The philosophy of Plotinos. His life, times, and philosophy

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Philosophy of Plotinos,

His Life, Cimes, and Philosophy.

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Kenneth ΣΤ

A.M. Harvard, and Sewanee; Ph.D. Tulane, New Orleans.
M.D. Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.

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Other Books by the Same Author,

THE MESSAGE OF PHILO JUDEUS of Alexandria. A sys-
tematic outline of his teachings, with quotations, and full ref-
erences. Cloth, $1.00, or 4 sh.

THE SPIRITUAL MESSAGE OF LITERATURE, or Proph-
etic Art. A Manual of the Comparative Religion of Literature.
Cloth, 6 sh. or $1.50.

OF COMMUNION WITH GOD, a book of intimate devotions,
such as the ‘Imitation of Christ,’ by Thomas A’Kempis. Cloth,
2 sh. or 50 cents.

VOICES OF PRAYER AND PRAISE, Hymns and Poems.
Cloth, 6 sh. or $1.50.

THE GENIUS OF SOCRATES, by Plutarch, Translated. This
is a revelation of Greek mystery-teachings about the fate of the
soul, here and hereafter. Ornamental Booklet, 2 sh., 50 cents.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1896, by
Dunlap Printing Company,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, DAG.

Copyright, 1910, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.

Ὡς ee eae

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINOS.

INDEX,
Page
Chapter I PLATONISM 2c. beeen eee I
τ. Plato's: Three Realiis: τὸ τινος δ cfs ees I
a. The Archetypal World ‘of Ideas. joccscsceac ee oe 2
3. The World. of Matter... .< 26.5 503. ose eee 3
4. The Univers@ 255055 αν ἀν 3
5: The Ragk-of Jdeas:..c).2. cece. exe b cee ee eee 3
6, The Human Souk 4 ivi34 44 cn awe τ τ τ᾿ 4
Chanter IL, ARISTOTELIANISM 42.40 2303.) 6
i: Plato. and Aristotle. ccisgicctau geese ee ee 6
4 The: Deity τ cisianiene seen ee ee τ
$ The: Psychology 6.3.00, esses oa ee 7
4. Phe: thes τόν cass ors sates Ree ee eee 8
Chapter TIT... SFOICISM oa eee 9
1. Plato,Aristotle,-and the Stoics..-.<.3..4.000 ae ee 9
2. The. Aristotelian -Dialectio.cncoscessinee eee 9
Ac COSMOLO RY: 5520556 ied ce eens ως 10
ΓΕ PACS 5 hi ee yates iy ee. ee ee II
Coemer TV. EMANATIONISM. 2625272226045 eee eee 12
ἘΣ ΤΟΙ͂Ο ΟΣ Hermes i550. s bey ola eee 12
S Relation tO Christanity: ccs thes cance cin iw ee ee eae 12
4 Soiference: front Platonism: 4.5.1.4 acne ues ees 14
ao Teermetic Conceptions ον τ ccd eens eae exe heekee 14
ας ΘΟ HENS τ τὸ re os yi eo a arbnees 14
ee 21S EA ae Nh cM, OY τ ΤΠ RRR tel Nite ν" 15
7. Spiritual Destiny Seip nee τ 15
Chapter V. AMMONIUS SAKKAS, PLOTINOS, AND
THEIR RELATION TO CHRISTIANITY..... 17
δι AMC ORAS τοὺ τ ρου αλλ εν aes Nie ΤΕ
Mee MEMEO γε τε ηλὸν irs sce ele cca REARS ue oat 17
a πεσε to. Christianity 2.200060. bccbedesceccecscces 18
4. The Recognition of the Authority of Plato.......... 20
5. Relation to Stem PRIGSODNY. «ns ders c yee cbc ee os 20
peace VI. MIKROKOSM AND MAKROKOS\M..... 22
. The Contemplative Be cca P PE eR NRSV CEO 22
τ ΕΝ θὲ τ 0.0 oe paw h δ baa ei edueRs 22
Mere BUC OEMs SG sees AS Seo ch nes a uch pov eee ewe 23
4. Cosmilogical Import of Psychology................ 24

ii INDEX.

Page

Chapter Vils. THE: FIRST REALM, THE: GOD css 26
Te ἢ ἢ οἰ Θ᾿ τσ andotie: Many se.6 boss ote ces alee wales 26

2: πὸ (God Above: Cognisability si.cses wc sacs ovine Gees 26

3. The Nomenclative Symbol for the Divinity.......... 27

Ay He GOGuS the first ΔΈ ΒΘ οἰ νυν ash enawewecerees es 27

Be Relsoe 6, NECESSITY £0: το λα vides aude wie wieee sen 27

OG WMranner Of DECetIN eas oy sete iin eae wn eh oda PA Aes 28

Vy melation OF Gause-and. W Of τοι τον εν βου δε ιν ον ον ee 28

Chapter Ve SECOND REALM, GOD, COSMIC

ACR CANE aE R TO EER NE POE στ Ν 30
Pate te COC Nn ISAD |e θγ οὐ crianien cates ea ace ate Gaete 30

2: identity Οἱ being ane Chougntsscisn σον νι τις ἐὐοτιοῖνν 30
Chapter 1 X.- THE THER ΡΟ REALM, THE SOUL. :..0..<¢ 42
1. The Trinity: Over-God, Saturn, and Zeus-Rhea..... 32

Oy - Θ 181 OL SOUS tio τον τὴς ots: t.p ὦ ἐπ dain eee ae gas 33
REO W OF SOU oe hue iso 6s hy see Ae whe chan 33

4 ὙΠῸ Transcendent Over-Soul) tudvctns coeeces iss ae h4G4 34

5. Inter-relation of Over-Soul and Souls.........sese0, 34
Chapter %. THE FOURTH REALM; REASON........: 36
τ Falak ate Tal he lea WB: Va [eae eae e ae Rent Amen ene NRE AR νυν τ 36

2: OCCT VV OT 1G SOUS og oa cies ae ais ere NO Swe Sian ole Sues 36
Chapter ΧΙ. ΤΉ ΒΙΕΤΗ REALM, SE NOMwésc.cs deus 37
1. The Senses of the Cet ONO o's hoe ον τοις τς a7

2. Unity Οὐ Souls i: the Mitte Realmiigeeycs ss tiasiad ss 37

ἣν EL MIM AN: ENGR = ROASTS + cece neirra cs τονε PACs 9a RE 37

As Celestial and “Physical οηθδονν ον τῶν τε π τον τϑιος 38

5. etises. Of sinimalS. fs cheese ecw cass 850d aeons 30
Chapter XIL. THE SIXTH REALM, ΤΥ «<2. 39
τ ΠΕ. eth: Realy, ois secs eee eh eho aces 39

2. The Sixth Realm of the, Over-Sodfiy x2 335 ἐξινφυςς 39

ἃ, The. Doctrine of Sympatny: ἐμ αν toeo-sxcta's vos 30

4. The Beautiful oss oa ΩΣ cc kee de eke aia do 40

5. Astrology and Vaticinatin: ρου κεν Bios asics is 40

δι Free Wal ρον οςς fare et eo Wal ieee Daa es 41

"1 δ. Daemon: i: 55. cs hve nae eT ba δον τς 42
ine creas “THE SEVENTH REALM, MATTER... 43

VA RSME ES TET ETE SO ty De ee as Oa eet PEN
2. Uncognisability of Matter: ξεν: 2s eS τ δον. ς “Ἢ:

4... intelligibility ‘of ‘Matter: 2535 Hats i ee IN 44

INDEX. ili

Page

Chapter XIV. REINCARNATION -οιῖοιι νειν ε ναι, εν, 45
t. Need for Reincartation icc. .c0 oe oe sere eee 46

Qo VAStICE! nec V hc re Gaels pee ane in oe τ», 46

3. The. Three. Factors: icc. ser nin dee nae πὴ ρου ρος 46
4:.Obiection: from ‘ODNVION. 2.35.4<.0<eers ota ee eenat 47

5. Objection trom: Suicide..4.0 e504 κε cree os ee ee 47
Chapter %.V.- ETHICS cians carter nae ees 48
1. Vietde and: Vice: scans kunew eee eee 48

2: Philosophy ‘ot Sit ico.9 5 a oe ee eee 49

3. The. Path of Enlightenment :.c:.21404.0. ee eee 49

4: The Daemon of Conscience.1.4.405.4556. see 50

Be οἰ ν so eoess E54 se Stra ew wee cece 51

δ: Fapoiness: ἐν το Σ ΕΣ κυ scanea ee eee eee 52
Chapter’ ΧΥΙ AESTHETICS acca be 54
τ The God; the Over-Beautitalioa. eis eee ae 54

2: Suman Beatity: ἐλέου oe ee ee 54
Chapter XVII... PLOTINOS AND PAGANISM 132.427 56
1 Pagan Deities’ τ τ eee eee cee eee 56

2. Monotheisin.ceccsaiceviceues sae ee eo ae eee 56

4. Augustine s..Debt to Plotinos .2475<.099 000 eae ee 56

4; Fhe Last Light of Greece. vice. 4 nsec eee: 56

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5 WANN

CHAPTER I.
PLATONISM.

1. Plato’s Three Realms.—Plato united in his system that which
was valuable in the systems of philosophy which preceded his.
We may therefore begin immediately with Plato in our prelimi-
nary sketch of Greek philosophy.

Plato divides existence into two great realms: that which can
be felt by the senses, the “sensible,” “to aisthéton,” and that
which can be understood, the “knowable,” “to noéton.” The
most cursory examination of the sense-world reveals the prob-
Jem of the One and the Many: for every object is one, inasmuch
as it is an object, yet manifold in its qualities. Which of these
is the most fundamental distinction? Earlier Greek philosophy
had given various answers to this question; but none of their
conclusions satisfied Plato wholly. Being, ‘‘ousia,’ as such,
could not, thought he, be attributed to any finite thing; on the
contrary, “becoming,” “genesis,” was a fitting description of the
phenomenal world. He proceeded further to reduce this dis-
tinction to its Pythagorean terms,the Limited and the Unlimited.
As both of these conceptions are united in that of a definite
number, so the truth of both the categories of the One and the
Many is their unity, their mixture, which fittingly represented
the eternal process of Becoming which may be witnessed in the
phenomenal world.

Unity will apply fittingly to the intelligible world, which alone
has true Being, being “existing being,” “reason,” and “ex-
istence,” ““Ont6ds on, Logos, Ousia.”

The Manifold, on the contrary, must apply to the formless,
odorless, chaotic matter, “hulé,”’ of which the world was formed.
We thus reach a third realm of existence, which, however, can
only be distinguishe1 as having existed before the creation or
formation of the phenomenal world.

Plato thus recognizes three realms of existence: “that which
becomes (the sense-world), that in which it becomes (matter),
and that from which it is copied (the intelligible world).” God,
is the Father, the reason, the “whence it grows,” the “hothen
phuetai,” of the world; matter is the mother and nurse, the con-
comitant cause, the “En ho ‘gignetai to gignomenon,” of the
world; and thus the world is the offspring of God and Matter.
. But we must not fail to analyze this intelligible world, this

knowable,” to noéton.” The phrase given above, “that from

2 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

which it is copied” implies that somebody copies something:
that the Deity copies the Ideas or archetypes. There is then,
above the intelligible world proper a still higher realm of ex-
istence, the Deity: which, in the Pythagorean terminology ad-
duced above would be the Mind, the “Nous,” the principle or
“cause,” “aition,’ of the phenomenal world.

We have thus four realms of existence: the Deity, the world
of Ideas, the world of Sense, and Matter. But as the latter
realm has ceased to exist since the creation of the phenomenal
world as such, there remain three realms of existence, which
are sometimes referred to as the Platonic Trinity: “Nous” or
the Deity, the intelligible world of Ideas, and the Sense-world
the “sensible,” ‘to aisthétikon.”” How loose and inaccurate
such an appellation is, is clear from the fact that Plato himself
did not recognize it. The Sense-world, the supposititious third
member of the Trinity, is the only-begotten Son, “Huios mono-
genés” of the Deity, the “Eik6n tou Theou,”’ ‘“Z6on aidion
kai noéton,” it is a “second” God, “future” before its genesis,
and ‘“‘created” after it; a “blessed deity.”

As the world of Ideas is a “Zéon aidion kai noéton,” an
“eternal and intelligible organism,” so the world of Sense is a
“Zoon ennoun,” an “intelligible organism,” a reasonable living
being, the creating principle of “Nous,” Reason, having reduced
the chaotic, necessary, and “alogos,” irrational Matter to an
image of the world of Ideas.

Thus the problem of the One and the Many was apparently
solved: every object being One, in view of its similarity to the
Idea according to which, as a pattern, it has been created; and
Manifold, in view of the formless matter which had been the
condition of its origination.

2. The Archetypal World of Ideas.—In explaining what Plato
meant by his World of Ideas, we must notice the fact that he
accepts the identification of Being and Thought of Parmenides.
As a consequence, his “intelligible world” is the world of true
existence, and everything exists only inasmuch as it participates
in this existence. An Idea is that which makes a horse a horse,
and a tree a tree; in short it is a general notion, an universal, a
species or genus, which abides unchanged amidst all the changes
of the individuals to which it applies. Hence the world of Ideas
is “in the supercelestial place,’ “En topé huperouranié,” be-
yond all change, far beyond this world, separate from the ob-
jects participating in it. The Ideas are archetypes, “paradigms,”
“Paradeigmata,” of every quality and every thing, many Ideas
at times being present in one and the same thing, as “just” and
“tall” in a “man.” These Ideas are co-ordinate, being distinct
entities, although they also rank hierarchically from the highest
genus to the lowest species, as they are the existence, being, aim
and end of everything subsumed under them. Yet they are
passive thoughts, and are without energy; they are only objects
of contemplation, far from the world.

Platonism. ; 3

3. The World of Matter.—If the Intelligible world, the “One”
is real existence, it follows that Matter, the “Many,” is nonex-
istence. It is therefore absurd to call Plato’s philosophical sys-
tem a dualism. Matter, “Hulé,” the indeterminate, has only neg-
ative predicates, it lacks form and quality, and cannot be appre-
hended by the senses. It can only be space, the form of out-
wardness, that is, coexistence and unordered sequence. It is an
empty form waiting for a content to be impressed upon it. It
is nothing, an abstraction from reality; yet it is absolute neces-
sity, and though not able to oppose the divine power, yet able to
mar its works.

4. The Universe.—The Sense-world is the most beautiful world
possible, being framed according to the most perfect of patterns,
by the best care. ‘He was good; and in a good being no
envy in relation to anything ever resides, but being without this
he wished everything to become as like himself as possible.” We
saw that the Sense-world was an “‘intelligible organism,” “Z6on
ennoun.” It is consequently able to think: and this is the char-
acteristic of mind, and mind exists in a soul, and a soul in a
body. As the younger should not rule the elder, and mind rules
the body, the mind of the world was older than the body of the
world. The Universe is therefore a living being, with a rational
soul interpenetrating its body. It regulates and harmonizes the
world; for as human bodies partake of the physical Universe,
so do human souls proceed from the souls of the Universe.

The Universe thus created is formed in two circles with a
common centre, in different planes; the inner circle is subdivided
into seven circles moving in directions opposite to that of the

outer one. Here we have the fixed stars and the seven planets
with their .orbits.

5. The Rank of Ideas.—Having explained the nature of Ideas it
remains for us to describe the rank and dignity they occupy. All
together they form an “intelligible world,” an “intelligible place”
an “intelligible organism,” “Kosmos noétos,” a “Topos noétos,”
a “Zoon noéton.” The cause of a thing is not the condition of
its existence, but its purpose; and the ultimate purpose of pur-
poses is the ruler of all other Ideas, ‘“‘basileus,” the king of
heaven, “Dophia, Zeus.” Plato combined here the Mind of
Anaxagoras, and the Good “Agathon,” of the Megareans and
Sokrates into an “Epekeina tés Ousias,” a “somewhat beyond
existence” an existence beyond all Being, the Idea partaking of
Being, “ousia.” This Being is both Mind and Good: a con-
scious good Being, the Idea, the absolute Unity excluding all
Manifoldness, a glorious fulfilment of the Eleatic dreams. Such
a conception of the Deity lifts him in a separate realm of exis-
tence, above all other Ideas soever.

That this was Plato’s conception has been much doubted. He,
the Creator, has been identified with the Idea of the Good, as
both are called by Plato “the best of the intelligible and eter-
nally existing beings.” He is himself the pattern he copies in

4 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

the creation, since he is said to copy an eternal pattern. The
world is therefore called a “sensible God,” an “image of the in-
telligible,” and an “image of the eternal gods.” Zeller thinks
the ideas cannot depend on God without affecting their self-ex-
istence; God cannot be dependent on the ideas, for the same rea-
son, and both cannot be co-ordinate without creating a dualism
Plato knows nothing of. Consequently, God and the Idea of
the Good are identical. This view of Zeller’s creates more diffi-
culties than it explains; for it does not account for the language
quoted above, and it permits us to ask, why was it the Idea of
the Good and not some other Idea which took upon itself the
office of a Creator? Why do not several Ideas create separate
universes?

And besides, a Cicator such as we have described is absolutely
needed by Plato in his Physics. The Ideas are true existence,
and Matter is non-existence; and both are separate. How shall
the rational principle infuse itself into matter to make it a ration-
al organism, unless the God who contemplates the Idea, gen-
erates them as a poet .n himself, and thus, so to speak, incar-
nates them? For Plato has no principle of Emanationism to
assist him, as had Aristotle.

6. The Human Soul.—We have seen that the Soul of the Uni-
verse begat the human souls. Yet we have other accounts
of their creation, which set forth that the Creator compounded
human souls in the same vessel in which he had compounded
the Soul of the Universe, the difference being that the elements
used were less pure; and after creating them, the Creator_as-
signed to each Soul its appropriate star. Thus the World-Soul
and each human soul are sisters, and not related to each other
as mother and daughter.

Each soul is composed of three parts. The first is reason, “‘to
logistikon,” which has its seat in the head, and is the organ of
knowledge. Its moderate regulation is the virtue called wisdom,
the opposite of this virtue is the vice, foolishness. The second
part of the soul attends to all bodily wants, and its name is the
“Epithumétikon.” It is the organ of perception, and has its
seat in the abdomen (the solar plexus). To this part of the soul
God has added, in the liver, an organ of intuitive and presen-
timentative knowledge. The moderate exercise of this part of
the soul is the virtue “Sdéphrosuné,” self-control, and its op-
posite habit is the vice “Akolasia,” intemperance. Lastly, we
have the third part of the soul, “to Thumveidés” the courageous
part of the soul, prepared by the secondary deities, presumably
the World-Soul, and this is the organ whose moderate exer-
cise is the virtue “Andria,” courage, as opposed to the vice
“Deilia,’ cowardice. The fourth virtue, “Dikaiosuné,” justice,
is the right relation between the above three virtues, and when it
is exercised towards God, it becomes ‘“‘Hosiotés,” holiness or
piety, since it is man’s end to resemble God, who is absolutely
good. This is happiness. Virtue is the health and order and
harmony of the soul, and should therefore be followed irrespec-

Platonism. 5

——

tive of consequences or sanctions; for to do injustice is worse
than to suffer it from another. This philosophy demands the
rationality of the entire man.

Yet, in a single life on earth, injustice to souls is patent. God
is just: consequently this life cannot be all. The soul exists
both before and after this life; it transmigrates through all forms
according to inexorable justice. If the soul of a wise man erred,
his next incarnation would be in the body of a woman; if the
soul persisted in its evil ways, the next incarnation would be
that of an animal. If however a soul for several incarnations
chose the study of philosophy, it would soon become perma-
nently freed from the necessity of reincarnating.

Pleasure is not necessarily good: it may indeed be evil; mod-
eration and health of the soul are pleasurable in themselves.
Pleasure is in itself antithetically opposed to all true insight.

CHAPTER. I.
ARISTOTELIANISM.

1. Plato and Aristotle—In order to understand Aristotle it will
be advantageous to notice his points of contact with and differ-
ence from his great Master.

Both were agreed that Matter was indeterminate, the ground
of all Plurality, the concomitant cause, the feminine principle,
the mother and the nurse of the world. Here they separate.
With Plato, Matter is non-existence, emptiness, void, “in which,”
“En ho.” With Aristotle Matter is incomplete, undeveloped
“dunamis” or power and possibility, “Ex hou,” ‘“‘out of which.”
Matter, according to Aristotle, is much more real than according
to Plato; the latter’s system may be described as a monism;
even though the former’s may be interpreted as a dualism.

With Plato, the Ideas were transcendent above the World that
participated in them. They were self-existent, objectively real.
With Aristotle, all of ctive existence apart from immanence in
the things which participated in them was denied them. They
are only the essence of the species, energy, “‘energeia,” form.
These universals realise themselves in the matter, and particu-
larize themselves into things.

Matter, or potentiality, and Form, or energy, are so closely
united that Reality results from both as a third principle. This
their invariable union is “perceptible substance,” as the statue
which results from the union of the bronze and the shape. In
all reality, therefore, we may distinguish the mover and the
moved, the active and the passive. Thus all reality is teleologi-
cal, having an end or aim to which it moves, as the magnet
moves to the steel. A teleological aim is the very reason of mo-
tion, and of every change of matter; which is real existence.
We now have a principle which is a satisfactory solution to
Plato’s unanswered question why the Ideas were impressed in
Matter; for we have here purposive activity, ranging through
all the octaves of creation, the moving and the moved principles.

This conception which is original to Aristotle is that of de-
velopment, with which he finally solved the ever recurring prob-
lem of the One and the Many, which Greek philosophy was
haunted by, and which Plato only restated in new terms.

Reality is thus the essence of the phenomena; being, “ousia,”
becomes essence, the “what it might be to exist’ “To ti én
einai’; and all appearance is the realisation of essence. The

Aristotelianism. 7

mere, inert “becoming” of Plato has become the living “de-
velopment” as soon as a teleological view of it is taken. This
self-realization of essence in the Sense-world is called an en-
telechy, ‘“Entelechia,” which takes place under four principles,
Matter, Form, End and Cause. The first two of these principles
refer to things related to each other; and the latter to individual
things.

2. The Deity.—When we ask for the origin of the motion of
the moving principles, it is answered that this must again be a
moving principle. As, however, we cannot make a regress into
the infinite, we must come to some prime Mover, himself un-
moved, that excludes all passivity and potentiality, and is pure
activity and energy. This is without Matter, ‘“aneu hulés,”
purus actus, eternal in its motion, simple, continuous, without
the limitation of space. Thus the source of movement is found
outside of the substances moved. It cannot cause motion, be-
cause every end aimed at is an instance of this process, and the
prime Mover of the world is its final end, the best, the efficient
cause. All reality lies between Matter and the prime Mover after
which everything strives and which everything desires. The
prime Mover is One, devoid of all multiplicity: therefore im-
mortal, pure, desiring nothing, desired of all. On this account it
is the end of scientific cognition; and because eternal, and eter-
‘nally desired of all, no unification between God and his world
beyond eternal desire is possible. The divine Mind thinks of
itself eternally: in it thinker and thought are eternally one, and
at rest; if it thought of creation or of something else it would not
be at rest. Human speculation or contemplation of pure thought
is the most divine occupation possible to man, re-discovering
God in blissful rest. Thus God is the end of human contem-
plation, thought of thought.

The Deity, according to Plato, was an Idea of Ideas; accord-
ing to Aristotle, it was a self-contained prime Mover of all real-
ity, transcendent above his world. And this world lay between
himself and Matter, opposed to him, because excluded from him.

The name of the Deity of Aristotle is the same as that of
Plato, The Good, and The Mind. Aristotle claims to take these
names not from Plato but from Anaxagoras, from whose Deity
Plato has also borrowed the name of his Idea of Ideas. Yet it
is true that the Deity of Aristotle is nearer to that of Anaxagoras
than that of Plato; for the former one was the all-including end
Ὀΐ all the “Logoi’ of things, the principle of motion in all reality.

3. The Psychology.x—The psychology of Aristotle is radically
different from that of Plato. Man is a mikrokosm; his soul
unites all the faculties of other orders of living beings. Never-
theless, the human soul may be divided into two parts: that which
pre-exists and survives the body, and that which dies with it.
The former is called ‘‘Nous,” reason, in general. It is the faculty
by which man excels all living beings. The latter is subdivided
into five “souls” or planes of consciousness. Each organ ex-
ists in view of some end, which is an activity: so the body ex-

8 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

ists for the soul. The two lowest ‘‘souls’” man possesses in
common with animals and plants: the “vegetable” and “as-
similating’ or “reproductive” souls. The difference between
plants and animals is that the latter have a common centre or
central organ, the heart: which the former do not possess. With’
animals, men share the “sensitive,” “appetitive,’” and “loco-
motive’ souls, which include memory, desire, and self-activity.
The reason itself, the distinctively human faculty, may be divided
into two parts: the passive and active reason; the passive
“dunamis” is a “tabula rasa’ and receives forms; on the other
_ hand the active ‘‘energeia’ generates forms and this active rea-
son alone has substantial eternal existence. The active “Nous”
is represented as divine, although in Aristotle’s cosmology we
found no place for such a direct unification of soul and God;
since God, rapt up in himself transcended the Universe. In this
its highest sphere we must consider Aristotle’s psychology and
cosmology inconsistent.

So far, then, the human soul is composed of seven subordinate
souls or planes of consciousness. If however we take the two
lowest as only one, then man will be found to have only six con-
stituent elements, or counting the body as one, in addition, we
will have seven.

4. The Ethics. —As little as Aristotle’s cosmology and psycho-
logy agree, so little does his system of Ethics agree with either.
Plato’s Ethics we saw to be intimately connected with his psy-
chology. Aristotle is however here the true empiricist; he finds
in Plato’s account five virtues; he adds to them other virtues he
finds in other philosophies, without much regard to his psychol-
ogy. Besides, he differs from Plato in making a virtue the mean
between two extremes, whereas his Master had only known of
a virtue and its contradictory vice. The teleological end of
action which Aristotle assumes is happiness, ‘‘eudaimonia,”
the mean habit of human activity. He pretends to deduce it
from experience; but finally assumes it as self-evident. He di-
vides his virtues into dianoétic and natural; but here he forgets
to define what the dianoétic virtues are. He only points out
various gradations of truth-conception, of which the “Nous,”
with its immediate grasp of intelligible principles reaches the
highest. The good of every being is the rational development
of its powers, and as man’s characteristic quality is his reason,
the dianoétic will be the highest. But we have already remarked
that he neglects to define these all-important virtues.

ἙΘΗΑΡΤΕΕ ΤΙ,

STOICISM.

1. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics—What Aristotle was to Plato,
that the Stoics were to Aristotle. Aristotle denied the trans-
cendence of the Ideas beyond their immanence in things; the
Stoics denied the transcendence of Aristotle’s Deity, and recog-
nized it as only immanent in the world, so that while Aristotle
called his Theology “‘Dialectics,”’ the Stoics called theirs “Phy-
5105. Yet the Stoics belong to a later age than either Plato or
Aristotle, for with the latter’s comprehensive glance all former
constructive work was ended. It remained for the Peripate-
tics and Academicians, the Stoics and Epicureans, to combine
what was given before. Besides, the Stoics and Epicureans were
more interested in Ethics, or the practical life, than in theoretic
discussions. They preferred to borrow their Dialect almost
ready-made from Aristotle, and their Physics from Herakleitos.
In this interest in Ethics they considered themselves followers of
Sokratés, looking on him as the pattern of the virtuous wise
man, and were the beginners of the movement in philosophy
which lasted for several centuries, being characterized by this
preference for Ethics over abstract reasoning.

2. The Aristotelian Dialectic—Their Dialectic they borrow from
Aristotle with the following changes. It is named Logic, be-
cause it treats of “Logos,” reason, which is already conceived
as “implicit” “Endiathetos” and “explicit” “Prophorikos.” Logic
then is divided into Rhetoric and Dialectic proper; its business
is however only secondary to Ethics, teaching how to avoid
errors. Doing away with all but the first four of Aristotle’s
categories, they reach a criterion of truth, “right reason,”
“orthos Logos” the quality of compelling assent, logical neces-
sity. Knowledge originates from sensation, the mind being a
“tabula rasa’’ at first. Thus, instead of Platonic Ideas or Aristo-
telian essence we have reflection or abstraction from these men-
tal images or impressions. This shows us that nothing is real
except corporeal matter; the best of reality is nothing but the
quality of occupying space. Reality which with Aristotle was
the product of four principles, Matter, Form, Efficient Cause and
Final Cause, is now the product of only two principles, the active
and passive ones, which are inseparable. They do not know
anything of a pure “Energeia,” or “Nous”; they only know of

10 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

a conscious principle “Reason” or “Logos” connected insep-
arably with the universe, just as the human soul or “Reason”
or “Logos” is united to the human body. This cosmical force,
moving, active, moulding, reasonable, is “Reason,” ‘Logos,’
and is the Deity. This form-principle is called “Logos,” Soul,
ether, nature, Zeus, and fire—not destructive, but constructive.
Being constructive this divine fire is the womb and grave of all
things, containing the rational germs “spermatic reasons,” “logoi
spermatikoi,” of all things. The human soul is of like character
with the World-Soul, and the breathing-in of the cool air of
the atmosphere assists its generation and preservation.

The human soul however, seems to be composed of different
elements, the governing force, is “the logical powers,” “to
logistikon,” seated in the breast, the generative function, speech
and the five senses. This would make eight component parts,
the crudeness of which classification is apparent at first sight.

Although the Stoics recognized only two principles, the pass-
ive “matter,” “Hé apoios ousia,” and the active, “The God”
“Ho Theos,” “in which reason exists,’ yet on the other hand
the divine soul is represented as being composed of Hexis,
phusis, psuché,” “habit,” “nature,” “soul,” and finally “Nous.”
In this we may trace a faint resemblance to Aristotle’s
psychology.

The formation of the world then took place by change of the
divine fire into air and water; which water separates into earth,
water and fire. Earth and water are passive; the finer air and
fire are active. Finally at the end of a definite age, all things are
resolved into the divine fire (conflagrative) after which the world
will be once more created, the same things as before happening
without variation into infinity, without any thing new. This of
course brings into the finite spherical world absolute “destiny”
“Heimarmené,’ and “providence,’ ‘Pronoia.” Destiny how-
ever only related to auxiliary causes so that primary causes re-
mained in our own free will and desire, whose actions were fore-
seen but not predetermined by providence. As to the immor-
tality of the soul, Stoic teachers differed.

3. The Ethics—The Stoics introduced into the domain of
Ethics several new conceptions. In the first place, man was
considered only in relation to himself, not in relation to the
State of Plato or Aristotle. To live according to nature is not
to live according to the nature of others, but according to one’s
own nature; the sage need only know himself. Thus the maxim
to live harmoniously with reason becomes an exhortation to live
harmoniously, in an absolute sense. In the second place, they
introduced the conception of Duty, “officium.” This does not
only regulate a natural impulse, as with Aristotle, but has the
power to suppress it. It suppresses all “affective states,” ‘“Pathé,”
fear, trouble, desire and pleasure, as leading only to morbid
states, pleasure and pain, and therefore worthless. “Apathy,”
“Apatheia” is consequently the highest human state—in con-
tradistinction to the Epicurean freedom from pain, This state

Stoicism. Il

can be attained by making dominant in one’s nature those ele-
ments which do not depend on external circumstances, so that
the sage is dependent on none but himself, and can be happy
even in the bull of Phalaris. The sage is then equal to Zeus,
except in the unimportant physical things. Pleasure may legiti-
mately follow the activity of the sage, but should not precede it.
The sage is perfectly virtuous—for if he has one virtue he will
have all the rest—the usual Platonic virtues, the end of man
being not contemplation but action. In this account of the four
virtues the Stoics seem to have completely lost sight of the rela-
tion between them and Plato’s psychology, their own psychol-
ogy being at best very crude.

All men are either fools or advancing towards wisdom, which
is to live according to nature, making human conduct agree
with the all-controlling law of nature, or, as some prefer to
put it, the Divine Will. Yet to live in associations is but the
means of living for oneself, to attain the chief good; for the
sage is neither husband nor citizen. The wise will live in an
ideal state embracing all men as such, dividing wealth and ad-
vantages, equally to all. Suicide was a legitimate means of end-
ing suffering.

The Ethics of the Stoics were in later times formulated into
maxims by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, which agree so
closely with some of the teachings of the New Testament that
they have been charged with plagiarism. Such a charge is only
plausible to those who are ignorant of the writings of the earlier
Stoics and the natural development of doctrine. The best evi-
dence of this is that Marcus Aurelius detested Christianity. And
this may have arisen from the fact that while its ethical maxims
agreed with his, yet he could not make rational to himself the
Incarnation.

This sketch of Stoicism would not be complete without men-
tion of their tendency to seek an allegorical meaning beneath
the exoteric sense of the words. Demokritos, Anaxagoras, Aris-
totle and the Cynics, had already explained the fables of the gods
as beautiful allegories, symbolizing spiritual truths. To the
Stoics, however, belongs the merit of having done this sys-
tematically in relation to all Pagan divinities, recklessly violating
the most evident rules of etymology. We will find this alle-
gorical method of interpretation in Philo Judaeus, and after him
in the mystics of all ages.

CHAPTER LY.
EMANATIONISM.

1. The Date of Hermes.—The time in which Hermés Trismeg-
istus lived is lost in uncertainty. It is impossible to assume his
identity with the traditional Hermés of Egyptian fame. Cas-
aubon and L. Ménard suppose the writer of the Hermetica to
have been an Alexandrian living at the end of the first, and at
the beginning of the second century, who may have assumed
the name of Hermés for several reasons, either that he thought
his doctrines agreed with those of Hermés, or because his dia-
logues introduced Hermés as a speaker, just as Plato introduced
Sokratés; or, finally, to gain authority and fame for his works.
He must have lived after Philo Judaeus, and Josephus, and have
been thoroughly imbued with the writings of Plato. He must
have been an early contemporary of Justin Martyr, who refers
to his doctrine of the Unity of God, and one of whose writings
contains a passage verbally identical with one in the Poemandres,
the only complete extant Hermetic work. Besides, Tertullian,
136-216, A. D., mentions him, so that the writer must have lived
between the time of Josephus and that of Tertullian.

That the Hermetic writings had influence over Ammonius
Sakkas, 241 A. D., is rendered possible by mention of him in the
works of Asklépios, the reputed grandson of Hermés. Besides,
several Hermetic fragments are addressed to an Ammon, who
might be Ammonius Sakkas, if these Hermetic fragments were
of the times of a disciple of Hermés living in the time of Ask-
lépios.

2. Relation to Christianity—There is no good ground for call-
ing Hermés a Christian. The Fathers (*) quote him whenever
his doctrine agrees with theirs, or could be so misunderstood as
to fit their purpose. This fact, however, should rather raise the
opposite presumption; for they were endeavoring to support
their own opinions by quotations from well-known heathen
writers, as for instance Plato and Homer, who were authorities
among the heathen. That Lactantius (*) and Cyril of Alexan-
dria (*) praised him means little or nothing; for even the Chris-
tian Justin held the Logos to be only a “second God,” a doc-
trine condemned at Nicaea.

If Hermés was familiar with the writings of Philo, he must
have also become familiar with the locutions of the Septuagint,
which Philo considered inspired. On this ground, therefore, if

Emanationism. 13

Hermés is considered a Christian, we must do the like by Philo.
The passages which are most often advanced as proofs iof the
Christianity of Hermés are as follows. “Thou, O Child, send
an acceptable sacrifice to The God, Father of all things. But
add also, O Child, through the Logos “Dia tou Logou (*).”
These words are Philonic in every particular; especially the
name “The God.” They cannot therefore constitute acquaint-
ance with the Christian dogma of the Trinity. Again, “Tat.—
Who is the generator of the regeneration? Hermés.—The Son
of the God, One Man, by the will of the God (°).” Here we see
Philonism again, especially in the expression “one man,” which
refers to the Logos, who must be a man since the human race
is in the image of the Logos. That the “one man” cannot refer
to the human body of Jesus is plain because from the following
passage we see that this “one man” existed before the creation
of the world, whereas the human body of Jesus only originated
several thousand years after it. “But the Father of all things, the
Mind; being life and light, began a Man like unto himself,
whom he loved as his own child, for he was very beautiful,
having the image of the Father. For The God loved his town
form, and to this delivered over all his own creations (°).” “Of
whom sowing, O Father?—Of the son of the God (‘).” Thus
eG) is the Organism of all things (δ) and the Tiool of God’s

i :

It has also been asserted that the following words constitute a
reference to the Holy Spirit: “Βαϊ The Mind, The God, being
masculine-feminine, originating life and light, begat by reason
another Mind-Creator, who being God of the Fire and Spirit
created seven administrators—(’).” This refers to the Logos,
and as we shall see these seven administrators are not the seven
names of the Spirit but the seven heavens of which the world
is composed. It is therefore another name for the Logos, and
nothing more.

Again, “Immediately from the downborne elements springs
forth the Word of The God, to the pure creation of all Nature,
and was united to the creative Mind, for it was consubstantial,
(Homo-ousios) with it—(").” We thus see that what above
appeared to be referred to the third person of the Trinity is here
referred to what would be the second; which is also called “the
spiritual Word (7). Besides, the word “consubstantial,” “Ho-
mo-ousios” was not used by any Christian writer of repute for
more than a century after this, in the days of Athanasius. Con-
sequently, Hermés cannot have used this word in the distinc-
tively theological meaning, whereas it agreed with his Philonism,
that all things were in God, but not God in them.

But besides showing negatively that Hermés was not a Chris-
tian, we may show this positively by noticing the fact that he
held to doctrines never countenanced by Christian authorities.
The Deity is masculine-feminine (**), there is a metempsychosis
of souls, regeneration is accomplished by silence, and divination
is approved of (ὃ.

14 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

3. Difference from Platonism.—Hermetic doctrine differs from
Platonism in several important particulars.

In the first place, we must notice the crude anthropomorphism,
by which the first and second orders of existence are likened
to the human figure. Plato’s conception of the Deity was too
exalted to call it anything but “Epekeina tés Ousias,”’ “that
which is beyond all Being,” “Over-Existence.”

Plato’s highest order of being was alone Mind, “Nous.” Here
“Nous” is predicated of the two highest orders of being, with-
out making it clear whether there is any difference of degree
between them.

Hermés limits the transmigration of souls to human bodies,
and represents that God saves the souls from “this shame,” of
being sent into the bodies of animals. Plato in his figurative
way seemed to countenance such animal transmigration.

4. Hermetic Conceptions.—In the Emanationism of the author
of the Hermetic writings, the Universe is composed of a number
of spheres of being, each the image of the other next above it
(5. The highest sphere of being is The God (Ὁ, the next is
the Logos, the Son of God (*"), and beyond him, there are seven
successive spheres of Being of which all things in heaven and .
earth are composed (*). Thus, there are nine spheres of being,
each proceeding from the other, in the image of its begettor;
Matter being the outermost (*). When God is considered apart
from the world, the latter, including the Logos, is called the
Ogdoad (7).

Psychology is analogical to cosmology. The soul is divided
into four parts (5): “But the soul of man is carried on in this
way. The Mind in the reason, “Logos,” the reason in the soul,
the soul in the spirit, the spirit in the body.” Death is only the
retiring of the spirit from the physical body (22.

5. Cosmology.—Although the Hermetic writer speaks of an
Ogdwoad besides God, he usually sums up all existence in three
orders of being, by comprehending the seven spheres proceed-
ing from the Logos under the title Soul. Thus we find the so-
called Platonic trinity: The God, the World, and the Soul (*).
He says: ‘First The God, Second the World, Third the Man;
the World because of the Man, but Man because of the God—
Of the entities some indeed are in bodies, some in ideas, but
some energies; but body is in ideas, but idea and energy in
body 9."

The first principle, The God, is the beginning and cause of
all things (*); his name is Logos, the God, the beautiful, the
good (5). In the Universe there is nothing which is not in
the God; whence neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor
figure is about the God. He is the Universe and the Universe
is around all things.

The second principle is “God,” as contrasted with “the God.”
He is the “first-begotten of God,” and the “second God,” (7).
He is also called “the Logos (*).”

The third principle is Soul, which may also be called “God,”

Emanationism. 15

though in a sense lower than that in which it applied is the
second principle (7).

The Logos is the archetypal system of ideas (”), and is the
Creator, whom the first principal generates, because it is his na-
ture to be good, and because he has a passion for good. “For
just as a man cannot live apart from life, so neither can the God
live without doing the good. For this is as it were Life, and as
it were motion of the God, to move all things, and to vivify (”).”

“While the First Principles is the Creator in respect to the
Second Principle, the Second Principle is the Creator proper

ae physical world is of course the body of the World-Soul

6. Ethics —The human soul develops by the experiences it
gathers in a series of reincarnations (“) which are limited to
human bodies by the guardianship of good spirits. “For of
The God is this law, to guard a human soul from this so great
disgrace (5) of entering the body of an animal.

Between the Soul and the Father is the Logos, or Second
Principle, the mediating element, the organ of God’s will Ὁ.
This is the “prize for souls (*).” “And this is the administra-
tion of the Universe, dependent from the nature of the One and
pervading it through the Mind of the One. Than which nothing
is more divine and energetic, or more unitive of men to the
Gods, of Gods to the men. This is the Good Daemon. Blessed
the soul which is fullest of this; unfortunate the soul that is void
of this. (ἜΣ

Man must hate the body, in order to love himself, the Soul
(*). Man is attracted to God by contemplation, as iron to the
magnet (“). Thus, contrariwise, impiety brings its own punish-
ment in darkness and fire (“). The only evil is ignorance of
the Deity (Ὁ). And it is possible to discern him through all
things by natural knowledge, since everything is his image, re-
motely or directly (“).

The mann by which the soul reaches its development is the
regeneration of silent contemplation, the “silent prayer” of the
later mystics. “Accept rational sacrifices pure from soul and
heart intent upon thee, O Unspeakable, Ineffable, Invoked by
silence (“).” Thus intellectual wisdom lies in silence (Ὁ).
“Draw to thyself and it will come; wish and it becomes. Lay
to rest the senses of the body and it will be the generation of the
Deity. Purify thyself from the rational avengers of the Matter
(*).” The road to be travelled by every soul passes through the
twelve signs of the Zodias (“) “of the nature indeed, but of all
twelve signs of the Zodiac (“) not “of the nature indeed, but of
all shaped forms.”

Besides silence, the way to reach God is to wrong no man (*}:
“But the worship of God is one: not to be evil {2

7. Spiritual Destiny—The end of life is to become divine.
“For it is possible, O Child, that the soul be defied, placed in
the body of man, having beheld the beauty of thy good (™).”

τό The Philosophy of Plotinos.

‘“Knowest thou not that thou hast been born The God, and Son
of the One, which also am I? (")” “But the human soul, not
every one but the pious, is a kind of daemonhood and divine;
and such a soul, after the departure from the body, having striven
the strife of this piety (but strife of piety is to have known the
God, and to have wronged no man) becomes wholly Mind (*).”
Thus some men are Gods already, and their humanity is nigh
to the Deity (*).

Transmigration of souls is only the means by which such a
deification can be accomplished. “And there, in order, they
mount upwards to the Father, and they deliver themselves up to
the powers, and becoming powers they become The God. This
is the good ending of those who attain knowledge, to be made
divine (").” Again, “Thou seest, O Child, how many bodies
we must pass through, and how many choirs of daemons, and
continuity and courses of the stars we must accomplish, that we
may hasten to the One and Only God (*),”

CHAPTER. ν.

AMMONIUS SAKKAS, PLOTINOS, AND THEIR RELA-
TION TO CHRISTIANITY.

1. Ammonius Sakkas—The founder of Neo-Platonism was
Ammonius Sakkas, of Alexandria. According to Porhpyry and
Theodoret, he was the son of Christian parents of humble cir-
cumstances, and became a laborer. Soon however he changed
his occupation and devoted himself to philosophy. He aban-
doned Christianity, as he could not approve of Christian htos-
tility to science and sneculations. Later in life, he taught phil-
osophy with great success, teaching orally, and demanding a
promise from his students to keep his doctrines secret. Among
his students were the two Origens, Herennius and Plotinos. We
only know of his doctrines that he discovered the agreement of
Aristotle with Plato, a remark supported by a statement of his
doctrines by his disciple Plotinos, who said that he felt himself
no more bound by his promise after the heathen Origen and
Herennius had broken theirs.

2. Plotinos.—Plotinos always remained silent about his birth-
day and place of birth; he was almost ashamed of having a
body, and would not sit for a picture. Yet is is supposed on
good authority that he must have been born in 204 or 205 A. D.,
in Lycopolis, in Egypt. In his twenty-eighth year he became
the pupil of Ammonius Sakkas and was so carried away with the
greatness of his teacher that he is reported to have said “Touton
Ezétoun,” “this is the man for me!” From the time he first met
him, he never left his side until the death of Ammonius Sakkas
broke up their mutual intercourse, which had now lasted eleven
years. Feeling that he had no other ties to bind him to Alex-
andria, he determined to go to Persia and India, to learn the
wisdom of the East. To accomplish this purpose he had at-
tached himself to the army of Gordian which was destined to a
campaign in the East; but_when the army broke up, he was
forced to return with it to Rome, where he settled as a teacher
of philosophy, holding consultations and successfully managing
his school till in his sixty-sixth year he died (270 A. D.)

As a teacher his sticcess was great, instructing poor as well
as rich. The Emperor Gallienus and the Empress Salonina,
among others, attended his lectures. This success was due not
only to his wisdom but also to his personal influence and power.
Above all, he owed much of it to his genuineness and spiritual-
ity. During the time that Porphyry lived with him he enjoyed
four times the ecstasy which he had preached to others as being
the height of human attainment.

18 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

According to his wish, Porphyry collected and edited his writ-
ings. These consisted of twenty-one earlier, and thirty-three
later short essays on various topics. Porphyry gathered these
into groups of nine, which he called Enneads. The order in
which he placed them was the chronological order of the times
when they were written, so that they are not arranged according
to the subjects discussed. The style of Plotonis is marred by
continual repetitions and very many obscurities of thought and
diction, so that a systematic representation of his doctrines is no
easy task.

As Plotinos considered himself a disciple of Ammonius Sak-
kas, we may for practical purposes assume that his writings rep-
resent the thought of his Master on all important points.

3. Relation to Christianity.—The system of Plotinos is so beau-
tiful and so coherent that Christian writers have not been slow
to ascribe all that is good in it to the early Christian training of
Ammonius Sakkas. How little such a claim means can be under-
stood when we recollect that Clement of Alexandria accused
Homer and Plato of stealing their best thoughts from the Jew-
ish prophets. Consequently such an explanation of the good
elements of Neo-Platonism would not merit any answer if it
were not that by such a claim (which is still made to-day) the
value of non-Christian philosophy is seriously impaired, and
Christianity is credited with more than it deserves.

In the first place, Ammonius Sakkas was a mere child when
Christian, and left Christianity as soon as he became able to
think for himself. Besides, Eusebius (Ὁ) distinctly states that he
left Christianity on account of its hostility to science and phil-
osophy, the very subject of dispute; and it is well known that
converts become the bitterest enemies of their former beliefs.
Would it be likely that Ammonius Sakkas would permit himself
to be influenced by Christianity in the very thing on account of
which he left it?

Not a single word or similarity of expression in the Enneads
betrays any acquaintance with the Christian formulations, nor
does Plotinos anywhere betray that his doctrines had arisen in
opposition to or imitation of Christianity; he utterly ignores it.
And the reason of this is plain; for the Christian usually be-
longed to the lowest and most unphilosophic classes, with a
few exceptions; and it seems ost amusing to think that a
man so deeply read in philosophy as Plotinos or Ammonius
Sakkas were should borrow all their best doctrines from emin-
ently unphilosophic sources.

Further, if we examine the state of contemporary Christian
philosophy we will see that it is almost without exception a ste-
reotyped form of Philonism adapted to the New Testament.
There are no original conceptions, and no learning; Clement’s
quotations from Greek literature being mostly made up at
second hand from cheap anthologies (*). How then could this
barren source furnish the acknowledged rich results of Neo-
Platonism?

Αιοη to C hristianity. 19

Besides, none can read the Enneads without seeing that Ploti-
nos is thoroughly at home in all Greek philosophy, devoting
whole books to the refutation of Aristotle’s categories and other
tenets, so that we are certain he took all his philosophic material
at first hand from philosophy itself.

All this, however, is only negative proof; positive proof is
also at hand. The doctrines of Plotinos do not in any case
agree with the Christian doctrines, and show no derivation from
them. The Christian conception of the Trinity, in its orthodox
form, is that all three Persons are co-equal in rank, and all three
are separate from the world, and as far from it the one as the
other. The Triad of intelligible beings that may be found in
Plotinos is God, the Mind, and individual Souls, each hierarchi-
cally subordinated to the other, and including the world as phy-
sical being in the latter term. Moreover, the whole system of
Plotinos is founded on the thought of development of all things
from God as emanations; and anybody who has read the Po-
lemic of Irenaeus against what he calls the “decay” of God will
not be likely to say that the system of Plotinos had any con-
nection at all with Christian dogma, especially since Athanasius
insisted so strenuously on the difference between ‘‘made” and
“begotten” which does not exist in the Plotinic Cosmology.

Besides all this, we can account for almost every dogma of
pater in earlier Greek philosophy, as he himself acknowl-
edges.

Nor need the moral earnestness, which is found in Plotinos
and which is found in Plato or Aristotle, point to a Christian
origin any more than that of the Stoics, from which without a
doubt, Plotinos and Ammonius Sakkas drew their inspiration.

This brings us to the relation of Plotinos to Philo. That
Plotinos had read the works of Philo, is entirely probable, al-
though the chaotic eclecticism and syncretism of the latter must
have rendered his works repulsive to any but Jews or Christians
who were unacquainted with the sources from which Philo drew
all that was valuable in his interpretation of the Scriptures. Yet
it is very improbable that the relation between the two was more
than that both of them drew their inspiration from the same
source; for it would have been a great deal easier for the phil-
osophic and consistent Plotinos to draw his material from the
original sources, Stoic and otherwise, than to go to a Jewish
adaptation and a chaotic eclecticist for what could be gotten
otherwise with much less trouble. And as a matter of fact, that
which separates Plotinos, (his emanational explanation of the
derivation of Matter from God), from Christianity, separates
him also from Philo, who never explained that relation. Besides,
the language and terminology of the two differ too much to sup-
pose any close relation between them. The Logos of Philo is
with Plotinos Nous; and with the latter we cannot find the
former’s important distinction between the Spoken and Un-
spoken Word.

4. The Recognition of the Authority of Plato—We said above

20 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

that we could account for all of Plotinos’s great conceptions in
earlier Greek philosophy. Before, however, making this. state-
ment good, we must notice that whether we think so or not, it
is certain that Plotinos either thought so, or affected to think
so in every work of his now extant.

Plotinos relies upon the authority of Plato in every small de-
tail (*). He refers to him as “the philosopher,” or even with
a mere “he says (°);” or even without any sign of quotation
as in the famous paragraph on the transmigration of souls which
we shall see later (°). If his opinion clashes with that of Plato,
he will resort to what to us seems a misinterpretation in order
to save Plato from censure (ὃ. He considers that he is re-
establishing pure Platonism, and desires to be called a Platonist;
if the issue is raised, he will refuse to depart from Plato’s norm.

Other philosophers are often referred to merely as “the an-
cients” or “the ancient and blessed philosophers” ‘‘Hoi archaioi”
or “Hoi archaioi kai makarioi philosophoi (°).” He _ believes
that his teaching concerning the Good, the Mind, and the Soul
is Platonic (°); but he finds it also in Parmenides, Herakleitos,
Anaxagoras and Empédoklés; Anaxagoras is said to be he
who through age attained accuracy. He believes (7) that some
of the ancients must have known the truth; the only question
remains which of them knew it most fully. Consequently, he
feels at liberty to criticise them, as he does Empédoklés and
Anaxagoras (”).

Worthy of notice is the fact that he claims that the very mar-
row of his system is the same as that of Sokratés and Plato:
“know thyself’ “Gnothi Seauton.” He says: “Let us obey
the command of the Deity, and learn to know ourselves (”).”
This fact might be used to prove that there existed such a thing
as an esoteric Platonic doctrine in which the moral element
was the prevailing one and which was handed down under oath
of secrecy. Many ot the Church Fathers look upon this maxim
as sufficient guide to salvation and it is remarkable how it meets .
us everywhere under the same name of being Platonic. At any
rate it is certain that the problems of Cosmology, Physics, Poli-
tics, and Sociology which were the main topics of exoteric
Greek philosophy, are to Plotinos important only inasmuch as
they are deductions from his doctrine of the welfare of the soul.

5. Relation to Greek Philosophy—To Aristotle Plotinos is in-
debted partially for his conception of development and emana-
tion; for the transcendence of God, for his psychology, and out-
lines or suggestions of cosmology.

To Plato, Plotinos owes his Nous (with the Platonic name of
God) his conception of the Earth-Soul, his categories, and al-
most all his details, as well as the transmigration and destiny of
souls.

To the Stoics Plotinos is indebted for his exclusive moral
interest, and possibly some touches of his conception of the
Earth-Soul, though this is very uncertain indeed, in spite of the
opinion of Erdmann.

Relation to Christianity. 21

To the Emanationist doctrines of writers such as the inditer of
the “Hermetica,” Plotinos owes his conception of Emanation,
which completed and inter-connected the various stages of the
Aristotelian conception of development. To this source, per-
haps, Plotinos owes his mysticism, and burning spirituality.

Thus we see how much of his system Plotinos owes to former
philosophy; and we need not scruple to admit his claim that
he is not an inventor of bold originality, but a high-souled phil-
osopher who combined into one system whatever was of value
‘in philosophy before his time. Thus, as Neo-Platonism is the
last phase of Greek philosophy, we may look upon his system as
that which represents the philosophy of Greece in its noblest
and most perfect proportions.

CHAPTER VI.
MIKROKOSM AND MAKROKOSM.

1. The Contemplative Life-—To Plotinos there is no object.

worthy of consideration except the Soul. ΑἹ] other subjects are
only interesting to him in the measure that they are efficient ac-
cessories to this end. ‘Concerning what would it be worth to
speak and think, rather than about the soul? Let us therefore
obey the command of the Deity who commands us to know
ourselves (*).”” To this absorbing topic the first and last Ennead
are devoted, and there is no Ennead between these two that does
not in some manner, directly or indirectly, refer to the subject
again.

In order therefore to present the philosophy of Plotinos in its
true aspect, we shall be forced to deal with all other matters
very summarily, reserving all of our space to the discussion of
the nature and destiny of the Soul.

Most of those who have taken in hand an exposition of the
views of Plotinos have devoted most of their time to his specu-
lative considerations. The reason of this partiality may have
arisen both from the fact that being professional philosophers,
they have looked upon the system of Plotinos as a system of
speculative philosophy; and also from the fact that Plotinos
places the “contemplative” or “theoreric” life as far above the
practical life as the real Hercules in Olumpos was above his
shadow in Hades (*). For Plotinos the practical life is only the
means to attain the theoretic life, and the latter is the aim of
the former (*).

Yet we must not take this “contemplative” life in the Hegel-
ian sense, which demands of the philosopher nothing more than
acquaintance with the terms of philosophy, and a habit to think
of metaphysical abstractions, which no logician would have dif-
ficulty to attain. Besides, such a contemplative life is within
the reach of all, whatever their private moral life has been, and
is not limited to those who have lived all vices out of themselves.
The fact that the contemplative life of Plotinos is exclusively
based, upon a perfection of the moral life proves it is something
more than mere skill in logomachy. The eontemplative life is
that one in which the soul attains to knowledge of God, face to
face, rapt in ecstasy.

Such a contemplative life is\it that Plotinos seeks.

2. Mikrokosm.—We have seen before that Aristotle was the
originator in philosophy of the word “mikrokosm.” His con-

πο ον, τος -,

Mikrokosm and Makrokosm. 23

ception was that man is a universe in miniature, just as the uni-
verse is a man enlarged. The advantage of this observation is
that if we know the constitution of one of these terms, we will
be able to reason to the constitution of the other. Thus in order
to know the Universe, we will only have to know ourselves;
and if we seek our highest self, we will know God. If man and
God be separate, how shall man ever hope for an at-one-ment
with God?

Plotinos is not inclined to use the word “mikrokosm,” al-
though he has the full Aristotelian conception of it. It may be
proved that in crediting him with it we are not reading into his
system that of Aristotle; for his Aristotelian psychology, and
his continual ascription of psychological terms to the World-
Soul assure us that he holds the mikrokosmic theory.

We will therefore proceed to give a sketch of his psychology,
in order that our investigations in cosmology and theology may
become lucid.

3. Psychology.—Every human soul is the unity of the following
seven elements:

1. “Ho Theos,” The God (‘).

2. “Nous Koinos,” Universal Mind (°).
3. “Nous Idios,” Individual Mind (°).
4. ““Logos, Dianoia,’’ Reason (").

5. “To Aisthétikon Meros,’ The psychophysical mechanism
of sensation (δ).

6. “To Phutikon Meros,” Vegetable life (ὃ).

7. “To Soma,” The form, body, matter (7°).

In presenting this scheme of psychology we must remember
that nowhere does Plotinos give us a complete exposition of it;
but it may be proved satisfactorily that he holds it, since he
always speaks of these particular faculties in a consistent man-
ner.

The first four of these psychological elements compose the
“Psuché” wor soul; the later three compose the body, the
“Eidolon Psuchés” or image of the body (ἢ). The body is
furnished to us, as we shall see, by the World-Soul, called the
“lunar gods (”).” The Soul is alone ourselves; it is created
by God. It is divided into two parts: the ideal, and rational
soul (*). The rational soul is composed of reason and indi-
vidual mind which faculties are realized in almost every soul;
the ideal soul consists of the two highest faculties that are in
many souls latent, or undeveloped.

The faculty of reason constitutes the individuality of the Soul,
for it has the power of identifyitig itself with the highest facul-
ties or of sinking into the lower. When the soul does sink into
the flesh, the higher faculties quiesce, become latent, and may
in extreme cases atrophy. Of course, the latent faculties may at
some later date be revivified (**).

While the soul is incarnate, all the seven faculties are indis-
olubly bound together; and the bond is broken only at death,
when the soul abandons the body as an old dress,

24 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

In this scheme of psychology are assured both the immanence
of the Soul in every part of the body, as the body is “in the
Soul,” and the transcendence of the higher faculties of the Soul
above the body (’).

We must remember that for Plotinos to know a thing, and to
become one with it were identical terms (*°). Therefore we can
become one with whatever we know: and as we have a God-
consciousness, the life of contemplation is the highest of all
possible lives for it means that we shall come to know God (”).

As a consequence of this we epitomize the universe, when in-
carnate, by having organs by which we can come into com-
munication with every one of the Seven -Realms tof which the
world consists. Therefore man is “Panta,” all (Ὁ; he is a
“Kosmos noétos,” an intelligible world ("). The soul is not an
aggregate, like a house, but a unity revolving around a centre
into which it can draw itself inwards (95). The soul ascends to
its highest heights not by addition, or adding itself to God, but
by immanent union with him (*).

Once the soul has incarnated into the body furnished by the
World-Soul, it is an indissoluble unity with it, using it as a tool
(*), not being affected by its pains more than the workman
is affected by the injuries to his tools (ἢ). Then the soul is like
a man standing with his feet in a tub of water (2), reaching
down to the very lowest form of being, matter, and being one
with or having a faculty to become lone with the cosmical Nous
and even The God (*). For we know that the soul is kin to the
Cosmical Nous and God, by faculties like them, though at times
obscured by being fallen into the flesh (**).

Plotinos does not always speak of the various faculties of the
soul in detail. He usually assumes the practical distinction, soul
and body. The soul is placed between God and the World, so
that like an amphibian it lives now here, and then beyond (”)
being able at its will to think without and against the will of
the body (*). Often, again, he divides the soul into a double
self: the inner or true self, that lives in the intelligible world,
the “ideal’’ soul we saw above (7); and the external self that
lives in the external world, the “rational” soul just mentioned

How the incarnation into the body furnished by the Earth-
Soul takes place is not quite clear: the soul is said to emit a
kind of light or heat (*) which is probably the celestial spiritual
body we shall see more about later on, in the Fifth Realm. This
light or heat gives form to the body supplied by the World-Soul,
and becomes united to the earthly spiritual body, or perhaps
even forms it. : '

4. Cosmological Import of Psychology.—In order to show forth
the relation of the small universe to the large one, we must
premise that each separate faculty of-man, while bound by an
indissoluble tie to the other faculties, exists in a universe of its
own. The physical body dwells in a realm of dead matter; the
vegetable soul in a realm of organic life in which organic life is

Mikrokosm and Makrokosm. 25

possible, and so on. Thus all human powers co-exist in the
separate realms for which they are fitted so that in order to be-
come universal we need only open ourselves to the universal (*).
These different Realms interpenetrate each other much as the
different universes of Messrs. Stewart and Tait, in their inter-
esting book, ‘“‘The Unseen Universe.”

The nature of the whole process of existence lies before us in
miniature. The First Realm is The God who is above all think-
able perfection and being; the Second Realm is the Divine Mind,
or Nous, which is Divine being and essence, proper. The third,
including the other four, the Realm of soul, which cannot be said
to have being, although it possesses existence. These universes
interpenetrate each other. The Soul and the World, which is its
image, are immanent in God; and God, in his absolute being
transcends all else. The Divine Mind is the image of God; the
individual mind is the image of the Divine Mind; finally, pro-
ceeding similarly through all the lower realms in their turn, the
body is the form or image of the vegetable life; this again is the
image or form of the sensual life; this again is the image of the
individual mind. Thus matter is the lowest grade of being; be-
yond is that abstraction we may call the darkness of nought,
which does not even exist.

While in the mind of Plotinos the immanence and trans-
cendence of these Realms is inseparably conjoined, we will be
forced, for the sake of clearness in exposition, to consider first
each Realm separately, and then to consider the transcendence
of God as shown forth in his image, man.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIRST REALM, THE GOD.

1. The One and the Many.—In order to understand anything,
it is necessary that the mind should receive through sensation
and reflection ideas and representations. The more sharply de-
fined these are, the more thoroughly understood are they; and
they will be clear in the degree that they are limited by and dis-
tinct from other ideas and representations. Ratiocination there-
fore necessarily implies a Manifold, which is subsumed under
the Unity of the apprehending mind. Unity is therefore more
fundamental than Manifioldness.

If we should apply these considerations to the Divine Being,
we see that Divine thought necessarily implies a Manifold, the
duality of thinker and thought, of being and activity (*). Asa
consequence of this, the Divine activity called Divine Thought
cannot be the highest plane of Divine Life. Above the realms
of Divine thought must be the realm of the Divine Unity of
Apperception, which is above all thought. God is then above
all describable thought, above all Divine Thought, above all
Divine Life, above all Divine Being (’).

The highest cannot be Manifoldness; it is Unity; for Mani-
foldness is after all only a Manifoldness of Unity (°), and every-
thing is itself only because it thus is One (*). God is thus above
all Divine Goodness, and even Divine Unity (°), and above
Divine Being (°). If we say that God is Goodness, then the
thought of this Divine Goodness has its subject and object; it
becomes good by partaking of the quality of goodness. And
if it thus needs this quality, if it thus depends on this quality,
then it cannot be independent and self-existent Goodness. The
same may be said of the Divine Unity and Being. Therefore
the simple must precede the compound (’), original being must
be independent of derivative being: cause must be independent
of effect, and Unity, of Manifoldness (°). God is above all cate-
gories of Life, Being, Thought and Activity. The God is then
Over-life, Over-being, Over-thought, and Over-activity. In this
last point Aristotle was left behind by Plotinos, who could
. not on logical grounds see his way to call God even “actus
purus,” pure energy; God is above even this. That there is a
God at all we only know by seeking a first cause of all other
causes. God is thus even above the Prime Mover of Aristotle.

2. The God Above Cognisability.—God is therefore unknowable.
He Apis all description (°), he is incomprehensible and infin-
ite (""). ts

The First Realm, The God. 27

The highest we know does not reach up to him (7). As he
is unlimited (0) he must be formless, (*) and therefore be even
above beauty (“). He is above good and honourable qualities
(*). Will as a psychological faculty does not exist in God ; for
will is a desire of good, of which God has no need or lack,
being its fulness (**). In God thinking and willing, that is, over-
thinking and over-willing, are the same, as happens even in a
form of God so much lower than he as the World-Soul (7). We
have already seen that God is above all activity (*) ; therefore
he is at rest while creating (Ὁ). Being above thought (2) he
is above self-consciousness (ἢ). Of him, therefore, we can only
tell what he is not ; no name or conception of him is adequate
Co;

3. The Nomenclative Symbol for the Divinity—Although we
cannot describe or give a name to God, we are forced to refer
to him in some manner ; by some designation. Plotinos there-
fore follows Plato in calling God by his most characteristic
quality of Goodness in moral relations, and Unity in metaphysi-
cal reflections. God is therefore called “the Good” ‘Tagathon”
(*) and “the One” “To Hen” (*) ; he is often referred to as
“the first,” for the sake of briefness and technicality in the
aetiological argument for his existence.

4. The God is the First Cause —Working back from the World
to God we find that he is the first cause. As such, he is activity,
even is above activity, for he is often called “cause” (*) and “the
first” (*). He is above pure activity, without any outside him-
self (7). He is the origin “ Arché” of all things ; although he
is really above origin (”) because the word “ origin” denotes
something which concerns us, not him (”). He may be called
the centre of all things, with the same limitation as above (*).

5. The God’s Necessity to Love.—If God is so perfect in his self-
existence, what can induce him to beget anything at all ?

The great argument of Irenaeus against the development or
emanation of God into his world was that this was nothing more
or less than decay of the Divine Being. This objection is how-
ever founded on a gross misconception, induced perhaps by
passionate antagonism. If God is perfect, he cannot decay ; if
he generates worlds and souls he does it from any other cause
than decay or degeneration of his Being (*).

Why could not the perfect Being remain alone, without creat-
ing or begetting other Beings? Because as every perfect Being
on earth secks to bring forth another, and the being on earth is
in the image, faint indeed, of God, so the most perfect of all
must beget, giving of himself without envy (5). The world was
not made by a chance desire; nor was it made because of
ratiocinative reasons (*) : the nature of himself (*) for it is a
physical (that is, a non-argumentative) necessity of his nature
to beget. As God’s nature is eternal, so are the offsprings of
his nature also eternal (*).

This necessity of God’s nature follows from the fact that God
is love, for the nature of Being, whatever its degree, is love.

28 The Philosophy of Plotinos:

“The universal soul has an universal love ; each individual soul
has its individual love ; and the love of the highest soul is God
(*).” Apart from partaking of the Divine Good no things love
or are loved (*) and the soul by the very constitution of its na-
pe a God and is ever forced to begin over and over to love

im ;

6. Manner of Begetting.—Love is a sufficient reason for all be-
getting ; but the question remains, How does this disinterested
love beget?

This is a question the wisest have never been able to explain
except by the use of illustrations drawn from the natural world.
Plotinos likens God to a river which is so full that it overflows
its banks ; and the water which has overflowed does the same,
extending itself ever in wider circuits (Ὁ. This figure must
however be taken with caution ; for it should not indicate either
a temporal becoming (2), since creation always takes place from
the inner or causal side (“) ; nor should it be understood to be
an emanation such as would abstract from the power of the first
cause ; the latter remains unmoved and undiminished, while the
stream of being flows from him (ὦ).

That which proceeds from him ever remains in him ; but he
is not in it as if contained by it (“). Plotinos advances the time-
honoured illustration of the sun and the ray of light that pro-
ceeds from it without diminishing its light or heat (ἢ.

These illustrations are to-day no longer intelligible, from the
fact that the law of continuity demands that the sun’s heatshould
grow less by just the amount that is substracted from it in the
form of the light of the ray, even though the sun’s heat be so
enormous that the loss be not apparent. Unless therefore we
find some other means of explaining the continued self-existence
oi God, in spite of his eternal begetting, which is doubtless the
case, the whole theory of Plotinos must be said to be yet un-
proved. Nevertheless, Plotinos would not suffer alone; the
whole philosophy of Christianity would fall together with his.

7. Relation of Cause and World.-—The details of the process of
begetting are as follaws - God is the sun which enlightens the
Universe (*) and rules all existence with his power (“). He is
the centre around which everything revolves (“) ; every little
part is organically related to the whole, so that from knowledge
of its nature, the nature of the centre may be deduced (*). All
creation has a natural longing for the first cause (*) and turns
itself towards him as a sunflower to the sun, in the degree that
its nature permits it to do so ; and the excellence of the nature
is judged by the power it possesses of turning to the first cause
(°). This is the natural instinct of self-preservation ; for inas-
much as the creature turns itself to its creator, does it turn itself
to its highest good (Ὁ). :

The process of begetting may be likened to the natural de-
velopment of a plant from a seed (*) and that which is begotten
may be called the son of the begettor, the latter thus becoming
the father of that which it has begotten (Ὁ). The first-begotten
is the image of the Begettor, the second-begotten of the First,

΄
-

ee Se ee

The First Realm, The God. 29

and so on (“) Unity and Perfection decreasing simultaneously
(*). Each thing is itself inasmuch as it is a Unity, and fulfils its
function and nature (5). The Divine Mind impresses its Ideas
in matter as with a seal, so that things are living expressions of
a divine Idea ("). That which is begotten is of course never of
equal intensity of being with that which begot it ; at each be-
getting of an image the light of perfection dims off into the
darkness of non-existence, Manifoldness increasing, and Unity
disappearing.

In matter, things are separated by space ; but in the Divine
Mind, they are only separated by form (*). Thus the soul is
wholly in every single member of the body ; therefore we may
say correctly the body is in the soul (*). Thus also God is
wholly in every single part of the world, for the world, and all
that is, is in him (“). The presence of the divine is always, for
lower beings, mediated through the presence of the intermediate
stages of Being. Thus in the physical World there are every-
ze three stages of being: Gad. the Nous, and the Earth-

oul.

If the centre of the Universe be God, then the First Sphere
is that of Nous, enlightened by God: the Second is that soul,
enlightened by the Nous ; the Third is that of body, enlightened
by that of soul ("). The body turns to the soul, the soul to the
Nous, and through it to God (ὅ). Thus each sphere is a dif-
ferent plenitude of divinity (*),each depending on the next high-
est sphere (Ὁ.

In this manner all the different Realms interpenetrate each
other. Plotinos sought to make this conception clear by illus-
trating it from the natural world : The soul is everywhere in the
body, as light as in air (5) ; but the body is in the soul as air in
light ; the light being rightly distinguished as the most basic
principle of the two (5). The inteilect generates and governs
the lower powers as splendour is in the ray, the ray in the light,
the light in the sun (%).

The question occured to Plotinos, how does each soul get an
undivided unit or quality of life from the World-Soul? This dif-
ficulty was settled by referring to the fact that many ears can
hear the same voice, the sound being in each case 1 ndivided (*).
Thus, wherever we are, are the three presences, God, the Mind,
and the World-Soul, which are known by the goodness, -beauty,
and life which we find inherent in all things on earth ().

What is space in the physical world, is excess of power, in-
tensity, in all higher spheres (™) ; in the physical world the cat-
egories of space and time represent nothing in the intelligible
World, form alone differentiating beings there("). Thus, on dif-
ferent planes, each faculty of man is conscious of itself in its own
way, and in its own kinds of limitation, connecting man with all
the octaves of the universe (”). These major and minor Realms
interpenetrating each other form a perfect harmony all together;
and their activity produces that harmony of the spheres which
haunted all Greek philosophy, and which was the great Te Deum
of creation ().

CHAPTER: VIII.
THE SECOND REALM, GOD, COSMIC MIND.

1. Saturn, the Cognisable Deity.—The first Realm was called
God. The second,Plotinos calls Saturn, for shortness of ap-
pellation (ἢ).

We saw, in speaking of the First Realm, that ratiocination im-
plies a Manifold, which shall be subsumed under the Unity of
apperception, besides being limited by a Unity of same logical
intension as itself. This Unity of apperception, which lies be-
hind the Manifold and Unity of ratiocination, was when applied
to the universe, God. This Manifold and Unity of ratiocina-
tion itself then becomes, applied to the universe, the Divine
Mind, Nous. It is therefore no more strict unity, but Unity
with Manifold (2), thinker and thought, subject and object (°).

What kind of thoughts does the Divine Mind think? It con-
templates iself, and thus thinks of that of which it is the image,
just as the human reason thinks of the higher unity of appercep-
tion, which is conscious of more than itself. God was Over-beau-
tiful; the Divine Mind is beautiful. God is Over-being, Over-
good, Over-life, Over-thought ; the Divine Mind is being, good-
ness, life, and thought. God is Over-activity ; the Divine Mind
is primary activity complete in its self (*). As eternity is only
intensity of the intelligible action of the Divine Mind (°), it may
be said to live in eternity, not in time (°). Thus it comprehends
all things that have existed, that exist, or that shall exist.

The consequence of this determination is that the Divine Mind
knows of no distinction between potentiality and actuality in
thought ("), no progress from not-thinking to thinking (*), no
inconcluded thinking (°), no unknown future (Ὁ) and no mem-
ory for the past (“). As human powers of ratiocination cannot
contemplate the actual Unity of apperception, but still can des-
cribe it and grasp it, so the Nous can never behold the actual
God () but can.describe him (*). Moreover, it cannot behold
what is below it, because itself is wholly thought (72.

2. Identity of Being and Thought.—God was Over-being and
the Divine Nous is full being. And as Being and Thought are
identical, the system of Thoughts of the Divine Mind are reality
(*). It is on this account that Plotinos refutes the ten Aris-
totelian and four Stoical Categories. These treated of the qual-
ities of matter ; but if matter is only an image of mind, then if
there are any Categories at all, they must be Categories of Mind,

‘the Secund Realm, Cosmic Mind. 31

beginning with Thought and Being (5). The Divine Mind in-
cludes ideas of all things and all numbers, so that it is a true in-
telligible World, “ Kosmos Noétos” (7). The Divine Mind is
to its Ideas as the science of geometry is to the propositions
contained in it (**); it thinks of all things (7°) and thus its uni-
versal has all forms (”). It contains as one power all powers, as
one God all lower Gods (5). It possesses life in itself and has
the original archetypes of all things (52). Even small things (*)
and human powers (*) are represented in it. The harmony and
peace of this world is blessedness (*) inasmuch as it accounts
for the beauty in all things, which is as it were the trace of its
presence in any thing ; and this beauty proceeds from the still-
ness of perfect motion.

we

CUOAPTER IX:
THE THIRD REALM : THE SOUL.

1. The Trinity : Over-God, Saturn and Zeus-Rhea.—The so-
called Platonic Trinity may be found, in a form much altered
from the original, in the speculations of Plotinos.

It is very true that Plotinos seems to be a little uncertain about
it in some places. He speaks of three successive states of being,
one lower than the other,—‘‘ Gods, daemons, and men (’).”
Again, he speaks as if there were four orders : the Good, the
Nous, the World-Soul, and daemons, which are the human souls
(7). Again, he speaks of souls of spheres and stars, spheres,
and the space below the moon, corresponding to divine, human,
and bestial men (°).

Yet, as a rule, he does not hesitate in enunciating a three-fold
order of existence : God, the Nous, and the Soul (*).

Of course it is understood that they are hierarchically sub-
ordinated the one to the other, and in no wise like the Christian
Trinity. As the second was the image of the first plane of being,
so is the third the image of the second, the reason of this further
begetting being the same that led to the begetting of the second
—unargumentative love (°). The Soul is an Idea imaged, and is
one of the circles of light which surround the inner light of God.
The highest heaven is full of fire, and therefore of ligh of which
all souls partake individually (°). So much is this the case that
the world is said to have many lights, being adorned and en-
lightened by many souls (ἢ who when thinking do not speak
but simply glow, when not incarnated (“). The sphere of the
Soul is therefore still intelligible light, although its sphere is the
outermost of those which may be called spheres of light; and be-
yond it begins illimitable darkness (δ).

In the Divine Mind, there is neither time or space ; in the
Soul begins time (°) and in the bedy beneath it begins space.
Thus the Soul is said “ to bring forth time.” :

The Soul is impassible (*°) ; therefore nothing can harm her ;
but she may sink into the Manifoldness of the body (7) and be
stifled in the agonies and passions of the flesh. Yet she
is not bound down to her body as to intellection : she reasons
through herself, and may understand through the Divine Com-
mon Mind or Nous, which to its individual reason is as form is
to matter ().

It will explain the position of the soul if we remark that the
process of begetting is always a proceeding into Manifoldness

The Third Realm, The Soul. 33

from Unity. Consequently,the Good was the Unity of appercep-
tion, Over-Unity. The Nous was Unity mingled with Mani-
foldness, the Unity still predominating. In the Soul however,
we see Unity mingled with Manifoldness, the Manifoldness pre-
dominating so much as to have discerpted that idea from all
others, so that all others are ‘‘ other” to it(*). Beneath the
Soul, in Reason, Sense, Vitality and Matter, the Manifold en-
croaches more and more on the Unity, until in matter, Unity
is in its last degree of degradation into Manifoldness.

2. Co-equality of Souls.—All souls were originally equal ; they
all came from the highest heaven (*°). They were all original-
ly parts of the same Divine Mind (7), and that they are alike
as to idea and nature is proved from the fact that they can un-
derstand one another, and in the intelligible world be at the
same place at the same time, that is, that they can communicate
(7ὴ with each other.

Yet in spite of this community of origin, there is no possible
doubt that there appears to reign much confusion injustice and
dissimilarity in the dispensation of the world as we know it. Yet,
in spite of this appearance of disorder, there reigns down below
here just as absolute order as obtains in the intelligible world
above (*). The Souls come from the same Nous and differ only
in Seen retainer (°). Souls may differ be-
cause of these original charactéfistic differences ( then by the
amount of experience gotten in former incarnations (ἢ) the
bodies given them differed, being celestial, ethereal, or of air (”),
or their education or discipline may have differed re Gut
through all this inequality runs the inexorable thread of Justice,
which metes out happiness according to goodness, which is
merit. “ The good alone are happy ; on this account is it that
the Gods are happy (*).” The difference between men and
Gods is only one of development ; men are incarnated in human
bodies, the Gods have spheres or worlds as bodies,and are called
“Gods” in respect to man because they give to their “ sister-
souls” the opportunity of incarnating. Men are also divine
beings (*) and are the “sisters” and “brothers” of the souls
of the Gods (5). Besides, Plotinos states explicitly that human
souls will have the same powers and will hold the same dignity
as the World-Soul, especially if they will turn into themselves
without spot (*).

3. The World-Soul.—We must now treat of the World-Soul.
Plotinos took his conception of it, not from the Stoics as some
authorities have thought, but from Plato. The latter seems to
have been uncertain whether the souls of men proceeded from
the World-Soul, whether they had all been created by God,in the
same mould, but smaller in size. Plotinos solves the difficulty
by saying, that the souls of man were born of the World-Soul in
respect to their bodies ; but that their impassible self, the rea-
son and mind had been created or begotten by the same Nous,
the World-Soul only offering her sister-souls opportunities for
development. We would thus explain the fact that we saw above

34 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

that everywhere on earth there were three presences, God, the
Nous, and the World-Soul, and that yet human souls and the
World-Soul, also called Jupiter for short (7), were brethren, and
equal as to origin.

Plato never defined accurately whether his World-Soul was
the Soul of.the whole physical universe, or only of the earth.
The Stoics distinctly looked to the Soul of the Universe when
speaking of a World-Soul, from which all other souls were be-
gotten. Plotinos was the first philosopher to limit this World-
Soul to the earth, assuming that each star soul possessed its own
soul. He says: “ One single life inheres in the one sphere, and
each sphere is located in one living being. Thus all creatures
which are on the sphere return to the same one life, and thus all
souls on one sphere are to a certain extent one (*).”

We must now enquire more particularly concerning the nature
of this World-Soul. The argument by which we rise to the
certainty of its existence is the Stoical one : just as in our body
is a soul, which keeps the body together, so every physical body
is kept together by a soul in which the body is (”). For bodies
are in the souls, which pervade them (*). The form of its body
is spherical, because it is perfect; for when unincarnate, the form
of the spiritual bodies of human souls are also spherical (*).

4. The Transcendent Over-Soul.—In the Third Realm, that of in-
dividual mind, as we have seen, human souls and the World-Soul
are different as to individuality, and coequal as to origin (*).
Nevertheless, the intellectual powers of the World-Soul are so
much more developed than ours that she is called “ pure intel-
lect (*),” knowing things not through organs of sense but by
direct intuition (5). She is outside of the world-body, and bears
all that is bodily within herself (*). Her self-consciousness (**)
is so much higher than ours that she neither has nor needs any
memory (”). Since she has all knowledge present to her mind,
which to Plotinos seems to be the characteristic of the memory
of stable souls, that is, the higher faculties of the soul, which are
impassible and which are not left behind at death (*). Nor does
the World-Soul possess reason, that is, reflection, of the Fourth
Realm (5), ‘ Logizesthai,” since an equal and perfect thought
has as little need of ratiocination as for a search after facts which
were known in the past. She has no receptivity for sensual
things, having no organs of sense (“) the sky serving her as an
eye. She creates, like God, above ratiocination or conscious
choice, impelled by the same divine necessity of love (“). She
never enters into connection with matter, her time being spent
in undisturbed meditation. There is also a lower World-Soul,
belonging to the Sixth Realm, called Rhea (5), which is related
to the human race in its lower realms much like the soul of a
tree is related to the fruits born by the tree (“). It is begotten
by the higher one, Zeus, as its image ; and is intimately connect-
ed with the matter of the world’s body.

5. Interrelation of Over-Soul and Souls.—We have already seen
that the World-Soul is to men a God, affording them oppor-

The Third Realm, The Soul. 35

tunities for incarnation. That men are incarnated in the body
of the World-Soul does not necessitate that the World-Soul
should conflict with the higher independent faculties of human
souls ; they are not as intimately connected with it as our mem-
bers are part of our bodies (“). The relation of the human soul
to the World-Soul may aptly if unelegantly be compared to the
relation existing between the human soul, and the soul of the
maggot which feasts on an amputated leg ip

The World-Soul rules and guides men (*), besides ruling her
body which obeys her better than our bodies do us, since every-
thing is well-disposed (“). Our bodies are made for us “by a
good soul,” the World-Soul, our sister (*). The World-Soul
pities us in our sorrows, and during the intervals between the
incarnations the human souls are protected by her, rising to the
height that is appropriate to their development in goodness (“).
While incarnate human souls can attain to be as blessed and
powerful as the World-Soul, averting or minimizing the
blows of fortune, and becoming the World-Soul’s colleague in
ruling her body (°). Thus the World-Soul and all human souls
are equal, inasmuch as they are only different manners of work-
ing of the Universal Mind ; different revelations of the same
life—just as one light streams in many directions Cc.

CHAPTER X.
THE FOURTH REALM, REASON.

1. Individual Mind.—This Realm of reason is lacking in the
World-Soul (*). Although the “individual Mind” of the Third
Realm is the essential characteristic of what makes a soul a soul,
yet this lower faculty of reason conjoined to it is the individual

faculty by which man may identify himself with his higher or |

lower powers. Thus the soul is represented as choosing be-
tween its two loves, its two daemons : the higher and lower Ga
The “individual Mind” of the Third Realm may be looked upon
as double: containing intellect and imagination. Therefore,
when the reason identifies itself with the “individual Mind” it
occurs that intellect and imagination appear doubly changed, as
discursive and permanent reason (*). Consequently we may
distinguish in every “rational” soul, as contrasted with the
“ideal soul,” three parts : mind (individual Nous) rational soul
(reason) and irrational soul (sense vitality and matter) (ὦ.
Besides, the human reason is called “ rational ” reason, “‘ Logos
Logikon,” to preclude the possibility of its ever incarnating in
the body of animals (°).

In this realm of reason man is responsible for his destiny.
When, however, man identifies his reason with his individual
Nous, it is plain that the reason ceases to exist as separate facul-
ty. This then happens in the case of World-Souls, called Gods,
who have become so good that, as it were, the possibility of
falling has disappeared (°).

This realm is the essentially human one, and is also called
“ Dianoia.” It is the lowest part of the eternal impassible soul ;
but it may become so buried in the flesh as to lose its individu-
ality, and becoming useless atrophy.

2. Other World-Souls—As the World-Soul called Zeus is
only the Soul of the Earth,there must be similar souls of “Gods”
in the other stars. They, like Zeus, are the most perfect souls
(2, and consequently are, as to their body, the visible Gods, the
image of the invisible Gods (ὃ. Like Zeus, the Earth-Soul, they
contemplate the cosmic Nous steadily from far (Ὁ) and live quiet-
ly, peacefully, harmoniously, producing as we have seen the
music of the spheres (°). Again, like Zeus, the Earth-Soul, they
have neither reason, nor memory nor ratiocinative powers, for
the same reason the Earth-Soul lacks them (7.

CHAPTER XI.
THE FIFTH REALM, SENSE.

τ. The Senses of the Over-Soul.—This Fifth Realm is also ap-
parently lacking in the World-Souls,as well as to all highersouls
of Gods. The Earth-Soul has no sense organs; yet in allegorical
fashion Plotirios makes the sky its eyes, and the races of animals
its veins (*). The highest Earth-Soul, called Zeus, has no need
to gather information through sensation.

It might at first sight seem that if these realms are lacking to
the Earth-Soul, it is impossible that each lower one should be
begotten in the image of the next higher one, as is the rule in
the system of Plotinos. It will however be seen on reflection,
that this objection overlooks the great factor of development.
Since the reason becomes merged into the individual Mind dur-
ing process of development, it is plain that it must have existed
at some time of the Earth-Soul’s career. Besides, nothing pre-
vents that though merged into the individual Nous the reason
and the sense man may still subsist in perfect order, and be able
beget their image as well as when existing separately.

2. Unity of Souls in the Fifth Realm.—lIt is in this realm of
sense that human souls and the Earth-Souls are for the first time
organically united ; for it will be remembered that the kind
Farth-Soul affords her sister souls opportunities for education by
incarnating in her body, furnishing to every incarnate soul her
three lowest faculties of sense, vitality, and matter (Ὁ. Plotinos
insists on this fact continually.

3. Human Sense-Realm.—This Realm of Sense furnishes to our
psychical life its sensations and passions (ἢ). Yet, it is much
more than this. It is here that we meet the spiritual body of
which the physical body is so perfect an image. This spiritual
body is again two-fold. The higher part belongs to the im-
passible, eternal soul itself, the lower belongs to the order and
dispensation of the Earth-Soul. They are identical in form; but
they are separable at death. The earthy spiritual body lasts
longer than the physical body, though both are by nature cor-
ruptible. The life which association with the rational soul
has given the earthly spiritual body recedes with the departure
of the Soul, as the light follows the withdrawal of a lighted can-

dle. The separation between the earthly and celestial spiritual .

bodies takes place when all vitality has left the former. We may
suppose that Plotinos would have explained the appearance of

. ὡς

48 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

gt.osts shortly after the death of the person, as being appear-
ances of the earthly spiritual body before its utter extinction.

4. Celestial and Physical Senses —What have these two spiritual
bodies to do with sensations? Much, every way. On the sup-
position of Plotinos, man has two sets of senses, corresponding
to the two spiritual bodies ; a celestial, and an earthly set of
senses. In this fact Plotinos sees the long-sought connection
between cerebral modifications and the psychical perception of
them. During the time of incarnation, both spiritual bodies
are closely united, each reacting on the other. Consequently,
physical excitations will be opportunities of celestial vision ;
while at times, as in dreams, the celestial set of senses is alone
active. A case in point would be that of the somnambulistic
subject who relishes the ideal apple suggested to her by the
operator.

It is thus that Plotinos explains the fact thatthe Earth-Soul has
perfect knowledge of all things without any sensation or organs
of sense. The Earth-Soul possesses a celestial set of senses in
her spiritual body, (celestial spiritual body), the earthly spirit-
ual body having become useless.

5. Senses of Animals—We here have an opportunity of en-
quiring concerning the nature of animals. The earthly spiritual
body of animals is present to them cqually and of like nature
with that of men, so that upon the quiescence of the higher hu-
man faculties, a low human soul might if degraded enough,—
although this would be a most extreme case—incarnate in the
body of an animal. The souls of animals and vegetables are of
one nature with human souls, although infinitely less developed.
Plotinos even asserts that they have a developed Reason (Fourth
Realm) (*). Nothing would oppose that as in the case of bad
men, so in animals the higher faculties would be present, but
only in an dormant or quiescent state.

CHAPTER XII.
THE SIXTH REALM, VITALITY.

1. The Sixth Realm.—The Sixth Realm in the human being is
the vegetable life of the body ; the vitality present in every pro-
toplasmic cell, and which makes all the difference between a
living and a dead body, when considered apart from conscious-

ness.

2. The Sixth Realm of the Over-Soul. The Earth-Soul has also
a Sixth Realm ; a lower soul, which we have already spoken of,
and which is called Rhea,to distinguish it from the higher Earth-
Soul called Zeus (*). At times this lower soul, is in some of
its lower phases also called Aphrodité (*), as the representant of
the reproductive functions of all vitality. This lower Earth-Soul
is the begotten image of the higher, through the two original
mediators, which are probably indicated by the word “ other,”
“allo” (δ. The lower Earth-Soul is connected with the earth-
body as human life is connected with the human body (ἢ). This
lower soul is the substrate of sensible appearance, its name is
Nature (°). It cannot meditate as the highest soul can ; it is
thought, but not self-conscious ; but is simple, and purposeless
(°). It may be said to have sensation just as a body sleeping
has sensation ; it differs therefore very much from the sensation
of the body in its full psychical state ("). Her products are “the
materials that dreams are made of ;” its quiet working proceeds
with the certainty of instinct, without interruption of ratiocina-
tion. It begets the matter of the earth-body as its image, from
the same inner necessity of love which led to the begetting of the
Cosmic Nous; only in a much lower degree; it cannotavoid shin-
ing with its light upon that which is below it,and which does not
yet exist (*). This necessity of love was from everlasting ; and
as on this account the Cosmical Nous was eternal, therefore the
Cosmical Nous begat all its images eternally. The consequence
is that the world is eternal (ὃ). Yet there are cyles in the history
of the world, just as in that of man ; but they are not Stoic or
Platonic in rigid fatalistic repetition. They only furnish the
aon circumstances necessary for the development of souls

{

3. The Doctrine of Sympathy.—In certain senses Nature may
be said to be imperfect ; but if we look we may see in her the
impress of the perfect divine nature. She is its offspring and
image. On it she depends for being. She only has existence

40 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

inasmuch as the Divine exists in her ("). She is not built up
of foreign elements, as an aggregate, as a house is built of sep-
arate bricks. She is, in her body and souls, an organic whole,
an organism, whose elements are all united in the highest Earth-
Soul (5). As in a human body the members are in mutual har-
mony, there is a unity although it be composed of sounds low
and high (*). As in a human body, so in the human organ-
ism every member is interdependent. All things act and react
on each other, by all means physical and psychical. This is the
doctrine of “sympathy,” which the modern doctrine of resul-
tance of forces has re-established, and which was used by Lotze
as his supposititiously original proof of causation.

4. The Beautiful.—There is nothing which is nearer to the
heart of Plotinos than the belief that the world is beautiful ; the
most beautiful world possible. Plotinos had to enforce his view
against heathen Gnostics and also Christian Gnostics, whom he
mentions in this polemic as being those who say that the world-
creator and the world are evil (*). Plotinos thinks (°°) that
the world should be composed of matter if it was to be the
image of God (of course he assumes tl.at matter is the image of
God) ; and within this sphere of matter which is the image of
God, we could not imagine a more beautiful world than ours.
It was made so beautiful in order that the higher spirits should
not be forced to pollute their glance by looking out into the
night of non-existence ; and especially to remind man of the
goodness of God, whose image it is, and who can therefore be
known by contemplating the world, his image. Again, (7) How
can man be said to honour the invisible Gods, if he despises
their visible images? How can the guidance of Providence be
admitted in the direction of minor matters if it be not admit-
ted in that of major ones? How can a man be called immortal,
if you deny immortality to the beautiful stars, and that these
have souls like men have?

5. Astrology and V aticination—The above explained doctrine
of “sympathy” or the coherence of things, or law of resul-
tance of forces (**) explains all the truth there is both in Astrol-
ogy and Vaticination. Plotinos cannot see his way to accepting
a crude Astrology (7) which supposes that the daily position of
the stars influences our daily life in a supernatural way. If the
Star-Souls are Gods they are good ; why then should their dif-
ferent position alter their influence? What have we little men
done to the stars that they should wish us evil? The influence
of the stars can be little more than that of their natural influence,
as of the moon on the tides, the sun on the life and spirits of,

men (5). The deeds of men which as responsible creatures they’
commit are just as important, if not more so (5). Of course the
life-giving influence of the sun is part of the physical influence:
which the soul finds in her incarnation into the body of the
Earth-Soul ; for evidently the sun exerts much influence on the
growth of nature, and the powers of men (*). Thus the Realm
of Sense and Vitality of man are affected by the state of the

The Sixth Realm, Vitality. 41

physical influences of the sun and moon; but the higher im-
passible soul escapes them, except in a reflex manner through
the body (*).

As to Vaticination, Plotinos does not go beyond the scientific
vaticination which from consideration of a single tooth or bone
can reconstruct the nature, age, and powers of a long extinct
race. Therefore, granting the law of coherence or sympathy, if
we are skilful enough, we can conclude from the condition of
one part of the cosmical organism to the conditions of the other
parts, as easily as the dancer judges of the position of the foot
from that of the hand (*). Both are consequences of the same
cause; therefore they will tell of each other (9). The heavens are
a celestial writing in which the skilful can read what will happen,
because all things are interdependent (7). The entrance of souls
into the world, and the general course of their actions is part of
the universal order of nature (7). A good analogy of inter-
dependence of the phenomena of this world may be found in
the fact that two eyes are not the same yet follow each other’s
motions, so that from the position of one, one may tell the po-
sition of the other (*).

In connection with Astrology and Vaticination, we should
speak of the state of the dead. They can still harm us, or do
us good; they can, by showing themselves, prove that souls
exist after death ; finally, they can inspire the Oracles, as they
see clearer than we do, not being fettered by the flesh (2).

6. Free-Will.—We are now led to the question of the relation
of this world-order to the free individuality of the soul. His po-
sition on tle subject is almost exactly that of Kant. Virtue and
the motion of the soul in the intelligible realm are free ; but the
soul’s deeds in the world are part of the law of continuity, psy-
chical as well as physical (*). Plotinos has no taste (5) for
the crude predestination of fatalism, and like immoral doctrines.

The design of all the world and what should happen in it was
part of the Providence of the divine Mind, not anteceding in
time, but in causality, for the world is the image of the Divine
Nous dwelling within it, so that it cannot be said to degenerate
or go wrong (*). Therefore the soul is, in respect to her three
lowest faculties, which belong to the World Order, rigidly con-
ditioned ; for this lower soul had been given it by the Earth-
Soul. Yet, in its higher impassible self it is free as self-existence
can make it ; and the soul will therefore be free exactly accord-
ing to whether she identifies herself with her higher or lower fa-
culties (“). 1 an is therefore a slave of body, (when his reason
has identified itself with his vitality and matter) (55) ; a slave of
fortune, (when his reason has identified itself with his sense-
‘world (*). But man is free (when his reason has identified itself
with his individual Nous,) turning all things to intellect (*) ;
and man is free (when his reason has identified itself with the
Cosmic Nous,) when the soul lives in contemplation neglecting
all else ("). Freedom is serving one’s own good, rather than ser-
ving that of another, that is, of the lower faculties contributed to

42 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

it by the Earth-Soul (*). While therefore many actions depend
entirely on circumstances (*), the highest God is freedom, rather
than even master of his nature (“) which would introduce Plur-
ality into his utter Unity.

7. The Daemon.—We have seen that there were men and dae-
mons and Gods. This word daemon must be carefully guarded
from its later evil meaning which was given it by Christianity.
In the days of Homer, it was interchangeable with God, “ Dai-
mon,” and probably remained quite as high in all classical lit-
erature, with which Plotinos was so thoroughly acquainted.
They are souls who are at a stage of development intermediate
between men and Gods. Like the latter they are eternal (“),
and can see in the intelligible realm by their spiritual celestial
senses (“), implying the possession of a celestial spiritual body
(*) hearing their prayers. They have no physical language (“) ;
but of course none is needed as we have seen that souls in the
intelligible world communicate thoughts to each other by an
increased glow of their inherent light.

CHAPTER. ΧΤΕΗΙ;
THE SEVENTH REALM, MATTER.

1. Evil_—If God is Unity, without any Manifoldness, then
matter is the greatest possible Manifoldness, with just enough
Unity admixed to it to make it recognizable as such. Utter
Manifoldness without Unity could not exist at all (‘). Therefore
since proximity to God is Goodness, the furthest distance from
him compatible with any kind of existence is evil (*). On this
account matter is “ Préton Kakon,” the greatest evil possible,
Evil itself. Absolute Evil, if it existed, would have no existence.
It is nothing but deprivation, emptiness, absence of good (ὃ).
Evil can therefore only exist in something else, in Being, either
in that intensity of Being called soul, or matter (*). Matter it-
self, for itself, is perfect. But when we look at Matter from a
higher intensity of good, say Vitality or Sense, then we call it
evil, because it is absence of a certain amount of good. There-
fore nothing is evil in itself ; a thing is only evil if you consider
it from a higher stand-point (°). But as Matter is the lowest
form of being, it is evil when considered from any stand-point
except itself (°). Good and Evil are not therefore opposed in
a contrary manner ; there is no such thing as a dualism in na-
ture. The utmost opposition of evil to good is a sub-contrary
one, a logical contrary (ἢ. Evil therefore does not exist
in what exists really ; only in that which declines to non-exis-
tence (*). There are as many grades of evil as there are grades
of Being (°). Matter is therefore not evil because it has any
evil qualities, but just because it has no qualities at all ; for qual-
ity is an intelligible limitation or form ; and God is pure form
or rather above it. Matter is almost formless, without quality
(°). As a consequence of this, evils are not sent by God, but
are only degeneration or declinations of qualities already pos-
sessed ("). There is nowhere unmixed evil: everywhere the
good and evil are mixed (”). But the saddest side of this view
of matter and evil is that if it be true, then it is nopeless to look
forward to a time when evil will have disappeared from the
world as at present constituted, for evil is only a low form of
good (*). And it will always be necessary that there should
exist different grades or forms of good ; they are all necessary
to the perfection of the world: as the painter who must use
more than one colour or shade of colour in his picture ; or the
poet who would have none but heroes in his tragedy (**). In
one single part therefore we should not require the perfection of

“ἈΑ." The Philosophy of Plotinos.

the whole, nor in one part should we require the characteristic
that belongs to another part (). Besides if there 15 one source
of good, it is only reasonable that there should be a gradual
diminution of it into annihilation, pure privation, emptiness ("").

The soul can never be called evil: at the utmost, it is the
fourth reduction of evil, or only a declension or disposition to
lower forms of being (Ὁ). :

Matter itself is formless stuff (Ὁ and without quality (Ὁ). It
is not size, but that which size makes (space) ; it is not measure,
but measure assumes it unto itself (5). It is not bodily ; it is
‘“AsOmatos” (7). It is not Being; it is only possibility of Being
(5). It is a weak image, shadow and declension of the spiritual
(*). It is unsatisfied yearning after Being (*). It is the thought
of nothing ©).

2. Uncognisability of Matter.—So little is known of the Sixth
Realm of Being, that it is only natural that its process of be-
getting its image, matter, should also be dark. To be sure, we
have the general principle that generation takes from the in-
telligible side of the world, and is like the germination of a seed;
and these two principles we shall have to apply here.

The things of sense are formed by their spermatic forms, or the
Ideas active in the seed. This idea Plotinos owed to the Stoics.
Each act of begetting has an idea in the cosmic Nous corres-
ponding to it, as well as a suitable number. Thus we may say
that seed is an active idea, the form of the future form, and
dwelling in the seed.

3. Intelligibility of Matter.—Since Being and Thoughtareidenti-
cal, the lowest form of being is also the lowest form of what
is intelligible. Therefore, matter is still being, and is still in-
telligible in its nature. This is the marrow of the contention of
the Idealists, that matter is in itself intelligible. Plotinos of
course never pushed the questions of epistemology far enough
to be driven to this result, to which he comes by another road.
He thinks that matter is intelligible, and that there must be some
sort of unity between us and matter (**), as his cosmology shows
at length.

CHAPTER XIV.
REINCARNATION.

1. Need for Reincarnation.—Before asking ourselves why we
should reincarnate, it will be worth while asking why it is at
all necessary to incarnate.

The aim of life is an ethical one. The end of life is vision of
God. This happiness, like all happiness, can only be gotten by
meriting it; for even Gods are only happy because they have
merited it. It is necessary therefore to havean opportunity of gain-
ing merit, to let our reason decide of its own will whether it will
identify itself with its lower or higher faculties Therefore it is
necessary for souls to be in the world that they may learn to
seek the good stedfastly, and work off all lower attractions (7).
Experience is after all a better teacher than mere knowledge (ἢ) ;
and experience can only be had in a body. The reason for in-
carnation is on the part of the soul a desire for procreation (°),
a lower form of divine love, evidently. ‘‘ Unless she have a
body, the soul will never progress, for there is another place
where the soul may propagate itself naturally. And if the soul
will progress, then it will build itself a place of habitation, and
will therefore generate a body (*).” Thus the soul collaborates
with the Divine Will in working out the World-Drama (°).

The purpose of incarnation is therefore a moral one ; and for
a man as serious as Plotinos, this moral purpose seemed worthy
of the creation of heaven and earth for this especial end (°).

2. Justice—We have already seen why one single life is not
long enough for this development of soul. The Divine Justice
cannot be vindicated if souls have not other lives in which the
present inequalities are satisfactorily accounted for.

But here is another purpose in reincarnation. Retribution (");
and the souls are led or enticed to come of their own free will
into such circumstances furnished by the Earth-Soul (Ὁ) as
will purify the souls by retribution (°), these circumstances be-
coming indissoluble parts of her as soon as she has incarnated

In order to make this retribution clear, Plotinos quotes the
famous passage of Plato (7) which sets forth, for instance, that
foolish kings will be reincarnated as eagles, quiet citizens as
bees, etc. (2. ι

Superficial readers have seized upon this passage to prove that
Plotinos taught a theory of reincarnation which made no dif-
ference between human and animal bodies. There can not, how-

46 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

ever, be the slightest doubt that Plotinos held no such theory ;
and as a matter of fact, many commentators have been led into
this blunder because Plotinos, in quoting this passage from
Plato, does not state that it is not his own, as is his custom,
when quoting Plato, who was “ the philosopher.”

In the first place, we have already seen that Plotinos took the
trouble to say that the human reason was “ rational” so that
it should not be likely to desire to incarnate in the body of an
animal (*). Besides, in the Cosmical Nous the Idea of a cow or
dog are as natural as those of men, and therefore it would be
unnatural for a human mind to enter into an animal body (*).

Such a scheme of haphazard interchange would interfere with
strict retribution among men.

Plotinos’s own scheme of reincarnation (7) will be found very
rational : bad masters become slaves, rich people who have used
their wealth badly, poor ; murderers are murdered, and rapers
are raped.

During the intervals between incarnations souls (which are in
this condition often confused with daemons) go to that part of
the World-Soul which is appropriate to their merits and their
condition, the good souls being at rest, and the evil ones suf-
fering in the meanwhile (°°).

The idea of a physical resurrection was most repugnant to
Plotinos ; as the body is no more than the tool or prison of the
soul, it would be cruel to enclose the soul in it and all its im-
perfections forever (7). After death, the soul goes whither its
inclination leads it, so that true friends will meet once more ;
when the soul reincarnates it reincarnates in the body most suit-
able for it (*). When the soul has left its body, it becomes that
towards which it had directed its activity (ἢ).

Thus it may indeed happen, that on account of utter and re-
peated wickedness a soul may sink into matter and die in bes-
tial circumstances (”) so that it will reincarnate in an animal or
vegetable body (7) ; for if the soul has become bestial, it is not
able to form for itself anything more than a bestial body.

The souls that need no more reincarnations on earth are
placed on the stars, whence they may see the universe, and be
in such circumstances as are most fitted to develop them. The
purest souls turn themselves towards the Cosmical Nous, and re-
turn for ever to their intelligible home.

3. The Three Factors—There are three factors in each reincar-
nation.

There is in all Being the yearning of love ; to communicate
of itself to that which is below. For such a reason, The God begat
the Nous in his own image. Likewise souls seek to beget their
image, and to give of themselves or the things below them.
From such a divine mission the soul returns better than she was
when she incarnated ; for she has been, as Methodius says, to a
certain extent a Christ. She must become individualized, and
self-determined to seek the good, till there be no more possi-
bility of falling (5) although in another place Plotinos says that

Reincarnation. 47

even unto the highest development a soul can reach on earth,
there is always for her the possibility of falling (*). Her first
desire is to care for and to enlighten the world of the senses; but
if she forgets herself in this occupation, and becomes anxious
pane welfare of the body and for its lusts, she is held down by
it F

In the second place, it is from her own inclination, and de-
sire that she incarnates in any particular body (*).

Yet, lastly, this very desire of hers was foreseen, foredeter-
mined—her destiny (*) ; in the fulness of time, with magical
powers she enters the body the Earth-Soul has prepared for her;
for she was not strong enough to remain in the intelligible
world (*).

4. Objection from Oblivion.—The usual objection to thetheory of
Reincarnation is the contention that in the present life human
souls do not remember their former incarnations.

Plotinos meets this objection in the following way. The lower
faculties of the soul, including Sense, Vitality, and Body—which
include also the passions and the physical memory, are furnished
by the Earth-Soul new to every soul which incarnates. We have
already seen that at death the soul leaves behind the earthy
spiritual body, with its passions and memories (*). This earthly
spiritual body lasts longer than the physical body, but begins to
decay at death, having in itself all that was learnt on earth, with
all the remembrance of the petty things of the life (”). As we
have seen, there is a higher memory in the eternal impassible
soul which also has the records of the life : and when the in-
carnate soul will have developed far enough, it will come into
the consciousness of all its past lives. Thus Plotinos says that
in the interval between incarnations much would be forgotten,
anyway, and consequently the Platonic recollection is put aside
for the lower faculties of the soul (*).

In order to make the point of Potinos clear, we may make use
of an illustration. A College graduate, in middle life, has prob-
ably forgotten most if not all the definite facts he learnt at Col-
lege, and yet he uses that mental training which that learning
gave him, to the end of his years.

5. Objection from Suicide.—There is still another objection to
reincarnation. If reincarnation be true, then suicide is not only
safe, but a very efficient means to free oneself from circum-
stances that have become unendurable for the time being.

On the contrary, the theory of reincarnation is the only theory
that will yield an adequate argument against suicide. It is fool-
ishness to waste opportunities of development ; and it is foolish
to leave the world until the soul is ready to abandon the cir-
cumstances surrounding it, and has learnt all possible lessons
from them (*),

GHAPTER “XN.
ETHICS:

As we have already pointed out, the main import of tne phil-
osophy of Plotinos is ethical, or practical. The end of his sys-
tem is the highest attainment possible to man ; and that is the
contemplative or theoretic life. But we have also seen how sup-
remely important to this life is morality (*).

1. Virtue and Vice.—All virtues are purifications, by which the
soul may disentangle itself from the lusts of the flesh. These
purifications cannot change the soul, since it is impassible and
eternal ; but they alter its relation to the body, giving it the
upper hand (*) and freeing it from the lusts and disturbances of
the flesh (*). It then appears in its original purity (ὦ), in which
state its likeness to God appears patent to all (°). Purity of soul
consists in the reason seeking to identify itself with the individ-
ual Nous, or Mind (°). As long as it keeps its purity, the soul
finds nothing evil ; let purity be lost, and life is an evil ; for life
is good only inasmuch as evil is repelled ("). The soul itself is
not evil, as long as it does not descend from the good (Ὁ).

What are the impediments of the soul? Anger, cupidity, lust,
pain, fear, gluttony, intemperance, avarice (°). What are the
goods we must attain? Just habits, pure temperance, fortitude,
modesty, calmness, divinity of mind (”).

What are virtues? “The energy of the soul, that which is
good for her according to her nature (").” Virtue is the most
effective means of development, being more effective than even
en γε, 0: What beauty is to the body, that is virtue to the
sou :

The four Platonic Cardinal Virtues are Temperance, Courage,
Magnanimity, and Prudence. Those who are unpurged by vir-
tue lie in Hades. Temperance is the fleeing of bodily lusts, sen-
sual gratification, and pleasure—the attainment of utter purity.
Courage is but the overcoming of the fear of death, that is, fear
of the soul of being outside of the body. This implies indiffer-
ence to all earthly advantages, or anything which cannot: be
taken away wth the soul at the time of death. Magnanimity is
the contempt of all advantages on earth. Prudence is wisdom
in turning away from lower things, and turning to the things
above (**).

It would be hard to find a more searching rule of life than
this, or a discipline that leads to a higher end than this : the end
of our life is not to avoid evil or copy the examples of good
men, but to become God (*).

Ὶ sats at oe :
ir ΡΝ A Von wg

aan

Ethics. 49

2. Philosophy of Sin.—We must now enquire concerning the
nature of sin. It is the agreement of the higher with the lower
faculties, instead of compelling them to obedience (Ὁ: “The
rational soul itself can never sin, but the lower soul may cease
to be its image, and break loose from its control and influence
(7). The death of the soul occurs when it is merged into the
body, and thus dies along with it, when buried in the ground.
This externalization of the soul is what is meant by Hades (”).
The weakness of the body which leads to sin is laziness, whereby
the soul becomes overweighted with matter in generating off-
spring (”). The natural appetites of the body are in themselves
good, so long as they are not misused (ἢ) ; likewise, the world
is beautiful by nature, so that souls may be recalled to God.
Pain and sorrow are the first perceptions of some dissolution
(*). The causes of sin are “rashness,’ primary “ otherness,”
and a desire to belong to oneself (5). But above all, the first
cause of sin is “ falling into generation (2). The meaning of
temperance is turning into oneself from the flesh and its lusts Ce

Yet the definite reason for turning away from the flesh, its
lusts, and the body, has not yet been assigned. The reason of
it is as follows : we have seen that all actions of the body in the
dispensation of the world-order have been strictly predeter-
mined, and that liberty exists only in the intelligible world. It
is plain, therefore, that if the reason identifies itself with the
body, it becomes absolutely the slave of the determinism of
external causality. If however it identifies itself with its “ideal”
soul, or with its individual Nous, then it has identified itself with
that part of itself which is free, and outside of the sphere of de-
terminism. The lusts of the flesh lead to slavery ; purity leads
to freedom and self-determination. We are not to be a live
body, but an embodied spirit (”). Inside the body, the soul is
preordained, along with all things ; outside of it she is free.
Therefore the aim of her struggles is to separate herself from
the body (ὦ.

3. The Path of Enlightenment.—This part of the Soul’s develop-
ment is called “ enlightenment (7), for she is herself a light.
This development may be divided into three (*) or seven (*) de-
grees: I. Purification by virtues; IT. Prayer; III. The adorning
and purification of the soul; IV. Beginning to be conscious of
the intelligible world ; V. Perseverance in this course ; VI. Full
fruition in it ; becoming like God, and unable to fall back ; VII.
Becoming God (*). Thus the development of every successive
faculty, assisted by knowledge of the right doctrine.

Although this path of development is the same for all souls,
yet as there are different kinds of souls, or souls with differing
characteristics, it is plain that the course of development must
be changed for each, although probably the same stages, or like
stages will occur.

This Plotinos calls “the threefold return of the soul to God

1) ” Each soul must progress in its own manner, since the
perfect life is, in each degree, to live according to nature (*).

50 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

There are three kinds of Souls: the Musician, who learns by
experience ; the Philosopher, who seeks knowledge, and the
Lover, whose characteristic power it is to love (*). Active and
sensual men are exiles from their true home; the Active re-
turn to their fatherland easier than the Sensual men, who are
like beasts laden down with prey—Plotinos then says that the
Musician is led upward from harmonious sounds to harmony in
general, and from this to ideality whence the path to the in-
telligible world is plain (**). The Lover is at first entangled in
the beauty of the flesh, but rises by his utter unselfishness to the
beauty of morals, and thence to science and the Nous (*).
Lastly, the Philosopher, who seeks knowledge, is so near to
perfection that he only needs a guide to free him from the weak-
ness of the body (*).

4. The Daemon of Conscience.—But who shall this necessary
guide be? Conscience, the Daemon. Plotinos’s explanation of
the phenomena of conscience is singularly clear and interesting.
The Daemon is not, as might be supposed, a supernatural guide.
It is only a natural phenomenon of psychology. It is not an
intelligence external to ourselves ; it is only our own higher self.
We have seen that man epitomizes in himself many principles.
His reason, as a rule, has identified itself with some one particu-
lar principle of his nature, either his individual Nous, or his
senses. The Daemon that leads him and warns him is that facul-
ty of his which is next above the one with which his reason has
identified itself. Let us suppose, for instance, that the reason of
a man has identified itself with his senses, and their lusts. The
next higher principle will then guide him and warn him of the
consequences of his self-indulgence. In this case the Daemon
would be his own individual Nous. Again, suppose his reason
has identified itself with his individual Nous: the Daemon in
this case will be the Cosmic Nous or Mind. Once more, if his
reason should further identify itself with his Cosmic Nous, then
the Daemon could be God himself.

The question arises,why could not God himself lead him in the
very first instance. Plotinos is not very clear on this point ; it
would seem he doubts the lower man could hear the Voice of
God. Thus man chooses his own Daemon, according to the
choice of principle on which he will act ("). Thus no man is
left to flounder in the dark, by God ; if man will but listen to
his inner voice, which will change with his own change for
better or worse (*), he will be led into the full glory of Divinity.

The inner voice is heard by prayer ; and the value of prayer
is great. Mere intellectual will and desire will certainly get an
appropriate answer through the law of the coherence of things
(ῳ ; but true prayer is adoration, not command of the Divinity

We thus come to the full meaning of the maxim, know thy-
self (“). The highest self of every man is God. This divinity
of every man is quiescent in him until he have developed it. To
become God, we have only to know ourselves. The human

Ethics. 51

soul is not an aggregate ; it is an organic unity of which God
is the highest phase. We develop by simplification of soul (τ
To enter into oneself, is to enter into God (*). Only with the
presupposition of such a psychology can the true meaning of the
famous maxim appear (“). Plotinos claimed to have received
the conception from tradition that was secret (“) ; Philo Judaeus
claimed the same origin for many of his dogmas. Thus, by the
purification of virtue, we rise, and are delivered from the bond-
age of the flesh and the world and ascend to the life of godlike
men and Gods, when in beatific vision we shall see God, “ Phugé
ones pros monon,” the flight of the Single to the Single, face
to face.

5. Ecstasy.—Plotinos had attained to ecstaic union with the
Deity four times during the years that Porphyry lived with him.
Hence, he described it as an objective fact (“) : “ Often having
been awakened to myself outside of the body, and having come
to be outside of all other things, but within myself, I saw a
marvellous light and beauty ; then there came over me an ab-
solute certainty that my destiny was a great one ; for when I
lived my highest life, and co-operated with the Deity in it, and
when I arrived, in it, to its activity, then I established myself
above all intellectual things.”

We must now explain the process of ecstasy. Ratiocination
is a mediate process which is subsumed under the Unity of ap-
perception. It is therefore not the highest mental activity (“).
We must proceed beyond it, and yield ourselves to the higher
being (“). We must prepare ourselves for absolute receptivity,
by being disturbed by no ratiocination (“). Thus can we be
suddenly filled with the higher light that streams from Deity
() just as the soul emits the light to form the celestial spirit-
ual body, and to join it to the earthly one. Now we have Deity
without being able to describe it (7) because the healthiest states
of the body are often unconscious ones (ἢ). Being united to
that which is above thought, the soul is no more soul or self,
but pure rest in God; and it is in “ ekstasis,” (standing out
above), “ Haploésis,” (simplification), and is in a state to be
com ared only with intoxication or love-madness ("). The in-,
telligible light cannot be sought ; it must be awaited like the
rising sun ; suddenly it appears in the soul—it is there, it has
not come (δ). It fills with joy and gladness, (7) which however |
cannot last long (*). The soul abandons the Deity not out of
fear, but out of natural restlessness and weakness, so that it
must fall from the Divine hypostatic union () as long as it is in-
carnate, for it has not yet completely severed the ties that bind
it to earth (5). Yet, as long as life will last, there will be an un-
quenchable desire to behold the Divine Light once more (Ὁ).

Yet, we must repeat, it is not every soul that can behold God.
If the eye is unclean, it cannot see. “The eye can never hope
to see the sun, unless it have become fit to see it ; nor can any
soul hope to see that which is Beautiful,unless it be beautiful it
self. Let everyone who would behold God and the Beautiful

52 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

become godlike and beautiful himself (°).” The soul must re-
turn to herself, and if she does not find herself beautiful, she
must polish herself as the sculptor polishes his statue.

In the act of ecstasy there are three stages: expectation of
the Divine, absolute trust in it, and final self-immolation, which
is above conscious thought in silence and peace. Nor can we
then see God: for if we could, God would be outside of our-
selves, whereas God rises into us fram within ("). Thus God
is the Light which is seen, but which is lost in the very vision of
it: for “Ta duo hen gignetai,” both become one ("). Eternal
felicity comes from eternal proximity to God (5), the eternally
beautiful, so that the soul loves God and is ever forced to begin
again to love him (*).

“Since God admits no Diversity into himself, he is always pre-
sent; and we become present to him whenever we put away Di-
versity from us. He does not seek us, as though he were forced
to live for us; but we seek him and live for him. Althoughindeed
we are ever revolving around him, we do not see him contin-
ually : but as a choir of singers which turns around the supreme
Master may for a short while be distracted from contemplation
of the Master, and blunder in the harmony, yet when they turn
to him then everything is perfect once again, thus do we always
revolve around God, even when we forget about it. But when
we look towards him again, then is our utmost wish crowned,
and we sing to him a Divine song, ever revolving around him.
(“).” “ Every soul in its natural state loves God, desiring to be
united to him, affecting the honest love of a pure virginity (").”
“Such is the life of Gods, of divine and blessed men, turning
away from the desolate life here below, flying alone to meet
God alone, face to face ().”

6. Happiness. —Such are the delights of ecstasy. These are
however not given to all. Happiness is the most that many are
able to reach ; and intelligible happiness all can have, although
they cannot all be free from pain ("). As the intelligible world
is outside of time, so there can be no addition of pleasure by re-
petition of ecstasy (Ὁ ; the only possible increase is a sound-
ing of deeper depths within (). The famous Aristotelian quib-
ble about the happiness of life being only known when life is
over and at an end is nothing but a very transparent sophism (”)
since happiness, after all, does not depend on deeds (”).

The wise man will have both joy and sorrow (”), for nothing
can be added to him or taken from him. If they are equally
wise, the rich and the poor man will be equally happy ; for if
external goods cannot add anything to intelligible things, how
can they add aught to intelligible happiness (‘). Happiness is
of the soul so that even the change of death has no power to dis-
turb it (7). Death is after all nothing more terrible than a
change of dress. on the stage (7). It is only terrible to children,
not to men (Ὁ). The soul should use the body as a tool, and not
be more affected by its injuries than a workman is affected by
the injury to his tool (Ὁ. Even in the bull οἱ Phalaris the wise

Ethics. 53

man is happy (™). Plotinos is not always so Stoical ; he has
usually more common sense, as when he says the end of virtue
is to separate soul from body ; but that until that time its pains
and sorrows must be borne as well as possible (Ὁ). Misfortune
is nothing to the good, and to the evil it is a means of educa-
tion. While we have bodies, they are certain to be sick at one
time or another and we must bear the inextirpabl. evil as well
as possible. After all, the purpose of life is to give souls an op-
portinity to become happy, and it is our own fault end weakness
if we are not. “ What is the wonder if souls do not enjoy a
divine life if they do not seek to become godlike (°)?” The
wise man enjoys the highest happiness of the world, the unsel-
fish intuitions ("). For the fleshly, this happiness therefore can-
not exist (5), and though the wise man may not enjoy all the
different pleasures of life, he sounds its deepest depths (*).
Circumstances can only affect the external consciousness of the
happy man ; so that when the soul awakens into itself it forgets
its earthly nightmare of misery, and its real waking hours are
continually with God (*).

CHAPTER XVI.
AESTHETICS.

1. God, the Over-Beautiful.—Plotinos is so passionately fond of
Beauty, that a review of his philosophy could not be complete,
if it did not set forth his opinion on the subject.

As God is Over-Good, so is he Over-Beautiful. The Cosmic
Nous is beautiful, because it is the image of God (ὖ) ; the World
is beautiful, because it is the image of the Nous (7. There are
therefore three most beautiful things: the Cosmic Nous, the
World-Soul, and the World-Body. Men who are slaves to
. Venus do not understand that what seems beautiful to them is
only beautiful because it is in some faint way the image of one
of these three things (*). When we behold beautiful things, we
become beautiful ; when we ignore them, we are ugly (Ὁ. Any-
thing is beautiful, therefore, only inasmuch as it is an image,
however faint, of one of these three things (°). Beauty therefore
lies in form (°). In as far then as any begotten image of the
Cosmic Nous resembles its Idea in the Nous (its Unity) is it
beautiful (7). Thus again, Unity is beautiful, the Manifold is
ugliness. The Divine Nous is the “ Protos kalon, mega kallos,
noéton kalon” ; and beauty is in Soul as begotten of the Nous
(*). Beauty is form vanquishing matter, the Divine Idea ex-
pressing itself through matter ; therefore matter is the last beau-
tiful (Ὁ the beauty of matter being more fully revealed in the
Realm of nature (Ὁ).

2. Human Beauty.—The soul, being itself an image of the
Nous, possesses in itself an innate formula or reason (since the
inner self is The God, the Over-Good), by which she recognizes
instinctively the beautiful. This formula is a Divine Idea (7).
Beauty is both sensual and incorporeal (7). Sensual beauty is
especially that of the eye or ear. Incorporeal beauty is the beauty
of virtue, or the beauty of the soul, which is the Divine Light
itself. :

AAs nobody can speak of physical beauty until he have seen
it himself, so nobody should dare to judge of incorporeal beauty
until he have perceived it himself by the faculties of his own
mind. Corporeal beauty is outside of the man; incorporeal
within ; consequently, a man cannot judge of incorporeal beauty
until he have returned to himself, or rather become perfect.

As our physical sight or hearing must be perfect before we can
judge of the beauty of a statue or of a song, just so must we be
normally beautiful ourselves before we dare give a judgement on

Aesthetics. 55

incorporeal beauty. We must return to ourselves, and if we find
we are not beautiful, we must polish and cut until the inner
statue be perfect.

The good and beautiful is that after which every soul strives :
“ Hou oregetai pasa psuché,” (*). ‘‘ Those who penetrate into
the holy of holies must first be purified by taking off their gar-
ments, and enter naked into that which they seek ; and there
they exist, and live, and understand—Whoever therefore sees
this, with what a love does he burn, with what a desire does he
yearn to be at one with the beloved ;” for the beauty of the
vision of God is the end of all souls, whose sorrows and trials
keep them from forgetting the desire for eternal bliss. “There”
(Ὁ “is the fatherland whence we came; and there is our
Father.” To fly to God we need no fleet or ships ; ‘‘ we must
throw away all things, neither strive to see any more ; but hav-
ing closed the eye of the body, we must assume and resurrect
another vision, which all indeed possess but which very few in-
deed develop.”

}

CHAPTER XVII.
PLOTINOS AND PAGANISM.

1. Pagan Deities.—It has been supposed that in framing his
system of philosophy, Plotinos was seeking to rehabilitate Pa-
ganism as a religion, by furnishing it with a dogmatical basis
such as it had not had before. Such a conception is totally mis-
taken. His references to the Gods are merely illustrative, for the
sake of cutting his explanations short; and he does not act
differently from Plato in the matter. Besides, if we glance over™
the full list of references we find many duplications of nomen-
elature, such as the Earth-Soul, which is sometimes called Zeus,
Aphrodité, Rhea, and Hermés ; we find many totally incompa-
tible conceptions, as for instance, that Uranus and Kronos are
still ruling deities, which still give Zeus all the power he wields.
and that Zeus and human souls are “ sister-souls.”” Then we
find a total lack of order in the nomenclature, many of the most
important names being left out entirely, with no possibility of
finding cosmic realities to which to apply them.

2. Monotheism.—lf the pagan namesof Deities used by Plotinos
indicated a dogmatical system, then the Pagan religions would
have to be changed ; for the system of Plotinos is a rigid mono-
theism ; and his whole conception of the One only source of
life and light seems incompatible with the Pagan Olympic Re-
public.

3. Augustine’s Debt to Plotinos.—Proof of this may be found in
the fact that Augustine of Hippo took the whole conception of
monotheism in its cosmic relations as it stood in Plotinos’s
works into his De Civitate Dei, without any material alterations.

Besides, when Herennius divided each of the three Plotinic

orders of existence into other three, this conception was almost
literally transcribed into Christian monotheism by merely al-
tering the nomenclature, is it not certain that it could not be
the basis of Pagan dogma, unless we are willing to admit that
Pagan dogma and Christian dogma were at bottom the same ?
4. The Last Light of Greece.—Plotinos is the last great light of
the Greek world. He summed up in himself almost all that was
worth preserving in the labours of his predecessors, and proving
that it was possible, outside of Christianity, to conceive of God
as absolutely just, as absolute Love, and absolute beauty.
Augustinian Christianity could not do as much. The absolute
justice of God is supposed to have demanded the damnation of

4)

Plotinos and Paganism. 57

the whole race he had made, unbaptised infants and all else, in-
discriminately. The absolute love of God could only be vindi-
cated by a super-natural mediation to tide over the emergency of
the ruin of his creatures. And we need not scruple to say Au-
gustine had no conception of God as the absolute Beauty.

Plotinos looked forward to the salvation of all, after salutary
education ; Augustine still speaks of eternal fire and of the worm
that dieth not.

The difficulty of Plotinos to explain his conception of the way
in which God begets his creatures, affects Christianity equally ;
and Christianity has the additional difficulty of providing an ex-
planation for the other mode of origination called “ creating.”

Both Plotinos and Christianity preach lofty morality ; but the
guidance of human life of Plotinos is God himself ; whereas
Augustine hesitates to say as much, lest the glory of the Son
be surpassed.

Christianity preaches the physical resurrection ot the flesh ;
Plotinos cannot away with it ; he does not look forward with
any degree of comtort at being enclosed for all eternity in the
limitations of the old body, even when glorified. He guards the
truth implied in it by the fact that souls when reincarnating
reassume flesh, without condemning them to it for all eternity.

La t of all, Plotinos explains every little injustice in the world,
every sorrow, every tear ; for reincarnation furnishes a scheme
of absolute justice. Chri tianity closes its eyes to the injustice,
and inequality of this world in its sublime faith that somehow
God is just ; but the Christian priest is mute before the cry for
justice in this world from the sorrowful and oppressed.

Plotinos is long since dead ; his philosophy, as his own, is
long dead ; but it has never died ; for it has strutted about in
borrowed plumes since his day till now. Yet, the world cannot
look back, it has too much in the future to crown it with suc-
cess ; few will have the time or leisure to look at the page of
ancient history on which we read the name of Plotinos. Yet it
will be a satisfaction for us to know that even in those gloomy
days, God was in his world, and revealed himself as ever through
his prophets and his saints.

NOTES

NOTES.
CHAPTER IV.

Where no name is given ‘‘ Poemandres ”’ is understood.

(1) Justin Martyr, Apol. 1: 21, 22; 2:6. Tertullian. c. Val. 15. de
Anima, 2, 33. Cyprian, de Idol. Van. Huseb. Pamph. Hist. Lib. 5: 8.
Clem. Al., Strom., 1: 21; 6: 4. Firm Lact. Div. Inst. 1: 6, 11; 2: 9. Hpit.
c. 4. Div. Inst. 2: 11, 13, 15, 16; 4: 8, 9, 6. δ: 65. 6: 25. 7: 4, 9, 13, 18.
Arnobius Adv. Gent. 2: 18. Aug. de Civ. Dei, 8: 23, 26. Cyril Al. ec.
Jul. 1: 30a, 31b, 33c; 2: 52a, 56b, 57b, 686, 64c; 8: 274c; 5:176b. Quoted.
(2) Lact. Div. Inst. 4: 9. (3) Cyril Al. c. Jul. 3865. (4) 13: 21. (5) 18: 4.
(6) 1: 12. (7) 13: 2. (8) 5: 4. (9) 9: 6. (10) 1: 9. (11) 1: 4. (12) 1: 5. (13)
1:.9; ὅς; 7. G4). 12: 19. (15) 1: 12: 81; 4: 11. δ: 8; 8: 85: Ὁ: δ᾽ 12:16
(16) 1: 26. (17) 1: 26. (18) 1: 9-11; 5: 3; 11-7. (19) 12: 22. (20) 15: 15. (21)
10: 18. (22) 10: 18; 12: 16. (28) 1: 8; 5: 11; 8: 2, 5; ὃ: 8; 10: 12, 14; 11:
4. (24) Of Hermés of Thal. to Tat. Ex Stobaeus Phys. 699 Meinecke,
1; 190. Patritius, p. 4. (25) 10: 1-3. (26) 1: 10; 2: 16; 7: 5; 14: 9. (27) 12:
8. (28) 1: 10.. (20) 12: 1. (80) 2: 8. (81) 11: 17. (82) 1: 8, 9, 13, 14; 8: 2.
(33) 2: 1-4; 8: 5. (84) 2: 17; 4: 8. (85) 10: 19, 20. (86) 9: 6; 10: 23. (37)
4: 3, 6. (38) 10: 23. (39) 4: 6. (40) 4: 11. (41) 10: 20. (42) 11: 21. (48) 11:
22. (44) 1: 31. (45) 18: 2. (46) 18: 7. (47) 18: 12. (48) 10: 19. (49) 12: 23
(50) 10: 6. (51) 18: 14. (52) 10: 19. (53) 12: 1. (54) 1: 26; 10: 6. (55) 4: 8.

CHAPIER-YV,
Where no name is given “ Ennead” is understood.

(1) Vita. Plotini. Porphyry, c. 3. (2) Eusebius, H. HB. 6: 19, 7. (3) Bigg.
Christian Platonists of Alex. p. 46. Note 2. (4) 3: 9: 2. (5) 1: 1: 12; 1:
4:‘1 ‘Beg: 1: St. 1 Beg. 8: 91:1 Beg. 6: 6: 17, p.-690'D. () 3S: 4: 2. (7)
4: 4: 22. (8) 3: 7, proem 325, C. (9) 5: 1: 8. (10) 3: 7, proem 325, C. (11)
2: 4: 7. (12) 4: 3: 1. ‘‘Let us be persuaded by the commandment of
the God to know ourselves’”’ ‘‘Peithoumetha de an t6 tou Theou parkel-
eusmati hautous gigndéskein.”’

CHAPTER VI.

(1) Bun. 4: 3: 1. (2) 1: 1: 12. (3) 3: 8: 4, 5 seqq. (4) 6: 9: 11; 4: 7: 12;
1: 1: 8. See-in general 1: 4: 9, 16; 4: 7: 12, 1:. 7: 2. (5) 4: 7: 12; 1: 1:
ΘΒ 2 ΣΡ 4: 7: 12s δὲ 8: 8. (7) 1:6: δ; 8: δὲ 4; 6: 7) 4: (8) 1: 4:
9. (9) 1: 4: 9, 6: 4: 15. (10) 1: 4: 9, 10; 6: 4: 15. (11) 6: 4: 15. (12) 2:
ΕΣ 1: δὲ See:1: 4: 0; 2: 1: 5; 2: 8: 12, 18; 2: 9: 17: (13) 6: 7: 6
(14) 4: 4: 4. See 6: 7: 15; 5: 2: 1; 5: 8: 8; 6: 5: 12; 6: 7: 6; 3: δὲ 4; 1:
4: 9, 10. (15) 1: 1: 12; 4: 8: 28: 6: 4: 16. (16) 6: 7: 6. (17) 6: 7: 14; 3: 2:
7; 4: 4: 36. (18) 6: 7: 80. (19) 3: 8: 5, 6. (20) 3: 8. Int. (21) 2: 1: 5, 3: 4:
3. (22) 4: 3: 20-24; 4: 7: 1; 6: 4: 16. (23) 6: 7: 5; 3: 4: 8; 4: 3: 12; 4: 7:
13; 4: 8: 8. (24) 4: 7: 12. (25) 1: 1: 9; 4: 8: 4; 6: 8: 1; 6: 4: 14. (26) 1:

62 The Philosophy of Plotinos.

Ὁ 2: 10 bs. 1:. 10: (ai) 1: τ 10. hs 4.16.1: 7 ee Os 7:8; 138)». 1: ἃ:
: 8:5; 5: 7: 5; 6: 4: 15. (29) 1: 1: 3, 4. (80) 6: 9: 8. (31) 6: 5: 11. (32)

100;
CHAPTER VII.

{ 9: 87,83 02-134" δ: 325102 526: Se 8. 7: 302-62 9:6, 7-42). δ: δὲ
10:13: 8: 7: 37: (3) δ: S12; δ: 6:-33'6:-6: 18... (4). 6: 9:1.) 8: 8: 10; 5:
Bi 17. AG) 6: 5.17. (ἢ δ: 4: SO ΡΠ Gs 7217 3 Ss OS: 6. (9) 3: 82:9;
{10).0:. 5: 1. {||}: 7s 1 2s Ss) 2: 6. Ss. 16 nd. (12) 4308: 8: 6e Ts ΤῊ
OF: Go {135} 0: ast, oe, oor 6s 8: 11» 62-0: 8 14. 12-6; 86;.9: δ: Ss 8
(15). ὃ: δ: 12. (16) 6:82 12°°6: 9: 6: 1. 7,4: 4:.9.:10: (18) deeds Ts ΘΕ ΣΤ;
Gi: 19: 19} δ: 5: 15. (20) 32.8: 10:53: 9. Ss Ὁ: 3:11 19. 5:6: 2: Ci)
υ 4240 δ. 9.15. 022) 5:9: 15;.14:.8: 62-6; 10: θ: ἧς: 8.» θ:.: 91. 8. (285). 8:
2 BER 6:2: 19: 17:0: 38. beg. (94. δ: δ: 6; δ: 2:9: 6: Θὲ δι (25)

8: 5: 8: 6: 5: 9: Θ᾽ ΟΣ 6. (26) 3::8: ie 4:8: Θὲ. 52-32-16: 6: :4:-1;
: 5. (27) 6: 8: 12, 16, 20; 5: 4: 2. (28) 6: 8: 8. (29) 6: 9: 3 Hnd. (80)
τ 92: O24 S402 2. betas 59) Os Bee. ες 3: 7 Beg: 5: 3: 12 Beg;

Ge Cr Os 7: = 3: Ὁ: 8:

"9.5. 1360). 5. δ.» 4, (517)
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18 End. (33) 6: 7: 8. (84) 2: 9: 8. (85)
6: 1: 22. (55).0: 7: 951. SO) GO: 1: ὅς
Zor δ: 93,02 1% 8: is ἢ: 3 Beg; 86: 9:

bo

5G. ᾿ 3: 12. (4
43) 5: fa (44) 1: 6: 8;
5 G2 5: 19: (46). 12-73-15
: 2: 8: (49) ἢ {1 10: (50); 1: ; 5: 5:
: δ: 10. (51) 6: 5: 1. (52) 3: 2: 16. (53) 3: 8: 10: 63:12: 4) 15:
eee eee a On) OL APRS OD. ΕΥ(58), δὲ 8.15: 1
. (57) 4: 4: 13. (68) 4: 4: 16. (59) 6: 5: 6. (60) 5: ;
1G:

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4:
4: 3,

16. (64) 1: 7. (65) 6: 4: 7. (66) 4: 3: 22; 5:
13, 14. (69) 6: 4: 2, 3. (70) 6: 4: 13. (71) 6:
18,

CHAPTER. VIUIt.

5:
2; (6:5; 1. (61) 4: 3; 152:.δ: δ᾽ 95655:
5: 1:
5:

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o>
00
δ...

ρῶς
ae
m8:

. 8: B, τι 7: 5, (6) B: 1: 4, (7) 2: 9: 4: Bi BZ ὃ Be 1: 4; Be τὸ
δι; -Os ans bs Os aes Oc es 0: 4: 2h. (10) 6: 2:8.) ae Ss ὧδ᾽
cis id degre ΒΤ ΟΘΟΣ ΟἹ :.(14) δ:.5: 0.06) 1: 8: 2; 8:-6:. δ᾽
: 21. (16) 6: 1-3. (17) 6: 2: 2. (18) 6: 2: 20. (19) 6: 7: 8. (20)
3: 2: 8: 3, 4; 6: 7: 15. (22) 6: 7: 8. (23) 6: 7: Ὁ: (24)
δ. 8

: ἀν 62-22-21.
CHAPTER.§X.

(1 1.8: Ga) 2: ὃ: 5; 18). 2: 9:9. )- Bs Oe 18. 4:. 8:. 10: 6:- δ᾽ 10: δὲ
7: 4, (δ) δ᾽ 2: Ts δ: 2: 1: δ: 8: 12. (6) Bs 1. ἢ, (ἢ 4: δ: 14.. (8) 4: 82 FT.
(θ).,Ἅ 4: 4 θ 8 Ss 15..8. 72,10, 12. GO) 42572-1385 ἘΠῚ) δ: θ:. 1 42 12-434:
2:1, (12) 1: 1: 18. (18) 1: 9: 1. (44) 4: 8: 18.. (15) 4: 8: 17. (16) 4: 9: 4.
(17) 4: 9: 5. (18) 4: 8: 16. (19) 4: 3: 5; 4: 8: 8; 5: 7: 1. (20) 4: 3: 5. (21)
8: 2: 18; 4: 8: 6. (22) 3: 2: 18; 4: 3: 6, 15. (23) 3: 2: 4. (24) 4: 7: 18. (25)
4: 7: 12. (26) 5: 1: 2. (27) 4: 4: 9, 10 ete. (28) 6: 5: 9. (29) 4: 9: 1; 2: 9:
7%. (80) 4: 3: 20, 21. (31) 2: 2: 2. (82) 4: 3: 2. (83) 5: 1: 3. (84) 4: 4: 1, 2,
δ. (85) 3: 4: 4; 3: 9: 2. (86) 4: 4: 24. (37) 4: 4: 6. (88) 4: 3: 25-27, 29-32.
4: 4: 6. (39) 4: 4: 10, 12. (40) 4: 4: 24. (41) 4: 8: 10; 4: 4: 10. (42) 5: 1: 7.
(48) 8: 1: 4; 4: 3: 4. (44) 4: 8: 2, 3. (45) 4: 8: 6. (46) 3: 2:17. (47) 2: 9: 7.
(48) 2: 9: 17. (49) 4: 8: 12. (60) 2: 9: 17. (51) 3: 5: 4; 4: ὃ: 4; 4: 9: 3.

12 δὲ
4: ὅ:

Notes. 63

CHAPTER X.

(1) 4: 4: 12. (2) 8: δ: 4. (8) 5: 8: 2. (4) 5: 3: 3. ©) 6: 7: 4. (6) 2: 9: 5,
15: 4. 4τ 6: (72:.-.9:. δ; 18. (8) 2: 9: δ᾽ Θὲ δ δ᾽ 42 8:1}: δ᾽ 1: 5 4S:
8: 3. (9) 5: 8: 8. (10) 4: 4: 8. (11) 2: 2: 2 End. 4: 4: 6-8, 42, 80.

CHAPTER. XI,

(1) 4:.4:.41. (2) Deck Ὁ 28 2 τ ει ole 1S a 1p 9: Δ ΟΣ 7 Aeros δ... Ὁ
4: δ, 6,12, 16; 16: (85). 1:1: 1; ©. 8: δ: 15;

CHAPTER ΧΙ

(1) δ:. 1... 1) 8: δ: 2, 8: δ᾽ 8: 13; 6: 8: Ὁ: (59) 328: 4: (4). Se 1.0: 2:
8:.9, 11],.18: 8:. δὲ 2:8. 6; 4:9: 4: 8: 2: (5) ἃ: 5: 17; 85: 8: 5; 4: ae 15: 10)
3;-8:-2, 8. .4:-.4:.185: (7) 8:-.8:.8: (8), 2: 92-23 9: δ 8 δι 5: 4.9 10: 4:
43-10; Θ: 7:1,.5. (ΒΘ 2:1: 1-433: 22 13 Ἀν 8: Ὁ; G0) 4:.5:.12:. δὲ ΠῚ. (ἹἹὺ
2: 9: 17: δι 1-35-69: 8; Bee: 6: 4: 25°62 3 15. U2) oF 221 ae
(13) 4: 4: 45. (14) 3: 2: 16. (15) 2: 9. (16) 2: 9: 4, 8, 18, Beg 17. (17) 2:
9: δ᾽ °6,. 18.08) 2: Ss 758: 3 ὦν Soa: 4: 22, 23, 26, 30. (19) 2: 3:

4:

1-6, 8. 18, 16, 26; 3: 1: 6; 4: 4: 31, 34. See 2: 3: 12, 15. (20) 3: 1: 6. (21)
2: 3: 14; 8: 1: 16. (22) 4: 4: 35. (23) 2: 3: 9: 11. (24) 4: 4: 33, 35, 39; 2:
3: 7; 3: 1: 6; 4: 8: 12. (25) 4:4: 34, 39. (26) 2: 3: 7; 3: 1: 6. (27) 4: 8: 12.
(28) 3: 3: 6. (29) 4: 7: 15. (30 4: 4: 6, 39. (81) 3: 1. (82) 3: 2: 1. (33) 2:
3: 9; 3: 1: 9. (84) 6: 8: 2. (35) 6: 8: 2. (36) 6: 8: 3. (37) 6: 8: 3. (38) 6:
8: 4. (39) 6: 8: 5. (40) 6: 8: 12. (41) 3: 5: 6. (42) 5: 8: 10 Beg. (43) 8: 5: 6.
(44) 4: 4: 43. (45) 4: 3: 18.

CHAPTER? XIII.

(1) 6: 9: 8. (2) 1: 8: 5. (3) 1: 8: 11. 2: 4: 15. 14, 16. (4) 1: 8: 11. Τὺ 1:
B: ΤΟ; (6) 1: 8: 10s 6. 7: 8.1: 8: 95: 10:Ὄ|,[5: 2: 4: 16: 101: 5: Ὁ [5}1-:
δ... 8: ©) 13.8: 4,.8; 10) 1: ΤΌ; 15: G1) 2: 99 || 719). 9: 9 Ὁ 2) Ὁ:
a. δ:.(1ὁ6ὁἡ 8: 2: 11. (15) 8: 2:.14.. 10) 1:-8: 1: 2: 8: 18: 3: 2: δ᾽. 4: 5: Ὁ.
(UT) 22:8: 4. (18). 2: 1: 8. (19) 2: 4:-8; (20) 2: 45-7, 11; 8: 6: 16:18. (21)
2: 4:8) 3: 6: 7.: (22) 2: 5: 5. (28) 8: 8: 10.

CHAPTER XIV.

(1) 4:7: 24. (2) 4: 8: 7. (8) 4: 8: 7. (4) 42-32 0: (δ) 43 T2138; (6}.2: 1: 2.
(7) 3: 2: 4, 18. (8) 2: 8: 15. (9) 4: 3: 24. (10) 2: 8: 16. (11) Phaedo 82
A. Tim. 91. de Rep. 10: 6: 20. (12) 3: 4: 2. (13) 6: 7: 4. (14) 6: 7: 7. (15)
8: 2: 13. (16) 8: 4: 6, 4: 8: δ. (1% 38: 6: 6. (18) 4: 3: 18, 15. (19) 3: 4: 2.
(20) I: 8: 13 (51) 8: 4: 2. (22) 4: 8: 5, 7. (23) 4: 4: 5. (24) 4: 317; 4: 7:
19. 4:8: 4, (25) Bi 2: 12; 4: 8: 5; δ: 1: 1. (26) 4: 8: 18. (27% 4: 8: ὅ, 6.
(28) 1: 1: 10, 12; 1: 10: 6. (20) 4: 7: 14; 4: 18: 5. (80) 4: 3: 25, 27, 2; 4:
#: 3-5, Gk) 1 θὲ. 23:2: 8:10: 3: 9: 17.

CHAPTER XV.

(1) 6: 7: a (2).8: 62:5; 1: 2: δὲ (8) 1: 2: 8; 1: 6: 6. (4) 1: 2: 3. (δ) 1:
2: 1. (6) 1: 2: 4. ae Shae (ep 1: δὲ ὅς, (9) 1-2: δ: 1: 6: ὅν (10): 1: @:
§. (42) 1: 7: e (12) 2: 9: 15. (13) 2: 9: 16. (14) 1: 6: 6. (15) 1: 2: 6, 7
See 1: 6: 6 ete. (16) 1: 1: 9. (17) 1: 1: 12. (18) 1: 8: 18; 2: 8: 17. (19) 1:
8: 14. (20) 1: 8: 15. (21) 4:4: 19. (22) 5: 1: 1. (23) 8: 5: 1, 5: 1: 1. (24)

g

The Philosophy of Plotinos.

μι
bo

: 7; 1: 6: 5. (25) 2: 3: 9, 15. (26) 3: 1: 8. (27) 3: 9: ὦ (28) 5: 8: 11.
: 86. (80) 6: 7: 36; 6: 9: 4. tg 8 Title. (82) 1: 4:3. (83) 5:9:
«Bs 1...(85) 1: 8: 9: C6): 1: ον ik iia Piel ie
a 88. (40) 2: 9: 14. (41) 1: 4: 3, 4. (42) 1: 2: page 11. (43)

ee ee een 11: 8:
10: 5: 8: 3. (44) 4: 8: 1. (45) 6: 9: 11. apa 8: 46° 8:
ii tog oy δον Pace na aan : 7: 84. (60)
᾿ δ: 8: 14. (62) 5: 8: 11, See 6: . (568), 5:8: 1;
10; 11: 6: 7: sor 62-92-10; 11. Serra nets δὲ δὲ 7; S:-@:

7: 34. (56) 5: 5: 8. (57) 6: 9:3. (58) 6: 9: 9, 10. (59) 6: 9: 11. (60)
: 6: 9. (61) 6: 7: 35. (62) 6: 7: 32. (63) 6: 7: 81. See 1: 4: 6. (64) δ: ὃ:
. (65) 6: 9: 9. (66) 6: 9: 11. (67) 1: 4: 6. (68) 1: 5: Quest 2. (69) 1:
: Quest 3. (70) 1: 5: Quest 5. (71) 1: 5: Quest 10.(72) 1: 4: 16. (73) 1:
: 15: (714) 1:45 14: (15) 3:2: 1ῦ; (76). 22-428: 17. 1:1. 8. 0713) 1: 4s
15. (79) 1. 2: δὲ 180) Sz Ως» 5. (81) 1: 4:.-19. (GB) 1: 511. (88) 1: 4::--10;
(84) 4: 8: 1.

cer

ΚΞ}
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ee τῶν ee ΤῊΣ τ σαν πο ee
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΄σ΄΄.
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~-—

CHAPTER X Vi.

(1 0:9) δ: Ss 3,8; 13; δ: 2: 21. (2) ὅ: δ: 15. (8) 6:8: 8, (Ὁ δ: 8:
40 (6) δ: 8:.8: (6) 1: 6: 8: δ:.8: 2: (..1: 6: 8. δὲ 8.15... (8) 16s 4s
Or Gia. 109}.1: 6.2; 6: 110}. δ: Sz 2. .(11).1:-6:-.5:(12}: 9:2. (18) 4: 6:
q.. (4d) Ts 0: 8.

Note from Zeller, with additions.

The Father of all Gods Uranus is God; Krénos, who devours his
children is the Nous who retains within itself all its active ideas.
Zeus, when escaping from him, is the begetting of the Soul beyond
the Nous. 5: 8: 12; 5:1: 4, 7. The tale of Lynkeus describes the trans-
parence of the intelligible world, 5: 8: 4. The World-Soul is called
Zeus, 5: 5: 3; 6: 4: 6; 2: 3: 31; 5: 8:10. It is also called Aphrodité, and
the double soul is explained as the double Aphrodité, 3: 5: 2, 8; 6: 8:
6; 5: 8: 18. Again, Héré, Démeter and Hestia are explained by the
World-Soul, as well as Zeus, 4: 4: 27. Apollo is Unity as denying
Manifoldness, 5: 5: 6. Hermés is the Logos, 3: 6: 19, which can rise or
sink. The sinking of the soul into the entangling flesh is shown by
Narcissus, and its flight, by the myth of Ulysses fleeing Circe and
Calypso, 1: 6: 8. The story of Prométheus and Pandora explains the
world adorned with gifts, 4: 3: 4. As image of the intelligible world
the physical world is called the mirror of Dionysios, 4: 3: 12. Minos
becoming guest of Zeus is the soul beholding Unity,6: 9: 7.—The Lower
Earth-Soul is also called Rhea, 5: 1: 7.

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Selections frott

IPlotinos’s Enneads

in Greek Text and English Cranslation

With an Introduction on Plotinos’s Life, Times, and Philosophy

by
Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, A.M., Harvard. Ph.D. Tulane.

Che MHionsalvat Press:

Philadelphia: 1501 North Marshall Street.
London: LUZAZ & Lo., 46 Gt. Russell $t. W.

Copyright, 1910, by Renneth Sylvan Guthrie. Entered at $tatioucrs’ Hall.

Chronological Order of Plotinos’s Works—1I

WORKS of PLOTINOS Arranged CHRONOLOGICALLY.

I. Before the arrival of Porphyry; Plotinos 59 years old.

1, On Beauty.

2, Immortality of the Soul.

3; Fate.

4, Nature of the Soul.

5, Spirit, Jdeas, and Being.

6, Descent of the Soul into the Body.

7, How That-which-is-after-the-First arises after the First; and
about the One.

8, Whether all souls are one.

9, About the Good, or the One.

10, On the three original Substances.

11. About the Origin and Order of That-which-is-after-the-First

12, About the two kinds of Matter.

13, Various Meditations,

14, About Circular Motion.

15, About the Daimon who has chosen us.

16, About rational Exit from this life (Suicide).

17, About Quality.

18, Whether /deas exist for Single-things

19, About Virtues.

20, About Dialectics.

21, How it may be said that the Soul is midway between Divis-
ibility and Indivisibility. |

24 Works Written During Porphyry’s 6-year Stay.

1, Is the Soul everywhere P

2, One and the Same are everywhere.

3, The Ultra-existent is beyond Thought; and What are the
First-Thinker and the Second-Thinker.

4, About Probability and Reality.

5, About:the Unimpressionability of the Incorporeal.

Chronological Order of Plotinos’s Works—2

6, About the Soul, I.

7, About the Soul, II.

8, About the Soul,III , or About the Method of Human Vision.

9, About Contemplation.

10, About Intelligible Beauty.

11, That the Intelligible is not outside of Intelligence; about
Intelligence, and the Good.

12, Against the Gnostics.

13, About Numbers.

14, How Distant Objects appear small.

15, Whether Happiness consists of Permanency.

16, About the Commingling pervading All.

17, How the Galaxy of Jdeas subsists; and About the Good.

18, Concerning Free Will.

19, About the World.

20, About Sensation and Memory.

21, About the Kinds of Beings, I.

22, About the Kinds of Beings, II.

23, About the Kinds of Beings, III.

24, About Eternity and Time.

5 Books Written During Porphyry’s Sojourn in Sicily,

1, About Blessedness (Happiness).

2, About Providence, I.

3, About Providence, II.

4, About Cognizable Substances, and their Envelopes.
5, About Eros.

Books Sent to Porphyry by Plotinus Just Before his Death.

1, What Evil is.

2, Whether the Stars Exert any Influence.

3, The Nature of Man and Living Beings.

4, About the First Good, or About Happiness.

Porphyry’s Topical Arrangement of Plotinos’s Works—1

PORPHYRY’S TOPICAL ARRANGEMENT of the WORKS

VOLUME FirST—Universal or General.
FIRST NINE-GROUP (Ennead)—Psychological Ethics.

1, About the Conception of the Living Being, and of Man.
2, About the Virtues.

3, About Dialectics.

4, About Happiness.

5, Whether Happiness consists in Permanency ?

6, Concerning Beauty.

7, About the First-Good and the other Goods.

8, About the Origin of Evil.

9. About the Rational Exit from Life, or Suicide.

SECOND NINE-GROUP (Ennead).—Physical and Cosmical.
1, About the World,
2, About Circular Motion.
3, About the Effectiveness and Influence of the Stars.
4, About the two Kinds of Matter.
5, About Energy and Force.
6, About Quality and Form.
7, About the Commingling Penetrating All.
8, Why Distant Objects appear smaller.
9, Against those (Gnostics) who assume an_evil_world-Creator,
and who consider the World evil.

THIRD NINE-GROUP (Ennead).—Cosmical and General.
1, About Fate.
2, About Providence, I.
3, About Providence, II.
4, About the Daimon who has Saved us.
5, About Eros.
6, About the Unimpressionability of the Incorporeal.
7, About Eternity and Time.
8, About Nature, Contemplation, and the One.
9, Various Meditations.

Porphyry’s Topical Arrangement of Plotinos’s Works.—2

VOLUME SECOND,—T7he Soul and the Intelligence.

FOURTH NINE-GROUP (Ennead).—The Soul.
1, Concerning the Nature of the Soul, I.
2, Concerning the Nature of the Soul, II.
3, Psychological Problems, I.
4, Psychological Problems, II.
5, Psychological Problems, III, or About Vision.
6, About Sensation and Memory.
7, About the Immortality of the Soul.
8, About the Descent of the Soul into the Body.
9, Whether all Souls are One.

FIFTH NINE-GROUP (Ennead),— J/ntelligence, Divine Ideas.

1, The three original (Hypostases) Substances.

2, Origin and Order of That-which-is-after-the-First.

3, Of Intelligible Existences, and of the Transcendent.

4, How That-which-is-after-the-First arises from the First, and
About the One.

5, That the Intelligible is not beyond Intelligence; of the Good.

6, The Ultra-Existent is beyond Thought; and Who are the
First-Thinker and Second-Thinker.

7, Whether Jdeas exist for Single-things.

8, About Intelligible Beauty.

9, About Intelligence, the /deas, and the Existent.

VOLUME THIRD,— The Transcendent.

SIXTH NINE-GROUP (Ennead),— The Existent, Good, One.

1, About the Kinds of Existence, I.

2, About the Kinds of Existence, II.

3, About the Kinds of Existence, III.

4, That the Existent is One, and simultaneously everywhere
Whole, 1.

5, The Same, 1].

6, About Numbers.

7, How subsists the Manifoldness of Ideas, and About the Good

8, About Free Will, and the Will of the One.

9, About the Good, or About the One,

Plotini Enneades IV, 8.1, VI. 9.8 b, IV. 8. 4¢.

IV. δ. 1.

, > , > 3 Ν 9 ~ 4 ‘\
Πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἐμαυτὸν EK τοῦ σώματος, καὶ
, A \ TAX ἐξ 3 A δὲ » θ Ν
γιγνόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω, ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ εἴσω, θαυμαστὸν
A AY A i“
ἡλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, καὶ τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας πιστεύσας
5S fa 9 ,ὔ Ἁ “A
τότε μάλιστα εἶναι, ζωήν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας, Kal τῷ
’ Ν ~ \ 9
θείῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἱδρυθεὶς εἰς ἐνέρ-
Ν ε \ A \ »
γειαν ἐλθὼν ἐκείνην, ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν ἐμαυτὸν
ἱδρύσας,
\ , \ 3 ge θ ’ did > \ 3 A
Mera ταύτην τὴν ἐν τῷ θείῳ στάσιν εἰς λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ
A A \ A Ν
καταβὰς, ἀπορῶ, πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ὅπως
Ν / fa) A
ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἡ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτο οὖσα
we , > x ’ >
οἷον ἐφάνη καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν, καίπερ οὖσα ἐν σώματι,

VI. 9. 3 b.

᾿Αλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ Kal περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις, Kal
ini OTL EV AUTH ρ nv ἡ ἀρχαία ς, κα
Ψ 9 τς , \ »¥ A . 9 A Ψ

ὅτι ἀπὸ τοιούτου, καὶ ETL μᾶλλον, καὶ ὅτι χωρισθεῖσαι ὅλαι,
Νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ μέρος ἡμῶν κατέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον
» AY , » 3 ν “A > ¥ , ε ,

εἴ τις τοὺς πόδας ἔχει ἐν ὕδατι, τῷ δ᾽ ἄλλῳ σώματι ὑπερέχοι,

ΙΝ. δ. ἃ ς.

» 4 Sk sQA @ ε , , >
ἔχει γάρ (τι) det οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπερέχον τι, Γίγνονται οὖν
- 9 ,ὕ 9 9. “3 , > A , , 9 aA
οἷον ἀμφίβιοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τόν τε ἐκεῖ βίον τόν τε ἐνταῦθα
Ν , “A A Ν Ν 3 a ἃ 4 ,
Tapa μέρος βιοῦσαι, πλεῖον μὲν τὸν ἐκεῖ, at δύνανται πλέον
A an A Ν Y 9 (ὃ A Ὁ δ , x 4
τῷ νῷ συνεῖναι, Tov δὲ ἐνθάδε πλεῖον, αἷς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φύ-
σει ἣ τύχαις ὑπῆρξεν, ὲ

Plotines’s Transcendence of the Soul. Ennead IV.8.1

2 The Transcendence of the Soul. &

I, Plotinos’s Own FREQUENTLY having been aroused out of

Experiences. the body unto myself, and having reached
the sphere exterior to other affairs but within myself, ον
I used to behold a marvellous beauty. & It is at such times
that most do I believe that I belong to a better destiny,
that I am living the best possible life, and that I experi-
ence at-one-ment with the Divinity; by which achieve-
ment I progress along unto a strenuous translation of my-
self above all intellectual spheres. ων ων ὧν

3. Reflections WHEN, at such times, after this sojourn

Experiences. jy the divine spheres, I descend from the
intellectual to the material realm, then am I wont to ques-
tion with myself how my descent occurred, οὐ and how
my soul ever insinuated itself into the body, in view of the
fact that the soul, even while she dwells in the body re-
mains the divine being as which she appeared while yet
separate from the body. ὧν ων ων ων

VI.9.$b. & THE soul originates from such a First-prin-
ciple, and is separated from the body as a whole, though
a part of it is held by the body—just as a man’s feet may
stand in water, while his body towers above it. ὧν

IV. 8.1 ζ. “Ὁ NEVERTHELESS, in spite of all that, the
soul ever preserves the transcendence of some part of her.
The souls are thus compelled to become amphibians, so to
speak; living the life beyond alternately with this life.
Some indeed live the higher life most, because, for them,
it happens to be easiest to commune with the cosmic In-
telligence; others, again, lead this life preponderatingly,
driven by their own nature, or by Chance or Fate. ων

Plotini Enneades ΓΝ 8.8

IV. 8. 8.

Kal εἰ χρὴ παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τολμῆσαι τὸ φαινόμ-
r f, , > A sO e e , Ν ἐδ
evov λέγειν σαφέστερον, οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἐδυ,
9 > »¥ 3 “A 3 ~ gn gt ee’ of Ν \ 3 ἊΜ“ 3 “A
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν TO νοητῷ ἀεί + τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ,
ἃ > ἴω ΔᾺλ δὲ > A ῆς θ aA 3 9“
ὃ, εἰ κρατοῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ κρατοῖτο καὶ θορυβοῖτο, οὐκ ἐᾳ
» ε κα > @ A τὰ A A ΕΝ ,
αἴσθησιν ἡμῖν εἶναι ὧν θεᾶται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω, Τότε
γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς τὸ νοηθὲν, ὅταν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἤκῃ κα-
ταβαῖνον. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ γίγνεται περὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ψυ-
A 9 Y
χῆς, γιγνώσκομεν, πρὶν ἂν εἰς ὅλην THY ψυχὴν ἥκῃ, οἷον
Ἂ 2 3 ἴω lal Q *
καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ μὲν οὖσα, γιγνώσκεται
ς« κ« 9 λ᾿ Y A 9 θ a Ἣν» ὃ ὃ ’, x ἃ
ἡμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ τῇ ἔνδον δυνάμει ἢ καὶ δια-
νοητικῇ ἀντιλαβαβώμεθα, ἢ ἄμφω,

lla Ν Ν » ἈΝ la) 4, Ἂς »“2ΣἍἢ A n~
doa yap ψυχὴ ἔχει τι Kal TOU κάτω πρὸς σῶμα, Kal TOD
ἄνω πρὸς νοῦν,

Κ XN ¢ \ AX. AY 5 ~ | es , ~ Ἂς Ν σῶ
at ἡ μὲν ὅλη καὶ ὅλου τῷ αὑτῆς μέρει τῷ πρὸς TO σῶμα
Ἂς: ¢ ‘a ε , > 4 4 + 9 lal
τὸ ὅλον κοσμεῖ, ὑπερέχουσα ἀπόνως, ὅτι μηδ᾽ ἐκ λογισμοῦ,

ε ε “A > ‘\ Ως ε ε 4 > 4, 4 " Ν /

ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ νῷ, ὡς ἡ τέχνη οὐ βούλε(ύε)ται, TO κάτω
A κι nA

αὐτῆς κοσμοῦντος τοῦ Odov °

ε 8. Ὁ 4 / ᾿ 4 » Ν ‘ 3
Αἱ δ᾽ ἐν μέρει γιγνόμεναι καὶ μέρους ἔχουσι μὲν καὶ αὖ-
Ν ὡς αν, 4 ’ » δὲ A 3 θ 4 ip RA 2 X Vd λ
ταὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον, ἄσχολοι δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀντιλήψει πολ-
A > 4 “A Ν 4 \ 4 Ἀ
λῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ λυπούντων Kal
ταραττόντων * ἅτε οὗ ἐπιμελοῦνται μέρους καὶ ἐλλειποῦς καὶ
πολλὰ ἔχοντος τὰ ἀλλότρια κύκλῳ, πολλὰ δὲ ὧν ἐφίεται,
ἊΨ \ a, 4 \ > / Ν ὃ Ψ 9 X\=-3 /
καὶ ἤδεται δὲ, καὶ ἡδονὴ ἠπάτησε - τὸ δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀνήδονον
A \ , “ἃ ,ὕ ε δὲ ὃ ᾿ oe ,
(dv) τὰς προσκαίρους ἡδονάς - ἡ δὲ διαγωγὴ ὁμοία,

Plotinos’s Transcendence of the Soul,—2 Ennead IV.8.s

ΠΥ Wo are mot FURTHER, if against the opinions of others
Transcendence [may dare clearly to set forth my views,
I should say that not the whole of our soul sinks into the
body, but some part of her ever remains in the intelligi-
ble sphere: though this may be hidden from us by the fact
that that part of the soul which remains in the sense- sphere,
if overwhelmed or confused, will not permit us to reach
the perception of what the higher portion of the soul is
beholding. 2 Only when these perceptions of the higher
soul are permitted downward access into the sense-sphere
do they really enter into us. ὧν For we do not recognize
an occurrence in any particular portion of the soul mere-
ly because of its occurrence; ὧν it becomes noticeable only
when it has pervaded the soul’s entirety. » For instance,
as long as Desire flourishes within our appetitive func-
tion, it remains unnoticed, and is not recognized until it
expresses itself through either force of sensation, or in-
telligence, or both. ὡΝ ὧν ων ων ων
2. Mechanism of SOULS incarnate or withdraw by virtue of
Incarnation. the activity of their reverse faces,—the low-
er functioning towards the body, the upper one towards

Intelligence. ὧν ων ot 5 ων ων
a.Inthe world- SO the Whole- or Universal-Soul, by its
nour downward activity incomparably and with-

out friction causes the whole World-body to bloom. & This
does not occur, as it would ineany human method-of-work-
ing, by rational-planning, but by insight of its upward act-
ivity of Intelligence. ων ων ὧν ων ων
b. In the Human LIKEWISE do individual souls, even though

Individual. they embody less divine existence, act both
transcendently and incarnately. ὧν Laboriously their cogni-
tion and perception grasps many confusing and injurious
impressions contrary to their higher nature, for the body
which they inform exists only partially, and as such is un-
satisfactory, being surrounded by many strange influences
and possessed by many needs and pleasures, which subject’
the souls to delusion. ὧν But their higher field of activity re-
mains impassive towards transitory pleasures, leading an
equable existence. ων ων ων ὧν ων

Plotini Enneades IV. 8. 5, b, d.

IV. 8. 5, ἢ.

Ὅ δὲ A , Ν A Ss 9 A LLOl N
ταν O€ ταῦτα πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον, ALOLWS

4 ’ ’ Ἂς \ A > » A

φύσεως νόμῳ (γίγνεται) - τὸ δὲ συμβαῖνον εἰς ἄλλου τοῦ
fe A 3 x xy LN SN 9. ἢ Ν » 2

χρείαν, καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ, αὐτὸν θεὸν εἴ τις λέ
» > x 3 4 » ~ 3 ᾿, »

you καταπέμψαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀσύμφωνος οὔτε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε

ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη.

IV, δ. 5, d.

Ψ = A A A Ν
Οὕτω τοι, καίπερ οὖσα θεῖον καὶ ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν ἄνω,

ἐντὸς γίγνεται τοῦ σώματος - καὶ θεὸς οὖσα ὁ ὕστερος ῥο-
πῇ αὐτεξουσίῳ καὶ αἰτίᾳ δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτὴν κοσ-
μήσει ὡδὶ ἔρχεται κἂν μὲν θᾶττον φύγῃ, οὐδὲν βέβλαπται,
γνῶσιν κακοῦ προσλαβοῦσα, καὶ φύσιν κακίας γνοῦσα,

, ὃ , » εἰ ἫΝ 3 XN Ν Ν ὃ ta
τάς TE δυνάμεις ἄγουσα αὑτῆς εἰς TO φανερὸν, Kal δείξασα

ἃ A A

ἔργα τε Kal ποιήσεις, ἃ EV TH ἀσωμάτῳ ἠρεμοῦντα μάτην TE
x ὃν 3 Xo aA 5. ἃ 9 IP ’, Ν a-- N ἔλ τ
ἂν ἦν, εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἀεὶ οὐκ ἰόντα, τήν τε ψυχὴν αὐτὴν ἐλα
θ x ἃ 5 3 3 “4 Ἰδὲ / ὃ λ ’, »

εν ἂν, ἃ εἶχεν, οὐκ ἐκφανέντα οὐδὲ πρόοδον λαβόντα, ELTEP

A ε a 57 Ν 4 4 A x

πανταχοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια τὴν δύναμιν ἔδειξε, κρυφθεῖσαν ἂν
ἁπάντῃ καὶ οἷον ἀφανισθεῖσαν, καὶ οὐκ οὖσαν, μηδέποτε ὄν-
τως οὖσαν, Νῦν μὲν γὰρ θαῦμα ἔχει τῶν ἔνδον ἕκαστος διὰ

A ’ ~ » a) 59 3 “ ‘\ Ν la)
τῆς ποικιλίας TOV ἔξω, οἷόν ἐστιν, ἐκ τοῦ τὰ γλαφυρὰ ταῦτα
δρᾶσαι,

Plotinos’s The Purpose of Life Ennead IV. 8. 5, b, d.

& The Purpose of Life, &

Misi in. BUT if to descend from the upper spheres

Human Soul. and to act out or suffer a human life-exper-
lence be acknowledged to result from an eternal law of
nature, or from the desire to be of service to some already
incarnate sufferer, one might well declare, without contra-
dicting either Truth or oneself, that—inasmuch as a chain’s
last link is united with the first, however many connect-
ing links intervene—that the human Soul was sent into
the world by God. ὡν ων ων ων ων

4. Βεπεῆεος [ΗΝ does the human Soul, though by nat-
an Incarnation. yre (divine, as native of the higher spheres,
being no more than a subordinate deity, engage in the
trammels of the body, reaching into this sphere by voluntary
condescension for the sake of both the developing of her
own powers and the maturing-and-beautifying of the spheres
beneath her. εν ων ὧν ὧν ων ων

Even if an incarnate human soul should swiftly flee from
life by an early death, she would not have suffered any harm
by her short incarnation, but rather have profited; gaining
discernment and unmasking of evil; revealing her innate
powers, manifesting both moral conduct and artistic creat-
iveness. ὧν All of these would in the unincarnated incorpore-
al aloofness of eternity have remained immature and inef-
fective. ὧν Even to the Soul herself would these her re-
sources have remained hidden, unmanifested, and inacces-
sible. ὧδ For ability remains hidden, invisible, non-exist-
ent,—nay, even unsuspected, without manifestation in con-
duct. 2 On the contrary, the Soul’s inner nature may be
generally apprehended and admired through her actions’
effectiveness, originality and charm. ων ων vw

Plotini Enneades V.8.3

V. 8. 3.

» ἣν" al
Eotw οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος κάλλους ἀρχέτυπος TOV
ἐν σώματι, τοῦ δ᾽ ἑν τῇ φύσει ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλλίων, Tap

' ματι, n ν ΤΏ ψυχῇ καλλίων, παρ

| πὰ A
οὗ καὶ ὁ ἐν TH φύσει : ἐναργέστατός ye μὴν ὁ ἐν σπουδαίᾳ
οὶ Ny eeN 4 , Ν Ν ἈΝ
ψυχῇ, καὶ ἤδη προϊὼν κάλλει - κοσμήσας γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν
\ A Ν 3 Ἂς X ’ὔ , 4 9
καὶ φῶς παρασχὼν ἀπὸ φωτὸς μείζονος πρώτως κάλλους ὁν-
, A 3 Ν 3 ENG JS -ὦὖν 3 ε
τος συλλογίζεσθαι ποιεῖ, ἀντὸς ἐν ψυχῇ ὧν, οἷός ἐστιν ὃ
Ν 9 aA ε 9 » 3 6 EVO 0° 3 ΥᾺλ IAN. 3
πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὁ οὐκ ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενος, οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν
ε Ν i) Ν λ ΄, 3 Ν 3 er ἊΝ Ν A 4 λ /
αὑτῳ, Διὸ οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ ποιητὴς τοῦ πρώτου ho-
, > ¢ an» aA δὲ Ὄ eon aA
you, κάλλους ἐν ὑλῃ ψυχικῇ OVTOS " VOUS OE οὗτος ὁ ἀεὶ νοῦς,
καὶ οὐ ποτὲ νοῦς, ὅτι μὴ ἐπακτὸς αὑτῷ °

Τίνα ἂν οὖν εἰκόνα τις αὐτοῦ λάβοι; πᾶσα γὰρ ἔσται ἐκ

rd 3 Ν Ν A Ν 3 4 3 lal ’ὔ ν
χείρονος, ᾿Αλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐκ νοῦ γενέσθαι, ὥστε
μὴ δι’ εἰκόνος, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον χρυσοῦ παντὸς χρυσόν τινα δεῖγμα
λαβεῖν, Καὶ εἰ μὴ καθαρὸς εἴη ὁ ληφθεὶς, καθαίρειν αὐτὸν
ἣ ἔργῳ ἣ λόγῳ, δεικνύντας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν τοῦτό ἐστι χρυσὸς͵
9 Ν Ἂν Ν 3 Pas ἐὰν “~ ’ὔ ν i, 3 ἴω 9 Ν
ἀλλὰ τουτὶ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ὀγκῷ μόνον - οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπὸ

5 τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν κεκαθαρμένου, εἰ δὲ βούλει ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶ
νοῦ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν κεκαθαρμένου, ν,
w ἴω La)
οἷός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς νοῦς,

Plotinos’s Ihe Four Degrees of Beauty Ennead V. 8.3

& The Four Degrees of Beauty. &

1, The Four THE Beauty which appears in the material

of Beauty. Body is an image of its archetype, the aspect
of Beauty in Nature. This, again, proceeds from the
more beautiful World-Soul, whose greater original beauty
may, however, be seen shining most clearly when it dwells
in some noble Auman soul, adorning it with the light of
a beauty that is progressive. & ‘This indwelling causes
the human soul to meditate about the nature of the
Supreme Beauty, which is incommunicable, abiding in it-
self, higher than the Logos-thought, being its creator; just
as psychic matter does not constitute the Beauty which
no more than resides in it. ὧδ But the Supreme Intelli-
gence, not having originated outside of Itself, can be un-
changing. ὧν ων ων ὃ ων wt

2. Mlustration or HOW material beauty can arise by being an

Refining Gold. jmage of the Intelligible may be explained
by a simple illustration. » Gold is recognized by our gen-
eral knowledge of metals which teaches us to discover gold
in crude ores, and to deal with these either by the prac-
tical process of refining, or by classification. & Likewise
we may examine the intelligence in us; which, on refin-
ing, turns out to be the World-Soul’s. * Nay, let us examine
even the superior Intelligence which informs the Divinities,

Plotini Enneades V.8.3—2.

> Ψ Ν \ ta XN x \ Ἁ Ν ’ 9
έμνοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες θεοὶ καὶ καλοὶ, καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὖ-
A 3 , 9 Ν 2-53 > ἃ aA Das x A
τῶν ἀμήχανον, ᾿Αλλὰ τί ἐστι du’ ὃ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, 7 νοῦς;

, ¢ A A 9 A 9 9 A ν δὶ ΠΝ 9
καὶ ὁοτι μᾶλλον νοῦς ἐνεργῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς WOTE ὁρᾶσθαι, Οὐ
Ν δὴ ψ theta ra Ν Zz \ Ἂ Ὄ 3 δῶ
yap δὴ οτι αὐτῶν καλὰ τὰ σώματα ' καὶ γὰρ, οἷς ἐστι σώ
ματα, οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι θεοῖς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν
A Ν χὰ θ 7 Ν δὴ ε θ / 9 \ δὴ Ν Ν
νοῦν καὶ οὗτοι θεοΐ + καλοὶ δὴ οἱ θεοΐ ov γὰρ δὴ ποτὲ μὲν
A Ν δὲ 3 ’ 9 3. 235 N A 9 9
φρονοῦσι, ποτέ δὲ ἀφραίνουσιν, ἀλλ΄ ἀεὶ φρονοῦσιν ἐν ἀπα-
“- ΩΝ ἴων ἴω A
θεῖ τῷ νῷ καὶ στασίμῷ καὶ καθαρῷ, Kal ἴσασι πάντα, καὶ
? 3 A 2 A , IAA Are “ Ν θ A
γιγνώσκουσιν ov τὰ ἀνθρώπεια, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑαντῶν, τὰ θεῖα,
Ne ES A Cues aA Ν A ε \ 3 > AO ἂν
kal ὅσα vous ὁρᾷ, Τῶν δὲ θεῶν οἵ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ ὄντες
Ὁ Ν 9 ΨΩ A + 7? & \ £9. € \ 3
(σχολὴ yap αὐτοῖς) θεῶνται ἀεί - οἷον δὲ πόῤῥωθεν τὰ ἐν
ἐκείνῳ αὐτῷ οὐρανῷ, ὑπεροχῇ τῆς ἑαυτῶν κεφαλῆς °

ε ἊΝ Φ 4 » ν » ἐν, 9 A A 5
Ou ἘΠΕ εκέινῳ οντές, οσοις ἡ OLKNOLS ΕἾΤ αὐτου Και EV
3 “A 3 Ν 9 A A A 3 A , Ν. 9 A
αυτῳ, εν TAVTL OLKOUVVYTES τῳ ἐκεῖ ουρβᾶνῳς Ilavra Yop EKEL
3 Ν Xe ~ 3 Ἂς Ἁ Ve mA A Ἁ
ουβανος͵, και ω) Vv ουρᾶνος, και θάλασσα, και ζῶα, και φυ-
\ \ ¥ θ A 9. , 9 ’ὔὕ A 3 A e de
TO, και αν βώποι, ταν ουρανιον εκεινου Του ουβανους Ou ε
θ Q δ᾽ τῷ 8. ΟΝ 3 9 A 9 θ , δ᾽ TAX A
€OU Ol EV avT@ ουκ ἀπαξιοῦντες αν βώπους ου α ΟΤι Τῶν
9 A Y A 9 A an \ Y Ν 9 A , Ἁ
ἐκεῖ, ὅτι τῶν ἐκεῖ, πᾶσαν μὲν διεξίασι τὴν ἐκεῖ χώραν καὶ
Ν ’ ᾿ VA
TOy TOTOV QAVATAVOMEVOL,

ah

Plotines’s Ihe Four Degree of Beauty. Ennead V.8.3

8. Beauty of the THE, GODS are reverend with the radiance

Divinities. of indescribable Beauty, which is manifest-
ation of supreme Intelligence. »* Not because of their world-
bodies are they beautiful, but because of their Intelligence.
Wherefore the Divinities that dwell in the intellectual
heaven are not irresponsibly to-day wise, and to-morrow
unwise. & Their wisdom consists of their refined impas-
sive and permanent all-comprehending Intelligence, which
is absorbed, not in changeful human affairs, but in divine
and intelligible issues. ὧδ Leisure is theirs, and perpet-
ually do they contemplate, » noticing the lower mundane
heaven from far merely as by a nod of the head. ὧν

4, Beauty of the HOWEVER the Divinities who dwell above

Divinities. and within this mundane heaven inter-pene-
trate this. ὧὐ For there appear all mundane odjects as ce-
lestial Platonic ideas: earth, sea, animals, plants, and men
are there in their celestial aspect. οὐ Its indwelling Div-
inities do not scorn men and their interests merely be-
cause they are mundane, but pervade that entire region
beyond with- a-refreshing-and-recuperating-infiuence. &

Plotini Enneades V. 8. 12,

Υ. 8. 12,

3 Ν ¥ a ε ν ὃ , A A ‘
Αλλὰ εἴρηται, πῶς ὡς ETEPOS δύναται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ
A ε + See rr a) io , ᾿ ἰδὲ δὴ Ψ ε ν ¥
πῶς ὡς αὐτός, πλὴν τοῦ ἰδών * ἰδὼν δὴ, εἴτε ὡς ἕτερος, εἴτε
ε , yo. 1 ae , x Ν ε ᾿ , ’,
ὡς μείνας αὐτὸς, τί ἀπαγγέλλει; ἢ θεὸν ἑωρακέναι τόκον
Ν / 3 ε “~ \
ὠδίνοντα καλὸν, καὶ πάντα δὴ ἐν αὑτῷ γεγεννηκότα, Kal
*). ¥ δ δ 2 Cy κα τς θ ὶ Ν ΓΟ ΠΡ
ἄλυπον ἔχοντα τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐν αὑτῷ - ἡσθεὶς γὰρ οἷς ἐγέννα,
‘ A / > ‘al A
καὶ ἀγασθεὶς TOV τόκων, κατέσχε πάντα παρ᾽ αὑτῷ, τὴν
ε la) Ἂ \ 3 A > oh > ,ὔ ε \ A »
αὑτοῦ Kal THY αὐτῶν ἀγλαΐαν ἀσμενίσας - ὁ δὲ, καλῶν ὃν-
Ν ἴω > ΕΥ̓
των, καὶ καλλιόνων τῶν εἰς τὸ εἴσω μεμενηκότων, μόνος ἐκ
lal » \ A 4 > » 5 > Ν
τῶν ἄλλων Ζεὺς παῖς ἐξεφάνη εἰς τὸ ἔξω, ᾿Αφ᾽ οὗ καὶ ὑσ-
, ἮΝ μὴ » 3 A @ 5 3 ’ \ > “A
τάτου παιδὸς ὄντος ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οἷον ἐξ εἰκόνος τινὸς αὐτοῦ,
A ἊΝ ’’ ἰφὶ Ν
ὅσος ὁ πατὴρ ἐκεῖνος, καὶ οἱ μείναντες παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ἀδελ-
φοί,
ε ry ΄ὕ A A 5
O δὲ ov φησι μάτην ἐλθεῖν Tapa τοῦ πατρός - εἶναι γὰρ
δὴ 3 a TAX 4 / wy; ε IE ας A
n αὐτοῦ addov κόσμον γεγονότα καλὸν, ὡς εἰκόνα καλοῦ °
δὲ \ 4 θ Ἂν > / λὴ Ν 3 / A
μηδὲ yap εἶναι θεμιτὸν, εἰκόνα καλὴν μὴ εἶναι μήτε καλοῦ
A Ν > VA ~ νον Ν
μήτε οὐσίας + μιμεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πανταχῇ. Καὶ γὰρ
\ Vs \ δ, ~ > / ε ’ὔ Ν Ἂν ,
Conv ἔχει, Kal TO τῆς οὐσίας, ὡς μίμημα, Kal TO κάλλος
ΑΝ 3 3 10 » δὲ \ > neat Se 3 A ε 3 4 aK 4
εἶναι, ws ἐκεῖθεν: ἔχει δὲ καὶ TO ἀεὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς εἰκών - 7) ποτὲ
\ 4 > / \ δὲ » 3 4 ld A > /
μὲν ἕξει εἰκόνα, ποτὲ δὲ ov, ov τέχνῃ γενομένης τῆς εἰκόνος,
~ \ 4 > 4 3 ν “ἡ fom , id
Πᾶσα δὲ φύσει εἰκών ἐστιν, ὅσον ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον μένῃ.

Διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ot φθείρουσι τοῦ νοητοῦ μένοντος, καὶ

ied sear) ρ Ἵ sg Sy

γεννῶσιν οὕτως, ὡς ποτὲ βουλευσαμένου τοῦ ποιοῦντος ποι-

A ν

εἶν, Ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος ποιήσεως τοιαύτης, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι
’ sQ> ¥ ν ν 3 ‘al 3 ’ 3 4

συνιέναι, οὐδ᾽ ἴσασιν, ὅτι, ὅσον ἐκεῖνο ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε

ὌΝ Ν a

τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ οὗ ἐστι, Kal ταῦτά ἐστιν - ἢν
Ἂν Ἁ Ν

δ᾽ ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται" χρηστέον γὰρ τούτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῇ τοῦ

σημαΐίνειν ἐθέλειν ἀνάγκῃ.

Plotinos’s Divine Emanation. Ennead V.8.12

& Divine Emanation. 29

1. Fertitity op WHOEVER in a trance-condition enters into

the Divine. fis own intelligence thereby enters into the Div-
ine and, whether as somebody else or as himself beholds a
vision of the Divine Saturnian Intelligence which is painless-
ly pregnant with divinely fair offspring. Bearing these
around within Himself, the Divine is delighted with that
to which He has given birth, admiring His offspring and
rejoicing in His own and in their splendor. » While those
offspring that remain unmanifested are both beautiful and
ever becoming more beautiful, the last child Zeus the World.
soul alone was manifested out into the external, forming
an image by which might be judged the nature and great-
ness of his Saturnian Father and yet unmanifested brethren.

2. Ghe World-soul NOT in vain, therefore, did Zeus the World-

by Emanation. soy/ proceed from the Father: ὧδ now one
world more exists, and has become more beautiful as image
of the Beautiful—for how could an image of existent Beauty
help being beautiful? ὧν And indeed there is no doubt
that Zeus the World-Soul imitates the Archetype in all —
his very life and being are imitations, his beauty is a de-
rivation; nay, his very eternity is an image — or will you
pretend that the Divine Image is present in him period-
ically only? The enduringness of the Archetype im-
plies that of the image naturally, not artificially, ον

by commana HENCE they who teach that while the in-

isan Absurdity visible World is permanent, the Visible one
is transitory, and that it originated from the command of
the Will of some Creator, are mistaken. ὧν They are un-
willing to understand the real meaning of Creation; they
do not realize that as long as the Divinity shines its in-
herent manifestation of illumination cannot cease, but was
and will be eternal. ὧδ We much regret that clearness
dictated these controversial terms, om oe

Plotini Enneades Ν, δ, 13.

V. 8. 13,

ε > θ 4 aes δ , ε , ὃ 5 , ν
O οὖν θεὸς ὁ εἰς τὸ μένειν ὠὡσαύτως δεδεμένος, καὶ συγ-
A A a) ν eS
χωρήσας TH παιδὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἄρχειν, (οὐ yap ἣν αὐτῷ
πρὸς τρόπου, τὴν ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν ἀφέντι, νεωτέραν αὑτοῦ καὶ
ὑστέραν μεθέπειν, κόρον ἔχοντι τῶν καλῶν.) ταῦτ᾽ ἀφεὶς
ἐστησέτε τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα εἰς ἑαυτὸν, καὶ μέχρις αὐτοῦ
»
πρὸς TO ἄνω.
» 3 > \ X 3 , 9 \ A Ν 9 4
Εστησε δ᾽ αὖ καὶ τὰ εἰς θάτερα ἀπὸ τοῦ παιδὸς ἀρξάμε-
> yY A ἴω
va εἶναι μετ᾽ αὐτὸν, ὥστε μεταξὺ ἀμφοῖν γενέσθαι τῇ τε
A ΕΝ A A.
ἑτερότητι τῆς πρὸς TO ἄνω ἀποτομῆς Kal τῷ ἀνέχοντι ἀπὸ
τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν, πρὸς τὸ κάτω δεσμῷ, μεταξὺ ὧν πατρός τε
ἀμείνονος καὶ ἥττονος υἱέος.
oO 6 3 on ε \ Sea e i x Ν ΧΑ Ἅ
ἐπειδὴ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ μείζων, ἣ κατὰ κάλλος ἦν,
ig A ww A
πρώτως αὐτὸς ἔμεινε καλὸς, καίτοι καλῆς Kal τῆς ψυχῆς
οὔσης *
Ν A ἃ
᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔστι καλλίων καὶ ταύτης, ὅτι ἴχνος αὐτὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ
4 3 Ν Ν \ \ 4 / \ ν > A ,,
τούτῳ ἐστὶ καλὴ μὲν τὴν φύσιν, καλλίων δὲ, ὅταν ἐκεῖ βλέπῃ.
ἜΑ ΜΚ ΎΤῚ Ἀν ΤῈ A N Y ΄ ,
Εἰ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς, Wa γνωριμώτερον λέγωμεν,
Noe Ἀπ} Ψ 3 Ν ‘\ ΄, 3 A > \ μὴ 3
καὶ ἡ ᾿Αφροδίτη αὐτὴ καλὴ, τίς ἐκεῖνος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ παρ
Caf / x 3, 3. ΡΝ 3 δὲ ta Ν ’,
αὕτης, πόσον ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖνο; εἰ O€ Tap ἄλλου, παρὰ τίνος
δὴ A
ψυχὴ Kal TO ἐπακτὸν καὶ TO συμφυὲς TH οὐσίᾳ αὑτῆς κάλλος
ἔχει;
> \ ἃ ν Ν ϑ SJ Ἁ ~ e a 3 3 A
Ἐπεὶ καὶ, ὁταν καὶ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ, τῷ αὑτῶν εἶναι, αἰσχροὶ
δὲ > er LAX B , pu Ὰ Ν VA Ν
ἑ, ἐπ᾿ ἀλλην μεταβαίνοντες φύσιν - καὶ γιγνώσκοντες μὲν
ε Ἂς Ν > Ν δὲ 3 A 3 A > 9 10
ἑαυτοὺς, καλοὶ, αἰσχροὶ δὲ, ἀγνοοῦντες, “Exet οὖν κἀκεῖθεν
τὸ καλόν,
53 > 4 9 ἊΝ ὁ , 9 3 κι , 9 -
Ap οὖν ἀρκεῖ τὰ εἰρημένα εἰς ἐναργῆ σύνεσιν ἀγαγεῖν
lal A , “SN > » x 500 4 > A 3 θ »Ἢἢ
τοῦ νοητοῦ τόπου; ἢ κατ᾽ ἄλλην ὁδὸν πάλιν αὖ δεῖ ἐπελθεῖν
ὧδε;

Plotinos’s Self-Knowledge of Beauty Ennead V.8.13.

& Self-Knowledge av Secret of Beauty. &

τ: Saturn Figured CA TURNIAN Intellectual Divinity is re-
Self-Sufficiencye presented by a bound Figure to indicate
that He is so gorged with Beauty as to isolate Himself
from His own creations, younger and later than Himself.

ἐς Order, spe First THUS He asserts a defined position be-
Self-Knowledge. tween the better Father Heaven, whom he
mythologically eastrates by delimitating himself from above,
and below from a lesser Son Zeus the World-soul as a bond
that might degrade and demean Him. ον ὧν ὧν

8. Intellect as. ἽΕΙ, inasmuch as His Father Heaven was
First Beautiful, opeater than could be called Beautiful, 80
He himself has survived as the First Beautiful, although
his child the World-Soul fo us men appears as Chief Beauty,

4, Beauty is BUT Intellect is more beautiful than the
OOS: Soul because the latter is no more than a
cast or impress moulded by Himself. Only because of this
is the World-Soul by nature beautiful; indeed, its beauty
increases whenever it gazes up at the Intellectual God. οὗ

5.No other SOureeWE have called the World-Soul Zeus; » but

ἘΕΧΊΝΙΝ, we might call it by its more common name
of Aphrodite, from its beauty. ὧν If then she is beautiful in
herself, how much more beautiful must her model Intellect
be? »& And from whom, if not from Him, could she ever
have derived that her innate and ingrown charm? ων

8. Beautyis © true is this that men also are beautiful
Self-Knowledge. only inasmuch as they abide within their
divine sphere, and become ugly whenever they grow un-
faithful to It. ὧν Hence our Beauty lies in knowing our-
selves; our ugliness in self-ignorance. » This, therefore,
is the secret of Beauty—Self-knowledge. ον ων ων

Plotini Enneades VI. 9, 9

VI. 9. 9,

Ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ χορείᾳ καθορᾷ nv μὲν ζωῆ ὴ
ν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ χορείᾳ καθορᾷ πηγὴν μὲν ζωῆς, πηγὴν
δὲ νοῦ, ἀρχὴν ὄντος, ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν, ῥίζαν ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐκ-
χεομένων ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, εἶτ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐλαττούντων, Οὐ γὰρ ὄγκος,
x θ NK > AS , A ὃ 959 iLO 9 Cae
ἢ φθαρτὰ av ἣν τὰ yevvapeva: νῦν δέ ἐστιν ἀΐδια, ὅτι ἡ ἀρ-
χὴ αὐτῶν ὡσαύτως μένει, οὐ μεμερισμένη εἰς αὐτὰ, ἀλλ᾽
4 Ψ \ 3 A , ε Ν » ε 4 ἃ
ὅλη μένουσα, Διὸ κἀκεῖνα μένει, οἱονεὶ μένοντος ἡλίου καὶ
Ν A te τ 5 Ἂ 3 rd θ Oe > > οἷ 3
- τὸ φῶς μένει : οὐ γὰρ ἀποτετμήμεθα, οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἐσμὲν, εἰ
καὶ παρεμπεσοῦσα ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡμᾶς εἷἵλ-
“3 AN , Ἂν ’ 3 / = 9
- κυσεν, ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἕν πνέομεν καὶ σωζόμεθα, οὐ δόντος, εἶτα ἀπο-
> Ν A [2 com a
στάντος ἐκείνου, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ χορηγοῦντος, ἕως ἂν ἢ, ὅπερ
ἐστί.

A , 3 \ 4 Ν 5A Ἁ Ν 3 3
Μᾶλλον μέντοι ἐσμὲν νεύσαντες πρὸς αὐτὸ, καὶ τὸ εὖ ἐν-
κ“. i) \ Ρ iy ἴω
ταῦθα, τὸ πόῤῥω εἶναι μόνον, καὶ ἧττον εἶναι - ἐνταῦθα καὶ
Ἁ lal », > A A
ἀναπαύεται ψυχὴ, Kal κακῶν ἔξω, εἰς τὸν τῶν κακῶν καθα-
; a Ν A A Ν
ρὸν τόπον ἀναδραμοῦσα, καὶ νοεῖ ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ἀπαθῆς ἐν-
ῦθα, καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν ἐνταῦθα

Plotinos’s Divine Discontent Ennead VI.9.9

& Divine Discontent. &

εἶ ϑοὰ she, HE SOUL, in this choric dance around the

of Life. divine origin of life, contemplates the well of
life, the spring of intelligence, the origin of Being, the
cause of goodness, the root of the soul,—all of which pro-
ceed out of the Divinity without diminishing It. * It is no
quantative-mass which would diminish by radiation; ὧν It is
eternal inasmuch as It abides whole, nor is dispersed among
the above objects which It originates. x Wherefore also these
continue-to-subsist, just as the light’s persistence rests on
that of the sun. οὗ For we are neither cut off, nor aban-
doned outside of It, even though corporeal nature, inter-
cepting us, might have succeeded in attracting us. & For
we breathe, live, move, and have our being in God, and are
saved, not as if salvation were something which would re-
main after its Giver had withdrawn, οὐ but a management
and support effected by, and limited to the indwelling of
the divine presence. ων he ων ων ων

ἐς πεν SUCH is the case because the intensity of our
Resides Beyond. existence varies directly in the degree that
we verge towards or fail from God; near Him lies our well-
being, while far from him souls grow lonely and fall into
a decline. & But there near God the soul recuperates,
distancing all evils by surging up unto the Place Untainted.
οἱ There can she freely think, there is she impassive, for
there reigns the life that is true. ων ὧν ων

Plotitti Enneades VI. 9, 9-—2.

Ἂν Ν ἴω > ϑ ΝΟ»
Τὸ γὰρ νῦν καὶ τὸ ἄνευ θεοῦ ἴχνος ζωῆς ἐκείνην μιμου-
ένου - τὸ δὲ € ton 37 Ν ον ψυν δὲ %
μ τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ Cnv ἐνέργεια μὲν νοῦ + ἐνέργεια δὲ καὶ
evva θεοὺς, ἐν ἡσύχῳ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐπαφῇ L δὲ κάλ
γεννς ς, ἐν ἡσύχῳ TH πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐπαφῇ, γεννᾷ δὲ κάλ-
ἴων , la) 9 ἀ nw
os, γεννᾷ δικαιοσύνην, γεννᾷ ἀρετήν, Ταῦτα yap κύει ψυ-
“ A ‘\ la “A
χὴ, πληρωθεῖσα θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἀρχὴ Kal τέλος - αρχὴ
ry Y 9 70 a δὲ ν δὲν Ἂς 3 A νὴ 3 A
μὲν, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν, τέλος Oe, OTL TO ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ - καὶ ἐκεῖ γε-
Ἄν 5 A
νομένη γίγνεται αὐτὴ καὶ ὅπερ HY, Τὸ yap ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐν
τούτοις ἔκπτωσις καὶ φυγὴ καὶ πτεροῤῥύησις.

Δηλοῖ δὲ, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ
, 7 A Ν / » A A Ἁ 3
σύμφυτος, καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ συνέζευκται ἔρως ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐν
la Nip oS 4 3 \ x 4 Aor? "Ἢ > 3 ’
γραφαῖς καὶ ἐν μύθοις, ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἕτερον θεοῦ ἐκείνη, ἐξ ἐκεί-
A A UA ‘\ Ss 9 A Ἂ ’,
νου δὲ, ἐρᾷ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ οὖσα ἐκεῖ τὸν οὐράνιον
» » 3 A \ / ὃ ’ \ ’ 3
ἔρωτα exer: ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάνδημος γίγνεται, Καὶ γάρ ἐστιν
3 A 6:9 », 9 7 3 ἴω Ἀ ’ 4 5
ἐκεῖ ᾿Αφροδίτη οὐρανία - ἐνταῦθα δὲ γίγνεται πάνδημος
® ε θ A Ny aA ν 9 δί Ν
οἷον ἑταιρισθεῖσα + καὶ ἔστι πᾶσα ψυχὴ Αφροδίτη, καὶ
ἴω 3. “ἢ ἃ Ν ~ > ’ id be 8
τοῦτο αἰνίττεται Kal τὰ τῆς ᾿Αφροδίτης γενέθλια, καὶ ὁ Ἔρως
ὁ μετ᾽ αὐτῆς γενόμενος,

"Epa οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ, ἑνωθῆναι θέλου-
ν , A x \ » "4 Ἂς 3

σα ὥσπερ παρθένος καλοῦ πρὸς καλὸν ἔρωτα, Ὅταν δὲ εἰς
γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῇ, ἄλλον ἀλλαξα-

, Ν » 3 ’ ᾿ς ε , , A
μένη θνητὸν ἔρωτα, ἐρημίᾳ πατρὸς vBpilerar: μισήσασα δὲ
πάλιν τὰς ἐντεῦθεν ὕβρεις, ἁγνεύσασα τῶν τῇδε, πρὸς τὸν
πατέρα αὖθις στελλομένη εὐπαθεῖ,

Plotitos’$ Divine Discontent, 2 Ennead VI. 9.9

8. This Lireis FOR THIS our god-forsaken existence is no

Not True Lifes more than a mimicry of veritable life; while
that life beyond is pure energy of the Intellect, which, by
communing with the Divinity in a tranquil mystic touch,
gives birth to such divinities as Beauty, Righteousness and
Virtue. These Three are brought forth by the Soul,
pregnant from being overshadowed by the Divinity.

Life beyond is, by the Soul, accounted her existence’s ori-
gin and end, inasmuch as she proceeds thence, and that
her ideal of good abides there,—and because, when she her-
self shall have reached there she will have evaded what
she was. For this our terrene life is no better than a
degradation, a flight, a clipping of the wings. es ἐξ

‘SeEsos ana LHIS indicates both that the Soul’s Good

of Aphrodite. lies beyond, and that the Eros-longing was
twin-born with her,—and this union appears prominently
in legend and literature. » The Soul loves God necessarily
both because she is separated from Him from Whom she
proceeded, and because her Celestial Eros-/onging dwells
there with God; she herself, here on earth, has become
vulgar Eros. ὧν ὡν ων ων ων ων

For above dwells Celestial Aphrodite, while here below
the earthly Aphrodite-soul becomes vulgarized as a courtesan.
This is indeed hinted at by Aphrodite’s birth-day, and her
twin Eros. ων ὧν ων ὧν ὧν ὧὖ

b. whe Roulae - 2011S, then, is the Sabsiance of these Π1}115᾿
Prodigal Daughter. Her very nature compels the Soul to love
God, desiring to experience at-one-ment with Him, as
much as a virgin cherishes a worthy love towards her
worthy father. ὧν But whenever she has entered into gen-
eration, she is blinded by what might be termed the mar-
riage pleasures, namely, the transformation of the divine
into a human Eros-/ove;—and in this separation from her
Father she wantons. But in time, growing to hate
worldly lasciviousness, and purifying herself from them,
she returns to her Father, fired-by-her-sacred-passion. .%

Plotini Enneades VI. 9, 9--3,

¥ , 9 A
Kat οἷς μὲν ἄγνωστόν ἐστι τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο, ἐντεῦθεν
9 , . 48 a 3 A eee. ar 3 ὶ A @
ἐνθυμείσθω ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐρώτων, οἷόν ἐστι τυχεῖν, ὧν
lal \ » Ἀ A
τις μάλιστα ἐρᾷ, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐρώμενα θνητὰ καὶ
Ν [2 * x
βλαβερὰ, καὶ εἰδώλων ἔρωτες, καὶ μεταπίπτει, ὅτι οὐκ ἦντὸ
» 9 , ὑδὲ ς 9 θὲ ε A δ᾽ ἃ A
ὄντως ἐρώμενον, οὐδὲ TO ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν, οὐδ᾽ ὃ ζητοῦμεν,
9 A Ν Ν 9 νΝ 3 , a 9 Ν A
Ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐρώμενον, ᾧ ἐστι καὶ συνεῖναι, μετα-
A \ 9 ; ,
λαβόντα αὐτοῦ καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντα, οὐ περιπτυσσόμενον σαρ-

ξὶν ἔξωθεν,

Ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ζωὴν ἄλλην ἴσ-
χει τότε, καὶ προϊοῦσα καὶ ἤδη προσελθοῦσα καὶ μετα-
σχοῦσα αὐτοῦ, ὦστε γνῶναι διατεθεῖσαν, ὅτι πάρεστιν ὁ

x 3 θ A A \ ὃ A Hy Ν » 9 κ᾿. δὲ
χορηγὸς ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς, καὶ δεῖ οὐδενὸς ἔτι - τοὐναντίον δὲ
> , Xx »» A \ 3 4, A 4 ἃ A
ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ στῆναι τούτῳ, Kal τοῦ-
το γενέσθαι μόνον, περικόψαντα τὰ λοιπὰ, ὅσα περικείμενα,
ν 3 a , 3 A X79 A 3X ,
ὥστε ἐξελθεῖν σπεύδειν ἐντεῦθεν, καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐπὶ θάτερα
δεδεμένους, ἵνα τῷ ὅλῳ αὐτῶν περιπτυξώμεθα,͵ καὶ μηδὲν μέ.

μένους, Ὁ ὁλῳ αὐτῶν περιπτυξώμεθα, καὶ μηδὲν μ
» ide Nas 4 A ε an ὃ A, .5 3 a
pos ἔχοιμεν, © μὴ ἐφαπτόμεθα θεοῦ, Ὁρᾷν δή ἐστιν ἐνταῦ-
A \ ἴω oe
θα κἀκεῖνον καὶ ἑαυτὸν, ὡς ὁρᾷν θέμις, ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἠγλαϊσμέ.
Ἂν Pa A A \ A > a. Ν
νον, φωτὸς πλήρη νοητοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ φῶς αὐτὸ καθαρὸν,
ἀβαρῆ, κοῦφον, θεὸν γενόμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντα, ἀναφθέν-
>
Ta μὲν τότε - εἰ δὲ πάλιν βαρύνοιτο, ὥσπερ μαραινόμενον,

Plotinos’s | Divine Discontent, 3 Ennead VI.9.9

6. Love, Earthly SUCH persons as have never been affected

and Celestial, by this sacred-passion may arrive at a con-
ception of it from an observation of the expression of
earthly Eros-loves whenever they attain their burning de-
sires. & Then reflect how much greater will be divine satisfac-
tion compared with the very real joys which proceed from loved
objects that are mortal, injurious, and at best, images; also
frail and unreliable, because they are not the veritably
Lovable, nor the genuinely Good which we seek; for beyond
only exists that which is veritably Lovable, οὐ with which
the person who has attained to It, and really possesses It,
can remain in touch; for It could not possess this perman-
ence were It enmeshed in flesh that is bound to decay. οὗ

7.Divine WHOEVER has once seen the Divine under-
τ Discontent. stands what I mean; how, beyond, the soul
flourishes into another life; and, on going right up to God—
nay, on having already gone up to God, thus has achieved
a share in God, and thus knows for itself the presence of
the Choir-leader of veritable life. ὧν ων ὡν

It is evident that in this condition the Soul eannot be in
any lack as it settles into this Uniqueness,—nay, becomes
this Uniqueness. ὧν Yet, fo effect this, must she strip off all
else, as it were husks, hastening to get out of this world.
Wherefore, we should be indignant about the bonds that
fetter us; we should embrace the Divinity with our whole
possibilities: leaving in ourselves not even a trifle which
would not be of service in laying hold on God. 2 Then,
only, will it be eternally fit for us to behold both Him
and our real selves which will be incandescent, and corus-
eating with light intelligible--nay, even beyond that, buoy-
ant, soaring in sheer light-divinity, having become, — nay,
being God, a-fiame-and-flaring with Divinity’s glowing-fire
into a radiance which—alas/—would flicker and die should
we again grow heavy with material motion or desire. ων

Plotini Enneades VI. 9. 1].

VI. 9. 11.

A A A ’, A ers
Τοῦτο δὴ ἤθελε δηλοῦν τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων τῶνδε ἐπίταγμα,
¥ 2 A
TO μὴ ἐκφέρειν ἐις μὴ μεμνημένους - ὡς οὐκ ἔκφορον ἐκεῖνο
x 3 A ὃ A Ν ” Ν θ a Y ἐν \ Saas io a
dv ἀπεῖπε δηλοῦν πρὸς ἄλλον τὸ θεῖον, OT@ μὴ καὶ AUT@ LOELY
ΩΣ > A 3 Ν e 3 Ν
εὐτύχηται, ᾿Επεὶ τοίνυν δύο οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕν ἣν αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδὼν
Ἂς χε δ , ε “Δ \ ε ,,} 3 3:16 la ἃ
πρὸς τὸ ἑωραμένον, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἑωραμένον, GAN ἡνωμένον, ὃς
A » “Δ 3 ε “A 3 4
ἐγένετο, OTE ἐμίγνυτο, EL μεμνῷτο, ἔχοι ἂν Tap ἐαντῳ EKEL-
νου εἰκόνα"

Ἦν δὲ ἕν καὶ αὐτὸς, διαφορὰν ἐν αὑτῷ οὐδεμίαν πρὸς ἑαυ-
τὸν ἔχων, οὔτε κατὰ ἄλλα ’ οὐ γάρ τι ἐκινεῖτο παρ᾽ αὐτῷ, οὐ
θυμὸς, οὐκ ἐπιθυμία ἄλλου παρῆν αὐτῷ ἀναβεβηκότι, ἀλλ᾽
οὐδέ τις λόγος, οὐδέ τις νόησις, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως αὐτὸς, εἶ δεῖ καὶ
τοῦτο λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἁρπασθεὶς ἣ ἐνθουσιάσας ἡσυχῇ
ἐν ἐρήμῳ καταστάσει γεγένηται ἀτρεμεῖ τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ,
οὐδαμοῦ ἀποκλίνων, οὐδὲ περὶ αὑτὸν στρεφόμενος, ἑστὼς
πάντῃ καὶ οἷον στάσις γενόμενος, οὐδὲ τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
καλὸν ἤδη ὑπερθέων, ὑπερβὰς ἤδη καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν

χορὸν,

Plotinos’s The Beatific Vision Ennead VI. 9. 1]

“5 The BEATIFIC VISION, &

ΚΡ ἀν λας THIS then must be the meaning of the
is an Experience. = Divinity’s mystery-injunction forbidding
one to divulge aught to the uninitiated:—namely, because
it is incommunicable to any whose sight and hearing was
not prepared for it. For this Vision did not consist of an
objective duality, but only of a subjective union of seer and
seen. Hence it was not something tangible, but a com-
munion; and only those persons that had, through such a
communion, once experienced at-one-ment, could, on
recalling the experience, form any conception of it. οὗ

2. Description of the IN that experience the seer became attuned

Beatific Vision. fo q unified harmony, being conscious of no
Opposition toward others or in himself:—no anger, no de-
sire, no conception, no thought,—nay, so to speak, even no
self. οὐ Rapt and inspired hangs he there, well-poised in
solitary calm, without a quiver in his own essence, set-
tling nowhere, not wheeling around, brooding motionless
until he himself becomes a pause. 2 Nay, not even about
Beauty cares he, having soared far beyond it — yea, even
beyond the choric graciousness of the Virtues. ὧδ ον

Plotini Enneades VI. 9. 1—2.

"4 3 Ἂς » ~ 9 ’ὔ 3 Ἂς 3 3 ,’

Ωσπερ τις εἰς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ ἀδύτου εἰσδὺς, εἰς τοὐπίσω κατα-
λιπὼν τὰ ἐν τῷ ναῷ ἀγάλματα, ἃ ἐξελθόντι τοῦ ἀδύτου πά-
λιν γίγνεται πρῶτα μετὰ τὸ ἔνδον θέαμα, καὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ συν-

/ Ν 39 » > 5... 2 3 3 Sess ἃ δὴ ΄

ουσίαν πρὸς οὐκ ἄγαλμα οὐὸ εἰκόνα, GAN αὐτὸ, ἃ δὴ γίγ-
νεται δεύτερα θεάματα, Τὸ δὲ ἴσως ἣν οὐ θέαμα, ἀλλὰ ἀλ-
hos τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν, ἔκστασις, καὶ ἄπλωσις, καὶ ἐπίδοσις
αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔφεσις πρὸς ἁφὴν καὶ στάσις καὶ περινόησις
πρὸς ἐφαρμογὴν, εἴπερ τις τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ θεάσεται,

Ei δ᾽ ἄλλως βλέποι, οὐδὲν πάρεστι, Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μιμή-
ματα καὶ τοῖς οὖν σοφοῖς τῶν προφητῶν αἰνίττεται, ὅπως
Ν 3 a Cee Ν δὲ ε Ν Ν Ἂν, Ἂ
θεὸς ἐκεῖνος ὁρᾶται, Σοφὸς δὲ ἱερεὺς τὸ αἴνιγμα συνιεὶς

3 Ν x las 9 “A ’ὔ “ LO , X 0 ’
ἀληθινὴν ἂν ποιοῖτο ἐκεῖ γενόμενος τοῦ ἀδύτου τὴν θέαν,
» A A
καὶ μὴ γενόμενος δὲ, TO ἄδυτον τοῦτο ἀόρατόν TL χρῆμα νο-
μίσας καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν, εἰδήσει ὡς ἀρχὴν, ἀρχὴν ὁρᾷ,
καὶ συγγίγνεται, καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν
A 9 , y δύ \ ¥ K Ν Ν A θέ Ν
τῶν θείων, ὅσα δύναται ψυχὴ ἔχειν. Καὶ πρὸ τῆς θέας τὸ
λοιπὸν ἐκ τῆς θέας ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῷ ὑπερβάντι πάν-
τα, τὸ ὅ ἐστι πρὸ πάντων,

Plotinos’s The Beatific Vision, 2 Ennead VI. 9. 1]

5. Beyond the Veit HE is like unto a man who has penetrated
9" the Sanctuary. into the innermost shrine, thus having left
behind him in the outer temple the statuesque images of
the Gods which greet him again only when he comes out
after interior vision and intercourse with the very Being
of the Divine—not merely forms or images which, after
all, are objects of vision in a secondary sense only. & As
to this interior experience however, it is not a vision, per-
haps, but another kind of seeing, an extasy, a simplifying
attunement, a self-surrender, a yearning for intimate touch,
a lull, a longing for at-one-ment-—and it is very doubtful
whether such an experience of beholding Being could be

had even in any sanctuary. ὧν ὧν ων ὧν
4 The Sanctuary THE Secret lies in the manner of seeing, for

Buta Condition. should a man look in some other manner,
he would remain unconscious of anything. This Sanctuary
is but a figurative analogy. The wisest prophet no
more than hints how God might be perceived. True, a
priest wise enough to understand the secret, might well
effect a veritable vision within an actual sanctuary; but ©
would it not be simpler and more likely, when he realizes
that a sanctuary no more than represents an invisible
origin and source of inspiration, a condition or principle, —
would it not, I say, be simpler for him to save himself the
trouble of penetrating the sanctuary by merely laying hold
of the condition by his likeness to the Divine; and this
direct method will not hinder him from attaining any divine
results within the natural limitations of his soul. » Hence
even before his vision he already claims its results—which
for him who would transcend all limitations consist of
That-which-is-before-and-beyond- All. ὧν ὧν ὧν

5. Disturbance of the BUTT why should the condition of lucidity be

Evil or Selfness. τη equilibrium? Because any disturbance thereof
results in either of two disastrous extremes: ὡν ων ὧν

Plotitti | Enneades VI. 9. 11---3,

3 \ ἊΝ 1) A , \ ἃ ν ε ~ 4 9 ἈΝ

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὸ πάντῃ μὴ ὃν ἥξει ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, ἀλλὰ
’ Ν A 3 ν \

κάτω μὲν Baca εἰς κακὸν ἥξει, Kal οὕτως εἰς μὴ ὃν, οὐκ εἰς

Ν, Ν. XP oe Ν > fg Ν A ν 9 3
τὸ παντελὲς μὴ ὄν, Τὴν ἐναντίαν δὲ δραμοῦσα ἥξει οὐκ εἰς

Ν >

ἄλλο, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἑαυτὴν, Kal οὕτως οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὖσα ἐν οὐδ-
i é ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὑτῇ, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν αὑτῇ po t οὐκ ἐν τῷ
ενί ἐστιν, ν αὕτῃ, ν αὑτῇ μόνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ

»" 3 SP
OVTL, ἐν εκέινῳς

td X Ν 9 / 3 3 ’ > > 3 ’ >
Γίγνεται yap καὶ αὐτός τις οὐκ οὐσία, GAA ἐπέκεινα Ov-
if Ὁ A > an
σίας, ταύτῃ ἧ προσομιλεῖ, Ei τις οὖν τοῦτο αὐτὸν γενόμενον
lo » ε ΄, 3 iA cae 3 Χ 3 3. 8 ἃς A cs
ἴδοι, ἔχει ὁμοίωμα ἐκείνου αὑτόν - Kal εἰ ad EavTOU μετα
ε 3 Ν ~ ’
βαίνει ὡς εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον, τελος ἂν ἔχοι τῆς πορείας,
3 , Ν, “~ 2 » Ψ ’ 3 Ν 4 3 ε “A \
Εκπίπτων δὲ τῆς θέας πάλιν ἐγείρας ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐν AUT@ καὶ
κατανοήσας ἑαυτὸν πάντῃ κεκοσμημένον, πάλιν κουφισθής-
5... 05 A SN A ION Ν Ν ,ὕ 3... .9 Sauk Ν
σεται du’ ἀρετῆς, ἐπὶ νοῦν ἰὼν καὶ διὰ σοφίας ἐπ᾽ αὐτό, Καὶ
g A νὴ
οὕτω θεῶν καὶ ἀνθφώπων θείων καὶ εὐδαιμόνων βίος ἀπαλ-
Ἀ A ¥ A A / 3 , A A \
hay?) τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τῇδε, βίος ἀνήδονος τῶν τῇδε, φυγὴ
Ss ld
μόνου πρὸς μόνον.

Plotinos’s The Beatific Vision, 3 Ennead ΝΊ. 9.1]

On the one hand, the nature of the soul is so material
that, if it descends, it will not simply evanesce, but will
proceed to destruction through real evil. ὧν ων

In the opposite direction, the soul would arrive, not to
another, but to its /ower self. So, while you might say
that the soul was in nonentity, because it was not in some
other-ness, yet it exists within itself; while, on the other
hand, it might be said to be in other-ness because it is
only in itself, and not in existence. ὡν ων ων

6 Formation of the WHAT is the fruit of this poised vision? ὦ
Liberation @ Flight. 4 formation—but of what? ὧν Not a forma-
tion of substance by the soul, for souls exceed substance
by as much as they hold communion with the Divinity.

However, aS soon aS a man notices that he has achieved
this communion, he will find that he has thereby formed in
himself an Image of that Divinity: and he has reached the
goal of his Journey whenever he finds himself proceeding
beyond from himself as if from an Image to an archetyp-
al Original. » Whereafter, falling from his vision, he will
in himself awaken Virtues, and behold himself on all sides
adorned. » Thus will he again swing himself upwards
through the Virtues to Intellect, and through Wisdom to
GOD. ὡν ὧν ὡν ὡν ὡν ὡν ὧν

Thus it happens that the life of the Gods and of divine
and happy men consists of a gradual Liberation from all
earthly bonds; a life without earthly hankerings; the
flight of the single attuned One to the single tuning One. »

NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION. |

THIS is not a mechanical representation of every word—
something within the power of any child turning the leaves
of a lexicon. It aims to express in reasonably idiomatic
English what Plotinos wished to convey; hence his words
are arranged in paragraphs, with plain topical headings.
It has, however, been possible to follow the text closely,
in spite of occasional necessary condensations, explana-
tions, classifications, and repetitions -- all amplifications
appearing in italics. No interpretation is intended to be
more than tentatively provisional until the reader make
his own from the text itself, the trouble and expense of
whose setting in new type could not have been justified
by any consideration short of making the casual reader
absolute master of the situation. Indeed, sore was the
temptation —for the reader’s benefit— to omit the Greek
so as to double the quantity of translation; but the inher-
ent difficulties of subject and expression demanded it, if
quality was to prevail.

However, should any desire, of this translation, more
than could be given here, his wish can be gratified while
at the same time endowing the whole English-speaking
world with the rays of this sweetest, fullest, and last light
of Greece by either of the following plans:

1. Pay the mere actual cost of issuing, at the rate of
two dollars per page, in groups of eight pages, the sub-
scriber to choose the passages, if he so desires.

2. Evenness of production can be secured only by issu-
ing the whole work at once. There are many men who
have by Providence been blessed sufficiently to pay, singly
or in a smail group, for the issuing of the whole thous-
and pages at once.

8. Become one of 40 subscribers who would pay regul-
arly twelve dollars a year, receiving a 32-page instalment
monthly until the work is complete—five years, perhaps.

If these financial sacrifices loom large, consider that the
translator would not personally profit thereby, and that
the ungrudging labors of perhaps the best quarter of his
life still bid fair to be wasted. Imagine his feelings!

Pera they
WAT Dey
ie Rien

dg

Β Guthrie, Kenneth Sylvan
693 The philosophy of Plotinos

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