek  Warburg,  I.  Leipzig,  B.  G.  Teubner,  1922.  i,  62  pp. 

3.  EINSTEIN'S  THEORY   OF   RELATIVITY   FROM   THE  EPISTEMO- 
LOGICAL  POINT  OF  VIEW.  The  Monist,  July  1922,  pp.  412-418. 

A  selection  from:  Einstein's  Theory  of  Relativity  (see  1921,  I.  Ch. 
VI) 

1923 

i.  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  SYMBOLISCHEN  FORMEN:  PART  ONE.  DIE 
SPRACHE.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1923.  xii,  293  pp.  (see  1925, 
i;  1929,  i;  1931,  i) 

Contents:  Vorwort — EINLEITUNG  UND  PROBLEMSTELLUNG — I.  Der  BegrifF 
der  symbolischen  Form  und  die  Systematik  der  symbolischen  Formen — II. 
Die  allgemeine  Funktion  des  Zeichens — Das  Bedeutungsproblem — III.  Das 
Problem  der  "Representation"  und  der  Aufbau  des  Bewusstseins — IV.  Die 
ideelle  Bedeutung  des  Zeichens— -Die  Oberwindung  der  Abbildtheorie. — 
PART  ONE:  ZUR  PHAENOMENOLOGIE  DER  SPRACHJLICHEN  FORM — CH.  /.  DAS 
SPRACHPROBLEM  IN  DER  GESCHICHTE  DER  PHILOSOPHIE— I. 
Das  Sprachproblem  in  der  Geschichte  des  philosophischen  Idealismus  (flaton, 
Descartes,  Leibniz) — II.  Die  Stellung  des  Sprachproblems  in  den  Systemen  des 
Empirismus  (Bacon,  Hobbes,  Locke ,  Berkeley) — III.  Die  Philosophic  der 
franzosischen  Aufklarung  (Condillacy  Maupertuis,  Diderot) — ^IV.  Die  Sprache 
als  Affektausdruck — Das  Problem  des  "Ursprungs  der  Sprache'*  (Giambatttsta 
Vico,  Hamann,  Herder,  Die  Romantik) — ^V.  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt—Vl. 
August  von  SMeicher  und  der  Fortgang  zur  "naturwissenschaftlichen" 
Sprachansicht — VII.  Die  Begrundung  der  modernen  Sprachwissenschaft  und 
das  Problem  der  "Lautgesetze" — CH.  //.  DIE  SPRACHE  IN  DER  PHASE 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  895 

DES  SINN  LICHEN  AUSDRUCKS—l.  Die  Sprache  als  Ausdrucksbewegung 
— GebSrdensprache  und  Wortsprache — II.  Mimischer,  analogischer  und 
symbolischer  Ausdruck— CH.  III.  DIE  SPRACHE  IN  DER  PHASE  DES 
ANSCHAULICHEN  AUSDRVCKS—l.  Der  Ausdruck  des  Raumes  und  der 
raumlichen  Beziehungen — II.  Die  Zeitvorstellung — III.  Die  sprachliche  Ent- 
wicklung  des  Zahlbegriffs — IV.  Die  Sprache  und  das  Gebiet  der  "inneren 
Anschauung"— Die  Phasen  des  Ichbegriffs— - CH.  IV.  DIE  SPRACHE  ALS 
AUSDRUCK  DES  BEGRIFFLICHEN  DENKENS—DIE  FORM  DER 
SPRACHLICHEN  BEGRIFFS-  UND  KLASSENBILDUNG—l.  Die  qualifi- 
zierende  Begriffsbildung — II.  Grundrichtungen  der  sprachlichen  Klassen- 
bildung— CH.  V.  DIE  SPRACHE  ALS  AUSDRUCK  DER  LOGISCHEN 
BEZIEHUNGSFORMEN—DIE  RELA  TIONSBEGRIFFE. 

2.  DER  BEGRIFF  DER  SYMBOLISCHEN  FORM  IM  AUFBAU  DER 
GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN.  Vortrage  der  Bibliothek  Warburg.  Leip- 
zig, B.  G.  Teubner,  1923,  I.  Vortrage  1921-1922,  pp.  11-39. 

5.  DIE  KANTISCHEN  ELEMENTS  IN  WILHELM  VON  HUMBOLDTS 
SPRACHPHILOSOPHIE.  Festschrift  ]ur  Paul  Hensel.  Greiz  i.V., 
Ohag,  1923,  pp.  105-127. 

1924 

jr.  ZUR  "PHILOSOPHIE  DER  MYTHOLOGIE."  Festschrift  fur  Paul 
Natorp,  zum  70.  Geburtstage.  Berlin,  W.  de  Gruyter,  1924,  pp. 
23-54.  From:  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formeny  II.  (Ein- 
leitung)  (see  1925,  i) 

2.  EIDOS  UND  EIDOLON. 

DAS  PROBLEM  DES  SCHONEN  UND  DER  KUNST  IN  PLATONS  DIALOGEN 
Vortrage  der  Bibliothek  Warburg.  Leipzig,  B.  G.  Teubner,  1924. 
II.  Vortrage  1922-1923,  Pt.  I,  pp.  1-27. 

1925 

/.  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  SYMBOLISCHEN  FORMEN:  BOOK  Two.  DAS 
MYTHISCHE  DENKEN.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1925.  xvi,  320  pp. 
(see  1923,  l;  1929,  I;  1931,  I.) 

Contents:  EINLEITUNG.  Das  Problem  einer  "Philosophic  der  Mythologie." 
— PART  ONE.  DER  MYTHOS  ALS  DENKFORM. — CH.  /.  CHARACTER  UND 
GRUNDRICHTUNG  DES  MYTHISCHEN  GEGENSTANDSBEWUSST- 
SEINS.—CH.  II.  EINZELKATEGOR1EN  DES  MYTHISCHEN  DEN- 
KENS. — PART  Two.  DER  MYTHOS  ALS  ANSCHAUUNGSFORM.  AUFBAU  UND 
GLIEDERUNG  DER  RAUMLICH-ZEITLICHEN  WELT  IM  MYTHISCHEN  BEWUSST- 
SEIN.  CH.  I.  DER  GRUNDGEGENSATZ.—CH.  II.  GRUNDZOGE  EINER 
FORMENLEHRE  DES  MYTHOS.— RAUM,  ZEIT  UND  ZAHL.—l.  Die 
Gliederung  des  Raumes  im  mythischen  Bewusstsein. — II.  Raum  und  Licht. — 
Das  Problem  der  "Orientierung." — III.  Der  mythische  Zeitbegriff. — IV.  Die 


896  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

Gestaltung  der  Zeit  im  mythischen  und  religiosen  Bewusstsein. — V.  Die 
mythische  Zahl  und  das  System  der  "heiligen  Zahlen." — PART  THREE.  DER 
MYTHOS  ALS  LEBENSFORM.  ENTDECKUNG  UND  BESTIMMUNG  DER  SUBJEK- 

TIVEN    WlRKLICHKEIT    IM    MYTHISCHEN    BEWUSSTSEIN. CH.   /.    DAS   ICH 

UND  DIE  SEELE.—CH.  II.  DIE  HERAUSB1LDVNG  DES  SELBSTGE- 
FOHLS  AUS  DEM  MYTHISCHEN  EINHEITS-  UND  LEBENSGEFOHL. 
— I.  Die  Gemeinschaft  des  Lebendigen  und  die  mythische  Klassenbildung. 
— Der  Totemismus. — II.  Der  Personlichkeitsbegriff  und  die  personlichen 
Cotter.— Die  Phasen  des  mythischen  Ichbegriffs.— CH.  III.  KULTUS  UND 
OFFER. — PART  FOUR.  DIE  DIALEKTIK  DES  MYTHISCHEN  BEWUSSTSEINS. 

2.  SPRACHE  UND  MYTHOS. 

EIN  BEITRAG  ZUM  PROBLEM  DER  GOTTERNAMEN. 

Studien  der  Bibliothek  Warburg,  VI,  Leipzig,  B.  G.  Teubner, 
1925.  87  pp. 

English  translation:  LANGUAGE  AND  MYTH.  Translated  by  Susanne 
K.  Longer.  New  York,  Harper  &  Brothers.  1946.  x,  103  pp. 

Contents:  I.  The  Place  of  Language  and  Myth  in  the  Pattern  of  Human 
Culture.  II.  The  Evolution  of  Religious  Ideas.  III.  Language  and  Concep- 
tion. IV.  Word  Magic.  V.  The  Successive  Phases  of  Religious  Thought.  VI. 
The  Power  of  Metaphor. 

3.  DIE  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  GRIECHEN  VON  DEN  ANFANGEN  BIS 
PLATON.  Lehrbuch  der  Philosophic,  hrsg.  von  M.  Dessoir.  Vol.  I. 
Die  Geschichte  der  Philosophic.  Berlin,  Ullstein,  1925.  139  pp. 

Contents:  Einleitung. — Die  Geschichte  der  Griechischen  Philosophic  als 
Geschichte  des  Sich-selbst-Findens  des  "Logos." — PART  ONE.  DIE  VORAT- 
T1SCHE  PHILOSOPHIE.—l.  Die  Jonische  Naturphilosophie.— -II.  Heraklit 
und  die  Pythagoreer. — III.  Die  Eleaten. — IV.  Die  Jungere  Naturphilosophie. 
—PART  Two.  DIE  ATTISCHE  PHILOSOPHIE.—l.  Die  Sophistik.— II. 
Sokrates. — III.  Platon. 

4.  PAUL  NATORP.  Kant-Studien.  Vol.  XXX,  1925,  pp.  273-298. 

1927 

/.  INDIVIDUUM  UND  KOSMOS  IN  DER  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  RENAIS- 
SANCE. Studien  der  Bibliothek  Warburg,  X.  Leipzig,  B.  G. 
Teubner,  1927.  ix,  458  pp. 

Italian  translation:  INDIVIDUO  E  COSMO  NELLA  FILOSOFIA  DEL  RINASCIMENTO. 
Translated  by  F.  Federici.  Firenze,  "La  Nuova  Italia,"  1935. 

Spanish  Translation :  (In  preparation) . 

Contents:  Einleitung. — I.  Nikolaus  Cusanus. — II.  Cusanus  und  I  (alien. — III. 
Freiheit  und  Notwendigkeit  in  der  Philosophic  der  Renaissance.  IV.  Das 
Subjekt-Objekt  Problem  in  der  Philosophic  der  Renaissance. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  897 

2.  ERKENNTNISTHEORIE  NEBST  DEN  GRENZFRAGEN  DER  LOGIK  UND 
DENKPSYCHOLOGIE.  Jahrbiicher  der  Philosophic.  Vol.  Ill,  Berlin, 
E.  S.  Mittler,  1927,  pp.  31-92. 

3.  DAS  SYMBOLPROBLEM  UND  SEINE  STELLUNG  IM  SYSTEM  DER 
PHILOSOPHIE.  Zeitschrift  fur  Asthetik  und  allgemeine  Kunstwis- 
senschajt.  Vol.  XXI,  Stuttgart,  Enke,  1927,  pp.  191-208. 

4.  DIE  BEDEUTUNG  DES  SPRACHPROBLEMS  FUR  DIE  ENTSTEHUNG 
DER  NEUREN  PHILOSOPHIE.  Festschrift  fiir  Carl  Meinhofj  1927, 
pp.  507-14- 

1928 

1.  DIE  IDEE  DER  REPUBLIKANISCHEN  VERFASSUNG:  Rede  zur  Ver- 
fassungsfeier  am  n.  August  1928.  Hamburg,  Friederichsen,  1929. 

33  PP- 

2.  HERMANN  COHEN'S  SCHRIFTEN  ZUR  PHILOSOPHIE  UND  ZEIT- 
GESCHICHTE.  Edited  by  Albert  Gorland  and  Ernst  Casstrer.  2  vols. 
Veroffentlichungen  der  Hermann  Cohen-Stiftung  bel  der  Akademte 

far  die  Wissenschaft  des  Judentums.  Berlin,  Akademie-Verlag,  1928. 

3.  ZUR  THEORIE  DES  BEGRIFFS. 
BEMERKUNGEN  zu  DEM  AUFSATZ  VON  G.  HEYMANS. 

Kant-Studien.  Vol.  XXXIII.  Berlin,  Reuther  &  Reichard,  1928, 
pp.  129-36. 

4.  NEOKANTIANISM.  —  RATIONALISM.  —  SUBSTANCE. — TRANSCEN- 
DENTALISM.— TRUTH. — Articles  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannic^ 
1 4th  ed.  1928. 

1929 

/.  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  SYMBOLISCHEN  FORMEN:  BOOK  THREE. 
PHANOMENOLOGIE  DER  ERKENNTNIS.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer, 
1929.  xii,  559  pp.  (see  1923,  I;  1925,  I;  1931,  l) 

Contents:  EINLEITUNG.  I.  Materie  und  Form  der  Erkenntnis. — II.  "Die 
Symbolische  Erkenntnis  und  ihre  Bedeutung  fiir  den  Aufbau  der  Gegen- 
standswelt. — III.  Das  "Unmittelbare"  der  inneren  Erfahrung. — Der  Gegen- 
stand  der  Psychologic. — IV.  Intuitive  und  symbolische  Erkenntnis  in  der 
modernen  Metaphysik. — PART  ONE:  AUSDRUCKSFUNKTION  UND  AUSDRUCKS- 
WELT.— CH.  I.  SUBJEKTIVE  UND  OBJEKTIVE  ANALYSE.— CH.  II. 
DAS  AUSDRUCKSPHANOMEN  ALS  GRUNDMOMENT  DES  WAHR- 
NEHMUNGSBEWUSSTSEINS.—CH.  III.  DIE  AUSDRUCKSFUNK- 
TIQN  UND  PA$  L&B-$PEIEN-PROBIEM,—PA*T  Two;  DAS  PROBLEM 


898  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

DER  REPRESENTATION  UND  DER  AUFBAU  DER  ANSCHAULICHEN  WELT. — CH. 
I.  DER  BEGRIFF  UND  DAS  PROBLEM  DER  REPRESENTATION.— 
CH.  II.  DING  UND  EIGENSCHAFT.—CH.  III.  DER  RAUM.—CH.  IV. 
DIE  ZEITJNSCHAUUNG.—CH.  V.  SYMBOLISCHE  PRAGNANZ.— 
CH.  VI.  ZUR  PATHOLOGIE  DES  SYMBOLBEWUSSTSEINS.—l.  Das 
Symbolproblem  in  der  Geschichte  der  Aphasielehre. — II.  Die  Veranderung 
der  Wahrnehmungswelt  im  Krankheitsbild  der  Aphasic. — III.  Zur  Pathologic 
der  Dingwahrnehmung. — IV.  Raum,  Zeit  und  Zahl. — V.  Die  pathologischen 
Storungen  des  Handelns. — PART  THREE:  DIE  BEDEUTUNGSFUNKTION  UND 
DER  AUFBAU  DER  WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN  ERKENNTNIS. — CH.  I.  ZUR 
THEORIE  DES  BEGRlFFS—l.  Die  Grenzen  des  "naturlichen  Wclt- 
begriffs." — II.  Begriff  und  Gesetz. — Die  Stellung  des  Begriffs  in  der  mathe- 
matischen  Logik. — Klassenbegriff  und  Relationsbegriff. — Der  Begriff  als 
Satzfunktion.—Begriff  und  Vorstellung.— CH.  II.  BEGRIFF  UND  GEGEN- 
STAND.—CH.  III.  SPRACHE  UND  WISSENSCHAFT.—D1NGZEICHEN 
UND  ORDNUNGSZEICHEN.  CH.  IV.  DER  GEGENSTAND  DER 
MATHEMATIK. — I.  Formalistische  und  intuitionistische  Begriindung  der 
Mathematik. — II.  Der  Aufbau  der  Mengenlehre  und  die  "Grundlagenkrise" 
der  Mathematik. — III.  Die  Stellung  des  Zeichens  in  der  Theorie  der  Mathe- 
matik.— IV.  Die  "idealen  Elemente"  und  ihre  Bedeutung  fur  den  Aufbau 
der  Mathematik.-— CH.  V.  DIE  GRUNDLAGEN  DER  NATURWISSEN- 
SCH  A  FT  LICHEN  ERKENNTNIS. — I.  Empirische  und  konstruktive  Man- 
nigfaltigkeiten. — II.  Prinzip  und  Methode  der  physikalischen  Reihenbildung. 
— III.  "Symbol"  und  "Schema"  im  System  der  modernen  Physik. 

2.  FORMEN  UND  VERWANDLUNGEN  DES  PHILOSOPHISCHEN  WAHR- 

HEITSBEGRIFFS,  In:  Hamburger  Universitats-Reden  gehalten  beim 
Rektoratswechsel  1929.  Hamburg,  1931,  pp.  17-36. 
Translated  into  Japanese  in  1930  by  Dr.  T.  Yura. 

3.  £TUDES  SUR  LA  PATHOLOGIE  DE  LA  CONSCIENCE  SYMBOLIQUE. 
Traduit  par  A.  Koyre.  Journal  de  Psychologie  Normale  et  Patholo- 
gique.  Vol.  XXV,  No.  5-8.  Paris,  Alcan,  pp.  289-336;  523-566. 

4.  LEIBNIZ  UND  JUNGIUS.  Bettrage  zur  Jungiusforschung.  Festschrift 
der  Hamburgischen  Universitat,  1929,  pp.  21-26. 

5.  DIE  IDEE  DER  RELIGION  BEI  LESSING  UND  MENDELSSOHN.  Fest- 
gabe  zum  10  jahrigen  Bestehen  der  Akademie  fur  die  Wissenschaft 
des  Judentums.  Berlin,  Akademie- Verlag,  1929,  pp.  22-41. 

6.  DIE  PHILOSOPHIE  MOSES  MENDELSSOHNS.  In:  "Moses  Mendels- 
sohn" Zur  200  jahrigen  Wiederkehr  seines  Geburtstages.  Pub- 
lished by  the  "Encyclopedia  Judaica,"  Berlin,  Schneider,  1929,  pp. 
40-60. 

7.  REDE  BEIM  BEGRABNIS  VON  ABY  WARBURG.  Aby  Warburg  zum 
Gedachtnis.  Printed  for  private  circulation.  1929. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  899 

8.  NACHRUF  AUF  ABY  WARBURG.  In:  Hamburger  Universitats- 
Reden  gehalten  beim  Rektoratswechsel  1929.  Hamburg,  1931,  pp. 
48-56. 

1930 

/.  "GEIST"  UND  "LEBEN"  IN  DER  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  GEGENWART. 
Die  Neue  Rundschau.  Vol.  XLI,  No.  I.  Berlin,  S.  Fischer,  1930, 
pp.  244-264. 

Translated  into  English  in  1947  by  Robert  Walter  Bretall  and  Paul  Arthur 
SMlpp  and  reprinted  in  the  present  volume  as  Part  III  (pp.  855-880)  under 
the  title:  "  'Spirit'  and  'Life'  in  Contemporary  Philosophy." 

2.  FORM  UND  TECHNIK.  In:  Kunst  und  Technik.  Aufsatze  hrsg.  von 
Leo  Kestenberg.  Berlin,  Wegweiser  Verlag,  1930,  pp.  15-61. 

3.  KEPLERS  STELLUNG  IN  DER  EUROPAISCHEN  GEISTESGESCHICHTE. 
Verhandlungen  des  naturwissenschajtlichen  Vereins,  Hamburg,  Vol. 
IV,  1930,  No.  3-4. 

1931 

/.  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  SYMBOLISCHEN  FORMEN:  INDEX.  Bearbeitet  von 
Dr.  Hermann  Noack.  Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer  Verlag,  1931.  92  pp. 
Contents:  Subject-  and  Author-Index j  Bibliography. 

2.  MYTHISCHER,    ASTHETISCHER    UND    THEORETISCHER    RAUM. 
Vierter  Congress  fur  Asthetik  und  allgemeine  Kunsttvissenschajt. 
Bericht  hrsg.  von  H.  Noack.  Stuttgart,  1931,  pp.  21-36. 

3.  ENLIGHTENMENT.  Article  in  the  "Encyclopedia  of  the  Social  Sci- 
ences" New  York,  1931. 

4.  DEUTSCHLAND  UND  WESTEUROPA  IM  SPIEGEL  DER  GEISTES- 
GESCHICHTE. In:  Inter-Nationes;  Zeitschrift  fur  die  kulturellen  Be- 
ziehungen  Deutschlands  zum  Ausland.  Vol.  I,  No.  3  and  4.  Berlin, 
deGruyter,  1931. 

5.  KANT  UND  DAS  PROBLEM  DER  METAPHYSIK. 
BEMERKUNGEN  zu  MARTIN  HEIDEGGER'S  KAMI-INTERPRETATION. 
Kant-Studien,  Vol.  XXXVI,  1931,  pp.  1-26. 

1932 

r.  DIE  PLATONISCHE  RENAISSANCE  IN  ENGLAND  UND  DIE  SCHULE 
VON  CAMBRIDGE.  Studien  der  Bibliothek  Warburg,  XXIV.  Leip- 
zig, B.  G.  Teubner,  1932.  143  pp. 
Contents:   Einleitung.   Die   gcschichtliche   Stellung  und   die  geschichtliche 


900  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

Mission  der  Schule  von  Cambridge. — I.  Die  Platonische  Akademie  in  Florenz 
und  ihre  Wirkung  auf  den  Englischen  Humanismus. — II.  Die  Idee  der  Re- 
ligion in  der  Schule  von  Cambridge. — III.  Die  Stellung  der  Schule  von 
Cambridge  in  der  Englischen  Geistesgeschichte. — IV.  Die  Bedeutung  der 
Schule  von  Cambridge  fur  die  allgemeine  Religionsgeschichte. — V.  Die 
Naturphilospphie  der  Schule  von  Cambridge. — VI.  Ausgang  und  Fortwirkung 
der  Schule  von  Cambridge. — Shaftesbury. — Index. 

2.  DIE  PHILOSOPHIC  DER  AUFKLARUNG.  Tubingen,  Mohr,  1932. 
xviii,  491  pp. 

Italian  translation:  LA  FILOSOFIA  DELL'ILLUMINISMO.  Translated  by  E.  Pocar, 
Firenze,  "La  Nuova  Italia,"  1935. 

Spanish  translation:  FILOSOFIA  DE  LA  ILLUSTRACION.  Mexico,  Fondo  de 
Cultura  Economica,  1943.  Translated  by  Eugenio  Imaz. 

English  translation:  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  ENLIGHTENMENT.  Translated 
by  F.  C.  A.  Koelln.  Princeton  University  Press.  (In  preparation.) 

Contents:  CH.  I.  DIE  DENKFORM  DES  ZE1TALTERS  DER  AUF- 
KLARUNG.—CH.  II.  NATUR-  UND  NATURERKENNTNIS  IM  DEN- 
KEN  DER  AUFKLARUNGSPHILOSOPHIE.—CH.  HI.  PSYCHOLOGIE 
UND  ERKENNTNISLEHRE.—CH.  IV.  DIE  IDEE  DER  RELIGION.— 

I.  Das  Dogma  der  Erbsunde  und  das  Problem  der  Theodizee. — II.  Die  Idee 
der  Toleranz  und  die  Grundlegung  der  natiirlichen  Religion. — III.  Religion 
und  Geschichte.— CH.  V.  DIE  EROBERUNG  DER  GESCHICHT LICHEN 
WELT.—CH.  VI.  RECHT,  STAAT  UND  GESELLSCHAFT.—l.  Die  Idee 

des  Rechts  und  das  Prinzip  der  unverausserlichen  Rechte. — II.  Der  Vertrags- 
gedanke  und  die  Methodik  der  Sozialwissenschaften. — CH.  VII.  DIE 
GRUNDPROBLEME  DER  ASTHETIK.— I.  Das  "Zeitalter  der  Kritik .»— 

II.  Die  klassizistische  Asthetik  und  das  Problem  der  Objektivitat  des  Schonen. — 

III.  Das  Geschmacksproblem   und  die  Wendung  zum  Subjektivismus. — IV. 
Die  Asthetik  der  Intuition  und  das  Genieproblem. — V.  Verstand  und  Ein- 
bildungskraft. — Gottsched  und   die   Schweizer. — VI.    Die  Grundlegung  der 
systematischen  Asthetik. — Baumgarten. — Index. 

3.  GOETHE  UND  DIE  GESCHICHTLICHE  WELT. 
DREI  AUFSATZE. 

Berlin,  Bruno  Cassirer,  1932.  148  pp. 

Content:  I.  Goethe  und  die  geschichtliche  Welt.  II.  Goethe  und  das  18. 
Jahrhundert.  III.  Goethe  und  Platon.  (see  1922,  i) 

4.  GOETHE  UND  DAS  18.  JAHRHUNDERT.  Zeitschrift  filr  Asthetik  und 
allgemeine  Kunstwissenschaft.  Vol.  XXVI,  1932,  pp.  113-48  (see 
1932,  3:  II) 

5.  GOETHES  IDEE  DER  BILDUNG  UND  ERZIEHUNG.  Padagogisches 
Zentralblatt.  Vol.  XII,  1932,  pp.  340-58. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  901 

6.  DER  NATURFORSCHER  GOETHE.  Hamburger  Fremdenblatt,  March 
19,  1932. 

7.  DIE    SPRACHE    UND   DER   AUFBAU   DER    GEGENSTANDSWELT. 
Bericht  uber  den  XII.  Kongress  der  deutschen  Gesellschaft  fur 
Psychologie.  Hamburg.  Jena,  G.  Fischer,  1932. 

French  translation:  LE  LANGUAGE  ET  LA  CONSTRUCTION  DU  MONDE  DES 
OBJETS.  By  P.  Guillaunte.  Journal  He  Psychology  Normale  et  Pathologique, 
Vol.  XXX,  pp.  18-44. 

Reprint  in:  PSYCHOLOGIE  DU  LANGUAGE,  par  H.  Delacroix,  E.  Cassirery  etc. 
Bibliotheque  de  Philosophic  contemporaine.  Paris,  Alcan,  1933,  pp.  18-44. 

8.  VOM  WESEN  UND  WERDEN  DES  NATURRECHTS.  Zeitsckrtft  ]ur 
Rechtsphilosofhie.  Vol.  VI,  No.  I.  Leipzig,  Meiner,  1932. 

9.  DIE  ANTIKE  UND  DIE  ENTSTEHUNG  DER  EXAKTEN  WISSEN- 
SCHAFT.  Die  Antike,  Vol.  VIII.  Berlin,  deGruyter,  1932,  pp.  276- 
300. 

70.  SPINOZA'S  STELLUNG  IN  DER  ALLGEMEINEN  GEISTESGESCHICHTE. 
Der  Morgen.  Vol.  VIII,  No.  5.  Berlin,  Philo-Verlag,  1932,  pp. 
325-348. 

n.  SHAFTESBURY  UND  DIE  RENAISSANCE  DES  PLATONISMUS  IN 
ENGLAND.  Vortrage  der  Bibltothek  Warburg,  Vol.  IX,  1930-31, 
pp.  136-55. 

12.  DAS  PROBLEM  J.  J.  ROUSSEAU.  Archiv  fur  Geschichte  der  Philo- 
sophte.  Vol.  XLI,  1932,  pp.  177-213;  479-5!3- 

Italian  translation:  IL  PROBLEMA  GIAN  GIACOMO  ROUSSEAU.  Translated  by 
Maria  Albanese,  Firenze,  "La  Nuova  Italia",  1938. 

/^.  KANT.  Article  in  the  "Encyclopedia  of  the  Social  Sciences"  New 
York,  1932. 

1933 

/.  L'UNITE  DANS  L'OEUVRE  DE  J.  J.  ROUSSEAU.  (X.  Leon,  E.  Cas- 
sirer,  etc.)  Bulletin  de  la  Soclete  Frangaise  de  Philosophie.  Vol. 
XXXII,  1933,  pp.  45-85. 

2.  HENRI  BERGSON'S  ETHIK  UND  RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE.  Der  Mor- 
gen,Vol.  IX,  No.  I.  Berlin,  Philo-Verlag,  1933. 
Swedish  translation:  Judisk  Tidskrift.  Vol.  XIV,  June  1941,  pp,  13-18. 


902  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

1935 

/.  SCHILLER  UND  SHAFTESBURY.  The  Publications  of  the  English 
Goethe  Society.  New  Series,  Vol.  XI,  Cambridge,  The  University 
Press,  1935,  pp.  37-59. 


1936 

/.  DETERMINISMUS   UND  INDETERMINISMUS  IN  DER  MODERNEN 
PHYSIK. 

HlSTORISCHE  UND  SYSTEMATISCHE  STUDIEN  ZUM  KAUSALPROBLEM. 

Goteborgs  Hogskolas  Arsskrift  XLII,  1936:  3.  ix,  265  pp. 

Contents:  PART  ONE.  HlSTORISCHE  VORBETRACHTUNGEN.—l.  Der 
"Lcrplacesche  Geist." — II.  Metaphysischer  und  kritischer  Determinismus. — 
PART  Two.  DAS  KAUSALPRINZ1P  DER  KLASSISCHEN  PHYSIK.— 
I.  Die  Grundtypen  physikalischer  Aussagen. — Die  Massaussagen. — II.  Die 
Gesetzes-Aussagen. — III.  Die  Prinzipien-Aussagen. — IV.  Der  allgemeine 
Kausalsatz.— PART  THREE.  KAUSALITAT  UND  WAHRSCHEINLICH- 
KEIT. — I.  Dynamische  und  statistische  Gesetzmassigkeit. — II.  Der  logische 
Charakter  statistischer  Aussagen. — PART  FOUR.  DAS  KAUSALPROBLEM 
DER  QUANTENTHEORIE. — I.  Die  Grundlagen  der  Quantentheorie  und 
die  Unbestimmtheits-Relationen. — II.  Zur  Geschichte  und  Erkenntnistheorie 
des  Atombegriffs.— PART  FIVE.  KAUSALITAT  UND  KONTINUITJ'T.— 
I.  Das  Kontinuitatsprinzip  in  der  klassischen  Physik. — II.  Zum  Problem  des 
"materiellen  Punktes."—SCHLUSSBETRACHTUNGEN  UND  ETHISCHE 
SCHLUSSFOLGERUNGEN. 

2.  INHALT  UND  UMFANG  DES  BEGRIFFS. 

BEMERKUNGEN  zu  KONRAD  MARC-WOGAU'S  GLEICHNAMIGER  SCHRIFT. 
Theoria,  Goteborg,  Vol.  II.  1936,  pp.  207-232. 


1937 

/.  DESCARTES  ET  L'IDEE  DE  L'UNITE  DE  LA  SCIENCE.  Revue  de 
Synthese.  Vol.  XIV,  No.  I.  Paris,  1937,  pp.  7-28.  (see  1939,  I, 
Part  One,  Ch.  II) 

2.  DESCARTES'  WAHRHEITSBEGRIFF.  Theoria,  Goteborg,  Vol.  Ill, 
*937>  PP-  161-87.  (see  1939,  i,  Part  One,  Ch.  II) 

3.  WAHRHEITSBEGRIFF  UND  WAHRHEITSPROBLEM  BEI  GALILEI. 
Scientia,  Milano,  Sept.-Oct.  1937,  pp.  121-130;  185-193. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  903 

1938 

/.  ZUR  LOGIK  DBS  SYMBOLBEGRIFFS.  Theoria,  GSteborg,  Vol.  IV, 
1938,  pp.  145-75- 

2.  LE  CONCEPT  DE  GROUPE  ET  LA  THEORIE  DE  LA  PERCEPTION. 

Journal  de  Psychologic,  Juillet-Decembre  1938,  pp.  368-414. 

English  translation:  THE  CONCEPT  OF  GROUP  AND  THE  THEORY  OF  PER- 
CEPTION. Philosophy  and  Phaenomenological  Research ,  Vol.  V.  1944,  pp. 
1-35- 

3.  REVIEW  OF  A.  C.   BENJAMIN'S  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  (New  York,  1937.)  Lychnos,  Upsala, 
1 938,  pp.  456-461. 

4.  OBER  BEDEUTUNG  UNO  „»«*  ~SSUNGSZEIT  VON  DESCARTES'  "RE- 
CHERCHE  DE    LA   VERITE    PAR    LA   LUMIERE    NATURELLE." 
Theoria,  Goteborg,  Vol.  IV,  1938,  pp.  193-234. 

5.  DESCARTES'  DIALOG  "RECHERCHE  DE  LA  VERITE  PAR  LA  LU- 
MIERE NATURELLE"  UND  SEINE  STELLUNG  IM  GANZEN  DER 
CARTESISCHEN  PHILOSOPHIE. 

EIN  INTERPRETATIONSVERSUCH. 

Lardomshistorlska  Samjundets   Arsbok,   Lychnos,   Upsala,    1938, 

PP-  139-I79- 

French  translation:  LA  PLACE  DE  LA  "RECHERCHE  DE  LA  V£RIT£  PAR  LA 

LUMIERE  NATURELLE"  DANS  L'OEUVRE  DE  DESCARTES.  Revue  Philosofhique, 

I939>  PP-  161-300. 

Reprinted    in:    DESCARTES.    Lehre-Personlichkeit-Wirkung.    1939,    15    Part 

Two,  Ch.  II. 

6.  REVIEW  OF  OEUVRES  COMPLETES  DE  MALEBRANCHE,  publ.  par 
D.  Roustan  et  Paul  Schrecker.  (Vol.  I,  1939.)  Theoria,  Goteborg 
Vol.  IV,  1938,  pp.  287-300. 

1939 

/.  DESCARTES. 

Lehre — Personlichkeit — Wirkung. 

Stockholm,  Bermann-Fischer  Verlag,  1939.  308  pp. 

Swedish  translation  (Ch.  Ill  only) :  DROTTNINC  CHRISTINA  OCH  DESCARTES, 
Stockholm,  Bonniers,  1940$  140  pp. 

French  translation:  DESCARTES,  CORNEILLE,  CHRISTINE  DE  SU£DE.  Trans- 
lated by  Madeleine  Frances  et  Paul  Schrecker.  Paris,  Vrin,  1942. 


9o4  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

Contents:  PART  ONE.  GRUNDPROBLEME  DES  CARTESIANISMUS.— • CH.  I.  DES- 
CARTES9 WAHRHEITSBEGRIFF.—CH.  II.  DIE  IDEE  DER  "EINHEIT 
DER  WISSENSCHAFT"  IN  DER  PHILOSOPHIE  DESCARTES'.— PART 
Two.  DESCARTES  UND  SEIN  JAHRHUNDERT. — CH.  I.  DESCARTES  UND 
CORNEILLE.—CH.  II.  DESCARTES9  "RECHERCHE  DE  LA  V&RIT& 
PAR  LA  LVMI&RE  NATURELLE."—CH.  III.  DESCARTES  UND  DIE 
KdNlGIN  VON  SCHWEDEN.  EINE  STUDIE  ZUR  GEISTESGE- 
SCHICHTE  DES  17.  JAHRHUNDERTS.—l.  Das  Verhaltnis  von  Descartes 
und  Konigin  Christina  als  geistesgeschichtliches  Problem. — II.  Der  "uni- 
versale  Theismus"  und  das  Problem  der  natiirlichen  Religion  im  17.  Jahr- 
hundert. — III.  Die  Renaissance  des  Stoizismus  in  der  Ethik  des  16.  und 
17.  Jahrhunderts. — IV.  Descartes'  Affcktenlehre  und  ihre  geistesgeschichtliche 
Bedeutung. — V.  Konigin  Christina  und  das  heroische  Ideal  des  17.  Jahr- 
hunderts, 

2.  AXEL  HAGERSTROM. 

EINE  STUDIE  ZUR  SCHWEDISCHEN  PHILOSOPHIE  DER  GEGENWART. 

Gbteborgs  Hogskolas  Arsskrijt,  XLV,  1939:  I.  1 19  pp. 

Contents:  I.  Der  Kampf  gegen  die  Metaphysik. — II.  Die  Kritik  des  Subjek- 
tivismus. — III.  Die  Moralphilosophie. — IV.  Recht  und  Mythos. — V.  Zur  Logik 

der  Geisteswissenschaften. 

j.  NATURALISTISCHE  UND  HUMANISTISCHE  BEGRUNDUNG  DER 
KULTUR-PHILOSOPHIE.  Goteborg  Kungl.  Vetenskap  och  Vitter- 
hets-Samhalles  Handlmgar.  5°  foldjer,  Ser.  A,  Bil.  7,  No.  3.  1939, 
pp.  1-28. 

Reprinted  in:  Der  Bogen,  Scholz  Verlag,  Wiesbaden,  Germany,  Vol.  2,  No. 
4,  April  1947. 

4.  DIE  PHILOSOPHIE  IM  17.  UND  18.  JAHRHUNDERT.  Paris,  Her- 
mann &  Cie,  1939,  94  pp.  Published  in  Chrontque  Annuelle^  publ. 
par  I'lnstitut  International  de  Collaboration  Philosophique. 

5.  WAS  IST  "SUBJEKTIVISMUS"?  Theorlay  Goteborg,  Vol.  V,  1939, 
pp.  111-140. 

.  6.  LA  PLACE  DE  LA  "RECHERCHE  DE  LA  VERITE  PAR  LA  LUMIERE 
NATURELLE"  DANS  L'OEUVRE  DE  DESCARTES.  Revue  Philoso- 
fhique,  1939,  pp.  261-300.  (see  1938,  5) 

1940 

i.  MATHEMATISCHE  MYSTIK  UND  MATHEMATISCHE  NATURWISSEN- 
SCHAFT. 

BETRACHTUNGEN  ZUR  ENTSTEHUNGSGESCHICHTE  DER  EXAKTEN  WISSEN- 
SCHAFT. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  905 

Lychnos,  Upsala,  1940,  pp.  248-265. 

2.  NEUERE  KANT-LITTERATUR.  Theoria,  Goteborg,  Vol.  VI.  1940, 
pp.  87-100. 

5.  WILLIAM  STERN. 

ZUR  WlEDERKEHR  SEINES  TODESTAGES. 

A  eta  Psychologica,  Vol.  V,  pp.  1-15. 

1941 

/.  LOGOS,  DIKE,  KOSMOS  IN  DER  ENTWICKLUNG  DER  GRIECHISCHEN 
PHILOSOPHIE.  Goteborgs  Hogskolas  Arsskrift,  Vol.  XLVII,  1941: 
6.  31  pp. 

2.  THORILDS  STELLUNG  IN  DER  GEISTESGESCHICHTE  DES  18.  JAHR- 
HUNDERTS.  Svenska  Historic — Vitterhetens-och  Antikvitet-Akade- 
miens  Handling ar,  1941. 

5.  THORILD  UND  HERDER.  Theoria,  Goteborg,  Vol.  VII.  1941,  pp. 
75-92. 

1942 

/.    ZUR  LOGIK  DER  KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN. 

Funf  Studien. 

Goteborgs  Hogskolas  Arsskrijt,  Vol.  XLVII.  1942:  I.  Goteborg, 

Wettergren  &  Kerbers  Forlag.  139  pp. 

Contents:  I.  Der  Gegenstand  der  Kulturwissenschaft. — II.  Dingwahrnehmung 

und  Ausdruckswahrnehmung. — III.  Naturbegriffe  und  Kulturbegriffe. — IV. 

Formproblem  und  Kausalproblem. — V.  Die  "Tragodie  der  Kultur." 

2.  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  LANGUAGE  UPON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
SCIENTIFIC  THOUGHT.  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XXXIX, 
No.  12.  June  4,  1942,  pp.  309-327. 

French  translation  in  Journal  de  Psychologic  Normale  et  Pathologique  Vol. 
XXXIX,  1946,  pp.  129-152. 

3.  GIOVANNI  Pico  DELLA  MIRANDOLA. 

A  STUDY  IN  THE  HISTORY  OF  RENAISSANCE  IDEAS. 

Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas.  Vol.  Ill,  No.  2,  April  1942,  pp. 

123-144  and  319-346. 

4.  GALILEO. 

A  NEW  SCIENCE  AND  A  NEW  SPIRIT. 

American  Scholar y  Vol.  XII,  1942,  pp.  5-19. 


906  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

1943 

/.  SOME  REMARKS  ON  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  ORIGINALITY  OF  THE 
RENAISSANCE.  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas.  Vol.  IV.  1943, 
pp.  49-56. 

2.  THE  PLACE  OF  VESALIUS  IN  THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  RENAIS- 
SANCE. The  Yale  Journal  of  Biology  and  Medicine.  Vol.  XVI,  No. 
2,  December  1942,  pp.  109-119. 

5.  NEWTON  AND  LEIBNIZ.  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  LII,  1943, 
pp.  366-391. 

4.  HERMANN  COHEN,  1842-1918.  Social  Research,  Vol.  X,  No.  2, 
May  1943,  pp.  219-232. 

1944 

/.  AN  ESSAY  ON  MAN. 

AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HUMAN  CULTURE. 

New  Haven.  Yale  University  Press.  London,  H.  Milford,  Oxford 

University  Press,  1944,  IX.  237  pp. 

Second  and  Third  Printing:  1945.  Fourth  Printing:  1947. 

Translated  into  Spanish  as:  ANTHROPOLOGIA  FILOSOFICA.  Introduction  a  una 
filosofia  de  la  cultura.  Version  Espanola  de  Eugenio  Imaz.  Mexico,  Fondo  de 
Cultura  Economica,  194.5.  IX,  419  pp. 

German  translation:  in  preparation. 

Contents:  Preface.  PART  ONE.  WHAT  IS  MAN? — I.  The  Crisis  in  Man's 
Knowledge  of  Himself. — II.  A  Clue  to  the  Nature  of  Man:  The  Symbol. — III. 
From  Animal  Reactions  to  Human  Responses. — IV.  The  Human  World  of 
Space  and  Time. — V.  Facts  and  Ideals.— PART  Two.  MAN  AND  CUL- 
TURE.— VI.  The  Definition  of  Man  in  Terms  of  Human  Culture. — VII. 
Myth  and  Religion. — VIII.  Language. — IX.  Art. — X.  History. — XI.  Science. 
— XII.  Summary  and  Conclusion. — Index. 

2.  FORCE  AND  FREEDOM. 

REMARKS  ON  THE  ENGLISH  EDITION  OF  JACOB  BURCKHARDT'S  "REFLECTION 
ON  HISTORY." 

American  Scholar,  Vol.  XIII,  Autumn  1944,  pp.  407-417. 

3.  THE  MYTH  OF  THE  STATE.  Fortune,  Vol.  XXIX,  No.  6,  June 
1944,  pp.  165-167,  198,  201,  202,  204,  206. 

4.  JUDAISM  AND  THE  MODERN  POLITICAL  MYTHS.  Contemporary 
Jewish  Record,  Vol.  VII,  1944,  pp.  115-126. 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  907 

Swedish  translation:  JUDENDOMEN  OCH  DE  MODERNA  POLITISKA  MYTERNA. 
Judisk  Tidskrift,  No.  9,  Sept.  1946,  pp.  266-274. 

POSTHUMOUS  PUBLICATIONS 

1.  ROUSSEAU   KANT   GOETHE.  Translated   from   the   German  by 
James  Gutmanny  Paul  Oscar  Kristeller  and  John  Herman  Randall, 
Jr.  History  of  Ideas  Series  No.  I.  Princeton  University  Press,  1945, 
98pp. 

Two  ESSAYS. 

Contents:  KANT  AND  ROUSSEAU. — I.  Personal  influences. — II.  Rousseau 
and  the  doctrine  of  human  nature. — III.  Law  and  the  state. — IV.  The  prob- 
lem of  optimism. — V.  "Religion  within  the  limits  of  mere  reason." — VI. 
Conclusion.  GOETHE  AND  THE  KANTIAN  PHILOSOPHY.— Sources 
and  literature. 

2.  THOMAS  MANNS  GOETHEBILD. 
EINE  STUDIE  OBER  LOTTE  IN  WEIMAR. 

Germanic  Review,  Vol.  XX,  No.  3,  October  1945,  pp.  166-194. 

1946 

i.  THE  MYTH  OF  THE  STATE.  New  Haven,  Yale  University  Press. 
London,  G.  Cumberledge,  Oxford  University  Press,  1946.  xii, 
303  pp.  Foreword  by  Charles  W.  Hendel. 

Spanish  translation:  EL  MITO  DEL  ESTADO.  Translated  by  E.  Nicol,  Mexico, 
Fondo  de  Cultura  Economica,  1947,  362  pp. 

Partial  German  translation  (Ch.  XVIII)  :  "DER  MYTHOS  ALS  POLITISCHE 
WAFFE"  in:  Die  Amerikanische  Rundschaut  194.3,  No.  n,  pp.  30-41. 

Complete  German  translation :  in  preparation. 
Swedish  translation :  in  preparation. 

Contents:  PART  ONE.  WHAT  IS  MYTH? — I.  The  Structure  of  Mythical 
Thought. — II.  Myth  and  Language. — III.  Myth  and  the  Psychology  of 
Emotions. — IV.  The  Function  of  Myth  in  Man's  Social  Life. — PART  Two. 
THE  STRUGGLE  AGAINST  MYTH  IN  THE  HISTORY  OF  POLITI- 
CAL THEORY.— V.  "Logos"  and  "Mythos"  in  Early  Greek  Philosophy.— 
VI.  Plato*s  Republic. — VII.  The  Religious  and  Metaphysical  Background  of 
the  Medieval  Theory  of  the  State. — VIII.  The  Theory  of  the  Legal  State  in 
Medieval  Philosophy. — IX.  Nature  and  Grace  in  Medieval  Philosophy.—X. 
Machiavelli's  New  Science  of  Politics. — XL  The  Triumph  of  Machiavellian 
and  its  Consequences. — XII.  Implications  of  the  New  Theory  of  State. — 

XIII.  The  Renaissance  of  Stoicism  and  "Natural  Right"  Theories  of  State, — 

XIV.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  and  its  Romantic  Critics. — 
PART  THREE.  THE  MYTH  OF  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY.— XV. 
The  preparation:  Carlyle. — XVI.  From  Hero  Worship  to  Race  Worship, — 


908  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

XVII.  Hegel. — XVIII.  The  Technique  of  the  Modern  Political  Myths. 
Conclusion.  Index. 

2.  GALILEO'S  PLATONISM.  In:  Studies  and  Essays  m  the  History  of 
Science.  Offered  in  homage  to  George  Sarton.  Edited  by  M.  F. 
Ashley  Montagu.  New  York,  H.  Schumann,  1946,  pp.  276-297. 

3.  ALBERT  SCHWEITZER   AS   CRITIC   OF  NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
ETHICS.  The  Albert  Schweitzer  Jubilee  Book.  Edited  by  A.  A. 
Robacky  Sci-Art  Publishers,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  March   1946,  pp. 
239-258. 

4.  STRUCTURALISM  IN  MODERN  LINGUISTICS.  Word.  Journal  of  the 
Linguistic  Circle  of  New  York,  Vol.  I,  No.   n,  August  1946, 
pp.  99-120. 

IN  PREPARATION 

IN  GERMAN:  Kleinere  Schriften.  (A  collection  of  previously  published 

essays.)  Artemis  Verlag,  Zurich,  Switzerland 

Das   Erkenntnis'problem   in  der  Philosophie   und   Wissenschajt  der 
neueren  Zeit 

Vol.  IV.  Artemis  Verlag,  Zurich,  Switzerland. 
(Cf.  1906,  3;   1907,  i;   1920,  I.) 

Contents:  Einleitung  und  Problemstellung — Book  One:  Die 
Exakte  Wissenschaft — Ch.  I.  Das  Raumproblem  und  die  Ent- 
wicklung  der  nicht-Euklidischen  Geometric — II.  Erfahrung  und 
Denken  im  Aufbau  der  Geometric — III.  Ordnungsbegriff  und 
Massbegriff  in  der  Geometric — IV.  Der  Zahlbegriff  und  seine 
logische  Begriindung — V.  Ziel  und  Methode  der  theoretischen 
Physik — Book  Two:  Das  Erkenntnisideal  der  Biologie  und  seine 
Wandlungen — Ch,  I.  Das  Problem  der  Klassifikation  und  die 
Systematik  der  Naturformen — II.  Die  Idee  der  Metamorphose 
und  die  "idealistische  Morphologic" — III.  Die  Entwicklungsge- 
schichte  als  Problem  und  als  Maxime — IV.  Der  Darwinismus  als 
Dogma  und  als  Erkenntnisprinzip— V.  Die  Entwicklungs- 
Mechanik  und  das  Kausalproblem  der  Biologie — VI.  Der  Vitalis- 
mus-Streit  und  die  "Autonomie  des  Organischen" — Book  Three: 
Grundjormen  und  Grundrichtungen  der  historischen  Erkenntnis — 
Ch.  I.  Der  Durchbruch  des  Historismus. — Herder — II.  Die 
Romantik  und  die  Anfange  der  kritischen  Geschichtswissenschaft. 
— Die  "historische  Ideenlehre" — Niebuhr — Ranke — W.  v.  Hum- 
boldt — III.  Der  Positivismus  und  sein  historisches  Erkenntnisideal 
— Hippolyte  Taine — IV.  Staatslehre  und  Verfassungslehre  als 


WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER  909 

Grundlagen  der  Geschichtsschreibung — Theodor  Mommsen — V. 
Politische  Geschichtsschreibung  und  Kulturgeschichte — Jacob 
Burckhardt — VI.  Die  psychologische  Typisierung  der  Geschichte 
— Kurt  Lamprecht — VII.  Der  Einfluss  der  Religionsgeschichte 
auf  das  historische  Erkenntnisideal — David  Friedr.  Strauss,  Renan, 
Fustel  de  Coulanges 

Der  Mythos  vom  Staate,  Translated  from  the  English. 
Artemis  Verlag,  Zurich,  Switzerland.  (See:  1946,  i) 

Philosophische  Anthrofologie.  (Tentative  title.)  Translated  from  the 
English. 
Artemis  Verlag,  Zurich,  Switzerland.  See:  1944,  I 

IN  ENGLISH:  Das  Erkenntnisfroblem.  Vol.  IV.  (English  title  not  yet 
established.)  Translated  from  the  German  by  Paul  Schrecker,  Yale 
University  Press 
The  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment.  Translated  from  the  German 

by  F.  C.  A.  Koelln,  Princeton  University  Press.  See:  1932,  2 
Determinism  and  Indeterminism  in  Modern  Physics  (place  of  publi- 
cation not  yet  determined).  See:  1936,  I 

IN  ITALIAN:  Essay  on  Man.  (Italian  title  not  yet  established.)  Trans- 
lated from  the  English.  Longanesi,  Turino,  Italy.  See:  1944,  I 

IN  SPANISH  :  Kants  Leben  und  Lehre.  (Spanish  title  not  yet  established.) 
Translated  from  the  German.  Fondo  de  Cultura  Economica, 
Mexico.  See:  1918,  I 

Das  Erkenntnisp-oblem.  Vol.  IV.  (Spanish  title  not  yet  established.) 
Translated  from  the  German.  Fondo  de  Cultura  Economica, 
Mexico. 

Individuum  und  Kosmos  in  der  Philosophic  der  Renaissance.  (Spanish 
title  not  yet  established.)  Translated  from  the  German.  Fondo  de 
Cultura  Economica,  Mexico.  See:  1927,  i 

IN  SWEDISH:  The  Myth  of  the  State.  (Swedish  title  not  yet  established.) 
Translated  from  the  English.  Natur  och  Kultur,  Stockholm, 
Sweden.  See:  1946,  I 


9io  WRITINGS  OF  ERNST  CASSIRER 

CHRONOLOGICAL  LIST  OF  PRINCIPAL  WORKS 

1902 — Leibniz'  System  in  seinen  wissenschaftlichen  Grundlagen. 
1906 — Das  Erkenntnisproblem  in  der  Philosophic  und  Wissenschaft 

der  neueren  Zeit.  Vol.  I.  (Cusanus  to  Bayle) 
1907 — Das  Erkenntnisproblem,  etc.  Vol.  II.  (Bacon  to  Kant) 
1910 — Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbegriff.  Untersuchungen  iiber  die 

Grundfragen  der  Erkenntniskritik. 

1916 — Freiheit  und  Form.  Studien  zur  deutschen  Geistesgeschichte. 
1918 — Kants  Leben  und  Lehre. 
1920 — Das  Erkenntnisproblem  in  der  Philosophic  und  Wissenschaft 

der  neueren  Zeit.  Vol.  III.  (Die  Nachkantischen  Systeme) 
192 1 — Zur    Einstein'schen    Relativitatstheorie.    Erkenntnistheoretische 

Betrachtungen. 
1921 — Idee  und  Gestalt.  Fiinf  Aufsatze.  Goethe,  Schiller,  Holderlin, 

Kleist.  (Erganzungsstudien  zu  "Freiheit  und  Form") 
1922 — Die  BegrifFsform  im  mythischen  Denken. 

1923 — Die  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Vol.  I.  Die  Sprache. 
1925 — Die    Philosophic    der    symbolischen    Formen.    Vol.    II.    Das 

mythische  Denken. 
1925 — Sprache  und  Mythos. 

1925 — Die  Philosophic  der  Griechen  von  den  Anfangen  bis  Platon. 
1927 — Individuum  und  Kosmos  in  der  Philosophic  der  Renaissance. 
1929 — Die  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen.  Vol.  III.  Phano- 

menologie  der  Erkenntnis. 
1932 — Die  Platonische  Renaissance  in  England  und  die  Schule  von 

Cambridge. 

1932 — Die  Philosophic  der  Aufklarung. 
1 932 — Goethe  und  die  geschichtliche  Welt. 

1936 — Determinismus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der  modernen  Phvsik. 
1 939 — Descartes.  Lehre-Personlichkeit-Wirkung. 
1942 — Zur  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften. 
1944 — An  Essay  on  Man. 
1945 — Rousseau  Kant  Goethe. 
1946 — The  Myth  of  the  State. 


INDEX 

Arranged  by 
ROBERT  S.  HARTMAN  AND  ROBERT  W.  BROWNING 


INDEX 


Abbott,  Thomas  K.,  481,  485,  578 

Absolute,  93 

Absolute  being,  293 

Absolute  ideal,  674 

Absolute  mind,  598 

Abstraction,  394 

Act  of  creation,  subconscious,  320 

Activity,  375 

Actus  purus  of  Aristotle,  866 

Aesthetic,  328 

Aesthetic  and  ethical  judgment,  368 

Aesthetic  attitude,    340 

Aesthetic  experience,  734.5   as  absorption  in 

living  form,  613 
Aesthetic  fancy,  373 
Aesthetic  form,  44,  349 
Aesthetic  logic,  318 
Aesthetic  theory,  329,  339,  645!?,  871  j  of 

the  Renaissance,  735 
Affinities  341 
Affinitive  geometry,  203 
Albert!,   use  of  perspective,  626 
Alchemy,  60 1 
Alhambra  of  Granada,  301 
(Das)  Allgemeine  im  Aujbau  der  geisteswis- 

s  ens  chaf (lichen  Erkenntnis,  355 
Allegorical,  371 
Altdorfer,   experiments   with    oblique   space, 

627 

Amor   intellectualis,    823 
Amphiboly  of  the  concept  of  reflection,  321 
Analogic   level   of   concept,    299)    level   of 

language,   298 
Analogue,   art  as,   servant  of   reason,   610, 

6x5-616 

Analogues  of  experience,    195 
Analogy,  254,  260 
Analysts,      307)      infinitesimal,      2851      of 

culture,    1x8)    of   experience,    197,    371) 

of  myth,  37 1  j  situs,  203 
Analytical  a  priori,  192 
Analytical  or  tautological  propositions,  255 
Anaxagoras,  281 
Anderson,  F.  H.,  474 
Animal  rationale ,   201 


Animal  symbolicumt  man  as,  201,  448,  461, 

493,  5<>5)  536 

Animals,  363,  869;    and  environment,  861 

Animism,  509,  5x7 

Anthropocentrism,    484 

Anthropological  philosophy,  446,  449,  451, 
457,  458,  461,  463,  464 

Anthropology,  cultural,  494.}  Kant's,  484- 
486)  phenomenological,  492  j  philosoph- 
ical, 278,  399,  446,  449,  457,  459,  461, 
463,  464,  817,  821,  824,  829,  842,  843, 
846;  spiritual,  491,  500,  541 

Anthropomorphism  of  the  child,  366 

Anthropomorphism,  objective,  663 

Antinomies  of  the  culture-concept,  92 

Antinomy  of  all  cultural  life,  320 

Antithesis  of  nature  and  spirit,  858 

Antithesis  between  real  powers  of  Being, 
872 

Anxiety,   67f 

Aphasia,  369 

A  priori,  135,  1521!,  158,  191,  210,  7371!) 
"basic  mental  function,"  161 ;  develop- 
ment  of  symbolic  forms,  165;  diversity, 
1 63;  "formal  structure  of  the  mind," 
173$  invariant  element  of  form,  1555 
Kant's  vs.  Leibniz',  249}  pragmatic 
criticism  of,  I75x?>  result  of  mental  at- 
titude, 1791  rule,  161 

Archimedes,  282 

Architecture,   348 

Ariosto,   350 

Aristotle,  85,  xxo,  190,  210,  281,  306, 
32X,  548,  551*.  555,  569,  573,  6*5*, 
839,  840,  844,  865f  j  actus  purus  of,  866} 
on  causes,  753)  on  definition  of  man, 
493  j  on  slavery,  478}  on  supreme  Form, 
866)  teleology  of,  866 

Art,    48,    84,    1x5,    161,    298,    308,    309, 

3X5,  341,  345,  375,  387,  393,  395,  39*, 
446,  461,  463,  464,  480,  558,  565,  566, 
569,  571,  633,  6421!,  832,  850,  851 )  an 
analogue,  6xo,  615-6x6}  autonomy  of, 
6xo,  6x6,  621,  625,  627,  629)  forms  of, 
5<>6,  5x3,  542)  as  imaginative  penetration 


913 


914 


INDEX 


into  the  nature  of  things,  610,  619}  as  imi- 
tation, 610;  variant  doctrines  of,  613-6151 
individual  rights  of,  667)  law  in,  644$ 
like  and  dislike  in,  68$fj  as  microcosm 
of  the  age,  610,  627-628}  part  of  man's 
total  functioning,  609,  6xo,  627,  629) 
museum  idea  of,  348}  pietism  hostile  to, 
607  j  and  philosophy,  607-608,  734,  756  j 
placement  of,  shown  in  diagram,  6xi} 
plastic,  origin  of,  and  conceptions  of  im- 
mortality, 607$  realism  in,  643)  and 
science,  735,  756}  self-subsistence  of, 
origin  in  gradual  freeing  from  substantial 
nature,  6ioj  symbol,  relation  to,  609, 
621)  as  symbolic  form,  608,  610,  6x8, 
624,  628)  two-fold  movement  in,  609- 
610,  629 

Art  as  Experiencct  by  John  Dewey,  346 
Art  in  Painting  by  Albert  C.  Barnes,  3$6f 
Artist,  347)  his  imagination  and  reflection, 
68ij   his  creative  world,  6821?)   his  ra- 
tionality, 6821? 
Artistic  creation,  339;  essence,  670$  media, 

348 

A  see  sis,  863 

Asceticism,  873 

Aspects  of  symbolism,  117 

Associative  law,  203 

Astral  mythology,  369 

Astrology,  49 

Astronomy,  Ptolemaic,  601,  602 

Atmosphere,  group,   279 

Atom,   280$   bomb,   279 

Atomism,  206 

Attraction  and  repulsion,  870 

Aujbau  der  Farbwelt,  by  Katz,  xo8 

Auden,  W.  H.,  629 

Augustine,  807 

Ausdrvck,  298 

Ausdrucks-Charakter,  114 

Ausdrucksfunktion,  95 

Auseinandersetzung,    between    World    and 

Ego,  322 

Autonomy  of  force,  190 
Axel  Haegerstroem,  by  Cassirer,  116,  206, 

208,  578f,  586,  591, 
A»iom,  105,  135 
Ayer,  A.  J.,  596,  597 

Baader,  Franz  von,  582 
Babbitt,  Irving,  350 
Babylonian  culture,  370 
Bach,  608 


Bacon,  261,  281,  737-740 

Bain,  Alexander,  578 

Baldwin,  Lord,  588 

Barnes,  Albert  C.,  356! 

Barth,  Karl,  846 

Basic  law  of  synthetic  unity,  767 

Bashan,  371 

Baumgardt,  David,  essay  by,  577-603$  594 

Baumgarten,    Alexander,    318,    345,    346, 

645,  832 

Beauty,  as  harmony,  6xo^   as  symbol,  609 
Becker,  Oskar,   199,  843 
Becoming,  326 

Bedeutung,  78,   298}   see  meaning 
Bedeutungsjunktiont  95 
Bedeutungzusammenhdnge,  163 
Beethoven,  350 
Beethoven-Gauss,  332 
Begrifserklarungt  871 
Behaviorism,    271,    273)    its    approach    to 

signs  and  symbols,  83  j  radical,  208 
Being,   125,   144,   548,  550-551,   554-556, 

558,  562-563,  737,  743,  747,  753,  754*, 

872$   antithesis  between   real  powers  of, 

872$    Being-for-itself,    872$    Being    and 

Nothingness,  822f 
Belief,  practical,  553 
Bell,  E.  T.,  Men  of  Mathematics,  332 
Benedict,  Ruth,  516,  517,  529 
Benfey,  370 

Bentham,  Jeremy,  599,  6o2f 
Bergson,  Henri,  3x0,  328,  399,  435^,  49*, 

492,  510,  639 
Berkeley,  George,  406 
Betuusstseiny  88)  see  Mind 
'Bewusstheit?  808,  822 
Bidney,  David,  essay  by,  467-544 
Bild,   375 

Biographical  data  as  science,  272 
Blanshard,  Brand,  472 
Bloomfield,    Leonard,    502 
Boas,  Franz,  504,  5x6 
Bodmer,  6x4 
Body  and  soul,  303 
Body,  physical,  775 
Boehm,  W.,  670 
Boileau,  617 

Boltzman,  L.,  197,  281,  787 
Bolyai,    192 
Boscovich,  281 
Bradley,  F.  H.,  206 
Breitinger,   6x4 
Brentano,  Franz,  803,  807 


INDEX 


Broad,  C.  D.,  577,  57$,  $80,  595 

Bronze,  age  of,  299 

Brouwer,     1991",    434)     see    Intuitionism, 

Formalism 

Brunschvicg,  L6on,  65 
Buber,  Martin,  846 
Buckle,  664 
Buehler,  Karl,  108,  830 
Bundle  of  sense-impressions,  202 
Burckhardt,  Jacob,  803 
Buxton,  Charles  Roden,  329 

Caird,  Edward,  843 

Calculus,  246}  of  classes,  249$  of  relations, 
244,  266 

Cambridge   Platonists,   464 

Canto rian  set  theory,  195,  199 

Cantor's  transfinite  numbers,  779 

Carnap,  Rudolf,  79ff,  208,  322,  596 

Cardinal  and  ordinal  numbers  as  compli- 
mentary, 245 

Cardinal  number,  ordinal  number  as  logi- 
cally prior  to,  245 

Cartesian  notion  of  mind,  478 

Case,    Edward    Murray,    poem,    405    essay, 

S2-S4 

Cassirer,  Ernst:  for  works,  consult  Biblio- 
graphy j  for  reference  to  works,  consult 
individual  titles )  for  topics,  consult  the 
remainder  of  the  Index  as  well  as  below ; 
for  his  essay,  855-880 }  aesthetic  and  sci- 
entific thought  synthesized  by,  734,  756} 
his  a-historical  ways  of  thought,  732, 
741  f,  755f)  ambiguities  as  multiple 
meanings  in,  756)  antitheses  as  used  by, 
733f  J  «*  priori,  doctrine  of,  I5if  j  apriori- 
zation  of  empirical  distinction,  351} 
balance,  44$  brightness  of  discourse,  731, 
754ffi  cheerfulness,  59  )  conceptualism  of, 
2o8f)  convictions  and  motives,  759} 
cultural  definition  of  man,  492-495  [see 
Animal  symbolicum]  \  cultural  reality, 
concept  of,  496-498}  cultural  symbolism, 
506-512)  cultural  unity,  541-544)  culture 
and  myth,  527-535)  dialectical  agreement 
and  disagreement  at  the  same  time,  737, 
745>  747,  749,  7531  dialectical  context 
as  giving  meaning  to  individual  state- 
ments, 7315,  735,  755ffj  as  editor,  44$ 
as  exile,  56,  59ff)  as  European,  45) 
Galileo  as  criticized  by,  737,  746f,  750, 
755)  Galileo  as  object  of  historical  in- 
vestigation by,  731-736)  Galileo  as 


witness  to  views  of,  736f,  744f,  750, 
755  J  generosity  of,  72)  as  German,  45) 
as  historian,  44,  689ff,  731-735,  748f, 
755f)  historical  transplanting  of  past 
thinkers,  732,  734)  historical  understand- 
ing, 749  i  history,  theory  of,  749,  756 
[see  History]  j  humanism  of,  443  ff> 
535-541)  irony  of,  756)  as  Jew,  45) 
as  Kantian,  367,  446f,  457f,  498-5<>M 
73*f,  745,  75<>f,  756,  757^,  799«  [see 
Kant,  Neo-Kantianism] )  language,  phi- 
losophy of,  379ff,  40 iff  [see  Language]) 
liberalism,  755f)  literary  interests,  447, 
454,  462,  66 iff)  man,  definition  of,  492- 
495  [see  Animal  symbolicum] }  as  man  of 
letters,  458,  6siff,  66iffj  mathematical 
concepts,  theory  of,  239ff  [see  Mathe- 
matics] j  memory,  50)  metaphor,  use  by, 
751  f)  mind,  theory  of,  395)  movement 
of  thought,  732ff,  742,  751,  756,  883f$ 
on  myth,  359*?,  379ff,  5I5ffi  optimism, 
749,  84offj  paradoxes  used  by,  736,  742, 
753)  as  phenomenologist,  367,  823!!) 
philosophical  style,  73 iff,  755ff)  and 
philosophical  tradition,  92)  philosophy, 
conception  of,  73ff)  philosophy  as  frame 
of  reference,  180)  philosophy  of  science 
and  the  social  sciences,  2698 >  and  Plato, 
74off,  752,  756)  Plato,  comparison  with, 
754ff)  on  the  psychological  function  of 
symbolic  forms,  512-515)  quotations,  use 
by,  732,  74of,  742f,  745,  755*  radiance, 
755,  840)  radicalism,  742 f  5  rationalism, 
535-541,  732)  reconciliation,  sense  of, 
749f,  753)  relativism  of,  756)  rhythm 
of  prose  of,  732,  755)  scholarship,  50, 
53)  science,  philosophy  of,  x83ff,  2i5ff, 
2695",  757ffj  scope  of  work,  94)  self- 
restraint,  48}  serenity,  53)  social  science, 
philosophy  of,  2698  [see  Culture]) 
sophistry,  Platonic,  754ff  j  sources,  use  of, 
732,  755?  «pell,  756,  840)  his  studies, 
42}  symbolism,  theory  of,  289:?  [see 
Art,  Language,  Myth,  etc.] )  as  synthesiz- 
ing art  and  science,  735,  756)  as 
synthesizing  empiricism  and  rationalism, 
735f)  as  synthesizing  history  and  phi- 
losophy, 732ff,  755f)  as  teacher,  44, 
52ff,  56ff,  756}  his  teachers  [see  Cohen, 
Natorp,  Simmel]  j  and  teaching  curricula, 
76}  Ideological  expressions  used  as  meta- 
phors, 752)  transcendental  orientation, 
88)  transparence,  752,  840}  understand- 


916 


1JND&X 


ing,  concept  of,  748*",  753,  755f}  on 
unitary  function  of  myth,  5 15-51 7  j  on 
unity,  cultural  problem  of,  541-544  j 
universal  liberal,  756}  urbanity,  749; 
way  of  thought  of,  73  iff  5  and  Whitehead, 
749$  world  crisis,  reaction  to,  $8f,  464, 
838 

Categorial  constitution,  8iof,  852 
Categorical  imperative,  473,  481,  487,  578 
Categories,   115,  156,  161,  251,  385,  397, 
766,  8765  a  priori,  4875  axiological,  488} 
doctrine   of,   248 
Category  of  creativity,  292 
Catharsis,  620 
Catholics,  535 
Cause,  77,  84,  94,  117,  303;  Aristotle  on, 

753}  Kant  on,  75of 
Causality,    166,   293,  455,    761,   767,   784, 

789,  790,  791}  law  of,  768f,  784^? 
Causal  relations,  780 
Centers,  points  of  reference,  323 
Certainty  of  knowledge,  15 if,  159,  778 
Chance,   743,   753 
Change,  277,  768 
Character,  79,  96,  341 
Characteristica  generalis>  316 
Characteristic  a  universalis,  849 
Chemistry,  275 
Child,  anthropomorphism  of,  366$  language 

of,  363*!}  play  of,  366 
Christianity,  425,  479 
Christians,  the  early,  479 
Christina,  Queen  of  Sweden,  675 
Cicero,  480 
Circle,  258 

Civilization,  fact  of,  486 
Class  and  classification,  129,  250 
Classical  mechanics,  776,  789  [see  Newton] 
Classicism,  German,  666 
Cognition,  context  of,  762 •,  object  of,  7651", 
778,  793  [see  Neo-Kantianism]  }  process 
of,  762,  771  j   progress  of,  7655   "x"  of, 
7*>5f,  778,  793   [see  Neo-Kantianism] 
Cognitive  functions,  negative  prefix  in,  861 
Cohen,  Hermann,  42,  185,  384,  549,  554, 
557,  567,  638,  759,  76o,  761,  763,  764, 
801,  802,  804,  805,  806,  809,  815,  818, 
822,  823,  830,  831,  833,  835.  837,  8*6' 
848,  849 

Cohen,  Morris  R.,  104,  447,  659 
Coleridge,  Samuel  T.,  839 
Collecting  facts,  278 
Collective      representations,      5i8f,      523fj 

wishes,  529 
Collingwood,    Cassirer's    criticism    of    his 


view  of  art,  617-618 
Color,  109,  191 
Combination    of   deduction    and    induction, 

579* 

Commercialism,   332 
Common  sense,  113,  381,  389 
Comparative   theory   of    the   sciences,    273, 

276 

Comprehensive  aesthetics,  328 
Comte,  Auguste,  455,  469,  488,  494,  498, 

5'5>  564,  572 

Comtean  sociology,  474,  477 

Conative  views  of  art.  See  Expressionism 

Concentration,  304,  323 

Concept,  99,  3405  logic  of  the  generic 
or  class,  250 

"Concept  of  Group  and  Theory  of  Per- 
ception," by  Cassirer,  98,  8261",  829,  839 

Conception  (s),  381,  391,  398*  ethical,  388, 
577ff}  mythic,  392,  395,  396  [see  myth, 
etc.]}  primitive,  387;  scientific,  383,  384, 

392 

Concepts,  130,  276,  2845  class,  250}  form- 
ation of,  272}  generic,  2505  levels  of, 
275}  mathematical,  239ff,  281}  rela- 
tional, 250 

Conceptual-function,  95 

Conceptual  thinking,  313 

Conceptualism  of  Cassirer,  2o8f 

Concrescence,    567,    570-571 

Conditions,  initial,  788 

Conic  sections,   308 

"Connection  of  meaning,"  163 

Conrad,  Joseph,  844 

Conrad-Martius,  Hedwig,  829 

Consciousness,  dialectics  of,  825,  834,  850} 
dialectic  of  the  mythical,  376}  mythic, 
558,  564ff,  57of,  573}  natural  function 
of,  305}  nature  and,  857}  pure,  808, 
8 10,  811,  842,  853}  synthesizing  func- 
tion of,  300  [see  Neo-Kantianism] 

Conservation   of  energy,    196 

Constancy,  2775  of  relations,  281 

Constitutive  forms,  94  [see  Neo-Kantian- 
ism] 

Constitution,  categorial,  810,  811,  852 

Construction  815,  816,  818}  of  matter, 
256}  of  series,  277}  theoretical,  156 

Contemplation,   553 

Content,  372,  7651  of  a  science,  274 

Context,  79,  80,  84,  85,  94,  109,  113,  117, 
266,  764,  765,  794}  of  cognition,  762} 
dynamic,  785}  of  experience,  763,  766} 
logical,  764$  no  objectivity  outside  the, 
86}  of  symbolic  forms,  306}  systematic, 


INDEX 


917 


7635   of  thought,  765  j  unity  of,  765 
Contingency  of  necessity,  750,  752ff 
Continuity,  263  j    law  of,  297$   pattern  of 

morality   between   soul  of  man   and   his 

creation,  320 
Coordination,  307 
Coordinate  systems,  Gaussian,  783 
Coordinates,  space-time,  783 
Copernican  revolution,  186,  321,  473,  484, 

536}   Kant's,  90,  743,  794f 
Copernicus,  186,  274,  747 
Copula  level  of  language,  298 
Copy   theory  of  knowledge,   258,   551,  571 
Corneille,  6725 

Correlativity  of  sense  and  senses,   101 
Correspondence   theories,    210 
Creation,    $$7-$$%,    5&O,    562,    563,     564, 

572  j  logic  of,  310$  process  of,  293 
Creative  civilization,  43 
Creative  energy,  65 
Creative  force,  362 
Creative  principle,  363 
Creative  process,  118 
Creative  synthesis,  259 
Creative  thought,  291 
Creativity,  category  of,  292 
Creativity  of  the  mathematical  method,  264 
Creativity  of   mathematical    thought,    254^ 
Creativity  of  thought,  262 
Crisis,   57,   326,    507,   528,   872?    in   philo- 

sophical anthropology,  467-470 
Criteria  of  verification,  213 
Critical  analysis,  294 
Critical  idealism,   145,  246 
Critical    philosophy,    191,    303,    407,    551, 

557,  573  [«ee  Kant] 
Criticism,  literary,  63  iff,  66  iff 
Critique  of  culture,  77,  160,  181,  296,  303, 

795 
Critique   of  Judgment,  by  Kant,   205,   346, 

617,  817 

Critique  of  knowledge,  125!?,  160 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  by  Kant,  489 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  by  Kant,  69,  86f, 

91,  168,  185,  205,  243,  251,  492,  549f> 

55*»  595,  727,  737,  7$6,  812,  814,  815, 

871 

Critique  of  reason,  77,  160,  296 
Croce,  Benedetto,  45,  355,  6171",  643^  671$ 

Cassirer's   criticism   of  his   view    of   art, 


Cultural  forms,  289ff,  379ff,  545  ff,  642, 
835ffj  periodic  system  of,  314 

Cultural  functionalists,  538 

Cultural  history,  495 

Cultural  matrix  of  inquiry,  211 

Cultural  process,  495 

Cultural  reality,  4966*,  8356* 

Cultural  reason,  501 

Cultural  social  science,  63 

Cultural  unity,  problem  of,  54  iff 

Culture,  77,  175,  452f,  455*?,  461  f,  547- 
574  j  anthropocentric  critique  of,  484- 
488;  category  of,  4941  concept  of,  470$ 
as  creation  of  the  mind,  175,  488} 
critique  of,  326,  499,  795;  freedom  as 
sphere  of,  488,  536-5395  functionalistic 
concept  of,  51  1  }  as  human  creation,  329$ 
as  language  of  human  spirit,  541  j  myth's 
role  in,  527-535$  nature  and,  472,  486$ 
as  organic  phenomenon,  5i4f}  phenom- 
enology of  human,  500,  833^  philoso- 
phy's mission  in,  92$  polaristic  concep- 
tion of,  494  $  as  the  process  of  man's 
progressive  self-liberation,  321;  as  super- 
organic,  5i4f}  tragedy  of,  573  fj  world 
of,  806,  833,  835,  836,  841,  845,  852 

Culturologists,   536,   537,    538 

Culturology,  494 

Dance,  348 

Dante,  343 

Darstellung,  298 

Darwin,  Charles,  210,  456 

Data    of    immediate    experience,    188,    298, 


Cultural  critique,  326,  4845,  499,  795 
Cultural  determinists,  538 
Cultural  evolution,  304 
Cultural  existentialists,  538 


Da  Vinci,  Leonardo,  649 

Death,  843 

Dedekind,   134 

Deduction,  I58fj  and  induction,  260,  <J79f 

Definition,   genetic,    258)    operational,   282 

Definitive   article  —  level   of   language,    298 

Democritus,  141,  600,  625 

Dematerialization,   318 

Demonstrative  pronouns  —  level  of  language, 

298 
Descartes,   Rene,   71,   244,   313,   353,  4<>6> 

445,  626,  808,  843,  867  j  and  Corneille, 

6728"  j  life  in  Stockholm,  71 
"Descartes   Wahrheitsbegriff,"   by   Cassirer, 

693>  706,  709 
Descriptive  analysis,   803 
Designation  of  the  sign,  8if 
Determinism,  753 
Determinismus  und  Indeterminismus  in  der 

mode  men  Physik,  by  Cassirer,  75,   185, 


9i8 


I94ff,  196,  208,  737,  74<>ff, 

759f,  774ff,  786ff 

Determinists,  cultural,  538$  historical,  538 
Detour,  art  of,  870 
Development  of  space,  322 
Development  of  relational  thought,  322 
Dewey,   John,    81,    g6y    2ogSt    342,    349, 

358,  440,  635 
Dialectic,  6405,  653,  659,  753,  75$}  Cas- 

sirer's,    737,    745,    747ff,    756  j    of    all 

cultural    life,    320$     Hegel's,    210  j     of 

mythical   consciousness,    3765    of   symbol 

relation,  102 
Diderot,    Denis,    654$    his    recognition    of 

importance  of  individuality  in  style,  615 
Differential  of  symbolic  forms,  306 
Differentiation,  297,   301,   323 
Diffuse  energies,  323 
Dilthey,  Wilhelm,  42,  452,  467,  488-492, 

494,  498,  500,  549,  6$4f,  663,  667,  803, 

804,  807 
Dimensions    of    space,    779  j     of    symbolic 

forms,  297 
Diotima,    755 
Diplomat,  283 
Ding-an-sich,  8 12,  814 
Disintegration    between    man    and    culture, 

320 
Distance,  between  man   and   reality,   874$ 

between  symbol  and  phenomenon,  307 
Distinctions,  empirical  and  real,  339 
Diversity,  7525   of  form,  163!?)   of  world 

pictures,   168 

Dogmatic  empiricism,  197 
Dogmatic  realism,  202 
Dogmatic  sensualism,  298 
Dogmatism,  65,  325 
Double  universal,  415 
Dream,  387,  392,  395,  397,  398 
Dualism,  128,  2105  epistemological,  500 
Dualistic  realism,  124,  136,  141 
Duerer,  naturalistic  perspective  of,  626 
Duhem,  Pierre,  169 
Durkheim,  £mile,  498,  524,  594 
Duties,  prima  facie,  577-582 
Dynamic  context,  785 
Dynamic  of  form,  664 
Dynamic    function    of   language,    878}    of 

metaphors,  879 
Dynamic  unity,  190 
Dynamics  of  social  events,  284 

Eaton,  Ralph,  246 
Ebner,  Ferdinand,  846 


INDEX 


Economic  equilibria,  288 

Economics,  279,  283,  838 

Eddington,  A.  S.,  207,  428,  434 

Education,  43 

Effect,  303 

Effects,  system  of,  775 

Efficient  energy,  868 

Ego,  810,  811,  823,  84iff,  853  j  birth  of  the, 

291 

Ehrenburg,   Ilya,   326 
Ehrenfels,  C.,  827 
Einheitsmotnente,  827 
Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  by  Litt,  Theo- 

dor,   355 

Einstein,  Albert,  42,  282,  745 
Einstein's    General    Theory    of    Relativity, 

192,  194,  200,  782 
Einstein's  Special  Theory  of  Relativity,  191, 

194,  200,  781 
(Zur)  Einsteinschen  Relativitatstheorie,  by 

Cassirer,    191,    193,   759    [see  Substance 

and  Function  and  Einstein's   Theory   of 

Relativity] 

Electron,  198,  280 j  as  material  point,  198 
Eliot,  T.  S.,  629 
Ellipse,  308 
Emotion,   278,  364 
Emotive  meaning,  589,  593 
Empathy,  96,  841  f 
Emphasis,  law  of  new,  297 
Empirical  epistemology,  98 
Empirical     knowledge,      178,      273      [see 

Science] 

Empirical  sciences,  philosophy  and  the,  273 
Empirical  space,   115 
Empiricism,  243,  263,  406,  733f,  736 j   of 

Cassirer's  philosophy,  88,   io6fj    logical, 

200,  209,  353 

Empty  space  and  empty  time,  86 1 
Energies  of  order,  873 
Energy,  284,  316,  8635  forms  of,  770$  of 

spirit,  301,  304 

Enlightenment,  445,  652,  654,  666 
Entelechy,  210 
Entities,  775 
Entropy,  775 
Environment,  363 
Environmental    correction    in   the   case   of 

signals,  83 
Envisagement,  394 

Epimetheus,  in  Goethe's  Pandora^  623 
Epistemology,  43,   77,   78,  98,    106,   251, 

262,  338,  385,  393,  398,  399>  494,  733» 

737ff,    761,    762,    871$    empirical,    98$ 


INDEX 


919 


idealistic,  506)  and  logic,  98,  251$ 
realistic,  505 

Equality,  287$  of  all  men,  480 

Equations,  284. 

Equilibria  of  forces,  288 

Erasmus,  451 

Erkenntnis  problem,  44,  64,  153,  l86ff, 
29if,  7095,  7i8f,  723,  725,  736 

Erkenntniswert  dfr  Sprache,  405,  406,  419 

Erlanger  program,  203 

Essay  on  Man,  (An),  53,  76,  117*",  201, 
303,  3*5,  3'9»  332,  387,  392,  397,  400, 
445*,  450,  458f,  4^3,  4M,  475,  493*, 
497,  499#,  507,  5*2,  538,  542,  607,  613, 
6i6ff,  629,  633,  6355,  653,  658,  663f, 
671,  682ff,  691,  695f,  698^,  704,  707, 
710,  805,  807,  813,  823,  826,  831,  835ff, 
845f,  Ssoffj  (Alexander  Pope's),  449, 

459 
Essays  in  Experimental  Logic,  by  Dewey, 

342 
Essence,  131,  375,  8i8f,  827,  829$  artistic, 

670 
Estrangement  of  the  symbolic  forms  from 

their  creator,  325 

Ethical  relativity,  593*f,  595,  597f,  600 
Ethics,  pluralistic,  577,  5905  empirical  and 

relational,  4855  objective  validity  in,  599 
Eucken,  Rudolf,  843 
Euclid,  85 

Euclidean  geometry,  iQzf,  203 
Euclidean  space,  780 
Euclidicity  of  physical  space,  780 
Euler,  313 
Events,  786 
Evil  and  error,  652 

Evolution,  cultural,  309  \  of  cultural  sym- 
bolism, 506-512)  of  language,  541} 

psychological,   $!3f 
Evolution,   Darwinian   theory   of,   503)    by 

mutation,  503 
Evolutionists,  488,  534 
Exact  sensuous  imagination,  302 
Excluded  middle,  principle  of,  199 
Existence,  2765,   298,  743,  774*  77* 
Existential  disengagement,  361 
Existentialism,  492,  807,  843$  theological, 

540 

L'Existentialisme,  by  J.-P.-Sartre,  492 
Existentialists,  537 
Exner,  F.,  741  ff 
Experience,  I26f,  148,  262,  266,  307,  383^, 

389,  392ff,  39**,  550,  553,  743,  75**, 

8o5f,  810,  852$  analysis  of,  371$  context 


of,  763,  766)  immediate,  138}  integra- 
tion of,  763$  intentional,  810,  817,  819, 
820^  intuitive  elaboration  of,  340  $  in- 
tuitive mastery  of,  341  $  and  mathematics, 
262,  264)  metaphysical,  836^  order  of, 
784)  pan-aesthetic  conception  of,  348} 
religious,  847,  848-854$  as  science,  85} 
totality  of,  281  j  "x"  of,  769,  771,  779 

Experience  and  Nature,  by  John  Dewey,  96 

Experiment,  284,  73  3 f,  736fj  question  and 
answer  in,  737 

Experimental  procedure,  282 

Explanatory  myth,  797 

Explication,   99 

Expression,  165,  298,  373,  407,  4i2ff,  4'9i 
and  conception,  387,  381,  3975  emotion- 
al, 385$  function,  95 

Expressionism,  and  genius,  616-617$  as 
inception  of  art,  619;  undisciplined,  false 
excess,  610 

Expressions,  intellectual  and  spiritual,   306 

Expressive  sense,  113 

Expressive  space,  115 

Fact  of  science,  194,  76 if 

Facts,  79,  278,  388f,  39ifj  interdependence 
of  facts  and  theory,  277$  in  terms  of 
knowledge,  210 

Faguet,  672 

Faith,  521,  522,  540 

Fanaticism,  599 

Farber,  Marvin,  802 

Fatalism,   538,  539 

Faust,  867f 

Fear,  341 

Feeling,  322,  385,  386,  389,  395,  397 

Fichte,  J.  G.,  384,  447,  4^0,  561,  633, 
646,  667/1*,  678f,  831 

"Ficino's  Place  in  Intellectual  History," 
by  Cassirer,  715,  717,  724 

Field  theory,  271,  283f,  775$  of  forces, 
775}  social  and  physical,  280 

Finitude  of  man,  551,  553,  554*555 

Fink,  Eugen,  802 

Fixed  centers,  97 

Folklore,  368 

Fontane,  Th.,  687 

Forces,  769 

Form,  321,  251,  6435,  648,  805,  812-822, 
825,  827,  830,  831^  beauty  one  aspect 
of  total  life  of,  6245  a  dynamic  principle, 
306,  664$  in  Goethe's  Pandora,  623  j 
living,  613,  620$  and  material,  337, 
346,  388)  in  painting,  685  [see  Cultural, 


920 


INDEX 


Culture,  Forms,  Myth,  Symbolic  forms] 

Formal  logic,  158,  241  f,  265 

Formalism,  430 

Formalists,   199,   249    [see   Hilbert,  Weyl] 

Formalization  of  mathematics,  199 

Forman,  Henry  James,  332 

Formative  energy,  868 

Form-qualities,  133 

Forms,  94,  100,  352$  cultural,  642  [see 
Cultural,  Culture]}  of  energy,  770$  of 
intuition  and  understanding,  86,  384 
[see  Kant]}  of  order,  86 ij  space  and 
time,  779}  symbolic,  289-333,  337**,  385, 
387,  39<>,  392,  395,  400,  794,  805,  812, 
825,  830,  831-845,  848,  852  j  trans- 
cendental, 385  [see  Kant] 

Fortschritt  (progress),  376 

Foundations  of  Logic  and  Mathematics,  by 
R.  Carnap,  8of 

Foundations  of  Theory  of  Signs,  by  C.  W. 
Morris,  8if 

Francesca,  Piero  della,  use  of  perspective, 
626 

Frank,  Philipp,   2o8f 

Frankena,  William  K.,   584 

Frazer,  Sir  James,  515,  517,  520 

Freedom,  479,  '487,  490,  553,  570,  571, 
84of,  852,  86i}  in  the  development  of 
culture,  5365  and  form,  644*1",  648} 
natural  and  cultural,  539$  of  the  spirit, 
3045  of  will,  373 

Frege,   132,   134 

Freiheit  und  Form,  355,  447,  608 f,  6i4f, 
62off,  633,  639,  645,  648ff,  654,  69if, 
709,  725,  832,  851 

Freud,  Sigmund,  395,  398,  594,  867 

"Freud   and  the  Future,"   331 

Freud,  Goethe,  Wagner >  331 

Function,  188,  302,  385,  501,  634,  750} 
concept  of,  501  j  development  from 
mythical  to  logical  function  of  linguis- 
tic symbols,  508}  of  ego,  542  j  of  myth, 
515-528}  poetic,  533}  psychological,  of 
symbolic  forms,  512-515}  and  structure, 
91}  subjective  and  objective,  of  symbolic 
forms,  5<>5f,  51  if}  teleological  unity  of, 
543}  theoretical,  of  symbols,  5<Hf} 
transcendental,  483}  unitary,  of  myth, 
512-517}  unity  of,  506,  637f 

Functional  character  of  pure  Form,  870 

Functional  laws,  789,  791 

Functional  relations,  766 

Functional  unity,  506,  637*",  645,  658 


Functionalizing    of    object,    553,    557-558, 

562   [see  Substance] 
Functions,  157,  795 
Fundamental  Principles  of  the  Metaphysics 

of  Ethics,  by  Kant  (ed.  by  Abbott),  481, 

485,  578 
Fundamentum  relationis,  767 

Gadamer,   803 

Galileo,  190,  284,  299,  309**,  313,  58if, 
7Hf,  731-756,  787*  vs.  Bacon,  73iff} 
on  Being,  743}  and  the  church,  749}  on 
determination,  753}  empiricism  of,  733f} 
on  eternal  and  necessary  things,  731}  on 
existence,  743}  vs.  Exner,  74iff}  experi- 
ments of,  736,  742}  on  experiment, 
733ff}  on  hypothesis,  734,  745}  on  in- 
duction, 737,  739}  on  inertia,  746}  on 
knowledge,  73  iff }  on  laws  of  nature, 
731,  733,  736ff,  739,  74^}  mathematical 
metaphysics  of,  746}  on  mathematical 
reasoning,  731}  on  mechanism,  746} 
metaphysical  basis  of,  739,  744,  746, 
748f}  vs.  Mill,  737ff>  on  mind,  731} 
on  motion,  746,  753}  on  necessity,  731} 
ontological  motives  of,  739,  744,  746f} 
on  phenomena,  731}  phoronomics  of, 
746}  quoted,  739,  742}  rationalism  of, 
732}  on  sensory  perception,  731}  on 
scientific  knowledge,  73 iff 

"Galileo:  A  New  Science  and  a  New 
Spirit,"  by  Cassirer,  714!?,  736ff 

Gate  of  Hell,   297,   325 

Gauss,  192 

Gaussian  co-ordinate  systems,  783 

Gawronsky,  Dimitry,  essays,  1-37}  an(* 
215-238 

Geiger,   Max,   845 

Geist,  78,  81,  342,  368 

"  *Geh?  und  'Leben*  in  der  Philosophic 
der  Gegenwart,"  by  Cassirer,  825,  836, 
839,  840 

Geistestvissenschaften,  432,  488,  549,  567, 
761,  792,  798 

General  Logic,  by  Eaton,  R.,  246 

General  Theory  of  Relativity,  19 iff,  200, 
782 

Genetic  definition,  256,   258 

Genius,  315 

'Genius'  theory  of  art.   See  Expressionism 

Geometry,  192,  203,  247,  277,  322}  non- 
Euclidean,  779f 

George,  Stefan,  803 

Germany,  68 


INDEX 


921 


German,  45,  326}  aesthetics,  6455$  en- 
lightenment, 666)  idealism,  41,  669, 
672  [see  Neo-Kantianism]  5  romanticism, 

446 

Geschichte  der  griechischen  Philosophic, 
by  Cassirer,  754 

Gesefalichkeit,  790 

Gestalt,  322,   327,  342,  417 

Gestalt  psychology,  202,  205,  271,  638 

Gestalten,  of  the  symbolic  forms,  295,  300 

Gestalt  en,  301,   325 

Gestaltqualitaten,  827 

Gesture,    300 

Gibbs,   197 

Gilbert,    Katharine,   essay,    605-630 

Gilson,  E.,  484 

"Giovanni  Pico  della  Mirandola,"  by  Cas- 
sirer, 717 

God,  553,  563,  846-853?  His  word  writ- 
ten in  nature,  737 

Gods,    387,    389,    390,    396 

Goethe,  43,  46,  67,  295,  302,  304,  350, 
384,  447,  457ff,  633,  635,  639, 
646,  647fF,  654,  659,  680,  83 if,  870, 
877,  8845  on  Bacon,  74of;  demonstra- 
tion of  Cassirer's  theory  of  art  as  sym- 
bol, 620-624;  early  assurance  about  for- 
mative function  of  art,  612-613$  early 
work,  621}  Farbenlehre,  7405  Faust, 
621-622;  on  induction,  74Ofj  and  Kan- 
tian philosophy,  3325  Pandora,  622-624-, 
and  Rousseau,  621 }  transiency  of  beau- 
tiful forms,  622-623}  Urfaust,  621 

"Goethe  und  die  geschichtliche  Welt,"  by 
Cassirer,  635,  649^  652f,  680 

"Goethe's  Pandora,"  by  Cassirer,  622ff 

Goldstein,  Kurt,  394,  831 

Good,  idea  of  the,  471,  473,  756}  man- 
ners, 348 

Goodness,  intrinsic,   582,   584,  588,   599 

Goodness,   moral,    589,   593 

Gorgias,   562 

Grammar  of  the  symbolic  function,  329 

Greek  language,  the  influence  of  the,  on 
philosophy,  71 

Greek  tragedy,  648 

Greek  philosophy,  639,  648 

Greeks,  the,  470,   471,  478 

Grimm,  Jakob,  448 

Groethuysen,   Bernard,  450 

Group,  atmosphere,  279}  concept,  203}  ob- 
servation, 282}  structure,  2855  tension, 

285 

"Group  Concept  and  Perception  Theory," 


by  Cassirer,  98,  826,  827,  829,  839 
Groups,  280,  282 
Growth  of  symbolic  forms,  297 
Grundlagen  der  Geometric,  by  Hilbert,  104 
Grundzuge  einer  Lehre  vom  Lichtsinn,  by 

Katz,    1 08 

Gundolf,  F.,  667,  676 
Gurwitch,  Dr.  A.,  202 
Gutmann,   James,    essay,    443-464 

Habit,  351 

Haeberlin,  Paul,   850 

Haecker,  Theodor,   853 

Haegerstroem,  Axelj  see  Axel  Haegerstrom 

Hamann,  615,  646 

Hamburg,    Carl    H.,    essay,    73-119}    88iff 

Hamilton's  principle  of  energy,  770 

Handbuch  der  physiologischen  Optik,  by 
Hering,  108 

Happiness,   540,   553 

Harmonization,    316 

Harmony,   169 

Harnack,    A.,   42 

Hartmann,  Nicolai,  584,  595,  844 

Hartman,  Robert  S.,  essay,  289-333 

Hebrew-Christian    tradition,    544 

Hegel,  41,  188,  200,  206,  210,  306,  310, 
355,  376,  421,  435,  447,  4$6f,  460, 
561,  563,  57'>  582,  633,  642,  667,  669, 
756,  825,  863,  868,  8755  on  history, 
312*,  on  symbol,  609;  teachings,  209} 
tradition,  210 

Heidegger,  Martin,  802,  807,  82off,  824, 
832,  842^}  Cassirer's  encounter  with, 
67f 

Heine,  Heinrich,  45 

Heisenberg,  W.,  198,  7895  his  indetermi- 
nacy principle,  197 

Helena,  in  Faust,  various  meanings  of,  621- 
622 

Hellenic  influence,  653 

Helmholtz,   42,    88,    io8f,    147,   202,   207, 

447 

Hendel,  Charles  W.,  essay,  55-59}   71 
Henning,  109 
Heraclitean  flux,  492 
Herder,  88,  338,  347,  447,  457,  45^,  460, 

615,  646 
Hering,   108,  202 

Hermeneutic  method,  807,  835,  844 
Hermencutics,   history   a  branch  of,   663 
Herodotus,  595 

Hertz,  Heinrich,  87,  2o6f,  559,  814 
Heyman,  Gerard,  154 


922 


INDEX 


Hierarchy  of  types  of  physical  statements, 

195 

Hierarchy  of  law,  190 
Hilbert,  D.,  88,  1041",  I99f 
Hildebrandt,  K.,  670 
Hiroshima,  279 
Historian,    aspiration    of,    663}    individual 

tact   of,   664 

Historical  method   (process),  634,   6385 
Historical     research,    Idealistic    philosophy 

and,  43$  field  of  culture,  369  j  methods, 

Historicism,  49 if 

Historicity,  of  symbol,  6ioj   of  style,  620 

History,  42,  356,  446,  453,  455,  457,  461, 
464,  633,  732,  756}  and  art,  664?  cul- 
tural, 495;  ecclesiastical,  42;  Hegel's 
theory  of,  312  [see  Hegel]}  as  herme- 
neutics,  663}  of  ideas,  445,  460}  of 
mathematics,  245}  and  philosophy,  734$ 
755*>  875}  of  science,  275,  313,  6896*, 
729ff}  as  self-knowledge,  663}  as  se- 
mantics, 663 

History  and  Philosophy,  ed.  by  Klibansky 
and  Paton,  46,  70,  450,  883 

Hobbes,   Thomas,   257,   809 

Hodges,  H.  A.,  467f 

Hoelderlin,  F.,  447$  457,  633,  635,  643, 
646,  666ff,  731 

Hoelderlin  und  der  deutsche  Idealismus,  by 
Cassirer,  666 

Hogarth's  line  of  beauty,  619 

Holborn,  Ha  jo,  essay  by,  41-46 

Holiness,   388f 

Holy  objects,   390 

Homer,  574 

Hooch,  De,  626 

Horizontal  dimensions  of  symbolic  forms, 
301 

How  We  Thtnky  by  Dewey,  342 

Human   activities,   316 

Human  nature,  497-537}  ego,  513}  [see 
Man] 

Human  studies,  48 8f,  495 

Human  universe,  315 

Humanism,  Cassirer's,  445f,  457,  46of, 
4°"3f,  535-541 

Humanism  of  the  Renaissance,  544 

Humanity,  concept  of,  478,  480-482$  and 
cultural  achievements,  494$  higher  ra- 
tionality of,  544 

Humboldt,  Wilhelm  von,  66,  88,  351,  362, 
372,  447f,  457,  460,  879 


Hume,  David,  137,  142,  151,  168,  I94f, 
394,  469,  485,  578,  596,  638,  839 

Husserl,  Edmund,  68f,  82,  213,  421,  557, 
802-854 

Huygens,  C.,  427 

Hyperbola,   308 

Hypostatization,  93,  257,  387,  397 

Hypothesis,  80,  156,  369,  376,  733f,  740, 
744f,  749ff$  vs.  "suspicion,"  740 

Hypothetical  character  of  empirical  knowl- 
edge, 178 

Hypothetical  method,   284 

I   and  Thou,   300,   845 

Idea,  863  j  or  image,  3725  logic  of  think- 
ing the,  355;  power  of  the,  863 

Ideal,  187,  674 j  and  the  actual,  4775  form, 
8ij  formative  activity,  875?  of  knowl- 
edge, 751$  mathematical  points,  198} 
progress,  376$  relative  and  absolute,  6745 
truth,  664,  688 

Idealism,  43,  142,  146,  160$  anthropo- 
logical, 488}  critical,  145,  529,  801, 
80$,  844  [see  Kant,  Neo-Kantianism] ; 
cultural,  538  j  German,  41,  669,  672 
[see  Hegel,  Kant]}  historical  488,  494, 
498»  537  [see  Neo-Kantianism]  j  ob- 
jective, 817$  transcendental,  55of,  558, 
562}  Utopian,  483 

Idealistic  theory  of  language,  4o8ff 

Ideas,   agreement  or  disagreement   of  our, 

I5i 

Ideation,   827f 

Idee  und  Gestalt,  by  Cassirer,  4471",  633, 
635,  642f,  647,  6486*,  656,  666,  670, 
677,  692,  737,  756 

Identity   element,   203 

Identity  philosophy,  859 

Idols  of  the  Tribe,  261 

"Influence  of  Language  upon  the  Develop- 
ment of  Scientific  Thought,"  by  Cassirer, 
826,  830 

Image,   384,   386$   395$  4<>o,  7^5,  77* 

Imagination,  43,  302,  366,  386,  389^  393*!, 
399*,  735 J  productive,  322,  871 

Imitation,  art  as,  610$  variants  of  doctrine 
of,  613-615)  individual  style  in,  6155 
insufficiency  of  art  as,  613,  618}  omis- 
sion with,  614$  selection  of  pregnant 
moment,  6141  relation  to  artistic  vision, 
619 

Immanence  and  transcendence  of  symbol, 
103 

Immediate  experience,  138,  189,  201 


INDEX 


923 


Imperatives,  categorical  for  certain  persons, 

S7» 

Implications,  177 

Implicit  definition,  104 

Impressions,  306,  373,  772  j  immediate, 
765,  773  j  to  Being,  163 

Incarnation  of  meaning,  94 

Independent  variability  of  the  two  symbol 
moments,  I  x  I 

Index  of  refraction  of  reality,  297 

Indicative  function  of  signs,  82 

Individual,  196)  and  civilization  431  fac- 
tum,  762 

Individuality,  importance  of,  in  art,  615 

Individuum  und  Kosmos  in  der  Philosophic 
der  Renaissance,  by  Cassirer,  607,  649*", 
7i3f,  716,  726,  731 

Induction,  158,  254,  284,  737ffj  and  de- 
duction, 260,  579f 

Inertia,  law  of,  746,  749,  769 

Inference,  mathematical,  2615  from  particu- 
lars, 739 

Infinitesimal  analysis,  285 

Initial  conditions,  788 

Inquiry,  cultural  matrix  of,  21 1 

Instrumentalism,   Dewey's,   209 

Intangibles,    283, 

Integrating  functions,  795 

Integration,  362  j  cultural,  468,  495)  of 
experience,  7635  intellectual  center  of, 
541}  of  man,  319}  of  nature,  319}  of 
social  sciences,  383 

Intellect,  Divine,  7375   Divine  and  human, 

747 

Intellection,  myth  as,  371 
Intellektualmythologie,  by  F.  Langer,   371 
Intelligibility  of  reality,  81 
Intensivierung,   340 
Intention  and  fulfillment,  816,  819 
Interdependence,   2841    of  fact-finding  and 

theory,  277 
Internal  tension,  772 
Interpersonal  life,  845,  846,  847,  849 
Interpretant,  8of 
Interpretation,  712 
Intervening  variables,   284! 
Interview  techniques,  282 
Intrinsic  goodness,  582,  584,  588,  599 
Intrinsic  qualifications,  343 
Introduction     to      Logic      and     Scientific 

Method,  by  Cohen  and  Nagel,  104 
Intuition,  283,  322,  339,  346,  407,  4121?, 

419,  81 5f,  8x8f,  821,  827)  function,  95$ 

mode,  98 


Intuitionism,  243,  430,  434 

Intuitionists,  199,  434 

Intuitive  elaboration  of  experience,   340 

Intuitive  Logos,  344 

Intuitive  mastery  of  experience,  341 

Intuitive  sight,  98 

Invariance,   of   a  priori,   174$    of  laws   of 

nature,  781,  783 
Invariants,  of  experience,   157,   191,  247; 

of  knowledge,    I72ffj    [see   Kant,  Neo- 

Kantianism] 
Irony,  Cassirer's,  756 

Jaeger,  W.,  533 

James,  William,   399,   522,   803,   839 

Jaspers,  Karl,  841,  843f 

Jeans,  Sir  James,   207,  428 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  482 

Jew,  Cassirer  as,  45 

Jewish,   Christian,   Buddhist  ethics,   580 

Jews,  535 

Joseph,  of  Thomas  Mann,  291,  300,  323, 

331 
July   revolution,    68of 

Kafka,  Franz,  844 

Kant,  Immanuel,  4iff,  64,  67,  77,  84,  86, 
90,  xo6,  i35f,  i42f,  i52ff,  i86f,  xgif, 
i94f,  205,  210,  212,  243,  248,  256, 
264,  266,  272,  296,  303,  3ixff  315,  32x, 
323*>  338,  362,  368,  385,  392,  404,  435, 
438,  440,  445ff,  452,  455,  457f,  459f, 
462,  469,  473,  48if,  536,  539,  549^, 
552ff,  565,  577ff,  603,  633f,  646f,  655*", 
667,  677ff,  736f,  743,  745,  75of,  759, 
763,  766,  781,  783,  785,  794,  806,  8o8ff, 
812,  8i4ff,  831,  839f,  842,  871$  Cas- 
sirer's critique  of,  498-501)  categorical 
imperative  of,  578  j  on  causation,  75ofj 
on  contingency  of  necessity,  750  j  "Co- 
pernican  Revolution"  of,  90,  743,  794f; 
critique  of  human  culture,  484-488; 
Critiques,  see  titles;  diary  of,  185;  on 
genius  and  nature  in  art,  617;  interac- 
tion, his  principle  of,  785$  logic,  2415 
on  number,  243;  on  necessity,  contin- 
gency of,  750;  on  regulative  principles, 
211}  schematism  of,  69  j  on  time,  243$ 
transcendental  deductions  of,  745,  751$ 
transcendental  method  of,  85,  195;  un- 
derstanding in,  243 

Kant  and  the  Problem  of  Metaphysics,  by 
Heidegger,  67 

(Von)  Kant  bis  Hegel,  by  Kroner,  355 


924 


INDEX 


"Kant  und  das  Problem  der  Metaphysik," 

by  Cassirer,   839!,  842f 
"Kant  und  die  moderne  Mathematik,"  by 

Cassirer,  253 
Kant  und  Herder,  by  Theodor  Litt,   338, 

347 
Kantianism,  45,  206,  793,  7955   orthodox, 

759 

1C  ants  Leben  und  Lehre,  by  Cassirer,  75, 
457*,  810,  817,  851 

Karl   Gustaf,   of   Sweden,   675 

Katz,  Der  Aufbau  der  Tastwelt,  109 

Kaufmann,   Felix,  essay  by,    183-213;    824 

Kaufmann,  Fritz,  essay  by,  799-854 

Kepes,   G.,  645 

Kepler,  50,  299,  312,  445  §  cosmic  har- 
mony of,  747 

KerSnyi,   Karl,   326,   328! 

Kierkegaard,   S.,   807,   843 f,   852 

Kinetic  theory  of  gases,  741 

Klages,  Ludwig,  840,  859,  874 

Klein,    F.,    203 

Kleist,  H.  von,  67,  447,  633fT,  643,  655, 
676ff,  857 

Klibansky  and  Paton,  Philosophy  and  His- 
tory, 46,  70,  450,  883 

Knowledge,  125,  55<>-558,  564*  5*7, 
57of,  732f,  744}  a  priori,  1915  of  artist, 
347^  copy  theory  of,  551,  571$  as  de- 
termination, 8i2f,  8i6f,  824}  as  dis- 
covery and  explication,  8i6ff,  824 \  of 
empirical  objects,  159;  factual  truth  in 
terms  of,  2iOj  ideal  of,  743;  as  mediate, 
7« 

Koch,  F.,  672 

Koehler,  W.,   870 

Krantz,  G.,  672 

Kraft  der   Verdichtung,   304 

Krise  der  Psychologie,  by  Buehler,  1 08 

Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  see  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason 

Kroner,  Richard,  355 

Krueger,  803 

Kuehnemann,   E.,    679 

Kuhn,  Helmut,  essay  by,  545-574 »  ^57 

Lamprecht,  Karl,  634,  664,  831 

Landscape,  aesthetic  perception  of,  613 

Langer,  Fritz,  371 

Langer,  Susanne  K.,  essay  by,  3  79-400  j 
83,  3<>9,  5«,  525 

Language,  43,  66,  97,  114,  161,  298, 
322,  338f,  362,  374,  382f,  3851",  394, 
446ff,  454,  461,  463,  558,  5645,  568ff, 


633,  748,  756,  832f,  837,  845$  as  an 
aesthetic  activity,  344$  and  art  and  myth, 
as  triad,  368)  and  the  arts,  myth  and 
theoretical  knowledge,  874)  as  basic  to 
cultural  activity,  504}  Cassirer's  philos- 
ophy of,  3511  as  a  category  of  Cassirer, 
748,  756)  and  the  child,  363^$  devel- 
opment of,  41  6f)  double  nature  of,  3901", 
400$  as  dynamic,  878^  as  energy,  879$ 
intellectual,  381)  as  interjection,  612, 
6165  and  logic,  415*  logical  element  of, 
341  i  of  myth,  328,  383,  387,  389,  396, 
404,  507;  origin  of,  363$  relation  of 
speech  to,  3775  representational,  364} 
and  scepticism,  877}  of  science,  404;  so- 
cial task  of,  505}  of  the  spirit,  497) 
spiritual  employment  of,  878}  structure 
oft  385,  399;  as  symbolic  form,  607} 
symbolic  function  of,  503;  of  symbolic 
logic,  100  j  transparency  of,  878  j  Vice's 
theory  of,  616 

Language  and  Myth,  by  Cassirer,  76,  115, 
339ff,  344,  3855,  39of,  396,  445,  496, 
507,  510,  522,  523 

Language    and    Reality,    by    Urban,    432, 


Language,  Signs  and  Behavior,  by  Morris, 
8if 

Lanz,  Henry,  597 

Laplace,   324,   455 

Lask,  Emil,  355,  815 

Law(s),  283,  340,  770,  774,  778,  787, 
795  j  in  art,  644;  of  causality,  76  8  f, 
784ff,  789f,  794,  798}  concept  of,  774; 
of  continuity,  2975  dynamical  and 
phoronomical,  746fj  dynamical  and  sta- 
tistical, 741,  743f*  functional,  789,  7915 
of  inertia,  746,  749;  moral,  487,  of  mo- 
tion, 769,  783,  785fj  of  nature,  487, 

73*>  733i  73*ff,  74*ff»  781,  783$  of 
new  emphasis,  297  j  Newton's,  769,  786} 
physical,  787  \  and  principles,  difference 
between,  196}  of  social  world,  540;  sta- 
tistical, 741,  787;  of  synthetic  unity, 

767 

Leadership,  275,  28*,  282 
Least  action,  principle  of,  196 
Leander,  Folke,  essay  by,  335-357 
Leibniz,  Gottfried  Wilhelm,  42,  210,  245, 
249,  256ff,   309f,  313,  316,  345,  406, 
445,  596,  633,  646,  745,  747,  803,  807, 
814,  832,  849,  861,  867;  on  art  as  ana- 
logue of  reason,  615)   functionalism  of, 
629;   on  importance  of  individuality  in 


INDEX 


925 


art,  615$  and  individual  vision,  614} 
revaluation  of  reality  in  terms  of  force, 
619 

Leibniz*  System,  by  Cassirer,  257,  803 

Lenzen,  Victor,   80 

Leonardo  da  Vinci,  on  art,  619,  725 

Leasing,  447,  554,  633,  646,  654*  and 
the  pregnant  moment  in  art,  614 

Letters  on  the  Aesthetic  Education  of  Man- 
kind, by  Schiller,  871 

Leucippus,  600 

Level(s),  343}  of  cognition,  99*  of  con- 
cepts, 275$  °f  language,  298)  meanings 
on  the  intuitive,  341 5  of  scientific  ma- 
turity, 275;  of  symbolic  forms,  167  [see 
Modality] 

Levy-Bruhl,  Lucien,  498,  518-520,  522-527, 
5*8,  594,  796 

Lewin,  Kurt,  essay  by,  269-288}  xvif,  271, 
285,  286 

Leyendecker,    Herbert,    829 

Liberalism,  755f 

Liberation  through   symbolic  forms,  67 

Libido,   395,   39& 

Lichterlebnisse,    no 

Lie,  definition  of  group  by,  203 

Liebmann,  Otto,  447,  455 

Life,  563^  566,  573,  817,  840,  843,  855ff} 
as  the  form  of  spirit,  295}  as  more  than 
impulse,  866}  as  pure  functional  ac- 
tivity, 875 

Litt,  Thcodor,  346,  353,  828,  845 

Like  and  dislike,  in  art,  68$f 

Linear  style,   351 

Lingua  universalis,  406 

Linguistic   symbols,    201    [see    Language] 

Llnienzugy  mf 

Lipps,  Theodor,  803 

Literature,  447,  454,  462,  642*1",  6635$ 
as  linguistic  art,  684}  and  philosophy, 
663^}  sociological  aspect  of,  616 

Lobachevski,  192 

Locke,  John,   151,  406,  469,  482,  596 

Loewith,  Karl,  803,  845 

Logic,  342;  of  artistic  imagination,  318; 
of  creation,  310}  of  the  generic  or  class 
concept,  250?  of  history,  337,  352}  of 
invention,  mathematics  as,  309;  and 
mathematics,  259,  262  j  of  philosophical 
thought,  353ff}  of  philosophy,  337,  352} 
of  power,  540}  of  the  relational  con- 
cept, 250}  of  signs,  316}  symbolic,  241} 
of  symbolic  forms,  309}  and  theory  of 
science,  272$  of  things,  316)  of  think- 


ing the  Idea,  355)  transcendental,  5 5 of, 

554*»    557,    565 
Logic:   the  Theory  of  Inquiry,  by  Dewey, 

353 

Logica  come  scienza  del  concetto  puro,  by 
Croce,  355 

Logical  context,  764 

Logical   determination,   298 

Logical  element  of  language,  341 

Logical  empiricism,  209}   cf.  200,   353 

Logical  exaggeration,  308 

Logical  invariants,  158,  164,  191 

Logical    j  udgment,    313 

Logical  order,  66 

Logical   positivism,    200,    209,    353 

Logical  unity  of  the  context,  764 

Logicists,   199 

(Zur)  Logik  der  Kulturwissenschaften,  by 
Cassirer,  119,  345,  349,  35*f,  456,  550, 
554,  694,  698,  70if,  722,  816,  845 

Logik  der  Philosophie  und  die  Kategorien- 
lehre,  by  Lask,  355 

Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntnis,  by  Cohen, 
761,  8o9f,  814,  822,  837 

"(Zur)   Logik  des  Symbolbegriffs,"  754 

Logische  Untersuchungen,  by  Husserl,  82, 
8o2ff,  8o8f,  8i8f,  825f 

(Die)logischen  Grundlagen  der  exakten 
Wissenschajten,  by  Natorp,  761,  782, 
784,  792 

Logistik,   241 

Logos,  66,  92,  299,  342ff,  365,  406,  846} 
intuitive,  344}  mythos  and,  328}  phi- 
losophy of  the  self-consciousness  of,  355} 
scientific,  344 

Logos  Dike  Kosmos  in  der  Entwicklung 
der  griechischen  Philosophie,  by  Cas- 
sirer, 633,  639f,  648,  653 

Lorentz    transformation    equations,    782 

Lotze,  Hermann,  42,   189,  415,  864 

Lowie,  R.  H.,  511 

Lunar  mythology,   369 

Lyric  poet,  artistic  character  of,  6 7 off 

Lyricism,   see  Expressionism 

Mach,   Ernst,   2O7f 

Machinery,  303 

Magic,  377,  387}  early  connection  with  art, 

6o9f}  and  myth,  520 
Magnitude,    157 
Mahnke,  803 
Malinowski,    Bronislaw,    511,    517,    52of, 

525,  5*7* 
Man,    315,   445f,   448,   45 *>   457»   459*i 


926 


INDEX 


4^553,  556,  573*,  833ff,  8371?,  843*?, 
8 5 of,  854,  877$  of  affairs,  or  social 
practitioner,  283;  as  agent  of  the  Idea, 
877$  as  animal  rationale,  201,  493;  as 
animal  symbolicum,  201,  448,  461,  493, 
5°5>  53^>  civilized,  486$  conventional 
vs.  real,  6645  as  creator  of  moral  laws, 
487$  cultural,  537;  cultural  definition  of, 
492-495  J  finitude  of,  551,  $35ffj  hu- 
manity, defined  by,  514$  and  humanity, 
494  j  knowledge  of,  473  j  literature,  de- 
scription in,  686)  as  measure,  4725  nat- 
ural, 486;  of  primal  times,  299}  psy- 
chological function  of  civilized  and  na- 
tive, 517-527;  ontological  nature  of, 
474f}  science  of,  495$  self-disintegra- 
tion of,  877}  substantial  nature  of,  495} 
as  symbol-making  animal,  503-505 }  sym- 
bolic form  of,  316}  universal  rationality 
of,  478$  in  the  universe,  743 

Mann,  Thomas,  291,  300,  323,  326,  328f, 
331,  648,  664f,  829 

Marburg  School,  65,  123,  i85f,  206,  209, 
2Xi,  588,  553,  567>  635,  759ff,  781, 
792,  798}  see  Cohen,  Natorp 

Marcus  Aurelius,  479ff 

Marc-Wogau,  Konrad,   88,   102,   105,   no 

Marionette  Theater,  by  von  Kleist,  858 

Maritain,  Jacques,  208 

Marx,  Karl,  347,  594,  599$  and  Freud, 
656 

Mass,   770,   775$    ponderable,   770 

Mass-points,  770 

Massaussagen,  195 

Material  bodies,  775 

Material   form,   349 

Materialism,  41 

Mathematical  concepts,  239fF 

Mathematical  economics,  286 

Mathematical  induction  and  deduction,  260 

Mathematical  inference,  259,  261}  as  pro- 
ductive of  new  knowledge,  253 

Mathematical  knowledge,  747 

Mathematical   logic,    241,    273^ 

Mathematical  metaphysics,  748,  75 3 f 

Mathematical  method,  264 

Mathematical   objects,   257f 

Mathematical    and    physical    formulations, 

99 

Mathematical  and  physical  space,  115 
Mathematical   rationalism,   732,   748 
Mathematical  reasoning,  731 
Mathematical  symbols,  266,  324 


Mathematical  thinking,  762}  continuity  of, 
263)  creative  advance  of,  254 

Mathematics,  129,  133,  177,  2416*,  245, 
275>  328,  331,  382,  385,  746,  762, 
8261",  829,  843}  and  experience,  262) 
history  of,  264}  and  logic,  241,  258, 
262)  as  logic  of  invention,  309}  and 
nature,  747}  philosophy  of,  429^}  pos- 
sibility of,  259}  as  progressive,  259} 
value  of,  154 

"Mathematische  Mystik  und  mathematische 
Naturwissenschaft,"  by  Cassirer,  715 

Mathematization  and  integration  of  the 
social  sciences,  286 

Mathesis  universalis,   244 

Matter,  770}  in  relation  to  form,  321 

Maturity,  levels  of  scientific,  275 

Mayer,  Robert,  740 

McTaggart,  J.  M.  E.,  593 

Meaning,  78,  83,  95,  98,  101,  171,  201, 
212,  265f,  298,  30if,  375,  388ff,  395, 
864}  behavioristic  theory  of,  5O2f}  con- 
centration of,  396}  emotive,  589,  593} 
incarnation  of,  94}  intuitive,  341 }  of 
mathematical  concept,  281}  multiplicity 
of,  756}  positivistic  theory  of,  41  of} 
primacy  of,  499 f}  relation  of  sound  to, 
377}  universal,  504 

Measurement,    274,    277,    285 

Mechanics  and  mysticism,   328 

Mechanics,  Newtonian,  156,  200,  338,  745, 

747,  769,  774*,  783,  787 
Mechanics,  quantum,  774,  776f,  7895,  798 
Mechanics,  statistical,  741,   788 
Mechanism,   745 f,   749 
Media  of  knowledge,  78 
Mediated  world,  773 
Mediating  function  of  the  symbol-concept, 

8? 

Medieval   thought,   character  of,   according 

to  Cassirer,  705 f. 
Meinecke,   42 
Mendelssohn,  Felix,  45 
Mendelssohn,  Moses,  447 
Mental  development,  503 
Mentalists,  503 
Mentality,   cultural,    5x9,    523}    prelogical 

and  mythical,  $z6f 

Metamorphoses  of  symbolic  forms,  164 
Metaphor,   752 
Metaphorical  thinking,  338 
Metaphysical  approach,  477,  484 
Metaphysical  controversy,  xoi 


INDEX 


927 


Metaphysical  crisis,  326 

Metaphysical   problem   of   symbolic   forms, 

317 

Metaphysical  realities,  486,   753 
Metaphysical    statements,    747,    749ff 
Metaphysical  world-ground,  865 
Metaphysics,  77,  93,   116,   124,   126,   137, 

206,    293,    296,    3i2f,    324,    326,    384^ 

393)  4$8,  490,  551,  564,  744,  749f,  867, 

874$  dualistic,  505  j  language  of,  438ffj 

and  language,  508}  mathematical,  747ff, 

7535   mythical,   509$   organic,   524 
Metaphysik  der  Siuent  Kant's,  578 
Mcta-psychological  theory,  476 
Method,  geisteswissenschaftlich  in  literature, 

673,  681$  historical,  43,  634,  638ffj  of 

a  science,  274 
Methodology,  272,  732 
Metrical  geometry,  203 
Meyer,  Eduard,  837 
Michelangelo,  301 
Michelson,  A.  A.,  78  ij   Michelson-Morley 

experiment,   781 

Microcosm  of  the  age,  art  as,  610,  627f 
Middle  Ages,  705,  865 
Military  strategy,  283 
Mill,  John  Stuart,  142,  1961",  602$  theory 

of  induction  of,   737-739 
Milton,  350 
Mimic    level,    of    concepts,    299  j    of    lan- 

guage, 298 
Mind,    78,    88,    146,    384,    387ff,    392f, 

395*>   73i,  735fi    absolute,   598  j    objec- 

tive, 598 
Miracle,   316 
Misconceptions,     positive     significance     of, 

383,  385 


Modality  (-ies),  114,   i66ff,  297 

Mode,    discursive,    391;    of    experiencing, 

384-,    imaginative,    391$    mythic,    389, 

393>  398i  of  perceiving,  384$  of  order, 

7785   of  thinking,  383,   387 
Modern   art,    appropriateness   of   Cassirer's 

views  to,  629f  j  perspective  in,  627  j  sub- 

jectivism in,  627 
Molecules,  280 
Moliere,  587 

Moments,  of  symbolic  forms,  297 
Monads,  210,  306 

Montagu,  M.  F.  Ashley,  essay  by,  359-377 
Moore,  G.  E.,  582-595,  603 
Moral  goodness,  589,  593 


Moral  obligation,  self  evident,  577 

Moral  self,  365 

Morality,  320,  3335  symbolism,  vehicle  of 
man's,  327 

Morally  fit,  583 

Morley,  E.  W.,  781 

Morphology,  803,  82$f,  828,  831 

Morris,  Charles  W.,   8 if,  5O2f 

Mosaic,   348 

Motion,  285,  746,  753}  laws  of,  7835$ 
Newton's  laws  of,  769,  786 

Motivation,  271 

Mozart-Dirichlet,  332 

Mueller,  Max,  338,  507,  516 

Museum  conception  of  art,  346ff 

Music,   167,   328,  331,   348 

Musicality  of  the  mathematician,  332 

Mysterium  des  Wirkens>  301  f 

Mystical  thinking,  796 

Mysticism,  328,  331  j  of  the  artist,  332? 
mechanics  and,  328 

Myth,  84,  115,  161,  1 66,  298,  309,  338f, 
356,  366,  383,  387,  389f,  393,  397, 
399f,  4«ff,  439,  446ff,  454,  461,  633$ 
analysis  of,  371,  compatibility  with  phi- 
losophy, 532;  concept  of,  517-527$  as 
ethnocentric,  535 j  explanatory,  797$  in 
Hoelderlin,  668  j  as  intellection,  371) 
irrational  powers  of,  540}  and  language, 
379-400,  5<>7fj  as  mystical  ethnocentric 
truth,  53 5  j  origin  of,  5i6f,  520?  and 
philosophy,  367,  3821",  393^,  532*  and 
poetry,  5*9-533 *  political,  534fj  role  in 
history  of  human  culture,  527-535$  as 
symbolic  form,  607$  symbolism  of,  612$ 
unitary  function  of,  515-517 

Myth  of  the  State,  by  Cassirer,  33,  75,  472f, 
475,  48iff,  513,  515,  5235,  533f,  536, 
538ff,  706,  7o8,  719,  724,  838 

Mythic  consciousness,  388ff,  558,  564, 
5655,  57of,  573 

Mythical  thought,  832f,  836f 

Mythische  Begriffe,  341 

(Das)  mythische  Denken,  821,  833$  see 
Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen 

Mythology,  43,  328,  369 

Mythos,  and  language,  328 

Mythos,  as  thought-form,  399 

Nagasaki,    279 

Naive  realism,  198 

Name(s),  323,  364,  386,  390!",  394,  397 

Natorp,  Paul,  42,  185,  759ff,  764-789, 


928 


INDEX 


794,  80  iff,  8ogff,  8i6ff,  821,  824, 
83of,  834,  84',  848ff 

Natural  History  and  Theory  of  the  Heav- 
ens, by  Kant,  323 

Natural  rights,  theory  of,  483 

Natural  science,  63,  272}  [see  Science] 

Naturalism,  41,  209,  211 

Naturalistic   fallacy,   589 

"Naturalistische  und  humanistische  Be- 
gruendung  der  Kulturphilosophie,"  by 
Cassirer,  452,  454,  456,  46off,  536,  692, 
704 

Nature,  125,  455,  73$,  742f,  ?66ff,  773, 
785^  and  consciousness,  857 }  and  his- 
tory, 495$  Hoelderlin's  conception  of, 
668}  invariance  of  laws  of,  781,  783} 
life  in  harmony  with,  480,  literature,  de- 
scription of,  686}  and  mathematics, 
747 fj  as  self-existent,  148)  as  sphere  of 
scientific  law,  487}  uniformity  of,  472 

Necessity,  750,  752ffj  of  knowledge,  151, 
159,  I72ff 

Neo-classicists,  64.^ 

Neo-deontologism,   577,   583 

Neo-Hegelians,  206,  355 

Neo-Kantian   axiologists,   488,    501 

Neo-Kantianism,  446,  448,  462,  470,  478, 
494,  498,  508,  543,  652,  757-797,  801- 
854$  [see  Marburg  School] 

Neo-Platonists,  368 

New  Laokoon,  by  Babbitt,  350 

Newton,  Isaac,  85,  190,  194,  299,  313, 
315,  427,  455,  459,  633,  651,  745,  747, 
769,  781,  783,  785*,  79i 

Newtonian  laws  of  motion,   769,  786 

Newtonian  mechanics,  156,  769,  774f,  783, 

787 
Newtonian    physics,    200,    338,    483,    485, 

745,  747 
Nexus,  263 
Nicol,  Eduardo,  495 
Nietzsche,   Friedrich,   210,    399,   447,    594, 

639,   648,   803 
Nihilism,   147 
No    Voice  is   Wholly  Lost,  by   Slochower, 

323 

Noema,    808 
Noesis,  8o8f,  841  f 
Nominalism,   208,   212,   257 
Non-being,    562f,    754 
Non-Euclidean  geometry,   i8lf,  779f 
Non-natural  characteristics,  584, 
Nordic  man,   535 
Northrop,  F.  S.  C,  471,  483 


Nostrand,  Howard  Lee,  489 

Novel,  analysis  of,  686fT 

Novelist,   347 

Number,  77,  84,  94,  117,  134,  166,  169, 
176,  241  ff,  277,  293,  300}  Kant's  the- 
ory of,  243}  as  primary  and  original  act 
of  thought,  244}  and  scheme  of  serial 
order  in  general,  244 

Object,  79,  84,  87,  159,  313,  372,  735, 
76iff,  768ff,  774f,  7775,  793ff,  797} 
of  cognition,  765;  functionalizing  of, 
553»  557f»  5^2}  mathematical,  257 

Objectification,  107,  169,  198,  2Oof,  206, 
794,  804,  8o9ff  834ff,  841  f,  844,  846f, 

873 

Objectify,  167 
Objectivation,    297 
Objective   anthropomorphism,   663 
Objective  idealism,  875 
Objective   mind,    598 
Objective  spirit,   292 
Objective  universe,   362 
Objective  validity   of   the  conceptual   order 

of  the  mind,   151 
Objectivity,    83,    8sf,    91,    107,    157,    193, 

295,  356,  733,  743f,  74$,  815 
Objektivitaet  ueberhaupt,  91 
Obligations,  self-evident,   577 
Observation,  80,  278,  284,  73  iff 
Ogden     and    Richards,     The    Meaning    of 

Meaning,  511 

Onomatopoetic  level  of  language,  298 
Ontological,  argument,  213}  knowledge  of 

man,  493-506}   metaphysics,  90}   priority 

of     individual,     477,     problems,     187} 

theory,  ^.6g( 
Ontologies,   806 
Ontologism,    64 
Ontology,  296,  468,  473,  486,  494,  744ff} 

[see  Being] 
Order,   mode  of,   778;    and   number,   245} 

serial,    129,    131,   288}    totality   of,   785 
Ordinal  number,  as  logically  prior  to  car- 
dinal, 245 

Organic  creativity,  875 
Organic  wholes,  590 
Organization,  category  as  general  form  of, 

251 

Origin,  principle  and  sphere  of,  821  f,  846 
Origin  of  Species,  by  Darwin,  210 
Ortega  y  Gasset,  Jose,  45,  489-492,  53$, 

539 


INDEX 


929 


Paine,  Thomas,  482 

Painting,    348)    analysis   of  form   in,   685 

Pan-aesthetic  conception  of  experience,  348 

Pan-Babylonianism,    370 

Pandora,  Goethe's,  symbolism  of,  6zzfF 

Pan-logistic  tendency,  344 j  of  Hegel's  sys- 
tem, 875 

Pan  of  sky,  Erwin,  art  as  condensed  symptom 
of  an  age,  628}  history  of  spatial  treat- 
ment, 624-628)  use  of  Cassirer's  con- 
ception of  art-symbol,  624,  627f 

Pap,  A.,  91 

Parabola,  308 

Parallel   postulate,    191 

Pareto,  V.,  210,  286 

Parmenides,  212,  549*552,  554fi  5^2f,  806, 

872 

Participation,  principle  of,  769,  796 

Particle,  776 

Particulars,     100,     263$     induction     from, 

737ff 

Parts,   280 
Pascal,  Blaise,  807 
Pasch,   104 
Passions,   psycho-physical   interpretation   of, 

674 

Pathos  of  the  spirit,  876 

Paton,  H.  J.,  46,  70,  450,  491,  584,  587, 
639,  883 

Peirce,  C.  S.,  21 1 

Perception,  202,  298,  302,  313,  374,  772$ 
selectivity  of,  975  sensationalist's  theory 
of,  202 

Perceptive  manifold,  the  matter  of  the 
symbolic  function,  101 

Perceptual  constancy,  202 

Perceptual  space,  322 

Permanence,  768 

Permanent   properties,    277 

Personal  style,  348 

Personalism,  846 

Personality,  271,  275$  type,  474 

Perspective,  adaptation  of,  626fj  modern 
treatment  of,  627$  relation  to  gen- 
eral world-outlook,  624^  Renaissance 
achievement  of,  626 

Petzaell,  Ake,  71 

Pfaender,  Alexander,  845f 

Phaenomenologie  der  Erkenntnis,  99,  343, 
813,  8i5f,  818,  821,  825f,  829,  831  j 
[see  Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Fontten, 
Vol.  Ill] 

Phantasy,  322 

Phenomenalism,    142 


Phenomenology,  67,  213,  421,  557,  801- 
854}  of  cognition,  306,  3iofj  genetic, 
82if,  825 

Phenomenological  method,  421,  435,  8o2ff 
Phenomenology   of  Spirit,  by   Hegel,    376, 

*7* 

Phenotypical   data,   284 

Phidias,  350 

Philosophic  der  Aujklaerung,  by  Cassirer, 
75*»  633,  636ff,  64if,  652,  654,  657, 
665 

Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Formen,  by 
Cassirer,  44,  48f,  65,  7$f,  78,  82,  87, 
95ff,  1 1 of,  ii4f,  1 1 8,  154,  1 60,  1 6 iff, 
188,  20of,  257,  263,  289-333,  361,  388, 
392,  394-,  396f,  399,  404*,  4<>9ff>  4*8f, 
42 iff,  426,  431,  436,  4385,  445,  448, 
461,  55of,  564,  567,  572,  607,  6ioff, 
6i3f,  616,  619,  6366%  64if,  657,  759f, 
77off,  792ff,  8o5ff,  801,  814,  8251,  8325, 
838,  842,  8465 

Philosopher,  vs.  Sophist,  754ff 

Philosophical  anthropology,  446,  449,  457, 
459,  461,  463f 

Philosophical   style,   Cassirer's,   73  iff,   755f 

Philosophical    systems,    as    hypostatizations, 

93 

Philosophical  universality,  92 

Philosophy,  353ff,  356,  392f,  339f,  7546** 
anthropological,  446,  449,  451,  457f, 
461,  463fj  and  art,  6o7f  [see  Art]} 
critical,  382,  407,  551,  557,  573,  [see 
Kant,  Nee-Kantianism]}  of  culture,  117, 
545-574,  8o5f,  8331,  843,  854  [see  Cul- 
ture]) Greek,  634,  648$  and  history, 
734ff,  755,  875$  of  history,  312, 
837i  875 j  of  language,  351,  607,  616, 
748,  802,  830,  8741",  878f  [see  Lan- 
guage] j  and  literature,  663 ffj  periods  of, 
381  fj  preparation  for,  367)  of  religion, 
805,  845-854,  875  j  and  science,  90,  273 
[see  Science] 

Philosophy  and  History,  ed.  by  Klibansky 
and  Paton,  46,  70,  450,  491,  639,  883 

Philosophy  in  a  New  Keyt  by  Langer,  83, 
309 

Phoronomics,  746 

Physical   body,   775 

Physical   field,   280 

Physical   laws,   787 

Physical  objectivity,  192 

Physical  science,  307 

Physicalism,  208 

Physici,   274f,   277,   282,   368,  741,   746$ 


930 


INDEX 


classical  and  modern,  7455  quantum,  195, 
198,  208 

Physiognomic  experiences,  298 

Picasso,  629 

Pico  della  Mirandola,  451,  715,  717 

Picture  magic,   373 

Planck,  Max,  42,  463,  743 

Planck's  constant,   198 

Plato,  81,  185,  306,  322f,  367,  445,  4471", 
555,  563,  573,  649,  653,  667*,  74°ff, 
761,  818}  art  and  sophistry  of,  756} 
humanistic  insight  of,  539,  idea  of  the 
Good,  756}  irony,  756)  man  and  culture, 
theory  of,  470-478}  metaphors,  use  of, 
75  2  j  myth,  theory  of,  5  3  off  j  Phttedrus, 
755}  Sophist,  754f}  space,  conception  of, 
6255  Symposium,  623,  755 

(Die)  Plato nische  Renaissance  in  England 
und  die  Schule  von  Cambridge,  by 
Cassirer,  464,  646,  718,  723 

Platonism,  445,  448,  464$  Cassirer's  752, 
756 

Plotinus,  672$  on  symbol,  609 

Plastic  imagination,   324 

Play,  871)  of  the  child,  366)  instinct  in 
art,  one-sidedness  of,  617 

Pluralistic  ethics,  577,  590 

Poet,  vs.  liar,  755 

Poetic  essence,  666,  684ff 

Poetry,  383,  398}  and  myth,  529-533 

Poincare",  207 

Points  of  view,  100,  162,  164,  167 

Polarity,  100}  in  art-symbols,  6o9f,  626  j 
basic  in  Being,  609$  of  life  and  knowl- 
edge, 858}  overcome,  609,  6295  of  sense 
and  senses,  95$  within  symbolic  form, 
880 

Polysynthetic  languages,  351 

Pope,  Alexander,  449,  459 

Pos,  Hendrik  J.,  essay  by,  61-72 

Positing,  163,  768f,  77*,  777 

Positivism,  81,  200,  209,  263,  353,  455f  j 
cultural,  206,  470,  538$  sociological,  470, 
494,  498,  536 

Possible,  the,  319,  862,  871 

Potencies  and  forms  of  the  soul,  371 

Potentiality,  327 

Power,  388ff,  397,  868}  of  symbolization, 
304 

Pragmatism,  209,  63  5  j  criticism  of  a 
priori  by,  I75ffj  logic  of,  353 j  [see 
Dewey,  James) 

Praegnanz,  301}  symbolic,  330,  41 3f,  422 

Praegungen  xum  Sein,  163 


Pre-established  harmony,  317 

Pregnant  moment,  selection  of,  in  art,  614 

Pre-scientific  symbolism,  336,  340 

Presentation,   298 

Presentative    and    representative    moments, 

97 

Prichard,  H.  A.,  577,  579 

Primary  datum,  293 

Primitive  people,  364 

Principia  Mathematics,   246 

Principle(s),  100,  156}  of  concatenation, 
399}  of  inertia,  769}  Kant's  regulative, 
2ii}  of  participation,  796}  of  relevancy, 
798 

Probability,  743,  787f 

Process,  311,  326}  of  cognition,  762,  771$ 
of  creation,  293}  endless  self-correcting, 
212}  historical,  634,  6385"}  of  removal, 
320 

Productive  imagination,   871 

Progress,  274,  490}  of  cognition,  765}  of 
knowledge,  1885  linear,  534}  of  mathe- 
matics, 259}  systemic,  762 

Projection,   765 

Projective  geometry,  203 

Prolegomena  to  any  Future  Metaphysic,  by 
Kant,  84,  115,  486 

Prometheus,  in  early  lyrics  of  Goethe,  621$ 
in  Pandora,  623 

Prophet,  304,  347,  844,  85iff}  Virgil, 
Dante,  Milton,  Goethe,  as,  329 

Prepositional  function,  100,  113 

Prepositional  meaning,  213 

Protagorean  maxim,  472 

Pseudo-problems,  187 

Psychoanalysis,  271 }  [see  Freud] 

Psychological  force,  288,  5151*,  540 

Psychologic  reference,  65 5f 

Psychologism,  803  f,  807 

Psychology,  293,  328,  362,  371,  382,  393  J 
descriptive,  804,  842}  dynamic,  395, 
398ff}  history  of,  271}  reconstructive, 
804,  809,  814,  821$  [see  Man] 

Psycho-pathology,   821,   829 

Psycho-physics,  271 

Ptolemaic  astronomy,  60 if 

Pure  essence,  375 

Pure  forms  of  order,  86 1 

Pure  imagination,  366 

Pure  meaning,  171 

Pure  space,  782,  861 

Pure  tautology,  255 

Pure  time,  782,  86 1 


INDEX 


Qualities,  114,  272,  303,  341 
Quantity,  272ff 

Quantum  physics,  195,  198,  208 
Quantum  mechanics,  774,  776f,  789ff,  798 

Radcliffe-Brown,  A.  R.,  517 

Randall,  John  Herman,  Jr.,  essay  by,  689- 

728 

Ranke,  F.,  663 

Ranke,  Leopold,  837 

Rationalism,  98,  180,  249,  263,  406,  530, 
734,  736,  748}  Cassirer's,  535'54',  73*i 
and  empiricism,  synthesized  by  Cassirer, 


Realism,  148}  in  art,  643$  dualistic,  24, 
136,  141  j  metaphysical,  143 

Reality,  96,  167,  294,  297f,  373,  3841",  389, 
397,  745*,  7^7,  774>  77$,  785,  835*,  837, 
852}  absolute,  747}  becoming,  314} 
cultural,  496-498}  intelligibility  of,  8ij 
meta-cultural,  538,  543$  mirror  of,  496  j 
new  dimension  of,  497,  503;  objective, 
509  j  ponderable,  775  j  pre-cultural,  498, 
538)  543)  and  the  symbol,  526)  symbolic, 
^39,  656  j  as  symbolically  mediate,  87 

Reason,  386!",  39if,  395,  398f,  737$  Cassirer 
on,  7365  cultural,  5015  dictates  of,  479  j 
historical,  488-490}  practical,  487  j  rule 
of,  530}  surrender  of,  539 

Reconciliation  of  opposites,  by  Cassirer, 
749ff,  756 

Reconstruction,  of  western  civilization,  43 

Reconstructive  analysis,   327 

Reference,  psychologic,  655fj  social,  6$3ff, 
659 

Regulae  philosophandi,  791 

Regulative  principles  of  inquiry,   187,  197 

Regulative  principles,  Kant's,  211 

Reichardt,  Konstantin,  essay  by,  661-688 

Reichenbach,  Hans,  180 

Reification,  312 

Reinach,  Adolf,  808,  84$f 

Relation-concept,  190 

Relation  (s),  128,  147,  190,  246,  248,  281, 
284,  8i5f,  826,  845ffj  calculus  of,  266} 
between  concepts  and  fact-finding,  2845 
constancy  of,  281;  functional,  766}  of 
sound  to  meaning,  377;  of  speech  to  lan- 
guage, 377}  subject-object,  $5$f}  un- 
certainty, 775,  7895 

Relative  ideal,   674 

Relativism,  141,  147,  472}  historical,  490, 
756 

Relativity,  of  cultural  conceptualization,  5x2 


Relativity,  Einstein's,  65,   iQif,   194,  200, 

300,  74Si  749i   78iff 
Relativity,  ethical,  593^,  595,  597*,  600 
Relativity  of  postulates,  180 
Relevancy,  principle  of,  798 
Religion,  84,  115,  162,  301,  387,  395»  398, 

400,  446,  454,  461,  513,  565,  57if,  633, 

832f,    845-854 j     875  j     positive,    424^ 

symbolism  of,  424,  609,  612 
Rembrandt,    experiments   with   near   space, 

627 

Removal,  dialectic  process  of,  309 
Renaissance,    296,    4455,    457,    464,    673, 

689ff,  735,  865 

"Renaissance  or  Prenaissance?"  by  Thorn- 
dike,  693 
Representation,  78,  95,  97,  103,  113,  298, 

304,  825*,  83 if 
Representational  language,  364 
Repression,  863 
Research,  274 
Richards,  I.  A.,  640 
Rickert,  Heinrich,  42,  501,  549,  640,  802, 

815,  837 

Rilke,  Rainer  Maria,  852 
Riemann,  192 
Riemannian  geometry,  191 
Riezler,  Kurt,  828 
Rodin,  A.,  291,  295ff,  299,  303*",  310,  314, 

320,  324,  333 
Romandichtung  und  Mythologie,  Ein  Brief' 

wechsel  mil  Thomas  Mann,  by  Kere*nyi, 

326 

Romanticism,  44*6ff,  454#,  530,  858$  Ger- 
man, 6661? 

Romanticists,  488,  529f,  644,  655 
Rosenberg,  Alfred,  535 
Rosenzweig,  F.,  669,  802 
Ross,  Sir  W.  D.,  577,  579,  594 
Rossetti,    350 
Rousseau,  J.  J.  447,  457#,  486f,  633,  635, 

646,  656}  and  the  youthful  Goethe,  621 
Rousseau  Kant   Goethe,  by   Cassirer,   332, 

458f,  484,  486,  633,  635,   647,  654ff, 

682,  851 
Russell,  Bertrand,  132,  200,  208,  211,  246, 

252,   261  f,   266,   596}   his  Principles   of 

Mathematics,    102,    1995    his    theory   of 

types,    195 

Sainte-Beuve,  456 

St.  Hilaire,  Geoffroy,  68 1 

St.  Thomas  Aquinas,   102,  626 

Sakulin,  P.  N.,  676 


932 


INDEX 


Sapir,  Edward,  502 

Sartre,  Jean-Paul,  492,  536 

Saxl,  F.,  essay  by,  47-51  )  xvi 

Schapp,  Wilhelm,   829 

Scheler,  Max,  584,  817,  821,  823,  826, 
84of,  845*,  859f»  865,  867,  872 

Schelling,  Friedrich,  41,  368,  371,  447ff, 
453f,  456!,  46of,  561,  646,  6676*)  on 
art  as  expression  of  genius,  6175  meta- 
physics of,  kinship  with  Goethe's  Pandora, 

627 

Schema,  space-time,  7671 

Schemata,  300,  86ij   [see  Kant] 

Schiller,  Friedrich,  324,  349,  447,  63 3f, 
646ff,  654,  665,  668,  831;  his  play 
theory  of  art,  617 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  213 

Schilpp,  Paul  A.,  582,  585,  592f 

Schlegels,  the,  on  art  as  expression  of 
genius,  617 

Schleiermacher,  Friedrich,  832,  849 

Schmidt,  Raymund,  596 

Scholasticism,  79 

Schopenhauer,  Arthur,  310,  447 

Science,  42,  114,  162,  276,  318,  340,  357, 
383,  385>  387,  395,  400,  446,  457,  461, 
463,  633,  642,  832,  834,  8385  and 
aesthetics,  735,  7565  Cassirer  on,  732f) 
definition  of,  265$  and  development,  156; 
experience  as,  for  Kant,  85$  jactum  of, 
76if)  Galilean,  483;  logic  and  theory  of, 
2725  of  mind,  398 j  natural,  4875  [see 
Physics,  Newton,  Newtonian]  5  of  order, 
245)  possibility  of,  86)  Renaissance,  482, 
484  [see  Galileo,  Renaissance] ;  as  self- 
developing  historical  fact,  156}  social, 
469  [see  Culture,  Social] j  stages  of,  275 ; 
symbolism  in,  106,  340,  404,  41 8f,  423, 
426ff,  508 

Scientia  generalis,  31  off,  316 

Scientific  abstraction,  287}  analysis,  2835 
cognition,  761  \  development,  2751  facts, 
284}  logos,  344)  method,  2751  research, 
41}  sense,  1135  syntax,  1065  thought, 
continuity  of,  263 

Scientism,   65 

Scientists,  reflecting,  as  philosophers,  89 

Script  magic,  373 

Sculpture,  301,  308,  324,  34-8f 

Seinsebenen  (planes  of  reality),  301 

Self,  822)  concern,  807;  knowledge,  138, 
354,  357,  471,  877 j  liberation,  305,  321) 
presentation,  836 

Self-evident  moral  obligations,  577 


Semantics,  history  a  branch  of,  663 

Semiotics,   81 

Seneca,  479* 

Sensation,  313,  322,  374 

Sensationalism,  202,  206,  208 

Sense  data,  no,  765,  772f 

Sense  perception,  97,  202,  733,  8i3f>  819, 
826f,  829)  selectivity  of,  97 

Sense  perspective,  101 

Sensibility,  243 

Sensualism,  dogmatic,  298 

Sentence,  298 

Sentiments,  278 

Separation,  of  I  and  world,  870;  of  man 
and  culture,  32 iff 

Serial  order,  99,  131,  6365,  648 

Series,  construction  of,  277 

Shaftesbury,  46,  447,  633,  646)  and  preg- 
nant moment  in  art,  614 

Shakespeare,   350,  643 

Sheldon,  W.  H.,  469 

Sidgwick,  Henry,  578,  593 

Sign(s),  78,  98,  344,  372f,  5025  analysis, 
8ij  behavioristic  approach  to,  83)  lin- 
guistic, 201  j  process,  8i;  and  signified, 
103;  vs.  symbols,  83)  vehicle,  82 

Similarity  of  forms,   308 

Sinn,  see  Meaning 

Situations,   social,   2698,   287 

Sketch,  as  imitation  with  omissions,  614 

Slochower,  Harry,  essay  by,  631-659$   323 

Smart,  Harold,  essay  by,  239-267;    154 

Smith,  Norman  Kemp,  595$  see  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason 

Social  field,  280,  283,  287 

Social  forces,  285  j  measurement  of,  274, 
282 

Social   psychology,   2698 

Social  reality  and  concepts,  283,  496ff 

Social   reference,   6535,   659 

Social  science,  269ff,  492ffj  integration  of, 
283)  world  of,  365 

Sociometric  techniques,  282 

Socrates,  450,  47*ffj  531,  573 

Solmitz,  Walter  M.,  essay  by,  729-756) 
88iff 

"Some  Remarks  on  the  Question  of  the 
Originality  of  the  Renaissance,"  by 
Cassirer,  706,  708,  720,  725 

Sophist,  vs.  Philosopher,  754 

Sophists,  367,  47if,  484 

Sorel,  210 

Soret,  680 

Soul,  371)  dualism  of  body  and,  479)  free- 


INDEX 


933 


dom  of,  479}  irrational  functions  of, 
478;  rational  activity  of,  479 
Space,  77,  84,  94,  117,  157,  166,  191, 
24$,  299,  300,  322ff,  362,  5651,  768, 
776ff,  782,  861,  874$  conceptual,  322} 
Euclidean,  779fj  as  order  of  coexistence, 
24.7;  perceptual,  322;  physical,  Euclidicity 
of,  780$  pure,  7825  and  time,  forms  of, 
779  i  unitary,  783 

Space-time,    761,    776}     continuum,    1935 

co-ordinates,  783$  schema,  767f 
Spatial   demonstration,   298 
Spatial  dimensions,  779 

Spatiality,  322$  of  thought,  324 
Speech,  345,  504 

Spencer,  456 

Spengler,  456 

Spinoza,  46,  331,  453,  482,  578,  667,  851, 
869 

Spirit,  368,  817,  840,  847,  852,  855-880} 
creativity  of,  339,  500}  expressions  of, 
505}  as  functional  activity,  875}  human, 
499}  life,  construction  of,  860 ;  as  ob- 
ject! fkati  on,  86i}  pathos  of,  876}  phe- 
nomenology of,  875 

Spiritual  employment  and  language,  878 

Spiritual  liberty,  366 

Spiritualization,   316,   570 

Spontaneity,  316,  325}  of  the  mind,  190 

(Die)  Sprache,  by  Cassirer,  338}  [see 
Philosophic  der  symbolischen  Fortnen, 
Vol.  I] 

Sprache  und  MytAos,  by  Cassirer,  338 

Stace,  W.  T.,  128 

State,  the,  474,  4765  concept  of,  53 if} 
cultural  priority  of,  477}  historical,  532? 
ideal,  532f;  mythical  conception  of,  533 

State,  of  soul,  320 

State,  of  a  thing,  776 

Statements,  196 

Static  conception  of  deduction,  259 

Statistical  averages,  197 

Statistical   laws,   741,   787 

Statistical  mechanics,  197,  788}  [see  Quan- 
tum physics,  Quantum  mechanics] 

Statistical    procedure,    286 

Stavenhagen,   Kurt,   846 

Stebbing,  L.  S.,   588 

Stellar  mythology,  369 

(Die)  Stellung  des  Menschen  im  Kosmos, 
by  Scheler,  859 

Stein,  Edith,  842,  845 

Stephens,  I.  K.,  essay  by,  149-181 

Stilbe griff  €,   351 


Stoicism,  6745  on  living  in  harmony  with 
nature,  4805  on  man  and  kumanitas, 
478-484}  political  philosophy  of,  479 

Stravinsky,  629 

Structural  properties,  281 

Structure  of  experience,  187,  298}  [see  a 
priori,  Kant,  Neo-Kantianism] 

Rtujengang   (systematic  progression),   376 

Style,  Cassirer's,  731-756 

Sublimation,   863 

Subject,  Hegel's  substance  and,  875 

Subjectification,  804,  810 

Subjective  and  objective,  140 

Subjectivism,  modern,  627 

Subjectivity,   805 ff 

Subject-object  relation,  555f 

Subject-predicate  logic,  234 

Subjectum,  Aristotelian,  767 

Substance,  302,  562,  636,  750,  768}  and 
attribute,  385,  388 

Substance  and  Function,  by  Cassirer,  63, 
79.  99*,  105,  116,  129,  I36f,  153,  !$$#> 
191,  199,  243ff,  252,  254f,  2$9f,  262, 
277f,  284f,  288,  361,  404,  6361,  641, 
737,  746f,  750,  782f,  785,  809,  826 

Substanzbegriff  und  Funklions  be  griff,  99, 
153,  i55>  404>  76o,  809,  815,  826 

Successor,  246 

Sumner,   W.   G.,   485 

Sun  mythology,   369 

Superstition,  389 

Suspicion,  vs.  hypothesis,  740 

Swabey,  William  C.,  essay  by,  121-148 

Sylvester,  James  Joseph,  332 

Symbol(s),  48,  66,  301,  307,  376,  386, 
388ff,  396,  498,  500,  794,  796}  aesthetic 
vs.  scientific,  religious,  6095  the  beautiful 
as,  609$  category  of,  505}  concept,  78, 
102}  definition  of,  502}  formula,  113} 
historicity  of,  6ioj  mathematical,  266} 
polarity  of,  609,  626 }  relation  to  art,  609, 
621}  situation,  79)  as  source  of  reality, 
541 }  as  ultimate  element  of  culture, 
5025  Vischer  on,  608 
Symbolic  forms,  76ff,  164,  289-333,  385, 
387,  390,  392,  395,  4°o>  445>  448,  461!, 
558ff,  5635,  572ff,  7941  805,  812,  825, 
830,  831-845,  848,  852  [see  Art,  Knowl- 
edge, Language,  Religion,  Myth] ;  ex- 
pression, 164}  language  as,  607$  meta- 
physics of  experience  as,  115;  myth  as, 
607}  as  organs  of  reality,  83$  and 
philosophy  of  culture,  115}  planes  of 
reality  of,  301 }  polarity  within,  880 } 


934 


INDEX 


as  progressive  states  of  the  emergence  of 
consciousness,  291  j  and  "pure  meaning/1 
164$  and  "representation,"  164$  as  reve- 
lation, 619$  as  symptoms  of  an  age,  628} 
as  systematic  of  the  spirit,  314 

Symbolic  function,  314;  fundamental,  92) 
between  logic  and  mathematics,  319)  be- 
tween logic  and  morality,  3195  primacy 
of,  302 

Symbolic  level,  of  the  concept,  299)  of 
language,  298 

Symbolic  logic,  199,  241}  language  of,  lOOj 
tautological  character  of,  2$$ff 

Symbolic  Praegnanz,  330,  41 3f,  422 

Symbolic   reality,    639,    656 

Symbolic  relation,   113 

Symbolical  universe,  497 

Symbolism,  332;  Cassirer  on,  502-506} 
evolution  of  cultural,  506-512)  pre- 
artistic,  6ioff;  religious,  424$  Rodin's, 
308)  in  science,  41 8f,  423,  426ffj  as 
vehicle  of  man's  morality,  327 

Symbolists,  French,  672 

"(Das)  Symbol  problem  und  seine  Stellung 
im  System  der  Philosophic,"  by  Cassirer, 
331,  608,  620,  812,  831 

Symptoms,   284,  628 

Synoptic  view  of  philosophy,  292 

Syntheses,  passive,  8nf,  816 

Synthesis,  86,  106,  307,  734!,  756}  of 
opposites,  170$  of  scientific  and  historical 
understanding,  756 

Synthetic  judgment  a  priori,  86,  187,  192, 

199,  75! 

Synthetic  unity,  basic  law  of,  767 
Synthetizing  function  of  consciousness,  300 
System,    330,   750,    775$    of   effects,   775$ 

of  experience  7$2fj  of  thought,  752f 
Systematic  nexus,   263 
Systematic   progression,   376 
Systemic  context,  763 
Systemic  progress,  762 
System    of    Transcendental    Idealism,    by 

Schelling,  859 

Taboos,  methodological,  275,  282 
Taboos,  scientific,   279 
Taine,  H.,  456,  658,  663f 
Tau,  M.,  687 
Tautology,   255 
Teaching  curricula,  76 
Technology,  303 
Teleology  of  Aristotle,  366 
Temperature,  284f 


Tempering  of  Russia,  by  Ehrenburg,  326 

Tension,  288)  in  art-symbols,  610,  626) 
in  Goethe's  Pandora  symbol,  622f»  be- 
tween the  I  and  its  environment,  870) 
internal,  772)  in  modern  art,  6305  and 
release,  618}  in  world  of  consciousness, 
609}  [see  Polarity] 

Tertiary  qualities,  341 

Theoretical  cognition,  301 

Theoretical  mode  of  the  symbol  function,  98 

"(Zur)  Theorie  des  Begriffs,"  154 

Theory,  6411  field,  775$  interdependence 
of  fact  finding  and,  2775  of  knowledge, 
4*,  551,  57*  J  of  relativity,  65,  I9if, 
194,  200,  300,  638,  745.  748,  78iff 

Thing(s),  281,  298,  303,  325,  386,  388, 
394,  397»  767f>  774#>  7*6 

Thing-concepts,   190 

Thing-in-itself,   196!?,  294,  376,  553,  561, 

765,   775,   793* 

Thorild,  Thomas,  337 

Thought,  context  of,  765$  development  of, 
253)  discursive,  391$  forms  of,  381,  385$ 
image  of,  384$  logical  vs.  pre-logical, 
524)  mythic,  391,  397,  517-527*  process 
of  objectifying,  154$  organ  of,  505; 
philosophical,  3825  post-scientific,  52ifj 
pre-logical,  5i8f)  productivity  of,  257; 
scientific,  385 

Thucydides,  664 

Tillich,  Paul,  425 

Timaeus,  323 

Time,  77,  84,  94,  "7,  *57>  166,  *93,  3<>o» 
768,  776ff,  782,  808,  82of)  beauty  sub- 
ject to,  624*  Kant's  theory,  243$  possible 
successiveness,  862}  possible  together- 
ness, 862$  primitive  perception  of,  6125 
pure,  782}  unitary,  783 

Timclessness,   756 

Tolstoy,   Leo,    332,   653 

Topology,  203 

Totality  of  experience,  281 

Totality  of  forms,  313 

Totality  of  order,  785 

To  turn  est  ante  partes,  579 

Town-planning,  348 

Tradition,   351,   s8if,   393 

Tragedy  of  culture,  573f 

Tragedy,  Greek,  648 

Transcendence,  85 3 f 

Transcendent  aesthetics,  185,  242,  346 

Transcendental,  analytic,  86)  idealism, 
55of,  558,  562  [see  Kant]*  logic,  158, 
241,  264,  55of,  554f>  557.  5*5$  method, 


INDEX 


935 


90,  185,  187,  805  j  question,  77$  syn- 
thesis, 555,  5575  relativization,  321  j  use 
of  the  categories,  187 

Transfinite  numbers,   779 

Treitschke,  H.,  663 

Transformability,    205 

Transformation (s),  203,  277  >  of  symbolic 
forms,  1 64 

Transvaluation  of  traditional  values,  210 

Troeltsch,  E.,  42 

Truth,  93,  167,  211,  294*  3°6ff,  33<>,  35$, 
375,  732,  756,  8i4f,  8i8f,  820,  871? 
conditions,  213}  empirical,  664}  ideal, 
664,  684$  theory  of,  258 

Two  Sources  of  Morality  and  Religion,  by 
Bergson,  328 

Tylor,  E.  B.,  515,  517,  520 

Tyrant,  vs.  philosopher-king,  755 

Ueberzeugung,  by  Hoelderlin,  731 

Uncertainty  relations,  775,  789*? 

Uncritical   realism,   205 
Understanding,     and     idiographic     insight, 
494}    native  endowment  of,  499;    theo- 
retical, 487*  Verstehen,  357,  753,  756 

Unification  of  the  p re-scientific  symbolic 
forms,  337f 

Unitary   function   of   myth,    5i$ff 

Unitary  origin  (Ursprungseinheit),  763 

Unitary  space  and  time,   783 

Unity,  Cassirer  on,  752,  755f  j  of  the  con- 
text, logical,  764^  cultural,  problem  of, 
54lffj  in  diversity,  163,  752$  of  function, 
513)  of  the  fundamental  mythical  ideas, 
370}  of  knowledge,  161,  163,  i88j  ac- 
cording to  law,  773)  in  the  manifold, 
541?  of  meaning,  163$  of  practical 
reason,  501}  of  science,  190$  of  the 
soul,  371}  of  system,  163$  two  sources 
of,  542f 

Universal  (s)  xoof,  130,  189,  196,  2o8f 

Universal  mind,  146,  598 

Universality,  in  art,  620 

Unknown,  progressing  into  the,  274 

Urban,  Wilbur  M.,  essay  by,  401-441)  488, 
508,  584 

Urphaenomene,  96 

Ursprungseinheit,  763 

Usener,  H.,  345 

Ushenko,  Andrew  P.,   85 

Utilitarianism,  579,  598^ 

Validity,  738,  741  fj  in  ethics,  599)  of  a 
principle  of  serial  order,  288 


Value(s),  388,  392)  cultural,  489$  and 
strength,  862)  in  themselves,  584)  in  the 
totality  of  strength,  862)  transvaluation 
of  traditional,  210 

Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  by  James, 

839 

Verites  de  fait  and  verites  de  rats  on,  212 

Verstehen,   357,   753,   756 

Vicious  circle  principle,  195 

Vico,  Giambattista,  368,  448)  on  language, 

616 

Virgil,  350 

Vischer,  Friedrich  Theodor,  48,  608 
Vision,    artistic,    347,    6i3f)     relation    to 

imitation,  619 
Vitalism,  historical,  49off 
Vives,  L.,  451 
Voelkergedanken,  371 
Volition,  278 
Volksgeisf,  454 
Von  Huegel,  425 
Von    Humboldt,    66,    88,    351,    362,    372, 

447f,  457,  460,  879 
Vossler,  Karl,  407,  411,  433 

"Wahrheitsbegriff     und     Wahrheitsproblem 

bei  Galilei,"  by  Cassirer,  706 
Walzel,  O.,  679 
Warburg,  47ff 

Warranted    assertability,    212 
Wave,  777 
Werkmeister,  William  H.,  essay  by,   757- 

798 

Werthegriffe,  351 
Wesenheit,  375 
Western  civilization,  43 
Weyl,  H.,  104,  193,  431,  434 
White,  L.  A.,  536f 
Whitehead,    A.    N.,    171,    195,    199,    207, 

357,  437,  473,  5*5,  749 
Whole  and  parts,  280 
Will  to  live  as  will  to  logic,  175 
Will  to  power,  510 
Winckelmann,  646)  opposition  to  theory  of 

individuality,  615 
Wind,  Edgar,  4$2f 
Windelband,  Wilhelm,  42,  567,  640 
Wirksamkeit,  375 
Wissenschaft,  humanities  as  in,  42 
"Wissenschaft    Bildung    Weltanschauung," 

639 

Woelfflin,  Heinrich,  351,  638,  831 
Wogau,  see  Marc-Wogau 
Word  magic,  373 


936 


INDEX 


Words,  3445  magical  powers  of,  509}  sym- 
bolic function  of,  508 
Wordsworth,  William,  175,  350,  839 
Wundt,  Wilhclm,  66,  480 

X  of  cognition,  765^  778,  793?  [see  Thing- 

in-itself] 
X  of  experience,   769,   771,   779 

Yale  University,  3  if,  511 

Yang  and  Yin,  324 

"Young  Man  of  Sals,"  of  Schiller,  324 


Zcno,  562 

Zero,  246 

Zinkernagel,  667,  669 

Znaniccki,  Florian,  498 

Zunis,  New  Mexico,  48 

Zur  Einsteimchen  Relativitaetstheorie,  by 
Cassirer,  191,  193,  759,  782$  [see  Sub- 
stance and  Function^  etc.] 

Zur  Logik  der  Kulturtvissenschajten,  by 
Cassirer,  347,  349»  35 «>  45*>  45$,  458 

"Zur  Theorie  des  Begriffs,"  by  Cassirer,  849